# Informing the Army’s Future Structure



## dimsum

> _When *Lieutenant-General Wayne Eyre* assumed command of the Canadian Army in August 2019, numerous initiatives were underway to modernize the force. With release in January 2021 _of Advancing with Purpose: The Canadian Army Modernization Strategy_, those initiatives are now aligned and knitted together under “one umbrella” providing a five-year change agenda. In the Fall 2020 issue, LGen Eyre spoke about the strategy and one of it’s two key initiatives, an adapted Managed Readiness Plan to inform how forces are generated. Shortly before he was named Acting Chief of the Defence Staff in February, he spoke with editor Chris Thatcher about the second, Force 2025, a wide-ranging effort to analyze force structure._








						FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure | Canadian Army Today
					






					canadianarmytoday.com


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## MilEME09

Force 2050 if I recall correctly could result in major changes to the Canadian Army. Which COA they pick we won't know for awhile though as the decision won't be made till this fall at the earliest. If you have DWAN access, there is a lot of information on F2050


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## FJAG

I've been researching quite a bit into the "Advancing With Purpose" Army transformation process that started back in 1997 and reached its formula in the early '00s with the "Army of Today, Interim Army, and Army of Tomorrow" concept that was targeting 2020 as its end-state.

I guess with Gen Eyre's statement in the most recent iteration of AwP of: To succeed in this milieu, the Army we have is not the Army we need, we're admitting that we missed the mark.

I know, I know, things change--but I'm a cynic and the various Waypoints on the road to 2020 should have caused us to make corrections along the way. And if I'm not mistaken, Gen Leslie in 2008, after the problems we encountered in Panjwaii (especially Medusa), set a course direction with the intent to make a part of our force heavy with tanks and Close Combat vehicles and some of the other kit needed, but did that carry through?  ... Nooooo ... the Army cancelled all that in 2013 after Leslie had retired and put all of its eggs firmly back on the road to a light to middle weight organization with no air defence etc etc concentrating on delivering nothing bigger than a battle group through a system of managed unreadiness. 

I've seen a few pieces of the 2025 puzzle and think that the Army might actually be aiming in the right direction at last but although I am cautiously optimistic, I've been disappointed before.

$.02

 🍻


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## Ostrozac

It appears to me that we are, as an army, approaching a decision point. The time for bluffing our way into a war and assuming that with some strong junior leadership and cobbled together equipment everything will work out fine may be long past. But a fundamental restructure will be hard, very very hard. Even if we need it.

To borrow a quote from the late Antony Beevor in one of his studies of the British Army “All the chickens have come home to roost, but there’s no room for them to land because the fields are full of sacred cows.”


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## Kirkhill

dimsum said:


> FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure | Canadian Army Today
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> canadianarmytoday.com


What would the effects be of maintaining Eyre in position through 2026?


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## Kirkhill

> _*Recognizing that it’s early in the process, do you have particular areas of focus where you might start to look at structural changes?*_
> 
> *Do we have the size of our force elements right? Is the company, is the squadron, is the battery design that we have now, is it fit for purpose for some of the new capabilities we’re bringing in, and the new way of operating? *That’s why the operating concept, _Close Engagement_, has to go hand-in-hand with the structural concept. How do we do combat team attacks? How do we do company group attacks in an adaptive dispersed environment? That thinking needs to inform Force 2025 as well.
> 
> We need to take a look at the demand signal for some of our capabilities. CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation), for example, has a high demand both internationally and domestically. Do we have the force generation for that right? And it is going to be increasingly important that we invest in our Reserve mission tasks.



Like Income Tax the Four Company Battalion was a WWI innovation.  I believe that it was occasioned by the need to make best use of the few available trained officers and NCOs, putting a bunch of untrained subbies and privates under close-supervision.  It also resulted in the rise of the Major.

Prior to concentrating those troops for the slaughter the army was structured around 8-10 small companies commanded by Captains and aided by a Lieutenant and a trainee officer (Ensign or Cornet)   The Lt Col had a Major or two to assist him.  The army (at least the British Army and the Royal Marines) existed and operated in a dispersed environment - one that necessitated working with the locals and the local government.  The army's regiments suffered as much from its troops going native as it did from the occasional massacre that prompted a punitive expedition.

If Dispersed Operations are back in the cards does the Army need more Captains with independent commands and is OJT a viable means of training them and their replacements?

What can be done with 10x companies of 40-50?


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## a_majoor

> What can be done with 10x companies of 40-50?



It really depends on the sort of doctrine that is being used. Modern weapons bring what used to be Battalion and Company support weapons capabilties down to the Company and Platoon (think of things like the Javelin or Spike ATGM and Starstreak MANPAD). Many different types of weapons and capabilities are merging in ways which are difficult to characterize in any traditional manner (think of the Switchblade UAV - electrically powered, range of up to 10km, has a camera and datalink and a 40mm warhead, and is recoverable if no target is discovered - all in a package about the same size as a traditional 60mm mortar tube).

Perhaps far more telling is the information revolution coming to the field - allowing units to draw upon and share information all up and down the chain - so long as proper EW precautions are taken (or even if not - how many soldiers use the capabilities of their cell phones like cameras, GPS and Google in the field?).

Questions like mobility and dispersed logistics are still being examined and answers developed - do solders get resupplied by drones or GPS guided parachute drops of packages? Do you drive around in a LAV or a quad ATV or something in between - or do you walk?

Whatever future force structure is being developed will eventually need to be modular and flexible enough to operate at all levels of warfare, deal with enemy doctrines like "Hybrid Warfare", "Unrestricted Warfare" or "4GW" (likely by being able to "plug and play" with other, non military aspects of the National DIME infrastructure (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic) and cross functional across all the different Domains - (Land, Sea, Air, Space, Electromagnetic, Cyber, Cognitive).

But without an understanding of what Canada's Grand Strategy is, or the doctrine needed to carry this out, you can simply go down rabbit holes and never come up with any sort of satisfactory or even usable answer.


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## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> What can be done with 10x companies of 40-50?



You've pretty much described a parachute battalion....

In 1 PARA, if not on ops in NI or whatever and beefed up accordingly, we never exceed about 60 per rifle company which, of course, meant that we had to carry everything for a 100+ person company (and do the job) anyways. Having said that, we had various atts and dets from the Bde such as engineers, gunners, RAFLOs etc.

In the airborne role, we rarely put more than 500 pax or so out the Herc doors and under parachute on our various exercises. Our SPE (NEO) Ops were planned based on using those numbers in action in the event we were deployed somewhere nasty.

Well, nastier than Aldershot on a Saturday night, that is  

So, in a light role then, you can get alot done with that number I would say.


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## Kirkhill

a_majoor said:


> But without an understanding of what Canada's Grand Strategy is, or the doctrine needed to carry this out, you can simply go down rabbit holes and never come up with any sort of satisfactory or even usable answer.



Conversely we need to understand the range of capabilities currently available to the government with the assets available, and what the next iteration might look like while maintaining the budget envelope.  Then we get to compare needs and capabilities and formulate that grand strategy.

Some folks call it GAP analysis - the Gap between what we need and what we have.


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## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Like Income Tax the Four Company Battalion was a WWI innovation. I believe that it was occasioned by the need to make best use of the few available trained officers and NCOs, putting a bunch of untrained subbies and privates under close-supervision. It also resulted in the rise of the Major.
> 
> Prior to concentrating those troops for the slaughter the army was structured around 8-10 small companies commanded by Captains and aided by a Lieutenant and a trainee officer (Ensign or Cornet) The Lt Col had a Major or two to assist him.


I thought that change came as part of the Cardwell reforms.


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## Old Sweat

I think Kirkhill is pretty close. For example, 2 RCR operated on an eight company establishment with captains commanding the companies for South Africa, along with two majors - one the DCO - and a basic support organization including machine gun and signals sections. The battalion could fight as two half-battalions.

Jumping ahead to the Salsbury Plain in 1914-1915, our battalions played musical org charts, switching back and forth between eight and four companies, until finally going firm on the latter.


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## McG

Yep.  That would be correct:


> Until the eve of the First World War infantry battalions were divided into eight companies, each normally commanded by a captain, although sometimes by a major, and assisted by two subalterns. Every captain, if his company was at full strength, was responsible for the work of about 100 NCOs and men.


David French, _ Military Identities : The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People C. 1870-2000_, Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005.


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## Kirkhill

Thanks for the challenge - it forced me to go back and check my memory.

This from the RUSI Journal of 1914





			https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071841409420125
		



In the Canadian context, from my copy of Daniel Dancock's "Gallant Canadians", a regimental history of the 10th Bn CEF, page 12, I gleaned the following:

In early 1915, against an authorized strength of 34 officers and 929 ORs the 10th showed 1124 on it rolls, including 44 officers.  It was overstrength prior to going across to France and being blooded at St Julien's Woods in April.

"Several organizational changes took place while the Tenth Battalion was on Salisbury Plain. One of these involved the formation of a machine-gun section.  Each battalion in the Canadian contingent was issued four American-made Colt(s)....

"The Battalion was also organized into four companies, but it was a convoluted process.  The entire Canadian contingent had come to England in eight-company battalions.  On 1 November they "reverted" (sic) to four companies, but this was over-turned later in the month by the War Office, which decreed that all British battalions must have eight companies. Unable to make up its mind, the War Office reversed itself in December, and the battalions had no sooner switched to four companies that they were once again ordered to restore the eight-company organization. The final decision was made in January 1915 in favour of four companies, designated by the letters A, B, C, and D.  The Tenth was ordered to reorganize on this basis on 18 January and completed the change on the twenty-first"

It always gives me great pleasure to discover that some things never change.

For backdrop, prior to January 1915 the Old Contemptibles, the regulars, had engaged in the Retreat from Mons, the Battle of the Frontiers, the Race to the Sea and the First Battle of Ypres.   There wasn't much of the old army left.

Edit:  Another way of looking at it - November 1914 to January 1915 was the transition from the Cavalry led war of manoeuvre to the three year siege led, as usual, by engineers, artillery and the Forlorn Hope of the infantry.


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## Kirkhill

With McG's question I was encouraged to take another look at the organization of the British/Canadian Army.

In August 1914 the 8-company battalion was the rule.
By January 1915, the death of the regular army and the advent of siege warfare the Brits reformed around a very large battalion with 4 companies.

That is the structure with which the battles of Ypres, Loos and the Somme were fought in 1915 and 1916.  The battles that destroyed the Territorials (and reduced battalions of Canadians, like the 10th to 10 to 25% of their original strength)  It was also the period when the Mills bomb, the rifle grenade and the Lewis gun were introduced to the arsenal.

By February 1917 Kitchener's Army and the Canadians were reorganized to fight battles as independent platoons of 28 to 44 ORs organized into four sections each under an NCO (CQB - bayonets and bombers, Spt - Lewis Gun and rifle-grenades).  Under the command of an officer and 4 ORs (runners/communicators). Effectively the army had reverted to the tactical organization of 1914 - a large number of semi-autonomous commands loosely co-ordinated.

Tactically, the four-company battalion only existed in the field from January 1915 to February 1917.  Two years.

And yet here we are, over a hundred years later, debating if it is the right structure for the present day.


Pamphlet SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917.








						Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917 : Great Britain War Office : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive
					

Book digitized by Google from the library of the University of California and uploaded to the Internet Archive by user tpb.



					archive.org
				




In fact, is it too much to say that by 1917 they were swarming the enemy?


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## Kirkhill

Field exercise and evolutions of infantry - 1859 is freely available on line.
Best Canadian exemplars of the structure is the Fort Henry Guard which exercises as a small company with an artillery section attached.

Not promoting return to redcoats and pipeclay (although I wonder if replicating the FHG exercises with modern small arms and blanks on the parade square might not be an interesting training increment - a study in fire control, listening for and obeying orders when the shooting starts, trusting your mates to cover for you while you prepare to cover them).

However the organization is interesting.

Company of 40 rank and file organized by files of two.  20 Files to the Company.  10 Files to the Sub-Division.  5 Files to the Section.  A detached Section or less also known as a Squad.

Corporals in the Ranks as part of the Sections.
4 Sergeants to the rear responsible for one of the 4 Sections.
1 Covering Sergeant responsible for the 4 Sergeants.

1 Captain responsible for the company
1 Sr Subaltern assisting the Captain
1 Jr Subaltern learning his trade

In battle Sr Subaltern given independent control of the Left Flank Subdivision (20 ORs and 2 Sgts).  Jr Subaltern assigned to the Right Flank Subdivision (20 ORs and 2 Sgts)  which is under the direct command of the Captain.

Weapons and spacings may have changed - but have the organizational principles changed?


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## blacktriangle

Kirkhill said:


> Weapons and spacings may have changed - but have the organizational principles changed?


They certainly have changed. Organize and re-organize all you want, but when you're lacking ATGMs, GBAD, and Long Range Artillery, it's probably futile. 

I think the best the CAF can hope to do is to possibly replicate what the UK is trying to do with the Strike Brigades. Maybe the CA could build a Strike Bde or BG based on LAV 6.0 (including LRSS) - but it will still require addressing the deficiencies listed above. 

I get that people don't love medium weight capabilities for Europe or the idea of "defeating at distance", but I see no other alternative for the CAF. A few LAVs on their own won't deter a peer adversary,  so why not use them to enable more capable systems? Systems that _will _serve as a form of deterrent, and that will provide true combat capability if required?


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## daftandbarmy

reveng said:


> They certainly have changed. Organize and re-organize all you want, but when you're lacking ATGMs, GBAD, and Long Range Artillery, it's probably futile.
> 
> I think the best the CAF can hope to do is to possibly replicate what the UK is trying to do with the Strike Brigades. Maybe the CA could build a Strike Bde or BG based on LAV 6.0 (including LRSS) - but it will still require addressing the deficiencies listed above.
> 
> I get that people don't love medium weight capabilities for Europe or the idea of "defeating at distance", but I see no other alternative for the CAF. A few LAVs on their own won't deter a peer adversary,  so why not use them to enable more capable systems? Systems that _will _serve as a form of deterrent, and that will provide true combat capability if required?



For 'light' Infantry, and other similar dismounted units, I believe that the organizational structures and principles that have been in place since WW2 (or the Bronze Age) would remain largely unchanged due to the limitations of the human body to carry much more than 60lbs (ish) in battle for extended periods, as well as the span of control limitations present in any dismounted force - until we all get issued jet packs of course..

Once we 'go mounted', the possibilities abound as the Army, like the Navy and Air Force, begin to 'man the equipment' rather than 'equip the man'. For the Army, alot of our organizational imperatives seem to be driven, shaped and incluenced by the Infantry, whether or not we realize it, too which is something to note. Arcane arguments about 'six or twleve' soldiers per section therefore become a moot point, for example, if your job is to figure out how to stuff four or five infanteers in the back of a Merkava.

Whilst in the UK I talked to a boffin who was working on some kind of theoretical principle/ doctrine to guide Army organizational structures based on some widely (but informally) recognized principles utilized by the Navy and Air Force related to manning equipment, and leadership and other practises suited to such environments, to best achieve desired effects etc. While fascinating, as that would mean the Army would have to admit to learning something from the other arms and services I assumed that he was engaged in the academic equivalent of a 'Forlorn Hope' 

Regardless, the combat arms (and others) have been successfully reshaping and adapting their org structures for decades to meet emerging needs, and I don't think we'll ever see an end to the need to retain that kind of flexibility.


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## Kirkhill

reveng said:


> Organize and re-organize all you want, but when you're lacking ATGMs, GBAD, and Long Range Artillery, it's probably futile.



For me though, the underlying question, whether it is about filling LAV seats, big sections, big platoons, big companies or big battalions, is whether it is more important to have a small number of large bodies or a large number of small bodies.

Personally I fall on the side of preferring a large number of small bodies, and I like the historical precedents.

The large number of small bodies supplies the bases for a the specialist capabilities you seek and also supply the basis of swarming tactics - a resilient horde that increases the number of targets the enemy sees, decreases their ability to counter the entire swarm and increases the number of nodes available to the friendly commander to observe and affect the battle.

And if the number of people in a body can be reduced by augmenting the body with motors and wires, I'm all for it.

As has been discussed before - 4 tanks with 16 crew on board.  When adding UGV Tanks do you add 4 to 12 unmanned vehicles and concentrate the 16 crew in 4 hulls? Or do you distribute the 16 crew among 16 hulls?  Or 4 crew among 4 hulls?

I favour the one person per hull solution supported by internal AI and an external net.

Further to D&B's comment - which I support generally - my, again, personal belief, is that the Canadian Army regularly seems to stuff-up by opting for the big command (largest number of bodies on parade) rather than the most capable command (largest number of guns on parade).


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## medic5

daftandbarmy said:


> For 'light' Infantry, and other similar dismounted units, I believe that the organizational structures and principles that have been in place since WW2 (or the Bronze Age) would remain largely unchanged due to the limitations of the human body to carry much more than 60lbs (ish) in battle for extended periods, as well as the span of control limitations present in any dismounted force - until we all get issued jet packs of course.


The Spartans organized themselves mostly territorially, but it seems in war (at least according to Xenophon and Thucydides) they did have tactical formations.

Spartan Army: 3500
Morai: 576
Lochoi: 144
Pentekostayi: 72
Enomotia: 3 x 12

A Roman legion was roughly 4800 strong divided into 10 cohorts (one of them double strength) with 6 centuries in each, further divided into 10 contubernium.

Legion: 4800
Cohort: 480
Century: 80
Contubernium: 8

The Mongols organized themselves into multiples of 10.

Tumen: 10,000
Mingghan: 1000
Zuun: 100
Arban: 10

Has organization really changed much through history? I'm willing to guess that even in prehistory humans have always organized themselves into similarly sized groups to fight.


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## FJAG

The key issue, and I think one where the answer varies depending on who one asks, is the question of span of control. How many entities can you mange before it's necessary to hand off part of the leadership task to someone else? 

My understanding has always been that the optimum for us humans is five (maybe that's because of the number of digits on one hand  🤷‍♂️). Once you try to control more than five entities, especially in complex and fluid situations, you lose effectiveness.

Generally speaking that's roughly what we do in most of our organizations when you look at sections in a platoon, platoons in a company, companies in a battalion and battalions in a brigade and so on.

While there is some benefit to be garnered from technology I'm not sure one can increase the entities managed by one person or headquarters much beyond that.

Incidentally D&B, I'm with you on the "equip the man v man equipment" issue. For all intents and purposes we've switched to an army that mans equipment for quite some time now. That's one of the main reasons I get so wrapped around the axle about the fact that well over half of our army (the reserve part and quite a bit of the regular part) are not being given any equipment to man. We keep pretending that this doesn't matter in order for the Army to be effective. It does and it will matter.

🍻


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## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> The key issue, and I think one where the answer varies depending on who one asks, is the question of span of control. How many entities can you mange before it's necessary to hand off part of the leadership task to someone else?
> 
> My understanding has always been that the optimum for us humans is five (maybe that's because of the number of digits on one hand  🤷‍♂️). Once you try to control more than five entities, especially in complex and fluid situations, you lose effectiveness.
> 
> Generally speaking that's roughly what we do in most of our organizations when you look at sections in a platoon, platoons in a company, companies in a battalion and battalions in a brigade and so on.
> 
> While there is some benefit to be garnered from technology I'm not sure one can increase the entities managed by one person or headquarters much beyond that.
> 
> Incidentally D&B, I'm with you on the "equip the man v man equipment" issue. For all intents and purposes we've switched to an army that mans equipment for quite some time now. That's one of the main reasons I get so wrapped around the axle about the fact that well over half of our army (the reserve part and quite a bit of the regular part) are not being given any equipment to man. We keep pretending that this doesn't matter in order for the Army to be effective. It does and it will matter.
> 
> 🍻



This is an interesting read:


THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY SQUAD: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? DETERMINING THE OPTIMUM INFANTRY SQUAD ORGANIZATION FOR THE FUTURE



			https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA293440.pdf


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## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The key issue, and I think one where the answer varies depending on who one asks, is the question of span of control. How many entities can you mange before it's necessary to hand off part of the leadership task to someone else?
> 
> My understanding has always been that the optimum for us humans is five (maybe that's because of the number of digits on one hand  🤷‍♂️). Once you try to control more than five entities, especially in complex and fluid situations, you lose effectiveness.
> 
> Generally speaking that's roughly what we do in most of our organizations when you look at sections in a platoon, platoons in a company, companies in a battalion and battalions in a brigade and so on.
> 
> While there is some benefit to be garnered from technology I'm not sure one can increase the entities managed by one person or headquarters much beyond that.
> 
> Incidentally D&B, I'm with you on the "equip the man v man equipment" issue. For all intents and purposes we've switched to an army that mans equipment for quite some time now. That's one of the main reasons I get so wrapped around the axle about the fact that well over half of our army (the reserve part and quite a bit of the regular part) are not being given any equipment to man. We keep pretending that this doesn't matter in order for the Army to be effective. It does and it will matter.
> 
> 🍻



I agree "span of control" is a critical matter but there is also the matter of degree of dispersal and the ability to communicate.

And I share the belief on the "equip the man vs man the equipment" argument.  That is why my pet peeve is over, what I see, as inefficient manning of equipment by tasking supernumeraries.  And my personal hobby horse is the Three Man Crew for the Infantry LAV and the related notion of filling the seats in back.

I don't see why we need three to crew the LAV, and armed infantry transporter, when the Strykers manage with two in the same role.  And don't tell me it is a design issue because I have to believe that it wouldn't take much to convert the existing turrets to something that more approximates an RWS that the Crew Commander inhabits.   

That leaves 8 seats for PAX.  That means that UP TO 8 PAX can be carried.  I suggest that, depending on task the LAV transporter may only be carrying a team of 2, 3, 4, or 6.  Or it might be carrying 8.  Or it might leave some spare seats to carry crews from wrecked vehicles.

As D&B says, once you start talking about vehicles then all bets are off.  

And yes, the Reserves should have equipment - not because they will be employing the equipment they train on but because they need to be able to fall in on the equipment they will be assigned in the field.


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## IRepoCans

Kirkhill said:


> I don't see why we need three to crew the LAV, and armed infantry transporter, when the Strykers manage with two in the same role.  And don't tell me it is a design issue because I have to believe that it wouldn't take much to convert the existing turrets to something that more approximates an RWS that the Crew Commander inhabits.


Last time I worked with 1RCR, the boats were all crewed by 2 pers (3IC was the crew comd / gunner) and the remainder were dismounted. I think this variation of the sect org is actually in the new(er) pam as well, a lot of this boils down to unit SOPs though. Same way how the Patricias have their weird take on the arrowhead and the Royals don't. Though I imagine it's not something exclusive to 1RCR.

So, your pet peeve might not actually exist at all as far as the mechanized battalions are concerned.



daftandbarmy said:


> This is an interesting read:
> 
> 
> THE EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY SQUAD: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? DETERMINING THE OPTIMUM INFANTRY SQUAD ORGANIZATION FOR THE FUTURE
> 
> 
> 
> https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA293440.pdf


I think there was a more contemporary take on this from the British perspective from the experiences of Afghanistan (and NI I imagine) with respect to the organization of the light infantry section.


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## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I agree "span of control" is a critical matter but there is also the matter of degree of dispersal and the ability to communicate.
> 
> And I share the belief on the "equip the man vs man the equipment" argument.  That is why my pet peeve is over, what I see, as inefficient manning of equipment by tasking supernumeraries.  And my personal hobby horse is the Three Man Crew for the Infantry LAV and the related notion of filling the seats in back.
> 
> I don't see why we need three to crew the LAV, and armed infantry transporter, when the Strykers manage with two in the same role.  And don't tell me it is a design issue because I have to believe that it wouldn't take much to convert the existing turrets to something that more approximates an RWS that the Crew Commander inhabits.
> 
> That leaves 8 seats for PAX.  That means that UP TO 8 PAX can be carried.  I suggest that, depending on task the LAV transporter may only be carrying a team of 2, 3, 4, or 6.  Or it might be carrying 8.  Or it might leave some spare seats to carry crews from wrecked vehicles.
> 
> As D&B says, once you start talking about vehicles then all bets are off.
> 
> And yes, the Reserves should have equipment - not because they will be employing the equipment they train on but because they need to be able to fall in on the equipment they will be assigned in the field.


Three man crews are generally based on the concept that you need one person to physically manoeuvre the vehicle, a second to actively engage targets and a third who is free from both maneuvering and engagement tasks so that he can actively seek fresh targets, determine effects on targets, observe for threats, communicate with leadership or other vehicles and give directions to the other two crew members.

Reducing a crew to two compromises the ability of doing one or more of the above tasks.

🍻


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## TangoTwoBravo

Visiting Kabul from Kandahar in 2006 I was asked by a US contractor (Ret'd US Army Col - are there any other types?) about the ideal squad size for the ANA. He had been going through various Soviet manuals (BMP, BTR etc) and was looking for a field perspective. I replied:  "As many ANA dudes as can fit in a 4Runner."  

Might as well argue about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.


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## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Reducing a crew to two compromises the ability of doing one or more of the above tasks.
> 
> 🍻


Not necessarily, Raytheon is making great strides In AI assisted targeting and engagement. They have a prototype AUGV with a 20mm, and built in friend and foe recognition. Video I watched it engaged enemy targets instantly, avoided engaging friendly targets. Put that on an armiured vehicle, now you don't need a gunner or a commander.


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## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Not necessarily, Raytheon is making great strides In AI assisted targeting and engagement. They have a prototype AUGV with a 20mm, and built in friend and foe recognition. Video I watched it engaged enemy targets instantly, avoided engaging friendly targets. Put that on an armiured vehicle, now you don't need a gunner or a commander.


I'll wait until I see it operate successfully 100% of the time. Until then I favour three. 

I'll go down to two once a commander can confirm the target and release the AI to complete the engagement. 

Once the system of secure data links becomes stable I'll let the commander and driver work from a remote station. 

Once the AI becomes so stable that we can take all the wetware out of the loop we should all be forced to watch "Wargames" and "The Terminator" series of movies over and over again.


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## blacktriangle

The same sensors and data that enable Active Protection Systems can also enable slew-to-cue weapons capabilities. Assuming the threat level warranted it, this could enable a secondary RWS (or perhaps a dedicated counter-ambush munition of some sort) to return fire automatically while the crew fight the primary weapon system against another target. Data sharing might also enable a smart system to determine that another vehicle in the vicinity (Perhaps a "Loyal C/S"?) was better situated or equipped to handle the threat etc. Lots of interesting possibilities to be worked out.

But I don't think we are there quite yet. Add a real capability and get it ironed out long before you start looking at cutting crew...


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## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> I agree "span of control" is a critical matter but there is also the matter of degree of dispersal and the ability to communicate.
> 
> And I share the belief on the "equip the man vs man the equipment" argument.  That is why my pet peeve is over, what I see, as inefficient manning of equipment by tasking supernumeraries.  And my personal hobby horse is the Three Man Crew for the Infantry LAV and the related notion of filling the seats in back.
> 
> I don't see why we need three to crew the LAV, and armed infantry transporter, when the Strykers manage with two in the same role.  And don't tell me it is a design issue because I have to believe that it wouldn't take much to convert the existing turrets to something that more approximates an RWS that the Crew Commander inhabits.
> 
> That leaves 8 seats for PAX.  That means that UP TO 8 PAX can be carried.  I suggest that, depending on task the LAV transporter may only be carrying a team of 2, 3, 4, or 6.  Or it might be carrying 8.  Or it might leave some spare seats to carry crews from wrecked vehicles.
> 
> As D&B says, once you start talking about vehicles then all bets are off.
> 
> And yes, the Reserves should have equipment - not because they will be employing the equipment they train on but because they need to be able to fall in on the equipment they will be assigned in the field.



The one reality of the Infantry experience of battle that is most conveniently forgotten is casualty rates. The huge, astonishing casualty rates.

With 100% casualties per fortnight in the Infantry section, a reality in high/ moderate intensity warfare, you're going to need alot of them. And a small section becomes pretty useless, pretty fast.

12 per section, at least, is probably a good idea if you want a section/ platoon that can last a week or two, but would require a whole of Army effort to maintain consistently. 

Which is probably why our section commanders are vastly over ranked right now. In a high intensity conflict a Sergeant, to the level we train them now, should be a Pl 2IC. MCpl - Section Commander. Cpl - Section 2IC.

If you want a good role for the reserves, the whole of the CAF reserves that is, it would be to provide lots of well trained teenaged riflemen to fill the gaps in the Infantry sections.


----------



## medic5

FJAG said:


> I'll wait until I see it operate successfully 100% of the time. Until then I favour three.
> 
> I'll go down to two once a commander can confirm the target and release the AI to complete the engagement.
> 
> Once the system of secure data links becomes stable I'll let the commander and driver work from a remote station.
> 
> Once the AI becomes so stable that we can take all the wetware out of the loop we should all be forced to watch "Wargames" and "The Terminator" series of movies over and over again.


I agree with FJAG here. Let's not get rid of any vehicle crewmen before we are 100% sure that the tech actually functions. We all know what happened in 1940 when two man turreted tanks came up against those with three man turrets.


daftandbarmy said:


> If you want a good role for the reserves, the whole of the CAF reserves that is, it would be to provide lots of well trained teenaged riflemen to fill the gaps in the Infantry sections.


If we can't get the reserves any equipment, this seems to be their role. In 1944, the US Army had to throw cooks and tank drivers and practically anyone into infantry roles. They had massively underpredicted the number of casualties that infantrymen were going to take, and had to fill the gaps with untrained personnel which went as well as you could expect.


----------



## Ostrozac

medic5 said:


> If we can't get the reserves any equipment, this seems to be their role. In 1944, the US Army had to throw cooks and tank drivers and practically anyone into infantry roles. They had massively underpredicted the number of casualties that infantrymen were going to take, and had to fill the gaps with untrained personnel which went as well as you could expect.


The same thing happened in the British Army and Canadian Army during the same period. The British were forced to transfer personnel from the RAF to the infantry. Canada resorted to using politically controversial conscripts. A fighting army needs to be able to replace casualties and surge replacements to where they are needed.

Of course, the ability to provide battlefield casualty replacements flies in the face of any number of peacetime sacred cows/rice bowls. The regimental system, gate keeping of specialist qualifications and carefully curated boutique career paths all work against what we probably need — lots of tough, smart, flexible soldiers that can be surged to where they are needed.

“I need 50 battlefield casualty replacements.“
“Done.”
“Nope. None of these guys are airbrake qualified. Because they might be for 3R22eR they all need to speak French and a third of them need Basic Para. And your RCEME and Log types no longer seem to have any field skills. Send them all on 8 months predeployment training and then get back to me.”


----------



## medic5

It seems we in the west always underestimate casualties in war. Didn't the Canadian Corps conscript because we ended up taking more casualties than got new enlistments? 

I think we are going to turn this into another restructuring the reserve thread, but the truth is our best option for replacing battlefield losses is with trained reservists, but we need to train them to actually be able to deploy without a year of pre deployment training. Regarding specialist qualifications, I feel in war they will quickly be thrown to the side. What exactly could we do with three companies of paratroopers anyway? I'm willing to bet it'll become the same as German Fallschirmjäger units, paratroopers only in name since the majority of the units' manpower are replacements. 

Forgive me for all the Second World War references, but I feel it's fitting as the last total war Canada fought in. (Plus I just read a book about the timeframe, so obviously ideas are still fresh.)


----------



## CBH99

I'm enjoying your WW2 references so far, actually.  Relevant to the thread & interesting.  History is a fantastic teacher, and while technology has changed drastically, the same concepts still apply today albeit in different forms.  Good food for thought.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

medic5 said:


> Forgive me for all the Second World War references, but I feel it's fitting as the last total war Canada fought in. (Plus I just read a book about the timeframe, so obviously ideas are still fresh.)



Sounds like you have just been reading James Holland's "Normandy '44 - D-day and the Epic 77-Day Battle for France". If so, excellent read, very educational and very relevant to this discussion.


----------



## GR66

With regard to the 2 vs. 3 crew members fighting the LAV question, does this not in some ways speak to the confusion over our doctrine?

The point has been made by many people here that the LAV isn't an IFV and we shouldn't treat it as such.  It's an armoured battle taxi with infantry support weapons mounted.  If we focus on using it as protected mobility to deliver dismounted infantry to the battlefield then do we need the 3rd crewman to make it more efficient for the mounted battle?  If our doctrinal focus is on the use of dismounted infantry in complex terrain then isn't the extra dismount more valuable to our primary focus?  

Focusing on the dismounted infantry squad should also make training and reinforcement easier too.  The differences between your mechanized infantry and light infantry skills required disappear once the LAV is treated as a method of transportation rather then an integral element of the infantry unit in combat.  It also makes the training of the Reserves simpler if they can focus on generating dismounted infantry squads/platoons to fill the vehicles.  It also means that in a truly major war that when you start running out of LAVs to replace battle losses you can substitute any vehicle that can carry 8 troops without having to change your basic doctrine.

This doesn't have to be something set in cement of course.  Even in a period of great power competition, just like during the Cold War the most common conflicts we are likely to be involved in are smaller proxy wars and counter insurgencies, etc.  The LAV is well suited for these less than full-scale war conflicts and in these cases having the 3rd person directing fire for the LAV would make perfect sense.  The upside of this is that these types of conflicts are unlikely to produce the high number of casualties that would require full mobilization of the Reserves to replace crews but instead they could focus on augmenting the dismounted squads.


----------



## Kirkhill

IRepoCans said:


> Last time I worked with 1RCR, the boats were all crewed by 2 pers (3IC was the crew comd / gunner) and the remainder were dismounted. I think this variation of the sect org is actually in the new(er) pam as well, a lot of this boils down to unit SOPs though. Same way how the Patricias have their weird take on the arrowhead and the Royals don't. Though I imagine it's not something exclusive to 1RCR.
> 
> So, your pet peeve might not actually exist at all as far as the mechanized battalions are concerned.



Thanks - Problem solved



FJAG said:


> Three man crews are generally based on the concept that you need one person to physically manoeuvre the vehicle, a second to actively engage targets and a third who is free from both maneuvering and engagement tasks so that he can actively seek fresh targets, determine effects on targets, observe for threats, communicate with leadership or other vehicles and give directions to the other two crew members.
> 
> Reducing a crew to two compromises the ability of doing one or more of the above tasks.



But surely the underlying supposition is that the LAV is a Fighting Vehicle?   My contention is that it is sufficiently poor at that task that it is bordering on reckless to use it in that manner.  It is particularly reckless when a section of under-utilized infanteers are being hauled around in the back listening to their I-pods and waiting for an opportunity to do something.

At very least the infantry should de-bus before the crew heads off to play with the enemy's tanks and ATGMs.  If they believe that an extra pair of eyes will improve their chances in that game then good luck to them.

The Stryker uses the same vehicle as an armoured truck.  One that stays one tactical bound behind the troops it transports and from that position, the same position a dismounted machine gun would adopt, the vehicle commander employs his own machine gun in support of the troops he transported, while he waits to recover the debussed troops.  He isn't manoeuvring against the enemy.  And he shouldn't be.  He transports troops to and from the fight.

Mechanically the LAV 6.0 is a Stryker with a bigger machine gun mounted.  The turret, in my opinion, doesn't improve the odds of the LAV surviving when operating against tanks.  If I were riding in the back and saw enemy tanks my first words would be "Let me out!"

The LAV is an excellent troop transporter.   The turret, while it improves the level of support it can offer, does not turn it into a Fighting Vehicle.



WRT "Span of Control"


Football vs Rugby

One brain on the sidelines (or as I like to think of it, the Chateau) constraining and controlling the actions of 40 or 50 others on the field who are opposed by 40 to 50 equally constrained and controlled brains under the direction of another Chateau brain.

Or

15 autonomous brains imprinted with the same instructions prior to the game facing 15 similarly instructed autonomous brains.  You could say the same for soccer -  the world's most popular game.  Even the Chinese and Al Qaeda's people play it.


D&B's maroon beret - famously worn by men who had Field Marshal's batons in their packs, according to Montgomery.  In the 1940s, certainly in 1946, their training emphasized that everybody had to know the objective, the intent and how to read a map.  It was anticipated that the battalion would be scattered all over creation and the role of the individual trooper was to form on the objective and, if he were the only trooper to arrive, continue the mission independently and pursue the mission's intent by any means that occurred to him.


It has been a long time since the Crimea - a war of close ordered files and bright uniforms that generals could see and direct.  The evolution from then has been towards loose files scattered across the field operating with forced autonomy because the general can't see them and can't communicate with them and can't orchestrate their actions in real time.   And more binoculars and radios don't really improve the situation because now the Chateau general's brain is overwhelmed by chattering voices seeing different things and reporting their different circumstances.

Ultimately his best play was before the battle - to train the troops to operate autonomously.

The balance, of course, is to make sure that the autonomous entity on the field is trained and equipped to operate effectively and that requires some mass.  And that mass is what we are discussing here.

For distributed operations I prefer the independent 50 man company divisible into two 24 man platoons, each capable of independent action.  The longer those platoons live and work together as single entities then the more effective they become.  Constant movement into and out of the platoon merely prevents them becoming effective.

And I don't think the next war between the US and its near-peer will be anything other than a distributed war.  The theater will be the whole planet and you will be hard pressed to find a schwerpunkt on which to concentrate your effort.

Edit - I see GR66 beat me to the punch.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> For me though, the underlying question, whether it is about filling LAV seats, big sections, big platoons, big companies or big battalions, is whether it is more important to have a small number of large bodies or a large number of small bodies.
> 
> Personally I fall on the side of preferring a large number of small bodies, and I like the historical precedents.
> 
> The large number of small bodies supplies the bases for a the specialist capabilities you seek and also supply the basis of swarming tactics - a resilient horde that increases the number of targets the enemy sees, decreases their ability to counter the entire swarm and increases the number of nodes available to the friendly commander to observe and affect the battle.
> 
> And if the number of people in a body can be reduced by augmenting the body with motors and wires, I'm all for it.
> 
> As has been discussed before - 4 tanks with 16 crew on board.  When adding UGV Tanks do you add 4 to 12 unmanned vehicles and concentrate the 16 crew in 4 hulls? Or do you distribute the 16 crew among 16 hulls?  Or 4 crew among 4 hulls?
> 
> I favour the one person per hull solution supported by internal AI and an external net.
> 
> Further to D&B's comment - which I support generally - my, again, personal belief, is that the Canadian Army regularly seems to stuff-up by opting for the big command (largest number of bodies on parade) rather than the most capable command (largest number of guns on parade).


I hate to emerge from several years of lurking to be a pedant; however the definition of IFV vs APC is actually completely dependent on armament.
"The term “armoured infantry fighting vehicle” means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, which normally provides the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside the vehicle under armoured protection, and which is armed with an integral or organic cannon of at least 20 millimetres calibre and sometimes an antitank missile launcher." (the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/9/14087.pdf)

To your other point, the 3 vs 2 man turret is about intended use; a weapon like the 25mm is designed to be used offensively and target acquisition and fire control becomes more important.  See crewing the Bradely or Warrior. I actually do believe the LAV is an effective IFV, it's protection is actually class leading, minus the Puma, the mobility is a trade off for the versatility we need. I think the problems of running them up to the assault is a training scar where the objective of a live attack is to do it as loud and as fast as humanly possible in order to make a great show for the assessing officers. It was very refreshing to have been in a company that was very willing to dismount it's guys and have them infill with the LAVs providing feints and fire bases, probably something we should emphasize in our training programs as opposed to simply smashing head long into prepared positions in the name of almighty validation.

oh ps I would personally like to avoid too much American inspired organization in our mechanized formations, I'd perfer not to split  sections across multiple vehicles and then try to sort that out on the objective


----------



## Kirkhill

> I hate to emerge from several years of lurking to be a pedant;



I too think that the Yankee notion of debussing and organizing on the objective is wrong.  The contents of the vehicle should be one singular set of debussing troopers, separate from the crew of course.

My problem has been, since the days of the AVGP Grizzly, the lack of adequate armour to protect the troops in battle when their ride is occasionally used against tanks and ATGMs.  While I accept that the LAV is as well protected as any vehicle in its class my problem is with the class as a whole.

In the US the Bradley (which is probably the best protected of the IFVs - excepting the Narmer) is still not tank-proof nor is it ATGM-proof.  In consequence, when used in Cavalry role only two dismounts are carried.  Only two unoccupied lives at risk.

Why would you keep 7 or 8 troops buttoned up and at risk while the crew of the "armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, ... deliver(s) fire from inside the vehicle under armoured protection"  Those bodies in the back are not contributing to the battle because they cannot "deliver fire from inside the vehicle".



> It was very refreshing to have been in a company that was very willing to dismount it's guys and have them infill with the LAVs providing feints and fire bases, probably something we should emphasize in our training programs as opposed to simply smashing head long into prepared positions in the name of almighty validation.



That seems a whole lot more sensible.

It also goes along with the notion that the number of bodies in the back should be determined by the task at hand and thus separate from the establishment of the vehicle.

Sometimes it might be appropriate to take an establishment of  4 vehicles with a driver and gunner each  and just add 4 commanders (3 pers / vehicle).  Perhaps it is the 2 man crew plus a 2 or 3 man weapons det, or a 4 man team, or a 6 man section, or a section and a command element..

Sometimes you want a 100 km battalion road move.  Fill the seats.  Sometimes you want a flanking force.  Minimal crew.

It is why continue support the idea of a separate LAV company in the battalion on the MaxFlex principle.


----------



## Kirkhill

I believe it was Scharnhorst that said “the infantryman should carry an axe in case he has to break down a door.”

I have gained the impression that to many that focus on the mounted battle the infantry in the back are akin to Scharnhorst's axes.  Something that should be in every tool kit even if it is seldom used.

For me that is a waste of available capability, even if they survive the battle buttoned up, and a greater waste if they are killed without having fired a shot.


----------



## markppcli

So I would argue for their organic inclusion for a few reasons:
Firstly I don't think you gain anything from creating a "carrier squadron" beyond confused chains of command and confusion. I base this off my time in New Zealand and watching two Lts (the LAV Tp Ld and the Infantry Pl Cmd) argue over who was in charge of the mission, the dismount, and the vehicles. Leaving them internal mitigates this. Of course this is just an example, there were other examples of just not understanding each others jobs and the inefficiencies of that, the advantage being they were much better crewmen than I'll ever be but I digress.​Secondly is the mobility; even if we were to dismount further out the ability to gather mass and then disperse to platoon hides after if greater if you have mobility beyond your feet.​Third organic at the platoon and section level allows us to have crew redundancy without having to hold them in a CQ or where ever else. We all have an extra driver and gunner and can keep the biggest gun in the fight.​​The Bradely Cav variant is actually gone, has been for a while now. The new orbat has 4-5 dismounts per Bradley in the Armoured Bde Cav Sqn. And while yes, all vehicles are of course vulnerable to ATGMs and tanks, they are protection against all manner of small arms and indirect fires when you do need to assault that dug in position. I'll take the risk of an ATGM strike over the option of foot slogging to the objective under mortar and MG fire. Similarly just because you're moving to an objective doesn't mean the LAV is expected to engage tanks, ideally your tanks and engaging their tanks. 

PS Bradely's armour is much less than some newer vehicles., Puma jumps to mind.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> So I would argue for their organic inclusion for a few reasons:
> *Firstly I don't think you gain anything from creating a "carrier squadron" beyond confused chains of command and confusion. I base this off my time in New Zealand and watching two Lts (the LAV Tp Ld and the Infantry Pl Cmd) argue over who was in charge of the mission, the dismount, and the vehicles. Leaving them internal mitigates this.* Of course this is just an example, there were other examples of just not understanding each others jobs and the inefficiencies of that, the advantage being they were much better crewmen than I'll ever be but I digress.​Secondly is the mobility; even if we were to dismount further out the ability to gather mass and then disperse to platoon hides after if greater if you have mobility beyond your feet.​Third organic at the platoon and section level allows us to have crew redundancy without having to hold them in a CQ or where ever else. We all have an extra driver and gunner and can keep the biggest gun in the fight.​​The Bradely Cav variant is actually gone, has been for a while now. The new orbat has 4-5 dismounts per Bradley in the Armoured Bde Cav Sqn. And while yes, all vehicles are of course vulnerable to ATGMs and tanks, they are protection against all manner of small arms and indirect fires when you do need to assault that dug in position. I'll take the risk of an ATGM strike over the option of foot slogging to the objective under mortar and MG fire. Similarly just because you're moving to an objective doesn't mean the LAV is expected to engage tanks, ideally your tanks and engaging their tanks.
> 
> PS Bradely's armour is much less than some newer vehicles., Puma jumps to mind.



Just curious though.  How is this problem managed when the battalion is carried operationally by RCAF rotary and fixed wing assets, or RCN boats or even Service Battalion trucks?  And is there an agreed standard within the battalions on the roles of the LAV Captains and Sgts once the Rifles have dismounted?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

A truck, ship or helicopter delivering infantry to a spot hopefully out of contact from which they then go fight is different than an armoured vehicle that manoeuvres the infantry in contact with the enemy. 

Stepping back from the micro of whether the section leaves one or two people in the turret, who and how do we intend to fight? Are we building a force that can do everything from peacekeeping (think UNIFIL as a modern example) to counter-insurgency (Kandahar) to conventional fighting (which could include fighting 2nd/3rd world Armies or conventionally armed and enabled proxies). Do we build units and formations that can do all three? Do we specialize?

We also need to realistic if we are talking about Force 2025. Don't expect "blue sky" planning where anything and everything can change. Its also quite soon in terms of organization.

I took part in Capability Development Experiment 10 (CDX 10) in early 2011 that envisioned a force in 2020 (we didn't predict COVID, but it was still a bad year). I was a Tank Sqn OC in a Battlegroup in a simulated (JCATs and VBS) Horn of Africa. The BG faced an insurgency as well as a hostile neighbouring state. The Battlegroup was dispersed to fight the insurgency, following ADO principles with one Troop of panzers attached to each company and me hanging out with a Troop "in reserve." The neighboring unfriendly state then destroyed one our of dispersed combat teams with a conventional attack that our BG could have easily handled had it not been spread across the countryside.  By the time we were able to mass it was too late. Experiments are just that and we can read too much into them, and perhaps the results just accorded with my confirmation bias that mass wins. Mass doesn't mean parking your tank squadron or battlegroup in a leaguer inviting destruction by any number of different fire systems. Penny-packeting, though, is an invitation to defeat in detail against someone willing and able to mass at the decisive time and space.  

Phew - that feels better.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> A truck, ship or helicopter delivering infantry to a spot hopefully out of contact from which they then go fight is different than an armoured vehicle that manoeuvres the infantry in contact with the enemy.
> 
> Stepping back from the micro of whether the section leaves one or two people in the turret, who and how do we intend to fight? Are we building a force that can do everything from peacekeeping (think UNIFIL as a modern example) to counter-insurgency (Kandahar) to conventional fighting (which could include fighting 2nd/3rd world Armies or conventionally armed and enabled proxies). Do we build units and formations that can do all three? Do we specialize?
> 
> We also need to realistic if we are talking about Force 2025. Don't expect "blue sky" planning where anything and everything can change. Its also quite soon in terms of organization.
> 
> I took part in Capability Development Experiment 10 (CDX 10) in early 2011 that envisioned a force in 2020 (we didn't predict COVID, but it was still a bad year). I was a Tank Sqn OC in a Battlegroup in a simulated (JCATs and VBS) Horn of Africa. The BG faced an insurgency as well as a hostile neighbouring state. The Battlegroup was dispersed to fight the insurgency, following ADO principles with one Troop of panzers attached to each company and me hanging out with a Troop "in reserve." The neighboring unfriendly state then destroyed one our of dispersed combat teams with a conventional attack that our BG could have easily handled had it not been spread across the countryside.  By the time we were able to mass it was too late. Experiments are just that and we can read too much into them, and perhaps the results just accorded with my confirmation bias that mass wins. Mass doesn't mean parking your tank squadron or battlegroup in a leaguer inviting destruction by any number of different fire systems. Penny-packeting, though, is an invitation to defeat in detail against someone willing and able to mass at the decisive time and space.
> 
> Phew - that feels better.



Glad you feel better 

I will stipulate that the point of debarkation matters - and whether or not that point is under fire (like a Hot LZ?).   Is that a doctrinal matter or that a matter of risk management by the local field commander at the time?

And I thoroughly agree with your second para.  Why, What and How are indeed the critical points.

WRT the "defeat in detail" or "en masse" - isn't there an answer in terms of the speed, precision and effectiveness of any QRF?    And isn't Artillery the fastest of the reaction forces available?   Their ability to precisely neutralize threats to dispersed forces seems to be one growing capability that doesn't seem to be getting the attention this civvy would give it.   Equally their ability to react over long ranges with Cannons, Missiles and Rocket Assisted Take Off UAVs extends the area of the umbrella under which dispersed forces could more securely operate.

But given that the enemy is considering playing the Long Range, Non-Contact game as well then the concurrent development of an Air Defence umbrella would seem to be in order.

If anybody were asking I would be suggesting putting my efforts on 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support) for both LRPF missiles and Air Defence and co-ordinating development with the RCN's CSC efforts.


Edit and for the record -  2 vs 3 in the vehicle, the integration of the GIBs, LRPFs and ADO, and the roles of the RCN, RCAF and CANSOF - all parts of a common spectrum, IMO.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> A truck, ship or helicopter delivering infantry to a spot hopefully out of contact from which they then go fight is different than an armoured vehicle that manoeuvres the infantry in contact with the enemy.
> 
> Stepping back from the micro of whether the section leaves one or two people in the turret, who and how do we intend to fight? Are we building a force that can do everything from peacekeeping (think UNIFIL as a modern example) to counter-insurgency (Kandahar) to conventional fighting (which could include fighting 2nd/3rd world Armies or conventionally armed and enabled proxies). Do we build units and formations that can do all three? Do we specialize?
> 
> We also need to realistic if we are talking about Force 2025. Don't expect "blue sky" planning where anything and everything can change. Its also quite soon in terms of organization.
> 
> I took part in Capability Development Experiment 10 (CDX 10) in early 2011 that envisioned a force in 2020 (we didn't predict COVID, but it was still a bad year). I was a Tank Sqn OC in a Battlegroup in a simulated (JCATs and VBS) Horn of Africa. The BG faced an insurgency as well as a hostile neighbouring state. The Battlegroup was dispersed to fight the insurgency, following ADO principles with one Troop of panzers attached to each company and me hanging out with a Troop "in reserve." The neighboring unfriendly state then destroyed one our of dispersed combat teams with a conventional attack that our BG could have easily handled had it not been spread across the countryside.  By the time we were able to mass it was too late. Experiments are just that and we can read too much into them, and perhaps the results just accorded with my confirmation bias that mass wins. Mass doesn't mean parking your tank squadron or battlegroup in a leaguer inviting destruction by any number of different fire systems.* Penny-packeting, though, is an invitation to defeat in detail against someone willing and able to mass at the decisive time and space. *
> 
> Phew - that feels better.



So you guys read up on the COIN thing in Vietnam, Rhodesia and South Africa, right?


----------



## Kirkhill

What would it take for the RCA to be able to drop a Type 26 CSC frigate or three into the middle of the Sahara?




General characteristics [2]Displacement:7,800 t (7,700 long tons) (standard)Length:151.4 m (496 ft 9 in)Beam:20.75 m (68 ft 1 in)Draught:8 m (26 ft 3 in)Propulsion:
CODLOG:
1 × Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine
4 × Rolls-Royce MTU Type 20V 4000 M53B high-speed diesel generators
2 × General Electric electric motors

Speed:27 knots (50 km/h; 31 mph)Range:7,000 nmi (13,000 km; 8,100 mi)Complement:204Sensors and
processing systems:
Command and control
Lockheed Martin Canada CMS 330 Combat System with AEGIS Fire Control Loop
USN Cooperative Engagement Capability (sensor netting)

Surveillance & weapon sensors
Lockheed Martin Canada AN/SPY-7(V)1[3] Solid State 3D AESA radar
MDA Solid State AESA Target Illuminator
X & S Band navigation radars
Electro-optical and infrared systems

Underwater warfare systems
Hull-mounted sonar: Ultra Electronics Sonar S2150-C[4]
Towed sonar: Ultra Electronics TFLAS[5] (variable depth)

Electronic warfare
& decoys:Lockheed Martin Canada RAVEN electronic countermeasures[6]
Ultra Electronics SEA SENTOR S21700 towed torpedo countermeasuresArmament:
Missiles
2 × quad box launchers:
8 × Naval Strike Missile[2]

2 × 3-cell ExLS:
24 × Sea Captor (CAMM) CIADS, quad-packed[7]

1 × 32-cell Mk 41 VLS:
RIM-162 ESSM Block II[8]
RIM-66 SM-2 Block IIIC[9]
BGM-109 Tomahawk


Torpedoes
2 × twin 324 mm (13 in) torpedo tubes(auto-loaded):
Mk 54 MAKO torpedo


Guns
1 × Leonardo OTO 127 mm (5 in)/64 LW Vulcano naval gun[10]
2 × BAE 30 mm (1.2 in) autocannons
6 × 12.7 mm (0.50 in) M2 machine guns

Aircraft carried:
Helicopters
1 × CH-148 Cyclonearmed with:
2 × Mk 54 MAKO Torpedo
1 × C6 FLEX 7.62 mm (0.300 in) GPMG


Aviation facilities:
Indal Technologies Beartrap
Large Chinook-capable flight deck
Enclosed hangar
Facilities for UAVs
Notes:
Flexible Mission Bay
Rolls-Royce Mission Bay Handling System
Modular mission support capacity for sea containers and vehicles
2 × 9–12 m (30–39 ft) multi-role boats
1 × 9 m rescue boat



Sensors not concentrated necessarily but dispersed, or at least augmented by dispersed sensors.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> Glad you feel better
> 
> I will stipulate that the point of debarkation matters - and whether or not that point is under fire (like a Hot LZ?).   Is that a doctrinal matter or that a matter of risk management by the local field commander at the time?
> 
> And I thoroughly agree with your second para.  Why, What and How are indeed the critical points.
> 
> WRT the "defeat in detail" or "en masse" - isn't there an answer in terms of the speed, precision and effectiveness of any QRF?    And isn't Artillery the fastest of the reaction forces available?   Their ability to precisely neutralize threats to dispersed forces seems to be one growing capability that doesn't seem to be getting the attention this civvy would give it.   Equally their ability to react over long ranges with Cannons, Missiles and Rocket Assisted Take Off UAVs extends the area of the umbrella under which dispersed forces could more securely operate.
> 
> But given that the enemy is considering playing the Long Range, Non-Contact game as well then the concurrent development of an Air Defence umbrella would seem to be in order.
> 
> If anybody were asking I would be suggesting putting my efforts on 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support) for both LRPF missiles and Air Defence and co-ordinating development with the RCN's CSC efforts.
> 
> 
> Edit and for the record -  2 vs 3 in the vehicle, the integration of the GIBs, LRPFs and ADO, and the roles of the RCN, RCAF and CANSOF - all parts of a common spectrum, IMO.


A troop-carrying AFV is different than a truck which is different from a helicopter which is different from a ship. They are held and employed very differently. The trucks, helicopters and ships are a means to move around and should be held centrally for re-allocation.  Plus they are much more general purpose. The AFV, whether armed with an MG or a cannon, manoeuvres the section. In the case of the 25mm (or similar) weapons it is an important part of the section/platoon's firepower. I doubt very much that a potential outcome of Force 2025 is to ditch the 25mm. 

No argument about GBAD. Regarding fires, I worry much less about integrating with the CSC than about the usual coalition joint fires. We need direct fire missiles for our infantry (ALAWs).


----------



## blacktriangle

Kirkkill - I wonder if it would look something like a Canadian take on the US Army's Multi Domain Task Force concept?

Perhaps it could be paired with some kind of Recce/Cavalry organization based on LAV 6.0 (including LRSS) for operations in Europe.


----------



## McG

reveng said:


> Kirkkill - I wonder if it would look something like a Canadian take on the US Army's Multi Domain Task Force concept?


The Canadian take on the MultiDomain concept is PFEC.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> The Canadian take on the MultiDomain concept is PFEC.


Is that available to the general public?


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> A troop-carrying AFV is different than a truck which is different from a helicopter which is different from a ship. They are held and employed very differently. The trucks, helicopters and ships are a means to move around and should be held centrally for re-allocation.  Plus they are much more general purpose. The AFV, whether armed with an MG or a cannon, manoeuvres the section. In the case of the 25mm (or similar) weapons it is an important part of the section/platoon's firepower. I doubt very much that a potential outcome of Force 2025 is to ditch the 25mm.
> 
> No argument about GBAD. Regarding fires, I worry much less about integrating with the CSC than about the usual coalition joint fires. We need direct fire missiles for our infantry (ALAWs).


Not so much thinking about ditching the 25mm..  More a case of ditching the section.  At least while the manoeuvre battle is being fought.


----------



## Kirkhill

And who is considering the Robotic Bren Gun Carrier?  Autonomous vehicle with Man in the Loop weapons station - Heli transportable carrier for light infantry.  Strong enough to recover a LAV?

Heliportable





Follow Me and Return Home.





Bundeswehr tests





ATGM System





Developed by the Finns and currently being further developed by the Estonians.   Apparently the Estonians are working to ensure that the vehicle cannot be high-jacked and turned against them.


----------



## Kirkhill

Milrem Robotics’ THeMIS UGV completes first deployment in Mali proving its effectiveness and reliability - EDR Magazine
					

05.05.2020 – Milrem Robotics, the provider of robotic solutions for challenging environments, successfully completed its first deployment period of its




					www.edrmagazine.eu


----------



## Kirkhill

And the "piece de resistance"  

Estonian Live Fire Ex.

A light company combined with a 6 gun D30 battery in the DF Anti-Tank role and a section of ZSU-23s mounted portee on the back of two trucks and enhanced by a pair of UGVs.   One up to support a Carl-Gustav AT team and one back transporting a cabled spotter drone.

The gun line is to hold against an attacking armoured battalion.


----------



## Edward Campbell

The (allied) doctrine for amphibious operations used to be (remember, please, that I retired going on 25 years ago) that the Navy task force commander retained full command of the landing force until (s)he was satisfied that the land force commander was secure on the beach.

I think that makes sense in that situation.

I do not believe we should try to equate ships with aircraft and APCs or troop carling vehicles. I think the problems of managing the "transition" when one has a carrier until and a separate combat arms force is too complicated. I think the idea of carrier regiments has one and ONLY one advantage: it may be necessary when you have insufficient resources ~ rather like a four month delay between vaccine doses.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> But surely the underlying supposition is that the LAV is a Fighting Vehicle?



I'm still curious what result is expected in a high-intensity conflict against a competent foe (eg. not Iraqis).


----------



## Kirkhill

Edward Campbell said:


> The (allied) doctrine for amphibious operations used to be (remember, please, that I retired going on 25 years ago) that the Navy task force commander retained full command of the landing force until (s)he was satisfied that the land force commander was secure on the beach.
> 
> I think that makes sense in that situation.
> 
> I do not believe we should try to equate ships with aircraft and APCs or troop carling vehicles. I think the problems of managing the "transition" when one has a carrier until and a separate combat arms force is too complicated. I think the idea of carrier regiments has one and ONLY one advantage: it may be necessary when you have insufficient resources ~ rather like a four month delay between vaccine doses.



I think that it makes sense to regularly co-operating forces in co-operation.  It makes sense to collocate different units that will work together in close cooperation in the field to reduce the administrative burden of having them work jointly.  Post marines on ships.  Collocate gunners, engineers and infanteers, helicopters and gunners and engineers and infanteers, and yes tanks and close combat vehicles and gunners and engineers and infanteers.

Familiarity breeds more than contempt.  Conversely, isolation is a sterile concept.

WRT the Light Armoured Vehicle as an Infantry Fighting Vehicle and further to the definition supplied by MarkPPCLI - 

"The term “armoured infantry fighting vehicle” means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, which normally provides the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside the vehicle under armoured protection, and which is *armed with an integral or organic cannon *of at least 20 millimetres calibre and sometimes an antitank missile launcher."

The key element is the highlighted one.  The difference between the M113 and the LAV is the M113 mounted the Platoon's weapons while the Platoon was in transit.  The Platoon dismounted the weapons for the fight.   The Battle Taxi fell in behind the lines to exfiltrate the Platoon when required.  The Platoon fought on the ground.  

The LAV, with its integral weapons, is not capable of dismounting its primary weapons.  To get the advantage of those weapons it is necessary to Fight the whole Vehicle.  You can't dig in the Bushmaster.  You have to dig in the entire LAV.    Once the vehicle has an integral weapon it is automatically a Fighting Vehicle, even if it has no armour at all.   

It is tempting to use the available vehicles to give the footsloggers a ride but the cost of giving the warm seats in the back is it makes the Fighting Vehicle a bigger target, less manoeuverable and thus less effective in its Fighting Role and it encourages keeping the infantry on board longer than they should be.

Those THeMIS UGVs present a better means of incorporating machine cannons and ATGMs into the infantry battalion in that they operate on the same scale as the infantry - similar size, similar speed, similar concealability, similar terrain.

If the Tanks need a companion vehicle with cannon and ATGMs then I think it would only be fair to those crews to give them the same armour and manoeuverability as the tanks.  Otherwise they will be picked off by Recoilless Rifles, anti-tank guns and older model tanks, ATGMs and drones while the "Modern" tanks battle it out.  

If they were carrying GIBs not only do they become larger targets, the armour becomes thinner and the GIBs.... don't do well at all.



It is true that our citizenry is parsimonious when it comes to defence.  We both know it was ever thus.  It is unlikely to change, especially if war becomes the common rather than the extraordinary.  So needs must.

The one thing it is clear that Canadians value more than their treasure is the blood of the children.  

That means that an infantry-centric force is less likely to be used than a technology-centric force.

That means that infanteers will have less value politically even when they are tactically critical.  We will have to hang on to those volunteers we get and make them as flexible as possible.  By all means, train the infanteers to work with the LAVs, even post the LAVs and the infanteers to the same battalion.  But I believe that those infanteers should also be trained to debus from helicopters.    And light infanteers should equally be trained to co-operate with LAVs.

If not a Carrier Regiment per Brigade then at least a Light Armoured Fighting Vehicle Company per Medium Battalion.


----------



## McG

McG said:


> The Canadian take on the MultiDomain concept is PFEC.


I assume so, but after a google search I only find references to the actual document.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> The one thing it is clear that Canadians value more than their treasure is the blood of the children.
> 
> That means that an infantry-centric force is less likely to be used than a technology-centric force.



So how did that work out in every war/battle that we've fought since, oh, I dunno, the Plains of Abraham?

Any war will result in a higher absolute number of infantry casualties than other arms and services. It's part of the territory.

That's why the chicks dig us, like, the most


----------



## Kirkhill

As long as we have the option of choosing our wars, our Kabinett wars, then the enthusiasm will only last as long as the low cost victories.  We can apparently sustain the drip of the occasional loss of a pilot here or there or an SOF operator.  But once we surpass the double digits, like the 158 lost in Afghanistan, then the government loses the citizenry.

I agree the frontline infantry is critical to winning wars.  I also agree that the frontline infantry takes most casualties and is always in short supply.

But the Canadian public will not support dead Canadians in Estonia.

On the other hand the Estonians, don't feel they have the luxury of the debate.  They are confronted with the possibility of taking on tanks with infanteers,  machine guns, Carl Gustaf's,  truck-mounted anti-aircraft cannons and towed gun/howitzers taking on tanks at ranges under 1 km.  They don't have the time or money to wait for the perfect anti-tank solution so they are making it up as they go along and working with what they have.

Meanwhile, we debate.

If we really wanted to help Estonia, or the Ukraine, we would buy them some of the latest war-winning technologies they are asking for and let them get on with it.  They have the will to fight for their land and their government. 

Another way we could assist, in the future, would be to send a flotilla of CSC frigates loaded to the gunwales with Tomahawks and Air Defence Missiles and park them where they could put an umbrella over the Baltic States, Kaliningrad and St Petersburg.

Canadians will support infantry casualties (maybe) when the Second Battle of the Plains of Abraham is fought.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> I assume so, but after a google search I only find references to the actual document.


Same here.

The closest useful related reference I can find is by some retired duffer in a podcast.    


__
		https://soundcloud.com/user-609485369%2Fdefence-deconstructed-how-canada-fights


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> And the "piece de resistance"
> 
> Estonian Live Fire Ex.
> 
> A light company combined with a 6 gun D30 battery in the DF Anti-Tank role and a section of ZSU-23s mounted portee on the back of two trucks and enhanced by a pair of UGVs.   One up to support a Carl-Gustav AT team and one back transporting a cabled spotter drone.
> 
> The gun line is to hold against an attacking armoured battalion.



With respect to debating "Structure"  -  did anybody else note that each of the 122mm D30 howitzers being used in the DF anti-tank role were being manned on the firing line by crews of three -  18 gunners for a battery of 6 guns.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> As long as we have the option of choosing our wars, our Kabinett wars, then the enthusiasm will only last as long as the low cost victories.  We can apparently sustain the drip of the occasional loss of a pilot here or there or an SOF operator.  But once we surpass the double digits, like the 158 lost in Afghanistan, then the government loses the citizenry.
> 
> I agree the frontline infantry is critical to winning wars.  I also agree that the frontline infantry takes most casualties and is always in short supply.
> 
> But the Canadian public will not support dead Canadians in Estonia.
> 
> On the other hand the Estonians, don't feel they have the luxury of the debate.  They are confronted with the possibility of taking on tanks with infanteers,  machine guns, Carl Gustaf's,  truck-mounted anti-aircraft cannons and towed gun/howitzers taking on tanks at ranges under 1 km.  They don't have the time or money to wait for the perfect anti-tank solution so they are making it up as they go along and working with what they have.
> 
> Meanwhile, we debate.
> 
> If we really wanted to help Estonia, or the Ukraine, we would buy them some of the latest war-winning technologies they are asking for and let them get on with it.  They have the will to fight for their land and their government.
> 
> Another way we could assist, in the future, would be to send a flotilla of CSC frigates loaded to the gunwales with Tomahawks and Air Defence Missiles and park them where they could put an umbrella over the Baltic States, Kaliningrad and St Petersburg.
> 
> Canadians will support infantry casualties (maybe) when the Second Battle of the Plains of Abraham is fought.



If you want Canadian casualties in large batches then by all means park a flotilla of CSC in the Baltic as part of a shooting war. 

A conventional war does not have to be in Latvia against the Russians. It can be in any number of 2nd/3rd world countries. 

While I respect the use of batteries of towed artillery in the AT role, it really shouldn't be your primary plan. If what you are saying is that we should arm them, fine (we are working mostly with the Latvians as opposed to Estonians but the principle is there), but they are also quite small. They are also quite NATO. As are we. That is why we are in Latvia with the EFP. 

We should remember that Force 2025 is right around the corner. It is not "blue sky" future stuff from Popular Mechanics and Crisis in Zefra. It needs to be fairly practical and grounded.


----------



## Kirkhill

Good enuff.  Thanks for the correction on Latvia.

Questions for you:

What portion of our fleet of 600 LAVs, 80 tanks and 37 howitzers should be allocated to repel invaders from the Baltics.  When should they be deployed?  How should they be deployed?  What roles would they perform?  How would they contribute to victory?

Three hours drive from the eastern borders to the sea.

And, wrt casualties in the flotilla, yet another reason for automating the vessels as much as possible.  Better a Billion lost than a couple of hundred sailors.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

You mean maybe 300 LAV's, 25 tanks and 25 guns that are serviceable and ready to deploy?


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to my last and the "Baltic Flotilla"

The Area of Influence of 3x CSC each with a 32 cell Mk41 VLS armed with Tomahawks and parked in the lee of the Shetlands.



Potential of up to 96 Tomahawks while operating under NATO air cover and their own point defence of 72 ready to fire CAMMs and 6x 30mm
 cannons.

Potential to advance east to Copenhagen before entering the Baltic proper and swapping Tomahawks for SM-6.


----------



## blacktriangle

TangoTwoBravo said:


> We should remember that Force 2025 is right around the corner. It is not "blue sky" future stuff from Popular Mechanics and Crisis in Zefra. It needs to be fairly practical and grounded.


So should we assume that Force 2025 has none of the following? 

-GBAD
-GMLRS, Self-propelled howitzers, or something like Spike NLOS
-Javelin or Spike LR (at least for the CA itself)

It seems like these are far from "blue sky", and yet the CAF doesn't seem close to filling any of these gaps. Unless I'm missing something?


----------



## Weinie

McG said:


> The Canadian take on the MultiDomain concept is PFEC.


To the best of my knowledge, PFEC remains a draft concept.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Further to my last and the "Baltic Flotilla"
> 
> The Area of Influence of 3x CSC each with a 32 cell Mk41 VLS armed with Tomahawks and parked in the lee of the Shetlands.
> .....
> Potential to advance east to Copenhagen before entering the Baltic proper and swapping Tomahawks for SM-6.


Compare that to this.



The CAF needs to determine how to function as an "inside force" (to steal a phrase from the USMC).  Sailing a surface warship into all that red doesn't strike me as an optimal way to do so.


----------



## Kirkhill

Seen

Assumptions

- Canadian 3-ship Flotilla off the Shetlands at extreme range of SU-35s.  96 ready to fire Tomahawks on board.  72 CAMM air defence missiles ready to fire.  Supplemented with 127mm and 30 mm guns.  Operating under the umbrella of the RAF

- Russia opposes with SU-35S - 112 built since 2007 (18 years of production - slow production rate - maintenance?)

Roll the dice, the Canadians get their missiles off, the Russians press home their attack and sink the three Canadian ships.   What were their losses on the approach, the attack and the egress?  What are the odds of replacing their aircraft?

Canada despatches another 3-Ship Flotilla from its 4 Flotilla reserve.  We thank the RCN for its service.  Did it really need 200 sailors on board each vessel?

As for operating as an inside force - it could be kind of neat to see what the effect of equipping 4GSR, or better yet all the regular Arty regiments with JLTV mounted NSMs would be and have the launchers scatter all over the Baltics, Poland or Romania. 



 What is the launcher to troop ratio expected by the USMC?  How many bodies do they expect to put at risk to achieve the anticipated effect?

That picture changes again with dispersed HIMARs trucks, also potentially autonomous, launching GMRLS out to 150 km and PrSMs in the 500 to 1500 km band.  We could talk about GLCMs, SM6s and HVMs but I think that they can be more effectively, and safely, delivered from the sea.

I have to believe that a few batteries (and ships) would be more welcome than a few hundred willing bodies with C7s. And be more useful, and be more easily expended by Canada. 

Cheers  

Edit - Marine Littoral Regiment 

- 1800 to 2000 all ranks
1 Log Battalion
1 AD Battalion
1 NMESIS Battalion - NSM-JLTV Rogues - 84 JLTV Launchers to the Battalion (with 166 ready to launch missiles)


----------



## MilEME09

reveng said:


> So should we assume that Force 2025 has none of the following?
> 
> -GBAD
> -GMLRS, Self-propelled howitzers, or something like Spike NLOS
> -Javelin or Spike LR (at least for the CA itself)
> 
> It seems like these are far from "blue sky", and yet the CAF doesn't seem close to filling any of these gaps. Unless I'm missing something?


GBAD project is a factor into F2025, part of the driving factor into F2025 is what NATO has requested of us.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:


> Compare that to this.
> 
> View attachment 65327
> 
> The CAF needs to determine how to function as an "inside force" (to steal a phrase from the USMC).  Sailing a surface warship into all that red doesn't strike me as an optimal way to do so.



An airborne 'Baltic Cork Opening' Danish land grab, a la the Crimea, has always been a Russian strategic possibility. It helps that they're within range of substantial air cover, of course. However, as this article suggests, they're having some modernizaton issues of their own in this part of their military:

Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces

The Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) compose one of the more important instruments in the General Staff’s toolkit, serving as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations, or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. The VDV has proven to be leading edge of Russian (and Soviet) military power in operations from the 1956 intervention in Hungary, to the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea. A combat arm distinct from the Land Forces, the VDV may be used tactically, operationally, or play a strategic role, depending on how it is employed. Whether responding to a crisis, or choosing to visit the territory of its neighbor without notice, Russia is likely to lean on the highest readiness units with elite training, and good mobility, which in many cases means the VDV.

Today the VDV consists of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals and an independent reconnaissance brigade. Parachute divisions can be air dropped to seize enemy air fields and key points, making them a strategic asset, while air assault units are flown into secured landing zones. Brigades represent a mix, often with one parachute battalion and two assault battalions. The Russian operation in Crimea, together with other military actions have demonstrated that if the VDV can seize an airport then they can fly in supporting battalions, and those follow-on units can secure terrain for Russia’s land forces to enter the battle space. In theory, it is a Soviet Airborne, simply cut down to Russian size (VDV Divisions used to have three regiments each, but were long ago reduced to two)."









						Rethinking the Structure and Role of Russia’s Airborne Forces
					

Re-posting my article on the Russian Airborne from Oxford’s Changing Character of War Program Issue Brief #4. This is a great center (or centre?), and has some of the more interesting article…




					russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> Good enuff.  Thanks for the correction on Latvia.
> 
> Questions for you:
> 
> What portion of our fleet of 600 LAVs, 80 tanks and 37 howitzers should be allocated to repel invaders from the Baltics.  When should they be deployed?  How should they be deployed?  What roles would they perform?  How would they contribute to victory?
> 
> Three hours drive from the eastern borders to the sea.
> 
> And, wrt casualties in the flotilla, yet another reason for automating the vessels as much as possible.  Better a Billion lost than a couple of hundred sailors.


We already have LAVs there, and M777 Batteries rotate through. Just saying. This isn't hypothetical. 

Were it suddenly up to me I would put a squadron of Leopard 2A6M there, with half-squadron crews rotating through. The point of the EFP (of which we are only one component) is to prevent "little green men" and opportunistic grabs presenting the West with a _fait accompli_.  The point is to make a "three hour drive to the sea" impossible. If there was a general war, there would be mobilization and deployment of forces from Canada. I've been part of few exercises of that at various levels with NATO, including one with actual troops, ships and aircraft to Norway. Do you know how a Light Battalion gets to Europe? The troops fly, but the equipment goes by ship. I would prefer that our Navy focus on keeping our sea lanes open than trade missiles with ground targets that only have to have two or three successes to wreck the whole enterprise.

I will come back to my point that Latvia is part of NATO - that is how we ended up there. Our Army should have NATO commitment on the continent in defence of NATO allies as part of our mission set. We also need a force to handle COIN missions as well as more traditional peacekeeping and stability operations. And of course our next shooting war will be something unexpected, but it will likely have aspects of all those types of operations. 

I certainly hope that GBAD and ALAWS find themselves in our 2025 structures. HIMARs or equivalents would, of course, also be welcome.


----------



## Kirkhill

I am in absolute agreement that, since the government has deployed the Battle Group, and it is integrated into the plan then two things should happen -

1 - Stick to the plan

2 - Properly equip and support the Battle Group to the full extent of our capabilities.  Some of those Force 2025 gaps could/should be trialled in Latvia with UORs.  As you say - ALAWS and MBTs would be nice, at least.

The heavy-handed point I was making was that there are other options that the government could be exploring within the envelope it has set, options with different "pain" levels, that may be more acceptable to the voter that pays attention.

Cheers,


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> We already have LAVs there, and M777 Batteries rotate through. Just saying. This isn't hypothetical.
> 
> Were it suddenly up to me I would put a squadron of Leopard 2A6M there, with half-squadron crews rotating through.


I don't think there is a need for our Leopards there as there are already heavy armour elements there from other countries.

That said I think that it would be a very good idea to have a full squadron there manned by a half squadron and augmented by the rest of the squadron for exercises if for no other reason than to provide opportunities for both our infantry and armour to practice combined arms operations at both the combat team and battle group level.

For the same reason, I would leave the M777s there (even though I firmly believe they are the wrong gun for the force there) so that both FOO/FACs, FSCCs, STACCs and gunline gunners return to conducting exercises for mechanized high intensity conflict.

Lord, we desperately need an experimental battle group over there for testing out new weapon systems and TPPs on a continuing basis.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I don't think there is a need for our Leopards there as there are already heavy armour elements there from other countries.
> 
> That said I think that it would be a very good idea to have a full squadron there manned by a half squadron and augmented by the rest of the squadron for exercises if for no other reason than to provide opportunities for both our infantry and armour to practice combined arms operations at both the combat team and battle group level.
> 
> For the same reason, I would leave the M777s there (even though I firmly believe they are the wrong gun for the force there) so that both FOO/FACs, FSCCs, STACCs and gunline gunners return to conducting exercises for mechanized high intensity conflict.
> 
> Lord, we desperately need an experimental battle group over there for testing out new weapon systems and TPPs on a continuing basis.
> 
> 🍻



What about Engineers?

Nothing like an Engineer Regiment to add 'texture' to the defence, of course


----------



## McG

Spain is providing engineers to the BG.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> Spain is providing engineers to the BG.



I was always of the opinion that the Infantry could waltz around in our underwear as long as the Engineers, Artillery and Armoured Corps were dialled in.

Or maybe just for the hell of it anyways, of course


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> What about Engineers?
> 
> Nothing like an Engineer Regiment to add 'texture' to the defence, of course


Yeah. I agree.



McG said:


> Spain is providing engineers to the BG.


Yes they are but I take the view they only need to be there for an exercise or two for their own and their Canadian supported arms training's sake not so much to bolster the overall force.

🍻


----------



## McG

What do troops train on at home if we put all the vehicles, weapons, and equipment for a tank squadron, engineer squadron, and artillery battery in Latvia for a few exercises a year? 
... and if the collective of eFP BGs fail to deter then all those resources are lost before the defeat battle.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> *What do troops train on at home* if we put all the vehicles, weapons, and equipment for a tank squadron, engineer squadron, and artillery battery in Latvia for a few exercises a year?
> ... and if the collective of eFP BGs fail to deter then all those resources are lost before the defeat battle.



Militia bullets


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> What do troops train on at home if we put all the vehicles, weapons, and equipment for a tank squadron, engineer squadron, and artillery battery in Latvia for a few exercises a year?
> ... and if the collective of eFP BGs fail to deter then all those resources are lost before the defeat battle.


When we weren't out on fall, winter or spring gun camp we were sweeping the gun park and doing other not so bang, bang things. Bullets (even Militia ones) are pricey and you can't go out shooting every day. There's lots of training that doesn't involved the big gear.

🍻


----------



## McG

When do troops learn how to use “the big gear” if it is all parked on another continent? How many fewer people get to experience resourced collective training because the kit is held out of country?

You say that you want all this kit in Latvia so our troops can experience combined arms training. There will be a whole lot less of that experience if we have balanced our resources so that Europe is the only place to do the training.
... And the little Adazi training area is not the best place to really stretch mechanized training. We have better at home.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I don't want to turn this into an EFP thread, but it should be noted that the EFP in Latvia has all sorts of capability from the contributing nations. I just think it is sad that our best equipment for conventional operations sits in Canada. Foundational training, while important, should not be an end in and of itself.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Just curious though.  How is this problem managed when the battalion is carried operationally by RCAF rotary and fixed wing assets, or RCN boats or even Service Battalion trucks?  And is there an agreed standard within the battalions on the roles of the LAV Captains and Sgts once the Rifles have dismounted?


The standard once dismounted is the the LAV Capt and Sgts fight the Vehicles, do a large degree they also managed the advance with most Pl Comd staying in th back on the advance, avoids the confusion of getting out of the turret under contact. Having never been deployed via RCN Boat, or Truck for an operation I frankly can't say, although I would imagine they would just slot into their respective organization as extra HQ elements. During my couple air mobile operations on Ex, the Helos dropped off the dismounts to seize vital ground while the LAVs punched through to them as "cavalry" - under the command of the Limas.

In reference to your comments about the "big targets" of IFV born infantry, I see your argument, but in todays battle field with mass proliferation of IR and II optics, your infantry platoon is a target regardless.  I would rather be vulnerable to a BTR companies 3 m111 stands than every single one of their MGs as I advance to their position for example. Of course your vulnerable to tanks, but that's what your tanks are for.

The Estonian exercise is interesting, but a lot of the Baltic countries are doing things "in extremis" not in ideal. Absolutely stuff we should look at, but if we're trying to set goals for organization maybe no out best goal post. (I am however a big fan of the Latvian Spike teams rolling around in little ATVs)

Lastly, I don't know that anyone was dismounting the .50 of the M1113 under contact. In the defense sure, but not on the attack, and to try an equate the capability of an m1113's .50 to a LAV turret in terms of direct fires is... well it's apples and oranges in the extreme.  

(apologies for the late reply, I was lost in the woods of Gagetown with OCdts)


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> The standard once dismounted is the the LAV Capt and Sgts fight the Vehicles, do a large degree they also managed the advance with most Pl Comd staying in th back on the advance, avoids the confusion of getting out of the turret under contact. Having never been deployed via RCN Boat, or Truck for an operation I frankly can't say, although I would imagine they would just slot into their respective organization as extra HQ elements. During my couple air mobile operations on Ex, the Helos dropped off the dismounts to seize vital ground while the LAVs punched through to them as "cavalry" - under the command of the Limas.
> 
> In reference to your comments about the "big targets" of IFV born infantry, I see your argument, but in todays battle field with mass proliferation of IR and II optics, your infantry platoon is a target regardless.  I would rather be vulnerable to a BTR companies 3 m111 stands than every single one of their MGs as I advance to their position for example. Of course your vulnerable to tanks, but that's what your tanks are for.
> 
> The Estonian exercise is interesting, but a lot of the Baltic countries are doing things "in extremis" not in ideal. Absolutely stuff we should look at, but if we're trying to set goals for organization maybe no out best goal post. (I am however a big fan of the Latvian Spike teams rolling around in little ATVs)
> 
> Lastly, I don't know that anyone was dismounting the .50 of the M1113 under contact. In the defense sure, but not on the attack, and to try an equate the capability of an m1113's .50 to a LAV turret in terms of direct fires is... well it's apples and oranges in the extreme.
> 
> (apologies for the late reply, I was lost in the woods of Gagetown with OCdts)



A great argument for providing even more, and more effective, suppressive fire via the artillery, mortars etc.

(And did you find the Franco Platoon's rifle?  ).


----------



## markppcli

Sure, know what's great about advancing in IFVs? You can button up and get even closer to the enemy before the mortars and artillery have to let up. All while engaging their dug in positions with more direct fires.

by the way, if we can manage the Estonians level of Anti Armour capability I'll be a happy camper: sect lvl 84s, Coy has Milan (soon to be spike), Bn has Javelin, and theres a Bde Anti Tank coy with more ATGMs. 

(oh I'm just here temporarily I was more dealing with "umm I think it's a swamp" "well thank god our boots are already wet eh?"


----------



## Infanteer

Why are we talking about who commands a LAV in a thread about the Canadian Army's force structure?  It's a command arrangement, not a structural one.


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:


> Why are we talking about who commands a LAV in a thread about the Canadian Army's force structure?  It's a command arrangement, not a structural one.


Because Canada confuses sub-tactical argument with grand strategy?


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> Why are we talking about who commands a LAV in a thread about the Canadian Army's force structure?  It's a command arrangement, not a structural one.


Well in an army as small as ours, and in the context of Force 2025 involving no major expansion or expendatures, the employment of the Army's largest AFV fleet defines the structures of 11/12 maneurve units, and therefore it's Bdes. The value of number of pers, or holding units becomes a question of if the structure works or we do we need / should we have an IFV squadron / regiment in each Bde?


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Why are we talking about who commands a LAV in a thread about the Canadian Army's force structure?  It's a command arrangement, not a structural one.


Because desks are made of quarks, hadrons, baryons and mesons?

And we buy the elements from which we construct the grand strategy desk by the quark?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Well in an army as small as ours, and in the context of Force 2025 involving no major expansion or expendatures, the employment of the Army's largest AFV fleet defines the structures of 11/12 maneurve units, and therefore it's Bdes. The value of number of pers, or holding units becomes a question of if the structure works or we do we need / should we have an IFV squadron / regiment in each Bde?


What he said.


----------



## Infanteer

Yes, but that misses the point.  The LAV needs a crew commander, needs a gunner, and needs a driver.  Which section that person belongs to and what cap badge he or she wears is irrelevant to the Army's structure for 2025, as those positions need to be filled.

If you're advocating shelving platforms because of changes to numbers of sub-units, then we're talking about something different.


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> Well in an army as small as ours, and in the context of Force 2025 involving no major expansion or expendatures, the employment of the Army's largest AFV fleet defines the structures of 11/12 maneurve units, and therefore it's Bdes. The value of number of pers, or holding units becomes a question of if the structure works or we do we need / should we have an IFV squadron / regiment in each Bde?


The question I'd have is given our current force structure can we continue to afford having our entire Reserve of infantry regiments as light infantry? Or should we start having some reroll as mechanized even if the battle taxi they get is a Mack truck?


----------



## markppcli

well I think what was being suggested by other would have been essentially a fifth maneuver, if you can call it that,  unit. Which woud be a large change in how we do things structurally. Similarly Kirkhill was questioning if we need Crew Commanders (we do) at all, which would result in more bodies available to do other things. So yeah low level structure but structure none the less. If talking about what units we will have, and how they will organize, isn't appropriate for a discussion on Force 2025 what is an appropriate topic?


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> well I think what was being suggested by other would have been essentially a fifth maneuver, if you can call it that,  unit. Which woud be a large change in how we do things structurally. Similarly Kirkhill was questioning if we need Crew Commanders (we do) at all, which would result in more bodies available to do other things. So yeah low level structure but structure none the less. If talking about what units we will have, and how they will organize, isn't appropriate for a discussion on Force 2025 what is an appropriate topic?


Considering F2025 is considering reorganization I'd say it's appropriate


----------



## markppcli

MilEME09 said:


> The question I'd have is given our current force structure can we continue to afford having our entire Reserve of infantry regiments as light infantry? Or should we start having some reroll as mechanized even if the battle taxi they get is a Mack truck?


Take all 60-70 odd Reserve Armoured and Infantry regiments, mash them together into about a dozen or so Bns of Canadian Mounted Rifles, with sub units perpetuating old regiments, each built around Infantry soldiers with TAPV for mobility crewed by Armoured crew. TAPV isn't idea but it's what we have.

Oh and in Edmonton and Fredricton have two "crew replacement regiments" that are tasked to produce Leopard Crewmen for support to the tank squadrons a la Royal Yeomanry.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> TAPV isn't idea but it's what we have.



Res F doesn't need first-line equipment.  Anything fitting the general idea of a carrier with better mobility than a truck should do.  I'd argue the simpler, the better - fewer specialized skills to be maintained (focus on cores) and lower maintenance burden.  If the kit is deployable for some ops (eg. peacekeeping), so much the better, although it risks the pool being taken away.


----------



## Infanteer

This conversation is going at this backwards.  The discussion on crews is a doctrinal matter, while the discussion on structure is related to land force roles and missions.  The latter should feed the former - so instead of starting with "how many people do we put in a LAV", the conversation should be on "what strategic roles and missions is the Army expected to conduct."  Work from the top down.

Here is a good example of where the discussion should start.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Our Army should have NATO commitment on the continent in defence of NATO allies as part of our mission set. We also need a force to handle COIN missions as well as more traditional peacekeeping and stability operations. And of course our next shooting war will be something unexpected, but it will likely have aspects of all those types of operations.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> When do troops learn how to use “the big gear” if it is all parked on another continent? How many fewer people get to experience resourced collective training because the kit is held out of country?
> 
> You say that you want all this kit in Latvia so our troops can experience combined arms training. There will be a whole lot less of that experience if we have balanced our resources so that Europe is the only place to do the training.
> ... And the little Adazi training area is not the best place to really stretch mechanized training. We have better at home.


If a battle group with one squadron of tanks and one mech rifle company exhausts all our "big gear" then we have a much larger problem than we think and we should all go home with our tails between our legs.

That said, we could use Europe as our CMTC for whatever sized organization we feel should be there. Units could rotate through to do whatever test exercises we consider useful as a check on training status and to get experience in a multinational environment. Leave a core staff of exercise controllers and equipment maintainers with everyone else being flown there and back by our transport squadrons.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> This conversation is going at this backwards.  The discussion on crews is a doctrinal matter, while the discussion on structure is related to land force roles and missions.  The latter should feed the former - so instead of starting with "how many people do we put in a LAV", the conversation should be on "what strategic roles and missions is the Army expected to conduct."  Work from the top down.
> 
> Here is a good example of where the discussion should start.


*Do we have the size of our force elements right? Is the company, is the squadron, is the battery design that we have now, is it fit for purpose for some of the new capabilities we’re bringing in, and the new way of operating? 
*That is directly from Force 2025; and is what we are talking about. Our role, which you neatly summarized, is frankly a known. We are discussing, within the confines set out in Force 2025, what that force should look like. We have no discussed the higher level, because it has been defined and set out already.


----------



## Kirkhill

Respectfully Infanteer but that is precisely the point in a small army.

We have invested so much in vehicles generally, and LAVs in particular, that just driving them about the countryside eats up a lot of manpower.   

We consume a battalion of infanteers as drivers.   Another battalion as gunners.   And that is from a force with only 9 battalions.  

If we assume that the LAV "needs" a full time vehicle commander then we are allocating an additional battalion of infanteers away from traditional infanteering and committing them to the vehicles.

At that point fully one third of the infantry, 3 out of 9 battalions are committed to the tactical employment of the vehicle leaving 6 battalions available for employment as infantry.   Add in the additional battalion lost in the transport platoons (9 spread across the Reg infantry) and you are now down to an army of 5 battalion equivalents of infantry or 15 company equivalents.

And two/thirds of those, call it 10 company equivalents, are tasked to the LAVs.   That leaves 5 company equivalents to man the 3 non-LAV battalions.

So, yes, the issue of whether or not the LAV needs a permanent vehicle commander separate from the gunner becomes important in determining capabilities available to the government and any Grand Strategy it can develop.

We have spent so much money employing tradesmen in London that it has constrained our ability to develop Grand Strategy.


RCIC 

1 Bn Truck Drivers
1 Bn LAV Drivers
1 Bn LAV Gunners
1 Bn LAV Commanders
3 Bn LAV GIBs (9 Coys)
2 Bn Non LAV infanteers (6 Coys)

CANSOFCOM

1 Bn Special Operators
1 Coy Extra Special Operators.


Given that what else is available  to the Canadian Government to influence events?

What can the RCAC do with its 3 Bn Equivalents of Drivers, Gunners and Commanders?  
Basically it is constrained to form on all those GDLS London LAVs.  

The RCA?  With 37 M777s that can reach out to 30 to 70 km once they find a suitable place to put their trails down?

Those, like the RCIC, are tactical influencers.  They serve Grand Strategy but they don't influence it.  Everybody else in the Army enables the tactical influencers.


The RCAF?

Probably the most flexible Grand Strategy influencer and enabler that DND supplies the Government.  And  doesn't get the attention that it needs in an infantry-centric force.  

They should be central to the Force 2025 planning, and to the Future Force.

The RCN?

Well, its current fleet is well equipped to keep trawlers at bay and to defend  US aircraft carriers.  And provides little in the way of capabilities that Force 2025 could exploit.

On the other hand the first of the CSCs is supposed to have been supplied by the Halifax tradesmen for us within a year or two of Force 2025 and entirely  within the Future Force frame.  And with that comes a slew of potential ordnance and command and control and transport  capabilities that could influence Force 2025.

Missiles and UAVs that can complement, augment and in some cases supplant capabilities that only the RCAF can currently supply.  Mission bays and extra berths that can transport Extra Special Operators, Special Operators, Non-LAV infanteers and LAV infanteers, but, sadly, not their LAVs.  Nor their accompanying RCAC tanks.    The RCA becomes surplus to requirement when the RCN transporting the Extra Special Operators, their helicopters, boats and UAVs, can reach out 1700 km with Tomahawks and SM6s,  185 km with the Naval Strike Missiles and 100 km with the 127mm Vulcano rounds - all capable of precisely engaging moving targets at extreme range.

All of which has left me curious as to how the Latvian Battle Group fits into the development of Force 2025 and the Future Force.  How much effort is being expended on Jointery?  

And why shouldn't the RCA be able to deploy ashore the same capabilities that the RCN can deploy 15 times over from the sea?  I think it would be a significant enabler of Grand Strategy if the RCA were capable of deploying the equivalent of even 3 CSCs ashore.

Given that premise how does the LAV Battalion contribute?  Or are we better off ensuring that, at least the 3 Battalion Equivalents of LAV GIBs are capable of deploying in the Mission Bays of the CSCs with Ultra Light Tactical Mobility Platforms?  Then they can augment the 2 Battalion Equivalents of Non-LAV infanteers and the reinforced Battalion Equivalent of Special and Extra Special Operators?

So, in that context, as far as I am concerned, the issue of whether the LAV needs a commander, whether the RCIC can afford to tie another full battalion of trained infanteers to a vehicle that has limited deployment opportunities and limited domestic utility (advantage of the Bushmaster in fighting floods?), and is a product of an era when the effort was to concentrate riflemen on an objective on a pre-determined and linear battlefied, rather than distribute them rapidly to parts unknown, yes, that battalion of LAV commanders matters.


Whoops! Sorry for the run-on sentence. 

And MarkPPCLI is dead right about the  Canadian Mounted Rifle Reserve.    And integrate them tightly with the LAV Battalions.

But, I still would argue, while agreeing that tactically it makes more sense to tie the GIBs to the LAVs strategically it would be advantageous to separate them.  The best compromise, In My Opinion, is the LAV Coy (or Squadron) attached or embedded within the Rifle Battalion.

The related thought is that I would rather have a larger number of 4 to 6 man sections that can be carried in any vehicles or operate on foot than a smaller number of 8-10 man sections that have to be split to be transported.


----------



## markppcli

Brad Sallows said:


> Res F doesn't need first-line equipment.  Anything fitting the general idea of a carrier with better mobility than a truck should do.  I'd argue the simpler, the better - fewer specialized skills to be maintained (focus on cores) and lower maintenance burden.  If the kit is deployable for some ops (eg. peacekeeping), so much the better, although it risks the pool being taken away.


Right I'm just suggesting there's what we have, and what would be ideal. Ideally we'd have a reg force fully mirrored by the reserves, instead we have access to TAPV. Which we can all agree isn't ideal but it's deployable, and will frankly be good enough.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> This conversation is going at this backwards.  The discussion on crews is a doctrinal matter, while the discussion on structure is related to land force roles and missions.  The latter should feed the former - so instead of starting with "how many people do we put in a LAV", the conversation should be on "what strategic roles and missions is the Army expected to conduct."  Work from the top down.
> 
> Here is a good example of where the discussion should start.



As a project manager I learned a long time ago that the problem needs to be worked from both ends concurrently.  Top Down - What you would like to do.  Bottom Up - What you can do.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Respectfully Infanteer but that is precisely the point in a small army.
> 
> We have invested so much in vehicles generally, and LAVs in particular, that just driving them about the countryside eats up a lot of manpower.
> 
> We consume a battalion of infanteers as drivers.   Another battalion as gunners.   And that is from a force with only 9 battalions.
> 
> If we assume that the LAV "needs" a full time vehicle commander then we are allocating an additional battalion of infanteers away from traditional infanteering and committing them to the vehicles.
> 
> At that point fully one third of the infantry, 3 out of 9 battalions are committed to the tactical employment of the vehicle leaving 6 battalions available for employment as infantry.   Add in the additional battalion lost in the transport platoons (9 spread across the Reg infantry) and you are now down to an army of 5 battalion equivalents of infantry or 15 company equivalents.
> 
> And two/thirds of those, call it 10 company equivalents, are tasked to the LAVs.   That leaves 5 company equivalents to man the 3 non-LAV battalions.
> 
> So, yes, the issue of whether or not the LAV needs a permanent vehicle commander separate from the gunner becomes important in determining capabilities available to the government and any Grand Strategy it can develop.
> 
> We have spent so much money employing tradesmen in London that it has constrained our ability to develop Grand Strategy.
> 
> 
> RCIC
> 
> 1 Bn Truck Drivers
> 1 Bn LAV Drivers
> 1 Bn LAV Gunners
> 1 Bn LAV Commanders
> 3 Bn LAV GIBs (9 Coys)
> 2 Bn Non LAV infanteers (6 Coys)
> 
> CANSOFCOM
> 
> 1 Bn Special Operators
> 1 Coy Extra Special Operators.
> 
> 
> Given that what else is available  to the Canadian Government to influence events?
> 
> What can the RCAC do with its 3 Bn Equivalents of Drivers, Gunners and Commanders?
> Basically it is constrained to form on all those GDLS London LAVs.
> 
> The RCA?  With 37 M777s that can reach out to 30 to 70 km once they find a suitable place to put their trails down?
> 
> Those, like the RCIC, are tactical influencers.  They serve Grand Strategy but they don't influence it.  Everybody else in the Army enables the tactical influencers.
> 
> 
> The RCAF?
> 
> Probably the most flexible Grand Strategy influencer and enabler that DND supplies the Government.  And  doesn't get the attention that it needs in an infantry-centric force.
> 
> They should be central to the Force 2025 planning, and to the Future Force.
> 
> The RCN?
> 
> Well, its current fleet is well equipped to keep trawlers at bay and to defend  US aircraft carriers.  And provides little in the way of capabilities that Force 2025 could exploit.
> 
> On the other hand the first of the CSCs is supposed to have been supplied by the Halifax tradesmen for us within a year or two of Force 2025 and entirely  within the Future Force frame.  And with that comes a slew of potential ordnance and command and control and transport  capabilities that could influence Force 2025.
> 
> Missiles and UAVs that can complement, augment and in some cases supplant capabilities that only the RCAF can currently supply.  Mission bays and extra berths that can transport Extra Special Operators, Special Operators, Non-LAV infanteers and LAV infanteers, but, sadly, not their LAVs.  Nor their accompanying RCAC tanks.    The RCA becomes surplus to requirement when the RCN transporting the Extra Special Operators, their helicopters, boats and UAVs, can reach out 1700 km with Tomahawks and SM6s,  185 km with the Naval Strike Missiles and 100 km with the 127mm Vulcano rounds - all capable of precisely engaging moving targets at extreme range.
> 
> All of which has left me curious as to how the Latvian Battle Group fits into the development of Force 2025 and the Future Force.  How much effort is being expended on Jointery?
> 
> And why shouldn't the RCA be able to deploy ashore the same capabilities that the RCN can deploy 15 times over from the sea?  I think it would be a significant enabler of Grand Strategy if the RCA were capable of deploying the equivalent of even 3 CSCs ashore.
> 
> Given that premise how does the LAV Battalion contribute?  Or are we better off ensuring that, at least the 3 Battalion Equivalents of LAV GIBs are capable of deploying in the Mission Bays of the CSCs with Ultra Light Tactical Mobility Platforms?  Then they can augment the 2 Battalion Equivalents of Non-LAV infanteers and the reinforced Battalion Equivalent of Special and Extra Special Operators?
> 
> So, in that context, as far as I am concerned, the issue of whether the LAV needs a commander, whether the RCIC can afford to tie another full battalion of trained infanteers to a vehicle that has limited deployment opportunities and limited domestic utility (advantage of the Bushmaster in fighting floods?), and is a product of an era when the effort was to concentrate riflemen on an objective on a pre-determined and linear battlefied, rather than distribute them rapidly to parts unknown, yes, that battalion of LAV commanders matters.
> 
> 
> Whoops! Sorry for the run-on sentence.
> 
> And MarkPPCLI is dead right about the  Canadian Mounted Rifle Reserve.    And integrate them tightly with the LAV Battalions.
> 
> But, I still would argue, while agreeing that tactically it makes more sense to tie the GIBs to the LAVs strategically it would be advantageous to separate them.  The best compromise, In My Opinion, is the LAV Coy (or Squadron) attached or embedded within the Rifle Battalion.
> 
> The related thought is that I would rather have a larger number of 4 to 6 man sections that can be carried in any vehicles or operate on foot than a smaller number of 8-10 man sections that have to be split to be transported.


I won't get into all you points but I think we need to consider whether or no that LAV is crewed by infantry or armour, the size of the force isn't going to change. Which is I think Infanteer's point now that I see it through that lens. I would suggest that in a force that will not grow, they should stay a) because I do believe the structure is superior regardless and b) you won't get increased manning so you may as well get increased integration. 

A better question I think worth asking is given Canada's inability and historic unwillingness, true of most middle powers, to conduct initial theatre entry, is there a reason to maintain 3 Bn of light infantry? In a war of maneuver, the CMBGs are supposed to be moving at mechanized speeds, the only way for the Light Bn to keep up is to be mounted in trucks and that's the worst of both worlds. Would it be better to maintain a single Bn of high readiness, rapidly deployable, conventional infantry and then back fill the rest of the RCIC with the left overs so to speak?  Or use those extra PY's to fill out a new counter UAV / GBAD capability?


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> *Do we have the size of our force elements right? Is the company, is the squadron, is the battery design that we have now, is it fit for purpose for some of the new capabilities we’re bringing in, and the new way of operating? *
> That is directly from Force 2025; and is what we are talking about. Our role, which you neatly summarized, is frankly a known. We are discussing, within the confines set out in Force 2025, what that force should look like. We have no discussed the higher level, because it has been defined and set out already.


If it has been defined and set out already, then what is it?

Force 2025 is derived from the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy (CAMS).  CAMS speaks to things like "interoperability within ABCANZ" and a "Global Response Task Force."  What do these mean?  Perhaps we should consider those before a company ORBAT?  When I read the CAMS sections on Force 2025, the explicit tasks are to "validate its ability to generate sufficient forces to meet the mission concurrency requirements" in various policies, as well as to "validate the functions, organization, and distribution of land formations..."

Again, start big, then go small.  Digging into sub-units at this point is missing the forest for the trees.


----------



## Kirkhill

> A better question I think worth asking is given Canada's inability and historic unwillingness, true of most middle powers, to conduct initial theatre entry, is there a reason to maintain 3 Bn of light infantry? In a war of maneuver, the CMBGs are supposed to be moving at mechanized speeds, the only way for the Light Bn to keep up is to be mounted in trucks and that's the worst of both worlds. Would it be better to maintain a single Bn of high readiness, rapidly deployable, conventional infantry and then back fill the rest of the RCIC with the left overs so to speak? Or use those extra PY's to fill out a new counter UAV / GBAD capability?




Or transfer the PYs from the RCIC to the RCA and CANSOFCOM?


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> If it has been defined and set out already, then what is it?
> 
> Force 2025 is derived from the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy (CAMS).  CAMS speaks to things like "interoperability within ABCANZ" and a "Global Response Task Force."  What do these mean?  Perhaps we should consider those before a company ORBAT?  When I read the CAMS sections on Force 2025, the explicit tasks are to "validate its ability to generate sufficient forces to meet the mission concurrency requirements" in various policies, as well as to "validate the functions, organization, and distribution of land formations..."
> 
> Again, start big, then go small.  Digging into sub-units at this point is missing the forest for the trees.



Forests are defined by their trees.  You can stand a 40,000 ft and observe that canopy and conclude that the forest is impassable.  And then you discover that the Panzers were manoeuvering between the trees.  The trees matter.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> If it has been defined and set out already, then what is it?
> 
> Force 2025 is derived from the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy (CAMS).  CAMS speaks to things like "interoperability within ABCANZ" and a "Global Response Task Force."  What do these mean?  Perhaps we should consider those before a company ORBAT?  When I read the CAMS sections on Force 2025, the explicit tasks are to "validate its ability to generate sufficient forces to meet the mission concurrency requirements" in various policies, as well as to "validate the functions, organization, and distribution of land formations..."
> 
> Again, start big, then go small.  Digging into sub-units at this point is missing the forest for the trees


Read Core Competancies :
The key Canadian Army characteristics remain largely unchanged:


The Canadian Army retains the ability to integrate capabilities to create a combined arms effect;
The Canadian Army’s heart is its professional soldiers, organized within a brigade group structure, and capable of conducting operations within a joint and pan-domain context;
The Canadian Army remains adaptive. Canadian Army institutions, in particular the school-houses, work to retain this characteristic. The Canadian Army finds opportunities in ambiguity; and
The Canadian Army is an increasingly network-enabled, medium land force augmented by light and heavy forces. Its composition optimizes versatility across the spectrum of missions and unique environments. The medium force allows the Canadian Army to provide task-tailored forces ready to respond broadly to many conflict types. The light forces offer strategic and operational agility, especially in rapidly evolving situations and in complex terrain. The heavy capabilities remain essential to enabling combat-effective medium weight forces and sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise.
Further

Assumptions​
There will be no fundamental changes to policy or resource allocation, and the Canadian Army’s modernization goals will remain relevant to the achievement of Canada’s defence objectives;
Subsequent planning horizons will be impacted by moderate policy and resource adjustments. This will necessitate a constant multi-horizon development perspective, meaning this document will require periodic updating;
Modernization efforts must be undertaken concurrent to force generation and force employment on operations. There will be no pause. Efforts must be managed and prioritized, with the tempo of change being a key lever of control; and,
Significant growth in structure is unlikely. All modernization efforts will be conducted with the perspective that every change in capability, structure, or organization must be done within the Canadian Army’s existing personnel envelope.
So we are discussing the changes within that context. What does the future Bde look like given that that structure will likely remain unchanged, and that manning will not be substantially different. Small changes, ie Bn / Coy Orbats are where we will see change. Given the recent history of the Canadian Forces I find the larger questions of national strategy boring, as our employment level is the tactical.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Forests are defined by their trees.  You can stand a 40,000 ft and observe that canopy and conclude that the forest is impassable.  And then you discover that the Panzers were manoeuvering between the trees.  The trees matter.


Sure.

I've been in many of the Force 2025 discussions occurring right now, and I'll tell you that "who is the LAV crew commander" is not on anyone's radar.


markppcli said:


> Read Core Competancies :
> The key Canadian Army characteristics remain largely unchanged:
> 
> 
> The Canadian Army retains the ability to integrate capabilities to create a combined arms effect;
> The Canadian Army’s heart is its professional soldiers, organized within a brigade group structure, and capable of conducting operations within a joint and pan-domain context;
> The Canadian Army remains adaptive. Canadian Army institutions, in particular the school-houses, work to retain this characteristic. The Canadian Army finds opportunities in ambiguity; and
> The Canadian Army is an increasingly network-enabled, medium land force augmented by light and heavy forces. Its composition optimizes versatility across the spectrum of missions and unique environments. The medium force allows the Canadian Army to provide task-tailored forces ready to respond broadly to many conflict types. The light forces offer strategic and operational agility, especially in rapidly evolving situations and in complex terrain. The heavy capabilities remain essential to enabling combat-effective medium weight forces and sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise.
> So we are discussing the changes within that context. What does the future Bde look like given that that structure will likely remain unchanged, and that manning will not be substantially different. Small changes, ie Bn / Coy Orbats are where we will see change. Given the recent history of the Canadian Forces I find the larger questions of national strategy boring, as our employment level is the tactical.



That isn't a list of strategic considerations that would give way to structural factors.  It's a shopping list of adjectives.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> Sure.
> 
> I've been in many of the Force 2025 discussions occurring right now, and I'll tell you that "who is the LAV crew commander" is not on anyone's radar.
> 
> 
> That isn't a list of strategic considerations that would give way to structural factors.  It's a shopping list of adjectives.


My point form that post was the major changes are not going to happen. It's going to be about small changes. Everything the army writes is buzz word centric. I mean look at this stuff:

Central to this guidance are the eight core missions of the CAF. The CAF will:


Detect, deter, and defend against threats to or attacks on Canada;
Detect, deter, and defend against threats to or attacks on North America in partnership with the United States, and through NORAD;
Lead and/or contribute forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global stability;
Lead and/or contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions within the UN, NATO, and other multilateral partners;
Engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad;
Provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad;
Provide assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies; and,
Conduct search and rescue operations.21
This isn't a staff college, I have no interest in discussing that stuff. I enjoy an intelligent, professional conversation about how the army works at my level. Since that's clearly inappropriate here, I shall retire to my previous lurking. Enjoy your gate sir, you guard it well.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Sure.
> 
> I've been in many of the Force 2025 discussions occurring right now, and I'll tell you that "who is the LAV crew commander" is not on anyone's radar.
> 
> 
> That isn't a list of strategic considerations that would give way to structural factors.  It's a shopping list of adjectives.



How about "Where, when, how, why and how often will we deploy the LAV battalions?"  And what is the replacement plan when the supply is exhausted?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> My point form that post was the major changes are not going to happen. It's going to be about small changes. Everything the army writes is buzz word centric. I mean look at this stuff:
> 
> Central to this guidance are the eight core missions of the CAF. The CAF will:
> 
> 
> Detect, deter, and defend against threats to or attacks on Canada;
> Detect, deter, and defend against threats to or attacks on North America in partnership with the United States, and through NORAD;
> Lead and/or contribute forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global stability;
> Lead and/or contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions within the UN, NATO, and other multilateral partners;
> Engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad;
> Provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad;
> Provide assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies; and,
> Conduct search and rescue operations.21
> This isn't a staff college, I have no interest in discussing that stuff. I enjoy an intelligent, professional conversation about how the army works at my level. Since that's clearly inappropriate here, *I shall retire to my previous lurking*. Enjoy your gate sir, you guard it well.



Don't.


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> My point form that post was the major changes are not going to happen.


The COAs that are being considered for analysis are, I'd venture, fairly significant.




markppcli said:


> Central to this guidance are the eight core missions of the CAF. The CAF will:



Those are policy statements.  The next level below is to consider how to assign resources and probable tasks to those policy statements.



markppcli said:


> This isn't a staff college, I have no interest in discussing that stuff. I enjoy an intelligent, professional conversation about how the army works at my level. Since that's clearly inappropriate here, I shall retire to my previous lurking. Enjoy your gate sir, you guard it well.


Feel free to throw your teddy bear in the corner.  I was only challenging the logic of the notion of jumping straight to Step 5 when the intermediate steps should be considered first in this thread.  Sorry that you feel threatened by this.

There are plenty of threads that talk about LAV crews, along with those that talk about how many soldiers should be in a rifle section, or how many guns in a battery, or tanks in a troop.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> How about "Where, when, how, why and how often will we deploy the LAV battalions?"  And what is the replacement plan when the supply is exhausted?


Now we're cooking with gas.


----------



## Kirkhill

So what answers are you coming up with?


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> This conversation is going at this backwards.  The discussion on crews is a doctrinal matter, while the discussion on structure is related to land force roles and missions.  The latter should feed the former - so instead of starting with "how many people do we put in a LAV", the conversation should be on "what strategic roles and missions is the Army expected to conduct."  Work from the top down.
> 
> Here is a good example of where the discussion should start.


You're bang on and you and I have had this discussion in this forum and elsewhere before.

Like T2B (and you unless you've changed your mind recently) I'm heavily into reforming into three asynchronous brigades: one targeted and equipped for heavy mech high intensity warfare (preferably with three combined arms battalions of two tank squadrons and two mech companies each) one equipped with three light infantry battalions as a rapid reaction force (and closely affiliated with the Special Operations Command for both northern services as well as a national/international QRF) and one as a medium weight more peacekeeping foreign service oriented one (with three LAV battalions).

There is no one all singing and dancing doctrine which covers all three albeit that basic infantry skills do form the core of all three but thereafter there is entirely too much specialization and too much specialist equipment required for each role. If each brigade routinely trains within its own skill sets/doctrine then there is much less need for lengthy pre-deployment training.

Reserves have a major role and also need specialized equipment and training. I've always maintained that the Reg F job is to fill those jobs which need extensive day to day training to stay competent or which may require a response to deploy on very short notice. Reserves, on the other hand should fill those jobs which have a lower skill level and which are not needed day to day but only in very major circumstances - there are many such jobs running from many support trades to combat trades such as artillery and even armour. To say that our current reserve structure is inadequate is an understatement. It needs major restructuring from the legislative level on up if it is to be a dependable.

Obviously we need to change our approach to fleet management and managed readiness cycles. We should focus readiness back to constant readiness rather than three (or even two stage) readiness which guarantees that 1/3 to 2/3 of our force is not ready to deploy. That also requires better management on how much of our force can be operationally deployed at any given time. If three combined arms battalions are not capable of keeping a half battlegroup in Latvia on a continuous basis then perhaps that brigade needs four such battalions long term. If the rapid reaction light brigade or the medium brigade has few deployments to handle then maybe it can get by quite comfortably with just two battalions. Battalions can always be rerolled if given sufficient time and equipment without the necessity of physically moving from base to base. A change in command affiliation is sufficient.

I think that infantry and even artillery is easiest to sort out. Infantry because it needs to conform to the core roles of the brigades. Artillery because the job is generally the same and much of the actual fire power can be relegated to the reserves while the FOO and FSCC jobs stay Reg F. Artillery equipment rather than personnel is the biggest issue. The armoured corps is, IMHO, the biggest problem in that it needs a better development of the separation in tank capability for the heavy brigade (in my mind in combined arms battalions/regiments) and a more proper delineation of what constitutes reconnaissance and/or cavalry across all the three of the specializations.

And then there is logistics across the board - we need a much better system that does not rob brigades and battalions of vital resources (both personnel and materiel) in order to form NSEs. There needs to be a very capable and flexible organization of both Reg F and Res support units which can be tapped on a regular and ongoing system to provide that rear link. IMHO NSEs should be smaller than they are now because deployed elements should take their own A and B Echs to do their normal doctrinal roles while NSEs should essentially only form the "rear link" and provide the support functions expected above unit level. That would require a delicate balance as between Bde service battalions (so that they continue to be able to fulfill the Bde's essential support in garrison functions) and specialized sustainment units which fill above (or outside) brigade level support tasks.

Finally, do we really need NCEs? We already have numerous bloated headquarters that look over a deployed battlegroup's shoulders. Sometimes there is a bde headquarters and then we have CJOC and on occasion 1 Div. We need to reduce layers. Do we really need to deploy a bde HQ when we deploy a battle group and less? Do we really need a 1 Cdn Div if we have no war plans to deploy a division. And if we ever do deploy one what's wrong with one of the two remaining divisional HQ (and yes, I think we need to reduce our Div HQs to two, 2 Div for everything including Petawawa and everything east of the Ottawa River and 3 Div for everything west of the Ottawa river (less Petawawa). Is there really any reason why the role of an NCE or bde HQ can't be handled form a slightly beefed up section of CJOC responsible for handling the named operation. If we form part of a force where Canada would be handling other battalions other than it's own battlegroup then by all means send a brigade headquarters (ensuring there is some depth to keep the day to day activities in the brigade back home perking) but unless there is a need for Canada to command a brigade, keep the brigade HQ at home.

Okay.

Back to my regular day.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> So what answers are you coming up with?



I would start by going:

Europe, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Asian-Pacific, North America, South America.

What is the Army likely to be doing in these places, how would it go about doing them, and what is the priority?


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> I won't get into all you points but I think we need to consider whether or no that LAV is crewed by infantry or armour, the size of the force isn't going to change.


Disagree re whether LAV should be infantry or armour - that's just playing with PYs and cap badges. I do believe that we need combined arms battalions like the Americans that are habitually paired armour and mech infantry within the same battalion. I don't care if the battalion is called 2 PPCLI or LdSH. In fact to keep traps shut I would suggest 1 CMBG has 1 and 2 PPCLI and the LdSH as their three combined arms battalions with each equipped identically.


markppcli said:


> Which is I think Infanteer's point now that I see it through that lens. I would suggest that in a force that will not grow, they should stay a) because I do believe the structure is superior regardless and b) you won't get increased manning so you may as well get increased integration.
> 
> A better question I think worth asking is given Canada's inability and historic unwillingness, true of most middle powers, to conduct initial theatre entry, is there a reason to maintain 3 Bn of light infantry?


The idea of a light battalion within a bde of two mech battalions makes sense only if you never intend to deploy the bde as an entity. Don't even get me started on the 8 gun ultra light howitzer artillery regiment.

There numerous roles for light forces including entry into a hostile OOTW theatre, northern operations, operations in mountainous terrain, operations in urban terrain, even foreign assistance training etc. My only problem is the way they are grouped. I prefer to see them in a single brigade with 2-3 battalions without tanks and modest engineer and artillery support (possibly hybrid Reg F and Res F regiments) so that the training and employment is all to a common doctrine.



markppcli said:


> In a war of maneuver, the CMBGs are supposed to be moving at mechanized speeds, the only way for the Light Bn to keep up is to be mounted in trucks and that's the worst of both worlds. Would it be better to maintain a single Bn of high readiness, rapidly deployable, conventional infantry and then back fill the rest of the RCIC with the left overs so to speak?  Or use those extra PY's to fill out a new counter UAV / GBAD capability?


Agreed that a CMBG targeted for high intensity combat should be organized, equipped and trained for only that role.  There's a reason why US Army manoeuvre brigades are designed as ABCTs, SBCTs and IBCTs each with its own doctrine for employment. So far we've gotten away with our structure because we do not consider the brigade as the smallest unit of action. We think in battle groups which are structured with a building block force structure mentality. That has a great cost in our ability to function properly at brigade level or above. The trouble is when the time comes where we have to commit a full brigade in a high intensity conflict (which many here think will never happen because we choose where we fight) we won't have the skill sets much less the gear to do so. Quite frankly, the way we organize the Army is a function that has been assumed by the Army for decades and is not the conscious decision of any government. Our inability to function (properly) as brigades is a self inflicted wound that's been two decades in the making.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Near term or long term?  

Grand Strategy  is not about Force 2025.   2050?  Definitely.  2100?  Probably.

The Canadian Armed Forces is primarily a body of people.  And the budget reflects that.

But the advantage they offer the government is defined by their equipment.  Their ability to influence events is defined by the engines the supervise, the launchers they operate and the munitions they deliver.

We focus on the people to the detriment of the influence the are capable of exerting if we don't consider first the technological opportunities currently available




FJAG said:


> You're bang on and you and I have had this discussion in this forum and elsewhere before.
> 
> ...
> 
> Obviously we need to change our approach to fleet management and managed readiness cycles. We should focus readiness back to constant readiness rather than three (or even two stage) readiness which guarantees that 1/3 to 2/3 of our force is not ready to deploy. That also requires better management on how much of our force can be operationally deployed at any given time. If three combined arms battalions are not capable of keeping a half battlegroup in Latvia on a continuous basis then perhaps that brigade needs four such battalions long term. If the rapid reaction light brigade or the medium brigade has few deployments to handle then maybe it can get by quite comfortably with just two battalions. Battalions can always be rerolled if given sufficient time and equipment without the necessity of physically moving from base to base. A change in command affiliation is sufficient.



No argument on the thrust.   I still want to leave open for discussion whether 15 LAVs with 150 infanteers  (Dr/Gnr/CC-7GIBs) on board is of more, less or equal value as 25 LAVs with 90 infanteers (Dr/Gnr - 4 GIBs) or 15 LAVs with 90 infanteers with drones,  CG-84 munitions, ALAWs and NLOS missiles)?

Agree with the two battalion light force, or even making it part of the CANSOF complex




FJAG said:


> I think that infantry and even artillery is easiest to sort out. Infantry because it needs to conform to the core roles of the brigades. Artillery because the job is generally the same and much of the actual fire power can be relegated to the reserves while the FOO and FSCC jobs stay Reg F. Artillery equipment rather than personnel is the biggest issue. The armoured corps is, IMHO, the biggest problem in that it needs a better development of the separation in tank capability for the heavy brigade (in my mind in combined arms battalions/regiments) and a more proper delineation of what constitutes reconnaissance and/or cavalry across all the three of the specializations.



Artillery may be easy to sort out at the tactical level.   But my personal belief is that is an under utilized and under appreciated asset that could make much better use of some of those infantry PYs.  120mm and 155mm launched loitering ISR munitions with 100 km range?  Himars launchers?  NASAMS launchers?  FOO/FAC teams?  Directing Cruise, Ballistic and HyperVelocity strike missions?   

How many infanteers, with what gear, does it take to permit the FOO/FAC teams to operate safely?




FJAG said:


> And then there is logistics across the board - we need a much better system that does not rob brigades and battalions of vital resources (both personnel and materiel) in order to form NSEs. There needs to be a very capable and flexible organization of both Reg F and Res support units which can be tapped on a regular and ongoing system to provide that rear link. IMHO NSEs should be smaller than they are now because deployed elements should take their own A and B Echs to do their normal doctrinal roles while NSEs should essentially only form the "rear link" and provide the support functions expected above unit level. That would require a delicate balance as between Bde service battalions (so that they continue to be able to fulfill the Bde's essential support in garrison functions) and specialized sustainment units which fill above (or outside) brigade level support tasks.



The area with the greatest domestic utility that should therefore be the easiest sell.



FJAG said:


> Finally, do we really need NCEs? We already have numerous bloated headquarters that look over a deployed battlegroup's shoulders. Sometimes there is a bde headquarters and then we have CJOC and on occasion 1 Div. We need to reduce layers. Do we really need to deploy a bde HQ when we deploy a battle group and less? Do we really need a 1 Cdn Div if we have no war plans to deploy a division. And if we ever do deploy one what's wrong with one of the two remaining divisional HQ (and yes, I think we need to reduce our Div HQs to two, 2 Div for everything including Petawawa and everything east of the Ottawa River and 3 Div for everything west of the Ottawa river (less Petawawa). Is there really any reason why the role of an NCE or bde HQ can't be handled form a slightly beefed up section of CJOC responsible for handling the named operation. If we form part of a force where Canada would be handling other battalions other than it's own battlegroup then by all means send a brigade headquarters (ensuring there is some depth to keep the day to day activities in the brigade back home perking) but unless there is a need for Canada to command a brigade, keep the brigade HQ at home.



I share the general reluctance to create more command centers.  But that is an inevitable function of Dispersed Operations, surely?  

The question, as far as I am concerned, is are those command elements able to effectively influence their area of interest?  How many buttons does each command cell have to push and what happens when they push them?

A stack of command cells stacked one on top of each other, each with only one button, is nonsense.   A flat pyramid of semi-autonomous cells with multiple buttons is sensible.


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> If a battle group with one squadron of tanks and one mech rifle company exhausts all our "big gear" then we have a much larger problem than we think ...


The availability & maintainability of our tanks means that putting our three tank squadrons in three geographically distant training areas will have the effect of ensuring our collective training rarely will go larger than a half squadron.




FJAG said:


> That said, we could use Europe as our CMTC for whatever sized organization we feel should be there. Units could rotate through to do whatever test exercises we consider useful as a check on training status and to get experience in a multinational environment. Leave a core staff of exercise controllers and equipment maintainers with everyone else being flown there and back by our transport squadrons.


If you want to move CMTC to Europe then you will guarantee reduced throughput (so less people getting exposed to the training) and increased costs. A a half BG of kit in Latvia for the glory of Canadian combat team training in Latvia is an answer looking for its question. If the BG needs capabilities that Canada can provide, then we can send those. But we won't improve collective training by trying to make the eFP BG a primary mechanism to deliver CT.



Infanteer said:


> Yes, but that misses the point.  The LAV needs a crew commander, needs a gunner, and needs a driver.  Which section that person belongs to and what cap badge he or she wears is irrelevant to the Army's structure for 2025, as those positions need to be filled.
> 
> If you're advocating shelving platforms because of changes to numbers of sub-units, then we're talking about something different.


Where our structure is still largely reflective of the work of Force 2013, we have a lot of organization that is designed around equipment & PYs that don't exist. Demi-platoons that have allocated only PYs for a section but are intended to be the nucleus of a full platoon on operations.  Unit & sub-unit echelons with all the PYs to remain mobile & deliver the support but none of the required vehicles are available. Most of these are vestiges of past structures that we still want but cannot afford in multiples of three.  

Do we really need brigades?  SSE espoused that brigades were important, but maybe it is just the Bde HQ and an assortment of BGs that are what we need. But we say we want mobile brigades and we tie-up a lot of resources (PY & Eqpt) in dysfunctional echelon and HQ elements that exist to enable mobility but which cannot actually provide mobility. If mobile brigades are important and we are not going to increase resources, then we need to consolidate the existing resources into fewer mobile brigades. If mobility is not important and our brigades can be anchored to FOBs/infrastructure, then maybe we can keep all the brigades but there are resources that can be allocated away from HQ & CSS mobility.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I think our Army has a number of psyches or Jungian archetypes. We have the Germany-era CMBG. Much of our structure and way of thought is derived from that. Its our received "good place." We have the rotational Battegroup in the Balkans, which morphed somewhat in the early Afghan days. One deployed Battlegroup that gets replaced every six months. One or maybe two battlegroups worth of "real gear." Then we have the hybrid TFK model with a rotational Bde HQ and a rotational BG plus enablers. 

If we want a CMBG to fight conventionally in the Germany construct we have the structure (more or less) but not the equipment. I think the assumption here is that it would be a single pulse and not a rotation. I think we have the structure and equipment for a rotational BG in a UN peacekeeping or even COIN role. For the TFK model we have our muscle memory and some equipment from Kandahar, now ten years since real use. 

Perhaps for the conventional fight we need to think along the lines of a well-enabled BG instead of a CMBG.


----------



## MilEME09

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I think our Army has a number of psyches or Jungian archetypes. We have the Germany-era CMBG. Much of our structure and way of thought is derived from that. Its our received "good place." We have the rotational Battegroup in the Balkans, which morphed somewhat in the early Afghan days. One deployed Battlegroup that gets replaced every six months. One or maybe two battlegroups worth of "real gear." Then we have the hybrid TFK model with a rotational Bde HQ and a rotational BG plus enablers.
> 
> If we want a CMBG to fight conventionally in the Germany construct we have the structure (more or less) but not the equipment. I think the assumption here is that it would be a single pulse and not a rotation. I think we have the structure and equipment for a rotational BG in a UN peacekeeping or even COIN role. For the TFK model we have our muscle memory and some equipment from Kandahar, now ten years since real use.
> 
> Perhaps for the conventional fight we need to think along the lines of a well-enabled BG instead of a CMBG.


Part of our problem too is we have five divisions with regular forces elements sprinkled across then all. It would be more effective for command and control if all reg force elements were under 1 Div, then have a 2nd Div for all reserve CBGs to report to.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Turning back to Force 2025, what capabilities are we willing to divest or allow to become dormant?


----------



## markppcli

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Turning back to Force 2025, what capabilities are we willing to divest or allow to become dormant?


I'll renter and pick up my teddy bear for this one.

Force 2025, to me, seems to placing emphasis back on our conventional warfighting capability. To be able to do that we need Air Defence, and probably more artillery in general. We probably don't need boutique light infantry companies, I would suggest that the Mountain Warfare role can be assigned to literally any other infantry unit, who can simply park the LAVs for that task. The theatre entry role is probably the domain of CSOR with a follow on force arriving by air. So in short I would say the majority of our Light Bns can be divested.


----------



## quadrapiper

markppcli said:


> I'll renter and pick up my teddy bear for this one.
> 
> Force 2025, to me, seems to placing emphasis back on our conventional warfighting capability. To be able to do that we need Air Defence, and probably more artillery in general. We probably don't need boutique light infantry companies, I would suggest that the Mountain Warfare role can be assigned to literally any other infantry unit, who can simply park the LAVs for that task. The theatre entry role is probably the domain of CSOR with a follow on force arriving by air. So in short I would say the majority of our Light Bns can be divested.


Outsider question: are the jump companies less valuable now that CSOR exists?


----------



## Kirkhill

Howsabout.....

Two times LAV based Combined Arms Brigades built on something like the Swedish model
An arty brigade based around replicating the capabilities of the RCN on shore with a dedicated Fire Control Regiment.
Beefing up CANSOF by adding an additional light battalion.


For Reference - 




The Swedish model is based on two "smaller" "LAV" companies per battalion paired with two organic "smaller" "Leo2" squadrons per battalion.  In practice it is 22 MBTs and 22 LAVs (IIRC) together with 2x Mor Pl, 1x AD Pl, 1x AT Pl and a raft of AT weapons carried aboard the LAVs for use by the dismounts (at ranges out to 4 km)


----------



## Infanteer

quadrapiper said:


> Outsider question: are the jump companies less valuable now that CSOR exists?



Were they valuable before CSOR existed?



			https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/WhenFailureThrives.pdf


----------



## Kirkhill

Of course we are going to need to get some bigger boats and planes if we focus on the LAV.  The Army may have to buy them for the Air Force and the Navy.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> Of course we are going to need to get some bigger boats and planes if we focus on the LAV.  The Army may have to buy them for the Air Force and the Navy.


"The requirement to win in close combat precedes all other requirements, today and into the future. With specific light and heavy capabilities, the Canadian Army is predominantly a medium-weight force equipped with the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) 6 family of vehicles that will serve as its core manoeuvre platform beyond Build 2 - Force 2030." This is from the Army Modernization Strategy. 

Why do we need to buy bigger ships and planes? What is your readiness concept that requires fully-loaded LAV battalions afloat on RCN-flagged ships? We have several decades of experience moving BGs across the world. Not to say that it is easy - it isn't. But we can do it.


----------



## FJAG

of all of the above quotes, these two interest me the most:



TangoTwoBravo said:


> ...
> If we want a CMBG to fight conventionally in the Germany construct we have the structure (more or less) but not the equipment. I think the assumption here is that it would be a single pulse and not a rotation. I think we have the structure and equipment for a rotational BG in a UN peacekeeping or even COIN role. For the TFK model we have our muscle memory and some equipment from Kandahar, now ten years since real use.
> 
> Perhaps for the conventional fight we need to think along the lines of a well-enabled BG instead of a CMBG.





TangoTwoBravo said:


> Turning back to Force 2025, what capabilities are we willing to divest or allow to become dormant?


We have an Army where the website says we consist of:



> 23,000 members serve as full-time soldiers in the Regular Force
> 19,000 are part-time, volunteer soldiers in the Reserve Force
> including 5,300 Rangers who serve in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada
> 
> 3,300 civilian employees who support the Army
> 63 Regular Force and 123 Reserve Force Units in 127 Communities
> 185 Ranger Patrols in 414 Communities


That's 36,700 who are potentially deployable. (do we really only have 13,700 primary reservists or is the Army's own web page out of whack?) In any event that well over a division and a half of folks. We have enough equipment for an armoured regiment, six LAV battalions and a proper 18 gun artillery regiment plus a good number of equipped engineers and support trades yet we wonder about whether we should be thinking of deploying nothing more than a "well-enabled BG"? We're seriously discussing divesting or making dormant even more capabilities?

As a Canadian taxpayer I want to take back ten billion per year because it's obviously being utterly wasted as an insurance policy for our national defence. I don't know what it's being spent on but a defence capability ain't one of them.

The government gives the Army funding to permit the manning for almost two divisions (Reg and Res combined). It behooves us to create a doctrine commensurate with that manning (albeit in a perfect world we should work out the doctrine first and build the manning afterwards but ... Canada). That doctrine should be the roadmap for everything else that makes up the Army as a whole - from cognitive, to procedural, to organizational, to material, and to moral components of how to make an army fight (yup and somewhere way down the line that doctrine should determine if we have 2 or 3 guys crewing a LAV [or even if it should be a LAV] and how many guys are needed for dismounts).

Instead of being a doctrine-based army we have become a capabilities-based army which in short means trying to figure out what we can do with the shit we've got. That's wrong on so many levels. And for full disclosure that's not a new thought I've had - it comes from Ian Hope's article "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" that was published in the Army and Training Bulletin in 2001/2. It was true then and its even more true today.

Folks. We're desperately in need of figuring out what the Army's role in Canada's defence is (and I believe a forward presence and an ability to deploy much more than 1/2 of a BG is involved as just one part of that, and should include special forces, quick reaction, medium weight peacekeepers and a whole herd of enabling systems from EW, UAV, loitering munitions etc) and then build and sell that doctrine with all of its consequences. And it needs to be a doctrine that can rapidly change as threats and capabilities change. We need to add capabilities. I can't think of a single one to divest - maybe change some from active to reserve status yes, but divest, no. And the reality is that we will be locked into some systems that we have now for some time to come but that doesn't mean we stay frozen in time and don't think outside the box and plan for the things that are needed to be successful in high intensity conflict

We simply cannot afford to have another 20 year Army Transformation plan like the one that led us to where we are now.

End of rant.

Returning to writing about history

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> Were they valuable before CSOR existed?
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/WhenFailureThrives.pdf





Kirkhill said:


> Howsabout.....
> 
> Two times LAV based Combined Arms Brigades built on something like the Swedish model
> An arty brigade based around replicating the capabilities of the RCN on shore with a dedicated Fire Control Regiment.
> Beefing up CANSOF by adding an additional light battalion.
> 
> 
> For Reference -
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Swedish model is based on two "smaller" "LAV" companies per battalion paired with two organic "smaller" "Leo2" squadrons per battalion.  In practice it is 22 MBTs and 22 LAVs (IIRC) together with 2x Mor Pl, 1x AD Pl, 1x AT Pl and a raft of AT weapons carried aboard the LAVs for use by the dismounts (at ranges out to 4 km)


Why attach it to CANSOFCOM? A single, airmobile, light BN held at Divisional level for a high readiness conventional force should be more than adequate, the Aussies do that with their Amphib Bn.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> "The requirement to win in close combat precedes all other requirements, today and into the future. With specific light and heavy capabilities, the Canadian Army is predominantly a medium-weight force equipped with the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) 6 family of vehicles that will serve as its core manoeuvre platform beyond Build 2 - Force 2030." This is from the Army Modernization Strategy.
> 
> Why do we need to buy bigger ships and planes? What is your readiness concept that requires fully-loaded LAV battalions afloat on RCN-flagged ships? We have several decades of experience moving BGs across the world. Not to say that it is easy - it isn't. But we can do it.



I don't see the need to keep a Battle Group afloat.  I do wonder how we get a Battlegroup from Edmonton to "unknown point on the globe" in a timely fashion that allows it to influence events for the government of Canada.

I just kind of thought that some means of transporting 40 tonne LAVs and 60 tonne tanks in useful numbers might require more transport than we currently have available to us.

And it would be good if the transport could move fast.


----------



## IRepoCans

quadrapiper said:


> Outsider question: are the jump companies less valuable now that CSOR exists?


Considering neither have touched on theatre entry in quite some time (jumping with the 82nd or the 173rd onto an airfield once every few years doesn't count), you could argue both are inappropriate for the role. The joint theatre entry experts (the Ranger Battalions) conduct an annual 8-week (per manoeuvre bn) package on all the skill sets required in addition to conducting Coy to Bn level seizures of airfields; ports; and, establishing TLZs to actually allow for a follow-on force to flow through (all under the conditions of fighting a near peer adversary). That's not even considering all other agencies and entities that would have to partake as well to maintain proficiency, so I'm at a loss of why we still think we can do theatre entry.

If we just want a light infantry force just to fight dismounted to dominate complex terrain, nothing stops a mechanized bn from re-rolling to do so; the reverse as I understand it, is not as simple. So what is the kind of light force we require, and what is it actually going to actually be proficient at? Because as it stands, light forces are basically lav bns in waiting (or backfill for dismounts with how the reserves are).



markppcli said:


> Why attach it to CANSOFCOM? A single, airmobile, light BN held at Divisional level for a high readiness conventional force should be more than adequate, the Aussies do that with their Amphib Bn.


Maybe not attach it to CANSOF, but definitely heavily integrated to support some of their missions, which in turn support the Div / theatre.


----------



## Kirkhill

So, per T2B, we have the structure.  We just don't have the kit.
Per FJAG, we have a useful amount of kit but our structure and, dare I say it, doctrine fails us.

I kind of lean towards FJAG's estimate.

Although I would offer that 



> enough equipment for an armoured regiment, six LAV battalions and a proper 18 gun artillery regiment plus a good number of equipped engineers and support trades



could be reconfigured as two brigades each with a Combined Arms "Pansar" type regiment, a pair of LAV battalions and an 18 gun regiment, plus engineers, support et al.



markppcli said:


> Why attach it to CANSOFCOM? A single, airmobile, light BN held at Divisional level for a high readiness conventional force should be more than adequate, the Aussies do that with their Amphib Bn.



And in response to that.  No reason at all.  A separate and distinct infantry regiment of an indeterminate size and organization capable of performing tasks not covered by the primary ORBAT but capable of working with them.

A heliportable CAR with ULCVs perhaps?


----------



## markppcli

I think the truth is somewhere between the two assessments there and I'll use a micro close to my heart as an example of the macro, CA wide issue. We have a TOW system, in probably sufficient numbers to equip some kind of ATGM capability across our BNs. We also have doctrine to lay out how we use this weapon system to it's best effect. The problem is those two things aren't synched. The TOW platoon pam clearly lays our the requirement for mobile tow platoons, and that dismounted systems are a last resort. What we have are dismounted stands, and we employ them as such. They're supposed to be held in a platoon, but instead are employed at Coy level in ad hoc systems because the numbers don't exist to meet our doctrine. 

As a summery of what I'm trying to say is that we have equipment, likely close to sufficient minus a few glaring omissions, and we have doctrinal structures that make sense and work. The problem is those two things are seemingly totally out of synch. This is probably out of the scope of FORCE 2025 though.


----------



## Kirkhill

IRepoCans said:


> Considering neither have touched on theatre entry in quite some time (jumping with the 82nd or the 173rd onto an airfield once every few years doesn't count), you could argue both are inappropriate for the role. The joint theatre entry experts (the Ranger Battalions) conduct an annual 8-week (per manoeuvre bn) package on all the skill sets required in addition to conducting Coy to Bn level seizures of airfields; ports; and, establishing TLZs to actually allow for a follow-on force to flow through (all under the conditions of fighting a near peer adversary). That's not even considering all other agencies and entities that would have to partake as well to maintain proficiency, so I'm at a loss of why we still think we can do theatre entry.
> 
> If we just want a light infantry force just to fight dismounted to dominate complex terrain, nothing stops a mechanized bn from re-rolling to do so; the reverse as I understand it, is not as simple. So what is the kind of light force we require, and what is it actually going to actually be proficient at? Because as it stands, light forces are basically lav bns in waiting (or backfill for dismounts with how the reserves are).
> 
> 
> Maybe not attach it to CANSOF, but definitely heavily integrated to support some of their missions, which in turn support the Div / theatre.




How about, when the Bde deploys, is there a use for Defence and Security troops?  How about a heliborne QRF?  Would a couple or three company sized elements come in handy in those roles?

Our game plan, so far as I can gather, does allow for three deployable brigades, each with its own helicopter squadron (Mix of Griffons and Chinooks?)  Don't they have utility regardless of whether or not the Brigade is LAV mounted on asphalt or operating with ULCVs in complex terrain, in the arctic or in the forests?

Each brigade has an Infantry Regiment.  Perhaps, if we are going to leave the GIBs and the LAVs attached like Siamese twins,  and we can't stuff all the extra GIBs into the allocated LAVs, perhaps we accept that the 3rd battalion is not so much an alternate LAV Bn in waiting as a battalion of independently deployable rifle coys.  It could train with CANSOFCOM and it could also be the point of contact between the Infantry Regiment and the local Militia units.

For the RCAC - stick all the tanks in all their variants into one Regiment in one Brigade and apply all the necessary PYs to fully equip the regiment (to include the necessary number of tank transporters necessary to keep up with the LAVs in theater).

The remaining PYs to be split equally between the other two regiments to provide the two remaining brigades with a Recce Sqn and a DF/AT Sqn.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I think the truth is somewhere between the two assessments there and I'll use a micro close to my heart as an example of the macro, CA wide issue. We have a TOW system, in probably sufficient numbers to equip some kind of ATGM capability across our BNs. We also have doctrine to lay out how we use this weapon system to it's best effect. The problem is those two things aren't synched. The TOW platoon pam clearly lays our the requirement for mobile tow platoons, and that dismounted systems are a last resort. What we have are dismounted stands, and we employ them as such. They're supposed to be held in a platoon, but instead are employed at Coy level in ad hoc systems because the numbers don't exist to meet our doctrine.
> 
> As a summery of what I'm trying to say is that we have equipment, likely close to sufficient minus a few glaring omissions, and we have doctrinal structures that make sense and work. The problem is those two things are seemingly totally out of synch. This is probably out of the scope of FORCE 2025 though.



A good number of us on this site can remember when the "dismounted" TOW was "mounted" on top of an M113 or a Jeep (replacing 106 mm recoilless rifles) so that they could fire and retire in a hurry.  Circa 1970s

Those same TOW systems were mounted in pairs on M113s in Norwegian built turrets. Circa 1980s.

Discussions ensued on moving the turrets to the  AVGPs/Bisons/LAVs/LAV6s.
Discussions ensued on replacing the turrets with new ones.
Discussions ensued about strapping TOWs onto LAV turrets.
Discussions ensued about replacing the TOWs with new ATGMs/LRAAWs/MRAAW(H)s/ALAWs
The TOWs were upgraded to RF standard
The TOWs were withdrawn from service 
Discussions continued about replacing the TOWs with new Carl Gustaf rounds and 40 km NLOS rounds.

And you got reissued the 1970s systems, dismounted, and no suitable vehicles (like the M113s and Jeeps) to mount them on.

Good news.  They are still useful against T72s, BMPs, BTRs, BMDs and MTLBs.  What's your blast signature like and time to target?

Canadian Army development.


----------



## daftandbarmy

IRepoCans said:


> Considering neither have touched on theatre entry in quite some time (jumping with the 82nd or the 173rd onto an airfield once every few years doesn't count), you could argue both are inappropriate for the role. The joint theatre entry experts (the Ranger Battalions) conduct an annual 8-week (per manoeuvre bn) package on all the skill sets required in addition to conducting Coy to Bn level seizures of airfields; ports; and, establishing TLZs to actually allow for a follow-on force to flow through (all under the conditions of fighting a near peer adversary). That's not even considering all other agencies and entities that would have to partake as well to maintain proficiency, so I'm at a loss of why we still think we can do theatre entry.
> 
> If we just want a light infantry force just to fight dismounted to dominate complex terrain, nothing stops a mechanized bn from re-rolling to do so; the reverse as I understand it, is not as simple. So what is the kind of light force we require, and what is it actually going to actually be proficient at? Because as it stands, light forces are basically lav bns in waiting (or backfill for dismounts with how the reserves are).
> 
> 
> Maybe not attach it to CANSOF, but definitely heavily integrated to support some of their missions, which in turn support the Div / theatre.



We did similar prearaiton with 5 AB Bde in the UK ...

.... Except that the only 'theatres' we could enter were in the developing world i.e., 3rd world countries, without a viable air defence capability, containing our nationals who might have to be evacuated through forced entry.

Even though we were formed and continuously trained as an Airborne Brigade, with all the bells and whistles, there is no way we could have successfully pulled off a theatre entry airborne operation against a peer/ near peer enemy; except, perhaps, as part of a spectacular 'forlorn hope' I suppose.

The same would apply to other air delivered troops. No air superiority, no airborne/airlanding/airmobile operation.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> A good number of us on this site can remember when the "dismounted" TOW was "mounted" on top of an M113 or a Jeep (replacing 106 mm recoilless rifles) so that they could fire and retire in a hurry.  Circa 1970s
> 
> Those same TOW systems were mounted in pairs on M113s in Norwegian built turrets. Circa 1980s.
> 
> Discussions ensued on moving the turrets to the  AVGPs/Bisons/LAVs/LAV6s.
> Discussions ensued on replacing the turrets with new ones.
> Discussions ensued about strapping TOWs onto LAV turrets.
> Discussions ensued about replacing the TOWs with new ATGMs/LRAAWs/MRAAW(H)s/ALAWs
> The TOWs were upgraded to RF standard
> The TOWs were withdrawn from service
> Discussions continued about replacing the TOWs with new Carl Gustaf rounds and 40 km NLOS rounds.
> 
> And you got reissued the 1970s systems, dismounted, and no suitable vehicles (like the M113s and Jeeps) to mount them on.
> 
> Good news.  They are still useful against T72s, BMPs, BTRs, BMDs and MTLBs.  What's your blast signature like and time to target?
> 
> Canadian Army development.


Yeah I didn't mean the specifics just that doctrine not lining up to the equipment, so we ignore doctrine often to the detriment, but we still pretend on TEWTs that we have doctrinal structures.  I stare in jealous at the m113 TUA monument on base.


----------



## Kirkhill

I'm saying that the doctrine, such as it was, evolved along with the availability of the weapons and lessons learned.  By the time you started receiving LAVs to replace Grizzlies the Berlin Wall had fallen, history had ended and the UN didn't want heavy weapons in Yugslavia.  

TOWs and all other ATGM type thingies were surplus to requirement.  Apparently a good number of people think they still are.  

Frighteningly offensive donchano.


----------



## lenaitch

I'm just going to jump in here and say that, as an outsider, I find the discussion fascinating and, as a citizen and tax payer, a tad disheartening.  A little difficult to cut through the acronyms but that doesn't detract from it.  It seems the wrong folks are running the army.

Carry on.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> A good number of us on this site can remember when the "dismounted" TOW was "mounted" on top of an M113 or a Jeep (replacing 106 mm recoilless rifles) so that they could fire and retire in a hurry.  Circa 1970s
> 
> Those same TOW systems were mounted in pairs on M113s in Norwegian built turrets. Circa 1980s.
> 
> Discussions ensued on moving the turrets to the  AVGPs/Bisons/LAVs/LAV6s.
> Discussions ensued on replacing the turrets with new ones.
> Discussions ensued about strapping TOWs onto LAV turrets.
> Discussions ensued about replacing the TOWs with new ATGMs/LRAAWs/MRAAW(H)s/ALAWs
> The TOWs were upgraded to RF standard
> The TOWs were withdrawn from service
> Discussions continued about replacing the TOWs with new Carl Gustaf rounds and 40 km NLOS rounds.
> 
> And you got reissued the 1970s systems, dismounted, and no suitable vehicles (like the M113s and Jeeps) to mount them on.
> 
> Good news.  They are still useful against T72s, BMPs, BTRs, BMDs and MTLBs.  What's your blast signature like and time to target?
> 
> Canadian Army development.


Heck, we had Iltis variants for TOW and we had a LAV 3 TOW under Armour and correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't there a BV206 variant. I know the Italians had one for AMF(L) but not sure if Canada did or not.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

If we are going to go all in on the LAV 6, we need a TUA turret, be it a new design or otherwise. Heavy weapons like the TOW, and C16 AGLS should not be dismounted primarily, they should be mounted systems.

Doctrine is only good if we practice it properly, I don't see it a lot, atleast not on my side.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Heck, we had Iltis variants for TOW and we had a LAV 3 TOW under Armour and correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't there a BV206 variant. I know the Italians had one for AMF(L) but not sure if Canada did or not.
> 
> 🍻


Aye, I'd forgotten about the LAV3-TOW.    In my defence, I hardly knew them.



> The Canadian Department of National Defence has awarded Genertal Dynamics Land Systems – Canada a C$ 49.2 million (about $46.3 million) contract to take *33 of the 71 LAV-III chassis originally manufactured under a previous contract for LAV-III TOW Under Armour (TUA) vehicles *
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> , *and use them as infantry carriers, instead of inegrating the Kvaerner TUA turret from older M113s*. GDLS Canada will oversee the LAV-III TUAV conversion and act as the lead integrator. Rheinmetall Canada of Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, will supply the Remote Weapon Station, which will feature a universal gun cradle capable of mounting 5.56, 7.62 and 12.7 mm armaments and a cooled thermal sight system. Delivery of the converted Infantry Section Carriers will occur from June 2008 – March 2009. GDLS release











						Canada Converting LAV-III TUAVs to Infantry Carriers
					

The Canadian Department of National Defence has awarded Genertal Dynamics Land Systems - Canada a C$ 49.2 million (about $46.3 million) contract to take 33 of the 71 LAV-III chassis originally manufactured under a previous contract for LAV-III TOW Under



					www.defenseindustrydaily.com
				





Here today and gone tomorrow.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> If we are going to go all in on the LAV 6, we need a TUA turret, be it a new design or otherwise. Heavy weapons like the TOW, and C16 AGLS should not be dismounted primarily, they should be mounted systems.
> 
> Doctrine is only good if we practice it properly, I don't see it a lot, atleast not on my side.


And under armour mortar carriers.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

E COY LdSH(RC) PUTS THE LAV TUA TO THE TEST
					

The Light Armoured Vehicle TOW Under Armour (LAV TUA) is the first element of the Direct Fire Unit (DFU) to begin Initial Product Testing (IPT)...



					www.strathconas.ca
				









The Finns and the Swedes certainly mounted them on BVs but I don't think Canadians ever did.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> If we are going to go all in on the LAV 6, we need a TUA turret, be it a new design or otherwise. Heavy weapons like the TOW, and C16 AGLS should not be dismounted primarily, they should be mounted systems.
> 
> Doctrine is only good if we practice it properly, I don't see it a lot, atleast not on my side.


  I'm still a fan of, in addition to dedicated ATGM platforms in dedicated platoons, strapping a pair of ATGMs onto the LAV turrets.

If you're going to insist in carting my brethren around the country on the off-chance they might come in handy then the least you could do is keep some distance between you and the other chap's big guns.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 65335
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> E COY LdSH(RC) PUTS THE LAV TUA TO THE TEST
> 
> 
> The Light Armoured Vehicle TOW Under Armour (LAV TUA) is the first element of the Direct Fire Unit (DFU) to begin Initial Product Testing (IPT)...
> 
> 
> 
> www.strathconas.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 65336
> 
> View attachment 65337
> 
> 
> The Finns and the Swedes certainly mounted them on BVs but I don't think Canadians ever did.


We absolutely did have BV-206 mounted TOW in Norway. I personally came across one, rolled, on a mountain track in 1992, when I trying to find a good OP for my FOO party. The Patricias, pride aside, were unhurt.


----------



## FJAG

SeaKingTacco said:


> We absolutely did have BV-206 mounted TOW in Norway. I personally came across one, rolled, on a mountain track in 1992, when I trying to find a good OP for my FOO party. The Patricias, pride aside, were unhurt.




Reminds me of the Texan tank crew that my FOO party adopted on a winter Reforger/Z Bty flyover after their M 60 slid down a hillside, threw both tracks and was abandoned by their company.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

FJAG said:


> of all of the above quotes, these two interest me the most:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> We have an Army where the website says we consist of:
> 
> 
> That's 36,700 who are potentially deployable. (do we really only have 13,700 primary reservists or is the Army's own web page out of whack?) In any event that well over a division and a half of folks. We have enough equipment for an armoured regiment, six LAV battalions and a proper 18 gun artillery regiment plus a good number of equipped engineers and support trades yet we wonder about whether we should be thinking of deploying nothing more than a "well-enabled BG"? We're seriously discussing divesting or making dormant even more capabilities?
> 
> As a Canadian taxpayer I want to take back ten billion per year because it's obviously being utterly wasted as an insurance policy for our national defence. I don't know what it's being spent on but a defence capability ain't one of them.
> 
> The government gives the Army funding to permit the manning for almost two divisions (Reg and Res combined). It behooves us to create a doctrine commensurate with that manning (albeit in a perfect world we should work out the doctrine first and build the manning afterwards but ... Canada). That doctrine should be the roadmap for everything else that makes up the Army as a whole - from cognitive, to procedural, to organizational, to material, and to moral components of how to make an army fight (yup and somewhere way down the line that doctrine should determine if we have 2 or 3 guys crewing a LAV [or even if it should be a LAV] and how many guys are needed for dismounts).
> 
> Instead of being a doctrine-based army we have become a capabilities-based army which in short means trying to figure out what we can do with the shit we've got. That's wrong on so many levels. And for full disclosure that's not a new thought I've had - it comes from Ian Hope's article "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" that was published in the Army and Training Bulletin in 2001/2. It was true then and its even more true today.
> 
> Folks. We're desperately in need of figuring out what the Army's role in Canada's defence is (and I believe a forward presence and an ability to deploy much more than 1/2 of a BG is involved as just one part of that, and should include special forces, quick reaction, medium weight peacekeepers and a whole herd of enabling systems from EW, UAV, loitering munitions etc) and then build and sell that doctrine with all of its consequences. And it needs to be a doctrine that can rapidly change as threats and capabilities change. We need to add capabilities. I can't think of a single one to divest - maybe change some from active to reserve status yes, but divest, no. And the reality is that we will be locked into some systems that we have now for some time to come but that doesn't mean we stay frozen in time and don't think outside the box and plan for the things that are needed to be successful in high intensity conflict
> 
> We simply cannot afford to have another 20 year Army Transformation plan like the one that led us to where we are now.
> 
> End of rant.
> 
> Returning to writing about history
> 
> 🍻Soyou think


So


FJAG said:


> of all of the above quotes, these two interest me the most:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> We have an Army where the website says we consist of:
> 
> 
> That's 36,700 who are potentially deployable. (do we really only have 13,700 primary reservists or is the Army's own web page out of whack?) In any event that well over a division and a half of folks. We have enough equipment for an armoured regiment, six LAV battalions and a proper 18 gun artillery regiment plus a good number of equipped engineers and support trades yet we wonder about whether we should be thinking of deploying nothing more than a "well-enabled BG"? We're seriously discussing divesting or making dormant even more capabilities?
> 
> As a Canadian taxpayer I want to take back ten billion per year because it's obviously being utterly wasted as an insurance policy for our national defence. I don't know what it's being spent on but a defence capability ain't one of them.
> 
> The government gives the Army funding to permit the manning for almost two divisions (Reg and Res combined). It behooves us to create a doctrine commensurate with that manning (albeit in a perfect world we should work out the doctrine first and build the manning afterwards but ... Canada). That doctrine should be the roadmap for everything else that makes up the Army as a whole - from cognitive, to procedural, to organizational, to material, and to moral components of how to make an army fight (yup and somewhere way down the line that doctrine should determine if we have 2 or 3 guys crewing a LAV [or even if it should be a LAV] and how many guys are needed for dismounts).
> 
> Instead of being a doctrine-based army we have become a capabilities-based army which in short means trying to figure out what we can do with the shit we've got. That's wrong on so many levels. And for full disclosure that's not a new thought I've had - it comes from Ian Hope's article "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" that was published in the Army and Training Bulletin in 2001/2. It was true then and its even more true today.
> 
> Folks. We're desperately in need of figuring out what the Army's role in Canada's defence is (and I believe a forward presence and an ability to deploy much more than 1/2 of a BG is involved as just one part of that, and should include special forces, quick reaction, medium weight peacekeepers and a whole herd of enabling systems from EW, UAV, loitering munitions etc) and then build and sell that doctrine with all of its consequences. And it needs to be a doctrine that can rapidly change as threats and capabilities change. We need to add capabilities. I can't think of a single one to divest - maybe change some from active to reserve status yes, but divest, no. And the reality is that we will be locked into some systems that we have now for some time to come but that doesn't mean we stay frozen in time and don't think outside the box and plan for the things that are needed to be successful in high intensity conflict
> 
> We simply cannot afford to have another 20 year Army Transformation plan like the one that led us to where we are now.
> 
> End of rant.
> 
> Returning to writing about history
> 
> 🍻


So you think that towed artillery are appropriate for a mechanized Brigade in a high intensity conventional fight?

We have the LAVs Bns to deploy a CMBG. We have 80 gun tanks, but they are not all the same. 20 of them are truly world-beating. We do not have GBAD which would usually be a Formation asset. Our infantry are one UOR away from being relevant. - much easier to acquire and field ALAWS than SP howitzers. So we could field a great BG. We need some real equipment work, though, to field a CMBG in a prime time fight.

Ps - I am having some quote box problems...


----------



## IRepoCans

daftandbarmy said:


> We did similar prearaiton with 5 AB Bde in the UK ...
> 
> .... Except that the only 'theatres' we could enter were in the developing world i.e., 3rd world countries, without a viable air defence capability, containing our nationals who might have to be evacuated through forced entry.
> 
> Even though we were formed and continuously trained as an Airborne Brigade, with all the bells and whistles, there is no way we could have successfully pulled off a theatre entry airborne operation against a peer/ near peer enemy; except, perhaps, as part of a spectacular 'forlorn hope' I suppose.
> 
> The same would apply to other air delivered troops. No air superiority, no airborne/airlanding/airmobile operation.


Precisely, I believe only the Americans (and really it's only the Rangers because of their dedicated air assets) can conduct a theatre entry against a near peer threat. Now, airmobile forces to facilitate NEOs is something we could do; especially if such a force regularly practiced with the units and agencies concerned.

But if Libya (which is the only contemporary event I can think of where Canadians were to be evacuated) is to be an example of anything, all our people were pulled out by chap from the shakies; as, according to his testimony: we didn't have anything planned.



Kirkhill said:


> I'm still a fan of, in addition to dedicated ATGM platforms in dedicated platoons, strapping a pair of ATGMs onto the LAV turrets.
> 
> If you're going to insist in carting my brethren around the country on the off-chance they might come in handy then the least you could do is keep some distance between you and the other chap's big guns.


My favourite thing about the ATGM / DFS capability in the CAF right now is that the subject matter experts in the capability are the Tor Scots and they don't even have LAVs, and they do it part time.


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> So you think that towed artillery are appropriate for a mechanized Brigade in a high intensity conventional fight?


Good God, No! There must be a hundred or more posts on this website from me whinging constantly about the need for properly armoured, self propelled guns (tracked preferable, wheeled) for both brigade and battle group direct support. I mentioned an eighteen-gun regiment because its a real combat enabler (even if towed it can still support a light brigade well, a medium brigade poorly, and a heavy brigade hardly at all) where an eight-gun regiment which doesn't even train as a proper regiment is about as useful as a penny packet of tanks is.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> We have the LAVs Bns to deploy a CMBG. We have 80 gun tanks, but they are not all the same. 20 of them are truly world-beating. We do not have GBAD which would usually be a Formation asset. Our infantry are one UOR away from being relevant. - much easier to acquire and field ALAWS than SP howitzers. So we could field a great BG. We need some real equipment work, though, to field a CMBG in a prime time fight.


ALWAS? 

My point simply was sit down and build a proper doctrine covering the things the Army needs to do in the future that isn't based on a constructing a Lego based building-block battle group. Create that doctrine so that it creates a force that can transition from simple every day missions to the really big scary big emergency stuff with the people and equipment needed for each step already in hand and trained. (Yup. I'm talking a form of mobilization here)

In the mean time we have lots of stuff that can be slotted into the developing doctrine on an interim basis while we concentrate on acquiring the new capabilities and training needed for the new doctrine. A lot of the stuff we already have is actually quite useful (such as the LAV 6.0 for smaller mission OOTW/peacekeeping.

Long story short, the Army costs the country entirely too much for it to be satisfied with doing just little things here and there. You don't need twelve manoeuvre battalions/regiments and a plethora of headquarters to keep fielding what we do. You could probably do that with two battle groups where each battle group recruits 70% of its people off the street on a two year contract, trains for one year and deploys for one year being replaced in alternating years by the second battle group.

Now I'm not advocating that we reduce the Army to two battlegroups but if we really want to reduce our heavy personnel costs and transfer that to much of that to equipment and then we could have two really well equipped battle groups. The point though is that we could keep a battle group in the field indefinitely with a force this small (say some 4-5,000 folks). We don't need an almost 40,000 strong army to do it. So if we're going to have 40,000 folks then we better have higher ambitions than battle groups; we need a plan that allows us to grow into a substantially larger force with all the bells and whistles that will allow us to survive and thrive in a modern high intensity fight.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG - 

The good news is that the army is keeping 40,000 people off the streets and out of the pubs.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

ALAWS - advanced lightweight anti-armour weapon system. The project meant to bring us something like Javelin, Spike, Bill etc. Manportable antitank missile in the 2km band.


----------



## OldSolduer

Kirkhill said:


> I'm saying that the doctrine, such as it was, evolved along with the availability of the weapons and lessons learned.  By the time you started receiving LAVs to replace Grizzlies the Berlin Wall had fallen, history had ended and the UN didn't want heavy weapons in Yugslavia.
> 
> TOWs and all other ATGM type thingies were surplus to requirement.  Apparently a good number of people think they still are.
> 
> Frighteningly offensive donchano.


IMO too many members and some of the leadership of the CAF have FORGOTTEN what the CAF's primary purpose is. 

I had a Bde Comd - some of you know him - who told us the primary role of the CAF is to defend Canada and anything else is a distraction. He and I got along quite well, despite some of his quirks.


----------



## GK .Dundas

IRepoCans said:


> Precisely, I believe only the Americans (and really it's only the Rangers because of their dedicated air assets) can conduct a theatre entry against a near peer threat. Now, airmobile forces to facilitate NEOs is something we could do; especially if such a force regularly practiced with the units and agencies concerned.
> 
> But if Libya (which is the only contemporary event I can think of where Canadians were to be evacuated) is to be an example of anything, all our people were pulled out by chap from the shakies; as, according to his testimony: we didn't have anything planned.
> 
> 
> My favourite thing about the ATGM / DFS capability in the CAF right now is that the subject matter experts in the capability are the Tor Scots and they don't even have LAVs, and they do it part time.


Care to expand on this ?


----------



## OldSolduer

GK .Dundas said:


> Care to expand on this ?


I'd like to know who is "Chap from the shakies".


----------



## blacktriangle

OldSolduer said:


> I'd like to know who is "Chap from the shakies".


Shaky Boats Service.

Back to ATGMs - hasn't ALAWS been going on for the better part of 15 years in some form or another? Seriously - what is the issue there? It seems sad even by CAF standards...


----------



## daftandbarmy

OldSolduer said:


> I'd like to know who is "Chap from the shakies".



'Shaky Boats' comes from the fact that they sometimes deploy by kayak/folboat. And apparently they're a little miffed about the banter 


SAS and SBS at war over 'shaky boats' banter that's 'undermining morale'​

EXCLUSIVE: Special Boat Service complained that SAS pals were undermining their reputation with constant jibes - and now they've been banned from using the terms

The SAS have been told to stop calling their sister regiment the Shaky Boats Service after SBS troops complained.

A senior SAS officer made the order after troopers said the name-calling was undermining morale and reputation.

Another nickname – Dope On A Rope, because the SBS abseil from helicopters on to ships – was also banned.

A source said teasing came to a head when a member of Seal Team Six – the US special forces unit which killed Osama bin Laden – asked an SBS operator why his regiment was called the Shaky Boats.

It is understood memos were then posted on noticeboards inside the SAS headquarters at Credenhill on the
outskirts of Hereford. One SAS soldier said: “When I heard about this I thought it was an early April Fools joke.

“The relationship between the SAS and the SBS has always been a bit tetchy, but trying to stop the SAS referring to the SBS as the Shaky Boats is nonsense.

“No-one in the SAS calls them the SBS. They are referred to as the Shaky Boats and an order like this is just going to enforce that.

“We know it winds them up, which is precisely why we do it. It’s a bit of banter. It’s just amazing that someone has complained.”

Relations between the two elite units have often been strained. Members of both regiments always like to claim theirs is the more professional force.

The latest animosity between them dates back to the early days of the Iraq War, when senior SAS non-commissioned officers accused their opposite numbers in the SBS of being unprofessional following a botched operation.

After the troops returned to the UK, one senior member of the SAS even accused them of being incompetent and lacking courage.

The claims related to an incident in which a small SBS force was ambushed by a 300-strong force of Iraqi insurgents.

Newspaper reports at the time said the SBS were forced to withdraw, leaving equipment and vehicles behind.


But the SBS said they remained in position and fought off the Iraqi force while firing more than 7,000 rounds in the process.

The row led to the then director of special forces ordering both units to end their rift.

The SBS dates back to 1940 and used to exclusively recruit men from the Royal Marines.










						SAS and SBS at war over 'shaky boats' banter that's 'undermining morale'
					

EXCLUSIVE: Special Boat Service complained that SAS pals were undermining their reputation with constant jibes - and now they've been banned from using the terms




					www.dailystar.co.uk


----------



## FSTO

daftandbarmy said:


> 'Shaky Boats' comes from the fact that they sometimes deploy by kayak/folboat. And apparently they're a little miffed about the banter
> 
> 
> SAS and SBS at war over 'shaky boats' banter that's 'undermining morale'​
> 
> EXCLUSIVE: Special Boat Service complained that SAS pals were undermining their reputation with constant jibes - and now they've been banned from using the terms
> 
> The SAS have been told to stop calling their sister regiment the Shaky Boats Service after SBS troops complained.
> 
> A senior SAS officer made the order after troopers said the name-calling was undermining morale and reputation.
> 
> Another nickname – Dope On A Rope, because the SBS abseil from helicopters on to ships – was also banned.
> 
> A source said teasing came to a head when a member of Seal Team Six – the US special forces unit which killed Osama bin Laden – asked an SBS operator why his regiment was called the Shaky Boats.
> 
> It is understood memos were then posted on noticeboards inside the SAS headquarters at Credenhill on the
> outskirts of Hereford. One SAS soldier said: “When I heard about this I thought it was an early April Fools joke.
> 
> “The relationship between the SAS and the SBS has always been a bit tetchy, but trying to stop the SAS referring to the SBS as the Shaky Boats is nonsense.
> 
> “No-one in the SAS calls them the SBS. They are referred to as the Shaky Boats and an order like this is just going to enforce that.
> 
> “We know it winds them up, which is precisely why we do it. It’s a bit of banter. It’s just amazing that someone has complained.”
> 
> Relations between the two elite units have often been strained. Members of both regiments always like to claim theirs is the more professional force.
> 
> The latest animosity between them dates back to the early days of the Iraq War, when senior SAS non-commissioned officers accused their opposite numbers in the SBS of being unprofessional following a botched operation.
> 
> After the troops returned to the UK, one senior member of the SAS even accused them of being incompetent and lacking courage.
> 
> The claims related to an incident in which a small SBS force was ambushed by a 300-strong force of Iraqi insurgents.
> 
> Newspaper reports at the time said the SBS were forced to withdraw, leaving equipment and vehicles behind.
> 
> 
> But the SBS said they remained in position and fought off the Iraqi force while firing more than 7,000 rounds in the process.
> 
> The row led to the then director of special forces ordering both units to end their rift.
> 
> The SBS dates back to 1940 and used to exclusively recruit men from the Royal Marines.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> SAS and SBS at war over 'shaky boats' banter that's 'undermining morale'
> 
> 
> EXCLUSIVE: Special Boat Service complained that SAS pals were undermining their reputation with constant jibes - and now they've been banned from using the terms
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.dailystar.co.uk


Its a sad day when the Special Forces turns into Special Needs Children.


----------



## Ostrozac

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I think our Army has a number of psyches or Jungian archetypes. We have the Germany-era CMBG. Much of our structure and way of thought is derived from that. Its our received "good place." We have the rotational Battegroup in the Balkans, which morphed somewhat in the early Afghan days. One deployed Battlegroup that gets replaced every six months. One or maybe two battlegroups worth of "real gear." Then we have the hybrid TFK model with a rotational Bde HQ and a rotational BG plus enablers.
> 
> If we want a CMBG to fight conventionally in the Germany construct we have the structure (more or less) but not the equipment. I think the assumption here is that it would be a single pulse and not a rotation. I think we have the structure and equipment for a rotational BG in a UN peacekeeping or even COIN role. For the TFK model we have our muscle memory and some equipment from Kandahar, now ten years since real use.
> 
> Perhaps for the conventional fight we need to think along the lines of a well-enabled BG instead of a CMBG.


I am not convinced that a Canadian battle group would be useful, or even wanted, on a high-intensity battlefield. It's my understanding that the Optimized Battle Group project (the OBGYN, for all you old 2RCR types) made it pretty clear that a battle group, on its own, tended to get it's ass kicked in a fight, and that the brigade is the minimum size to provide some depth, combat power, and enablers.

If we go to war, let's say for planning purposes into the next Korean War, what role does a Canadian battle group fill? Our American allies think in terms of brigade combat teams -- if we show up with a  battalion, what are we going to be doing besides guarding POWs? Form part of a composite brigade? Those don't seem very impressive, either. The multinational polyglot brigades that NATO is cobbling together in the Baltics are going to be effective as tripwires, but if I were a Russian and I had the choice between fighting against a Polish brigade or a composite brigade composed of soldiers from 15 different countries, all with different languages and equipment, I know who I'd rather kick off against.

As I see it, as an army, we have a choice. If we want to be able to fight, we need to organize and equip our brigades as fighting formations. If we want to be a constabulary force, then being organized around rotational battle groups is fine, and indeed, probably ideal. But if we can't make up our minds, the chances are, at some point in the future, that we will over promise to cabinet and under deliver on the battlefield.


----------



## ArmyRick

Following


----------



## IRepoCans

TangoTwoBravo said:


> ALAWS - advanced lightweight anti-armour weapon system. The project meant to bring us something like Javelin, Spike, Bill etc. Manportable antitank missile in the 2km band.


I thought we were looking at the Spikes within the 5-7 km range so we could actually outrange MBTs as dismounts, the newer Javelins also reach out to 5km. Either way, would these merely just be available to the DFS pl or would they find themselves within the rifle coys? Because a brigades worth of LAVs with ATGMs that can readily dismount would indeed be quite useful and a pain in the ass for any armour.

_Nothing is more ludicrous than tank hunting with a Carl G and having the LAV or Leopard pretend it didn't see you 2-3 km before it got within range._


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

IRepoCans said:


> I thought we were looking at the Spikes within the 5-7 km range so we could actually outrange MBTs as dismounts, the newer Javelins also reach out to 5km. Either way, would these merely just be available to the DFS pl or would they find themselves within the rifle coys? Because a brigades worth of LAVs with ATGMs that can readily dismount would indeed be quite useful and a pain in the ass for any armour.
> 
> _Nothing is more ludicrous than tank hunting with a Carl G and having the LAV or Leopard pretend it didn't see you 2-3 km before it got within range._


I am not with the project - people were looking at a variety of systems. Javelin was the archetype that the Staff College went with - assumption of 2.5km range. They key points are manportability and range past 2km (and of course ability to destroy armour). The sad thing is that the Army was identified the problem in the 80s. It is not Eryx with its 600m range!

Don't want to divert this thread into equipment details too much while also accepting that we need to talk about equipment. To be relevant on the conventional battlefield our infantry need anti-tank systems. Tanks are not that AT system. AHs are not that AT system. A LAV company with 4 integral Javelin equivalents, possibly augmented by TOW equivalents, can look after itself against mechanized threats allowing tanks to mass where needed. This was an old lesson reinforced on CDX10.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I am not with the project - people were looking at a variety of systems. Javelin was the archetype that the Staff College went with - assumption of 2.5km range. They key points are manportability and range past 2km (and of course ability to destroy armour). The sad thing is that the Army was identified the problem in the 80s. It is not Eryx with its 600m range!
> 
> Don't want to divert this thread into equipment details too much while also accepting that we need to talk about equipment. To be relevant on the conventional battlefield our infantry need anti-tank systems. Tanks are not that AT system. AHs are not that AT system. A LAV company with 4 integral Javelin equivalents, possibly augmented by TOW equivalents, can look after itself against mechanized threats allowing tanks to mass where needed. This was an old lesson reinforced on CDX10.



How about an anti-tank mortar?

Strix mortar round​
*Pansarsprängvinggranat m/94* _STRIX_ is a Swedish endphase-guided projectile fired from a 120 mm mortar currently manufactured by Saab Bofors Dynamics.[1]

STRIX is fired like a conventional mortar round. The round contains an infrared imaging sensor that it uses to guide itself onto any tank or armoured fighting vehicle in the vicinity where it lands. The seeker is designed to ignore targets that are already burning.

Launched from any 120 mm mortar, Strix has a normal range of up to 4.5 km. With the addition of a special sustainer motor, however, range can be increased to 7.5 km.






						Strix mortar round - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> How about an anti-tank mortar?
> 
> Strix mortar round​
> *Pansarsprängvinggranat m/94* _STRIX_ is a Swedish endphase-guided projectile fired from a 120 mm mortar currently manufactured by Saab Bofors Dynamics.[1]
> 
> STRIX is fired like a conventional mortar round. The round contains an infrared imaging sensor that it uses to guide itself onto any tank or armoured fighting vehicle in the vicinity where it lands. The seeker is designed to ignore targets that are already burning.
> 
> Launched from any 120 mm mortar, Strix has a normal range of up to 4.5 km. With the addition of a special sustainer motor, however, range can be increased to 7.5 km.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Strix mortar round - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


Absolutely, D&B

But first you would have to buy a 120mm mortar.  And a 120mm mortar carrier.  And Mjolner turrets would have to be verified on LAVs.  No?  Doubt if that would make it to Force 2025 let alone the eFP Battle Group.

T2B is talking about a pretty  modest UOR by limiting himself to 4 ATGM-CLU per coy.  There is no reason why for Force 2025 we shouldn't be looking at 3 or 4 per Platoon.

Question to T2B?

What are the sight lines like in Latvia?  The images I have seen the country looks more like the Canadian Shield than the Prairies.  Pretty close country.   Could they exploit the long sight lines?  Conversely  would there be anything to hinder minimum range engagements with long range missiles?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

While I have been to Latvia and Lithuania, I have not been in the EFP. I have exercised at formation level for both countries with good map data. There are areas of close country and areas that are more open. There are manouevre corridors with line of sight that mechanized forces used in both directions during WW2. 

You can take a gander on Google.


----------



## Kirkhill

Thinking about FJAG's 40,000 PY army I took a look back at some stale-dated numbers from 2010-2013.



The RCIC planned on using 5796 PYs to field 9 Bns.
But they only reckoned on having 4182 of them actually available.
They also reckoned on having 1704 other trades to help them field those battalions but reckoned on only 1056 actually  being available.

First suggestion - don't plan on having that which you don't have.

To field 9 Bns they have 4182 PYs available.  464-465 PYs per battalion.
Plus 1056 other trade PYs. 117 PYs per battalion.

So, 9 fielded battalions of 582 all ranks, all trades.
5238 of FJAGs 40,000. Call it 13%.  Or better, 5238 of his 23,000 Regs - 23%.  Can't actually plan on the Reserves being able to provide anything.



The RCAC planned on using 1599 PYs to field 3 Rgts.
But they only reckoned on having 1328 of them actually available.
They also reckoned on having  415 other trades to help them field those battalions but reckoned on only 318 actually  being available.

First suggestion repeated - don't plan on having that which you don't have.

To field 3 Rgts they have 1328 PYs available.  443 PYs per regiment.
Plus 316 other trade PYs. 106 PYs regiment.

So, 3 fielded regiments of 549 all ranks, all trades.
1646 of FJAGs 40,000. Call it 4%.  Or better, 1646 of his 23,000 Regs - 7%.  Again, can't actually plan on the Reserves being able to provide anything.

RCIC and RCAC combined fielding 12 Manoeuvre Units of approximately 450 combat arms with 100 combat support and service support attached or embedded.


Peculiarly enough those manning levels bring us broadly into the levels employed by the Swedes and the Danes and others.


Second Suggestion - Continue with 3x Symmetric Brigades with 3x equal RCAC Regiments and 9x equal RCIC Battalions equally distributed amongst 3 RCIC Regiments.

Third Suggestion - Plan operations around the Brigade Group.  The Brigade Group to consist of 1x RCAC Regiment, 2x RCIC Battalions (LAV Mounted), 1x RCIC Battalion of equivalent size and organization (Dismounted), 1x Mixed RCAF Helicopter Squadron (Griffon and Chinook) permanently attached to the Brigade.

Fourth Suggestion - adopt Swedish practices.


Impact of Swedish practice on RCAC

Existing equipment and personnel capable of fielding 3 Regiments each containing 22 MBTs and 38x LAV/IFV.  Sufficient personnel available to man 8x 120mm Mortar Carriers and 4x VSHORAD vehicles if acquired.  Organized into a Recce Tp, 2x Mortar Tps, 1x VSHORAD Tp, 2x IFV mounted infantry coys equipped for anti-tank warfare and 2x MBT squadrons.  The Regiments are adequately resourced with C4I assets and an embedded Log and Maint Sqn - including medics.

This is made possible by:

Permanently splitting an RCAC MBT Sqn into 2x Augmented Half-Squadrons of 11x MBTs each

Reducing the number of LAV/IFVs per platoon from 4 to 3.
Reducing the number of dismounts to 1 Gd Commander plus 3x 6 troopers organized around 3x AT Teams.  Total of 19 Dismounts / Pl
The 3x LAV/IFVs are manned by their  2 man crews (Driver and Gunner) and their permanently mounted command team (Pl L, Pl WO, LAV Sgt). Total of 9 vehicle-bound.

Alternate view of the 28 man platoon.  3x 6man AT sections.  1x 6man LAV section.  1x 4man Command det with one person focusing on the ground game, one focusing on the mounted game, one commanding the platoon as a whole and one focusing on the rear link.

The AT sections are equipped with 6x C7 equivalents, 2x C9 equivalents, 1x C6 equivalents, 1x DMR, a CG-84 or an ATGM-CLU issued from battalion, or AT-4s or NLAWs, and a number of AT mines.  The precise armament depends on the commanders' appreciation of the task at hand.


Impact on the RCIC

Adopt the 6 man section,  28 man platoon and the arms locker concept.

Issue 3 LAVs per platoon.

Use savings in PYs and LAVs  to staff  the Mortars and VSHORADs.

RCAC's MBT Sqn (2x Half Squadrons) replaced by a 3rd LAV Company in each of the 6 mounted battalions

The three dismounted battalions, identically equipped and organized as the LAV battalions to be focused on Brigade ops as an  Anti-Tank focused QRF deployable in conjunction with the Brigade Helicopter Squadrons.



All troops to be capable of managing lower intensity conflict when appropriately augmented, trained and commanded.

Light troops to be supplied from vehicle park with ULCVs capable of being transported by Griffon.



Short form

Is anybody willing to give up PYs and Vehicles at the sub- and sub-sub-unit levels if it results in more effective and better equipped units operating within a familiar construct?



Stick a needle in my eye, beat me, hurt me, make me cry!

Cheers.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Ostrozac said:


> I am not convinced that a Canadian battle group would be useful, or even wanted, on a high-intensity battlefield. It's my understanding that the Optimized Battle Group project (the OBGYN, for all you old 2RCR types) made it pretty clear that a battle group, on its own, tended to get it's ass kicked in a fight, and that the brigade is the minimum size to provide some depth, combat power, and enablers.
> 
> If we go to war, let's say for planning purposes into the next Korean War, what role does a Canadian battle group fill? Our American allies think in terms of brigade combat teams -- if we show up with a  battalion, what are we going to be doing besides guarding POWs? Form part of a composite brigade? Those don't seem very impressive, either. The multinational polyglot brigades that NATO is cobbling together in the Baltics are going to be effective as tripwires, but if I were a Russian and I had the choice between fighting against a Polish brigade or a composite brigade composed of soldiers from 15 different countries, all with different languages and equipment, I know who I'd rather kick off against.
> 
> As I see it, as an army, we have a choice. If we want to be able to fight, we need to organize and equip our brigades as fighting formations. If we want to be a constabulary force, then being organized around rotational battle groups is fine, and indeed, probably ideal. But if we can't make up our minds, the chances are, at some point in the future, that we will over promise to cabinet and under deliver on the battlefield.


I am not suggesting that a BG would attempt to do the same think as a CMBG. A robust BG, though, could indeed work in a Multinational Div (a Div Cav mission set) or a Multinational Brigade. In terms of promises, at least we could fulfill a BG.

The Optimized Battlegroup was also not trying to be a CMBG. I was an OC there - interesting times. Some great stuff, but ultimately the Army seemed to lose interest. Running with that thought, I am not sure if there is appetite for fixed BGs to enable the envisioned ECATs that Close Engagement talks about.


----------



## dapaterson

TangoTwoBravo said:


> but ultimately the Army seemed to lose interest.



So, what can the Army do to keep momentum on initiatives like this - to ensure they survive first contact with the enemy the proponent being posted?


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> So, what can the Army do to keep momentum on initiatives like this - to ensure they survive first contact with the enemy the proponent being posted?



Nothing. It can probably do nothing without national level leadership starting with the political will to lead it.


----------



## Kirkhill

What does political leadership have to do with 40 years of indecision on ATGMs that would actually give the infantry some purpose?  Deciding to fill seats rather than keeping mortars?  Deciding to spend years debating phantom Corps and Optimum Battle Groups rather than figuring out how to make the best of what is available?

I have no love for the government but you don't get to duck the internal responsibility of DND and particularly the Army.

Your lunch is being eaten by CANSOFCOM.  While you moan they are out there experimenting with new vehicles, new weapons, new technologies.

They have actually bought the Spike LR ALAWS that T2B is asking for.  Maybe they can loan the eFP half a dozen?  

And who decided that new sights and ammo for Carl Gustaf could be continually kicked down the road when everybody in the west has continually upgraded their systems because they are useful, effective and cheap?


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> Thinking about FJAG's 40,000 PY army I took a look back at some stale-dated numbers from 2010-2013.
> 
> 
> 
> The RCIC planned on using 5796 PYs to field 9 Bns.
> But they only reckoned on having 4182 of them actually available.
> They also reckoned on having 1704 other trades to help them field those battalions but reckoned on only 1056 actually  being available.
> 
> First suggestion - don't plan on having that which you don't have.
> 
> To field 9 Bns they have 4182 PYs available.  464-465 PYs per battalion.
> Plus 1056 other trade PYs. 117 PYs per battalion.
> 
> So, 9 fielded battalions of 582 all ranks, all trades.
> 5238 of FJAGs 40,000. Call it 13%.  Or better, 5238 of his 23,000 Regs - 23%.  Can't actually plan on the Reserves being able to provide anything.
> 
> 
> 
> The RCAC planned on using 1599 PYs to field 3 Rgts.
> But they only reckoned on having 1328 of them actually available.
> They also reckoned on having  415 other trades to help them field those battalions but reckoned on only 318 actually  being available.
> 
> First suggestion repeated - don't plan on having that which you don't have.
> 
> To field 3 Rgts they have 1328 PYs available.  443 PYs per regiment.
> Plus 316 other trade PYs. 106 PYs regiment.
> 
> So, 3 fielded regiments of 549 all ranks, all trades.
> 1646 of FJAGs 40,000. Call it 4%.  Or better, 1646 of his 23,000 Regs - 7%.  Again, can't actually plan on the Reserves being able to provide anything.
> 
> RCIC and RCAC combined fielding 12 Manoeuvre Units of approximately 450 combat arms with 100 combat support and service support attached or embedded.
> 
> 
> Peculiarly enough those manning levels bring us broadly into the levels employed by the Swedes and the Danes and others.
> 
> 
> Second Suggestion - Continue with 3x Symmetric Brigades with 3x equal RCAC Regiments and 9x equal RCIC Battalions equally distributed amongst 3 RCIC Regiments.
> 
> Third Suggestion - Plan operations around the Brigade Group.  The Brigade Group to consist of 1x RCAC Regiment, 2x RCIC Battalions (LAV Mounted), 1x RCIC Battalion of equivalent size and organization (Dismounted), 1x Mixed RCAF Helicopter Squadron (Griffon and Chinook) permanently attached to the Brigade.
> 
> Fourth Suggestion - adopt Swedish practices.
> 
> 
> Impact of Swedish practice on RCAC
> 
> Existing equipment and personnel capable of fielding 3 Regiments each containing 22 MBTs and 38x LAV/IFV.  Sufficient personnel available to man 8x 120mm Mortar Carriers and 4x VSHORAD vehicles if acquired.  Organized into a Recce Tp, 2x Mortar Tps, 1x VSHORAD Tp, 2x IFV mounted infantry coys equipped for anti-tank warfare and 2x MBT squadrons.  The Regiments are adequately resourced with C4I assets and an embedded Log and Maint Sqn - including medics.
> 
> This is made possible by:
> 
> Permanently splitting an RCAC MBT Sqn into 2x Augmented Half-Squadrons of 11x MBTs each
> 
> Reducing the number of LAV/IFVs per platoon from 4 to 3.
> Reducing the number of dismounts to 1 Gd Commander plus 3x 6 troopers organized around 3x AT Teams.  Total of 19 Dismounts / Pl
> The 3x LAV/IFVs are manned by their  2 man crews (Driver and Gunner) and their permanently mounted command team (Pl L, Pl WO, LAV Sgt). Total of 9 vehicle-bound.
> 
> Alternate view of the 28 man platoon.  3x 6man AT sections.  1x 6man LAV section.  1x 4man Command det with one person focusing on the ground game, one focusing on the mounted game, one commanding the platoon as a whole and one focusing on the rear link.
> 
> The AT sections are equipped with 6x C7 equivalents, 2x C9 equivalents, 1x C6 equivalents, 1x DMR, a CG-84 or an ATGM-CLU issued from battalion, or AT-4s or NLAWs, and a number of AT mines.  The precise armament depends on the commanders' appreciation of the task at hand.
> 
> 
> Impact on the RCIC
> 
> Adopt the 6 man section,  28 man platoon and the arms locker concept.
> 
> Issue 3 LAVs per platoon.
> 
> Use savings in PYs and LAVs  to staff  the Mortars and VSHORADs.
> 
> RCAC's MBT Sqn (2x Half Squadrons) replaced by a 3rd LAV Company in each of the 6 mounted battalions
> 
> The three dismounted battalions, identically equipped and organized as the LAV battalions to be focused on Brigade ops as an  Anti-Tank focused QRF deployable in conjunction with the Brigade Helicopter Squadrons.
> 
> 
> 
> All troops to be capable of managing lower intensity conflict when appropriately augmented, trained and commanded.
> 
> Light troops to be supplied from vehicle park with ULCVs capable of being transported by Griffon.
> 
> 
> 
> Short form
> 
> Is anybody willing to give up PYs and Vehicles at the sub- and sub-sub-unit levels if it results in more effective and better equipped units operating within a familiar construct?


I genuinely enjoy your thought experiments on these matters Kirkhill.  Whenever I read these proposed alternatives, I always enjoy sitting here with a cup of tea & trying to envision them in my head, in a way that would be workable.  I may not post in reply to these often, but I often ponder these types of posts.


That being said, just random thoughts here...

-  If the Army wanted to seriously upgrade it's lethality without spending a ton of money, or having any big capital contracts for the public & parliament to delay/ruin... the integration of a good DMR, and ATGM system would be gold.  By having a DMR at the section or platoon level, and an ATGM capability in there too, the lethality of our troops would skyrocket, and the government wouldn't have to pay a ton of $$ to make it happen.  

-  If adopting a 28 person platoon, 3 LAVs won't be enough vehicles.  In my world, I would stick with 4 vehicles.  (Remember, if one vehicle is damaged, you need some extra room in remaining vehicles for those troops to jump into.)  It would also allow you to disperse your troops via more vehicles, and allow more LAV based firepower when engaged.  (I realize the focus now is on peer vs. peer, but in Afghanistan, the LAV did most of the killing & doorway creation.)

-  Well trained, well equipped troops can always engage in lower intensity conflicts.  The same cannot be said for 'lighter' troops equipped with 'light weapons' engaging in higher intensity conflicts.  (I know that's already well established, not critiquing what you wrote here.)


----------



## Kirkhill

So, 28 PY Platoons organized around 4 LAVs with 12 PYs to crew the LAVs and 16 PYs for dismounts and a rolling, well-equipped, arms locker.

The equipping of the arms locker is at least as important as the actual distribution of the troops.  But just to continue the exercise -

4x Dr
4x Gnr

4x 4 PY Tms organized around AT weapons and MGs - One Tm Ldr designated Section Ldr.

1x PL - mounted
1x P2 - mounted
1x LAV Sgt
1x LAV Cpl

3x Infantry Regiments
6x LAV Battalions
18x LAV Companies
54x LAV Platoons

Plus

3x Armoured Regiments
6x LAV Sqns
18x LAV Tps

Therefore retaining the 4th LAV means 72 LAVs to be found or not to be reallocated.

Would you rather have the 4th LAV in each Platoon?  Or 8 LAVs in each wheeled and armoured units carrying 120mm mortars?

I don't know if that specific choice is required but it does kind of go hand-in-glove with the discussion we're having.





Secondary thought  that occurred after I finished my rant about "opportunities missed".

In the eighties the government proposed building the Militia 200 Bisons in London and 400 Bv206s at Foremost in Calgary.  And then they found they didn't have the money and stuff had to be cancelled.

The decision was made, along with transferring the CF-18 maintenance contract from Manitoba to Quebec, to proceed with building the Ontario Bisons instead of the Alberta Bv206s.  And then the Army claimed the Bisons leaving the Militia sucking fumes.

In 2013 the Army was fighting floods in Alberta with Bushmaster cannons.  

In an alternate history those floods would have been managed by 41 Bde mounted in locally manufactured and supported Bv206s and Foremost, would be contemplating building more for the DAME project and contemplating competing for world wide markets - Just like GDLS London.


Thought for the day


----------



## blacktriangle

In terms of our peer adversaries, what exactly are we trying to defeat? Something like a Russian BTG?

Shouldn't we answer that question first? In order to make informed choices about how to organize & equip?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

reveng said:


> In terms of our peer adversaries, what exactly are we trying to defeat? Something like a Russian BTG?
> 
> Shouldn't we answer that question first? In order to make informed choices about how to organize & equip?


As always, it depends, but the frame for conventional conflict would be an adversary with modern equipment in open conflict. It might not be linear, but it is not COIN. We have fairly established force ratios as a guide. 

So could a Canadian Battle Group defeat an adversary equipped with modern equipment? So an opponent with tanks, APCs, a variety of indirect fire, a contested airspace, a contested electronic spectrum, somewhat similar night vision etc. 

To start small, could one of our Combat Teams or Company Groups defeat a battalion-sized attack on their position? Lets give the opponent a company of T72s (upgraded), three companies of BMP2 equivalents and supporting fires from a Brigade.

Right now, our LAV company could muster three platoons of 25mm and something like four 84mm. Let's say they had two dismounted TOW attached. If the OC can site the Killzone to have engagements inside the 2km range then the LAVs have a chance to defeat the BMPs with direct fire. The T72s will be a big problem, even with 2 TOW. We could attach Leopard 2A6M to the company, but now those tanks are fixed and if the enemy Brigade masses elsewhere we would likely face a penetration.

To me, the answer is that adding at least four Javelin equivalents to the Company allows them to defeat (if not destroy) a battalion-sized force attacking them (assuming again that they have selected an appropriate KZ to keep the engagement band inside the 25mm effective range). The Battlegroup's Leopards can then be used as countermoves, massing their fire while staying as dispersed as possible.

To me, the good news is that Structure we have can incorporate this without new organizations. 

Additionally, I think we keep the exact nature of our potential conventional opponent broad as equipment can change.


----------



## Kirkhill

Have we developed contingencies for handling Turkish type UAVs in the region?

Can the Bushmasters contribute to that fight?  What type of addition EO/IR gear might be required?


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:


> Have we developed contingencies for handling Turkish type UAVs in the region?
> 
> Can the Bushmasters contribute to that fight?  What type of addition EO/IR gear might be required?


The 25mm contributes next to nothing to countering medium altitude UAVs of the type widely employed in the recent Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. Even if it had a proximity fused round, 25mm just isn’t going to reach up to the 15,000 feet altitude band, and trying to search the sky with a turreted optic just isn’t practical. These UAVs even operate above the effective range of many dedicated antiarcraft guns like the ZSU-23–4, which has a radar for target acquisition.

You‘ll probably want a combined antiaircraft gun/missile system like the Pantsir if you want to swat flies at that altitude.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> The 25mm contributes next to nothing to countering medium altitude UAVs of the type widely employed in the recent Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict. Even if it had a proximity fused round, 25mm just isn’t going to reach up to the 15,000 feet altitude band, and trying to search the sky with a turreted optic just isn’t practical. These UAVs even operate above the effective range of many dedicated antiarcraft guns like the ZSU-23–4, which has a radar for target acquisition.
> 
> You‘ll probably want a combined antiaircraft gun/missile system like the Pantsir if you want to swat flies at that altitude.


Pretty expensive fly swatter for a horde of pests.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> As always, it depends, but the frame for conventional conflict would be an adversary with modern equipment in open conflict. It might not be linear, but it is not COIN. We have fairly established force ratios as a guide.
> 
> So could a Canadian Battle Group defeat an adversary equipped with modern equipment? So an opponent with tanks, APCs, a variety of indirect fire, a contested airspace, a contested electronic spectrum, somewhat similar night vision etc.
> 
> To start small, could one of our Combat Teams or Company Groups defeat a battalion-sized attack on their position? Lets give the opponent a company of T72s (upgraded), three companies of BMP2 equivalents and supporting fires from a Brigade.
> 
> Right now, our LAV company could muster three platoons of 25mm and something like four 84mm. Let's say they had two dismounted TOW attached. If the OC can site the Killzone to have engagements inside the 2km range then the LAVs have a chance to defeat the BMPs with direct fire. The T72s will be a big problem, even with 2 TOW. We could attach Leopard 2A6M to the company, but now those tanks are fixed and if the enemy Brigade masses elsewhere we would likely face a penetration.
> 
> To me, the answer is that adding at least four Javelin equivalents to the Company allows them to defeat (if not destroy) a battalion-sized force attacking them (assuming again that they have selected an appropriate KZ to keep the engagement band inside the 25mm effective range). The Battlegroup's Leopards can then be used as countermoves, massing their fire while staying as dispersed as possible.
> 
> To me, the good news is that Structure we have can incorporate this without new organizations.
> 
> Additionally, I think we keep the exact nature of our potential conventional opponent broad as equipment can change.



How much artillery cover could we offer our Combat Team? I assume a 155mm battery/regiment as required?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

daftandbarmy said:


> How much artillery cover could we offer our Combat Team? I assume a 155mm battery/regiment as required?


It would depend. The company group would be part of a Battle Group (BG) that would in turn be part of a Brigade. The BG would certainly be Canadian. The Bde might not be. 

We should have some form of Battalion/Battle Group level fire support - most armies use mortars. The Bde would have a Regiment/Battalion of artillery - lets say SP 155mm. Maybe they all fire in support of our company group. Maybe they have another more pressing target? 

One thing I neglected to mention in my little wargame was engineer support. However it happens, the company/combat team would have counter-mobility support (as part of a higher plan) and survivability support. 

If we were employing an Optimized Battle Group as part of a multi-national Bde or Div then I would imagine that Canada would include an Engineer Sqn. Or not! Perhaps Canadian Sappers would in turn be part of a multi-national Engineer construct. The Staff College assumption is an integral Canadian Engineer Squadron.


----------



## blacktriangle

TangoTwoBravo said:


> A robust BG, though, could indeed work in a Multinational Div (a Div Cav mission set)


T2B, could you elaborate on how you might see this playing out? If I'm reading into it correctly, it strikes me as a way for a BG in Europe to make a useful contribution to a larger NATO force. 

Also, I'd be curious to hear if anyone has opinions on the use of Light Cav like the UK has fielded on Jackal/Coyote? Is there a place for something like this in the CA?


----------



## Kirkhill

Just to recap and round out - By sacrificing rifles (40 to 28) and LAVs (4 to 3) in the Platoons,

The Swedes end up with a Combined Arms Battalion of

2x Half-Squadrons of 11x Leo2 each
2x LAV* Coys of 12x LAVs and 3 dismount groups of 19 rifles well equipped for ground combat (AT and APers)
1x Recce Pl of 4 LAVs with 4 Inf Sections and an HQ
2x Mortar Pl of 4 LAVs with 120mm mors
1x VSHORAD AAA Pl of 4 LAVs with Radar guided 40mm
1x Pnr Pl with 3x LAV-E and 1x AVLB

Command and Control  is organized around the BHQ (Pl), a Comms Pl, the Spt Coy HQ and the Log Coy HQ.

The Log Coy comprises

1x Tn Pl
1x Fuel and Ammo Pl
1x Repair Pl
1x Med Pl

The Spt Coy supplies its own Tn fleet.

The Log Coy supplies each of the four Manoeuvre Coy Qs with

2x Armd Log vehs
1x Armd Amb
1x Armd MRT
1x ARV

In addition each company receives, or has embedded, its own FOO/FAC team in its own LAV.


And, by way of Background









						Objectives for Swedish total defence 2021–2025 - Government bill ‘Totalförsvaret 2021–2025’
					

The Government bill contains proposals on an overall objective for total defence, new objectives for military and civil defence, the direction of t...




					www.government.se
				












						Swedish Army - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Old Sweat

TangoTwoBravo has raised an interesting point about fire support. I know I am light years out of date, but to my old gunner mind, the most important asset his FOO brings with him, besides his training and experience, is his radio. For a quick attack, the FOO using the DS battery and the battalion mortars could organize a fairly hefty and flexible fire plan. For anything more, we are talking battle group, so the BC would ask for the use of the artillery regiment with an allotment of ammunition for the task.

If the operation needs to be upgraded, we are talking the divsional artillery with a whole bunch of bullets, and maybe, to steal a phrase from my fighter pilots cronies back then, aluminum overcast. Certainly fixed and rotary winged and unmanned to boot. It is hard to get this across in our tiny army and air force, but learning and understanding the process has to be part of officer development.

Sir Brian Horrocks, who commanded 30 (BR) Corps in NWE, wrote in his memoirs, and I am paraphrasing, how his Corps artillery commander have every gun within range perched on the end of his radio antenna. All Sir Brian had to do was ask, and it happened. Unlikely these days, maybe, but nature hates a vacuum.


----------



## Infanteer

Old Sweat, we don't use radios anymore.  FOO's use their cell phones and call missions in with WhatsApp.


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:


> Pretty expensive fly swatter for a horde of pests.


And that’s one reason why Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV like the Turkish TB2 are turning out to be such a great weapon. They are only a few million dollars each, without crew on board, so if you lose one it isn‘t the end of the day. And nobody is really out there actively hunting them, as they are generally considered not really valuable enough to task large missiles and fighter aircraft.

So you can stand off above the range of ground fire and MANPADs and happily spend all day calling in artillery or firing missiles. At least that was Azerbaijan’s recent experience using them.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> And that’s one reason why Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV like the Turkish TB2 are turning out to be such a great weapon. They are only a few million dollars each, without crew on board, so if you lose one it isn‘t the end of the day. And nobody is really out there actively hunting them, as they are generally considered not really valuable enough to task large missiles and fighter aircraft.
> 
> So you can stand off above the range of ground fire and MANPADs and happily spend all day calling in artillery or firing missiles. At least that was Azerbaijan’s recent experience using them.



So what is the advantage of a VSHORAD system?  Or should the money go into C-RAM?


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> Old Sweat, we don't use radios anymore.  FOO's use their cell phones and call missions in with WhatsApp.


That would probably be because the secure network centric force that was promised to decades ago hasn't been rolled out yet.  😉 

On a serious note, those same FOO/FACs and their "radios" and the Fire Support Coordination Centres are also the link to everything else that can go "boom" that a theatre commander makes available whether it be general support multi launch or precision rockets, aviation, close air or naval gun and missile/rocket fire (that's for all our littoral advocates) or the multitude of additional munition systems on the drawing boards.

Old Sweat's point is well taken though. We have to think well above the battle group level in a high intensity conflict and even when we ourselves bring just that to the fight, we need to be trained for and have the ability to properly utilize all the necessary resources available unless we wish to be relegated to guarding POWs in the rear area. 

Old Sweat, in another discussion he and I had mentioned an interesting comment that purportedly came from the then CDS at the time of the run-up to Gulf War 1 to the effect of "if we deployed land forces, a brigade group should be sent." His reasoning was that it was large enough to appear on briefing maps, and thus gain international attention. Now that's politics. And that's why the Army should always have the ability to offer the politicians an option much bigger than a battlegroup.

🍻


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:


> So what is the advantage of a VSHORAD system?


The really low level stuff is still out there — attack helicopters and the like. Plus there’s now the smaller UAVs, not everything is a Predator-equivalent. If you’re fighting a near-peer foe with decent airpower, you’ll want a layered air defence system. Instead, most western armies (including Canada) went with a hand wave and “the Air Force will win us air superiority on the first day”.


----------



## blacktriangle

Infanteer said:


> Old Sweat, we don't use radios anymore.  FOO's use their cell phones and call missions in with WhatsApp.


Reminds me of the reports years back of GRU implanting malware into the apps that Ukrainian artillery were using in order to target them. To be fair, I also read that much of this was overblown. But then again, they're the same actors that pulled off the SolarWinds campaign...


----------



## MilEME09

You mean the app the GRU actually developed that the Ukrainians were using? The one we told them about because we sending their location while feeding them the wrong adjustments. Let's just say some never listen


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> That would probably be because the secure network centric force that was promised to decades ago hasn't been rolled out yet.  😉
> 
> On a serious note, those same FOO/FACs and their "radios" and the Fire Support Coordination Centres are also the link to everything else that can go "boom" that a theatre commander makes available whether it be general support multi launch or precision rockets, aviation, close air or naval gun and missile/rocket fire (that's for all our littoral advocates) or the multitude of additional munition systems on the drawing boards.
> 
> Old Sweat's point is well taken though. We have to think well above the battle group level in a high intensity conflict and even when we ourselves bring just that to the fight, we need to be trained for and have the ability to properly utilize all the necessary resources available unless we wish to be relegated to guarding POWs in the rear area.
> 
> Old Sweat, in another discussion he and I had mentioned an interesting comment that purportedly came from the then CDS at the time of the run-up to Gulf War 1 to the effect of "if we deployed land forces, a brigade group should be sent." His reasoning was that it was large enough to appear on briefing maps, and thus gain international attention. Now that's politics. And that's why the Army should always have the ability to offer the politicians an option much bigger than a battlegroup.
> 
> 🍻


 And why I like the idea of the RCA being able to replicate the area of influence of an CSC flotilla on land.  Not because we need the 1700 km umbrella that Tomahawks supply but because it is something (I believe) we can do within our PY budget,  it would supply a focus for our deployments and would really show up on the maps.  The Brigade Gp then becomes a Strategic Reserve just as 4 CMBG and the Honest Johns were.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> That would probably be because the secure network centric force that was promised to decades ago hasn't been rolled out yet.  😉
> 
> On a serious note, those same FOO/FACs and their "radios" and the Fire Support Coordination Centres are also the link to everything else that can go "boom" that a theatre commander makes available whether it be general support multi launch or precision rockets, aviation, close air or naval gun and missile/rocket fire (that's for all our littoral advocates) or the multitude of additional munition systems on the drawing boards.
> 
> Old Sweat's point is well taken though. We have to think well above the battle group level in a high intensity conflict and even when we ourselves bring just that to the fight, we need to be trained for and have the ability to properly utilize all the necessary resources available unless we wish to be relegated to guarding POWs in the rear area.
> 
> Old Sweat, in another discussion he and I had mentioned an interesting comment that purportedly came from the then CDS at the time of the run-up to Gulf War 1 to the effect of "if we deployed land forces, a brigade group should be sent." His reasoning was that it was large enough to appear on briefing maps, and thus gain international attention. Now that's politics. And that's why the Army should always have the ability to offer the politicians an option much bigger than a battlegroup.
> 
> 🍻



'As long as the Infantry, Armour and Engineers can be covered by their own Artillery' might be a good working principle


----------



## CBH99

reveng said:


> Reminds me of the reports years back of GRU implanting malware into the apps that Ukrainian artillery were using in order to target them. To be fair, I also read that much of this was overblown. But then again, they're the same actors that pulled off the SolarWinds campaign...


Was it the apps the Ukrainians were using, that were giving away their positions?  Or was it Russian UAVs orbiting overhead, which would basically pinpoint their location as soon as they transmitted anything, re: EMCON.  

First I had heard of the apps is all, curious.


----------



## blacktriangle

CBH99 said:


> Was it the apps the Ukrainians were using, that were giving away their positions?  Or was it Russian UAVs orbiting overhead, which would basically pinpoint their location as soon as they transmitted anything, re: EMCON.
> 
> First I had heard of the apps is all, curious.


IIRC, it was a (supposedly) legitimate app that was compromised. Geolocational data from implanted devices was then supposedly used to cue ISR assets to get the fidelity needed to facilitate strikes. I remember the whole thing was debated quite a bit. I'll see if I can send you a link or something as to not throw this discussion off too much.


----------



## McG

The Ukrainian Artillery app is discussed here:





						Fancy Bear - Wikipedia
					






					en.m.wikipedia.org


----------



## markppcli

CBH99 said:


> Was it the apps the Ukrainians were using, that were giving away their positions?  Or was it Russian UAVs orbiting overhead, which would basically pinpoint their location as soon as they transmitted anything, re: EMCON.
> 
> First I had heard of the apps is all, curious.


Essentially Ukrainians began using an Android App for imputing targetting data on D30 Howitzers. Russians hack the App, and are able to see where large concentrations of users are located, then use this Data to target Ukrainian artillery positions.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

reveng said:


> T2B, could you elaborate on how you might see this playing out? If I'm reading into it correctly, it strikes me as a way for a BG in Europe to make a useful contribution to a larger NATO force.
> 
> Also, I'd be curious to hear if anyone has opinions on the use of Light Cav like the UK has fielded on Jackal/Coyote? Is there a place for something like this in the CA?


If we are in a conventional setting but not quite a linear as WW2 there will be lots of open flanks. A Canadian BG could be a "cavalry/security" unit for a Brigade or Division. Guard tasks, either front flank or rear could all be tasks for such a BG whether the parent formation is conducting offensive or defensive tasks. It would operate under the fire support coverage of the guarded/parent formation. 

So let's say we had a US-led MultiNational Division with three Brigades each of which came from a single Troop Contributing Nation. To that, Canada adds a mechanized BG with integral infantry, a Leopard 2A6M squadron, integral engineers, a recce squadron and a TA Bty (FOOs and some UAVs). The BG could guard an open flank of the Div as it advances, able to fight and not just screen. 

Heck, even a CMBG could perform such a task for a larger formation and I have done so on a UR.

A CMBG brings much more capability, of course, and I think we all envision it being in a US or UK multinational division, leveraging our ABCA advantage. The Brigade is where we really start to integrate combat power. Thing is, we have to actually generate that capability with more than a PowerPoint orgchart and some JCATS icons. We have pretty much everything for the BG with the exception of ALAWS. For the CMBG we need those. We need SP artillery. We need GBAD. We need to consider the variants of our Leopards. We do have have plenty of structure for that. Moving infantry between units and rearranging who is the gunner in the LAV will not solve the problem.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> If we are in a conventional setting but not quite a linear as WW2 there will be lots of open flanks. A Canadian BG could be a "cavalry/security" unit for a Brigade or Division. Guard tasks, either front flank or rear could all be tasks for such a BG whether the parent formation is conducting offensive or defensive tasks. It would operate under the fire support coverage of the guarded/parent formation.
> 
> So let's say we had a US-led MultiNational Division with three Brigades each of which came from a single Troop Contributing Nation. To that, Canada adds a mechanized BG with integral infantry, a Leopard 2A6M squadron, integral engineers, a recce squadron and a TA Bty (FOOs and some UAVs). The BG could guard an open flank of the Div as it advances, able to fight and not just screen.
> 
> Heck, even a CMBG could perform such a task for a larger formation and I have done so on a UR.
> 
> A CMBG brings much more capability, of course, and I think we all envision it being in a US or UK multinational division, leveraging our ABCA advantage. The Brigade is where we really start to integrate combat power. Thing is, we have to actually generate that capability with more than a PowerPoint orgchart and some JCATS icons. We have pretty much everything for the BG with the exception of ALAWS. For the CMBG we need those. We need SP artillery. We need GBAD. We need to consider the variants of our Leopards. We do have have plenty of structure for that. *Moving infantry between units and rearranging who is the gunner in the LAV will not solve the problem.*



But it accomplishes the mission of giving the illusion of progress at little cost


----------



## markppcli

TangoTwoBravo said:


> If we are in a conventional setting but not quite a linear as WW2 there will be lots of open flanks. A Canadian BG could be a "cavalry/security" unit for a Brigade or Division. Guard tasks, either front flank or rear could all be tasks for such a BG whether the parent formation is conducting offensive or defensive tasks. It would operate under the fire support coverage of the guarded/parent formation.
> 
> So let's say we had a US-led MultiNational Division with three Brigades each of which came from a single Troop Contributing Nation. To that, Canada adds a mechanized BG with integral infantry, a Leopard 2A6M squadron, integral engineers, a recce squadron and a TA Bty (FOOs and some UAVs). The BG could guard an open flank of the Div as it advances, able to fight and not just screen.
> 
> Heck, even a CMBG could perform such a task for a larger formation and I have done so on a UR.
> 
> A CMBG brings much more capability, of course, and I think we all envision it being in a US or UK multinational division, leveraging our ABCA advantage. The Brigade is where we really start to integrate combat power. Thing is, we have to actually generate that capability with more than a PowerPoint orgchart and some JCATS icons. We have pretty much everything for the BG with the exception of ALAWS. For the CMBG we need those. We need SP artillery. We need GBAD. We need to consider the variants of our Leopards. We do have have plenty of structure for that. Moving infantry between units and rearranging who is the gunner in the LAV will not solve the problem.


When you see SP Artillery does is _need_ to be Howitzers or would 120mm mortar carriers suffice? obviously both being the ideal of course. In Latvia the Slovenes had 120s towed by Valuks ( Pandur 6x6s), and while I know it's not ideal, would something like that provide us with at least something workable in your opinion?

I do think that the inclusion of weapons systems into existing structures is something we do very poorly. Giving a rifle company a TOW system, or a C16 for that matter, does not guarantee its effective employment. In fact having led the "just throw it in the back" tow section on an eFP rotation it's more likely the opposite as it will be sidelined and not well understood. Similarly while the C16 is undoubtedly an effective weapon system, it's place in our orbats means it is rarely deployed, and when it is it's as an afterthought. What I'm trying to say is that it's not as simple as giving a company a Javelin, we need to have time and space to train those companies in the effective employment, and as importantly the sustainment of what ever ALAWS / ATGM we procure.


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> If we are in a conventional setting but not quite a linear as WW2 there will be lots of open flanks. A Canadian BG could be a "cavalry/security" unit for a Brigade or Division. Guard tasks, either front flank or rear could all be tasks for such a BG whether the parent formation is conducting offensive or defensive tasks. It would operate under the fire support coverage of the guarded/parent formation.
> 
> So let's say we had a US-led MultiNational Division with three Brigades each of which came from a single Troop Contributing Nation. To that, Canada adds a mechanized BG with integral infantry, a Leopard 2A6M squadron, integral engineers, a recce squadron and a TA Bty (FOOs and some UAVs). The BG could guard an open flank of the Div as it advances, able to fight and not just screen.
> 
> Heck, even a CMBG could perform such a task for a larger formation and I have done so on a UR.
> 
> A CMBG brings much more capability, of course, and I think we all envision it being in a US or UK multinational division, leveraging our ABCA advantage. The Brigade is where we really start to integrate combat power. Thing is, we have to actually generate that capability with more than a PowerPoint orgchart and some JCATS icons. We have pretty much everything for the BG with the exception of ALAWS. For the CMBG we need those. We need SP artillery. We need GBAD. We need to consider the variants of our Leopards. We do have have plenty of structure for that. Moving infantry between units and rearranging who is the gunner in the LAV will not solve the problem.


The difference between what you are suggesting is that you look at the Canada Army for what it is and I look at it for what it should be.

The vision I have is for one of transformation to a greater potential but at similar cost. 

Right now we have a large number of full-time soldiers based the cold war concept of an Army in being (much of our strength being wasted in an overly large bureaucracy in Ottawa). The full-time salaries and benefits involved have eroded our ability to buy new equipment and maintain it and train properly, hence the mind-numbing concept of managed fleets and readiness. Pretty much every nation has devolved it's basic organizational concept to the brigade group level which is the lowest organization capable of supporting itself during operations. We are currently incapable of expanding our footprint beyond three marginally equipped brigade groups.

Those brigade groups have two major capabilities: both our LAV fleet and our support fleet of vehicles are relatively new and do not require much upgrading. While I have issues with the LAV 6.0, they are perfectly useable and could be greatly improved if we could integrate anti-armour missiles on the turrets over and above providing dismounted anti-armour weapons to the infantry.

The point is that in order to be a viable fighting force we need to develop ways to fill out the ranks, augment the equipment and train as formations. That costs money but the issue here is very simple. We either find the money to make our Army a capable force, or we simply decide never to go into a full spectrum conflict. 

The former requires an entirely new Army which makes the best use of what we have but changes in a very significant way how we are organized and manned. To generate more money for the essential equipment we need to cut full-time salaries significantly - firstly by reducing all headquarters positions (not just the Army ones), both military and civilian and secondly we need to develop a much more stable and sustainable trained and equipped reserve force.

We simply cannot continue with the manning of the Army (and the Forces as a whole) the way it is. It is mathematically unsustainable. It depends on significantly more funding from the government every year as salaries and benefits become more and more expensive. We will continue with the spiral of rusted out equipment and lowered training standards to compensate. Even worse, we will continue to suffer forced cuts in manning to hold the line. It is far better to have a planned force restructure based on a given budgets than unplanned reactive ones.

The only other option if we continue with our bloated administrative elements and if we fail to properly equip our Army is to continue to lose capabilities to the point where it is ineffective and non deployable. That condition is almost guaranteed to bring about a political decision to abandon the Army except as a minor constabulary force which will only deploy in very limited circumstances in favour of sustaining the Navy and Air Force.

If there's one thing that studying about the Army for the last thirty years has taught me it's that politicians do want to make an impact on the world stage and that the Army is the most effective way of doing that. Our move into the Balkans, our move into Kabul, our move into Kandahar and our move into Latvia were all decisions made at the political level to enhance Canada's standing in the international community. And yes, while the RCAF and the RCN contributed to those operations, it was the Army that made the most impact on the political scene.

The problem isn't so much that the politicians short change the Army. It's National Defence and the CAF that does so. Let's face it, by the time that the MND is given options, the services have already made their deals and compromises for how the money is to be spent. First and foremost is the maintenance (and expansion) of DND/CAF's bureaucracy. Thereafter its a grab bag of whose turn is it and whose equipment is the most rusted out. And again, that rust out is entirely as a result of the fact that DND/CAF prioritizes keeping tens of thousands of full-time personnel on the payroll year after year even when they are not needed under current peacetime conditions. They refuse to consider any improvement to the reserve system that would allow the reserve force to be a meaningful and viable equipped and trained force capable of being used in an emergency. As I've said numerous times: a Class A reservist costs 1/6th of a full-time equivalent. For the reduction of every full-time member, you can hire and train three reservists and put the other fifty percent of the saving to equipment and O&M. The thing is it's impossible to do with our present "come when you feel like" it reserve service. It needs major reform; reform that NDHQ/CAF refuses to undertake.

By all means, plan on deploying no more than a BG during peacetime if that's what you want but for the sake of the country plan on creating a system that has a viable plan and methodology to expand that force rapidly in size when the unthinkable happens. 

🍻


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

markppcli said:


> When you see SP Artillery does is _need_ to be Howitzers or would 120mm mortar carriers suffice? obviously both being the ideal of course. In Latvia the Slovenes had 120s towed by Valuks ( Pandur 6x6s), and while I know it's not ideal, would something like that provide us with at least something workable in your opinion?
> 
> I do think that the inclusion of weapons systems into existing structures is something we do very poorly. Giving a rifle company a TOW system, or a C16 for that matter, does not guarantee its effective employment. In fact having led the "just throw it in the back" tow section on an eFP rotation it's more likely the opposite as it will be sidelined and not well understood. Similarly while the C16 is undoubtedly an effective weapon system, it's place in our orbats means it is rarely deployed, and when it is it's as an afterthought. What I'm trying to say is that it's not as simple as giving a company a Javelin, we need to have time and space to train those companies in the effective employment, and as importantly the sustainment of what ever ALAWS / ATGM we procure.


I think a 120mm SP mortar for a BG would be awesome. Not sure it would have the range, though, to be a Bde-level artillery replacement. Others would know more on that!

Fair point that equipping the infantry with a Javelin-equivalent would need more than "Here you go, carry this around with you!" It would need incorporation into collective training in addition to whatever individual training would be required. I think, though, it would be an order of magnitude less than some other systems that would require dedicated organizational structures. Staff College has Javelin in the units, so its not like we have nothing to go on in terms of employment. Not necessarily helpful for the platoon issued with one, but its a start.


----------



## markppcli

markppcli said:


> When you see SP Artillery does is _need_ to be Howitzers or would 120mm mortar carriers suffice? obviously both being the ideal of course. In Latvia the Slovenes had 120s towed by Valuks ( Pandur 6x6s), and while I know it's not ideal, would something like that provide us with at least something workable in your opinion?
> 
> I do think that the inclusion of weapons systems into existing structures is something we do very poorly. Giving a rifle company a TOW system, or a C16 for that matter, does not guarantee its effective employment. In fact having led the "just throw it in the back" tow section on an eFP rotation it's more likely the opposite as it will be sidelined and not well understood. Similarly while the C16 is undoubtedly an effective weapon system, it's place in our orbats means it is rarely deployed, and when it is it's as an afterthought. What I'm trying to say is that it's not as simple as giving a company a Javelin, we need to have time and space to train those companies in the effective employment, and as importantly the sustainment of what ever ALAWS / ATGM we procure.


As Col Ritchie told us during a town hall a couple years ago " I'd love TOW and Mortar platoons but we just tried to take Rocky Ford and I had to call in 1 CER to act s infantry, I can't afford to loose more bayonets and I'm not getting any more." So it is on some level a structural problem when we can't adjust the LAV Bn we train and employ, which seems to the consensus core of what the CA is going to produce for missions, to reflect new realities and equipment. It would be ideal, well acceptable, if we gave ATGM capability to the reserves to produce deployable platoons to support deploying forces, but as we've discussed on here it's not a reliable force generator. 

As an aside to the towed Mortars, I would be curious to see if we could hook up a trailer hitch to the TAPV and get something rigged up for an 81mm. While far from "SP Artillery" at least it would be some kind of mobile indirect capability.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> When you see SP Artillery does is _need_ to be Howitzers or would 120mm mortar carriers suffice? obviously both being the ideal of course. In Latvia the Slovenes had 120s towed by Valuks ( Pandur 6x6s), and while I know it's not ideal, would something like that provide us with at least something workable in your opinion?
> 
> I do think that the inclusion of weapons systems into existing structures is something we do very poorly. Giving a rifle company a TOW system, or a C16 for that matter, does not guarantee its effective employment. In fact having led the "just throw it in the back" tow section on an eFP rotation it's more likely the opposite as it will be sidelined and not well understood. Similarly while the C16 is undoubtedly an effective weapon system, it's place in our orbats means it is rarely deployed, and when it is it's as an afterthought. What I'm trying to say is that it's not as simple as giving a company a Javelin, we need to have time and space to train those companies in the effective employment, and as importantly the sustainment of what ever ALAWS / ATGM we procure.


You raise two good points both of which are these days rarely understood well.

With respect to the Howitzer v mortar issue, the question is are you looking simply at the battle group level or something more. 

Our abandonment of the "Cold War" Army in the late 1990s and a transformation into a medium force had many knock on effects. The desire to create a force more capable of deploying rapidly into a theatre against a lightly armed foe made the elimination of tracked heavy elements such as tanks and SPs which were at the time "rusting out" and expensive to maintain and, difficult to deploy. Up until 2006 we had little use for either mortars or artillery (or tanks for that matter) and allowed both systems to atrophy. 

Mortars, especially battalion mortars, have one key characteristic: they provide immediate, guaranteed, all-weather indirect fire support to the battalion. Artillery has its own characteristic which is the ability to reach out further than mortars and through its fire support network has the ability to mass indirect fires from many different sources and calibres in all weather. Some of that fire is immediate and guaranteed (the close support batteries) while others are more of an "as available" situation. In any event, when a given battalion or brigade is in extreme circumstances, fire can be massed from many sources. 

Artillery also provides a heavier projectile and a more precise projectile than a mortar although developing munitions make individual, guided projectile capabilities from mortars more viable every day. If close-in guided fire is needed mortars are already quite effective. If range and massed fires are required artillery is still, and will remain, the answer especially as the deep battle becomes more important and as forces are more mobile and dispersed.

I tend to agree with your thoughts on the "inclusion of weapon systems into existing structures". The infantry in particular has been very possessive of their rifle companies (see for example the elimination of mortars and pioneers and to an extent anti-armour when they were hit with a PY crunch) I think new structures are needed to incorporate new weapon systems and operational concepts for the high-intensity battlefield. I personally think that the all-singing, all-dancing infantryman is no longer viable. I believe that we need to clearly differentiate between light, medium and heavy forces and their likely operational context and reform, not just the infantry but all the combat and support arms and their structures and weapons mixes accordingly.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> As Col Ritchie told us during a town hall a couple years ago " I'd love TOW and Mortar platoons but we just tried to take Rocky Ford and I had to call in 1 CER to act s infantry, I can't afford to loose more bayonets and I'm not getting any more." So it is on some level a structural problem when we can't adjust the LAV Bn we train and employ, which seems to the consensus core of what the CA is going to produce for missions, to reflect new realities and equipment. It would be ideal, well acceptable, if we gave ATGM capability to the reserves to produce deployable platoons to support deploying forces, but as we've discussed on here it's not a reliable force generator.
> 
> As an aside to the towed Mortars, I would be curious to see if we could hook up a trailer hitch to the TAPV and get something rigged up for an 81mm. While far from "SP Artillery" at least it would be some kind of mobile indirect capability.


I'm glad to see the realization that there aren't enough folks in the Reg F to go around. Saying that the reserves are not a reliable force generator is true but is nobody's fault but our own for not making them such. We've seen just how good a force generator the reserves can be if given half a chance during Afghanistan where up to 20% of each deployed battle group or more were reservists. The problem isn't the materiel itself, it's the system that makes them unreliable for anything but deployments with a long lead time to integrate and train them.

Just another aside. Giving reservists a "specialty" that only they do will lead to problems. Not because they can't be relied on to show up--legislation allows them to be called into service--but because their absence from much of the routine training impedes the development of essential experience to allow the development of the more senior leadership within both the platoon and the battalion. You need a small core of Reg F people of all specialties within a battalion at all times to keep the skill levels alive and to allow the more senior leaders to properly understand how such specialties are employed. It is all to easy to ignore the ATGM platoon or the mortar platoon if it is not with you on a battalion exercise and therefore to allow the combined arms skills to fade. The absence of artillery and engineers and even armour on much of the infantry's training results in the infantry not having as good a grasp of their employment as they should. Unfortunately even where such a core exists it is frequently shuffled into the rifle companies to add missing bayonets rather than in playing their proper role.

🍻


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## markppcli

FJAG said:


> You raise two good points both of which are these days rarely understood well.
> 
> With respect to the Howitzer v mortar issue, the question is are you looking simply at the battle group level or something more.
> 
> Our abandonment of the "Cold War" Army in the late 1990s and a transformation into a medium force had many knock on effects. The desire to create a force more capable of deploying rapidly into a theatre against a lightly armed foe made the elimination of tracked heavy elements such as tanks and SPs which were at the time "rusting out" and expensive to maintain and, difficult to deploy. Up until 2006 we had little use for either mortars or artillery (or tanks for that matter) and allowed both systems to atrophy.
> 
> Mortars, especially battalion mortars, have one key characteristic: they provide immediate, guaranteed, all-weather indirect fire support to the battalion. Artillery has its own characteristic which is the ability to reach out further than mortars and through its fire support network has the ability to mass indirect fires from many different sources and calibres in all weather. Some of that fire is immediate and guaranteed (the close support batteries) while others are more of an "as available" situation. In any event, when a given battalion or brigade is in extreme circumstances, fire can be massed from many sources.
> 
> Artillery also provides a heavier projectile and a more precise projectile than a mortar although developing munitions make individual, guided projectile capabilities from mortars more viable every day. If close-in guided fire is needed mortars are already quite effective. If range and massed fires are required artillery is still, and will remain, the answer especially as the deep battle becomes more important and as forces are more mobile and dispersed.
> 
> I tend to agree with your thoughts on the "inclusion of weapon systems into existing structures". The infantry in particular has been very possessive of their rifle companies (see for example the elimination of mortars and pioneers and to an extent anti-armour when they were hit with a PY crunch) I think new structures are needed to incorporate new weapon systems and operational concepts for the high-intensity battlefield. I personally think that the all-singing, all-dancing infantryman is no longer viable. I believe that we need to clearly differentiate between light, medium and heavy forces and their likely operational context and reform, not just the infantry but all the combat and support arms and their structures and weapons mixes accordingly.
> 
> 🍻


Thank you for the education! 

WRT your previous points about the reserves I tend to agree they need to be better integrated, and should be the holders of our real niche capabilities (Jungle Warfare, Mountain Warfare, ect). My previous suggestion of ten (ish) Bns of Mounted Rifles and two or three Tank Crew Replacement Regiments was aimed at better integration, and a real role. I would wonder if we could force generate the third infantry BN in each CMBG from a "ready reserve" made up of a company from each of the existing CBGS (which would become the CMR Bns in my fever dreams) mounted in their own TAPVs. Held at their home units and massed for formation exercises.  In the discussion of artillery, could we assign the roles of divisional artillery regiments to the Reserves, in a break glass in case of war scenario?

My final question on the reserve roles you envision; the French Army has a reserve company in each of it's Infantry Regiments  and I assume they have similar arrangements in other branches and corps is that be the superior organizational structure, reducing the manning of regular force soldiers and also more closely integrating the reserves? (I suspect I'm veering outside of force 2025 here my apologies)


----------



## Brad Sallows

> I do wonder how we get a Battlegroup from Edmonton to "unknown point on the globe" in a timely fashion that allows it to influence events for the government of Canada.



From the altitude of politics, Canada likes to send a ship or some aircraft to influence events (ie. to participate in someone else's events; we can't do very much on our own).  Fast in; and when the necessity arises, fast out.  Land forces (eg. battle group) makes a stronger political statement of commitment (more at risk).  All this for operations short of a major war, for which the CAF always manages to put something together from what is already at hand.

So that leaves a major war, for which nothing less than a brigade (with all the capabilities it needs to look after itself in battle) makes much sense (to me) .  I sometimes wonder whether a multinational brigade attached to someone's otherwise national division is a contribution welcomed by the politicians but a bit of a PITA for the division commander.

If we can't send one (a brigade) Right Now without displacing someone else's deploying forces, Canada's is a reinforcing force.  And regardless, the force needs replacement pools (people and kit).  Status quo, time is needed to put it together and work it up.  All the equipment, plus extras, has to already be there irrespective of where it is held; and what is mainly needed from the Res F is coal-face soldiers (those who are ready or near-ready for the initial go; those who are not for the replacement stream).


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Thank you for the education!
> 
> WRT your previous points about the reserves I tend to agree they need to be better integrated, and should be the holders of our real niche capabilities (Jungle Warfare, Mountain Warfare, ect). My previous suggestion of ten (ish) Bns of Mounted Rifles and two or three Tank Crew Replacement Regiments was aimed at better integration, and a real role. I would wonder if we could force generate the third infantry BN in each CMBG from a "ready reserve" made up of a company from each of the existing CBGS (which would become the CMR Bns in my fever dreams) mounted in their own TAPVs. Held at their home units and massed for formation exercises.  In the discussion of artillery, could we assign the roles of divisional artillery regiments to the Reserves, in a break glass in case of war scenario?
> 
> My final question on the reserve roles you envision; the French Army has a reserve company in each of it's Infantry Regiments  and I assume they have similar arrangements in other branches and corps is that be the superior organizational structure, reducing the manning of regular force soldiers and also more closely integrating the reserves? (I suspect I'm veering outside of force 2025 here my apologies)


Around two years ago I spent quite some time reviewing what our Army reserve should look like and how to get it to the point where it can be dependable. I wrote a short book and an article on the subject.

I basically see a regular force and a reserve force made up of one of three types of units. The units are:  

Type 1) a unit made up exclusively of regular force or predominantly regular force members (for units that require a quick reaction operational deployment or are highly skilled operators such as special forces); 
Type 2) a unit made up of primarily reserve personnel with some regular force leadership and admin staff (for units that will only deploy in extreme cases of national emergency but which could also supply volunteers to round out Type 1) units; and 
Type 3) hybrid units which have varying numbers of regular force and reserve force personnel (where a portion of the unit needs to be highly skilled or ready to deploy but the bulk only is needed in extreme circumstances)

These varying units would have a roles as follows:

a special operations force made up of Type 1) elements;
a light quick reaction and northern operations brigade group made up of Type 1) units;
a medium mechanized brigade group (LAVs but no tanks) for follow up purposes and peacekeeping operations made up predominantly of Type 1) units;
a heavy armoured brigade (LAVs, tanks, SPs) for standing operations in Europe made up predominantly of Type 1) units;
two heavy armoured brigade groups of predominantly Type 2 units which would be fully equipped and trained to deploy only in a major emergency. They would have a full scale of equipment and be trained in combined arms operations and to reinforce in Europe or any theatre requiring a heavy force. For an example consider one of the several National Guard Armored Brigade Combat Teams in existence;
one artillery brigade, one sustainment brigade and one manoeuvre enhancement brigade each of which would be fully equipped and trained and made up of Type 3) units and provide both support to ongoing operations in peacetime and a capability to provide significantly expanded support capabilities to deployed manoeuvre forces in an emergency. Again think of the National Guard artillery, sustainment and manoeuvre enhancement brigades;
A number of Type 2) infantry battalions and reconnaissance regiments equipped only with light scales of equipment for training whose primary purpose is to fill vacancies in Type 1) units or to provide individual reinforcements or casualty replacements; and
An integrated recruiting and training establishment of four regional Type 3) depot battalions to train all Reg F and Res F personnel to an identical DP1 standard in addition to the existing Combat Arms school and trade school establishments
Running the numbers, these units could be built using the existing Army's PYs and Army reserve positions. The main issues with building such a force is:

equipping the force and equipment maintenance;
legislation to introduce a set number of "mandatory training days" for reservists and significant employer/family support legislation; 
operational plans (with impact on both the RCAF and the RCN) to project the force into a foreign theatre in times of an emergency;
potentially, prepositioning assets in high-risk theatres to allow "fly-over" deployments in emergencies and for exercises with the increased equipment and maintenance issues;
the inevitable opposition by the Res F to the inevitable and necessary and long overdue reduction in the number of small undermanned reserve units and a similar opposition by the Reg F to the necessary and long overdue reduction in PYs (especially at headquarters above brigade level) to generate the funds needed for equipment and O&M
I'm particulalry agnostic when it comes to how these organizations are equipped as I see these "brigades" as not necessarily being organized and equipped as we see them now. My view is based on what basic structures should be possible within existing numbers and what general functions they should have. 

The question of the French force structure is one I also tend to leave vague under the general rubric of "hybrid" unit as this will vary with the need for such unit to potentially deploy a rapid reaction element versus a major emergency element. For example, an artillery multi-launch rocket regiment in the arty brigade might be 95% reservist while an air defence regiment within the same brigade may be 50% reservist; a heavy engineer support regiment in the manoeuvre enhancement brigade might have a headquarters and one full squadron Reg F and two squadrons in different parts of the country that are 95% reservist. The whole thing depends on a careful analysis of what is actually needed in each force on a day-to-day basis during peacetime and what necessary elements (individuals to full formations) are needed only in the event of a major emergency (and by definition under the NDA, "emergency" includes full-out war)

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Going back to stale dated numbers:

In 2008 the RCA claimed 1805 Reg PYs and felt the need to expand those PYs to 2228.

This was predicated on the need to generate

3 Fmn FSCC
3 Fmn ASCC
3 Fmn STA FSC

9 BC Parties
9 BG FSCC
9 BG ASCC

33 FOO/FAC Parties (4 PY per party total of 132 PY of 1805-2228)

An Unknown Number of AD Radar Tps (10x MRR purchased in 2018?)
5x SUAV Tps (Blackjack)
5x AWL Tps (HALO)
5x WLR Tps (LCMR)

In terms of being able to engage the enemy the RCA proposed

6x M777 Gun Batteries of 6 Guns each (36 Guns with 7 PY / Gun for a total of 252 Gun Numbers)
The 7 PY Gun Det was felt to be marginal and required upsizing to 10 PY / Gun for a total of 360 Gun Numbers on the 36 Guns.

In Addition the RCA wanted 16 Long Range Precision Fires Systems

And 3x GBAD Tps (Btys preferred)

LRPRS and GBAD were constrained, in part, by the number of gunners available.



Consider.

1. In 2008 the RCA had managed to convince the government to buy Archer 155s

Each Archer carries 4 crew, but only requires 2.   2x Techs, 1x Cmd, 1x Gnr/Dr.

Lets assume minimal manning of 2 and assume that the Techs come from the existing supply of Gun Techs in each battery.

36x Archer 155s requires 72 Gunners instead of 252 to 360 Gunners anticipated if employing M777s. 
180 to 288 PYs saved for the same number of tubes

2.  With the saved PYs the RCA acquired 16 HIMARs to fulfill the LRPRS requirement

16 HIMARS can be operated by 2 Gunners but usually carries 3.  The third PY is part of the command team and we will assume that, like the Techs, they come from the existing command team in each battery.

Lets assume minimal manning of 2, like the Archers.

16x LRPRS HIMARS requires 16x 2 Gunners for a total of 32.

The unemployed 180 to 288 M777 Gunners, if they were tasked to man the 16 HIMARs, would be reduced to 148 to 256.

3. With the residual PYs the RCA acquired 10 GBAD Tps based on the purchase of 10x MRR and the NASAMS organization of

1x Radar (2x Ops)
1x EO/IR (2x Ops)
1x FDC (3x Ops)
1x Firing Det (4x Ops)
Number of Weapons (Guns and Missiles) assigned to each Tp variable depending on Threat Management.

Total of 11x Gunner PYs per Tp for a total of 110 PYs from the remaining 148 to 256 PYs.   38 to 146 PYs left for reassignment.


4. Summary - within the 2008 RCA Regular Force PY Envelope, had the RCA been able to acquire Archers rather than M777s it would have been able to field

36x 155mm (capable of launching current NATO projectiles as well as Excaliburs, Vulcano and HVM out to 100 km)
16x MLRS/GMLRS/PrSM munitions out to 500 km with the prospect of 1500 km in sight)
10x NASAMs GBAD Tps

And spares to man FOO/FAC tms, sensors and co-ord centres.

Motors not muscles.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> ....
> 🍻





FJAG said:


> I tend to agree with your thoughts on the "inclusion of weapon systems into existing structures". The infantry in particular has been very possessive of their rifle companies (see for example the elimination of mortars and pioneers and to an extent anti-armour when they were hit with a PY crunch) I think new structures are needed to incorporate new weapon systems and operational concepts for the high-intensity battlefield. I personally think that the all-singing, all-dancing infantryman is no longer viable. I believe that we need to clearly differentiate between light, medium and heavy forces and their likely operational context and reform, not just the infantry but all the combat and support arms and their structures and weapons mixes accordingly.
> 
> 🍻



Going back that Swedish drum I have banging of late -  That 6 man "Section" they use - I get the sense that it is more an AT Tm of 2, armed with CG-84 or other ATGMs depending on mission, defended by a team of 4.

And the CG-84, and the M203/320 40mm, both of them have the ability to launch Laser Guided Projectiles.  That means somebody in the team needs to carry a designator to illuminate targets.  Shouldn't one designator suffice to direct grenades, bombs and missiles?


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Going back to stale dated numbers:
> 
> In 2008 the RCA claimed 1805 Reg PYs and felt the need to expand those PYs to 2228.
> 
> This was predicated on the need to generate
> 
> 3 Fmn FSCC
> 3 Fmn ASCC
> 3 Fmn STA FSC
> 
> 9 BC Parties
> 9 BG FSCC
> 9 BG ASCC
> 
> 33 FOO/FAC Parties (4 PY per party total of 132 PY of 1805-2228)
> 
> An Unknown Number of AD Radar Tps (10x MRR purchased in 2018?)
> 5x SUAV Tps (Blackjack)
> 5x AWL Tps (HALO)
> 5x WLR Tps (LCMR)
> 
> In terms of being able to engage the enemy the RCA proposed
> 
> 6x M777 Gun Batteries of 6 Guns each (36 Guns with 7 PY / Gun for a total of 252 Gun Numbers)
> The 7 PY Gun Det was felt to be marginal and required upsizing to 10 PY / Gun for a total of 360 Gun Numbers on the 36 Guns.
> 
> In Addition the RCA wanted 16 Long Range Precision Fires Systems
> 
> And 3x GBAD Tps (Btys preferred)
> 
> LRPRS and GBAD were constrained, in part, by the number of gunners available.
> 
> 
> 
> Consider.
> 
> 1. In 2008 the RCA had managed to convince the government to buy Archer 155s
> 
> Each Archer carries 4 crew, but only requires 2.   2x Techs, 1x Cmd, 1x Gnr/Dr.
> 
> Lets assume minimal manning of 2 and assume that the Techs come from the existing supply of Gun Techs in each battery.
> 
> 36x Archer 155s requires 72 Gunners instead of 252 to 360 Gunners anticipated if employing M777s.
> 180 to 288 PYs saved for the same number of tubes
> 
> 2.  With the saved PYs the RCA acquired 16 HIMARs to fulfill the LRPRS requirement
> 
> 16 HIMARS can be operated by 2 Gunners but usually carries 3.  The third PY is part of the command team and we will assume that, like the Techs, they come from the existing command team in each battery.
> 
> Lets assume minimal manning of 2, like the Archers.
> 
> 16x LRPRS HIMARS requires 16x 2 Gunners for a total of 32.
> 
> The unemployed 180 to 288 M777 Gunners, if they were tasked to man the 16 HIMARs, would be reduced to 148 to 256.
> 
> 3. With the residual PYs the RCA acquired 10 GBAD Tps based on the purchase of 10x MRR and the NASAMS organization of
> 
> 1x Radar (2x Ops)
> 1x EO/IR (2x Ops)
> 1x FDC (3x Ops)
> 1x Firing Det (4x Ops)
> Number of Weapons (Guns and Missiles) assigned to each Tp variable depending on Threat Management.
> 
> Total of 11x Gunner PYs per Tp for a total of 110 PYs from the remaining 148 to 256 PYs.   38 to 146 PYs left for reassignment.
> 
> 
> 4. Summary - within the 2008 RCA Regular Force PY Envelope, had the RCA been able to acquire Archers rather than M777s it would have been able to field
> 
> 36x 155mm (capable of launching current NATO projectiles as well as Excaliburs, Vulcano and HVM out to 100 km)
> 16x MLRS/GMLRS/PrSM munitions out to 500 km with the prospect of 1500 km in sight)
> 10x NASAMs GBAD Tps
> 
> And spares to man FOO/FAC tms, sensors and co-ord centres.
> 
> Motors not muscles.


Not arguing with the facts and figures but to note the following.

1. Fmn FSCC and STACCs were not new. There was always a bde FSCC based on the CO and Ops O of the close support regiment and the BAIO (although that role was rarely played). The ASCC was a long time asset of 4th AD (later 4th RCA (GS)) so there was only a marginal change in PYs;

2. The BG FSCC always existed as a combination of the BG's Mor Pl and the close support regiment's BC party. The foolish elimination of the Mor Pl necessitated an increase in the close support regiment's BC party to form the entirety of the BG FSCC;

3. There is no need for a BG ASCC as long as a Bde ASCC exists. In the unique circumstances in Afghanistan there were occasions when the ASCC had elements at both the BG and the Bde but the BG ASCC is not a separate entity;

4. prior to the 2005 restructuring, each close support regiment already had 3 BC parties and 6 FOO parties (with a planned wartime augmentation of a third FOO party for each deployed BG) for a total of 18 (27) Note as well that each BG had a minimum of two mortar FCs for a total of 18. Accordingly the need to increase FOO party PYs came very much from the mortar party reduction (albeit not purely one-to-one);

5. M777 manning requires 10 people. 7 is not only marginal, it's near impossible for sustained operations in a dispersed highly mobile environment) It takes a lot of grunt work to emplace and deplace the gun and to handle the ammo especially with the sub optimal gun tractors and bulk ammo handling capabilities;

6. Archer is leaps and bounds superior to this in all respects although one should not underestimate the off-position ammo handling needed. In addition, while Archer crews need to be skilled, there is more room for semi-skilled reserve ammo handling teams thereby reducing the number of PY needed in a hybrid reg/res bty. They do, however, require more skilled maintenance staff than an M777 battery;

7. A HIMARS battery could be run primarily by reservists. The establishment for a complete battery runs around 100-118 depending on configuration which is not dissimilar from a gun battery. Again, while there are fewer operators of each weapon system, there is a need for a more robust ammo handling element and maintenance det.

I have maintained for years and years (even when I served in the Reg F artillery) that artillery was one of the primary elements in the Army that was absolutely rife for becoming a hybrid force with a large reserve component because generally it was only needed in times of very high tensions. What was needed on a full-time basis was a sufficiently large enough Reg F component to provide full-time FSCC, FOO, ASCC, STACC support to the infantry and armoured units and formations, a full-time command and control structure and sufficient gunners to provide an emergency rapid reaction deployment force (whether guns or radars or UAVs or GBAD) and to provide sufficient personnel for skill retention and development, career advancement, equipment maintenance and training of the reserve force. The vast bulk of the manpower up to and including junior officer should be reservist. What's critical as well is that the equipment for the entire force be held in hand a nd the doctrine fully developed and applied.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

Any clue as to whether or not Commander 2 Wing RCAF and Commander 4 RCA GSR have exchanged phone numbers?


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Going back that Swedish drum I have banging of late -  That 6 man "Section" they use - I get the sense that it is more an AT Tm of 2, armed with CG-84 or other ATGMs depending on mission, defended by a team of 4.
> 
> And the CG-84, and the M203/320 40mm, both of them have the ability to launch Laser Guided Projectiles.  That means somebody in the team needs to carry a designator to illuminate targets.  Shouldn't one designator suffice to direct grenades, bombs and missiles?


It gets us back to that old WW2 dichotomy where the brits generally used the machine guns to support the rifle sections while the Germans tended to use the rifles to augment and protect the machine guns which were the main element.

Over my career I've seen 11 man sections with one or two Brens or C2s with the odd 3.5 inch rocket launcher mounted in 3/4 ton trucks to ever reducing sections with a variety of rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns and anti-armour weapons. Not all of those changes had been put into place as a result of firm doctrinal changes. I frankly would be hard pressed to talk intelligently about how a section, platoon or company should be organized for the fight considering the many changes in weapon systems going on. Quite frankly I'm not so sure if its something that needs to be studied to death or whether someone should just pick something and get on with it.

🍻


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## markppcli

I think the thing to take away from a Swedish Section is the weapons locker model they follow. The 84 is available, so's an LMG, so's a GPMG. What they dismount with depends on the task at hand.


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## TangoTwoBravo

I am going to change gears for a second and look at some other mission sets.

Let's say that the GOC turns to the CA and says "we need to you to provide a Battalion to a UN peacekeeping mission in xxxxx. Maybe a Sector HQ as well?" Having served in Southern Lebanon alongside UNIFIL, a divisional level UN force I think that we could. Our LAVs and TAPVs would give us some options for a force to patrol a battalion sector. Depending on the mine/UXO/IED threat we have some muscle memory from Afghanistan that would prove useful. I am sure we could provide plenty of CIMIC/IA guys to go to meetings. Our CMBG HQs could form the nucleus of a Sector HQ (in UNIFIL there is a lead nation for each Bde HQ, but the other nation in the Sector provide people as well). 

Is there a capability or structure that we are missing for a mission set like that?


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## markppcli

No I think we have the capacity to do this. Probably in a mission like this, we'd like to have some more UAVs though?


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## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I am going to change gears for a second and look at some other mission sets.
> 
> Let's say that the GOC turns to the CA and says "we need to you to provide a Battalion to a UN peacekeeping mission in xxxxx. Maybe a Sector HQ as well?" Having served in Southern Lebanon alongside UNIFIL, a divisional level UN force I think that we could. Our LAVs and TAPVs would give us some options for a force to patrol a battalion sector. Depending on the mine/UXO/IED threat we have some muscle memory from Afghanistan that would prove useful. I am sure we could provide plenty of CIMIC/IA guys to go to meetings. Our CMBG HQs could form the nucleus of a Sector HQ (in UNIFIL there is a lead nation for each Bde HQ, but the other nation in the Sector provide people as well).
> 
> Is there a capability or structure that we are missing for a mission set like that?


Nope. You could even add an EW cell, an ASCC element and a helicopter squadron, an engineer troop and a few other capabilities as well if desired.

And if some morons started using us for target practice we could follow that up with some UAVs, an LCMR, a half squadron of tanks, and a troop of guns and or mortars to shoot back with as well. We would be in trouble if they used suicide Cessnas or drones.

But then there's this from the SSE:


> The re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canada and its allies of the importance of deterrence. At its core, deterrence is about discouraging a potential adversary from doing something harmful before they do it. A credible military deterrent serves as a diplomatic tool to help prevent conflict and should be accompanied by dialogue. NATO Allies and other like-minded states have been re-examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer.” Deterrence has traditionally focused on conventional and nuclear capabilities, but the concept is also increasingly relevant to the space and cyber domains.


and:


> The Army trains to fight at the brigade group-level. This is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns while integrating various components, be they from another service, government department, non-governmental organization, or coalition partner. The brigade group consists of approximately 4,800 soldiers, organized in eight major units generally including Artillery, Armour, Infantry, Engineer, and Combat Service Support organizations. Combinations of these units operate together in “battle groups” to provide the joint force with the requisite firepower, mobility, protection, sustainment, and command and control functions to effectively coordinate their employment.


and:


> Fundamental to future effectiveness as a combat-ready force, the Canadian Army will recapitalize many core capabilities, such as command, control and communications systems, weapons and soldier night vision systems, and logistic vehicle fleets. The Canadian Army will continue to pursue investment in war-fighting capabilities such as ground-based air defence, bridge and gap crossing equipment, anti-tank guided missile systems, and vehicles to better operate in Canada’s north.



By all means, have an ability to deploy a BG when and where desired in low intensity operations but develop a doctrine and equip and train the force to fight as a brigade or higher in high intensity ones. "Walk softly but carry a big stick" Teddy R.

🍻


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## Ostrozac

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Is there a capability or structure that we are missing for a mission set like that?


Only two. First, the Canadian Army’s continuing inability to force generate significant quantities of women for such deployments, as has been requested by the UN. Second, we have a deep institutional mistrust of the United Nations that was born out of experiences in Yugoslavia and Rwanda (but does not seem to be shared by either the Canadian population or government).

In both cases, these are a result of senior leadership that never really got over the 1990’s — cultural change is difficult, but certain senior leaders that appear to view life as some kind of fraternity party movie and view white vehicles as shameful means that change won’t even start.

Aside from that, we are well postured to provide UN peacekeeping forces, both in terms of structure and equipment.


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## TangoTwoBravo

FJAG said:


> Nope. You could even add an EW cell, an ASCC element and a helicopter squadron, an engineer troop and a few other capabilities as well if desired.
> 
> And if some morons started using us for target practice we could follow that up with some UAVs, an LCMR, a half squadron of tanks, and a troop of guns and or mortars to shoot back with as well. We would be in trouble if they used suicide Cessnas or drones.
> 
> But then there's this from the SSE:
> 
> and:
> 
> and:
> 
> 
> By all means, have an ability to deploy a BG when and where desired in low intensity operations but develop a doctrine and equip and train the force to fight as a brigade or higher in high intensity ones. "Walk softly but carry a big stick" Teddy R.
> 
> 🍻


Trust me, I have read SSE. Worked at Div and CMBG level. Was happy to see the CMBG included in SSE, but I also see things as they are and not how I wish they were to be.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Looking at a COIN scenario, what do we need? I think the army that we have now is the result of our Kandahar experience. Some things have been put aside and others added on, but at the end of the day I think we would recognize the situation and would know roughly what to do. Acknowledging that we would would need to know some rust off, is there a structure or capability that we are missing?


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## markppcli

For a modern coin situation? We absolutely need a drone counter measure, that is becoming a standard part of the insurgent playbook in the way that IEDs did in the mid 2000s. That can be VSHORAD, it can be jammers, hell it can be a group of highly trained Canadian Geese for all I care, but we do need it.


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## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Trust me, I have read SSE. Worked at Div and CMBG level. Was happy to see the CMBG included in SSE, but I also see things as they are and not how I wish they were to be.



I've been on this thread much too much today, T2B.

And I don't want to be too repetitive but I think that when we accept things the way that they are when we know that they are terribly wrong then we have stopped serving our country and are just working for a paycheck (and I know that's not fair to those who are in positions who can't effect change - I'm concentrating on the level of leadership that can and should).

Far too many people at the centre of the CAF are willing to settle for what it is. They take minute steps to fine tune a system that is patently broken rather than looking at the truth of the matter which is that we devote as much money and effort to administrative overhead as to combat capabilities and that a radical change is needed to reset the system. 

Honestly, T2B (and you too DAP - you denizen of the country's biggest self-licking ice cream cone 😉 ), if the CAF were a civilian corporation, the board of directors, CEO, COO and CFO would have been fired long ago together with most of middle management and 50% of the administrative side of the workforce (excluding the maintenance side). I constantly marvel at the annual Departmental Performance Report results, as much for the meaningless performance indicators selected as for the meaningless statistics reported. DND has made an art form of finding success in the banal and avoiding the hard questions.

We need bold vision and a plan. We need to see how things should be and work towards that and damn the naysayers.

🍻


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## GR66

While I 100% agree that we need to step up and create an Army that can realistically fight the high-end fight I think it's also important to not abandon all of the things that we've learned from our experiences in Afghanistan.

I think there are several things I think it's important to keep in mind while we make the shift to "great power competition".  Firstly, I personally have my doubts that Maneuver Warfare in a potential war against Russia will play out like some people think it will.  Due to the nuclear umbrella under which Russia and Western Europe are protected along with the generally smaller armies that exist now in comparison to the Cold War I don't think we are likely to see the Operation Barbarosa/Bagration style offensives that some people seem to imagine.  Personally I think we are much more likely to see more limited (geographically) operations where Russia (or other peer/near-peer opponents) sees the opportunity to seize some important territory quickly (like Crimea) in hopes that the West won't have the will to try and "undo" what has been done.

While there may be an element of geographical maneuver in the initial assault, the counter will more likely require positional/attritional warfare against an enemy entrenching to maintain their gains.  That doesn't mean that "maneuverism" is dead...you can still strike an enemy's weaknesses, undermine their morale and exploit their vulnerabilities in an urban context,...but some people seem to equate maneuver with highly mobile warfare with deep penetrating attacks.  I have my doubts if that will actually be the case.

The other thing to keep in mind is that in our last bout of great power competition, there wasn't actually any full-scale war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact but there were lots of proxy wars, insurgencies and small scale wars as the powers competed for resources, influence and advantage over each other.  I fully expect a very similar situation going forward but this time with two rival powers in Russia and China.  I think we will be much more likely to be engaged in these kinds of conflicts going forward than in full-scale war with either Russia or China.

That doesn't mean we don't need to seriously upgrade our forces to be able to face high-intensity peer/near-peer conflict because Russia and China will likely equip their proxies with various high-tech weapons, but it does mean that we should also be prepared to continue to face the same types of conflicts as we've faced in Afghanistan, Syria, the Balkans, Korea, etc. in the past.


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## TangoTwoBravo

FJAG said:


> I've been on this thread much too much today, T2B.
> 
> And I don't want to be too repetitive but I think that when we accept things the way that they are when we know that they are terribly wrong then we have stopped serving our country and are just working for a paycheck (and I know that's not fair to those who are in positions who can't effect change - I'm concentrating on the level of leadership that can and should).
> 
> Far too many people at the centre of the CAF are willing to settle for what it is. They take minute steps to fine tune a system that is patently broken rather than looking at the truth of the matter which is that we devote as much money and effort to administrative overhead as to combat capabilities and that a radical change is needed to reset the system.
> 
> Honestly, T2B (and you too DAP - you denizen of the country's biggest self-licking ice cream cone 😉 ), if the CAF were a civilian corporation, the board of directors, CEO, COO and CFO would have been fired long ago together with most of middle management and 50% of the administrative side of the workforce (excluding the maintenance side). I constantly marvel at the annual Departmental Performance Report results, as much for the meaningless performance indicators selected as for the meaningless statistics reported. DND has made an art form of finding success in the banal and avoiding the hard questions.
> 
> We need bold vision and a plan. We need to see how things should be and work towards that and damn the naysayers.
> 
> 🍻


The good news is that we are not a civilian corporation. Please don't presume to lecture me on service.


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## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The good news is that we are not a civilian corporation. Please don't presume to lecture me on service.


PM inbound


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## Infanteer

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Looking at a COIN scenario, what do we need? I think the army that we have now is the result of our Kandahar experience. Some things have been put aside and others added on, but at the end of the day I think we would recognize the situation and would know roughly what to do. Acknowledging that we would would need to know some rust off, is there a structure or capability that we are missing?


That depends.  Our conception of "COIN requirements" would be far different if Canada had deployed to RC East instead of RC South.


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## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> And I don't want to be too repetitive but I think that when we accept things the way that they are when we know that they are terribly wrong then we have stopped serving our country and are just working for a paycheck (and I know that's not fair to those who are in positions who can't effect change - I'm concentrating on the level of leadership that can and should).


You assume a General or Admiral is a level of leadership that can affect change.  What happens when the Minister, or Treasury Board, or PCO says no?  Is that "settling for what is and collecting a paycheck" or is that "working within the boundaries the civilians have laid out for you?"

To add, Force 2025 and CAMS were sold as "in house" projects, so don't expect the massive resourcing and recapitalization that your proposal has to be viable COA in a discussion on Force 2025.


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## MilEME09

Infanteer said:


> You assume a General or Admiral is a level of leadership that can affect change.  What happens when the Minister, or Treasury Board, or PCO says no?  Is that "settling for what is and collecting a paycheck" or is that "working within the boundaries the civilians have laid out for you?"
> 
> To add, Force 2025 and CAMS were sold as "in house" projects, so don't expect the massive resourcing and recapitalization that your proposal has to be viable COA in a discussion on Force 2025.


In fact F2025 assumes funding won't change so everything must be done within existing framework


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## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> You assume a General or Admiral is a level of leadership that can affect change.  What happens when the Minister, or Treasury Board, or PCO says no?  Is that "settling for what is and collecting a paycheck" or is that "working within the boundaries the civilians have laid out for you?"
> 
> To add, Force 2025 and CAMS were sold as "in house" projects, so don't expect the massive resourcing and recapitalization that your proposal has to be viable COA in a discussion on Force 2025.


I actually used to assume that individuals at that level could affect change, at least within what ought to be their sphere of authority. I have found out more recently just how high up the chain internal and external friction to progress operates.

And yes, I do believe that when the TB or MND or PCO interferes with the right path or directs something which is wrong and will cost people their lives then working within those boundaries is "settling". There used to be a time when generals and admirals resigned in order to voice their opposition in public to bad policies. When is the last time we saw that happen?

The trouble is that while there is much external friction to progress, entirely too much of that friction comes from within in the struggle for resources and turf protection. I've long been a believer in Belzile's statement from 2005 



> _... Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war.
> 
> This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.
> 
> The Canadian Forces needs a plan.*[1]*_
> 
> [1] J.L. Granatstein and LGen (retd) Charles Belzile, _The Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later _Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Calgary, 2005  p. 12
> https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.n...cturing_The_Reserves_-_English.pdf?1413661138



This is why my biggest criticism in this thread is that we have the numbers (if not the full equipment) to man a division plus but we think and plan at the battle group level with LEGO plug and play parts. I've seen a number of the plans for the Army from 1997 onward but they have not strike me as plans to move forward, merely as plans to get by. 

I've seen snippets of Force 2025 and CAMS and am actually, for once, optimistic that within the resource limitations in place, it will create some positive change but there is still doubt in my mind as to what the targets are for 2030: is there a plan to think big? Are we even capable of big, bold plans anymore?

Honestly, I'm getting weary myself about my constant cynicism. Being retired gives me the ability to voice my criticism (in public like here). What I find discouraging though is that what I see (and many others have seen) as self-evident fundamental flaws and potential solutions does not seem to find acceptance by those within the system. The enduring failure to improve and utilize the reserve force is just one of those. I'm just not sure whether that's because of the boiling frog syndrome, or institutional restraint in voicing opposition to leadership.

Look. I'm not attempting to disparage either you or T2B. I respect both of you and your opinions entirely too much to do that. And I know that each of you is working to improve the system from within wherever you can. I honestly hope to see more positive indicators as Force 2025 and CAMS moves forward. 

I think I've yapped too much in this thread already so, because I tend to be repeating myself, I'll move more into a listening watch for a while. 

🍻


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Infanteer said:


> That depends.  Our conception of "COIN requirements" would be far different if Canada had deployed to RC East instead of RC South.


True that. Perhaps Light infantry and mortars would have featured more prominently.


----------



## Infanteer

TangoTwoBravo said:


> True that. Perhaps Light infantry and mortars would have featured more prominently.



Let's admit it - we jumped at the opportunity to put our jungian heart (the medium-heavy BG of the Staff College's dream) in Kandahar as it could roam around the arid valleys and riverbeds looking for a fight.  This may not have been appropriate after the Taliban figured out how the game worked in 2006.


----------



## Weinie

Infanteer said:


> Let's admit it - we jumped at the opportunity to put our jungian heart (the medium-heavy BG of the Staff College's dream) in Kandahar as it could roam around the arid valleys and riverbeds looking for a fight.  This may not have been appropriate after the Taliban figured out how the game worked in 2006.


Ok, but hindsight is 20/20. There were many more factors in play then just Staff Colleges dreams at that time. There was no sense of real urgency, as the Taliban were still seen as a spent, albeit resurging in some sectors, force. The US had switched their focus to Iraq. Canada dithered long past the point of decision where Kandahar was basically the only AO left. The decision by Canada to not support the U.S. in Iraq certainly figured into the diplomatic calculus ITO the level of support we would offer in Afghanistan, which was seen as a "just" conflict.  There was no psychic counterpart of instinct here, rather the instinctual feeling was that we had badly underestimated the degree of hard feelings that the U.S. would direct towards us in not supporting Iraq. We attempted to minimize those recriminations.

My .02


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## dapaterson

The CAF never took Afghanistan seriously.

Compare over the years of our engagement: The number of students sent on multi-year Korean language training to prepare them for diplomatic postings or staff college in Korea, and the number of students sent on year long or multi-year Dari and Pashto language training.

Inertia is a hell of a drug.


----------



## Infanteer

Weinie said:


> Ok, but hindsight is 20/20. There were many more factors in play then just Staff Colleges dreams at that time. There was no sense of real urgency, as the Taliban were still seen as a spent, albeit resurging in some sectors, force. The US had switched their focus to Iraq. Canada dithered long past the point of decision where Kandahar was basically the only AO left. The decision by Canada to not support the U.S. in Iraq certainly figured into the diplomatic calculus ITO the level of support we would offer in Afghanistan, which was seen as a "just" conflict.  There was no psychic counterpart of instinct here, rather the instinctual feeling was that we had badly underestimated the degree of hard feelings that the U.S. would direct towards us in not supporting Iraq. We attempted to minimize those recriminations.



That's not what I'm referring to.  It's more in response to the Army's hammer in search of a nail, and how we try to fit a structure into a conflict that it may not be appropriate for.  We "uparmoured" in Afghanistan in response to the Taliban trying to seize and hold parts of Kandahar province in 2006.  A conventional response to a conventional threat.  However, by the time our battlegroup was augmented for full up square combat team attacks, the Taliban already realized their strategic approach wasn't going to work and switched gameplans.  And yet we kept driving around, looking for the next Medusa.

This is all well documented in much of the operational analysis on the campaign from 2007-2011.

Despite sitting in PD sessions about "winning hearts and minds" before hand, we'd rotate heavy BGs over to Afghanistan, armour up like Robocop, and scramble a half dozen 70 ton tanks around the province in reaction to the war of the flea.  The outcome was an enemy who wouldn't mass (because he learned and adapted), a bunch of wrecked infrastructure (which doesn't handle 70 ton armoured vehicles), and locals who were waiting for us to leave.


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:


> The CAF never took Afghanistan seriously.
> 
> Compare over the years of our engagement: The number of students sent on multi-year Korean language training to prepare them for diplomatic postings or staff college in Korea, and the number of students sent on year long or multi-year Dari and Pashto language training.
> 
> Inertia is a hell of a drug.


I think you might be off the mark personally, I think the CAF took it seriously, I do not think the GoC did, otherwise they would of committed more, and interfered less.


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:


> The CAF never took Afghanistan seriously.
> 
> Compare over the years of our engagement: The number of students sent on multi-year Korean language training to prepare them for diplomatic postings or staff college in Korea, and the number of students sent on year long or multi-year Dari and Pashto language training.
> 
> Inertia is a hell of a drug.


That is a mischaracterization and is patently untrue.  The CAF took Afghanistan very seriously.  It just didn't see the ROI on having year-long language courses for relatively obscure Iranian dialects to use during a 6-month rotation.  There is merit to this logic, and one has to wonder if there would be any additional value in the Western soldier being able to directly converse with an Afghan to hear him say "Hey Canadian, you are leaving in 2011?!?"


----------



## GR66

My gut tells me that FJAG is right that within the existing manning and budget we should be able to field a much more effective Army.

I'm going to throw out one possible model to achieve this that would allow us to be effective in the types of conflict I believe we're most likely to end up fighting as well as being significantly more capable than we currently are in a peer/near-peer conflict.

My assumptions are that the Army is not going to increase in size, the Reg Force will remain primarily a LAV-based force and there will be limited equipment buying opportunities beyond projects that are already in the works.

PY's and money would be saved by reducing the number of Divisions from five to three and the number of Brigade Groups from 13 to 8.  These PYs would be put into filling out the Combat Support positions within the Reg Force Regiments and cost savings used to expand the budgets of existing equipment purchase programs (as identified in the Advancing with Purpose document).

Armoured Regiments:

The three existing Armoured Regiments would be symmetrically organized as LAV-based regiments with some of the AT/DFS support lost from the removal of the tanks from the regiments replaced equipping a portion of the LAVS with RWS-mounted ATGM's under the "Anti-Tank Guided Missile"/"LAV Specialist Variant Enhancement" programs.  Ideally I'd also like to see the addition of some Direct Fire Support vehicles to the regiments (120mm Centuro II turret?) but that may have to wait for a future program.
The tanks, which are to be modernized under the "Tank Life Extension" program would be grouped together in a new all tank Regiment as part of 1 Mechanized Brigade in Edmonton.  This would centralize maintenance and support in one location.  Individual tank squadrons could be attached to each of the LAV-based Armoured Recce Regiments as required or in the case of a major conflict the Regiment could deploy as a whole.  The PYs for this new Tank Regiment would come from the re-roleing of 3PPCLI.  This transition would take several years and would aim to be completed by the time the tank modernization program is completed in 2027.

Ground-Based Air Defence:
- A new GBAD Regiment to be stood up as part of the "Ground Based Air Defence" program with a LAV-based SHORAD vehicle.  Ideally (for sake of commonality of parts/munitions and interoperability) I'd like to see us use the same RWS as the US Army IM-SHORAD system with dual-Hellfire and quad-Stinger missile launchers.  This same RWS could also be fitted with the same dual-Hellfire and a single Javelin or single/dual TOW missile launcher for our ATGM LAVs to provide commonality of equipment.  The personnel for this new GBAD Regiment would come from the re-roleing of 3 R22R.  This transition would take place over the several years required for the new GBAD system to be selected and rolled out.  Not all of the 3-R22R PYs would be required for this new Regiment so the extra PYs would roll back into the Reg Force Infantry Battalions to fill out their CS elements.

Artillery:
- Replace the M777's in the Regular Force Artillery Regiments with a Self-propelled Howitzer under the "Indirect Fire Modernization" program.  For commonality and interoperability it would likely be best if we went with the same wheeled 155mm howitzer system that gets selected for the US Army's Stryker Brigades.  As noted previously the wheeled howitzers require less personnel to operate than the towed M777's so some of the artillery PY's saved could be shifted to support Reserve artillery TA functions.  The M777s removed from Reg Force service would be moved to the Reserves.

Infantry:

PY's left over from the re-roleing of the 3rd Battalions of the PPCLI and R22R would go into filling slots in the remaining 6 x LAV infantry battalions - in particular the Combat Support roles, including the addition of 120mm mortars to the CS Companies.  Ideally we would procure turreted 120mm mortar vehicles but if required could at least have LAV-mounted 120mm mortars with 81mm dismounts like in the US Army Stryker Brigades.  This could be covered under a combination of the "Indirect Fire Modernization" and "LAV Specialist Variant Enhancement" projects.  The "Anti-Tank Guided Missile" program could also cover ATGM equipped LAVs for the CS Companies.
The 3rd Battalion of the RCR in Gagetown would become the 1st Battalion of the Canadian Light Reaction Regiment.  This would be a re-envisioning of Light Battalions away from simply being light infantry to smaller, mobile companies capable if independent action and much more easily deployable by air when an immediate response is required.
The 560 troops currently allotted to a light battalion under Force 2013 could be used to fully man a slightly reduced size Battalion HQ (80 pers) and Admin Company (80 pers) which would leave enough PY's for 8 x fully manned 50 pers Companies.  This is where the Army could innovate and experiment with various light company constructs to develop small company groups capable of rapid deployment to a crisis zone with light vehicles providing a potentially wide variety of capabilities (JTAC's, ATGM teams, Pioneers, UAV's, Light Recce, Counter UAV, EW, Loitering Munitions, etc.).  Being a fully manned battalion should mean that there should be at least 2 or 3 of these Company-Groups at high readiness at any time in order to provide the Army the capability to rapidly respond to a developing crisis.

Reserves:

If Reserve units are "right sized" to be organized as Companies/Squadrons/Batteries instead of "Regiments" and grouped together, you could have three symmetrical Infantry Brigade Groups, each with an Armoured Recce Regiment, a 12-gun M777 Artillery Regiment, a Combat Engineer Regiment, a Signals Regiment and a Service Battalion.
In case of full mobilization this would theoretically allow deployment of a full Division of light infantry with supporting elements.
In a more realistic scenario these Companies could be used to generate platoon-sized units to either provide dismounted infantry reinforcements for combat losses to the Reg Force battalions, or alternately group together to provide a 3rd Light Infantry Battalion (complete with Combat Support elements) to each of the Mechanized Brigade Groups.


In addition to these three Infantry Brigade Groups you would be left with 8 x Company-sized infantry units in each of Ontario and Atlantic Canada to make a 2nd and 3rd Battalion to round out the 1st Battalion of the new Canadian Light Response Regiment (former 3 RCR) along with a Combat Support Battalion consisting of one Artillery Battery, Combat Engineer Squadron, Signals Squadron and Service Company.
These two Reserve Light Response Battalions could be a source of straight light-infantry to round our more specialized troops in the Reg Force Battalion, or could eventually expand to include their own specialist units/equipment once the doctrine is developed to put new technologies in place.

- Finally, there would be two Reserve Artillery Batteries available in each of the Reserve Brigade Groups that could be equipped with HIMARS once the "Long-Range Precision Fires" project comes online.


I'm sure that people will be able to point out numerous issues with a plan like this, but I think it shows that with some willingness to be creative and break some rice bowls the Canadian Army and Reserves could be much more effective within the constraints of our current manning and existing equipment plans.


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> PY's and money would be saved by reducing the number of Divisions from five to three and the number of Brigade Groups from 13 to 8.  These PYs would be put into filling out the Combat Support positions within the Reg Force Regiments and cost savings used to expand the budgets of existing equipment purchase programs (as identified in the Advancing with Purpose document).



The Army only has 4 Divisions (1st Cdn Div belongs to CJOC).  If you cut one division HQ and 5 CBG HQs, you will save 143 PYs.

If we're drawing up armies on napkins, here is a rough approximation of your Reg Force PY pool:

Field Force: (CMBGs and CCSB): 15,180
Support to ARes (CBG, CRPGs, and RSS staff): 900
Army and Div HQs: 730
Training System: 2,640
Base Support: 2,200
Bands: 70


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## Brad Sallows

> 8 x fully manned 50 pers Companies



What is the advantage of 8x50 over 3x133?  Larger span of control to keep the CO exercised?


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:


> That is a mischaracterization and is patently untrue.  The CAF took Afghanistan very seriously.  It just didn't see the ROI on having year-long language courses for relatively obscure Iranian dialects to use during a 6-month rotation.  There is merit to this logic, and one has to wonder if there would be any additional value in the Western soldier being able to directly converse with an Afghan to hear him say "Hey Canadian, you are leaving in 2011?!?"


The US did this language training, but it was a four year commitment for the selected officers (and it may only have been officers). They did 12 months language training , 12 months in theatre, 12 months in a US based staff job supporting the theatre, and then a second 12 months back in theatre. I don't know how much value it returned form them.

Regardless, I don't think we can point to our experience in Afghanistan and say that we know how to COIN. Maybe it can be said that we never lost tactically, but we certainly never achieved the strategic goals aside from being seen to contribute to a US priority.


----------



## GR66

Brad Sallows said:


> What is the advantage of 8x50 over 3x133?  Larger span of control to keep the CO exercised?


This is in following with some of the other threads which discuss the way that pre-1914 Battalions were made up of larger numbers of smaller companies and that the consolidation into larger companies was a direct result in the attritional warfare that was experienced in WWI.

The idea is that with smaller, more specialized forces in a modern battle space dispersion is of greater importance in order to avoid being picked apart by precision fires which will identify and target concentrated forces.  

It's also a case of "different horses for different courses".  The Mechanized Brigades and the Reserve Infantry Brigades would continue to have the larger (modern) company sizes, but only the Light Reaction Forces would have the smaller Company groups.  This would give you flexibility to respond with different types of forces in different situations as well as possibly more realistically representing the size of rapid reaction force we could be able to quickly deploy and support by air considering the size of our transport fleet.


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## McG

For consideration: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc47/mds/Kieley.pdf


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## TangoTwoBravo

Infanteer said:


> Let's admit it - we jumped at the opportunity to put our jungian heart (the medium-heavy BG of the Staff College's dream) in Kandahar as it could roam around the arid valleys and riverbeds looking for a fight.  This may not have been appropriate after the Taliban figured out how the game worked in 2006.


Indeed. At the risk of derailing the thread, the rotational approach to COIN has drawbacks, among them the need for each rotation to prove oneself in combat.  The Brits, though, took a light force into Helmand in 2006 and relied on a heavier force to bail them out.

Putting aside the chances of success in such an endeavor, is there a capability missing in the Canadian Army to embark on a COIN campaign?


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> This is in following with some of the other threads which discuss the way that pre-1914 Battalions were made up of larger numbers of smaller companies and that the consolidation into larger companies was a direct result in the attritional warfare that was experienced in WWI.
> 
> The idea is that with smaller, more specialized forces in a modern battle space dispersion is of greater importance in order to avoid being picked apart by precision fires which will identify and target concentrated forces.
> 
> It's also a case of "different horses for different courses".  The Mechanized Brigades and the Reserve Infantry Brigades would continue to have the larger (modern) company sizes, but only the Light Reaction Forces would have the smaller Company groups.  This would give you flexibility to respond with different types of forces in different situations as well as possibly more realistically representing the size of rapid reaction force we could be able to quickly deploy and support by air considering the size of our transport fleet.




Just to span the gap between the CO managing 3x 133 or 8x 50:

The Old 8x50 companies were led by Captains assisted by their Subalterns.

The companies were grouped into regiments led by Colonels and their assisting Field Officers, Lieutenants Colonel and Majors with Lts Col commanding a wing of the regiment in the field (also known as a battalion) , and Majors commanding a wing of the battalion.

So a 20 company regiment, organized around 20 Captaincies of 50 PYs and commanded by a Colonel, would be divided into 2 Battalions of 10 companies each commanded by one of the Colonel's lieutenants with each Lt Col assisted by Majors.  

The 10 companies would comprise:

an independent light company (recce company) commanded by a senior captain;
an independent grenadier company (support company) commanded by a senior captain, and;
2 wings, each of 4 line companies (rifles), with the wings commanded by a Major.



So, the answer to the span of control question is 

Instead of the 1916 formula of 28 to 44 PYs under a Subaltern and his 4 PY command team

Return to the pre-1914 structure of 50 PYs under a Captain (more seasoned and trusted with autonomous decision making), held within a Regiment of 16 to 26 Captaincies and divisible, under the team of Field Officers into Battalions  of 8 to 13 Companies  under Lt Cols and further divisible into "wings" under Majors.



To keep things less disruptive there is no reason to interfere with the Field Officers and the Battalion, Company structure.  All that is necessary is to progress the tendency that began in 1917 with the re-introduction of small, autonomous units of 28 to 44, now called Platoons instead of Companies.  

Expand the scope of capabilities,  and the autonomy ,  of the Platoon on the ADO battlefield, and place it under the Command of a Captain with a Lt as a deputy.   Leave the Companies as Field Grade Commands.

Or,  if the Captains, prefer upgrade the name of their 50 PY  command to the traditional Captain's command of a Company and rename the Battalion Companies as Wings under Majors.


You could keep the Mech Battalions under the 1917 formula and the Lights, Rangers and Reserves under the older formula


Or whatever...


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## CBH99

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Indeed. At the risk of derailing the thread, the rotational approach to COIN has drawbacks, among them the need for each rotation to prove oneself in combat.  The Brits, though, took a light force into Helmand in 2006 and relied on a heavier force to bail them out.
> 
> Putting aside the chances of success in such an endeavor, is there a capability missing in the Canadian Army to embark on a COIN campaign?


If there is one capability that we are currently missing, that I believe would be a game changer for us in a future COIN campaign - it would be armed UAVs.  

We can all debate the pros & cons of wheeled vs. tracked, different types of weapons and ammo, etc etc.  If there is one capability that I think would be a huge game changer, a fairly straight forwards acquisition (In theory, anyway...  ) - ideal in almost all operations, but survivable in a future COIN operation - it would be to have armed ISR assets overhead.

It's great that the Canadian UAV detachment was able to the patrols & FOBs about enemy sneaking up on their position, or observe an enemy planting an IED.  To be able to have them deal with the problem?  Gold.



T2B, I reckon you have a fair bit of experience.  What would be your answer to that question?  (Missing capability in the Canadian Army to embark on a COIN campaign?)


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## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Indeed. At the risk of derailing the thread, the rotational approach to COIN has drawbacks, among them the need for each rotation to prove oneself in combat.  The Brits, though, took a light force into Helmand in 2006 and relied on a heavier force to bail them out.
> 
> Putting aside the chances of success in such an endeavor, is there a capability missing in the Canadian Army to embark on a COIN campaign?



Does that argue for making a decision on deploying and rotating  Either a COIN adapted Light Force OR a Heavy Force?  Or does it argue for  a long term commitment of the COIN adapted Light Force with a "disengaged"  Heavy Force in local garrison as a QRF?  A sheathed sword of a threat?


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## Kirkhill

CBH99 said:


> If there is one capability that we are currently missing, that I believe would be a game changer for us in a future COIN campaign - it would be armed UAVs.
> 
> We can all debate the pros & cons of wheeled vs. tracked, different types of weapons and ammo, etc etc.  If there is one capability that I think would be a huge game changer, a fairly straight forwards acquisition (In theory, anyway...  ) - ideal in almost all operations, but survivable in a future COIN operation - it would be to have armed ISR assets overhead.
> 
> It's great that the Canadian UAV detachment was able to the patrols & FOBs about enemy sneaking up on their position, or observe an enemy planting an IED.  To be able to have them deal with the problem?  Gold.
> 
> 
> 
> T2B, I reckon you have a fair bit of experience.  What would be your answer to that question?  (Missing capability in the Canadian Army to embark on a COIN campaign?)



Given limitations on PYs should the Army be spending PYs on UAVs, and even Air Defence?

Or should the RCAF be bound more tightly into a Canadian Expeditionary Force, by tying 2 Wing in Bagotville into the plan and requiring them to not only supply Radars, LRPAs, and F18s/F35s, but also UAVs, Air Defence Artillery and ASCCs?

The would allow the RCA to focus on ground bound strike assets (M777s, Archers and potentially 120mm carriers) with 4 RCA focusing on rapidly deployable LRPRs.  

The RCAF is going to be looking for more places to employ its PYs as planes get more expensive and the number of pilots required gets smaller.


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## Kirkhill

And, for that matter, helicopters.

I can't help but think that a sense of urgency would ensue if the co-ordinators were subject to the same dust and bombs as the people being supported.


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## Edward Campbell

A couple of disconnected points:

1. Our modern brigade group is a child of the 1950s nuclear battlefield. The watchword was dispersal ~ a corps frontage went from narrow, less than the range of an 8" howitzer in WWII to, literally, 100+km in Northern Army Group in the 1960s. Nuclear weapons made dispersal necessary ~ a concentrated force was a lucrative target, and modern mechanized equipment and better communications made dispersal ~ and concentration in time possible, and our nuclear weapons made a new kind of concentration of force possible. 1 BR Corps had three small divisions plus a large_ish _Canadian brigade group ~ larger than any other in.NATO, not as large as many thought it needed to me. (P. 12 of Maj Kieley's paper.)

2. We have never, since the mid-1960s been able to field what we considered to be a "proper" decision. We tried in the RV series (I was on RV 81) and we put three small brigade groups into the field with massive reserve augmentation but they were in no one's imagination a division in anything other than name.

3. A lack of proper formations in which commanders think about formation operations means that many Canadian commanders ~ with two or three stars ~ are highly skilled company commanders and have some, albeit limited experience at unit or even battle group command but few have any real, useful experience as formation commanders.

4. Brooke Claxton, starting in about 1950, made the most far reaching changes in military organization and strategy in Canadian history ~ more radical than Hellyer/Unification/Integration in the 1960s ~ without ever needing a White Paper because he had the confidence of his PM (St Laurent and his cabinet). The difference between the 1950s and the 2020s is that the government of the day was committed, then, to playing a responsible leading role in global affairs the government today is committed to nothing at all. Claxton, his deputy and Mainguy, Simonds and Curtis didn't need a policy framework because he, St Laurent, Pearson and Howe and Truman and Acheson and then General Eisenhower (in Fontainebleau) were in pretty much complete accord about why and what and how much Canada needed to do.


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## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> ... So a 20 company regiment, organized around 20 Captaincies of 50 PYs and commanded by a Colonel, would be divided into 2 Battalions of 10 companies each commanded by one of the Colonel's lieutenants with each Lt Col assisted by Majors. ...


So we now have 1X Col, 2 X LCol, 4 X Maj, 20 X Capt and 20 X Lt/2Lt (assuming you still have a company Capt assisted by a subaltern as under the old system) commanding a 1,000 man regiment (not counting regt'l staff or service support) rather than 1 X LCol, 4 X Maj and 23 X Capt/Lt/2Lt commanding a 700 man battalion (not counting bn staff or service support)

I presume brigades will now be commanded by BGens.

When I look at a regiment I see a steady progression over the years until evolving into the triangular regimental system used by the Americans during the latter part of WW2. There a regt (commanded by a Col) had three battalions (commanded by LCols) each with four coy (3 rifle and 1 weapons) each with 4 platoons of roughly 40 (again 3 rifle and 1 weapons). The big difference here is that each platoon is commanded by a 2Lt; the companies are 200 strong; the battalion is 871 strong and the regiment is 3,118. That's roughly a brigade (and remember the WW2 regiments had only some organic artillery with the rest of the artillery, engineers or service support all belonging to the division.

In effect a US WW2 infantry regiment had a colonel commanding some 27 X 40 man platoons and roughly 12 X weapons platoons.

It strikes me that if the aim is to create 40-50 man elements then rather than converting a 700 man battalion into a 1,000 man regiment (with its inherent rank inflation) one might want to consider replacing the brigade with a colonel commanded 3,000 plus regiment. This gives you close to the same net effect but with the advantage of using a more familiar triangular command structure and employment paradigm.

All that begs the question as to whether the brigade's combat support and service support elements stay with the "regiment" or are recaptured upward into a division like structure (or some other aggregate that devolves elements to a "regiment" on an as required basis -- but that's another issue entirely.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

The big question for me is "Autonomy"

The WW1/WW2 Lt was given 90 days training and closely supervised while given limited objectives.

The current model suggests that at least some, if not all, of the force is going to be widely distributed/dispersed and primarily invested in observing the AO, concentrating fires on the objective first (implying direct comms with support and integral long range weapons) and only concentrating bodies on the objective once the objective (and its support)  is suppressed/neutralized.

Is that the job for a 90 day wonder?
Or is that the job for a seasoned Captain/WO team?


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## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> The big question for me is "Autonomy"
> 
> The WW1/WW2 Lt was given 90 days training and closely supervised while given limited objectives.
> 
> The current model suggests that at least some, if not all, of the force is going to be widely distributed/dispersed and primarily invested in observing the AO, concentrating fires on the objective first (implying direct comms with support and integral long range weapons) and only concentrating bodies on the objective once the objective (and its support)  is suppressed/neutralized.
> 
> Is that the job for a 90 day wonder?
> Or is that the job for a seasoned Captain/WO team?


Where do the "seasoned" captains come from? I presume that means that each "company" would have that "subaltern" deputy that I only assumed before. 90 day wonders take a year or so to learn their jobs these days - plus they have very experienced WOs as pl 2i/cs. Will each of those now become an MWO in a fifty-man company?

🍻


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## Kirkhill

Perhaps,

But equally we could start filling sections with Privates instead of Corporals, implementing Corporals as Junior Leaders of Teams or Sections, Master Corporals as Sergeants in Training (dare I say Lance Sergeants?) and Sergeants as Platoon NCOs?

Then  you end up with seasoned Sergeants under seasoned Captains and Warrants and Lieutenants learning their trade.  Along with the other bodies in the Platoon/Company.

That autonomy is why the Light and Grenadier companies went to Senior Captains while Junior Captains, and their Subalterns, stayed in the Line Companies - under close supervision.

The British Army, traditionally, is an Army of Sergeants.

Most other armies, at their peril, neglect the Sergeants and focus on the dichotomy between the Commissioned and the Others.


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## suffolkowner

How to structure the army is a problem all small organizations are likely having. Found this on the situation in Australia. Equipment purchased! organization?









						Plan Beersheba, LAND 400 and a third way
					

The Australian Army’s joint LAND 400 program provides the opportunity to reshape and reorganise the combat formation of the Army to better support the combat capability of the Army, with a focus on developing a highly mobile, hardened and networked land forces, explains Jeremy Carpenter.




					www.defenceconnect.com.au


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## markppcli

suffolkowner said:


> How to structure the army is a problem all small organizations are likely having. Found this on the situation in Australia. Equipment purchased! organization?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Plan Beersheba, LAND 400 and a third way
> 
> 
> The Australian Army’s joint LAND 400 program provides the opportunity to reshape and reorganise the combat formation of the Army to better support the combat capability of the Army, with a focus on developing a highly mobile, hardened and networked land forces, explains Jeremy Carpenter.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defenceconnect.com.au


Sort of the advantage of having clear purpose and direction for your military isn't it. Of course with the current Australian IFV purchase numbers, 450 IFs with around 20 support varients, it seems ass though they're aiming for a fully mechanized 3 Brigades. As a regional power in an increasingly volatile South Pacific that makes sense, though I wonder if they would have been better served by simply adopting the Boxer has their IFV and Recce vehicle.


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## Old Sweat

Hmmm, this is interesting and demonstrates that we are not afraid to think outside the box. I do have some difficulty with a "lots of little companies" concept, including the very real possibility of having to group them into big companies. Let me toss in being unable to have standard groupings, of say, two or three companies, and then fielding and fighting these three or four groups. Let's talk employment, perhaps manoeuvring two or three groups, with one or two companies in reserve. Somebody, who wants to manage change, will propose a command pool remarkably similar to our current company headquarters, and then somebody else will say let's train like we would like to fight, so let's permanently group each of these with the same two or three "little" companies. Anybody want to guess what is the next logical step?

And as a gunner, how many FOO parties are required for a battalion, the answer probably lies somewhere between one and eight, okay, two and eight. Obviously, with today's field regiment capable of shooting as one, two, three, or four fire units, this has all the makings of a cluster screw. 

And what about support weapons platoons, not to mention Echo and Tango troops and squadrons? 

I really don't have a dog in this fight, and haven't tried to calculate the various combinations of combat power. What I am trying to do is move the discussion forward a step or two. My skin is pretty thick, so have at me.


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## markppcli

My objection to "little companies" is that we already have a 40 ish person organization often lead by a captain... it's a platoon.


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## McG

We promote people to captain based on time alone. While there is a huge difference between a senior captain and a junior captain, the difference between lieutenants and captains (as a collective) is less distinct. Until promotion to captain is selection based, the rank is not a good fit for mini sub-units


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## GR66

markppcli said:


> My objection to "little companies" is that we already have a 40 ish person organization often lead by a captain... it's a platoon.


I'm not suggesting (and I don't _think _anyone else here suggested) that we abandon our more traditional structure to have an entire army of small companies (or large platoons if you prefer).

The idea would be that you have a portion of your force...the light portion...organized such that you have relatively small groupings of troops that are capable of dispersed, independent operations.  The intention wouldn't be to have these units congregate to take on opposition conventional forces directly (that's what our own conventional forces would be for), but rather to keep the enemy off balance.  Create fog on the battlefield.  Threaten lines of logistics.  Slow their advance.  

One of the strengths of the Russians and Chinese armies that has often been mentioned is their mass.  We may have better quality troops/weapons but they have greater weight of troops/firepower.  Small but well armed units units using hit and run tactics could force the enemy to disperse their forces to deal with these attacks.  That would allow our conventional units to take on their forces while their advantage of greater mass is diminished.

Smaller, agile forces such as these would also be very useful in counter-insurgencies and smaller proxy wars which in my opinion are likely to increase in frequency as great power competition heats up.  Neither the Russians or the Chinese are going to want to try and take on the strongest aspect of the US military, its conventional forces, if they can instead achieve their political goals through other, less direct means.


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## Ludoc

GR66 said:


> I'm not suggesting (and I don't _think _anyone else here suggested) that we abandon our more traditional structure to have an entire army of small companies (or large platoons if you prefer).
> 
> The idea would be that you have a portion of your force...the light portion...organized such that you have relatively small groupings of troops that are capable of dispersed, independent operations.  The intention wouldn't be to have these units congregate to take on opposition conventional forces directly (that's what our own conventional forces would be for), but rather to keep the enemy off balance.  Create fog on the battlefield.  Threaten lines of logistics.  Slow their advance.



In a conventional fight isn't this what we would use CSOR for? A bunch of fit, motivated, light forces led by Senior Captains who have been selected for the role.


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## Infanteer

Switching gears.

Hypothesis and hypothetical scenario.  Tanks are too expensive to maintain and operate in the numbers needed, and are mothballed.

How do you structure the Army?  How does it stay relevant in areas where pacing threats are introducing new armoured systems?


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## dapaterson

Prior to mothballing, can we at least upgrade to a single, common standard?


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## Infanteer

No, because after mothballing, we will sell the A4s to a South American country (jungles or mountains, who needs 70 ton MBTs more?) and we'll put the A6s in the museums.


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## McG

Infanteer said:


> How do you structure the Army? How does it stay relevant in areas where pacing threats are introducing new armoured systems?


UAVs. Lots of UAVs … and missile based anti-tank artillery.


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## FJAG

GR66 said:


> ... One of the strengths of the Russians and Chinese armies that has often been mentioned is their mass.  We may have better quality troops/weapons but they have greater weight of troops/firepower.  Small but well armed units units using hit and run tactics could force the enemy to disperse their forces to deal with these attacks.  That would allow our conventional units to take on their forces while their advantage of greater mass is diminished. ...


Don't know much about the Chinese organization at the brigade and below level but as for the Russians, do not forget that in general their manoeuvre battalions are significantly smaller than ours while their fire support is significantly larger.

Tank battalions are 31 tanks (10 per coy) with only some 151 personnel. Same for infantry battalions which also have only 37 IFVs (10 per coy) and 461 pers (including their mortar battery and weapons pl.

On the other hand a brigade's one tank battalion and three rifle battalions are supported by 2 x SP artillery battalions (36 tubes) ; 1 x rocket battalion ( 18 launchers); 1 x Anti-tank battalion ( 36 systems); and 2 x AD missile battalions (6 x SA 13; 6 x SA-19; 12x SA 15; 27 x SA-18 Manpads)

That should give folks a hint.



Infanteer said:


> Switching gears.
> 
> Hypothesis and hypothetical scenario.  Tanks are too expensive to maintain and operate in the numbers needed, and are mothballed.
> 
> How do you structure the Army?  How does it stay relevant in areas where pacing threats are introducing new armoured systems?



Hypothetical answer. 

If a manned tank is too expensive then conceivably so would be a remotely controlled or autonomous "tank" -- unless we use a small, lightly armoured chassis and built very cheaply as a multiple-shot but one-use expendable weapon system. In other words they are closer in concept to expendable munitions rather than reusable fighting vehicles. 

Such systems would require less PYs to operate thereby greatly reducing recurring annual costs for a full unit. Maintenance and recovery and administrative support would also be greatly reduced on an annual basis and in combat. Effectively a unit operating such vehicles would be issued fully armoured and fueled (maybe even electric) replacement vehicles (perhaps in containers) the way that fuel and ammunition is supplied now. 

There would need to be a limited form of replenishment to keep vehicles fueled, armed and serviced during non combat phases and to rearm and refuel those that do not end up being destroyed in a given engagement (such vehicles could be programmed to navigate themselves to a replenishment point when all ammo is expended). To reduce size and weight missiles would probably be the best form of armament although some might be armed with a suite of anti-personnel weapons such as grenade launchers and/or machine guns. (I prefer an either/or mixed fleet of anti-armour and anti-personnel rather than an all-singing and dancing single vehicle so as to keep the vehicles as small and uncomplicated as possible)

Such units would need to be tied in to existing UAV sensor systems and would probably also need to run their own UAV "eyes" probably mixed in with a suite of light to medium UAVs and loitering munitions. Targeting is remote controlled or AI once mature.

I still have some doubts as to offensive operations. It's one thing to engage and defeat enemy equipment, it's quite another to seize key terrain. Offensive ops will require combined arms operations with a robust infantry component. Until such time as we deploy robot-grunts, that means people in heavily armoured carriers/fighting vehicles to minimize casualties. Those have both a heavy maintenance burden as well as significant recurring annual costs which are difficult to avoid. Some of the vehicles within that organization should also be "tanks" to provide the traditional shock value and intimate direct fire support as well as the psychological element for our own troops and the enemy's. Using a common chassis for the "tank" and IFV would lessen the maintenance burden. 

This type of more traditional combined arms unit would also be heavily supported during an attack by the expendable weapon systems described above so that fewer of the traditional "tanks" are needed.

I'll leave aside the need for massive indirect fire support because I know most of you infantry and tank types would rather not think about that. 😁 More importantly, that wasn't the question.

Hypothetically

🍻


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## CBH99

Infanteer said:


> Switching gears.
> 
> Hypothesis and hypothetical scenario.  Tanks are too expensive to maintain and operate in the numbers needed, and are mothballed.
> 
> How do you structure the Army?  How does it stay relevant in areas where pacing threats are introducing new armoured systems?


This is actually a really good question, and has my gears turning.  

and a very relevant question, since even if we don’t mothball the tanks, we won’t be able to deploy them in sufficient numbers to really change the outcome of a peer vs peer conflict.  (Even in an all out conflict, does 40 or so Canadian tanks arriving by ship a month later, really change much?)


- Increase firepower to the LAVs.  If the US can slap a 35mm onto their Stryker, we can too damnit.  Or larger.  

- Introduce a highly efficient ATGM capability to the LAV, or TAPV, and dismounted to the troops.  (Tank units hate it when ATGMs start raining down randomly on their positions.  And it doesn’t take many successful hits to make a tank unit combat ineffective.)

- Add a generous amount of loitering UAVs to all units.  No inter-service pissing matches.  We care about results, not whether the member operating it is wearing a blue or green T-shirt.  (Manufacture them in Canada.  Cheap and easy to use.  Can destroy a target once found.  Worked wonders against Armenia recently)


0.02


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> I'll leave aside the need for massive indirect fire support because I know most of you infantry and tank types would rather not think about that. 😁 More importantly, that wasn't the question.
> 
> Hypothetically
> 
> 🍻


Actually quite the opposite!  Being able to call in artillery to attack enemy in the open, cover a tactical retreat, or pummel certain grids to “shape” the fight in the way we want - is very much something we thought of all the time.  Believe me on that!

Outside of our FOB we established which routes and areas were most likely to be used by the enemy to attack us, and had our mortars zeroed in.  

Artillery support - whether it was on patrol and provided by the big guns, or while in base provided by the mortars - were very important to all of us.  

(To the mysterious senior powers that be, maybe not so much?)


- If mothballing the tanks, the mandatory trade off would be an equal number of platforms for long range fires.  

- Or 75% trade for long range fires, 25% for cheap suicide drones.  Either way, we don’t mothball the tanks without getting something of equal or more value in return.


Another 0.02


----------



## GR66

WRT all these unmanned vehicles and swarms of UAVs being envisioned.  What does control of these look like in a situation with unrestricted electronic warfare?  

Could an enemy effectively shut these down with some kind of brute force EM blocking technology?  I'm totally uneducated on these things so have no idea.  Presumably such a tactic would prevent their own use of those parts of the EM spectrum as well, but they may be willing to take that hit if they are stronger on the lower end of the tech scale.

Would this give an advantage to a side that is willing to make use of fully autonomous AI weapon systems that don't need comms to keep a human in the loop?


----------



## PuckChaser

McG said:


> UAVs. Lots of UAVs … and missile based anti-tank artillery.


How do you control those UAVs in an EM-denied environment? Sure you can program them to fly around, but without that electronic tether you're not able to get real time video or employ weapons systems with them.


----------



## IRepoCans

I am not sure if I am a fan of multiple small coys, because that ultimately leads to much smaller platoons that lack the capacity to carry certain capabilities and in turn the mass capable of sustaining a handful of casualties before being rendered ineffective. Plus I don't see how we'll manage to train and develop all these junior officers in a timely manner to support the concept, and I doubt we'll effectively employ our NCOs as well.

Especially when we could simply just take existing structures and adapt them to be far more capable of operating in a distributed manner, such as: giving the individual rifle company more organic assets that would usually be attached. This in turn could see certain capabilities pushed down to the platoon depending on their means of movement (mechanized platoons should have ATGMs organic to it, whereas ATGM could be within a coy level detachment / section in a light company). Which in turn make the platoons more suited to operating slightly more distributed than normal with a lot more teeth to bear.

The Americans did it with the Rangers (which I detailed below); and, the Brits with their Royal Marines fighting Commando units (with their mix of close and stand off companies) and SFSG (which have a fire support platoon that can employ MMG, HMG and ATGM in each strike coy). I imagine there are other none SOF organizations that have pushed more down to the coy level; operate in a distributed manner; and, are focused on striking and defeating peer and near peer entities.



Spoiler: Ranger Rifle Company Organization



Ranger Rifle Company (Which there are four of in each manoeuvre bn for a total of twelve rifle coys)
​Company HQ: Usual make-up​​Anti-Tank Section: Three two-man AT teams, one for each platoon​​Fire Support Element:​
FSO, FS NCO, and FS specialist for the coy HQ
One FO and RTO for each platoon
​Medical Section:​
Two medical NCOs at the coy HQ
One medical NCO and enlisted medic for each platoon
​3 x Ranger Rifle Platoons:​
Platoon HQ: PL, PSgt, RTO
3 x Rifle Squad: One SL, two four-man fire teams
MG Squad: One SL, three two-man gun teams
​Habitual attachments from the HHC:​
Sniper Section: Three two-man sniper teams, one for each platoon
Recce Team: Six pers
Mortar Section / Squad (60mm, 81mm, and 120mm mortars)
All of which can be moved in their modified Strykers, various light weight ground mobility platforms in the absence of / or in concert with air transport; or as dictated by the tactical situation.


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> Actually quite the opposite!  Being able to call in artillery to attack enemy in the open, cover a tactical retreat, or pummel certain grids to “shape” the fight in the way we want - is very much something we thought of all the time.  Believe me on that! ...


I did say it half facetiously but while you are bang on about the folks outside the wire understanding and appreciating the firepower provided, the folks who run the twin towers in Ottawa were and continue to be highly reticent to allocate PYs or to fund new equipment or to transfer some of the essential capabilities to the reserves in any meaningful way.

The current artillery structure is fairly well set up and equipped to handle another COIN operation like Afghanistan (so long as the Taliban do not get any UAV assets and everyone operates the way they did fifteen years ago) Anything else we're in a world of hurt. We have not kept pace with either new technologies or the new threats.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

PuckChaser said:


> How do you control those UAVs in an EM-denied environment? Sure you can program them to fly around, but without that electronic tether you're not able to get real time video or employ weapons systems with them.


That really is where the next systems arms race will be as measures and counter measures and counter-counter measures will proliferate. 

Back in the 70's we first started thinking seriously about EMP and how to make electronics survivable. By the 90s we pretty much made any emitting system like radars a target while designing radar resistant stealthy products. To the best of my knowledge none of those things are perfect even yet. 

We have a long way to go in securing those technologies and in providing for an adequate analogue fallback. That doesn't mean we shouldn't work on the needed systems and concepts while simultaneously making them proof or upgradeable against counter measures.

I never thought we'd have driverless cars either. It seems the technology is getting better every day. On the other hand the more we develop AI and autonomous weapons the closer we get to Skynet. 

🍻


----------



## PuckChaser

But in the context of going full bore to replace tanks with UAVs, until we have the counter to the counter-measure of EA on our communications links, we basically give ourselves 0 capabilities in the medium term. At least with manned vehicles, a sub-unit commander can be given orders verbally and given mission command so they can operate once rounds start flying and the EM spectrum is denied.

We also have the closest thing to 0 Land EW capability, it's stuck in a Afghanistan "good enough" mindset. If we're planning on a fight in the Baltics, we're not going to fare all that well.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Don't know much about the Chinese organization at the brigade and below level but as for the Russians, do not forget that in general their manoeuvre battalions are significantly smaller than ours while their fire support is significantly larger.
> 
> Tank battalions are 31 tanks (10 per coy) with only some 151 personnel. Same for infantry battalions which also have only 37 IFVs (10 per coy) and 461 pers (including their mortar battery and weapons pl.
> 
> On the other hand a brigade's one tank battalion and three rifle battalions are supported by 2 x SP artillery battalions (36 tubes) ; 1 x rocket battalion ( 18 launchers); 1 x Anti-tank battalion ( 36 systems); and 2 x AD missile battalions (6 x SA 13; 6 x SA-19; 12x SA 15; 27 x SA-18 Manpads)
> 
> That should give folks a hint.
> 
> 
> 
> Hypothetical answer.
> 
> If a manned tank is too expensive then conceivably so would be a remotely controlled or autonomous "tank" -- unless we use a small, lightly armoured chassis and built very cheaply as a multiple-shot but one-use expendable weapon system. In other words they are closer in concept to expendable munitions rather than reusable fighting vehicles.
> 
> Such systems would require less PYs to operate thereby greatly reducing recurring annual costs for a full unit. Maintenance and recovery and administrative support would also be greatly reduced on an annual basis and in combat. Effectively a unit operating such vehicles would be issued fully armoured and fueled (maybe even electric) replacement vehicles (perhaps in containers) the way that fuel and ammunition is supplied now.
> 
> There would need to be a limited form of replenishment to keep vehicles fueled, armed and serviced during non combat phases and to rearm and refuel those that do not end up being destroyed in a given engagement (such vehicles could be programmed to navigate themselves to a replenishment point when all ammo is expended). To reduce size and weight missiles would probably be the best form of armament although some might be armed with a suite of anti-personnel weapons such as grenade launchers and/or machine guns. (I prefer an either/or mixed fleet of anti-armour and anti-personnel rather than an all-singing and dancing single vehicle so as to keep the vehicles as small and uncomplicated as possible)
> 
> Such units would need to be tied in to existing UAV sensor systems and would probably also need to run their own UAV "eyes" probably mixed in with a suite of light to medium UAVs and loitering munitions. Targeting is remote controlled or AI once mature.
> 
> I still have some doubts as to offensive operations. It's one thing to engage and defeat enemy equipment, it's quite another to seize key terrain. Offensive ops will require combined arms operations with a robust infantry component. Until such time as we deploy robot-grunts, that means people in heavily armoured carriers/fighting vehicles to minimize casualties. Those have both a heavy maintenance burden as well as significant recurring annual costs which are difficult to avoid. Some of the vehicles within that organization should also be "tanks" to provide the traditional shock value and intimate direct fire support as well as the psychological element for our own troops and the enemy's. Using a common chassis for the "tank" and IFV would lessen the maintenance burden.
> 
> This type of more traditional combined arms unit would also be heavily supported during an attack by the expendable weapon systems described above so that fewer of the traditional "tanks" are needed.
> 
> I'll leave aside the need for massive indirect fire support because I know most of you infantry and tank types would rather not think about that. 😁 More importantly, that wasn't the question.
> 
> Hypothetically
> 
> 🍻



We used to disparage the Russian system because it was all teeth and no tail.   Their troops, in our view, were designed to be consumed.  Use the company, battalion, regiment, division until it needed to be replaced.  On the other hand our large divisions were supposed to be sustainable in the field.  But I doubt that anybody really thought of a Division lasting more than a couple of weeks in a high intensity environment without having to be withdrawn and rebuilt.

Somewhere along the line though, we stopped laughing at the Division supplying Pizzas and Coke machines like the Americans and started expecting that.

It the Russians were all teeth and no tail we seem to have shifted to all tail and no teeth.

WRT Technology

Technology in some fields, like UAVs, is mature enough to have an impact on the battlefield.  In my view that impact is to continue the drive to dispersion.  That dispersion makes it harder to deploy and support and create effects from heavy forces.  Which, in turn, makes it harder to generate an offence.

For reference I don't see the difference between a smart munition and a UAV regardless of the means of launching.  The Air Domain is the most easily exploited and the easiest one for "robots" to "navigate" and it is "universal".  It has application in the Ground, Marine and Space Domains.

Submarine robots are not dissimilar to aerial robots except for the major issue of the communications barrier.  That drives a move towards more autonomy.   On the other hand, given that comms in the Air Domain are not guaranteed then the autonomy required in the Submarine Domain would probably serve the Air Domain equally well.

For the Land Domain, I don't see Isaac Asimov Robots, or even Ripley Exoskeletons and Heinlein Drop Pods anywhere on the horizon.   I do see vehicles with reduced crewing requirements.   But those vehicles need to be cheap, provide long range situational awareness to the crew and their team-mates, be able to communicate node to node and be designed to focus the protection on the crew and not the weapon.



> I still have some doubts as to offensive operations. It's one thing to engage and defeat enemy equipment, it's quite another to seize key terrain. Offensive ops will require combined arms operations with a robust infantry component. Until such time as we deploy robot-grunts, that means people in heavily armoured carriers/fighting vehicles to minimize casualties. Those have both a heavy maintenance burden as well as significant recurring annual costs which are difficult to avoid. Some of the vehicles within that organization should also be "tanks" to provide the traditional shock value and intimate direct fire support as well as the psychological element for our own troops and the enemy's. Using a common chassis for the "tank" and IFV would lessen the maintenance burden.



I think you are right about offensive actions and the need for heavy forces.  But CBH99 is also right about the ability to deploy them in a timely fashion.

So the first element, surely must be to buy time to deploy the heavies by creating the siege conditions they are designed to break?

That means we assume the enemy, being the aggressor, has the element of surprise on their side when launching an offense.  So our first imperative is to stall and/or break that offence.  That means delivering munitions rapidly, over long distances, to defeat the elements around which the offence is built.  Currently we are concerned about Russian tanks being massed and countering them.  Smart Munitions and UAVs seem to be a viable combination.

That same combination will make it hard for our own troops to manoeuver once the enemy force is stalled, the siege is established and our own heavies are deployed and concentrated.  That suggests to me that our APCs need to be heavily armoured and protected by a light, radar guided gun with a rapid slew rate and lots of ammunition.    I don't think a 33/35/40/57 mm gun to defeat similarly armed is the requirement for an infantry transporter.  I think a rapid slew ROWS with a 5.56 Minitat for knocking down munitions at the last minute (Phalanx, Trophy, CRAM) has more value in creating space for the deployment of own troops.

Keep the big gun vehicles separate from the infantry carrying vehicles and minimize their crews.  If a 1-2 man 155mm SPH, or MRLS is possible then a 1-2 man 35-120mm DFS vehicle with onboard ATGMs must be possible.

And yes by all means - massive indirect fire support (and ground based air defence)

But that means wise use of available PYs.

M777s with 10 man crews are not wise.

Each 10 man crew could field:

An Archer/Rheinmetall style 155mm SPH with a two man crew
A HIMARS with a two man crew
A Wiesel style 120mm mortar with a three man crew
A FOO team with a three man crew

The HIMARS and the SPHs are big enough that they can accommodate their own MRT teams and tools.

And for GBAD?





NASAMS and SkyShield - 13 PYs = 1x M777 and a Command Team.


And GR66 has it right for me, wrt small companies.  By all means retain the conventional configuration in the symmetric brigades.  (1x Arty, 1x Combined Arms, 2x LAV)

But leave the 3rd Battalions open for experimentation - for rapid deployment on the dispersed battle field - something between the conventional force and the special force but equipped to stall an enemy advance and establish the siege.

For me that means lots of smart munitions capable of taking out lots of ground vehicles.  Yes, lots of ATGMs,  but equally lots of laser designators to direct munitions launched by other partners.


----------



## Kirkhill

WRT Comms and Navigation in a GPS denied environment - fortunately there has been some thought given to that.









						Autonomous Navigation for Drone Swarms in GPS-Denied Environments Using Structured Learning
					

Drone swarms are becoming a new tool for many tasks including surveillance, search, rescue, construction, and defense related activities. As their usage increases, so does the possibility of adversarial attacks on their contribution to these use cases. One possible...




					link.springer.com
				












						Landmarks based path planning for UAVs in GPS-denied areas
					

In this paper, we propose a UAV path planner travelling from a given source to goal location in GPS-denied areas. The environment consists of a set of…




					www.sciencedirect.com
				












						These drone swarms survived without GPS
					

DARPA says its new drone technology can collaborate and adapt with minimal human commands, even when its communications are challenged.




					www.c4isrnet.com
				









						SAGE Journals: Your gateway to world-class research journals
					

Subscription and open access journals from SAGE Publishing, the world's leading independent academic publisher.




					journals.sagepub.com
				





Apparently the navigation systems seem to fall back on "dead reckoning" (Inertial Navigation Systems), refined by terrain following and celestial navigation, a bit of electro-optical formation flying, and a bit of bayesian analysis (each unit calculating its own position and the swarm averaging its result). 

Targeting can be by optical recognition against on board data, or by ground designation or by observer.

Comms are also possible by optical line of site comms (laser) from node to node in the net created by the swarm.  If you can see one part of the swarm you can communicate with the entire swarm assuming the maintain line of sight with each other.  Equally if one of the swarm can see you, or a land mark, it can locate the entire swarm.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> ...  I don't think a 33/35/40/57 mm gun to defeat similarly armed is the requirement for an infantry transporter.  I think a rapid slew ROWS with a 5.56 Minitat for knocking down munitions at the last minute (Phalanx, Trophy, CRAM) has more value in creating space for the deployment of own troops.
> 
> Keep the big gun vehicles separate from the infantry carrying vehicles and minimize their crews. ....


See, that jives in with my own thoughts. This is why I disagree with things like one weapon system for both AT and AD. A missile might be a missile but the two roles are so distinct that one crew with one weapon system becomes too complex to do both jobs (the old jack of all trades master of none concept)

I'm a firm believer that one should have two different systems/vehicles for carrying infantry and providing fire support. That was the original concept for Stryker - maximize internal room for dismounts and minimize the vehicles weapon systems to the bare minimum needed for defence of the vehicle. Unfortunately the Bradley principle of hanging all sorts of weapons system into or onto the turret slowly undermined that concept. IMHO the sole role of the APC should be to transport the dismounts as quickly and safely as possible to where they will be of use. The crew commander should focus on that. Let specialty direct fire systems/vehicles handle the mounted fire fight.

Unfortunately economics will always rear their head. It's cheaper (both in dollars and manning) to add an ever more complex all singing and dancing turret to the APC (thus making it an IFV) then to add yet another fleet of specialty vehicles and crews to the team.


Kirkhill said:


> ...And GR66 has it right for me, wrt small companies.  By all means retain the conventional configuration in the symmetric brigades.  (1x Arty, 1x Combined Arms, 2x LAV)...


My biggest problem with "small companies" is that they do not have enough resources in and of themselves. By the time that you add in an AT capability, and an AD capability, and a scout capability (whether vehicular or UAV), and a fire support team, and a mobility team (engineer or pioneer), and a command team, and a sustainment element you start to have a fairly large sized organization. 

Sure, you can use a building block principle for adding those elements from a central pool but that only adds the inefficiency of creating on-the-fly ad-hoc teams without any great reduction in team size. 

I'm not by any stretch of the imagination defending the current company/battalion structure (things have changed entirely too much since I did that type of stuff for a living) but until something significantly superior comes along, I'm happy to fine tune it rather than throwing it under the bus for something unproven. I do think, and have thought for quite some time, that an experimental brigade (and in a pinch even a battle group) would be a fine idea.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

$0.02:



> Tanks are too expensive to maintain and operate in the numbers needed, and are mothballed.



So the two main capabilities lost are anti-tank and DFS.  (I suppose Canada doesn't have much else to fill either right now.)



> How do you structure the Army?



More indirect fire units.  More AD to protect the indirect fire units.  More drone counter-air.  More aviation.  Infantry force organized around support weapons (mortar, anti-tank, direct fire, MG) for the <800m battle.  (Differently for close terrain.)  Everything under armor (proof against fragments and .50 cal and below, maybe resistant to 20-25mm) for movement.

Probably just blew through "too expensive to maintain and operate", though.  Much of the stuff needed is costly and complex, if it is any good.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> See, that jives in with my own thoughts. This is why I disagree with things like one weapon system for both AT and AD. A missile might be a missile but the two roles are so distinct that one crew with one weapon system becomes too complex to do both jobs (the old jack of all trades master of none concept)
> 
> I'm a firm believer that one should have two different systems/vehicles for carrying infantry and providing fire support. That was the original concept for Stryker - maximize internal room for dismounts and minimize the vehicles weapon systems to the bare minimum needed for defence of the vehicle. Unfortunately the Bradley principle of hanging all sorts of weapons system into or onto the turret slowly undermined that concept. IMHO the sole role of the APC should be to transport the dismounts as quickly and safely as possible to where they will be of use. The crew commander should focus on that. Let specialty direct fire systems/vehicles handle the mounted fire fight.
> 
> Unfortunately economics will always rear their head. It's cheaper (both in dollars and manning) to add an ever more complex all singing and dancing turret to the APC (thus making it an IFV) then to add yet another fleet of specialty vehicles and crews to the team.
> 
> My biggest problem with "small companies" is that they do not have enough resources in and of themselves. By the time that you add in an AT capability, and an AD capability, and a scout capability (whether vehicular or UAV), and a fire support team, and a mobility team (engineer or pioneer), and a command team, and a sustainment element you start to have a fairly large sized organization.
> 
> Sure, you can use a building block principle for adding those elements from a central pool but that only adds the inefficiency of creating on-the-fly ad-hoc teams without any great reduction in team size.
> 
> I'm not by any stretch of the imagination defending the current company/battalion structure (things have changed entirely too much since I did that type of stuff for a living) but until something significantly superior comes along, I'm happy to fine tune it rather than throwing it under the bus for something unproven. I do think, and have thought for quite some time, that an experimental brigade (and in a pinch even a battle group) would be a fine idea.
> 
> 🍻



Distressing.  We are approaching points of agreement. We'll have to work on that.    

Agreed on the economics.  The only real solution is to accept that we will have to make do with Made in Canada solutions.  That, however, includes most US manufacturers and Rheinmetall.  Not a bad set of catalogues to work from in my opinion.  



> My biggest problem with "small companies" is that they do not have enough resources in and of themselves. By the time that you add in an AT capability, and an AD capability, and a scout capability (whether vehicular or UAV), and a fire support team, and a mobility team (engineer or pioneer), and a command team, and a sustainment element you start to have a fairly large sized organization.



See, I think we are seeing the role of the "small companies" differently.   

I don't see them as Close Combat Infantry at all.  I see them as skirmishers operating at one remove from the enemy.  I don't see "adding" an AT capability.  I see an AT capability as their "raison d'etre" with AT weapons integral to their section structure.  CG84s with CGLPs, Javelins etc.  Heavy on machine guns.  Mounted on vehicles that can  be deployed in large numbers by air.    Certainly with a local defence AD capability.
No scout capability.  The whole unit is a scouting/screening unit.  Any "company" can be tasked to the point, the flanks or the reserve.  

Fire Support Team?  If you mean an ANGLICO type team then absolutely.  If you mean big guns, maybe not, unless mounted on light, air deployable vehicles (and 1 gun per C17 is not what I am suggesting).

And a mobility team?  More of a counter-mobility team.  More C4 than D9s.  The unit should learn to work with the terrain rather than trying to adjust the terrain.

And of course the Command Element is integral, throughout.


I am looking for something that could handle The Retreat from Mons rather than Passchendael.

And something that might be organized along the lines of the First Special Service Force or early Commandos.

The Brigade's own SOF unit that specializes in conventional warfare but is available as an adjunct to CANSOFCOM when the situation demands.


----------



## Kirkhill

Funny.  Going back and re-reading my last.... I just realized I have not described an infantry unit at all.  What I have described is an air-portable light recce unit....one that can operate mounted, and dismounted with helo support.

Not so much FSSF as early SAS/LRDG.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Funny.  Going back and re-reading my last.... I just realized I have not described an infantry unit at all.  What I have described is an air-portable light recce unit....one that can operate mounted, and dismounted with helo support.
> 
> Not so much FSSF as early SAS/LRDG.


In a lot of ways what you are describing from a doctrinal concept is one of the two UK Strike Brigades. While I've been looking, I haven't found very much on how that brigade or the units in it function other than the basis will be two cavalry regiments with Ajax (right now still Scimitar and Challenger) and two infantry battalions with Boxer (right now still Warrior). Beyond that there is still a lot of experimentation being worked out with how these elements will operate.

Personally I dislike any organization that selects the equipment first and then tries to figure out what to do with it.  But at least one of the brigades is designated a "Strike Experimentation Group" so that's a positive sign.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

IRepoCans said:


> The Americans did it with the Rangers (which I detailed below); and, the Brits with their Royal Marines fighting Commando units (with their mix of close and stand off companies) and SFSG (which have a fire support platoon that can employ MMG, HMG and ATGM in each strike coy). I imagine there are other none SOF organizations that have pushed more down to the coy level; operate in a distributed manner; and, are focused on striking and defeating peer and near peer entities.
> [/SPOILER]



It doesn't matter how 'special' you are as a unit. Where meat meets metal, the metal will (usually) always win.

I'm guessing that the uncertain reality we're living through right now will force us to maintain a mixed force of light and heavy units, for that reason.


----------



## Underway

There are a lot of good arguments for removing tanks from the CAF.  The argument that they were useful in Afghanistan is valid only because they provided an overmatch capability for the situation.  There was literally no way the Afghans could fight back against a modern MBT.  And of course, we had no other options for direct fire, everything else we had was indirect.

It seems pretty clear that the main enemy of an MBT in modern battlespaces is either aircraft or precision fires.  There are literally dozens of videos from Syria or Armenia showing how UAV's coupled with precision fires find and destroy armour.  The Ukrainian situation has also made it clear that this is an extremely deadly threat.

Removing tanks, going full middleweight, UAVs for scouting and precision fires.  Canada can't and doesn't need to be all singing and all dancing.  Doubling down on our excellent fieldcraft and infantry skills, skulking around scouting the enemy using various recce assets, then flattening them with precision fires seems like something that we could become experts in quite quickly.Direct fire will be ATM.  Quite literally what the USMC is trying to do.  It's a strong vision, and has quite a bit of merit.


----------



## CBH99

PuckChaser said:


> But in the context of going full bore to replace tanks with UAVs, until we have the counter to the counter-measure of EA on our communications links, we basically give ourselves 0 capabilities in the medium term. At least with manned vehicles, a sub-unit commander can be given orders verbally and given mission command so they can operate once rounds start flying and the EM spectrum is denied.
> 
> We also have the closest thing to 0 Land EW capability, it's stuck in a Afghanistan "good enough" mindset. If we're planning on a fight in the Baltics, we're not going to fare all that well.


The mindset of 'good enough' EW against groups of enemy with AK's and RPG's, and the odd technical they would ride into battle in -- isn't saying much 🤦‍♂️   

Good enough to jam some remote detonated IED's that were made by some guy in a grape hut?  Good to know our $20B a year buys us enough capability to jam a home-made radio shack remote det... let's hope some real guidance and specific capabilities/organization of capability comes out of this FORCE 2025.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> The argument that they were useful in Afghanistan is valid only because they provided an overmatch capability for the situation.



For anything less than the Soviets pouring into the Fulda Gap, I rather prefer to send the army out with overmatch.


----------



## Underway

Brad Sallows said:


> For anything less than the Soviets pouring into the Fulda Gap, I rather prefer to send the army out with overmatch.


And an overmatch against armour appears to be precision fires with UAV's.  The way the CA is currently constructed Azerbijan would kick our butts, using Turkish drones dropping rockets an mortars on our positions.  Fast, agile, proper air defence, precision artillery/rockets etc... are the way of the future for small armies.  It would allow us to provide a specialist skill set for NATO, and similarly allow us to do peace support missions without draining the bank.

If tanks are so important to our armies fighting structure why are there none in the Baltics?  Because we can't afford to move and operate them there.  If we can't afford to use them for that sort of role, then we need to rethink if we actually need them or let the US provide the heavy formations.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Underway said:


> There are a lot of good arguments for removing tanks from the CAF.  The argument that they were useful in Afghanistan is valid only because they provided an overmatch capability for the situation.  There was literally no way the Afghans could fight back against a modern MBT.  And of course, we had no other options for direct fire, everything else we had was indirect.
> 
> *It seems pretty clear that the main enemy of an MBT in modern battlespaces is either aircraft or precision fires.*  There are literally dozens of videos from Syria or Armenia showing how UAV's coupled with precision fires find and destroy armour.  The Ukrainian situation has also made it clear that this is an extremely deadly threat.
> 
> Removing tanks, going full middleweight, UAVs for scouting and precision fires.  Canada can't and doesn't need to be all singing and all dancing.  Doubling down on our excellent fieldcraft and infantry skills, skulking around scouting the enemy using various recce assets, then flattening them with precision fires seems like something that we could become experts in quite quickly.Direct fire will be ATM.  Quite literally what the USMC is trying to do.  It's a strong vision, and has quite a bit of merit.



Not so. The best anti-tank weapon is still another tank. With great backup from other resources of course.


----------



## CBH99

Underway said:


> There are a lot of good arguments for removing tanks from the CAF.  The argument that they were useful in Afghanistan is valid only because they provided an overmatch capability for the situation.  There was literally no way the Afghans could fight back against a modern MBT.  And of course, we had no other options for direct fire, everything else we had was indirect.
> 
> It seems pretty clear that the main enemy of an MBT in modern battlespaces is either aircraft or precision fires.  There are literally dozens of videos from Syria or Armenia showing how UAV's coupled with precision fires find and destroy armour.  The Ukrainian situation has also made it clear that this is an extremely deadly threat.
> 
> Removing tanks, going full middleweight, UAVs for scouting and precision fires.  Direct fire will be ATM.  Quite literally what the USMC is trying to do.  It's a strong vision, and has quite a bit of merit.
> 
> Canada can't and doesn't need to be all singing and all dancing.


Militaries all over the world are in the horrible habit of preparing to fight their last war.  Very few are good at planning & equipping for what they 'think' will be their next war.  The US has done a very impressive job, thus far, of recognizing that pattern and trying to fix it.

Whether a conflict between the US & China kicks off or not, the fact that they are organizing and equipping themselves as if that fight WILL happen is a change in mindset, even from Iraq 2.0.


Canada went from "We are getting rid of tanks!"  to  "Tanks could be useful, we will keep tanks and deploy them."  to  "We need modern tanks, ASAP!"  all in a short period of time, by military thinking/procurement standards.  We are, unfortunately, a very reactive organization with leadership that is appointed based on their willingness to STFU and not cost the government any more money than they need to.  

Canada absolutely doesn't need to be all singing and all dancing.  I couldn't agree more.  I think we should decide what specific things we want to be *really *good at, and *excel at being really really good at those things.*  A ship with a dozen or two Canadian MBTs pulling into harbour a month or so after the conflict erupts isn't really doing anybody any good.  (My 0.02)

Like you said, the USMC is trying to divest themselves of MBTs and drastically enhance the lethality of it's small units, precisely because they feel that in a peer conflict, that will serve them better. 



Let's look at other conflicts that have happened recently - Ukraine, Syria, Armenia, etc.  What worked well, and what didn't work?  Was there a noticeable game changer?  (Ukraine and Armenia, the huge and noticeable game changer was suicide drones/loitering munitions.)  

Cheap enough for 2nd world countries to procure in mass quantities, and expend without any fuss - and the result is one less enemy tank.  They can be built faster, cheaper, and be deployed with less training and without risking personnel - and the result is a severely depleted enemy armoured force.  The CAF should be saying "Hmmmmm, this is worth looking into, right now."

Same conflicts listed above, ATGM capabilities.  A modern, accurate, reliable ATGM that kills enemy tanks quickly - prefer the system to be fire and forget.  A few solid systems out there right now.  Plenty of video evidence to show how a non-professional soldier can figure it out, and take out enemy tanks.  (Killing the crew, which takes a while to train, and several million dollars worth of hardware that isn't quickly replaced.)



We have the industry, and budget (believe it or not) to be one of the most lethal armies in the world, just by focusing on what could be our strengths, and divesting ourselves of capabilities that we most likely won't require.  Keep it simple.  (Even if we were tasked with a Mali deployment tomorrow, the LAVs and TAPVs would be the prime fighting vehicles I would imagine.)

Sure, the public might laugh or have comments about "Our Army doesn't have tanks!"  Oh well.  Who cares.  This is the same public that quite often says "I didn't even know we had a Navy!" despite the Navy being in the news fairly often.  One just has to spend a few moments reading the comment section on CBC to be reminded that it isn't worth caring about what the public thinks in regards to these decisions - they aren't the ones deploying.


----------



## CBH99

daftandbarmy said:


> Not so. The best anti-tank weapon is still another tank. With great backup from other resources of course.


Genuine question... is it though?

I know that has tended to be true, and one only has to look at the Gulf War to realize that the best tools to kill Iraqi tanks were American tanks, supported by attack helicopters.  (Personally, I would argue that attack helicopters were more optimal, as they could spot & kill enemy tanks from further distances without being seen.)

Maybe that is still true.  Maybe it isn't?  (I don't know...)


- Looking at the case of Armenia, the best anti-tank weapon was a cheap drone that would scream down onto the tank once the tank was spotted, destroying the tank.  Armenia lost the conflict, and lost a staggering percentage of it's armoured force in an amazingly short period of time.  

- Depending on terrain, would ATGMs not be more ideal?  Far easier to maneuver, can engage directly or top attack, and can quickly move/hide after being fired.  Easier to move/hide than an MBT.

- One aspect I'd suggest in determining how good an anti-tank system is - how quickly can the asset be replaced if lost during a conflict?  If we lose a tank, that's a few CAF members gone.  They take time to train, especially good tank crews - can't replace them too quickly.  How quickly can we replace the tank we lost?  This is Canada, we won't.  How much would it cost to replace that tank anyway?  (No idea, but tanks aren't cheap.)

Suicide drones on the other hand can be manufactured in a single day.  Be operated without any harm to the operator.  If they see a target and attack, BOOM!  If they get shot down, or taken down via EW?  It's inconvenient, but a lot less inconvenient than a lost tank.  


Backup resources are always important, agreed.  But is the best anti-tank weapon still another tank?  🤷‍♂️


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> And an overmatch against armour appears to be precision fires with UAV's.  The way the CA is currently constructed Azerbijan would kick our butts, using Turkish drones dropping rockets an mortars on our positions.  Fast, agile, proper air defence, precision artillery/rockets etc... are the way of the future for small armies.  It would allow us to provide a specialist skill set for NATO, and similarly allow us to do peace support missions without draining the bank.
> 
> If tanks are so important to our armies fighting structure why are there none in the Baltics?  Because we can't afford to move and operate them there.  If we can't afford to use them for that sort of role, then we need to rethink if we actually need them or let the US provide the heavy formations.


There are tanks in the Battle Group that Canada commands in Latvia - Italy supplies 8 X Arietes ; Poland supplies a company of PT-91 Twardy (14 tanks); and Spain 6 X Leopard 2E. 

There are also various infantry fighting vehicles amongst at least three additional mechanized infantry companies from Italy, Spain and Slovakia.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> Genuine question... is it though?
> 
> I know that has tended to be true, and one only has to look at the Gulf War to realize that the best tools to kill Iraqi tanks were American tanks, supported by attack helicopters.  (Personally, I would argue that attack helicopters were more optimal, as they could spot & kill enemy tanks from further distances without being seen.)
> 
> Maybe that is still true.  Maybe it isn't?  (I don't know...)
> 
> 
> - Looking at the case of Armenia, the best anti-tank weapon was a cheap drone that would scream down onto the tank once the tank was spotted, destroying the tank.  Armenia lost the conflict, and lost a staggering percentage of it's armoured force in an amazingly short period of time.
> 
> - Depending on terrain, would ATGMs not be more ideal?  Far easier to maneuver, can engage directly or top attack, and can quickly move/hide after being fired.  Easier to move/hide than an MBT.
> 
> - One aspect I'd suggest in determining how good an anti-tank system is - how quickly can the asset be replaced if lost during a conflict?  If we lose a tank, that's a few CAF members gone.  They take time to train, especially good tank crews - can't replace them too quickly.  How quickly can we replace the tank we lost?  This is Canada, we won't.  How much would it cost to replace that tank anyway?  (No idea, but tanks aren't cheap.)
> 
> Suicide drones on the other hand can be manufactured in a single day.  Be operated without any harm to the operator.  If they see a target and attack, BOOM!  If they get shot down, or taken down via EW?  It's inconvenient, but a lot less inconvenient than a lost tank.
> 
> 
> Backup resources are always important, agreed.  But is the best anti-tank weapon still another tank?  🤷‍♂️


If a tank can be destroyed by a drone then everything else is even easier to destroy. Replacing a squadron of tanks with a company of ATGMs gets you no real advantage. Adding a viable anti-air/anti-drone defence system and/or active protection systems will give you a degree of protection regardless what you put it on or deploy it with.

Would we have use for loitering munitions. Absolutely. But even if you take out quite a few of the enemy equipment you still have no weapon system to counter attack with or to seize ground with.

A combined arms organization is exactly that - a combination of assets that work in concert. Do I know what the right mix of those assets is? Nope. But I'm fairly sure of what type of assets you need and some type of heavily armoured but well protected piece of kit still has a role amongst all the other stuff in some cases.

🍻


----------



## suffolkowner

Ideally we should be able to sing and dance at the same time.  Could we do Afghanistan over again? We have the added capabilities from that engagement Leopard 2, M777, Chinooks, upgraded Lavs, but it seems that we are dependent on the opposing force lacking any anti-tank or air defence capabilities nevermind the presence and proliferation of loitering munitions. It seems unreasonable to me to expect that even when facing non-state or near state actors like ISIS or the Taliban in the future. 

Still lacking the basics

GBAD
SHORAD
MALE/HALE UAV

an almost complete absence of any firing options other than the MBT. If the removal of the tank resulted in the aquisition of these capabilities than at least there would be something to talk about but more than likely it will just result in another lost capability.

The wish list

GBAD--NASAAMS2?
SHORAD--IMSHORAD?
MALE/HALE--Reaper?
155mmSPH--Archer/Caesar/ATMOS?
MRLS--HIMARS/Lynx?
120mmSP--Cardom/NEMO/AMOS?
loitering munitions--Harop?

and the communications,radar, and EW capabilities to support all the above


----------



## GR66

suffolkowner said:


> Ideally we should be able to sing and dance at the same time.  Could we do Afghanistan over again? We have the added capabilities from that engagement Leopard 2, M777, Chinooks, upgraded Lavs, but it seems that we are dependent on the opposing force lacking any anti-tank or air defence capabilities nevermind the presence and proliferation of loitering munitions. It seems unreasonable to me to expect that even when facing non-state or near state actors like ISIS or the Taliban in the future.
> 
> Still lacking the basics
> 
> GBAD
> SHORAD
> MALE/HALE UAV
> 
> an almost complete absence of any firing options other than the MBT. If the removal of the tank resulted in the aquisition of these capabilities than at least there would be something to talk about but more than likely it will just result in another lost capability.
> 
> The wish list
> 
> GBAD--NASAAMS2?
> SHORAD--IMSHORAD?
> MALE/HALE--Reaper?
> 155mmSPH--Archer/Caesar/ATMOS?
> MRLS--HIMARS/Lynx?
> 120mmSP--Cardom/NEMO/AMOS?
> loitering munitions--Harop?
> 
> and the communications,radar, and EW capabilities to support all the above


Add Trophy APS/Raytheon Quick Kill to the list to provide some protection to these assets.

As quickly becomes obvious there are a LOT of pieces of the puzzle to fielding an effective and survivable military force and we are missing a LOT of those pieces.  

FGAG has long suggested having a Heavy, Medium and Light Brigade instead of 3 x symmetrical medium brigades to meet the different challenges we might face.  While my personal belief is that lighter forces are far more likely to be what we need for the proxy wars and insurgencies that are the most common expressions of great power competition I agree that it would be foolish to completely abandon the heavy elements of combat power because if you DO need them light forces cannot fill the gap.

Perhaps if we don't have the personnel and budget to field three properly manned and equipped Brigades (heavy/medium/light) we should instead focus on the two extremes.  One Heavy Brigade with combined arms battalions of tanks and LAVs, SP artillery, GBAD, ATGMs, etc. all protected by active protection systems and one Light Brigade with many of the features that have been discussed in this thread and elsewhere.  

Any resources that remain should be put into Reg Force and Reserve capabilities to support these Brigades including EW, GBAD and Fires (everything from mortars, howitzers and loitering munitions to long range precision strike like HIMARS).

In all honesty this really should be doable within the budget and manning available to the Army.


----------



## daftandbarmy

If you're looking for a 'Maslow's Heirarchy of Needs' applied to any modern military force, here are a couple of good quotes to help point you in the right direction:

"For good or for ill, air mastery is today the supreme expression of military power and fleets and armies, however vital and important, must accept a subordinate rank." -- Winston Churchill, 1949

"If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and lose it quickly.” — Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery


----------



## Kirkhill

There is a place for the tank on the modern battlefield.  Even the USMC acknowledges that.  They have just made the decision to pass the task on to the US Army who maintains a useful fleet of tanks, organized, trained and supported to excel in their role.   Likewise with cannons and attack helicopters.   They are hard to deploy rapidly over long distances.

Our ABCA partners all maintain fleets of modern tanks.   There is a need for them.  But perhaps  the need is  not as great as it was.

I do question the notion that the tank is the best anti-tank weapon.  To me that sets up a boxing match between two equal opponents.  15 rounds to have the judges declare a draw.   I want to see Rock-Paper-Scissors - assymetric battles that generate a conclusive result quickly.

I believe that tanks have their places.  Afghanistan was one example, as the Danes and Canadians proved.  Modern tanks with good crews were better than what the locals could put up.  They significantly overmatched the locals.   Score one for the tanks.

Tanks, I believe, are also critical to the offense.  But they are a lot more vulnerable to defenders than they used to be.  They are too expensive, and hard to deploy to be used en masse.  They need to be husbanded and kept in the rear to exploit opportunities.  They require a lot more battlefield preparation than they used to.  

That battlefield prep,  as always, falls to the artillery.  So the real question, for me, is how best to exploit, fully, the modern technologies available to the artillery.    And that starts with providing the arty with eyes and ears and good comms.



The second point that occurs to me from this discussion is this.  Is there still a place for Infantry on the modern battlefield?

Infantry in the sense of the traditional foot-slogger.

As I read all of the discussions it seems to me that infanteers are going to ride as far forwards as they can before dismounting.  Doesn't that make them all Mounted Infantry or, as they came to be known in the 1600s, Dragoons?

Planes, trains and automobiles, or ATVs and helos.  

And as far as the Close With and Destroy Bit is concerned.  The strength of the infanteer on the ground could be described in terms of their ability to employ man-portable artillery - ATMs, AA, MGs, even the re-learning of long range shooting instead of the 200 meter battle.  And the elimination of the bayonet.  More fusiliers, musketeers and rifles than "infantry".


----------



## Brad Sallows

Of course, the advantage of drones only lasts until effective counter-measures are deployed.  Then the guy with a tank-equipped army still has a tank-equipped army.


----------



## CBH99

Brad Sallows said:


> Of course, the advantage of drones only lasts until effective counter-measures are deployed.  Then the guy with a tank-equipped army still has a tank-equipped army.


When you’re right, you’re right.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Of course, the advantage of drones only lasts until effective counter-measures are deployed.  Then the guy with a tank-equipped army still has a tank-equipped army.


Only if they are still on the boat to theatre and the boat is still above water.

If they are in theatre then those drones will have started to strip away the tanks, with or without counter-measures.  And the drones (Precision Guided Munitions of all sorts) are cheaper than the tanks, IFVs and APCs.


----------



## Underway

FJAG said:


> There are tanks in the Battle Group that Canada commands in Latvia - Italy supplies 8 X Arietes ; Poland supplies a company of PT-91 Twardy (14 tanks); and Spain 6 X Leopard 2E.
> 
> There are also various infantry fighting vehicles amongst at least three additional mechanized infantry companies from Italy, Spain and Slovakia.



Yes, however, I was referring to Canadian tanks.  It sort of proves my point. 

1.  Canada never in our history has fought without allies.  All conflicts are choices. 
2.  In Latvia it was decided that other countries would be better to supply the heavy armour, Canada would be better to supply HQ, support, LAV's, infantry.  If Canada didn't have tanks this wouldn't have changed.  We still would be providing the same thing.
3.  Tanks are expensive, we've spread over three regiments and a school.  Why?  Because of internal army politics or ego as far as I can tell.  If tanks were so useful then they wouldn't be piecemealed out like this to "retain skills".  They would be concentrated so they can do their job correctly.
4. Peace support missions where Canada has intervened don't require tanks. 



FJAG said:


> A combined arms organization is exactly that - a combination of assets that work in concert. Do I know what the right mix of those assets is? Nope. But I'm fairly sure of what type of assets you need and some type of heavily armoured but well protected piece of kit still has a role amongst all the other stuff in some cases.


Yes, heavy armour has a role, however, is it one that Canada needs or has to fill?  This is the entire point of my argument. I'm not saying tanks are dead, I'm saying Canada, given the army's historical roles, and geopolitical realities we don't actually need them.  Someone else provides the heavy armour, we slot in elsewhere in the battlespace.

Given how vulnerable armour has been shown to be against precision fires perhaps that's where we need to focus instead.  Not many allies have that capability. Lots of them have tanks.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to my thought on Infantry and Dragoons.

Here is a not atypical sight on Alberta highways.



The pick-up with one or two ATVs or snowmachines on the back is common.  The trailer with the RIB is not so common.

Here's the militarised version.



My problem with the ISV is its size and weight in the Canadian context.  In the US context, at 5000 lb kerb weight, the vehicle can be sling loaded by the US Utility Helicopter, the BlackHawk.  However it is twice the weight, empty, that a CH146 can lift.  The Polaris Dagor is a little lighter at 2045 kg but still too heavy for the CH146.  And there are only 17 CH147s in the inventory, meaning that if all the CH147s were tasked to one lift they could only lift 34 vehicles concurrently.




On the other hand things like the Polaris MRZR are liftable, I believe, over short distances, by the CH146 but can't maintain highway speeds.  And they are relatively bulky so take up a lot of space in an aircraft.


----------



## GR66

If we're deploying light forces in response to a peer attack of some sort what is the likelihood that we will a) have a significant number of rotary wing aircraft forward deployed to be available to transport our vehicles, and b) what is the likelihood that we'd be willing to risk those aircraft by using them to forward deploy those vehicles?

A more likely scenario in my mind is we use our fixed wing transport to deliver the units and their vehicles a safe distance away from the front and they self deploy from there.  A somewhat larger vehicle gives you many more options as far as weapons that can be integrated (basically anything that you've seen mounted on a Humvee) and if you really need to deploy forces forward by helicopter there are ATV's etc. that could be used instead.


----------



## Underway

GR66 said:


> If we're deploying light forces in response to a peer attack of some sort what is the likelihood that we will a) have a significant number of rotary wing aircraft forward deployed to be available to transport our vehicles, and b) what is the likelihood that we'd be willing to risk those aircraft by using them to forward deploy those vehicles?
> 
> A more likely scenario in my mind is we use our fixed wing transport to deliver the units and their vehicles a safe distance away from the front and they self deploy from there.  A somewhat larger vehicle gives you many more options as far as weapons that can be integrated (basically anything that you've seen mounted on a Humvee) and if you really need to deploy forces forward by helicopter there are ATV's etc. that could be used instead.



And what you describe is the only way we could deploy anything but paratroops (whatever form they come in).  A friendly port or airbase.  We have no amphib or ro-ro capability to deploy any other way.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> ... FJAG has long suggested having a Heavy, Medium and Light Brigade instead of 3 x symmetrical medium brigades to meet the different challenges we might face.  While my personal belief is that lighter forces are far more likely to be what we need for the proxy wars and insurgencies that are the most common expressions of great power competition I agree that it would be foolish to completely abandon the heavy elements of combat power because if you DO need them light forces cannot fill the gap.
> 
> Perhaps if we don't have the personnel and budget to field three properly manned and equipped Brigades (heavy/medium/light) we should instead focus on the two extremes.  One Heavy Brigade with combined arms battalions of tanks and LAVs, SP artillery, GBAD, ATGMs, etc. all protected by active protection systems and one Light Brigade with many of the features that have been discussed in this thread and elsewhere.
> 
> Any resources that remain should be put into Reg Force and Reserve capabilities to support these Brigades including EW, GBAD and Fires (everything from mortars, howitzers and loitering munitions to long range precision strike like HIMARS).
> 
> In all honesty this really should be doable within the budget and manning available to the Army.


The highlighted portion above is where you and I definitely agree. This belief is where I base my division between which forces should be Reg F - doing a job day-to-day and Res F- doing a job only when an major emergency strikes.

Equipment has a high initial cost to acquire and a much lower continuing cost to maintain. Personnel has a recurring annual cost very much dependent on whether it is full-time or part-time. You need both to be there in sufficient numbers and in an acceptable state of maintenance and collective training to be employable.

The need for having a lighter force (and I'll leave aside its constituent parts) to deal with day-to-day or rapid need threats should be substantially met by Reg F units whose size can be tailored to meet the government's appetite for involvement in these types of missions (as well as the ability to be augmented by Res F volunteers on follow-on rotos)

The need for a more complex and less likely high intensity threat should be substantially met by Res F units who spend most of the waiting time on less expensive stand-by. That such units need combat ready equipment is obvious. That they need to have a core of trained leadership (many of which will be full-timers) is also obvious. The these organizations need both individual and collective training to get them to an acceptable standard of training is also obvious. And finally that these organizations cannot be built and equipped overnight but will need to be created over years is equally obvious.

I call these Res F formations "heavy" because I currently believe that for modern peer combat traditional "heavy" equipment is one essential component, albeit that many other lighter elements such at ATGMs, AD, UAVs, radars, comms, EW, rockets etc etc are also needed (and who knows, might even predominate). I call them "heavy" because they will be doing heavy fighting as much as having some heavy equipment.

I've been a proponent of three asymmetric Reg F brigades but my thinking is that perhaps two would do if one created one Reg F "heavy" brigade (to train for the big stuff and continuously man Latvia) and one Reg F light/medium brigade (to be a quick reaction/peacekeeping force). The third brigade could be carved up with one battalion or so becoming part of CSOR (which would have an expanded mandate going into more light ops and foreign training assistance tasks) and the rest being the foundation of the core of an expandable, mobilizable Res F structure of perhaps two "heavy" manoeuvre and three or four support brigades as well as a small pool of battalions of individual augmentees to the two Reg F brigades. 

The big thing is that yes, I agree; the lighter missions are the ones we will be doing much more of day-to-day and that the larger portion of the Reg F Army should be dedicated to that on a day-to-day basis. But ... we could afford a better equipped and larger "heavy" component for the Army if we saved a substantial amount of the annual costs by having its manpower come from less expensive reservists.



Underway said:


> And what you describe is the only way we could deploy anything but paratroops (whatever form they come in).  A friendly port or airbase.  We have no amphib or ro-ro capability to deploy any other way.



We don't necessarily need the capability. What we need is a plan. Some possible solutions are:

1) have standing contracts for civilian ROROs with a number of secure port options for Europe or wherever and a plan road/rail movement within theatre;

2) create Naval and Air and Army reserve resources whose principle jobs and equipment are international deployment support;

3) preposition stocks of equipment and supplies in theatre and have standing contracts with airlines to do emergency flyovers; and

4) reorganizing Maple Resolve to be annual deployment test exercises.

Not having the resources full-time is not an excuse. Not having a standing plan is inexcusable.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Re naval transport

We have Canadian Cargo Ship Companies like Federal and CSL.  We have a demonstrated requirement for more maritime connectors around out coasts, particularly in the Arctic.  Why aren't we subsidizing excess capacity which the government can access in time of need as STUFT (Shipping Taken Up From Trade?)

Have the companies take on designs that aren't necessarily optimum for their needs but include ancillary capabilities that could come in handy.

Have the Reserves (Naval or Arty or Air) take on the task of managing and operating containerized AD systems that can be deployed aboard or on shore.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> In a lot of ways what you are describing from a doctrinal concept is one of the two UK Strike Brigades. While I've been looking, I haven't found very much on how that brigade or the units in it function other than the basis will be two cavalry regiments with Ajax (right now still Scimitar and Challenger) and two infantry battalions with Boxer (right now still Warrior). Beyond that there is still a lot of experimentation being worked out with how these elements will operate.
> 
> Personally I dislike any organization that selects the equipment first and then tries to figure out what to do with it.  But at least one of the brigades is designated a "Strike Experimentation Group" so that's a positive sign.
> 
> 🍻




Near as I can understand the Strike Brigade concept was eliminated, in the sense of a Combined Arms Brigade.

The current form seems to comprise the following "kinetic" elements :


1x Combat Aviation Brigade Combat Team - equipped with Apache and Wildcat helos

1x Deep Recce Strike Brigade Combat Team - equipped with MRLS and AS90s (or their replacements) together with an AJAX mounted recce unit
(some people would call this an Artillery Brigade)

2x Heavy Brigade Combat Teams - equipped with Challenger MBTs, AJAX AFVs and Boxer WAPCs

2x Light Brigade Combat Teams - equipped with Jackal Recce Vehicles, Foxhound Protected Vehicles and Light Infantry.

1x Air Manoeuvre Brigade Combat Team - globally deployable, air transportable Light Infantry equipped with specialty light vehicles

1x Army Special Operations Brigade (Rangers - Persistent Presence)

1x Security Force Assistance Brigade (Persistent Presence)






__





						Restructuring the British Armed Forces – Finabel
					






					finabel.org
				




The document outlines further changes that will occur to the service. The British Army structure will be reorganised into seven self-sufficient Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), divided as follows: two heavy, one deep strike, two light, one air manoeuvre, and one combat aviation brigade (Forces.net, 2021).





__





						Defence in a Competitive Age - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






			https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/971859/_CP_411__-_Defence_in_a_competitive_age.pdf


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Near as I can understand the Strike Brigade concept was eliminated, in the sense of a Combined Arms Brigade.
> 
> ...


Not quite. Army 2020 Refine was definitely changed by the _Defence in the Competitive Age_

The Deep Strike Brigade Combat Team (DSBCT) essentially continues the Strike Brigade (SB) concept of deep ranging dispersed forces that would degrade an advancing enemy through attrition by way of a wide variety of weapons including AS 90, MLRS, air, ATGMs etc.

The key change the Brits have done (aside from the numerous obvious changes) is reorganize from pure brigades (where all artillery, engineers and other support was held separate from the brigades and allocated out as required by mission/operation) into brigade combat teams each of which has integral combat and service support elements. Its interesting that they took the American term rather than the Canadian "brigade group" - let's face it; we did it first - sucking up to their special friends, I bet.

It's this more permanent grouping of guns and rockets into the DSBCT which makes the DSBCT look different from the SB. The Challengers and Warriors currently in them were scheduled to be replaced by Ajax and Boxer anyway. If the DSBCT ends up with no Boxers but be purely AJAX, that could be a definite improvement in both mobility and maintenance.

Similarly the SBs were meant to be the rapid reaction elements of 3 UK Div (presumably to be followed up in due course by it's two heavy brigades and other divisional assets if required and time and space permitted.) That still seems to be the case but reading the tea leaves it looks a bit more like the DSBCT is not expected to be able to act as independently as first envisioned but be part of a bigger force instead. My expectation would be that in a defensive fight, once the DSBCT gets worn down or overrun its artillery resources (if still extant) would transfer to whatever force is still in the game.

I'm actually surprised that neither Pinstripe nor Wavell have any articles on these changes yet (just some generic fluff on _DCA_.

🍻


----------



## Underway

My thoughts on planning follows.  I'm still learning this theory so some of this may be way off.  But this is how I currently understand it:


FJAG said:


> Personally I dislike any organization that selects the equipment first and then tries to figure out what to do with it.  But at least one of the brigades is designated a "Strike Experimentation Group" so that's a positive sign.


Contrast that with the Royal Navy.  They know what they want (carrier strike, submarine nuclear strike, limited amphibious operations, protection of those assets with the rest of the fleet) and generally how to get there.  That's because they have a threat to plan against, and they know the tools to deal with that threat.  The threat to the UK is seaborne and they develop elsewhere.  The RN needs to be able to strike at those threats before they make it near the UK or her interests.

The UK army is generally developed on capability-based planning (CBP) from what I can see.  Which is not ideal.  There is no land-based "threat" for them to plan against.  So they develop expeditionary forces that are generally balanced with their capabilities.  And that means equipment first, doctrine second in a lot of cases.  Get the capability and then figure out how to integrate it.

For Canada, we are forced into CBP given that we have no existential threat territorially similar to the UK.  So you developed capabilities.  So for ships, we want generally purpose frigates because you never know what the job is going to be.  And an army that has no focus because again, no idea what the job is going to be.  CBP also seems to cause longer-lived equipment.  Equipment generally outlives the doctrine because it also outlives the threat.  If there is no threat you can often ignore older equipment issues because it still provides a capability.  There is not impetus to change equipment because there is no threat.

Contrast that with how we responded in Afghanistan.  The UAV's, helicopters, tanks, and RG31's were threat-based planned equipment purchases.  They fit into our insurgency doctrine that was developed in response to a specific threat.


----------



## Underway

So all that above to say there isn't a threat to Canada.  However, there are direct threats to Canada.  Land, air, sea we are in a fireproof house.  That much is very clear.  However, we are on the front lines in information, cyber, and space domains.  These are where Canadian security really needs to step up and should be considered heavily in any army future structure discussions.  There may be a role there for the army (information for sure) that needs to be considered.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Underway said:


> My thoughts on planning follows.  I'm still learning this theory so some of this may be way off.  But this is how I currently understand it:
> 
> Contrast that with the Royal Navy.  They know what they want (carrier strike, submarine nuclear strike, limited amphibious operations, protection of those assets with the rest of the fleet) and generally how to get there.  That's because they have a threat to plan against, and they know the tools to deal with that threat.  The threat to the UK is seaborne and they develop elsewhere.  The RN needs to be able to strike at those threats before they make it near the UK or her interests.
> 
> *The UK army is generally developed on capability-based planning (CBP) from what I can see.  Which is not ideal.  There is no land-based "threat" for them to plan against.  So they develop expeditionary forces that are generally balanced with their capabilities.  And that means equipment first, doctrine second in a lot of cases.  Get the capability and then figure out how to integrate it.*
> 
> For Canada, we are forced into CBP given that we have no existential threat territorially similar to the UK.  So you developed capabilities.  So for ships, we want generally purpose frigates because you never know what the job is going to be.  And an army that has no focus because again, no idea what the job is going to be.  CBP also seems to cause longer-lived equipment.  Equipment generally outlives the doctrine because it also outlives the threat.  If there is no threat you can often ignore older equipment issues because it still provides a capability.  There is not impetus to change equipment because there is no threat.
> 
> Contrast that with how we responded in Afghanistan.  The UAV's, helicopters, tanks, and RG31's were threat-based planned equipment purchases.  They fit into our insurgency doctrine that was developed in response to a specific threat.



The land based threat for the UK has always been generated from mainland Europe which, like their NATO involvement, is still central to their defence policy. 

The lighter forces they generate to meet their 'residual Imperial commitments' has always been arranged around the edges of that central European 'heavy metal' force. 

Now that they see a growing threat from China, they've formally rearranged some of those light forces into a more specific type of deterrent, probably to be able to interact more seamlessly with similar US forces. Compared to the cost of their their armoured formations and nuclear deterrent, this is petty cash of course.


----------



## CBH99

Underway said:


> So all that above to say there isn't a threat to Canada.  However, there are direct threats to Canada.  Land, air, sea we are in a fireproof house.  That much is very clear.  However, we are on the front lines in information, cyber, and space domains.  These are where Canadian security really needs to step up and should be considered heavily in any army future structure discussions.  There may be a role there for the army (information for sure) that needs to be considered.


The level of tardiness & lack of foresight in Ottawa on defense matters has only been possible because we are lucky enough to have a giant moat on 3 sides of us, and the baddest kid on the block as our neighbour.  We couldn't have lucked out more, actually.

I have ZERO knowledge of information/cyber operations, how to conduct them, or how to protect ourselves from them.  Technology outpaced me over a decade ago, and the knowledge gap between myself and what technology can do just grows every day.  With Russia and China as 'non-friendly' nations with keen interests in our affairs, I do hope that cyber security will be a major focus in Ottawa soon.

Imagine debit cards not working, and ATMs down?  Banking history, gone?  After all, we don't actually use much cash these days - somebody near a computer could destroy our personal finances in a way that would leave us literally screwed.  And when it happens to everybody at the same time?  Cell phones won't work?  No internet?  No power?  The cyber threat seems to be like the nuclear threat's little angry brother, and the one we should be a lot more terrified of in terms of probability.  As such, a focus on cyber across military and national infrastructure should be a top priority.




Underway said:


> My thoughts on planning follows.  I'm still learning this theory so some of this may be way off.  But this is how I currently understand it:
> 
> Contrast that with the Royal Navy.  They know what they want (carrier strike, submarine nuclear strike, limited amphibious operations, protection of those assets with the rest of the fleet) and generally how to get there.  That's because they have a threat to plan against, and they know the tools to deal with that threat.  The threat to the UK is seaborne and they develop elsewhere.  The RN needs to be able to strike at those threats before they make it near the UK or her interests.
> 
> The UK army is generally developed on capability-based planning (CBP) from what I can see.  Which is not ideal.  There is no land-based "threat" for them to plan against.  So they develop expeditionary forces that are generally balanced with their capabilities.  And that means equipment first, doctrine second in a lot of cases.  Get the capability and then figure out how to integrate it.
> 
> For Canada, we are forced into CBP given that we have no existential threat territorially similar to the UK.  So you developed capabilities.  So for ships, we want generally purpose frigates because you never know what the job is going to be.  And an army that has no focus because again, no idea what the job is going to be.  CBP also seems to cause longer-lived equipment.  Equipment generally outlives the doctrine because it also outlives the threat.  If there is no threat you can often ignore older equipment issues because it still provides a capability.  There is not impetus to change equipment because there is no threat.
> 
> Contrast that with how we responded in Afghanistan.  The UAV's, helicopters, tanks, and RG31's were threat-based planned equipment purchases.  They fit into our insurgency doctrine that was developed in response to a specific threat.


Using that as a reference, I would think air assets would be our most valuable in terms of usefulness & versatility.  Whether it is NORAD duties such as intercepting foreign aircraft, possibly intercepting incoming ballistic missiles, participating in coalition operations, supporting our friends when needed (Baltic Air Policing, or temporarily taking over for Alaska based F-15C/Ds when the fleet was down, etc.)  Plus they can relocate themselves to where needed in the country far faster than any other asset.

Everybody wants to destroy a threat before it gets to their shores.  And historically, the RN has been the focal point of that for the UK.  The RCN does play an important role in so many ways, but I envision it continuing to deploy as it recently has been - OP Caribbe, Africa, Persian Gulf, SCS, etc.  General purpose as we don't know what the operation will bring, but the CSC should be able to handle the higher intensity scenarios a lot better than the Halifax class.

The Army, like you said - also general purpose, as we don't know what the deployment will be or what will be required.  Nobody saw Afghanistan happening, or having troops in Iraq, Ukraine, Latvia, etc all at the same time.  

Can we be all singing and all dancing, and keep a MBT capability?  Yes, we can.  We are now.  Should we be all singing and dancing though?  Personally, I don't know.  I've leaned towards 'no'.  

Our allies have because their perceived threats are all much closer, geographically.  Tanks don't have to go very far if you border Russia, are being invaded by Russia, and are as big as southern Alberta.  

Is the number of tanks we could provide to an emergency operation worth the resources of sustaining that capability, when it will take us ages to get them to where they are needed?  (Load onto train, train to a port.  Find a ship to transport them, or probably 2 ships.  Load them up.  Sail off.  And hope the country where they are needed has port access, otherwise it's back to the train.)  

Are they useful?  Yes.  Would our limited number of tanks be useful in a theater where several other countries have them in useful numbers, especially if ours take a while to get there?  I would argue no.  The resources we use on that capability may be better used on something else that would be much more versatile for us.  


Good points on both sides.  Like almost everything else we face as a country/military, a lot of it is waiting to see what the next conflict looks like 🤷‍♂️


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Not quite. Army 2020 Refine was definitely changed by the _Defence in the Competitive Age_
> 
> The Deep Strike Brigade Combat Team (DSBCT) essentially continues the Strike Brigade (SB) concept of deep ranging dispersed forces that would degrade an advancing enemy through attrition by way of a wide variety of weapons including AS 90, MLRS, air, ATGMs etc.
> 
> The key change the Brits have done (aside from the numerous obvious changes) is reorganize from pure brigades (where all artillery, engineers and other support was held separate from the brigades and allocated out as required by mission/operation) into brigade combat teams each of which has integral combat and service support elements. Its interesting that they took the American term rather than the Canadian "brigade group" - let's face it; we did it first - sucking up to their special friends, I bet.
> 
> It's this more permanent grouping of guns and rockets into the DSBCT which makes the DSBCT look different from the SB. The Challengers and Warriors currently in them were scheduled to be replaced by Ajax and Boxer anyway. If the DSBCT ends up with no Boxers but be purely AJAX, that could be a definite improvement in both mobility and maintenance.
> 
> Similarly the SBs were meant to be the rapid reaction elements of 3 UK Div (presumably to be followed up in due course by it's two heavy brigades and other divisional assets if required and time and space permitted.) That still seems to be the case but reading the tea leaves it looks a bit more like the DSBCT is not expected to be able to act as independently as first envisioned but be part of a bigger force instead. My expectation would be that in a defensive fight, once the DSBCT gets worn down or overrun its artillery resources (if still extant) would transfer to whatever force is still in the game.
> 
> I'm actually surprised that neither Pinstripe nor Wavell have any articles on these changes yet (just some generic fluff on _DCA_.
> 
> 🍻




For reference and discussion?









						Explaining the British Army’s Strike Concept
					

The British Army’s new Strike concept has attracted much negative comment. But it is considerably more robust and well-founded than its critics claim, and it has the potential to offer infantry brigades the ability to march and manoeuvre under armour at far greater distances than is currently...




					rusi.org
				












						Strike Brigades - More than Just a Medium Weight Capability
					

Nicholas Drummond takes us on a deep dive into how the Strike concept can provide much more than just a medium weight capability.




					wavellroom.com
				












						The Light Strike Brigade - Think Defence
					

The Light Strike Brigade is therefore based on the core principles of the joint land strike concept but with much lighter vehicles that can exploit the




					www.thinkdefence.co.uk
				





Couple of observations - 

The Strike Brigade Concept is built on transport from the sea.  There aren't enough air assets to deliver a useful force in a timely fashion.

There are no infantry.  Everyone is a Dragoon.


----------



## Kirkhill

If a "pickup" truck is an acceptable transport for light forces then which variant?








Lets assume that all the vehicles have equivalent powertrains, suspension, mobility and towing capacity.

Which one is more suitable for a 300 km march?


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> There are no infantry.  Everyone is a Dragoon.


Why not Panzergrenadier, Mounted Infantry, Mechanized Infantry or Motor Infantry?  Or my personal favourite Foot Cavalry...


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Why not Panzergrenadier, Mounted Infantry, Mechanized Infantry or Motor Infantry?  Or my personal favourite Foot Cavalry...


Mounted Rifles has more Canadian flavour.

NWMR, CMR... 

Regardless, Underway, when are you lot going to buy us a couple of Big Honking Ships to transport our National Medium Response Brigade?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> If a "pickup" truck is an acceptable transport for light forces then which variant?
> 
> 
> View attachment 65443
> 
> View attachment 65444
> 
> View attachment 65445
> 
> Lets assume that all the vehicles have equivalent powertrains, suspension, mobility and towing capacity.
> 
> Which one is more suitable for a 300 km march?



That depends... is it raining?


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> That depends... is it raining?


While it ain't training if it ain't raining...how do you feel about relocating to Wainwright from Brandon at 100 kmh and 40 below?

Might at least want a convertible.


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> Regardless, Underway, when are you lot going to buy us a couple of Big Honking Ships to transport our National Medium Response Brigade?


I'll put it on my list, right after I finish the AOPS and JSS builds.  Have to get the CSC build contract in place still.  Oh and then there is a submarine replacement project office that needs to be stood up along with an MCDV replacement project office.

Hmmm... The navy is kinda busy for the next 20 years.  Maybe call the airforce and see what they have going on?

Seriously though for things like submarines the navy can create an office to look at options, with the expectation that government policy will eventually look to submarine replacement, even if there isn't an replacement direction right now.  They've signaled they want to keep submarines so the RCN will carry on with that line of thinking.

There is no gov't direction for a big honking ship or rapid deployment of anything aside from SOF/light infantry elements.  So you can't even do an options analysis.

The death of the BHS was due to a lack of interest from the Army.  Frankly, without them pushing on the project and explaining why they need such a capability it wasn't going to last long.  If the army doesn't want, or think it needs a BHS then they won't push the government for it.  And if they don't push the government the government won't examine that option.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> I'll put it on my list, right after I finish the AOPS and JSS builds.  Have to get the CSC build contract in place still.  Oh and then there is a submarine replacement project office that needs to be stood up along with an MCDV replacement project office.
> 
> Hmmm... The navy is kinda busy for the next 20 years.  Maybe call the airforce and see what they have going on?
> 
> Seriously though for things like submarines the navy can create an office to look at options, with the expectation that government policy will eventually look to submarine replacement, even if there isn't an replacement direction right now.  They've signaled they want to keep submarines so the RCN will carry on with that line of thinking.
> 
> There is no gov't direction for a big honking ship or rapid deployment of anything aside from SOF/light infantry elements.  So you can't even do an options analysis.
> 
> The death of the BHS was due to a lack of interest from the Army.  Frankly, without them pushing on the project and explaining why they need such a capability it wasn't going to last long.  If the army doesn't want, or think it needs a BHS then they won't push the government for it.  And if they don't push the government the government won't examine that option.


And thus the Medium Brigade is stranded.

And, for similar reasons, so is a Light Brigade.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

If it is intended for the Canadian Army to fight in conventional operations then you need tanks. If the argument against tanks is that loitering munitions can kill tanks then surely that argument extends to everything else. While the lessons of the Azerbaijan/Armenian war are interesting, they also need some context. 

While the EFP has multi-national groupings at below unit level, this is not the norm for combat operations. Counting on getting a tank sub-unit attached from another nation is a much different matter than counting on fire support/CSS from another nation. 

Maintenance budgets are expensive - so cut less important budgets. Move the tanks to Gagetown so they are all in one place and we spend less money moving them back and forth. Stop viewing the tank squadrons as training aids for every platoon/company commander to do foundation training. It is true that they are not in Latvia. The point remains that they could be. They could have sailed there and back many times. The priority would be EFP, not Maple Resolve. The Leopard 2A6Ms are pretty much the only capability in the CA that are ready for prime time. Having said that, leaving them in Canada does mean that you can form the armour component of a BG or CMBG for commitment anywhere.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> And thus the Medium Brigade is stranded.
> 
> And, for similar reasons, so is a Light Brigade.


If we are delivering a BG or CMBG to Europe (or the ME or Africa etc) we don't need the shipping itself to be RCN. It doesn't need to be military. I am having a hard time finding a plausible scenario where we are in an opposed-entry. It might be subjected to all sorts of things, but its not Juno Beach.


----------



## Kirkhill

I agree that if Canada engages in conventional ops then tanks are required.  I also don't have a problem with clustering all the heavy assets in Gagetown with proximity to Shearwater.  By all means add the Canadian Tank Regiment (or Fort Garry Horse) to the TOE of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade along with 4 GSR and 4 ESR.

And as for the nature of the ships necessary - I agree we're not talking Juno or even the Aleutians.




> The first operational use of a Stryker Brigade was in Iraq between 2003 and 2004. A complete brigade sailed directly from the USA to Kuwait. Upon arrival, it deployed as a single unit travelling 900 kilometres in a single bound with everything needed to support operations for 72 hours. What was notably absent from the column was the usual logistics tail that accompanied armoured formations. En route to its initial area of responsibility, the Brigade was re-tasked to a trouble spot, Samarra. The unexpected arrival of such a large force wrong-footed insurgent forces and meant that the situation was stabilised with surprising speed and efficiency. The Brigade then proceeded to relieve the US 101st Airborne Division in Mosul, its original task. Upon arrival, it found that a force a third of the size of a light infantry division could dominate the same area of ground with less effort. Over a 12-month period, Stryker vehicles covered an average of 32,000 kilometres with units achieving readiness levels of 96%. Post-operational analysis suggested that the Stryker Brigade concept was nothing short of revolutionary in the impact it achieved.3











						Strike Brigades - More than Just a Medium Weight Capability
					

Nicholas Drummond takes us on a deep dive into how the Strike concept can provide much more than just a medium weight capability.




					wavellroom.com
				





All that is required is a RoRo or two on 72 hours notice to move (maybe 7 days).   And they don't need to be armed and armoured and milspec, nor do they need to lodge troops.   The troops can go by air in comfort and join up with their gear in theatre.  In fact, their gear could remain in storage at Shearwater - entirely separate from the gear owned by the Brigades.

In a similar vein the USMC has paired their LAV units with the unarmed, aluminum, JHSV catamaran ferries.   For rapid deployment to unopposed landings.

And, given the fact that the vessels would not be used militarily frequently that would argue against the need for a large crew of any type, let alone a large, permanent, navy crew.


WRT the Light Brigade - we have the air assets to support a Light Response to the types of threats likely to be encountered in Canada and North America.


----------



## Underway

TangoTwoBravo said:


> If we are delivering a BG or CMBG to Europe (or the ME or Africa etc) we don't need the shipping itself to be RCN. It doesn't need to be military. I am having a hard time finding a plausible scenario where we are in an opposed-entry. It might be subjected to all sorts of things, but its not Juno Beach.


And there is the reason the Army didn't push for a BHS.  Canada doesn't go anywhere without allies.  That means the force structure (including the RCN one) must rely upon allies to create the situation where Canada can then deploy the follow-on forces, or we deploy to a benign enough environment where we can gradually build up forces or land them with a civilian chartered ship.

The only place I can see us strategically needing rapid deployment is within Canada.  And given our infrastructure only the Arctic needs amphib.  This means AOPS is good enough for the small unit operations we do in the arctic.


----------



## Kirkhill

Or, again, another Danish model.









						New contract with Armed Forces
					

The Danish Armed Forces and DFDS enter into an agreement on providing ships for the transport of military equipment.




					www.dfds.com
				




While it is true that we will never operate without allies (even, I suspect, in the Canadian Arctic) I do get a bit weary of every question being answered with "We don't really need that.  Our allies will take care of it."    That leads to Canada becoming Iceland and the Canadian Army not being able to justify anything.  After all, if we're invaded, the Americans will take care of it.

I think we can do what we are organized to do.   I think we make bad decisions, when we make decisions at all, and we focus too much on the number of people and not enough on the equipment they can manage.


----------



## CBH99

Totally agreed with several of the posts above from Kirkhill, T2B, Underway, etc.  

Can we do what we are designed to do?  Yes.  Grouping all of the tanks together in one location is a smart move and would simplify things immensely - a more practical use of this resource which would make them a lot more useful.  

With the odd exception, in defensive operations supporting efforts elsewhere, any force Canada deploys will be a follow-on force.  Even if the action is still happening, we have the luxury of geography.  

In that sense I was thinking of kit that would be still useful, while perhaps also easier and faster to deploy.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> If a "pickup" truck is an acceptable transport for light forces then which variant?
> 
> 
> View attachment 65443
> 
> View attachment 65444
> 
> View attachment 65445
> 
> Lets assume that all the vehicles have equivalent powertrains, suspension, mobility and towing capacity.
> 
> Which one is more suitable for a 300 km march?


Whatever vehicle you pick it should be capable of mounting all of those various weapons systems that we've seen trialed on Humvee/JLTV-class vehicles.  Avenger-type SHORAD RWS, ATGM launchers, 120mm mortar carrier, Multi-tubed UAV/loitering munition launchers, Multi-tubed/multi-munition rocket launchers, EW gear, counter-battery radar, etc.

If a light force is going to be anything more than unarmoured and quick-moving infantry then it needs to have all of those sense and strike capabilities to make a difference on the battlefield.  C-130 transportability should be the goal....kind of what the original Stryker vehicle vision was for the US Army.


----------



## Kirkhill

The Striker blossomed because it was trying to protect 11 people.  (16.47 tonnes)

The LAV 6.0 is trying to protect 10 people. (28.6 tonnes)

The TAPV is trying to protect 6 people (17.2 tonnes)

The Jackal minimally protects 5 people (6.7 tonnes)

The JLTV is trying to protect 4 people (4.7 tonnes)

Real question here.

If all "infantry" needs to be mounted, and bigger units require bigger vehicles, but smaller vehicles are easier to acquire and deploy, should the infantry be built around smaller sections?  Or even around bricks/teams?

It isn't hard to find a transportable vehicle capable of mounting all the assets described by GR66.   The problem arises in transporting troops in large numbers in a single vehicle under armour.  Numbers = Volume.  Volume = Surface Area.  Surface Area = Mass.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

LAVs, while heavier than their name would indicate, are transportable. Within the context of FORCE 2025 one of the assumptions is that we are a LAV-based force.  A LAV infantry battalion has all sorts of capability for peacekeeping, COIN and stability operations that light infantry lack. Working in TAPVs for some mission/terrain sets might also make sense. I spent a year in a blue baseball cap in Southern Lebanon. The battalions there had a mixture of LAV-types and what I would call TAPVs. 

Let's say the Canadian Army had been tapped to send a Battle Group to Mali in 2016 wearing blue helmets. There would be a lot of effort getting a LAV (and TAPV) battle group there, but that is the cost of doing business. You don't go and build dedicated shipping under an RCN flag to handle the episodic movement of troops into theatres where you have an SPOD/APOD already.


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> For reference and discussion?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Strike Brigades - More than Just a Medium Weight Capability
> 
> 
> Nicholas Drummond takes us on a deep dive into how the Strike concept can provide much more than just a medium weight capability.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> wavellroom.com


Just finished reading this.   This is literally the concept I think of when I look at CA capability.  We are very close to this concept of a middleweight. It's interesting that the US grew this out of a Canadian shift to the LAV family.  We just lack some of the capabilities to make it work properly.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> LAVs, while heavier than their name would indicate, are transportable. Within the context of FORCE 2025 one of the assumptions is that we are a LAV-based force.  A LAV infantry battalion has all sorts of capability for peacekeeping, COIN and stability operations that light infantry lack. Working in TAPVs for some mission/terrain sets might also make sense. I spent a year in a blue baseball cap in Southern Lebanon. The battalions there had a mixture of LAV-types and what I would call TAPVs.
> 
> Let's say the Canadian Army had been tapped to send a Battle Group to Mali in 2016 wearing blue helmets. There would be a lot of effort getting a LAV (and TAPV) battle group there, but that is the cost of doing business. You don't go and build dedicated shipping under an RCN flag to handle the episodic movement of troops into theatres where you have an SPOD/APOD already.


And I agree.

That is why I posted the article about the Danish Ferry company DFDS and its Public Private Partnership with the Danish and German governments to supply ocean going RoRo ferries at "Notice To Move" from a bespoke fleet of seven.

I agree entirely that the RCN "doesn't have to".  And I apologise for the misdirection I may have caused by yanking Underway's chain.  

Certainly it would be nice if the Canadian Government and its military advisers could come to a more coherent inter-service plan.  But the cat can be skinned many ways.  And the Danish system is one method that does not require LHAs, LHDs, LPDs, LSDs or aircraft carriers.  I offer it as an exploitable possibility that Canada has not exploited.

Some time back a chap name of Chretien was asked why he didn't by more air transports, before Harper bought the C17s, 130s and 147s.  His response was that if we had them sitting on the runway someone might ask us to use them.

I guess we wouldn't want to make it to easy to use the Army either.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Just finished reading this.   This is literally the concept I think of when I look at CA capability.  We are very close to this concept of a middleweight. It's interesting that the US grew this out of a Canadian shift to the LAV family.  We just lack some of the capabilities to make it work properly.




And I think spending some cash on those missing capabilities and organizing a Danish DFDS type transport partnership would tie things up with a bow. 

What is to stop the Government subsidizing BC Ferries, Marine Atlantic and Federal to supply surplus capacity that the Government could lease back at short notice?


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Just finished reading this.   This is literally the concept I think of when I look at CA capability.  We are very close to this concept of a middleweight. It's interesting that the US grew this out of a Canadian shift to the LAV family.  We just lack some of the capabilities to make it work properly.



One other point that I took from the article was that the US brigade moved with a short logistical tail and kept 72 hours supplies on its own wheels.  It exploited the difference between the needs of the Wheeled Brigade and the demands of the logistically encumbered heavy brigades.

One thing that intrigues me is my sense that the Canadian concept doesn't fully exploit the fact that each section vehicle is essentially a deuce and a half.  We seem to see a need to attach a tail based on the armoured regiment to the wheeled unit thereby, it seems to me, losing some of the benefits that the LAV concept offers.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> For reference and discussion?


Those articles are fairly old Kirkhill. The real question is how has the new defence structure changed the concept to a Deep Strike Combat Team and how is it organized and expected to function.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> If it is intended for the Canadian Army to fight in conventional operations then you need tanks. If the argument against tanks is that loitering munitions can kill tanks then surely that argument extends to everything else. While the lessons of the Azerbaijan/Armenian war are interesting, they also need some context.
> 
> While the EFP has multi-national groupings at below unit level, this is not the norm for combat operations. Counting on getting a tank sub-unit attached from another nation is a much different matter than counting on fire support/CSS from another nation.
> 
> Maintenance budgets are expensive - so cut less important budgets. Move the tanks to Gagetown so they are all in one place and we spend less money moving them back and forth. Stop viewing the tank squadrons as training aids for every platoon/company commander to do foundation training. It is true that they are not in Latvia. The point remains that they could be. They could have sailed there and back many times. The priority would be EFP, not Maple Resolve. The Leopard 2A6Ms are pretty much the only capability in the CA that are ready for prime time. Having said that, leaving them in Canada does mean that you can form the armour component of a BG or CMBG for commitment anywhere.


Agree almost fully with that. I agree we should have at least half of our tanks in EFP (not sure if that's two full squadrons or not these days) and build our force around that with the mech infantry elements from other countries.

Where we differ is the location of the remainder of our tanks which in my opinion should be with 1 CMBG so that 1 CMBG can develop all the tank expertise and supply the rotos to EFP (Not to mention that Wainwright is a good range for tank training). Whatever other tank related training that is done at Gagetown (from individual crewman training to combat team commander training should be moved to 1 CMBG as well so that the equipment can be centrally maintained and shared. We will never be able to exercise at a collective level if the Canadian based tanks are centralized in Gagetown. As long as we are this limited in tank numbers they need to be with a single unit which would be tasked to provide all tank related training.



Underway said:


> And there is the reason the Army didn't push for a BHS.  Canada doesn't go anywhere without allies.


The issue isn't so much that we have a BHS, the issue is we need a plan to do expeditionary deployments by whatever means floats your boat (pun intended) and to exercise that plan on a regular basis.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> And I think spending some cash on those missing capabilities and organizing a Danish DFDS type transport partnership would tie things up with a bow.
> 
> *What is to stop the Government subsidizing BC Ferries, Marine Atlantic and Federal to supply surplus capacity that the Government could lease back at short notice?*



Customer demands and unions, for two...

I sailed on DFDS ferries a fair bit during various Norway winter deployments. The only reason they were available IIRC is because ridership was down in the winter time, hence 'ships taken up from trade' STUFT ships were a dime a dozen.


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> Certainly it would be nice if the Canadian Government and its military advisers could come to a more coherent inter-service plan.  But the cat can be skinned many ways.


It's not like we don't talk.  The AOPS design was heavily influenced by an ongoing discussion with the Army on how it does arctic operations and what it would like to see for support from the RCN.  Similarly, the 127mm gun and the "land attack" flexibility of the CSC come directly from our experiences in Libya, off the coast of the Balkans, conversations with CANSOFCOM and the Army.

One day the army will be able to rely upon Canadian ships providing fire support from just offshore.



Kirkhill said:


> One other point that I took from the article was that the US brigade moved with a short logistical tail and kept 72 hours supplies on its own wheels.  It exploited the difference between the needs of the Wheeled Brigade and the demands of the logistically encumbered heavy brigades.
> 
> One thing that intrigues me is my sense that the Canadian concept doesn't fully exploit the fact that each section vehicle is essentially a deuce and a half.  We seem to see a need to attach a tail based on the armoured regiment to the wheeled unit thereby, it seems to me, losing some of the benefits that the LAV concept offers.



I'm not entirely sure that this is the case.  LAV companies move with a pretty short tail.  Fuel seems to be the limiting factor.  A lot of stuff can be stored in the side bins, usually full of IMPs and the section's sleeping gear.  Jerry cans as well, just in case.


----------



## Kirkhill

I'll stipulate that my perceptions can be wrong.


daftandbarmy said:


> Customer demands and unions, for two...
> 
> I sailed on DFDS ferries a fair bit during various Norway winter deployments. The only reason they were available IIRC is because ridership was down in the winter time, hence 'ships taken up from trade' STUFT ships were a dime a dozen.



But, with respect to availability, I think that is the point.  The Danish government ensures that there is more supply than demand by making sure that there are more hulls than the market requires for strictly commercial purposes.  It is not trying to run a profitable service.  It is running a public service - kind of like a road over water.

As to the unions, well, if necessary, withdraw the union crews and replace them with willing mariners, or reservists, or even RCA types.  Or, write up a contract comparable to that used by Federal for the Asterix crew.


----------



## lenaitch

Kirkhill said:


> What is to stop the Government subsidizing BC Ferries, Marine Atlantic and Federal to supply surplus capacity that the Government could lease back at short notice?



Not a sailor but wondering how much use a fleet of near-shore ferries would be to the CAF.

According to Wiki, of FedNav's 64 owned vessels, only two are registered in Canada; the rest sail under flags of convenience (Barbados & Marshall Islands).  I don't know if there would be any legal issues pressing those flags into military or conflict service.


----------



## Kirkhill

lenaitch said:


> Not a sailor but wondering how much use a fleet of near-shore ferries would be to the CAF.
> 
> According to Wiki, of FedNav's 64 owned vessels, only two are registered in Canada; the rest sail under flags of convenience (Barbados & Marshall Islands).  I don't know if there would be any legal issues pressing those flags into military or conflict service.



Also not a sailor, but I have sailed.  And it isn't so much the distances the ship sails as the sea-states in which they operate.  I have been on board the Digby - St John Ferry across the Bay of Fundy when it shipped green water.

The Baltic Ferries operated by DFDS generally operate short hauls but are capable of trans-oceanic runs.

As to Flagging.  That is a matter between the Government and the Owner.  If the contract stipulated Canadian flags then the ships would likely be flagged in Canada.  Ships reflag.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> One other point that I took from the article was that the US brigade moved with a short logistical tail and kept 72 hours supplies on its own wheels.  It exploited the difference between the needs of the Wheeled Brigade and the demands of the logistically encumbered heavy brigades.
> 
> One thing that intrigues me is my sense that the Canadian concept doesn't fully exploit the fact that each section vehicle is essentially a deuce and a half.  We seem to see a need to attach a tail based on the armoured regiment to the wheeled unit thereby, it seems to me, losing some of the benefits that the LAV concept offers.


You can have a "light" tail if you are driving through an operational theatre where there is an in-place force and use their logistics. You could drive across Canada if you rely on gas stations and restaurants.  

You do realize that a Deuce and a Half does not replenish itself as it rolls along. The fuel, rations and water (not to mention ammo) need to come from somewhere. The echelon is the link between the LAV at the end of the grease pencil arrow on the map and the "somewhere" that commodities come from. The Ech is a big as needs to be and as small as it can.


----------



## Kirkhill

I realize.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Also not a sailor, but I have sailed.  And it isn't so much the distances the ship sails as the sea-states in which they operate.  I have been on board the Digby - St John Ferry across the Bay of Fundy when it shipped green water.
> 
> The Baltic Ferries operated by DFDS generally operate short hauls but are capable of trans-oceanic runs.
> 
> As to Flagging.  That is a matter between the Government and the Owner.  If the contract stipulated Canadian flags then the ships would likely be flagged in Canada.  Ships reflag.



I'm no expert but I'm guessing that the BC Ferries are vastly inferior in bad weather performance to the DFDS ships. 

We had almost all of 45 CDO embarked on one of them, with all of our vehicles and that baby was ploughing through arctic winter gales, with big combers rocketing over the bows, like a hot knife through Danish pastry.

Even better, I discovered that I could stay at the bar in the forward part of the ship much longer than most of my Royal Marines colleagues, most of whom had to slink away to their grots to a chorus of 'Who's the real commando now boys?' from me


----------



## lenaitch

Kirkhill said:


> Also not a sailor, but I have sailed.  And it isn't so much the distances the ship sails as the sea-states in which they operate.  I have been on board the Digby - St John Ferry across the Bay of Fundy when it shipped green water.
> 
> The Baltic Ferries operated by DFDS generally operate short hauls but are capable of trans-oceanic runs.
> 
> As to Flagging.  That is a matter between the Government and the Owner.  If the contract stipulated Canadian flags then the ships would likely be flagged in Canada.  Ships reflag.



Shipping companies use flags of convenience to save costs (taxation, labour, regulatory compliance, etc.).  I would imagine the companies would expect the government to pay the net differences upfront and ongoing, just for being available.  Then again, we the people might determine that is an acceptable strategic cost.

Also, regarding the coastal ferries, I wonder what their range would be.


----------



## Kirkhill

So, are you suggesting that a federal subsidy would not only improve availability by adding more hulls, but also improve seaworthiness, safety and comfort?  As well as increased utility?


----------



## Kirkhill

lenaitch said:


> Shipping companies use flags of convenience to save costs (taxation, labour, regulatory compliance, etc.).  I would imagine the companies would expect the government to pay the net differences upfront and ongoing, just for being available.  Then again, we the people might determine that is an acceptable strategic cost.
> 
> Also, regarding the coastal ferries, I wonder what their range would be.



The Norland was a RoRo ferry that operated between Hull and Zeebrugge - roughly 350 km.

In 1982 she transported 2 Para from Plymouth to San Carlos Water in the Falklands - something like 15,000 km




> MV _Norland_​From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
> 
> 
> 
> Jump to navigationJump to search
> 
> General characteristics after 1987 stretchGeneral characteristicsHistory
> 
> 
> _Norland_ 1979 in RotterdamName:
> _Norland_ (1974–2002)
> _SNAV Sicilia_ (2002–2010)
> Owner:
> North Sea Ferries (1974–1996)
> P&O North Sea Ferries (1996–2002)
> SNAV Aliscafo (2002–2010)
> Operator:
> North Sea Ferries (1974–1996)
> P&O North Sea Ferries (1996–2002)
> SNAV (2002–2010)
> Port of registry:
> Hull,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> UK (1974–2006)
> Madeira,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Portugal (2006–2007)
> Naples,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Italy (2007–2010)
> Yard number:972Launched:13 October 1973In service:1974Out of service:2010Identification:IMO number: 7333822Honours and
> awards:Falkland Islands, 1982Fate:ScrappedClass and type:ROROTonnage:12,988 GRTLength:152.77 m (501.2 ft)Tonnage:26,290 GTLength:173.29 m (568.5 ft)Beam:25.2 m (83 ft)Draft:6.02 m (19.8 ft)Propulsion:Two SWD 16TM410Speed:19 knots (35 km/h)
> The _*Norland*_ was a P&O roll-on/roll-off ferry operating between Kingston upon Hull in Yorkshire, UK, and Rotterdam Europoort, Netherlands, and then Zeebrugge, Belgium. The 27,000 tonne ferry was built in 1974 by AG Weser, Bremerhaven, for Dutch North Sea Ferries partners Noordzee Veerdiensten N.V. Sistership MV _Norstar_ sailed under Dutch flag and _Norland_ under British flag and with (mainly) British crew. The ship transferred to P&O North Sea Ferries in 1996.
> Contents​
> 1Falklands Service
> 2Post P&O
> 3Popular culture
> 4References
> Falklands Service[edit]​During the Falklands War, the Ministry of Defence requisitioned the _Norland_ to be used as a troopship in the Task Force sent to retake the Falkland Islands from Argentina. _Norland_ was among the ships to enter San Carlos Water during the amphibious landings of Commandos and Paratroopers, Captained by Donald Ellerby CBE. The ship survived attack from the Argentine Air Force, and at the end of the war repatriated the defeated Argentine troops back home, alongside the _Canberra_.[1] For this service _Norland_ received the battle honour "Falkland Islands 1982,"[2] which for many years was displayed in one of the passenger lounges, with a painting of the ship in San Carlos Water.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> One other point that I took from the article was that the US brigade moved with a short logistical tail and kept 72 hours supplies on its own wheels.  It exploited the difference between the needs of the Wheeled Brigade and the demands of the logistically encumbered heavy brigades.
> 
> One thing that intrigues me is my sense that the Canadian concept doesn't fully exploit the fact that each section vehicle is essentially a deuce and a half.  We seem to see a need to attach a tail based on the armoured regiment to the wheeled unit thereby, it seems to me, losing some of the benefits that the LAV concept offers.



Just FYI, the link below is to the new US Congressional Budget Office Primer on the US Military's Force Structure for 2021. It has an excellent breakdown of the ORBAT of each of a US ABCT, SBCT and IBCT starting at page 22. 

With respect to the logistic tail that attaches note in particular the tails for the SBCT (the closest thing to our LAV based CMBGs). You'll see at pg 30 that each Rifle company and Battalion HQ have fairly decent support tails included BUT note in particular at page 31 that each battalion is also supported by a Forward Support Company that is part and parcel to the Brigade Support Battalion and that, in addition to an FSC for each battalion in the brigade, the BSB also has a very robust Maintenance Company and Distribution Company. 

As an aside note the following:

1) an ABCT has less personnel than an SBCT - 4,040 to 4,680 (ARNG 4,220 to 4,430) - This is in part because tank coys have less people then ABCT rifle coys and because SBCT rifle coys are larger than an ABCT rifle coy (in part because each SBCT rifle coy has two mortar dets.)

2) The primer reflects the amended structure of the ABCT with three Combined Arms Bns (two with 2 tank, 1 inf coys and 1 with 1 tank and 2 inf coys) - Note also that it reflects that one of the tank coys removed from the combined arms bns has been put into the Cavalry Squadron creating a more robust cavalry unit)

3) Note as well that the primer reflects the amended structure of the SBCTs where the three MGS which had previously been in each rifle coy (for a total of 27 for the brigade) are now gone although twelve of them have been placed into the Cavalry Squadron as a weapons coy.

4) Note as well some of the other organizational points:

a) What we would call the Field ambulance is in the BSB;

c) The Engr bn has two field coys and also provides administrative management for a bde Sigs Coy and the bde intelligence coy

5) ARNG ABCTs are equipped identically to their Active Army counterparts but have about a third of the direct annual cost ($690 mil to $240Mil)

6) ARNG SBCTs also ($600mil to $200mil) - There are even less indirect costs and much less overhead for ARNG brigades.

These are the reasons why I keep saying over and over again that we need to put much, much more of the Army's resources into a restructured, equipped and improved Res F.

https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-05/57088-Force-Structure-Primer.pdf

For those of us who like orbat line diagrams, have at it.  😁 

🍻


----------



## Weinie

Underway said:


> *I'll put it on my list, right after I finish the AOPS and JSS builds.  Have to get the CSC build contract in place still.  Oh and then there is a submarine replacement project office that needs to be stood up along with an MCDV replacement project office.*
> 
> Hmmm... The navy is kinda busy for the next 20 years.  Maybe call the airforce and see what they have going on?
> 
> Seriously though for things like submarines the navy can create an office to look at options, with the expectation that government policy will eventually look to submarine replacement, even if there isn't an replacement direction right now.  They've signaled they want to keep submarines so the RCN will carry on with that line of thinking.
> 
> There is no gov't direction for a big honking ship or rapid deployment of anything aside from SOF/light infantry elements.  So you can't even do an options analysis.
> 
> The death of the BHS was due to a lack of interest from the Army.  Frankly, without them pushing on the project and explaining why they need such a capability it wasn't going to last long.  If the army doesn't want, or think it needs a BHS then they won't push the government for it.  And if they don't push the government the government won't examine that option.


C'mon dude, priorities.


----------



## lenaitch

Kirkhill said:


> So, are you suggesting that a federal subsidy would not only improve availability by adding more hulls, but also improve seaworthiness, safety and comfort?  As well as increased utility?



Possibly; I'm just throwing out thoughts.


Kirkhill said:


> The Norland was a RoRo ferry that operated between Hull and Zeebrugge - roughly 350 km.
> 
> In 1982 she transported 2 Para from Plymouth to San Carlos Water in the Falklands - something like 15,000 km



Yes, but what about ours?  Marine Atlantic operate in more open ocean than the bulk of the BC Ferries fleet.


----------



## Kirkhill

I guess what I am suggesting is adding a new class of ferry to the fleets... Assuming that the existing fleets don't meet requirements


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Just FYI, the link below is to the new US Congressional Budget Office Primer on the US Military's Force Structure for 2021. It has an excellent breakdown of the ORBAT of each of a US ABCT, SBCT and IBCT starting at page 22.
> 
> With respect to the logistic tail that attaches note in particular the tails for the SBCT (the closest thing to our LAV based CMBGs). You'll see at pg 30 that each Rifle company and Battalion HQ have fairly decent support tails included BUT note in particular at page 31 that each battalion is also supported by a Forward Support Company that is part and parcel to the Brigade Support Battalion and that, in addition to an FSC for each battalion in the brigade, the BSB also has a very robust Maintenance Company and Distribution Company.
> 
> As an aside note the following:
> 
> 1) an ABCT has less personnel than an SBCT - 4,040 to 4,680 (ARNG 4,220 to 4,430) - This is in part because tank coys have less people then ABCT rifle coys and because SBCT rifle coys are larger than an ABCT rifle coy (in part because each SBCT rifle coy has two mortar dets.)
> 
> 2) The primer reflects the amended structure of the ABCT with three Combined Arms Bns (two with 2 tank, 1 inf coys and 1 with 1 tank and 2 inf coys) - Note also that it reflects that one of the tank coys removed from the combined arms bns has been put into the Cavalry Squadron creating a more robust cavalry unit)
> 
> 3) Note as well that the primer reflects the amended structure of the SBCTs where the three MGS which had previously been in each rifle coy (for a total of 27 for the brigade) are now gone although twelve of them have been placed into the Cavalry Squadron as a weapons coy.
> 
> 4) Note as well some of the other organizational points:
> 
> a) What we would call the Field ambulance is in the BSB;
> 
> c) The Engr bn has two field coys and also provides administrative management for a bde Sigs Coy and the bde intelligence coy
> 
> 5) ARNG ABCTs are equipped identically to their Active Army counterparts but have about a third of the direct annual cost ($690 mil to $240Mil)
> 
> 6) ARNG SBCTs also ($600mil to $200mil) - There are even less indirect costs and much less overhead for ARNG brigades.
> 
> These are the reasons why I keep saying over and over again that we need to put much, much more of the Army's resources into a restructured, equipped and improved Res F.
> 
> https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-05/57088-Force-Structure-Primer.pdf
> 
> For those of us who like orbat line diagrams, have at it.  😁
> 
> 🍻



Returning to the regularly scheduled broadcast

The wiring diagram for the Stryker Brigade as it existed in 2003 when it made its run into Iraq to relieve the 101st Abn.  It was dragging18x M198s at the time.










						FM 3-21.31 Chapter 1 Overview Of The Stryker Brigade Combat Team
					






					www.globalsecurity.org
				






> The SBCT can be deployed rapidly and can be sustained by an austere support structure for up to 72 hours of independent operations. The SBCT conducts operations against conventional or unconventional enemy forces in all types of terrain and climate conditions and all spectrums of conflict (major theater war [MTW], smaller-scale contingency [SSC], and peacetime military engagement [PME]).














> The brigade support battalion (BSB) performs distribution-based and centralized logistics while providing health service support (HSS) and Class VIII resupply for the brigade. The small size of the battalion significantly minimizes its footprint (Figure 1-12). However, the BSB will maintain enough CSS capability for self-sustained operations for 72 hours of combat operations. The BSB commander also serves on the SBCT commander's special staff. (See FM 4-93.7 for a more detailed discussion of SBCT brigade support battalion capabilities.)



Yes, the Brigade has been modified over the last 20 years.   Yes it has dropped the MGS.   Yes it has beefed up its tail in response to long-term deployment requirements, and, apparently, in preparation for more vehicle casualties being inflicted in a near-peer conflict.  And perhaps that is more reflective of our needs than a rapid deployment Strike brigade.  Do we value speed of response or persistence?  Or even establishing long term garrisons?

But, in 2003, the Brigade was intentionally designed with a short tail to permit a 72 hour fast chase down the grease pencil.  With the short tail the Brigade moved 900 km from ship to objective in 72 hours.

Since then the world has rotated a few times and all the BCTs are being rethought.









						Army’s ground combat center is developing new methods, formations for the next war
					

The job of figuring out where new technological advances, doctrine and tactics meet is at the epicenter of innovations in ground combat — the Maneuver Center of Excellence.




					www.armytimes.com
				




The Stryker BCT is getting particular consideration and might be applicable to Canada.   Self Propelled Howitzers and HIMARS?  EW?  Drones?









						Big changes coming to Army Stryker brigades
					

From more artillery to electronic warfare and engineers, the formation will change.




					www.armytimes.com
				







Just a final point about Canadian Echelons

Why did the Army find it necessary to commit the same echelon structure to its Light Battalions as it did to its Medium Battalions in Force 2013?

I thought we were short of trades people?  Why would you add them to units that don't need them and just slow the units down?   Why wouldn't you keep those scarce resources for the units that would most benefit from them?


----------



## Kirkhill

From a 2014 exercise at NTC - Stryker employed as a Troop Carrier and not a Fighting Vehicle.









						Stryker crews find ways to defeat armored enemy
					

Joint Base Lewis-McChord’s 19-ton Stryker vehicles made their mark early in the Iraq War as speedy “tactical taxis” hauling soldiers to hot spots a couple years after they started coming off the assembly line.



					www.stripes.com


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Infanteer said:


> Compare that to this.
> 
> View attachment 65327
> 
> The CAF needs to determine how to function as an "inside force" (to steal a phrase from the USMC).  Sailing a surface warship into all that red doesn't strike me as an optimal way to do so.


Age old proverb of Naval Warfare that is still applicable today:

"A Ship's a fool to fight a fort"

Sailing a flotilla of CSCs anywhere in to what are basically littoral waters, is a recipe for disaster in a full fledged war.  The Bear would sink us faster than you can snap your fingers.

As for developing an Amphibious Capability....

Waste of money IMO.  What we could use though is an actual JSS like the Karel Doorman that could be used for Commando Actions, HADR, NEO, etc.

Something that is capable of carrying additional supplies, supporting a SOTF, acting as a C2 Platform, carrying a couple of Chinooks, etc.  Give it some ice-breaking capability and we could even use it up North.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Just a quick reminder of where China is investing most. 

I know we keep focusing on SE Asian bodies of water but we'll need to look at an Indian Ocean/ South Atlantic strategy too, methinks.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> From a 2014 exercise at NTC - Stryker employed as a Troop Carrier and not a Fighting Vehicle.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Stryker crews find ways to defeat armored enemy
> 
> 
> Joint Base Lewis-McChord’s 19-ton Stryker vehicles made their mark early in the Iraq War as speedy “tactical taxis” hauling soldiers to hot spots a couple years after they started coming off the assembly line.
> 
> 
> 
> www.stripes.com



There is indeed a difference between a Stryker and a LAV 6 due to the weapons system. Its been that way since the US went with the SBCT. Our CMBG has a number of differences. We have, in theory, tanks. They have TOW and Javelin. Their TOW and Javelin make their infantry at least able to Block or Retain. I was with the US Army as a Canadian officer for six months back in 98: from NTC experience they considered a 2km circle of anti-tank death around their infantry platoons due to the integral Javelin. 

One of the assumptions of FORCE 2025 is that we continue to be a LAV6 based army, so I don't think that pulling the turrets off is on the table. I do hope that ALAWS (Javelin equivalent) makes it into the capabilities. We need it whatever level we operate. Going back to get TUA will look odd considering we junked the brand new LAV TUA that we purchased in the mid-2000s...Almost as bad as we will look asking for tanks again if we get rid of them again.


----------



## dapaterson

One thing to remember: capabilities that are relatively easy to obtain and train (ALAWS) will normally be a lower priority outside operations than more complex to obtain, integrate and train pieces (GBAD).   It's less than ideal, but departmental capacity to execute acquisition is limited, so triage and prioritization is necessary.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> There is indeed a difference between a Stryker and a LAV 6 due to the weapons system. Its been that way since the US went with the SBCT. Our CMBG has a number of differences. We have, in theory, tanks. They have TOW and Javelin. Their TOW and Javelin make their infantry at least able to Block or Retain. I was with the US Army as a Canadian officer for six months back in 98: from NTC experience they considered a 2km circle of anti-tank death around their infantry platoons due to the integral Javelin.
> 
> One of the assumptions of FORCE 2025 is that we continue to be a LAV6 based army, so I don't think that pulling the turrets off is on the table. I do hope that ALAWS (Javelin equivalent) makes it into the capabilities. We need it whatever level we operate. Going back to get TUA will look odd considering we junked the brand new LAV TUA that we purchased in the mid-2000s...Almost as bad as we will look asking for tanks again if we get rid of them again.



Well, we replaced cheap, lightweight and reliable waterproof rain gear with expensive, heavy rain gear of dubious quality.

So anything is possible


----------



## Infanteer

Humphrey Bogart said:


> Waste of money IMO.  What we could use though is an actual JSS like the Karel Doorman that could be used for Commando Actions, HADR, NEO, etc.
> 
> Something that is capable of carrying additional supplies, supporting a SOTF, acting as a C2 Platform, carrying a couple of Chinooks, etc.  Give it some ice-breaking capability and we could even use it up North.


Agreed.  Even the USMC, or many in it, see the big ships that compose the ARG as "exquisite capability."

Something like you said is on the money.  Stick a box with missiles on it, and add the capability to dispatch self-guided floating platforms for landing reusable rockets (a la SpaceX) that can be launched and recovered from around the world, and you have a real 21st-century interconnected naval platform.


----------



## dapaterson

Unless there's an awning to provide shelter from the sun and rain for cocktails in foreign ports, I don't think the RCN is interested.


----------



## Underway

Humphrey Bogart said:


> Age old proverb of Naval Warfare that is still applicable today:
> 
> "A Ship's a fool to fight a fort"
> 
> Sailing a flotilla of CSCs anywhere in to what are basically littoral waters, is a recipe for disaster in a full fledged war.  The Bear would sink us faster than you can snap your fingers.
> 
> As for developing an Amphibious Capability....
> 
> Waste of money IMO.  What we could use though is an actual JSS like the Karel Doorman that could be used for Commando Actions, HADR, NEO, etc.
> 
> Something that is capable of carrying additional supplies, supporting a SOTF, acting as a C2 Platform, carrying a couple of Chinooks, etc.  Give it some ice-breaking capability and we could even use it up North.


That's sea denial and why Russia invests so heavily in submarines, fast missile boats, and aircraft, which push those denial zones further away from their coast.

Any naval action would first have to clear those obstacles and then push past the shore based defences somehow.  Ideally, you degrade their ability to sense.  This is why the Swedes are very much into their fast stealthy corvettes as the Baltics are basically a Russian lake.

That's likely one of the reasons the Baltic states have NATO deployed there.  Reinforcing them by sea instead could be very difficult.


As for the additional supplies and C2 platform... JSS and to a less extent AOPS have been designed with that flexibility.  Not that I would risk an AOR in a truly hot spot.


dapaterson said:


> Unless there's an awning to provide shelter from the sun and rain for cocktails in foreign ports, I don't think the RCN is interested.


Hey, we earned those cocktails after running the edge of a hurricane all the way to the Med  .  Had to rehydrate  🍸.  It took 6 months before we had recovered enough to come home.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> There is indeed a difference between a Stryker and a LAV 6 due to the weapons system. Its been that way since the US went with the SBCT. Our CMBG has a number of differences. We have, in theory, tanks. They have TOW and Javelin. Their TOW and Javelin make their infantry at least able to Block or Retain. I was with the US Army as a Canadian officer for six months back in 98: from NTC experience they considered a 2km circle of anti-tank death around their infantry platoons due to the integral Javelin.
> 
> One of the assumptions of FORCE 2025 is that we continue to be a LAV6 based army, so I don't think that pulling the turrets off is on the table. I do hope that ALAWS (Javelin equivalent) makes it into the capabilities. We need it whatever level we operate. Going back to get TUA will look odd considering we junked the brand new LAV TUA that we purchased in the mid-2000s...Almost as bad as we will look asking for tanks again if we get rid of them again.




I don't know if anybody else is suggesting it, but I'm certainly not.   We have turreted vehicles.  I am not proposing getting rid of the turrets.  No more than I am suggesting we get rid of the tanks we have.


I am saying that we should be investing in the ALAWS capability despite DAP's experienced observation.



dapaterson said:


> One thing to remember: capabilities that are relatively easy to obtain and train (ALAWS) will normally be a lower priority outside operations than more complex to obtain, integrate and train pieces (GBAD).   It's less than ideal, but departmental capacity to execute acquisition is limited, so triage and prioritization is necessary.



Or is this all of a kind with not having transport on hand.

Are we going to continue to live without a rapid reaction capability and design our army to be a second or third wave persistent presence?  An Army where we will always have time to replace our Itis's with RG-31s before deploying?  And an army that will only deploy where we don't need ATGMs and Air Defence systems?

And as for sailing into the Baltic - I would prefer to stand off from the Baltic and fire into it to reduce the fortresses from 1700 km away.

For the record, the fortress of Quebec was taken by sailing up to it.


----------



## Underway

TangoTwoBravo said:


> There is indeed a difference between a Stryker and a LAV 6 due to the weapons system. Its been that way since the US went with the SBCT. Our CMBG has a number of differences. We have, in theory, tanks. They have TOW and Javelin. Their TOW and Javelin make their infantry at least able to Block or Retain. I was with the US Army as a Canadian officer for six months back in 98: from NTC experience they considered a 2km circle of anti-tank death around their infantry platoons due to the integral Javelin.
> 
> One of the assumptions of FORCE 2025 is that we continue to be a LAV6 based army, so I don't think that pulling the turrets off is on the table. I do hope that ALAWS (Javelin equivalent) makes it into the capabilities. We need it whatever level we operate. Going back to get TUA will look odd considering we junked the brand new LAV TUA that we purchased in the mid-2000s...Almost as bad as we will look asking for tanks again if we get rid of them again.


Some questions.  Isn't the LAV 6 heavier than the current Strykers because of armour differences?  Does that change how we use them?

Secondly do tanks not reduce the strategic mobility of the CMBG as everything else is wheeled.  Does that combined with the LAV armour improvements make a CMBG a heavier formation than a SBCT or is that dependant on all the other effectors an SBCT has that we don't?


----------



## suffolkowner

Underway said:


> Some questions.  Isn't the LAV 6 heavier than the current Strykers because of armour differences?  Does that change how we use them?
> 
> Secondly do tanks not reduce the strategic mobility of the CMBG as everything else is wheeled.  Does that combined with the LAV armour improvements make a CMBG a heavier formation than a SBCT or is that dependant on all the other effectors an SBCT has that we don't?


I don't know what the actual differences are between the Piranha line vs LAV 700 vs LAV 6 vs LAV 3 is but the difference between a Boxer and the ASLAV is quite striking. In the middle LAV3 vs Piranha. And on the right Bison vs ACSVLAV6


----------



## Infanteer

Underway said:


> Some questions.  Isn't the LAV 6 heavier than the current Strykers because of armour differences?  Does that change how we use them?


It's an entirely new hull, suspension, and powerpack.  All that adds up.



> Secondly do tanks not reduce the strategic mobility of the CMBG as everything else is wheeled.  Does that combined with the LAV armour improvements make a CMBG a heavier formation than a SBCT or is that dependant on all the other effectors an SBCT has that we don't?



"Strategic mobility" is generally used to refer to the ability of a force to be deployed in and out of theatre.  A frigate possess a high degree of strategic mobility as it can sail into the South China Sea, sail right back out, and be in the Gulf fairly quickly, with a limited cost in terms of resources (essentially, the gas it burns to get there).

The Stryker Brigade was originally envisioned as a strategically mobile formation.  Something that could be fit on C-17s and C-130s and be flown into a theatre for quick effect - the stated goal was 96 hours.  Vision never really made it to reality though.  The Strykers are too large and heavy.  RAND did a study and found that the deployment time was generally 2-3 weeks, and that this would consume a lot of C-17s (not C-130s) to make it happen.

In the CAF context, tanks will not significantly affect the strategically mobility of a CMBG as a CMBG is not inherently strategically mobile.  We don't have the capacity in our air transport fleet to move a significant land force element.  If I recall correctly (a loadie can sort me out) you can get 1x MBT on a C-17, and 2x LAVs on a C-17, so you ain't getting much forward deployed very fast.  The most effective way is to move by ship, but when it comes to a large transport ship, the difference between an MBT and LAV is negligible.

Now the argument has been shifted to arguing for the LAV/Strykers "operational mobility."  This is viewed as the ability of a force to move around once in theatre.  The common "inflection point" that is often cited is Kosovo in 1999, where heavy tracked NATO forces were busy offloading and plodding towards Pristina only to find that the wheeled BTRs of the Russians had beat them to the city.  A Stryker Brigade was supposed to offer a double whammy of strategic and operational mobility; it could get to the theatre fast and move around quickly.  It only is able to live up to the latter (for good examples of this, see the actions of US 2 Cavalry Regiment, a SBCT, moving about Europe in the last few years as part of NATO deterrence).

A CMBG with tanks will lose that inherent mobility as tanks can't move far on their own before suffering maintenance issues.  This is why transporters are usually used to operational transport MBTs.


----------



## MilEME09

Underway said:


> Secondly do tanks not reduce the strategic mobility of the CMBG as everything else is wheeled.  Does that combined with the LAV armour improvements make a CMBG a heavier formation than a SBCT or is that dependant on all the other effectors an SBCT has that we don't?


That would depend how we employ our tanks?, given our small tank force I'd see them as a solar head formation to open up the enemy lines for the LAV forces to exploit.


----------



## Underway

Infanteer said:


> In the CAF context, tanks will not significantly affect the strategically mobility of a CMBG as a CMBG is not inherently strategically mobile.  We don't have the capacity in our air transport fleet to move a significant land force element.  If I recall correctly (a loadie can sort me out) you can get 1x MBT on a C-17, and 2x LAVs on a C-17, so you ain't getting much forward deployed very fast.  The most effective way is to move by ship, but when it comes to a large transport ship, the difference between an MBT and LAV is negligible.
> 
> Now the argument has been shifted to arguing for the LAV/Strykers "operational mobility."  This is viewed as the ability of a force to move around once in theatre.  The common "inflection point" that is often cited is Kosovo in 1999, where heavy tracked NATO forces were busy offloading and plodding towards Pristina only to find that the wheeled BTRs of the Russians had beat them to the city.  A Stryker Brigade was supposed to offer a double whammy of strategic and operational mobility; it could get to the theatre fast and move around quickly.  It only is able to live up to the latter (for good examples of this, see the actions of US 2 Cavalry Regiment, a SBCT, moving about Europe in the last few years as part of NATO deterrence).
> 
> A CMBG with tanks will lose that inherent mobility as tanks can't move far on their own before suffering maintenance issues.  This is why transporters are usually used to operational transport MBTs.


So is the addition of tanks to a CMBG worth losing that operational mobility then? Or is this a case of best/worst of both worlds.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:


> Agreed.  Even the USMC, or many in it, see the big ships that compose the ARG as "exquisite capability."
> 
> Something like you said is on the money.  Stick a box with missiles on it, and add the capability to dispatch self-guided floating platforms for landing reusable rockets (a la SpaceX) that can be launched and recovered from around the world, and you have a real 21st-century interconnected naval platform.





Infanteer said:


> It's an entirely new hull, suspension, and powerpack.  All that adds up.
> 
> 
> 
> "Strategic mobility" is generally used to refer to the ability of a force to be deployed in and out of theatre.  A frigate possess a high degree of strategic mobility as it can sail into the South China Sea, sail right back out, and be in the Gulf fairly quickly, with a limited cost in terms of resources (essentially, the gas it burns to get there).
> 
> The Stryker Brigade was originally envisioned as a strategically mobile formation.  Something that could be fit on C-17s and C-130s and be flown into a theatre for quick effect - the stated goal was 96 hours.  Vision never really made it to reality though.  The Strykers are too large and heavy.  RAND did a study and found that the deployment time was generally 2-3 weeks, and that this would consume a lot of C-17s (not C-130s) to make it happen.
> 
> In the CAF context, tanks will not significantly affect the strategically mobility of a CMBG as a CMBG is not inherently strategically mobile.  We don't have the capacity in our air transport fleet to move a significant land force element.  If I recall correctly (a loadie can sort me out) you can get 1x MBT on a C-17, and 2x LAVs on a C-17, so you ain't getting much forward deployed very fast.  The most effective way is to move by ship, but when it comes to a large transport ship, the difference between an MBT and LAV is negligible.
> 
> Now the argument has been shifted to arguing for the LAV/Strykers "operational mobility."  This is viewed as the ability of a force to move around once in theatre.  The common "inflection point" that is often cited is Kosovo in 1999, where heavy tracked NATO forces were busy offloading and plodding towards Pristina only to find that the wheeled BTRs of the Russians had beat them to the city.  A Stryker Brigade was supposed to offer a double whammy of strategic and operational mobility; it could get to the theatre fast and move around quickly.  It only is able to live up to the latter (for good examples of this, see the actions of US 2 Cavalry Regiment, a SBCT, moving about Europe in the last few years as part of NATO deterrence).
> 
> A CMBG with tanks will lose that inherent mobility as tanks can't move far on their own before suffering maintenance issues.  This is why transporters are usually used to operational transport MBTs.



How about a 'light formation' with airportable tanks/ MPF? 

Light tank prototypes arrive at Fort Bragg for soldier evaluation​
BAE’s MPF prototype can be transported via a C-130 aircraft. Three can fit on a C-17 aircraft. The Army is requiring the vehicle be C-17 transportable.









						Light tank prototypes arrive at Fort Bragg for soldier evaluation
					

Mobile Protected Firepower prototypes will be put through the paces with the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, at the start of the new year.




					www.defensenews.com


----------



## Infanteer

daftandbarmy said:


> How about a 'light formation' with airportable tanks/ MPF?


That's been a mirage for decades now.  The US has tried multiple iterations of a light armour deployable formation in many different iterations.  The 9th ID (Test) was stood up in Fort Lewis in the 1980s as a concept formation for such a force.

The French seemed to have some success in getting a wheeled force into Mali for Op SERVAL, but these were older lighter vehicles that are all being phased out for newer, heavier platforms so I'm not sure they could repeat this.


----------



## McG

A good chunk of SERVAL was deployed by ship and then drove for several days to catch-up to the fight.


----------



## Infanteer

Underway said:


> So is the addition of tanks to a CMBG worth losing that operational mobility then? Or is this a case of best/worst of both worlds.


Main battle tanks offer an unparalleled level of tactical mobility (moving around the battlefield) combined with firepower and protection.  Despite sensationalist claims by "analysts" that the tank is dead and the UAV will rule the world, the proof of the enduring value of the MBT is evident in a review of conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), Gaza (2008), Syria (2011), and Ukraine (2014).

So, the question for all the budding Force Developers here is "do I need unparalleled tactical mobility, firepower, and protection in the face of a regular adversary" or "does the nature of the adversary permit me to forego this capability to enhance my operational mobility and reduce (somewhat) my logistical trail?"


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

The Russians were also moving through friendly territory - allowed for a certain risk acceptance.


----------



## Infanteer

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The Russians were also moving through friendly territory - allowed for a certain risk acceptance.


Shhh....don't spoil a good narrative.  

....and let's not talk about Grozny....


----------



## Weinie

Infanteer said:


> Main battle tanks offer an unparalleled level of tactical mobility (moving around the battlefield) combined with firepower and protection.  Despite sensationalist claims by "analysts" that the tank is dead and the UAV will rule the world, the proof of the enduring value of the MBT is evident in a review of conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), Gaza (2008), Syria (2011), and Ukraine (2014).
> 
> So, the question for all the budding Force Developers here is "do I need unparalleled tactical mobility, firepower, and protection in the face of a regular adversary" or "does the nature of the adversary permit me to forego this capability to enhance my operational mobility and reduce (somewhat) my logistical trail?"


Yup. But does the fact that our MBT's, as capable as they are, will likely not arrive in time to make a difference, necessitate a re-think of where the CAF can push capability?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Weinie said:


> Yup. But does the fact that our MBT's, as capable as they are, will likely not arrive in time to make a difference, necessitate a re-think of where the CAF can push capability?


What is “in time?” How do you think that LAVs are getting to the theatre of operations?


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> What is “in time?” How do you think that LAVs are getting to the theatre of operations?



Judging from current efforts "in time" is more than four years before engagement.   The ePF stood up in Latvia in 2017.   An earlier force was deployed in Poland in 2014.


----------



## Weinie

TangoTwoBravo said:


> What is “in time?” How do you think that LAVs are getting to the theatre of operations?


And you just added another "failure" in our COA. What do we bring, legitimately, and more importantly, expeditiously, to the fight?


----------



## Infanteer

TangoTwoBravo said:


> What is “in time?” How do you think that LAVs are getting to the theatre of operations?


This.

A tank and a LAV will take the same amount of time to project from Canada.  There are factors that differentiate the value proposition of each of the two platforms, but deployability ain't one of them.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> Judging from current efforts "in time" is more than four years before engagement.   The ePF stood up in Latvia in 2017.   An earlier force was deployed in Poland in 2014.


When was the decision made on the EFP? When was the multinational structure hammered out? I am asking rhetorically of course. The weight of the vehicles had nothing to do with it. Moving a BG with Leopards to Europe is the same time as a BG with LAVs. 

Yes - we can put an infantry company without equipment into Europe quite quickly as was done. So?


----------



## Underway

Infanteer said:


> Main battle tanks offer an unparalleled level of tactical mobility (moving around the battlefield) combined with firepower and protection.  Despite sensationalist claims by "analysts" that the tank is dead and the UAV will rule the world, the proof of the enduring value of the MBT is evident in a review of conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), Gaza (2008), Syria (2011), and Ukraine (2014).
> 
> So, the question for all the budding Force Developers here is "do I need unparalleled tactical mobility, firepower, and protection in the face of a regular adversary" or "does the nature of the adversary permit me to forego this capability to enhance my operational mobility and reduce (somewhat) my logistical trail?"


So basically this article here covers much of what you are getting at.

No, Drones Haven’t Made Tanks Obsolete

So as a budding "Force Developer" (land side... I got naval stuff cased, I'm sure I'll be promoted in no time...   )the balance given the threat is off.

Proper air defence to keep UAV's at range and shield your force from easy artillery wins or flying IED's for the enemy may be the critical component here.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Main battle tanks offer an unparalleled level of tactical mobility (moving around the battlefield) combined with firepower and protection.  Despite sensationalist claims by "analysts" that the tank is dead and the UAV will rule the world, the proof of the enduring value of the MBT is evident in a review of conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), Gaza (2008), Syria (2011), and Ukraine (2014).
> 
> So, the question for all the budding Force Developers here is "do I need unparalleled tactical mobility, firepower, and protection in the face of a regular adversary" or "does the nature of the adversary permit me to forego this capability to enhance my operational mobility and reduce (somewhat) my logistical trail?"



Where we used to count tanks in the thousands we now count them in the 10s and 100s.    The only country that can honestly talk about having thousands of tanks on hand is the US.

Russia has: 

20x T14 Armata (2016)
350x T90 (1992)
450x T80 (1976)
2000x T72 (1973)

To be fair it has many more in storage.  How many runners?  

The world's armies aren't building Tank Armies anymore.  They are deploying squadrons and regiments.  20 to 100.

Certainly tanks have their tactical uses.  But does anyone see tanks dominating the way they did in WW2?  Or even Gulf War 1?  

And before anyone says "Israel" - the country is small and benefits from interior lines of communication.  The tanks effectively shuttle around inside Fortress Israel.  They are not part of an expeditionary army.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> So basically this article here covers much of what you are getting at.
> 
> No, Drones Haven’t Made Tanks Obsolete
> 
> So as a budding "Force Developer" (land side... I got naval stuff cased, I'm sure I'll be promoted in no time...   )the balance given the threat is off.
> 
> Proper air defence to keep UAV's at range and shield your force from easy artillery wins or flying IED's for the enemy may be the critical component here.



I'll give the author of the Drone article the bad training.  But not the terrain.  The terrain was open country.  The very country that tank commanders used to dream about.   Now they seem to be arguing for the Ardennes and the Bocage as ideal tank terrain.   True if in defence.


----------



## Infanteer

Weinie said:


> And you just added another "failure" in our COA. What do we bring, legitimately, and more importantly, expeditiously, to the fight?


And this gets to the heart of what I feel is a fundamental weakness of capability-based planning.  Asking "how might we be threatened" can deliver a capability that can never realistically be used.  A threat based planning model that asks "who is threatening us and where" forces us to realistically consider how we could fight and win with tools and structures being proposed.

Fighting it out in fake land-locked countries on a mythical continent may cut it for staff college, but it doesn't cut the mustard when considering real problems for force design.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Weinie said:


> And you just added another "failure" in our COA. What do we bring, legitimately, and more importantly, expeditiously, to the fight?


Not tracking. Which failure?

The transit time to a theatre will simply be a planning factor. It will take the time it will take.


----------



## Weinie

TangoTwoBravo said:


> When was the decision made on the EFP? When was the multinational structure hammered out? I am asking rhetorically of course. The weight of the vehicles had nothing to do with it. Moving a BG with Leopards to Europe is the same time as a BG with LAVs.
> 
> Yes - we can put an infantry company without equipment into Europe quite quickly as was done. So?





TangoTwoBravo said:


> Attach files
> Not tracking. Which failure?
> 
> The transit time to a theatre will simply be a planning factor. It will take the time it will take.


See Infanteer's response above. He got it


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Certainly tanks have their tactical uses.  But does anyone see tanks dominating the way they did in WW2?  Or even Gulf War 1?


Tanks only have tactical use.  They did not dominate in WW2, nor in the Gulf War.  Mechanized combined arms formations did in those conflicts, of which a tank is only a single component.  The distinction is important, and I can see a combined arms formation exerting the same level of dominance as it has in previous conflicts.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Weinie said:


> See Infanteer's response above. He got it


Which COA are you referring to? Humor me.


----------



## Brad Sallows

The most effective use of tank-heavy forces (which actually means about 1:2 tank:infantry units) is pursuit and exploitation, or contra same.  It's wasteful to employ them as assault/breaching or defensive formations.  Administrative operational mobility has always been by transport.  Canada does not (and for the foreseeable future will not) have tank formations.   The case for our tanks is to hold the advantage in unfair fights during the operations in which we participate.  Like everything else, we need more on hand than we actually deploy.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Infanteer said:


> And this gets to the heart of what I feel is a fundamental weakness of capability-based planning.  Asking "how might we be threatened" can deliver a capability that can never realistically be used.  A threat based planning model that asks "who is threatening us and where" forces us to realistically consider how we could fight and win with tools and structures being proposed.
> 
> Fighting it out in fake land-locked countries on a mythical continent may cut it for staff college, but it doesn't cut the mustard when considering real problems for force design.


I guess the trick is seeing into the future 5 to 20 years. But yes, we should start with a realistic assessment of where we would be fighting as opposed to a DATE scenario.


----------



## Weinie

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Which COA are you referring to? Humor me.


Any course of action where Canada is going to be able to effectively contribute a timely force. We ain't talking Gulf War buildup, I am referring to European/Baltic scenarios that will likely be resolved before we can even incorporate/comprehend the Strat sit,


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Weinie said:


> Any course of action where Canada is going to be able to effectively contribute a timely force. We ain't talking Gulf War buildup, I am referring to European/Baltic scenarios that will likely be resolved before we can even incorporate/comprehend the Strat sit,





Weinie said:


> Any course of action where Canada is going to be able to effectively contribute a timely force. We ain't talking Gulf War buildup, I am referring to European/Baltic scenarios that will likely be resolved before we can even incorporate/comprehend the Strat sit,


Ok - I’ve been part of a couple of high level exercises in this context. Some virtual, one live. 

How do you think US heavy forces would get to Europe? 

The transatlantic bond takes some effort. It’s a planning factor.


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> And this gets to the heart of what I feel is a fundamental weakness of capability-based planning.  Asking "how might we be threatened" can deliver a capability that can never realistically be used.  A threat based planning model that asks "who is threatening us and where" forces us to realistically consider how we could fight and win with tools and structures being proposed.
> 
> Fighting it out in fake land-locked countries on a mythical continent may cut it for staff college, but it doesn't cut the mustard when considering real problems for force design.


For me that is the heart of the question. This tends to get me back to Ian Hope's article "Misunderstanding Mars and Minerva: The Canadian Army's Failure to Define an Operational Doctrine" written some 20 years ago as he was analyzing the road to transformation that we had embarked on then. I think since then we've gone even further down the rabbit hole.

By having created an agile, modular force where the mass of the Army is relegated simply to force generation roles and our force employer elements are crafted on an as required basis with lengthy periods to cobble together the various disparate elements we are simply conflating the question of "where will we need to fight?" with the questions of "where will we choose to go?"  

Expecting the government to tell us that without first educating them heavily in the options, is unrealistic. And, obviously, before we can educate anyone we will need to have first run a very detailed analysis.

For me the rough analysis is that at some point the Army may need to fight (and definitely needs to present a very credible deterrent force in theatre) in Europe and we should firstly develop an overarching doctrine for that. Secondly we may choose to go into lesser, more touchy-feely situations where the anticipated level of conflict may be harsh but isn't a threat to our national security. That force might be more tailored and specifically trained but should also in this day and age be capable of protecting itself robustly.

Am I ignoring China. Yes, for the time being. We are neither threatened heavily by them nor in alliances that might mandate our presence there. On top of that much of the doctrine for dealing with China should mirror that for Europe (albeit elements might vary). If we can get our doctrine right for Europe it should be mostly transferable to China. 

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Underway said:


> Some questions.  Isn't the LAV 6 heavier than the current Strykers because of armour differences?  Does that change how we use them?
> 
> Secondly do tanks not reduce the strategic mobility of the CMBG as everything else is wheeled.  Does that combined with the LAV armour improvements make a CMBG a heavier formation than a SBCT or is that dependant on all the other effectors an SBCT has that we don't?


Armour, Hull, but mostly the turret and weapon system. We operate them differently than the US uses Strykers because they bring different capabilities to the fight. A LAV 6 can engage and destroy the En IFV's where as a Stryker realistically cannot, so the risk of moving it up to fire isn't worth it. It will be interesting to see how that changes with the new 30mm equipped Strykers, both the Dragoon and it's newer cousin.



There's been some discussion about ALAWS, but that's wrapped up in the Light Force Enhancement Project is it not? Will that procurement be in numbers that could see all our infantry equipped with Spike / Javelin / MMP / NLAWS / what ever?


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> There's been some discussion about ALAWS, but that's wrapped up in the Light Force Enhancement Project is it not?


Not anymore.  IIRC, the Light Force Enhancement Project was broken down from an omnibus project to one that simply looked at light transport (the UTVs).


----------



## dapaterson

Which should be shut down completely, and rolled into LVM or LUV, not a small bespoke fleet driving up sustainment cost and complexity.


----------



## McG




----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> Not anymore.  IIRC, the Light Force Enhancement Project was broken down from an omnibus project to one that simply looked at light transport (the UTVs).


Cheers, I was just going off what I saw on the govt projects page. As long as it's following that 2027 ish time line I'm happy to hear it, given TOW's replacement is slated for the 2030s.


----------



## Underway

Given that a CMBG has tanks, was this the excuse/reason to not move forward on an ALAWS capability? STBG as stated earlier have plenty of methods to deal with armour using Javelin etc..., but didn't have a 25mm turret on their LAV's nor tanks attached to their formations.

Was Canada using our vehicles as the anti-armour solution?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Underway said:


> Given that a CMBG has tanks, was this the excuse/reason to not move forward on an ALAWS capability? STBG as stated earlier have plenty of methods to deal with armour using Javelin etc..., but didn't have a 25mm turret on their LAV's nor tanks attached to their formations.
> 
> Was Canada using our vehicles as the anti-armour solution?


I am not a DLR insider, but much of the Canadian Army you see today is because of Kandahar. The irony is that the Taliban saved our tank capability and killed our anti-tank capability. They also finished off our GBAD. I am simplifying, but there it is. They also gave us back our Chinook capability. 

To your question, some might look at the Canadian Army and say:  "you have Leopard 2A6M with arguably the best tank cannon in the world. What do you need anti-armour for?" At Capability Experiment 10 (back in 2011), the BG that I was a part of did an exercise in JCATS/VBS with anticipated capabilities of 2020. Because the infantry had no real anti-tank capability the Leopard squadron was split up and given to the infantry companies to protect them. Led to defeat in detail. One of the take-aways was the need for integral anti-armour in the infantry. 

I am not sure what keeps holding it up. ALAWS (or whatever we decide to call it) wouldn't even need new structures or organizations.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Given that a CMBG has tanks, was this the excuse/reason to not move forward on an ALAWS capability? STBG as stated earlier have plenty of methods to deal with armour using Javelin etc..., but didn't have a 25mm turret on their LAV's nor tanks attached to their formations.
> 
> Was Canada using our vehicles as the anti-armour solution?



Kind of like we don't need mortars and HMGs because we have the C16 GMGs.  We don't need Javelins because we have the Carl G and the tanks.

Well, if the tanks are replacements for the Javelins then we need them allocated to replace the Javelins, or the MGS or the Stryker Brigades.  If we are going to concentrate them and hold them in reserve for the counter punch, or the pursuit, then what do we use in their place at the battalion level?  I recall that the Horse Cavalry was held in reserve precisely for that exploitation role for 3 years in Flanders during WWI. 




dapaterson said:


> Which should be shut down completely, and rolled into LVM or LUV, not a small bespoke fleet driving up sustainment cost and complexity.




The LVM (Light) is calling for 1000 to 1500 unarmoured expeditionary vehicles with 3 tonne payload and 400 to 600 unarmoured domestic vehicles with the equivalent payload.  To my eye that looks a lot like a replacement for the MLVW (or the old deuce and a half) instead of the LSVW.

The LUV programme is calling for the delivery of up to 3000 vehicles to replace the G-Wagons and the Milverados. (8000 km per year, 60% on highways, 20% on gravel, 20% cross country)

The Light Force Enhancement  - Tactical Mobility Platform  is calling for 330 CH-147 transportable vehicles.

In the last couple of years the gap between the LUV and the TMP has been narrowed by the US Army's adoption of the Infantry Squad Vehicle - a chopped and channeled Milverado.

Perhaps those two projects could end up being one after all but I don't know that the ISV could realistically be described as a UTV.  At the same time I think it is going to be hard to find a UTV that can keep up with the LAVs on the highway.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> If we can get our doctrine right for Europe it should be mostly transferable to China.



"Never fight a land war in Asia."  Or east of the Vistula.  Design accordingly.


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile RUSI offers some insight into UAVs and tanks.

What is on "The other side of the hill"?  That has been the age old question (Jerry Potts's answer to Commissioner MacLeod of the NWMP was the classic: "Nudder hill").   The take from the RUSI is that there are no more hills.   There are so many eyes in the sky,  that the hills have disappeared.  There is no more concealment, much less cover.  And even field craft is not enough to cover the new gap.









						Your Tanks Cannot Hide
					

Massed Turkish drone and artillery strikes against Syrian tanks and armoured vehicles have major implications for the viability of traditional armoured manoeuvre warfare on the modern battlefield.




					rusi.org
				













						The Key to Armenia’s Tank Losses: The Sensors, Not the Shooters
					

Amid a lively debate about the viability of the UK’s heavy armour, the loss of over 42 Armenian T-72s to Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh requires further analysis., Despite the heavy Armenian armoured losses, the key lessons from the videos Azerbaijan has published online are not about...




					rusi.org
				













						Drones and missiles tilt war with Armenia in Azerbaijan’s favour
					

,




					www.rusi.org
				





A couple of comments stood out




> There is a tendency for Western soldiers to dismiss what can be learned from these incidents because the videos show limited tactical proficiency being displayed by Armenian troops. This is misguided for several reasons. The snippet videos usually show armour manoeuvring, when camouflage is hard to maintain, and which Western forces would equally have to do if they were to affect the outcome of battle. The videos have also been selected as examples of Azerbaijani successes. However, there is actually a lot of evidence of Armenian forces digging in, concealing positions, and deploying decoys, of which at least two were struck by Azerbaijani forces.
> 
> More importantly, this dismissal of evidence suggests a lack of appreciation of just how naked the modern battlefield has become.





> To conclude from this that the tank’s days are numbered, however, is a serious error. From the videos in Nagorno-Karabakh it is evident that unarmoured vehicles and dismounted infantry are faring no better, even those dug into positions with camouflage screens. Indeed, the lack of protection means they will likely fare worse since there are more kinds of munitions that are lighter and easier to employ that can kill them.
> 
> Besides the vulnerability of other kinds of vehicle, the ability to inflict persistent attrition upon an adversary at reach does not change the fact that land warfare is about taking and holding ground, and the ground will still ultimately need to be assaulted. Once committed to an assault on defended positions, armour remains critical to rapid success with acceptable losses. The challenge is to get a combined arms formation within striking distance without it having suffered heavy losses before entering the direct fire zone. Armenia, for instance, has lost the equivalent number of tanks to more than a third of the UK’s heavy armour inventory.






> The ubiquitous availability of highly attritable and high-fidelity surveillance and reconnaissance assets, from electronic and multispectral sensing, to video feeds from UAVs, leaves little room to hide. Modern camouflage designed to reduce the electromagnetic signature beyond the visible spectrum can render armored vehicles less obvious to passive surveillance, but generally fall short of concealing vehicles from more determined observation. Turkey’s domestically produced Bayraktar and Anka UAVs had little difficulty in picking out Syrian armour amidst Idlib’s sparse terrain, and then following their movements. Once found, vehicles can also be targeted by increasingly precise and tailored munitions, whether delivered by the UAV, or from afar.
> 
> It is fair to say that Western armies have to a large extent been in denial about the impact of these capabilities. Awaiting a revolution in swarm technology and AI, Western forces have largely overlooked the fact that it is the density of sensors that is decisively reshaping the battlefield. Of course, much criticism can be leveled at the Syrian forces for their poor vehicle handling, lack of camouflage, and tendency to bunch up in targetable laagers. However extensive testing in the US and UK has consistently shown that Western vehicles are not much harder to find. The deep and unmistakable tracks that armoured vehicles cut in the ground leave a trail that UAVs can follow, and the fishhook turn leaves little doubt as to which woodblock the vehicle has entered, even if it has subsequently set up multi-spectral screens and camouflage.
> 
> Given the range and endurance of modern ISR capabilities, and the distance that armoured forces must traverse under threat before actually coming into the direct fire zone, it must be doubted whether existing concepts of armoured manoeuvre will remain viable, as armoured units face persistent attrition before ever they reach an adversary ground formation.




The suggestions, broadly, are that while Western Armies seek the perfect eye in the sky the enemy is launching hundreds of airborne cellphones.

Those cellphones have stripped the cover from the field and left the advance naked.  The modern tactician can no longer count on finding an off-route covered approach.  Cross country moves are now easier to detect than road moves - they leave tracks that are observable.   The modern general will now find himself confronting the same problems as Churchill moving from the Netherlands to Bavaria.  Roadbound with spies everywhere.  How do you bring the enemy to battle?  Or better yet how do you survive long enough to get to battle?  The Indians and Partisans now have an air force.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I am not a DLR insider, but much of the Canadian Army you see today is because of Kandahar. The irony is that the Taliban saved our tank capability and killed our anti-tank capability. They also finished off our GBAD. I am simplifying, but there it is. They also gave us back our Chinook capability.
> 
> To your question, some might look at the Canadian Army and say:  "you have Leopard 2A6M with arguably the best tank cannon in the world. What do you need anti-armour for?" At Capability Experiment 10 (back in 2011), the BG that I was a part of did an exercise in JCATS/VBS with anticipated capabilities of 2020. Because the infantry had no real anti-tank capability the Leopard squadron was split up and given to the infantry companies to protect them. Led to defeat in detail. One of the take-aways was the need for integral anti-armour in the infantry.
> 
> I am not sure what keeps holding it up. ALAWS (or whatever we decide to call it) wouldn't even need new structures or organizations.



You answered my question as I was writing it.

Cheers.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Meanwhile RUSI offers some insight into UAVs and tanks.
> 
> What is on "The other side of the hill"?


In 1916, trenches were observed from air observer planes and could be predictably be destroyed with a known quantity of shells from British artillery.

In 1944, German reinforcements to Normandy could not move to attack the beachheads by day due to the crippling effect of allied air supremacy.   This was the crux of Rommel's argument for an operational approach of deploying at the beaches.  Movement was largely conducted at night.

Exposure to detection and destruction from aerial sensors is not a new phenomenon.  UAVs are simply the new flavour of wine.  What's more - this phenomenon isn't undefeatable - armies have been doing it through various methods for a century.  Anyone arguing otherwise doesn't have a clue about how land warfare has been fought since 1914.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Infanteer said:


> Tanks only have tactical use.  They did not dominate in WW2, nor in the Gulf War.  Mechanized combined arms formations did in those conflicts, of which a tank is only a single component.  The distinction is important, and I can see a combined arms formation exerting the same level of dominance as it has in previous conflicts.


I will argue that tanks indeed dominated the North African battlefield and certain Eastern front battlefields.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> In 1916, trenches were observed from air observer planes and could be predictably be destroyed with a known quantity of shells from British artillery.
> 
> In 1944, German reinforcements to Normandy could not move to attack the beachheads by day due to the crippling effect of allied air supremacy.   This was the crux of Rommel's argument for an operational approach of deploying at the beaches.  Movement was largely conducted at night.
> 
> Exposure to detection and destruction from aerial sensors is not a new phenomenon.  UAVs are simply the new flavour of wine.  What's more - this phenomenon isn't undefeatable - armies have been doing it through various methods for a century.  Anyone arguing otherwise doesn't have a clue about how land warfare has been fought since 1914.


The argument is not that it has been possible to see over the hill.  It has always been possible for scouts to sneak the occasional peek.  The argument is that the number of eyes in the sky are so plentiful, cheap and capable that there are no more hills (or gullies).

Big difference between needing a government to fund sensors and backyard mechanics and local machine shops being able to build them from parts found in the local mall or Amazon.

Tell me you are comfortable operating at Suffield in LAVs while being observed 24/7 by a stand off fleet of Quadcopters.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Tell me you are comfortable operating at Suffield in LAVs while being observed 24/7 by a stand off fleet of Quadcopters.


Your proposition assumes that quadcopters are able to persist overhead 24/7.  For every measure, there is a countermeasure.

Folks argued that the bomber would always get through.  In reality, it wouldn't always get through, and even if it did, it didn't always deliver the intended effect.


----------



## Brad Sallows

"Ideal tank terrain" (open) is also "ideal anti-tank terrain".  What made tanks dominant was the tactical and operational mobility of the formations (as noted above, including mechanized and motorized).  In North Africa the ability to move - to encircle, or to escape encirclement - was critical to survival.

Follow the line of reasoning: drones overmatch tanks; we can't have tanks.  The enemy makes personnel carriers and artillery pieces the next targets.  Drones overmatch PCs and artillery; we can't have those.  Pretty soon we are down to leg infantry with whatever they can carry, because drones.

It is overwhelmingly the case that the first times new technologies and tactics are deployed, they achieve remarkable successes, and then the advantages fade (often quickly) as countermeasures are developed.

I suppose if air threats are increasing, the prudent response is improved air defence (starting with "some air defence").  And since shells have unparalled tactical mobility, more artillery firing units if we choose to have fewer direct firing pieces.  Anything that can be fired from full defilade should be on the table, especially if the controller doesn't have to be with the firing piece.

But I doubt any analysis will find a way to anything except unacceptable casualties if anything too complex or too expensive is disallowed.


----------



## Infanteer

Colin Parkinson said:


> I will argue that tanks indeed dominated the North African battlefield and certain Eastern front battlefields.


The argument I made was that tanks do not dominate anywhere above the tactical battlefield.  A careful reading of those campaigns would suggest not.

Operationally, North Africa was as much about anti-tank weapons as it was tanks (see: CRUSADER - failure of massed British tanks).  It was also about combined arms, and how not to do it (see: failure of British Jock Columns).

The Eastern Front was no different.  Superior Soviet tanks could tactically dominate in 1941, when they outclassed anything the Germans could put in the field, but operationally (and strategically) the flawed execution of combined arms warfare meant it didn't matter how great a KV-2 or a T-34 was.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> "Ideal tank terrain" (open) is also "ideal anti-tank terrain". * What made tanks dominant was the tactical and operational mobility of the formations (as noted above, including mechanized and motorized)*.  In North Africa the ability to move - to encircle, or to escape encirclement - was critical to survival.



We tend to keep talking about one arm or service, like tanks, as a 'war winner' when in fact we need to continually remind ourselves that the real strength of a great military force lies not in who has the biggest tank, for example, but who has the strongest combined arms team.

The German Army's primary mode of transportation during the Blitz wasn't tanks, it was foot and horse. They just had a really well led, integrated, approach to maximizing their strngths, minimizing their weaknesses, and whacking the allies when and where they least expected it.

A key conflict winning component we also tend to constantly underemphasize is, of course, political/diplomatic.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Other pieces of evidence: the Germans re-roled light to panzer divisions between Poland and France, and doubled the number of panzer divisions between France and Russia.  This was achieved by spreading the available tanks over more divisions.  I suppose they must have understood that the battlefield tactical influence of tanks was less important than the operational influence of mechanized combined arms formations.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Your proposition assumes that quadcopters are able to persist overhead 24/7.  For every measure, there is a countermeasure.
> 
> Folks argued that the bomber would always get through.  In reality, it wouldn't always get through, and even if it did, it didn't always deliver the intended effect.



So your counter to the obsolence of the technology of the tank is the obsolescence of the technology of the bomber?

As I have noted before the bomber was just a device that permitted the bombardier to ride his bomb most of the way to his target rather than having to send his bomb from his bombard and trust to the science of ballistics and the vagaries of the weather to hit his target.  Now that same bombardier, cheaply, can sit beside his coffee pot, tell his bomb what target to look for, send it, have it takes a couple of laps of the area, look for the target and look for another if it can't find it and return to base if it comes up completely dry.  All the while the bombardier can keep eyes on.

If you want to argue that the elements of warfare have not changed since we were smashing skulls with clubs, sticking each other with spears and chucking darts with atlatls then you will get no argument from me.   On the other hand technology constantly changes the dynamics of warfare. Tanks did that. Bombers did that.  UAVs and PGMs are doing that.  I agree entirely with observations about combined arms tactics.  Absolutely no argument about that.  But who is to say that the Tank will endure as part of that structure?   What happened to the Quick Firing 13 pdr used by the Royal Horse Artillery?  It was better than the muzzle-loading cannons of Napoleon but not as good as Guderian's panzers.

Which brings us to the business of managing change: adaptation, innovation and experimentation.




> https://army.ca/forums/javascript:void(0)
> In February, the Loyal Wingman finally took flight in Australia. A pilot-less, stealthy aircraft designed to operate alongside manned fighters, the drone exemplifies what may be *a better approach to military innovation: rapidly delivering large numbers of advanced capabilities cheaply and doing so in a way that augments the legacy force, not simply replacing it.  *





> ... an alternative to the current model of military modernization and innovation. For years, defense planners have pursued world-class, high-tech capabilities that would offset enemy weapons and systems. But their pursuit of silver bullets for the wars of the future left us unprepared for the wars of today and the immediate years ahead—a pattern seemingly reinforced by the recent budget request.
> 
> While R&D is vital for maintaining the military's edge, we need to do more in the near term to translate technological advances into fielded weapons and as large a scale as possible. We may never close the gap between the rate of technological evolution and that of the military, but we can narrow it. We can think about continual innovation rather than long, multi-decade cycles of modernization. We can focus on bringing new concepts into the field as they become available and having them complement, not replace existing weapons. And we can remember that even the most high-end aircraft can only be in one place at a time. There is no substitute for quantity.











						Pilotless Fighters:  Getting Numbers and Capabilities
					

In February, the Loyal Wingman finally took flight in Australia. A pilot-less, stealthy aircraft designed to operate alongside manned fighters, the drone exemplifies what may be a better approach to m




					www.realcleardefense.com
				





The US and the UK have spent fortunes chasing pipe dreams to generate revolutionary vehicles that would "overmatch" any enemy they were likely to face.   And all of those efforts were judged fiascos.

On the other hand, many of the technologies incorporated in those experimental "fiascos" were found to be sufficiently practical that they could be added to existing inventories to improve their capabilities.

The Abrams improvements are one example.  HVM munitions for 155s and 127s from rail gun experiments is another.

Sometimes it is important to recognize that what you have in hand is good enough.  Equally it is important to recognize what you have at hand.


----------



## markppcli

Underway said:


> Given that a CMBG has tanks, was this the excuse/reason to not move forward on an ALAWS capability? STBG as stated earlier have plenty of methods to deal with armour using Javelin etc..., but didn't have a 25mm turret on their LAV's nor tanks attached to their formations.
> 
> Was Canada using our vehicles as the anti-armour solution?


I think the nail in the ATGM coffin was probably breaking up the Tow Under Armour hulls to make LAV 3 RWS.  I assume the theory was that we have tow in war stock if it ever gets that bad, unfortunately that ignores certain realities about employing such a heavy system without integrated mobility.


Do we think drones will not be persistent ? I would assume any kind of drone “screen” task would have a rotating schedule of fly overs with new assets coming on station as the last one comes off. New thermal imaging also defeating a great deal of our previous techniques to avoid detection. I mean obviously we can still hide and disperse but is it wrong to say this is an unprecedented amount of observation?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Compared to British formations, the Panzer Division was much better balanced in terms of combined arms. The Panzer Division's magic also had much to do with the mechanization/motorization of all its elements. Even if the infantry did not always have APCs (and in fact seldom did), they did all have trucks. The artillery was towed by trucks instead of horses. The Germans also grouped their Panzer Divisions together. Even Panzer Divisions had towed and/or self-propelled anti-tank weapons. 

Combined arms is still, to me, the _sine qua non_ of a modern army looking to fight on the conventional battlefield.  

Looking at the recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, we need to determine if is the Russo-Japanese War or the Spanish Civil War in terms of validity to our situation.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I think the nail in the ATGM coffin was probably breaking up the Tow Under Armour hulls to make LAV 3 RWS.  I assume the theory was that we have tow in war stock if it ever gets that bad, unfortunately that ignores certain realities about employing such a heavy system without integrated mobility.
> 
> 
> Do we think drones will not be persistent ? I would assume any kind of drone “screen” task would have a rotating schedule of fly overs with new assets coming on station as the last one comes off. New thermal imaging also defeating a great deal of our previous techniques to avoid detection. I mean obviously we can still hide and disperse but is it wrong to say this is an unprecedented amount of observation?



We also had a "misfire" with the Eryx system.  It performed poorly, cost a lot and was never required.  Meanwhile, the Javelin was being used by our allies not so much as an anti-tank weapon as a bunker buster.  A role our CG-84s could have managed (in many cases) if we had the right ammunition.  But we, in my understanding, only had anti-tank ammunition because that is how we justified the CG-84 in the first place.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Infanteer said:


> The argument I made was that tanks do not dominate anywhere above the tactical battlefield.  A careful reading of those campaigns would suggest not.
> 
> Operationally, North Africa was as much about anti-tank weapons as it was tanks (see: CRUSADER - failure of massed British tanks).  It was also about combined arms, and how not to do it (see: failure of British Jock Columns).
> 
> The Eastern Front was no different.  Superior Soviet tanks could tactically dominate in 1941, when they outclassed anything the Germans could put in the field, but operationally (and strategically) the flawed execution of combined arms warfare meant it didn't matter how great a KV-2 or a T-34 was.


The Anti-tank weapons were the response to the tanks, but it's the tank that created a fluidity that terrain allowed. tanks brought mobility, firepower and protection together and the unique terrain allowed that combination the greatest amount of freedom possible. The German AT screen only worked as well as it did due to the lack of a useful HE round in British tanks, the AT screen became less effective with the introduction of the Grant, who could stand off and destroy the AT guns from outside the useful range of most of them. AT guns could only dominate locally and did not have anywhere the fluidity to respond to events. I still argue that tanks and the terrain were the dominant factor and the other arms had to adjust to their use and deployment.
In the Eastern Front, tanks by sheer numbers would dominate a battlefield locally. Although I concede it was a clash of army sized groups that decided the matter.


----------



## Brad Sallows

As soon as someone puts a system on the battlefield comparable to what is the final line of anti-missile defence for ships, I suppose it will be all over with drones.  Until the next revolutionary change.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> We also had a "misfire" with the Eryx system.  It performed poorly, cost a lot and was never required.  Meanwhile, the Javelin was being used by our allies not so much as an anti-tank weapon as a bunker buster.  A role our CG-84s could have managed (in many cases) if we had the right ammunition.  But we, in my understanding, only had anti-tank ammunition because that is how we justified the CG-84 in the first place.


HEAT was what was in theatre if I'm not mistaken?  I have no idea if there were also HE rounds, though from my understanding (and the pam) they are in the system I've just never seen one. Javelin worked because it targeted thin roofs over thick walls. I'm digressing though.

Can we sufficiently say that critical to any likely CF mission, be it COIN or high intensity conflict, drone countermeasures are a very high priority to allow freedom of movement to our, almost certainly LAV based, mechanized forces? Countermeasures being both hardware (equipment) and software (people's skills and mindsets).


----------



## Brad Sallows

But German AT screens were effective and remained effective because they discovered the use of AA artillery in the AT role, and were able to "dominate locally".  If tanks were dominant, some Allied offensives should not have gone so badly.  Part of the answer to "why" is that an effective counter to tanks is defence in depth; the further tanks move beyond range of their own artillery, the more vulnerable they become.  

So, back to combined arms, the point of which is to force the enemy to simultaneously solve many different problems at once instead of optimizing against one threat at a time.  But, again, that's just the battlefield.  What makes tanks occasionally decisive is operating in formations that can exploit breaches and occupy rear areas.  And for that, motorized/mechanized (ie. more balanced) formations are often just as good or better (infantry are harder to dislodge).


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> As soon as someone puts a system on the battlefield comparable to what is the final line of anti-missile defence for ships, I suppose it will be all over with drones.  Until the next revolutionary change.



Perhaps something like this?



> The Canadian Army will receive the latest generation *Protector RWS, a Remote Weapon Station prepared for wireless control, counter UAS capability, multi-sensor fusion, as well as other new functions required by the expanding user community.* The systems for Canada will be produced in parallel with five other programs, creating synergies in supply base and project execution for the benefit of the customers.
> 
> The Government of Canada will procure 360 ACSV to replace the Bison LAV and M113 Tracked LAV fleets. These vehicles will support a range of operations which include domestic disaster relief and overseas peace keeping missions.
> 
> The ACSV are based on the LAV 6.0 platform and will integrate with and support the existing LAV 6.0 platform currently in use by the CAF. This will provide a number of advantages including reduced training and sustainment costs, as well as the availability of common spare parts to fix vehicles quickly during operations.











						Canadian Army to equip its ACSVs with newest generation remote weapon station
					

Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace has announced on Tuesday that the Canadian Army will equip the Armoured Combat Support Vehicles (ACSV) with a newest generation remote weapon station. General Dynamics Land Systems - Canada and Kongsberg have signed a contract for delivery of the Protector Remote...




					defence-blog.com
				




Allied with something like this?



			https://www.rafael.co.il/worlds/land/trophy-aps/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=gsn&gclid=CjwKCAjwwqaGBhBKEiwAMk-FtNLxYeDRR75340bTmQx_VTWzItW2q5AFl9iTTQ7ZckK9b5O2gO_RcBoCn_gQAvD_BwE
		


At that point the ACSV TCV may end up being the next evolutionary step for the LAV.



The Brits have definitely committed to that course of action











						Thales UK Awarded $252.3 Million to Supply Protector RS4 RWS for British Army Boxer Vehicles
					

Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) and Rheinmetall Landsysteme have jointly awarded a contract, worth $252.3 million (Â£180 million), to Thales ...




					militaryleak.com
				






They are also looking for an overwatch vehicle something like this - reminiscent of the CVR-T Swingfire vehicle.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Perhaps something like this?



Sure.  If it comes down to attrition (cost and ease of manufacture), drones and missiles are more expensive than shells and bullets.


----------



## markppcli

I guess it all depends on what weapons go in those ACSV in terms of how effective will they be in engaging UAVs, and at what level they can do so. I believe the vehicle pictured at the end of your message is the new "Brimstone" concept for Spike NLOS.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I guess it all depends on what weapons go in those ACSV in terms of how effective will they be in engaging UAVs, and at what level they can do so. I believe the vehicle pictured at the end of your message is the new "Brimstone" concept for Spike NLOS.


You're right on the Brimstone - of equal interest to me was the ROWS on the hull.  Identical to that on the Infantry Carrier.

And here's my preferred "toy" for the FPF ROWS - apparently applicable to vehicles from LAVs to LFE-TMPs.






Add Trophy to the system and you have your own Phalanx C-RAM.


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill said:


> You're right on the Brimstone - of equal interest to me was the ROWS on the hull.  Identical to that on the Infantry Carrier.
> 
> And here's my preferred "toy" for the FPF ROWS - apparently applicable to vehicles from LAVs to LFE-TMPs.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Add Trophy to the system and you have your own Phalanx C-RAM.


Oh look…at 0:56 you can see the BPATS* working. 😆 



*Beaten Path Automatic Translation System.


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> Oh look…at 0:56 you can see the BPATS* working. 😆
> 
> 
> 
> *Beaten Path Automatic Translation System.


 
All right! I'll bite.  Say what?


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> The argument I made was that tanks do not dominate anywhere above the tactical battlefield.  A careful reading of those campaigns would suggest not.
> 
> Operationally, North Africa was as much about anti-tank weapons as it was tanks (see: CRUSADER - failure of massed British tanks).  It was also about combined arms, and how not to do it (see: failure of British Jock Columns).
> 
> The Eastern Front was no different.  Superior Soviet tanks could tactically dominate in 1941, when they outclassed anything the Germans could put in the field, but operationally (and strategically) the flawed execution of combined arms warfare meant it didn't matter how great a KV-2 or a T-34 was.



Your historical references do have me thinking because my research for our gunner book has me at the turn of the century where the Army is making the first tentative steps to converting it's rusting out Cold War army to the medium weight thing it has become.

My point here is that we were essentially experimenting with two concepts - on the one hand aggregation of sensors into an ISTAR company and on the other an aggregation of TOWs and ADATS and MGS into a Direct Fire System. Neither really panned out. Twenty years later our sensors did get better but I'm not so sure we ever achieved the degree of aggregation ever contemplated and DFS pretty much faded away. Afghanistan undoubtedly took our focus off the ball in a big way - but even that ended 11 years ago. 

While we clearly haven't advanced the weapons' procurement process our doctrinal thought processes should not have stopped. Both the Navy and the Air Force seem to have some thoughts about where they are heading (albeit their processes [JUSTAS I'm talking about you] seem to be no faster than the Army's).

It's pretty clear to me sitting at home, long retired, that doctrinally we are much worse off then even during the decade of darkness. While LAVs have their issues they are heads and shoulders above the M113 and the Leo2 is much better than the C1 but we still haven't done anything about figuring out how to win the deep battle, how to deliver long range precision fires, how to counter the various air threats, how to fight the close in anti-armour battle or how to optimize the new capabilities coming out daily. It would seem to me that until we get a handle on how to actually participate in a heavy battle any thinking about what kit we want is a tad premature.

Quite frankly, I'm starting to think that one of the best things the Army could do for Force 2025 is to completely break up one of the CMBGs in order to create the numerous enablers that are needed on a modern battlefield. (or perhaps just one infantry battalion in each brigade and turn the remaining two and the armoured regiment into three proper combined arms battalions and a small but better designed cavalry regiment plus additional enablers) What's killing the Army is the high recurring cost of people. People are important but people without equipment and a doctrine are just a speed bump on the battlefield.

🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill said:


> All right! I'll bite.  Say what?


Look at the pintle wobbling, then imagine how that’s affecting where the huge rate of bullets is going.  Methinks the beaten zone/path is all over the place…


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Brad Sallows said:


> But German AT screens were effective and remained effective because they discovered the use of AA artillery in the AT role, and were able to "dominate locally".  If tanks were dominant, some Allied offensives should not have gone so badly.  Part of the answer to "why" is that an effective counter to tanks is defence in depth; the further tanks move beyond range of their own artillery, the more vulnerable they become.
> 
> So, back to combined arms, the point of which is to force the enemy to simultaneously solve many different problems at once instead of optimizing against one threat at a time.  But, again, that's just the battlefield.  What makes tanks occasionally decisive is operating in formations that can exploit breaches and occupy rear areas.  And for that, motorized/mechanized (ie. more balanced) formations are often just as good or better (infantry are harder to dislodge).


The Germans discovered the role of AA guns in the AT role during the Spanish civil war, luckily a 88mm HE shell was more than enough for a T26. During the invasion of France Medium AA units with 88's had AP ammunition already issued to deal with the Char B's. The Germans were experts in AT gun use and deployment and the European Terrain favoured them. That being said the Stugs in the Panzerjager units had the highest tank kill ratios as did the US Tank Destroyer Battalions. Lessons for us:

Learn the correct lessons early on and follow through on the solution.
If fighting a armour heavy force, dedicated AT resources are needed
If fighting a infantry or defensive entrenched foe, then dedicated HE resources are needed
If fighting a foe well equipped with unmanned assets, both surveillance and attack, make sure you have adequate and organized AD


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> Look at the pintle wobbling, then imagine how that’s affecting where the huge rate of bullets is going.  Methinks the beaten zone/path is all over the place…


Seen...


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> The Germans discovered the role of AA guns in the AT role during the Spanish civil war, luckily a 88mm HE shell was more than enough for a T26. During the invasion of France Medium AA units with 88's had AP ammunition already issued to deal with the Char B's. The Germans were experts in AT gun use and deployment and the European Terrain favoured them. That being said the Stugs in the Panzerjager units had the highest tank kill ratios as did the US Tank Destroyer Battalions. Lessons for us:
> 
> Learn the correct lessons early on and follow through on the solution.
> If fighting a armour heavy force, dedicated AT resources are needed
> If fighting a infantry or defensive entrenched foe, then dedicated HE resources are needed
> If fighting a foe well equipped with unmanned assets, both surveillance and attack, make sure you have adequate and organized AD




As I said:  Rock, Paper, Scissors.


----------



## Kirkhill

Somewhere a while back some one noted that we could deliver a company rapidly anywhere, but once they got there what could they do?

I'm going to assume that we can get anyone anywhere in the CC-150 Polaris (assuming they are not being shot at).  Each CC-150 carries 194 Pax - Self Loading Cargo that walks through the door.

Assuming that limitation let's say that 3 of our CC-150s can carry 3x 194 Infanteers or 582 soldiers used to carrying their kit on their backs.  That is a good sized battalion.  What can they carry on board with them?

Pyro, Det Cord and C4
Pistols, Rifles, DMRs, LMGs and GPMGs
CG-84s, Javelins, NLAWs, AT4s etc
40mm UGLs, 60mm Mortars and 81mm Mortars
MANPADS
Radios
EO/IR gear
UAVs

If they just parked themselves at the airport as a security force I believe they would make a statement.

But,  there's more.

Let's say we task 3 of our 5 C17s to land along with them.

One C17 can transport 21x MRZRs in a single level, and I am inclined to believe a clever load master could figure out how to double that amount.  But let's assume that we only add 21 MRZRs to the infantry battalion for command, recce, DFS and CQ duties. Or twice that.  And the other C17s to bring in various other arms and their gear.

I believe that such a force would make at least as useful a contribution, in the short term, as the ePF.   And it could be reinforced, as time permitted, by air, with heavier gear.

The key elements for me would be lots of AT gear, lots of MGs and DMRs, lots of mortars, lots of UAVs and lots of surveillance gear and NVGs.  Oh.  And Air Defence.


----------



## dapaterson

On rare occasions, soldiers may want food and water.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> On rare occasions, soldiers may want food and water.


There you go with the details again.  

The first 72 hours of water and IMPs can walk through the doors of the CC150s with them.   Or be stowed in the lower hold beneath them.

And we still have a couple of CC-150s and CC-177s in hand.


----------



## dapaterson

Water: 30L per person per day for hydration and ablutions.  So, 582 pers x 30L/pers/day x 3 days = 52,380L water.  

That's roughly one point five CC150 cargo planes carrying nothing but water. 

For three days supply only.


----------



## blacktriangle

markppcli said:


> I guess it all depends on what weapons go in those ACSV in terms of how effective will they be in engaging UAVs, and at what level they can do so. I believe the vehicle pictured at the end of your message is the new "Brimstone" concept for Spike NLOS.


Just to clarify, Spike NLOS & Brimstone are separate systems.

Spike NLOS (Exactor) was procured as UOR during Iraq, IIRC. It was originally mounted on M113 and they now have a trailer mounted version (Exactor-2) It’s operated by Royal Artillery units.

And yes, the mounted overwatch capability being planned is supposedly going to be based around Brimstone.

Regardless of system or cap badge used, NLOS missile capability would go a long ways to making Canada relevant on the modern battlefield. It should be a priority along with ALAWS. Not holding my breath though.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Water: 30L per person per day for hydration and ablutions.  So, 582 pers x 30L/pers/day x 3 days = 52,380L water.
> 
> That's roughly one point five CC150 cargo planes carrying nothing but water.
> 
> For three days supply only.



Paratroopers don't 'ablute' so there's a good logistics argument for employing them on certain ops


----------



## Infanteer

dapaterson said:


> Water: 30L per person per day for hydration and ablutions.  So, 582 pers x 30L/pers/day x 3 days = 52,380L water.


Maybe if you're supplying some cozy camp or something.  I don't recall ever expending that much water with a rifle platoon on its own in Afghanstan.  10L a day perhaps?  So that's 1/3 of your estimate.

...and why would you have to fly it in?  Water exists on most places in the planet, and there are numerous ways to procure, clean, and store it.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Water: 30L per person per day for hydration and ablutions.  So, 582 pers x 30L/pers/day x 3 days = 52,380L water.
> 
> That's roughly one point five CC150 cargo planes carrying nothing but water.
> 
> For three days supply only.





1947. One quart per man per day.  And drink when the Corporal tells you.

30 litres?

Lets assume that the CC-150s are arriving at a functional airport.   And lets assume that the troops can go 72 hours without a shower. Allow 2l per man per day. They are also carrying a 9 kg case of IMPs each for 10 meals.

582x 2kg x 3 days = 3,492 kg
582x 9kg = 5,238 kg

8,730 kg food and water for 582 for 72 hours.

1.5 CC-150s = 53,380 l
1x CC-150 = 34,920 l = 34,920 kg

8,730 kg = 25% of a CC-150.  Significant right enough.  But please don't tell me that that is a show stopper?  Maybe we have to send some of our C130s along as well.

PS D&B

The 1947 guys were Paras.   And they were required to shave every morning.


----------



## McG

Modern Anti-tank artillery.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Somewhere a while back some one noted that we could deliver a company rapidly anywhere, but once they got there what could they do?
> 
> I'm going to assume that we can get anyone anywhere in the CC-150 Polaris (assuming they are not being shot at).  Each CC-150 carries 194 Pax - Self Loading Cargo that walks through the door.
> 
> Assuming that limitation let's say that 3 of our CC-150s can carry 3x 194 Infanteers or 582 soldiers used to carrying their kit on their backs.  That is a good sized battalion.  What can they carry on board with them?
> 
> Pyro, Det Cord and C4
> Pistols, Rifles, DMRs, LMGs and GPMGs
> CG-84s, Javelins, NLAWs, AT4s etc
> 40mm UGLs, 60mm Mortars and 81mm Mortars
> MANPADS
> Radios
> EO/IR gear
> UAVs
> 
> If they just parked themselves at the airport as a security force I believe they would make a statement.
> 
> But,  there's more.
> 
> Let's say we task 3 of our 5 C17s to land along with them.
> 
> One C17 can transport 21x MRZRs in a single level, and I am inclined to believe a clever load master could figure out how to double that amount.  But let's assume that we only add 21 MRZRs to the infantry battalion for command, recce, DFS and CQ duties. Or twice that.  And the other C17s to bring in various other arms and their gear.
> 
> I believe that such a force would make at least as useful a contribution, in the short term, as the ePF.   And it could be reinforced, as time permitted, by air, with heavier gear.
> 
> The key elements for me would be lots of AT gear, lots of MGs and DMRs, lots of mortars, lots of UAVs and lots of surveillance gear and NVGs.  Oh.  And Air Defence.


A realistic initial goal for your limited rapid response forces would be to determine the main direction of attack of the enemy and assist with providing targets for allied aircraft and long-range precision strike weapons which would form the bulk of the initial response while the heavy forces prepare to move to theatre.

So instead of dropping a Battalion of light infantry to form a fairly immobile blocking force you could instead do something like this...

A C-17 can carry 10 x Humvee-class vehicles.  Two x 5 vehicle squads each with:

1 x EW/SIGINT vehicle to assist in identifying targets


2 x multi-tube loitering munition launchers to attack and/or laze targets for other launchers


1 x SHORAD/C-UAS vehicle to protect the launch vehicles from enemy UAVs


1 x Support Vehicle with reloads/supplies, etc.


----------



## dapaterson

Planning figure is 30L daily.  Short term you can go lower.  But to maintain a fighting force you will need it. And yes, there are other sources that require purification and storage, but those are equipment and personnel not included in your assumptions.

Ignore sustainment at your peril.  Perhaps watch the movie "A Bridge Too Far".


----------



## OldSolduer

dapaterson said:


> On rare occasions, soldiers may want food and water.


And ammunition or have we already covered that...


----------



## dapaterson

Why would you need ammunition resupply?

In Gulf War I, the initial deployment of Airborne forces was primarily a psychological operation to demonstrate resolve, not an effect military force.


----------



## Kirkhill

To refine my assumptions

The first battalion goes over to secure the forward end of the conveyor with a single landing of 3x CC-150 and 3x C-17s.

After that the conveyor can exploit the sustained carrying capacity of 4x CC-144, 5x CC-150, 5x CC-177, 17x CC-130J indefinitely, or at least as long as the skies are clear.

We're also modelling the intervention after the ePF which assumes a functioning, passably modern economy.  Which even Afghanistan and Mali provided.

All bets are off if the other guys are shooting already.


If those assumptions are accepted then how long would it take to deploy an entire CMBG by air as a deterrent force?

The alternative would be shipping the CMBGs kit by sea and transporting the rest of the personnel by the air conveyor.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> If those assumptions are accepted then how long would it take to deploy an entire CMBG by air as a deterrent force?


See the RAND link I posted earlier.  They've done the math for an SBCT.   An SBCT, three DOS, and the necessary package to secure/run an airhead weighs in at 16,200 short tons and has 4,525 personnel.

The analysis estimated 182 C-17 lifts to move this 5,000 nmi into a functional airfield.  8 Wing would fall out of the sky before pulling that off.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> See the RAND link I posted earlier.  They've done the math for an SBCT.   An SBCT, three DOS, and the necessary package to secure/run an airhead weighs in at 16,200 short tons and has 4,525 personnel.
> 
> The analysis estimated 182 C-17 lifts to move this 5,000 nmi into a functional airfield.  8 Wing would fall out of the sky before pulling that off.


With it highly unlikely that any Canadian government will be willing to pay the cost of forward stationing a CMBG in Europe (especially with the CF-18 replacements, the CSCs and our huge pandemic debt eating up so much of the budget) I think it's fair to assume that any major Canadian military combat force deployed to Europe will be after the fighting begins.

That being the case then probably the most logical and effective thing the Army could do (in terms of rapid response while our heavy forces muster) would be to figure out what air-deployable assets we could rapidly mobilize to protect and support our forward deployed fighters (likely our most effective rapid reaction force) - airfield defence troops, AD units, engineers, etc. - or a selection of ISR assets to identify targets and/or light fires units to slow the advance.


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> See the RAND link I posted earlier.  They've done the math for an SBCT.   An SBCT, three DOS, and the necessary package to secure/run an airhead weighs in at 16,200 short tons and has 4,525 personnel.
> 
> The analysis estimated 182 C-17 lifts to move this 5,000 nmi into a functional airfield.  8 Wing would fall out of the sky before pulling that off.


I read that RAND study some time ago and there are two key things about it. 

First math is math. When you count up airlift capacity, distances, load to be transported and the various related parameters (number of crews, crew rest, a/c down for maintenance etc) you get an objective answer as to what you can do. Simply put the math is very limiting on what we can do with Canadian military airlift at any given time. That's not to say we are estopped from deploying an airmobile force, just that our appetite needs to be modest.

Second, this study was completed for the USAF in 2002 to give the US Army some heartburn (or a reality check) about their latest brainfart i.e. the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. In short it concludes that using a combination of a CONUS base, a forward deployed equipment in Germany and regional prepositioned sites in key theatres of operation would facilitate rapid air or sea transport into a hot spot. (albeit even with this it considers timelines of 5 to 14 days achievable rather than 3 days)

I presume this study made its way into Canada where the LAV 3 and Coyote were already a reality and the MGS was being talked about. Nonetheless we continued on with the idea that our force was going to be an "agile" one which at least alluded to an expectation of deployability by air. The inability to transport our M109s and Leopards by air (in our then Hercs) certainly contributed to their deaths because they no longer fit the definition of an "agile" weapon system.

In short, a Canadian medium weight force, of any capability at all, will need to deploy by sea. We have little need to secure an airhead - a port maybe. If we do plan on deploying a light force into any theatre we need for it to be small, mostly self-sufficient and probably with no expectation of there being a heavier follow-up force unless a sea lane and time is available.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Curiously  the east coast ferries are owned by the Government of Canada.  They are in a position to supply 3 or 4 more ocean going roros to Marine Atlantic and Bay Ferries.... if they wanted to expand Atlantic connectivity.

And provide sea lift for  a CMBG... in a permissive environment of course.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I was part of a NATO exercise in 2018 where we deployed a Bde HQ, a Light Infantry Battalion and associated support to Norway along with an air component and of course a maritime component. The troops flew in, but everything else for the land component went by ship. 

We have a couple of mission sets that require rapidity of deployment where air will be the usual method of entry: non-combatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance disaster relief.  NEO is not really the combat operation that some folks envision/dream about.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I was part of a NATO exercise in 2018 where we deployed a Bde HQ, a Light Infantry Battalion and associated support to Norway along with an air component and of course a maritime component. The troops flew in, but everything else for the land component went by ship.
> 
> We have a couple of mission sets that require rapidity of deployment where air will be the usual method of entry: non-combatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance disaster relief. * NEO is not really the combat operation that some folks envision/dream about*.



With any luck at all.   As a potential evacuee I would much rather not be dodging bullets on my way on board my aircraft or ship.


----------



## Infanteer

TangoTwoBravo said:


> NEO is not really the combat operation that some folks envision/dream about.


How CJOC sees the NEO: Enough CAF personnel in civilian clothing to help GAC get CANCITS out of the country.

How the Army translates this: You need a Light Infantry Battalion ready to go, led by Samuel L. Jackson from _Rules of Engagement_.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Infanteer said:


> How CJOC sees the NEO: Enough CAF personnel in civilian clothing to help GAC get CANCITS out of the country.
> 
> How the Army translates this: You need a Light Infantry Battalion ready to go, led by Samuel L. Jackson from _Rules of Engagement_.


True! As a planner for a couple of NEO certification exercises there was usually a bit of a gulf between what people think NEO is going into it (which included me) and what the mission actually entails.


----------



## Old Sweat

Back a million years ago, when I was in J3, I wrote a couple of contingency plans for NEOs. One, after I retired, was actually dusted off, albieit in a different context. Flexibility has to be a key factor, along with the realization that we are tap dancing with international law. The aim is to get in, collect and document our citizens, and get out, without having to be heavy-handed. The poor buggers that live there are left, stuck in the mess that caused us to act in the first place.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> True! As a planner for a couple of NEO certification exercises there was usually a bit of a gulf between what people think NEO is going into it (which included me) and what the mission actually entails.



We referred to it as a 'Break and Enter' operation with a 'soft' or 'hard' knock, as the situation dictated


----------



## Underway

Infanteer said:


> How CJOC sees the NEO: Enough CAF personnel in civilian clothing to help GAC get CANCITS out of the country.
> 
> How the Army translates this: You need a Light Infantry Battalion ready to go, led by Samuel L. Jackson from _Rules of Engagement_.


How the Navy translates this: WTF are we going to fit all these people? HTF are we going to feed them? WTF are they going to s**t?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Underway said:


> How the Navy translates this: WTF are we going to fit all these people? HTF are we going to feed them? WTF are they going to s**t?


I ran a NEO certex in Halifax a couple of years ago. In the margins of the Ex the RCN was gracious enough to give the HQ (which included Whole of Government partners) a good tour of VDQ. 

Having a Frigate in the area of a NEO in time would likely require a bit of luck (or incredible foresight), but I saw the big advantage being in terms of C2 support as opposed to being the means of evacuation. Your ships have fantastic comms. Of course, the ship could also sail away!


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I ran a NEO certex in Halifax a couple of years ago. In the margins of the Ex the RCN was gracious enough to give the HQ (which included Whole of Government partners) a good tour of VDQ.
> 
> Having a Frigate in the area of a NEO in time would likely require a bit of luck (or incredible foresight), but I saw the big advantage being in terms of C2 support as opposed to being the means of evacuation. Your ships have fantastic comms. Of course, the ship could also sail away!



Since we've drifted into this subject, here's something relevant from the UK. I like their use of the term 'non-discretionary' to describe NEO ops i.e., do it, or your nationals get chopped into little bits by the bad guys ....


Joint Doctrine Publication 3-51 Non-combatant Evacuation Operations

Purpose 

1. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-51, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations provides insight, guidance and points to consider when planning and conducting a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). Context 

2. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) is responsible for coordinating the evacuation of British nationals from areas of crises, often with support from other government departments, such as the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Integration between the FCDO and MOD is paramount to success, whether it is through planning support or providing military assets to conduct a NEO. The necessary interaction for this type of crisis is recognised in a service level agreement between the two departments. Audience 

3. JDP 3-51 is intended for use primarily by military commanders and their staff at the strategic and operational levels of command. The publication also acts as a useful guide to diplomatic staff serving in the UK and overseas. It should inform local FCDO contingency evacuation plans where appropriate. Although the doctrine highlights some tactical-level considerations, it does not attempt to cover tactics, techniques and procedures.1

*4. A NEO is a non-discretionary operation *that often requires a national response. Differing interests and risk thresholds often result in countries responding to crisis in different ways. Although evacuations are likely to be conducted in a multinational setting, the interaction between nations will probably be limited to the coordination of separate national plans rather than a unified multinational endeavour. However, commanders and their staff should read North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine on NEOs in addition to this publication to understand the challenges of operating as part of a coalition when conducting a multinational evacuation.



			https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/979907/20210412-JDP_3_51_NEO_web_V2-O_1_.pdf


----------



## Underway

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I ran a NEO certex in Halifax a couple of years ago. In the margins of the Ex the RCN was gracious enough to give the HQ (which included Whole of Government partners) a good tour of VDQ.
> 
> Having a Frigate in the area of a NEO in time would likely require a bit of luck (or incredible foresight), but I saw the big advantage being in terms of C2 support as opposed to being the means of evacuation. Your ships have fantastic comms. Of course, the ship could also sail away!


JSS is going to have the same all-up comms (including my personal fav radio, PRC-117, yes I'm that much of a nerd I have a fav radio) and the space for C2 of your NEO HQ including OPS spaces and conference spaces.

Right now the NEO plan for frigates in a pinch is to convert the hangar into a shelter.  There is a NEO kit in stores that has clothes, flip flops, towel and some toiletries.  We also carry plenty of cots and blankets.  Using the hangar also allows us to control access for security reasons.  The single heads below the hangar are for ablutions.  

The situation in Lebanon in 2006 could have been assisted with a naval asset that sailed immediately from Halifax, there was enough time. However, even if we did have a ship big enough to do the task it would have been quite the risk to send a warship into those waters, hopefully, no accidental attack by the Israelis or Hezbollah on our asset when you pulled alongside to get the evacs.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

daftandbarmy said:


> Since we've drifted into this subject, here's something relevant from the UK. I like their use of the term 'non-discretionary' to describe NEO ops i.e., do it, or your nationals get chopped into little bits by the bad guys ....
> 
> 
> Joint Doctrine Publication 3-51 Non-combatant Evacuation Operations
> 
> Purpose
> 
> 1. Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-51, Non-combatant Evacuation Operations provides insight, guidance and points to consider when planning and conducting a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). Context
> 
> 2. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) is responsible for coordinating the evacuation of British nationals from areas of crises, often with support from other government departments, such as the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Integration between the FCDO and MOD is paramount to success, whether it is through planning support or providing military assets to conduct a NEO. The necessary interaction for this type of crisis is recognised in a service level agreement between the two departments. Audience
> 
> 3. JDP 3-51 is intended for use primarily by military commanders and their staff at the strategic and operational levels of command. The publication also acts as a useful guide to diplomatic staff serving in the UK and overseas. It should inform local FCDO contingency evacuation plans where appropriate. Although the doctrine highlights some tactical-level considerations, it does not attempt to cover tactics, techniques and procedures.1
> 
> *4. A NEO is a non-discretionary operation *that often requires a national response. Differing interests and risk thresholds often result in countries responding to crisis in different ways. Although evacuations are likely to be conducted in a multinational setting, the interaction between nations will probably be limited to the coordination of separate national plans rather than a unified multinational endeavour. However, commanders and their staff should read North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine on NEOs in addition to this publication to understand the challenges of operating as part of a coalition when conducting a multinational evacuation.
> 
> 
> 
> https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/979907/20210412-JDP_3_51_NEO_web_V2-O_1_.pdf


For those interested, the CAF has CFJP 3-5 Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations as our doctrinal foundation. We exercise it annually with our Government partners and all components. Sometimes its just the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT), other times it can include infantry sub-units, ships and aircraft. As was pointed out earlier, NEO must be flexible.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> How CJOC sees the NEO: Enough CAF personnel in civilian clothing to help GAC get CANCITS out of the country.
> 
> How the Army translates this: You need a Light Infantry Battalion ready to go, led by Samuel L. Jackson from _Rules of Engagement_.



Could that translate into a LIB by CC-150 with their man-portable weapons in containers delivered by CC-177?  No arms necessary when handing out water, meals and blankets and escorting little old ladies to their seats on their RCAF flights.  On the other hand weapons close to hand if the situation changes?


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> For those interested, the CAF has CFJP 3-5 Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations as our doctrinal foundation. We exercise it annually with our Government partners and all components. Sometimes its just the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT), other times it can include infantry sub-units, ships and aircraft. As was pointed out earlier, NEO must be flexible.


Done it again.  Thanks T2B.


----------



## Kirkhill

So, as I see it, we can get a light force, usefully armed IMO, on the ground in a permissive environment in about a week.  Once that force is established it can be built up with reinforcements, at a trickle.  It's major problem is that the bigger and heavier the force is the less likely it is that we will be able to recover the force in a timely fashion.  Dunkirk 2 would be a problem.  Hong Kong 2 would be more likely.

We need sea transport on hand to move the Medium Force.  Transport that is virtually identical to that required for the Heavy Force.  Strategically then, the Medium Force offers few, if any, advantages over the Heavy Force.  There can be considerable debate about the merits of the two forces once they are in theatre.  But the first problem we face, having decided we are going to be supplying a Medium Force, is getting the force to an appropriate theatre of our choosing.  And executing a recovery when necessary.  We may get to choose the where and when of the insertion.   They enemy may get to choose the where and when of the withdrawal.

With that need declared the standard solutions are

1. USN/RN large amphibious vessels  (Albions and Tarawas)
2. RFA/MSC fleet auxilliaries (Bay Class LSDAs)
3. PPP - Various and includes DFDS RoRo Ferry arrangement with Denmark and Point Class RoRo arrangement with RN (long term charters and leases)
4. STUFT (Shipping Taken Up From Trade) - urgent charters from the market.

We have demonstrated that we are not in the market for Solution 1.  The RCN is not in the market for a BHS.
We have relied on urgent charters from the market,  as far as I can gather.  Solution 4.  Has that been successful?  Is it appropriate for a retirement in the face of the enemy?
Solution 2 is a possibility but it requires establishing an organization we don't have
Which brings me to the Solution 3, the PPP arrangements.

We have started down that road, it seems to me, with Federal and the Asterix.  I have also found out that the ferries on the Atlantic coast and in the Gulf of St Lawrence are also PPP ventures with the vessels being owned by the Government of Canada and operated by local private interests like Marine Atlantic and Bay Ferries.  I also discovered that they Yarmouth to Bar Harbor ferry operated by Bay Ferries Ltd is actually owned by the USN Military Sealift Command.  She is the original high speed catamaran HST-2 that was taken up from Hawaii Superferry at the instigation of the Marines and spawned 15 vessel T-EPF / JHSV fleet built by Austal.

I think it would be a reasonable suggestion that one of the PPP models be adopted to both improve marine connectivity down the Labrador, with Iqaluit and with Greenland and Iceland.

Iqaluit was actually expecting a RoRo terminal but apparently the Infrastructure Government decided it was too expensive.  Personally I think that those types of investments are exactly the investments the Government of Canada should be making.   They stake a much more significant claim than an annual snowmobile excursion among the polar bears.









						High costs killed Iqaluit-Labrador vehicle ferry dream, Nunavut minister says | Nunatsiaq News
					

Due to high construction costs, Iqaluit’s new deepsea port, now under construction, can’t accommodate a once-dreamed-of Iqaluit-Labrador vehicle ferry




					nunatsiaq.com
				




Government builds ships to its specs and charters them out as excess capacity to local operators with the understanding that they can be withdrawn from trade (without disrupting connectivity) in support of Government operations.  It wouldn't bother me if the vessels ran empty most of the time - any more than it bothers me to drive along an empty divided highway on the prairies.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> So, as I see it, we can get a light force, usefully armed IMO, on the ground in a permissive environment in about a week.  Once that force is established it can be built up with reinforcements, at a trickle.  It's major problem is that the bigger and heavier the force is the less likely it is that we will be able to recover the force in a timely fashion.  Dunkirk 2 would be a problem.  Hong Kong 2 would be more likely.
> 
> We need sea transport on hand to move the Medium Force.  Transport that is virtually identical to that required for the Heavy Force.  Strategically then, the Medium Force offers few, if any, advantages over the Heavy Force.  There can be considerable debate about the merits of the two forces once they are in theatre.  But the first problem we face, having decided we are going to be supplying a Medium Force, is getting the force to an appropriate theatre of our choosing.  And executing a recovery when necessary.  We may get to choose the where and when of the insertion.   They enemy may get to choose the where and when of the withdrawal.
> 
> With that need declared the standard solutions are
> 
> 1. USN/RN large amphibious vessels  (Albions and Tarawas)
> 2. RFA/MSC fleet auxilliaries (Bay Class LSDAs)
> 3. PPP - Various and includes DFDS RoRo Ferry arrangement with Denmark and Point Class RoRo arrangement with RN (long term charters and leases)
> 4. STUFT (Shipping Taken Up From Trade) - urgent charters from the market.


NEO is not intended to be a combat operation. There are different levels of cooperation/support from the host nation security forces which determine the posture along with, of course, the threat. There is a CONPLAN and several SUPLANs for this that includes the generic phasing of the operation as well as how the NEO element moves and stages into and out of the theatre (modified to fit the specific geography). The method of evacuation of the entitled personnel to the designated Safe Haven will depend on a number of factors, but think contracted solutions as Plan A for most situations (but there are always exceptions). The Head of Mission (diplomat) with the advice of the CO NEO will work on that in cooperation with CAF elements back home and allies/like-minded nations seeking to do the same things for their people. Cooperation is the byword. 

As a doctrinal aside, Dunkirk 2 would be an _extraction_. If we are talking about _rescuing_ people then its a whole different operation.

The so-what of all this is that we have units assigned to this: some on a rotational basis (infantry battalions), others on an as-needed basis and others still as part of the OLRT and NEO HQ. 

I am comfortable with contracted shipping for episodic deployments of our forces into theatres.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

As much as I like the Mistrals, I be happy with 2 Bay Class ships and would give up a CSC and AOP's for them. They need a crew of 63 and the RN runs them with the RFA. It would mean we also have secure transportation to move our forces overseas as required.


----------



## Kirkhill

I understand the point about NEO operations.  Lebanon is the one that most immediately comes to mind.   In an active combat zone non combatants found their own way to the docks and then were shuttled to a safe haven in Cyprus as I recall.  

I am thinking more along the lines of the government being able to react rapidly to a developing crisis before the bullets start flying and discourage the opening of hostilities.   And then, when they discover they got it wrong and decide they don't want to hang around, are capable of extracting their troops, and their gear before they lose them all.

Where do you find vessels to urgently extract troops when the docks are under fire?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> I understand the point about NEO operations.  Lebanon is the one that most immediately comes to mind.   In an active combat zone non combatants found their own way to the docks and then were shuttled to a safe haven in Cyprus as I recall.
> 
> I am thinking more along the lines of the government being able to react rapidly to a developing crisis before the bullets start flying and discourage the opening of hostilities.   And then, when they discover they got it wrong and decide they don't want to hang around, are capable of extracting their troops, and their gear before they lose them all.
> 
> Where do you find vessels to urgently extract troops when the docks are under fire?


In a NEO there are points where people gather - they get themselves to those points. They get screened etc before moving to where they will be evacuated from. 

We should not invest in shipping based on the fear of being stranded in a theatre.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> As much as I like the Mistrals, I be happy with 2 Bay Class ships and would give up a CSC and AOP's for them. They need a crew of 63 and the RN runs them with the RFA. It would mean we also have secure transportation to move our forces overseas as required.



This is what the Point Class RoRo offers as PPP/PFI







This is what the Multi Role Vessel / Littoral Strike Ship / Special Operations Mothership looks like.







> Operational experience in the 1990's (Gulf War, Bosnia, ... ) demonstrated the difficulties the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had in rapidly obtaining and chartering suitable ships to move military equipment in the short timescales demanded by the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, and for supporting the Armed Forces’ needs in operations worldwide.
> The Strategic Defence Review 1998 identified a need for six Roll-On Roll-Off vessels (Ro-Ro) to give an improved strategic sealift capability to support the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. Operational experience has demonstrated the difficulties in obtaining suitable ships to move military equipment in the short timescales demanded by the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, and for the Armed Forces' needs in operations worldwide. An improved strategic sealift capability was a commitment in the SDR. It will play a key role in fulfilling the Armed Forces' equipment lift requirements in a wide range of operations, including those involving the deployment of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces.
> The full six-ship service is only required for major operation and exercise, so the MOD has pursued a contract for a long term service under the Private Finance Initiative. Under the terms of the contract the service provider can make ships available for the generation of commercial revenue, at times when they are not needed by MOD - thus delivering better value for money for the taxpayer.











						The Point-class Ro-Ro ships: getting the forces where they must go
					

Unglamorous but fundamental   The Point class Ro-Ro ships  Project designation:   SR(Sea) 7047 (JRRF Revise)  Status:  In service  I n Se...




					ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> In a NEO there are points where people gather - they get themselves to those points. They get screened etc before moving to where they will be evacuated from.
> 
> We should not invest in shipping based on the fear of being stranded in a theatre.




I'm not asking you to invest in anything.  I am asking the government to invest in a capacity that will serve the civilian economy in peace and also be available to pull the fat from the fire when and if.   It would also be available for charter for exercises and operations.

Personally I would sooner trust Canadian assets to a Canadian contract rather than rely on the good auspices of Cypriot, Panamanian, Ukrainian or even American commercial interests.








Canada
G-T-S Katie standoff ends​CBC News · Posted: Aug 03, 2000 6:36 AM ET | Last Updated: August 3, 2000
Canada's navy has boarded G-T-S Katie and two destroyers are now escorting the ship to port.
The Navy landed 14 Canadian soldiers on the vessel by helicopter.
The captain of the ship claimed his vessel was under attack.
Defence Minister Art Eggleton says there was no attack, the boarding went without incident and all Canadian personnel are safe. Eggleton says Canada has "stayed fully within the bounds of international law".
The small convoy is expected to arrive in Quebec on Sunday.
The American cargo ship is carrying $200 million worth of military equipment back from Kosovo, equipment used by Canadian peace-keepers in the Yugoslav province. It also had three Canadian military personnel returning from Kosovo.
The owners of the ship were refusing to bring it into port until a dispute over money owed was settled with the company contracted by the military to transport the equipment. Both sides are claiming the other side is not living up to their contract.
G-T-S Katie was supposed to have docked in Montreal a couple of weeks ago. But the cargo vessel anchored off the coast of Newfoundland about 160 kilometres off the Avalon Peninsula just outside Canadian territorial waters.
The two warships escorting the vessel are HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Montreal.


Is it really right to suggest that we have a viable plan and structures in place that should give us the necessary sense of comfort?



This is NOT proposed as a DND budget item.  This is and OGD/Private industry item which could be used to benefit the Government, including its DND.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> I'm not asking you to invest in anything.  I am asking the government to invest in a capacity that will serve the civilian economy in peace and also be available to pull the fat from the fire when and if.   It would also be available for charter for exercises and operations.
> 
> Personally I would sooner trust Canadian assets to a Canadian contract rather than rely on the good auspices of Cypriot, Panamanian, Ukrainian or even American commercial interests.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Canada
> G-T-S Katie standoff ends​CBC News · Posted: Aug 03, 2000 6:36 AM ET | Last Updated: August 3, 2000
> Canada's navy has boarded G-T-S Katie and two destroyers are now escorting the ship to port.
> The Navy landed 14 Canadian soldiers on the vessel by helicopter.
> The captain of the ship claimed his vessel was under attack.
> Defence Minister Art Eggleton says there was no attack, the boarding went without incident and all Canadian personnel are safe. Eggleton says Canada has "stayed fully within the bounds of international law".
> The small convoy is expected to arrive in Quebec on Sunday.
> The American cargo ship is carrying $200 million worth of military equipment back from Kosovo, equipment used by Canadian peace-keepers in the Yugoslav province. It also had three Canadian military personnel returning from Kosovo.
> The owners of the ship were refusing to bring it into port until a dispute over money owed was settled with the company contracted by the military to transport the equipment. Both sides are claiming the other side is not living up to their contract.
> G-T-S Katie was supposed to have docked in Montreal a couple of weeks ago. But the cargo vessel anchored off the coast of Newfoundland about 160 kilometres off the Avalon Peninsula just outside Canadian territorial waters.
> The two warships escorting the vessel are HMCS Athabaskan and HMCS Montreal.
> 
> 
> Is it really right to suggest that we have a viable plan and structures in place that should give us the necessary sense of comfort?
> 
> 
> 
> This is NOT proposed as a DND budget item.  This is and OGD/Private industry item which could be used to benefit the Government, including its DND.



Various European powers need shipping for troops etc mainly because: colonies and residual colonial commitments.

Canada? We're one of the main reasons they needed Navies in the first place.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Various European powers need shipping for troops etc mainly because: colonies and residual colonial commitments.
> 
> Canada? We're one of the main reasons they needed Navies in the first place.




I think I could argue that the Labrador and Nunavut are Canadian colonies that could benefit from a "Navy".   In fact if the Navy had been implemented in time then Joey Smallwood's evacuation of the outports may not have been necessary.



> *Between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, the Newfoundland government led by Premier Joey Smallwood closed 250 coastal villages. Thirty thousand people were uprooted and relocated to larger villages and towns.*
> 
> ....
> 
> *The provincial government also decided that it could not afford to bring modern services to these outports, many of which could be reached only by sea.*





			https://www.cbc.ca/history/EPISCONTENTSE1EP16CH3PA1LE.html


----------



## Kirkhill

Another couple of examples of civil infrastructure dual tasked for defence needs.

Swiss highway tunnels are built as bombproof shelters.
Swedish highways are built as runways.


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> Where do you find vessels to urgently extract troops when the docks are under fire?



Anywhere you can. You would be surprised how many ships can be chartered for a giant pile of money, even in a war zone.


----------



## GR66

Please describe the scenario where you foresee NATO being driven off the continent and forced to repeat a Dunkirk-type extraction?


----------



## medic5

GR66 said:


> Please describe the scenario where you foresee NATO being driven off the continent and forced to repeat a Dunkirk-type extraction?


Perhaps trapped in the Baltics if Putin decides to gamble it all? Maybe if the SCS goes hot and it plays out like 1942 in the Pacific where nearly every island is overrun? Near impossible but I just wanted to give some examples.


----------



## GR66

medic5 said:


> Perhaps trapped in the Baltics if Putin decides to gamble it all? Maybe if the SCS goes hot and it plays out like 1942 in the Pacific where nearly every island is overrun? Near impossible but I just wanted to give some examples.


If Russia overruns the Baltics we certainly won't be sending any transport ships...military or commercial into the Baltic State ports to pull out our troops.  And unless we by some miracle suddenly get a Marine Corps with all the offensive, opposed landing tools that would go with that we won't be landing any mechanized troops on the islands of the South China Seas.

There are a lot of other military needs where I'd prefer to see the GOC spend our tax dollars before it spends any money purchasing/subsidizing Ro-Ro ships (even in a PPP scheme).  To be honest, if we ever get to a situation where we have to deploy a Mechanized Brigade to Europe to defend against a Russian attack then the government could simply press the existing ferries into service due to the State of Emergency.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> If Russia overruns the Baltics we certainly won't be sending any transport ships...military or commercial into the Baltic State ports to pull out our troops. ...


No. But we might want to land a brigade or two in Bremen or Antwerp or Le Havre or Brest or even Bilbao and move north and make the line in the sand in Poland, or wherever, stronger.

I personally don't care if we have RCN ships or ones picked up from trade or some other structure. All I care about is that  a) there's a plan and b) we exercise it at reasonable intervals.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> No. But we might want to land a brigade or two in Bremen or Antwerp or Le Havre or Brest or even Bilbao and move north and make the line in the sand in Poland, or wherever, stronger.
> 
> I personally don't care if we have RCN ships or ones picked up from trade or some other structure. All I care about is that  a) there's a plan and b) we exercise it at reasonable intervals.
> 
> 🍻


I agree 100% that we need a plan and to practice it.  I just don't think that subsidizing new ships is worth the cost vs taking up civilian ships when required.  I imagine you could buy a lot of Javelin missiles or whatever for the cost of a pair of Ro-Ro ships on each coast.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I agree 100% that we need a plan and to practice it.  I just don't think that subsidizing new ships is worth the cost vs taking up civilian ships when required.  I imagine you could buy a lot of Javelin missiles or whatever for the cost of a pair of Ro-Ro ships on each coast.


My guess is that you are right considering we would only need one or two for a few months every few years or so. The only problem is ensuring  a system whereby the ships are guaranteed when required which might require some legislation, some cash on a stand-by basis and perhaps crews trained to operate the ships if the crew balks. - Nothing to worry about except if you don't plan for it and have contingency plans in place. Something we're not to good with as far as I know.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> My guess is that you are right considering we would only need one or two for a few months every few years or so. The only problem is ensuring  a system whereby the ships are guaranteed when required which might require some legislation, some cash on a stand-by basis and perhaps crews trained to operate the ships if the crew balks. - Nothing to worry about except if you don't plan for it and have contingency plans in place. Something we're not to good with as far as I know.
> 
> 🍻


CAST Redivivus.


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> My guess is that you are right considering we would only need one or two for a few months every few years or so. The only problem is ensuring  a system whereby the ships are guaranteed when required which might require some legislation, some cash on a stand-by basis and perhaps crews trained to operate the ships if the crew balks. - Nothing to worry about except if you don't plan for it and have contingency plans in place. Something we're not to good with as far as I know.
> 
> 🍻


What about that annual exercise I thought they started in Norway a few years ago.  Trident Juncture?

Even if done every 2nd year, like RIMPAC - that one exercise alone would help us smooth out a game plan for if we need to quickly contract ships & deploy.  

Good practice for DND in finding, acquiring, contracting the ships.

Good practice in moving & loading kit on this end, and unloading kit on the other end.  

Could we not just follow the plan we do for Trident Juncture?  Seems like a decently thought out and practiced plan?


----------



## suffolkowner

I've always liked the Bay Class and Point Class as well. Maybe subsidize a couple of extra ships for the Arctic sealift?






						The Government of Canada invests in Arctic sealift and re-supply operations and marks the fourth anniversary of the Oceans Protection Plan
					

/CNW/ - Communities in Canada's Arctic rely on marine sealift and re-supply services for food and important goods. Shipping in the Arctic can be challenging,...




					www.newswire.ca
				












						Flotte - Desgagnés Transarctik Inc.
					

Desgagnés Transarctik Inc.




					www.arcticsealift.com


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

CBH99 said:


> What about that annual exercise I thought they started in Norway a few years ago.  Trident Juncture?
> 
> Even if done every 2nd year, like RIMPAC - that one exercise alone would help us smooth out a game plan for if we need to quickly contract ships & deploy.
> 
> Good practice for DND in finding, acquiring, contracting the ships.
> 
> Good practice in moving & loading kit on this end, and unloading kit on the other end.
> 
> Could we not just follow the plan we do for Trident Juncture?  Seems like a decently thought out and practiced plan?


We done a couple of Trident Junctures. TRJE 18 involved us moving a Bde HQ, an infantry battalion and associated supports along with the ATF and national command/support elements into Norway. It was good to do it live and also as part of a large movement of troops (7 brigades flowing in), but it was also very expensive. I believe the TRJE livex series has been morphed into something less intensive (I’ve changed jobs since 2018).

We have strat movers and an organization that coordinates this.


----------



## GR66

Do the ships we're using for practicing our loading/unloading have to actually "sail"?  I'm sure the existing  Marine Atlantic ferries for example must go in for refit at Atlantic yards on some type of scheduled basis.  Could we contract with them to have their ships sit dockside for an extra week during their regular maintenance so we can do a loading/unloading exercise?


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> We done a couple of Trident Junctures. TRJE 18 involved us moving a Bde HQ, an infantry battalion and associated supports along with the ATF and national command/support elements into Norway. It was good to do it live and also as part of a large movement of troops (7 brigades flowing in), but it was also very expensive. I believe the TRJE livex series has been morphed into something less intensive (I’ve changed jobs since 2018).
> 
> We have strat movers and an organization that coordinates this.



Good stuff! I assume that 'trains' were involved at one point?

It's not a real logistics test of a formation level landing unless it involves train networks, of course


----------



## SeaKingTacco

daftandbarmy said:


> Good stuff! I assume that 'trains' were involved at one point?
> 
> It's not a real logistics test of a formation level landing unless it involves train networks, of course


Trains are “super fun”.

I remember the train loading in Wainwright after RV92. A day long affair, as each CN rail employee had a different opinion on how vehicles were supposed to be chained and chocked. We must have chained and chocked at least a dozen different ways that day….


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Please describe the scenario where you foresee NATO being driven off the continent and forced to repeat a Dunkirk-type extraction?



When NATO splits and leaves the Eastern states facing Russia on their own?  I honestly can't see Germany, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy fronting the Russians.  On the other hand I can't see the Scandinavians, the Balts, the Poles, Hungarians, and Romanians doing anything other.   And I suspect the Bulgarians are just as likely to side with the Russians.  Given that level of uncertainty I think it is appropriate to keep a viable exit strategy on hand.  And, for me, that means keeping a ready supply of shipping on hand to rapidly relocate heavy gear en masse.  There is a reason for the sayings about burning your boats behind you.  



GR66 said:


> With it highly unlikely that any Canadian government will be willing to pay the cost of forward stationing a CMBG in Europe (especially with the CF-18 replacements, the CSCs and our huge pandemic debt eating up so much of the budget) *I think it's fair to assume that any major Canadian military combat force deployed to Europe will be after the fighting begins.*
> 
> That being the case then probably the most logical and effective thing the Army could do (in terms of rapid response while our heavy forces muster) would be to figure out what air-deployable assets we could rapidly mobilize to protect and support our forward deployed fighters (likely our most effective rapid reaction force) - airfield defence troops, AD units, engineers, etc. - or a selection of ISR assets to identify targets and/or light fires units to slow the advance.



But how do we muster any forces "after the fighting begins" with no lift assets on hand, and no willingness to risk them?



Humphrey Bogart said:


> Age old proverb of Naval Warfare that is still applicable today:
> 
> "A Ship's a fool to fight a fort"
> 
> Sailing a flotilla of CSCs anywhere in to what are basically littoral waters, is a recipe for disaster in a full fledged war.  The Bear would sink us faster than you can snap your fingers.
> 
> As for developing an Amphibious Capability....
> 
> Waste of money IMO.  What we could use though is an actual JSS like the Karel Doorman that could be used for Commando Actions, HADR, NEO, etc.
> 
> Something that is capable of carrying additional supplies, supporting a SOTF, acting as a C2 Platform, carrying a couple of Chinooks, etc.  Give it some ice-breaking capability and we could even use it up North.



I can't get over this comment I'm afraid.  How did Britain end up with the Falklands, most of the Caribbean, the free run of the Pacific and taking Louisbourg and Quebec?  How about the Americans taking the Pacific Islands from the Japanese?  D-Day?  Retaking the Falklands?  I suggest there have been an awful lot of successful fools out there.

Having said that, the secret, IMO has been to supply the ships with guns that outrange those of the fort.    And adding Tomahawks, SM6s, and potentially PrSMs to the loadout of the CSCs would do that.  Or is standing off 1700 km from shore in blue water still considered Littoral Warfare?




Infanteer said:


> I would start by going:
> 
> Europe, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Asian-Pacific, North America, South America.
> 
> What is the Army likely to be doing in these places, how would it go about doing them, and what is the priority?




The target set defined here is essentially everywhere.  That suggests to me the NEED to deploy everywhere if the Army wants to present the Government with credible options for using it.  Or what is the purpose of maintaining the Army?  

Is the Army CAPABLE of deploying everywhere assuming a Medium Weight LAV/MBT based force? 

I am going to stipulate that there are going to be places the Army might deploy that the Navy can't reach - even with 1700 km fire support.   And that air movement is going to be necessary for places like Mali and Afghanistan.  That is one of the reasons I would like the Army to be able to replicate the capabilities of a CSC ashore - and that puts a heavy emphasis on the RCA.

As noted above I believe that we have the ability to move a Light Force into an uncontested airfield and establish a conveyor from Canada to the objective country and that that can be done expeditiously.  Complete with a useful GBAD-CRAM capability deliverable by C-17.

I further accept that moving a Medium CMBG into that environment by air is unrealistic.  If we are talking about surging the entire Brigade in a week.

But.

If we hold that airfield for a week or two we can start beefing up the Light force with, perhaps, a LAV Company?  And an MBT troop?  How much more reinforcement could flow in over a month? Three months?  I'm fairly sure that is how you established the persistent presence in Afghanistan.   And perhaps T2Bs eFP?  Given time, and money, anything is possible.  The problems start when neither is there but there remains that GAP between NEED and CAPABILITY.  Underway noted that it is possible to buy ships to go into war zones on short notice, if you are willing to pay a fortune.  And, I would add, you are willing to generate expedient plans on short notice. 

The other problem, and I still maintain it is a legitimate one, is how do you extract your force when the enemy starts voting?   What are we willing to sacrifice in the interests of Canada?  Do we leave the Brigade to die in place?  Do we reinforce it?  Will our allies save us or will they be otherwise engaged? Do we withdraw the force with their gear?  Or do we just withdraw the troops with whatever they can carry on their backs?

In Mali and Afghanistan the only option is by air.  In the Baltic, and the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea, and the China Seas there is the theoretical option of movement by sea.  If it's not a practical option then perhaps that needs to made plain.  Otherwise I fear we are back to the era of the CAST Brigade.

The Canadian Air Sea Transportable Brigade, for reference was a force tasked to the reinforcement of Norway in 1968 by the government of the day.  It was predicated on moving a Mechanized Brigade from Valcartier, along with a couple of CF-5 Squadrons from Bagotville, to Norway on thirty days notice if Norway asked and if Norway sent the ships to Canada to pick up the Brigade.   That force was seldom exercised and never used.  Mulroney decided to cut the allocation and reallocate the troops to the German theater where they had been tasked prior to 1968.  And then the wall fell and everybody came home.... or went to Yugoslavia.

My concern is that we may end up talking a good game, even as we continue to focus our efforts on the Russians and ignore the Chinese, and end up, once again, leaving Norwegians, Danes, Swedes, Finns, Balts, Poles, etc disappointed and facing the Russians on their own.


----------



## Kirkhill

And just to throw another perspective into the discussion...









						How the F-35 Has Reshaped the Strategic Balance in Europe
					

Because of its heavy investment in military technology, Russia was recently thought to have achieved an edge in air power over its NATO rivals. However, that advantage is now up for debate due to the




					www.realcleardefense.com


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill said:


> I can't get over this comment I'm afraid. *How did Britain end up with the Falklands, most of the Caribbean, the free run of the Pacific and taking Louisbourg and Quebec*? How about the Americans taking the Pacific Islands from the Japanese? D-Day? *Retaking the Falklands*? I suggest there have been an awful lot of successful fools out there.


Major Capital ships of the day and, more recently, SSNs.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill,

We put a mechanized BG in Afghanistan and sustained it there for years. It went partway by ship, and the rest of the way (shortest possible) by air. We can move mechanized BGs and CMBGs across the Atlantic. Perhaps you are obsessed with Dunkirk, but if the EFP would have the time and space to stage back onto a very vulnerable RORO it would also have the time and space to drive South and then West out of contact. If it came to a situation of being able to extract the troops but not the equipment in the opening round of a general war, we have a factory for LAVs.  

If your assumption is that NATO splits then there is not much rational to talk about in the context of FORCE 2025. The countries you enumerated are in the NATO Baltic states right now. 

Transporting a CMBG to Europe would be a major endeavor, but the greater challenge would be the generation of that CMBG for that conventional war. The selection and generation of those capabilities required by the CMBG is more important than worrying about how to move them across the Atlantic. At the risk of minimizing the problem, we have people who work on the movement problem. 

At the risk of a history thread, you don't fight a fort with a ship (assuming equivalent technology of course). The ship (or boats) drops off sufficient soldiers and artillery out of range of the fort who then take it from the landward side. Tyre, Quebec, Louisburg, Singapore, Port Stanley. etc.


----------



## Kirkhill

For you T2B









						Army Signals The Abrams Tank Is Here To Stay
					

The Abrams tank is destined to outlive many of the warfighting systems that appeared following its debut in 1980.




					www.forbes.com
				




I do think though that with respect to the discussion about Tanks we are approaching the world of Grandfather's Axe.   For the Americans a Tank will be an Abrams and an Abrams will be a tank.  



> Abrams looks likely to remain a core capability in warfighting plans through mid-century, because soldiers can’t live without it if they are to engage in ground combat with near-peer adversaries like Russia.





> a revolution in digital technology would also give tanks exceptional situational awareness, lethality and adaptability.
> 
> The Army has leveraged these emerging technologies to upgrade Abrams capabilities several times, resulting in the latest version, officially designated M1A2SEPV4.



I look forward to the M1A2SEPV10 circa 2050.  Remote self-loading gun launching loitering UAVs to 50 km.   Lighter.  New Comms. New Sensors.  New power pack.  New running gear.  One man crew.  Hover package under trials.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Kirkhill,
> 
> We put a mechanized BG in Afghanistan and sustained it there for years. It went partway by ship, and the rest of the way (shortest possible) by air. We can move mechanized BGs and CMBGs across the Atlantic. Perhaps you are obsessed with Dunkirk, but if the EFP would have the time and space to stage back onto a very vulnerable RORO it would also have the time and space to drive South and then West out of contact. If it came to a situation of being able to extract the troops but not the equipment in the opening round of a general war, we have a factory for LAVs.
> 
> If your assumption is that NATO splits then there is not much rational to talk about in the context of FORCE 2025. The countries you enumerated are in the NATO Baltic states right now.
> 
> Transporting a CMBG to Europe would be a major endeavor, but the greater challenge would be the generation of that CMBG for that conventional war. The selection and generation of those capabilities required by the CMBG is more important than worrying about how to move them across the Atlantic. At the risk of minimizing the problem, we have people who work on the movement problem.
> 
> At the risk of a history thread, you don't fight a fort with a ship (assuming equivalent technology of course). The ship (or boats) drops off sufficient soldiers and artillery out of range of the fort who then take it from the landward side. Tyre, Quebec, Louisburg, Singapore, Port Stanley. etc.



The Scandinavian countries continue to rely on shore fortifications as a strong deterrent:

Land-Based Coastal Defence Is Indeed No Joke​
What lessons does this offer for the 21st century? Well, for a start, mobile, land-based coastal defence is especially useful as an asymmetrical tactic for a weaker belligerent fighting in its home littorals. This fits well into an A2/AD strategy a smaller state worried about being invaded might employ. Training, equipping and deploying capable land-based coastal defence unit is more cost-efficient (if less prestigious) than deploying a large navy in order to control offshore waters. Second, it is most effective if it takes advantage of rough terrain and weather. Finally, it can be an effective delaying tactic as a part of a wider defence strategy, especially if the defender is waiting for aid from abroad. By coastal defences’ very presence, an attacker might have to reconsider where it should land its invading forces.









						Land-Based Coastal Defence Is Indeed No Joke
					

Need more examples? Look to Northern Europe during WWII.



					thediplomat.com


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The Scandinavian countries continue to rely on shore fortifications as a strong deterrent:
> 
> Land-Based Coastal Defence Is Indeed No Joke​
> What lessons does this offer for the 21st century? Well, for a start, mobile, land-based coastal defence is especially useful as an asymmetrical tactic for a weaker belligerent fighting in its home littorals. This fits well into an A2/AD strategy a smaller state worried about being invaded might employ. Training, equipping and deploying capable land-based coastal defence unit is more cost-efficient (if less prestigious) than deploying a large navy in order to control offshore waters. Second, it is most effective if it takes advantage of rough terrain and weather. Finally, it can be an effective delaying tactic as a part of a wider defence strategy, especially if the defender is waiting for aid from abroad. By coastal defences’ very presence, an attacker might have to reconsider where it should land its invading forces.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Land-Based Coastal Defence Is Indeed No Joke
> 
> 
> Need more examples? Look to Northern Europe during WWII.
> 
> 
> 
> thediplomat.com



Isn't that precisely what the USMC is exploiting?  A deployable, relocatable, coastal artillery capability - that redefines Littoral Warfare as anything within 1700 km of a shoreline.

And if that... then does that mean that invasions, and even reinforcements, have become impractical?


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Kirkhill,
> 
> We put a mechanized BG in Afghanistan and sustained it there for years. It went partway by ship, and the rest of the way (shortest possible) by air. We can move mechanized BGs and CMBGs across the Atlantic. Perhaps you are obsessed with Dunkirk, but if the EFP would have the time and space to stage back onto a very vulnerable RORO it would also have the time and space to drive South and then West out of contact. If it came to a situation of being able to extract the troops but not the equipment in the opening round of a general war, we have a factory for LAVs.
> 
> If your assumption is that NATO splits then there is not much rational to talk about in the context of FORCE 2025. The countries you enumerated are in the NATO Baltic states right now.
> 
> Transporting a CMBG to Europe would be a major endeavor, but the greater challenge would be the generation of that CMBG for that conventional war. The selection and generation of those capabilities required by the CMBG is more important than worrying about how to move them across the Atlantic. At the risk of minimizing the problem, we have people who work on the movement problem.
> 
> At the risk of a history thread, you don't fight a fort with a ship (assuming equivalent technology of course). The ship (or boats) drops off sufficient soldiers and artillery out of range of the fort who then take it from the landward side. Tyre, Quebec, Louisburg, Singapore, Port Stanley. etc.



Consider, then a Battle Group, supported by a floating expeditionary support base.  A developing concept for the USMC.  Not necessarily a new idea.

Canada did something along those lines in Somalia, backing up the (light) Canadian Airborne Regiment, living under canvas, with  HMCS Preserver supplying helo support, maintenance, hospital, command and control and R&R facilities.  Floating warehouse and gas station.

How about deploying a JSS and an Asterix in the first roto of an army mission?  Leave them in place long enough to see how the situation develops and whether heavier weapons stored aboard might be required.

I know all sorts of things are possible.  If cash.  And I am truly impressed by the work arounds the CAF has managed to achieve both its, and government's, objectives.   

But is Force 2025 simply an exercise in deciding to "cross that bridge when we get there"?  Or are you trying to devise a functional force that will provide the 80% solution?


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> For consideration: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc47/mds/Kieley.pdf



Had a good chance to read through it now.  

Hard to disagree with him or his conclusions.


----------



## Underway

SeaKingTacco said:


> Trains are “super fun”.
> 
> I remember the train loading in Wainwright after RV92. A day long affair, as each CN rail employee had a different opinion on how vehicles were supposed to be chained and chocked. We must have chained and chocked at least a dozen different ways that day….


Haha I totally agree. I was work party for a train loading. It was quite a workday.  But really interesting nevertheless.


----------



## blacktriangle

Am I the only one that thinks we should perhaps leave close combat in Europe, to say, Europeans? Send fires & ISR,  advisors, plus appropriate sustainment.

On the other hand, I think Canada would be capable of contributing something like the LRRG the UK is running in Mali.


----------



## Good2Golf

reveng said:


> Am I the only one that thinks we should perhaps leave close combat in Europe, to say, Europeans? Send fires & ISR,  advisors, plus appropriate sustainment.
> 
> On the other hand, I think Canada would be capable of contributing something like the LRRG the UK is running in Mali.


Which fires? What ISR?  

LRRG - using TAPV?  

Canada: “Meh, we’ve already done Mali…”


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Had a good chance to read through it now.
> 
> Hard to disagree with him or his conclusions.


I disagree with him. IMHO he has situated the estimate. My biggest problem is the statement "



> ... When this design model is applied to the Canadian Army it reveals a discordant force that both maintains overly expensive and complex capabilities that it is  unlikely to employ, and that simultaneously fails to invest in urgently required capabilities that have already been mastered by former third world nations. ...



While he asks all the right questions, he immediately narrows the debate by using the term "... unlikely to employ ..." to utterly dismiss an entire class of weaponry without proper argument or a proper evaluation of the courses open or a proper risk assessment.

Missing from his argument is the much needed reform to eliminate the waste of funds inherent within the central administrative overhead structure of DND/CAF nor any discussion of the options available through the use of reserve forces (particulalry for those "unlikely to employ" scenarios).

Yup. He's right. The Army's not structured right. Nope. He's wrong about his desired structure for the future. We had a similar vision two decades ago. How'd that work out for us? Let's face it. If we're so outmatched then why don't we pack the whole shebang in and simply turn the whole thing into a "rent a constabulary expeditionary force from India" when we need it. That would probably save us ten to fifteen billion a year (except of course that NDHQ/CAFHQ will still be there sucking up dollars - we'll need garlic and a wooden stake to put that 🧛‍♂️🧛‍♀️outfit down)

🍻


----------



## suffolkowner

Good2Golf said:


> Which fires? What ISR?
> 
> LRRG - using TAPV?
> 
> Canada: “Meh, we’ve already done Mali…”


Is the TAPV not an acceptable vehicle for this mission?

It doesn't seem like LRRG is that onerous a mission, 300 troops some Jackals, Coyotes and Foxhounds?


----------



## Good2Golf

Not a recce guy myself, but I’ve not heard good things about the TAPV…some joke they’d rather have BRDMs… 

If we did do something like LRRG, I’d think that would be a CSOR thing, given the potential AQIM nexus.


----------



## suffolkowner

Good2Golf said:


> Not a recce guy myself, but I’ve not heard good things about the TAPV…some joke they’d rather have BRDMs…
> 
> If we did do something like LRRG, I’d think that would be a CSOR thing, given the potential AQIM nexus.


On the surface it just seems like the TAPV would be more capable. Breaking down, rolling over and catching on fire disregarded


----------



## suffolkowner

FJAG said:


> I disagree with him. IMHO he has situated the estimate. My biggest problem is the statement "
> 
> 
> 
> While he asks all the right questions, he immediately narrows the debate by using the term "... unlikely to employ ..." to utterly dismiss an entire class of weaponry without proper argument or a proper evaluation of the courses open or a proper risk assessment.
> 
> Missing from his argument is the much needed reform to eliminate the waste of funds inherent within the central administrative overhead structure of DND/CAF nor any discussion of the options available through the use of reserve forces (particulalry for those "unlikely to employ" scenarios).
> 
> Yup. He's right. The Army's not structured right. Nope. He's wrong about his desired structure for the future. We had a similar vision two decades ago. How'd that work out for us? Let's face it. If we're so outmatched then why don't we pack the whole shebang in and simply turn the whole thing into a "rent a constabulary expeditionary force from India" when we need it. That would probably save us ten to fifteen billion a year (except of course that NDHQ/CAFHQ will still be there sucking up dollars - we'll need garlic and a wooden stake to put that 🧛‍♂️🧛‍♀️outfit down)
> 
> 🍻


It's hard to see the overly complex and expensive capabilities the Army is maintaining. If you could guarantee that the tanks would be replaced by everyones favorite wish lists, I would buy into the argument. The Leo2's are not the reason we don't have SPH's, MLRS, GBAD, SHORAD, TUA-AT, SP Mortar carrier, and drone and anti-drone capabilities


----------



## Brad Sallows

> A deployable, relocatable, coastal artillery capability



Bombers that launch from a long way out.


----------



## daftandbarmy

reveng said:


> Am I the only one that thinks we should perhaps leave close combat in Europe, to say, Europeans? Send fires & ISR,  advisors, plus appropriate sustainment.
> 
> On the other hand, I think Canada would be capable of contributing something like the LRRG the UK is running in Mali.



That happened a couple of times before, in 1913 and 1938. They didn't do so well IIRC ...


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> That happened a couple of times before, in 1913 and 1938. They didn't do so well IIRC ...


Which is why alliances like NATO exist


----------



## blacktriangle

Good2Golf said:


> Which fires? What ISR?
> 
> LRRG - using TAPV?
> 
> Canada: “Meh, we’ve already done Mali…”


I know we have nothing suitable. I’m simply suggesting an alternative COA. It would take considerable investment. However, if we are indeed serious about defending Europe…

As for the TAPV, I remember a thread on here when the program was announced. IIRC. what the recce types said they didn’t want, is exactly what they got in the end…


----------



## Good2Golf

reveng said:


> I know we have nothing suitable. I’m simply suggesting an alternative COA. It would take considerable investment. However, if we are indeed serious about defending Europe…
> 
> As for the TAPV, I remember a thread on here when the program was announced. IIRC. what the recce types said they didn’t want, is exactly what they got in the end…


Yeah, at least when US Congress forces stuff on DoD, it’s usually not bad…”Here USAF, take 200 more F-15EX, whether you like it, or not.”


----------



## Underway

Bit of a sidetrack but last I heard TAPV was being removed from the RegF Recce game and being replaced with LAV 6 Recce variants.  TAPV's were going to be doing other tasks.  Not too sure if that's true or not but it made sense when I heard it.


----------



## markppcli

The guys teaching ATL I spoke to informed me part of the “cavalry” change is 4 car troops, down from the doctrinal 8 Coyote Recce troop, which would align for the LAV Recce numbers.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> That happened a couple of times before, in 1913 and 1938. They didn't do so well IIRC ...


How many nuclear weapons did the West have in 1913 and 1938?  There are fundamental differences between pre-1945 and now.  

While we prepared for the USSR rolling through the Fulda Gap during the Cold War, the fact that they didn't attempt it is more due to the fact that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volgograd, and basically every other significant population centre in the Soviet Union would be a smoldering crater if they managed to break through than it was to the perceived strength of 4 CMBG or the rest of NATO's forces.

Does that mean we ignore conventional deterrence or the threat that Russia poses?  Of course not.  But I think we should be realistic about the threat that Russia actually poses to Western Europe.  Absolutely I believe they could possibly take advantage of any perceived Western weakness to re-take some of their former client regions...especially those areas with significant Russian minorities.  

However you'll have a difficult time convincing me that we need to fear Russian armoured columns driving towards the Rhine.  The Russian Army is a fraction of the size that the Warsaw Pact was able to field at the end of the Cold War.  The average age in Russia has gone from 34.9 in 1990 to 40.2 in 2020.  The population of NATO nations is 941 million vs 146 million in Russia.  

Russia simply isn't an existential threat to the West in a conventional war and they have no interest in committing national suicide in a nuclear war any more than we do.  Accidents of course can happen, but in my opinion as long as we retain our overall conventional military overmatch to deter them from making a big gamble in a place where we have no choice but to escalate if we face a set-back then I believe there are numerous non-military levers we have that we can use that can be as, or more effective than strictly military levers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> *Russia simply isn't an existential threat to the West in a conventional war *and they have no interest in committing national suicide in a nuclear war any more than we do.  Accidents of course can happen, but in my opinion as long as we retain our overall conventional military overmatch to deter them from making a big gamble in a place where we have no choice but to escalate if we face a set-back then I believe there are numerous non-military levers we have that we can use that can be as, or more effective than strictly military levers.



The Russians aren't fighting a conventional war right now, but they are making gains in the 'sphere of influence expansion', especially with the states on it's western borders.

Putin won't do a smash and grab but he might do a 'sneak a cheek', like Crimea, especially where he perceives weakness on the part of NATO members and a sense of disunity or apathy from his intended targets.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> The Russians aren't fighting a conventional war right now, but they are making gains in the 'sphere of influence expansion', especially with the states on it's western borders.
> 
> Putin won't do a smash and grab but he might do a 'sneak a cheek', like Crimea, especially where he perceives weakness on the part of NATO members and a sense of disunity or apathy from his intended targets.


100% agreed.  There are lot of things we could/should do to deter/prevent Russia from doing these things, but some people seem to fixate on the spectre of an all-out conventional war vs Russia.  

Armoured Divisions are important in the overall balance of power between Russia and NATO and have an important role to play, but they probably aren't the solution to the most likely threats from Russia.  Information Ops, Little Green Men, political interference, hacking, economic pressure, etc. are probably more likely weapons of choice over Armata tanks.  

Don't get me wrong.  I support EFP Latvia and think we should do anything we can to make that contribution more potent in deterring any potential Russian aggression.  That being said, my personal opinion is that a full Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Europe likely wouldn't make any real difference in the balance of real power.  Russia doesn't want to get into a war with NATO that doesn't have any real clear end game...they wan't to increase their sphere of influence with minimal cost.  

EPF Latvia (the more well equipped the better) is good to prevent a miscalculation by Russia that they can get what they want with military force, but I believe that blocking Russian efforts to negatively impact the infrastructure, governance and social cohesion of the Baltic States would be a better investment by the West than stationing more Canadian troops and Tanks on the Russian border.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> The Russians aren't fighting a conventional war right now, but they are making gains in the 'sphere of influence expansion', especially with the states on it's western borders.
> 
> Putin won't do a smash and grab but he might do a 'sneak a cheek', like Crimea, especially where he perceives weakness on the part of NATO members and a sense of disunity or apathy from his intended targets.


Don't forget the unseen war thats been going on for awhile now in cyber space, we are far being in the cyber, and IA game, and it shows, I wouldn't be surprised at all if much of the anti-vax movement in the west was actually being pushed by russian or chinese interests to destabilize the west.


----------



## Kirkhill

I think Putin's role models are not so much Stalin and Brezhnev as Potemkin and Rasputin.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> That happened a couple of times before, in 1913 and 1938. They didn't do so well IIRC ...



Of course you could argue the definition of insanity...expecting a different result


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Of course you could argue the definition of insanity...expecting a different result


Are you referring to Army organization threads on Army.ca?


----------



## Underway

GR66 said:


> How many nuclear weapons did the West have in 1913 and 1938?  There are fundamental differences between pre-1945 and now.
> 
> While we prepared for the USSR rolling through the Fulda Gap during the Cold War, the fact that they didn't attempt it is more due to the fact that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volgograd, and basically every other significant population centre in the Soviet Union would be a smoldering crater if they managed to break through than it was to the perceived strength of 4 CMBG or the rest of NATO's forces.
> 
> Does that mean we ignore conventional deterrence or the threat that Russia poses?  Of course not.  But I think we should be realistic about the threat that Russia actually poses to Western Europe.  Absolutely I believe they could possibly take advantage of any perceived Western weakness to re-take some of their former client regions...especially those areas with significant Russian minorities.
> 
> However you'll have a difficult time convincing me that we need to fear Russian armoured columns driving towards the Rhine.  The Russian Army is a fraction of the size that the Warsaw Pact was able to field at the end of the Cold War.  The average age in Russia has gone from 34.9 in 1990 to 40.2 in 2020.  The population of NATO nations is 941 million vs 146 million in Russia.
> 
> Russia simply isn't an existential threat to the West in a conventional war and they have no interest in committing national suicide in a nuclear war any more than we do.  Accidents of course can happen, but in my opinion as long as we retain our overall conventional military overmatch to deter them from making a big gamble in a place where we have no choice but to escalate if we face a set-back then I believe there are numerous non-military levers we have that we can use that can be as, or more effective than strictly military levers.


It's even more simple than that.

Russia despite its reputation in recent years only ever invades a country for its own defensive interests.  The Russians are _*pathologically afraid*_ of invasion.  Mongols, Vikings, Poland/Lithuania, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Prussia, Germany, France, Japan, the US, UK, even Canada have at one time intervened or invaded Russia.  All of Russia's foreign policy and military actions since its founding have been with two major objectives in mind.  Frost-free port and defend the motherland.

There are 3 or 4 invasion routes into Russia.  The biggest one is the northern European plain which runs from France to Moscow.  There is the southern Carpathian route which runs through Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine.  Then there is the Caucasus'.  And of course, the east route the Mongols took but there hasn't really been an invasion like that since "modern" Russia has existed.

All of Putin's moves have been to plug those defensive gaps.  Russian demography is falling off a cliff and the number of conscripts available in the next 10 years will be half of what it is today.  This means if Russia can't plug those gaps somehow they won't have enough troops to defend themselves.

Wrecking Georgia (Caucasus route) when they were about to join NATO.  Wrecking Ukraine and annexing Crimea (Caucasus and Carpathian route) when Ukraine had a western-backed revolt against an elected pro-Russian.  Backstopping Belarussia (Northern European Plain) no matter how sketchy they are.

Russia isn't a non-nuclear threat to the core NATO nations.  We are a threat to them, and they are playing the game to protect themselves.

To bring it back around to Force 2025:  Is Russia and China who we should be organizing against.  A war against China will be all navy and airforce.  Maybe army to retake Taiwan.  Against Russia unless we invade them they aren't going to go much further.  Not to mention the rest of NATO could slap Russia badly without breaking too much of a sweat.  Hell Europe alone could do it.


----------



## Infanteer

Underway said:


> It's even more simple than that.
> 
> ....
> 
> To bring it back around to Force 2025:  Is Russia and China who we should be organizing against.  A war against China will be all navy and airforce.  Maybe army to retake Taiwan.  Against Russia unless we invade them they aren't going to go much further.  Not to mention the rest of NATO could slap Russia badly without breaking too much of a sweat.  Hell Europe alone could do it.


Blammo.  This is where any Force Structure analysis needs to start - a realistic strategic assessment.


----------



## Ostrozac

Underway said:


> To bring it back around to Force 2025:  Is Russia and China who we should be organizing against.


That isn't a bad point. A Canadian Army that is organized for counter insurgency battle groups, with the capacity to surge, in an emergency, to provide a brigade against a second-tier conventional army like Iran or North Korea looks very different from a Canadian Army that is trained and equipped to fight head to head against the Russians and Chinese. A choice has to be made. The first option will get thoroughly defeated if it tries punching above its weight. The second option is decidedly more expensive, and absolutely needs a functioning procurement system.


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> ... Against Russia unless we invade them they aren't going to go much further.  Not to mention the rest of NATO could slap Russia badly without breaking too much of a sweat.  Hell Europe alone could do it.



The problem with building buffer zones is that there's always another buffer zone required until a natural obstacle arises. In Europe there are enormous swatches of land with no barriers except the odd crossable river. 

The last time Russia built a buffer zone around itself it took some 50 years for the buffers to free themselves from Communist and Russian domination.

I'm not looking to attack Russia. I'm looking at stopping yet one more Georgia or Donbass before they happen. Maybe I took it too seriously when a Russian diplomat told me that if the Baltics ever join NATO, the tanks will roll.



> _The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression_.[1]
> [1] Ochmanek, David _et al._ “U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World” _RAND Corp_ 2017 at p. 45 Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning



That means a credible force in the right place or a with a solid plan to be in the right place when required.

For me the concept of force structure and equipment has always been fairly easy. Since we will undoubtedly not deploy without a major presence from our North American neighbour we should be structured and equipped exactly like them so that we can fully interoperate, if necessary using their equipment, seamlessly. And they do have a lot of spare equipment and new capabilities to work with.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> I'm looking at stopping yet one more Georgia or Donbass before they happen. Maybe I took it too seriously when a Russian diplomat told me that if the Baltics ever join NATO, the tanks will roll.


Sorry to break it to you mate, but they joined NATO....😀

The next logical question is what constitutes a deterrent?  Do tripwire multinational battlegroups?  Does a trip wire need a specific capability, or could we achieve the same effect with a summer Cadet Camp?


----------



## McG

We could probably do it more effectively with a cadet camp. Canadian's are more likely to demand vengance if the Russian war machine rolls over a bunch of our teenagers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> For me the concept of force structure and equipment has always been fairly easy. Since we will undoubtedly not deploy without a major presence from our North American neighbour we should be structured and equipped exactly like them so that we can fully interoperate, if necessary using their equipment, seamlessly. And they do have a lot of spare equipment and new capabilities to work with.
> 
> 🍻



The weakness in this plan is, of course, the food.

If we had to eat hominay, black eyed peas and chicken fried steak I'm pretty sure we'd have a rebellion on our hands (except the Newfies of course  ).


----------



## Underway

Ostrozac said:


> That isn't a bad point. A Canadian Army that is organized for counter insurgency battle groups, with the capacity to surge, in an emergency, to provide a brigade...


Are we though?  That's the experience and perhaps the application, but not the true organizational lines. 

The Canadian Army seems to be organized (intentionally or not) to retain/train core capabilities.  Train the Ref F up (and PRes short term surge) to use those capabilities and then provide the structure on which the army can be grown into a fighting force in the case of a general conflict. The WW2 model. 

The other organizational structure is political.  Every region gets tanks, every region gets a base or two.  Everyone gets reserve units because of "historical reasons" or "awareness". Regimental Senates (what a joke those are) are selected because of local political influence to ensure that they stay.


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> Sorry to break it to you mate, but they joined NATO....😀
> 
> The next logical question is what constitutes a deterrent?  Do tripwire multinational battlegroups?  Does a trip wire need a specific capability, or could we achieve the same effect with a summer Cadet Camp?


 So we're up to using child hostages as shields now?

Yup. They are in NATO and therein lies our Article 5 dilemma. One tends to gloss over the fact that ethnic Russians make up about 25% of Latvia's population and almost 50% of Riga's. It would take very little to foment an "independence and reconnect with the Motherland" movement a la Eastern Ukraine.

Maybe growing up in Berlin in the 1950s jaded my view of the Russians. I personally think most Russians are great people with an impressive culture but I wouldn't trust their leadership one inch when it comes to their own self interest and survival in power. We're already at war with that leadership except on a level we've never experienced before. The "figurative" tanks have been rolling for some time now.

This isn't going to cut it forever.


----------



## CBH99

McG said:


> We could probably do it more effectively with a cadet camp. Canadian's are more likely to demand vengance if the Russian war machine rolls over a bunch of our teenagers.


Hmmmmmmmmmm… 🤔 🤷🏼‍♂️


----------



## blacktriangle

daftandbarmy said:


> That happened a couple of times before, in 1913 and 1938. They didn't do so well IIRC ...


To be fair, I did say we should leave _close combat _to the Europeans. That doesn't mean there aren't other, better ways to contribute to the alliance.


----------



## daftandbarmy

reveng said:


> To be fair, I did say we should leave _close combat _to the Europeans. That doesn't mean there aren't other, better ways to contribute to the alliance.



IIRC that Mackenzie-King tried to keep us out of yet another European Civil War by offering to run this program instead:









						British Commonwealth Air Training Plan - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




That didn't work out so well either 

But yes, there are other roles that might be useful as an alternative to close combat, however, we'd better get used to having not much say in what happens...


----------



## blacktriangle

daftandbarmy said:


> But yes, there are other roles that might be useful as an alternative to close combat, *however, we'd better get used to having not much say in what happens...*


Other than in the minds of the uniformed bureaucracy in Ottawa & perhaps some on this forum, I'd say that's already the case.


----------



## CBH99

I was going to say...do we get much of a say in what happens as it stands now?


----------



## markppcli

An interesting study in a similar sized military task organized for their security concerns.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> For me the concept of force structure and equipment has always been fairly easy. Since we will undoubtedly not deploy without a major presence from our North American neighbour we should be structured and equipped exactly like them so that we can fully interoperate, if necessary using their equipment, seamlessly. And they do have a lot of spare equipment and new capabilities to work with.
> 
> 🍻




My problem with that is that there is then little difference between Canada and the Warsaw Pact. We might as well recruit Canadians and use them to fill seats in American vehicles.   And we weren't willing to do that for the Brits, even when we were British.  Sam Hughes fixed that problem.

Are we destined to be an Imperial Auxiliary?   Or do we get to pick and choose our fights?

And if we are getting to pick and choose why not choose to pick something that we feel we can afford in both treasure and blood.

Was Paul Hellyer so wrong in his appreciation of the situation?  I don't think so.  We are a long way from the fight.  Any fight.  What strategic influence can the army, any army, in any structure, bring to bear in a timely fashion.  I can't say that I am a fan of a heavy force deployed in Canada.  Garrisoned in Europe.  Yes.  Garrisoned in Canada? Without adequate transport?  No.  

Regardless of the weight of force we choose to deploy, it has to be able to get into the fight before the fight is over.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The weakness in this plan is, of course, the food.
> 
> If we had to eat hominay, black eyed peas and chicken fried steak I'm pretty sure we'd have a rebellion on our hands (except the Newfies of course  ).


Speak for yourself.  I learned to love me some chicken fried steak washed down with MGD.   And biscuits and gravy.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Speak for yourself.  I learned to love me some chicken fried steak washed down with MGD.   And biscuits and gravy.


----------



## suffolkowner

Kirkhill said:


> My problem with that is that there is then little difference between Canada and the Warsaw Pact. We might as well recruit Canadians and use them to fill seats in American vehicles.   And we weren't willing to do that for the Brits, even when we were British.  Sam Hughes fixed that problem.
> 
> Are we destined to be an Imperial Auxiliary?   Or do we get to pick and choose our fights?
> 
> And if we are getting to pick and choose why not choose to pick something that we feel we can afford in both treasure and blood.
> 
> Was Paul Hellyer so wrong in his appreciation of the situation?  I don't think so.  We are a long way from the fight.  Any fight.  What strategic influence can the army, any army, in any structure, bring to bear in a timely fashion.  I can't say that I am a fan of a heavy force deployed in Canada.  Garrisoned in Europe.  Yes.  Garrisoned in Canada? Without adequate transport?  No.
> 
> Regardless of the weight of force we choose to deploy, it has to be able to get into the fight before the fight is over.


Having equipment commonality with the Americans or NATO Europe (M1A2/Leo2) makes a lot of sense and I think that is starting to be stipulated with the tanker acquisition and the LVM projects. 

I wonder do we need to transport our own equipment into the European theater if we are using common equipment? Should it not be possible for us or the US or European NATO to have extra equipment pre positioned? How much equipment are we really talking about that we could or would actually man if things turned hot.


----------



## suffolkowner

markppcli said:


> An interesting study in a similar sized military task organized for their security concerns.


Thanks Mark, I look forward to watching it. The comparison between Australia and Canada is always fascinating. I'm not sure the Australians have their force structure all figured out either though. They do without a doubt have no trouble in commiting the money to a change in direction. But I'm still curious how they see using 75 M1A2, 450 IFV's, and 200+ Boxers. Australia's north is already extremely limiting terrain for heavy fighting vehicles. Indonesia's is probably much worse


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Blammo.  This is where any Force Structure analysis needs to start - a realistic strategic assessment.



What if the Army, regardless of structure, is incapable of delivering a strategic impact?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

daftandbarmy said:


> IIRC that Mackenzie-King tried to keep us out of yet another European Civil War by offering to run this program instead:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> British Commonwealth Air Training Plan - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That didn't work out so well either
> 
> But yes, there are other roles that might be useful as an alternative to close combat, however, we'd better get used to having not much say in what happens...


It's why I think we should invest in some amphibious landing ships. They can move our equipment and allies, support missions around the world and garner valuable international Brownie points for minimal political risk.


----------



## blacktriangle

Colin Parkinson said:


> It's why I think we should invest in some amphibious landing ships. They can move our equipment and allies, support missions around the world and garner valuable international Brownie points for minimal political risk.


In a shooting war, Amphibs are still a legitimate target - perhaps even HVT depending what type of ship we went with.

If we are still speaking primarily of Europe & the CA, I think we should be focusing on what can we afford to have in place, on Day 1 of conflict, to support the alliance. Along the lines of what Kirkhill was getting at earlier.

I suggest a combination of modern sensors & effectors to put the adversary at risk. It would provide some form of deterrent, as well as an actual capability in case of war. If however, we are bent on conducting close combat, or acting as an "inside force", then I suggest we add something along the lines of a cavalry BG that T2B spoke of. If we are really serious, do both. And they'd both be applicable to other missions around the world.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Fully agree in a shooting war, amphibs and AOR''s are primary targets. However there are many missions that the navy does at the bidding of the government and it's allies, that don't bring that level of threat. Man the Amphibs with Fleet Auxiliary and small naval detachment, like the RN does.


----------



## blacktriangle

If we are just trying to buy brownie points, perhaps we should ask our allies what they need & want? 

It may not be an Amphib. What if it's an EP-3 or Rivet Joint det somewhere? Are we still game?


----------



## Underway

markppcli said:


> An interesting study in a similar sized military task organized for their security concerns.


What I found most interesting about this video was that Australia originally had a Heavy Mechanized Brigade, a Medium Weight Motorized Brigade, and a Light Brigade.

They then switched to Mixed Brigade Groups because they were unable to properly sustain a single brigade for long periods of time in Iraq.

Essentially they built the Canadian model which was the CMBG as stated by @Infanteer. All Mid weight+.  One unit regenerating, the next working up, and the third on deployment. And here some of us are advocating doing what they had before the change with one Brigade focused as a Heavy Mechanized one Middle Weight and the last Mid-Light forces.


----------



## Infanteer

A bit different.

They only have two infantry battalions per brigade, and neither possesses vehicles (or one battalion may have Bushmasters - can't recall).  The Armoured Regiment possesses a reconnaissance (cav) squadron, a tank squadron, and a carrier squadron to "mech up" a battalion of infantry.

To me, this is a structure designed to produce battle groups.  I think there are issues with this brigade structure as a fighting entity primarily due to the fact that there are only two real manoeuvre units and they have different mobility platforms.


----------



## FJAG

I'm not fond of the Australian Army's present structure which mirrors our own all too much. Brigades may be organized as brigade groups but the basic mix of equipment does not hint at it being an entity designed to fight as a brigade but more like Infanteer says, one designed to generate battle groups (a total of six based on the six infantry battalions) in a similar three year cycle to our MRS. 

Three good points:

1) At least their regiments have gone back to three four-gun M777 batteries (for a twelve gun regiment) instead of our two battery (eight-gun regiment); On the other hand their reserve artillery is all 81mm mortar and gave up any real ability to support the regular artillery under Plan Beersheba;

2) They have a Sustainment brigade with three Force Support battalions and health services battalions over and above the service battalions in the three regular brigades;

3) the army reserve is about our P Res size (at 17,000) but organized into about one third of the battalion sized units making each battalion significantly larger and more viable. (albeit that a report from 2014 indicates that it is not unusual in a 500 man battalion to have only 100 show up for training) (Maybe we should use their amalgamation system. If they can have a 10/27 RAR maybe we could have a 48th Royal Queen's Own Rifles Highlander Regiment of Canada  ) I don't see them particulalry well equipped albeit two light reserve brigades are paired with each Reg F brigades.

The really good point is that there is a solid plan to upgrade the war fighting potential. The purchase of 450 IFVs and 160 M1 hulls and 30 K9 howitzers show a clear plan to build all three of their brigades into fully armoured brigade combat teams (albeit the number of guns might be a bit light but they would still have 50 plus M777s in their inventory as well - maybe they'll revive the reserve artillery with those.)

Long story short, I'm still a follower of the US National Guard and Reserve structure for both deployable manoeuvre, combat support and sustainment formations to provide an ability to grow the force rapidly. If necessary pair a reserve brigade with a regular brigade if we can't afford the gear up front (something that's pretty easy considering that Reg F gear stands idle for most of a summer anyway.)

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> A bit different.
> 
> They only have two infantry battalions per brigade, and neither possesses vehicles (or one battalion may have Bushmasters - can't recall).  The Armoured Regiment possesses a reconnaissance (cav) squadron, a tank squadron, and a carrier squadron to "mech up" a battalion of infantry.
> 
> To me, this is a structure designed to produce battle groups.  I think there are issues with this brigade structure as a fighting entity primarily due to the fact that there are only two real manoeuvre units and they have different mobility platforms.


My understanding, and certainly what the video states, is that that structure has changed. The Bn's now own their vehicles with the ACR being one Tank Sqn and two Cav (recce) Sqns. I agree this is about producing battle groups, essentially they see themselves has at most fighting two battle groups at a time, that is however based on their operational experience since WW2. Given that they don't have the burden of commitment to fighting for European Democracy, they can afford to be task oriented to smaller interventions.



> 3) the army reserve is about our P Res size (at 17,000) but organized into about one third of the battalion sized units making each battalion significantly larger and more viable. (albeit that a report from 2014 indicates that it is not unusual in a 500 man battalion to have only 100 show up for training) (Maybe we should use their amalgamation system. If they can have a 10/27 RAR maybe we could have a 48th Royal Queen's Own Rifles Highlander Regiment of Canada  ) I don't see them particulalry well equipped albeit two light reserve brigades are paired with each Reg F brigades.



They also did this wild thing where they looked at their reserves and thought " are we really getting a capability out of reserve Armour / Artillery or would they be better off providing us XYZ?


----------



## markppcli

Underway said:


> What I found most interesting about this video was that Australia originally had a Heavy Mechanized Brigade, a Medium Weight Motorized Brigade, and a Light Brigade.
> 
> They then switched to Mixed Brigade Groups because they were unable to properly sustain a single brigade for long periods of time in Iraq.
> 
> Essentially they built the Canadian model which was the CMBG as stated by @Infanteer. All Mid weight+.  One unit regenerating, the next working up, and the third on deployment. And here some of us are advocating doing what they had before the change with one Brigade focused as a Heavy Mechanized one Middle Weight and the last Mid-Light forces.


Yeah I question what we would do if and when we end up in another Afghan / Bosnia / what ever scenario where we need to rotate BG's in and out every six months if we aren't in a symmetrical structure.  Is that more likely than 1 CMBG being required to fight as a Bde in Europe? I'd argue yes.


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> 2) They have a Sustainment brigade with three Force Support battalions and health services battalions over and above the service battalions in the three regular brigades;


Caution with direct comparisons as the Australian Army as some of their formations perform functions that the Canadian Army has seen migrated to other L1s.

In the case of the 17th Sustainment Brigade, I see it has three Force Support Battalions and three Medical Battalions.  The Force Support Battalions appear to be 3rd line sustainment organizations, something in the CA that was moved from the CA to CJOC's CFJOSG.  The Medical Bns in that sustainment brigade belong to MPC's Health Services Group.



markppcli said:


> My understanding, and certainly what the video states, is that that structure has changed.


You are correct.  I asked my Australian Army colleagues and each Brigade has a mech bn with M113s (driven by Infantry), a motor bn with Bushmasters (driven by infantry), and an Armoured Regiment with 1x Tank and 2x Cav (recce) sqns.

Comments I got were that this set-up is terrible and is focused on battle groups but is over-generalized at the expense of effectiveness.  If they actually need to fight a brigade, they have to build it from all three, which means in the Aussie structure the Brigade is essentially a force generator only.  At least a CMBG is, nominally, organized on paper to fight as a whole (we'll ignore the awkward homeless light infantry battalion).

Apparently, my colleagues were saying there was a degree of dissatisfaction with their new set-up and there are already calls to revert back to the old asymmetric brigade principle as it provided the units with more focus.  Grass is always greener on the other side of the fence I guess?



markppcli said:


> Yeah I question what we would do if and when we end up in another Afghan / Bosnia / what ever scenario where we need to rotate BG's in and out every six months if we aren't in a symmetrical structure.  Is that more likely than 1 CMBG being required to fight as a Bde in Europe? I'd argue yes.



My belief is that if you have three of something, you have this covered.  Say the CAF becomes fixed for an enduring mission that requires force X.  Your asymmetric army only has 3 of X, and 9 of Y and Z.  With a 6-month rotation, you have 1.5 years to adapt.  With an 8-month rotation, you have 2 years.

Armies are more than capable of rerolling units for specific missions within that time.  For example, the British Army set up a jungle warfare school in Malaya in the 1950s.  Conscript battalions organized to fight the Soviets in Germany would rotate in and through the school (I can't recall if it was a 6 or a 12 week program) at the school - first half individual skills, second half collective training.  If the flavour of the day demands force type X for a mission, then temporarily reroll force type Y for that mission.  Once a force returns from its mission, it returns to its primary role/mission.


----------



## Kirkhill

I think that the Aussies, generally, do a better job of managing their expectations.

Australia is not going to change the world.  Neither is Canada. 
Australia does see the need to protect itself.   Canada doesn't.
Australia sees the need for friends for the same reason it seeks to protect itself.  Does Canada?

I don't think that Australia has had the chance to develop the same complacency as Canada.  Regardless of who controls the international order, or even if there is one, Canadians have not felt the pinch at home. Why worry?

Back to the strategic framework for a Force 2025 and beyond.

The Aussies are prepared to sacrifice a bit of blood and treasure on a voluntary basis, at the time and place of their choosing, in an effort to maintain friendships that they hope will result in assistance when they need it.  Hope is a Course of Action.

Canadians, IMO, don't perceive a future in which they will need help.  They're still here despite wars, and revolutions, and changes of "masters" and atomic bombs elsewhere.

Given that neither Australia or Canada is going to change the world by military means (unless the strategy is to be so late to the fight that the bloody battlefield is empty and they are the last organized militaries on the planet) then both nations have the luxury of doing what they want.  What they do, internationally, is explicitly about earning "brownie points" with potential friends in the hope that they will keep Canada in mind the next time things change. 

In Canada's case the CEF and the ANZACs efforts in WWI bought 1931 Westminster independence.  The WWII effort bought an organizing seat at the United Nations. NORAD bought the Autopact. North Warning Line bought the Canada US Free Trade Agreement.  Those were the strategic effects of Canadian military involvements.  I can't point to single Canadian military victory that changed the immediate outcome of any major international conflict.   I can point to many instances where Canada's efforts were welcomed and appreciated and rewarded by allies.

The point then becomes for me, not how we organize, beyond acknowledging that any effort we undertake should be well organized to succeed at what we choose to do, but what should we do?

And in the context of the spectrum of operations I believe that we, again, have the luxury of splitting our responses into discrete, graduated, capabilities.  That is why I can support Colin's notion of government supported logistical shipping that can be safely employed to mutual benefit in times of an enduring peace but can also be of use when war "breaks out".  At the same time, internationally, I argue for a "high tech" military presence that emphasises treasure over blood, motors over muscles.  That provides capabilities that we can afford to friendly governments that can't afford them.   Most countries are not short of rifles.  Quality sensors, Air Defence, Long Range Artillery, Aircraft and Satellites, Comms and Logistical support.  All those are the things that we need, that we can afford and that we can supply to those in need.

Infantry is not something that we should be focusing on.   Except in defence of our territory.  And there, given the nature of the threats (few to non-existent currently) we don't need legs.  Even wheels are of limited value in terms of timely response in our territory.   Wings (fixed and rotary) are necessary to generate a timely response with strategic effect territorially.  Light vehicles, with rubber tracks, and shallow draft boats can be used to great advantage to move spotter teams around that can direct the fires necessary to disrupt incursions in Canadian territory.

The international employment of infantry does offer two benefits to Canada.  It demonstrates Canada's willingness to commit.  It offers the opportunity for Canadians to learn how to fight on the modern battlefield.  Both of those are worthy endeavours.  But they are limited endeavours.   They don't require an infantry-centric national defence strategy.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> You are correct.  I asked my Australian Army colleagues and each Brigade has a mech bn with M113s (driven by Infantry), a motor bn with Bushmasters (driven by infantry), and an Armoured Regiment with 1x Tank and 2x Cav (recce) sqns.
> 
> Comments I got were that this set-up is terrible and is focused on battle groups but is over-generalized at the expense of effectiveness.  If they actually need to fight a brigade, they have to build it from all three, which means in the Aussie structure the Brigade is essentially a force generator only.  At least a CMBG is, nominally, organized on paper to fight as a whole (we'll ignore the awkward homeless light infantry battalion).
> 
> Apparently, my colleagues were saying there was a degree of dissatisfaction with their new set-up and there are already calls to revert back to the old asymmetric brigade principle as it provided the units with more focus.  Grass is always greener on the other side of the fence I guess?


Was that in reference to the Bde structure or the Infantry manning their own vehicles? How do they feel this will change when the new IFVs come online? An order of 400 plus will surely equip all 6 infantry Bns?



> My belief is that if you have three of something, you have this covered.  Say the CAF becomes fixed for an enduring mission that requires force X.  Your asymmetric army only has 3 of X, and 9 of Y and Z.  With a 6-month rotation, you have 1.5 years to adapt.  With an 8-month rotation, you have 2 years.
> 
> Armies are more than capable of rerolling units for specific missions within that time.  For example, the British Army set up a jungle warfare school in Malaya in the 1950s.  Conscript battalions organized to fight the Soviets in Germany would rotate in and through the school (I can't recall if it was a 6 or a 12 week program) at the school - first half individual skills, second half collective training.  If the flavour of the day demands force type X for a mission, then temporarily reroll force type Y for that mission.  Once a force returns from its mission, it returns to its primary role/ mission.



I guess I can only think back to the problems I saw, admittedly from a distance (outside of one lav on lav collision), with 3 PPCLI attempting to mechanize in 2010 (11?), where the specific skills and techniques were perhaps a bit harder to grasp than taking light infantry to a jungle school. That being said if we're still having 2 Brigades built around LAV infantry it's probably not such a big deal.



Infanteer said:


> They only have two infantry battalions per brigade, and neither possesses vehicles (or one battalion may have Bushmasters - can't recall).  .


7 Infantry Bns fully manned, or 9 anemic Bns... which is preferable?


----------



## GR66

Do the symmetrical Brigades technically need to be geographically symmetrical?

The need for three maneuver units in a Brigade really only applies when you're actually fielding a complete Brigade Group, not when they are in barracks or when the infantry battalions are force generating individual Battle Groups.

For example, we could have three symmetrical Mechanized Brigade Groups each with:

1 x Armoured Recce Regiment (2 x LAV Recce Squadrons)
2 x LAV Infantry Battalions
1 x Artillery Regiment
1 x Engineer Regiment
1 x Support Battalion

The 3rd (Tank) Squadrons could be concentrated in a single geographic location to simplify logistics, maintenance and training.   Admin support could be provided by whichever Armoured Recce Regiment they are geographically co-located with (Edmonton for training spaces?  Gagetown to be with the Armour School?)

Need to generate a Battle Group?  Two LAV Battalions in each Brigade available to cycle through readiness.  Attach one or both Armoured Recce Squadrons and if required attach a Tank Troop from the 3rd Squadrons.  That would cover likely 95% of the deployment requirements we would typically face.

The balloon goes up and you need to deploy a full Brigade Group for a major conflict?  Deploy one Tank Squadron with each Armoured Recce Regiment and now you have three maneuver units (along the lines of the Australian structure ) per Brigade Group.  Rotate between the Brigades for extended deployments.

Things get really heavy and you attach all three Tank Squadrons to the Armoured Recce Regiment to make it a tank-heavy unit.  A one shot deal for Canada admittedly (unless we buy more tanks).

This set-up would free up the three Light Infantry Battalions to create a 4th, Light Brigade Group.  These three units could rotate readiness and provide the basis for a rapid response capability for the Army.


----------



## Kirkhill

Or another thought - Three Deep Strike Brigades with a Cavalry Regiment and Infantry Battalion and a Divisional Artillery Regiment (8 Batteries - HQ & Svcs, STA, Obs, 3x 155, LRPRs, GBAD-CRAM) .  Designed to form the core of an allied Division together with a Div HQ and an Air Force Wing.


----------



## Underway

> Was that in reference to the Bde structure or the Infantry manning their own vehicles? How do they feel this will change when the new IFVs come online? An order of 400 plus will surely equip all 6 infantry Bns?


~380 are IFV variants and the remainder are Mobility Support Vehicles for the Engineers.

Not all the IFV are going to the infantry, there are going to be 120mm mortars, other engineering vehicles, logistics carriers, ambulances, mortar ammunition carriers etc...  Like the LAV's for us, they are going to various places to do other jobs.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> ...They also did this wild thing where they looked at their reserves and thought " are we really getting a capability out of reserve Armour / Artillery or would they be better off providing us XYZ?


When you apportion artillery and armour the overriding questions should be "do we need artillery and armour day-to-day, or could this be a capability met by having it in a reserve force for generating when required?" The short answer for me is that the Aussies, as structured, do not need 9 full-time artillery batteries. Three full-time and six to nine reserve would probably do the job quite well. Their current armour on the other hand is quite thin and probably needs all three existing squadrons (but where do they get their depth augmentation from if they no longer have any armoured reserves except as recce with the reserve infantry battalions?)

IMHO, a multi-purpose force needs a healthy number of full-time infantry, engineers and service support folks. Armour, artillery, air defence etc not so often but when you do need them then they better be there ... in reserve. It's up to the Army to structure the reserve force so that it is available and ready when eventually needed.



Infanteer said:


> Caution with direct comparisons as the Australian Army as some of their formations perform functions that the Canadian Army has seen migrated to other L1s.
> 
> In the case of the 17th Sustainment Brigade, I see it has three Force Support Battalions and three Medical Battalions.  The Force Support Battalions appear to be 3rd line sustainment organizations, something in the CA that was moved from the CA to CJOC's CFJOSG.  The Medical Bns in that sustainment brigade belong to MPC's Health Services Group.


Understood. The hallmark for me with a resource being in the "Army" rather than with another "L1" is that in the Army it generally becomes a equipped, deployable entity with a doctrine that meshes with the remaining Army doctrine. Other L1 organizations frequently do not.



Infanteer said:


> ...Apparently, my colleagues were saying there was a degree of dissatisfaction with their new set-up and there are already calls to revert back to the old asymmetric brigade principle as it provided the units with more focus.  Grass is always greener on the other side of the fence I guess?
> 
> ...My belief is that if you have three of something, you have this covered.  Say the CAF becomes fixed for an enduring mission that requires force X.  Your asymmetric army only has 3 of X, and 9 of Y and Z.  With a 6-month rotation, you have 1.5 years to adapt.  With an 8-month rotation, you have 2 years.


This effectively is the problem with symmetric organizations which are built to feed the three-cycle managed readiness system (and to maintain thin-skinned regimental parity). IMHO the system creates more issues than it cures not the least of which is losing the ability to train and fight properly as a brigade (be it light, medium or heavy) and having 2/3rds of the force "unready" at all times.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Underway said:


> ~380 are IFV variants and the remainder are Mobility Support Vehicles for the Engineers.
> 
> Not all the IFV are going to the infantry, there are going to be 120mm mortars, other engineering vehicles, logistics carriers, ambulances, mortar ammunition carriers etc...  Like the LAV's for us, they are going to various places to do other jobs.


380 at roughly 50 odd per Bn is more than enough to equip all six, likely with a Bn still for war stock.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Or another thought - Three Deep Strike Brigades with a Cavalry Regiment and Infantry Battalion and a Divisional Artillery Regiment (8 Batteries - HQ & Svcs, STA, Obs, 3x 155, LRPRs, GBAD-CRAM) .  Designed to form the core of an allied Division together with a Div HQ and an Air Force Wing.



Dimsum posted this comment from an article about Russian and Chinese NCOs and their ways of war.









						PRC, Russia Professionalize – Without Cloning US NCOs
					

WASHINGTON: “For both Russia and China, they lag far behind where we are in terms of an NCO corps,” Army intelligence analyst Ian Sullivan told me. “[But] the answer for both Russia and China might not be to build an NCO corps that is similar to the United States…. What if their way of war...




					army.ca
				






> ... *US and Western ground tactics emphasize maneuver warfare*, with small teams seizing opportunities to work their way forward and take apart the enemy’s defenses; firepower is important, but its primary role is to blast open gaps for maneuver units to advance through. *Russia and China emphasize firepower, disrupting and destroying the enemy at the longest possible distance*; maneuver is important, but primarily for setting up advantageous positions for long-range fires.
> 
> 
> “They’re both very heavy on fires to prevent us from maneuvering,” an approach often called anti-access/area denial warfare, Sullivan said. “We win by maneuver, they win by fires, [and] the fires fight may not necessarily require… the kind of NCO corps that we have, the thinking, educated, dynamic NCO corps.”



The challenge of defending Canada, it seems to me is more like the challenges of defending Russia and China than Western Europe.

The biggest obvious differences are that Western Europe is one of the most densely populated places on the planet (and it is covered in asphalt).  China has high density areas but also has areas of extreme low density (Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia come to mind).  Russia has a large area with few roads and a declining population.  Both Russia and China need exert the government's influence over long distances rapidly from a limited number of widely separated fixed bases.  

An artillery-centric army might make more sense for the defense of Canada than an infantry-, or even cavalry-centric one.  With a strong Air Force element.

It is not that I expect Canada to be invaded but rather that if an invasion/incursion happens I would like to be able to break it up and disrupt as soon as it starts happening.  And, as I noted, it is a low manpower, high technology strategy that we can afford and that we can offer in useful support of friends and allies.


----------



## Kirkhill

And the USMC is buying the Israeli Hero-120 Loitering Munitions that were used to effect in Azerbaijan.









						US Marine Corps to buy UVision Hero-120 loitering munition
					

The US Marine Corps plans to acquire an undisclosed number of UVision Hero-120 loitering munitions to be mounted and launched from two types of armoured ground vehicles and an autonomous boat.




					www.flightglobal.com
				




UVision Hero-120 Loitering Munition  (12.5 kg with 4.5 kg warhead - length 1.5 m)








Hero-120 and Launcher






To be added to the USMC LAV Battalions in the 81 Mortar Carriers.  Range band increases from 2.4 - 3 nm to 5 - 54 nm.



Also to be deployed on the JLTV  (Oshkosh Hero-120 Concept)







And the  LRUSV (Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel)














						The first weapon system for the USMC's new LRUSV: Hero-120 - Naval Post- Naval News and Information
					

he first weapon system for the United States Marine Corps’ new Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel (LRUSV) has been confirmed. The UVision Air Ltd. Hero-120 Organic Precision Fires (OPF) smart loitering munition system




					navalpost.com
				







> Loitering munitions are a type of explosive unmanned air vehicle that can also conduct limited amounts of reconnaissance.





> The USMC wanted a weapon with the ability to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as well as attack targets between 5nm (7km) and 54nm, it said in its request for information posted in 2019. The loitering munition is intended to “enhance indirect fire capability within the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion”, said Jeff Nebel, team lead for Program Manager Fires, at the time.
> 
> “Hero-120 is a high precision smart loitering munition system with a unique aerodynamic structure that carries out pinpoint strikes against anti-armour, anti-material and anti-personnel targets including tanks, vehicles, concrete fortifications, and other soft targets in populated urban areas,” says UVision. “The Hero-120’s high precision capability ensures minimal collateral damage. Its wide range of multi-purpose warheads enable the operational user to effectively engage all targets.”





> The use of loitering munitions – in place of mortars, air-launched missiles and tanks – is a new concept in warfare. The type saw limited use as anti-personnel weapons during the USA’s war on terror, in particular by special operations forces. In 2020, use by Azerbaijani troops against Armenian tanks in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Central Asia demonstrated that the weapons might upend conventional thinking about military operations.
> 
> Though loitering munitions, such as the Hero-120, are typically more expensive than mortars or tank rounds, they have greater range and greater precision, leading to fewer wasted shots. The ability to loiter above a target, in the case of the Hero-120, for up to 60min, also reduces the risk of friendly fire or civilian casualties, say manufacturers.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Apparently, my colleagues were saying there was a degree of dissatisfaction with their new set-up and there are already calls to revert back to the old asymmetric brigade principle as it provided the units with more focus.  Grass is always greener on the other side of the fence I guess?


Why do people with straight hair get it curled while people with curly hair get it straightened?  Hairdressers make a fortune out of that one.

And, for the record, I too, in general, like the principle of threes (one on, one in the wash and one in the drawer).  

On the other hand a "strategic reserve" item like, for example an air transportable battalion, that is outside of the regular rotation and kept for the occasional short, sharp shock - that can be limited to a single high readiness force, or perhaps a two battalion/battlegroup brigade.


----------



## Kirkhill

> “As we've seen in lots of recent conflicts,* the proliferation of long-range weapons and sensors and things like that make it very challenging to survive on the current battlefield *if you are a large unit that's operating in—--*with large groups of people very close to each other*. So you need to be able to disperse and distribute your forces and still achieve effects,” Watson said in an interview.
> 
> The current battalion with three rifle companies, a weapons company with crew-served weapons such as machine guns, and a headquarters company is not organized and equipped for future distributed warfare, he said.
> 
> A proposed infantry battalion design would eliminate the weapons company and train Marines in rifle companies to use a range of weapons instead of specializing in just one. *The idea is that a smaller unit with more weapons training will increase their survivability and mission capabilities* as part of a Marine Expeditionary Unit, Marine Littoral Regiment, or Infantry Regiment.











						The Marine Corps Is Redesigning Infantry Battalions for the Future
					

Recommendations for a nimbler unit organization with fewer grunts and more tech will go to the commandant next year.




					www.defenseone.com


----------



## Kirkhill

And a counter-point for those that think there will be sea-lift for the asking when we need it:






						Across the Expanse: The Sealift Dilemma in a War Against China | Center for International Maritime Security
					






					cimsec.org
				




It seems likely to me that when we are looking for sea-lift others will be looking for it as well.  Even if we are not heading in the same direction.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> The Marine Corps Is Redesigning Infantry Battalions for the Future
> 
> 
> Recommendations for a nimbler unit organization with fewer grunts and more tech will go to the commandant next year.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defenseone.com


There's a limit as to how many blades you can fit into the average Swiss Army infantryman/infantry company. Once you get to the point that the system is so easy to use that you can hand stuff out like Cracker Jack you might as well have autonomous or semi autonomous systems and leave a little room in the LAV for food and water.

If the infantry battalion is going to become crew-served weapons heavy, maybe we should be thinking of redesigning the infantry battalion into two or three weapons companies and one rifle company instead.

As an aside, the development of counter drone systems has me convinced that we need to keep a reasonable mix of high tech loitering munitions and big old guns firing dumb hunks of steel wrapped high explosives that can't be screwed with - perhaps even in the same regiment.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> There's a limit as to how many blades you can fit into the average Swiss Army infantryman/infantry company. Once you get to the point that the system is so easy to use that you can hand stuff out like Cracker Jack you might as well have autonomous or semi autonomous systems and leave a little room in the LAV for food and water.
> 
> If the infantry battalion is going to become crew-served weapons heavy, maybe we should be thinking of redesigning the infantry battalion into two or three weapons companies and one rifle company instead.
> 
> As an aside, the development of counter drone systems has me convinced that we need to keep a reasonable mix of high tech loitering munitions and big old guns firing dumb hunks of steel wrapped high explosives that can't be screwed with - perhaps even in the same regiment.
> 
> 🍻



Or, as has been argued upthread, is there a role for infantry at all?

If crew-served then transported.  One small vehicle with two people or many strong backs?

As to the issue of preserving capabilities, and designing armies, you might be interested in this article.









						ADOPT THE RIGHT PLANNING HORIZON AND BUILD AN ARMY FOR WWIII
					

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense testified recently before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees about President Biden's fiscal year 2022 defense budget request. Some were surprised to hear China named as the "driver" or pacing threat justifying the...




					warroom.armywarcollege.edu
				







> It has been argued elsewhere, convincingly, that the Navy/Marine Corps team is best suited to safeguarding America’s interests and global stability in times of peace (reflected in the now-discarded “Global Force for Good” tagline). The Air Force has always sold itself—grotesquely, in some cases—as the post-WWII guarantors of strategic stability. The Space Force is now out there trying to figure out what to wear, trying to dominate high orbit, and competing for funding with its parent service, the past master of the budget wars up until this point.
> 
> What does that leave for the Army?


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Or, as has been argued upthread, is there a role for infantry at all?
> 
> If crew-served then transported.  One small vehicle with two people or many strong backs?
> 
> As to the issue of preserving capabilities, and designing armies, you might be interested in this article.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ADOPT THE RIGHT PLANNING HORIZON AND BUILD AN ARMY FOR WWIII
> 
> 
> The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense testified recently before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees about President Biden's fiscal year 2022 defense budget request. Some were surprised to hear China named as the "driver" or pacing threat justifying the...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> warroom.armywarcollege.edu


If there's one thing that Afghanistan taught us it's that there's always a need for a local security force whenever specialty teams go out beyond the wire. Having two-man teams carrying major weapons systems wandering around a dispersed battlefield is a tad risky. There will always be a role for infantrymen. 

BTW. There's really nothing I disagree with in Maj Hendell's article.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Or, as has been argued upthread, is there a role for infantry at all?



Only if you want to avoid a conclusion, or be defeated by the enemy's infantry


----------



## Underway

> *US and Western ground tactics emphasize maneuver warfare*, with small teams seizing opportunities to work their way forward and take apart the enemy’s defenses; firepower is important, but its primary role is to blast open gaps for maneuver units to advance through. *Russia and China emphasize firepower, disrupting and destroying the enemy at the longest possible distance*; maneuver is important, but primarily for setting up advantageous positions for long-range fires.
> 
> 
> “They’re both very heavy on fires to prevent us from maneuvering,” an approach often called anti-access/area denial warfare, Sullivan said. “We win by maneuver, they win by fires, [and] the fires fight may not necessarily require… the kind of NCO corps that we have, the thinking, educated, dynamic NCO corps.”



There is a reason for this.  First and foremost is that they never expect to have air superiority.  Their artillery is their airforce.  NATO expects that its airpower will disrupt and destroy the enemy at the longest possible distance.  Russia expects their airpower to get a few shots in and then be on the defensive the whole time.  This is also why they develop amazing Air Defence Systems like the S400.

Given that paradigm, it makes sense that Russia would value its artillery more than its maneuver elements, as it does double duty. Traditional artillery jobs and airforce jobs as well.

The second is that they are inherently defensive militaries because their geopolitical outlook is defensive. Russian and China are always being invaded by others.  China builds a big wall.  Russia uses buffer states as their wall. Modern translation is anti-access/area denial.



Kirkhill said:


> The challenge of defending Canada, it seems to me is more like the challenges of defending Russia and China than Western Europe.
> 
> The biggest obvious differences are that Western Europe is one of the most densely populated places on the planet (and it is covered in asphalt).  China has high density areas but also has areas of extreme low density (Tibet, Xinjiang and Mongolia come to mind).  Russia has a large area with few roads and a declining population.  Both Russia and China need exert the government's influence over long distances rapidly from a limited number of widely separated fixed bases.
> 
> An artillery-centric army might make more sense for the defense of Canada than an infantry-, or even cavalry-centric one.  With a strong Air Force element.
> 
> It is not that I expect Canada to be invaded but rather that if an invasion/incursion happens I would like to be able to break it up and disrupt as soon as it starts happening.  And, as I noted, it is a low manpower, high technology strategy that we can afford and that we can offer in useful support of friends and allies.



The challenge in defending Canada... is that there is no external threat.  We've effectively neutralized the true external threat by being best buddies with it, the US.  Any other threat would be sea-based.  If you want to defend the homeland against conventional threats, invest in airpower and naval power.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Underway said:


> There is a reason for this.  First and foremost is that they never expect to have air superiority.  Their artillery is their airforce.  NATO expects that its airpower will disrupt and destroy the enemy at the longest possible distance.  Russia expects their airpower to get a few shots in and then be on the defensive the whole time.  This is also why they develop amazing Air Defence Systems like the S400.
> 
> Given that paradigm, it makes sense that Russia would value its artillery more than its maneuver elements, as it does double duty. Traditional artillery jobs and airforce jobs as well.
> 
> The second is that they are inherently defensive militaries because their geopolitical outlook is defensive. Russian and China are always being invaded by others.  China builds a big wall.  Russia uses buffer states as their wall. Modern translation is anti-access/area denial.
> 
> 
> 
> The challenge in defending Canada... is that there is no external threat.  We've effectively neutralized the true external threat by being best buddies with it, the US.  Any other threat would be sea-based.  If you want to defend the homeland against conventional threats, invest in airpower and naval power.



...and cyber and other information security


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Russian ... always being invaded by others.



Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bessarabia, Finland...


----------



## Underway

Yes, all of those countries have invaded Russia at one point or another.  Actually, the Lithuanian/Polish Empire was a massive predator of the Russian people for decades.  The Swedes invaded Russia through Estonia and Finland.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Or, as has been argued upthread, is there a role for infantry at all?
> 
> If crew-served then transported.  One small vehicle with two people or many strong backs?
> 
> As to the issue of preserving capabilities, and designing armies, you might be interested in this article.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ADOPT THE RIGHT PLANNING HORIZON AND BUILD AN ARMY FOR WWIII
> 
> 
> The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense testified recently before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees about President Biden's fiscal year 2022 defense budget request. Some were surprised to hear China named as the "driver" or pacing threat justifying the...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> warroom.armywarcollege.edu


So what does an Army do when enemy aircraft, loitering munitions and precision fires take away their ability to maneuver?  Or if they are just simply overmatched by the enemy's technology and hide among the civilian population?  Or when their military objective is geographically limited and then they settle in to defend?

A lot of these ideas may be 100% correct for the initial stages of a conflict where maneuver is the name of the game and there are still lots of expensive precision weapons to be used.  But what happens when all those loitering munitions and ATGMs have been expended and the armies take to the cover of urban centres?  Infantry and cheap HE will then become very important.

I'm with FJAG in his idea that we should have both ends of the spectrum...the high tech precision munitions supplemented by a large volume of cheap HE.  The same might be said of our infantry.  Have a solid core of mechanized forces for the start of the fight, but be prepared with a mass of light infantry when all the expensive gear is expended.  

Of course I'd prefer to have a core of high tech mechanized infantry to start the fight with an even larger mass of equally high tech mechanized infantry to continue, but we have to be realistic.


----------



## FJAG

I've been mulling over where in the organization some of these loitering munition systems belong. I've toyed with the Deep Strike Brigade model and have been wondering just exactly how the recce elements and infantry elements in it work together - who does what when it comes to engaging the enemy.

The more I thought about it the more my old corps affiliation keeps rearing its head and for all intents and purposes, all that these new weapon systems are is nothing more or less than over-the horizon anti-armour artillery. They essentially do what anti-tank artillery did when positioned amongst the infantry front line but also so much more beyond that. The big thing is you do not want to tie these systems down to a local area, like artillery you want to mass their fires at critical points across the entire front, as they develop.

Yes there is a role for recce albeit its a much more aggressive role than in the past. Giving them the ability to call in either area neutralization (if that's still a thing anymore) or precision strikes from delivery systems well behind the lines seems appropriate (with the usual leveling of FOOs/JTACS amongst them)  IMHO this screen should have some tanks (if for no other reason then local counterattacks) as well as some direct fire anti-armour missiles and, of course GBAD.

As for infantry, they too have a role with a variety of direct long and short range anti-armour weapons which should be organic to the battalions, again augmented by indirect fires support. Just not so sure it's in a deep strike model. Strikes me (pun intended) their place is more in the traditional main line of defence which would be dispersed wider and deeper and with a greater reserve that could position itself once the main enemy thrust line is discerned)

Just as an aside, I'm not too fond of the term "Deep Strike" - sounds like something out of a Marvel Comic. I like "Cavalry" - it allows for the wearing of neat Stetsons on parade.

All-in-all I don't see much difference in who does what, just a lot of adjustment for the weapon systems out there at any given time.



Underway said:


> Russian and China are always being invaded by others.  China builds a big wall.  Russia uses buffer states as their wall. Modern translation is anti-access/area denial.



Re Russian Wars --> go here for a complete list - Warning! Its a really long one.

🍻


----------



## medic5

China's history is filled with both foreign invasions and fracturing/reunification. Probably is why the CCP is so authoritarian and maintains tight control of the PLA.


----------



## Kirkhill

> The challenge in defending Canada... is that there is no external threat. We've effectively neutralized the true external threat by being best buddies with it, the US. Any other threat would be sea-based. If you want to defend the homeland against conventional threats, invest in airpower and naval power.



I agree entirely with Underway.  The majority of Canada's professional defence effort should be focused on the RCN and the RCAF and a strong CANSOFCOM.   And for the record, as far as I am concerned, Special Operations does not imply that the Operators are Special but that their Operations are Special, Special in the sense of not being ordinary, conventional.

Which brings us to Maj Hendell's question:  What does that leave for the Army?

And there I find myself, broadly, in agreement with FJAG.  The Army should prepare for the Spanish Inquisition... as in that which no one expects.

We have different prescriptions for the same set of symptoms. 

FJAG, as I understand, continues from the Army's stated desire to be infantry-centric  and proposes vesting the artillery in the Reserves. 

I am coming to the reverse.   Discard the infantry-centric Regular force and vest the Cavalry and Artillery and Mounted Infantry in the Regular, Expeditionary Force.   And commit the Militia to an infantry-centric home defence force supplemented with light cavalry and artillery support.

The Brits, in my view, have taken their Light Division, Heavy Division and Air Mobile Brigade and reconfigured them into two  an Air Mobile Brigade Gp, two Light Brigade Gps, two Heavy Brigade Gps and two Special Operations Brigades.   They retain two Div HQs with additional ISR, Cyber and EW assets.  The sacrifice has been that of Divisional Support Troops.  They have rolled the Divisional Support Troops into the single Deep Strike Brigade to include the Divisional Recce Regiment, the Divisional Artillery, what is analogous to the Divisional MG Battalion and, presumably the Divisional RE Regiment.

My proposal sees Canada creating three Div HQs with Divisional Support Brigades (instead of the single Canadian Combat Support Brigade) that would form the core element of Canada's Expeditionary Force.    They would be the organizing principal, along with deployable RCAF wings, around which allies could form.  The model is somewhere between the Latvian ePF and the Canadian 21st Army Group with a bit of the Korean War vintage Commonwealth Division thrown in.

The rationale is that, as noted before, the commitment is of treasure more than blood.  That means that foreign interventions by the government are likely to be supported longer.   Also the commitment is of things that many allies will have trouble finding the treasure to buy themselves. Finally the skills learned by the Expeditionary Force are technical skills that will be useful to the defence of Canada and that can be transmitted to the Home Defence force in the event the Grand Inquisitor appears.  It is my expectation that in the expeditionary wars Canada will be supporting people committed to expending their own blood in defence of their territory.  It is my hope that if Canadian territory were similarly threatened then Canadians would be similarly motivated.

The consequence then is that a Canadian Division Support Brigade would be operating with local infantry and armoured brigades under command.  One of three on deployment at any one time and rotating in and out of theater.

At home, those same CDSBs would be the core of the Militia based Homeland Defence, together with CanSOFCOM and a Light Infantry Brigade.

So, my prescription:

CanSOFCOM

Cdn Lt Brigade - 2 RCR, 2 PPCLI, 2 R22eR.

1 Cdn Div HQ (Joint)
1 CDSB - LdSH(RC), 1 PPCLI, 1 RCHA, 1 CER
1 Expeditionary Wing RCAF (ISR, Satellites, UAS, LRPA, F35 GRS, CC-130, CH-146, CH-147)

2 Cdn Div HQ (Joint)
2 CDSB - RCD, 1 RCR, 2 RCHA, 2 CER
2 Expeditionary Wing RCAF (ISR, Satellites, UAS, LRPA, F35 GRS, CC-130, CH-146, CH-147)

5 Cdn Div HQ (Joint)
5 CDSB - 12e RBC, 1 R22eR, 5 RALC, 5 CER
5 Expeditionary Wing RCAF (ISR, Satellites, UAS, LRPA, F35 GRS, CC-130, CH-146, CH-147)

Militia

10x Infantry Brigade Groups each committed to growing to full Brigades in the event of the Inquisitor. 
Standard practice would be a Reg Force and C Class Cadre,  a B Class Immediate Reaction Call Out Force of Company Strength,  an A Class Parade Strength capable of generating a Battalion Strength unit in extremis, and a strong Supp List Reserve of trained soldiers with prior service.

The Militia Infantry Brigades to include light cavalry squadrons, and close support/GBAD-CRAM batteries.

The Reg Force CDSBs to be organized something like:

The CDSB Arty Regiments to be large regiments with HQ and Services Bty, STA Battery, FOO/FAC Battery, GBAD-CRAM Battery, AT Battery, 3x Cannon Batteries, 1x SSM Battery.

The Cavalry Regiment to be modelled on the Swedish Pansar Unit with two small Tank Squadrons (9-14), two LAV Squadrons, and two Mortar Tps as well as a Loitering Munitions Tp.

The LAV infantry battalion, and the Cavalry LAV troops to be crewed by 3, with 6 dismounts carrying AT weapons and MGs.  The Infantry Battalion also to be equipped with a vehicle mounted LR AT company.

This organization calls for 6 infantry battalions, 3 of which will be highly automated and mechanized while 3 will depend on their legs and wings.

All other reg force elements will also emphasize motors over muscles.

The Militia will focus on manpower, light weapons and light vehicles, home defence and Aid to the Civil Powers.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Yes, all of those countries have invaded Russia at one point or another.  Actually, the Lithuanian/Polish Empire was a massive predator of the Russian people for decades.  The Swedes invaded Russia through Estonia and Finland.



Huh.  Apologism for tyranny and colonialism reaches a new high.


----------



## Underway

Brad Sallows said:


> Huh.  Apologism for tyranny and colonialism reaches a new high.


I knew exactly what you were trying to say. Ignored it and turned it around.  And yes all of those listed countries committed the same brutality on the Russians as the Russians visited on them right back.  Picking sides over there is fraught with moral missteps, particularly if your memory is long enough.

I'm just speaking to the Russian mindset within a historical context.  I frankly don't care who's great grandpa, grandpa or father killed who or invaded whom.  History repeats itself.  Russia tries to get border states on their sphere (invasion, puppet gov't whatever works).  Someone invades Russia through those states.  Russia collapses and because they have no natural geographic defense, they get predated upon by those border states.  Russia gets strong and controls them again.  Rinse repeat.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Sure, but I can guess that some people not might have understood what you were trying to say.  I've come across that "mindset" offered up (by Russian apologists/supporters) as an excuse for Russian behaviour repeatedly over my decades.  (Similarly for China.)


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Side note C.G.E. Mannerheim, the Finnish Winter War hero against the Soviets, actually spied on China and assessed invasion routes for Imperial Russia as a decorated officer.


----------



## Underway

Colin Parkinson said:


> Side note C.G.E. Mannerheim, the Finnish Winter War hero against the Soviets, actually spied on China and assessed invasion routes for Imperial Russia as a decorated officer.


Ukrainian nationalists sided with Nazi Germany against the Soviets, and were some of the most "effective" at dealing with the "Jewish problem". Those same nationalist groups are in some cases who we are training in Ukraine to fight the Russians again.  Like I said morality over there is full of missteps.  Best to not focus on right and wrong and focus on geopolitical interests or you'll go crazy.

*Back to Force 2025....*

I've been doing quite a bit of reading up on CMBG organization and the sub organizations that make them up.  Question for those better in the know.

What is the point of the Light Infantry Battalion in a CMBG.  It seems kind of an orphan.  Is it to retain the jump capability?  Doesn't that skill set now reside within CSOR or do they have a different role?  Are they used for air deployment/vertical envelopment type things or are they to hold ground behind the CMBG.  Provide security or garrison forces.

No idea really.  It just seems odd to have the tanks, the LAV 6's doing fire and manouver warfare.  Wouldn't they leave the light battalions behind?


----------



## Infanteer

Underway said:


> What is the point of the Light Infantry Battalion in a CMBG.  It seems kind of an orphan.  Is it to retain the jump capability?  Doesn't that skill set now reside within CSOR or do they have a different role?  Are they used for air deployment/vertical envelopment type things or are they to hold ground behind the CMBG.  Provide security or garrison forces.
> 
> No idea really.  It just seems odd to have the tanks, the LAV 6's doing fire and manouver warfare.  Wouldn't they leave the light battalions behind?


Here is how I understand how it all went down, pulled from various secondary sources.  In the 1990s the Army faced a major organizational change.  4 CMBG was shuttered up, the Airborne Regiment was disbanded, and FRP was in full swing.  The Army had to move pieces around in what really was its last major structural change.

The Third Battalions were reduced to cadres in 10/90 battalions; led by a Reg Force CO, but with most of its personnel drawn from affiliated reserve units.  Also, upon disbanding the Airborne Regiment, a Airborne training company remained behind in Trenton.

Near the end of the 1990s, the decision was made to put the airborne elements into the Third Battalions as para companies, with the rest of the 10/90 unit being augmented from PYs from other places (including the other Battalions) to create the light battalions.  However, around the turn of the century, the idea was to get rid of them, and to plow their PYs into the First and Second Battalions to keep them up to strength.  But 9/11 happens, and 3 PPCLI heads out with the 101st Airborne Division to Kandahar, and now light forces are seen as a necessary capability in the war on terror and the age of insurgency.  So they get retained on the order of battle.  Shortly after, the combat support companies in all battalions are cut; there were other pressures, but that equaled out to the 9 x companies that the centre needed to harvest..

Now the argument is that light forces are required, even though they are within a the mechanized brigades that were really just their temporary homes at the end of the 1990s until they were supposed to be shelved.  Everyone is keen to do some sort of deliberate force design for them, as opposed to the awkward evolution that led to their creation.  Fast forward almost 20 years, and there has been lots of light forces talk, and a MID that was partially implemented (but in contradictory ways - why is your strategically ready force have all of its capabilities partially embedded in the reserves?), and you end up where we are now, with light battalions still awkwardly afloat with no real centre of excellence, and still in search of a valid mission within the Army.


----------



## FJAG

Cynic that I am I was just going to say that we couldn't afford the LAVs to equip the last three battalions. 

That aside, we've flirted between mech and light forces since the 1960. 4 CMBG in Europe was fully mechanized and we had mechanized elements in Canada as well to support and reinforce 4 CMBG but when we formed Force Mobile Command in the 60s and went through the unification debacle, two of our brigades were designated for defence of Canada roles and were light and supposedly air transportable. We continued in that vein until the mid to late seventies when we bought a fleet of AVGPs for the lighter forces while the Europe and Europe-oriented forces were more into Leos and M113s. That really gelled in 1976 with both 1 and 5 brigade being fully mechanized   in M113s and AVGPs while 2 Brigade turned itself into the light and limber Special Service Force with 1 RCR, the Cdn Airborne Regiment, the RCD, 2 RCHA and 2 CER as our all singing and all dancing rapid reaction force.

Around the time that 4 CMBG came home the SSF was disbanded, the Airborne Regiment kicked to the curb, the AVGPs started to be relegated Bosnia and numerous other uses before going to foreign countries but 2 CMBG was stood up again. The redistribution of equipment created the three more or less identical brigades with two mech (M113) and one light battalion each (It went so far that the artillery regiment in each brigade had two M109 batteries to support the mech battalions and we acquired the 105mm LG1 to support the light air mobile battalions. As the LAVs came in they essentially replaced the M113s in the six mech infantry battalions with those old venerable APC now redesignated as Tracked LAVs (TLAV) and relegated to a wide variety of duties.

I think you can tell between what Infanteer says and my own thoughts from before the 1990s that the way we deal with the issue of light v mech forces is not always rational and deliberate. Sometimes there is a strategic purpose from the government of the day; sometimes its because there isn't enough money for all the equipment or people needed; sometimes its serendipity and the whims of whoever is in the CLS slot at the time and how many bright ideas are being bandied around in committee. You've got your finger on the key issue though; there is no doctrinal reason to have one light battalion in what is essentially a mechanized brigade.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

nd


Infanteer said:


> Here is how I understand how it all went down, pulled from various secondary sources.  In the 1990s the Army faced a major organizational change.  4 CMBG was shuttered up, the Airborne Regiment was disbanded, and FRP was in full swing.  The Army had to move pieces around in what really was its last major structural change.
> 
> The Third Battalions were reduced to cadres in 10/90 battalions; led by a Reg Force CO, but with most of its personnel drawn from affiliated reserve units.  Also, upon disbanding the Airborne Regiment, a Airborne training company remained behind in Trenton.
> 
> Near the end of the 1990s, the decision was made to put the airborne elements into the Third Battalions as para companies, with the rest of the 10/90 unit being augmented from PYs from other places (including the other Battalions) to create the light battalions.  However, around the turn of the century, the idea was to get rid of them, and to plow their PYs into the First and Second Battalions to keep them up to strength.  But 9/11 happens, and 3 PPCLI heads out with the 101st Airborne Division to Kandahar, and now light forces are seen as a necessary capability in the war on terror and the age of insurgency.  So they get retained on the order of battle.  Shortly after, the combat support companies in all battalions are cut; there were other pressures, but that equaled out to the 9 x companies that the centre needed to harvest..
> 
> Now the argument is that light forces are required, even though they are within a the mechanized brigades that were really just their temporary homes at the end of the 1990s until they were supposed to be shelved.  Everyone is keen to do some sort of deliberate force design for them, as opposed to the awkward evolution that led to their creation.  Fast forward almost 20 years, and there has been lots of light forces talk, and a MID that was partially implemented (but in contradictory ways - why is your strategically ready force have all of its capabilities partially embedded in the reserves?), and you end up where we are now, with light battalions still awkwardly afloat with no real centre of excellence, and still in search of a valid mission within the Army.



Tangentially, this is a nice paper about why we need Cbt Sp Coys back in the Infantry Battalions:


BACK TO THE FUTURE: ENABLING THE INFANTRY BATTALION 

The aim of this service paper is to recommend returning the 81mm Mortar and Assault Pioneer Platoons to the Infantry Battalions. Since these capabilities were divested, to the Artillery and Engineer Corps respectively, a great deal has changed in the Canadian Armed Forces. High attrition in the post-Afghanistan period, coupled with modest recruiting means that the requirement for the maintenance of these relatively new capabilities, within their new corps, has drawn attention and effort away from their core capabilities. The Infantry Battalion in Battle still lists Mortar Platoon and Assault Pioneer Platoon as part of the Battalion order of battle as these key enablers are required for the infantry to be able to achieve its tasks.1 These capabilities should be returned to the Infantry Corps to ensure that they are manned in accordance with their importance, and to allow the other corps to focus their own efforts on their essential capabilities.




			https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/318/192/tarrantr.pdf


----------



## dapaterson

Capabilities were not divested to other corps.  Responsibility to deliver effects was transferred without resources to make it so.

The CAF needs to decide what it wants to be when it grows up and do so within the parameters the government dictates in terms of personnel and funding limits.


----------



## Brad Sallows

I was ruminating on the way Canada sometimes openly free-rides on US defence spending (any time we officially acknowledge/assume that we don't really have to do something ourselves because the US does or will do it).  In view of that, or the prospect of it, being a good neighbour seems the least possible repayment.  Yet  often the people most happy to spend money on things other than defence are among the most likely to show the back of the hand to the US, and cheer on our politicians when they do so.

One way to be a good neighbour is to at least look after our own territory.  So the question raised is whether our forces are properly arranged and equipped to handle all possible tasks in our airspace and sea spaces short of general war (without requiring US assistance or involvement, although co-operation is welcome).  In particular I'm thinking of the unmentionable topic of being able to patrol under sea ice.  That leaves the navy and air force holding most of the obvious tasks, but what must the army have to support them?  (Obviously not mechanized forces for most of the country and its coastlines.)


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> I was ruminating on the way Canada sometimes openly free-rides on US defence spending (any time we officially acknowledge/assume that we don't really have to do something ourselves because the US does or will do it).  In view of that, or the prospect of it, being a good neighbour seems the least possible repayment.  Yet  often the people most happy to spend money on things other than defence are among the most likely to show the back of the hand to the US, and cheer on our politicians when they do so.
> 
> One way to be a good neighbour is to at least look after our own territory.  So the question raised is whether our forces are properly arranged and equipped to handle all possible tasks in our airspace and sea spaces short of general war (without requiring US assistance or involvement, although co-operation is welcome).  In particular I'm thinking of the unmentionable topic of being able to patrol under sea ice.  *That leaves the navy and air force holding most of the obvious tasks, but what must the army have to support them?  (Obviously not mechanized forces for most of the country and its coastlines.)*



You mean the Canadian Rangers, right?


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Capabilities were not divested to other corps.  Responsibility to deliver effects was transferred without resources to make it so.
> 
> The CAF needs to decide what it wants to be when it grows up and do so within the parameters the government dictates in terms of personnel and funding limits.


Is it the CAF or the Army though? 

I know that everyone fights for resources around the table and the Army's a bit behind on that but I doubt that either the Navy or the Air Force care very much about how the Army assigns priorities within it's own bailiwick. 


daftandbarmy said:


> BACK TO THE FUTURE: ENABLING THE INFANTRY BATTALION


Had to chuckle about that article when I first read about 1 RCR having to use the old salts to teach TOW to Ukrainians on Op Unifier. Had the same problem when the artillery had to teach M109 usage to the Latvians 13 years after divestment.

He's got his facts wrong in some of the paper. the infantry didn't "give up nine mortar platoons for the artillery ... to be able to force generate three mortar troops". The PYs for those platoons went elsewhere (as he later points out not one PY went to the artillery, they all went to the CMTC). The artillery was double tasked with guns and mortars and in fact had to reshuffle its own PYs by cutting guns in favour of filling in the FSCC positions and MFC positions the infantry lost. 

Again when I'm at my most cynical I figured some old Airborne guy said  "hey the airborne battery had six L5s and 12 mortars and could do that sh*t so what do we have to lose?" 

Also the 81mm mortar was not used in local defence of the M777. It was used in defence of the FOBs and to support infantry operations close in to FOBs. Also his discussion about massing artillery is incomplete. As a general principle that's right but in Afghanistan the greatest contribution of the M777 was its high precision delivery of single rounds to take out point targets in a danger close environment and with limited collateral damage.

I entirely agree with his view that the infantry should have its mortar platoons (and under armour) and pioneers back (and its anti-armour platoon which he thinks isn't all that necessary because you can just hand out Javelins like candy), but this is a really weak paper for a major to write. For crying out loud he has seven references in his bibliography and four of those are Wikipedia. 🤦‍♂️

🍻


----------



## devil39

Infanteer said:


> Here is how I understand how it all went down, pulled from various secondary sources.  In the 1990s the Army faced a major organizational change.  4 CMBG was shuttered up, the Airborne Regiment was disbanded, and FRP was in full swing.  The Army had to move pieces around in what really was its last major structural change.
> 
> The Third Battalions were reduced to cadres in 10/90 battalions; led by a Reg Force CO, but with most of its personnel drawn from affiliated reserve units.  Also, upon disbanding the Airborne Regiment, a Airborne training company remained behind in Trenton.
> 
> Near the end of the 1990s, the decision was made to put the airborne elements into the Third Battalions as para companies, with the rest of the 10/90 unit being augmented from PYs from other places (including the other Battalions) to create the light battalions.  However, around the turn of the century, the idea was to get rid of them, and to plow their PYs into the First and Second Battalions to keep them up to strength.  But 9/11 happens, and 3 PPCLI heads out with the 101st Airborne Division to Kandahar, and now light forces are seen as a necessary capability in the war on terror and the age of insurgency.  So they get retained on the order of battle.  Shortly after, the combat support companies in all battalions are cut; there were other pressures, but that equaled out to the 9 x companies that the centre needed to harvest..
> 
> Now the argument is that light forces are required, even though they are within a the mechanized brigades that were really just their temporary homes at the end of the 1990s until they were supposed to be shelved.  Everyone is keen to do some sort of deliberate force design for them, as opposed to the awkward evolution that led to their creation.  Fast forward almost 20 years, and there has been lots of light forces talk, and a MID that was partially implemented (but in contradictory ways - why is your strategically ready force have all of its capabilities partially embedded in the reserves?), and you end up where we are now, with light battalions still awkwardly afloat with no real centre of excellence, and still in search of a valid mission within the Army.


In the late 1990s we had COs who referred to the "Light" Bns (which they weren't) as equipment deficient Bns (which they probably were...but trying very hard to be something else and likely succeeding with time).


----------



## McG

Around 2000, I heard General Jeffery (then CLS) refer to the 3rd Bns as “battalions awaiting APCs” with the idea being they existed as a reservoir of PYs in the hope that the government might keep buying more of the new LAV3.


----------



## Good2Golf

Infanteer said:


> [good stuff clipped…]
> …Now the argument is that light forces are required, even though they are within a the mechanized brigades that were really just their temporary homes at the end of the 1990s until they were supposed to be shelved.  Everyone is keen to do some sort of deliberate force design for them, as opposed to the awkward evolution that led to their creation.  Fast forward almost 20 years, and there has been lots of light forces talk, and a MID that was partially implemented (but in contradictory ways - why is your strategically ready force have all of its capabilities partially embedded in the reserves?), and you end up where we are now, with light battalions still awkwardly afloat with no real centre of excellence, and still in search of a valid mission within the Army.


Yup, this is the Army’s challenge to resolve.

The Army has ADHD when it comes to light forces. Neither the GoC, nor the CAF are going to direct the Army how to address light forces; the onus is is squarely on the Army to work it out, but, I predict it never will.  I participated as a charter member rep in enough LFWGs that I need both hands to count them, yet it seemed impossible for the Army to get out of the starting gate about what LF should be, how to shape them, and how to equip and employ them.

Invariably it devolved into a PY, equipment and physical basing discussion….reinforced by injections from leadership, thusly….
 |
V



McG said:


> Around 2000, I heard General Jeffery (then CLS) refer to the 3rd Bns as “battalions awaiting APCs” with the idea being they existed as a reservoir of PYs in the hope that the government might keep buying more of the new LAV3.



The Army’s challenge will be, that as it fritters and frets about what LF should be within an Army nexus, to maintain relevance to the CAF and GoC, when those establishments see CANSOF’s CSOR bang out the door and do stuff that Army LF (actually, capably in the past), self-espoused as the ones to do the job.

Until then, other CAF element will either watch from the side, or in some cases continue to try to support LF development, but the flavour will likely remain “let’s the rest of us know when you’ve sorted it out…”

$0.02

G2G


----------



## Underway

Infanteer said:


> Near the end of the 1990s, the decision was made to put the airborne elements into the Third Battalions as para companies, with the rest of the 10/90 unit being augmented from PYs from other places (including the other Battalions) to create the light battalions. However, around the turn of the century, the idea was to get rid of them, and to plow their PYs into the First and Second Battalions to keep them up to strength. But 9/11 happens, and 3 PPCLI heads out with the 101st Airborne Division to Kandahar, and now light forces are seen as a necessary capability in the war on terror and the age of insurgency. So they get retained on the order of battle. Shortly after, the combat support companies in all battalions are cut; there were other pressures, but that equaled out to the 9 x companies that the centre needed to harvest..



So this whole scenario happens again in some form or another. I'm pretty confident that it's not 3PPCLI that joins the 101st.  It's CSOR that goes in (they didn't exist in 2001).  This would literally be the exact role they were designed for.

That has to fit into the calculus somewhere.



dapaterson said:


> The CAF needs to decide what it wants to be when it grows up and do so within the parameters the government dictates in terms of personnel and funding limits.



This relates to my last sentence above.  There are area's where the interests of the various elements (army, navy, airforce, SOF) overlap and discussion need to be had.  If the army divested the light battalions with the idea that CSOR was now able to do those tasks (not saying they are, just an example) that would require a discussion between the elements.  Of all the elements the army needs to have the self-reflection more than the others.

So I guess this brings back the discussion, perhaps the army needs a light brigade centre of excellence.  An air cavalry of sorts.  Is that even a valuable asset in today's modern battlespace? Is this the idea behind the heavy, med and light push in some circles instead of the balanced CMBG organizations that currently exist?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Underway said:


> So this whole scenario happens again in some form or another. I'm pretty confident that it's not 3PPCLI that joins the 101st.  It's CSOR that goes in (they didn't exist in 2001).  This would literally be the exact role they were designed for.



Well, maybe not.

Our infantry is highly capable of operating in a 'light forces' environment in a conventional role, as was demonstrated by 3VP and others. 

CSOR (to my knowledge) doesn't tend to deploy in a battle group context e.g., 'two up, one back, bags of smoke, go for the greenest part of the map'. If they did, it would be a complete waste of their specialist skills and the situation would have to be pretty dire.

We don't need a 'centre of excellence' for light infantry. We're already pretty excellent at that stuff. 

We need a decision on what we're going to do with our light infantry, which doesn't seem to be going away but is drifting around in some kind of Army purgatory. 

Then it's providing the kit and troops required to populate a fairly self-reliant battalion that's ready to anchor a light BGp to take on a peer/near peer enemy in the light role. And that means support weapons, the right vehicles, C&C capacity etc.

Right now, if we deployed them anywhere in their current state, IIRC we could only send them to some kind of low intensity UN or disaster relief/ domestic response mission.


----------



## Good2Golf

daftandbarmy said:


> Well, maybe not.
> 
> Our infantry is highly capable of operating in a 'light forces' environment in a conventional role, as was demonstrated by 3VP and others.
> 
> CSOR (to my knowledge) doesn't tend to deploy in a battle group context e.g., 'two up, one back, bags of smoke, go for the greenest part of the map'. If they did, it would be a complete waste of their specialist skills and the situation would have to be pretty dire.
> 
> We don't need a 'centre of excellence' for light infantry. We're already pretty excellent at that stuff.
> 
> …


🤔  CAN LF could deploy again as they did in 2001, but I’d posit that the CSOR of today would be there before our LF, integrated with and supporting JTF 2, and the GoC’s decision Space would then be, “Do we have to send anything else (LF, Mech, etc.) in?”

As a lens to look at the CURSIT pan-deployed CAF Ops, is there any appetite for sending CA LF to augment OP IMPACT? 🧐


----------



## MJP

Good2Golf said:


> As a lens to look at the CURSIT pan-deployed CAF Ops, is there any appetite for sending CA LF to augment OP IMPACT? 🧐


Well yes but in almost purely D&S roles despite them thinking it is more....moot considering the role they are/have filled could be done by any of our Inf Bns IMHO.


----------



## Infanteer

Underway said:


> So this whole scenario happens again in some form or another. I'm pretty confident that it's not 3PPCLI that joins the 101st.  It's CSOR that goes in (they didn't exist in 2001).  This would literally be the exact role they were designed for.


I will state categorically that CSOR would not deploy today as a subordinate unit to a US Infantry Brigade Combat Team (what 3/101 essentially was); especially considering that 3 PPCLI started by guarding Kandahar Airfield...not a SOF task.  There is a fundamental difference between what a Light Infantry Battalion and CSOR do.

A Light Infantry Battalion is a conventional force organized to conduct ground operations as part of a land formation to seize and hold ground, defeat enemy forces, and engage local populations.  They really draw their tasks from three buckets - offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations.

CSOR is a Special Operations force organized to conduct special operations in support of national objectives.  I've seen the SOF task buckets best characterized broadly as direct action, unconventional warfare, and special reconnaissance.  There are other things as well, but I find these "buckets" get to the essence of the SOF mission set.

CSOR is not a light infantry battalion, and its organization and employment is reflective of this.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> I will state categorically that CSOR would not deploy today as a subordinate unit to a US Infantry Brigade Combat Team (what 3/101 essentially was); especially considering that 3 PPCLI started by guarding Kandahar Airfield...not a SOF task.  There is a fundamental difference between what a Light Infantry Battalion and CSOR do.
> 
> A Light Infantry Battalion is a conventional force organized to conduct ground operations as part of a land formation to seize and hold ground, defeat enemy forces, and engage local populations.  They really draw their tasks from three buckets - offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations.
> 
> CSOR is a Special Operations force organized to conduct special operations in support of national objectives.  I've seen the SOF task buckets best characterized broadly as direct action, unconventional warfare, and special reconnaissance.  There are other things as well, but I find these "buckets" get to the essence of the SOF mission set.
> 
> CSOR is not a light infantry battalion, and its organization and employment is reflective of this.



Is there still a need for a Tier-N Special Operations Capable Light Force in your view?  A hybrid force that permits the government to "escalate" slowly from Special Operations to Conventional Operations?  A Force that can extract/reinforce Special Operations elements in a timely fashion without having to wait for a Mechanized Brigade to be repositioned?

The Yanks transition through their SEALs and Delta types to MEU (SOCs) and Rangers to Airborne and Lt Infantry to Strykers to Heavies (Heavies to include Combat Aviation Brigades).
The Brits transition through SBS/SAS to 1 Para SFSG to Army Special Operations Brigade to Lt Infantry to Medium-Heavies.

And both the Brits and the Yanks have explicitly added, as a new non-conventional, ie Special, asset,  Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs  or STABs) designed explicitly to generate diplomatic brownie points without upsetting the client's neighbours too much.

What options on that spectrum does the Canadian Army offer the Government?  And how much of the spectrum is managed by CanSOFCOM?


----------



## Good2Golf

So two questions follow: 

1) would Canada ever be called to participate in a US light combat formation as it was in 2001?

2) if Canada was called upon as such, could the CA even provide a unit-level capability as it did in 2001?

The issue isn’t some trying to portray that CSOR has replaced any of the CA’s light battalions, but rather how does the GoC see the various force capabilities available to them to support the variety of policy and coalition capability demands put to it.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Light force == difficult terrain force.  Surely there has to be something short of CSOR in the toolbox for places where the LAVs can not go, consisting of suitable equipment and people who train with it regularly.


----------



## Infanteer

Good2Golf said:


> So two questions follow:
> 
> 1) would Canada ever be called to participate in a US light combat formation as it was in 2001?
> 
> 2) if Canada was called upon as such, could the CA even provide a unit-level capability as it did in 2001?


1.  Don't know - that's a political question.
2.  Sure - the Light Bns haven't changed much since 2001.  They even have Cbt Sp platoons back!  In all seriousness though, our Light Bns routinely integrate with US IBCTs on exercise to work on interoperability.  We send units to the JRTC every year to participate in US validation exercises.


----------



## blacktriangle

Is it worth maintaining jump capability in conventional units if we don't plan on conducting forcible entry somewhere?  And if so, would it make sense to consolidate that capability within one battalion, perhaps in Ontario? 

Also, would there be any value in having the remaining two light battalions focus on an SFA role?


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Is there still a need for a Tier-N Special Operations Capable Light Force in your view?  A hybrid force that permits the government to "escalate" slowly from Special Operations to Conventional Operations?  A Force that can extract/reinforce Special Operations elements in a timely fashion without having to wait for a Mechanized Brigade to be repositioned?


What is "Tier-N?"  I've seen lots of reference to "SOF Tiers" but I've never actually seen it referenced within SOF.

Light Battalions are conventional infantry units, so you generally aren't going to get anything more out a light battalion than you would out of a mechanized battalion in terms of hands and feet skills.  As Brad Sallows mentions, light battalions represent a unit that can trained to enable increased capability in difficult terrain.  They can also be considered more "strategically responsive" if they are properly equipped and training and provided with a mission to do so (think US Global Response Force).  I'm not sure we're there on the latter aspect in the CA.

But the idea that Light Forces exist to provide some sort of B team for an airfield seizure is not anything that I've seen promoted or practiced.  There are areas where SOF missions can transition to and from the Army, such as the building partner capacity mission in Niger (note which battalion supplied the soldiers), but I wouldn't say any of this is specific to the light forces.


----------



## Infanteer

reveng said:


> Is it worth maintaining jump capability in conventional units if we don't plan on conducting forcible entry somewhere?  And if so, would it make sense to consolidate that capability within one battalion, perhaps in Ontario?


The 67 dollar question.


----------



## Brad Sallows

"Jump" (or "amphibious", or "oversnow") is not synonymous with "forcible entry".  It's a way of getting somewhere.  Sometimes the only way in to where you want to be is by air/aviation.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> "Jump" (or "amphibious", or "oversnow") is not synonymous with "forcible entry". * It's a way of getting somewhere.*  Sometimes the only way in to where you want to be is by air/aviation.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> What is "Tier-N?"  I've seen lots of reference to "SOF Tiers" but I've never actually seen it referenced within SOF.
> 
> Light Battalions are conventional infantry units, so you generally aren't going to get anything more out a light battalion than you would out of a mechanized battalion in terms of hands and feet skills.  As Brad Sallows mentions, light battalions represent a unit that can trained to enable increased capability in difficult terrain.  They can also be considered more "strategically responsive" if they are properly equipped and training and provided with a mission to do so (think US Global Response Force).  I'm not sure we're there on the latter aspect in the CA.
> 
> But the idea that Light Forces exist to provide some sort of B team for an airfield seizure is not anything that I've seen promoted or practiced.  There are areas where SOF missions can transition to and from the Army, such as the building partner capacity mission in Niger (note which battalion supplied the soldiers), but I wouldn't say any of this is specific to the light forces.



Tier N is a reference to the proliferation of SOF tiers that I perceive.  It gets difficult to keep track of which tree-climbing specialty belongs to which guild these days.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> "Jump" (or "amphibious", or "oversnow") is not synonymous with "forcible entry".  It's a way of getting somewhere.  Sometimes the only way in to where you want to be is by air/aviation.



Kind of like why SAR Techs (and Smoke Jumpers) are parachute trained?


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Is it the CAF or the Army though?
> 
> I know that everyone fights for resources around the table and the Army's a bit behind on that but I doubt that either the Navy or the Air Force care very much about how the Army assigns priorities within it's own bailiwick.
> 
> Had to chuckle about that article when I first read about 1 RCR having to use the old salts to teach TOW to Ukrainians on Op Unifier. Had the same problem when the artillery had to teach M109 usage to the Latvians 13 years after divestment.
> 
> He's got his facts wrong in some of the paper. the infantry didn't "give up nine mortar platoons for the artillery ... to be able to force generate three mortar troops". The PYs for those platoons went elsewhere (as he later points out not one PY went to the artillery, they all went to the CMTC). The artillery was double tasked with guns and mortars and in fact had to reshuffle its own PYs by cutting guns in favour of filling in the FSCC positions and MFC positions the infantry lost.
> 
> Again when I'm at my most cynical I figured some old Airborne guy said  "hey the airborne battery had six L5s and 12 mortars and could do that sh*t so what do we have to lose?"
> 
> Also the 81mm mortar was not used in local defence of the M777. It was used in defence of the FOBs and to support infantry operations close in to FOBs. Also his discussion about massing artillery is incomplete. As a general principle that's right but in Afghanistan the greatest contribution of the M777 was its high precision delivery of single rounds to take out point targets in a danger close environment and with limited collateral damage.
> 
> I entirely agree with his view that the infantry should have its mortar platoons (and under armour) and pioneers back (and its anti-armour platoon which he thinks isn't all that necessary because you can just hand out Javelins like candy), but this is a really weak paper for a major to write. For crying out loud he has seven references in his bibliography and four of those are Wikipedia. 🤦‍♂️
> 
> 🍻


The “just hand out Javelins” is something very easy to say when your total knowledge of ATGM employment comes from TEWTs where can just say “Anti Armour will cover this” and everyone nods sagely. It was similar to my experiance with the just throw the tow in the LAV system, fine sir where do I put the 4 foot long 75lb 80,000 dollar missile with the sensitive RF transmitter?


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Then it's providing the kit and troops required to populate a fairly self-reliant battalion that's ready to anchor a light BGp to take on a peer/near peer enemy in the light role. And that means support weapons, the right vehicles, C&C capacity etc.



What near peer light force do you have in mind? Look at our “rivals” in China and Russia, light forces don’t really exist. Even the Chinese Light Brigades are heavily motorized and the VDV is essentially mechanized infantry.


----------



## McG

reveng said:


> Also, would there be any value in having the remaining two light battalions focus on an SFA role?


Note: “SFA” is a US doctrinal acronym. In Canada we use “SFCB.”  In Canada there is a slang use for “SFA” that probably precludes using the acronym in doctrine. I watched a room full of Canadian colonels struggle to contain their giggles as a US colonel briefed that “NATO is in Afghanistan to do SFA, and NATO is making great strides in accomplishing SFA.”


----------



## blacktriangle

McG said:


> Note: “SFA” is a US doctrinal acronym. In Canada we use “SFCB.”  In Canada there is a slang use for “SFA” that probably precludes using the acronym in doctrine. I watched a room full of Canadian colonels struggle to contain their giggles as a US colonel briefed that “NATO is in Afghanistan to do SFA, and NATO is making great strides in accomplishing SFA.”


I’d argue we’re pretty good at doing SFA here in Canada…

As for capacity building, perhaps we should start with ourselves. If those same Colonels spent more time sorting real issues out, and less time coming up with our own set of acronyms, perhaps we’d be further ahead in the game.

Fair enough though - thank you for the correction.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> What near peer light force do you have in mind? Look at our “rivals” in China and Russia, light forces don’t really exist. Even the Chinese Light Brigades are heavily motorized and the VDV is essentially mechanized infantry.



If we're part of NATO, I assume we'll need to pony up light forces for things like Northern Norway defence. 

If we're working with a US coalition, I assume we'd need to be able to work alongside their various Mountain/Littoral-Amphib/Airmobile-portable-borne formations.

But again, I guess the big question is what do we want our light units to do and, if our strategy dictates, re-role them if we don't need them.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> But again, I guess the big question is what do we want our* light units  Forces* to do and, if our strategy dictates, re-role them if we don't need them.


FTFY.

And just because the government says they want Forces that can do stuff doesn't necessarily mean they actually want them to do it.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> FTFY.
> 
> And just because the government says they want Forces that can do stuff doesn't necessarily mean they actually want them to do it.



So you've just nicely described the PRes CAF Mission Tasks A.K.A. OP FASCINATOR  






						Backgrounder | Backgrounder: Strengthening the Army Reserve through Mission Tasks
					

As part of the Strengthening the Army Reserve (StAR) initiative, Army Reserve units will be focused more closely on specific Mission Tasks. The Army Reserve has expertise that is valued for domestic and international operations. Given the current threat environment and political realities...




					www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> If we're part of NATO, I assume we'll need to pony up light forces for things like Northern Norway defence.
> 
> If we're working with a US coalition, I assume we'd need to be able to work alongside their various Mountain/Littoral-Amphib/Airmobile-portable-borne formations.
> 
> But again, I guess the big question is what do we want our light units to do and, if our strategy dictates, re-role them if we don't need them.


Norway itself choosing to use mechanized combined arms battalions to defend itself. 

10th Moutain is a name, it has not "mountain" role. If we look at other NATO Mountain Forces, Alpini or Chasseur Alpine, we'll find they are actually motorized / light mechanized units. 

You're right in the big question thing, what do we need our army to do? Do we need to provide light forces and if so what is their role? The Aussies, not to constantly fall back to that, have done that well in determining they need a light Bn as their lead amphibious force to be supported by their Mechanized forces.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> The “just hand out Javelins” is something very easy to say when your total knowledge of ATGM employment comes from TEWTs where can just say “Anti Armour will cover this” and everyone nods sagely. It was similar to my experiance with the just throw the tow in the LAV system, fine sir where do I put the 4 foot long 75lb 80,000 dollar missile with the sensitive RF transmitter?


That's really the point I was making too with my comment much earlier in the thread with "too many blades in the swiss army infantryman". 

I know that weapon systems are becoming easier to operate but nonetheless there are only so many diverse skills you can load on someone before they become inefficient with most of them. Whether its recce or mortars or ATGMs or GBAD or loitering munitions etc etc there are skill levels, tactical employment doctrines, interrelated target acquisition and control arrangements, etc etc that apply and its practically impossible to download all of that onto one Mark 1 No 1 Grunt not to mention his already overloaded body and LAV. 

Just a simple example is back in the 60s and 70s when we started handing out medium and heavy machine guns to everybody and his aunt rather than having them employed in specialist squads and platoons, the expertise as to how to properly site and employ them went down the tubes. I presume we have that somewhat back under control although what with Afghanistan and all I suspect that the tactical employment of them may have suffered again.

That's why in other threads I keep saying keep the heavier ATGMs and Manpad out of the rifle companies. They don't belong in the company; they deploy more broadly in layers that overlay the company positions and that can be adjusted, controlled and employed to meet the development of the threat. Flexibility and tight command and control are the key for maximizing these systems.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Just a simple example is back in the 60s and 70s when we started handing out medium and heavy machine guns to everybody and his aunt rather than having them employed in specialist squads and platoons, the expertise as to how to properly site and employ them went down the tubes. I presume we have that somewhat back under control although what with Afghanistan and all I suspect that the tactical employment of them may have suffered again.


Shhh every time some one mentions that a platoon gets forced to read that "emma gees" article again.

I completely agree, throwing tools into the tool box takes up time and space in training and support. Adding weapon systems into existng structures doesn't not mean that capability is going to be employed effectively in any way shape or form. Look at the C16 in an infantry Bn: it's held by the CQ and brought out a couple times a year for a defensive exercise or a course, no one is proficient in it, and there's not way for the company to effectively man them without robbing peter.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> That's really the point I was making too with my comment much earlier in the thread with "too many blades in the swiss army infantryman".
> 
> I know that weapon systems are becoming easier to operate but nonetheless there are only so many diverse skills you can load on someone before they become inefficient with most of them. Whether its recce or mortars or ATGMs or GBAD or loitering munitions etc etc there are skill levels, tactical employment doctrines, interrelated target acquisition and control arrangements, etc etc that apply and its practically impossible to download all of that onto one Mark 1 No 1 Grunt not to mention his already overloaded body and LAV.
> 
> Just a simple example is back in the 60s and 70s when we started handing out medium and heavy machine guns to everybody and his aunt rather than having them employed in specialist squads and platoons, the expertise as to how to properly site and employ them went down the tubes. I presume we have that somewhat back under control although what with Afghanistan and all I suspect that the tactical employment of them may have suffered again.
> 
> That's why in other threads I keep saying keep the heavier ATGMs and Manpad out of the rifle companies. They don't belong in the company; they deploy more broadly in layers that overlay the company positions and that can be adjusted, controlled and employed to meet the development of the threat. Flexibility and tight command and control are the key for maximizing these systems.
> 
> 🍻




Fair points FJAG but if we are content saying that we can rerole LAV to Light to Para and back again I have to ask how much easier it is to rerole an infantry battalion from an anti-personnel direct fire role to an anti-tank direct fire role.

I agree that training is involved but is the difference greater than that of conducting hasty and prepared attacks and defences; in open, close or urban terrain; in boreal, jungle, arctic and desert environments?

I agree that fire discipline is going to be a major issue when, instead of the individual soldier having 300 rounds of 5.56 at his disposal for the anti-personnel battle, in the antii-tank battle it will be a case of the Section Leader having half a dozen 84mms or the  Platoon Leader having a dozen ATGMs and some Swingfires.  It will require different templates for different kill zones and different call of shots.

But I don't accept that swapping an infantry section from clearing houses to hunting tanks is a particularly difficult problem.


And - following up - how exactly do we define a HEAVY ATGM when Javelins, issued at Section level in many armies, cover the 2 to 5 km band.   Vehicle mounted systems, the next band up, are reaching out to 50 km.

I have no problem with the 50 km band being an Arty responsibility.  But the 5 km band is no longer strictly a Bn responsibility.  That band has moved down to the Coy/Pl level.


----------



## markppcli

For a quick task? No.

For a longer operation, that requires sustainment, and planning gap drills and such yes.


----------



## Kirkhill

> *The SBCT has three organic systems capable of destroying enemy armor *and can employ lethal fires to disrupt and neutralize armored forces. The first organic system is the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Company that is assigned to the SBCT headquarters. This *ATGM Company employs tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) systems mounted on Strykers* and is highly effective at destroying armor at a range of 3,750 meters.2 Many times this force is *held in reserve or placed by the brigade commander *to reinforce his main effort operation.
> 
> The second organic system,* the Mobile Gun System (MGS)*, may look like a tank to the casual observer, but this vehicle was built as an Infantry support system. The MGS does have a M68A1E4 105mm cannon, but it was built to operate independently and support Infantrymen in the fight. Furthermore, the Infantry battalions within the SBCT are only authorized to have nine of these systems. It is also important to note that only 143 MGS have been produced for the U.S. Army. As a result of this decision, *each SBCT will only receive nine of its authorized 27 MGS systems*.
> 
> The last organic system is *the Javelin, which is the primary anti-armor system across the SBCT formation*. Each SBCT rifle battalion has M98A2 Javelin Weapon Systems that are *employed at the squad level to defeat enemy armor*. The Javelin system is a highly effective armor-defeating weapon system that was first employed in military service in 1996 as a replacement for the M47 Dragon anti-tank missile. The Javelin is a fire-and-forget missile that has automatic self-guidance that does not require a Soldier to steer the missile onto the target. This fire-and-forget capability allows the operator to fire the missile and retain cover and concealment. *The Javelin provides dismounted Infantrymen a surefire way to effectively kill tanks*. *The system’s portability makes it the anti-armor weapon of choice for light early entry forces.* It has an extremely high probability kill rate against enemy armor and is effective out to 2,500 meters.3



The Javelin now outranges the TOW missile.



> Trained Soldiers were able to achieve a 50-percent kill ratio on enemy armored vehicles in both offensive and defensive operations. While 50 percent is low, it was in real-world battlefield conditions with Infantrymen climbing up significant terrain to achieve effects against enemy armor.





> The key to the employment of the M98A2 was the use of movement and maneuver of the Stryker vehicles and the dismounted Infantry. NTC’s vast open terrain allowed for the employment of weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges. This required a “push and pull” technique between dismounted and mounted Infantry Soldiers. The Stryker platoons would dismount Infantry squads and “push” them forward, utilizing the Strykers’ remote weapon systems to cover their movement. The dismounted squads seized dominate terrain, established hasty support-by-fire positions using Javelins, and provided overwatch for the Strykers as they “pulled” forward. The “push and pull” technique allowed the battalion to defeat enemy armor by maneuvering the dismounted Infantry with Javelins to positions of advantage and overwatch the movement of vehicles as they bounded forward. This technique requires a thorough terrain analysis by the battalion staff during the military decision-making process and the company leadership during troop leading procedures in order to maximize the usage of the terrain available.
> 
> During Battle Period 4 of NTC 14-03, we found ourselves attacking into an enemy armored formation defending key terrain in vicinity of the Arrowhead and Alpha/Bravo Pass. We had to maneuver to Refrigerator Gap and conduct a breach of enemy obstacles to pass elements of the brigade onto their objective. The terrain was not the most suitable place to maneuver Strykers as it was restrictive or severely restrictive in nature. Based on the posture of the enemy, we recognized we would have to employ the “push and pull” technique described above. Our rifle companies deliberately cleared mountainous terrain dismounted en-route to their objective and only moved vehicles forward once overwatch positions with Javelins were established. While this technique took extended time to execute, it enabled our battalion to destroy 10 armored vehicles before reaching our objective.







__





						U.S. Army | Infantry Magazine
					






					www.benning.army.mil
				




And, again, we have the Swedish Pansar Battalion with their Squad Level selection of AT4, CG84, N-LAW and BILL as alternative weapons systems.


----------



## Kirkhill

Interesting that the Javelin CLU also works with the Stinger MANPAD.

Not necessary that the rifle sections have MANPADS but not a bad idea if the entire battalion has the same CLU.  The AD platoon can then add to the AT battle if the situation calls for it.   You could even call it the ADATs Platoon.









						Raytheon launches Stinger missile from Javelin launcher
					

Raytheon Missiles & Defense, a Raytheon Technologies business, announced last week that it successfully completed the first-ever demonstration of a Stinger missile fired from a Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Unit, or LWCLU, for the U.S. Army. The missile engaged and defeated an unmanned...




					www.israeldefense.co.il


----------



## markppcli

@Kirkhill 3,750 meters is still greater than 2,500 no? Also the T2B Arrow exceeds that range but I digress. My point is that even in that formation you still have ATGM over watch. I'm not anti Javelin, I'm very pro it, but we need to be sure that the way we employ and issue it makes sense and works. If that means we drop the Carl G for it, fine, but there's a limit to how much space we have and how much people can carry. Tools in the swiss army knife and all that.

Bill hasn't been in service since 2013.

edit: After some quick research, the Javelin has been extended to 4000m in the dismounted role. Still less that an TOW 2B.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Fair points FJAG but if we are content saying that we can rerole LAV to Light to Para and back again ...


I'm not one of those "we". I tend to think that there's a significant difference between armoured and mech and light infantry. I see Armoured infantry more like you do as a very specialized role with specialized equipment (like a CV 90) and tactics - I don't see LAVs as part of that. Our LAVs I see more in the Stryker brigade role. In that respect, yes, I see the LAV battalions as being able to, in fact trained to, fight dismounted and therefore "light capable".


Kirkhill said:


> ... I have to ask how much easier it is to rerole an infantry battalion from an anti-personnel direct fire role to an anti-tank direct fire role.
> 
> I agree that training is involved but is the difference greater than that of conducting hasty and prepared attacks and defences; in open, close or urban terrain; in boreal, jungle, arctic and desert environments?
> 
> I agree that fire discipline is going to be a major issue when, instead of the individual soldier having 300 rounds of 5.56 at his disposal for the anti-personnel battle, in the antii-tank battle it will be a case of the Section Leader having half a dozen 84mms or the  Platoon Leader having a dozen ATGMs and some Swingfires.  It will require different templates for different kill zones and different call of shots.
> 
> But I don't accept that swapping an infantry section from clearing houses to hunting tanks is a particularly difficult problem.


I may not be the best guy in this forum to ask that question. I've had the Reg F Combat Team Commanders course and Command and Staff Course, worked as a FOO for several years with mostly mech battalions and ran a Res rifle company (platoon +) for a few years but compared to the more knowledgeable people on this board my experience is indeed limited. That said, IMHO, I think it's very difficult to rerole folks (especially once deployed). One can always rerole and retrain but there is a time factor involved with that and most people underestimate the time needed. The training on the weapon system is perhaps the easiest. The training on the tactics is significantly harder and, for a start, requires that there are trained and experienced officers and NCOs available to conduct the training.


Kirkhill said:


> And - following up - how exactly do we define a HEAVY ATGM when Javelins, issued at Section level in many armies, cover the 2 to 5 km band.   Vehicle mounted systems, the next band up, are reaching out to 50 km.
> 
> I have no problem with the 50 km band being an Arty responsibility.  But the 5 km band is no longer strictly a Bn responsibility.  That band has moved down to the Coy/Pl level.


It's not a range thing. Maybe it was when we layered M72s and Carl Gs and TOWs. But I doubt very many direct fire weapons operators in a rifle company will ever engage at 5 kms (except in the Middle East). For me it's more a question of how many operators are needed for a crew served weapon, a gunner, a loader? an ammo handler, a communicator/driver? How mobile does the system need to be when in contact? How many systems work as mutually supporting teams - two - three? Are these systems part of a main defence line or part of a deep guard? What role do they provide while the force is mobile - flank protection -  rear guard - advance guard - how are they controlled?

During my training we had both close in ATk weapons in the rifle company and ATGM platoons with the battalion. During about 80% of the operational phases, the ATGM platoon did it's job nowhere near a rifle company. Only once you got into the last phase of a defensive operation would they be covering anywhere near the rifle companies.

It's very much the same with air defence. Yes we have manpads which are much easier to operate than the Blowpipe but by the time that you tie in radars and air support coordination and selected air corridors and threat vectors and optimum firing positions you end up with a force that is constantly moving and repositioning itself across the battlefield to provide the best coverage. 

Rifle companies rarely occupy a piece of ground that's optimal for heavy ATGMs or GBAD. Even if they have a weapon system that reaches out and touches someone at 5 Kms the bulk of the rifle company's weapon systems operate in a band from several hundreds of metres to maybe a kilometre at best and the coy will be sited to exploit those ranges (yup, I know the 25mm reaches out further than that but where will it be sited in whatever phase you are in). 

OTOH, an ATGM platoon (or better yet an ATGM coy) can be sited to fully exploit the longer ranges from positions that are nowhere near the rifle company. Each will have its own command structure to exploit its weapon systems to the best advantage. Dumping all of that on a company commander will almost guarantee that something will not operate at its optimum - especially when you are dealing with more widely dispersed operations and you need to cover the gaps because the rifle companies are, in all probability, no longer mutually supporting. I can't think of anything more difficult than a rifle company commander trying to control half of his company falling back from their long-range ATk or AD firing positions back into the main position to start fighting with a set of medium and then light weapons as the battle closes in on him while in the meantime his position is being pounded by 152mm splinters.

Like you, I believe we aren't postured right. And I think the biggest fiction we tell ourselves is that we are a multi-purpose and agile force - and then go through a three-year managed readiness cycle with a specialized six month predeployment training cycles for a particular mission. That's about as far away as you can get from the definition of multi-purpose and agile. Adding greater complexity to the rifle company will not move us forward. We need to clearly establish what a rifle company is to do (and by that I mean what effects can it deliver with the bulk of the weapons system it has [or ought to have] and not with the additional ones we could foist on it without regard if they realistically can employ them) and then build and provide the additional specialist enablers needed to cover everything else. By all means give the rifle company anti-armour weapons that work well within their zone (like the Carl G) but don't try to spread the company all over the battlefield.

And just let me reinforce what I said before. I distinguish between the job that an armoured infantry company does in a combined arms battalion in an armoured brigade with the job done by a light or LAV rifle company in a mech brigade. An armoured infantry company requires a whole different suite of tools most of which will be bolted onto their IFVs.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Not every tool needs to be in the back does it?  Some could be at the CQ or with the RQ?

Thanks for the info on BILL.


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## Underway

How does a 25mm fit into this? We keep comparing to Stykers, which is fair given their similarity, but we have a tool they don't.  The Dragoon variant isn't every vehicle. 

It's conversations like this I wish there was an Army.ca Pub.  I could buy a pint for the table and pick the brains of all the Army types for a couple of hours over nachos and wings.   🍻


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Not every tool needs to be in the back does it?  Some could be at the CQ or with the RQ?
> 
> Thanks for the info on BILL.


So now the change around requires CQ to drop off the system. So we're regigging on the go. Not exactly this really quick, low effort turn around  you were talking about.



Kirkhill said:


> And - following up - how exactly do we define a HEAVY ATGM when Javelins, issued at Section level in many armies, cover the 2 to 5 km band.   Vehicle mounted systems, the next band up, are reaching out to 50 km.


Payload, and weight. There's a reason a TOW missile is twice the weight of a Javelin. 

To echo what @FJAG is saying, the Anti Armour platoon's job is firing happening kilometers away from the line companies. The task isn't simply to carry a missile and stand over there, it's specific tactics and tasks. Covering flanks and gaps, assessing gaps, sited in enough depth that your signature is masked, having appropriate fire control, ect. I have been part of the TOW section of a rifle company enough to know that when it's just a secondary task it's done badly, to the point that the system is as much a detriment as it is an asset.


----------



## blacktriangle

Underway said:


> How does a 25mm fit into this? We keep comparing to Stykers, which is fair given their similarity, but we have a tool they don't.  The Dragoon variant isn't every vehicle.



I'd be curious to know if there's any talk of moving beyond 25mm in the coming years? Most new vehicles (and upgrade programs like the Stryker Dragoon) seem to have weapons in the 30mm - 40mm range.


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## markppcli

Underway said:


> How does a 25mm fit into this? We keep comparing to Stykers, which is fair given their similarity, but we have a tool they don't.  The Dragoon variant isn't every vehicle.
> 
> It's conversations like this I wish there was an Army.ca Pub.  I could buy a pint for the table and pick the brains of all the Army types for a couple of hours over nachos and wings.   🍻











						US Army chooses winner to build its new Stryker gun system
					

The Army has chosen who will build its Medium Caliber Weapon System for the Stryker combat vehicle.




					www.defensenews.com
				




Funny you should mention that. It appears that the US army has recognized they're under gunned against Russian Motor Rifle Regiments in Europe and will be doing a mass up gun. LAV Company Tactics (interim) states that the one of the LAV's  jobs is the destruction of enemy IFV's and APCs. So that takes some stress of our anti armour weapons in comparison to say a Stryker or Light formation. What the actual number looks like we shall see I suppose. 



reveng said:


> I'd be curious to know if there's any talk of moving beyond 25mm in the coming years? Most new vehicles (and upgrade programs like the Stryker Dragoon) seem to have weapons in the 30mm - 40mm range.


None to my knowledge. It would require a substantial turret redesign to even fit a 30mm Bushmaster 2 in there. That being said for the jobs it's supposed to do against vehicles 25mm is still adequate, it's when you start talking about HE / Airburst capability that the differences show.


----------



## McG

reveng said:


> I'd be curious to know if there's any talk of moving beyond 25mm in the coming years? Most new vehicles (and upgrade programs like the Stryker Dragoon) seem to have weapons in the 30mm - 40mm range.


At 40 mm, you also can find options for swatting UAV & UAV swarms.








						Ammunition - CTA International
					

40CT AMMUNITION A SMART SOLUTION FOR EVERY SCENARIO APFSDS-T KE-AB  GPR AB-T GPR-PD-T GPR-KE-T TP-T TPRR-T The main unique feature of the 40CT ammunition is its Cased Telescoped design, in which the projectile is integrated into the cartridge case. This innovative design enables 40CT ammunition...




					www.cta-international.com


----------



## Underway

markppcli said:


> None to my knowledge. It would require a substantial turret redesign to even fit a 30mm Bushmaster 2 in there. That being said for the jobs it's supposed to do against vehicles 25mm is still adequate, it's when you start talking about HE / Airburst capability that the differences show.


There is only one weapon that I know of that can fit into approx the same space but would still require a turret redesign is the CTAS 40mm.



The CTAS ammo was what @McG just posted. However the ammunition does take up more space then a 25mm and is much much more expensive...


----------



## markppcli

Yeah I personally think the anti drone capability is probably worth it but you’d also loose significant ammunition capacity so I’d imagine that means no more HE on dismounts which means you need more coax storage. Probably a price worth paying.


----------



## markppcli

Underway said:


> It's conversations like this I wish there was an Army.ca Pub.  I could buy a pint for the table and pick the brains of all the Army types for a couple of hours over nachos and wings.   🍻


Could always set up a discord server for beers and fireside chats. Probably best discussed on another thread though.


----------



## Underway

Not to turn this into an advert for CTA but glossy brochure stuff from here:


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> How does a 25mm fit into this? We keep comparing to Stykers, which is fair given their similarity, but we have a tool they don't.  The Dragoon variant isn't every vehicle.
> 
> It's conversations like this I wish there was an Army.ca Pub.  I could buy a pint for the table and pick the brains of all the Army types for a couple of hours over nachos and wings.   🍻


If I understand things correctly, the need for a 25 mm system came out of a specific operational requirement submitted by 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Europe as a counter APC weapon system (In part it explains why the system is called the "Dragoon" because 2CR is known as the 2nd Dragoons). 2nd Cav is about the size and structure of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team.

Armored Cavalry Regiments in the US Army used to have a more traditional role of scouting, reconnaissance and providing screens and guards for more conventional divisions but have more recently been rebranded into being either Armored BCTs or Stryker BCTs. While as an SBCT 2nd Cav is really more a light infantry brigade transported in armoured personnel carriers, my guess is that 2nd Cav because of its location and more bellicose opponent considers itself more robust than the average SBCT and wanted a greater edge in being able to defeat the mech infantry forces it might face and therefore looked to augment their capability in that respect (seeing our LAVs and the various other wheeled carriers with 25 and 30 mm systems helped make up their minds). Incidentally the Dragoon's turret is unmanned (although it can be reloaded from inside) while our LAV's turret is manned. The Dragoon still carries around a full squad.

How far the US will go in deploying the Dragoon is questionable because doctrinally the Stryker is not meant to be an infantry fighting vehicle but an armoured personnel carrier. The US Army has proper IFVs in their ABCTs namely the Bradley and has a project on the books (the Next-Generation Combat Vehicle) which is designed to replace all the close combat needs of the Army. My guess is that the Dragoon will stay as a niche vehicle which will not replace the basic Strykers nor change the Stryker combat doctrine in general. There are currently 9 SBCTs in the Army and I believe contracts have been let to partially convert three of those to Dragoons (not on a one for one but 1/4 to 1/2 of them in various companies basis). Incidentally the US Army is concurrently doing an upgrade program to their Stryker fleet similar to the hull upgrades of our own LAV 6.0.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> So now the change around requires CQ to drop off the system. So we're regigging on the go. Not exactly this really quick, low effort turn around  you were talking about.
> 
> 
> Payload, and weight. There's a reason a TOW missile is twice the weight of a Javelin.
> 
> To echo what @FJAG is saying, the Anti Armour platoon's job is firing happening kilometers away from the line companies. The task isn't simply to carry a missile and stand over there, it's specific tactics and tasks. Covering flanks and gaps, assessing gaps, sited in enough depth that your signature is masked, having appropriate fire control, ect. I have been part of the TOW section of a rifle company enough to know that when it's just a secondary task it's done badly, to the point that the system is as much a detriment as it is an asset.


And yet it appears that one way in which the Stryker-borne battalion can be employed is as an Anti-tank battalion.  Not just as a rifle battalion with Anti-Tank support.

The CO has to plan the Anti-Tank battle around 27 squad missile launchers with 4000 m range, and a 128 mm, 8.4 kg Tandem warhead.

Vice the 152 mm 6.4 kg warhead of the TOW?

And I didn't mean, anywhere, to give the impression that individual sections would just reach into the tool box and do a quick change from mouseholing towns to taking on Panzer brigades. 

I would expect the Chain of Command to advise what type of operations the nation was to engage in.  Exactly in the same manner that a battalion would be warned for a deliberate attack or a hasty defence.  The battalion would draw and distribute the necessary stores.

The US Army went to Afghanistan with Javelins and AT4s.  They swapped them out for CG84s.

Now they are relearning Javelin skills and adding Switchblades to their tool boxes.


----------



## Kirkhill

And.... Is the LAV an Infantry Section Carrier with a Heavy Machine Gun?

Or....Is it a mobility challenged Infantry Fighting Vehicle?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> And yet it appears that one way in which the Stryker-borne battalion can be employed is as an Anti-tank battalion.  Not just as a rifle battalion with Anti-Tank support.
> 
> The CO has to plan the Anti-Tank battle around 27 squad missile launchers with 4000 m range, and a 128 mm, 8.4 kg Tandem warhead.
> 
> Vice the 152 mm 6.4 kg warhead of the TOW?
> 
> And I didn't mean, anywhere, to give the impression that individual sections would just reach into the tool box and do a quick change from mouseholing towns to taking on Panzer brigades.
> 
> I would expect the Chain of Command to advise what type of operations the nation was to engage in.  Exactly in the same manner that a battalion would be warned for a deliberate attack or a hasty defence.  The battalion would draw and distribute the necessary stores.


Well no what they described wasn't an anti tank Bn, it was a Bn allowing he maneuvre of it's carriers with the infantry creeping up with ATGMs. That's not an "anti tank Bn" in the way that you'd see the Anti Tank Bn of a Russian Division for example, where it's principal purpose is providing fires against tanks.

Tow 2 B warheads are also tandem, I'm very curious how the Javelin manages 4km of range which so much warhead weight in comparison to the total weight of the missile.

With regards to changing jobs; that's sort of exactly what you said isn't it?


Kirkhill said:


> But I don't accept that swapping an infantry section from clearing houses to hunting tanks is a particularly difficult problem.



It's about as different as taking a 10 soldiers from doing arifle section job to being assault pioneers. Or taking an artillery troop and telling them to do a fighting patrol. Of course you can do that but will it be optimal?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> And.... Is the LAV an Infantry Section Carrier with a Heavy Machine Gun?
> 
> Or....Is it a mobility challenged Infantry Fighting Vehicle?


It’s a wheeled infantry fighting vehicle in the same vein as a VCBI, Freccia, and various other models. With substantial advantages in protection over most.


----------



## Kirkhill

I don't know much about life today but circa 1982, with pretty much the same tool kit you have today, as an Infantry platoon leader, I was expected to train my platoon for both those operations, along with mounted and dismounted ops.  Laying concertina and tanglefoot, enfilade from defilade, fortify a house, and a bunch of other stuff.  

Were we masters of anything?

We were jacks of all trades.  

Platoon in battle 309(3)


----------



## markppcli

Your platoon were qualified assault pioneers and did all those jobs? They did demo, crater roads? Built bunkers? Ect? Ie did they do the jobs of an assault pioneer platoon?
Those tasks you listed are not assault pioneer tasks is what I’m trying to get at. I listed some of those specialities.


----------



## Kirkhill

Obviously not.

What I am saying is that there was one very broad standard for all rifle infantry.

Everything was predicated on dismounted tactics.  

Vehicles merely moved us from a to b.

The problems started with the Grizzly (purchased instead of the Marder that everyone wanted).  And have never been resolved.


----------



## markppcli

It’s not a problem, it’s an evolution. M113s could never contribute to the fight ( to little armour, ineffective weapon on the move), a LAV can and does. Trying to compare the two is apples and oranges. The Grizzly was a turd no doubt about it, but outside of having wheels it shares virtually nothing with a LAV (6 or 3).

Saying there was one standard for infantry is a bit disingenuous given what we were talking about. There were absolutely specialist roles, particularly anti tank, organized and manned differently than a standard rifle section. These were in combat support company. The Rifle Section of 1982 didn’t just pick up an become a 106mm recoilless rifle section at the drop of a hat.


----------



## GR66

All these discussions are very interesting and important.  They go to the heart of what the Canadian Army could/should become.  However, the topic of this thread is about "FORCE 2025".  It's now the middle of 2021.  Most of the fundamental changes being discussed here (Heavy/Medium/Light Brigades vs. Symmetrical Brigades, LAVs as APCs vs IFVs, the best use of currently non-existent ATGMs and Loitering Munitions, the proper structure and role of Light/Rapid Reaction Forces, etc.) won't actually be addressed until FORCE 2030, FORCE 2035 or even beyond.

I think the goal of FORCE 2025 should be to begin setting the framework within which all of these debates and changes can take place as we move forward.  To achieve that goal I would propose the three following changes:

1) Simply the Army command structure in such a way as to re-focus our attention on Brigade-sized deployments as opposed to simply force generating troops for Battle Groups.  Combine all of the Reg Force Brigades (as well as the Canadian Combat Support Brigade which would support a deployed Canadian Brigade Group) within a single (2nd) Division.  Group all of the Reserve Brigades under a single (3rd) Division.  

2) Group all of our Tank Squadrons in a single geographic location.  This will simplify training and logistics while the Army decides how it wants to eventually deploy its limited tank resources.  If we decide on designating one Brigade as our "Heavy" Brigade then they are already together in place to do that.  If we wish to maintain symmetrical Armoured Regiments within each Brigade then we can use the "affiliated" Brigade model and keep the tanks co-located physically but organizationally/operationally part of each of the Brigade Groups.

3) Remove the 3rd (Light) Infantry Battalions from the Mechanized Brigades and group them together in a single Light Brigade.  We would then have a single Light Infantry organization within which we can focus on answering all of those questions about what the role of Light forces should be in the Canadian Army, how they should be organized and equipped, etc. without the distraction of being an appendage of the Mechanized Brigades.  We could also rotate readiness between the three Light Battalions to provide a rapid response capability for the Army.


----------



## Kirkhill

With respect Mark "It" is a problem.

Prior to the Grizzly we had a General Purpose Infantry based on battalions of 4 rifle companies of large sections and a company of long service specialists who could be relied on to perform their specialist tasks in support of the rifles, or, when the need arose, could revert to being rifles.  One man in each section was lost to the vehicle as a driver.  In the absence of the vehicle that driver would revert to life as a rifleman.

In the 80s the infantry wanted a piece of the armoured battlefield.  Our enemies and allies were all kitting up with BMPs, BMDs and Marders.  The Yanks were working on the Bradley and the Brits on the Warrior.  Canada's Army, and the Infantry in particular, wanted to stay "relevant" to that fight.  The government of the day was less enthused.  It didn't want to further engage in Europe.  It saw the army's role as an anti-insurrection force with domestic application.   And it didn't want to risk "tanks in the streets" and to civilians an IFV, with its tracks and turret, is a tank.

Consequently the government authorized the purchase of the AVGP.  A brilliant police vehicle for something like the para-military police of Europe.  At odds with the British traditions of both a non-standing army and civil policing.

The Army tried to make the best of a bad situation and employ the Grizzly, and the Cougar.

The Cougar was at least given the accurate description of being a "trainer" - even if it was a poor tank trainer.

The Grizzly should have been designated as an IFV trainer for Panzergrenadiers.

The problem was that the adoption of the Grizzly forced the conversion of the General Purpose Infantry sections to specialist Panzergrenadier sections.   Sections that dedicate 3 of their number to crewing their vehicle and only allow for 6 dismounts for General Duties.  And those dismounts are specialists in the Armoured Battle, tied to their vehicles and equipped for that battle.  But in Canada's case their vehicle was never adequate for that battle and the troops were never given the weapons necessary for that battlefield - namely the section level, 2000 m, Milan ATGM.

So we lost 2/3 of the infantry to the specialist Panzergrenadier role while denying them the tools necessary to do that job, both vehicles and weapons (in addition to the lack of the Milan the 20mm cannon was replaced by the venerable, supposedly dismountable, 50.)  The other 1/3 of the infantry was actually still in General Purpose configuration with large sections but they were equipped with the M113s which could actually keep up with the tanks while the Grizzlygrenadiers were in the rear with the gear.  And the Airborne was in its own special place.

Since that time, IMO, Canada has been trying to catch up.

Coyote moved closer to the Marder ideal with its 25mm turret.
LAV 3 upped the armour
LAV 6 upped the armour again.

We are approaching the capabilities of the original 1980s vintage Marder with better comms - which the current generation of allied vehicles also have.

We still have not completed the transition to the Marder (now exemplified by the CV90) in that we still rely on wheels and not tracks.   And we never got round to supplying those essentials for infantry on the armoured battlefield, the anti-tank missile.

Panzergrenadiers are dedicated anti-tank teams that can revert to riflemen when the need permits.  But the crew is still lost to the section and is only available to the section if the vehicle can stay in range of the riflemen.

Canada has, again IMO, converted itself into a Panzer Army, without Anti-Tank weapons and a vehicle that struggles to keep up with the tanks, just in time for the rest of the world to move away from reliance on tanks and back to an emphasis on General Purpose Infantry.  That is how I see Airborne, Heliborne, Mountain, Light, Stryker, Piranha, Boxer and Scorpion equipped infantry.  All of which are equipped with 2-5 km dismountable Anti-Tank missiles,  man-portable artillery like the CG 84mm, and are adopting more UAS type munitions in the 40mm to 120mm calibre range.

The good news is that the battlefield is now moving back to asphalt so the LAV's wheels are less problematic.  They can cross a short European field on the way to the next road without getting too far out of range of the nearest tow truck.

The bad news is that while our allies are building vehicles that transport full sized general purpose sections, sections that can operate in a variety of environments, with or without their vehicles, vehicles that have separate crews that don't detract from the section, we are stuck with 2/3s (3/3s) of our infantry tied to their vehicles.  And we have lost the GP infantry.

Unless we want to consider the time it takes to rerole and requalify a LAV battalion for duties without their vehicles, their turrets, their optics and their cannons.  Not to mention without pioneers, mortars, MANPADS and, of course ATGMs.

LAV infantry is a form of specialist infantry - previously exemplified by the Panzergrenadier.

The reason we have so much trouble identifying the role of the Light Infantry is that they are the odd-job men.  They are the general duties, general purpose, bog-standard, infantry.  They used to be the basis of Canada's Army.  Which resulted in an Army which could successfully turn its hand to any problem.

Up thread I proposed 3x DS Brigades (Divisional Support or "Deep Strike", whatever).  Those brigades incorporated one specialist infantry battalion each.  I also proposed a separate, stand alone, "Light" brigade of 3 "Light" infantry battalions.

I am going to revise that prescription to 3x DSBs as configured and add a second pure infantry brigade.  And remove the label "Light" from the lexicon.  They are simply "Infantry Brigades".  Just like the Infantry Brigades of the Militia.  All specialists on working on their feet, to close with and destroy, regardless of season or terrain, or transport.

The number of bodies in the infantry, in a battalion, in a company, in a section doesn't really bother me.   So long as they are appropriately organized and equipped to defeat the threats that face Canada at home and its citizens and interests overseas.

And I don't believe that the LAV army does that.


----------



## markppcli

My question to that is who supports this Light Brigade? Who provides it mobility, who fixes its trucks, who provides it medical assistance? Simply throwing them all together does not a brigade make. 

I would rather see us man our Bn's fully, ie with combat support companies manned full time not by reserve mortar and assault pioneer platoons. The ATGM capability can be manned by our existing tow systems for now. The PYs would come from the 3rd Bns with one left to provide that "operational quick reaction" we seem to require. Maybe it could be jump qualified.


----------



## Kirkhill

With respect to the section level ATGM vs the battalion level ATGM platoon -  

Technologically the burden for training operators to load, aim and fire ATGMs, has, just like machine guns, decreased over the years.  And just like machine guns they are being distributed like candy and hand-grenades.  Those that worry that the techniques associated with best tactical employment are being lost as a result are right to worry.  Just like the techniques associated with the machine guns are occasionally lost and demand the re-reading of "The Emma-Gees".   The good news is that much of the Emma Gees is applicable to the employment of ATGMs.  (siting in pairs, enfilade from defilade, masking signature, mutual support, covering your arcs, range templates....)

Just as the CO should have somebody in has staff specialized in optimizing the use of his available MGs, he also needs someone specialized in optimizing the use of his available ATGMS, regardless of who in his battalion is carrying them.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> With respect Mark "It" is a problem.
> 
> (1. )Prior to the Grizzly we had a General Purpose Infantry based on battalions of 4 rifle companies of large sections and a company of long service specialists who could be relied on to perform their specialist tasks in support of the rifles, or, when the need arose, could revert to being rifles.  One man in each section was lost to the vehicle as a driver.  In the absence of the vehicle that driver would revert to life as a rifleman.
> 
> In the 80s the infantry wanted a piece of the armoured battlefield.  Our enemies and allies were all kitting up with BMPs, BMDs and Marders.  The Yanks were working on the Bradley and the Brits on the Warrior.  Canada's Army, and the Infantry in particular, wanted to stay "relevant" to that fight.  The government of the day was less enthused.  It didn't want to further engage in Europe.  It saw the army's role as an anti-insurrection force with domestic application.   And it didn't want to risk "tanks in the streets" and to civilians an IFV, with its tracks and turret, is a tank.
> 
> Consequently the government authorized the purchase of the AVGP.  A brilliant police vehicle for something like the para-military police of Europe.  At odds with the British traditions of both a non-standing army and civil policing.
> 
> The Army tried to make the best of a bad situation and employ the Grizzly, and the Cougar.
> 
> The Cougar was at least given the accurate description of being a "trainer" - even if it was a poor tank trainer.
> 
> The Grizzly should have been designated as an IFV trainer for Panzergrenadiers.
> 
> The problem was that the adoption of the Grizzly forced the conversion of the General Purpose Infantry sections to specialist Panzergrenadier sections.   Sections that dedicate 3 of their number to crewing their vehicle and only allow for 6 dismounts for General Duties.  And those dismounts are specialists in the Armoured Battle, tied to their vehicles and equipped for that battle.  But in Canada's case their vehicle was never adequate for that battle and the troops were never given the weapons necessary for that battlefield - namely the section level, 2000 m, Milan ATGM.
> 
> So we lost 2/3 of the infantry to the specialist Panzergrenadier role while denying them the tools necessary to do that job, both vehicles and weapons (in addition to the lack of the Milan the 20mm cannon was replaced by the venerable, supposedly dismountable, 50.)  The other 1/3 of the infantry was actually still in General Purpose configuration with large sections but they were equipped with the M113s which could actually keep up with the tanks while the Grizzlygrenadiers were in the rear with the gear.  And the Airborne was in its own special place.
> 
> Since that time, IMO, Canada has been trying to catch up.
> 
> (2) Coyote moved closer to the Marder ideal with its 25mm turret.
> LAV 3 upped the armour
> LAV 6 upped the armour again.
> 
> We are approaching the capabilities of the original 1980s vintage Marder with better comms - which the current generation of allied vehicles also have.
> 
> We still have not completed the transition to the Marder (now exemplified by the CV90) in that we still rely on wheels and not tracks.   And we never got round to supplying those essentials for infantry on the armoured battlefield, the anti-tank missile.
> 
> Panzergrenadiers are dedicated anti-tank teams that can revert to riflemen when the need permits.  But the crew is still lost to the section and is only available to the section if the vehicle can stay in range of the riflemen.
> 
> (3) Canada has, again IMO, converted itself into a Panzer Army, without Anti-Tank weapons and a vehicle that struggles to keep up with the tanks, just in time for the rest of the world to move away from reliance on tanks and back to an emphasis on General Purpose Infantry.  That is how I see Airborne, Heliborne, Mountain, Light, Stryker, Piranha, Boxer and Scorpion equipped infantry.  All of which are equipped with 2-5 km dismountable Anti-Tank missiles,  man-portable artillery like the CG 84mm, and are adopting more UAS type munitions in the 40mm to 120mm calibre range.
> 
> (4)The good news is that the battlefield is now moving back to asphalt so the LAV's wheels are less problematic.  They can cross a short European field on the way to the next road without getting too far out of range of the nearest tow truck.
> 
> (5) The bad news is that while our allies are building vehicles that transport full sized general purpose sections, sections that can operate in a variety of environments, with or without their vehicles, vehicles that have separate crews that don't detract from the section, we are stuck with 2/3s (3/3s) of our infantry tied to their vehicles.  And we have lost the GP infantry.
> 
> (6) Unless we want to consider the time it takes to rerole and requalify a LAV battalion for duties without their vehicles, their turrets, their optics and their cannons.  Not to mention without pioneers, mortars, MANPADS and, of course ATGMs.
> 
> LAV infantry is a form of specialist infantry - previously exemplified by the Panzergrenadier.
> 
> (7) The reason we have so much trouble identifying the role of the Light Infantry is that they are the odd-job men.  They are the general duties, general purpose, bog-standard, infantry.  They used to be the basis of Canada's Army.  Which resulted in an Army which could successfully turn its hand to any problem.
> 
> Up thread I proposed 3x DS Brigades (Divisional Support or "Deep Strike", whatever).  Those brigades incorporated one specialist infantry battalion each.  I also proposed a separate, stand alone, "Light" brigade of 3 "Light" infantry battalions.
> 
> I am going to revise that prescription to 3x DSBs as configured and add a second pure infantry brigade.  And remove the label "Light" from the lexicon.  They are simply "Infantry Brigades".  Just like the Infantry Brigades of the Militia.  All specialists on working on their feet, to close with and destroy, regardless of season or terrain, or transport.
> 
> The number of bodies in the infantry, in a battalion, in a company, in a section doesn't really bother me.   So long as they are appropriately organized and equipped to defeat the threats that face Canada at home and its citizens and interests overseas.
> 
> And I don't believe that the LAV army does that.


You made a bunch of disjointed points there that I've gone ahead and numbered and will attempt to answer in turn. 

1. Uh no we adopted M113 in the 1960s, and surely the crew were also part of the section no? So we've been dealing with a vehicle adjusting the size of our sections.  I have no idea about the internal capacity of the Grizzly, it's frankly irrelevant to me. 

2. The Coyote is nothing like a Marder, I'm assuming you're only talking about the armanment? You know the Coyote isn't an IFV or APC obviously so I don't see where you're going. The LAV.. fine but you seem stuck on it being different than a Marder and that being inherently bad as opposed to simply a trade off. Panzer grenadiers are no dedicated anti tank teams, they are infantry that get to the fight and fight along side vehicles, that's from the origin of the term all the way to the current Panzer Grenadier Bn.  

3. Which of our allies are adopting lighter infantry? That's factually incorrect. In fact our allies are actually rapidly mechanizing in a way we are not. I agree about the ATGM, getting TOW back is good but not enough. 

4. This lav mobility point you keep brining up is a bit tired. I've crewed LAV's for nearly a decade, and I honestly don't have very many mobility issues, it comes up but it's hardly this giant issue you make it out to be. 

5. Such as? Most AFVs are actually designed to carry around 8, I'd struggle to think of many that carry more and maintain an equivalent armament. 

6. We train to do tasks without LAVs all the time. We do patrolling exercises, we do dismounted section and platoon attack ranges. The drivers and gunners rotate out to do that stuff to. So no I don't see it.

7. Infantry without mobility has become, frankly, obsolete. That doesn't mean they have to be "panzergrenadiers" but it does mean they need some kind of internal mobility, and the open bed truck isn't acceptable anymore. The "bog standard" is mechanized. Go look at the ORBAT of our allies and rivals, the mechanized infantry is the norm, not the exception. 

Respectfully I'm still not sure what the overall point you were trying to make was?  As far as I can see it is "the LAV is bad" and that is largely based off your experience with the Grizzly? Because as I pointed out above, many of your points are either incorrect (capacity of vehicles) or I'm simply unaware of them (reinvestment in light infantry forces).


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> My question to that is who supports this Light Brigade? Who provides it mobility, who fixes its trucks, who provides it medical assistance? Simply throwing them all together does not a brigade make.
> 
> I would rather see us man our Bn's fully, ie with combat support companies manned full time not by reserve mortar and assault pioneer platoons. The ATGM capability can be manned by our existing tow systems for now. The PYs would come from the 3rd Bns with one left to provide that "operational quick reaction" we seem to require. Maybe it could be jump qualified.



I'll agree with you on the support platoons - but I am not particularly fussed about the  PYs.  I would sooner that garrison battalions had a full complement of kit and skills, even at cadre levels, than be concerned about having the numbers available to go out the door tomorrow.  In reality it takes the Army a year to bring a battalion up to deployment level in any case.   I'd sooner have a smaller, high-tech expeditionary force at NTM.

As for the support of the Brigade?  That depends.  Is it working with the Air Force, the Navy, the Army or allies.   (Who supports the ePF?)
Is it being carried by boats, ships, planes, helicopters, trucks or buses - before it deploys Shank's Mare?  The battalions, in garrison, need adminstrative vehicles.  It also needs all of the man-portable gear it would employ on the battlefield in order to fully exercise the battalion.  It needs to be able to get to a variety of terrains for training.

It doesn't need to be tied to a particular vehicle, nor does it need to be tied to particular numbers.  It does need to be tied to particular capabilities.


----------



## Kirkhill

If you want the short form?   The LAV restricts strategic mobility, has operational and tactical limitations, and drives the organization of the infantry.

Infantry is infantry with or without the LAV.  

I am a glad you have confidence in your vehicle.

PS - you're the one that brought up "evolution"

The Piranha Grizzly AVGP with 3+6 crew (and two jumpseats)  and a 50/7.62 hand cranked turret evolved
It became the Piranha Bison APC and the Piranha LAV-25 (USMC 3+6) and then the Coyote which evolved
It became the LAV 3 which further evolved 
It became the LAV 6.

And those vehicles are all about their ability to carry troops (so the number of crew and pax doesn't appear immaterial to me), and their ability to fight (so the armament doesn't appear immaterial).  As to mobility.  Again I am really glad that you have confidence in your vehicle and your ability to employ it and your troops to full advantage.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I'll agree with you on the support platoons - but I am not particularly fussed about the  PYs.  I would sooner that garrison battalions had a full complement of kit and skills, even at cadre levels, than be concerned about having the numbers available to go out the door tomorrow.  In reality it takes the Army a year to bring a battalion up to deployment level in any case.   I'd sooner have a smaller, high-tech expeditionary force at NTM.
> 
> As for the support of the Brigade?  That depends.  Is it working with the Air Force, the Navy, the Army or allies.   (Who supports the ePF?)
> Is it being carried by boats, ships, planes, helicopters, trucks or buses - before it deploys Shank's Mare?  The battalions, in garrison, need adminstrative vehicles.  It also needs all of the man-portable gear it would employ on the battlefield in order to fully exercise the battalion.  It needs to be able to get to a variety of terrains for training.
> 
> It doesn't need to be tied to a particular vehicle, nor does it need to be tied to particular numbers.  It does need to be tied to particular capabilities.


Oh that was a comment directed at the previously posted orbat with no supports inside a light brigade.
Capabilities are intrinsically tied to equipment (vehicles) and numbers.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Oh that was a comment directed at the previously posted orbat with no supports inside a light brigade.
> Capabilities are intrinsically tied to equipment (vehicles) and numbers.


Vehicles are equipment. Equipment is not necessarily vehicles.  And not all vehicles are held within the unit.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Oh that was a comment directed at the previously posted orbat with no supports inside a light brigade.
> Capabilities are intrinsically tied to equipment (vehicles) and numbers.


That proposed ORBAT is as mentioned a transitional structure to separate the Light Battalions into a single Brigade structure while their doctrine, equipment and structure are being developed.  It would not stay like that....three traditional light infantry battalions.  The final structure (and support elements) would be determined once the role and structure are determined.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Oh that was a comment directed at the previously posted orbat with no supports inside a light brigade.
> Capabilities are intrinsically tied to equipment (vehicles) and numbers.



The light brigade, which I was wrong to not define,  was and is, an administrative structure not a tactical one.  The key tactical elements I envisage are the DSBs - which are reinforceable, potentially with General Purpose Infantry.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> If you want the short form?   The LAV restricts strategic mobility, has operational and tactical limitations, and drives the organization of the infantry.
> 
> Infantry is infantry with or without the LAV.
> 
> I am a glad you have confidence in your vehicle.
> 
> PS - you're the one that brought up "evolution"
> 
> The Piranha Grizzly AVGP with 3+6 crew (and two jumpseats)  and a 50/7.62 hand cranked turret evolved
> It became the Piranha Bison APC and the Piranha LAV-25 (USMC 3+6) and then the Coyote which evolved
> It became the LAV 3 which further evolved
> It became the LAV 6.
> 
> And those vehicles are all about their ability to carry troops (so the number of crew and pax doesn't appear immaterial to me), and their ability to fight (so the armament doesn't appear immaterial).  As to mobility.  Again I am really glad that you have confidence in your vehicle and your ability to employ it and your troops to full advantage.


I only bring up the capabilities because you focus on the limitations exclusively, I imagine if we were in Boxer or Puma or CV90s you’d make the same points. My point on Grizzly to Coyote was that, in the Canadian. Context, those are not like for like. As in we didn’t get Grizzly then Replace it with Coyote. You’re of course correct that they’re all from the same ancestry.

You said you weren’t fussed about numbers but the crux of your argument seems to be that the reduction of the section by two (9 in an m113 to 7 in a lav6) is some how a crippling issue to the infantry and I frankly just don’t see it. It’s also impossible to make these sorts of arguments without talking about pros and cons of being mounted.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Vehicles are equipment. Equipment is not necessarily vehicles.  And not all vehicles are held within the unit.


I’m finding this a very frustrating conversation when every point of discussion just gets jumped around when it’s challenged.
Obviously not all equipment is vehicles, obviously, but you can’t separate that from capability. Ie motorized Bn have different capabilities than mechanized, then an air mobile, ect.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> We could also rotate readiness between the three Light Battalions to provide a rapid response capability for the Army.



Speaking of readiness, would consolidation (light forces, medium forces, tanks, guns, etc) into one or fewer locations make any appreciable dent in the number of posting moves ?


----------



## markppcli

It would. I also really struggle to see what we need 3 light Bns for. Really stretches the army more than it needs to be frankly.


----------



## Infanteer

Brad Sallows said:


> Speaking of readiness, would consolidation (light forces, medium forces, tanks, guns, etc) into one or fewer locations make any appreciable dent in the number of posting moves ?


I suspect it wouldn't as posting in between brigade units is only a small part of the APS.  Some analytics with the career managers' databases would give you the real figures, but:

1.  Most of the Army's move credits are allocated to Officers who move between field units and schoolhouses, reserve support, staff college, NDHQ, and higher HQs.  Consolidating field forces wouldn't put a dent in this.

2.  For Army NCM move credits, there are generally to and from schoolhouses and reserve support, and to a lesser extent to other higher functions.  No CTC school is co-located with a brigade, and save Valcartier the Div TCs are largely dislocated from the field forces.


----------



## McG

markppcli said:


> My question to that is who supports this Light Brigade? Who provides it mobility, who fixes its trucks, who provides it medical assistance? Simply throwing them all together does not a brigade make.
> 
> I would rather see us man our Bn's fully, ie with combat support companies manned full time not by reserve mortar and assault pioneer platoons. The ATGM capability can be manned by our existing tow systems for now. The PYs would come from the 3rd Bns with one left to provide that "operational quick reaction" we seem to require. Maybe it could be jump qualified.


The idea that the PRes will train a soldier to be rifleman & mortarman (or rifleman & pioneer) seems to be setting ourselves to achieve neither skill set to adequacy. Simultaneously, not generating & maintaining these skills in Reg F infanteers seems like underutilization of the full-time personnel.

Anyway, here are some thoughts on properly establishing support capabilities for the infantry battalion of 2025: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/papers/csc/csc47/sp/McGregorA.pdf


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I only bring up the capabilities because you focus on the limitations exclusively, I imagine if we were in Boxer or Puma or CV90s you’d make the same points. My point on Grizzly to Coyote was that, in the Canadian. Context, those are not like for like. As in we didn’t get Grizzly then Replace it with Coyote. You’re of course correct that they’re all from the same ancestry.
> 
> You said you weren’t fussed about numbers but the crux of your argument seems to be that the reduction of the section by two (9 in an m113 to 7 in a lav6) is some how a crippling issue to the infantry and I frankly just don’t see it. It’s also impossible to make these sorts of arguments without talking about pros and cons of being mounted.



You are quite correct. I would make the same points.  It is not the LAV in particular that bothers me.  It is the focus of the army on the Medium concept that bothers me.  As Infanteer has routinely pointed out there isn't much to choose between the strategic mobility of a LAV/Leo2 based Medium Brigade and a CV90/Leo2 based Heavy Brigade.  Frankly I would sooner have the heavies.  But we have the LAVs so needs must.

Unlike many others, and despite my leading questions here, I do see the utility of the General Purpose Infantry Battalion.  Not least for its strategic response time and its terrain and platform independence.  You can even turn them into Boarding Parties.

With respect to the issue of the tendency to light forces vs mechanized forces I suspect we are seeing the same data and drawing different conclusions.

1.  Armed forces everywhere are drawing down the number of tanks and not replacing them.  
2.  Armed forces are upgunning their light troops with longer ranged, heavier effect weapons
3.  Armed forces are adding armoured vehicles but.
4.  The new armoured vehicles are dispensing with turrets and replacing them with RWS stations so as to increase the number of troops inside
     (Marder 3+6, Bradley 3+6, Warrior 3+7, CV90 3+6 to 8, USMC LAV25 3+6, Stryker 2+9, Stryker Dragoon 2+9, Boxer 3+8, USMC ACV  1 + 12).       They are also swapping firepower for armour plate to protect the contents.
     The emphasis, in my opinion is moving from the vehicle being a light tank to accompany heavy tanks and towards a more secure carrier of            larger groups of infantry.
5.  Armed forces are equipping their infantry with more vehicles but those vehicles, aside from the ones mentioned above, are dispensing with           armour and weaponry to make the vehicles, and the infantry they support, more strategically and operationally deployable by air (both fixed        and rotary wing).
6.  The Armed forces are also enhancing their Stand-Off capabilities adding range to all weapons systems all the way down to the 40mm grenade  launcher in the form of both guided projectiles and uas systems. 

It is my belief that if, on the modern battlefield, you have driven your vehicle to within autocannon range you have done something seriously wrong.

The issue is not that I think an extra infanteer in the back makes a difference.  But I do think that an infantry built around sections of 8 or 9 or 12 or 16 fights differently than an infantry built around sections of 6.   And I would like to see one common training standard across a utilitarian, strategically deployable, operationally useful infantry corps.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Warrior may be gone or kept for longer if the Ajax problems don't get resolved. The USMC is actually going from a larger vehicle to a smaller one. I noticed a picture recently with Namers now equipped with RWS and what appears to be an auto-cannon.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> Warrior may be gone or kept for longer if the Ajax problems don't get resolved. The USMC is actually going from a larger vehicle to a smaller one. I noticed a picture recently with Namers now equipped with RWS and what appears to be an auto-cannon.



Or is the USMC going from a small boat with tracks to a large amphibious APC? 

And the Namer does the first thing right.  It protects its infantry.  (3+9).  But at 60 tonnes it is exactly as strategically effective as the Leo 2.  Which would make it a great pairing for a Heavy Brigade.


----------



## markppcli

Colin Parkinson said:


> Warrior may be gone or kept for longer if the Ajax problems don't get resolved. The USMC is actually going from a larger vehicle to a smaller one. I noticed a picture recently with Namers now equipped with RWS and what appears to be an auto-cannon.


AJAX's service will determine the life time of Scimitars, not Warriors. The Warriors will now be whole sale replaced by the Boxer. What that Boxer will look like, ie main armament, is yet to be seen.



Kirkhill said:


> You are quite correct. I would make the same points.  It is not the LAV in particular that bothers me.  It is the focus of the army on the Medium concept that bothers me.  As Infanteer has routinely pointed out there isn't much to choose between the strategic mobility of a LAV/Leo2 based Medium Brigade and a CV90/Leo2 based Heavy Brigade.  Frankly I would sooner have the heavies.  But we have the LAVs so needs must.
> 
> Unlike many others, and despite my leading questions here, I do see the utility of the General Purpose Infantry Battalion.  Not least for its strategic response time and its terrain and platform independence.  You can even turn them into Boarding Parties.
> 
> With respect to the issue of the tendency to light forces vs mechanized forces I suspect we are seeing the same data and drawing different conclusions.
> 
> 1.  Armed forces everywhere are drawing down the number of tanks and not replacing them.
> 2.  Armed forces are upgunning their light troops with longer ranged, heavier effect weapons
> 3.  Armed forces are adding armoured vehicles but.
> 4.  The new armoured vehicles are dispensing with turrets and replacing them with RWS stations so as to increase the number of troops inside
> (Marder 3+6, Bradley 3+6, Warrior 3+7, CV90 3+6 to 8, USMC LAV25 3+6, Stryker 2+9, Stryker Dragoon 2+9, Boxer 3+8, USMC ACV  1 + 12).       They are also swapping firepower for armour plate to protect the contents.
> The emphasis, in my opinion is moving from the vehicle being a light tank to accompany heavy tanks and towards a more secure carrier of            larger groups of infantry.
> 5.  Armed forces are equipping their infantry with more vehicles but those vehicles, aside from the ones mentioned above, are dispensing with           armour and weaponry to make the vehicles, and the infantry they support, more strategically and operationally deployable by air (both fixed        and rotary wing).
> 6.  The Armed forces are also enhancing their Stand-Off capabilities adding range to all weapons systems all the way down to the 40mm grenade  launcher in the form of both guided projectiles and uas systems.
> 
> It is my belief that if, on the modern battlefield, you have driven your vehicle to within autocannon range you have done something seriously wrong.
> 
> The issue is not that I think an extra infanteer in the back makes a difference.  But I do think that an infantry built around sections of 8 or 9 or 12 or 16 fights differently than an infantry built around sections of 6.   And I would like to see one common training standard across a utilitarian, strategically deployable, operationally useful infantry corps.


I suppose that's fair, but in reference to point 4, the more recent adoptions of behicles points to a practical limited of around 8 dismounts to a vehicle, and I can't think of many new vehicle's coming online that are a down grade of weapon systems. From Patria AMVs to Puma's by and large the weapons on carriers, even if it is an RWS, are getting larger and more complex, not smaller. But I'm probably getting two into the smaller details of armoured vehicles than the actual over arching concepts. 

I fundamentally do not think that you must deploy a Bn with it's vehicles. In fact the CAF has done so on Op Reassurance and Op Impact rotations, deploying companies from mechanized Bn's to do roles far from their LAVs. So I don't buy the argument that you loose all strategic mobility.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> As Infanteer has routinely pointed out there isn't much to choose between the strategic mobility of a LAV/Leo2 based Medium Brigade and a CV90/Leo2 based Heavy Brigade.



Strategic movement of any significant amount of heavy equipment is so far away from being a capability of the CAF as to be set aside for a near-term spitball session.  But for the kinds of operations and tasks Canada undertakes, has a predominantly wheeled force yielded any measurable administrative benefits (eg. lower VOR rates, lower maintenance costs) and/or more tactical advantages?


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> I fundamentally do not think that you must deploy a Bn with it's vehicles. In fact the CAF has done so on Op Reassurance and Op Impact rotations, deploying companies from mechanized Bn's to do roles far from their LAVs. So I don't buy the argument that you loose all strategic mobility.


Those aren't good examples.  They are not infantry battalion missions, they are SFCB missions that don't require "infantry", but rather require a TF HQ and a mish-mash of leader heavy detachments to "build capacity" in a static location(s).


----------



## Colin Parkinson

markppcli said:


> AJAX's service will determine the life time of Scimitars, not Warriors. The Warriors will now be whole sale replaced by the Boxer. What that Boxer will look like, ie main armament, is yet to be seen.
> 
> 
> I suppose that's fair, but in reference to point 4, the more recent adoptions of behicles points to a practical limited of around 8 dismounts to a vehicle, and I can't think of many new vehicle's coming online that are a down grade of weapon systems. From Patria AMVs to Puma's by and large the weapons on carriers, even if it is an RWS, are getting larger and more complex, not smaller. But I'm probably getting two into the smaller details of armoured vehicles than the actual over arching concepts.
> 
> I fundamentally do not think that you must deploy a Bn with it's vehicles. In fact the CAF has done so on Op Reassurance and Op Impact rotations, deploying companies from mechanized Bn's to do roles far from their LAVs. So I don't buy the argument that you loose all strategic mobility.


That was the original intent, but if the Ajax program is in as serious trouble as claimed in the media, they may have to rerole the Warriors for awhile.


----------



## Underway

Is strategic mobility for the army not provided by planes, trains, and ships?  Is it not the capability to deploy and sustain forces worldwide? I was corrected earlier in this thread that the LAV can deliver only operational and tactical mobility.

Any restriction caused in strategic mobility by a LAV would be equal to any other vehicles of similar size and/or weight.  As @Brad Sallows pointed out most of the assets that can affect strategic mobility are not CAF assets.


----------



## Infanteer

Underway said:


> Is strategic mobility for the army not provided by planes, trains, and ships?  Is it not the capability to deploy and sustain forces worldwide? I was corrected earlier in this thread that the LAV can deliver only operational and tactical mobility.
> 
> Any restriction caused in strategic mobility by a LAV would be equal to any other vehicles of similar size and/or weight.  As @Brad Sallows pointed out most of the assets that can affect strategic mobility are not CAF assets.


Correct.


----------



## blacktriangle

If three light battalions is too limiting, is there any merit in keeping one true light battalion or light BG? Perhaps based on 3 RCR? Something that is owned by the Army, capable of independent operation, and also interoperable with CANSOF? Is there a need for Canada to have a limited Global or Territorial Response capability that resides in the CA itself?

The other two battalions could be folded into the remaining six mech units to flesh out combat support capabilities and personnel shortfalls. If no light unit is required, then fold 3 RCR in as well. Or perhaps CANSOF would like something along the lines of a Ranger Bn, and use it as a pipeline for direct entry into that world.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Is strategic mobility for the army not provided by planes, trains, and ships?  Is it not the capability to deploy and sustain forces worldwide? I was corrected earlier in this thread that the LAV can deliver only operational and tactical mobility.
> 
> Any restriction caused in strategic mobility by a LAV would be equal to any other vehicles of similar size and/or weight.  As @Brad Sallows pointed out most of the assets that can affect strategic mobility are not CAF assets.




I would say "supply" strategic mobility rather than "affect" it.  The weight and dimensions of any kit will impact the transport in which it can be deployed and the speed and distance.

The availability of air and sealift are the key elements in being able to deploy a force in a strategically useful manner.  Too little or too late is not useful.  Fustest with the mostest usually wins.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> Those aren't good examples.  They are not infantry battalion missions, they are SFCB missions that don't require "infantry", but rather require a TF HQ and a mish-mash of leader heavy detachments to "build capacity" in a static location(s).


I wasn’t talking about Ukraine or the training side of Iraq. We’ve sent a rifle company to Poland in a light role, and took over the FP Coy task in Iraq in SUVs. Admittedly the last one isn’t an “infantry task.”


----------



## markppcli

reveng said:


> If three light battalions is too limiting, is there any merit in keeping one true light battalion or light BG? Perhaps based on 3 RCR? Something that is owned by the Army, capable of independent operation, and also interoperable with CANSOF? Is there a need for Canada to have a limited Global or Territorial Response capability that resides in the CA itself?
> 
> The other two battalions could be folded into the remaining six mech units to flesh out combat support capabilities and personnel shortfalls. If no light unit is required, then fold 3 RCR in as well. Or perhaps CANSOF would like something along the lines of a Ranger Bn, and use it as a pipeline for direct entry into that world.


Would make sense to me, an airmobile high readiness Bn and six mechanized Bns all flushed out with their supports.


Colin Parkinson said:


> That was the original intent, but if the Ajax program is in as serious trouble as claimed in the media, they may have to rerole the Warriors for awhile.


Warriors for Recce when Scimitars haven’t been replaced yet? Seems like you just continue on the same platform rather than switching it around.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Would make sense to me, an airmobile high readiness Bn and six mechanized Bns all flushed out with their supports.



I'm actually ok with that.  If Underway will buy me a ship or two to move a Brigade to, and from, theatre at short notice.

I would still require a General Purpose Infantry-Centric Militia - with a strong permanent force cadre of organizers, instructors and supporters.  

And a strong contingent of light cavalry and gun/missile operators.   Trucks in the parking lot for disaster relief would be nice as well.  

How's the budget doing?


----------



## suffolkowner

The size and mobility of your MBT and IFV/APC has to have in theatre strategic consequences and not just tactical considerations if operations are too greatly limited due to the inability to traverse terrain or cross over or under bridges or use roadways

Why is there so much trouble with the AJAX? Is it not a derivative of the ASCOD and does it suffer from the same issues?









						AJAX: Delayed Programme 'Doomed To Fail' If MOD Ignores Leaked Report
					

There are 589 Ajax vehicles on order with UK defence, with 14 delivered. Forces News spoke to defence analyst Francis Tusa.




					www.forces.net
				




Interesting topic on organizational issues, I'm enjoying it


----------



## GR66

reveng said:


> If three light battalions is too limiting, is there any merit in keeping one true light battalion or light BG? Perhaps based on 3 RCR? Something that is owned by the Army, capable of independent operation, and also interoperable with CANSOF? Is there a need for Canada to have a limited Global or Territorial Response capability that resides in the CA itself?
> 
> The other two battalions could be folded into the remaining six mech units to flesh out combat support capabilities and personnel shortfalls. If no light unit is required, then fold 3 RCR in as well. Or perhaps CANSOF would like something along the lines of a Ranger Bn, and use it as a pipeline for direct entry into that world.


I'd view the three Light Battalions as a starting point for FORCE 2025 leading into FORCE 2030.  It just separates the light infantry battalions from the Mechanized Battalion structure to allow for some experimentation with roles and structures.  

I imagine you'd likely end up with something that would be based on, or allow you to build Combat Teams using light air-transportable vehicles.  These Combat Teams might be heavy on integrated support elements to allow for extended independent operations until heavier forces are able to follow on.  They'd likely be equipped with a higher proportion of launchers to rifles than our traditional infantry battalions to make up for their smaller size.

How ever they end up looking I'm certain it would be considerably smaller than a three Battalion Light Infantry Brigade because frankly we'd have no way of deploying and supporting such a large unit in the field at the same time as we're trying to mobilize and deploy a Mechanized Brigade Group.  

Once you figure out the right structure for the Light force I'd shift the surplus PY's back into the LAV Battalions to fill out the Combat Support Companies to give them the extra "launchers" they need to properly support their "rifles".

FORCE 2025 should be seen as a stepping stone to where we want to end up, not as an objective itself.


----------



## markppcli

I don’t know that we have so much infantry that we can commit a full third to experimentation.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> I don’t know that we have so much infantry that we can commit a full third to experimentation.


But we can commit them to being a poorly thought out appendage to our Mechanized Brigades?

Edited to add:  At least the short experimentation phase is intended to end up with a useful end product.  And frankly we should always have a portion of our force committed to experimentation in order to keep up with changes in technology, etc. (obviously not 1/3 of our force).


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> But we can commit them to being a poorly thought out appendage to our Mechanized Brigades?


No, we commit them as PYs to fill out our anemic mechanized Bns. With perhaps a Bn held at Divison (like a real division. I one of our regional ones) as a conventional high readiness / qrf.

left overs can fill up our institutions so we aren’t  stripped bare of NCOs for half the year.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> No, we commit them as PYs to fill out our anemic mechanized Bns. With perhaps a Bn held at Divison (like a real division. I one of our regional ones) as a conventional high readiness / qrf.


So we're saying the same thing.  Only I'm just saying that it will take some time to make that transition.  You're not going to disband two battalions of infantry and come up with a new role for a re-defined light force and equip it to fulfill that role by 2025.  

Absolutely I'm fully in favour of shifting some PY's from the Light Battalions into the LAV Battalions starting at the beginning of the transition process but these things don't happen overnight.


----------



## markppcli

I suppose the fact that we’ve not found a role for them in thirty years counts for naught then ? Or is 40 years the time frame we deem as acceptable for organizational changes ?


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> So we're saying the same thing.  Only I'm just saying that it will take some time to make that transition.  You're not going to disband two battalions of infantry and come up with a new role for a re-defined light force and equip it to fulfill that role by 2025.
> 
> Absolutely I'm fully in favour of shifting some PY's from the Light Battalions into the LAV Battalions starting at the beginning of the transition process but these things don't happen overnight.


I'm not trying to say it's an overnight thing, I just don't accept that it can't be done in 5 years. We have plenty of examples to follow, and haven't found a role for them in decades. So let's keep a Bn and we can plug and play with that as needed. What is needed now if full (ish) battalions and schools to let the army function properly.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> I'm not trying to say it's an overnight thing, I just don't accept that it can't be done in 5 years. We have plenty of examples to follow, and haven't found a role for them in decades. So let's keep a Bn and we can plug and play with that as needed. What is needed now if full (ish) battalions and schools to let the army function properly.


If you believe that we can disband two Light Infantry Battalions, re-locate 1000+ personnel, transfer LAV Battalions from Gagetown to Petawawa and from Quebec to Valcartier (does it make sense for those Brigades to have their remaining Battalions physically separated?  Shilo might be a special case because they have their Artillery Regiment and training facilities there already) by 2025 then I'm all in with you.  Figuring out the structure and equipment for the remaining Light Battalion (3 RCR relocated to Gagetown?) might take longer than that, but I can live with it.

I however don't have as much faith as you in the ability of the CF to move that quickly.


----------



## markppcli

Relocation would be ideal but probably isn’t practical at this point. Of course 2R22Rs LAVs are actually in Valcartier anyways so too easy there. The light Bn should be in Pet with the Chinooks, also close to Trenton for air lift. Just makes sense. I think transferring personal could be done relatively quickly if I’m honest.


----------



## Underway

Ok so following this construct of reducing the light infantry.  You take 3 PPCL and 3e 22nd and use those extra people to fill out the other two battalions.   If there are folks leftover (say a company's worth) then perhaps a specialty company needs to be made like TOW or somesuch to provide another tool.

3 RCR becomes the only Reg F light infantry Bn (I chose them because they are closest to the majority of air assets both fixed and rotary wing). Experimentation begins on how to best use them.

No moves need to be made immediately.  3e 22nd is literally an hour and a half from Valcartier.  Most soldiers live halfway between the two in the suburbs anyway.   3PPCLI will likely have to have some pers moved to Brandon.
That also means that the RCR doesn't benefit from the re-roll of the extra battalion for numbers.  

OK so infantry is sorted out, some pain but it's not as brutal as the next question.

What to do with the armour?  From what I understand the organization is that Strats have 2 tank companies, 1 recce.  RCD have 3 recce and a shared tank with 12RBC for training/famil  12 RBC has a two recce.

What's a good way to deal with them.


----------



## markppcli

Underway said:


> Ok so following this construct of reducing the light infantry.  You take 3 PPCL and 3e 22nd and use those extra people to fill out the other two battalions.   If there are folks leftover (say a company's worth) then perhaps a specialty company needs to be made like TOW or somesuch to provide another tool.
> 
> 3 RCR becomes the only Reg F light infantry Bn (I chose them because they are closest to the majority of air assets both fixed and rotary wing). Experimentation begins on how to best use them.
> 
> No moves need to be made immediately.  3e 22nd is literally an hour and a half from Valcartier.  Most soldiers live halfway between the two in the suburbs anyway.   3PPCLI will likely have to have some pers moved to Brandon.
> That also means that the RCR doesn't benefit from the re-roll of the extra battalion for numbers.
> 
> OK so infantry is sorted out, some pain but it's not as brutal as the next question.
> 
> What to do with the armour?  From what I understand the organization is that Strats have 2 tank companies, 1 recce.  RCD have 3 recce and a shared tank with 12RBC for training/famil  12 RBC has a two recce.
> 
> What's a good way to deal with them.


I would, in the interested of minimizing regimental infighting, probably name that new light Bn something else, maybe even use a reserve unit? Queens Own Rifles of Canada or something maybe? Anyways we can spend 6 months studying it and probably arrive at something resembling a good idea. Each Regiment would basically give up a company, and have two companies to reinforce their 1st and 2nd Bns, now with full combat support coys, extra bodies would fill in our depleted schools.

The Armour. We aren't getting more tanks, so it's a decision between having an Australian style 2 Recce 1 Tank Regiment per Bde, or do we mass them in one Regiment? I would say it's probably better we mass them, and then the next question is does it belong in Wainwright or Gagetown?


----------



## Underway

markppcli said:


> I would, in the interested of minimizing regimental infighting, probably name that new light Bn something else, maybe even use a reserve unit? Queens Own Rifles of Canada or something maybe? Anyways we can spend 6 months studying it and probably arrive at something resembling a good idea. Each Regiment would basically give up a company, and have two companies to reinforce their 1st and 2nd Bns, now with full combat support coys, extra bodies would fill in our depleted schools.
> 
> The Armour. We aren't getting more tanks, so it's a decision between having an Australian style 2 Recce 1 Tank Regiment per Bde, or do we mass them in one Regiment? I would say it's probably better we mass them, and then the next question is does it belong in Wainwright or Gagetown?


If you're going to rename them then it has to be The Blackwatch.  Mainly because you would never, ever again have recruiting issues as all those PRes Scottish regiments would switch over in a heartbeat!

 Are the tanks not already generally massed?  Strats have two tank companies and 1 recce in their regiment.  The RCD and 12RBC share a tank company between themselves for training and sustainment in case of a long mission.  This seems... odd.  It leaves 3rd Div short on Recce and the other two short on armour. 

If you are going to mass them, then does that not mean you need more Recce elements in the Div as well?  Wouldn't ideally you have 3 tank companies with 3 recce.  Or are CMBG only requiring one of each.  And if you mass the tanks then the other CMBGs are going to need different AT assets (like a TOW company I mentioned earlier).

This assumes of course that you don't just rotate different regiments in and out of CMBG's as we did in Afghanistan. Where there was some mix and match with the units that filled out the deployed troops (Strat tanks, RCD recce, PPCLI infantry, one RCR company, all were part of my deployment in 09).


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> The Armour. We aren't getting more tanks, so it's a decision between having an Australian style 2 Recce 1 Tank Regiment per Bde, or do we mass them in one Regiment? I would say it's probably better we mass them, and then the next question is does it belong in Wainwright or Gagetown?


Wainwright, strats have the more experience at this point, I'd also move the school to Wainwright or Suffield. If Suffield, arrange a deal so the British run OPFOR, would create some great training opportunities.


----------



## Ostrozac

markppcli said:


> I would, in the interested of minimizing regimental infighting, probably name that new light Bn something else


And congratulations, we have just invented the Canadian Airborne Regiment. 

All of this is pure posturing of course, if we can't decide what the army is for. If it is for force generating combat ready medium brigades, as SSE implies, then the light battalions are of course, useless -- unless we actually want a high-readiness light force, something that we possibly don't want, as we disbanded such a force in 1995 and haven't really missed it much. Light forces are something that the army hasn't been able to wrap their heads around over the course of the ensuing 25 years, so it's a hard argument that light infantry battalions without doctrine or supporting enablers bring something to the table that a LAV battalion temporarily stripped of its armoured vehicles can't provide. Especially if we insist on a 6-12 month road to war -- this is plenty of time for a LAV company to re-role to dismounted.

The bigger gaps are not organizational, they involve equipment. Self-propelled mortars, ATGMs, air defence, artillery that is not towed behind a truck. And we won't fix our equipment problem before 2025 -- so long as we treat purchasing a pistol as having the complexity of the Manhattan Project.


----------



## markppcli

MilEME09 said:


> Wainwright, strats have the more experience at this point, I'd also move the school to Wainwright or Suffield. If Suffield, arrange a deal so the British run OPFOR, would create some great training opportunities.


The counter point being that having them in Gagetown puts them much closer to ports if we did need to deploy them.


----------



## markppcli

Underway said:


> Are the tanks not already generally massed?  Strats have two tank companies and 1 recce in their regiment.  The RCD and 12RBC share a tank company between themselves for training and sustainment in case of a long mission.  This seems... odd.  It leaves 3rd Div short on Recce and the other two short on armour.
> 
> If you are going to mass them, then does that not mean you need more Recce elements in the Div as well?  Wouldn't ideally you have 3 tank companies with 3 recce.  Or are CMBG only requiring one of each.  And if you mass the tanks then the other CMBGs are going to need different AT assets (like a TOW company I mentioned earlier).


I think that's common problem when discussing out organization, assuming rationality had something to do with it and we aren't just the result of various cuts and knee jerk reactions.


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> The counter point being that having them in Gagetown puts them much closer to ports if we did need to deploy them.


Counter point, CFB Wainwright and Suffield have railheads for quick loading and transport to a port.


----------



## markppcli

MilEME09 said:


> Counter point, CFB Wainwright and Suffield have railheads for quick loading and transport to a port.


Quick being a relative term when you're going from Alberta to the Ocean.


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> Quick being a relative term when you're going from Alberta to the Ocean.


It's just over 6H by rail from medicine hat to Vancouver, best search gets me about 4H from gagetown to Halifax. In the grand scheme of things, 2 hours isn't much.


----------



## markppcli

MilEME09 said:


> It's just over 6H by rail from medicine hat to Vancouver, best search gets me about 4H from gagetown to Halifax. In the grand scheme of things, 2 hours isn't much.


There's a port in St John though. So you could just drive them the 1.5 hours to the port. At which point there also much closer to Europe, which is where we expect to use tanks isn't it?


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> And congratulations, we have just invented the Canadian Airborne Regiment.
> 
> All of this is pure posturing of course, if we can't decide what the army is for. If it is for force generating combat ready medium brigades, as SSE implies, then the light battalions are of course, useless -- unless we actually want a high-readiness light force, something that we possibly don't want, as we disbanded such a force in 1995 and haven't really missed it much. Light forces are something that the army hasn't been able to wrap their heads around over the course of the ensuing 25 years, so it's a hard argument that light infantry battalions without doctrine or supporting enablers bring something to the table that a LAV battalion temporarily stripped of its armoured vehicles can't provide. Especially if we insist on a 6-12 month road to war -- this is plenty of time for a LAV company to re-role to dismounted.
> 
> The bigger gaps are not organizational, they involve equipment. Self-propelled mortars, ATGMs, air defence, artillery that is not towed behind a truck. And we won't fix our equipment problem before 2025 -- so long as we treat purchasing a pistol as having the complexity of the Manhattan Project.



And we're back...


----------



## Underway

Finally something I know something about.  It doesn't matter where you put them as long as there is rail.  What's 3 days in a month-long deployment operation.  Anywhere on the Pacific, it will take two weeks to sail somewhere, and anywhere on the Atlantic it's a week.  And if it's further into the Med or Indian ocean we're looking at a longer timeframe. 

*rough timelines...


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Actually, you also need a harbour that is equipped to efficiently load that type of equipment, and that means Montreal, Halifax or Vancouver. The other harbours would have to improvise. Also, I thought that was one of the main reason the main depot of oversea (read Europe) support was CFB Montreal. After all, sailing from Montreal or Halifax is a 36 hours difference, and as Underway mentioned, what's two or three extra days?

Personally, I think that the greatest delay, in any event, would be for the Army to get its gear (and arses) together, but I am quite happy to be proven wrong.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> And we're back...


If back means a high readiness light infantry force that can be sent around the world on shorter notice with less tail and 6 mechanized battalions each fully manned then I’m fine with it.


----------



## suffolkowner

Underway said:


> Finally something I know something about.  It doesn't matter where you put them as long as there is rail.  What's 3 days in a month-long deployment operation.  Anywhere on the Pacific, it will take two weeks to sail somewhere, and anywhere on the Atlantic it's a week.  And if it's further into the Med or Indian ocean we're looking at a longer timeframe.
> 
> *rough timelines...


Yeah but if you want to cross the Pacific or Atlantic does it make sense to come from all the way across the country? It's an organization thing again as to how to set the various units. Are they going to be symmetrical or asymmetrical? Dispersed or aggregated? How and who are training where and with what?  It's hard to believe we can't afford to keep them in Wainwright and Gagetown. We have 80ish tanks with 40 with the Lord Strathcona's Horse and 20 with the Royal Canadian Dragoons(where are the other 20?) while the Australians have their 59 over 5 locations

"The Army’s operational fleet of Abrams is held by Army’s three Armoured Cavalry Regiments in Adelaide, Brisbane and Townsville. Additionally, vehicles for training purposes are also held at the School of Armour in Puckapunyal and the Army Logistic Training Centre at Bandiana."


----------



## GR66

I think the point of a Light Battalion would be that it's air deployable.  I guess from that sense Petawawa would be a good choice.


----------



## markppcli

suffolkowner said:


> Yeah but if you want to cross the Pacific or Atlantic does it make sense to come from all the way across the country? It's an organization thing again as to how to set the various units. Are they going to be symmetrical or asymmetrical? Dispersed or aggregated? How and who are training where and with what?  It's hard to believe we can't afford to keep them in Wainwright and Gagetown. We have 80ish tanks with 40 with the Lord Strathcona's Horse and 20 with the Royal Canadian Dragoons(where are the other 20?) while the Australians have their 59 over 5 locations
> 
> "The Army’s operational fleet of Abrams is held by Army’s three Armoured Cavalry Regiments in Adelaide, Brisbane and Townsville. Additionally, vehicles for training purposes are also held at the School of Armour in Puckapunyal and the Army Logistic Training Centre at Bandiana."


20 I imagine are with our Bn worth of LAVs for deployments


----------



## suffolkowner

markppcli said:


> 20 I imagine are with our Bn worth of LAVs for deployments


they're set aside just in case ready to go?


----------



## Brad Sallows

If LAV companies must dismount, presumably the requirements leading to it apply to everything else.  So a bunch of other people must also re-role and a bunch of capabilities (equipments) must be exchanged for "difficult terrain" versions.  Do we have those?  Are there any differences (technical, doctrinal, experiential) which militate against simple re-roling and argue for dedicated users?


----------



## MilEME09

suffolkowner said:


> Yeah but if you want to cross the Pacific or Atlantic does it make sense to come from all the way across the country? It's an organization thing again as to how to set the various units. Are they going to be symmetrical or asymmetrical? Dispersed or aggregated? How and who are training where and with what?  It's hard to believe we can't afford to keep them in Wainwright and Gagetown. We have 80ish tanks with 40 with the Lord Strathcona's Horse and 20 with the Royal Canadian Dragoons(where are the other 20?) while the Australians have their 59 over 5 locations
> 
> "The Army’s operational fleet of Abrams is held by Army’s three Armoured Cavalry Regiments in Adelaide, Brisbane and Townsville. Additionally, vehicles for training purposes are also held at the School of Armour in Puckapunyal and the Army Logistic Training Centre at Bandiana."


We don't have enough tanks to mam multiple Regiments. Awhile I agree one location could catch us off guard if we have to move then to the other coast, this can be mitigated by regularly practicing doing such a task. A split force means you'd get half our tanks to the fight and the rest 36 hours later. Might as well concentrate them and wait to get a whole Regiment in the fight at the same time.


----------



## suffolkowner

MilEME09 said:


> We don't have enough tanks to mam multiple Regiments. Awhile I agree one location could catch us off guard if we have to move then to the other coast, this can be mitigated by regularly practicing doing such a task. A split force means you'd get half our tanks to the fight and the rest 36 hours later. Might as well concentrate them and wait to get a whole Regiment in the fight at the same time.


So the 6 mechanized battalions will be wholly asymmetric then?

How is it that Australia can split their 59 tanks over 5 bases(?14,14,14,6, &6?) but we cant split our 82 over 2?


----------



## GR66

So something a little more like this?


----------



## MilEME09

suffolkowner said:


> So the 6 mechanized battalions will be wholly asymmetric then?
> 
> How is it that Australia can split their 59 tanks over 5 bases(?14,14,14,6, &6?) but we cant split our 82 over 2?


Given our current state ID argue they already are asymmetric. Trying to have our brigades apo be Swiss army knifes means they will be good at most tasks and masters of none. Australia may be able to split their force which ever way they want. We have ours split right now, they also are more efficient, doesn't mean a split force is the right way to go. Saying they can do it is fine, but does it actually work for them or are they doing it to justify keeping up those units and bases?


----------



## Kirkhill

And the assymetry is generated by a discussion about how to manage 20 tanks per brigade.


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:


> And the assymetry is generated by a discussion about how to manage 20 tanks per brigade.


And 20 tanks per brigade is too few to actually give the effect associated with an Armoured Regiment. 20 tanks isn’t enough to generate shock action. At best, that’s an infantry direct fire support company, like the tank company of a Korean War-era US Regimental Combat Team. At worst, they are extremely expensive mobile pillboxes.

If we are to have tanks, then we need to mass them.


----------



## Underway

suffolkowner said:


> Yeah but if you want to cross the Pacific or Atlantic does it make sense to come from all the way across the country? It's an organization thing again as to how to set the various units. Are they going to be symmetrical or asymmetrical? Dispersed or aggregated? How and who are training where and with what?  It's hard to believe we can't afford to keep them in Wainwright and Gagetown. We have 80ish tanks with 40 with the Lord Strathcona's Horse and 20 with the Royal Canadian Dragoons(where are the other 20?) while the Australians have their 59 over 5 locations


My point was it takes so long to ship a tank that unless you are doing it by air it really doesn't matter if it comes halfway across the country.  What's a 5-day train ride from Edmonton to Halifax when it takes a month to prepare, pack and load the tank, train it to a port and then sail it to its destination, where you unload it and get it ready for use.  The train ride time is almost a rounding error.

The other 20 tanks are at the Armour School in Gagetown for training purposes and one of each variant is also at the EME School in Borden.


----------



## suffolkowner

Underway said:


> My point was it takes so long to ship a tank that unless you are doing it by air it really doesn't matter if it comes halfway across the country.  What's a 5-day train ride from Edmonton to Halifax when it takes a month to prepare, pack and load the tank, train it to a port and then sail it to its destination, where you unload it and get it ready for use.  The train ride time is almost a rounding error.
> 
> The other 20 tanks are at the Armour School in Gagetown for training purposes and one of each variant is also at the EME School in Borden.


I guess that makes sense the more I think about it. So we're suggesting having one heavy brigade and two mediums with a battalion of light?

Thanks for the information on the tanks. Who gets the 2A6M's and who gets the 2A4M's?


----------



## Underway

suffolkowner said:


> I guess that makes sense the more I think about it. So we're suggesting having one heavy brigade and two mediums with a battalion of light?
> 
> Thanks for the information on the tanks. Who gets the 2A6M's and who gets the 2A4M's?


They are mixed up. I recently read a service paper on this (hence why a navy guy knows some of this stuff).  This makes some sense, if the single company shared with RCD and 12RBC is for training/familiarity and both schools are for the same then you would ideally want your soldiers able to drive/fix any variant they are dropped into.  Tanks for deployment will likely come from the Strats stock, hence why they have double the number.  

That of course causes other problems as now your maintainers and parts are not perfectly matched losing efficiency.  Frankly, if the money is found they should if possible all be upgraded to the same variant or maximum two variants.  There has been some discussion on participating in the German Leopard 2A8 program to upgrade them all together though, similar to the LAV 6 upgrade program where the vehicle hulls are being consolidated down from many to few types.


----------



## MilEME09

Upgrading our fleet to a common standard would go a long way to helping our selves out, especially in terms of logistics and maintenance. Tanks are already maintenance heavy vehicles, the more we can do to streamline it the better. Last time I was in Borden they had a full troop at the school because of all the variants we use and have to learn. If we had a standard variant, the school could probably get away with 1 maybe two tanks, making more available to the Regiments.


----------



## suffolkowner

Upgrading the Leo2's to one standard should really be a simple program, just deciding between KMW and Rheinmetall. The British were apparently offered a lease instead of upgrading the Challenger 2








						The MoD was offered Leopard 2 tanks on lease
					

With Challenger 3, Stuart Crawford argues that the UK has relegated its self to the role of an off-the-shelf customer.




					ukdefencejournal.org.uk
				




What would the upgrades consist of to bring/replace to a 2A7+ or 2A8 standard? Are we talking adding an active protection system?

An older post on the 2A7+









						Future Leopard 2 improvments?
					

Despite the Leopard 2A7 being a relatively new tank - it was introduced into service in 2014 - the German Army is looking for further upgra...




					below-the-turret-ring.blogspot.com


----------



## MilEME09

More digital features, protection increases, FCS upgrades, communication and cooling upgrades. Likely cost a few million per tank. We would be short on tanks for a hit but worth it, factory could do a deep maintenance over haul while at it.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> More digital features, protection increases, FCS upgrades, communication and cooling upgrades. Likely cost a few million per tank. We would be short on tanks for a hit but worth it, factory could do a deep maintenance over haul while at it.




The RCAF has developed a model for such a programme






						CP-140 Aurora fleet modernization and life extension - Canada.ca
					

The Aurora fleet is Canada’s primary airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft. It has been modernized with a world-class integrated mission suite with state-of-the-art avionics, communications systems, computer networks, and sensors.




					www.canada.ca
				












						Canada's CP-140 Aurora MPA Upgraded to Block IV Takes First Flight - Naval News
					

The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)'s first Block IV-modified CP-140 Aurora conducted its first flight to conduct test assessments. The test flight took place between Halifax and Greenwood.




					www.navalnews.com
				




Initiatied in 1999


----------



## Underway

Heres the plan:

upgrade to electronics and digital systems of the tanks. Internal systems will be almost completely overhauled
All cabling will be replaced with fibre wires, where it's not already used.
New cameras and optics will be installed, giving the crew full digital 360° vision of their surroundings.
upgraded C4I systems will be installed. This means full uplink compatibility to satellites, as well as other communication types. It will also be fully compatible with the Galileo satellite navigation system to complement GPS.

Secondary armament currently consists of one coaxial and one anti-aircraft 7.62 mm machine gun. In the 2A8, this second machine gun will be replaced by a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun (50 cal) mounted on an RWS
No significant changes will be made to the main gun.
For improved protection, the Leopard 2A8 will be equipped with AMAP-EL electric reactive armour; which will be mounted on the front and the turret only. With that equipment, the 2A8 will also serve as testbed for the technology
It will be possible to add the AMAP-ADS hard-kill active protection system to the 2A8 in a modular compatibility.

Added to that are some smaller crew comfort and safety improvements with a better climate control system, improved seats, slight reorganization of internal systems, and other minor changes.
Canada has actually been heavily involved in giving feedback for improvements as we are the only force to use 2A6 in combat.  KMW values their Canadian partner's input (at least according to their website!) and many of the changes for the 2A7 and 2A7+ are a result of that feedback.

Whether the 2A8 actually becomes a thing or not, or is just a version of the 2A7+ time will tell.


----------



## FJAG

Okay. I've given this some thought ever since seeing GR66's orbats so of course I just had to some of my own. Those of you who have seen my book have a general idea where I'm heading but I've refined it somewhat.

In short I see a two-phase restructure. Phase 1 is a reorganization that attempts as much as possible to use all existing infrastructure and existing equipment. It essentially calls for no new equipment (albeit that projects should start for a further Phase 2 restructure in 2030. (I'll post my ideas for Phase 2 later. Don't sweat the issue of who gets which roles for future weapon systems. What might be described as a mech recce squadron here might in future also carry some anti-armour weaponry. I'm looking at things with broad brushes at the moment.

The following are key elements:


I'm a strong advocate of restructuring the reserves to maximize their stand-by and augmentation potential. I fully realize that this requires a broad redefinition of reserve terms of service, employer legislation, training, equipment and Reg F commitment. I also think that just because we haven't done something about it in 70 years is absolutely no reason to do anything now. You'll see that my organizations are defined as Reg F, Res F and Hybrid Reg & Res F depending on the very rough ratios and functions provided in each organization. There are a significant number of Res F unit amalgamations and reductions in headquarters. On the other hand all existing Reg F RSS staff-whether at bde HQ or within units-will be retained and redistributed so that each retained reserve unit will have the RSS staff of its various amalgamated components;
The below diagrams for simplicity's sake have left off headquarters and admin companies, medical, Sigs and MP units. It's anticipated all of those will be provided roughly as they are now in a Reg F brigade;
Re 1 CMBG. In redistributing equipment I've basically made 1 CMBG an armour heavy brigade with all - and I mean all - tanks going to Edm/Wainwright. I see any and all training having to do with tanks (whether armoured, armoured infantry, officer etc being done in Edm/Wainwright (if necessary with a Combat Arms School Det there) under the auspices of the 3 Div Depot Bn there. In order to create 4 sqns and spares etc each squadron will be reduced to three 4-tank troops and a 3-tank Sqn HQ (for 15 total) which will eat up 60 total plus a pair for the armd regt HQ. In total there will be one tk heavy combined arms regt and two infantry heavy combined arms battalions. To an extent this mirrors the basics of a US ABCT;
Within 1 CMBG, I have removed the cbt sp coys from the two inf heavy combined arms bns. Some of the weapon systems will go to the rifle coys but the personnel and vehicles, together with the armoured recce squadron have made their way, together with one rifle coy, into the 3 PPCLI bn which is now designated a cavalry bn. I do not see this force as a pure recce force but expect it to have a larger more robust anti-tank capability (both direct and indirect);
artillery within all the brigades remains unchanged with the exception that each regiment now has a reserve six-gun battery (using their existing 105mm C3s);
With respect to 2 CMBG I have transferred 3 RCR to CANSOFCOM as a Security Force Capacity Building bn. It will require to change into a multi-disciplinary organization with various occupational groups and will probably be reduced in size from a full battalion but leader/instructor heavy;
2 RCR's LAVs in Gagetown go to 3 R22eR so that 5 CMBG becomes a complete LAV brigade. 1 RCR Petawawa's LAVs will be redistributed to three Depot Bns that are responsible for training Res F augmentees (as well as Reg F DP1 students) and which do not have ready access to the LAVs in Edm/Wainwright or Valcartier.
A Res F infantry battalion and recce sqn (envisioned from the Ottawa area) will form 2 CMBG's third light battalion.
As mentioned above, 5 CMBG becomes a full 3 LAV Bn bde. 2 Div's 2 CLBG and 5 CMBG become Canada's primary quick reaction, peacekeeping, northern operations etc force while 2 Div builds for heavier missions. While reservists do not have any additional equipment over their current holdings, the intent is that they conduct much of their annual training on the equipment of their Reg F counterparts.
The CCSB in Kingston will essentially remain as is with the exception that I see the need to add another Hybrid EW Regiment to take on additional cyber security missions, a need to beef up and integrate the Intelligence Regiment more and to add another Engr Sp Regt, a supply and transport battalion, a maintenance battalion and a service battalion from the existing Eastern Ontario (as far west as Oshawa perhaps) to beef up our capabilities to conduct NSE operations without stripping various bases and service battalions of resources.
A  New Artillery brigade is formed in the Maritimes which will take over both 4th Arty Regt (GS) and 4 ESR as well as forming an GBAD regiment within the Maritimes and a LRPR Regt from the artillery units in eastern Quebec (Until such time as such weapon systems are available the artillery regiments will amalgamate into two regiments and continue using the 105 mm C3 howitzers. A Res F Recce Regt, Light inf bn and a service bn will be formed by amalgamating remaining Res F units in the Maritimes.
The first slide below is what I believe is - more or less - the existing Army's structure. The second slide represents the Phase 1 Force 2025 structure.





🍻


----------



## FJAG

So here are my thoughts for Phase 2 which has much less restructuring but is based on roles and tasks if and when money is ever freed up for new equipment purchases. These are the following key elements to Phase 2:


I'm not looking at priorities - just concepts.
1 CABG gets converted to tracked IFVs, and obtains 18 wheeled self propelled howitzers.  The intent is at a minimum to convert the entire brigade to a full on armoured CA. This will make eight M777s available for reassignment. Four could go to each of 2 RCHA and 5 RALC to give them three four-gun batteries each.
32 Bde (Ontario) and 41 Bde (Western Canada) convert to armoured brigades as well. If money is available then more IFVs and tanks can be purchased to equip one or both of the brigades. If money isn't available then at least sufficient training vehicles must be made available so that both brigades can be trained on the equipment so that they can properly augment 1 CABG.
If 1 CABG is upgraded to IFVs then eight LAV companies are available for redistribution. My priority would be to distribute these to 34 CMBG in Quebec to double the capacity to two full CMBGs (one Reg and Res). A second thought would be to make  32 in ON a LAV rather than an armoured brigade.
I've decided to make the three Cavalry bns/regiments more robust by organizing them with two recce coys/sqns one anti-armour coy/sqn and one armed UAV battery each. In addition each brigade artillery regiment also receives a wheeled armed UAV battery. (Concurrent with this would need to be a general expansion of anti-armour systems at the rifle company level.
Further to the 18 wheeled self propelled howitzers for 1 RCHA, additional ones should be considered in order of priority for 5 RALC and 34 CMBG as well as 32 and 41 Bde (if they get equipped). 5 RALC and 34 Bde are so equipped then 2 CMBG should go to three six-gun M577 batteries and the remaining guns assigned to 32 Bde's artillery regiment in order to keep all maintenance for the M777 in Ontario.
There are numerous additional capabilities that need to be acquired chief amongst them are a BGAD regiment (preferably three twelve-launcher batteries and requisite radars) and a LRPR system (preferably a three siz-launcher batteries) both of which are hybrid organizations with one battery Reg F and two Res F each. 



The organization is set up primarily to cater to the following factors:

The choice on what equipment to purchase is based on one of two posture options: The first is that without any major equipment acquisitions, the force is postured to organize its reserves to train on the equipment of the Reg F within division that it belongs to. This means that both the Reg F and Res F within a given division will have the same role and a mission and equipment and should be able to work with the same doctrine and TTPs but will not be able to expand beyond the force's current capabilities rapidly. The second is that with any additional equipment purchases (or even through a hand-me-down system), the force will be able to train on and expand with whatever additional equipment is made available. I.e. the force can rapidly grow in the event of an emergency;
Critical equipment procurement is firstly in GBAD and secondly with an expanded anti-armour capability by way of anti-armour forces in the cavalry bns/regts and in the artillery regiments and then ground based fires (especially long range); and
The system is set up to generally cater to the existing infrastructure and generally ought not to need any additional PYs for the Reg F but may require some affiliation changes  - for example combined arms battalions are permanent armour/infantry establishments and 3 PPCLI becoming a cavalry regiment when I'm sure people would prefer to reactivate the VIII CH. I'm an agnostic on these issues and as far as I'm concerned the anti-armour battery in the cavalry bn could easily be infantry the same way mortars are. 
And yes, if there needs to be a budget reduction then 2 CLBG is the first on the chopping block to be replaced by reservists.
Anyway. Have fun with it.

🍻


----------



## quadrapiper

MilEME09 said:


> More digital features, protection increases, FCS upgrades, communication and cooling upgrades. Likely cost a few million per tank. We would be short on tanks for a hit but worth it, factory could do a deep maintenance over haul while at it.


Maybe, for a hypothetical upgrade program, add in a purchase of enough new 2A8s to make up for however many are in for refit. Keeps the fleet at expected size, provides an immediate training platform for maintainers and operators, and, when everything's finished, provides a few more tanks.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Okay. I've given this some thought ever since seeing GR66's orbats so of course I just had to some of my own. Those of you who have seen my book have a general idea where I'm heading but I've refined it somewhat.
> 
> In short I see a two-phase restructure. Phase 1 is a reorganization that attempts as much as possible to use all existing infrastructure and existing equipment. It essentially calls for no new equipment (albeit that projects should start for a further Phase 2 restructure in 2030. (I'll post my ideas for Phase 2 later. Don't sweat the issue of who gets which roles for future weapon systems. What might be described as a mech recce squadron here might in future also carry some anti-armour weaponry. I'm looking at things with broad brushes at the moment.
> 
> The following are key elements:
> 
> 
> I'm a strong advocate of restructuring the reserves to maximize their stand-by and augmentation potential. I fully realize that this requires a broad redefinition of reserve terms of service, employer legislation, training, equipment and Reg F commitment. I also think that just because we haven't done something about it in 70 years is absolutely no reason to do anything now. You'll see that my organizations are defined as Reg F, Res F and Hybrid Reg & Res F depending on the very rough ratios and functions provided in each organization. There are a significant number of Res F unit amalgamations and reductions in headquarters. On the other hand all existing Reg F RSS staff-whether at bde HQ or within units-will be retained and redistributed so that each retained reserve unit will have the RSS staff of its various amalgamated components;
> The below diagrams for simplicity's sake have left off headquarters and admin companies, medical, Sigs and MP units. It's anticipated all of those will be provided roughly as they are now in a Reg F brigade;
> Re 1 CMBG. In redistributing equipment I've basically made 1 CMBG an armour heavy brigade with all - and I mean all - tanks going to Edm/Wainwright. I see any and all training having to do with tanks (whether armoured, armoured infantry, officer etc being done in Edm/Wainwright (if necessary with a Combat Arms School Det there) under the auspices of the 3 Div Depot Bn there. In order to create 4 sqns and spares etc each squadron will be reduced to three 4-tank troops and a 3-tank Sqn HQ (for 15 total) which will eat up 60 total plus a pair for the armd regt HQ. In total there will be one tk heavy combined arms regt and two infantry heavy combined arms battalions. To an extent this mirrors the basics of a US ABCT;
> Within 1 CMBG, I have removed the cbt sp coys from the two inf heavy combined arms bns. Some of the weapon systems will go to the rifle coys but the personnel and vehicles, together with the armoured recce squadron have made their way, together with one rifle coy, into the 3 PPCLI bn which is now designated a cavalry bn. I do not see this force as a pure recce force but expect it to have a larger more robust anti-tank capability (both direct and indirect);
> artillery within all the brigades remains unchanged with the exception that each regiment now has a reserve six-gun battery (using their existing 105mm C3s);
> With respect to 2 CMBG I have transferred 3 RCR to CANSOFCOM as a Security Force Capacity Building bn. It will require to change into a multi-disciplinary organization with various occupational groups and will probably be reduced in size from a full battalion but leader/instructor heavy;
> 2 RCR's LAVs in Gagetown go to 3 R22eR so that 5 CMBG becomes a complete LAV brigade. 1 RCR Petawawa's LAVs will be redistributed to three Depot Bns that are responsible for training Res F augmentees (as well as Reg F DP1 students) and which do not have ready access to the LAVs in Edm/Wainwright or Valcartier.
> A Res F infantry battalion and recce sqn (envisioned from the Ottawa area) will form 2 CMBG's third light battalion.
> As mentioned above, 5 CMBG becomes a full 3 LAV Bn bde. 2 Div's 2 CLBG and 5 CMBG become Canada's primary quick reaction, peacekeeping, northern operations etc force while 2 Div builds for heavier missions. While reservists do not have any additional equipment over their current holdings, the intent is that they conduct much of their annual training on the equipment of their Reg F counterparts.
> The CCSB in Kingston will essentially remain as is with the exception that I see the need to add another Hybrid EW Regiment to take on additional cyber security missions, a need to beef up and integrate the Intelligence Regiment more and to add another Engr Sp Regt, a supply and transport battalion, a maintenance battalion and a service battalion from the existing Eastern Ontario (as far west as Oshawa perhaps) to beef up our capabilities to conduct NSE operations without stripping various bases and service battalions of resources.
> A  New Artillery brigade is formed in the Maritimes which will take over both 4th Arty Regt (GS) and 4 ESR as well as forming an GBAD regiment within the Maritimes and a LRPR Regt from the artillery units in eastern Quebec (Until such time as such weapon systems are available the artillery regiments will amalgamate into two regiments and continue using the 105 mm C3 howitzers. A Res F Recce Regt, Light inf bn and a service bn will be formed by amalgamating remaining Res F units in the Maritimes.
> The first slide below is what I believe is - more or less - the existing Army's structure. The second slide represents the Phase 1 Force 2025 structure.
> 
> View attachment 65594
> 
> View attachment 65597
> 
> 🍻





FJAG said:


> So here are my thoughts for Phase 2 which has much less restructuring but is based on roles and tasks if and when money is ever freed up for new equipment purchases. These are the following key elements to Phase 2:
> 
> 
> I'm not looking at priorities - just concepts.
> 1 CABG gets converted to tracked IFVs, and obtains 18 wheeled self propelled howitzers.  The intent is at a minimum to convert the entire brigade to a full on armoured CA. This will make eight M777s available for reassignment. Four could go to each of 2 RCHA and 5 RALC to give them three four-gun batteries each.
> 32 Bde (Ontario) and 41 Bde (Western Canada) convert to armoured brigades as well. If money is available then more IFVs and tanks can be purchased to equip one or both of the brigades. If money isn't available then at least sufficient training vehicles must be made available so that both brigades can be trained on the equipment so that they can properly augment 1 CABG.
> If 1 CABG is upgraded to IFVs then eight LAV companies are available for redistribution. My priority would be to distribute these to 34 CMBG in Quebec to double the capacity to two full CMBGs (one Reg and Res). A second thought would be to make  32 in ON a LAV rather than an armoured brigade.
> I've decided to make the three Cavalry bns/regiments more robust by organizing them with two recce coys/sqns one anti-armour coy/sqn and one armed UAV battery each. In addition each brigade artillery regiment also receives a wheeled armed UAV battery. (Concurrent with this would need to be a general expansion of anti-armour systems at the rifle company level.
> Further to the 18 wheeled self propelled howitzers for 1 RCHA, additional ones should be considered in order of priority for 5 RALC and 34 CMBG as well as 32 and 41 Bde (if they get equipped). 5 RALC and 34 Bde are so equipped then 2 CMBG should go to three six-gun M577 batteries and the remaining guns assigned to 32 Bde's artillery regiment in order to keep all maintenance for the M777 in Ontario.
> There are numerous additional capabilities that need to be acquired chief amongst them are a BGAD regiment (preferably three twelve-launcher batteries and requisite radars) and a LRPR system (preferably a three siz-launcher batteries) both of which are hybrid organizations with one battery Reg F and two Res F each.
> 
> View attachment 65600
> 
> The organization is set up primarily to cater to the following factors:
> 
> The choice on what equipment to purchase is based on one of two posture options: The first is that without any major equipment acquisitions, the force is postured to organize its reserves to train on the equipment of the Reg F within division that it belongs to. This means that both the Reg F and Res F within a given division will have the same role and a mission and equipment and should be able to work with the same doctrine and TTPs but will not be able to expand beyond the force's current capabilities rapidly. The second is that with any additional equipment purchases (or even through a hand-me-down system), the force will be able to train on and expand with whatever additional equipment is made available. I.e. the force can rapidly grow in the event of an emergency;
> Critical equipment procurement is firstly in GBAD and secondly with an expanded anti-armour capability by way of anti-armour forces in the cavalry bns/regts and in the artillery regiments and then ground based fires (especially long range); and
> The system is set up to generally cater to the existing infrastructure and generally ought not to need any additional PYs for the Reg F but may require some affiliation changes  - for example combined arms battalions are permanent armour/infantry establishments and 3 PPCLI becoming a cavalry regiment when I'm sure people would prefer to reactivate the VIII CH. I'm an agnostic on these issues and as far as I'm concerned the anti-armour battery in the cavalry bn could easily be infantry the same way mortars are.
> And yes, if there needs to be a budget reduction then 2 CLBG is the first on the chopping block to be replaced by reservists.
> Anyway. Have fun with it.
> 
> 🍻


A couple questions/comments.

1) I'm on board with maintaining an armoured capability for the heavy fight, but in all probability the vast majority of our deployments will still be the kind of "small wars" that will suit our LAV-based medium forces.  Do you foresee putting the Armoured units of 1 CABG into the rotation for those deployments or will it all fall to 5 CMBG (or 2 CLBG if light forces are more appropriate)?  

2)  In your model what is the largest field force you picture the CA deploying into a combat situation and how do you envision the rotation/replacement of those units in the field.   Do you see the Reserves deploying as their own formations, or used to augment the Reg Force formations?

3)  How likely do you think it is that we will get a new fleet of tracked IFVs for 1 CABG to replace their LAVs at the same time that we are investing in various other systems (GBAD, LRPF, AT, etc. not to mention major investments outside the Army - CSCs, JSS, CF-18 replacements, North Warning System upgrades, eventual Kingston-class and sub replacements, etc.)?  Chances of equipping 1 or 2 Reserve Brigades with IFVs and Tanks as well?  If the IFV purchase doesn't happen would that change what you propose?

4) I understand your using the CS companies and their vehicles from the 1 CABG to populate 3 PPCLI as a Cavalry Regiment (without needing to find money for additional PYs and vehicles), but does it make sense to strip those enablers from the battalions that you are expecting to be used in your heaviest fighting against peer/near-peer enemies?  Shouldn't those Battalions have the most enablers attached since you expect them to face the most difficult adversaries?

One thing I find interesting is the idea peeling off a couple of LAV companies to provide training vehicles for the Reserves.  In my mind not so that you'll have LAV-equipped Reserve units deploying (I just don't see the $ being made available for that), but so that at least a portion of the Reserve Force units can have personnel trained and competent in driving/fighting the LAVs.  It would allow for much more valuable augmentation of the Reg Force battalions than just being able to provide some "guys in back".

GBAD?  Check.  SP-Howitzers?  Check.  Vehicle-mounted AGTMs (as well as hand-held)?  Check.  Expanded EW, Engineer Support and Logistics?  Check, Check, Check!

Moving 3 RCR to CANSOFCOM as something similar to the US Security Force Assistance Brigades I'm not so sure about.  I think CSOR is the best unit to fulfill that role.  Personally I think the Army should retain an internal Rapid Response capability.  I think it could likely be built from the existing Light Battalions and could probably be pared down to a single Battalion+ in size since I doubt we have the capability of deploying and supporting a force any bigger than that anyway.  

Those are my initial thoughts anyway.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> A couple questions/comments.
> 
> 1) I'm on board with maintaining an armoured capability for the heavy fight, but in all probability the vast majority of our deployments will still be the kind of "small wars" that will suit our LAV-based medium forces.  Do you foresee putting the Armoured units of 1 CABG into the rotation for those deployments or will it all fall to 5 CMBG (or 2 CLBG if light forces are more appropriate)?


My thought is that 3 Div and 1 CABG and it's reserve units would be responsible for all Op Reassurance related rotos and exercises in Europe. 2 Div including 2 CLBG 5 CMBG and their reserve brigade would be responsible for all other operations. The two CCSBs would support any and all missions as required.


GR66 said:


> 2)  In your model what is the largest field force you picture the CA deploying into a combat situation and how do you envision the rotation/replacement of those units in the field.   Do you see the Reserves deploying as their own formations, or used to augment the Reg Force formations?


I know it's out of style to see anything in the way of a major deployment. I do, however, want the ability to deploy up to a division. My concept involves that reserve formations have a healthy number of Reg F personnel in both leadership and staff roles and that as such, once they are equipped and have achieved an acceptable level of training, reserve formations would be deployable. Over and above that there are a number of reserve units which would provide augmentees.


GR66 said:


> 3)  How likely do you think it is that we will get a new fleet of tracked IFVs for 1 CABG to replace their LAVs at the same time that we are investing in various other systems (GBAD, LRPF, AT, etc. not to mention major investments outside the Army - CSCs, JSS, CF-18 replacements, North Warning System upgrades, eventual Kingston-class and sub replacements, etc.)?  Chances of equipping 1 or 2 Reserve Brigades with IFVs and Tanks as well?  If the IFV purchase doesn't happen would that change what you propose?


I'm looking at this as an aspirational plan done over time. I tend to believe that if all you ever set is low goals then all that you will ever achieve is low objectives (or worse - fail to meet your low objectives). I tend to believe in the Golden Rule of Deterrence - _The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression. _We currently do not do that. Politically we need to be seen by our allies to be doing more (just as soon as some of them do more) or we are going to loose political credibility and thereby influence. We are perceived as freeloaders by some and irrelevant by others. That's not a good thing and a few billion spent on defence industry in this country would go a long way for both economic development in our heavy manufacturing sector and to build up a stock of military equipment. Putting that equipment into the hands of a reserve force (which would need major reform) would ensure that we do not have the highly costly full-time PYs to feed year-to-year. In the end, if one develops a viable reserve force, one could conceivably--and probably should--reduce the size of the Reg F and their pay envelope.


GR66 said:


> 4) I understand your using the CS companies and their vehicles from the 1 CABG to populate 3 PPCLI as a Cavalry Regiment (without needing to find money for additional PYs and vehicles), but does it make sense to strip those enablers from the battalions that you are expecting to be used in your heaviest fighting against peer/near-peer enemies?  Shouldn't those Battalions have the most enablers attached since you expect them to face the most difficult adversaries?


The enablers aren't actually being stripped. My model is the US ABCT. Combined arms battalions do not have "weapons companies" like the IBCTs do. Anti armour weapons are part of the IFV (see Bradley) and a pair of 120 mm mortars are organic to each combined arms rifle company. There is a scout platoon within the battalion headquarters and then, of course, the battalion has tanks and the brigade has a full cavalry battalion. It's not the entire CS company going to the cavalry bn but a large part of it.


GR66 said:


> One thing I find interesting is the idea peeling off a couple of LAV companies to provide training vehicles for the Reserves.  In my mind not so that you'll have LAV-equipped Reserve units deploying (I just don't see the $ being made available for that), but so that at least a portion of the Reserve Force units can have personnel trained and competent in driving/fighting the LAVs.  It would allow for much more valuable augmentation of the Reg Force battalions than just being able to provide some "guys in back".


Exactly. I've been mulling over divisional depot battalions for some time. What I would like to see is that the battalions have several companies that are scattered around the region so that training can happen close to wherever units are (such as in large urban centres as well as the current training centres) Each battalion would be responsible for both recruiting for the army and training everything in the way of DP1 and DP2 for all Reg F and Res F in their part of the country. Essentially a recruit, Res F or Reg F would be recruited and go on a BTL with the appropriate Depot Bn who would manage that individual until they achieve DP1 standard at which time they are turned over to a unit. Training would be year round for Reg F (and Res F who have the time to do it) and full-summer training for Res F students (including distance learning where appropriate) and managing trades people attending community college training and officer candidates civilian attending universities. I'm particulalry concerned about service support trades that seem to have choke points in their training cycles which I would like to see relieved by offloading much of the fundamental trades training to community colleges (where we would pay tuition but not salaries for reservists) and then have specific mil equipment courses during summer breaks (where we do pay salaries) Key to this is that at the depots, the training for a Reg F member and Res F member be identical and using the same equipment. (and that would be regardless of whether we fully equip the reserves or not. In my perfect world, Class A training during the winter would be restricted to ten monthly 2.5 day mandatory sessions during which basic refresher trg (such as annual weapons trg) while the summer would be a two (and better yet three) week mandatory exercise using a full complement of the Reg F equipment if the reserves do not have their own. 


GR66 said:


> GBAD?  Check.  SP-Howitzers?  Check.  Vehicle-mounted AGTMs (as well as hand-held)?  Check.  Expanded EW, Engineer Support and Logistics?  Check, Check, Check!
> 
> Moving 3 RCR to CANSOFCOM as something similar to the US Security Force Assistance Brigades I'm not so sure about.  I think CSOR is the best unit to fulfill that role.  Personally I think the Army should retain an internal Rapid Response capability.  I think it could likely be built from the existing Light Battalions and could probably be pared down to a single Battalion+ in size since I doubt we have the capability of deploying and supporting a force any bigger than that anyway.


Actually 2 CLBG retains 1 and 2 RCR as light battalions plus the RCDs as a light cavalry unit with two light recce, 1 light anti-armour and one light UAV/anti-armour squadron plus an engineer and service capability. That is the Army's rapid reaction force which, in a pinch can be reinforced by LAV equipped elements from 5 CMBG.


GR66 said:


> Those are my initial thoughts anyway.


Thanks. I appreciate them.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> My thought is that 3 Div and 1 CABG and it's reserve units would be responsible for all Op Reassurance related rotos and exercises in Europe. 2 Div including 2 CLBG 5 CMBG and their reserve brigade would be responsible for all other operations. The two CCSBs would support any and all missions as required.
> 
> I know it's out of style to see anything in the way of a major deployment. I do, however, want the ability to deploy up to a division. My concept involves that reserve formations have a healthy number of Reg F personnel in both leadership and staff roles and that as such, once they are equipped and have achieved an acceptable level of training, reserve formations would be deployable. *Over and above that there are a number of reserve units which would provide augmentees*.
> 
> I'm looking at this as an aspirational plan done over time. I tend to believe that if all you ever set is low goals then all that you will ever achieve is low objectives (or worse - fail to meet your low objectives). I tend to believe in the Golden Rule of Deterrence - _The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression. _We currently do not do that. Politically we need to be seen by our allies to be doing more (just as soon as some of them do more) or we are going to loose political credibility and thereby influence. We are perceived as freeloaders by some and irrelevant by others. That's not a good thing and a few billion spent on defence industry in this country would go a long way for both economic development in our heavy manufacturing sector and to build up a stock of military equipment. *Putting that equipment into the hands of a reserve force (which would need major reform) would ensure that we do not have the highly costly full-time PYs to feed year-to-year. In the end, if one develops a viable reserve force, one could conceivably--and probably should--reduce the size of the Reg F and their pay envelope.*
> 
> The enablers aren't actually being stripped. My model is the US ABCT. Combined arms battalions do not have "weapons companies" like the IBCTs do. Anti armour weapons are part of the IFV (see Bradley) and a pair of 120 mm mortars are organic to each combined arms rifle company. There is a scout platoon within the battalion headquarters and then, of course, the battalion has tanks and the brigade has a full cavalry battalion. It's not the entire CS company going to the cavalry bn but a large part of it.
> 
> *Exactly. I've been mulling over divisional depot battalions for some time. What I would like to see is that the battalions have several companies that are scattered around the region so that training can happen close to wherever units are (such as in large urban centres as well as the current training centres) Each battalion would be responsible for both recruiting for the army and training everything in the way of DP1 and DP2 for all Reg F and Res F in their part of the country. Essentially a recruit, Res F or Reg F would be recruited and go on a BTL with the appropriate Depot Bn who would manage that individual until they achieve DP1 standard at which time they are turned over to a unit. Training would be year round for Reg F (and Res F who have the time to do it) and full-summer training for Res F students (including distance learning where appropriate) and managing trades people attending community college training and officer candidates civilian attending universities. I'm particulalry concerned about service support trades that seem to have choke points in their training cycles which I would like to see relieved by offloading much of the fundamental trades training to community colleges (where we would pay tuition but not salaries for reservists) and then have specific mil equipment courses during summer breaks (where we do pay salaries) Key to this is that at the depots, the training for a Reg F member and Res F member be identical and using the same equipment. (and that would be regardless of whether we fully equip the reserves or not. In my perfect world, Class A training during the winter would be restricted to ten monthly 2.5 day mandatory sessions during which basic refresher trg (such as annual weapons trg) while the summer would be a two (and better yet three) week mandatory exercise using a full complement of the Reg F equipment if the reserves do not have their own.*
> 
> Actually 2 CLBG retains 1 and 2 RCR as light battalions plus the RCDs as a light cavalry unit with two light recce, 1 light anti-armour and one light UAV/anti-armour squadron plus an engineer and service capability. That is the Army's rapid reaction force which, in a pinch can be reinforced by LAV equipped elements from 5 CMBG.
> 
> Thanks. I appreciate them.
> 
> 🍻



It seems your approach depends heavily on a more effective Reserve, and I've tried to highlight those bits that reflect that emphasis.

Have you seen anything, anywhere, in the CAF doctrine world that gives even a hint that they have any intention of building, and then relying on, a Reserve Force capability like that? 

Currently, to get from where we are now to something even close to what you're proposing is a moon shot, IMHO.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> It seems your approach depends heavily on a more effective Reserve, and I've tried to highlight those bits that reflect that emphasis.
> 
> Have you seen anything, anywhere, in the CAF doctrine world that gives even a hint that they have any intention of building, and then relying on, a Reserve Force capability like that?
> 
> Currently, to get from where we are now to something even close to what you're proposing is a moon shot, IMHO.


It's like this D&B.

I have absolutely no expectations that the fools that have botched the reserve system continuously from the mid 1950s will suddenly have a epiphany and say "You know! FJAG's right. Lets do that" - because - Dunning-Kruger.

That, however, should not stop us from putting forward ways that the system can and should be improved. 

I'm perfectly prepared to say that the system cannot be improved by fine tuning regardless how well intentioned it might be. It needs radical reform to reach its full potential. 

How about you?

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> It's like this D&B.
> 
> I have absolutely no expectations that the fools that have botched the reserve system continuously from the mid 1950s will suddenly have a epiphany and say "You know! FJAG's right. Lets do that" - because - Dunning-Kruger.
> 
> That, however, should not stop us from putting forward ways that the system can and should be improved.
> 
> I'm perfectly prepared to say that the system cannot be improved by fine tuning regardless how well intentioned it might be. It needs radical reform to reach its full potential.
> 
> How about you?
> 
> 🍻





FJAG said:


> It's like this D&B.
> 
> I have absolutely no expectations that the fools that have botched the reserve system continuously from the mid 1950s will suddenly have a epiphany and say "You know! FJAG's right. Lets do that" - because - Dunning-Kruger.
> 
> That, however, should not stop us from putting forward ways that the system can and should be improved.
> 
> I'm perfectly prepared to say that the system cannot be improved by fine tuning regardless how well intentioned it might be. It needs radical reform to reach its full potential.
> 
> How about you?
> 
> 🍻



Damn. How dare you be so reasonable?


----------



## Kirkhill

With FJAG. 

It is not so much that I expect anyone to adopt any of my maunderings. I would just like to think I am assisting in keeping the dialogue open and helping to prevent fossilisation.


----------



## CBH99

Good2Golf said:


> The issue isn’t some trying to portray that CSOR has replaced any of the CA’s light battalions, but rather how does the GoC see the various force capabilities available to them to support the variety of policy and coalition capability demands put to it.


I'm not meaning to derail the thread at all, I'm asking this in the context of the bigger "FORCE 2025" picture.

How expensive is it to equip & deploy a 100 person contingent of CSOR guys, compared to a 100 person force of infantry types?  (Very general comparison of sustainment costs?)


One thing I've noticed repeatedly is the difference in perspective when it comes to the approach.  And by that I mean:


Regular military, man the equipment
Special Operations, equip the man

If the money was invested smartly, and the training was relevant to the goal of what we wanted FORCE 2025 to be ready for - I am curious about this.


(Asking moreso out of general curiosity, feeding this into a bigger picture idea)


----------



## blacktriangle

CBH99 said:


> I'm not meaning to derail the thread at all, I'm asking this in the context of the bigger "FORCE 2025" picture.
> 
> How expensive is it to equip & deploy a 100 person contingent of CSOR guys, compared to a 100 person force of infantry types?  (Very general comparison of sustainment costs?)
> 
> 
> One thing I've noticed repeatedly is the difference in perspective when it comes to the approach.  And by that I mean:
> 
> 
> Regular military, man the equipment
> Special Operations, equip the man
> 
> If the money was invested smartly, and the training was relevant to the goal of what we wanted FORCE 2025 to be ready for - I am curious about this.
> 
> 
> (Asking moreso out of general curiosity, feeding this into a bigger picture idea)


Don't forget the cost to train, and subsequently the cost to maintain (and compensate for) those skills. Something tells me that's where you'd find the true cost differences.


----------



## Underway

CBH99 said:


> How expensive is it to equip & deploy a 100 person contingent of CSOR guys, compared to a 100 person force of infantry types? (Very general comparison of sustainment costs?)



Equip is more expensive mainly because the radios they use are much much better, any other weapons/gear they use is almost a rounding error after comms are considered.  Training is much more expensive.  Not only the selection, but even something as simple as the amount of ammunition they use is orders of magnitude more than infantry uses.

In the grand scheme of things, however, it's chump change. (looks a 60+billion dollar warship procurement and 30+ billion dollar aircraft procurement)


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> It seems your approach depends heavily on a more effective Reserve, and I've tried to highlight those bits that reflect that emphasis.
> 
> Have you seen anything, anywhere, in the CAF doctrine world that gives even a hint that they have any intention of building, and then relying on, a Reserve Force capability like that?
> 
> Currently, to get from where we are now to something even close to what you're proposing is a moon shot, IMHO.


Judging from what I have seen of F2025 so far, someone, somewhere may be trying to do just that. However as we have pointed out, many times over multiple threads, having an effective reserve force is a complicated beast that takes more then just changes to an org chart or doctrine.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Equip is more expensive mainly because the radios they use are much much better, any other weapons/gear they use is almost a rounding error after comms are considered.  Training is much more expensive.  Not only the selection, but even something as simple as the amount of ammunition they use is orders of magnitude more than infantry uses.
> 
> In the grand scheme of things, however, it's chump change. (looks a 60+billion dollar warship procurement and 30+ billion dollar aircraft procurement)



Are we all agreeing that the primary difference between a Special Forces Operator and the rest of the Army is the training budget?  To me that speaks more to the shoddy attention to training in the rest of the Army, in particular the Reserves, than about the quality of the Special Operators.

We almost seem to be saying "if you jump through enough hoops long enough and prove yourself committed to us we will eventually train you".  (Come to that, based on the tales from recruiting, we seem to be saying exactly that).

Why wouldn't we be training the Light Infantry (or General Duties Infantry as I prefer) with the same intensity as the SF Operators? As Underway notes, in the grand scheme it would be chump change - especially given how few of the creatures there are.  And local range time and thousands of bullets has to be cheaper than the grand theatre pieces of Wainwright.

For that matter, with respect to the Reserves, which would attract and retain most civilians?   A bit more beer money or an annual allocation of 5000 rds of 5.56 or 9mm, a rifle with an annual refurbishment and a new barrel, and free access on their own time to a local range?

Add in some useful multipurpose vehicles from MILCOTS market and decent comms  and you have the basis for a solid volunteer force.

And, with a few thousand more rounds annually, and access to some of the more exotic disposable weapons available,  you can train effective infantry.


Final thought:

With respect to the number and size of infantry battalions.  Frankly  I have no time for tying the PYs, or the structure of the non-LAV infantry to the LAV infantry.   If anything I would be looking to the CSOR end of the spectrum for ideas.

The number of infanteers, even the number of companies, is not as important as the existence of the Light Battalions and the range of weaponry and skills they can bring to the field.   I would recommend keeping 3 Battalions, if for no other reasons than mutual political support and permitting three discrete but mutually communicative local experiments to develop and adapt lessons learned.

I would be fine with three Light Battalions of 270 each if that is all the manpower that is available.

On the other hand, if we are going to tie ourselves to the LAVs then, 45 LAVs with 6 GIBs each = 270.  If the Light Battalions were organized on that principle, and the reserves, then they would supply a ready drop in to the LAVs when the LAVs ran out of GIBs...assuming the LAVs survive.

4 LAVs = 4x 6 Infanteers (1x 6 Command and Support + 3x 6 with  1x 4-man fire team and 1x2 crew served system) modelled on the Scandinavian pattern.  = 24

15 LAVs = 3x 4x 6 Infanteers = 72 + 3x 1x 6 Command and Support  =18 for a total of 90

45 LAVs = 2x 3x 4x 6 Infanteers with 2x 3x 1x 6 Command and Support = 180 + 15x 6 Command and Support specialists = 90 for a total of 270.

270 that can be dumped in the back of the LAVs or operate independently as battalions or companies or support of CANSOFCOM, or be brigaded into what would be, effectively, a 20th century battalion of 810 with an additional 270 HQ and Atts.

It could also be a model for the Reserves.

I know it means 6 man sections and 24 man platoons.  That just means you need to task more sections and more platoons and more companies to achieve your objectives if the situation requires.


----------



## dapaterson

It starts with selection, not training.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> For that matter, with respect to the Reserves, which would attract and retain most civilians?   A bit more beer money or an annual allocation of 5000 rds of 5.56 or 9mm, a rifle with an annual refurbishment and a new barrel, and free access on their own time to a local range?



In my experience it's the same stuff that attracts and retains the most Reg F personnel: good leadership.

Just watch the troops melt away when there's a crappy CO/ RSM in the seat.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> In my experience it's the same stuff that attracts and retains the most Reg F personnel: good leadership.
> 
> Just watch the troops melt away when there's a crappy CO/ RSM in the seat.




I won't disagree.  But good leaders also melt away when they don't have the tools (read Authority and Budget) commensurate with their desires and their Responsibilities.  When they spend too much time reaching back and don't have the time to push forwards.


----------



## Kirkhill

This should go in the British Military thread but it also is germane to this discussion concerning the utility of light forces.









						Paratroopers drop into the desert at dawn as UK sends warning to Russia
					

In an exclusive dispatch, Danielle Sheridan reports from alongside Army's latest operation in Jordan as UK bolsters its Middle East presence




					www.telegraph.co.uk


----------



## FJAG

Just a few random thoughts Kirkhill.

Special Forces Operators are envisioned to be ready to deploy tactically on zero notice. Their standard of training needs to be very high at all times. Most other army components do not need that and the training can be more paced.

There is also the issue of the materiel that you start with as DAP points out. spec operators have been specially selected for their capabilities to learn rapidly, make rapid decisions and be self starters and already come to the organization with a fairly good skill set. Other parts of the army not so much. There is also the level of training to be achieved. While special operators may have a variety of missions many of their skill sets transfer from one mission to the other and are generally focused on the small team level. Army units on the other hand have a wide variety of disparate skill sets and the units need to be trained and exercised collectively in ever larger groupings. All that takes time when you consider the level of turnover, postings and blank files in the unit.

While the costs of ammunition might be chump change for a small unit like TF 2, it becomes pretty big dollars for a mechanized brigade once you factor in everything including pol costs, rations etc etc for 5,000 folks. Just as important is leadership burn out. It takes a lot of effort to put together a meaningful exercise for a battalion. We've all done advance to contacts up and down the ranges where the most challenging aspect was staying awake in the back of the track. Really good training, however, requires a lot of senior folks putting a lot of time and effort into organizing it. You can only do that for so long.

The other aspect is the number of folks. Back when I was a young gunner officer I was told that the reason we had two guns in the troop was because it took three guns using the projectiles we had and the rate of fire the guns gave out to neutralize a certain size of enemy tactical entity. We had four guns because that way one could always be down for rest and maintenance and even if we lost one we would still be an effective fire unit. Then we became three gun troops and then six gun batteries and now two gun troops but I seriously doubt there has been a rationale evaluation of the effects since the 1970s. I'm not saying that we don't know what the effects are - we do - its just we haven't tied those to the establishment and a high intensity conflict. Our establishments are $ for number of systems purchased and available PYs driven.

It's the same for infantry. Back in the sixties we changed from 303s and Brens to we used the same platoon establishment when we switched to FNs. The M113 more or less accommodated that section but you suddenly had to deal with the driver and machine gunner one dismount. That was a whole new thing but more and more the size and organization of the section had to do with the specific number of vehicles and crew required and whatever room was left for dismounts. Folks like Infanteer have a lot better handle on the development of small team tactics and organization then I ever will but I think that mostly these things are reactive to numbers of troops and vehicles available than rational thought. I've never been able to understand how, if there is a rational number of people required in a section (and thereby platoon and company etc) how we could do something like foist HTLA on units in combat the way we did. It's almost like on exercise when you pull folks out to practice combat casualties.

All that is to say I'm not sure if anyone can put there finger on the number of dismounts that a battalion needs for any given situation before it becomes combat incapacitated. I'm not even sure if we game this at any given time to see if our establishments should change or if we just react (like when mortars and pioneers disappeared or when we went down to two batteries in a three battalion brigade)

While it's nice to have a standard model of what a rifle platoon or company should be, it seems to me that a combined arms brigade looks and operates very, very differently from a light infantry brigade.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> This should go in the British Military thread but it also is germane to this discussion concerning the utility of light forces.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Paratroopers drop into the desert at dawn as UK sends warning to Russia
> 
> 
> In an exclusive dispatch, Danielle Sheridan reports from alongside Army's latest operation in Jordan as UK bolsters its Middle East presence
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.telegraph.co.uk



Well, the British have a military doctrine that matches their Foreign Policy so, of course, they have 'light forces' like an Air Assault Brigade. 

Canada? I'm not so sure....


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Just a few random thoughts Kirkhill.


Good stuff!



FJAG said:


> Special Forces Operators are envisioned to be ready to deploy tactically on zero notice. Their standard of training needs to be very high at all times. Most other army components do not need that and the training can be more paced.



Agreed.  The shorter the NTM then the more training is necessary.



FJAG said:


> There is also the issue of the materiel that you start with as DAP points out. spec operators have been specially selected for their capabilities to learn rapidly, make rapid decisions and be self starters and already come to the organization with a fairly good skill set. *Other parts of the army not so much*.



I presume you are talking about Gunners?  

My sense is that much of the population falls into the entrepreneurial, self-starter, self-taught realm these days.  The lack of steady work will do that to you. 



FJAG said:


> There is also the level of training to be achieved. While special operators may have a variety of missions many of their skill sets transfer from one mission to the other and are generally focused on the small team level. Army units on the other hand have a wide variety of disparate skill sets and the units need to be trained and exercised collectively in ever larger groupings. All that takes time when you consider the level of turnover, postings and blank files in the unit.



I would suggest that what you described wrt to the special operators applies equally to the infantry.   I will stipulate that the rest of the Army are Specialists.  I guess what I am saying is that the Special Operators' specialty is Generalism - a field that used to be the job of the infantry.





			In Praise of Infantry; Wavell, 1948
		


And his stable mate Slim

"[Special Forces] trained, equipped and mentally adjusted for one kind of operation were wasteful. They did not give, militarily, a worthwhile return for the resources in men, material and time that they absorbed... They were usually formed by attracting the best men... The result was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army. This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it should be expected to climb a tree.'
*Field Marshal Sir William Slim*, 1956"

I've re-read that quotation many times.  And my sense is not that he was complaining about training men for particular operations (like jumping out of aeroplanes or landing craft) but that they were then held in reserve on double rations and the fighting was left to the rest of the PBI.

Modern Special Forces and the PBI have reversed roles.  The SF Operators are on call or in the field every day.   The PBI mans the garrisons.



FJAG said:


> While the costs of ammunition might be chump change for a small unit like TF 2, it becomes pretty big dollars for a mechanized brigade once you factor in everything including pol costs, rations etc etc for 5,000 folks. Just as important is leadership burn out. It takes a lot of effort to put together a meaningful exercise for a battalion. We've all done advance to contacts up and down the ranges where the most challenging aspect was staying awake in the back of the track. Really good training, however, requires a lot of senior folks putting a lot of time and effort into organizing it. You can only do that for so long.



But I'm not talking about 3 mechanized brigades, and 6 more in reserve.  I'm considering 27 regular companies and 51 in reserve, all armed with direct fire small arms with common sighting systems - and access to the panoply of man-portable munitions currently on the market.  Lots of 5.56 and 9mm.  Occasional familiarization with the munitions.

You can keep your 25/105/120/155 rounds for the specialists to play with.



FJAG said:


> The other aspect is the number of folks. Back when I was a young gunner officer I was told that the reason we had two guns in the troop was because it took three guns using the projectiles we had and the rate of fire the guns gave out to neutralize a certain size of enemy tactical entity. We had four guns because that way one could always be down for rest and maintenance and even if we lost one we would still be an effective fire unit. Then we became three gun troops and then six gun batteries and now two gun troops but I seriously doubt there has been a rationale evaluation of the effects since the 1970s. I'm not saying that we don't know what the effects are - we do - its just we haven't tied those to the establishment and a high intensity conflict. Our establishments are $ for number of systems purchased and available PYs driven.



I agree, kind of.  But replacing 25 pdrs with 155mm Archers was never going to be a one for one proposition in any case.

Rational thought, IMHO, starts with recognition of the realities, and those realities include budgets, people and the realistic capabilities of available vehicles.  We pull Orbats (TOEs if you will) from various eras with ease and compare those to modern requirements. 

But we routinely forget that, like all plans, they never survived contact with the enemy.  The Cal Highs, the Maisies and, in particular the Black Watch spent their war from July 44 to Mark Tennant's last round on May 8th 1945 fighting whatever the enemy had to send at them with whatever they had available to respond.  The number of people, the level of training, the supply of weapons, ammunition and vehicles, even dry boots, shovels and rations were constantly in flux.  Part of the job of the leadership, whoever was surviving on a given day, was to reorganize his troops to accomplish Paragraph 2 Intent.

Unlike the arty which had a more stable structure.



FJAG said:


> All that is to say I'm not sure if anyone can put there finger on the number of dismounts that a battalion needs for any given situation before it becomes combat incapacitated. I'm not even sure if we game this at any given time to see if our establishments should change or if we just react (like when mortars and pioneers disappeared or when we went down to two batteries in a three battalion brigade)



And I will counter that I don't think there is an answer to the numbers of anything that are needed for any given situation.  Battles have been lost with overwhelming numbers.  They have been won against insurmountable odds.

Plans are good.  They are necessary to organize the pieces on the chess board.  But how they are employed decides the match.  D&B is right to focus on the quality of the leadership.  But that means giving junior leaders to play chess, to play games and lose, in short - to learn.  And that costs money.  But training infantry costs less money than tankers, engineers and mechanics.



FJAG said:


> While it's nice to have a standard model of what a rifle platoon or company should be, it seems to me that a combined arms brigade looks and operates very, very differently from a light infantry brigade.
> 
> 🍻



There we agree. 

I happen to think that light forces are under-estimated, particularly in the Canadian context with its focus on 4CMBG and the armoured battlefield of the North German Plain.

Interestingly the Germans put a lot of emphasis on Defended Localities manned by well equipped light infantry while the Panzers were heading back to Moscow.

If the capabilities of Light Forces, and the General Duties Infantry, were under-estimated in the 80s it is all the more true today.  Even the Yanks are resurrecting the too light to fight 7th  9th Division.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Are we all agreeing that the primary difference between a Special Forces Operator and the rest of the Army is the training budget?


If y'all are agreeing on that, then y'all (1) missed my earlier post explaining the difference and (2) are wrong.

Special Operations Forces have different missions, with a different bucket of tasks, and thus or organized and employed differently.  The training bit falls out from that.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> If y'all are agreeing on that, then y'all (1) missed my earlier post explaining the difference and (2) are wrong.
> 
> Special Operations Forces have different missions, with a different bucket of tasks, and thus or organized and employed differently.  The training bit falls out from that.


Is that maybe where the "Special" in Special Operations Forces comes from?


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> If y'all are agreeing on that, then y'all (1) missed my earlier post explaining the difference and (2) are wrong.
> 
> Special Operations Forces have different missions, with a different bucket of tasks, and thus or organized and employed differently.  The training bit falls out from that.


So my error.  The difference is not the troops.  It is the tasks they get assigned and the size of the training budget they get.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> I've re-read that quotation many times.  And my sense is not that he was complaining about training men for particular operations (like jumping out of aeroplanes or landing craft) but that they were then held in reserve on double rations and the fighting was left to the rest of the PBI.


The quote was drawn from Defeat into Victory, and his earlier commentary provides context to his statement.

He wasn't complaining about specially trained forces hanging back, his argument was that they were training too many men for specific tasks that would not achieve strategic effect in the theatre.  More specifically, he was incensed that the Chindits were increased to a 6 brigade force, and that a well trained, experienced division (70th Infantry, which fought in North Africa) was broken up to provide additional forces to form the Chindit force.

When every division counted in that theatre, Slim felt those brigades would have been better suited conducting conventional operations against Japanese forces in India and Burma as opposed to conducting long range penetration operations into Burma which ultimately resulted in the Chindits being decimated by the jungle and Japanese.

In sum, Slim acknowledged need for specially organized forces elsewhere in the book ("to stir things up") but was opposed to the overabundance of manpower and resources dedicated to tasks that would not achieve strategic effect in the theatre he was fighting in.


----------



## Kirkhill

I read the same book. 

As I recall he didn't think the Chindits offered more than his line battalions, British and Indian, did.

As to the tasks of the Special Forces.  That has been something of a movable feast over the years.  The Special Forces Support Group owes its existence to the SAS and SBS being tasked to jobs they felt a common line battalion could do.  Like clearing caves.  And thus 1 Para got promoted to the Champions League.

And now we have the promotion of line battalions to the Army Special Operations Brigade and Security Forces Assistance Brigade.  The Paras and the Royal Marines are regularly retasked to special missions like Sierra Leone.  In Malaya and Borneo that SAS got the press but almost every battalion did time in the jungles working with the locals.  Reserve units like 21 and 23 SAS and the HAC have been reassigned and re-reassigned.

Again, I will stand on my statement that it is not the operators that are special so much as the operations.  The primary difference is the amount of preparation.  Kind of like taking a year to convert a reservist to field ready standard.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> I read the same book.
> 
> As I recall he didn't think the Chindits offered more than his line battalions, British and Indian, did.
> 
> As to the tasks of the Special Forces.  That has been something of a movable feast over the years.  The Special Forces Support Group owes its existence to the SAS and SBS being tasked to jobs they felt a common line battalion could do.  Like clearing caves.  And thus 1 Para got promoted to the Champions League.
> 
> And now we have the promotion of line battalions to the Army Special Operations Brigade and Security Forces Assistance Brigade.  The Paras and the Royal Marines are regularly retasked to special missions like Sierra Leone.  In Malaya and Borneo that SAS got the press but almost every battalion did time in the jungles working with the locals.  Reserve units like 21 and 23 SAS and the HAC have been reassigned and re-reassigned.
> 
> Again, I will stand on my statement that it is not the operators that are special so much as the operations.  The primary difference is the amount of preparation.  *Kind of like taking a year to convert a reservist to field ready standard.*



No. No way.

Out of about 150 trained soldiers who attempt SAS/ Joint UKSF selection they will accept about 10, from two selections per year. That's about 20 people (about 4-5 of which might be Officers) per year. 

Just because you are a PARA or a Marine doesn't get you a pass. They can fail just like anyone else, and many do. Other SOF organizations have similar selection standards. 

And for good reason because they are employed on very specific, strategic and tremendously risky tasks, completely open to being fucked up by other units who think they're 'special'. Which I have seen happen (at arms length of course) with tragic results.

The UK's SFSG was modelled closely on the US 'Delta-Rangers' approach. Same goes for the JTF2-CSOR thing, and this methodology has been proven time and again in the GWOT, and elsewhere, so it's probably not going away soon.

They are not 'light Infantry' and should never be utilized as such, and vice versa.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> No. No way.
> 
> Out of about 150 trained soldiers who attempt SAS/ Joint UKSF selection they will accept about 10, from two selections per year. That's about 20 people (about 4-5 of which might be Officers) per year.
> 
> Just because you are a PARA or a Marine doesn't get you a pass. They can fail just like anyone else, and many do. Other SOF organizations have similar selection standards.
> 
> And for good reason because they are employed on very specific, strategic and tremendously risky tasks, completely open to being fucked up by other units who think they're 'special'. Which I have seen happen (at arms length of course) with tragic results.
> 
> The UK's SFSG was modelled closely on the US 'Delta-Rangers' approach. Same goes for the JTF2-CSOR thing, and this methodology has been proven time and again in the GWOT, and elsewhere, so it's probably not going away soon.
> 
> They are not 'light Infantry' and should never be utilized as such, and vice versa.



But the entire Special Service ethos evolved from calling for volunteers from the Army.  Most were disgruntled infanteers bored of hanging round barracks and wanting to get into the fight.  Selection largely consisted of rounding up the willing 

The willing were then formed into company sized groups like the SAS, SBS, Popski's Private Army, and Churchill's Commandos.  The concept became popular, and useful, and evolved into something like 30 Army Commandos, 11 Marine Commandos and  18 Para battalions.  Even the SAS expanded to a full Brigade.  

By VJ Day in August 45 the Parachute battalions were being allocated 18 year olds straight out of basic infantry schools.  Some were being passed by MOs to the Paras with flat feet because they wouldn't have to march as they were to be flown to work...

Whole units were "volunteered" to the Air Landing Brigades while others were "volunteered" to  Achnacarry.

People that couldn't keep up with the rigorous training, that weren't mission ready, were simply RTUd (Returned To Unit (or predicament for those volunteers from the Glasshouse)).

Certainly there is a case for well-trained, capable troops, mission ready for deployment at short notice.  And I support both the concept and existence of the Special Forces and their ethos.

But.

Given that the Special Forces are, according to Infanteer's definition, described by the tasks they are assigned, and those tasks vary constantly over time,  then  IMO it is little wonder that the difference between Special Forces and Light Infantry fades to grey.   

SAS in Afghanistan complained about the numbers they were losing clearing caves.   When the war started there wasn't a high expectation of a need for cave clearers.   That was not on the conventional training schedule.  One could call it a Special Operation.  Something outside of the ordinary.  So it got assigned to the Special Operations Community.   When it became ordinary (or rather designated ordinary) it was passed on to more conventional forces like the Paras, and eventually light infantry.

Similar developments occurred in Borneo and Malaya.  Special circumstances demanded immediate, effective response by capable troops ( in both cases these included troops that were found in the Reserves, not on the active rolls).  The skills and tactics were developed and passed on to regular light infantry, including Paras and Marines along with Guards and County regiments, and they took over as the special became conventional.

The Paras still moan about Tunisia where they were dropped in and then kept in the line for months as just a few more battalions of light infantry.  But the local requirement in mountainous Tunisia was for infantry.   Once the paras were on the ground they were there to fight.  For as long as the circumstances required and they were capable.   Arnhem was a light infantry fight.

The Orne river was a light infantry fight.  So was the Crater in Aden.  So was the Radfan.

The SAS, in North Africa, essentially fought as Light Cavalry after discovering the disadvantages of dropping into the middle of an enemy held airfield and having to rely on Shank's Mare (with a few broken legs) to exfiltrate.

And, at the other end of the spectrum, we can't forget "those who only stand and wait".  Those soldiers of all arms who stood guard at vital points with a Lee Enfield.  Including here in Canada.   The most basic of "infantry" skills.

I don't take issue with the Special Forces, Paras and Marines training hard and demanding that their troops be able to keep up as they train for a broad spectrum of operations that the rest of the Army anticipates may occur but seem a lot less likely than the operations the rest of the Army trains for.

But when the enemy starts voting, and starts doing the unexpected, then the unexpected becomes the expected and the  Army has to be able to shift, to adapt, and do it rapidly.

If you find your Special Forces over tasked and your conventional forces under tasked then the Special has become conventional and the Army needs to adjust.    And given that the Special Forces are almost uniformly "light", and assuming that they have demonstrated an ability to succeed with light equipment and tactics, then  the need is most likely to be for comparably equipped troops who can absorb the lessons learned at local battle schools.   Just like the British Army (and Sam Hughes's CEF) morphed at Boulogne and Etaples absorbing local lessons from survivors of the early battles of WWI.

If the Special and Light Forces prove inadequate to the enemy and it proves necessary to bring up heavier forces then they have at least bought time to deploy the heavies.  They have also learned how the enemy fights and its capabilities.   And they remain on site to secure the flanks and react to the unexpected.

Don Rumsfeld died yesterday: Known knowns, Known unknowns, Unknown unknowns.    The LAV-Heavies manage the Known knowns.  The Specials handle the Unknown unknowns.   The grey zone of Known unknowns I suggest is best met by light forces that are adaptable, trainable, rapidly deployable and, importantly, relatively cheap to equip with an adaptable tool kit that can be rapidly refreshed from the market with the latest technology.

Almost every one of the Five Eyes (and much of NATO) has been moving their emphasis from Heavies to Specials as their specials are heavily tasked and their Heavies are under utilized.   More Heavies are being converted to Light and while the Specials expand more of the Special Operations (Duties) are cascaded down to re-roled Lights.

One of the many areas I agree with FJAG is that just because the market demand for Heavies is changing does not mean that we should be discarding the Heavies.  Any more than the Brits discarded their Specials after WW2.   In both instances the solution is the same.  Retain those skills (and in the case of the Heavies the equipment) in Reserve, in storage.

The Heavies need a permanent force presence.  But the mass, on which they rely, should be held in reserve.

And Reserves should also be being prepared to fill the slots on the actual grey battlefield of today.  To take the load off the Specials.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Whatever SF were or were meant to be in WWII, is different from what they are and should be today.

True SF (unconventional tasks) aside, concentrating the best combat soldiers and leaders in units which spend a lot of time out of battle and occasionally in short operations with high casualty rates seems a bit insane.  Not really maximizing potential.


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## MilEME09

Perhaps with our SF guys we should use a small number of then to create a internal OMLT going around the various units both reg and reserve and training them for a bit. It would utilize their skill sets and experience to increase the overall effectiveness of the CAF.


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## Colin Parkinson

Technology has really helped SF expand their influence and abilities, in particular comms, CAS and helicopters. The light infantry/Commandos/Para/CSOR serve not only as recruiting ground but also as a backstop/QRF for SF forces and can quickly exploit the gains made by the SF or support their withdrawal against superior forces. So from what i have seen those light forces fill a need in the conflicts that are not near peer/peer fights. For those while the aforementioned forces can play a role, they will get curb stomped by a competent armoured brigade. Even if they do manage to stop them, it will be at a very high cost and your SF/Light forces will be shattered and need to rebuild.


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## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Perhaps with our SF guys we should use a small number of then to create a *internal OMLT* going around the various units both reg and reserve and training them for a bit. It would utilize their skill sets and experience to increase the overall effectiveness of the CAF.



This was one of my Hobby Horses.

You don't need SOF troops though, just a small training cadre of Capt/WO/Sgt/MCpl types per unit, maybe 5 or 6 of them, who have far more time and resources to design and deliver meaningful training to everyone, Offrs/SNCOS too.

The British TA model is a good example.


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## Kirkhill

Converting Stryker-borne light infantry into a Javelin Anti-Armor Battalion capable of successfully defending against and attacking mechanized forces by being well prepared and exploiting terrain.





__





						U.S. Army | Infantry Magazine
					






					www.benning.army.mil
				






> The battalion was able to destroy enemy mechanized elements at distances of 1,500-2,000 meters away from positions of dominant terrain with a clear line of sight. Trained Soldiers were able to achieve a 50-percent kill ratio on enemy armored vehicles in both offensive and defensive operations. While 50 percent is low, it was in real-world battlefield conditions with Infantrymen climbing up significant terrain to achieve effects against enemy armor.





> The key to the employment of the M98A2 was the use of movement and maneuver of the Stryker vehicles and the dismounted Infantry. NTC’s vast open terrain allowed for the employment of weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges. This required a “push and pull” technique between dismounted and mounted Infantry Soldiers. The Stryker platoons would dismount Infantry squads and “push” them forward, utilizing the Strykers’ remote weapon systems to cover their movement. The dismounted squads seized dominate terrain, established hasty support-by-fire positions using Javelins, and provided overwatch for the Strykers as they “pulled” forward. The “push and pull” technique allowed the battalion to defeat enemy armor by maneuvering the dismounted Infantry with Javelins to positions of advantage and overwatch the movement of vehicles as they bounded forward. This technique requires a thorough terrain analysis by the battalion staff during the military decision-making process and the company leadership during troop leading procedures in order to maximize the usage of the terrain available.
> 
> During Battle Period 4 of NTC 14-03, we found ourselves attacking into an enemy armored formation defending key terrain in vicinity of the Arrowhead and Alpha/Bravo Pass. We had to maneuver to Refrigerator Gap and conduct a breach of enemy obstacles to pass elements of the brigade onto their objective. The terrain was not the most suitable place to maneuver Strykers as it was restrictive or severely restrictive in nature. Based on the posture of the enemy, we recognized we would have to employ the “push and pull” technique described above. Our rifle companies deliberately cleared mountainous terrain dismounted en-route to their objective and only moved vehicles forward once overwatch positions with Javelins were established. While this technique took extended time to execute, it enabled our battalion to destroy 10 armored vehicles before reaching our objective.





> one of the biggest lessons at the tactical level was that dismounted Infantryman employing Javelins in the right terrain can hold their own against enemy armor. As we move into our next training path, Javelin training needs to be more deliberately integrated at the individual through collective training levels. Our leader development program needs to incorporate these lessons learned so that we can coach junior leaders on the tactical deployment of the Javelin in the SBCT as it pertains to terrain.
> 
> Our battalion recognized that training 40 Javelin operators was insufficient for NTC, considering the lethality of the system against a near-peer threat utilizing armor. Units should maximize the ability to send one to two weapons squad leaders per company to the Heavy Weapons Leaders Course at Fort Benning (http://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/197th/229/HWLC/). This course trains Soldiers in the rank of sergeant through lieutenant on the tactical employment of an anti-armor platoon and technical proficiency of the Javelin, Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) and heavy machine guns while operating in a decentralized competitive environment. Having this expertise resident in the squad gives a rifle battalion the ability to train proficiency on the Javelin for all Soldiers in the formation.



Terrain and training.


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## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Converting Stryker-borne light infantry into a Javelin Anti-Armor Battalion capable of successfully defending against and attacking mechanized forces by being well prepared and exploiting terrain.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> U.S. Army | Infantry Magazine
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.benning.army.mil
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Terrain and training.


And 40 ATGMS per Bn.... One of my biggest issues with using NTC / CMTC as a test bed is that you don't carry ammunition for the ATGMS. I mean you may have some simulated rounds, but it never really matches how much weight / sustainment you really need to support it. Nothing saying that's unsurmountable of course.


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## Old Sweat

I may be demonstrating my age, but a Striker Anti-Tank Battalion can't fight by itself. It would have to cross-group with other units, and be supported by artillery, engineers, etc.

Circa 1963 the Canadian regular infantry consisted of 13 battalions, grouped into six regiments: Canadian Guards, The RCR, PPCLI, R22eR, QOR, and the Black Watch. The Van Doos had three battalions, while the others each fielded two. After extensive study, including a major field exercise to gather data for operational analysis, 3 R22eR was converted to an anti-tank battalion of three companies, each of three mixed 106RR/Entac ATGMs, and one company of SS11ATGMs. The other infantry battalions also retained their 106RR anti-tank platoons. I may be wrong on the SS11B distribution, that that was nearly 60 years ago, and I was a lowly gunner subaltern in 1 RCHA in Gagetown. Anyway, this did not last, although I am not sure how much cap badge politics had to do with it. My main point, is that the anti-tank company in 4 CIBG in Germany was a supporting arm, and, while the commanderv may have advised the brigade commander, I am not sure that advisory role ever left the RCAC, and it would have been really unusual to give the unit an independent mission, witheut or without other troops. In a brigade combat team, the US Army might adopt another course, and they would only do so after lots of thought, trials, and exercises.


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## OldSolduer

Old Sweat said:


> I may be demonstrating my age, but a Striker Anti-Tank Battalion can't fight by itself. It would have to cross-group with other units, and be supported by artillery, engineers, etc.


I think it would require local protection by infantry. Just a thought.


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## FJAG

Old Sweat said:


> I may be demonstrating my age, but a Striker Anti-Tank Battalion can't fight by itself. It would have to cross-group with other units, and be supported by artillery, engineers, etc.
> 
> Circa 1963 the Canadian regular infantry consisted of 13 battalions, grouped into six regiments: Canadian Guards, The RCR, PPCLI, R22eR, QOR, and the Black Watch. The Van Doos had three battalions, while the others each fielded two. After extensive study, including a major field exercise to gather data for operational analysis, 3 R22eR was converted to an anti-tank battalion of three companies, each of three mixed 106RR/Entac ATGMs, and one company of SS11ATGMs. The other infantry battalions also retained their 106RR anti-tank platoons. I may be wrong on the SS11B distribution, that that was nearly 60 years ago, and I was a lowly gunner subaltern in 1 RCHA in Gagetown. Anyway, this did not last, although I am not sure how much cap badge politics had to do with it. My main point, is that the anti-tank company in 4 CIBG in Germany was a supporting arm, and, while the commanderv may have advised the brigade commander, I am not sure that advisory role ever left the RCAC, and it would have been really unusual to give the unit an independent mission, witheut or without other troops. In a brigade combat team, the US Army might adopt another course, and they would only do so after lots of thought, trials, and exercises.


I remember having a big fight on a hill during a brigade TEWT in 1970 about the SS11s (which were fast disappearing from out inventory to be replaced by nothing for quite a few years until the TOW made its debut) as to whether ATGMs should be an artillery resource (as a successor to the dozens and dozens of anti-tank batteries we had in the war) or belong to the armoured corps (because they thought all things anti-tank should be armoured) or to the infantry (because they had them then and possession was nine-tenths of the law).

It seems whenever we discuss these things the old PY thing rears its ugly head and we ignore things like what is the best command and control structure? how are these things going to be tactically employed? is it an essential integral weapons system to x unit type or only an occasional enabler? etc etc.

Costs are a very prohibitive factor when it comes to "arming" the Stryker battalion at roughly $400k for a command launch unit and $100-150k per missile. A Carl G on the other hand comes in at roughly $20k with rounds around $500-3K. Yup. A Carl G isn't a Javelin but then how often does an infantry battalion fight at ranges above 1,000 metres? There's a role for specialized anti-armour platoons and companies and layered anti-armour defences.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

But if you look at a grouping of 6 bodies with one gunner with a CLU and a loader and a Fireteam of a leader, a grenadier,  a DMR and a C6 gunner,. And a vehicle with spare rounds, a 25 and a C6 in close support to their rear, I suggest the CO has an abundance of tools at his disposal to create a movable problem for armoured forces.


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## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> But if you look at a grouping of 6 bodies with one gunner with a CLU and a loader and a Fireteam of a leader, a grenadier,  a DMR and a C6 gunner,. And a vehicle with spare rounds, a 25 and a C6 in close support to their rear, I suggest the CO has an abundance of tools at his disposal to create a movable problem for armoured forces.


Ah the "toss it in lav" school of thought, my nemesis. A Javelin is 47 inches long, an nearly a foot with protective caps. How many of those can you realistically store in a LAV with everything else you need to fight?


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## Kirkhill

Old Sweat said:


> I may be demonstrating my age, but a Striker Anti-Tank Battalion can't fight by itself. It would have to cross-group with other units, and be supported by artillery, engineers, etc.
> 
> Circa 1963 the Canadian regular infantry consisted of 13 battalions, grouped into six regiments: Canadian Guards, The RCR, PPCLI, R22eR, QOR, and the Black Watch. The Van Doos had three battalions, while the others each fielded two. After extensive study, including a major field exercise to gather data for operational analysis, 3 R22eR was converted to an anti-tank battalion of three companies, each of three mixed 106RR/Entac ATGMs, and one company of SS11ATGMs. The other infantry battalions also retained their 106RR anti-tank platoons. I may be wrong on the SS11B distribution, that that was nearly 60 years ago, and I was a lowly gunner subaltern in 1 RCHA in Gagetown. Anyway, this did not last, although I am not sure how much cap badge politics had to do with it. My main point, is that the anti-tank company in 4 CIBG in Germany was a supporting arm, and, while the commanderv may have advised the brigade commander, I am not sure that advisory role ever left the RCAC, and it would have been really unusual to give the unit an independent mission, witheut or without other troops. In a brigade combat team, the US Army might adopt another course, and they would only do so after lots of thought, trials, and exercises.



I think what you are talking about is exactly what the US, and thus its allies, are all currently wrestling with.   Adaptive.  Dispersed. Operations.

How adaptive can a small body of troops be?  How big an arms locker can they manage?  How far apart can they be dispersed?  What is their  Area of Influence and how does it compare to its Area of Observation?  How will it operate?  How will it be controlled?  Supported?  Turned into a cohesive effective force?

As near as I can figure most infantry battalions are fielding about 24 Javelin type ATGMs each.  I no longer know if they qualify as medium or heavy, short, medium or long range.  And I suspect a lot of other folk are working throw that.

Some armies/units issue Javelins, which have a range of 2500 to 4750m apparently depending on the CLU and how stable the CLU is, at section level (27 per battalion).  Some hold them at Platoon, 2-3 per, some at Company, 6 per, and some at Battalion - and some a combination of all of the above.  The difference between the TOW and the Javelin is becoming so marginally small that the USMC is ditching TOWs in its Weapons companies for additional Javelins.   The Strykers are adding CLUs to their ROWS so as to be able to launch  a missile from under armour without having to dismount their sections, who will still have their own CLUs.

The Bradleys with their two TOW launchers and 7 onboard missiles, also carry a pair of CLUs per platoon and 4 to 6 Javelins so a Bradley infantry company of 14 vehicles carries 98 TOWs and up to 18 Javelins for a total of 116 Anti-Tank rounds with 4750m range.

The Israelis are complicating things further their Spike series of missiles.

Their 8 kg Short Range weapon is a 1500m disposable weapon for platoons.

The 14 kg Medium Range weapon has a range of 2500 kg which makes it a direct replacement for the early model Javelin.

The same 14 kg  Long Range weapon was also marketed with a longer range of 4000m or that of the later model Javelins

The Long Range weapon has been upgraded to 5500m with a weight of 12.7 kg

There is also the larger 34 kg  Extended Range missile with  a range of  8000m that is compatible with light vehicles

The Extended Range weapon has also been upgraded to a range of 10,000m.

And finally there is the 70 kg N-LOS Spike with a range of >> 25 km.

And for targeting these things we have 40mm Drone-40s with 10 km ranges that can be launched from an under barrel grenade launcher or by hand.

So the same section that prior to Afghanistan was built around the post-WW2 200m battle now, potentially has the ability to reach out beyond 1000m to 5000m and observe 10,000m.  And kill tanks and bunkers.

But, at the same time it is now more vulnerable to being struck from above by those same 40mm drones and airbursting munitions launched from 2000m away by launchers like the CG-84.



I just don't think anybody knows how all this is going to play out.

Sept 1914.  What is the effect of Vickers and Maxims and QF 13 and 18 pdrs with airburst shrapnel?


I sense that the aim is to disperse the troops as much as possible while concentrating their fires with effect at the longest possible ranges.  But how do you keep them in control.   And how do you support them?  With Fires.  With Beans.  With Bullets.

There seems to be an awful lot of upheaval at the moment and an awful lot of experimentation.

And not much for answers.

And somebody is asking what is Force 2025 going to look like.


I'm pretty sure that the answer is going to involve lots of artillery in the form of long range guns, missiles, loitering munitions, UASs and a requirement for GBAD-CRAM systems with EW and Directed Energy capabilities.

I am not sure what it going to mean for heavy forces which take time to mass at a  point that may have moved by the time they get there.  And what it means for the Engineers if the enemy spends less time on roads and fixed routes.


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## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Ah the "toss it in lav" school of thought, my nemesis. A Javelin is 47 inches long, an nearly a foot with protective caps. How many of those can you realistically store in a LAV with everything else you need to fight?



How many people do you need to put in a LAV to fight?  What else do you need to carry?  And what is to be carried at the CQ or RQ level to be issued according to a prepared plan.

And you always have those big bins hanging off the side. 


How do the yanks manage to carry 7 TOWs and a couple of Javelins in a Bradley?


Throw out a couple of bodies that you don't have and can't hire in any case.   Send them over to the Arty.


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## Kirkhill

And further to developments in missile technology that threatens vehicles and fixed targets




> Drone Guides Tank-Killing Missile Shot Beyond Visual Range​European missile-makers MBDA have demonstrated for the first time a guided missile hitting a tank beyond the operator’s range of vision with target data from a small drone. The test firing, carried out by the French Army at Canjuers in the south of France, and announced this week, shows how tactical quadcopters could change the battlefield.





> MBDA’s Missile Moyenne Portée (‘Medium-Range Missile’), or MMP, entered service in 2017. The soldier-portable, 33-pound missile is the equivalent of the U.S. Javelin, and is capable of taking out the heaviest tanks from 4,000 meters away. The missile has an infra-red seeker for identifying and locking on to targets. It can be locked on before launch, or fired and then locked on in flight. In addition to the normal direct fire modes, the MMP is network-enabled and has the ability to receive third-party target designation, as seen in the firing demonstration.





> The spotter drone was an NX70 made by French company Novadem. This 2.2-pound quadcopter looks much like a consumer drone, but is rather more capable, with 45-minute endurance and the ability to operate in 40-mph winds. It also has an encrypted data link, a thermal imaging camera and a sophisticated software suite. A digital terrain model provides target georeferencing – in other words, you can point the camera at a target and it will generate the precise coordinates on the ground, without using a laser rangefinder which might give away the drone’s position.












						Drone Guides Tank-Killing Missile  Shot Beyond Visual Range
					

European missile-makers MBDA have demonstrated a guided missile hitting a tank beyond the operator’s range of vision with target data from a small drone for the first time. This will open up new tactical possibilities.




					www.forbes.com


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## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> How many people do you need to put in a LAV to fight?  What else do you need to carry?  And what is to be carried at the CQ or RQ level to be issued according to a prepared plan.
> 
> And you always have those big bins hanging off the side.
> 
> 
> How do the yanks manage to carry 7 TOWs and a couple of Javelins in a Bradley?
> 
> 
> Throw out a couple of bodies that you don't have and can't hire in any case.   Send them over to the Arty.


I realize I've taken this far to literally but I went into a google search so you can all suffer though these pictures too. 






So the answer is that they store them in purpose built racks, not just tossed inside. Speaking to an American Tank guy I know, apparently the TOW reloads get swapped for Javelin rounds as there is no space for both, so it's not just addition it's exchange. 

Fundamentally I agree with lots of ATGMs being a good thing, but I don't like using stuff like NTC as an experiment because they don't have to worry about the logistics of reloading those launchers. That not only effects your chain, but also your Infantry's ability to do it's job of seizing ground when they're all loaded down with a four foot long missile.


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## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I realize I've taken this far to literally but I went into a google search so you can all suffer though these pictures too.
> 
> View attachment 65665
> 
> View attachment 65666
> View attachment 65667
> 
> So the answer is that they store them in purpose built racks, not just tossed inside. Speaking to an American Tank guy I know, apparently the TOW reloads get swapped for Javelin rounds as there is no space for both, so it's not just addition it's exchange.
> 
> Fundamentally I agree with lots of ATGMs being a good thing, but I don't like using stuff like NTC as an experiment because they don't have to worry about the logistics of reloading those launchers. That not only effects your chain, but also your Infantry's ability to do it's job of seizing ground when they're all loaded down with a four foot long missile.



For reference, here's what it looks like when you bring a Javelin to a firefight as dismounted Infantry.

'Holy f*ck' went through my mind a couple of times, I must admit:


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> For reference, here's what it looks like when you bring a Javelin to a firefight as dismounted Infantry.
> 
> 'Holy f*ck' went through my mind a couple of times, I must admit:


Okay. Perhaps just being a tad critical here but they just fired a $150,000 missile to take out a sniper where a few $300 60 mm mortar rounds would have probably been more effective and lighter to lug around. And I'm not even going to mention using a few 105 mm artillery rounds for a few hundred more that require no lugging around by the grunts at all.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Happily use a $150,000 missile in such a context if it means we all walk away from the engagement under our own power.


----------



## Infanteer

That's where the 84mm comes in handy.  I remember a sister platoon employing one to great effect in Afghanistan.  We forget the central, important role of HE in winning engagements.  There are alternatives to very expensive guided AT system to produce that effect.


----------



## Underway

M72.  40mm grenade launchers of various types.  In the Canadian context likely a 25mm not too far away.  Lots of options out there.  But I'm not going to criticize someone using a tool they had available at the time.  It's not like the Taliban had lots of armour you needed to save that missile for.


----------



## Brad Sallows

If funds were unlimited I'd not mind expending any amount whatsoever, too.  Since funds are limited, expensive munitions in place of cheaper ones means something else is being shorted, which can always be interpreted to ultimately mean that lives are lost.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> If funds were unlimited I'd not mind expending any amount whatsoever, too.  Since funds are limited, expensive munitions in place of cheaper ones means something else is being shorted, which can always be interpreted to ultimately mean that lives are lost.


An Excalibur round (which is at the high end of precision munitions) costs half of what a Javelin costs and even better, a "dumb" 155 with a PGK precision guidance system comes in at around $10k and would be more effective.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

Attach files


Underway said:


> M72.  40mm grenade launchers of various types.  In the Canadian context likely a 25mm not too far away.  Lots of options out there.  But I'm not going to criticize someone using a tool they had available at the time.  It's not like the Taliban had lots of armour you needed to save that missile for.


I recall analysis that indicated the M72 was too small/short ranged and the 40mm HE was next to useless - not enough to cause suppression (and hence shock) and too easily blown off course.

I wonder if an upgrade on the Folgore could be made into a something potent, yet economical.  Basically an upgunned 84.









						Breda Folgore - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> That's where the 84mm comes in handy.  I remember a sister platoon employing one to great effect in Afghanistan.  We forget the central, important role of HE in winning engagements.  There are alternatives to very expensive guided AT system to produce that effect.


Yeah I think the Javelin advantage in Afghanistan was just because of how those grape huts and other structures were built, much easier to go through the roof as it were. 

You're of course very correct about us and forgetting what winning the firefight actually looks like. We train to achieve that in the time it takes to submit a contact report, when the reality is that you could be spending an hour doing it. Rangisms and the need to get everyone through trump everything I suppose.


----------



## Kirkhill

Assuming that the fire fight is won?

Advance to contact Sept 1914...When was the firefight won?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Assuming that the fire fight is won?
> 
> Advance to contact Sept 1914...When was the firefight won?


Some time around 1919


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Okay. Perhaps just being a tad critical here but they just fired a $150,000 missile to take out a sniper where a few $300 60 mm mortar rounds would have probably been more effective and lighter to lug around. And I'm not even going to mention using a few 105 mm artillery rounds for a few hundred more that require no lugging around by the grunts at all.



This enagement looked a litle but like a PR tour e.g. '1 Section... you will have a journalist attached to you tomorrow. Take them our for a'drive by shooting' and make it look good, will you?'


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Okay. Perhaps just being a tad critical here but they just fired a $150,000 missile to take out a sniper where a few $300 60 mm mortar rounds would have probably been more effective and lighter to lug around. And I'm not even going to mention using a few 105 mm artillery rounds for a few hundred more that require no lugging around by the grunts at all.


I'm sure you mean the 2 inch mortar? I think the Brits had retired that well before they were in Helmand.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I'm sure you mean the 2 inch mortar? I think the Brits had retired that well before they were in Helmand.



Nope.

They used the 51mm MOR, which proved awful for a variety of reasons during its first real war, so they went back to the 60mm MOR.

*51 MM Light Mortar*
The 51 mm Light Mortar is a weapon that can be carried and fired by one man, and is found in the HQ of an infantry platoon.

The mortar is used to fire smoke, illuminating and HE rounds out to a range of approximately 750 m; a short range insert device enables the weapon to be used in close quarter battle situations with some accuracy.

The 51 mm Light Mortar has replaced the older 1940s 2' mortar.

*Although the weapon remains available it is approaching its planned out of service date across the armed forces. The capability provided by the 51 mm mortar is being replaced by a combination of systems including the 40 mm Under-slung Grenade Launcher and rocket hand-fired illumination and smoke rounds. In Afghanistan, the 51 mm capability is being augmented by a purchase of a more modern 60 mm mortar.*



			British Army - The Infantry - 51mm Mortar, 60mm Mortar and Grenade Machine Gun - a5a13.2


----------



## markppcli

One day i'll get tired of being told I'm wrong.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> One day i'll get tired of being told I'm wrong.



If you have a wife and teenaged kids, like me, you'll acclimatize quickly


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> One day i'll get tired of being told I'm wrong.


I find that once you get old, you're never wrong!


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> ...
> *Although the weapon remains available it is approaching its planned out of service date across the armed forces. The capability provided by the 51 mm mortar is being replaced by a combination of systems including the 40 mm Under-slung Grenade Launcher and rocket hand-fired illumination and smoke rounds. In Afghanistan, the 51 mm capability is being augmented by a purchase of a more modern 60 mm mortar.*
> ...​


 ... and the Javelin.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Well, plainly the name must mean something to someone, since 2" is very close to 50.8 mm (51 mm).  I assume they kept the calibre but made other improvements and adopted a metric name to reduce confusion.


----------



## markppcli

@FJAG 






24:30 the Cost of Javelin vs 84mm Carl G


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> @FJAG
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 24:30 the Cost of Javelin vs 84mm Carl G


This is an excellent video. The first portion is informative but drags a bit while the second portion, the lecture by the Chieftain, on the development and the use of tank destroyers and the capabilities and issues of modern anti-tank warfare is absolutely brilliant and raises numerous points for consideration of forming a new anti-tank capability for the Canadian Army.

🍻


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> @FJAG
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 24:30 the Cost of Javelin vs 84mm Carl G


I found this to be a very interesting video.  In particular the discussions about the WWII era tank destroyer battalions and the relative effectiveness of AT weapons evenly distributed down at the lower levels of the unit structure vs concentrated in dedicated mobile AT units that can mass fire at a particular point in the battlefield.  

Particularly interesting were his comments (around the 25min mark) about the politics around German wartime AT vehicle production with the politicians pushing for massive, heavily-armoured weapons like the Jagdtiger while the German Army really wanted highly mobile, lightly armoured, open-topped tank destroyers with excellent guns that could be employed enmasse in no less than Company (and preferably Battalion) strength.

I also think he made a very good point about not taking all the videos showing the effectiveness of ATGMs and loitering munitions against tanks in recent conflicts as being an indication of how effective they would be in a high intensity conflict vs a peer enemy.

I'd say the speaker definitely comes down on the side of the dedicated weapons/AT Platoon/Company/Battalion as opposed to the "arms locker" approach at least as far as the higher-end dedicated AT weapons go.  

In a Canadian context, if we consider our Leopards as our primary anti-tank weapon how does that suggest we best organize our limited number of tanks?  

I also found it interesting that there were no questions at the end of the talk.


----------



## FJAG

The lack of questions is most probably fatigue at sitting in a classroom when you're attending what is basically a handling weapons in the field oriented course. ... and then they're Yanks.

I agree with the dedicated weapons conclusion and add to that the fact that they need to be distributed to cover the zones that the units cover. His remark about the Bradley and the mixing of the long range wire guided TOW (which requires the vehicle to pause while shooting), the limited range of other infantry weapons, the high visibility of a tank hunting team to thermal optics, the need to fill gaps (especially in dispersed operations), the need for a strong reserve to counter penetrations all weigh in here as to how these weapons need to be organized in a formation. What he didn't cover very well is how suppressive artillery fire used by the advancing force will also hinder anti-armour defences.

There's a lot of meat to digest here (not the least of which is the example of how an Israeli tank force caught in a missile ambush had forgotten basic anti-tank drills because they'd been too tuned in to fighting a lightly armed insurgency.)

I think they need to bring the Chieftain and a few more historians and a bunch of wargamers into the the Force 2025 development process. (actually I'd be surprised and disappointed if they haven't already)

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> There's a lot of meat to digest here (not the least of which is the example of how an Israeli tank force caught in a missile ambush had forgotten basic anti-tank drills because they'd been too tuned in to fighting a lightly armed insurgency.)
> 
> 
> 🍻


When I get back to my unit i'm going to poll how many crews have ever even loaded MBGDs let alone fired them. We need to start seeing that as a drill and expecting it to be followed. 


I think there's a lot to be taken from it, I posted it simply because of the timely Javelin vs Carl G cost comment. I tend to agree that while a "weapons locker" works for an infantry platoon or section fight, it's probably not the way to organize your AT plan. 


What conclusions an we draw form this in terms of our lav based, expeditionary army?


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> When I get back to my unit i'm going to poll how many crews have ever even loaded MBGDs let alone fired them. We need to start seeing that as a drill and expecting it to be followed.
> 
> 
> I think there's a lot to be taken from it, I posted it simply because of the timely Javelin vs Carl G cost comment. I tend to agree that while a "weapons locker" works for an infantry platoon or section fight, it's probably not the way to organize your AT plan.
> 
> 
> *What conclusions an we draw form this in terms of our lav based, expeditionary army?*



We shouldn't let the lessons from Afghanistan adversely skew our planning for a future peer/near peer armoured conflict type fight?


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> We shouldn't let the lessons from Afghanistan adversely skew our planning for a future peer/near peer armoured conflict type fight?


This is one of the major reasons why I favour an asymmetric Army and have always argued against the all-singing, all-dancing concept.

We talk about muscle memory when we talk about small-arms drills and why it's important. The same concepts work at the formation level. There are many constituent parts there that need to operate in sync and switching your focus from counterinsurgency to high intensity conflict gets in the way of that process (just look at the ineffective eunuch that the artillery-especially air defence and tubes- has become, the armoured corps is becoming, and even the infantry is constantly at risk of what with mortars and atgms). Even when we didn't have Afghanistan the Army was slewing off capabilities and procedures and a fundamental understanding of the basics of what is needed at the extreme end even for a "small" army. (and IMHO, a two-division sized force is not a small army unless we allow it to be - and we did)

There needs to be an element of the Army (and IMHO it needs to be at least one brigade) which constantly thinks and practices high intensity warfare. At the same time we need an element that constantly thinks and practices low intensity, counter-insurgency and/or peacekeeping. We need to build sound doctrine and sound organizations for both environments so long as we are actively looking at both ... and we are looking at both. Yes, you can slew around from one to the other, it just takes time, but to properly develop the doctrine, the TTPs, the "muscle memory" and keep it developing with the times, you need at least a part of the force as a centre of excellence in that environment.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

We don't have a force large enough to merit a tank destroyer/anti tank unit.  (We sort of do, but there are so many capability shortcomings to fielding anything more than a brigade group, and defeating large armour attacks is not at the head of the list.)  Could still try to maintain a doctrine by working with allies.

The phrase "local protection" describes what the CAF needs to actually have.

Dead ends: towed anti-tank guns, high velocity anti-tank guns on tracked chassis.  Still useful: recoilless guns (versatility), missile systems, tanks.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> This is one of the major reasons why I favour an asymmetric Army and have always argued against the all-singing, all-dancing concept.


The tough part in an Army the size of ours I think is finding the balance between being asymmetric enough to maintain a diversity of skill sets while at the same time maintaining enough symmetry to not wear out the most commonly elements of the force.


----------



## Kirkhill

A couple of thoughts

I'll start with "The Rise and Fall of the Emma Gees".  That pamphlet keeps recurring because machine guns became ubiquitous.   When they did they became the infanteer's personal belt fed rifle and employed at the gunner's discretion.  They lose much of their effectiveness that way.  Fire discipline, ammunition consumption, priority targets, mutual support, concentration of fire, etc - all of that is lost over time.  Muscle memory fades.  Maintaining a small MG platoon in the battalion as a Centre of Excellence probably has as much or more value than its actual tactical value.

At its best it provides MG advisors to Coy and Platoon commanders on how to get the best out of their assortment of  GPMGs, LMGs and Automatic Rifles.

Although the weapons are universally distributed for carriage somebody needs to be maintaining a plan on how best to employ them as the CO/OC takes his command into different situations.

I suggest the same thing is true for mortars/artillery starting with hand grenades, 40mm-51mm-60mm-81mm-120mm-155mm and other HE launchers.

It is also true for the Anti-Tank Plan managing AT grenades and 40mm-66mm-84mm-120mm-127mm-152mm HEAT warheads.

Some of these weapons are "specialist" weapons.  This is particularly true of the older systems. Newer systems don't require the same degree of operator training.  This is good and bad and replicates the Rise and Fall of the Emma Gees.  The old time specialist operators knew not just how to operate their systems but also their strengths and weaknesses and how to get the best out of them.

This is not a new problem.   And, again, I suggest that history offers guides.  In particular the mock battles of the Fort Henry Guard.  Each man in the 24 man platoon is issued 60 rounds.  He doesn't own any of those rounds.  Those 1440 rounds belong to the Lieutenant leading the platoon.  And he gets to decide how to group his weapons and where and when to discharge them.  The fire discipline is more akin to a modern artillery unit than a modern infantry unit.  I suggest that that same fire discipline needs to be employed with the modern infantry's support weapons.   Section may only have half a dozen 84mm rounds or 2x 127mm Javelin rounds.  But the Platoon Leader has 6 Javelins and 18 to 24x 84mms.  The Coy Commander will have 18 to 24 Javelins and/or 54 to 112 84mm rounds.  And those rounds can be selected depending on the target set anticipated.

Some of the lessons of the Emma Gees also apply.  The Irishman in the Anti-Armour video talked about the value of Key Holes and using terrain. That is also known a "enfilade from defilade".  Taking the enemy from the flanks while protecting your own flanks.  Fire and Retire.  Masking your signature.  Obscurants.  (In ancient days we didn't carry HE for the platoon mortar - we carried smoke and a couple of flares)

These lessons, I suggest are common to all Direct Fire systems, including the rifle.



Second thought

The cost of the Javelin - The capital cost of the Javelin is apparently somewhere in the 80 to 150,000 dollar range.  About the same as most large calibre ATGMs.  Pricey.

But what price FJAGs Excalibur, or even his cheaper guided systems?

For that round to be delivered to that grape hut the following is required:

The round,
The gun,
The truck,
The ammunition limber or equivalent
The crew
The GPO
The FSCC
The FOO
The Pl Leader
The Section Leader

A lot of dollars and time.

The Javelin may cost a lot of dollars but so does a manned battery of guns with rounds on hand.  And delivery of the arty round takes time.  And a second or third shot may be needed depending on how successful the game of Chinese Whispers was in relaying the target co-ordinates.  And assuming the enemy hasn't moved by the time the first round arrives and stays around for the second round if the first round fails.

The Javelin, on the other hand, is immediately available, accurate, and effective.

Reducing the price of the effect is, of course, desirable.  And thus CG84s, AT4s, NLAWs, M72s, 40mms and, I suggest, in the near future the provision of the 70mm APKWS vehicle mounted missiles which were developed as a cheaper supplement to the TOWs and Hellfires.  And which could be mounted on the back of a MRZR.















						PolarisGov  MRZR - Armed UGV.... With a  FLIR  BlackHornet VRS (Vehicle Reconnaissance System) & Arnold Defense FLETCHER LGR-4 (Laser Guided Rocket x4)
					






					www.snafu-solomon.com
				





As the guy in that field being shot at I would sooner have the solution to my problem in my hands than have to rely or my radio for timely assistance.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> We don't have a force large enough to merit a tank destroyer/anti tank unit.  (We sort of do, but there are so many capability shortcomings to fielding anything more than a brigade group, and defeating large armour attacks is not at the head of the list.)  Could still try to maintain a doctrine by working with allies.
> 
> The phrase "local protection" describes what the CAF needs to actually have.
> 
> Dead ends: towed anti-tank guns, high velocity anti-tank guns on tracked chassis.  Still useful: recoilless guns (versatility), missile systems, tanks.



Agreed.   We don't have a force large enough to merit specialized units.  

But we should be able to create skilled Multi-Purpose Units.  In the bad old days the Support Company was  repository of specialist skills (and I note that the Brits maintained their MG platoons even while they distributed GPMGs to sections).  But it was also convertible to a rifle company.  Just like engineers can, in extremis, be converted (and wasted) as rifles.

I don't see why 27 sections, organised as 9 platoons, 3 companies and 1 battalion can't be effectively trained to employ their available MGs,  HE and AT weapons in a co-ordinated anti-armour defense plan.  Or  be trained to use a portion of the assets as a fixed fire base while the rest of the unit advances.

But I thought the army taught those things in any case?


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> A couple of thoughts
> 
> I'll start with "The Rise and Fall of the Emma Gees".  That pamphlet keeps recurring because machine guns became ubiquitous.   When they did they became the infanteer's personal belt fed rifle and employed at the gunner's discretion.  They lose much of their effectiveness that way.  Fire discipline, ammunition consumption, priority targets, mutual support, concentration of fire, etc - all of that is lost over time.  Muscle memory fades.  Maintaining a small MG platoon in the battalion as a Centre of Excellence probably has as much or more value than its actual tactical value.
> 
> At its best it provides MG advisors to Coy and Platoon commanders on how to get the best out of their assortment of  GPMGs, LMGs and Automatic Rifles.
> 
> Although the weapons are universally distributed for carriage somebody needs to be maintaining a plan on how best to employ them as the CO/OC takes his command into different situations.
> 
> I suggest the same thing is true for mortars/artillery starting with hand grenades, 40mm-51mm-60mm-81mm-120mm-155mm and other HE launchers.
> 
> It is also true for the Anti-Tank Plan managing AT grenades and 40mm-66mm-84mm-120mm-127mm-152mm HEAT warheads.
> 
> Some of these weapons are "specialist" weapons.  This is particularly true of the older systems. Newer systems don't require the same degree of operator training.  This is good and bad and replicates the Rise and Fall of the Emma Gees.  The old time specialist operators knew not just how to operate their systems but also their strengths and weaknesses and how to get the best out of them.
> 
> This is not a new problem.   And, again, I suggest that history offers guides.  In particular the mock battles of the Fort Henry Guard.  Each man in the 24 man platoon is issued 60 rounds.  He doesn't own any of those rounds.  Those 1440 rounds belong to the Lieutenant leading the platoon.  And he gets to decide how to group his weapons and where and when to discharge them.  The fire discipline is more akin to a modern artillery unit than a modern infantry unit.  I suggest that that same fire discipline needs to be employed with the modern infantry's support weapons.   Section may only have half a dozen 84mm rounds or 2x 127mm Javelin rounds.  But the Platoon Leader has 6 Javelins and 18 to 24x 84mms.  The Coy Commander will have 18 to 24 Javelins and/or 54 to 112 84mm rounds.  And those rounds can be selected depending on the target set anticipated.
> 
> Some of the lessons of the Emma Gees also apply.  The Irishman in the Anti-Armour video talked about the value of Key Holes and using terrain. That is also known a "enfilade from defilade".  Taking the enemy from the flanks while protecting your own flanks.  Fire and Retire.  Masking your signature.  Obscurants.  (In ancient days we didn't carry HE for the platoon mortar - we carried smoke and a couple of flares)
> 
> These lessons, I suggest are common to all Direct Fire systems, including the rifle.
> 
> 
> 
> Second thought
> 
> The cost of the Javelin - The capital cost of the Javelin is apparently somewhere in the 80 to 150,000 dollar range.  About the same as most large calibre ATGMs.  Pricey.
> 
> But what price FJAGs Excalibur, or even his cheaper guided systems?
> 
> For that round to be delivered to that grape hut the following is required:
> 
> The round,
> The gun,
> The truck,
> The ammunition limber or equivalent
> The crew
> The GPO
> The FSCC
> The FOO
> The Pl Leader
> The Section Leader
> 
> A lot of dollars and time.
> 
> The Javelin may cost a lot of dollars but so does a manned battery of guns with rounds on hand.  And delivery of the arty round takes time.  And a second or third shot may be needed depending on how successful the game of Chinese Whispers was in relaying the target co-ordinates.  And assuming the enemy hasn't moved by the time the first round arrives and stays around for the second round if the first round fails.
> 
> The Javelin, on the other hand, is immediately available, accurate, and effective.
> 
> Reducing the price of the effect is, of course, desirable.  And thus CG84s, AT4s, NLAWs, M72s, 40mms and, I suggest, in the near future the provision of the 70mm APKWS vehicle mounted missiles which were developed as a cheaper supplement to the TOWs and Hellfires.  And which could be mounted on the back of a MRZR.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> As the guy in that field being shot at I would sooner have the solution to my problem in my hands than have to rely or my radio for timely assistance.


Your two thoughts seem to somewhat contradict each other.  In the first you are highlighting the need to better control the use of weapons by having specialists who are better able to understand and coordinate the weapons, but in the 2nd point you seem to suggest that the guy in the fields should have the ability to make the decisions on use of those weapons without having to rely on direction from above.


----------



## Brad Sallows

The gun,
The truck,
The ammunition limber or equivalent
The crew
The GPO
The FSCC
The FOO
The Pl Leader
The Section Leader

Already all paid for, because we have artillery for other reasons.  The incremental costs are the rounds and the training to use them.


----------



## Brad Sallows

A question to gunners: from the point of view of command/control, does it really matter how many batteries are part of a regiment right now?  Surely artillery can integrate more batteries into a unit quickly.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66:
I accept that those are contradictory thoughts.  They reflect two different battlefield with two different enemies.

But the common thread is who owns the support weapons.   I suggest in both cases the OC owns the weapons. 

In the Afghan situation he dispatches a small unit on a fighting patrol against an isolated target.  He allocates one of his support systems to his section, which is trained in its use and authorized to employ the two rounds they are carrying.

At Wainwright that same OC might choose to group his systems in one platoon or deploy his sections primarily to optimize their anti-armour effect and mass their fires.  He may even choose to adopt volley fire by platoon.

The OC needs to be able to exercise his troops to cover both scenarios, and many others, and train them how to use all their weapons in unison as well as in isolation.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> The gun,
> The truck,
> The ammunition limber or equivalent
> The crew
> The GPO
> The FSCC
> The FOO
> The Pl Leader
> The Section Leader
> 
> Already all paid for, because we have artillery for other reasons.  The incremental costs are the rounds and the training to use them.



Are they?  We have 37 guns.  We have, nominally, 243 rifle sections plus a plethora of Surveillance, Observation, Recce, Cavalry and Armoured teams.  All wanting anti-armour support.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> We don't have a force large enough to merit a tank destroyer/anti tank unit.  (We sort of do, but there are so many capability shortcomings to fielding anything more than a brigade group, and defeating large armour attacks is not at the head of the list.)  Could still try to maintain a doctrine by working with allies.
> ...



At over 30,000 soldiers in field units (Reg and Res) we're large enough, but the question is how should this unit look. My own view is that what we typically designate as recce regiments are the first part of it. A highly mobile unit, partially equipped with UAVs, used to observing and concentrating and dispersing as needed makes the key forward part. That needs to be meshed with the intelligence and EW system and a weapons delivery capability (in my view both long range precision guided rockets as well as shorter range armed UAVs. Cal it a cavalry regiment to distinguish it from traditional recce and armour. That organization (whether organic to the brigade or whether a "divisional attachment" is your new anti-armour force and can operate as a screen and once driven in to the flanks and gaps and as a blocking force.



GR66 said:


> The tough part in an Army the size of ours I think is finding the balance between being asymmetric enough to maintain a diversity of skill sets while at the same time maintaining enough symmetry to not wear out the most commonly elements of the force.



 Yup, but that's a balancing act and taking an appetite suppressant when we start spreading ourselves too thin. In the 1970s we essentially had three brigades: one in Germany dedicated to high intensity conflict, two in Canada which were light and multi purpose and a small Special Service Force rapid reaction element and still we could put two battalion sized rotations through Cyprus every year. Today we still have three combat brigades a combat support brigade and a Special Operations Command. The manning is thinner but the functional components are, for the most part, still there.

As I keep suggesting. Make the stuff you need day-to-day or on very short notice Reg F and give the "only needed in emergency" roles to the ARes or to a hybrid RegF/ARes units. Have a core that masters the skills and a relatively inexpensive mass that fills the ranks when needed.



Kirkhill said:


> ... The cost of the Javelin - The capital cost of the Javelin is apparently somewhere in the 80 to 150,000 dollar range. About the same as most large calibre ATGMs. Pricey.
> 
> But what price FJAGs Excalibur, or even his cheaper guided systems?
> 
> For that round to be delivered to that grape hut the following is required: ...



That argument might have some minimal merit if the infantry didn't already have some cheaper choices organically, but the real problem with it is that the artillery's role is not limited to delivering the odd Excalibur on some hapless sniper in Afghanistan (although based on its present establishment one can't blame one for thinking that ... I'm pretty sure that's what goes through the minds of some of the Army's misguided senior commanders - kind of like why are we paying for air defense, the Taliban don't have planes). Artillery is what it is and has what it has because in real wars there is a need to move and mass fires rapidly across the battlefield ... and to defend against air threats ... and even to add the over-the-horizon capabilities to the anti-armour fight.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> That argument might have some minimal merit if the infantry didn't already have some cheaper choices organically, but the real problem with it is that the artillery's role is not limited to delivering the odd Excalibur on some hapless sniper in Afghanistan (although based on its present establishment one can't blame one for thinking that ... I'm pretty sure that's what goes through the minds of some of the Army's misguided senior commanders - kind of like why are we paying for air defense, the Taliban don't have planes). Artillery is what it is and has what it has because in real wars there is a need to move and mass fires rapidly across the battlefield ... and to defend against air threats ... and even to add the over-the-horizon capabilities to the anti-armour fight.
> 
> 🍻



In my mind - when it functions - the primary advantage of the artillery is volume (or mass) if you prefer.  Not the launching of the occasional Excalibur but the launching of volleys of Excaliburs mixed with a bunch of HE.

For example, in support of an infantry battalion, appropriately armed with ATGMs, taking on an armoured force.

As to the availability of cheaper solutions.  I agree.  Now if only someone would buy them.  I'm specifically thinking of Carl Gustafs that have a multitude of weapons - flechettes, airburst, bouncing, HE, Anti Structure, APERs, Anti-Light Armour, Anti-Heavy Armour, smoke, flares, laser guided... that are compatible with that projector.  And yet, as I understand it, most of our CGs are issued with HEAT rounds that are designed to punch very small holes in very hard targets.

Likewise for the M72s.  Those have advanced beyond Light Anti-Tank Weapons and with their variety of warheads are now disposable RPGs.


----------



## Kirkhill

By the way, when I referred to using battalion weapons in unison I am assuming that everyone has their Personal Role Radio these days.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> A question to gunners: from the point of view of command/control, does it really matter how many batteries are part of a regiment right now?  Surely artillery can integrate more batteries into a unit quickly.



Yes they can. The rule of thumb for a direct support regiment (one that gives a guaranteed high rate of availability to the supported arms) is one battery per manoeuvre unit. That's why in the good old days we had four batteries in some regiments then went down to three for the three battalions (one was double tasked to support the recce screen and also the battalion in reserve). Going down to two presently is simply a numbers game that has nothing to do with doctrine. Armies tend to work stuff in threes and typically an artillery regiment or battalion has three gun or rocket batteries.

One can add more batteries, if appropriate, and if they can be properly commanded and controlled in the fight. Beyond direct support of manoeuvre elements, artillery provides general support which consists of weapon systems which are used in various stages of a battle or simultaneously across a broader front ... think MLRS or HIMARS for example or reinforcing support ... think of divisional or even corps tube artillery that can be added in at particular critical areas and times. 

I think what limits adding batteries to a given direct support regiment is whether that particular type of battery's capability can be properly integrated into the regiment's command and control structure and whether it needs to be full-time organic to the supported formation or not. I've previously mentioned "over-the-horizon" anti tank batteries utilizing armed drones or short range precision anti-armour rockets. I think something like that would fit very well into a brigade's direct support regiment's role as they would be less vulnerable than front-line direct fire missiles and would bolster the brigades anti-armour capabilities with a flexible wide ranging massed response at critical stages and would be coordinated into the brigade's overall anti-armour and indirect fires support plans by one entity at the highest level. 



Kirkhill said:


> Are they?  We have 37 guns.  We have, nominally, 243 rifle sections plus a plethora of Surveillance, Observation, Recce, Cavalry and Armoured teams.  All wanting anti-armour support.



We have 24 guns in regiments. The rest are in schools etc. 

I'm the last guy to say "we can't afford that" when something is needed, but long before I'd start handing out a Javelin to each rifle sections, I'd want to make sure we've priorized providing a basic GBAD system , an armed UAV system and sufficient battalion anti-armour platoons, mortar platoons and direct support artillery. I think I'd let the rifle platoons coast with their CarlGs for quite a while longer until all that other stuff gets sorted out and properly integrated first.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Brad Sallows said:


> We don't have a force large enough to merit a tank destroyer/anti tank unit.  (We sort of do, but there are so many capability shortcomings to fielding anything more than a brigade group, and defeating large armour attacks is not at the head of the list.)  Could still try to maintain a doctrine by working with allies.
> 
> The phrase "local protection" describes what the CAF needs to actually have.
> 
> Dead ends: towed anti-tank guns, high velocity anti-tank guns on tracked chassis.  Still useful: recoilless guns (versatility), missile systems, tanks.


I think probably a Brigade AT Coy would make sense, with Bn's holding their own ATGMs. If that means we see a company level Javalin det, or a platoon I'm not really fussed. I wouldn't put it on the sections though as that erodes their primary task of takinga nd holding ground.


I think we get get a bit lost in Equip the Man vs Man the Equipment. What we should be looking at is the Brigade as the man, we give it the equipment it needs to do it's job, and then we man that. Organizations and structures are equipment dependent to a large degree.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Yes they can. The rule of thumb for a direct support regiment (one that gives a guaranteed high rate of availability to the supported arms) is one battery per manoeuvre unit. That's why in the good old days we had four batteries in some regiments then went down to three for the three battalions (one was double tasked to support the recce screen and also the battalion in reserve). Going down to two presently is simply a numbers game that has nothing to do with doctrine. Armies tend to work stuff in threes and typically an artillery regiment or battalion has three gun or rocket batteries.
> 
> One can add more batteries, if appropriate, and if they can be properly commanded and controlled in the fight. Beyond direct support of manoeuvre elements, artillery provides general support which consists of weapon systems which are used in various stages of a battle or simultaneously across a broader front ... think MLRS or HIMARS for example or reinforcing support ... think of divisional or even corps tube artillery that can be added in at particular critical areas and times.
> 
> I think what limits adding batteries to a given direct support regiment is whether that particular type of battery's capability can be properly integrated into the regiment's command and control structure and whether it needs to be full-time organic to the supported formation or not. I've previously mentioned "over-the-horizon" anti tank batteries utilizing armed drones or short range precision anti-armour rockets. I think something like that would fit very well into a brigade's direct support regiment's role as they would be less vulnerable than front-line direct fire missiles and would bolster the brigades anti-armour capabilities with a flexible wide ranging massed response at critical stages and would be coordinated into the brigade's overall anti-armour and indirect fires support plans by one entity at the highest level.
> 
> 
> 
> We have 24 guns in regiments. The rest are in schools etc.
> 
> I'm the last guy to say "we can't afford that" when something is needed, but long before I'd start handing out a Javelin to each rifle sections, I'd want to make sure we've priorized providing a basic GBAD system , an armed UAV system and sufficient battalion anti-armour platoons, mortar platoons and direct support artillery. I think I'd let the rifle platoons coast with their CarlGs for quite a while longer until all that other stuff gets sorted out and properly integrated first.
> 
> 🍻




OK - I agree with you.  Let me have a battalion anti-armour platoon wit 8 CLUs on the peace-time establishment.   That would permit a useful number for an immediate response unit but, more importantly would create and anti-armour centre of excellence in the battalion and create a training centre for instructing section Carl Gustaf gunners how to operate the Javelin/Spike ATGMs.  It would also develop the tactics which the CG-Gunners, and their commanders, could expect to employ with their weapons when employed in unison.  But please supply the battalions with the full range of munitions available for the Carl Gustaf.

And by the way - to the anti-armour, and mortar platoons (and presumably the pioneers) organize a DF platoon to maintain both MG and Designated Marksman skills.  (Pet notion - every MG number 2 should be equipped with a DMR rifle with good optics.


----------



## markppcli

So a full combat support company? Where do we get those numbers? I have a couple suggestions and they start with a 3.


Do we assume that the job of the army is to expect to deploy battle groups, task tailored to mission, with the capacity to deploy a brigade if required? If so how to be best achieve that? What is required vs what is wanted vs what do we have?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I think probably a Brigade AT Coy would make sense, with Bn's holding their own ATGMs. If that means we see a company level Javalin det, or a platoon I'm not really fussed. *I wouldn't put it on the sections though as that erodes their primary task of takinga nd holding ground.*



But how does the section hold ground against an armoured threat?  Absolutely, when taking ground, the heavy ATGM is probably going to be more trouble than it is worth.  But once the section is in place its biggest threat is likely to be armoured.

On the other hand grouping the ATGMs into a firesupport base in support of the advance is likely to be useful.  Maybe a fourth section in each platoon (a weapons det if you like) armed with 2 to 4 ATGMs is an appropriate compromise.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> But how does the section hold ground against an armoured threat?  Absolutely, when taking ground, the heavy ATGM is probably going to be more trouble than it is worth.  But once the section is in place its biggest threat is likely to be armoured.
> 
> On the other hand grouping the ATGMs into a firesupport base in support of the advance is likely to be useful.  Maybe a fourth section in each platoon (a weapons det if you like) armed with 2 to 4 ATGMs is an appropriate compromise.


Well then we end up with a weapons det trying to carry enough ammunition to keep the Javelin, the 84, and the C6 supplied. God help them if CQ drops off a C16 for them. Now let's say we have the 84's as a part of a weapons locker for the section. Fine, they probably won't want to carry them on the assault, so where is the weapons locker? Is it in a carrier  close by, or is it a few bounds back with the CQ? 

I would prefer to see and atgm held at a no lower than company level. That way no one is trying to carry it on the assault, and you aren't loosing section bodies to it. It's also where it can be off set, and given more freedom to hunt for lack of a better term. Sections have their M72s, platoons their 84s, and the company it's ATGM section. The Bn would have it's TOW (maybe), which could be held as a Bde AT Coy.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> So a full combat support company? Where do we get those numbers? I have a couple suggestions and they start with a 3.



My numbers start reducing at the section level.  And in the vehicles.   2 man crews for the infantry (armour can do their thing) because I expect the vehicles to be fighting from fixed positions while the infantry is dismounted.  I envisage them as an armoured and mobile HMG firebase.   6 man sections for all types of battalions (a fire team plus a crew served weapon).

Small platoons in the support company to maintain skills and distribute skills in the battalion and to provide some tactical capability.  But the support platoons would be using the same weapons available to the rifle platoons.   The rifles could then reinforce the support platoons by adding their weapons to the employment plans developed by the support platoons, or the the support platoons could detach teams to support detached companies and platoons.

In our army I believe that skills retention is a lot more important than tactical readiness.  One battle group at 72 hours notice to move could be kept up to strength.  Follow on forces are at 90 to 180 days NTM with others at 365 days NTM.   Those units can add numbers at lot easier than they can add, and learn to employ, skills.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Well then we end up with a weapons det trying to carry enough ammunition to keep the Javelin, the 84, and the C6 supplied. God help them if CQ drops off a C16 for them. Now let's say we have the 84's as a part of a weapons locker for the section. Fine, they probably won't want to carry them on the assault, so where is the weapons locker? Is it in a carrier  close by, or is it a few bounds back with the CQ?
> 
> I would prefer to see and atgm held at a no lower than company level. That way no one is trying to carry it on the assault, and you aren't loosing section bodies to it. It's also where it can be off set, and given more freedom to hunt for lack of a better term. Sections have their M72s, platoons their 84s, and the company it's ATGM section. The Bn would have it's TOW (maybe), which could be held as a Bde AT Coy.



Then your Platoon Leader and OC haven't done their jobs right.  The C6  I would put into the section's arms locker.   The choice of Javelin or CG84 should be made by the OC or the Pl Ldr before the enemy is sighted, much less engaged.   I want the Javelin the same place as the shovels, picks, machetes, concertina and spare batteries are held.  Deliverable on short notice so that they can be integrated into the battle plan when required.

We seem to be saying much of  a sameness.  The difference, I believe, is that we are debating how much flexibility we can expect out of the troops manning the ATGMs and whether they are tied to their weapons or their tactics.  Does it matter to the tactics if the DF-AT system is the M72 or the Javelin or anything in between?  Can we expect one gunner to manage an M72, an AT-4, an N-LAW, a CG-84 and a Javelin/Spike CLU?

I wouldn't be overly concerned about the TOW.  I know we have them but we are talking about incorporating the Javelins, which have comparable range and effect to the TOW (4-5 km), somewhere in the battalion.  The Brigade AT coy can either be equipped with 10 km heavier ATGMs or the 25 to 40 km N-LOS systems (assuming that they don't end up with the Arty in an AT bty or in the LRPRs bty.)


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> I think probably a Brigade AT Coy would make sense, with Bn's holding their own ATGMs. If that means we see a company level Javalin det, or a platoon I'm not really fussed. I wouldn't put it on the sections though as that erodes their primary task of takinga nd holding ground.
> 
> 
> I think we get get a bit lost in Equip the Man vs Man the Equipment. What we should be looking at is the Brigade as the man, we give it the equipment it needs to do it's job, and then we man that. Organizations and structures are equipment dependent to a large degree.



That meets my own thought except I'd go for two anti-armoured "companies": one either direct or over-the-horizon to go with the brigade's "cavalry" regiment and another over-the-horizon artillery battery. That and an anti-armour platoon with each battalion.

"Equip the man" has become jingoism. I think it is still perfectly applicable for such organizations as the special forces and to an extent the rifle companies but for the bulk of the Army - we've been manning the equipment for some time now.



markppcli said:


> So a full combat support company? Where do we get those numbers? I have a couple suggestions and they start with a 3.



Which ought to be doable for an armoured brigade. 

A US ABCT has one armoured regiment and two infantry battalions organized into three combined arms battalions. Those battalions do not have separate combat support companies because the ATGM and mortar capability is built into the rifle companies and recce into the bn's headquarters company. That said, if one took the brigade's light battalion one could build up the necessary combat support elements in the three combined arms battalions and have enough PYs left over which when added to the armoured regiment's recce squadron would form the basic structure of a cavalry regiment/battalion.



markppcli said:


> Do we assume that the job of the army is to expect to deploy battle groups, task tailored to mission, with the capacity to deploy a brigade if required? If so how to be best achieve that? What is required vs what is wanted vs what do we have?



I think that most armies have come to the conclusion that the brigade is the lowest level of integrated unit of action. We've been that way for over a half a century, the Americans went for BCTs two decades ago and the Brits just went that way as well.

The battle group was always an ad hoc organization cobbled together from within brigade resources to meet a certain mission. I think Canada made a large mistake when it went to the building block concept a few decades ago because we lost a major edge on organizing and training our brigades (a situation that CMTC supposedly remedied). As long as we accept the missions we do, we'll need to form battle groups for deployments but in my mind we should always, always focus on training for brigade operations and form battle groups for tasks or missions as a temporary measure. If the infantry and tankers and artillery and engineers and the service support folks train and organize for that, carving off a task specific temporary battle group ought not to be a challenge so long as the specific task is one suited for that particular type of brigade (ie heavy, medium or light)

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> My numbers start reducing at the section level.  And in the vehicles.   2 man crews for the infantry (armour can do their thing) because I expect the vehicles to be fighting from fixed positions while the infantry is dismounted.   6 man sections for all types of battalions.


So we expect heavy lav casualties then. I mean fine if we build that in, but I'd be pretty stunned to watch enemy IFVs not jockeying and moving their fire positions.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> So we expect heavy lav casualties then. I mean fine if we build that in, but I'd be pretty stunned to watch enemy IFVs not jockeying and moving their fire positions.



I expect the LAVs to jockey and relocate while focusing on supporting the dismounted infantry that they have delivered to the assault line, in exactly the same way that I would expect the MG platoon to jockey and relocate.   I expect them to be fighting the 4 mph battle.  Not the 40 mph battle.

And if that means casualties amongst the LAVs and their crews I can only think it also means casualties among the dismounted assault troops.  Those troops want the fire of those LAVs on their objective constantly as they advance.  That, surely, limits the possibilities for the LAVs to jockey and relocate.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I expect the LAVs to jockey and relocate while focusing on supporting the dismounted infantry that they have delivered to the assault line, in exactly the same way that I would expect the MG platoon to jockey and relocate.   I expect them to be fighting the 4 mph battle.  Not the 40 mph battle.
> 
> And if that means casualties amongst the LAVs and their crews I can only think it also means casualties among the dismounted assault troops.  Those troops want the fire of those LAVs on their objective constantly as they advance.  That, surely, limits the possibilities for the LAVs to jockey and relocate.


I cant get into why this doesn't really make sense with what you said earlier without explaining the lowest levels of AFV operation, so I'm just going to leave this be. Suffice to say that a gunner is not going to be able to operate the cannon, handles, comms, and direct the driver in a jockey all at the same time on his own. But that's just my experience.





FJAG said:


> That meets my own thought except I'd go for two anti-armoured "companies": one either direct or over-the-horizon to go with the brigade's "cavalry" regiment and another over-the-horizon artillery battery. That and an anti-armour platoon with each battalion.
> 
> "Equip the man" has become jingoism. I think it is still perfectly applicable for such organizations as the special forces and to an extent the rifle companies but for the bulk of the Army - we've been manning the equipment for some time now.
> 
> 
> 
> Which ought to be doable for an armoured brigade.
> 
> A US ABCT has one armoured regiment and two infantry battalions organized into three combined arms battalions. Those battalions do not have separate combat support companies because the ATGM and mortar capability is built into the rifle companies and recce into the bn's headquarters company. That said, if one took the brigade's light battalion one could build up the necessary combat support elements in the three combined arms battalions and have enough PYs left over which when added to the armoured regiment's recce squadron would form the basic structure of a cavalry regiment/battalion.
> 
> 
> 
> I think that most armies have come to the conclusion that the brigade is the lowest level of integrated unit of action. We've been that way for over a half a century, the Americans went for BCTs two decades ago and the Brits just went that way as well.
> 
> The battle group was always an ad hoc organization cobbled together from within brigade resources to meet a certain mission. I think Canada made a large mistake when it went to the building block concept a few decades ago because we lost a major edge on organizing and training our brigades (a situation that CMTC supposedly remedied). As long as we accept the missions we do, we'll need to form battle groups for deployments but in my mind we should always, always focus on training for brigade operations and form battle groups for tasks or missions as a temporary measure. If the infantry and tankers and artillery and engineers and the service support folks train and organize for that, carving off a task specific temporary battle group ought not to be a challenge so long as the specific task is one suited for that particular type of brigade (ie heavy, medium or light)
> 
> 🍻



I supposed I'm inherently wrong in seeing the Bde operation as tasking their battle groups aren't I? Downside of the coal face view I suppose.


----------



## Ostrozac

markppcli said:


> Well then we end up with a weapons det trying to carry enough ammunition to keep the Javelin, the 84, and the C6 supplied. God help them if CQ drops off a C16 for them. Now let's say we have the 84's as a part of a weapons locker for the section. Fine, they probably won't want to carry them on the assault, so where is the weapons locker? Is it in a carrier  close by, or is it a few bounds back with the CQ?
> 
> I would prefer to see and atgm held at a no lower than company level. That way no one is trying to carry it on the assault, and you aren't loosing section bodies to it. It's also where it can be off set, and given more freedom to hunt for lack of a better term. Sections have their M72s, platoons their 84s, and the company it's ATGM section. The Bn would have it's TOW (maybe), which could be held as a Bde AT Coy.


The assault is precisely when you most want the 84, it’s primary role should be as a bunker-buster — it is shockingly inadequate as an anti-tank weapon, and although we named it the SRAAW (Medium), that’s because we pressed it into the role that should have been filled by something like Milan.

When we had Eryx we had no choice but to push them down to platoon level, because of the all-too-short range, but Javelin would be a comfortable fit at the company level. But whether held at platoon or company level, the important thing is that a dismounted company needs to be able to hold ground, which you cannot do without ATGM — because without ATGM the enemy can feel safe to standoff armoured vehicles outside recoilless rifle range and freely reduce our defensive positions with direct fire. A reverse slope defence can mitigate that, but not eliminate it. We need to make our infantry dangerous to approach — and 3 Carl Gs per company frontage certainly doesn’t cut it.

There‘s an old line that the Soviets considered the best tank terrain to be that without anti-tank weapons. As it stands, there is a risk that our next enemy believes that terrain is whatever is being held by a Canadian infantry company.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I cant get into why this doesn't really make sense with what you said earlier without explaining the lowest levels of AFV operation, so I'm just going to leave this be. Suffice to say that a gunner is not going to be able to operate the cannon, handles, comms, and direct the driver in a jockey all at the same time on his own. But that's just my experience.


Mark, I will bow to your experience, and all those others that have been there, done that.

My counter point is based on the Stryker operating as a section carrier and employing its ROWS in support with only a 2 man crew.  And when the Stryker is upgunned to the 30mm Dragoon ROWS it still operates with a 2 man crew.

Fundamentally, I thnk that I am perceiving the LAV as an adjunct for an infantry battalion (an Infantry Section Carrier) as opposed to seeing it as a Light Armoured Car in an armoured regiment (an Armoured Fighting Vehicle).


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Mark, I will bow to your experience, and all those others that have been there, done that.
> 
> My counter point is based on the Stryker operating as a section carrier and employing its ROWS in support with only a 2 man crew.  And when the Stryker is upgunned to the 30mm Dragoon ROWS it still operates with a 2 man crew.
> 
> Fundamentally, I thnk that I am perceiving the LAV as an adjunct for an infantry battalion (an Infantry Section Carrier) as opposed to seeing it as a Light Armoured Car in an armoured regiment (an Armoured Fighting Vehicle).








						M1296 Dragoon Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com
					

The M1296 Dragoon is an upgraded version of the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle with significantly improved lethality. It is fitted with unmanned turret armed with a 30 mm cannon. Its official designation is Infantry Carrier Vehicle - Dragoon, or ICVD.



					www.military-today.com


----------



## Kirkhill

In the Anti-Tank video you posted LCol Moran commented that BMP2 switched from the 76mm of the BMP1 to the 30mm cannon not to make it a better AFV, in the sense of being able to engage other AFVs, but to be able to better engage dismounted ATGM teams at longer ranges.  A 2 km Milan team could not be outranged by a machine gun.  A 30mm burst would throw their aim off.


----------



## markppcli

I more meant as an example of


Ostrozac said:


> The assault is precisely when you most want the 84, it’s primary role should be as a bunker-buster — it is shockingly inadequate as an anti-tank weapon, and although we named it the SRAAW (Medium), that’s because we pressed it into the role that should have been filled by something like Milan.
> 
> When we had Eryx we had no choice but to push them down to platoon level, because of the all-too-short range, but Javelin would be a comfortable fit at the company level. But whether held at platoon or company level, the important thing is that a dismounted company needs to be able to hold ground, which you cannot do without ATGM — because without ATGM the enemy can feel safe to standoff armoured vehicles outside recoilless rifle range and freely reduce our defensive positions with direct fire. A reverse slope defence can mitigate that, but not eliminate it. We need to make our infantry dangerous to approach — and 3 Carl Gs per company frontage certainly doesn’t cut it.
> 
> There‘s an old line that the Soviets considered the best tank terrain to be that without anti-tank weapons. As it stands, there is a risk that our next enemy believes that terrain is whatever is being held by a Canadian infantry company.


My point was more about the encumberance and logistics than what tool for what job really.


----------



## Ostrozac

markppcli said:


> My point was more about the encumberance and logistics than what tool for what job really.


That’s fair. I agree that rifle sections should be fairly lean and mean, but platoon weapons dets need to be humping enough firepower to actually win firefights. I suspect that probably means a 5 vehicle platoon, to haul everything and everyone, but 5 LAVs vs 4 LAVs per platoon isn’t the hill I want to make my stand on. I’m standing by my favourite bugbear — ATGMs. Self-propelled mortars being a close second.


----------



## markppcli

Ostrozac said:


> That’s fair. I agree that rifle sections should be fairly lean and mean, but platoon weapons dets need to be humping enough firepower to actually win firefights. I suspect that probably means a 5 vehicle platoon, to haul everything and everyone, but 5 LAVs vs 4 LAVs per platoon isn’t the hill I want to make my stand on. I’m standing by my favourite bugbear — ATGMs. Self-propelled mortars being a close second.


I'm not against the idea sections have that, I just think it means we need to take that into consideration in how we support them, and how far away they get. Al alternative though do you need a weapons det in a mechanized platoon if every section could have access to an 84 and a C6 stored in a lav? Could then those PYs become the Coy Javelin section. Just a thought I've had watching a C6 team gun a long side the LAV firing it's stabilized C6.


----------



## Ostrozac

markppcli said:


> do you need a weapons det in a mechanized platoon if every section could have access to an 84 and a C6 stored in a lav?


Yes, in my opinion. Several reasons come to mind, the first is space in the vehicle. Not just for the weapons, but the 84mm ammo and the SF kits. Also flexibility. A platoon, and a company, needs to be able to fight either alongside its vehicles or separated from them. If you’re absolutely tied to fighting near your vehicle, you’re not an infantry unit — you’re some type of cavalry. Also, effectiveness. I’ve always been shocked, going back to when I was a weapons det commander, that while we preached that machine guns should be sited in pairs, in practice they were issued singly — I think that a platoon weapons det should have a pair of GPMGs, with SF kits, hence my bias towards a physically larger weapons det.

With their grenade launcher ammo and M72s the rifle section is probably already on the edge of humping too much stuff for the assault, I’d put everything heavier into the platoon weapons det.


----------



## Kirkhill

That brings up the issue of should all infantry battalions be identical?   Or can LAV infantry battalions not only divest themselves of much of the Combat Support Company, but also reduce their mounted sections to a single fire team (with or without ATGMs).   And perhaps supply an ACSV formation to carry full sized companies from full sized battalions.


----------



## Kirkhill

As to infantry and cavalry and SP Mortars

Infantry SP Mortar for the 4 MPH battle







Cavalry SP Mortar for the 40 MPH battle.


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:


> That brings up the issue of should all infantry battalions be identical?


They absolutely should all be identical, as we have no light forces doctrine and no one can point to a role currently being done by the 3rd battalions* that couldn’t be done by a LAV battalion dismounted.

An exception would be the “heavy brigade” armoured infantry role that was abandoned when the Army cancelled the Close Combat Vehicle project. But that would require a tracked IFV, that we don‘t intend to acquire.

*Except for parachuting. Which has little tactical application for a force that has access to Chinooks.


----------



## markppcli

Ostrozac said:


> Yes, in my opinion. Several reasons come to mind, the first is space in the vehicle. Not just for the weapons, but the 84mm ammo and the SF kits. Also flexibility. A platoon, and a company, needs to be able to fight either alongside its vehicles or separated from them. If you’re absolutely tied to fighting near your vehicle, you’re not an infantry unit — you’re some type of cavalry. Also, effectiveness. I’ve always been shocked, going back to when I was a weapons det commander, that while we preached that machine guns should be sited in pairs, in practice they were issued singly — I think that a platoon weapons det should have a pair of GPMGs, with SF kits, hence my bias towards a physically larger weapons det.
> 
> With their grenade launcher ammo and M72s the rifle section is probably already on the edge of humping too much stuff for the assault, I’d put everything heavier into the platoon weapons det.


So we already have 84 racks and with a front line load of, if memory serves, 6 rounds for it I don't think the ammo storage is that big of an issue. The SF kit yes, but I'd argue that should almost be seen as defensive stores or specialized equipment, no one's setting that up on a hasty attack. Unless you are in which case I'd very much like to see how it's done. 

If you had a Weapons Section, because it's past being a det now, with 2 x C6 Teams (4) and an 84mm team (2) that gives you 6, now let's assume the MG teams will operate under the direct control of a MCpl with the 84 belonging to the Pl Cmd. We're at 7, but 8 in the LAV. Could you give up the No 2 on a C6 to make up that space? Maybe. Or could we get really radical have the WO dismount from depth to control the dismounted fight with the PL Comd taking control of the LAV fight, freeing that seat? Or vice versa. 

I do absolutely agree with you though that we are getting to that point where it's very easy to overburden out guys. We need to start thinking about how much we expect out of the rifle section, and how do these new tools we have to improve our accuracy effect that. Do we need as many rounds if we're supposed to be getting more and more first round hits?


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> They absolutely should all be identical, as we have no light forces doctrine and no one can point to a role currently being done by the 3rd battalions* that couldn’t be done by a LAV battalion dismounted.
> 
> An exception would be the “heavy brigade” armoured infantry role that was abandoned when the Army cancelled the Close Combat Vehicle project. But that would require a tracked IFV, that we don‘t intend to acquire.
> 
> *Except for parachuting. Which has little tactical application for a force that has access to Chinooks.



I find the argument that we have no doctrine for employment a fairly weak reason for not having the capability.  But that's an argument that I have lost many times over.  And I will respectfully bow out and agree to disagree.

I am willing to accept that Canada's Army is comfortable in its LAVs and that is how it chooses to work.  Now all that has to happen is for the government to agree that they will only employ you in places where your LAVs are comfortable and at the time of your choosing.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> As to infantry and cavalry and SP Mortars
> 
> Infantry SP Mortar for the 4 MPH battle
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Cavalry SP Mortar for the 40 MPH battle.


Does the twin motor carrier still have a small troop compartment? Have this be the weapons det vehicle


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## Kirkhill

The armies that are using the twin mortars, by and large, are the same ones issuing Anti-Tank weapons to the sections and deploying small sections of 6 rather than 10.

In my view each section in a CV90 essentially is, first and foremost, a weapons det.  A weapons det that can also conduct local clearing operations.


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## Underway

If AT is best used in mass, then penny packeting it out to the platoon level seems folly where it would overburden the rifle coy's with little overall impact to the battlespace.  Even a few Javlin's wouldn't allow you to hold against aggressive armour any more than without.  For the recce elements that they would be good against, the LAV 25mm would suffice to deal with those as well as the 84.

This was mentioned earlier by either @TangoTwoBravo or @Infanteer with regards to how to distribute tanks (the ultimate AT weapon), and that when they were split up they were massacred.  

So those orphan light infantry Battalions we were talking about earlier in the thread.  Seems to me that they could be re-rolled into AT companies.  This would allow for the number needed to have an impact against enemy massed armour.  Set up in the defensive where the terrain was favourable to hold the ground or b) move rapidly to an area where the enemy armour has massed and is pushing in.  

Obviously, you would like to use your own tanks for this in an ideal situation but in many ways, the increased operational mobility of LAV AT could be very useful here.  It would also fit into the infantry role of holding the ground.

Would this be dismounted AT capability where you set up a tripod system for use or a TUA type system (or both)?  Given the way, the Spike-LR and now the MMP work it could be combined with a larger tactical UAS to provide non-LOS targeting.


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## Ostrozac

On the topic of light forces, I would observe that even when we had a dedicated light infantry force, with enablers trained and equipped to fight alongside them, in the form of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, mechanized units were still tasked with dismounted roles — the AMF(L) role in Norway comes to mind. Not to mention that nominally Airborne units would rerole to mechanized if operations required — M113 for Germany, AVGP for Somalia. We have a long history of mech retraining to fight dismounted, and vice versa. I‘d lean towards every battalion training to fight mechanized, with LAVs, with the option to downgrade to dismounted, as it is faster to transition down than up.


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## Weinie

Kirkhill said:


> My numbers start reducing at the section level.  And in the vehicles.   2 man crews for the infantry (armour can do their thing) because I expect the vehicles to be fighting from fixed positions while the infantry is dismounted.  I envisage them as an armoured and mobile HMG firebase.   6 man sections for all types of battalions (a fire team plus a crew served weapon).
> 
> Small platoons in the support company to maintain skills and distribute skills in the battalion and to provide some tactical capability.  But the support platoons would be using the same weapons available to the rifle platoons.   The rifles could then reinforce the support platoons by adding their weapons to the employment plans developed by the support platoons, or the the support platoons could detach teams to support detached companies and platoons.
> 
> In our army I believe that skills retention is a lot more important than tactical readiness.  One battle group at 72 hours notice to move could be kept up to strength.  Follow on forces are at 90 to 180 days NTM with others at 365 days NTM.   Those units can add numbers at lot easier than they can add, and learn to employ, skills.


The fallacy, as I see it, with this NTM COA is that it doesn't account for casualties/attrition.

When we were working CBP, no one factored in that we could likely expect extensive/massive attrition, across all domains in a near peer/peer environment. We likely would not have enough time, or the sp chain, to train/equip/re-equip a follow-on force before hostilities finished.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> On the topic of light forces, I would observe that even when we had a dedicated light infantry force, with enablers trained and equipped to fight alongside them, in the form of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, mechanized units were still tasked with dismounted roles — the AMF(L) role in Norway comes to mind. Not to mention that nominally Airborne units would rerole to mechanized if operations required — M113 for Germany, AVGP for Somalia. We have a long history of mech retraining to fight dismounted, and vice versa. I‘d lean towards every battalion training to fight mechanized, with LAVs, with the option to downgarde to dismounted, as it is faster to transition down than up.



My problem here Ostrozac is that prior to the AVGP/LAV era there was no difference between infantry carried in trucks, helicopters, or M113s, or walking, at the Company level.  The Combat Support Coy looked different but retained the same capabilities.  Even the Airborne fought their rifle platoons the same way as the M113 platoons.  They organized their Combat Support along Company Cbt Tm lines.

One set of manuals served all types of infantry.  And they could expect to swap vehicles but always understanding they were going to assault on foot with the same weapons and the same support regardless of the means of transport.  When moving they would take their platoon mgs and mount them on the pintles for expedient protection on the move.  When halted, and going into the defence, the MGs would be dismounted to establish an effective anti-personnel defence.  In the assault - well circumstances dictated how the OC and Pl Ldr decided to employ the guns.

When we got the AVGPS then we lost the flexibility to dismount the guns - they, and their gunner, were now tied to a platform that couldn't go where the rifles went and made a much bigger target.  And even with the old Grizzly, when the VC dismounted it was only with great difficulty.  As to the number of people you could put on the ground - The M113 and all other forms of transport permitted the retention of the nominal 10 man rifle section (with an 11th for the driver).  The Grizzly had seats for 11 according to the pamphlet.  1 was the driver.  2 was the gunner.  3-8 sat back to back in the rear facing outwards at their vision blocks.  9 was the VC/Section Ldr who was jammed in between the driver and the turret with no room for his fighting order.  (That had to be handed to him by his manservant after the dismount).  Numbers 10 and 11 shared a 1.5 man folding jumpseat just behind the engine compartment.  In practice it was more common just to carry six and the section leader/vc.

That set the template for the entire LAV series.  Our LAV infantry is not infantry as it was known in the 1960s.  It is Armoured Infantry or even Cavalry.  The emphasis throughout is fighting and supporting the vehicle with the troops.  Not, IMO, the vehicle supporting the troops.   That is why I have difficulty with the notion of the LAV battalion being able to swap rides and immediately start operating effectively as leg infantry.  It is nothing to do with fitness or smarts.  It has everything to do with mindset, training and familiarity with your suite of weapons and sensors.

Having said that I can accept that Canada is going to field a LAV/ACSV army and that, if needs must, then the LAV army has the ability, with a year's notice, to turn itself into something else.  I question whether or not a LAV battalion can ditch its vehicles and fight as effectively in the leg role as a battalion that trains that way from the get go.


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## Brad Sallows

> Are they?  We have 37 guns.



My point is this: whatever size force of manoeuvre units we have, if it is properly supported it will have artillery.  So we don't pretend that the cost of guns, trucks, limbers, etc is part of the cost of PGM anti-armour rounds when we compare to the cost of launchers and missiles.  With artillery, the launchers we sort of get "for free".

Likewise, unless the 84mm we have are incapable of firing munitions other than HEAT, we already have a good enough (versatile, flexible, portable) weapon - we just need to buy ammunition and pay to train people to use it.  If we are too poor to use Javelin to bust a bunker with a handful of insurgents in it, we have an affordable alternative.

My question about artillery organization was intended to highlight the fact that an artillery unit (my simplified high level view) is a fire control centre, however many batteries you want to plug in to meet most use cases, and a commensurately sized administrative echelon.  The number of batteries doesn't matter; the number of available FOO parties matters.

The thing about "tank destroyer doctrine" is that I would not expect anyone to revisit the WWII solution (essentially a purpose-designed and -equipped tank-defeating blocking force capable of displacing frequently to avoid being overcome); I'd expect to see a doctrine emerge for a particular kind of combined arms battle, maybe necessitating (or preferring) some things we don't have (like attack helicopters).  I'd expect most of those things to have other uses.

It relates, I suppose, to my short answer to the question about alternatives if we did away with tanks: more indirect fire (firing pieces, not necessarily units) and aviation.


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## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> If AT is best used in mass, then penny packeting it out to the platoon level seems folly where it would overburden the rifle coy's with little overall impact to the battlespace.  Even a few Javlin's wouldn't allow you to hold against aggressive armour any more than without.  For the recce elements that they would be good against, the LAV 25mm would suffice to deal with those as well as the 84.



I believe that you are still confusing logistics and command & control.  Just because the section carries a weapons system does not mean that the section commands that system.  In a leg battalion loads are distributed across the backs of the troops.  They are then aggregated at dropoffs for the use of the relevant systems.  81mm bombs and MG Link for example.  LIkewise for the ATGMs.   The ATGMs fire can be massed (in a broadside) even if the sections are dispersed.  In fact ideally you want to establish a kill zone that concentrates the targets at a distance from the launchers while the launchers are separated.

The fires will be concentrated.  The firing posts will be distributed.  

The army doesn't work from a battleship where everybody is concentrated in one target.  It presents multiple targets and concentrates its effects on the target.  Instead of a single battleship the better naval analogy would be a flotilla of gunboats swarming a battleship.


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## Brad Sallows

Surely if whatever ATGMs we might have are long range (ie. not Eryx), they all belong at the battalion level (not company) to be properly controlled and employed. (Still "local protection", obviously.)


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## Kirkhill

I can't disagree with much there (aside from getting free arty support because - everyone knows we should have arty).

I agree with Tank Destroyer doctrine. 

I think that that doctrine is not about the platform and the projector  so much as the ammunition.  We have standalone munitions, 84mm munitions, 105, 120, 127, 152 and 155 caliber munitions all of which can launch a variety of warheads.  Even the Javelin and TOW has a separate bunker busting round.  And we haven't touched the stuff that is circling over head.

We are talking about maintaining separate AT specialist units.  We might as well be talking about maintaining two Javelin platoons.  One for the AT role and one for the Bunker  Busting role.  Or separating 105 batteries into High Angle and Low Angle batteries.

Whatever organization that transpires it needs to be sufficiently flexible to switch, at notice, from one target set to another, from one battlefield to another.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Surely if whatever ATGMs we might have are long range (ie. not Eryx), they all belong at the battalion level (not company) to be properly controlled and employed. (Still "local protection", obviously.)



I agree in principle but what happens when the Defended Localities are more widely distributed than they were in 1982?  Do we post the ATGMs in the gaps, have them roving, or give them safe harbour in the defensive perimeter and rely on sighting them like 5 km machine guns (ie interlocking arcs and mutual coverage of fronts).?

The CO sets the plan but does he retain tactical control?   He might.  But then again circumstances might suggest distributed control to him.


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## quadrapiper

Would the light battalions, assuming there's any use in them at all, make more sense as a single regiment, rather than bolted on to primarily LAV units?


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## Kirkhill

quadrapiper said:


> Would the light battalions, assuming there's any use in them at all, make more sense as a single regiment, rather than bolted on to primarily LAV units?



For me, yes even if it were only a two battalion independent regiment with only internal support. 

But, I'm the guy that would treat the LAV battalions as Light Cavalry and reduce the vehicle load from a crew and a section to a crew (3 man) and a fire team/wpns det.

I would also be eliminating that Direct Fire elements of the Combat Support Company (including the AT and MG elements) but beefing up the Recce platoon into a fourth company.   An ACSV company could lift logistics or a leg infantry group.

If anybody was asking.  

But Canada has a LAV army.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Weapons can be sited by the CO (should he feel so inclined to micromanage) and still belong to companies and platoons. 

To me, something like a Javelin should belong to the company. A company should be able to defend itself against an attack that includes enemy tanks. Placing four Javelin equivalents in the company provides a framework over which other systems can be imposed, especially when you factor in twelve or so 25mm cannons. Any tanks we have can then be concentrated as required instead of being used to protect the infantry.

I think it would make sense, in a European context, to have a Javelin-style system in each company (one with each platoon and one with a Coy wpns det) with a battalion level TOW platoon.  

As a complete historical aside, the US Tank Destroyer doctrine from the Second World War is an example of what can happen when you overthink doctrine out of contact with the enemy.


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## markppcli

quadrapiper said:


> Would the light battalions, assuming there's any use in them at all, make more sense as a single regiment, rather than bolted on to primarily LAV units?


Probably, if you ever watch a Bde exercise take place the hoops we jump through to find a job for them can be fairly .... inventive.


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## MilEME09

Slight off tangent, but given the state if CSS in the CAF it doesn't matter the make up of our regiments when we can't even sustain them long term in a combat environment. We barely sustained a battlegroup in Afghanistan, anything larger would of broke us. Our whole supply and logistics chain needs to be torn down and re built.


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## Kirkhill

How long would it take us to find a light infantry doctrine if 2 CBG (or 2 CIB) in Petawawa were attached to the 10th Mtn  in Fort Drum?

After all we already send Deputy Armored Corps commanders to Texas.

Repeat the 1st SSF experiment on larger scale.


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## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> I believe that you are still confusing logistics and command & control.  Just because the section carries a weapons system does not mean that the section commands that system.  In a leg battalion loads are distributed across the backs of the troops.  They are then aggregated at dropoffs for the use of the relevant systems.  81mm bombs and MG Link for example.  LIkewise for the ATGMs.   The ATGMs fire can be massed (in a broadside) even if the sections are dispersed.  In fact ideally you want to establish a kill zone that concentrates the targets at a distance from the launchers while the launchers are separated.
> 
> The fires will be concentrated.  The firing posts will be distributed.
> 
> The army doesn't work from a battleship where everybody is concentrated in one target.  It presents multiple targets and concentrates its effects on the target.  Instead of a single battleship the better naval analogy would be a flotilla of gunboats swarming a battleship.


Not confusing anything.  I'm well aware of how the separate elements work together in the combat team and how the army can direct its fire.  It doesn't change the fact that four Javelins in a Coy are going to have a limited effect.  Congrats, the entire Javelin inventory of the company was used to mobility kill a single tank thanks to smoke and an active protection system.  In order to properly control and set up AT capability for an Infantry Bn, you need a dedicated AT coy/platoon for the CO to set up on the proper terrain with the proper sightlines.

Like @TangoTwoBravo stated that a battalion-level AT capability would be valuable.

There was a reason we had TUA that were developed before those LAV's were cannibalized to make the LAV RWS.


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## FJAG

Not going to throw my own thoughts in here. I've done that before. But I just wanted to point out that the US Army has differing organizations and doctrine for each of their ABCTs, SBCTs, and IBCTs.

Its only the IBCT that has weapons companies at the rifle battalion. That's not to say that there aren't scouts or mortars in the all three types of rifle battalions. Each them in fact has a headquarters company which contains both the command and control elements as well as medical, scout and four mortar dets (I sometimes wonder if we really need a combat support company or if this organization just provides a spare major and MWO to replace casualties  ). But the light IBCT infantry battalion has weapons entities. Each IBCT rifle company has a 60 mm mortar det. Each IBCT Rifle platoon has a weapons squad which can man any two of two MMGs or two Javelins.  The IBCT infantry battalion's weapons company has four platoons and can field a mix and match of systems. Each platoon of four vehicles has two fitted for ITAS TOW and, in addition, there are 2 x .50 HMGs; 2x Mk 19 40mm grenade launchers and two Javelin systems. So as far as anti-armour systems are concerned, the IBCT infantry battalion can field 8 x TOW and 8 Javelin within the weapons company and another 18 Javelins from its nine rifle platoon weapons squads. (that's if they go all out on Atk weapons rather than MGs) On top of that my understanding is that the scout vehicles in the six cavalry platoons and three battalion scout platoons also carry Javelins for roughly another 50.

The ABCT on the other hand has it's primary anti-armour capability in its six tank companies for roughly a hundred tanks and the TOW launchers mounted on the Bradleys of its four rifle companies and three cavalry troops - that's a minimum of 95 TOW launchers. And yes, there are Javelins spread around the brigade as well but no specific weapons companies.

The SBCT is organized differently again. It has no tanks nor battalion weapons companies. The rifle companies used to have the MGS 105 mm Stryker but these are all gone (except for a dozen relegated to the weapons company of the brigade's cavalry squadron  which also has 10 TOW Strykers). Rifle companies each have a two mortar Strykers in addition to the battalions four tubes. Javelins proliferate at the rifle squad and scout squad levels to my understanding. The situation is changing somewhat more. Currently the plan is to upgrade half of the rifle squads' Strykers with 30 mm gun systems while the remaining half are to get CROWS-J (Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station-Javelin (roughly 80 to the brigade)

I think what is clear from the above is that there are differing ways of meeting the challenge of engaging armour. In some ways these differences come from the essential functions that the brigade is to perform, in others its based on legacy equipment (for example the Bradleys TOWs have been around long before the Stryker was a thing or the Javelin existed). I believe in more centralized anti-armour forces, the Americans disagree and have the advantage of lots of cash to proliferate them everywhere.

One common point is that brigade anti-armour platoons or companies are no longer there in any of these brigades. On the other hand, the brigade's cavalry elements all have very robust anti-armour capabilities.

The critical point for any discussion is to understand the role of the formation within which the weapon is to be used and how it will be employed. Is the formation basically a heavy, fast moving hard striking force that fights more mobile than statics; is it a lightly armed formation that once dug in to defend has little mobility available to it; or is it one with lightly armoured somewhat mobile elements that does have some protected mobility available but basically fights dismounted like the light one. The mix of weapon systems may-and probably will-vary with that even if we call the basic unit "the infantry battalion". Those battalions might very well vary. Even the cavalry elements vary because of the primary vehicles contained within each type of brigade.

The other thing is things change over time. Stryker brigades didn't become the thing people thought they would be back in 2000. Their deployability never became as rapid as people hoped. Rather than battle taxis they've been uparmoured, and are now getting fighting stations.

So far all the changes vis-a-vis anti-armour has been of the direct fire type, but my guess is that will change with the next iteration of the US Army as greater use is made of autonomous vehicles and armed UAVs.

Unfortunately we continue to lag in this field and very badly indeed. The fact that the meanest light infantry brigade in the US Army can bring several hundreds of ATGMs to the fight while we bring ? ought to be a sharp rap to the back of our collective heads (and I won't even mention artillery or AD)

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

> I agree in principle but what happens when the Defended Localities are more widely distributed than they were in 1982?



Someone considers the doctrine, and having considered the doctrine, makes a plan suitable to the circumstances.  Anti-armour plans originate from higher rather than lower, so I suppose it makes more sense for the stuff to be held higher.

In the "2025" context, I'd be surprised if the government committed more than a unit to any particular place in the next few years and a bit worried if the government committed to a conflict with a likely anti-armour threat needing more than "local protection".  I suppose for now it still makes sense to have battalion anti-armour platoons, and I see a point to not over-burdening rifle companies with ever-increasing quantities and weights of support weapons and munitions.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> Someone considers the doctrine, and having considered the doctrine, makes a plan suitable to the circumstances.  Anti-armour plans originate from higher rather than lower, so I suppose it makes more sense for the stuff to be held higher.
> 
> In the "2025" context, I'd be surprised if the government committed more than a unit to any particular place in the next few years and a bit worried if the government committed to a conflict with a likely anti-armour threat needing more than "local protection".  I suppose for now it still makes sense to have battalion anti-armour platoons, and I see a point to not *over-burdening* rifle companies with ever-increasing quantities and weights of support weapons and munitions.



In my (fairly limited) experience, the overburdening of Infantry occurs where commanders are risk averse/ unimaginitive/ indecisive and/or where logistics/ staff planning support is poor, all of which contributes to a poor team and lack of trust hence 'we'd better carry it or we'll never see it when we need it.'


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## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> Someone considers the doctrine, and having considered the doctrine, makes a plan suitable to the circumstances.  Anti-armour plans originate from higher rather than lower, so I suppose it makes more sense for the stuff to be held higher.
> 
> In the "2025" context, I'd be surprised if the government committed more than a unit to any particular place in the next few years and a bit worried if the government committed to a conflict with a likely anti-armour threat needing more than "local protection".  I suppose for now it still makes sense to have battalion anti-armour platoons, and I see a point to not over-burdening rifle companies with ever-increasing quantities and weights of support weapons and munitions.



So I had this thought. Let's say we've sent a LAV company off the do peacekeeping somewhere in Africa and some local tinpot rebel or insurgent manages to get a half dozen old T54s or T55s or T62s mobile and sets up a little tank ambush ...

I guess runaway becomes our option right up until they follow us to the UN FOB. 

I know, I know, Far fetched. But then there's this:









> T-54/T-55 operators and variants - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org





> T-62 - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org



🍻


----------



## quadrapiper

markppcli said:


> Probably, if you ever watch a Bde exercise take place the hoops we jump through to find a job for them can be fairly .... inventive.


Running further down that option, would it be worth looking at significant differentiation from the mechanized norm? 

Get into (and my ignorance will show here...) mountain and other vehicle-unfriendly terrain, recce, ATV/snowmachine, snow in general, unopposed parachuting (if that's of value), etc. and whatever other not-LAV work might be relevant.

If playing the "does what it says on the tin" game is worth it, let that be the PPCLI's new existence.


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## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> So I had this thought. Let's say we've sent a LAV company off the do peacekeeping somewhere in Africa and some local tinpot rebel or insurgent manages to get a half dozen old T54s or T55s or T62s mobile and sets up a little tank ambush ...
> 
> I guess runaway becomes our option right up until they follow us to the UN FOB.
> 
> I know, I know, Far fetched. But then there's this:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻


Lucky for us older model T-55s can be penetrated from the from by a M72, I'd place a bet that a 25mm sabot round would kill it from the rear.


----------



## GR66

OK...a bit of a swerve here, but the comment on the video at the 25 minute mark about the German political fixation on the big, heavy TDs like the Jagdtiger vs. the lighter, more mobile TDs that the German Army wanted got me thinking.  

Are modern MBT's like the Abrams and Leopard the modern equivalents of the Jagdtiger?  As the speaker describes it "a stupidly impressive vehicle but also a stupid vehicle".  

As we all know, costing of military equipment is like reading tea leaves and there are very few apples to apples comparisons available.  However, this website (Ancile) suggests the cost of a Leopard 2A7+ is around 8.5 million euros each (approx. $10 million USD).  Meanwhile Wikipedia says that Italy purchased 10 x Centauro II vehicles (basically a LAV-type hull with a 120mm gun turret) for $186 million USD (Freccia IFV - Wikipedia).  That means that you could purchase approximately 5 x LAV-based 120mm gun vehicles for the price of a single Leopard 2A7+.

If you look at Lanchester's laws of attrition from the video (at the 19 minute mark) you can see how mass of fires has a major impact on the outcome of an engagement between opposing forces.  Does this suggest we should rethink some of the arguments made against a LAV-based mobile gun system in an anti-tank role?


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## Underway

Lanchester's laws have a number of assumptions behind them, the first of which is "all things being equal".  But we know that all things are NOT equal.  Accuracy, armour, active protection, terrain, mobility are all factors that need to be considered in a situation.

Yes, quantity has its own quality, but quality matters quite a bit.  Centauro can't fire on the move, it can't survive a hit from a return 120mm whereas an MBT may very well survive a 120mm hit.  It likely can't get the rate of fire of an MBT and it can be destroyed by artillery much more easy.

And of course there is the crew protection aspect.  We want a tank to protect the crew.  The crew are more expensive than the tank itself and can be used to crew another tank.  A tank is just money and industrial output.


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## markppcli

quadrapiper said:


> Running further down that option, would it be worth looking at significant differentiation from the mechanized norm?
> 
> Get into (and my ignorance will show here...) mountain and other vehicle-unfriendly terrain, recce, ATV/snowmachine, snow in general, unopposed parachuting (if that's of value), etc. and whatever other not-LAV work might be relevant.
> 
> If playing the "does what it says on the tin" game is worth it, let that be the PPCLI's new existence.


You mean like having mountain and parachute companies? They already do. THe problem being those numbers aren't really worhtwhile for maintaining specializations of that nature.


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## quadrapiper

More expanding those skills across the three light battalions, and (carrying on the idea of reforming them as a single regiment) having enough mass to train the entire unit effectively in those specialties, and to support ongoing training.

How much LAV-specific training time do you see?


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## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> More expanding those skills across the three light battalions, and (carrying on the idea of reforming them as a single regiment) having enough mass to train the entire unit effectively in those specialties, and to support ongoing training.
> 
> How much LAV-specific training time do you see?



I have no direct experience converting a full light Infantry battalion into a mechanized/ armoured Infantry battalion, but I'm guessing that the LAV specific training has more to do with the operators (commanders, drivers, gunners etc) as opposed to the 'cargo' in the back. 

Once the key operators are trained, it only takes a week or so to get the troops into the swing of things. Collective training up to BGp level would take longer, of course.


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## dapaterson

New equipment generally needs training for three groups: the operators, the employers and the maintainers.


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## Kirkhill

I suggest that the biggest training delta, and the one most frequently poorly addressed, is that of the employer.

What does this thing do?  How am I going to use it?   What are its limits?


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> New equipment generally needs training for three groups: the operators, the employers and the *maintainers*.



As a guy from a thoroughly 'dismounted' Infantry background I was most impressed at the work that had to go into the maintenance side for re-roling us into a 'mounted/ semi-mounted' unit for deployments to places like Belfast and Norway.

Hopping in a vehicle is one thing. Making sure that this vehicle, which covers thousands of Kms per week under high stress conditions, is ready to hop into is quite another.


----------



## markppcli

quadrapiper said:


> How much LAV-specific training time do you see?


So this is a multi faceted question. That I spent a fair bit of time staring at the screen writing and rewriting answers to. The answer is quite simply between the crew qualifications, the OJT training of the Limas, and the spatial awareness required of command teams (we move faster and reach further) it all adds up a lot. All of those people, however, are qualified dismounted infanteers and cover those skills on their career courses in a way that is not always true in the reverse ( WOs and up excluded). 

I am pretty firm in my belief it's much easier, from a training perspective, so strip LAVs and have guys go dismounted then it is to add LAVs and all of a sudden insert a huge amount of both class room and field training. 

To your other point, again each Light Bn has a para coy, has a mountain coy, has an "other coy." I don't see what you're suggesting as different? Bare in mind, we're all just talking about the numbers in a full Bn, but the army is talking about stripping Bns down to 60 percent manning to fill schools. So why are we even acting like 9 Bns is doable?


----------



## blacktriangle

It doesn't sound like there is use for 3 Light Bns in the CMBGs. Seems like they'd be better off re-roled to either true armoured infantry (with a proper IFV), re-roled to something like Light Cavalry (along with PRes Armd Recce) or simply have the personnel consolidated into the other Bns to pump up numbers and perhaps restore lost capabilities. 

As for the tank destroyer talk, I think it was McG that posted what a modern tank destroyer looks like. It's an NLOS ATGM capability. Personally I think these should be controlled by the Artillery, and should be a priority right after we get something like Javelin or Spike LR for the Infantry. As for those complaining about using ATGM against Taliban & Daesh types, so what? The missiles have a limited shelf life IIRC, and there haven't exactly been many tanks to engage in recent decades...


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> As a guy from a thoroughly 'dismounted' Infantry background I was most impressed at the work that had to go into the maintenance side for re-roling us into a 'mounted/ semi-mounted' unit for deployments to places like Belfast and Norway.
> 
> Hopping in a vehicle is one thing. Making sure that this vehicle, which covers thousands of Kms per week under high stress conditions, is ready to hop into is quite another.


Now imagine an M109 battery with 21 tracks and another 17 wheeled vehicles.

You'll understand why my RCEME LMT could do no wrong in my eyes.





markppcli said:


> ... the spatial awareness required of command teams (we move faster and reach further) it all adds up a lot.


I'm not sure how things are done these days but in my day back in the mid seventies, the combat team commanders course had both a dismounted followed by a mounted phase. That course was basically designed for all infantry and armour leaders who had company/squadron command potential and a smattering of us gunners, engineers, loggies etc.



markppcli said:


> ... but the army is talking about stripping Bns down to 60 percent manning to fill schools. So why are we even acting like 9 Bns is doable?


IMHO that would be a big mistake. The schools are already adequate in size to handle the core and leadership training. We definitely need a surge of recruiting and DP1 training to fill the blank files but much of that could be done with a temporary diversion of such training to regiments. We did that quite successfully in the artillery in the mid seventies( again) as the branch grew with extra batteries and air defenders (we had a great cut in the artillery around 1969-70, followed by stagnation for five years followed by a resurgence which put hundreds of new officers and gunners into the system very quickly). Personally I'd rather see a rifle company in each brigade temporarily designated to teach new recruits for their regiment rather then permanently sending the personnel as instructors to the school. I think beefing up the schools is in large measure a sign of our fetish for trying to centrally control everything.

A second solution is a thorough review of course lengths. We tend to have too much put into the syllabus and don't utilize the training week as well as we could. Most run on a five day 8 hour per day week. Time to get back to concentrating on the "must knows" and cutting back on the "should knows" and "could knows".

If the schools really need a few more folks maybe we should use the PYs from two excess div headquarters and five reserve brigade headquarters that we don't really need.

🍻


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Pulling back up to a higher altitude for a moment, perhaps we look at tasks, potential operations and what capabilities we are deficient? Our higher level documents are sometimes us writing orders to ourselves, but they are an appropriate place to start. 

Strong Secure and Engaged directs the CAF to _deter and defend Canada and North America against attacks_. I am not sure if we need to look too deeply into those tasks with respect to Force 2025.

_Lead and/or contribute to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries._ This is a wide task including potential counter-insurgency along the lines of ISAF to conventional operations against a peer. The EFP would fall into this basket. I think we can see some Force 2025 implications in terms of capabilities and equipment. Infantry anti-armour weapons for BG level operations, and GBAD and SP artillery (depending on intensity) for CMBG-level operations. 

_Lead and/or contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions with the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral partners._ So peacekeeping and stability operations need to be a part of the discussion. We could argue whether ISAF would fall into this basket or the former. End result brings us to the same place. Could be some Force 2025 so-whats here.

_Engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad_. Another broad category which would include missions like UNIFIER. Might be some Force 2025 implications here in terms of organization?

_Provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad. _For the Army I think we can see the NEO task here. I am not sure if there are Force 2025 implications with this one as we have had rotating battalions assigned to this task for some time.

_Provide assistance to civil authorities and nongovernmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies_. A rather wide basket. I am not sure if our DART for disasters abroad and various IRUs for domestic situations require new capabilities. Having worked with some US agencies, however, perhaps an enhanced CBRN capability for consequence management?

While we could all debate on the system to acquire, I think it is hard to argue against something like a Javelin. Doesn't really need any new organizations. GBAD is a bigger question - our nature will be to have champagne tastes with beer income. What organizational changes would we need for that capability? For capacity-building, do we need dedicated units or are we happy taking away the leadership of units every couple of years to form capacity building missions?


----------



## markppcli

I suppose we'd need to define what kind of range and effect the Bde, i think we can agree a divisional deployment is unlikely, need from it's GBAD, and then determine if that's one system or a system of systems. If cost is an issue I've noticed what seems like a coulpe perfectly serviceable ADATS and 35mm guns parked in the grass around Gagetown....


----------



## Kirkhill

Battle Group Anti-Tank Options - American Style

Cold War Bradley Battalion - 54 Bradleys with 108 Ready TOWs and an additional 216 TOWs in the hulls - 3750 m range   
                                            - 24 Dragon MRAAW -  1000 m range 
Anti armor weapons held at section/squad level.

USMC Battalion - 8x HMMWV mounted TOW held at Battalion
                          - 24x Dragon held at battalion
                          - 18x 83mm SMAW held at company (6/coy)

US Abn Battalion - 20x HMMWV with 20x TOW and/or 10x M2 HMG and/or 10x 40mm GMG
                            - 18x Dragon held at platoon (2/pl)

US Lt Battalion (2000) - 4x Vehicle mounted TOW and/or M2 and/or 40mm
                                   - 18x Dragon held at coy (6/coy)

US Rangers - 9x Carl Gustav (RAAWS) held at company (3/coy)

Dragons replaced in service with Javelin (2500 m)   TOW still providing Long Range coverage at 4000 m

Javelin range improved to 4000 m and starts to replace TOW in some battalions

US Stryker - 27 Javelins held at squad level (1/squad) - 4000 m  -  firing post for a single missile added to the RWS. 

US Marines converting some of their TOWs to Javelins.

US forces adding Carl Gustavs.  Selection of Javelin or Carl Gustav dependent on operations and scenario.



British airmobile forces armed with Milans and used as Anti-Tank forces on the armoured battlefield.  Deployed by companies and battalions by helicopter.

Battalions held up to 24 firing posts.




Add ammunition types for the CG84 (27x 1/section) and up to 18 to 27 Javelin Firing Posts (CLU) per battalion.    6 to 10 rounds in the battalion per CG84 and CLU.


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Pulling back up to a higher altitude for a moment, perhaps we look at tasks, potential operations and what capabilities we are deficient? Our higher level documents are sometimes us writing orders to ourselves, but they are an appropriate place to start.
> 
> Strong Secure and Engaged directs the CAF to _deter and defend Canada and North America against attacks_. I am not sure if we need to look too deeply into those tasks with respect to Force 2025.


Not arguing with you at all but the one weakness with SSE for this discussion is that it is worded so broadly that it can be interpreted in just about any way that one wants. Obviously the flesh on the bones is added in the upper reaches of the twin towers in large part with how funds are allocated but we're not privy to those priorities.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> For capacity-building, do we need dedicated units or are we happy taking away the leadership of units every couple of years to form capacity building missions?


That question is loaded with the answer. It strikes me that the one thing that we are not short of in the CAF is middle leadership at either the officer or NCO level. The problem is that it is all located either in field units or at a variety of headquarters and since headquarters are not well known for willingly giving up their staff positions it would seem to me that we're just playing a shell game if we allocate PYs to a permanent FSCB organization ... the positions will most probably come out of units anyway but permanently rather than temporarily.

If we were to pull 300 some odd MCpls to majors PYs out of Ottawa to form an FSCB battalion I'd be all for it. My guess, however, is that it will end up coming out of the light battalions and several of the other arms.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Underway said:


> Lanchester's laws have a number of assumptions behind them, the first of which is "all things being equal".  But we know that all things are NOT equal.  Accuracy, armour, active protection, terrain, mobility are all factors that need to be considered in a situation.
> 
> Yes, quantity has its own quality, but quality matters quite a bit.  Centauro can't fire on the move, it can't survive a hit from a return 120mm whereas an MBT may very well survive a 120mm hit.  It likely can't get the rate of fire of an MBT and it can be destroyed by artillery much more easy.
> 
> And of course there is the crew protection aspect.  We want a tank to protect the crew.  The crew are more expensive than the tank itself and can be used to crew another tank.  A tank is just money and industrial output.


Actually the Centauro II with the 120mm gun does have stabilization for firing on the move.  Otherwise you're basically claiming the same differences between a Leopard and Centauro as could be made between a Jagdtiger and a Hellcat.  

Yes it's Wikipedia, but it claims "The Hellcat was the most effective U.S. tank destroyer of World War II. It had a higher kill to loss ratio than any other tank or tank destroyer fielded by U.S. forces in World War II."  M18 Hellcat - Wikipedia

Another key point of course is to not refer to a TD as a "tank".  They have different and specific roles.  A TD is meant to be used in the defence...massing fire from a larger number of cheaper platforms to overwhelm attacking tanks through volume of fire (with the added bonus of being able to provide direct fire support to infantry).

I'm certainly not suggesting that we adopt something like the Centauro INSTEAD of Leopards, but simply raising the question as to whether the argument made by the speaker in relation to TD's historical roles and the advantage of superiority in quantity of platforms possibly has some validity now as well.

If we are going on the assumption that the role of the CF in a European conflict would at least initially be in the defence (I'm assuming that we have no intention of invading Russia), then would it for example be beneficial to have a Regiment of TDs as part of our armoured mix instead of three Armoured Recce Regiments?   Maybe a Tank Regiment for the attack, a TD Regiment for defence and an Armoured Recce Regiment for....well Recce.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

FJAG said:


> Not arguing with you at all but the one weakness with SSE for this discussion is that it is worded so broadly that it can be interpreted in just about any way that one wants. Obviously the flesh on the bones is added in the upper reaches of the twin towers in large part with how funds are allocated but we're not privy to those priorities.
> 
> That question is loaded with the answer. It strikes me that the one thing that we are not short of in the CAF is middle leadership at either the officer or NCO level. The problem is that it is all located either in field units or at a variety of headquarters and since headquarters are not well known for willingly giving up their staff positions it would seem to me that we're just playing a shell game if we allocate PYs to a permanent FSCB organization ... the positions will most probably come out of units anyway but permanently rather than temporarily.
> 
> If we were to pull 300 some odd MCpls to majors PYs out of Ottawa to form an FSCB battalion I'd be all for it. My guess, however, is that it will end up coming out of the light battalions and several of the other arms.
> 
> 🍻


The Army Commander in 2019 referred to the "missing middle" with regards to our Sgt to Maj level of leadership. I just came from an operational garrison, and we had rifle companies commanded by Lieutenants with a single Lieutenant as the 2IC as the rest of the leadership was tasked out to capacity building operations and missions with a heavy draw on leadership. My Garrison support unit was also critically short of Sgts to Majs. You can't just snap your fingers and draw 300 MCpl to Maj PYs out of Ottawa and have leaders who would go on those missions. 

Regarding SSE, if this discussion is to be more than cloud shoveling then it needs a framework grounded in our tasks and not our wishes. Now, since this is not a decision-making body I suppose it doesn't make much of a difference in the end.  

One option that should be on the table, if capacity building missions are going to be the norm, should be converting some of our units into such organizations. When not engaged on such missions they could run training for both components.


----------



## Kirkhill

Particularly like the idea of operationalizing the training system and having them learn their trade on our own citizen volunteers.


----------



## Underway

GR66 said:


> Actually the Centauro II with the 120mm gun does have stabilization for firing on the move.  Otherwise you're basically claiming the same differences between a Leopard and Centauro as could be made between a Jagdtiger and a Hellcat. ...(snip)...



Sure, that doesn't invalidate my point.  All things are not equal. The French are very much fans of large calibre on light wheeled vehicles.  I think this is more of their recce doctrine, but also very useful in their colonial bush wars.


----------



## medic5

GR66 said:


> Actually the Centauro II with the 120mm gun does have stabilization for firing on the move.  Otherwise you're basically claiming the same differences between a Leopard and Centauro as could be made between a Jagdtiger and a Hellcat.
> 
> Yes it's Wikipedia, but it claims "The Hellcat was the most effective U.S. tank destroyer of World War II. It had a higher kill to loss ratio than any other tank or tank destroyer fielded by U.S. forces in World War II."  M18 Hellcat - Wikipedia
> 
> Another key point of course is to not refer to a TD as a "tank".  They have different and specific roles.  A TD is meant to be used in the defence...massing fire from a larger number of cheaper platforms to overwhelm attacking tanks through volume of fire (with the added bonus of being able to provide direct fire support to infantry).
> 
> I'm certainly not suggesting that we adopt something like the Centauro INSTEAD of Leopards, but simply raising the question as to whether the argument made by the speaker in relation to TD's historical roles and the advantage of superiority in quantity of platforms possibly has some validity now as well.
> 
> If we are going on the assumption that the role of the CF in a European conflict would at least initially be in the defence (I'm assuming that we have no intention of invading Russia), then would it for example be beneficial to have a Regiment of TDs as part of our armoured mix instead of three Armoured Recce Regiments?   Maybe a Tank Regiment for the attack, a TD Regiment for defence and an Armoured Recce Regiment for....well Recce.


These are just my thoughts on the whole tank destroyer concept:

In order to defeat modern armour you need a large caliber high velocity gun. In order to mount a large caliber gun you need a rather large chassis. Larger vehicle means more vulnerability and more logistical burden. In the end you have a vehicle that can be destroyed with quite literally any handheld infantry anti-tank weapon, plus probably whatever autocannon is mounted on IFVs/AFVs.

Would you rather spend your money and manpower on a vehicle that won't last a second on the battlefield and is vulnerable to everything, or just purchase and man infantry anti-tank weapons that go from point blank to NLOS?

About the comparison between the Jagdtiger and Hellcat, mobility and size would be what I deem to be the largest differences. Today a Leopard has just as much mobility as any "tank destroyer" on good terrain and size is identical.


----------



## medic5

Underway said:


> Sure, that doesn't invalidate my point.  All things are not equal. The French are very much fans of large calibre on light wheeled vehicles.  I think this is more of their recce doctrine, but also very useful in their colonial bush wars.


Underway,

Why can the French operate lightly armoured vehicles in their colonial wars without them being constantly destroyed by IEDs? What differences are there between the French's conflicts versus the US in the Middle East?


----------



## daftandbarmy

medic5 said:


> Underway,
> 
> Why can the French operate lightly armoured vehicles in their colonial wars without them being constantly destroyed by IEDs? What differences are there between the French's conflicts versus the US in the Middle East?



They aren't immune:

Two French soldiers killed in Mali: French presidency​President Emmanuel Macron’s office says an explosive device hit the soldiers’ vehicle Saturday in Mali’s Menaka region.









						Two French soldiers killed in Mali: French presidency
					

President Emmanuel Macron’s office says an explosive device hit the soldiers’ vehicle Saturday in Mali’s Menaka region.




					www.aljazeera.com


----------



## Underway

medic5 said:


> Underway,
> 
> Why can the French operate lightly armoured vehicles in their colonial wars without them being constantly destroyed by IEDs? What differences are there between the French's conflicts versus the US in the Middle East?


Assuming this is correct and not just recency bias (ie: we don't see the French news so the perceived risk may be different than what it actually is).

This is just a guess based on what I have read. It comes down to the terrain and population.  The French conflict in Mali has much less urban terrain to fight in than Afghanistan and Iraq did.  And what urban terrain there is, its not 3-foot thick mud buildings that double as bunkers.  

It likely means that the  French can choose different routes to their targets and thus avoid obvious IED emplacement.  The second thing is that the conflict is ethnic in nature. This means that the local population may very well be on the side of the French as opposed to Iraq/Afghanistan where the local population was often ambivalent or hostile.  The major urban centres are pro-French.

/complete supposition


----------



## CBH99

medic5 said:


> Underway,
> 
> Why can the French operate lightly armoured vehicles in their colonial wars without them being constantly destroyed by IEDs? What differences are there between the French's conflicts versus the US in the Middle East?


Mali does present a considerable IED threat.  

Their light vehicles can go almost anywhere (I think we’ve all seen videos of their super light tanks basically parked almost vertically after reversing up a decent gradient) - their vehicles can go basically anywhere.  

Underway is correct.  Heavy firepower on light vehicles seems to work well for them.  


We should also remember though, both Iraq and Afghanistan were drawn out conflicts with plenty of western forces going about those two countries.  A lot of France’s bushfire ‘wars’ tend to be short interventions, if they go dynamic.  (Problems aren’t short lived, but action taken to temporarily deal with the escalation tends to be short lived.)

The IED threat in Iraq and Afghanistan was substantially higher than any other conflicts happening at the time - precisely because we provided our with a target rich force, and they knew our LAVs & convoys would stick to the roads unless in a TIC.  So not only were we a decently target rich enemy for them, we were predictable to an extent.  

They also knew that western media was moreso their ally than ours.  Killing 4 or 6 western soldiers in an IED strike would prompt outcry from that country’s citizenry, which would eventually have the country pull its forces.  And the best way for them to do it was with IEDs.  


The insurgency in Mali - as far as I understand anyway - isn’t that sophisticated yet.  


0.02 (I could be totally wrong about the above, just thoughts)


----------



## CBH99

Underway said:


> Assuming this is correct and not just recency bias (ie: we don't see the French news so the perceived risk may be different than what it actually is).
> 
> This is just a guess based on what I have read. It comes down to the terrain and population.  The French conflict in Mali has much less urban terrain to fight in than Afghanistan and Iraq did.  And what urban terrain there is, its not 3-foot thick mud buildings that double as bunkers.
> 
> It likely means that the  French can choose different routes to their targets and thus avoid obvious IED emplacement.  The second thing is that the conflict is ethnic in nature. This means that the local population may very well be on the side of the French as opposed to Iraq/Afghanistan where the local population was often ambivalent or hostile.  The major urban centres are pro-French.
> 
> /complete supposition


We posted at the same time Underway.  

Underway worded what I was trying to say much more succinctly.


----------



## Brad Sallows

The purpose-built gun-armed TD made sense for a short period in WWII (a period before it was actually developed and deployed); it no longer does.

The point was to put a weapon powerful enough to defeat tanks on a tracked chassis so that it could move into and out of action rapidly (more so than towed guns) and displace to new positions on the battlefield.  Today a powerful enough gun can be put into a heavily armoured, closed-top, properly turreted tank with high battlefield mobility and speed.

The other piece of equipment that has the requisite mobility and hitting power is the attack helicopter - the true successor to the tracked TD.

Whatever anti-armour capability Canada has must firstly be properly employable for defence against armour other than in massed tank-heavy formations.  For the latter, we need a doctrine (and allies) but not another over-specialized piece of equipment.  If a wheeled gun is wanted, other reasons should (must) be found.


----------



## OldSolduer

CBH99 said:


> We posted at the same time Underway.
> 
> Underway worded what I was trying to say much more succinctly.


I'll give the French credit - if they think its an issue they will take some form of action, world opinion be damned.


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The Army Commander in 2019 referred to the "missing middle" with regards to our Sgt to Maj level of leadership. I just came from an operational garrison, and we had rifle companies commanded by Lieutenants with a single Lieutenant as the 2IC as the rest of the leadership was tasked out to capacity building operations and missions with a heavy draw on leadership. My Garrison support unit was also critically short of Sgts to Majs. You can't just snap your fingers and draw 300 MCpl to Maj PYs out of Ottawa and have leaders who would go on those missions.


I guess that's my own fault for saying "Ottawa" when I should have said "headquarters". IMHO we do not need four static divisional headquarters nor ten static brigade headquarters and I'm wondering if even CMTC is still a necessary thing or becoming an unaffordable luxury. What use is there for these entities if the deployable field force becomes tiny and non deployable as well?

If capacity building is so important (and I actually agree with you that we should have an entity that is specifically oriented towards that and tasked with it) then the manning for it has to come out of somewhere. If not the headquarters then the field units are the only solution.

Where you and I diverge in this discussion is that I do believe that one can just "snap your fingers" and reduce the size of the headquarters. The problem is no one will commit to snapping their fingers. Instead they sit around in committees and let every HQ department justify their existence and the need to keep their departments filled while operational companies are run by lieutenants. One only needs to look at the limited outcome that came out of Leslie's report and his statistics of what expanded disproportionately during the Afghan period to see where all the PYs have gone.

The issue is that when you are short of folks, which the Army appears to be, then you need to take an appetite suppressant somewhere. Real defence outputs are not measured by how many people we employ simply administering the bureaucracy of defence. We need to protect the field force's organizational integrity (even if we change its structure) so that it does not lose additional PYs to administrative functions or niche roles.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> Regarding SSE, if this discussion is to be more than cloud shoveling then it needs a framework grounded in our tasks and not our wishes. Now, since this is not a decision-making body I suppose it doesn't make much of a difference in the end.


Like I said, the argument that this discussion should come out of the SSE is something I believe in as well (albeit that I have some issues with SSE). The problem with that approach is that for even a reasonable discussion those who see the NATO mission see justification for their approach, while peacekeepers and capacity builders see theirs and defence of the homeland ones see theirs. The question is where do you put the emphasis? On this issue people in this forum and elsewhere will differ.

I've said for some time that the multiplicity of our missions isn't the problem, the problem is that as a symmetric and general purpose Army, we toss taskings around like candy at a kid's birthday party while our managed readiness system guarantees that a large portion of our force is "not ready". By reorganizing the force into two divisions - one with one Reg F brigade and designated reserve units to concentrate on a heavy force for deterrence with NATO and one with two Reg F brigades (one light and one mech) and designated reserve units to concentrate on rapid reaction scenarios, capacity building and peacekeeping - would reduce both staff and training time in preparing for missions; would facilitate the ability to more fully integrate the Res F into their Reg F counterparts role; and facilitate equipping, maintaining and sustaining the separate parts.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> One option that should be on the table, if capacity building missions are going to be the norm, should be converting some of our units into such organizations. When not engaged on such missions they could run training for both components.


And yes, I would give capacity building as one of the tasks of the light brigade and probably reconfigure the brigade in such a way that all of the requisite components of a proper capacity building unit - including a rotational system - were part and parcel to its establishment. To me, the best structure for a capacity building force is one based on a battle group structure with a core of leaders and instructors for all the key elements (inf, armour/recce, arty, engr, sigs, CSS) which would not only be able, in its day-to-day role, to provide the capacity building function but could also, in an emergency with planned augmentation from the reserves expand into a full light battle group or more.

It strikes me that the light brigade would have less day-to-day out of country missions if the heavy brigade concentrates on northern Europe and the medium brigade on peacekeeping rotations and thus look more to internal issues such as capacity building the reserves and northern and coastal operations.

While I totally agree that there must be an integrated training system for both components  that has the capacity to shrink or expand with the fluctuating demands for training output, I see some issues in having a unit that is designed to do both capacity building and own force training. When it comes to own force training one of the most critical elements, especially for the Res F is regularity and dependability that courses will go as planned. It's hard enough just integrating Reg F and Res F training because of the summer training v summer leave/APS cycles of the two forces. Adding a foreign component in, especially if it requires delivering that training in the foreign country creates a complexity that will almost ensure something will have to give - my bet is it would be the Res F training element. We definitely need to fix the training system of both our Reg F and Res F components and it needs to be one that is focused heavily towards training the Res F during the prime school vacation periods when both the students and the Reg F equipment is available and, as much as possible, by distributing that training as far down to the local level as is practical.

So, that in broad strokes, is my solution. I'm interested in hearing yours.

🍻


----------



## CBH99

Strong domestic manufacturing capability for their military goods.  Carrier capability.  Strong navy.  Strong nuclear sub capability.   Non-NATO member who can match to the beat of their own drum if they choose. 

They really are the heavy hitters of Europe.  I’m not sure why the world saw Germany as such for so long. 

The French have a mighty big stick when they need it.

Edit - ^^ reply to OldSoldier.


----------



## GR66

My point isn't to be a cheerleader for the Centaruo but to question assumptions.  If the purpose of Force 2025 is to re-align the CF to better meet the challenges of future warfare then I think this is the time to do it.

The claim has been made and often repeated that the best anti-tank weapon is another tank.  Is that really the case?  What makes it better than ATGMs, Loitering Munitions, Artillery, etc.?  Is it the fact that the round fired from a tank is faster and harder to intercept and does greater damage than the other options?  If that's the case then is it more tank guns that we need (regardless of how they are mounted) to best defeat enemy armour?  Is it the armour protection that the tank provides which makes it survivable?  Is that level of protection only required because a tank is a line-of-sight weapon?  

Is a tank currently designed the way it is more for its offensive role (it has to be able to survive in an exposed attack) rather than for its defensive role as an anti-tank weapon?  Would different designs for each role be more effective...or do we simply combine the requirements into a single dual-purpose design for flexibility?  What are the benefits and costs of each approach.

Then there is the higher level questions.  Is the offensive capability of a tank worth the cost if the rest of your forces aren't equipped to be able to conduct offensive operations?  What can your tanks achieve if the accompanying infantry is cut apart in non-survivable APCs?  

Again...maybe the tank is the right answer, but maybe we should ask some tough questions about what kinds of conflicts we expect to face and what the best tools to win those conflicts might be.

$.02


----------



## Underway

OldSolduer said:


> I'll give the French credit - if they think its an issue they will take some form of action, world opinion be damned.



complete sidetrack:  They never gave up their colonies.  The entirety of French Africa has been subsidizing France's treasury for more than 60 years.  Quite literally if the Frenchafrique wants access to their own money they have to borrow it from the French National bank.  They are financially under the thumb of France.  Interestingly whenever a politician in those colonies makes a big play to remove French currency they get assassinated.  Also isn't it interesting that when Gaddafi made a large play to replace the French currencies with a Pan African one suddenly his country fell apart?

Good video on what is essentially French oppression to control their "colonies"


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> Strong domestic manufacturing capability for their military goods.  Carrier capability.  Strong navy.  Strong nuclear sub capability.   Non-NATO member who can match to the beat of their own drum if they choose.
> 
> They really are the heavy hitters of Europe.  I’m not sure why the world saw Germany as such for so long.
> 
> The French have a mighty big stick when they need it.
> 
> Edit - ^^ reply to OldSoldier.


It's because for most of the last half of the last century Germany looked at the threat on its northern and eastern border and constitutionally isolated itself from interference in the rest of the world while France had a strong buffer to its north and thus had the luxury of looking outward at its possessions, its former possessions and the Francophonie.

🍻


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

GR66 said:


> My point isn't to be a cheerleader for the Centaruo but to question assumptions.  If the purpose of Force 2025 is to re-align the CF to better meet the challenges of future warfare then I think this is the time to do it.
> 
> The claim has been made and often repeated that the best anti-tank weapon is another tank.  Is that really the case?  What makes it better than ATGMs, Loitering Munitions, Artillery, etc.?  Is it the fact that the round fired from a tank is faster and harder to intercept and does greater damage than the other options?  If that's the case then is it more tank guns that we need (regardless of how they are mounted) to best defeat enemy armour?  Is it the armour protection that the tank provides which makes it survivable?  Is that level of protection only required because a tank is a line-of-sight weapon?
> 
> Is a tank currently designed the way it is more for its offensive role (it has to be able to survive in an exposed attack) rather than for its defensive role as an anti-tank weapon?  Would different designs for each role be more effective...or do we simply combine the requirements into a single dual-purpose design for flexibility?  What are the benefits and costs of each approach.
> 
> Then there is the higher level questions.  Is the offensive capability of a tank worth the cost if the rest of your forces aren't equipped to be able to conduct offensive operations?  What can your tanks achieve if the accompanying infantry is cut apart in non-survivable APCs?
> 
> Again...maybe the tank is the right answer, but maybe we should ask some tough questions about what kinds of conflicts we expect to face and what the best tools to win those conflicts might be.
> 
> $.02


We bought the Leopard 2s with the money intended for 66 Mobile Gun Systems (MGS). Now, buying military equipment is sometimes a little like eBay where the shipping costs can add up. 

The Leopard 2A6M is a supreme tank-killer with its optics, electronics and 55 calibre barrel. Other systems can kill tanks, though, and simple tank-killing is not necessarily a reason to get a tank. An MBT is a general purpose weapon system and is one of the fundamental components of combat power on the modern, conventional battlefield. We have Leopard 2s, so I don't see the need to go and invest in a wheeled gun system. I absolutely see a need for infantry-portable anti-tank weapons in the 2k band and some longer range ATGMs. Having infantry AT means that we can mass our tanks as required instead of parceling them out a troop at a time to protect infantry companies. 

A LAV company with four Javelin and perhaps two TOW in support with an obstacle plan and fire support should be able to block against a battalion supported by tanks. This frees a Leopard Squadron attached to the BG to be countermoves, massing as appropriate instead of being weak everywhere and strong nowhere. 

This is not a new lesson, but it was brought home to me on Capability Development Experiment 10 (CDX10), which I wrote about a few pages back. 

While I was impressed by Namer's when I was in the Middle East, you don't necessarily need those to conduct offensive operations in a conventional battlefield. We have doctrine and tactics to allow mechanized infantry to make a contribution to the fight from vehicles with the protection of a LAV or M113. Namers are very useful in stability operations where you might be sending infantry into urban areas against an irregular foe. 

We have a world-class MBT, and if our infantry had something like Javelin we could field one of the most capable Battle Groups around. Perhaps in a Cavalry role for a formation, perhaps as a line BG as part of a Multi-National Brigade Group.


----------



## quadrapiper

markppcli said:


> So this is a multi faceted question. That I spent a fair bit of time staring at the screen writing and rewriting answers to. The answer is quite simply between the crew qualifications, the OJT training of the Limas, and the spatial awareness required of command teams (we move faster and reach further) it all adds up a lot. All of those people, however, are qualified dismounted infanteers and cover those skills on their career courses in a way that is not always true in the reverse ( WOs and up excluded).
> 
> I am pretty firm in my belief it's much easier, from a training perspective, so strip LAVs and have guys go dismounted then it is to add LAVs and all of a sudden insert a huge amount of both class room and field training.


Copy. Would (and this is assuming "light" is useful, as opposed to "LAV-less") replacing LAV-related time with mountain, jump, and other skills produce sufficient training time to deliver three battalions who're able to effectively maintain those skills across their structure, rather than as three orphan companies?


markppcli said:


> To your other point, again each Light Bn has a para coy, has a mountain coy, has an "other coy." I don't see what you're suggesting as different? Bare in mind, we're all just talking about the numbers in a full Bn, but the army is talking about stripping Bns down to 60 percent manning to fill schools. So why are we even acting like 9 Bns is doable?


You'd mentioned that those current units were too small to maintain the specialty: assumed that meant three scattered companies were too small, so was looking at massing - whether that would mean a para battalion, a mountain battalion, and a "miscellaneous" battalion, or being able to deliver those skills to all three battalions at a sufficiently high level of quality to be worthwhile.

As far as numbers, better informed people keep mentioning overgrown HQs.


----------



## OldSolduer

Underway said:


> complete sidetrack:  They never gave up their colonies.  The entirety of French Africa has been subsidizing France's treasury for more than 60 years.  Quite literally if the Frenchafrique wants access to their own money they have to borrow it from the French National bank.  They are financially under the thumb of France.  Interestingly whenever a politician in those colonies makes a big play to remove French currency they get assassinated.  Also isn't it interesting that when Gaddafi made a large play to replace the French currencies with a Pan African one suddenly his country fell apart?
> 
> Good video on what is essentially French oppression to control their "colonies"


Thank you for your explanation. Its very interesting and informative.


----------



## markppcli

quadrapiper said:


> Copy. Would (and this is assuming "light" is useful, as opposed to "LAV-less") replacing LAV-related time with mountain, jump, and other skills produce sufficient training time to deliver three battalions who're able to effectively maintain those skills across their structure, rather than as three orphan companies?
> 
> You'd mentioned that those current units were too small to maintain the specialty: assumed that meant three scattered companies were too small, so was looking at massing - whether that would mean a para battalion, a mountain battalion, and a "miscellaneous" battalion, or being able to deliver those skills to all three battalions at a sufficiently high level of quality to be worthwhile.
> 
> As far as numbers, better informed people keep mentioning overgrown HQ



Sorry I'm not trying to be rude here, but that's literally what we have in terms of numbers. I guess you could group all the light companies by specialty, sure, but we still wouldn't have the capacity for supporting them. For example who's providing them mobility, fire support, or feeding and fueling them? In terms of training time, that's largely what happens.  I just don't see what the benefit is, it's like we're chasing a job for the Light Bns as opposed to filling the jobs we know we need filled. 

If we cut an HQ, and I think we probably ought to,  those PYs aren't Ptes and Cpls that you need to fill in the sections and platoons.


----------



## OldSolduer

markppcli said:


> those PYs aren't Ptes and Cpls that you need to fill in the sections and platoons.


And here's the issue: Everyone talks about equipment and infrastructure but to make it work you have to have breathing thinking human beings.  That seems to be forgotten.


----------



## CBH99

TangoTwoBravo said:


> We bought the Leopard 2s with the money intended for 66 Mobile Gun Systems (MGS). Now, buying military equipment is sometimes a little like eBay where the shipping costs can add up.
> 
> The Leopard 2A6M is a supreme tank-killer with its optics, electronics and 55 calibre barrel. Other systems can kill tanks, though, and simple tank-killing is not necessarily a reason to get a tank. An MBT is a general purpose weapon system and is one of the fundamental components of combat power on the modern, conventional battlefield. We have Leopard 2s, so I don't see the need to go and invest in a wheeled gun system. I absolutely see a need for infantry-portable anti-tank weapons in the 2k band and some longer range ATGMs. Having infantry AT means that we can mass our tanks as required instead of parceling them out a troop at a time to protect infantry companies.
> 
> A LAV company with four Javelin and perhaps two TOW in support with an obstacle plan and fire support should be able to block against a battalion supported by tanks. This frees a Leopard Squadron attached to the BG to be countermoves, massing as appropriate instead of being weak everywhere and strong nowhere.
> 
> This is not a new lesson, but it was brought home to me on Capability Development Experiment 10 (CDX10), which I wrote about a few pages back.
> 
> While I was impressed by Namer's when I was in the Middle East, you don't necessarily need those to conduct offensive operations in a conventional battlefield. We have doctrine and tactics to allow mechanized infantry to make a contribution to the fight from vehicles with the protection of a LAV or M113. Namers are very useful in stability operations where you might be sending infantry into urban areas against an irregular foe.
> 
> We have a world-class MBT, and if our infantry had something like Javelin we could field one of the most capable Battle Groups around. Perhaps in a Cavalry role for a formation, perhaps as a line BG as part of a Multi-National Brigade Group.


Amen.  

The acquisition of a modern ATGM and DMR would be an extremely cheap way to drastically increase the lethality of a BG.  

In theory both could be easy contracts.  Fund them, push them through as UORs, train the troops, done.  (Relatively easy, I know someone will point out the inevitable ‘can’t snap your fingers’ point, which is valid.)

Doesn’t require an increase in PYs.  Does give them the ability to reach out and accurately touch someone though.  Or blow up their ride.


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> Amen.
> 
> The acquisition of a modern ATGM and DMR would be an extremely cheap way to drastically increase the lethality of a BG.
> 
> In theory both could be easy contracts.  Fund them, push them through as UORs, train the troops, done.  (Relatively easy, I know someone will point out the inevitable ‘can’t snap your fingers’ point, which is valid.)
> 
> Doesn’t require an increase in PYs.  Does give them the ability to reach out and accurately touch someone though.  Or blow up their ride.



Regretfully UORs are not for the acquisition of equipment that is meant to become a standard in the force but only with mission specific without the usual long term maintenance and support and organizational changes. UORs are Unforecasted Operational Requirements and intended to be for temporary operational use. I'm not sure if this requirement is currently in the Army's wish list and know even less as to its status (if any).

On the other hand, I'm coming to the conclusion that they could be cheaply integrated if one considers that the CLU is not terribly expensive as compared to the missile and that, as a fire and forget weapon, it does not require much (if any) experience in actually firing a number of weapons in training. Most of the proficiency seems to come from training in its tactical employment and from Javelin simulator missions to teach acquisition and tracking. 

A few articles that I've seen indicate that live firing is not part of the training package for many individual trainees in the US Army. That means one could get by with a very limited training stock and even a small war stock with additional purchases coming in times of crisis.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Well ALAWS has apparently separated from the Light Force Enhancement Project, so some kind of ATGM is in the works within the next 5 ish years.

DMR is, to me, a very COIN oriented weapon system. I get the rule of cool effect they have, but I don't know that it massively increases a section or a platoon's lethality. If we did want them though, simply order more C20s.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> They aren't immune:
> 
> Two French soldiers killed in Mali: French presidency​President Emmanuel Macron’s office says an explosive device hit the soldiers’ vehicle Saturday in Mali’s Menaka region.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Two French soldiers killed in Mali: French presidency
> 
> 
> President Emmanuel Macron’s office says an explosive device hit the soldiers’ vehicle Saturday in Mali’s Menaka region.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.aljazeera.com



They aren't immune.  They just have a higher pain threshold.  Especially when its foreigners in French service.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> The purpose-built gun-armed TD made sense for a short period in WWII (a period before it was actually developed and deployed); it no longer does.
> 
> The point was to put a weapon powerful enough to defeat tanks on a tracked chassis so that it could move into and out of action rapidly (more so than towed guns) and displace to new positions on the battlefield.  Today a powerful enough gun can be put into a heavily armoured, closed-top, properly turreted tank with high battlefield mobility and speed.
> 
> The other piece of equipment that has the requisite mobility and hitting power is the attack helicopter - the true successor to the tracked TD.
> 
> Whatever anti-armour capability Canada has must firstly be properly employable for defence against armour other than in massed tank-heavy formations.  For the latter, we need a doctrine (and allies) but not another over-specialized piece of equipment.  If a wheeled gun is wanted, other reasons should (must) be found.




Both the Heavily Armoured vehicle (wheeled or tracked) and the Attack Helicopter - take time to deploy from Canada and require a great deal of in-theatre support.  Although a half-squadron of AH-64s could probably be supported and commanded from the Asterix or a JSS.  Load weapons on shore.


----------



## medic5

Kirkhill said:


> Both the Heavily Armoured vehicle (wheeled or tracked) and the Attack Helicopter - take time to deploy from Canada and require a great deal of in-theatre support.  Although a half-squadron of AH-64s could probably be supported and commanded from the Asterix or a JSS.  Load weapons on shore.


I too am a huge fan of attack helicopters. What I worry is their vulnerability in places they would be useful, especially if we lack capable and modern fighters to protect them. (F-35, Trudeau.)


----------



## Kirkhill

CBH99 said:


> Amen.
> 
> The acquisition of a modern ATGM and DMR would be an extremely cheap way to drastically increase the lethality of a BG.
> 
> In theory both could be easy contracts.  Fund them, push them through as UORs, train the troops, done.  (Relatively easy, I know someone will point out the inevitable ‘can’t snap your fingers’ point, which is valid.)
> 
> Doesn’t require an increase in PYs.  Does give them the ability to reach out and accurately touch someone though.  Or blow up their ride.



Converts the infantry battalion, regardless of means of transport, into an effective contributor to any battlefield - and not just cargo to button up inside a patrol vehicle that covers long ranges at a high rate of knots.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Converts the infantry battalion, regardless of means of transport, into an effective contributor to any battlefield - and not just cargo to button up inside a patrol vehicle that covers long ranges at a high rate of knots.



Assuming three rifle companies, 1 x 84mm per section gives you 27 x 84mm. Add 1 x C6 to those sections and you have a nice little 'speed bump' for any enemy armoured formation.

As I recall, this was the scale of issue we had when participating in various NATO exercises. Our company level Kill Zones were well covered.

Battalion assets (16 x MILAN, 9 x 81mm MOR & 9 x C6-SF) thickened things up and closed the gaps nicely.

And yes, we were 'light' infantry and carried all this stuff.


----------



## Kirkhill

One point I would raise about in support of the American decision to distribute the ATGMs widely - you can't kill them all.

If you concentrate them in a Battalion platoon or a Platoon det  you risk loosing your entire capability.  All you really need, perhaps in a small battalion concentration, is your Anti-Tank Defence Co-Ordination Cell to establish the plan for all the AT weapons in the battalion, regardless of the level they are held at.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Assuming three rifle companies, 1 x 84mm per section gives you 27 x 84mm. Add 1 x C6 to those sections and you have a nice little 'speed bump' for any enemy armoured formation.
> 
> As I recall, this was the scale of issue we had when participating in various NATO exercises. Our company level Kill Zones were well covered.
> 
> Battalion assets (16 x MILAN, 9 x 81mm MOR & 9 x C6-SF) thickened things up and closed the gaps nicely.
> 
> And yes, we were 'light' infantry and carried all this stuff.



Not that you would have objected to an Airborne wheelbarrow or a Mini Moke if they were handy?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Not that you would have objected to an Airborne wheelbarrow or a Mini Moke if they were handy?



Actually, the best solution is 'host nation transport', as it's known. 

Where the Queen doesn't provide, we 'procure' through local arrangements. We had something going with the local Home Guard, for example, and borrowed their vehicles sometimes.

Then there was the guy whose day job was driving semi-trailers


----------



## Underway

daftandbarmy said:


> Actually, the best solution is 'host nation transport', as it's known.
> 
> Where the Queen doesn't provide, we 'procure' through local arrangements. We had something going with the local Home Guard, for example, and borrowed their vehicles sometimes.
> 
> Then there was the guy whose day job was driving semi-trailers



Did the same in Afghanistan.  Our shipped from Canada John Deere Gator broke and it would have cost $20,000 to get a new one.  We looked over the FOB wall and pointed to a tuk-tuk driving by (essentially a motorcycle front with a two-wheeled bed in back) and asked "how much would those cost?"   Turns out $2000.  We bought two, saved the crown $16000, and had way more fun driving them around.  Even jingled them all up because that's how you are supposed to roll in a tuk-tuk.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> If you concentrate them in a Battalion platoon or a Platoon det  you risk loosing your entire capability.



WTF?  How does organizational concentration require spatial concentration?


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> One point I would raise about in support of the American decision to distribute the ATGMs widely - you can't kill them all.
> 
> If you concentrate them in a Battalion platoon or a Platoon det  you risk loosing your entire capability.  All you really need, perhaps in a small battalion concentration, is your Anti-Tank Defence Co-Ordination Cell to establish the plan for all the AT weapons in the battalion, regardless of the level they are held at.


My experience suggests otherwise.  Concentration allows for focus, and expertise.  Machine guns are distributed willy nilly around the battalion, and our Corps machine gun capability is woeful these days.

I've watched us work side-by-side with other militaries who concentrate these capabilities at some level and the difference in abilities is noticeable.


----------



## GR66

It seems the general consensus is that we should at the least strive to be able to field a mechanized Brigade Group capable of fighting in a peer fight.  Since this is the most complex/high end capability we expect to need it makes sense that we should address that need first.

What does that Brigade look like?


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> My experience suggests otherwise.  Concentration allows for focus, and expertise.  Machine guns are distributed willy nilly around the battalion, and our Corps machine gun capability is woeful these days.
> 
> I've watched us work side-by-side with other militaries who concentrate these capabilities at some level and the difference in abilities is noticeable.


But you distribute LAVs Willy nilly.  Every section gets one.  😁


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Actually, the best solution is 'host nation transport', as it's known.
> 
> Where the Queen doesn't provide, we 'procure' through local arrangements. We had something going with the local Home Guard, for example, and borrowed their vehicles sometimes.
> 
> Then there was the guy whose day job was driving semi-trailers


Procedure was up and running in Palestine.  😁


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

GR66 said:


> It seems the general consensus is that we should at the least strive to be able to field a mechanized Brigade Group capable of fighting in a peer fight.  Since this is the most complex/high end capability we expect to need it makes sense that we should address that need first.
> 
> What does that Brigade look like?


Well, I think that a Battle Group (BG) is a more realistic goal for a high-intensity peer fight. We are almost there, with infantry anti-tank being the big delta and that is _fairly_ easy to fix. 

Going to a CMBG would require much more in terms of capabilities. Our artillery is not ready for that kind of fight. A CMBG should have GBAD. That is not to say we should not look to achieve that. Just that we need to be realistic. We already have template for what a CMBG should look like for that kind of fight. From an Excel table/Powerpoint TO&E we are there...


----------



## medic5

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Well, I think that a Battle Group (BG) is a more realistic goal for a high-intensity peer fight. We are almost there, with infantry anti-tank being the big delta and that is _fairly_ easy to fix.
> 
> Going to a CMBG would require much more in terms of capabilities. Our artillery is not ready for that kind of fight. A CMBG should have GBAD. That is not to say we should not look to achieve that. Just that we need to be realistic. We already have template for what a CMBG should look like for that kind of fight. From an Excel table/Powerpoint TO&E we are there...


I seem to remember something about US Army BCTs being fairly weak on air defence as well. What goes between 1980s Stingers and the extremely rare Patriot battery?

Is a lack of effective air defence a uniquely Canadian thing, or is it a western thing where air superiority has been guaranteed for the last 40 years?


----------



## CBH99

medic5 said:


> I seem to remember something about US Army BCTs being fairly weak on air defence as well. What goes between 1980s Stingers and the extremely rare Patriot battery?
> 
> Is a lack of effective air defence a uniquely Canadian thing, or is it a western thing where air superiority has been guaranteed for the last 40 years?


It isn’t a uniquely Canadian problem by any stretch.  

Most western countries were focused on COIN operations for the last 20 years or so.   With limited budgets, AD capabilities atrophied across NATO with most countries.  

One thing the US can do very well is design & introduce a new capability in lightning speed, even if just an interim capability.  Upgunning the Strykers with a 35mm was pretty quick, and putting together an AD package for the Stryker was pretty quick too.  

But it isn’t just a Canadian problem.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> WTF?  How does organizational concentration require spatial concentration?


You're not wrong.  The battalion Javelin platoon, rather than giving them 6x ACSVs of their own to travel in, could be allocated as a gunner and loader pair to 24 LAVs.   Assuming there is a couple of spare seats available.

Organizational concentration doesn't require spatial concentration.


----------



## FJAG

Not


medic5 said:


> I seem to remember something about US Army BCTs being fairly weak on air defence as well. What goes between 1980s Stingers and the extremely rare Patriot battery?
> 
> Is a lack of effective air defence a uniquely Canadian thing, or is it a western thing where air superiority has been guaranteed for the last 40 years?


Not just weak but nonexistent. Air defence in the US Army is a divisional and higher resource. Around the same time that the Army started splitting into BCTs, the divisions (which still exist) were divested of air defence capabilities although a significantly reduced capability stayed within bot Active Army and National Guard AD battalions and brigades.

At it's lowest level is the shoulder fired Stinger which, while it still is available in large numbers are not in general distribution within BCTs. They are available for specific roles and some appear as self defence weapons on Navy ships.

The next level of air defence that would be available at the BCT level is the Avenger which is a vehicle mounted battery of Stingers and a .50 machine gun. These mostly exist in Natl Guard battalions but because of the recent revival of AD a few additional Active Army battalions have been reformed as a temporary measure while the new Stryker mounted SHORAD systems are coming on line.

There are additional layers of higher and further striking systems in the inventory and if your interested in the overall state, there's a fairly recent Congressional briefing paper on the subject here.

In short, BCT's do not currently have organic AD systems but do operate under an AD umbrella when there is an air threat.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Assuming three rifle companies, 1 x 84mm per section gives you 27 x 84mm. Add 1 x C6 to those sections and you have a nice little 'speed bump' for any enemy armoured formation.
> 
> As I recall, this was the scale of issue we had when participating in various NATO exercises. Our company level Kill Zones were well covered.
> 
> Battalion assets (16 x MILAN, 9 x 81mm MOR & 9 x C6-SF) thickened things up and closed the gaps nicely.
> 
> And yes, we were 'light' infantry and carried all this stuff.


Interesting that all the stuff that was relied on to do the killing was in the Support Company.

And that without the Support Company both the infantry and the rest of the Army seem to have lost the sense of what an infantry battalion is and what it can do.  What it isn't is a bunch of riflemen.

Who supports who?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Interesting that all the stuff that was relied on to do the killing was in the Support Company.
> 
> And that without the Support Company both the infantry and the rest of the Army seem to have lost the sense of what an infantry battalion is and what it can do.  What it isn't is a bunch of riflemen.
> 
> Who supports who?



I guess that's what a team is all about, right?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I think we still need to be able to operate as a CMBG - SSE directs us to be able to lead either a NATO or UN style mission and also states that the Brigade is important. Our CMBG HQs could certainly take a Sector in a place like Southern Lebanon (the UNIFIL Mission is a Div with two Sectors - each having a Bde HQ) or a NATO counter-insurgency/stability mission. 1st Cdn Div, owned by CJOC but inhabited by many Army folks, can at least provide a framework for something like RC South or even the HQ of a Cdn led mission. I think the environment would have to be somewhat permissive (we aren't fighting against conventional forces on a large scale).

Looking at the high-intensity European context, what capabilities do we need to operate as a pure CMBG within a multi-national Division?

Does the calculus change for something like Gulf War 1 or OIF?


----------



## CBH99

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Looking at the high-intensity European context, what capabilities do we need to operate as a pure CMBG within a multi-national division?


We do have decent APCs / IFVs.  As I think you stated upthread, we do have good tanks.  (Even if we could/should get them all to the same standard.)  

Looking at this purely from an Army perspective, I would go back to what you suggested upthread also.  A lethal, modern ATGM.  That alone could substantially increase lethality of our units.  

I had suggested a good DMR also.  

Ideally, 60mm and 81mm mortars available at the platoon or company level.  Options are always nice.  

And obviously a modern, lethal AD system. Preferably two actually - one MANPAD type, own vehicle mounted (talks to radar, etc)


None of these capabilities are expensive, complicated, timely to acquire or train, and we don’t ‘have’ to always have PYs dedicated to all of them simultaneously.  But if I had a vote, add those capabilities to our units that are already equipped with LAV 6 / TAPV / Leopard 2 - and we would have a pretty lethal and effective CMBG.


0.02


----------



## markppcli

CBH99 said:


> We do have decent APCs / IFVs.  As I think you stated upthread, we do have good tanks.  (Even if we could/should get them all to the same standard.)
> 
> Looking at this purely from an Army perspective, I would go back to what you suggested upthread also.  A lethal, modern ATGM.  That alone could substantially increase lethality of our units.
> 
> I had suggested a good DMR also.
> 
> Ideally, 60mm and 81mm mortars available at the platoon or company level.  Options are always nice.
> 
> And obviously a modern, lethal AD system. Preferably two actually - one MANPAD type, own vehicle mounted (talks to radar, etc)
> 
> 
> None of these capabilities are expensive, complicated, timely to acquire or train, and we don’t ‘have’ to always have PYs dedicated to all of them simultaneously.  But if I had a vote, add those capabilities to our units that are already equipped with LAV 6 / TAPV / Leopard 2 - and we would have a pretty lethal and effective CMBG.
> 
> 
> 0.02


If we need a DMR, just buy or re purpose the C20s. Done.


----------



## medic5

FJAG said:


> Not
> 
> Not just weak but nonexistent. Air defence in the US Army is a divisional and higher resource. Around the same time that the Army started splitting into BCTs, the divisions (which still exist) were divested of air defence capabilities although a significantly reduced capability stayed within bot Active Army and National Guard AD battalions and brigades.
> 
> At it's lowest level is the shoulder fired Stinger which, while it still is available in large numbers are not in general distribution within BCTs. They are available for specific roles and some appear as self defence weapons on Navy ships.
> 
> The next level of air defence that would be available at the BCT level is the Avenger which is a vehicle mounted battery of Stingers and a .50 machine gun. These mostly exist in Natl Guard battalions but because of the recent revival of AD a few additional Active Army battalions have been reformed as a temporary measure while the new Stryker mounted SHORAD systems are coming on line.
> 
> There are additional layers of higher and further striking systems in the inventory and if your interested in the overall state, there's a fairly recent Congressional briefing paper on the subject here.
> 
> In short, BCT's do not currently have organic AD systems but do operate under an AD umbrella when there is an air threat.
> 
> 🍻


Thanks FJAG. From my quick read at the paper, the Stinger remains the man-portable option, with Avengers (basically a Humvee with a bunch of Stingers) being replaced by M-SHORAD, a Stryker mounted system. Then a bunch of laser weapons that will probably never come to fruition. 

My question is this:
The US is no longer guaranteed to have air superiority in a peer conflict, therefore their maneuver units are required to have their own air defense. Today, the only air defense that is available is a few battalions of Humvee mounted Stingers, in a 58 BCT strong army. Why is air defense so low on the priority list for modernization? How does the Patriot function in an air defense system? 

If the US, who itself cannot even protect their own units, cannot protect their allies, should it not be the CAF's priority to fill this gap since nobody else can provide it in times of war?


----------



## medic5

markppcli said:


> If we need a DMR, just buy or re purpose the C20s. Done.


How does the 6.8/NGSW factor into this equation? Would it be worth it to follow the US if they do change caliber? How does increasing the standard caliber affect the DMR role?


----------



## markppcli

medic5 said:


> How does the 6.8/NGSW factor into this equation? Would it be worth it to follow the US if they do change caliber? How does increasing the standard caliber affect the DMR role?


In the next five years? It doesn't.


----------



## GR66

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Well, I think that a Battle Group (BG) is a more realistic goal for a high-intensity peer fight. We are almost there, with infantry anti-tank being the big delta and that is _fairly_ easy to fix.
> 
> Going to a CMBG would require much more in terms of capabilities. Our artillery is not ready for that kind of fight. A CMBG should have GBAD. That is not to say we should not look to achieve that. Just that we need to be realistic. We already have template for what a CMBG should look like for that kind of fight. From an Excel table/Powerpoint TO&E we are there...


I guess this really is the $64,000 question.  Is fielding a CMBG to a peer conflict currently "aspirational" or "delusional"? 

Can we realistically (even with some HQ consolidation and other "tweaks") deploy a full CMBG plus the CCSB in support to a conflict zone, keep it supplied and reinforced with both troops and replacement equipment/ammo/fuel/supplies to cover losses without totally breaking the Army? 

If it's not currently realistic then in terms of Force 2025/Force 2030 timeframes should we instead focus on being able to deploy a Battle Group instead?  If that's the case, then does using out current "Affiliated" Battle Group approach still make sense, or would creating "Optimal" Battle Groups better prepare us for a fight (17 pages of discussion here - enjoy!:  The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group).  Or possibly an asymmetric mix of the two.  Two or three "optimal" Battle Groups configured for (and training together for) a peer fight and a separate "traditional" CMBG with the Medium/Light forces to fulfill the ongoing typical/non-peer fight deployments.

I personally believe that we should aspire to being able to deploy and sustain full CMBG to a conflict but maybe we should accept that all the changes that are required to achieve that (force structure, major equipment, Reserve legislation, etc.) are beyond what can be realistically achieved in the 10-year timeframe.  If that's the case should we in the meantime structure ourselves in a way that we can maximize what we can currently contribute while we work toward the eventual goal?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> I guess this really is the $64,000 question.  Is fielding a CMBG to a peer conflict currently "aspirational" or "delusional"?
> 
> Can we realistically (even with some HQ consolidation and other "tweaks") deploy a full CMBG plus the CCSB in support to a conflict zone, keep it supplied and reinforced with both troops and replacement equipment/ammo/fuel/supplies to cover losses without totally breaking the Army?
> 
> If it's not currently realistic then in terms of Force 2025/Force 2030 timeframes should we instead focus on being able to deploy a Battle Group instead?  If that's the case, then does using out current "Affiliated" Battle Group approach still make sense, or would creating "Optimal" Battle Groups better prepare us for a fight (17 pages of discussion here - enjoy!:  The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group).  Or possibly an asymmetric mix of the two.  Two or three "optimal" Battle Groups configured for (and training together for) a peer fight and a separate "traditional" CMBG with the Medium/Light forces to fulfill the ongoing typical/non-peer fight deployments.
> 
> I personally believe that we should aspire to being able to deploy and sustain full CMBG to a conflict but maybe we should accept that all the changes that are required to achieve that (force structure, major equipment, Reserve legislation, etc.) are beyond what can be realistically achieved in the 10-year timeframe.  If that's the case should we in the meantime structure ourselves in a way that we can maximize what we can currently contribute while we work toward the eventual goal?



No idea if this has been done before, or makes sense, but would it be easier/ more efficient to have a reasonable number of 'high readiness coys/sqns/btys' in each Division?

Kind of like an IRU, but more of them and fully tooled up for WW3....


----------



## Underway

medic5 said:


> The US is no longer guaranteed to have air superiority in a peer conflict, therefore their maneuver units are required to have their own air defense.



Given anything approaching 6 months of conventional conflict, there will be no enemy airforce left in a conflict with the US.  No one comes even close to them.  The _US Navy_ has the second-largest airforce in the world with over 3700 aircraft.  NATO doctrine assumes strategic control of the air because frankly that's the most likely scenario by a long shot.

That being said with UAV's the NATO may not have _local_ superiority. Or there may be a need to shoot down incoming ordinance which is where GBAD comes into play.

Small UAS that can't be tracked or engaged by traditional air defense is the gap that needs to be plugged.  A MALE or HALE UAS can be engaged by traditional fighter aircraft and will likely be wiped out pretty quickly.  In particular triangulation of their ground stations will also be a priority.

But the small platoon and company level stuff of Scan Eagle size or smaller is a problem as they can sneak in under the fighter cover.

This is the type of GBAD that the Canadian army should be focusing on (IMHO), Stinger missiles, directed energy (microwave,laser), AA guns, and their own suicide UAVs to engage and limit exposure to such things.  It's a good thing small UAS were not mature enough during Afghanistan or there would have been plenty of issues with them in the FOB's dropping mortar bombs on us or flying into airspace to collide with aircraft.


----------



## Kirkhill

On the aspirational or delusional front - do we know how our enemies are going to fight?   Will they fight like 1980s communists, 1990s Iraqis, Partisans or 2020 Turks?  Or better yet - will they fight like Americans.   Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.



CBH99 said:


> We do have decent APCs / IFVs.  As I think you stated upthread, we do have good tanks.  (Even if we could/should get them all to the same standard.)
> 
> Looking at this purely from an Army perspective, I would go back to what you suggested upthread also.  A lethal, modern ATGM.  That alone could substantially increase lethality of our units.
> 
> I had suggested a good DMR also.
> 
> Ideally, 60mm and 81mm mortars available at the platoon or company level.  Options are always nice.
> 
> And obviously a modern, lethal AD system. Preferably two actually - one MANPAD type, own vehicle mounted (talks to radar, etc)
> 
> 
> None of these capabilities are expensive, complicated, timely to acquire or train, and we don’t ‘have’ to always have PYs dedicated to all of them simultaneously.  But if I had a vote, add those capabilities to our units that are already equipped with LAV 6 / TAPV / Leopard 2 - and we would have a pretty lethal and effective CMBG.
> 
> 
> 0.02



One cheap weapon that we are apparently not training with, supplying, or respecting as much as we should perhaps is smoke.

MarkPPCLI noted that very few people seem to be exploiting their grenade dischargers on their vehicles.

One of the primary capabilities of mortars is the ability to project smoke densely and fast and at a distance.  Our 1980s vintage 60mm mortars were primarily Smoke Projectors (WP if I remember).  I recall reading about the Radfan campaign in Oman in the 1970s where FOBs with a 25pdr and an 81mm would have the 81 with a mixed load of 5-10 rounds prepped for Immediate Action.  The Mix was predominantly Smoke with a couple of HE mixed in.

So, in terms of tools that can be bought cheaply

- a lethal, modern armoured defense system based on the Carl Gustaf for the Short Range work (500 to 1000 (2000 Extreme)), a Medium Range direct fire system for the 2000 to 5000 m band  and, if the budget stretches that far, an NLOS system for the Arty.

- good DMR, indeed, widely distributed

- refresh the 60 and 81 mm mortars

- upgrade the CG84 to the lighter, shorter,  M4 version with improved sights.

- upgrade the ammunition inventory for the Mortars and CG84 (essentially a direct fire mortar) and buy lots of smoke and use it freely in training.

Everything from vehicle MBGDs, to 40s, 60s, 81s and CG84s. Not to forget hand grenades 

Smoke, or Obscurants, allows Light Infantry with ATGMs to break contact cleanly after getting off two rapid Fire and Forget shots.  Just like a tank or a LAV with their MBGDs.

Two Shots and You're Free​
Daniel Morgan and the Battle of Cowpens



> The victory may have hinged on one sentence Morgan shouted to his men the night before as they huddled around campfires, preparing to meet Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton and his feared Green Dragoons and infantry at dawn. Morgan, a former teamster from the Virginia frontier and commander of the Virginia Rifles at the two battles of Saratoga, said *“Boys, give me two shots and you are free to fall back.”*
> 
> With those words he relieved the militiamen’s worst fears: standing up to a cavalry charge where they would be chopped up with sabers and trampled by horses, or confronting the dreaded rows of British bayonets. With little military training or equipment, the militiamen were only confident of their marksmanship, and hoped to fire at the enemy from a distance, out of range of British Brown Bess muskets. In almost every engagement where a militia had confronted regular British troops, the militia had broken ranks and run for the thickets and swamps.








						Two Shots and You're Free | Robert Morgan
					






					www.robert-morgan.com


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> In the next five years? It doesn't.


Should it?


----------



## Kirkhill

Thinking about smoke I remember being thoroughly impressed with demonstration staged on one exercise where the Calg Highr ex staff surrounded our position with trip flares and smoke grenades then proceeded to trigger the lot at night.  The effect was to comprehensively blind those in the smoke and light and at the same time set them up against a lighted backdrop for us in the defense.  It was like shooting at people backlit by a movie screen.   People that couldn't see us shooting at them.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> I guess this really is the $64,000 question.  Is fielding a CMBG to a peer conflict currently "aspirational" or "delusional"?
> 
> Can we realistically (even with some HQ consolidation and other "tweaks") deploy a full CMBG plus the CCSB in support to a conflict zone, keep it supplied and reinforced with both troops and replacement equipment/ammo/fuel/supplies to cover losses without totally breaking the Army?
> 
> If it's not currently realistic then in terms of Force 2025/Force 2030 timeframes should we instead focus on being able to deploy a Battle Group instead?  If that's the case, then does using out current "Affiliated" Battle Group approach still make sense, or would creating "Optimal" Battle Groups better prepare us for a fight (17 pages of discussion here - enjoy!:  The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group).  Or possibly an asymmetric mix of the two.  Two or three "optimal" Battle Groups configured for (and training together for) a peer fight and a separate "traditional" CMBG with the Medium/Light forces to fulfill the ongoing typical/non-peer fight deployments.
> 
> I personally believe that we should aspire to being able to deploy and sustain full CMBG to a conflict but maybe we should accept that all the changes that are required to achieve that (force structure, major equipment, Reserve legislation, etc.) are beyond what can be realistically achieved in the 10-year timeframe.  If that's the case should we in the meantime structure ourselves in a way that we can maximize what we can currently contribute while we work toward the eventual goal?



I think we are confronted with Admiral Jellicoe's dilemma - 'the only *man* on either side who *could lose the war* in an afternoon' - and dam near did at Jutland.  We need to have an army can survive the opening moves of any war in which it is engaged.  And it needs to be able to engage in any war and counter any tactics.  And it needs to be cheap, quick and good.


----------



## Kirkhill

For a bit of seasoning









						Fighting the Fight We Are In | SOF News
					

Dr. Ajit Maan argues that the U.S. needs an offensive narrative strategy that shapes perceptions that inoculates populations to insurgent narratives.




					sof.news


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I guess this really is the $64,000 question.  Is fielding a CMBG to a peer conflict currently "aspirational" or "delusional"?
> 
> Can we realistically (even with some HQ consolidation and other "tweaks") deploy a full CMBG plus the CCSB in support to a conflict zone, keep it supplied and reinforced with both troops and replacement equipment/ammo/fuel/supplies to cover losses without totally breaking the Army?
> 
> If it's not currently realistic then in terms of Force 2025/Force 2030 timeframes should we instead focus on being able to deploy a Battle Group instead?  If that's the case, then does using out current "Affiliated" Battle Group approach still make sense, or would creating "Optimal" Battle Groups better prepare us for a fight (17 pages of discussion here - enjoy!:  The Optimal Battle Group vs. the Affiliated Battle Group).  Or possibly an asymmetric mix of the two.  Two or three "optimal" Battle Groups configured for (and training together for) a peer fight and a separate "traditional" CMBG with the Medium/Light forces to fulfill the ongoing typical/non-peer fight deployments.
> 
> I personally believe that we should aspire to being able to deploy and sustain full CMBG to a conflict but maybe we should accept that all the changes that are required to achieve that (force structure, major equipment, Reserve legislation, etc.) are beyond what can be realistically achieved in the 10-year timeframe.  If that's the case should we in the meantime structure ourselves in a way that we can maximize what we can currently contribute while we work toward the eventual goal?


Canada has been wrestling with this question from when we first committed a force to NATO some 70 years ago. Then as now the issue was to deter aggression with the aim of avoiding what at that time was a likely thermonuclear war. Deterrence, now as then, has to show convince the opponent that any attack is likely to end in failure which, in short means the deterring force has to be a credible one.

I'm not going to get into the argument about whether a trip-wire rifle company as part of an international contingent makes a credible deterrent - there are numerous opinions on that already.

What I will say is that for most armies the division used to be the smallest unit of action. That has changed as armies devolved the concept of a self-contained fighting force to the brigade group. Yes, you can push the concept down even further if you wish to a squadron/company combat team. The problem, however, isn't its mix of all arms and support elements, it is the impact that the size of the unit will bring both on the field as well as in the diplomatic circles amongst your allies and opponents. 

The smaller that you are the less anyone will care about the fact that you are there. The reason 27 Infantry Brigade was shipped to Europe was to make such an impact. It did. Even when we determined that we'd never be able to send the other 2/3rds of 1 Cdn Div in time to make a difference. But 27 Bde (later 4 CMBG) wasn't all that we sent. We also sent 1 Air Div which had 12 fighter squadrons. Now that was an impact statement and made Canada's commitment at the time a noticeable one.

Things have changed. We're now fending off insidious attacks well below the threshold of tanks crossing the border but nonetheless indicative of opponents who will exploit weakness and who do need to be kept in check whether it be on the border or in cyberspace.

What bothers me is that at this critical time we are making statements like "realistically all we can field is a battlegroup". That has two problems for me. First it shows an inability to properly visualize the potential that four full-time brigades and ten reserve brigades (albeit at half-strength) could bring to the table. Second, if true - and I'm very much afraid that it might be considering our performance to generate forces for Afghanistan - then it shows that the Army has indeed been a very poor steward of the resources given to it by the people of Canada. While its facile to blame the politicians for their lack of committing sufficient funds to the Forces, one has to reasonably ask as to where the fault lies when twenty two billion dollars a year buys you defence outputs of three fighter squadrons, a dozen ships and one battlegroup. Canada employs over 100,000 people in defence but that's our output at the sharp end?

To get back to your question GR66 "Is fielding a CMBG to a peer conflict currently "aspirational" or "delusional"?". The answer bloody well better be "aspirational" and be supported by a robust plan to do that and even better. If its "delusional" then the criticism of our leadership should go far beyond their inability to get sexual assault issues under control and turn instead to the inability to mange our defence capability outputs.

🍻


----------



## suffolkowner

I think from what I've read in this thread it's delusional to suggest that Canada could field a brigade group and sustain it over time including sustaining personnel and equipment losses. In this thread we are still hashing out the structure of the organiztion of the Army's Brigades and how they are outfitted. I don't know how to judge that though? How many of our NATO allies could sustain a CMBG overseas? I'm assumming the US/UK/France/Germany(?). Could Poland or Italy or Spain?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

FJAG said:


> Canada has been wrestling with this question from when we first committed a force to NATO some 70 years ago. Then as now the issue was to deter aggression with the aim of avoiding what at that time was a likely thermonuclear war. Deterrence, now as then, has to show convince the opponent that any attack is likely to end in failure which, in short means the deterring force has to be a credible one.
> 
> I'm not going to get into the argument about whether a trip-wire rifle company as part of an international contingent makes a credible deterrent - there are numerous opinions on that already.
> 
> What I will say is that for most armies the division used to be the smallest unit of action. That has changed as armies devolved the concept of a self-contained fighting force to the brigade group. Yes, you can push the concept down even further if you wish to a squadron/company combat team. The problem, however, isn't its mix of all arms and support elements, it is the impact that the size of the unit will bring both on the field as well as in the diplomatic circles amongst your allies and opponents.
> 
> The smaller that you are the less anyone will care about the fact that you are there. The reason 27 Infantry Brigade was shipped to Europe was to make such an impact. It did. Even when we determined that we'd never be able to send the other 2/3rds of 1 Cdn Div in time to make a difference. But 27 Bde (later 4 CMBG) wasn't all that we sent. We also sent 1 Air Div which had 12 fighter squadrons. Now that was an impact statement and made Canada's commitment at the time a noticeable one.
> 
> Things have changed. We're now fending off insidious attacks well below the threshold of tanks crossing the border but nonetheless indicative of opponents who will exploit weakness and who do need to be kept in check whether it be on the border or in cyberspace.
> 
> What bothers me is that at this critical time we are making statements like "realistically all we can field is a battlegroup". That has two problems for me. First it shows an inability to properly visualize the potential that four full-time brigades and ten reserve brigades (albeit at half-strength) could bring to the table. Second, if true - and I'm very much afraid that it might be considering our performance to generate forces for Afghanistan - then it shows that the Army has indeed been a very poor steward of the resources given to it by the people of Canada. While its facile to blame the politicians for their lack of committing sufficient funds to the Forces, one has to reasonably ask as to where the fault lies when twenty two billion dollars a year buys you defence outputs of three fighter squadrons, a dozen ships and one battlegroup. Canada employs over 100,000 people in defence but that's our output at the sharp end?
> 
> To get back to your question GR66 "Is fielding a CMBG to a peer conflict currently "aspirational" or "delusional"?". The answer bloody well better be "aspirational" and be supported by a robust plan to do that and even better. If its "delusional" then the criticism of our leadership should go far beyond their inability to get sexual assault issues under control and turn instead to the inability to mange our defence capability outputs.
> 
> 🍻


Is this about prestige and impact for you? You are tracking that Canada is the lead nation for one of the EFP BattleGroups? That is not a minor effort or minor achievement.  I am not sure what your comments on Afghanistan force generation are about?

I've been part of contemporary exercises where 1st Canadian Division is deployed for a general war in Europe (Computer Assisted Exercise of course) - when you actually count up the resource requirements its staggering. I've been involved in the briefings of the bill should we try to do it for real - some stony faces around the table from those being briefed.  Even a full CMBG requires equipment and capabilities not really being looked at. A CMBG for Europe is aspirational - a BG, a real fighting BG, is absolutely possible. If you stretch the timeframe out from warning to delivery to something like a year then things become more realistic for formation-sized employment in a hot war. 

Force 2025 does not count on additional resources. It is not a pipedream or armchair fantasy session.

The good news, though, for an aspirational CMBG in a European hot-war is that we have the structure, doctrine and indeed much of the training regime already in place. It is one of our "happy places" as an institution - the CMBG Jungian mask is quite familiar.  

A CMBG HQ and a Canadian BG is also something that could be realistic for many missions, be they a modern peacekeeping mission such as an Eretria Redux or a counter-insurgency mission. There might be some capabilities from our Kandahar days that have been allowed to whither or simply become dormant that might prove useful in such an operation.


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Is this about prestige and impact for you? You are tracking that Canada is the lead nation for one of the EFP BattleGroups? That is not a minor effort or minor achievement.  I am not sure what your comments on Afghanistan force generation are about?


I'm not sure why you always have to try to get a little personal dig in when responding to one of my more critical posts. I never said it was about "prestige" for me I said it was about "impact" for Canada.

Take this from Hillier's book on why we went to Kandahar:


> I agreed completely with the choice of Kandahar over Herat, because that western Afghan city was a backwater and sending a Canadian mission there would have been costly and given us little visibility or impact internationally.


There are several other references which make it clear that Canada (i.e. the government and the then CDS) chose Kandahar as its ISAF role because of its proximity to the Americans and that we would be seen and recognized for our commitment.

The problem is that a rifle company and a battlegroup headquarters is a "minor" effort for a country of our size and economy - our GDP is slightly ahead of Russia's. But I do recognize that it's a tripwire force and in many respects simply a token one that requires a "presence" and not a large force. The problem is that we are deluding ourselves by thinking its a "major" effort. A truly major effort would be the token tripwire force and a plan to bring significantly more into theatre if the situation requires it. It's the mental attitude that we are already doing everything we can and that we "realistically" can't do more is what I find so objectionable.

My reference to force generation for Afghanistan is that it required the entire Army, including the reserves to keep one battle group in the field. We essentially had a personnel base (reg and res) of two divisions and were working flat out but could only generate one battle group (plus a brigade headquarters). By anyone's calculations that's a very poor return on investment and indicative of a systemic problem.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> I've been part of contemporary exercises where 1st Canadian Division is deployed for a general war in Europe (Computer Assisted Exercise of course) - when you actually count up the resource requirements its staggering. I've been involved in the briefings of the bill should we try to do it for real - some stony faces around the table from those being briefed.  Even a full CMBG requires equipment and capabilities not really being looked at. A CMBG for Europe is aspirational - a BG, a real fighting BG, is absolutely possible. If you stretch the timeframe out from warning to delivery to something like a year then things become more realistic for formation-sized employment in a hot war.
> 
> Force 2025 does not count on additional resources. It is not a pipedream or armchair fantasy session.
> 
> The good news, though, for an aspirational CMBG in a European hot-war is that we have the structure, doctrine and indeed much of the training regime already in place. It is one of our "happy places" as an institution - the CMBG Jungian mask is quite familiar.
> 
> A CMBG HQ and a Canadian BG is also something that could be realistic for many missions, be they a modern peacekeeping mission such as an Eretria Redux or a counter-insurgency mission. There might be some capabilities from our Kandahar days that have been allowed to whither or simply become dormant that might prove useful in such an operation.



I fully understand that Force 2025 does not count on additional resources and that's not my fundamental issue. In fact I applaud Force 2025 as an initiative because reform is seriously needed. As I've argued in the past, I think we made a mistake with Advancing with Purpose and all its bits and pieces over the last twenty years and any correction is welcomed. I only have very general information about Force 2025's options and those unfortunately do not leave me mightily impressed as I think while some are good ideas, others are poor ones and the whole thing doesn't go far enough - but those are the options and not the final plan so I'll wait and see.

The problem that I have, deals with the other things which you indicate.

We are now ten years past Afghanistan. Throughout that affair the Army divested critical capabilities. We are now seven years past the Russian invasion of the Ukraine and seen the new styles of combat there and while we seem to have held the line on further major divestments, we have made little progress on reorganizing and restructuring the Army to meet these new realities. If an army like Azerbaijan's with a defence budget 15% of Canada's and with a GDP of 2.5% of Canada's can acquire and utilize new weapon systems then it seems that learning from what is going on around you isn't rocket science. 

Further, you indicate that there are required equipment and capabilities that "are not really being looking at". And also that if we had a timeframe "from warning to delivery" of a year then it might be more realistic "for formation-sized employment in a hot war"

The trouble is that I know that everything you say accurately describes the Army as it stands. My problem is with the fact that ten and seven years after Afghanistan and the Ukraine, the Army is still in that condition and the fact that there is no concerted major, earth-shattering effort underway to correct all that - and earth-shattering is what seems to be needed - is indeed troubling.

There are dozen's of cheap easy solutions that we could do. Leasing some Avengers from the US (or borrow them from the National Guard for heaven's sake) so that we could reform and rebuild air defence doctrine and TTPs is one; creating a more viable plan to restructure and train the reserves so that they can realistically assume and contribute capabilities that the Reg F currently can't handle with its manpower is another; acquiring limited numbers of modern weapons systems and establishing a trials and evaluation unit to determine how best to organize, train on and utilize such equipment is a third. There are many more which are not part of Force 2025. We desperately need to jump start reform because we won't be given a year to build it from scratch.

If the leadership around the table has stony faces when they hear the briefing bill and then do nothing, then we have the wrong leaders. I know how easy it is for a committee to talk itself out of taking action and that, unfortunately, has been my experience when it comes to making difficult decisions in Ottawa.

I've said it before and mean it. The Army sets low goals for itself that it knows it can achieve - it calls those realistic goals - I call it planned underachievement.

So I'll put it to you directly: are you satisfied with the current state of the Army? and, if not, are you satisfied that the Army has a proper plan in the works that will rapidly bring the Army up to a condition where it could 1) deploy a brigade to a "hot war" and 2) properly sustain and expand that brigade with further forces up to a division?

I would suggest that if your answer to part 2) is no then Canada should seriously consider that it should no longer pay the annual expense of four full-time brigades. Just remember that Canada originally expanded the active force to deploy a brigade full-time to Europe and to expand that force to a division in time of emergency. We've struggled for decades with whether or not the latter was "realistic" but here we stand today with an Army still of four brigades and apparently no "realistic" expectation of using it. To have it sitting around because we might take on another peacekeeping mission doesn't justify that expense (or, more importantly, the truly obscene expense of its layers of administrative overhead)

🍻


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

FJAG said:


> I'm not sure why you always have to try to get a little personal dig in when responding to one of my more critical posts. I never said it was about "prestige" for me I said it was about "impact" for Canada.
> 
> Take this from Hillier's book on why we went to Kandahar:
> 
> There are several other references which make it clear that Canada (i.e. the government and the then CDS) chose Kandahar as its ISAF role because of its proximity to the Americans and that we would be seen and recognized for our commitment.
> 
> The problem is that a rifle company and a battlegroup headquarters is a "minor" effort for a country of our size and economy - our GDP is slightly ahead of Russia's. But I do recognize that it's a tripwire force and in many respects simply a token one that requires a "presence" and not a large force. The problem is that we are deluding ourselves by thinking its a "major" effort. A truly major effort would be the token tripwire force and a plan to bring significantly more into theatre if the situation requires it. It's the mental attitude that we are already doing everything we can and that we "realistically" can't do more is what I find so objectionable.
> 
> My reference to force generation for Afghanistan is that it required the entire Army, including the reserves to keep one battle group in the field. We essentially had a personnel base (reg and res) of two divisions and were working flat out but could only generate one battle group (plus a brigade headquarters). By anyone's calculations that's a very poor return on investment and indicative of a systemic problem.
> 
> 
> 
> I fully understand that Force 2025 does not count on additional resources and that's not my fundamental issue. In fact I applaud Force 2025 as an initiative because reform is seriously needed. As I've argued in the past, I think we made a mistake with Advancing with Purpose and all its bits and pieces over the last twenty years and any correction is welcomed. I only have very general information about Force 2025's options and those unfortunately do not leave me mightily impressed as I think while some are good ideas, others are poor ones and the whole thing doesn't go far enough - but those are the options and not the final plan so I'll wait and see.
> 
> The problem that I have, deals with the other things which you indicate.
> 
> We are now ten years past Afghanistan. Throughout that affair the Army divested critical capabilities. We are now seven years past the Russian invasion of the Ukraine and seen the new styles of combat there and while we seem to have held the line on further major divestments, we have made little progress on reorganizing and restructuring the Army to meet these new realities. If an army like Azerbaijan's with a defence budget 15% of Canada's and with a GDP of 2.5% of Canada's can acquire and utilize new weapon systems then it seems that learning from what is going on around you isn't rocket science.
> 
> Further, you indicate that there are required equipment and capabilities that "are not really being looking at". And also that if we had a timeframe "from warning to delivery" of a year then it might be more realistic "for formation-sized employment in a hot war"
> 
> The trouble is that I know that everything you say accurately describes the Army as it stands. My problem is with the fact that ten and seven years after Afghanistan and the Ukraine, the Army is still in that condition and the fact that there is no concerted major, earth-shattering effort underway to correct all that - and earth-shattering is what seems to be needed - is indeed troubling.
> 
> There are dozen's of cheap easy solutions that we could do. Leasing some Avengers from the US (or borrow them from the National Guard for heaven's sake) so that we could reform and rebuild air defence doctrine and TTPs is one; creating a more viable plan to restructure and train the reserves so that they can realistically assume and contribute capabilities that the Reg F currently can't handle with its manpower is another; acquiring limited numbers of modern weapons systems and establishing a trials and evaluation unit to determine how best to organize, train on and utilize such equipment is a third. There are many more which are not part of Force 2025. We desperately need to jump start reform because we won't be given a year to build it from scratch.
> 
> If the leadership around the table has stony faces when they hear the briefing bill and then do nothing, then we have the wrong leaders. I know how easy it is for a committee to talk itself out of taking action and that, unfortunately, has been my experience when it comes to making difficult decisions in Ottawa.
> 
> I've said it before and mean it. The Army sets low goals for itself that it knows it can achieve - it calls those realistic goals - I call it planned underachievement.
> 
> So I'll put it to you directly: are you satisfied with the current state of the Army? and, if not, are you satisfied that the Army has a proper plan in the works that will rapidly bring the Army up to a condition where it could 1) deploy a brigade to a "hot war" and 2) properly sustain and expand that brigade with further forces up to a division?
> 
> I would suggest that if your answer to part 2) is no then Canada should seriously consider that it should no longer pay the annual expense of four full-time brigades. Just remember that Canada originally expanded the active force to deploy a brigade full-time to Europe and to expand that force to a division in time of emergency. We've struggled for decades with whether or not the latter was "realistic" but here we stand today with an Army still of four brigades and apparently no "realistic" expectation of using it. To have it sitting around because we might take on another peacekeeping mission doesn't justify that expense (or, more importantly, the truly obscene expense of its layers of administrative overhead)
> 
> 🍻


Do you not think that the Army has been busy on operations since 4 CMBG was shut down and we left Germany? Have we been sitting around? Is there a task from the Government where we have failed to provide? What else would you have liked the Army to have done in Afghanistan? Do you understand what was involved in sustaining those rotations? The Army has three combat brigades, and the people in those brigades were fully committed to rotational operations from the 90s onwards. Do you feel that we did not provide value for your money?

The missions today are different, but we still have significant Army contributions to three international missions (every third year a CMBG is heavily committed to those missions), and I will say again that we are the lead nation for one of the EFP Battle Groups. We've exercised moving a Bde HQ and a Battalion to Norway and conducted several warfighting CAXs with NATO in a European context. Were the Canadian Army called upon to deploy a Bde HQ and a BG to a UN or NATO mission we could certainly do so. The shortfall I see is a CMBG against a peer in Eastern Europe. How would pick the crews that get the well-protected tanks from the crews that don't? Do you wish to send towed artillery into that fight? 

I will say it again that the calculus could change for something like OIF. I will also note that when the possibility of deploying a CMBG to Gulf War 1 presented itself it did not happen. Canada could deploy a very capable BG to something like OIF (just need some infantry AT). I really like the CMBG - its where things come together. We also need a lot things to be able to put one up against a peer foe. A Battlegroup with a squadron of Leopard 2A6Ms, though, is something very capable that could do something important now. I am sure that the US would appreciate having such a BG as part of a multinational force for some unforeseen kinetic operation. Similarly, leveraging our experience of the past decades we could absolutely provide a Bde HQ and a BG and all the things on the very important edges (capacity building etc) to a UN or NATO stability operation. We are in better shape than we were in 2005 heading into the South. 

GBAD is indeed one of the top priorities (it might actually be the top) for capability development right now. I don't have a timeline, but just being a priority is a huge step from before. There is a tank life extension project. The managed readiness plan has been adjusted to have a CMBG actually in high readiness for a year before it gets sent on those missions I mentioned earlier. This means that the Army is much better positioned to generate forces for unforeseen missions while still honouring the existing ones. These are positive developments.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

FJAG said:


> I'm not sure why you always have to try to get a little personal dig in when responding to one of my more critical posts. I never said it was about "prestige" for me I said it was about "impact" for Canada.
> 
> Take this from Hillier's book on why we went to Kandahar:
> 
> There are several other references which make it clear that Canada (i.e. the government and the then CDS) chose Kandahar as its ISAF role because of its proximity to the Americans and that we would be seen and recognized for our commitment.
> 
> The problem is that a rifle company and a battlegroup headquarters is a "minor" effort for a country of our size and economy - our GDP is slightly ahead of Russia's. But I do recognize that it's a tripwire force and in many respects simply a token one that requires a "presence" and not a large force. The problem is that we are deluding ourselves by thinking its a "major" effort. A truly major effort would be the token tripwire force and a plan to bring significantly more into theatre if the situation requires it. It's the mental attitude that we are already doing everything we can and that we "realistically" can't do more is what I find so objectionable.
> 
> My reference to force generation for Afghanistan is that it required the entire Army, including the reserves to keep one battle group in the field. We essentially had a personnel base (reg and res) of two divisions and were working flat out but could only generate one battle group (plus a brigade headquarters). By anyone's calculations that's a very poor return on investment and indicative of a systemic problem.
> 
> 
> 
> I fully understand that Force 2025 does not count on additional resources and that's not my fundamental issue. In fact I applaud Force 2025 as an initiative because reform is seriously needed. As I've argued in the past, I think we made a mistake with Advancing with Purpose and all its bits and pieces over the last twenty years and any correction is welcomed. I only have very general information about Force 2025's options and those unfortunately do not leave me mightily impressed as I think while some are good ideas, others are poor ones and the whole thing doesn't go far enough - but those are the options and not the final plan so I'll wait and see.
> 
> The problem that I have, deals with the other things which you indicate.
> 
> We are now ten years past Afghanistan. Throughout that affair the Army divested critical capabilities. We are now seven years past the Russian invasion of the Ukraine and seen the new styles of combat there and while we seem to have held the line on further major divestments, we have made little progress on reorganizing and restructuring the Army to meet these new realities. If an army like Azerbaijan's with a defence budget 15% of Canada's and with a GDP of 2.5% of Canada's can acquire and utilize new weapon systems then it seems that learning from what is going on around you isn't rocket science.
> 
> Further, you indicate that there are required equipment and capabilities that "are not really being looking at". And also that if we had a timeframe "from warning to delivery" of a year then it might be more realistic "for formation-sized employment in a hot war"
> 
> The trouble is that I know that everything you say accurately describes the Army as it stands. My problem is with the fact that ten and seven years after Afghanistan and the Ukraine, the Army is still in that condition and the fact that there is no concerted major, earth-shattering effort underway to correct all that - and earth-shattering is what seems to be needed - is indeed troubling.
> 
> There are dozen's of cheap easy solutions that we could do. Leasing some Avengers from the US (or borrow them from the National Guard for heaven's sake) so that we could reform and rebuild air defence doctrine and TTPs is one; creating a more viable plan to restructure and train the reserves so that they can realistically assume and contribute capabilities that the Reg F currently can't handle with its manpower is another; acquiring limited numbers of modern weapons systems and establishing a trials and evaluation unit to determine how best to organize, train on and utilize such equipment is a third. There are many more which are not part of Force 2025. We desperately need to jump start reform because we won't be given a year to build it from scratch.
> 
> If the leadership around the table has stony faces when they hear the briefing bill and then do nothing, then we have the wrong leaders. I know how easy it is for a committee to talk itself out of taking action and that, unfortunately, has been my experience when it comes to making difficult decisions in Ottawa.
> 
> I've said it before and mean it. The Army sets low goals for itself that it knows it can achieve - it calls those realistic goals - I call it planned underachievement.
> 
> So I'll put it to you directly: are you satisfied with the current state of the Army? and, if not, are you satisfied that the Army has a proper plan in the works that will rapidly bring the Army up to a condition where it could 1) deploy a brigade to a "hot war" and 2) properly sustain and expand that brigade with further forces up to a division?
> 
> I would suggest that if your answer to part 2) is no then Canada should seriously consider that it should no longer pay the annual expense of four full-time brigades. Just remember that Canada originally expanded the active force to deploy a brigade full-time to Europe and to expand that force to a division in time of emergency. We've struggled for decades with whether or not the latter was "realistic" but here we stand today with an Army still of four brigades and apparently no "realistic" expectation of using it. To have it sitting around because we might take on another peacekeeping mission doesn't justify that expense (or, more importantly, the truly obscene expense of its layers of administrative overhead)
> 
> 🍻


FJAG, the CAF is far busier in the 2000s-2010s than it ever was when we had a CMBG in Europe.  It's also considerably smaller than it used to be.

Take the year 2010 for instance:

Canada had a SOTF, Infantry Battlegroup, PRT, Aviation Task Force and TF HQ deployed to Afghanistan.

Canada also deployed an Infantry Battalion to Haiti for Op HESTIA along with Naval and Air Assets.

It did both these missions while also contributing a significant effort to the security effort of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics.

This isn't even mentioning all the other enduring Naval and Air contributions to NATO, NORAD, Disaster Response, the MENA theatre, etc.

The CAF managed to run two simultaneous major international operations along with a major domestic operation, at one point having 10k+ personnel engaged in operations concurrently on opposite ends of the World, one of which is a landlocked Country.

It then turned around the next year and made another big contribution in Libya, leading the operation and contributing 10% of the ordnance. I don't know how much more bang for your buck you get than that?  I don't know of many other NATO countries outside the big players that could even pull that off.


----------



## Kirkhill

Humphrey Bogart said:


> FJAG, the CAF is far busier in the 2000s-2010s than it ever was when we had a CMBG in Europe.  It's also considerably smaller than it used to be.
> 
> Take the year 2010 for instance:
> 
> Canada had a SOTF, Infantry Battlegroup, PRT, Aviation Task Force and TF HQ deployed to Afghanistan.
> 
> Canada also deployed an Infantry Battalion to Haiti for Op HESTIA along with Naval and Air Assets.
> 
> It did both these missions while also contributing a significant effort to the security effort of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics.
> 
> This isn't even mentioning all the other enduring Naval and Air contributions to NATO, NORAD, Disaster Response, the MENA theatre, etc.
> 
> The CAF managed to run two simultaneous major international operations along with a major domestic operation, at one point having 10k+ personnel engaged in operations concurrently on opposite ends of the World, one of which is a landlocked Country.
> 
> It then turned around the next year and made another big contribution in Libya, leading the operation and contributing 10% of the ordnance. I don't know how much more bang for your buck you get than that?  I don't know of many other NATO countries outside the big players that could even pull that off.



Given that operating environment is the Army appropriately organized to meet its day-to-day needs?   We have been working with the CMBG construct for 60 years or so.   The Army has been "managing" to meet the government's requirements, varied and variable, with that construct.   The construct has been retained over concern that it may be needed, or at least be useful, in a high intensity conflict.  But in 60 years the optimum construct sat in garrison for 25 years (in fairness, like the rest of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces contributing to the maintenance of international stability).  For the last 35 years the construct has not been employed as designed.  Even when opportunities arose, the Gulf Wars, the government of the day declined to employ the tools that the Army offered.  Instead they went different directions.  They employed the Air Force when they wanted to make a short, sharp statement publicly.  They routinely employ the silent service on long term alliance building operations like Op Carib and STANAVFORLANT and RIMPAC type exercises.  They also routinely employ Special Forces on operations that are becoming less and less special.

Meanwhile the entire structure of the Army continues its focus on a construct that hasn't been employed in any manner in 35 years and, operationally, since the Korean War.

I understand the frustration of those who feel we could be doing more with the money and people the government allocates to the Army and its Reserves.   And I share that frustration.

I also understand the importance of being ready for worst case scenarios.   I plan that way myself.

But sometimes we might have to shift our focus.

Personally I understand how we got to a LAV based, medium weight, infantry-centric force.  And I can appreciate its value in situations like Eritrea, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and ePF.   And potentially elsewhere.

And I accept that the Army we have may be called to do things other than that for which it prepares and may turn up a variety of UORs.

My concern is that the Army, by focusing on the very Canadian Middle of the Road Medium Weight LAV force is neither adequately preparing for the operations for which the CMBG was designed, nor is it taking advantage of the opportunities available to it to refocus efforts to deal with emerging threats and non-traditional operations.

I appreciate that the Army is very busy.  But is it usefully busy?  Or is a lot of that busyness the result of having to meet the government's needs by managing a force construct that is not optimal for those needs?

The Army "manages".  But should it have to spend as much effort as it does just managing?

FJAG is concerned about his 22 billion dollars.   I suggest that he is probably getting value for about 50 to 70% of that money given the ongoing operations of the  CSE, the RCN,  the RCAF and  CANSOFCOM, as well as the Army.  My personal belief is that any business that operates at 70% efficiency, especially in a highly changeable environment, is probably doing about as well as can be expected.  I also believe that a 70% organization can also be profitable and effective.

In Army terms that translates into 10 units under command - 2 groups of 3 committed forwards dealing with the actual situation, 1 group of three ready to adapt to the situation as it evolves and the 10th group in the commander's back pocket ready to react act short notice to manage his unknown unknowns.

I believe, with the LAV force we have 60% of the force committed.   It seems to me we are debating the nature of the 10% strategic reserve and also, more importantly how to manage that final 30%.   Do we need it or should it be committed to support the  LAV Force?  Should it be committed to the Strategic Reserve?   Does it need to be used to build Reserve capacity through training and leadership?   Or, should it be retained in a more amorphous adaptable element.

Do we make matters more difficult for ourselves with nomenclature and not fully giving credit to the value of the administrative brigade and assuming that brigades only have value when they are operational and fully supported?

What was it that Brad Sallows said?  "How does organizational concentration require spatial concentration?"  That doesn't just apply to AT platoons in battalions.  It is equally worth considering at the Army level.

Infanteer favours, based on his experience, spatial concentration in peacetime and operational dispersal. 

There is another alternative and that is to disperse units in peacetime but add to their training regime local brigading of those dispersed assets. 

The Ops Order format, under Situation is explicit in noting that the fighting force will be different than it was in garrison, or even the approach march.  Every  Situation includes Atts and Dets.  I hope that current army training regularly reflects that lack of certainty.

And, personally, I would be more than happy to have a readily adaptable, trained but undefined element in the construct.   An Odd Job Brigade - dispersed or concentrated.

Does the Army train for Max-Flex?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Humphrey Bogart said:


> FJAG, the CAF is far busier in the 2000s-2010s than it ever was when we had a CMBG in Europe.  It's also considerably smaller than it used to be.
> 
> Take the year 2010 for instance:
> 
> Canada had a SOTF, Infantry Battlegroup, PRT, Aviation Task Force and TF HQ deployed to Afghanistan.
> 
> Canada also deployed an Infantry Battalion to Haiti for Op HESTIA along with Naval and Air Assets.
> 
> It did both these missions while also contributing a significant effort to the security effort of the 2010 Vancouver Olympics.
> 
> This isn't even mentioning all the other enduring Naval and Air contributions to NATO, NORAD, Disaster Response, the MENA theatre, etc.
> 
> The CAF managed to run two simultaneous major international operations along with a major domestic operation, at one point having 10k+ personnel engaged in operations concurrently on opposite ends of the World, one of which is a landlocked Country.
> 
> It then turned around the next year and made another big contribution in Libya, leading the operation and contributing 10% of the ordnance. I don't know how much more bang for your buck you get than that?  I don't know of many other NATO countries outside the big players that could even pull that off.



And yet, we still seem to suffer from a self-image issue, as well as being seen as somewhat of an 'Uncle Sam coat tail rider'.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> Given that operating environment is the Army appropriately organized to meet its day-to-day needs?   We have been working with the CMBG construct for 60 years or so.   The Army has been "managing" to meet the government's requirements, varied and variable, with that construct.   The construct has been retained over concern that it may be needed, or at least be useful, in a high intensity conflict.  But in 60 years the optimum construct sat in garrison for 25 years (in fairness, like the rest of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces contributing to the maintenance of international stability).  For the last 35 years the construct has not been employed as designed.  Even when opportunities arose, the Gulf Wars, the government of the day declined to employ the tools that the Army offered.  Instead they went different directions.  They employed the Air Force when they wanted to make a short, sharp statement publicly.  They routinely employ the silent service on long term alliance building operations like Op Carib and STANAVFORLANT and RIMPAC type exercises.  They also routinely employ Special Forces on operations that are becoming less and less special.
> 
> Meanwhile the entire structure of the Army continues its focus on a construct that hasn't been employed in any manner in 35 years and, operationally, since the Korean War.
> 
> I understand the frustration of those who feel we could be doing more with the money and people the government allocates to the Army and its Reserves.   And I share that frustration.
> 
> I also understand the importance of being ready for worst case scenarios.   I plan that way myself.
> 
> But sometimes we might have to shift our focus.
> 
> Personally I understand how we got to a LAV based, medium weight, infantry-centric force.  And I can appreciate its value in situations like Eritrea, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and ePF.   And potentially elsewhere.
> 
> And I accept that the Army we have may be called to do things other than that for which it prepares and may turn up a variety of UORs.
> 
> My concern is that the Army, by focusing on the very Canadian Middle of the Road Medium Weight LAV force is neither adequately preparing for the operations for which the CMBG was designed, nor is it taking advantage of the opportunities available to it to refocus efforts to deal with emerging threats and non-traditional operations.
> 
> I appreciate that the Army is very busy.  But is it usefully busy?  Or is a lot of that busyness the result of having to meet the government's needs by managing a force construct that is not optimal for those needs?
> 
> The Army "manages".  But should it have to spend as much effort as it does just managing?
> 
> FJAG is concerned about his 22 billion dollars.   I suggest that he is probably getting value for about 50 to 70% of that money given the ongoing operations of the  CSE, the RCN,  the RCAF and  CANSOFCOM, as well as the Army.  My personal belief is that any business that operates at 70% efficiency, especially in a highly changeable environment, is probably doing about as well as can be expected.  I also believe that a 70% organization can also be profitable and effective.
> 
> In Army terms that translates into 10 units under command - 2 groups of 3 committed forwards dealing with the actual situation, 1 group of three ready to adapt to the situation as it evolves and the 10th group in the commander's back pocket ready to react act short notice to manage his unknown unknowns.
> 
> I believe, with the LAV force we have 60% of the force committed.   It seems to me we are debating the nature of the 10% strategic reserve and also, more importantly how to manage that final 30%.   Do we need it or should it be committed to support the  LAV Force?  Should it be committed to the Strategic Reserve?   Does it need to be used to build Reserve capacity through training and leadership?   Or, should it be retained in a more amorphous adaptable element.
> 
> Do we make matters more difficult for ourselves with nomenclature and not fully giving credit to the value of the administrative brigade and assuming that brigades only have value when they are operational and fully supported?
> 
> What was it that Brad Sallows said?  "How does organizational concentration require spatial concentration?"  That doesn't just apply to AT platoons in battalions.  It is equally worth considering at the Army level.
> 
> Infanteer favours, based on his experience, spatial concentration in peacetime and operational dispersal.
> 
> There is another alternative and that is to disperse units in peacetime but add to their training regime local brigading of those dispersed assets.
> 
> The Ops Order format, under Situation is explicit in noting that the fighting force will be different than it was in garrison, or even the approach march.  Every  Situation includes Atts and Dets.  I hope that current army training regularly reflects that lack of certainty.
> 
> And, personally, I would be more than happy to have a readily adaptable, trained but undefined element in the construct.   An Odd Job Brigade - dispersed or concentrated.
> 
> Does the Army train for Max-Flex?


I think we have to train for uncertainty in how/where/against who we are going to be employed, and indeed flexibility is very important. We talk about "a war vs the war." During Afghanistan I think it was entirely appropriate to train for "the war" since we knew where we were going and who we would be fighting. I suppose now we have to train for "a war" or "many wars." Some might not even look like war at first glance.

I do not see a need to abandon the CMBG construct, nor training the CMBG HQs for operations. We've generated enough HQs above BG for operations in the last two decades to show that there is absolutely value in continuing to do so. You are correct, though, that they also have a very important purpose which is administering and training battalions/regiments. 

A key aspect of the LAV infantry battalions is their flexibility. Could they leave their LAVs in Canada and deploy in TAPVs or even lighter vehicles to a peacekeeping/stability operation in a jungle/urban area of operations? I think so. Could they leave their LAVs in Canada and deploy in support of a Head of Mission for an assisted departure or NEO? I think so. Could their LAVs allow them to patrol an area of separation in Africa? Yes. Could they participate in combat operations in an operation such as Gulf War 1 or OIF? Yes - they need a tank squadron with them and some anti-tank missiles, but they can do that type of operation. 

Regarding skill sets, some do indeed benefit from being housed together and then attached out as needed.


----------



## Kirkhill

So a quick follow up to FJAG's questions.

Are you happy with your Army?

Are you happy commiting your soldiers to your Army?

For me those questions are far more important than what we outsiders think of your Army.

But.

The comms gap, as in all projects, occurs between what you expect to supply and what your client expects to buy.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> So a quick follow up to FJAG's questions.
> 
> Are you happy with your Army?
> 
> Are you happy commiting your soldiers to your Army?
> 
> For me those questions are far more important than what we outsiders think of your Army.
> 
> But.
> 
> The comms gap, as in all projects, occurs between what you expect to supply and what your client expects to buy.


Is this a Senate hearing?

There are things I would look at changing and of course there are problems, but I am happy with the Army. Some of the organizational changes I would make would likely cause other problems. It is fun to reorganize the Army on a napkin at the mess when you are not accountable for the implementation and outcome. I think that one thing we tend to neglect in our musing is support (both combat service support and institutional support). I would privilege some capabilities over others, based on my own biases from experience, inclination and my own read of events which may well be wrong. 

I am between postings right now, but when I was in command I was not a feudal baron deciding to commit "my" soldiers. Those soldiers were entrusted to me by the Army. I will respond to a reframed question: I did not and do not feel moral injury commanding soldiers in this army.


----------



## Kirkhill

Heard you clear.  

Just an interested citizen trying to stay informed.


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Do you not think that the Army has been busy on operations since 4 CMBG was shut down and we left Germany? Have we been sitting around? Is there a task from the Government where we have failed to provide? What else would you have liked the Army to have done in Afghanistan? Do you understand what was involved in sustaining those rotations? The Army has three combat brigades, and the people in those brigades were fully committed to rotational operations from the 90s onwards. Do you feel that we did not provide value for your money?
> 
> The missions today are different, ...





Humphrey Bogart said:


> FJAG, the CAF is far busier in the 2000s-2010s than it ever was when we had a CMBG in Europe. It's also considerably smaller than it used to be.



Thanks to both of you for your responses. Quite frankly I would like to see from each of you what our own views are on what the Force 2025 structure ought to be and which way the Army should move forward beyond what it is now because you obviously have views on the subject.

I'm acutely aware that things have been different since 4 CMBG shut down and I'm very aware that the Army has been busy. My current book project has me researching in exactly that timeframe and I know exactly the difficulties the CAF as a whole has faced since then, the reductions in both money and personnel it had to deal with. I know the tremendous effort put out by those who deployed to Afghanistan. I do not want to minimize what was accomplished especially in the very early years of this century when the Army was challenged by having to still deal with the former Yugoslavia and the early Afghanistan commitments simultaneously.

Just as an aside I want to mention why I haven't talked about the Air Force and Navy. It's primarily because they are a equipment centric forces which in my opinion are getting as much out of their organizations as they can based on the equipment that they'd been able to acquire within the funding envelope they were given. I believe that they too have issues but they are not as widespread as the Army's and less within their control. As I've previously mentioned, my biggest complaint with the CAF as a whole is that too much of its annual funding goes into maintaining its very large administrative overhead and that affects all three groups. I don't blame the Army for that directly even though I think some of the Army's headquarters structures could and should be streamlined.

My issue with the Army is not with what it has done but the failed opportunities to do more. Those are structural flaws that come from its senior leadership and not the folks who do their bidding.

Much of my problem with the Army has been that it's the biggest manager of human resources and equipment within the CAF yet still hasn't been able to properly equip itself or manage its people. Note that I'm deliberately using the term manage here rather than leadership. I have no issues with leadership, I have issues with stewardship and management.

While the Army has had structural problems for over a half of a century my concerns with it start immediately after the recall of 4 CMBG. The Army essentially had both the personnel and equipment from Germany to reassign to the remaining brigades. Complicating this was the Yugoslavia mission and indirectly Somalia. The real problem in my mind was that with the Cold War "over" there was once again a desire by the government, and to an extent within the Army, to move toward a lighter, more versatile structure.

It would have been logical at the time to move the heavy equipment into "reserve" status and to provide a mission for the reserve force to take over that capability (properly managed by the Reg f) and relieve the regular force in general of what was increasingly being seen as a burden. It would have left the regular force structured to fulfil the increasing OOTW missions which were perceived as the most likely role for the Army of the future. Instead the Army distributed the heavy gear mostly equally across the three brigades. The reserve force which was and is a recognized poor performer in general was once more put through a series of restructuring projects all of which failed for lack of will and an inability to convince the influential ad hoc Reserves 2000 of the direction of reform.

In large measure the Army accepted the benefit the reserves gave it in being able to plump up their full-time establishment (mostly for administrative overhead) with Class Bs and continued to allow the deterioration of the Class A "what have you done for me today" element which made them essential useless for anything but some vague Class C "augmentation" roles. In saying this I fully acknowledge the role played by Class Cs both in Yugoslavia and later in Afghanistan but that success came both serendipitously and because of the long lead time for training rotations that followed and not through deliberate planning or actions to improve reserve service in general.

In the same way that a large portion of the Army's strength (the Class As) was left to flounder with poor training and high non-effective strength and turnover, the Army's equipment, still effective albeit aging, was being divested before any replacement or doctrinal changes were effected.

By 2003 it is generally acknowledged that the Army was at a breaking point. The Yugoslavia commitment together with the deployment of one small battalion to Afghanistan (it wasn't really a full-on battlegroup because the artillery basically constituted a small mortar group and the engineers just a bit more than pioneers) had been too much. Both the CDS and the CLS argued strongly against a further Op Apollo roto and the government accepted that and the Army left Afghanistan for a year.

The Athena Phase 1 Kabul mission was only undertaken because the government saw it as a great opportunity for avoiding going to Iraq while still pleasing the Americans and NATO. It was scaled back as soon as practical (even though we had withdrawn most of our elements from Yugoslavia) and was to be replaced by a PRT mission in Kandahar. That PRT was scaled up to a battlegroup for security at the insistence of the CDS. The deployment was sustained through a system of managed equipment and readiness. Yes, there were other missions as well, but effectively all of the Army's resources, including its reserve force, was needed to keep one battlegroup and a brigade headquarters (which contained numerous foreign participants) in the field.

Even before all this though, back in 2002 LGen Jeffery, the CLS, made it clear to a House NDVA committee that he viewed a brigade as a flexible thing anywhere from two units of some 2,000 to a full bde of 5-6000. His mandate was to be able to field a brigade within 90 days under the existing white paper and while he might be able to generate the former if given more time he would not be able to generate the latter. As for a full-mechanized battle group which he was mandated to generate on 21 days notice he stated it would take six months.

By 2005 there was much action underfoot within the Army in implementing managed readiness but effectively this system was designed to manage getting and keeping one battle group and one task force headquarters out the door. Everything else was ad hoc (albeit that there was room for small impromptu missions. Effectively under managed readiness, 1/3 of the force is considered ready and 2/3 of the force is considered not ready to deploy. The weakness of this system was eloquently pointed out by Gen Baril and J.L. Granatstein in their report on Reserve Restructure when they called attention to the fact that there is no planning being done in the Army to deal with a large scale call out in the case of a major conflict. Effectively, the equipment holdings of the regular force, which are already inadequate to fully equip it, is all that there is and the training and organization for the reserves for such a role is non existent.

So to answer your question: did the people in those three combat brigades provide value for my (actually Canada's - again with the getting personal) money? Yes those "people" did - as did the thousands of reservists who went and who you didn't mention in any way. The real question, however, is: does the Army provide value for it's money? There I have to say no because it is poorly structured and wastes resources.

Throughout your response you mention the capability to deploy a BG and a brigade headquarters but never once a full brigade. The one point we agree on is that deploying a full brigade won't happen. I think your position is that it's not necessary based on our SSE taskings -which is true - while I believe that the SSE is worded the way it is because its beyond the Army's capability to generate and sustain a full CMBG. That to me is where the Army is failing. We have over 40,000 soldiers but are neither equipped nor organized to deploy and sustain even one full brigade, especially in a high intensity conflict. If the Army was a grade school student its report card would read: "Johnny is failing to measure up to his potential."

As long as the SSE identifies great power competition as a serious threat and contemplates near-peer conflict there is a need to prepare the Army for that - unless you interpret "near-peer" as someone as poorly equipped for war as Canada's Army.

There's a dichotomy here. Essentially any near-peer conflict calls for anti-armour and air defence forces with artillery thrown in. Realistically the Army can only cover one of those - anti-armour - by way of its tanks. OOTW operations on the other hand still, for the most part, rely on infantry.

Infantry in the pure rifle company form has been questioned as a viable solution since well back in the 1970s when Trudeau, the elder, wanted a mobile anti-armour force to replace our infantry brigade in Europe (it was still termed an infantry combat group in those days notwithstanding its armoured regiment and self propelled artillery). The Army trialed and war gamed all manner of combinations of infantry, tanks, ATGMs, recoilless rifles and attack helicopters for Europe and generally found the rifle company the least useful component (that's not to say they don't have a role but three battalions to one armoured regiment wasn't it).

However, if you take those same infantrymen, and equip them with ATGMs, AD weapons and a form of mobility they suddenly become very useful, both in a near-peer setting and in an OOTW setting. Even better is if they are supported by MI, EW, indirect fire support, drones etc. In this respect, depending on how fancy one wants to get with their mobility, even light reserve units could make valuable contributions to expand the standing force beyond its present size if properly equipped, trained and organized.

So let me just finish off by restating my point so that it doesn't get misunderstood. I'm not calling into question the value of those who have and are serving. My sole complaint is that over the last few decades the Army has steadfastly neglected, or attempted and failed, at properly utilizing all the manpower and resources put at its disposal by failing to plan for and prepare for the next challenge facing it. It divested equipment and capabilities that every modern Army should have - if not in its active force then in a properly organized and trained reserve. The fact that we can't generate a full brigade and even if we could then it would be predominantly infantry force with no ATGMs, little artillery, no AD and only a few tanks thus making it unsuitable for near-peer conflict means that it is not value for money. The fact that we might be able to generate one battle group with some tanks does not justify a four division, fourteen brigade establishment.

That, in my view, is a systemic failure which, a decade after Afghanistan and seven years after the Ukraine, has not been corrected. Worse yet, I see no attempt in what little I've seen of Force 2025 that addresses these shortcomings or that the Army even realizes that they are shortcomings. Force 2025 looks at fixing some known issues to allow the Army to do what it does now better and also to fix some critical issues that would, if not checked, cause catastrophic harm. It does little which would properly leverage all the resources available to the Army and move it forward.

🍻


----------



## Underway

TangoTwoBravo said:


> GBAD is indeed one of the top priorities (it might actually be the top) for capability development right now. I don't have a timeline, but just being a priority is a huge step from before. There is a tank life extension project.


This is good to hear.  As I'm absorbing all the info and the discussion I find myself constantly reforming my thoughts.

Opinion:
Regarding GBAD this makes sense.  UAS have proven themselves, and are going to be prevalent through all levels of conflict intensity.  A simple UAS that watches deployments or setup of units all the way to loitering munitions will also present varying levels of threats.  Systems that hard and soft kill them are going to be extremely useful, as well as methods to locate their control stations.

What makes this important for Canada within our particular organizational structure is that this sort of low-level GBAD for smaller UAS need to be organic to the CMBG or BG.  It's ok if the overarching air superiority is from the airforce.  And it's quite ok for us to rely on long-range fires and long-range GBAD from our allies, particularly the US.  But organic GBAD is something that we want to be integrated and trained together within our own organizations.
/Opinion

Regarding the Leo life extension, is this an upgrade type thing (aka LAV III to LAV 6) or just a fix everything old to make it better.  I would be nice to see something like the Challenger 3 upgrade, with significant mods to the tank to bring it electronically and safetywise into the 2020s (storing ammo without blowout panels, active protection, third gen thermals, 50 cal RWS and so on), or even making all the tanks a single mod (like upgrading all the Leo 2A4 to the 2A6 CAN standard).


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG

You know I accept much of your argument but there is one area where I think we need to clarify things.

When you talk of a four division, fourteen brigade establishment I think we need to separate clearly the operational from the administrative.  I accept that even when considering just the administrative functions it strains my credulity to accept the need for the numbers of HQs given the numbers of bodies, both reserve and reg, in question.

But don't have to be clear that the Administrative requirement for HQs is independent of the Operational needs?

By the way it is five divisions if we include the Joint First Division.

I can see the value of retaining 3x CMBGs in their current format.  It does give an operational focus should the need arise while creating a pool of assets from which can be drawn appropriate adhoc assemblages to suit the mission.  Given the necessary time.  And that is my biggest concern: the size and speed of any reaction force.  I would like to have an additional option in the back pocket than just the Medium Weight option.  That is why I am fond of maintaining a pool of well trained light troops suitably equipped with the most firepower they can carry with them on the planes we have.

My problems start with the 4th regular brigade and continue through the utilization of the reserves.  We agree that the reserves are under-equipped and under-employed.  I think we could make better use of the four tiers of availability baked into the reserve system - Short time Cs, Part time Bs, Occasional As and if absolutely necessary Supp List.

It would be nicer if we could reclaim the Regiment from its political dungeon to its original administrative meaning.   A body of troops trained in a common regime to a common standard.

I also not that many armies still retain the Repple Coy or Bn in their organization.   A depth pool of reservists, those off strength undergoing training, the sick and the LOB.

Those troops are not tactically organised.  They are retained on strength but at long lead times.  My sense is the longer the lead time the less need their is for detailed organisation and task assignment.  And, indeed it may be counter productive if it causes current resources to be used in supplying outmoded capabilities.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> This is good to hear.  As I'm absorbing all the info and the discussion I find myself constantly reforming my thoughts.
> 
> Opinion:
> Regarding GBAD this makes sense.  UAS have proven themselves, and are going to be prevalent through all levels of conflict intensity.  A simple UAS that watches deployments or setup of units all the way to loitering munitions will also present varying levels of threats.  Systems that hard and soft kill them are going to be extremely useful, as well as methods to locate their control stations.
> 
> What makes this important for Canada within our particular organizational structure is that this sort of low-level GBAD for smaller UAS need to be organic to the CMBG or BG.  It's ok if the overarching air superiority is from the airforce.  And it's quite ok for us to rely on long-range fires and long-range GBAD from our allies, particularly the US.  But organic GBAD is something that we want to be integrated and trained together within our own organizations.
> /Opinion
> 
> Regarding the Leo life extension, is this an upgrade type thing (aka LAV III to LAV 6) or just a fix everything old to make it better.  I would be nice to see something like the Challenger 3 upgrade, with significant mods to the tank to bring it electronically and safetywise into the 2020s (storing ammo without blowout panels, active protection, third gen thermals, 50 cal RWS and so on), or even making all the tanks a single mod (like upgrading all the Leo 2A4 to the 2A6 CAN standard).



Underway - I would still like to be able to deconstruct the 3 stripers command, with all its offensive and defensive capabilities, and be able to relocate those same capabilities to the land war.  Option one would be to put everything on trailers and drag it into position.  Option two, and I say  this knowing the sailors are going to say "The Ship!!!", but option two is to take a ship and tie it up at the dock in a foreign port.  The ship then assumes the same risks as the inhabitants of the dock, the host country and any Canadian Army types that would be doing the same job instead.  Actually I would be looking for something other than a frigate - perhaps something more like a warehouse/transit point/hotel/hospital/maintenance facility/comms/command facility with both strong local Air Defence and lots of Reach.  -  Kind of like and AOR with some of its TEU space tasked to GBAD and LRPRs modules in the ready to fire mode.

Putting it another way I guess,  I am looking for a floating Brigade Maintenance Area that can ship from Halifax and dock in Riga and tie up there for the duration.   The navy's job is just to get her into harbour and escort her back to Halifax after the festivities are over and the Brigade, or Battlegroup, is recalled.


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> This is good to hear.  As I'm absorbing all the info and the discussion I find myself constantly reforming my thoughts.
> 
> Opinion:
> Regarding GBAD this makes sense.  UAS have proven themselves, and are going to be prevalent through all levels of conflict intensity.  A simple UAS that watches deployments or setup of units all the way to loitering munitions will also present varying levels of threats.  Systems that hard and soft kill them are going to be extremely useful, as well as methods to locate their control stations.


I would go a step further than "extremely useful" to "critical". We were very lucky in Afghanistan that the technology was not as mature then as it was not long after. Our only AD capability at the time (yes we still had one for much of that time) was targeted at the conventional air threat and would in all likelihood been of little use for aircraft as small as that.


Underway said:


> What makes this important for Canada within our particular organizational structure is that this sort of low-level GBAD for smaller UAS need to be organic to the CMBG or BG.  It's ok if the overarching air superiority is from the airforce.  And it's quite ok for us to rely on long-range fires and long-range GBAD from our allies, particularly the US.  But organic GBAD is something that we want to be integrated and trained together within our own organizations.
> /Opinion


AD organizations vary. In the US low level AD was principally organized in battalions for the command and control element that is offered by such units and for the larger area that they cover. They were originally designed for divisions. It will be interesting to see how the new IM-SHORAD systems will be used but I note that so far they have deployed a full battalion, the 5th of the 4th AAR. The plan is to have 144 IM-SHORAD systems fielded in four battalions this year which means 36 systems per battalion or 12 per battery which is similar to the Avenger organization. Each battery ordinarily also has target acquisition radars over and above those on the individual system. I have no idea what the deployment allocation would be seeing as there is one rotational Stryker brigade in Poland along with V Corps (forward) and various support installations and an artillery brigade in Grafenwohr and an Airborne brigade in Italy.

On the other hand, when we had Blowpipe it was organic to the brigade's artillery regiment. ADATs was concentrated in 4 AD regiment and allocated out to brigades and in Germany was employed in separate otganizations one of which supported the airfield and another 4 CMBG.

The establishments of a typical Russian Motor Rifle brigade comes with two AD battalions (as well as two SP arty battalions, an ATk battalion and an MLRS battalion)

I would expect when GBAD comes back to Canada it will be centrally held in 4 GS Regt but allocated out to deployed BGs or CMBGs as required.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG
> 
> You know I accept much of your argument but there is one area where I think we need to clarify things.
> 
> When you talk of a four division, fourteen brigade establishment I think we need to separate clearly the operational from the administrative.  I accept that even when considering just the administrative functions it strains my credulity to accept the need for the numbers of HQs given the numbers of bodies, both reserve and reg, in question.
> 
> But don't have to be clear that the Administrative requirement for HQs is independent of the Operational needs?
> 
> By the way it is five divisions if we include the Joint First Division.


Sure. There are three operational brigades: 1, 2 and 5. The CCSB is primarily administrative and to the best of my knowledge does not have a deployment capability. The four army divisions and the ten reserve brigades are all administrative although they do have operational roles vis-a-vis domestic operations. They do not have a deployable international operations role. In effect they are force generators. 

I don't include 1 Div which is an operational hq with a deployment capability but does not belong to the Army per se - it belongs to CJOC and, as you say, is a joint hq.

In my mind 1 Div as the sole operational Div HQ is adequate as are two non deployable force generating Div HQs. 

I think three Reg F deployable brigade headquarters are sufficient and that the CCSB should remain a non deployable HQ as long as we do not foresee ever deploying a division. On the other hand it should be capable of deploying a command and control element if there is ever a need to deploy several CS elements that cannot be adequately controlled by a brigade headquarters. I do not see that as an issue with the current level of deployments.

Based on numbers and geography I see a need for only five reserve brigades which for so long as we have no capability to deploy reserve units should be non-deployable force generators. That would give every reserve brigade between three to five thousand personnel. (and as an aside, yes I think reserve units need to be amalgamated into roughly forty bn sized units)

I think the Army should aspire to developing the reserves into a force that can deploy units and even formations. If we ever get close to that then I think that reserve brigade headquarters (which in my mind should have a high Reg F component to them) should also become deployable. In my mind the optimum should be a deployable reserve brigade and just below that the capability that a reserve brigade should be able to generate a battle group for a rotation such as with the eFP.

🍻


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

FJAG said:


> Thanks to both of you for your responses. Quite frankly I would like to see from each of you what our own views are on what the Force 2025 structure ought to be and which way the Army should move forward beyond what it is now because you obviously have views on the subject.
> 
> I'm acutely aware that things have been different since 4 CMBG shut down and I'm very aware that the Army has been busy. My current book project has me researching in exactly that timeframe and I know exactly the difficulties the CAF as a whole has faced since then, the reductions in both money and personnel it had to deal with. I know the tremendous effort put out by those who deployed to Afghanistan. I do not want to minimize what was accomplished especially in the very early years of this century when the Army was challenged by having to still deal with the former Yugoslavia and the early Afghanistan commitments simultaneously.
> 
> Just as an aside I want to mention why I haven't talked about the Air Force and Navy. It's primarily because they are a equipment centric forces which in my opinion are getting as much out of their organizations as they can based on the equipment that they'd been able to acquire within the funding envelope they were given. I believe that they too have issues but they are not as widespread as the Army's and less within their control. As I've previously mentioned, my biggest complaint with the CAF as a whole is that too much of its annual funding goes into maintaining its very large administrative overhead and that affects all three groups. I don't blame the Army for that directly even though I think some of the Army's headquarters structures could and should be streamlined.
> 
> My issue with the Army is not with what it has done but the failed opportunities to do more. Those are structural flaws that come from its senior leadership and not the folks who do their bidding.
> 
> Much of my problem with the Army has been that it's the biggest manager of human resources and equipment within the CAF yet still hasn't been able to properly equip itself or manage its people. Note that I'm deliberately using the term manage here rather than leadership. I have no issues with leadership, I have issues with stewardship and management.
> 
> While the Army has had structural problems for over a half of a century my concerns with it start immediately after the recall of 4 CMBG. The Army essentially had both the personnel and equipment from Germany to reassign to the remaining brigades. Complicating this was the Yugoslavia mission and indirectly Somalia. The real problem in my mind was that with the Cold War "over" there was once again a desire by the government, and to an extent within the Army, to move toward a lighter, more versatile structure.
> 
> It would have been logical at the time to move the heavy equipment into "reserve" status and to provide a mission for the reserve force to take over that capability (properly managed by the Reg f) and relieve the regular force in general of what was increasingly being seen as a burden. It would have left the regular force structured to fulfil the increasing OOTW missions which were perceived as the most likely role for the Army of the future. Instead the Army distributed the heavy gear mostly equally across the three brigades. The reserve force which was and is a recognized poor performer in general was once more put through a series of restructuring projects all of which failed for lack of will and an inability to convince the influential ad hoc Reserves 2000 of the direction of reform.
> 
> In large measure the Army accepted the benefit the reserves gave it in being able to plump up their full-time establishment (mostly for administrative overhead) with Class Bs and continued to allow the deterioration of the Class A "what have you done for me today" element which made them essential useless for anything but some vague Class C "augmentation" roles. In saying this I fully acknowledge the role played by Class Cs both in Yugoslavia and later in Afghanistan but that success came both serendipitously and because of the long lead time for training rotations that followed and not through deliberate planning or actions to improve reserve service in general.
> 
> In the same way that a large portion of the Army's strength (the Class As) was left to flounder with poor training and high non-effective strength and turnover, the Army's equipment, still effective albeit aging, was being divested before any replacement or doctrinal changes were effected.
> 
> By 2003 it is generally acknowledged that the Army was at a breaking point. The Yugoslavia commitment together with the deployment of one small battalion to Afghanistan (it wasn't really a full-on battlegroup because the artillery basically constituted a small mortar group and the engineers just a bit more than pioneers) had been too much. Both the CDS and the CLS argued strongly against a further Op Apollo roto and the government accepted that and the Army left Afghanistan for a year.
> 
> The Athena Phase 1 Kabul mission was only undertaken because the government saw it as a great opportunity for avoiding going to Iraq while still pleasing the Americans and NATO. It was scaled back as soon as practical (even though we had withdrawn most of our elements from Yugoslavia) and was to be replaced by a PRT mission in Kandahar. That PRT was scaled up to a battlegroup for security at the insistence of the CDS. The deployment was sustained through a system of managed equipment and readiness. Yes, there were other missions as well, but effectively all of the Army's resources, including its reserve force, was needed to keep one battlegroup and a brigade headquarters (which contained numerous foreign participants) in the field.
> 
> Even before all this though, back in 2002 LGen Jeffery, the CLS, made it clear to a House NDVA committee that he viewed a brigade as a flexible thing anywhere from two units of some 2,000 to a full bde of 5-6000. His mandate was to be able to field a brigade within 90 days under the existing white paper and while he might be able to generate the former if given more time he would not be able to generate the latter. As for a full-mechanized battle group which he was mandated to generate on 21 days notice he stated it would take six months.
> 
> By 2005 there was much action underfoot within the Army in implementing managed readiness but effectively this system was designed to manage getting and keeping one battle group and one task force headquarters out the door. Everything else was ad hoc (albeit that there was room for small impromptu missions. Effectively under managed readiness, 1/3 of the force is considered ready and 2/3 of the force is considered not ready to deploy. The weakness of this system was eloquently pointed out by Gen Baril and J.L. Granatstein in their report on Reserve Restructure when they called attention to the fact that there is no planning being done in the Army to deal with a large scale call out in the case of a major conflict. Effectively, the equipment holdings of the regular force, which are already inadequate to fully equip it, is all that there is and the training and organization for the reserves for such a role is non existent.
> 
> So to answer your question: did the people in those three combat brigades provide value for my (actually Canada's - again with the getting personal) money? Yes those "people" did - as did the thousands of reservists who went and who you didn't mention in any way. The real question, however, is: does the Army provide value for it's money? There I have to say no because it is poorly structured and wastes resources.
> 
> Throughout your response you mention the capability to deploy a BG and a brigade headquarters but never once a full brigade. The one point we agree on is that deploying a full brigade won't happen. I think your position is that it's not necessary based on our SSE taskings -which is true - while I believe that the SSE is worded the way it is because its beyond the Army's capability to generate and sustain a full CMBG. That to me is where the Army is failing. We have over 40,000 soldiers but are neither equipped nor organized to deploy and sustain even one full brigade, especially in a high intensity conflict. If the Army was a grade school student its report card would read: "Johnny is failing to measure up to his potential."
> 
> As long as the SSE identifies great power competition as a serious threat and contemplates near-peer conflict there is a need to prepare the Army for that - unless you interpret "near-peer" as someone as poorly equipped for war as Canada's Army.
> 
> There's a dichotomy here. Essentially any near-peer conflict calls for anti-armour and air defence forces with artillery thrown in. Realistically the Army can only cover one of those - anti-armour - by way of its tanks. OOTW operations on the other hand still, for the most part, rely on infantry.
> 
> Infantry in the pure rifle company form has been questioned as a viable solution since well back in the 1970s when Trudeau, the elder, wanted a mobile anti-armour force to replace our infantry brigade in Europe (it was still termed an infantry combat group in those days notwithstanding its armoured regiment and self propelled artillery). The Army trialed and war gamed all manner of combinations of infantry, tanks, ATGMs, recoilless rifles and attack helicopters for Europe and generally found the rifle company the least useful component (that's not to say they don't have a role but three battalions to one armoured regiment wasn't it).
> 
> However, if you take those same infantrymen, and equip them with ATGMs, AD weapons and a form of mobility they suddenly become very useful, both in a near-peer setting and in an OOTW setting. Even better is if they are supported by MI, EW, indirect fire support, drones etc. In this respect, depending on how fancy one wants to get with their mobility, even light reserve units could make valuable contributions to expand the standing force beyond its present size if properly equipped, trained and organized.
> 
> So let me just finish off by restating my point so that it doesn't get misunderstood. I'm not calling into question the value of those who have and are serving. My sole complaint is that over the last few decades the Army has steadfastly neglected, or attempted and failed, at properly utilizing all the manpower and resources put at its disposal by failing to plan for and prepare for the next challenge facing it. It divested equipment and capabilities that every modern Army should have - if not in its active force then in a properly organized and trained reserve. The fact that we can't generate a full brigade and even if we could then it would be predominantly infantry force with no ATGMs, little artillery, no AD and only a few tanks thus making it unsuitable for near-peer conflict means that it is not value for money. The fact that we might be able to generate one battle group with some tanks does not justify a four division, fourteen brigade establishment.
> 
> That, in my view, is a systemic failure which, a decade after Afghanistan and seven years after the Ukraine, has not been corrected. Worse yet, I see no attempt in what little I've seen of Force 2025 that addresses these shortcomings or that the Army even realizes that they are shortcomings. Force 2025 looks at fixing some known issues to allow the Army to do what it does now better and also to fix some critical issues that would, if not checked, cause catastrophic harm. It does little which would properly leverage all the resources available to the Army and move it forward.
> 
> 🍻





FJAG said:


> Thanks to both of you for your responses. Quite frankly I would like to see from each of you what our own views are on what the Force 2025 structure ought to be and which way the Army should move forward beyond what it is now because you obviously have views on the subject.
> 
> I'm acutely aware that things have been different since 4 CMBG shut down and I'm very aware that the Army has been busy. My current book project has me researching in exactly that timeframe and I know exactly the difficulties the CAF as a whole has faced since then, the reductions in both money and personnel it had to deal with. I know the tremendous effort put out by those who deployed to Afghanistan. I do not want to minimize what was accomplished especially in the very early years of this century when the Army was challenged by having to still deal with the former Yugoslavia and the early Afghanistan commitments simultaneously.
> 
> Just as an aside I want to mention why I haven't talked about the Air Force and Navy. It's primarily because they are a equipment centric forces which in my opinion are getting as much out of their organizations as they can based on the equipment that they'd been able to acquire within the funding envelope they were given. I believe that they too have issues but they are not as widespread as the Army's and less within their control. As I've previously mentioned, my biggest complaint with the CAF as a whole is that too much of its annual funding goes into maintaining its very large administrative overhead and that affects all three groups. I don't blame the Army for that directly even though I think some of the Army's headquarters structures could and should be streamlined.
> 
> My issue with the Army is not with what it has done but the failed opportunities to do more. Those are structural flaws that come from its senior leadership and not the folks who do their bidding.
> 
> Much of my problem with the Army has been that it's the biggest manager of human resources and equipment within the CAF yet still hasn't been able to properly equip itself or manage its people. Note that I'm deliberately using the term manage here rather than leadership. I have no issues with leadership, I have issues with stewardship and management.
> 
> While the Army has had structural problems for over a half of a century my concerns with it start immediately after the recall of 4 CMBG. The Army essentially had both the personnel and equipment from Germany to reassign to the remaining brigades. Complicating this was the Yugoslavia mission and indirectly Somalia. The real problem in my mind was that with the Cold War "over" there was once again a desire by the government, and to an extent within the Army, to move toward a lighter, more versatile structure.
> 
> It would have been logical at the time to move the heavy equipment into "reserve" status and to provide a mission for the reserve force to take over that capability (properly managed by the Reg f) and relieve the regular force in general of what was increasingly being seen as a burden. It would have left the regular force structured to fulfil the increasing OOTW missions which were perceived as the most likely role for the Army of the future. Instead the Army distributed the heavy gear mostly equally across the three brigades. The reserve force which was and is a recognized poor performer in general was once more put through a series of restructuring projects all of which failed for lack of will and an inability to convince the influential ad hoc Reserves 2000 of the direction of reform.
> 
> In large measure the Army accepted the benefit the reserves gave it in being able to plump up their full-time establishment (mostly for administrative overhead) with Class Bs and continued to allow the deterioration of the Class A "what have you done for me today" element which made them essential useless for anything but some vague Class C "augmentation" roles. In saying this I fully acknowledge the role played by Class Cs both in Yugoslavia and later in Afghanistan but that success came both serendipitously and because of the long lead time for training rotations that followed and not through deliberate planning or actions to improve reserve service in general.
> 
> In the same way that a large portion of the Army's strength (the Class As) was left to flounder with poor training and high non-effective strength and turnover, the Army's equipment, still effective albeit aging, was being divested before any replacement or doctrinal changes were effected.
> 
> By 2003 it is generally acknowledged that the Army was at a breaking point. The Yugoslavia commitment together with the deployment of one small battalion to Afghanistan (it wasn't really a full-on battlegroup because the artillery basically constituted a small mortar group and the engineers just a bit more than pioneers) had been too much. Both the CDS and the CLS argued strongly against a further Op Apollo roto and the government accepted that and the Army left Afghanistan for a year.
> 
> The Athena Phase 1 Kabul mission was only undertaken because the government saw it as a great opportunity for avoiding going to Iraq while still pleasing the Americans and NATO. It was scaled back as soon as practical (even though we had withdrawn most of our elements from Yugoslavia) and was to be replaced by a PRT mission in Kandahar. That PRT was scaled up to a battlegroup for security at the insistence of the CDS. The deployment was sustained through a system of managed equipment and readiness. Yes, there were other missions as well, but effectively all of the Army's resources, including its reserve force, was needed to keep one battlegroup and a brigade headquarters (which contained numerous foreign participants) in the field.
> 
> Even before all this though, back in 2002 LGen Jeffery, the CLS, made it clear to a House NDVA committee that he viewed a brigade as a flexible thing anywhere from two units of some 2,000 to a full bde of 5-6000. His mandate was to be able to field a brigade within 90 days under the existing white paper and while he might be able to generate the former if given more time he would not be able to generate the latter. As for a full-mechanized battle group which he was mandated to generate on 21 days notice he stated it would take six months.
> 
> By 2005 there was much action underfoot within the Army in implementing managed readiness but effectively this system was designed to manage getting and keeping one battle group and one task force headquarters out the door. Everything else was ad hoc (albeit that there was room for small impromptu missions. Effectively under managed readiness, 1/3 of the force is considered ready and 2/3 of the force is considered not ready to deploy. The weakness of this system was eloquently pointed out by Gen Baril and J.L. Granatstein in their report on Reserve Restructure when they called attention to the fact that there is no planning being done in the Army to deal with a large scale call out in the case of a major conflict. Effectively, the equipment holdings of the regular force, which are already inadequate to fully equip it, is all that there is and the training and organization for the reserves for such a role is non existent.
> 
> So to answer your question: did the people in those three combat brigades provide value for my (actually Canada's - again with the getting personal) money? Yes those "people" did - as did the thousands of reservists who went and who you didn't mention in any way. The real question, however, is: does the Army provide value for it's money? There I have to say no because it is poorly structured and wastes resources.
> 
> Throughout your response you mention the capability to deploy a BG and a brigade headquarters but never once a full brigade. The one point we agree on is that deploying a full brigade won't happen. I think your position is that it's not necessary based on our SSE taskings -which is true - while I believe that the SSE is worded the way it is because its beyond the Army's capability to generate and sustain a full CMBG. That to me is where the Army is failing. We have over 40,000 soldiers but are neither equipped nor organized to deploy and sustain even one full brigade, especially in a high intensity conflict. If the Army was a grade school student its report card would read: "Johnny is failing to measure up to his potential."
> 
> As long as the SSE identifies great power competition as a serious threat and contemplates near-peer conflict there is a need to prepare the Army for that - unless you interpret "near-peer" as someone as poorly equipped for war as Canada's Army.
> 
> There's a dichotomy here. Essentially any near-peer conflict calls for anti-armour and air defence forces with artillery thrown in. Realistically the Army can only cover one of those - anti-armour - by way of its tanks. OOTW operations on the other hand still, for the most part, rely on infantry.
> 
> Infantry in the pure rifle company form has been questioned as a viable solution since well back in the 1970s when Trudeau, the elder, wanted a mobile anti-armour force to replace our infantry brigade in Europe (it was still termed an infantry combat group in those days notwithstanding its armoured regiment and self propelled artillery). The Army trialed and war gamed all manner of combinations of infantry, tanks, ATGMs, recoilless rifles and attack helicopters for Europe and generally found the rifle company the least useful component (that's not to say they don't have a role but three battalions to one armoured regiment wasn't it).
> 
> However, if you take those same infantrymen, and equip them with ATGMs, AD weapons and a form of mobility they suddenly become very useful, both in a near-peer setting and in an OOTW setting. Even better is if they are supported by MI, EW, indirect fire support, drones etc. In this respect, depending on how fancy one wants to get with their mobility, even light reserve units could make valuable contributions to expand the standing force beyond its present size if properly equipped, trained and organized.
> 
> So let me just finish off by restating my point so that it doesn't get misunderstood. I'm not calling into question the value of those who have and are serving. My sole complaint is that over the last few decades the Army has steadfastly neglected, or attempted and failed, at properly utilizing all the manpower and resources put at its disposal by failing to plan for and prepare for the next challenge facing it. It divested equipment and capabilities that every modern Army should have - if not in its active force then in a properly organized and trained reserve. The fact that we can't generate a full brigade and even if we could then it would be predominantly infantry force with no ATGMs, little artillery, no AD and only a few tanks thus making it unsuitable for near-peer conflict means that it is not value for money. The fact that we might be able to generate one battle group with some tanks does not justify a four division, fourteen brigade establishment.
> 
> That, in my view, is a systemic failure which, a decade after Afghanistan and seven years after the Ukraine, has not been corrected. Worse yet, I see no attempt in what little I've seen of Force 2025 that addresses these shortcomings or that the Army even realizes that they are shortcomings. Force 2025 looks at fixing some known issues to allow the Army to do what it does now better and also to fix some critical issues that would, if not checked, cause catastrophic harm. It does little which would properly leverage all the resources available to the Army and move it forward.
> 
> 🍻


You keep talking about four Divisions. Yes, we have four organizations that are called Divisions and they have Brigades, but in reality we have three CMBGs, a CCSB and a collection of Reserve units. Those Divisions are very busy commanding and administering those reserve units in their geographical areas and three are double-hatted as Joint Task Force headquarters for domestic operations (an important task that is always being used). When we cut 4 CMBG in the early 90s as part of the reduction of the CAF those units became, for the most part, 10/90 units. Many then came back into being units circa 96/97, but with only a modest increase in personnel for the Army. We stripped out the schools in the mid-90s as part of this, leading to the migration of leadership to fill CFTPO. We have some hollow structures. 

Fighting a conventional war in Europe at Brigade level is, perhaps, the _ne plus ultra _task, but it is not the task that justifies the current structure and size of the army. With Leopard 2A6M in a BG we are arguably in a better place than we would have been in 1989 as a CMBG if the balloon went up. As an armour officer I certainly think of the conventional fight, but something like a Kandahar redux is a more likely fight. While not everybody deployed over the conflict, we needed the size of the Regular Force that we have to sustain that fight and we would need it for the next one. 

Moving forward as a army, I believe we need to prepare for everything from peacekeeping to stability/COIN to conventional war. The first does not have to be UN and the last does not have to be in Europe. We need some capabilities for the conventional fight, but we cannot neglect those needed for the more likely stability operation. I love a good combat team attack against an isolated Soviet platoon ("March on the Guidon!"), but there might be some others tasks out there. It turns out that COIN and stability operations aren't easy. We need to keep training our CMBG HQs. I think that some units could be re-rolled into capacity- building, and our tanks should be consolidated (in Gagetown).


----------



## Kirkhill

The struggle is real 



> AN AMERICAN FORCE STRUCTURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY​











						An American Force Structure for the 21st Century - War on the Rocks
					

The United States is unprepared for its current strategic challenges. Since the end of the Cold War, no nation could seriously threaten the territorial or



					warontherocks.com
				







> While the United States maintains global security responsibilities, much of its combat power — along with its sustainment base — is located in the homeland and would require transportation into theater in the event of war.  The requirement to deploy globally in a crisis or conflict is not new. But the challenges in executing such movement rapidly enough to be relevant are novel ones. Influenced by the successes of Desert Storm, the U.S. national security leadership fashioned the nation’s military for short wars that would quickly deny U.S. adversaries their objectives. America’s military leadership also has had the luxury of being able to plan for a protracted logistics build-up. In the future, the country’s most powerful potential adversaries start with significant advantages that render a strategy focused on rapid denial of their objectives risky.
> 
> ... The U.S. military does not have enough logistics capability to rapidly deploy for and sustain a fight against a peer-level adversary. But the magnitude of the imbalance, and the fact that the U.S. defense budget is very unlikely to grow enough to address the imbalance while continuing to fund current combat capabilities, requires recognizing a very difficult truth. To enable the United States to prevail in a fight against a peer-level adversary oceans away — and in a potentially protracted contest — requires shifting a large portion of the defense budget from combat capabilities to deployability and sustainment assets. Only by having the supporting and sustainment capabilities to succeed in such a conflict can the United States maximize its ability to deter any such conflict in the first place.



If the US is short of assets to move its own forces, with whom are we going to hitch a ride?


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> The struggle is real
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> An American Force Structure for the 21st Century - War on the Rocks
> 
> 
> The United States is unprepared for its current strategic challenges. Since the end of the Cold War, no nation could seriously threaten the territorial or
> 
> 
> 
> warontherocks.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If the US is short of assets to move its own forces, with whom are we going to hitch a ride?


One thing the US does repeatedly - which genuinely surprises me - is eliminate their ability to generate critical capabilities due to short term thinking.

In some areas, the US is swift and effective at planning for and equipping for future conflicts.  

But eliminating the C-17 production line, the F-22 production line, etc - because “we don’t have any orders so it doesn’t make sense to keep that building equipped to produce those planes.”   Planes need replacing, regardless of whether they crashed, aged out, damaged, etc.

Every year, the US Congress buys the US military hardware they don’t ask for.  

The US Army had to officially request no more M1’s due to they don’t have anywhere to store them anymore.  (Have thousands fresh off the production line, parked, and stored.)

The US Navy requests 14 E/F Super Hornets, Congress buys them 18 ‘just because we like you.’   If they are able to keep those lines running despite no orders, couldn’t they keep a very baseline capability to produce C-17’s and cheap transport ships?


<Bewildered rant done>


----------



## Kirkhill

Ford keeps production lines open, with no orders, because people keep replacing worn out trucks.


----------



## PuckChaser

CBH99 said:


> One thing the US does repeatedly - which genuinely surprises me - is eliminate their ability to generate critical capabilities due to short term thinking.
> 
> But eliminating the C-17 production line, the F-22 production line, etc - because “we don’t have any orders so it doesn’t make sense to keep that building equipped to produce those planes.”   Planes need replacing, regardless of whether they crashed, aged out, damaged, etc.
> 
> Every year, the US Congress buys the US military hardware they don’t ask for.


You answered your own question. The US system has more money to throw at the problem, but is exponentially more politically tainted. Those production line openings and closings are all negotiated between political parties based on who's up for re-election, so military hardware is held hostage if you want to stick it to the other guy because they didn't vote for your bill.

I fully agree with you though, the C-17 line being shut down was incredibly short-sighted as there's no real replacement for that aircraft and it's a workhorse for many militarys. If someone waved a magic wand and dropped 2 more CC-177s into our laps, the RCAF would welcome them with open arms as we're running our A/C into the ground very quickly.


----------



## CBH99

PuckChaser said:


> You answered your own question. The US system has more money to throw at the problem, but is exponentially more politically tainted. Those production line openings and closings are all negotiated between political parties based on who's up for re-election, so military hardware is held hostage if you want to stick it to the other guy because they didn't vote for your bill.
> 
> I fully agree with you though, the C-17 line being shut down was incredibly short-sighted as there's no real replacement for that aircraft and it's a workhorse for many militarys. If someone waved a magic wand and dropped 2 more CC-177s into our laps, the RCAF would welcome them with open arms as we're running our A/C into the ground very quickly.


I'm guessing it's based on what state, or area of state, the factory is in?  Aka who's district it is in?  (For example, they are happy to buy E/F Hornets from Boeing, but not C-17's because *that* facility isn't where it should be?)


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> You keep talking about four Divisions. Yes, we have four organizations that are called Divisions and they have Brigades, but in reality we have three CMBGs, a CCSB and a collection of Reserve units. Those Divisions are very busy commanding and administering those reserve units in their geographical areas and three are double-hatted as Joint Task Force headquarters for domestic operations (an important task that is always being used). When we cut 4 CMBG in the early 90s as part of the reduction of the CAF those units became, for the most part, 10/90 units. Many then came back into being units circa 96/97, but with only a modest increase in personnel for the Army. We stripped out the schools in the mid-90s as part of this, leading to the migration of leadership to fill CFTPO. We have some hollow structures.
> 
> Fighting a conventional war in Europe at Brigade level is, perhaps, the _ne plus ultra _task, but it is not the task that justifies the current structure and size of the army. With Leopard 2A6M in a BG we are arguably in a better place than we would have been in 1989 as a CMBG if the balloon went up. As an armour officer I certainly think of the conventional fight, but something like a Kandahar redux is a more likely fight. While not everybody deployed over the conflict, we needed the size of the Regular Force that we have to sustain that fight and we would need it for the next one.
> 
> Moving forward as a army, I believe we need to prepare for everything from peacekeeping to stability/COIN to conventional war. The first does not have to be UN and the last does not have to be in Europe. We need some capabilities for the conventional fight, but we cannot neglect those needed for the more likely stability operation. I love a good combat team attack against an isolated Soviet platoon ("March on the Guidon!"), but there might be some others tasks out there. It turns out that COIN and stability operations aren't easy. We need to keep training our CMBG HQs. I think that some units could be re-rolled into capacity- building, and our tanks should be consolidated (in Gagetown).


This may surprise you but you and I agree fully on this.

With respect to the four divisional headquarters and the 10 reserve brigade headquarters the only point that I'm making is that if the Army is once again "hollow" then half of these headquarters could be eliminated based on the size of the overall force and the pressing need of people in more vital areas.

I agree with you fully on what we need to prepare for and even on the fact that most of our full-time effort should go to COIN and stability. I've always maintained that if (and its a big if) we reorganized to two divisional headquarters then the western division (basically Ontario and west) with one Reg F heavy brigade, two Res F brigades and a Res F CSS/CS brigade should concentrate on European high intensity issues. In other words the less  likely but more extreme scenarios. Meanwhile the eastern division with one light Reg F brigade, a mechanized Reg F brigade, a Res brigade and a Reg/Res CSS/CS brigade concentrate on all the OOTW matters. As would CANSOFCOM. In other words 3/4 of the full-time strength would concentrate on the day-to-day more likely types of operations we would be participating in while the smaller full-time portion, including a fairly heavy res component would concentrate on the less likely high intensity matters.

My view is that you need some elements (including reservists whether as augmentees or deployable entities) to prepare for, have the capabilities, and be the centre of knowledge of high intensity combat. Its too important to leave as a secondary duty. As it is the Army is trying to be a jack of all trades. I think that both high-intensity and OOTW are very challenging fields that need specialization - well developed doctrine and well developed forces to execute that doctrine. I've disagreed with the "agile, multi-purpose" force concept from day one simply on the basis that you can't do both well and the only way that you can is with lengthy predeployment cycles. If the force was split by function then not only would the skill sets get better but the readiness cycles could be significantly shorter. Similarly equipment holdings and training materiel could be allocated and concentrated to the appropriate division.

By reducing to two divisional headquarters, you have unity of purpose within each division in the management of the force generation of their respective subordinate headquarters and units including rotations and exercises. The same in the lower number of res brigades. Each would have a number of troops closer to a full-sized brigade and would manage their res elements in accordance with the direction of their respective divisional headquarters. Fewer headquarters and a shorter span of control should lead to a more unified and focused output. 

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> This may surprise you but you and I agree fully on this.
> 
> With respect to the four divisional headquarters and the _*10 reserve brigade headquarters *_the only point that I'm making is that if the Army is once again "hollow" then half of these headquarters could be eliminated based on the size of the overall force and the pressing need of people in more vital areas.



I'm sorry, I just had a slight 'MI moment' when I read that.

Pass the AED please


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## dapaterson

Five Res F Bdes:

BC, AB, SK

MB, ON

ON

QC

NB, NL, NS, PE


Next problem?


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## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Five Res F Bdes:
> 
> BC, AB, SK
> 
> MB, ON
> 
> ON
> 
> QC
> 
> NB, NL, NS, PE
> 
> 
> Next problem?


Actually numbers wise you need to group MB with BC, AB, SK to be able to get up to around 4,500. Otherwise . Ontario could support both a 4,500 brigade and a 3,000 CSS/CS brigade.


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> The struggle is real
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> An American Force Structure for the 21st Century - War on the Rocks
> 
> 
> The United States is unprepared for its current strategic challenges. Since the end of the Cold War, no nation could seriously threaten the territorial or
> 
> 
> 
> warontherocks.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If the US is short of assets to move its own forces, with whom are we going to hitch a ride?


This article is based on changing assumptions.  That the US has global security responsibilities.  It doesn't.  It only has North American security responsibilities.  It has global security choices.  The US is choosing to not deploy rapidly because it doesn't need to.


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> This article is based on changing assumptions.  That the US has global security responsibilities.  It doesn't.  It only has North American security responsibilities.  It has global security choices.  The US is choosing to not deploy rapidly because it doesn't need to.


I wish that were true.

I agree that the US has global security choices but force structure is also a choice and more often than not is not based on needs but on wants. All too often logistics are kept scaled more for peacetime than a potential was. It's cheaper that way and the fancy kit bling is so much more attractive. (In fairness, it appears more essential)

At least the US Army keeps a vast percentage of its reserve force in support and service support brigades which are low cost in peace time and easily spun up in war time. That unfortunately still doesn't get them into theatre.

On the other hand Canada has virtually no depth in reserve logistics support other than a few very understrength and practically unequipped brigade service battalions and virtually no internal lift capability.

You're very right. That's a choice. As to need? Only time will tell.

🍻


----------



## suffolkowner

I think if we can't equip a brigade with either the personnel or equipment then perhaps then perhaps we should adjust our eyes to more adequately represent our stomachs, but sustaining a battle group should not be beyond our capabilities. What other countries are capable of doing is unknown to me, so I don't have any frame of reference but the Italians would seem to be our nearest comparable. A fully equipped battle group should still require at the least the addition of self propelled artillery, motar carrier, SHORAD, and AT capability. We've concentrated on moving PY's around but has anyone tallied up the additional equipment requirements. I think that will put an end to the idea of sustaining a brigade



			https://cdn.statcdn.com/Infographic/images/normal/14636.jpeg
		




			https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2021/3/pdf/210316-pr-2020-30-en.pdf


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> This article is based on changing assumptions.  That the US has global security responsibilities.  It doesn't.  It only has North American security responsibilities.  It has global security choices.  The US is choosing to not deploy rapidly because it doesn't need to.



Just like every plant I have commissioned is subject to changing assumptions.  The chase of the moving target is codified/excused as Continuous Improvement.  Are we there yet?

As FJAG says everything is about choices.  Nobody has to do anything.

But.

The Armed Forces exist to deal with the world when it runs out of choices.


----------



## Kirkhill

Question to all and sundry:

How many helicopters does 408 squadron hold in Edmonton?  And, to confirm, they are all Griffons, right?


----------



## Kirkhill

OK - The answer to the above question, according to Google, is 16.   Assuming a small section of 6 then 16x6 = 96 or a small company being lifted simultaneously.  4 lifts for a Battalion. Each lift represents moving a fighting force anywhere on the battlefield in a 100 km radius in 30 minutes.

Now if only they could do something useful when they got there.

Currently the best they can do is pelt armour plate with 7.62mm pellets.  If they are lucky they will be ignored.

On the other hand IF they had 24 ATGMs in the battalion, or 8 available to the company, and also 4 CG M4s to the platoon then those 16 helicopters could relocate 8 ATGM firing posts with 48x 4 km missiles and 12 CG84s with 72 rounds - some 500m AT rounds and lots of smoke.

Enemy advance identified.

AT equipped company group lifted in 30 minutes to a flank ahead of the advance. 

Establish an "enfilade in defilade" position using available terrain.

Engage enemy at 2-4 km with 48 fire and forget missiles using volley fire and retire tactics.

Pop smoke with CGs, and lay down a screen of 7.62 pellets to break contact. 

Retire at best rate of knots to the RV for pickup and recovery by the helos. 

Retain 500 m CG84 AT-HEDP rounds for the unexpected on the exfil.

Home for breakfast.


And if the Squadron is regrouped, swapping 4x CH146s for 4x CH147s from 450  then the relocatable force expands from 16x 6 = 96 to 12x 6 + 4x 44 = 248 troops in the relocatable AT force.


The problem for the infantry is not that they are irrelevant on the armoured battlefield.  It is just that Canadian Infantry have not been given the tools that make every other army's infantry relevant.

In the absence of those tools strained scenarios have to be developed to justify their employment (and what to do with transport helicopters).

And with those tools the infantry can take the load off the RCAC's tanks so that they can be retained as the Mailed Fist.


----------



## Kirkhill

And once they are finished eating up the enemy's vehicles, containing their mounted opponents, then they are available to accompany the Mailed Fist with bomb and bayonet to close with and destroy the enemy.


----------



## GR66

I'm going to do a bit of an about face on this topic.  My heart lies with FGAG and Kirkhill in many ways.  I think a country the size and wealth of Canada should aspire to be able to fairly rapidly field a combat-capable Mechanized Brigade Group and sustain it.  I also see a future for light forces using emerging technologies in dispersed operations to great effect.  

Unfortunately, for a great many diverse reasons we are pretty far away from either of those goals.  However, as TangoTwoBravo has pointed out we have a pretty good starting point with our existing CMBG structure.  So maybe a better goal for the Force 2025 to Force 2030 time frame should be to consolidate and strengthen that base so that going forward we have a stronger foundation to build upon.

As far as deploying and sustaining a full CMBG in a combat operation goes, there are a whole bunch of reasons we can't currently do that (transport, support organizations, Reserve structure/training/equipment/legislation, supply, replacement equipment, etc.).  We need to recognize those weaknesses and start working on solutions now so that going forward such a deployment could be an option.

With regard to a dedicated Heavy Brigade.  Firstly, as noted above we wouldn't have the capability to deploy it as a full Brigade and I see zero possibility of Canada forward deploying such a force in Europe.  There simply is neither the political will or the budget to support it.  So in any case we'd be looking at a slower, trans-Atlantic deployment of a Battle Group.  That is something that can be done within the current CMBG structure.

I find the possibilities for a rapidly deployable light force that is sensor heavy and uses non-LOS weapons to counter the advance of a conventional force quite intriguing.  But I'm not sure that is where we should focus our efforts right now.  We probably only have enough transport capability to deploy and sustain a handful of Company-Group sized units.  Is that enough mass to make a significant difference against a major peer invasion force?  Would we want to risk our air transport assets in this deployment when they will also be needed to deploy and support our heavier follow-on forces?  Does this capability fit better with CSOR rather than with our Reg Force Light Battalions?  If a major conventional war is the least likely of our deployment scenarios, then would we be better off adding these capabilities to our Mechanized units instead where they are better protected (and for most other types of operations rapid deployment isn't as critical)?

I'd say for Force 2025 we should disband the 3rd Light Battalions from the Reg Force CMBGs.  Use those PYs to increase the manning levels in the remaining Mech Battalions...starting with fully filling out the Combat Support Companies with all the required support elements (AT, mortars, pioneers, MG?, recce, etc.).  Higher permanent manning levels should also help to reduce the time required to ready the Battalions for deployment.

Concentrate all of the Leopard Squadrons in a single location to simplify logistics and support and standardize training and tactics.  Form them into a separate Tank Regiment, or have it a composite Regiment with detached Squadrons from each of the three existing Armoured Regiments...let the RCAC figure that one out.

Dedicate a portion of the Reserves specifically to augmenting the Reg Force.  For example, Reserve Infantry Regiments (restructured as Companies) could augment the Reg Force Mech Battalions.  This could be done in one of two ways.  You could either pair a Reserve Regiment with each Reg Force Company and task the Reserve Regiment with force generating a Platoon to augment that Company, or you could group the Reserve Regiments (Companies) together to provide a 3rd and 4th Light Battalion to augment the parent Reg Force Regiments.

There would be enough Reserve Infantry units left in Ontario to create a single Reserve Canadian Infantry Brigade Group.  The medium term goal would be to work on equipping and training this Brigade to the point of being able to force generate a Light Infantry Battle Group with the eventual goal of being to deploy the entire Brigade in case of full mobilization.  Perhaps this Brigade could even be given a specialized role.  For example, defence of our forward airfields and/or landing ports/supply hubs during a conflict.  Or possibly winter/arctic warfare or urban ops.

Assign three Reserve Arty Regiments to each Reg Force Arty Regiment and task them each will supplying an additional 3-gun Battery.  When the Reg Force Regiments eventually get a self-propelled 155mm gun the M777s can be moved to these Reserve Batteries keeping all the 155mm guns concentrated in three Reg Force Regiments.  The three remaining Ontario Reserve Regiments would be grouped to provide the Artillery Regiment for the Reserve Infantry Brigade.  The remaining Reserve Artillery Regiments would remain 105mm regiments until such time as we bring SHORAD and HIMARS capabilities online.  Then they can transition into supplying batteries for hybrid Reg/Reserve AD & Rocket Regiments.

Four Reserve Armoured Regiments per CMBG area could be tasked to each supply a TAPV Recce Troop to provide a composite Squadron for each Reg Force Armoured Regiment.  They could also provide individual augmentees to be trained on the LAV Recce platform.  The three Atlantic Regiments (plus the 5th Ontario Reserve Regiment) would be grouped to provide the Armoured Recce Regiment for the Reserve Infantry Brigade.  The two BC Regiments could be re-tasked for more specialized roles (AT, UAV Recce, etc.).

The three Engineer, Signal and Service units from the current Ontario Brigade Groups would group to provide the support elements for the Reserve Infantry Brigade.  The units from the rest of the current Reserve Brigades would either be used to augment the Reg Force elements of the CMBGs or beef up the CCSB.

Nothing that is creating a radically new capability, but hopefully changes that would make the existing structure stronger and provide a strong foundation for future growth.


----------



## Brad Sallows

A country this size should be able to keep a mechanized division on the table (and commensurate naval and air forces).  The problem is that Canada is, in some ways, pathetic.


----------



## Kirkhill

As I was writing up my suggestions on the employment of AT systems by the infantry it occurred to me:  in the absence of an effective Anti-Tank weapon the LAV battalions are essentially toting Gendarmes, not Soldiers.   It is little wonder that when those Gendarmes are deployed without the LAVs, as a light force, they have little impact on the battlefield.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> ... With regard to a dedicated Heavy Brigade.  Firstly, as noted above we wouldn't have the capability to deploy it as a full Brigade and I see zero possibility of Canada forward deploying such a force in Europe.  There simply is neither the political will or the budget to support it.  So in any case we'd be looking at a slower, trans-Atlantic deployment of a Battle Group.  That is something that can be done within the current CMBG structure. ...


I've always maintained that there are numerous options available that will produce something better than what we have. Many of your ideas fit in very well with my own. (which therefore makes them absolutely brilliant ideas   )

I'll take up the defence of the heavy brigade, however.

Firstly I think that such a brigade is necessary for the simple reason that it is organized and employed differently from how either a light or mech brigade is (and thus needs its own table of organization and training regime). It's use as a brigade in full is entirely aspirational as in a day to day context, I see it more being used to reinforce a light or mech contingent, that is being seriously tactically challenged, with a heavy battle group.

There are two points to this.

First, is that when we operated in Afghanistan the opponent was a very light asymmetric force which at no time ever challenged our contingent's survival. They had the ability to hurt us but never kill us as an entity. On the other hand, there are numerous OOTW scenarios out there where the potential opposition is armed in a way that could seriously challenge a light or mech battle group. That type of scenario would have our deployed force living under a constant threat or be such that militarily we shouldn't deploy our force when politically the government might want us to.

Second, I do not consider projecting either such a heavy brigade or a heavy battle group offshore a limitation. The deployment difficulties are recognized factors that need to be planned for and exercised to the point that we have a known optimal planning requirement that we can then adjust the system to. I try to distinguish the way we are from the way we ought to be.

Each of the United States, Russia and now Britain have gone to brigade groups and brigade combat teams as units of action with heavy, medium and light versions. I'm not saying we should be blind copy-cats, but we should consider that much research has gone into that and the formats are there for very valid tactical reasons. The key raison d'être for a heavy brigade or combined arms battalion is its ability to conduct aggressive offensive actions in all but the most difficult terrain. Light and mechanized brigades are very limited in that respect (albeit they may be the preferred option in difficult terrain). In addition those countries also maintain a divisional framework for occasions when a force larger than a brigade needs to deploy.

Generally these brigades have the ability to spin off a combined arms battle group. With a US ABCT that's already organic by way of the armour heavy or infantry heavy combined arms battalions. The Russians do it as well with their Battalion Tactical Groups. Essentially their brigades and battle groups are similar to Canada's CMBG (if it has a tank regiment) and Canada's battle groups (with the major exceptions that Canada has a tactically unsound NSE concept on operations, and lacks sufficient artillery, anti-armour and AD capabilities).

Do I see the heavy brigade used in most of Canada's OOTW scenarios? No, but I do see it as the preferred option to maintain the eFP presence in Latvia which appears to be a long term mission. If we had a heavy brigade with three combined arms battalions and a cavalry battalion with even one full reserve brigade (unequipped but trained as heavy) we would have sufficient elements to maintain the eFP indefinitely and even reinforce it, if desired or necessary. In addition I foresee that there may come a time where we might need to deploy a heavy combined arms battalion on an OOTW deployment.

For me the big difference with what Canada is doing now comes in the fact that "heavy" components should not merely be "bolt-on" elements to an otherwise light or mech force. That only works in very limited circumstances. It needs to be a properly organized, equipped, manned and trained to its own doctrine and TTPs if it is to have any success in combat.

Do I see a political limitation here? No I don't. Each of Canada's missions into Kabul and Kandahar were politically motivated and there were no objections in Canada to taking heavy weapons like LAVs and artillery into what were basically humanitarian operations because there was a clear understanding of the risks. Similarly, the acquisition of the Leopard 2 were seen by the politicians as a reasonable response by the government to the increased level of threat in Kandahar and to reduce Canadian casualties. The subsequent plan to obtain IFVs was also accepted by the Government albeit subsequently killed by the Army itself. I sometimes (but not always) think that the phrase "the government won't do that" is a code phrase used within the Army by folks who "don't want to do that". I suspect that the concept of the symmetric Army and the resistance to an asymmetric one has more to do with regimental cliques that feel that they will get the short end of the stick in a reorganization then the need to keep the structure to facilitate managed readiness. But that's the cynic in me coming out.

Edited to add:



> Poland could purchase M1 Abrams tanks from US
> 
> 
> The Polish Armed Forces are reportedly interested in acquiring up to 250 tanks in the M1A2 SEPv3 variant and a further dozen tracked vehicles for training.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defensenews.com



🍻


----------



## GR66

There are lots of things that can (and should) be done given enough time.  My thoughts above are limited to the Force 2025 (3-1/2 year) and Force 2030 (8-1/2 year) time frames.

I think that consolidating 3 Battalions of infantry, modernizing and concentrating our tanks, purchasing and integrating AGTMs, a self-propelled artillery system, a SHORAD capability and possibly loitering munitions (including developing our doctrine, training systems, etc.), and completely re-aligning and re-grouping our Reserve forces is a fair bit to bite off in that time frame.  Never mind all the changes that will be going on in both the RCN and RCAF during that same time frame.

Going beyond to Force 2035, etc. I agree that more changes should follow.  But in the short term let's fix our cracked and leaky foundation then we can look at putting on that nice, new addition!


----------



## Kirkhill

How about.....  

WW2 British/Canadian Armoured Division

2 Brigades and a Support Group?

1 Armoured Brigade (Combined Arms?)
1 Motor Infantry Brigade (LAV?)
1 Support Group of Arty (keep), Air Defence (keep), Anti-Tank (keep?),

We don't have to organize on the Triangular Division.  Do we?

2 of our 3 Brigades to make a fully functional WW2 Armoured Division analog.   The 3rd Brigade as a Light Force.

I think we could get Force 2025 to this configuration in short order.  

With, of course, the addition of the infantry ATGM and an NLOS system for the Arty.


----------



## blacktriangle

But is there a need for a Brigade-sized light force, Kirkhill? The discussion I've seen in this thread can't even agree on whether or not there is a role for a single Light Bn in the CA.


----------



## Kirkhill

I take very different view.  My view is that the light brigade (or regiment or group - I'm not fashed about having a formed brigade with all the appurtenances and a defined mission) is available to to everything that the rest of the army can't do.

I would be quite content with an assemblage of well trained light companies available to reinforce LAVs, hold ports, provide security, take on anti-tank roles, assault over rough terrain, take on flank duties, establish defended localities,... release troops for training, conduct training, OMLTs, PRTs.... should I go on?

I can agree that the LAV guys can probably do a lot of this stuff but I would argue that there is a lot of this stuff that doesn't need LAVs and there is a lot more stuff to be done than there are LAVs available.

Most of the world is not accessible by road.  That's where you will find the "bandits" of the world, the Bin Ladens et al, organizing.  Up in the mountains, the caves, the deserts, the jungles, the swamps and the islands.  Those are the places where you need light troops. Troops that can be deployed by whatever transport is available.  They are going to do their fighting on their feet a long way from home.

And, again, I will agree that the LAV guys could do this, given time, but why not have troops on hand practicing for those eventualities so we don't have to waste time adapting to the situation.

Better a battalion in time than a division too late.

The problem, as I see it, is that we are used to building a solution for a clearly defined problem.  

I argue the need is there for a Just In Case force.  An adaptable force.

That force can't hang around long.  It needs to be removed, reinforced or replaced.  But in the time that it is on the ground it is permitting follow on forces, like the LAV troops, to reorganize and adjust there efforts to meet the demands of the situation on the ground.

Go ahead, Fill all the LAVs you have with number of troops allocated to the infantry.  Give me the 1000 or so that will be left over and organize them into standard platoons that fit in the back of 4 LAVs (Not the crews - those three will remain LAV specialists) But with a standard platoon of 24 organized into 3x 6 man sections and a 6 man HQ section that body of troops could be organized to backfill LAV casualties, operate independently or as companies or battalions.

1000 troops equals something like 40x 24 man platoons of adaptable, just in case forces.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> There are lots of things that can (and should) be done given enough time.  My thoughts above are limited to the Force 2025 (3-1/2 year) and Force 2030 (8-1/2 year) time frames.
> 
> I think that consolidating 3 Battalions of infantry, modernizing and concentrating our tanks, purchasing and integrating AGTMs, a self-propelled artillery system, a SHORAD capability and possibly loitering munitions (including developing our doctrine, training systems, etc.), and completely re-aligning and re-grouping our Reserve forces is a fair bit to bite off in that time frame.  Never mind all the changes that will be going on in both the RCN and RCAF during that same time frame.
> 
> Going beyond to Force 2035, etc. I agree that more changes should follow.  But in the short term let's fix our cracked and leaky foundation then we can look at putting on that nice, new addition!


It takes a long time to turn a force around. Our last transformation essentially aimed at 20 years which I thought was too long but was probably needed to cater to the inordinately long time our procurement cycles work at (and let's face it we're not even there yet although we pretend to be).

I think we need to look beyond 2030 to ensure that what we do in 2025 and 2030 defines the capabilities we should be aiming towards, facilitates the ongoing transformation, and doesn't hinder us with restricted numbers of people or dead-end organizational structures. If, for example, we lose a full-time brigade we not only lose a necessary deployable headquarters but a formation that we will in all probability never see again. I'd rather see a battalion or two reduced to a headquarters and one full-time company with the other companies designated to be filled by reservists rather than the entire battalion being lost and redistributed. That way at least you keep one very valuable bn headquarters for employment and/or rotations. While I tend to advocate strongly for the consolidation of administrative headquarters (like our divisions and reserve brigades) I'm also a proponent of keeping and even increasing all operational field headquarters even if some of the field units need to become hollow or hybrid full/part-time units.

One of my concerns is the fixing of the training system and that we do not do so in a way that will significantly restrict what we can do in the field force later. Fix the training system we must, but not in a way that cripples our ability to deploy and sustain units. Our administrative overhead has already impacted our defence outputs for a long time. We have to guard against any further negative impacts.

🍻


----------



## GR66

OK...keep your 3rd (Light) battalion HQ and a single Company for each Regiment.  That still frees up two infantry companies and a CS company to beef up our Mech Battalions in each Regiment.

That gives Kirkhill his three Reg Force Light Companies to play with  and fill the rest of the Battalion with Reserve Regiments (Companies).  We have enough Reserve infantry units that you could have five or six or eight Companies in the Light Battalion or a 4th all-Reserve Battalion for each Regiment.  The rest of the Reserve Regiments can pair up with a Reg Force LAV Company to provide a Platoon of Augmentees to each and then still have a full Reserve Brigade Group in Ontario.


----------



## Kirkhill

For reference - attached is a worksheet that I recently prepared.

It is based on the numbers and ranks anticipated in the 2013 force review.  This is for one of the three regiments.

It starts from the premise of there being 9 Lt Cols of Infantry with 9 CWOs, three of each per regiment.  

It proceeds to incorporate the 7 Majors and 7 MWOs allocated to each Lt Col.   etc.

The only additional body is the Regimental Colonel.  Lts (SN) are supernumerary's held at Regiment.

Based on the numbers available, there are lots of Captains and few Privates, then each Captain essentially gets a small platoon under command.  24 all ranks including himself.  Lts are trainees and assistants.

But the first thing I did was take all the 45 LAVs allocated to each LAV battalion, excluding the CO/DCO, and filled them with their 135 crewmembers (3 per vehicle).  That leaves 7seats in the back, 6 and a spare.  A group of 4 carries a 24 man platoon.  

I know the LAV guys like that association to be permanent at the section level.  That's fine.  It's not the way that I would do it but so what.  Nobody does things the way I like - especially my wife and kids.  The important part is the allocation of numbers.

According to the way I have allocated the troops the LAVs get 45 vehicles with 6 man sections.  They also get a recce and a pioneer platoon.  They don't get an MG platoon, a Mortar platoon or a Transport platoon.  

I figure they have got 45 2.5 tonne trucks for carrying the gear that a conventional infantry battalion would carry on its wheels.  The LAV battalion rides and fights on its wheels.

The transport platoon in the LAV battalion is function that doesn't exist in the light infantry battalion.  The light infantry battalion's transport platoon is to make up the difference between the 60 lbs on each man's back and the rest of the kit that the battalion owns.  9 men in a LAV with the same 60 lbs only take up 540 of the 5000 lb load carrying capacity available in the LAV.

In the Lt Battalion I have grouped the Transport platoon with the MG/DFS and Mortar platoons thus combining the functions that I see the LAV filling - transport and fire support.  The primary role of the transport platoon is to transport ammunition (bullets and bombs), defence stores, rations and troops, in that order.

Each of the LAV battalions uses 464 of the PYs allocated to the Infantry Corps for its Regiments.  The remaining PYs are enough for 3 battalions without LAVs, structured with all the required capabilities of an infantry battalion, with 401 infantry PYs each.

HQ, Recce, Pnr, 9x Rifle, MG, Mor, Tpt.  All tailored to fit into the back of LAVs if necessary, or CH-146s.  Each of the Brigades has a Squadron of Griffons - 16 helos with 6 men each equals a company of 96 troops.

Sigs, Log, Rats, Meds, Maint are attached from other branches according to current norms.  

No changes in external structures.  No changes in internal structures.  Just reallocation of the available troops to fill the gaps.


----------



## Underway

FJAG said:


> The subsequent plan to obtain IFVs was also accepted by the Government albeit subsequently killed by the Army itself.


Because the LAV 6 upgrade essentially made that entire program redundant.  The LAV is an IFV that people seem to ignore because it doesn't have tracks.

In a weird way, GDLS won the competition in the end.  They were bidding the Piranha 5 as an option.  Nexter was putting up another 8x8 VBCI and The CV90 was bid by BAE.   The LAV 6 is basically a Piranha 5.  So all of the army's LAV's were converted to one of the bidders.  For cheaper than the actual project was going to cost.


----------



## suffolkowner

Underway said:


> Because the LAV 6 upgrade essentially made that entire program redundant.  The LAV is an IFV that people seem to ignore because it doesn't have tracks.
> 
> In a weird way, GDLS won the competition in the end.  They were bidding the Piranha 5 as an option.  Nexter was putting up another 8x8 VBCI and The CV90 was bid by BAE.   The LAV 6 is basically a Piranha 5.  So all of the army's LAV's were converted to one of the bidders.  For cheaper than the actual project was going to cost.


Kinda but I think they just didn't have the money or the force structure for it anyways. In my mind tracks have to be better but a dozer operator of mine told me how he once watched a wheeled komatsu dozer push and pull a Cat D11 any which way it wanted. What does an IFV really need to separate itself in my mind it would need better protection than the LAV 6 but that doesn't necessarily need to come from the added weight of more armour does it?

The LAV 6 is to the LAV 700 is what the LAV 700 is to the Piranha 5 I think. So theres still a fair difference, I think the LAV 700 is using the Piranha 5's suspension


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> Because the LAV 6 upgrade essentially made that entire program redundant.  The LAV is an IFV that people seem to ignore because it doesn't have tracks.
> 
> In a weird way, GDLS won the competition in the end.  They were bidding the Piranha 5 as an option.  Nexter was putting up another 8x8 VBCI and The CV90 was bid by BAE.   The LAV 6 is basically a Piranha 5.  So all of the army's LAV's were converted to one of the bidders.  For cheaper than the actual project was going to cost.


I haven't actually seen a comparison of the cost figures as the LAV upgrade project ended up upgrading more LAVs then IFVs were being purchased. The IFVs would also have added additional vehicles to the fleet as the LAV UP looked to upgrading virtually all of the existing LAV IIIs which, unless I'm off track would have left us with all the Reg F battalions mechanized.

I don't dislike the LAV 6.0 at all. I think that it has its purpose and is good at it. OTOH I do not think that a wheeled IFV is as good for intimately integrated work with tanks. The tank and LAV battalion has limited road mobility because of the tanks and limited cross country mobility because of the LAVs. The LAV might perform reasonably on the plains of Shilo and Wainwright but put it into plowed fields in Europe; or hedgerows or the rubble of bombed out buildings or sodden clay fields, and the tanks will quickly leave the LAVs behind them.

Generally I agree though, given the right weapon systems and the right armour and the right engine, you can probably make a wheeled IFV as good as a tracked one. Until you get to traction part where they differ and the wheels win out on a practicable road network and the tracks win out in broken terrain. My personal preference is that with tracked tanks you want tracked IFVs. For a combined arms battalion you really only need four companies of tracked IFVs and a handful of tracked command and support vehicles. My guess is a hundred would probably do. That wouldn't break the bank and would free up enough LAVs to equip the light battalions in the other two brigades.

I also agree that what we have is LAVs, so let's make the best of what we have.

🍻


----------



## suffolkowner

FJAG said:


> I haven't actually seen a comparison of the cost figures as the LAV upgrade project ended up upgrading more LAVs then IFVs were being purchased. The IFVs would also have added additional vehicles to the fleet as the LAV UP looked to upgrading virtually all of the existing LAV IIIs which, unless I'm off track would have left us with all the Reg F battalions mechanized.
> 
> I don't dislike the LAV 6.0 at all. I think that it has its purpose and is good at it. OTOH I do not think that a wheeled IFV is as good for intimately integrated work with tanks. The tank and LAV battalion has limited road mobility because of the tanks and limited cross country mobility because of the LAVs. The LAV might perform reasonably on the plains of Shilo and Wainwright but put it into plowed fields in Europe; or hedgerows or the rubble of bombed out buildings or sodden clay fields, and the tanks will quickly leave the LAVs behind them.
> 
> Generally I agree though, given the right weapon systems and the right armour and the right engine, you can probably make a wheeled IFV as good as a tracked one. Until you get to traction part where they differ and the wheels win out on a practicable road network and the tracks win out in broken terrain. My personal preference is that with tracked tanks you want tracked IFVs. For a combined arms battalion you really only need four companies of tracked IFVs and a handful of tracked command and support vehicles. My guess is a hundred would probably do. That wouldn't break the bank and would free up enough LAVs to equip the light battalions in the other two brigades.
> 
> I also agree that what we have is LAVs, so let's make the best of what we have.
> 
> 🍻


so a tracked LAV 6 then






						Stryker+Tr Prototype Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com
					

The Stryker+Tr is currently being developed by General Dynamics Land Systems. It is a tracked version of the M1126 Stryker infantry carrier vehicle. The new APC is aimed at the US Army's requirement.



					www.military-today.com


----------



## FJAG

suffolkowner said:


> so a tracked LAV 6 then
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Stryker+Tr Prototype Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com
> 
> 
> The Stryker+Tr is currently being developed by General Dynamics Land Systems. It is a tracked version of the M1126 Stryker infantry carrier vehicle. The new APC is aimed at the US Army's requirement.
> 
> 
> 
> www.military-today.com



Interesting vehicle. I wonder how much hull and automotive parts commonality it has with the LAV 6. I prefer a composite rubber track but an IFV might be on the border of being too heavy for today's technology although it has been fitted to the CV 90.

🍻


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## suffolkowner

FJAG said:


> Interesting vehicle. I wonder how much hull and automotive parts commonality it has with the LAV 6. I prefer a composite rubber track but an IFV might be on the border of being too heavy for today's technology although it has been fitted to the CV 90.
> 
> 🍻








						CANADIAN DEFENCE MATTERS
					

A blog about contemporary defence issues from a Canadian perspective.




					jgmjgm516.blogspot.com
				




“ General Dynamics has created a tracked version of the Stryker. The vehicle keeps the highly survivable double-V hull, and tracks were attached using externally mounted suspension. It is considerably heavier at 70,000 lbs (35 tons), but the tracked suspension can handle up to 84,000 pounds (42 tons) to allow for additional armor, weapons, and cargo. Its power plant offers 700 horsepower and has the vehicle *has greater than 60 percent commonality with wheeled Strykers. *The Tracked Stryker also has greater fuel efficiency and a wider track and a wider track for better mobility than the M113.”

oh the fun we can have developing our own unique tracked IFV


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## medic5

Crazy idea, why not avoid any more uniqueness and just lease US equipment.

We can lease Bradleys for the tracked IFV, some Avengers for air defence, some Paladins for SP artillery, maybe whatever they are giving IBCTs to give more mobility to the light battalions?

Who knows, maybe leasing is an easier sell for the Liberals.


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## MilEME09

medic5 said:


> Crazy idea, why not avoid any more uniqueness and just lease US equipment.
> 
> We can lease Bradleys for the tracked IFV, some Avengers for air defence, some Paladins for SP artillery, maybe whatever they are giving IBCTs to give more mobility to the light battalions?
> 
> Who knows, maybe leasing is an easier sell for the Liberals.


Given the USMC just divested all their tanks and most tube arty, we could equipment all three Regiments plus even a few reserve units with tanks.


----------



## medic5

MilEME09 said:


> Given the USMC just divested all their tanks and most tube arty, we could equipment all three Regiments plus even a few reserve units with tanks.


Their M777s too. 

Enough artillery to replace all the 105s. We could even expand our regular force regiments if we wanted to.


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## GR66

medic5 said:


> Crazy idea, why not avoid any more uniqueness and just lease US equipment.


Maybe this should be built into the procurement portion of Force 2025.

1.  Equipment need identified
2.  What are the Americans using and is it still in production?
3.  Is there a truly legitimate reason that item can't work for Canada?
NO?  - purchase the item
YES? - Look at the other options

Let's be honest, any combat deployment by Canada is almost certainly going to be in conjunction with the United States.  While the US may have its own logistical challenges in a major war, their capability is still far beyond ours.  In a real, high intensity shooting war we will quickly use up our stocks, have difficulty re-supplying and minimal capability to replace or expand.  Using the same equipment as the US as much as possible would greatly simplify these issues.


----------



## suffolkowner

GR66 said:


> Maybe this should be built into the procurement portion of Force 2025.
> 
> 1.  Equipment need identified
> 2.  What are the Americans using and is it still in production?
> 3.  Is there a truly legitimate reason that item can't work for Canada?
> NO?  - purchase the item
> YES? - Look at the other options
> 
> Let's be honest, any combat deployment by Canada is almost certainly going to be in conjunction with the United States.  While the US may have its own logistical challenges in a major war, their capability is still far beyond ours.  In a real, high intensity shooting war we will quickly use up our stocks, have difficulty re-supplying and minimal capability to replace or expand.  Using the same equipment as the US as much as possible would greatly simplify these issues.


I think an already in allied use provision is being used in the Polaris replacement and HSVS program, so this may be a thing going forward. I don't know if I would want to limit myself just to American sources as they don't always get it right, however I can see from an Army perspective how the pros outweigh the cons more so than for the RCAF and of course the RCN needs tend to be bespoke. It is my understanding that we have been offered Bradleys and Humvee's for free before but have turned them down based on need and operational cost concerns.


----------



## GR66

suffolkowner said:


> I think an already in allied use provision is being used in the Polaris replacement and HSVS program, so this may be a thing going forward. I don't know if I would want to limit myself just to American sources as they don't always get it right, however I can see from an Army perspective how the pros outweigh the cons more so than for the RCAF and of course the RCN needs tend to be bespoke. It is my understanding that we have been offered Bradleys and Humvee's for free before but have turned them down based on need and operational cost concerns.


Clearly there are things that we wouldn't want to purchases just because the US is using them but a "perfect" bespoke solution might not look so perfect when you can't get any replacements, etc.

Specifying "already in other allied use" could be step 4 if it's determined that the US option won't work.  The advantage of US vs other allied use is typically a) the US will almost always use an item in higher volume than the rest of our allies put together, b) In the case of of a major peer conflict in Europe/the Pacific US production facilities and utilities will be more likely to remain in production than facilities closer to the warzone (Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Japan, Singapore, etc.) and c) the US is more likely to maintain significant quantities of war stocks than our other allies.

I'm certainly not opposed to putting Canadian produced military equipment at the head of the purchasing queue either so long as it's not a one-off production run/capability that can't continue/resume/ramp up when required.


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## MilEME09

Luckily I think we have finally learned our lesson and more and more contracts have included the provision that it has to be a proven platform in service with our allies. Good example is the current LVM program, the replacement for both the HLVW and the LSVW must be proven platforms.

We need to stop buying one offs, our budget can't afford it.


----------



## blacktriangle

markppcli said:


> The guys teaching ATL I spoke to informed me part of the “cavalry” change is 4 car troops, down from the doctrinal 8 Coyote Recce troop, which would align for the LAV Recce numbers.


I meant to ask this earlier - so in the end, they gave up on the idea of having composite LAV/TAPV Sqns, Tps & Ptls? Will they be incorporating more dismounts into the picture, or will it be manned like the Coyote used to be?

I read a paper recently indicating that Australia will be going down to 4 car troops with their Boxer CRVs. Sounded like more of a numbers game for them than anything else.


----------



## markppcli

blacktriangle said:


> I meant to ask this earlier - so in the end, they gave up on the idea of having composite LAV/TAPV Sqns, Tps & Ptls? Will they be incorporating more dismounts into the picture, or will it be manned like the Coyote used to be?
> 
> I read a paper recently indicating that Australia will be going down to 4 car troops with their Boxer CRVs. Sounded like more of a numbers game for them than anything else.


I imagine so? I didn't get a chance to have a long talk about it frankly.


----------



## FJAG

blacktriangle said:


> I meant to ask this earlier - so in the end, they gave up on the idea of having composite LAV/TAPV Sqns, Tps & Ptls? Will they be incorporating more dismounts into the picture, or will it be manned like the Coyote used to be?
> 
> I read a paper recently indicating that Australia will be going down to 4 car troops with their Boxer CRVs. Sounded like more of a numbers game for them than anything else.


I sometimes wonder where some of the math comes from. A recce troops used to have seven cars before it stepped down to five. At the same time a Russian recce platoon was three cars (pretty much like any platoon in the Russian inventory - tanks, infantry, artillery etc. - platoon commanders don't get their own ride, they're an extra body in the number 1 section's vehicle).

I expect there is some logic behind all of those: area to be covered; equipment available; redundancy for casualties; span of control and so on. Sometimes the numbers just seem a bit arbitrary or are based on "we've always done it that way".

🍻


----------



## Underway

FJAG said:


> I don't dislike the LAV 6.0 at all. I think that it has its purpose and is good at it. OTOH I do not think that a wheeled IFV is as good for intimately integrated work with tanks. The tank and LAV battalion has limited road mobility because of the tanks and limited cross country mobility because of the LAVs. The LAV might perform reasonably on the plains of Shilo and Wainwright but put it into plowed fields in Europe; or hedgerows or the rubble of bombed out buildings or sodden clay fields, and the tanks will quickly leave the LAVs behind them.



You would be surprised with how mobile LAV's can be.  The routes they take are often different than the tracked vehicles but that's often just as much a factor of their higher centre of gravity than it is their wheels.  In an 8x8 drive those things are remarkable. 

That doesn't invalidate any concern regarding "matching" up the vehicles.  They do limit each other somewhat.  Guess we need to design an 8x8 tank then...   👹



> What does an IFV really need to separate itself in my mind it would need better protection than the LAV 6 but that doesn't necessarily need to come from the added weight of more armour does it?



LAV 6 has a good balance between mobility, protection and firepower.  Everyone has their own opinion on which way it should go.


----------



## MilEME09

Underway said:


> LAV 6 has a good balance between mobility, protection and firepower.  Everyone has their own opinion on which way it should go.


So a LAV with say a 105 or 120mm direct fire gun..... ladies and gentlemen we just reinvented the MGS, we have gone full circle.


----------



## Underway

MilEME09 said:


> So a LAV with say a 105 or 120mm direct fire gun..... ladies and gentlemen we just reinvented the MGS, we have gone full circle.


I see you lean more the firepower side of things.  I'm more of keeping centred on the triangle personally.  I wouldn't say no to alternative weapons besides a gun (Spike missile tube or something).


----------



## MilEME09

Underway said:


> I see you lean more the firepower side of things.  I'm more of keeping centred on the triangle personally.  I wouldn't say no to alternative weapons besides a gun (Spike missile tube or something).


Mobility is also important, perhaps a balance would be a 75mm or a 90mm main gun? And an active protection system


----------



## GR66

I know this is all "back of a napkin" thinking, but here's another shot at a Force 2025 force structure based on some of the comments in this thread.

3rd (Light) Infantry Battalions maintain their HQ and a single Company each to maintain a deployable rapid reaction capability.  The rest of the 3rd Battalions are filled out by Reserve Regiments.

Each Reg Force Company is paired with a Reserve Regiment in order to provide Platoon/Troop/Battery level augmentation .

The extra Reserve Regiments in Ontario are formed into a single Light Brigade Group with the goal of equipping and training this unit to the point that this Brigade Group becomes fully deployable.

This proposal leaves enough Reserve Artillery Regiments to provide future SHORAD and HIMARS batteries as well as a light Infantry Battalion to provide force protection for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade.  

In this plan only one Reserve Armoured Recce Regiment would have to be re-rolled as Infantry and one other Regiment would be surplus to the plan and could possibly be given a HUSAR role due to the earthquake and tsunami threats to BC.  

Equipment goals for Force 2025 would be Tank Modernization, ATGMs, SHORAD and HIMARS.


----------



## PuckChaser

Just because I'm a bit biased, all of your divisions better be good at mission command because there's no Sigs assets at all...


----------



## blacktriangle

PuckChaser said:


> Just because I'm a bit biased, all of your divisions better be good at mission command because there's no Sigs assets at all...


Everyone released or retired.


----------



## FJAG

This last Org Chart made me think for a second about whether or not a given reserve battalion could even provide support to a given Reg F company which made me think about the brits that pair battalion to battalion in some cases which made me look up the Brit structure again.

Our Army reserve has over twice as many battalions and regiments as the Brit Army Reserve. Considering we have given up on the concept of the "Militia" as a mobilization base for building a "great host" one has to honestly question why we keep this archaic structure alive if not to humour the politically connected old farts. That leaves me the question of whether we actually still have so many politically connected old farts?

I favour amalgamating three to four Reserve units into one fully staffed or even overstaffed battalion/regiment and then forming the consolidated units into five reserve brigades and assigning a full reserve brigade or two to support a given Reg F brigade. I think that for augmentation purposes, a company on company relationship is to granular even though it could build strong relationships. You need a larger pool and even battalion to battalion might not be sufficient as long as we rely on volunteers. Besides, I want the ability to generate deployable reserve units.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> This last Org Chart made me think for a second about whether or not a given reserve battalion could even provide support to a given Reg F company which made me think about the brits that pair battalion to battalion in some cases which made me look up the Brit structure again.
> 
> Our Army reserve has over twice as many battalions and regiments as the Brit Army Reserve. Considering we have given up on the concept of the "Militia" as a mobilization base for building a "great host" one has to honestly question why we keep this archaic structure alive if not to humour the politically connected old farts. That leaves me the question of whether we actually still have so many politically connected old farts?
> 
> I favour amalgamating three to four Reserve units into one fully staffed or even overstaffed battalion/regiment and then forming the consolidated units into five reserve brigades and assigning a full reserve brigade or two to support a given Reg F brigade. I think that for augmentation purposes, a company on company relationship is to granular even though it could build strong relationships. You need a larger pool and even battalion to battalion might not be sufficient as long as we rely on volunteers. Besides, I want the ability to generate deployable reserve units.
> 
> 🍻



The TA have their own strategic and political issues:


Future Reserves 2020, the British Army and the politics of military innovation during the Cameron era​
This article examines why and how the recent attempt to transform the TA was undertaken, and analyses its outcome. It shows that—contrary to the view of Edmunds and colleagues that ‘the most important long-term driver for change [in the reserves was] strategic in nature’2—the key drivers behind the restructuring of the TA were intensely political, ideological and financial; and it argues that the real factors underpinning the origins of FR2020—and the army's resistance to those motives—are crucial to understanding the policy's evolution and impact. Our analysis reveals how these ideological and financial dynamics resulted in an ad hoc defence policy and consequent intraservice and civil–military frictions, providing further evidence of incoherence in defence policy-making during Cameron's premiership. In presenting this analysis we make three important contributions to the military innovation literature, while also increasing understanding of reserve forces among international security scholars.









						Future Reserves 2020, the British Army and the politics of military innovation during the Cameron era
					

Abstract. Since 2001 there has been an increase in the use of reserve forces in conflicts sparking a number of organizational transformations when it comes to r




					academic.oup.com


----------



## GR66

PuckChaser said:


> Just because I'm a bit biased, all of your divisions better be good at mission command because there's no Sigs assets at all...


To be honest I left them out because I'm quite ignorant of the Sigs world and how much of their role is dedicated to domestic JRTF ops and how much is dedicated to the Brigades to which they are assigned.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> This last Org Chart made me think for a second about whether or not a given reserve battalion could even provide support to a given Reg F company which made me think about the brits that pair battalion to battalion in some cases which made me look up the Brit structure again.
> 
> Our Army reserve has over twice as many battalions and regiments as the Brit Army Reserve. Considering we have given up on the concept of the "Militia" as a mobilization base for building a "great host" one has to honestly question why we keep this archaic structure alive if not to humour the politically connected old farts. That leaves me the question of whether we actually still have so many politically connected old farts?
> 
> I favour amalgamating three to four Reserve units into one fully staffed or even overstaffed battalion/regiment and then forming the consolidated units into five reserve brigades and assigning a full reserve brigade or two to support a given Reg F brigade. I think that for augmentation purposes, a company on company relationship is to granular even though it could build strong relationships. You need a larger pool and even battalion to battalion might not be sufficient as long as we rely on volunteers. Besides, I want the ability to generate deployable reserve units.
> 
> 🍻


My thinking is that a Reserve Infantry Regiment is in all reality in manning the equivalent of a Company.  That being the case we should organize it as a Company.

Each Reserve infantry unit would have three Platoons...two trained Platoons and one Recruit/PAT Platoon.  In case of mobilization each Reserve Regiment would be tasked to supply one of their two trained Platoons to augment/supply replacements for their affiliated Reg Force Company. The 2nd "trained" platoon would go to standby while the Recruit/PAT Platoon is trained up to proficiency at a Battalion-level training Depot.  New recruits come into the system to replace the now trained recruits.  

Assuming that our three Reg Force Brigades are rotating through our deployment it should give our Reserve Regiments/Brigade Depots enough time to keep generating new trained Platoons to augment their Reg Force Companies.


----------



## suffolkowner

Underway said:


> You would be surprised with how mobile LAV's can be.  The routes they take are often different than the tracked vehicles but that's often just as much a factor of their higher centre of gravity than it is their wheels.  In an 8x8 drive those things are remarkable.
> 
> That doesn't invalidate any concern regarding "matching" up the vehicles.  They do limit each other somewhat.  Guess we need to design an 8x8 tank then...   👹
> 
> 
> 
> LAV 6 has a good balance between mobility, protection and firepower.  Everyone has their own opinion on which way it should go.


slap these on the LAV6 for added mobility instead of a complete tracked suspension like in the tracked stryker, doable?






						Mattracks | Agriculture & Commercial Tracks
					

Rubber Tracks for 4x4 Tractors, Trenchers, Commercial Vehicles




					mattracks.co


----------



## daftandbarmy

Underway said:


> You would be surprised with how mobile LAV's can be.  The routes they take are often different than the tracked vehicles but that's often just as much a factor of their higher centre of gravity than it is their wheels.  In an 8x8 drive those things are remarkable.
> 
> That doesn't invalidate any concern regarding "matching" up the vehicles.  They do limit each other somewhat.  Guess we need to design an 8x8 tank then...   👹
> 
> 
> 
> LAV 6 has a good balance between mobility, protection and firepower.  Everyone has their own opinion on which way it should go.



How are they in snow like, you know, in Canada and Russia?


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> How are they in snow like, you know, in Canada and Russia?



As opposed to tracks on ice?









MilEME09 said:


> Mobility is also important, perhaps a balance would be a 75mm or a 90mm main gun? And an active protection system



Why not a 105mm on an armoured car?

Japan's Type 16 8x8 Maneuver Combat Vehicle - 26 tonnes
Italy's Centauro B1 8x8 Tank Destroyer - 24 tonnes
France's AMX 10 RC 6x6 Recce Vehicle - 15 to 22 tonnes
US's Stryker 8x8 Mobile Gun System - 19 tonnes.

Contemporary "heavy" guns have been mounted on armoured cars by Panhard, on the Saladin and on Staghounds.

They have their uses - just not in a stand-up fight with tanks.  But they are able to keep up with the LAVs on the highway while the tanks get into the battle.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> ...
> 
> 3rd (Light) Infantry Battalions maintain their HQ and a single Company each to maintain a deployable rapid reaction capability.  The rest of the 3rd Battalions are filled out by Reserve Regiments.
> 
> ....



And now you are back to 1987 and Perrin Beatty's 10/90 3rd Battalions - They were to have a Reg Force Cadre and be manned by Reserves.  

They morphed into 25/75 battalions with a jump company, then into 90/10 LAV battalions without LAVs and finally into Light Battalions with no purpose.


----------



## Underway

daftandbarmy said:


> How are they in snow like, you know, in Canada and Russia?


Well I've never driven one (passenger only), but I did work with them in Shilo on pre-deployment.  Armpit deep prairie snow bogged them down.  I thought the LAV was stuck.  Four wheels turned, churned the area to mud.  The new driver then switched to 8 wheel drive.  They were no longer bogged down and immediately lept forward on the advance again.  I think you can also add chains to the tires as well if you need to.


----------



## dangerboy

Underway said:


> I think you can also add chains to the tires as well if you need to.


You can add chains to the LAV, they are part of the vehicle's equipment.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> And now you are back to 1987 and Perrin Beatty's 10/90 3rd Battalions - They were to have a Reg Force Cadre and be manned by Reserves.
> 
> They morphed into 25/75 battalions with a jump company, then into 90/10 LAV battalions without LAVs and finally into Light Battalions with no purpose.


My recollection is that the 10/90s were a way of preserving units and CO/RSM billets when the 4 CMBG units were stood down circa 1993. 3 RCR for example, was in Germany as a full up battalion, and then went to Borden as a 10/90 before being stood back up as a full battalion circa 96/97 (a mech battalion on light scales was the phrase I think...). The 8CH solution was a little different - Reg F RHQ and A Sqn (tanks) combined with the PRes 8CH. That got shut down in 1997 and the panzers rolled into the school. 

I think, looking back from my perch as a young PRes Capt at the time, that the 10/90s were a good concept that scared the heck out of some.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> And now you are back to 1987 and Perrin Beatty's 10/90 3rd Battalions - They were to have a Reg Force Cadre and be manned by Reserves.
> 
> They morphed into 25/75 battalions with a jump company, then into 90/10 LAV battalions without LAVs and finally into Light Battalions with no purpose.


By the way 

Beatty was also the guy that bought 200 simple Bison 8x8s as APCs for the Militia and was planning on buying 400 Bv206s from a Calgary company.

The Bisons would have allowed the Militia to respond quickly by road to any foreseeable crisis in Settler country when roads and weather permitted while the Bvs would have permitted timely response in the other 80% of the country year around.

It turned out the Army's need was greater than the Militia's.  And, once again, the Militia was stripped of assets and a useful role.

Not the first time.  Not the last time.

Which always brings me back to the home guard Canadian Rangers model for the Militia.

The Army has demonstrated time after time the only thing they want from the "Reserves" is their budget.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> My recollection is that the 10/90s were a way of preserving units and CO/RSM billets when the 4 CMBG units were stood down circa 1993. 3 RCR for example, was in Germany as a full up battalion, and then went to Borden as a 10/90 before being stood back up as a full battalion circa 96/97 (a mech battalion on light scales was the phrase I think...). The 8CH solution was a little different - Reg F RHQ and A Sqn (tanks) combined with the PRes 8CH. That got shut down in 1997 and the panzers rolled into the school.
> 
> I think, looking back from my perch as a young PRes Capt at the time, that the 10/90s were a good concept that scared the heck out of some.


Agreed.  The 10/90s were, and are, a good idea.  And, if the regs were to fully support the concept then I would fully support a 6 LAV battalion RCIC with one SOC light battalion.


----------



## quadrapiper

FJAG said:


> Our Army reserve has over twice as many battalions and regiments as the Brit Army Reserve. Considering we have given up on the concept of the "Militia" as a mobilization base for building a "great host" one has to honestly question why we keep this archaic structure alive if not to humour the politically connected old farts. That leaves me the question of whether we actually still have so many politically connected old farts?


Other than badges, buttons, and the possibility of unusual hats, how much of an issue is a rainbow of regiments? Battalions I get: why pay a LCol, CWO, etc. to lead a company or platoon.


----------



## dapaterson

The constant churn to produce senior personnel can lead to sub optimal selection (last man standing).  Fewer LCols and CWOs means more time for more junior personnel to gain experience.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> Other than badges, buttons, and the possibility of unusual hats, how much of an issue is a rainbow of regiments? Battalions I get: why pay a LCol, CWO, etc. to lead a company or platoon.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> Agreed.  The 10/90s were, and are, a good idea.  And, if the regs were to fully support the concept then I would fully support a 6 LAV battalion RCIC with one SOC light battalion.


That first sentence right there lies the heart of the issue, any initiative will fail if those tasked to execute do not believe it will work or not motivated to do so. We all say we are one big army but when push comes to shove it doesn't always seem that way.


----------



## Underway

What is a 10/90?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Underway said:


> What is a 10/90?


It was type of unit where, in theory, there was 10% Regular Force and 90% Reserve Force. I am going back in my hazy memories as a young B(A) Capt, but 3 RCR had a Battalion HQ in Borden and several affiliated Reserve units in the area. The Regular Force Cadre was augmented in these units, especially the critical NCO rank and I believe that these units then each provided a company to the 10/90 battalion.

My impression was that the troops were happy since they had well-planned and executed exercises/courses, but that senior Reserve leadership was a little worried. Seeing as how Reserve units are having a very hard time generating their own COs I think it is something worth looking at. 

I think its beyond Force 2025, but even as a young Reserve officer I saw the value in amalgamation, which could be seen in a 10/90 light. Turn each CBG into 10/90 unit. Perhaps each geographical area gets one armour and artillery 10/90.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> It was type of unit where, in theory, there was 10% Regular Force and 90% Reserve Force. I am going back in my hazy memories as a young B(A) Capt, but 3 RCR had a Battalion HQ in Borden and several affiliated Reserve units in the area. The Regular Force Cadre was augmented in these units, especially the critical NCO rank and I believe that these units then each provided a company to the 10/90 battalion.
> 
> My impression was that the troops were happy since they had well-planned and executed exercises/courses, but that senior Reserve leadership was a little worried. Seeing as how Reserve units are having a very hard time generating their own COs I think it is something worth looking at.
> 
> I think its beyond Force 2025, but even as a young Reserve officer I saw the value in amalgamation, which could be seen in a 10/90 light. Turn each CBG into 10/90 unit. Perhaps each geographical area gets one armour and artillery 10/90.



It was a short term attempt to hide Reg F PYs from the chopping block, which seemed to work for them.

Unlike what we expected, a partnership between the Reg F and Reserves kind of like the TA operates in the UK, they landed on us like a large rock, announced that they were in charge of all the training (except for the recruits) and squished out all the other leadership and inserted their own people to lead our troops while we did all the admin. A high level of condescension and disrespect permeated most of their interactions with us. When it ended, the Reg F took all of our well trained and experienced soldiers with them, which destroyed our succession for few years.

Also, some of the people they sent us were simply awful. I was a rifle company OC who had to deal with _the worst_ MWO/CSMs I've ever encountered in my career. He was clearly sent to us to get rid of him, and pretty quickly had a wide range of complaints lodged against him. Some called him a 'Militia-hater' but it was pretty clear he hated every type of human, including himself. On the upside, his son joined our unit and became an excellent MCpl, so I guess you could score a win there.

A Reg F Major , a pretty good guy who I knew from Phase training, took over from me as I had to move out of town with work and wound up returning him to the mother ship pretty quickly. We thought he would be dealt with, as we were assured he would be by the then CO, but he wasn't of course.

So, yeah, it worked out pretty well for the Reg F based on what I saw


----------



## Brad Sallows

10/90: as long as the true reasons aren't along the lines of "to keep the 3rd bns and their leaders around", and the rug isn't pulled out again suddenly.  I heard a few who were there, then, grouse about what happened when everything ended; I didn't hear any praise for the way in which it was done.


----------



## FJAG

I like the concept of hybrid units very much. I think, however, that the 10/90 battalion has an inherent weakness that makes it unattractive to the Reg F.

If you look at a 10/90 infantry battalion with a full-up strength of 6-700 it means the Reg F component is approximately 60-70 personnel who the Reg F in general, look at as being heavily underutilized on a day-to-day basis and potentially unavailable for deployments. With a Res F as small as 20,000 that still adds up to 2,000 Reg F personnel (add another 3-500 for brigade headquarters) who are "lost" to the day-to-day operations of the Army with their only perceived benefit being the eventual creation of a useable battalion for a major emergency. It will always be a target for syphoning off personnel (and equipment if its ever given any) as "more important" missions come up.

I would think that what might perhaps be more palatable to the Reg F side would be a hybrid battalion of say 25 to 30% where much of the battalion headquarters and one full company, squadron or battery would be Reg F. The reason for the full sub-unit is that when not conducting reserve training, it would have a sufficient mass to train itself and provide continuous career development for it's personnel. It would also be sufficient numbers so that during the very busy summer training periods for the Res F elements, there would be sufficient people to allow for a reasonable summer leave and APS program.

More importantly, as a complete sub-unit, it would be available for deployments (assuming it could raise sufficient augmentees from the Res F component of the battalion to leave a large enough core behind to continue on with the rest of the battalion's training). The same would be true for the battalion headquarters. It could do occasional rotations so long as a sufficient core remains behind to lead the entire battalion. In fact a properly constructed system could create more deployable unit and even brigade headquarters and thereby create not only more deployable "chunks" out of which task forces could be formed during peacetime but also create a viable framework of a force which, in an emergency, could form a larger force then we now are able to generate.

The ratio of Reg F to Res F ought to be somewhat flexible so that units with a high peace-time day-to-day utilization or deployment rate could have a second Reg F subunit while those which have virtually no peace-time day-to-day utilization could have a smaller Reg F component.

As T2B points out, it's weakness within the Res F perception is the fact that it does negate the need for senior Res F leadership. Essentially there is no need beyond company level majors and MWOs and, perhaps, a very limited number of LCols and CWOs. Quite frankly, and notwithstanding D&Bs experience, the system could and should be developed so that all admin functions devolve onto the Reg F cadre and that the only responsibility for the Res F leadership is the training within their own companies (with opportunities to voluntarily rise into battalion or brigade staff positions if they accept the required training)

I must admit, that the regimental system with its tiers of leadership and special buttons and bows creates a problem with this as Reg F and Res F are all bound to their cap badges. I'm somewhat envious of the flexibility of the US uniform system which is fairly standard and battalion identity is portrayed by a single enameled badge worn on the chest with brigade or divisional affiliation by a shoulder patch. It makes cross-posting dead simple. That said, I'm sure that we have enough CWOs in the Army who can sit down and work out this particular conundrum and do we really care if on a battalion parade one company parades in a highland uniform and another in rifle green? I guess the QM might but that's why he gets paid those sweet, sweet Reg F bucks.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> 10/90: as long as the true reasons aren't along the lines of "to keep the 3rd bns and their leaders around", and the rug isn't pulled out again suddenly.  I heard a few who were there, then, grouse about what happened when everything ended; I didn't hear any praise for the way in which it was done.



Despite all my whining the training and resources provided to the Pioneer platoon, which was our 'mission tasking', were excellent.

We got a Pioneer SNCO and small team of instructors, LSVW pioneer vehicles with chainsaws and all the other toys, explosives, courses, exercises etc etc.

Did I mention explosives?

The effort was was lavishly supported in comparison with anything else I've ever seen outside of a Reg F unit. Certainly better than anything I've seen being provided to Reserve Units for the current iteration of mission taskings.

If this approach could be used for the 'forces of good', as opposed to the actual Machiavellian reality that played out, we'd have to station provost staff at the armoury door with billy clubs to keep people away, I'm sure.


----------



## Kirkhill

In fairness to the Army side of things, the Militia, with memories still fresh in the senior leadership of the Civil Defence efforts of buckets and ladders, were not thrilled about being tasked to the defence of domestic Vital Points.  There was a lot of moaning about having to practice standing guard at the local Post Office.

From my standpoint learning how to create a defended locality anywhere, post office, power station or hydro-electric site, would have provided a great focus for training a reserve company.   If that skill could be learned, and practiced, on the weekend, then it would have been a portable skill for the unit.  Something the unit could be called to do, defence and duties, domestically and on expedition.    And it would have been a useful platform for working out the kinks in cohesion and management.

Whoever was advising Beatty in 1987, wasn't all wrong, despite his fleet of 12 nuclear subs (even that wasn't militarily wrong so much as it was politically wrong).


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> If this approach could be used for the 'forces of good', as opposed to the actual Machiavellian reality that played out, we'd have to station provost staff at the armoury door with billy clubs to keep people away, I'm sure.


Instead of to encourage the less-than-fully-housed along? You might also have to find a bit more classroom space.

Sidebar: Bay Street's peculiarities (messes, messes, and more messes, etc.) have some period justifications. Harder to parse is why the Nanaimo armoury's so constricted, especially as the sole significant CAF facility in the area.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> Instead of to encourage the less-than-fully-housed along? You might also have to find a bit more classroom space.
> 
> Sidebar: Bay Street's peculiarities (messes, messes, and more messes, etc.) have some period justifications. Harder to parse is why the Nanaimo armoury's so constricted, especially as the sole significant CAF facility in the area.



I'm a big fan of the Nanaimo Armoury. 

It has more than one training room, has a rifle range a short drive up the road, and won't fall down in an earthquake (or a heavy truck driving by)


----------



## quadrapiper

Re: HQs and brigades. Would there be any benefit to making a sharp split between a given number of deployable brigade HQs, maybe sitting under CJOC along with that Division HQ, and a purely non-deployable training/FG/domestic defence and emergency response structure?


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> I'm a big fan of the Nanaimo Armoury.
> 
> It has more than one training room, has a rifle range a short drive up the road, and won't fall down in an earthquake (or a heavy truck driving by)


Absolutely. Just seems a bit cosy for something purpose-built for its current occupants; no room for growth; where Bay Street's had a century or so to become host to museums, cadet corps and squadrons, etc.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> Absolutely. Just seems a bit cosy for something purpose-built for its current occupants; no room for growth; where Bay Street's had a century or so to become host to museums, cadet corps and squadrons, etc. *as opposed to what is really required to train a military for the 21st Century.*



There, FTFY.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> In fairness to the Army side of things, the Militia, with memories still fresh in the senior leadership of the Civil Defence efforts of buckets and ladders, were not thrilled about being tasked to the defence of domestic Vital Points.  There was a lot of moaning about having to practice standing guard at the local Post Office.
> 
> From my standpoint learning how to create a defended locality anywhere, post office, power station or hydro-electric site, would have provided a great focus for training a reserve company.   If that skill could be learned, and practiced, on the weekend, then it would have been a portable skill for the unit.  Something the unit could be called to do, defence and duties, domestically and on expedition.    And it would have been a useful platform for working out the kinks in cohesion and management.
> 
> Whoever was advising Beatty in 1987, wasn't all wrong, despite his fleet of 12 nuclear subs (even that wasn't militarily wrong so much as it was politically wrong).


My first operational deployment as a Reg F officer was to take my troop to Montreal where we stood guard on hydro towers and one MP. It's what we do when we have to. The problem for the young keen soldier is if he is being told that standing guard or digging in rubble is to be his prime objective in life. They'll vote with their feet if that's the case.

🍻


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> There, FTFY.


Hey, it's got six (Five? Can't remember if junior ranks is combined) messes. What more do you want?


----------



## Kirkhill

Better doing something and grumbling than doing nothing at all, FJAG.   You can always improve the situation by making sure the next detail is not a shit detail.

As to voting with feet... that seems to be happening anyway judging by the recruits that aren't showing up and the Reg releases that aren't transferring to the Reserves.

I'm aware of one Regiment that was not invited to stand guard at Buckingham Palace because it was feared they would site their mgs, layout the sandbags and concertina and organize a brew up.

I saw local home guards in Sweden doing much the same thing around their docks.


----------



## McG

quadrapiper said:


> Re: HQs and brigades. Would there be any benefit to making a sharp split between a given number of deployable brigade HQs, maybe sitting under CJOC along with that Division HQ, and a purely non-deployable training/FG/domestic defence and emergency response structure?


No. 
CJOC does not need more force generation responsibilities to distract from its force employment reason to exist. This would create more new HQs but may not remove any existing HQs.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> If this approach could be used for the 'forces of good'



Matches what I heard.  The number of CTs when the experiment ended I took to be evidence that the units were well-run during that period.  I heard grousing that the Res F units were drained, but part of the value of the Res F is providing CTs by people who have decided Forces life is for them after all.  The allegations that some of the Res F units had kit deficiencies afterward, I thought less well of.  But given the way Res F units treat each others' holdings of vehicles and other stores, a sort of justice.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> Hey, it's got six (Five? Can't remember if junior ranks is combined) messes. What more do you want?



AFAIK there are:


2 x Offrs Messes
2 x SNCOS Messes
2 x JRs Messes
2 x Association offices (unsure of the alcohol content but based on the results... )
1 x Band Room (a.k.a, the unofficial Shebeen)

Plus what ever the Cadet Officers have to drink to get them through a session of looking after kids like I was  

And then there are:


2 x Museums
2 x BOR Offices
2 x Recruiting Offices
2 x RSS Adjt's Offices
2 x Coy/Bty Offices
2 x Adm Coy/ HQ Coy Offices
2 x CO's Offices
2 x Padre's Offices
2 x Ops Offices (where the RSS hang out talking about the Reg F 'back in my day'  )
2 x Cadet Offices
1 x (broken) SAT range
1 x 12 person conference room with a screen capable of hosting video meetings when it's not broken (I've never seen it working)
A half dozen Office spaces 'in the roof' that are unusable due to lack of DIN connections, and the fact that they were designed and built in 1915 before anyone cared about whether or not you had to egress successfully during a fire, so are usually filled with junk from the museums and BORs etc.
And then there is, all on its lonesome:

1 x 20/25 person lecture/training theatre with the latest high tech training addition: a whiteboard.

It's always been pretty clear to me, though, that based on what the two CO's can get into trouble for the space allocation is pretty much on target ...


----------



## lenaitch

Kirkhill said:


> As opposed to tracks on ice?


Nothing that a cordless driver and a box of self-tapping screws couldn't solve !


----------



## CBH99

Brad Sallows said:


> Matches what I heard.  The number of CTs when the experiment ended I took to be evidence that the units were well-run during that period.  I heard grousing that the Res F units were drained, but part of the value of the Res F is providing CTs by people who have decided Forces life is for them after all.  The allegations that some of the Res F units had kit deficiencies afterward, I thought less well of.  But given the way Res F units treat each others' holdings of vehicles and other stores, a sort of justice.


I've always HATED that Reserve units have to borrow each other's vehicles and such, even just for exercises.  One of the things that would bring morale down extremely quickly was knowing we had 2 or 3 working ML's, only to have another unit need to borrow 1 for an exercise.  Usually it would come back just as we lent it out, no issues.  Sometimes it would come back broken - not necessarily the fault of the unit that borrowed it, just that it wasn't the most reliable to begin with.

When you factor in the distances between some units, and borrowing a vehicle ends up into a 3hr to 6hr drive.  And then again, after ex.  And what happens if there is a domestic emergency, and both units need working vehicles?  Miracles.  Literally some folks who have some decent mechanical skills, and miracles.


I was under the impression that the MSVS was supposed to be bought in sufficient numbers that the reserve units who received them wouldn't have to beg/borrow/lend between themselves.  Is this still the case?  Please for the love of anything holy, let that RFP come out this summer 🙏


----------



## Brad Sallows

I never minded borrowing; I took it for granted that each unit alone would not have enough of some things.  What I took exception to was the culture.  

Example: send trucks to support summer training camps (Vernon, Nanaimo), with reminder from the HQ transport to include full EIS; receive trucks back at end of summer stripped.  

Example: send box amb to support an RV ex; receive damaged (not broken) unit back, VOR for a couple of months during high demand period (autumn) - not because of motor vehicle accident, but because of abuse and neglect.  

Example: ordered to send fully stocked panniers to support summer training and cadet camps; receive panniers back pillaged.

Example: loan canvas in good condition; receive back different (and deficient) canvas (not due to the kind of shuffling which must happen during large collective exercises, but deliberate exchange by a single borrowing unit).

Best part: sanctimonious regimental officers of prominent units who would brook no criticism, while their corporals are openly bragging about stripping EIS, swapping eqpt, etc.

All resolvable (and not a bit of it unique - I'd be surprised to meet anyone who spent at least a year in a Res F unit's supply/transport section and encountered none of it) but the supply system takes time and is (or was) capable of occasionally being snotty about it.  Meanwhile, Sep and Oct are good months for training, so borrow what you're waiting for from someone else...


----------



## blacktriangle

daftandbarmy said:


> AFAIK there are:
> 
> 
> 2 x Offrs Messes
> 2 x SNCOS Messes
> 2 x JRs Messes
> 2 x Association offices (unsure of the alcohol content but based on the results... )
> 1 x Band Room (a.k.a, the unofficial Shebeen)
> 
> Plus what ever the Cadet Officers have to drink to get them through a session of looking after kids like I was
> 
> And then there are:
> 
> 
> 2 x Museums
> 2 x BOR Offices
> 2 x Recruiting Offices
> 2 x RSS Adjt's Offices
> 2 x Coy/Bty Offices
> 2 x Adm Coy/ HQ Coy Offices
> 2 x CO's Offices
> 2 x Padre's Offices
> 2 x Ops Offices (where the RSS hang out talking about the Reg F 'back in my day'  )
> 2 x Cadet Offices
> 1 x (broken) SAT range
> 1 x 12 person conference room with a screen capable of hosting video meetings when it's not broken (I've never seen it working)
> A half dozen Office spaces 'in the roof' that are unusable due to lack of DIN connections, and the fact that they were designed and built in 1915 before anyone cared about whether or not you had to egress successfully during a fire, so are usually filled with junk from the museums and BORs etc.
> And then there is, all on its lonesome:
> 
> 1 x 20/25 person lecture/training theatre with the latest high tech training addition: a whiteboard.
> 
> It's always been pretty clear to me, though, that based on what the two CO's can get into trouble for the space allocation is pretty much on target ...


The PRes summarized in one post.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Who was sharing when there were 4 units at Bay St?


----------



## quadrapiper

McG said:


> No.
> CJOC does not need more force generation responsibilities to distract from its force employment reason to exist. This would create more new HQs but may not remove any existing HQs.


Sorry - might not have been clear. Meant standalone brigade HQs; no FG other than their own internal evolutions, to be bundled with whatever unit mix makes sense for a given deployment.

Separately, build the FG/DOMOPS part of the Army on the assumption that nothing above the battalion level will be deploying as a formed unit, but may have some command responsibility for operations within its own footprint in Canada. Would you need to maintain fourteen C(M)BG HQs _and _four division HQs to make that happen?


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> AFAIK there are:
> 
> 
> 2 x Offrs Messes
> 2 x SNCOS Messes
> 2 x JRs Messes
> 2 x Association offices (unsure of the alcohol content but based on the results... )
> 1 x Band Room (a.k.a, the unofficial Shebeen)
> 
> Plus what ever the Cadet Officers have to drink to get them through a session of looking after kids like I was
> 
> And then there are:
> 
> 
> 2 x Museums
> 2 x BOR Offices
> 2 x Recruiting Offices
> 2 x RSS Adjt's Offices
> 2 x Coy/Bty Offices
> 2 x Adm Coy/ HQ Coy Offices
> 2 x CO's Offices
> 2 x Padre's Offices
> 2 x Ops Offices (where the RSS hang out talking about the Reg F 'back in my day'  )
> 2 x Cadet Offices
> 1 x (broken) SAT range
> 1 x 12 person conference room with a screen capable of hosting video meetings when it's not broken (I've never seen it working)
> A half dozen Office spaces 'in the roof' that are unusable due to lack of DIN connections, and the fact that they were designed and built in 1915 before anyone cared about whether or not you had to egress successfully during a fire, so are usually filled with junk from the museums and BORs etc.
> And then there is, all on its lonesome:
> 
> 1 x 20/25 person lecture/training theatre with the latest high tech training addition: a whiteboard.
> 
> It's always been pretty clear to me, though, that based on what the two CO's can get into trouble for the space allocation is pretty much on target ...


And here I thought the messes were the worst imposition on the place.

Is there a practical need for each unit to have its own _everything_?


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> And here I thought the messes were the worst imposition on the place.
> 
> Is there a practical need for each unit to have its own _everything_?



No. Not at all. 

Except for ego gratification purposes, of course


----------



## CBH99

Brad Sallows said:


> I never minded borrowing; I took it for granted that each unit alone would not have enough of some things.  What I took exception to was the culture.
> 
> Example: send trucks to support summer training camps (Vernon, Nanaimo), with reminder from the HQ transport to include full EIS; receive trucks back at end of summer stripped.
> 
> Example: send box amb to support an RV ex; receive damaged (not broken) unit back, VOR for a couple of months during high demand period (autumn) - not because of motor vehicle accident, but because of abuse and neglect.
> 
> Example: ordered to send fully stocked panniers to support summer training and cadet camps; receive panniers back pillaged.
> 
> Example: loan canvas in good condition; receive back different (and deficient) canvas (not due to the kind of shuffling which must happen during large collective exercises, but deliberate exchange by a single borrowing unit).
> 
> Best part: sanctimonious regimental officers of prominent units who would brook no criticism, while their corporals are openly bragging about stripping EIS, swapping eqpt, etc.
> 
> All resolvable (and not a bit of it unique - I'd be surprised to meet anyone who spent at least a year in a Res F unit's supply/transport section and encountered none of it) but the supply system takes time and is (or was) capable of occasionally being snotty about it.  Meanwhile, Sep and Oct are good months for training, so borrow what you're waiting for from someone else...


I agree with you about the culture being a big problem.  What I was trying to get at was, if each unit just had enough vehicles to support themselves, then most of those issues wouldn't even exist.

We are talking (back in my day anyway, so this may be a bit outdated) - 2 working ML's per unit, maybe more if the unit is larger.  When I was in, the units in Red Deer, Medicine Hat, and Lethbridge could all do just fine with 2 working ML's, and a few working LS's.  The units aren't that big, and they don't need that many vehicles.  (Calgary Highlanders on the other hand, during the Afghan War days, were a pretty big unit and were quite busy training up & deploying sub-units, so their vehicle needs would be greater.)

If the reserve force had just the bare minimum in terms of working vehicles, we wouldn't have to borrow vehicles from each other, or lend vehicles to summer training camps.  That crappy culture of pillaging parts off of loaned vehicles wouldn't be able to exist.  



It just blows my mind that as a G7 country, and a NATO nation, we literally have to count on one hand whether we have enough vehicles to operate even domestically - despite DOMOPS being a very frequent & routine thing now.  If anything, a unit should have 2 or 3 MSVS (or however many they require) - plus some extra vehicles in a pool somewhere that can be used as required.  I don't even think Boko Haram has to pillage vehicles the way we do.  

(The current plan, as far as I understand, is to acquire somewhere between 650 and 1,100 medium trucks for the Army.  That's a pretty big gap.  If we are only replacing these vehicles every 2 or 3 decades, shouldn't we be buying on the higher side, closer to the 1,100?  For all of the reasons above, and then some.)


0.02


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Part of the problem is we see trucks as Capital Assets and not depreciating disposable items that they are. Our Milcots should be rotated out every 10 years. 15 years for tactical trucks. Literally we need a NSS for Milcot/tactical vehicles. Also if you buy a portion of your fleet every few years then you always have trucks coming in and ones being surplused. This means less maintenance as well.


----------



## McG

quadrapiper said:


> Sorry - might not have been clear. Meant standalone brigade HQs; no FG other than their own internal evolutions, to be bundled with whatever unit mix makes sense for a given deployment.


You were clear. You are proposing to take the job of force generating formation HQs away from the Army and make it a CJOC problem. The Army invests massive resources into generating those HQs, and dumping that work on CJOC is a distraction from the reason the command exists. You are also going to increase the number of formation HQs by creating separate deployable vs administrative Bde HQs. There is nothing good in the idea.


----------



## MilEME09

Colin Parkinson said:


> Part of the problem is we see trucks as Capital Assets and not depreciating disposable items that they are. Our Milcots should be rotated out every 10 years. 15 years for tactical trucks. Literally we need a NSS for Milcot/tactical vehicles. Also if you buy a portion of your fleet every few years then you always have trucks coming in and ones being surplused. This means less maintenance as well.


Would also mean slow upgrades too, a imagine a milcot built off a 2021 Silverado would be vastly different from the 2003 model.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Having to share makes more effective use of limited equipment.  Provided there were a fleet rotation policy, having more vehicles sitting in Res F compounds would not bother me.  Of course that introduces the problem of receiving worn out hangar queens in exchange for dependable vehicles.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Somebody asked a few pages back (before the topic of Reserve messes came up) about what it would take to field a Division. I've been part of such exercises in a European general war context as part of Div staff. Fielding the manoeuvre brigades is part of it, but that is just the beginning.  You need the mobile and survivable communications architecture for all of that. You need Division-level sustainment units. You need Division-level fire support: Attack helicopters (and not Griffons with Dillon guns) and MLRS are required to give the Div Comd the ability to prosecute his battle and shape the fight for his brigades. The good news is that a Div does not normally have lots of bridging...

I was part of the execution of one of these as a Cdn Div with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in a CAX setting (although we fought a fictional foe...) It is good to think and train at that level, although I am not sure just how likely such a scenario would be. There are lots of policy off-ramps for an aggressor against NATO.

The EFPs are meant to deter someone being opportunistic leading to such a situation. They deter against a "little green men/coup de main" scenario where a fairly bloodless attack is presented as a _fait accompli_. 

There is also a NATO Response Force (NRF), command of which passes between Joint Force Command Naples and Joint Force Command Brunssum. There are Canadians in both of those HQs, I believe weighted more heavily towards Naples. Canada contributes to the NRF, and the Trident Juncture (TFJE) series exercised that (and had CAX that confirmed the JFC). TRJE 18 saw the Canadian army deploy a Bde HQ, a light infantry battalion with support to Norway by ship.  The NRF is an important frame within which to determine what capabilities we need to develop. 

There are also entities called NFIUs (NATO Force Integration Units) in eight NATO countries (including all of the Baltics) that plan and enable the flow of NATO forces into those countries and subsequent sustainment.  The NFIUs are a great innovation, and have "on the ground" ties with the host nation. Canadians have been part of those. Some NATO nations have "port opening units" which were in great demand as seven Brigades flowed into Norway by ship in 2018. 

The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that is a roughly brigade-sized element (I think its up to five battalions). The HQ and forces for this come from the NATO Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) on a rotational basis. In 2018 the Italians were the Bde HQ and one of the Bns: they did Ex Brilliant Jump as a prequel to Trident Juncture. I believe their remit was to be somewhere in NATO within days, enabled potentially by the NFIUs. I am sure that some here would like to jump on the VJTF, but I think the NRF with a Bde HQ and a BG makes the most sense for us. 

I do believe that we should be able to surge a CMBG for something like the NRF. There is some capability development to be done if we intend to do this in a full-on European war context, perhaps less so if it was something like OIF. I posted all of this to highlight that Canada does not act in a vacuum in Europe. We are part of NATO, and a component of the trans-Atlantic bond.


----------



## Kirkhill

RCA A&B Batteries and Militia School - 1871
Infantry School Corps - 1883
Cavalry School Corps -1883

Security Forces Assistance Brigade - British Army
OMLTs and PRTs

Operationalize the CADTC
Shortage of Trainers.

10/90 Battalions - 1983
Battalion officers - S3 Major - Ops and Training
A Militia Battalion (with Militia LCol if available) with a Reg force Trg Cadre  that can be withdrawn intact for operations.

Mountain & Arctic Warfare Cadre - RM
Operational role in recce
Training role in training.


Some disjointed thoughts.


----------



## Kirkhill

Subsequent thoughts

Infantry-centric and therefore not applicable to every other arm but

10 platoons per Reserve battalion  
9 Reserve Rifle Platoons organised in 3 companies
1 Reg force Recce Platoon with Major and staff - S3 Trg and Ops - Local High Readiness and Training Cadre

Addresses anticipated high casualties among the infantry 

Problems with deciding number of platoons per each of 51 reserve infantry units, collocation, local training and group training, number of Reg platoons tasked.

Does nothing to address crew served weapons requirements, tactical employment and does nothing at all for every other arm.


Back to John A MacDonald's observation - too much geography.


----------



## medic5

Kirkhill said:


> Subsequent thoughts
> 
> Infantry-centric and therefore not applicable to every other arm but
> 
> 10 platoons per Reserve battalion
> 9 Reserve Rifle Platoons organised in 3 companies
> 1 Reg force Recce Platoon with Major and staff - S3 Trg and Ops - Local High Readiness and Training Cadre
> 
> Addresses anticipated high casualties among the infantry
> 
> Problems with deciding number of platoons per each of 51 reserve infantry units, collocation, local training and group training, number of Reg platoons tasked.
> 
> Does nothing to address crew served weapons requirements, tactical employment and does nothing at all for every other arm.
> 
> 
> Back to John A MacDonald's observation - too much geography.


Would you ever deploy said platoons? If not, then this is another administrative formation, which is more or less the same as what we have right now.

You can't have half a platoon in one unit, a weapons section in another, then expect them to work well together unless they regularly participate in exercises together, which requires job protection at a federal level. 

Reserve restructuring is impossible unless our political leaders actually make an effort for it. Geography is a challenge yes, but the US ARG has figured it out in some of their less densely populated states. If they can put together deployable BCTs, surely we can deploy at least battalion sized units right? There just needs to be the political will to do so.


----------



## FJAG

medic5 said:


> ... Reserve restructuring is impossible unless our political leaders actually make an effort for it. Geography is a challenge yes, but the US ARG has figured it out in some of their less densely populated states. If they can put together deployable BCTs, surely we can deploy at least battalion sized units right? There just needs to be the political will to do so.



I'll go a step further and say that it needs the will of both our political leaders, our military ones and the defence bureaucracy. 

For me the hallmark situation is the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team from the Idaho ARNG but with battalion sized units also in Nevada, Montana and Oregon encompassing an area only slightly smaller than that covered by the lower portion of BC and the Prairies but also with a slightly smaller population then its Canadian western counterparts.

If they can field a heavy armored brigade combat team then so could western Canada. Ontario and Quebec could easily form three to four BCTs/brigades while the Maritimes would be hard pressed to form one half of a brigade group but could easily, when integrated with Reg F units there, form a smaller hybrid combat support brigade. 

The materiel is there; the model exists south of us; the only thing missing is the will.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> The materiel is there; the model exists south of us; the only thing missing is the will.


If by "materiel" you mean the troops in the Reserves then you're right, but the actual physical materiel is the problem.  

We can't (i.e. "won't") equip our Reg Force with the absolutely vital military equipment they need to survive in a peer conflict.  There is no way in a million years I can see the Canadian government (of any party) spending the money to equip the Reserves with several Brigades worth of modern military equipment....and the extra personnel training bill, and the expanded facilities and training areas to handle them, and the logistics, and the maintenance, etc. 

Is it literally doable from a pure economic point of view?  Sure.  We're a wealthy G7 country.  If the political will was there then we would find a way to do it.  But that's the hitch.  There is no political will to do it.  And frankly just like prior to WWI and WWII I can't imagine the situation changing during peacetime.  Sad but true.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> If by "materiel" you mean the troops in the Reserves then you're right, but the actual physical materiel is the problem.
> 
> We can't (i.e. "won't") equip our Reg Force with the absolutely vital military equipment they need to survive in a peer conflict.  There is no way in a million years I can see the Canadian government (of any party) spending the money to equip the Reserves with several Brigades worth of modern military equipment....and the extra personnel training bill, and the expanded facilities and training areas to handle them, and the logistics, and the maintenance, etc.
> 
> Is it literally doable from a pure economic point of view?  Sure.  We're a wealthy G7 country.  If the political will was there then we would find a way to do it.  But that's the hitch.  There is no political will to do it.  And frankly just like prior to WWI and WWII I can't imagine the situation changing during peacetime.  Sad but true.


I definitely meant the troops.

The equipment I've been calling mostly deficient ever since the '60s when it was still in many ways up to par with the Reg F though in smaller quantities.

You know it's not so much in spending a lot on new gear for the reserves. If we just stopped trashing our old but still viable gear it would be helpful for training (and yes, I know there are maintenance issues but that's not insurmountable) We could still have AVGPs, Leo 1s, ADATS and M109s and now could hold onto TLAVs, Cougars and other gear. Yes its not the best, yes it needs work but it would provide a training vehicle and even have some utility in certain situations. It's amazing how much work young kids will do to keep old clunkers on the road.

And I sometimes wonder how cheap a rate we could get from the Americans if we wanted to lease some of that gear sitting idle in the Nevada desert? My guess is pretty darn cheap. A few M1, M2 and Paladin battalions would really ramp up recruiting and retention.

More realistically, and having nothing whatsoever to do with the government, the simple fact is that reserves need gear for training mostly in the summer which is usually the time of year when the Reg F doesn't need it. If the Reg F gear was shared for training it would go a long way into having reserves more capable for augmentation roles. The trouble is that while there are some local initiatives of this type, there is no Army wide program to require this.

But the real underlying fundamental problem is the way the reserves are organized and their basic terms of service which could easily be fixed by some tweaking but which the leadership won't do. Unit consolidation, mandatory training, obligatory periods of service, employee protection legislation are all needed to fix the atrocious turnover rates and the reserves inability to advance to meaningful collective training. 

The people are great and if we treated them better we could get so much more out of them.

🍻


----------



## medic5

GR66 said:


> And I sometimes wonder how cheap a rate we could get from the Americans if we wanted to lease some of that gear sitting idle in the Nevada desert? My guess is pretty darn cheap. A few M1, M2 and Paladin battalions would really ramp up recruiting and retention.


Most of my friends aren't aware that Canada even has a military, and nobody knows that you can join the reserves in high school. It's definitely an issue, when most students are considering summer/part time jobs, they don't even know its an option. Simple solution: send recruiters to schools. Perhaps bring a few plastic rifles, some CADPAT, and the ability to start your application on the spot.  All your recruiting problems for the Reserves are gone. Retention? That's far more difficult. Contracts are probably a good place to start.

About equipment, what about Humvees? Super easy to maintain, they aren't that large, you could probably just park it next to the armoury. It's not particularly useful, but at least its a vehicle right?


----------



## Brad Sallows

No worse than using CJs to practice recce.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> No worse than using CJs to practice recce.



I used one as a AVGP in a Combat Team Attack once. 

There weren't enough APCs for everyone and I thought it better that a rifle section got the one meant for the Cbt Tm Comd. So I just commandeered a Jeep from the umpires, which already had a radio, and 'Tally Ho'!

It was kind of fun weaving in and out between the Leo 1s and the APCs in the assault.  

For me and the driver


----------



## Brad Sallows

A man must live dangerously.


----------



## CBH99

medic5 said:


> Most of my friends aren't aware that Canada even has a military, and nobody knows that you can join the reserves in high school. It's definitely an issue, when most students are considering summer/part time jobs, they don't even know its an option. Simple solution: send recruiters to schools. Perhaps bring a few plastic rifles, some CADPAT, and the ability to start your application on the spot.  All your recruiting problems for the Reserves are gone. Retention? That's far more difficult. Contracts are probably a good place to start.


When I was the unit recruiter, I went to one or two career fairs at the local high schools each year.  By invitation.  Same applied to the local college.  Regardless of whether people followed up and applied, I always had a busy booth.


medic5 said:


> You can't have half a platoon in one unit, a weapons section in another, then expect them to work well together unless they regularly participate in exercises together, which requires job protection at a federal level.


Call me crazy, but didn't the federal government pass this very legislation ages ago during the Afghan war years?

I distinctly remember (perhaps in a parallel universe) that the government had passed legislation protecting reservist's employment who were getting ready to deploy.  It was discussed both at the unit level, and my own separate recruiting CoC.


----------



## medic5

CBH99 said:


> When I was the unit recruiter, I went to one or two career fairs at the local high schools each year.  By invitation.  Same applied to the local college.  Regardless of whether people followed up and applied, I always had a busy booth.


This is just my thoughts, but recruiting in Canada feels very passive on the part of recruiters. In the US, there are lots of stories about recruiters texting high schoolers about their plans, recruiting offices next to the Mcdonalds, and obviously JROTC at every high school. Once again, just my own thoughts from my very limited experience, haven't gone through the recruiting process in either country. 

I'm guessing its partially a culture thing and also that Canada has a smaller military proportionately. It also seems to me that US recruiters are more proactive and "seek out" recruits as opposed to waiting for them to email. So CBH, want to convince me of the merits of joining the Reserves? (This is a joke, I'm applying this summer as soon as I finish this biology course which for some weird reason is a requirement for Med A)


CBH99 said:


> Call me crazy, but didn't the federal government pass this very legislation ages ago during the Afghan war years?
> 
> I distinctly remember (perhaps in a parallel universe) that the government had passed legislation protecting reservist's employment who were getting ready to deploy.  It was discussed both at the unit level, and my own separate recruiting CoC.


I was not even alive when Afghanistan happened so I'm far from the most knowledgable person on this, but I think I read something on another thread about how job protection was only for pre deployment training, the key word there being deployment. There needs to be job protection for training that is not predeployment, unless we want to wait for a war before a platoon finally trains together. 

I think that one of the biggest issues with the Reserves outside of what we've discussed above is the lack of training as a larger unit. A reserve platoon needs to know how to work with other platoons, with weapons companies and artillery and armour, which I hope can be practiced before pre deployment training. The only way to practice the skills I've described is through exercises, and the only way to do exercises of reserve units outside of predeployment is employment protection so people can actually show up.

Take everything I've said with a grain of salt, the extent of my experience is reading about this sort of thing because I find it interesting.


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> Call me crazy, but didn't the federal government pass this very legislation ages ago during the Afghan war years?
> 
> I distinctly remember (perhaps in a parallel universe) that the government had passed legislation protecting reservist's employment who were getting ready to deploy.  It was discussed both at the unit level, and my own separate recruiting CoC.



It's pretty useless legislation, IMHO.

If you work for the public sector you probably already get time off.

If you work for yourself, you're probably going to be unemployed when you return.

If you work for the private sector, except in a few cases, the same thing will likely occur at some point because not many organizations can justify/ support having an employee away for that long.


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> When I was the unit recruiter, I went to one or two career fairs at the local high schools each year.  By invitation.  Same applied to the local college.  Regardless of whether people followed up and applied, I always had a busy booth.
> 
> Call me crazy, but didn't the federal government pass this very legislation ages ago during the Afghan war years?
> 
> I distinctly remember (perhaps in a parallel universe) that the government had passed legislation protecting reservist's employment who were getting ready to deploy.  It was discussed both at the unit level, and my own separate recruiting CoC.


Job protection was passed but it's very limited, designed for operational deployments only. There's no protection whatsoever for training. The legislation is federal for federal employees and provincial (mostly as part of employment standards legislation)for everyone else and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and in most cases is toothless. For a look at your provinces legislation see here.



daftandbarmy said:


> I used one as a AVGP in a Combat Team Attack once.
> 
> There weren't enough APCs for everyone and I thought it better that a rifle section got the one meant for the Cbt Tm Comd. So I just commandeered a Jeep from the umpires, which already had a radio, and 'Tally Ho'!
> 
> It was kind of fun weaving in and out between the Leo 1s and the APCs in the assault.
> 
> For me and the driver


You're a braver man than me, Gunga Din. When I was running around with the Germans I'd even get nervous if all I had was an aluminum M113 amongst all that careening steel around me. Never too fond of having a hatches-closed Leo reversing out of a firing position at full speed near me. If I'd been in a CJ or an Iltis I would have been so far behind the charge that they would've had to use an HF radio to get ahold of me.


----------



## lenaitch

medic5 said:


> Most of my friends aren't aware that Canada even has a military, and nobody knows that you can join the reserves in high school. It's definitely an issue, when most students are considering summer/part time jobs, they don't even know its an option. Simple solution: send recruiters to schools. Perhaps bring a few plastic rifles, some CADPAT, and the ability to start your application on the spot.  All your recruiting problems for the Reserves are gone. Retention? That's far more difficult. Contracts are probably a good place to start.
> 
> About equipment, what about Humvees? Super easy to maintain, they aren't that large, you could probably just park it next to the armoury. It's not particularly useful, but at least its a vehicle right?



Great idea, but in many areas, particularly urban, school boards, teachers' unions parents' groups, and a political party or two, would be apoplectic.


----------



## medic5

lenaitch said:


> Great idea, but in many areas, particularly urban, school boards, teachers' unions parents' groups, and a political party or two, would be apoplectic.
> 
> 
> View attachment 65794


Well could the school boards and teachers unions stop recruiters from say, setting up on a street corner that just happens to be next to a school? There is a marijuana dispensary within 500 meters of my school, and I don't see any outrage yet.


----------



## quadrapiper

lenaitch said:


> Great idea, but in many areas, particularly urban, school boards, teachers' unions parents' groups, and a political party or two, would be apoplectic.


Given the grumbling from school staff in Sooke, which has a significant CAF population (just up the road from Esquimalt), about _cadet _recruiting in schools, best of luck!


----------



## Brad Sallows

In my time, the local unit would send a couple of guys to the high school career fair.  As it happened, one of them was a classmate (joined as soon as permitted).

In addition to JROTC, the US has closer ties between its Scouting organizations and its armed forces.  Here, I'm not even sure the boys can have their own scout troops without having to admit girls.  Probably don't even do "British Bulldog" anymore.


----------



## Underway

daftandbarmy said:


> I used one as a AVGP in a Combat Team Attack once.
> 
> There weren't enough APCs for everyone and I thought it better that a rifle section got the one meant for the Cbt Tm Comd. So I just commandeered a Jeep from the umpires, which already had a radio, and 'Tally Ho'!
> 
> It was kind of fun weaving in and out between the Leo 1s and the APCs in the assault.
> 
> For me and the driver


I get it.  Was on a CIMIC team during a Level 6 live-fire range with an entire combat team.  GWagon amoung the tanks and LAV's.  Insanely cool for a navy guy.  I musta had my face right up against the glass the whole time like a kid in a Christmas window.


----------



## Kirkhill

medic5 said:


> Would you ever deploy said platoons? If not, then this is another administrative formation, which is more or less the same as what we have right now.
> 
> You can't have half a platoon in one unit, a weapons section in another, then expect them to work well together unless they regularly participate in exercises together, which requires job protection at a federal level.
> 
> Reserve restructuring is impossible unless our political leaders actually make an effort for it. Geography is a challenge yes, but the US ARG has figured it out in some of their less densely populated states. If they can put together deployable BCTs, surely we can deploy at least battalion sized units right? There just needs to be the political will to do so.




Would you ever deploy said platoons?

As part of a Reserve  Company or Battalion group on local DomOps?  Perhaps.
As part of a Regular Company or Battalion group on Expeditionary Ops? Perhaps.

I know that many are weary of me banging the same drum.   I get weary.  But I figure if FJAG and his Heavy Supporters can persevere than I can continue to offer what I hope is constructive opposition.

So.

The nature of warfare continues its never-ending cycle of adaptation as people find new ways to adapt and overcome.  This invariably means doing what the other guy isn't.   Nobody can defend against all threats.  Nobody can hold everything.

But.

Any single course of action is doomed to failure.  Balance is required.

To which I continue to argue for the inclusion of a robust "light" component in the Force 2025 structure.

It is relatively cheap.
It is deployable.
It is useful.

It is in tune with the zeitgeist of our allies.
It is compatible with a continuing maritime presence aboard both the AOPS and the CSCs.
It is air deployable.
It is operational by air, sea and land in terrain inaccessible by road.
It reflects the continuing rise in non-conventional disruptive efforts by our enemies that is generating increasing demand for Special Operations Forces.

It reflects the return to "history" or, as I choose to call it "Hobbesian Conflict", more commonly known these days as Dispersed, Multi-Domain, Grey Zone conflict.

The Medium Force is a capability.  It can, indeed, be a useful capability.  It shouldn't be our only capability.
The Medium Force is the modern equivalent of the Hanoverian Dragoons raised to maintain order in Britain during the Jacobite insurgencies of the early 1700s.  But the Hanoverians also raised regiments of light infantry to serve the government's foreign interests aboard the Royal Navy.

FJAG argues for a Heavy Reserve in support of the Medium Force.

I argue for a Light Reserve in support of CANSOFCOM.

Both efforts require a bridging element of Regulars to join the Reserve to the Regs.

The Heavy Reserve needs Maintainers and Trainers.

The Light Reserve needs Trainers and many fewer Maintainers.   It also requires many fewer dollars.


Again, I emphasise, I am not talking about superhero weekend warriors.  I am talking about regular infantry doing regular infantry things, in dispersed small units, creating an environment in which Special Forces and Medium Forces can succeed.


The discussion is a live one all over.










						Lawmaker: Special Operations Must Adapt to Gray Zone Conflict - USNI News
					

Increasing gray zone conflicts around the world means U.S. Special Operations Command must adapt to the era of great power competition while still being a counter-terrorism force, a key House lawmaker said Wednesday. Disinformation campaigns by China, Russia and others and attacks by...




					news.usni.org
				












						Putting the Sting in the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy: A Vision for the Future of the MAGTF - Modern War Institute
					

The newest US maritime strategy, Advantage at Sea, fails to include the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) as a viable operational component for competition in the gray zone. Though Advantage […]




					mwi.usma.edu
				









						JUST IN Report Army Doing Poor Job Communicating Its Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Needs
					

JUST IN Report Army Doing Poor Job Communicating Its Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Needs




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> ...  But I figure if FJAG and his Heavy Supporters can persevere than I can continue to offer what I hope is constructive opposition.
> 
> ...  The Medium Force is a capability.  It can, indeed, be a useful capability.  It shouldn't be our only capability.
> 
> ... FJAG argues for a Heavy Reserve in support of the Medium Force.
> 
> ... I argue for a Light Reserve in support of CANSOFCOM.


Let us not forget that in arguing for a heavy force amongst the reserves I do not throw either the medium or light force overboard. I think that there is abundant justification for all three as well as appropriate and robust combat and combat service support.

My overriding argument for where to employ reservists is in such jobs where 1) they are not needed for the Force's day to day operations; and 2) they are not required as a quick reaction force nor are their skill sets so complex that they need to practice them on a day to day basis.

It's for those reasons that I can see a heavy force as being reservist primarily because they are only needed in extreme circumstances, they cost significantly less to maintain year to year and their skill sets are such that for the most part they can be broken down into easily manageable subsets. There are clearly components within the force that need a higher level of training and experience than the average reservist can acquire but because of that I insist that there must be a number of full-timers in key positions throughout the heavy structure.

I don't actually argue for a heavy force to support the medium force per se. I believe that the two coexist and have some differing levels of capabilities that may in certain circumstances be complimentary. I have the same opinion about light forces.

I can see both light and medium reserve forces. My insistence for light and medium forces making up the bulk of the  full-time branch of the Army is based almost exclusively on the fact that I see these capabilities as being needed on either short notice or on continuing day to day operations of the type currently being carried out by the CAF. In fact, the type of light force that you advocate would in my mind fit into the reserve scheme of things very well. We do not need anti-armour hunting teams on a day to day basis but reservists skilled in the weapon handling and tactics involved would be of benefit in an extreme situation where we are required to fight a force with an armour capability. As you point out they would be relatively inexpensive, easy to train and easy to maintain.

I do not see much use for many of the Class A type of reservist with CANSOFCOM because of the high readiness and high skill requirements of that organization albeit that individual situations (such as released CANSOFCOM personnel) might apply. IMHO your type of force would fit better into the Army in general.

🍻


----------



## medic5

I agree with FJAG here. Light forces will be used more in non peer conflicts, and heavy forces will be used in peer conflicts, meaning that the Reserves should contain the heavy forces. 

Here's a question that I have. What use is there for medium forces, at least medium forces in the current configuration we have? An LAV is just as immobile as a Bradley strategically, throwing in a few tanks wouldn't make that much of a difference at a large scale. I think we can all agree that a heavy force is much more useful in a peer conflict, and a light force is much more useful in difficult terrain/lower intensity conflicts. What need is there for a medium force? At least one that has the strategic mobility of a heavy force, but not the capabilities of one. 

And could someone link that tool for making ORBATs? I'd like to give it a shot.


----------



## FJAG

medic5 said:


> I agree with FJAG here. Light forces will be used more in non peer conflicts, and heavy forces will be used in peer conflicts, meaning that the Reserves should contain the heavy forces.
> 
> Here's a question that I have. What use is there for medium forces, at least medium forces in the current configuration we have? An LAV is just as immobile as a Bradley strategically, throwing in a few tanks wouldn't make that much of a difference at a large scale. I think we can all agree that a heavy force is much more useful in a peer conflict, and a light force is much more useful in difficult terrain/lower intensity conflicts. What need is there for a medium force? At least one that has the strategic mobility of a heavy force, but not the capabilities of one.
> 
> And could someone link that tool for making ORBATs? I'd like to give it a shot.


I see them very useful in peacekeeping operations as a show of force and  patrol vehicle with a basic mine and small arms resistance capability. I actually think that they would be very useful for that. One might want to add anti-rpg screens for that.

🍻


----------



## Edward Campbell

This is a fascinating discussion, but given that 2025 is only three years away I do wonder about its utility.

I note that the Government-of-the-Day seems (as far as I can see) to have given no strategic direction. That doesn't surprise me. At a guess something in excess of 60% of Canadians never, ever think about the Canadian Armed Forces (unless prompted by either casualties or a scandal) and almost all of those (my guess is 50%+ of the adult population agree with this: Opinion: ‘Defence’ doesn’t fit the job of Canada’s military any more. Let’s create a Department of National Safety instead


----------



## FJAG

Edward Campbell said:


> This is a fascinating discussion, but given that 2025 is only three years away I do wonder about its utility.
> 
> I note that the Government-of-the-Day seems (as far as I can see) to have given no strategic direction.



This isn't really a government initiative in the first place. It's an initiative from within the Army to see how it can improve with the resources available to it and still meet the governments SSE requirements. The SSE, much as I dislike it, is the governments current direction. Force 2025 is one of the Army's processes of implementing that direction.

Notwithstanding certain criticisms I might have made in this thread above, I fully support the concept. Each service should constantly be looking at how to improve on a continuing basis. The transformation initiated in the late 1990s that got the Army to what it was today was one such initiative. IMHO that transformation was based on some misguided assumptions but it did allow the Army, by fits and starts, to manoeuvre its way through almost a decade of war. Unfortunately, it left the Army badly poised for the future; something that the Army should have clearly recognized and addressed five or six years ago but didn't.

Better late than never. I truly hope something positive comes out of this notwithstanding all the chaff blowing around the CAF at this time.

🍻


----------



## medic5

Edward Campbell said:


> This is a fascinating discussion, but given that 2025 is only three years away I do wonder about its utility.
> 
> I note that the Government-of-the-Day seems (as far as I can see) to have given no strategic direction. That doesn't surprise me. At a guess something in excess of 60% of Canadians never, ever think about the Canadian Armed Forces (unless prompted by either casualties or a scandal) and almost all of those (my guess is 50%+ of the adult population agree with this: Opinion: ‘Defence’ doesn’t fit the job of Canada’s military any more. Let’s create a Department of National Safety instead
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 65809


Reading that article made me absolutely furious.  This quote especially: 

"Militarism is a cancer in the U.S. and every other secure country that buys into the idea that war is every country’s principal threat. Even in Canada, “defence” represents the largest discretionary line item in the federal government’s budget."

I don't understand, why does funding for climate change, or pandemic protection, or firefighting have to come out of the CAF budget? This is the same line of thinking that US "activists" use, saying things like, "free college for all if you just cut the US military budget by 10%!". 

Just because that climate change or pandemics or whatever natural disaster presents a threat, does not mean that the need for an armed forces disappears. 

Militarism is a cancer in the US. I would argue that if it weren't for this "cancer", the world and definitely Canada would be in a worse place.


----------



## MilEME09

__ https://www.facebook.com/230798677012118/posts/4093953500696597
			




So a look into the world of Force 2025, good bye armoured recce, hello Cavalry Regiments!


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The LAV-6 is as heavy as most tracked APC's/IFV's. One option is to build up the recovery and Combat Engineering portions of the Reserves to provide depth and support to regular for units deployed on missions. Because I suspect the LAV-6 in Combat is going to eat up recovery assets quickly.


----------



## Weinie

Colin Parkinson said:


> The LAV-6 is as heavy as most tracked APC's/IFV's. One option is to build up the recovery and Combat Engineering portions of the Reserves to provide depth and support to regular for units deployed on missions. Because I suspect the LAV-6 in Combat is going to get eat*en* up recovery assets quickly.


FTFY.


----------



## dapaterson

First fitter LAV will be part of the ACSV project.  Recovery for LAVs is a job for a Leo II recovery variant.

RCEME reserve is an interesting problem space, worsened repeatedly by allegedly smart officers continually resetting and "improving" training such that no one ever can complete training before it gets reset again.

Nothing like having a soldier returned from a course because the 1.3 they were loaded on is now the same as the 1.2 they did last year, and what they really need is the new 1.2 (and no one in the RCEME school knew it when they were loaded).  Bonus points when said soldier's dad is a general...


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:


> RCEME reserve is an interesting problem space, worsened repeatedly by allegedly smart officers continually resetting and "improving" training such that no one ever can complete training before it gets reset again.
> 
> Nothing like having a soldier returned from a course because the 1.3 they were loaded on is now the same as the 1.2 they did last year, and what they really need is the new 1.2 (and no one in the RCEME school knew it when they were loaded).  Bonus points when said soldier's dad is a general...


Since I joined in 09 it has changed 4 times, I have retaken courses and qualifications because of RCEME schools games multiple times. As a result I will have 12 years in September but still not fully qualified. The latest change happened in 2018 adding C3 howitzer for reserve techs, as well as the C16 and readded .50 cal. As a result every previously fully qualified tech who could go over seas now can't because they need all courses complete to go over seas in trade. Yes that's right you need C3 qualified to go over seas.

I am convinced the school cannot actually manage its personal and training properly both Reg and reserve and the army needs to step in and sort it out.


----------



## CBH99

That is the dumbest & most profound self created problem I’ve heard of in a while - and being that we are all military folks (some retired, some former) that is REALLY something!  Unbelievable.  

Why in the hell do we spend so much time and money on leadership courses when there doesn’t seem to be much at the top? Can the RCEME school, or Army in general, not look at this and say… 

“If we get rid of the useless qualifications, and focus on the solid skills our folks need to be helpful on deployments, we could increase the number of personnel available by X%.”   And just make the changes and get it done.  


Small, yet incredibly helpful decisions made by the people who are supposed to have our organizations ready, would solve 90% of our problems.


----------



## GR66

I think that in general our current "medium" force structure works fairly well for the majority of the non-peer conflicts which will in all likelihood make up the vast majority of threats we will be likely to face.  It needs some already identified improvements (ATGMs, SHORAD, etc.), but we have the structure in place to (theoretically at least) have rotating deployments for two LAV-infantry Battle Groups with tank support for one of them.

Where the discussion gets trickier is when we talk about how we "heavy up" to face a peer threat and how we "bulk up" to be able to field a Brigade Group as opposed to a Battle Group.  

Are we limiting ourselves by making the assumption that the best contribution we can make to a peer ground conflict is up-arming and up-sizing our medium infantry force to a heavy(ish) Brigade Group?

The US Army and National Guard between them have 34 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, 9 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and 15 Armored Brigade Combat Teams.  The British Army will be reorganizing to have 2 x Heavy, 1 x Deep Strike, 2 x Light and 1 x Air Manoeuvre Brigades.  The Polish Army has around 15 assorted Brigades, 8 for the Germans, 7 for the French, etc. 

Absolutely a well trained and equipped Heavy Brigade Group from Canada would be a welcome addition to a NATO ground force, but realistically we could end up being just one small element of a large multi-national force that all have roughly the same structure and types of equipment.  Is there something potentially different that we could offer that would complement and/or enhance our allies Brigades rather than just adding to the number of them?


----------



## FJAG

I've been rereading Kasorak's "A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army 1950-2000" and was particulalry struck by the repetition of one issue.

Canada war-gamed our European commitment several times in the late 1970s and 1980s with the same general results. For example Ex BRONZE TALON 3 made it clear that the critical arm in those exercises was both the Blue and Red force artillery (in those days we had four 6-gun M109 batteries there and were wargaming an MLRS battery as well) which inflicted 72% of the Red casualties and 83% of the Blue casualties respectively. The lesson learned from that was two-fold, we need plenty of artillery, and that we need to devote more counter battery resources to quieten Red artillery.

Conversely, the least effective arm in these evaluations was the infantry which at the time was in M113s (or the notional Canadian Infantry Fighting Vehicle) and did have some TOWs but no medium range ATGMs. Dismounted infantry rarely contributed to the fight. The recommendation from that was we needed a personnel carrier that could participate in the counter APC fight (the suggestion at the time was something BMPish) and that we needed medium range ATGMs desperately. The CIFV provided that BMPish fire support but would draw artillery fire onto the dug in infantry with it and was also susceptible to artillery fire.

The CIFV results are somewhat concerning about how to conduct the infantry defensive fight as the LAV falls somewhat into a comparable.

Tanks (and notional tank destroyers with 105 mm guns), incidentally, were found effective in all scenarios.

I'm sure that the newer weapon systems facing us today make pure rifle companies even less relevant now than before.

I'm not sure how much the Army wargames northern European scenarios these days. I presume that they still are and I would find their more recent studies particulalry useful in figuring out how to structure Force 2025. It seems to me that our predominantly infantry-centric army, as structured and equipped, is not suitable for many scenarios that it might encounter. While Kirkhill and I differ on structure, I think there is a clear necessity that much of our infantry force needs to be trained for and employed in roles other than the traditional rifle company (whether light or mech) roles which occupy much of their time now. Whether that's as a robust cavalry force or in composite combined arms battalions or as anti-armour companies needs to be trialed out but essentially most of the Army's PYs are in the infantry and they need to evolve. If the need is for more artillery and reconnaissance and anti-armour forces, the reserves can and should play a big role.

I do believe that there will always be a need for a fallback role to basic infantry skills for OOTW but they need to be redesigned and re-equipped for the higher end things. I think that can be done without breaking the bank. In large part of the war gaming points the way, doctrine can be developed and practiced even before the weapon systems arrive. The German Army developed its skills in plywood tanks long before the steel ones rolled off the production lines. The big thing is to get the doctrine going so that organizations and equipment acquisition will follow a cogent plan.

🍻


----------



## CBH99

If thought along those lines for a while now.   I do believe we could be much more helpful and useful in providing some capabilities that are lacking, rather than just adding another brigade to the NATO side.  

A source of cheap suicide drones, manufactured here in Canada?  Focus more on the Air Force and provide a 12 pack rather than a 6 pack of our future fighter?

Modern and lethal AD assets from short range to medium range?  (Not THAAD, but perhaps a patriot type?)

🤷🏼‍♂️🤷🏼‍♂️


----------



## SeaKingTacco

FJAG said:


> I've been rereading Kasorak's "A National Force: The Evolution of Canada's Army 1950-2000" and was particulalry struck by the repetition of one issue.
> 
> Canada war-gamed our European commitment several times in the late 1970s and 1980s with the same general results. For example Ex BRONZE TALON 3 made it clear that the critical arm in those exercises was both the Blue and Red force artillery (in those days we had four 6-gun M109 batteries there and were wargaming an MLRS battery as well) which inflicted 72% of the Red casualties and 83% of the Blue casualties respectively. The lesson learned from that was two-fold, we need plenty of artillery, and that we need to devote more counter battery resources to quieten Red artillery.
> 
> Conversely, the least effective arm in these evaluations was the infantry which at the time was in M113s (or the notional Canadian Infantry Fighting Vehicle) and did have some TOWs but no medium range ATGMs. Dismounted infantry rarely contributed to the fight. The recommendation from that was we needed a personnel carrier that could participate in the counter APC fight (the suggestion at the time was something BMPish) and that we needed medium range ATGMs desperately. The CIFV provided that BMPish fire support but would draw artillery fire onto the dug in infantry with it and was also susceptible to artillery fire.
> 
> The CIFV results are somewhat concerning about how to conduct the infantry defensive fight as the LAV falls somewhat into a comparable.
> 
> Tanks (and notional tank destroyers with 105 mm guns), incidentally, were found effective in all scenarios.
> 
> I'm sure that the newer weapon systems facing us today make pure rifle companies even less relevant now than before.
> 
> I'm not sure how much the Army wargames northern European scenarios these days. I presume that they still are and I would find their more recent studies particulalry useful in figuring out how to structure Force 2025. It seems to me that our predominantly infantry-centric army, as structured and equipped, is not suitable for many scenarios that it might encounter. While Kirkhill and I differ on structure, I think there is a clear necessity that much of our infantry force needs to be trained for and employed in roles other than the traditional rifle company (whether light or mech) roles which occupy much of their time now. Whether that's as a robust cavalry force or in composite combined arms battalions or as anti-armour companies needs to be trialed out but essentially most of the Army's PYs are in the infantry and they need to evolve. If the need is for more artillery and reconnaissance and anti-armour forces, the reserves can and should play a big role.
> 
> I do believe that there will always be a need for a fallback role to basic infantry skills for OOTW but they need to be redesigned and re-equipped for the higher end things. I think that can be done without breaking the bank. In large part of the war gaming points the way, doctrine can be developed and practiced even before the weapon systems arrive. The German Army developed its skills in plywood tanks long before the steel ones rolled off the production lines. The big thing is to get the doctrine going so that organizations and equipment acquisition will follow a cogent plan.
> 
> 🍻


This.
I was involved in several, fairly detailed CAXs in my Army days.

Artillery (tube and rocket) was always the decisive factor.

The fastest way to stop a Soviet MRR or a TR was to dump DPICM on them.  If they penetrated the obstacle in a KZ, reseed with FASCAM and counterattack with Tanks.

All the infantry did was provide close protection to the ATGMs.


----------



## Kirkhill

I concur with all of the above.

I think the only real point of disagreement I have is with how artillery is defined.  I would argue that the 84mm Carl Gustav recoilless rifle is man-portable artillery.  A bit smaller in calibre than the 87.6 mm 25 pdr and a bit more manoeuverable than Kipling's  62.5 mm  mule packed Screw Guns.  I would even go so far as to link the M72s, APKWS and Javelins to the MLRS as "infantillery" (my compliments to Old Sweat).

I'll go further and describe the Tank/Tank Destroyer as self-propelled field artillery, or if you prefer horse artillery.    The real revolution for the cavalry was not the shift from horses to tracks but from sword to 120mm rifles and cannons.  While the infantry stayed focused on the bayonet.

And finally the Artillery, managing the indirect fight with long range rifles and missiles.




FJAG said:


> Conversely, the least effective arm in these evaluations was the infantry which at the time was in M113s (or the notional Canadian Infantry Fighting Vehicle) and did have some TOWs but no medium range ATGMs. Dismounted infantry rarely contributed to the fight. The recommendation from that was we needed a personnel carrier that could participate in the counter APC fight (the suggestion at the time was something BMPish) and that we needed medium range ATGMs desperately. The CIFV provided that BMPish fire support but would draw artillery fire onto the dug in infantry with it and was also susceptible to artillery fire.
> 
> The CIFV results are somewhat concerning about how to conduct the infantry defensive fight as the LAV falls somewhat into a comparable.



Has anybody done the experiment to see what is more effective in the defence?   A CIFV/LAV battalion (with or without ATGMs) or an ATGM equipped Light Infantry Battalion grouped with a Squadron of Engineers?

I agree completely that an infantry-centric army without widely dispersed "artillery" assets,  and we can include other manportable and light vehicle assets like MGs and Mortars, crew served weapons, is broadly ineffective and little more than a constabulary force.

With that in mind I like the idea of the "Divisional Support" or "Deep Strike" formation based on an Artillery Regiment with MRLS, and C4ISR unit and a Square Battle Group.  We emphasise technology rather than manpower.   Three of those would form the back bones of each of the current Brigade Groups.   But that is Force 2030.   Not Force 2025.

We can keep the Medium/Light forces for sustaining peace-keeping/constabulary tasks., where they will be well received and usefully employed.  Both would benefit from the immediate acquisition of 4-5 km ATGMs, MANPADs, Mortars and upgrading the ammunition for the CG-84.  That is Force 2025.

Edit - we could also include the brigade TACHEL squadrons, together with ATGM armed light infantry, as part of the Deep Strike complex.  And do that quickly as part of the Force 2025.


----------



## daftandbarmy

SeaKingTacco said:


> This.
> I was involved in several, fairly detailed CAXs in my Army days.
> 
> Artillery (tube and rocket) was always the decisive factor.
> 
> The fastest way to stop a Soviet MRR or a TR was to dump DPICM on them.  If they penetrated the obstacle in a KZ, reseed with FASCAM and counterattack with Tanks.
> 
> All the infantry did was provide close protection to the ATGMs.



Many years ago I had the opportunity to attend a series of lectures - in the UK - that looked at the battles of the future and tried to draw some conclusions based on the relatively limited war type conflicts of the 70s and 80s, with the addition of more modern weapon systems etc.

The 'inconvenient truth' is that Infantry casualties in any future peer-peer conflict will be enourmous, and far beyond what 'polite discussion' will ever explore.

This will happen despite any fancy new kit they give us. Western liberal democracies, even the ones that feature conscription, will be appalled and wholly unprepared for these vast casualty rates, and the impacts will likely be wide ranging and decisive in terms of which side can, as the Duke of Wellington remarked at Waterloo, 'pound the longest'.

The army that will win the peer to peer conflict of the future will likely have more, and better protected and supported, Infantry.

More importantly, they will also be backed by the political and public will to persevere despite the rapidly growing piles of mutilated teenagers.


----------



## Kirkhill

It is going to take some rage before Canadians will accept those kinds of casualties.

And you will get your infantry war if that rage is sustained after all the technology is destroyed.

Back to rocks and pointy sticks ... after the last tank is gone.


----------



## dapaterson

Mass casualties are a reality of war.  I would posit that the CAF does not adequately prepare its leaders for that reality.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> It is going to take some rage before Canadians will accept those kinds of casualties.
> 
> And you will get your infantry war if that rage is sustained after all the technology is destroyed.
> 
> Back to rocks and pointy sticks ... after the last tank is gone.



The reality is that you can't gain or hold ground without Infantry. That was as true in ancient Sumeria as it is in the 21st Century.

The difference now is that there are a gazillion weapon systems designed to destroy Infantry, and they are more accurate and lethal than ever before.

We will still need Infantry, we'll just need alot more of them. About five times more than we think we'll need, apparently.

If we haven't taken steps to figure out how we're going to do that, both politically and militarily, we could find ourselves in a bigger hurt locker than we might have been otherwise.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Mass casualties are a reality of war.  I would posit that the CAF does not adequately prepare its leaders for that reality.


The Op Broadsword estimates that I recently posted somewhere on this site for Gulf War 1 probably were since we didn't go. 



FJAG said:


> A timely comment OS. I was just reading "A National Force" and came across the item starting at pg 224 on the planning of Op Broadsword which was the contingency planning that was being done by Mobile Command for a possible 4 CMBG (reinforced by Op Pendant flyover) deployment in support of the first Iraq War (not sure if you were a part of that planning process at the time).
> 
> High on the list of issues was the estimated casualties against what was at the time still considered to be a very powerful conventional force. The size of the Canadian force (brigade plus support) was estimated at 11,000. The casualty estimates ranged from a low of 1,000 killed and 3,472 wounded (of which 1,416 would return to duty) therefore requiring 3, 052 replacements and 2,397 killed and 13,791 wounded (of which 5,313 would be returned to duty) therefore requiring 10,875 replacements. These potential casualties would require a 500 bed field hospital which Canada did not have (it did have a 40 bed one capable of expanding to 100) and which none of the allies could provide because theirs were already all allocated.
> 
> It was also noted that the deployment would use up all our Leopard tanks leaving none for replacement or follow-on training; that we did not have sufficient anti-armour weapons (especially no medium level ones); and the brigade was deficient in Javelins and ADATS. The estimates also indicated that Canadian helicopter resources for medevac purposes would be exhausted within 15 days.
> 
> As far as replacements were concerned, the Army calculated that on a 35% turn-out rate, the Reserves would only generate some 3,300 replacements which was at the extreme lower end of the need while the higher end casualties would require all the Militia then in existence.
> 
> Op Broadsword was, of course, never put into effect and luckily for the allies, the air campaign so degraded the Iraqi forces that the expected casualty figures were well short of what was anticipated.


That looked brutally real. 

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

In terms of artillery, I've posted else where but a cheap saturation type system like creating a 24 to 48 cell CRV-7 launcher on a Mack truck or a LAV chassis could deliver a lot of firepower against a conventional force. There is also a laser guided version for SF or recce elements to paint a target.


----------



## Kirkhill

I accept that infantry holds ground.  My sense is that you are not going to replicate the armies of Verdun and the Somme,  You are going to have to husband what infantry you have.  So the early phases of the war will be all about stripping those technological advantages from your enemy while retaining some yourself.   The infantry will be the last act.


----------



## PuckChaser

If we're going to take massive casualties, I'm willing to bet the other side of the fight has done the same calculation and come up with similar numbers. Seems curiously like the MAD principles of nuclear weapons: As long as you have sufficient numbers of technologically similar weapons on both sides, only lunatics with limited value for their own troops would push for that type of engagement. Then you get the "little green men" and grey space conflicts that have dominated recently. 

We need a big enough military with the right tools to be a deterrent, or else when the other guy constantly running his math equation finally comes up favourable to his side due to our cuts from key equipment (guns, tanks, atgms, EW) or an over reliance on reserves then we end up in a hurt locker pretty quick. Unfortunately it'll be a constant battle to maintain the funding required for that equilibrium, because the short sighted masses see no conflicts (due to conventional MAD) and think that means there's no more need for the military...


----------



## FJAG

Official stats for roughly the active period of 27 Sep to 10 Oct 2020 for Armenia and Azerbaijan:


> According to official figures released by the belligerents, Armenia lost 4,005 troops killed,[3] while Azerbaijan claimed 2,879 of their troops were killed with 28 missing in action.





> Casualties of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org



Most commentators believe these figures are understatements of actual casualties.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Official stats for roughly the active period of 27 Sep to 10 Oct 2020 for Armenia and Azerbaijan:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Most commentators believe these figures are understatements of actual casualties.
> 
> 🍻


And those casualties were sustained by populations directly in the firing line.  Not people who want to be seen to be doing the right thing at zero cost.


----------



## GR66

PuckChaser said:


> If we're going to take massive casualties, I'm willing to bet the other side of the fight has done the same calculation and come up with similar numbers. Seems curiously like the MAD principles of nuclear weapons: As long as you have sufficient numbers of technologically similar weapons on both sides, only lunatics with limited value for their own troops would push for that type of engagement. Then you get the "little green men" and grey space conflicts that have dominated recently.
> 
> We need a big enough military with the right tools to be a deterrent, or else when the other guy constantly running his math equation finally comes up favourable to his side due to our cuts from key equipment (guns, tanks, atgms, EW) or an over reliance on reserves then we end up in a hurt locker pretty quick. Unfortunately it'll be a constant battle to maintain the funding required for that equilibrium, because the short sighted masses see no conflicts (due to conventional MAD) and think that means there's no more need for the military...


I agree with this in terms of conflict with Russia which is really the main peer threat we're talking about in a land war scenario (I'd argue that any fight with China would be an air and sea conflict for Canada).  Russia simply does not have the numbers to take on NATO in an all out conflict because European NATO is simply too large in both area and population for a (declining) population like Russia to be able to defeat.

Any war with Russia will almost certainly be over a defined, relatively small territory that Russia believes that they can capture and hold where they believe NATO either doesn't have the political will to counter militarily, or NATO may counter the action but don't have the political will to expand the fighting beyond a limited local conflict to a general war against Russia.  An actual invasion of Russian territory, or possibly even deep strikes against Russian strategic targets would risk nuclear escalation.  I think both sides have a strong interest in keeping any Russian/NATO conflict conventional and local.  That certainly doesn't mean that whole Battalions couldn't get eaten up in minutes...just ask the Ukrainians...but I don't believe you'd have to see WWI/WWII style full national mobilization to conduct the kind of war we're likely to see with Russia.

The calculus is quite different when you talk about an invasion of North Korea or Iran.  In both of those cases they would have no desire to limit the scope of the conflict as they would be fighting for their national (political) survival.  An invasion of either of those countries could eat up large numbers of troops, but the question is would we choose to invade them?  Wouldn't we be more likely to use our air dominance to destroy their military capacity and possibly conduct limited raids against suspected WMD sites, etc. rather than conduct a full-scale invasion?


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Official stats for roughly the active period of 27 Sep to 10 Oct 2020 for Armenia and Azerbaijan:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Most commentators believe these figures are understatements of actual casualties.
> 
> 🍻



And that's for a fairly short 'Six Week War', as some have called it, with a  relatively limited scope between a couple of nations we would regard as 'second world countries'. 

What would a mere 'few months' of a war like that, with a slightly broader scope between first world peers, look like in terms of casualties?

We might need to reconnect with why all those dozens of WW1 era armouries are dotted across our country: to facilitate rapid, mass recruitment.

Right now, for example, our 'Reserves' are not at all set up to do what they need to do in a war like that. I haven't done the math, but my sense is that if we converted all the current reserve units in Canada to combat arms units, those units that take the most casualties, and ensured they were fully integrated with the Reg F in terms of equipment and training, we might be taking a small step in the right direction. We would also need to stand up new/more/ bigger/ more technically capable CSS units like, for example, medical units that are always under appreciated/ resourced in peace time.

In any case although we're probably well set up well to fight another Afghanistan e.g., an expeditionary style COIN campaign that roughly equates to a drive by shooting, it bears thinking about when we start planning for any future peer-peer conventional conflict.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> And that's for a fairly short 'Six Week War', as some have called it, with a  relatively limited scope between a couple of nations we would regard as 'second world countries'.
> 
> What would a mere 'few months' of a war like that, with a slightly broader scope between first world peers, look like in terms of casualties?
> 
> ...



How about this


> The overall number of confirmed deaths in the war in Donbas, which started on 6 April 2014, has been put at 13,000–13,200.[9]





> Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org



🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> How about this
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻



Scary. How long would an allied 'coalition of the willing', let's say a NATO division of some kind, be able to sustain casualties like that I wonder. 

What if the Canadian contribution 'only' suffered about 4-500 dead and wounded in 6 weeks... how would we react? It gives us a good starting point to plan from anyways.

It is said that the Spanish Civil War was a good warning about what might be just around the corner for the Great Powers. We'd ignore the lessons from this nasty little war at our peril, I would say.


----------



## GR66

I wonder if a variation of the new British Deep Recce Strike Brigade might have a useful role.  I don't necessarily see it as taking on the role of "deep strike" but rather as a direct counter to Russian indirect fires strength.

A Recce element (ground vehicle and UAVs) to identify enemy Recce elements/Radar emitters.  A SHORAD element optimized for UAV-type threats (guns and plentiful, cheap missiles vs. expensive heavy missiles) to keep their Battalion Tactical Group/Brigade-level UAV assets away from our maneuver units.  Larger air threats (helicopters, fast air, high altitude UAVs, etc. from their Divisional levels and above) can be left to heavier AD units and our own fast air.

The Strike element could come in two layers.  One group with Non-LOS missiles/loitering munitions/anti-radiation missiles to take out enemy Recce, EW and AD vehicles, etc. and a second group with HIMARS to provide counter-battery fire against their artillery.

All these units are less manpower intensive than infantry Battalions and the types of systems they would use are the type that could be mounted on light vehicles which make them suitable for Reserve units as well.

We could still maintain two traditional Brigade Groups and a significant portion of our Reserves could be dedicated to providing the required infantry replacements that a major conflict would require.


----------



## Edward Campbell

PuckChaser said:


> If we're going to take massive casualties, I'm willing to bet the other side of the fight has done the same calculation and come up with similar numbers. Seems curiously like the MAD principles of nuclear weapons: As long as you have sufficient numbers of technologically similar weapons on both sides, only lunatics with limited value for their own troops would push for that type of engagement. Then you get the "little green men" and grey space conflicts that have dominated recently.
> 
> We need a big enough military with the right tools to be a deterrent, or else when the other guy constantly running his math equation finally comes up favourable to his side due to our cuts from key equipment (guns, tanks, atgms, EW) or an over reliance on reserves then we end up in a hurt locker pretty quick. Unfortunately it'll be a constant battle to maintain the funding required for that equilibrium, because the short sighted masses see no conflicts (due to conventional MAD) and think that means there's no more need for the military...



Except that the other side*s* (the plural really matters to me because I do NOT believe that China and Russia are anything more than fair weather friends) have different social values that we do in the US led West. Both have taken horrendous casualties before because both have cultures that place the needs of the Motherland higher than the needs, even the lives, of any and all individuals.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> And that's for a fairly short 'Six Week War', as some have called it, with a  relatively limited scope between a couple of nations we would regard as 'second world countries'.
> 
> What would a mere 'few months' of a war like that, with a slightly broader scope between first world peers, look like in terms of casualties?
> 
> We might need to reconnect with why all those dozens of WW1 era armouries are dotted across our country: to facilitate rapid, mass recruitment.



We can't forget that the effort in WWI was largely a cultural effort.  It was born of the British Diaspora of the Victorian and Edwardian eras, a diaspora that had an outsized influence in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the Rhodesias,  as well as India.  

To many of those Brits in the CEF, I believe, they saw themselves first as Brits and subjects of the King, and secondly as Canadians - in the same sense that Highlanders and Lowlanders, Irish and Welsh, Devon men and Geordies, Lancastrians and Kentish men identified as Brits with regional identities.

Those people were tied to the Crown and moved by the same cultural impulses.  They were also tied to the same religious framework with a strong belief in an afterlife, a belief reinforced by a life that was regularly cut short by disease, violence, hunger and poor diet, and high risk working conditions.

None of that applies to our comfortable Canadian (or OECD) life style.

The only way I perceive motivating the masses enough to support mass mobilization and developing a toleration for the mass casualties you are envisaging is if the hordes arrive in Toronto.  And by that time it will be too late.

The only reasonable counter is to keep the hordes at bay by breaking them up before they get here.  And doing it with short, rapid, low cost thrusts.

We are fencing.  Not building shield walls.   





 

I see CANSOFCOM, Light Brigades and Deep Strike Brigades as part of an avoidance strategy  -  avoidance of having to fight the hordes in Toronto with mass casualties.

Not just adding another shield to another army's shield wall in a foreign country.





> Of the first contingent formed at Valcartier, Quebec in 1914, about two-thirds were men who had been born in the United Kingdom. By the end of the war in 1918, at least half of the soldiers were British-born....
> 
> ... Many British nationals from the United Kingdom or other territories who were resident in Canada and the United States also joined the CEF. A sizeable percentage of Bermuda's volunteers who served in the war joined the CEF,











						Canadian Expeditionary Force - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Scary. How long would an allied 'coalition of the willing', let's say a NATO division of some kind, be able to sustain casualties like that I wonder.
> 
> What if the Canadian contribution 'only' suffered about 4-500 dead and wounded in 6 weeks... how would we react? It gives us a good starting point to plan from anyways.
> 
> It is said that the Spanish Civil War was a good warning about what might be just around the corner for the Great Powers. We'd ignore the lessons from this nasty little war at our peril, I would say.



I know that there are always two views on the issue of strengthening the forces: on the one hand you want to pose a credible deterrent and on the other if you pose a genuine threat then your opponent may react to it. Russia and China are both good cases on point. Both are bellicose, both have intentions to expand and grow.

For me the tipping point is that both will exploit signs of weakness. With Russia it's the foray into former Eastern Block countries that over the last half century have established a significant Russian population within their borders. Historically this reminds me of Germany's 1930s objectives to unify with ethnic German societies across Europe. Russia wants buffers made up of other people than its own. China, on the other hand seeks to control both territory, such as the South China Sea, populations (Taiwan), and economies.

In all these cases western society has yet to draw a bright line in the sand. IMHO, every success either Russia or China have encourages them to take the next step.

Insofar as Europe is concerned, the problem is that while Russia has turned towards a new model of warfare, NATO maintains a cobbled together alliance of mostly ineffectives with a Cold War character to it. Only the UK and France have any nuclear deterrent and it's not large by and of itself. Their commitment to mutual defence is fragmented and only apparent in the Forward Presence forces which, by and of themselves, have little actual combat power. A few, directly threatened, countries like Poland are doing more to solidify and uparm their forces than the traditional big powers like the US, UK and even Canada.

I'm a firm believer that world peace comes from a credible deterrent force that makes an opponent think twice before committing hostile acts. Canada's Forces don't meet that definition. Anyone with even the most rudimentary intelligence and analysis would find that Canada, particulalry its army, despite its current defence spending, is the very definition of "the emperor has no clothes". Yes, we can dabble in defence and international politics but we do so without clout amongst our opponents and our peers.

I think our Navy is probably doing the best it can although there is always room for improvement. The Air Force is IMHO out to lunch with it's continued focus on new fighter jets to the exclusion of long range unmanned strike and ground based air defence capabilities. It's aviation role continues to limp along while transport is probably doing the best it can as well. The Army is totally out to lunch with a schizophrenic organization that tries to, and fails to, be everything for everyone at the same time. A modular plug and play army without the components to plug and play with is of limited value.

Canada's Army has little to worry about with respect to suffering casualties when being sent into a serious conflict. When our military leaders have to advise their political masters of what the Army's true capabilities are in a time of crisis, it won't get sent or will get plugged into some minor roles in the far and distant rear.

$.02


----------



## MilEME09

I think a good indication of where our doctrine is shifting is in the change of armoured recce units becoming Cavalry Regiments dedicated to recce in force and counter recce. A much more in your face and direct force role. Given what NATO has requested of us, I think we very much are shifting to confront a near peer enemy.


----------



## dapaterson

FJAG said:


> Canada's Army has little to worry about with respect to suffering casualties when being sent into a serious conflict. When our military leaders have to advise their political masters of what the Army's true capabilities are in a time of crisis, it won't get sent or will get plugged into some minor roles in the far and distant rear.



Like Hong Kong?


----------



## Kirkhill

> Insofar as Europe is concerned, the problem is that while Russia has turned towards a new model of warfare, NATO maintains a cobbled together alliance of mostly ineffectives with a Cold War character to it.



Extrapolating on my shield wall analogy I believe Russia has abandoned the field entirely while NATO is still trying to maintain a strategy based on an ineffective shield wall, hoping that the other side will see the error of its ways and return to proper soldiering.  Fight fair.

Ukraine, although the definition is contested, has traditionally been thought of as The Borderlands.  Borderlands, like Ukraine, the NW Frontier, Derry, the Welsh Marches and "The Borders"  have always been ripe for playing "Great Games".    Russia has previous form on the NW Frontier of India playing with the British Raj.  The French intervened in the Anglo-Scots Borders for 500 years.  The Ukraine spawned the Cossacks.  The Anglo-Scots Border spawned the Moss Troopers.  Both were mounted.  Both acted independently.  Both could be bought.  Both formed the bases for Government riders dedicated to "pacifying" and "keeping the peace" on the borders.  Often brutally.  The British variants were curbed by the rule of law to a greater extent than their Russian counterparts but nobody ever developed a fondness for "The Dragoons" - especially when used to break up strikes and demonstrations as at Peterloo.

Russia is playing a version of the Great Game.  It has abandoned the field, aside from some gestures of which Potemkin would be proud, and has transferred its efforts to borderlands and behind their opponents shield wall.  Its agents are more akin to the Counter-Reformation Jesuits in Britain and the Societe des Missions Etrangeres in Acadia.  They exploit the rules of the societies of the OECD to foment disorder and weaken the shield wall, even as they outflank, bypass and ignore it.

Our Medium Force Dragoons have some utility in the borderlands maintaining the peace.  But that maintenance is a never ending task.  Those troops are better garrisoned as an enduring presence in low intensity trouble spots.  Like Afghanistan. I think the outcome in Afghanistan might have been different if the OECD had telegraphed a willingness to stay for the long haul by building bases with permanent walls and glittering marble arches.  Not camping like another bunch of nomadic raiders from the desert.  Raiders that would come and go.

But to be able to Fence, to employ foil, epee and sabre effectively, it is necessary to be well equipped, well trained, be observant and light on ones feet - willing to not only attack rapidly and decisively and with precision when the opportunity presents itself, but also to be able to deflect the enemy's strikes and retire rapidly to set up the next thrust.

The Medium Force is not agile.  It is an enduring presence.  It is best deployed outside of Canada in garrison.

A Canadian based force must, first and foremost, be agile.  And it needs reach.  And it needs precision.   And it needs to be deadly.

But, most importantly, it needs a society willing to use it.


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:


> Like Hong Kong?


Which by the end of the war turned into a Canadian Force landing in Tokyo Harbour during phase 2 of Operation downfall. Imagine those casualties for a second.


----------



## Kirkhill

I'm a firm believer that World Peace is an illusion.   Just like a lawn free of dandelions.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> ... But to be able to Fence, to employ foil, epee and sabre effectively, it is necessary to be well equipped, well trained, be observant and light on ones feet - willing to not only attack rapidly and decisively and with precision when the opportunity presents itself, but also to be able to deflect the enemy's strikes and retire rapidly to set up the next thrust.
> 
> The Medium Force is not agile.  It is an enduring presence.  It is best deployed outside of Canada in garrison.
> 
> A Canadian based force must, first and foremost, be agile.  And it needs reach.  And it needs precision.   And it needs to be deadly.
> 
> But, most importantly, it needs a society willing to use it.



Ever since Trudeau the Greater, Canadian governments have been looking for that light, agile quick reaction force while the Army, until the turn of the century, had been working hard to maintain a heavy Cold War model. I think that in large measure this is because, until the turn of the century, the Army recognized instinctively that a light, agile force would be quickly ground up if it faced a serious challenge.

So the Army changed. And will need to change again. And there is a role for lighter, more lethal, forces so long as we do not throw out some of the more reliable and necessary weapon systems. There will always be a role for heavy forces if for nothing else but to seize key terrain in the face of heavy opposition. There will always be a need for much artillery if for nothing else than to provide a reliable, all weather capability to blunt or neutralize the enemy's artillery.  

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Ever since Trudeau the Greater, Canadian governments have been looking for that light, agile quick reaction force while the Army, until the turn of the century, had been working hard to maintain a heavy Cold War model. I think that in large measure this is because, until the turn of the century, the Army recognized instinctively that a light, agile force would be quickly ground up if it faced a serious challenge.
> 
> So the Army changed. And will need to change again. And there is a role for lighter, more lethal, forces so long as we do not throw out some of the more reliable and necessary weapon systems. There will always be a role for heavy forces if for nothing else but to seize key terrain in the face of heavy opposition. There will always be a need for much artillery if for nothing else than to provide a reliable, all weather capability to blunt or neutralize the enemy's artillery.
> 
> 🍻



The key element in fencing is the ability to retire, rapidly and gracefully while maintaining balance.  The art is in not waiting around long enough to be ground up.  You are not trying to beat the other guy into submission.  You are attempting to keep him on the back foot and off balance.

Hence the need for a mobile base afloat to which a deployed force can retire expeditiously.

I can understand why an army with no way home might be disinclined to deploy unless it was guaranteed of victory.  And the supply of heavy weapons.

Light and Special forces are not about attriting the enemy's armies.   They are about changing the enemy's opinions.

PS - I took fencing long enough to learn the art and discover I was a better rugby player.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further thoughts

If the Army has been focusing on the heavy "shield wall" then it has been committing the Canadian Government to the role of a junior partner in an alliance.  Canada doesn't have the numbers to build a long enough shield wall on its own to secure its flanks in a linear fight.  It will always need allies and will usually be a minor component.

Alternately the fencing model, based on not holding ground but thrusts designed to disrupt, and rapid withdrawal when the situation requires, permits a more independent foreign policy - permitting the rapid support of interests when the government chooses,  and the equally rapid withdrawal of support, again, when the government chooses.

The key is to make sure that any allies we choose to support notice our presence and our absence.  That means we have to be able to affect the course of events in the field when we are there.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Further thoughts
> 
> If the Army has been focusing on the heavy "shield wall" then it has been committing the Canadian Government to the role of a junior partner in an alliance.  Canada doesn't have the numbers to build a long enough shield wall on its own to secure its flanks in a linear fight.  It will always need allies and will usually be a minor component.
> 
> Alternately the fencing model, based on not holding ground but thrusts designed to disrupt, and rapid withdrawal when the situation requires, permits a more independent foreign policy - permitting the rapid support of interests when the government chooses,  and the equally rapid withdrawal of support, again, when the government chooses.
> 
> The key is to make sure that any allies we choose to support notice our presence and our absence.  That means we have to be able to affect the course of events in the field when we are there.


Your fencing analogy is more parry than thrust.

The shield wall versus mobile defence was always recognized as an issue during the Cold War. The mobile defence concept unfortunately trades space for survival. That's not a viable option when the other guys' sole objective is to seize and hold as much of your space as they can. That was always the issue with Germany where every foot lost was a foot of Germany and resulted in forming as much of a shield wall defence as possible.

The objective in a European defence was always to hold a line while striking deep to destroy the follow-on echelons before they could deploy. That's why NATO had tactical nuclear weapons and a policy to use them. 

The point of a more modern defence wouldn't change that much except for the fact that there may be more scope for using more advanced non-nuclear and non-aircraft-delivered weapon systems to strike deep. 

The general tactic here though is 1) absorb the attack as far forward as possible; 2) strike deep and destroy the follow-on forces; and 3) counterattack to retake what was lost during 1).  While 1) and 2) can be done in different ways, 3) will always rely on a heavy force. The question is how well can you keep that heavy force intact and how quickly can you bring it to bear. 

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

> The general tactic here though is 1) absorb the attack as far forward as possible; 2) strike deep and destroy the follow-on forces; and 3) counterattack to retake what was lost during 1). While 1) and 2) can be done in different ways, 3) will always rely on a heavy force. The question is how well can you keep that heavy force intact and how quickly can you bring it to bear.



Or

You can, as you suggest, parry.   Sidestep the initial engagement and deflect.  Wait until the enemy is extended (April 1918 after the German offensive lost impetus or late May 1940) and then thrust.  

The deep strike doesn't have to be a ground strike.  It can be an aerial strike and these days that doesn't necessarily mean fighter bombers with 500 km combat radii.  It could just as easily be a 1500 km missile barrage.

As for retaking ground, first deny the enemy the opportunity to hold the ground by disrupting its supply lines and letting it wither.  As far as the locals are concerned which is a better outcome?  Occupation?  Or Caen 1944?


----------



## Kirkhill

Army’s ground combat center is developing new methods, formations for the next war
					

The job of figuring out where new technological advances, doctrine and tactics meet is at the epicenter of innovations in ground combat — the Maneuver Center of Excellence.




					www.armytimes.com
				












						Big changes coming to Army Stryker brigades
					

From more artillery to electronic warfare and engineers, the formation will change.




					www.armytimes.com


----------



## Kirkhill

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3-96-000-WEB-1.pdf
		


19 January 2021  FM 3-96

SECTION I – INFANTRY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-1. The IBCT is an expeditionary, combined arms formation optimized for dismounted operations in
complex terrain—a geographical area consisting of an urban center larger than a village and/or of two or
more types of restrictive terrain or environmental conditions occupying the same space (ATP 3-34.80). The
IBCT can conduct entry operations by ground, airland, air assault, or amphibious assault into austere areas
of operations with little or no advanced notice. Airborne IBCTs can conduct vertical envelopment by
parachute assault. The IBCT’s dismounted capability in complex terrain separates it from other functional
brigades and maneuver BCTs.

1-2. Mission variables, categories of specific information needed to conduct operations, help to determine
the task organization and required augmentation for the IBCT. For example, if additional tactical mobility—
the ability of friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield relative to the enemy
(ADP 3-90)—is required, the higher tactical headquarters can temporarily augment the IBCT with aviation
assets to conduct air movements or air assault operations (see FM 3-99). Augmentation can include wheeled
assets such as the mine-resistant ambush protected family of vehicles (see ATP 3-21.10).

1-3. The role of the IBCT is to close with the enemy by means of fire and movement to destroy or capture
enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close combat, and counterattack to control land areas,
including populations and resources. Fire and movement is the concept of applying fires from all sources
to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the enemy, and the tactical movement of combat forces in relation
to the enemy (as components of maneuver applicable at all echelons). At the squad level, fire and
movement entails a team placing suppressive fire on the enemy as another team moves against or
around the enemy.

1-4. The IBCT performs complementary missions to SBCTs and ABCTs. The IBCT optimizes for the
offense against conventional, hybrid, and irregular threats in severely restrictive terrain. The IBCT performs
missions such as reducing fortified areas, infiltrating and seizing objectives in the enemy’s rear, eliminating
enemy force remnants in restricted terrain, and securing key facilities and activities. The IBCT conducts
stability operations tasks in the wake of maneuvering forces.

1-5. IBCTs configure for area defense and as the fixing force component of a mobile defense. The IBCT’s
lack of heavy combat vehicles reduces its logistic requirements. Not having heavy combat vehicles gives
higher commanders greater flexibility when adapting various transportation modes to move or maneuver the
IBCT. Airborne IBCTs conduct airborne assault-specific missions. All IBCTs can conduct air assault
operations. (See FM 3-99 for information on airborne and air assault operations.)

1-6. The IBCT is a combined arms force organized around dismounted Infantry. Cavalry, field artillery,
engineer, intelligence, signal, sustainment, and CBRN reconnaissance units are organic to the IBCT (see
figure 1-1).* Unique to the IBCT is the weapons company in each Infantry battalion, composed of four*
*mounted assault platoons and provides those battalions with the capability to defeat light enemy armor threats
with organic mounted tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided/wireless guided Improved Target
Acquisition System, M2 series heavy machine gun, and MK-19 40-millimeter (mm) grenade machine gun*
*weapon systems (see paragraph 1-9). *Higher commanders augment the IBCT for a specific mission with
additional capabilities. Augmentation can include aviation, Armor, field artillery, air defense, military police,
civil affairs, a tactical PSYOP element, engineers, CBRN, and additional information systems assets. Three
Infantry battalions and the Cavalry squadron serve as the IBCT’s primary maneuver forces.

1-7. The Infantry battalions organize with a headquarters and headquarters company, three Infantry rifle
companies, and a weapons company (see figure 1-2 on page 1-4). The headquarters and headquarters
company provides planning and intelligence, signal, and fire support to the battalion. The headquarters
company has a battalion command section, a battalion staff section, a company headquarters, battalion
medical, scout, and mortar platoons, a signal section, and a sniper squad. The headquarters company mortar
platoon is equipped with 120-mm mortars (trailer towed) and 81-mm mortars (ground mounted). The
battalion receives a forward support company (FSC) for sustainment purposes (see chapter 9), normally in a
direct support relationship. (See ATP 3-21.20 for additional information.)

1-8. Infantry rifle companies have three Infantry rifle platoons, a mortar section, a Raven unmanned aircraft
system (UAS) team, and a headquarters section. Each rifle platoon has three Infantry rifle squads and a
weapons squad. The mortar section has two squads, each with a 60-mm mortar. Habitual attachments to the
Infantry rifle company include a fire support team at the company level and forward observer teams at the
platoon level, medics assigned to the rifle platoons, and a senior medic at the company level. (See
ATP 3-21.10 and ATP 3-21.8 for additional information.)

1-9. The Infantry weapons company has a company headquarters and four assault platoons. Each assault
platoon has two sections of two squads and a leader’s vehicle. Each squad contains four Soldiers and a vehicle
mounting the heavy weapons. The heavy weapons can be tailored to a mission based on the commander’s
mission analysis. Infantry weapons companies are equipped with the following weapons: the tube launched,
optically tracked, wire guided/wireless guided Improved Target Acquisition System, the MK19, the M2, and
the M240 series machine gun. While all of the weapons vehicles can mount the MK19 and the M2, only two
vehicles per platoon are equipped to mount the Improved Target Acquisition System. Habitual attachments
for the weapons company include a fire support team at the company level and medics. (See ATP 3-21.20,
appendix D for additional information.)

Note. The Infantry battalion scout platoon and IBCT Cavalry squadron organize, train, and equip
to conduct reconnaissance, security operations, and surveillance. However, reconnaissance,
security operations, and surveillance remain a core competency of the Infantry rifle company,
platoon, and squad.

1-10. The IBCT Cavalry squadron’s mission focuses on information requirements—in intelligence usage,
those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment 
that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander
(JP 2-0)—tied to the execution of tactical missions (normally reconnaissance, security operations, and
surveillance). The squadron’s information collection effort answers the commander’s priority intelligence
requirements. Information acquired during collection activities about the threat and the area of interest allows
the IBCT commander to focus combat power, execute current operations, and prepare for future operations
simultaneously.

1-11. The Cavalry squadron (see figure 1-3) has four troops: a headquarters and headquarters troop, two
mounted Cavalry troops, and one dismounted Cavalry troop. (See ATP 3-20.96.) The headquarters troop
organization includes a command section, the troop headquarters section, the squadron primary staff, a
medical section, a sniper section, a retransmission (known as RETRANS) section, an attached fire support
cell, and a tactical air control party (TACP). The two mounted Cavalry troops (three scout platoons each) are
equipped with wheeled vehicles (each with a crew and scout team for dismounted operations), tube launched,
optically tracked, wire guided/wireless guided Improved Target Acquisition Systems, the Long-Range
Advance Scout Surveillance Systems, a mortar section (120-mm trailer towed), and a Raven UAS team. The
dismounted Cavalry troop (two dismounted scout platoons each) enables dismounted infiltration and
rotary-wing aircraft insertion and has a mortar section (60-mm ground mounted), a Raven UAS team, and a
sniper squad. Habitual attachments to the Cavalry troop include a fire support team at the troop level and
forward observer teams at the platoon level, medics assigned to each platoon, and a senior medic at the troop
level. (See ATP 3-20.97 and ATP 3-20.98.) The squadron receives an FSC for sustainment purposes (see
chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship.

1-12. The IBCT field artillery battalion has four batteries: a headquarters and headquarters battery, two
105-mm firing batteries (six-gun M119 series towed howitzer battery), and one 155-mm firing battery
(six-gun M777 series towed howitzer battery). The firing batteries in a battalion have two 3-gun firing
platoons. The field artillery battalion provides massing fires in space and time on single or multiple targets
with precision, near precision, and area fires to support IBCT operations. The IBCT field artillery battalion
has a target acquisition platoon (counterbattery and countermortar radars) organized and equipped to quickly
detect, and accurately locate, classify, and report indirect fire from enemy mortars, artillery, and rockets to
permit their immediate engagement with counterfire. The information provided includes the point of origin,
predicted point of impact, radar cross section, and velocity. The battalion receives an FSC for sustainment
purposes, normally in a direct support relationship. The battalion receives an FSC for sustainment purposes
(see chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship. (See ATP 3-11.23 for additional information.)

More to follow re SBCT and ABCT.


----------



## Kirkhill

SECTION II – STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-28. The SBCT is an expeditionary combined arms force organized around mounted Infantry. SBCT units
operate effectively in most terrain and weather conditions. The role of the SBCT is to close with the enemy
by means of fire and movement to destroy or capture enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close
combat, and counterattack to control land areas, including populations and resources. The SBCT can gain the
initiative early, seize and retain key terrain—an identifiable characteristic whose seizure or retention affords
a marked advantage to either combatant (ADP 3-90), and conduct massed fire—fire from a number of
weapons directed at a single point or small area (JP 3-02), to stop the enemy.

1-29. The SBCT is task organized to meet specific mission requirements. All SBCTs include maneuver, field
artillery, intelligence, signal, engineer, CBRN, and sustainment capabilities (see figure 1-8 on page 1-12).
This organizational flexibility enables SBCTs to function across the range of military operations. Unique to
the SBCT is the weapons troop (with three antitank guided missile (ATGM) platoons and three mobile gun
system (known as MGS) platoons) that provides the SBCT the ability to defeat light-skinned enemy armor
or task organize those assets to maneuver battalions based on mission requirements (see paragraph 1-33).
Higher commanders augment the SBCT for a specific mission with additional capabilities such as aviation,
Armor, field artillery, air defense, military police, civil affairs, a tactical PSYOP element, engineers, CBRN,
and information systems assets.

1-30. SBCTs balance combined arms capabilities with significant mobility. The SBCT primarily fights as a
dismounted Infantry formation that includes three SBCT Infantry battalions. The SBCT Infantry battalion
has a headquarters and headquarters company, and three SBCT Infantry rifle companies each with three
SBCT Infantry rifle platoons (see figure 1-9). The headquarters and headquarters company provides planning
and intelligence, signal, and fire support to the battalion. The headquarters company has a battalion command
section, a battalion staff section, a company headquarters, battalion medical, scout, and mortar platoons, a
signal section, and a sniper squad. The headquarters company mortar platoon is equipped with 120-mm
Stryker mortar carrier vehicles that have an 81-mm mortar dismounted capability. Each SBCT Infantry rifle
company has a section of organic 120-mm Stryker mortar carrier vehicles that have a 60-mm mortar
dismounted capability and a Raven UAS team. Habitual attachments to the SBCT Infantry rifle company
include a fire support team at the company level and forward observer teams at the platoon level, medics
assigned to the rifle platoons, and a senior medic at the company level. The battalion receives an FSC for
sustainment purposes (see chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship. (See ATP 3-21.21 and
ATP 3-21.11 for additional information.)

1-31. The Cavalry squadron of the SBCT is extremely mobile. The Cavalry squadron is composed of five
troops, one headquarters and headquarters troop, three Cavalry troops equipped with Stryker reconnaissance
vehicles, and weapons troop equipped with Stryker ATGM vehicles and Stryker MGS vehicles (see
figure 1-10 on page 1-14). The headquarters troop organization includes a command section, the troop
headquarters section, the squadron primary staff, a medical section, a sniper section, a RETRANS section,
an attached fire support cell, and a TACP. The squadron receives an FSC for sustainment purposes (see
chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship. (See ATP 3-20.96.)

1-32. Each Cavalry troop includes headquarters section, two scout platoons, a Raven UAS team, and a mortar
section. The two scout platoons contain four reconnaissance vehicles, each with a crew and scout team for
dismounted operations. The mortar section consists of two 120-mm mounted mortar carrier vehicles led by
a sergeant first class. Habitual attachments to the Cavalry troop include a fire support team at the troop level
and forward observer teams at the platoon level, medics assigned to each platoon, and a senior medic at the
troop level. (See ATP 3-20.97 and ATP 3-20.98.)

1-33. The weapons troop combat power resides within its three ATGM platoons and three MGS platoons. It
has a headquarters section with an assigned Infantry carrier vehicle. The ATGM platoon engages the enemy
by means of long-range antiarmor fires and maneuvers to destroy or to repel the enemy’s assaults by fire,
and counterattack. The platoon consists of three ATGM vehicles. The MGS platoon provides precise
long-range direct fire to destroy or suppress hardened enemy bunkers, machine gun positions, sniper
positions, and long-range threats. It also creates Infantry breach points in urban, restricted, and open rolling
terrain. The MGS 105-mm main gun provides the platoon with limited antiarmor, self-defense capabilities.
The platoon consists of four MGS vehicles. Attachments include a fires support team with a fire support
vehicle from the field artillery battalion to support with fires and medics with a medical support vehicle from
the medical platoon of the headquarters and headquarters troop of the Cavalry squadron. (See ATP 3-21.91
for additional information.)

1-34. The SBCT field artillery battalion has four batteries: a headquarters and headquarters battery and three
six-gun lightweight M777-series 155-mm towed howitzer batteries. The SBCT field artillery battalion
organizes each howitzer battery with two firing platoons of three guns each. The battalion supports SBCT
operations with precision, near precision, and area fires. The field artillery battalion has two AN/TPQ-53
counterfire radars and four AN/TPQ-50 lightweight countermortar radars for target acquisition. (See
ATP 3-09.42 for additional information.)


----------



## Kirkhill

SECTION III – ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

1-36. The ABCT’s role is to close with the enemy by means of fire and movement to destroy or capture
enemy forces, or to repel enemy attacks by fire, close combat, and counterattack to control land areas,
including populations and resources. The ABCT organizes to concentrate overwhelming combat power.
Mobility, protection, and firepower enable the ABCT to conduct offensive operations with great precision
and speed. The ABCT performs complementary missions to the IBCT and SBCT.

1-37. The ABCT conducts offensive operations to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. The ABCT
conducts defensive operations to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, and develop favorable
conditions for offensive actions. During stability, the ABCT’s commitment of time, resources, and forces
establish and reinforce diplomatic and military resolve to achieve a safe, secure environment and a
sustainable peace.

1-38. The ABCT conducts sustained and large-scale combat operations within the foundations of unified
land operations through decisive action. The ABCT seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative while
synchronizing its actions to achieve the best effects possible. During combat operations, the ABCT can fight
without additional combat power but can be task organized to meet the precise needs of its missions. The
ABCT conducts expeditionary deployments and integrates its efforts with unified action partners.

1-39. The ABCT (figure 1-11 on page 1-16) is a combined arms organization consisting of three combined
arms battalions of Armor and mechanized Infantry companies. Cavalry, field artillery, engineer, intelligence,
signal, sustainment, TUAS, and CBRN reconnaissance units are organic to the ABCT. Higher commanders
augment the ABCT for a specific mission with additional capabilities. Augmentation can include aviation,
Infantry, field artillery, air defense, military police, civil affairs, tactical PSYOP element, engineers, CBRN,
and additional information systems assets.

1-40. Three combined arms battalions are the ABCT’s primary maneuver force. Each combined arms
battalion conducts sustained combined arms and close combat operations as an essential part of the ABCT
formation. The combined arms battalions of the ABCT serve as a deterrent to armed conflict; they can deploy
worldwide in the conduct of decisive action. Combined arms battalions execute operations within their
assigned areas of operations in support of the commander’s scheme of maneuver. The combined arms
battalion receives an FSC for sustainment purposes (see chapter 9), normally in a direct support relationship.

1-41. Combined arms battalions combine the efforts of their Armor companies and mechanized Infantry
companies along with their headquarters and headquarters company to execute tactical missions as part of a
combined arms operation. Within the ABCT, two combined arms battalions (see figure 1-12) have two Armor
companies (each with three tank platoons and a headquarters section) and one mechanized Infantry company
(with three mechanized Infantry platoons, a headquarters section, and a Raven UAS team); and one combined
arms battalion has two mechanized Infantry companies (each with three mechanized Infantry platoons, a
headquarters section, and a Raven UAS team) and one Armor company (with three tank platoons and a
headquarters section). The headquarters and headquarters company of each combined arms battalion provides
planning and intelligence, signal, and fire support to the battalion. Each headquarters company has a battalion
command section, a battalion staff section, a company headquarters, battalion medical, scout, and mortar 
platoons, a signal section, and a sniper squad. The headquarters company mortar platoon is equipped with
120-mm mortar carrier vehicles that have a 120-mm mortar dismounted capability. Habitual attachments to
the maneuver companies include a fire support team at the company level and forward observer teams at the
platoon level, medics assigned to the rifle platoons, and a senior medic at the company level. (See ATP 3-90.5
and ATP 3-90.1 for additional information.)

1-42. The fundamental purpose of the Cavalry squadron is to perform reconnaissance and security operations
in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations, often in conjunction with fighting for information
to support the ABCT commander. The conduct of security operations by the squadron provides an economy
of force while allowing the ABCT commander the flexibility to conserve combat power for engagements
where better desired.

1-43. The Cavalry squadron has a headquarters and headquarters troop, three ground Cavalry troops, and an
Armor company (see figure 1-13 on page 1-18). The headquarters troop organization includes a command
group, the troop headquarters section, the squadron primary staff that is; personnel, intelligence, operations,
logistics, signal, the medical platoon, an attached fire support cell, and a TACP. The squadron has 120-mm
self-propelled mortars (see ATP 3-20.96). The squadron receives an FSC for sustainment purposes (see
chapter 4), normally in a direct support relationship. The ground Cavalry troops have two platoons with six
Bradley fighting vehicles and a Raven UAS team. The Armor company has three platoons with four M1
Abrams main battle tanks. Habitual attachments to the Cavalry troop tank and company include a fire support
team at the troop/company level and forward observer teams at the platoon level, medics assigned to each
platoon, and a senior medic at the troop/company level. (See ATP 3-20.15, ATP 3-20.97, and ATP 3-20.98.)

1-44. The ABCT field artillery battalion has four batteries, a headquarters and headquarters battery and three
batteries of six M109 (family of vehicles) Paladin self-propelled 155-mm howitzers. The batteries are manned
and equipped to operate as two separate firing platoons of three guns. The field artillery battalion provides
massing fires in space and time on single or multiple targets with precision, near precision, and area fires to
support ABCT operations. The field artillery battalion has two AN/TPQ-53 counterfire radars and four
AN/TPQ-50 lightweight countermortar radars for target acquisition. (See ATP 3-09.42 for additional
information.)


So?  Are we close to matching any of the above?


----------



## FJAG

I've posted this before but I'll do it again. The Congressional Budget Office periodically publishes a Primer for the members of Congress as to the basics behind the US Military and some of the cost factors involved in operating them. It shows some very granular visuals of what the component parts are. For the Army, the structures of the three BCTs start at page 17.



> https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-05/57088-Force-Structure-Primer.pdf



In answer to your question Kirkhill: No! We are not matching them. In the beginning as we started our turn of the century Army Transformation processes we were designing something similar to the Interim Brigade Combat Team (which would become the Stryker BCT). 

We were close albeit our structure had several deficiencies principally lack of artillery, lack of mortars, an eventual lack of direct fire systems (albeit we serendipitously rectified that in part with Leo 2s), lack of ATGMs, and a lack of the divisional level and above enablers (rockets, more artillery, air defence, sustainment and mobility enablers, ABCT follow up forces etc)

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I've posted this before but I'll do it again. The Congressional Budget Office periodically publishes a Primer for the members of Congress as to the basics behind the US Military and some of the cost factors involved in operating them. It shows some very granular visuals of what the component parts are. For the Army, the structures of the three BCTs start at page 17.
> 
> 
> 
> In answer to your question Kirkhill: No! We are not matching them. In the beginning as we started our turn of the century Army Transformation processes we were designing something similar to the Interim Brigade Combat Team (which would become the Stryker BCT).
> 
> We were close albeit our structure had several deficiencies principally lack of artillery, lack of mortars, an eventual lack of direct fire systems (albeit we serendipitously rectified that in part with Leo 2s), lack of ATGMs, and a lack of the divisional level and above enablers (rockets, more artillery, air defence, sustainment and mobility enablers, ABCT follow up forces etc)
> 
> 🍻


Sorry for having missed your original post and thanks for the repost.   And we agree that we are not matching them... and have got a long way to go to catch up.

Having said that the fastest route to catching up within the Force 2025 construct is the acquisition of man portable weapons that can be carried by both LAV battalions and Light battalions.  

Sorting out the artillery, and SPHs and SHORADs and Cavalry and ISR and  Reserve integration is probably unlikely before 2030.

From your CBO report

The US Army maintains 60 Brigade Combat Teams of which 32 are Active Federal Forces and 28 are held by State National Guards.

Of the 32 Active BCTs 12 are Armored with Abrams and Bradley's,  (38% ABCT), 7 are Stryker-borne infantry (22% SBCT) and 13 are other, lighter, infantry (40% IBCT).

Of the 28 state National Guard BCTs  fully 21 of them are light infantry of various types (75% IBCT).  There are only 2 Stryker Brigades (7% SBCT) and 5 Armored Brigades (18% ABCT).

So, the first thing I could note is that both the Federal Army and the state National Guards skew towards the light end of the spectrum.  This is especially true if the Stryker BCTs are seen as motorized light infantry that can operate with or without their Strykers. 

The Federal Army is 40% Light and 22% Stryker-Light or 62% infantry.

The State National Guards are 75% Light and 7% Stryker-Light or 82% Infantry.

Combined the federalized US Army is 57 % Light and 15% Stryker-Light or  72% Infantry.


The Heavy army, the 17 ABCTs, constitute 28% of the federalized Army with 12 of them, or 71% of the Armored force being operated by the Active Army.  Only 5, or 29% of the Armored force is held by the National Guards.  That is 5/28ths of the National Guard, or 18%.  It is 5/60ths of the US Army when federalized, or 8%.



Infantry BCTs require 4560 PYs to man fully.   They eat up 15,910 PYs to man and support.

Stryker BCTs only require an additional 120 direct PYs (4680) to man.  On the other hand they require a total of 16,670 PYs to man and support them.

Armored BCTs have the lowest direct manning requirements (4040).  Their total manpower requirements fall between the IBCTs and SBCTs at 16,330.


On the other hand the National Guard and Reserves seem well suited to Artillery Brigades and to Aviation Brigades - helicopters being particularly useful in DomOps.


----------



## FJAG

Remember that the Active Army's light BCTs are primarily specialized ones such as airborne, mountain, air mobile while the ARNG ones are primarily straight up leg organizations. The Active Army ones are more in the nature of quick reaction forces while the ARNG ones are more in the nature of a follow-on filler, general purpose force.

Costs are also an issue. Even for the US Army, there are budget limitations. Note that when you convert an Active IBCT to an Active ABCT there is a tremendous capital cost component but on the other hand the annual operating costs do not vary much because each has roughly the same manpower to pay although the fuel and ammo and maintenance budgets go up a bit with the ABCT.

Conversely, there is a very large cost saving when you convert and Active BCT to an equivalent ARNG BCT. The annual cost goes down by almost 2/3.

There is a cost comparison tool that accompanies the CBO primer which assists members of Congress to determine the rough order of magnitude for making changes to the military's force structure. You can find it here.



> CBO’s Interactive Force Structure Tool | Congressional Budget Office
> 
> 
> This tool allows the user to see the effects on the Department of Defense’s total operation and support costs and on the size of the military of adding or subtracting tanks, ships, aircraft, and other units.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.cbo.gov



🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

I suppose ground can be held with a relatively small force if the enemy can be denied from getting there at all.

If infantry are expected to be more vulnerable, I'd rather invest more in capabilities to protect them and have fewer infantry relative to other arms, than write people off.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> I suppose ground can be held with a relatively small force if the enemy can be denied from getting there at all.
> 
> If infantry are expected to be more vulnerable, I'd rather invest more in capabilities to protect them and have fewer infantry relative to other arms, than write people off.



A curtain of shells and a deep hole rather than walls of steel?


----------



## CBH99

Just reading through the back & forth between members in the thread lately - noteable FJAG & Kirkhill - this has turned into quite the interesting discussion.  The math and percentages being thrown back & forth alone has been mind numbing (I'm not great at math) but fun to follow as the suggestions/ideas are backed with real world examples.


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> Just reading through the back & forth between members in the thread lately - noteable FJAG & Kirkhill - this has turned into quite the interesting discussion.  The math and percentages being thrown back & forth alone has been mind numbing (I'm not great at math) but fun to follow as the suggestions/ideas are backed with real world examples.



Don't encourage them!


----------



## GR66

GR66 said:


> A SHORAD element optimized for UAV-type threats (guns and plentiful, cheap missiles vs. expensive heavy missiles) to keep their Battalion Tactical Group/Brigade-level UAV assets away from our maneuver units.  Larger air threats (helicopters, fast air, high altitude UAVs, etc. from their Divisional levels and above) can be left to heavier AD units and our own fast air.



Jet-Powered Coyote Drone Defeats Swarm In Army Tests

I can imagine pretty great value to having a couple of troops of vehicles equipped with these to sweep the sky above maneuver Brigade or Battle Group of enemy spotter UAVs.  Blind their arty so they can't as easily hit their targets with precision and strike back with precision munitions.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> I suppose ground can be held with a relatively small force if the enemy can be denied from getting there at all.
> 
> If infantry are expected to be more vulnerable, I'd rather invest more in capabilities to protect them and have fewer infantry relative to other arms, than write people off.



Just rethinking Brad's comment here and remembering a Canadian precedent:  22-25 April 1951 - Kapyong and 2 PPCLI - raised with Special Force men contracted for 18 months direct from civilian life as of June 1950.  

3 "light" infantry battalions from 3 national governments supported by a regt of 25 pdrs from a 4th nation, a mortar company and a troop of 15 tanks from a 5th.   And a division from the "host" nation.  And lots of air support.  The tanks were used as DFS artillery in mobile pillboxes.

Key element was the terrain - mountains and narrow valleys and lots of rivers and creeks. 



Also, taking a look at FJAG's CBO report something else stood out.


3:1

Each combined arms Brigade Combat Team, with 4,000 men, requires, in US usage, something like 16,000 men to field the BCT, including the BCT itself.    So 4,000 men in the field and 12,000 men in support.

In the Canadian context, where we aspire to maintain 3 similar active Brigades (Groups/Combat Teams) then that would suggest an active regular Army requirement of 48,000.  Given our current numbers that alternately suggests one active Brigade Group, or three independent Battle Groups are a more realistic goal if we wish to fit into a US "shield wall".   There is no foreseeable Force 2025 structure for the Reserves/Militia.  That will have to wait for Force 2030.

On the other hand all bets are off when allocating bodies to "Special" Forces, whether in the form of CANSOFCOM or the 1950 2nd Battalions of the RCR, PPCLI and R22eR.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Each combined arms Brigade Combat Team, with 4,000 *men*, requires, in US usage, something like 16,000 *men *to field the BCT, including the BCT itself.    So 4,000 *men *in the field and 12,000 *men *in support.



Ahem... 'people'


----------



## Kirkhill

Potayto Potahto  (or tatties)


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> … remembering a Canadian precedent: 22-25 April 1951 - Kapyong and 2 PPCLI - raised with Special Force men contracted for 18 months direct from civilian life as of June 1950.


In this case “direct from civilian life” is a bit misleading as the senior officers and sr NCO were all WW II vets, and many of the jr officers & jr NCO were also war vets.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> In this case “direct from civilian life” is a bit misleading as the senior officers and sr NCO were all WW II vets, and many of the jr officers & jr NCO were also war vets.



And, IIRC, we didn't deploy the reserves because they were focused on the Central Front in Germany.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG is correct that there was a high percentage of troops that had only been released 5 years previous.  But the Special Force only required a brigade of volunteers from that world.

As to the Central Front in Germany - St Laurent was just getting that organized, in part due to the sudden Korean emergency.  Canada only had three battalions of infantry in 1950.  It had just joined the newly formed NATO in April 1949.  

Canada followed the same practice in 1950 that it had in the 1890s with the Strathcona's for South Africa and in 1914 with Gault's PPCLI.  Even the CEF and the WW2 forces were not made up of "Government" soldiers.  Soldiers in government service were asked it they wanted to go overseas.  They weren't commanded.  They joined with civilians recruited off the streets.

Politicians have been running from division for a very long time.


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile:  A US Rethink









						‘It Failed Miserably’: After Wargaming Loss, Joint Chiefs Are Overhauling How the US Military Will Fight
					

In a fake battle for Taiwan, U.S. forces lost network access almost immediately. Hyten has issued four directives to help change that.




					www.defenseone.com


----------



## Kirkhill

It is Air Force and it is US ..... but it references the Arctic and its importance to the US.  An issue of concern to us.  Do we want them mowing our lawn?









						USAF to Increase Arctic Investment as Strategy, Wargames Outline Needs in the Region | Air & Space Forces Magazine
					

The US Air Force spends around $6 billion a year on priorities focused on the Arctic and expects to increase that as the region's importance grows.




					www.airforcemag.com
				






> The Department of the Air Force in July 2020 unveiled its first-ever Arctic Strategy, which outlined the importance of the region as Russia builds up its military presence and China looks to normalize its own presence there. As the strategy passes its one-year anniversary, the department is working to implement it. This effort will be a “lifetime effort for us—we got a lot more to go,” Hinote said.


----------



## OldSolduer

Kirkhill said:


> Potayto Potahto  (or tatties)


Taters is acceptable as well


----------



## Kirkhill

Of Light Infantry and ATGMs on the armoured battlefield



> During the early nineties, 24 Airmobile Brigade and the Multi-National Airborne Division (MNAD) was designed to be a highly mobile ATGW screening force, exploiting the mobility of small vehicles like the Longline Light Strike Vehicle (Ground Mobile Weapon Platform), quickly carried forward by Puma and Chinook support helicopters.



From Think Defence via Think Defence on Load Carriage and Daft and Barmy on British Military Current Events









						British Military Current Events
					

Regimental nostalgia for D&B




					army.ca
				












						The Overburdened Infantry Soldier - Think Defence
					

Since there were first soldiers, the weight they have carried has been subject to cyclical variation. The upward trend that saw its zenith during operations in Afghanistan is now subject to realisation that it is both unsustainable and undesirable.




					www.thinkdefence.co.uk
				












						Helicopter Transportable Vehicles - Think Defence
					

Usually seen as the sole domain of special forces, helicopter transportable vehicles provide a mobility advantage for all land and amphibious forces. They




					www.thinkdefence.co.uk
				






>


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I’d like to zoom-in to what capabilities we’d need to develop for the Canadian Army, based on analysis of the types of operations and opponents we could face. While some would like to measure against the Russian Army or the Chinese, I am not sure how likely such a face to face encounter is. I think, though, that a battle with a 2nd or 3rd World country with some Russian equipment, doctrine and training is certainly a realistic opponent short of a global war. The recent engagements between Azerbaijan and Armenia show that small countries we do not normally associate with world powers can acquire and effectively employ very modern equipment.

A term that has been used in reference to the Russian military is the “Snow Dome.” It is a visualization of Russian capabilities as a “snow dome” that you see in gift shops, with the Russian forces inside the Snow Dome being protected by a variety of complementary systems ranging including air defence, rockets and artillery, EW and other systems. While somewhat defensive in nature, it can be seen as offensive as well as the Snow Dome is mobile. To get at Russian forces, whether on offence or defence, you have to deal with the Snow Dome.

Snow Dome article from 2017

A simple historical example would be the Egyptian defensive positions established in the 1973 War after they seized their bridgeheads over the Suez Canal. They established a Sagger and SAM belt that Israeli armour and aircraft destroyed themselves on. The Egyptians were finally defeated when they were drawn out from their somewhat immobile “Snow Dome” in their effort to put additional pressure on the Israelis to try to help the faltering Syrians on the Golan. There were also Israeli adaptations, mostly a return to combined arms operations along with some tactical humility.

The Snow Dome concept can be seen at all levels, but I think that the Canadian Army needs to look at the defeating the tactical level while being aware of the effects that could be felt from higher level systems. A 2nd World opponent (or even a well-organized non-state actor such as Hezbollah) could well have modern, capable AD, EW, rocket and tube artillery, UAVs (armed and otherwise) along with the tanks, IFVs, ATGMs and infantry that we tend to focus on.

Could a CMBG simply rely on systems held by a multi-national Division to defeat the Snow Dome and allow us to do our Battle Group attacks in our traditional manner? What capabilities would we need to develop to defeat the Snow Dome if we were attacking a battalion group supported by Russian-style systems that could be found at brigade and possibly division level?


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I’d like to zoom-in to what capabilities we’d need to develop for the Canadian Army, based on analysis of the types of operations and opponents we could face. ...


I would think that the key doctrinal lesson that comes out of the last seven or eight years of conflicts is that we should be prepared for having to face major weapon systems regardless of the place of conflict that we go to.

I'm still a believer in that we should design our brigades as our primary all-arms self-sufficient formation rather than a concept of building blocks to put together task specific battlegroup. I'm still a believer in a light (air mobile capable), medium (primarily LAV Mechanized) and heavy brigade (with tanks) structure but within each brigade structure there should be a similarity of design and capability.

That said, the brigade should be able to spin off a battlegroup-sized slice of itself from its internal resources in order to put a fully balanced task force into the field while the Army should also be able to scale up into a multiple brigade force. To me that means that each brigade should have:

1) three manoeuvre battalions, each with its own organic infantry, direct gun fire, ATGM, and mortar/light rocket and/or attack drone capability. To me that means eliminate straight infantry battalions and armour regiments in exchange for combined arms battalions which, however, should come in two infantry heavy and one direct fire heavy battalion in each brigade;

2) a cavalry battalion with three combined arms recce/UAV, infantry, direct fire/ATGM, mortar/light rocket and or attack drone companies so that a complete combined arms cavalry company can be spun off to augment a battle group. 

3) an artillery regiment of three six-gun batteries (M777 for the light brigade; armoured SPs for the others); one fire support coord battery capable of providing one brigade level FSCC, three BG level FSCCs, and nine FOO/JTAC teams; one STA battery capable of providing three STA troops each containing an STACC/ASCC, and three troops with combined CMR and UAV capabilities; one AD Battery with three troops each with radars and SHORAD systems capable of engaging everything from light UAVs to low-level fast air;

4) an engineer regiment with three squadron HQs and an assortment of troops providing a minimum of two of each (preferably three) of mine clearance and EOD, vertical and horizontal construction, combat engineer and water supply;

5) a service battalion with three company HQs and an assortment of platoons providing a minimum of two of each (preferably three) of supply, transport and maintenance platoons. IMHO the service bn should also be the administrative headquarters for the brigade FD ambulance and an MP platoon (each of which is capable of splitting into three slices); and

6) a brigade headquarters with a signals squadron and a military intelligence company with the capability to split off a minimum of two (preferably three) command and control cells with a signals troop and an MI platoon each.

IMHO, the NSE concept needs major revision so that the NSE is responsible solely for communications with national logistics resources and with sufficient resources to transport from air/sea head to warehousing facilities while the deployed service company deals with the NSE and all logistics forward from the NSE. The service company must be self contained and capable of forward deployment away from the NSE as required.

Over and above the resources within the brigades, the Army should also have additional "divisional" resources capabilities (which could and should be equipped for deployment but manned by dedicated regular and reserve or double hatted positions from within the Army;

1) a combat support brigade with:

a deployable brigade headquarters;
one or two general support artillery regiments with long range rocket capability; medium range radars, medium range UAVs, attack drone capabilities, medium level AD capability; and together capable of forming one div level FSCC, STACC, and ASCC;
a general support engineer regiment with a capability to form a div level Engr Sup CC;
an EW regiment;
a cyber warfare regiment;
a divisional signals regiment;
an MI regiment;
a CBRN battalion;
an Info Activity TF; and
attached as required, a reserve force infantry battalion and a reserve force service battalion
2) a sustainment (or combat service support) brigade (primary supplier of NSE elements) with:

a deployable brigade headquarters;
a transport bn;
an MP regiment;
a field hospital;
a combat service support/special troops bn with a personal services (HR, financial, legal) company, supply company, a POL company, an ammo company; and
attached as required, a reserve force infantry battalion and a reserve force service battalion
I'll leave aside the question of what the reserve force should form over and above dedicated augmentee positions within the above organizations, especially the two "divisional" support brigades which would be extensive. In general I'll leave it that I think they could and should form two additional brigade groups within current manpower permissible levels.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I would think that the key doctrinal lesson that comes out of the last seven or eight years of conflicts is that we should be prepared for having to face major weapon systems regardless of the place of conflict that we go to.
> 
> I'm still a believer in that we should design our brigades as our primary all-arms self-sufficient formation rather than a concept of building blocks to put together task specific battlegroup. I'm still a believer in a light (air mobile capable), medium (primarily LAV Mechanized) and heavy brigade (with tanks) structure but within each brigade structure there should be a similarity of design and capability.
> 
> That said, the brigade should be able to spin off a battlegroup-sized slice of itself from its internal resources in order to put a fully balanced task force into the field while the Army should also be able to scale up into a multiple brigade force. To me that means that each brigade should have:
> 
> 1) three manoeuvre battalions, each with its own organic infantry, direct gun fire, ATGM, and mortar/light rocket and/or attack drone capability. To me that means eliminate straight infantry battalions and armour regiments in exchange for combined arms battalions which, however, should come in two infantry heavy and one direct fire heavy battalion in each brigade;
> 
> 2) a cavalry battalion with three combined arms recce/UAV, infantry, direct fire/ATGM, mortar/light rocket and or attack drone companies so that a complete combined arms cavalry company can be spun off to augment a battle group.
> 
> 3) an artillery regiment of three six-gun batteries (M777 for the light brigade; armoured SPs for the others); one fire support coord battery capable of providing one brigade level FSCC, three BG level FSCCs, and nine FOO/JTAC teams; one STA battery capable of providing three STA troops each containing an STACC/ASCC, and three troops with combined CMR and UAV capabilities; one AD Battery with three troops each with radars and SHORAD systems capable of engaging everything from light UAVs to low-level fast air;
> 
> 4) an engineer regiment with three squadron HQs and an assortment of troops providing a minimum of two of each (preferably three) of mine clearance and EOD, vertical and horizontal construction, combat engineer and water supply;
> 
> 5) a service battalion with three company HQs and an assortment of platoons providing a minimum of two of each (preferably three) of supply, transport and maintenance platoons. IMHO the service bn should also be the administrative headquarters for the brigade FD ambulance and an MP platoon (each of which is capable of splitting into three slices); and
> 
> 6) a brigade headquarters with a signals squadron and a military intelligence company with the capability to split off a minimum of two (preferably three) command and control cells with a signals troop and an MI platoon each.
> 
> IMHO, the NSE concept needs major revision so that the NSE is responsible solely for communications with national logistics resources and with sufficient resources to transport from air/sea head to warehousing facilities while the deployed service company deals with the NSE and all logistics forward from the NSE. The service company must be self contained and capable of forward deployment away from the NSE as required.
> 
> Over and above the resources within the brigades, the Army should also have additional "divisional" resources capabilities (which could and should be equipped for deployment but manned by dedicated regular and reserve or double hatted positions from within the Army;
> 
> 1) a combat support brigade with:
> 
> a deployable brigade headquarters;
> one or two general support artillery regiments with long range rocket capability; medium range radars, medium range UAVs, attack drone capabilities, medium level AD capability; and together capable of forming one div level FSCC, STACC, and ASCC;
> a general support engineer regiment with a capability to form a div level Engr Sup CC;
> an EW regiment;
> a cyber warfare regiment;
> a divisional signals regiment;
> an MI regiment;
> a CBRN battalion;
> an Info Activity TF; and
> attached as required, a reserve force infantry battalion and a reserve force service battalion
> 2) a sustainment (or combat service support) brigade (primary supplier of NSE elements) with:
> 
> a deployable brigade headquarters;
> a transport bn;
> an MP regiment;
> a field hospital;
> a combat service support/special troops bn with a personal services (HR, financial, legal) company, supply company, a POL company, an ammo company; and
> attached as required, a reserve force infantry battalion and a reserve force service battalion
> I'll leave aside the question of what the reserve force should form over and above dedicated augmentee positions within the above organizations, especially the two "divisional" support brigades which would be extensive. In general I'll leave it that I think they could and should form two additional brigade groups within current manpower permissible levels.
> 
> 🍻



Offhand I would say you are well on your way to complying with this observation re the US Army



Kirkhill said:


> Infantry BCTs require 4560 PYs to man fully.   They eat up 15,910 PYs to man and support.
> 
> Stryker BCTs only require an additional 120 direct PYs (4680) to man.  On the other hand they require a total of 16,670 PYs to man and support them.
> 
> Armored BCTs have the lowest direct manning requirements (4040).  Their total manpower requirements fall between the IBCTs and SBCTs at 16,330.



All we need is a force of about 48,000 to field 3 Brigade Groups

Unfortunately



> Size
> 
> 23,000 members serve as full-time soldiers in the Regular Force
> 19,000 are part-time, volunteer soldiers in the Reserve Force
> including 5,300 Rangers who serve in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada
> 
> 3,300 civilian employees who support the Army
> 63 Regular Force and 123 Reserve Force Units in 127 Communities
> 185 Ranger Patrols in 414 Communities








						The Canadian Army of Today - Canada.ca
					

The Canadian Army Command is divided into four geographical regions, which provide a single chain of command for Regular and Reserve Forces in each region.




					www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Going back to capabilities and the threat for a moment, let's do a little thought experiment. Assume that we have deployed a CMBG HQ to a theatre as part of a multi-national division that is in turn part of a multi-national force. This is a surge - it is not going to be a rotational deployment. Perhaps it is somewhere in the Middle East or Caucasus and the force has the mission of liberating a nation or part of a nation that has been taken over by a 2nd World opponent that has Russian equipment. Russia is staying out of it, but their advisors put in place a very effective integrated air defence network. The enemy has Brigade Tactical Groups with a variety of AFVs. They have SP tube artillery and several battalions of rockets. They have Russian EW and AD at the BTG and Div level.

Let's say that our CMBG is tasked with a penetration of the enemy defences through which a US force will pass. 

The integrated air defence network will make it very difficult for us to rely on things like CP-140 Auroras conducting ISR, and we cannot just rely on our supporting air force dropping JDAMs on enemy position.  Our UAVs will have difficulties with the enemy EW and AD - doesn't mean that they cannot operate but it will not be Kandahar either. I don't think that coalition space assets would be neutralized in this scenario - a big difference from facing a true peer. 

So what?

Our own Ground Manouevre Reconnaissance will need to be robust to make up for difficulties faced by our airborne ISR. Our fire support will need to be able to neutralize/destroy targets without relying on airpower. Our M777s can certainly put fire down, but are they up to the challenges of a fight against a mechanized enemy with robust counter-battery? Do we rely on coalition fires (our bigger brothers) or would some kind of long range rocket system (HIMARS) be worth the investment in money and people? Our own EW will need to be able to assist with sense as well as disrupt the C2 of the enemy system. 

Our assembly areas used in traditional tactics will be quite vulnerable to enemy fires - hanging around in the open will not be a good idea. A means to neutralize enemy UAVs will be required in order to buy us some time when manouevring. 

Looking at tactics, we tend to focus on the enemy platoons/companies/battalions. Maybe we need to focus on the key systems that make up their Snow Down? I am not just saying we should use Targeting - perhaps our manouevre should be aimed at disrupting their system. We did something like this as a Div working in a Corps a few years ago on a CAX. You have to take a CAX with a healthy grain of salt, but once our tanks penetrated to where the enemy rocket systems were operating their defence fell apart. Taking positions just meant we continued to get shellacked by rockets...Anyhoo. 

I think our field HQs need to be smaller and more mobile. What capabilities in our HQ complexes are we willing to sacrifice to gain that mobility? 

How many battalions/regiments would we offer up in trade for these capabilities? Is there danger in building capabilities into the Brigade that normally reside at Div? Is there danger in not doing so?


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## blacktriangle

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Looking at tactics, we tend to focus on the enemy platoons/companies/battalions. Maybe we need to focus on the key systems that make up their Snow Dome?


IMO, you're correct. 

I see one big problem. The Army is not as comfortable "fighting systems" as the other services. So I think many would prefer to let someone else take care of the problem.


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## Kirkhill

As was mentioned in the Snowdome article "there is nothing new".

In my opinion the Snowdome is analogous to the phalanx, the testudo, the shieldwall, the schiltron, the tercio and the square.  The "solutions" are to mass troops at a weak spot, or to stand back at a safe distance and wear the defenders down by lobbing lots of missiles into their midst.  I suggest that the more stuff you have to lob in the general direction of the foe then the fewer troops you have to mass and risk.

Consequently I am in favour of standing back as far as you can and lobbing a lot of cheap rounds as fast as possible to do five things:

1 Deny them the ability to resupply or retreat. (Box Barrage)
2 Overwhelm the enemy's ability to discriminate between targets (EW, Decoys, Lots of cheap inaccurate missiles (Hamas vs Iron Dome))
3 Eat up the enemy's supply of ammunition (See Hamas vs Iron Dome)
4 Attrit the enemy's vehicles (Husband Precision Rounds for employment after enemy's defences attrited)
5 Attrit the enemy's troops (Husband own troops until enemy vehicles and troops attrited).

Number 6 is to launch troops to "break the square (snowdome)"

Tubes launching missiles, precision and dumb, real and decoy, bullets or bombs or rockets, from aircraft, uavs, helos, ships, trucks or AFVs.  Or manportable ground mounts.

Lots of tubes.  Lots of missiles.

At Agincourt 1000 English "knights" and 5000 English archers faced 10,000 "knights", 10,000 men-at-arms and 5000 archers.

The English won with 300,000 arrows in their wagon train.

Emphasis on long-range crew-served weapons - especially for the "cavalry" and the "infantry".


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## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> ...Assume that we have deployed a CMBG HQ to a theatre as part of a multi-national division that is in turn part of a multi-national force.


I'll assume you meant CMBG and not just the HQ.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> ...Let's say that our CMBG is tasked with a penetration of the enemy defences through which a US force will pass.
> ...
> Our own Ground Manouevre Reconnaissance will need to be robust to make up for difficulties faced by our airborne ISR.


Absolutely agree and not just for this scenario but all. The need to fight for info and time has become more difficult and necessary.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> Our fire support will need to be able to neutralize/destroy targets without relying on airpower.


Absolutely again.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> Our M777s can certainly put fire down, but are they up to the challenges of a fight against a mechanized enemy with robust counter-battery?


IMHO the M777 is absolutely incapable of providing fire support for mech operations against an enemy with adequate indirect fire resources even if we provided 18 guns v 8 to a brigade because of their limited mobility and complete lack of armour. Even if we provide armoured crew vehicles like we did in Afghanistan for moves, the guns will be out of action during counter battery. All of Canada's M777s should be relegated to light air mobile capable brigades. Mech brigades need automated, armoured SPs. I don not care if they are wheeled or tracked although I prefer tracked.
Secondly, our supply system was severely challenged at times to keep artillery ammunition supplied in the relatively low quantities demanded in Afghanistan. The system needs a serious overhaul.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> Do we rely on coalition fires (our bigger brothers) or would some kind of long range rocket system (HIMARS) be worth the investment in money and people? Our own EW will need to be able to assist with sense as well as disrupt the C2 of the enemy system.


There will always be a point where enemy artillery capable of hitting our manoeuvre elements will be out of range of close support artillery. Longer range systems are no longer an option but mandatory. They are a div and higher resource so should be part of the international force we belong to ... but ... the only way one can guarantee it as a resource available to the Cdn CMBG is if we own our own and they become part of the international div artillery with a caveat that we have a priority call when required.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> Our assembly areas used in traditional tactics will be quite vulnerable to enemy fires - hanging around in the open will not be a good idea. A means to neutralize enemy UAVs will be required in order to buy us some time when manouevring.


Definitely.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> Looking at tactics, we tend to focus on the enemy platoons/companies/battalions. Maybe we need to focus on the key systems that make up their Snow Down? I am not just saying we should use Targeting - perhaps our manouevre should be aimed at disrupting their system. We did something like this as a Div working in a Corps a few years ago on a CAX. You have to take a CAX with a healthy grain of salt, but once our tanks penetrated to where the enemy rocket systems were operating their defence fell apart. Taking positions just meant we continued to get shellacked by rockets...Anyhoo.


Taking that Snow Dome down needs to be done comprehensively prior to the attack. Keeping it down is a task that needs to be continuously dealt with through a wide variety of means including manoeuvre elements.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> I think our field HQs need to be smaller and more mobile. What capabilities in our HQ complexes are we willing to sacrifice to gain that mobility?


I know field headquarters have grown throughout Afghanistan because of their mostly static nature. I don't really know how large battalion and brigade field headquarters are these days. In my, Cold War, days the biggest element was always the Sigs Sqn (whose antennae farm was always the biggest projectile magnet) with the number of bde HQ staff around 35 before adding on the FSCC, the ESCC, the TACP, etc. I presume these days with better EW and ASIC resources they have grown even more. 

There's only so far you can downsize before losing casualty redundancy and 24/7 effectiveness. I personally think the "penthouse" has been the worst add-on to bde and below headquarters ever invented because they both impede immediate mobility and generate a work practice that takes people out of their armoured vehicles where they have a level of protection from surprise strikes. I think the maintenance of comms and the ability to function fully "under armour" are the key challenges facing all levels of field headquarters.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> How many battalions/regiments would we offer up in trade for these capabilities? Is there danger in building capabilities into the Brigade that normally reside at Div? Is there danger in not doing so?


I honestly don't think that you need that many.

I can see a heavy brigade repurposing one infantry battalion so that the two remaining ones and the armoured regiment form three combined arms battalion. There will be some need to form a cavalry battalion (I tend to think of it as a battalion rather than a regiment - so that the zipperheads don't lay an automatic claim to it.) but that manning can come from several sources depending on how it is organized.

Do light and medium brigades need two full-time infantry battalions? or can one of them be a 10/90 or 20/80 battalion. (That still leaves you three battle group infantry battalion HQs to form deployable battle groups around in each brigade)

In most cases its repurposing and a better system of integrating reserve forces. I've said it before, about 80% of gun/rocket battery jobs and STA can be done by reservists. A much lower percentage for the FSCC/FOO battery and service support battery. Much of the manning for a Svc Bn's transport platoons can be reservist. Infantry battalions can have a fair number of reservists in the support company and much of a cavalry battalion's recce, inf, UAV and ATGM personnel at the coy level can be reservist. 

The sine quo non is that we need to desperately reform the reserve system so that regular force brigades are capable of operating day-to-day from their internal resources and that there is a viable system of calling up reservists (and not just as "volunteers" - the last time I looked section 31(1) of the NDA still allowed for the obligatory placement of reservists on active service); that the Army create a better training system for reservists; and be willing to be a tad less risk averse.

None of these issues are insurmountable. Most of the organizational issues are well within the Army's control, a very few need CAF/NDHQ participation (principally funding for relatively low numbers of equipment the Army doesn't have and shouldn't go to war without.) Basically the biggest thing the Army lacks is an open mind.


🍻


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> As was mentioned in the Snowdome article "there is nothing new".
> 
> In my opinion the Snowdome is analogous to the phalanx, the testudo, the shieldwall, the schiltron, the tercio and the square.  The "solutions" are to mass troops at a weak spot, or to stand back at a safe distance and wear the defenders down by lobbing lots of missiles into their midst.  I suggest that the more stuff you have to lob in the general direction of the foe then the fewer troops you have to mass and risk.
> 
> Consequently I am in favour of standing back as far as you can and lobbing a lot of cheap rounds as fast as possible to do five things:
> 
> 1 Deny them the ability to resupply or retreat. (Box Barrage)
> 2 Overwhelm the enemy's ability to discriminate between targets (EW, Decoys, Lots of cheap inaccurate missiles (Hamas vs Iron Dome))
> 3 Eat up the enemy's supply of ammunition (See Hamas vs Iron Dome)
> 4 Attrit the enemy's vehicles (Husband Precision Rounds for employment after enemy's defences attrited)
> 5 Attrit the enemy's troops (Husband own troops until enemy vehicles and troops attrited).
> 
> Number 6 is to launch troops to "break the square (snowdome)"
> 
> Tubes launching missiles, precision and dumb, real and decoy, bullets or bombs or rockets, from aircraft, uavs, helos, ships, trucks or AFVs.  Or manportable ground mounts.
> 
> Lots of tubes.  Lots of missiles.
> 
> At Agincourt 1000 English "knights" and 5000 English archers faced 10,000 "knights", 10,000 men-at-arms and 5000 archers.
> 
> The English won with 300,000 arrows in their wagon train.
> 
> Emphasis on long-range crew-served weapons - especially for the "cavalry" and the "infantry".


While I think we have to be careful with historical analogies, I am going to flip your script. The English longbowmen are the Snow Dome and we are the French Knights trying to get at those men at arms inside it.


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## Ostrozac

What really worries me is that the equipment that we most desperately need was identified quite some time ago, and some even had named projects assigned to them. No equipment actually arrived. I'm thinking about armed UAV (the JUSTAS project), long range rocket artillery (the LRPRS project) and manportable ATGM (the ALAAWS project). As an institution, we have looked at the problem, we have understood the problem, but we weren't able to deliver a solution.

We also struggle with boots, backpacks and pistols -- so I probably shouldn't be surprised that a procurement system that can't supply such basic equipment also can't deal with the most modern tools of war, but I am disappointed. And worried, worried that one day we will over promise on our capabilities to either cabinet or our allies, and will have to pay the price when our deficiencies are called out on the battlefield.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> While I think we have to be careful with historical analogies, I am going to flip your script. The English longbowmen are the Snow Dome and we are the French Knights trying to get at those men at arms inside it.



Fair enough.  Agincourt was 1415.  The wins went back and forth until 1453 and the Battle of Castillon.  The definitive solution was, arguably, cannonballs and powder, increasing the stand off range and replacing muscle power with chemical power.

Tubes and missiles.

Ostrozac has it about right.  The issue is not that the necessary kit has not been identified.  It, and its ammunition, and the necessary training, hasn't been bought.


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> While I think we have to be careful with historical analogies, I am going to flip your script. The English longbowmen are the Snow Dome and we are the French Knights trying to get at those men at arms inside it.


If only we were the well-equipped knights. 

We're more like the French men-at-arms who had to follow the first wave of knights on foot and slog in their cheaper armour through the mud and dead and dying horses and knights while everyone and their uncle was raining down 30" of Ash with a wicked barbed steel point on the front.


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> To me that means that each brigade should have …
> an engineer regiment with three squadron HQs and an assortment of troops providing a minimum of two of each (preferably three) of mine clearance and EOD, vertical and horizontal construction, combat engineer and water supply;


What do you think you are saying here, because I don’t think I am understanding. Are you asking for brigades to have three troops dedicated to water supply?  Three EOD troops?


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## FJAG

McG said:


> What do you think you are saying here, because I don’t think I am understanding. Are you asking for brigades to have three troops dedicated to water supply?  Three EOD troops?


Not at all. I'm saying that each brigade should have an engineer regiment and that each regiment should have three squadrons so that there would be an ability to create three squadron deployments for three battlegroups with the brigade. I'm saying that I'm not sure how many and what type of troops the regiment should have but that the Eng R should be capable of doing two simultaneous rotations with a capability of supplying those functions (as well as whatever additional functions Eng Sqns provide to deployed battlegroups) simultaneously. I doubt that a whole  troop is used to provide water supply which I understand is a function currently provided from within the Support Squadron as required.

Currently an Engr R has two field squadrons, a support squadron a CIED squadron and an Admin sqn. My suggestion on the structure with the troops is so that if the brigade deploys a single battlegroup that requires engineer support then one of the sqn HQ can deploy with the BG with sufficient troops of a nature that can provide the requisite engr support for the BG regardless of whether the troop is one of its organic troops or with attached elements from another squadron. Basically I want the engr regt to be able to provide a minimum of two such squadrons simultaneously (or preferably three)

Just a thought.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Not at all. I'm saying that each brigade should have an engineer regiment and that each regiment should have three squadrons so that there would be an ability to create three squadron deployments for three battlegroups with the brigade. I'm saying that I'm not sure how many and what type of troops the regiment should have but that the Eng R should be capable of doing two simultaneous rotations with a capability of supplying those functions (as well as whatever additional functions Eng Sqns provide to deployed battlegroups) simultaneously. I doubt that a whole  troop is used to provide water supply which I understand is a function currently provided from within the Support Squadron as required.
> 
> Currently an Engr R has two field squadrons, a support squadron a CIED squadron and an Admin sqn. My suggestion on the structure with the troops is so that if the brigade deploys a single battlegroup that requires engineer support then one of the sqn HQ can deploy with the BG with sufficient troops of a nature that can provide the requisite engr support for the BG regardless of whether the troop is one of its organic troops or with attached elements from another squadron. Basically I want the engr regt to be able to provide a minimum of two such squadrons simultaneously (or preferably three)
> 
> Just a thought.
> 
> 🍻


Same idea as RCEME Battalions having 6 companies, 1 recovery, 1 heavy vehicle/tracked, 1 wheeled vehicle, 1 light vehicle, 1 ancillary,  a HQ, plus a training platoon. Strange how we have the doctrine for it but have never been organized like that since probably the 50s.


----------



## CBH99

Ostrozac said:


> What really worries me is that the equipment that we most desperately need was identified quite some time ago, and some even had named projects assigned to them. No equipment actually arrived. I'm thinking about armed UAV (the JUSTAS project), long range rocket artillery (the LRPRS project) and manportable ATGM (the ALAAWS project). As an institution, we have looked at the problem, we have understood the problem, but we weren't able to deliver a solution.
> 
> We also struggle with boots, backpacks and pistols -- so I probably shouldn't be surprised that a procurement system that can't supply such basic equipment also can't deal with the most modern tools of war, but I am disappointed. And worried, worried that one day we will over promise on our capabilities to either cabinet or our allies, and will have to pay the price when our deficiencies are called out on the battlefield.


Not to derail this thread, as we do have the Procurement thread - but I couldn’t agree more.  

The sad part is that none of these procurements should have been particularity challenging, or overly expensive.  It’s the government’s insistence that we do things “a certain way” - which means involving several other federal agencies, and follow certain roadmaps - a system which the government has acknowledged repeatedly is broken.  

Decide on a pistol that makes sense.  Figure out how many you require.  Buy them.  We ARE NOT legally obligated to give certain companies business, or buy their product if they complain.  They use our own system of extreme accommodation against us.  

The only way to field new capabilities quickly is with a UOR, and by that time - in this context - it won’t be adequate.


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> Currently an Engr R has two field squadrons, a support squadron a CIED squadron and an Admin sqn.


You've got bad data.  That's an outdated construct.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> What really worries me is that the equipment that we most desperately need was identified quite some time ago, and some even had named projects assigned to them. No equipment actually arrived. I'm thinking about armed UAV (the JUSTAS project), long range rocket artillery (the LRPRS project) and manportable ATGM (the ALAAWS project). As an institution, we have looked at the problem, we have understood the problem, but we weren't able to deliver a solution.
> 
> We also struggle with boots, backpacks and pistols -- so I probably shouldn't be surprised that a procurement system that can't supply such basic equipment also can't deal with the most modern tools of war, but I am disappointed. And worried, worried that one day we will over promise on our capabilities to either cabinet or our allies, and will have to pay the price when our deficiencies are called out on the battlefield.



Thinking more about this:

I can just about give the Army and Air Force a pass on the JUSTAS and LRPRS projects.  They fall under the same political considerations that deny the Forces new aircraft, attack helicopters, tanks and self propelled howitzers. 

But are we to seriously understand that the Army can't procure ALAAWS?  Or even more egregiously purchase the ammunition stocks and modifications that would optimize, and fully exploit, the capabilities of the Carl Gustav?  A large calibre, single shot rifle?

And it was the Army that decided that riflemen were more valuable than AT Gunners, Mortarmen and Pioneers.  In that decision alone was the justification for discontinuing the ALAAWS project and, by extension, the Carl Gustav optimization.  In retrospect it would have been better to retain the Combat Support Company organization even if much of its manpower had been parcelled out to the rifle coys and platoons as dets and employed as rifles.  

Similarly with the TUA systems and E Coy LdSH(RC).

Similarly with the ADATS systems, the Oerlikons and the Blowpipe/Javelin dets.


The lesson seems to be that it is better to hold on to a reduced cadre with obsolete weapons than it is to divest entirely of capabilities.  At least with the cadre you retain expertise in the employment of analogous weapons systems and retain the rationale for weapons and their upgrades.

Retention means you are telling the political masters you know what you need and you can't do without them.  Divesting and then asking to reacquire them weakens your bargaining position and reduces your perceived competence.


Chinooks also come to mind.


So, with respect to the Future Structure, perhaps the structure, as T2B is intimating, should be less concerned with the weapon of the day and more concerned with the nature of the threat and let the capabilities and weapons derive from there.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> But are we to seriously understand that the Army can't procure ALAAWS?  Or even more egregiously purchase the ammunition stocks and modifications that would optimize, and fully exploit, the capabilities of the Carl Gustav?  A large calibre, single shot rifle?


I've been hearing for about 2 years now a plan ti upgrade all our Carl G's to M4 standard which comes with a larger ammunition family, alas budget, competing priorities and politics have probably put it on the back burner.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> I've been hearing for about 2 years now a plan ti upgrade all our Carl G's to M4 standard which comes with a larger ammunition family, alas budget, competing priorities and politics have probably put it on the back burner.



It has disappeared down the PWGSC/PSPC memory hole but those projects, along with ALAAWS were on the books as long ago as 2014 at least - with delivery scheduled in the 2025 to 2030 timeframes - give or take a decade.

ALAAWS, or its predecessors, go all the way back to the 1980s.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Thinking more about this:
> 
> I can just about give the Army and Air Force a pass on the JUSTAS and LRPRS projects.  They fall under the same political considerations that deny the Forces new aircraft, attack helicopters, tanks and self propelled howitzers.
> 
> But are we to seriously understand that the Army can't procure ALAAWS?  Or even more egregiously purchase the ammunition stocks and modifications that would optimize, and fully exploit, the capabilities of the Carl Gustav?  A large calibre, single shot rifle?
> 
> And it was the Army that decided that riflemen were more valuable than AT Gunners, Mortarmen and Pioneers.  In that decision alone was the justification for discontinuing the ALAAWS project and, by extension, the Carl Gustav optimization.  In retrospect it would have been better to retain the Combat Support Company organization even if much of its manpower had been parcelled out to the rifle coys and platoons as dets and employed as rifles.
> 
> Similarly with the TUA systems and E Coy LdSH(RC).
> 
> Similarly with the ADATS systems, the Oerlikons and the Blowpipe/Javelin dets.
> 
> 
> The lesson seems to be that it is better to hold on to a reduced cadre with obsolete weapons than it is to divest entirely of capabilities.  At least with the cadre you retain expertise in the employment of analogous weapons systems and retain the rationale for weapons and their upgrades.
> 
> Retention means you are telling the political masters you know what you need and you can't do without them.  Divesting and then asking to reacquire them weakens your bargaining position and reduces your perceived competence.
> 
> 
> Chinooks also come to mind.
> 
> 
> So, with respect to the Future Structure, perhaps the structure, as T2B is intimating, should be less concerned with the weapon of the day and more concerned with the nature of the threat and let the capabilities and weapons derive from there.




Curiously, I note that we have the necessary Majors and MWOs and Captains and WOs to recreate the Mortar, Pioneer, and AT platoons, as well as the Combat Support Company (known as the Defence Company back in the 1920s) and the fourth Rifle Company.   They were retained even as their troops and responsibilities were removed.

So, given the superfluous expertise available couldn't some of them be tasked explicitly as Offensive and Defensive Co-Ordinators?  Given focused responsibility for the Air Defence, Anti-Tank, Anti-Personnel, Counter-Mobility, Screening and Deception, Fires Support, ISR battles?  With or without troops?

The responsibility would be to consider the threats and then figure out how to manage those threats with existing battalion weapons and munitions available from the supply system as well as available support from other arms and services?

You would then have 12 unit cells focused on discrete problems.  12 cells that could analyse and evaluate and experiment and exchange notes and create the evidence of gaps that need filling.  But also 12 cells that would be in a position to make the best of the tools on hand in each of the directed areas of concern.


----------



## MilEME09

__ https://www.facebook.com/548577038603547/posts/3944171455710738
			




This came across my feed today, and it's a capability we need to be able to counter or face serious casualties. Loitering anti tank drones like this will likely be hard to detect due to size


----------



## Kirkhill

While giving credit to the risk of the concept it is worth noting that Dahir is all about the Concept.









						Meet Dahir Semenov, the inventor behind a strange, dream-like world
					

An apartment building is on fire. The blaze bursts from windows and balconies high above the street. Below it, you can see city streets gridlocked for miles. You begin to hear sirens…




					honisoit.com
				




Having said that the risk is real enough based on Turkish/Azerbaijani/Israeli experience.  And although all of these presentations tend to focus on killing tanks they will be more effective against IFVs, LAVs and APCs.  And more useful in that they will create more casualties faster.

In WW2 German UBoats went after the soft targets, troop carriers being particularly valuable, while avoiding the hard targets.


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> You've got bad data.  That's an outdated construct.


Why am I not surprised - specially after having gone to the Army's website to check. (where in 1CER they call the support squadron an armoured squadron). I'm really not to worried about the actual org these days (although I would be interested if you want to post or PM me the current structure). The point was to suggest an organization (in broad brush terms) that could meet the needs of a brigade but also have the ability to slice off a customizable squadron for an independent battle group's support.

My point really, based on T2B's initial query, was to say that I think we need to focus the Army's organization on a deployable brigade group construct but structure the brigade's organization in such a way that it can spin off fully functioning all-arms battlegroups for the smaller missions we are undoubtedly going to keep committing to.

I see a fully deployable brigade that can spin off slices for smaller ops as well being a component of a division in larger ones as a different concept from a brigade that's designed from the outset to create battle groups out of building blocks. In my opinion our current brigades are less deployable entities and more generators of forces smaller than a brigade. To change to deployable brigades requires a change in attitude (focus) and equipment as well as reorganization of manning. (Just as an example: its the difference between what our current artillery regiments look like and what a fully equipped 18 gun regiment with a properly functioning regimental HQ and brigade FSCC and a properly functioning ammunition supply system looks like - the former can build one functioning battery for a battle group - the latter is a fully functioning regiment for a brigade - even if substantially manned by reservists - but can slice off a battery as required)

🍻


----------



## OldSolduer

MilEME09 said:


> I've been hearing for about 2 years now a plan ti upgrade all our Carl G's to M4 standard which comes with a larger ammunition family, alas budget, competing priorities and politics have probably put it on the back burner.


I briefed my troops on that about 7 years ago. And someone briefed me on it in 1987 or so. Kick the can down the road.


----------



## GR66

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Going back to capabilities and the threat for a moment, let's do a little thought experiment. Assume that we have deployed a CMBG HQ to a theatre as part of a multi-national division that is in turn part of a multi-national force. This is a surge - it is not going to be a rotational deployment. Perhaps it is somewhere in the Middle East or Caucasus and the force has the mission of liberating a nation or part of a nation that has been taken over by a 2nd World opponent that has Russian equipment. Russia is staying out of it, but their advisors put in place a very effective integrated air defence network. The enemy has Brigade Tactical Groups with a variety of AFVs. They have SP tube artillery and several battalions of rockets. They have Russian EW and AD at the BTG and Div level.
> 
> ...


A couple of thoughts on this.

1) I think the fact that 2nd World opponents and even non-state actors are able to get their hands on quite sophisticated weapon systems puts into question the viability of dedicated Light Brigades or Battle Groups for the Canadian Army. 

I definitely agree that there is a role that can be played by Light forces even in a peer conflict. However, I think that in order to be effective they need to offset their lightness with volume and I don't believe that the Canadian Army currently has the depth of capabilities to be able to deploy and support both a sufficiently sized Light Brigade for rapid response as well as a Medium/Heavy Brigade in a more traditional response.  And given political risk aversion I'd bet that the Medium/Heavy response is the one that would always be deployed over the Light response.  That being the case, I don't see the value in Canada specifically building and equipping a dedicated Light Brigade (or Light Battalions within a Brigade structure).  Perhaps there is a role within CSOR for a dedicated Light role, but I think the PYs and equipment dollars would be better spent in the Army on our LAV-based Medium forces.  If truly required, the LAV infantry can deploy dismounted if the specific circumstances require it.

2)  Overall I think the Canadian Army needs to bring more in the way of indirect fires to the table to be able to handle the modern battlefield.  As a first step the Brigade Artillery Regiments need more guns and more survivable guns (and as FJAG mentions the logistics and targeting support to make use of those guns).  

The 4th Artillery Regt. (General Support) should also be beefed up with additional TA capabilities.  Possibly Reserve augmentation to cover more of the battlefield and deal with attrition?  This might also be the place to put a dedicated long-range counter-battery capability (HIMARS?  Loitering Munitions?) to counter enemy fires strength.  Again this could possibly be a Reserve capability.

3)  We need to move quickly to establish a SHORAD capability to protect our forces from the sensors the enemy is using to direct their artillery.  My preference would be a strong focus on the lower level UAV direct threat to the Brigade with an emphasis on guns, microwave and low cost missiles/counter-UAVs to deal with large quantities of smaller UAVs over defense against enemy large UAVs, helicopters and fast air (which can better be countered by our own fast air or higher echelon AD units).

4) We need to invest in active protection measures to make our vehicles more survivable against these various threats.  The cost of these systems is much less than the cost in lives (and vehicles) from not having them.

What would I be willing to give up to get this?  I think that if you were to say re-align the Reg Force to have two Heavy(-ish) Brigade Groups with three LAV infantry Battalions each and turn the 3rd Brigade into a 25/75 Brigade then the savings in PYs should be enough to begin funding some additional equipment beyond the existing current programs of record.


----------



## Rifleman62

Speaking of procurement, new boots pending  3 Aug 21??









						iPolitics AM: Singh marks NDP’s 60th anniversary
					

Exactly 60 years after his party officially adopted its current moniker at its five-day inaugural convention in Ottawa — during which, it’s worth noting, those same newly united members elected then-Saskatchewan premier Tommy Douglas to serve as its first-ever leader — current New Democrat...




					ipolitics.ca
				






> Also making the rounds in _la belle province _is *Agriculture Minister Marie-Claude Bibeau*, who stops by Sherbrooke boot-maker* L.P. Royer Inc*. to share details of a new contract that will “ensure that the members of the Canadian Armed Forces have the equipment they need to fulfill their commitment to serving Canadians at home and abroad.” (2 PM)



L.P. Royer Inc also share a boot contract in 2014


----------



## MilEME09

Will these ones also fall apart after a week?


----------



## dapaterson

Might this be a way to settle this complaint?






						Canada Gazette – COMMISSIONS
					

January 21, 2017, Part 1, Volume 151, Number 3, Canada Gazette




					canadagazette.gc.ca


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> A couple of thoughts on this.
> 
> 1) I think the fact that 2nd World opponents and even non-state actors are able to get their hands on quite sophisticated weapon systems puts into question the viability of dedicated Light Brigades or Battle Groups for the Canadian Army.
> 
> I definitely agree that there is a role that can be played by Light forces even in a peer conflict. However, I think that in order to be effective they need to offset their lightness with volume and I don't believe that the Canadian Army currently has the depth of capabilities to be able to deploy and support both a sufficiently sized Light Brigade for rapid response as well as a Medium/Heavy Brigade in a more traditional response.  And given political risk aversion I'd bet that the Medium/Heavy response is the one that would always be deployed over the Light response.  That being the case, I don't see the value in Canada specifically building and equipping a dedicated Light Brigade (or Light Battalions within a Brigade structure).  Perhaps there is a role within CSOR for a dedicated Light role, but I think the PYs and equipment dollars would be better spent in the Army on our LAV-based Medium forces.  If truly required, the LAV infantry can deploy dismounted if the specific circumstances require it.
> 
> 2)  Overall I think the Canadian Army needs to bring more in the way of indirect fires to the table to be able to handle the modern battlefield.  As a first step the Brigade Artillery Regiments need more guns and more survivable guns (and as FJAG mentions the logistics and targeting support to make use of those guns).
> 
> The 4th Artillery Regt. (General Support) should also be beefed up with additional TA capabilities.  Possibly Reserve augmentation to cover more of the battlefield and deal with attrition?  This might also be the place to put a dedicated long-range counter-battery capability (HIMARS?  Loitering Munitions?) to counter enemy fires strength.  Again this could possibly be a Reserve capability.
> 
> 3)  We need to move quickly to establish a SHORAD capability to protect our forces from the sensors the enemy is using to direct their artillery.  My preference would be a strong focus on the lower level UAV direct threat to the Brigade with an emphasis on guns, microwave and low cost missiles/counter-UAVs to deal with large quantities of smaller UAVs over defense against enemy large UAVs, helicopters and fast air (which can better be countered by our own fast air or higher echelon AD units).
> 
> 4) We need to invest in active protection measures to make our vehicles more survivable against these various threats.  The cost of these systems is much less than the cost in lives (and vehicles) from not having them.
> 
> What would I be willing to give up to get this?  I think that if you were to say re-align the Reg Force to have two Heavy(-ish) Brigade Groups with three LAV infantry Battalions each and turn the 3rd Brigade into a 25/75 Brigade then the savings in PYs should be enough to begin funding some additional equipment beyond the existing current programs of record.



Leaving aside the LAV/Lt question for the moment it is my understanding that the Personnel Budget is separate from the Capital and Operating budgets and that savings in one area are not directly transferable to the other areas.

As to the vulnerability of the Light Forces - I think both the Light and the LAV forces would benefit from a better suite of sensors (to include EO/IR, Rdr, Sigs, EW, Acoustics), a better suite of active defence systems (to include GBAD-CRAM, and an ATGM suite), a better suite of decoys, spoofers and obscurants, a broader range of platforms from which to deploy (to include UAVs and light vehicles including motor cycles for despatch riders when the world goes silent) and finally a fuller spectrum of munitions for all weapons currently in the inventory.

If you are going to concentrate all of the infantry PYs available in 6 battalions rather than 9 then those battalions are going to become even more precious, less likely to be used and, at the same time going to have to cross train to a greater extent to be able to deploy without their LAVs.

How many of the 27 rifle companies currently on the active rolls are currently engaged?

Having said that I do agree with the need for more Fires of all types and I also agree that there are reserve roles in those areas.

Arty for Guns and Missiles and UAVs.   Infantry and Cavalry/Recce for Mortars, Manpads, DF and Man in the Loop NLOS ATGMs as well as UAVs.  All designed to thicken the Active force lines and not to provide capabilities the Regs don't have.


----------



## MilEME09

Here's my concern, every time we loose a capability we never get it back without along fight, if we loose those battalions to amalgamation, history has shown we likely will never get them back. We would have better luck continuing the shell game and fighting for increased manning to properly fill out our battalions without class B positions.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> If you are going to concentrate all of the infantry PYs available in 6 battalions rather than 9 then those battalions are going to become even more precious, less likely to be used and, at the same time going to have to cross train to a greater extent to be able to deploy without their LAVs.


I'd argue that from a political point of view light battalions are the least likely ones to be deployed because we as a nation are highly risk and casualty adverse.

As for cross-training, as several people on here have noted our infantry are already trained to fight dismounted.  Whether they drive to the fight in a LAV or a Polaris they will fight the same and need the same man-portable kit to succeed against an opposing mechanized force.  

True, if you're instead talking about a truly optimized Light force with specialized equipment, etc. for dispersed operations then I agree there would be a training delta.  But I'd argue that our equipment budget would be better spent on better equipping the LAV battalions (mortar and ATGM vehicles for example) rather than a new, separate fleet of light and specialist vehicles.


----------



## OldSolduer

MilEME09 said:


> Will these ones also fall apart after a week?


Oh my you are a cynic.


----------



## GR66

Going to throw this out there as a possible 2025 first step towards a re-designed Army.

Highlights:

Concentrates the LAV battalions together within Reg Force Brigades (with rotating readiness each Brigade can force generate a medium-weight Infantry Battle Group (which remains our most likely type of foreign deployment requirement).
Adds an additional Artillery Battery to the Reg Force Brigade Artillery Regiments.
Frees up some Reg Force PYs from the Light Infantry companies for some of the key enablers that need to be added to the Army (SHORAD, additional indirect fires, Anti-tank, etc.).
Creates a hybrid 25/75 Brigade that maintains the core of Reg Force enablers/supporting elements which are harder for the Reserves to generate and focusing the Reserve elements on the core combat trades.  Centralizes this hybrid Brigade in one Province to minimize the spread of additional support infrastructure required.
Consolidates the Reserve units into fewer Brigades which more realistically represents the size of the units.  This consolidation at least provides a structure which has the potential for possible deployment as a unit as Reserve restructuring evolves.
Matches each Reg Force/Hybrid Brigade with a Reserve Brigade which gives opportunities for a direct augmentation relationship to be created between affiliated Reg/Reserve units.

This structure could develop in a number of different ways as we move toward Force 2030, 2035 and beyond.  In its initial form it has created essentially a "Heavy" Brigade with all the tanks concentrated in 1 Brigade, 5 Brigade as a "Medium" Brigade and the hybrid 2nd Brigade as a "Light" Brigade.  You could keep this structure, or with the reduction in Reg Force PYs you could adjust the existing budget more towards equipment and upgrade/purchase enough tanks to equip both Reg Force Armoured Regiments.  Over time the hybrid Brigade could also be equipped with the same equipment as the Reg Force Brigades giving it a deployment capability similar to the US National Guard Brigades.

View attachment Force 2020-2025.png


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Going to throw this out there as a possible 2025 first step towards a re-designed Army.
> 
> Highlights:
> 
> Concentrates the LAV battalions together within Reg Force Brigades (with rotating readiness each Brigade can force generate a medium-weight Infantry Battle Group (which remains our most likely type of foreign deployment requirement).
> Adds an additional Artillery Battery to the Reg Force Brigade Artillery Regiments.
> Frees up some Reg Force PYs from the Light Infantry companies for some of the key enablers that need to be added to the Army (SHORAD, additional indirect fires, Anti-tank, etc.).
> Creates a hybrid 25/75 Brigade that maintains the core of Reg Force enablers/supporting elements which are harder for the Reserves to generate and focusing the Reserve elements on the core combat trades.  Centralizes this hybrid Brigade in one Province to minimize the spread of additional support infrastructure required.
> Consolidates the Reserve units into fewer Brigades which more realistically represents the size of the units.  This consolidation at least provides a structure which has the potential for possible deployment as a unit as Reserve restructuring evolves.
> Matches each Reg Force/Hybrid Brigade with a Reserve Brigade which gives opportunities for a direct augmentation relationship to be created between affiliated Reg/Reserve units.
> 
> This structure could develop in a number of different ways as we move toward Force 2030, 2035 and beyond.  In its initial form it has created essentially a "Heavy" Brigade with all the tanks concentrated in 1 Brigade, 5 Brigade as a "Medium" Brigade and the hybrid 2nd Brigade as a "Light" Brigade.  You could keep this structure, or with the reduction in Reg Force PYs you could adjust the existing budget more towards equipment and upgrade/purchase enough tanks to equip both Reg Force Armoured Regiments.  Over time the hybrid Brigade could also be equipped with the same equipment as the Reg Force Brigades giving it a deployment capability similar to the US National Guard Brigades.
> 
> View attachment 65959




If you are going to buy steel for deployments why are you spending muscle?

If you are going with a LAV based / Wheels based force why not take full advantage of that and use it to reduce the number of PYs relative to every tube in the system?

Instead of packing as many bodies as possible into each vehicle why not reduce the number of bodies in each vehicle and optimize the tubes per vehicle?  45 LAVs per Battalion?  More if you add in the Recce Platoon?   Strap a couple of ATGM launchers on each turret.  Add a Trophy system.  Add an AD radar to half a dozen or so and supply them with AA missiles along with their Bushmasters.  Convert some to AMOS or Mjolnir 120mm mortar turrets.    Maybe even add a few 105mm RWS turrets to the mix.  And reduce the number of GIBs to 4 PYs per LAV.

A lot more capability.  Many of the gaps filled.  Far fewer bodies.  And residual PYs for other capabilities.  Including CH-146 transportable Light Companies.

And all of the capabilities are "upgrades" to existing platforms.  Conversions of LAVs, ACSVs and the occasional TAPV.

If you're going with LAVs you have converted the infantry to dragoons in any event.  And the dragoons are cavalry.  Not infantry.

Meanwhile I will still argue for the benefit of well armed light infantry that can be rapidly deployed to inhospitable firing positions by means of our available helicopter force.  That means  a dozen CH-146s and 4x CH-147s attached to each Brigade on ops.  It does not need road warrior light vehicles.

It does argue for small vehicles that can be transported by CH-146, along with the troops, that can carry 750 kg of platoon and/or company supplies, and that will spend most of their life quietly crawling along in the rear of the foot-borne troops with an occasional sprint to the CQ.

Call it 8x ATV per Coy,  all held at the CQ.  One for each platoon driver, one for the Coy HQ driver and 4 for the CQSM and his 3 drivers.

They are not there to transport the troops.  They are there to take a load of their backs and carry lots of water, bullets and bombs.


On long term deployments you don't want casualties.  Casualties turn long term deployments into short term deployments once the headlines hit.  The best solution to casualties is not more steel on wheels.  It is not to deploy the bodies in the first place.  Deploy vehicles not bodies unless you have to, or unless the ground prevents the deployment of the vehicles.

If you really need more bayonets in the assault then heli-lift them up to the line of departure to marry up with the vehicles where they can supply mutual intimate support.

I see nothing wrong with a 3 Brigade structure with a LAV based ISR regiment, a pair of LAV dragoon battalions (equipped with a full suite of suitable tubes), and a well equipped light battalion trained and equipped to operate with CH-146s and 147s on both the armoured and the remote battlefields.  That would mean that each brigade would be equipped to go Medium  AND Light and that follow on rotations would have the time to adapt and reorg to meet the needs of the operation.

And the Tanks? I would concentrate them in the Combat Support Brigade Group.  Along with the Armoured Engineers, the Div Recce/ISR Regiment and the Div Arty Group.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> If you are going to buy steel for deployments why are you spending muscle?
> 
> If you are going with a LAV based / Wheels based force why not take full advantage of that and use it to reduce the number of PYs relative to every tube in the system?
> 
> Instead of packing as many bodies as possible into each vehicle why not reduce the number of bodies in each vehicle and optimize the tubes per vehicle?  45 LAVs per Battalion?  More if you add in the Recce Platoon?   Strap a couple of ATGM launchers on each turret.  Add a Trophy system.  Add an AD radar to half a dozen or so and supply them with AA missiles along with their Bushmasters.  Convert some to AMOS or Mjolnir 120mm mortar turrets.    Maybe even add a few 105mm RWS turrets to the mix.  And reduce the number of GIBs to 4 PYs per LAV.
> 
> A lot more capability.  Many of the gaps filled.  Far fewer bodies.  And residual PYs for other capabilities.  Including CH-146 transportable Light Companies.
> 
> And all of the capabilities are "upgrades" to existing platforms.  Conversions of LAVs, ACSVs and the occasional TAPV.
> 
> If you're going with LAVs you have converted the infantry to dragoons in any event.  And the dragoons are cavalry.  Not infantry.
> 
> Meanwhile I will still argue for the benefit of well armed light infantry that can be rapidly deployed to inhospitable firing positions by means of our available helicopter force.  That means  a dozen CH-146s and 4x CH-147s attached to each Brigade on ops.  It does not need road warrior light vehicles.
> 
> It does argue for small vehicles that can be transported by CH-146, along with the troops, that can carry 750 kg of platoon and/or company supplies, and that will spend most of their life quietly crawling along in the rear of the foot-borne troops with an occasional sprint to the CQ.
> 
> Call it 8x ATV per Coy,  all held at the CQ.  One for each platoon driver, one for the Coy HQ driver and 4 for the CQSM and his 3 drivers.
> 
> They are not there to transport the troops.  They are there to take a load of their backs and carry lots of water, bullets and bombs.


Nothing in the proposed structure precludes changes to the composition of Companies, Platoons or Sections, what equipment those troops carry, or what weapons are mounted on the vehicles they ride.  

Without adding or eliminating a single Reg Force or Reserve unit (other than a few Reserve Brigade HQ's) I believe it simply provides a more solid (and realistic) foundation from which the design of the Future Army can begin.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Nothing in the proposed structure precludes changes to the composition of Companies, Platoons or Sections, what equipment those troops carry, or what weapons are mounted on the vehicles they ride.
> 
> Without adding or eliminating a single Reg Force or Reserve unit *(other than a few Reserve Brigade HQ's*) I believe it simply provides a more solid (and realistic) foundation from which the design of the Future Army can begin.



How dare you propose to limit the career paths of the inexperienced and unqualified to the ranks of 'Junior General Officer'?


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Going to throw this out there as a possible 2025 first step towards a re-designed Army.
> ...
> View attachment 65959



You're starting to come to the dark side with me. Welcome.

My thoughts (as expressed before)

1) With a total of eight brigades, you can cut the divisions down to two (an eastern one based on 2 Div [with  5, 34, 36 Bdes and the CCSB] and a western one based on 3 Div [with 1, 2, 41, and 32 Bdes]). I would remove the two surplus div headquarters but keep all the div support establishments and reassign them to the two remaining divs as appropriate.

2) I would reform two of the inf bns and the armoured reg't in 1 Bde into three combined arms battalions and retask the third inf battalion as a cavalry regiment/battalion)

3) I would also restructure 12 RBC as a cavalry regiment/battalion (essentially I see cavalry regiments as more robust combined arms organizations capable of much more than reconnaissance)

4) If one does restructure the third inf battalion in 1 Bde to cavalry, there will a few companies of LAVs surplus to repurpose.

5) While you are right and can't expect to do much more by 2025, I think one should position for 2030 by earmarking significant numbers in both 36 Bde and 32 Bde to converting them to additional combat support and combat service support capabilities as the total force is too manoeuvre heavy and too light on support. In particular, Ontario has the capability of generating more reservists than anyone else so there is some scope there.

All that said, I'm not quite sure of what 2 Bde's role is to be in this structure. It strikes me we are creating two types of reserve brigades - 2 Bde with a Reg F HQs and res coys and 32, 34, 36 and 41 with Res F HQs and coys. It looks to me like you are wanting to create a brigade of mostly reservists which has the ability to generate deployable battle groups while the other reserve brigades are essentially hole fillers. I'm not sure if this two tier structure is workable. My expectation is that the Res F units assigned to 2 Bde will generate no more individual volunteers for deployments than any other Res F unit which means any 2 Bde battlegroup deploying will still need to recruit people from elsewhere.

One factor here is that you are reducing the Res bdes from ten to four. Assuming that you are keeping the same RSS staff that means the number of RSS in each "new" Res F "Bde" and "battalion/regiment" will increase by a factor of 2.5. If you add to that the Reg F officers and NCMs being retained within 2 Bde and distribute them across all the Res F bdes and 2 Bde equally you could probably establish a very robust Reg F presence in every reserve unit across the board and create all Res Bdes into viable hybrid units (albeit more like 15-20/85-80 rather than 25-30/75-70)

(And yes D&B - I would put Reg F colonels and other senior Reg F staff into all Res F bde headquarters so that they too can deploy with appropriate augmentation when required and where appropriate. It's not like we have a shortage of Reg F colonels and staff and how much mileage do we really get out of the Res F colonels and BGens we have now?)

Which begs the question - what do we do with Petawawa besides give it all to CANSOFCOM?

🍻


----------



## PuckChaser

FJAG said:


> Which begs the question - what do we do with Petawawa besides give it all to CANSOFCOM?


Considering the RTA and ranges are booking 6-8 months in advance and spend 90% of the year full, any COA that doesn't involve retaining it is an absolute non starter. Anyone east of the GTA and west of Montreal are using it non stop, including the Queens Own for para.


----------



## FJAG

PuckChaser said:


> Considering the RTA and ranges are booking 6-8 months in advance and spend 90% of the year full, any COA that doesn't involve retaining it is an absolute non starter. Anyone east of the GTA and west of Montreal are using it non stop, including the Queens Own for para.


You know me. I hate it every time the Army divests itself of old equipment that still has some life in it. There's no way I'd give up an acre of land that's part of a useable range (the twin towers in Ottawa on the other hand ....)

My thought was more in the line of what types of new equipment do we need/should we get that could benefit from being flown around large swatches of rural countryside linked to an impact area. I keep saying we need an experimental brigade to test out new gear. Maybe if we convert 2 CMBG to a combat support brigade headquarters plus a battle group to trial new gear and tactics (as well as a couple of reserve units as suggested.) - Gagetown would probably be a more realistic area for such an organization but its too far away from all the chair-warming generals and politicians in Ottawa that one wants to bring out to the ranges for an afternoon to impress them with the demonstration of a new toy revolutionary piece of equipment.

🍻


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## FJAG

Made me wonder what the twin towers in Ottawa are worth and how many SP guns and rocket launchers one could buy (or lease) with the cash.


----------



## MilEME09

Or we could just bring back all our old testing establishments, RCEME/EME/LEMS had a testing facility for vehicles and equipment which was closed down, in the early 90s if I recall correctly. If we want to play with the big boys, we gotta start acting like a proper army. Buy extra vehicles, shoot them, blow them up, find out how they break so we know our own weaknesses.


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## McG

LETE was pretty small and surrounded by suburbs. I don’t think we ever did explosive testing of vehicles there. DRDC Valcartier does that sort of work. They have blown up most (if not all) armoured vehicle types in CAF service to assess & improve survivability.


----------



## Edward Campbell

The former three test establishments (AETE, LETE and NETE) were (25+ years ago when I was serving and involved) all quite different, one from the others, in organization, structure and operation. Each added considerable value. LETE closed after a high pressure local/provincial political pressure campaign and because the military had too little influence in Ottawa.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> You're starting to come to the dark side with me. Welcome.
> 
> My thoughts (as expressed before)
> 
> 1) With a total of eight brigades, you can cut the divisions down to two (an eastern one based on 2 Div [with  5, 34, 36 Bdes and the CCSB] and a western one based on 3 Div [with 1, 2, 41, and 32 Bdes]). I would remove the two surplus div headquarters but keep all the div support establishments and reassign them to the two remaining divs as appropriate.


This idea was presented as a "step 1" for implementation for Force 2025.  Consolidation of the Divisions may be something for Force 2030 or beyond but to be honest I don't know enough about what they bring to the table administratively to say how they should be dealt with.


FJAG said:


> 2) I would reform two of the inf bns and the armoured reg't in 1 Bde into three combined arms battalions and retask the third inf battalion as a cavalry regiment/battalion)


I'm personally of the belief that almost all of the deployments we're likely to face will be similar to the ones we've faced in the post Korea era.  Brush wars, counter-insurgencies, "stabilization" operations, etc.  I believe these types of operations are well suited to our LAV-based infantry with varying levels of support by armour depending on the intensity of the operations.  

I think that optimizing a significant portion of our forces for a specific type of high-intensity conflict will limit their utility in the most likely of deployment scenarios we are likely to face.  At the same time, I'm not sure it gives us much advantage over the existing Brigade Group structure which can generate Battle Groups and Combat Teams in various configurations to face the specific threat types it might end up facing.

That being said, this is only true if the time and effort is put in for the Brigade to actively train in combined arms operations when it is not deployed so that tank-infantry-artillery cooperation is well practiced and understood by all elements when the time comes for a peer conflict.


FJAG said:


> 3) I would also restructure 12 RBC as a cavalry regiment/battalion (essentially I see cavalry regiments as more robust combined arms organizations capable of much more than reconnaissance)


Same as my comment for point 2 above.  My preference would be to have two identically organized Reg Force Brigade Groups.  Ideally as we move into Force 2030, you'd equip 12 RBC with three tank squadrons the same as I'm proposing for LdSH.  IF we get into a major war vs. Russia (or Iran or North Korea) we will armour.  I believe we should expand the capability we have available rather than try to scramble to expand it at the last minute when we realize it is (again) required.


FJAG said:


> 4) If one does restructure the third inf battalion in 1 Bde to cavalry, there will a few companies of LAVs surplus to repurpose.


Again back to point 2.  Having three identical LAV infantry Battalions in each of 1 Bde and 5 Bde would allow each of those Brigades to rotate readiness between them to have one infantry Battle Group ready to deploy at a given time.  I feel that our LAV Battalions are our most versatile deployment option (with augmentation as required) for the vast majority of our likely missions.


FJAG said:


> 5) While you are right and can't expect to do much more by 2025, I think one should position for 2030 by earmarking significant numbers in both 36 Bde and 32 Bde to converting them to additional combat support and combat service support capabilities as the total force is too manoeuvre heavy and too light on support. In particular, Ontario has the capability of generating more reservists than anyone else so there is some scope there.


Agreed.  I'd lean however to 36 Bde and 37 Bde (instead of 32 Bde) though.  Keep the support capabilities co-located and near the most likely coast they will have to deploy from.


FJAG said:


> All that said, I'm not quite sure of what 2 Bde's role is to be in this structure. It strikes me we are creating two types of reserve brigades - 2 Bde with a Reg F HQs and res coys and 32, 34, 36 and 41 with Res F HQs and coys. It looks to me like you are wanting to create a brigade of mostly reservists which has the ability to generate deployable battle groups while the other reserve brigades are essentially hole fillers. I'm not sure if this two tier structure is workable. My expectation is that the Res F units assigned to 2 Bde will generate no more individual volunteers for deployments than any other Res F unit which means any 2 Bde battlegroup deploying will still need to recruit people from elsewhere.


My thought on 2 Bde stems from our inability to recreate in Canada what the US has been able to do with the Army National Guard which is to have fully deployment capable Reserve Brigades.  One of the reasons sometimes cited for this is that our Reserve system has difficulty generating the required support trades required to properly support a Reserve Brigade. 

By limiting the Reserve contribution to the Brigade to just the line infantry companies, armoured squadrons and artillery batteries and maintaining the existing Reg Force Brigade infrastructure and supporting elements you are greatly simplifying the Reserve task.  Obviously this doesn't resolve any of the legislative issues around mobilization of the Reserves, but it at least provides a foundational structure for future mobilization if/when required.  

The maintenance of the core structure of 2 Bde as Reg Force also provides a pool of trained members to be able to augment 1 Bde and 5 Bde during peacetime operations.

The three all-Reserve Brigade Groups (excluding the 36 Bde in the Atlantic - see point 5 above) have been restructured to match the same general structure as the Reg Force/Hybrid Brigades within their Division.  The idea is to create the ability to have direct affiliation between Reg Force sub-units and the Reserve Regiments.  For example, A Company, 1 PPCLI would be affiliated with the North Saskatchewan Regiment.  Class B positions could be made available within the Company to allow N Sask R Reservists to participate in Reg Force exercises, etc.  Augmentation requirements for the Company would be prioritized to the N Sask R to fill before being opened up to other units.  This system could build up some trust and familiarity between the Reg Force and their affiliated Reserve units so that when deployments (and inevitable augmentation/casualty replacements are required) they system works more seamlessly.

Two issues I do see with my proposed Reserve restructuring are:
1)  How should 2 Bde be equipped.  A supposedly deployable Brigade is useless without actual equipment to deploy with.  I think in an ideal world with unlimited funds you'd want to equip 2 Bde with exactly the same equipment as 1 Bde and 5 Bde (tanks for the Armoured Squadrons, LAVs for the Infantry Companies and whatever gun the Reg Force ends up with for the Artillery Batteries.  

In reality though, I can't see the government/CF coming up with the funding to do this.  Perhaps then there could be a role for 2 Bde as a Light Brigade as envisioned by Kirkhill and others on here.  Vehicle acquisition and maintenance costs would be less and the Army would be gaining a new/different capability beyond what it has now.  Some may argue that it doesn't make sense to have your Light capability vested in the Reserves because due to their lightness they are inherently able to more quickly deploy by air than your Medium/Heavy forces.  I'd argue that the Canadian situation is slightly different.  Firstly, I question whether we have the airlift capability to rapidly deploy and sustain a light force of sufficient size to make a significant military difference in a major conflict.  Secondly, I believe that the Canadian Government/population is too risk adverse to deploy Light forces into combat in anything less than a major conflict.  Both of these factors make placing a Light capability within the Reserves less of an issue.

2) Are you potentially creating issues by having two different types of Reserve units.  2 Bde focused on being deployable in case of mobilization and the remaining Reserve Brigades being focused on augmentation.  Will this create a situation where the Augmentation Brigades are even more starved of support and resources than they are now as limited Reserve resources are focused on 2 Bde?  Can this be offset by the closer direct relationships between the Reg Force units and their affiliated Reserve units?


FJAG said:


> One factor here is that you are reducing the Res bdes from ten to four. Assuming that you are keeping the same RSS staff that means the number of RSS in each "new" Res F "Bde" and "battalion/regiment" will increase by a factor of 2.5. If you add to that the Reg F officers and NCMs being retained within 2 Bde and distribute them across all the Res F bdes and 2 Bde equally you could probably establish a very robust Reg F presence in every reserve unit across the board and create all Res Bdes into viable hybrid units (albeit more like 15-20/85-80 rather than 25-30/75-70)
> 
> (And yes D&B - I would put Reg F colonels and other senior Reg F staff into all Res F bde headquarters so that they too can deploy with appropriate augmentation when required and where appropriate. It's not like we have a shortage of Reg F colonels and staff and how much mileage do we really get out of the Res F colonels and BGens we have now?)
> 
> Which begs the question - what do we do with Petawawa besides give it all to CANSOFCOM?
> 
> 🍻


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I'm personally of the belief that almost all of the deployments we're likely to face will be similar to the ones we've faced in the post Korea era.  Brush wars, counter-insurgencies, "stabilization" operations, etc.  I believe these types of operations are well suited to our LAV-based infantry with varying levels of support by armour depending on the intensity of the operations.
> 
> I think that optimizing a significant portion of our forces for a specific type of high-intensity conflict will limit their utility in the most likely of deployment scenarios we are likely to face.  At the same time, I'm not sure it gives us much advantage over the existing Brigade Group structure which can generate Battle Groups and Combat Teams in various configurations to face the specific threat types it might end up facing.
> 
> That being said, this is only true if the time and effort is put in for the Brigade to actively train in combined arms operations when it is not deployed so that tank-infantry-artillery cooperation is well practiced and understood by all elements when the time comes for a peer conflict.


That's why I think we need two different brigades. Our current commitment to Latvia is in effect a bn headquarters and one company but the battalion is a combined arms battalion because several of the other nations are providing tank companies. Proper combined arms operations are a skill which is basically missing from most (but not all) of our Reg F and all of our Res F training. We need at least one brigade that is structured for it and practices it frequently. With 5 Bde structured as a medium infantry centric force we can meet all the other non-combined arms missions as well as develop the skills in that area.


GR66 said:


> Same as my comment for point 2 above.  My preference would be to have two identically organized Reg Force Brigade Groups.  Ideally as we move into Force 2030, you'd equip 12 RBC with three tank squadrons the same as I'm proposing for LdSH.  IF we get into a major war vs. Russia (or Iran or North Korea) we will armour.  I believe we should expand the capability we have available rather than try to scramble to expand it at the last minute when we realize it is (again) required.
> 
> Again back to point 2.  Having three identical LAV infantry Battalions in each of 1 Bde and 5 Bde would allow each of those Brigades to rotate readiness between them to have one infantry Battle Group ready to deploy at a given time.  I feel that our LAV Battalions are our most versatile deployment option (with augmentation as required) for the vast majority of our likely missions.


No matter which way you cut it, with the current SSE missions and only two force generating brigades (even if you roll 2 Bde into the mix) and six month tour rotations, folks will be meeting themselves coming and going on rotations. (That's one of the key reasons I suggest beefing up Res F brigade and bn headquarters with Reg F pers so that those organizations have the ability to also generate battle groups.


GR66 said:


> Agreed.  I'd lean however to 36 Bde and 37 Bde (instead of 32 Bde) though.  Keep the support capabilities co-located and near the most likely coast they will have to deploy from.


IMHO coasts don't matter. Central On is a two-day road move from a port and convoys can get there faster than the ships carrying them. Population and the ability to generate a constant sustainable supply of reservists is the critical factor. To create one viable CS or even CSS would take all the reservists in the Maritimes. Since there's always someone who wants to be a grunt or zipperhead, you need enough of a presence of those capabilities to absorb those volunteers leaving few for CS and CSS roles. Southern ON has that population (but is a little weak for nearby ranges for such things as armoured and artillery) and therefore more suited for building non combat units)


GR66 said:


> My thought on 2 Bde stems from our inability to recreate in Canada what the US has been able to do with the Army National Guard which is to have fully deployment capable Reserve Brigades.  One of the reasons sometimes cited for this is that our Reserve system has difficulty generating the required support trades required to properly support a Reserve Brigade.
> 
> By limiting the Reserve contribution to the Brigade to just the line infantry companies, armoured squadrons and artillery batteries and maintaining the existing Reg Force Brigade infrastructure and supporting elements you are greatly simplifying the Reserve task.  Obviously this doesn't resolve any of the legislative issues around mobilization of the Reserves, but it at least provides a foundational structure for future mobilization if/when required.
> 
> The maintenance of the core structure of 2 Bde as Reg Force also provides a pool of trained members to be able to augment 1 Bde and 5 Bde during peacetime operations.


Agree with all those points which is why I want to see all Res F units "beefed up". I want to see one effective Res F not a two-tiered system. Been there and did that in 1966 - it sucked. My concern with 2 Bde as you structure it is that there will be too many Reg F pers in those 2 Bde units who will be doing very little on a day-to-day basis. They'll be bouncing around from deployments to just preparing for summer camps. My preference is to spread them out, increase the ability to deploy all reserve units and increase the overall capability of all Res F brigades. I think that meets your overall objectives better.

When you talk about "support trade" I suspect you mean service support trades because we're not too terrible at generating combat support trades (but admittedly could be much better). The problem with generating enough service support trades is we do not do it right. You need both full-time service support to actually support the day-to-day operations of the Res brigade (which requirement goes up as you start adding equipment to them) as well as part-time service support folks with specific roles who can be mobilized (or act as volunteer call ups) for emergencies. Since we are having problems generating full-time service support personnel for the current Reg F structures, the system is failing across the board and needs a major redesign. I've articulated a few ideas in the past but basically, like alcoholism, the Reg F first needs to admit that it has a serious problem that can't be cured by little band-aid fixes (and from what I can tell from this forum, this is not just an Army problem but one that hits the Navy and Air Force as well).


GR66 said:


> The three all-Reserve Brigade Groups (excluding the 36 Bde in the Atlantic - see point 5 above) have been restructured to match the same general structure as the Reg Force/Hybrid Brigades within their Division.  The idea is to create the ability to have direct affiliation between Reg Force sub-units and the Reserve Regiments.  For example, A Company, 1 PPCLI would be affiliated with the North Saskatchewan Regiment.  Class B positions could be made available within the Company to allow N Sask R Reservists to participate in Reg Force exercises, etc.  Augmentation requirements for the Company would be prioritized to the N Sask R to fill before being opened up to other units.  This system could build up some trust and familiarity between the Reg Force and their affiliated Reserve units so that when deployments (and inevitable augmentation/casualty replacements are required) they system works more seamlessly.


I agree with that, mostly.


GR66 said:


> Two issues I do see with my proposed Reserve restructuring are:
> 1)  How should 2 Bde be equipped.  A supposedly deployable Brigade is useless without actual equipment to deploy with.  I think in an ideal world with unlimited funds you'd want to equip 2 Bde with exactly the same equipment as 1 Bde and 5 Bde (tanks for the Armoured Squadrons, LAVs for the Infantry Companies and whatever gun the Reg Force ends up with for the Artillery Batteries.
> 
> In reality though, I can't see the government/CF coming up with the funding to do this.  Perhaps then there could be a role for 2 Bde as a Light Brigade as envisioned by Kirkhill and others on here.  Vehicle acquisition and maintenance costs would be less and the Army would be gaining a new/different capability beyond what it has now.  Some may argue that it doesn't make sense to have your Light capability vested in the Reserves because due to their lightness they are inherently able to more quickly deploy by air than your Medium/Heavy forces.  I'd argue that the Canadian situation is slightly different.  Firstly, I question whether we have the airlift capability to rapidly deploy and sustain a light force of sufficient size to make a significant military difference in a major conflict.  Secondly, I believe that the Canadian Government/population is too risk adverse to deploy Light forces into combat in anything less than a major conflict.  Both of these factors make placing a Light capability within the Reserves less of an issue.


My thoughts are that all 2025 plans have to be equipment neutral for the reasons that you cite. If you take a look at the National Guard, most of the ARNG BCTs are still IBCTs with limited equipment. This is not for lack of equipment - there's plenty in desert storage - but because of the ongoing maintenance and training burden. It currently costs 130 million less each year to support an ARNG IBCT than an ABCT and even 60 million less than an SBCT. And that's before you factor in the capital costs to bring the stored equipment up to standard and periodically upgraded.

However, we need a long term doctrine which should include a long term equipment plan which absolutely has to include a coherent upgrade of the reserves capability with appropriate equipment. Whether or not that plan is to create a peacetime-only force employment program which accepts the risk that the force will be underequipped in time of emergency or whether it equips the force for a potential full war-time role with the required increase in capital and maintenance costs is immaterial to me so long as the strategy/doctrine is clearly articulated and the force structure and training oriented towards achieving it. Let's be honest with ourselves and the government and stop this ridiculous fiction that we are an agile, medium force capable of full-spectrum peer conflict. Whatever posture we take in 2025 should be a stepping stone to the country's long-term goals for its military.


GR66 said:


> 2) Are you potentially creating issues by having two different types of Reserve units.  2 Bde focused on being deployable in case of mobilization and the remaining Reserve Brigades being focused on augmentation.  Will this create a situation where the Augmentation Brigades are even more starved of support and resources than they are now as limited Reserve resources are focused on 2 Bde?  Can this be offset by the closer direct relationships between the Reg Force units and their affiliated Reserve units?


Yup! Yup! and no! 

Don't get me wrong though. I think it is vital (essential) that we create a closer direct relationship between the Reg F and the Res F. I believe in hybrid units as I've articulated before. I just not fond of the 2 Bde construct you put forward. 

In my previous examples of hybrid structures I generally tend to have at least one sub-unit be Reg F as well while both the regimental/battalion headquarters and service support company have Res F positions to fill out positions not needed for day-to-day peacetime needs (e.g additional transport, medical, or signals personnel for a full war-time establishment). I do this so that the Reg F part of the unit has the ability to train as a unit at all levels (albeit at reduced scales) during their day-to-day operations and therefore become proficient at all their skill levels from the individual soldier on up and to also have the structure and designated Res F personnel in place to expand in an emergency. A headquarters and service support company alone do not have this ability. More importantly, for hybrid specialist units (such as rocket or air defence artillery, military intelligence, cavalry regiments, electronic warfare regiments etc etc) it is vital that there is a proper core of full-timers from the bottom to the top to develop and practice doctrine at all levels and even be able to immediately deploy a quick reaction element if required. 2 Bde as proposed can't do this.

🍻


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

I personally think discussing anything to do with force composition and structure and not looking at it from a Joint perspective is a waste of time. 

I just participated in Exercise TALISMAN SABRE off the coast of Australia and the combined arms effects in the Land, Air, Sea, SOF and Cyber domains the ANZAC are able to bring to bear is very impressive. 






Any FEC for our Army should be carefully considered with support to and from the other services in mind.


----------



## Infanteer

Humphrey Bogart said:


> Any FEC for our Army should be carefully considered with support to and from the other services in mind.


Like, say, a Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept?


----------



## FJAG

The latest from the Thin Pinstripped Line:



> At the heart of this tragedy is perhaps a deeper question – why, after decades of focus on globally deployable militaries, and trying to send troops abroad to carry out operations, does the West still seem stretched to deliver a sustainable outcome to a military operation, and is the price paid worth the investment in the military forces acquired?...





> A key lesson from Afghanistan is perhaps that for all the talk of nation states deploying on coalition operations, there is little ability to operate in a large scale in distant countries without the US being present. It remains the key provider of support, enablers and the ability to not just ‘kick the door in’ but also rebuild the door and put the military presence on a long-term footing to support government policy outcomes.
> 
> There are a small number of western countries that can deliver a medium scale effort abroad – the UK and France are chief in this regard, where it is possible to deploy and sustain a military force that can both operate and be credible, and not just a flag on a PowerPoint chart. ...





> The public will support or tolerate risks where a quick win is at stake. They seem to rarely mind, or understand low level training or mentoring, or even limited presence where it has a clear rationale. There is though little interest or support in getting involved in someone else’s long-term affairs, particularly when prior expeditions have had such limited success.
> 
> The era we are now entering in the West is maybe better defined as that of aggressive deterrence – namely possession of military forces used to deter and coerce others into acting in a manner we judge fit – be it by training, presence or support to multi-national activity, and in extremis used to enforce outcomes in support of international rules-based system as a message to third parties of the risks of conflict with the West. The US will continue to act as the lead for this sort of activity, supported by other parties, but there will be declining interest or value seen in long term presence after the conflict is over.
> 
> Perhaps the time is approaching when there will be fundamental shifts in force structures and capabilities – away from a model optimised to deploy divisions with support, which in turn generates sustainable brigades on long term peacekeeping/enforcement missions like Iraq or Afghanistan, to one that instead focuses on the very small scale and the very large scale and little in between. ...





> No Longer Paying for Breakages - Western Intervention Post Afghanistan
> 
> 
> A blog about UK defence issues which tries to put a positive and fresh look at many current matters impacting UK and wider defence.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com



🍻


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## Humphrey Bogart

Infanteer said:


> Like, say, a Pan-Domain Force Employment Concept?


Yes but it would take an act of God to make it actually happen in Canada.


----------



## McG

Humphrey Bogart said:


> I personally think discussing anything to do with force composition and structure and not looking at it from a Joint perspective is a waste of time.
> 
> …
> 
> Any FEC for our Army should be carefully considered with support to and from the other services in mind.


Will we ever get to true joint capability development when the strongest voices are defending what each service sees as its identity?


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> That's why I think we need two different brigades. Our current commitment to Latvia is in effect a bn headquarters and one company but the battalion is a combined arms battalion because several of the other nations are providing tank companies. Proper combined arms operations are a skill which is basically missing from most (but not all) of our Reg F and all of our Res F training. We need at least one brigade that is structured for it and practices it frequently. With 5 Bde structured as a medium infantry centric force we can meet all the other non-combined arms missions as well as develop the skills in that area.
> 
> No matter which way you cut it, with the current SSE missions and only two force generating brigades (even if you roll 2 Bde into the mix) and six month tour rotations, folks will be meeting themselves coming and going on rotations. (That's one of the key reasons I suggest beefing up Res F brigade and bn headquarters with Reg F pers so that those organizations have the ability to also generate battle groups.


Two different issues here.  One is the asymmetrical structure of the Brigades you propose.  There's 17 pages of discussion here of the relative benifits/problems of Optimal vs. Affiliated Battle Groups.  I personally come down on the side of Affiliated Battle Groups (and Brigades) and there's a good article in a back issue of the Canadian Army Journal (starting on page 202 (here) that makes what I feel is a pretty good argument in their favour.  Those that fought in WWII and maintained the current Brigade Structure through the Cold War seemed to feel that the structure worked well for a major, mechanized conflict.  If the issue is a lack of training in combined operations and re-grouping of forces within the Brigade then fix the training.

If you are worried that having only two force generating Brigades (although the number of LAV Infantry Battalions isn't changing) to meet our deployment commitments, then wouldn't optimizing 2 Bde with combined arms Battalions mean that all of those deployments that don't call for a heavy, armoured force (almost certainly to be the vast majority of deployments) would all fall on 5 Bde?  I agree that deployable Reserve Battle Groups would be an ideal way to take the pressure off the Reg Force Battalions, but realistically with out current legislation, equipment and training for the Reserves we are very far away from that point (if the political will would ever even be there to mobilize Reserves for overseas deployments - short of a major war).


FJAG said:


> IMHO coasts don't matter. Central On is a two-day road move from a port and convoys can get there faster than the ships carrying them. Population and the ability to generate a constant sustainable supply of reservists is the critical factor. To create one viable CS or even CSS would take all the reservists in the Maritimes. Since there's always someone who wants to be a grunt or zipperhead, you need enough of a presence of those capabilities to absorb those volunteers leaving few for CS and CSS roles. Southern ON has that population (but is a little weak for nearby ranges for such things as armoured and artillery) and therefore more suited for building non combat units)


Reasonable point.  No reason the breakdown of Brigade/Battalion locations couldn't be adjusted.


FJAG said:


> Agree with all those points which is why I want to see all Res F units "beefed up". I want to see one effective Res F not a two-tiered system. Been there and did that in 1966 - it sucked. My concern with 2 Bde as you structure it is that there will be too many Reg F pers in those 2 Bde units who will be doing very little on a day-to-day basis. They'll be bouncing around from deployments to just preparing for summer camps. My preference is to spread them out, increase the ability to deploy all reserve units and increase the overall capability of all Res F brigades. I think that meets your overall objectives better.


An alternative form of 25/75 structure for 2 Bde could be to maintain a single Reg Force Battalion and 2-3 Reserve Battalions.  Basically the same number of Reg Force positions would still be freed up to beef up support for the rest of the Reserve units.


FJAG said:


> When you talk about "support trade" I suspect you mean service support trades because we're not too terrible at generating combat support trades (but admittedly could be much better). The problem with generating enough service support trades is we do not do it right. You need both full-time service support to actually support the day-to-day operations of the Res brigade (which requirement goes up as you start adding equipment to them) as well as part-time service support folks with specific roles who can be mobilized (or act as volunteer call ups) for emergencies. Since we are having problems generating full-time service support personnel for the current Reg F structures, the system is failing across the board and needs a major redesign. I've articulated a few ideas in the past but basically, like alcoholism, the Reg F first needs to admit that it has a serious problem that can't be cured by little band-aid fixes (and from what I can tell from this forum, this is not just an Army problem but one that hits the Navy and Air Force as well).


Correct...CSS trade support for the Reserve Brigades.  I don't see much hope for transforming the Reserves without giving them more CSS support.  Better in my mind to have less combat trades with better support than a lot of combat trades without sufficient support.


FJAG said:


> I agree with that, mostly.
> 
> My thoughts are that all 2025 plans have to be equipment neutral for the reasons that you cite. If you take a look at the National Guard, most of the ARNG BCTs are still IBCTs with limited equipment. This is not for lack of equipment - there's plenty in desert storage - but because of the ongoing maintenance and training burden. It currently costs 130 million less each year to support an ARNG IBCT than an ABCT and even 60 million less than an SBCT. And that's before you factor in the capital costs to bring the stored equipment up to standard and periodically upgraded.


Perhaps this is an alternate model to be explored?  If we don't seem to be able to generate the capability to equip and train Reserve Brigades due to lack of training time/facilities/instructors/technical support, then maybe we should instead focus on building up a stock of extra equipment to have on hand in case a major conflict requires expansion of the Army.  Modern equipment takes a very long time to acquire and doing so in the middle of a conflict might be impossible.  However, if we have a store of equipment on hand we could then take our Reserves which are trained in the important basic military skills and give them the extra training they need before they deploy.  Pay up front for additional equipment (and a relatively small annual cost for maintenance staff) and defer the much larger annual training bill for only when it is needed in an emergency.


FJAG said:


> However, we need a long term doctrine which should include a long term equipment plan which absolutely has to include a coherent upgrade of the reserves capability with appropriate equipment. Whether or not that plan is to create a peacetime-only force employment program which accepts the risk that the force will be underequipped in time of emergency or whether it equips the force for a potential full war-time role with the required increase in capital and maintenance costs is immaterial to me so long as the strategy/doctrine is clearly articulated and the force structure and training oriented towards achieving it. Let's be honest with ourselves and the government and stop this ridiculous fiction that we are an agile, medium force capable of full-spectrum peer conflict. Whatever posture we take in 2025 should be a stepping stone to the country's long-term goals for its military.
> 
> Yup! Yup! and no!
> 
> Don't get me wrong though. I think it is vital (essential) that we create a closer direct relationship between the Reg F and the Res F. I believe in hybrid units as I've articulated before. I just not fond of the 2 Bde construct you put forward.
> 
> In my previous examples of hybrid structures I generally tend to have at least one sub-unit be Reg F as well while both the regimental/battalion headquarters and service support company have Res F positions to fill out positions not needed for day-to-day peacetime needs (e.g additional transport, medical, or signals personnel for a full war-time establishment). I do this so that the Reg F part of the unit has the ability to train as a unit at all levels (albeit at reduced scales) during their day-to-day operations and therefore become proficient at all their skill levels from the individual soldier on up and to also have the structure and designated Res F personnel in place to expand in an emergency. A headquarters and service support company alone do not have this ability. More importantly, for hybrid specialist units (such as rocket or air defence artillery, military intelligence, cavalry regiments, electronic warfare regiments etc etc) it is vital that there is a proper core of full-timers from the bottom to the top to develop and practice doctrine at all levels and even be able to immediately deploy a quick reaction element if required. 2 Bde as proposed can't do this.
> 
> 🍻


----------



## FJAG

I hadn't come across the optimized v affiliated thread before (before my time on this forum) and I'll read it in due course. In short I agree totally with Bobbitt for all the reasons he gives. I make two exceptions to this.

First I believe in combined arms battalions where armoured infantry and tanks are grouped into one battalion. That doesn't negate the ability to rejuggle companies when required but does give you three manoeuvre battalions which are thoroughly integrated and practiced in combined arms operations.

The second is cavalry regiments. I think cavalry regiments will in short order be morphing into something much more complex than our current reconnaissance regiment and as such will need a group of skills permanently assigned such as recce, anti-armour, UAVs, loitering munitions, possibly some infantry and engineers and ready access to long range artillery. While some of these (like FOOs, JTACs, could and should be under artillery control for training and certification and affiliated with the cavalry regiment) others may need to be organic. I really fail to understand how, with ADO, we haven't already reformed these units a long time ago. I like the CAJ article on Asymmetric brigades where the author collocates the Cavalry regiments with artillery regiments on the same bases.

I liked the direction that Leslie was taking the Army of the Future concept in 2007. Its unfortunate that the Family of Land Combat Systems initiative went so far off the rails as it did after 2007. Without something like what FLCS was foreshadowing, ADO becomes a pipe dream regardless of how you organize the teams.

We might be a "people" oriented army but IMHO, equipment is the trump card.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Of course all of this Force 2025 thought experiment assumes that we are committed to maintaining traditional, Infantry-heavy Brigades that are designed to take and hold ground against a peer enemy.  

There are other models that have been suggested (Cavalry Brigades, Recce-Strike Brigades, Light Brigades of various flavours, etc.) which would totally change the way we look at our force structure.

While traditionalists would argue that the ability to take and hold ground is the fundamental requirement of success in land warfare, perhaps Canada is in a fairly unique position to adopt a different model.  The direct threats against our homeland are best dealt with by air, sea, cyber and security forces as the threat of direct invasion is virtually non-existent.  We don't have any overseas territories to defend and by definition any military action we undertake overseas in defence of our allies will be by definition fought alongside allies.  

If our peer fights are always going to be expeditionary and part of a coalition and all of our coalition partners have traditional Infantry-heavy Brigades to take and hold the ground, then does that give Canada the opportunity to focus on those other roles and types of structures?

To be honest, I'm not sold one way or the other.  I see definite opportunities for major contributions that could be made by non-traditional formations but at the same time I fear that those same forces would face serious risk due to their lack of "weight" in a major conflict.  

This I think is a fundamental question that needs to be asked and answered before any rational decisions on force structure can be made.


----------



## Infanteer

Taking and holding ground is a fundamental of success in land tactics, but you're talking about Canada's approach to strategy.  Two different things.

I thought the Dandourand strategy ("Canada lives in a fireproof house") was discredited long ago?  If you wish to promote a rules-based international order (a foundational policy of Canada stated again and again) you can't hide behind an ocean.


----------



## dapaterson

Yeah, but Canada has three oceans to hide behind.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> Taking and holding ground is a fundamental of success in land tactics, but you're talking about Canada's approach to strategy.  Two different things.
> 
> I thought the Dandourand strategy ("Canada lives in a fireproof house") was discredited long ago?  If you wish to promote a rules-based international order (a foundational policy of Canada stated again and again) you can't hide behind an ocean.


Clearly Sen. Dandurand was wrong in his assertion that Canada is “a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.”.  Numerous events in the last decades have clearly shown that to be untrue.

However, the tools required to fight fires in our "house" (direct threats to Canada) may be different than the tools required to fight fires in our "neighbourhood" (threats to our broader interests).  

Are traditional Infantry Brigades required for the direct defence of Canada?  Or are the threats we realistically face best countered by the RCAF, RCN, BMD, Security forces, cyber defence, political action, etc.?

For broader threats against our national interests, some situations may suite lighter, non-traditional forces.  Many would argue that counter-insurgencies are better handled by Special Forces, Security Assistance forces and specific enablers rather than our own boots on the ground.  Other situations (North Korea and Ukraine for example) however do require the ability to take and hold ground.  The question then is it necessary that Canada provide that specific capability, or could Canada instead provide valuable other capabilities that support and enable our coalition partners to successfully fulfill that role?  

A refocusing of our capabilities toward non-traditional Brigade structures doesn't mean that we have to abandon the traditional capability altogether, but perhaps that specific role could be shifted to our Reserve forces for use when absolutely required.  

I think these are important fundamental questions to ask.


----------



## Kirkhill

While we debate how we are going to organize our World War 1 technologies by 2025




> Aug. 12 (UPI) -- The U.S. Army says it's developed a combat-capable prototype of a high-energy laser weapon.
> 
> The laser, which has been 24 months in the making, can be mounted on a Stryker military vehicle and used to defend troops against drones as well as rockets, artillery and mortars, according to an Army press release this week.





> The Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office said it expects to deliver a platoon of four laser-equipped Strykers in fiscal year 2022.





> The shoot-off was a competition between defense contractors Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, which had both developed two 50-kilowatt laser weapons, Task & Purpose reported.





> The Directed Energy-Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense laser prototype





> Last year, the Navy broke ground on a facility to test, fire and evaluate complete laser weapons systems in maritime settings.
> 
> Earlier this year, the Air Force said it would continue tests of its High Energy Laser Weapon System 2, made by Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, that would also be used against drones.
> 
> The military had originally hoped to use laser-equipped Strykers in Iraq and Syria against explosive-laden drones but now plans to use the technology in Europe where military planners short-range air defense gap.
> 
> The Army is also working on a larger 300 kilowatt truck-mounted laser to defend against cruise missiles that it hopes to have ready by 2024.











						Army successfully tests high-energy laser weapon
					

The U.S. Army says it's developed a combat-capable prototype of a high-energy laser weapon.




					www.upi.com
				




Littoral Combat Regiments

500 km battalions

Microwave and Laser Air Defence Systems

Mature Precision Strike Environments

Swarms of 40mm UGL Drones with 20 km ranges


And we're not sure about Carl Gustavs, ATGMs and Helicopters.










						Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR)
					

A Marine Littoral Regiment will be a self-deployable, multi-domain force optimized for the contact and blunt layers.  It will persistently operate across the competition continuum to support the Joint



					www.marines.mil
				












						Laser directed energy weapons likely to receive the most investment in future: Poll
					

Verdict has conducted a poll to assess the form of directed energy weapons that is likely to receive the most investment going forward.




					www.airforce-technology.com
				












						Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles and the U.S. Marine Corps: Options Available - Naval News
					

Peter Ong reports on the Land-Based Anti-Ship Missile (LBASM) options on the table for the USMC and US Army ground forces to use against threatening enemy ships, with the latest from Virtual Modern Day Marine Expo 2020.




					www.navalnews.com
				









						Air | DEFENDTEX
					






					www.defendtex.com
				





And the RCAF has to contend with not just a pilotless air force but a runway free air force.  A 4000 km, pilotless "fighter-bomber-ISR" that, together with its launcher, fits inside a Sea-Can.










						This Containerized Launcher For The XQ-58A Valkyrie Combat Drone Could Be A Game Changer
					

The system would be air, rail, road, or sea transportable, allowing for long-range, hard-hitting drone swarms to make unpredictable attacks.




					www.thedrive.com
				









						Containerized Launcher for XQ-58A Valkyrie – UAS VISION
					






					www.uasvision.com
				












						Air Force's Secretive XQ-58A Valkyrie Experimental Combat Drone Emerges After First Flight
					

The QX-58 may lead to a whole new class of highly-flexible and affordable unmanned combat air vehicles that could revolutionize how the USAF fights.




					www.thedrive.com
				




The prototype has already been retired and the factory in Indiana  Oklahoma City  has opened.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Yeah, but Canada has three oceans,* and the greatest military power in history who happens to be a close neighbour, *to hide behind.



There, FTFY


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Clearly Sen. Dandurand was wrong in his assertion that Canada is “a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.”.  Numerous events in the last decades have clearly shown that to be untrue.
> 
> However, the tools required to fight fires in our "house" (direct threats to Canada) may be different than the tools required to fight fires in our "neighbourhood" (threats to our broader interests).
> 
> Are traditional Infantry Brigades required for the direct defence of Canada?  Or are the threats we realistically face best countered by the RCAF, RCN, BMD, Security forces, cyber defence, political action, etc.?
> 
> For broader threats against our national interests, some situations may suite lighter, non-traditional forces.  Many would argue that counter-insurgencies are better handled by Special Forces, Security Assistance forces and specific enablers rather than our own boots on the ground.  Other situations (North Korea and Ukraine for example) however do require the ability to take and hold ground.  The question then is it necessary that Canada provide that specific capability, or could Canada instead provide valuable other capabilities that support and enable our coalition partners to successfully fulfill that role?
> 
> A refocusing of our capabilities toward non-traditional Brigade structures doesn't mean that we have to abandon the traditional capability altogether, but perhaps that specific role could be shifted to our Reserve forces for use when absolutely required.
> 
> I think these are important fundamental questions to ask.






Infanteer said:


> Taking and holding ground is a fundamental of success in land tactics, but you're talking about Canada's approach to strategy.  Two different things.
> 
> I thought the Dandourand strategy ("Canada lives in a fireproof house") was discredited long ago?  If you wish to promote a rules-based international order (a foundational policy of Canada stated again and again) you can't hide behind an ocean.




Taking Ground.  Holding Ground.  

Surely we are talking about two different things here?

And is infantry the right tool?  Or, another way of looking at that is, "are we giving our infantry the right tools".



I'm going to focus on the Defence.  After all, it is the Department of National Defence that holds the cards here.  Not the Department of National Offence or even the Department of War.

Defence is all about Holding Ground.

If the ground is held by an Anti-Aircraft Battery is it held?

"The defending Argentine forces (at Goose Green), known as Task Force Mercedes, consisted of two companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Piaggi's 12th Infantry Regiment (12IR); his third company (Company B) was still deployed on Mount Kent as "Combat Team Solari" and only re-joined 12IR after the fall of Goose Green airfield.[15] The task force also contained a company of the ranger-type 25th Infantry Regiment (25th _Special_ Infantry Regiment or 25IR).[16] *Air defence was provided by a battery of six 20 mm Rheinmetall anti-aircraft guns, manned by air force personnel and two radar-guided Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns from the 601st Anti-Aircraft Battalion. Both the 20mm and 35mm anti-aircraft cannon could also be used in a direct fire ground support role, and this was the case in the last stages of the fighting.* There was also one battery of three OTO Melara Mod 56 105 mm pack howitzers from the 4th Airborne Artillery Regiment.


If we are in the business of Defending, both our allies and ourselves, shouldn't we be focusing more on those systems that can be rapidly deployed in the run up to a crisis and employed to discourage the crisis?  

Things that are designed not so much to retake that which is lost but designed to prevent the other chap taking it in the first place?

Things that are designed to break up the attacking forces and render them less capable?  Less of a threat regardless of their intentions?
It is debated what the actual ratio of attackers to defenders should be, and at Goose Green the numbers favoured the defenders.  It is also argued that offensive action is a vital component of any defence and that defence should not be static but based on manoeuvre.

But.

Inherently defence requires fewer bodies and enjoys the advantages of prepositioning, internal lines of communications, netting and good logistics.  And supplying a solid base for short range sallies.



I was thinking of disparaging Colin's suggestion for a small calibre auto-cannon for reserve Anti-Air troops.  Now I am re-thinking that rapid judgement.

A VSHORAD battery of 35mm, or even 25mm emplaceable cannons, supplementing an Anti Air element (Missiles and Direct Energy Systems)  would be a very useful core around which to build a light infantry battle group.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Before you re-design the Reserves and their roles, I seriously suggest you hire a competent firm to do anonymous entrance, serving and exit surveys to find out why people in this generation are joining, staying and leaving. You can have the best designed plan from a military point of view but no one to implement it because you have alienated why people join and stay.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> ... "The defending Argentine forces (at Goose Green), known as Task Force Mercedes, consisted of ... *Air defence was provided by a battery of six 20 mm Rheinmetall anti-aircraft guns, manned by air force personnel and two radar-guided Oerlikon 35 mm anti-aircraft guns from the 601st Anti-Aircraft Battalion. Both the 20mm and 35mm anti-aircraft cannon could also be used in a direct fire ground support role, and this was the case in the last stages of the fighting.*



It's not surprising that the Argentinians would be using Air Force anti-aircraft organizations. They took their cue from the Prussian and German armies over the years and during WW2 much of the German anti-aircraft resources were part of the German Luftwaffe. These were principally units tied to airfields, industrial areas and other more stationary strategic installations while army air defence resources were more oriented towards the tactical mobile field force. Argentina still divides its air defence resources as between the army and air force (and for that matter the navy whose ships provide air defence). It seems like Canada's Air Force finds spending money on ground based air field and strategic air defence beneath it. (But so does the Army - go figure   - at least the Cdn Navy still cares.)



Colin Parkinson said:


> Before you re-design the Reserves and their roles, I seriously suggest you hire a competent firm to do anonymous entrance, serving and exit surveys to find out why people in this generation are joining, staying and leaving. You can have the best designed plan from a military point of view but no one to implement it because you have alienated why people join and stay.



That's working it ass backwards. What people want to join is secondary to what is needed. The overarching question should always be: what do we need that could be provided by way of reservists? You then structure the system so that it becomes desirable for individuals to join and serve (and yes a good survey and study will help with that) in these newer units.

I agree with you though that we currently have a lot of folks in trades that they enjoy and want to stay with. That should be catered to as well and that shouldn't be too difficult because everyone that we have in the reserves is in a trade that we will undoubtedly have to keep.

The difficulty is organization and unit affiliation. Simply put we no longer have a need to keep 100 man infantry battalions with everything that entails. We need to figure out a way to consolidate battalions in a way that allows the creation of the efficiency of consolidated units while leaving vestiges of historical connections - perhaps something as inelegant as a named infantry battalions and armoured/cavalry regiments with companies/squadrons that each retain the title, uniforms and customs of their predecessors but without a need for their own CO, RSM and honouraries. Artillery was always built around numbered batteries and can be consolidated into fewer regiments based on the retention of the more senior batteries in each geographic region.

I agree that willy-nilly reorganization does not make sense. There must be a plan and a purpose that clearly guides the way. For Force 2025 to be successful in general, there needs to be a clear path drawn to the force structure beyond 2025. Even if we won't have the equipment for cavalry regiments or loitering munitions or precision rocket units or whatever capabilities we see as necessary, organizational groupings overall and the doctrinal role of the reserves needs to be clearly articulated to show the ultimate structure and the path that Force 2025 will take to get us there.

Force 2025's greatest failure will be if it looks specifically at concrete changes for the Reg F and leaves the Res F in limbo in its current morass as an add-on project at a later date.

I do wonder if Gen Eyre's promotion will rob the Army of a visionary or help the Army by having him in a position where actual change can be effected.  

🍻


----------



## CBH99

Question for those far more familiar with force structure than I am.  

I realize a true integrated AD network involves a lot of radars, targeting information, redundancy of systems, ability to project false targets to aircraft, potentially complicated C2, and the weapon systems themselves.  It isn’t as simple as some folks imagine.

That being said…are we over complicating this??

- Do we need any kind of high altitude AD system like Patriot, or can we safely assume that level of AD capability will be present?  (While true we don’t want to rely on allies for everything, we also don’t want to replicate capabilities, nor acquire a capability we won’t use because someone else has that covered.)

- Are we defending our forces from helicopters?  Drones?  Fighter aircraft?   I’d reckon all 3.  

Should we keep it as simple as possible and acquire a modern, easy to use system that can engage helicopters and drones, and the odd unlucky low flying fighter?  Or should we pursue a layered capability that includes Patriot type capabilities, right down to a radar guided gun to swat away drones?  

Personally I think we should buy a modern, lethal, easy to use MANPAD system so our troops can engage low flying aircraft.  Use the same system in a mounted role on a vehicle designed for AD.  (Even if it’s a LAV with a radar, a few missiles and a gun system.)


Something in the air that isn’t ours?  Take it out.  Keep it simple.  

Whoever controls the air really does control the battle.  And if the enemy can’t use helicopters to transport their troops, or use drones to target/engage us, it makes life for us far easier.  

High flying & fast jets will be an Air Force problem anyway.  Airfield AD could be done by something already in service and proven, like Iron Dome.



Are we over complicating this?


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> Question for those far more familiar with force structure than I am.
> 
> I realize a true integrated AD network involves a lot of radars, targeting information, redundancy of systems, ability to project false targets to aircraft, potentially complicated C2, and the weapon systems themselves.  It isn’t as simple as some folks imagine.
> 
> That being said…are we over complicating this??


Not really. Think back again to the system which we had. ADATS was a laser guided missile with a range of about 6 miles, It was complimented by the shoulder launched Javelin command link guided missile with a range of around 3 miles. (Forget about the Oerlikon gun systems which were really only static airfield air defence albeit good at it)

That system is barely sufficient to cover a brigade area with a large enough bubble/barrier to deal with attack helicopters and some air to ground attack aircraft. Most air to surface missiles, even then, could be launched and guided from well outside that stand-off range.


CBH99 said:


> - Do we need any kind of high altitude AD system like Patriot, or can we safely assume that level of AD capability will be present?  (While true we don’t want to rely on allies for everything, we also don’t want to replicate capabilities, nor acquire a capability we won’t use because someone else has that covered.)


Our air defence capability always assumed that we would be working as a low level component of a higher level system provided by the US or Germans.


CBH99 said:


> - Are we defending our forces from helicopters?  Drones?  Fighter aircraft?   I’d reckon all 3.


In the past helicopters and fighter/bomber aircraft. Drones were never a big issue. The current GBAD system deals with all three as well as incoming missiles (whether air or ground launched) which will undoubtedly require either one piece of equipment with different weapon systems that are tailored to meet various threats with an economy of effort or several differing systems each designed to deal with a specific threat. You do not want to waste the very few high end missiles on low cost/low capability drones which can be engaged by less expensive systems.


CBH99 said:


> Should we keep it as simple as possible and acquire a modern, easy to use system that can engage helicopters and drones, and the odd unlucky low flying fighter?  Or should we pursue a layered capability that includes Patriot type capabilities, right down to a radar guided gun to swat away drones?


Simple is good but it ain't that simple. AD is heavily dependent on sophisticated target acquisition systems that can pick up various threats and quickly analyze them as friend/foe, then link to gun/missile/laser/etc systems that are within the target envelope and can engage rapidly before the enemy threat either exits the envelope or completes its attack. That requires 1) sophisticated airspace management and control structures; 2) sophisticated target acquisition systems; 3) sophisticated target engagement capabilities; and 4) a reliable and hack/suppression proof data link backbone.


CBH99 said:


> Personally I think we should buy a modern, lethal, easy to use MANPAD system so our troops can engage low flying aircraft.  Use the same system in a mounted role on a vehicle designed for AD.  (Even if it’s a LAV with a radar, a few missiles and a gun system.)


Manpads have their role but are too expensive for small threats which nonetheless can cause catastrophic damage. (By expensive I mean not so much the cost - although that is a factor - but I mean that you have too few of these systems and therefore will likely run out of them before the enemy runs out of attack systems) I'm no air defence expert - during my day we gunners dabbled in air defence (with blowpipe and Boffin) and I transferred out before we started getting serious about it - but to me air defence capabilities will consist of a suite of defence systems with a common target acquisition and command and control system.

You can't simply hand air defence systems out like M72s to everyone as things are now - at least not for helicopters, fast air and missiles. At some point we might have a defensive - probably vehicle borne - weapon system that will effectively engage drones on close in surveillance or attack runs but we don't have them now.


CBH99 said:


> Something in the air that isn’t ours?  Take it out.  Keep it simple.
> 
> Whoever controls the air really does control the battle.  And if the enemy can’t use helicopters to transport their troops, or use drones to target/engage us, it makes life for us far easier.


That's the objective. The road to that objective is far from simple.


CBH99 said:


> High flying & fast jets will be an Air Force problem anyway.


Don't count on the air force - they have their own problems. You need guaranteed 100% response - that's one thing that the air forces can't provide.


CBH99 said:


> Airfield AD could be done by something already in service and proven, like Iron Dome.


Airfields are a much simpler problem because they occupy very little space compared to a field formation, don't move, and can be defended with heavy sophisticated machinery that generally isn't too suitable for manoeuvre formation employment.


CBH99 said:


> Are we over complicating this?


Nope. We aren't. Drone technology, long range precision guided weapons and the such have greatly complicated the problem since the 1980s to the 2010s when we had the kit. 

I've been an advocate for quite a while in off loading such things as artillery and air defence on the reserves because these are capabilities that you do not need to use or even train on every day. On top of that the equipment is such that the procedures for the usage of these types of systems can be taught as easily repetitive drills that people can learn and master part-time (much of the job is ammo handling and moving and positioning the system after which target engagement is getting more and more automated) The key, however, is that such equipment is getting dreadfully expensive, needs full-time maintainers with fairly high skills, and need very well-trained and well experienced full-time leaders. This means it is not gear that you can buy at the last moment and hand out to people as the board the Airbus on the way overseas. 

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> Before you re-design the Reserves and their roles, I seriously suggest you hire a competent firm to do anonymous entrance, serving and exit surveys to find out why people in this generation are joining, staying and leaving. You can have the best designed plan from a military point of view but no one to implement it because you have alienated why people join and stay.



Easy:

- Why do they join? Money, personal challenge, team atmosphere, fun, patriotism.

- Why do they leave? Boring and poorly supported training disconnected from any higher purpose, inconsistent leadership, broken promises, probelms getting courses and zero deployments, and negligent administration.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Easy:
> 
> - Why do they join? Money, personal challenge, team atmosphere, fun, patriotism.
> 
> - Why do they leave? Boring and poorly supported training disconnected from any higher purpose, inconsistent leadership, broken promises, probelms getting courses and zero deployments, and negligent administration.


Well, that's worth at least a $150,000 consultant's fee.

For a mere $5,000,000 more we'll provide DND/CAF with solutions.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Well, that's worth at least a $150,000 consultant's fee.
> 
> For a mere $5,000,000 more we'll provide DND/CAF with solutions.


Are they supplying the watch?  $5,000,000 sounds heavily discounted.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Are they supplying the watch?  $5,000,000 sounds heavily discounted.


----------



## suffolkowner

On Air defence Corporal Frisk examines Finlands procurement plan. Sea Ceptor/Land Ceptor point defence commonality for Canada?









						Finnish Land Ceptor – MBDA Aiming High in ITSUKO
					

After half a decade of talking fighters under the auspice of the HX-programme, much has already been said. Which meant that ironically enough, the most interesting piece of kit at the Kaivari 21 ai…




					corporalfrisk.com
				




I think we might or someone is over complicating it. 

IM-SHORAD just do it! Only question in my mind is the addition of a 30mm too much from a logistics standpoint for a small niche capability

NASAAMS2/3 or similar like the above Land Ceptor/CAMMER just do it!


----------



## SeaKingTacco

suffolkowner said:


> On Air defence Corporal Frisk examines Finlands procurement plan. Sea Ceptor/Land Ceptor point defence commonality for Canada?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Finnish Land Ceptor – MBDA Aiming High in ITSUKO
> 
> 
> After half a decade of talking fighters under the auspice of the HX-programme, much has already been said. Which meant that ironically enough, the most interesting piece of kit at the Kaivari 21 ai…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> corporalfrisk.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think we might or someone is over complicating it.
> 
> IM-SHORAD just do it! Only question in my mind is the addition of a 30mm too much from a logistics standpoint for a small niche capability
> 
> NASAAMS2/3 or similar like the above Land Ceptor/CAMMER just do it!


If it can be used on land, we should go for it. The RCN is already buying it, which means the ammunition will be qualified into Canadian service.

Sharing missile rounds between the Army and the Navy makes sense to me!


----------



## GR66

The same Moog RIwP RWS used on the IM-SHORAD can accommodate a wide variety of weapons.  If you want commonality with our existing weapons it can be mounted with the same M242 Bushmaster 25mm as the LAV or you could go with .50 cal for more/cheaper ammo.

The IM-SHORAD uses a quad Stinger launcher and a dual Hellfire launcher, but we could go with the Stingers and a quad Coyote counter-drone interceptor instead to focus on smaller threats and go with a battery of the CAMM launchers mentioned above for the larger threats.

One thing I do hope though is that whatever SHORAD system we end up with we integrate it into a system of systems.  We should have our own UAVs  and counter-battery radars to identify enemy systems that seek to take our our SHORAD launchers and neutralize them with our own loitering munitions/precision fires/anti-radiation missiles/EW systems.  No point spending all that money on an AD system just to see them knocked out 2 minutes after they start radiating.


----------



## Kirkhill

All of the Air Force inventory of missiles can be ground launched - A!M-120, AIM-9, CRV-7 (APKWS)
As can the RCN's ESSM.  

NASAMS has got them covered.

I wonder if the real discussion is who is going to pay for the replacements when the RCA starts eating up RCAF and RCN inventory.  Because the missiles have already been cleared for Canadian service and are in inventory and the supply chain.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I've been an advocate for quite a while in off loading such things as artillery and air defence on the reserves because these are capabilities that you do not need to use or even train on every day. On top of that the equipment is such that the procedures for the usage of these types of systems can be taught as easily repetitive drills that people can learn and master part-time (much of the job is ammo handling and moving and positioning the system after which target engagement is getting more and more automated) The key, however, is that such equipment is getting dreadfully expensive, needs full-time maintainers with fairly high skills, and need very well-trained and well experienced full-time leaders. This means it is not gear that you can buy at the last moment and hand out to people as the board the Airbus on the way overseas.
> 
> 🍻


I agree that something like a CAMM-based AD system that targets larger UAVs, helicopters and fast air would be well suited to the Reserves, but I think an argument could be made that AD capability against smaller UAVs might be required for any deployment so should be a Reg Force capability (with the ability for the Reserves to expand the capability in a major conflict).  

It may not require full vehicle-borne AD batteries, but perhaps at least a hand-held (microwave?) capability might be needed for the CS Companies or even in the Platoon "weapons locker".  Or maybe with the low cost and easy availability of small UAVs that can even be used as loitering munitions does require something more robust for all deployments.


----------



## Kirkhill

Given what we're seeing on TV these days I am inclined to go back and revisit our discussion about Big Honking Ships / RoRo Ferries / Joint Support Ships / Floating Warehouses-Hotels-Garages-Hospitals-Command Centres.

And I know the JSS won't float in Bagram.


But how about the Baltics? Black Sea? North Sea? Med? Taiwan-Japan-Korea? Singapore-Malaysia? Aden? Qatar? Oman?

Just how much can we rely on our allies?  How do we control our own timings?  Our own deployments?  

Some shade was cast on the notion of having a Plan B for withdrawal.  I am more inclined to see a necessity for maintaining a national ability to withdraw a field force in a timely manner at the hour of our choosing.


Operational Support Hubs (Jamaica, Germany, Dakar, Kenya, Oman, Singapore, and Korea was it?)
Joint Support Ships and iAORs 
More C17s (if they can be rebuilt from the boneyard)
CC150 replacements

And a ROBUST NEO plan.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Given what we're seeing on TV these days I am inclined to go back and revisit our discussion about Big Honking Ships / RoRo Ferries / Joint Support Ships / Floating Warehouses-Hotels-Garages-Hospitals-Command Centres.
> 
> And I know the JSS won't float in Bagram.
> 
> 
> But how about the *Baltics? Black Sea? North Sea? Med? Taiwan-Japan-Korea? Singapore-Malaysia? Aden? Qatar? Oman?*
> 
> Just how much can we rely on our allies?  How do we control our own timings?  Our own deployments?
> 
> Some shade was cast on the notion of having a Plan B for withdrawal.  I am more inclined to see a necessity for maintaining a national ability to withdraw a field force in a timely manner at the hour of our choosing.
> 
> 
> Operational Support Hubs (Jamaica, Germany, Dakar, Kenya, Oman, Singapore, and Korea was it?)
> Joint Support Ships and iAORs
> More C17s (if they can be rebuilt from the boneyard)
> CC150 replacements
> 
> And a ROBUST NEO plan.



Based on what the Navy used to tell me, the pre-requisite for having any kind of shipping roaming around freely in these 'bathtubs', fairly constrained watery areas, is overwhelming air superiority. This means lots of either land or carrier based aircraft.

As the Repulse and Prince of Wales discovered in WW2 Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse - Wikipedia


----------



## Kirkhill

Seen.  But in the absence of a navy, or even a ship, then you are looking at Hong Kong and Singapore.  The navy lost ships at Crete and Dunkirk.  But at least some of the army got off.

If the army is going to be put at risk going into situations that can turn sour on 36 hours notice, in the absence of air cover, doesn't it make sense to keep a back door open?  Or are soldiers less valuable than sailors?


----------



## GR66

Canada is essentially an island.  As much as my heart is with the Army, the bulk of our defence budget should be focused on the RCAF and RCN.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Canada is essentially an island.  As much as my heart is with the Army, the bulk of our defence budget should be focused on the RCAF and RCN.


No problem.  Don't send troops.  Send planes. And drones.  And lots of isr assets.

And keep the navy out of the world's bathtubs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Canada is essentially an island.  As much as my heart is with the Army, the bulk of our defence budget should be focused on the RCAF and RCN.



We tried that before. 

Then they had to create a 'super heavy' casualty rate to describe what our Infantry was experiencing.


----------



## Dale Denton

Not sure if this belongs in this thread, please re-direct if it doesn't.

I've been reading up on the UKs Very High Readiness response in Kabul, and Canada sending SOF there as well and I have some questions. Are we using SOF too often, and for too many varying jobs? Would the subdelegation and divestment from SOF to a very high readiness light infantry unit be of better use? Frees up SOF for the many other skills they need to continue to hone.  

A non-SOF unit that acts more like a PARA/OSONS-ish/Pathfinder/Ranger/Raider elite light infantry unit to spearhead operations. Designate an existing battalion with the job, keep it small at first, equip it for a lite-SOF job. Give them OSONS patches and pair them with the many similar existing units for training. Netherlands Marine Corps, RM, US Rangers, Pathfinders, LRRP - whomever. 

Similar in the way the Australians designated 2RAR for amphibious operations, but make it a fast moving VHR unit instead.


----------



## daftandbarmy

LoboCanada said:


> Not sure if this belongs in this thread, please re-direct if it doesn't.
> 
> I've been reading up on the UKs Very High Readiness response in Kabul, and Canada sending SOF there as well and I have some questions. Are we using SOF too often, and for too many varying jobs? Would the subdelegation and divestment from SOF to a very high readiness light infantry unit be of better use? Frees up SOF for the many other skills they need to continue to hone.
> 
> A non-SOF unit that acts more like a PARA/OSONS-ish/Pathfinder/Ranger/Raider elite light infantry unit to spearhead operations. Designate an existing battalion with the job, keep it small at first, equip it for a lite-SOF job. Give them OSONS patches and pair them with the many similar existing units for training. Netherlands Marine Corps, RM, US Rangers, Pathfinders, LRRP - whomever.
> 
> Similar in the way the Australians designated 2RAR for amphibious operations, but make it a fast moving VHR unit instead.



Like say, and I'm just spit balling here, a Light Infantry centred Battle Group?


----------



## FJAG

I've been an advocate of an asynchronous army tiered into light, medium and heavy components for a long time. In all my permutations of such a force, the light force is located in Petawawa for exactly the reason that it should be organized and trained in conjunction with both TF-2 and the CSOR. I'm not to the point where they are part of the same command, or what roles go to whom, as I'm still of the view that a light brigade has value separate and apart from a special operations organization (and to continue to be a model for reserve light brigades). They should, however, be organized and trained in such a way that they can rapidly reinforce a special ops mission with additional and heavier equipped elements if and when the need arises.

That still leaves the question of whether or not we need a Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) capability. LCol Peterson in his recent article on an asynchronous army suggests that 2 RCR in Gagetown be converted and reorganized into a multi-disciplinary SFCB battalion which he locates in Gagetown under the CCSB (and thereby collocated with the Combat Arms School which is a terrific idea for many reasons). If we haven't already learned the lesson then the outcome of Afghanistan should teach us that capacity building is a specialized task that needs to be in the hands of people who are trained and organized for it and who can develop the doctrine for such missions. It should not be a secondary or tertiary duty for other units albeit other units, both regular and reserve can be tasked to augment such missions from time to time.

While he leaves the light brigade with three light battalions, I see nothing wrong with the idea that such a brigade could be reduced to two or even one regular force battalion while the remaining components are reserves. The key is knowing exactly how large a force the brigade will need to deploy as a rapid reaction capability and having enough ready, full-time elements to meet that need. It may be that ordinarily all that is needed is a combat team while in extreme circumstances a battle group is required.

Yup. I think you are in the right thread. All of these ideas should be in play and be considered for Force 2025.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Agreed that it is the right thread.  And agree with FJAG, D&B and GR66.  The Robust NEO role is certainly up there as far as a critical requirement is concerned and it should be collocated and associated with CANSOFCOM while still part of the Army.

That takes care of one "independent" brigade.

For the other two.  I note that the WW2 UK/Cdn Armoured Divisions were 2 Brigade Divisions (one 3 regiment Armoured and one 3 battalion motorized infantry).  Each division also had its Divisional Support troops.

CANSOFCOM associated Army Light Brigade
1x Mechanized Division of 2 Mech Brigades and a Cbt Spt Bde.

Add reserves to suit.

Now for the next question - who would we send to maintain support in the field for the Northern Alliance for the next 20 years?  And how many?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Agreed that it is the right thread.  And agree with FJAG, D&B and GR66.  The Robust NEO role is certainly up there as far as a critical requirement is concerned and it should be collocated and associated with CANSOFCOM while still part of the Army.
> 
> That takes care of one "independent" brigade.



FWIW, our 'NEO Brigade' structure was quite large and was based on the worst case assumption that you would have to do a non-permissive 'break and enter' operation to gain access to a failing/failed state, usually via an airport.

2 x Parachute Battalions were to capture the immediate airfield by parachute assault, then up to three other Infantry bns (plus a wide range of atts and dets including arty) would fly in and take charge of the 'footprint'. There are those here who know alot more than I do about this bit, but it's the oval shaped area around the airport that might be used to fire SAMs at aircraft. This is a huge area.

Following, company group sized task forces (with light armour etc) would deploy to various places to extract the UK nationals. Helicopters or host nation transport would be available, in theory anyways. Where a hostage situation was in progress, SOF would be attached to help deal with that.

All that to say it's probably a bigger commitment than just one standard Brigade, and it's probably not a SOFCOMM led thing.


----------



## Kirkhill

Lt armour meaning the 8 tonne Scimitar/Scorpion CVR(T)s?  Roughly the same weight as the JLTVs?  With 3 to 4 of them equalling one LAV 6?  2 per Herc?  I per CH-47?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Lt armour meaning the 8 tonne Scimitar/Scorpion CVR(T)s?  Roughly the same weight as the JLTVs?  With 3 to 4 of them equalling one LAV 6?  2 per Herc?  I per CH-47?



Yup. They were awesome. 

That BV was worth the trouble  

No idea if they still use them or not though.


----------



## Dale Denton

Format changed for ease of reading.


To break the specialization down further and spread out the Very-High Readiness (VHR) burden on people down even further, you could have each Regt. have an assigned speciality and rotate on a 3 month VHR schedule:

1st Battalion have a specialization in Arctic warfare, LRRP and or/a Light Mounted Raider/Defender role.​Give them everything from the Domestic Arctic Mobility Enhancement (BV206 replacement) and Tactical Mobility Platform (MRZRs) projects.

2nd Battalion has a specialization in all things airborne/heliborne _(i.e. HALO, HAHO, etc...)_​NEO specialists?

3rd Battalion has a specialization in Amphib, Littoral and Beachhead fortification.all things airborne/heliborne _(i.e. HALO, HAHO, etc...)_​A pacific/counter Chinese policy tilt with a new LHA/LHD for HADR and totally non-violent stuff 


All are trained and proficient in Mechanized Infantry and split into FJAGs Light/Med/Heavy split.

Political win for a _reinvention_ of a "cold war culture and organisation" and a bonus for cheaply re-equipping the 'grunts on the ground'.

Would buy gov't time to delay expensive mobile fires projects and would be an easy win and quick result compared to a Navy demanding 15 CSCs and RCAF demanding 88 jets.


----------



## Kirkhill

Coming back to Force Structure from the General Officer excursion into the capabilities of the lower ranks -

Some examples from the USMC - 15 Man Squad (3x 4 man teams (4x Automatic Rifles with 1x M320), 1x Squad Ldr, 1x Asst Squad Ldr (Joint Fires Trained Observer)/Communicator, 1x Squad Surveillance operator)  One team would be trained on demo and rockets and issued a Carl Gustav.  One team would be trained in drone ops.  One team would be trained in counter-drone ops.  The Squad would also be issued an accurized rifle for the DMR.



> Beyond the equipment and new positions, the Marines in these beefed up squads also are seeing more training. Brower is a qualified joint fires observer. While that’s not a prerequisite for all squad leaders it is a path being pursued for assistant squad leaders within the new formation.
> 
> Siverts and Johnson said they’ve linked up with local artillery trainers to put as many Marines as they can fit into the joint fires primer course. While not the fully certified school, the primer course gets Marines exposed to the concepts and prepared for doing those missions.











						15-Marine rifle squad: An exclusive look inside the future infantry
					

Your first look at the transformation of the rifle squad.




					www.marinecorpstimes.com
				




Meanwhile the Royal Marines 



> The Royal Navy said Vanguard Strike Company will "shape how the Royal Marines Commandos of the future will operate around the globe", and will have access to "game-changing technology and weaponry".
> 
> The service also said company personnel will work in "small, versatile teams" tailored for their mission, delivering "a more agile and lethal capability".
> Traditionally, Royal Marines operate in sections of eight but, as part of the Future Commando Force, Commandos have been testing these smaller groups.
> 
> A training exercise last summer saw 60 Royal Marines from 40 Commando split into three groups while trying to find and fight each other at Bovington Training Area in Dorset.
> Marine Edward Harte, 40 Commando, said they were testing the new concept by "going as four-man teams".
> As well as a change in the number of personnel, these smaller teams also tested the Future Commando Force concept by allowing more autonomy, with the skill set of personnel being tailored to each mission.
> 
> Larger teams have also been trialled – Royal Marines taking part in Littoral Response Group (Experimentation) in Cyprus in October tried operating in groups of 12 rather than eight, allowing for more specialists to be involved.











						Watch: What is the Future Commando Force?
					

The Royal Marines modernisation programme has seen the creation of a new unit, a new uniform, and new technology being tested.




					www.forces.net


----------



## KevinB

Take a look at the US Army Multi Domain Operations 2028


			https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Coming back to Force Structure from the General Officer excursion into the capabilities of the lower ranks -
> 
> Some examples from the USMC - 15 Man Squad (3x 4 man teams (4x Automatic Rifles with 1x M320), 1x Squad Ldr, 1x Asst Squad Ldr (Joint Fires Trained Observer)/Communicator, 1x Squad Surveillance operator)  One team would be trained on demo and rockets and issued a Carl Gustav.  One team would be trained in drone ops.  One team would be trained in counter-drone ops.  The Squad would also be issued an accurized rifle for the DMR.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 15-Marine rifle squad: An exclusive look inside the future infantry
> 
> 
> Your first look at the transformation of the rifle squad.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.marinecorpstimes.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Meanwhile the Royal Marines
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Watch: What is the Future Commando Force?
> 
> 
> The Royal Marines modernisation programme has seen the creation of a new unit, a new uniform, and new technology being tested.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.forces.net



Although it all sounds super sexy and hi tech, the role of the Royal Marine will really not change that much IMHO. They are not Special Forces, nor will they be utilized as such.

I'm sure it's all part of the sales job the Corps has to do to convince the MoD to spend money on upgrading their kit to the standard that similar US forces achieved over a decade ago.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Although it all sounds super sexy and hi tech, the role of the Royal Marine will really not change that much IMHO. They are not Special Forces, nor will they be utilized as such.
> 
> I'm sure it's all part of the sales job the Corps has to do to convince the MoD to spend money on upgrading their kit to the standard that similar US forces achieved over a decade ago.


Man, I've no doubt that there is a great deal of marketing going on in these presentations.

But frankly I'm not really bothered if the Royals go to battle in a short bus or not.  They may or may not be speshul.

That, IMHO, is beside the point.

The point is that what used to be special is becoming more generic.  Common soldiers are being asked to do things that used to be speshul.  They are being asked to operate in manners that were uncommon to line troops a decade or two ago..   And the prospect of them operating in those older manners is receding.   Yes there may be occasional need for the "traditional" operations but, in practice, the demand for those traditional services has been decreasing while the speshul dispersed operations have trended upwards.

Your experience in NI with the 4 man team may be exemplary of the new working environment but I think it is safe to say that not every army (or navy) has experienced operations the same way and still track with their traditional squad/section structure.

The Armies of the world still generally hew to a 6 to 10 man section.

The US Marines have had a lot of experience operating as three fire teams under a squad leader.

Now they are operating as three fire teams under a command cell.

The Royals appear to be looking at two fire teams and a command cell or team as one of their solutions.


My suspicion is that the armies are evolving in parallel with their evolution from lines of muskets to everyman a skirmisher with a long range smokeless rifle.  That which was special is becoming a new norm.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> The point is that what used to be special is becoming more generic. Common soldiers are being asked to do things that used to be speshul. They are being asked to operate in manners that were uncommon to line troops a decade or two ago.. And the prospect of them operating in those older manners is receding. Yes there may be occasional need for the "traditional" operations but, in practice, the demand for those traditional services has been decreasing while the speshul dispersed operations have trended upwards.
> -------------------------------
> My suspicion is that the armies are evolving in parallel with their evolution from lines of muskets to everyman a skirmisher with a long range smokeless rifle.  That which was special is becoming a new norm.


Doctrine defines Capabilities, Capabilities define Requirements, etc
  (in theory)
As tools get added to conventional forces - they are more flexible to assist in former SOF only roles - it doesn't mean that was Special is the new norm -- longer range radios, night vision and ISR capabilities allow conventional forces to operate in a more dispersed environment - and as we have seen from Afghanistan a lot of trickle down tasks ended up in conventional forces -- the US ARMY SFA Brigades, Canadian OMLT/P-OMLT. Heck Afghanistan should have been the centerpiece of SOF/Conventional operations - instead of being inverted and botched.


I don't think that Special Operations are becoming the new conventional norm - but that missions that used to be tasked to SOF outside the "27" key SOF Mission sets which US SOCOM has now distilled into 12 core SOF functions - and honestly it is a an odd list (I suspect SEAL butchery was at play again).   
Someone quick tell the Rangers that Airfield seizure didn't make the cut as a specific task cutout, and got lumped into DA


Direct Action 
Special Reconnaissance
Unconventional Warfare  
Foreign Internal Defense  
Civil Affairs Operations 
Counterterrorism  
Military Information Support Operations 
Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction  
Security Force Assistance 
Counterinsurgency  
Hostage Rescue and Recovery 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance


Of those 12 depending on how you slice the pie - only MISO and HRR are really only SOF specific as while DA sounds cool, it is a Raid, so depending on the level of complexity it may be a SOF mission or not, and SR Missions are really only SOF specific when they get into Low Vis and non permissive AO's.




But for a long time digital and SAT radios, thermal sights, dual tube NV, MFLD and suppressors where SOF only items, or SOF only had access to ISR feeds - after SOF have proved technologies - the cascade effect has occurred - and lead to more capable and employable conventional forces.   In turn those more capable forces - are no longer constrained by older doctrine, and the cycle continues.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Doctrine defines Capabilities, Capabilities define Requirements, etc
> (in theory)
> As tools get added to conventional forces - they are more flexible to assist in former SOF only roles - it doesn't mean that was Special is the new norm -- longer range radios, night vision and ISR capabilities allow conventional forces to operate in a more dispersed environment - and as we have seen from Afghanistan a lot of trickle down tasks ended up in conventional forces -- the US ARMY SFA Brigades, Canadian OMLT/P-OMLT. Heck Afghanistan should have been the centerpiece of SOF/Conventional operations - instead of being inverted and botched.
> 
> 
> I don't think that Special Operations are becoming the new conventional norm - but that missions that used to be tasked to SOF outside the "27" key SOF Mission sets which US SOCOM has now distilled into 12 core SOF functions - and honestly it is a an odd list (I suspect SEAL butchery was at play again).
> Someone quick tell the Rangers that Airfield seizure didn't make the cut as a specific task cutout, and got lumped into DA
> 
> 
> Direct Action
> Special Reconnaissance
> Unconventional Warfare
> Foreign Internal Defense
> Civil Affairs Operations
> Counterterrorism
> Military Information Support Operations
> Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
> Security Force Assistance
> Counterinsurgency
> Hostage Rescue and Recovery
> Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
> 
> 
> Of those 12 depending on how you slice the pie - only MISO and HRR are really only SOF specific as while DA sounds cool, it is a Raid, so depending on the level of complexity it may be a SOF mission or not, and SR Missions are really only SOF specific when they get into Low Vis and non permissive AO's.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But for a long time digital and SAT radios, thermal sights, dual tube NV, MFLD and suppressors where SOF only items, or SOF only had access to ISR feeds - after SOF have proved technologies - the cascade effect has occurred - and lead to more capable and employable conventional forces.   In turn those more capable forces - are no longer constrained by older doctrine, and the cycle continues.


Missed you Kevin.  Glad you're back.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Missed you Kevin.  Glad you're back.


Glad to be back.



LoboCanada said:


> Format changed for ease of reading.
> 
> 
> To break the specialization down further and spread out the Very-High Readiness (VHR) burden on people down even further, you could have each Regt. have an assigned speciality and rotate on a 3 month VHR schedule:
> 
> 1st Battalion have a specialization in Arctic warfare, LRRP and or/a Light Mounted Raider/Defender role.​Give them everything from the Domestic Arctic Mobility Enhancement (BV206 replacement) and Tactical Mobility Platform (MRZRs) projects.
> 
> 2nd Battalion has a specialization in all things airborne/heliborne _(i.e. HALO, HAHO, etc...)_​NEO specialists?
> 
> 3rd Battalion has a specialization in Amphib, Littoral and Beachhead fortification.all things airborne/heliborne _(i.e. HALO, HAHO, etc...)_​A pacific/counter Chinese policy tilt with a new LHA/LHD for HADR and totally non-violent stuff
> 
> 
> All are trained and proficient in Mechanized Infantry and split into FJAGs Light/Med/Heavy split.
> 
> Political win for a _reinvention_ of a "cold war culture and organisation" and a bonus for cheaply re-equipping the 'grunts on the ground'.
> 
> Would buy gov't time to delay expensive mobile fires projects and would be an easy win and quick result compared to a Navy demanding 15 CSCs and RCAF demanding 88 jets.


Part of the issue with Canada is the idea that each of the 3 Infantry Regiments should each get an equal slice of the pie, despite it being geographically foolish.  It also makes the Brigade Groups while "equal" not suited for deployment as a Brigade Group.

Secondly is people thinking they can have a budget for multiple roles for units outside CANSOFCOM.  Frankly there isn't time to train on multiple skill sets for a larger force either.

When 3 PPLCI was chucked thru the blender (10/90 Total Force) and left BC to be reconstituted in Edmonton, the only viable Amphibious training area was lost - when 1 PPLCI was moved from Calgary - the practical distance to the Mountains jumped. 
 When CABC was changed to whatever it is now - and moved from Edmonton to Trenton - the fact the MOI cadre went too was beyond moronic. 
2 PPCLI moving from Winnipeg to Shilo got them a training area.
 When 1 RCR moved from London - at least it got a decent training area in Petawawa.

None of the Brigades even have all three Infantry BN's colocated (- edit I may be wrong with the 22eR - and admittedly don't care enough to see if they are all in Valcatraz.

 But the end state is the Army hasn't given any though to sensible training locations for it forces in quite some time.

You are much better suited to aligning the Regiments toward a role - as opposed to aligning the different #'rd battalions.
    But you also much understand while there is still a requirement for static line jumping in Conventional Forces - the application of HAHO/HALO etc beyond a Pathfinder Det is not warranted - the entire goal of static line jump is to get folks into target where you want them - the entire idea of HAHO/HALO is to give the jumper an ability to alter his course to a DZ (Simplification - but good enough for this discussion).

Lets look at a Hypothetical Mission for NEO in a semi non permissive environment -
   Bad people have started to take over a country - and you have many folks stuck - and now the bad people have control of all the airports in the country.

TO seize an airfield you drop the Para Coy's from the 3rd Bn's (very practical right - lets stop here to get 3VP's, oh stop here to get the Royal, and a stop here to get the Vandoo Company,,,)  and drop them on the airfield -- - 
    Depending on the size of the airfield - it may be a company task - or require more than 3 companies (and remember no HQ or real support since the disbanding of the CAR) 
  Airfield seizures are generally costly -- and frankly that's why you have Rangers  
    You don't want to waste CSOR on an Airfield seizure when they could be assisting JTF-2 in securing hostages or sensitive items, as well as your QRF.


----------



## GR66

Going to throw this out there for the sake of discussion...

There seem to be two views on force structure.  Some propose more dispersed structures with more vehicles and sensors/weapons but less "rifles", while others support the view that you need "weight" in a peer conflict and that means more boots on the ground.

Most day-to-day operations probably support the former, while the risk of conflicts with a peer enemy probably support the latter.

Instead of having dedicated Light/Medium/Heavy units in varying proportions of Reg Force and Reserve units (depending on how likely you believe a peer conflict is to happen), what if you could have a force structure that is flexible and can change from one type to another depending on the threat environment?

The Canadian Army is actually heavy on Armoured Recce squadrons in relation to our doctrine, but Recce units are exactly what you need if you're going to conduct dispersed operations (perhaps mixing in UAV/Loitering munition platforms with our Recce/Surveillance vehicles).  

You could replace one of the Infantry Companies in our LAV Battalions with a Recce Squadron and at the same time drop the 2nd Fire Team from each Infantry Section to give you the kind of Cavalry Battalion that should work well in Counter-Insurgency/Security Assistance type deployments (which are likely to be the most common types of deployments the Canadian Army is likely to face.  

The LAVs from the Infantry Companies that have been displaced by the Recce Squadrons could be provided to the Reserves in each area to give them a platform to train on .  

By grouping together existing Reserve Infantry Regiments into Reserve Brigades (with each Reserve Regiment in Company strength) you could create ongoing affiliations between Reg Force Companies and Reserve Regiments where the Reserve Regiments could Force Generate Infantry Fire Teams which could augment the Reg Force Sections as required for deployments where the more dispersed initial structure is not suitable.

In the case of a major conflict where full mobilization of the Reserves is required, each Reserve Infantry Brigade could be responsible for sending augmentees to bring up the strength of the existing Sections and could also be possible to mobilize a 3rd Battalion for each Regiment using the "Training" LAV Company vehicles.

The system could look something like this:


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Going to throw this out there for the sake of discussion...
> 
> There seem to be two views on force structure.  Some propose more dispersed structures with more vehicles and sensors/weapons but less "rifles", while others support the view that you need "weight" in a peer conflict and that means more boots on the ground.
> 
> Most day-to-day operations probably support the former, while the risk of conflicts with a peer enemy probably support the latter.
> 
> Instead of having dedicated Light/Medium/Heavy units in varying proportions of Reg Force and Reserve units (depending on how likely you believe a peer conflict is to happen), what if you could have a force structure that is flexible and can change from one type to another depending on the threat environment?


One needs to be realistic with the CF.
   3 Brigades isn't much of an Army for a G-7/8 nation.
The LAV is a taxi - and not a very applicable one for a peer/near peer threat.

The CF contributions are always (since WWII) to a coalition -- the best way to structure the CF is to identify what sort of Coalitions you are going to join - and what gaps they might have, or where the best use of the CDN $ would be.

Reserve Integration was a failure in the 90's with the 10/90 Battalions - and the CF isn't a heavy army - so it is honestly best poised as a IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) - a lighter footprint force - which also aligns better to Canadian Territorial defense.

IMHO Canada would be better served by making 1 and 3 VP and 1 and 3 RCR into strict Light Infantry jump capable forces - with the RCR LIB's getting more Airmobile assets - and the VP LIB's focusing on Mountain Operations.
  As well as making those LIB's better able to interoperate with CANSOF.
Those would be your crisis IRF - and the ability to place a Light Brigade world wide ideally inside 72hrs.

 Then push the LAV's to flush out 2 VP and 2 RCR (the geographical orphan BN's) - which both are also at decent training sites for those vehicles.
As well as the Vandoo BN's.  Other LAV's would be keep at the 3 locations for reserve training.

This way you would have 5 LAV BN - and able to deploy with the Armor and supporting army for longer durations and support with reserve augmentation.

Armored Recce is OBE - there is nothing you can do with Armored Recce that you can't do better with Light Troops and support from Aerial/Ground Surveillance.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Glad to be back.
> 
> 
> Part of the issue with Canada is the idea that each of the 3 Infantry Regiments should each get an equal slice of the pie, despite it being geographically foolish.  It also makes the Brigade Groups while "equal" not suited for deployment as a Brigade Group.
> 
> Secondly is people thinking they can have a budget for multiple roles for units outside CANSOFCOM.  Frankly there isn't time to train on multiple skill sets for a larger force either.
> 
> ...


Kevin - welcome back. 

In your absence (although maybe you've been following some of these threads) we've been hashing around the Army's force structure quite a bit.

Just to capsulate some of that, there's been a fair bit of discussion about the fact that the Army's current three symmetric brigades is a poor structure for many reasons. While there is some disagreement on what should be the right structure, I tend to side with this article found in the most recent Canadian Army Journal on pg 48. We need an asymmetric force with a light, heavy and medium capability. I tend not to go into details of the forces' internal structures as that ought to be a product of a doctrine which we haven't examined or written yet.

My own views also tend to straddle the view that we have entirely too many human resources wasted on the administration of the total force. By administration I mean the bureaucracy behind administration and not the logistics and sustainment side which I consider to be under resourced. I tend to believe that for some 26 billion dollars per year Canada should have greater defence outputs than it can currently muster. One way of converting wasted dollars into better capabilities is to cut the very high volume of full-time positions currently allocated to administrative overhead and reallocate the funds to equipment which is desperately needed. A military is a balance of the right expenditures on personnel, equipment and operations and maintenance and currently Canada's high personnel expenditures cripple the other two components.

In hand with that is to strengthen the reserve force to make it more capable. We do need personnel but many of them can be "in reserve". That requires a bottom up redesign of the entire reserve (and in large measure the regular) organization. For your light reading I've published an article in the Canadian Military Journal on the subject which gives a snapshot view of the issues involved. I've never been too fond of that article because of it's space restraints so developed it into a short book - Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis.

Cheers - and once again, welcome back.

🍻


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> One needs to be realistic with the CF.
> 3 Brigades isn't much of an Army for a G-7/8 nation.
> The LAV is a taxi - and not a very applicable one for a peer/near peer threat.
> 
> The CF contributions are always (since WWII) to a coalition -- the best way to structure the CF is to identify what sort of Coalitions you are going to join - and what gaps they might have, or where the best use of the CDN $ would be.
> 
> Reserve Integration was a failure in the 90's with the 10/90 Battalions - and the CF isn't a heavy army - so it is honestly best poised as a IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) - a lighter footprint force - which also aligns better to Canadian Territorial defense.
> 
> IMHO Canada would be better served by making 1 and 3 VP and 1 and 3 RCR into strict Light Infantry jump capable forces - with the RCR LIB's getting more Airmobile assets - and the VP LIB's focusing on Mountain Operations.
> As well as making those LIB's better able to interoperate with CANSOF.
> Those would be your crisis IRF - and the ability to place a Light Brigade world wide ideally inside 72hrs.
> 
> Then push the LAV's to flush out 2 VP and 2 RCR (the geographical orphan BN's) - which both are also at decent training sites for those vehicles.
> As well as the Vandoo BN's.  Other LAV's would be keep at the 3 locations for reserve training.
> 
> This way you would have 5 LAV BN - and able to deploy with the Armor and supporting army for longer durations and support with reserve augmentation.
> 
> Armored Recce is OBE - there is nothing you can do with Armored Recce that you can't do better with Light Troops and support from Aerial/Ground Surveillance.


Question about your proposal above (which I find practical & doable, and a better use of our current resources)

You mention making 1 and 3VP + 1 and 3RCR into strict light infantry battalions that are jump capable.  Then you mention pushing the LAV's to flush out 2VP and 2RCR, partially because they are both located at decent training sites.


Are you suggesting reducing the number of LAV's available to 1 and 3 battalions, both VP and RCR?  Or eliminating them entirely from those units, and pushing them to 2VP and 2RCR to be LAV heavy units with a decent number of spare vehicles/parts?

And lastly, what does OBE mean?



Edit - I know it's been mentioned above, but it's genuinely good to see you back here & that you're safe.  I always enjoy reading & learning from your posts.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Kevin - welcome back.


snip


FJAG said:


> 🍻


Thx Appreciate that -- I had glanced at the CAJ Article - and a few other documents when I had to go over the US ARMY 2028 "White Paper" to make sense of it for someone else on another project.  
  I hate the font though, very oddly I missed the author on the Asymmetrical Force on my first read, and I will love to disagree with him elsewhere.😎

 I don't have a Kindle - I am going to get the book on paperback.



CBH99 said:


> Question about your proposal above (which I find practical & doable, and a better use of our current resources)
> 
> You mention making 1 and 3VP + 1 and 3RCR into strict light infantry battalions that are jump capable.  Then you mention pushing the LAV's to flush out 2VP and 2RCR, partially because they are both located at decent training sites.
> 
> 
> Are you suggesting reducing the number of LAV's available to 1 and 3 battalions, both VP and RCR?  Or eliminating them entirely from those units, and pushing them to 2VP and 2RCR to be LAV heavy units with a decent number of spare vehicles/parts?
> 
> And lastly, what does OBE mean?
> 
> 
> 
> Edit - I know it's been mentioned above, but it's genuinely good to see you back here & that you're safe.  I always enjoy reading & learning from your posts.


I would remove the LAV's from the LIB's entirely -- maintenance and proficiency training on them and their crews robs time (and $) that could be used to expand capabilities of LIB - maybe call them LI-SOC (Special Operations Capable) or perhaps a better term for Canada (and not to give CANSOF heartburn) would be LI-SOA (Special Operation Assistance) Forces 

OBE  - Other than Order of the British Empire   Overtaken By Events.
    I was tempted to say gone the way of the Dinosaur - but figured OBE was less contentious.


----------



## KevinB

Also like what was done for Somalia with the CAR - there is nothing stopping LI forces from being GUBs in a LAV if the mission requires.
JSOC assets in Iraq used Strykers for taxis to areas where dropping in with a help was ill-advised.

But LAV's are heavy and bulky - and to land them you need an airport - so a Para capability to seize an airfield is an absolute requirement.
 At Min you want the ability to drop 4 coy of Paras - as while a company can control a small airport - it can't control a large one - and it can't overcome any sort of defensive position


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> ..., very oddly I missed the author on the Asymmetrical Force on my first read, and I will love to disagree with him elsewhere.😎


Thought that you might.


----------



## MilEME09

KevinB said:


> Also like what was done for Somalia with the CAR - there is nothing stopping LI forces from being GUBs in a LAV if the mission requires.
> JSOC assets in Iraq used Strykers for taxis to areas where dropping in with a help was ill-advised.
> 
> But LAV's are heavy and bulky - and to land them you need an airport - so a Para capability to seize an airfield is an absolute requirement.
> At Min you want the ability to drop 4 coy of Paras - as while a company can control a small airport - it can't control a large one - and it can't overcome any sort of defensive position


And to support such a move we need light air deployable heavy weapons as well.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> And to support such a move we need light air deployable heavy weapons as well.



A Light Heavy Weapon?  Is that a Medium?  

Or are you talking about an unarmoured large calibre weapon?


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> A Light Heavy Weapon?  Is that a Medium?
> 
> Or are you talking about an unarmoured large calibre weapon?


Un armoured or light armoured heavy weapons, light vehicles with TOW, HMGs, or if we ever went down  that route again pac howitzers


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> A Light Heavy Weapon?  Is that a Medium?


I’m sorry but I’m sitting here with some tea while I wait for dinner in the oven, and I almost snorted it when I read that 😅


----------



## CBH99

MilEME09 said:


> Un armoured or light armoured heavy weapons, light vehicles with TOW, HMGs, or if we ever went down  that route again pac howitzers


I think we really should start looking at some of the latest advancements in anti-armour weapons, medium to heavy machine guns, mortars, etc etc.

Either when it’s time to replace the C9A2, or if we get serious and revamp/reorganize overall.  Plenty of newer materials being used that offer lighter weight, durability, can be 3D printed as needed, that are more reliable, and can fire an entire belt without the barrel overheating

TOW, even the latest versions, while capable - are outdated.  The missiles are slow, electronic systems outdated in terms of employment in the next conflict, etc.  (Not saying TOW is useless at all, but there are plenty of modern systems which are lighter, easier to transport & mount, easier to carry and use if dismounted, with missiles that fly much faster, can be fire & forget, etc)


If we went with the LIB idea above and divested them of the LAV’s to pool them elsewhere, having those LIBs equipped with more lethal, lighter weight, and more reliable weapons would add to the game change in ways that are orders of magnitude bigger than their price tag.  

0.02


----------



## KevinB

I'd suggest Armed Light Helicopters - or drones - supported by Air and Armed UAV.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I'd suggest Armed Light Helicopters - or drones - supported by Air and Armed UAV.



Loachman would like that.  A twofer.  UASs and he gets his Kiowa back.   😁


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> I'd suggest Armed Light Helicopters - or drones - supported by Air and Armed UAV.


Haven’t you heard, we have armed UAVs coming soon.  Right around the corner actually.  JUSTAS is already funded, and the government is as eager to get moving on it as they are any other file in defence.

Just a few steps left.  Like analyzing which options are available to us (MALE type, armed, and compatible with allies…pretty much narrows it down, but heaven forbid we just say what we want and buy it) - making sure Public Works is on board, Industry Canada is on board, the IRB’s are satisfactory, Treasury Board approves, and the lawsuits from all of the companies that didn’t win are dismissed.

We should have armed drones providing real time ISR and armed overwatch to the LIBs any day now.  



An armed light helicopter?  I mean, the CH-146 is fairly light.  And they are now armed… what else could you have in mind?  😉😈

(I’ve heard of this Loachman fellow, and that he may have flown in a helicopter like once or twice…)


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> One needs to be realistic with the CF.
> 3 Brigades isn't much of an Army for a G-7/8 nation.
> The LAV is a taxi - and not a very applicable one for a peer/near peer threat.
> 
> The CF contributions are always (since WWII) to a coalition -- the best way to structure the CF is to identify what sort of Coalitions you are going to join - and what gaps they might have, or where the best use of the CDN $ would be.
> 
> Reserve Integration was a failure in the 90's with the 10/90 Battalions - and the CF isn't a heavy army - so it is honestly best poised as a IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) - a lighter footprint force - which also aligns better to Canadian Territorial defense.
> 
> IMHO Canada would be better served by making 1 and 3 VP and 1 and 3 RCR into strict Light Infantry jump capable forces - with the RCR LIB's getting more Airmobile assets - and the VP LIB's focusing on Mountain Operations.
> As well as making those LIB's better able to interoperate with CANSOF.
> Those would be your crisis IRF - and the ability to place a Light Brigade world wide ideally inside 72hrs.
> 
> Then push the LAV's to flush out 2 VP and 2 RCR (the geographical orphan BN's) - which both are also at decent training sites for those vehicles.
> As well as the Vandoo BN's.  Other LAV's would be keep at the 3 locations for reserve training.
> 
> This way you would have 5 LAV BN - and able to deploy with the Armor and supporting army for longer durations and support with reserve augmentation.
> 
> Armored Recce is OBE - there is nothing you can do with Armored Recce that you can't do better with Light Troops and support from Aerial/Ground Surveillance.


We had some discussion earlier in this thread (at least I think it was this thread) about whether heavy armour was really a practical capability for Canada to have.  (See Leopard 2A4 & A6)

The arguments for keeping heavy armour were along the lines of heavy armour still has a very important role on the modern battlefield, especially against a peer enemy.  Even in Afghanistan, tanks proved extremely helpful & capable in many ways.

The arguments for getting rid of that capability were that at most, we would only be deploying maybe a dozen or two tanks at most, and they would arrive in theatre too late to really change much.  Even within Canada, just upgrading them all to the same standard and moving them by rail to a port would be slow and time consuming, even if the Army acted fast.  (We won’t always have the luxury of a decade long COIN operation to deploy this, acquire that, etc)



Where do you see heavy armour fitting in with your proposal above, if it fits at all?


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> Haven’t you heard, we have armed UAVs coming soon.  Right around the corner actually.  JUSTAS is already funded, and the government is as eager to get moving on it as they are any other file in defence.
> 
> Just a few steps left.  Like analyzing which options are available to us (MALE type, armed, and compatible with allies…pretty much narrows it down, but heaven forbid we just say what we want and buy it) - making sure Public Works is on board, Industry Canada is on board, the IRB’s are satisfactory, Treasury Board approves, and the lawsuits from all of the companies that didn’t win are dismissed.
> 
> We should have armed drones providing real time ISR and armed overwatch to the LIBs any day now.
> 
> 
> 
> An armed light helicopter?  I mean, the CH-146 is fairly light.  And they are now armed… what else could you have in mind?  😉😈
> 
> (I’ve heard of this Loachman fellow, and that he may have flown in a helicopter like once or twice…)



Honestly the fact the 146 is still operational surprises me.    I would suggest the CF needs at least 3 types of Helicopter - the 47's are back, a medium utility - think Blackhawk - or (as I honestly expected the 146 airframe to be near end of life) the US Blackhawk replacement is coming up - and I think that would be a solid option depending on what is selected.
As much as I am a Little Bird fan - I think the AH-6/MH-6 only really fits to SOF - and something like an AH-1Z Super Cobra would probably be the best option for the CF - they are significantly lighter, and cheaper than the Apaches.



CBH99 said:


> We had some discussion earlier in this thread (at least I think it was this thread) about whether heavy armour was really a practical capability for Canada to have.  (See Leopard 2A4 & A6)
> 
> The arguments for keeping heavy armour were along the lines of heavy armour still has a very important role on the modern battlefield, especially against a peer enemy.  Even in Afghanistan, tanks proved extremely helpful & capable in many ways.
> 
> The arguments for getting rid of that capability were that at most, we would only be deploying maybe a dozen or two tanks at most, and they would arrive in theatre too late to really change much.  Even within Canada, just upgrading them all to the same standard and moving them by rail to a port would be slow and time consuming, even if the Army acted fast.  (We won’t always have the luxury of a decade long COIN operation to deploy this, acquire that, etc)
> 
> 
> 
> Where do you see heavy armour fitting in with your proposal above, if it fits at all?


Heavy Armor is sustainment role.  
    I think in the ideal world Canada would have a forward deployed Heavy Bde like 4 CMBG was "back in the day" - some sort of tracked IFV - and the Leo's -- with some Leo 2 retained at CTC Gagetown for training.

Heavy Forces take absolutely forever to get into a fight - unless you have it prepositioned - or ready to roll to either a RO-RO fleet or a metric butt ton of C-17's -- the whole 1 tank / AC is an extremely impractical way to deliver forces - as you can jump a company with support weapons and sustainment equipment or take 1 tank (not a hard choice) and if you are not jumping - you can get 2 Coy worth of troops and gear (it can take creative loading - but the C-17 has the space and weight to do it easily).

I think Canada's decision to acquire the Leo's was an absolutely imbecilic idea - while they could do operations in limited areas of Afghanistan - it just smacked of rampant careerism on behalf of the Armored Corp Flag Officers - and a great deal more capability could have been acquired for the price tag of an insignificant amount of tanks.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> Honestly the fact the 146 is still operational surprises me.    I would suggest the CF needs at least 3 types of Helicopter - the 47's are back, a medium utility - think Blackhawk - or (as I honestly expected the 146 airframe to be near end of life) the US Blackhawk replacement is coming up - and I think that would be a solid option depending on what is selected.
> As much as I am a Little Bird fan - I think the AH-6/MH-6 only really fits to SOF - and something like an AH-1Z Super Cobra would probably be the best option for the CF - they are significantly lighter, and cheaper than the Apaches.
> 
> 
> Heavy Armor is sustainment role.
> I think in the ideal world Canada would have a forward deployed Heavy Bde like 4 CMBG was "back in the day" - some sort of tracked IFV - and the Leo's -- with some Leo 2 retained at CTC Gagetown for training.
> 
> Heavy Forces take absolutely forever to get into a fight - unless you have it prepositioned - or ready to roll to either a RO-RO fleet or a metric butt ton of C-17's -- the whole 1 tank / AC is an extremely impractical way to deliver forces - as you can jump a company with support weapons and sustainment equipment or take 1 tank (not a hard choice) and if you are not jumping - you can get 2 Coy worth of troops and gear (it can take creative loading - but the C-17 has the space and weight to do it easily).
> 
> I think Canada's decision to acquire the Leo's was an absolutely imbecilic idea - while they could do operations in limited areas of Afghanistan - it just smacked of rampant careerism on behalf of the Armored Corp Flag Officers - and a great deal more capability could have been acquired for the price tag of an insignificant amount of tanks.


I thought the CH-146 was getting long in the tooth also, as they are going on 30 years old next year.  For 30 year old airframes they actually look pretty darn good, in my opinion.  

I was chatting with some guys here at 408 Sqn and they explained that with the type of maintenance the RCAF provides the Griffon fleet, they are constantly being refreshed into near new condition.  (For example, replacing whole sections of the aircraft, like the tail section/rotor on a somewhat regular basis.)

With the upgrade program now made official and including some modest, yet useful upgrades - I can see the government waiting to see what aircraft the US chooses, and basing a decision off of that.  (Especially if Bell ends up being a big player.)

Agreed both on the MH-6 family and the Cobra family.  



In an ideal world, having a heavy (Chinook), a medium (Black Hawk), and a light (armed recce helo?  Utility w/ weapons available for mounting?) would be great.  I would even go so far as to expand our tactical helicopter fleet just a wee bit, but that is a discussion for another thread/post.  

Realistically, however, I do hope that someone with some brainpower & authority will keep it simple, buy from Bell if the design is valid & proven, and we aren’t the sole operator.  (Even better if the US chooses the Bell design.)

Chinook for a heavy helo, and a fleet of NGVL to replace the Griffon - with versatile enough weapons mounts that it can be used for armed overwatch/recce if need be.

One thing the CAF could really benefit from as a whole, would be to keep things as simple as possible when it comes to what equipment we run.  (I was all for the C-27 Spartan because of its commonality with C-130J, and going with the AW-101 family for our maritime helicopter, replacing the EH-101 fleet with them when the time comes.  Keep spare parts and manufacturer support simple and helpful.)



anyways I’m getting off track…

I don’t see us going back to having 3 helo types anytime soon - especially when JUSTAS comes online.


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> One thing the CAF could really benefit from as a whole, would be to keep things as simple as possible when it comes to what equipment we run.  (I was all for the C-27 Spartan because of its commonality with C-130J, and going with the AW-101 family for our maritime helicopter, replacing the EH-101 fleet with them when the time comes.  Keep spare parts and manufacturer support simple and helpful.)


For major capital acquisitions - given the size of the CF budget - looking at jumping on NATO country (okay the US And Uk only really) programs would offer a lot of savings -- but probably won't fly because it isn't Quebec related spending spree


CBH99 said:


> anyways I’m getting off track…
> 
> I don’t see us going back to having 3 helo types anytime soon - especially when JUSTAS comes online.


I love drones - but a UAV isn't a replacement for an AH, even if you stick a CANSOF guy in with the drone 'pilot' to help interpret the ground - you do not get the same SA as being in the area - and AH can do very close support missions.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> ...
> I think Canada's decision to acquire the Leo's was an absolutely imbecilic idea - while they could do operations in limited areas of Afghanistan - it just smacked of rampant careerism on behalf of the Armored Corp Flag Officers - and a great deal more capability could have been acquired for the price tag of an insignificant amount of tanks.


You're cost issue is a red herring in this case. We procured the Leos at a dirt cheap rate from the Netherlands of roughly $100,000 per vehicle. Even with the upgrading costs it was far, far below market rate. The budget used for that acquisition was the budget which had already been approved for the fewer Mobile Gun System (MGS) version of the LAV3s that the armoured corps had on their drawing board.

On top of that the boss of the Army at the time was a gunner who listened to the infantry who had been on TF 1-06 and especially TF 3-06 during Op Medusa who pleaded that they desperately needed an armoured direct fire capability to defeat the various, almost impregnable, structures that the Taliban were using as strong points. (There were issues with collateral damage using 155mm artillery and US air resources were not consistently available)

The careerist armored officers at the time-folks like Hillier-were arguing for and designing their direct-fire capabilities using the LAV MGS, LAV under armour and adaption of the air defence ADATS systems to their ground-to-ground anti-tank capability and had already given up their Leo1s for disposal. I tend to agree that the armoured careerists at the time were out-to-lunch with their transformation plans, but acquiring the Leo 2s wasn't of their making. (Similarly the artillery of the time had given up their M109s without any concrete plan for replacement other than the Indirect Fire Capability project which had a ten year horizon and would have left the artillery with noting but older 105mm guns. - the M777s came out of left field as a UER purchase when we committed to Kandahar). Essentially at the time the Leo2s were bought, the Army's hierarchy (albeit with some opposition) was intent on rebuilding the Canadian Army into what would essentially be anemic Stryker brigades (essentially with two rather than three mechanized battalions, no artillery worth speaking and no substantial enablers all designed to be deployed as plug and play battle groups)

🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

KevinB said:


> I'd suggest Armed Light Helicopters - or drones - supported by Air and Armed UAV.


MUM-T 👍🏼


----------



## FJAG

Good2Golf said:


> MUM-T 👍🏼


Don't get me wrong, I'd love to see the Griffons finally have role that would allow them to do useful recce and attack roles by way of unmanned surrogate systems, but unless the UAVs are light and small enough to be launched from the helicopter (and recovered?) why do you even need the helicopter? Wouldn't a ground based launch, control and recovery system be easier and cheaper to operate? If its line of sight data linkage, couldn't you just do that through rebroadcast drones?

I can appreciate how coupling a drone to an attack helicopter can extend the capabilities of the attack helicopter but a drone like the Shadow still needs a ground crew anyway. Since we don't have attack helicopters to start with, why not just cut the helicopter out of the loop entirely in favour of a ground launched missile guided by way of the drone or through suicide drones?

🍻


----------



## suffolkowner

Helicopters have to be really at risk doing CAS if planes like the A-10 are considered unsurvivable do they not? It seems like a mission for UAS for the risk adverse.









						HELICOPTERS, AS THEY SHOULD BE
					

A blog about contemporary defence issues from a Canadian perspective.




					jgmjgm516.blogspot.com
				




While I'm not sure I agree 100% with the above I think we missed the boat on our helicopter structure and Afghanistan and the at the time failed Cyclone project was a missed opportunity.

With respect to tanks/IFV/APC and getting them to Europe/Asia in a hurry I feel like there will in all probability be lots lying around once the shooting starts it will be the personnel that will be short, if the past is any indication. For a long slow burn like Afghanistan redux it's a different story


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG, fully agree with the overall capability requirement. MUM-T shouldn’t be looked at in isolation, for the same reason that uniquely RPAS Ops shouldn’t be discounted either.  Particularly in an A2AD environment, one may not have the luxury of long-haul control and datalink back to the City of Sin.  Localized connectivity may be the best you can get, and having an expanded Tac ISR ecosystem isn’t to be under appreciated.


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> FJAG, fully agree with the overall capability requirement. MUM-T shouldn’t be looked at in isolation, for the same reason that uniquely RPAS Ops shouldn’t be discounted either.  Particularly in an A2AD environment, one may not have the luxury of long-haul control and datalink back to the City of Sin.  Localized connectivity may be the best you can get, and having an expanded Tac ISR ecosystem isn’t to be under appreciated.



Is there any room in the Griffon plan for the USMC Yankee/Zulu upgrade?  How about "upgrading" some of the Griffons to Vipers?


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill said:


> Is there any room in the Griffon plan for the USMC Yankee/Zulu upgrade?  How about "upgrading" some of the Griffons to Vipers?


Kirkhill, I think that ship sailed a long time ago when DND kicked the Griffon mid-life project down the road in a watered-down form (Griffon Limited Life-Extension - GLLE) so far that it displaced the planned capital program for the Tactical Reconnaissance and Utility Helicopter (TRUH).

TRUH last existed as a planned (and costed) capital program in 2016. Defence Acquisition Guide 2016 (Archived) - Tactical Reconnaissance Utility Helicopter project page refers.  Note the 2026-2036 implementation time frame…then. TRUH no longer exists in the publicly-available Defence Services Program capital acquisition plan, the Defence Capabilities Blueprint (DCB).  DND’s DCB page, filtered for RCAF-sponsored projects, refers.

Since 2016, GLLE has been pushed right and watered down to the point where it publicly seems to be limited to a minor avionics and engine turbine and fuel control upgrade. This means nothing anywhere close to the USMC’s UH-1Y ‘upgrade’ program, certainly neither new T-700 engines, nor upgraded rotor/transmission for increased AUW. GLLE now has a delivery schedule (for now) of 2027-2028 (DCB web page for the GLLE Project refers). Assuming conservatively that GLLE’d Griffons will fly for at least 10-12 years, that puts them operational until 2040.  Perhaps that’s why we no longer see any trace of TRUH to replace Griffon (orig. ‘UTTH’)?

And then the issue of doctrinal AH?  While I’m not normally one to say ‘Never’, I think I can say fairly confidently that Canada will NEVER get Attack Helicopters (AH-64/AH-1/Tigre/etc.)

$0.02

G2G


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> Kirkhill, I think that ship sailed a long time ago when DND kicked the Griffon mid-life project down the road in a watered-down form (Griffon Limited Life-Extension - GLLE) so far that it displaced the planned capital program for the Tactical Reconnaissance and Utility Helicopter (TRUH).
> 
> TRUH last existed as a planned (and costed) capital program in 2016. Defence Acquisition Guide 2016 (Archived) - Tactical Reconnaissance Utility Helicopter project page refers.  Note the 2026-2036 implementation time frame…then. TRUH no longer exists in the publicly-available Defence Services Program capital acquisition plan, the Defence Capabilities Blueprint (DCB).  DND’s DCB page, filtered for RCAF-sponsored projects, refers.
> 
> Since 2016, GLLE has been pushed right and watered down to the point where it publicly seems to be limited to a minor avionics and engine turbine and fuel control upgrade. This means nothing anywhere close to the USMC’s UH-1Y ‘upgrade’ program, certainly neither new T-700 engines, nor upgraded rotor/transmission for increased AUW. GLLE now has a delivery schedule (for now) of 2027-2028 (DCB web page for the GLLE Project refers). Assuming conservatively that GLLE’d Griffons will fly for at least 10-12 years, that puts them operational until 2040.  Perhaps that’s why we no longer see any trace of TRUH to replace Griffon (orig. ‘UTTH’)?
> 
> And then the issue of doctrinal AH?  While I’m not normally one to say ‘Never’, I think I can say fairly confidently that Canada will NEVER get Attack Helicopters (AH-64/AH-1/Tigre/etc.)
> 
> $0.02
> 
> G2G




Ah well.  It is to dream.


----------



## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> And then the issue of doctrinal AH?  While I’m not normally one to say ‘Never’, I think I can say fairly confidently that Canada will NEVER get Attack Helicopters (AH-64/AH-1/Tigre/etc.)
> 
> $0.02
> 
> G2G


If only we knew a TacHel guy or two who are intelligent and experienced enough to create a doctrine for one...
   Now the silliness of the RCAF, and it's distain towards "Army" Rotary Wing if different.

Frankly I think CANSOFCOM should control Rotary Wing in Canada - Cleary it's Special since the RCAF wants to minimize it as much as it can.

I honestly think the US Army, USMC, and USN did it right with Rotary Wing - the fix wing folks have no love for it - so it should go to the supported commands/elements anyway.


----------



## Good2Golf

…double-edged sword, KevinB.  If the Canadian Army were (put back) in charge of funding green aviation, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the same thing happen to aviation as it did in the early-90s…hint: Starts with “Ch” and rhymes with “opped the Chinook D-model Upgrade Project and shut down the CFLUH (light [armed] helicopter) Project.”

It would be no more than a shoulder shrug and a footnote in the list of things “we just can’t do.”


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> You're cost issue is a red herring in this case. We procured the Leos at a dirt cheap rate from the Netherlands of roughly $100,000 per vehicle. Even with the upgrading costs it was far, far below market rate. The budget used for that acquisition was the budget which had already been approved for the fewer Mobile Gun System (MGS) version of the LAV3s that the armoured corps had on their drawing board.


For those - what about the follow ons?


FJAG said:


> On top of that the boss of the Army at the time was a gunner who listened to the infantry who had been on TF 1-06 and especially TF 3-06 during Op Medusa who pleaded that they desperately needed an armoured direct fire capability to defeat the various, almost impregnable, structures that the Taliban were using as strong points. (There were issues with collateral damage using 155mm artillery and US air resources were not consistently available)


Yes because no AH existed - tanks are absolutely terrible for most territory in Afghanistan - I'd argue while they where used effectively by the CF in Afghanistan - the desire for them was the fact that Infantry Officers in Canada had experience with tanks from the various development courses  - and defaulted to TANK - as opposed to seeing the requirement was actually better met by AH's
 *I say that as someone with both experience with both.


FJAG said:


> The careerist armored officers at the time-folks like Hillier-were arguing for and designing their direct-fire capabilities using the LAV MGS, LAV under armour and adaption of the air defence ADATS systems to their ground-to-ground anti-tank capability and had already given up their Leo1s for disposal. I tend to agree that the armoured careerists at the time were out-to-lunch with their transformation plans, but acquiring the Leo 2s wasn't of their making. (Similarly the artillery of the time had given up their M109s without any concrete plan for replacement other than the Indirect Fire Capability project which had a ten year horizon and would have left the artillery with noting but older 105mm guns. - the M777s came out of left field as a UER purchase when we committed to Kandahar). Essentially at the time the Leo2s were bought, the Army's hierarchy (albeit with some opposition) was intent on rebuilding the Canadian Army into what would essentially be anemic Stryker brigades (essentially with two rather than three mechanized battalions, no artillery worth speaking and no substantial enablers all designed to be deployed as plug and play battle groups)
> 
> 🍻


No disagreement there, but experience colors the lens everyone looks at solutions through.
   I also freely admit there are things that AH cannot do, but in the grand scheme of what was better for the CF, I think the AH>Tank


----------



## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> …double-edged sword, KevinB.  If the Canadian Army were (put back) in charge of funding green aviation, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the same thing happen to aviation as it did in the early-90s…hint: Starts with “Ch” and rhymes with “opped the Chinook D-model Upgrade Project and shut down the CFLUH (light [armed] helicopter) Project.”


I think (hope) that the Canadian Army has learned some valuable lessons from Afghanistan and Syria.
    There are a lot of young (to us) bright officers who don't remember 4 CMBG or Reforger - and the stale idea of a peer battle in Germany - and have actual experience with combat operations.


----------



## Good2Golf

KevinB said:


> No disagreement there, but experience colors the lens everyone looks at solutions through.
> I also freely admit there are things that AH cannot do, but in the grand scheme of what was better for the CF, I think the AH>Tank


Perhaps if the AH was marketed as an Armed Reconnaissance Unicorn Helper (ARUH)?


----------



## KevinB

You are a creative guy -- but I think PARROT - Partially Armored Reconnaissance Reserve Over Terrain would fly better 
- That way there is no "Armed" reference - and the 'defensive capabilities' out to 20km or something can in fine print


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> One needs to be realistic with the CF.
> 3 Brigades isn't much of an Army for a G-7/8 nation.
> The LAV is a taxi - and not a very applicable one for a peer/near peer threat.
> 
> The CF contributions are always (since WWII) to a coalition -- the best way to structure the CF is to identify what sort of Coalitions you are going to join - and what gaps they might have, or where the best use of the CDN $ would be.
> 
> Reserve Integration was a failure in the 90's with the 10/90 Battalions - and the CF isn't a heavy army - so it is honestly best poised as a IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) - a lighter footprint force - which also aligns better to Canadian Territorial defense.
> 
> IMHO Canada would be better served by making 1 and 3 VP and 1 and 3 RCR into strict Light Infantry jump capable forces - with the RCR LIB's getting more Airmobile assets - and the VP LIB's focusing on Mountain Operations.
> As well as making those LIB's better able to interoperate with CANSOF.
> Those would be your crisis IRF - and the ability to place a Light Brigade world wide ideally inside 72hrs.
> 
> Then push the LAV's to flush out 2 VP and 2 RCR (the geographical orphan BN's) - which both are also at decent training sites for those vehicles.
> As well as the Vandoo BN's.  Other LAV's would be keep at the 3 locations for reserve training.
> 
> This way you would have 5 LAV BN - and able to deploy with the Armor and supporting army for longer durations and support with reserve augmentation.
> 
> Armored Recce is OBE - there is nothing you can do with Armored Recce that you can't do better with Light Troops and support from Aerial/Ground Surveillance.




A further thought wrt this, and the need to be realistic.

Howzabout?

Retain the three brigades.

Retain two in their existing 1+2 LIB + LAV configurations.
Convert one to a 2+1 LIB + LAV configurations

Create 3 Lt Cav ISR regiments, one per existing brigade.

Collocate one of the 1+2 Brigades with a Divisional Tank Regiment Group (Tanks and Armd Engrs) and potentially the Div Arty Group.  Keep the Combat Support Group of specialists separate.

You still end up with 5 LAV Battalions, a functional RCAC with a Tank Regiment, and 3 deployable Bde HQs.

But you also end up with a Bde HQ emphasising and acting as champion for the LIBs.

And that is the real LAV LIB problem.  So much of the army is invested in the LAVs that the LIBs dont get the respect or consideration they deserve.

And that, in turn, has a detrimental effect on the LAV Bns because their GIBs dont get access to "the heavy / large caliber weapons" available to the footborne soldiers these days.

Instead of 3 LAV Bde Commanders, 6 LAV Bn Commanders and 3 LAV Bn Commanders without LAVs,  the discussion group would be 2 LAV Bde Commanders with 5 LAV Bn Commanders and 1 LIB Bde Commander with 4 LIB Bn Commanders.  A 7 on 5 discussion.  In addition the LAV Commanders would have to cognizance of their GIBs needs.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> One needs to be realistic with the CF.
> 3 Brigades isn't much of an Army for a G-7/8 nation.
> The LAV is a taxi - and not a very applicable one for a peer/near peer threat.
> 
> The CF contributions are always (since WWII) to a coalition -- the best way to structure the CF is to identify what sort of Coalitions you are going to join - and what gaps they might have, or where the best use of the CDN $ would be.
> 
> Reserve Integration was a failure in the 90's with the 10/90 Battalions - and the CF isn't a heavy army - so it is honestly best poised as a IRF (Immediate Reaction Force) - a lighter footprint force - which also aligns better to Canadian Territorial defense.
> 
> IMHO Canada would be better served by making 1 and 3 VP and 1 and 3 RCR into strict Light Infantry jump capable forces - with the RCR LIB's getting more Airmobile assets - and the VP LIB's focusing on Mountain Operations.
> As well as making those LIB's better able to interoperate with CANSOF.
> Those would be your crisis IRF - and the ability to place a Light Brigade world wide ideally inside 72hrs.
> 
> Then push the LAV's to flush out 2 VP and 2 RCR (the geographical orphan BN's) - which both are also at decent training sites for those vehicles.
> As well as the Vandoo BN's.  Other LAV's would be keep at the 3 locations for reserve training.
> 
> This way you would have 5 LAV BN - and able to deploy with the Armor and supporting army for longer durations and support with reserve augmentation.
> 
> Armored Recce is OBE - there is nothing you can do with Armored Recce that you can't do better with Light Troops and support from Aerial/Ground Surveillance.


and


KevinB said:


> Also like what was done for Somalia with the CAR - there is nothing stopping LI forces from being GUBs in a LAV if the mission requires.
> JSOC assets in Iraq used Strykers for taxis to areas where dropping in with a help was ill-advised.
> 
> But LAV's are heavy and bulky - and to land them you need an airport - so a Para capability to seize an airfield is an absolute requirement.
> At Min you want the ability to drop 4 coy of Paras - as while a company can control a small airport - it can't control a large one - and it can't overcome any sort of defensive position


Always interesting to get different viewpoints and ideas on how best to move forward.  A couple of questions come to mind.

1)  You suggest a lighter footprint force would be a capability gap that we could fill for our potential coalition partners.  Do you believe that there is some inherent capability that a light infantry battalion specifically brings to the table that would make it valuable to our partners, or is it simply the fact that being light (and air deployable) it can be quickly deployed to meet a developing threat?  If it's simply the rapid deployability that makes them desirable, are there other air mobile capabilities that might be even more valuable than a light infantry battalion?  Engineers, ISR assets, precision fires, SHORAD, JTACs, light AT vehicles, EW capabilities, etc.?

2)  Your suggestion is to concentrate the light battalions in Petawawa (1 & 3 RCR) and Edmonton (1 & 3 VP).  Presumably, you'd rotate readiness between the battalions.  Do you foresee any issues with the high-readiness battalion shifting geographically back and forth between two locations?  Would you be better off having three light battalions consolidated in a single location (Petawawa) by having 2 RCR and RCD swapping locations?  This could become your primary jump-capable force concentrated in a single location that is fairly close to the major air transportation base.

3)  You suggest that armoured recce has been "overtaken by events".  Do you see no useful role for the LAV Recce vehicle either as part of the LAV battalion CS company or as a Brigade Recce resource?  Possibly combined with other assets like tube-launched UAV/Loitering Munitions vehicles, EW vehicles, etc.?  Is it the capability of the vehicle that you think is obsolete or that the vehicle itself is too heavy for the role and would be better suited to a lighter (air transportable?) platform.

4)  You recommend that at minimum you'd want the ability to drop four parachute companies in order to take an airfield.  Do you think that forced entry is a "must have" role for Canada, or is the capability more of a "like to have" that may or may not be worth the expense?  If it's a capability we want to have, would it make sense to drop your proposed 4th LIB and instead have 3 x LIBs with four companies each to rotate readiness so you wouldn't have to patch together a large enough force from different units when it is required?


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> For major capital acquisitions - given the size of the CF budget - looking at jumping on NATO country (okay the US And Uk only really) programs would offer a lot of savings -- but probably won't fly because it isn't Quebec related spending spree
> 
> I love drones - but a UAV isn't a replacement for an AH, even if you stick a CANSOF guy in with the drone 'pilot' to help interpret the ground - you do not get the same SA as being in the area - and AH can do very close support missions.


Oh I completely agree.  But the Canadian public have to be some of the dumbest, most out of touch, unrealistic, “woke” societies on Earth when it comes to military matters. 

Buying an attack helicopter won’t fly.  Look at all the fuss to be had just over deploying Griffons…

An armed recce helicopter on the other hand?  😏🤷🏼‍♂️🤫  (Call it a recce helicopter that can be used to scan for enemy forces that may want to attack innocent civilians, and the weapons are purely to protect civilians from the bad guys.  Boom, all of a sudden the public either supports or is indifferent to the purchase just by what we call it...  🤦‍♂️ )



I don’t remember the exact details of the Leo2 purchase, but I do remember some of them were acquired for dirt cheap as part of the deal we negotiated.  ($100,000 is cheaper than what we paid for each G-Wagon.)

In my opinion it WAS the better option than going with the all LAV force as Hillier had mentioned, which included the 105mm MGS.  Their thinking was ‘the tank is dead’ - thankfully the Leo2 came into the inventory when it did, as it offered protection from IEDs that the LAV simply couldn’t. 

Does it make sense to keep them moving forwards?  Debatable.  But they did very much prove their worth at the time.  (I believe it was just the USMC, the Dutch, and the CAF that deployed tanks to southern Afghanistan.)

Like FJAG said, those thick reinforced mud walls were tough as hell.  Small arms weren’t getting through, and the 25mm would blast away through them in short order.  A 120mm (??) round just took the party to a whole new level...time to recalculate what arc one is covering.  



Would a fleet of standardized MBTs be nice to have, and fulfill a useful role given enough time to deploy?  Absolutely.  

Is it realistic for the CAF to deploy more than a dozen or two of them to an operation, even with a few weeks to a month notice?  As currently set up, no.  Sending MBTs across the pond would be much more efficiently done via ship than airplane, but even then they wouldn't be arriving quickly.  They would also be arriving to reinforce a continent where most NATO countries have decent sized tank fleets.




Given the discussion about reorganizing the Army to make better use of the LAVs, or getting more capable LIBs - at the end of the day, it boils down to using our limited budgets wisely.  Is having a fleet of tanks we won't ever deploy worth the cost of maintenance/upkeep, as a G7 country *should* have tanks?  Or can we tangibly put that money elsewhere, and be more useful to a coalition deployment?


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> Oh I completely agree.  But the Canadian public have to be some of the dumbest, most out of touch, unrealistic, “woke” societies on Earth when it comes to military matters.
> 
> Buying an attack helicopter won’t fly.  Look at all the fuss to be had just over deploying Griffons…
> 
> An armed recce helicopter on the other hand?  😏🤷🏼‍♂️🤫  (Call it a recce helicopter that can be used to scan for enemy forces that may want to attack innocent civilians, and the weapons are purely to protect civilians from the bad guys.  Boom, all of a sudden the public either supports or is indifferent to the purchase just by what we call it...  🤦‍♂️ )
> 
> 
> 
> I don’t remember the exact details of the Leo2 purchase, but I do remember some of them were acquired for dirt cheap as part of the deal we negotiated.  ($100,000 is cheaper than what we paid for each G-Wagon.)


Dont get me started on the G-Wagon 


CBH99 said:


> In my opinion it WAS the better option than going with the all LAV force as Hillier had mentioned, which included the 105mm MGS.  Their thinking was ‘the tank is dead’ - thankfully the Leo2 came into the inventory when it did, as it offered protection from IEDs that the LAV simply couldn’t.


I've seen M1A2 Abrams taken out by IED's - the enemy can and will build a bigger bomb.
   Tanks by themselves are really just targets - and the lack of a tracked IFV does reduce the interoperability = except in some terrain/and threat conditions 


CBH99 said:


> Does it make sense to keep them moving forwards?  Debatable.  But they did very much prove their worth at the time.  (I believe it was just the USMC, the Dutch, and the CAF that deployed tanks to southern Afghanistan.)
> 
> Like FJAG said, those thick reinforced mud walls were tough as hell.  Small arms weren’t getting through, and the 25mm would blast away through them in short order.  A 120mm (??) round just took the party to a whole new level...time to recalculate what arc one is covering.


But a Hellfire from a Helo can take out things from above - as well as do gun and rocket runs 


CBH99 said:


> Would a fleet of standardized MBTs be nice to have, and fulfill a useful role given enough time to deploy?  Absolutely.
> 
> Is it realistic for the CAF to deploy more than a dozen or two of them to an operation, even with a few weeks to a month notice?  As currently set up, no.  Sending MBTs across the pond would be much more efficiently done via ship than airplane, but even then they wouldn't be arriving quickly.  They would also be arriving to reinforce a continent where most NATO countries have decent sized tank fleets.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Given the discussion about reorganizing the Army to make better use of the LAVs, or getting more capable LIBs - at the end of the day, it boils down to using our limited budgets wisely.  Is having a fleet of tanks we won't ever deploy worth the cost of maintenance/upkeep, as a G7 country *should* have tanks?  Or can we tangibly put that money elsewhere, and be more useful to a coalition deployment?





Kirkhill said:


> A further thought wrt this, and the need to be realistic.
> 
> Howzabout?
> 
> Retain the three brigades.
> 
> Retain two in their existing 1+2 LIB + LAV configurations.
> Convert one to a 2+1 LIB + LAV configurations
> 
> Create 3 Lt Cav ISR regiments, one per existing brigade.


Why not give the Lt Cav ISR the LAV's - 


Kirkhill said:


> Collocate one of the 1+2 Brigades with a Divisional Tank Regiment Group (Tanks and Armd Engrs) and potentially the Div Arty Group.  Keep the Combat Support Group of specialists separate.
> 
> You still end up with 5 LAV Battalions, a functional RCAC with a Tank Regiment, and 3 deployable Bde HQs.
> 
> But you also end up with a Bde HQ emphasising and acting as champion for the LIBs.
> 
> And that is the real LAV LIB problem.  So much of the army is invested in the LAVs that the LIBs dont get the respect or consideration they deserve.


 Honestly in my 2+1 from above with the RCR and PPLCI, I would expect the Reservers to fill a 3rd LIB for prolonged issues - with the 3rd (well 2nd Bn) brought in for sustainment in longer missions that have a footprint and now can bring in heavier equipment. 



Kirkhill said:


> And that, in turn, has a detrimental effect on the LAV Bns because their GIBs dont get access to "the heavy / large caliber weapons" available to the footborne soldiers these days.
> 
> Instead of 3 LAV Bde Commanders, 6 LAV Bn Commanders and 3 LAV Bn Commanders without LAVs,  the discussion group would be 2 LAV Bde Commanders with 5 LAV Bn Commanders and 1 LIB Bde Commander with 4 LIB Bn Commanders.  A 7 on 5 discussion.  In addition the LAV Commanders would have to cognizance of their GIBs needs.


My believe is anyone can be a GIB - while a LAV crew that can actually work with dismounts is much harder to find.
  But I don't think that LAV Bn's do a good job thinking out how to best retain and expand the skills of LI.



GR66 said:


> and
> 
> Always interesting to get different viewpoints and ideas on how best to move forward.  A couple of questions come to mind.
> 
> 1)  You suggest a lighter footprint force would be a capability gap that we could fill for our potential coalition partners.  Do you believe that there is some inherent capability that a light infantry battalion specifically brings to the table that would make it valuable to our partners, or is it simply the fact that being light (and air deployable) it can be quickly deployed to meet a developing threat?  If it's simply the rapid deployability that makes them desirable, are there other air mobile capabilities that might be even more valuable than a light infantry battalion?  Engineers, ISR assets, precision fires, SHORAD, JTACs, light AT vehicles, EW capabilities, etc.?


 The US has a robust rapidly deployable force -- but few other allies other than the British -- I think Canada adding to a QRF/IRF coalition would reap a lot more benefit in bang for the buck - and foreign appreciation.
  Troops on the ground are always appreciated - especially early on.
 Engineers would be part of the LI-BDE Construct - the rest you mention is pretty much vapor ware in the CF - or lags behind allies.



GR66 said:


> 2)  Your suggestion is to concentrate the light battalions in Petawawa (1 & 3 RCR) and Edmonton (1 & 3 VP).  Presumably, you'd rotate readiness between the battalions.  Do you foresee any issues with the high-readiness battalion shifting geographically back and forth between two locations?  Would you be better off having three light battalions consolidated in a single location (Petawawa) by having 2 RCR and RCD swapping locations?  This could become your primary jump-capable force concentrated in a single location that is fairly close to the major air transportation base.


  I don't see the need to colocate all - in fact I see a desire to have at least two staging areas.



GR66 said:


> 3)  You suggest that armoured recce has been "overtaken by events".  Do you see no useful role for the LAV Recce vehicle either as part of the LAV battalion CS company or as a Brigade Recce resource?  Possibly combined with other assets like tube-launched UAV/Loitering Munitions vehicles, EW vehicles, etc.?  Is it the capability of the vehicle that you think is obsolete or that the vehicle itself is too heavy for the role and would be better suited to a lighter (air transportable?) platform.


I simply see it doing nothing - they are heavy to move easily - to light to fight. 
   EW assets are better off either with a static protected position - or airborne for larger coverage and 'more survivability'.


GR66 said:


> 4)  You recommend that at minimum you'd want the ability to drop four parachute companies in order to take an airfield.  Do you think that forced entry is a "must have" role for Canada, or is the capability more of a "like to have" that may or may not be worth the expense?  If it's a capability we want to have, would it make sense to drop your proposed 4th LIB and instead have 3 x LIBs with four companies each to rotate readiness so you wouldn't have to patch together a large enough force from different units when it is required?


I think forced entry is a must for any nation that wants to be a credible international player - and look out for their own interests.
  My belief is that 1 BN would be on IRF, the second of the Bde to be on standby - they would rotate then hand odd to the other Bde -- my belief if you are going to do an Airfield seizure you are probably going to send at least 1 Bn - with SOF, and perhaps the 2nd BN, and be spooling up the other two too follow.
   I also expect the LIB's to have a Cbt Spt Coy, as well as attachments from a CER, Medics etc.

I didn't want to get too down in the weeds as it was just me throwing an idea out on what I felt was probably in Canadas best interest from both a Army, Nation, and Budget standpoint.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> I don't see the need to colocate all - in fact I see a desire to have at least two staging areas.
> Curious - what do you see as the benefits?


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> Dont get me started on the G-Wagon
> 
> I've seen M1A2 Abrams taken out by IED's - the enemy can and will build a bigger bomb.
> Tanks by themselves are really just targets - and the lack of a tracked IFV does reduce the interoperability = except in some terrain/and threat conditions
> 
> But a Hellfire from a Helo can take out things from above - as well as do gun and rocket runs
> 
> 
> Why not give the Lt Cav ISR the LAV's -
> 
> Honestly in my 2+1 from above with the RCR and PPLCI, I would expect the Reservers to fill a 3rd LIB for prolonged issues - with the 3rd (well 2nd Bn) brought in for sustainment in longer missions that have a footprint and now can bring in heavier equipment.
> 
> 
> My believe is anyone can be a GIB - while a LAV crew that can actually work with dismounts is much harder to find.
> But I don't think that LAV Bn's do a good job thinking out how to best retain and expand the skills of LI.
> 
> 
> The US has a robust rapidly deployable force -- but few other allies other than the British -- I think Canada adding to a QRF/IRF coalition would reap a lot more benefit in bang for the buck - and foreign appreciation.
> Troops on the ground are always appreciated - especially early on.
> Engineers would be part of the LI-BDE Construct - the rest you mention is pretty much vapor ware in the CF - or lags behind allies.
> 
> 
> I don't see the need to colocate all - in fact I see a desire to have at least two staging areas.
> 
> 
> I simply see it doing nothing - they are heavy to move easily - to light to fight.
> EW assets are better off either with a static protected position - or airborne for larger coverage and 'more survivability'.
> 
> I think forced entry is a must for any nation that wants to be a credible international player - and look out for their own interests.
> My belief is that 1 BN would be on IRF, the second of the Bde to be on standby - they would rotate then hand odd to the other Bde -- my belief if you are going to do an Airfield seizure you are probably going to send at least 1 Bn - with SOF, and perhaps the 2nd BN, and be spooling up the other two too follow.
> I also expect the LIB's to have a Cbt Spt Coy, as well as attachments from a CER, Medics etc.
> 
> I didn't want to get too down in the weeds as it was just me throwing an idea out on what I felt was probably in Canadas best interest from both a Army, Nation, and Budget standpoint.


I think your idea is great and makes a lot of sense.

Sorry, I wasn’t trying to ask for specifics and bog down the convo.  There were a few items in your suggestion I was just curious about.  (ie, keep the tanks or no? Etc)  Overall, your ideas/suggestions make a lot of sense, and would increase our output given the same relative budget.   👍🏻



I have suggested previously in this thread that given our military’s size, budget, and that we as a country have a pretty small population spread out over a huge landmass — we should decide what we want to contribute, and excel at ‘that’ thing.  Whatever it may be.

We have discussed potential restructuring in a ton of different ways, including PYs, weapon systems, doctrine, future technologies, etc.  

I enjoy reading the suggestions, especially as most of them have merit even if they are in total opposition of each other.  


I do respectfully disagree with FJAG on having a light/medium/heavy brigade.  Not that having those options wouldn’t be ideal - in an ideal world, having units that fit those criteria to choose from for a deployment would be great.  

If budgets were bigger or could be spent more efficiently, and we could reduce the overhead and fill out some units with more people - that would be worth looking into if we restructured for the future.  

However, given how things are right now — budgets, unable to spend that budget wisely, excessive overhead, etc.  I think we should ask ourselves “What could we provide to a coalition that would be extremely helpful, is in demand, and helps checks the box for defending Canadian territory?”

Then be world class at that role.  


0.02 🍻


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> For those - what about the follow ons?


If memory serves me correctly, the deal went down like this:
a) we originally deployed a squadron of Leo C1s in 2006 and then arranged to borrow 20 Leo 2A6Ms and two recovery vehicles from Germany which were lightly Canadianized and then deployed mid 2007.
b) concurrently we bought 80 Leo 2A4s and 20 Leo 2A6s from the Netherlands.
c) the 20 Dutch Leo 2A6s were modified to Leo 2A6M standards and given directly to Germany in exchange for the borrowed 20 which we retained
d) Of the 80 Leo 2A4s, 20 were converted to Leo 2A4Ms; 42 converted to Leo 2A4+; 
e) a further 15 Leo 2A4s were purchased from Germany for parts and a further 12 Leo 2A4s (Pz 87) were purchased from Switzerland
f) 30 of the Leo 2A4s were converted into 12 ARVs and 18 AEVs

All of these were bought with the $600 million (I've seen that figure as $460 million in some places- you know how government accountants can't keep their figures straight) which had been allocated for the purchase of 66 MGSs which were to replace the 116 Leo C1s that remained in service by the turn of the millennium.


KevinB said:


> Yes because no AH existed - tanks are absolutely terrible for most territory in Afghanistan - I'd argue while they where used effectively by the CF in Afghanistan - the desire for them was the fact that Infantry Officers in Canada had experience with tanks from the various development courses  - and defaulted to TANK - as opposed to seeing the requirement was actually better met by AH's
> *I say that as someone with both experience with both.


Canada did use attack helicopters in Afghanistan - basically US ones in early 2006 and subsequently, whenever available, Dutch ones. We also had access to Predator and US and Dutch tac air. In later years US resources again became more available under the surge. All Canadian artillery FOO dets deploying to Afghanistan had at least one trained and qualified JTAC to employ tac air and attack aviation.

I don't think anyone realistically ever considered that the air force would spring for attack helicopters. Love a duck - it took the 2008 Manley report to even get Chinooks back into the system.


KevinB said:


> No disagreement there, but experience colors the lens everyone looks at solutions through.
> I also freely admit there are things that AH cannot do, but in the grand scheme of what was better for the CF, I think the AH>Tank


I think tanks and attack helicopters are complementary weapon systems - its hard to seize and hold ground with an attack helicopter and its hard to redeploy tanks quickly. In a real fight there are clear roles for both. 

Again, the biggest impediment to Canada obtaining attack helicopters is the RCAF. I sometimes consider it a miracle that we even have transport aircraft seeing as they don't go zoom, zoom. ... And don't get me started about how long its been taking to get a MALE UAV.

🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> Again, the biggest impediment to Canada obtaining attack helicopters is the RCAF. I sometimes consider it a miracle that we even have transport aircraft seeing as they don't go zoom, zoom. ... And don't get me started about how long its been taking to get a MALE UAV.
> 
> 🍻


…and I will continue to hold (even ex-)Army officers to account for sins past.  Every significant decision that resulted in tactical aviation capabilities being cut or reduced was under the Aegis of the *Canadian Army*.  FMC chose not to find MTH upgrade in 1990/1991 and to cease CFLH in 1993/1994.  Vote 5 funding was FMC’s accountability, not Air Command’s.  Even CFUTTH’s pivot from UH-60s (CADO’s DLA recommendation) to Bell 412’s in 1992 was endorsed in *St-Hubert*, NOT *Winnipeg*.

The Army is the Scorpion to Tactical Aviation’s Frog…


----------



## FJAG

Good2Golf said:


> …and I will continue to hold (even ex-)Army officers to account for sins past.  Every significant decision that resulted in tactical aviation capabilities being cut or reduced was under the Aegis of the *Canadian Army*.  FMC chose not to find MTH upgrade in 1990/1991 and to cease CFLH in 1993/1994.  Vote 5 funding was FMC’s accountability, not Air Command’s.  Even CFUTTH’s pivot from UH-60s (CADO’s DLA recommendation) to Bell 412’s in 1992 was endorsed in *St-Hubert*, NOT *Winnipeg*.
> 
> The Army is the Scorpion to Tactical Aviation’s Frog…


I noted your earlier comment to KevinB re "double-edged sword" and totally agree with you. 

While the Army has always had funding restraints, its response to those over the last three decades has been to randomly shed capabilities. I know that there have been many people diligently at work doing the best they can but for some reason or other the Army has been struck by institutional ineptitude when it comes to its own equipment. I blame it all on a lack of any real doctrine and an attempt to cobble together what it considers to be the most relevant capabilities but along the way causes the shedding of what is truly necessary to be a "full-spectrum" force.

I can list a litany of lost/almost lost capabilities which includes armour, SP armoured artillery, anti-armour, mortar shuffling around, air defence, STA, IFVs ... one can go on and on.

One can argue the value of a full-spectrum heavy force vs a light or medium rapidly deployable force until the cows come home but we haven't been in Afghanistan as a combat force since 2011 while we have been in Latvia leading an international armoured battle group. We're not committed to any rapid deployment interventionist or air-field seizing missions (and after this week's events in Afghanistan we're not likely to be ever again except as special ops folks) but we are more and more being recommitted to Europe and we should be seriously thinking Pacific (there's even a comment recognizing that in the SSE notwithstanding our current Sino-loving regime)

I know that our glacial definition of land requirements and procurement system is working on things but I seriously doubt that the Army has a coherent forward looking strategy. So ... yup .... I agree .... putting aviation into the hands of the Army would not be a recipe for any greater success than where it is now. We would certainly not see anything as expensive to acquire and sustain as attack helicopters magically appear overnight. The question would be: what would the Army be prepared to give up for that? Two infantry battalions for one squadron? - hardly likely.

🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

I will in fairness point out that more recently, the Canadian Army did sacrifice an armoured recce squadron to give PYs to the Air Force to ensure that Chinooks would serve on an Army base, not an Air Force base…FJAG, over a good dunkleweisse, I’ll share the 3*-3* conversation backstory to the end state there. 😉 🍻 

cheers
G2G


----------



## FJAG

Good2Golf said:


> I will in fairness point out that more recently, the Canadian Army did sacrifice an armoured recce squadron to give PYs to the Air Force to ensure that Chinooks would serve on an Army base, not an Air Force base…FJAG, over a good dunkleweisse, I’ll share the 3*-3* conversation backstory to the end state there. 😉 🍻
> 
> cheers
> G2G


 I'm a Reinheitsgebot Pilsner kind of guy, but I'm game. 🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> …and I will continue to hold (even ex-)Army officers to account for sins past.  Every significant decision that resulted in tactical aviation capabilities being cut or reduced was under the Aegis of the *Canadian Army*.  FMC chose not to find MTH upgrade in 1990/1991 and to cease CFLH in 1993/1994.  Vote 5 funding was FMC’s accountability, not Air Command’s.  Even CFUTTH’s pivot from UH-60s (CADO’s DLA recommendation) to Bell 412’s in 1992 was endorsed in *St-Hubert*, NOT *Winnipeg*.
> 
> The Army is the Scorpion to Tactical Aviation’s Frog…


Each brigade has a TacHel squadron co-located.  What is the purpose of that squadron?  Who pays for it? Who tasks it? Is there some doctrine associated with a brigade level asset and its 146/147 ratio?

Or is it an orphan? Like the LIBs?


----------



## Good2Golf

A hybrid across the country. 1 and 5 Bde are the only formations with a dedicated op 146 Sqn. CTC has a 146 Sqn in location, but its primary role as the OTU is 146 operational conversion and secondarily is support to CTC. 2 Bde has no dedicated 146 Sqn.  427 may support a 2 Bde request only after its primary role for CANSOF is fulfilled. 147 uniquely home bases in Petawawa, but to geographically centre amongst the brigades, not as a dedicated unit to 2 CMBG.  The RCAF has essentially delegate day to day coord of TH assets to 1 Wing HQ in Kingston, which coords with respective G3 Avns at the Bdes and CTC to assign TH assets as required to support CA requests.  More complex activities will rise both the green and light blue(ish) chains for planning and tasking.  Discretion is also left to each Sqn CO to conduct local activity for collateral training where both the Army and the Sqn may benefit from collaboration.  

There are some +/- to the above, but that’s the general gist of if. 

Regards 
G2G


----------



## Kirkhill

Thanks for the usual education.


----------



## Kirkhill

"Events, dear boy, events."  Attributed to former UK PM Harold MacMillan ca 1957.

Events.   Disrupt and dictate.  They create the environment in which governments operate.  They define how governments are judged.  They force governments to react.

One of the tools that a sovereign government is permitted is an armed force which it can deploy in any manner it sees fit.  And at any time of its choosing.

Some governments choose to retain the ability to react rapidly, acting on the basis that some events are best countered with timely interventions.
Some governments choose to retain the ability to react deliberately, acting on the basis that some events are best countered coolly.
All governments always retain the ability to not react at all, to simply ignore events.

A well prepared government will, in my opinion, maintain all three capabilities:  the ability to react rapidly, to react deliberately or to ignore.

My sense is that the majority of Canadian governments, especially since the Lester Pearson era, have limited, if not eliminated the ability of the government to used armed force rapidly.  The emphasis has been on the deliberate response, and a limited deliberate response at that.

Politically that makes it easier for the government to pursue its preferred policy with respect to events: Ignore.  Ignore and wait for them to pass over the political horizon, to be forgotten.   And, in truth.  it works.  Events ignored are not allowed to disrupt, to dictate.

But sometimes events intrude that cannot be ignored.

Most of us here, on this site, believe in the need for the government to possess the ability to respond to events.  Especially events that impact on the government's sovereign territory. 

My personal appreciation is that most of Canada's sovereign territory is more easily accessed by air than by land, by helicopters and aeroplanes than by trucks, by ships and boats than by rail, by tracks than by wheels.  And that wireless communications are a necessity.   It is my belief that if the government is denied, or better, denies itself, the ability to operate in these modes, then it and its armed forces, are doing a disservice to the state and the people that pay taxes to have their sovereign government protect them and their interests.

It is well enough to believe that it is unlikely that we will be called on to defend ourselves either because of a lack of an intruder or because our neighbour will "mow our lawn for us". 

But events keep showing us that the unlikely happens.

That is why I keep harping on the need for a force that can deploy and operate usefully, in a timely fashion, all across Canada's sovereign territories, by day or by night, regardless of season or terrain.  That is why I continue to argue for a light force that can deploy by air and sea nationally.  A light force that can operate seamlessly with the RCAF, the RCN and CANSOFCOM as well as Other Government Departments. A light force rendered as capable as possible with the best available technology compatible with rapid national deployment.  A light force that can be internationally deployed if Canada's interests are appropriately served, if the operational environment is suitable and if events are deemed to require it.  And can't be ignored.

We have created an army that does not meet my basic national objectives. 

It is an army that permits the government to deploy deliberately, ponderously, infrequently.  To ignore events. 

But it is also one that is poorly equipped for its primary function, a function well managed by its sister services, the RCN and the RCAF who operate in the environment daily in peace and war, the defence of the homeland.


Helicopters make more sense than tanks.
UAS's make more sense than SP guns.
Bandvagons make more sense than LAVs.

Slainte.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> My personal appreciation is that most of Canada's sovereign territory is more easily accessed by air than by land, by helicopters and aeroplanes than by trucks, by ships and boats than by rail, by tracks than by wheels.  And that wireless communications are a necessity.   It is my belief that if the government is denied, or better, denies itself, the ability to operate in these modes, then it and its armed forces, are doing a disservice to the state and the people that pay taxes to have their sovereign government protect them and their interests.


I 110% agree


Kirkhill said:


> It is well enough to believe that it is unlikely that we will be called on to defend ourselves either because of a lack of an intruder or because our neighbour will "mow our lawn for us".
> 
> But events keep showing us that the unlikely happens.
> 
> That is why I keep harping on the need for a force that can deploy and operate usefully, in a timely fashion, all across Canada's sovereign territories, by day or by night, regardless of season or terrain.  That is why I continue to argue for a light force that can deploy by air and sea nationally.  A light force that can operate seamlessly with the RCAF, the RCN and CANSOFCOM as well as Other Government Departments. A light force rendered as capable as possible with the best available technology compatible with rapid national deployment.  A light force that can be internationally deployed if Canada's interests are appropriately served, if the operational environment is suitable and if events are deemed to require it.  And can't be ignored.


Same reasons that I see +1


Kirkhill said:


> We have created an army that does not meet my basic national objectives.
> 
> It is an army that permits the government to deploy deliberately, ponderously, infrequently.  To ignore events.
> 
> But it is also one that is poorly equipped for its primary function, a function well managed by its sister services, the RCN and the RCAF who operate in the environment daily in peace and war, the defence of the homeland.


I think that is the basic premise that needs to be hammered home -- the current version of the Can Army is neither fish nor fowl, and entirely inedible.  


Kirkhill said:


> Helicopters make more sense than tanks.
> UAS's make more sense than SP guns.
> Bandvagons make more sense than LAVs.
> 
> Slainte.


IF Canada was to triple its Defense budget - then one could argue for an Armored Brigade, with SP Guns, Deep Strike Missile system, a robust AA capacity.
  However, the realistic view is it (you) won't - and thus need to be very astute with the force structure.

Since FJAG has clarified the costing for the Leo 2's, I'll accept that it was a reasonable choice at the time.


FJAG said:


> Canada did use attack helicopters in Afghanistan - basically US ones in early 2006 and subsequently, whenever available, Dutch ones. We also had access to Predator and US and Dutch tac air. In later years US resources again became more available under the surge. All Canadian artillery FOO dets deploying to Afghanistan had at least one trained and qualified JTAC to employ tac air and attack aviation.


Having assets in theatre to use if available outside their own national tasks, doesn't equal experience in employment.
  Every phase course plays leap down the corridor in Gagetown - there is a big difference in the familiarity between using as a set piece part of doctrine - and adapting on the fly to employing attached assets.




FJAG said:


> I don't think anyone realistically ever considered that the air force would spring for attack helicopters. Love a duck - it took the 2008 Manley report to even get Chinooks back into the system.
> 
> I think tanks and attack helicopters are complementary weapon systems - its hard to seize and hold ground with an attack helicopter and its hard to redeploy tanks quickly. In a real fight there are clear roles for both.


I totally agree - I just think on a cost benefit analysis the AH gives a lot more to the CF (unless one got the tanks at a steal).



FJAG said:


> Again, the biggest impediment to Canada obtaining attack helicopters is the RCAF. I sometimes consider it a miracle that we even have transport aircraft seeing as they don't go zoom, zoom. ... And don't get me started about how long its been taking to get a MALE UAV.
> 
> 🍻



Based on everything I have read here - and outside of here, the biggest impediment to the Canadian Army is itself.
  What needs to happen is a totally new white paper - and doctrine written to best fulfill the needs of Canada - which I view is a Light centric force (as I sit in Virginia and understand that my opinion means nothing).


----------



## Kirkhill

Maybe we can resurrect Paul Hellyer's White Paper.  He obviously pissed off a lot of people, especially those invested in kilts, but his fundamental operating assumptions weren't wrong.



The M113 loading into a C130.  With ease.




The Bv206 loading into a CH-47D.  With care.



The Wiesel loading into a CH-47.


How many Bandvagons and Wiesels in a C17?


----------



## Kirkhill

Answering my own question.

14 to 21 Wiesel Tankettes in a C17 (6 Bv206s and 5 M113s - the M113s are mass limited rather than volume limited - by volume you could squeeze something like 10 of the original M113s into a C17 if they weighed half as much).


----------



## Kirkhill

Also, apparently, a C130 can carry 3 MH-6 Little Birds which can be in the air in 15 minutes of arrival and ramp down.

Presumably that means a C17 can lift an entire squadron?









						Night Stalkers: 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)
					





					books.google.ca


----------



## KevinB

In my experience MC-130's usually carry two plus FARP stuff and Security personnel.
     I think three is fine for an administrative move - but wouldn't want to be trying to do three on the clock in a non fully permissive area.


----------



## GR66

Here's the latest Force 2025 recipe from the kitchen of GR66.  It starts off with a healthy helping of KevinB, a dash of FJAG and a sprinking of Kirkhill and topped off with a few special ingredients of my own.  Take a bite and let me know what ingredients you think should be changed...

*Infantry*

Starts with KevinB's idea of having both the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the RCR and PPCLI as Light Battalions and R22R as all LAV Battalions.  I'd take it one step further and make 2 RCR a light battalion as well.

FJAG (and others) have noted "We're not committed to any rapid deployment interventionist or air-field seizing missions" but I agree with KevinB that a rapid reaction capability would be a contribution to our allies that would allow us to punch above our weight so to speak.  It's a capability that only a handful of our allies have so would be highly valued.  As for seizing airfields, etc. I agree that it's not a likely scenario, but like armour, AD, AT and SP artillery it's one of those capabilities that you'd greatly miss having if it is required.  I don't think it means that we need to recreate the CAR, but if we continue with our current system of having one company in each Light Battalion as a parachute company, then we'd have 5 x jump companies available should the need arise.

Having 4 x LAV Battalions and 5 x Light Battalions (instead of the current 6 and 3) would allow us to manage readiness as follows:

LAV Battalions (4):
1 x Deployed
1 x High Readiness
1 x Road to High Readiness
1 x Reconstituting

Light Battalions (5):
1 x Deployed
1 x Rapid Reaction (72hr Standby)
1 x High Readiness
1 x Road to High Readiness
1 x Reconstituting

With this system we'd be able to have 2 x Battalions on Deployment (1 x LAV and 1 x Light), an additional two at High Readiness ready to replace them (or to deal with an emerging threat) and an additional Light Rapid Reaction Battalion on 72hr standby to deal with any rapidly developing threats.

*Armour:*

Personally I'd be in favour of retaining and upgrading the 82 x Leopards we have to a single variant.  I agree that they are not as dominant on the battlefield as they once were, that an AH might provide more versatility and that there is a pretty high cost to maintain quite a small and difficult to deploy fleet.  All that being said, we don't have an alternative platform to fulfill the role of the tank at the present time and it will be well beyond 2025/2030 before we have something coming online to replace them.  So for now I'd keep them.

RCD
I'd have them switch locations with 2 RCR and co-locate them with the Armour School and concentrate all our tanks in the single Regiment.  Here they would be closer to an embarkation point for shipping to Europe (the most likely place they'd be needed) and this is likely a skill that should be practiced annually.

12RBC
Loses the shared tank squadron and becomes a straight Recce Regiment.  Moving forward I'd begin replacing some of the LAV Recce vehicles with LAV-based UAV launch platforms and LAV-based AT platforms.

LdSH
I'd give the Strathconas a similar mix of capabilities as 12RBC (recce/UAV/AT) but mounted on light, air-transportable vehicles to support our Light Battalions and to enable rapid deployment.

*Artillery:*

5 RALC & 1 RCHA
I'd re-equip these two Regiments with the same SP Artillery system that the US Army procures for its Stryker Brigades.  Hopefully the reduced manning requirements for these guns would allow both Regiments to expand to 3 x Batteries and possibly even leave enough PYs left to be transferred to 2 RCHA.

2 RCHA
I'd keep the M777s for this Regiment and if enough PYs are saved by switching 5 RALC and 1 RCHA to a self-propelled platform then I'd either add a 3rd 4-gun battery or expand the existing batteries to 2 x 6-gun batteries.  I'd have all of these batteries be jump qualified.

*Engineers:*

I'd have one jump qualified field squadron in each Regiment.

*Equipment:*

With the above changes to the structure of the Army, there would be 2 x Battalions of LAVs and 3 x Squadrons of Armoured Recce vehicles (plus more when additional Recce vehicles begin to be replaced with UAV-launch and AT variants).

I'd use 1 x Battalion of the LAVs, 1 x Armoured Recce Squadron, 1 x Battery of M777s (hopefully to be eventually replace with the new SP-Artillery vehicle) and 1 x Squadron of the upgraded Leopards to create a pre-positioned Canadian Battle Group in Europe - equipment only - as part of our deterrence against Russia (and to reinforce our Latvia contingent if required).  Personally, I'd likely choose to place this pre-positioned force in Germany.  If we place it too close to the potential front then it might be targeted for destruction in place before we can get there, or we might have to fly into contested airspace in order to meet up with our equipment.  In a more limited conflict initiated by Russia they would be less likely to attack targets in Germany in hopes of avoiding a full-scale NATO response to an attack with limited territorial goals.

The remaining LAV Battalion vehicles I'd place as training company vehicles in Gagetown, Meaford and Wainwright for use of both the Reg Force Light Battalions and the Reserve Infantry Regiments to use for familiarization training.

The extra LAV Recce vehicles could be either used as conversion hulls for new variant vehicles, or parceled out to the infantry Recce Platoons or Reserve Armoured Recce Regiments.

This FORCE 2025 would look something like this:


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Here's the latest Force 2025 recipe from the kitchen of GR66.  It starts off with a healthy helping of KevinB, a dash of FJAG and a sprinking of Kirkhill and topped off with a few special ingredients of my own.  Take a bite and let me know what ingredients you think should be changed...
> 
> *Infantry*
> 
> Starts with KevinB's idea of having both the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the RCR and PPCLI as Light Battalions and R22R as all LAV Battalions.  I'd take it one step further and make 2 RCR a light battalion as well.
> 
> FJAG (and others) have noted "We're not committed to any rapid deployment interventionist or air-field seizing missions" but I agree with KevinB that a rapid reaction capability would be a contribution to our allies that would allow us to punch above our weight so to speak.  It's a capability that only a handful of our allies have so would be highly valued.  As for seizing airfields, etc. I agree that it's not a likely scenario, but like armour, AD, AT and SP artillery it's one of those capabilities that you'd greatly miss having if it is required.  I don't think it means that we need to recreate the CAR, but if we continue with our current system of having one company in each Light Battalion as a parachute company, then we'd have 5 x jump companies available should the need arise.
> 
> Having 4 x LAV Battalions and 5 x Light Battalions (instead of the current 6 and 3) would allow us to manage readiness as follows:
> 
> LAV Battalions (4):
> 1 x Deployed
> 1 x High Readiness
> 1 x Road to High Readiness
> 1 x Reconstituting
> 
> Light Battalions (5):
> 1 x Deployed
> 1 x Rapid Reaction (72hr Standby)
> 1 x High Readiness
> 1 x Road to High Readiness
> 1 x Reconstituting
> 
> With this system we'd be able to have 2 x Battalions on Deployment (1 x LAV and 1 x Light), an additional two at High Readiness ready to replace them (or to deal with an emerging threat) and an additional Light Rapid Reaction Battalion on 72hr standby to deal with any rapidly developing threats.
> 
> *Armour:*
> 
> Personally I'd be in favour of retaining and upgrading the 82 x Leopards we have to a single variant.  I agree that they are not as dominant on the battlefield as they once were, that an AH might provide more versatility and that there is a pretty high cost to maintain quite a small and difficult to deploy fleet.  All that being said, we don't have an alternative platform to fulfill the role of the tank at the present time and it will be well beyond 2025/2030 before we have something coming online to replace them.  So for now I'd keep them.
> 
> RCD
> I'd have them switch locations with 2 RCR and co-locate them with the Armour School and concentrate all our tanks in the single Regiment.  Here they would be closer to an embarkation point for shipping to Europe (the most likely place they'd be needed) and this is likely a skill that should be practiced annually.
> 
> 12RBC
> Loses the shared tank squadron and becomes a straight Recce Regiment.  Moving forward I'd begin replacing some of the LAV Recce vehicles with LAV-based UAV launch platforms and LAV-based AT platforms.
> 
> LdSH
> I'd give the Strathconas a similar mix of capabilities as 12RBC (recce/UAV/AT) but mounted on light, air-transportable vehicles to support our Light Battalions and to enable rapid deployment.
> 
> *Artillery:*
> 
> 5 RALC & 1 RCHA
> I'd re-equip these two Regiments with the same SP Artillery system that the US Army procures for its Stryker Brigades.  Hopefully the reduced manning requirements for these guns would allow both Regiments to expand to 3 x Batteries and possibly even leave enough PYs left to be transferred to 2 RCHA.
> 
> 2 RCHA
> I'd keep the M777s for this Regiment and if enough PYs are saved by switching 5 RALC and 1 RCHA to a self-propelled platform then I'd either add a 3rd 4-gun battery or expand the existing batteries to 2 x 6-gun batteries.  I'd have all of these batteries be jump qualified.
> 
> *Engineers:*
> 
> I'd have one jump qualified field squadron in each Regiment.
> 
> *Equipment:*
> 
> With the above changes to the structure of the Army, there would be 2 x Battalions of LAVs and 3 x Squadrons of Armoured Recce vehicles (plus more when additional Recce vehicles begin to be replaced with UAV-launch and AT variants).
> 
> I'd use 1 x Battalion of the LAVs, 1 x Armoured Recce Squadron, 1 x Battery of M777s (hopefully to be eventually replace with the new SP-Artillery vehicle) and 1 x Squadron of the upgraded Leopards to create a pre-positioned Canadian Battle Group in Europe - equipment only - as part of our deterrence against Russia (and to reinforce our Latvia contingent if required).  Personally, I'd likely choose to place this pre-positioned force in Germany.  If we place it too close to the potential front then it might be targeted for destruction in place before we can get there, or we might have to fly into contested airspace in order to meet up with our equipment.  In a more limited conflict initiated by Russia they would be less likely to attack targets in Germany in hopes of avoiding a full-scale NATO response to an attack with limited territorial goals.
> 
> The remaining LAV Battalion vehicles I'd place as training company vehicles in Gagetown, Meaford and Wainwright for use of both the Reg Force Light Battalions and the Reserve Infantry Regiments to use for familiarization training.
> 
> The extra LAV Recce vehicles could be either used as conversion hulls for new variant vehicles, or parceled out to the infantry Recce Platoons or Reserve Armoured Recce Regiments.
> 
> This FORCE 2025 would look something like this:
> 
> View attachment 66232




Now if only we could figure out how to integrate TACHEL into the scheme....


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Now if only we could figure out how to integrate TACHEL into the scheme....


Agreed, as well the LIB's will need dedicated standby/support aircraft.


----------



## Kirkhill

Which leads me to the question:  What authority, and budget, does Canadian Joint Operations Command possess?

Doesn't it seem reasonable that they are setting the terms of reference for the components and deciding how those components are going to work together,  and the tools they need?  Shouldn't they be deciding how TACHEL gets utilized and what the Army needs to have to be able to work with TACHEL, and what the RCAF needs to support those operations, and how many berths the RCN needs to keep clear on their vessels to embark a functional air-ground team?



> Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC)​What CJOC does​CJOC leads most Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operations in Canada, North America, and around the world.
> CJOC directs CAF missions from planning to closing, to meet national and international strategic goals. It ensures rapid responses in CAF operations by:
> 
> planning for contingencies;
> establishing structures and processes that can be activated or expanded at short notice for:
> command-and-control;
> intelligence;
> support.
> 
> Leadership​Vice-Admiral J.R. (Bob) Auchterlonie
> Related links​CAF Operations and Exercises
> CJOC structure and roles​CJOC is made up of the following:
> 
> CAF task forces deployed on operations in Canada and North America
> six standing regional Joint Task Force Headquarters across Canada
> a Canada-wide network of support units, the Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group
> CAF task forces deployed on operations in other countries
> CJOC headquarters staff that plan and direct CAF operations
> CJOC is assisted by the:
> 
> Joint Force Air Component Commander, based in Winnipeg
> Maritime Component Commanders, located in Esquimalt and Halifax
> 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, based in Kingston
> The Component Commanders lead the:
> 
> Royal Canadian Navy
> Canadian Army
> Royal Canadian Air Force
> Component Commanders provide insight into the specifics of CAF operations. They take part in contingency planning and readiness activities. They also command and control CAF elements in operations. This is done under CJOC direction.
> CJOC also works closely with partners in operations. These include:
> 
> other Canadian government departments and agencies
> the armed forces of traditional allies and nations with shared defence goals
> multinational organizations like NATO and the United Nations (UN)
> CJOC directs all CAF operations except those run solely by:
> 
> Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
> NORAD


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Which leads me to the question:  What authority, and budget, does Canadian Joint Operations Command possess?
> 
> Doesn't it seem reasonable that they are setting the terms of reference for the components and deciding how those components are going to work together,  and the tools they need?  Shouldn't they be deciding how TACHEL gets utilized and what the Army needs to have to be able to work with TACHEL, and what the RCAF needs to support those operations, and how many berths the RCN needs to keep clear on their vessels to embark a functional air-ground team?


CJOC is a force employer. They do not have the budget or authority to develop overarching doctrine (which includes pretty much everything from org to eqpt and trg) Essentially they focus on contingency and mission planning and execution albeit there is some provision for establishing structures and processes for intelligence, support and command and control.

JSOC might have an interest in the things you contemplate but is not the deciding agency. We've got to give some responsibility to the CDS, CLS, CAS and CNS, don't we? - otherwise why would we need all those generals and their staff?  😉 

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

So the simple solution is to hand the budget to CJOC and have them buy what they need from CLS, CAS and CNS?  If the elements don't supply what their "customer" wants they don't get paid?


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Here's the latest Force 2025 recipe from the kitchen of GR66. ...


Sorry mate - not buying this one.

I'll stick with my general formula that in order to develop the proper doctrine and expertise we need to reorganize into what are essentially three brigades, one light, one medium and one heavy. Scattering these capabilities around the country and mix and matching them within a brigade accomplishes very little. Placing a tank regiment within what is essentially a light brigade so that it can be garrisoned in Gagetown close to a port is counterproductive at best. It needs to be collocated with mechanized infantry (even if only LAV 6.0) and the appropriate armoured engineer, artillery and support agencies. The Wainwright ranges are still the best for training combined arms forces.

I can buy 5GMBC as a full up medium LAV brigade but I'm still of the view that the light brigade and the medium brigade should be under one divisional headquarters which would become our centre of excellence for OOTW having both a rapid deployment capability and a medium weight follow-up force capability.

I'll stay with these two organizations where 3 PPCLI is transformed into a cavalry/strike regiment for the heavy brigade, the recce regiments into cavalry/strike regiments for the light and medium brigades and 3 RCR becomes a multi-disciplinary FSCB battalion under CANSOFCOM.




Effectively that targets one full-time brigade as the centre of excellence for all things NATO/Europe and two full-time brigades for everything else including OOTW.

As far as TacHel. Leave 1 Wing in Kingston and primarily responsive to 2 Cdn Div for joint training - (With the exception of 408 Sqn in Edmonton-which can continue to support 3 Div-everything else is already in the east.) In the same way the transport wing, 8 Wing in Trenton, can also be primarily responsive to 2 Div for joint training. Of course they respond, as tasked, to CJOC and 1 Div for operations.

3 Div on the other hand should be gaining expertise in all things rail and ship movement (both North America and Europe)

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Sorry mate - not buying this one.
> 
> I'll stick with my general formula that in order to develop the proper doctrine and expertise we need to reorganize into what are essentially three brigades, one light, one medium and one heavy. Scattering these capabilities around the country and mix and matching them within a brigade accomplishes very little. Placing a tank regiment within what is essentially a light brigade so that it can be garrisoned in Gagetown close to a port is counterproductive at best. It needs to be collocated with mechanized infantry (even if only LAV 6.0) and the appropriate armoured engineer, artillery and support agencies. The Wainwright ranges are still the best for training combined arms forces.


Done.  This is fixed fairly simply by switching around KevinB's LAV Brigade assignments.  Instead of making the isolated Battalion locations the LAV units, make the co-located units the LAV Battalions.  Make the Strathconas the Tank Regiment and you have your three flavours of Brigades...Light/Medium/Heavy.

2 Brigade becomes your Light Brigade with 3 x LIBs, 5e Brigade is your Medium Brigade (basically identical to our existing Medium Brigades but I'd still redesign the Armoured Recce Squadrons as I described) and 1 Brigade is your Heavy Brigade with LdSH (tanks) and 2 x LAV Brigades all co-located in Edmonton being your 3 x maneuver units for deployment with 2 PPCLI in Shilo becoming the Regiment's Light Battalion.


FJAG said:


> I can buy 5GMBC as a full up medium LAV brigade but I'm still of the view that the light brigade and the medium brigade should be under one divisional headquarters which would become our centre of excellence for OOTW having both a rapid deployment capability and a medium weight follow-up force capability.


No issues with breaking down the Divisions as you suggest.


FJAG said:


> I'll stay with these two organizations where 3 PPCLI is transformed into a cavalry/strike regiment for the heavy brigade, the recce regiments into cavalry/strike regiments for the light and medium brigades and 3 RCR becomes a multi-disciplinary FSCB battalion under CANSOFCOM.
> 
> View attachment 66236
> View attachment 66237
> 
> Effectively that targets one full-time brigade as the centre of excellence for all things NATO/Europe and two full-time brigades for everything else including OOTW.
> 
> As far as TacHel. Leave 1 Wing in Kingston and primarily responsive to 2 Cdn Div for joint training - (With the exception of 408 Sqn in Edmonton-which can continue to support 3 Div-everything else is already in the east.) In the same way the transport wing, 8 Wing in Trenton, can also be primarily responsive to 2 Div for joint training. Of course they respond, as tasked, to CJOC and 1 Div for operations.
> 
> 3 Div on the other hand should be gaining expertise in all things rail and ship movement (both North America and Europe)
> 
> 🍻


I didn't include Reserve Brigades in my structure but I think we both agree that the units need to be consolidated into Brigades/Battalions that realistically reflect their actual size and capabilities.  I think we also agree that the Reserves are potentially a good place to invest in some of those capabilities that are most likely to be required only in a major conflict and focus the full-time PYs on fulfilling the more likely ongoing missions the Army will be asked to participate in.

There are a couple of areas where we disagree however.  You would structure your Heavy Brigade using the "Optimal" Battle Group concept with one Tank-heavy combined arms Battalion and two Infantry-heavy combined arms Battalions.  I on the other hand believe that a major NATO/Russia military conflict with a full-scale conventional war remains a fairly low probability event.  Yes, we should be prepared and equipped to deal with it IF it should come to pass, but I believe that specifically tailoring 1/2 of our Reg Force specifically for that particular mission is a mis-allocation of our limited resources.  My proposed structure would have a Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions co-located in Edmonton.  There is nothing preventing the Brigade from exercising them in Battle Groups of the configuration you suggest, but in my opinion there is no reason to self-limit our options by formalizing specific force structures for the Battalions.

The other area where we disagree is with your assumptions for the next steps for 2030.  I honestly just don't see any hope that the money will be available to transition our Heavy Brigade forces to tracked IFVs and begin equipping our Reserves with IFVs, Tanks, etc.  

I also think it's unrealistic to believe that the many structural, monetary and legislative issues that stand in the way of creating an Army Reserve that is capable of fielding operational units any time in the near future.  In my opinion it will take a national crisis for there to be the will to make the changes that would be required to make this happen.  So I think then it would be folly to base our plans on the assumption that magically this will somehow happen.

Group the Reserve Regiments into Battalions.  Provide them with as much cheap, but effective equipment as we can.  Get them training together as larger formation.  Create better relations between Reserve units and Reg Force units by formalizing relationships between them for augmentation.  Create the LAV Training Companies (and Class B positions during the Reg Force exercise season) to better prepare Reservists to augment Reg Force units on deployment.  There is lots of room for improvement while we continue to push for more fundamental changes.


----------



## CBH99

GR66 said:


> Done.  This is fixed fairly simply by switching around KevinB's LAV Brigade assignments.  Instead of making the isolated Battalion locations the LAV units, make the co-located units the LAV Battalions.  Make the Strathconas the Tank Regiment and you have your three flavours of Brigades...Light/Medium/Heavy.
> 
> 2 Brigade becomes your Light Brigade with 3 x LIBs, 5e Brigade is your Medium Brigade (basically identical to our existing Medium Brigades but I'd still redesign the Armoured Recce Squadrons as I described) and 1 Brigade is your Heavy Brigade with LdSH (tanks) and 2 x LAV Brigades all co-located in Edmonton being your 3 x maneuver units for deployment with 2 PPCLI in Shilo becoming the Regiment's Light Battalion.
> 
> No issues with breaking down the Divisions as you suggest.
> 
> I didn't include Reserve Brigades in my structure but I think we both agree that the units need to be consolidated into Brigades/Battalions that realistically reflect their actual size and capabilities.  I think we also agree that the Reserves are potentially a good place to invest in some of those capabilities that are most likely to be required only in a major conflict and focus the full-time PYs on fulfilling the more likely ongoing missions the Army will be asked to participate in.
> 
> There are a couple of areas where we disagree however.  You would structure your Heavy Brigade using the "Optimal" Battle Group concept with one Tank-heavy combined arms Battalion and two Infantry-heavy combined arms Battalions.  I on the other hand believe that a major NATO/Russia military conflict with a full-scale conventional war remains a fairly low probability event.  Yes, we should be prepared and equipped to deal with it IF it should come to pass, but I believe that specifically tailoring 1/2 of our Reg Force specifically for that particular mission is a mis-allocation of our limited resources.  My proposed structure would have a Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions co-located in Edmonton.  There is nothing preventing the Brigade from exercising them in Battle Groups of the configuration you suggest, but in my opinion there is no reason to self-limit our options by formalizing specific force structures for the Battalions.
> 
> The other area where we disagree is with your assumptions for the next steps for 2030.  I honestly just don't see any hope that the money will be available to transition our Heavy Brigade forces to tracked IFVs and begin equipping our Reserves with IFVs, Tanks, etc.
> 
> I also think it's unrealistic to believe that the many structural, monetary and legislative issues that stand in the way of creating an Army Reserve that is capable of fielding operational units any time in the near future.  In my opinion it will take a national crisis for there to be the will to make the changes that would be required to make this happen.  So I think then it would be folly to base our plans on the assumption that magically this will somehow happen.
> 
> Group the Reserve Regiments into Battalions.  Provide them with as much cheap, but effective equipment as we can.  Get them training together as larger formation.  Create better relations between Reserve units and Reg Force units by formalizing relationships between them for augmentation.  Create the LAV Training Companies (and Class B positions during the Reg Force exercise season) to better prepare Reservists to augment Reg Force units on deployment.  There is lots of room for improvement while we continue to push for more fundamental changes.
> View attachment 66238


Both of your proposals make a lot of sense, even if they differ in slight yet fundamental ways.

I am curious, and I imagine there are a few others who have followed this thread and enjoy reading these proposals who are also curious or at least wondering as we read - 

how does the CAF currently deploy heavy vehicles en-masse for deployments or exercises?  (Afghanistan being a good example, or Latvia.)


I am under the impression the vehicles are shipped to Montreal by rail, then loaded onto a ship, which then offloads the vehicles/cargo at it’s destination port?  

Is this the case for vehicles based out west also?  Or would vehicles belonging to units out west be loaded onto a ship in BC?  



(Seeing as we are discussing the structure and capabilities of what we want our military to do by 2025, having a firm idea on how these vehicles are physically transported out of the country would help me big time in terms of what types of units are based where.


----------



## Kirkhill

My preference for GR66's solution is the greater emphasis on Light Battalions, which I will continue to offer, provides more flexibility.  I have no problem with a 2 Division structure.  I have no problem with a heavier brigade with a heavy division support group.  Fill yer boots.

But I do prefer GR66's 4 LAV Bn structure with a Prepositioned Kit.  and 5 Light Bns.  I might settle for 4 Light Bns.

1 Heavy Bde with 2 LAV Bns, an ISR Unit and an MBT Unit.  No Probs.
Combine with the Div Suppt Groups and the Cbt Spt Bde under a single deployable Div HQ. No Probs.

Other Div HQ responsible for two Light Brigades each with 2x LIBs and 1x LAV  and a Div Spt Bde with a ISR Unit, a Fd Arty Regt and a GS Regt.

TAC Hel to continue in location but with tighter associations with the  Light Bdes and a bigger training budget.

LIBs to be properly financed, equipped and trained.

A Div

LAV, LAV, MBT
ISR, Fd Arty, GS Arty,
Cbt Spt Bde

A Nudder Div

LIB, LIB, LAV, TACHEL
LIB, LIB, LAV, TACHEL
ISR, Fd Arty, GS Arty
Cbt Spt Bde, TACHEL

Locations to be sorted out by politicians.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Done.  This is fixed fairly simply by switching around KevinB's LAV Brigade assignments.  Instead of making the isolated Battalion locations the LAV units, make the co-located units the LAV Battalions.  Make the Strathconas the Tank Regiment and you have your three flavours of Brigades...Light/Medium/Heavy.
> 
> 2 Brigade becomes your Light Brigade with 3 x LIBs, 5e Brigade is your Medium Brigade (basically identical to our existing Medium Brigades but I'd still redesign the Armoured Recce Squadrons as I described) and 1 Brigade is your Heavy Brigade with LdSH (tanks) and 2 x LAV Brigades all co-located in Edmonton being your 3 x maneuver units for deployment with 2 PPCLI in Shilo becoming the Regiment's Light Battalion.


I like this concept much more.

I like the idea of a battle group in Europe albeit at the moment we have a battle group headquarters with a LAV company and a battery and an NSE and some other elements, so your force is bigger than what we are committed to.

I note that your heavy brigade does not have either a recce squadron nor a cavalry squadron. You do have three infantry battalions though and with the tank regiment that makes four manoeuvre battalions. That's why I turned the PYs for the light battalion into a cavalry "bn" that is a combination of recce, infantry, anti-armour and (sometime soon) guided UAV systems. An armoured regiment and two mech infantry battalions (whether pure or mixed combined arms) are sufficient as the manoeuvre elements of a heavy brigade.


GR66 said:


> No issues with breaking down the Divisions as you suggest.
> 
> I didn't include Reserve Brigades in my structure but I think we both agree that the units need to be consolidated into Brigades/Battalions that realistically reflect their actual size and capabilities.  I think we also agree that the Reserves are potentially a good place to invest in some of those capabilities that are most likely to be required only in a major conflict and focus the full-time PYs on fulfilling the more likely ongoing missions the Army will be asked to participate in.


Yup. We agree.


GR66 said:


> There are a couple of areas where we disagree however.  You would structure your Heavy Brigade using the "Optimal" Battle Group concept with one Tank-heavy combined arms Battalion and two Infantry-heavy combined arms Battalions.  I on the other hand believe that a major NATO/Russia military conflict with a full-scale conventional war remains a fairly low probability event.  Yes, we should be prepared and equipped to deal with it IF it should come to pass, but I believe that specifically tailoring 1/2 of our Reg Force specifically for that particular mission is a mis-allocation of our limited resources.  My proposed structure would have a Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions co-located in Edmonton.  There is nothing preventing the Brigade from exercising them in Battle Groups of the configuration you suggest, but in my opinion there is no reason to self-limit our options by formalizing specific force structures for the Battalions.


Fair enough although the Army already has a history of mixing companies from one battalion into other battalions on deployment so one could easily deploy an infantry heavy combined arms battalion without its tanks and add a rifle company from somewhere else if needed. Whether the brigade is combined arms or the battalions is combined arms is a matter of doctrine that we should settle by design and experimentation. In this respect we should be open to new ideas, new weapon system, new organizations and new TTPs. Regimental traditions be damned.


GR66 said:


> The other area where we disagree is with your assumptions for the next steps for 2030.  I honestly just don't see any hope that the money will be available to transition our Heavy Brigade forces to tracked IFVs and begin equipping our Reserves with IFVs, Tanks, etc.


Understood. The idea is to show asperation. I, like KevinB, do not think that the LAV 6.0 makes a proper IFV for combined arms warfare. Effectively with the proposed structure, for the cost of about one hundred IFVs, you have one fully equipped heavy brigade and can reallocate five companies of LAV 6.0s to the east to provide additional equipment to strengthen the medium force with another battalion plus. In the meantime we bumble along with the LAVs we do have and which are coming on line.


GR66 said:


> I also think it's unrealistic to believe that the many structural, monetary and legislative issues that stand in the way of creating an Army Reserve that is capable of fielding operational units any time in the near future.  In my opinion it will take a national crisis for there to be the will to make the changes that would be required to make this happen.  So I think then it would be folly to base our plans on the assumption that magically this will somehow happen.


There are no structural or legislative changes that can't be easily overcome ... if ... we ... develop ... the ... will ... to ... do ... so. 

Concentrating/consolidating reserve units is a money saver through removing numerous unnecessary headquarters and their high end staff. There is clearly a cost issue with equipping the reserves but let's face the truth, there is critical equipment needed for the Army as a whole: AD, Anti-armour, armed UAVs, artillery etc etc. At some point money has to be spent on this equipment in any event and if much of it is manned by hybrid units with a large reserve component then there is a substantial annual personnel costs savings. When we talk dollars here, having much of this necessary equipment manned by low cost reservists should make money available for more equipment.

That said, I agree with you that if we haven't seriously addressed this issue in the last seventy years we probably never will and will continue to bumble along the way we do until there is a major crisis by which time it's too late.

This reminds me of my tour with an Italian mountain artillery regiment. The regiment had a core of regular force full-timers but the bulk of the regiment was made up by draftees. I asked the RSM which element of the regiment took the longest time to train and without the bat of an eye he said the mules ... first you had to get a horse and a donkey together in a field, then wait through the natural gestation period of a mule, then wait for it to grow to a useable size and then get it together with a mule driver and train them both how to haul guns up a mountain - all that take years. Draftee 2nd lieutenants and sergeants they could turn out in six months.

If Rumsfeld was right about anything it's that "you go to war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time". Right now, the army that we have has only the equipment for one half of the soldiers that we have. We need a plan to acquire more equipment and to organize and train the people we have on it in a comprehensive way in accordance with whatever doctrine we develop.


GR66 said:


> Group the Reserve Regiments into Battalions.  Provide them with as much cheap, but effective equipment as we can.  Get them training together as larger formation.  Create better relations between Reserve units and Reg Force units by formalizing relationships between them for augmentation.  Create the LAV Training Companies (and Class B positions during the Reg Force exercise season) to better prepare Reservists to augment Reg Force units on deployment.  There is lots of room for improvement while we continue to push for more fundamental changes.


That's definitely my target for 2025.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> Both of your proposals make a lot of sense, even if they differ in slight yet fundamental ways.
> 
> I am curious, and I imagine there are a few others who have followed this thread and enjoy reading these proposals who are also curious or at least wondering as we read -
> 
> how does the CAF currently deploy heavy vehicles en-masse for deployments or exercises?  (Afghanistan being a good example, or Latvia.)
> 
> 
> I am under the impression the vehicles are shipped to Montreal by rail, then loaded onto a ship, which then offloads the vehicles/cargo at it’s destination port?
> 
> Is this the case for vehicles based out west also?  Or would vehicles belonging to units out west be loaded onto a ship in BC?
> 
> 
> 
> (Seeing as we are discussing the structure and capabilities of what we want our military to do by 2025, having a firm idea on how these vehicles are physically transported out of the country would help me big time in terms of what types of units are based where.



Generally through 4th Canadian Movement Control Unit in Montreal which is now part of the Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group. 



> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Operational Support in Canada - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> The operational support framework of Canadian Joint Operations Command is designed for maximum flexibility to satisfy widely varying requirements of task forces deployed on continental and expeditionary operations.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.canada.ca



Just as an example when 2 CMBG from Petawawa was tasked to form a brigade headquarters and battle group for Kabul in 2004, they were just finishing off an exercise in Wainwright Alberta. Personnel and equipment were designated while in Wainwright and designated equipment was moved to Montreal by rail, road convoy and flat bed truck to 4 CMCU where some of it was repacked into shipping containers and the containers and non containerized vehicles were then loaded on a ship to SE Asia where it was received and prepositioned by the Canadian Theatre Activation Team. Troops subsequently flew from Canada to Camp Mirage and from there by Hercules into Kabul where they spent days rooting around shipping containers looking for their gear.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Now if only we could figure out how to integrate TACHEL into the scheme....


Question regarding Attack Helicopters vs. Armed Helicopters.  Presumably in a peer fight (e.g. Russia) enemy AD systems will preclude using an AH in any type of line-of-site type attack using it's gun systems.  Instead, I assume you would use NLOS missile attacks using either a mast-mounted sight on the helicopter itself or by having the targets identified by other units.

Perhaps a cheaper 80% alternative to attack helicopters (because as Canadians that's what we always look for with regard to our military ) we make one of the criteria for any new medium lift helicopter we purchase be that it can be fitted with weapons (including ATGMs) similar to the armed Blackhawk.


----------



## Good2Golf

We could shoot M982 Excalibur. 👍🏼


----------



## dapaterson

Good2Golf said:


> We could shoot M982 Excalibur. 👍🏼
> 
> View attachment 66245


But what would the recoil do to the CH147?


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Question regarding Attack Helicopters vs. Armed Helicopters.  Presumably in a peer fight (e.g. Russia) enemy AD systems will preclude using an AH in any type of line-of-site type attack using it's gun systems.  Instead, I assume you would use NLOS missile attacks using either a mast-mounted sight on the helicopter itself or by having the targets identified by other units.
> 
> Perhaps a cheaper 80% alternative to attack helicopters (because as Canadians that's what we always look for with regard to our military ) we make one of the criteria for any new medium lift helicopter we purchase be that it can be fitted with weapons (including ATGMs) similar to the armed Blackhawk.



In a peer fight I would be standing off as far as possible with all our weapons systems.  Close with and destroy is the last phase.  Not the first phase.

Helicopters I perceive as transport devices.  Just like trucks.  And just the way I perceive LAVs.   Their function is to get troops quickly into blocking positions to constrain enemy movement and to create bases, or even FUPs, from which offensive operations can be undertaken.  Ideally offensive operations will be artillery led.

The purpose of transport is to get troops and their gear as quickly as possible, as close as possible, as safely as possible, to the enemy.  Heavy emphasis on the "As Possible" bit.  Reality intrudes in all operations and, in my opinion, there are no magic solutions, light or heavy, that are not subject to the "As Possible" rule.

Let's just suppose we do get into a punch up with Russia or China.  Does anybody really anticipate our LAVs and Leos rolling down the streets or Beijing or Moscow?  On the other hand I can foresee opportunities for light forces to whittle away at Russian and Chinese control of Siberia, Xinjiang, Tibet and Afghanistan.  Or assisting in the border zones.

In those areas there is more opportunity to pick the fight, the location, the timing and the means.

As a transport system the helicopter should, by all means, have the ability to transport weapons, and to employ them while in transit.  I think that arming Utility Helicopters and providing the 80% solution makes more sense than dedicating scarce dollars to specific solutions.

As to the ISR capabilities - apparently the term of art these days is MUM-T (Manned UnManned - Teaming?).  Greater reliance on pumping out 40mm drones with 10 km ranges from a hand-held M320 in the cabin of  the helo than playing sneak and peek with mast mounted systems.

My sense is that the Army should train and equip to do tasks that make it useful most of the time.   It should certainly plan for the peer fight.  It should prepare to contribute to that fight as effectively as possible within the scope set by the capabilities we possess at the time.

But nobody can be under any illusion that we will be defeating Russia or China on our own.  At least not on their turf.

On the other hand we should be able to do that on our own turf.

The Finns were able to do just that.  With light forces.

Edit - and the Vietnamese have beaten the French, the Americans and the Chinese.   Maybe we should be taking lessons from them.


----------



## Kirkhill

You know, the more I think about it, why not just get Bell Textron to pump out another couple of hundred cheap Griffons?  And perhaps a few dozen Jet Rangers?

In the event it is always about working with what you have.  And adjusting your plans to the capabilities of the kit available.


----------



## dapaterson

Who will fly and maintain them?


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Who will fly and maintain them?



Fair question.

To be answered with another.

Which has more general utility?   500 TAPVs?  or 200 Griffons and Jet Rangers?


----------



## Kirkhill

And as for training pilots - what is the difference between training someone to sit outside a helicopter and flying it with a smartphone or training the same person, with the same smartphone, to sit inside the same helicopter?


----------



## Good2Golf

dapaterson said:


> But what would the recoil do to the CH147?


Slow it down to the speed of a Griffon...


----------



## dapaterson

Kirkhill said:


> And as for training pilots - what is the difference between training someone to sit outside a helicopter and flying it with a smartphone or training the same person, with the same smartphone, to sit inside the same helicopter?



Exactly.  You need the capacity to train pilots.  Where are you getting that capacity from?


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Exactly.  You need the capacity to train pilots.  Where are you getting that capacity from?


The same place we are getting the capacity to train people to drive all this unmanned kit entering the inventory.


----------



## Kirkhill

We can look at the Northrop Grumman FireScout MQ8C and compare it to the Bell 407 and the Bell 206L-4 Long Ranger.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Exactly.  You need the capacity to train pilots.  Where are you getting that capacity from?


The same place we are getting the capacity to train people to drive all this unmanned kit entering the inventory.


----------



## dapaterson

Kirkhill said:


> The same place we are getting the capacity to train people to drive all this unmanned kit entering the inventory.



Nice of you to assume that the RCAF has fixed their pilot training failings.

And there's a huge difference between a handful of MALE UAVs and one hundred new manned platforms.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Exactly.  You need the capacity to train pilots.  Where are you getting that capacity from?


Not to sound too flippant, but we surged artillery training output in the mid seventies by utilizing the field regiments for that until the battle schools could catch up to a sustainment level.

I don't want to put pilot training on a par with turning out gunners, but simply want to say that when it's a matter of necessity AND priority then a solution is and the resources can be made available. 

The ongoing pilot issue is an interesting point, however. It beggars the imagination that a profession as interesting to young people as flying jets and helicopters has problems retaining and training people especially with the money that's been thrown at that. 

Essentially there must be a fundamental underlying deficiency there that needs to be discovered and have its back broken. Personally I'd start by seriously exploring the idea of getting rid of the requirement that all pilots be officers and waste four years of peak flying time in university. -- But that's a whole other thread where we've beaten that idea to death recently. My point is that many of the CFs capacity limitations are self imposed - the CF needs to seriously unblock much of its bureaucratically-based constipation in our recruiting, training and human resource management systems or it will always limp along the way it is now.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

I think I detect cynicism from DAP.

😁

Actually I am thinking less about MALE (or female) programs and more the technology behind quadcopters and loitering munitions.

No pilot flies them, in the sense of keeping them in the air.  AFAIK the pilot is more of a commander than a driver.


----------



## dapaterson

The problem space is well understood.  Addressing it would require firing half the RCAF leadership, holding the rest to account, but would risk undermining the continual pilot caterwauling that they are underpaid... when most commercial pilots pay for their own training, and then both the pilots in the cockpit of a Q400 makes less than a mid-range RCAF pilot.

But because no one will ever hold GOFOs to account for systemic failure...


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> Not to sound too flippant, but we surged artillery training output in the mid seventies by utilizing the field regiments for that until the battle schools could catch up to a sustainment level.
> 
> I don't want to put pilot training on a par with turning out gunners, but simply want to say that when it's a matter of necessity AND priority then a solution is and the resources can be made available.
> 
> The ongoing pilot issue is an interesting point, however. It beggars the imagination that a profession as interesting to young people as flying jets and helicopters has problems retaining and training people especially with the money that's been thrown at that.
> 
> Essentially there must be a fundamental underlying deficiency there that needs to be discovered and have its back broken. Personally I'd start by seriously exploring the idea of getting rid of the requirement that all pilots be officers and waste four years of peak flying time in university. -- But that's a whole other thread where we've beaten that idea to death recently. My point is that many of the CFs capacity limitations are self imposed - the CF needs to seriously unblock much of its bureaucratically-based constipation in our recruiting, training and human resource management systems or it will always limp along the way it is now.
> 
> 🍻


FJAG, turns out the 90s’ panacea, ASD, isn’t so panaceic after all…we’ve probably spent more, and had consistently lower output after pilot training was substantively demilitarized and contracted out…


----------



## Kirkhill

Maybe the problem will solve itself by putting the "Air Force" back in the hands of its original owners - The Bombardiers: Firing Intelligent Loitering Munitions


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> I think I detect cynicism from DAP.
> 
> 😁
> 
> Actually I am thinking less about MALE (or female) programs and more the technology behind quadcopters and loitering munitions.
> 
> No pilot flies them, in the sense of keeping them in the air.  AFAIK the pilot is more of a commander than a driver.



Bell's Pilot Optional  Uber.


----------



## Navy_Pete

dapaterson said:


> The problem space is well understood.  Addressing it would require firing half the RCAF leadership, holding the rest to account, but would risk undermining the continual pilot caterwauling that they are underpaid... when most commercial pilots pay for their own training, and then both the pilots in the cockpit of a Q400 makes less than a mid-range RCAF pilot.
> 
> But because no one will ever hold GOFOs to account for systemic failure...


I don't think pilots are complaining they are underpaid now with the big raise, but they still get treated like crap by some crappy "leaders", so I guess that goes with your first point. And they keep promoting crappy "leaders", so not really sure what their damage is as an institution.


----------



## FJAG

Good2Golf said:


> FJAG, turns out the 90s’ panacea, ASD, isn’t so panaceic after all…we’ve probably spent more, and had consistently lower output after pilot training was substantively demilitarized and contracted out…


I really know very little about the inner workings in the RCAF these days except what I hear here from the folks in it. Back in the early eighties, my brother in law (actually my sister in law's husband) who ran 2 CFFTS in Moose Jaw took me for a tour around and explained the air force training system which all seemed to make eminent sense at the time (mind you we still flew CF5s and Voodoos then).

I've never been a fan for privatizing anything. Hell, I think most civil servants should be traded in for uniformed personnel who can handle a rifle in a pinch. Contracted UAVs are anathema to me. For some reason I can't quite fathom, we've becomes a force that can't function without civilians and civilian contractors. I can't quite put my finger on it but it strikes me that there is something fundamentally wrong with that. Maybe it's just that this is another way of getting around PY limitations and using O&M funds for what are essentially personnel costs. It strikes me as a way of gaming the system. 

I remember back in staff school, one of my syndicate mates was a Starfighter jockey who told me that when he finished his training on the CF 104 as one of the top candidates, he and a handful of the other top guys were kept on at the school to teach flying fundamental to new incoming serials for a year before being passed on to an operational squadron.

It strikes me that the whole training system has gone to heck in a handbag since we adopted managed readiness. It seems to drag things out for basically routine matters and reduces the number of people available to dedicate to the individual training system. Whenever I hear of folks sitting around for month after month waiting for basic trades training it makes my skin crawl. Every military training system should be designed to provide an efficient throughput of the numbers needed to fill the units on a continuing basis AND be capable of surging training when required. A military that can't surge their training system is doomed. We tend to reach into a paper thin reserve on occasion but it is a reserve that can only provide individual augmentees rather than vital equipment and functions.

IMHO the whole system is deeply flawed and not capable of major crisis response.

🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG, good points…let me add Managed Readimess to the Alternate Service Delivery non-panacea.  Crappy ideas used to excuse proper and appropriate allocation of resources to provide what should have otherwise been a resilient force composition, training and currency/readiness standard…seems to have resulted in the CAF’s ability to “do less with more…”


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> How about if the Bv-Series/Bronco style vehicles were acquired for the Transport Platoons and the Transport Coys of the Service Battalions?  As A-echelon "B" vehicles?
> 
> I would like to keep the F-echelon of the Light Infantry very light and heli-transportable. And in Canada heli-transportable means compatible with the Griffon, not the Chinook. That is why I am leaning more heavily towards Ultra Light platforms.  I am not particularly bothered about operating in cold, wet environments with open vehicles.  We have experience and we have existing technologies.


I'll respond to this here so as to not further derail the C3 Replacement thread.

I think that we differ on how we envision the role of the Light Battalions.  You seem to see them as raiders swooping in unexpectedly to strike where least expected.  For these roles the ultra-light vehicles, aircraft and weapons you propose make sense for these types of distributed operation.  In my opinion that is the role of CSOR rather than the Light Battalions.

To me, the role of the Light Battalions is to provide a force that can respond more quickly than our our heavier forces, or can operate more effectively in complex terrain where our LAVs aren't effective.  Yes the Light Battalions need to trade protection for mobility to achieve their goals but they also need to arrive with enough "weight" (ammo, support weapons, numbers) to be able to effectively defend against heavier enemy forces.

For me then I'd look instead for vehicles that can transport a Section with their gear (and be mounted with support weapons with enough ammo to fight a heavier enemy) rather than Fire-Team sized ultra-light vehicles.  So to me I'd look at a Bv-series/Bronco or JLTV or Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) class of land vehicle and a Medium Lift Utility Helicopter along the lines of a UH-60, AW-101 or one of the FVL contenders rather then a swarm of Griffons or other light helicopters.

My philosophy would be to purchase a proven, reliable, relatively common vehicle/aircraft - preferably one in service with the US or our other major allies - that will effectively carry an infantry Section and their gear, can be customized to mount a variety of support weapons/roles (indirect fire, UAV/Loitering Munitions/ATGMs/SHORAD/Ambulance/Command/Cargo, etc.) and is relatively simple to maintain.  Let CSOR focus on the ultra-light, raiding end of the spectrum which is better suited to Company Group operations likely anyway.


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:


> But what would the recoil do to the CH147?


Probably rip the hook from the under belly, totally fine if you only need one shot


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> I'll respond to this here so as to not further derail the C3 Replacement thread.
> 
> I think that we differ on how we envision the role of the Light Battalions.  You seem to see them as raiders swooping in unexpectedly to strike where least expected.  For these roles the ultra-light vehicles, aircraft and weapons you propose make sense for these types of distributed operation.  In my opinion that is the role of CSOR rather than the Light Battalions.
> 
> To me, the role of the Light Battalions is to provide a force that can respond more quickly than our our heavier forces, or can operate more effectively in complex terrain where our LAVs aren't effective.  Yes the Light Battalions need to trade protection for mobility to achieve their goals but they also need to arrive with enough "weight" (ammo, support weapons, numbers) to be able to effectively defend against heavier enemy forces.
> 
> For me then I'd look instead for vehicles that can transport a Section with their gear (and be mounted with support weapons with enough ammo to fight a heavier enemy) rather than Fire-Team sized ultra-light vehicles.  So to me I'd look at a Bv-series/Bronco or JLTV or Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) class of land vehicle and a Medium Lift Utility Helicopter along the lines of a UH-60, AW-101 or one of the FVL contenders rather then a swarm of Griffons or other light helicopters.
> 
> My philosophy would be to purchase a proven, reliable, relatively common vehicle/aircraft - preferably one in service with the US or our other major allies - that will effectively carry an infantry Section and their gear, can be customized to mount a variety of support weapons/roles (indirect fire, UAV/Loitering Munitions/ATGMs/SHORAD/Ambulance/Command/Cargo, etc.) and is relatively simple to maintain.  Let CSOR focus on the ultra-light, raiding end of the spectrum which is better suited to Company Group operations likely anyway.



The primary point of clarification:  I don't see Light Battalions as dedicated raiders.  I do see them as being able to conduct raids.  Everyone should be able to conduct raids.  Artillery raids are a thing.

I do see the Light Battalions as being able to deploy quickly AND HOLD.  I do see the Light Battalions as being able TO SUSTAIN operations in complex terrain.

I don't think it is necessary for the infantry battalion on the ground to go in with a Wagon Train with a months worth of supplies when it should be able to rely on those supplies being pushed forwards by its supporting arms.  It should be able to rely on rounds on target delivered by the arty's guns and rockets, the air force's helos and aircraft and whoever is going to take responsibility for operating intelligent munitions that have no pilots.

If there is one image that defines the Light Infantry to me it is this one



This is White City in Japanese occupied Burma.  Originally held by the Chindits.    The Chindits, although Special in their day, were replaced by line infantry battalions from all over the British world once the Specials proved that the Japanese could be beaten in the jungles and were not 10 feet tall.

The infantry was supplied by air with air crews of various nationalities.   They did not possess their own supply system.  They had to rely on their support.

They were operating in terrain where neither they, nor the Japanese, could make effective use of tanks.



Royal Welch Fusiliers Burma December 1944

Burma was no raid.



One of the longstanding discussions on this site is the utility of the Battle Group vice the Brigade Group and whether Battalions should train independently or as part of the Brigade.

Perhaps the lack of Brigade training is a problem.  Perhaps it encourages the battalion to look inwards to solve its problems rather than looking outwards and learning to trust its allied, supporting arms.


----------



## KevinB

Lots of stuff of late.

 I think there seems to be two significant issues (and two side to both of those issues).

At the crux is WHAT IS A LIGHT UNIT:


GR66 said:


> I think that we differ on how we envision the role of the Light Battalions.  You seem to see them as raiders swooping in unexpectedly to strike where least expected.  For these roles the ultra-light vehicles, aircraft and weapons you propose make sense for these types of distributed operation.  In my opinion that is the role of CSOR rather than the Light Battalions.


Light Infantry is key to Multi Domain Distributed Operations -- CSOR isn't the asset for that, but CSOR can add expertise and assistance in some areas to assist the LIB tasks.

Going back to my NEO example from before -
  LIB forces jump onto an airfield to seize it -
  JTF-2 assets operating as advance force have already inserted via low visibility insertion to either provide inextremis HR to to provide support to HRR teams in bound after airfield is secure.
  CSOR seizes/controls actual airport - while LIB's secure the field / and provide cutoff forces.

  JTF-2 HRR team lands and with CSOR conduct extractions.
   The HRR team landing is the first time a CF AC is actually required to land - to disembark troops and vehicles.

* I can't emphasize how important it is for a nation to have their own capability here -- all you need to do it look to the current news and see that your allies goals are not always your own - and you want the ability to conduct these sorts of things flying solo - or are part of a coalition -- worst case with a partner or few you can control more airports - and this evac more people, or the same people in a shorter period of time.



GR66 said:


> To me, the role of the Light Battalions is to provide a force that can respond more quickly than our our heavier forces, or can operate more effectively in complex terrain where our LAVs aren't effective.  Yes the Light Battalions need to trade protection for mobility to achieve their goals but they also need to arrive with enough "weight" (ammo, support weapons, numbers) to be able to effectively defend against heavier enemy forces.


Then it is not longer a Light Force - it is a Motorized Force - slightly lighter than the LAV force - but still tied to a cumbersome supply echelon.
   Some Support Vehicles may be required - but the primary aspect of LIGHT forces needs to be its versatility - and not being tied to a platform:
 Light Forces should be able to be deployed via Air (landing or parachute) Helicopter, truck, mule or "Mk1" boot etc.

Javelin etc type Anti Armor tools need to be added - so light forces are not reliant upon vehicle support weapons -

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The next major source of disagreement seems to be on entire force structure.

Frankly IF Canada had a significantly larger budget earmarked to Defense - it would be be so much of a $ and PY issue.

 You could make the PPLCI 3 Light BN's and have 1 Light Brigade based in Edmonton
 Suffield (are the Brits still using it significantly? Could become CTC  - moving the Armor,
 Recreate the Canadian Guard as a Reg Force Reg't - and base in Shilo as a Mechanized Force with the LdSH(RC) as a Heavy Armor Force and 1 CMBG
 The RCR get collocated in Pet as Light Infantry - and 2 Light Bde
 The Vandoos get LAV's as a Medium Infantry Bde
The Black Watch gets reconstituted in Gagetown as 2 CMBG

That gives you a Light DIv - and a Mechanized Div -, with the ability to plug the Medium Bde in as a sustainment force.


Since that won't happen - I think the best COA is to divest the PPCLI of the LAV's - as Edmonton isn't a LAV training area, Wainwright is okay, (but shuts down training across it for LAV's to do Live training at the Platoon level)- but Suffield is better, but a ways away.






FJAG - the book arrived from Amazon


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Lots of stuff of late.
> 
> I think there seems to be two significant issues (and two side to both of those issues).
> 
> At the crux is WHAT IS A LIGHT UNIT:
> 
> Light Infantry is key to Multi Domain Distributed Operations -- CSOR isn't the asset for that, but CSOR can add expertise and assistance in some areas to assist the LIB tasks.
> 
> Going back to my NEO example from before -
> LIB forces jump onto an airfield to seize it -
> JTF-2 assets operating as advance force have already inserted via low visibility insertion to either provide inextremis HR to to provide support to HRR teams in bound after airfield is secure.
> CSOR seizes/controls actual airport - while LIB's secure the field / and provide cutoff forces.
> 
> JTF-2 HRR team lands and with CSOR conduct extractions.
> The HRR team landing is the first time a CF AC is actually required to land - to disembark troops and vehicles.
> 
> * I can't emphasize how important it is for a nation to have their own capability here -- all you need to do it look to the current news and see that your allies goals are not always your own - and you want the ability to conduct these sorts of things flying solo - or are part of a coalition -- worst case with a partner or few you can control more airports - and this evac more people, or the same people in a shorter period of time.
> 
> 
> Then it is not longer a Light Force - it is a Motorized Force - slightly lighter than the LAV force - but still tied to a cumbersome supply echelon.
> Some Support Vehicles may be required - but the primary aspect of LIGHT forces needs to be its versatility - and not being tied to a platform:
> Light Forces should be able to be deployed via Air (landing or parachute) Helicopter, truck, mule or "Mk1" boot etc.
> 
> Javelin etc type Anti Armor tools need to be added - so light forces are not reliant upon vehicle support weapons -


I agree with those basic concepts - a light force should not be special ops force but should be capable of operating dismounted in various scenarios but should also have the capabilities to be moved by vehicles when required. Essentially three light companies can be moved by a dozen or so 2.5 - 3 ton trucks which would be preferable to a slew of 72 fire team or 36 section carriers with all the maintenance, supply and driver burden that those add. That used to be one of the roles that the brigade's supply and transport company was tasked with before 3/4 ton and M113 section carriers came into vogue.


KevinB said:


> The next major source of disagreement seems to be on entire force structure.
> 
> Frankly IF Canada had a significantly larger budget earmarked to Defense - it would be be so much of a $ and PY issue.
> 
> You could make the PPLCI 3 Light BN's and have 1 Light Brigade based in Edmonton
> Suffield (are the Brits still using it significantly? Could become CTC  - moving the Armor,
> Recreate the Canadian Guard as a Reg Force Reg't - and base in Shilo as a Mechanized Force with the LdSH(RC) as a Heavy Armor Force and 1 CMBG
> The RCR get collocated in Pet as Light Infantry - and 2 Light Bde
> The Vandoos get LAV's as a Medium Infantry Bde
> The Black Watch gets reconstituted in Gagetown as 2 CMBG
> 
> That gives you a Light DIv - and a Mechanized Div -, with the ability to plug the Medium Bde in as a sustainment force.
> 
> Since that won't happen - I think the best COA is to divest the PPCLI of the LAV's - as Edmonton isn't a LAV training area, Wainwright is okay, (but shuts down training across it for LAV's to do Live training at the Platoon level)- but Suffield is better, but a ways away.


The objective of a light division and a heavy/mechanized division is the direction I tend to take as well. We differ in the idea of adding PYs to the personnel budget which IMHO isn't in the cards under any Canadian government during peacetime. As a result, I put my emphasis on a vastly improved and equipped reserve force to fill the blank files. With the current size of the Reg F Army and the Res F Army we have enough positions to man two divisions plus a central command, control and training cadre. 

For me the division of labour vis a vis the regs and reserves is simple: if the position or unit is required for quick reaction or entails such complexity that it requires full-time training to be effective then the position/unit should be Reg F. If on the other hand it is a position that is neither and can be maintained through a reserve status then it should be Res F. In many cases there can be a mix of a full-time individuals where needed for leadership or complexity or a quick reaction element but also less skilled reservists for the bulk of the unit and who all work out of hybrid units (the appropriate ratios must be determined on a case-by-case basis)

Heavy forces-because of the fact they are only deployed in narrow circumstances usually in extreme situations-should be staffed by a larger ratio of reservists. In my view one heavy Reg F brigade to be quickly available, to develop and exercise doctrine, and to provide training and leadership to the heavy reserve components. 

Lighter forces-because they are more frequently deployed on a day-to-day basis during OOTW and on short notice-should have a much larger full-time force component.

In my book I put the heavy elements (1 Reg F brigade and 2 Res F brigades plus a reserve sustainment brigade) in the western part of the country (which includes ON less Petawawa) primarily because of the three ranges Wainwright, Suffield and Shilo (and yes, that means some travel for the ON reservists who would fly onto equipment in the west for training (albeit I consider Camp Grayling MI an option) The lighter division is in the east and based on 2 Light brigade and 5 mechanized brigade. The Reserves provide an artillery and manoeuvre enhancement brigade but there are also sufficient reserve infantry battalions in Quebec and the Maritimes to reinforce 1 and 5 brigade. I didn't want to create an additional res light brigade because IMHO there is a necessity for an artillery brigade and the east cannot generate enough reservists to merit an additional light brigade. Besides I wasn't sure whether we strategically needed another light/mech brigade (5 manoeuvre and two support brigades seem enough)



KevinB said:


> FJAG - the book arrived from Amazon


Good. Hope you find it though provoking at least. 

Quite frankly my views as to the structure of the force has changed a bit - as you can see from the above ORBATs I put out since this thread started. Fundamentally though my basic premise is that we need to develop our reserve force structure as a force expander - our reserve force must provide us with something more than individual augmentees - it must provide a larger field force then what the Reg F alone can provide. While I do not find the US National Guard as perfect, I do find it a worthwhile example of what the basic idea of a reserve force should be - an equipped, annually less expensive, part-time force that can provide more and wider capabilities than what the full-time force alone can provide.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> For me the division of labour vis a vis the regs and reserves is simple: if the position or unit is required for quick reaction or entails such complexity that it requires full-time training to be effective then the position/unit should be Reg F. If on the other hand it is a position that is neither and can be maintained through a reserve status then it should be Res F. In many cases there can be a mix of a full-time individuals where needed for leadership or complexity or a quick reaction element but also less skilled reservists for the bulk of the unit and who all work out of hybrid units (the appropriate ratios must be determined on a case-by-case basis)



Devil's advocate here...

The readiness levels of reserve units can be quite high.

In the UK, for example, the TA units of my regiment were tasked to the 'Central Front' and, as a result, were ready to parachute into battle on 24 hours notice, which they practised regularly by jumping a full battalion into Germany for weekend exercises. Over 400 troops would deploy on such exercises.

They were better equipped than we were as out main role was 'Out of NATO area' operations and, as a result, we had older radios and more dated anti-armour weapons as our most likely opponents would be 'developing world' types. 

When the Falklands War blew up they had to strip the TA battalions of all their gucci kit to send off to the South Atlantic which, for example, is why 2 & 3 PARA were equipped with the battle winning MILAN firing posts that helped them to defeat superior enemy ground forces.


----------



## KevinB

Without a meaningful legislation that protects Reservists - and a entire reconfiguring of the system - the augmented system is all one can get.

I think a 10/90 (and I have nightmares of that) is the only way to incorporate any sort of equipment to reserve units - beyond light trucks etc.
  As well a large robust regular force maintenance force.

More to follow


----------



## Colin Parkinson

When we were "Ops Tasked" our unit had our own vehicle tech with a 5/4 ton fitted with tools and parts. Our vehicle serviceability rates were excellent. Vehicle heavy Reserve units should have a Class B vehicle tech position with an allotment of tools and parts. they are should also be expected to help each other on larger repairs. Local Svc Battalions should have Class B vehicle techs, with mobile shop truck with hiab crane. anyone with a Civilian mechanic certification should be automatically allowed to repair Milcots with a short familiarisation course and have a budget to source parts locally with a accounting through the repair logs.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I agree with those basic concepts - a light force should not be special ops force but should be capable of operating dismounted in various scenarios but should also have the capabilities to be moved by vehicles when required. Essentially three light companies can be moved by a dozen or so 2.5 - 3 ton trucks which would be preferable to a slew of 72 fire team or 36 section carriers with all the maintenance, supply and driver burden that those add. That used to be one of the roles that the brigade's supply and transport company was tasked with before 3/4 ton and M113 section carriers came into vogue.
> 
> The objective of a light division and a heavy/mechanized division is the direction I tend to take as well. We differ in the idea of adding PYs to the personnel budget which IMHO isn't in the cards under any Canadian government during peacetime. As a result, I put my emphasis on a vastly improved and equipped reserve force to fill the blank files. With the current size of the Reg F Army and the Res F Army we have enough positions to man two divisions plus a central command, control and training cadre.
> 
> For me the division of labour vis a vis the regs and reserves is simple: if the position or unit is required for quick reaction or entails such complexity that it requires full-time training to be effective then the position/unit should be Reg F. If on the other hand it is a position that is neither and can be maintained through a reserve status then it should be Res F. In many cases there can be a mix of a full-time individuals where needed for leadership or complexity or a quick reaction element but also less skilled reservists for the bulk of the unit and who all work out of hybrid units (the appropriate ratios must be determined on a case-by-case basis)
> 
> Heavy forces-because of the fact they are only deployed in narrow circumstances usually in extreme situations-should be staffed by a larger ratio of reservists. In my view one heavy Reg F brigade to be quickly available, to develop and exercise doctrine, and to provide training and leadership to the heavy reserve components.


 I started to address this before I got distracted  -- I agree in principle - but the maintenance issues of a heavy force will be taxing on a Reserve unit - more so, because the larger equipment will be pooled at a larger CFB.
   10/90 flopped because there was no method of compelling reservists to do things.
 The Can Gov needs to take a realistic approach to both job security - and activation of reservists.

Frankly to me - the LAV GIBs can be reservists - the crews can be regular or a mix.   The LAV requires a little less maintenance than tracked vehicles - and I just don't see wheeled vehicles as a substitute for an actual armored vehicle. 




FJAG said:


> Lighter forces-because they are more frequently deployed on a day-to-day basis during OOTW and on short notice-should have a much larger full-time force component.


Agreed entirely 


FJAG said:


> In my book I put the heavy elements (1 Reg F brigade and 2 Res F brigades plus a reserve sustainment brigade) in the western part of the country (which includes ON less Petawawa) primarily because of the three ranges Wainwright, Suffield and Shilo (and yes, that means some travel for the ON reservists who would fly onto equipment in the west for training (albeit I consider Camp Grayling MI an option) The lighter division is in the east and based on 2 Light brigade and 5 mechanized brigade. The Reserves provide an artillery and manoeuvre enhancement brigade but there are also sufficient reserve infantry battalions in Quebec and the Maritimes to reinforce 1 and 5 brigade. I didn't want to create an additional res light brigade because IMHO there is a necessity for an artillery brigade and the east cannot generate enough reservists to merit an additional light brigade. Besides I wasn't sure whether we strategically needed another light/mech brigade (5 manoeuvre and two support brigades seem enough)


I am honestly not tracking the desire to place the Heavier BDE in the West -- while I agree Shilo, and Suffield are good training locations.  Wainwright is not for vehicles, or at least vehicle live fire beyond a .50.
  I think the Mountains in the West are a great training tool that can be used by Light forces - 

 Perhaps the better option is moving 2 CMBG/ all three RCR to Shilo - leaving Petawawa to CANSFOCOM 

Suffield can become CTC-West (or Ideally CTC) - as it offers a lot more than Lawfield Corridor for fire and maneuver training.


FJAG said:


> Good. Hope you find it though provoking at least.


It just arrived on Saturday - and I haven't been able to find time to do more than open the cover -- I am hoping my wife, kids, and dogs give me some time this evening.


FJAG said:


> Quite frankly my views as to the structure of the force has changed a bit - as you can see from the above ORBATs I put out since this thread started. Fundamentally though my basic premise is that we need to develop our reserve force structure as a force expander - our reserve force must provide us with something more than individual augmentees - it must provide a larger field force then what the Reg F alone can provide. While I do not find the US National Guard as perfect, I do find it a worthwhile example of what the basic idea of a reserve force should be - an equipped, annually less expensive, part-time force that can provide more and wider capabilities than what the full-time force alone can provide.
> 
> 🍻


Honestly pre 9/11 I didn't have much faith in the National Guard - but one Federalized - the ability to deploy in Afghanistan and Iraq showed it was truly a robust capability - that many other nations do not have.



Regardless, I don't think it matter much - unless the CF as a whole entity sits down and takes a realistic look at the $ and PY that are available - and matches them to the mission requirements dictate by the GoC.   Personally I have little hope in that, as I think without a very strong Minister running DND no one will care about breaking through the Regimental stranglehold that exists in allocations, or base structure -- let along the inter service support requirements that exist and are constantly ignored.


----------



## KevinB

Colin Parkinson said:


> When we were "Ops Tasked" our unit had our own vehicle tech with a 5/4 ton fitted with tools and parts. Our vehicle serviceability rates were excellent. Vehicle heavy Reserve units should have a Class B vehicle tech position with an allotment of tools and parts. they are should also be expected to help each other on larger repairs. Local Svc Battalions should have Class B vehicle techs, with mobile shop truck with hiab crane. anyone with a Civilian mechanic certification should be automatically allowed to repair Milcots with a short familiarisation course and have a budget to source parts locally with a accounting through the repair logs.


Again there is a significant difference between a unit that have a few 5/4's, and MLVW's as opposed to a companies worth of LAV's.
Also in my experience "vehicle serviceability" in the reserves can mean a significantly different thing - and rarely did it really mean a 100% mission ready - it usually meant it could probably get to the closest training area and back.

The fact that again the CF went down to the 1 ton route with the MILCOT (after the debacle of the 1 ton and the CUCV) again speaks to the idea of a paper capability being acquired as opposed to an actual vehicle.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Without a meaningful legislation that protects Reservists - and a entire reconfiguring of the system - the augmented system is all one can get.
> 
> I think a 10/90 (and I have nightmares of that) is the only way to incorporate any sort of equipment to reserve units - beyond light trucks etc.
> As well a large robust regular force maintenance force.
> 
> More to follow


There are basically two types of reservist - students and not students. Students can get by with the system we have. Not students are critical to a healthy reserve and they definitely need employment protection legislation.

Sometimes when I'm at my most cynical I tend to believe that the reason the Army has not "fixed" the reserve system is that it is scared that a properly configured and trained reserve force would end up creating a realization within the political masters that they could get by with a lot less full-timers during peacetime.

When I crunch a few numbers (I'm retired; I have time) I think that you could pull 7,500 Reg F PYs out of the field force and still have three equipped and manned brigades that could fulfill our current peacetime missions as set out in the SSE. Note by field force I mean the three brigades and the divisional headquarters) Divisional support and training establishments across the country remain untouched.

Basically a brigade right now is 5,000 folks so 15,000 for the field force. We have roughly 20,000 authorized and paid reservists on a good day.

So, if you fire 7,500 Reg F full timers you are left with 7,500.

Put 5,000 of those into one fully manned and equipped brigade. They're your quick reaction force; your Roto 0 force; and your doctrine and training establishment which develops and maintains the Army's high end professional cadre.

The Res F already has some 500 RSS. 

Of the 2,500 remaining Reg F PYs, you assign another 500 to the RSS to fill a total of 1,000 key full-time leadership and training positions in the Res F.

The remaining 2,000 Reg F PYs are primarily service support and training personnel to provide for the maintenance of the two remaining brigades' worth of equipment which will be manned and operated primarily by reservists. Their training function is to train additional reserve service support personnel.

Your 20,000 reservists are consolidated into a three to four reserve force brigades greatly reducing brigade headquarters and unit headquarters requirements (Hell, we could cut out all but one divisional headquarters). The key here is to keep enough position in a BTL/ATL-both trainers and trainees-to keep generating personnel through individual training without putting an individual training burden on the units. The units receive personnel trained to DP1 standards and concern themselves solely with continuation and collective training.

Effectively when we need to meet operational peacetime missions, we send a Roto 0 from the Reg F brigade and start forming Rotos 1 and thereafter from the Reg F and volunteer Res F personnel of the other brigades. If we ever get to a point where there are not enough volunteers we place enough non-volunteering reservists on active service as are needed to fill the roto. (The legislation already allows us to do that)

If we need to "mobilize" for something big, we can mobilize two Res F brigades to accompany the Reg F brigade and still have 10,000 reservists as backups. We already have the equipment for three brigades. We will also continue to have a BTL/ATL organization left behind to generate new troops.

Such a system would save the Army roughly $3/4 of a billion per year to roll into more reservists or equipment or training.

Obviously we need to make changes to the reserves but that's actually easier than you think. What's going to be hard is to pry another 10,000 full-timers out of their cubicles in Ottawa.  😁 

Like I said: when I'm cynical.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Like I said: when I'm cynical.
> 
> 🍻


One man's cynic is another's realist...


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> ... I am honestly not tracking the desire to place the Heavier BDE in the West -- while I agree Shilo, and Suffield are good training locations.  Wainwright is not for vehicles, or at least vehicle live fire beyond a .50. ...


My preference comes from 7 of my years in the Reg F spent in Shilo including exercise where we had Centurions in Wainwright and Leo 1s with the German Army in Shilo (including doing numerous live fire battle group battle runs). Was out in Suffield for two arty exercises but never tank. I had four years in Petawawa and way too many courses in Gagetown. Never actually spent any time on the ranges in Valcartier.

Of the three ranges I'd rate Suffield the best for live-fire BG level combined arms battle runs, Wainwright second and Shilo third. Suffield is almost 1,600 sq km, Wainwright is almost 600 sq km and Shilo is roughly 400 sq km. All three are relatively open rolling prairie terrain which has much more open useable terrain than Petawawa (300 sq km)  or Valcartier (roughly 300 sq km) or even Gagetown (1,100 sq km) which is both overpopulated by the schools and at the same time limited in open terrain.

That's basically why I put the heavy force there. Res F manpower is a problem in the west. The three western brigades can barely muster 4,500 individuals so barely a brigade. That's one of the key reason I add most of ON to the Army of the West. It can easily generate a brigade plus but that's with the intent (in the book) of creating two heavy reserve brigades). ON and QC are probably the worst place for training a heavy brigade because of their limited ranges. Camp Grayling in MI (at 590 sq km) does offer a nearby facility but the ranges are not as open as the Prairie ones.

The trade off is that to deploy the brigade requires a rail move to either an east or west or southern coast port.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> My preference comes from 7 of my years in the Reg F spent in Shilo including exercise where we had Centurions in Wainwright and Leo 1s with the German Army in Shilo (including doing numerous live fire battle group battle runs). Was out in Suffield for two arty exercises but never tank. I had four years in Petawawa and way too many courses in Gagetown. Never actually spent any time on the ranges in Valcartier.
> 
> Of the three ranges I'd rate Suffield the best for live-fire BG level combined arms battle runs, Wainwright second and Shilo third. Suffield is almost 1,600 sq km, Wainwright is almost 600 sq km and Shilo is roughly 400 sq km. All three are relatively open rolling prairie terrain which has much more open useable terrain than Petawawa (300 sq km)  or Valcartier (roughly 300 sq km) or even Gagetown (1,100 sq km) which is both overpopulated by the schools and at the same time limited in open terrain.
> 
> That's basically why I put the heavy force there. Res F manpower is a problem in the west. The three western brigades can barely muster 4,500 individuals so barely a brigade. That's one of the key reason I add most of ON to the Army of the West. It can easily generate a brigade plus but that's with the intent (in the book) of creating two heavy reserve brigades). ON and QC are probably the worst place for training a heavy brigade because of their limited ranges. Camp Grayling in MI (at 590 sq km) does offer a nearby facility but the ranges are not as open as the Prairie ones.
> 
> The trade off is that to deploy the brigade requires a rail move to either an east or west or southern coast port.
> 
> 🍻


I think realistically that only Gagetown and Suffield offer a true Mechanized training area - 
   Wainwright has a number of oil and gas leases (which IIRC Gagetown did too) - as well as cattle etc - the Life fire area for a LAV Platoon there is significantly restricted (and a total cluster for larger training) - but my main point was Edmonton has absolutely nothing for ranges other than small arms KD ranges.
  I'd suggest that even Petawawa with the restricted areas it has offers a Mechanized formation more than Edmonton.
 *which brings to the point that really non of the Bde bases are significantly useful for training of mechanized forces, but Edmonton is the least Mech friendly location.   

While LAV's can self deploy to Wainwright from Edmonton - tanks cannot - and the wear and tear on the LAV's to me isn't worth it, and it just takes crossing the road in Pet.

I think the Army needs to address that little elephant first.


----------



## Kirkhill

> Res F manpower is a problem in the west. The three western brigades can barely muster 4,500 individuals so barely a brigade. That's one of the key reason I add most of ON to the Army of the West.



No argument.  Just a point of reference.  Back in the Dark Ages a regiment of my acquaintance wished to open a adjunct platoon in Drumheller.  The request was denied.  This despite there being adjunct platoons scattered hither and yon in BC, Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes.  Some within a couple of traffic lights of each other.

Perhaps Ottawa still has unpleasant memories of Gabriel Dumont and the Northwest Mounted Rifles of Duck Lake.  If only they had remembered to pay him and not disbanded his unit.





__





						North West Mounted Rifles
					





					library.usask.ca
				




We have pickups and don't mind driving a bit for a hamburger but it still takes time to get from town to town.


----------



## dapaterson

The Army has multiple elephants they refuse address; the biggest being the maintenance of the Regimental Balance Of Terror in terms of equipment and (god forbid) number of badged Reg F battalions.  It's impossible to have serious discussions when the conclusions must support three battalions each of three regiments, with everyone getting the same manning and equipment, as if it's kindergarten and each of the precious little five year olds has to be given the same treat.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> The Army has multiple elephants they refuse address; the biggest being the maintenance of the Regimental Balance Of Terror in terms of equipment and (god forbid) number of badged Reg F battalions.  It's impossible to have serious discussions when the conclusions must support three battalions each of three regiments, with everyone getting the same manning and equipment, as if it's kindergarten and each of the precious little five year olds has to be given the same treat.



... and seven regiments of recce (or so I'm told)


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> The Army has multiple elephants they refuse address; the biggest being the maintenance of the Regimental Balance Of Terror in terms of equipment and (god forbid) number of badged Reg F battalions.  It's impossible to have serious discussions when the conclusions must support three battalions each of three regiments, with everyone getting the same manning and equipment, as if it's kindergarten and each of the precious little five year olds has to be given the same treat.


Come on, you forgot the same problem occurs elsewhere in the Army - the Infantry hardly have a monopoly on the candy bowl.


----------



## MilEME09

Realistically Suffield has a rail head, expanding that would solve the tank transport issue. I have advocated a couple times for expanding Suffield, we can run Force on Force training with the British in summer, medicine hat is right there, and calgary is 3 hours away, 2 hours to lethbridge. The housing market isn't crazy either.


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> Realistically Suffield has a rail head, expanding that would solve the tank transport issue. I have advocated a couple times for expanding Suffield, we can run Force on Force training with the British in summer, medicine hat is right there, and calgary is 3 hours away, 2 hours to lethbridge. The housing market isn't crazy either.


IIRC Wainwright has a railhead as well - I was admittedly drunk during most of the Wainwright portion of RV92 - but I recall that vehicles came in and out by rail.

Honestly due to the Brits - Suffield should be a fantastic training area *other than their absolutely nasty habit of crapping in cut out old road wheels and leaving it for people to find latter.

Of course I am the guy who's still wondering WTF on getting rid of the runway in Edmonton and the why of moving CABC to Trenton (and rebrand it) as opposed to the main base when Greisbaugh (spelling) was shuttered.  Because the Mountain Ops side of CABC does so much better in Trenton I guess (sarcasm).  Admittedly I have been shaking my head for 25 years on that and still never gotten a good answer on that logic.


----------



## MilEME09

Having read the latest F2025 information available on the DWAN, all I can say is which of you buggers is on the project? It reads as if they are taking our ideas.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Having read the latest F2025 information available on the DWAN, all I can say is which of you buggers is on the project? It reads as if they are taking our ideas.


----------



## KevinB

Based on recent conversations in the C3 Howitzer thread I decided I would bring my axe over here 
C3 Howitzer Replacement

Reforming the Regimental Structures.     If I where King...


  Light Brigade Combat Team 
      1 x BCT HQ
      2x Light Regimental Combat Team 
      1x Med Regimental Combat Team 

  BCT HQ.   - Col 
     Command and Signals Squadron  LtCol CoS, Maj sub units and Staff rank positions.
     Svc Squadron 
     Support Squadron 
     Tac Hel Squadron 
     Medium Hel Squadron 
     Cbt Engineer Squadron 
     ACSS (see FJAG I'm relearning) 
    2x GS Arty Bty 
     AD Bty 
     ISR Squadron 
     Int Coy 
     MP Coy

    Light Regimental Combat Team (Airborne/Airmobile):  LtCol, sub unit commands all majors 
        1 HQ Coy 
        4 Light Rifle Coy
        1 Cbt Engineer Sqn
        1 Artillery Bty
        1 Svc & Spt Squadron 
        1 Recce Platoon 
        1 Sniper troop 
        1 Tac Hel Squadron 
        1 AH Hel Squadron 
        1 AD Troop
        1 ISR/Int Sqn

     Medium Regimental Cbt Team: Lt Col, sub unit all Maj 
         1 HG Coy
         3 LAV Rifle Coy 
         1 Armored Recce Sqn+ (combining both Black hat and Inf Recce)
         1 Sniper Troop - light vehicle 
         1 Tank Sqn
         1 Cbt Engineer Sqn - Armored vehicle based
         1 Svc&Spt Sqn 
         1 Arty Bty (Armored vehicle - either LAV tow or SPA)
         1 Tac Hel Sqn
         1 MH Hel Sqn
         1 AH Hel Sqn
         1 AD Troop
         1 ISR/Int Sqn 


Then I'd flop the Light to Med RCT #'s for the Medium Brigade Combat Team.


Heavily invested in more Rotary Wing - but if I was King, the Army would own those - and the RW Pilot Career would be a 00XA MOC.
   I'd also ensure the RCAF was subservient to the CA in terms of supplying airlift.

*A number of the Medium BCT PY's would be reserve billets - and a reimagined 10/90 concept (maybe 20/80) - as staging the Medium BCT would take time - while the Light units could be wings up inside 48hrs.

And for the rank conscious - you can inflate all command ranks for deployment so they can work in a coalition structure as needed.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> IIRC Wainwright has a railhead as well - I was admittedly drunk during most of the Wainwright portion of RV92 - but I recall that vehicles came in and out by rail.
> 
> Honestly due to the Brits - Suffield should be a fantastic training area *other than their absolutely nasty habit of crapping in cut out old road wheels and leaving it for people to find latter.
> 
> Of course I am the guy who's still wondering WTF on getting rid of the runway in Edmonton and the why of moving CABC to Trenton (and rebrand it) as opposed to the main base when Greisbaugh (spelling) was shuttered.  Because the Mountain Ops side of CABC does so much better in Trenton I guess (sarcasm).  Admittedly I have been shaking my head for 25 years on that and still never gotten a good answer on that logic.


Sometimes there just isn’t a good answer to be found.  Your comment at the end just bluntly reminded me of a file I am investigating right now…sometimes there simply is no logic to be found in a decision, it just…”is”…. 🤨🤔🤷🏼‍♂️

Silly decisions by silly people who don’t think things through, or who don’t think about the bigger picture.  (Personally I think they messed up.  Shilo would have been the better place for a Mountain Ops course.)


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Heavily invested in more Rotary Wing - but if I was King, the Army would own those - and the RW Pilot Career would be a 00XA MOC.
> I'd also ensure the RCAF was subservient to the CA in terms of supplying airlift.


Same here ... if I was king.

Small change to your idea: - I'd create an aviation brigade - 3/4 of all pilots would be warrants (yeah I'd change the rank structure in the army too ... if I were king. 

WOs would go back to being staff sergeants; MWOs get the rank of Sergeant Major (Battery, coy, sqn whatever); and CWOs get the rank of Regimental/Brigade/Div Sergeant Major. Warrants would be a whole different intermediate structure. Any SMs who isn't old enough to retire or able to further climb up the ladder becomes a WO.

All problems solved.

😁


----------



## ueo

FJAG said:


> Same here ... if I was king.
> 
> Small change to your idea: - I'd create an aviation brigade - 3/4 of all pilots would be warrants (yeah I'd change the rank structure in the army too ... if I were king.
> 
> WOs would go back to being staff sergeants; MWOs get the rank of Sergeant Major (Battery, coy, sqn whatever); and CWOs get the rank of Regimental/Brigade/Div Sergeant Major. Warrants would be a whole different intermediate structure. Any SMs who isn't old enough to retire or able to further climb up the ladder becomes a WO.
> 
> All problems solved.
> 
> 😁


Sounds alot like the US Proposals late50s early 60;sThe WO discussion was totally accepted as was the helo bde (subsequently upgraded). Both are in play today.


----------



## GR66

Are we limiting ourselves by designing our proposed Brigades as strictly geographically centered (e.g. "the heavy Brigade will be in 3 Division in the West" etc.) when the Divisions, like our Regiments, are force generation structures rather then force employment structures?

Wouldn't it be just as possible for CJOC to field a Battle Group consisting of RCD (Petawawa), 1 PPCLI (Edmonton), 2 RCR (Gagetown), 1 RCHA (Shilo) and 5 CER (Valcartier) as it would to field a basically identically structured Battle Group consisting of  12 RBC, 1 & 2 R22R, 5 RALC and 5 CER all from Valcartier/Quebec?

How does that change the options we have for how the Army is reorganized?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> *Are we limiting ourselves by designing our proposed Brigades as strictly geographically centered* (e.g. "the heavy Brigade will be in 3 Division in the West" etc.) when the Divisions, like our Regiments, are force generation structures rather then force employment structures?
> 
> Wouldn't it be just as possible for CJOC to field a Battle Group consisting of RCD (Petawawa), 1 PPCLI (Edmonton), 2 RCR (Gagetown), 1 RCHA (Shilo) and 5 CER (Valcartier) as it would to field a basically identically structured Battle Group consisting of  12 RBC, 1 & 2 R22R, 5 RALC and 5 CER all from Valcartier/Quebec?
> 
> How does that change the options we have for how the Army is reorganized?



Good point.

We continually constrain ourselves geographically so that, for example, 1 CBG is the 'PPCLI Brigade'. 

It's weird that we allow regimental affiliations to dominate formation level units to the extent we do.

Probably yet another reason why the Navy and Air Force think we're odd


----------



## Kirkhill

In many respects I think your mixed group is the most likely.

Especially if casualties are expected.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> In many respects I think your mixed group is the most likely.
> 
> Especially if casualties are expected.


We already did it in Afghanistan, regularly you had X regiment have a company from Y regiment.

Why do we don't start moving Regiments around? Why not swap say 2VP and 2 RCR? Having different Regiments in different divisions would encourage cross training and encourage the sharing of ideas outside the regimental family


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> We already did it in Afghanistan, regularly you had X regiment have a company from Y regiment.
> 
> Why do we don't start moving Regiments around? Why not swap say 2VP and 2 RCR? Having different Regiments in different divisions would encourage cross training and encourage the sharing of ideas outside the regimental family


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> We already did it in Afghanistan, regularly you had X regiment have a company from Y regiment.
> 
> Why do we don't start moving Regiments around? Why not swap say 2VP and 2 RCR? Having different Regiments in different divisions would encourage cross training and encourage the sharing of ideas outside the regimental family



Heck. Great idea. All it would take is money. 

Oh wait!



Edit.  But don't you cross train with USMC, 10th Mountain, 82nd Airborne, III Armored Corps etc?   And you don't cross train with your own brigades?


----------



## Infanteer

MilEME09 said:


> Why do we don't start moving Regiments around? Why not swap say 2VP and 2 RCR? Having different Regiments in different divisions would encourage cross training and encourage the sharing of ideas outside the regimental family


So, you mean like every Brigade in the Canadian Army prior to 1993?


----------



## FJAG

I sometimes envy the US for its flexibility in its uniform. Basically the uniform is a standard one for everyone without a whole lot of "quiffs" apparent yet provides for insignia that personalizes it.

The individual wears small badges which designate which corps/branch he/she belongs to regardless of where posted and also wears a small "distinctive unit insignia" badge that designates the current battalion he/she is assigned to. Get posted from the 2nd battalion 121st infantry to the 1st battalion 239th infantry and you just change a badge.

With something like that you could easily create hybrid Reg F/ Res F units where everyone wears the same uniform and the same DUI but still somewhere have a small badge that reflects your actual branch or corps or even a regimental affiliation.

I like traditions and uniform do-dads as much as the next guy (maybe more than some) but not when they get in the way of organizational efficiency. I've pondered how to amalgamate company-sized reserve battalions into one battalion with integrated "RSS" staff as part of the chain of command and pictured parades where everyone wears a mish-mash of highland and rifle and line regimental uniforms with homeless PPCLI guys out front - not pretty. But if you changed to the designation of affiliation through smaller badges, the uniforms could be identical but folks could still wear a badge identifying the first unit/regiment or branch they enrolled (however you want to use those regimental affiliation badges) and still have an identical cap badge and shoulder or breast pocket badge of the current battalion. That would also apply to service support folks etc posted into the battalion. On posting, you just change the DUI badge(s) for the new unit/assignment.

While we're at it, why not issue everyone one pair of the standard combat boots, like the ones coming off the line now, for parade wear and still leave them bootforgen for real boots for real work? That way at least on parade everyone would look the same and not like a collection of vagabonds gathered together.



GR66 said:


> Are we limiting ourselves by designing our proposed Brigades as strictly geographically centered (e.g. "the heavy Brigade will be in 3 Division in the West" etc.) when the Divisions, like our Regiments, are force generation structures rather then force employment structures?
> 
> Wouldn't it be just as possible for CJOC to field a Battle Group consisting of RCD (Petawawa), 1 PPCLI (Edmonton), 2 RCR (Gagetown), 1 RCHA (Shilo) and 5 CER (Valcartier) as it would to field a basically identically structured Battle Group consisting of  12 RBC, 1 & 2 R22R, 5 RALC and 5 CER all from Valcartier/Quebec?
> 
> How does that change the options we have for how the Army is reorganized?



Locating a brigade's units close to each other facilitates the necessary inter-unit collective training that is needed without adding too much expense when bringing them together.

I think for things like a support or service support brigade it would be fairly easy to be geographically dispersed.

Same for reserve brigades which would only train collectively on one exercise per year and would have to move to a centralized training base anyway.

While we're at it with the uniform stuff, I could see reducing each Reg F infantry regiment to one battalion and redesignating each of the remaining six to a battalion name currently at nil strength (especially one with some regional affiliation and some war-time record). There's too much of a voting block within the Army the way things are now. If those three infantry regiments are broken up reorganizing structures and even rerolling a battalion or two to new skill sets becomes much simpler. "Divide and conquer!"


----------



## Kirkhill

> I think for things like a support or service support brigade it would be fairly easy to be geographically dispersed.



Does that really work in practice though?  Does it work for the Service Battalions? The Engineers? For 1 Wing?  Does it even really work for the Gunners?  Or do the Brigade's and the local command structure create so much gravitational pull that each regiment becomes a unique entity making it harder for the whole to combine?   Conversely, do some entities work so hard at countering that pull that the local units are unresponsive to the needs of the their co-located "clients"?

I don't know the answer.   I don't know that there is one.  

I think GR66 and MilEME probably have the best one.  Regular travel and exercise.  Even if it does cost money.


----------



## MilEME09

Our biggest problem with CSS is we diversified too much, Service Battalion, tech services, base support, etc.... As a result we cannot support our selves (something the army has admitted). While resources can't be centralized, we need to decrease the number of organizations to reduce over head to free space for additional techs turning wrenches.


----------



## ballz

Geography is a real constraint and has a huge impact on your ability to train together. It also matters for understanding the constraints each unit faces. I used to think 2 RCR was probably pretty similar to 2VP, being separated from the Brigade, having a big training area next door, etc. After one intro/SAV to Shilo, boy was I ever wrong.

I'd also assume that 2VP and 1 RCHA would receive even less favourable base services from 3 CDSG. Right now if something is falling off the rails, Comd 1 CMBG is across the street from both Comd 3 CDSG and Comd 3 Div, it can be easily addressed. I don't think it would work so well if it was Comd 2 CMBG fielding complaints and having to try and get them addressed.

Having 2 RCR/C Sqn or 2VP/1 RCHA seperated from their Brigades already has pros/cons (for the units), but increasing the distance seems like it would only magnify the cons and not come with any additional benefits. It would everything more difficult logistically, the displaced units would be less able to get support from their Bde HQ, etc.

I don't know why we wouldn't organize geographically and then try to force generate, to the extent possible, from established and cohesive formations, rather trying to throw a mix of things together which would lead to an awful lot of C2 problems at the start. Bolting one rifle company onto a cohesive Battlegroup is one thing and I doubt there weren't some C2 issues to be worked out.... but bolting together various parts from various different regions/HQs to try and stand up a cohesive formation, methinks would be a C2 disaster.


----------



## Kirkhill

ballz said:


> Geography is a real constraint and has a huge impact on your ability to train together. It also matters for understanding the constraints each unit faces. I used to think 2 RCR was probably pretty similar to 2VP, being separated from the Brigade, having a big training area next door, etc. After one intro/SAV to Shilo, boy was I ever wrong.
> 
> I'd also assume that 2VP and 1 RCHA would receive even less favourable base services from 3 CDSG. Right now if something is falling off the rails, Comd 1 CMBG is across the street from both Comd 3 CDSG and Comd 3 Div, it can be easily addressed. I don't think it would work so well if it was Comd 2 CMBG fielding complaints and having to try and get them addressed.
> 
> Having 2 RCR/C Sqn or 2VP/1 RCHA seperated from their Brigades already has pros/cons (for the units), but increasing the distance seems like it would only magnify the cons and not come with any additional benefits. It would everything more difficult logistically, the displaced units would be less able to get support from their Bde HQ, etc.
> 
> I don't know why we wouldn't organize geographically and then try to force generate, to the extent possible, from established and cohesive formations, rather trying to throw a mix of things together which would lead to an awful lot of C2 problems at the start. Bolting one rifle company onto a cohesive Battlegroup is one thing and I doubt there weren't some C2 issues to be worked out.... but bolting together various parts from various different regions/HQs to try and stand up a cohesive formation, methinks would be a C2 disaster.



But, 

Politically, what is the effect if the 1 CMBG is tasked to a major effort and then takes casualties at the rate of the First Day of the Somme, or even Verrieres Ridge?

I can easily see the infantry battalions switched around even if the rest of the brigade structure is shipped over, and employed, intact.


----------



## ballz

Kirkhill said:


> But,
> 
> Politically, what is the effect if the 1 CMBG is tasked to a major effort and then takes casualties at the rate of the First Day of the Somme, or even Verrieres Ridge?
> 
> I can easily see the infantry battalions switched around even if the rest of the brigade structure is shipped over, and employed, intact.



I'm not sure I understand your point. It seems to be an argument about symmetrical vs. asymmetrical, but that's not really the same argument as having geography dictate who falls under what Brigade vs. having 1 CMBG consist of 1 VP, 2 RCR, and 3 R22R.


----------



## dapaterson

Pull all bases out of the RCN, CA, RCAF, VCDS and CMP, put them under Support Command.  Toss the supply depots there as well, the MP group, HS group, recruiting group.

Voila.  The Army can divest the four Areas turned Divs, recycle them into one Reg F div and one Res F Div HQ.  Lots of savings possible there...


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Pull all bases out of the RCN, CA, RCAF, VCDS and CMP, put them under Support Command.  Toss the supply depots there as well, the MP group, HS group, recruiting group.
> 
> Voila.  The Army can divest the four Areas turned Divs, recycle them into one Reg F div and one Res F Div HQ.  Lots of savings possible there...


Lord!

I sure hope you just forgo to add the "Sarcasm" emoji.


----------



## dapaterson

Why do we need five different organizations running bases (poorly)?

Why not a single one that can actually do it properly?


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:


> Why do we need five different organizations running bases (poorly)?
> 
> Why not a single one that can actually do it properly?


But the different uniform colours need all those orgs to check the box on formation command for more potential 2-leafs.


----------



## dapaterson

McG said:


> But the different uniform colours need all those orgs to check the box on formation command for more potential 2-leafs.



We'll make every building on base its own formation!


----------



## Kirkhill

ballz said:


> I'm not sure I understand your point. It seems to be an argument about symmetrical vs. asymmetrical, but that's not really the same argument as having geography dictate who falls under what Brigade vs. having 1 CMBG consist of 1 VP, 2 RCR, and 3 R22R.



I'm sorry I wasn't clear.

Going into WWI one of the major recruiting tools was "the rest of the village is signing up - why aren't you?" Often asked by pretty young girls with white feathers to hand out to the laggards.  The result was Kitchener's Army and the Pals Battalions and the Newfoundland Regiment and, in truth the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

But Sam Hughes did the CEF one favour.  When he got it to Valcartier he scrambled the pieces so that battalions weren't tied as tightly to a specific town as the Brits.  As a result he saved the CEF from one of the major crises of morale that almost derailed the British war effort.

After the First Day of the Somme the casualty reports came out.  And villages all over Britain discovered that all the volunteers they had prodded to enlist were dead.  Newfoundland still remembers that day.

The effect on the British army was to start redistributing recruits and returning soldiers to regiments other than their local ones.  And to start redistributing battalions among brigades and divisions so that, in the event of casualties, the burden would be more uniformly distributed across the country.  The cynic might say more easily hidden.

What I am saying is that regardless of how the army raises or trains its brigades in peacetime, in wartime there is an incentive to break up those formations and re-organize them.

And if it is not political pressure then two or three battles will start the process of reorganization in any event.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Why do we need five different organizations running bases (poorly)?
> 
> Why not a single one that can actually do it properly?



The one mob may not do it properly but they couldn't do it worse - and could be held accountable.  Maybe...


----------



## FJAG

I don't think running a base is rocket science. We already have specialists in all the main departments working there from finance to construction engineers to run the departments.

Different bases have very differing requirements. Shilo differs from Halifax which differs from Winnipeg. There are different requirements, different priorities and different ways budgets are allocated.

We don't need yet another centralized bureaucracy in Ottawa led by a three-star with a flurry of staff telling the field formations either what they need or what they are allowed to have.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

The generalists will save us mentality cripples the CAF.

The Army need to focus on fighting, not building positions to hide those unfit to command.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> The generalists will save us mentality cripples the CAF.
> 
> The Army need to focus on fighting, not building positions to hide those unfit to command.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> The generalists will save us mentality cripples the CAF.
> 
> The Army need to focus on fighting, not building positions to hide those unfit to command.


So does concentrating every decision and a fifth of all manpower in Ottawa cripple the CAF.

I would think that the ratio of those unfit to command is probably spread equally throughout the force. The problem is far too many senior positions in general and not who they specifically belong to. We have a few colonels/captains commanding brigades and wings and whatever we call a bundle of ships these days and a much, much, much larger menagerie of them commanding cubicles all over Ottawa.

The issue is not solved by creating yet another herd of them in yet another centralized group. It's solved by tuning down the overall number of commands, groups, directorates and what have you so that there is less need to promote marginal people into yet another make-work organization.

I do agree that two divisional headquarters are sufficient for the Army the size that it is. (I'm not even sure one needs to be a MGen to command a division, when a bde is commanded by a colonel, but that's pretty much what it is everywhere).

Just as a point - the Army's (and Navy's and Air Force's) need to focus on fighting also includes having appropriate facilities, an appropriate recruiting and training establishments, appropriate personnel support services, and appropriate supply and maintenance facilities in order to have their ability to fight sustained. The centralization of some of those has also had sub-optimal outcomes as well.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

The Army robs O&M from bases, creating inferior quality of life to the other base operators, in order to run useless collective training events, wasting millions to bring vehicles to Wainwright, declaring units "ready", then posting out the leadership.  

A single authority for bases would ensure common standards, appropriate facilities (not what petty empires want, but what they need), support services etc etc.

Stripping out the CDSG/CDSB constructs and their parallels in the RCAF. RCN, CMP and VCDS to consolidate would result in material savings in personnel doing those functions - savings in both money and personnel that could be redirected to operational outputs.

Or keep the Army model of bases having LCols as CO Pers, CO Tech Svcs, CO Blanket washing etc ad nauseum, plus the CDSG having  duplicates above, with the Div having duplicates above, the Army duplicates above...

Your call.


----------



## Kirkhill

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----------



## FJAG

We have the potential to go back and forth for days on this. I tend to agree with most of your positions but not this one.


dapaterson said:


> The Army robs O&M from bases, creating inferior quality of life to the other base operators, in order to run useless collective training events, wasting millions to bring vehicles to Wainwright, declaring units "ready", then posting out the leadership.


I do not consider collective training as useless. However, we agree on CMTC. I think that it was designed to solve a problem of the Army's own creation back in the '00s - managed readiness. I have no idea if the Army "robs" O&M or because of the size and nature of its force it is generally underfunded and needs to adjust priorities.


dapaterson said:


> A single authority for bases would ensure common standards, appropriate facilities (not what petty empires want, but what they need), support services etc etc.


One man's petty empire is another man's bespoke organization tailored to meet requirements.


dapaterson said:


> Stripping out the CDSG/CDSB constructs and their parallels in the RCAF. RCN, CMP and VCDS to consolidate would result in material savings in personnel doing those functions - savings in both money and personnel that could be redirected to operational outputs.


We've all seen those hollow promises before. I was there for integration/unification in the sixties. The CAF is still waiting for many of the benefits that these were supposed to deliver.


dapaterson said:


> Or keep the Army model of bases having LCols as CO Pers, CO Tech Svcs, CO Blanket washing etc ad nauseum, plus the CDSG having  duplicates above, with the Div having duplicates above, the Army duplicates above...
> 
> Your call.


I'm not saying that the system can't be improved. It can and it should. Stripping out meaningless management structure is high on my list. As I said, reduce the divisions in number by all means - two is appropriate. Thin out management layers by all means. But you'll still need many of the services being provided by something akin to a CDSG so the vast bulk of the people will still be needed.

All that I'm against is taking the CDSGs (and their Navy and Ai Force equivalents) away from the Army, Navy and Air Force and forming yet another 10,000 to 15,000 person establishment run out of Ottawa. Right now the Army's four CDSGs are run by four colonels. Betcha dollars to donuts that if this bunch plus the Navy and Air Force bases came under a unified authority there'd be a three star and a herd of two stars, one stars and the gods only know what else put in charge. This is starting to sound like a make-work plan to get loggies a whole bunch of extra stars and career field.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> But,
> 
> Politically, what is the effect if the 1 CMBG is tasked to a major effort and then takes casualties at the rate of the First Day of the Somme, or even Verrieres Ridge?
> 
> I can easily see the infantry battalions switched around even if the rest of the brigade structure is shipped over, and employed, intact.


The CF recruiting method for the reg force isn't like that -- while that applies to the reserver units - it doesn't apply to the regular Army.
Losing a village won't happen if 1 VP was wiped out one day.
   Besides the PPLCI has a long Regimental tradition of being wiped out and reconstituted...


The cardinal rule is if 3 CF Officers get together - they form a HQ.
    Just looking at the current ORBAT I am legimiately confused by the number of seemingly redundant HQ's.


Any actual change needs to start at the ground up - then justify everything above it.

Ideally this would start with filling line units to full strength.
   Then their Higher Command HQ and Support functions.

 I suspect that the Army would quickly run out of bodies 
    For instance looking at the Rifle Bn 
 4 x 180 man Rifle Coy = 720
 1 x Recce Platton. = 40
 1 x Sniper Troop.   = 16
 1 x Adm/Spt Coy. =140
 1 x HQ                 = 84 (just to make it even)

 That is without a fully Cbt Spt Coy

So 9 of those =9000 bodies 

 Arty Reg't
  3 x 8 Gun Bty = 420
8 Gun Bty  = ~ 140  (been a while since I look at this but 10 / gun, 2 CP's @ 5 each, Recce @ 6, 2 OP's @4, BC's Party/DCC @ 8, plus TSM's, BCM, BK etc - so 140 sound sounds good/ BTY
  1 Adm Bty
 I've not been paying attention for a while, but radar guys, AD Bty, Mortars (cause apparently Infantry can't be trusted) 

 Your at 600 min there
   2 RCHA, a RALC, and W Bty in Gagetown  = there is at least 2000 bodies.

 I'm even worse at the Engineer Regiment math
 3 sections @10 / troop  (plus Troop Cdr, TSM, etc. - lets say 45
 2 troops / Squadron  so at least 120 / Sqn 
 3 Sqn / Reg
 so 360 in just Field squadrons
  Then Heavy Equipment Sqn at another 120
 CSS Squadron 
 etc 
   Lets call it 600 there too 
so 3 CER's (I can't recall the French term) plus the Airfield folks  - I'll be low here - but 2,000 

Now the Armored  - I never paid attention to them - so bear with me here)1
 4 tanks / platoon (4 folks in a tank) 16 
 2 Platoon/ Troop  - 50 inc HQ / troop
 2 Troops / Sqn  so 120 ish / Sqn
 3 Sqn  Reg  360
 Recovery Sqn  ~ 120
Recce Sqn ~ 120
 HQ folks  - say 700 total?
 3 Armored units  - so 2,100

 So we are over 15k in just Cbt Arm PY's

No Service BN
No Comms Reg 
No Higher HQ's 

Having 1 Can Div HQ is a stretch - having more is like putting your boots on without getting dressed and heading out to work.


----------



## Good2Golf

dapaterson said:


> Stripping out the CDSG/CDSB constructs and their parallels in the RCAF. RCN, CMP and VCDS to consolidate would result in material savings in personnel doing those functions - savings in both money and personnel that could be redirected to operational outputs.


Yeah, because “Shared Services” functionality works so well? 🙄  So CFJ(army)OSG will make everything run so smoothly?

…or one could just leave the RCAF Wings and RCN Bases alone, since they’re not substantively broken, and let them do their L2-administered L3/L4 support as they have, and let CFJOSG do what CJOC tasks it to do, and let the Army continue to soul-search how to sort out a properly functioning support CDSG/CDSB/ASG/ASU/Base/Whatever structure to support the generating field force…


----------



## blacktriangle

Assuming 1000 positions/battalion as per Kevin's example, I wonder how many the CA could fully man today using only those found in BN lines?

If the answer is only six or seven, perhaps that's what the CA should be working with to start. It would also serve to further highlight how silly the number of divisions is. Repeat this process with every organization/capability, until you see the army you actually have (or don''t have, as the case may be)


----------



## FJAG

blacktriangle said:


> Assuming 1000 positions/battalion as per Kevin's example, I wonder how many the CA could fully man today using only those found in BN lines?
> 
> If the answer is only six or seven, perhaps that's what the CA should be working with to start. It would also serve to further highlight how silly the number of divisions is. Repeat this process with every organization/capability, until you see the army you actually have (or don''t have, as the case may be)


There's another theory of manning units, however. 

Develop a war establishment as per doctrine and then only man the organization sufficiently during peacetime to allow for proper training and to develop the full offr and NCM leadership cadre needed for expansion. Then fill in the blank files from other units or reservists if and when the need arises.

I constantly carp on how we have too many people in administrative management positions (especially in Ottawa) but at the same time I think we really can never have too many full-time officers and NCOs capable of operating at the unit level. A financially and operationally efficient military should be able to find the balance.

While reducing the numbers of battalions to meet current personnel strength would benefit the remaining units and even the equipment distribution, it would severely limit the ability of the force to grow in an emergency.

With three Reg F brigades and another 15 - 20,000 reservists, a two division force is reasonable even if we're still short of two divisions' worth of equipment

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

If we follow doctrine, we open up a new can of worms, we will need a lot more men and equipment. As example Below is a Division maintenance battalion, yes that is right a RCEME Battalion, and it is larger then most front line A ech units. We would need an army much large to flush this organization out. Not even touching the fact that by doctrine maintenance is separate but in practice we are part of service battalions. This organization is also very out of date and last revised pre-90s.


----------



## Kirkhill

2013  4182 1056

The reference year

The number of infanteers authorized for the field force

The number of non-infanteers authorized to  support the infantry battalions.

1000 PYs per battalion.

4 battalions?  Maybe 5?

Or do we use another number than 1000?


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> If we follow doctrine, we open up a new can of worms, we will need a lot more men and equipment. As example Below is a Division maintenance battalion, yes that is right a RCEME Battalion, and it is larger then most front line A ech units. We would need an army much large to flush this organization out. Not even touching the fact that by doctrine maintenance is separate but in practice we are part of service battalions. This organization is also very out of date and last revised pre-90s.
> 
> View attachment 66333


Boy, I haven't seen that for quite some time. Luckily I still have a copy of CFP 314 Vol 2 Maintenance in Battle from back in 1987 - part of Gen Baril's scheme to actually put a doctrine into play so that we all knew just how tricky a big Cold War army needed to be and what all its moving parts had to be to be successful. I think something like this was reissued in the late 1990s as well before everything went to hell in a handbasket under transformation.

Here's the key takeaway from this, however. This is what was, at the time, the best staff estimate to set out what was necessary to support three brigades in the field each of which had its own A Ech maintenance elements at the unit level and a maintenance company at the brigade group level. It stands to reason that an organization of the nature of a DISGP and its maintenance battalion should exist within peacetime for a three-brigade army to provide maintenance support at the above-brigade level and, if there was any intent on ever deploying one or more brigades, to be capable of mobilizing itself or a portion of itself for the field so as to provide the appropriate support for the deployed Canadian force in theatre. Composite DISGP battalions could be spun off to each of the three major brigade support bases.

But no. Instead we have a CF Joint Operational Support Group that nebulously strips deploying units and brigade headquarters of their A Ech and ad hoc cobbles together NSEs from bases and support units all over the country which provide both forward support and the rear link for whatever we deploy.

Do we even teach maintenance doctrine anymore? That's a rhetorical question. Of course we do. I'm just not sure if anyone still takes it seriously?


----------



## daftandbarmy

ballz said:


> Geography is a real constraint and has a huge impact on your ability to train together. It also matters for understanding the constraints each unit faces. I used to think 2 RCR was probably pretty similar to 2VP, being separated from the Brigade, having a big training area next door, etc. After one intro/SAV to Shilo, boy was I ever wrong.
> 
> I'd also assume that 2VP and 1 RCHA would receive even less favourable base services from 3 CDSG. Right now if something is falling off the rails, Comd 1 CMBG is across the street from both Comd 3 CDSG and Comd 3 Div, it can be easily addressed. I don't think it would work so well if it was Comd 2 CMBG fielding complaints and having to try and get them addressed.
> 
> Having 2 RCR/C Sqn or 2VP/1 RCHA seperated from their Brigades already has pros/cons (for the units), but increasing the distance seems like it would only magnify the cons and not come with any additional benefits. It would everything more difficult logistically, the displaced units would be less able to get support from their Bde HQ, etc.
> 
> *I don't know why we wouldn't organize geographically and then try to force generate*, to the extent possible, from established and cohesive formations, rather trying to throw a mix of things together which would lead to an awful lot of C2 problems at the start. Bolting one rifle company onto a cohesive Battlegroup is one thing and I doubt there weren't some C2 issues to be worked out.... but bolting together various parts from various different regions/HQs to try and stand up a cohesive formation, methinks would be a C2 disaster.



Except that everyone 'hates' R22eR, stuffed into their 'Belle Province' ghetto.

We've built three Army solitudes. That's not a good thing.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

dapaterson said:


> Pull all bases out of the RCN, CA, RCAF, VCDS and CMP, put them under Support Command.  Toss the supply depots there as well, the MP group, HS group, recruiting group.
> 
> Voila.  The Army can divest the four Areas turned Divs, recycle them into one Reg F div and one Res F Div HQ.  Lots of savings possible there...


Yeah, because centralizing IT in SSC and centralizing CE in RP Ops has been such a raging success…


----------



## CBH99

dapaterson said:


> The Army robs O&M from bases, creating inferior quality of life to the other base operators, in order to run useless collective training events, wasting millions to bring vehicles to Wainwright, declaring units "ready", then posting out the leadership.
> 
> A single authority for bases would ensure common standards, appropriate facilities (not what petty empires want, but what they need), support services etc etc


I’ve enjoyed all of the suggestions in the last page or so, even if sometimes (as an observer to this thread) - one can see the minor details that things are getting snagged on.  

Curious - it is mentioned above that the Army robs bases of O&M, creating inferior quality of life for the other base operators.  


Genuinely curious what is meant by that?


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> I’ve enjoyed all of the suggestions in the last page or so, even if sometimes (as an observer to this thread) - one can see the minor details that things are getting snagged on.
> 
> Curious - it is mentioned above that the Army robs bases of O&M, creating inferior quality of life for the other base operators.
> 
> 
> Genuinely curious what is meant by that?


O&M is Operations and Maintenance $'s.  (General just internal operations - to keep the wheels turning as it where)
   Beans, Bullets etc - and ensuring that the base doesn't crumble.

I suspect that DAP means that the supported Army units draw deeper into it - and so the Base itself cannot really support itself.


----------



## Kirkhill

​AUSA Presentation
BRIG. PAUL TENNANT, BRITISH ARMY
Thursday, June 24, 2021









						Radical Redesign: British Army Changes in Step With Its US Counterpart
					

The U.K.’s recent Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy has important consequences for the British Arm




					www.ausa.org


----------



## MilEME09

Given the massive infrastructure deficit we have, I agree. A central authority controlling bases and infrastructure would ensure needs a met where they are needed most. We also need aa part of economic recovery a infrastructure boost of a few billion as a one time injection


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> AUSA Presentation
> BRIG. PAUL TENNANT, BRITISH ARMY
> Thursday, June 24, 2021
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Radical Redesign: British Army Changes in Step With Its US Counterpart
> 
> 
> The U.K.’s recent Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy has important consequences for the British Arm
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.ausa.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 66341


Not to be too picky but an Army of 72,500 is 0.11% of the population of the UK (roughly 66million) and not 1.1%. Same issue re the US Army ratio. Tennant is obviously neither a gunner nor an engineer - Ah! He's an aviator.  😁 

I've been waiting for this network centric army ever since someone stuffed 500 pounds of Brit Field Artillery Computer Equipment (FACE) and a ring line adapter into my M577 CP back in 1972. Any sign of it yet?

😁


----------



## ballz

All I'll say is there is plenty of money for both Army units and the bases that support them, it is simply managed poorly (to be generous). Not a big surprise when your stance on managing money is that Commanders don't need to know anything about money because they'll always be supported by "experts," and then the experts we provide them don't even understand what a general ledger is, let alone how to manage a $2 billion budget.

The CAF's Deputy CFO [highest-ranking uniformed finance officer.... the CFO is ADM(Fin)] literally can't retire right now because there is a legal requirement from Treasury Board that for a department of a certain size, that the Deputy CFO be a designated accountant, and there are no Colonels in waiting that have one... they're literally trying to get the requirement relaxed to what is essentially just an accounting diploma (i.e. the first two years of a business degree). The knock-on effect is that if the current D.CFO retires then the DND will have no choice but to fill it with a civilian CPA, and of course once it's filled by a civilian it's going to stay civilian.

A few years ago the Army Compt, the "expert" advising the CCA, was a Transport Officer.


----------



## daftandbarmy

ballz said:


> All I'll say is there is plenty of money for both Army units and the bases that support them, it is simply managed poorly (to be generous). Not a big surprise when your stance on managing money is that Commanders don't need to know anything about money because they'll always be supported by "experts," and then the experts we provide them don't even understand what a general ledger is, let alone how to manage a $2 billion budget.
> 
> The CAF's Deputy CFO [highest-ranking uniformed finance officer.... the CFO is ADM(Fin)] literally can't retire right now because there is a legal requirement from Treasury Board that for a department of a certain size, that the Deputy CFO be a designated accountant, and there are no Colonels in waiting that have one... they're literally trying to get the requirement relaxed to what is essentially just an accounting diploma (i.e. the first two years of a business degree). The knock-on effect is that if the current D.CFO retires then the DND will have no choice but to fill it with a civilian CPA, and of course once it's filled by a civilian it's going to stay civilian.
> 
> A few years ago the Army Compt, the "expert" advising the CCA, was a Transport Officer.



One of my former Pl Comds is an accountant, quite highly regarded apparently, and worked for the BC Ministry of Health. He's since been promoted and moved on to another ministry.

If only we could leverage the talents lurking in the reserve world, eh?


----------



## dapaterson

No need for DND to have any military finance officers above the rank of Major (for deployed ops), except that the generals want one of their own up close.

Civilianizing the hard finance portfolio within DND would be a positive first step in professionalization.


----------



## ballz

dapaterson said:


> No need for DND to have any military finance officers above the rank of Major (for deployed ops), except that the generals want one of their own up close.
> 
> Civilianizing the hard finance portfolio within DND would be a positive first step in professionalization.



I'm on the fence, I'm not in total disagreement, or agreement, I have grappled with what the fix is for a while.... a born and bred finance officer is almost as out-to-lunch when it comes to "how things work in the Army" as a civilian, so at least if the civilian is a designated accountant they get one major aspect of the job

That said, there's no requirement for a CPA unless you're what, an FI-04 I believe? Most of our civilian finance positions are filled by people no more qualified... if you have a degree, you can be an FI-02 for sure, not sure about FI-03... FI-02 is the highest level of civilian finance position we have in 3 Div... of course, filled by former Majors because heaven forbid we bring in some outside perspective.

It's funny you chose the rank of Major... all of the Div Comptrollers are Majors and the Base Comptrollers are usually Majors. They can do an awful lot of damage at that rank, completely unchecked, before their inevitable promotion no matter how bad they've f'd things up.

A CPA in Edmonton can easily start at $150k as a financial controller (comptroller, different word, same meaning) in industry and eventually top out between $200k-250k once they're experienced in that role. An FI-04 tops out at $134k after 7 years. So if we're going to attract the proper quality of professional into the Div Compt and Base Compt roles to do the actual job properly, we'd probably need to replace the Major and make it an EX-02 position.... extrapolate that across the CAF, its a hard sell because the decision-makers thing everything is working relatively fine.... they don't know what they don't know.

We're quite simply trying to get blood from a stone.



daftandbarmy said:


> If only we could leverage the talents lurking in the reserve world, eh?



Good luck.... the problem with telling people they are an expert is they start to believe it. If an audit partner from KPMG told them how an accounts payable cycle is supposed to work they'd say "oh no, that's not how we do things." They've got _experience_, didn't you know?


Anywho, I guess my point was, you can restructure who controls what when it comes to bases, it isn't going to fix anything. Money makes the world go round especially when it comes to institutional support and so if you can't control/understand the money, you can't really fix the problems.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> No need for DND to have any military finance officers above the rank of Major (for deployed ops), except that the generals want one of their own up close.
> 
> Civilianizing the hard finance portfolio within DND would be a positive first step in professionalization.


As long as people don't start trying to show a profit by selling their items to other parts of the Mil.
   You get range costs of 5k plus a day that way (cost of a days range time at NSWC Crane).
 Or an arsenal building items (like a M4/M16 Front sight post) and selling it back to the system at a massive mark-up.


----------



## Weinie

KevinB said:


> As long as people don't start trying to show a profit by selling their items to other parts of the Mil.
> You get range costs of 5k plus a day that way (cost of a days range time at NSWC Crane).
> Or an arsenal building items (like a M4/M16 Front sight post) and selling it back to the system at a massive mark-up.


I never understood that angle for the US military, but experienced it several times.


----------



## ballz

KevinB said:


> As long as people don't start trying to show a profit by selling their items to other parts of the Mil.
> You get range costs of 5k plus a day that way (cost of a days range time at NSWC Crane).
> Or an arsenal building items (like a M4/M16 Front sight post) and selling it back to the system at a massive mark-up.



I can't speak to the specific example being used above, but "transfer pricing," which is when different divisions of the same corporation, or sometimes subsidiary corps that all belong to the same parent corp, is a big issue in proper managerial accounting that the DND is also oblivious to.

Transfer pricing affects decision-making and improper transfer pricing leads to bad decisions.

Let's take for example, quarters which each base just decides whatever it wants to charge. We have good quarters like the French Grey Inn or Yukon Lodge almost completely vacant, meanwhile shoving a soldier on a 4 or 5 month task into a run-down 4-bed room with new roommates coming in and out as required (since they only look at it as bed spaces) simply because the Base decides to charge $65/night for the French Grey Inn / Yukon Lodge type facilities and $15/night for the communal living spaces. Therefore, schools who don't care about the soldier and only their operating budget go with the cheaper option. Meanwhile we're wondering why we have retention problems. The incremental cost of using the better room is zero.

At one point 3 CDTC was able to get a better deal at a motel, and so here the DND was bleeding out cash to the private sector meanwhile having empty rooms in the Yukon Lodge that had no incremental costs if they were filled.

And then even better, since revenue from quarters and costs of using quarters are built into financial plans, any time plans change (and usually no one base-side knows about it) it has a huge knock-on effect... suddenly the Base is reporting huge financial pressures since they did not get the expected revenue, meanwhile the units that didn't spend that money are spending it all on March madness items.

The fluctuations in financial reporting are magnified to the degree that the room costs... it was 50% the cost, the fluctuation would be 50% less, and more of the money would be in the right hands from the start.

I mean, if we had proper comptrollership, the Div Comptrollers would get a grip on this.... but just go ask a finance officer what "transfer pricing" is and take note of the confused look on their face.


----------



## dapaterson

... Reg F pay as a hidden cost that's utterly ignored enters the discussion ...


----------



## Infanteer

"Transfer Pricing"


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## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> ... Reg F pay as a hidden cost that's utterly ignored enters the discussion ...



I'm guessing, as with most corporations, it's the biggest variable cost in the mix.


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## dapaterson

There's over $6B annually in Regular Force pay and allowances that is centrally held (for valid reasons), but is also centrally attributed, instead of being charged to local, organizational cost centres.  The latter would permit better review and analysis; the former is "how we did it under the old, pre-1997 finance system, so why change".

But Reg F labour being perceived as "free" creates negative behaviours: for example, suppose you're an ACSO in BC who needs to recertify on a trainer that's in NS.  Your fearless clerks in the orderly room may well "save" $50 in airfare by giving you a 14 hour flight plan (commercial), where the additional $50 would have reduced that flight time to 7 hours.  The "saved" seven hours are invisible, so the clerk will be commended for making you travel YYJ - YVR - YYC - YWG - YUL - YFC - YHZ and saving $50 over letting you fly YYJ - YVR - YYZ - YHZ (and not lose your luggage).


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> There's over $6B annually in Regular Force pay and allowances that is centrally held (for valid reasons), but is also centrally attributed, instead of being charged to local, organizational cost centres.  The latter would permit better review and analysis; the former is "how we did it under the old, pre-1997 finance system, so why change".
> 
> But Reg F labour being perceived as "free" creates negative behaviours: for example, suppose you're an ACSO in BC who needs to recertify on a trainer that's in NS.  Your fearless clerks in the orderly room may well "save" $50 in airfare by giving you a 14 hour flight plan (commercial), where the additional $50 would have reduced that flight time to 7 hours.  The "saved" seven hours are invisible, so the clerk will be commended for making you travel YYJ - YVR - YYC - YWG - YUL - YFC - YHZ and saving $50 over letting you fly YYJ - YVR - YYZ - YHZ (and not lose your luggage).



Which is why we should go with a time based system, like other professions, of course


----------



## Kirkhill

ballz said:


> I'm on the fence, I'm not in total disagreement, or agreement, I have grappled with what the fix is for a while.... a born and bred finance officer is almost as out-to-lunch when it comes to "how things work in the Army" as a civilian, so at least if the civilian is a designated accountant they get one major aspect of the job
> 
> That said, there's no requirement for a CPA unless you're what, an FI-04 I believe? Most of our civilian finance positions are filled by people no more qualified... if you have a degree, you can be an FI-02 for sure, not sure about FI-03... FI-02 is the highest level of civilian finance position we have in 3 Div... of course, filled by former Majors because heaven forbid we bring in some outside perspective.
> 
> It's funny you chose the rank of Major... all of the Div Comptrollers are Majors and the Base Comptrollers are usually Majors. They can do an awful lot of damage at that rank, completely unchecked, before their inevitable promotion no matter how bad they've f'd things up.
> 
> A CPA in Edmonton can easily start at $150k as a financial controller (comptroller, different word, same meaning) in industry and eventually top out between $200k-250k once they're experienced in that role. An FI-04 tops out at $134k after 7 years. So if we're going to attract the proper quality of professional into the Div Compt and Base Compt roles to do the actual job properly, we'd probably need to replace the Major and make it an EX-02 position.... extrapolate that across the CAF, its a hard sell because the decision-makers thing everything is working relatively fine.... they don't know what they don't know.
> 
> We're quite simply trying to get blood from a stone.
> 
> 
> 
> Good luck.... the problem with telling people they are an expert is they start to believe it. If an audit partner from KPMG told them how an accounts payable cycle is supposed to work they'd say "oh no, that's not how we do things." They've got _experience_, didn't you know?
> 
> 
> Anywho, I guess my point was, you can restructure who controls what when it comes to bases, it isn't going to fix anything. Money makes the world go round especially when it comes to institutional support and so if you can't control/understand the money, you can't really fix the problems.



Just as a point:  Samuel Pepys was a civilian.   As was the entire Commissariat.



> senior officer of the Commissariat (a department of HM Treasury responsible for the procurement and issue of various stores and victuals to the army and the provision of transport). The Commissariat officers were uniformed civilians, appointed by the Treasury but issued with letters of commission by the War Office;[2] they were given rank as follows:
> 
> 
> Commissary General (equivalent to a Brigadier General)
> Deputy Commissary General (equivalent to a Lieutenant Colonel or Major)
> Assistant Commissary General (equivalent to a Captain)
> Deputy Assistant Commissary General (equivalent to a Lieutenant)
> Commissary Clerk (equivalent to an Ensign).[2]
> The department was overseen by a _Commissary-in-Chief_ from 1809-1816, and by a _Commissary General in Chief_ from 1858 to 1869.
> 
> Between 1793 and 1859 _Assistant Commissary_, _Commissary_ and (from 1810) _Chief Commissary_ were (civilian) ranks in the Field Train Department of the Board of Ordnance (the field force element of the Ordnance storekeeping system).[3]


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## MJP

dapaterson said:


> There's over $6B annually in Regular Force pay and allowances that is centrally held (for valid reasons), but is also centrally attributed, instead of being charged to local, organizational cost centres.  The latter would permit better review and analysis; the former is "how we did it under the old, pre-1997 finance system, so why change".


It is a good example.  Lots of centralized costs on the institutional support side that are not attributed well that led to poor decisions because the decision maker(s) often don't deal with the downstream or upstream costs because we don't use a transfer pricing model


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## ballz

dapaterson said:


> Your fearless clerks in the orderly room may well "save" $50 in airfare by giving you a 14 hour flight plan (commercial), where the additional $50 would have reduced that flight time to 7 hours.  The "saved" seven hours are invisible, so the clerk will be commended for making you travel YYJ - YVR - YYC - YWG - YUL - YFC - YHZ and saving $50 over letting you fly YYJ - YVR - YYZ - YHZ (and not lose your luggage).



To be fair, that is management's fault for abrogating their responsibilities to clerks. It is the approving authority that is supposed to determine your method of travel and itinerary, balancing out these factors. The non-clerk management have determined they are "too busy" to do their jobs and have handed it off to a clerk and blindly follow whatever they say. And most people claim they are too incompetent to do their own ITA up / book their own travel, they need a clerk to babysit them.

A proper comptroller function would also help sort this out. For example, if Brigades had a proper finance platoon, with the G8 in command of it (which is actually in our CSS doctrine), no way in hell would FSAs be wasting time doing people's personal admin (i.e. booking travel, leave passes, etc.) for them.... just like in the private sector where the accountants don't do your personal admin. Instead we've got 3x FSAs in a unit and it's a complete mess and a travesty how they are employed.

We have the shitty management we deserve.


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## Kirkhill

Transfer Pricing -

As when the factory transfers its product to the warehouse.  The warehouse transfers the product to the regional depot.  The regional depot transfers the product to the national sales outlet.  The national sales outlet transfers the product to the integrator.  The integrator transfers the product to the assembler.  The assembler transfers the product to the system vendor.  The system vendor transfers the product to the client.  And, in some instances, the client will transfer the product to its relevant division who will transfer it to its point of use.  That, in the real world of cases I have known, is nine transfers.  And, in a vertically integrated company, say somebody of the Lockmart variety selling goods and services, all of those transfers can be internal.

Assume that each transfer represents a 33% mark up, or a gross margin of 25%, entirely normal, then your factory produced $100 item will cost

$100x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1.33x 1,33 = $1302. 

And thus your $1300 Golden Hammer supplied by the OEM as a spare part.

As Ballz and DAP note - there is ample room for negotiation in that chain.


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## Good2Golf

dapaterson said:


> ... Reg F pay as a hidden cost that's utterly ignored enters the discussion ...


By hidden you mean ‘sunk’.  So remind me how RegF MILPAY directly impacts a CA base O&M again? 🤔


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## ballz

Good2Golf said:


> By hidden you mean ‘sunk’.  So remind me how RegF MILPAY directly impacts a CA base O&M again? 🤔



Reg Force pay, and I cannot stress this enough, is *not* a sunk cost, not by definition or in reality.


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## Good2Golf

ballz said:


> Reg Force pay, and I cannot stress this enough, is *not* a sunk cost, not by definition or in reality.


Until the approved manning level of the CAF components is reduced and concomitant Vote 1 allocation reduced, Government has essentially decided that that is what will be allocated to the Department program.  Okay, so don’t call it sunk…it is still incurred by the authorized man in level and can’t or won’t be recovered until authorized levels are adjusted.  There is not refund that the Department gets that it can reallocate elsewhere, should manning levels be changed.


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## ballz

Good2Golf said:


> Until the approved manning level of the CAF components is reduced and concomitant Vote 1 allocation reduced, Government has essentially decided that that is what will be allocated to the Department program.  Okay, so don’t call it sunk…it is still incurred by the authorized man in level and can’t or won’t be recovered until authorized levels are adjusted.  There is not refund that the Department gets that it can reallocate elsewhere, should manning levels be changed.



Reg Force pay is a _fixed_ cost, but you have not yet "incurred" it. You incur it as you use it.

A sunk cost is a cost you've already incurred. If you have 10 troops with nothing to do tomorrow, their costs are not yet incurred. You can task them to do something. You can task them to participate in training. Or you can task them to mow the lawn. Or you can task them to do COMREL.

Viewing it as a "sunk cost" or as "free" is what causes us to have zero regard for what we're actually making people do and how much time we are wasting. Time is money, and it is quantifiable, we even have a Cost Factors Manuel for calculating the cost of a soldier's time. If we started quantifying how much money we waste in time we might finally stop making soldiers do so much stupid shit.

The Department would benefit hugely if it put some basic constraints around time. We don't need to put it under a Commander's budget but we can implement a time-based system, as many professions do, as pointed out earlier by daft. It's just basic governance stuff.


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## Good2Golf

You mistake my view of “sunk” as “free.”  I do not consider them the same.  Where do you believe I did?  

As far as incurred, they are incurred right up until the member ceases serving. Assigned tasks have nothing to do with the government’s  incurred obligation to pay CAF members.


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## ballz

Good2Golf said:


> As far as incurred, they are incurred right up until the member ceases serving. Assigned tasks have nothing to do with the government’s  incurred obligation to pay CAF members.



No, I'm not sure why we're arguing about this at this point if you agree that the costs are sunk costs, other than me being anal-retentive about terminology and we're talking about accounting terminology. You do not incur a cost until you have received the benefit of the services provided. If we did, when you enrol someone you'd have to book a liability for their entire career's worth of salary / pension / benefits, etc. and reduce that liability as you pay the wages. "Incurring a cost" means there's a corresponding liability. There's no liability on the books until you've worked that day.

A good example of this is SWE... since their cheques are always cut 2 weeks after, at the end of the year there is a liability on the financial statements for up to 2 weeks worth of pay that has not yet been paid. As of 31 Dec, that 2 weeks was an actual incurred cost and is represented by a liability on the balance sheet.

It's not the case for Reg Force because we're paid on 31 Dec, so the DND doesn't "owe us" any money. It hasn't incurred a cost for a "future" days of service.



Good2Golf said:


> There is not refund that the Department gets that it can reallocate elsewhere



It can actually. Vote 1 money is "operating costs" and includes salaries but also operational and maintenance expenses. If you, for example, go on Leave Without Pay, the Department can spend that Vote 1 they would have had to pay you on any other Vote 1 item such as an operating or maintenance expense. Because, as I explained, they had not already incurred the costs of your salary, there is no liability to pay you, and since you went on leave without pay they never did end up incurring the cost and can therefore use the Vote 1 money elsewhere.

Reg Force pay is "L114," the "L" means "local," which means they can convert it to other funds, such as L101, at the L1 level. For "C" funds (corporate) such as C127 (PRes O&M), ADM(Fin) is the authority to convert it to something else.


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## FJAG

ballz said:


> The Department would benefit hugely if it put some basic constraints around time. We don't need to put it under a Commander's budget but we can implement a time-based system, as many professions do, as pointed out earlier by daft. It's just basic governance stuff.



As a long-time sufferer under a "billable hour regime" I'd say that one won't run up the flagpole in the Forces. I must admit though that timesheets were highly useful in allowing me to track activities and measure progress towards financial targets. Unfortunately it would be impractical for many soldiers (although useful for some). Time ticketing only works well for people whose remuneration is based on accurate billing information. For salaried workers its a hated inconvenience.

I've lost touch over the years as to what goes on in the gun park these days but amongst us Cold War combat arms folks (that included gunners and engineers back then) there was a general division of activities: field exercises; regimental schools/individual training; administration; maintenance; sweeping the gun park.  The first four were usually pursued in some annual cycle.

Field exercises are limited by resources. Yes you can always have more dry exercises but there comes a time when you are flogging a dead horse with dry training. Exercises need to be meaningful and structured and not just time fillers. That left a lot of time each year for other activities.

The other three activities are generally rank conscious. Various administrative functions take officers and some NCMs away from the troops who are left to conduct some form of training or maintenance under reduced supervision. Regimental schools involved many, but not all members. These activities rarely mesh well and there are inevitably times where various individuals or sometimes whole rafts of folks (usually junior troops) have nothing to do. Hence sweeping the gun park (or painting rocks if you're in the RCR) And don't get me started on the lack of activity that takes place during the APS for those not actually on leave or being posted.

I doubt if managed readiness has changed the basic nature of those activities. My guess is that by taking a one year training cycle and stretching it over 2 or 3 years has probably created more gaps where there is a lack of anything constructive to do so that even more people are standing around with hands in their pockets.

The problem for the Army is that, unlike a factory where underemployed workers effect the bottom line, there is no financial consequence at the unit level arising from underemployed soldiers. If 75% of the unit is busy with something that's usually looked at as a win. One regrets that 25% aren't too busy but how can you fix it besides laying on yet another sports' afternoon trip to a local brewery?

You can't solve that with time sheets. 

Comprehensive time/efficiency studies might provide data on how much each portion of the unit spends on productive/nonproductive activities. I think the results might be shocking but at least that would allow adjusting activities so that there is less "wasted time" especially amongst the junior ranks. My fear is that this could become just another case of centralized management dictating to COs how to suck eggs. It could help if there was a lower administrative burden coupled with more funding for useful exercises so that the entire unit spends more of its time working together. But that's highly unlikely to happen. 

Yup. There's a lot of benefit for leader/managers who do not need to be concerned about the labour component on the expense column of their balance sheet.

🍻


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## ballz

FJAG said:


> As a long-time sufferer under a "billable hour regime" I'd say that one won't run up the flagpole in the Forces. I must admit though that timesheets were highly useful in allowing me to track activities and measure progress towards financial targets. Unfortunately it would be impractical for many soldiers (although useful for some). Time ticketing only works well for people whose remuneration is based on accurate billing information. For salaried workers its a hated inconvenience.



There are other ways to govern the use of time. I.e. a limit on how many soldier days per year can be spent on COMREL activities and other good ideas that GOFOs find to fill our non-existent white space.



FJAG said:


> I doubt if managed readiness has changed the basic nature of those activities. My guess is that by taking a one year training cycle and stretching it over 2 or 3 years has probably created more gaps where there is a lack of anything constructive to do so that even more people are standing around with hands in their pockets.



Yes, you have definitely lost touch. The "managed readiness" plans have been anything but "managed." They didn't take a one-year training cycle and stretch it out, if anything it's led to us doing the same gateways numerous times per year. If 2VP has to do level 4 again this FY (still up for debate), they'll have gone to Level 4 (or higher) 4x in 18 months. People are jumping through their assholes right now to keep up.



FJAG said:


> The problem for the Army is that, unlike a factory where underemployed workers effect the bottom line, there is no financial consequence at the unit level arising from underemployed soldiers. If 75% of the unit is busy with something that's usually looked at as a win. One regrets that 25% aren't too busy but how can you fix it besides laying on yet another sports' afternoon trip to a local brewery?



You're off-the-mark on the problem entirely, it's the opposite. The problem isn't underemployed people, it's people being tasked left right and centre to non-value activities because their time is "free," without any regard for the things they actually need to get done and the fact that doing nonsense stuff means either less time spent on the important stuff, or much much longer hours to try and jam it all in.



FJAG said:


> Comprehensive time/efficiency studies might provide data on how much each portion of the unit spends on productive/nonproductive activities. I think the results might be shocking but at least that would allow adjusting activities so that there is less "wasted time" especially amongst the junior ranks. My fear is that this could become just another case of centralized management dictating to COs how to suck eggs. It could help if there was a lower administrative burden coupled with more funding for useful exercises so that the entire unit spends more of its time working together. But that's highly unlikely to happen.



Actually, I was talking about putting constraints on all of the GOFOs whose clever ideas to boost their own portfolio cost the COs the ability to actually conduct proper training, which causes us to just do some box-checking BS just to say we've met "x" level of foundation training... even though we haven't actually, because in the time we had left, all we could was line up 4x LAVs, walk in a straight line, and call it Level 3 live-fire.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> As a long-time sufferer under a "billable hour regime" I'd say that one won't run up the flagpole in the Forces. I must admit though that timesheets were highly useful in allowing me to track activities and measure progress towards financial targets. Unfortunately it would be impractical for many soldiers (although useful for some). *Time ticketing only works well for people whose remuneration is based on accurate billing information. For salaried workers its a hated inconvenience.*



Which nicely explains the cultural difference between reservists (hourly oppressed proletarians who still sign time constrained pay sheets) and regulars (evil, salaried with perqs, overlords)


----------



## FJAG

ballz said:


> Yes, you have definitely lost touch



Yup. That sounds like a whole lot of different problems.

I've railed against managed readiness for some time but primarily on the basis that it leaves 2/3 of the force "not ready" while we in the past, in our own bumbling way, were ready pretty much each year (albeit that some of us sat at shorter notices to move than others with the fan-out list closer at hand). It was more like the unit was ready the whole time and the purpose of the annual training cycle was to take already trained people who had come in on postings that summer and work them into the team and maybe push the yardsticks ahead a little.

It's never been said about me that I lack imagination, but I have a hard time seeing how box checking in today's Army actually functions. It was hard enough just to get everyone through their battle fitness tests and qualified on their personal and crew served weapons without having to pick up stragglers here and there. And that was when we had a fair bit of time, plenty of ammo and the vast majority of our gear was well maintained (even if old) and functioning. 

If there's even an ounce of truth in what you say (and I have absolutely zero reason to doubt you) then the problem seems to run much deeper than I thought.



daftandbarmy said:


> Which nicely explains the cultural difference between reservists (hourly oppressed proletarians who still sign time constrained pay sheets) and regulars (evil, salaried with perqs, overlords)



I know you're being semi-facetious but that never concerned me as either RSS or as a reservist.

The thing that bugged me most was training. Doing individual qualification training in the unit lines was highly inefficient eating up resources and time having to deal with very small courses and having a third to a half of the people showing up whenever they wanted. On the other hand getting people slots on area or nationally run courses in the summer was like playing the lottery. Even when you did pick a winner, chances are the course would be cancelled because there were too few students, instructors, resources, - pick one.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

Efficiency is over-rated.  

Only partially kidding.

Nudder war story.  Customer has a plant producing a product from oats via a complex process.  The process is inefficient but it produces a very, very high value product at a very, very low yield.  Customer wants to increase production.  Double it.  Options are to make the process more efficient by adding a few more million dollars worth of rare and complex equipment requiring special certifications. OR.  Buy 5 more sacks of oats a day.  And accept the inefficiency.

Customer is still chasing efficiency.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

In the 1980's I saw the indifference Reg Force soldiers had to good use of time, as a reservist we had a better sense of the cost of time. I not sure if that still holds true today. FJAG is right that stupid/make work is morale sapping after a while, particularly with the level of education you see in private soldiers today. You also have motivated individuals and non-motivated. The motivated ones should have opportunities during slack times/ make work projects to further their careers/education/skills, leaving the non-motivated ones to work on the projects. Occasionally you need to involve the motivated to join the make work, so they remember to share in the suck, particularly if it's a dirty but important job.


----------



## KevinB

ballz said:


> There are other ways to govern the use of time. I.e. a limit on how many soldier days per year can be spent on COMREL activities and other good ideas that GOFOs find to fill our non-existent white space.


There should be "this space intentionally left blank" areas for that - not operational requirements get shunted aside.



ballz said:


> Yes, you have definitely lost touch. The "managed readiness" plans have been anything but "managed." They didn't take a one-year training cycle and stretch it out, if anything it's led to us doing the same gateways numerous times per year. If 2VP has to do level 4 again this FY (still up for debate), they'll have gone to Level 4 (or higher) 4x in 18 months. People are jumping through their assholes right now to keep up.


 I don't think many of us think Managed Readiness means it was managed -- it was a simple catechism to justify a rotational schedule for deployed units - and theoretically fit other requirements in the sandwich.


ballz said:


> You're off-the-mark on the problem entirely, it's the opposite. The problem isn't underemployed people, it's people being tasked left right and centre to non-value activities because their time is "free," without any regard for the things they actually need to get done and the fact that doing nonsense stuff means either less time spent on the important stuff, or much much longer hours to try and jam it all in.


 Again - that time isn't free and should be allocated by the CoC so that sub-unit or unit cannot be made available for dog and ponies.


ballz said:


> Actually, I was talking about putting constraints on all of the GOFOs whose clever ideas to boost their own portfolio cost the COs the ability to actually conduct proper training, which causes us to just do some box-checking BS just to say we've met "x" level of foundation training... even though we haven't actually, because in the time we had left, all we could was line up 4x LAVs, walk in a straight line, and call it Level 3 live-fire.


 That is a CoC issue - no one should be 'checking the box' for training that isn't being conducted properly -- that is criminal to the troops and the mission, and a career ender for the OIC/RCO who signed off when things go south later (and they always go south).


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> That is a CoC issue - *no one should be 'checking the box' for training that isn't being conducted properly* -- that is criminal to the troops and the mission, and a career ender for the OIC/RCO who signed off when things go south later (and they always go south).



But.... but..... but that's the core foundation of most of the rubbish I observed over the course of a decade or so....


----------



## ballz

KevinB said:


> There should be "this space intentionally left blank" areas for that - not operational requirements get shunted aside.
> 
> 
> I don't think many of us think Managed Readiness means it was managed -- it was a simple catechism to justify a rotational schedule for deployed units - and theoretically fit other requirements in the sandwich.
> 
> Again - that time isn't free and should be allocated by the CoC so that sub-unit or unit cannot be made available for dog and ponies.
> 
> That is a CoC issue - no one should be 'checking the box' for training that isn't being conducted properly -- that is criminal to the troops and the mission, and a career ender for the OIC/RCO who signed off when things go south later (and they always go south).



Of course everything you said is correct..... and exactly opposite of the reality in our units. OCs and COs don't get to tell the Army "sorry, we can't do that, we've got our level 1/2 FTX scheduled during that dog & pony event."

It's either compress the FTX, move it (which means it gets jammed in somewhere and compressed), or have a skeleton crew do the FTX while half the troops are out doing the dog & pony.

And the institution is pleased with that because technically all boxes were checked.


----------



## MilEME09

ballz said:


> Of course everything you said is correct..... and exactly opposite of the reality in our units. OCs and COs don't get to tell the Army "sorry, we can't do that, we've got our level 1/2 FTX scheduled during that dog & pony event."
> 
> It's either compress the FTX, move it (which means it gets jammed in somewhere and compressed), or have a skeleton crew do the FTX while half the troops are out doing the dog & pony.
> 
> And the institution is pleased with that because technically all boxes were checked.


And in the end the troops get sub par training as a result, get pissed off and don't come out next year cause it was a terrible go.


----------



## GR66

Circling back to force structure...

Here's an example of what could be done if we abandon the geographic structure of the Force Generation Brigades.

2 x Reg Force Brigades each with:

1 x Cavalry Regiment (adapted from Armoured Recce Regiments....possibly Recce Sqn/AT Sqn/Mech. Inf. Coy?)
2 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions
2 x Light Infantry Battalions
1 x Artillery Regiment (3 x SP 155mm Howitzer Batteries)
1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
1 x Service Battalion

One of the two Reg Force Brigade would also have a Tank Regiment as the 3rd Armoured Regiment

Each Reg Force Brigade would have a mirror Reserve Infantry Brigade:

Reg Force Brigade HQ w/Class B Reserve augmentation
1 x Cavalry Regiment (TAPV or JLTV-like vehicle version of Reg Force Cavalry Regiments)
4 x Light Infantry Battalions (4 x Reserve Regiments each being one Company per Battalion)
1 x Artillery Regiment (3 x M777 Howitzer Batteries to augment the Reg Force Regiments in deployments)
1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
1 x Service Battalion

Because the Reg Force Brigades are reduced in number from 3 to 2, that would leave one "surplus" Reg Force CER and Service Battalion.  These could be split to create two 50/50 units to support each Reserve Brigade giving them much more effective support than the existing all-Reserve Brigades can provide.  The remaining Reserve Combat Engineer, Service and Signals units that are not required to fill out the 50/50 units in the Reserve Brigades could be grouped together to provide additional CSS Regiments/Battalions in the Canadian Combat Support Brigade.

The reduction in Reg Force Brigades would also leave one Reg Force Artillery Regiment uncommitted.  This Regiment could give one of its current gun batteries to each of the other two Reg Force Regiments (giving them 3 x Batteries each) and leaving it with a full HQ, FO and STA batteries.  This could form the core of a new SHORAD Regiment with the firing batteries being filled by Reserve Regiments.

There are enough Reserve Artillery Regiments that in addition to providing 3 x M777 batteries for each of the two Reserve Brigades and 3 x SHORAD Batteries for 1 RCHA that they could also provide 3 x Regiments to man a 3 Battery Regiment of HIMARS and 2 x 3 Battery Regiments of UAV/Loitering Munition launch vehicles.  These batteries could either be directed by 4 RCA (GS) or assigned as additional batteries to the 2 x Reg Force Artillery Regiments for deployments.  I'd group these Reserve Artillery Regiments, the SHORAD Regiment and 4 RCA (GS) into a separate Artillery Brigade.

There are enough Reserve Infantry and Armoured Regiments left after creating this structure that you could create a 3 Company Arctic Response Battalion to support each Ranger Patrol Group (1 x Reserve Regiment forming each Company).  There would also be several unassigned Regiments that could be formed into Transport Companies (BVs10's or similar?).

This structure would look something like this:


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Circling back to force structure...
> 
> Here's an example of what could be done if we abandon the geographic structure of the Force Generation Brigades.
> 
> 2 x Reg Force Brigades each with:
> 
> 1 x Cavalry Regiment (adapted from Armoured Recce Regiments....possibly Recce Sqn/AT Sqn/Mech. Inf. Coy?)
> 2 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions
> 2 x Light Infantry Battalions
> 1 x Artillery Regiment (3 x SP 155mm Howitzer Batteries)
> 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1 x Service Battalion
> 
> One of the two Reg Force Brigade would also have a Tank Regiment as the 3rd Armoured Regiment
> 
> Each Reg Force Brigade would have a mirror Reserve Infantry Brigade:
> 
> Reg Force Brigade HQ w/Class B Reserve augmentation
> 1 x Cavalry Regiment (TAPV or JLTV-like vehicle version of Reg Force Cavalry Regiments)
> 4 x Light Infantry Battalions (4 x Reserve Regiments each being one Company per Battalion)
> 1 x Artillery Regiment (3 x M777 Howitzer Batteries to augment the Reg Force Regiments in deployments)
> 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1 x Service Battalion
> 
> Because the Reg Force Brigades are reduced in number from 3 to 2, that would leave one "surplus" Reg Force CER and Service Battalion.  These could be split to create two 50/50 units to support each Reserve Brigade giving them much more effective support than the existing all-Reserve Brigades can provide.  The remaining Reserve Combat Engineer, Service and Signals units that are not required to fill out the 50/50 units in the Reserve Brigades could be grouped together to provide additional CSS Regiments/Battalions in the Canadian Combat Support Brigade.
> 
> The reduction in Reg Force Brigades would also leave one Reg Force Artillery Regiment uncommitted.  This Regiment could give one of its current gun batteries to each of the other two Reg Force Regiments (giving them 3 x Batteries each) and leaving it with a full HQ, FO and STA batteries.  This could form the core of a new SHORAD Regiment with the firing batteries being filled by Reserve Regiments.
> 
> There are enough Reserve Artillery Regiments that in addition to providing 3 x M777 batteries for each of the two Reserve Brigades and 3 x SHORAD Batteries for 1 RCHA that they could also provide 3 x Regiments to man a 3 Battery Regiment of HIMARS and 2 x 3 Battery Regiments of UAV/Loitering Munition launch vehicles.  These batteries could either be directed by 4 RCA (GS) or assigned as additional batteries to the 2 x Reg Force Artillery Regiments for deployments.  I'd group these Reserve Artillery Regiments, the SHORAD Regiment and 4 RCA (GS) into a separate Artillery Brigade.
> 
> There are enough Reserve Infantry and Armoured Regiments left after creating this structure that you could create a 3 Company Arctic Response Battalion to support each Ranger Patrol Group (1 x Reserve Regiment forming each Company).  There would also be several unassigned Regiments that could be formed into Transport Companies (BVs10's or similar?).
> 
> This structure would look something like this:
> View attachment 66369




So the key question here, of course, is how many new 2 star positions will this open up?


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Here's an example of what could be done if we abandon the geographic structure of the Force Generation Brigades.



Gutsy move resurrecting that upstart newbie regiment The Canadian Guards but relegating much older and more illustrious reserve units (including all the highland ones) to the dustbin of the supplementary order of battle.  😉 That aside, some good ideas though.

I won't reargue the issue of symmetric v asymmetric brigades except to say I'm a diehard asymmetric brigade advocate.

I've long been a fan of a western division and an eastern division and getting rid of two of the existing ones.

It looks to me like all the brigade headquarters and their signals squadrons are Reg F which is a good idea to be able to generate sustainable deployed brigade headquarters. Each of the artillery and CSS brigades could use those and a service battalion as well - there should be enough reserve units and personnel around which those can be formed from. I like the use of hybrid service battalions so that there is a capability within the reserve brigade to provide proper supply and maintenance functions especially if one starts equipping those brigades seriously.

Incidentally I'm vehemently opposed to established Class B positions. If a position merits full-time service it should be a Reg F PY. Class Bs are temporary jobs - or were meant to be. They are being dreadfully abused to create additional full-time positions on a permanent basis over and above the Reg F establishment. Besides, if you contract the 10 Res F brigades and 130 some odd units to four brigade headquarters and 20 - 25 some odd units, you'll have a slew of Reg F RSS to reallocate.

Not sure if the star above the brigade symbols is because you are suggesting they should become a one star command or not. Personally I think that they should remain a colonel's command. Adding a battalion does not merit a rank upgrade. On top of that, if the two divisions are not deployable entities and just force generation formations (which is how I see them) then I think that they do not merit a two star either. A BGen should be more than enough. Leave 1 Cdn Div with a two star because he may actually need to use both of them and is running a proper (more or less) divisional staff structure.

I'll let tankers chime in on whether or not Petawawa is the best place for tanks. In my mind, most of Petawawa is impassable forest whose only value for tanks is as a ricochet trace. One way or the other the tank regiment should be on whatever base that also has two mech battalions and a cavalry regiment because that will give you the ability to train up combined arms battlegroups and a heavy brigade capability. I think that you really need Gagetown or Wainwright/Suffield for tanks and you probably don't want to put a tank regiment and two mech battalions into Gagetown with the schools there. So in that respect I'd put the tank regiment, a cavalry regiment and two mech battalions into Edmonton and move the two light battalions to Petawawa where they can be a bit chummier with the SOF folks. And yes; I'd call the two light battalions PPCLI because "light".

Just another observation. You've allocated four mech battalions but we have gear for six. Any plan for those extra LAVs?

I have this thing for wanting to see BTLs dealt with. I like the term "depot battalion" but "Security Force Capacity Building" is more in vogue. They're obviously not identical but much of what a depot battalion does with recruit intake and BTL training of both regular and reserve personnel could fit into an SFCB's mandate if properly organized, geographically dispersed and augmented by reserve personnel during peak summer training periods. Your elimination of one Reg F infantry battalion (together with PY savings from the two divisional headquarters) should provide enough Reg F PYs to staff the cadre of two (an eastern and a western) hybrid SFCB battalions.

One final note. I think the Prairies would be working flat out to fill the units you've assigned to them. On the other hand, I think Ontario has more to offer. It strikes me that the two reserve infantry brigades are roughly 5,500 each. The arty brigade strikes me as roughly 2,500 - 3,000 reservists if you add a sig sqn and service battalion. The CS brigade appears quite light on reservists. So even if you add in a BTL and SFCB capability, you still seem to be below authorized reserve strength for the Army and what the regions can generate. Personally I'd like to see more CSS/CS - a transport battalion with a HET and POL capability comes to mind; another GS engineer regiment (for that matter I would split 4 ESR into two hybrid ESRs (one in Gagetown and one in Ontario); a CBRN unit; provision for an MP battalion (I know - like field ambulances, not an army resource); maybe a special troops battalion that specialized in theatre level rear area support (financial, personal services, supply, legal etc - basically used to generate NSEs)

🍻


----------



## KevinB

I'm still in shock people think there is room for 2 Div in an Army that isn't a Div...
   Shakespeare had it wrong, starting with the Lawyers isn't nearly as effective as HQ's


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Gutsy move resurrecting that upstart newbie regiment The Canadian Guards but relegating much older and more illustrious reserve units (including all the highland ones) to the dustbin of the supplementary order of battle.  😉 That aside, some good ideas though.


I figured it would be safer than picking one existing Regiment over the others...there's no winning in cap badge wars!    I'm agnostic on naming....each Battalion could have a different Regimental affiliation as long as I'm concerned.


FJAG said:


> I won't reargue the issue of symmetric v asymmetric brigades except to say I'm a diehard asymmetric brigade advocate.
> 
> I've long been a fan of a western division and an eastern division and getting rid of two of the existing ones.
> 
> It looks to me like all the brigade headquarters and their signals squadrons are Reg F which is a good idea to be able to generate sustainable deployed brigade headquarters. Each of the artillery and CSS brigades could use those and a service battalion as well - there should be enough reserve units and personnel around which those can be formed from. I like the use of hybrid service battalions so that there is a capability within the reserve brigade to provide proper supply and maintenance functions especially if one starts equipping those brigades seriously.


The layout I provided is just a rough sketch of general structure.  As mentioned there would be enough "unassigned" Reserve Service Battalions to form together into Battalions for the CCSB and the Artillery Brigade.  


FJAG said:


> Incidentally I'm vehemently opposed to established Class B positions. If a position merits full-time service it should be a Reg F PY. Class Bs are temporary jobs - or were meant to be. They are being dreadfully abused to create additional full-time positions on a permanent basis over and above the Reg F establishment. Besides, if you contract the 10 Res F brigades and 130 some odd units to four brigade headquarters and 20 - 25 some odd units, you'll have a slew of Reg F RSS to reallocate.
> 
> Not sure if the star above the brigade symbols is because you are suggesting they should become a one star command or not. Personally I think that they should remain a colonel's command. Adding a battalion does not merit a rank upgrade. On top of that, if the two divisions are not deployable entities and just force generation formations (which is how I see them) then I think that they do not merit a two star either. A BGen should be more than enough. Leave 1 Cdn Div with a two star because he may actually need to use both of them and is running a proper (more or less) divisional staff structure.


The star(s) above the Divisions/Brigades is just a carryover from the original Wikipedia force structure diagram that I copied from.  I'm not proposing any changes to existing ranks.


FJAG said:


> I'll let tankers chime in on whether or not Petawawa is the best place for tanks. In my mind, most of Petawawa is impassable forest whose only value for tanks is as a ricochet trace. One way or the other the tank regiment should be on whatever base that also has two mech battalions and a cavalry regiment because that will give you the ability to train up combined arms battlegroups and a heavy brigade capability. I think that you really need Gagetown or Wainwright/Suffield for tanks and you probably don't want to put a tank regiment and two mech battalions into Gagetown with the schools there. So in that respect I'd put the tank regiment, a cavalry regiment and two mech battalions into Edmonton and move the two light battalions to Petawawa where they can be a bit chummier with the SOF folks. And yes; I'd call the two light battalions PPCLI because "light".


Again, I'm agnostic on where the specific equipment is located....the diagram provided is just a potential framework on which to base a final structure.  There's been debate on this thread as to the best location for the tanks but if the West is determined by the tankers to be the best location then put them in the West along with the LAV battalions and put the Light battalions in Petawawa (or Valcartier/Gagetown if the Eastern Division is determined to be the best location).


FJAG said:


> Just another observation. You've allocated four mech battalions but we have gear for six. Any plan for those extra LAVs?


I see several options for the extra LAVs made available from the restructuring.  
1)  The non-tank Armoured Regiments could be converted to Cavalry Regiments with Recce/AT/LAV Infantry Squadrons/Companies....or combined arms Squadrons, etc.
2)  LAV training companies could be set up for training Reservists from the Reserve Battalions affiliated with the Reg Force LAV Battalions to provide a source of trained augmentees.  
3)  Some of the LAV hulls no longer dedicated to the Mech Battalions could be used as conversion hulls for new variants (SHORAD for the AD Regiment and AT for the Cavalry Regiments, etc.)
4)  A Battle Group worth of LAVs could be pre-positioned in Europe as part of an expanded NATO commitment.  Deploying a Battle Group (or Brigade Group) to Europe by sea in response to any Russian incursions in Europe would likely be too little, too late to have any real impact on a limited seizure of territory (and I don't foresee any major invasion of NATO by Russia being in the cards).  However, having the ability to rapidly fly over the troops to man a Mechanized Battle Group already in place (along with a Rapid Response Light Battalion) could have both a deterrent effect if Russian aggression looks imminent and also would be a very positive political signal to our NATO allies that we are taking our commitment to their defense seriously.


FJAG said:


> I have this thing for wanting to see BTLs dealt with. I like the term "depot battalion" but "Security Force Capacity Building" is more in vogue. They're obviously not identical but much of what a depot battalion does with recruit intake and BTL training of both regular and reserve personnel could fit into an SFCB's mandate if properly organized, geographically dispersed and augmented by reserve personnel during peak summer training periods. Your elimination of one Reg F infantry battalion (together with PY savings from the two divisional headquarters) should provide enough Reg F PYs to staff the cadre of two (an eastern and a western) hybrid SFCB battalions.


Agreed.  Individual training could be centralized in Battalion/Brigade training depots so the Reserve units can focus on collective training.


FJAG said:


> One final note. I think the Prairies would be working flat out to fill the units you've assigned to them. On the other hand, I think Ontario has more to offer. It strikes me that the two reserve infantry brigades are roughly 5,500 each. The arty brigade strikes me as roughly 2,500 - 3,000 reservists if you add a sig sqn and service battalion. The CS brigade appears quite light on reservists. So even if you add in a BTL and SFCB capability, you still seem to be below authorized reserve strength for the Army and what the regions can generate. Personally I'd like to see more CSS/CS - a transport battalion with a HET and POL capability comes to mind; another GS engineer regiment (for that matter I would split 4 ESR into two hybrid ESRs (one in Gagetown and one in Ontario); a CBRN unit; provision for an MP battalion (I know - like field ambulances, not an army resource); maybe a special troops battalion that specialized in theatre level rear area support (financial, personal services, supply, legal etc - basically used to generate NSEs)
> 
> 🍻


As mentioned previously, there are Reserve units that are not accounted for in the general proposed framework structure that could be used for various other necessary roles (Training Depots/Battalions, Transport Battalions, etc.).  The "boundaries" between the Brigades/Divisions can/should be flexible to ensure that the required manning can be provided for the units required.

This is proposed as a general first step for the Force 2025-2030 timeframe and working with existing units/equipment (for the most part).  Additional changes to the structure to make the Reserve Battalions/Brigades deployable when/if the legislative/administrative changes are made to Reserve service terms could follow (including equipment, etc.).


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> I'm still in shock people think there is room for 2 Div in an Army that isn't a Div...
> Shakespeare had it wrong, starting with the Lawyers isn't nearly as effective as HQ's


Heck...Patton had an entire imaginary Army Group in the lead up to D-Day so just consider this as our uniquely Canadian maskirovka!


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## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Heck...Patton had an entire imaginary Army Group in the lead up to D-Day so just consider this as our uniquely Canadian maskirovka!


Patton wasn't paying for the HQ...


I don't think ANY MECH/ARMOR should be in Edmonton - the transport to go anywhere is ridiculous.

Edmonton should be a Light Bde
Petawawa should be a Light Bde

Valcatraz isn't ideal either - but better than Pet or Ed.

So if you restructure the CF, anyway.

10 Reg Bn's and 5 20/80 Training/Sustainment Bn's.

1-2 PPCLI  - Edmonton.       3 PPLCI becomes a Reserve 20/80
1-2 CDN Para - Petawawa   3 Can Para  ditto
1-2 RCR - Gagetown          3 RCR ditto
1-2 Vandoo - Valcatraz.         3 R22eR ditto
1-2 Canadian Guard - Shilo.  3 CG ditto

PPCLI and Can Para Reg't are Light/Airborne/Airmobile.  PPCLI getting Mountain Focus/Para Reg't gets Arctic

RCR Group is Heavy - Tank and Tracked IFV
R22eR and CG are LAV - wheeled Mechanized


Move ALL the Cbt Arms Schools to Suffield.


You kind of get 2 Div then.


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## MilEME09

KevinB said:


> Patton wasn't paying for the HQ...
> 
> 
> I don't think ANY MECH/ARMOR should be in Edmonton - the transport to go anywhere is ridiculous.
> 
> Edmonton should be a Light Bde
> Petawawa should be a Light Bde
> 
> Valcatraz isn't ideal either - but better than Pet or Ed.
> 
> So if you restructure the CF, anyway.
> 
> 10 Reg Bn's and 5 20/80 Training/Sustainment Bn's.
> 
> 1-2 PPCLI  - Edmonton.       3 PPLCI becomes a Reserve 20/80
> 1-2 CDN Para - Petawawa   3 Can Para  ditto
> 1-2 RCR - Gagetown          3 RCR ditto
> 1-2 Vandoo - Valcatraz.         3 R22eR ditto
> 1-2 Canadian Guard - Shilo.  3 CG ditto
> 
> PPCLI and Can Para Reg't are Light/Airborne/Airmobile.  PPCLI getting Mountain Focus/Para Reg't gets Arctic
> 
> RCR Group is Heavy - Tank and Tracked IFV
> R22eR and CG are LAV - wheeled Mechanized
> 
> 
> Move ALL the Cbt Arms Schools to Suffield.
> 
> 
> You kind of get 2 Div then.


So you are going armour and mech heavy in gagetown but you will move the armour and infantry school from gagetown to Suffield? Sounds like a CAF decision alright


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## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I'm still in shock people think there is room for 2 Div in an Army that isn't a Div...
> Shakespeare had it wrong, starting with the Lawyers isn't nearly as effective as HQ's


I'm actually not shocked at all.

There are enough folks in the army, reg and res, to add up to two divisions albeit there is only equipment for one division (less key capabilities as discussed throughout this forum)

The question really is are we optimized for their utilization? I think we'll all agree on the fact that we are not. That leaves the question what can we and what can't we change?

Practically speaking we can't change infrastructure much. Politically we need to be geographically dispersed and are pretty much confined to the bases and facilities there. Another major move, like Calgary to Edmonton (which was a political move in the first place - cough, PC, cough) or major infrastructure changes are highly unlikely. Similarly keeping reserve units geographically dispersed is an imperative.

What that can and should we do?

Basically streamline the structure based on needs and resources.

CJOC is not an army organization but constitutes an essential element for planning and conducting deployed operations domestically and internationally. It's a static headquarters and has 1 Cdn Div and CFJOSG under command with (the last time I looked) some 2,300 people which include just over 500 in the HQ, just over 100 each in 1 Cdn Div HQ and CFJOSG HQ and various domestic TF HQs while some 650 make up the CFJSR and the rest a variety of elements such as ammunition depots.

Whether the core HQ of the CJOC is too large or not is not a question I can answer never having served there. My gut tells me its not out of whack but I see no reason for a 1 Cdn Div HQ nor a CFJOSG HQ as their functions, as static elements could be served by having them as departments within CJOC HQ itself. Currently 1 Cdn Div HQ has an ability to deploy forward when given signals resources from the CFJSR but is that really practical?

Everyone and his dog has gone in for the force generator/force employer model of things which is where I see the issue. We used to have a brigade as both the generator of its components as well as the potential employing headquarters if mobilized. Our current operating concepts do not seriously contemplate a brigade as a deploying entity although a brigade headquarters (or elements thereof) is.

Currently we have four static regional div headquarters and 11 static and 3 deployable brigade headquarters as force generators and a CJOC headquarters (and its 1 Cdn Div HQ, CFJOSG, and six regional Task Force headquarters) as the force employers. There is some duplication as the regional task forces, for the most part (but not all), fall under the regional army divisions.

Long story short the key needs are 1) a joint static headquarters in Canada to plan and command operations and 2) sufficient formation deployable headquarters to efficiently a) generate forces for deployment and b) properly command deployed forces in theatre responsive to CJOC.

What we tend to forget in the US context is that the US doesn't generally have continually existing Joint Task Force headquarters; it takes existing formation headquarters (army, navy or air force) and tasks them a "joint" or "combined joint" task force whereby the necessary supporting joint assets are grafted onto the existing formation headquarters. Thus HQ 10 Mountain Division (a force generator) was used to form CJTF 76 in Afghanistan (a force employer) the same way that HQ 82 Airborne Division was sent to Afghanistan to form CJTF 82. We tend to do the same with brigade headquarters. HQ 2 CMBG was tasked to provide the bde hq for TF 5-08 as Task Force Kandahar. But the plan turns very weak when we contemplate anything over a bde.

Basically getting rid of 1 Cdn Div is a shell game as we still need the staff to fulfill the same functions, just within CJOC. I guess we would save ourselves a MGen (There's already 1 LGen, 2 MGen and a few BGens in CJOC). So if 1 Cdn Div's functions are subsumed in CJOC how do we deploy a Div HQ if we ever need one.

Simple, we reduce our four static div hqs to 2--one for western Canada and one for eastern Canada. We have over 40,000 personnel which is roughly the equivalent of two divisions. There are enough Reg F pers for roughly 3.5 brigades and enough reservists for 3 to 5 brigades (brigades vary in size from 2,500 to 5,000 depending on function) Therefore we only need 6 to 8 brigade headquarters in total.

Currently our Res F Bde HQs have minor force generating capabilities and no force employment requirements except in domestic ops. Basically they are marginal performers. Their utility would be increased if they had a higher Reg F component to them and were organized completely identical to Reg F Bde HQs. This should be possible by concentrating the current level of RSS staff at bde level for ten bde hqs into 3-5 brigade hqs, adding other Class A positions and concentrating the 10 some odd Res F signals regiments into three to five brigade signals squadrons (with additional personnel for higher formation use).

Similarly, if 130 plus reserve units get concentrated into some 25-30 units with their RSS staff equally concentrated, then it should be possible for a Res bde to generate an occasional battle group (augmented by RSS or other Reg F personnel for specific positions and trades).

If that were the case, Res F brigade headquarters and battle groups could become deployable (just as ARNG brigades are) and the Army could easily sustain the continuous deployment of one brigade headquarters and a battlegroup (or even two) indefinitely with a mixture of Reg F and Res F deployments.

The last issue is surging the force. An Army should routinely be able to surge a large portion of its force in a crisis. Whether it will or not is, of course an uncertainty, but the capability should be there and routinely validated through exercises.

With an Army of 40,000 plus we should be capable of surging a division of 15 to 20,000. We have most of the equipment for that already. The fact of the matter is that we cannot predict whether or not we might be required to do this at some point in time. Another fact is that it is our duty to be prepared to do it if that time should come. It is criminal negligence to not be prepared for extreme circumstances especially in light of the fact that the SSE recognizes clear threats that require deterrence of, and a capability to engage in full-spectrum operations with, a near peer. To say that we haven't needed to do it for thirty years and that the government doesn't require it is sheer sophistry and rationalization.

There are already more than enough staff amongst the four static divisional headquarters to easily create two deployable divisional headquarters which provide both the static day-to-day force generation role as well as a surge deployable hq as required. The key element missing is the equivalent of a divisional signals regiment which was subsumed into the CJSR. CJSR would need to be structured to be able to generate a single div sigs regt (augmented by designated reservists) which could take turns exercising with one or the other of the two div hqs and be prepared to deploy with one or the other as tasked.

Another element missing from the Army is a robust CS and CSS structure. The one CSS brigade Canada currently has, fills some vital functions but is inadequate as is witnessed by our inability to maintain much of our equipment and in particulalry the paucity of Res F equipment and that we are constantly having to rob bases, service battalions and even units when we deploy to form cobbled together NSEs which are barely able to sustain peacetime operations or low intensity conflicts. We need to seriously reorganize our CS and CSS systems. Of the 3 to 5 Res F brigades we could man with existing establishments, there is very little need to form more than three manoeuvre brigades and at least two should be CS or CSS. Together with a restructured CSSB, that would give Canada three such brigades which is still too low a ratio. In the US, the majority of brigades are CS and CSS. But even three such brigades (with a high Res F ratio) would provide Canada with a vastly more capable CS/CSS capability for day-to-day sustainable operations and also provide the support backbone required to surge a division.

The point here is that the Army, with its existing PYs and Res F authorized positions is capable of doing much more than it can and needs to reorganize to do it.

If we are capable of manning and deploying 6-8 brigades then two divisional headquarters are perfectly reasonable. I think that looking at the scope of what we have done in the past during Afghanistan (i.e. deploying just in battlegroups) and what is stated in the SSE is self limiting. The CF writes the SSE. The CF tells the government what it is capable of and the governments policy is built on that. It should be the other way around but in practical terms we haven't had a government in over 70 years that really understood defence. IMHO any defence force that tells a government that with over 20 billion a year and over a 120,000 employees that we can aim for nothing higher than a pair of battlegroups is misleading the government and setting extremely low goals for itself. Any military should be capable of surging a large force in extreme circumstances and in order to do so it must have the structure to do so relatively rapidly and exercise it routinely. We do not. We've built bureaucracies rather than combat capable headquarters. Sadly we do have the resources there; we just waste them.

🍻


----------



## Fabius

An actual option being discussed and or decided upon is whether the army creates a new additional Division HQ, to which will report all the CMBGs in their current configuration. This Div would be a high readiness Div... 
So an actual option being discussed is add more HQ... 
I just don’t get WTF we are thinking.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Fabius said:


> An actual option being discussed and or decided upon is whether the army creates a new additional Division HQ, to which will report all the CMBGs in their current configuration. This Div would be a high readiness Div...
> So an actual option being discussed is add more HQ...
> I just don’t get WTF we are thinking.


----------



## FJAG

Fabius said:


> An actual option being discussed and or decided upon is whether the army creates a new additional Division HQ, to which will report all the CMBGs in their current configuration. This Div would be a high readiness Div...
> So an actual option being discussed is add more HQ...
> I just don’t get WTF we are thinking.


Noooooooooo!

I've said this before and I'll say it again. We need a Minister of National Defence that has some fundamental understanding of the military, some balls and is prepared to ruthlessly kick ass and fire people willy-nilly.

I tend to reread Leslie's report on transformation almost yearly and every year I get more and more convinced that there should be an order in council that a) arbitrarily sets a limit on the number of full-time civilian and military personnel allowed to form NDHQ (roughly 50% of what's there now) and its internal budget and b) says to the civilian and military leadership: "that's what you've got - make it work". - Oh and forbid any Class B positions other than ones replacing vacant PY positions. Same for GOFOs - arbitrarily cut the number in half. 

The problem is that whenever you have a headquarters looking for ways to trim numbers they never trim themselves. They will always, always, always find ways to justify their own numbers. (see Leslie)


----------



## Fabius

Well at least it’s COA 3 so obviously a throw away but nonetheless it’s indicative of the lack of imagination (to be kind) that exists.  

From what I am seeing the official planning for F2025 has three options on the table.

Option 1.  Rerole three Bns into ISR  Battalions. ISR Bn belong to the CMBGs. 

Option 2. Asymmetrical Bdes. Heavy/Light/Mech from West to East.

Option 3. HR Division with extant CMBG structures reporting to it. All other static Divisions remain with only PRES Bdes. 

All COAs feature some reg/res adjustments within the CCSB. 

One thing I do like is the attempt to define readiness and tie it to equipment and manning levels. Right now though that’s very draft and will need some hard decisions to be made. It’s also odd that the heavy forces seem to be drifting towards higher readiness levels than the light forces. 

Some formal decisions should be made this fall though...


----------



## FJAG

Fabius said:


> Well at least it’s COA 3 so obviously a throw away but nonetheless it’s indicative of the lack of imagination (to be kind) that exists.
> 
> From what I am seeing the official planning for F2025 has three options on the table.
> 
> Option 1.  Rerole three Bns into ISR  Battalions. ISR Bn belong to the CMBGs.
> 
> Option 2. Asymmetrical Bdes. Heavy/Light/Mech from West to East.
> 
> Option 3. HR Division with extant CMBG structures reporting to it. All other static Divisions remain with only PRES Bdes.
> 
> All COAs feature some reg/res adjustments within the CCSB.
> 
> One thing I do like is the attempt to define readiness and tie it to equipment and manning levels. Right now though that’s very draft and will need some hard decisions to be made. It’s also odd that the heavy forces seem to be drifting towards higher readiness levels than the light forces.
> 
> Some formal decisions should be made this fall though...



Not so odd when you consider that our major sustained deployed effort at this time is leading and participating in a multinational combined arms battalion.

Incidentally, just to add a point to the divisional headquarters issue above. Denmark has two asymmetric brigades and five CS/CSS regiments, and one reserve light infantry regiment but provides the bulk of the divisional headquarters for NATOs Multi-national Division North in Latvia.


----------



## MilEME09

Fabius said:


> An actual option being discussed and or decided upon is whether the army creates a new additional Division HQ, to which will report all the CMBGs in their current configuration. This Div would be a high readiness Div...
> So an actual option being discussed is add more HQ...
> I just don’t get WTF we are thinking.


yeah when I read that my first thought was why would we keep all the other Div HQ's to manage the reserves, and IS? why create a new div and not just move all reg force under 1 div? we do not need a 6th Canadian Division, it sounds like more empire building to me. If anything all reserve's should be managed by a single Div HQ, and all IS/CDSG's should be under a single command acting at the size of a independent brigade HQ. This would create 1 full time Div, one Reserve Div, and a institutional support brigade to manage all infrastructure, bases etc.... Talking with people I am getting a sense for which COA is being favored but we will have to wait a few months for the final call.

The funny part is that adding an HQ is supposed to save us PY's


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Not so odd when you consider that our major sustained deployed effort at this time is leading and participating in a multinational combined arms battalion.
> 
> Incidentally, just to add a point to the divisional headquarters issue above. *Denmark has two asymmetric brigades and five CS/CSS regiments, and one reserve light infantry regiment but provides the bulk of the divisional headquarters for NATOs Multi-national Division North in Latvia.*



... and they have conscription ... a.k.a. slave labour


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> What we tend to forget in the US context is that the US doesn't generally have continually existing Joint Task Force headquarters; it takes existing formation headquarters (army, navy or air force) and tasks them a "joint" or "combined joint" task force whereby the necessary supporting joint assets are grafted onto the existing formation headquarters. Thus HQ 10 Mountain Division (a force generator) was used to form CJTF 76 in Afghanistan (a force employer) the same way that HQ 82 Airborne Division was sent to Afghanistan to form CJTF 82. We tend to do the same with brigade headquarters. HQ 2 CMBG was tasked to provide the bde hq for TF 5-08 as Task Force Kandahar. But the plan turns very weak when we contemplate anything over a bde.


This what I really don't get - why isn't the US Model looked at -- it seems to follow that 1 CMBG HQ would do better running a deployed 1 CMBG rather than a set piece HQ that just takes their stuff?

The various US COM's exist but as Corps/higher formations - CENTCOM, AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, etc - but DIv and Corps get assigned to them for operations.
   I would suggest that unless the CF can field 2 Div fully deployed with troops, and equipment - that 1 Div HQ is sufficient - and CJOC suffices as the "Theatre" Command, in the event that the CF deploys an entire Div ( at that point - all the reserves will likely be mobilized and conscription returned - IMHO) 


FJAG said:


> Basically getting rid of 1 Cdn Div is a shell game as we still need the staff to fulfill the same functions, just within CJOC. I guess we would save ourselves a MGen (There's already 1 LGen, 2 MGen and a few BGens in CJOC). So if 1 Cdn Div's functions are subsumed in CJOC how do we deploy a Div HQ if we ever need one.
> 
> Simple, we reduce our four static div hqs to 2--one for western Canada and one for eastern Canada. We have over 40,000 personnel which is roughly the equivalent of two divisions. There are enough Reg F pers for roughly 3.5 brigades and enough reservists for 3 to 5 brigades (brigades vary in size from 2,500 to 5,000 depending on function) Therefore we only need 6 to 8 brigade headquarters in total.


I still don't see the need for that many Bde HQ - as the CF can fully equip less than 3 Bde with actual modern war fighting equipment.
  When every solider has proper PPE, Dual Tube NV's (at least for cat arms)  and a modern MFAL - then larger equipment, then I would be worried about more HQ beyond the Reg Force Bde HQ's - I won't be holding my breathe for even the Reg Bde's to be fully kitted though...


FJAG said:


> Currently our Res F Bde HQs have minor force generating capabilities and no force employment requirements except in domestic ops. Basically they are marginal performers. Their utility would be increased if they had a higher Reg F component to them and were organized completely identical to Reg F Bde HQs. This should be possible by concentrating the current level of RSS staff at bde level for ten bde hqs into 3-5 brigade hqs, adding other Class A positions and concentrating the 10 some odd Res F signals regiments into three to five brigade signals squadrons (with additional personnel for higher formation use).
> 
> Similarly, if 130 plus reserve units get concentrated into some 25-30 units with their RSS staff equally concentrated, then it should be possible for a Res bde to generate an occasional battle group (augmented by RSS or other Reg F personnel for specific positions and trades).
> 
> If that were the case, Res F brigade headquarters and battle groups could become deployable (just as ARNG brigades are) and the Army could easily sustain the continuous deployment of one brigade headquarters and a battlegroup (or even two) indefinitely with a mixture of Reg F and Res F deployments.


 You need an entire rework for the Reserves and equipping at the same level as the Reg force (which is still currently lacking) before that is a possibility.


FJAG said:


> The last issue is surging the force. An Army should routinely be able to surge a large portion of its force in a crisis. Whether it will or not is, of course an uncertainty, but the capability should be there and routinely validated through exercises.


110% agreed


FJAG said:


> With an Army of 40,000 plus we should be capable of surging a division of 15 to 20,000. We have *most* of the equipment for that already. The fact of the matter is that we cannot predict whether or not we might be required to do this at some point in time. Another fact is that it is our duty to be prepared to do it if that time should come. It is criminal negligence to not be prepared for extreme circumstances especially in light of the fact that the SSE recognizes clear threats that require deterrence of, and a capability to engage in full-spectrum operations with, a near peer. To say that we haven't needed to do it for thirty years and that the government doesn't require it is sheer sophistry and rationalization.


Would you be willing to define most 


FJAG said:


> There are already more than enough staff amongst the four static divisional headquarters to easily create two deployable divisional headquarters which provide both the static day-to-day force generation role as well as a surge deployable hq as required. The key element missing is the equivalent of a divisional signals regiment which was subsumed into the CJSR. CJSR would need to be structured to be able to generate a single div sigs regt (augmented by designated reservists) which could take turns exercising with one or the other of the two div hqs and be prepared to deploy with one or the other as tasked.


I'm still not sure why the static Div HQ exist - it just screams lack of focus on a Fighting Army to me - and thus is fat than can be butchered off to make room for more PY for the fighting forces.


FJAG said:


> Another element missing from the Army is a robust CS and CSS structure. The one CSS brigade Canada currently has, fills some vital functions but is inadequate as is witnessed by our inability to maintain much of our equipment and in particulalry the paucity of Res F equipment and that we are constantly having to rob bases, service battalions and even units when we deploy to form cobbled together NSEs which are barely able to sustain peacetime operations or low intensity conflicts. We need to seriously reorganize our CS and CSS systems. Of the 3 to 5 Res F brigades we could man with existing establishments, there is very little need to form more than three manoeuvre brigades and at least two should be CS or CSS. Together with a restructured CSSB, that would give Canada three such brigades which is still too low a ratio. In the US, the majority of brigades are CS and CSS. But even three such brigades (with a high Res F ratio) would provide Canada with a vastly more capable CS/CSS capability for day-to-day sustainable operations and also provide the support backbone required to surge a division.
> 
> The point here is that the Army, with its existing PYs and Res F authorized positions is capable of doing much more than it can and needs to reorganize to do it.


Ah yes the great Svn Bn breakup and base side support aspects -- I return to the fact that the Bde's and Div (inc HQ's) need to be fully deployable (and supported while deployable) - I would happily blood let Mech Inf BN's of GIB PY's to bring up maintenance levels - as reservists can be thrown in the back of a LAV fairly easily - again would need a restructure of the CF reserve policies - 


FJAG said:


> If we are capable of manning and deploying 6-8 brigades then two divisional headquarters are perfectly reasonable. I think that looking at the scope of what we have done in the past during Afghanistan (i.e. deploying just in battlegroups) and what is stated in the SSE is self limiting. The CF writes the SSE. The CF tells the government what it is capable of and the governments policy is built on that. It should be the other way around but in practical terms we haven't had a government in over 70 years that really understood defence. IMHO any defence force that tells a government that with over 20 billion a year and over a 120,000 employees that we can aim for nothing higher than a pair of battlegroups is misleading the government and setting extremely low goals for itself. Any military should be capable of surging a large force in extreme circumstances and in order to do so it must have the structure to do so relatively rapidly and exercise it routinely. We do not. We've built bureaucracies rather than combat capable headquarters. Sadly we do have the resources there; we just waste them.
> 
> 🍻


To me the Canadian Taxpayer is getting sold a bill of goods from the CF - the rate of return on the money invest in the CF for the outcome is absolutely tragic (I'm not to keen on my own rate of return down here either - but that's a different story).

 Given the size of the Canadian Army, it is fairly inexcusable that there is not a possibility to have 1 entire Div on high readiness - even with a Bde deployed.


----------



## Kirkhill

From the US CBO Primer conveniently provided by FJAG previously.

1,000,000 "Man" Army

50% in Reserves

15% in Full-Time Institutional Overhead
15% in Full-Time Support Units
20% in Full-Time Combat Units

And note that the "Combat Units", the Brigade Combat Teams, include Combat Service Support troops as well

Or, putting it another way, each "Combat" PY in a BCT requires 3 "Support" PYs in addition.

32 BCTs at 4000 each = 128,000 PYs
32 BCTs at 5000 each = 160,000 PYs

Out of the 1,000,000 PY Army.

So, following the US model and working with Canadian Army  numbers


23,000 members serve as full-time soldiers in the Regular Force 
19,000 are part-time, volunteer soldiers in the Reserve Force
including 5,300 Rangers who serve in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada

3,300 civilian employees who support the Army 
63 Regular Force and 123 Reserve Force Units in 127 Communities
185 Ranger Patrols in 414 Communities
23,000 + 19,000 + 3,300 = 45,000 PYs

20% of 45,000 = 9,000 Combat PYs  (2 US BCT equivalents)

15% of 45,000 = 6,800 BCT PYs (1.5 US BCT equivalents) 

Divide 1.5 by 3 CMBGs and you get about half a BCT for each CMBG - and that sounds about right.

Off hand I would say that we are doing a great job of following the US model.  A model with which the US is dissatisfied and is constantly trying to improve.

And a model that is currently trying to manage an increasingly long range, dispersed, battlefield.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> This what I really don't get - why isn't the US Model looked at -- it seems to follow that 1 CMBG HQ would do better running a deployed 1 CMBG rather than a set piece HQ that just takes their stuff?


That's what I think too. Unfortunately that was part of the general plug-and-play philosophy that came out of Future Force and the Army's transition. You can notice this with the TFK brigade headquarters deployments which operated on 9 month tours and the battle group deployments which ran on 6 month tours. There was always a partial out of sync with that with the Bde HQ commanding a battle group from its brigade for only part of the tour. In fact TFK 6-09 (Menard and 5 CMBG) led battlegroups from 1 PPCLI and 1 RCR. One can argue that an overlap assisted corporate memory from battle rotation to rotation but with 6 and 9 months cycles that only happened every second bde hq rotation. IMHO it was a sub optimal system. ARNG brigades on Op Phoenix, on the other hand) went with their entire brigades for the entire tour (albeit most battalions had augmentees from elsewhere in the Army)


KevinB said:


> The various US COM's exist but as Corps/higher formations - CENTCOM, AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, etc - but DIv and Corps get assigned to them for operations.


Not quite accurate. US COMs are Unified Combatant Commands which have responsibility for all operations conducted within their geographic areas. They are the highest formation command elements (but can't be called corps). You are correct that they are assigned forces generated by others and when the operation is large enough could be a divisional or even a corps headquarters. For example V Corps has recently been reactivated at Fort Knox with a forward HQ in Poland to support EUCOM. In effect CJOC is Canada's unified combatant command for the conduct of operations anywhere in the world including within Canada.


KevinB said:


> I would suggest that unless the CF can field 2 Div fully deployed with troops, and equipment - that 1 Div HQ is sufficient - and CJOC suffices as the "Theatre" Command, in the event that the CF deploys an entire Div ( at that point - all the reserves will likely be mobilized and conscription returned - IMHO)


I tend to focus on two for three reasons. One, the number of soldiers and units is to large to be left willy nilly in a pool and require some command structure. Two, I tend to divide the force into two components with one component (the heavier one) focused on Europe while the second focuses on lighter, quicker reaction and OOTW type operations. Having separate overarching headquarters builds high level expertise and supervision of training etc at the brigade and below level. Three, while I believe that we don't have the ability to deploy more than one division, we should have two headquarters trained and prepared to deploy so that rotations can occur and a core will exist to form a second division if required. (consider it redundancy in the event of casualties if nothing else)


KevinB said:


> I still don't see the need for that many Bde HQ - as the CF can fully equip less than 3 Bde with actual modern war fighting equipment.
> When every solider has proper PPE, Dual Tube NV's (at least for cat arms)  and a modern MFAL - then larger equipment, then I would be worried about more HQ beyond the Reg Force Bde HQ's - I won't be holding my breathe for even the Reg Bde's to be fully kitted though...


Again that's based on numbers of people that we have. At 40,000 + and 2,500 to 5,000 per brigade (take away schools and headquarters outside the brigades and BTL/ATLs) you end up with roughly 6-8 brigades. If we keep with the idea of deploying a bde hq with a battlegroup sized TF to provide the higher level functions, then you should have enough trained bde hq staffs to equal the battlegroup rotations. And, like you, I believe the supervising headquarters and the battlegroup should be folks that know each other and have trained together.

More importantly, I look to the future and building an army to a doctrine that makes all units and formations combat capable with the necessary gear for their role. To start that process you first have to create the structure. That includes a proper supervising headquarters and the proper CSS structure to support it. During the building of the force, you can timeshare common equipment amongst Reg F units (who don't need it in the summer) and Res F units (who do need it in the summer) but eventually there needs to be an proper equipping.

There are dozens of reasons that I prefer an overall structure that blends Reg F and Res F units (such as a Reg F heavy brigade and a Res F heavy brigade in the same division) chief amongst which is common equipment so that sharing is possible and common doctrine to train to. The Reg F brigade is your go to guys for ops and the Res F guys are your lower cost augmentees, reinforcements and eventually (when fully equipped) your follow on expansion force.

Our system for leaving Reg F and Res F to muddle along on their own has been IMHO a disaster which ended up with the Afghan scenario where a deploying force needed six months of predeployment trg before becoming "ready". (You could probably recruit folks off the street and have them "ready" to fill the ranks in six months - and I think during Afghanistan many of the Reg F privates didn't have too much more time than that before deploying)


KevinB said:


> You need an entire rework for the Reserves and equipping at the same level as the Reg force (which is still currently lacking) before that is a possibility.


I agree 100% with that.


KevinB said:


> Would you be willing to define most


There are, regretfully and unbelievably, far too many capability gaps with few solutions on the near horizon.


KevinB said:


> I'm still not sure why the static Div HQ exist - it just screams lack of focus on a Fighting Army to me - and thus is fat than can be butchered off to make room for more PY for the fighting forces.


We agree totally. IMHO, however, there is just enough equipment and personnel (both Reg F and Res F) to form those extra three to five Res F brigades into deployable and capable bde gp hqs (for that matter the current Reg F CCSB is also a static headquarters)

Where the real heavy equipment shortfall is seen is within the Res F units which have little or no capability to train beyond the basic individual level. This is where "twinning" Res F brigades/units with Reg F brigades/units for summer training would pay big dividends until an equipment procurement program is fashioned. This is where the Reg F oversight has sadly fallen down because more often than not its "lets find them something to do" and "lets get them a couple of TAPVs" and maybe all the honoraries will shut up. The reserves come as an inconvenient afterthought rather than as a key cost-saving component for the Army.


KevinB said:


> Ah yes the great Svn Bn breakup and base side support aspects -- I return to the fact that the Bde's and Div (inc HQ's) need to be fully deployable (and supported while deployable) - I would happily blood let Mech Inf BN's of GIB PY's to bring up maintenance levels - as reservists can be thrown in the back of a LAV fairly easily - again would need a restructure of the CF reserve policies -


We basically agree. There are two types of maintainers. The ones you need to fix stuff during peacetime who work as full-timers everyday which should primarily be in units and at service battalion maintenance companies augmented by static workshops for heavy duty stuff. But. You also need to be able to surge maintainers for operations when stuff gets broken faster and more seriously. That's why I think there is a role for part-time maintainers in the Res F whose job is solely to learn to do their job (just like gunners and infantry) so they can fill in as augmentees or as theatre level maintainers on deployments while unit and service battalion maintainers do their jobs within their units.

It ought to be dead simple to get these folks. Pay their tuition for community college light and heavy mechanic course during the winter, give them full summer employment in between courses to get their BMQ and additional trg leveraging what they learned at the CC to make them DP1 qualified on military gear and then require them to serve several years with a maintenance company as reservists as pay back for their tuition (we do this for lots of specialties including RMC). Even better, offer them a one year call-out once DP1 qualified, to work full-time at workshops fixing the backlog of broken stuff and gaining experience for their future civilian and military jobs. Think of how much shorter the DP1 training could be if they've had two years of being taught the basics of the trade at a CC while not being paid a salary and living at home with mom and dad.

Of course there's still the spare parts issue that needs fixing.


KevinB said:


> To me the Canadian Taxpayer is getting sold a bill of goods from the CF - the rate of return on the money invest in the CF for the outcome is absolutely tragic (I'm not to keen on my own rate of return down here either - but that's a different story).


My opinion exactly. $20+ billion per year and basically all the Army gets us is the equivalent of two deployed battlegroups. We could hire a mercenary force to provide that and save $5 billion per year even before we reduce the size of that obscenity of a National Defence Headquarters that populates Ottawa.


KevinB said:


> Given the size of the Canadian Army, it is fairly inexcusable that there is not a possibility to have 1 entire Div on high readiness - even with a Bde deployed.


I think our definition of "readiness" - especially "high readiness" is very much influenced by Ottawa's practice to risk aversion. I find it somewhat hypocritical that the Army has gone to such an extreme level of anal retentiveness with the states of training but at the same time has missed the mark totally at providing the troops with the equipment which they need to survive in a war. All of our governments' defence policy statements include a provision to be capable of high-intensity operations yet we do not have some very key equipment needed for that.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

I'm curious if anyone has the contractor breakdown for the US Army for support to the BCT's




Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 66390
> 
> View attachment 66391
> 
> From the US CBO Primer conveniently provided by FJAG previously.
> 
> 1,000,000 "Man" Army
> 
> 50% in Reserves
> 
> 15% in Full-Time Institutional Overhead
> 15% in Full-Time Support Units
> 20% in Full-Time Combat Units
> 
> And note that the "Combat Units", the Brigade Combat Teams, include Combat Service Support troops as well
> 
> Or, putting it another way, each "Combat" PY in a BCT requires 3 "Support" PYs in addition.
> 
> 32 BCTs at 4000 each = 128,000 PYs
> 32 BCTs at 5000 each = 160,000 PYs
> 
> Out of the 1,000,000 PY Army.
> 
> So, following the US model and working with Canadian Army  numbers
> 
> 
> 23,000 members serve as full-time soldiers in the Regular Force
> 19,000 are part-time, volunteer soldiers in the Reserve Force
> including 5,300 Rangers who serve in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada
> 
> 3,300 civilian employees who support the Army
> 63 Regular Force and 123 Reserve Force Units in 127 Communities
> 185 Ranger Patrols in 414 Communities
> 23,000 + 19,000 + 3,300 = 45,000 PYs
> 
> 20% of 45,000 = 9,000 Combat PYs  (2 US BCT equivalents)
> 
> 15% of 45,000 = 6,800 BCT PYs (1.5 US BCT equivalents)
> 
> Divide 1.5 by 3 CMBGs and you get about half a BCT for each CMBG - and that sounds about right.
> 
> Off hand I would say that we are doing a great job of following the US model.  A model with which the US is dissatisfied and is constantly trying to improve.
> 
> And a model that is currently trying to manage an increasingly long range, dispersed, battlefield.


I'm curious if there is also a contractor / BCT available.

My guess is there is at least .5 of a PY to 1 full PY missing in contractor support personnel.
   You can't swing a dead cat and not hit contractors on a US Base.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 66390
> 
> View attachment 66391
> 
> From the US CBO Primer conveniently provided by FJAG previously.
> 
> 1,000,000 "Man" Army
> 
> 50% in Reserves
> 
> 15% in Full-Time Institutional Overhead
> 15% in Full-Time Support Units
> 20% in Full-Time Combat Units
> 
> And note that the "Combat Units", the Brigade Combat Teams, include Combat Service Support troops as well
> 
> Or, putting it another way, each "Combat" PY in a BCT requires 3 "Support" PYs in addition.
> 
> 32 BCTs at 4000 each = 128,000 PYs
> 32 BCTs at 5000 each = 160,000 PYs
> 
> Out of the 1,000,000 PY Army.
> 
> So, following the US model and working with Canadian Army  numbers
> 
> 
> 23,000 members serve as full-time soldiers in the Regular Force
> 19,000 are part-time, volunteer soldiers in the Reserve Force
> including 5,300 Rangers who serve in sparsely settled northern, coastal and isolated areas of Canada
> 
> 3,300 civilian employees who support the Army
> 63 Regular Force and 123 Reserve Force Units in 127 Communities
> 185 Ranger Patrols in 414 Communities
> 23,000 + 19,000 + 3,300 = 45,000 PYs
> 
> 20% of 45,000 = 9,000 Combat PYs  (2 US BCT equivalents)
> 
> 15% of 45,000 = 6,800 BCT PYs (1.5 US BCT equivalents)
> 
> Divide 1.5 by 3 CMBGs and you get about half a BCT for each CMBG - and that sounds about right.
> 
> Off hand I would say that we are doing a great job of following the US model.  A model with which the US is dissatisfied and is constantly trying to improve.
> 
> And a model that is currently trying to manage an increasingly long range, dispersed, battlefield.


I'm not sure how you can say "we are doing a great job of following the US model".

At 40,000 personnel (I'm leaving the Rangers out of this) roughly 35% should be in manoeuvre brigades (inclusive of their organic support personnel), 45% in support brigades and 20% in administrative overhead based on the US model.

Our three Reg F manoeuvre brigades are established at roughly 5,000 PYs which means 37.5% of the total Army is in Reg F manoeuvre brigades. I don't have accurate figures for the CCSB but I think it wouldn't be greater than 2,500 Reg F PYs. Which works out to roughly 6.5% as support troops. When you deal with the reserves, out of the 15-16,000 of them (I actually have issues with the Res F being 19,000 _Including _5,000 Rangers but can't find accurate figures anywhere) The bulk are in the CBG's which, inclusive of their support elements) makes them manoeuvre brigades as well. Some--like the communications regiments, CIMIC, the MI regiment could be considered support--but they are a minority. My estimate would be that 80% or more of the Army Reserve would be considered "combat" and 20% or less would be "support" so lets say very roughly out of 16,000 reservists, 13,000 "combat" and 3,000 "support".

In total for the Army then we have 15,000 Reg F and 13,000 Res F (for 23,000 total) in "combat" brigades and 2,500 Reg F and 3,000 Res F (for a total of 5,500) in "support" brigades. which gives us roughly 57% in "combat" and 13% in "support" leaving 30% for overhead.

I don't want to put too much into that overhead number because overhead in a Canadian Forces context because of the mixing of green and purple trades and roles makes the figures somewhat apples and oranges. On the other hand the "combat" and "support" figures are very telling.

What I'm fixing on is this:


We have too high a "combat" to "support" ratio by far which means that we do not have the ability to support and sustain our full combat element. We can only sustain a fraction of it at any given time which completely negates our ability to surge a large force. The US Army has that capability by virtue of the high percentage of support brigades it keeps both within the Active Army as well as the Reserve component (both ARNG and USAR);
the 13,000 "combat" reservists that we do have are in Res CBGs which are unequipped and non deployable which means that we do not have the ability to grow the "combat" side of the force any greater than three brigades. The US Army, on the other hand, equips and collectively trains its reserve component which means that it can grow its Active army "combat" elements by 75% when mobilizing its reserve formation/units.
the 3,000 "support" reservists that we do have are with few exception (again the comms res being the good one) equipped or organized which means that we do not have the ability to grow the "support" side of the force any greater than the single CCSB that we currently have. The US Army on the other hand, equips and trains its ARNG and USAR reserve component which means that it can grow its "support" elements by 250% when mobilizing its reservists. That's huge.
Long story short, while we have enough folks to roughly man two divisions, we only have enough equipment and personnel to put together a ramshackle one at best and our lack of "support" elements (both combat support and combat service support) is so inadequate that we'd be hard pressed to support even a brigade over time.

We aren't even close to following the US model. - And that, is the problem.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

So is trading LAV for BlackHawks and Littlebirds with the Taliban off the table?


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG:

Do you know the reason why there are no small car manufacturers?  And why it is so difficult to start a mom and pop food business?

Because there is so much "non-productive" but "essential" work that has to be done.  That work is covered by Overhead, by Administration, by Utilities, Bricks and Mortar, Consultants, Lawyers, Accountants, Tax Assessors ad infinitum.

A small military faces the same challenges, IMO.  Especially one that aspires to do everything and is reluctant to make choices, that is reluctant to cut the suit to the suit the cloth.  

If the intent is to cooperate with the Yanks then the inclination is to have a Canadian available to  sit in every Yankee office.  So we start filling from the top down.  The alternative is to accept that we can't do everything we want, even if it is because our taxpayers are unaware and uncaring of the risks and costs around them, and do what we can.

And we can do a light force.  We can't do a heavy force.  

We're kidding ourselves that 80 refurbed, super-annuated Cold War relics is a solid foundation on which to build a heavy division.  It is the basis on which to build a single armoured battle group and no more. 

As to the arty,  when does it become apparent that the world has moved on and it is time to replace 6 pdr rifled breech loaders with 18 pdr QF guns and 4.5" howitzers?

I'm not having a dig.  But there is an awful lot of change in the air and we already missed a generation of changes (like not buying Light Guns when everyone else was or not buying MLRS and AD and Attack Helicopters when everyone else was).    Our allies are moving on from the AirLand Battle and re-examining which of those legacy systems have legs and which ones need to be cut to free up cash for other systems that they think/believe/hope/feel will be more useful.

When are we going to roll the dice and take a chance? Because ultimately that is what this is all about.  We can never know the future perfectly so we must always be prepared to chance it.  

We debate interminably.  We act so infrequently that movement seems imperceptible.


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> I think our definition of "readiness" - especially "high readiness" is very much influenced by Ottawa's practice to risk aversion. I find it somewhat hypocritical that the Army has gone to such an extreme level of anal retentiveness with the states of training but at the same time has missed the mark totally at providing the troops with the equipment which they need to survive in a war. All of our governments' defence policy statements include a provision to be capable of high-intensity operations yet we do not have some very key equipment needed for that.
> 
> 🍻


…if only the main deploying forces could be brought to high readiness to DAG’n’Go as quickly as the TAV 30+1 days types do… 😉


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG:
> 
> Do you know the reason why there are no small car manufacturers?  And why it is so difficult to start a mom and pop food business?
> 
> Because there is so much "non-productive" but "essential" work that has to be done.  That work is covered by Overhead, by Administration, by Utilities, Bricks and Mortar, Consultants, Lawyers, Accountants, Tax Assessors ad infinitum.
> 
> A small military faces the same challenges, IMO.  Especially one that aspires to do everything and is reluctant to make choices, that is reluctant to cut the suit to the suit the cloth.


Sorry, but I don't quite understand where you're going with this post. If you are talking about my decision to ignore the issue of overhead in my last post I did so because the two aren't as easy to compare as the "combat" to "support" ratios because our integrated force structure makes that hard as against their no integrated Army. I didn't do it because I didn't think it was essential to have such overhead.


Kirkhill said:


> If the intent is to cooperate with the Yanks then the inclination is to have a Canadian available to  sit in every Yankee office.  So we start filling from the top down.  The alternative is to accept that we can't do everything we want, even if it is because our taxpayers are unaware and uncaring of the risks and costs around them, and do what we can.


I don't see those as the only choices at all. 


Kirkhill said:


> And we can do a light force.  We can't do a heavy force.


Yes we can and that is essentially what we are doing in Latvia. The issue is not whether or not we can do heavy; the issues are how large a force can we do heavy with? what capabilities are we short to do it effectively and how do we compensate for those?


Kirkhill said:


> We're kidding ourselves that 80 refurbed, super-annuated Cold War relics is a solid foundation on which to build a heavy division.  It is the basis on which to build a single armoured battle group and no more.


Actually with that number you can build an Armoured Brigade Combat Team ( which has 73 tanks). It's many of the key enablers were short on.


Kirkhill said:


> As to the arty,  when does it become apparent that the world has moved on and it is time to replace 6 pdr rifled breech loaders with 18 pdr QF guns and 4.5" howitzers?


I think everyone knows that. The Army lost its way over the last twenty years. Knowing things are screwed up and correcting them in this very sluggish combat development and equipment acquisition system Canada runs are two different things


Kirkhill said:


> I'm not having a dig.  But there is an awful lot of change in the air and we already missed a generation of changes (like not buying Light Guns when everyone else was or not buying MLRS and AD and Attack Helicopters when everyone else was).    Our allies are moving on from the AirLand Battle and re-examining which of those legacy systems have legs and which ones need to be cut to free up cash for other systems that they think/believe/hope/feel will be more useful.


We have left AirLand battle behind around the turn of the millennium. We haven't replaced with anything that I'd call concrete doctrine albeit we have flirted with adaptive dispersed operations and now with Pan-Domain operations (our answer to the US Army's Multi-Domain Operations and the related USAF and USN's new doctrines). 

I don't doubt that the intellectual debates are going on at higher levels about this (notwithstanding various government lobbed harassing hand grenades thrown in from the sidelines). Here's an example. We're just not seeing any quick (or even reasonable) action and in fact have seen counterproductive activities (such as the deactivating air defence and still not having a MALE UAV)

The point though is that just because there are new capabilities does not automatically mean old legacy systems are obsolete. We do not yet understand the full extent of newer systems and their limitations and while we're figuring that out new countermeasures are being developed and even newer offensive systems are being developed. One still needs to seize ground and you don't do that with a UAV or even a hypersonic missile. You do that with armoured and protected ground forces which, for the time being, are manned systems. In the future they may be autonomous or semi-autonomous but they'll still be classified as heavy.


Kirkhill said:


> When are we going to roll the dice and take a chance? Because ultimately that is what this is all about.  We can never know the future perfectly so we must always be prepared to chance it.


We've been doing that but in doing so we've been betting that nothing serious is going to happen. On this issue I'm a glass half empty guy.


Kirkhill said:


> We debate interminably.  We act so infrequently that movement seems imperceptible.


You know I keep pondering that. I know many of the folks that have made some of these poor decisions. They're for the most part good guys and reasonably smart. At least as smart as you and I and in many cases a lot smarter. They have the Army's best interest at heart and believe they are doing the best thing in light of the circumstances. There have been serious debates and push back on a lot of things but in the end, we are where we are.

I tend to put down the workings of Ottawa as the boiling frog syndrome. You simply do not understand the peril they're in as the water gets gradually warmer. Too many small issues divert you from seeing your real goals much less achieving them.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> You know I keep pondering that. I know many of the folks that have made some of these poor decisions. They're for the most part good guys and reasonably smart. At least as smart as you and I and in many cases a lot smarter. They have the Army's best interest at heart and believe they are doing the best thing in light of the circumstances. There have been serious debates and push back on a lot of things but in the end, we are where we are.


You and I disagree at this point - IMHO more GOFO should publicly fall on their sword (they have their pension anyway) for needed programs rather than accept the bad/no solution.

I also have seen so many of them take a sampling of the direction of the wind, before they make recommendation or support something.
  As well a few have absolutely about turned when the wind shifted -- I have zero time or respect for an Officer like that.


FJAG said:


> I tend to put down the workings of Ottawa as the boiling frog syndrome. You simply do not understand the peril they're in as the water gets gradually warmer. Too many small issues divert you from seeing your real goals much less achieving them.
> 
> 🍻


I think it's more the soul destructive power of NDHQ - I know a lot of bright motivated people who went in, and where hollow shells of themselves after.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> You and I disagree at this point - IMHO more GOFO should publicly fall on their sword (they have their pension anyway) for needed programs rather than accept the bad/no solution.
> 
> I also have seen so many of them take a sampling of the direction of the wind, before they make recommendation or support something.
> As well a few have absolutely about turned when the wind shifted -- I have zero time or respect for an Officer like that.
> 
> I think it's more the soul destructive power of NDHQ - I know a lot of bright motivated people who went in, and where hollow shells of themselves after.


We actually don't disagree. 

While I say I think they acted with best interest, I also believe that there should have been wholesale falling on swords or being put to the figurative sword. Even with the best of intentions, if the policies you create, or follow, fail then the right thing to do is accept responsibility Every once in a while on this forum I keep complaining that there isn't enough use of NDA section 124 Negligent Performance of Duty.

Just as an aside, did you know that in Feb 2003 MGen Cameron Ross, the Director General of International Security Policy resigned over the announcement that Canadian troops were going to Kabul? He did so in protest over the Chretien government's past lack of properly providing the Forces the resources that they needed and the fact that there was no relief on the horizon while another 2,000 troops were being deployed. It does happen, but generally not often and usually not loudly.

The trouble is that in my view the whole chain of events that got us where we are today is because of transformations that were set in motion back in the late 1990s early 2000s and the folks behind those are all long gone. Dumb stuff was still going on when I retired in 2009 and since then I've lost touch with the inner workings (to the extent I ever really had touch with them). 

On a recent note, any failures to move forward the modernization and optimization of the Forces, and particulalry the Army, since Russia's 2014 actions in the Ukraine is criminal negligence. It has the potential to cause a lot of unnecessary deaths.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

I've no doubt there are people smarter than us pondering the situation.  And I don't doubt they are good guys. But for gawd's sake I wish they would decide.  Something.  Anything.

How about a 7 year term for each of the Chiefs of Staff with one being swapped out every year?

Put some continuity into the system.  Maybe that would help.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> On a recent note, any failures to move forward the modernization and optimization of the Forces, and particulalry the Army, since Russia's 2014 actions in the Ukraine is criminal negligence. It has the potential to cause a lot of unnecessary deaths.
> 
> 🍻



Oh come, come my good man. Certainly we have the right manning, weapons, tactics and equipment to match/counter this type of Russian tomfoolery....

Artillery Launch in Ukraine. Massive Grad and Uragan Rocket Launch In Eastern Ukraine​


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> In effect CJOC is Canada's unified combatant command for the conduct of operations anywhere in the world including within Canada.


[tangent] I've seen this before, and it is not accurate.  A Unified Combatant Commander responds directly to the political leadership of the US (National Command Authority is the old term - now POTUS/SECDEF).  They are responsible for taking political direction, forging strategy, and providing it to subordinate theatres forces to turns into operations.

CJOC has no strategic function.  It takes CDS strategic directives and turns it into operations.

The strategic authorities and responsibilities (which are substantial) wielded by a Combatant Commander in the US are, in a Canadian context, vested in the CDS.  The Strategic Joint Staff assists him or her in executing these authorities.  CJOC, if we wish to continue drawing parallels to the US, is in effect a sub-unified command.  Comd CJOC, however, maintains relationships with Combatant Commanders due to the "trifurcated" nature of the US system (three separate and distinct command authorities which in Canada are all vested in the CDS) - the CDS simply doesn't have the bandwidth to link into all of these 4*s and focuses on the CJCS as the de facto US ChOD. [/tangent]


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Oh come, come my good man. Certainly we have the right manning, weapons, tactics and equipment to match/counter this type of Russian tomfoolery....
> 
> Artillery Launch in Ukraine. Massive Grad and Uragan Rocket Launch In Eastern Ukraine​




I can just hear the dude in field in the last shoot, as he is puffing on his Cuban, "I love the sound of rockets in the morning".    


FJAG, I have chilled and I regret the tone, if not the content, of my last outburst.  It's just that I don't share your sense of the possible and the useful.

We will continue to disagree I fear.

  Cheers, Sir.


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> [tangent] I've seen this before, and it is not accurate.  A Unified Combatant Commander responds directly to the political leadership of the US (National Command Authority is the old term - now POTUS/SECDEF).  They are responsible for taking political direction, forging strategy, and providing it to subordinate theatres forces to turns into operations.
> 
> CJOC has no strategic function.  It takes CDS strategic directives and turns it into operations.
> 
> The strategic authorities and responsibilities (which are substantial) wielded by a Combatant Commander in the US are, in a Canadian context, vested in the CDS.  The Strategic Joint Staff assists him or her in executing these authorities.  CJOC, if we wish to continue drawing parallels to the US, is in effect a sub-unified command.  Comd CJOC, however, maintains relationships with Combatant Commanders due to the "trifurcated" nature of the US system (three separate and distinct command authorities which in Canada are all vested in the CDS) - the CDS simply doesn't have the bandwidth to link into all of these 4*s and focuses on the CJCS as the de facto US ChOD. [/tangent]


Good point. That's a very important distinction.

🍻


----------



## McG

MilEME09 said:


> why create a new div and not just move all reg force under 1 div?


Because an Army reorg plan is only going to tinker with Army assets. 1 Div is not Army, it is CJOC.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I can just hear the dude in field in the last shoot, as he is puffing on his Cuban, "I love the sound of rockets in the morning".
> 
> 
> FJAG, I have chilled and I regret the tone, if not the content, of my last outburst.  It's just that I don't share your sense of the possible and the useful.
> 
> We will continue to disagree I fear.
> 
> Cheers, Sir.



I've just read the latest PowerPoint presentation on the COAs for Force 2025 and all that I can say is the discussions in this thread by all of us are more realistic, more productive and more forward leaning than the drivel I just saw.

I certainly withdraw anything that I've said that might suggest that the folks working on Force 2025 are smarter than us. There is an idea or two in there worth grabbing onto but overall its incoherent and misses most of the real issues that need to be solved.



ps. If all we did was agree with each other on this site it wouldn't be half as much fun or half as informative.

😉


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Because an Army reorg plan is only going to tinker with Army assets. 1 Div is not Army, it is CJOC.



And thereby hangs the tale!  Thanks McG.

The reason why we need a 2nd operational Div HQ is because the 1st Div HQ doesn't exist.  It is a misnamed Joint Operation.....

In the meantime we have 4 other Militia Regions masquerading as non-existent Divisions.

Thankfully I have got lots of home-made scrumpy.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> And thereby hangs the tale!  Thanks McG.
> 
> The reason why we need a 2nd operational Div HQ is because the 1st Div HQ doesn't exist.  It is a misnamed Joint Operation.....
> 
> In the meantime we have 4 other Militia Regions masquerading as non-existent Divisions.
> 
> Thankfully I have got lots of home-made scrumpy.



What we really need, of course, is 1 x Reg F Div and 1 x Militia Div.

Because what we do really well is 'divisions'


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> What we really need, of course, is 1 x Reg F Div and 1 x Militia Div.
> 
> Because what we do really well is 'divisions'


move all Reg force elements under CJOC directly, 2nd Div becomes the controller for all Reserve and institutional training


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> move all Reg force elements under CJOC directly, 2nd Div becomes the controller for all Reserve and institutional training



You know what? That might just work, as long as the Reserves can keep the egoes of their 'Junior Generals' in check


----------



## blacktriangle

We speak of brigades and divisions, and yet can't provide a single BG with what it needs to operate effectively in this century.

We lack almost everything on the high end (except GOFOs) and the average Taliban fighter is now probably better equipped on an individual scale than most of the RegF and all of the PRes.

Force 2025, indeed.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> You know what? That might just work, as long as the Reserves can keep the egoes of their 'Junior Generals' in check


That is where you force the reserves to be realistic entities to their actual strength, less LCol's and Col's means less Jr Generals

Two divisions, one for ops, and one for training works for the air force seemingly well, why not the army? yes they are not perfect either but it would save a fair amount of PY's to eliminate 4 div HQ's


----------



## KevinB

blacktriangle said:


> We speak of brigades and divisions, and yet can't provide a single BG with what it needs to operate effectively in this century.
> 
> We lack almost everything on the high end (except GOFOs) and the average Taliban fighter is now probably better equipped on an individual scale than most of the RegF and all of the PRes.
> 
> Force 2025, indeed.


Well to be fair, the Taliban doesn't have to deal with LCMM's and DLR...


----------



## FSTO

FJAG said:


> I've just read the latest PowerPoint presentation on the COAs for Force 2025 and all that I can say is the discussions in this thread by all of us are more realistic, more productive and more forward leaning than the drivel I just saw.
> 
> I certainly withdraw anything that I've said that might suggest that the folks working on Force 2025 are smarter than us. There is an idea or two in there worth grabbing onto but overall its incoherent and misses most of the real issues that need to be solved.


So its not just the Navy that is living in a fantasy?


----------



## FJAG

FSTO said:


> So its not just the Navy that is living in a fantasy?


I actually like the Navy's direction with the CSC (albeit I think all its other ships need some serious weaponizing).

The question for you guys is how are you going to man it. That might have a knock on effect for the Army. If you cut the CSC fleet by just one that could free up some serious cash to buy a lot of ground-based stuff.  😉 

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I actually like the Navy's direction with the CSC (albeit I think all its other ships need some serious weaponizing).



And there is another "trend".

Ships that sail with empty silos and rails.   Helicopters without guns and missiles.  Artillery without missiles.  Infantry without missiles.  Aircraft without missiles.

And god forbid we should have surface attack missiles.

Lack of understanding of missiles?
Lack of advocates for missiles?
Lack of TB dollars for missiles?
Lack of Political Will for missiles?
All of the above?

We can build platforms because, like hospitals, they look good and they provide jobs for Canadians and recycle Canadian dollars from taxpayers to taxpayers and make the politicians look as if they are doing something.  They also provide full time jobs for a select number of Canadians.

But hospitals save people.  They cure taxpayers or at least extend their lives and make them feel better.

What are military platforms supposed to do?  Killing seems so crass.


----------



## Kirkhill

At the risk of rocketing off the rails again myself I took another look at the CBO Primer for clues on Canada.

I think I have been looking at the wrong "Department".  I was looking at the "Department of the Army" chapter for clues on how to run the Army.  

In fact I believe the better base of comparison is the "Department of the Navy".  The USN is its own tri-service expeditionary force with its own cabinet representative and its own budget.  And its own politics.   The CAF has more in common with the USN notwithstanding that when it scrapes all of its pieces together it might just about be able to field the a semblance of a single Marine Expeditionary Force based on a Marine Division.  But minus a whole bunch of enablers.

And the USN has been called out in Aid to the Civil Power in the US.  Particularly US Marines in Los Angeles 1992 under the auspices of the Insurrection Act.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> At the risk of rocketing off the rails again myself I took another look at the CBO Primer for clues on Canada.
> 
> I think I have been looking at the wrong "Department".  I was looking at the "Department of the Army" chapter for clues on how to run the Army.
> 
> In fact I believe the better base of comparison is the "Department of the Navy".  The USN is its own tri-service expeditionary force with its own cabinet representative and its own budget.  And its own politics.   The CAF has more in common with the USN notwithstanding that when it scrapes all of its pieces together it might just about be able to field the a semblance of a single Marine Expeditionary Force based on a Marine Division.  But minus a whole bunch of enablers.
> 
> And the USN has been called out in Aid to the Civil Power in the US.  Particularly US Marines in Los Angeles 1992 under the auspices of the Insurrection Act.


The USMC is a better look - it is it's own Tri-Service inside the Navy.

Ground Forces; Conventional and Special 
Aviation; Fixed wing of many shapes, sizes and roles, and Rotary of different flavors - oh and Rotary Attack too...
Sea going vessels; - no not just the Amphibs - but albeit new, they are getting into coastal/littoral "Brown Water" Navy stuff.


I often thought Unification of the CF back in the days of FJAG  was a method to Marine"ize" the different elements of the CF into one.


----------



## FSTO

FJAG said:


> I actually like the Navy's direction with the CSC (albeit I think all its other ships need some serious weaponizing).
> 
> The question for you guys is how are you going to man it. That might have a knock on effect for the Army. If you cut the CSC fleet by just one that could free up some serious cash to buy a lot of ground-based stuff.  😉
> 
> 🍻


It’s too late on the other platforms to up-gun them. 
As for the personnel issue. Well, that needs some serious focus and not just in the CAF. All aspects of our society are under severe “Manning” pressures.


----------



## FSTO

KevinB said:


> The USMC is a better look - it is it's own Tri-Service inside the Navy.
> 
> Ground Forces; Conventional and Special
> Aviation; Fixed wing of many shapes, sizes and roles, and Rotary of different flavors - oh and Rotary Attack too...
> Sea going vessels; - no not just the Amphibs - but albeit new, they are getting into coastal/littoral "Brown Water" Navy stuff.
> 
> 
> I often thought Unification of the CF back in the days of FJAG  was a method to Marine"ize" the different elements of the CF into one.


The Marines don’t get ashore without the Navy.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FSTO said:


> The Marines don’t get ashore without the Navy and Air Force top cover.



There, FTFY


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> And we can do a light force.  We can't do a heavy force.
> 
> We're kidding ourselves that 80 refurbed, super-annuated Cold War relics is a solid foundation on which to build a heavy division.  It is the basis on which to build a single armoured battle group and no more.





Kirkhill said:


> When are we going to roll the dice and take a chance? Because ultimately that is what this is all about.  We can never know the future perfectly so we must always be prepared to chance it.
> 
> We debate interminably.  We act so infrequently that movement seems imperceptible.


You're 100% right that a properly equipped and supported light force optimized for adaptive dispersed operations and capable of deep strike, etc., etc., etc. would almost certainly be much more effective and useful to both Canada and our allies than the force that we currently have (debates about specific platforms in specific situations like tanks and tracked AFVs aside). 

The key part of that statement though is "properly equipped and supported".  If you're going to go the radical route you have to go "all in".  Half-assing it will only leave you with the worst of both worlds...an under-supported light force that can't respond quickly or effectively enough to make a difference on the battlefield and too under-armed/armoured to stand up to heavier enemy forces. 

What is your confidence level that the Canadian Government, public, DND, Army will be on side to make the required commitment to make that actually happen? 

I may be very cynical (I delude myself by calling it "pragmatic" in my less negative moments), but we have most of the basic building blocks in place for a traditional medium/light force with a sprinkling of tanks to provide a "heavy-ish" capability.  With some targeted new (actually returning) capabilities like SHORAD, AT, SP Arty, UAVs, etc. we are capable of transforming the CA into a force that could hold its own against most enemy militaries. 

The equipment however is likely the easiest part of the transformation that is required.  In my opinion we need to restructure the CA in such a way that it is task focused on the capability of deploying, employing, supporting and sustaining combat forces in action.  That requires structural changes to the way the CA is organized but also changes in the mindset of the leadership and members.  If the CA doesn't think like a war-fighters then the culture won't support the structural and equipment changes that will allow them to excel as war-fighters.


----------



## FSTO

daftandbarmy said:


> There, FTFY


As long as the Air Force get the diplomatic clearance, tanker support and prepositioned airfields to get to the beaches!😊


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> You're 100% right that a properly equipped and supported light force optimized for adaptive dispersed operations and capable of deep strike, etc., etc., etc. would almost certainly be much more effective and useful to both Canada and our allies than the force that we currently have (debates about specific platforms in specific situations like tanks and tracked AFVs aside).
> 
> The key part of that statement though is "properly equipped and supported".  If you're going to go the radical route you have to go "all in".  Half-assing it will only leave you with the worst of both worlds...an under-supported light force that can't respond quickly or effectively enough to make a difference on the battlefield and too under-armed/armoured to stand up to heavier enemy forces.
> 
> What is your confidence level that the Canadian Government, public, DND, Army will be on side to make the required commitment to make that actually happen?
> 
> I may be very cynical (I delude myself by calling it "pragmatic" in my less negative moments), but we have most of the basic building blocks in place for a traditional medium/light force with a sprinkling of tanks to provide a "heavy-ish" capability.  With some targeted new (actually returning) capabilities like SHORAD, AT, SP Arty, UAVs, etc. we are capable of transforming the CA into a force that could hold its own against most enemy militaries.
> 
> The equipment however is likely the easiest part of the transformation that is required.  In my opinion we need to restructure the CA in such a way that it is task focused on the capability of deploying, employing, supporting and sustaining combat forces in action.  That requires structural changes to the way the CA is organized but also changes in the mindset of the leadership and members.  If the CA doesn't think like a war-fighters then the culture won't support the structural and equipment changes that will allow them to excel as war-fighters.



In my cynical/pragmatic mode - I have very little confidence of anybody doing anything.

As to properly equipped and supported - "With some targeted new (actually returning) capabilities like SHORAD, AT, SP Arty, UAVs, etc. "  - that pretty much describes the problem right there, regardless of whether we are talking about light, medium, heavy or even special forces.  We have none of the above so we "need" to buy all of the above.  

My sense is that light force platforms cost less to acquire and require fewer, and lest costly, enablers (aircraft, ships and helicopters) to deploy.  That means, in my view, that the scarce dollars the taxpayer affords DND can be spent ensuring that our troops don't die easily and that they are as effective as possible in killing large numbers of the enemy in target rich environments.


----------



## Kirkhill

FSTO said:


> As long as the Air Force get the diplomatic clearance, tanker support and prepositioned airfields to get to the beaches!😊


Dont forget the hotels!


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> My sense is that light force platforms cost less to acquire and require fewer, and lest costly, enablers (aircraft, ships and helicopters) to deploy.  That means, in my view, that the scarce dollars the taxpayer affords DND can be spent ensuring that our troops don't die easily and that they are as effective as possible in killing large numbers of the enemy in target rich environments.


All enablers are costly 

But yes - the there are three main reasons why I think the CDN Army should be Light centric:
 1) Cost: Light Forces while still capital intensive to equip to the modern standard are much cheaper than Heavy Forces - who need most of the same individual items, please costly large items.

 2) Bang for the Buck: Getting to and fro is easier and cheaper, and you don't have to rejig a slew of training areas for operations.

 3) QRF/IRF Roles gain political capital, and allow Canada to determine what areas to quickly support - and to get out quickly as needed/desired.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> ... The key part of that statement though is "properly equipped and supported".  If you're going to go the radical route you have to go "all in".  Half-assing it will only leave you with the worst of both worlds...an under-supported light force that can't respond quickly or effectively enough to make a difference on the battlefield and too under-armed/armoured to stand up to heavier enemy forces.
> 
> What is your confidence level that the Canadian Government, public, DND, Army will be on side to make the required commitment to make that actually happen? ...


You also have to keep in mind the circumstances of how we got to where we are.

At the end of the 90s we did go all in on a medium force concept leaving behind a force that was principally heavy (with some light). We did this based on the failed state notion that Bosnia et al kept as occupied in the 90s. Our concept was similar and slightly ahead of the Stryker medium force that the US built for the purpose of rapid deployment which was heavy enough to protect itself but was always considered an advance force for the heavy follow up ABCT. For us it was top of the line.

We dropped the MGS and replaced them with older tanks and then newer mine resistant tanks (using the money earmarked for the MGS) in a hurry once the Taliban started blowing up our LAVs. In fact we went so far as to start a project to add an IFV to create one heavy brigade. After the CLS who championed that left for another job his replacement scrapped that project for the LAV Up instead and then cancelled air defence. All with the intent that failed states was our business model.

Then came the Ukraine and we're back facing the same old foe who runs an armoured heavy organization preceded by little green men.

We're where we are because we shuffle around capabilities to meet circumstances. Right now we're on a par with a Soviet Motor Rifle Regiment of the 1990s but without the artillery, air defence and anti-armour systems that they have.

It looks like it will probably be a long time before we do the failed state thing again based on the Afghan experience. It's a very uncertain time for the Army. The Navy will have a role, in the Pacific unless I'm missing my guess. If we ever do get F 35s then the Air Force will also have a role with its numerous allies sharing the same air frame. (Transport is always "in" but I don't give much hope for helicopters getting substantially better). 

The Army on the other hand has little direction. NATO will put pressure on us for something. A medium brigade with some tanks might be the thing. Even the Americans have a Stryker brigade there but those are significantly more powerful than our medium brigades and getting more powerful but do remember that this is only one brigade while the Americans advance headquarters is a Corps which signals quite strongly that there are heavy elements envisioned for deployment.

And lets not fool ourselves. When we talk heavy v medium in a Canadian context we're actually talking the same thing because our infantry, regardless of the name, will be in LAV 6.0s. The true difference between heavy and medium is the combat context. Heavy armoured generally has tanks and armoured infantry fighting mounted on and through objectives (That's where the CV90, the Marder and the Bradley come in). Medium forces (like the Stryker) move mounted but fight dismounted like light infantry with some extra direct fire support from their transports. I have no idea what tactics and TTPs they are teaching our mech, tanks supported, infantry, but I do hope it's not "heavy armour" ones.

This gets me back to what I've been whining about in this forum for quite some time; we need to really focus on what potential threats we need to prepare for and then build the right doctrine for it and equip accordingly. Many of us have different viewpoints about that direction on this forum, which is just fine. There are undoubtedly the same varying opinions within the Army. What is needed, as you point out, is that someone gets off their butt, makes a decision and then gets the appropriate government buy-in.  With all the crap sidetracking the GOFOs right now, I'm not so sure anyone really has their eye on the ball. I'm certainly not holding my breath for the incumbent MND to give any direction. Regardless of who wins this election, the next guy/gal will hopefully be better.

🍻


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> Regardless of who wins this election, the next guy/gal will hopefully be better.
> 
> 🍻


I hope so too.  But IF the LPC wins, I think we should expect more of the same.  

In theory, we had a winning team at the helm.  Vance was highly regarded for how he conducted himself as Task Force Commander in AFG, and our MND was an experienced guy who had a few tours in the sandbox.

Neither of them accomplished much of note during their time at the helm.  I imagine this is because the PM and leadership of the LPC want “yes men” in those roles.  

If the LPC is voted in again, I don’t see much changing.  Especially in regards to drastic changes in how the CAF is organized or operates.  If two experienced officers at the helm aren’t allowed to steer the ship, I doubt a random appointee will be able to do so.  

(I have high hopes for this election!  Truly, I do!  Just feeling pessimistic if the old boys club gets voted in again is all.)


🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Leopard 1 - 114x 42.2 tonnes
M109 A4B+ - 76x 27.5 tons





M113 - 1143x 12.3 tonnes
Lynx - 174x 8.8 tonnes
Ferret - 124x 3.7 tonnes

M151A2 - 935x 1.1 tonnes
MLVW - 2700x 6.3 to 7.5 tonnes

C1 Howitzer - 2.3 tonnes
L5 Pack Howizer - 1.3 tonnes

Now, were we a "principally heavy force with some light" - the CMBG 4 vision?

Or were we a globally deployable light force with prepositioned heavy elements - Hellyer's Force Mobile Command vision?

Personally I lean towards the globally deployable light force view.

The M113, as purchased was a lightly armoured, amphibious, tracked vehicle capable of being delivered by Canada's sizeable fleet of C130s anywhere in Canada for tactical employment.   It moved 10 troops and only required a crew of one, the driver.  It moved the troops anywhere.  It kept them warm and dry.  It could protect them in an NBC environment.  It could even slow down the occasional  bullet and shell fragment.

It could be delivered by airlanding, by LAPES or by parachute.  And that was true of all of the other gear that was lighter than the M113, ie anything other than the Leos and the M109s.

Operating in support of them the RCAF purchased 24 C-130 E Hercules in 1964, 15 DHC-5A Buffalo in 1967, 9 DHC-6 Twin Otters ca 1971, 74 OH-58 Kiowas in 1970, 10 UH-1 Iroquois in 1968, 50 Canadian designed "Twin Hueys" in 1971 and 8 CH-47C Chinooks in 1974.

The reason CMBG4 wanted the M113s replaced/augmented by the Marder, and the US wanted the Bradley, was precisely because they were considered to be too light to fight on the North German Plains.

We were a useful light force.

We were never a heavy force.

PS.  The Marder weighed the same as the M109. 28 tonnes.


----------



## MilEME09

The problem with trying to be a heavy force, we need a way to get that force moved across the ocean, The RCN has no such capability to do that right now.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> The problem with trying to be a heavy force, we need a way to get that force moved across the ocean, The RCN has no such capability to do that right now.



Not if we maintain a Heavy Brigade in Europe 24/7/365 because, you know, statistics show that they're prone to 'family feuds' that get out of hand.


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:


> I don't think ANY MECH/ARMOR should be in Edmonton - the transport to go anywhere is ridiculous.
> 
> Edmonton should be a Light Bde



If you actually compare what you can do in training areas across the country your logic is backwards.  Western Canada offers the best manoeuvre areas for a heavy force by far, while you have to leave the area to find good training for the light battalion (although the location of the Rockies is helpful).

Transport of tanks isn't ridiculous, it's actually rehearsing something that would be done in a real contingency.  Just need all the heavy haulers in one place.



Kirkhill said:


> The CAF has more in common with the USN notwithstanding that when it scrapes all of its pieces together it might just about be able to field the a semblance of a single Marine Expeditionary Force based on a Marine Division.  But minus a whole bunch of enablers.



Nope.  The Department of the Navy has a Marine Corps, but one that isn't obligated to consider major land war requirements, and is actively trying to move away from that posture (hence, eliminating its tank capability).  The USN and USMC have air elements, but those are subordinated to servicing the CSG/MAGTF (and jealously guarded from the CAOC), and can let the USAF worry about the air campaign.  The DND and the CAF must consider the whole gamut of operations in all domains, while the Department of the Navy and the USN/USMC are singularly focused on the maritime domain.



FSTO said:


> The Marines don’t get ashore without the Navy.



Really?  They just spent 20 years fighting in the landlocked areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, and have standing SPMAGTF's that are globally deployed to land bases abroad.  They wish to reinvigorate the "Green/Blue" relationship to "get back to their roots", but they frequently do go ashore without the Navy.



FJAG said:


> Heavy armoured generally has tanks and armoured infantry fighting mounted on and through objectives (That's where the CV90, the Marder and the Bradley come in). Medium forces (like the Stryker) move mounted but fight dismounted like light infantry with some extra direct fire support from their transports. I have no idea what tactics and TTPs they are teaching our mech, tanks supported, infantry, but I do hope it's not "heavy armour" ones.



Weight of a Stryker ICV = 16,800kg

Weight of a CV 90 MkIV = 37,000kg

Weight of a Marder 1A5 = 34,000kg

Weight of a M2 Bradley = 27,500kg

Weight of a LAV 6.0 = 28,600kg

Weight of Namer ICV = 60,000kg

Be careful how you define light, medium, and heavy forces....


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Nope.  The Department of the Navy has a Marine Corps, but one that isn't obligated to consider major land war requirements, and is actively trying to move away from that posture (hence, eliminating its tank capability).  The USN and USMC have air elements, but those are subordinated to servicing the CSG/MAGTF (and jealously guarded from the CAOC), and can let the USAF worry about the air campaign.  The DND and the CAF must consider the whole gamut of operations in all domains, while the Department of the Navy and the USN/USMC are singularly focused on the maritime domain.



To clarify.

I agree with you operationally.  From an administration standpoint, ie having all the right spreadsheets with all the right boxes to fill I think the USN is still the better model.  This particularly caught my eye 



> The Department of the Navy’s forces are distinctive not
> only for their number and variety of units but also for
> the way in which different types of forces routinely work
> closely together. The Army and Air Force each essentially
> focus on a single type of military power (ground
> combat or air combat), but the Navy and Marine Corps
> routinely integrate ships with aircraft (as in carrier strike
> groups), ships with ground combat units (as in amphibious
> ready groups), and aircraft with ground combat
> units (as in Marine expeditionary forces). Although all
> U.S. forces are expected to be able to operate jointly
> with other services, the routine and habitual integration
> of different types of military power within DoN goes
> beyond typical joint operations. For example, the Marine
> Corps has fewer artillery units to support its ground
> combat units than the Army does, in part because the
> Corps prefers to provide additional firepower (fire
> support) for its combat units by using its attack
> aircraft—aircraft that may well be based on Navy ships.
> In contrast, the Army has traditionally structured itself
> on the assumption that it must have substantial artillery
> capability in case Air Force aircraft are not available to
> provide fire support.



The U.S. Military’s Force Structure: A Primer, 2021 Update  Chapter 3, page 46

As you read through the primer, especially on the Navy/USMC, it becomes apparent how difficult it is to unfuggle the Navy and Marine and Logistics and Air budgets because of how intertwined their jointness is.  

As the CBO notes the Army and the Air Force have pretty clear boundaries (except when they overlap with the Navy and Marines).  The Navy and Marines are the original purple mess.  And thus, just the right model for DND accountants.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> ...
> Now, were we a "principally heavy force with some light" - the CMBG 4 vision?
> 
> Or were we a globally deployable light force with prepositioned heavy elements - Hellyer's Force Mobile Command vision?
> ...


We were kind of both.

Go back to the end 50s and into the 60s and you'll remember that we used to rotate brigades through Germany until 1959. That settled down with 4th CIBG. At the time we had four CIBGs: 1 in Calgary, 2 in Petawawa, 3 in Gagetown and 4 in Germany.

When the the M113s came they went to 3 and 4 CIBG (They were renamed in 1968 to CBG and then CMBG). Same with the M109s they were with 3 and 4 bdes. Incidentally 3 CIBG had both Black Watch battalions and two Van Doo battalions. These and the other battalions (Cdn Guards, QOR, RCR and PPCLI) all rotated around back and forth to Germany.

Anyway, while 3 and 4 CIBGs were heavyish and eventually got the M113s (basically 3 was the feeder force for 4), 1 and 2 CIBGs stayed fairly light (3/4 ton section carriers). With unification everything went to hell in a handbasket as 3 CIBG was disbanded in 1970 and its gear either redistributed or put in mothballs. 5th CMBG was formed and received the going to Norway role while the government directed that the Army turn light and airmobile (that's where the term "Mobile Command" came in, the Airborne Regiment was created and we gunners in Canada got L5s.

The big deal though was that the government wanted 4th brigade to go light as well. Lots of war game modelling with attack helicopters and heliborne anti armour teams came and went but both NATO and the Army was well dug into keeping 4 CMBG heavy and basically dragged its feet for decades. The move to getting Cougars and Grizzlies was to appear light to the government while having training tanks and APCs to keep training folks for Germany. (By the way much of this is well documented [albeit with a fairly opinionated viewpoint] by Peter Kazurak in A National Force)

I won't take sides in this debate (albeit I've always had a tracks fetish) but the Army has a way of getting around government direction when it wants to. Quite frankly though, I don't think either Trudeau or Cabinet gives a Rat's A as to how we organize and configure as long as we don't go out there to buy a whole lot of expensive crap that isn't built by Irving. I swear to the gods though that if Irving or whatever's left of Canadair ever got interested in tank and IFV building we'd have a well equipped army in no time.



MilEME09 said:


> The problem with trying to be a heavy force, we need a way to get that force moved across the ocean, The RCN has no such capability to do that right now.


The world is awash in RORO ships to lease. That's the least of the problem.



daftandbarmy said:


> Not if we maintain a Heavy Brigade in Europe 24/7/365 because, you know, statistics show that they're prone to 'family feuds' that get out of hand.


And that's my favourite idea. You could even flyover reserve units in the summer for Milcons when all the Reg F takes three months of annual leave. 😉



Infanteer said:


> Be careful how you define light, medium, and heavy forces....


I try to be. I know that the weight of the LAV 6.0 has greatly increased over that of the LAV III and that much of that comes from a double V hull, heavier engine and running gear and while there has been some armour enhancement to the sides it still falls (I think) into a Class III. I understand the Strykers are undergoing similar upgrades. My classifying it "medium" comes mostly from a combination of firepower at the low end, especially no anti-armour missiles (which also limits the CV90 but it has a larger gun) and lack of tracks.

I'm somewhat hampered in that I have an older 2003 version of Combat Team Operations Interim (based on the Leopard C1 and LAV III) and that all my practical experience is with Centurions, older Leopard, Marders and M113s but I would have concerns with a wheeled LAV as to the requirement in the assault that "infantry platoons must remain close to intimate support tanks". I've seen that work well with Marders but even M113s had problems in keeping up with Leos on relatively even ground much less rutted farm fields or, heaven forbid, grape orchards.

I'll certainly yield to your much greater experience than mine in this area. The way that I see it, it's not the weight per se that defines heavy; its the protection, maneuverability and armament that matters. Strykers are clearly medium (hell, technically "light" hence "Light Armoured Vehicle") and not meant to fight onto and through objectives. As far as I see, LAV 6.0s are still the same way despite the extra weight. They provide transportation and fire support to dismounted elements but not much more.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> ....
> 
> I won't take sides in this debate   ...



I think you might be a wee bit late for that.    



FJAG said:


> the Army has a way of getting around government direction when it wants to



Do I hear "swamp"?  "Blob"?

Government?  Who needs 'em?


----------



## MilEME09

We have gotten crafty before to get around TB, we can do it again, problem is we are our own worst enemy. In the words of Rick Hillier the CAF is a self licking ice cream cone. We will continue to build empires it seems to increasing erode our operational effectiveness unless someone finally puts a stop to it, I don't know who would be the choice for a conservative MND but one can hope, and that's it....hope change can happen.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> If you actually compare what you can do in training areas across the country your logic is backwards.  Western Canada offers the best manoeuvre areas for a heavy force by far, while you have to leave the area to find good training for the light battalion (although the location of the Rockies is helpful).
> 
> Transport of tanks isn't ridiculous, it's actually rehearsing something that would be done in a real contingency.  Just need all the heavy haulers in one place.


Wouldn't it be nice to actually live on a training area for your gear?
  As well have a railhead so your aren't double loading (loading on a low bed vehicle to have them drive to load on a railhead)?

IF Canada wants to have a Heavy Force (and I am dead set that the Army isn't big enough to make a worthwhile heavy force that could actually participate in a peer - peer conflict *US Peer, as Canadian Military Peers are like Uganda and Botswana at this point),  Then ONLY Training systems should be in Canada, and the Heavy Bde be forward deployed - it can even rotate ever few years for Regimental "Equity"

 Heavy Forces have zilch to do with Canadian Territorial Defense - because if you think anyone invading Canada is going to do anything more than Snicker at a Div of Heavy Tanks (which Canada doesn't have anyway) you out of your mind.
  Light Forces can disperse and run an insurgency - because that is what the size of the force can do.






Infanteer said:


> Really?  They just spent 20 years fighting in the landlocked areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, and have standing SPMAGTF's that are globally deployed to land bases abroad.  They wish to reinvigorate the "Green/Blue" relationship to "get back to their roots", but they frequently do go ashore without the Navy.


They need a role again - the butchers are at the door - and the Expeditionary nature of the USMC is being reinvested in.



Infanteer said:


> Weight of a Stryker ICV = 16,800kg
> 
> Weight of a CV 90 MkIV = 37,000kg
> 
> Weight of a Marder 1A5 = 34,000kg
> 
> Weight of a M2 Bradley = 27,500kg
> 
> Weight of a LAV 6.0 = 28,600kg
> 
> Weight of Namer ICV = 60,000kg
> 
> Be careful how you define light, medium, and heavy forces....



I'd rather one look at what it needs to be moved - and create a 4th category.
Light -- Can work in a UH-60/Osprey type craft
Med-Light - can work in a CH-47
Medium  - can work in a C-130 
 Heavy - needs C-17, better yet sea borne transport.

Regardless of what you call it - if you look at what Canada is willing to put on the table these days - It's an under equipped Div.
 Trying to make a Heavy Bde requires a significant amount more capital to be invested in equipment - unless everyone is content with a "In Name Bde" (again).


The bizarre Missing items (Air Defense) fill a Defense of Canada role much better than a lot of other either missing or antiquated gear.

Reading the Government Mandate to the CF - I'd be hauling the pretty much everyone from BG up for an inquisition on why they are for the most part incapable of filling ANY of the missions allocated currently.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> We have gotten crafty before to get around TB, we can do it again, problem is we are our own worst enemy. In the words of Rick Hillier the CAF is a self licking ice cream cone. We will continue to build empires it seems to increasing erode our operational effectiveness unless someone finally puts a stop to it, I don't know who would be the choice for a conservative MND but one can hope, and that's it....hope change can happen.


James Bezan Selkirk-Interlake-Eastman from Manitoba is the current CPC Shadow MND.



> Bezan was born May 19, 1965 in Russell, Manitoba[3] Bezan majored in livestock technology in Olds College's Agricultural Production program.[4] Bezan worked in the livestock and cattle industries in the 1980s and 1990s, and started his own company in 1996. He served as Chief Executive Officer of the Manitoba Cattle Producer's Association, and has sat on boards in the fields of cattle and food production. He also operates a family farm near Teulon, Manitoba.[5]





> In first session of the 41st Parliament, Bezan served as the Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence





> On September 19, 2013, Bezan was appointed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence. He began the 2nd session of the 41st Parliament with this role.[2





> Bezan was one of thirteen Canadians banned from traveling to Russia under retaliatory sanctions imposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2014.[31] He replied through his official Twitter feed, "Sanctions by Russia will not silence me standing up for Ukraine. This is a badge of honour for all critics of the Crimea Invasion."[31





> James Bezan - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org



He's very into Ukrainian issues which could make things interesting vis-a-vis NATO support.



KevinB said:


> Heavy Forces have zilch to do with Canadian Territorial Defense - because if you think anyone invading Canada is going to do anything more than Snicker at a Div of Heavy Tanks (which Canada doesn't have anyway) you out of your mind.
> Light Forces can disperse and run an insurgency - because that is what the size of the force can do.


But what would we do if the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team from the Idaho National Guard should attack us and we won't have a heavy brigade in western Canada to defend ourselves with? They have M1s and Bradleys and Paladins and everything. ... and, and if the Utah National Guard with their artillery brigade with HIMARS and more Paladins and all those helicopters should join in. 😱

And our light forces have no anti-armour weapons. We'll have to make IEDs out of pressure cookers or something. I'm not sure we'd be allowed to run an insurgency because I'm quite sure our current leadership are more the surrender monkey types. 



KevinB said:


> The bizarre Missing items (Air Defense) fill a Defense of Canada role much better than a lot of other either missing or antiquated gear.


I don't want to get your hopes up too high but the GBAD program is looking at short range and very short range AD. So from a "defence of Canada" point of view we could maybe cover Parliament Hill including Bytown Market. Hopefully the Navy could cover the two shipyards.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:


> Wouldn't it be nice to actually live on a training area for your gear?
> As well have a railhead so your aren't double loading (loading on a low bed vehicle to have them drive to load on a railhead)?


Is a two hour drive down a four lane freeway really that much of an impediment?



KevinB said:


> Heavy Forces have zilch to do with Canadian Territorial Defense - because if you think anyone invading Canada is going to do anything more than Snicker at a Div of Heavy Tanks (which Canada doesn't have anyway) you out of your mind.



Where is it stated that heavy forces are required for territorial defence?


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> Not if we maintain a Heavy Brigade in Europe 24/7/365 because, you know, statistics show that they're prone to 'family feuds' that get out of hand.


Seriously, does anyone here actually believe that re-establishing a full-time Canadian Brigade Group in Europe is a realistic possibility?  We're not only talking the cost of re-equipping the Army like we're discussing here to be able to stand up in a peer conflict against Russia (which based on the state of the post-Covid economy on top of the CSC program and the upcoming fighter replacements I have serious doubts about being properly fulfilled as it is), but also the cost of forward deploying fully 1/3 of our current Reg Force Army to face a potential enemy (Russia) which frankly I seriously doubt most Canadians see as significant enough a threat to justify the cost.

An alternative approach which I think would be more likely achievable from an economic and political standpoint would be to expand our light force capability and have the ability to rapidly (i.e. within 72 hours) deploy a well-equipped and supported Light Battle Group anywhere in the world with the ability to expand this to a full Brigade within a week or so.  And practice this capability.  This would go a long way to demonstrating to both our allies and potential enemies our capability and willingness to respond to aggression.

Shifting to primarily lighter forces would also free up some of our heavier equipment (I'm not 100% sold on divesting in all our heavier equipment like tanks...not every job requires just a screwdriver, so better to have a well-equipped toolbox just in case).  We could for example use the surplus vehicles to pre-position a full Battle Group worth of LAVs and Leopards and all the other supporting weapons and equipment in Europe (co-located with our eFP Latvia force?) and fly over the troops to man the equipment (again, practised at least annually).  

The ability to in fairly short order fly over the troops to man an additional Mechanized Battle Group in Latvia and an additional Light Battle Group (wherever required) - which can be expanded to a full Brigade - would in my mind gain almost as much political capital with our allies and deterrent effect to our enemies as the more costly (and less flexible) forward deployment of a Mechanized Brigade Group.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> But what would we do if the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team from the Idaho National Guard should attack us and we won't have a heavy brigade in western Canada to defend ourselves with? They have M1s and Bradleys and Paladins and everything. ... and, and if the Utah National Guard with their artillery brigade with HIMARS and more Paladins and all those helicopters should join in. 😱


This is why I'd be focusing on AD and AT stuff for Defense of Canada missions - it also serves as fantastic force protection elements for Expeditionary Light Forces.


FJAG said:


> And our light forces have no anti-armour weapons. We'll have to make IEDs out of pressure cookers or something. I'm not sure we'd be allowed to run an insurgency because I'm quite sure our current leadership are more the surrender monkey types.


No worries - I'm thinking Milley and Austin might surrender first...



FJAG said:


> I don't want to get your hopes up too high but the GBAD program is looking at short range and very short range AD. So from a "defence of Canada" point of view we could maybe cover Parliament Hill including Bytown Market. Hopefully the Navy could cover the two shipyards.


I continue to cry.




Infanteer said:


> Is a two hour drive down a four lane freeway really that much of an impediment?


2 hrs to Wx from CFB Edmonton?  I've done that drive a few times - and while possible to be under 2hrs in a PMV, I know it used to be a 4*hr road move in LAV's (thought that was before the Freeway upgrade) it is still 127miles from 1PPLCI's gate to the entry road past Range Control  in WX - so I would be inclined to accept 2.5-3hr drive for a transport - plus loading and unloading time.

So one loses 1/2 day on each end -- 
   As opposed to driving across Hwy 17 in Pet - and no TDY to go zero a LAV...
I get you like drivey-shooty things and Edmonton, and I know your smart  - but a cost benefit analysis shows its a fools errand to base heavier stuff there, I think you are letting emotions crowd your judgment on the validity of that base choice.


Infanteer said:


> Where is it stated that heavy forces are required for territorial defence?


It isn't - Hency why any CF heavier force should be forward deployed and not allowed to sit in an useless base where they can't direct train in Canada...


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Seriously, does anyone here actually believe that re-establishing a full-time Canadian Brigade Group in Europe is a realistic possibility?  We're not only talking the cost of re-equipping the Army like we're discussing here to be able to stand up in a peer conflict against Russia (which based on the state of the post-Covid economy on top of the CSC program and the upcoming fighter replacements I have serious doubts about being properly fulfilled as it is), but also the cost of forward deploying fully 1/3 of our current Reg Force Army to face a potential enemy (Russia) which frankly I seriously doubt most Canadians see as significant enough a threat to justify the cost.


I could think of several scenarios that might work with relatively minor changes in financial impact other than ones we need to make regardless (such as properly equipping air defence and anti-armour capabilities and beefing up our CS and CSS). All of them, however, have the precondition that a Canadian government is prepared to have a brigade sized presence in Europe. All scenarios contemplate prepositioning equipment with minimal personnel actually in theatre.

The first scenario would involve creating smaller armoured squadrons of 14 tanks each. That should provide the ability to form six tank squadrons with enough (give or take one or two). With five squadrons and with six LAV companies, you have enough vehicles to form a combined arms brigade of three manoeuvre battalions with an armoured squadron spare for use in a cavalry regiment. Flesh out the rest of the brigade with whatever gear is needed to make it work.

The remaining tank squadron and two LAV companies get prepositioned as a combined arms training battalion in Wainwright. Essentially that uses up all of our tanks and 8 companies of LAVs leaving ten companies of LAVs. Leave two LAV companies with each of 2 and 5 Brigades as a training resource and turn their six infantry battalions to light battalions. Place the remaining four LAV companies with 1 Bde as their operational/training vehicles (over and above the Wainwright stock. At this point you have the ability to run courses and exercise at the combined arms battalion level year round for the army in general at Wainwright and to operationally deploy up to two mech battalions anywhere in the world (from the remaining LAV training stocks). In addition each region has some LAVs to train additional crews locally before sending them to Wainwright for collective training or Europe for brigade level exercises throughout the year. 1 Bde becomes the primary flyover force, but each Bde can have rotations where they prepare for and assume a mech role. Because the vast majority of the tanks are located in Europe, much of the armoured individual and collective training will need to be made to fit in at Wainwright or in Europe. 

Equip the light brigades in whichever way floats your boat.

Option two is very different but also becomes a fly-over force.

Let's face it, if we approached the US and offered to add a flyover ABCT to V Corps in Poland so long as the Americans equipped it in Poland and also provided up to an ABCT's worth of equipment in Canada as training stocks at no capital cost to us (we'd be responsible for maintenance and training costs of course), they would do it out of their spare stocks in a heart beat because a) they have the gear and b) we'd add tremendous joint political clout to the alliance. Again, the idea is to maximize training in Europe throughout the year by flying over battle groups and up to bde level. The flyovers would be practice for operations and would negate the need for a separate CMTC element in Wainwright. 

By doing that, we would still have 18 companies of LAV 6.0s which would equip one CMGB (preferably 5 CMBG) as a three LAV battalion medium brigade, leave 2 CMBG as a light brigade and have 9 LAV companies available as training stock for quite a few reserve units and as operational stock for up to a battle group deployment somewhere else in the world.

So. Easy-peasy. There are numerous variants of this for people who dislike Wainwright or think the numbers won't quite work but essentially, if we consider Europe as our "CMTC" and preposition all the heavy equipment there and can be used by multiple units throughout the year, our costs to access it doesn't change much from much of what we already spend on exercise travel as we merely transport people and not equipment. As to facilities, Poland (and NATO I think) is paying for much of V Corps' infrastructure and would, most probably, do the same for Canada. We could always insist on that as a precondition. And yes, we would need a pretty good MOU with the Americans to make this a) work and b) keep our highly valued "Canadian independence" from the American War Machine. 



GR66 said:


> An alternative approach which I think would be more likely achievable from an economic and political standpoint would be to expand our light force capability and have the ability to rapidly (i.e. within 72 hours) deploy a well-equipped and supported Light Battle Group anywhere in the world with the ability to expand this to a full Brigade within a week or so.  And practice this capability.  This would go a long way to demonstrating to both our allies and potential enemies our capability and willingness to respond to aggression.
> 
> Shifting to primarily lighter forces would also free up some of our heavier equipment (I'm not 100% sold on divesting in all our heavier equipment like tanks...not every job requires just a screwdriver, so better to have a well-equipped toolbox just in case).  We could for example use the surplus vehicles to pre-position a full Battle Group worth of LAVs and Leopards and all the other supporting weapons and equipment in Europe (co-located with our eFP Latvia force?) and fly over the troops to man the equipment (again, practised at least annually).
> 
> The ability to in fairly short order fly over the troops to man an additional Mechanized Battle Group in Latvia and an additional Light Battle Group (wherever required) - which can be expanded to a full Brigade - would in my mind gain almost as much political capital with our allies and deterrent effect to our enemies as the more costly (and less flexible) forward deployment of a Mechanized Brigade Group.


 I have no problems with a flyover, but it doesn't happen as rapidly as you think unless you preposition equipment. Even a light brigade is a pretty heavy animal. Once you preposition then there is practically no difference as between a light, medium or heavy brigade because the manpower involved is pretty much the same (about 5,000 folks barring additional theatre level assets).

My problem with light brigades is what is their role once they get there? Prepositioning a mech battle group in Latvia is and idea but it would need to be a full one as the elements we have there are already fully wedded into a multi-national battle group and you can't just start taking that apart. That BG doesn't need extra Canadians as its pretty sizeable in its own right already. 

The problem with light brigades is that the need in Europe is still for an additional six ABCTs (3 manned "stay in the game", 3 prepositioned) in the region as a proper deterrent/fighting force (see: RAND Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States: What it takes to win 2017) Yes there is also a need to add six SBCT/IBCTs but first and foremost is to get the numbers of ABCTs or their equivalents in place.

I certainly appreciate that conditions change as weapon systems change BUT it seems to me everyone thinks that these advances in technology only apply to light forces and that we "heavy" guys are looking to maintain armoured forces exactly as they were in the 1980s. That's a fallacy: heavy forces will also be making tremendous strides forward as countermeasures and offensive systems become more robust. The one thing with light forces which will always be a given is that while they might develop tremendous defensive capabilities, they will always be handicapped by limited tactical mobility, and even strategic mobility, unless the air environment is very permissive, and they will never have the counterpunch capability of armoured forces.

I'm not anti-light. I'm for a balance force (even one as small as ours). Don't throw the heavy baby out with the bathwater like your 1990-2000 forefathers tried.

🍻



KevinB said:


> No worries - I'm thinking Milley and Austin might surrender first...


Sooo ....... you're ruling out Trump in 2024?   😁 

🍻


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I get you like drivey-shooty things and Edmonton, and I know your smart - but a cost benefit analysis shows its a fools errand to base heavier stuff there, I think you are letting emotions crowd your judgment on the validity of that base choice.


I'm fully with Infanteer on this one.

Suffield is the best but the Brits are using it throughout the best training seasons and there is no sign of that's stopping anytime soon. in addition there is no infrastructure there that isn't Brit so even co-sharing the base is impossible.  On top of that there is very little military housing available for people based permanently to the base ad very little available in the adjacent communities. Medicine Hat is about 45 km away which is doable but a drag (especially in winter). That leaves Wainwright, Shilo, Meaford, Petawawa, Valcartier, Aldershot and Gagetown.

Meaford and Aldershot - way too small.

Valcartier -  very restricted. Do they even fire tanks there or go to Gagetown for that?

Shilo can do several combined arms battle runs (although in my day that was with 105mm and I have zero knowledge of the required ricochet traces for 120mm and how they would fit in these days. My guess is that they could.

Petawawa has much less useable space than Shilo and while it could support some static shooting (same 105 v 120 issue for me) it would be severely restricted on how much combined arms maneuvering you could do even with dry training.

That leaves only three real possibilities: Shilo (see above), Wainwright and Gagetown. I took my advanced gunnery course and my combat team commander's course in Gagetown, did battle runs with Germans in Shilo and exercised with artillery up and down Wainwright, Shilo, and Gagetown (Not to mention Petawawa, Suffield, Meaford and Yakima).

Of the three, Wainwright has the most useable space that would be ideal for combined arms training, Shilo would come second. I'm torn by Gagetown. It clearly is the largest, has a great manoeuvre area (although again I'm not sure how much 120mm is restrained there). I mean there's nothing you can't do there for artillery and mech infantry (including training for getting unstuck from boggy ground). It's biggest deficit is that the Combat Arms School is there and as such fully occupies the infrastructure and the range training schedules. There's nothing that says it can't be shared (We did it for RV 81 but that took years of coordination to get the 4-6 weeks or so the Div had there.)

So ... practically speaking if the overriding criteria is to be able to step out of the compound and directly onto the ranges, the most logical one is ---  Shilo??? --- It has infrastructure for two battalions/regiments; has accessible housing; and has adequate (but not great) manoeuvre and impact areas (and yup - there's even a crappy railhead if you need to move things in and out to the real close CPR mainline.)

Wainwright? Good for training. No competition from anyone else. Very limited housing and would need infrastructure upgrading to become a permanent facility. On the other hand, Edmonton's facilities are pretty new and quite adequate save for the drive down the highway. (I presume that there is a large enough training area there for adequate small arms training and very limited dry manoeuvre training - I haven't been to the base since long before the move up from Calgary) 

I'm not sure if 1 CMBG permanently prepositions shared gear in Wainwright so that its just a bus ride down but even a road move isn't wasted if you treat it as a training event. We used to have to road and rail move 3 RCHA to Wainwright at least every second year and the moves were training activities in their own right. Not every day needs to be spent putting bullets down range to be worthwhile. Rail moves are a fact of life and need to be mastered the way that they were in 4 CMBG (which incidentally didn't have a large training area near it either and always entailed a move to somewhere else.)

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:


> So one loses 1/2 day on each end --
> As opposed to driving across Hwy 17 in Pet - and no TDY to go zero a LAV...
> I get you like drivey-shooty things and Edmonton, and I know your smart  - but a cost benefit analysis shows its a fools errand to base heavier stuff there, I think you are letting emotions crowd your judgment on the validity of that base choice.


Tell me what that cost benefit analysis is then?

Explain the magnitude of additional time and fuel costs for a road move from Edmonton to Wainwright, perhaps with a DTSF?  Show me how a 3-4 hour road move on Day 1 of an exercise significantly impacts the remaining exercise plan differently from a 30 minute road move.  Also, let's see a good comparison of AFV manoeuvre boxes in Petawawa or Valcartier vs Wainwright or Suffield (and even Cold Lake - want to shoot sabot?).  And we better evaluate the difference between range limitations in Gagetown and training areas out West too.

You can pitch "bias" and "emotion" at me because I don't agree with your cost benefit analysis, but lets see what said cost benefit analysis has behind it.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Let's face it, if we approached the US and offered to add a flyover ABCT to V Corps in Poland so long as the Americans equipped it in Poland and also provided up to an ABCT's worth of equipment in Canada as training stocks at no capital cost to us (we'd be responsible for maintenance and training costs of course), they would do it out of their spare stocks in a heart beat because a) they have the gear and b) we'd add tremendous joint political clout to the alliance. Again, the idea is to maximize training in Europe throughout the year by flying over battle groups and up to bde level. The flyovers would be practice for operations and would negate the need for a separate CMTC element in Wainwright.


I'm inspired by your confidence that the US will gladly supply for free two full ABCT's worth of equipment to a NATO partner that is already spending well below the mandated 2% of GDP on defence.  Especially as they are proposing huge Covid-recovery budgets in the states and the Democrats have a razor thin majority in the Senate (for now).

I'm also inspired by your confidence that a Canadian government would gladly face the political backlash by the opposition by Canada basically outsourcing our Army to be an integrated part of the US military.  No matter what type of MOU you put in place it WILL be spun by the opposition as that.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Wouldn't it be nice to actually live on a training area for your gear?
> As well have a railhead so your aren't double loading (loading on a low bed vehicle to have them drive to load on a railhead)?
> 
> IF Canada wants to have a Heavy Force (and I am dead set that the Army isn't big enough to make a worthwhile heavy force that could actually participate in a peer - peer conflict *US Peer, as Canadian Military Peers are like Uganda and Botswana at this point),  Then ONLY Training systems should be in Canada, and the Heavy Bde be forward deployed - it can even rotate ever few years for Regimental "Equity"
> 
> Heavy Forces have zilch to do with Canadian Territorial Defense - because if you think anyone invading Canada is going to do anything more than Snicker at a Div of Heavy Tanks (which Canada doesn't have anyway) you out of your mind.
> Light Forces can disperse and run an insurgency - because that is what the size of the force can do.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> They need a role again - the butchers are at the door - and the Expeditionary nature of the USMC is being reinvested in.
> 
> 
> 
> I'd rather one look at what it needs to be moved - and create a 4th category.
> Light -- Can work in a UH-60/Osprey type craft
> Med-Light - can work in a CH-47
> Medium  - can work in a C-130
> Heavy - needs C-17, better yet sea borne transport.
> 
> Regardless of what you call it - if you look at what Canada is willing to put on the table these days - It's an under equipped Div.
> Trying to make a Heavy Bde requires a significant amount more capital to be invested in equipment - unless everyone is content with a "In Name Bde" (again).
> 
> 
> The bizarre Missing items (Air Defense) fill a Defense of Canada role much better than a lot of other either missing or antiquated gear.
> 
> Reading the Government Mandate to the CF - I'd be hauling the pretty much everyone from BG up for an inquisition on why they are for the most part incapable of filling ANY of the missions allocated currently.



Medium - can work in a C-130


M (tonnes)L (m)W (m)H (m)C130 E19.1​12.5​3.0​2.7​C130 J 3019.1​17.1​3.0​2.7​Lynx8.5​4.6​2.4​2.2​M1139.8​4.9​2.7​2.5​Bv2064.5​6.9​1.9​2.4​M1511.1​3.4​1.6​1.8​Iltis1.6​4.0​1.5​1.8​Ferret3.7​3.7​1.9​1.9​Grizzly10.5​6​2.5​2.5​Cougar10.7​6​2.5​2.5​Bison12.4​6.5​2.5​2.2​MLVW6.3​6.7​2.4​2.9​Coyote14.4​6.4​2.5​2.7​LAVIII16.9​7​2.7​2.8​LAV6.028.6​7.62​2.78​3.16​MSVS18.1​10.4​3.2​3.5​A400M37​17.7​4​3.85​C1776.9​27​5.5​3.76​


It occurs to me that since the 1964 purchase of the fleet of 24 C130 E Hercules that every vehicle the infantry owned was transportable by Herc.

That was true for everything up to and including M113s, Grizzlies and Bisons.

With the Coyote we started pushing our luck maxing out the height limitation.  LAVIII broke the height barrier as did the LAV6.0 and the MSVS.  And the LAV6.0 handily breaks the weight barrier.

In short we have been pushing the envelope, with respect to deployability and finally broke it. 

And the deflection point was 2 October 2003 -  Cpl Robbie Beerenfenger and Sgt Robert Short,

Understandably protection became a higher priority than deployability, especially when deployability could be fixed with C17s, help from our friends and the time available to trickle in troops, vehicles and supplies.



But


In the bad old days, with 24 C130 Hercs I believe that Canada had the ability to deploy the following:

A parachute battalion with M151 Jeeps reinforced by an L5 pack howitzer battery and engineers in a single lift.

A 4 company battalion with recce platoon, anti-tank platoon, mortar platoon and pioneers air landed with 14 M113s and 9 Lynxes in a second lift.  The battalion would be capable of establishing a 3 company perimeter for all round defence while employing the M113s and the Lynxes as a mobile element for recce, screen and quick reaction.  The rest of the battalion's vehicles could follow by air in subsequent lifts taking advantage of time in exactly the same way it was exploited in Afghanistan.

The civil background to this was the couple of thousand airports, fields, and strips available throughout Canada.  Not to mention frozen lakes and lands.

In short, the Special Service Force in Petawawa could land a mechanized force anywhere in Canada in a week.  Or could land a battalion in Cyprus.

That capability was retained even when the urban AVGP (the Grizzly), the Bison and the Bv206 were acquired.

That is a capability that has been lost.



It could have been retained, along with acquiring more protection, if more C17s had been acquired.  That option is no longer open to us.

It seems that a solution (at least partial) could be found by acquiring 24 A400Ms to complement the C17s. (And nobody ask where the pilots and engineers are going to come from - in the scheme of things it is a rounding error - especially if the need is there). 

The reason the solution is only partial is that while the LAV6.0 may be a suitably protected vehicle with many uses one thing it is not is a replacement for either the M113, or the Bv206 when it comes to the rough terrain that defines 70 to 90% of Canada and requires a light, tracked, (amphibious) vehicle that can be supported, and preferably transported, by CH-147F.


Moving up from the CC-130 to the A-400M would raise the definition of Medium to include the LAV6.0 and set new limits on both Cavalry and Artillery vehicles for domestic and expeditionary service. 

Even an M109 would fit in an A-400M.  For delivery anywhere in Canada.   Or globally.


In fact you could probably, just about, lift an ancient 105mm Leopard 1 (C2) in an A400M. (if fully unloaded, unmanned and dried out)


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I'm inspired by your confidence that the US will gladly supply for free two full ABCT's worth of equipment to a NATO partner that is already spending well below the mandated 2% of GDP on defence.  Especially as they are proposing huge Covid-recovery budgets in the states and the Democrats have a razor thin majority in the Senate (for now).
> 
> I'm also inspired by your confidence that a Canadian government would gladly face the political backlash by the opposition by Canada basically outsourcing our Army to be an integrated part of the US military.  No matter what type of MOU you put in place it WILL be spun by the opposition as that.


The fact is that the US has quite a few M1s in storage at the Sierra Depot. Yes they are not the latest versions with all the bells and whistles, but neither are the ones in ARNG and even some Active units. Somewhat the same for Bradleys and M109s. Like us, the US does have manpower and budget issues and having a NATO member, even a cheap one like us, partner up with them by adding something they consider of value to V Corps in Poland would probably be an attractive thing for a low cost. They are actively selling refurbished equipment cheaply to several countries and granting equipment to former Soviet Block countries in order to shore up alliances. Betcha a $1 multi-year lease wouldn't be out of the question.

My guess it would be much easier to convince the US to loan us some of this equipment (and one or two ABCTs are a drop in the bucket) than to convince our government/military to take on the burden of training on and maintaining this gear. Canada is exceptionally good at finding fault with just about any course of action. Political opposition is a given unless in the midst of a deep crisis like 9/11. Sometimes you just have to do the right thing and stop wringing your hands over whether Swords into Plowshares will be unhappy. The internet being what it is in influencing the nation, what you really need is a good Twitter campaign to sell this.   

Seriously though. And let's be blunt. If DND can't come up with the cash to properly equip our army; and if we can't get DND to sort out its spending priorities so that we have an effective army; and if we can't sort out our procurement system so that we can spend our money in a relatively efficient manner; and if we try to second and third guess every reaction to a step forward; then why don't just pack the whole thing in and shut the DND down to an air defence command and a small reserve constabulary force? Personally this neither fish nor fowl stasis we are in is offensive. Sometimes I wonder as to whether the things that DND does is simply to keep a hundred thousand plus folks (especially all their GOFOS and EXs) earning half the defence budget rather than concentrating on defence outputs. Keeping nine "light" infantry battalions without proper gear is like an expensive social security program because equipped as they are we'd be loath to deploy them into any serious harms way - so what's their purpose in peacetime? Basically were an insurance policy and maybe its time to buy the policy with the $19.99 per month premium rather than the $2,000,000,000 per month one.

Hopefully my pessimism doesn't uninspire you. I'm actually not bipolar. 

🍻


----------



## blacktriangle

If the path forward is a mechanized medium/heavy force, I agree with those that believe it should be in Europe, on day 1 of conflict.

But perhaps that is not the best way to provide support to our NATO allies? Considering the Russian emphasis on artillery, perhaps we should focus on countering that threat specifically? Extended range cannons, rocket artillery, AD & indirect fire protection, EW & ISR capabilities etc...

Or, could we focus on the unconventional side of the house, and have light forces with their own mobility assets ready to counter LGM wherever they appear?


----------



## Infanteer

blacktriangle said:


> If the path forward is a mechanized medium/heavy force, I agree with those that believe it should be in Europe, on day 1 of conflict.


Is the cost of garrisoning 4,000 CAF members and their families abroad something that the system can handle?  The Brits have pulled out of mainland Europe, the the US is retrenching its positions worldwide.  How is it that Canada can afford to fund this expense when our allies are trying to move the otherway?


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Tell me what that cost benefit analysis is then?
> 
> Explain the magnitude of additional time and fuel costs for a road move from Edmonton to Wainwright, perhaps with a DTSF?  Show me how a 3-4 hour road move on Day 1 of an exercise significantly impacts the remaining exercise plan differently from a 30 minute road move.  Also, let's see a good comparison of AFV manoeuvre boxes in Petawawa or Valcartier vs Wainwright or Suffield (and even Cold Lake - want to shoot sabot?).  And we better evaluate the difference between range limitations in Gagetown and training areas out West too.
> 
> You can pitch "bias" and "emotion" at me because I don't agree with your cost benefit analysis, but lets see what said cost benefit analysis has behind it.


Cost in TDY $ for any courses that can't now be done locally
   1 VP for instance will cost a lot more than 1 RCR or 1 R22eR to run a LAV Gunner class - as you have students now needing TDY pay for the overnights - that the other units with me ranges don't need to pay.

Cost in Transportation $ For the Low Beds, and crews - I'm not sure if the CF actually has enough low bed tractor trailers to heavy haul a Bn let alone a Bde in one or even 5 moves.
 Seeing what if costs to move a CONEX Box (Sea Container) of ammo from Indiana to WV on a standard bed tractor trailer, and how much to low bed a MRAP from Norfolk to WV - I suspect you would be looking at a contracted out cost / move of about $3k each round trip.

Cost in Vehicle O&M for those that road move?  I'm much more familiar with blade hour budgeting for certain US Rotary wing assets these days (and why its often cheaper to rent Twin Huey time here for units that can - but I am sure the CF has some formula for X KM and/or Y Hours - because your adding 250miles and 5 hours min round trip to the platforms that road move.

That may not come out of units budgets - but it is coming from somewhere - and reducing the pot of money (and time) that you could be doing other things.

I suspect quite quickly that the cost of infrastructure to base the Bde in Wx would be recovered - especially as a lot of that infrastructure is going to be needed anyway if you keep running personnel out there.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Is the cost of garrisoning 4,000 CAF members and their families abroad something that the system can handle?  The Brits have pulled out of mainland Europe, the the US is retrenching its positions worldwide.  How is it that Canada can afford to fund this expense when our allies are trying to move the otherway?


I suspect that the host country would bend over backwards to assist the CF with any infrastructure needs.

Sure the cost of the moves upfront is significant - but I would also guess (based on previous history) the US Army would also bend over backward to get the CF all the kit it could desire from US Stock to fill that unit up to the max.

Beyond the Relocation expenses - I don't think there would be a significant burden, unless you did it entirely solo and setup your own little village for the Bde personnel.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Is the cost of garrisoning 4,000 CAF members and their families abroad something that the system can handle?  The Brits have pulled out of mainland Europe, the the US is retrenching its positions worldwide.  How is it that Canada can afford to fund this expense when our allies are trying to move the otherway?



The Brits have indeed pulled out of mainland Europe - and have moved definitively to a lighter force equipped with novel technologies, a more dispersed foot print and more reliant on special forces (special being extremely broadly defined).

They have retained some heavy capabilities but that seems to be the area in which there is the least amount of investment and the greatest divestment of legacy capabilities.

Tracks are displaced by wheels and wings, both fixed and rotary.  Bullets are displaced by missiles.


----------



## blacktriangle

Infanteer said:


> Is the cost of garrisoning 4,000 CAF members and their families abroad something that the system can handle?  The Brits have pulled out of mainland Europe, the the US is retrenching its positions worldwide.  How is it that Canada can afford to fund this expense when our allies are trying to move the otherway?


I don't think it can under current conditions. I don't think we will ever deploy a true formed brigade again except under extreme duress (and with extreme delay) I'm also not convinced it would make much of a difference, anyways.

Canada could help to counter some of the unconventional/hybrid operations that adversaries can and would conduct. Both kinetic and non-kinetic.


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:


> Cost in TDY $ for any courses that can't now be done locally
> 1 VP for instance will cost a lot more than 1 RCR or 1 R22eR to run a LAV Gunner class - as you have students now needing TDY pay for the overnights - that the other units with me ranges don't need to pay.



Great, you've saved a couple hundred bucks in Incidental expenses and breakfast on a LAV gunner course, a rounding error on a Brigade's budget.  That's if you choose to execute the course in the manner - the common practice is to deploy to the field as part of a unit exercise, for which TD benefits do not apply (this is what LDA is for), so this issue is not a factor.



KevinB said:


> Cost in Transportation $ For the Low Beds, and crews - I'm not sure if the CF actually has enough low bed tractor trailers to heavy haul a Bn let alone a Bde in one or even 5 moves.
> Seeing what if costs to move a CONEX Box (Sea Container) of ammo from Indiana to WV on a standard bed tractor trailer, and how much to low bed a MRAP from Norfolk to WV - I suspect you would be looking at a contracted out cost / move of about $3k each round trip.
> 
> Cost in Vehicle O&M for those that road move?  I'm much more familiar with blade hour budgeting for certain US Rotary wing assets these days (and why its often cheaper to rent Twin Huey time here for units that can - but I am sure the CF has some formula for X KM and/or Y Hours - because your adding 250miles and 5 hours min round trip to the platforms that road move.
> 
> That may not come out of units budgets - but it is coming from somewhere - and reducing the pot of money (and time) that you could be doing other things.



This is not a cost benefit analysis.  This is just some random guesses on vehicle O&M costs (only one factor in the analysis) and no consideration of benefits.


----------



## Kirkhill

Operational structure of the Polish Land Forces - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						Polish Land Forces - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




1 Armd Cav Div
3 Mech Divs

4 Armd Cav Bdes
8 Mech Bdes
1 Air Mobile Bde
1 Airborne Bde

1009 MBT



> At present, Polish Army has a stock of 1009 tanks (2017). There are a total of 249 Leopard 2 tanks (137 Leopard 2 A4, 105 Leopard 2 A5, 5 Leopard 2PL,[15] 2 Leopard 2 NJ), 232 PT-91 tanks that underwent modernization in 2016, and 328 T-72 tanks. 230 of the T-72 are being upgraded in Bumar-Labedy arms manufacturer plant. Some of the improvements are: installation of new radio communication systems, digital engine control and start-up system, 3rd generation thermal imaging cameras, external transport baskets, and any necessary overhauls and repairs that can improve their longevity and combat ability on the modern battlefield.[16]



Beyond moral comfort what, in practical terms, is the Canadian Army going to offer the Poles?

And, despite the heavy preponderance of heavy and mech forces, why do the Poles waste effort by retaining two light brigades?  With whom the Brits regularly practice. 

Yes.  We could repeat 4 CMBG and relocate it forward to Poland.  At considerable expense and with little practical value and permanently tied.

Or.  We could add some more light force reinforcement and focus on ISR technologies, the Artillery and the Air Force to supply things that our budget can afford and the Poles can't.



> The brigade is currently[_when?_] composed of five separate battalions; 1 command battalion, 3 airborne infantry battalions, and 1 logistics battalion. The command battalion provides command and control for the brigade and also provides a reconnaissance company, a company of sappers, and an anti-aircraft battery. The airborne battalions consists of: a command company, 3 rifle companies, a mortar company, a logistics company and a medical support team. The brigade's logistics battalion is tasked with supplying any material supplies needed by the brigade during an operation.
> 
> Brigade units are stationed in three separate garrisons , its structure is as follows:
> 
> 
> *6th Airborne Brigade "Brig. Gen. Stanisław Sosabowski"* in Kraków
> 6th Command Battalion in Kraków
> 6th Airborne Battalion in Gliwice
> 16th Airborne Battalion in Kraków
> 18th Airborne Battalion in Bielsko-Biała
> 6th Logistic Battalion in Kraków
> 
> The brigade is directly responsible to the Armed Forces General Command (Poland).





> 25th Air Cavalry Brigade in Tomaszów Mazowiecki
> 
> 
> 
> 25th Command Battalion in Tomaszów Mazowiecki
> 1st Light Cavalry Battalion in Leźnica Wielka
> 7th Uhlan Battalion in Tomaszów Mazowiecki
> 1st Aviation Group in Leźnica Wielka
> 1st Squadron with 16x Mi-8T transport helicopters
> 2nd Squadron with 16x Mi-17-1V transport helicopters
> 
> 7th Aviation Group in Nowy Glinnik
> 1st Squadron with 12x PZL W-3WA Sokół armed transport helicopters
> 2nd Squadron with 12x PZL W-3WA Sokół armed transport helicopters
> 
> Air Medical Evacuation Unit in Nowy Glinnik with 2x PZL W-3WA AE Sokół and 2x Mi-17AE medical evacuation helicopters
> 25th Logistic Battalion in Tomaszów Mazowiecki





> The (25th Air Cavalry)  brigade serves in an air assault role, where troops are transported to and then inserted into battle using helicopters. This enables the brigade to have a high degree of maneuverability, being able to be transported rapidly to strategic or tactical situations.











						25th Air Cavalry Brigade - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						6th Airborne Brigade (Poland) - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

And for reference here is a kit list for the Poles.






						List of equipment of the Polish Land Forces - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> The Brits have indeed pulled out of mainland Europe - and have moved definitively to a lighter force equipped with novel technologies, a more dispersed foot print and more reliant on special forces (special being extremely broadly defined).


I don't know if I'd agree with "lighter force" per se. There has been a significant manpower reduction since 2000 (much more severe than ours which had to equate to unit cuts) Under Army 2020 Refine there were was an armoured division and still is. There are still two "heavy brigades" and a Strike brigade albeit these have been turned into BCTs to make them more self sufficient. The light elements were always a bit of a "mix and match and go" element to start with and have now been "modernized" with some going into "special" categories. Forgive me if after the outcome of Afghanistan I'm not a bit jaded about these new specialties as being designed to meet the problems of the last war. I don't doubt that we'll all stay in the capacity building game to some extent but I do think everyone right now is heavily rethinking the old three-block war/counterinsurgency models to a great extent and in particular their populations' tolerance for sending their boys off to those.


Kirkhill said:


> They have retained some heavy capabilities but that seems to be the area in which there is the least amount of investment and the greatest divestment of legacy capabilities.


The investments in heavy elements is quite robust and don't forget they consider Ajax an investment in heavy. As is Boxer. These are definitely not "light" capabilities and if "medium" they are on the high side of medium. We'll have to wait and see how the whole Ajax issue plays out.

So, while the Brits have reduced the overall side of the Army over the last two decades considerably, their ratio of heavy to light has changed very little.


Kirkhill said:


> Tracks are displaced by wheels and wings, both fixed and rotary.  Bullets are displaced by missiles.


I don't buy those assumptions. Each of those has its role and IMHO, even considering our small size, putting all your eggs in one basket or the other is the wrong way to go. Mixing up your light and heavy eggs in one basket isn't the best thing either.



blacktriangle said:


> I don't think it can under current conditions. I don't think we will ever deploy a true formed brigade again except under extreme duress (and with extreme delay) I'm also not convinced it would make much of a difference, anyways.


Extreme duress is why the Army exists. We have three brigades of stuff; why not train and be prepared to use it as such.

Extreme delay is simply a matter of bad planning.


blacktriangle said:


> Canada could help to counter some of the unconventional/hybrid operations that adversaries can and would conduct. Both kinetic and non-kinetic.


Unconventional/hybrid operations are a phase of war (Infanteer can correct me; there's probably an authorized term for it now). But as a phase, there are other phases that follow it. Don't forget that the very term "hybrid" contemplates a mix of unconventional and conventional warfare. Why else would the Russian Army maintain 136 contractor manned Tactical Battalion Groups?



Kirkhill said:


> Beyond moral comfort what, in practical terms, is the Canadian Army going to offer the Poles?
> 
> And, despite the heavy preponderance of heavy and mech forces, why do the Poles waste effort by retaining two light brigades? With whom the Brits regularly practice.
> 
> Yes. We could repeat 4 CMBG and relocate it forward to Poland. At considerable expense and with little practical value and permanently tied.


Let me see if I have this right. The Poles have 11 heavy or mech brigades and one airborne and one airmobile brigade (a ratio of 5.5 heavy to 1 light) so we should send them something light because they're short on light?

Does their force structure not give us a a hint of what they expect will be needed in this theatre.

And yes. Moral comfort by deploying a credible deterrent force is something allies do. This is why we build military alliances. The key words here are "credible deterrent force". Not a meaningless speed bump.

This whole thing reminds me of President Kennedy's "Moon" speech. 


> We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, ...


I'm not saying abandon light for heavy. They're both important. I'm saying NATO is our biggest military gig. And it requires "heavy" and in a serious showdown that means at least a brigade to be meaningful. If you want to bring an anti-little green men capability and airmobile battalion with whizz bang weapons and some form of cyber warfare stuff - bring it too once we finally figure out what we want and how to build it and how to use it. In the meantime stay "heavy", my friend.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

> In 1951, 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade arrived in Europe, to be succeeded by the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade in 1953, then 2 CIBG in 1955, then 4 CIBG in 1957. In 1959, when 4 CIBG's tour was due to end, a change was made in the reinforcement policy for Germany. Instead of whole brigades rotating every two years, the decision was made to keep 4 CIBG and its associated brigade units in place, instead rotating the major combat elements to Germany every three years.





> The division traces its origins to the activation of Headquarters No. 1 Air Division, Royal Canadian Air Force in Paris, France, on 1 October 1952. Air Division headquarters relocated to Metz, France in April 1953.[10] No. 1 Air Division was established to meet Canada's NATO air defence commitments in Europe. It consisted of four wings of twelve fighter squadrons located at four bases. Two bases were located in France (RCAF Station Marville (No. 1 Wing) and RCAF Station Grostenquin (No. 2 Wing)) and two were located in West Germany (RCAF Station Zweibrücken (No. 3 Wing) and RCAF Station Baden-Soellingen (No. 4 Wing)). ( No. 1 Wing was first located at RCAF North Luffenham, England and was moved to Marville some time after October, 1954). These wings were part of a group of bases which also included U.S. and French installations, all of which came under the jurisdiction of NATO's Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF) which, in turn, was commanded by Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE). Components located in Metz included Air Division Headquarters, an air traffic control centre, a telecommunications centre, a combat operations centre, and a support unit. From 1952 to 1963 the RCAF operated the 30 Air Materiel Base, at RCAF Langar (RAF Langar) in Nottinghamshire. RCAF Langar was Canada's last base in the U.K. and served as a primary supply station for No. 1 Air Division RCAF in Europe.
> 
> Canadian squadrons were originally equipped with Canadair Sabre day fighters. One squadron of each wing, however, would be replaced by the all-weather CF-100 in 1956. The Sabre squadrons were replaced by (nuclear) strike/reconnaissance CF-104 Starfighters in 1962.



Which do we reckon bought Canada more political clout?  27 CIB/4CMBG or 1 Air Div RCAF ?

Which is more flexible and has greater domestic utility as well as forward presence?

And as for the RCN

15x CSC with 32 strike length Mk41 cells = 96 long range precision strike missiles (cruise, ballistic, loitering, hypervelocity.....) from each of five task groups of 3 vessels.  And that would still leave 3x 8 NSMs and 2x24 Sea Ceptors for self defence.

What constitutes long range fire support?



> WASHINGTON — By 2023, the U.S. Army will have begun delivering a portfolio of strategic, mid-range and short-range fires capabilities that will change the paradigm against near-peer adversaries Russia and China, according to Brig. Gen. John Rafferty, who is in charge of the service’s long-range precision fires modernization effort.
> 
> The Army wrapped up a strategic fires study earlier this year that found a gap in the service’s ability to reach enemy targets in the mid-range (about 500-2,000 kilometers), Rafferty told Defense News in a Sept. 4 interview.



The HIMARS/MLRS system is already exceeding 400 km and the US Army has adopted the SM6 and Tomahawk missiles for the near term Mid-Range missiles (>1000 km).  The USMC is also adopting the Tomahawk to revive the GLCM capabilities lost during the Greenham Common era.

I suggest our contribution will be measured not in how many rations we consume but in how many targets we eliminate and how quickly they disappear.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I'm not saying abandon light for heavy. They're both important. I'm saying NATO is our biggest military gig. And it requires "heavy" and in a serious showdown that means at least a brigade to be meaningful.
> 
> 🍻



This.

Our CoG should be NATO, of course. And no one takes you seriously, as a nation, unless you (literally) bring out the big guns.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> This.
> 
> Our CoG should be NATO, of course. And no one takes you seriously, as a nation, unless you (literally) bring out the big guns.



I agree.  And the Navy has always had the biggest guns.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> I agree.  And the Navy has always had the biggest guns.



And the most 'fun' guns...


----------



## Kirkhill

And...



> *Origins*
> 
> The origins of Royal Navy Field Gun lay in 1899, in the Second Boer War, and in particular the epic 119-day Siege of Ladysmith.  As the British Army was besieged by Boer fighters in the garrison town of Ladysmith, Natal, the Royal Navy landed guns from HM Ships Terrible and Powerful to help in the relief of the siege.  Special carriages and mountings for these guns had been improvised by Percy Scott, before the Naval Brigade manhandled six field guns each weighing nearly half a metric tonne over rough terrain to assist their opposite numbers of the British Army.
> 
> The gallant defenders were helped enormously by the arrival at the last minute, of Captain the Hon Hedworth Lambton of the Naval Brigade with his 280 Blue-Jackets, four 12 pounders and two 4.7 inch guns.  After the siege of Ladysmith was finally lifted on 28 Feb 1900, Her Majesty Queen Victoria I sent a telegram: ‘Pray express to the Naval Brigade my deep appreciation of the valuable services they have rendered with their guns'’.  Displays of this magnificent feat began in London that year.
> 
> *History of the Competition*
> 
> Each year since 1907, this teamwork, leadership, and moral and physical courage has been commemorated in the form of annual Field Gun competitions.  In June 1907, what was to become the Inter-Command Competition began in Olympia, between Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham.  Two months later, on 28 August 1907, the Brickwoods Competition, which was to become the Royal Navy Field Gun Tournament for the Brickwoods Trophy, began for Portsmouth crews.  The first winners were the Royal Marines Light Infantry Field Gun Crew from Forton.











						Royal Navy Field Gun| Royal Navy
					






					www.royalnavy.mod.uk


----------



## Kirkhill

1989



> 1 British Corps[edit]​The area 1 BR Corps had to defend lay between Hanover to the north and Kassel to the south and extended from the Inner German Border to the Upper Weser Valley. In case of war, the Corps first line of defense would have been a screening force of 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards, 16th/5th The Queen's Royal Lancers and 664 Squadron Army Air Corps, which would have become an ad hoc brigade formation under command of BAOR's Brigadier Royal Armoured Corps. Behind the screening force 1st Armoured and 4th Armoured Division would form up. 3rd Armoured Division was to the rear of the two forward deployed division as reserve. 2nd Infantry Division was to defend the Corps Rear Area and prepare a last line of defence along the Western bank of the Weser river.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *1 British Corps*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 1 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 7 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 12 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 22 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 3 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 4 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 6 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 33 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 4 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 11 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 20 Armoured
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 1 Artillery
> 1st British Corps units 1989
> Units in italics were based in the UK and would join parent organization upon mobilization
> 
> 
> I British Corps, Bielefeld[note 1][7]
> 1st (BR) Corps HQ Defence Company, Royal Pioneer Corps, Bielefeld
> 5th (Volunteer) Btn, Royal Green Jackets, Oxford, UK, 1st British Corps HQ security unit
> _Special Air Service Group_, Stay Behind Observation Posts and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol unit[8]
> _63 (SAS) Signal Squadron_, Royal Signals (V), Thorney Island, UK
> _21st Special Air Service Regiment (Artists)_ (V), Chelsea, UK
> _23rd Special Air Service Regiment_ (V), Birmingham, UK
> _Honourable Artillery Company_, Finsbury, UK, (Surveillance and Target Acquisition Patrols)[9]
> 
> *Commander Royal Artillery 1 (BR) Corps*, Bielefeld
> 1st Artillery Brigade, Dortmund
> _Detachment, 55th Signal Squadron, Royal Signals (V)_, Liverpool, UK
> 5th Heavy Regiment, Royal Artillery, Dortmund, (12x M107, supports 4th Armoured Division)
> 32nd Heavy Regiment, Royal Artillery, Dortmund, (12x M107, supports 1st Armoured Division)
> Corps Support Group, Bielefeld
> 39th Heavy Regiment, Royal Artillery, Sennelager, (12x M110, re-roling to 24x M270 MLRS from December 1989)
> 50 Missile Regiment Royal Artillery, Menden, (12x MGM-52 Lance missile launchers)
> _94th Locating Regiment_, Royal Artillery, Larkhill, UK, (Target Acquisition), (includes 5th (Gibraltar 1779-83) Field Battery with 6x L118 light guns for AMF (L))
> _8th Btn, Queen’s Fusiliers_ (V), Clapham, UK, 50th Missile Regiment, Royal Artillery, security unit
> _266th (Gloucestershire Volunteer Artillery) Observation Post Battery_, Royal Artillery (V), Clifton, UK (3x L118 light guns)
> _269th (West Riding) Observation Post Battery_, Royal Artillery (V), Leeds, UK (3x L118 light guns)
> _307th (South Nottinghamshire Hussars Yeomanry, Royal Horse Artillery) Observation Post Battery_, Royal Artillery (V), Bulwell, UK (3x L118 light guns)
> 
> Air Defence Group, Dortmund
> 12th Air Defence Regiment, Royal Artillery, Dortmund, (24x self-propelled and 24x towed Rapier missile systems)
> _16th Air Defence Regiment_, Royal Artillery, Kirton in Lindsey, UK, (48x towed Rapier missile systems, 1x Battery supports UKMF/1st Infantry Brigade, 1x Battery supports 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines)
> 22nd Air Defence Regiment, Royal Artillery, Dortmund, (24x self-propelled and 24x towed Rapier missile systems)
> _102nd (Ulster) Air Defence Regiment Royal Artillery (V), Belfast, UK, (32x Javelin)_
> _104th Air Defence Regiment_, Royal Artillery (V), Newport, UK, (64x Javelin)
> _105th (Scottish) Air Defence Regiment_, Royal Artillery (V), Edinburgh UK, (64x Javelin)
> 
> 8th Transport Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, Münster, supports Heavy, and Missile Regiments
> _153 (Highland) Transport Regiment_, Royal Corps of Transport (V), Edinburgh, UK, supports the Air Defence Regiments
> 
> 
> *Commander Royal Engineers 1 (BR) Corps*, Bielefeld
> *29th Engineer Brigade (V)*, Newcastle-on-Tyne, UK - the brigade was planned join I British Corps in Germany within 72 hours of mobilization.
> HQ 29th Engineer Brigade & Signal Troop, Royal Signals, Newcastle-on-Tyne
> 71st (Scottish) Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers (V), Glasgow
> 72nd (Tyne Electrical Engineers) Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers (V), Gateshead
> 73rd Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers (V), Nottingham
> 105th (Tyne Electrical Engineers) Plant Squadron, Royal Engineers (V), South Shields
> 117th (Highland) Field Support Squadron, Royal Engineers (V), Dundee
> 873rd Movement Light Squadron, Royal Engineers (V), Acton, provides lighting for night operations
> 29th Engineer Brigade Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (V), Newcastle-on-Tyne
> 
> 23rd Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers, Osnabrück
> 25th Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers, Osnabrück
> 28th Amphibious Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers, Hameln, (60x M2D Ferries)
> 32nd Armoured Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers, Munsterlager, (30x FV432, 12x FV103 Spartan, 12x FV180 Combat Engineer Tractor, 27x AVLB, 27x Centurion AVRE)
> 43rd Plant Squadron, Royal Engineers, Osnabrück
> 65th Corps Support Squadron, Royal Engineers, Hameln, (20x M2 Amphibious Rigs)
> Corps Lighting Troop, Royal Engineers, Herford
> 211th Mobile Civilian Artisan Group, Royal Engineers, Sennelager
> 256th Mobile Civilian Plant Group, Royal Engineers, Hannover
> 1st Postal & Courier Regiment, Royal Engineers, Hannover
> 
> *Commander Aviation BAOR and 1 (BR) Corps*, Bielefeld
> 1 Wing AAC, Hobart Barracks in Detmold, West Germany, (Wing disbanded during 1989)
> 1 Regiment AAC, Tofrek Barracks in Hildesheim, supported 1st Armoured Division
> 651 Squadron AAC, (Anti-Tank, 4x Gazelle AH.1, 12x Lynx AH.7 (TOW))
> 652 Squadron AAC, (Anti-Tank, 4x Gazelle AH.1, 12x Lynx AH.7 (TOW))
> 661 Squadron AAC, (Reconnaissance, 12x Gazelle AH.1)
> 
> 3 Regiment AAC, Salamanca Barracks in Soest, supported 3rd Armoured Division
> 653 Squadron AAC, (Anti-Tank, 4x Gazelle AH.1, 12x Lynx AH.7 (TOW))
> 662 Squadron AAC, (Reconnaissance, 12x Gazelle AH.1)
> 663 Squadron AAC, (Reconnaissance, 12x Gazelle AH.1)
> 
> 4 Regiment AAC, Hobart Barracks in Detmold, supported 4th Armoured Division
> 654 Squadron AAC, (Anti-Tank, 4x Gazelle AH.1, 12x Lynx AH.7 (TOW))
> 659 Squadron AAC, (Anti-Tank, 4x Gazelle AH.1, 12x Lynx AH.7 (TOW))
> 669 Squadron AAC, (Reconnaissance, 12x Gazelle AH.1)
> 
> 664 Squadron AAC, St George's Barracks in Minden, (Reconnaissance, 12x Gazelle AH.1)
> 
> 
> *Commander Communications 1 (BR) Corps*, Bielefeld
> 7th Signal Regiment, Royal Signals, Herford
> 14th Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare), Royal Signals, Celle
> 22nd Signal Regiment, Royal Signals, Lippstadt
> _4th (Volunteer) Btn, Worcestershire & Sherwood Foresters_, Redditch, UK
> 
> *Commander Transport 1 (BR) Corps*, Bielefeld
> 7th Tank Transporter Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, Sennelager
> 10th Corps Transport Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, Bielefeld
> 24th Transport & Movement Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, Hanover
> 25th Transport & Movement Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, Bielefeld
> _150th (Northumbrian) Transport Regiment_, Royal Corps of Transport (V), Hull, UK
> _151st (Greater London) Transport Regiment_, Royal Corps of Transport (V), Croydon, UK
> _152nd (Ulster) Ambulance Regiment_, Royal Corps of Transport (V), Belfast, UK
> _154th (Lowland) Transport Regiment_, Royal Corps of Transport (V), Glasgow, UK
> _157th (Wales & Midlands) Transport Regiment_, Royal Corps of Transport (V), Cardiff, UK
> _162nd Movement Control Regiment_, Royal Corps of Transport (V), Grantham, UK
> 14th Corps Support Squadron, Royal Corps of Transport, Bielefeld
> 
> *Commander Medical 1 (BR) Corps*, Bielefeld
> 21st Field Hospital, Royal Army Medical Corps, Rinteln
> 32nd Field Hospital, Royal Army Medical Corps, Hannover
> _33rd Field Hospital_, Royal Army Medical Corps, Aldershot, UK
> _202nd (Midlands) General Hospital_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Birmingham, UK
> _203rd (Welsh) General Hospital_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Cardiff, UK
> _204th (North Irish) General Hospital_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Belfast, UK
> _211th (Wessex) Field Hospital_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Barnstaple, UK
> _212th (Yorkshire) Field Hospital_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Sheffield, UK
> _217th General Hospital_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Walworth, UK
> _219th (Wessex) Field Hospital_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Keynsham, UK
> 83rd Field Medical Equipment Depot, Royal Army Medical Corps, Hannover
> 
> *Commander Supply 1 (BR) Corps*, Bielefeld
> 5th Ordnance Battalion, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Paderborn
> 6th Ordnance Battalion, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Bielefeld
> 2nd Aircraft Support Unit, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Detmold
> 
> *Commander Maintenance 1 (BR) Corps*, Bielefeld
> 1st (BR) Corps Troops Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Bielefeld
> 20th Electronics Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Minden
> 71st Aircraft Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Detmold
> _124th (Tyne Electrical Engineers) Recovery Company_, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (V), Newton Aycliffe, UK
> _126th Reclamation Workshop_, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (V), Bordon, UK
> _133th (Kent) Corps Troops Workshop_, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (V), Maidstone, UK
> 
> *Provost Marshal 1 (BR) Corps*, Bielefeld
> 110th Provost Company, Royal Military Police, Sennelager
> 115th Provost Company, Royal Military Police, Osnabrück
> _116th Provost Company_, Royal Military Police (V), Cannock, UK
> 
> 
> note 1: December 1989.
> 
> 1st Armoured Division[edit]​1st Armoured Division was the corps' Northern forward deployed division.
> 
> 
> *1st Armoured Division*, Verden
> HQ 1st Armoured Division & Signal Regiment, Royal Signals, Verden
> *7th Armoured Brigade*, Soltau
> HQ 7th Armoured Brigade & 207th Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Soltau
> Royal Scots Dragoon Guards, Fallingbostel, (57x Challenger 1 main battle tanks, 8x FV101 Scorpion armoured reconnaissance vehicles)
> 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, Fallingbostel, (57x Challenger 1, 8x FV101 Scorpion)
> 1st Btn, Staffordshire Regiment (Prince of Wales's), Fallingbostel, (45x Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, 38x FV432 armoured personnel carriers, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 
> *12th Armoured Brigade*, Osnabrück
> HQ 12th Armoured Brigade & 212th Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Osnabrück
> 4th Royal Tank Regiment, Osnabrück, (57x Chieftain main battle tanks,[note 2] 8x FV101 Scorpion)
> 1st Btn, Royal Irish Rangers, Osnabrück, (79x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 1st Btn, Royal Green Jackets, Osnabrück, (79x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> _4th (Volunteer) Btn, Royal Green Jackets_, London, UK
> 
> *22nd Armoured Brigade*, Bergen-Hohne
> HQ 22nd Armoured Brigade & 201st Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Bergen-Hohne
> Queen's Own Hussars, Bergen-Hohne, (57x Challenger 1, 8x FV101 Scorpion)
> 1st Royal Tank Regiment, Hildesheim, (57x Chieftain, 8x FV101 Scorpion)
> 1st Btn, Scots Guards, Bergen-Hohne, (79x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 2nd Btn, Royal Anglian Regiment, Celle, (79x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 
> _Parachute Regiment Group_,[note 3] Aldershot, UK
> _Group HQ & Signals Troop_, Royal Signals, Aldershot, UK
> _4th (Northern) Btn__, Parachute Regiment_, Pudsey, UK
> _10th (County of London) Btn, Parachute Regiment_, Chelsea, UK
> _15th (Scottish Volunteer) Btn, Parachute Regiment_, Glasgow, UK
> 
> *Commander Royal Artillery 1st Armoured Division*, Bergen-Hohne
> 1st Field Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, Bergen-Hohne, (24x Abbot howitzers)
> 4th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, Osnabrück, (24x M109A2 howitzer)
> 40th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, Bergen-Hohne, (24x M109A2)
> 10th (Assaye) Air Defence Battery, (36x Javelin SAM)
> 
> 
> 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards, Wolfenbüttel, (48x FV107 Scimitar, 16x FV102 Striker anti-tank vehicles, 20x FV103 Spartan), unit based closest to the inner German border.
> 21st Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers, Nienburg, (30x FV432, 12x FV103 Spartan, 12x FV180 Combat Engineer Tractor, and 12x Armoured vehicle-launched bridges)
> 1st Armoured Division Transport Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, Bunde
> 1st Ordnance Battalion, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Verden
> 7th Armoured Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Fallingbostel
> 12th Armoured Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Osnabrück
> 1st Armoured Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps, Bergen-Hohne
> 2nd Armoured Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps, Osnabrück
> _220th (1st Home Counties) Field Ambulance_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Maidstone, UK
> 111th Provost Company, Royal Military Police, Bergen-Hohne
> 
> 2nd Infantry Division[edit]​2nd Infantry Division was based in the North East of the United Kingdom and was planned to have joined I British Corps in Germany within 72 hours of mobilization. The division was tasked with defending the Corps Rear Area and prepare a last line of defense along the Western bank of the Weser River. Therefore, the 29th Engineer Brigade was added to the division and was tasked with route maintenance and preparation of defensive positions on the western bank of the Weser River in the Upper Weser Valley.
> 
> 
> *2nd Infantry Division*, York, based in the United Kingdom.
> HQ 2nd Infantry Division & Signal Regiment, Royal Signals, York
> *15th (North East) Infantry Brigade*, Alanbrooke Barracks, Topcliffe
> HQ 15th Infantry Brigade & Signal Troop (V), Royal Signals, Topcliffe
> Queen's Own Yeomanry, Newcastle upon Tyne, (reconnaissance regiment with 80x FV721 Fox, 20x Spartan)
> 1st (Cleveland) Btn, Yorkshire Volunteers (V), York
> 2nd (Yorkshire & Humberside) Btn, Yorkshire Volunteers (V), York
> 6th (Volunteer) Btn, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (V), Newcastle upon Tyne
> 7th (Durham) Btn, The Light Infantry (V), Durham
> 8th (Yorkshire) Btn, The Light Infantry (V), Wakefield
> 
> *24th Airmobile Brigade*, Catterick
> HQ 24th Airmobile Brigade & 210th Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Catterick
> 1st Btn, Green Howards (Alexandra, Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment), Catterick
> 1st Btn, Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire, Catterick
> 3rd Btn, The Light Infantry, Blackpool, (43x Saxon, 8x FV721 Fox, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 9 Regiment Army Air Corps, RAF Topcliffe
> No. 672 Squadron AAC, (Lynx Light Battlefield Helicopter Squadron, activated 1 January 1990, 12x Lynx AH.9)
> No. 3 Flight AAC, (4x Gazelle AH.1)
> 
> 51st Field Squadron (Air Mobile), Royal Engineers, Ripon, from 38th Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers
> 24th (Airmobile) Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps, Catterick
> 
> *29th Engineer Brigade (V)*, Newcastle-on-Tyne
> HQ 29th Engineer Brigade & Signal Troop, Royal Signals, Newcastle-on-Tyne
> 71st (Scottish) Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers (V), Glasgow
> 72 (Tyne Electrical Engineers) Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers (V), Gateshead
> 73rd Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers (V), Nottingham
> 105th (Tyne Electrical Engineers) Plant Squadron, Royal Engineers (V), South Shields
> 117th (Highland) Field Support Squadron, Royal Engineers (V), Dundee
> 873rd Movement Light Squadron, Royal Engineers (V), Acton, provides lighting for night operations
> 29th Engineer Brigade Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (V), Newcastle-on-Tyne
> 
> 49th (Eastern) Infantry Brigade, Chilwell
> HQ 49th Infantry Brigade & Signal Troop (V), Royal Signals, Chilwell
> Royal Yeomanry, Chelsea, (Armoured reconnaissance with 80x FV721 Fox, 20x Spartan)
> 3rd (Volunteer) Btn, Staffordshire Regiment (Prince of Wales's) (V), Wolverhampton
> 5th (Volunteer) Btn, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (V), Coventry
> 5th (Shropshire and Herefordshire) Btn, The Light Infantry (V), Shrewsbury
> 5th (Volunteer) Btn, Royal Anglian Regiment (V), Peterborough
> 7th (Volunteer) Btn, Royal Anglian Regiment (V), Leicester
> 
> Commander Royal Artillery 2nd Infantry Division, York
> 27th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, Topcliffe, (18x FH-70), supports 24th Airmobile Brigade
> 100th (Yeomanry) Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (V), London, (24x L118 light guns), supports 49th Infantry Brigade
> 101st (Northumbrian) Field Regiment, Royal Artillery (V), Newcastle upon Tyne, (24x L118 light guns), supports 15th Infantry Brigade
> 103rd (Lancashire Artillery Volunteers) Air Defence Regiment, Royal Artillery (V), Liverpool, (64x Javelin)
> 
> 2nd Transport Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, Catterick
> 2nd Ordnance Battalion, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Catterick
> 15th Field Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Catterick
> 15th Field Support Squadron, Royal Engineers, Ripon, from 38th Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers
> 250th Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Grimsby
> 251st (Sunderland) Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Sunderland
> 254th Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Cambridge
> No. 655 Squadron AAC, Northern Ireland Regiment AAC, AAC Ballykelly, (Anti-tank, 4x Gazelle AH.1, 12x Lynx AH.7)
> 150th Provost Company, Royal Military Police, Catterick
> 
> 3rd Armoured Division[edit]​3rd Armoured Division was the corps' reserve formation.
> 
> 
> *3rd Armoured Division*, Soest
> HQ 3rd Armoured Division & Signal Regiment, Royal Signals, Soest
> *4th Armoured Brigade*, Münster
> HQ 4th Armoured Brigade & 204th Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Münster
> 14th/20th King's Hussars, Münster, (57x Challenger 1, 8x FV101 Scorpion), one squadron detached to Berlin Infantry Brigade
> 17th/21st Lancers, Münster, (57x Challenger 1, 8x FV101 Scorpion), one squadron detached to British Forces Cyprus
> 1st Btn, Grenadier Guards, Münster, (45x Warrior, 38x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 
> *6th Armoured Brigade*, Soest
> HQ 6th Armoured Brigade & 206th Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Soest
> 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, Hemer, (56x Challenger 1, 8x FV101 Scorpion)
> 1st Btn, Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment), Werl, (45x Warrior, 38x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 3rd Btn, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, Hemer, (45x Warrior, 38x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 
> *33rd Armoured Brigade*, Paderborn
> HQ 33rd Armoured Brigade & 202nd Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Paderborn
> Blues and Royals, Sennelager, (57x Challenger 1, 8x FV101 Scorpion)
> 1st Btn, Queen's Own Highlanders, Münster, (79x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 1st Btn, Queen's Lancashire Regiment, Paderborn, (79x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 
> *Commander Royal Artillery 3rd Armoured Division*, Münster
> 2nd Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, Münster, (24x M109A2)
> 46th (Talavera) Air Defence Battery, (36x Javelin)
> 
> 3rd Field Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, Paderborn, (24x Abbot howitzers)
> 49th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, Lippstadt, (24x M109A2)
> 
> _9th/12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales’s)_, Wimbish, UK, (24x FV101 Scorpion, 24x FV107 Scimitar, 16x FV102 Striker, 19x FV103 Spartan)
> 26th Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers, Iserlohn, (30x FV432, 12x Spartan, 12x FV180, and 12x AVLB)
> 3rd Armoured Division Transport Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, Duisburg
> 3rd Ordnance Battalion, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Soest
> 5th Armoured Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Soest
> 6th Armoured Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Münster
> 11th Armoured Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Soest
> 3rd Armoured Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps, Sennelager
> 5th Armoured Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps, Münster
> _221st Field Ambulance_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Kingston-upon-Thames, UK
> 113th Provost Company, Royal Military Police, Werl
> 
> note 2: units in _italics_ were based in the UK and would join 1st Armoured Division upon mobilization.
> 
> 4th Armoured Division[edit]​4th Armoured Division was the Corps' Southern forward deployed division. As the division's area of operation was hilly and woody, 19th Infantry Brigade was added to it.
> 
> 
> *4th Armoured Division*, Herford, FRG
> HQ 4th Armoured Division & Signal Regiment, Royal Signals, Herford
> *11th Armoured Brigade*, Minden, FRG
> HQ 11th Armoured Brigade & 211th Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Minden
> 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, Paderborn, (57x Chieftain, 8x FV101 Scorpion)
> 1st Btn, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Minden, (79x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 2nd Btn, Queen's Regiment, Minden, (79x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> _1st Btn, 51st Highland Volunteers_ (V), Perth, UKnote 2
> 
> _*19th Infantry Brigade*_, Colchester, England- the brigade would join 4th Armoured Division within 48 hours of receiving marching orders.
> HQ 19th Infantry Brigade & 209th Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Colchester
> Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales Own), Tidworth, (57x Chieftain, 8x FV101 Scorpion), one squadron detached to UKMF/1st Infantry Brigade
> 1st Btn, King's Own Royal Border Regiment, Colchester, (43x Saxon, 8x FV721 Fox, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 1st Btn, Royal Anglian Regiment, Colchester, (43x Saxon, 8x FV721 Fox, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 3rd Btn, Royal Anglian Regiment, Colchester, (43x Saxon, 8x FV721 Fox, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> 34th Field Squadron, Royal Engineers, Waterbeach, from 39th Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers
> 657 Squadron AAC, Colchester, (Anti-Tank, 4x Gazelle AH.1, 12x Lynx AH.7)
> 
> *20th Armoured Brigade*, Detmold, FRG
> HQ 20th Armoured Brigade & 200th Signal Squadron, Royal Signals, Detmold
> 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards, Detmold, (57x Chieftain, 8x FV101 Scorpion)
> 15th/19th King's Royal Hussars, Detmold, (57x Chieftain, 8x FV101 Scorpion)
> 2nd Btn, Royal Irish Rangers, Lemgo, (79x FV432, 8x FV107 Scimitar, 4x FV103 Spartan, 8x 81mm Mortars)
> _5th (Volunteer) Btn, Queen's Regiment_ (V), Canterbury, UK
> 
> *Commander Royal Artillery 4th Armoured Division*, Paderborn
> 19th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, Dortmund, (24x Abbot self-propelled howitzers)
> 26th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, Gütersloh, (24x Abbot howitzers)
> 43rd (Lloyd's Company) Air Defence Battery, (36x Javelin)
> 
> _45th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery_, Colchester, UK, (18x FH70 towed howitzers), supports 19th Infantry Brigade
> 
> 16th/5th Queen's Royal Lancers, Herford, (48x FV107 Scimitar, 16x FV102 Striker, 20x FV103 Spartan)
> 35th Engineer Regiment, Royal Engineers, Hamlen, (30x FV432, 12x Spartan, 12x FV180 Combat Engineer Tractor, and 12x AVLB)
> 4th Armoured Division Transport Regiment, Royal Corps of Transport, Minden
> 4th Ordnance Battalion, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Herford
> 4th Armoured Workshop, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Detmold
> _8th Field Workshop_, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, Colchester, UK
> 4th Armoured Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical Corps, Minden
> _19th Field Ambulance_, Royal Army Medical Corps, Colchester, UK
> _222nd (East Midlands) Field Ambulance_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Leicester, UK
> _223rd (Durham) Field Ambulance_, Royal Army Medical Corps (V), Newton Aycliffe, UK
> 114th Provost Company, Royal Military Police, Detmold


----------



## Kirkhill

The Brits, in accordance with virtually everybody else, including the Americans and the Germans, have downsized, if not eliminated, their heavy forces.  Two brigades, with two regiments of Challengers, originally built in 1991 - 30 years ago.  446 were originally ordered.  148 of them are to be retained and upgraded to supply those two regiments.



> Disbandment of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) and Royal Air Force Germany (RAFG) in 1994, following the end of the Cold War and the Options for Change defence review in the early 1990s, reduced the strength of the British Armed Forces in Germany by almost 30,000 with just one division (1st Armoured) remaining by the late 1990s,[7] concentrated in North Rhine-Westphalia. The British presence was estimated to have been contributing 1.5 billion euros annually to the German economy in 2004.[7] Following a further spending review, one brigade was withdrawn and Osnabrück Garrison closed in 2009.[8]
> 
> Administrative support for British service personnel in Germany and across continental Europe was delegated to United Kingdom Support Command (Germany), (UKSC(G)). The four Army garrisons in Germany were under the direct administrative control of UKSC(G).[1] The General Officer Commanding UKSC(G) also functioned as head of the British Forces Liaison Organisation (Germany), which was responsible for liaising and maintaining relations with German civil authorities.[9]
> 
> Under the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, it was decided that British military units would cease to be permanent deployed in Germany by the end of 2019. This led to a scaling down of the British military presence, and a restructuring of command and support structures.[10]
> 
> HQ British Forces Germany was formed in January 2012 replacing the UKSC(G) and the Germany Support Group (GSG).[11] Rhine Garrison, which principally comprised HQ British Forces Germany in the Rheindahlen Military Complex and Elmpt Station, also reduced in size; the HQ moved to Bielefeld in July 2013 and other units returned to the UK.[12] The two central garrisons - Gütersloh and Paderborn - combined to form a single "super garrison" called Westfalen Garrison in April 2014.[13]
> 
> With the departure of Major General John Henderson in March 2015, the Commanding Officer of British Forces Germany became a brigadier's post, with Brigadier Ian Bell assuming command.[14]
> 
> In autumn 2019, British Forces Germany effectively closed,[15] with the last military base handed back to the German Bundeswehr in February 2020.[16] However, some training will still be undertaken in Germany with regard to NATO capability.[17]



We can contribute another heavy brigade to Europe - to add to those of the frontline states - Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, (Ukraine), Romania and Bulgaria and Turkey if you like.  Or, we can figure out some other way to contribute in a timely, effective and welcome manner.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> 1989



Thanks alot, now my JDSC PTSD is kicking in


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> The Brits, in accordance with virtually everybody else, including the Americans and the Germans, have downsized, if not eliminated, their heavy forces.  Two brigades, with two regiments of Challengers, originally built in 1991 - 30 years ago.  446 were originally ordered.  148 of them are to be retained and upgraded to supply those two regiments.
> 
> 
> 
> We can contribute another heavy brigade to Europe - to add to those of the frontline states - Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, (Ukraine), Romania and Bulgaria and Turkey if you like.  Or, we can figure out some other way to contribute in a timely, effective and welcome manner.


You do not need to be heavy to Fight.
   I'm admitted lost on the concept of those who feel that a commitment to NATO needs to be a Heavy Bde.

NATO is defensive - if you are willing to play the complex terrain game on the defense - you don't need the heavy armor/IFV assets.
  I can guarantee you a Light Strike BN with Javelin (AT) and J model Stingers can put a dent in any attacker using terrain as an asset, add some thermobaric rounds for Mk19 and AT-4 and you can clobber houses too.
    Now add Armed UAV's and Deep Strike Capability from Bde - and you have a significantly more lethal force than a bunch of LAV 6.0 and Leo 2A6/7's


----------



## MilEME09

KevinB said:


> You do not need to be heavy to Fight.
> I'm admitted lost on the concept of those who feel that a commitment to NATO needs to be a Heavy Bde.


NATO disagrees with you unfortunately, they have requested a heavy brigade from Canada. Which of course we presently cannot fulfill.


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> NATO disagrees with you unfortunately, they have requested a heavy brigade from Canada. Which of course we presently cannot fulfill.


Was the answer to NATO, "You can't get blood from a Stone"?

I suspect if the CDN GOV went to NATO and said, we can't give you a Heavy Bde - but we can give you a Light Bde with asskicking gear and a bunch of high level enablers, NATO would pass out from shock and when they wake up gladly accept.

I've seen M1A2's knocked out in Iraq - sure it there where only mobility kills - but they where some single insurgents with advanced anti-armor tools.


----------



## MilEME09

KevinB said:


> Was the answer to NATO, "You can't get blood from a Stone"?
> 
> I suspect if the CDN GOV went to NATO and said, we can't give you a Heavy Bde - but we can give you a Light Bde with asskicking gear and a bunch of high level enablers, NATO would pass out from shock and when they wake up gladly accept.
> 
> I've seen M1A2's knocked out in Iraq - sure it there where only mobility kills - but they where some single insurgents with advanced anti-armor tools.


Essentially yes because we do not have heavy IFVs, GBAD, SPG, etc...


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I'm not saying abandon light for heavy. They're both important. I'm saying NATO is our biggest military gig. And it requires "heavy" and in a serious showdown that means at least a brigade to be meaningful. If you want to bring an anti-little green men capability and airmobile battalion with whizz bang weapons and some form of cyber warfare stuff - bring it too once we finally figure out what we want and how to build it and how to use it. In the meantime stay "heavy", my friend.
> 
> 🍻


I guess the highlighted part is what I'm not sold on.  If you're correct (and many will agree with you) that the threat of Russian hard force aggression against our Eastern European allies is the primary military threat that we face, then I get where you are coming from with your focus on heavy forces forward deployed to counter a Russian attack.

I just don't see the traditional Cold War-type scenario playing out.  A Russian invasion of a NATO member will trigger a Chapter 5 response and I will contend that a full-scale war between Russia and NATO is unwinnable by Russia without the use of nuclear weapons (and no number of Canadian Brigades/Divisions/Corps will make any difference in that situation).  In fighting NATO the Russians face Operation Barbarossa in reverse...invading a more populous enemy with no clear physical final objective as an end goal.   

That does not mean that I don't believe there are serious military threats from Russia....just not full-scale invasion of a NATO member.  Russia is not stupid.  They can count.  They don't want full-scale open war with NATO because they know that whatever initial advantage they might have on the battlefield, ultimately they are out manned, out gunned and outclassed economically by NATO.  They will ultimately lose.  

Their alternative then is to undertake actions which will support their goals without their ending up in a war they cannot win.  Frankly I'm more worried about them stirring up discontent among ethnic Russians in the Baltics than I am about Armata tanks surging across the border.  What good are Leopard tanks and Javelin missiles against protesting Russo-Latvian citizens?  I'm also more concerned about increasingly illiberal governments in places like Hungary and Poland shifting further away from Western ideals and deciding that other illiberal states like Russia have policies more in line with their own thinking than their NATO allies.

We would probably be better off spending the money we'd put into a European-based heavy Brigade Group into economic development in the Baltic States so that the ethnic Russians in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are the happiest, wealthiest ethnic Russians East of the Oder.  That way the Russian government would have no wedge to generate discontent in the Baltics...in fact it might even make Russian citizens begin to question their own government.

All that being said, I don't discount the fact that heavy forces MAY be needed at some point.  And it might even be in Europe that they are needed.  I also understand the importance of clearly signalling to our European allies that we are serious about defending them if they are ever invaded.   That's why I don't recommend eliminating our heavy(-ish) forces.  I support our role in eFP Latvia and would support pre-positioning the equipment for an additional Battle Group in Europe as a concrete symbol of our commitment.   

The reality is that just like during the Cold War, the majority of the actual combat by Canadian troops will not be against Russian (or Chinese) invaders of the West.  It will be in developing world countries supporting pro-Western forces against pro-Russian/Chinese forces.  Armoured Brigades may not be as useful in those conflicts as lighter forces.  NATO in my opinion (at least in terms of direct defence of Europe against Russian invasion vs broader coalition defence of our collective interests worldwide) is NOT our biggest military gig.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> You do not need to be heavy to Fight.
> I'm admitted lost on the concept of those who feel that a commitment to NATO needs to be a Heavy Bde.
> 
> NATO is defensive - if you are willing to play the complex terrain game on the defense - you don't need the heavy armor/IFV assets.
> I can guarantee you a Light Strike BN with Javelin (AT) and J model Stingers can put a dent in any attacker using terrain as an asset, add some thermobaric rounds for Mk19 and AT-4 and you can clobber houses too.
> Now add Armed UAV's and Deep Strike Capability from Bde - and you have a significantly more lethal force than a bunch of LAV 6.0 and Leo 2A6/7's


Counterattacks are part of a defence. A light Strike battalion (whatever that turns out to be once everyone finishes fiddling with it) is not the force to do that.

A combined arms battalion with Javelins and Stingers with some thermobarics, AT-4, armed UAVs and deep strike capability (by which I presume you are talking indirect fire support can do all that too AND can counterattack which your lighter force can't. 

I think one has to keep in mind that the brigade has been and remains a "close combat" force. Its primary weapons operate within limited ranges unless you add manoeuvre. Even if you upgrade a CS artillery regiment's range capabilities, the deep battle it might participate in is not the BCT's battle but that of other formations assigned specifically to the deep battle. Some of those may be specialized forms of BCTs (such as the UK Deep Strike Brigade) others may be lay-behind special forces or satellite ISR systems or passive/active sensor systems directing deep strike missiles etc, etc. Quite frankly we don't know what shape those organizations will be yet. Just for the fun of it, here's a fairly recent US publication about the Army's thoughts on BCT's Cross-domain Manoeuvre concepts. They see utility in all forms of BCTs and I'm sure as future weapon system mature these roles will be refined.



> BCTs conduct cross-domain maneuver primarily in the Close Area, that portion of the MDO operational framework where friendly and enemy formations, forces, and systems are in imminent physical contact and will contest for control of physical, temporal, virtual, and cognitive space in support of campaign objectives.17 As part of the Joint Force, airborne- and air assault-capable InfantryBCTs(IBCT) contribute to forcible entry operations. Airborne-capable IBCTs are unique in that they have the capability to be projected and delivered over strategic distances into the Deep Maneuver Area to surprise an enemy force, seize a lodgment, and gain the initiative. Armored BCTs (ABCT) and Stryker BCTs (SBCT) may also be used to defeat an enemy’s A2/AD capabilities Cross-domain maneuver is the synchronization and employment of forces and capabilities through movement in combination with converged lethal and nonlethal capabilities across multiple domains, the EMS, and the IE. Cross-domain maneuver creates synergistic effects in the physical, temporal, virtual, and cognitive realms that increase relative combat power and provide the overmatch necessary to destroy or defeat enemy forces, control land areas and resources, and protect populations. AFC Pam 71-20-2 10 when employed from offset objectives, creating multiple dilemmas for the enemy. BCTs also operate in the tactical support area where they conduct area security



Let me add one thing. There's no such thing as a "light" airborne or "light" air mobile force. The delivered portion might be "light" but the delivery means are very heavy, very complex, tremendously expensive and very vulnerable. Without those delivery system you are not only "light" but also "practically static".

I've never argued that there isn't a role for the type of forces you and others suggest; I'm merely saying that the argument that one doesn't need heavy systems is a fallacy. It was a fallacy when we designed our Future Force in 2000-2003. We quickly learned in combat against a very unsophisticated but resourceful enemy that suddenly we needed to heavyize our force with modern precision artillery, tanks and much heavier double hulled LAVs that almost rank up there with IFVs.

Things are changing, yes they are, but things have been changing since the end of WW2 and there hasn't been a decade where some new weapon development hasn't resulted in a flurry of pundits announcing the death of the tank (and by association "heavy" forces) and yet they are still here and, at least in the US Army's eyes, will be around for quite a while yet.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Army Signals The Abrams Tank Is Here To Stay
					

The Abrams tank is destined to outlive many of the warfighting systems that appeared following its debut in 1980.




					www.forbes.com
				






> The Army has leveraged these emerging technologies to upgrade Abrams capabilities several times, resulting in the latest version, officially designated M1A2SEPV4.
> 
> What that nomenclature indicates is that today’s Abrams is the A2 upgrade of the original version, incorporating a “system enhancement package” now approaching its fourth iteration.
> 
> The centerpiece of the latest variant is a third-generation “forward looking infrared” sensor system that enables the tank crew to detect, identify and target hostile forces at greater range with greater precision—even in the presence of obscurants such as smoke and fog.
> 
> The system integrates passive signals from two different infrared frequencies to deliver high-fidelity color resolution, which when combined with the tank’s sophisticated fire control computer virtually guarantees a kill of any enemy within range.
> 
> However, that idea of being “within range” is about to undergo a transformation, because the next variant of Abrams after V4 will likely be part of a resilient tactical network that can see threats dozens of kilometers away, and loitering tank rounds with pop-out wings will enable the tank to engage those targets.
> 
> The next iteration of Abrams may also have 360-degree situational awareness thanks to a new generation of sensors, reactive armor that defeats incoming antitank rounds both kinetically and non-kinetically (through jamming), and an autoloader for its main gun that removes crew from the turret and thus allows a weight-saving reduction in armor.
> 
> Saving weight is important, because at over 60 tons, the Abrams can’t use all the bridges and other infrastructure in places where it may need to fight.
> 
> Composite armor of the kind Abrams carries provides great protection, but it makes the tank heavier than any other vehicle in the joint arsenal.
> 
> Reducing weight, which probably requires taking a crew member out of the turret, would enhance the flexibility of the vehicle in combat.
> 
> The Army and General Dynamics (a contributor to my think tank) are considering a raft of other potential upgrades to Abrams—everything from hybrid electric drive to controlling robotic vehicles on the battlefield.
> 
> As the digital revolution unfolds, the array of options for further improving Abrams is nearly endless.
> 
> And the pool of potential customers may be too: Taiwan has recently confirmed plans to buy over a hundred of the tanks, and Poland looks poised to do the same thing.
> 
> Other countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific may do likewise.
> 
> So if you thought the era of tank warfare was drawing to a close, you might want to revisit that assumption.
> 
> The Army’s main battle tank is becoming more versatile than anyone could have imagined when it debuted in 1980, and the return of great-power military rivalry has reminded planners that there are some missions only a tank can accomplish.






> The Abrams tank thus is destined to outlive many of the other battlefield innovations that have appeared in the years since it first saw service.




Except that by that time it will be differently armed, differently armoured, differently powered and differently employed with or without a crew and be lighter.  But it will still be a tank.

Just like Conservatives are liberal and Liberals are democrats.  It gets awfully hard to keep up with the definitions in a world where words matter so much.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> You do not need to be heavy to Fight.
> I'm admitted lost on the concept of those who feel that a commitment to NATO needs to be a Heavy Bde.
> 
> NATO is defensive - if you are willing to play the complex terrain game on the defense - you don't need the heavy armor/IFV assets.
> I can guarantee you a Light Strike BN with Javelin (AT) and J model Stingers can put a dent in any attacker using terrain as an asset, add some thermobaric rounds for Mk19 and AT-4 and you can clobber houses too.
> Now add Armed UAV's and Deep Strike Capability from Bde - and you have a significantly more lethal force than a bunch of LAV 6.0 and Leo 2A6/7's



That all sounds good until you realize what we'd be up against from the opposition's indirect fire assets. 

For example:


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> Let me add one thing. There's no such thing as a "light" airborne or "light" air mobile force. The delivered portion might be "light" but the delivery means are very heavy, very complex, tremendously expensive and very vulnerable. Without those delivery system you are not only "light" but also "practically static".


A salient point.  I recall seeing somewhere (I'd have to dig deeper to confirm) that a US Aviation Brigade to support an IBCT took more connectors to deploy than an ABCT.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> That all sounds good until you realize what we'd be up against from the opposition's indirect fire assets.
> 
> For example:





FJAG said:


> Counterattacks are part of a defence. A light Strike battalion (whatever that turns out to be once everyone finishes fiddling with it) is not the force to do that.
> 
> A combined arms battalion with Javelins and Stingers with some thermobarics, AT-4, armed UAVs and deep strike capability (by which I presume you are talking indirect fire support can do all that too AND can counterattack which your lighter force can't.
> 
> I think one has to keep in mind that the brigade has been and remains a "close combat" force. Its primary weapons operate within limited ranges unless you add manoeuvre. Even if you upgrade a CS artillery regiment's range capabilities, the deep battle it might participate in is not the BCT's battle but that of other formations assigned specifically to the deep battle. Some of those may be specialized forms of BCTs (such as the UK Deep Strike Brigade) others may be lay-behind special forces or satellite ISR systems or passive/active sensor systems directing deep strike missiles etc, etc. Quite frankly we don't know what shape those organizations will be yet. Just for the fun of it, here's a fairly recent US publication about the Army's thoughts on BCT's Cross-domain Manoeuvre concepts. They see utility in all forms of BCTs and I'm sure as future weapon system mature these roles will be refined.
> 
> 
> 
> Let me add one thing. There's no such thing as a "light" airborne or "light" air mobile force. The delivered portion might be "light" but the delivery means are very heavy, very complex, tremendously expensive and very vulnerable. Without those delivery system you are not only "light" but also "practically static".
> 
> I've never argued that there isn't a role for the type of forces you and others suggest; I'm merely saying that the argument that one doesn't need heavy systems is a fallacy. It was a fallacy when we designed our Future Force in 2000-2003. We quickly learned in combat against a very unsophisticated but resourceful enemy that suddenly we needed to heavyize our force with modern precision artillery, tanks and much heavier double hulled LAVs that almost rank up there with IFVs.
> 
> Things are changing, yes they are, but things have been changing since the end of WW2 and there hasn't been a decade where some new weapon development hasn't resulted in a flurry of pundits announcing the death of the tank (and by association "heavy" forces) and yet they are still here and, at least in the US Army's eyes, will be around for quite a while yet.
> 
> 🍻





Infanteer said:


> A salient point.  I recall seeing somewhere (I'd have to dig deeper to confirm) that a US Aviation Brigade to support an IBCT took more connectors to deploy than an ABCT.




I don't know about you guys - but the one thing I learned in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last 20 years - is next war, I am so being an insurgent.
   Nice weather - meh I am going to the beach
   Crappy weather - I am off to setup an EFP or snipe someone - as the enemy Helicopters and UAV's don't work too well in sandstorms etc.

I would prepare for defense in depth - and bleed out the opponent.  The Light Force is there to deter - not to launch counter attacks into defensive positions.  Layback/Staybehind missions and partisan link ups used to be a CF Infantry task/skill - it doesn't take a dude with a dinner plate to organize -- I don't see that as a SOF specific mission -- larger CW yes - but anyone with some experience in Afghan and Iraq can see how to exploit conventional forces - in a non conventional way.

 If you are put into a ring with a championship boxer -- you don't box him for you will lose, you fight dirty and mean, and use things he won't expect.   "The only fair fight, is the one you win"

I am not against Heavy Forces -- I just don't see the interest in the CF to pony up for them, and I do see the fact that Canada can save face by showing up early with well equipped light forces.     

  In 72hrs you could get the majority of a Light Bde anyway in the world with Canada's current fleet of available aircraft.

One should not view Light Forces as mobile by Mk1 Combat Boot - sure the boot may be the first method to get into position - but there has to be mobility options for the Force.
   The Light doesn't "Need" the Aviation Support, or other vehicles - they sure as heck help - but in terms of occupying initial ground - they are not required - the Bde Assets are needed (AD, AT, Deep Fire etc).
    The supporting assets can arrive in follow on chalks, and so can heavier forces.

  I don't see Canada being able to move 1/10th of a Medium (let alone heavy) force anywhere in the world in 144hrs.

You go to war with the forces you have, not the ones you want to have -- so either you preposition a ton of equipment worldwide -- or you accept that to arrive "in time" you need to either have a vastly expanded Transport Wing(s) of the RCAF - or tailor the force to what you can get there quickly with what you have in terms of planes.


----------



## FJAG

I promised myself to stay off this forum for a few days so that I could finally get some book writing and model railroading done, but I'm just too much of a sucker for this thread.


KevinB said:


> I am not against Heavy Forces -- I just don't see the interest in the CF to pony up for them, and I do see the fact that Canada can save face by showing up early with well equipped light forces.
> 
> In 72hrs you could get the majority of a Light Bde anyway in the world with Canada's current fleet of available aircraft.


I'm sure that I'd disagree because not all of our aircraft are up and available at any given time and even a light brigade needs some key gear and if one is talking the whole light brigade then there's actually a fair amount of equipment in the various headquarters and the tail involved.

But, assuming you are correct then it would be even easier to get a heavy brigade deployed if its gear was prepositioned and only people have to move because both brigades have roughly the same number of folks.


KevinB said:


> One should not view Light Forces as mobile by Mk1 Combat Boot - sure the boot may be the first method to get into position - but there has to be mobility options for the Force.
> The Light doesn't "Need" the Aviation Support, or other vehicles - they sure as heck help - but in terms of occupying initial ground - they are not required - the Bde Assets are needed (AD, AT, Deep Fire etc).
> The supporting assets can arrive in follow on chalks, and so can heavier forces.


That puts you well outside the 72 hours envelope then.


KevinB said:


> I don't see Canada being able to move 1/10th of a Medium (let alone heavy) force anywhere in the world in 144hrs.
> 
> You go to war with the forces you have, not the ones you want to have -- so either you preposition a ton of equipment worldwide -- or you accept that to arrive "in time" you need to either have a vastly expanded Transport Wing(s) of the RCAF - or tailor the force to what you can get there quickly with what you have in terms of planes.


Probably the only quote of Rumsfeld I'm one hundred percent on board with. Particulalry from the point of view that if Canada had at least one  "heavy" brigade it could still choose to deploy it as a "medium" or "light" brigade if circumstances demanded that. On the other hand, if you do not have a "heavy" brigade in peacetime then you will never be able to form, train and deploy it in any reasonable time frame whatsoever. That capability is gone for years, period. 

That's what we saw happening in 2000. We could have put our heavy gear "into reserve" and dedicate a small core of full-time folks to keeping up the essential skills and leading and training reservists while keeping it maintained but the euphoria of creating an "agile and relevant future force" tuned to the new order of operating in failed states overcame common sense and we divested and divested and divested to save a few bucks here and there.

Yup. That Rumsfeld quote is the very reason I keep arguing so strongly that we need to maintain a portion of the force as a "heavy" one and my argument has always been that because it is less likely needed on a day-to-day basis it should be a smaller full-time portion than the "light" and "medium" force and heavily weighted towards one manned in large part by a reformed and revitalized reserve force.

If there's one lesson from Arnhem that's worth remembering it's what happens to a "light" forward deployed force when there's no "heavy" force to back them up on the ground.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> If there's one lesson from Arnhem that's worth remembering it's what happens to a "light" forward deployed force when there's no "heavy" force to back them up on the ground.
> 
> 🍻



Unless you need a 'sacrificial bunt' type of manoeuvre, of course


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> A salient point.  I recall seeing somewhere (I'd have to dig deeper to confirm) that a US Aviation Brigade to support an IBCT took more connectors to deploy than an ABCT.



A very salient point.   And one that got me wondering about the inclusion of the UK's Combat Aviation Brigade Combat Team with its Global Response Force as it patently couldn't deploy rapidly in support of 16 Air Assault Brigade.  

On the other hand Europe is part of the globe (not being facetious) and the CABCT can self-deploy it helicopters across the UK and continental Europe while its support personnel and vehicles deploy by RAF Chinooks, Hercs, A400s and C17s.   On those grounds I felt that the CABCT was a better fit for the UK's eurocentric heavy 3rd div, adding to its two Heavy BCTs and its Deep Strike Recce BCT.  In fact one multi-squadron regiment of Wildcats and Apaches does seem to be focused on that task,

But if the CABCT were a purely army asset then it would not recognize the value that the same assets have when deployed afloat in support of the RN and its Royal Marines.  The RN's fleet makes the helicopters of the CABCT and the RAF a truly global response asset.  The helicopters get the support and transport they need from the fleet's ships.  Both the Big Honking variety and the Surface Combatants.

As to the Air Manouevre Brigade Combat Team, essentially the air deployable light infantry force assigned to the Global Response Force, it can be deployed by the RAF's fixed wing transport globally both in opposed and non-opposed environments.   It can also be deployed with the Royal Marines on RN ships.  Or it can be deployed and supported  intra-theatre in Europe by both RAF fixed and rotary wing assets, the Chinooks, Hercs, A400s and C17s.  Again, like the CABCT with whom it will find itself co-operating globally, in Europe it could deploy as an independent BCT or a reinforced BCT or as a mobile reserve for 3 UK Div  resulting in 3 UK DIV comprising:

Div HQ
Div Log
7 Air Defence Gp
2x HBCT (Challengers and Boxers)
1x Deep Strike Recce BCT (Arty Brigade)
1x Combat Aviation Bde (Wildcats and Apaches)
1x Air Mobile Brigade (Paras, Gurkhas, Yorks, Chinooks, Hercs, A400s, C17s)

All of which take centre stage under NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps commanded and supported by the UK Army.

An Army backed up by the RN/RM Littoral Strike Groups in the Baltic, the RN's surface and subsurface assets with its guns, missiles and ICBMs, and by everything the RAF has available for sense, strike and support.    The RN and the RAF also supply air defence.

I would love to see Canada commit to defence in the same way the UK and Singapore and Australia do.  I believe we can afford it.  But I am in the minority.  As is virtually everybody reading this.

I believe that we can afford to supply all those capabilities the UK can.  And I think we should.  But, again, I am in the minority.

The reason I am in the minority is, in large part, strategic distance.  Most Canadians don't perceive a threat and don't perceive a need for the capability.  And that same strategic distance makes it a costly endeavour to both deploy forces and to sustain them once deployed.  And Canadians understand the benefits of Child Tax Credits rather than those of a Forward Defence.

So I am trying to find ways to work within the constraints set by my fellow taxpayers.

They don't "Grok" heavy brigades in Poland and Latvia.

They, apparently, do "Grok" helicopters, aircraft and trucks loaded with soldiers and supplies in snowstorms, icestorms, floods and forest fires, or when the water plant breaks down.

From my perspective that is great news because those things that they want are precisely the things that will create a globally deployable force.  Because Halifax is closer to London and the Caribbean than it is to Vancouver and Alert the same assets that allow the CAF to deploy to Vancouver and Alert to react to domestic crises would allow it to deploy to Europe and the Caribbean.  And if it could deploy a brigade to Europe then it can add to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, to 3 UK Div or even to the RN/RM forces for global deployment.  And the Canadian element can be as large or small, as heavy or light, as we like and our taxpayers will permit.

In the meantime our taxpayers seem to be a lot more tolerant of the dollars spent on the out-of-sight-out-of-mind RCN/RCAF/CANSOFCOM which operate domestically and globally everyday in peace and war.  That is an area that I would fully exploit and ensure that all platforms were fully supplied with the full range of offensive capabilities.  And that means buying lots and lots of missiles for the CSCs, the F18s and the CP140s, as well as for P8s, F35s and JUSTAS UAS's when and if.

I would also exploit the "unarmed" RCN - its AOPS, it MCDVs and the Asterix (with or without Obelix and the JSS's) for their ability to "rescue" Canadians.   Vancouver, Victoria, Prince Rupert, St John's, Nain, Iqaluit, Inuvik, Churchill, Rankin, Resolute and Alert all need to  know that when they get into trouble they can be rescued by the government.  And that they have continual support.   And that support requires the heavy logistic commitment that could also be applied globally.

We keep focusing on what we want to deploy and stumbling over the lack of logistical support.  We should be focusing on selling the logistical support to the domestic market.  That is the growth opportunity.  And that is the group of key enablers in which we are most deficient.  It is also the group of key enablers that the government could fund out of regional support, public safety and international aid.  Not National Defence.  Although they would be available to National Defence and the CAF to support their domestic and international operations.

By off loading those logistics (and some domestic surveillance and comms needs) then the taxpayers might permit the defence budget to be refocused to meet their low expectations while still permitting us to create effective offensive and defensive capabilities.

Like Kevin and GR66 I am not against Heavy Forces and especially not against Combat Aviation, which I consider to be an extremely versatile and useful Heavy Force, once it is in theatre, with very heavy logistical support requirements.  I am just trying to figure out how to do the best we can with the purse, and constraints, given to us by our fellow taxpayers.

Slainte mhor to all.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I promised myself to stay off this forum for a few days so that I could finally get some book writing and model railroading done, but I'm just too much of a sucker for this thread.
> 
> I'm sure that I'd disagree because not all of our aircraft are up and available at any given time and even a light brigade needs some key gear and if one is talking the whole light brigade then there's actually a fair amount of equipment in the various headquarters and the tail involved.
> 
> But, assuming you are correct then it would be even easier to get a heavy brigade deployed if its gear was prepositioned and only people have to move because both brigades have roughly the same number of folks.
> 
> That puts you well outside the 72 hours envelope then.
> 
> Probably the only quote of Rumsfeld I'm one hundred percent on board with. Particulalry from the point of view that if Canada had at least one  "heavy" brigade it could still choose to deploy it as a "medium" or "light" brigade if circumstances demanded that. On the other hand, if you do not have a "heavy" brigade in peacetime then you will never be able to form, train and deploy it in any reasonable time frame whatsoever. That capability is gone for years, period.
> 
> That's what we saw happening in 2000. We could have put our heavy gear "into reserve" and dedicate a small core of full-time folks to keeping up the essential skills and leading and training reservists while keeping it maintained but the euphoria of creating an "agile and relevant future force" tuned to the new order of operating in failed states overcame common sense and we divested and divested and divested to save a few bucks here and there.
> 
> Yup. That Rumsfeld quote is the very reason I keep arguing so strongly that we need to maintain a portion of the force as a "heavy" one and my argument has always been that because it is less likely needed on a day-to-day basis it should be a smaller full-time portion than the "light" and "medium" force and heavily weighted towards one manned in large part by a reformed and revitalized reserve force.
> 
> If there's one lesson from Arnhem that's worth remembering it's what happens to a "light" forward deployed force when there's no "heavy" force to back them up on the ground.
> 
> 🍻



But FJAG I think the key words separating us are would-could-should-if.

I can agree we should have kept the Leo 1's in running condition.  With new technology they could be more effective.  They could be lighter and deployable by air in troop numbers by C17s and, IF we had them, by squadron numbers by A400Ms.  But we didn't keep them.  We didn't upgrade them and we didn't buy A400s.   

So we were forced to go on the open market for 100 used tanks that the Dutch and Germans were divesting and ended up with a mixed fleet of 20x A6Ms, 20x A4Ms and 42x A4s.  Some of them are the best equipped Leo2s in the world.  Some, or all, of them, still have some 1970s technology systems on board.  The logistics on that don't feel good.  Let alone the specialist fleet of support variants for the EME and Eng types or the fact  that they are separated by strategic distances in isolated packets across Canada.  Which squadron do you want to preposition?  The A4s are the only ones you could train on realistically in Canada so that the troopers could drop into the seats in Latvia.

I can agree we should have kept the M109 and tracked the American Paladin/A7/ELRC programmes.  But we didn't and now we have to go buy new/used ones and their support and figure out how to deploy and use them all over again (our old drills won't work on the new kit).  

Just like the Chinooks which we should also have kept and had to reacquire, in larger numbers.

I can agree we should also have held on to the M113s, even the Lynxs and Ferrets could have come in handy.  We should have bought the 400 Bv206s.  The Bisons should have been retained for the Militia.  The mortars should have been retained when we bought the GMGs.  The ADATs and Skyshield and Javelins should have been retained.  The Milans should have been bought instead of the Eryx.  They should have been replace by the Javelin or the Spike ATGMs.  The Carl Gustav should have been upgraded to the A4 model with the Canadian designed CDC sights and a full slate of ammunition produced under licence in Montreal.

I can agree with you on all of that.  But those decisions were made and we come up short on dam near everything.  So yes, I like the idea of the Heavy, Medium, Light mix under a divisional structure with a full slate of divisional assets and a properly equipped and trained reserve force but I just don't see that happening with the budget, or the man-power given to us.

And the manpower is probably the biggest hurdle, even more than the budget.



> The Canadian Armed Forces is comprised of approximately *68,000 Regular Force and 27,000 Reserve Force members*, increasing to 71,500 and 30,000 respectively under Strong, Secure, Engaged − Canada's defence policy, as well as 5,200 Ranger Patrol Group members



68,000 full timers

Based on most evidence available, including the CBO primer and the UK white paper only 25% of those are going to be engaged in combat brigades, wings and naval task forces.

That means a total man-power supply of 17,000 full time personnel to man the frigates, the MCDVs, the AOPVs, the JSSs, the SSKs, the CF-18s, the CP140s, the CC130s, the C17s, the CH146s, 147s, 148s and 149s, as well as 3 CMBGs and a Divisional Support Group and CANSOFCOM.

17,000 people to man the Permanent Active Militia.  

The other 51,000 are supposedly there to ensure that the Militia, both Permanent Active and Sedentary, are properly supported, trained and organized.   

If there is one gross error it is that those 51,000 have been allowed to neglect their obligations to organizing the rest of their taxpaying citizens into a proper Home Guard designed to manage crises, of all sorts, and not just to fill the occasional hole in mythic Permanent Active Corps.

The target body for the 51,000 is not the 17,000 of the Permanent Active Militia but the approximately 17,000,000 men and women of military ages (16 to 60).  Those are the people that are relying on the government to have a plan in place to employ them when things go pear-shaped in Canada.

There is a bunch of stuff I think we coulda woulda shoulda and that if but - but here we are.  

So how do we get out of it?

I think we can't afford both a proper divisional support group of key enablers and a proper, modern heavy armoured team.  I don't think our government will support both and probably not either.  But I do think there is productive work to be done with what we have in terms of kit, people and dollars.

Cheers again FJAG.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Yup. That Rumsfeld quote is the very reason I keep arguing so strongly that we need to maintain a portion of the force as a "heavy" one and my argument has always been that because it is less likely needed on a day-to-day basis it should be a smaller full-time portion than the "light" and "medium" force and heavily weighted towards one manned in large part by a reformed and revitalized reserve force.


This is where I can't see it working.
    Sure Reserve units can be GIB's - but maintenance and training on Heavy gear is both time and $.
 Pre-positioned gear needs a robust infrastructure to ensure it is ready - and the crews need to be at 100% for it they do a flyover they need to be ready to roll as soon as they are wheels down.

The other issue is - at least with a jump capable force - you can always drop some of it to secure your airhead - it allows for a lot more flexibility in reactive positioning - than needing to go to fixed spot - and gather gear.

Honestly to be properly prepared you need both options available - and they can mutually support - with the Light securing the area and then a relief in place occurs - and the Light forces can do more dispersed annoying Light things 




FJAG said:


> If there's one lesson from Arnhem that's worth remembering it's what happens to a "light" forward deployed force when there's no "heavy" force to back them up on the ground.
> 
> 🍻


Agreed - but that is why a 'Light' unit isn't just a bunch of Infantry guys out for a walk.



I think in the ideal world - the CF would have at LEAST 1 Heavy Div - and 2 Light (Medium capable) Div's 
   Unless the budget gets a major plus up I don't see that happening.

So the question comes back to what can you do with the money you have?

 I just don't think 70 some odd Leo2's is a credible background for a Heavy Force, and the LAV 6.0 definitely is not a Heavy IFV -- it has ZERO Anti Tank Capability.   At the very least it needs a ATGM system if it wants to play Heavy IFV.


----------



## Good2Golf

daftandbarmy said:


> Unless you need a 'sacrificial bunt' type of manoeuvre, of course


Like Dieppe?


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> Like Dieppe?


Hong Kong?


----------



## Kirkhill

And speaking of Hong Kong.....

Global Britain has despatched two unprovocative, "unarmed" lowly OPVs to carry the Union flag throughout the Indo-Pacific.  These two vessels seeking innocent passage among Global Britain's trading partners are named for two rivers.   One of them, the Spey, is a river on the east coast of Scotland better known for the whiskeys of Glenlivet, Glefiddich, Cardhu, Dufftown and Macallan.  It it also the heart of 45 Commando's recruiting area.

The other ship, the other river, is more interesting.  It is the river that divides the foreigners of Cornwall from the decent Saxon English of Devon.  It flows through the city of Plymouth and the Royal Naval Base of Devonport.  Devonport is the home of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, in particular 42 Commando.

So, seeking innocent passage in the South China Seas we have HMS Spey, associated with Scotland, Whiskey and the Royal Marines accompanying HMS Tamar associated with England, Drake, the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines.

HMS Tamar, like many other British ships, is not the first of that name.  She has a predecessor.  The earlier "HMS _Tamar_, was a 3,650 ton British troopship laid down in 1862[5] and launched in 1863."

"In 1897 HMS Tamar arrived in Victoria City, Hong Kong on 11 April [1] She was stationed permanently in the harbour from 1897 to 1941, when she was scuttled during the Battle of Hong Kong during World War II, to avoid being used by the invading Japanese Imperial forces." However HMS Tamar continued in use from 1945 to 1997 as the Hong Kong Shore Station.

HMS Tamar doused her colours on July 1, 1997.  

But now she is back.  Flying the Union flag and the White Ensign in the South China Seas.  Accompanied by a Scots boat from the Whisky Trail.

I can only hope that there is an Astute or Trafalgar in company.


----------



## blacktriangle

As others have pointed out, we currently lack the resources to be truly "heavy", and there appears to be an aversion to going "light". 

Given the ongoing investment in the LAV 6.0, I would suggest that a medium weight Cavalry force is probably what we can provide at this time. I think it was Tango2Bravo that suggested providing a Cavalry BG for another NATO formation. I think that is doable, especially if we address some of the most glaring capability deficiencies. You could provide that, and still set aside enough resources and personnel to form a high-readiness Light Inf BG for global/territorial response.

Regardless of what force "weight" one favours, there's still something critical missing - a backbone of firepower & technological enablers.


----------



## FJAG

Oh God my day is blown again isn't it. Luckily I got some pool maintenance in.



Kirkhill said:


> But FJAG I think the key words separating us are would-could-should-if.



Just an aside, the Leo C1s had just come off a recent rebuild, the M109s were still capable (and would still be today) and I think we still have the TLAVs. The Leo C1s were suitable as a stopgap in Afghanistan but their lack of IED resistance was a problem. The M109s didn't have the "precision fire" capability that modernists were looking for. Both systems were eminently suitable for a reserve training role and even certain levels of combat operations. TLAVs from the '60s are still running around the world in their 10s of thousands.

The issue is nothing more or less that maintenance ... and that is nothing more or less than a question of full-time PY allocation priorities. The money is there for the people and the spare parts -- IF -- its not used up for administrative overhead and other things. We would rather put 4,000 Class B's to work in headquarters shuffling paper around then allocating a 1,000 of those PYs or Class Bs on turning wrenches - and I doubt we actually need that many in the Army although the Air Force and Navy could all use a few.

You are right though. It is a matter of would-could-should. An right now we do have 100 Leo 2 gun tanks, and we do have six battalions of LAV 6.0s and getting another 400+ support LAVs. We also still have all those Bisons and TLAVs kicking around which someone will undoubtedly want to dispose of. As  junior NCO I was taught to think of "must knows, should knows, and could knows". I consider financial allocation within DND as "must dos, should dos, and could dos". Since DNDs aim is to be an organization that can bring violence to bear in an emergency then the "must do" is to build a well rounded capable force that can react to a full-spectrum of threats. 

Abandoning necessary capabilities due to full-time manpower restrictions when you have tens of thousands of unequipped and poorly trained reservists makes absolutely zero sense to me. 

Spending half of DND's annual budget on personnel costs when even critical front -line equipment can't be maintained makes zero sense to me.

And having an Army that presents three poor options for reorganizing itself but which in each option ensures that useless div hqs  are maintained (even adding one in one case) while complaining that we are short of trainers makes zero sense to me.



Kirkhill said:


> So how do we get out of it?
> 
> I think we can't afford both a proper divisional support group of key enablers and a proper, modern heavy armoured team. I don't think our government will support both and probably not either. But I do think there is productive work to be done with what we have in terms of kit, people and dollars.



It's really just a game of personnel numbers and equipment. With 40,000 plus Reg F and Res F personnel we easily have the numbers. It becomes problematic if decade after decade you continue to segregate the force with very minor exceptions (Class Bs filling into HQs and RSS bolstering reserve units) You are absolutely right though. If we continue to ignore the true potential of a reserve force then we do not have the numbers. We absolutely need to apply Gibbs Rule # 5 - "Don't waste good!"

There are new and essential weapon systems coming on line which we will have to incorporate. There wont be a choice. As long as we keep dividing the force the way that we do we will continue to have to give up Reg F capabilities in order to generate the PYs for them (just like we did with infantry mortars, half of our artillery and all of our air defence)

Just as a thought. Take the existing tanks, two battalions of existing LAV6.0s, leave them 105mmC3s for the time being and some TLAVs, TAPVs and a good bit of a service battalion and 300 maintainers and maybe 500 trainer/operators/leaders. Form a reserve brigade around that using 4,000 reservists and the 500 RSS they already have. The annual cost to operate that brigade will go down by 70% per year on Reg F PYs alone. The equipment wear and tear will be reduced as will annual operating costs for fuel and ammo (And yes we need to sharpen up the Res F system but we should have done that decades ago.) That will leave you an armoured brigade in reserve that you can fall back to if and when needed and give you close to 4,000 PYs that you can reallocate to new weapon systems (like GBAD, loitering munitions, ISR and Cyber operators, you name it) as enablers to a brigade or division and still leave you a Reg F light and medium brigade to do whatever day-to-day things need doing. 



KevinB said:


> This is where I can't see it working.
> Sure Reserve units can be GIB's - but maintenance and training on Heavy gear is both time and $.


That's where I have disagreed with my Reg F peers for decades. 

Reservists can be more than GIBs, if you create the conditions for them to succeed. The Canadian Army has been meticulous since the 1960s, at least, in ensuring that the conditions were continuously sub-optimal. There have been short bursts of Reg F champions in the system but at best the system is one of benign neglect and much more often malicious neglect. Rather than fix the problem an general attitude of condescension permeates the system from bottom to, unfortunately, the top.

That maintenance is required to maintain a heavy force is a given. The fact that the equipment is used less frequently also means that there is less maintenance to be done and more extended time to do it in. It's part of the Reg F mentality problem that they say that "we can't give you heavy equipment because you do not have the full-timers to maintain it." When you sit back and think about it it's easy to see that's just a stupid statement but reflects the fact that they also do not put as much effort into maintaining Reg F equipment as is necessary.  If keeping an equipped reserve brigade maintained requires full-time maintainers then that's what the system needs to supply. 

I sometimes get the feeling that we give equipment to the Reg F so that they'll have something to do day-by-day rather than that they and their equipment together are a necessary capability that the country may need some day. When it comes to the difference between a Res F capability and a Reg F capability the only real difference that there should be is readiness and that can be compensated for by having hybrid units with a Reg F sub-unit and several Res F sub units.

You are right about training being a factor. There are some jobs where one simply needs to practice one's skills on a day-to-day basis to keep them sharp. Those are clearly full-timer jobs. SOF is a good example. Others where you need a quick reaction force. Full-timers again. But wherever there is time to develop skills and no need to react quickly reservists can do the job. The vast majority of positions in a heavy brigade, or most brigades including CS and CSS brigades for that matter, can be part-timers. You just need the right organization and the right training and it can be done. It takes an effort to get going but once operating pays huge dividends in reduced cost and expanded capabilities.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> Like Dieppe?



Like the Battle of the Somme?


----------



## Kirkhill

Human resources planning summary for Core Responsibilities and Internal Services​
*Core Responsibilities and Internal Services**2017–18
 Actual
 full-time
 equivalents**2018–19
 Actual
 full-time
 equivalents**2019–20
 Actual
 full-time
 equivalents**2020–21
 Planned
 full-time
 equivalents**2021–22
 Planned
 full-time
 equivalents**2022–23
 Planned
 full-time
 equivalents*OperationsN/A4,8844,9232,8602,8862,910Ready ForcesN/A45,56646,01646,48946,91747,280Defence TeamN/A20,12320,24320,83821,02521,180Future Force DesignN/A2,4212,6692,2232,2282,233Procurement of CapabilitiesN/A2,4202,3392,1762,1822,189Sustainable Bases, Information Technology Systems and InfrastructureN/A13,20913,36314,84314,91314,971*Subtotal**N/A**88,623**89,553**89,429**90,151**90,763*Internal ServicesN/A3,3474,0395,2935,3085,321*Total**N/A**91,970**93,592**94,722**95,459**96,084*






						Spending and human resources - Canada.ca
					






					www.canada.ca
				




I presume you have seen this.

One thing that jumps out at me is the 15,000 PYs/FTEs or so in Sustainable Bases, IT and Infrastructure.

I'm going to suggest that vehicles and mechanical systems are infrastructure.  Once they have been used they should be returned to stores at the base to be refurbished and reshelved for reissue. 

Reduce the number of bases and armouries and transfer those bricks and mortar maintenance PYs to mechanical system PYs.

But that is an old idea that has occurred to many others.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 66419
> 
> Human resources planning summary for Core Responsibilities and Internal Services​
> *Core Responsibilities and Internal Services**2017–18
> Actual
> full-time
> equivalents**2018–19
> Actual
> full-time
> equivalents**2019–20
> Actual
> full-time
> equivalents**2020–21
> Planned
> full-time
> equivalents**2021–22
> Planned
> full-time
> equivalents**2022–23
> Planned
> full-time
> equivalents*OperationsN/A4,8844,9232,8602,8862,910Ready ForcesN/A45,56646,01646,48946,91747,280Defence TeamN/A20,12320,24320,83821,02521,180Future Force DesignN/A2,4212,6692,2232,2282,233Procurement of CapabilitiesN/A2,4202,3392,1762,1822,189Sustainable Bases, Information Technology Systems and InfrastructureN/A13,20913,36314,84314,91314,971*Subtotal**N/A**88,623**89,553**89,429**90,151**90,763*Internal ServicesN/A3,3474,0395,2935,3085,321*Total**N/A**91,970**93,592**94,722**95,459**96,084*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Spending and human resources - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.canada.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I presume you have seen this.
> 
> One thing that jumps out at me is the 15,000 PYs/FTEs or so in Sustainable Bases, IT and Infrastructure.
> 
> I'm going to suggest that vehicles and mechanical systems are infrastructure.  Once they have been used they should be returned to stores at the base to be refurbished and reshelved for reissue.
> 
> Reduce the number of bases and armouries and transfer those bricks and mortar maintenance PYs to mechanical system PYs.
> 
> But that is an old idea that has occurred to many others.



We could save a bunch of wasted fixed costs by getting rid of the bases and having the troops live in the community. They can then concentrate on a daily basis at a local facility, with a much smaller and cheaper footprint, for training.

Like, you know, the Reserves.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> We could save a bunch of wasted fixed costs by getting rid of the bases and having the troops live in the community. They can then concentrate on a daily basis at a local facility, with a much smaller and cheaper footprint, for training.
> 
> Like, you know, the Reserves.



Whit? You mean turn up at the office on the daily?  Like regular fowks? You're hauvin' a laugh, Wull!


----------



## Kirkhill

Here's another thought







Buy all our new support weapons on pallets or in containers and buy lots of MSVS SMP Load Handling Systems.  The civvy's would go nuts for the extra assistance during the next power outage, icestorm, flood, fire or evacuation.  You could probably talk them into an extra 1000 to manage civil emergencies.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Whit? You mean turn up at the office on the daily?  Like regular fowks? You're hauvin' a laugh, Wull!



It seemed to work for this mob 


STRENGTH BORN FROM WEAKNESS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RAIDING CONCEPT AND THE BRITISH COMMANDOS​
Once the men were selected, the next requirement was to get them organized and trained. Much like the former Independent Companies, the commandos were not put in barracks, but, rather, each man was given a subsistence allowance, and was required to find his own accommodation and food. Commanding officers touted this practice to be of great value because it increased a man’s self-reliance, made him available for training at any time of the day or night, and eliminated the loss of manpower due to the perennial demands of administrative duties and tasks inherently associated with any garrison setting.24 The commando troops appreciated this aspect as well. “It is the greatest job in the Army that one could possibly get, and it is a job that, if properly carried out, can be of enormous value,” asserted Major Geoffrey Appleyard. He added: “No red tape, no paper work ...just pure operations, the success of which depends principally on oneself and the men one has oneself picked to do the job with you... it’s revolutionary.”25 Many agreed. That is why the RTU assessment (Return To Unit) became the CO’s most powerful punishment.26






						Strength Born from Weakness: The Establishment of the Raiding Concept and the British Commandos - Canadian Military Journal
					

Strength Born from Weakness: The Establishment of the Raiding Concept and the British Commandos



					www.journal.forces.gc.ca


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> It seemed to work for this mob
> 
> 
> STRENGTH BORN FROM WEAKNESS: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RAIDING CONCEPT AND THE BRITISH COMMANDOS​
> Once the men were selected, the next requirement was to get them organized and trained. Much like the former Independent Companies, the commandos were not put in barracks, but, rather, each man was given a subsistence allowance, and was required to find his own accommodation and food. Commanding officers touted this practice to be of great value because it increased a man’s self-reliance, made him available for training at any time of the day or night, and eliminated the loss of manpower due to the perennial demands of administrative duties and tasks inherently associated with any garrison setting.24 The commando troops appreciated this aspect as well. “It is the greatest job in the Army that one could possibly get, and it is a job that, if properly carried out, can be of enormous value,” asserted Major Geoffrey Appleyard. He added: “No red tape, no paper work ...just pure operations, the success of which depends principally on oneself and the men one has oneself picked to do the job with you... it’s revolutionary.”25 Many agreed. That is why the RTU assessment (Return To Unit) became the CO’s most powerful punishment.26
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Strength Born from Weakness: The Establishment of the Raiding Concept and the British Commandos - Canadian Military Journal
> 
> 
> Strength Born from Weakness: The Establishment of the Raiding Concept and the British Commandos
> 
> 
> 
> www.journal.forces.gc.ca



It was also a great recruiting tool.  My dad learned to fire an automatic pistol at age 13 by borrowing the pistol belonging to the Commando billeted with his family in Troon.  The Commando was recovering from his exertions at Narvik.  The local constabulary was not impressed with my father's enthusiasm.  Nor with his schoolmate's experimentation with some kinetic Home Guard formulations in amongst the dunes at the beach.

One thing that did stand out well was intelligence gathering.  If the Commandos wanted find out what they were going to be doing next they went down to talk to the fishwives at the market.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 66419
> 
> Human resources planning summary for Core Responsibilities and Internal Services​
> *Core Responsibilities and Internal Services**2017–18
> Actual
> full-time
> equivalents**2018–19
> Actual
> full-time
> equivalents**2019–20
> Actual
> full-time
> equivalents**2020–21
> Planned
> full-time
> equivalents**2021–22
> Planned
> full-time
> equivalents**2022–23
> Planned
> full-time
> equivalents*OperationsN/A4,8844,9232,8602,8862,910Ready ForcesN/A45,56646,01646,48946,91747,280Defence TeamN/A20,12320,24320,83821,02521,180Future Force DesignN/A2,4212,6692,2232,2282,233Procurement of CapabilitiesN/A2,4202,3392,1762,1822,189Sustainable Bases, Information Technology Systems and InfrastructureN/A13,20913,36314,84314,91314,971*Subtotal**N/A**88,623**89,553**89,429**90,151**90,763*Internal ServicesN/A3,3474,0395,2935,3085,321*Total**N/A**91,970**93,592**94,722**95,459**96,084*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Spending and human resources - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.canada.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I presume you have seen this.
> 
> One thing that jumps out at me is the 15,000 PYs/FTEs or so in Sustainable Bases, IT and Infrastructure.
> 
> I'm going to suggest that vehicles and mechanical systems are infrastructure.  Once they have been used they should be returned to stores at the base to be refurbished and reshelved for reissue.
> 
> Reduce the number of bases and armouries and transfer those bricks and mortar maintenance PYs to mechanical system PYs.
> 
> But that is an old idea that has occurred to many others.



I've looked at these charts over the years and continue to wonder at whether or not those categories are designed to deliberately obscure what the money is spent on or whether that's just a biproduct of an attempt by someone to give what they considered relevant data.

With my own biased way of interpreting things I do note that total planned full time equivalents are rising by 4,078 but that the Ready Forces is only rising by 1,714. On the other hand Internal services, sustainable bases etc and Defence Team (whatever that is) is rising by 4,793. The difference is made up by Operations, Future Force design and procurement losing 2,393.

I'm not quite sure where the dividing line between PYs allocated to operations and those allocated to Ready Team but I'm guessing that the increase in Ready Force PYs is probably significantly related to and offset by the decrease in Operations. Assuming I'm right with that than we're seeing a reduction of what I'll call the Army, Navy and Air Force "field force" of give or take 260 while the CFs administrative overhead is rising by the aforesaid 4,793.

Sigh!

Someone with better departmental financial analysis skills than me let me know if my fears are rational or irrational.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Just an aside, the Leo C1s had just come off a recent rebuild, the M109s were still capable (and would still be today) and I think we still have the TLAVs. The Leo C1s were suitable as a stopgap in Afghanistan but their lack of IED resistance was a problem. The M109s didn't have the "precision fire" capability that modernists were looking for. Both systems were eminently suitable for a reserve training role and even certain levels of combat operations. TLAVs from the '60s are still running around the world in their 10s of thousands.



The M113/TLAV is a deathtrap -- I don't know who doctored the story to suggest it faired better against IED's than a LAV - but an aluminum box isn't something anyone wants to be in.   It has neither the design (Box) nor the material construction (Aluminum) to be  protective vehicle - it is tracked - so it has some decent terrain qualities to it.

 I wonder how it would do as a Gun Tractor?  Actually serious there - as it can tow - sure the dismount action rear (or right etc) would be a bit of a goat rope with troops needing to go through the door vice the ramp (unless there was a releasable shackle that one could drop/lower the gun - drive forward and then drop the ramp.




FJAG said:


> The issue is nothing more or less that maintenance ... and that is nothing more or less than a question of full-time PY allocation priorities. The money is there for the people and the spare parts -- IF -- its not used up for administrative overhead and other things. We would rather put 4,000 Class B's to work in headquarters shuffling paper around then allocating a 1,000 of those PYs or Class Bs on turning wrenches - and I doubt we actually need that many in the Army although the Air Force and Navy could all use a few.
> 
> You are right though. It is a matter of would-could-should. An right now we do have 100 Leo 2 gun tanks, and we do have six battalions of LAV 6.0s and getting another 400+ support LAVs. We also still have all those Bisons and TLAVs kicking around which someone will undoubtedly want to dispose of. As  junior NCO I was taught to think of "must knows, should knows, and could knows". I consider financial allocation within DND as "must dos, should dos, and could dos". Since DNDs aim is to be an organization that can bring violence to bear in an emergency then the "must do" is to build a well rounded capable force that can react to a full-spectrum of threats.
> 
> Abandoning necessary capabilities due to full-time manpower restrictions when you have tens of thousands of unequipped and poorly trained reservists makes absolutely zero sense to me.
> 
> Spending half of DND's annual budget on personnel costs when even critical front -line equipment can't be maintained makes zero sense to me.
> 
> And having an Army that presents three poor options for reorganizing itself but which in each option ensures that useless div hqs  are maintained (even adding one in one case) while complaining that we are short of trainers makes zero sense to me.


100% there


FJAG said:


> It's really just a game of personnel numbers and equipment. With 40,000 plus Reg F and Res F personnel we easily have the numbers. It becomes problematic if decade after decade you continue to segregate the force with very minor exceptions (Class Bs filling into HQs and RSS bolstering reserve units) You are absolutely right though. If we continue to ignore the true potential of a reserve force then we do not have the numbers. We absolutely need to apply Gibbs Rule # 5 - "Don't waste good!"
> 
> There are new and essential weapon systems coming on line which we will have to incorporate. There wont be a choice. As long as we keep dividing the force the way that we do we will continue to have to give up Reg F capabilities in order to generate the PYs for them (just like we did with infantry mortars, half of our artillery and all of our air defence)
> 
> Just as a thought. Take the existing tanks, two battalions of existing LAV6.0s, leave them 105mmC3s for the time being and some TLAVs, TAPVs and a good bit of a service battalion and 300 maintainers and maybe 500 trainer/operators/leaders. Form a reserve brigade around that using 4,000 reservists and the 500 RSS they already have. The annual cost to operate that brigade will go down by 70% per year on Reg F PYs alone. The equipment wear and tear will be reduced as will annual operating costs for fuel and ammo (And yes we need to sharpen up the Res F system but we should have done that decades ago.) That will leave you an armoured brigade in reserve that you can fall back to if and when needed and give you close to 4,000 PYs that you can reallocate to new weapon systems (like GBAD, loitering munitions, ISR and Cyber operators, you name it) as enablers to a brigade or division and still leave you a Reg F light and medium brigade to do whatever day-to-day things need doing.
> 
> 
> That's where I have disagreed with my Reg F peers for decades.
> 
> Reservists can be more than GIBs, if you create the conditions for them to succeed. The Canadian Army has been meticulous since the 1960s, at least, in ensuring that the conditions were continuously sub-optimal. There have been short bursts of Reg F champions in the system but at best the system is one of benign neglect and much more often malicious neglect. Rather than fix the problem an general attitude of condescension permeates the system from bottom to, unfortunately, the top.


I started as a reservist - I think there are enormous unrealized potential in the reserves.
   However - that requires significant changes to the Res Structure - and given the CF has been resistant for years - as well as no parliamentary support for legislation with teeth for the reserves - I don't see the Reserves as currently viable unless that changes.




FJAG said:


> That maintenance is required to maintain a heavy force is a given. The fact that the equipment is used less frequently also means that there is less maintenance to be done and more extended time to do it in. It's part of the Reg F mentality problem that they say that "we can't give you heavy equipment because you do not have the full-timers to maintain it." When you sit back and think about it it's easy to see that's just a stupid statement but reflects the fact that they also do not put as much effort into maintaining Reg F equipment as is necessary.  If keeping an equipped reserve brigade maintained requires full-time maintainers then that's what the system needs to supply.


Years ago in Cyprus a buddy and I where drinking - he said if he was king (this was in 92 keep in mind) all the CBT ARMS pers would be reservists - and the only full time forces would be Maintenance and Supply -- I thought he was crazy - he did allow to retain the CAR and support in the Reg's  - but he suggested that if the res was structured correctly - then it would serve the CF's needs fine.

I think he was a lot more right now than I did then.

   BUT - it requires a massive change in the CF -- I don't see the Senior Leaders or Political support for something like that.



FJAG said:


> I sometimes get the feeling that we give equipment to the Reg F so that they'll have something to do day-by-day rather than that they and their equipment together are a necessary capability that the country may need some day. When it comes to the difference between a Res F capability and a Reg F capability the only real difference that there should be is readiness and that can be compensated for by having hybrid units with a Reg F sub-unit and several Res F sub units.


Agreed


FJAG said:


> You are right about training being a factor. There are some jobs where one simply needs to practice one's skills on a day-to-day basis to keep them sharp. Those are clearly full-timer jobs. SOF is a good example. Others where you need a quick reaction force. Full-timers again. But wherever there is time to develop skills and no need to react quickly reservists can do the job. The vast majority of positions in a heavy brigade, or most brigades including CS and CSS brigades for that matter, can be part-timers. You just need the right organization and the right training and it can be done. It takes an effort to get going but once operating pays huge dividends in reduced cost and expanded capabilities.
> 
> 🍻


See we agree on a lot of things as well


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I've looked at these charts over the years and continue to wonder at whether or not those categories are designed to deliberately obscure what the money is spent on or whether that's just a biproduct of an attempt by someone to give what they considered relevant data.
> 
> With my own biased way of interpreting things I do note that total planned full time equivalents are rising by 4,078 but that the Ready Forces is only rising by 1,714. On the other hand Internal services, sustainable bases etc and Defence Team (whatever that is) is rising by 4,793. The difference is made up by Operations, Future Force design and procurement losing 2,393.
> 
> I'm not quite sure where the dividing line between PYs allocated to operations and those allocated to Ready Team but I'm guessing that the increase in Ready Force PYs is probably significantly related to and offset by the decrease in Operations. Assuming I'm right with that than we're seeing a reduction of what I'll call the Army, Navy and Air Force "field force" of give or take 260 while the CFs administrative overhead is rising by the aforesaid 4,793.
> 
> Sigh!
> 
> Someone with better departmental financial analysis skills than me let me know if my fears are rational or irrational.
> 
> 🍻


The charts are so muddled it seem intentional.




42%, $9,760,714,328 for Ready Forces; - I assume this is Salaries?


15%, $3,444,253,339 for Defence Team; - ? I would have thought the entire CAF was the Defense Team...


16%, $3,680,697,534 for Sustainable Bases, Information Technology Systems and Infrastructure; I find it interesting the "Green Base" spending is Lumped with IT - and no real breakdown,  


17%, $3,910,791,611 for Procurement of Capabilities; Capital Acquisition I would assume - but no break down of programs than I can see.


5%, $699,552,288 for Operations; Broken down on follow on link


4%, $845,220,905 for Future Force Design;  ? 


3%, $699,552,288 for Internal Services; Administration costs?  




It doesn't really get any clearer with either of the two supporting links

Although you can see where Operations Funds are spent by location in this.





						Planned Costs for Major Canadian Armed Forces Operations - Canada.ca
					






					www.canada.ca
				





Then more muddy water.





						Consolidated Future-Oriented Statement of Operations (unaudited) - Canada.ca
					

The plan’s focus is on the work the Defence team will do in the year ahead to serve Canada.




					www.canada.ca


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> The M113/TLAV is a deathtrap -- I don't know who doctored the story to suggest it faired better against IED's than a LAV - but an aluminum box isn't something anyone wants to be in.   It has neither the design (Box) nor the material construction (Aluminum) to be  protective vehicle - it is tracked - so it has some decent terrain qualities to it.


I'd never heard anyone say it fared better than a LAV and agree with you that it probably wouldn't. I know the upgrade included a heavier suspension and bolt on armour but have no idea if any of that went to the belly and even if it did it would still be a flat bottomed box.

I wouldn't call it a death trap though in spite of pictures like this:






Anything once hit can go that way. The armour was meant as a fragment catcher and up to 7.62 mm if I remember correctly. It shouldn't be used as a combat vehicle. I don't think it was ever really meant to be anything other than a high mobility, slightly protected transport vehicle with the fighting elements dismounting well short of effective direct fire.



KevinB said:


> I wonder how it would do as a Gun Tractor?  Actually serious there - as it can tow - sure the dismount action rear (or right etc) would be a bit of a goat rope with troops needing to go through the door vice the ramp (unless there was a releasable shackle that one could drop/lower the gun - drive forward and then drop the ramp.


We did use the Grizzlies in that role (with the LG1) and the M548 (with the L5). I can't recall the M113 ever being used and the only concern I would have would be the towing pin configuration as to the how far you could open the door with a gun attached - but since it worked with the Grizzly, my guess is it would work with the M113.

In Afghanistan they used trucks to pull the guns (mostly because they also needed to carry ammo) but used TLAVs to transport the bulk of the gun detachment under armour. As you might guess, the preferred method of moving guns when they had to be moved was by CH-47.



KevinB said:


> I started as a reservist - I think there are enormous unrealized potential in the reserves.
> However - that requires significant changes to the Res Structure - and given the CF has been resistant for years - as well as no parliamentary support for legislation with teeth for the reserves - I don't see the Reserves as currently viable unless that changes.


I don't know if you've come across the book Relentless Struggle down south. It was commissioned by Reserves 2000 which as you might know is a lobbying group of senior Militia officers mainly from the Toronto area to show how their actions over the years has saved the Reserves. IMHO Reserves 2000 is also part of the problem because they fanatically continue to hang onto every cap badge. Their primary solution is to fund and expand many more reservists into the existing footprint ... and oh yeah, equip it as well.

The problem lies between Reserves 2000's unrealistic expectations and stubbornness (which is pushed up to the government through pressuring their local MPs), and the CF's Reg F pushback because while the Reg F likes individual augmentees, they have absolutely no use for formed reserve units. What's left is an uneasy truce which accomplishes zip and moves no agenda forward.

As I said before, we have the personnel authorizations and funding for the equivalent of two divisions and the equipment of one. You could as a phase 1 reorganize the reserves to mirror the four Ref brigades and share equipment during the summer. In phase 2 you would slowly grow the equipment. The Reg F wouldn't like that because of the additional wear and tear on equipment and Reserves 2000 wouldn't like it because such a reorganization would reduce the number of reserve units from 126 (or so) poorly established and manned ones to 30 (or so) fully established and manned ones. Obviously there are also many other fundamental changes needed.



KevinB said:


> Years ago in Cyprus a buddy and I where drinking - he said if he was king (this was in 92 keep in mind) all the CBT ARMS pers would be reservists - and the only full time forces would be Maintenance and Supply -- I thought he was crazy - he did allow to retain the CAR and support in the Reg's  - but he suggested that if the res was structured correctly - then it would serve the CF's needs fine.
> 
> I think he was a lot more right now than I did then.


I also think that every branch of the Army needs a certain sized core that is the repository of its corporate knowledge and which validates that through constant practice. That needs a certain number of full-timers. 

For me the repetitive demise and rebirth of artillery STA and air defence and the long lag between reformation and what I would call final operating capability were major object lessons. I feel that way about tanks and armoured infantry (as you might have noticed) which is barely holding on to the skills of proper combined arms operations. Infantry mortars and pioneers are another. I'm sure that there are many more examples of skill sets that have been sacrificed on the alter of cost cutting and PY reshuffles.



KevinB said:


> BUT - it requires a massive change in the CF -- I don't see the Senior Leaders or Political support for something like that.


Obviously there are also many other fundamental changes needed. Personally I think they are relatively simple ones which require very few legislative changes (the biggest would be much better employment protection legislation). Most of the changes are regulatory or policies well within DND's authority to make unilaterally.



KevinB said:


> See we agree on a lot of things as well


We do.


🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> …On the other hand Internal services, sustainable bases etc and Defence Team (whatever that is) is rising by 4,793. The difference is made up by Operations, Future Force design and procurement losing 2,393…


For ‘Defence Team’, I’m going to go with a well-obfuscated “combined CAF/DND in the NCR/NDHQ.”

20k sounds about “right.”


*right = likely, not justified. 😉


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> For ‘Defence Team’, I’m going to go with a well-obfuscated “combined CAF/DND in the NCR/NDHQ.”
> 
> 20k sounds about “right.”
> 
> 
> *right = likely, not justified. 😉



It might include 'resources' like the guy who smelled of cheap booze and hung around the armoury doing 'project management' for a few things that no one ever really figured out.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> It might include 'resources' like the guy who smelled of cheap booze and hung around the armoury doing 'project management' for a few things that no one ever really figured out.



I'm fascinated that the Defence Team is separate from the Future Force planning team.  One might have thought that that might have been part of their day job.


----------



## CBH99

I don’t mean to derail the thread at all.  I do have a question, as I am curious to hear the thoughts of those who have taken a keen interest in this thread.

If the CAF could acquire a highly modern SHORAD/Medium-Range AD system…OR…a modern, lethal AT system… which do you think would be more useful/practical for Force 2025?  

(You have to choose one or the other.)


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> I don’t mean to derail the thread at all.  I do have a question, as I am curious to hear the thoughts of those who have taken a keen interest in this thread.
> 
> If the CAF could acquire a highly modern SHORAD/Medium-Range AD system…OR…a modern, lethal AT system… which do you think would be more useful/practical for Force 2025?
> 
> (You have to choose one or the other.)



I would go with the AD option.
   Mainly as I am much more scared of AirPower than Armored Forces.    There are a lot of things one can do to slow down an Armored formation without a Missile (but those would be nice) - and you can use terrain to limit their mobility and firepower.

 Air - without friendly Air Superiority you are a sitting duck without a decent AD net.  Also tanks can't swim - planes just keep flying -- so AD will always have a role...


----------



## GR66

Swerving back to the questions on force structure.  Are we again self-imposing limitations on ourselves by confusing our Brigade Groups and Regiments as Force Employment organizations rather than Force Generation organizations?

For example, if Wainwright is considered the best location for Mechanized/Tank training, then our thinking automatically goes to "1 Brigade with the Strathconas and PPCLI becomes our Heavy Brigade".  But none of 1 Brigade, LdSH or the PPCLI are actually Force Employment units.

Would alternative model possibly to have each major base specialize in a particular role...Light, Medium and Heavy...and expose all of the Regiments to each to provide the maximum flexibility to the forces you're able to deploy depending on the particular circumstances of the conflict of the day.

Edmonton/Wainwright - Specializes in Mechanized Operations

A Sqn LdSH (Leopards)
A Sqn RCD (Leopards)
A Sqn 12 RBC (Leopards)
1 PPCLI (LAVs)
1 RCR (LAVs)
1 R22eR (LAVs)

Valcartier/Quebec - Specializes in Medium/Cavalry-type Operations

B Sqn LdSH (LAV Recce/LAV AT)
B Sqn RCD (LAV Recce/LAV AT)
B Sqn 12 RBC (LAV Recce/LAV AT)
2 PPCLI (LAVs)
2 RCR (LAVs)
2 R22eR (LAVs)

Petawawa - Specializes in Light/Airborne/Air Mobile-type Operations

C Sqn LdSH (Light Vehicles)
C Sqn RCD (Light Vehicles)
C Sqn 12 RBC (Light Vehicles)
3 PPCLI (Dismounted/Light Vehicles/Aircraft)
3 RCR (Dismounted/Light Vehicles/Aircraft)
3 R22eR (Dismounted/Light Vehicles/Aircraft)

Personnel within each Regiment could move between Squadrons/Battalions within their own Regiments in their career to get exposure to the different types of operations they may be required to undertake without pigeon-holing a particular Regiment to a specific role that may or may not be required at any given time (e.g. RCR stuck with multiple deployments for Light role missions because they are the "Light" Brigade while PPCLI and their "Heavy" units are under utilized).  At the same time, physical assets like tanks can be geographically centralized to simplify logistics, etc.


----------



## Kirkhill

I'll disagree with Kevin.  I would go with the AT option.

I don't disagree on the risks and benefits associated with the AD option but I'm going with the AT option on the grounds of timeline and budget.  And also on impact.

We are talking about SHORAD here (and I choose to interpret that strictly as something like the 25 km SkySabre LandCeptor CAMM system recently acquired by the RA).  The SHORAD complex requires a large investment to get a single system in a short time but will take a few years to deliver, a few more years to reach IOC (Initial Operating Capacity) and a few more years to bed in.

This is 2021 (almost over) and we are discussing something that will make an impact on the structure and utility of Force 2025.  That means something that can be in place by 2024 at the latest. 2022,2023,2024.  That makes for a very short timeline.   On those grounds alone I would argue for the AT solution.

AT also wins in terms of Budget.  It is a scaleable purchase that has utility even with a low rate of investment.  The individual firing points and rounds are relatively low cost.   The also can be introduced in small numbers over time and either concentrated in one unit if operations are imminent or widely distributed for training purposes or some combination depending on circumstances.  As money comes available then the numbers can be increased and distribution made more general.  By 2025 the whole infantry force could be well equipped.

And that brings me to the third point: impact. Particularly on the infantry.

This is a programme that has been on the books since the 1980s and has been constantly sidelined.  In my opinion it is emblematic of the shift of the infantry to the constabulary role.  It has left the infantry with nothing but their rifles and machine guns to contribute to the battle if they don't have their LAVs and Bushmasters.

I believe that equipping the infantry, both LAV and Light, with ATGMs (Manportable) will change the infantry's capabilities, their sense of utility, their mindset, reduce the gap between LAV and Light forces as people emphasise weapons over platforms, and perhaps it will change the Army's perception on Light Forces generally.

I keep coming back to a comment made about planning brigade exercises and trying to figure out what to do with the 3rd Battalion in order to justify it deploying with helicopters.  A lot of money being spent to deliver a few dozen machine guns to fight armoured vehicles.  I believe that calculus would change if that same airlift money were spent to lift the machine guns and a few dozen Anti-Tank missiles with 10 kg warheads, ranges out to 5 km and secondary utility in the Anti-Structure role.

AT over AD.  

At the same time I would start planning immediately to introduce the SHORAD in time for Force 2030. And perhaps more importantly for the Anti-Drone fight the VSHORAD system based on the MANPADs like Stinger.

I would allow that the cost and time benefits of the AT missiles apply equally to the Stinger.  It too could be introduced widely and slowly.  But I believe it would require more specialised training and co-ordination to become effective in defeating the aerial threat of the drone swarm.


----------



## Kirkhill

And GR66 - you're a better man than I am putting up that proposal.


----------



## Fabius

GR66,
To some degree I think the Armoured Corps is having the same debate about what units will crew the tanks once/if they are centralized in Wainwright.
From my perspective I want the LdSH to crew them all.  I want the Army to break the self imposed mentality that everything has to be equal and the same.  This mentality that all Bde's and Regiments must have the same sub unit capabilities and opportunities is negatively impacting our ability to mass at the BG and Bde levels and it needs to stop in my opinion.

In terms of AD vs AT I would go with AT for most of the same reasons Kirkhill outlined. We can get AT into the force quicker and easier than AD at this point and given F2025 is 3 years out, speed is an issue.


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> Someone with better departmental financial analysis skills than me let me know if my fears are rational or irrational.





KevinB said:


> The charts are so muddled it seem intentional.



What you are reading is a chart showing the Core Responsibilities of the DND under the Departmental Results Framework (DRF).  This is a largely fiscal reporting mechanism run by the Centre (PCO/Finance) across all government departments.

I wouldn't use it as a tool for what you are trying to do here as it is focused on breaking down DND/CAF activities into specific Program Inventories and costing them out.  It's a fiscal governance tool, and not an organizational one.  There is a lot of work done at the Command levels (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc) and the VCDS shop (CProg) in translating military activities into DRF language.

If you're interested in the DRF (what the Department is supposed to do for the GoC) and the Departmental Results Report (what it actually did), fill your boots!






						Departmental Results Report 2019-2020 - Canada.ca
					

Table of contents/Index Page




					www.canada.ca


----------



## McG

GR66 said:


> Edmonton/Wainwright - Specializes in Mechanized Operations
> 
> A Sqn LdSH (Leopards)
> A Sqn RCD (Leopards)
> A Sqn 12 RBC (Leopards)
> 1 PPCLI (LAVs)
> 1 RCR (LAVs)
> 1 R22eR (LAVs)
> 
> Valcartier/Quebec - Specializes in Medium/Cavalry-type Operations
> 
> B Sqn LdSH (LAV Recce/LAV AT)
> B Sqn RCD (LAV Recce/LAV AT)
> B Sqn 12 RBC (LAV Recce/LAV AT)
> 2 PPCLI (LAVs)
> 2 RCR (LAVs)
> 2 R22eR (LAVs)
> 
> Petawawa - Specializes in Light/Airborne/Air Mobile-type Operations
> 
> C Sqn LdSH (Light Vehicles)
> C Sqn RCD (Light Vehicles)
> C Sqn 12 RBC (Light Vehicles)
> 3 PPCLI (Dismounted/Light Vehicles/Aircraft)
> 3 RCR (Dismounted/Light Vehicles/Aircraft)
> 3 R22eR (Dismounted/Light Vehicles/Aircraft)


As much as regimental politics currently demands that everyone get an equal slice of pie, this is the worst possible way to mitigate. The geographic career stability of the current regimental system would be completely gone. The multi-capbadge structure of your armoured units would be prone to cohesion & disciplinary problems (not to mention the significant pain of requiring a geographic posting to move between sub-units). Accept that not every regiment gets every toy (this is optimal), merge regiments (ie one armoured regiment of three battalions), or design symmetric brigades.


----------



## Infanteer

All the Army rebuilds here would be better off just not putting Regimental affiliations.  Just say "Mech Inf Bn" or "Armoured Regiment."


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> If you're interested in the DRF (what the Department is supposed to do for the GoC) and the Departmental Results Report (what it actually did), fill your boots!


Thanks Infanteer. Seen it in the past and digested it.

What my question was really addressing is whether my meatball analysis of the PY allocation as between core responsibilities for this and next FY is correct. In other words is it a wash as between operations and ready force for the field force (ie the principle Army, Navy Air Force, SOFCOM elements) while the PY increase and offsets in the other core responsibilities indicates a roughly 4,800 extra PYs in what are relatively admin overhead categories.

It's obviously not easy to extract actual PY allocation and usage just by looking at the blended core responsibilities categories.

🍻


----------



## ballz

FJAG said:


> I've looked at these charts over the years and continue to wonder at whether or not those categories are designed to deliberately obscure what the money is spent on or whether that's just a biproduct of an attempt by someone to give what they considered relevant data.
> 
> With my own biased way of interpreting things I do note that total planned full time equivalents are rising by 4,078 but that the Ready Forces is only rising by 1,714. On the other hand Internal services, sustainable bases etc and Defence Team (whatever that is) is rising by 4,793. The difference is made up by Operations, Future Force design and procurement losing 2,393.
> 
> I'm not quite sure where the dividing line between PYs allocated to operations and those allocated to Ready Team but I'm guessing that the increase in Ready Force PYs is probably significantly related to and offset by the decrease in Operations. Assuming I'm right with that than we're seeing a reduction of what I'll call the Army, Navy and Air Force "field force" of give or take 260 while the CFs administrative overhead is rising by the aforesaid 4,793.
> 
> Sigh!
> 
> Someone with better departmental financial analysis skills than me let me know if my fears are rational or irrational.
> 
> 🍻



The DRF breaks down a lot further than that. What you're looking at is the programs, but within the programs it's broken down further.

So "Ready Forces" breaks down into "Land Ready Forces" (Army) which breaks down into

Collective Training
Individual Training
Land Service Support
Land Readiness Management
Canadian Ranger Programs
Land History, Heritage, COMREL (seems kinda dishonest to include this in Land Ready Forces)
Support to Operations (aka Force Gen costs for an Op)

And all of those breakdown further.... it's like that for every "program." Without seeing how it's broken down there's not much useful information to be gained.

Then there's also the execution problem that affects data integrity..... the Army has been funding and capturing all of our PCF courses which are clearly an IT cost, as Collective Training, for years now. 🙃

Also all the Base Maintenance, Transport, Supply, etc. functions fall under program 6, the sustainable bases one..... so that should probably be all captured under Land Ready Forces for a Base like Edmonton, Pet, Gagetown since all that money is actually going towards sustaining the Land Ready Forces stuff but hey.....


----------



## KevinB

Not what I would call Air Defense - but hey





						Air defence procurement projects - Canada.ca
					

The competition to replace Canada’s fighter jets. Purchases and upgrades for maritime helicopters, tactical transports, search and rescue aircraft, and airborne intelligence aircraft.




					www.canada.ca


----------



## SeaKingTacco

KevinB said:


> Not what I would call Air Defense - but hey
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Air defence procurement projects - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> The competition to replace Canada’s fighter jets. Purchases and upgrades for maritime helicopters, tactical transports, search and rescue aircraft, and airborne intelligence aircraft.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.canada.ca


Fighters are one leg of the triad, along with GBAD and naval Air Defence


----------



## KevinB

SeaKingTacco said:


> Fighters are one leg of the triad, along with GBAD and naval Air Defence


No disagreement there -- just the Tripod seems to be a monopod there...
 Also not sure how the title ties to the description.
"The competition to replace Canada’s fighter jets. Purchases and upgrades for maritime helicopters, tactical transports, search and rescue aircraft and airborne intelligence aircraft."

It seems more like the title should have been Defence Air Procurement...


----------



## SeaKingTacco

KevinB said:


> No disagreement there -- just the Tripod seems to be a monopod there...
> Also not sure how the title ties to the description.
> "The competition to replace Canada’s fighter jets. Purchases and upgrades for maritime helicopters, tactical transports, search and rescue aircraft and airborne intelligence aircraft."
> 
> It seems more like the title should have been Defence Air Procurement...


Oh, I aware that the tripod is more like a flagpole, today. There should be two more legs.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Well, at least a uneven bipod: The frigates are quite capable of defending themselves against air threats. And in that line, the Surface Combatant program can be seen as the second leg in full: They will be able to provide area air defence and even  participate in BMD.


----------



## GR66

McG said:


> As much as regimental politics currently demands that everyone get an equal slice of pie, this is the worst possible way to mitigate. The geographic career stability of the current regimental system would be completely gone. The multi-capbadge structure of your armoured units would be prone to cohesion & disciplinary problems (not to mention the significant pain of requiring a geographic posting to move between sub-units). Accept that not every regiment gets every toy (this is optimal), merge regiments (ie one armoured regiment of three battalions), or design symmetric brigades.


Very fair criticism.  It's important to keep in mind that 90% of the time the troops are not deployed and the basic quality of life during that time is a major factor in retention, etc.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> As much as regimental politics currently demands that everyone get an equal slice of pie, this is the worst possible way to mitigate. The geographic career stability of the current regimental system would be completely gone. The multi-capbadge structure of your armoured units would be prone to cohesion & disciplinary problems (not to mention the significant pain of requiring a geographic posting to move between sub-units). Accept that not every regiment gets every toy (this is optimal), merge regiments (ie one armoured regiment of three battalions), or design symmetric brigades.



'Gegraphic career stability'. Is that a real thing?


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

It used to be for the Maritimers in the Black Watch.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Oldgateboatdriver said:


> It used to be for the Maritimers in the Black Watch.



I assume they had DNA tests to ensure the gene pool was deep enough to ensure that they were Darwin proof?


----------



## KevinB

Oldgateboatdriver said:


> Well, at least a uneven bipod: The frigates are quite capable of defending themselves against air threats. And in that line, the Surface Combatant program can be seen as the second leg in full: They will be able to provide area air defence and even  participate in BMD.


And the Army?

I mean I get that the RCAF doesn't like the idea of the army having dangerous (to them) toys - but...


----------



## SeaKingTacco

I


KevinB said:


> And the Army?
> 
> I mean I get that the RCAF doesn't like the idea of the army having dangerous (to them) toys - but...


I remember some of the discussions around the time of the birth of ADATS. To say that Air Command did not love the idea of a Sgt commanding a vehicle that could shoot down a fighter was an understatement….


----------



## Kirkhill

Hmmm.  One Sergeant.  8 Captains.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Hmmm.  One Sergeant.  8 Captains.
> 
> View attachment 66433



You know, just looking at that picture, and thinking about the AD AT discussion.  I get that there is a cost to ammunition.  I get that Air Defence is indeed a specialization that requires particular skills.

But here is where I find myself bumping up against a problem.

How do the navies of the world manage to deal with surface threats, subsurface threats, aerial threats, missiles, boats and smugglers with an array of multiple caliber guns, missiles, torpedoes and troops transported by jackstay, boat and helicopter from one single room surrounded by all the systems and accessed from comfy seats?



And yet the army needs separate capbadges and colonels to perform similar jobs.


----------



## Infanteer

That's easy, those components of a Navy don't manouevre - the ship drives through water....


----------



## Kirkhill

But, hopefully, all those cap badges and colonels are flying in loose formation and maneuvering together, not working independently.


----------



## Halifax Tar

McG said:


> As much as regimental politics currently demands that everyone get an equal slice of pie, this is the worst possible way to mitigate. The geographic career stability of the current regimental system would be completely gone. The multi-capbadge structure of your armoured units would be prone to cohesion & disciplinary problems (not to mention the significant pain of requiring a geographic posting to move between sub-units). Accept that not every regiment gets every toy (this is optimal), merge regiments (ie one armoured regiment of three battalions), or design symmetric brigades.



Pardon me while I stray out of lanes... 

Why do you think the CBT Arms folks couldn't deal with the geographical instability ?  

Most other branches don't have that stability.  Or perhaps they should ?


----------



## FJAG

ballz said:


> The DRF breaks down a lot further than that. What you're looking at is the programs, but within the programs it's broken down further.
> 
> So "Ready Forces" breaks down into "Land Ready Forces" (Army) which breaks down into
> 
> Collective Training
> Individual Training
> Land Service Support
> Land Readiness Management
> Canadian Ranger Programs
> Land History, Heritage, COMREL (seems kinda dishonest to include this in Land Ready Forces)
> Support to Operations (aka Force Gen costs for an Op)
> 
> And all of those breakdown further.... it's like that for every "program." Without seeing how it's broken down there's not much useful information to be gained.
> 
> Then there's also the execution problem that affects data integrity..... the Army has been funding and capturing all of our PCF courses which are clearly an IT cost, as Collective Training, for years now. 🙃
> 
> Also all the Base Maintenance, Transport, Supply, etc. functions fall under program 6, the sustainable bases one..... so that should probably be all captured under Land Ready Forces for a Base like Edmonton, Pet, Gagetown since all that money is actually going towards sustaining the Land Ready Forces stuff but hey.....


I thought it would probably be something like that. That's a doable method when you count cash but becomes somewhat strained when dealing with PYs where a given individual may straddle several programs (or could be interpreted amongst several programs).

I'm not generally a great fan of performance measurement because unless well designed and scrupulously implemented (which most are not) they tend to provide fuzzy data and frequently aren't worth the effort. Industries that have a variety of cost inputs to measure against an incoming cash flow generally do much better with it than organizations that are just input consumers with no real measurable outputs.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Thinking more on the naval analogy

One Lt Colonel (Commander)
225 Under Command  (Small Battalion or Reinforced Company Combat Team)

Own Base

Responsible for 

Base Maintenance
Base Engineering
Hotel (Room and Board)
Continuous Surveillance of Surface (Land), Air, and Subsurface (Underground)
Relocating Base constantly

Conducting constabulary and combat duties

Preparing for peer on peer high intensity warfare

Assets on hand, in addition to the vessel and its boats



Armament
24 × Honeywell Mk 46 torpedoes
16 × Evolved Sea-Sparrow SAM
8 × RGM-84 Harpoon SSM
1 × 57 mm Bofors Mk2 gun
1 × 20 mm Vulcan Phalanx CIWS
6 × .50 caliber machine guns
Aircraft carried1 × CH-148 Cyclone

I remember reading that the Absalom crew of 100 was divided in roughly 4 equal parts.

One to drive the ship
One to power the ship
One to supply room and board
One to fight the ship.

And there, again, we have that 3:1 ratio of Tail to Tooth.

But the tooth covers a large variety and number of targets in three dimensions over a very large area.  And most of its day job is actually spent in surveillance, observation and reconnaissance.  Delivering ordnance happens so infrequently as to be risible.


Now why can't a soldier be more like a sailor?  Pace Henry Higgins.


----------



## quadrapiper

Kirkhill said:


> You know, just looking at that picture, and thinking about the AD AT discussion.  I get that there is a cost to ammunition.  I get that Air Defence is indeed a specialization that requires particular skills.
> 
> But here is where I find myself bumping up against a problem.
> 
> How do the navies of the world manage to deal with surface threats, subsurface threats, aerial threats, missiles, boats and smugglers with an array of multiple caliber guns, missiles, torpedoes and troops transported by jackstay, boat and helicopter from one single room surrounded by all the systems and accessed from comfy seats?
> 
> View attachment 66437
> 
> And yet the army needs separate capbadges and colonels to perform similar jobs.


How would a deployed Army HQ handling similar responsibilities (say, loosely, a single site defended to an equivalent degree to a CSC's capabilities, with a similar degree of comms, log, etc. self-sufficiency, and a large patrol area) compare as far as rank/size?

Betting it's not a LCol and a handful of majors with captain watchkeepers.


----------



## Good2Golf

Oldgateboatdriver said:


> Well, at least a uneven bipod: The frigates are quite capable of defending themselves against air threats. And in that line, the Surface Combatant program can be seen as the second leg in full: They will be able to provide area air defence and even  participate in BMD.


…perhaps one day the Army will stop with its incessant internal bickering and resolve the “AD/AT/LF/gloves” conundrum…

…perhaps…


----------



## Kirkhill

quadrapiper said:


> How would a deployed Army HQ handling similar responsibilities (say, loosely, a single site defended to an equivalent degree to a CSC's capabilities, with a similar degree of comms, log, etc. self-sufficiency, and a large patrol area) compare as far as rank/size?
> 
> Betting it's not a LCol and a handful of majors with captain watchkeepers.


How many Lt Cdrs, Lt(N) and POs are there in the Halifax?


----------



## Kirkhill

And.....

What would it take to organize  the army into 15 deployable "Stone Frigate" Combat Teams with exactly the same assets as a CSC but mounted on pallets deployable by truck, helos, planes .... and ships?

It strikes me that they would create great bases for stabilizing the unstabilized and providing sally ports for larger elements, or special and OGD elements.

And, in a peer on peer effort they could be grouped in Task Forces supplying mutual cover and defending a large operational area in which a mech brigade could manoeuvre, light or heavy.

15x 225 = 3,375

Or one small Brigade.


Edit - and the Brigade is getting smaller 

Number under command being reduced from 225 to 204 for a Brigade reduction from 3,375 to 3,060 for a saving of 315, or another 1.5 commands.

While the assets under command are increasing


Sensors and
processing systems
Command and control
Lockheed Martin Canada CMS 330 Combat System with AEGIS Fire Control Loop
USN Cooperative Engagement Capability (sensor netting)

Surveillance & weapon sensors
Lockheed Martin Canada AN/SPY-7(V)1[3] Solid State 3D AESA radar
MDA Solid State AESA Target Illuminator
X & S Band navigation radars
Electro-optical and infrared systems

Underwater warfare systems
Hull-mounted sonar: Ultra Electronics Sonar S2150-C[4]
Towed sonar: Ultra Electronics TFLAS[5] (variable depth)

Electronic warfare
& decoysLockheed Martin Canada RAVEN electronic countermeasures[10] Ultra Electronics SEA SENTOR S21700 towed torpedo countermeasuresArmament
Missiles
2 × quad box launchers:
8 × Naval Strike Missile[2]

2 × 3-cell ExLS:
24 × Sea Ceptor (CAMM) CIADS, quad-packed[6]

1 × 32-cell Mk 41 VLS:
RIM-162 ESSM Block II[7]
RIM-66 SM-2 Block IIIC[8]
BGM-109 Tomahawk


Torpedoes
2 × twin 324 mm (13 in) torpedo tubes (auto-loaded):
Mk 54 MAKO torpedo


Guns
1 × Leonardo OTO 127 mm (5 in)/64 LW Vulcano naval gun[9]
2 × BAE 30 mm (1.2 in) autocannons
6 × 12.7 mm (0.50 in) M2 machine guns

Aircraft carried
Helicopters
1 × CH-148 Cyclone armed with:
2 × Mk 54 MAKO Torpedo
1 × C6 FLEX 7.62 mm (0.300 in) GPMG


Aviation facilities
Indal Technologies Beartrap
Large Chinook-capable flight deck
Enclosed hangar
Facilities for UAVs
Notes
Flexible Mission Bay
Rolls-Royce Mission Bay Handling System
Modular mission support capacity for sea containers and vehicles
2 × 9–12 m (30–39 ft) multi-role boats
1 × 9 m rescue boat



and we haven't talked about the 390 sailors in their 6 Arctic Patrol Bases (65 each), the 212 in their 4 Subsurface Patrol Bases (53 each) and the 402 reservists manning their Patrol Bases (37 each).

If you add the whole bunch together  (3060 + 390 + 212 + 402)  you get a total strength of 4064.  Or one Brigade Gp of rations (including 10% part-timers).

What does the Army deliver for a comparable investment in manpower?


----------



## Kirkhill

SystemsBasesUnits/BaseUnits/FleetNaval Strike Missile[2]15​8​120​Sea Ceptor (CAMM) CIADS, quad-packed[6]15​24​360​RIM-162 ESSM Block II[7]15​32​480​RIM-66 SM-2 Block IIIC[8]15​16​240​BGM-109 Tomahawk15​8​120​Mk 54 MAKO torpedo15​24​360​Leonardo OTO 127 mm (5 in)/64 LW Vulcano naval gun[9]15​1​15​BAE 30 mm (1.2 in) autocannons15​2​30​12.7 mm (0.50 in) M2 machine guns15​6​90​CH-148 Cyclone armed with:15​1​15​


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> And.....
> 
> 
> What does the Army deliver for a comparable investment in manpower?


It doesn't sink?


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

I see what you are driving at, Kirkhill, but it is unfair to compare manpower of the Navy vs what it delivers by looking only at the crewing of the ships. The very large and manpower intensive industrial bases that support those ships, particularly on the naval architecture/engineering/maintenance side of things must be included, and that just doubled your manpower requirement, without providing for training and staffing ashore. The Navy produces its effect with the totality of its manpower, not just the sea going personnel.

Moreover, at action station, everyone has a duty/secondary duty to perform and everybody is up for the duration, duties which no one performs "full time". In an Army/land situation, wouldn't all of the above things have to be manned at all times? That requires more personnel.

And being on land, with surface threats that can hide and crawl up to you undetected form multiple directions at once, unlike at sea where there is no hiding on the surface and approaches are more limited in numbers and watched over by sensors, wouldn't you need a much larger number of "basic" (read infanteer) personnel for force protection?


----------



## KevinB

Oldgateboatdriver said:


> And being on land, with surface threats that can hide and crawl up to you undetected form multiple directions at once, unlike at sea where there is no hiding on the surface and approaches are more limited in numbers and watched over by sensors, wouldn't you need a much larger number of "basic" (read infanteer) personnel for force protection?


Depending where you are - surface and subsurface threats can swim up to you.
   USS Cole for instance...


----------



## FSTO

KevinB said:


> It doesn't sink?


But it does get run over.


----------



## Blackadder1916

KevinB said:


> It doesn't sink?


----------



## Halifax Tar

Kirkhill said:


> Thinking more on the naval analogy
> 
> One Lt Colonel (Commander)
> 225 Under Command  (Small Battalion or Reinforced Company Combat Team)
> 
> Own Base
> 
> Responsible for
> 
> Base Maintenance
> Base Engineering
> Hotel (Room and Board)
> Continuous Surveillance of Surface (Land), Air, and Subsurface (Underground)
> Relocating Base constantly
> 
> Conducting constabulary and combat duties
> 
> Preparing for peer on peer high intensity warfare
> 
> Assets on hand, in addition to the vessel and its boats
> 
> 
> 
> Armament
> 24 × Honeywell Mk 46 torpedoes
> 16 × Evolved Sea-Sparrow SAM
> 8 × RGM-84 Harpoon SSM
> 1 × 57 mm Bofors Mk2 gun
> 1 × 20 mm Vulcan Phalanx CIWS
> 6 × .50 caliber machine guns
> Aircraft carried1 × CH-148 Cyclone
> 
> I remember reading that the Absalom crew of 100 was divided in roughly 4 equal parts.
> 
> One to drive the ship
> One to power the ship
> One to supply room and board
> One to fight the ship.


One to pay, feed and supply the ship. 


Kirkhill said:


> And there, again, we have that 3:1 ratio of Tail to Tooth.





Kirkhill said:


> But the tooth covers a large variety and number of targets in three dimensions over a very large area.  And most of its day job is actually spent in surveillance, observation and reconnaissance.  Delivering ordnance happens so infrequently as to be risible.
> 
> 
> Now why can't a soldier be more like a sailor?  Pace Henry Higgins.


You've left out Logistics



Kirkhill said:


> How many Lt Cdrs, Lt(N) and POs are there in the Halifax?


1 LCdr
1 CPO
5 to 10 LT(s) HODs and a sundry of positions 
5 CPO2 1 per department



Kirkhill said:


> And.....
> 
> What would it take to organize  the army into 15 deployable "Stone Frigate" Combat Teams with exactly the same assets as a CSC but mounted on pallets deployable by truck, helos, planes .... and ships?
> 
> It strikes me that they would create great bases for stabilizing the unstabilized and providing sally ports for larger elements, or special and OGD elements.
> 
> And, in a peer on peer effort they could be grouped in Task Forces supplying mutual cover and defending a large operational area in which a mech brigade could manoeuvre, light or heavy.
> 
> 15x 225 = 3,375
> 
> Or one small Brigade.
> 
> 
> Edit - and the Brigade is getting smaller
> 
> Number under command being reduced from 225 to 204 for a Brigade reduction from 3,375 to 3,060 for a saving of 315, or another 1.5 commands.
> 
> While the assets under command are increasing
> 
> 
> Sensors and
> processing systems
> Command and control
> Lockheed Martin Canada CMS 330 Combat System with AEGIS Fire Control Loop
> USN Cooperative Engagement Capability (sensor netting)
> 
> Surveillance & weapon sensors
> Lockheed Martin Canada AN/SPY-7(V)1[3] Solid State 3D AESA radar
> MDA Solid State AESA Target Illuminator
> X & S Band navigation radars
> Electro-optical and infrared systems
> 
> Underwater warfare systems
> Hull-mounted sonar: Ultra Electronics Sonar S2150-C[4]
> Towed sonar: Ultra Electronics TFLAS[5] (variable depth)
> 
> Electronic warfare
> & decoysLockheed Martin Canada RAVEN electronic countermeasures[10] Ultra Electronics SEA SENTOR S21700 towed torpedo countermeasuresArmament
> Missiles
> 2 × quad box launchers:
> 8 × Naval Strike Missile[2]
> 
> 2 × 3-cell ExLS:
> 24 × Sea Ceptor (CAMM) CIADS, quad-packed[6]
> 
> 1 × 32-cell Mk 41 VLS:
> RIM-162 ESSM Block II[7]
> RIM-66 SM-2 Block IIIC[8]
> BGM-109 Tomahawk
> 
> 
> Torpedoes
> 2 × twin 324 mm (13 in) torpedo tubes(auto-loaded):
> Mk 54 MAKO torpedo
> 
> 
> Guns
> 1 × Leonardo OTO 127 mm (5 in)/64 LW Vulcano naval gun[9]
> 2 × BAE 30 mm (1.2 in) autocannons
> 6 × 12.7 mm (0.50 in) M2 machine guns
> 
> Aircraft carried
> Helicopters
> 1 × CH-148 Cyclonearmed with:
> 2 × Mk 54 MAKO Torpedo
> 1 × C6 FLEX 7.62 mm (0.300 in) GPMG
> 
> 
> Aviation facilities
> Indal Technologies Beartrap
> Large Chinook-capable flight deck
> Enclosed hangar
> Facilities for UAVs
> Notes
> Flexible Mission Bay
> Rolls-Royce Mission Bay Handling System
> Modular mission support capacity for sea containers and vehicles
> 2 × 9–12 m (30–39 ft) multi-role boats
> 1 × 9 m rescue boat
> 
> 
> 
> and we haven't talked about the 390 sailors in their 6 Arctic Patrol Bases (65 each), the 212 in their 4 Subsurface Patrol Bases (53 each) and the 402 reservists manning their Patrol Bases (37 each).
> 
> If you add the whole bunch together  (3060 + 390 + 212 + 402)  you get a total strength of 4064.  Or one Brigade Gp of rations (including 10% part-timers).
> 
> What does the Army deliver for a comparable investment in manpower?


Again, Logistics.



Oldgateboatdriver said:


> I see what you are driving at, Kirkhill, but it is unfair to compare manpower of the Navy vs what it delivers by looking only at the crewing of the ships. The very large and manpower intensive industrial bases that support those ships, particularly on the naval architecture/engineering/maintenance Logistics side of things must be included, and that just doubled your manpower requirement, without providing for training and staffing ashore. The Navy produces its effect with the totality of its manpower, not just the sea going personnel.
> 
> Moreover, at action station, everyone has a duty/secondary duty to perform and everybody is up for the duration, duties which no one performs "full time". In an Army/land situation, wouldn't all of the above things have to be manned at all times? That requires more personnel.
> 
> And being on land, with surface threats that can hide and crawl up to you undetected form multiple directions at once, unlike at sea where there is no hiding on the surface and approaches are more limited in numbers and watched over by sensors, wouldn't you need a much larger number of "basic" (read infanteer) personnel for force protection?


Lastly, Logistics. 

I know what we do is seldom seen or appreciated so I will take every opportunity to make sure it is recognized.  And taken to account.


----------



## KevinB

Blackadder1916 said:


>


The exception that proves the rule 


Halifax Tar said:


> Lastly, Logistics.
> 
> I know what we do is seldom seen or appreciated so I will take every opportunity to make sure it is recognized.  And taken to account.


The adage that Amateurs talk tactics - Professionals talk Logistics...

 I think a 1:6 tooth to tail relationship is fairly reasonable in this day and age - based on what you and OldBoat posted about the Navy - seeing US Rotary Wing aspects that seems to bear out as well -- I'm unsure of the Fixed Wing side but I suspect it is close.
  The US Army works with about the same when you factor contracted support positions.

As long as that tail covers all aspects of the Combat Service Support, Sustainment (inc recruiting and training) and Support requirements (and I am lumping non Deployable HQ there too).


How Big is Canada's Regular Force Army again?


----------



## Kirkhill

Halifax Tar said:


> One to pay, feed and supply the ship.
> 
> 
> You've left out Logistics
> 
> 
> 1 LCdr
> 1 CPO
> 5 to 10 LT(s) HODs and a sundry of positions
> 5 CPO2 1 per department
> 
> 
> Again, Logistics.
> 
> 
> Lastly, Logistics.
> 
> I know what we do is seldom seen or appreciated so I will take every opportunity to make sure it is recognized.  And taken to account.



I stand firmly corrected.  And I fully appreciate the value of the logistics trade.  

But that comes out of the 204 to 225 people placed under the command of the "Base Commander"

Which just makes the Army situation appear less defensible in my eyes.


----------



## Kirkhill

Oldgateboatdriver said:


> I see what you are driving at, Kirkhill, but it is unfair to compare manpower of the Navy vs what it delivers by looking only at the crewing of the ships. The very large and manpower intensive industrial bases that support those ships, particularly on the naval architecture/engineering/maintenance side of things must be included, and that just doubled your manpower requirement, without providing for training and staffing ashore. The Navy produces its effect with the totality of its manpower, not just the sea going personnel.
> 
> Moreover, at action station, everyone has a duty/secondary duty to perform and everybody is up for the duration, duties which no one performs "full time". In an Army/land situation, wouldn't all of the above things have to be manned at all times? That requires more personnel.
> 
> And being on land, with surface threats that can hide and crawl up to you undetected form multiple directions at once, unlike at sea where there is no hiding on the surface and approaches are more limited in numbers and watched over by sensors, wouldn't you need a much larger number of "basic" (read infanteer) personnel for force protection?



I am not persuaded it is unfair.





Looking at the Skyshield crew (top) with two Gunners manning a control station that receives Radar and EO/IR inputs and can respond with 2x 35mm cannons and an array of missiles, or the NASAMs crew of 11 and their sensors, missiles and controls I am not convinced that the army can't do a lot more with the PYs it has.  Particularly if they were arty PYs.

In the 204 PY ship lets suppose that we are actually looking at 50 EME types to man the generators, the ROWPUs, maintain the weapons and sensors.  There are another 50 Service Bn types supplying hotel and logistics support.  And yet another 50 Gunners manning the CIC.  The last 50 responsible for sailing the ship - lets put them into Command, Sigs and Defence and Duties.

Mount the gear on pallets, as shown in the SkyGuard and NASAMS pictures.   Add as many palletized and containerized modules as you like.  Add fixed and roving Remote Weapons Systems



Now how much work can be effectively done within arms reach of the coffee pot?  By how few gunners?  And how big a D&D platoon do you need before you have to call on the infantry? 

Or can the infantry be kept in reserve for more offensive duties such as counter-attacks, offensive patrols or battalion assaults?

The navy demonstrates daily that it is possible to replace muscles with motors.  The army, I think, could take a few lessons from them.

It wouldn't be the first time.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I am not persuaded it is unfair.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Mount the gear on pallets, as shown in the SkyGuard and NASAMS pictures.   Add as many palletized and containerized modules as you like.  Add fixed and roving Remote Weapons Systems
> 
> Now how much work can be effectively done within arms reach of the coffee pot?  By how few gunners?  And how big a D&D platoon do you need before you have to call on the infantry?
> 
> Or can the infantry be kept in reserve for more offensive duties such as counter-attacks, offensive patrols or battalion assaults?
> 
> The navy demonstrates daily that it is possible to replace muscles with motors.  The army, I think, could take a few lessons from them.


Local Defense needs to be viewed as an Internal Responsibility.  If we learned nothing from the last 20 years it needs to be that security in an Asymetrical battlefield - and lets face it, regardless if it is Peer/Near Peer, or Low Level Conflict/Peace Support missions - any enemy is going to make it as Asymetrical as possible.

Much like (as I understand) the Navy views damage control etc as secondary duties, all the CSS, HQ etc personnel need to view local defense as their own secondary duty - and in some cases it will involve continuous manning of some personnel.

When you attach a Coy or PL from an Inf Bn as D&S it just further weakens the Tooth side of the equation -- it is FAR better to plan for that in your manning already, now obviously no one will expect a Maintenance Platoon to be able to hold off a Mechanized Coy - but there must be training and equipment for those personnel to be able to cover their own 6...


----------



## Kirkhill

I agree with you Kevin.  And I don't think it would be news to the Navy who is used to damage control parties, launching recce parties and even, repelling boarders.

But what I am suggesting is that a Naval Stone Frigate, supplying a 25 to 50 km air defence bubble, a 100 km to 200 km fire support bubble (5" guns and NSMs plus whatever is in the Mk41 silos other than SAMs) plus its close defence 35s and HMGs etc, provides, for a very low investment in PYs a firm base from which to launch a Battle Group.  With Aviation support.


----------



## Halifax Tar

KevinB said:


> The exception that proves the rule
> 
> The adage that Amateurs talk tactics - Professionals talk Logistics...
> 
> I think a 1:6 tooth to tail relationship is fairly reasonable in this day and age - based on what you and OldBoat posted about the Navy - seeing US Rotary Wing aspects that seems to bear out as well -- I'm unsure of the Fixed Wing side but I suspect it is close.
> The US Army works with about the same when you factor contracted support positions.
> 
> As long as that tail covers all aspects of the Combat Service Support, Sustainment (inc recruiting and training) and Support requirements (and I am lumping non Deployable HQ there too).
> 
> 
> How Big is Canada's Regular Force Army again?



Just FYI a frigate has bunks for around 254 peeps.  Of that about 30 pers are in the Log Dept.  

Also when a ship deploys the crew is cut to bring on the com research, int, PAO, padre and NTOG.  And that's not including staff if you're unlucky enough to be the command platform. 

For interests sake; in FRE in 2020 we left with all 254 bunks full.  We sailed back into Halifax last July at just under 200.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Blackadder1916 said:


>



Stalwart: "Hold my tea, old chap, and watch this..."


----------



## McG

Halifax Tar said:


> Pardon me while I stray out of lanes...
> 
> Why do you think the CBT Arms folks couldn't deal with the geographical instability ?
> 
> Most other branches don't have that stability.  Or perhaps they should ?


It is not that Cbt Arms can’t deal with some geographic instability and the need for occasional moves. Every occupation has some requirement to move, but the vast majority of occupations can move people between between different units & sub-units inside of a single geographic location. This improves stability & quality of life. I believe even the Navy assigns a home port and does most movements within the home port instead of moving people between Halifax & Victoria simply to serve on a different ship. 

The proposal of building three Army brigades that each had equal representation of each regiment would be the same as imposing the opposite of home ports. Instead of being able to move personnel of a common occupation between neighbouring units (or neighbouring sub-units as the proposal implies for armour), you would have to needlessly move them & families to another city in another province. Doesn’t mater if it is frigates or tank squadrons, such a system would be wasteful & an unneeded imposition on members & families.


----------



## CBH99

Halifax Tar said:


> Just FYI a frigate has bunks for around 254 peeps.  Of that about 30 pers are in the Log Dept.
> 
> Also when a ship deploys the crew is cut to bring on the com research, int, PAO, padre and NTOG.  And that's not including staff if you're unlucky enough to be the command platform.
> 
> For interests sake; in FRE in 2020 we left with all 254 bunks full.  We sailed back into Halifax last July at just under 200.


Seriously… nobody has asked what the hell happened to the 54-odd souls that weren’t on the ship when it got back?  😐


----------



## Kirkhill

More on the subject of Army vs Navy organization

INTERNAL ORGANISATION
HDMS Absalon internal organisation is constructed in order to be able to support any contingent that is
carried onboard in any of the above mentioned roles. The organisation is divided in 4 divisions
- Operations division:
6 officers, 4 PO, 21 ratings
- Logistics division:
2 officers, 4 PO, 24 ratings
- Weapons- and Electronics
division:
2 officers, 3 PO, 12 ratings
- Technical Division:
4 officers, 1 PO, 13 ratings

On overseas operations she will plus up the crew

Crew
The crew size during deployment to Operation OCEAN SHIELD will be around 155. The
permanent crew will be supplemented by a number of specialists from the Royal Danish
Army, the Royal Danish Air Force, the Navy’s corps of Frogmen, and the naval Military
Police.

HDMS Absalon is equipped with 2 RHIBs which are used for normal personnel transfer and during Man
Over Board (MOB) operations. Furthermore HDMS Absalon can carry and handle up to two medium size
helicopters (Merlin-size)

SENSORS:
SMART-S Air surveillance radar
TERMA Surface surveillance radar
FURUNO Navigation radars
FLIR Infrared camera
4 x CEROS Fire control radars with TV, laser and electro optics
EDO Electronic Support Measure
ATLAS Medium Range sonar with Mine Avoidance
For Command, Control and Communication purposes Absalon uses UHF- VHF- HF and SATCOM
supporting; TV, phone, fax, WWW, LAN and classified networks.

WEAPONS:
1 x 127mm gun Anti air/surface gun including naval fire support.
2 x 35mm gun Close in weapon system (CIWS)
8 x 12,7mm Heavy machine gun
HARPOON Surface-surface missile
SEASPARROW Surface-air missile
STINGER Anti air
MU-90 torpedoes Subsurface warfare
CHAFF Anti ship missile defence

FLEX-deck
Absalon has a feature that makes it unique compared to other navy vessels. Besides being able to fight as a
standard frigate it has the capability to carry a wide variety of material and personnel due to the FLEX-deck
layout. The FLEX-deck can be compared to a “ferry-deck”
and the size of the deck makes it possible for Absalon to
support many different kinds of capacities.
Via the aft hatch HDMS Absalon can load items with a size
and weight equivalent to the weight of a tank (62 t) from the
Danish Army. Adjacent compartments and holds are also an
integrated part of the FLEX-deck.


----------



## Halifax Tar

McG said:


> It is not that Cbt Arms can’t deal with some geographic instability and the need for occasional moves. Every occupation has some requirement to move, but the vast majority of occupations can move people between between different units & sub-units inside of a single geographic location. This improves stability & quality of life. I believe even the Navy assigns a home port and does most movements within the home port instead of moving people between Halifax & Victoria simply to serve on a different ship.
> 
> The proposal of building three Army brigades that each had equal representation of each regiment would be the same as imposing the opposite of home ports. Instead of being able to move personnel of a common occupation between neighbouring units (or neighbouring sub-units as the proposal implies for armour), you would have to needlessly move them & families to another city in another province. Doesn’t mater if it is frigates or tank squadrons, such a system would be wasteful & an unneeded imposition on members & families.



So not what Log, RCEME, Med, SIGs, ect do because reasons ? 

The RCN is a bad example for your point. For RCN trades there are only two operational bases.  And HPDs do not get assigned unless the person is part of the RCN.  Those not wearing that cap badge do not get that protective blanket.

I'm not trying to to be flippant but what's the difference between and an RCR infanteer and a R22R infanteer ?  Other than a cap badge and adolescent chest ponding of course.


----------



## Halifax Tar

CBH99 said:


> Seriously… nobody has asked what the hell happened to the 54-odd souls that weren’t on the ship when it got back?  😐


Well we sadly lost 6 when Stalker went down. 

Then the Air Dept left as we had no helo.  And we continued to repat pers for various reasons.


----------



## CBH99

Halifax Tar said:


> Well we sadly lost 6 when Stalker went down.
> 
> Then the Air Dept left as we had no helo.  And we continued to repat pers for various reasons.


Well that attempt at dark sarcasm backfired big time.  My apologies, sincerely.  


(When first glancing at the post, leaving with 254 and coming back with roughly 200 had me scratching my head.  I had taken Stalker into account, but hadn’t realized the air det had come back early (which makes total sense.))


----------



## Halifax Tar

Kirkhill said:


> More on the subject of Army vs Navy organization
> 
> INTERNAL ORGANISATION
> HDMS Absalon internal organisation is constructed in order to be able to support any contingent that is
> carried onboard in any of the above mentioned roles. The organisation is divided in 4 divisions
> - Operations division:
> 6 officers, 4 PO, 21 ratings
> - Logistics division:
> 2 officers, 4 PO, 24 ratings
> - Weapons- and Electronics
> division:
> 2 officers, 3 PO, 12 ratings
> - Technical Division:
> 4 officers, 1 PO, 13 ratings
> 
> On overseas operations she will plus up the crew
> 
> Crew
> The crew size during deployment to Operation OCEAN SHIELD will be around 155. The
> permanent crew will be supplemented by a number of specialists from the Royal Danish
> Army, the Royal Danish Air Force, the Navy’s corps of Frogmen, and the naval Military
> Police.
> 
> HDMS Absalon is equipped with 2 RHIBs which are used for normal personnel transfer and during Man
> Over Board (MOB) operations. Furthermore HDMS Absalon can carry and handle up to two medium size
> helicopters (Merlin-size)
> 
> SENSORS:
> SMART-S Air surveillance radar
> TERMA Surface surveillance radar
> FURUNO Navigation radars
> FLIR Infrared camera
> 4 x CEROS Fire control radars with TV, laser and electro optics
> EDO Electronic Support Measure
> ATLAS Medium Range sonar with Mine Avoidance
> For Command, Control and Communication purposes Absalon uses UHF- VHF- HF and SATCOM
> supporting; TV, phone, fax, WWW, LAN and classified networks.
> 
> WEAPONS:
> 1 x 127mm gun Anti air/surface gun including naval fire support.
> 2 x 35mm gun Close in weapon system (CIWS)
> 8 x 12,7mm Heavy machine gun
> HARPOON Surface-surface missile
> SEASPARROW Surface-air missile
> STINGER Anti air
> MU-90 torpedoes Subsurface warfare
> CHAFF Anti ship missile defence
> 
> FLEX-deck
> Absalon has a feature that makes it unique compared to other navy vessels. Besides being able to fight as a
> standard frigate it has the capability to carry a wide variety of material and personnel due to the FLEX-deck
> layout. The FLEX-deck can be compared to a “ferry-deck”
> and the size of the deck makes it possible for Absalon to
> support many different kinds of capacities.
> Via the aft hatch HDMS Absalon can load items with a size
> and weight equivalent to the weight of a tank (62 t) from the
> Danish Army. Adjacent compartments and holds are also an
> integrated part of the FLEX-deck.



I find it interesting how small their Weapons and Technical divisions are.  

Ours are the biggest divisions on the ship.


----------



## Halifax Tar

CBH99 said:


> Well that attempt at dark sarcasm backfired big time.  My apologies, sincerely.
> 
> 
> (When first glancing at the post, leaving with 254 and coming back with roughly 200 had me scratching my head.  I had taken Stalker into account, but hadn’t realized the air det had come back early (which makes total sense.))


No sweat my friend.  All in good conversation


----------



## Kirkhill

Halifax Tar said:


> I find it interesting how small their Weapons and Technical divisions are.
> 
> Ours are the biggest divisions on the ship.



Even with larger divisions you still deliver more capability per salary than the army does.   The army could be doing better by making better use of available technology rather than counting bayonets.


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> I am not persuaded it is unfair.
> 
> 
> Looking at the Skyshield crew (top) with two Gunners manning a control station that receives Radar and EO/IR inputs and can respond with 2x 35mm cannons and an array of missiles, or the NASAMs crew of 11 and their sensors, missiles and controls I am not convinced that the army can't do a lot more with the PYs it has.  Particularly if they were arty PYs.



I'm not really sure what point you are trying to make comparing the number of pers photographed with the two systems.  And do the individuals pictured accurately reflect the numbers needed to operate the equipment next to them? 









						Skyshield Oerlikon ground-based short range air defense system cannon missile technical data sheet  | Germany German army artillery vehicles systems UK | Germany German army military equipment UK
					

Skyshield Oerlikon ground-based short range air defense system cannon missile technical data sheet specifications information description intelligence pictures photos images identification Germany German army Rheinmetall defense industry army military tec




					www.armyrecognition.com
				




Crew 7







And those numbers don't take into account additional pers requirements if the system has to be manned 24/7.  Most aggressors don't provide notification that they intend to attack the installation/locale that you are tasked to defend.  You don't want to be at lunch or taking a shit when it hits the fan.


----------



## McG

Halifax Tar said:


> So not what Log, RCEME, Med, SIGs, ect do because reasons ?


Log, RCEME, and Sigs can all be posted between various units & sub-units in all the big army & navy bases. Yes, some occupations have to move more because they are more distributed in smaller numbers to support everywhere. But, I have known cooks, clerks, and maintainers to spend as long in one base as the regimental system & HPD allow to infantrymen and sailors.

In any case, one would be part of the problem if they were to argue that some occupations have to move more often of necessity therefor it is acceptable to introduce that churn and cost on all occupations even in absence of necessity.



Halifax Tar said:


> The RCN is a bad example for your point. For RCN trades there are only two operational bases. And HPDs do not get assigned unless the person is part of the RCN. Those not wearing that cap badge do not get that protective blanket.


Yes, so it’s actually the perfect analogy to the Army’s regimental system, just less fragmented.



Halifax Tar said:


> I'm not trying to to be flippant but what's the difference between and an RCR infanteer and a R22R infanteer ? Other than a cap badge and adolescent chest ponding of course.


To an outsider? Nothing. It is tribal branding. It is reinforced with custom, ritual, and career management structures. With few exceptions, the regimental system does not allow posting a member of one regiment into another (there are a few inter-regimental exchange officers, and it is possible to change regimental affiliation just as purple trades can seek to change environments, but this is rare).

You could question the legitimacy of the regimental system itself. Inter-unit mobility is not even its worst foible. But there are many other threads for that debate. As Infanteer already noted, when designing future force structures it is better to define the requirements in terms that are regiment agnostic.


----------



## Halifax Tar

McG said:


> Log, RCEME, and Sigs can all be posted between various units & sub-units in all the big army & navy bases. Yes, some occupations have to move more because they are more distributed in smaller numbers to support everywhere. But, I have known cooks, clerks, and maintainers to spend as long in one base as the regimental system & HPD allow to infantrymen and sailors.



You're premise is built on the exceptions.  It does happen but it's rare.



McG said:


> In any case, one would be part of the problem if they were to argue that some occupations have to move more often of necessity therefor it is acceptable to introduce that churn and cost on all occupations even in absence of necessity.



I actually agree.  So let's fold the idea of needing sailors with army experience and vice versa and post soldiers to the army, sailors to the navy and aviators to hotels, like god intended.

Right now that doesn't happen as the rule.  So let's see if could give every occupation that sweet sweet geographic stability.  We might even save some cash in the process.



McG said:


> Yes, so it’s actually the perfect analogy to the Army’s regimental system, just less fragmented.
> 
> 
> To an outsider? Nothing. It is tribal branding. It is reinforced with custom, ritual, and career management structures. With few exceptions, the regimental system does not allow posting a member of one regiment into another (there are a few inter-regimental exchange officers, and it is possible to change regimental affiliation just as purple trades can seek to change environments, but this is rare).
> 
> You could question the legitimacy of the regimental system itself. Inter-unit mobility is not even its worst foible. But there are many other threads for that debate. As Infanteer already noted, when designing future force structures it is better to define the requirements in terms that are regiment agnostic.



Your regimental systems sounds like empires with another name.  Both of which are ok so long as they serve the country and the CAF above their own interests.


----------



## Kirkhill

This is what your CSC driver will have under his command


----------



## Kirkhill




----------



## Kirkhill

I decided to spare you the 24 torpedos and the 9m rescue RIB.

So whether or not we are talking 2 men on watch, or a group of 11 transporters  and installers with a 24/7 watch of 2 or a CIC of 20 to 30 I don't see a Canadian Army equivalent in terms of manpower efficiency.

And, as far as I am aware, once a ship leaves dock she is operating in a 24/7 environment with all surveillance systems manned and all hands having to respond to the unusual and the exceptional from their own resources.

Fortunately their boss has a lot of resources other than manpower.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Halifax Tar said:


> Your regimental systems sounds like empires with another name.  Both of which are ok so long as they serve the country and the CAF above their own interests.



Based on about 70% of the COs and Bde Comds I've seen in action, and/ or suffered under, over the past 20 years or so the main effort seems to be unconstrained/unaccountable ego self-gratification, cronyism and career progression at the expense of most other individuals and institutions.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 66472View attachment 66473View attachment 66474View attachment 66475View attachment 66476View attachment 66477View attachment 66478
> View attachment 66479View attachment 66480
> 
> I decided to spare you the 24 torpedos and the 9m rescue RIB.
> 
> So whether or not we are talking 2 men on watch, or a group of 11 transporters  and installers with a 24/7 watch of 2 or a CIC of 20 to 30 I don't see a Canadian Army equivalent in terms of manpower efficiency.
> 
> And, as far as I am aware, once a ship leaves dock she is operating in a 24/7 environment with all surveillance systems manned and all hands having to respond to the unusual and the exceptional from their own resources.
> 
> Fortunately their boss has a lot of resources other than manpower.



Taking another look at what the CSC has on hand and converting the Guns into land based equivalents as I did with the missiles.



In terms of  range, weight of shot and range the Leonardo 5"/127mm is broadly equivalent to 4 Archer 155mm with ready ammunition.



The 30 mm RWS are similar to the 35mm Milleniums used in conjunction with Rheinmetall's MANTIS system



> *MANTIS Air Defence System* [1](_modular, automatic and network capable targeting and interception system_), formerly titled as *NBS-C-RAM* (_Nächstbereichschutzsystem_ Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar),





> The NBS C-RAM system is supposed to detect, track and shoot down incoming projectiles before they can reach their target within very close range. The system itself is based on Oerlikon Contraves' Skyshield air defence gun system.
> 
> An NBS C-RAM system consists of six 35mm automatic guns (capable of firing 1,000 rounds per minute), a ground control unit and two sensor units. The entire system is fully automated. The guns fire programmable AHEAD ammunition, developed by Rheinmetall Weapons and Munitions - Switzerland (formerly Oerlikon Contraves Pyrotec). The ammunition carries a payload of 152 tungsten projectiles weighing 3.3g (51gr) each.
> 
> Originally, the German Army ordered a first batch of two systems in 2009, with two more following in 2013. All MANTIS systems have been transferred to the German Air Force, which is now responsible for all air defence tasks. The first two systems cost around €110.8 million, plus another €20 million for training and documentation purposes. In a follow-on contract, worth around €13.4 million, Rheinmetall will also deliver the corresponding ammunition to the German Army.[2]
> 
> The German _Bundeswehr_ took over the first MANTIS system on January 1, 2011.[3]





> Crew4











						Nächstbereichschutzsystem MANTIS - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






The 2nd Cavalry needs two more to match the CSC 50 Cal supply









						2nd Cavalry Regiment spearhead remote-operated force protection systems in Sinai
					

Soldiers from 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Task Force War Eagle are spearheading the integration of the Army's remote-operated Force Protection Systems during a peacekeeping mission in the Sinai Peninsula.TF War Eagle is deployed to the Sinai....




					www.army.mil
				




But perhaps they could swap out those two for two of these











						armynow.net
					

This domain may be for sale!



					armynow.net
				




They would go a long way to covering the "dead ground" and patrolling problems.

And all controlled from something like this



By a "Lt Col"  and some 200 or so under command.  A Ship's Company.


----------



## Kirkhill

So here's my suggestion for an experiment.

4 General Support Regiment.

Convert it into the 16th Canadian Surface Combatant. Plan on having it use the Combat Management System, the sensors and the missiles, and the guns (where possible) of the CSCs and containerize them to create a deployable firm base to support expeditionary operations.  Just as if you were tying a CSC to the dock in an unstable country.  Use that to establish the Brigade Maintenance Area. 

And then, with that firm base in hand, work out what the rest of  your expeditionary force looks like.

Your target is the same sensor capacity, the same offensive and defensive capacities, and the same number of PYs as a CSC frigate - 204 deployed. The remainder of the regiment's PYs can be retained with the regiment in Canada for continuing support of operations.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> So here's my suggestion for an experiment.
> 
> 4 General Support Regiment.
> 
> Convert it into the 16th Canadian Surface Combatant. Plan on having it use the Combat Management System, the sensors and the missiles, and the guns (where possible) of the CSCs and containerize them to create a deployable firm base to support expeditionary operations.  Just as if you were tying a CSC to the dock in an unstable country.  Use that to establish the Brigade Maintenance Area.
> 
> And then, with that firm base in hand, work out what the rest of  your expeditionary force looks like.
> 
> Your target is the same sensor capacity, the same offensive and defensive capacities, and the same number of PYs as a CSC frigate - 204 deployed. The remainder of the regiment's PYs can be retained with the regiment in Canada for continuing support of operations.



Or just develop an app so any soldier can deploy the weapon systems through their iPhone?


----------



## Rifleman62

daftandbarmy​


> Based on about 70% of the COs and Bde Comds I've seen in action, and/ or suffered under, over the past 20 years or so the main effort seems to be unconstrained/unaccountable ego self-gratification, cronyism and career progression at the expense of most other individuals and institutions.


You forgot the Bde HQ Reg F COS who where the worst predators.


----------



## FJAG

If I have your hypothesis right, and while interesting, Kirkhill, I think the general idea is impractical.

Army units are the way they are in large measure to cater to redundancy/protection and mobility. 

The one thing about a ship is its inherently a mobile platform and if that mobility is destroyed in one blow, the system is completely out of action. Considering it is one amongst a few targets makes it highly vulnerable and reliant on its own (and its fleet's) self-defence measures. Another thing is that ships are generally not engaged in long actions. There are lengthy periods where the ship is capable of resting the bulk of its crew.

Army units are designed to disperse and have redundant command and control systems. They are generally staffed to be able to operate 24/7 (albeit in these tighter PY times that's fallen a bit by the wayside). More importantly the redundancy is designed to allow the system to keep operating via different nodes should one or more elements be lost to action. Mobility is critical. Systems need to move as individual elements when required and to do so rapidly. One doesn't have time to have a container truck come to pick up modules. And they are widely dispersed so that they don't all fall victim to one attack like a ship might.

Many of the weapon systems that you describe are essentially the same as between Navy and Army with simply a different chassis to make that mobility happen. While a ship may only need a dozen or so folks in the engine room to provide that mobility, and a dozen or two people to operate the weapon system because all are fixed to the same platform, Army units may need hundreds of drivers and operators to move and operate the individual components.

Ships have one combat centre because they need to because they are all prisoners on the same ship and because they can because intercommunication is easiest and their is no room nor advantage in dispersing throughout the ship (albeit that within a fleet or task force varying ships may have specialized roles). Army elements are widely dispersed because they need to be (see redundancy above) and because it is not necessary to group functions as centrally. For air defence, for example, to create a shield you need varying weapon systems from light to heavy covering from the most forward most vulnerable and exposed elements to hardened facilities in the rear. Field artillery covers a wide variety of functions from intimate close support in the forward area to general support across a wide area and deep into the enemies rear. Army formations from brigades which fight the close battle to divisions and corps which fight the deep battle and provide overall management each have different needs and needs for widely dispersed nodes. There is no FOO/JTAC in the Navy and doesn't need to be. There is no FSCC in the Navy nor does there need to be. On a ship everyone huddles around the CO and folks can communicate face to face if needed while in armies, their commanders and advisors are by necessity widely dispersed. Combat replenishment works entirely differently by necessity. Equipment maintenance works differently by necessity as do many other of the equivalent specialties found on a ship for which there is a similar army trade.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Perhaps a little less than that.   At least for now.

What I am really suggesting is reverting to Henry VIII and his Board of Ordnance approach.  Guns were the novel weapons in his day.  And the navy was his lead force.  He deployed his ordnance both on his ships and on land.  Eventually the George's gave us The Arsenal at Woolwich.

I think this experiment has a real chance.  I am going to guess that Lockmart is going to be building a dry land version of the CIC and Combat Management System in any case.  Take gunners into the RCN for a while to observe and learn.  Then take them and the RCN Weapons types and bring them ashore to develop the CSC system.

Then sort out the logistics of which missiles and guns to transfer to the shore and which ones to replace and which ones to add at some indefinite point in the future.

Perhaps we keep the ESSMs and the CAMMs and the NSMs and swap out the SM2s/6s for MLRS pods that can be truck, track or pallet mounted  Tomahawk GLCMs might wait until we get a more offensive government.

We can keep the CRAM decoys, cannons and RWS.  Might want to consider some Extra Long Range Cannon candidates.

We can keep the Helicopter and UAS ops management systems.

We might want to swap some of the sensors, for example the radar, for the RCA's MRR system.

All the time keeping the CIC and the Combat Management System intact and retaining the goal of manning a system 24/7 within the 204 PY envelope.


Once that is sorted then the gaps in arty coverage can be healed with the Field Regiments.

Once they are sorted then the patrol coverage and capabilities of the Cavalry can be defined.

Once that is sorted then the strike capabilities of the Infantry, their ability to close and destroy, can be defined.


But the key element is to start with the available, known, technology and use it to do as much as possible within the budget while using as few PYs as possible in the non-infantry roles.

Then you can retain those PYs for the infantry, both regs and reserves.

And training them will become much easier when they know what support they will have available to them.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG you are mixing the Army's needs with the capabilities that a Frigate can deliver.

Everything you say is true.  But I am positing that the Army buy one Frigate to define and defend a Brigade area of operations.  And then ask itself what else it needs.

The things the "Frigate" can't do the rest of the army, and the artillery must do.

A firm base.

That is what is lacking in our discussions, our strategy and our policy.  We wamble all over the place.

I am suggesting that we have a solid, real world example we can use to fix a point of origin and that we can then build on that.  A cornerstone frigate if you like.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG you are mixing the Army's needs with the capabilities that a Frigate can deliver.
> 
> Everything you say is true.  But I am positing that the Army buy one Frigate to define and defend a Brigade area of operations.  And then ask itself what else it needs.
> 
> The things the "Frigate" can't do the rest of the army, and the artillery must do.
> 
> A firm base.
> 
> That is what is lacking in our discussions, our strategy and our policy.  We wamble all over the place.
> 
> I am suggesting that we have a solid, real world example we can use to fix a point of origin and that we can then build on that.  A cornerstone frigate if you like.


We're a joint force. If we are ever in a position where one frigate/CSC could practically support a deployed field force and form a "firm base" then it's presence and replenishment requirements would be programmed into the op plan and it would be controlled by CJOC and the Joint Force commander. Same for the RCAF fighter elements. That's how it has worked and will work in numerous amphibious/littoral ops like the Falklands, Gulf 1 and many smaller ops.

I see nothing wrong with the idea of using a frigate in this role when practical (the Navy might have a different opinion) it's the idea of "the Army buy one Frigate" or even the concept of buying a frigate's worth of combat components to establish a hard defence point. The later because we are highly unlikely to go into a situation like that without our allies who would provide the defensive shield and much of the deep strike capability. We're hard pressed to afford the close support shield and strike capabilities as it stands.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Rifleman62 said:


> daftandbarmy​
> You forgot the Bde HQ Reg F COS who where the worst predators.


Do go on!


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> We're a joint force. If we are ever in a position where one frigate/CSC could practically support a deployed field force and form a "firm base" then it's presence and replenishment requirements would be programmed into the op plan and it would be controlled by CJOC and the Joint Force commander. Same for the RCAF fighter elements. That's how it has worked and will work in numerous amphibious/littoral ops like the Falklands, Gulf 1 and many smaller ops.
> 
> I see nothing wrong with the idea of using a frigate in this role when practical (the Navy might have a different opinion) it's the idea of "the Army buy one Frigate" or even the concept of buying a frigate's worth of combat components to establish a hard defence point. The later because we are highly unlikely to go into a situation like that without our allies who would provide the defensive shield and much of the deep strike capability. We're hard pressed to afford the close support shield and strike capabilities as it stands.
> 
> 🍻


Honestly - the biggest take away I got from Kirkhill's system - was it's a fantastic FOB defense system - or fixed HQ defensive system.

   In Iraq a lot of the large bases had the CIWS Phallanx 20mm systems in ConEx boxes setup for not just Anti Air (Air being incoming in this instance) - but also local defense - not sure what occurred after the trial - but more did arrive - so I would assume it was performing at least adequately - it also allowed decrease manning of the perimeter towers - as the system had better sensors than the guards in the towers (I saw a NODLR in one tower I had throwback LETE visions from the late 80'/early 90's when I saw that).

I don't view it as a very practical system for the mobile Army - but it would be a decent system as part of a FARP, or to quickly support an airfield seizure (or impromptu dry lake bed landing strip).   You could reduce your D&S needs in terms of PY's and give those positions a reasonable stand off to be more than just dark of night positions - and could be used to support forward dispersed operations (via back of Hercules or C-17) - you wouldn't need significant equipment to move them either - there are rapid collapsible "hoists" with off-road tires that could be moved to position by a Light vehicle (not a ATV - but more akin to a GMV).


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Kirkhill said:


> You know, just looking at that picture, and thinking about the AD AT discussion.  I get that there is a cost to ammunition.  I get that Air Defence is indeed a specialization that requires particular skills.
> 
> But here is where I find myself bumping up against a problem.
> 
> How do the navies of the world manage to deal with surface threats, subsurface threats, aerial threats, missiles, boats and smugglers with an array of multiple caliber guns, missiles, torpedoes and troops transported by jackstay, boat and helicopter from one single room surrounded by all the systems and accessed from comfy seats?
> 
> View attachment 66437
> 
> And yet the army needs separate capbadges and colonels to perform similar jobs.


I have been wanting to weigh in on this topic for the past few days but have not had the time.

Unfortunately Kirkhill, you are comparing Apples and Oranges.  The way Ships fight and organize themselves is fundamentally different from the Army.  There are a number of reasons for this:

*Command, Charge & Control*

Firstly, as it relates to Command and Control, the big difference between Naval Forces and Land Forces is that every single soldier on the ground is able to manoeuvre independently and has freedom of action, right down to the individual rifleman within a section.  This is not the case at all in the Navy.  The only one actually Manoeuvring the Ship in the Navy is the Officer of the Watch.

Likewise the concept of Control in the Navy is different from the Army.  In the Navy all control is centralized in the hands of the Commanding Officer.  Control deals with three different aspects:


Control of Ship's Movements
Control of Fighting Equipment and Sensors
Tactical Employment

The Commanding Officer has the ability to delegate control and this is done either verbally, through Captain's Standing Orders or Battle Orders (which are classified).  An example of this would be Control of Tactical Employment of the Helicopter.  Normally the CO retains Control of the Helicopter but may delegate Launch and Recovery IAW the Flying Program to the Operations Room Officer which means the ORO has the CO's permission to order the launch and recovery of the Helicopter as long as it is IAW the Flying Program. 

The Commanding Officer retains Command at all times and ultimately is responsible for everything that happens.  Command, unlike Control cannot be delegated. 

A third concept that is unique to the Navy is Charge.  Charge is "The responsibility vested in the Commanding Officer for the proper and safe movements and operation of the ship and her company".  Charge can be delegated and the Officer of the Watch who is the CO's representative when they are not present holds Charge of the Ship.  When an Officer holds Charge, they have authority over everybody on the Ship with the exception of the CO and the XO and are essentially there to ensure things are done properly and safely.  The ORO may have been delegated Control but the Officer of the Watch still holds Charge and if there is a disagreement over something, it's their duty to inform the Commanding Officer.

Now where am I going with all of this? 

Really it's to highlight how the Navy is fundamentally different from the Army in many respects when it comes to Command and Control. 

There are really only three people on a Naval Vessel that actually fight the Ship:

The Commanding Officer
The Operations Room Officer; and
The Officer of the Watch.

Everyone else has a roll they have to play but it is ultimately to support those three individuals and the latter two ultimately support the Captain who is the final authority on all matters. 

*Employment of Sensors & Weapons*

The second difference between the Land and Naval Environment is the Ship itself.  For the most part, Warships are heavily automated.  The complex software and combat management suites that manage the fighting equipment and sensors can actually, for the most part fight themselves.  Humans are there for fact checking and decision making because the machines themselves are sometimes too good. 

I won't describe in great deal how this works because a lot of this stuff can easily stray in to the realm of classified and need-to-know but essentially you could in theory set the combat systems to automatic and the Ship would fight itself without human input.  The human input is there to make sure we don't do things like shoot down civilian aircraft, inadvertently launch missiles, etc.  

In order to understand how an Ops Room works you need to really visualize it as if it's the inside of an MBT where all the operators are loaders, the SWC and ASWC are gunners and the ORO is the Crew Commander.  The Ship is ONE Manoeuvre Element. 

You can't organize a Land Force the same way because if you take for instance, a Mechanized Infantry Company with LAVs, already you can see how much more difficult Command and Control is with 15 IFVs, 100+ dismounts capable of acting independently, different weapons systems with decentralized control.  ONE vs MANY.... CENTRALIZED vs DECENTRALIZED

*Functional & Fighting Organization *

Your understanding of how a Ship is organized and it's departments work is inaccurate. That's because a Ship has a Functional Organization and a Fighting Organization and depending on what they are doing will determine what organization people answer to and fall under.

The Fighting Organization consists of Specialized Teams that serve a combat/operational function and form for a specific reason.

The Functional Organization is administrative in nature and exists for routine administration and personnel management.

The Departments themselves, Operations, Engineering, Combat Systems, Deck, Logistics, are all part of the Functional Organization and members belong to these departments.  When conducting evolutions and sailing though, members fall under the Fighting Organization which is governed by the Watch and Station Bill and is distinct from the Functional Organization.

A great example of this would be when the Ship is brought to Emergency Stations.  I am a watchkeeper and normally fall under Operations (which is my functional organization) but if I am off-watch, I will go to my Section Base and belong to the Damage Control Organization at that point. 

This distinction doesn't exist in the Army.  The functional and fighting organizations are the same. 

The point I'm trying to make is that Navies and Armies are different.  The way they do things are different but there are very valid reasons for this.


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> A firm base.
> 
> That is what is lacking in our discussions, our strategy and our policy.  We wamble all over the place.
> 
> I am suggesting that we have a solid, real world example we can use to fix a point of origin and that we can then build on that.  A cornerstone frigate if you like.



A real world example of what you suggest.  A "firm base" that had state of the art weapons (and intercommunications) covering all approaches (by land and air) "defending" terrain that was adopted to minimize manpower requirements.  Sounds like the Maginot Line.  How did that work out for them?


----------



## Kirkhill

Excellent!  Responses! 

All telling me how I have got it wrong.      Good stuff.

Now.  I agree the Canadian Forces are a Joint Force.  Even if only nominally.  It is that nominal caveat that prompted me to think along these lines in the first place.  How could the Army and the Navy work together?  What can the Navy do that the Army needs?  Or at least could benefit from?   The Navy has been making some significant steps in the Army's direction by ensuring it has a useful Long Range Gunfire Support capability and a useful Land Attack Missile capability.  Capabilities that the Army can't seem to figure out for itself.

But, as has been pointed out before, in this Joint environment the RCN is reluctant to tie up one of its frigates against a potentially hostile dock.  In fact I am reliably informed they would even be reluctant to chance their ships in the Baltics and the Black Sea.  Areas where the Army might find itself operating and might welcome the weight of fire available.  And I am not persuaded that we can rely on our allies to supply the necessary support if we get into trouble.

It has been suggested that my proposition makes an excellent fixed base.  Great.  That is exactly what I was looking for.  I want to make the CAF into an independent force capable of deploying independently in support of Canada's domestic and international needs.

And being able to independently support Bermuda, or Montserrat, or Mauritius, or Rwanda is a start.  Or even padding Singapore's defenses.  Or adding to Perth's (North or South).


So here is my next question.

When was the last time a Halifax was anchored in Saint John to support an exercise in Gagetown?  The docks are 20 to 25 km from the Nerepis Hills and the southern limits of Gagetown.

What happens if a Halifax, acting as a CSC analog, were parked in Saint John and used as a Brigade HQ and Maintenance Area?  Could a Joint Command Team drive a Combat Team across Gagetown's ranges from the frigate?  What could the Army do with the analogous fire support, and aerial support, available from and through the frigate?  What could the Army do with the information the frigate could supply?  What could the Army do with the Air Support the frigate could co-ordinate?  What could the Army do with the Naval Boarding Parties and their 12m RHIBs on the St John River?

Once that series of experiments are complete then I would suggest that the Army could look differently at whether or not they need or want the capabilities the frigate offers for themselves.

And this has absolutely nothing to do with the Maneuvering Elements, the Brigades.   It has everything to do with an expeditionary force, an independent foreign policy, home defence, a divisional support structure and Jointery.

And I fully acknowledge I don't know the inner workings of either the Arty or the Navy.

But, at the end of the day, the Navy delivers a whack of a lot of firepower on short notice from a mobile base manned with 204 people.

And I don't see the Army coming close to meeting that capability.

If I want to defend Halifax, Quebec, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and Victoria, heck add in Prince Rupert, St John's and Iqaluit I would call on the Navy to park one of it frigates at the docks or in the roads.  That would still leave me 3 to 6 spare frigates, 4 subs, 6 to 8 AOPVs and a dozen MCDVs for patrols.

What is the Army doing?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> If I want to defend Halifax, Quebec, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and Victoria, heck add in Prince Rupert, St John's and Iqaluit I would call on the Navy to park one of it frigates at the docks or in the roads.  That would still leave me 3 to 6 spare frigates, 4 subs, 6 to 8 AOPVs and a dozen MCDVs for patrols.
> 
> What is the Army doing?


Dispersing is protection in the land environment -- that ship is going to be 1 target.

1 target - even an Ticonderoga class cruiser or Zumwalt class Destroyer (which is oddly larger than the Tico's).   Both of those have more capability than a CF City Class Frigate, but are still 1 target.

I don't think any of the CFC's want to be tied up a pier -- I mean look at Battleship row in Peal Harbor for a reason no ship wants to be tied up under attack - because it robs them of mobility -- static targets are much easier targets regardless of the method of attack.


Take that same 205 pers - and you can spread then out - have mutual support and overlapping fields of fire - you also force the enemy to disperse their attacks, so it is no longer one point target but a bunch of smaller targets.



I think it's interesting to look at the capability of a CFC in terms of its land power relationship - but Humphrey just gave us a class on the Navy - and it won't work for the Army, as it robs survivability and adaptability.


View the Navy as the Borg - the Borg have capabilities - but you don't want to be a Borg.




I chose to view the CFC idea as a model of firepower that could be emulated by a Combat Team.
  Mainly because looking at the CF Regular Army roster - I think think to properly support the Army as a persistent conflict survivor - the current model is a sham, and I honestly don't see even 1 CBMG being a sustainable entity.


----------



## KevinB

Sustainability as I mentioned above is the way one keeps a force up to strength.
   For war time sustainability one must be able to replace soldiers, and equipment, in their entirety.

One needs a way to recruit and train soldiers - the CF does that fairly well compared to most other western nations.

The major tripping point where the CF runs out of steam is sustainment of equipment.

Small Arms and Small Arms Ammo - the CF does well, as Colt Canada (former Diemaco) and IVI have domestic production capabilities.

Anything beyond 7.62mm NATO (other than the Bolt Action Sniper Rifles) is an OUTCAN production.
MFLD's (Multi Function Laser Devices), and Night Visions Systems - OUTCAN

LAV - body is Canadian - but the weapon and fire control/optics/thermal - OUTCAN

Leo 2 - OUTCAN

ATGM - MISSING GAP ALREADY
MANPAD - MISSING GAP ALREADY
SHORAD - Ditto

I can go on -- but basically internally Canada can field and train a soldier with a rifle to GPMG
   and put them in a taxi, and I am not even addressing the significant lack of CSS that is requires to sustain a Maneuver unit function in combat for a prolonged period.

Beyond the Make Up of the CF -- the Canadian Defence Industrial base needs realignment, and partnerships created with allies to ensure that expansion of the CF can be done organically.


----------



## Kirkhill

I don't think I am making my point.

With the Navy's battle management system a small number of people in one room have access to a highly automated system of sensors and weapons.  A system that can operate with man in the loop or weapons free. It is highly responsive, very flexible and puts a very large number of capabilities, some of which are highly specialized  in a small packet under the command of a field grade officer.

Not a specialist command but a generalist command.

The other point is that the capabilities can be centralized, duplicated or dispersed.

I stand to be corrected but it is my understanding that ships sailing in company can see everyone else's picture and launch everyone else's missiles.

It is also my understanding, from the air defense side of the house that both MANTIS cram and NASAMS systems can be widely dispersed.  In the case of NASAMS the launcher modules can be 25 km apart.  In the CRAM case they can be spread over an area the size of an airfield.

So yes, posting a multibillion ship at Ontario Place is suboptimal. But if I want air defence of Canada's cities the Navy can do a better job of it than the Army.  The Navy can also bring heavier weapons to bear against shore targets than the Army.

And it doesn't have to be that way.  All of the weapons the navy uses, or contemplates using, can be mounted on field carriages and employed ashore.  In General Support.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I don't think I am making my point.


I know what you are trying to say.


Kirkhill said:


> With the Navy's battle management system a small number of people in one room have access to a highly automated system of sensors and weapons.  A system that can operate with man in the loop or weapons free. It is highly responsive, very flexible and puts a very large number of capabilities, some of which are highly specialized  in a small packet under the command of a field grade officer.


A Ship is both an Open and Closed network.



Kirkhill said:


> Not a specialist command but a generalist command.
> 
> The other point is that the capabilities can be centralized, duplicated or dispersed.
> 
> I stand to be corrected but it is my understanding that ships sailing in company can see everyone else's picture and launch everyone else's missiles.


From my understanding - very limited that is to - the US ADC's can fire other ships SA missiles, as they control the air defense battle - but I don't think they can launch other items (and I doubt many Captains want other other hands on the trigger).




Kirkhill said:


> It is also my understanding, from the air defense side of the house that both MANTIS cram and NASAMS systems can be widely dispersed.  In the case of NASAMS the launcher modules can be 25 km apart.  In the CRAM case they can be spread over an area the size of an airfield.


My understanding as well.


Kirkhill said:


> So yes, posting a multibillion ship at Ontario Place is suboptimal. But if I want air defence of Canada's cities the Navy can do a better job of it than the Army.  The Navy can also bring heavier weapons to bear against shore targets than the Army.


I would say that is a telling comment on the state of the Army...



Kirkhill said:


> And it doesn't have to be that way.  All of the weapons the navy uses, or contemplates using, can be mounted on field carriages and employed ashore.  In General Support.


I mentioned this elsewhere - I'm not sure the Army "needs" all of the same capabilities.
  A City class can't exactly bring 74 120mm guns and 150 'ish LAV 25mm cannons to bear on a target.

The Close Fight is Different on Land than Sea - both in offense and defense.

 Perhaps the better method to look at is what capabilities are current missing from the Army - and does the Navy have an "Easy Button" to solve that...


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Perhaps the better method to look at is what capabilities are current missing from the Army - and does the Navy have an "Easy Button" to solve that...



Naval gunfire support.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Naval gunfire support.



Precisely.

And that is precisely why the Naval Division was created and is commemorated each year with the Gun Run competitions.

The Army needed what the Navy had.  And the Navy couldn't get their ships within range.  So they dismounted their guns and dragged them.











__





						THE NAVAL GUNS IN NATAL 1899-1902 - South African Military History Society - Journal
					





					samilitaryhistory.org
				




Meanwhile the Royal Artillery at Colenso


----------



## Kirkhill

15 years later 

13 pdr Fd 1904,  18 pdr Fd 1903,  4.5" Howitzer 1908, 3" Stokes Mortar 1915.

And the Royal Regiment of Artillery had stood up, in 1899, the Royal Garrison Artillery which was made responsible for the long range guns of the coastal defence, siege and heavy batteries and, later, for the air defence batteries.

In other words those elements of the artillery that, like the civilian population they were tasked to defend, were immobile and couldn't manoeuvre away from the threat.  They, like the civilians, had to stand in place and hope to defeat the attacking force.

Iron Dome style.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I know what you are trying to say.
> 
> A Ship is both an Open and Closed network.
> 
> 
> From my understanding - very limited that is to - the US ADC's can fire other ships SA missiles, as they control the air defense battle - but I don't think they can launch other items (and I doubt many Captains want other other hands on the trigger).
> 
> 
> 
> My understanding as well.
> 
> I would say that is a telling comment on the state of the Army...
> 
> 
> I mentioned this elsewhere - I'm not sure the Army "needs" all of the same capabilities.
> A City class can't exactly bring 74 120mm guns and 150 'ish LAV 25mm cannons to bear on a target.
> 
> The Close Fight is Different on Land than Sea - both in offense and defense.
> 
> Perhaps the better method to look at is what capabilities are current missing from the Army - and does the Navy have an "Easy Button" to solve that...




I don't envisage a single City Class frigate or CSC doing the same job as a LAV Brigade.  I see the weapons (and TOC/CIC) of the frigate organizing the battlespace and supplying the common picture for the brigade as well as the cover under which a brigade would operate.

And that brigade would still need to include a Field Artillery Regiment with something akin to 155s, GMRLSs or NSMs and VSHORAD requirements.  And that is in addition to local FSCC and STA.

But I do see the frigate adding in novel technologies like swarms of loitering munitions.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Sustainability as I mentioned above is the way one keeps a force up to strength.
> For war time sustainability one must be able to replace soldiers, and equipment, in their entirety.
> 
> One needs a way to recruit and train soldiers - the CF does that fairly well compared to most other western nations.
> 
> The major tripping point where the CF runs out of steam is sustainment of equipment.
> ...


This has been a problem since the 1960s. In those days both the Reg F and the Res F used towed 105mm and 155mm and the infantry 3/4 to trucks as section carriers. There were therefore lots of spare equipment and reservists trained on it to sustain the four regular force brigades. Only the armoured corps was out of step with some Shermans still hanging on in the reserves while the Reg F had converted into close to 300 Centurions.

Things changed dramatically during the sixties as the infantry went to M113s but not enough for the reserves. The artillery went for M109s and then L5s but left the reserves with C1s. As the old 52-54 pattern SMP fleets timed out we started buying field vehicles for the Reg F and "training ersatz" vehicles for the reserves. Who can ever forget the Jeep CJs or the crappy Chevy 1 tons.

From time to time we take a stab at it - the Grizzleys and Cougars (but those were training tanks and APCs for everybody in Canada Reg and Res alike) and the Bisons (immediately snaffled by the Reg F as they came off the line.)

Bottom line is for around six decades we live in two solitudes. The Reg F gets sustainment by never committing more than elements of one brigade at a time and generate their sustainability from within the pool of their gear while the Res F offers nothing in the way of sustainment equipment (maybe a few TAPVs) and only partially trained personnel with generally very limited experience on the equipment they will actually work on once assigned as augmentees. Accordingly we give rotos some six months to get organized and trained.

We have around a hundred k plus people in DND costing some 10 billion per year in rough numbers. That's half the budget and while Class A reservists cost us 1/6 per year of a PY, the leadership's main concern is that if they agreed to a 10 or 20,000 reduction in full timers, they wouldn't see that 1 - 2 billion come back as equipment or O&M to fully equip the 20,000 reservists we have.

DND is chocking on its personnel costs. Our equipment acquisitions do not meet any coherent overarching vision or strategy for a future force but are generally shoehorned into available budgets.

I do disagree about the "doing well training soldiers". Recruiting takes an inordinate amount of time; we have numerous soldiers sitting on their butts awaiting courses; many trades are critically undermanned; we have a heard of qualified people filling cubicles in Ottawa rather than in the field or training institutions. We could do so much better.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> This has been a problem since the 1960s.


Agreed 


FJAG said:


> Bottom line is for around six decades we live in two solitudes. The Reg F gets sustainment by never committing more than elements of one brigade at a time and generate their sustainability from within the pool of their gear while the Res F offers nothing in the way of sustainment equipment (maybe a few TAPVs) and only partially trained personnel with generally very limited experience on the equipment they will actually work on once assigned as augmentees. Accordingly we give rotos some six months to get organized and trained.


Which has given rise to a massive misunderstanding of what it actually takes to field combat units.
   The US had a massive wake up call with Iraq - and they where way better prepared than Canada due to the way they structure their Army (Reg/Res/NG) 


FJAG said:


> We have around a hundred k plus people in DND costing some 10 billion per year in rough numbers. That's half the budget and while Class A reservists cost us 1/6 per year of a PY, the leadership's main concern is that if they agreed to a 10 or 20,000 reduction in full timers, they wouldn't see that 1 - 2 billion come back as equipment or O&M to fully equip the 20,000 reservists we have.


 To be fair I don't thin the CF gets even 1/6th the "value" of a PY with the current reserve structure.
    I certainly wouldn't want to restructure anything before a massive restructuring of the reserve force occurred -- and the Regimental and Political issues with that are daunting.


FJAG said:


> DND is chocking on its personnel costs. Our equipment acquisitions do not meet any coherent overarching vision or strategy for a future force but are generally shoehorned into available budgets.


It's unfortunate - as the CF has a fair amount of bright folks - and the Army USED to have a world class test establishment in LETE.


FJAG said:


> I do disagree about the "doing well training soldiers". Recruiting takes an inordinate amount of time; we have numerous soldiers sitting on their butts awaiting courses; many trades are critically undermanned; we have a heard of qualified people filling cubicles in Ottawa rather than in the field or training institutions. We could do so much better.
> 
> 🍻


I was talking about the end result - a CF Private fresh out of BattleSchool is significantly more capable that a Private out of training in any other Army, the same goes for a young officer out of phase training - and for the most part the NCO corps as well.
    The capability gaps in the CF are not its personnel - but it's equipment.
  There are GIANT gaps there - and a lot of systems that are criminal neglected by any Force that believes it is ready for a Peer/Near Peer threat.










						See Taiwanese jets take off from rural roads, and more from its latest drill
					

The Taiwanese military exercise envisioned a Chinese attack taking out the island’s main airfields, necessitating the use of rural roads as runways to carry on the fight.




					www.defensenews.com
				




Due to Canada's geographic location - it needs to be structured like an Expeditionary Force, while still not neglecting Interal Defense and Support needs.
   I think the look to Europe with NATO is extremely short sighted - and I think the Pacific Rim is a much better location where Canada could make a meaningful contribution.

I know the author - and I think he's extremely accurate in this.








						Shuvaloy Majumdar: The Chinese dragon circles Afghanistan, as Beijing looks to impose a new world order
					

Islamabad, Tehran and Kabul form a constellation of assets that adorn the dragon’s crown, as it triumphantly circles over the tombstone of the Pax Americana it…




					nationalpost.com
				




 I don't push Light Forces just for fun or because I hate Mech (I do - but not germane to this) - I think an Amphibious MEU - and Prepositioned Heavier/Med Forces in Australia would be a much better usage of the Cdn Tax Dollar.


----------



## Brad Sallows

European members of NATO can look after themselves on land, and have been able to do so since not too long after the USSR collapsed.  While boots-on-ground near the frontier is a reassuring political commitment, it's a lot of money doing not very much and is meagre in the big picture.  Canada should find some other way to reassure its European NATO partners that Canada is in, will stay in, and will call if answered.  Then spend the not-spent money on other defence needs.


----------



## Halifax Tar

Brad Sallows said:


> European members of NATO can look after themselves on land, and have been able to do so since not too long after the USSR collapsed.  While boots-on-ground near the frontier is a reassuring political commitment, it's a lot of money doing not very much and is meagre in the big picture.  Canada should find some other way to reassure its European NATO partners that Canada is in, will stay in, and will call if answered.  Then spend the not-spent money on other defence needs.



Grow the Navy show our NATO allies we are the go to for ASW.  We will take on a greater role in safeguarding the shipping lanes to Europe.


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## Brad Sallows

A view I share.  North American commitment to assist European partners in the defence of Europe is worthless without control of shipping lanes.


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## FJAG

KevinB said:


> To be fair I don't thin the CF gets even 1/6th the "value" of a PY with the current reserve structure.


I agree entirely. The concept of Tue and Thur (or whatever) night training is a colossal waste of time and really nothing much more than a lead in to standing around and hoisting a few in the mess afterwards. I much prefer the one weekend a month and a good 2 to 3 weeks in the summer concept. I expect if we ever cut the Tue/Thur thing we would lose a few folks (maybe quite a few). But in the end might that not be better for the force?


KevinB said:


> I certainly wouldn't want to restructure anything before a massive restructuring of the reserve force occurred -- and the Regimental and Political issues with that are daunting.


Restructuring does concern me. On the one hand it's essential if one ever wants to get to developing an ability to train collectively and generate full units. On the other hand past rounds of consolidating units has not been very successful because other than the restructure itself, the reservists at the time saw no meaningful change in the equipment they had or the training they were given. Restructuring (consolidation of units) usually happens as an element of cost cutting measures which concurrently reduce equipment purchases and training opportunities. That's just self defeating. If one wants to restructure into larger consolidated units it HAS TO BE accompanied by investments into better equipment and training. That will help convince the traditionalist and will keep and grow the force.


KevinB said:


> I was talking about the end result - a CF Private fresh out of BattleSchool is significantly more capable that a Private out of training in any other Army, the same goes for a young officer out of phase training - and for the most part the NCO corps as well.


I've said this many times ... the young officer, NCOs and soldiers of today's army appear to be much more capable than those of my generation. That causes a conundrum for me because I also think that today's training system falls well short of the mark.


KevinB said:


> The capability gaps in the CF are not its personnel - but it's equipment.
> There are GIANT gaps there - and a lot of systems that are criminal neglected by any Force that believes it is ready for a Peer/Near Peer threat.


I keep thinking over the shitstorm the UK went through because of its poor equipment in early Afghanistan and ours with the Iltis yet we have so many deficiencies which are almost guaranteed to cause unnecessary loss of life and limb.


KevinB said:


> Due to Canada's geographic location - it needs to be structured like an Expeditionary Force, while still not neglecting Interal Defense and Support needs.
> I think the look to Europe with NATO is extremely short sighted - and I think the Pacific Rim is a much better location where Canada could make a meaningful contribution.


If you add in the issue of Canada's geography, many internal operations would be in the nature of expeditionary as well.

I don't think the look to NATO in Europe is short sighted at all. The lack of a look at the Pacific definitely is but for the moment is politically driven with a bit of a Pollyanna dreamer calling the shots. We need to look in both directions.

Another thread had me thinking about how one could go about doing that which, unfortunately got me thinking about CSCs and nuclear subs but also what does a MDTF really look like. That also got me thinking about MDO (I still dislike the term Pan-domain - sorry PPCLI Guy). I'm starting to think that we need to go back to making OOTW/capacity building back into a secondary duty and start focusing more on the higher end of the spectrum. I still think the heavy, medium and light construct of manoeuvre brigades is valid (although our weapons and capability mixes need major refining) IMHO our biggest weakness in structure is the absence of functional CS and CSS brigades. I can see a CS brigade, capable of expeditionary operations, that is structured to do MDF missions. And it strikes me as blindingly obvious that is we are an expeditionary army then we better have a darn fine CSS brigade structure. from back to 1970, I have never liked this blending of purple support base structures or the more recent iteration of static NSEs. I can see where some f those functions are of value, but if you start with a combat capable organization, you can always become static while if you start static you can never become something more mobile and still combat support capable.


KevinB said:


> I don't push Light Forces just for fun or because I hate Mech (I do - but not germane to this) - I think an Amphibious MEU - and Prepositioned Heavier/Med Forces in Australia would be a much better usage of the Cdn Tax Dollar.


Take a peak at my thoughts in the Best Base thread where for the fun of it I disassemble 1 CMBG and the three CBGs and reassemble them into an ABCT and IBCT with the IBCT possibly focused to the Pacific (possibly as an MDTF) while the ABCT looks to NATO. The latter can easily change direction. 

That could be interesting, with 3 Div and two brigades focused west and the rest of the Army elsewhere.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

This is the NASAMS Fire Direction Centre.  It brings the CIC of the RCN ashore.  It allows the Army to employ all the assets in the Canadian Inventory currently and potentially available to the RCN and the RCAF.  CAMM, AIM9, ESSM, AIM-120, SM2, SM6, Harpoon, NSM and potentially the Tomahawk.  That extends the Army's sphere of influence out to a radius of 1500 km or so.  200 km if the Tomahawk is eliminated. But the SM6 is a long range missile as well.



> The FDC is a true Multi-Domain Command & Control component and can, pending on the desired configuration, support a wide range of missions; GBAD, Army counterfire operations, coastal defence, air surveillance, airspace management and others.

















						NASAMS Air Defence System
					

KONGSBERG/raytheon offers a fielded and proven NASAMS Air Defence System with the capability to protect several areas and high-value assets separated bu large distances. NASAMS is the world´s first operational Network Centric Ground Based Air Defence System and is delivered or under production...




					www.kongsberg.com
				





Given that sphere of influence being available to the Divisional Artillery Group of 4 General Support Regiment, what would three brigades, in the Light Medium range, with three Field Artillery Regiments, a pair of Cavalry regiments and a single regiment of tanks be able to accomplish?  Domestically and Internationally?


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## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I agree entirely. The concept of Tue and Thur (or whatever) night training is a colossal waste of time and really nothing much more than a lead in to standing around and hoisting a few in the mess afterwards. I much prefer the one weekend a month and a good 2 to 3 weeks in the summer concept. I expect if we ever cut the Tue/Thur thing we would lose a few folks (maybe quite a few). But in the end might that not be better for the force?
> 
> 
> 🍻



Or put all reservists on Class B for 6 year contracts. Don't renew the ones you don't need. Those who leave after 6 years get $40,000 education cash from VAC.


----------



## KevinB

WRT the Reserves: I do think 1 night a week can be productive - maybe not very week - but at least 1 weekend a month is mandatory for reservists - and some period of continuous duty during the year - not necessarily the summer for everyone.
  I remember as a student - that the money added up for the weekly parade nights - and some of then offered good training value.
The key is to be able to gainfully employ people - as I'd argue the Reg Force (at least Cbt Arm Personnel)  wastes and equal amount of time while in Garrison.

I think if you truly want to capitalize on the reserves pool - then you need to make something that appeals to them.
   I'm not just talking about HS or University Students - but older members as well, and ALSO has value for the CF.
I can think of tons of things done for interest sakes that had zero training value - and also things done for theoretical training value (that didn't really) and disaffected a lot of members.  Additionally I think both reg and reserve forces would benefit from something like the GI Bill down here.
 I remember the CF had an educational reimbursement system for a while, but in my experience it wasn't a great system in the 2000's, and I am not current now on how that does.


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## Kirkhill

Why not extend the Cadet system to include the student recruits? As I recall there was already a mechanism in place to train cadets at places like Cornwallis, Esquimalt and Vernon for 2 to 10 weeks annually and pay them.  Parade the 16 to 21 year Olds separately from the youngsters and don't call them cadets.


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## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Why not extend the Cadet system to include the student recruits? As I recall there was already a mechanism in place to train cadets at places like Cornwallis, Esquimalt and Vernon for 2 to 10 weeks annually and pay them.  Parade the 16 to 21 year Olds separately from the youngsters and don't call them cadets.


I would be going to go the other way - and stop cadets at 16 - the older ones can join the reserves.  If you aren't calling them cadets - then just add them to the reserve pool.


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## dapaterson

Stop recruiting anyone below the age of majority.  If mommy or daddy has to sign for you to enrol, we don't need you.

Ninety percent of the CAFs problems would be solved by staffs properly planning with realistic timelines.

But as long as the Army is always surprised by annual events, and thinks nothing of tossing new non urgent tasks in late July for mid-September implementation by Reserve units, things fail.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Stop recruiting anyone below the age of majority.  If mommy or daddy has to sign for you to enrol, we don't need you.
> 
> Ninety percent of the CAFs problems would be solved by staffs properly planning with realistic timelines.
> 
> But as long as the Army is always surprised by annual events, and thinks nothing of tossing new non urgent tasks in late July for mid-September implementation by Reserve units, things fail.



What are you trying to do.... plug the 'arterial scale retention bleed' issue?


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I would be going to go the other way - and stop cadets at 16 - the older ones can join the reserves.  If you aren't calling them cadets - then just add them to the reserve pool.




In that case you need three training systems.

One for full time soldiers
One for full time students
One for full time civilians.

They are three very different groups with very different needs and and expectations.  And availability.


----------



## Blackadder1916

KevinB said:


> I think the look to Europe with NATO is extremely short sighted - and I think the Pacific Rim is a much better location where Canada could make a meaningful contribution.
> 
> . . . - I think an Amphibious MEU - and Prepositioned Heavier/Med Forces in Australia would be a much better usage of the Cdn Tax Dollar.



All well and good, but, remember this is Canada we are talking about.  As much as we may like the downunder or have some shared history, what is our actual treaty commitment?  As far as I am aware (there may be some obscure interpretations of other agreements) Canada is a signatory to two (and only two) agreements that bind us in a mutual defence arrangement outside our borders - the North Atlantic Treaty and the North American Air Defence Agreement.  So, going back to first principles (of war), any reorganization of the Canadian Army would have to include maintaining (selection of the aim already done by treaty) a viable ground combat force for use in Europe.  Not being prepared to back up our word with troops on the ground would rightfully make us ***** in the eyes of our NATO allies.  Yes, dick-measuring matters and having a handful of ships keeping sea lanes open or providing a half dozen fighters doesn't count.

That doesn't mean it has to be stationed there, though a cadre footprint would be the preferable COA.  Nor does it have to be FedEx and be there positively, absolutely overnight.  But there should be a visible commitment to expand on the BG(-) that we currently are providing in Latvia.  And as much as your experience and preference is for light forces, my preference is for mechanized (he said, whipping out his old fart, Cold Warrior, 4 CMBG, 1 Cdn Div (Fwd) credentials).  Was there a place for light forces in Europe (Germany) back in the day?  Yes, but mainly it was terrain dependent and they were tightly meshed in the overall defence plans.  Oh, the countries that had light formations in their NATO order of battle were also the most mechanized.  The enemy (those Fantasian bastards), despite reorganization of their forces to smaller formations and a greater focus on hybrid warfare, are still primarily mechanized and heavily tank focused.  If/when they transition to more traditional operations it will require a mechanized response preferably with an armour component.


----------



## KevinB

Blackadder1916 said:


> All well and good, but, remember this is Canada we are talking about.  As much as we may like the downunder or have some shared history, what is our actual treaty commitment?  As far as I am aware (there may be some obscure interpretations of other agreements) Canada is a signatory to two (and only two) agreements that bind us in a mutual defence arrangement outside our borders - the North Atlantic Treaty and the North American Air Defence Agreement.  So, going back to first principles (of war), any reorganization of the Canadian Army would have to include maintaining (selection of the aim already done by treaty) a viable ground combat force for use in Europe.  Not being prepared to back up our word with troops on the ground would rightfully make us ***** in the eyes of our NATO allies.  Yes, dick-measuring matters and having a handful of ships keeping sea lanes open or providing a half dozen fighters doesn't count.


I would suggest that 1 Bde of Armor to Europe means nothing in the grand scale.
   1 Bde of Rapid Deployable forces in the Pacific with Naval and Air would help NATO a great deal more.
 Why - both China and Russia border the Pacific, why fight a 1 front war if you can make a two front.



Blackadder1916 said:


> That doesn't mean it has to be stationed there, though a cadre footprint would be the preferable COA.  Nor does it have to be FedEx and be there positively, absolutely overnight.  But there should be a visible commitment to expand on the BG(-) that we currently are providing in Latvia.  And as much as your experience and preference is for light forces, my preference is for mechanized (he said, whipping out his old fart, Cold Warrior, 4 CMBG, 1 Cdn Div (Fwd) credentials).  Was there a place for light forces in Europe (Germany) back in the day?  Yes, but mainly it was terrain dependent and they were tightly meshed in the overall defence plans.  Oh, the countries that had light formations in their NATO order of battle were also the most mechanized.  The enemy (those Fantasian bastards), despite reorganization of their forces to smaller formations and a greater focus on hybrid warfare, are still primarily mechanized and heavily tank focused.  If/when they transition to more traditional operations it will require a mechanized response preferably with an armour component.


All of our Allies are going towards a Multi Domain Operations approach.
   4 CMBG was an actual (for the time) modern Armored Brigade - with Tanks, APC's - M109's etc.
 Canada doesn't currently have that.
   The LAV is not an AFV - at very least it needs an integral ATGM to be viable.
   There is no Self Propelled Under Armor Artillery
   There is No Air Defense 
   There are NO ATGM's - even man portable units.
   No Engineer SEV IFV's (again see LAV issue)
   No GS Arty 
   There is not enough CS and CSS to support a BDE if there was all of the above.

My point is when you are starting from effectively scratch - you need to look where the forces you can be best allocated and structured to punch above your weight.

When you look to International trade - does the majority of seaborne commerce come from Pacific Rim or Europe? (its Pacific based) -- that alone would dictate that Canada have some larger interest - even selfish interest in looking to the Pacific.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Or put all reservists on Class B for 6 year contracts. Don't renew the ones you don't need. Those who leave after 6 years get $40,000 education cash from VAC.


A class B Reservist on a six year contract is legally and for all intents and purposes a Reg F soldier. You accomplish exactly the same thing by offering a Reg F recruit a six year contract with a bonus at the end.

The strength in the Reserves is in its Class A which allows you to recruit and train and hold a larger force then you can afford with full-time soldiers alone. - IF YOU DO IT RIGHT!

If you don't do it right you have what we have.



KevinB said:


> WRT the Reserves: I do think 1 night a week can be productive - maybe not very week - but at least 1 weekend a month is mandatory for reservists - and some period of continuous duty during the year - not necessarily the summer for everyone.
> I remember as a student - that the money added up for the weekly parade nights - and some of then offered good training value.
> The key is to be able to gainfully employ people - as I'd argue the Reg Force (at least Cbt Arm Personnel)  wastes and equal amount of time while in Garrison.


That's my way of thinking. Full summer employment while they are students and train the hell out of them. Full Reg F courses (spread over consecutive summers if necessary.) Offer tuition for university or worthwhile community colleges to build up obligatory service obligations and after that reduce their commitments to what is basically necessary so that they maintain their skills and unit effectiveness but at the same time can develop their civilian career and family life.


KevinB said:


> I think if you truly want to capitalize on the reserves pool - then you need to make something that appeals to them.
> I'm not just talking about HS or University Students - but older members as well, and ALSO has value for the CF.
> I can think of tons of things done for interest sakes that had zero training value - and also things done for theoretical training value (that didn't really) and disaffected a lot of members.  Additionally I think both reg and reserve forces would benefit from something like the GI Bill down here.
> I remember the CF had an educational reimbursement system for a while, but in my experience it wasn't a great system in the 2000's, and I am not current now on how that does.


Yup - all that and federal employment protection legislation.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> Stop recruiting anyone below the age of majority.  If mommy or daddy has to sign for you to enrol, we don't need you.
> 
> Ninety percent of the CAFs problems would be solved by staffs properly planning with realistic timelines.
> 
> But as long as the Army is always surprised by annual events, and thinks nothing of tossing new non urgent tasks in late July for mid-September implementation by Reserve units, things fail.


17 year olds (at least when I joined the Militia) where the absolute majority of recruits.
   This way they are trained to basic trade by 18 - and deployable...
 Also given the # of reservists that drop off after high school, you are getting another year of service from a large percentage of folks.


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## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:


> A real world example of what you suggest.  A "firm base" that had state of the art weapons (and intercommunications) covering all approaches (by land and air) "defending" terrain that was adopted to minimize manpower requirements.  Sounds like the Maginot Line.  How did that work out for them?


Slow on the uptake am I 

But my response to your Maginot observation is how did the lack of the firm base at Antwerp work out for the Allies in NW Europe.

Some firm bases are necessary.

And I would build my expeditionary firm base around the addition of two NASAMs Fire Direction Centres with NASAMs launchers to a three ship naval task force, equipped with weapons from the RCN inventory, seeing as how the Army has nothing in their league, and a MANTIS C-RAM system or two.  All to be sent ashore and distributed and manned by the 4GSR


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## Humphrey Bogart

Kirkhill said:


> Excellent!  Responses!
> 
> All telling me how I have got it wrong.      Good stuff.
> 
> Now.  I agree the Canadian Forces are a Joint Force.  Even if only nominally.  It is that nominal caveat that prompted me to think along these lines in the first place.  How could the Army and the Navy work together?  What can the Navy do that the Army needs?  Or at least could benefit from?   The Navy has been making some significant steps in the Army's direction by ensuring it has a useful Long Range Gunfire Support capability and a useful Land Attack Missile capability.  Capabilities that the Army can't seem to figure out for itself.
> 
> But, as has been pointed out before, in this Joint environment the RCN is reluctant to tie up one of its frigates against a potentially hostile dock.  In fact I am reliably informed they would even be reluctant to chance their ships in the Baltics and the Black Sea.  Areas where the Army might find itself operating and might welcome the weight of fire available.  And I am not persuaded that we can rely on our allies to supply the necessary support if we get into trouble.
> 
> It has been suggested that my proposition makes an excellent fixed base.  Great.  That is exactly what I was looking for.  I want to make the CAF into an independent force capable of deploying independently in support of Canada's domestic and international needs.
> 
> And being able to independently support Bermuda, or Montserrat, or Mauritius, or Rwanda is a start.  Or even padding Singapore's defenses.  Or adding to Perth's (North or South).
> 
> 
> So here is my next question.
> 
> When was the last time a Halifax was anchored in Saint John to support an exercise in Gagetown?  The docks are 20 to 25 km from the Nerepis Hills and the southern limits of Gagetown.
> 
> What happens if a Halifax, acting as a CSC analog, were parked in Saint John and used as a Brigade HQ and Maintenance Area?  Could a Joint Command Team drive a Combat Team across Gagetown's ranges from the frigate?  What could the Army do with the analogous fire support, and aerial support, available from and through the frigate?  What could the Army do with the information the frigate could supply?  What could the Army do with the Air Support the frigate could co-ordinate?  What could the Army do with the Naval Boarding Parties and their 12m RHIBs on the St John River?
> 
> Once that series of experiments are complete then I would suggest that the Army could look differently at whether or not they need or want the capabilities the frigate offers for themselves.
> 
> And this has absolutely nothing to do with the Maneuvering Elements, the Brigades.   It has everything to do with an expeditionary force, an independent foreign policy, home defence, a divisional support structure and Jointery.
> 
> And I fully acknowledge I don't know the inner workings of either the Arty or the Navy.
> 
> But, at the end of the day, the Navy delivers a whack of a lot of firepower on short notice from a mobile base manned with 204 people.
> 
> And I don't see the Army coming close to meeting that capability.
> 
> If I want to defend Halifax, Quebec, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver and Victoria, heck add in Prince Rupert, St John's and Iqaluit I would call on the Navy to park one of it frigates at the docks or in the roads.  That would still leave me 3 to 6 spare frigates, 4 subs, 6 to 8 AOPVs and a dozen MCDVs for patrols.
> 
> What is the Army doing?


 Forgive me for taking some time to respond to this but there is a lot to unpack here.

*How do Ships Fight?*

The first thing I will say is that the worst possible place you could be if you are a Ship is alongside.... Why?  Because Ships defend themselves with Manoeuvre as their first defence.  Only through Manoeuvre is a Ship able to make appropriate use of all of it's Non-Kinetic and Kinetic Effects.  The response or action the Ship will take is dependent on the type of threat:  Air, Surface, Sub-Surface, etc.  When we talk about Surface and Air threats and how Ship's deal with them specifically, what you are describing is what we call Detect to Engage Sequence.  The Detect to Engage Sequence describes the process by which contacts are identified, warned and if necessary, prosecuted.

The purpose of the Detect to Engage Sequence is to be able to make an early detection and classification of incoming threats and be able to effectively use the appropriate weapon to engage and defend the Ship.  Detect to Engage occurs in 5 Phases, they are:

Detect
Localize
Classify
Track
Engage

These all occur at different ranges from far to near and dependent on where the threat is will influence what system is used.  I can't get in to specifics on this for obvious reasons but in order to effectively defend itself a Ship needs to be able to Manoeuvre.  The reason for this is that the best way to actually defend a Ship from aircraft and missiles is with Soft Kill Systems AKA Chaff, Jamming, etc.  Effectively using the Ship's Soft Kill systems requires you to be able to manoeuvre.  If we are talking about Sub-surface threats, manoeuvre and counter-measures are the only Defence you actually have.  

*Why Ships Must Avoid Littorals and Areas that Restrict Manoeuvre?*

As far as fighting in the Littorals is concerned, Ship's are at their biggest disadvantage in Littoral waters because it limits their ability to manoeuvre, which limits the ability to bring all their weapons systems to bear and also constrains their ability to actually Mass combat power. Mass is one of two critical elements of Naval Combat and is a key predicator of success.  The other is Scouting, which I will get in to later.  

On the water, everything is open, there is nowhere to hide.  If you can see the enemy, he can also see you.  This is even more prevalent with modern sensors which can detect threats long before a Ship is even in a position to actually effectively engage in a way that guarantees a successful hit.  So how do you gain an advantage?  With numbers of course.  Mass is critical in Naval Combat and it's basically a case of whoever is able to bring the most guns, missiles, torpedoes, etc to the battle wins.  Because Ships are not able to make use of terrain or other features in the defence, it makes no sense to piece meal forces.  When Fleets do actually fight, the best way to guarantee success or at the very least, prevent defeat in detail, is through concentration of force/firepower.  

It was shown over and over again in the Pacific Theatre in WWII that dispersion and piece-mealing of Naval Forces was a surefire way to lose a Naval Battle.  Why?  For one thing, Ship's are a lot harder to sink than we actually think they are.  Secondly, Fleets were being detected well before they ever got the first shot off and Defence is at a huge advantage in Naval Warfare.  Most of the offensive combat power in a Naval Force is actually contained in the Aircraft Carrier or other Capital Ships.  Finding the Carrier was relatively easy, actually getting planes to it was rather hard.  If you showed up to a battle with 1 Carrier and the enemy had 2, it was basically a guarantee that no matter what you did, the enemy fleet would win simply due to math being on their side.  The Carriers would have enough warning from their screening forces of an impending attack that they would be able to get their aircraft in the air and even if you launched the first shot, they would be able to successfully defend themselves and then counter-attack at which point, the math and statistics take over and your forces are attrited at exponentially every successive attack.  

There is no cover or concealment on the water.  If I have 20 guns and you have 10 guns (A 2:1 Advantage) and you point and shoot at 10 targets and in the unlikely event score 10 perfect hits, I still have 10 untouched guns left to return fire with.  Now lets be more realistic and say that only 50% of hits were effective.  You shoot your 10 which is really only 5.  I now have 15 left and shoot my 15 which is really 7 or 8 if I round up, you now have 3 and I have 15 left..... I think you get the drift.

I've put it in a table for you to illustrate the effect of concentration of force:


Combat Power = 50% effective HitsAttacking Force (AF) (1:2 ratio) Defending Force (DF) (2:1 ratio)Start of Battle1020AF Attack1015DF Counter Attack215AF Counter Attack214DF Counter Attack014

Likewise, if the Attacker has a numerical advantage at the commencement of the Battle, the advantage is even more pronounced:


Combat Power = 50% effective HitsAttacking Force (AF) (2:1 ratio)Defending Force (1:2) ratio)Start of Battle2010AF Attack200DF Counter Attack010

KevinB's example of the Navy being like the Borg is apt.  Dispersion on the water = death.  If you disperse, you're inviting your fleet to be destroyed in detail.  So if you can't disperse how do you gain an advantage? The answer is Scouting.

*Scouting is a Critical Component of Naval Warfare*

Arleigh Bruke is famous for the following line:  "The difference between a good officer and a poor one, is about ten seconds." What he meant by this is all things being equal, whoever takes the first shot wins.  This is why finding the enemy before he finds you, is of critical importance in Naval Warfare.  

Scouting in Naval Warfare is the only way to give you any sort of advantage over your adversary.  All things being equally, localizing and finding your enemy is the only thing that is really going to give you an advantage in a Naval Engagement.  This is why Fleets fight the way they do with various layers of defence and detection, the most deadly ones being submarines.

Why do you think that every Navy in the World (except us it seems) is aggressively pursuing submarine and sub-surface capabilities?  It's because with the proliferation of satellites, long-range aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, cyber technology, etc. The only real place on the water that a Military Force can actually remain undetected is under the water.  Given the advanced detection capabilities that modern Navies have at their disposal, everyone basically knows where each others surface ships are at all times.  This further erodes the argument that one should disperse ones Naval Forces.  

Given this fact, concentration of force is even more critical today than it was in Arleigh Burke's time.  Scouting is also critical and Canada is making a huge mistake not seriously pursuing a real submarine capability which is the only way we are going to gain any sort of advantage over our adversaries in an actual shooting war.


*So What is the SO WHAT of the Above as it Relates to What You Wrote?*

Your idea that we should tie up a Frigate alongside somewhere and use it to support land forces would be a misuse of that asset.  Blue-Water Ships are at a huge disadvantage in littoral and constrained waters.  They are unable to make full use of their kinetic and non-kinetic sensors and weapons and are at a huge disadvantage against both symmetric and asymmetric threats in that environment.  The old adage, "A ship's a fool to fight a fort" comes to mind.  

If the Canadian Navy wanted to consider getting serious about operations in littorals, it would invest in submarines, marine commando forces, commando support ships, unmanned systems, etc.  Likewise, you would never conduct an amphibious invasion through littoral waters, you would do it from the open ocean with your amphibious forces remaining well offshore until the conditons had been set for them to proceed inland.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> On the other hand past rounds of consolidating units has not been very successful because other than the restructure itself, the reservists at the time saw no meaningful change in the equipment they had or the training they were given.



Well, there was the attraction of going from poorly-resourced infantry battalion to poorly-resourced MLBU.


----------



## Kirkhill

Humphrey Bogart said:


> Forgive me for taking some time to respond to this but there is a lot to unpack here.
> 
> *How do Ships Fight?*
> 
> The first thing I will say is that the worst possible place you could be if you are a Ship is alongside.... Why?  Because Ships defend themselves with Manoeuvre as their first defence.  Only through Manoeuvre is a Ship able to make appropriate use of all of it's Non-Kinetic and Kinetic Effects.  The response or action the Ship will take is dependent on the type of threat:  Air, Surface, Sub-Surface, etc.  When we talk about Surface and Air threats and how Ship's deal with them specifically, what you are describing is what we call Detect to Engage Sequence.  The Detect to Engage Sequence describes the process by which contacts are identified, warned and if necessary, prosecuted.
> 
> The purpose of the Detect to Engage Sequence is to be able to make an early detection and classification of incoming threats and be able to effectively use the appropriate weapon to engage and defend the Ship.  Detect to Engage occurs in 5 Phases, they are:
> 
> Detect
> Localize
> Classify
> Track
> Engage
> 
> These all occur at different ranges from far to near and dependent on where the threat is will influence what system is used.  I can't get in to specifics on this for obvious reasons but in order to effectively defend itself a Ship needs to be able to Manoeuvre.  The reason for this is that the best way to actually defend a Ship from aircraft and missiles is with Soft Kill Systems AKA Chaff, Jamming, etc.  Effectively using the Ship's Soft Kill systems requires you to be able to manoeuvre.  If we are talking about Sub-surface threats, manoeuvre and counter-measures are the only Defence you actually have.
> 
> *Why Ships Must Avoid Littorals and Areas that Restrict Manoeuvre?*
> 
> As far as fighting in the Littorals is concerned, Ship's are at their biggest disadvantage in Littoral waters because it limits their ability to manoeuvre, which limits the ability to bring all their weapons systems to bear and also constrains their ability to actually Mass combat power. Mass is one of two critical elements of Naval Combat and is a key predicator of success.  The other is Scouting, which I will get in to later.
> 
> On the water, everything is open, there is nowhere to hide.  If you can see the enemy, he can also see you.  This is even more prevalent with modern sensors which can detect threats long before a Ship is even in a position to actually effectively engage in a way that guarantees a successful hit.  So how do you gain an advantage?  With numbers of course.  Mass is critical in Naval Combat and it's basically a case of whoever is able to bring the most guns, missiles, torpedoes, etc to the battle wins.  Because Ships are not able to make use of terrain or other features in the defence, it makes no sense to piece meal forces.  When Fleets do actually fight, the best way to guarantee success or at the very least, prevent defeat in detail, is through concentration of force/firepower.
> 
> It was shown over and over again in the Pacific Theatre in WWII that dispersion and piece-mealing of Naval Forces was a surefire way to lose a Naval Battle.  Why?  For one thing, Ship's are a lot harder to sink than we actually think they are.  Secondly, Fleets were being detected well before they ever got the first shot off and Defence is at a huge advantage in Naval Warfare.  Most of the offensive combat power in a Naval Force is actually contained in the Aircraft Carrier or other Capital Ships.  Finding the Carrier was relatively easy, actually getting planes to it was rather hard.  If you showed up to a battle with 1 Carrier and the enemy had 2, it was basically a guarantee that no matter what you did, the enemy fleet would win simply due to math being on their side.  The Carriers would have enough warning from their screening forces of an impending attack that they would be able to get their aircraft in the air and even if you launched the first shot, they would be able to successfully defend themselves and then counter-attack at which point, the math and statistics take over and your forces are attrited at exponentially every successive attack.
> 
> There is no cover or concealment on the water.  If I have 20 guns and you have 10 guns (A 2:1 Advantage) and you point and shoot at 10 targets and in the unlikely event score 10 perfect hits, I still have 10 untouched guns left to return fire with.  Now lets be more realistic and say that only 50% of hits were effective.  You shoot your 10 which is really only 5.  I now have 15 left and shoot my 15 which is really 7 or 8 if I round up, you now have 3 and I have 15 left..... I think you get the drift.
> 
> I've put it in a table for you to illustrate the effect of concentration of force:
> 
> 
> Combat Power = 50% effective HitsAttacking Force (AF) (1:2 ratio)Defending Force (DF) (2:1 ratio)Start of Battle1020AF Attack1015DF Counter Attack215AF Counter Attack214DF Counter Attack014
> 
> Likewise, if the Attacker has a numerical advantage at the commencement of the Battle, the advantage is even more pronounced:
> 
> 
> Combat Power = 50% effective HitsAttacking Force (AF) (2:1 ratio)Defending Force (1:2) ratio)Start of Battle2010AF Attack200DF Counter Attack010
> 
> KevinB's example of the Navy being like the Borg is apt.  Dispersion on the water = death.  If you disperse, you're inviting your fleet to be destroyed in detail.  So if you can't disperse how do you gain an advantage? The answer is Scouting.
> 
> *Scouting is a Critical Component of Naval Warfare*
> 
> Arleigh Bruke is famous for the following line:  "The difference between a good officer and a poor one, is about ten seconds." What he meant by this is all things being equal, whoever takes the first shot wins.  This is why finding the enemy before he finds you, is of critical importance in Naval Warfare.
> 
> Scouting in Naval Warfare is the only way to give you any sort of advantage over your adversary.  All things being equally, localizing and finding your enemy is the only thing that is really going to give you an advantage in a Naval Engagement.  This is why Fleets fight the way they do with various layers of defence and detection, the most deadly ones being submarines.
> 
> Why do you think that every Navy in the World (except us it seems) is aggressively pursuing submarine and sub-surface capabilities?  It's because with the proliferation of satellites, long-range aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, cyber technology, etc. The only real place on the water that a Military Force can actually remain undetected is under the water.  Given the advanced detection capabilities that modern Navies have at their disposal, everyone basically knows where each others surface ships are at all times.  This further erodes the argument that one should disperse ones Naval Forces.
> 
> Given this fact, concentration of force is even more critical today than it was in Arleigh Burke's time.  Scouting is also critical and Canada is making a huge mistake not seriously pursuing a real submarine capability which is the only way we are going to gain any sort of advantage over our adversaries in an actual shooting war.
> 
> 
> *So What is the SO WHAT of the Above as it Relates to What You Wrote?*
> 
> Your idea that we should tie up a Frigate alongside somewhere and use it to support land forces would be a misuse of that asset.  Blue-Water Ships are at a huge disadvantage in littoral and constrained waters.  They are unable to make full use of their kinetic and non-kinetic sensors and weapons and are at a huge disadvantage against both symmetric and asymmetric threats in that environment.  The old adage, "A ship's a fool to fight a fort" comes to mind.
> 
> If the Canadian Navy wanted to consider getting serious about operations in littorals, it would invest in submarines, marine commando forces, commando support ships, unmanned systems, etc.  Likewise, you would never conduct an amphibious invasion through littoral waters, you would do it from the open ocean with your amphibious forces remaining well offshore until the conditons had been set for them to proceed inland.



I agree that tying up a frigate is a misuse of the asset.

I agree that ships need sea room.

I don't want the hull and the bridge.    

I just want the weapons and the sensors, the CIC and the generators.  And I want to hand them off to 4 General Support Regiment so that they can use them ashore.

No more and no less than that.

And I want to be able manage a C-RAM system, similar to the MANTIS, and a scattering of unmanned launchers spread over a 20 km radius from 4 GSRs CIC/TAC/FDC/HQ after the fashion of the NASAMS system.

You can keep your ships at sea.  

All I am asking for is that the army be able to stand in and do the types of things a ship does, or might do.

Shoot down Aircraft
Shoot down Missiles
Shoot down Cruise Missiles
Shoot down helicopters
Shoot down UAS
Blow ships out of the water
Blow boats out of the water
Strike land targets with 70 - 100 km gun fire
Strike land targets at 185 km missile fire

Create an air defence bubble with a 25 to 50 km radius under which friendly forces can manoeuver.

I keep reading that the Army wants to be able to do all those things, and will get around to it some day.  

But the Navy is doing all those things today.  We know how.  We have the systems in place.  We have the weapons in inventory.  The logistics and the command and control are all sorted.

It is out of exasperation that I suggest being a fool and tying up a ship.  Of course that is an idiotic use of a perfectly good ship.  But.  In terms of National Defence that ship tied up would be of more use to the defence of Toronto, or Vancouver, than anything the Army can do.

If you wish me to be less idiotic then the ships can patrol the Georgia Straits and Lake Ontario.  The range of your weapons and sensors will still provide the necessary coverage.  Coverage, again, that the Army can't.

And I consider that inability on the part of the army to be a problem.   A problem that leaves a hole in our national defence, a problem that can be solved and a problem that has a budget to solve it at some point in the future with the purchase of a GBAD system (currently undefined) and a Long Range Precision Fires system (currently undefined).  I am saying that if they were defined in terms of the weapons systems of the 16th and 17th CSCs - without the hulls - drawing from the AEGIS ashore concept - or the Guns of Navarone if you prefer - then we could quickly get 4 General Support Regiment into the GBAD/LRPF game, perhaps integrating something like the NASAMS and MANTIS concepts.

I also happen to think that defining the Area of Operations of a 3 Brigade Army by looking at the area of coverage a Divisional Support Artillery Regiment would be a useful means of defining what other pieces of the puzzle would fit inside that perimeter.  And how an 11 km Howitzer would apply in an area covered by 200 km NSMs and F35s and 70 km gunfire.

Please, by all means, keep your ships at sea, but spare the Army a couple of your Combat Information Centres and a ship load or two of your missiles and launchers.

And may the two of you continue on your merry separate ways, keeping as much distance from the RCAF as possible.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Please, by all means, keep your ships at sea, but spare the Army a couple of your Combat Information Centres and a ship load or two of your missiles and launchers.
> 
> And may the two of you continue on your merry separate ways, keeping as much distance from the RCAF as possible.


There are better systems for coordinating Land power than a CiC Mirror on the ground -- and based on what has been written - the way a ship fights the sea/air battle, is different that fighting a land/air battle.
   I think you are losing some folks by your reliance on the terms - as opposed to the capabilities.

If I am reading you correctly - you want a battlefield management system that can coordinate the fight in the air and land.
    Part of the problem occurs with complex terrain - as well as the number of moving parts.
 It requires an enormous amount of bandwidth to do that on the land - as you have dispersed forces on both sides - when you add more inputs, and more targets/potential targets you have a lot to deal with.

 Part of this is why the US Mil is going to CL/AI for these systems, and the US Army Unified Network program - the other aspect is you can't just use some of the sensor systems that a Ship has on land - as you'd legitimately cook a lot of forces with the output.


----------



## Ostrozac

KevinB said:


> The capability gaps in the CF are not its personnel - but it's equipment.


I would disagree, based on the state of our most critical CSS enablers, A 21st century army that refuses to recruit/train/retain RCEME and Sigs isn’t an army, it’s a CrossFit club with a pile of expensive spare parts. The personnel situation in some of our support trades is dreadful. And these are exactly the same capabilities that also lack reserve depth.


----------



## Ostrozac

dapaterson said:


> Stop recruiting anyone below the age of majority.  If mommy or daddy has to sign for you to enrol, we don't need you.


That is a direct challenge to ROTP and RMC and CMR, which depend on a steady flow of 17 year old High School graduates to fill the rooms. Now, I’m not defending ROTP, but tossing it aside shouldn’t be taken lightly. And it’s not just RMC — some Privates report to St Jean weeks out of school. Refusing to recruit straight out of high school would represent a major shift.


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:


> I would disagree, based on the state of our most critical CSS enablers, A 21st century army that refuses to recruit/train/retain RCEME and Sigs isn’t an army, it’s a CrossFit club with a pile of expensive spare parts. The personnel situation in some of our support trades is dreadful. And these are exactly the same capabilities that also lack reserve depth.


If only we had a pile of spare parts.

😉


----------



## MJP

FJAG said:


> If only we had a pile of spare parts.
> 
> 😉


We have lots of spares parts....the right ones can be a challenge


----------



## KevinB

MJP said:


> We have lots of spares parts....the right ones can be a challenge


You never now when those AVGP parts will come in handy...


----------



## MJP

KevinB said:


> You never now when those AVGP parts will come in handy...


True, although the depots have largely been purged of old(er) fleets spare parts, although surprises do show up. My fav example is there is a part in the depot with a 1956 date on it and is associated with the MLVW fleet.  Likely what has happened is as the replacement vehs have come in over the years, the Supply Manager has just rolled that part into the vehicle's Equipment Registration Number (ERN) without reviewing if that part has had any actual usage.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Humphrey Bogart said:


> Forgive me for taking some time to respond to this but there is a lot to unpack here.
> 
> *How do Ships Fight?*
> 
> The first thing I will say is that the worst possible place you could be if you are a Ship is alongside.... Why?  Because Ships defend themselves with Manoeuvre as their first defence.  Only through Manoeuvre is a Ship able to make appropriate use of all of it's Non-Kinetic and Kinetic Effects.  The response or action the Ship will take is dependent on the type of threat:  Air, Surface, Sub-Surface, etc.  When we talk about Surface and Air threats and how Ship's deal with them specifically, what you are describing is what we call Detect to Engage Sequence.  The Detect to Engage Sequence describes the process by which contacts are identified, warned and if necessary, prosecuted.
> 
> The purpose of the Detect to Engage Sequence is to be able to make an early detection and classification of incoming threats and be able to effectively use the appropriate weapon to engage and defend the Ship.  Detect to Engage occurs in 5 Phases, they are:
> 
> Detect
> Localize
> Classify
> Track
> Engage
> 
> These all occur at different ranges from far to near and dependent on where the threat is will influence what system is used.  I can't get in to specifics on this for obvious reasons but in order to effectively defend itself a Ship needs to be able to Manoeuvre.  The reason for this is that the best way to actually defend a Ship from aircraft and missiles is with Soft Kill Systems AKA Chaff, Jamming, etc.  Effectively using the Ship's Soft Kill systems requires you to be able to manoeuvre.  If we are talking about Sub-surface threats, manoeuvre and counter-measures are the only Defence you actually have.
> 
> *Why Ships Must Avoid Littorals and Areas that Restrict Manoeuvre?*
> 
> As far as fighting in the Littorals is concerned, Ship's are at their biggest disadvantage in Littoral waters because it limits their ability to manoeuvre, which limits the ability to bring all their weapons systems to bear and also constrains their ability to actually Mass combat power. Mass is one of two critical elements of Naval Combat and is a key predicator of success.  The other is Scouting, which I will get in to later.
> 
> On the water, everything is open, there is nowhere to hide.  If you can see the enemy, he can also see you.  This is even more prevalent with modern sensors which can detect threats long before a Ship is even in a position to actually effectively engage in a way that guarantees a successful hit.  So how do you gain an advantage?  With numbers of course.  Mass is critical in Naval Combat and it's basically a case of whoever is able to bring the most guns, missiles, torpedoes, etc to the battle wins.  Because Ships are not able to make use of terrain or other features in the defence, it makes no sense to piece meal forces.  When Fleets do actually fight, the best way to guarantee success or at the very least, prevent defeat in detail, is through concentration of force/firepower.
> 
> It was shown over and over again in the Pacific Theatre in WWII that dispersion and piece-mealing of Naval Forces was a surefire way to lose a Naval Battle.  Why?  For one thing, Ship's are a lot harder to sink than we actually think they are.  Secondly, Fleets were being detected well before they ever got the first shot off and Defence is at a huge advantage in Naval Warfare.  Most of the offensive combat power in a Naval Force is actually contained in the Aircraft Carrier or other Capital Ships.  Finding the Carrier was relatively easy, actually getting planes to it was rather hard.  If you showed up to a battle with 1 Carrier and the enemy had 2, it was basically a guarantee that no matter what you did, the enemy fleet would win simply due to math being on their side.  The Carriers would have enough warning from their screening forces of an impending attack that they would be able to get their aircraft in the air and even if you launched the first shot, they would be able to successfully defend themselves and then counter-attack at which point, the math and statistics take over and your forces are attrited at exponentially every successive attack.
> 
> There is no cover or concealment on the water.  If I have 20 guns and you have 10 guns (A 2:1 Advantage) and you point and shoot at 10 targets and in the unlikely event score 10 perfect hits, I still have 10 untouched guns left to return fire with.  Now lets be more realistic and say that only 50% of hits were effective.  You shoot your 10 which is really only 5.  I now have 15 left and shoot my 15 which is really 7 or 8 if I round up, you now have 3 and I have 15 left..... I think you get the drift.
> 
> I've put it in a table for you to illustrate the effect of concentration of force:
> 
> 
> Combat Power = 50% effective HitsAttacking Force (AF) (1:2 ratio)Defending Force (DF) (2:1 ratio)Start of Battle1020AF Attack1015DF Counter Attack215AF Counter Attack214DF Counter Attack014
> 
> Likewise, if the Attacker has a numerical advantage at the commencement of the Battle, the advantage is even more pronounced:
> 
> 
> Combat Power = 50% effective HitsAttacking Force (AF) (2:1 ratio)Defending Force (1:2) ratio)Start of Battle2010AF Attack200DF Counter Attack010
> 
> KevinB's example of the Navy being like the Borg is apt.  Dispersion on the water = death.  If you disperse, you're inviting your fleet to be destroyed in detail.  So if you can't disperse how do you gain an advantage? The answer is Scouting.
> 
> *Scouting is a Critical Component of Naval Warfare*
> 
> Arleigh Bruke is famous for the following line:  "The difference between a good officer and a poor one, is about ten seconds." What he meant by this is all things being equal, whoever takes the first shot wins.  This is why finding the enemy before he finds you, is of critical importance in Naval Warfare.
> 
> Scouting in Naval Warfare is the only way to give you any sort of advantage over your adversary.  All things being equally, localizing and finding your enemy is the only thing that is really going to give you an advantage in a Naval Engagement.  This is why Fleets fight the way they do with various layers of defence and detection, the most deadly ones being submarines.
> 
> Why do you think that every Navy in the World (except us it seems) is aggressively pursuing submarine and sub-surface capabilities?  It's because with the proliferation of satellites, long-range aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, cyber technology, etc. The only real place on the water that a Military Force can actually remain undetected is under the water.  Given the advanced detection capabilities that modern Navies have at their disposal, everyone basically knows where each others surface ships are at all times.  This further erodes the argument that one should disperse ones Naval Forces.
> 
> Given this fact, concentration of force is even more critical today than it was in Arleigh Burke's time.  Scouting is also critical and Canada is making a huge mistake not seriously pursuing a real submarine capability which is the only way we are going to gain any sort of advantage over our adversaries in an actual shooting war.
> 
> 
> *So What is the SO WHAT of the Above as it Relates to What You Wrote?*
> 
> Your idea that we should tie up a Frigate alongside somewhere and use it to support land forces would be a misuse of that asset.  Blue-Water Ships are at a huge disadvantage in littoral and constrained waters.  They are unable to make full use of their kinetic and non-kinetic sensors and weapons and are at a huge disadvantage against both symmetric and asymmetric threats in that environment.  The old adage, "A ship's a fool to fight a fort" comes to mind.
> 
> If the Canadian Navy wanted to consider getting serious about operations in littorals, it would invest in submarines, marine commando forces, commando support ships, unmanned systems, etc.  Likewise, you would never conduct an amphibious invasion through littoral waters, you would do it from the open ocean with your amphibious forces remaining well offshore until the conditons had been set for them to proceed inland.


Events will interfere with the best laid plans, such as the Falklands whee the ships had to come into restricted waters to perform their tasks.


----------



## Infanteer

Humphrey Bogart said:


> Forgive me for taking some time to respond to this but there is a lot to unpack here.
> 
> *How do Ships Fight?*


You've been reading your Hughes!


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Infanteer said:


> You've been reading your Hughes!


I do own and have read the book.  I've also got some personal experience now doing it. Transiting a place like Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz will give you an appreciation of where you don't want to have to fight a ship.


----------



## Kirkhill

Deep breath.  Reset.

Let's try and keep Humphrey out of Dire Straits.

4th Regiment (General Support) has responsibility for Air Space Coordination, STA Coordination and the development of Ground Based Air Defence.

Its primary purchase to date is the EL/M-2084 Multi Mission Radar, employed as a Medium Range Radar, 10 units, an Israeli ground-based mobile 3D AESA multi-mission radar (MMR) family produced by ELTA, a subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries and supplied by Rheinmetall in Quebec.

Rheinmetall also has experience delivering Skyguard, Skyshield and MANTIS  VSHORAD and C-RAM air defence systems integrating guns and missiles.

I am also aware of the NASAMs system which disperses unmanned palletized pods of missiles up to 25 km from their Fire Direction Centres.

So here is the question:

What would it take to make it possible for 4 Regiment to be able to utilize all of the missiles currently in the Canadian inventory, as well as those anticipated?

The Navy uses ESSM and Harpoon, has used SM2 and is projecting the potential use of SM3/SM6 and Tomahawk as well as the NSM and CAMM.

The Air Force use AIM 9 and AIM 120.   And its aircraft (Hornets and Auroras) are used by other air forces to launch Harpoons.  It also uses the CRV-7 70mm rocket.


And here is the second question:

With the infrastructure in place to launch GBAD missiles from fixed sites (port and airfield defence - sites from which you can not manoeuver away) what would it take to add emplaced Long Range Precision Fires to the capabilities - another capability for which the 4th regiment is purportedly responsible?

If the RCN can defend a location from which it can launch offensive strikes, helicopters, VTOL UASs, and maintain local situation awareness with multiple radars and eo/ir systems, 24/7, with a Company of 204  what would it take for the  Artillery's 4th Regiment to emulate that?



It is my belief that if that set of capabilities could be clarified, defined and vested in the army's structure as a divisional asset then it would clarify the roles of the brigades and the units working for them.   That in turn would set the kit requirements and the PY requirements and then the Reg/Reserve requirements.


I suggest that we start by making the best use of the technologies already available to us.


And, I apologize unreservedly for allowing my temper to get the better of me.    I know enough to know I don't know enough.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

We have not used CRV-7s for decades.


----------



## Kirkhill

SeaKingTacco said:


> We have not used CRV-7s for decades.


Thanks


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Deep breath.  Reset.
> 
> Let's try and keep Humphrey out of Dire Straits.
> 
> 4th Regiment (General Support) has responsibility for Air Space Coordination, STA Coordination and the development of Ground Based Air Defence.
> ...
> 
> So here is the question:
> 
> What would it take to make it possible for 4 Regiment to be able to utilize all of the missiles currently in the Canadian inventory, as well as those anticipated?


Okay. The previous version of 4RCA (GS) (i.e. 4 AD Regt) was responsible for all things AD as a deployable unit. "Development" of GBAD capabilities as in project definition, evaluation selection, procurement etc" are under a number of Agencies in the Army. The centre for expertise in keeping a minor level of currency in the subject stays with the Artillery school at the CTC.

4RCA(GS) is now the unit that operates MMRs for target acquisition, STACCs for STA coordination, BLackjack UAVs and ASCCs for air space coordination. They have no direct role in AD per se at this point. My guess is that once the project gets closer to coming on line, a decision will be made on how to implement it and I'd be surprised if 4RCA(GS) doesn't get a role in that. A lot depends on the scale of the project as we've had AD batteries as parts of RCHA close support regiments in the past, systems with the Res F and elements with 4 AD. 

To answer your question as best as it can be, 4RCA(GS) and the Artillery School are probably the organizations in the Army most capable at this point in time of assisting with the overall implementation of such a program. I have zero idea as to whether the GBAD project has any mandate to work on the integration of the GBAD system with any other system. 

One concern I have for GBAD is that the contemplated budget is between $250 - 499 million which isn't very much for a complex system which is to counter everything from drones to inflight projectiles from both ground and air delivery systems.

So the answer to your question at the end of the day is - sure - , 4RCA(GS), if it becomes the GBAD agency, could integrate other AD systems IF the project specifications require it and the necessary command and control data linkage is part of the SOR and is acquired.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Okay. The previous version of 4RCA (GS) (i.e. 4 AD Regt) was responsible for all things AD as a deployable unit. "Development" of GBAD capabilities as in project definition, evaluation selection, procurement etc" are under a number of Agencies in the Army. The centre for expertise in keeping a minor level of currency in the subject stays with the Artillery school at the CTC.
> 
> 4RCA(GS) is now the unit that operates MMRs for target acquisition, STACCs for STA coordination, BLackjack UAVs and ASCCs for air space coordination. They have no direct role in AD per se at this point. My guess is that once the project gets closer to coming on line, a decision will be made on how to implement it and I'd be surprised if 4RCA(GS) doesn't get a role in that. A lot depends on the scale of the project as we've had AD batteries as parts of RCHA close support regiments in the past, systems with the Res F and elements with 4 AD.
> 
> To answer your question as best as it can be, 4RCA(GS) and the Artillery School are probably the organizations in the Army most capable at this point in time of assisting with the overall implementation of such a program. I have zero idea as to whether the GBAD project has any mandate to work on the integration of the GBAD system with any other system.
> 
> One concern I have for GBAD is that the contemplated budget is between $250 - 499 million which isn't very much for a complex system which is to counter everything from drones to inflight projectiles from both ground and air delivery systems.
> 
> So the answer to your question at the end of the day is - sure - , 4RCA(GS), if it becomes the GBAD agency, could integrate other AD systems IF the project specifications require it and the necessary command and control data linkage is part of the SOR and is acquired.
> 
> 🍻


Curious...is there some kind of logical/technical cut-off point between where a counter UAV/VSHORAD system could be integrated directly into an infantry battalion/armoured squadron and when it needs to be split off into a dedicated AD Battery?  Does it depend on range bands for aerospace control?  Method of detection used (e.g. if a radar system is used), etc.?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Curious...is there some kind of logical/technical cut-off point between where a counter UAV/VSHORAD system could be integrated directly into an infantry battalion/armoured squadron and when it needs to be split off into a dedicated AD Battery?  Does it depend on range bands for aerospace control?  Method of detection used (e.g. if a radar system is used), etc.?



Given that some types of anti-drone defences can be deployed by 12 gauge shotgun, I'd say you could integrate such technology anywhere. I'm just slightly disappointed that this one isn't connected to the Cyberdyne Corporation  :

SKYNET Drone Defense​Regular price$ 27.00









						SKYNET Drone Defense
					

The Skynet Drone Defense system is designed to down a drone that could be interfering with police investigations. Using 12 gauge rounds as the delivery system, the shells separate into tethered pieces after firing them. As these parts separate and extend outward, a web is created that is 5' in...




					www.maverickdrone.com


----------



## Kirkhill

And once again it is all about the Aussies.



> LAND 19 Phase 7B will deliver the Army-operated component of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defence (JIAMD) capability.
> 
> This project will replace the current Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) capability, including the RBS-70, as the Army's principal air defence weapon. While the Phase 7B solution will be able to operate independently, it will be designed to operate as a subset of the broader JIAMD capability and has a key project interdependency with the Joint Battle Management System to be delivered by project AIR 6500.
> 
> The project scope includes acquisition of new capability elements including radars, missile launchers and command & control systems, as well as integration with existing Army vehicles and radios.








						Short Range Ground Based Air Defence | Sectors | Defence
					

CASG Project Short Range Ground Based Air Defence, Land 19 Phase 7B




					www1.defence.gov.au
				








__





						Australian Government to procure short-range air defence capability
					

The Australian Government has revealed plans to procure short-range air defence (SHORAD) capability to enhance troop safety.




					www.army-technology.com
				












						Australia to produce its own guided missiles as part of billion-dollar defence manufacturing plan
					

Australia will move to produce its own guided missiles under a $1 billion plan to establish a new weapons facility with a global arms manufacturer.




					www.abc.net.au
				












						Raytheon Australia
					

Capability Partner for Australia's Defence.




					www.raytheon.com
				





2.5 BAUSD investment

NASAMs SHORAD system with AIM-120s and AIM-9xs.

Joint Integration with the Air Force and the Navy

Building their own guided missiles








Apparently?  Seeking correction.

2 Batteries of 3 Troops - 6 Troops total

Each Troop to comprise 1 Fire Direction Centre, 1 AESA radar, 1 EO/IR vehicle and 3 or more emplaced Multi Missile Launchers or Hawkei roving launchers - equipped with AMRAAMs or Sidewinders.

Other countries are backing into the system in small investments buying troop sets without the missiles for less than 100 MUSD.  Others are buying the radars separately.

In Poland's case they have also adapted the NASAMs C4ISR system to mount a couple of NSM firing Coastal Defence squadrons.














						null
					

null




					www.defence24.com


----------



## Kirkhill

The Dutch, who also use the NASAMs system, operate Patriot batteries as well as mobile very short range air defence based on 4 Stingers mounted on their Fennek scout car.


----------



## Kirkhill

__





						How a magic box and a new radar delivered a coalition air picture | Canadian Army Today
					






					canadianarmytoday.com
				






> The MRR brings together what were previously separate air defence and surveillance target acquisition functions in one platform. It was initially intended to detect and locate sources of indirect fire such as rocket propelled grenades, mortars and other munitions that were fired at bases in Afghanistan. But in air defence mode, it can identify friend or foe targets such as aircraft at great distance.






> Blindback is one of the Air Force’s foremost authorities on Link networks and had volunteered for the exercise when he heard planners needed tactical datalink specialists. He immediately recognized that communicating was going to be a challenge. Though the Alaska NORAD Region (ANR) had communications infrastructure and command and control systems to support the exercise, there was no Link 16 network to connect the MRR in the field to the exercise command centre. However, though the radar troop and Marines would be dispersed and “in the boonies” during the exercise, they could receive a cellphone signal.
> 
> *The radar troop, based at 5th Canadian Division Support Base Gagetown, N.B., made a pitstop at Best Buy before heading north and bought a 4G modem puck and a sim card. When they plugged it into the spoke kit in the back of their Bison, “boom, we had connectivity,” said Blindback. “*We were able to create a computer network and configured the system to pass Link 16 data over the computer network rather than over radio frequency.”
> 
> 
> The significance of that became apparent as radios and other equipment used by various Marine, U.S. Army and National Guard units froze or otherwise experienced firmware failures in the frigid conditions. *The spoke kit not only connected the MRR to the exercise command, it also provided the air picture to the Canadian and Alaskan regional NORAD command centres and the national chains of command, including Canadian Joint Operations Command in Ottawa.*


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Curious...is there some kind of logical/technical cut-off point between where a counter UAV/VSHORAD system could be integrated directly into an infantry battalion/armoured squadron and when it needs to be split off into a dedicated AD Battery?  Does it depend on range bands for aerospace control?  Method of detection used (e.g. if a radar system is used), etc.?


You'd need someone with a lot more technical expertise in data and communication systems to answer that one but linking two or more highly secure and highly specialized C3 system isn't done without a lot of planning and specialized gear and processes. I doubt very much as to whether we have anything in the works that would link Navy and Army systems as suggested here.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> You'd need someone with a lot more technical expertise in data and communication systems to answer that one but linking two or more highly secure and highly specialized C3 system isn't done without a lot of planning and specialized gear and processes. I doubt very much as to whether we have anything in the works that would link Navy and Army systems as suggested here.
> 
> 🍻



I wonder what we would need to do to get an invite into this place?  We used to be on friendly terms.









						Raytheon Australia
					

Capability Partner for Australia's Defence.




					www.raytheon.com
				









						AIR6500 Joint Battle Management and Integrated Air and Missile Defence System – Industry Capability Network
					






					icn.org.au
				






> The Royal Australian Air Force’s vision is to transform into a fully networked 5th generation force able to prevail against increasingly complex and lethal threats. Key to this vision is Project AIR 6500, a Joint Air Battle Management System (JABMS) that will interconnect the many disparate platforms, systems and sensors across the air, land, sea, space, electromagnetic and cyber domains into a collaborative environment that provides shared situational awareness of the battlespace and the ability to rapidly plan responses to threats. This JABMS will coordinate and synchronise ADF operations, including the tracking and engagement of forces with an Area of Operations. The JABMS will be deployable in addition to supporting Australian-based capabilities.
> 
> The ADF’s existing air defence systems will be upgraded or replaced by Project AIR 6500.


----------



## Kirkhill

Lockheed, Northrop shortlisted for Australian Air Battle Management System
					

Defence Minister Peter Dutton and Minister for Defence Industry Melissa Price made the joint announcement on Aug. 5.




					www.defensenews.com


----------



## SeaKingTacco

FJAG said:


> You'd need someone with a lot more technical expertise in data and communication systems to answer that one but linking two or more highly secure and highly specialized C3 system isn't done without a lot of planning and specialized gear and processes. I doubt very much as to whether we have anything in the works that would link Navy and Army systems as suggested here.
> 
> 🍻


Link 16?


----------



## Kirkhill

Or other means?



> The Army’s medium range radar certainly fit the bill as a niche capability. The MRR brings together what were previously separate air defence and surveillance target acquisition functions in one platform. It was initially intended to detect and locate sources of indirect fire such as rocket propelled grenades, mortars and other munitions that were fired at bases in Afghanistan. But in air defence mode, it can identify friend or foe targets such as aircraft at great distance.
> 
> Working alongside the Marines from the back of a LAV II Bison, the radar troop tracked live rocket rounds, accurately identifying the launch and impact points to within a diameter of 60 and 20 metres, respectively. The MRR also supported Special Forces operating at considerable distance, providing accurate location information of their two Chinook helicopters to the Marine Corps commander on the ground.
> 
> “One of the biggest things we offered was greater command situational awareness for assets operating in the area of operations, whether that was fixed-wing or rotary-wing assets,” said Lieutenant Travis Fryxell, an artillery officer with the 4th Artillery Regiment (GS).
> 
> That the MRR was able to share its air picture was due in no small measure to a little-known RCAF spoke kit, so-called because of its hub and spoke architecture. The magic box, as others quickly dubbed it, “allows you to get that communications infrastructure, no matter where you are in the world, as long as you have some basic rules,” explained Sergeant Tim Blindback, a Joint Interface Control Officer with 21 Aerospace Control and Warning Squadron at 22 Wing North Bay, Ont., the Canadian Air Defence Sector for NORAD.
> 
> “The box allows you to plug in a cell phone and as long as you have internet connectivity in any way, shape or form, you can get a good, secure connection back to home base and out into the world.”
> 
> Blindback is one of the Air Force’s foremost authorities on Link networks and had volunteered for the exercise when he heard planners needed tactical datalink specialists. He immediately recognized that communicating was going to be a challenge. Though the Alaska NORAD Region (ANR) had communications infrastructure and command and control systems to support the exercise, there was no Link 16 network to connect the MRR in the field to the exercise command centre. However, though the radar troop and Marines would be dispersed and “in the boonies” during the exercise, they could receive a cellphone signal.
> 
> The radar troop, based at 5th Canadian Division Support Base Gagetown, N.B., made a pitstop at Best Buy before heading north and bought a 4G modem puck and a sim card. When they plugged it into the spoke kit in the back of their Bison, “boom, we had connectivity,” said Blindback. “We were able to create a computer network and configured the system to pass Link 16 data over the computer network rather than over radio frequency.”
> 
> The significance of that became apparent as radios and other equipment used by various Marine, U.S. Army and National Guard units froze or otherwise experienced firmware failures in the frigid conditions. The spoke kit not only connected the MRR to the exercise command, it also provided the air picture to the Canadian and Alaskan regional NORAD command centres and the national chains of command, including Canadian Joint Operations Command in Ottawa.
> 
> “That was huge because we did not have that capability before,” said Marshall. “[The Link and MRR teams] were the star of the show. They got to do a lot more than we expected, even with the grand scale of this exercise.”
> 
> Getting two systems to share data might not seem that remarkable. But “having it actually communicate with NORAD, because of the encryption and all the different computer systems and software languages, was a marvel,” said Fryxell.
> 
> No one had ever envisioned deploying the spoke kit – two heavy servers in a large Pelican case – in the back of an armoured vehicle, admitted Blindback. Though it was “overkill” for the purposes of Arctic Edge, it was a creative solution and an example of how to “make the best use of what you have at the time.
> 
> “It was designed to support forward deployments in other countries, like standing up a headquarters,” he explained. “It was meant to serve every possible network need that you might require. We only wanted connectivity to one network. But we saw the opportunity and we happened to have one for use. It took a lot of work to get it into place, but it worked out really well.”
> 
> For Blindback’s 22 Wing team, which was co-located with the exercise headquarters and served as the bridge to the MRR troop in the field, being able to provide the HQ staff with a complete air picture, including blue force tracking, and facilitate text messaging and basic chat over a secure connection, was gratifying.
> 
> “The Americans were ecstatic. They were able to look at the Ex staff and say, ‘We have active TDLs (tactical datalinks) in the field.’ That was something they weren’t able to accomplish domestically because of those problems with the equipment failures,” he said. “It gave the Ex the only TDL component that it would have had otherwise, and it proved Canada can show up and get stuff done.”







__





						How a magic box and a new radar delivered a coalition air picture | Canadian Army Today
					






					canadianarmytoday.com


----------



## blacktriangle

Kirkhill said:


> Or other means?


It sounds like it was still Link 16 data being passed, just via a different transmission medium. JREAP perhaps? Dunno.


----------



## Kirkhill

blacktriangle said:


> It sounds like it was still Link 16 data being passed, just via a different transmission medium. JREAP perhaps? Dunno.


I think you're right.  But it is nothing that I understand.  On the other had there is apparently as Sergeant in North Bay that does.


----------



## Kirkhill

OK - so this should probably be in the GBAD section but Force 2025 seems to be all consuming.

Norway - NASAMs GBAD  - built by Kongsberg

The Norwegian structure seems to be based on a mobile emplaced Battery with a CTOC.  The components are pallet mounted and transported by truck or helicopter to the Defended Locality for emplacement

The Battery has four troops each controlled by a 2 man Fire Direction Centre.  Under command are 2 automated radar units, an EO/IR spotter and 3 Muli Missile Launchers each capable of launching 6 AMRAAMs, ESSMs or Sidewinders.

The Dutch bought 2 single troop batteries each with a single CTOC, FDC, EO/IR and Radar and 3 MMLs launching AIM-120 AMRAAMS-  They paid 60 MUSD for the two troops.

The Indonesians also bought the same configuration as the Dutch and paid 77 MUSD.  They also paid an additional 95 MUSD for 36 AIM-120 C-7 AMRAAMs.



On the more mobile front the Germans procured a Light Anti-Aircraft System based on their Wiesel/Ozelot tankette.

They purchased 7 Battery CPs, 7 single Wiesel vehicles in total and 10 platoon sets.

Each Platoon set is commanded by one Wiesel CP with a Commander, Radar Operator and Driver and a Radar and EO/IR system. Typically each platoon consists of a CP and 5 Wiesels with 4 ready to launch Stingers and an EO/IR sight. 

The system can operate independently or netted.

The Greeks bought the system and mounted it on 16 HMMVWs with each vehicle incorporating a radar, EO/IR and ready to launch missiles.

The Finns also bought the system mounting it in 54 containers that can be carried on UniMog 5000s.

The system has also been proposed for mounting in Boxers with newer missiles and radars  as well as in navalized containers for use at sea.


For close in, emplaced defence, or C-RAM (Counter Rocket Artillery and Missiles) Rheinmetall offers the MANTIS system.

The German Army purchased two MANTIS sets with training, manuals and ammunition for 144.2 MEUR.  Each set consists of a 2 man Fire Direction Centre, two automated EO/IR-Radar Sensor Packages, and 6 35mm Millenium AHEAD guns.  All components are pallet mounted and transportable by truck, in transport aircraft or under MH/HH helicopters.

The US adopted their navy's Phalanx CIWS as the basis of their C-RAM program and have modified it with SeaRAM missiles, lasers and specialized 20mm ammunition.

Canada's GBAD intent​Funding Range​$250 million to $499 million
Anticipated Timeline (Fiscal Year)​
*2019/2020* Start Options Analysis
*2020/2021* Start Definition
*2023/2024* Start Implementation
*2026/2027* Initial Delivery
*2029/2030* Final Delivery









						LeFlaSys (ASRAD) Short-Range Air Defence System
					

The ASRAD-R export version of the LeFlaSys SHORAD missile system. The LeFlaSys light mechanised SHORAD (short-range air defence system) has been developed for the German Army by STN ATLAS Elektronik GmbH (now Rheinmetall Defence Electronics) in Bremen and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) in Kassel...




					www.army-technology.com
				












						Hensoldt, Rheinmetall and Diehl bid for future Germany air defence system
					

Rheinmetall Electronics, Diehl Defence and Hensoldt Sensors will bid for the future German short-range and very short-range air defence system.




					www.army-technology.com
				












						National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS)
					

The National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) is a medium-range, network-centric air defence system designed and developed jointly by Raytheon and Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, primarily for the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF). The system can be deployed to identify, engage and...




					www.airforce-technology.com
				












						Kongsberg wins contract to supply NASAMS components to Australia
					

Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace has received a contract from Raytheon Australia to supply National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) components.




					www.army-technology.com
				












						NSM Coastal Defence contract valued at NOK 1,3 Billions with Poland - KONGSBERG
					






					www.kongsberg.com
				





One common architecture linking C-RAM, SHORAD, V-SHORAD (Mobile) and Long Range Precision Fires (NSM - Sea and Land Attack) with elements drawn from air force, navy and artillery and variously employed depending on how the services are organized nationally.

The German MANTIS system was bought by the Army and then transferred to the Air Force two years later.


----------



## Kirkhill

Based on the above Force 2030

500 MCAD

100 MCAD for a 6 Gun C-RAM troop
100 MCAD for a 3 launcher NASAMs troop
??? MCAD for a Wiesel/Ozelot VSHORAD (Air Mobile) troop/platoon

Opening Bid

3x NASAMs Troops armed from existing weapons stocks with ESSMs, AMRAAMs and Sidewinders
1x C-RAM Troop

Base Battery for expeditionary force

1x 6 vehicle VSHORAD Troop with Stingers.

Force 2035

2nd Battery

Plus LAV6.0 based VSHORAD system.


Still sticking with AT over AD for Force 2025


----------



## CBH99

The reason I asked to hear the thoughts of the folks on this forum about “If we could only get either AT or AD in place soon, which one would you choose and why?” was because for myself - I’m quite torn.  

And everybody has good points on this.  Neither side has any faults.  

On the one hand, a modern ATGM system would be fairly easy to absorb into the arsenal.  Training would be pretty straightforward, simulators would be fairly affordable and easy to implement, and it could be purchased/acquired in a timely manner.  (In theory, anyway…ahem…)

It would give the Army a real punch it doesn’t currently have, making our Army units far more lethal in a pretty cost effective manner.  

(Aren’t there guided munitions for the 84mm now, in the most recent versions of both the ammo and the Carl G?  Is that possibly an option?)




On the other hand, I’m inclined to agree with Kevin - if the enemy controls the skies above us, we can’t do anything - we can’t move, we can’t emit any electronic signatures at all, we can’t communicate, and the enemy can pick off what they want at their own will.  

Having some form of AD system would allow our Army units to do their thing, while taking out the enemy’s ability to do anything other than the same.  

Just look at the Ukrainian experience against Russia’s modernized warfare.  Their troops couldn’t even use their radios without a barrage of artillery landing on them soon afterwards.  And without being able to hide or maneuver freely, the Russians were able to employ some devastating EW capabilities against them.  


In terms of purchasing a system that could be implemented by 2025 (essentially 3 years time) - there are options for both.  

Could we go through the entire procurement process for a sophisticated, layered AD system…have it purchased…manufactured for us…delivered to us…have troops trained and proficient with it at all levels… in that time period?  

I don’t think we could, especially at the pace we do things.  

Could we purchase a modern, capable MANPAD system that would allow units to engage drones, helicopters, low flying planes, etc?  

Yes, I think we could.  The process would be extremely similar to buying the ATGM.  



Overall, I’m inclined to agree with KevinB (and whoever else went with the AD option, I’ll catch up on reading this week.)

I go this route _assuming_ quite a few things however:

- that we will be operating in a coalition environment, where a sophisticated AD network is already in place.

- even if it isn’t in place at the time hostilities start, it will very much be a top priority and I imagine will be set up fairly early on in any campaign.  

- Coalition air assets will be engaging enemy aircraft.  Just in terms of sheer numbers & modern technology, coalition air forces would be clearing the skies of enemy combat aircraft in short order.  

- I see far more potential for conflict with China than I do with Russia.  

Unlike western politicians who are only focused on winning the next election, talking their way out of scandals, their approval ratings, and pondering “Just how woke do I have to pretend to be?” - Putin is a very smart man, who concerns himself with morr important matters.  He is, quite noticeably, one of the smartest people in any debate or any conference.  Because if this, I see war fairly unlikely, minus the odd land grab like they did in Ukraine.  

I don’t have the same confidence in President Xi.  


Happy Monday guys!  Start the week off strong 🍻


----------



## KevinB

The main reason I said AD - was ATGM's can be done easily when the immediate need jumps up to bite like a snake -- AD take a lot more time and effort to get right - and requires JOINT integration to do properly -- ATGM are an Army only issue - unless the AirForce it putting some on an Attack Helicopter - oh wait...

I see China as the main deference need at this point.  SO my main focuses would be Navy #1, I say that as it pains me as an Army centric guy - but the best bang for the buck comes in Sea Power at this point - then a Joint Expeditionary Capability.
   Maybe I'll call it the JERC - Joint Expeditionary/Reactionary Capability.
 That requires a Joint Approach - as the Army can't do anything if it can't get there and be supported, and the Air Force can't do anything if it can't get there and be supported.
 Really only there Navy has a solo role - but also a supporting role to ferry the Joint Forces, and provide support.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The main reason I said AD - was ATGM's can be done easily when the immediate need jumps up to bite like a snake -- AD take a lot more time and effort to get right - and requires JOINT integration to do properly -- ATGM are an Army only issue - unless the AirForce it putting some on an Attack Helicopter - oh wait...
> 
> I see China as the main deference need at this point.  SO my main focuses would be Navy #1, I say that as it pains me as an Army centric guy - but the best bang for the buck comes in Sea Power at this point - then a Joint Expeditionary Capability.
> Maybe I'll call it the JERC - Joint Expeditionary/Reactionary Capability.
> That requires a Joint Approach - as the Army can't do anything if it can't get there and be supported, and the Air Force can't do anything if it can't get there and be supported.
> Really only there Navy has a solo role - but also a supporting role to ferry the Joint Forces, and provide support.



I can agree with everything you said there.  I just can't see anything being done to make the CAF battle-ready for the Pacific before 2025.

With the exception of continuing the current policy of attaching Halifax frigates to American (or is that AUKUS?) battle groups.

And frankly I don't expect to be seeing reports of Canadians fighting Chinese tanks any time soon.  Now, Russian tanks in Latvia?  Different story.
And ATGMs in the hands of infanteers would be quick and good and relatively cheap.   If we're serious about supporting the Eastern Europeans with tanks and LAVs then we should start shipping them soon - with lots of ATGMs.  And start placing orders now for AD systems, new guns, Long Range Missiles, N-LOS systems and UAVs - with Initial Operating Capacities five years from now - ca 2027.

And our Air Force?  Well I wonder how the Aussies would feel about us flying their F-18s in defence of Australia?


----------



## KevinB

Ideally no one would be fighting Chinese or Russian tanks, I do think Russia is fairly well deterred in Europe that the underequiped Can Army isn't in dire need of ATGM's, nor do I think China is going to punch out immediately either -- both those countries are cause for concern - and both need to be addressed by a robust Defense (and for Canada Defence) Policy - and a wholistic look at the needs versus wants.

With any luck  you guys will have a new Party and new leader in place tonight - or Force 20XX can BOHICA for the JT show.


----------



## FJAG

I've stayed out of the AT v AD battle because it's kind of like asking you to choose which of your children you want to kill. They're both essential.

I tend to favour going for AD first for two reasons.

First, like Kevin says, its a harder weapon system to develop into an integrated functioning capability for the same reasons he states; and

Second, a brief exposure to modern warfare showed in the Ukraine that most kills were indirect fire strikes brought in by airborne sensors and in Armenia, by loitering munitions also coupled with airborne sensors. In both cases those took place long before the armoured forces made contact (if at all)

In short it seems a capability to wipe out airborne sensors and incoming munitions is paramount if you wish to survive long enough to even use your AT resources.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I've stayed out of the AT v AD battle because it's kind of like asking you to choose which of your children you want to kill. They're both essential.
> 
> I tend to favour going for AD first for two reasons.
> 
> First, like Kevin says, its a harder weapon system to develop into an integrated functioning capability for the same reasons he states; and
> 
> Second, a brief exposure to modern warfare showed in the Ukraine that most kills were indirect fire strikes brought in by airborne sensors and in Armenia, by loitering munitions also coupled with airborne sensors. In both cases those took place long before the armoured forces made contact (if at all)
> 
> *In short it seems a capability to wipe out airborne sensors and incoming munitions is paramount if you wish to survive long enough to even use your AT resources.*
> 
> 🍻



Kind of like WW2 then?

Good thing we we're quick on the uptake after that AAR


----------



## CBH99

The reason I asked to hear the thoughts of the folks on this forum about “If we could only get either AT or AD in place soon, which one would you choose and why?” was because for myself - I’m quite torn.  

And everybody has good points on this.  Neither side has any faults.  

On the one hand, a modern ATGM system would be fairly easy to absorb into the arsenal.  Training would be pretty straightforward, simulators would be fairly affordable and easy to implement, and it could be purchased/acquired in a timely manner.  (In theory, anyway…ahem…)

It would give the Army a real punch it doesn’t currently have, making our Army units far more lethal in a pretty cost effective manner.  

(Aren’t there guided munitions for the 84mm now, in the most recent versions of both the ammo and the Carl G?  Is that possibly an option?)




On the other hand, I’m inclined to agree with Kevin - if the enemy controls the skies above us, we can’t do anything - we can’t move, we can’t emit any electronic signatures at all, we can’t communicate, and the enemy can pick off what they want at their own will.  

Having some form of AD system would allow our Army units to do their thing, while taking out the enemy’s ability to do anything other than the same.  

Just look at the Ukrainian experience against Russia’s modernized warfare.  Their troops couldn’t even use their radios without a barrage of artillery landing on them soon afterwards.  And without being able to hide or maneuver freely, the Russians were able to employ some devastating EW capabilities against them.  


In terms of purchasing a system that could be implemented by 2025 (essentially 3 years time) - there are options for both.  

Could we go through the entire procurement process for a sophisticated, layered AD system…have it purchased…manufactured for us…delivered to us…have troops trained and proficient with it at all levels… in that time period?  

I don’t think we could, especially at the pace we do things.  

Could we purchase a modern, capable MANPAD system that would allow units to engage drones, helicopters, low flying planes, etc?  

Yes, I think we could.  The process would be extremely similar to buying the ATGM.  



Overall, I’m inclined to agree with KevinB (and whoever else went with the AD option, I’ll catch up on reading this week.)

I go this route _assuming_ that we will be operating in a coalition environment, where a sophisticated AD network is already in place.  Even if it isn’t in place at the time hostilities start, it will very much be a top priority and I imagine will be set up fairly early on in any campaign.  

Coalition air assets will be engaging enemy aircraft.  Just in terms of sheer numbers & modern technology, coalition air forces would be clearing the skies of enemy combat aircraft in short order.  

Nothing like having the largest & most advanced - BY FAR - Air Force in the world on our side.  And the second largest ‘Air Force’ is actually just the air arm of the world’s largest navy, again on our side 


If I had to choose between the two, I would go with the AD option.  The Air Force will be fighting the glorious fight up there in their fast jets, trying to gain air superiority.  

However, we only have to look at the recent conflict with Armenia to see just how deadly both a sophisticated and non-sophisticated enemy could be with a few handful of cheaply produced drones.  The army needs a way to defend against those. 

0.02


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> The reason I asked to hear the thoughts of the folks on this forum about “If we could only get either AT or AD in place soon, which one would you choose and why?” was because for myself - I’m quite torn.
> 
> And everybody has good points on this.  Neither side has any faults.
> 
> On the one hand, a modern ATGM system would be fairly easy to absorb into the arsenal.  Training would be pretty straightforward, simulators would be fairly affordable and easy to implement, and it could be purchased/acquired in a timely manner.  (In theory, anyway…ahem…)
> 
> It would give the Army a real punch it doesn’t currently have, making our Army units far more lethal in a pretty cost effective manner.
> 
> (Aren’t there guided munitions for the 84mm now, in the most recent versions of both the ammo and the Carl G?  Is that possibly an option?)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On the other hand, I’m inclined to agree with Kevin - if the enemy controls the skies above us, we can’t do anything - we can’t move, we can’t emit any electronic signatures at all, we can’t communicate, and the enemy can pick off what they want at their own will.
> 
> Having some form of AD system would allow our Army units to do their thing, while taking out the enemy’s ability to do anything other than the same.
> 
> Just look at the Ukrainian experience against Russia’s modernized warfare.  Their troops couldn’t even use their radios without a barrage of artillery landing on them soon afterwards.  And without being able to hide or maneuver freely, the Russians were able to employ some devastating EW capabilities against them.
> 
> 
> In terms of purchasing a system that could be implemented by 2025 (essentially 3 years time) - there are options for both.
> 
> Could we go through the entire procurement process for a sophisticated, layered AD system…have it purchased…manufactured for us…delivered to us…have troops trained and proficient with it at all levels… in that time period?
> 
> I don’t think we could, especially at the pace we do things.
> 
> Could we purchase a modern, capable MANPAD system that would allow units to engage drones, helicopters, low flying planes, etc?
> 
> Yes, I think we could.  The process would be extremely similar to buying the ATGM.
> 
> 
> 
> Overall, I’m inclined to agree with KevinB (and whoever else went with the AD option, I’ll catch up on reading this week.)
> 
> I go this route _assuming_ that we will be operating in a coalition environment, where a sophisticated AD network is already in place.  Even if it isn’t in place at the time hostilities start, it will very much be a top priority and I imagine will be set up fairly early on in any campaign.
> 
> Coalition air assets will be engaging enemy aircraft.  Just in terms of sheer numbers & modern technology, coalition air forces would be clearing the skies of enemy combat aircraft in short order.
> 
> Nothing like having the largest & most advanced - BY FAR - Air Force in the world on our side.  And the second largest ‘Air Force’ is actually just the air arm of the world’s largest navy, again on our side
> 
> 
> If I had to choose between the two, I would go with the AD option.  The Air Force will be fighting the glorious fight up there in their fast jets, trying to gain air superiority.
> 
> However, we only have to look at the recent conflict with Armenia to see just how deadly both a sophisticated and non-sophisticated enemy could be with a few handful of cheaply produced drones.  The army needs a way to defend against those.
> 
> 0.02



Well, if we issued these we could do both


----------



## KevinB

FWIW I don't view a handheld ATGM or MANPAD as part of a network system -- they are not linked -- they are just individual enhancements.
   Loiter Munitions or remote systems are perfect for the network approach.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Well, if we issued these we could do both









Would targeting be an issue?


----------



## Kirkhill

Is there much of a distinction to be made among Ground Launched Cruise Missiles, Loitering Munitions, "Loyal Wingmen", "Predators" and UAVs generally?  Aren't they all UAVs? Projectiles? Bullets?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Kirkhill said:


> Would targeting be an issue?


The tiny UAV's would best be done with ECM means and shotgun.

With the money the CAF hands back every year, we could have a standing requirement approved to use surplus funds to buy X number of AT systems (pick one system as a "Interim system") every year for 5-7 years and build up a stock of missile and launchers. At the same time build up our AD systems and networks, with monies properly identified and funded.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> The tiny UAV's would best be done with ECM means and shotgun.
> 
> With the money the CAF hands back every year, we could have a standing requirement approved to use surplus funds to buy X number of AT systems (pick one system as a "Interim system") every year for 5-7 years and build up a stock of missile and launchers. At the same time build up our AD systems and networks, with monies properly identified and funded.


Great idea. Go one step further.  Any spare money should be spent on munitions, consumables and spare parts for inventory.


----------



## FJAG

Colin Parkinson said:


> The tiny UAV's would best be done with ECM means and shotgun.
> 
> With the money the CAF hands back every year, we could have a standing requirement approved to use surplus funds to buy X number of AT systems (pick one system as a "Interim system") every year for 5-7 years and build up a stock of missile and launchers. At the same time build up our AD systems and networks, with monies properly identified and funded.


I'm actually putting my money on directed energy systems and ECM jamming in combination. Small light-weight UAVs have very little "armour" and can easily be put down once targeted. What I don't want to see is a $500,000 missile used to knock down a $500 easily replaceable or swarming drone. Even a $1,000  35 or 40 mm airburst round is uneconomical if a burst of a dozen or so are fired at a target if an energy pulse could do it.

A system of systems to deal with varying threats is the way to go.

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

That level of ECM equipment would be a platoon asset, not a AD asset. Likely directed energy and larger ECM units will be part of a combined Arty/Sig troop


----------



## Kirkhill

But what if your Black Hornet camera has got a 20 km field of vision with High Definition Imagery.

Will you see that observer if it is sitting on a wall observing you from 15 miles away?  And if you do observe the observer would the platoon be issued with a device with a 15 mile range?  What other electronic systems are operating within that range that might be friendly?  Directed Energy doesn't follow a ballistic curve and tends to spread a bit.


----------



## CBH99

Colin Parkinson said:


> The tiny UAV's would best be done with ECM means and shotgun.
> 
> With the money the CAF hands back every year, we could have a standing requirement approved to use surplus funds to buy X number of AT systems (pick one system as a "Interim system") every year for 5-7 years and build up a stock of missile and launchers. At the same time build up our AD systems and networks, with monies properly identified and funded.


_Not trying to derail the thread with this, even though it clearly belongs in another thread_. I will elaborate in the appropriate thread. 



Just to touch on this though…

I know the CAF can’t spend more than X number of dollars without the appropriate process from Treasury Board.  Does anybody have current info on what that number is?

Could they CAF not use those funds to buy spare parts, simulators, ammunition, forward that money to help fund other projects, etc - if they did it in increments just under that amount?  

Or, like suggested, have approval to use those funds to purchase ammunition, spare parts, and various other small but important items if need be?


----------



## dangerboy

CBH99 said:


> I know the CAF can’t spend more than X number of dollars without the appropriate process from Treasury Board.  Does anybody have current info on what that number is?


This might not be current and overly simplistic but there are votes given to DND based on our annual estimates from parliament. The votes that impact procurement most commonly are Vote 1 and Vote 5:

Vote 1 (O&M/NP)
•    No specific external project approval constrains the Department's authority to expend Vote 1 funds
•    Special review process for Vote 1 procurement over $30M
•    Internal Departmental approval controls exist (NPOC)
Vote 5 (Capital) Project Approval
•    Minister ( $30M )
•    Treasury Board ( > $30M )
•    Cabinet/Treasury Board ( High Dollar Value ($100M), High Risk or Profile )
•    Internal Departmental approval controls exist such as Program Management Board (PMB)

Someone else will need to give more info.


----------



## suffolkowner

CBH99 said:


> _Not trying to derail the thread with this, even though it clearly belongs in another thread_. I will elaborate in the appropriate thread.
> 
> 
> 
> Just to touch on this though…
> 
> I know the CAF can’t spend more than X number of dollars without the appropriate process from Treasury Board.  Does anybody have current info on what that number is?
> 
> Could they CAF not use those funds to buy spare parts, simulators, ammunition, forward that money to help fund other projects, etc - if they did it in increments just under that amount?
> 
> Or, like suggested, have approval to use those funds to purchase ammunition, spare parts, and various other small but important items if need be?


In the private world you get fired for this, dont ask me how I know😇


----------



## dapaterson

Departments are assessed on their ability to deliver projects, using a tool called the OPCMA, with a rating from 0 (incompetent) to 4 (walks on water).  Much like a Fort Frontenac "A", the 4 exists but is never awarded.

Every project is assessed using a tool called the PCRA, which also assigns a score of 0-4.  If the PCRA is at it below the department's OPCMA, the Minister can normally approve the project.

Procurement within the project is subject to the dollar values previously mentioned, but also subject to other policies such as the Common Service Policy, things like the GoC policy on clothing procurement, munitions supply program etc etc

(DND also has two additional votes, 10 and 15, but they are special purpose and rarely seen outside NDHQ.)


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:


> DND also has two additional votes, 10 and 15, but they are special purpose and rarely seen outside NDHQ.


But every SFCB mission wants vote 10 to give/buy the host nation the tools/eqpt we use because that is what we teach them to use.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Have a policy to allow DND to draft TB personal from ADM down to fill out AT teams and AD teams in event of an emergency. In which case the TB people might actually start thinking about end result vs policy. I have my own version of Dante's Hell for TB staff. Most of our problems in government stem from them.


----------



## dapaterson

I have had few problems with TBS staff; lots of problem with CAF and departmental staff not bothering to understand what they need to do, and complaining that their indifferent efforts were not rewarded.


----------



## KevinB

So looking at your election results last night, I hereby move to rename the thread Farce 2025, as the rust out continues.
   Unless you can find a way to get glossy selfies of JT displayed prominently on new equipment, that are green and have no cost, to get support from the collaborators.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> So looking at your election results last night, I hereby move to rename the thread Farce 2025, as the rust out continues.
> Unless you can find a way to get glossy selfies of JT displayed prominently on new equipment, that are green and have no cost, to get support from the collaborators.



Even worse, because it turned out pretty much status quo but now everyone really dislikes each other even more, the lack of decisive actions and deferred leadership on important files will probably accrue exponentially.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> So looking at your election results last night, I hereby move to rename the thread Farce 2025, as the rust out continues.
> Unless you can find a way to get glossy selfies of JT displayed prominently on new equipment, that are green and have no cost, to get support from the collaborators.


We will just tell him they are green.  And since a lot of them are green, dumb dumb won’t know the difference when he shows up for selfies.  Boom!  Genius!  🤯

Tell him that the company that made them had to invest an equal amount into Canada, so they are free.  Not only free, but that return investment created thousands of jobs which means more money coming into government.  

“Justin, I think such great decisions from you actually DESERVE a selfie…get in there!”


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> We will just tell him they are green.  And since a lot of them are green, dumb dumb won’t know the difference when he shows up for selfies.  Boom!  Genius!  🤯
> 
> Tell him that the company that made them had to invest an equal amount into Canada, so they are free.  Not only free, but that return investment created thousands of jobs which means more money coming into government.
> 
> “Justin, I think such great decisions from you actually DESERVE a selfie…get in there!”


I have a solution based on that.

   Have the US DoD offer the Bradley - but a Canadian variant (no changes) and call it the Justin.
    When the ATGM rack deploys it can drop a picture of a JT Selfie.

 Next Up the Trudeau class SSN - call the first one Pierre - and let JT envision a family dynasty...


----------



## OldSolduer

KevinB said:


> So looking at your election results last night, I hereby move to rename the thread Farce 2025, as the rust out continues.
> Unless you can find a way to get glossy selfies of JT displayed prominently on new equipment, that are green and have no cost, to get support from the collaborators.


IMO the CAF will further erode and rust. To pay for the pandemic, DND budget will be cut. The CAF will be lucky to purchase a rowboat.


----------



## KevinB

OldSolduer said:


> IMO the CAF will further erode and rust. To pay for the pandemic, DND budget will be cut. The CAF will be lucky to purchase a rowboat.


What will the fallout be for a CCF cracking up at Sea, or a Hornet dropping out of the Air?
     - those rowboats may be useful.
For nothing else you can row across the lakes and come and stay at my house...


----------



## OldSolduer

KevinB said:


> What will the fallout be for a CCF cracking up at Sea, or a Hornet dropping out of the Air?
> - those rowboats may be useful.
> For nothing else you can row across the lakes and come and stay at my house...


The Lake it is said never gives up her dead when the gales of November come early....

Rowboats wouldn't be useful


----------



## CBH99

OldSolduer said:


> The Lake it is said never gives up her dead when the gales of November come early....
> 
> Rowboats wouldn't be useful


I for one am happy ‘The Lake’ doesn’t give up her dead every November.  I don’t want a bunch of bodies floating around everywhere, and Halloween is over by then.  

I really do enjoy the prairies ☺️🤷🏼‍♂️




KevinB said:


> I have a solution based on that.
> 
> Have the US DoD offer the Bradley - but a Canadian variant (no changes) and call it the Justin.
> When the ATGM rack deploys it can drop a picture of a JT Selfie.
> 
> Next Up the Trudeau class SSN - call the first one Pierre - and let JT envision a family dynasty...


I think you may be onto something.

Call them “Civilian Protection Vehices” that carry civilians in dangerous areas to safety. They get into the armoured vehicles for their own protection, and driven away from danger.  

The gun on top is to protect them as they are whisked away.  

And those aren’t ATGM racks silly, they fire small Canadian-built drones that fly ahead to make sure we rescue an equal number of people to ensure nobody is offended, there aren’t any dangers to the local environment.  

Have them made in the US instead of Canada?  Even better!  Jobs are bullshit anyway.  



If that doesn’t get us a seat next to Senegal at the UN Security Council, nothing will.  

Guys?  I think we’re onto something…


----------



## ballz

CBH99 said:


> _Not trying to derail the thread with this, even though it clearly belongs in another thread_. I will elaborate in the appropriate thread.
> 
> 
> 
> Just to touch on this though…
> 
> I know the CAF can’t spend more than X number of dollars without the appropriate process from Treasury Board.  Does anybody have current info on what that number is?
> 
> Could they CAF not use those funds to buy spare parts, simulators, ammunition, forward that money to help fund other projects, etc - if they did it in increments just under that amount?
> 
> Or, like suggested, have approval to use those funds to purchase ammunition, spare parts, and various other small but important items if need be?



I understand that most people don't understand why we can't use "surplus" funds, so let me explain....

People think of our budgets as cash, but they are not. The DND does not receive $20 billion in cash at the start of the year, and then physically hand back the $1 billion that is leftover.

Our budgets are simply how much you are allowed to spend within a given time period. The government holds onto as little cash & cash equivalents as possible at any given time. For example, at end of FY19, the government had $49.5 billion in cash and cash equivilants... and that includes all of our accounts receivable (things we've invoiced for but have not received payment for yet... for example, outstanding tax bills).

With $49.5 billion in cash holdings across the entire Federal government on 31 March 2019, it then approved, as part of the budget, spending of $355.6 billion dollars. It doesn't go out and borrow to bring it up to $355.6 billion in cash holdings on 1 April 2019..... it borrows it as required to keep interest costs down. This is basic corporate cashflow management 101, practiced by practically every corporation, which keeps the cost of borrowing as low as possible.... never hold onto more cash than you need.

Obviously revenues matter and cut down on how much you have to borrow.... if your revenues are outpacing your expenditures, then you don't end up borrowing anything.

So bottom line, don't think of the DND's budget as physical cash that is handed back in at the end of the year... it's not.


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> I for one am happy ‘The Lake’ doesn’t give up her dead every November. I don’t want a bunch of bodies floating around everywhere, and Halloween is over by then.
> 
> I really do enjoy the prairies ☺️🤷🏼‍♂️



I loved my time in Manitoba but enjoyed moving to southwest Ontario even more, especially living on Lake Erie. 

That thing about boaters floating around everywhere is a thing though.

🚣‍♂️


----------



## CBH99

ballz said:


> I understand that most people don't understand why we can't use "surplus" funds, so let me explain....
> 
> People think of our budgets as cash, but they are not. The DND does not receive $20 billion in cash at the start of the year, and then physically hand back the $1 billion that is leftover.
> 
> Our budgets are simply how much you are allowed to spend within a given time period. The government holds onto as little cash & cash equivalents as possible at any given time. For example, at end of FY19, the government had $49.5 billion in cash and cash equivilants... and that includes all of our accounts receivable (things we've invoiced for but have not received payment for yet... for example, outstanding tax bills).
> 
> With $49.5 billion in cash holdings across the entire Federal government on 31 March 2019, it then approved, as part of the budget, spending of $355.6 billion dollars. It doesn't go out and borrow to bring it up to $355.6 billion in cash holdings on 1 April 2019..... it borrows it as required to keep interest costs down. This is basic corporate cashflow management 101, practiced by practically every corporation, which keeps the cost of borrowing as low as possible.... never hold onto more cash than you need.
> 
> Obviously revenues matter and cut down on how much you have to borrow.... if your revenues are outpacing your expenditures, then you don't end up borrowing anything.
> 
> So bottom line, don't think of the DND's budget as physical cash that is handed back in at the end of the year... it's not.


That was actually incredibly informative, helps me to understand the situation very differently.  Thanks for posting that


----------



## GR66

In Volume 19.1 of the Canadian Army Journal, Lt Col Cole F. Peterson lays out his argument for an asymmetrical Brigade structure for Force 2025.
It contains lots of detail and discussion of how his proposal would work and meet the SSE requirements of the Government.  The basic force structure can be found on Pg. 54.  There are definitely similarities between his proposal and those by various members on this forum.  

I would propose a couple of modifications which are intended to achieve the following objectives:

1) Increase the combat power of the "Heavy" Brigade
2) Correct the over abundance of Recce Squadrons in the Army
3) Introduce a Cavalry capability to the Army in addition to the existing Armoured/Infantry structure
4) Improve the ability of the Reserve Infantry to both augment Reg Force Infantry units and to generate units for mobilization.

All of these modifications are interrelated in my proposal.

a) Adjust the structure of the Mechanized Infantry Battalions in the (Heavy) Armoured Brigade Group so that each Battalion has double the number of LAVs than in the existing structure.  At a Platoon level here's how the new structure would look in comparison to the existing structure:

- The LAVs would have permanent manning separate from the 10-soldier dismounted section.  This would allow the 2 x LAVs per section to each carry 5 dismounts with room to spare in the back for extra attachments (Medics, FOOs, Interpreters, etc., or extra weapons/equipment such as ATGMs, MANPADS, mini-Drones, microwave counter-UAV devices, etc.).

This change could be handled in a number of ways organizationally.   The Mech Infantry Section could be increased from 10 to 16 troops to cover the two vehicle crews; the LAVs could be grouped into separate "Carrier" Companies within the Battalion Structure; or you could completely separate the dismounts from the vehicle crews by having two Mechanized Battalions (LAV crews only) and two separate Infantry Battalions in the Armoured Brigade Group.

Doubling up on the number of LAVs for the Armoured Brigade Infantry Battalions would allow you to increase the combat strength of the dismounted infantry by 21% (10 dismounts per section rather than 7) and double your mounted fire support for the Battalion.  It would also mean that the Reg Force Light Infantry Battalions as well as Reserve Infantry Regiments could augment/replace the Reg Force Mechanized Infantry dismounted sections without any training delta.  All dismounted infantry units (Reg Force Mechanized, Reg Force Light and Reserve Force Light) could all be trained and organized identically for dismounted operations (including a full 7-soldier Weapons Detachment for Mech Infantry Platoons).

b)  In order to both make up for the loss of Infantry troops and LAVs to the beefed up Armoured Brigade Mech Infantry Battalions as well as addressing the over abundance of Armoured Recce Squadrons in the Armoured Regiments, the three Mech Infantry Brigades in the (Medium) Mechanized Brigade Group would be converted to 3 x Cavalry Regiments each with 2 x Armoured Recce Squadrons and 2 x Mechanized Infantry Companies (using the traditional LAV Infantry Company structure).  Each of the Heavy and Medium Brigades would maintain a single Armoured Recce Squadron as a Brigade-level asset.

The proposed revised force structure would look like this:


All of this can be done without the addition of any new equipment.  Just the shifting of existing personnel and equipment between units.

Going forward, the addition of new equipment would be used to evolve the new structure.  Man-portable systems would make our dismounted infantry more effective.  Vehicle-mounted support weapons (ATGMs, AGLs, LAV-based mortar-systems, etc.) would provide extra intimate fire support for our dismounted Mech Infantry and the Cavalry Regiments could add ATGMs, Loitering Munitions, UAV Launchers, etc. to become "Sense and Strike" Regiments.

For the Reserves we could convert some of the existing Regiments into Carrier Battalions to mirror the Armoured Brigade Carrier Battalions.  We could equip these with All-Terrain Tracked Carriers like the BvS10 or Bronco.  These vehicles have room for 2 crew and a full 10-soldier dismounted section so we could have deployable Reserve Mechanized Battalions with only 1/2 the total number of vehicles required as the LAV carrier battalions.

If we ever do purchase heavier IFVs or HAPCs for the Reg Force we could fairly easily integrate these into the Armoured Brigade Carrier Battalions.  It's just a vehicle swap.  The dismounted infantry elements would see no change.  The surplus LAVs could then be shifted to the Reserve Carrier Battalions making them more effective.


----------



## Dale Denton

Fantastic and well-articulated proposal GR66.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> - The LAVs would have permanent manning separate from the 10-soldier dismounted section.  This would allow the 2 x LAVs per section to each carry 5 dismounts with room to spare in the back for extra attachments (Medics, FOOs, Interpreters, etc., or extra weapons/equipment such as ATGMs, MANPADS, mini-Drones, microwave counter-UAV devices, etc.).


I would suggest 4 pers 
  Historically most soldiers/leaders can only look after 3 additional people in stress environments.   It increases with experience of the soldiers under command, but rifle sections are generally not filled with 10+ year troops.
 This has been borne out by a lot of study at various levels of training/experience.

    Plus when you start adding stuff to the LAV - room becomes a premium, and I would gladly sacrifice a rifleman to make room for other enablers.

 4 Also works for a lot of other vehicles - and if you really want - you can push the section size to 12 with 3x 4 man bricks - 
   Which then admittedly requires a slew of LAV's


----------



## FJAG

Okay, I'll play devil's advocate. 

The suggested format essentially almost doubles the number of LAVs in a rifle company with a significant supply and maintenance burden. I sometimes marvel at how the Russians manage to have a platoon operate out of three BMPs/BTRs. They do this by reducing the platoon to a total of thirty with ten per vehicle.

In that respect then a Cdn/US platoon already exceeds the combat power of a Russian platoon by 10-15% for manpower and 30% in APCs.

Maybe we should go in a different direction. 

I won't advocate for a three-vehicle platoon but do wonder as to whether we need ten or even eight or nine dismounts per section. Maybe we can reduce the actual "section" to a four man brick and maybe take up two more GIB seats with weapon specialists/enablers: GPMG, Javelin, drone operator, CarlG/grenade launcher/mortarman, what have you. A platoon would then have: four three-man crewed LAVs and dismounts of a three-man platoon command element; three four-man "sections"; and four two-man weapon specialist/enabler teams - all for a total of 23 dismounts but with a stronger emphasis on working around the support weapons and LAV support rather than the rifles. The pl comd controls the bricks, the WO the weapons/enablers.

That gives each LAV a total of 8 (for the pl comd veh) or 9 (for each sect carrier) which leaves a little extra room for a ride along or ammo.

IMHO - save the extra LAVs and create another battalion with them.

Same for the medium LAV brigade/battalion.

For light battalions I would stay with a two brick, nine-man section and concentrate the specialist weapons/enablers at the platoon level divided between the pl comds veh and a separate weapons carrier (The extra brick compensates for the lack of the LAV support).

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Okay, I'll play devil's advocate.
> 
> The suggested format essentially almost doubles the number of LAVs in a rifle company with a significant supply and maintenance burden. I sometimes marvel at how the Russians manage to have a platoon operate out of three BMPs/BTRs. They do this by reducing the platoon to a total of thirty with ten per vehicle.
> 
> In that respect then a Cdn/US platoon already exceeds the combat power of a Russian platoon by 10-15% for manpower and 30% in APCs.
> 
> Maybe we should go in a different direction.
> 
> I won't advocate for a three-vehicle platoon but do wonder as to whether we need ten or even eight or nine dismounts per section. Maybe we can reduce the actual "section" to a four man brick and maybe take up two more GIB seats with weapon specialists/enablers: GPMG, Javelin, drone operator, CarlG/grenade launcher/mortarman, what have you. A platoon would then have: four three-man crewed LAVs and dismounts of a three-man platoon command element; three four-man "sections"; and four two-man weapon specialist/enabler teams - all for a total of 23 dismounts but with a stronger emphasis on working around the support weapons and LAV support rather than the rifles. The pl comd controls the bricks, the WO the weapons/enablers.
> 
> That gives each LAV a total of 8 (for the pl comd veh) or 9 (for each sect carrier) which leaves a little extra room for a ride along or ammo.
> 
> IMHO - save the extra LAVs and create another battalion with them.
> 
> Same for the medium LAV brigade/battalion.
> 
> For light battalions I would stay with a two brick, nine-man section and concentrate the specialist weapons/enablers at the platoon level divided between the pl comds veh and a separate weapons carrier (The extra brick compensates for the lack of the LAV support).
> 
> 🍻



After one or two decent contacts you'd have no one to run the vehicles because: Infantry Casualty Rates.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> After one or two decent contacts you'd have no one to run the vehicles because: Infantry Casualty Rates.



Face it.  After one or two decent contacts we'd have no infantry at all because: Infantry Casualty Rates.

We don't have a wartime army.  And we're not likely to get one.  We might get a home defence one and perhaps a diplomatic corps one.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Okay, I'll play devil's advocate.


I will too 

As soon as you dismount or need to operate in areas that are not suitable for LAV's, then the 'walking rifle' force becomes significantly more important - this is the main reason why I don't like tying Infantry to a vehicle - any vehicle.
  I think that anyone can be a GiB - the vehicle crew no so much - I'm not sure that is an Infantry role - but whomever does it, needs to be familiar with Infantry, and not thinking they are a solo Cavalryman/Armored entity as soon as they drop the ramp.

But I think everyone is missing the point when just looking at Infantry Casualty Rates - the bigger issue logistically will be Vehicle Casualty Rates - and what that does for the force.  That was the main reason for my thought on over supply of LAV's.
  The loss of a LAV in my enormously large LAV Platoon only removes 1/8th of the LAV firepower and 1/8th of the space.

I don't think the LAV is a very survivable vehicle in a Mid-High Intensity Battlefield - better than a 113 sure, but folks will be "lobbing" stuff designed to take out a MBT - and any ATGM will gut a LAV like a fish.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> *I don't think the LAV is a very survivable vehicle in a Mid-High Intensity Battlefield* - better than a 113 sure, but folks will be "lobbing" stuff designed to take out a MBT - and any ATGM will gut a LAV like a fish.



Agreed.

And if vehicles like that have to be deployed in such conflicts then that means the Infantry will have to operate in a dismounted role more frequently to clear, protect, pathfind, assault etc. as the LAV is no Bradley or Marder.

And that means, probably, a higher Infantry casualty rate.

Being an 'emotionally intelligent' kind of guy, I wonder what would happen if we got the spreadsheets out on this one?


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Okay, I'll play devil's advocate.
> 
> The suggested format essentially almost doubles the number of LAVs in a rifle company with a significant supply and maintenance burden. I sometimes marvel at how the Russians manage to have a platoon operate out of three BMPs/BTRs. They do this by reducing the platoon to a total of thirty with ten per vehicle.
> 
> In that respect then a Cdn/US platoon already exceeds the combat power of a Russian platoon by 10-15% for manpower and 30% in APCs.
> 
> Maybe we should go in a different direction.
> 
> I won't advocate for a three-vehicle platoon but do wonder as to whether we need ten or even eight or nine dismounts per section. Maybe we can reduce the actual "section" to a four man brick and maybe take up two more GIB seats with weapon specialists/enablers: GPMG, Javelin, drone operator, CarlG/grenade launcher/mortarman, what have you. A platoon would then have: four three-man crewed LAVs and dismounts of a three-man platoon command element; three four-man "sections"; and four two-man weapon specialist/enabler teams - all for a total of 23 dismounts but with a stronger emphasis on working around the support weapons and LAV support rather than the rifles. The pl comd controls the bricks, the WO the weapons/enablers.
> 
> That gives each LAV a total of 8 (for the pl comd veh) or 9 (for each sect carrier) which leaves a little extra room for a ride along or ammo.
> 
> IMHO - save the extra LAVs and create another battalion with them.
> 
> Same for the medium LAV brigade/battalion.
> 
> For light battalions I would stay with a two brick, nine-man section and concentrate the specialist weapons/enablers at the platoon level divided between the pl comds veh and a separate weapons carrier (The extra brick compensates for the lack of the LAV support).
> 
> 🍻


I specifically chose to not detail how the 10-soldier section was made up because I think that is a whole separate argument. 

I think where you and I differ is not on the need for Heavy forces but on how we believe they will be used.  I get the strong impression from your posts that you are envisioning maneuver warfare like we were preparing for during the Cold War, while I believe it will be more like Fallujah, Marawi or Grozny. 

Tanks are absolutely key for both but for urban combat protected mobility and lots of boots on the ground are also key.  100% agree that the LAV is not a great vehicle for that environment, but it's what we have now so we need to make the best use of it we can.  Vehicle losses will be high so we will need lots of LAVs supporting the inventory to be able to maintain that protected mobility.  Once your mobility is stripped away the opportunity to maneuver within an urban environment is lost (as well as the ability to counter enemy maneuvers). 

Lots of boots on the ground are also needed in cities as casualties will be high.  People smarter than me can figure out exactly how those seats in the back of the LAVs (and hopefully eventually HAPCs) are organized and what they are armed with, but in my opinion the more seats available and filled, the better chances we'll have.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> I specifically chose to not detail how the 10-soldier section was made up because I think that is a whole separate argument.


Even the # is an argument 



GR66 said:


> I think where you and I differ is not on the need for Heavy forces but on how we believe they will be used.  I get the strong impression from your posts that you are envisioning maneuver warfare like we were preparing for during the Cold War, while I believe it will be more like Fallujah, Marawi or Grozny.


 Only folks with overwhelming artillery and AirPower are going to want to fight in the open - I hate to say it, but the US MDO shift to complex terrain and dispersed operations, is admission that in some theaters will will not have that advantage - hence the city defender - and subterranean operations aspects.


GR66 said:


> Tanks are absolutely key for both but for urban combat protected mobility and lots of boots on the ground are also key.  100% agree that the LAV is not a great vehicle for that environment, but it's what we have now so we need to make the best use of it we can.  Vehicle losses will be high so we will need lots of LAVs supporting the inventory to be able to maintain that protected mobility.  Once your mobility is stripped away the opportunity to maneuver within an urban environment is lost (as well as the ability to counter enemy maneuvers).


    I'm less enamored with tanks after seeing them in Iraq - I could do a lot more for the $ in an urban defensive setting without tanks, but I agree armor is still needed if for nothing else but the potential to counter attack.



GR66 said:


> Lots of boots on the ground are also needed in cities as casualties will be high.  People smarter than me can figure out exactly how those seats in the back of the LAVs (and hopefully eventually HAPCs) are organized and what they are armed with, but in my opinion the more seats available and filled, the better chances we'll have.


 I'm significantly less sure of that these days than I once was.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Even the # is an argument



The US Marines are going to a 15 pax squad. 12-15 is a good number IMHO...



Type: Marine Infantry Platoon
Origin: U.S. Marine Corps (United States)
Personnel: 1 Officer and 47 Enlisted and 1-3 Usual Enlisted Attachments
→ Platoon Headquarters (1 Officer and 2 Enlisted + 1-3 Attachments)

1× Platoon Commander, Second Lieutenant or First Lieutenant (OF-1), armed with 1 M27 IAR
1× Platoon Sergeant, Staff Sergeant (OR-6), armed with 1 M27 IAR
1× Radiotelephone Operator (RTO), Lance Corporal (OR-3), armed with 1 M27 IAR
1-3× Corpsmen*, Hospitalman or Petty Officer, armed with 1 M27 IAR
* Corpsmen are a U.S. Navy sailor attached to the rifle platoons as combat medics.
→ 3× Rifle Squads (15 Enlisted Each)

1× Squad Leader*, Sergeant (OR-5), armed with 1 M27 IAR
1× Assistant Squad Leader, Corporal (OR-4), armed with 1 M27 IAR
1× Squad Systems Operator, Lance Corporal (OR-3), armed with 1 M27 IAR

3× Fire Teams
1× Team Leader, Corporal (OR-4), armed with 1 M27 IAR
1× Automatic Rifleman, Lance Corporal (OR-3), armed with 1 M27 IAR
1× Grenadier, Lance Corporal (OR-3), armed with 1 M27 IAR and 1 M320 40mm grenade launcher (standalone)
1× Rifleman, Lance Corporal (OR-3)
One fire team's Rifleman will be armed with an M38 SDMR
One fire team's Rifleman will be armed with an M27 IAR and M3E1 MAAWS (Carl Gustaf)
One fire team's Rifleman will be armed with an M27 IAR


* The most senior squad leader acts as assistant platoon sergeant. Under the TO&E the platoon guide takes on this role, although in reality the dedicated platoon guide role is not often used.









						U.S. Marine Rifle Platoon (2020s)
					

The planned layout of the USMC Rifle Platoon for the 2020s.




					www.battleorder.org


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I specifically chose to not detail how the 10-soldier section was made up because I think that is a whole separate argument.
> 
> I think where you and I differ is not on the need for Heavy forces but on how we believe they will be used.  I get the strong impression from your posts that you are envisioning maneuver warfare like we were preparing for during the Cold War, while I believe it will be more like Fallujah, Marawi or Grozny.


Yes and no. I do see combined arms units as the most complex organization for the most complex environment. Accordingly, since I believe one should equip and train for the most complex and then everything else is easier. So in that respect Cold War-yes. But our Cold War Army was tanks and non fightable M113s filled with bayonets. I do see the LAV as a firepower contributor while recognizing its not a tank-level IFV. It does have a strong gun (could be stronger) and I think it should have bolt on anti-armour missiles.

My difference is in the reduction of the size of bayonets with an increase of enablers (who in a pinch can be co-opted into bayonets if that's what's needed). So in that respect - Cold War - no.

I see the increase in organic infantry in the mix within the combined arms battalion by way of a ratio of two infantry companies to one tank battalion (which incidentally allows Canada to form a three-combined arms battalion brigade within existing resources.)


GR66 said:


> Tanks are absolutely key for both but for urban combat protected mobility and lots of boots on the ground are also key.  100% agree that the LAV is not a great vehicle for that environment, but it's what we have now so we need to make the best use of it we can.  Vehicle losses will be high so we will need lots of LAVs supporting the inventory to be able to maintain that protected mobility.  Once your mobility is stripped away the opportunity to maneuver within an urban environment is lost (as well as the ability to counter enemy maneuvers).


In a situation where even more infantry beyond what the combined arms battalion has is essential, then either a light or medium battalion or companies thereof can be added to the mix. Recall, I favour Canada having a brigade of each: light, medium and heavy with additional Res F infantry.

Where my Cold-War bias really stands out is that I'm a firm believer that for just about everything, a battalion is needed to work as an entity within a brigade group framework. I absolutely abhor the concept of our current mix and match battlegroups which we slap together for deployments and where we consider armoured regiments and artillery regiments solely as force generators and not as force employers.

I firmly believe this concept as set out in FM 3-96 re Brigade Combat Teams:


> Brigade combat teams (BCTs) organize to conduct decisive action—the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authorities tasks (ADP 3-0). BCTs are the Army’s primary combined arms, close combat force.


One can add or subtract elements to a BCT but inherently the BCT is a balanced force with all requisite elements needed for combat and sustainment. So are our brigade groups. We do not have organic battle groups. We assemble them from scratch but it is a rare situation where a battle group is capable of decisive action. We used to know that during the Cold War. Battle groups were generally the temporary attachment of an infantry company or tank squadron cross attached to an armoured regiment or infantry battalion for a specific task or mission but not a wholesale creation of a mini-1/3rd-brigade designed for independent operations.

IMHO Army transformation and Afghanistan taught us many bad lessons that we need to unlearn even if there are finacial constraints.



GR66 said:


> Lots of boots on the ground are also needed in cities as casualties will be high.  People smarter than me can figure out exactly how those seats in the back of the LAVs (and hopefully eventually HAPCs) are organized and what they are armed with, but in my opinion the more seats available and filled, the better chances we'll have.


True enough although I think one needs to have a general understanding of what you want your force to be configured as at a standard. Modifications are inevitable.

Space in and on a LAV is limited and there needs to be a balance of people and weapon reloads. I spent my "armoured" time in M113s with generally five man crews which left plenty of space for other stuff including luxuries. That was also in the days of our tiny 64 pattern webbing and no vests so we reveled in space. LAV 6.0s not so much. Reducing a LAV to 4 + 2 dismounts does leave some room for expendables but still not much. And yes, I am considering LOBs and casualties but I'd still rather take those 12 extra LAVs per company and form additional companies and battalions out of them. I think that it provides more options and flexibility.


🍻


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> The US Marines are going to a 15 pax squad. 12-15 is a good number IMHO...


I wonder how much of that has to do with the AAVP holding 21 dismounts.

By the time you take the 50 man platoons and the Coy HQ and weapons platoon you are getting close to a 200 man rifle company. (all run by a captain)

I betcha Marines and the Army debate this a lot.


----------



## Kirkhill

Just a reminder on the Map we are looking at.

Position:  CFS Alert
Reference: North Pole

Distance from Forward Edge of Battle Area at North Pole - 845 km or about 20 mins by F35 at full speed. a lot less by hypersonic missile.

Russian Sector -  Left of Arc 9 0'Clock, Right of Arc 3 O'Clock
NATO Sector from 3 0'clock to 9 O'Clock

Left Flank - NORAD 9 O'Clock to 6 O'Clock
Right Flank - Nordic Defence 6 O'Clock to 3 O'Clock

Canada's Sector - 6 O'Clock to 8 O'Clock

Points of dispute

Donut Hole
Lomontsov Ridge
Bering Sea
Northwest Passage

Canada's Strategic Position

Right Hand Marker for the Indo-Pacific Theatre - terminating at the North Pole
Left Hand Marker for the European Theatre - terminating at the North Pole
Centre for the Arctic Theatre - facing Russia
First Line of Defence for the US Homeland


Right Flank (Nordics)   - 230 Fighters being modernized with 143 F-35s
Left Flank (Alaska)  2 Squadrons of F22 with E-3 AWACs and 2 Squadrons of F35s

Right Flank (Nordics) -  GBAD - 1x Patriot and 3x NASAMS systems
Left Flank (Alaska) - GBAD - ABM at Fort Greely (Enhanced by USN systems afloat)

Right Flank (Nordics) - 10x Brigade Groups
Left Flank (Alaska) - 3x BCT (1 Abn, 1 Stryker, 1 NG) - Being formed into a Division and reequipped for Arctic Operations - highly air mobile
In Support (Just South of the 49th) - 7th Inf Div (3x SBCT (1 NG)) 10th Mtn Div (2x Lt Inf) - both also highly air mobile

Canada

3x CBG, no GBAD and 94 F18s.

And the UK CDS

 Gen. Sir Nick Carter said Britain would also like to "co-operate in terms of helping Canada do *what Canada needs to do as an Arctic country*."

If we're not doing what the Brits, the Americans, the Danes, the Norwegians, Swedes and Finns think we need to do then they will do it for us.

Buy their lawn mowers or have them cut the grass and send us the bill.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> If we're not doing what the Brits, the Americans, the Danes, the Norwegians, Swedes and Finns think we need to do then they will do it for us.
> 
> Buy their lawn mowers or have them cut the grass and send us the bill.


Eventually the guy mowing the lawn moves into the house - as he notices it's fairly empty...


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I wonder how much of that has to do with the AAVP holding 21 dismounts.
> 
> By the time you take the 50 man platoons and the Coy HQ and weapons platoon you are getting close to a 200 man rifle company. (all run by a captain)
> 
> I betcha Marines and the Army debate this a lot.



Once upon a time I was a Captain in charge of a 200 man (with females attached sometimes) company, from time to time. At the ripe old age of between 25 - 28 years.

It worked great. Mainly because I believe that those who put me in the job had the confidence that I could do it, and I had the right support from a great CSM, Pl Comds, CQMS etc etc


----------



## Blackadder1916

FJAG said:


> I wonder how much of that has to do with the AAVP holding 21 dismounts.



While there may have been some consideration about AAVP size, amtracs are not organic to Marine infantry battalions; they are organized in separate Assault Amphibious Battalions.  A company from an AABn can provide the lift for an infantry battalion.  As well, while the AAVP is still in service and will probably remain for some years, its already selected replacement is a wheeled vehicle that has a much reduced capacity.

It's been over 40 years since I had the displeasure of bobbing around in high surf in an amtrac (Ex Kernal Potlach 1979 - 3 VP).  After the first time, when over half of us (Pioneer Pl and a sect from 1 CER crammed into one trac) got sea sick (once puking started, it was contagious), I snagged scopolamine from the sick bay and gave everyone a shot before the next time we played "The Longest Day".  It was thus an uneventful trip to the beach.


----------



## Kirkhill

Just a couple of other points

The Canadian Arc subtends 52W and 142W - 90 degrees.  6 time zones.   That is about half of the NATO sector in the Arctic.

1 CBG in Edmonton is responsible for the arc from 142W at the Alaskan Border to the Lakehead at 89W - 43 degrees.  3 Time Zones.  Half the Canadian sector.  One Quarter of the NATO sector. 25%.   The only road to the Arctic is a seasonal one the terminates at the extreme western edge of the Canadian sector at 68N.   2500 km short of CFS Alert.

2 CBG in Petawawa is responsible for the arc from the Lakehead at 89W to the Ontario-Quebec border at 79W - 10 degrees.  1 Time Zone. One Ninth of the Canadian sector.  5% of the NATO sector.  Their access to the Arctic terminates at James Bay - 51 N.  Edmonton is north of 53 N.

5 CBG in Valcartier is responsible for the arc from the Ontario-Quebec border at 79W to Cape Spear at 52W - 37 degrees - 2-1/2 Time Zones.  One third of the Canadian sector. 15% of the NATO sector. Their access to the Arctic terminates at the seasonal Trans-Taiga road at 55N.  Fort McMurray is at 57N.

Alert is at 82N.

It is 100 km from Denmark (Greenland)
700 km from the Thule Airbase
800 km from the North Pole
1200 km from Norway (Svalbard)
1800 km from Russia (Franz Josef Land)

4300 km from Trenton

2500 km from the Border shared by Russia, Finland, Sweden and Norway.  -  4 to 5 hours by CC-130,  2 to 3 hours by C-17.  8 hours or so by CH-47 unloaded, ferry range.


----------



## Kirkhill

CC-130s, A-400s, CH-147s, F-35s, Patriots, NASAMs, LRPFs.  Manportable weapons. Bv206s / BvS10.  Lt Helicopters.


----------



## Kirkhill

Three U.S. and British Submarines Meet at the North Pole
					

Two American submarines and one British boat gathered near the North Pole in mid-March 2018 for one of the biggest Arctic undersea exercises in decades. ICEX 2018, the 27th in a series of roughly biennial exercises dating back to 1959, kicked off in early March, when aircraft from the Alaska...




					warisboring.com
				






> Three U.S. and British Submarines Meet at the North Pole​ICEX 2018 involved live torpedo-firing​
> Two American submarines and one British boat gathered near the North Pole in mid-March 2018 for one of the biggest Arctic undersea exercises in decades.
> 
> ICEX 2018, the 27th in a series of roughly biennial exercises dating back to 1959, kicked off in early March, when aircraft from the Alaska Air National Guard and the Canadian air force began delivering supplies to an ice floe inside the Arctic Circle.
> 
> The supplies allowed a military-civilian team to begin building Camp Skate. The camp boasted accommodations for around 50 people and the infrastructure for a wide range of civilian scientific experiments and military training events spanning five weeks.




What would be the strategic impact of actively defending CFS Alert with a NASAMS battery?

Or filling the GBAD requirement with 3 air deployable NASAMS batteries?  One for Alert.  One for Thule.  One for Reykjavik.

Militia Troops for Home Defence.


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:


> What would be the strategic impact of actively defending CFS Alert with a NASAMS battery?


Purely symbolic, I’d say. NASAMS, with its short range, wouldn’t be my first choice against stand off cruise missiles, which have been the standard armament of the Russian bomber force since the 1980’s. 

The sole US Army Air Defense unit in Alaska doesn’t even have an anti-aircraft role — it’s a ballistic missile defense unit oriented more against North Korea than Russia.


----------



## Kirkhill

But strategy is all about symbolism.

Norway is constantly being pressured over Svalbard by Russia.  Are the Russians really happy to have us sit undisturbed in Alert?  Or would it be a useful symbolic gesture to take Alert off line?

I think it would be an interesting statement of intent to procure the means to deploy by air an air defence system equivalent to that deployed by a Halifax or CSC.  And to be able to assist NATO and NORAD by covering Thule and Reykjavik would also be diplomatically advantageous.

The defence of Iceland is one of the jobs to which Canada has been assigned in the past.


----------



## Kirkhill

Russian Base at Nagorskoye in Alexandra Land, Franz Josef Land
80N.  1500 km from Alert  2100 km from Thule  1000 km from the North Pole   1200 km from the Finnmark Border,  400 km from Svalbard









BBC Report 






Can we get any volunteers for Northern Duty?


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill said:


> But strategy is all about symbolism.
> 
> Norway is constantly being pressured over Svalbard by Russia.  Are the Russians really happy to have us sit undisturbed in Alert?  Or would it be a useful symbolic gesture to take Alert off line?


Like they potentially have done in the past to NORAD capability?

_cough…PIN-3…cough_


----------



## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> Like they potentially have done in the past to NORAD capability?
> 
> _cough…PIN-3…cough_


Much more likely than potentially IMHO...


----------



## Kirkhill

Marines Testing Regiment at Heart of Emerging Island-Hopping Future - USNI News
					

The Marine Corps is starting to form and experiment with the littoral regiment at the heart of its modern-day island-hopping strategy, the head of Marine Corps combat development told USNI News. The stand-up of this first Marine Littoral Regiment is among the first and most visible steps being...




					news.usni.org
				




Littoral Regiment



> The basic idea for the MLR is about *1,800 to 2,000 Marines and sailors* – smaller than the 3,400-strong 3rd Marine Regiment operating out of Hawaii today – that would include three main elements: a* Littoral Combat Team*, a* Littoral Anti-Air Battalion*, and a *Littoral Logistics Battalion*, spokesman Maj. Josh Benson told USNI News.
> 
> “The Littoral Combat Team (LCT) is task-organized around an infantry battalion along with a long-range anti-ship missile battery. The LCT is designed to provide the basis for employing multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advance base (EAB) sites that can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) of key maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning,” he said.





> “The Littoral Anti-Air Battalion is designed to train and employ air defense, air surveillance and early warning, air control, and forward rearming and refueling capabilities.





> The Littoral Logistics Battalion provides tactical logistics support to the MLR by resupplying expeditionary advance base sites, managing cache sites, and connecting to higher-level logistics providers,” along with also providing for medical and maintenance capabilities.





> A regimental headquarters would supplement these organizations with “enhanced signals and human intelligence, reconnaissance, communications, logistics planning, civil affairs, cyber, and information operations capabilities.”



3 of them. - 5400 PY.


----------



## Good2Golf

KevinB said:


> Much more likely than potentially IMHO...


Yeah, I think 'allegedly' would have been closer to the truth.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Marines Testing Regiment at Heart of Emerging Island-Hopping Future - USNI News
> 
> 
> The Marine Corps is starting to form and experiment with the littoral regiment at the heart of its modern-day island-hopping strategy, the head of Marine Corps combat development told USNI News. The stand-up of this first Marine Littoral Regiment is among the first and most visible steps being...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> news.usni.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Littoral Regiment
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 3 of them. - 5400 PY.



Too bad they can't find a more aggressive term than 'Littoral'. 

Like, you know, 'The Water Rats' or something like that


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Too bad they can't find a more aggressive term than 'Littoral'.
> 
> Like, you know, 'The Water Rats' or something like that


Littorally offensive?


----------



## Kirkhill

Something suitably and inoffensively Canadian?  Regional Defence Group?  Ground Based Air Defence Battery - fine.   Coastal Defence Troop instead of that Long Range Precision Fires stuff.  Infantry Battalion - fine.


----------



## KevinB

Ostrozac said:


> Purely symbolic, I’d say. NASAMS, with its short range, wouldn’t be my first choice against stand off cruise missiles, which have been the standard armament of the Russian bomber force since the 1980’s.
> 
> The sole US Army Air Defense unit in Alaska doesn’t even have an anti-aircraft role — it’s a ballistic missile defense unit oriented more against North Korea than Russia.


Keep in mind US forces have AD assets spread out in all levels as well.
   Down to MANPADS at the squad level...


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> The US Marines are going to a 15 pax squad. 12-15 is a good number IMHO...


But then there's this:


> “I am very confident that we have to reduce the size of the infantry battalion, I’m confident of that. Exactly how much, we gotta experiment with that. I say that because, for example, if you’re going to be light and lethal and able to operate in an austere environment, you have to be a little bit smaller and more powerful, you have to be, because if you’re still at the size we are now, I haven’t done anything to make myself more able to disaggregate underneath the watchful eye of a pacing threat,” Smith said in a phone interview this week.





> Marines Testing Regiment at Heart of Emerging Island-Hopping Future - USNI News
> 
> 
> The Marine Corps is starting to form and experiment with the littoral regiment at the heart of its modern-day island-hopping strategy, the head of Marine Corps combat development told USNI News. The stand-up of this first Marine Littoral Regiment is among the first and most visible steps being...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> news.usni.org



That's kind of where I'm heading - smaller and more powerful but more of them with broader capabilities.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Once upon a time I was a Captain in charge of a 200 man (with females attached sometimes) company, from time to time. At the ripe old age of between 25 - 28 years.
> 
> It worked great. Mainly because I believe that those who put me in the job had the confidence that I could do it, and I had the right support from a great CSM, Pl Comds, CQMS etc etc


See my last post about smaller and more lethal.

I also think senior captains (who've had a few years as platoon commanders, company 2i/c, a battalion staff tour, and the combat team commanders course) are the perfect folks to command companies.

🍻


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> Keep in mind US forces have AD assets spread out in all levels as well.
> Down to MANPADS at the squad level...


Curious.  

Has the Stinger been upgraded at all over the years, or are the MANPADS using stock launchers & stock missiles acquired ages ago?

The reason I ask is because our (the west) focus was on Iraq and Afghanistan for so long, any available R&D money I’m assuming went into improved armoured vehicles and personal kit.


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> Curious.
> 
> Has the Stinger been upgraded at all over the years, or are the MANPADS using stock launchers & stock missiles acquired ages ago?
> 
> The reason I ask is because our (the west) focus was on Iraq and Afghanistan for so long, any available R&D money I’m assuming went into improved armoured vehicles and personal kit.


Stinger upgrades have continued. 
  In the grand scheme the PPE upgrades and various vehicle upgrades are a very minor portion of the budget - and a lot of those where funded outside the standard line item budget.

Around 4 years ago DoD (especially the Army) pivoted back from the small wars and started looking back at Peer/Near Peer threats - it's gotten major play in the past two years, but the AD aspect never really came off the table - even with the major focuses to Afghanistan and Iraq.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> I would suggest 4 pers
> Historically most soldiers/leaders can only look after 3 additional people in stress environments.   It increases with experience of the soldiers under command, but rifle sections are generally not filled with 10+ year troops.
> This has been borne out by a lot of study at various levels of training/experience.
> 
> Plus when you start adding stuff to the LAV - room becomes a premium, and I would gladly sacrifice a rifleman to make room for other enablers.
> 
> 4 Also works for a lot of other vehicles - and if you really want - you can push the section size to 12 with 3x 4 man bricks -
> Which then admittedly requires a slew of LAV's





FJAG said:


> Okay, I'll play devil's advocate.
> 
> The suggested format essentially almost doubles the number of LAVs in a rifle company with a significant supply and maintenance burden. I sometimes marvel at how the Russians manage to have a platoon operate out of three BMPs/BTRs. They do this by reducing the platoon to a total of thirty with ten per vehicle.
> 
> In that respect then a Cdn/US platoon already exceeds the combat power of a Russian platoon by 10-15% for manpower and 30% in APCs.
> 
> Maybe we should go in a different direction.
> 
> I won't advocate for a three-vehicle platoon but do wonder as to whether we need ten or even eight or nine dismounts per section. Maybe we can reduce the actual "section" to a four man brick and maybe take up two more GIB seats with weapon specialists/enablers: GPMG, Javelin, drone operator, CarlG/grenade launcher/mortarman, what have you. A platoon would then have: four three-man crewed LAVs and dismounts of a three-man platoon command element; three four-man "sections"; and four two-man weapon specialist/enabler teams - all for a total of 23 dismounts but with a stronger emphasis on working around the support weapons and LAV support rather than the rifles. The pl comd controls the bricks, the WO the weapons/enablers.
> 
> That gives each LAV a total of 8 (for the pl comd veh) or 9 (for each sect carrier) which leaves a little extra room for a ride along or ammo.
> 
> IMHO - save the extra LAVs and create another battalion with them.
> 
> Same for the medium LAV brigade/battalion.
> 
> For light battalions I would stay with a two brick, nine-man section and concentrate the specialist weapons/enablers at the platoon level divided between the pl comds veh and a separate weapons carrier (The extra brick compensates for the lack of the LAV support).
> 
> 🍻


Here's a hybrid of my original thought and the comments from KevinB (4-man teams) and FJAG (more support weapon-to-rifle ratio) above.

Each Section reduced to two 4-man Fire Teams.
Weapons Detachment and Command team move from separate LAV to join the Section LAVs

Platoon Commander with Signaler
Platoon 2 I/C with a System Operator (similar to USMC Squad System Operator)
Weapon Detachment Commander with Designated Marksman


----------



## Kirkhill

If looking at Dutch, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian practice a couple of things seem to stand out

3 or 4 vehicles in a group with permanently mounted crews of 3.  The vehicles are fought as a group.

There are empty seats in the back.

The basic block in the back is a group of four primarily organized around an AT Gunner (Carl Gustaf, Panzerfaust), the assistant and a pair of machine gunners with 2x C9.  In the vehicle a C6 and a DMR.  AT Gunner has his personal weapon.

That leaves 1 to 3 empty seats in each vehicle.  Those are taken by Command elements, (Section Leaders, Section 2ics, Dismount Leaders) and various atts like medics and FCs. 

No dismount signallers.  I guess everybody is assumed to have his own PRR.

The Pl Ldr generally stays with the vehicles and fights the vehicles. 

Typically there are 6 bodies in the back as a section.  The Section Ldr, the 2ic, the AT gnr and assistant and the 2 MG gunners.

These teams are not designed for the bayonet charge.  They are designed to destroy vehicles with the MGs protecting the AT gunners who are protecting their vehicles, or to breach and clear houses and bunkers used as fighting positions, or to establish a defensive firing line anchored by AT weapons, MGs and DMRs.


----------



## Dale Denton

Kirkhill said:


> Marines Testing Regiment at Heart of Emerging Island-Hopping Future - USNI News
> 
> 
> The Marine Corps is starting to form and experiment with the littoral regiment at the heart of its modern-day island-hopping strategy, the head of Marine Corps combat development told USNI News. The stand-up of this first Marine Littoral Regiment is among the first and most visible steps being...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> news.usni.org



If I may be hopeful, I think we could cheaply offer to placate our friends and join AUKUS on the cheap, by offering to take over and specialize in one useful area so they can rely on us for that. We could offer up 'Marine Coastal Defence Groups' that could be Island Logistics (NSS orders), GBAD (on a LAV platform), Airfield setup/defence. Cheaper than buying long-range missiles.


----------



## markppcli

In effect they clear the ground vehicles can’t. Signallers have become less guy carrying a radio, and more platoon IT specialist with the advent of 152s anyways.

I’m very curious about Manpads at squad level, I don’t know that I’ve seen any source for that? Surely something like that could be held at BN?


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> Stinger upgrades have continued.
> In the grand scheme the PPE upgrades and various vehicle upgrades are a very minor portion of the budget - and a lot of those where funded outside the standard line item budget.
> 
> Around 4 years ago DoD (especially the Army) pivoted back from the small wars and started looking back at Peer/Near Peer threats - it's gotten major play in the past two years, but the AD aspect never really came off the table - even with the major focuses to Afghanistan and Iraq.


That is good to hear.  Obviously AD is incredibly important, but with such a huge focus on Iraq and Afghanistan I thought any funding would have been directed at vehicles/capabilities relevant to those conflicts.  

During the height of each of those conflicts, I would always read about new armoured vehicles, sensors, jammers, etc.  I didn’t hear a peep about AD.  

I’m glad the Stinger has been upgraded.  I was worried it would end up being the TOW 1 if the sky.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> In effect they clear the ground vehicles can’t. Signallers have become less guy carrying a radio, and more platoon IT specialist with the advent of 152s anyways.
> 
> I’m very curious about Manpads at squad level, I don’t know that I’ve seen any source for that? Surely something like that could be held at BN?


I believe it is threat level dependent - but the scale of issue goes down to the squad.
   Admittedly the Stinger is pretty brain dead - even I can use one.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> I believe it is threat level dependent - but the scale of issue goes down to the squad.
> Admittedly the Stinger is pretty brain dead - even I can use one.


So I did a quick google, they’re running maneuver unit guys through while standing up their 10 SHORAD battalions.


			Redirect Notice
		


So how they push them “in theatre” is likely a command decision.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> So I did a quick google, they’re running maneuver unit guys through while standing up their 10 SHORAD battalions.
> 
> 
> Redirect Notice
> 
> 
> 
> So how they push them “in theatre” is likely a command decision.


I'm amazed how the Army can make what is a 3hour class to some MOS's a 5 week class for 11B's.
  Also considering all we did in Afghanistan in the 80's was give them missiles - and the Mujahdeen figured out to use it with the pictogram on the side.

It is legitimately about as brain dead as the Javelin - both will have battery issues if left on, but the Stinger won't let you target a friendly AC - so it's not exactly requiring massive amount of teaching.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Littorally offensive?





KevinB said:


> I'm amazed how the Army can make what is a 3hour class to some MOS's a 5 week class for 11B's.
> Also considering all we did in Afghanistan in the 80's was give them missiles - and the Mujahdeen figured out to use it with the pictogram on the side.
> 
> It is legitimately about as brain dead as the Javelin - both will have battery issues if left on, but the Stinger won't let you target a friendly AC - so it's not exactly requiring massive amount of teaching.



Dude, you've just destroyed about 10,000 staff jobs with one missile


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> I'm amazed how the Army can make what is a 3hour class to some MOS's a 5 week class for 11B's.
> Also considering all we did in Afghanistan in the 80's was give them missiles - and the Mujahdeen figured out to use it with the pictogram on the side.
> 
> It is legitimately about as brain dead as the Javelin - both will have battery issues if left on, but the Stinger won't let you target a friendly AC - so it's not exactly requiring massive amount of teaching.


I would imagine it’s the difference between how to employ vs how to pull the trigger.  I can only hope those 5 weeks talk about how to function in an AD network.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I would imagine it’s the difference between how to employ vs how to pull the trigger.  I can only hope those 5 weeks talk about how to function in an AD network.


I imagine several days in wasted in unboxing and verify content (based on other programs)


----------



## markppcli

Also, sorry this should have been in the original post, I’m fundamentally against the “oh we can just implement X Y Z weapon.” It is a scar we have from exercises where we don’t have actual support weapon ammunition. Kirkill posted an article a while ago about how effective e strikers with Javelins were in JRTC, well I guarantee they weren’t carrying spare dummy missiles every time they took a position. Similarly having been in a “tow capable section” where we were expected to carry a tow inside the LAV, there isn’t the space for the rounds, and no one really tried to figure out how we’d do that. We need to have the logistics and the support figured out when shit gets hot.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> I'm amazed how the Army can make what is a 3hour class to some MOS's a 5 week class for 11B's.
> Also considering all we did in Afghanistan in the 80's was give them missiles - and the Mujahdeen figured out to use it with the pictogram on the side.
> 
> It is legitimately about as brain dead as the Javelin - both will have battery issues if left on, but the Stinger won't let you target a friendly AC - so it's not exactly requiring massive amount of teaching.


Now I know I’m going to get flamed for this.  And rightfully so, as I realize not everybody joins the military as a military enthusiast, cadet, or any military involvement beforehand.  

But that’s how I felt about BMQ once I’d been an instructor on like 2 courses.  😅


“Am I seriously explaining to people how to thread their boots, and tie their shoes?”

“Did we seriously just take a weekend to be told not to be racist, sexist, rapists?”


Like many other organizations, someone did something with “Exhihit A” - in this case a Stinger, and now for liability purposes we have to make sure we check EVERY box, so we can say ‘Bloggins passed the course.’  😅


----------



## CBH99

markppcli said:


> Also, sorry this should have been in the original post, I’m fundamentally against the “oh we can just implement X Y Z weapon.” It is a scar we have from exercises where we don’t have actual support weapon ammunition. Kirkill posted an article a while ago about how effective e strikers with Javelins were in JRTC, well I guarantee they weren’t carrying spare dummy missiles every time they took a position. Similarly having been in a “tow capable section” where we were expected to carry a tow inside the LAV, there isn’t the space for the rounds, and no one really tried to figure out how we’d do that. We need to have the logistics and the support figured out when shit gets hot.


If I recall correctly, they unleashed an unGodly amount of mayhem with like 50 imaginary Javelin missiles or something.  (Or was it more than 100?) 😅


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> Also, sorry this should have been in the original post, I’m fundamentally against the “oh we can just implement X Y Z weapon.” It is a scar we have from exercises where we don’t have actual support weapon ammunition. Kirkill posted an article a while ago about how effective e strikers with Javelins were in JRTC, well I guarantee they weren’t carrying spare dummy missiles every time they took a position. Similarly having been in a “tow capable section” where we were expected to carry a tow inside the LAV, there isn’t the space for the rounds, and no one really tried to figure out how we’d do that. We need to have the logistics and the support figured out when shit gets hot.


IMHO there is room in the LAV for TOW missiles - but not with a bunch of GIB's.
   As far as a TOW in the LAV - ideally the Bradley turret would have been used on the LAV 6.0 


    Any new system needs to be properly itegrated - not just into user training, but in collective training, and planning, and logistic support of the systems.
  Very often several (or all) of those steps get missed - and there is not support, and no employment plan.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> IMHO there is room in the LAV for TOW missiles - but not with a bunch of GIB's.
> As far as a TOW in the LAV - ideally the Bradley turret would have been used on the LAV 6.0
> 
> 
> Any new system needs to be properly itegrated - not just into user training, but in collective training, and planning, and logistic support of the systems.
> Very often several (or all) of those steps get missed - and there is not support, and no employment plan.


Well I’ve done it and it was in two modes:

1. Everything in the jump boxes and you can fit two people in. Missiles …… good luck.

2. Everything out of the jump boxes and maybe 4 people but less if you want missiles. We broke the control hands doing that.

The response I got was “use the side bins” and when I asked if we could have rounds for a trial run, to be rechecked by ammo techs to ensure this was a viable plan I was met with stern looks and silence. 

This is of course before we consider a) the tactical ramifications of having a functionally immobile atgm, and b) how we plan on resupplying said atgm.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> Well I’ve done it and it was in two modes:
> 
> 1. Everything in the jump boxes and you can fit two people in. Missiles …… good luck.
> 
> 2. Everything out of the jump boxes and maybe 4 people but less if you want missiles. We broke the control hands doing that.
> 
> The response I got was “use the side bins” and when I asked if we could have rounds for a trial run, to be rechecked by ammo techs to ensure this was a viable plan I was met with stern looks and silence.
> 
> This is of course before we consider a) the tactical ramifications of having a functionally immobile atgm, and b) how we plan on resupplying said atgm.


Yeah - I am honestly at a loss for that.
  If you want an ATGM with a LAV - it really needs to be to the turret and controlled in the turret - or (which is a terribly bad idea) it can get ghettorigged on the rear deck and controlled by some poor sod who sits in an air sentry hatch and it exposed to everything bad outside.

Frankly without a Bradley type turret - they should have made a LAV 6.0 TUA - that way the LAV formation could have had an integral Armor Defense Asset - as opposed to the colossal disaster you talk about.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I'm amazed how the Army can make what is a 3hour class to some MOS's a 5 week class for 11B's.
> Also considering all we did in Afghanistan in the 80's was give them missiles - and the Mujahdeen figured out to use it with the pictogram on the side.
> 
> It is legitimately about as brain dead as the Javelin - both will have battery issues if left on, but the Stinger won't let you target a friendly AC - so it's not exactly requiring massive amount of teaching.


Funny that you should mention that. A few days ago I was grousing on other means with Petard about how much time is wasted on Army courses. I'm pretty much convinced we could achieve a much better throughput on our courses if we made much better use of the time available and cut out all the "could know" and "stuff we really don't need to know" crap out of our syllabi. Add to that not teaching to the lowest common denominator.  Sometimes you just don't want the guys who can't pick things up quickly.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Funny that you should mention that. A few days ago I was grousing on other means with Petard about how much time is wasted on Army courses. I'm pretty much convinced we could achieve a much better throughput on our courses if we made much better use of the time available and cut out all the "could know" and "stuff we really don't need to know" crap out of our syllabi. Add to that not teaching to the lowest common denominator.  Sometimes you just don't want the guys who can't pick things up quickly.
> 
> 🍻


My theory is most Military Courses are structures so they can be taught to the absolutely lowest common denominator so that in time of conscription when you don't have your pick - you can train a new solider to a task that doesn't always have the prerequisites for (be that intelligence or courses).

   My theory is also the Military never likes to get rid of something from a course or general tradition - despite being utterly useless and the same skill be taught in a more Military relevant method - that actually applies to a trade.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> My theory is most Military Courses are structures so they can be taught to the absolutely lowest common denominator so that in time of conscription when you don't have your pick - you can train a new solider to a task that doesn't always have the prerequisites for (be that intelligence or courses).
> 
> My theory is also the Military never likes to get rid of something from a course or general tradition - despite being utterly useless and the same skill be taught in a more Military relevant method - that actually applies to a trade.


A favourite example being a Brit exchange officer getting up in the middle of the LAV 6 crew commander course to vent his frustrations at Being taught a class he was, in total fairness to him, just taught on Turret Op. Why? Because those periods were meant as refreshers when they weren’t directly attached to each other. God forbid anyone cut a day or two off the course to eliminate redundancy.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Yeah - I am honestly at a loss for that.
> If you want an ATGM with a LAV - it really needs to be to the turret and controlled in the turret - or (which is a terribly bad idea) it can get ghettorigged on the rear deck and controlled by some poor sod who sits in an air sentry hatch and it exposed to everything bad outside.
> 
> Frankly without a Bradley type turret - they should have made a LAV 6.0 TUA - that way the LAV formation could have had an integral Armor Defense Asset - as opposed to the colossal disaster you talk about.


My preference is mount it on the G rides for now. Not ideal but we’re divesting most of them anyways so local modifications should be less of a hassle. Throw an 84 and c6 in each car as a weapons locker, and use the now freed up weapons det PYs to man the ATGM platoon. Pl WO gets an LS to haul missiles, each truck has a trailer to haul their full missile load and dismounted kit.


----------



## Ostrozac

markppcli said:


> My preference is mount it on the G rides for now. Not ideal but we’re divesting most of them anyways so local modifications should be less of a hassle. Throw an 84 and c6 in each car as a weapons locker, and use the now freed up weapons det PYs to man the ATGM platoon. Pl WO gets an LS to haul missiles, each truck has a trailer to haul their full missile load and dismounted kit.


Mounting the support weapons and their ammo on the vehicles that have to be left behind once the bullets and bombs start flying wouldn't be my first choice, If there’s a shortage of armoured vehicles, I’d prefer to mount the riflemen (with their e-tools!) in the trucks, and put the support weapons under armour.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> If looking at Dutch, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian practice a couple of things seem to stand out
> 
> 3 or 4 vehicles in a group with permanently mounted crews of 3.  The vehicles are fought as a group.
> 
> There are empty seats in the back.
> 
> The basic block in the back is a group of four primarily organized around an AT Gunner (Carl Gustaf, Panzerfaust), the assistant and a pair of machine gunners with 2x C9.  In the vehicle a C6 and a DMR.  AT Gunner has his personal weapon.
> 
> That leaves 1 to 3 empty seats in each vehicle.  Those are taken by Command elements, (Section Leaders, Section 2ics, Dismount Leaders) and various atts like medics and FCs.
> 
> No dismount signallers.  I guess everybody is assumed to have his own PRR.
> 
> The Pl Ldr generally stays with the vehicles and fights the vehicles.
> 
> Typically there are 6 bodies in the back as a section.  The Section Ldr, the 2ic, the AT gnr and assistant and the 2 MG gunners.
> 
> These teams are not designed for the bayonet charge.  They are designed to destroy vehicles with the MGs protecting the AT gunners who are protecting their vehicles, or to breach and clear houses and bunkers used as fighting positions, or to establish a defensive firing line anchored by AT weapons, MGs and DMRs.



Here's what a Canadian Armoured Infantry Battalion could look like using the Swedish model.  

With this set up our "Heavy" Brigade could have three identical Armoured Infantry Battalions and still have enough Leopards for a Reserve Tank Company/Squadron and a bunch of LAVs available for the Reserves.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Modern version of this is an option


----------



## OldSolduer

KevinB said:


> My theory is most Military Courses are structures so they can be taught to the absolutely lowest common denominator so that in time of conscription when you don't have your pick - you can train a new solider to a task that doesn't always have the prerequisites for (be that intelligence or courses).
> 
> My theory is also the Military never likes to get rid of something from a course or general tradition - despite being utterly useless and the same skill be taught in a more Military relevant method - that actually applies to a trade.



Because we've ALWAYS done it that way.


----------



## KevinB

OldSolduer said:


> Because we've ALWAYS done it that way.


Once I added up the time - simply on inspections for Kit and Quarters on a QL3 Infantryman course.
   Then I added the time that the candidates spend doing chicken shit to get ready.

Think if instead of folding ones underwear and T Shirt etc that time was actually spent on Kim's Games and other Observation and Learning tasks?
  The problem is a lot of teaching items are done by rote and the WHY is not even known to half the staff, let alone the students.
 So the true reason is lost.

I mean let us be honest - 99% of foot drill should have been dropped from the syllabus years ago as one isn't forming square to repel calvary anymore.

  Of course I'm the guy who always has to question everything.


----------



## Good2Golf

OldSolduer said:


> Because we've ALWAYS done it that way.


…and user feedback indicates that training is ever so exciting and very much looked forward to…otherwise the Army wouldn’t have been so big on “Train to ExciteTM!” 😉


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Once I added up the time - simply on inspections for Kit and Quarters on a QL3 Infantryman course.
> Then I added the time that the candidates spend doing chicken shit to get ready.
> 
> Think if instead of folding ones underwear and T Shirt etc that time was actually spent on *Kim's Games* and other Observation and Learning tasks?
> The problem is a lot of teaching items are done by rote and the WHY is not even known to half the staff, let alone the students.
> So the true reason is lost.
> 
> I mean let us be honest - 99% of foot drill should have been dropped from the syllabus years ago as one isn't forming square to repel calvary anymore.
> 
> Of course I'm the guy who always has to question everything.



Be careful. 

These days the fact that you're using a reference to a Rudyard Kipling tale, an arch colonialist, might get you put on some kind of 'naughty list'


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I mean let us be honest - 99% of foot drill should have been dropped from the syllabus years ago as one isn't forming square to repel calvary anymore.
> 
> Of course I'm the guy who always has to question everything.


Things should be questioned - in a big way. Tell me, does anyone other than the guard on Parliament Hill actually need to know how to do the left form on the march ... or the left and right incline for that matter. I remember decades and decades ago standing on the parade square with my regiment and having to do a "move to the right in column of route" saying to myself - its a simple enough movement but  if we adopted a different formation on parade right from the start where the officers stood on the right flank and the NCOs on the left then we could just do a simple right turn and already be in position to march off. And then there's the whole "officers promenading and getting on parade" routine. I haven't checked lately but in my day the manual on drill and ceremonial was thicker than the one on combat team tactics.



GR66 said:


> Here's what a Canadian Armoured Infantry Battalion could look like using the Swedish model.
> 
> With this set up our "Heavy" Brigade could have three identical Armoured Infantry Battalions and still have enough Leopards for a Reserve Tank Company/Squadron and a bunch of LAVs available for the Reserves.



I quite like this. The US combined arms battalion used to have a two tank/two rifle company organization but changed it to three companies. Two have two tank/one infantry and one has two infantry/one tank. The deducted tank company went to the cavalry squadron while the two deducted infantry companies just disappeared.

I know that changing the composition of a tank squadron from four troops to three just because we are limited on the number of tanks, isn't a good practice but it strikes me that pretty much everyone else has three troops in a squadron and I pretty much agree that changing to a three troop organization should be done unless someone can come up with a darned good reason for keeping four (other than more is always better).

The drop to three vehicles in a platoon is also worth looking at. The Russians have done it that way since day one.

I'm also quite a fan of dropping the support company in favour of placing the recce, mortar and AD or ATk elements directly under the Bn HQ Coy and creating a separate logistics company as they do. Again, the US has been doing this for years without ill effects. The support company does not fight as an entity and does not need an independent company command structure. If anything it creates an unnecessary step in the CoC. Their administrative needs can easily be met by the adm pl within the HQ Coy which also meets the needs of the Bn HQ's element itself.

IMHO, the way we use the term HQ Company right now muddles the function of being a Tactical HQ and providing logistics support to the Bn as a whole. In many ways this is merely a change in terminology but I would think a uniform standard of logistics or CSS companies across varying establishments (uniform structure but not uniform personnel or equipment which vary with the nature of the unit supported) all commanded by a logistician trained in combat service support at the unit level would standardize logistics functions across the brigade. (I know we trade in one combat arms major and one MWO PY for a logistician major and MWO PY but I'm pretty sure that the world wouldn't end)

I'd even go so far as advocating for a brigade support battalion (BSB - to replace the service battalion) which would include forward support companies (FSC) as logistics companies for each unit in the brigade (again tailored by unit function). This would create a more unified CSS structure within in the brigade and provide clear technical oversight from the BSB over the various unit FSCs.

The same could be done with unit medical platoons being attached forward elements from the brigade's field ambulance or for that matter, even battalion int cells being forward deployed elements of a brigade intelligence platoon (or better yet, a beefed up intelligence company).

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> Modern version of this is an option








This is a Dutch Fennek recce vehicle in VSHORAD mode with 4x Stinger.   They have a similar MRAT version.  They use Spike, not Javelin.  And definitely not TOW.

By the way the Dutch GBAD system progresses up from the Stinger-Fennek to the AMRAAM-ER/ESSM NASAMs to the Patriot with both the PAC-2 SAM and PAC-3 ABM missiles.


----------



## FJAG

Everything old is new again.   

From the 1950s:






Inexpensive and small armoured vehicles to make up the backbone of an anti-armour defence (supplemented by tanks and dismounted anti-armour teams) make so much sense . Why we needed to muck around with ADATS in the anti armour role and Multi Effects Vehicles on expensive LAV chassis when the solution to much of what we needed sat on the other side of the Fulda Gap for decades is beyond me.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Just check your left flank.


----------



## FJAG

Canada's looked like this:






On the other hand we had more then than we do now.

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Light AT mixed with recce and flank security would be good roles for the Armoured Reserve.


----------



## Kirkhill

Light vehicles, like jeeps, unarmoured, would also make for unobtrusive patrol vehicles for domestic operations in Canada.  Giving the "Cavalry" the opportunity to practice seeing without being seen.

And, apparently you can fit four ready to fire ATGMs on a jeep.  Even if you have to dismount and launch them remotely.

Meanwhile the Danes are adding a dedicated LIB to there toolkit.






						Light Infantry: a New Tool for the Danish Army
					

The Danish Army is in the process of raising a new light infantry battalion to enable it to react more quickly to situations developing around the world.




					euro-sd.com


----------



## Blackadder1916

FJAG said:


> Canada's looked like this:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On the other hand we had more then than we do now.
> 
> 🍻



Or this;




Checking the map to find a gasthof with a better field of fire.


----------



## Good2Golf

Wow!  Check out the awesome Rouleau-RollTM on the driver and CC's boonie caps!


----------



## markppcli

Ostrozac said:


> Mounting the support weapons and their ammo on the vehicles that have to be left behind once the bullets and bombs start flying wouldn't be my first choice, If there’s a shortage of armoured vehicles, I’d prefer to mount the riflemen (with their e-tools!) in the trucks, and put the support weapons under armour.


If you’ve sighted your TOW properly it’s should be like 1 k back and to the flank. Direct fire shouldn’t be a huge worry and by doctrine it should relocate rapidly after the first round. Can do that in a g ride easy enough. Let me add it’s not the ideal option, it’s just what we have in the cupboard right now.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> If you’ve sighted your TOW properly it’s should be like 1 k back and to the flank. Direct fire shouldn’t be a huge worry and by doctrine it should relocate rapidly after the first round. Can do that in a g ride easy enough. Let me add it’s not the ideal option, it’s just what we have in the cupboard right now.


While I agree that is ideal - based on my experience with US Armor moving in Iraq in the cities - and what I have seen of Russian and Chinese formations - I don't think you are going to get a symetrical battlespace to work in and the DS answer won't work.

Personally I think that the time for TOW has come and gone - and the CF should be looking at Hellfire options - 
   It (Hellfire) can also fill a (limited) SHORAD role as well


----------



## markppcli

It’s absolutely past it’s prime. No question. But this is a thread about Force 2025 which is built around limited investment and no real substantial changes. It’s what can we fix in four years. 

In an ideal world I’d see us with Spike in its various forms with NLOS at Brigade level, but hey that’s not a 4 year fix (in this army).


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> It’s absolutely past it’s prime. No question. But this is a thread about Force 2025 which is built around limited investment and no real substantial changes. It’s what can we fix in four years.


I rather cynically thing that it could be Force 3025 and the Army still wouldn't have the time...


markppcli said:


> In an ideal world I’d see us with Spike in its various forms with NLOS at Brigade level, but hey that’s not a 4 year fix (in this army).


The only thing that concerns me is the Israeli "over marketing" with the range spec of the NLOS - they claim 25km
   Hellfire MMW NLOS is only 14km with a larger missile with more fuel 
   Javelin is 5km with the new CLU - and a similar size missile 

 Plus the US systems are cheaper - and the logistical tail here can support the CF a lot better, unless the CF is going to get into domestic production of an ATGM under license (not unheard of - but unlikely for the CF build/buy quantity).


----------



## Kirkhill

WRT e-Missiles, Virtual Battles and stuffing TOWs in LAVs

Item the first.  TOWs were not stuffed in LAVs.  Javelins were stuffed in Strykers.



> The Javelin provides dismounted Infantrymen a surefire way to effectively kill tanks. The system’s portability makes it the anti-armor weapon of choice for light early entry forces. It has an extremely high probability kill rate against enemy armor and is effective out to 2,500 meters.3
> 
> First used in combat during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Javelin was effective at destroying T-72 and Type 69 tanks. In one engagement, a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) destroyed two T-55 tanks, eight armored personnel carriers, and four troop trucks with the Javelin.4



I'm sure there are those here that can correct but I understand an SF-ODA is a team of 12 highly experienced soldiers.

2x T55
8x APC
4x Trucks

Doesn't sound like a bad day's work for a dozen soldiers.  Even if you are talking ancient T55s.



> Using the eight-step training model, we developed a four-day program of instruction (POI) to teach designated battalion personnel how to employ and operate the Javelin prior to the NTC rotation. We utilized a four-man team of NCOs who had graduated from the Heavy Weapons Leader Course at Fort Benning as instructors.....Four designated instructors were able to train 40 Javelin operators during the course, providing each company (including our Headquarters and Headquarters Company) the ability to employ Javelins at NTC. The anti-armor POI gave designated Javelin operators eight hours of hands-on training time.



4 NCO instructors trained 40 operators in 4 days giving each operator 8 hours of hands-on training time.

As for the e-Training



> Use of the Javelin at NTC 14-03​The employment of the M98A2 using the FTT proved to be a critical asset for the battalion during the force-on-force scenario of NTC rotation 14-03. *The FTT is a fully integrated, three-dimensional force-on-force training device consisting of a simulated round, a battery charger, and batteries. The round incorporates a MILES laser transmitter to allow simulated Javelin engagements during training exercises*. The FTT is designed to simulate the Javelin’s operational and engagement parameters. *The battalion was able to destroy enemy mechanized elements at distances of 1,500-2,000 meters away from positions of dominant terrain with a clear line of sight*.* Trained Soldiers were able to achieve a 50-percent kill ratio on enemy armored vehicles in both offensive and defensive operations.* While 50 percent is low, *it was in real-world battlefield conditions with Infantrymen climbing up significant terrain to achieve effects a*gainst enemy armor.
> 
> The key to the employment of the M98A2 was the use of movement and maneuver of the Stryker vehicles and the dismounted Infantry. *NTC’s vast open terrain allowed for the employment of weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges*. This required a “push and pull” technique between dismounted and mounted Infantry Soldiers. The* Stryker platoons would dismount Infantry squads and “push” them forward, utilizing the Strykers’ remote weapon systems to cover their movement. The dismounted squads seized dominate terrain, established hasty support-by-fire positions using Javelins, and provided overwatch for the Strykers as they “pulled” forward.* The “push and pull” technique allowed the battalion to *defeat enemy armor by maneuvering the dismounted Infantry with Javelins to positions of advantage and overwatch the movement of vehicles as they bounded forward*. This technique requires a thorough terrain analysis by the battalion staff during the military decision-making process and the company leadership during troop leading procedures in order to maximize the usage of the terrain available.
> 
> During Battle Period 4 of NTC 14-03, we found ourselves* attacking into an enemy armored formation defending key terrain* in vicinity of the Arrowhead and Alpha/Bravo Pass. We had to maneuver to Refrigerator Gap *and conduct a breach of enemy obstacles* to pass elements of the brigade onto their objective. The terrain was not the most suitable place to maneuver Strykers as it was restrictive or severely restrictive in nature. Based on the posture of the enemy, we recognized we would have to* employ the “push and pull” technique *described above. *Our rifle companies deliberately cleared mountainous terrain dismounted* en-route to their objective and only *moved vehicles forward once overwatch positions with Javelins were established*. While this technique took* extended time to execute*, it enabled our battalion to* destroy 10 armored vehicles before reaching our objective*.



Now maybe I am misreading this 2014 script but it sure sounded like a real world exercise to me.





__





						U.S. Army | Infantry Magazine
					






					www.benning.army.mil
				




And, since 2014 the effective range of the Javelin has been demonstrated as 4750m when fired from a vehicle mounted CLU and 4000 m when fired dismounted with a modernized lightweight CLU.









						JJV demonstrates Javelin missile's extended range capability
					

The Javelin surface-to-air missile has demonstrated its ability to engage targets beyond the existing maximum range during a series of US Army tests.




					www.army-technology.com
				





TOW  3000 to 3750 m



> *Weight:* 204 lbs (92.5 kg) (empty M220 launcher with TOW 2 mods and AN/TAS-4A fitted) + 52.8 lbs (23.9 kg) for TOW-2 FCS module with inserted battery pack (21 lbs (9.5 kg) for separate BPS with power conditioner) and ~ 60 lbs (27.2 kg) for missile



Javelin 1500 to 4750 m depending on launch platform.



> Mass22.3 kg (49.2 lb): (Ready to fire)
> 6.4 kg (14.1 lb) Detachable Command Launch Unit (CLU)[6][7]
> 15.9 kg (35 lb): Missile in launch tubeLengthMissile: 1.1 m (43 in)
> Launch tube: 1.2 m (47 in)DiameterMissile: 127 mm (5.0 in)
> Launch tube: 142 mm (5.6 in)



Spike MR/LR/LR2 - 2500m/4000m/5500m



> Spike-MR[edit]​The medium range version (Israeli designation: *NT-Gil*). The weight of the missile is 14 kg (30 lb 14 oz), its minimum range is 200 m, while its maximum range is 2,500 m (1.6 mi). It is used by infantry and special forces.[15]
> 
> Spike-LR[edit]​Long range version (Israeli designation: *NT-Spike*). The weight of the missile is 14 kg (30 lb 14 oz), and the weight of the complete system is less than 45 kg (99 lb 3 oz).[16] Maximum range is 4,000 m (2.5 mi) and it is used by infantry and light combat vehicles. It adds fiber-optic communication to and from the operator during flight.[17] Reported armour penetration capability is more than 700 mm (28 in) of Rolled homogeneous armour (RHA).[18] It is also deployed by Sentry Tech remotely controlled weapons stations along the Gaza border.[19] In early 2014, Rafael revealed they had increased the range of the Spike-LR to 5 km (3.1 mi), enhancing versatility on existing firing platforms and allowing it to be utilized on new ones like light helicopters.[20]
> 
> Spike-LR II[edit]​
> 
> 
> Spike LR 2
> A new generation of the original Spike-LR is in full-scale development and scheduled to be operational by the end of 2018. Spike-LR II (Israeli designation: *Gil-2*, גיל 2) has reduced weight to 12.7 kg (28 lb), increased range of 5.5 km (3.4 mi) at ground level and 10 km (6.2 mi) from helicopters using an RF data-link, warhead options of tandem HEAT with 30% increased armor penetration or a multipurpose blast warhead with selectable impact or penetration detonation fusing, a new seeker that includes an uncooled IR sensor with a smart target tracker with artificial intelligence features, the ability to fire on grid target coordinates using an inertial measurement unit for third party-target allocation, and is compatible with legacy launchers. The missile is designed with a counter-active protection system (CAPS) capability, being able to hit targets at higher impact angles of up to 70 degrees.[21][22] First ordered by the IDF in October 2017.[23]




e-Warriors or not I still find it hard to understand that these aren't already in all our infantry battalions arms lockers.  Along side the Carl Gustafs.


----------



## Kirkhill

And there is always this









						RAFAEL Introduces an Airmobile Spike NLOS for Special Ops - Defense Update:
					

RAFAEL has tested a new lightweight launcher for its Spike NLOS missile system, designed for integration on light offroad vehicles. For the launcher - Defense Update:




					defense-update.com
				




4x NLOS Missiles with 30km range mounted on a UTV - total weight 1780 kg


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I'm sure there are those here that can correct but I understand an SF-ODA is a team of 12 highly experienced soldiers.
> 
> 2x T55
> 8x APC
> 4x Trucks
> 
> Doesn't sound like a bad day's work for a dozen soldiers.  Even if you are talking ancient T55s.


It was ironically 1 dude with the Javelin who caused the mayhem - yes the book value for a SODA is 12, but I've seen deployed teams of 10-15.
 A lot of teams where run by Warrants (most who had been NCO's for ages) for a bit when times where lean pre GWOT.

I am personally disappointed an enterprising young Captain or Major never tried to sneak Javelin in as a IOR/UOR buy.


----------



## Kirkhill

Are we getting it wrong thinking that 20-30 km range makes the N-LOS a Brigade Asset?

If the Squad/Section  is receiving AT and AD missiles with 5 km ranges and 40mm UAVs with 10 km ranges then isn't 20-30 km a Bn range weapon?


----------



## MilEME09

Hear me out, everything that is old is new sooo






						TH-495 - Wikipedia
					






					en.m.wikipedia.org
				




Back to the drawing board. In seriousness though would a bolt on AT or AA pod work on a LAV 6? Have it reloaded via the air sentry hatch? Or via a hatch near the gunner?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Are we getting it wrong thinking that 20-30 km range makes the N-LOS a Brigade Asset?
> 
> If the Squad/Section  is receiving AT and AD missiles with 5 km ranges and 40mm UAVs with 10 km ranges then isn't 20-30 km a Bn range weapon?


The NLOS is a fair bit heavier and needs some more asset coordination to make it work from my understanding. 

What I like about Spike is it’s ability to “semi loiter” you can get a range and bearing, but the missile in the air, and acquire with the optics in the missile.


----------



## FJAG

Good2Golf said:


> Wow! Check out the awesome Rouleau-RollTM on the driver and CC's boonie caps!


I still have my Robin Hood hat from 40 years ago complete as per EIS with a gunner cap badge.


Kirkhill said:


> I'm sure there are those here that can correct but I understand an SF-ODA is a team of 12 highly experienced soldiers.


An ODA is established for a captain with a warrant officer 1 or 2 (the US type) an ops master sergeant, an ops/int sergeant first class and eight sergeants first class/sergeants with specialties in weapons, engineering, medical and communications (two of each). As KevinB points out, that's the establishment but teams are frequently short folks or are augmented such as by a SOT-A (Special Operations Team - Alpha) which are SIGINT specialists


Kirkhill said:


> e-Warriors or not I still find it hard to understand that these aren't already in all our infantry battalions arms lockers. Along side the Carl Gustafs.


It's not hard to understand at all - lack of arty --> $$$;  lack of air defence --> $$$; lack of anti-armour --> $$$. $$$ is a matter of priorities. What will we fund? and each of the listed items was low on the priority list. I've said it before: If the Taliban would have used tanks and aircraft we'd have anti-armour and air defence today - maybe only bought on a UOR but still.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> It's not hard to understand at all - lack of arty --> $$$;  lack of air defence --> $$$; lack of anti-armour --> $$$. $$$ is a matter of priorities. What will we fund? and each of the listed items was low on the priority list. I've said it before: If the Taliban would have used tanks and aircraft we'd have anti-armour and air defence today - maybe only bought on a UOR but still.
> 
> 🍻



On the other hand since I got married and left the militia (Yes, the events are linked) the army appears to have gone through a SRAAW(H) = Eryx programme,  a MRAAW(H) = Milan programme, a LRAAW(H) = TOW replacement programme, an ALAAWS = Javelin/Spike programme.  And I got married in 1984.  Before the walls fell Shaka!.


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> Before the walls fell Shaka!.


Oooohhhhh…. TNG Picard reference?


----------



## GR66

Looking a bit more at the numbers comparison between our current Infantry structure and the Swedish Mechanized Infantry structure you get some interesting numbers.

Just looking at the line Infantry Platoon structure, currently each Infantry Platoon is 40 x troops (3 x 10-man Sections and a 10-man Command Element plus Weapons Detachment) with the Mechanized Infantry Platoons each having 4 x LAVs.

Current Structure:

3 x symmetrical Brigades each with:
   2 x LAV Battalions (18 x Mech Platoons = 72 x LAVs and 720 x Troops)
   1 x Light Battalion (9 x Light Platoons = 360 x Troops)

That gives us a total of 216 x LAVs and 3,240 x Troops in our line Infantry Platoons.

By comparison, using the Swedish model, each Mechanized Platoon would have 29 x Troops riding 3 x LAVs

So using a Swedish Platoon model, if you were to have one Heavy Brigade consisting of 3 x combined arms Battalions (18 x Mech Infantry Platoons) and two fully Mechanized Infantry Battalions (each with 27 x Mech Infantry Platoons) you'd end up with a total of 72 x Swedish-style Mech Platoons.

That would give us a total of 216 x LAVs and 2,088 x Troops.  

Same total number of LAVs, but a savings of 1,152 Infantry PYs.  And this is just the savings from the line Infantry Platoons.  I haven't considered any savings from differences in the CS Company, etc. numbers between the two models.

This would allow us to have an all-Mechanized Infantry force with PYs to spare.  Those numbers could be used to either bring our Force Generation numbers up closer to the unit Establishment numbers, or we could even stand up an additional dedicated Light Battalion in addition to our existing units.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Looking a bit more at the numbers comparison between our current Infantry structure and the Swedish Mechanized Infantry structure you get some interesting numbers.


I like where some of this is heading.

When it comes to reducing the size of establishments I always tend to give a thought of redundancy for LOBs and casualties and how many of those a given unit could absorb before becoming combat ineffective. I've read a number of articles on that - usually written by someone looking to make their name with a staff paper aimed at revolutionizing the world - but have rarely seen anything persuasive that leads me to go one direction or the other. On top of that there are our own experiences which show how platoons and companies continue to function even with casualties. Most notably was C Coy 1 RCR during Op Medusa.

While the above makes one wonder to what level organizations can be reasonably trimmed, I find it particulalry disconcerting that rather than study and analyze those structures (or at least not report them when if we do) to determine if there is a minimal acceptable level, we continue to maintain that structure while readily giving up capabilities in other fields. Simple examples are when the Army was pressed for PYs to form CMTC the infantry gave up mortar platoons and assault pioneers rather than downsizing companies. Where is the study to justify that? Similar examples abound vis a vis anti-armour, air defence and even basic artillery. 

I have for many years looked at Russian (and previously Soviet) establishments and marveled at how they can operate a BMP battalion on 461 personnel, a tank battalion on 151 personnel, a self propelled howitzer battalion on 211 and a complete brigade with a total of four manoeuvre battalions and six separate artillery battalions for 3,000 to 4,500 personnel. Yes there are differing operational concepts but why don't we adopt those as well. Their system would easily slip into a NATO formation and we can see that by the number of former-Soviet bloc nations now a part of NATO and still operating more or less using Russian structures. Why we haven't developed efficient autoloaders for tanks and artillery like the Russians did many decades ago also boggles my mind.

When we reduce a platoon (infantry or armour) to a three vehicle construct, we can effectively form two tank battalions in Canada vice one (with spares) and can make nine mechanized infantry battalions vice six. That's not to say that the extra battalions need to be fully manned by Reg F personnel. The extras could be a less expensive to maintain and pay Res F organization. Yes, there are also issues with respect to the "tail" in each brigade and behind that but reductions occur with them as well. The point is one could create more fighting organizations fully equipped from the existing stockpile of gear that we have. 

There are places where we can't change things as dramatically. Artillery and anti-armour are the biggest headache with a very limited stock of guns and capabilities.  Further, we need to clearly articulate how we intend to incorporate modern weapon systems and how our doctrine will change to deal with new threats. An overarching plan for a future Force 2030 is essential to allow us to start the work on structure for Force 2025 and lay the capital project foundations needed for the next decade.

If we don't know the final direction we want to go in, its impossible to take the first step. Frankly there is nothing in the institutional options for Force 2025 that makes me feel warm and fuzzy about that direction. If anyone has any outcomes from the most recent discussions I'd be happy to see them (and probably be disappointed again).

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Looking a bit more at the numbers comparison between our current Infantry structure and the Swedish Mechanized Infantry structure you get some interesting numbers.
> 
> Just looking at the line Infantry Platoon structure, currently each Infantry Platoon is 40 x troops (3 x 10-man Sections and a 10-man Command Element plus Weapons Detachment) with the Mechanized Infantry Platoons each having 4 x LAVs.
> 
> Current Structure:
> 
> 3 x symmetrical Brigades each with:
> 2 x LAV Battalions (18 x Mech Platoons = 72 x LAVs and 720 x Troops)
> 1 x Light Battalion (9 x Light Platoons = 360 x Troops)
> 
> That gives us a total of 216 x LAVs and 3,240 x Troops in our line Infantry Platoons.
> 
> By comparison, using the Swedish model, each Mechanized Platoon would have 29 x Troops riding 3 x LAVs
> 
> So using a Swedish Platoon model, if you were to have one Heavy Brigade consisting of 3 x combined arms Battalions (18 x Mech Infantry Platoons) and two fully Mechanized Infantry Battalions (each with 27 x Mech Infantry Platoons) you'd end up with a total of 72 x Swedish-style Mech Platoons.
> 
> That would give us a total of 216 x LAVs and 2,088 x Troops.
> 
> Same total number of LAVs, but a savings of 1,152 Infantry PYs.  And this is just the savings from the line Infantry Platoons.  I haven't considered any savings from differences in the CS Company, etc. numbers between the two models.
> 
> This would allow us to have an all-Mechanized Infantry force with PYs to spare.  Those numbers could be used to either bring our Force Generation numbers up closer to the unit Establishment numbers, or we could even stand up an additional dedicated Light Battalion in addition to our existing units.



Like  FJAG I like this avenue of investigation.

Couple of more points  especially with respect to the HQ company and Combat Support  

16 more LAV/ACSVs buy you 

4 LAVs in a Recce Platoon (2x 2?) PYs unknown - allow for 40? but possibly as low as 24?
4 LAVs in an AD Platoon  12 PYs (3 crew per vehicle)
8 LAVs in 2x 120mm Mor Platoons 24 PYs (3 crew per vehicle)









2nd point 

If you are looking at Combined Arms Battalions you are now looking at 6 Cap Badges, not 3, and 12 units, not 9.  But you are also looking at the field strength of both the RCIC and the RCAC.

It is the right thing to look at.  It is also the right thing to disregard the Cap Badges.  For the purpose of this exercise.

With respect to FJAG's concerns about casualties:

There are two primary means of handling casualties.  You can replace individuals.  You can replace units.  Large sections with LOBs speak to the former.  Small sections with entire LOB sections speak to the latter.

Life gets simpler if the LIB Sections reflect the requirements of the LAV platoons.  In other words, if 3 LAVs in a platoon and a ground element of 20 then make 20 the basis of the LIB platoon.  And use the extra PYs to create a 4th platoon in the Company and add Combat Support elements. But maintain the 20 PY establishment, even in the CS elements so that, in extremis, they can become GIBs in the back of a standard LAV platoon.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> If you’ve sighted your TOW properly it’s should be like 1 k back and to the flank. Direct fire shouldn’t be a huge worry and by doctrine it should relocate rapidly after the first round. Can do that in a g ride easy enough. Let me add it’s not the ideal option, it’s just what we have in the cupboard right now.



It worked well enough during the 'Toyota War'.

Chad (aided by certain French associated forces) kicked Libyan ass, with Land Cruiser mounted Electric Dart Teams taking out alot of their armour:

In March 1987, the main Libyan air base of Ouadi Doum was captured by Chadian forces. Although strongly defended by minefields, 5,000 soldiers, tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft, the Libyans' base fell to a smaller Chadian attacking force led by Djamous equipped with trucks mounted with machine guns and antitank weapons. Observers estimated that, in the Chadian victories in the first three months of 1987, more than 3,000 Libyan soldiers had been killed, captured, or deserted. Large numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters were captured or destroyed. In some cases, Libya sent its own aircraft to bomb abandoned Libyan equipment to deny its use to the Chadians. It was reported that, in many cases, Libyan soldiers had been killed while fleeing to avoid battle. At Ouadi Doum, panicked Libyans had suffered high casualties running through their own minefields.[









						Toyota War - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

And while we were talking about Canadian AT solutions - in the Afghanistan era

The Strange Case of Echo Company, Lord Stratchona's Horse (Royal Canadians)












						E COY LdSH(RC) PUTS THE LAV TUA TO THE TEST
					

The Light Armoured Vehicle TOW Under Armour (LAV TUA) is the first element of the Direct Fire Unit (DFU) to begin Initial Product Testing (IPT)...



					www.strathconas.ca
				




In 2006, IIRC LAVs were already in Afghanistan. Missiles were already in use against fortified targets.  Wireless TOWs were being built with Bunker Buster Warheads.

The US were using TUA Strykers.

Canada had already started building and fielding what was planned to be 66 TUA LAVs.  Echo Company (from the TOW platoons of the PPCLI) had been rebadged, gone on initial conversion training from M113 to LAV and been issued their first 4 units of a planned 18.

And then the project died.  TOW/TUA/ALT Turrets were stripped from hulls and replaced with Nanuk RWS turrets and shipped to Afghanistan along with the tanks.  The TOW stocks were sold off.  I believe the USMC bought them.

And then we have to buy new TOWs, to mount on tripods, for Latvia, to support infantry mounted in LAVs.

FJAG - our problem is not just a lack of money.  

I am sure that those TUA LAVs would have been welcome additions to the LAVs in Afghanistan.


----------



## GR66

With regard to the Swedish-model Infantry Platoons, the TAPV could be used with an identical dismounted force structure (although with twice the vehicle requirements) for the Reserve Infantry Regiments.

TAPV #1:  Section Leader with 2-man AT Team
TAPV #2:  Section 2 I/C with 2-man MG Team

Standardization makes augmentation and interoperability easier.

Grouping the TAPVs into Carrier Companies so that you can also concentrate your maintenance resources would also make it easier to eventually transition some of the Reserve Carrier Companies to the LAV....if we ever replace some of the LAVs in the Reg Force Battalions with a tracked IFV/HAPC, or purchase additional tanks to convert more of them into Armoured Infantry Battalions.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> And while we were talking about Canadian AT solutions - in the Afghanistan era
> 
> The Strange Case of Echo Company, Lord Stratchona's Horse (Royal Canadians)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> E COY LdSH(RC) PUTS THE LAV TUA TO THE TEST
> 
> 
> The Light Armoured Vehicle TOW Under Armour (LAV TUA) is the first element of the Direct Fire Unit (DFU) to begin Initial Product Testing (IPT)...
> 
> 
> 
> www.strathconas.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In 2006, IIRC LAVs were already in Afghanistan. Missiles were already in use against fortified targets.  Wireless TOWs were being built with Bunker Buster Warheads.
> 
> The US were using TUA Strykers.
> 
> Canada had already started building and fielding what was planned to be 66 TUA LAVs.  Echo Company (from the TOW platoons of the PPCLI) had been rebadged, gone on initial conversion training from M113 to LAV and been issued their first 4 units of a planned 18.
> 
> And then the project died.  TOW/TUA/ALT Turrets were stripped from hulls and replaced with Nanuk RWS turrets and shipped to Afghanistan along with the tanks.  The TOW stocks were sold off.  I believe the USMC bought them.
> 
> And then we have to buy new TOWs, to mount on tripods, for Latvia, to support infantry mounted in LAVs.
> 
> FJAG - our problem is not just a lack of money.
> 
> I am sure that those TUA LAVs would have been welcome additions to the LAVs in Afghanistan.


E Coy was part of the overall redesign of the direct fire capability that was supposed to follow the demise of the tank in the early 2000s. The components were the LAV TUA manned by the infantry, the artillery's ADATS from 4 AD Regt in its anti-armour role and a new capability by way of the Mobile Gun System (MGS) to be manned by the armoured corps.

I'm not sure of the exact organization that these systems were to fall into but essentially there were supposed to be 71 TUAs (I've never seen the number 66 except with respect to the MGS), 30 Multi-Mission Effects Vehicles (the ADATS LAV III follow-on budgeted at $750 million - cancelled in Nov 2006) and 66 MGS for some $600 million which was cancelled in favour of the Leo 2 purchase.)  That ought to translate into 3 regiments (albeit at the time we were thinking very much to forming battlegroups with coy sized attachments and started thinking of artillery and armour as regimental sized force generators but not force employers) so we would probably see some nine composite company-sized deployable groups.

There were several reasons why the projects died a painful death (not least of all in my mind that the idea was silly to start with) but essentially the MGS $s disappeared into the Leo 2, some of the TUAs were reconverted to infantry carriers and the MMEV outright cancelled with the ADATS holding on another half decade with 4 AD Regt as an air defence system.

I tend to agree that we should have kept the TUA with anti armour platoons but anti-armour was dying out in general. It's not the first capability divestment I've disagreed with. They would certainly be useful in Latvia now.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> E Coy was part of the overall redesign of the direct fire capability that was supposed to follow the demise of the tank in the early 2000s. The components were the LAV TUA manned by the infantry, the artillery's ADATS from 4 AD Regt in its anti-armour role and a new capability by way of the Mobile Gun System (MGS) to be manned by the armoured corps.
> 
> I'm not sure of the exact organization that these systems were to fall into but essentially there were supposed to be 71 TUAs (I've never seen the number 66 except with respect to the MGS), 30 Multi-Mission Effects Vehicles (the ADATS LAV III follow-on budgeted at $750 million - cancelled in Nov 2006) and 66 MGS for some $600 million which was cancelled in favour of the Leo 2 purchase.)  That ought to translate into 3 regiments (albeit at the time we were thinking very much to forming battlegroups with coy sized attachments and started thinking of artillery and armour as regimental sized force generators but not force employers) so we would probably see some nine composite company-sized deployable groups.
> 
> There were several reasons why the projects died a painful death (not least of all in my mind that the idea was silly to start with) but essentially the MGS $s disappeared into the Leo 2, some of the TUAs were reconverted to infantry carriers and the MMEV outright cancelled with the ADATS holding on another half decade with 4 AD Regt as an air defence system.
> 
> I tend to agree that we should have kept the TUA with anti armour platoons but anti-armour was dying out in general. It's not the first capability divestment I've disagreed with. They would certainly be useful in Latvia now.
> 
> 🍻


I'm am always amazed why the Infantry is willing to piss away combat forces that have been hard requirements and say "oh well, we don't need them right now..."
   The Canadian Army seems to have an incredible power to be willfully ignorant.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> E Coy was part of the overall redesign of the direct fire capability that was supposed to follow the demise of the tank in the early 2000s. The components were the LAV TUA manned by the infantry, the artillery's ADATS from 4 AD Regt in its anti-armour role and a new capability by way of the Mobile Gun System (MGS) to be manned by the armoured corps.
> 
> I'm not sure of the exact organization that these systems were to fall into but essentially there were supposed to be 71 TUAs (I've never seen the number 66 except with respect to the MGS), 30 Multi-Mission Effects Vehicles (the ADATS LAV III follow-on budgeted at $750 million - cancelled in Nov 2006) and 66 MGS for some $600 million which was cancelled in favour of the Leo 2 purchase.)  That ought to translate into 3 regiments (albeit at the time we were thinking very much to forming battlegroups with coy sized attachments and started thinking of artillery and armour as regimental sized force generators but not force employers) so we would probably see some nine composite company-sized deployable groups.
> 
> There were several reasons why the projects died a painful death (not least of all in my mind that the idea was silly to start with) but essentially the MGS $s disappeared into the Leo 2, some of the TUAs were reconverted to infantry carriers and the MMEV outright cancelled with the ADATS holding on another half decade with 4 AD Regt as an air defence system.
> 
> I tend to agree that we should have kept the TUA with anti armour platoons but anti-armour was dying out in general. It's not the first capability divestment I've disagreed with. They would certainly be useful in Latvia now.
> 
> 🍻



Funny how "Anti-Armour" was dying out but every Anti-Armour missile manufacturer started manufacturing Anti-Structure/Bunker-Busting warheads for their missiles - particularly popular with the troops since at least 1982 when the Brits were using Milans on bunkers at 2 km.

We disagree on the silliness of the Direct Fire Unit.  I like the idea of a Direct Fire Company (Heavy) in every Infantry Battalion. Some mounted on LAVs to the engineering limits of the vehicle.  Some mounted on Airportable UTVs to the limits of those vehicles.

We agree on the utility of the TUA Platoon in the infantry.

You are right on the 66/71 issue.  My error.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Funny how "Anti-Armour" was dying out but every Anti-Armour missile manufacturer started manufacturing Anti-Structure/Bunker-Busting warheads for their missiles - particularly popular with the troops since at least 1982 when the Brits were using Milans on bunkers at 2 km.
> 
> We disagree on the silliness of the Direct Fire Unit.  I like the idea of a Direct Fire Company (Heavy) in every Infantry Battalion. Some mounted on LAVs to the engineering limits of the vehicle.  Some mounted on Airportable UTVs to the limits of those vehicles.
> 
> We agree on the utility of the TUA Platoon in the infantry.
> 
> You are right on the 66/71 issue.  My error.


While the 152mm LV gun on the M551 Sheridan never really worked to a useful point with the Shillelagh thru barrel ATGM - I always thought that method would have been more useful than the 105mm LAV MGS - but honestly I still don't understand why the LAV 6.0 never considered adding a Bradley turret - there are Hellfire Bradley turret prototypes - and you wouldn't need a TUA platoon at that point.

 To me that makes more sense as you aren't not needing more PY - and there are a variety of Hellfire options that make it a replacement for a DFS gun as well.

You don't need every LAV in the fleet to have that turret (ideally yes, but dealing with budget issues - you could make it 1-2 / Platoon -- plus if you have a link to a UAV you can launch NLOS and have the UAV do acquisition for you.
     The Hellfire can do limited (very limited) SHORAD as well if you want (I don't think the RCAF would be keen - as it doesn't have an IFF setup like the Stinger etc).


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> While the 152mm LV gun on the M551 Sheridan never really worked to a useful point with the Shillelagh thru barrel ATGM - I always thought that method would have been more useful than the 105mm LAV MGS - but honestly I still don't understand why the LAV 6.0 never considered adding a Bradley turret - there are Hellfire Bradley turret prototypes - and you wouldn't need a TUA platoon at that point.
> 
> To me that makes more sense as you aren't not needing more PY - and there are a variety of Hellfire options that make it a replacement for a DFS gun as well.
> 
> You don't need every LAV in the fleet to have that turret (ideally yes, but dealing with budget issues - you could make it 1-2 / Platoon -- plus if you have a link to a UAV you can launch NLOS and have the UAV do acquisition for you.
> The Hellfire can do limited (very limited) SHORAD as well if you want (I don't think the RCAF would be keen - as it doesn't have an IFF setup like the Stinger etc).




Heck one ATGM turreted platoon per company would be useful.  There are lots of strap-on ATGM systems for turrets.  Use the same missile for both mounted and dismounted work.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I'm am always amazed why the Infantry is willing to piss away combat forces that have been hard requirements and say "oh well, we don't need them right now..."
> The Canadian Army seems to have an incredible power to be willfully ignorant.



Right now they're hiding all their Cbt Sp Coys in the militia.

And we're not doing such a good job keeping them going, sadly.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> We disagree on the silliness of the Direct Fire Unit. I like the idea of a Direct Fire Company (Heavy) in every Infantry Battalion. Some mounted on LAVs to the engineering limits of the vehicle. Some mounted on Airportable UTVs to the limits of those vehicles.


Don't get me wrong, I firmly believe in direct fire (anti-armour) capabilities in the infantry battalion whether as a support platoon/company in its own right or distributed amongst rifle companies.

It's the early 2000s experimentation with brigading all heavy direct fire capabilities (TOW/MGS/ADATS(MMEV)) in one unit and then using modularity to create DFS teams in Tactical Self-Sufficient Units (TSSUs)

As an aside I found a thread going back to 2005 on this board discussing the then ongoing trials. Some of you were participants - it seems many of you shared my views. 



> Successul trials held for direct fire system
> 
> 
> Interesting and maybe informative read for all you TOW qualified people out there (RCR,VanDoo, & PPCLI). ;) http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/lf/English/6_1_1.asp?id=367  Exert  While the infantry and armour troops were fairly familiar with each other in the field, the air defence gunners were the...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> army.ca



🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Don't get me wrong, I firmly believe in direct fire (anti-armour) capabilities in the infantry battalion whether as a support platoon/company in its own right or distributed amongst rifle companies.
> 
> It's the early 2000s experimentation with brigading all heavy direct fire capabilities (TOW/MGS/ADATS(MMEV)) in one unit and then using modularity to create DFS teams in Tactical Self-Sufficient Units (TSSUs)
> 
> As an aside I found a thread going back to 2005 on this board discussing the then ongoing trials. Some of you were participants - it seems many of you shared my views.
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻




Good Lord!  You're not going to start quoting me back at me are you?  That is most ungentlemanly.   Besides, I change my mind.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Right now they're hiding all their Cbt Sp Coys in the militia.
> 
> And we're not doing such a good job keeping them going, sadly.


We’ll TOW is part of the Light Bn DFS platoon, and each mechanized company is allowed one system. It’s just not employed properly, to the point I’ve been told we’re anchoring our defence on the tow. 

@KevinB the Italians run it that way. Two Freccia with Spike as part of the company support platoon, with a few more in the Battalion Support Company.  Let’s you give those guys freedom to set up good atgm spots while not worrying to much about momentum and all that. If I recall they have dismounted stands in the back.


----------



## GR66

Again expanding on the Swedish model, how would that look for our Armoured Regiments?  Presumably, RCD would provide the Tank Squadrons for the Armoured Infantry Brigade.  What could the Strathconas and 12 RBC look like?

Sticking with the 4 x Squadrons/Companies per Regiment, each with the 3 x Platoons/Troops of three vehicles model you could do something like:

2 x Recce Squadrons/Companies.  Each Platoon/Troop with 2 x LAV LRSS and 1 x LAV w/tube launched UAVs/loitering munitions
2 x AT Squadrons/Companies.  Each Platoon/Troop with 3 x LAV ATGM vehicles

That would give each Armoured Recce Regiment a total of 12 x LAV LRSS, 6 x LAV-UAV and 18 x LAV-ATGM.  Using a non-LOS capable missile on the LAV-AT vehicles would allow targeting from the Regiment's own Recce vehicles/UAVs, the Brigade Recce Squadron vehicles, or the Infantry Battalion's Recce Platoon vehicles.

Presuming a crew of 4 for each vehicle (Commander, Driver, Gunner, Loader/Systems Operator) that's a total of 144 personnel manning the Troop-level vehicles which I believe is roughly the current establishment strength for a single Recce Squadron.  At these numbers you could likely have all of the Reg Force Armoured elements manned at full Establishment strength and have a fully manned separate Recce Squadron for each Reg Force Brigade as well.


----------



## McG

KevinB said:


> I still don't understand why the LAV 6.0 never considered adding a Bradley turret


Probably because GDLS offers its own TOW equipped LAV turret in both the 25 mm and 30 mm cannon configurations. Why drum up business for BAE?


----------



## MilEME09

McG said:


> Probably because GDLS offers its own TOW equipped LAV turret in both the 25 mm and 30 mm cannon configurations. Why drum up business for BAE?


Wonder how much it would be to retrofit out turrets like this?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

markppcli said:


> We’ll TOW is part of the Light Bn DFS platoon, and each mechanized company is allowed one system. It’s just not employed properly, to the point I’ve been told we’re anchoring our defence on the tow.
> 
> @KevinB the Italians run it that way. Two Freccia with Spike as part of the company support platoon, with a few more in the Battalion Support Company.  Let’s you give those guys freedom to set up good atgm spots while not worrying to much about momentum and all that. If I recall they have dismounted stands in the back.


Since when is penny-packetting TOW doctrine?

Siting TOW used to be part of the Bde Anti-Armour plan…


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> Probably because GDLS offers its own TOW equipped LAV turret in both the 25 mm and 30 mm cannon configurations. Why drum up business for BAE?


Would you accept Bradley TYPE turret - seems that would have been a no brainer for 6.0


----------



## daftandbarmy

SeaKingTacco said:


> Since when is penny-packetting TOW doctrine?
> 
> Siting TOW used to be part of the Bde Anti-Armour plan…



Oh, I'll go!

Is the answer: since 'being fair' became more important than 'being effective'?


----------



## FJAG

SeaKingTacco said:


> Since when is penny-packetting TOW doctrine?
> 
> Siting TOW used to be part of the Bde Anti-Armour plan…


I'm not sure what rationale there is these days other than we have limited equipment and need to spread it around.

You're right about the way things used to be when we had weapons each with its specific envelope. Depending on the size of that envelope depends on where it is placed in the organization and tactically deployed. In my days that was LAW, MAW and TOW period. Things changed a bit when Eryx came on the scene but not much as it filled a small niche above MAW. Remember that LAWs and MAWs and even Eryx fell fairly much within the same envelope as a battalions other weapons which, at the time didn't exceed a .50. 

These days we are into a whole new regime. A battalion's rifles and machine guns still have the same range, but the LAV adds an ability to reach out further as do newer ATGMs, drones and loitering munitions. Quite frankly, I think it's time to throw out the old rulebooks and rewrite them for what we have and - most importantly - what we should have to properly fight.

I can't help but think that if we are focused on dispersed operations (as we should be) then we really need to build a very robust cavalry capability that can provide a screen, a guard and fill in the the gaps and flanks. In a light or medium brigade we may only need two infantry battalions in favour of converting the recce regiment and the third battalion to two cavalry regiments consisting of a mix of recce and direct fire vehicles, primarily ATGM equipped infantry, maybe a UAV/loitering munitions capability and a solid core of FOOs/JTACs. In effect a brigade with an ability to create some hard points and some fluid forces to manoeuvre around them. Just spitballing here.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> Probably because GDLS offers its own TOW equipped LAV turret in both the 25 mm and 30 mm cannon configurations. Why drum up business for BAE?


There's also this:








> https://www.gdls.com/images/pdf/stryker/ATGM.pdf



Meanwhile the Poles have added a Spike to a turret:








> Polish Company HSW Unveils Its Turret RCTS-30 with Spike Anti-tank Guided Missiles
> 
> 
> Recently, the Polish Company Huta Stalowa Wola S.A (HSW) has conducted trial tests with its Remote Controlled Turret System (RCTS-30) ...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> militaryleak.com



The possibilities are endless. All that's needed is some vision, a plan and some cash.

Incidentally, does anyone have a breakdown of the variants coming down the ramp of the most recent LAV VI Combat Support Vehicle project. It strikes me from what I read that it's C&C and CSS vehicle and anything but actual combat support.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Incidentally, does anyone have a breakdown of the variants coming down the ramp of the most recent LAV VI Combat Support Vehicle project. It strikes me from what I read that it's C&C and CSS vehicle and anything but actual combat support.
> 
> 🍻


This is from Wikipedia but I think it's in line with other articles I've seen:

41 x Troop Cargo Vehicles (TCV), 49 x Ambulance, 97 x Command Post Vehicles, 19 x Engineer Vehicles, 18 x EW Vehicles, 54 x Maintenance Recovery Vehicles, 70 x Mobile Repair Team Vehicles and 13 x Fitter/Cargo Vehicles.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> This is from Wikipedia but I think it's in line with other articles I've seen:
> 
> 41 x Troop Cargo Vehicles (TCV), 49 x Ambulance, 97 x Command Post Vehicles, 19 x Engineer Vehicles, 18 x EW Vehicles, 54 x Maintenance Recovery Vehicles, 70 x Mobile Repair Team Vehicles and 13 x Fitter/Cargo Vehicles.



Which is awesome in its own right, of course.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> This is from Wikipedia but I think it's in line with other articles I've seen:
> 
> 41 x Troop Cargo Vehicles (TCV), 49 x Ambulance, 97 x Command Post Vehicles, 19 x Engineer Vehicles, 18 x EW Vehicles, 54 x Maintenance Recovery Vehicles, 70 x Mobile Repair Team Vehicles and 13 x Fitter/Cargo Vehicles.



Not too sound too pricky about it but 24 mortar carriers, 24 gun tractors for the M777, and maybe 24 TOW vehicles would have been more important than 97 command post vehicles. 

Just for comparison, a complete Stryker brigade has 30 CP variants: 5 in Bde HQ, 5 in each of the three rifle bn HQs (and none for the company - they operate out of standard Strykers), 1 in the arty Bn (I presume for the FSCC) and 9 in the Cavalry Sqn (6 in the HQ and 1 in each of the three troops) - so for each CMBG as configured there should be 24 as only two bns are LAV'd and the Recce regt could probably be cut back to 5 as well - lets say 21 per brigade all up. That would leave 34 to repurpose. 

Maybe it's just me but I'd prefer to see mortars and ATGMs under armour instead of a herd of superfluous staff officers.

Okay I could be persuaded away from the gun tractors although TLAVs were vital in Afghanistan to protect the detachments when moving by road.


----------



## Ostrozac

FJAG said:


> Okay I could be persuaded away from the gun tractors although TLAVs were vital in Afghanistan to protect the detachments when moving by road.


I‘m not fully convinced that towed guns behind armoured vehicles makes much sense. I remember when LG1 towed by Grizzly AVGP was supposed to be the next best thing — that didn’t last long. A US SBCT tows their M777 behind trucks. Either go with self propelled, or don’t. Halfway makes little sense,

We used to have self-propelled 81mm mortar versions of the Bison — I always found them to be an incredible useful, lethal, weapon system, and having 99 rounds on board was impressive. I’m not sure why we abandoned them. Nor why an SPM (either 81 or 120) isn’t on the table right now.


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:


> I‘m not fully convinced that towed guns behind armoured vehicles makes much sense. I remember when LG1 towed by Grizzly AVGP was supposed to be the next best thing — that didn’t last long. A US SBCT tows their M777 behind trucks. Either go with self propelled, or don’t. Halfway makes little sense,



I have to admit I'm on the fence on the thing. I personally favour armoured SP's (wheeled or tracked) to provide protection from counter fire. The armoured gun limber doesn't do that but it provides armoured protection for the crew from IEDs (within reason) and from small arms fire while on the road. That was an important point for gun detachments in Afghanistan on those occasions where they had to occasionally change position by road. The armoured gun limber is also incompatible with air moves of a battery. For example an M119 and its HMMWV can be lifted by a Chinook and while an M777 can be lifted, it's armoured limber can't which limits things.

One of the big problems with the first few Kandahar tours was which vehicle would be the M777s limber. Gunners would train on one system in Canada and find themselves with something completely different when they finally arrived because folks in theatre reassigned vehicles willy-nilly.

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Ostrozac said:


> I‘m not fully convinced that towed guns behind armoured vehicles makes much sense. I remember when LG1 towed by Grizzly AVGP was supposed to be the next best thing — that didn’t last long. A US SBCT tows their M777 behind trucks. Either go with self propelled, or don’t. Halfway makes little sense,
> 
> We used to have self-propelled 81mm mortar versions of the Bison — I always found them to be an incredible useful, lethal, weapon system, and having 99 rounds on board was impressive. I’m not sure why we abandoned them. Nor why an SPM (either 81 or 120) isn’t on the table right now.


A Bison like LAV 6 with a 120mm in it would make a significant difference right now.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> I'm am always amazed why the Infantry is willing to piss away combat forces that have been hard requirements and say "oh well, we don't need them right now..."
> The Canadian Army seems to have an incredible power to be willfully ignorant.


Not to sound petty or immature, but I think it’s just a matter of an absence of common sense. 

It’s pretty lacking in all areas of life - government, private business, everyday decisions made by people who haven’t thought through their actions beyond the immediate “Me Do This Now…” 🤪


Ostrozac said:


> I‘m not fully convinced that towed guns behind armoured vehicles makes much sense. I remember when LG1 towed by Grizzly AVGP was supposed to be the next best thing — that didn’t last long. A US SBCT tows their M777 behind trucks. Either go with self propelled, or don’t. Halfway makes little sense,
> 
> We used to have self-propelled 81mm mortar versions of the Bison — I always found them to be an incredible useful, lethal, weapon system, and having 99 rounds on board was impressive. I’m not sure why we abandoned them. Nor why an SPM (either 81 or 120) isn’t on the table right now.


Couldn’t agree more.  The vehicles are already in production right here in Canada, and there are Stryker versions already in service that are of the SPM variant.  

Talk about a simple solution to a problem that would increase the lethality of our field units.  (Mind you, a modern ATGM is also a simple solution to another problem, and…..)


----------



## markppcli

SeaKingTacco said:


> Since when is penny-packetting TOW doctrine?
> 
> Siting TOW used to be part of the Bde Anti-Armour plan…


Well that would imply we follow doctrine….

Give  infsntry platoon and section in battle a read and compare the organization it gives for a Bn in comparison to reality. We’ve decided that instead of using PYs for tow platoons we’ll make a section in deploying companies tow capable….


----------



## SeaKingTacco

markppcli said:


> Well that would imply we follow doctrine….
> 
> Give  infsntry platoon and section in battle a read and compare the organization it gives for a Bn in comparison to reality. We’ve decided that instead of using PYs for tow platoons we’ll make a section in deploying companies tow capable….


FML…


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> Well that would imply we follow doctrine….
> 
> Give  infsntry platoon and section in battle a read and compare the organization it gives for a Bn in comparison to reality. We’ve decided that instead of using PYs for tow platoons we’ll make a section in deploying companies tow capable….


By now I think most people think Doctrine is that humor website with military satire...


----------



## Weinie

KevinB said:


> By now I think most people think Doctrine is that humor website with military satire...


I am a doctrine guy, and even I have to agree with that.


----------



## suffolkowner

FJAG said:


> Not too sound too pricky about it but 24 mortar carriers, 24 gun tractors for the M777, and maybe 24 TOW vehicles would have been more important than 97 command post vehicles.
> 
> Just for comparison, a complete Stryker brigade has 30 CP variants: 5 in Bde HQ, 5 in each of the three rifle bn HQs (and none for the company - they operate out of standard Strykers), 1 in the arty Bn (I presume for the FSCC) and 9 in the Cavalry Sqn (6 in the HQ and 1 in each of the three troops) - so for each CMBG as configured there should be 24 as only two bns are LAV'd and the Recce regt could probably be cut back to 5 as well - lets say 21 per brigade all up. That would leave 34 to repurpose.
> 
> Maybe it's just me but I'd prefer to see mortars and ATGMs under armour instead of a herd of superfluous staff officers.
> 
> Okay I could be persuaded away from the gun tractors although TLAVs were vital in Afghanistan to protect the detachments when moving by road.


from wikipedia as well





__





						List of equipment of the Canadian Army - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




651 LAV III originally purchased. 550 upgraded to LAV 6.0 standard under the LAV UP program in 2019. Configurations consist of 278 Infantry Section Carrier (ISC), 181 Command Post Vehicle (CPV), 47 Observation Post Vehicle (OPV), and 44 Engineer LAV (ELAV).[146] Additional 66 vehicles are being upgraded to LAV 6.0 standard under the LAV Recce Surveillance System (LRSS) program by 2020.[145][115][147][148]

so another 181 LAV 6 Command Post Vehicles. Do we need more than the 278 Infantry Section Carriers? You would think it would be easy to add the motar carriers, IM-SHORAD, TOW. Jobs! Jobs! Jobs! after all.


----------



## FJAG

suffolkowner said:


> ...
> 651 LAV III originally purchased. 550 upgraded to LAV 6.0 standard under the LAV UP program in 2019. Configurations consist of 278 Infantry Section Carrier (ISC), 181 Command Post Vehicle (CPV), 47 Observation Post Vehicle (OPV), and 44 Engineer LAV (ELAV).[146] Additional 66 vehicles are being upgraded to LAV 6.0 standard under the LAV Recce Surveillance System (LRSS) program by 2020.[145][115][147][148]
> 
> so another 181 LAV 6 Command Post Vehicles. Do we need more than the 278 Infantry Section Carriers? You would think it would be easy to add the motar carriers, IM-SHORAD, TOW. Jobs! Jobs! Jobs! after all.


If we already had 181 CP versions under LAV UP, why did we get another 97 under LAV Combat Support Vehicle?

Just doing some quick math at 4 section carriers per platoon (incl the pl comd) and three platoons to a coy (12) and three companies per battalion (36 - assuming the coy comd vehicles are CP versions) and six LAV battalions (108) (and just for fun, a complete extra battalion in storage for operational use (144) (and just for heck, lets say another battalion in schools etc (180) - so where are the other 98 section carriers (that's almost three battalions). 

We seem to also have a herd of CPs (181? Really?), enough OPVs for 3 regt's (27 - 36 needed out of 47) and engineers (44). 

And that's before we count what? 500 TAPVs? and another 361 LAV 6.0s under the LAV Combat Support Vehicle program.

At this rate we'll have more armoured vehicles then we can man? - Kind of like the navy and ships, isn't it? - Good thing that the Air Force has more than enough pilots   

🍻


----------



## suffolkowner

FJAG said:


> If we already had 181 CP versions under LAV UP, why did we get another 97 under LAV Combat Support Vehicle?
> 
> Just doing some quick math at 4 section carriers per platoon (incl the pl comd) and three platoons to a coy (12) and three companies per battalion (36 - assuming the coy comd vehicles are CP versions) and six LAV battalions (108) (and just for fun, a complete extra battalion in storage for operational use (144) (and just for heck, lets say another battalion in schools etc (180) - so where are the other 98 section carriers (that's almost three battalions).
> 
> We seem to also have a herd of CPs (181? Really?), enough OPVs for 3 regt's (27 - 36 needed out of 47) and engineers (44).
> 
> And that's before we count what? 500 TAPVs? and another 361 LAV 6.0s under the LAV Combat Support Vehicle program.
> 
> At this rate we'll have more armoured vehicles then we can man? - Kind of like the navy and ships, isn't it? - Good thing that the Air Force has more than enough pilots
> 
> 🍻


I've wondered about the LAV variants for years! None of my army buddies seemed to be able to explain the mix either.


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> If we already had 181 CP versions under LAV UP


The LAV 6 CP is poorly named. It is a turreted command vehicle for platoon, company, and battalion commanders. Engr Recce Sgt sometimes operate from LAV 6 CP because they don’t need all the benches of an ISC.

The ACSV CP will be an actual stand-up CP reminiscent of a Bison & Queen Marry hybrid.


----------



## OldSolduer

McG said:


> The LAV 6 CP is poorly named. It is a turreted command vehicle for platoon, company, and battalion commanders. Engr Recce Sgt sometimes operate from LAV 6 CP because they don’t need all the benches of an ISC.
> 
> The ACSV CP will be an actual stand-up CP reminiscent of a Bison & Queen Marry hybrid.


An actual command post vehicle needs room for radios and other stuff - like people to man the radios. A vehicle with a turret on it isn't a CP.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> The LAV 6 CP is poorly named. It is a turreted command vehicle for platoon, company, and battalion commanders. Engr Recce Sgt sometimes operate from LAV 6 CP because they don’t need all the benches of an ISC.
> 
> The ACSV CP will be an actual stand-up CP reminiscent of a Bison & Queen Marry hybrid.


I seemed to sense that from the pictures of companies in their existing LAVs and of the LAV CS program CP variants. (I understood that the difference between a LAV III section carrier and CP carrier was the radio installation (and I think, a CP penthouse kit). IMHO the company CPs should stay exactly that way because - well - combat. 

I can see roles for perhaps 5 Queen Marys in a bn CP and Recce Rgt CP and maybe 8 in a bde HQ, which puts us around 70 or so as currently structured - but 181 Queen Marys? Especially when there are no mortar or ATGM carriers?

Colour me cynical.


----------



## suffolkowner

FJAG said:


> I seemed to sense that from the pictures of companies in their existing LAVs and of the LAV CS program CP variants. (I understood that the difference between a LAV III section carrier and CP carrier was the radio installation (and I think, a CP penthouse kit). IMHO the company CPs should stay exactly that way because - well - combat.
> 
> I can see roles for perhaps 5 Queen Marys in a bn CP and Recce Rgt CP and maybe 8 in a bde HQ, which puts us around 70 or so as currently structured - but 181 Queen Marys? Especially when there are no mortar or ATGM carriers?
> 
> Colour me cynical.


I think its suggested maybe 97 from the ACSV not the 181 from the LAV 6.0


----------



## McG

Well, some of those CPs will replace bison CPs that currently do RRBs, I would guess. There is also unit & sub-unit CPs for Artillery & Engineers … including in 5 Div (when I saw 4 GS’s MRR Bty in the field it was all B fleet except for the Queen Marry CP). I imagine 1 Div HQ and/or JSR will claim a few more, and there are probably a few going to schools.


----------



## FJAG

suffolkowner said:


> I think its suggested maybe 97 from the ACSV not the 181 from the LAV 6.0


You're right of course. I think I'm getting too tired.

So with 97 ACSV CPs we should be able to fill all the brigade and mech bn CPs with maybe a few extras. That should release, one would think, 97 LAV 6.0 UP CP versions ( if they were already being used as bde and bn CPs and of which there are 181 total)- which begs the question: where will all those LAV 6.0 UP CP's be used if the bns and bde HQ won't need them any more.


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> So with 97 ACSV CPs we should be able to fill all the brigade and mech bn CPs with maybe a few extras. That should release, one would think, 97 LAV 6.0 UP CP versions


It will not free-up LAV 6 CPs because most of those are used as commanders’ vehicles and not as CPs. Some are company CPs, but you have identified they should stay as such. Others are Engr Recce where they are needed for radio configuration & the extra eqpt space on the back.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> It will not free-up LAV 6 CPs because most of those are used as commanders’ vehicles and not as CPs. Some are company CPs, but you have identified they should stay as such. Others are Engr Recce where they are needed for radio configuration & the extra eqpt space on the back.


Yeah. I know that much of the LAV ACSV program is to replace tired Bisons and TLAVs. That makes a lot of sense (although I disagree with divestment. There's usage left in many of those old beasts.)

A lot of the LAV ACSVs, like the fitter and recovery and ambulance and extra engineer vehicles should have been bought decades ago.

But lets leave aside the version numbers and concentrate on total numbers of armoured vehicles. 

We have 550 under LAV UP, another 66 under Recce and another 361 under LAV ACSV - That's a total of 927 LAV 6.0 of all versions. The there are 500 TAPVs for a total armoured fleet of 1,427 wheeled armoured vehicles.

If you look at a Stryker BCT it has a total of around 220 Strykers (actually 294 but that's for three Stryker battalions each of whom has 8 mortar carriers - we only have two mech battalions and no mortars). So three Stryker BCTs (with two mech bns each) total 660 Strykers give or take a dozen here or there. We have close to 40% more LAV 6.0s and when you take the TAPVs into account we have close to 100% excess the number of vehicles needed to equip 3 Stryker BCTs. And yes, some of those TAPVs are with the Reserves.

The Canadian Army is obviously giving LAVs to a lot of folks and teams that the US Stryker BCT equips with wheeled vehicles. No wonder we have a problem with VOR rates. And undoubtedly there's a number being held in an operational reserve and at schools - but that's still a fair gap.

All of which gets me back to my original bitch which is why we don't equip our battalions with ATGM and mortar LAVs? If it's just PYs then fill them with reservists. Between the 181 LAV UP turreted CPs and the 97 LAV ACSV "Queen Mary" CPs we have a total of 278 CPs of some type or other. Do we just value armouring our staff officer more than armouring our mortars and ATGMs (that we have far too few of anyway)?

And don't get me started on why we don't allocate four or five companies' worth to reserve force training centres.

Rant ends.


----------



## McG

I suspect politics had much to do with it. The ACSV was plodding along and then suddenly launched forward in a rush that conveniently allowed a “we’re buying Canadian” announcement just before the 2019 election. How did the project get that speed? It ditched detailed defining of fleet composition requirements and did strict platform replacement with some minor tweaking. We also committed to buying all the new ACSV in the same new hull that GDLS designed to replace a Queen Mary.  So the combat team ambulance, which used to be the smallest most subtle vehicle as bison or TLAV, will now be one of the tallest. The troop carrier and Engr Sect Carrier will also be extraneously bulky & harder to hide. This would not be a good platform for ATGM or mortars.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> I suspect politics had much to do with it. The ACSV was plodding along and then suddenly launched forward in a rush that conveniently allowed a “we’re buying Canadian” announcement just before the 2019 election. How did the project get that speed? It ditched detailed defining of fleet composition requirements and did strict platform replacement with some minor tweaking. We also committed to buying all the new ACSV in the same new hull that GDLS designed to replace a Queen Mary.  So the combat team ambulance, which used to be the smallest most subtle vehicle as bison or TLAV, will now be one of the tallest. The troop carrier and Engr Sect Carrier will also be extraneously bulky & harder to hide. This would not be a good platform for ATGM or mortars.


That modularity is actually a good thing. As long as it still fits in an airplane and under the vast majority of bridges its still good. 

One can only hope that there will be another purchase of LAVs for SHORAD, mortar and ATGM. Personally I would like to keep London in production and to continue to make armoured vehicles for the Army indefinitely. I'd just like to spread them out a bit further than they are now.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> That modularity is actually a good thing. As long as it still fits in an airplane and under the vast majority of bridges its still good.
> 
> One can only hope that there will be another purchase of LAVs for SHORAD, mortar and ATGM. Personally I would like to keep London in production and to continue to make armoured vehicles for the Army indefinitely. I'd just like to spread them out a bit further than they are now.
> 
> 🍻



FJAG - where do you expect to employ this never-ending stream of tin-cans?

Can we have some money to buy some more helicopters from Montreal?  They will come in at least as handy.


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG - where do you expect to employ this never-ending stream of tin-cans?
> 
> Can we have some money to buy some more helicopters from Montreal?  They will come in at least as handy.


I don’t mean to reply on FJAG’s behalf obviously, but I think he’s simply thinking of developing a longer term plan than exists now. 

I had suggested something similar in another thread a while back.  

Instead of ordering 550 LAVs from GDLS in London all at once, and then nothing for a decade or so - if we did spread our purchases out to be more frequent, it would benefit everyone.  

Same goes for helicopters in Quebec (thankfully Bell does make good helicopters) - by purchasing 10 a year or so, and upgrading the ones in cycle, it just stabilizes the workforce.  Stable workforce is a more experienced workforce, stabilizes the local economy, etc.  

(The above only works if we don’t have to run a bloody competition every single time ofcourse…)


Our boom & bust way of doing things isn’t good for anybody.  



0.02


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG - where do you expect to employ this never-ending stream of tin-cans?
> 
> Can we have some money to buy some more helicopters from Montreal?  They will come in at least as handy.


Twenty thousand unequipped reservists.

This stuff is new enough to last another twenty years.

It actually provides options if one organizes to maintain it properly. I keep saying; government and the people understand the need for defence and security - they're just fed up with the spiraling costs much of which stems from keeping a standing army on year-round salaries. Think of what you could do if you could freeze the budget bet dedicate 30% of the full-time pay packet to modernizing equipment.



CBH99 said:


> I don’t mean to reply on FJAG’s behalf obviously, but I think he’s simply thinking of developing a longer term plan than exists now.
> 
> I had suggested something similar in another thread a while back.
> 
> Instead of ordering 550 LAVs from GDLS in London all at once, and then nothing for a decade or so - if we did spread our purchases out to be more frequent, it would benefit everyone.


Very much so. It's an industry which we have to keep alive and in fact we should help it to diversify. We need to keep product upgrades and improvements and maintenance constantly going over the next twenty or so years of the life of this equipment and have a viable manufacturing base for when it is time yo replace it. If there's one thing that is clear its that once an industry like this shuts down its a massive and very expensive effort to start it up again. There's absolutely no reason why the capability shortfalls that we have now can't be incorporated into a LAV 6.0 chassis. I can see autoloading 155 SPs, ammo limbers and a variety of precision rockets type systems all using a common chassis. Maybe a few of the Centauro like tank destroyers - I already mentioned mortar and ATGM carriers. We just spent $2 billion on 381 vehicles that will take until 2022 or so to complete - let's spend another half billion every year for the next five or six years to build another 300 real combat support vehicles.

The other thing is trucks. This replacement of the whole fleet at one time with a range of different types of vehicles is IMHO problematic - especially as we tend to reduce the size of the fleet with each purchase. We need a selection of a limited number of standard SMP vehicles which keep being continuously in a set number per year produced to offset losses, and spare parts to replace worn out elements and being product improved. My guess is that eighty percent of a given truck does not change from model to model - frames, cabs, load beds, wheels - they can be manufactured with the same tools and dies for decades. Power packs and drivetrain elements do go through generations and the chassis should be capable of taking a new one just like many aircraft can take modified and improved engines.

We need a long term industrial manufacturing plan. Oh yeah. And then there's ammunition. But that's another story. 

🍻


----------



## Dale Denton

I think this may be worth a new thread? Strategic industrial manufacturing and sustainability? 

Make an NSS for the Army/RCAF. Tell key industrial partners that if they maintain a heavy presence in this country, we will keep them working. 

Make a commitment to industry that Canada will always have the ability to build almost any ship the RCN/CCG needs, APCs (and many variants) rotary wing aircraft. Add to that list as you wish. 

You could even use local Toyota dealerships to run basic maintenance on a MILCOTs Toyota Land Cruiser, and use the companies large manufacturing presence in Canada to keep the auto industry happy too. Cheaper and than giving an auto industry plant loans or handouts, and heck, the CF gets something out of it too. Buy CANAMs or MRZRs for the Reserves (to start) and try something similar.

Keep a line building more and more complex LAV variants and maintain the ability to run deep maintenance on older models on a running basis like the US does with the Abrams. Start a design project on the next LAV/APC to be built here in 10 years using our decades of experience in wheeled LAVs. Start building the easier 'base' models then grow the project to replace the newer and complex LAV 6 variants (ACSVs, SHORAD, AA/AD, MC etc...) with your new LAV. Export unarmed versions only...if anyone else buys them.

Run a parallel project to build out the LAV fleet to see how we can throw more jobs on this platform. A new turret (maybe different caliber?), ATGM, SHORAD, AD, Mortar and any variant that a company can reasonably fit onto the platform. Carry notes over to the next LAV program to make the new one more future-proof and easier to work on and maintain. 

Same thing with the Griffon and Twin Otter. Buy X many new ones per year, build new features into them. Start a new replacement program with other Bell/Viking products built or assembled in Canada in 10 years. The utility helicopter market is growing and our friends also have a need (UK), wouldn't it be great if we anticipated the needs of our friends and our own CF to build something we can all use?


----------



## Kirkhill

Now I get your drift, FJAG.

And I agree with you.

Perhaps it would help it would help if we established "utility" standards rather than all these custom-tailored variants?

Ammunition orders are standardized.  The only real variable is the quantity.

Perhaps if we could contract for baseline units that are useful in their own right to be delivered at a standard pace.  In the way that trucks are commonly built.  Powertrain and frame and cab to which a box can be attached.  A Bison type armoured vehicle - light and amphibious and able to be driven by a militia driver - neither that nor the M113 seemed to take much effort to modify to meet specific needs.  An up-engined utility standard Griffon II perhaps.  A steady supply of C6,7,8 and 9 parts out of Diemaco.

Is that in line with your thinking?  Start with a delivery schedule equivalent to wastage so as to maintain a standard of capability?

Edit - Just finished typing after you posted GR66.


----------



## foresterab

I've been following this for weeks and pondering options...not so much for Reg Force units but the role of Reserve units and operability.

Please also keep in mind I'm a civilian but have a background in emergency management which has colored much of my thinking. 

Premise 1 - Use of reserve units will continue and most likely expand in response to emergency civilian situations (fire/flood/pandemic...)  due to ability of the federal government to be able to deploy a uniform, self contained, visible force to assist the lead province/municipality
Premise 2 - Vehicles have to be able to be maintain by existing civilian infrastructure within Canada.   This means over the counter purchase and limited specialty equipment unless it's for a very distinct and unique military role.

When I think of the military and the number of functions needed by each unit - people mover/transport/POL/medical I often think back to working overseas and in Nepal the role of Tata trucks.  These are sold as a vehicle with cab/frame/tires but the rear deck is custom built based upon the customer's needs.   So the same truck can be installed with a tank for POL or water movement or a flat deck if you need to move modular sea cans.   Add stake mounts or stakes to the side of a flat deck and you've for a cattle truck/log truck/hay bale wagon.   Simple and low tech but due to the common parts for almost all the truck it becomes easy for a mechanic to work on any truck vs. a specific vehicle model.   For reference these are about 20 ton capacity and for size reference between a 6x6 truck and long haul tractor trailer truck in size.

If a reserve unit is running 100 personnel we are not talking a significant number of vehicles unless a person starts thinking about how to deploy both the soldier and it's gear.    My personal preference would be a "large" fleet of 4x4 extended cab pickups suitable for 4x soldiers.   Why this set up?

4x4 capacity allows for travel in both remote and urban areas.   
Pickup allows for the use of civilian Class 5 driver's licenses with limited additional driver training needed
An extended cab pickup is suitable for travel and/or deployment point of personal gear while on operations.  This is similar to wildfire crews deploying with handtools and personal webbing for the day but also allows for transportation of support gear in bed.   
In event of break down you have the ability to surge 50% of the crew capacity per truck - 6 people - with seatbelts.   This is often overlooked but can be important.   Note this is a surge capacity and should be baseline as now you're jammed tight in the truck. 
Addition of a truck topper unit allows for set up of a medical aid post.   Its not a question of "if" injuries are to occur but a question of "When" and "how many".   Addition of a clean sterile location for immediate stabilization is a major gain for this type of work and a 1/10 ratio would not be unrealistic of truck.  
If the full unit deployed this way we'd be talking 25 trucks.   20,000 reserve unit/100 people per = need for 5,000 pickups.   As mentioned elsewhere this should not be a surge purchase but part of an ongoing replacement/rotation of trucks in the 200-250 range per year.   Why so few...because you need more than just pick ups.

For example - Transport unit:

need for a wrecker/tow trucks?   Can a deck truck similar to AMA contractor be used?  you need a couple but you're able to handle at least most smaller units. 
Fuel truck as you want to have your own fueling station.   Tidy tanks in the back of a few trucks can be a major assist but you still want reliable fuel.  
Crane/boom truck?  Need to move a major generator? Sea Can? you're not doing it with pickups so now you're into larger units. 
Mechanic service truck? 
Command and communications truck?
Now even for this type of scenario there are a number of truck models out there used by welders/pressure trucks/water trucks that are in the 5-15 ton range and will handle much of the work.   Instead of deploying everything as trucks you then have a smaller subset of larger trucks (class 3 civilian license equivalent) that are common dual wheel drive 4x4 capable for driver familiarity even if they don't know the specific truck.   

A couple more considerations...I've used 100 soldiers as a basic premise.  But not all units are at that level and maybe not all are priority for purchasing new trucks based upon their existing fleets.   But the Government of Canada already buys pickups and cars via bulk offers for other departments so it would not be a reach to add additional trucks to existing processes.   Service work can be done via local dealerships/mechanic garages so you're not maintaining a parts inventory and you have a product that, upon end of lifespan, can easily be disposed of via local surplus auction/sale.    Additional trucks can also be sourced via fleet rentals if needed for specific training missions and remain fully integrated. 

This however is a pure civilian response situation and does not fully address the needs of an Army especially looking at specialized unit formation and higher training.    But the cost of running a pick up is significantly lower than that of running a larger unit which in theory allows for a more centralized fleet of military vehicles (i.e. LAV's) to be maintained at the main training bases.    Coordination of a road movement convey with pick-ups would translate, at least, partially to running a supply convoy on CFB Gagetown or Wainwright.    Much of command is knowing where your resources are and communication between units and this can be learned on cheaper units maneuvering in rural Saskatchewan or British Columbia via civilian vehicles prior to doing an annual? bi-annual? unit exercise on the more unit specific unit mission units.  

If the Armed Forces are going to insist upon long pre-mission workup exercises prior to deployment on UN/NATO missions then I tend to think that trying to maintain full capacity everywhere is not likely.   Instead focus on a simpler task loading for the day to day while aligning the structure and main unit focus in alignment for the clearly defined and pre-planned larger scale training (i.e. a reservist should be able to show all major training to an employer at the beginning of the calendar year short of war mobilization) might help bridge the gap between being under resourced for a peer-to-peer conflict situation and being over geared for simpler civilian aid missions. 

Anyways...a different perspective from a civilian.
foresterab


----------



## FJAG

Actually not bad for a civilian effort.

My thoughts on logistic vehicles differ significantly from Canada's past line of thinking which consists of fleets of both standard military pattern (SMP) and commercial off the shelf (but militarized - MILCOTS) lines in weight ranges going from utility (around .25 to 1.5 ton capacity) to 1.25 to 1.5 ton (your basic pick up range), 2.5 ton, 5 ton (medium capacity) and 10 ton (heavy capacity).

My thoughts differ in that I don't simply want to give reservists trucks to provide them mobility, I want to equip them the same way as the Regular Force so that they can fully operationally capable and perform military missions particulalar to their specialty.

Firstly I would give up the MILCOTS line completely. It basically doubles the variety of vehicles and creates a more complex spare parts and maintenance requirement (even if the work is given to neighbourhood car dealers) and limits the number of vehicles which can be deployed operationally. One think about car dealerships, they won't go to the Congo on a UN deployment or to Latvia on a NATO one. Quite frankly, I'd give up a complete Regular Force infantry battalion if it would give us six hundred more maintainers and parts supply clerks within the various brigades.

As far as the lines of vehicles go I'd firstly give up the give up the light utility vehicles and light support vehicles completely in favour of a single 4x4 light utility chassis in the 1.5 - 2 ton capacity range. Something in the nature of a JLTV but with a little more flexibility in body choices. Give it the basic frame and powertrain of, for example, a Ford F-350 with a modified suspension and standard belly plate to be mine resistant so that everything from the engine to the wheels, regardless of model, is standard. Then add specialized bodies from unarmoured to armoured and from basic utility (passenger) to basic utility (cargo), small CPs, ambulance. maint fitter, light infantry section vehicle, light wheeled reconnaissance etc etc. (in very, very round figures, we need about 4,000 of these)

Next create a basic tactical logistics line in say the 7.5 - 10 ton range and which would be the sole vehicle (save recovery) within all battalion sized units. Again a common mine resistant chassis suspension and powertrain and cab (either armoured or unarmoured) but specialized load beds from pallet to cargo with drop down benches for passengers to gun tractor det cab and ammo storage to specialized containers from everything from fitters to communications to secured stores etc. (again in very round figures I would guess we need about 4,000 of these as well plus some trailers)

The third line of vehicles would be heavy logistics line of around a 15 ton capacity. Same idea as the medium as to chassis, power train and cab with varying cargo configuration possibilities including a semi trailer capable one for both flatbed and containers. These would only be held at the brigade service battalion and any service support formations. (My guess is about 1,500 plus some trailers)

There is one additional limited class and if can be built from the heavy line with perhaps a much heavier powertrain that would be good. Basically it has two variants, one is a recovery vehicle with the capacity to handle up to the heaviest LAV we have in difficult terrain and the other is a Heavy Equipment Transport (HET) variant capable of handling the heaviest Leo 2 tank that we have. (my guess is around 100 - 125 recovery and 50 - 75 HETs)

The standardization into three fleets each based on its own common chassis and powertrain would greatly simplify both training of operators and maintainers and the maintenance system. If the powertrains come with few modifications from standard production lines then one can add on commercial maintenance support but, quite frankly I'm a firm believer that we need to a) simplify maintenance through standardized vehicle lines and b) train and man all our maintenance support in house through full-time military maintainers so that we can ensure the deployability of our maintenance system. A 100% simplified SMP fleet will still be fully able to support any and all domestic operations.

I'll be the first to agree that others have a much different view of how the Army should handle vehicle fleets and maintenance. Unfortunately while their views may prevail and may be feasible in a peacetime army, they will not enhance operational capabilities which, after all, is why the government spends the big bucks on us.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

From a weekend with too much time on my hands.

The vehicle list garnered from Public Services and Procurement Canada's recently delivered and currently under development projects.  Presumably these constitute the backbone of Force 2025-Force 2030



CF (SSE Upgrade)71,500RCN CSC15RCN SSK4RCN JSS2RCN AOPS6+2RCN MCDV12RCAF Ftrs88RCAF CP140 Recap14CH-14685CH-14715CH-14827CH-14914CC-130J17CC-1505CC-1775CC-1444*Canadian Army Vehicles*M77737Leopard 2 - Ttl112CHER-HCE-Exp207ERC104LVM-Lt Domestic400-600Leopard 2A6M20CHER-HSA-Exp-Backhoes12ERC-A78Leopard 2A4M20CHER-HCE-Exp-Dozers30ERC-B26Leopard 2A442CHER-HCE-Amd-Dozers6Leopard 2 AEV18CHER-HCE-Exp-Loaders24LVM-Hy Expeditionary -Ttl340-520LVM-Lt Expedtionary - Ttl1000-1500Leopard 2 AVBL??CHER-HCE-Amd-Loaders6LVM-Hy Expeditionary-TCV-16.5T50-75LVM-Lt Expeditionary -TCV-3T290-425Leopard 2 ARV12CHER-HCE-Exp-Graders19LVM-Hy Expeditionary-MHC10-18LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Cage80-100CHER-HCE-Amd-Graders6LVM-Hy Expeditionary-MRT50-82LVM-Lt Expeditionary-MRT255-395LAV-Ttl977CHER-HCE-Exp-Excavators19LVM-Hy Expeditionary-LHS200-300LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Adm410-640LAV-ISC278CHER-HCE-Amd-Excavators6LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Tractor30-45LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Ftr55-70LAV-Cmd181CHER-HCE-Exp Compactors13LVM-Lt Expeditionary-Amb110-130LAV-LRSS66CHER-HCE-Amd- Compactors4LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Fuel100-120LAV-OPV47CHER-HCE-Exp-Crane-Med10LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Water10-15LAV*-EW18CHER-HCE-Amd-Crane-Med4LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Flatracks200-300LAV-Eng44CHER-HCE-Trlr-Lowbed8LVM-Hy Expeditionary-ISO-Pods2-8LAV*-Eng19CHER-HCE-Modules-Dump40ACSV-CPV97LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Trlr-Fuel30-70LVM-Lt Expeditionary -Trlr-Cgo100-150ACSV-Amb49CHER-HCE-COTS131LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Trlr-HET30-45LVM-Lt Expeditionary -Trlr-Water100-150ACSV-MRT70CHER-HCE-COTS-Backhoes31LVM-Hy Expeditionary-Trlr-LHS50-100ACSV-MRV54CHER-HCE-COTS-Dumptrucks31ASCV-FCV13CHER-HCE-COTS-Trlr-Tilt69MSVS-MilCOTS - Ttl1300LUV-MilCOTS-2T-Ttl1061ACSV-TCV41MSVS-MilCOTS - TCV895LUV-C&RCHER-MHE292MSVS-MilCOTS - Cage128LUV-UV858TAPV - Ttl500CHER-MHE-RTCH12MSVS-MilCOTS - Flatbed100LUV-MP143TAPV-Recce RWS138CHER-MHE-RTFL-Hvy20MSVS-MilCOTS - Arty94LUV-Cable60TAPV-GU RWS226CHER-MHE-RTFL-Med66MSVS-MilCOTS - Eng51TAPV-Recce55CHER-MHE-RTFL-Lt81MSVS-MilCOTS - MHC32TAPV-GU81CHER-MHE-RTFL-Zoom113MSVS-SMP-Ttl1587LUV-SMP-2T1159IEDDMSVS-SMP-LHS750LUV-C&R466MSVS-SMP-TCV600LUV-UV647MSVS-SMP-MRT150LUV-MP46MSVS-SMP-MHC50LUV-CableMSVS-SMP-Arty37LUV-APKMSVS-APS161LUV-Trlr-1TMSVS-Trlrs322MSVS-ISO995MSVS-SEV Kits868LFE-TMP-1T/3T (PL/GVW)330LFE-TMP-Personnel (4+1)230LFE-TMP-Cgo (2+1)100LFE-TMP-Trlr-0.5T330


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## Kirkhill

A more succinct summary


Actual/MinMaxMBT-63T112LAV-29T977TAPV-18T500Eng Plant - Exp207MHE292Recovery104Hy Exp-16T340520Md Exp-8T1587Lt Exp-4T10001500LUV Exp-2T1159TMP Exp-1T330Eng Plant - Dom131Md Dom-8T1300Lt Dom-4T400600LUV Dom-2T1061


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## Brad Sallows

Well, we can't give new armoured equipment to the Res F because it's too complex to maintain.

And we can't give old armoured equipment to the Res F because it's too worn out to maintain.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> Well, we can't give new armoured equipment to the Res F because it's too complex to maintain.
> 
> And we can't give old armoured equipment to the Res F because it's too worn out to maintain.



So what you're saying is that, regardless of where the kit goes, we need more maintainers?


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> So what you're saying is that, regardless of where the kit goes, we need more maintainers?



Or, we need to turn it over more frequently so you're not having to source, rebuild or build ancient parts.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> There is one additional limited class and if can be built from the heavy line with perhaps a much heavier powertrain that would be good. Basically it has two variants, one is a recovery vehicle with the capacity to handle up to the heaviest LAV we have in difficult terrain and the other is a Heavy Equipment Transport (HET) variant capable of handling the heaviest Leo 2 tank that we have. (my guess is around 100 - 125 recovery and 50 - 75 HETs)


IMHO your not going to get a wheeled Recovery Vehicle that can reliably recover a combat loaded LAV off-road - better get an actual ARV for that - and having extra ARV's for the Leo's is not a bad thing at all...



FJAG said:


> The standardization into three fleets each based on its own common chassis and powertrain would greatly simplify both training of operators and maintainers and the maintenance system. If the powertrains come with few modifications from standard production lines then one can add on commercial maintenance support but, quite frankly I'm a firm believer that we need to a) simplify maintenance through standardized vehicle lines and b) train and man all our maintenance support in house through full-time military maintainers so that we can ensure the deployability of our maintenance system. A 100% simplified SMP fleet will still be fully able to support any and all domestic operations.


Dump the Med IMHO - a light 1.5-2t chassis and a 12-15t Heavy simplifies the fleet.
   I would get everything in at least 1/2 armored (floor to waist - and pillars to add mission/theatre specific armor beyond that.
 Then you can get a 3rd Light COTS unarmored fleet - that can be used for admin stuff that an A vehicle isn't needed for - with the understanding it doesn't leave Canada EVER.



FJAG said:


> I'll be the first to agree that others have a much different view of how the Army should handle vehicle fleets and maintenance. Unfortunately while their views may prevail and may be feasible in a peacetime army, they will not enhance operational capabilities which, after all, is why the government spends the big bucks on us.
> 
> 🍻


The CF needs a major intake of CS personnel - or - reroll of PY in the Reg Force to those trades - and they need to be able to look after a Reg and Res fleet - of common vehicles -- failure to equip the Res Force like the Regs (who have major gaps already) sets them up for failure - and a piece part plug and almost play hole in the dyke filler - not a credible force on its own.


----------



## suffolkowner

From my civilian only experience if I have 100 units of whatever, I might aim to replace 10 a year, and thus by 10 years everything has been replaced and it is time to start over. I'm not sure how that would work in the military though as from year 1 to year 10 the model could have gone through several variants that differ so greatly they are pratically different. It doesn't seem like an ideal situation from a commonality perspective.

On the LAV's we've actually accomplished quite a bit here in moving from a LAV 3/Bison/Coyote to the LAV 6.0. In the meantime GDLS London has produced the LAV 700 so we're behind or missed the next evolution in the LAV family (not including the PiranhaV). I'm guessing the LAV 6.0 will be replaced by whatever replaces the LAV 700 (LAV 8.0?) if we're lucky.


----------



## CBH99

The vehicle itself may expand into different variants (AT, AD, EW, Ambulance, etc) - but usually the engine, power packs, drive trains, and flux inhibitors stay the same.  

You are correct, that if GDLS designs a new generation (LAV 8.0) there could be substantially different setups when it comes to that stuff. 

But 10 years isn’t a terribly long time by military vehicle design/testing/production standards.  If we end up with newer vehicles going to some units while other units wait for theirs to eventually be ready for replacement, I don’t see that as really inhibiting us all that much.  

(We are the masters of orphan fleets, after all…so this is peanuts!)


It’s been mentioned up thread that in addition to the vehicles, we should be able to manufacture the turrets for the vehicles.  I agree.  

At one point, Canadian companies produced fantastic optics and surveillance equipment.  Perhaps that still do?  I don’t know.  I believe FLIR and NightSun were both Canadian ideas & products.  



(Mods, perhaps this should be split into it’s own thread?  Lots of possibilities to discuss!)


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## Ostrozac

CBH99 said:


> At one point, Canadian companies produced fantastic optics and surveillance equipment.  Perhaps that still do?  I don’t know.  I believe FLIR and NightSun were both Canadian ideas & products.


They still do. Optics manufactured by Wescam out of Burlington were very successfully used by Azerbaijan in their recent war with Armenia. Their Turkish-made TB2 UAV are equipped with the Wescam MX-15.


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## GR66

CBH99 said:


> It’s been mentioned up thread that in addition to the vehicles, we should be able to manufacture the turrets for the vehicles.  I agree.


Turrets or Remote Weapons Stations?  As I've noted previously, GDLS has already integrated the Moog Reconfigurable Integrated-Weapons Platform (RIwP) on the Stryker for their IM-SHORAD system.  I'm assuming that the RWS would take up less internal space in the LAV than the turret basket and would be easier to upgrade to new weapons as the come available.

The IM-SHORAD system is equipped with a 30mm Autocannon, a dual Stinger launcher and a dual Hellfire launcher, but the advantage of this system is that it is designed to be reconfigurable and has lots of gun, missile and optics options available to fulfill a wide variety of potential roles.

A LAV-AD could go with the same configuration as the IM-SHORAD Stryker, or if it better suits our AD Command and Control systems we could go with a quad Stinger configuration instead.

A LAV-AT version could use Hellfire, TOW or Javelin missiles....or a combination of these.

A LAV-UAV version could be equipped with tube-launched Coyote UAVs for Recce, EW, C-UAS or Strike missions.

Bonus is that the same RWS could be installed on our TAPVs or on a light vehicle like the JLTV if we decide to go that route.


----------



## CBH99

GR66 said:


> Turrets or Remote Weapons Stations?  As I've noted previously, GDLS has already integrated the Moog Reconfigurable Integrated-Weapons Platform (RIwP) on the Stryker for their IM-SHORAD system.  I'm assuming that the RWS would take up less internal space in the LAV than the turret basket and would be easier to upgrade to new weapons as the come available.
> 
> The IM-SHORAD system is equipped with a 30mm Autocannon, a dual Stinger launcher and a dual Hellfire launcher, but the advantage of this system is that it is designed to be reconfigurable and has lots of gun, missile and optics options available to fulfill a wide variety of potential roles.
> 
> A LAV-AD could go with the same configuration as the IM-SHORAD Stryker, or if it better suits our AD Command and Control systems we could go with a quad Stinger configuration instead.
> 
> A LAV-AT version could use Hellfire, TOW or Javelin missiles....or a combination of these.
> 
> A LAV-UAV version could be equipped with tube-launched Coyote UAVs for Recce, EW, C-UAS or Strike missions.
> 
> Bonus is that the same RWS could be installed on our TAPVs or on a light vehicle like the JLTV if we decide to go that route.


Are those GDLS produced RWS also built here in Canada?  

Fantastic idea though!  A common RWS that could be installed on LAVs and TAPV, and possibly JLTV or something similar.  A capable system, commonality, that provides our units with a variety of additional options when engaging the enemy.  

I’m a wee bit behind on RWS tech apparently.  Thanks for the update 


My main, overall point is along the same thing as FJAG’s.  

If we simply changed some basic things about the way we do business, and we got away from our ‘Boom & Bust’ style of procurement - we could really grow, stabilize, and enhance employment opportunities around the country.  

Building optics in Burlington, Ontario for example - which I had no idea.  

Helicopters in Quebec.  Planes in Quebec and Alberta.  Ships in BC & Nova Scotia. 

Light utility vehicles (like the MilCOTS, or their dark blue SUV’s you see at various Brigade HQ’s) that are built in Canada and can be taken into local dealerships.  

C7 series (or whatever next gen rifle is selected down the road, same applies to C9 and C6) all produced in Ontario. Possibly frag grenades & concussion grenades/flashbangs also.  

Etc, etc…


We will never have a huge defence industry by any means.  But if we spread our purchases out, rather than how we do things now, it could go a long way to really stabilizing and enhancing our workforce/economy.  (Sweden is a good example, perhaps?)

Perhaps then our governments would see defence as an investment rather than a sunk cost.  

______


*I realize this has taken a turn away from discussing what we want our Army to look like in 2025.  But it isn’t completely irrelevant either.  

Perhaps we start to implement some of what is possible into our Force2025 vision - as it has just as much of a strategic effect on our defence capabilities as anything else.  


Cheers lads 🍻


----------



## Infanteer

CBH99 said:


> *I realize this has taken a turn away from discussing what we want our Army to look like in 2025.  But it isn’t completely irrelevant either.


You guys all did that about 60 pages ago....


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> Are those GDLS produced RWS also built here in Canada?


No



CBH99 said:


> Fantastic idea though!  A common RWS that could be installed on LAVs and TAPV, and possibly JLTV or something similar.  A capable system, commonality, that provides our units with a variety of additional options when engaging the enemy.


RWS still don't provide the same SA as turrets - and generally due to the size at least configurable.



CBH99 said:


> My main, overall point is along the same thing as FJAG’s.
> 
> If we simply changed some basic things about the way we do business, and we got away from our ‘Boom & Bust’ style of procurement - we could really grow, stabilize, and enhance employment opportunities around the country.


That requires a multi-year long term Defense Commitment - and while one can blame the Politicians - Senior Leaders in the CF have been failing on this for years.


CBH99 said:


> Building optics in Burlington, Ontario for example - which I had no idea.


Wescam is a subsidiary of L3 Harris - I wouldn't consider their ISR stuff to be solely made in Canada.



CBH99 said:


> Helicopters in Quebec.


The Griffon was outdate the day the contract was inked - Boeing Vertol used to have a facility in Arnprior but I believe it was shuttered at least for production of anything Hook related year ago.



CBH99 said:


> Planes in Quebec and Alberta.


Nothing in the fighter realm other than part pieces - 


CBH99 said:


> Ships in BC & Nova Scotia.


Which is a great start - I do wish there was a heavier armed AOSP variant - and the new Surface Combatant Ship was heavier and heavier armed - but that's just me -- also I'd wish for a true Amphibious TF and supporting assets there 


CBH99 said:


> Light utility vehicles (like the MilCOTS, or their dark blue SUV’s you see at various Brigade HQ’s) that are built in Canada and can be taken into local dealerships.





CBH99 said:


> C7 series (or whatever next gen rifle is selected down the road, same applies to C9 and C6) all produced in Ontario.


Diemaco was spun off to Colt - Colt was bought by Cz - one needs to wonder how int he name of all that is holy, why they still retain the right of first refusal on CF Small Arms projects.  I'm a full believer that small arms at the very least should be a nationally controlled item 


CBH99 said:


> Possibly frag grenades & concussion grenades/flashbangs also.


Not up to speed anymore on CDN made explosives and pyro - but their used to be domestic manufacturing.


CBH99 said:


> Etc, etc…
> 
> 
> We will never have a huge defence industry by any means.  But if we spread our purchases out, rather than how we do things now, it could go a long way to really stabilizing and enhancing our workforce/economy.  (Sweden is a good example, perhaps?)


Certain things need to be part of a countries domestic defense industrial base - other items need to be part of a national emergency structure with knowledge and ability to make 


CBH99 said:


> Perhaps then our governments would see defence as an investment rather than a sunk cost.
> 
> ______


Sadly I don't think this happen without another major crisis - but one that is nearer and dearer to Canada.


CBH99 said:


> *I realize this has taken a turn away from discussing what we want our Army to look like in 2025.  But it isn’t completely irrelevant either.
> 
> Perhaps we start to implement some of what is possible into our Force2025 vision - as it has just as much of a strategic effect on our defence capabilities as anything else.
> 
> 
> Cheers lads 🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems - Canada
					

A world-class developer and manufacturer of all-caliber ammunition and energetic materials intended for the military and armed police forces.




					www.gd-otscanada.com
				









						Rheinmetall Canada – Defence and security systems supplier
					

Rheinmetall Canada is a proud member of the Germany Rheinmetall Group and offers a full range of defence and security products for more than 30 years.




					www.rheinmetall.ca
				





























Loitering Munitions, Surveillance, 2x 7 70mm, Log, 30mm, Spike/40mm, Comms.  - UGVs based on the Argus.  Prototypes in existence and field trials commenced.


----------



## CBH99

Infanteer said:


> You guys all did that about 60 pages ago....


What?  Us?  Noooooo....

(In all fairness, Reserve Force Restructure, C3 Replacement, TAPV, LAV 6.0, etc are pretty much all included under the far reaching umbrella of Force 2025.  So it wasn't like we started talking about fighter jets in an infantry tactics thread THIS time...)


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> What?  Us?  Noooooo....
> 
> (In all fairness, Reserve Force Restructure, C3 Replacement, TAPV, LAV 6.0, etc are pretty much all included under the far reaching umbrella of Force 2025.  So it wasn't like we started talking about *fighter jets in an infantry tactics thread *THIS time...)



Unless, of course, you choose to 'give them the whole nine yards' during the ambush


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> You guys all did that about 60 pages ago....


We could probably use an update on how the Army's own Force 2025 plan is progressing. We've pretty much run out of paper napkins for sketching out our own ideas.

That said, creating a viable domestic defence industry to support a long term Army equipping plan and sustainable support plan would seem to me to be something that the Army should be very much concerned in - even if not within in the very limited objectives of Force 2025.

In the words of my favourite Belzile and Rumsfeld quotes: "An Army that thinks small and plans for very little ..." and "You go to war with the army you have ..."


----------



## foresterab

FJAG said:


> Actually not bad for a civilian effort.
> 
> My thoughts on logistic vehicles differ significantly from Canada's past line of thinking which consists of fleets of both standard military pattern (SMP) and commercial off the shelf (but militarized - MILCOTS) lines in weight ranges going from utility (around .25 to 1.5 ton capacity) to 1.25 to 1.5 ton (your basic pick up range), 2.5 ton, 5 ton (medium capacity) and 10 ton (heavy capacity).
> 
> My thoughts differ in that I don't simply want to give reservists trucks to provide them mobility, I want to equip them the same way as the Regular Force so that they can fully operationally capable and perform military missions particulalar to their specialty.
> 
> ....
> 
> As far as the lines of vehicles go I'd firstly give up the give up the light utility vehicles and light support vehicles completely in favour of a single 4x4 light utility chassis in the 1.5 - 2 ton capacity range. Something in the nature of a JLTV but with a little more flexibility in body choices. Give it the basic frame and powertrain of, for example, a Ford F-350 with a modified suspension and standard belly plate to be mine resistant so that everything from the engine to the wheels, regardless of model, is standard. Then add specialized bodies from unarmoured to armoured and from basic utility (passenger) to basic utility (cargo), small CPs, ambulance. maint fitter, light infantry section vehicle, light wheeled reconnaissance etc etc. (in very, very round figures, we need about 4,000 of these)
> 
> Next create a basic tactical logistics line in say the 7.5 - 10 ton range and which would be the sole vehicle (save recovery) within all battalion sized units. Again a common mine resistant chassis suspension and powertrain and cab (either armoured or unarmoured) but specialized load beds from pallet to cargo with drop down benches for passengers to gun tractor det cab and ammo storage to specialized containers from everything from fitters to communications to secured stores etc. (again in very round figures I would guess we need about 4,000 of these as well plus some trailers)
> 
> The third line of vehicles would be heavy logistics line of around a 15 ton capacity. Same idea as the medium as to chassis, power train and cab with varying cargo configuration possibilities including a semi trailer capable one for both flatbed and containers. These would only be held at the brigade service battalion and any service support formations. (My guess is about 1,500 plus some trailers)
> 
> There is one additional limited class and if can be built from the heavy line with perhaps a much heavier powertrain that would be good. Basically it has two variants, one is a recovery vehicle with the capacity to handle up to the heaviest LAV we have in difficult terrain and the other is a Heavy Equipment Transport (HET) variant capable of handling the heaviest Leo 2 tank that we have. (my guess is around 100 - 125 recovery and 50 - 75 HETs)
> 
> The standardization into three fleets each based on its own common chassis and powertrain would greatly simplify both training of operators and maintainers and the maintenance system. If the powertrains come with few modifications from standard production lines then one can add on commercial maintenance support but, quite frankly I'm a firm believer that we need to a) simplify maintenance through standardized vehicle lines and b) train and man all our maintenance support in house through full-time military maintainers so that we can ensure the deployability of our maintenance system. A 100% simplified SMP fleet will still be fully able to support any and all domestic operations.
> 
> I'll be the first to agree that others have a much different view of how the Army should handle vehicle fleets and maintenance. Unfortunately while their views may prevail and may be feasible in a peacetime army, they will not enhance operational capabilities which, after all, is why the government spends the big bucks on us.
> 
> 🍻


Hello FJAG,

I think we're thinking the same general thoughts on vehicles although you have superior knowledge of the fleet and especially terminology currently used.  

The one issue I have is one that we have faced often which is the degree of "addons" and associated cost.   If we use the 4x4 light utility chassis (i.e. 1 ton gas or diesel truck) and add a mine resistant plate + specialized bodies there can be a very significant cost creep that is often ignored when counting units.  If I use an $80,000 baseline cost for a 1 ton diesel truck but have to add a custom topper to every unit and bumper/light package/tow winch/blast shield to each I'm guessing that truck has jumped closer to the $120,000 range...a 50% increase in costs without a corresponding increase in mission capacity.       I think of my issued work truck...fancy light bar and bumper package someone figured was "needed" and was over $26,000 for add-ons...with no change in how I do my work and only limited assistance with the light bar.   Multiply that level of "mission creep" and the local fleet now has to be either worked longer to pay off in both miles and years or you move to a similar unit that is modern and mechanically reliable.    Do I need a $25,000 custom gear topper for carrying equipment and webbing or would a $4,000 standard canopy cover meet 99% of needs?   Yes...some functions are needed....a flat deck instead of box can be invaluable at times.  A modular medical unit that be slid into a box is priceless...but these should be exception and not the norm.   

Common trucks for use on both Reserve and Regular force operations is nice but I think is overly simplistic.   Even if a single supplier, e.g. Ford, was chosen there will be a difference between model years of trucks that will result in them driving slightly different.   So differences in modifications are fine as long as we also acknowledge that the driver will have to learn the following on any vehicle - model size, year, tire conditions, ground conditions, fueling, and mission load.   I can take an experienced truck driver and flip them to a different but somewhat similar vehicle easy allowing for some local familiarity training but I cannot assume any driver will be able to operate anywhere perfectly because that's the unit in the local armory in downtown city X uses under perfect conditions.   Hence I'm less concerned if Reserve units run purely civilian models 90% of the time and then shift to the modified fleet at a central base on annual exercise because if nothing else they need to adjust to the different road/ground conditions. 

In regards to the basic simple people mover...yes 4-5,000 trucks is a good estimate.   I would however completely eliminate service work beyond very limited functions and instead use the civilian market place for this part/service work as I would hope the Armed Forces are not deploying to active danger zones in pickups again (shades of the Iltus) 

As a person moves to tactical logistics and heavy logistics unfortunately the options become much more limited and for these I would put much greater emphasis on moving towards a common fleet that would be the model expected to be deployed on missions.   I think of the US 6x6 truck as a good example of medium level logistics and would agree a significant number are needed but would guess more in the 2,500  range as opposed to your estimate of 4,000.   

Heavy logistics...the anomaly and big stuff.   15 ton is still a medium truck (Class 3 license) and I think we're into more of a civilian equivalent class 1 fleet.   Think 65 ton bed trucks with cranes, tractor trailer with scissor lift flatbed for hauling D8 bulldozers around, and even worse when you get to tank recovery vehicles and transporters.    I personally think more tractor trailer logistics because of the more versatile set up...same tractor can haul a fuel trailer or flat deck or low boy trailer...but it also speaks to a higher level discussion needed on how this would align with rail transport, cargo transport aircraft, maritime support, and civilian contractor support.     I don't have experience in those fields and while it'd be a great topic to talk over a beer it needs to be reviewed by experts.   What is the logistical needs of a deployed battalion?  armored brigade? in terms of tons/day...how many trucks is that...of what configuration...and supply, and support, and surplus needed to account for wastage?    One advantage of heavy logistics being tractor trailer based however is that civilian contractors may be able to surge  if needed to move a brigade across the nation or establish a major supply dump mid point to front lines from  a port.   Still in the 2500 units needed especially if trailers are counted separate from tractors (which they should)

Thinking this over coffee however is only part of the issue as there are some key mission definitions needed, especially for the Reg. Force, that are currently absent.   If the main mission is Canada then NATO then X....then that greatly changes what units are to be considered for use in Canada and we should be looking at buying NATO compatible units only (i.e. More LAV's)  and focusing on the first mission, then either ready brigade being specifically trained on mission #2, and rest monitored by options by rotation (artic training? US integration? Counter Terrorism?) while rotating roles within unit designation to ensure the knowledge spreads out over time (i.e. 3x light battalions with 1 Canada focus, 1 transition to specialty mission, and last on NATO duty).     If FORCE 2025 does not clearly define the mission priorities we can talk logistics all day long and still not be effective as political decisions get made.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Unless, of course, you choose to 'give them the whole nine yards' during the ambush



Oh! You mean like 29 Cdo.  Or 5 RA?   Yeah.  We can bring F-35s into an infantry discussion.  No worries.  One STA patrol with its own F35 on overwatch.    






And while we're at it, seeing as how the Brits want to be so helpful, maybe the RM can show Canadians how to operate in the actual Arctic.  Or maybe the Norwegians can help out.


----------



## CBH99

I don't know why, but the 2nd guy in the "Forging the Arctic Commando" video seems utterly badass.

I don't know if it's that his accent sounds so proper, or that he speaks more slowly, or that he seems like the more 'refined gentleman' type (perhaps it's all 3 of these?) - but of everybody who speaks to the camera in that video, I feel like this guy has "Kingsman" written all over him.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> You guys all did that about 60 pages ago....


Want and realistically expect aren't synonymous...


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Oh! You mean like 29 Cdo.  Or 5 RA?   Yeah.  We can bring F-35s into an infantry discussion.  No worries.  One STA patrol with its own F35 on overwatch.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And while we're at it, seeing as how the Brits want to be so helpful, maybe the RM can show Canadians how to operate in the actual Arctic.  Or maybe the Norwegians can help out.



Believe me, Arctic Norway in the winter time is quite different from operating in the Canadian Arctic.

For one thing, if the British deployed straight to our Arctic with the kit they've got on issue they'd probably be dead in a couple of days. It's meant for a maximum of about minus 30, and designed for fast movement through the mountains/ forests on skis. Leather ski-march boots, flimsy tarps for shelters, yay!

On the other hand, working with the Canadians in Arctic Norway was somewhat painful to watch as their kit was so heavy and awkward (e.g., giant parkas and snowshoes) that they were usually road bound/ great targets.


----------



## KevinB

foresterab said:


> Hello FJAG,
> 
> I think we're thinking the same general thoughts on vehicles although you have superior knowledge of the fleet and especially terminology currently used.
> 
> The one issue I have is one that we have faced often which is the degree of "addons" and associated cost.   If we use the 4x4 light utility chassis (i.e. 1 ton gas or diesel truck) and add a mine resistant plate + specialized bodies there can be a very significant cost creep that is often ignored when counting units.  If I use an $80,000 baseline cost for a 1 ton diesel truck but have to add a custom topper to every unit and bumper/light package/tow winch/blast shield to each I'm guessing that truck has jumped closer to the $120,000 range...a 50% increase in costs without a corresponding increase in mission capacity.       I think of my issued work truck...fancy light bar and bumper package someone figured was "needed" and was over $26,000 for add-ons...with no change in how I do my work and only limited assistance with the light bar.   Multiply that level of "mission creep" and the local fleet now has to be either worked longer to pay off in both miles and years or you move to a similar unit that is modern and mechanically reliable.    Do I need a $25,000 custom gear topper for carrying equipment and webbing or would a $4,000 standard canopy cover meet 99% of needs?   Yes...some functions are needed....a flat deck instead of box can be invaluable at times.  A modular medical unit that be slid into a box is priceless...but these should be exception and not the norm.


It's been done - but the major problem with that - it the chassis was never made for the weight over roads let alone any off-road.
   The fleets last a SUPER short time -- and while it can work for some small specialized elements - it doesn't work for a conventional military.



foresterab said:


> Common trucks for use on both Reserve and Regular force operations is nice but I think is overly simplistic.   Even if a single supplier, e.g. Ford, was chosen there will be a difference between model years of trucks that will result in them driving slightly different.   So differences in modifications are fine as long as we also acknowledge that the driver will have to learn the following on any vehicle - model size, year, tire conditions, ground conditions, fueling, and mission load.   I can take an experienced truck driver and flip them to a different but somewhat similar vehicle easy allowing for some local familiarity training but I cannot assume any driver will be able to operate anywhere perfectly because that's the unit in the local armory in downtown city X uses under perfect conditions.   Hence I'm less concerned if Reserve units run purely civilian models 90% of the time and then shift to the modified fleet at a central base on annual exercise because if nothing else they need to adjust to the different road/ground conditions.


 No - you need a similar force - while I am often characterized as a light champion - a F550 (etc) isn't a military vehicle - and should never try to be shoehorned into that role -- the Res need the same equipment scale as the Reg Force - or you may as well save a ton of money on those personnel.



foresterab said:


> In regards to the basic simple people mover...yes 4-5,000 trucks is a good estimate.   I would however completely eliminate service work beyond very limited functions and instead use the civilian market place for this part/service work as I would hope the Armed Forces are not deploying to active danger zones in pickups again (shades of the Iltus)


 Iltis 
  Soft Skin vehicles aren't necessary a bad thing - but everything needs to be viewed from threat dependent.
   Soft Skin low vis vehicles can be significantly better at many things than hardened low vis vehicles - because at the end of the day it really isn't hard to spot an armor package if you know what you are looking for.  That said - the requirement for true Low Vis for the conventional force is slim to nil in most theaters. 




foresterab said:


> As a person moves to tactical logistics and heavy logistics unfortunately the options become much more limited and for these I would put much greater emphasis on moving towards a common fleet that would be the model expected to be deployed on missions.   I think of the US 6x6 truck as a good example of medium level logistics and would agree a significant number are needed but would guess more in the 2,500  range as opposed to your estimate of 4,000.
> 
> Heavy logistics...the anomaly and big stuff.   15 ton is still a medium truck (Class 3 license) and I think we're into more of a civilian equivalent class 1 fleet.   Think 65 ton bed trucks with cranes, tractor trailer with scissor lift flatbed for hauling D8 bulldozers around, and even worse when you get to tank recovery vehicles and transporters.    I personally think more tractor trailer logistics because of the more versatile set up...same tractor can haul a fuel trailer or flat deck or low boy trailer...but it also speaks to a higher level discussion needed on how this would align with rail transport, cargo transport aircraft, maritime support, and civilian contractor support.     I don't have experience in those fields and while it'd be a great topic to talk over a beer it needs to be reviewed by experts.   What is the logistical needs of a deployed battalion?  armored brigade? in terms of tons/day...how many trucks is that...of what configuration...and supply, and support, and surplus needed to account for wastage?    One advantage of heavy logistics being tractor trailer based however is that civilian contractors may be able to surge  if needed to move a brigade across the nation or establish a major supply dump mid point to front lines from  a port.   Still in the 2500 units needed especially if trailers are counted separate from tractors (which they should)


 I would go with one type - 





						HEMTT A4 | Oshkosh Defense
					






					oshkoshdefense.com
				



 You can get many variants out of it - with a common chassis - and the 6x6 does nothing well.




foresterab said:


> Thinking this over coffee however is only part of the issue as there are some key mission definitions needed, especially for the Reg. Force, that are currently absent.   If the main mission is Canada then NATO then X....then that greatly changes what units are to be considered for use in Canada and we should be looking at buying NATO compatible units only (i.e. More LAV's)  and focusing on the first mission, then either ready brigade being specifically trained on mission #2, and rest monitored by options by rotation (artic training? US integration? Counter Terrorism?) while rotating roles within unit designation to ensure the knowledge spreads out over time (i.e. 3x light battalions with 1 Canada focus, 1 transition to specialty mission, and last on NATO duty).     If FORCE 2025 does not clearly define the mission priorities we can talk logistics all day long and still not be effective as political decisions get made.


In true CF fashion - the expectation from the Politicians is ALL OF THE ABOVE...
   So you need to figure out how to do that, without growing PY or the Budget - because most likely PY are going down - and the Budget is frozen


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Believe me, Arctic Norway in the winter time is quite different from operating in the Canadian Arctic.
> 
> For one thing, if the British deployed straight to our Arctic with the kit they've got on issue they'd probably be dead in a couple of days. It's meant for a maximum of about minus 30, and designed for fast movement through the mountains/ forests on skis. Leather ski-march boots, flimsy tarps for shelters, yay!
> 
> On the other hand, working with the Canadians in Arctic Norway was somewhat painful to watch as their kit was so heavy and awkward (e.g., giant parkas and snowshoes) that they were usually road bound/ great targets.


Key point that is often missed is the need to tailor ones PPE for the environment -- there are not three temperature zones - Desert - Temperate - Arctic - and you hit on a number of things where the CF Arctic kit is generally good for higher arctic work - but sucks in the "Mid Cold" areas - 
This is very visible to CF members working with the USMC at their Mountain Warfare Training Center, going to Norway, or other non high arctic winter deployments.


----------



## Kirkhill

The "Dry Cold" of Canada versus hypothermia on a Scottish golf course in July.


----------



## Weinie

Kirkhill said:


> Oh! You mean like 29 Cdo.  Or 5 RA?   Yeah.  We can bring F-35s into an infantry discussion.  No worries.  One STA patrol with its own F35 on overwatch.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And while we're at it, seeing as how the Brits want to be so helpful, maybe the RM can show Canadians how to operate in the actual Arctic.  Or maybe the Norwegians can help out.


Great vids. Thanks for posting them.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Key point that is often missed is the need to tailor ones PPE for the environment -- there are not three temperature zones - Desert - Temperate - Arctic - and you hit on a number of things where the CF Arctic kit is generally good for higher arctic work - but sucks in the "Mid Cold" areas -
> This is very visible to CF members working with the USMC at their Mountain Warfare Training Center, going to Norway, or other non high arctic winter deployments.



The USMC were the enemy force for most of our end of winter deployment NATO exercises, usually around Bardufoss airfield.

They were really good at simulating how the Russian would operate, which was kind of them. We could easily ski through mountain ranges on the flanks and cut them up on the roads they couldn't leave.

However, they had tons of kit. I recall one attack with the Royal Marines where we did quite well, as we thought, having inserted via landing craft at night and captured a bridge. As we were standing around feeling smug I was talking to one of the (very polite) USMC Officers and he said 'yeah, you guys were good, but we had a squadron of F18s blow you up before you got here.'


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> The USMC were the enemy force for most of our end of winter deployment NATO exercises, usually around Bardufoss airfield.
> 
> They were really good at simulating how the Russian would operate, which was kind of them. We could easily ski through mountain ranges on the flanks and cut them up on the roads they couldn't leave.
> 
> However, they had tons of kit. I recall one attack with the Royal Marines where we did quite well, as we thought, having inserted via landing craft at night and captured a bridge. As we were standing around feeling smug I was talking to one of the (very polite) USMC Officers and he said 'yeah, you guys were good, but we had a squadron of F18s blow you up before you got here.'


They have learned a lot over the years.


----------



## Kirkhill

foresterab said:


> Hello FJAG,
> 
> I think we're thinking the same general thoughts on vehicles although you have superior knowledge of the fleet and especially terminology currently used.
> 
> The one issue I have is one that we have faced often which is the degree of "addons" and associated cost.   If we use the 4x4 light utility chassis (i.e. 1 ton gas or diesel truck) and add a mine resistant plate + specialized bodies there can be a very significant cost creep that is often ignored when counting units.  If I use an $80,000 baseline cost for a 1 ton diesel truck but have to add a custom topper to every unit and bumper/light package/tow winch/blast shield to each I'm guessing that truck has jumped closer to the $120,000 range...a 50% increase in costs without a corresponding increase in mission capacity.       I think of my issued work truck...fancy light bar and bumper package someone figured was "needed" and was over $26,000 for add-ons...with no change in how I do my work and only limited assistance with the light bar.   Multiply that level of "mission creep" and the local fleet now has to be either worked longer to pay off in both miles and years or you move to a similar unit that is modern and mechanically reliable.    Do I need a $25,000 custom gear topper for carrying equipment and webbing or would a $4,000 standard canopy cover meet 99% of needs?   Yes...some functions are needed....a flat deck instead of box can be invaluable at times.  A modular medical unit that be slid into a box is priceless...but these should be exception and not the norm.
> 
> Common trucks for use on both Reserve and Regular force operations is nice but I think is overly simplistic.   Even if a single supplier, e.g. Ford, was chosen there will be a difference between model years of trucks that will result in them driving slightly different.   So differences in modifications are fine as long as we also acknowledge that the driver will have to learn the following on any vehicle - model size, year, tire conditions, ground conditions, fueling, and mission load.   I can take an experienced truck driver and flip them to a different but somewhat similar vehicle easy allowing for some local familiarity training but I cannot assume any driver will be able to operate anywhere perfectly because that's the unit in the local armory in downtown city X uses under perfect conditions.   Hence I'm less concerned if Reserve units run purely civilian models 90% of the time and then shift to the modified fleet at a central base on annual exercise because if nothing else they need to adjust to the different road/ground conditions.
> 
> In regards to the basic simple people mover...yes 4-5,000 trucks is a good estimate.   I would however completely eliminate service work beyond very limited functions and instead use the civilian market place for this part/service work as I would hope the Armed Forces are not deploying to active danger zones in pickups again (shades of the Iltus)
> 
> As a person moves to tactical logistics and heavy logistics unfortunately the options become much more limited and for these I would put much greater emphasis on moving towards a common fleet that would be the model expected to be deployed on missions.   I think of the US 6x6 truck as a good example of medium level logistics and would agree a significant number are needed but would guess more in the 2,500  range as opposed to your estimate of 4,000.
> 
> Heavy logistics...the anomaly and big stuff.   15 ton is still a medium truck (Class 3 license) and I think we're into more of a civilian equivalent class 1 fleet.   Think 65 ton bed trucks with cranes, tractor trailer with scissor lift flatbed for hauling D8 bulldozers around, and even worse when you get to tank recovery vehicles and transporters.    I personally think more tractor trailer logistics because of the more versatile set up...same tractor can haul a fuel trailer or flat deck or low boy trailer...but it also speaks to a higher level discussion needed on how this would align with rail transport, cargo transport aircraft, maritime support, and civilian contractor support.     I don't have experience in those fields and while it'd be a great topic to talk over a beer it needs to be reviewed by experts.   What is the logistical needs of a deployed battalion?  armored brigade? in terms of tons/day...how many trucks is that...of what configuration...and supply, and support, and surplus needed to account for wastage?    One advantage of heavy logistics being tractor trailer based however is that civilian contractors may be able to surge  if needed to move a brigade across the nation or establish a major supply dump mid point to front lines from  a port.   Still in the 2500 units needed especially if trailers are counted separate from tractors (which they should)
> 
> Thinking this over coffee however is only part of the issue as there are some key mission definitions needed, especially for the Reg. Force, that are currently absent.   If the main mission is Canada then NATO then X....then that greatly changes what units are to be considered for use in Canada and we should be looking at buying NATO compatible units only (i.e. More LAV's)  and focusing on the first mission, then either ready brigade being specifically trained on mission #2, and rest monitored by options by rotation (artic training? US integration? Counter Terrorism?) while rotating roles within unit designation to ensure the knowledge spreads out over time (i.e. 3x light battalions with 1 Canada focus, 1 transition to specialty mission, and last on NATO duty).     If FORCE 2025 does not clearly define the mission priorities we can talk logistics all day long and still not be effective as political decisions get made.



The vehicle has to work. (Tires inflated, engine cranks, heater works, brakes work, comfortable seats).

The vehicle has to suit the task and the environment.  And the environmental protection increases from keeping out the sun, the heat, the cold, the wind, the dust, the rain, the snow, the hail, the rocks, the blast, the shrapnel, the bullets, the HEAT rounds, the APFSDS rounds.

The vehicle, like every other tool required, has to be able to get to the job site.  And it can't be assumed that it will be able to self-deploy because most of Canada, and most of the World, does not have roads.   Even in the US.  And Canada is on an island, with its own Archipelago.  It is surrounded by, and separated from the rest of the world by, water.  It is separated from much of itself by trees, rocks, ice, water and bogs.

We spend much of our time considering Europe and conflict there.  But Europe is the anomaly.  Especially the traditional "cockpits".  They have been largely covered with asphalt since WW1.  The spaces between roads are short.  Well within the range of the available array of direct fired weapons and certainly within the range of all artillery - even when you define artillery as a 5 km effector like the 81mm mortar or the  MANPADs Stinger or the Spikes, TOWs and Javelins of the world.   It seems quite likely that we will be approaching a field from one road while the opposition will be approaching the same field on another road and that we will engage each other across the field with direct fire weapons and never actually enter the field.  Europe has about 6,000,000 km of road and some 50-100,000 km of Highways.  That ground is regularly covered by civilian wheeled vehicles.  In my opinion it is very unlikely that even in a protracted war that that entire network will be destroyed, or even badly damaged.    And the damaged areas are more likely to resemble construction sites regularly traveled by dump-trucks and cement mixers.

Dump-trucks seem to me to be a good starting point for the "middle of the road" (yes) vehicle.  

The next point is Seacans, Containers, TEUs, ISOs.   Small stuff should fit inside them.  Big stuff should carry them.  Shelters should be them.

Now, can you put an armoured SeaCan on the back of a Dump-Truck with an armoured crew cab and mount an RWS.  If you can then you have created a LAV.  Or a Boxer.  Or a LAV 700.

You now have something that can support the fight in any region that has a well developed road network.  Like Europe.  The US. The St Lawrence. The Lower Mainland.  The Prairies.  That force could also operate anywhere there is a hard dry surface - like Afghanistan, or Mali, or Somalia, or Australia.  But it has to get there and it has to get there in a timely fashion in large numbers.  (Lots of ships and large planes). Or it has to be prepositioned in the areas (Lots of warehouses, spare kit, security guards and maintainers).

For the rest of the world, for the rest of Canada surface transport is entirely a local affair.  Roads are likely to be short, rough, rutted tracks. With gravel if you are lucky.  Surface water is unreliable, assuming that it is not ice and mushy and covered in snow and at risk of break up.  Or the sand bars and rocks, even the course, have shifted - or that there is enough water in it to float your boat at all.  Those rivers worked well for small, shallow draft boats, like canoes and York boats, but couldn't be made useful for paddle steamers.  Those plans always ran aground.  

The railways did the job that canals were able to do in Europe.  As long as there was enough trade, enough people to pay for them.  The same goes for highways.

But with a couple of hundred thousand people spread over 8 to 10,000,000 km2 of broken and interrupted rocks, ice, trees, bogs, lakes and rivers air transport is the only real, in my opinion, practicable solution.   And that means a heliborne force strongly supported by a fleet of tactical airlifters that can operate from short, rough air strips.

It also means that the surface vehicles, (boats, wheels or tracks) need to be air transportable, geared towards short range travel over rough terrain and narrow tracks.  And they need to be sturdy enough that they won't break easily but cheap enough so that they can be replaced on a regular schedule or when they do break.  Weaponry has to be acquired with the available vehicles in mind.  Tactics adjusted to suit.  Organizations and training will the follow.

Once such an air transportable capability is established then it can be deployed anywhere on the globe.

I understand that a heliborne force is actually an expensive proposition.   The helicopters themselves are hard to transport and their support system is very expensive.  But they have they advantage that they can be based on any flat surface, ashore or afloat to which they can fly.  

Just like big ships carry little skiffs so big aircraft can carry little helicopters.  It is one, very expensive, method of transporting some helicopters.   But most helicopters will have to go by sea.  But maybe not all the way on one ship.  Leapfrogging hundreds of kilometers at a time from shore to ship,, ship to shore, shore to shore, ship to ship, and ultimately ship to shore is at least as practicable as disassembling helicopters, freighting them and then reassembling them.  And the ships supporting them as Forward Refuelling Points, floating gas stations, could be military ships but could also be civilian ships  as they don't have to approach hostile shores.  The helicopters can launch at long range.  Or they can leapfrog to the shore via any military vessel with a flight deck.

Once the helicopter is ashore in its new theater then it forms the base of a very flexible force.  And its bases, if properly protected by GBAD form hard firing points for Long Range Precision Fires -preferably in heli-portable modules that can be carried by truck when circumstances permit or require.

A model force structure for Canada is not the US Stryker Brigades, and certainly not their Armored Brigades, not even the 82nd Airborne.  Not even the USMC. The better models are the 10th Mountain and the 101st Airborne.  Stiffened with a LAV/Leo capability perhaps.  But designed to operate with helicopters, small craft and vehicles, protected by a deployable, layered GBAD and LRPF system and with air support from overwatching F-35s, MMAs, RPASs and Satellites.

Two well supported heliborne light infantry brigades and a LAV/Leo brigade with a pair of battle group sized spare kit sets, one pre-positioned in Europe and another in a warehouse in a railhead in Canada connected to a floating warehouse on each coast would be a useful structure. With a 2025-2030 planning horizon.

I think a lot of good work could be completed by 2025.  Up to and including the supply of the floating warehouses and the prepositioning in Europe and the Canadian Depot.

And the militia, trains for the light battle.  The one they are most likely to fight at home.  And one that will be useful in many scenarios overseas.  And one that would form the basis for heavying up if the fight requires more heavy forces, or just replacements to man the heavier forces.


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## Kirkhill

As for the helicopter base of the force.

Keep the Griffons.

Add in UH-1Y Venoms and AH-1Z Vipers.

The Vipers and Venoms upgrade the Griffons power and MTOW from 1800 shaft horse power and 5400 kg to 3100 shp and 8400 kg.  The empty weights also increase from 3400 kg to 5400 kg but the disposable load increases from 2000 kg to 3000 kg.  That extra tonne means the ability to start lifting UGVs, ATVs, UTVs, TMPs (Edit: RHIBs) and even light guns along with their crews.    Or carrying a heavier load of mounted guns, bullets, missiles and sensors.


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## Kirkhill

An 800 shp, (empty wt 1200 kg, operating wt 1500 kg) helicopter with a one tonne payload.  Optionally armed, optionally manned, in service in the RCAF, operated by every helicopter pilot in the RCAF, and manufactured in Quebec on an open production line.

CH-139 Jet Ranger
Bell 407 Jet Ranger

Bell ARH-70 Arapaho Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter

Firescout MQ-8C UAS - Armed Recce, Surveillance and Logistics.

Compatible with Army Ops, CC-130s, CC-177s and A-400s and the AOPS, AORs and CSCs.

Does that make it a candidate for an Uber Helicopter?  An unmanned helicopter which the "pilot", or passenger, commands rather than flies?  Order a pick up.  Command a loiter.   Instruct a come back and get me.  Deliver another crate of ammo.  Pick up the casualties.


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## KevinB

JLTV - 2 variants
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) - USAASC

I posted the HMTT link above -- but by and large those two platforms should fill all the "Wheeled" needs of an Army at this point (I used "wheeled" because the LAV being wheeled but doesn't fall into that category.

I think the BAE BsV 10 is a much better vehicle for Canada than the LAV - at least some some roles.
Sweden adding to BvS10 fleet, ordering 127 more of the all-terrain vehicles
as like the BV 206 it is a solid off-road system that can be used into the Arctic but still in the South most parts of Canada - and overseas as needed.
   Even if only 1 Bde's worth would be procured it allows significant mobility improvements in non wheeled terrain (bog, deep snow etc).


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## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> An 800 shp, (empty wt 1200 kg, operating wt 1500 kg) helicopter with a one tonne payload.  Optionally armed, optionally manned, in service in the RCAF, operated by every helicopter pilot in the RCAF, and manufactured in Quebec on an open production line.
> 
> CH-139 Jet Ranger
> Bell 407 Jet Ranger
> 
> Bell ARH-70 Arapaho Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter
> 
> Firescout MQ-8C UAS - Armed Recce, Surveillance and Logistics.
> 
> Compatible with Army Ops, CC-130s, CC-177s and A-400s and the AOPS, AORs and CSCs.
> 
> Does that make it a candidate for an Uber Helicopter?  An unmanned helicopter which the "pilot", or passenger, commands rather than flies?  Order a pick up.  Command a loiter.   Instruct a come back and get me.  Deliver another crate of ammo.  Pick up the casualties.


If you want to stick with Bell
Bell V-280 - Future Long Range Assault Aircraft


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## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> If you want to stick with Bell
> Bell V-280 - Future Long Range Assault Aircraft



For the same reasons we're sticking with one ship-builder, and one LAV-builder, one small arms supplier and one ammunition supplier.  It is also the reason I would propose engaging Rheinmetall in Quebec for a broader range of GBAD and UGV solutions.

Likewise, the BAE Hagglunds BV series - we should try and recreate Perrin Beatty's licenced contract with Foremost of Calgary to produce 400 Bv206s.  Foremost does rough terrain tracked logistics for the oil industry in the north.  But they move a bit slower than the Hagglunds designs.

This is all about domestic security of supply and "picking winners" is a legitimate national security strategy.


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## Kirkhill

I agree on the Bv series but I am not sold on the heavier armoured Bv206S and the larger BvS10 (armoured or unarmoured).  And definitely not the Bronco.

This is the reason I like the Bv206 series.






Rather than this






Although the Bv206 and Bv206S mixed fleet would be good.









The soft top fits inside the Chinook, everything can be underslung, and they all fit inside the Herc.


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## GR66

Is a helicopter-based force really a viable expeditionary option for us?  How many helicopters and how many heavy lift aircraft do you need to deploy and support a heliborne force large enough to be of sufficient size to make a significant military impact?  A Battalion/Battle Group minimum?  

Would you be better off using our limited airlift capability to deploy a force using light vehicles that would have a significantly lower logistical support requirement than a heliborne force and not be tied to a vulnerable airfield.  How survivable would a heliborne force be operating near the front in a peer conflict?


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## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Is a helicopter-based force really a viable expeditionary option for us?  How many helicopters and how many heavy lift aircraft do you need to deploy and support a heliborne force large enough to be of sufficient size to make a significant military impact?  A Battalion/Battle Group minimum?
> 
> Would you be better off using our limited airlift capability to deploy a force using light vehicles that would have a significantly lower logistical support requirement than a heliborne force and not be tied to a vulnerable airfield.  How survivable would a heliborne force be operating near the front in a peer conflict?


A tilt rotor could self deploy and air refuel


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## GR66

KevinB said:


> A tilt rotor could self deploy and air refuel


Still only seats two more troops than a Griffon.  How many do you need to deploy and support a Battle Group sized force?  How close to the front can they operate in a peer conflict...and once the troops disembark they are foot mobile only.

By comparison, now many troops in MRAZR's or DAGORs (or BV206's) could you deploy by Herc and Globemaster that would have mobility in the battle space?


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## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Still only seats two more troops than a Griffon.  How many do you need to deploy and support a Battle Group sized force?  How close to the front can they operate in a peer conflict...and once the troops disembark they are foot mobile only.
> 
> By comparison, now many troops in MRAZR's or DAGORs (or BV206's) could you deploy by Herc and Globemaster that would have mobility in the battle space?


I don't view them as an either or -- I view both vehicles and vertical lift to be key components


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## Kirkhill

The key element is selecting vehicles that are compatible with the available vertical lift.   If we want to lift more of the heavier vehicles then we're going to need to get you more Chinooks.

The Tilt-Rotors I see more as a CanSOFCom vehicle - for getting small teams to inhospitable locations discretely in a hurry.

A lot can still be done with conventional helicopters.  Especially in a Dispersed Operations where company combat teams will be spread out.

At the same time I am inclined to still be keeping  a LAV/Leo CA Brigade on the Swedish model as well as a LAV based Cavalry regiment in each of two Light Brigades.  We have the airlift to bring in the occasional troop of LAVs to support the deployment of Light Battalions/Companies.  If the terrain permits.

Two troops of CVRTs made a big difference to the effectiveness of 8 Lt Bns in the Falklands.


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## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> The key element is selecting vehicles that are compatible with the available vertical lift.   If we want to lift more of the heavier vehicles then we're going to need to get you more Chinooks.
> 
> The Tilt-Rotors I see more as a CanSOFCom vehicle - for getting small teams to inhospitable locations discretely in a hurry.
> 
> A lot can still be done with conventional helicopters.  Especially in a Dispersed Operations where company combat teams will be spread out.


I am decidedly not enamored with the Griffon - also after counting 440+ holes in a Blackhawk we came in on - I decided that speed is much safer.
   Seeing lots of green tracer coming uo at you isn't fun - when you realize that for everyone you see there are 3 rounds you don't...



GR66 said:


> Still only seats two more troops than a Griffon.  How many do you need to deploy and support a Battle Group sized force?  How close to the front can they operate in a peer conflict...and once the troops disembark they are foot mobile only.
> 
> By comparison, now many troops in MRAZR's or DAGORs (or BV206's) could you deploy by Herc and Globemaster that would have mobility in the battle space?


 It can carry way more than 2x the Griffon -- (over 12k versus 5 for the Griffon)  the Griffon is a 6 pax max combat load - vice 12 for the 280.
   Every other Military have made the decision (and a lot in Canada too) that the Griffon is not a suitable combat helo.

You need an airmobile option in current operations - if just for CSAR and MedEvac - but realistically to rapidly move troops or resupply/reinforce complex terrain where land vehicles cannot do so easily.





   In Afghan - Hooks generally launched after the Apaches (if there was any AH cover at all) - as they are much faster.   



Kirkhill said:


> At the same time I am inclined to still be keeping  a LAV/Leo CA Brigade on the Swedish model as well as a LAV based Cavalry regiment in each of two Light Brigades.  We have the airlift to bring in the occasional troop of LAVs to support the deployment of Light Battalions/Companies.  If the terrain permits.
> 
> Two troops of CVRTs made a big difference to the effectiveness of 8 Lt Bns in the Falklands.


The 280 can do almost 1,400 miles self deploying solo - plus it can refuel in the air.   Self Deployment at least to a more localized to the front location reduces a significant stressor on the air/sealift.

     I agree with you on mobility options - I think more Hooks are needed in the long run -- but I wouldn't waste anymore cash on Griffons - it was a bygone bird when it came into service...


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## GR66

KevinB said:


> I am decidedly not enamored with the Griffon - also after counting 440+ holes in a Blackhawk we came in on - I decided that speed is much safer.
> Seeing lots of green tracer coming uo at you isn't fun - when you realize that for everyone you see there are 3 rounds you don't...
> 
> 
> It can carry way more than 2x the Griffon -- (over 12k versus 5 for the Griffon)  the Griffon is a 6 pax max combat load - vice 12 for the 280.
> Every other Military have made the decision (and a lot in Canada too) that the Griffon is not a suitable combat helo.
> 
> You need an airmobile option in current operations - if just for CSAR and MedEvac - but realistically to rapidly move troops or resupply/reinforce complex terrain where land vehicles cannot do so easily.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> In Afghan - Hooks generally launched after the Apaches (if there was any AH cover at all) - as they are much faster.
> 
> 
> The 280 can do almost 1,400 miles self deploying solo - plus it can refuel in the air.   Self Deployment at least to a more localized to the front location reduces a significant stressor on the air/sealift.
> 
> I agree with you on mobility options - I think more Hooks are needed in the long run -- but I wouldn't waste anymore cash on Griffons - it was a bygone bird when it came into service...


Don't get me wrong.  I'm not opposed to the V-280 Valor.  Definitely a much better option than the Griffon and numerous roles it could fulfill.

However, what I'm not convinced of is the idea of making helicopters/VTOLs the primary focus of our military as per Kirkhill's 2 x Heliborne Brigades and one Heavy Brigade.

Whichever aircraft you use (Griffon, Valor, etc.) the cost would be huge.  The Osprey costs in the ballpark of $75 million per unit which is I believe ballpark around the same as a C-130J Hercules which would give you much greater and versatile lift capability.  Bell says the Valor will be around the same price as the AH-64E Apache (~$69 million).  A CH-47 Chinook is around $32 million, and the Bell 525 is around $15 million (for the civilian version?  Say $20 million for a military version?).

By comparison, an M1A2 Abrams costs about $9 million, a LAV around $7 million, a JLTV is $400,000 and a Polaris Dagor $150,000.

I just can't see getting enough helicopters (of whatever type) to equip two Brigades of Infantry.  It's just not realistic from a cost point of view or in my opinion, an opportunity cost point of view in light of the many other things you could buy with that money.


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## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> If you want to stick with Bell
> Bell V-280 - Future Long Range Assault Aircraft



Sexy beast...


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## Kirkhill

My take on the Griffon is it is the heliborne version of the MilCOTS vs SMP truck debate.

The Griffon will continue to serve well enough domestically where "440+" perforations are unlikely (unless hail or 7.62mm ball point).    The fleet can be upgraded/replaced over time in Squadron size sets.   With Hook additions.   And I do see a place for the Valor.   Just like I see a place for Challengers in the jet transport fleet.   Sometimes you need to move a small crew fast.

But as GR66 points out it is a lot of capability to be used just humping a dozen infantry around Southern Alberta, or Nunavut.
On the other hand maybe it is just the thing when dodging bullets in Afghanistan.  But 440 mph Mosquitoes were being brought down with machine guns and 20mm cannons and F100s were downed by Golden BBs.

Like FJAG I see no reason to chuck perfectly useable kit just because something better comes along.   I would still keep the Griffon as domestic utility bird even as the fleet was upgraded to the marinized UH-1Y, AH-1Z pair.  Aircraft that can operate over salt water as well as dust, snow and fresh water.  Aircraft that can operate from an AOPS, a CSC or an AOR or a Multi-Role Support Ship.  And that can self-deploy. Not intercontinentally but certainly over long distances.

With respect to the helicopter vs LAV debate.  Domestically I see  a lot more utility in helicopters than in LAVs.  With 250 or so small battalions of a village, or large company every 100 km or so (30 to 40,000 km2) with no roads or rail connecting them, floods and fires, fuel and food shortages, lost souls, medical emergencies, I see lots of opportunities for utility helicopters to make themselves useful when not carting Anti-Tank teams around some distant theatre.

Equally I see lots of places for helicopters to add to logistical support overseas in peace and war.  And heliborne troops making a difference in all types of combat.  Especially when operating with national combat air support.

We have about a Division of troops (a small Division Kev, but a Division).  I looked into 10 CAB, supporting 10th Mtn Div.   G2G will correct me I know.

10 CAB flies 4 Battalions (apologies to the Air Cav) and an independent Coy.

The Air Cav "Battalion" (Squadron) is an Armed Recce Squadron that was stripped of its Kiowas (Jet Rangers) and issued 24 Apaches (10 tonnes).  As well it has a  "Company" (Troop) outfitted with 8 RQ-7 UAS (0.2 tonnes)

The main element in the Brigade is 10 Combat Avn Regt which owns the other flying battalions and the independent company.

The first battalion is an attack battalion and flies an additional 24 Apaches (10 tonnes)
The second battalion is an assault battalion and flies 20 Blackhawks (10 tonnes)
The third battalion is the general support battalion and it flies a mixed fleet of 12 Chinooks (23 tonnes) and another 20 Blackhawks in various specialty configurations.
The independent company flies 12 MQ-1C Grey Eagle UAS (1.5 tonne) - The RPAS MQ-9 Predator is a 6 tonne aircraft.

So, in total, we are looking at 48 Apaches, 40 Blackhawks, 12 Chinooks, 12 Grey Eagle UAS and 8 Raven UAS.

In the RCAF we have 85 Griffons and 15 Chinooks.  And that is augmentable with SARs 4 Twin Otters and 15 CH-149s as well as 17 J-series Hercs and 5 CC-177s to enhance tactical air movement domestically.  And internationally.

Edit:  Actually with all the hard strips around Canada the troops could fly in relative luxury in the CC-150s and join up with flown-in kit.

I will stipulate the Griffon is not a Blackhawk.  Even the Venom and Viper are not Blackhawks.  But they would improve the capabilities of the force over time.   And maybe you aren't allowed to buy Zulus because they look wrong but you could, perhaps, buy Yankees and use them as better gunship escorts.  And if you get a friendly government maybe they will let you buy some proper gunships.

Support vehicles that can be delivered by Griffons and Chinooks, designed to accompany and support foot-borne troops over broken, soft and wet terrain should also be acquired for local, short-range manoeuver on the ground.  Long range movement (50 km or more) would be by air.

In the meantime work can be done with the kit available.

Now if only the infantry were properly equipped with the right suite of man portable support weapons they could carry with them in the helicopters that were available.

In the meantime, with the LAVs/Leos and ACSVs that are on hand or in production - FJAG could get a full Swedish model Combined Arms Brigade of 3 Pansar Units and a Cavalry Unit, preposition one battle group set in Poland, keep another set in the warehouse in Canada, and still have vehicles left over for training regs and reserves at home.  Vehicles enough, that, if required a light battalion could be re-roled to supply LAV companies.

And then we can start concentrating on the Arty.


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## Good2Golf

Kirkhill, your numbers 👍🏼 confirm that Canada’s entire green aviation capability equates to but one CAB/GSAB(-), and there is probably close to a small icecube’s chance in a super-nova of having any non-green rotary assets anywhere near a deployed land force element.  At best, rotary use practically wouldn’t be dedicated/committed constantly to anything above BG-sized formations.  The 100% numbers are never seen practically in use because the fleet size numbers we built around serviceability/op availability numbers. That’s why you’d probably only see a Coy Gp lifted in an airmobile op, using 4-6 Chinooks.  Same reasons I doubt that you’d ever see an airborne use of 5 CC-177s.  If the TRUH program delivers a V-280 or even Defiant-like capability to replace the Griffon, I’m pretty sure that it won’t be anywhere close to the 85 figure of the current Griffon fleet.


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## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> And then we can start concentrating on the Arty.



As an Infantry guy I'd put this at the top of the list, of course


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## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> Kirkhill, your numbers 👍🏼 confirm that Canada’s entire green aviation capability equates to but one CAB/GSAB(-), and there is probably close to a small icecube’s chance in a super-nova of having any non-green rotary assets anywhere near a deployed land force element.  At best, rotary use practically wouldn’t be dedicated/committed constantly to anything above BG-sized formations.  The 100% numbers are never seen practically in use because the fleet size numbers we built around serviceability/op availability numbers. That’s why you’d probably only see a Coy Gp lifted in an airmobile op, using 4-6 Chinooks.  Same reasons I doubt that you’d ever see an airborne use of 5 CC-177s.  If the TRUH program delivers a V-280 or even Defiant-like capability to replace the Griffon, I’m pretty sure that it won’t be anywhere close to the 85 figure of the current Griffon fleet.


Where it should be triple if not more...
 I can find a role/need for 310 280's and 105 hooks - plus another 300 AH - and I could mission creep it to many more if given $ 


 Years ago it took 3 Griffons / section (yes section) on a small airmobile op from Calgary to somewhere in K Country - it was winter, so the Toboggan group etc took space and weight as well as snowshoes etc.   
    That worked out to 12 / Platoon - it got scrubbed halfway through - and HL's where used as there where not enough Griffons and they burned too much fuel to move the 50km to keep running sorties.

 In my experience the CH-135 was actually more capable - at least from a GiB perspective.


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## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> Kirkhill, your numbers 👍🏼 confirm that Canada’s entire green aviation capability equates to but one CAB/GSAB(-), and there is probably close to a small icecube’s chance in a super-nova of having any non-green rotary assets anywhere near a deployed land force element.  At best, rotary use practically wouldn’t be dedicated/committed constantly to anything above BG-sized formations.  The 100% numbers are never seen practically in use because the fleet size numbers we built around serviceability/op availability numbers. That’s why you’d probably only see a Coy Gp lifted in an airmobile op, using 4-6 Chinooks.  Same reasons I doubt that you’d ever see an airborne use of 5 CC-177s.  If the TRUH program delivers a V-280 or even Defiant-like capability to replace the Griffon, I’m pretty sure that it won’t be anywhere close to the 85 figure of the current Griffon fleet.



Thanks for confirming my numbers.  I also agree with your political (both military and civil) assessment of the probabilities.

But I stand by my position that there is capability there.  Capability that should have an exploitable plan.  Even if it is an in extremis plan.  IF, that notorious word, IF it were required could Canada deploy, and sustain, a light brigade in Nunavut, or Alaska, with national assets.  And I will stipulate that we are talking about dispersed company teams operating from localised logistical and support hubs.   The fixed wing assets are simply to get to those hubs.  I agree that sucking up all the  C-17s and the Hercs in a single parachute drop is unlikely, although, again, independent company teams could be deployed and sustained with the assets on hand, I believe.

Is the capability equivalent to that of a single CAB/GSAB(-)?  Absolutely not.  But we have some capabilities in the field that could be effectively employed to cover much of the full spectrum of conflict likely to be encountered domestically and in North America.   In that context even the LAVs have utility if combined with the Stryker BCTs in the States.  And the Light Bdes/Bns could operate with the US Infantry BCTs.

My broader point is that we focus on the particular and ignore the general.  

We spend our time in fora like this debating how we can fight in the most absolutely dire set of circumstances and then concentrate our efforts on designing a force for that particular case.  We then assume that that particular force will have general application to all other parts of the spectrum.

In the process we develop, and justify, a tiny perfect force.  A force that never seems to become perfect but always becomes tinier.   A force that aspires to contribute to a multi-national high-end conflict that might happen and yet spends its time doing "other stuff" in the inconsequential part of the spectrum that we assume we can cover.

My primary point is, rather than detailing what we can't do because of what we lack, can we focus for a bit on what we can do with what we have?

That is where I see the big difference between us and the Europeans, particularly the Scandinavians and the Easterners.   They are forced to look at the threat, the Russians, ask themselves what can the Russians do, then ask what can be done to counter them with whats on hand.  Even if it is just molotovs, sticky bombs and Blacker Bombards.

Once that exercise is complete then they, and we, can look at our domestic/NORAD capability gaps and start to fill them. 

And the first place I would look to find the capabilities to plug those gaps is the Artillery.  Artillery purchased to support the forces and capabilities we have.  

FJAG is right.  (I don't say that too often).

I have been focusing on the Chinese threat.  Because it is in the headlines and it exercises our American friends, neighbours and allies.  As well as the Aussies, Kiwis and Brits.

The Russians I have relegated to a side show with the greatest likelihood of contact being, in words that CzechPivo might recognize,"in a far away country, between people of whom we know nothing".  For the rest of us that was Chamberlain justifying his inaction over the Sudetenland in 1938.  The Sudetenland was less than 1000 km from Dover, less than the distance from Windsor to Quebec City and reachable by the existing ferries, roads, rail and aircraft of the day.

But, after taking another look at the Arctic, in the context of the a long range US expeditionary capability, the context of the establishment of Russia's new bases, the context of Russia's predilection for undeclared regional conflicts in its border zones, and context of the immense instability in the energy market, after taking another look at the Arctic, the probability of having to deploy troops to Alert, to Resolute, to Inuvik, to Iqaluit, to Thule, or even to Little Diomede is increasing.  It is approaching the likelihood of a Russo-Scandinavian conflict.  And perhaps it is more likely.  Scandinavia is a little too close to Russia's strategic infrastructure at Murmansk, St Petersburg and Kaliningrad.  And it is a hard target.  That would not be a Ukrainian war of little green men and a constantly running sore.  It would quickly escalate to a major, international conflict.  And economically it would gain Russia very little.

Conversely, all that arctic natural gas that we are unwilling to exploit (MacKenzie Pipeline), Putin has already started exploiting for geopolitical power and for treasure.  

The arctic was protected for decades, generations, by the prospect of nuclear conflict.  People have worked around that obstacle long enough that the fear of nuclear conflict is not as visceral, nor as widely held, as it was.  

Ukraine is a modern country with well developed infrastructure to all points of its borders, well connected and with a useful national army and a reasonably well developed national arms industry.  And only one major exploitable ethnic split.

Compared to Canada Ukraine is a hard target.

What happens if, instead of barricades showing up on railway tracks, unfortunate events such as that at the radar station PIN-3 alluded to by G2G and Kevin, start increasing?  Or the locals in the north, like those in Greenland, start getting better financial offers for their resources.  How long until the frozen north becomes as unstable as the Donbas?

And when would the US decide it had to risk direct confrontation with Russia by assisting Canada with a domestic problem?

All this to say that we need to focus on the risks at home and how we can manage them with what we have.  

Then figure out the gaps and what we need to fill them.

And, by all means, look at the Artillery first.  It can likely be procured, faster and cheaper, and is becoming more capable, than Air Force assets.  Although the difference between a Guided Projectile and a RATO assisted jet powered UAS/Drone is becoming vanishingly small.

The need to transport troops and assets will never go away.  That technology will constantly change.  It will require constant replacement and upgrading.

Oops.  I did it again.


----------



## Kirkhill

In addition to the economic advantages that might accrue from securing a bigger chunk of the arctic gas revenues (even by just firming the  Russian claim to the entire Lomonosov Ridge) there is a fair chunk of strategic real estate in the north on which the US depends.  Real estate on Canada's sovereign territory that the US expects Canada to defend and maintain.

In addition to Alert, and the RCAF's FOLs, there are 47 North Warning Radar sites that need to be protected.  Radar sites that are being upgraded at US insistence.  

One of the reasons the USMC has created their Littoral Regiments is precisely to create large platoon sized packets that can hold sufficient ground to deploy sensors and missiles.  Their evaluation is that each site will require at least 40 to 50 infantry marines in addition to the artillery and anti-aircraft specialists.  And that is assuming that each site can be relocated when the need presents itself.  

Could Canada currently deploy, sustain and support 50 or 60 platoons to act as security forces in the north if those sites started having unfortunate fires?


----------



## foresterab

Kirkhill said:


> My take on the Griffon is it is the heliborne version of the MilCOTS vs SMP truck debate.
> 
> The Griffon will continue to serve well enough domestically where "440+" perforations are unlikely (unless hail or 7.62mm ball point).    The fleet can be upgraded/replaced over time in Squadron size sets.   With Hook additions.   And I do see a place for the Valor.   Just like I see a place for Challengers in the jet transport fleet.   Sometimes you need to move a small crew fast.
> 
> But as GR66 points out it is a lot of capability to be used just humping a dozen infantry around Southern Alberta, or Nunavut.
> On the other hand maybe it is just the thing when dodging bullets in Afghanistan.  But 440 mph Mosquitoes were being brought down with machine guns and 20mm cannons and F100s were downed by Golden BBs.
> 
> Like FJAG I see no reason to chuck perfectly useable kit just because something better comes along.   I would still keep the Griffon as domestic utility bird even as the fleet was upgraded to the marinized UH-1Y, AH-1Z pair.  Aircraft that can operate over salt water as well as dust, snow and fresh water.  Aircraft that can operate from an AOPS, a CSC or an AOR or a Multi-Role Support Ship.  And that can self-deploy. Not intercontinentally but certainly over long distances.
> 
> With respect to the helicopter vs LAV debate.  Domestically I see  a lot more utility in helicopters than in LAVs.  With 250 or so small battalions of a village, or large company every 100 km or so (30 to 40,000 km2) with no roads or rail connecting them, floods and fires, fuel and food shortages, lost souls, medical emergencies, I see lots of opportunities for utility helicopters to make themselves useful when not carting Anti-Tank teams around some distant theatre.
> 
> Equally I see lots of places for helicopters to add to logistical support overseas in peace and war.  And heliborne troops making a difference in all types of combat.  Especially when operating with national combat air support.





Kirkhill said:


> ....
> 
> In the RCAF we have 85 Griffons and 15 Chinooks.  And that is augmentable with SARs 4 Twin Otters and 15 CH-149s as well as 17 J-series Hercs and 5 CC-177s to enhance tactical air movement domestically.  And internationally.
> 
> Edit:  Actually with all the hard strips around Canada the troops could fly in relative luxury in the CC-150s and join up with flown-in kit.
> 
> I will stipulate the Griffon is not a Blackhawk.  Even the Venom and Viper are not Blackhawks.  But they would improve the capabilities of the force over time.   And maybe you aren't allowed to buy Zulus because they look wrong but you could, perhaps, buy Yankees and use them as better gunship escorts.  And if you get a friendly government maybe they will let you buy some proper gunships.
> 
> Support vehicles that can be delivered by Griffons and Chinooks, designed to accompany and support foot-borne troops over broken, soft and wet terrain should also be acquired for local, short-range manoeuver on the ground.  Long range movement (50 km or more) would be by air.
> 
> In the meantime work can be done with the kit available.
> 
> Now if only the infantry were properly equipped with the right suite of man portable support weapons they could carry with them in the helicopters that were available.
> 
> In the meantime, with the LAVs/Leos and ACSVs that are on hand or in production - FJAG could get a full Swedish model Combined Arms Brigade of 3 Pansar Units and a Cavalry Unit, preposition one battle group set in Poland, keep another set in the warehouse in Canada, and still have vehicles left over for training regs and reserves at home.  Vehicles enough, that, if required a light battalion could be re-roled to supply LAV companies.
> 
> And then we can start concentrating on the Arty.


It's an interesting take on the air mobile assets as this is something that I often mentally toss around as an opportunity Canada could take that would be of major interests to our international partners and domestic ops.  

85 Griffon Bell 412 helicopters can be augmented by the fairly significant civilian medium fleet that is currently mostly used for domestic operations (i.e. wildfire) and/or tourism (heliskiing).   These are primarily Bell model 204/204/212 and while some go back to early Vietnam the older airframes have slowly been getting retired as "newer" frames become available.   The nice thing is that there are some common parts and more importantly similar capacities at least amongst the civilian frames that could be a big surge capacity.    Unfortunately there is a big utilization delta between RCAF machines and civilian models in that almost all civilian pilots are limited to full visibility flight operations only - hence the ask for Griffons to assist on wildfires to operate under zero vis conditions in intelligence roles due to their advanced training and instruments.   For context the 2016 Horse River fire in Fort MacMurray, AB had 170 helicopters (all types) on wildfire mostly of Medium (Bell 212) or intermediate (A-star 350's) types. 

There are a much smaller number of heavy lift helicopters out there but they do exist, primiarily in BC due to heli-logging, that also could be surged.   The issue with these is that they require much more robust operating sites due to fuel needs/weight vs. a medium that can operate via drum fuel in the middle of the woods.   They also tend to be a much wider range of models - Russian and American - which has significant issues on pilot training and parts.   The Chinook is a great airframe in this niche and again should be maintained, if not expanded, by the RCAF.

Lights and intermediates are much more varied.   20 years ago the Bell 206/Kiowa was the standard frame but they have largely been replaced the A-star 350 frame (and many sub-models) as a larger, faster, more comfortable machine of similar costs.   Great for moving technically 5 adults but you're not hauling gear and it's a tight fit to fit that many on board.   4 lighter troops and webbing plus limited support gear is an option but you're either hauling gear or people.   Go down to a tiny Robson R-22 and it's 2 people and a coffee mug only....so the question is under what roles would such a fleet be of use beyond domestics and/or limited UN missions.   These are not airframes that the RCAF should be focused upon beyond initial training machines. .

In regards to fixed wing operations I know air tankers/water bombers but wonder how much freight can be transported in say, Northern Ontario or Quebec via the small armada of float planes used for local transport/fishing guides/communities.    That being said it's small individual packages and a CC-130 would be a far superior option if sufficient frames occurred. 

Looking forward...if we can not afford to support say a Heavy Tank Brigade then we should be looking at other key needs of our international obligations.   Transport, especially heavy transport, in both helicopter and fixed wing is constantly coming up in both NATO/UN/Domestic asks and is one skill set I think Canada should be looking at more.    This means expanding at minimum the C-130 fleet and possibly longer term looking at additional heavy lifters like the A-400 other NATO partners are using in the absence of the C-17 line.    

Tradeoffs for consideration - cost of new purchase of airframes vs. eventual replacement cost of the Leopards?   Manpower needs for a battalion of armor vs. squadron of transports?  Training costs?  Deployment rate and impact upon the greater Canadian Armed Forces?  Is this acceptable to our partners?    It's a purely political decision but also aligns the current political funding support of the Armed Forces maybe better with the mission profile that support would received for?

Sorry for the ramble over morning coffee but made me think about it more again,
foresterab


----------



## FJAG

Thought I'd throw in a sentence or two   on the helo issue.

Back to the theme here for Force 2025 being one for stabilizing force structure into something "better" and "sustainable" while we ponder Force 2030. (and while recognizing that RCAF assets aren't part of the Force 2025 initiative anyway)

We have enough tactical lift helicopters to suit our purposes. While there are ten squadrons flying Griffons, one is oriented SOF, four are base support and search and rescue and one is a training squadron. That basically leaves four squadrons (one of which has the role of providing armed escorts when necessary) for tactical lift. Add to that the Chinook squadron and you probably have enough lift capacity for one battalion plus a supporting artillery battery.

What I see as a problem (aside from the obvious lack of attack helicopters and that I'm not a fan of the Griffon) is that 1 Wing is not a CAB and that the aviation resources are not concentrated enough and it's not properly equipped for it to be a real CAB. The spreading around of squadrons is part of Canada's fetish for ensuring that everyone gets a little bit of everything and not enough of anything.

So, again, if I were king, and if I carry through to shuffle the Army into the one heavy, one mech and one light brigade (because that's what we have gear for) then I'd do the following:

1) make 1 Wing a real CAB - not in name but in equipment and capability to deploy as an entity and provide all of its squadrons with the necessary operational and maintenance support (and training) to operate as a unified formation.

2) move 408 squadron from Edmonton to Petawawa. In my kingdom, 1 CMBG is an armoured brigade and 2 CMBG becomes a light brigade. 1 Wing's primary focus is to support the light brigade. Moving 408 would give Pet it's own (non SOF) squadron as well as the Chinooks. On top of that, 400 Sqn in Borden, 430 Sqn in Quebec and 438 Sqn at St Hubert, are close enough to Kingston (1 Wings HQ) and Pet that they can easily combine for training. In time I would consider moving 1 Wing HQ to Pet as well but it's not pressing.

I realize that by removing a squadron from 1 CABG would deprive it of helicopter support but essentially I can live with that. 1 CABG focuses on armoured mech ops with little scope for tactical lift. What they lose during training is experience with recce and medivac. That can be remedied by sending a flight to work with them annually and concentrating much more on UAV supported operations.

By leaving 430 Sqn in Quebec and  438 in Montreal, 5 CMBG can practice all aspects of aviation skills regularly as they have a higher probability of having some of their troops operate light on occasion than 1 CABG.

2 CLBG needs the bulk of helicopter resources and in addition to doing year round training with 408 and 450 squadrons (and on occasion 427 Sqn) it should have at least one exercise annually in Ontario where 408, 427, 400, 430, 438 and 450 Sqns all concentrate under 1 Wing to support a full light brigade's combined arms formation level operation.

As a Force 2030 (or 2035) objective I would focus on creating a real attack helicopter squadron in Pet. I thought of moving 438 Sqn from Montreal to Pet and redistributing its Griffons to the other Griffon squadrons but think that I'd rather make it a largely reserve force squadron instead. Ideally I'd like to brigade all the Griffons in one place to simplify the maintenance establishment for them but they are already spread all over hell and back as support and search and rescue capabilities so that's not optimal. I think the only practical ways to create robust Res F flights is by having squadrons close to the major cities, Toronto, Montreal and Quebec - and maybe Ottawa and Kingston to work with the Pet folks.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

OK.

If we are going to continue stretching the envelope then 2 CBG, and 1 Wing, need to move to the centre of the domestic area of operations.

Yellowknife.

Valcartier is close enough to Ottawa, Kingston and Gagetown to be the central element in Eastern Canada.  Valcartier can work a little harder.  And it and Edmonton can make use of their LAVs on the Highways.

Edmonton is already expected to cover Yellowknife, Vancouver, Calgary, Saskatoon, Regina, Winnipeg and Thunder Bay.

Yellowknife at 62N is still further south than Fairbanks, Fort Wainwright and Eielson Air Base at 64N.  And by the time you moved 2 CBG and 1 Wing into town its population would be the same as Fairbanks.

Assuming you can get southerners from Ottawa to express their true, patriot love for the true north strong and free by standing on guard.

Edit: I would be willing to accept the retention of 2 CBG and the collocation of 1 Wing at Petawawa if there were a permanently detached, rotating light battle group with a mixed Griffon/Chinook/UAS squadron located in Churchill - with a new rail line, an upgraded air field and an AOPS/AOR capable harbour.

Edit:  The airport, railway and the harbour already exist.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> OK.
> 
> If we are going to continue stretching the envelope then 2 CBG, and 1 Wing, need to move to the centre of the domestic area of operations.
> 
> Yellowknife.
> 
> Valcartier is close enough to Ottawa, Kingston and Gagetown to be the central element in Eastern Canada.  Valcartier can work a little harder.  And it and Edmonton can make use of their LAVs on the Highways.
> 
> Edmonton is already expected to cover Yellowknife, Vancouver, Calgary, Saskatoon, Regina, Winnipeg and Thunder Bay.
> 
> Yellowknife at 62N is still further south than Fairbanks, Fort Wainwright and Eielson Air Base at 64N.  And by the time you moved 2 CBG and 1 Wing into town its population would be the same as Fairbanks.
> 
> Assuming you can get southerners from Ottawa to express their true, patriot love for the true north strong and free by standing on guard.
> 
> Edit: I would be willing to accept the retention of 2 CBG and the collocation of 1 Wing at Petawawa if there were a permanently detached, rotating light battle group with a mixed Griffon/Chinook/UAS squadron located in Churchill - with a new rail line, an upgraded air field and an AOPS/AOR capable harbour.
> 
> Edit:  The airport, railway and the harbour already exist.



Because Cold Lake isn't remote enough, right?


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Because Cold Lake isn't remote enough, right?


Because Cold Lake isn't Jointy enough.  You can't get the Navy there.

And it ain't in the centre of the country.  A flight of Chinooks in Churchill can ferry themselves anywhere in Canada, East Coast to West Coast and North of Resolute in something like 8 hours.  I believe?   As long as there is local airfield they can touch done on once they get to the area of operations they can gas up and get to work.

Edit: And Churchill needs development, as does the Hudson Bay Route - Add two Polar Icebreakers to the Port and start shipping lumber, furs, grain, gas and oil.


----------



## McG

With the great distances and and few runways across Canada’s north, tilt-rotor aircraft would give options even for operations at home.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Because Cold Lake isn't Jointy enough.  You can't get the Navy there.
> 
> And it ain't in the centre of the country.  A flight of Chinooks in Churchill can ferry themselves anywhere in Canada, East Coast to West Coast and North of Resolute in something like 8 hours.  I believe?   As long as there is local airfield they can touch done on once they get to the area of operations they can gas up and get to work.


A Hook doesn't need a field - it just needs prepositioned fuel - which can be kicked out the back of a Herc if need be.
   But I don't think that it best to have all the Helo's based up North 
I would rather rotate Light units north on a seasonal aspect - like Alert postings. 




FJAG said:


> Thought I'd throw in a sentence or two   on the helo issue.
> 
> Back to the theme here for Force 2025 being one for stabilizing force structure into something "better" and "sustainable" while we ponder Force 2030. (and while recognizing that RCAF assets aren't part of the Force 2025 initiative anyway)
> 
> We have enough tactical lift helicopters to suit our purposes. While there are ten squadrons flying Griffons, one is oriented SOF, four are base support and search and rescue and one is a training squadron. That basically leaves four squadrons (one of which has the role of providing armed escorts when necessary) for tactical lift. Add to that the Chinook squadron and you probably have enough lift capacity for one battalion plus a supporting artillery battery.


Doing Kevin math - that makes roughly 8.5 birds / squadron of Griffons, I will use 10 for the Operational Sqn for simplicities sake.
   10 x 4 = 40 Griffons
     1 of which is doing "Armed Escort" - so 30 for available for UH purposes.
   and 15 Hooks - which I suspect some are fairly hard dedicated to CANSOF, I'll say 3 for the purposes of this exercise.

1 Hook / M777 - is that a 6 or 8 gun Bty?
   Lets say 4 for argument sake.       - that leaves 8 Hooks to move people, and 30 Griffons.
      Being generous I will let the Griffon carry 6 combat loaded troops with rucks etc.
    Thats 180 troops.
      If you squeeze really tight in a Hook with a combat load you are looking at a max of 40 troops - but realistically going north - your at a 30 pax max with toboggans etc.  - so with 8 you have another 240.

   Best case scenario you get all 15 hooks - you still need to cut some to the guns - and if you leave the guns - that's 450 troops going North - plus the Griffons - so a BN Minus in one sortie




FJAG said:


> What I see as a problem (aside from the obvious lack of attack helicopters and that I'm not a fan of the Griffon) is that 1 Wing is not a CAB and that the aviation resources are not concentrated enough and it's not properly equipped for it to be a real CAB. The spreading around of squadrons is part of Canada's fetish for ensuring that everyone gets a little bit of everything and not enough of anything.


The fairness aspect simply ensure no one has enough of anything to do anything -- a very Canadian solution 


FJAG said:


> So, again, if I were king, and if I carry through to shuffle the Army into the one heavy, one mech and one light brigade (because that's what we have gear for) then I'd do the following:


    I would make 4 Bde, using the reserves to bring the #'s up.
2 Light 1 Med, and 1 Mech (I refuse to call anything with LAV's Heavy regardless of the Leo 2).



FJAG said:


> 1) make 1 Wing a real CAB - not in name but in equipment and capability to deploy as an entity and provide all of its squadrons with the necessary operational and maintenance support (and training) to operate as a unified formation.
> 
> 2) move 408 squadron from Edmonton to Petawawa. In my kingdom, 1 CMBG is an armoured brigade and 2 CMBG becomes a light brigade. 1 Wing's primary focus is to support the light brigade. Moving 408 would give Pet it's own (non SOF) squadron as well as the Chinooks. On top of that, 400 Sqn in Borden, 430 Sqn in Quebec and 438 Sqn at St Hubert, are close enough to Kingston (1 Wings HQ) and Pet that they can easily combine for training. In time I would consider moving 1 Wing HQ to Pet as well but it's not pressing.
> 
> I realize that by removing a squadron from 1 CABG would deprive it of helicopter support but essentially I can live with that. 1 CABG focuses on armoured mech ops with little scope for tactical lift. What they lose during training is experience with recce and medivac. That can be remedied by sending a flight to work with them annually and concentrating much more on UAV supported operations.
> 
> By leaving 430 Sqn in Quebec and  438 in Montreal, 5 CMBG can practice all aspects of aviation skills regularly as they have a higher probability of having some of their troops operate light on occasion than 1 CABG.


  I was following you until that -- I would colocate in 1 spot -- Sqn's can do away trips to the other locations for training every few months.


FJAG said:


> 2 CLBG needs the bulk of helicopter resources and in addition to doing year round training with 408 and 450 squadrons (and on occasion 427 Sqn) it should have at least one exercise annually in Ontario where 408, 427, 400, 430, 438 and 450 Sqns all concentrate under 1 Wing to support a full light brigade's combined arms formation level operation.


  As I said above - I think 1 Wing needs to be colocated in Pet.


FJAG said:


> As a Force 2030 (or 2035) objective I would focus on creating a real attack helicopter squadron in Pet. I thought of moving 438 Sqn from Montreal to Pet and redistributing its Griffons to the other Griffon squadrons but think that I'd rather make it a largely reserve force squadron instead. Ideally I'd like to brigade all the Griffons in one place to simplify the maintenance establishment for them but they are already spread all over hell and back as support and search and rescue capabilities so that's not optimal. I think the only practical ways to create robust Res F flights is by having squadrons close to the major cities, Toronto, Montreal and Quebec - and maybe Ottawa and Kingston to work with the Pet folks.
> 
> 🍻


For 2030 - I'd be trying to find a Griffon replacement


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Because Cold Lake isn't Jointy enough.  You can't get the Navy there.
> 
> And it ain't in the centre of the country.  A flight of Chinooks in Churchill can ferry themselves anywhere in Canada, East Coast to West Coast and North of Resolute in something like 8 hours.  I believe?   As long as there is local airfield they can touch done on once they get to the area of operations they can gas up and get to work.
> 
> Edit: And Churchill needs development, as does the Hudson Bay Route - Add two Polar Icebreakers to the Port and start shipping lumber, furs, grain, gas and oil.



Yeah, about that 'port thing':

N.W.T. premier urges investment in Arctic ports as sea ice recedes​Bob McLeod says he wants to see at least 3 ports in the territory support increased shipping traffic​
Climate change has hurt the northern economy in ways few southern Canadians can appreciate, says Northwest Territories Premier Bob McLeod, but he also wants to make sure his territory benefits from increased shipping traffic as Arctic sea ice recedes.

"It's getting harder to resupply our communities," McLeod said in an interview Tuesday from Saskatoon, where he spoke at the Pacific NorthWest Economic Region summit.

"We rely a lot on ice roads. Their life span is getting shorter and shorter," he said.

McLeod noted fuel had to be flown into three communities last year.

Declining rainfall meant reservoirs didn't replenish enough for two hydroelectric facilities to run, meaning diesel generators had to be fired up.





			https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nwt-premier-urges-investment-arctic-ports-1.5223319


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> With the great distances and and few runways across Canada’s north, tilt-rotor aircraft would give options even for operations at home.


I'm a firm believer that future CF rotary assets need to be tilt-rotor - if just for the Domestic aspect.
    I would have preferred the V-22 to the Hook honestly - (sorry GTG) as I think it offers more to the CF.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I'm a firm believer that future CF rotary assets need to be tilt-rotor - if just for the Domestic aspect.
> I would have preferred the V-22 to the Hook honestly - (sorry GTG) as I think it offers more to the CF.



As required, IIRC that alot of our domestic needs can be met through contracting with the private sector.

For example, the 'fire fighting' air fleets operating across the country during the summer can grow to be bigger than the RCAF, as I understand it


----------



## foresterab

FJAG said:


> .....
> 
> So, again, if I were king, and if I carry through to shuffle the Army into the one heavy, one mech and one light brigade (because that's what we have gear for) then I'd do the following:
> 
> 1) make 1 Wing a real CAB - not in name but in equipment and capability to deploy as an entity and provide all of its squadrons with the necessary operational and maintenance support (and training) to operate as a unified formation.
> 
> 2) move 408 squadron from Edmonton to Petawawa. In my kingdom, 1 CMBG is an armoured brigade and 2 CMBG becomes a light brigade. 1 Wing's primary focus is to support the light brigade. Moving 408 would give Pet it's own (non SOF) squadron as well as the Chinooks. On top of that, 400 Sqn in Borden, 430 Sqn in Quebec and 438 Sqn at St Hubert, are close enough to Kingston (1 Wings HQ) and Pet that they can easily combine for training. In time I would consider moving 1 Wing HQ to Pet as well but it's not pressing.
> 
> I realize that by removing a squadron from 1 CABG would deprive it of helicopter support but essentially I can live with that. 1 CABG focuses on armoured mech ops with little scope for tactical lift. What they lose during training is experience with recce and medivac. That can be remedied by sending a flight to work with them annually and concentrating much more on UAV supported operations.
> ....


FJAG,

So a question for you?   I've worked with many ex-military pilots on wildfire duties from multiple nations from Vietnam to Australia to Norway and I wonder how difficult it would be to find a pilot/civilian charter that has the following:
1) Military background to allow for clear understand of command functions
2) Use of a Bell 212 for at least daytime Medivac.    For reference we use them and/or Astar's for this depending on situation. 
3) Use of a Astar or 212 for recce work?  I use these folks as an intelligence asset when working Plans roles and to do low level flight and/or mapping and/or over C&C is possible and common uses for us.  

What this does not allow however is:
A) Lack of experience if the concentrated squadrons do not work with 1CMBG 
B) Lack of overland travel experience.   A critical Canadian skill especially if you're into Mountain ops vs. coastal vs. artic training
C) Possible OPSEC issues due to radio usage.   But these guys can already operate with CFB Cold Lake on fires (with permission) so less of an issue
D) possible insurance issues?

Again I'm looking at this from an augmentation, short term charter perspective as an alternative to maintaining a second, expensive fleet that is occasionally used for 1 CMBG.     It's a trade off of dollars and accepting a lesser capacity potentially in order to maintain training at "good  enough" levels....which might be fine for a Company Level or even Battalion exercise but should be not accepted if you're doing Combat Team (sorry...brain fart on the right term as that's a US expression) final mission training or Brigade level exercises.   

It's looking at what's good enough vs. perfect scenario and when do we need each?
foresterab


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> A Hook doesn't need a field - it just needs prepositioned fuel - which can be kicked out the back of a Herc if need be.
> But I don't think that it best to have all the Helo's based up North
> I would rather rotate Light units north on a seasonal aspect - like Alert postings.



As I noted, while I wish that we would post a heliborne force at Yellowknife, I recognize the lack of funds and will power.  Thus my Churchill suggestion - a permanent station (like Alert) but with Aircraft and troops, perhaps from a heli-mobile brigade in Petawawa, rotating in and out.  Long term, short term, some mix.  It doesn't matter.  So long as the presence and northern focus is established.  

And I agree it would be better NOT to put all the helos up north.  On the other hand it would be better to buy more VTOL craft so some could be permanently stationed further north to support northern security and development  and military response.



KevinB said:


> Doing Kevin math - that makes roughly 8.5 birds / squadron of Griffons, I will use 10 for the Operational Sqn for simplicities sake.
> 10 x 4 = 40 Griffons
> 1 of which is doing "Armed Escort" - so 30 for available for UH purposes.
> and 15 Hooks - which I suspect some are fairly hard dedicated to CANSOF, I'll say 3 for the purposes of this exercise.
> 
> 1 Hook / M777 - is that a 6 or 8 gun Bty?
> Lets say 4 for argument sake.       - that leaves 8 Hooks to move people, and 30 Griffons.
> Being generous I will let the Griffon carry 6 combat loaded troops with rucks etc.
> Thats 180 troops.
> If you squeeze really tight in a Hook with a combat load you are looking at a max of 40 troops - but realistically going north - your at a 30 pax max with toboggans etc.  - so with 8 you have another 240.
> 
> Best case scenario you get all 15 hooks - you still need to cut some to the guns - and if you leave the guns - that's 450 troops going North - plus the Griffons - so a BN Minus in one sortie



Accepting that you are not going to get all the rotary wing assets into one place for one long range lift.

On the other hand a two stage lift might be doable.

Troops to a staging field, of which there are many in Canada, by CC-150 Polaris.
6 to 8 Hooks to self-deploy light to the staging field.
Hooks and troops join up to deploy to FOB.  Troops to be moved in lifts over a 12 hour period?

Vehicles, Guns, Supplies and other large kit to be delivered by tactical landing, LAPES, airdrop or precision air drop to FOB by Hercs and CC-177s




KevinB said:


> The fairness aspect simply ensure no one has enough of anything to do anything -- a very Canadian solution
> 
> I would make 4 Bde, using the reserves to bring the #'s up.
> 2 Light 1 Med, and 1 Mech (I refuse to call anything with LAV's Heavy regardless of the Leo 2).
> 
> 
> I was following you until that -- I would colocate in 1 spot -- Sqn's can do away trips to the other locations for training every few months.
> 
> As I said above - I think 1 Wing needs to be colocated in Pet.
> 
> For 2030 - I'd be trying to find a Griffon replacement



One of the problems with the collocation solution is that the Griffons are used every day.  All over the place.  And that is a good thing.  

With their short legs they can't be centralized, they have to be dispersed.  Just like Milverados.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Yeah, about that 'port thing':
> 
> N.W.T. premier urges investment in Arctic ports as sea ice recedes​Bob McLeod says he wants to see at least 3 ports in the territory support increased shipping traffic​
> Climate change has hurt the northern economy in ways few southern Canadians can appreciate, says Northwest Territories Premier Bob McLeod, but he also wants to make sure his territory benefits from increased shipping traffic as Arctic sea ice recedes.
> 
> "It's getting harder to resupply our communities," McLeod said in an interview Tuesday from Saskatoon, where he spoke at the Pacific NorthWest Economic Region summit.
> 
> "We rely a lot on ice roads. Their life span is getting shorter and shorter," he said.
> 
> McLeod noted fuel had to be flown into three communities last year.
> 
> Declining rainfall meant reservoirs didn't replenish enough for two hydroelectric facilities to run, meaning diesel generators had to be fired up.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/nwt-premier-urges-investment-arctic-ports-1.5223319



Too bad they didn't have any exploitable natural gas up there.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I'm a firm believer that future CF rotary assets need to be tilt-rotor - if just for the Domestic aspect.
> I would have preferred the V-22 to the Hook honestly - (sorry GTG) as I think it offers more to the CF.



I'm a firm believer that tilt-rotors have a place in the CF rotary assets inventory.  Including domestically.   If nothing else it would cut down on the need for airstrips with their maintenance and snow-clearance requirements.

However I also see a continuing need for utility birds with useful payloads but short legs.  I also see, especially with foresterabs intervention, a greater exploitable opportunity with reserve flights and squadrons.  There seems to be a large community of helicopter, and bush plane, pilots whose skills could be better utilized by making government aircraft available, in reserve, on demand, locally, for their use.  Whether or not they are Air Force, Rangers or CASARA.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> As required, IIRC that alot of our domestic needs can be met through contracting with the private sector.
> 
> For example, the 'fire fighting' air fleets operating across the country during the summer can grow to be bigger than the RCAF, as I understand it



Maybe we just need a better plan and organization?


----------



## lenaitch

daftandbarmy said:


> As required, IIRC that alot of our domestic needs can be met through contracting with the private sector.
> 
> For example, the 'fire fighting' air fleets operating across the country during the summer can grow to be bigger than the RCAF, as I understand it


One problem is the water bomber variant of the CL-415 doesn't have a lot of interior space to be of much use - it's all tanks. There is the Twin Otters.  The Fire Boss (all private under contract as far as I know) is basically a water tank with an engine and cockpit strapped to it. Also, I'm not sure how suitable the CL-415 is for winter use.


----------



## daftandbarmy

lenaitch said:


> One problem is the water bomber variant of the CL-415 doesn't have a lot of interior space to be of much use - it's all tanks. There is the Twin Otters.  The Fire Boss (all private under contract as far as I know) is basically a water tank with an engine and cockpit strapped to it. Also, I'm not sure how suitable the CL-415 is for winter use.



I'm sure that there are other aircraft types, from Beavers to the biggest jet liners, that can be leased as required for a variety of reasons.

As a result, I'm not sure that you could argue successfully for a (big, sexy, expensive) tilt rotor for domestic purposes.


----------



## foresterab

lenaitch said:


> One problem is the water bomber variant of the CL-415 doesn't have a lot of interior space to be of much use - it's all tanks. There is the Twin Otters.  The Fire Boss (all private under contract as far as I know) is basically a water tank with an engine and cockpit strapped to it. Also, I'm not sure how suitable the CL-415 is for winter use.


In regards to wildfire support I would argue a more important tool would be adding C-130 airframes and using a modular MAFF's unit (these slid in and out as needed) similar to what the US uses with it's National Guard Units.    Greater overall flexibility and better alignment with the Armed Forces overall mission.  Keep in mind that the initial response will be by the province and usually the first response needed is air transport for civilian evacuations which means you do not want a specialized plane.  Each province runs a slightly different mix of airframes and capacity in response to their local conditions and needs. 

That being said there is a niche that is used by other countries - Malaysia, Thailand, Greece, Turkey where the CL-415 are used in a SAR role up to and including mid ocean landing if conditions work.    This might be of more use on the West Coast on interior bays within the near shore than say the Atlantic.

The CL-515 is still in development and not ready for production but as I understand it will be able to better handle both suppression and transport needs.  Viking still has only released concept details on these planes and search for interested parties.  

Either way the MAFF's unit is a great tool and is often overlooked when looking at the "shiny" planes.
foresterab


----------



## foresterab

daftandbarmy said:


> I'm sure that there are other aircraft types, from Beavers to the biggest jet liners, that can be leased as required for a variety of reasons.
> 
> As a result, I'm not sure that you could for a (big, sexy, expensive) tilt rotor for domestic purposes.


There's actually a fair number of heavy lift machines out there...the challange is finding a common fleet.   Coulson for example has Sikorsky S61's the same as Vancouver Island Helicopters but others use the Bell 412ST or russian K-max or Kamov's.    The challange is that many of these are lift only and do not have the capacity to move a platoon of men like a Chinook does....so if you only need sling loads moved you're find but not the people movers.     They have become more popular on wildfires due to the sheer volume of water they can move in the right conditions but are a tool and not the solution to everything. 

Fixed wing charters can be done up to a 737 level not bad....and frankly after that size you're into restricting which airports/strips can be used a lot.   However the lead time for orders can be difficult as many, such as the Buffalo Airways fleet, are tied up with their regular contracts and may not be available short of either excessive premium prices or limited availability.    Artic and rough strips also limit how many planes are out there but there are some sizable fleets out there folks don't think about...Kenn Borak Air based in Red Deer, AB for example runs Basler BT-67 planes (turbine engined DC-3/C-47) and is a main supplier to Antarctica that could also be used.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I'm a firm believer that tilt-rotors have a place in the CF rotary assets inventory.  Including domestically.   If nothing else it would cut down on the need for airstrips with their maintenance and snow-clearance requirements.
> 
> However I also see a continuing need for utility birds with useful payloads but short legs.  I also see, especially with foresterabs intervention, a greater exploitable opportunity with reserve flights and squadrons.  There seems to be a large community of helicopter, and bush plane, pilots whose skills could be better utilized by making government aircraft available, in reserve, on demand, locally, for their use.  Whether or not they are Air Force, Rangers or CASARA.


Osprey has a decent payload - granted the F model Hook does out do it (15k lbs versus 21k) - but larger tilts are coming.

I personally view civilian A/C as In Extremis use only - like a Dunkirk style evacuation - as they are not hardened against EW, ground fire - have no counter measures - and don't have TRF or Low/No Light Capability.   

If I'd been in a Bell 412 instead of a -60, I would not be typing right now...


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> If I'd been in a Bell 412 instead of a -60, I would not be typing right now...



Pictures, should they exist, would be fun


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Pictures, should they exist, would be fun


I was not even thinking of that at the time -- the SEAL ASP had just been blown about 2 min after we landed and things where a little hectic - plus it was steak and lobster night at the DFAC (I do think the cooks were also on the fire staff - as the food wast tainted by Diesel and cold when I managed to get a meal).   I've got some of a MRAP I was in that took an IED - and a pretty terrible shot of a SAM that was shot at another Blackhawk I was in -- I didn't know what it was at the time - at first I thought it was just a flare from another helo - but realized later by the pilots reactions/and corresponding flight pattern, and the crew chief doing a mad minute on his 240 that something was up)


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Osprey has a decent payload - granted the F model Hook does out do it (15k lbs versus 21k) - but larger tilts are coming.
> 
> I personally view civilian A/C as In Extremis use only - like a Dunkirk style evacuation - as they are not hardened against EW, ground fire - have no counter measures - and don't have TRF or Low/No Light Capability.
> 
> If I'd been in a Bell 412 instead of a -60, I would not be typing right now...



Good enough.  So do we keep a civilian fleet for everyday use when no one is shooting at us?  Or a military fleet that gets eaten up doing stuff for which it is overkill?  Or do we do something else?  Accept that the military solution is overkill but reserve it for "break the glass" scenarios and scatter them for use by reservists and qualified civilians?

We can't afford to replace large fleets of high-tech gear on the same two year schedule we used to use when buying Dodge Chargers.  Brits, the Yanks and the Aussies can't afford it either.   They are making adjustments and deciding what risks they can afford to take.

The Aussies are the least risk averse.  The Brits have started one of their occasional major resets, to the chagrin of retired Colonels everywhere.  The Yanks - Well if our Cyclone programme looks shaky we might want to look at any US vertical lift programme of the last 40 years and ask why the fleet still looks like Ronald Reagan's?  As does the fleet of Tanks and APCs/IFVs and SPHs.

There was the Kiowa.  Then there was the Comanche.  Then there was the Arapaho.  Then they were all scrapped and replaced with the 1980s vintage, 40 year old, Apache.  And grandfather has replaced the handle, and the head, on that axe a number of times.

We have to work with what is given.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Good enough.  So do we keep a civilian fleet for everyday use when no one is shooting at us?  Or a military fleet that gets eaten up doing stuff for which it is overkill?  Or do we do something else?  Accept that the military solution is overkill but reserve it for "break the glass" scenarios and scatter them for use by reservists and qualified civilians?


 FRP everyone and give the US DoD 15B a year then...

 Either you get gear or you don't.    Like the US CRAF - I would think it behooves Canada to offer incentives for local airlines/companies to use equipment that can be used to help the CF.

But we have just been arguing that the MILCOT was a terrible plan for the reserves and didn't offer any gains - so the idea that it would work for A/C to me is foolish.





Kirkhill said:


> We can't afford to replace large fleets of high-tech gear on the same two year schedule we used to use when buying Dodge Chargers.  Brits, the Yanks and the Aussies can't afford it either.   They are making adjustments and deciding what risks they can afford to take.


 My point would be - you can cascade the Griffons to the Reserve - when a new program kicks off -- but if you have enough airframe you don't need to run them ragged in peacetime.
    If I was King, I would be linking in with the US FVL - and imbedding someone on their CFT -
 I threw the 280 on the table due to the Bell hamstring you felt was good for the National Defence Industrial segment.
   But IMHO that is a little risky if Bell gets kicked to the curb and the LMS option goes forward.



Kirkhill said:


> The Aussies are the least risk averse.  The Brits have started one of their occasional major resets, to the chagrin of retired Colonels everywhere.  The Yanks - Well if our Cyclone programme looks shaky we might want to look at any US vertical lift programme of the last 40 years and ask why the fleet still looks like Ronald Reagan's?  As does the fleet of Tanks and APCs/IFVs and SPHs.


  I'm not sure if you're being serious at this point -- but I'd argue virtually nothing is the same as under Reagan.


Kirkhill said:


> There was the Kiowa.  Then there was the Comanche.  Then there was the Arapaho.  Then they were all scrapped and replaced with the 1980s vintage, 40 year old, Apache.  And grandfather has replaced the handle, and the head, on that axe a number of times.
> 
> We have to work with what is given.


 The difference is the Apache is still a first rate AH, and the Echo V6 is a long long long way ahead of even a Longbow D model.








						Flying with V6 Apache: Supporting Today’s Missions to Prepare for Tomorrow’s Threats
					

“Fly, fight and survive.” This unofficial mantra of Apache aircrews is the ultimate goal when in combat and engaged in enemy fire, not only for themselves, but also for the ground soldiers the attack helicopter crews routinely support.




					www.lockheedmartin.com


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Doing Kevin math - that makes roughly 8.5 birds / squadron of Griffons, I will use 10 for the Operational Sqn for simplicities sake.
> ...
> Best case scenario you get all 15 hooks - you still need to cut some to the guns - and if you leave the guns - that's 450 troops going North - plus the Griffons - so a BN Minus in one sortie


I was thinking more temperate climate conditions but don't disagree with your winter kit numbers. 

As for guns, these cockamamie days a Reg F battery is 4 x M777 while a regiment is 8   (something that I strongly disagree with - it should be 6 and 18.)


KevinB said:


> I would make 4 Bde, using the reserves to bring the #'s up.
> 2 Light 1 Med, and 1 Mech (I refuse to call anything with LAV's Heavy regardless of the Leo 2).


I've gone several different directions depending on whether the argument is based on current equipment; relatively possible future equipment; or pie-in-the-sky if I were king equipment.

In the first scenario there is a Reg F light, mech and armoured brigade supported by a hybrid combat support brigade. In the relatively possible future equipment scenario I would leave the Reg F light and mech brigades as is, realign the Reg F armoured brigade into two hybrid armoured brigades, convert the combat support brigade into a hybrid artillery brigade and realign the rest of the reserve force into  a light brigade, a mech brigade, a hybrid manoeuvre enhancement brigade and a hybrid sustainment brigade.


KevinB said:


> I was following you until that -- I would colocate in 1 spot -- Sqn's can do away trips to the other locations for training every few months.
> 
> As I said above - I think 1 Wing needs to be colocated in Pet.


Yeah. I was thinking minimal new facilities and the ability to draw on having squadron facilities collocated where a pool of reservists exist. Pet really sucks for that. That shouldn't stop the Wing HQ from moving to Pet but would leave the squadrons dispersed and instead of building new hangers would spend the cash on ATGMs instead.   


KevinB said:


> For 2030 - I'd be trying to find a Griffon replacement


Of course we both know that with our procurement system for helicopters we'd get neither before 2040. 

🍻


----------



## FJAG

foresterab said:


> FJAG,
> 
> So a question for you?   I've worked with many ex-military pilots on wildfire duties from multiple nations from Vietnam to Australia to Norway and I wonder how difficult it would be to find a pilot/civilian charter that has the following:
> 1) Military background to allow for clear understand of command functions
> 2) Use of a Bell 212 for at least daytime Medivac.    For reference we use them and/or Astar's for this depending on situation.
> 3) Use of a Astar or 212 for recce work?  I use these folks as an intelligence asset when working Plans roles and to do low level flight and/or mapping and/or over C&C is possible and common uses for us.


No idea.


foresterab said:


> What this does not allow however is:
> A) Lack of experience if the concentrated squadrons do not work with 1CMBG
> B) Lack of overland travel experience.   A critical Canadian skill especially if you're into Mountain ops vs. coastal vs. artic training
> C) Possible OPSEC issues due to radio usage.   But these guys can already operate with CFB Cold Lake on fires (with permission) so less of an issue
> D) possible insurance issues?
> 
> Again I'm looking at this from an augmentation, short term charter perspective as an alternative to maintaining a second, expensive fleet that is occasionally used for 1 CMBG.     It's a trade off of dollars and accepting a lesser capacity potentially in order to maintain training at "good  enough" levels....which might be fine for a Company Level or even Battalion exercise but should be not accepted if you're doing Combat Team (sorry...brain fart on the right term as that's a US expression) final mission training or Brigade level exercises.
> 
> It's looking at what's good enough vs. perfect scenario and when do we need each?
> foresterab


I wouldn't consider such a charter fleet as a viable alternative. It's far safer and easier to ferry a military flight or two out west for the odd exercise. Personally, once you remove the light battalion from 1 CMBG the need for aviation support in training becomes minimal. For an armoured brigade recce/attack helicopters are useful. I don't consider the Griffon a very viable recce helicopter (others may disagree) and we don't have attack helicopters so its a stretch at the best of times.

🍻


----------



## lenaitch

daftandbarmy said:


> I'm sure that there are other aircraft types, from Beavers to the biggest jet liners, that can be leased as required for a variety of reasons.
> 
> As a result, I'm not sure that you could argue successfully for a (big, sexy, expensive) tilt rotor for domestic purposes.



Sorry, my earlier post was an incomplete thought - I had to go make dinner.  Short of a national emergency where aircraft could be conscripted/leased/coerced, leasing private aircraft for year-to-year CAF domestic needs would probably limit itself to either leasing companies, such as Voyageur, and perhaps commercial carriers with some spare aircraft.  I would think most of these would be inherently larger airframes, likely at least Twin Otter-ish size, which is probably great for capacity but the bigger the aircraft the more limited you get for suitable airfields.  I suppose one advantage to using block leased fleets would be a degree of commonality for how the CAF personnel would use them, rather than trying to adapt plans and logistics to a wide variety of constantly changing airframes.   At the smaller end, the Cessnas, Beavers, etc., the majority of the those are small fleets; sometimes fleets of one or two.  Although more flexible in terms of where they can get into, they are typically VFR operations and often piloted by low-hour pilots getting their start in the industry. 

Unless the goal would be to spurn a new private industry based on semi-permanent government contracts ('semi' in the sense that there will always be contracts, just rotating contractors), the small aircraft bush-and-gravel runway fleet is the lifeline of remote communities, outfitter tourism and resource exploration and I don't know how much spare capacity there would be without degrading these clients.

I imagine it is the same situation in the rotary world.  Other than companies such as Canadian Helicopters, I don't get the sense that there is much lease capacity in other than light machines.

I have this imagine of a domestic CAF operation looking like an Oshkosh meet or a Gathering of the Classics.


----------



## Kirkhill

Lenaitch,

I would sooner the government bought a standardized fleet to be manned by part-time civilians and then sold off on a regular schedule.  The fleet would then be renewed.  Might even put a few Hercs in the mix.

Development up north is going to cost money.  Something is going to have to be subsidized.  Why not helicopters and aircraft?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Lenaitch,
> 
> I would sooner the government bought a standardized fleet to be manned by part-time civilians and then sold off on a regular schedule.  The fleet would then be renewed.  Might even put a few Hercs in the mix.
> 
> Development up north is going to cost money.  Something is going to have to be subsidized.  Why not helicopters and aircraft?


Sort of a CRAF for the North?  -- subsidize certain platforms for Canadian companies, with the agreement that those who partake do need to be willing to supply crews and craft if called up.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Lenaitch,
> 
> I would sooner the government bought a standardized fleet to be manned by part-time civilians and then sold off on a regular schedule.  The fleet would then be renewed.  Might even put a few Hercs in the mix.
> 
> Development up north is going to cost money.  Something is going to have to be subsidized.  Why not helicopters and aircraft?



The DC-3 and King Air seem to be the fleet of choice there:

What's Hidden in the Hangar? Buffalo Airways Tour​
I made this Buffalo Airways Hangar tour video for "EAA Spirit of Aviation Week" it was streamed for the Event on July 23rd, 2020


----------



## Good2Golf

KevinB said:


> I'm a firm believer that future CF rotary assets need to be tilt-rotor - if just for the Domestic aspect.
> I would have preferred the V-22 to the Hook honestly - (sorry GTG) as I think it offers more to the CF.


To an enlightened CAF, I would agree, KevinB.  The reality of all this (including the political reality) is that we won’t have tiltrotors anytime soon, well continue to have some type of Camada/Quebec/Mira-Bell product now and in the future, we won’t get anymore Chinooks, and there is no way in earth one could ever get a ‘civilian surge’ rotary-wing capability trained up on NVG and able to support even moderately opposed operations that would otherwise provide, to quote _Battlestar Galactica_, a rag tag (fugitive) fleet…

That why I stated earlier the best the Army can expect out of (rotary) aviation is a CoyGp…maybe (+) on a good day.  Call it a BG (-… or even - -) if you want, but PRes and eqpt readiness and op avail levels will not realistically support more.  Folks like to use max kit fleet sizes to plan ops, but that doesn’t happen…ever.  I notice nobody is planning a BDE (X) armoured operation with ‘all of our’ 82 Leo2 A6M/A4M tanks.

Kirkhill, for the Yellowknife suggestion:


----------



## GR66

If we're looking at what we'd like the Army to be capable of in the near to mid term within the constraints of what equipment we currently have (and what realistically we can hope to get in the current economic climate), here's what I'd hope to see:

1) The ability to independently deploy a credible military force (even if Light-weight) to a distant location within a reasonably quick period of time (days/weeks vs weeks/months).  This could include anything from friendly, well supported environments like NATO Europe to austere environments like the Canadian Arctic.

2) The ability to contribute a heavier, high-intensity combat capable force as a contribution to a larger, allied force in case of a major conflict.

3) The ability to continue to contribute forces capable of partaking in stability/counter insurgency operations in cooperation with allied forces and host nation forces (including capacity building).

4) Our deployed forces should not have to rely on higher level allied formations for capabilities which should normally be present in the size of force we have deployed.


In terms of specific capabilities it might look something like this:

1 x Airborne Battle Group capable of deploying by C-130J (too few CC-177s to risk) to secure a forward air base/port/staging area - by air assault if required.  This same Battle Groups should also have the ability/training to deploy from RCN ships by landing craft/helicopters to secure the objective from sea (not proposing the capability to conduct an opposed amphibious landing operation).

1 x Airborne-capable Engineer Squadron capable of improving a rough landing field for sustained operations by C-130J's/CC-177s.

1 x AD Regiment with the capability to provide layered air defence of the airport/sea port once secured (as opposed to the mobile SHORAD capabilities that would support the maneuver units).  This unit should also be able to be deployed by C-130J.

1 x Light Brigade capable of deploying from the secured landing area and equipped with vehicles capable of being deployed by C-130J.  This Brigade Group should have integrated light vehicle mounted AT, SHORAD and Indirect Fire elements.  

1 x "Heavy" Mechanized Brigade Group equipped with Tanks and LAVs.  Also with all required AT/AD/IF capabilities integrated

1 x Medium/Cavalry Brigade equipped with LAVs capable of a supporting Recce/Strike role in a high-intensity conflict as well as stability/counter insurgency/peace keeping roles.

Artillery (Gun/AD/Rocket) - both Reg Force and Reserves - other than the direct support Regiments attached to the "Heavy" and Light Brigade Groups to be grouped together in an Artillery Brigade.

Reserve Armour/Infantry would be re-organized to supply at least 1 x "Heavy" Brigade (initially set up to supply trained augmentees only to the Reg Force Heavy Brigade until such future time as equipment is acquired to be able to make the Reserve Brigade deployable) and 1 x Light Brigade with the same vehicles/equipment as the Reg Force Light Brigade.

Reserve Arctic Response Companies would be equipped with BV206's (or similar) and would be assigned direct affiliations with specific Arctic communities and their Ranger patrols.  This would foster ongoing relationships and local knowledge for the Reserve units and create the opportunity for eventual expansion of the Reserve units to have actual satellite locations in these communities as they grow.

As for TacHel, I personally think the Griffon should eventually be upgraded to a larger, medium-lift helicopter.  Maybe follow along with the US FVL program, or a common airframe as an eventual CH-149 replacement.  Either option is likely quite a way out and outside a Force 2025/2030/2035 discussion.  The good thing about the Griffon though is that it can be transported in our existing air transport fleet (1 in a C-130J or 3 in a CC-177 if I'm not mistaken).  I wonder if maintaining this capability should be a goal.  Even if we upgrade/upsize the Griffon fleet perhaps we should keep at least a squadron of light utility (ideally with an armed recce/gunship capability) that could be deployed by air in support of our Light Brigade.


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> If we're looking at what we'd like the Army to be capable of in the near to mid term within the constraints of what equipment we currently have (and what realistically we can hope to get in the current economic climate), here's what I'd hope to see:
> 
> 1) The ability to independently deploy a credible military force (even if Light-weight) to a distant location within a reasonably quick period of time (days/weeks vs weeks/months).  This could include anything from friendly, well supported environments like NATO Europe to austere environments like the Canadian Arctic.
> 
> 2) The ability to contribute a heavier, high-intensity combat capable force as a contribution to a larger, allied force in case of a major conflict.
> 
> 3) The ability to continue to contribute forces capable of partaking in stability/counter insurgency operations in cooperation with allied forces and host nation forces (including capacity building).
> 
> 4) Our deployed forces should not have to rely on higher level allied formations for capabilities which should normally be present in the size of force we have deployed.


That sounds like every White Paper I've seen since the 1980s.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> If we're looking at what we'd like the Army to be capable of in the near to mid term within the constraints of what equipment we currently have (and what realistically we can hope to get in the current economic climate), here's what I'd hope to see:
> 
> 1) The ability to independently deploy a credible military force (even if Light-weight) to a distant location within a reasonably quick period of time (days/weeks vs weeks/months).  This could include anything from friendly, well supported environments like NATO Europe to austere environments like the Canadian Arctic.



That item alone would break the bank IMHO, unless we wanted to define 'light weight' as 'forlorn hope'


----------



## MilEME09

Infanteer said:


> That sounds like every White Paper I've seen since the 1980s.


Every white paper that we haven't fully implemented


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> To an enlightened CAF, I would agree, KevinB.  The reality of all this (including the political reality) is that we won’t have tiltrotors anytime soon, well continue to have some type of Camada/Quebec/Mira-Bell product now and in the future, we won’t get anymore Chinooks, and there is no way in earth one could ever get a ‘civilian surge’ rotary-wing capability trained up on NVG and able to support even moderately opposed operations that would otherwise provide, to quote _Battlestar Galactica_, a rag tag (fugitive) fleet…
> 
> That why I stated earlier the best the Army can expect out of (rotary) aviation is a CoyGp…maybe (+) on a good day.  Call it a BG (-… or even - -) if you want, but PRes and eqpt readiness and op avail levels will not realistically support more.  Folks like to use max kit fleet sizes to plan ops, but that doesn’t happen…ever.  I notice nobody is planning a BDE (X) armoured operation with ‘all of our’ 82 Leo2 A6M/A4M tanks.
> 
> Kirkhill, for the Yellowknife suggestion:
> View attachment 66758





Got your attention. 

Semi-serious.

Do I expect the CAF to establish a "proper" (personal opinion) operational presence in our north?  No,
Would I like one?  Yes.  
And the reference to Fairbank and Thule is as a basis of comparison.  Hardship postings or not people are living and working in comparable places.

Do I think Canada should be able to establish a Brigade Maintenance Area in Yellowknife (Or Churchill) and support  a dispersed force of 47 platoons, even Perrin Beatty's Vital Point Guards at the North Wng Installations, half a dozen company teams at the FOLs, Alert and Churchill, a pair of Battle groups at Yellowknife (QRF and Base Defence) and the 200 or so Ranger Patrols?  Yes.

Or is that a Div Maintenance Area?

And the dominant characteristic of the force is the need for navigation, communication, logistics support (fuel, shelter, water, food, transport), sensors, VVSHORAD GBAD and Small Arms to defend against small groups of lightly armed attackers equipped with UAVs, possibly operating in swarms.  Attackers likely arriving by air and atv, possibly small boat.
Personally I am becoming more enamoured of Churchill as a point of focus.

It has existing infrastructure (air, sea and rail) that needs to be refurbished.  It is centrally located being equidistant from both Yellowknife and Kuujuaq, meaning it can cast into both the western and eastern arctic.   Hooks from Petawawa pushed forwards to there could cast to Resolute, the Barrens and the entire Boreal Forest.   And with the railway, troops in rotation there could get down to Winnipeg for R&R.  As could the locals.

What I am trying to get at, in all these posts, is that Canada itself needs defending.  And that that should be the first focus rather than the last.

For too long we have assumed, been told, that it is a lost cause to defend Canada.  Too few people.  Too much land.

But in 1871, when the Brits left John A to his own devices and abandoned Kingston and Quebec, Sir John did four things, with fewer people.  

He established his own artillery garrisons at Kingston and Quebec.  He raised and despatched a small force of soldiers to deploy in permanent small detachments.  He established an east-west line of communication across the ground held by that small group of soldiers (riflemen, policemen, constables).  In parallel with the railway he established a telegraph system for "instant" communications.

Some others have looked north, Diefenbaker comes to mind, and lots of westerners.  But the centre of gravity has never moved from Montreal.  The Radio and the Aircraft were supposed to "modernize" the north.  The Golden Era of the Bush Pilot.  But that stalled.  Along with the multiple attempts by Rupert's Land interests to revive the Hudson's Bay route.  A route that created wealth for the HBC and for their local traders, the Cree.  A route that was killed when the ships stopped coming to York Factory and then the Fur Trade was killed.

I would like to at least change the focus.  To the north.  To Resolute.  To Yellowknife.  To Churchill.   And the 2-300 communities scattered across land that could be used to generate a lot of wealth for all of us.

We need to protect ourselves from leaving openings for our enemies, real and imagined, to exploit assymetrically.  And before the shooting starts.  At the same time we need to be able to respond when the shooting starts.

And once we have got all that done then we can go looking for fights where we can help out our friends, or at least discomfit or enemies.

(Your fault G2G!)

In terms of detail.

Churchill, NATO, shipping, railway, icebreakers, northern focus.









						The Port of Churchill: Frozen Out?
					

In the first of a new series on Canada's North, Paul Pryce discusses the precarious situation of Manitoba's northern port - and what can be done to save it.




					natoassociation.ca
				




How about, at least, running regular deployment exercises to Churchill of 2 Expeditionary Wing from Bagotville, 450 squadron, 408 Squadron from Edmonton and a rotation of the Light Infantry Battalions.   Have them run security exercises at VPs and QRF exercises throughout the North.   Bring the AOPSs into Churchill and have them shadow land based excursions up the coasts.  etc.

WRT civilians wearing NVGs. Nope.  But they don't have to.  We have you military guys to do that. When and if the bullets start flying.

Civilians could handle the logistic support to distributed communities, ranger patrols and VP platoons when there are no bullets.

And that logistic support could be put to use in the event of civil emergencies.  Especially if a portion of the people operating that support are short field qualified, and have access to EO/IR devices, good nav support and good comms, and bladders for water and fuel and such ...

And making such a fleet of aircraft, and ATVs available to civilians from the public purse, doesn't have to be impossible.

Openly subsidized government hardware to support community economic development.











I could add in the leased fleet of oil cars.

Or the "hidden" subsidies for rail, ship-building, building aircraft, operating airlines.

We might as well get something tangible out of those hidden investments.  Buy actual planes.   

Yes small aircraft are preferred in the civilian market.  Which to me makes the Valor an interesting civilian prospect for puddle jumping from community to community with small cargoes.  And with that production base make some available to the Air Force.

But delivering fuel and a village worth of rations needs something bigger, but short field compatible.  Something to replace/supplement ice-roads and seasonal barges.  Which are also subsidized.  Why not subsidize the operation of "uneconomical" Hercs by local operators.  In Government of Canada colours.

Yep.  I know I dream in techni-color TM.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> That sounds like every White Paper I've seen since the 1980s.



And the one closest to "reality" in terms of needs was 1987.   Too bad history ended and the world changed.

Funny though.  When I re-read that strategic assessment the only thing I would change would be some of the numbers and replace the word Russia with China as the champion of the anti-democratic East.  The European maps have to change as well.

Edit - and GR66s solution sounds a lot like Perrin Beatty's.

A Div HQ and a Brigade in Europe (Mech)
2 Medium Brigades in Canada for reinforcement of Europe.
1 Lt Brigade (SSF) for defence of Canada.

An Air Force as big as the Regular Army (20,000 each) with a Navy of 10,000.

A Reserve Force of 90,000 equipped with Bv206s and Bisons with capabilities ranging from armed security guards for Vital Points (like the NWR radar sites), enhanced existing militia units, 10/90 battalions.   Oh yeah.  And the ADATs/SkyShield GBAD.

All really shot down by the inclusion of 12 nasty nuclear powered submarines.


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill, I seriously doubt we’ll do much about NWS station security…especially if the PIN-3 mystery fire at Lady Franklin Point is any indicator.

Just an unforeseen fire, folks.  Nothing to see here.


----------



## MilEME09

I think any permanent arctic presence is out of the question, that said I do believe we should develop the infrastructure to rapidly deploy to the arctic. Especially given climate change is making the far north more open, we need to be able to rapidly respond to shipping disasters, etc...


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> Kirkhill, I seriously doubt we’ll do much about NWS station security…especially if the PIN-3 mystery fire at Lady Franklin Point is any indicator.
> 
> Just an unforeseen fire, folks.  Nothing to see here.
> View attachment 66759



As I said, just like Frank, in Techi-Color.

But I seem to recall the Canadian Army developing a plan to invade the US back in the 20s or 30s.  Not because there was a hopinhel of it being put into play but because it might come in handy some time in the future.  

It seems to me that the Forces could at least expend some energy in developing credible plans and capabilities for the North.  And defence of NWR sites seems to be at least a credible basis for planning exercises.  At least as credible as chasing Fantasians around Wainwright.


----------



## Weinie

Good2Golf said:


> Kirkhill, I seriously doubt we’ll do much about NWS station security…especially if the PIN-3 mystery fire at Lady Franklin Point is any indicator.
> 
> Just an unforeseen fire, folks.  Nothing to see here.
> View attachment 66759


Maybe we gather or clone some of the loners/adventure addicts on here, and then post them to each of these stations to do fire watch. Resupply by air three times a year. Give them a surplus .303 and the excess ammo left from the Rangers to fight off polar bears and the odd wayward Russki. 

It works on "Life Below Zero."

I love it when a solution comes together.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The DC-3 and King Air seem to be the fleet of choice there:
> 
> What's Hidden in the Hangar? Buffalo Airways Tour​
> I made this Buffalo Airways Hangar tour video for "EAA Spirit of Aviation Week" it was streamed for the Event on July 23rd, 2020



Lemmesee.  DC-3, C-47, Dakota

Government surplus.  Standardized production.  Simple.  Hard to break....


----------



## Weinie

Kirkhill said:


> Lemmesee.  *DC-3, C-47, Dakota*
> 
> Government surplus.  Standardized production.  Simple.  *Hard to break....*


Probably the perfect planes for Canada's North as it currently exists. But apparently, they are getting more rare and expensive(as parts supply wanes and fewer suppliers will build parts for them). They are, after all,  a 70 year old design


----------



## Kirkhill

Weinie said:


> Probably the perfect planes for Canada's North as it currently exists. But apparently, they are getting more rare and expensive(as parts supply wanes and fewer suppliers will build parts for them).




Could a Viking Buffalo II fill some of the gaps?  Also not pressurized.


----------



## Weinie

Kirkhill said:


> Could a Viking Buffalo II fill some of the gaps?  Also not pressurized.


It seems like it would have less than half the range of the above aircraft under full load, which means that we would have to adopt a new northern policy, procure the aircraft, and then establish multiple FOB's for them to operate out of. 

And now we are back full circle, from ideal to practical.


----------



## Kirkhill

> The DC-3 has a cruising speed of 207 mph (333 km/h), a capacity of 21 to 32 passengers or 6,000 lbs (2,700 kg) of cargo, and a range of *1,500 mi (2,400 km)*, and can operate from short runways. The DC-3 had many exceptional qualities compared to previous aircraft.






> The Buffalo is a utility transport aircraft that can take off and land on the most rugged strips as short as a soccer field. It serves a vast territory from the British Columbia / Washington border to the Arctic and from the Rocky Mountains to 1,200 kilometres out over the Pacific Ocean.
> 
> 
> 
> Length24 mWingspan29.25 mHeight8.53 mEmpty weight12,474 kgMaximum gross weight19,560 kgMaximum speed420 km/hRange2,240 kmLocationsComox, B.C.This aircraft is used forSearch and rescue



We have multiple FOBs.  They're called villages or native communities.  All of them have some sort of landing strip.  And each of the NW Radar sites has a landing strip.

As to the range issue - I could be wrong but I believe that the 1200 km reference, assuming that is what you are talking about, is due to the fact that when operating over water the aircraft must return to land to fill up.  It can only use half its gas outbound.  If the Buffalo is hopping from one field or strip with fuel to another, then its range is the same as the DC3 - 2240 km vs 2400 km. 


DHC-5 Range (runway ops)2,038 miles (3279 km) with zero payload, *691 miles (1112 km) with 18,000 lb payload*.



> Capacity: Two crew and up to 41 troops



I don't know.  It looks like a practical alternative to me.   If I remember correctly it was in competition with the early Chinooks as a tactical lifter.



> The DHC-5 has a maximum payload capacity of 6.3 t and the cabin has been designed to carry a single Pershing missile, a M151 truck (Edit = a jeep), a 105mm howitzer or 41 combat troops.





			DHC-5 Buffalo


----------



## MilEME09

perhaps our arctic issue would be a good testing ground for solar powered aircraft? or some type of hybrid aircraft? we can't keep fuel in all these small towns and villages, especially ones only accessible by air or ice roads. In order to make it work we would need some kind of fuel pipe line, but that is not practical. Maybe air isn't the best idea, maybe we need to go the sea route? heavy ice breakers making patrols through our northern waters.


----------



## Weinie

Kirkhill said:


> We have multiple FOBs.  They're called villages or native communities.  All of them have some sort of landing strip.  And each of the NW Radar sites has a landing strip.
> 
> As to the range issue - I could be wrong but I believe that the 1200 km reference, assuming that is what you are talking about, is due to the fact that when operating over water the aircraft must return to land to fill up.  It can only use half its gas outbound.  If the Buffalo is hopping from one field or strip with fuel to another, then its range is the same as the DC3 - 2240 km vs 2400 km.
> 
> 
> DHC-5 Range (runway ops)2,038 miles (3279 km) with zero payload, *691 miles (1112 km) with 18,000 lb payload*.
> 
> 
> 
> I don't know.  *It looks like a practical alternative to me. *  If I remember correctly it was in competition with the early Chinooks as a tactical lifter.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> DHC-5 Buffalo


Had it been a practical alternative, the Canadian government would have leaped on it as a "Buy Canadian" first and only response. It would have "created jobs, spent Canadian money here, supported Canadian industry, and would have been lauded into Hansard as the gov't spending taxpayers money wisely and where it belongs."

It also may have bought votes in B.C.

Just sayin.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Could a Viking Buffalo II fill some of the gaps?  Also not pressurized.



Air North just retired their Hawker Sidley's. I flew on those for a bit and they're awesome.

And as we're in the habit of buying used aircraft etc....









						Air North Retires Hawker Siddeley HS 748
					

MIAMI - Air North (4N) informs that on January 21, its Hawker Siddeley HS 748 aircraft with registration C-FCSE performed its last flight. 4N revealed the news




					airwaysmag.com


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> That sounds like every White Paper I've seen since the 1980s.


And is it the Government or the Army that stands in the way of it being implemented?

We've already looked at the Swedish model to show how we could re-organize our "Heavy" brigade and create a Medium Cavalry/Recce-Strike Brigade while at the same time freeing up both LAVs and infantry PYs.

We already have 3 x Parachute Companies as part of our existing Light Brigade structure...so there's the core of the Airborne Battle Group and we have 17 x CC-130J's to transport them.

The Light Battalions (with freed up PYs from the Mech units to make up for the Airborne Battalion) can be grouped together in a single Brigade as almost everyone on this forum has already suggested.

So what are we missing?

Using the Swedish model for the Heavy Brigade we've freed up LAVs along with some Leopards so both can be used for Reserve Training Companies for 1 Brigade.  That covers the Heavy Brigade Reserve augmentation requirement.

We already have programs in place for our AD and AT requirements but freeing up LAVs actually makes this easier.  GDLS is already installing the Moog RiWP RWS on Stryker vehicles and this can meet our needs.  Quad (2 x dual) Stinger launchers for our maneuver unit VSHORAD requirement.  Quad (2 x dual) Hellfire launchers for our AT requirement.  Quad (2 x dual) Coyote UAV launchers for our Recce/Strike requirement.  We've actually made this procurement easier as we no longer have to provide new vehicles but rather just replace the turrets with the RWS.  The Ground Based Air Defence Project should also cover the balance of the AD requirement to protect a FOB.

The LUV replacement program is already in place to replace both the G-Wagon and "Milverados".  This will fulfill the need for a light, air-transportable Section carrier for our Light Brigade.  We could actually make this procurement easier as well by adopting the same Chevy Colorado-based Infantry Squad Vehicle being purchased by the US Army for it's Light Infantry units.  Commonality with the US would be very helpful in joint operations from a logistical point of view.  Extra bonus points if part of the purchase agreement is that our ISVs are to be made at the GM Oshawa plant.  Makes it a much easier sell to the Government.

Vehicles for the Arctic Response Companies?  The Domestic Arctic Mobility Enhancement project is already in place to replace our Bv206's by 2029/2030.

We'd still want a new mortar system for the infantry Battalions.  In the short term we could continue to use dismounted 81mm mortars, but the US Army already has a program in place to replace their M1129 Stryker Mortar Carrier Vehicles with a new turreted 120mm mortar.  We should piggyback off that program and get the same system for our LAV Battalions.  We'll already have LAV hulls to mount them on.  For the Light Battalions, the Elbit Spear II 120mm mortar is a soft-recoil system that can be mounted on light 4x4 wheeled vehicles...like the ISV.

Same deal for the M777 replacement for the Heavy Brigade.  Piggyback off the US Army's program to purchase a wheeled 155mm howitzer system for their Stryker Brigades.

All the basics are already in place for the Army to implement these suggestions with most of the equipment requirements already either covered under existing procurement projects, or capable of being piggybacked of US Army projects.

It looks like to me that it's the Army leadership that is the roadblock...not the Government.


----------



## lenaitch

Kirkhill said:


> We have multiple FOBs.  They're called villages or native communities.  All of them have some sort of landing strip.  *And each of the NW Radar sites has a landing strip.*



According to Wiki and Google earth, some are helipad only and some with strips are listed as abandoned (which, admittedly, could be rehabilitated).


MilEME09 said:


> perhaps our arctic issue would be a good testing ground for solar powered aircraft? or some type of hybrid aircraft? we can't keep fuel in all these small towns and villages, especially ones only accessible by air or ice roads. In order to make it work we would need some kind of fuel pipe line, but that is not practical. Maybe air isn't the best idea, maybe we need to go the sea route? heavy ice breakers making patrols through our northern waters.


Agree a decent testing opportunity for industry, but not sure military logistical planning is a good basket to place experimental eggs.  Current activity in electric aircraft (don't know about hybrid) is pretty much limited to light, range-challenged aircraft.  Solar is great provided there is sun and I imagine temperature degradation on batteries would be an issue.


----------



## MilEME09

lenaitch said:


> According to Wiki and Google earth, some are helipad only and some with strips are listed as abandoned (which, admittedly, could be rehabilitated).
> 
> Agree a decent testing opportunity for industry, but not sure military logistical planning is a good basket to place experimental eggs.  Current activity in electric aircraft (don't know about hybrid) is pretty much limited to light, range-challenged aircraft.  Solar is great provided there is sun and I imagine temperature degradation on batteries would be an issue.


Perhaps a two stage approach? Unmanned long endurance drones for monitoring, manned aircraft ready to go to respond.


----------



## daftandbarmy

lenaitch said:


> According to Wiki and Google earth, some are helipad only and some with strips are listed as abandoned (which, admittedly, could be rehabilitated).
> 
> Agree a decent testing opportunity for industry, but not sure military logistical planning is a good basket to place experimental eggs.  Current activity in electric aircraft (don't know about hybrid) is pretty much limited to light, range-challenged aircraft.  Solar is great provided there is sun and I imagine temperature degradation on batteries would be an issue.



The elctricity for most remote northern communities is provided by diesel generators, and for 6 months of the year there is no sun, so....


----------



## Kirkhill

1987 White Paper Force - Primary Legacy - The North Warning System of 47 Remote, Unattended, Radar Sites.

Proposed Territorial Defence Force - Total Force

4,000 Rangers
90,000 Militia
400 Bv206
200 Bison


Rangers to continue their mission of patrolling their hunting grounds and reporting their observations


Militia to establish a force of Security Guards, "minimally trained", to secure military Vital Points.
(Dew Line, further south, was covered by both Ranger and commercial activity.  The had "eyes on".  The North Warning System was not only unmanned but unobserved.  Presumably the VP guards were not, as we feared at the time, to guard local post offices in the south, but the NWS sites in the north.)  

The Vital Point guard force would be based on small groups (I assume platoon sized) organized into Task Forces and Brigaded for administrative purposes.

The VP force would be 100% Militia and would be raised from the 90,000 people on strength when the force was required up north.  It wasn't a permanent placement.  It was a permanent commitment.



The Rangers and the VP force would be backed up by a 10/90 Light Brigade.  10% Regular Force and 90% Militia.
3 Light Battalions, 1 Cougar AVGP Squadron and 1 Artillery Regiment (presumably C1 105s)



The next level of domestic support started to include a greater Reg Force commitment.  It was based on one of the 3 existing Reg Brigade Groups. It was a 50/50 Medium Brigade.  50% Regs and 50% Militia.  It was to be equipped with AVGP Cougars and Grizzlies, and presumably Bisons, as well as M113s and either M109s or 105s or perhaps a combination.  Remember: "No tanks in the streets!"  3 Battalions, 1 Cougar AVGP Squadron and 1 Artillery Regiment.



The centre-piece of the Territorial Defence Force was the Canadian Airborne Regiment.  A parachuted deployable 90/10 immediate reaction Airborne Battle Group that could be dropped anywhere in Canada with the existing fleet of Hercs and supported with the helicopter force of Kiowa, Iroquois and Chinook.

The CAR had a peace-time establishment of 730, all ranks organized into 3 Commandos of 154 commanded by a Major.
The Commandos each had 4 "rifle" platoons of three sections, and a separate "weapons" platoon of 3 TOW launchers, 2 HMGs and a mortar group of 4 81mm mortars.   The weapons platoon was mounted  and supplied with jeeps.  They could be brigaded to create as support company if the entire regiment was deployed as a unit.

Command and Control was exercised by the HQ and Sigs Squadron of 132, including the CAR's recce platoon.

Combat Service Support was supplied by the CAR's own Airborne Service Commando of 134 which provided "first line medical, maintenance, transport and supply" support.

When the CAR was plus-upped to the parachutable Airborne Battle Group of 925 it added 6 L5 105mm howitzers and a VSHORAD GBAD section with 5 Blowpipes. These additions were supplied by E Battery 2 RCHA.  2 CER supplied 64 Engineers. The final addition was a Medical group of 17 capable of emergency surgery in the field as well as ambulance services.

The "hidden" costs and capabilities of the CAR included the Canadian Forces Parachute Maintenance Depot which packed, maintained and supplied all the 'chutes, and the Canadian Airborne Centre.  The Airborne Centre provided training in static and high altitude parachuting, but also in dropping kit.  It also trialled kit and techniques.


So, the Territorial Defence Force from the top, 

925 Regs committed to an Immediate Reaction Unit in the form of the 90/10 Airborne Battle Group.

A 50/50 Medium Brigade Gp 

A 10/90 Light Brigade Gp

A 0/100 Vital Point security force

90,000 Militia under 131 local commanders

The Canadian Rangers.

Supported by Hercs, Chinooks, Iroquois and Kiowa.



This left the following Expeditionary Force under the newly recreated 1st Canadian Division.  A Division (-).  Being only a 2 Brigade Division, previously seen in WW2 Armoured Divisions.  

One Brigade, 4 CMBG, was a 75/25 Brigade Group, light on infantry, with only two battalions mounted in M113s, one Leo and M113 equipped Armoured Regiment, and large Artillery Regiment with 24 M109s, an ADATs VSHORAD Battery mounted on M113s.  The Division also had 1 or 2 Batteries of towed/emplaced radar guided 35mm anti-aircraft guns under the Oerlikon SkyShield system.  

As noted the Brigade was not fully manned.  It required 25% of its strength, Militia, to be flown over from Canada.  Likely this would happen the same day that the Territorial Defence Force was fully manned and the Vital Point guards deployed. It would also happen the same day that the Division started to receive the Canadian Air Sea Transportable Brigade Group which had orginally been tasked to Norway but was reassigned to Germany to re-create the 1st Canadian Division.

The CAST Brigade was to be a 90/10 Medium Brigade based in Canada, equipped with the M113s, Leos, M109s and AVGPs in Canada but to fall in on M113s, Leos and M109s prepositioned in Germany.  This was a three battalion Brigade

The final element of the Expeditionary Force was an independent light infantry battalion based in Canada that would be flown over to join NATO's multi-national Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force (Land) - North.  AMF(L)-North.  This also was a 90/10 Regular unit.  In Europe it was expected to continue operating in Scandinavia with Bv206 tracks.

So the expeditionary force

1 Canada Based 90/10 Immediate Reaction Light Infantry Unit (AMF(L))

1 Mechanized Division (-)
        1 Pre-Positioned 75/25 Mechanized Brigade Gp (-)
        1 Canada Based 90/10 Air deployable Mechanized Brigade (with prepositioned gear)
        GBAD and SPH Artillery.

What this meant was that the AMF(L) Bn and the CAST Bde were both available at priority call for the Territorial Defence needs of Canada.  If they were called to Europe because of NATO commitments then there was a Militia based Territorial Defence Force on hand to replace and augment them in Canada.


Personally I saw little wrong with the plan then and nothing wrong with the plan now.  

From the Militia it asks that it puts 90,000 willing citizens on its rolls.  Some would be tasked to jobs that only required what they could learn down at the armoury during the week to become glorified armed night-watchmen in dreary, unexciting, uncomfortable locations.  Class A service.

Some would be trained to Reg Standards but continue with civvy life with a commitment to fall in when summoned.  Class B service.

Some would make themselves available full time to keep the Militia running, along with Reg Force cadres, while others volunteered for the Immediate Reaction Units and the Expeditionary Forces.  Class C service.


This was the fully integrated, Total Force, plan.


Disrupted by:

SSNs, 
The Fall of the Wall,
Recession, 
The Fall of the CAR,
Confusion and Chaos,
Institutional Inertia.

But the plan?  The plan is still a workable plan.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The elctricity for most remote northern communities is provided by diesel generators, and for 6 months of the year there is no sun, so....



Indeed.  Solar might be an issue. Winds are intermittent, as everywhere.  And water is frozen....hydro is problematic.  Geo-thermal might make sense in some places.  

My personal preference is to try to duplicate the Medicine Hat experience and exploit "surface" deposits of Natural Gas for local use.  In this case "local" means 9,000,000 km2.  Might have to bottle it and ship it by river, sea, ice, (air? - unmanned? - tie it to a balloon and float it?).


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> Perhaps a two stage approach? Unmanned long endurance drones for monitoring, manned aircraft ready to go to respond.











						Zephyr
					

The first stratospheric UAS of its kind, Zephyr provides a persistent and adaptable solution, unlike other unmanned aircraft. Its persistence enables a capability of flying continuously for months at a time, at around 70,000ft, above weather and conventional air traffic. It is a HAPS: a High...




					www.airbus.com
				






Already accepted into RAF service - Surveillance, Comms and NAV - solar-electric.  How it might be used in the High Arctic in December would be interesting.

Described as a High Altitude Pseudo Satellite (HAPS).


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill said:


> Indeed.  Solar might be an issue. Winds are intermittent, as everywhere.  And water is frozen....hydro is problematic.  Geo-thermal might make sense in some places.
> 
> My personal preference is to try to duplicate the Medicine Hat experience and exploit "surface" deposits of Natural Gas for local use.  In this case "local" means 9,000,000 km2.  Might have to bottle it and ship it by river, sea, ice, (air? - unmanned? - tie it to a balloon and float it?).


SMRs (small modular reactors).  Canada knows how to do nuclear power.  It would be a shame to not kill two birds with one stone: enduring, relatively easily-deployable power in the North; and supporting Paris 2050.


----------



## Kirkhill

Looking Back at the 1987 Force some other thoughts occur.

What went wrong, in addition to the previously suggested problems:

Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda and Afghanistan.
Universal service.

How different might things have been if the Canadian Government had simply seized the opportunity and impounded the GTS Katie in  2000.

Rick would have had his Big Honking Ship and established a Government Transport Capability - which could then have been defended as existing and necessary and subject to renewal and improvement.

Also, what would have happened if the VP Force had been recruited under Class A and Supplist terms, with similar fitness standards as the Rangers, and maybe the Corps of Commissionaires.  

Class B and C service would require being sufficiently fit, and well trained, and available, to fall in with the Regs.


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> Zephyr
> 
> 
> The first stratospheric UAS of its kind, Zephyr provides a persistent and adaptable solution, unlike other unmanned aircraft. Its persistence enables a capability of flying continuously for months at a time, at around 70,000ft, above weather and conventional air traffic. It is a HAPS: a High...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.airbus.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 66769
> 
> Already accepted into RAF service - Surveillance, Comms and NAV - solar-electric.  How it might be used in the High Arctic in December would be interesting.
> 
> Described as a High Altitude Pseudo Satellite (HAPS).











						Space serving the Arctic and the Great Canadian North
					

The Canadian North and the Arctic are a vast region of ice and snow, and the home of people with rich and diverse cultures.




					www.asc-csa.gc.ca
				





Canada does have multiple satellites over the Arctic currently.  They can be used to monitor ship traffic, among other things.  

The government/DND does have the tools in place currently to observe above surface contacts.   Those tools just aren’t visible or high profile.  

MPA & RPA over the North sounds great.  And it would be, absolutely.  But is it duplicating a capability we already have, re identifying surface contacts?

True.  We don’t have the ability to promptly respond to violations the way we could with a MPA.  But our MPA can’t engage surface contacts anyway.  


Between satellites above the Arctic and the AOPS roaming about, as well as the facility being built, we aren’t blind by any means.  I think we forget just how big of an area the Arctic actually is.  

Our problems are knowing what is happening sub-surface, and an ability to influence what’s happening sub-surface.  And to be frank, I don’t see any Canadian government being able to change that anytime soon - even if we did UOR everything we would want.   



Personally, I say let our key allies be allies.  

We deployed MPA to the UK when they were experiencing a gap in having that capability - I don’t think anybody in the UK thought Canada was invading, or stealing their sovereignty.  We were being a good ally.   

We deployed CF-18 fighters to Alaska to take over USAF NORAD duties when their F-15C fleet was grounded due to 2 mid-air breakups back to back.  I don’t think the US thought we were trying to steal Alaska, we were being a good ally.  

If nuclear submarines are the main tool to operate under arctic ice, and keep Russian and Chinese nuclear submarines away - then let them fill the capability gap we have.  


0.02 🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Class B and C service would require being sufficiently fit, and well trained, and available, to fall in with the Regs.



So, like the majority of the staff in our reserve CBG HQs?


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> So, like the majority of the staff in our reserve CBG HQs?




Wwweeeelll!  Reaally?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Wwweeeelll!  Reaally?



I had the opportunity to go for a (very slow, very short) run with one of the CBG HQs a couple of times.

It was kind of like watching a refugee column, except that most refugees manage to retain some shred of their dignity


----------



## Kirkhill

CBH99 said:


> Space serving the Arctic and the Great Canadian North
> 
> 
> The Canadian North and the Arctic are a vast region of ice and snow, and the home of people with rich and diverse cultures.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.asc-csa.gc.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Canada does have multiple satellites over the Arctic currently.  They can be used to monitor ship traffic, among other things.
> 
> The government/DND does have the tools in place currently to observe above surface contacts.   Those tools just aren’t visible or high profile.
> 
> MPA & RPA over the North sounds great.  And it would be, absolutely.  But is it duplicating a capability we already have, re identifying surface contacts?
> 
> True.  We don’t have the ability to promptly respond to violations the way we could with a MPA.  But our MPA can’t engage surface contacts anyway.
> 
> 
> Between satellites above the Arctic and the AOPS roaming about, as well as the facility being built, we aren’t blind by any means.  I think we forget just how big of an area the Arctic actually is.
> 
> Our problems are knowing what is happening sub-surface, and an ability to influence what’s happening sub-surface.  And to be frank, I don’t see any Canadian government being able to change that anytime soon - even if we did UOR everything we would want.
> 
> 
> 
> Personally, I say let our key allies be allies.
> 
> We deployed MPA to the UK when they were experiencing a gap in having that capability - I don’t think anybody in the UK thought Canada was invading, or stealing their sovereignty.  We were being a good ally.
> 
> We deployed CF-18 fighters to Alaska to take over USAF NORAD duties when their F-15C fleet was grounded due to 2 mid-air breakups back to back.  I don’t think the US thought we were trying to steal Alaska, we were being a good ally.
> 
> If nuclear submarines are the main tool to operate under arctic ice, and keep Russian and Chinese nuclear submarines away - then let them fill the capability gap we have.
> 
> 
> 0.02 🍻




I guess I was looking at all the Satellite, GPS, Navigation and Comms projects on the DND books and thinking how many of them would benefit the civilian population of the north.  So why not lay those projects into Northern Development, and take them off the DND books?  Just ensure that they provide secure, encrypted channels which the DND can access.

Same thinking on logistics and sustainment.

Rather that ensuring that the CAF can operate in an "inhospitable" environment in our own back yard why not have the Government create a more generally hospitable environment nationally?  It might gain it some political brownie points with the First Nations.  And it would allow the CAF to focus its money on deployment and pointy end stuff.

Unless of course the plan is to eat up the DND budget on domestic housework and claim it as NATO/NORAD credits.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> I had the opportunity to go for a (very slow, very short) run with one of the CBG HQs a couple of times.
> 
> It was kind of like watching a refugee column, except that most refugees manage to retain some shred of their dignity



Sound like candidates for the Vital Points Invalid Task Force.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Sound like candidates for the Vital Points Invalid Task Force.



It's OK though, no one starts work before 0930 because they all have time off to do 'personal PT'.

It could be much worse otherwise


----------



## Kirkhill

Where's the Ohmigawdfather emoji?


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> . . .   It might gain it some political brownie points with the First Nations. . . .



Not a lot of calories in Northern brownies.


Province/ TerritoryPopulation estimateTotal seatsYukon34.6661Northwest Territories43,6751Nunavut33,3221


----------



## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:


> Not a lot of calories in Northern brownies.
> 
> 
> Province/ TerritoryPopulation estimateTotal seatsYukon34.6661Northwest Territories43,6751Nunavut33,3221



Agreed.  But on the other hand you don't need to bake that many brownies.  And the locals have such nice stuff.  A few calories go a long way.



> *Canada’s 292 remote communities* rely heavily on diesel fuel for heating, electricity generation, and transportation. The high cost of diesel energy is a major expense for these communities, and the “true cost” can be even higher.



PUBLICATION - March 6, 2019 - By Dave Lovekin, Dylan Heerema





Backgrounder
Download PDF


----------



## lenaitch

daftandbarmy said:


> The elctricity for most remote northern communities is provided by diesel generators, and for 6 months of the year there is no sun, so....



I'm missing the correlation.


CBH99 said:


> Personally, I say let our key allies be allies.
> 
> We deployed MPA to the UK when they were experiencing a gap in having that capability - I don’t think anybody in the UK thought Canada was invading, or stealing their sovereignty.  We were being a good ally.
> 
> We deployed CF-18 fighters to Alaska to take over USAF NORAD duties when their F-15C fleet was grounded due to 2 mid-air breakups back to back.  I don’t think the US thought we were trying to steal Alaska, we were being a good ally.
> 
> If nuclear submarines are the main tool to operate under arctic ice, and keep Russian and Chinese nuclear submarines away - then let them fill the capability gap we have.
> 
> 
> 0.02 🍻



To me there is a difference between helping a friend during a short-term time of need and having others fill what just about every other serious nation considers sovereign responsibilities. (yes, I realize Iceland and New Zealand).  If we get others to do stuff on our territory, I suppose we can't complain when they do it their way, on their terms, without asking.  Why would they?  We would have telegraphed the reality that we don't care. 

Domestic security is a different discussion from how we can contribute internationally.  I suppose we could farm out any number of functions; border control, fishery enforcement, coast guard, air navigation.  Look at the money we would save.


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> SMRs (small modular reactors).  Canada knows how to do nuclear power.  It would be a shame to not kill two birds with one stone: enduring, relatively easily-deployable power in the North; and supporting Paris 2050.





> Upfront Capital Costs (NR Can):
> First-of-a-kind units suitable for mining are estimated to cost in the order of *$200-350M for a 20 MWe SMR*, with lower costs thereafter as the supply chain develops. May 21, 2021





> *Propane Powered Micro-CHP*
> ​When it comes to efficiency, there’s no doubt that micro combined heat and power (micro CHP) beats electricity supplied over the grid.
> 
> *The electricity that comes to a typical single-family home in the U.S. is only about 33 percent efficient*, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). That’s *because the heat used to generate it in a coal- or gas-fired power plant is lost, as is some of the electricity itself during transmission over high-voltage power lines.*
> 
> (I believe that to be likely in an SMR as well, unless the houses were close enough together to benefit from a central hot water distribution system)
> 
> *Compare that to micro CHP, which uses an on-site gas- or propane-fired engine to generate electricity while capturing the engine’s heat to produce hot water. These systems are typically 60 to 80 percent efficient, with some systems nearing 90 percent efficiency, according to the EPA.*
> 
> Micro CHP is best suited for large, luxury homes with a high thermal load.  (Or a small northern one with cold dark days and long cold nights)
> 
> Micro CHP is already an established technology in Japan and Europe, but it has a much smaller share of the U.S. single-family market. That is primarily due to the systems’ cost. They currently run around $14,000 per kW installed, or $21,000 for a small, 1.5kW residential system, according to Fairfax, Virginia–based consultancy ICF. That per kW cost tends to go down as system size goes up; manufacturer Yanmar says its 5kW system typically costs between $40,000 and $60,000 installed, or $8,000 to $12,000 per kW.
> 
> (1.5 kW for a residential unit.  Consider a small village or 1000 people.  250 homes?   375 kW.  Or 0.375 MWe.  Even if each home were supplied with a  5kW Yanmar system at 60,000 USD - and sold their power back into the community grid - that would only cost *15,000,000 USD - 20,000,000 CAD - to install and create a 1.25 MWe energy "hotspot" in the North.*)
> ...
> Home size and thermal load​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Micro CHP systems offer the best payback in areas where electricity costs are high. Shown is Yanmar’s CP5WN model.
> The most likely residential candidates for micro CHP are large luxury homes of at least 3,000 square feet with a high thermal load, according to ICF. Amenities that contribute to the above-average thermal load include heated swimming pools, hot tubs, and spas, as well as heated driveways and walkways for snow removal.
> 
> “We want to utilize a minimum of around 60 percent of the available BTUs of heat that we produce,” says Michael Alfano, sales application engineer at Adairsville, Georgia–based Yanmar America. “To make it financially justifiable to install our 5kW system, somewhere between 5,000 and 7,500 square feet is usually our base on a residential application. Homes with radiant heat or hydronic heating work best.”
> 
> Local electricity costs
> 
> In the U.S., micro CHP has the best payback in areas that have high electricity costs.
> The national average in September 2017 was 13.3 cents per kW hour, according to the EIA. Areas that typically exceed that average are the Northeast, California, Alaska, and Hawaii, as well as many large cities, according to Anne Hampson, principal in the distributed energy resources practice at ICF.
> Keep in mind, too, that while a utility may report a lower-than-average per kW hour price, you’ll want to look at your client’s total electric bill to figure out what they’re actually paying.
> “The utility might tell you that they’re selling a kilowatt at 6 cents [per hour], but when you take the entire bill and divide it by the kilowatts actually used, you find out that it’s closer to 21 or 22 cents,” Thuesen says. “Other service charges and taxes add up to a significant portion of the bill, which [the client is] not paying with CHP.”
> Spark spread size​The spark spread, or the price difference between electricity and gas or propane in a given market, also comes into play. Using a lower-cost fuel source, CHP units can generate electricity at a cheaper rate than what the utility charges. “That’s a big key to the deployment of these systems,” Alfano says. “When you have a large spark spread, it becomes very viable to use a micro CHP system.”
> Net metering options​States that allow net metering to spin a home’s electric meter backward when a micro CHP system generates excess power also help justify the cost. Yet while micro CHP combined with on-site battery storage is completely feasible for off-grid homes, that’s not where most systems are used.
> “The majority of the systems we know about are still grid-connected,” Hampson says. “Those homeowners can run their systems to meter power back to the utility, and use that as another way to zero out their electric bill.
> Power-loss potential​Other candidates for micro CHP are homes located in remote areas where extending utility service from the grid would be cost prohibitive, and those in areas where extreme weather events like hurricanes and blizzards could result in prolonged power outages. Propane’s advantage as an off-grid fuel is especially compelling as a power source for micro CHP at these types of homes. And unlike backup generators, which can fail after extended continuous use, micro CHP units are designed to run 24/7, if needed.
> “One of the sweet spots for micro CHP is a large custom home in an area where the grid goes down, such as hurricane and tornado zones, or regions that experience big snowstorms and high winds,” says David Goswick, CEO of Houston-based HOUZE Advanced Building Science Inc., which has built four homes powered by micro CHP. “Think about [the impact of] Superstorm Sandy on Long Island, or Hurricane Harvey here in Houston.”











						Five Ways to Tell if Micro CHP is Right For a Home
					

Construction pros thinking about micro combined heat and power should check their residential project against these considerations.




					propane.com
				




Or, for those living in the Boreal Forest - Biomass. 









						Electricity from woodchips and pellets - Säätötuli Canada
					

Produce electricity and heat with woodchips or pellets with the Finnish Volter small-scale Combined Heat and Power (CHP) units.




					www.saatotuli.ca
				




Come to that, it is probably safer, and cheaper to ship wood pellets (aka renewable biomass) down river from the Dene to the Inuit than it is to produce and ship propane.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

I am not sure propane is a reliable source of heat/power for Arctic communities, where the temperature routine
falls to the point where is becomes a liquid and therefore, unburnable.


----------



## Kirkhill

SeaKingTacco said:


> I am not sure propane is a reliable source of heat/power for Arctic communities, where the temperature routine
> falls to the point where is becomes a liquid and therefore, unburnable.




I didn't know that.   Thanks.

Another reason for "Biomass" perhaps?  (I was adding a bit to my last while you writing - bad habit of mine - thinking and writing in real time).


----------



## Kirkhill

https://www.ieabioenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/T32_CHP_Report_01_2019.pdf
		


Article from the International Energy Association on the use of domestic biomass Combined Heat and Power generators.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Kirkhill said:


> https://www.ieabioenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/T32_CHP_Report_01_2019.pdf
> 
> 
> 
> Article from the International Energy Association on the use of domestic biomass Combined Heat and Power generators.


I think there is some room for a thoughtful rethink of how northern communities are powered and heated. I have seen the quantities of diesel fuel shipped north each year and it is staggering. If we can put a dent in that amount (without further driving northern communities into energy poverty) it is worth it.


----------



## daftandbarmy

SeaKingTacco said:


> I think there is some room for a thoughtful rethink of how northern communities are powered and heated. I have seen the quantities of diesel fuel shipped north each year and it is staggering. If we can put a dent in that amount (without further driving northern communities into energy poverty) it is worth it.



Since we seem to have drifted into NRCAN territory, I thought I'd share this for interest:

Reducing diesel energy in rural and remote communities​

Diesel generated energy​Remote communities not connected to the North American electricity grid rely on costly and greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting diesel generated electricity.

Energy efficiency and conservation measures can help to reduce overall demand for diesel and provide savings to communities. *Local renewable energy* such as *wind, solar, hydro* or* biomass* can replace diesel, reduce environmental and health impacts, and create local economic development opportunities.

”Remote communities . . . do not receive the benefits that 99 percent of the Canadian population take for granted, such as guaranteed, reliable and affordable electricity,” said Christopher Duschenes, Director, Centre for the North, The Conference Board of Canada. “They rely solely on locally generated electricity, which typically comes from diesel-powered generators. This limits the potential growth of these communities, results in high electricity costs and can have adverse environmental impacts.”

Power Shift: Electricity for Canada’s Remote Communities,
The Conference Board of Canada








						Clean Energy for Rural and Remote Communities Program
					






					www.nrcan.gc.ca


----------



## Kirkhill

SeaKingTacco said:


> I think there is some room for a thoughtful rethink of how northern communities are powered and heated. I have seen the quantities of diesel fuel shipped north each year and it is staggering. If we can put a dent in that amount (without further driving northern communities into energy poverty) it is worth it.



The two basics of modern society - a warm house and hot water.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Since we seem to have drifted into NRCAN territory, I thought I'd share this for interest:
> 
> Reducing diesel energy in rural and remote communities​
> 
> Diesel generated energy​Remote communities not connected to the North American electricity grid rely on costly and greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting diesel generated electricity.
> 
> Energy efficiency and conservation measures can help to reduce overall demand for diesel and provide savings to communities. *Local renewable energy* such as *wind, solar, hydro* or* biomass* can replace diesel, reduce environmental and health impacts, and create local economic development opportunities.
> 
> ”Remote communities . . . do not receive the benefits that 99 percent of the Canadian population take for granted, such as guaranteed, reliable and affordable electricity,” said Christopher Duschenes, Director, Centre for the North, The Conference Board of Canada. “They rely solely on locally generated electricity, which typically comes from diesel-powered generators. This limits the potential growth of these communities, results in high electricity costs and can have adverse environmental impacts.”
> 
> Power Shift: Electricity for Canada’s Remote Communities,
> The Conference Board of Canada
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Clean Energy for Rural and Remote Communities Program
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.nrcan.gc.ca













When you compare the two maps and look at all the diesel fired orange circles in the lower one, and compare them to the number in the upper one found in the green, boreal forests - biomass (or wood for us reprobates) seems like a good starting point for a small population spread over a large area with lots of trees around them.


----------



## Kirkhill

Sorry for the drift.  This all started because I wanted to emphasise that the first job of National Defence was the defence of Canada - and that most of Canada is a sparsely populated, native dominated area into which southerners seldom venture, and the vast majority of them have little interest in venturing.   Despite that there are good reasons to invest in the north, in the natives and to prepare to actively defend the space.

I happen to think that the 1987 plan was one of the best at defining the northern requirements and prescribing a domestic defence solution that wouldn't break the bank (except for the nuclear subs which are a "should" not a "must").

The resulting three brigade regular force (based on deploying two infantry battalions per brigade and a separate light infantry battle group) with the independent CAR battle group as a fourth light infantry battle group, still makes sense to me.  We just need the ability to transport 4 CMBG (-), or the CAST Bde,  or at least AMF(L) in a timely fashion.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Kirkhill said:


> Five Ways to Tell if Micro CHP is Right For a Home
> 
> 
> Construction pros thinking about micro combined heat and power should check their residential project against these considerations.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> propane.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Or, for those living in the Boreal Forest - Biomass.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Electricity from woodchips and pellets - Säätötuli Canada
> 
> 
> Produce electricity and heat with woodchips or pellets with the Finnish Volter small-scale Combined Heat and Power (CHP) units.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.saatotuli.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Come to that, it is probably safer, and cheaper to ship wood pellets (aka renewable biomass) down river from the Dene to the Inuit than it is to produce and ship propane.


I worked closely with the individuals in the band that pushed this through, one of those projects that were a real win-win for everyone. Not every small community can do this, but the project was so successful that Yukon Energy asked them to expand their grid into the Yukon and BC Hydro pays them to provide power to Atlin. The profits after costs and maintenance gets plowed back into the community and BC Hydro saves money because it's not sending large quantities of diesel to the generators every week by truck. It also builds a sense of responsibility into the band and the people working at the plant.  The Atlin hydro project – embodying First Nation principles - NS Energy


----------



## Colin Parkinson

SeaKingTacco said:


> I think there is some room for a thoughtful rethink of how northern communities are powered and heated. I have seen the quantities of diesel fuel shipped north each year and it is staggering. If we can put a dent in that amount (without further driving northern communities into energy poverty) it is worth it.


Official bits on SMR




__





						Canada’s Small Modular Reactor Action Plan
					






					www.nrcan.gc.ca
				




Opposing view, one good point in this article is that the FN don't want to be the guinea pigs and I think it's a valid concern. So start with a remote but road connected non-FN community to build the first one and work the bugs out of it.
Is Canada betting big on small nuclear reactors? Here’s what you need to know | The Narwhal


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> I worked closely with the individuals in the band that pushed this through, one of those projects that were a real win-win for everyone. Not every small community can do this, but the project was so successful that Yukon Energy asked them to expand their grid into the Yukon and BC Hydro pays them to provide power to Atlin. The profits after costs and maintenance gets plowed back into the community and BC Hydro saves money because it's not sending large quantities of diesel to the generators every week by truck. It also builds a sense of responsibility into the band and the people working at the plant.  The Atlin hydro project – embodying First Nation principles - NS Energy



One of the reasons I like the home-fired micro CHP option is that it is both and individual and community advantage.

Every home with a wood-fired CHP system would have a dual incentive to maintain a fuel supply to their "furnace" and keep it in working order.

It would keep the house warm and bright and it would supply a steady income from the export of electricity to the community.
The community would benefit from the excess energy for community projects like offices, gyms, meeting halls, community pools, indoor rinks and small business opportunities like machine shops, and 3D printers, sewing, laundries, bakers, smokehouses.

And, if one house goes dark, there are a lot of others to pick up the slack.


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> Official bits on SMR
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Canada’s Small Modular Reactor Action Plan
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.nrcan.gc.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Opposing view, one good point in this article is that the FN don't want to be the guinea pigs and I think it's a valid concern. So start with a remote but road connected non-FN community to build the first one and work the bugs out of it.
> Is Canada betting big on small nuclear reactors? Here’s what you need to know | The Narwhal



The oilsands are one good option.


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> Canada does have multiple satellites over the Arctic currently.  They can be used to monitor ship traffic, among other things.
> 
> The government/DND does have the tools in place currently to observe above surface contacts.   Those tools just aren’t visible or high profile.
> 
> MPA & RPA over the North sounds great.  And it would be, absolutely.  But is it duplicating a capability we already have, re identifying surface contacts?
> 
> True.  We don’t have the ability to promptly respond to violations the way we could with a MPA.  But our MPA can’t engage surface contacts anyway.


There are still significant gaps - gaps which adversaries have int eh past capitals to do nefarious things.

 I would suggest the gaps are significantly larger than most know or understand the implications of.


----------



## Good2Golf

SeaKingTacco said:


> I am not sure propane is a reliable source of heat/power for Arctic communities, where the temperature routine
> falls to the point where is becomes a liquid and therefore, unburnable.


I did some winter-time OJT in Cold Lake back in the 80s and remember seeing MSE ops outside bouncing on the bumpers of propane-powered vehicles to try and get some pressure in the tanks. Propane’s boiling point is -42°C, so when the temp drops below -42C (as is entirely possible in Cold Lake and other CAF bases, propane fuel systems didn’t work very well.  CNG boils at -161°C so at least compressed natural gas could be considered, although it has less thermal energy/unit mass than propane.


----------



## CBH99

lenaitch said:


> To me there is a difference between helping a friend during a short-term time of need and having others fill what just about every other serious nation considers sovereign responsibilities. (yes, I realize Iceland and New Zealand).  If we get others to do stuff on our territory, I suppose we can't complain when they do it their way, on their terms, without asking.  Why would they?  We would have telegraphed the reality that we don't care.
> 
> Domestic security is a different discussion from how we can contribute internationally.  I suppose we could farm out any number of functions; border control, fishery enforcement, coast guard, air navigation.  Look at the money we would save.


I agree with you.  And it absolutely begins what could potentially be a slippery slope. 


However, I think we have to keep things in context:

-  Yes, those were short term deployments used to fill capability gaps that our allies had at the time.  

But that was also just a fluke.  It could have taken the UK longer to replace their MPA than it did.  It could have taken the USAF longer to clear the F-15C fleet for operations than it did.   


Even if we did exactly as the Australians are doing, having a nuclear submarine capability would take years to obtain - at best. 

We could sign a contract today, pay it out in full, and start integrating our members onto their boats tomorrow - and it would still take years, at best, to have our own similar capability. 


So since generating that capability overnight can’t happen, but that capability is perhaps a solid requirement for Arctic naval operations - perhaps we should be open to at least discussing and exploring the matter?

Yes, it would be nice to operate in our own backyard without having to ask our allies.  But we are where we are.  

______


The other capabilities that you mention our capabilities that we already have and duties we already execute currently.  Not so with nuclear submarines.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Kirkhill said:


> One of the reasons I like the home-fired micro CHP option is that it is both and individual and community advantage.
> 
> Every home with a wood-fired CHP system would have a dual incentive to maintain a fuel supply to their "furnace" and keep it in working order.
> 
> It would keep the house warm and bright and it would supply a steady income from the export of electricity to the community.
> The community would benefit from the excess energy for community projects like offices, gyms, meeting halls, community pools, indoor rinks and small business opportunities like machine shops, and 3D printers, sewing, laundries, bakers, smokehouses.
> 
> And, if one house goes dark, there are a lot of others to pick up the slack.


One of the challenges up north like the Yukon, is the slow growth of trees, you can find a lot of what we would consider as young trees that are actually 60 years old. They make excellent lumber due to the tight grain, but they are not 'renewable" in a economic sense. 
Example all the trees in this picture are post gold rush, where the hills were stripped bare for wood;


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> One of the challenges up north like the Yukon, is the slow growth of trees, you can find a lot of what we would consider as young trees that are actually 60 years old. They make excellent lumber due to the tight grain, but they are not 'renewable" in a economic sense.
> Example all the trees in this picture are post gold rush, where the hills were stripped bare for wood;



Fair enough.  Assume that each of 269 communities has an allotment of 30,000 km2.  What is the sustainable yield of timber?  Peat?

Assume also a community of 1000 in  250 households.


----------



## Dale Denton

Yet another useful LAV variant that we won't get.

*This Is Our First Look At The Marines' Loitering Munition-Armed Light Armored Vehicle*​The 'suicide drones' will allow Marine light armored units to surveil the battlefield and strike targets with pinpoint precision from up above.​BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK OCTOBER 11, 2021
This Is Our First Look At The Marines' Loitering Munition-Armed Light Armored Vehicle


> Israeli firm UVision has shown off the first pictures of a U.S. Marine Corps 8x8 LAV-25-series wheeled armored vehicle with a multi-round launcher for loitering munitions, which are often described as "suicide drones." The company had announced earlier this year that the Marines had selected this launch system, together with a variant of the Hero-120 loitering munition, as the winning entry for its Organic Precision Fires-Mounted program.
> 
> UVision released the photographs of the modified LAV-M, which is the mortar carrier variant of the LAV-25, as part of its official unveiling of the Multi-Canister Launcher (MCL) at the Association of the U.S. Army's main annual conference in Washington, D.C., which opened today. A lower resolution image of the MCL by itself on the ground during a live-fire test had previously emerged.


----------



## FJAG

LoboCanada said:


> Yet another useful LAV variant that we won't get.
> 
> *This Is Our First Look At The Marines' Loitering Munition-Armed Light Armored Vehicle*​The 'suicide drones' will allow Marine light armored units to surveil the battlefield and strike targets with pinpoint precision from up above.​BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK OCTOBER 11, 2021
> This Is Our First Look At The Marines' Loitering Munition-Armed Light Armored Vehicle


I actually don't like it all that much. It strikes me something on a chassis like the HIMARS but with two of those launcher pods on the back of the flatbed would be handier and offer twice the round delivery at one time. Then bugger off for reloads before the counterfire comes in. It would still be compatible with an existing vehicles system for maintenance and be lower to the ground - probably lighter, too.

🍻


----------



## Colin Parkinson

yet it's small enough to be mounted on smaller vehicles which would work with the Reserves. Most MRLS systems are to big for our reserves, I quite like some of the ex-Warsaw pact stuff, a lot of bang for very little buck.


----------



## MilEME09

Colin Parkinson said:


> yet it's small enough to be mounted on smaller vehicles which would work with the Reserves. Most MRLS systems are to big for our reserves, I quite like some of the ex-Warsaw pact stuff, a lot of bang for very little buck.


Our allies have proven any piece of kit can be manned by the reserves if the framework is there to support it. Until the CAF has the desire to make the reserves useful beyond individual augmentation, and it's two teir training system, we will never effectively use our entire force.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> *Our allies have proven any piece of kit can be manned by the reserves *if the framework is there to support it. Until the CAF has the desire to make the reserves useful beyond individual augmentation, and it's two teir training system, we will never effectively use our entire force.



We've proved that too, throughout the years.


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> Our allies have proven any piece of kit can be manned by the reserves if the framework is there to support it. Until the CAF has the desire to make the reserves useful beyond individual augmentation, and it's two teir training system, we will never effectively use our entire force.


I always found it interesting the Officer Corps didn't have a two tier training system - at least as the Phase Levels - 
   While the Res courses where always abridged versions of the Reg Force ones.

The NG down here has nearly all the same kit as the Regular Army - generally only lagging on the latest Night Operations Gear as it cascades down.

Which of course - combined with actual legislation to protect and empower them - allows the NG to be Federalized and active as whole units.


----------



## Kirkhill

More tangential wanderings I'm afraid but I honestly don't know where to put a lot of this stuff as, in my view, it all has a bearing on future structure and the world in which it will operate.    And maybe my confusion is reflective of the current state of play.  There is an awful lot of flux at the moment.

This article:   Reserve operations?  C3 Replacement?  Loyal Wingman? RCAF?  RCA?  FSCC?  ASCC?  Expeditionary Wing?  LRPF?  UAS?  Key West Agreement? Loitering Armed Munitions?  Drones?  RCN?


> AUSA NEWS: Air Wolf Program May Give Army Unprecedented Battlefield Speed​*10/11/2021*
> By Stew Magnuson
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Kratos photo
> 
> Aircraft manufacturer Kratos is under contract with the Army to evaluate the possibility of converting one of its target drones into a high-speed unmanned aerial vehicle.
> 
> The Air Wolf program has the potential to give the Army unprecedent control and speed on the battlefield with the platform reaching Mach 0.7, said Steve Fendley, president of Kratos Defense and Security Systems Inc.’s unmanned systems division.
> 
> “Yeah, it’s fast,”, Fendley said in a recent interview. “It’s a Shadow on steroids,” he added, referring to the Army’s tactical UAV. The only systems that the Army has that are faster are missiles.
> 
> For a comparison, a Shadow UAV’s top speed is about 100 mph, a Gray Eagle drone based on the Predator flies at about 192 mph and an Apache attack helicopter’s top speed is 227 miles per hour. The Air Wolf could fly over battlefields at about 538 mph with control and maneuverability that conventional missiles don’t possess.
> 
> The Air Wolf is based on the company’s MQM-178 Firejet air-to-air and surface-to-air aerial target.
> 
> Fendley said the drone’s speed and size would make it extraordinarily survivable. At about 10 feet long with a six-and-half foot wingspan, “it’s so small, it would be very, very hard for an offensive strike to take out that system.”
> 
> The Air Wolf takes off from a pneumatic launcher that can be towed by a tactical wheeled vehicle.
> 
> “It's a very low-cost approach. It allows you to have successive flights very, very quickly,” he added.
> 
> As for the mission, Fendley said: “It’s a tactical system that applies a specific autonomous mission with specific payloads that the Army has identified to satisfy some of their mission needs.” There is a strike mission and an intelligence-gathering mission, he added.
> 
> Army Futures Command has given Kratos a sole-source contract to provide the aircraft for evaluation. The company has moved from the digital engineering phase to flying the prototypes. In August, it completed a 100 percent successful flight at the Burns Flat, Oklahoma Range Facility.
> 
> While still in the research-and-development phase, Fendley said there are “several different exit ramps” for the project that could lead it to a program of record with a permanent spot in the Army arsenal.
> 
> *Topics:* Air Power, Robotics, Robotics and Autonomous Systems








						Air Wolf Program May Give Army Unprecedented Battlefield Speed
					

Air Wolf Program May Give Army Unprecedented Battlefield Speed




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				





Disruption.


----------



## Kirkhill

Pratt & Whitney’s GatorWorks to 3D print entire jet engine
					

The first time Pratt & Whitney's GatorWorks attempted to 3D-print a combustor for the miniature TJ-150 jet engine, the results were anything but perfect. Lessons learned, the West Palm Beach, Florida-based outfit is now taking additive manufacturing one step further: attempting to produce a...




					www.flightglobal.com


----------



## Kirkhill

But....









						Russia says it launched and intercepted 10 missiles during drills near Japan
					

The fleet released video of the exercise, which showed missiles being launched from a Russian vessel. Additional weapons systems, including the AK-630 rotary cannon and heavier artillery, are shown firing in the footage.




					www.stripes.com


----------



## CBH99

I agree.  There is a lot that can fall under a Army Force 2025 discussion - everything from force structure, which capabilities do we want, what equipment do we need to provide those capabilities, recruiting & retaining the force, etc. 

We could (and the CAF probably should) do a Force 2030 document also.  Force 2025 can be what we want the force to realistically look like in basically 3yrs, while 2030 could focus more on the final product. 


But… I’m not sure Russia’s naval tech falls under either of those?  😉   (Just giving you a hard time)

______


Question about our country’s defense industrial base, as we had been chatting about earlier.  

Does Canada produce any night-vision products intended for Army use?  

(NVG for individuals, surveillance suite for Coyote, LAV 6.0 recce, TAPV, etc.)

I know we produce FLIR systems.  What about modern Night Vision systems?


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> I agree.  There is a lot that can fall under a Army Force 2025 discussion - everything from force structure, which capabilities do we want, what equipment do we need to provide those capabilities, recruiting & retaining the force, etc.
> 
> We could (and the CAF probably should) do a Force 2030 document also.  Force 2025 can be what we want the force to realistically look like in basically 3yrs, while 2030 could focus more on the final product.
> 
> 
> But… I’m not sure Russia’s naval tech falls under either of those?  😉   (Just giving you a hard time)
> 
> ______
> 
> 
> Question about our country’s defense industrial base, as we had been chatting about earlier.
> 
> Does Canada produce any night-vision products intended for Army use?


Not that are modern 


CBH99 said:


> (NVG for individuals, surveillance suite for Coyote, LAV 6.0 recce, TAPV, etc.)


No 


CBH99 said:


> I know we produce FLIR systems.  What about modern Night Vision systems?



 Canada has no capability to produce either high end Thermal or II Tubes, or CMOS type systems, as well as neither in or out of band MFAL's.
    By high end I mean above 2,200 FOM or 640x480 thermal resolution.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> Not that are modern
> 
> No
> 
> 
> Canada has no capability to produce either high end Thermal or II Tubes, or CMOS type systems, as well as neither in or out of band MFAL's.
> By high end I mean above 2,200 FOM or 640x480 thermal resolution.


So there I was googling “CMOS type systems, and MFAL’s the other night…”

I actually am going to learn me a thing or two about whatever the final part of your post meant 😅🤷🏼‍♂️



And that now makes sense, re not producing our own night vision equipment.  

The reason I asked that is because I have a source at 1VP who told me the other night that the NVG’s issued to us for Afghanistan were on loan from the Americans…

I didn’t believe it at first.  I remember taking them out of the box, and it was clear they were brand new.  

Then another guy in 1VP said the same thing, as did someone else from 3VP.  


If that is the case, part of industrial part of Force 2025 could/should be our own ability to produce FLIR and NV systems.  

0.02


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> So there I was googling “CMOS type systems, and MFAL’s the other night…”
> 
> I actually am going to learn me a thing or two about whatever the final part of your post meant 😅🤷🏼‍♂️
> 
> 
> 
> And that now makes sense, re not producing our own night vision equipment.
> 
> The reason I asked that is because I have a source at 1VP who told me the other night that the NVG’s issued to us for Afghanistan were on loan from the Americans…
> 
> I didn’t believe it at first.  I remember taking them out of the box, and it was clear they were brand new.
> 
> Then another guy in 1VP said the same thing, as did someone else from 3VP.
> 
> 
> If that is the case, part of industrial part of Force 2025 could/should be our own ability to produce FLIR and NV systems.
> 
> 0.02


You can't do that reasonably.

 NV churn is ridiculous - I remember my first experience in the CF with NODs, nasty honeycomb - dual tube goggles with very limited field of view the PVS-5 (which I think we called 604's?, and an old PVS-2 Starlight scope.
   *The PVS-5 had a weird housing more akin to a diving mask - and you needed to constantly focus each eye piece to see at different ranges - it was incredibly disorientating to walk with.

That was well over 30 years ago.


I won't take a deep dive into NV - as the history is much better listed here C5ISR Center U.S.ARMY CCDC | History

For future force efforts - it appears (I am not involved with the program) that the Microsoft HoloLens as the frame work for IVAS will incorporate multiple sensors 'into' the lens - from 3k+ FOM WP tubes - to 1280+ Thermal and other features.



At the 2015 USASOC Sniper Comp - my partner and I ran WP PVS-31's for NOD's and where able to run the Night Stress Pistol CQB phase under full NOD's and beat a lot of teams using white light - we had dots on our pistols and only three teams inc us ran the course "dark" all three of those team did better than ones choosing (Needing) to use pistol lights and handhelds - as for us it was effectively daylight.


  For the low light rifles phases - we ran a mix of II and Thermal - and I had a fused device for my spotting scope, and we had three Wilcox RAPTAR's as MFAL - 
All of that gear we had 6 years ago that was cutting edge really just available to Tier 1 only then - is now effectively obsolete.
The two of us had over 750k of Night Vision Gear between us -- while some entities can afford to rotate though gear like that - larger ones cannot - and while it's not obsolete for the majority of users, this is how/why gear like this needs to cascade down.

    White Phos Tubes are still tricking into the Vanilla side of SOCOM - but while still excellent NV - has about half the capability of the current highest end devices.   The US Army is fielding E-BNVD - basically a regular Green Phos PVS-31, although I heard it is supposed to get WP tubes shortly.


----------



## Good2Golf

CBH99, high grade NVGs (like KevinB mentions, FOM - figure of merit like 2200 and above) are ITAR-controlled.  Joe hunter in America can get FOM 2400-2600 goggles, but I think other nations are limited to 1600 or so, without an ItAR waiver/exception. I’ve flown with 2200+ and the difference is notable compared to earlier Gen-III or -II devices.   Lucky US hunters! 😉


----------



## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> CBH99, high grade NVGs (like KevinB mentions, FOM - figure of merit like 2200 and above) are ITAR-controlled.  Joe hunter in America can get FOM 2400-2600 goggles, but I think other nations are limited to 1600 or so, without an ItAR waiver/exception. I’ve flown with 2200+ and the difference is notable compared to earlier Gen-III or -II devices.   Lucky US hunters! 😉


All tubes are actually ITAR controlled, 1,800 are restricted to NATO/5Eyes (used to be 1600) - and other things beyond 2200 are restricted to certain parts of 5Eyes and require a US DoD Unit sponsor with a rider for joint anti-terrorist operations (I'm sure folks can do the math that only a few entities get this)

FWIW the French make a very decent 2k+ WP tube - I've seen some of their stuff integrated into systems down here.
    IF one wanted to try to start making "Made in Canada" NODs - starting with Photonis would not be terrible








						Image intensifier tube 4G
					

The 4G technology is particularly suited to the very high demands of special forces. Get the best DRI* range and be the first to see.




					www.photonis.com
				



   I've seen some of their tubes with an over 3k spec sheet...


However I think the future is digital - and tubes are going to go the way of the DoDo - the future is in fused devices - with some thermals now being able to detect daytime footprints - and able to be used in daylight. 
    I'm still of the opinion that Thermal is great for target detection - but target discrimination needs to be done via II or other non thermal means.


----------



## CBH99

I had no idea NOD’s were ITAR controlled, nor that the tech has/does evolve that rapidly.  I didn’t know how much I didn’t know until reading these posts from KevinB and Good2Golf.   

It makes perfect sense, it’s just that this tech doesn’t get the focus that the big sexy capital equipment gets.  


Note to self… Stay on the good side of anybody who can actually say, in all seriousness - “The vanilla side of SOCOM.”


----------



## Kirkhill

LoboCanada said:


> Yet another useful LAV variant that we won't get.
> 
> *This Is Our First Look At The Marines' Loitering Munition-Armed Light Armored Vehicle*​The 'suicide drones' will allow Marine light armored units to surveil the battlefield and strike targets with pinpoint precision from up above.​BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK OCTOBER 11, 2021
> This Is Our First Look At The Marines' Loitering Munition-Armed Light Armored Vehicle



Do we have an interservice/interbranch department responsible for munitions or ordnance?

A lot of the munitions being proposed these days, especially in the missile, UAS, drone fields seem to be platform independent.  

We already have examples of systems in our arsenal that are employed only by one branch but could equally be employed by the other two.   I am thinking about AIM-9s, AIM-120s, ESSMs, Harpoons and whatever the CANSOFCOM types are using.

The entire spectrum of UAS and drones are generally platform independent.  If it can be launched from an aircraft then it can launched from a vehicle.  If it can be launched from a vehicle then it can be launched from a boat.  If it can be launched from a boat then it can be launched from a ship.  If it can be launched from a ship then it can be launched from land.  (And submarines are boats).

If the bullet is the weapon why do we buy separate bullets for each service according to specific platforms rather than buying bullets to kill specific targets and then figure out how we use them on available, or intended, platforms?


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I always found it interesting the Officer Corps didn't have a two tier training system - at least as the Phase Levels -
> While the Res courses where always abridged versions of the Reg Force ones.
> 
> The NG down here has nearly all the same kit as the Regular Army - generally only lagging on the latest Night Operations Gear as it cascades down.
> 
> Which of course - combined with actual legislation to protect and empower them - allows the NG to be Federalized and active as whole units.



Reservists in the Combat Arms do the same training courses as the Reg F Officers, and are integrated into the platoons on all the courses.

You're just more likely to pass if you happen to be a MilColl Officer, as opposed to DEO or RESO


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Reservists in the Combat Arms do the same training courses as the Reg F Officers, and are integrated into the platoons on all the courses.
> 
> You're just more likely to pass if you happen to be a MilColl Officer as opposed to DEO or RESO


I realized my comment missed NCM courses being abridged versions of the Reg Equivalent.


----------



## IRepoCans

WP is pretty widespread now (even amongst the white side of SOCOM): Australian Army runs PVS-31As complete for all combat arm units and their direct support (to include their reserves); the French, the Germans and the UK are phasing in WP dual tube systems for combat arms (Elbit based for the latter two); there are already quite a few provincial and federal entities in Canada that use L3 or Elbit WP systems.

CAF side, last time I checked the benchmark which we are evaluating all dual tube systems against is the PVS-31A and it strongly leaned toward WP. Hell, we even are jumping on fused systems whether that comes in the form of a COTI or something akin to a PSQ-36 (because from what I've heard, the ENVG-B is hot garbage compared to the 36) is anyone's guess.

The big shake your head moment is realization that we're still rocking PAQ-4s and PEQ-2s whilst everyone else is moving onto the latest generation of LADs (some of which even act as laser range finders) and most of our infantry pers don't even know the capability you gain with a IR illuminator co-aligned with your IR designator.

To say we are generations behind in night fighting equipment and experience would be an understatement.


----------



## dapaterson

The Army is working to refresh its NV holdings. Scope creep appears to have been suppressed sufficiently to let it move forward.


----------



## dangerboy

They had an initial purchase of 300 new MNVGs with White Phosphors tubes. They were scheduled to go to the reserves I have no idea what the distribution plan actually was. Supporting the Canadian Army Reserves - Canada.ca


----------



## IRepoCans

dangerboy said:


> They had an initial purchase of 300 new MNVGs with White Phosphors tubes. They were scheduled to go to the reserves I have no idea what the distribution plan actually was. Supporting the Canadian Army Reserves - Canada.ca


That's easy the division training centres will take them, or they're tucked in MSA somewhere never to be seen.

I was on a reserve PLQ / ISSC where 95% of the course had never used MNVGs on let alone a PEQ-2 or PAQ-4 (the latter two we didn't even have on the course).

Rant on:

Hell, we didn't even have PRRs, MBITRs or Harris 152s, whichever manpack variant we're supposedly using for ground comms. I get the whole distributed deep operations against an EW capable enemy and emcon; but that doesn't mean you can't train pers on the radio systems they are supposed to be qualified to operate because there are comms windows that'll still have to be made even in an emcon enviroment. 

And leading into the whole _NEW_ light forces doctrine as I see it is this: the CAF forgot somehow to soldier properly as dismounts against a peer threat and it's an attempt to give some purpose to the otherwise purposeless light infantry battalions. Because there's nothing new about any of it, everything is already in the BGLs, everything is already something that is established in NATO or ABCA doctrine. It's like the rigid adherence to conducting only frontals because that's all we supposedly know how to do.

Rant off.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

dapaterson said:


> The Army is working to refresh its NV holdings. Scope creep appears to have been suppressed sufficiently to let it move forward.


I see what you did there


----------



## MJP

IRepoCans said:


> That's easy the division training centres will take them, or they're tucked in MSA somewhere never to be seen.
> 
> I was on a reserve PLQ / ISSC where 95% of the course had never used MNVGs on let alone a PEQ-2 or PAQ-4 (the latter two we didn't even have on the course).


Div TCs are low man on the totem pole for kit so they hold almost none and kit like that is not held inside MSAs.

The vast majority of our nightfighting gear outside of CANSOF was held in the CMBGs with a small reserve in the depots.  It was like much of our equipment managed, controlled and surged to units or formations for trg or operations


----------



## Ostrozac

KevinB said:


> *The PVS-5 had a weird housing more akin to a diving mask - and you needed to constantly focus each eye piece to see at different ranges - it was incredibly disorientating to walk with.


Try driving a M113 while wearing them! That was quite the experience.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> The Army is working to refresh its NV holdings. Scope creep appears to have been suppressed sufficiently to let it move forward.


About 6 years ago I tried to steer a Solicitation from DND to buy more SIMRAD's to getting something that wasn't 30 years out of date.
  There was zero interest in buying something new - 
   When John Marshall was absorbed to the SF side, I think they pretty much gutted the Regular Army of anyone with much of a schmick about Night Operations.



IRepoCans said:


> WP is pretty widespread now (even amongst the white side of SOCOM): Australian Army runs PVS-31As complete for all combat arm units and their direct support (to include their reserves); the French, the Germans and the UK are phasing in WP dual tube systems for combat arms (Elbit based for the latter two); there are already quite a few provincial and federal entities in Canada that use L3 or Elbit WP systems.
> 
> CAF side, last time I checked the benchmark which we are evaluating all dual tube systems against is the PVS-31A and it strongly leaned toward WP. Hell, we even are jumping on fused systems whether that comes in the form of a COTI or something akin to a PSQ-36 (because from what I've heard, the ENVG-B is hot garbage compared to the 36) is anyone's guess.


ENVG was an utter train wreck - a perfect example of a program lead with no experience on the ground actually using NV.




__





						Enhanced Night Vision Goggle (ENVG) - USAASC
					

DESCRIPTION: The AN/PSQ-20 Enhanced Night Vision Goggle (ENVG) provides dismounted Brigade Combat Team warfighters the capability to observe and maneuver in all weather conditions, through obscurants, during limited visibility and under all lighting conditions while enabling rapid detection and...




					asc.army.mil
				



   Imaging attaching a Brick to a PVS-14 MNVG and a Skeetir-L and adding some duck tape to keep it all together.

  ENVG-B started out as a Army version of the PVS-31, it is morphing into an attempt to take the PVS-31, Fuse it with Thermal - like the PSQ-36. and add networked capabilities - all of which are capabilities to be fielded in IVAS.








						L3Harris secures new $100m order for ENVG-B system from US Army
					

L3Harris has received an $100m order from the US Army for the delivery of its Enhanced Night Vision Goggle – Binocular (ENVG-B) system.




					www.army-technology.com
				



   Realistically the currently fielded version of ENVG-B is a PSQ-36 in tan - with a data in, not just digital output port
L3 Harris makes all three (PVS-31, PSQ-36, and ENVG-B), as well as the GPNVG, and fused offerings of the GPNVG (I've looked through one - but not sure what they are calling that).




IRepoCans said:


> The big shake your head moment is realization that we're still rocking PAQ-4s and PEQ-2s whilst everyone else is moving onto the latest generation of LADs (some of which even act as laser range finders) and most of our infantry pers don't even know the capability you gain with a IR illuminator co-aligned with your IR designator.
> 
> To say we are generations behind in night fighting equipment and experience would be an understatement.


The non CANSOF side of the CF is in very bad shape - the lack of a real forend for mounting MFAL's is a significant hinderance - the TRIAD "pitchfork" is an example of an idiot with no understanding making a decision simply based on up front cost - without looking at performance - or the issues that the TRAID cause to the life of the attached devices.

 Admittedly the PEQ-2 isn't terribly obsolete - other than the lack of a vis laser - and the vast amount of troops down here don't understand the uses of that either - I went up to Ft Drum when 10th Mountain still ran RIMAC (two week shooting school) - during the "CQB week" I got to teach a class on vis laser employment as a buddy of mine was the NCOIC - back then they mostly had M16A4's and ACOG's - and it was virtually impossible to get a sight picture easily - especially if trying to use cover - so a 40 min class on short range shooting with laser was a bit of an eye opener for them - that was with the PEQ-15's - which outside the SOCOM LA-5 version was a let down as far as Mw power compared to the -2, and for night use the -2 was IMHO actually preferable (admittedly the slaved boards for the laser adjustment is also much nicer on the -15 - as your IR Ill, LP, and VIS are slaved - so you can confirm zero much easier).

The PAC-4C was absolute before the CF bought them - I'm legitimately wondering what imbecile thought that was a good option.
   Low power - and no illuminator - yuck.

If I was going to revamp the Army NV program - I'd see if I could borrow guys from the Hill - because both indoor and outdoor experiences under NOD's are significantly different - and illuminator work can be remarkably useful or hurtful depending on the skill of the user.


One of the biggest issues I have seen for the CF, is quite often the Canadian Distributor of items has about as much of a clue as most staff and contracting officers - and suggests items that brief well, but absolutely are criminally stupid for field usage.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MJP said:


> Div TCs are low man on the totem pole for kit so they hold almost none and kit like that is not held inside MSAs.
> 
> The vast majority of our nightfighting gear outside of CANSOF was held in the CMBGs with a small reserve in the depots.  It was like much of our equipment managed, controlled and surged to units or formations for trg or operations



My unit has an operational tasking to provide a dismounted Recce Pl (other units provide pioneer, mortar and other taskings).

Our issue of night vision devices, a key piece of kit to achieve that tasking, has been zero over the several years since the taskings were dished out.

Based on my direct experience in this matter, we're officially worse off than the 'bog standard and not operationally tasked' militia of 1979 who were, at least, issued with Starlight Scopes.

Nice work, CAF


----------



## KevinB

dangerboy said:


> They had an initial purchase of 300 new MNVGs with White Phosphors tubes. They were scheduled to go to the reserves I have no idea what the distribution plan actually was. Supporting the Canadian Army Reserves - Canada.ca











						Cadex Defence – Precision rifles, chassis and more
					

For over 25 years, Cadex has designed and manufactured an extensive line of high quality and premium products for Special Operations, Military, Law Enforcement, and Civilians across the globe.




					www.cadexdefence.com
				



 Probably because CADEX is not a manufacturer of NV.
Second point - what sort of dipshit buys a MNVG at this point in time - this isn't 1990 or even 2001.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

KevinB said:


> Cadex Defence – Precision rifles, chassis and more
> 
> 
> For over 25 years, Cadex has designed and manufactured an extensive line of high quality and premium products for Special Operations, Military, Law Enforcement, and Civilians across the globe.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.cadexdefence.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Probably because CADEX is not a manufacturer of NV.
> Second point - what sort of dipshit buys a MNVG at this point in time - this isn't 1990 or even 2001.


Canada hasn’t figured out binocular vision, yet…


----------



## OldSolduer

SeaKingTacco said:


> Canada hasn’t figured out binocular vision, yet…


Dammit if they monos were good enough for me they are damn well good enough for you!! 



In WW1 Canadians were in the forefront using tech and innovation to lead the way.
Sadly it sounds like we don't care.


----------



## KevinB

SeaKingTacco said:


> Canada hasn’t figured out binocular vision, yet…


Except Aviation, Pathfinders, SARTech's and CANSOF.
   Heck the older Low Profile PVS-21 BNVG where in CF service for MFP and SAR jumps before most other armies knew anything more than a PVS-7, I would assume the knowledge behind that acquisition got pulled behind the SOF curtain too.

 But 2M for 300 PVS-14 with WP tubes?  That's $6,666.66 a piece - that's more with exchange rate than a USG entity can get a PVS-31A - which had TWO WP tubes - and wired rear helmet mount battery pack (which is a good counterweight)  - as opposed to the screw in battery on the 14.

I mean if the CF wanted a WP Monocle - it should have been darned near 2k, heck for that price they could have gotten a modular system with a Photonis tube that can be used as Monocle, Binocular - or Weapon mounted II system for that price - with mounts for helmet and weapon.


----------



## KevinB

OldSolduer said:


> Dammit if they monos were good enough for me they are damn well good enough for you!!
> 
> 
> 
> In WW1 Canadians were in the forefront using tech and innovation to lead the way.
> Sadly it sounds like we don't care.


I'm not a fan of the way Commonwealth Armies do Force Modernization, toooooo much power is in the hands of the LCMM.
   The LCMM should be a servant of the users, not a master of it's domain.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Except Aviation, Pathfinders, SARTech's and CANSOF.


Which tells us all we need to know about the Government's National Defence priorities.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Which tells us all we need to know about the Government's National Defence priorities.


Not necessarily - combined with the recent Monocle purchase (and the price they paid) it shows knowledge has been replaced by ignorance and/or incompetence (or some sort of nepotism).


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill said:


> Which tells us all we need to know about the Government's National Defence priorities.


And the extant maturity of other CAF organizations to get their poop in a group, at least for some of the smaller-scale procurements that politicians don’t immediately see as own-riding cash cows to be pursued assiduously.

I first flew with AN/AVS-501s (a CAN-specific build of US Gen II AN/PVS-5C) back in ‘91. I think they had a FOM of between 600-800, crappy for sure, but than no NVGs and a single landing light as the alternative.  I was very happy to get in with Gen III tubes subsequently: AN/AVS- later ANVIS-6, -9, Pinnacle -9 and ‘some other models.’  All to say that op and tech requirements were established, applicable staff work done to ensure life-cycle support for the systems as well as supporting systems like focussing devices and maintenance equipment, and a recurring update program to assign applicable capital funding for fleet turnover and expansion.  It isn’t rocket science, but it does take organizations to form up their paths and commit to them in an informed and progressive manner.  Not to become a continual nag about the Army’s challenges with sorting things and getting in with them (light forces, anybody?), but I’ll nag about the fact that the army does enjoy a good long stare at its belly button and whining when others move on in contemporary technology. As KevinB and others noted, the CA’s NV program writ large is….or has…room to improve.  Good Lord, if the AF has had NV sorted for 30+ years, can it really be that hard? 🤔


----------



## CBH99

OldSolduer said:


> Dammit if they monos were good enough for me they are damn well good enough for you!!
> 
> 
> 
> In WW1 Canadians were in the forefront using tech and innovation to lead the way.
> Sadly it sounds like we don't care.


I was hoping once combat operations in Afghanistan ended in 2011, the folks with multiple tours were the ones who would stay in & pave the way forwards for the CAF.  

I got out in 2011, once the combat operations ended.  Garrison life started to creep in again, and I realized how much I hated it.  

I was somewhat surprised at how many colleagues felt the same way — and the CAF went from having a recruiting wait list, to all of a sudden being short by a few thousand folks.  

The mindset of “Well this is how we did it in the 1970’s and it worked just fine then, so that’s how we are going to do it now” crept back, and frighteningly quickly at that!


The notable senior folks who did stay in were under-achievers during Afghanistan, and stayed that way afterwards.  

Or they did well for themselves and did some really good work, which hopefully isn’t tarnished from the scandal that’s happening now.  Some of them are still in, and I find them to be some of the sole sources of real drive and change.  

Others I think had plenty of drive, experience, and great ideas on how to make us a more modern, effective, and _efficient_ fighting force.  Some of those individuals ended up being the CDS and MND, and there seems to be some kind of substantial leverage hanging over them that prevents them from taking any solid initiative.

(I highly doubt a guy like Vance, who received plenty of praise from the troops when he was TF Commander, went into this position without some great ideas.  Same with our MND, who had more than enough experience to implement some solid ideas also.  That they both appear to have become more of the same ‘yes men’ has me questioning whether those positions are cursed for now, with the current government.)


Sorry for the lazy unintentional rant!  

Worked in the 1970’s?  Why change it if it isn’t broken?  😉


----------



## dapaterson

The Army's usual approach:

1. Over spec so there's nothing on the market.
2. Complain.
3. Write a thinly veiled attempt at sole source.
4. Fail.
5. Do a real competition.
6. Discover that the years of diddling around eroded your purchasing power 
7. Wait to see if inflation will magically reverse itself.
8. Admit that you can't afford the quantities you think you need, and compromise.
9. Buy the tech you specced five years ago for delivery three years from now.


----------



## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> And the extant maturity of other CAF organizations to get their poop in a group, at least for some of the smaller-scale procurements that politicians don’t immediately see as own-riding cash cows to be pursued assiduously.
> 
> I first flew with AN/AVS-501s (a CAN-specific build of US Gen II AN/PVS-5C) back in ‘91. I think they had a FOM of between 600-800, crappy for sure, but than no NVGs and a single landing light as the alternative.  I was very happy to get in with Gen III tubes subsequently: AN/AVS- later ANVIS-6, -9, Pinnacle -9 and ‘some other models.’  All to say that op and tech requirements were established, applicable staff work done to ensure life-cycle support for the systems as well as supporting systems like focussing devices and maintenance equipment, and a recurring update program to assign applicable capital funding for fleet turnover and expansion.  It isn’t rocket science, but it does take organizations to form up their paths and commit to them in an informed and progressive manner.  Not to become a continual nag about the Army’s challenges with sorting things and getting in with them (light forces, anybody?), but I’ll nag about the fact that the army does enjoy a good long stare at its belly button and whining when others move on in contemporary technology. As KevinB and others noted, the CA’s NV program writ large is….or has…room to improve.  Good Lord, if the AF has had NV sorted for 30+ years, can it really be that hard? 🤔


Rotary Wing guys have always been on the cutting edge of NVG's.
   The GPNG weight and bulk made it a no go for most ground units - but it does stellar work for folks who need clarity and field of view in the air - and Dev, as SEAL's love shinny stuff


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> Not necessarily - combined with the recent Monocle purchase (and the price they paid) it shows knowledge has been replaced by ignorance and/or incompetence (or some sort of nepotism).


Which these days shouldn’t be the case, at all.  

If I’m the person who is either in charge, or directly advising the person in charge, of what to purchase to enhance our NV capabilities (Army wide, or perhaps something trade specific) - and I’m woefully out of my knowledge base…there is nothing wrong with reaching out to allied organizations and discussing with them what has worked well/not well for them, and asking for advice based on their experience. 

Ignorance, in this case, shouldn’t exist.  We each have more access to information, discussion forums, and reviews about tech available at our fingertips.  

If we want to bring ourselves up to speed on something quickly, and truly bring a useful capability to bear - reach out and ask an allied unit for feedback/advice based on their experience.   

Heck, even reach out to some of the CANSOF types and their network of contacts for feedback.  

Ignorance isn’t really acceptable, in my opinion anyway, when it comes to these things.  


Anyways.  Lunch break is over, and also my random rants. 😉


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> Which these days shouldn’t be the case, at all.
> 
> If I’m the person who is either in charge, or directly advising the person in charge, of what to purchase to enhance our NV capabilities (Army wide, or perhaps something trade specific) - and I’m woefully out of my knowledge base…there is nothing wrong with reaching out to allied organizations and discussing with them what has worked well/not well for them, and asking for advice based on their experience.


Clearly you never worked in DLR 



CBH99 said:


> Ignorance, in this case, shouldn’t exist.  We each have more access to information, discussion forums, and reviews about tech available at our fingertips.
> 
> If we want to bring ourselves up to speed on something quickly, and truly bring a useful capability to bear - reach out and ask an allied unit for feedback/advice based on their experience.
> 
> Heck, even reach out to some of the CANSOF types and their network of contacts for feedback.


There used to be a vast gap between CANSOF and the rest of the Army -- a lot of gear was viewed as "Special" by Regular Army and ignored - without realizing that 99% of "Special" kit is only special due to initial expense - and that it has equal employment utility across the Force.

I've been out of the CF for a long time - and my close friends who remained are either MWO's or above on the NCO side, or LCol's or above on the O side of the conventional army, or Sgt and above on the SOF side -- so I don't get a true coal face opinion anymore.



CBH99 said:


> Ignorance isn’t really acceptable, in my opinion anyway, when it comes to these things.


The ignorant most often don't know they are ignorant...
     A buddy of mine once explained why he chose to sit in the parking lot and shoot the shit with me and another guy instead of exhibiting at a Defense Event.  He pointed out that there where 7-8 folks he could have a truly deep discussion with in small arms - and he was sitting with 2 of them, he was going to gain nothing from exhibiting - and gain more by our talk.
  I was very proud - not that because a decorated member of that entity would skip his own entities event - but because I had hired him, and he had replaced me when I left, and he had truly learned one of life's lessons.



CBH99 said:


> Anyways.  Lunch break is over, and also my random rants. 😉


You always know morale hasn't hit rock bottom and people still care when they rant -- as for when the bitching stops - that's when you worry, as they have gotten into plotting...


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Which tells us all we need to know about the Government's National Defence priorities.



What I was getting at was some entities are actively engaged and don't have time to muck around debating the nature of the universe.  Consequently decisions are made and the consequences incorporated into the operational plan.  If something doesn't work then the other thing is done.  If it does work then move on.


Aviation, SAR, CANSOF (and Pathfinders?) seem to be routinely engaged - especially SAR, both techs and their aviation.  CANSOF and logistics aviation seem to be in demand from our allies.

NORAD, NorthCom, SovPats and the RCN all seem to be gainfully employed and have to manage operations despite equipment and manning issues.

But, the Army......???

Would anybody really notice if Canada withdrew from Latvia?

Here's a bone for D&B to chew on,  knowing his great professional admiration for the RAF Regiment.   Going back to Perrin Beatty's VP Guards - how would it be if the Militia were organized along RAF Regiment lines.   A lot of policing, a bit of armed security and a bit of GBAD.

47 NORAD Radar sites plus North Bay, Cold Lake and Bagotville and 5 FOLs (Inuvik, Yellowknife, Rankin Inlet, Kuujjuaq and Iqaluit)
4 Sigs sites (Alert, Masset, Gander and Leitrim)
4 Naval Radio Sites - Aldergrove, Matsqui, Mill Cove and Newport Corner
Resolute
Nanisivik

That is 65 sites, most of them unmanned.   If even one platoon were assigned to each station that would be 65 platoons required.  If an enduring presence were required, adopting oil industry northern policies ( two weeks to a month on and then two weeks to a month off) Then there would be a need for 130 to 200 platoons.  Or roughly the same number of "platoons" as the Rangers can field.  And the Rangers do it with a fraction of the population base available to the southern Militia.

5000 Rangers in 200 patrols = 25 Rangers per patrol = a small platoon

200 VP platoons of 25 militia = 5000 militia.

Not a force to be permanently deployed up north, but a permanently available force, trained to Home Guard standards, that can establish a presence where there is none when it is needed.

A force to be backed up by the Rangers, by Arctic Rapid Response Companies, by Territorial Battle Groups, by Regular Lt Bn IRUs.

And then organize the remaining Regs into modified versions of  4 CMBG - light on infantry, only two battalions, but heavy on arty, 24 guns, GBAD, STA, UAS, FOO/FAC and Fire and Air SCCs.   75/25 Reg/Militia-Reserve or possibly even 50/50.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> But, the Army......???
> 
> Would anybody really notice if Canada withdrew from Latvia?


Absolutely starting with the Baltic states, followed by the Nordic states, followed by Russia and followed by the rest of NATO.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

Back to F2025 it self, it would appear they went back to the drawing board a bit to redo COA3, now it's COA 3.1 and 3.2, the 6th Div HQ is gone in both cases


----------



## Ostrozac

MilEME09 said:


> Back to F2025 it self, it would appear they went back to the drawing board a bit to redo COA3, now it's COA 3.1 and 3.2, the 6th Div HQ is gone in both cases


Aw! But building a new HQ would have been actually achievable in the timelines and within our comfort zone. Bonus points if we had put it in the greater Montreal area and the formation patch incorporated the quadruple arrows, just so that we can officially go full circle right back to where we started.

On a more serious note, a COA that incorporated “more division headquarters” was probably never going to fly. The Leslie plan talked about fewer Div HQ, down to two I think, and in the old days for quite some time brigades reported directly to St Hubert with no intermediate HQs.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Back to F2025 it self, it would appear they went back to the drawing board a bit to redo COA3, now it's COA 3.1 and 3.2, the 6th Div HQ is gone in both cases


Good start. Call me again when three or four more are gone.

I'll be interested in seeing how they plan to juggle that - particulalry the TBG structures. 

Currently there are 49 Res F infantry battalions. The COA 3 structure calls for 19 Res F Infantry TBG/battalions with 2 x RFL 1 companies and 1 x RFL 2 company each but still under 10 x Bde HQs. Quite frankly at that rate the Maritimes, Quebec and the Prairies could be reduced to one brigade HQ each, Ontario to two with the Maritimes and Quebec as one division, Ontario and the Prairies as another and all the Reg F brigade groups to one division. 

Under COA 3 arty  goes from 16 regiments plus three independent batteries to 10 TBGs;  armour goes from 19 Res F regiments to 7 TBGs; 10 CERs and 10 Svc Bns and 10 Sigs Regts stay at 10 each. Each of these could easily be amalgamated into 5 TBGs each.

Ta Da - 3 division HQs, 4 Reg F brigades and 5 Res F ones. Those HQ PY savings alone would provide the 2-300 PYs being sought to add to the instructor cadres.

I quite dislike the basic COA 3 concept primarily because it puts all the Reg F brigades under one division while the Res F brigades are under separate ones. This breaks the linkage between Reg F and Res F brigades and their shared geographic training establishments. Strangely that is not listed as a disadvantage for COA 3.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Can anyone share where one might be able to find these COAs?


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> Can anyone share where one might be able to find these COAs?


Just search Force 2025 of ACIMS, it's all available for anyone to view. It is app constantly changing, the decision brief will occur before the end of the year with an announcement on Jan about what the future will be.


----------



## markppcli

Cheers I’ll take a look tomorrow


----------



## CBH99

Ostrozac said:


> Aw! But building a new HQ would have been actually achievable in the timelines and within our comfort zone. Bonus points if we had put it in the greater Montreal area and the formation patch incorporated the quadruple arrows, just so that we can officially go full circle right back to where we started.
> 
> On a more serious note, a COA that incorporated “more division headquarters” was probably never going to fly. The Leslie plan talked about fewer Div HQ, down to two I think, and in the old days for quite some time brigades reported directly to St Hubert with no intermediate HQs.


The Leslie plan called for fewer HQ.  And while Hillier is known for his ‘big honkin’ ship’ comment - I don’t think he was a proponent of even more HQ’s either.  

Which has me asking a question only one person can truly answer.  How/why does Vance seem to be onboard for new HQ’s?  

I thought his experience, especially when including Afghanistan, he’d have realized the value of being more streamlined.  Sometimes “less is more” really is true.  


Anyways, back to F2025… no additional HQ’s.  Our goal is to get our crap together, streamline, and become a more efficient force.  Not bloat even more.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Good start. Call me again when three or four more are gone.
> 
> I'll be interested in seeing how they plan to juggle that - particulalry the TBG structures.
> 
> Currently there are 49 Res F infantry battalions. The COA 3 structure calls for 19 Res F Infantry TBG/battalions with 2 x RFL 1 companies and 1 x RFL 2 company each but still under 10 x Bde HQs. Quite frankly at that rate the Maritimes, Quebec and the Prairies could be reduced to one brigade HQ each, Ontario to two with the Maritimes and Quebec as one division, Ontario and the Prairies as another and all the Reg F brigade groups to one division.
> 
> Under COA 3 arty  goes from 16 regiments plus three independent batteries to 10 TBGs;  armour goes from 19 Res F regiments to 7 TBGs; 10 CERs and 10 Svc Bns and 10 Sigs Regts stay at 10 each. Each of these could easily be amalgamated into 5 TBGs each.
> 
> Ta Da - 3 division HQs, 4 Reg F brigades and 5 Res F ones. Those HQ PY savings alone would provide the 2-300 PYs being sought to add to the instructor cadres.
> 
> I quite dislike the basic COA 3 concept primarily because it puts all the Reg F brigades under one division while the Res F brigades are under separate ones. This breaks the linkage between Reg F and Res F brigades and their shared geographic training establishments. Strangely that is not listed as a disadvantage for COA 3.
> 
> 🍻


I still like Kevin's COA 4: 2 Div each of 3 Bde - all Bde mixed Reg and Res.
   I save even more PY 
 And given the recent GOFO immolation, less HQ seems to be healthier for everyone...


----------



## markppcli

Follow the Dutch model with each brigade having a reserve Bn made up of dispersed companies. Apply this equally to the Artillery and Engineers where they get reserve Sqns and Batteries. Set up regional reserve admin centres, in the buildings of the old Bdes.


----------



## Kirkhill

A bit more Force 2025 situation.

The evolution of the Canadian Air Sea Transportable Brigade is fascinating.  As is the ACE Mobile Force (Land) - North.

From its inception in 1968, as a Joint Force substituting 2x CF-5 CAS Squadrons for an armoured ground element, discussions over ownership of helicopters,  how do you get M109s to the field, where do you find transport vessels in a crisis (ask the Norwegians to provide them), the role of the RCN in getting troops there, supporting them ashore, withdrawing them if need be,  lack of experience with brigade, joint and expeditionary ops,  taking 2 to 4 years to plan a rapid intervention into a 30 day war...

Has anything been resolved?  Or was the reconsolidation of the Canadian effort in Germany from 1987 a short term fix, a dodge by the military establishment, that allowed a problem that needed to be addressed then, and still needs to be addressed?  An opportunity missed?

I know some of our contributors have direct experience of this era, and may have been involved in some of the planning.   Does this account accord with recollections?






						Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				








> The *Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group*, or *CAST*, was a Canadian Forces battle group dedicated to the rapid reinforcement of Norway in the event of a land war in Europe. The Group was based on a mechanized infantry brigade, supported by two Rapid Reinforcement Fighter Squadrons equipped with Canadair CF-5 fighters and a variety of supporting units. Manpower varied between 4,800 and 5,500 troops depending on how it was counted. CAST formed in 1968 as part of a widespread realignment of Canadian forces in Europe, and disbanded again in 1989 when the Forces were recombined into larger battalion sized group in West Germany.





> a ... formation roughly the size of the European portion of 4 CMBG would be deployed to Norway given one month's notice by the Norwegian government.





> CAST consisted of three major components; the three mechanized infantry battalions of the 5 CMBG, two Rapid Reinforcement Fighter Squadrons with 10 CF-5 fighters each, an artillery regiment and an armored reconnaissance squadron. In total, CAST contained about 5,500 men in the combined force. Their battle plan was known as Operational Plan BORAL.[3] BORAL relied on the Norwegians supplying the required roll-on/roll-off sealift capability, while Canadian commercial aircraft would be commandeered to move in advanced parties.
> 
> In the case of a war, CAST would be joined by similar-sized units from the United Kingdom/Netherlands Landing Force and US's 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade.[4]






> Planning started in the summer of 1984 and it was found the Operational Plan BORAL was sketchy at best - it had never been developed to any sort of operational level. Further, it became clear that "NDHQ planners… were addressing a large scale joint/combined exercise for the first time…"[3] Planning dragged on, and BRAVE LION was not ready for deployment for a full two years, a worrying development for a system designed to be rapidly deployed in a short war.[2] The required sealift capability was not available, and additional commercial ships from West Germany, England and Panama had to be chartered.[6]





> The main infantry sections and supporting units were in place in 7 days, but the mechanized forces and equipment were not unloaded until the 22nd day[9] - the majority of time allotted to the entire war (30 days). There was no plan to test or provide for a strategic withdrawal, which many commented would leave the troops stranded.[6][10]






> Militarily, the forces proved entirely capable once they arrived, carrying out operations until they returned in October. The only notable event was the crash of a CH-137 Kiowa helicopter than resulted in three minor injuries.[11] Small portions of the force, notably heavy trucks, were left in Norway to avoid having to ship them in the future.[6]
> 
> However, the entire mission structure behind the combat sections was generally considered a failure.[3] Logistics support was cobbled together from several different existing groups, while the extensive logistics experience that was part of Headquarters Canadian Forces Europe was not called upon. Further confusion ensued over the role of the Canadian naval forces in the exercise; planning did not call for any Canadian ships to be dedicated to the mission as they were expected to be part of a much larger NATO antisubmarine effort. However, it was clear that the mission would require naval support, especially if opposed at landing, and such support had never been arranged. Finally, traditional rivalries between the land and air forces led to a division of effort between helicopter and fighter support that was never addressed.[3]




The Canadian Forces, with the connivance of a Canadian Government who doesn't want assets sitting "at the end of the runway" because they might be asked to use them, has been ducking the obvious since the era of Pearson and Hellyer.

If Canada wanted to play a part in a Pearsonian United Nations then it needed a Joint Force that could deploy and sustain a Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade.   And that meant:

the army providing a Light Division of 3 Light Brigades,
or the Navy providing Big Honking Ships with escorts to transport tanks, M109s and trucks, 
and the Air Force committing to Close Air Support of the army,
and the army committing to defending the Air Force.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I still like Kevin's COA 4: 2 Div each of 3 Bde - all Bde mixed Reg and Res.
> I save even more PY
> And given the recent GOFO immolation, less HQ seems to be healthier for everyone...


Does Kevin's COA 4 include any CS or CSS brigades?

FJAG's  COA 4 also includes 2 Divs but with 3 x Reg and 2 x Res manoeuvre brigade groups and 1 x CS and 2 x CSS brigades.

That's another thing that I don't like about the Army's COA 3 (nor 1 and 2). While there seems to be some change in structure and lines of responsibility in CSS, nothing seems to tear us away from what is basically a static structure. Nothing creates more operationally focused deployable CSS assets. Have I told you recently that I think that NSEs are the work of the devil? 

Nothing that I see in any of these COAs is designed to grow the force to a level where it can expand beyond three brigade groups and nowhere is there any indication we will create the ability to deploy anything beyond a battlegroup. (Besides that I just don't trust people that talk about a future MLRS capability and then show a picture of a HIMARS - It's not that I want MLRS, I prefer HIMARS - but it shows a profound shallowness of knowledge)



FJAG said:


> The COA 3 structure calls for 19 Res F Infantry TBG/battalions with 2 x RFL 1 companies and 1 x RFL 2 company each but still under 10 x Bde HQs.


I need to make a correction to what I said above. The infantry battalions with 2 x RFL 1 and 1 x RFL 2 companies refers to the Reg F battalions. The Res F TBGs are all identified as having only an RFL 3 capability. Sorry about that.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Does Kevin's COA 4 include any CS or CSS brigades?


I would have them directly part of the Divs - and Bdes 
   I view them as integral structures necessary for operations, but I view the Bde as the lowest reasonable deployable asset - beyond limited short duration operations that would be mostly CANSOFCOM run.

I don't see a need for a CSS Bde - but Bn's inside the Bde and Div's.
   Maybe that is naive of me - but I view higher HQ of those formations to be unnecessary in a Military this small.



FJAG said:


> FJAG's  COA 4 also includes 2 Divs but with 3 x Reg and 2 x Res manoeuvre brigade groups and 1 x CS and 2 x CSS brigades.
> 
> That's another thing that I don't like about the Army's COA 3 (nor 1 and 2). While there seems to be some change in structure and lines of responsibility in CSS, nothing seems to tear us away from what is basically a static structure. Nothing creates more operationally focused deployable CSS assets. Have I told you recently that I think that NSEs are the work of the devil?


I always viewed NSE and NCE as the Devil 
   I think there should be more Svc Bn's in each Bde, as well as more robust Maintenance sub units in the Bn/Reg't's.
Depending on how one defines CS depends if I think they should be a Deiv or Bde asset - or specifically part of Bn's/Reg't in the Bde's.





FJAG said:


> Nothing that I see in any of these COAs is designed to grow the force to a level where it can expand beyond three brigade groups and nowhere is there any indication we will create the ability to deploy anything beyond a battlegroup. (Besides that I just don't trust people that talk about a future MLRS capability and then show a picture of a HIMARS - It's not that I want MLRS, I prefer HIMARS - but it shows a profound shallowness of knowledge)


Well its better than years ago when the briefing slide for Div Arty was always an MLRS and no program for MLRS was active...



FJAG said:


> I need to make a correction to what I said above. The infantry battalions with 2 x RFL 1 and 1 x RFL 2 companies refers to the Reg F battalions. The Res F TBGs are all identified as having only an RFL 3 capability. Sorry about that.
> 
> 🍻


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I would have them directly part of the Divs - and Bdes
> I view them as integral structures necessary for operations, but I view the Bde as the lowest reasonable deployable asset - beyond limited short duration operations that would be mostly CANSOFCOM run.
> 
> I don't see a need for a CSS Bde - but Bn's inside the Bde and Div's.
> Maybe that is naive of me - but I view higher HQ of those formations to be unnecessary in a Military this small.


I agree that a full manoeuvre brigade is probably the largest force we can reasonably expect to deploy (although I tend to think that if you are going to pay a division's worth of folks a full-time salary then you should have the ability to surge them all in the event of a Come to Jesus Moment.)

But, in any event, if you do deploy a brigade then the brigade service battalion provides the combat service support internal to the brigade and not the theatre level support that goes on behind it. That means that in the event of a full brigade's deployment you need a deployable theatre support organization as well as the brigade's service battalion. IMHO the best way to have that theatre support available is to have a hybrid CSS brigade that can force generate the necessary transport, supply and maintenance companies needed to support a deployed brigade. On top of that a sustainment battalion headquarters from a CSS brigade could also incorporate control over such theatre level personnel and health services support as might be necessary. If you do not have such a thing then you will need to rob all of the remaining manoeuvre brigade service battalions and base support establishments to form something along the lines of a composite sustainment battalion or, even worse, do that and rob the deployed brigade service battalion of some of its assets to do theatre level sustainment.

I tend to agree that support brigades should be within the force generating divisions, but primarily for administration and training. Effectively they are an Army level resource deployed in small or large chunks as dictated by requirements. 

We certainly do not have the size of an army to have the number and variety of CS and CSS brigades that the US has but there are three that we should focus on: an artillery brigade to concentrate all esoteric indirect fire and AD assets such as 4 RCA(GS) beyond the close support artillery in the manoeuvre brigades; a sustainment brigade for the basic supply, transport and maintenance support needed at theatre level; and a manoeuvre enhancement brigade where one can concentrate the remaining odds and sods from engineer support regiments to the Canadian Army Intelligence Regiment to 21 EW Regiment, to the nebulous Army MP Group (the whole MP chain needs downward renaming/restructuring desperately) to CNRB to CIMIC to the Influence Activity etc etc etc. 

We essentially already have a manoeuvre enhancement brigade by way of the Cdn Cbt Support Brigade. It would only need minor restructuring and redefining of tasks. In addition there is the CF Joint Operational Support Group which could form the core of a sustainment brigade. (It's not that I'm anti joint organizations I just think that a hybrid Reg F/ Res F Army structure offers more options for expansion and focused mission specific training - IMHO, the 1,100 strong CFJOSG is too large for a headquarters and too small as a force generator for the functions it supports - I think it needs restructuring to put paid to the NSE concept and to better leverage Res F manpower - obviously restructuring the CFJOG is outside of the scope for Force 2025)

The key need for these brigades (and their headquarters) is to focus the organization and training of them to be able to force generate theatre level support for everything from deployed battle groups to brigades (and in that Come To Jesus Moment - a whole division) so that the manoeuvre brigades are not required to cannibalize and bastardize their CS and CSS agencies to do that and can focus on their own training and support to their brigade groups.

For the most part, CS and CSS brigades should be hybrid with the ratio of Reg F to Res F of their various elements dependent on the likelihood of rapid or frequent deployment as opposed to deployment only in extreme circumstances.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I agree that a full manoeuvre brigade is probably the largest force we can reasonably expect to deploy (although I tend to think that if you are going to pay a division's worth of folks a full-time salary then you should have the ability to surge them all in the event of a Come to Jesus Moment.)


Actually I was arguing we shouldn't piecemeal - and opt for Bde Deployments (which would force several large elephants to be addressed).



FJAG said:


> But, in any event, if you do deploy a brigade then the brigade service battalion provides the combat service support internal to the brigade and not the theatre level support that goes on behind it. That means that in the event of a full brigade's deployment you need a deployable theatre support organization as well as the brigade's service battalion. IMHO the best way to have that theatre support available is to have a hybrid CSS brigade that can force generate the necessary transport, supply and maintenance companies needed to support a deployed brigade. On top of that a sustainment battalion headquarters from a CSS brigade could also incorporate control over such theatre level personnel and health services support as might be necessary. If you do not have such a thing then you will need to rob all of the remaining manoeuvre brigade service battalions and base support establishments to form something along the lines of a composite sustainment battalion or, even worse, do that and rob the deployed brigade service battalion of some of its assets to do theatre level sustainment.


 The Bde is effectively your theatre force if a Bde deploys.
    You shouldn't need an NSE or NCE - as the Bde should be self sufficient.
  In a Div OP - the Bde would still need to deal with higher - same issue should apply.



FJAG said:


> I tend to agree that support brigades should be within the force generating divisions, but primarily for administration and training. Effectively they are an Army level resource deployed in small or large chunks as dictated by requirements.


They aren't truly an Army level resource though - the CF can't currently really field an equipped Division - so IMHO it is best to field a smaller better equipped and trained force than a larger under equipped force - as an under equipped force I just a large waste of tax payer money in peacetime - and just a huge stack of body bags in wartime.


FJAG said:


> We certainly do not have the size of an army to have the number and variety of CS and CSS brigades that the US has but there are three that we should focus on: an artillery brigade to concentrate all esoteric indirect fire and AD assets such as 4 RCA(GS) beyond the close support artillery in the manoeuvre brigades; a sustainment brigade for the basic supply, transport and maintenance support needed at theatre level; and a manoeuvre enhancement brigade where one can concentrate the remaining odds and sods from engineer support regiments to the Canadian Army Intelligence Regiment to 21 EW Regiment, to the nebulous Army MP Group (the whole MP chain needs downward renaming/restructuring desperately) to CNRB to CIMIC to the Influence Activity etc etc etc.


  Div Arty Assets  -- I just don't think it needs to be called a Bde, it can be a Regiment +, as well as Staff at Div.
    I see the Sustainment Bde as being better suited to being broken down to Bde Level - making the Service BN's actually capable of CSS functions for the Brigade - even if it needs 3 Svc Bn / Bde - they don't need a separate HQ staff (IMHO)
   I just don't see large amounts of Troops to satisfy the requirement for a slew of support staff positions - as even with reserve mobilization it's really just a 1 Div deployable Army 


FJAG said:


> We essentially already have a manoeuvre enhancement brigade by way of the Cdn Cbt Support Brigade. It would only need minor restructuring and redefining of tasks. In addition there is the CF Joint Operational Support Group which could form the core of a sustainment brigade. (It's not that I'm anti joint organizations I just think that a hybrid Reg F/ Res F Army structure offers more options for expansion and focused mission specific training - IMHO, the 1,100 strong CFJOSG is too large for a headquarters and too small as a force generator for the functions it supports - I think it needs restructuring to put paid to the NSE concept and to better leverage Res F manpower - obviously restructuring the CFJOG is outside of the scope for Force 2025).


 Those are (or should be) Div assets - I'm not sure they need to be called Bde's IMHO.


FJAG said:


> The key need for these brigades (and their headquarters) is to focus the organization and training of them to be able to force generate theatre level support for everything from deployed battle groups to brigades (and in that Come To Jesus Moment - a whole division) so that the manoeuvre brigades are not required to cannibalize and bastardize their CS and CSS agencies to do that and can focus on their own training and support to their brigade groups.


I fully agree with that.


FJAG said:


> For the most part, CS and CSS brigades should be hybrid with the ratio of Reg F to Res F of their various elements dependent on the likelihood of rapid or frequent deployment as opposed to deployment only in extreme circumstances.


 I think the entire Army should be a hybrid force down to the Bde's - but I still think those assets should be part of the deployable Bde.


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## Ostrozac

KevinB said:


> I always viewed NSE and NCE as the Devil


In the event of a Canadian brigade being committed, I can, conceptually, see the necessity of a Canadian organization for handling nationally-specific supplies, acting as a replacement personnel depot, and generally answering the mail back home to free up the brigade headquarters in contact to fight, plan and coordinate with their coalition division headquarters. But it doesn’t have to be a monster interfering with and micromanaging the close fight. The equivalent organizations in the Korean War, 2 Canadian Administrative Unit and 25 Canadian Reinforcement Group, were located in Kure, Japan, while remaining under command of the Canadian Brigade commander.

On the question of whether this is a joint function provided by NSE/JOSG/an Operational Support Hub or this is an Army function provided by a Service Battalion (Rear) — that is probably splitting hairs — it would mostly be the same people doing the same jobs.

Personally, just like during Korea,  I’d like to see the NSE located for enough back to be safe for walking out — that way you could also use it as an R&R centre. 🎉 🍻


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## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Actually I was arguing we shouldn't piecemeal - and opt for Bde Deployments (which would force several large elephants to be addressed).


Realistically Canada tends to cheap out and mixes in when there are allies involved and then becomes part of a multinational force. We don't have enough staying power to deploy a brigade for any significant period.


KevinB said:


> The Bde is effectively your theatre force if a Bde deploys.
> You shouldn't need an NSE or NCE - as the Bde should be self sufficient.
> In a Div OP - the Bde would still need to deal with higher - same issue should apply.


Wholly  disagree. 

A brigade service battalion does not have the establishment (neither headquarters nor sub-units) to deal efficiently with national theatre level support, nor ought it to. The bde svc bn concerns itself with brigade level support well forward of where theatre level support agencies work out of. It ought not to have to deal with the intricacies involved. There needs to be a separate element that concerns itself with getting supplies, personnel, equipment etc into theatre and moves them forward to the bde svc bns.


KevinB said:


> They aren't truly an Army level resource though - the CF can't currently really field an equipped Division - so IMHO it is best to field a smaller better equipped and trained force than a larger under equipped force - as an under equipped force I just a large waste of tax payer money in peacetime - and just a huge stack of body bags in wartime.


By Army level I simply mean they aren't a divisional level resource such as an old style Discom or Div Arty used to be but rather are part of a modular structure that can be added on to a deployed force of any size to provide capabilities that are not organic to a brigade group. We tend to agree about better equipped and trained vs underequipped and undertrained force. Where we disagree is on the size of the day-to-day force and the break-glass-in-case-of-fire force Canada ought to be able to generate with what the taxpayers are currently paying.


KevinB said:


> Div Arty Assets  -- I just don't think it needs to be called a Bde, it can be a Regiment +, as well as Staff at Div.


Arty brigades are generally small. In our case it needs nothing more than an air defence battalion, an long range precision rocket battalion, a UAV strike battalion (or whatever we want to call it) and a small svc bn - probably 2,500 personnel with about 70% reservist. It's not a div arty asset. Its a set of resources that can augment a battle group, brigade or division as required.


KevinB said:


> I see the Sustainment Bde as being better suited to being broken down to Bde Level - making the Service BN's actually capable of CSS functions for the Brigade - even if it needs 3 Svc Bn / Bde - they don't need a separate HQ staff (IMHO)
> I just don't see large amounts of Troops to satisfy the requirement for a slew of support staff positions - as even with reserve mobilization it's really just a 1 Div deployable Army
> 
> Those are (or should be) Div assets - I'm not sure they need to be called Bde's IMHO.


Disagree - see theatre level support above.


KevinB said:


> I think the entire Army should be a hybrid force down to the Bde's - but I still think those assets should be part of the deployable Bde.


I don't disagree that there ought to be a rethink of what the organic components of a manoeuvre brigade should be and what components ought to be maintained in modular elements that can be attached to a battlegroup, brigade or division only when needed. Part of that discussion involves what does a manoeuvre brigade need to own and train with all the time in order to become proficient in its use. But there also needs to be consideration of what elements there are that need to exist within their own structure separate from the manoeuvre brigade in order to properly develop their capabilities and to provide the flexibility to tailor a specific task force with more or less of those elements.

I can think of many elements that ought not to be organic to a manoeuvre brigade including air defence (with the exception of self air defence assets); engineer support regiments; deep strike capabilities (such as precision rockets and loitering munitions), military police units above the brigade MP platoon (such as might be needed for rear area prisoner handling), intelligence (except bde int assets) Role 3 Medical facilities etc etc.

Our experience in Afghanistan has seriously tainted our view of combat. Brigade headquarters and their support organizations grew into large static organizations that operated over much larger AOs than normal and who ran relatively small and restricted service support elements (also working from static locations). For full spectrum operations they need to be tighter, more mobile and able to focus on operations within their immediate area of responsibility and not be distracted by extraneous issues.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

Brigade combat team - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




Stryker Bde Service Battalion

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Distribution Company
Field Maintenance Company
Medical Company

Forward Support Company (Engineers)
Forward Support Company (Artillery)
Forward Support Company (Cavalry)
Forward Support Company (Infantry)
Forward Support Company (Infantry)
Forward Support Company (Infantry)

One Battalion, 9 Companies under command (6 Detached)

Could an Artillery Regiment be organized on similar lines?  The Engineers?  The Cavalry?  Just because the infantry is commonly triangular why do the other arms Regiments have to follow suit?

Why not a 10 Battery Artillery Regiment, or a 6 Squadron Cavalry Regiment?  Leaving a single service core element and detachable elements to form combined arms teams?


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## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Could an Artillery Regiment be *organized *on similar lines?  The Engineers?  The Cavalry?  Just because the infantry is commonly triangular why do the other arms



No. Once you start trying to _organize _that scruffy lot, you're embarking on a journey of broken hearts


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## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Could an Artillery Regiment be organized on similar lines? The Engineers? The Cavalry? Just because the infantry is commonly triangular why do the other arms Regiments have to follow suit?
> 
> Why not a 10 Battery Artillery Regiment, or a 6 Squadron Cavalry Regiment? Leaving a single service core element and detachable elements to form combined arms teams?



The main reason artillery is triangular is to support triangular bns at the rate of one to one. However, Canadian arty regiments aren't triangular now (its a PY thing that has nothing to do with the reality of war fighting anymore). Leaving aside the HQ battery there are two gun batteries, an STA battery and an observation battery. There used to be four gun batteries (three close support one general support). That still makes sense to me. And if one was to acquire a short range loitering munitions battery it would fit in nicely. On the other hand deep strike weapons do not fit into a brigade group's scheme of operations but might fit in with a brigade group assigned to the role of a divisional or corps covering force or a deep strike brigade. 

That's why artillery should be capable of a) massing fires (centralized with a common command and control system) and b) being modular (to allow redistribution and reallocation) to support varying missions.

Engineer support regiments work the same way. They can be assigned to missions that have zero to do with a brigade groups mission. Cavalry to.

That's my whole point. Don't lock assets into a manoeuvre brigade that do not need to be there at all times. It impedes their flexibility of the brigade as well as the shoehorned asset.

This from FM 3-96 The Brigade Combat Team:



> BCTs are the Army’s primary combined arms, close combat force. ... BCTs include capabilities across the command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection warfighting functions. These capabilities are scalable to meet mission requirements. All BCTs include maneuver; field artillery; intelligence; signal; engineer; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); and sustainment capabilities. Higher commanders augment BCTs with additional combat power for specific missions. Augmentation might include aviation, Armor, Infantry, field artillery, air defense, military police, civil affairs, a tactical psychological operations (PSYOP) company, engineers, additional CBRN capabilities, cyberspace, and information systems. Organizational flexibility enables the BCT to accomplish missions across the range of military operations.



I'm not saying that we can't look at the organization of a brigade group to see if it could be better, but at the same time let's not start stuffing things into them that do not need to be there just because we think they need to be stuffed somewhere - especially when we have general purpose brigades widely dispersed around the country.

While we are not as large as the US Army, their brigade building block system is scalable. We obviously do not have enough resources to build air defence brigades, or military intelligence brigades or engineer brigades or civil affairs brigades or medical brigades or signals brigades, but we have enough CS and CSS battalions and regiments that ought to be "brigaded". The three I discussed above are adequate for the needed role.

🍻


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## MilEME09

Theater level support is 4th line which is above the Division service group, it is usually colocated at ports, or airports in order to support the flow of materials into the theater. It is entirely separate from a service battalion, and should never be mixed together or double hated. 

Remember F echelon is 1st Line for the unit
Service battalions provide 2nd line and limited 3rd line support to the brigade 
3rd line full support is provided by the division service group/ division workshops
4th line support is corp/theater level COSCOM units, and handles full rebuilds of equipment as well as the flow of goods into and out of theater. 4th line also technically includes original manufacturer.

While all lines of support are designed to be mutually supportive, they all preform very specific rolls and are organized, and manned according to their roles.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Theater level support is 4th line which is above the Division service group, it is usually colocated at ports, or airports in order to support the flow of materials into the theater. It is entirely separate from a service battalion, and should never be mixed together or double hated.
> 
> Remember F echelon is 1st Line for the unit
> Service battalions provide 2nd line and limited 3rd line support to the brigade
> 3rd line full support is provided by the division service group/ division workshops
> 4th line support is corp/theater level COSCOM units, and handles full rebuilds of equipment as well as the flow of goods into and out of theater. 4th line also technically includes original manufacturer.
> 
> While all lines of support are designed to be mutually supportive, they all preform very specific rolls and are organized, and manned according to their roles.


It seems almost like we've lost the bubble on remembering all the lessons learned from the past. During WW2 we had a significantly higher ratio of personnel dedicated to support roles rather than to manoeuvre. With peacetime we tended to reduce support functions across the board. 

During the Cold War we had few deployed forces other than 4 CMBG and the Cyprus commitment - the odd UN contingent here or there. The theatre level logistics structure for both were pretty much built into the system. We never did have a good structure to surge the rest of the force (the three other "lightish" brigades) including the AMF(L) and CAST but those were always economy of effort tasks.

With Yugoslavia and Afghanistan we got into the business of supporting long-term deployments but, again, never did build the the logistics system to back those operations. Oh, we built headquarters for that like CANOSCOM and then CJOC/CFJOSG but we never built a structure of support units/formations which are designed to deploy, and more importantly, designed to scale up deployed support.

I keep looking at the US model for guidance primarily because it is designed to 1) operate as an expeditionary force like Canada; 2) keeps both a ready force and a "in-an-emergency-break-the glass-force" and 3) uses reserves as a viable cost control measure. The scale is obviously different but the objectives are similar.

The last time I counted, the US Army, since going modular, maintained 31 Active Army manoeuvre brigades; 27 National Guard manoeuvre brigades; 75 Active Army combat support and combat service support brigades; 78 National Guard combat support and combat service support brigades and 59 Reserve combat support and combat service support brigades. The key takeaways are that 1) the ratio of manoeuvre brigades to support brigades is 58 to 212 or roughly 1 to 4. The ratio of active to reserve manoeuvre brigades is 31 to 27 or roughly 1 to 1. Finally, the ratio of active to reserve support brigades is 75 to 137 or roughly 1 to 2.

In Canada we have three manoeuvre brigades to 1 combat support brigade (plus one could and should add in 1 Wing's aviation resources) in the regular force and 10 unequipped and roughly 1/3 to 1/2 strength manoeuvre brigades and no combat support or combat service support brigades in the reserve force.

Canada's Army has a strength of roughly 42,000 of which 23,000 are regulars (roughly 55% Reg F). The US Army has 485,000 Active and 525,000 ARNG and USAR reservists (48% Active). That's roughly equivalent.

On the other hand, our total Army is 5% of the size of the US Army. 5% of their manoeuvre brigades would indicate we should have 1.5 Reg F and 1.5 Res F manoeuvre brigades (or three in total). In addition, 5% of their support brigades indicates that we should have 3.75 Reg F and 6.75 Res F support brigades which would get Canada close to the 1 to 4 ratio of manoeuvre to support.

Now there's a certain amount of adjustment required to compensate for the scaling that occurs due to higher formation levels such as divisions and corps headquarters but nonetheless, it's quite clear that Canada lags tremendously in the support elements needed to support the nation's manoeuvre forces. This is why we can't deploy and sustain a full brigade much less a division even though we have the numbers and the equipment (barring a few key capabilities) that indicates we ought to be able to field a division (if not two based on the number of manoeuvre brigades we could man (based on established combat arms positions we should be able to man three Reg F and three Res F brigades - realistically, of course we can't).

To put it in context, and to adjust the ratios based on the smaller size of our Army, if we wanted to have a force that could be properly sustained on operations we could probably be able to form a division made up of 2 Reg F and 1 Res F manoeuvre brigades with an additional Res F manoeuvre brigade held "in reserve". To provide that sustainment we would need 8 support brigades, 4 within the division (one each artillery, sustainment, manoeuvre enhancement and aviation) and 4 for theatre support (one each sustainment, manoeuvre enhancement, and two providing mixed resources from air defence to MI to MP to CBRN to Cyber etc etc)

This, of course requires a massive realignment within both the Reg F and the Res F. Cutting the Reg F manoeuvre capabilities from 3 to two brigades would 1) free up sufficient PYs to staff any and all hybrid positions to give day-to-day strength and leadership to the support brigades; 2) reduce the strain on current support infrastructure as between day-to-day support functions and deployments; but 3) reduce the ability to deploy the number of rifles on day-to-day peacetime deployments while on the other hand the Reg F and Res F's ability to provide domestic and international support of a non-kinetic nature would be significantly enhanced.

For the Res F it would require a massive change of focus from combat arms functions to support functions. Effectively Res F many trades would see little change (arty, signals, engineers, MI, MP) but there would be a drastic reduction in infantry and recce units offset by a dramatic increase in combat service support functions. That would get us to the point where the necessary 4 lines of support are reestablished and sustainable to the point of supporting the entire army and not merely the odd battlegroup here or there.

Not a popular concept, I know and I've been skirting the issue in many of my own past organizational models where I tend to protect manoeuvre elements at the expense of proper service support - protecting cap badges, I guess. Time to change.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> Theater level support is 4th line which is above the Division service group, it is usually colocated at ports, or airports in order to support the flow of materials into the theater. It is entirely separate from a service battalion, and should never be mixed together or double hated.
> 
> Remember F echelon is 1st Line for the unit
> Service battalions provide 2nd line and limited 3rd line support to the brigade
> 3rd line full support is provided by the division service group/ division workshops
> 4th line support is corp/theater level COSCOM units, and handles full rebuilds of equipment as well as the flow of goods into and out of theater. 4th line also technically includes original manufacturer.
> 
> While all lines of support are designed to be mutually supportive, they all preform very specific rolls and are organized, and manned according to their roles.


I tend to be a bit pragmatic - I don't see the CF having a real Division - thus I believe that the Div simply becomes the pond of higher enablers.
   I would adjust if there was a larger force.


FJAG said:


> It seems almost like we've lost the bubble on remembering all the lessons learned from the past. During WW2 we had a significantly higher ratio of personnel dedicated to support roles rather than to manoeuvre. With peacetime we tended to reduce support functions across the board.
> 
> During the Cold War we had few deployed forces other than 4 CMBG and the Cyprus commitment - the odd UN contingent here or there. The theatre level logistics structure for both were pretty much built into the system. We never did have a good structure to surge the rest of the force (the three other "lightish" brigades) including the AMF(L) and CAST but those were always economy of effort tasks.
> 
> With Yugoslavia and Afghanistan we got into the business of supporting long-term deployments but, again, never did build the the logistics system to back those operations. Oh, we built headquarters for that like CANOSCOM and then CJOC/CFJOSG but we never built a structure of support units/formations which are designed to deploy, and more importantly, designed to scale up deployed support.
> 
> I keep looking at the US model for guidance primarily because it is designed to 1) operate as an expeditionary force like Canada; 2) keeps both a ready force and a "in-an-emergency-break-the glass-force" and 3) uses reserves as a viable cost control measure. The scale is obviously different but the objectives are similar.


The Objective may be similar - but the implementation is totally different.



FJAG said:


> The last time I counted, the US Army, since going modular, maintained 31 Active Army manoeuvre brigades; 27 National Guard manoeuvre brigades; 75 Active Army combat support and combat service support brigades; 78 National Guard combat support and combat service support brigades and 59 Reserve combat support and combat service support brigades. The key takeaways are that 1) the ratio of manoeuvre brigades to support brigades is 58 to 212 or roughly 1 to 4. The ratio of active to reserve manoeuvre brigades is 31 to 27 or roughly 1 to 1. Finally, the ratio of active to reserve support brigades is 75 to 137 or roughly 1 to 2.
> 
> In Canada we have three manoeuvre brigades to 1 combat support brigade (plus one could and should add in 1 Wing's aviation resources) in the regular force and 10 unequipped and roughly 1/3 to 1/2 strength manoeuvre brigades and no combat support or combat service support brigades in the reserve force.
> 
> Canada's Army has a strength of roughly 42,000 of which 23,000 are regulars (roughly 55% Reg F). The US Army has 485,000 Active and 525,000 ARNG and USAR reservists (48% Active). That's roughly equivalent.
> 
> On the other hand, our total Army is 5% of the size of the US Army. 5% of their manoeuvre brigades would indicate we should have 1.5 Reg F and 1.5 Res F manoeuvre brigades (or three in total). In addition, 5% of their support brigades indicates that we should have 3.75 Reg F and 6.75 Res F support brigades which would get Canada close to the 1 to 4 ratio of manoeuvre to support.


So everything can (and I believe should fit) in 1 CDN Div - fortunately with all the GOFO bloodletting - now the Army Commander can also be the Div commander - so one only needs to find 1 2Star who isn't tainted.



FJAG said:


> Now there's a certain amount of adjustment required to compensate for the scaling that occurs due to higher formation levels such as divisions and corps headquarters but nonetheless, it's quite clear that Canada lags tremendously in the support elements needed to support the nation's manoeuvre forces. This is why we can't deploy and sustain a full brigade much less a division even though we have the numbers and the equipment (barring a few key capabilities) that indicates we ought to be able to field a division (if not two based on the number of manoeuvre brigades we could man (based on established combat arms positions we should be able to man three Reg F and three Res F brigades - realistically, of course we can't).


 1 CMBG and 1 and 2 CLBG  Plus 1CSB 
    I would make 1 CLBG Reg only and have 1 CMBG and 2 CLBG 50/50 


FJAG said:


> To put it in context, and to adjust the ratios based on the smaller size of our Army, if we wanted to have a force that could be properly sustained on operations we could probably be able to form a division made up of 2 Reg F and 1 Res F manoeuvre brigades with an additional Res F manoeuvre brigade held "in reserve". To provide that sustainment we would need 8 support brigades, 4 within the division (one each artillery, sustainment, manoeuvre enhancement and aviation) and 4 for theatre support (one each sustainment, manoeuvre enhancement, and two providing mixed resources from air defence to MI to MP to CBRN to Cyber etc etc)
> 
> This, of course requires a massive realignment within both the Reg F and the Res F. Cutting the Reg F manoeuvre capabilities from 3 to two brigades would 1) free up sufficient PYs to staff any and all hybrid positions to give day-to-day strength and leadership to the support brigades; 2) reduce the strain on current support infrastructure as between day-to-day support functions and deployments; but 3) reduce the ability to deploy the number of rifles on day-to-day peacetime deployments while on the other hand the Reg F and Res F's ability to provide domestic and international support of a non-kinetic nature would be significantly enhanced.
> 
> For the Res F it would require a massive change of focus from combat arms functions to support functions. Effectively Res F many trades would see little change (arty, signals, engineers, MI, MP) but there would be a drastic reduction in infantry and recce units offset by a dramatic increase in combat service support functions. That would get us to the point where the necessary 4 lines of support are reestablished and sustainable to the point of supporting the entire army and not merely the odd battlegroup here or there.
> 
> Not a popular concept, I know and I've been skirting the issue in many of my own past organizational models where I tend to protect manoeuvre elements at the expense of proper service support - protecting cap badges, I guess. Time to change.
> 
> 🍻


The Regimental Mafia system needs to be taken out and shot.
   Lay up all the colors - and start fresh.


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## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Not a popular concept, I know and I've been skirting the issue in many of my own past organizational models where I tend to protect manoeuvre elements at the expense of proper service support - protecting cap badges, I guess. Time to change.
> 
> 🍻



Or even better, time to have a clear strategic plan and the willingness to implement it.


----------



## Kirkhill

Administrative Regiments and Operational Regiments
Administrative Divisions and Operational Divisions.

Is that where the Canadian Army falls down?

The Royal Canadian Navy.  The Royal Canadian Air Force.  The Royal Canadian Artillery.  The Royal Canadian Engineers.  The Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  Each of those have a singular identity.  The regiment is ubiquitous.  They have their own internal, and external politics, and the obviously intrude into operational matters.  But the administrative is not as tightly woven with the operational as it is in the Army, both Regular and Reserve, Active and Sedentary.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment is often cited as an example of what happens when the operational regiment splits from the administrative.  Supposedly, in the eyes of some, it became a "dumping ground" for the Regimental Sergeant Major's problem children.  But, I believe, there is another school of thought that traces the problems back to when each regular force infantry regiment got its own Commando.   The original concept, I believe, was that the Airborne was a posting, not a career.  That everyone in the army would have the opportunity to rotate through it.

I can suggest, as others have, I am sure, that the tight association of  the operational brigades with administrative regiments of infantry reflects a similar problem.  And it is not just one of Francos vs Anglos.  It is also Army of the West and Army of the East.  Regimental Pride, which can be a good thing, overflows into operational disputes on everything from the nature of war and policy to doctrine and tactics.

The problem becomes much worse in the Reserves where operational roles are demanded for willing volunteers with limited skills.

The Americans are mocked for their "morale patches" with their NFL/NBA team names.
The Brits are praised for their cap badges. (Although the Vikings and Poachers could make great CFL names - better than Red Blacks, two Roughriders, or the Edmonton team).

However the Americans intentionally split up their administrative regiments and spread them across their operational formations
Even the Brits hold their infantry battalions in administrative Divisions (Guards - Scots, Welsh, Irish - Kings - Queens) by Regiments  (Guards, Scots, Welsh, Irish, Lancs, Yorks, Mercs, PWORR, Fusiliers, Gib, Paras, Rifles, Gurkhas)  The battalions are then assigned roles, active or reserve, light, or mech, and tasked to operational brigades.

The Aussies don't seem to have the same problems but they also don't have the defining difference of being a bilingual country.  They didn't have to find a solution to that problem. 

But we have made a virtue of a vice.  And baked it in clay.  The problem of conscription, of French Canada's legitimately different views, of ensuring that they, and natives, and the recent immigrants have a legitimate home in the Army and the opportunity for advancement is a hard one.   But the problem and its 1960s solution need to be revisited again.


With the best will in the world, my old regiment, staffed with good and willing people, is not going to be able to deploy a company, let alone a battalion to fight a 30 day war in Norway on 7 days notice.  It might be able to refight The Hundred Days  with 4 years of recruiting, training and experience in the field.  The army that those veterans of 1918 wanted to retain died in 1919.  Just like the one the veterans of 1945 wanted to retain died in 1946.

Those Regiments make great recruiting grounds.  But they are not the basis of an operational army.  Even, or especially, when they are employed full time.

I am going to suggest anathema.   Mixed Cap Badges at the Unit Level.

Combined Arms Teams with Black, Green and Blue hats and sub units with Infantry and Cavalry badges

LAV Battle Groups with Black Hat LAV squadrons and Green hatted rifle companies and Ubiquitous Fires Batteries

Lt Battle Groups with Black Hat lt recce squadrons and Green rifle companies and Ubiquitous Fires Batteries

Organized in mixed Brigade Groups or Task Forces under the administration of 1 Canadian Div.

The 1 Canadian Divisional Support Group then becomes the administrative home for various capabilities  on which CJOC can draw and assign the fielded formations and units as it sees fit.

CJOC also has the opportunity to raise, equip and train task forces from the administrative divions of the Reserves, given adequate time.


The local Regiments should be exploited for what they can do best - bring in willing volunteers and organize them.  Then point them in the direction of training and employment opportunities.


The Regular force infantry families?  They need to be rethought.   As do their cavalry counter-parts.


----------



## Kirkhill

Reading what Kevin and FJAG are posting while I was posting it seems that the conversation is leading us all in the same direction.  Kind of.

Is the biggest difference between the Artillery and Engineer Lt Col and the Infantry and Cavalry Lt Col that the former are comfortable with despatching their commands to support other branches while the latter expect to be accumulating accretions from other branches and leading them?

Should  Field Grade officers (Majors, Lt Colonels and Colonels) be separated from their Regiments?  After all they are no longer paying for the privilege of leading.  They are being paid to lead and follow.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Reading what Kevin and FJAG are posting while I was posting it seems that the conversation is leading us all in the same direction.  Kind of.
> 
> Is the biggest difference between the Artillery and Engineer Lt Col and the Infantry and Cavalry Lt Col that the former are comfortable with despatching their commands to support other branches while the latter expect to be accumulating accretions from other branches and leading them?
> 
> Should  Field Grade officers (Majors, Lt Colonels and Colonels) be separated from their Regiments?  After all they are no longer paying for the privilege of leading.  They are being paid to lead and follow.



I used to think of the Arty and Engrs as the rocks around which the rest of us riff raff flowed 

In reality, on operations, all arms grouping and re-grouping happens so much that no one really cares what cap badge you are because there is no cap badge on a helmet (yet). All anyone really cares about is capabilities.

It was always fun to watch the reactions of my (roughie toughie paratroopers and commandoes) when they watched - with awe - the tubby little ATO prance out to deal with yet another huge, dangerous IED


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> It seems almost like we've lost the bubble on remembering all the lessons learned from the past. During WW2 we had a significantly higher ratio of personnel dedicated to support roles rather than to manoeuvre. With peacetime we tended to reduce support functions across the board.
> 
> During the Cold War we had few deployed forces other than 4 CMBG and the Cyprus commitment - the odd UN contingent here or there. The theatre level logistics structure for both were pretty much built into the system. We never did have a good structure to surge the rest of the force (the three other "lightish" brigades) including the AMF(L) and CAST but those were always economy of effort tasks.
> 
> With Yugoslavia and Afghanistan we got into the business of supporting long-term deployments but, again, never did build the the logistics system to back those operations. Oh, we built headquarters for that like CANOSCOM and then CJOC/CFJOSG but we never built a structure of support units/formations which are designed to deploy, and more importantly, designed to scale up deployed support.
> 
> I keep looking at the US model for guidance primarily because it is designed to 1) operate as an expeditionary force like Canada; 2) keeps both a ready force and a "in-an-emergency-break-the glass-force" and 3) uses reserves as a viable cost control measure. The scale is obviously different but the objectives are similar.
> 
> The last time I counted, the US Army, since going modular, maintained 31 Active Army manoeuvre brigades; 27 National Guard manoeuvre brigades; 75 Active Army combat support and combat service support brigades; 78 National Guard combat support and combat service support brigades and 59 Reserve combat support and combat service support brigades. The key takeaways are that 1) the ratio of manoeuvre brigades to support brigades is 58 to 212 or roughly 1 to 4. The ratio of active to reserve manoeuvre brigades is 31 to 27 or roughly 1 to 1. Finally, the ratio of active to reserve support brigades is 75 to 137 or roughly 1 to 2.
> 
> In Canada we have three manoeuvre brigades to 1 combat support brigade (plus one could and should add in 1 Wing's aviation resources) in the regular force and 10 unequipped and roughly 1/3 to 1/2 strength manoeuvre brigades and no combat support or combat service support brigades in the reserve force.
> 
> Canada's Army has a strength of roughly 42,000 of which 23,000 are regulars (roughly 55% Reg F). The US Army has 485,000 Active and 525,000 ARNG and USAR reservists (48% Active). That's roughly equivalent.
> 
> On the other hand, our total Army is 5% of the size of the US Army. 5% of their manoeuvre brigades would indicate we should have 1.5 Reg F and 1.5 Res F manoeuvre brigades (or three in total). In addition, 5% of their support brigades indicates that we should have 3.75 Reg F and 6.75 Res F support brigades which would get Canada close to the 1 to 4 ratio of manoeuvre to support.
> 
> Now there's a certain amount of adjustment required to compensate for the scaling that occurs due to higher formation levels such as divisions and corps headquarters but nonetheless, it's quite clear that Canada lags tremendously in the support elements needed to support the nation's manoeuvre forces. This is why we can't deploy and sustain a full brigade much less a division even though we have the numbers and the equipment (barring a few key capabilities) that indicates we ought to be able to field a division (if not two based on the number of manoeuvre brigades we could man (based on established combat arms positions we should be able to man three Reg F and three Res F brigades - realistically, of course we can't).
> 
> To put it in context, and to adjust the ratios based on the smaller size of our Army, if we wanted to have a force that could be properly sustained on operations we could probably be able to form a division made up of 2 Reg F and 1 Res F manoeuvre brigades with an additional Res F manoeuvre brigade held "in reserve". To provide that sustainment we would need 8 support brigades, 4 within the division (one each artillery, sustainment, manoeuvre enhancement and aviation) and 4 for theatre support (one each sustainment, manoeuvre enhancement, and two providing mixed resources from air defence to MI to MP to CBRN to Cyber etc etc)
> 
> This, of course requires a massive realignment within both the Reg F and the Res F. Cutting the Reg F manoeuvre capabilities from 3 to two brigades would 1) free up sufficient PYs to staff any and all hybrid positions to give day-to-day strength and leadership to the support brigades; 2) reduce the strain on current support infrastructure as between day-to-day support functions and deployments; but 3) reduce the ability to deploy the number of rifles on day-to-day peacetime deployments while on the other hand the Reg F and Res F's ability to provide domestic and international support of a non-kinetic nature would be significantly enhanced.
> 
> For the Res F it would require a massive change of focus from combat arms functions to support functions. Effectively Res F many trades would see little change (arty, signals, engineers, MI, MP) but there would be a drastic reduction in infantry and recce units offset by a dramatic increase in combat service support functions. That would get us to the point where the necessary 4 lines of support are reestablished and sustainable to the point of supporting the entire army and not merely the odd battlegroup here or there.
> 
> Not a popular concept, I know and I've been skirting the issue in many of my own past organizational models where I tend to protect manoeuvre elements at the expense of proper service support - protecting cap badges, I guess. Time to change.
> 
> 🍻



FJAG, it is the same problem that we have been skirting since at least the CAST Bde era in 1968.   We wanted to be able to deploy an operational force but lacked the means to do it.   The problem there is that the support functions have to be the most professional functions in the Army.  They have to be available to support the operational side at a moments notice.  They have to support it during training.  They have to conduct the training.  They have to maintain the kit.  Order supplies, maintain comms and provide the maps and intelligence.

The operational side of the house, especially when considering a peer on peer conflict, is going to sit on its hands in garrison for long periods.

Did I just make the argument for a strong, professional, Institutional Army and a Militia with a small Active Permanent Force?

And Transport.  Lots and lots of Transport - Trucks, Helos, Planes and Ships.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Should  Field Grade officers (Majors, Lt Colonels and Colonels) be separated from their Regiments?  After all they are no longer paying for the privilege of leading.  They are being paid to lead and follow.


IMHO the NCO Mafia is just as bad.


----------



## dapaterson

Kirkhill said:


> Should  Field Grade officers (Majors, Lt Colonels and Colonels) be separated from their Regiments?  After all they are no longer paying for the privilege of leading.  They are being paid to lead and follow.


Report to the PM on the Leadership and Management of the CF, 1997, made similar arguments, and pulled the regimental names from the battle schools, and changed the cap badges of Army Colonels.


----------



## GR66

Which is better, to have a fully supported and deployable Brigade structure that has depth for reinforcement and sustainability in a prolonged conflict or a Divisional structure which assumes you're going to empty the pantry in order to deploy it?  

If you were to shift two a two Brigade (1 x Heavy and 1 x Light) structure vs the current three Brigade structure (symmetrical as now, or a Light/Medium/Heavy split) what would you gain and lose?

Ongoing peacetime deployments might be more difficult to generate with fewer maneuver units to draw from.  On the other hand you could shift the Artillery, Engineer and Support elements from the 3rd Brigade to the remaining two Brigades (or into hybrid Reg Force/Reserve units).  

As noted by both KevinB and FJAG, the approach you take would also change how you'd organize your CS and CSS elements.

Two Heavy Brigades and two Light Brigades....one of each Reg Force and Reserves?  Beefed up supporting elements?  Perhaps a couple of Territorial Battalions/Arctic Response Battalions in addition to the expeditionary force Brigade structure?


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Which is better, to have a fully supported and deployable Brigade structure that has depth for reinforcement and sustainability in a prolonged conflict or a Divisional structure which assumes you're going to empty the pantry in order to deploy it?
> 
> If you were to shift two a two Brigade (1 x Heavy and 1 x Light) structure vs the current three Brigade structure (symmetrical as now, or a Light/Medium/Heavy split) what would you gain and lose?


There CF doesn't have 2 Heavy Brigades - and honestly not even 1.
   There are enough vehicles for a Medium Brigade with Tanks, but still is missing a lot of key enablers.
   There is not enough equipment for much more, there are a lot of LAV's - but it's not a Heavy IFV, and never will.

So let's look at it as a LAV Bde with Tanks (I will call it LAV-T) 
  If the Brit's continue to occupy Suffield for most of the training year - Wx is the only logical place for the Bde - or perhaps the Bde equipment.
 *ideally I think the LAV-T Bde would be based in Central Canada - West Ontario - or East Manitoba - but that would require an entirely new base and training area.

I don't see the CA being able to field 4 Bde (Reg and Res) with the current manning levels.
   So it's realistically 1 LAV-T Bde, and 2 Light Bde (potentially with some CAV ability with LAV's).

I don't view Mechanized until as rapid deployment - simply as the CF cannot move them quickly -- as we have discussed before that either means Pre-Positioning - or accepting they are a follow on force.
  So I would have them manned as 30/70 (30% Reg and 70% Res) 

The Light Bdes - ideally would be 1 East and 1 West - to be able to help run DomOps - and would be manned at a 70/30 Split Reg and Res.



GR66 said:


> Ongoing peacetime deployments might be more difficult to generate with fewer maneuver units to draw from.  On the other hand you could shift the Artillery, Engineer and Support elements from the 3rd Brigade to the remaining two Brigades (or into hybrid Reg Force/Reserve units).


 I think the only way the CA moves forward is with a unified command - with Reg and Res in the same Bde, and some sub units mixed as well.



GR66 said:


> As noted by both KevinB and FJAG, the approach you take would also change how you'd organize your CS and CSS elements.
> 
> Two Heavy Brigades and two Light Brigades....one of each Reg Force and Reserves?  Beefed up supporting elements?  Perhaps a couple of Territorial Battalions/Arctic Response Battalions in addition to the expeditionary force Brigade structure?


 As I mention above I think given the major gaps in capabilities and equipment deficiencies that 3 Bde is the absolute max the CA can field with any degree of credibility.

   The Light Bdes would be the IRU, and have Dom Ops roles - as well as Mountain, Arctic, Maritime etc.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> Report to the PM on the Leadership and Management of the CF, 1997, made similar arguments, and pulled the regimental names from the battle schools, and changed the cap badges of Army Colonels.


Which did nothing really - the LFWA Battle School didn't all of a sudden not become populated by near 100% PPCLI - and even knows which Branch/Unit a Col is from - and the Regimental HQ's still track and publish the servicing Col - GOFO as their original hat badge.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG, it is the same problem that we have been skirting since at least the CAST Bde era in 1968.   We wanted to be able to deploy an operational force but lacked the means to do it.   The problem there is that the support functions have to be the most professional functions in the Army.  They have to be available to support the operational side at a moments notice.  They have to support it during training.  They have to conduct the training.  They have to maintain the kit.  Order supplies, maintain comms and provide the maps and intelligence.
> 
> The operational side of the house, especially when considering a peer on peer conflict, is going to sit on its hands in garrison for long periods.
> 
> Did I just make the argument for a strong, professional, Institutional Army and a Militia with a small Active Permanent Force?
> 
> And Transport.  Lots and lots of Transport - Trucks, Helos, Planes and Ships.


The way that I see it is that we will still have a general operational/deployed day-to-day role that will be like what we do today. A smallish army contingent in a place like Latvia, a small but very professional special operations force for quick reaction (and in my mind foreign training role) and a large enough conventional force to maintain readiness to deploy an additional battlegroup if required/desired.

That does not take a very large support structure on a day-to-day basis and should be filled by the Reg F cadres of hybrid CSS units. What is critical is that there be a large enough and trained enough and equipped enough force to expand into a surge when required. 

Army transport should be a no brainer. What seventeen or eighteen year old kid doesn't want to drive big army trucks through muddy fields? Logistic vehicles are some of the least expensive vehicles we own. Hell, the MilCOTS could probably even be useful in theatre level transport companies. And HET companies. How often are they really needed? If the Reg F could arrange to move their heavy equipment on weekends the bulk of HET transport and POL transport (of which, I think, we could use a lot more of than we have) could all be passed on to reserve units with a small core of Reg F leadership. The problem seems to be that over the last fifty years, every time that we refresh the fleet we reduce its size.



dapaterson said:


> Report to the PM on the Leadership and Management of the CF, 1997, made similar arguments, and pulled the regimental names from the battle schools, and changed the cap badges of Army Colonels.


I remember that and recall that it made little difference about anything other than for a while I had to wear the generic colonel's cap badge before the JAG put us all back into the branch one.

I actually like the US Army system where the uniforms are standard and the distinct unit identifier are inexpensive, small, enameled badges that you can change out quite easily on postings. Note that the gunners and engineers and a whole hockey sock full of others already wear badges that easily transfer with units. It's really only the infantry and armoured corps that are so heavily invested in this "regimental" thing and even there, amongst the Reg F regiments there is very little uniform difference that can't be changed if a Patricia should go Royal.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Report to the PM on the Leadership and Management of the CF, 1997, made similar arguments, and pulled the regimental names from the battle schools, and changed the cap badges of Army Colonels.



Presumably it didn't last.  Was it something worth pursuing with more vigour?


----------



## dapaterson

The change in names, and non-specialist Army colonels no longer wearing regimental / branch accoutrements has lasted.

Culture change, on the other hand...


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> There CF doesn't have 2 Heavy Brigades - and honestly not even 1.
> There are enough vehicles for a Medium Brigade with Tanks, but still is missing a lot of key enablers.
> There is not enough equipment for much more, there are a lot of LAV's - but it's not a Heavy IFV, and never will.
> 
> So let's look at it as a LAV Bde with Tanks (I will call it LAV-T)
> If the Brit's continue to occupy Suffield for most of the training year - Wx is the only logical place for the Bde - or perhaps the Bde equipment.
> *ideally I think the LAV-T Bde would be based in Central Canada - West Ontario - or East Manitoba - but that would require an entirely new base and training area.
> 
> ....
> 
> I don't view Mechanized until as rapid deployment - simply as the CF cannot move them quickly -- as we have discussed before that either means Pre-Positioning - or accepting they are a follow on force.
> So I would have them manned as 30/70 (30% Reg and 70% Res)


I think we're arguing semantics as opposed to a real issue. Totally agree we can't form an ABCT with the equipment we have but we can form a Motor Rifle Brigade which is heavyish but not heavy. (lets leave aside the arty, AD and anti-armour issues for the time being - that definitely needs rectifying before we could ever think of peer to peerish ops.) So we're left with something that could realistically be called a Mech brigade.

We have enough tanks to form two tank battalions if we go down to three troops per battalion and three tanks per troop as some others do. We have enough LAVs for easily six battalions. So we have the core equipment of two mech brigades - one Reg F one Res F. The Reg F one in Edmonton/Wainwright/Shilo the Res F one in Ontario - as the only place where you have enough people to man it (Ontario generates around 5,300 reservists) and have ranges where tanks can be fired (annually). For actual summer manoeuvre training fly the brigade to Wainwright for a few weeks and use the Reg F gear or if gear is prepositioned (as it could be at this rate then fly them to Poland or wherever for their two - three weeks summer training.) 



KevinB said:


> I don't see the CA being able to field 4 Bde (Reg and Res) with the current manning levels.
> So it's realistically 1 LAV-T Bde, and 2 Light Bde (potentially with some CAV ability with LAV's).


I think that they can based on the numbers distribution for reservists in Canada but it also depends on how many reservists will be rebadged to support roles.

Put the Reg F light brigade into Quebec. Put the Res F light brigade into Quebec and the Maritimes (Quebec and the Maritimes generate appx 7,200 reservists between them. 

When you subtract the Reg F cadres for the two Res F manoeuvre brigades you end up with around 3,000 reservists uncommitted in Quebec/the Maritimes; 1,500 in Ontario; and 4,000 in western Canada. At roughly 2,000 reservists per support brigade that should provide for four support brigades which could be spread across the whole country. 

The numbers above are based on a very poor reserve system that is far from the best at recruiting and training and retaining their people. It needs fixing and real equipment holdings and a real mission might finally get the Reg F and Res F leadership off their collective butts to fix things. One should be capable of generating another 8,000 reservists for four more support brigades.



KevinB said:


> The Light Bdes - ideally would be 1 East and 1 West - to be able to help run DomOps - and would be manned at a 70/30 Split Reg and Res.



I don't see the need because for the vast majority of DomOps that we do any soldier will do and in fact more engineers, truckers and logisticians should be even better for DomOps. If push comes to shove leave a 500 man light amphibious/mountain battalion on the BC mainland.


KevinB said:


> I think the only way the CA moves forward is with a unified command


Technically it is. Spiritually its far from that.


KevinB said:


> - with Reg and Res in the same Bde, and some sub units mixed as well.


Definitely agree. BUT. This will take careful thinking so that the Reg F cadre doesn't spend the bulk of its year sweeping armory floors. I've always though that a battalion with a mostly Reg F HQ and CSS coy and one full-time subunit and two Res F subunits and additional headquarters staff would work best.


KevinB said:


> As I mention above I think given the major gaps in capabilities and equipment deficiencies that 3 Bde is the absolute max the CA can field with any degree of credibility.


I disagreed above and still do. But then I'm a glass half full guy. The big point, however, is that the system and not just the structure must be changed to generate better trained reservists and make the experience so worthwhile during their "useable" years that retention becomes much better. There are dozens of ways to do this.


KevinB said:


> The Light Bdes would be the IRU, and have Dom Ops roles - as well as Mountain, Arctic, Maritime etc.


Sure.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The way that I see it is that we will still have a general operational/deployed day-to-day role that will be like what we do today. A smallish army contingent in a place like Latvia, a small but very professional special operations force for quick reaction (and in my mind foreign training role) and a large enough conventional force to maintain readiness to deploy an additional battlegroup if required/desired.
> 
> That does not take a very large support structure on a day-to-day basis and should be filled by the Reg F cadres of hybrid CSS units. What is critical is that there be a large enough and trained enough and equipped enough force to expand into a surge when required.
> 
> Army transport should be a no brainer. What seventeen or eighteen year old kid doesn't want to drive big army trucks through muddy fields? Logistic vehicles are some of the least expensive vehicles we own. Hell, the MilCOTS could probably even be useful in theatre level transport companies. And HET companies. How often are they really needed? If the Reg F could arrange to move their heavy equipment on weekends the bulk of HET transport and POL transport (of which, I think, we could use a lot more of than we have) could all be passed on to reserve units with a small core of Reg F leadership. The problem seems to be that over the last fifty years, every time that we refresh the fleet we reduce its size.
> 
> 
> I remember that and recall that it made little difference about anything other than for a while I had to wear the generic colonel's cap badge before the JAG put us all back into the branch one.
> 
> I actually like the US Army system where the uniforms are standard and the distinct unit identifier are inexpensive, small, enameled badges that you can change out quite easily on postings. Note that the gunners and engineers and a whole hockey sock full of others already wear badges that easily transfer with units. It's really only the infantry and armoured corps that are so heavily invested in this "regimental" thing and even there, amongst the Reg F regiments there is very little uniform difference that can't be changed if a Patricia should go Royal.
> 
> 🍻



But don't we need a large number of skill sets in small volumes?  Its one thing to say that we are a small army and therefore we can't afford all the skill sets that the Yanks (or the Chinese) can.  But if we are fighting a modern war aren't there a lot of those skill sets that are indispensible?

I agree that truck drivers should be a dead easy get for the Reserves.  

But how about drone mechanics?  Cyber warfare?

When we look at the Stryker BCT (and the IBCTs and ABCTs have the same enablers) we find, in addition to the Service Battalion with its HQ and Command Support people, its truck drivers, mechanics and medics and its 6 forward support companies,  Sigs and Military Intelligence Companies and a Target Acquisition Platoon.

To that the US Army intends to add an EW platoon, a cyberspace electromagnetic activities cell, a drones platoon, a 3D printing platoon, a drone maintenance platoon, and robot combat vehicle operators, as well as attaching a divisional MSHORAD element permanently, an engineer company, another Cavalry platoon to eachsquadron, and two more guns to each artillery battery.    All of those elements, capabilities have very long tails tying them into the Institutional Army, and Higher Level formations.

Yes we can field keen kids with rifles.  We have been doing that very well since 1871 apparently.

But we don't seem to come to grips with developing a proper system of support.  That was evident in 1885 where we relied on Brit engineers and gunners and civilian transport to deploy to the Northwest.  It was evident again in South Africa.  So much so that in 1903 a 1000 man Permanent Force army  divided into Garrison Artillery, the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Royal Canadian Regiment was doubled to 2000 with the formation of regular companies of Royal Canadian Engineers, an Army Service Corps, a Canadian Ordnance Corps, a Canadian Army Signal Corps, a Candian Corps of Signals. an intelligence branch, staff clerks and pay staff.  At the same time engineering and stores were transferred from the Department of the Militia to the General Officer Commanding.

So by 1907 the Army had the elements of a miniature field force.  Which was then strewn about the countryside in companies and dets as trainers.

According to "We Stand on Guard".

The problem seems to have endured through the CAST era from 1968 to 1989 into the present day.

Interestingly enough 

"Stryker brigade takes over base support and force protection ops in Iraq, sans Strykers" Wednesday, Sep 22​








						Stryker brigade takes over base support and force protection ops in Iraq, sans Strykers
					

A new Army unit takes over support and force protection operations in Iraq.




					www.militarytimes.com
				




A LAV Brigade, deployed without LAVs, in the role of training and support.


----------



## Kirkhill

But don't we need a large number of skill sets in small volumes? Its one thing to say that we are a small army and therefore we can't afford all the skill sets that the Yanks (or the Chinese) can. But if we are fighting a modern war aren't there a lot of those skill sets that are indispensible?

Before I diverted myself there was another point I wanted to make emanating from the same observation.

It is the same problem that small civilian companies have.  Their working environment demands that they have a reservoir of skill sets on which to draw.  But they can't afford to have all the skill sets manned internally.  So they end up doing the job themselves in a half-assed fashion, often getting themselves into trouble.  Or they buy in the skilled people on a temporary basis - people that aren't fully engaged with the company and its circumstances.  Or they buy the capability from a third party.  In all cases they are less competitive than their competitors.

In my opinion, or maybe it is just me coming around to appreciating DAP's position, the CAF needs to spend on its Central Nervous and Cardio-Vascular systems, its ability to plan, exert command and control and transport its operational elements.  And those require full time professionals dedicated to the tasks at hand and in sufficient numbers to continually develop and polish and pass on the developed skills. The operational elements need occasional exercise but generally can rest in the armouries.  Except for those that are regularly employed?

The point, with respect to planning, command and control and transport are that those are the primary elements required to mitigate civil emergencies.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Should  Field Grade officers (Majors, Lt Colonels and Colonels) be separated from their Regiments?


It’s “senior officers” in Canada, but otherwise maybe. Army Col are already separated from branch and regiment … at least in dress. I don’t think all Army LCol necessarily need to look the same, but maybe they could shed regimental accoutrements for branch accoutrements except for such periods of time where they happen to be a battalion CO.


----------



## Kirkhill

Thanks for the correction McG.

Something else I got wrong.  I forgot to include my reference on the Stryker Brigade upgrades.  It's from April this year.









						Big changes coming to Army Stryker brigades
					

From more artillery to electronic warfare and engineers, the formation will change.




					www.armytimes.com


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> But don't we need a large number of skill sets in small volumes? Its one thing to say that we are a small army and therefore we can't afford all the skill sets that the Yanks (or the Chinese) can. But if we are fighting a modern war aren't there a lot of those skill sets that are indispensible?
> 
> Before I diverted myself there was another point I wanted to make emanating from the same observation.
> 
> It is the same problem that small civilian companies have.  Their working environment demands that they have a reservoir of skill sets on which to draw.  But they can't afford to have all the skill sets manned internally.  So they end up doing the job themselves in a half-assed fashion, often getting themselves into trouble.  Or they buy in the skilled people on a temporary basis - people that aren't fully engaged with the company and its circumstances.  Or they buy the capability from a third party.  In all cases they are less competitive than their competitors.
> 
> In my opinion, or maybe it is just me coming around to appreciating DAP's position, the CAF needs to spend on its Central Nervous and Cardio-Vascular systems, its ability to plan, exert command and control and transport its operational elements.  And those require full time professionals dedicated to the tasks at hand and in sufficient numbers to continually develop and polish and pass on the developed skills. The operational elements need occasional exercise but generally can rest in the armouries.  Except for those that are regularly employed?
> 
> The point, with respect to planning, command and control and transport are that those are the primary elements required to mitigate civil emergencies.


Skill sets are a monstrous issue. Gunners, just as an example, have ridden and are riding the peaks and valleys of that with air defence, STA and now even guns. 

You always need a certain critical mass of each trade or classification to ensure that those skills are alive and rank progression moves satisfactorily. It took quite a while to revive STA and its anyone's guess as to how long it will take to revive the AD specialty. I expect tankers are barely hanging on and I doubt that mortars and anti armour will have an easy go of it. Technical skills such as technicians capable of servicing the few numbers of highly complex digital gun management systems, which are spread over three geographical locations, are a very weak link. And there are dozens and dozens of skill sets like that where we are barely hanging on with very little depth. As our equipment becomes ever more complex we will have a need for more and more highly skilled and trained people and with them a highly capable logistics management capability.

I really do think we are too infantry heavy in the Reg F Army. Not to mention too divisional headquarters and Res F brigade headquarters and CMTC and other things heavy. All at the expense of those core systems. The good news is that we can train reservists to be good infantrymen, gunners, tankers and combat engineers. The question is whether we can reduce our appetite for operational deployments that eats them up. If nothing else, Afghanistan should have taught us that getting into long-term stabilization missions in third world non-western societies in the midst of a civil war is a zero-sum game. Time to get back into Cold War mode.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Something else that has been niggling at me.   The role of the Forward Observer, Mortar Fire Controller, FOO/FAC.  Is it, like the signaller, moving down the chain?

Two articles.









						The future Marine Rifle Squad as explained by a machine gunner
					

The Marine Corps does a lot of things well. One of those things is to do more with less, and as you'd expect as a result, another is to innovate. However,




					www.sandboxx.us
				












						2ID Soldiers test upgraded Anti-Tank Guided Missile Stryker targeting system
					

YAKIMA TRAINING CENTER, Washington — Networked Lethality capabilities were recently tested in the Stryker Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) vehicle here b...




					www.army.mil
				




In the first case the discussion is about the new 16 man USMC squad (16 men when the Navy Corpsman is attached to the Command team).  The emphasis is on adding capabilities while taking the load off the Squad Leader.

The Squad Leader gains an Assistant and Squad Systems Operator.



> The newly created position of Marine Systems Operator replaces the position of radio Marine. While the System operator will be tasked with carrying the squad’s radio, they will expand into other systems as well. This includes the use of quadcopter-based reconnaissance devices.
> 
> Additionally, the implementation of a squad range finder might be delegated to the system’s operator, but it’s a tool that could be used by the assistant squad leader as well.



But it (the squad range finder) "could be used by the assistant squad leader".



> the* assistant squad leader *can now* manage comms with command* and *manage and coordinate fires,* leaving the squad leader to focus on the fight. *Coordinating fires means communicating to relay target information and friendly positions for artillery, mortar, and air strikes,* among others. These tasks are essential in a fight, but can take away from a squad leader’s situational awareness, and as a result, their ability to lead their squad.



It seems to me that the squad is gaining its own, permanent, FO as Assistant Squad Leader, especially if the ASL takes control of the Squad Range Finder.  That infantry man is likely to be doing the same job for the Squad Leader that an MFC does for a Platoon Leader, a FOO does for a Coy OC and Battery Commander does for a Bn CO.

In fact, it seems like the Squad is becoming a mini-platoon capable of dispersed independent operations.....

A related observation from the article is this



> Grenadier was a role traditionally reserved for fireteam leaders. Of course, just like coordinating fires can distract the squad leader from his or her primary responsibilities, this often forced fireteam leaders to be either good grenadiers _or_ good team leaders. When a leader’s focus is on putting 40mm HEDP on bad guys, they might not be focusing on their leadership tasks. Moving this to another position allows the team leader to focus on leading.



The Fire Team leader used to be responsible for leading and for fire support with his grenade launcher.  Now he has one of his team dedicated to providing fire support - ie learning to read the battle in a manner that would build skills compatible with the position of Asst Squad Leader.

The final piece of the puzzle is this



> the Marine Corps aims to improve communications through the use of tablets. The Marine Corps Common Handheld tablet will allow commanders to transmit real-time information to the squad through commercially available devices.  This allows command or fellow squads to transmit important real-time information, including maps, locations, pictures of potential high-value targets, and much more.



Networking all the squads over longer ranges.


Which brings me to the second article




> Networked Lethality capabilities were recently tested in the Stryker Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) vehicle here (Yakima) by Soldiers of the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division.





> Soldiers validated the effectiveness of the Stryker’s Modified Improved Target Acquisition System (MITAS) under realistic combat situations against a dynamic opposing force.
> 
> Through networked lethality, crews can now pass images and cue targets between vehicle platforms.





> Network lethality allows each Stryker to act as a sensor by transmitting situational reports and images within the Platoon, Company, and Brigade.
> 
> Other MITAS upgrades include the precision far target locator (pFTL), image enhancement, high-definition color camera, and upgraded missile launcher.
> 
> The pFTL integrates with the laser range finder, which allows for greater accuracy and precision while detecting enemy targets.
> 
> The networked lethality also enables and allows the ATGM vehicles to increase their tactical dispersion within the limits of the terrain, explained Thomas.
> 
> Optical enhancements provide the ATGM gunner with improvements for detecting, recognizing, and identifying targets at greater ranges and with more clarity.
> 
> “I was able to take images of enemy targets over 9 kilometers and cue my wingman to their location using the network lethality capability,” said Sgt. Anthony Rodrigues, Stryker ATGM Gunner for 1st Platoon, Delta Troop, Delta Troop, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment.



Every Squad, mounted or dismounted, becomes a sensor and a target designator and can call for support to a clearly defined target.  In this case it is working with 4 km TOW ATGMs mounted on other vehicles.  It could just as easily be calling for Loitering Munitions, NLOS-AT missiles, gunfire support, long range precision fires or air support. Or even EW support....assuming they can get the call through.

The point is how many other "technical trades" can be simplified to the point where even Millitia might be able to master them on Wednesday night?














It is interesting to see the distribution of arms in the Marine Squad - 15 Automatic Rifles (including the Corpsman's rifle), 1 DMR,  3 dedicated 40mm Grenade Launchers with proper sights, 1 84mm Carl Gustaf, and 1 Range Finder - together with the Squad Systems Operator's quadcopter and other toys.

The Squad has a secure link to the rear and its support, excellent view to the other side of the hill, and an array of weapons capable of dealing with barriers and personnel, in general or in detail.









						US Army tests networked lethality upgrade on anti-tank guided missile Strykers
					

The US Army recently tested networked lethality capabilities in the Stryker anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) vehicle which will allow crews to pass images and cue targets between vehicle platforms.    During operational testing conducted by the 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, soldiers validated t




					defbrief.com


----------



## Kirkhill

> I really do think we are too infantry heavy in the Reg F Army



Agreed. Fully.

I'd sooner have an infantry battalion per brigade less and their numbers converted into ISR, Precision Fires (NLOS-AT and Loitering Attack Munitions) and GBAD operators.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks for the correction McG.
> 
> Something else I got wrong.  I forgot to include my reference on the Stryker Brigade upgrades.  It's from April this year.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Big changes coming to Army Stryker brigades
> 
> 
> From more artillery to electronic warfare and engineers, the formation will change.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.armytimes.com


An interesting article but it leaves the question about what is concurrently going on within ABCTs and IBCTs on some of these issues which would effect them as well. The establishments of ABCTs, IBCTs and SBCTs have a very high degree of commonality except where specific to their roles.

One thing about our hypothetical reorg to two mech and two light brigades would mean we have almost sufficient M777s to equip the light brigades fully as long as we get new and much more appropriate wheeled SPs for the mech brigades.

I'm really chuffed about the possibility of eight gun batteries again - takes me back 55 years. In Afghanistan we operated a six-gun battery as three two-gun troops for most of the time. With digital fire control systems, autoloaders capable of burst fire, and rapid deploy SP capabilities I could see an eight-gun battery operating as four two-gun troops (or even eight independent guns) constantly repositioning, and firing precision missions or occasional massed concentrations as required. I think with dispersed operations being an expected norm, a 30% increase in guns become a necessity.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> An interesting article but it leaves the question about what is concurrently going on within ABCTs and IBCTs on some of these issues which would effect them as well. The establishments of ABCTs, IBCTs and SBCTs have a very high degree of commonality except where specific to their roles.
> 
> One thing about our hypothetical reorg to two mech and two light brigades would mean we have almost sufficient M777s to equip the light brigades fully as long as we get new and much more appropriate wheeled SPs for the mech brigades.
> 
> I'm really chuffed about the possibility of eight gun batteries again - takes me back 55 years. In Afghanistan we operated a six-gun battery as three two-gun troops for most of the time. With digital fire control systems, autoloaders capable of burst fire, and rapid deploy SP capabilities I could see an eight-gun battery operating as four two-gun troops (or even eight independent guns) constantly repositioning, and firing precision missions or occasional massed concentrations as required. I think with dispersed operations being an expected norm, a 30% increase in guns become a necessity.
> 
> 🍻



I would't be surprised if the IBCTs followed the Marines with their Squad (or Platoon) level systems operators, range finders (designators?) and tablets while the ABCTs get the same networking in their  Abrams and Bradleys that are in the Stryker ATGM vehicles.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I would't be surprised if the IBCTs followed the Marines with their Squad (or Platoon) level systems operators, range finders (designators?) and tablets while the ABCTs get the same networking in their  Abrams and Bradleys that are in the Stryker ATGM vehicles.


There's the limitation of folks a Stryker can carry coupled with the fact that the Strykers themselves bring stuff to the game. I'm quite sure some of the functions that are carried out by the Marine dismounted squad will be covered by the platoon or the mounted elements. UAV controllers can be back with the Zulus as long as there is a dat feed to the dismounts.

That said I do have concerns about much of this data link stuff in a full-on EW environment.

I do like the Stryker ATGM system though. That almost strikes me as a no-brainer solution that will take us ten years to analyze and validate.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Skill sets are a monstrous issue. Gunners, just as an example, have ridden and are riding the peaks and valleys of that with air defence, STA and now even guns.
> 
> You always need a certain critical mass of each trade or classification to ensure that those skills are alive and rank progression moves satisfactorily. It took quite a while to revive STA and its anyone's guess as to how long it will take to revive the AD specialty. I expect tankers are barely hanging on and I doubt that mortars and anti armour will have an easy go of it. Technical skills such as technicians capable of servicing the few numbers of highly complex digital gun management systems, which are spread over three geographical locations, are a very weak link. And there are dozens and dozens of skill sets like that where we are barely hanging on with very little depth. As our equipment becomes ever more complex we will have a need for more and more highly skilled and trained people and with them a highly capable logistics management capability.
> 
> I really do think we are too infantry heavy in the Reg F Army. Not to mention too divisional headquarters and Res F brigade headquarters and CMTC and other things heavy. All at the expense of those core systems. The good news is that we can train reservists to be good infantrymen, gunners, tankers and combat engineers. The question is whether we can reduce our appetite for operational deployments that eats them up. If nothing else, Afghanistan should have taught us that getting into long-term stabilization missions in third world non-western societies in the midst of a civil war is a zero-sum game. Time to get back into Cold War mode.
> 
> 🍻



Just as a point, in addition to the 18, going on 24 howitzers  the Styker Brigade also has 36 120mm self-propelled mortars along with 12 81mms and 18 60mm mortars.  As well as a plethora of 40mm Grenade Launchers,  It also has 81 Javelin launchers, one per Squad and 9 TOW vehicles with twin launchers.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Something else that has been niggling at me. The role of the Forward Observer, Mortar Fire Controller, FOO/FAC. Is it, like the signaller, moving down the chain?


I've been interviewing a bunch of battery commanders and FOO/JTACs who had deployed to Afghanistan and quite frankly I'm amazed at how complex the job has gotten from my Cold warrior days. Firstly there is a herd of complex equipment from the LAV OPV itself to a whole new generation of comms and sensor gear. More importantly though the skills and teamwork needed in coordinating everything from a multitude of new munitions as well as air, aviation and Predator resources in a crowded airspace and a multitude of widely dispersed mounted and dismounted elements on the ground is much more complex even in what was a relatively low intensity combat zone.

It's one thing to say "put the round there" its quite another to have a high level of understanding what will happen once it gets there. Splinters do not distribute themselves evenly - they are very dependent on the line gun-target, and the angle of decent something your average assistant squad leader will have no knowledge or experience with. That's just one very small issue.

With the loss of the mortar platoon and the bn FSCC and MFCs, the artillery had to step up and, while reducing guns, it significantly increased the FSCCs and FOO/JTACs in the CF. Keeping them trained and qualified and, in the case of JTACs - recertified, is a major job that we are not keeping up with as well as we should. There are very significant training requirements and retraining requirements and for the most part FOO/JTAC NCOs are pretty much their own career stream these days while FOOs themselves are still a short term (roughly two year) assignment for officers on the artillery _cursus honorum_. Right now the artillery is established for 9 x FSCC crews and 27 x FOO/JTAC teams - that's basically 9 x battle groups of three sub units each which is enough to provide rotations for one or two battlegroups but not the whole force if you count in the armoured regiments as manoeuvre elements. It's getting very tough for Res F FOOs to do anything beyond the most basic dismounted fire support operations and even harder for Res F battery commanders to be able to provide the full scope of FSCC support needed with the limited training that they have.

All that said to point out that while I dearly love every supported arms guy to be able to do calls for fire (and they certainly did in Afghanistan), the complexity of what constitutes indirect fire support these days (and even more complex once we add loitering munitions and such into the mix) is such that there will, in all probability, be no more moving down the chain. The supported arms call for fire will probably continue much the same way it does now and be much more accurate for target location than it used to be (as will the corresponding rounds delivered much more precisely) but there will continue to be the need for a very highly trained "interpreter/support manager" as between the caller and the appropriate delivery system. (As an aside I'm not sure of the state of the return of mortars to the infantry at this time)

🍻


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:


> Just as a point, in addition to the 18, going on 24 howitzers  the Styker Brigade also has 36 120mm self-propelled mortars along with 12 81mms and 18 60mm mortars.  As well as a plethora of 40mm Grenade Launchers,  It also has 81 Javelin launchers, one per Squad and 9 TOW vehicles with twin launchers.


Well, yeah, because infantry without integrated organic fire support weapons die in bucketloads. This was a lesson learned in approximately 1914 that Canada, and specifically our procurement system and regimental/cap badge mafias, actively deny.

If we’re serious about war fighting, we need to build robust combat support within the infantry. And if we intend to use our infantry for parades, floods, riots and occasional counter-insurgency, then maybe we don’t. But we shouldn‘t confuse the two — and I fear that we already have. The company in Latvia is tasked to fight Russians, if necessary, but it lacks the integral anti-armour capability to do so, and our procurement system lacks the ability to UOR them the Javelins (or equivalent) they need to do their jobs.


----------



## MilEME09

Ostrozac said:


> Well, yeah, because infantry without integrated organic fire support weapons die in bucketloads. This was a lesson learned in approximately 1914 that Canada, and specifically our procurement system and regimental/cap badge mafias, actively deny.
> 
> If we’re serious about war fighting, we need to build robust combat support within the infantry. And if we intend to use our infantry for parades, floods, riots and occasional counter-insurgency, then maybe we don’t. But we shouldn‘t confuse the two — and I fear that we already have. The company in Latvia is tasked to fight Russians, if necessary, but it lacks the integral anti-armour capability to do so, and our procurement system lacks the ability to UOR them the Javelins (or equivalent) they need to do their jobs.


If we go by WW2 stats, 3 in 5 soldiers should be non combat trades. We really don't have that kind of ratio because of our high bloat. As a result the CA has also admitted Service Battalions can't support army ops as currently structured, and IS isn't efficiently supporting bases. It's one of the major focuses of F2025 in order to completely restructure our sustainment functions.


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:


> our procurement system lacks the ability to UOR them the Javelins (or equivalent) they need to do their jobs.


In order to UOR a Javelin someone in the CoC needs to initiate a UOR and someone else in the CoC needs to approve it. My guess is that there is no such UOR and that the CoC is prepared to leave it that way while waiting for a project to deliver it. This is not a procurement problem; this is a calculated leadership issue which must feel that the TOWs there are adequate.

I have only the most peripheral knowledge of this but as far as I know there will be a capability gap in man-portable anti-armour until 2026 at best and there is no project for a mounted anti-armour capability. If push came to shove and the risk of hostility was higher I assume (and hope) that a UOR might magically appear as it did for the M777 back in 2005 and subsequently for Leopards and CH-47 but until then ...

🍻


----------



## Ostrozac

MilEME09 said:


> If we go by WW2 stats, 3 in 5 soldiers should be non combat trades.


Modern weapons systems, communications technology and intelligence capabilities will easily drive that to 4 in 5. But… the regimental system still drives our army,


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I've been interviewing a bunch of battery commanders and FOO/JTACs who had deployed to Afghanistan and quite frankly I'm amazed at how complex the job has gotten from my Cold warrior days. Firstly there is a herd of complex equipment from the LAV OPV itself to a whole new generation of comms and sensor gear. More importantly though the skills and teamwork needed in coordinating everything from a multitude of new munitions as well as air, aviation and Predator resources in a crowded airspace and a multitude of widely dispersed mounted and dismounted elements on the ground is much more complex even in what was a relatively low intensity combat zone.
> 
> It's one thing to say "put the round there" its quite another to have a high level of understanding what will happen once it gets there. Splinters do not distribute themselves evenly - they are very dependent on the line gun-target, and the angle of decent something your average assistant squad leader will have no knowledge or experience with. That's just one very small issue.
> 
> With the loss of the mortar platoon and the bn FSCC and MFCs, the artillery had to step up and, while reducing guns, it significantly increased the FSCCs and FOO/JTACs in the CF. Keeping them trained and qualified and, in the case of JTACs - recertified, is a major job that we are not keeping up with as well as we should. There are very significant training requirements and retraining requirements and for the most part FOO/JTAC NCOs are pretty much their own career stream these days while FOOs themselves are still a short term (roughly two year) assignment for officers on the artillery _cursus honorum_. Right now the artillery is established for 9 x FSCC crews and 27 x FOO/JTAC teams - that's basically 9 x battle groups of three sub units each which is enough to provide rotations for one or two battlegroups but not the whole force if you count in the armoured regiments as manoeuvre elements. It's getting very tough for Res F FOOs to do anything beyond the most basic dismounted fire support operations and even harder for Res F battery commanders to be able to provide the full scope of FSCC support needed with the limited training that they have.
> 
> All that said to point out that while I dearly love every supported arms guy to be able to do calls for fire (and they certainly did in Afghanistan), the complexity of what constitutes indirect fire support these days (and even more complex once we add loitering munitions and such into the mix) is such that there will, in all probability, be no more moving down the chain. The supported arms call for fire will probably continue much the same way it does now and be much more accurate for target location than it used to be (as will the corresponding rounds delivered much more precisely) but there will continue to be the need for a very highly trained "interpreter/support manager" as between the caller and the appropriate delivery system. (As an aside I'm not sure of the state of the return of mortars to the infantry at this time)
> 
> 🍻



So, could that be met by a small "spotter" force and a larger Fire Support Coordination Centre?


----------



## dapaterson

There is finite project capacity and procurement capacity in DND and government.

Is a Javelin or similar capability more important than replacing fighters? Replacing the frigates? Getting LAV support variants? Midlife upgrades to various fleets? Keeping enterprise software systems up to date and supported?


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> So, could that be met by a small "spotter" force and a larger Fire Support Coordination Centre?


No.

Every FOO always has been, but even more so now, is a mini fire support coordination centre who has to juggle numerous resources. While battalion FSCC and brigade FSCC's take some of the burdens off the FOO (such as air space coord and finding and pushing down resources) at the end of the day its the FOO/JTAC team (and sometimes the BC when tactically deployed with the bn comd) tied to the troops in contact who juggles the delivery of terminal effects on the ground in front of his supported troops. In Afghanistan it would not be unusual for a single FOO/JTAC team to be simultaneously controlling gun fire, Predator strikes and fast air during a TIC - sometimes, when available, attack helicopters. All of these need eyeballs on the target area and a team. Note that FOO tech NCOs are qualified to fire missions and should also be JTACs. As a FOO I trained both my Sigs to shoot the guns as well (in those days we generally had four-man FOO parties - during Afghanistan they ran from 5 to 6. to be able to work 24/7)

🍻


----------



## CBH99

dapaterson said:


> There is finite project capacity and procurement capacity in DND and government.
> 
> Is a Javelin or similar capability more important than replacing fighters? Replacing the frigates? Getting LAV support variants? Midlife upgrades to various fleets? Keeping enterprise software systems up to date and supported?


That’s a good point, and one I don’t think many people take into consideration when thinking about what projects/capabilities we should be adopting.  I know I didn’t, anyway.  

I think when we look at Force 2025, none of the projects that have been discussed would take lengthy amounts of time or require lengthy acquisition processes.  

That being said, I admit that even simple projects can take a long time.  (Pistol replacement, anyone?)

New fighters & subsequent tankers/transports are extremely important, as is the new CSC fleet, and upgrades to some fleets (re Griffon, etc.)  

Are any of these suggested projects more important than those?  For our current deployments, no, I don’t believe so.  New fighters, new CSC fleet, AOPS, JSS, etc are all more important, especially when it comes to international/coalition commitments, NORAD, etc.  

But all of the above are big projects with big price tags, which require big money to not only be spent by us, but subsequently invested into Canada by who we do business with.  They are big projects which - while they don’t have to take as long as they do - would take some time regardless.  

None of the smaller projects for Force 2025 _should_ be overly expensive or lengthy.  

Platoon/company level basic AD capability?  Narrow it down to a few systems (already in service with a key ally being one of them) - open a competition, choose one, sign a contract, etc.  

DND wouldn’t have so many projects on the go if they could just sign off on the smaller/basic ones faster.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> We have enough tanks to form two tank battalions if we go down to three troops per battalion and three tanks per troop as some others do. We have enough LAVs for easily six battalions. So we have the core equipment of two mech brigades - one Reg F one Res F. The Reg F one in Edmonton/Wainwright/Shilo the Res F one in Ontario - as the only place where you have enough people to man it (Ontario generates around 5,300 reservists) and have ranges where tanks can be fired (annually). For actual summer manoeuvre training fly the brigade to Wainwright for a few weeks and use the Reg F gear or if gear is prepositioned (as it could be at this rate then fly them to Poland or wherever for their two - three weeks summer training.)


With so few tanks available and no plans to purchase more on the books is it the best course of action to split them in half and geographically separate them?

I'm tempted to think that we stick with the Swedish model for our Heavy-ish Mech Brigade.  Three combined arms Battalions in Edmonton/Wainwright each with 2 x Tank Squadrons/Companies (using the 3 x 3-tank Platoon format per Squadron/Company).  

This concentrates all of our tanks in one geographic location for support.  Combined arms Battalions rather than pure Tank and Infantry Battalions within a Brigade allows for better training in combined arms operations.  And there are enough tanks left over for the Alberta/Sask. Reserve Armoured regiments to train on the left over Leopards to provide augmentation/replacements for deployments.  

If we ever make the decision to expand our tank fleet then we can expand the Reserve Armoured capability to cover the full 6 x Squadrons/Companies required to field a 2nd full Mech Brigade.  We can still have enough LAVs available to equip the Reserves (in Ontario?) with enough vehicles to fully augment the Infantry portion of the Brigade.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> With so few tanks available and no plans to purchase more on the books is it the best course of action to split them in half and geographically separate them?
> 
> I'm tempted to think that we stick with the Swedish model for our Heavy-ish Mech Brigade.  Three combined arms Battalions in Edmonton/Wainwright each with 2 x Tank Squadrons/Companies (using the 3 x 3-tank Platoon format per Squadron/Company).
> 
> This concentrates all of our tanks in one geographic location for support.  Combined arms Battalions rather than pure Tank and Infantry Battalions within a Brigade allows for better training in combined arms operations.  And there are enough tanks left over for the Alberta/Sask. Reserve Armoured regiments to train on the left over Leopards to provide augmentation/replacements for deployments.
> 
> If we ever make the decision to expand our tank fleet then we can expand the Reserve Armoured capability to cover the full 6 x Squadrons/Companies required to field a 2nd full Mech Brigade.  We can still have enough LAVs available to equip the Reserves (in Ontario?) with enough vehicles to fully augment the Infantry portion of the Brigade.


Because I like playing with paper napkin org charts I might play with that idea for a bit.

I'm torn between two limitations: on the one hand concentrating the capabilities in Edmonton/Wainwright makes a lot of sense from a ranges and maintenance point of view; and on the other hand the combined 38 and 41 CBG manpower sucks at roughly 2,400 - even if you add in 39 CBG you still only generate some 3,900 reservists at best and I tend to think 39 CBG's best utilization is as a light battle group. Ontario followed by Quebec and the Maritimes are your best manpower pools.

Like I said, I'll ponder it.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Because I like playing with paper napkin org charts I might play with that idea for a bit.
> 
> I'm torn between two limitations: on the one hand concentrating the capabilities in Edmonton/Wainwright makes a lot of sense from a ranges and maintenance point of view; and on the other hand the combined 38 and 41 CBG manpower sucks at roughly 2,400 - even if you add in 39 CBG you still only generate some 3,900 reservists at best and I tend to think 39 CBG's best utilization is as a light battle group. Ontario followed by Quebec and the Maritimes are your best manpower pools.
> 
> Like I said, I'll ponder it.
> 
> 🍻


For the Reserve Mech Brigade the Tank units are in the Prairies....the LAV infantry in population-rich Ontario.  Keep a LAV company of spares in Wainwright so the Infantry elements can fly out for summer concentration and practice their Armour-Infantry coordination.  The non-Armoured units from 38/39/41 can form a Light Territorial/Arctic Response Brigade Group.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> There is finite project capacity and procurement capacity in DND and government.
> 
> Is a Javelin or similar capability more important than replacing fighters? Replacing the frigates? Getting LAV support variants? Midlife upgrades to various fleets? Keeping enterprise software systems up to date and supported?


It shouldn't be like that though.
   The Capital Acquisition budget are/should be planned out - and so each service/entity is able to field modern equipment, and needs to prioritize when there isn't enough to go around.

 - The Army needs to accept that this is their failure - I believe as far as actual war fighting capability that an ATGM and GBAD are infinitely more important than yet more LAV's.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> It shouldn't be like that though.
> The Capital Acquisition budget are/should be planned out - and so each service/entity is able to field modern equipment, and needs to prioritize when there isn't enough to go around.
> 
> - The Army needs to accept that this is their failure - I believe as far as actual war fighting capability that an ATGM and GBAD are infinitely more important than yet more LAV's.


We absolutely do not need any more LAV battalions. We do need LAV chassis for mounted mortars, ATGM systems and GBAD (maybe even a direct fire gun capability and an indirect fire gun capability).

Whether we can or should create those out of current hulls or not is the question.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> It shouldn't be like that though.
> The Capital Acquisition budget are/should be planned out - and so each service/entity is able to field modern equipment, and needs to prioritize when there isn't enough to go around.
> 
> - The Army needs to accept that this is their failure - I believe as far as actual war fighting capability that an ATGM and GBAD are infinitely more important than yet more LAV's.



What about radios we can use to ctually talk to each other like real soldiers as opposed to, you know, having to share out our smart phone numbers during O Groups?


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## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> We absolutely do not any more LAV battalions. We do need LAV chassis for mounted mortars, ATGM systems and GBAD (maybe even a direct fire gun capability and an indirect fire gun capability).
> 
> Whether we can or should create those out of current hulls or not is the question.
> 
> 🍻


I'd argue new hulls, why? Because I would prefer to have spares incase of future battle field losses for the main fleet.


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## IRepoCans

daftandbarmy said:


> What about radios we can use to ctually talk to each other like real soldiers as opposed to, you know, having to share out our smart phone numbers during O Groups?


Don't even have to be new, just need to have them, and actually train people on them before a pre-deployment work-up.

I'd kill for a handful of MBITRs (or IMBITRs if we're going for future-proof) with long whip multi-band antennas from Shakespeare.


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## PuckChaser

IMBITRs aren't future proof if your future includes Type 1 voice and data comms. CA is buying PRC-163 radios which is a Type 1 TSM-X capable 152A. What CA hasn't realized, is they're double the cost of a 152A. Champagne tastes, Labatt 50 budget...


----------



## IRepoCans

The PRC-163s are plagued with issues from what I hear; hell an 18E I know is doing all he can to hold onto their MBITRs and 152s. Funny considering since USASOC went with 163s, and the US Army is going with IMBITRs (which are Type 1 TSM capable btw).

Plus, we're odd about purchasing new shiny things: we'll pay premium for hot garbage opposed to paying an acceptable price for something that works quite well.

I wonder if we ever looked at the MPU5s?


----------



## PuckChaser

IMBITRs are not Type 1 capable, says right on their website. The 148D will be Type 1 capable once it gets NSA certification. There's nothing wrong with the 163, it's a 152A glued to a Type 1 TSM SDR. It has significantly more upside than the 148D, but we wouldn't go wrong with either.

CAF has a bunch of MPU5s for ISSP and other uses. They use a different waveform than 163/148 so the WB networking piece isn't compatible. From my understanding ISSP is moving towards the 163 to leverage the contracts in place from Crypto Modernization Project (as is tradition, it wasn't scoped or funded properly).

Edit: I can see where the nomenclature is difficult when someone is just Googling radios. The 148C IMBITR is the current radio that actually exists, and is not Type 1 capable. The 148D IMBITR doesn't exist until NSA certification is complete, and will be Type 1 capable.


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## KevinB

FJAG said:


> We absolutely do not need any more LAV battalions. We do need LAV chassis for mounted mortars, ATGM systems and GBAD (maybe even a direct fire gun capability and an indirect fire gun capability).
> 
> Whether we can or should create those out of current hulls or not is the question.
> 
> 🍻


All of which where part of the recent LAV buy...
   A slew of CP variants - probably with no radios to use in them based on what I have been recently reading.

At this point I would settle for 1 Bde to be actually equipped as a Modern Army.
   The CA will never fully equip the Army - at least to full 3 Active Reg Bde - and forget the Reserves.
 1 Reg force Bde - 1 Res Bde - and actually equip them -- then if money ever shows up again - build another Bde of Regs and another of Res.
  Rinse and repeat as one can - but always forces on a modern well equipped force - rather than a poor equipped slightly larger one.


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## CBH99

As a country that enjoys the ‘luxury’ of being able to focus primarily on expeditionary operations, I couldn’t agree more.  



I’ve argued in the past that we need to decide what we want to do, and focus on doing that exceptionally well.  

Discuss with our US and NATO allies which capabilities they’d like us to bring to a fight, and focus on bringing those capabilities in a world class manner.  

We either spend our money more efficiently, and equip our current Army adequately with modern yet basic capabilities - or we focus on a niche, and be world class at it.  

0.02


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## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> All of which where part of the recent LAV buy...
> A slew of CP variants - probably with no radios to use in them based on what I have been recently reading.
> 
> At this point I would settle for 1 Bde to be actually equipped as a Modern Army.
> The CA will never fully equip the Army - at least to full 3 Active Reg Bde - and forget the Reserves.
> 1 Reg force Bde - *1 Res Bde *- and actually equip them -- then if money ever shows up again - build another Bde of Regs and another of Res.
> Rinse and repeat as one can - but always forces on a modern well equipped force - rather than a poor equipped slightly larger one.



No. Not on your life. There is no way we could develop the right kind of leaders, above the rank of Major/MWO or so, to man such a formation - alone - in the reserves.

If you have a Reg F Bde that is 'augmented' with Reservists, then that might work. Over the course of 10-15 years you could then try to grow the reserve capabilities to staff up complimentary units, possible to BGp size.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> No. Not on your life. There is no way we could develop the right kind of leaders, above the rank of Major/MWO or so, to man such a formation - alone - in the reserves.
> 
> If you have a Reg F Bde that is 'augmented' with Reservists, then that might work. Over the course of 10-15 years you could then try to grow the reserve capabilities to staff up complimentary units, possible to BGp size.


I agree with you.  I probably should have clarified, I believe the CF needs to fully integrate the Reg and Res structure - which will probably mean zero room for any Res Officers above Maj for some time - and very few NCO's above WO.

  As the experience level grows - and a new reserve system gets implemented - that could change.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> No. Not on your life. There is no way we could develop the right kind of leaders, above the rank of Major/MWO or so, to man such a formation - alone - in the reserves.
> 
> If you have a Reg F Bde that is 'augmented' with Reservists, then that might work. Over the course of 10-15 years you could then try to grow the reserve capabilities to staff up complimentary units, possible to BGp size.


I tend to agree and am starting to think that in general all battalions/regiments and brigades should be in a 30/70 or 70/30 RegF to Res F mix depending on their primary role. The important considerations are:

1) the Reg F components must mostly exist in full subunits so that they can properly train, career develop, maintain proficiency, develop doctrine and deploy if necessary;

2) the Res F components must be looked at primarily as an in-an-emergency-break-the-glass force, have a regulated training program designed to meld with their Reg F counterparts, must at the DP1 and DP2 level be trained identically as individuals on the same equipment as their Reg F counterparts and undergo collective training annually at least at the sub-unit but preferably at the unit level.

So when I say a 30/70 bn I mean one which has one full Reg F rifle company and two full Res F rifle companies and a spread throughout the rest of the bn at a roughly 30/70 level. Basically the Bn HQ can administer and train as a battalion year round with the one company that it has and ordinary Reg F career progression goes on with them. During peacetime it could even deploy a Bn HQ and rifle company with support from within its Reg F strength and Res F volunteers. In an emergency it can be mobilized as a full battalion. The Res F companies could have either a small Reg F cadre to provide leadership and support or draw those individuals from the reminder of the battalion as required.

A 70/30 bn would reverse the Reg F to Res F ratio and have two full rifle companies and one full Res F rifle company with the same 70/30 split in the HA and support companies. The point here is that subunits are 100% Reg F or 100% Res F (albeit such subunits might be augmented by a small RSS like staff from within the battalion.

In essence the 70/30 battalions would be at a higher level of readiness and deployment capability. In both cases each battalion would have the responsibility to train its Reg F elements during the Sep to May period and its Res F elements (as well as Reg F DP1 and 2 training) during the May to Aug period.

Ideally the battalion should be fully equipped for both its components but, in the short term until such equipment is available the Res F elements would train on their Reg F counterparts equipment. Obviously where equipment is only shared, full mobilization becomes problematic.

Brigades work in the same way. A 70/30 brigade group might have two 70/30 battalions and one 70/30 battalion and vice versa. Either way the brigade still has the ability to train full-time as a 3 battalion brigade group.

Certain trades could be predominantly or exclusively 30/70 units such as artillery and armour. Others should be predominantly or exclusively 70/30 such as brigade level CSS, while above brigade level CSS could be 30/70 or even less.

Basically leadership positions within the Res F would rise above the major level only rarely where an individual has undertaken the necessary training to rise above that rank and has achieved an acceptable amount of full-time experience. Certain trades might be able to achieve that more easily then others especially in support trades where an individual has similar civilian employment and been able to gain the requisite skills and experience.

So let's talk cap badges and geography. 

Basically 70/30 bns remain at their Reg F bases and are based on existing Reg F bns. Their respective Res F battalion could come from any region of the country but should obviously be as close to the Reg F unit as possible. 30/70 bns on the other hand should be cap badged to whatever Res F units we want to perpetuate. The bulk of the Res F element of the bn HQ and support companies would be from that perpetuated unit. Their two Res F companies could be based on existing Res F units and one could even go so far as to allow each company to perpetuate a specific Res F unit (hell, give each of them their own honourary LCols too - but not honourary Cols) The bn headquarters should be in the local city from which their reservists are drawn. That leaves the question of the Reg F company/battery/squadron etc. That could vary. Some could be attached for training to a 70/30 bn at a Reg F base during the Sep to Apr training cycle. Others, depending on their needs could be put into the local region of their parent unit. We still have a mixture of urban and near urban bases that could accommodate a company sized element with adequate range and training facilities albeit they would need to travel to a larger base for more complex collective training. What's important, however, is that the battalion retains command over both its Reg F and Res F elements at all times and is responsible for their development.

Deployments. 

We've already touched on that but based on the fact that 70/30 and 30/70 bns all have Reg F leadership either one can have its Reg F component deploy augmented by Res F volunteers from across the country or even with other Reg F subunits (as we've frequently done in Afghanistan). It's the same with brigade HQ. Since even a 30/70 brigade headquarters has Reg F leadership its deployable with augmentation and leaving an adequate level of rear party behind.

Numbers

I haven't run a staff check on math but based on 30/70 and 70/30 splits, one could theoretically realign our three Reg F and ten Res F manoeuvre brigades into three 70/30 brigades and three 30/70 brigades. With the current count of mech equipment we should be able to form: 

one fully equipped 70/30 heavyish bde gp with one tank regiment and two mech inf bns with two bns worth of LAVs;
one partially equipped 30/70 heavyish bde gp with one tank regiment and two mech inf bns with one bn worth of LAVs;
one partially equipped  70/30 mech bde gp with three mech bns but only two bns worth of LAVs;
one partially equipped 30/70 mech bde gp with three mech bns but only one bn worth of LAVs;
one fully equipped 70/30 light bde gp; and
one fully equipped 30/70 light bde gp
I still see a bigger role for CS and CSS so at a minimum I would split the CCSB into one 30/70 CS brigade and one 70/30 CSS brigade. On top of that I'm highly open to creating at least one new 30/70 CSS bde even at the expense of one manoeuvre bde gp.

Overall numbers do not change. The intent is to create a better trained and more integrated Res F while reducing "non deployable" formations and units HQs into fewer but more "deployable" formation and unit HQs and subunits and to ramp up augmentation and mobilization capabilities.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Here's a basic question which I think has a big influence on how we choose to structure the Reserves.

Say we have a Reg Force Brigade which we deploy into a high-intensity conflict.  As this Brigade begins to take loses are we going to use our Reserves to replace those loses and keep the Brigade up to strength, or are we going to replace the Brigade with new, fully formed Reserve Brigade?

For example, 2 Canadian Light Infantry Brigade Group is deployed to block a Russian incursion from Belarus into Poland and sustains losses.  Do we replace that Brigade with 20 Canadian Light Infantry Brigade Group (Reserve) or do we use the personnel and equipment from 20 CLBG(R) to bring 2 CLBG back up to strength?

If the former, then maybe the 70/30 Reg Force Brigade - 30/70 Reserve Force Brigade structure makes sense.  If however you're going to use your Reserves to reinforce the existing units then maybe it makes more sense to increase the number of units/sub-units within the Reg Force Brigade Structure rather than create additional Reserve Brigades (with all the overhead that comes with them).

So 2 CLBG might have 1 RCR, 2 RCR, 3 RCR, 4 RCR(Res), 5 RCR(Res) and 6 RCR(Res).  Or alternately 1 RCR might have 3 x Reg Force Companies and 3 x affiliated Reserve Companies.  These associations between Reg Force and Reserve units/sub-units could strengthen the level of cooperation and trust between the components of the Army.

I guess there are advantages to both approaches.  Total unit replacement allows you to field a larger force and maybe has a short term advantage in unit cohesion (at least until losses require augmentation from other units) while reinforcement perhaps has some logistical advantages as you are only supporting the one Brigade in theatre, not both the original Brigade (which presumably you're now trying to bring back up to strength) and the new Brigade.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I tend to agree and am starting to think that in general all battalions/regiments and brigades should be in a 30/70 or 70/30 RegF to Res F mix depending on their primary role. The important considerations are:
> 
> 1) the Reg F components must mostly exist in full subunits so that they can properly train, career develop, maintain proficiency, develop doctrine and deploy if necessary;
> 
> 2) the Res F components must be looked at primarily as an in-an-emergency-break-the-glass force, have a regulated training program designed to meld with their Reg F counterparts, must at the DP1 and DP2 level be trained identically as individuals on the same equipment as their Reg F counterparts and undergo collective training annually at least at the sub-unit but preferably at the unit level.
> 
> So when I say a 30/70 bn I mean one which has one full Reg F rifle company and two full Res F rifle companies and a spread throughout the rest of the bn at a roughly 30/70 level. Basically the Bn HQ can administer and train as a battalion year round with the one company that it has and ordinary Reg F career progression goes on with them. During peacetime it could even deploy a Bn HQ and rifle company with support from within its Reg F strength and Res F volunteers. In an emergency it can be mobilized as a full battalion. The Res F companies could have either a small Reg F cadre to provide leadership and support or draw those individuals from the reminder of the battalion as required.
> 
> A 70/30 bn would reverse the Reg F to Res F ratio and have two full rifle companies and one full Res F rifle company with the same 70/30 split in the HA and support companies. The point here is that subunits are 100% Reg F or 100% Res F (albeit such subunits might be augmented by a small RSS like staff from within the battalion.
> 
> In essence the 70/30 battalions would be at a higher level of readiness and deployment capability. In both cases each battalion would have the responsibility to train its Reg F elements during the Sep to May period and its Res F elements (as well as Reg F DP1 and 2 training) during the May to Aug period.
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻



The largest regiment in the British Army served successfully on continuous operations for over 20 years, roughly along those lines. They were also the first regiment to fully integrate women into their structure, quite successfully. Might be worth having a look at their approach from some good ideas:


The *Ulster Defence Regiment* (*UDR*) was an infantry regiment of the British Army established in 1970, with a comparatively short existence ending in 1992. Raised through public appeal, newspaper and television advertisements,[1] their official role was the "defence of life or property in Northern Ireland against armed attack or sabotage" but unlike troops from Great Britain they were never used for "crowd control or riot duties in cities".[2][3][4] At the time the UDR was the largest infantry regiment in the British Army, formed with seven battalions plus another four added within two years.[5]

It consisted mostly of part-time volunteers until 1976, when a full-time cadre was added.[6] Recruiting in Northern Ireland at a time of intercommunal strife, some of its (mostly Ulster Protestant) members were involved in sectarian killings.[7][8][9][10] The regiment was originally intended to more accurately reflect the demographics of Northern Ireland, and began with Catholic recruits accounting for 18% of its soldiers; but by the end of 1972, after the introduction of internment this had dropped to around 3%.[11] It is doubtful if any other unit of the British Army has ever come under the same sustained criticism as the UDR.[12]

Uniquely in the British Army, the regiment was on continuous active service throughout its 22 years of service.[6] It was also the first infantry regiment of the British Army to fully incorporate women into its structure.[6]

Battalion structure​
The first seven battalions raised made the UDR the largest infantry regiment in the British Army at that time.[43] Two years later, four more were added, taking the total to eleven – 8th (County Tyrone); 9th (Country Antrim); 10th (City of Belfast) and 11th (Craigavon).

The regiment was described in 1972 as:



> Organised into 11 Battalions (59) companies: two in Belfast and the remainder cover county or sub-county areas. Seven of the eleven are commanded by regular commanding officers. In addition the training majors, quartermaster, regimental sergeant majors, chief clerks, and signaller NCOs are also regulars. There are a number of 'conrate' (full-time UDR) posts in each unit, including adjutants, permanent staff instructors, security guards, etc. Many of the officer and senior rank conrates are ex-regulars. The remainder are part-timers. Their main tasks are guarding key points, patrolling, and surveillance, and manning vehicle checkpoints. They do not operate in the 'hard' areas of Belfast, and are not permitted to become involved in crowd confrontations anywhere. Men are armed with self-loading rifles or sub-machine guns. The current strength of the Regiment is 7910.[65]


Until 1976 the full-time cadre were "conrates" (so called because they had a "consolidated rate of pay")[66][67] whose duties consisted of guarding bases and carrying out administrative tasks. The role of the regiment was expanded by raising full-time platoons, known as "Operations Platoons", to perform duties on a 24-hour basis. The first of these was raised at 2 UDR under the command of a sergeant. By the end of the 1970s, the permanent cadre had been raised to sixteen platoons. These were then increased to company strength with the conrate role being phased out and full-time UDR soldiers undertaking their own guard duties and administration.[68]

The full-time element eventually increased to more than half the total personnel.

In 1990, the regiment's numbers stood at 3,000 part-time and 3,000 full-time soldiers, with 140 attached regular army personnel in key command and training positions.[69] The standard of training of the permanent cadre made them suitable to be used in much the same way as regular soldiers and it was not uncommon for regular army units to then come under local command and control of a UDR Battalion Headquarters.[70]

The dispersal of UDR soldiers into their areas of responsibility was through sub-barracks of platoon or company size. Battalion headquarters would usually be located in the county town, but not always as some counties had two battalions. Guarded by conrate soldiers, these barracks would become doubly active after 6pm as part-time soldiers arrived for evening duties. After Ulsterisation began in 1976, many battalion headquarters had full-sized permanent cadre companies and these would maintain a 24-hour presence in the battalion's "tactical area of responsibility" (TAOR).

An example of this structure can be seen in the make-up of 2 UDR based at Drumadd Barracks in Armagh:


CompanyPart/Full-timeBaseHours of dutyNumber on dutyHQ CoyMixedArmagh, Command, Control & AdminAdmin 9-5, Watchkeepers 24 hr9-5 = 15, 24hr = 5A CoyFull-timeArmagh2435B CoyPart-timeArmagh/Newtownhamilton/Caledon7 pm – 2 am35C CoyPart-timeGlenanne7 pm – 2 am35D CoyPart-timeLoughgall7 pm – 2 am35

Sub-headquarter units would maintain contact with their own patrols and HQ by radio. In many cases the radios were operated by Greenfinches (female soldiers),[71] whose husbands or sons and/or daughters were on one of the active patrols, which led to tense moments when mobile units or foot patrols came under attack and submitted a "contact report" by radio.






						Ulster Defence Regiment - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

https://archives.nato.int/assignment-of-a-canadian-battalion-to-the-ace-mobile-forces
		


ACE Mobile Force (Land) - North has been much on my mind of late.   It was a light force, air-deployable, equipped with Bv206s (prepositioned) and a 105mm battery.  It may have had an attached troop of engineers.

The standard call from SHAPE was for a single, reinforced battalion of:

3 Rifle Companies
1 Support Company with Mortar and Anti-Tank Platoons
1 Recce Platoon
1 Sigs Platoon
1 Pioneer Platoon
1 Fd Artillery Bty or Hy Mor (120mm) Platoon
1 Air Contact Team
1 HQ Liaison Officer

Medical Support to RAP and Chaplain
Ordnance and Supply Dets
Provost Section

This was essentially a standard Canadian battalion with an Artillery bty attached.

It was the alternate light grouping to the Canadian Airborne Regiment.


What happens if this:

Brigadier in charge of Militia Division is put in charge of the Reg Brigade.
The Reg Brigade then splits into two permanent elements that report to the Brigadier.

One element is the Light Infantry Battle Group under a Lt Colonel replicating the ACE Mobile battle groups.  Notably we now have better air transport.  That would give us three rapid reaction units, with or without airborne capabilities.  They would regularly exercise with available helicopters.

The other element would be a Regimental Combat Team under the full Colonel currently commanding the Brigade Gp.

Two RCTs would be based on 2 LAV Infantry Battalions each, with the RCAC providing a large, independent Recce/ISR squadron, and a separate Armoured Defence squadron.   Artillery, Engineers and Service Support to suit.

The third RCT would be based on the Swedish Pansar model  with 3 Combined Arms Battalions/Regiments - each of two small MBT "squadrons" of 11 (using 66 of our available Leos and leaving 16 in reserve) and two LAV "companies" (size 11 to 16 vehicles each). Each with its own Recce tp.  RCT to have separate Recce and Armoured Defence troops.  Again Artillery, Engineers and Service Support to suit.

That gives 6 independently deployable entities.  And if nothing else the Brigadier can have fun putting his light force against his heavier force and seeing how they make out.


By my count that means

3 Lt Bns, 4 LAV Bns,  (7 of 9 existing Bns)

3 Recce Sqns, 3 Armoured Defence Sqns,  (6 of 9 existing Sqns)
6 small MBT Sqns and 6 LAV Coys

The 5 remaining Lt Cols (2 Inf and 3 Armd) can fight it out for slots and reassign infantry and armd troops under their command as they see fit.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Here's a basic question which I think has a big influence on how we choose to structure the Reserves.
> 
> ...  As this Brigade begins to take loses are we going to use our Reserves to replace those loses and keep the Brigade up to strength, or are we going to replace the Brigade with new, fully formed Reserve Brigade? ...


The system I talked about above is designed to provide more deployable bde and bn HQs and deployable sub-units regardless of how they'll be used. In WW2 Canada trained and sent formed bns to the UK. Once they reached the maximum number of deployed divisions and brigades, replacement battalions were basically broken up on arrival and fed in as individual replacements rather than as formed units.

The important thing is to have a choice. If the system is to do individual augmentees or replacements from the get-go then you cannot replace full units or expand the size of the deployed force. If the system is designed to generate replacements as formed units then you still have an option to break the unit up and feed it in piecemeal. Incidentally the same goes for equipment. You can't replace battle damaged gear if you aren't holding replacement gear.

Any good army mobilization plan should have two clear elements to it: 1) how we expand existing military resources to full combat status and 2) how do we generate additional troops from the civilian population and more equipment from industrial base if required.  I don't know for sure but I'm pretty positive that Canada does not have any viable mobilization plan.



Kirkhill said:


> ACE Mobile Force (Land) - North has been much on my mind of late. It was a light force, air-deployable, equipped with Bv206s (prepositioned) and a 105mm battery. It may have had an attached troop of engineers.


I was part of AMF(L)'s 105 mm L5 battery from 1972 to 1976 (Never went to Norway but had a sweet trip to Northerb Italy out of it). We were much more equipped with M113s, Lynxes, M577s and M548s then BVs and depended more on strategic Norwegian demolitions to stop the advancing Russians than our own firepower. Essentially we were the equivalent of the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics but without a permanent presence.

There was nothing particulalry special about the AMF(L) battle group other than its tasking. In the 70s, We had three "lightish" brigades (actually at that time the brigades in Canada were known as "Combat Groups") with roughly nine battalions (there was some flux going on) and could form five such battle groups (mainly because 3RCHA and 5RALC only had two six-gun L 5 batteries each and 2 RCHA only had one six-gun L 5 battery (The AMF(L) battery). There was an additional L 5 battery dedicated to the Airborne and another with the Artillery school (with a variety of guns) and we even were able to fudge another six-gun C1 battery into 2 RCHA) That essentially left three to four battalions with no guns unless you mobilized reserve C 1 batteries which was a viable option in those days.

I didn't like our system in Canada then because we felt pretty second class to our big brothers in 4 CMBG in Germany. More important, other than the AMF(L) and to a limited extent the CAST Combat Group, we didn't really feel we had much of a role in life. Defence of Canada is a somewhat nebulous concept when you consider the vast territory, the lack of numbers and lack of equipment. Even now, when you think about it, its hard to get anywhere and once there its hard to be able to act, shield and sustain yourself. There's little threat there that can't be better dealt with than with air power and missiles. Believe me there is very little in the role that makes a young soldier say "this is sh*t-hot stuff I'm doing". At least in the 70s we could look forward to a posting to 4 CMGB at some point in our careers.

I've run your sample organization through my head several times and in essence (if I have it right) you end up with three Reg F Bdes with each brigade having one light Reg F battle group and one Regimental Combat Team. In two brigades the RCT has two mech bns plus recce/ISTAR, arty engr and CSS attachments while the third RCT has three combined arms bns (two LAV coys and 2 small tank sqns each) plus recce/ISTAR, arty, engr and CSS attachments. Unless I'm mistaken this is all accomplished with Reg F personnel while the Res F is left off to its own devices or plugging gaps in the three brigades.

I could see it done but I'm not really sure why. You could do all of this out of the existing establishment of the Reg F brigades with temporary regroupings which strike me as a bit more flexible that the suggested RCT construct. By cutting manoeuvre units down to ten bns (3 Lt, 4 LAV, 3 combined arms) rather than the existing twelve (3 Lt, 6 LAV and 3 armd) you put an added load on battlegroup HQ deployment rotations. One of my objectives was to create more deployable headquarters so that battlegroup deployed rotation load and Bde HQ deployed rotation loads can be spread out amongst more elements.

🍻


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## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> There was nothing particulalry special about the AMF(L) battle group other than its tasking.
> 
> 🍻



Having been part of the AMF (L) Brigade in the north, our understanding that the 'tasking' was to make sure that someone from almost every NATO country was killed or wounded by a Soviet led invasion, mainly so those NATO countries couldn't wriggle out of their mandate to defend Europe.

Preferably, we would be extinguished while gloriously defending Norway or Denmark by Russian, and not other Warsaw Pact, troops.

Our equipment levels reflected that mission and wasn't too far removed from fairly lightly armed foot/lorry borne troops in WW2.

It wasn't until you added the 'heavy metal' of the Norwegians and USMC that we finally amounted to more than Motor Rifle Regiment roadkill.

In other words, I'd be careful about using the AMF (L) as an example for much apart from a 'forlorn hope'.


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## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Having been part of the AMF (L) Brigade in the north, our understanding that the 'tasking' was to make sure that someone from almost every NATO country was killed or wounded by a Soviet led invasion, mainly so those NATO countries couldn't wriggle out of their mandate to defend Europe.
> 
> Preferably, we would be extinguished while gloriously defending Norway or Denmark by Russian, and not other Warsaw Pact, troops.
> 
> Our equipment levels reflected that mission and wasn't too far removed from fairly lightly armed foot/lorry borne troops in WW2.
> 
> It wasn't until you added the 'heavy metal' of the Norwegians and USMC that we finally amounted to more than Motor Rifle Regiment roadkill.
> 
> In other words, I'd be careful about using the AMF (L) as an example for much apart from a 'forlorn hope'.


Bingo.

As I said, I put most of my faith into those Norwegian demolitions which were to bring down all the bridges and fill the valleys with mountain rubble.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The system I talked about above is designed to provide more deployable bde and bn HQs and deployable sub-units regardless of how they'll be used. In WW2 Canada trained and sent formed bns to the UK. Once they reached the maximum number of deployed divisions and brigades, replacement battalions were basically broken up on arrival and fed in as individual replacements rather than as formed units.
> 
> The important thing is to have a choice. If the system is to do individual augmentees or replacements from the get-go then you cannot replace full units or expand the size of the deployed force. If the system is designed to generate replacements as formed units then you still have an option to break the unit up and feed it in piecemeal. Incidentally the same goes for equipment. You can't replace battle damaged gear if you aren't holding replacement gear.
> 
> Any good army mobilization plan should have two clear elements to it: 1) how we expand existing military resources to full combat status and 2) how do we generate additional troops from the civilian population and more equipment from industrial base if required.  I don't know for sure but I'm pretty positive that Canada does not have any viable mobilization plan.
> 
> 
> I was part of AMF(L)'s 105 mm L5 battery from 1972 to 1976 (Never went to Norway but had a sweet trip to Northerb Italy out of it). We were much more equipped with M113s, Lynxes, M577s and M548s then BVs and depended more on strategic Norwegian demolitions to stop the advancing Russians than our own firepower. Essentially we were the equivalent of the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics but without a permanent presence.
> 
> There was nothing particulalry special about the AMF(L) battle group other than its tasking. In the 70s, We had three "lightish" brigades (actually at that time the brigades in Canada were known as "Combat Groups") with roughly nine battalions (there was some flux going on) and could form five such battle groups (mainly because 3RCHA and 5RALC only had two six-gun L 5 batteries each and 2 RCHA only had one six-gun L 5 battery (The AMF(L) battery). There was an additional L 5 battery dedicated to the Airborne and another with the Artillery school (with a variety of guns) and we even were able to fudge another six-gun C1 battery into 2 RCHA) That essentially left three to four battalions with no guns unless you mobilized reserve C 1 batteries which was a viable option in those days.
> 
> I didn't like our system in Canada then because we felt pretty second class to our big brothers in 4 CMBG in Germany. More important, other than the AMF(L) and to a limited extent the CAST Combat Group, we didn't really feel we had much of a role in life. Defence of Canada is a somewhat nebulous concept when you consider the vast territory, the lack of numbers and lack of equipment. Even now, when you think about it, its hard to get anywhere and once there its hard to be able to act, shield and sustain yourself. There's little threat there that can't be better dealt with than with air power and missiles. Believe me there is very little in the role that makes a young soldier say "this is sh*t-hot stuff I'm doing". At least in the 70s we could look forward to a posting to 4 CMGB at some point in our careers.
> 
> I've run your sample organization through my head several times and in essence (if I have it right) you end up with three Reg F Bdes with each brigade having one light Reg F battle group and one Regimental Combat Team. In two brigades the RCT has two mech bns plus recce/ISTAR, arty engr and CSS attachments while the third RCT has three combined arms bns (two LAV coys and 2 small tank sqns each) plus recce/ISTAR, arty, engr and CSS attachments. Unless I'm mistaken this is all accomplished with Reg F personnel while the Res F is left off to its own devices or plugging gaps in the three brigades.
> 
> I could see it done but I'm not really sure why. You could do all of this out of the existing establishment of the Reg F brigades with temporary regroupings which strike me as a bit more flexible that the suggested RCT construct. By cutting manoeuvre units down to ten bns (3 Lt, 4 LAV, 3 combined arms) rather than the existing twelve (3 Lt, 6 LAV and 3 armd) you put an added load on battlegroup HQ deployment rotations. One of my objectives was to create more deployable headquarters so that battlegroup deployed rotation load and Bde HQ deployed rotation loads can be spread out amongst more elements.
> 
> 🍻





> There was nothing particulalry special about the AMF(L) battle group



That's a good thing.  I don't want special.  I want available.



> We had three "lightish" brigades (actually at that time the brigades in Canada were known as "Combat Groups")



Also a good thing.  We have three Battle Groups and three "lightish" Brigades (-).  A combination of a lack of heavy kit and a lack of transport to move heavy kit makes this about as good as we get.  In the meantime we have 3 Brigade constructs that can be deployed immediately or enhanced by Canadian active or reserve assets or by allied assets.  We also have three light battle groups that can be deployed independently, form the basis of an expanded group or added to the RCTs.  I consider that a reasonably flexible organization.
I didn't like our system in Canada then because we felt pretty second class to our big brothers in 4 CMBG in Germany



> Unless I'm mistaken this is all accomplished with Reg F personnel while the Res F is left off to its own devices or plugging gaps in the three brigades.



That is a correct reading of the suggestion.



> I could see it done but I'm not really sure why. You could do all of this out of the existing establishment of the Reg F brigades with temporary regroupings which strike me as a bit more flexible that the suggested RCT construct



I agree it could be done. And it should be done.  But it isn't being done.  The "RCT" types in the Brigade Gps seem to have no time for the Lt Battalion types - except for wishing that they were riding along in the back of the LAVs with them.  

By separating the entities then I hope to have the two entities given time and space to concentrate on their own particular capabilities.





> Our equipment levels reflected that mission and wasn't too far removed from fairly lightly armed foot/lorry borne troops in WW2.




Or the CAR in Cyprus?

Or the Paras and Commandos on the Falklands?

Or the Argylls in the Crater?

Or operations in the Balkans, or Malaysia, or Kenya or Indonesia

Or a hundred and one other post WW2, Cold War expeditions that happened while the Russians traded cigarettes and Vodka with the BAOR.


And thanks for the reminder that well placed demolitions can be more effective than a fire plan.


I know that there are jobs that are not interesting.  Sitting around Canadian garrisons is probably one of  them.  A posting to Germany, or Norway, or Italy, or Cyprus, or Sinai, or the Caribbean, or all sorts of other places probably livens up a soldier's life regardless of the kit he is issued.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> That's a good thing.  I don't want special.  I want available.
> 
> 
> 
> Also a good thing.  We have three Battle Groups and three "lightish" Brigades (-).  A combination of a lack of heavy kit and a lack of transport to move heavy kit makes this about as good as we get.  In the meantime we have 3 Brigade constructs that can be deployed immediately or enhanced by Canadian active or reserve assets or by allied assets.  We also have three light battle groups that can be deployed independently, form the basis of an expanded group or added to the RCTs.  I consider that a reasonably flexible organization.
> I didn't like our system in Canada then because we felt pretty second class to our big brothers in 4 CMBG in Germany
> 
> 
> 
> That is a correct reading of the suggestion.
> 
> 
> 
> I agree it could be done. And it should be done.  But it isn't being done.  The "RCT" types in the Brigade Gps seem to have no time for the Lt Battalion types - except for wishing that they were riding along in the back of the LAVs with them.
> 
> By separating the entities then I hope to have the two entities given time and space to concentrate on their own particular capabilities.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Or the CAR in Cyprus?
> 
> Or the Paras and Commandos on the Falklands?
> 
> Or the Argylls in the Crater?
> 
> Or operations in the Balkans, or Malaysia, or Kenya or Indonesia
> 
> Or a hundred and one other post WW2, Cold War expeditions that happened while the Russians traded cigarettes and Vodka with the BAOR.
> 
> 
> And thanks for the reminder that well placed demolitions can be more effective than a fire plan.
> 
> 
> I know that there are jobs that are not interesting.  Sitting around Canadian garrisons is probably one of  them.  A posting to Germany, or Norway, or Italy, or Cyprus, or Sinai, or the Caribbean, or all sorts of other places probably livens up a soldier's life regardless of the kit he is issued.




We had skis to go up against 7 airborne divisions plus some other stuff, like commando units, that were all (mostly) mounted in armoured vehicles.

So, pretty much a fair fight then


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> We had skis to go up against 7 airborne divisions plus some other stuff, like commando units, that were all (mostly) mounted in armoured vehicles.
> 
> So, pretty much a fair fight then


We had lovely little Italian pack howitzers.







I think your mob had them then as well.

See that little tube gizmo on the front of the shield. Yup, that's a yoke so that you could hitch the gun to a donkey, mule or horse. The true meaning of Horse Artillery.

😁


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> We had skis to go up against 7 airborne divisions plus some other stuff, like commando units, that were all (mostly) mounted in armoured vehicles.
> 
> So, pretty much a fair fight then



Not a fair fight.  But Canada was offered the opportunity to preposition 4 CMBG in Norway and declined.  The problem is not the organization.  The problem is the politicians, or the army, or both, and the choice of the unit tasked.

And even if Canada had relocated 4 CMBG to Norway, would it materially have changed your odds against the Russians?  Or the odds of the local Norwegians?

Not picking a fight.  I'd lose.  Just saying that we need more than one hammer in our tool box.  

Cheers.


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said something in his post that I’d been trying to say for a while now, but didn’t know how to say it without offending almost everybody in the room. 

Canada, just due to it’s geography, and where we are located in the world - aircraft, missiles, and warships tend to be a better answer to any situation in which the ‘defence of Canadian territory in a combat capacity is concerned.’

We lucked out in a lot of ways, especially when it comes to the luxury of not needing to take ‘defence of the land’ very seriously.    We have a massive country in terms of sheer sized combined with a pretty small population, which is also spread pretty thin. 

We have the Arctic to our north.  And even if the Russians did invade, and pushed all the way through the Arctic to land troops on Canadian soil…better hope they picked the right time of year.  Otherwise, just let the NWT in winter just do it’s thing. 

We have vast oceans on either side of us.  On the other side of the Atlantic we have our European and NATO friends.  On the other side of the Pacific - which thankfully is pretty big - we have more friends than enemies. 

And to the south we have Uncle Sam, who - while they measure their GDP% for defence differently than we do, it can’t be argued they don’t take military spending extremely seriously. 

The military itself is a HUGE employer in the US, and the industry that supports it is another HUGE employer. Global superpower, democratic, friendly people with which many of us have family on both sides of the border. 


I have no idea how many battalions or brigades we should have


FJAG said:


> We had lovely little Italian pack howitzers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think your mob had them then as well.
> 
> See that little tube gizmo on the front of the shield. Yup, that's a yoke so that you could hitch the gun to a donkey, mule or horse. The true meaning of Horse Artillery.
> 
> 😁


Geepers you're old...  👴  Tell us, what IS your secret?


----------



## Kirkhill

"Not a fair fight"

That line has stuck with me.  

A company dispatched to the Baltic with no ATGMs and no mortars.
Special Servicemen recruited into 2nd Battalions and dispatched to Korea to fight at Kapyong
Medac Reservists
Hong Kong
Dieppe (a new book on the subject just released recently)
Sam Hughes's CEF, paper boots, his secretary's entrenching tool, the Ross rifle, the potato digger.

Even 4 CMBG - "the nuclear tripwire" 

Our history is replete with politicians employing soldiers "inappropriately"

I am reminded of the "No more Vietnams" mantra of the US Army.   A view held by the recently departed Colin Powell.  A view that held that if the Army was heavy then the politicians would have to think carefully and slowly because rapid response would be difficult.  A view that held that anything other than a Bradley was "too light to fight".  

Conveniently Caspar Weinberger and Ronald Reagan figured out how to employ that Heavy Army and the power of the US Treasury to bankrupt the USSR without firing a shot on the Inter-German border.  Or throwing a missile over head of Canada.

As to the comments about the utility of troops vs missiles, planes and boats - I agree with all.   But I think that technology is affecting that balance. And one way it is affecting the balance in the magnification of the power of the man with the binoculars and the radio.  As demonstrated in Afghanistan by the men in western saddles with B52s at their beck and call.

The defence of Canada may not depend on boots on the ground.  But Canada can be defended by the Mark one eyeball and a smart phone.  And an F35.


----------



## dangerboy

Kirkhill said:


> "Not a fair fight"
> 
> That line has stuck with me.
> 
> A company dispatched to the Baltic with no ATGMs and no mortars.
> Special Servicemen recruited into 2nd Battalions and dispatched to Korea to fight at Kapyong
> Medac Reservists
> Hong Kong
> Dieppe (a new book on the subject just released recently)
> Sam Hughes's CEF, paper boots, his secretary's entrenching tool, the Ross rifle, the potato digger.


Not to derail the thread but what is the new book on Dieppe?


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> Geepers you're old...  👴  Tell us, what IS your secret?


No idea. I have a history of the males on my father's side of the family dying young of heart attacks and had two stents placed myself. All I can think of is my Mother's side's genes have added some longevity - it sure as hell isn't my exercise regime.


----------



## Kirkhill

dangerboy said:


> Not to derail the thread but what is the new book on Dieppe?











						Ten times worse than the Charge of the Light Brigade: the Dieppe Raid disaster of 1942
					

The hare-brained Dieppe Raid was a massacre – and all for the sake of Mountbatten’s ego, says Patrick Bishop in his superb Operation Jubilee




					www.telegraph.co.uk
				




Cheers.  Let me know if it is as good as its review.


----------



## Kirkhill

> WASHINGTON — The mashup of an Australian small boat designed for safety and an American sensors and communications suite that helped Marines secure the Kabul airport during the August evacuation may help fill *a capability gap as the U.S. Marine Corps eyes distributed operation*s in the Pacific.
> 
> Australia-based company the Whiskey Project is pitching its multimission reconnaissance craft (MMRC) as *a way to meet the Marines’ needs to “sense first, see first and strike first”* — in a craft with a low enough signature that it’s hard to detect, but has powerful organic and remote sensors and a communications package that can report back to decision-makers, company officials say.











						Australian small boat with US comms package in testing for Marine Corps urgent need
					

The Whiskey Project is pitching its multimission reconnaissance craft as a way to meet the Marines’ needs to “sense first, see first and strike first” with a low-signature boat and a situational awareness package that's already proved itself in Afghanistan.




					www.defensenews.com
				







Kirkhill said:


> "Not a fair fight"
> 
> As to the comments about the utility of troops vs missiles, planes and boats - I agree with all.   But I think that technology is affecting that balance. And one way it is affecting the balance in the magnification of the power of the man with the binoculars and the radio.  As demonstrated in Afghanistan by the men in western saddles with B52s at their beck and call.
> 
> The defence of Canada may not depend on boots on the ground.  But Canada can be defended by the Mark one eyeball and a smart phone.  And an F35.



The defence of Canada is custom made for Dispersed Operations with its emphasis on expeditionary advanced base operations.



> "Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations is a form of expeditionary warfare that involves the employment of mobile, low-signature, operationally relevant, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain naval expeditionary forces from a series of austere, temporary locations ashore or inshore within a contested or potentially contested maritime area in order to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment."











						Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)
					

Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations is a form of expeditionary warfare that involves the employment of mobile, low-signature, operationally relevant, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain



					www.marines.mil
				





Although the US is applying the concept in a maritime environment I believe it is equally applicable in  the Canadian context.  The common denominator is "space".  Too much space to hold by conventional means resulting in the classic dilemma of trying to defend everything while holding nothing.  The difference between the USN/USMC operating environment and the CAF operating environment is that tropical waters are replaced with rocks and ice, palms replaced with pines.


Here's a question.  Has Canada ever really had an Arctic Capable Brigade?  When Canada was offered the opportunity to relocate from Germany to Norway, because of assumed Arctic expertise, was Canada actually capable of deploying, sustaining and operating a brigade in the Arctic?  Is it now?

I believe that at least one USMC type "littoral" regiment, similarly armed but geared towards operating in the bogs, pines, rocks and ice of Canada's Arctic should be in our tool box.


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> when I say a 30/70 bn I mean one which has one full Reg F rifle company and two full Res F rifle companies and a spread throughout the rest of the bn at a roughly 30/70 level. ...
> 
> A 70/30 bn would reverse the Reg F to Res F ratio and have two full rifle companies and one full Res F rifle company with the same 70/30 split in the HA and support companies. The point here is that subunits are 100% Reg F or 100% Res F (albeit such subunits might be augmented by a small RSS like staff from within the battalion.


Why not a 60/40 Bn?  2 x Rifle Coy & 1 x Cbt Sp Coy that are Reg F and 2 x Rifle Coy that are PRes.


----------



## Kirkhill

Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR)
					

A Marine Littoral Regiment will be a self-deployable, multi-domain force optimized for the contact and blunt layers.  It will persistently operate across the competition continuum to support the Joint



					www.marines.mil


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> Why not a 60/40 Bn?  2 x Rifle Coy & 1 x Cbt Sp Coy that are Reg F and 2 x Rifle Coy that are PRes.


With HQ and Admin Coy - I think you get 70/30


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Australian small boat with US comms package in testing for Marine Corps urgent need
> 
> 
> The Whiskey Project is pitching its multimission reconnaissance craft as a way to meet the Marines’ needs to “sense first, see first and strike first” with a low-signature boat and a situational awareness package that's already proved itself in Afghanistan.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defensenews.com


That is a very well thought out craft - scaleable armor packages - and various deck mounting options -- plus its wired for network 'stuff'
   After seeing a lot of guys doing that who've been damaged badly in RHIB's and the like - the engineering work they put in the design makes it very user friendly even in unpleasant water conditions at speed.



Kirkhill said:


> The defence of Canada is custom made for Dispersed Operations with its emphasis on expeditionary advanced base operations.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)
> 
> 
> Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations is a form of expeditionary warfare that involves the employment of mobile, low-signature, operationally relevant, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain
> 
> 
> 
> www.marines.mil
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Although the US is applying the concept in a maritime environment I believe it is equally applicable in  the Canadian context.  The common denominator is "space".  Too much space to hold by conventional means resulting in the classic dilemma of trying to defend everything while holding nothing.  The difference between the USN/USMC operating environment and the CAF operating environment is that tropical waters are replaced with rocks and ice, palms replaced with pines.
> 
> 
> Here's a question.  Has Canada ever really had an Arctic Capable Brigade?


 No - other than CAR jumps into the Arctic for "Lightning Strike" which occasionally got boosted with other Abn assets - there was never a real attempt.
   and it wasn't a fully Bde - more of a BN+ with enablers.



Kirkhill said:


> When Canada was offered the opportunity to relocate from Germany to Norway, because of assumed Arctic expertise, was Canada actually capable of deploying, sustaining and operating a brigade in the Arctic?  Is it now?


 I susceptibility it could - but it would empty the cupboard bare for anything else - there would need to be constant C17 and C130 sorties for supplies.   As well I don't think the CF has BV206's anymore - so everything would be the few snowmobiles and bangyboard ski's...
   So pretty much no real mobility.



Kirkhill said:


> I believe that at least one USMC type "littoral" regiment, similarly armed but geared towards operating in the bogs, pines, rocks and ice of Canada's Arctic should be in our tool box.


 I would argue that would be the role for the Light Bde's - but I wouldn't shoehorn them just into that.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> Why not a 60/40 Bn?  2 x Rifle Coy & 1 x Cbt Sp Coy that are Reg F and 2 x Rifle Coy that are PRes.



My limited time with in contact with the 10/90 experience, personalities excluded, leads me to believe that this is a model that should be adopted wholesale across the CAF, and is one that somewhat mirrors the approach with the TA in the UK (which I have also seen in action, and it works well).

We don't need to have everyone wearing the same cap badge, we just need consistent support at the reserve unit level that can train and FG troops for various exercises and operations, and provide ongoing, relevant and thoughtfully prepared and delivered Pro D for all rank levels, up to and including LCol etc.

I don't know if 10/90 is the right proportion, of course, but the principle seems sound.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> Why not a 60/40 Bn?  2 x Rifle Coy & 1 x Cbt Sp Coy that are Reg F and 2 x Rifle Coy that are PRes.


To an extent the % figure is arbitrary. My key point is that you do not distribute the Reg F element across the entire bn but keep one subunit (or two in the 70/30 version) intact so that it can train and deploy as a full subunit.

As to cbt support companies, I think they are typically not needed for day-to-day usage and I wouldn't waste valuable full-time resources on them. I would keep just enough to be able to support the one full time Reg F company if it should need to deploy rapidly and to provide the SMEs needed to provide leadership and training to the Res F members. That's the same reasoning why I make all armoured and arty units 30/70 - the lower probability that they need to deploy.

As for a four rifle company construct, in such a case I would prefer a 50/50 split in the cbt sp coy for the same reason. But having said that, I'm not sure why one would add another rifle company. The only advantage I see is the ability to have more Res F volunteers within the battalion to draw on. My way of dealing with 30/70 and 70/30 bns is to create a force that has an overall appx ratio of 50/50 but is broken into higher and lower readiness units. In any case where a 70/30 bn needs to quickly deploy with three rifle companies I would prefer they are augmented by a Reg F coy from another bn. I don't see two Res F companies able to generate a full company's worth of volunteers in any event. One company would either need to be placed on active service or a wider volunteer pool would need to be looked to.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> My limited time with in contact with the 10/90 experience, personalities excluded, leads me to believe that this is a model that should be adopted wholesale across the CAF, and is one that somewhat mirrors the approach with the TA in the UK (which I have also seen in action, and it works well).
> 
> We don't need to have everyone wearing the same cap badge, we just need consistent support at the reserve unit level that can train and FG troops for various exercises and operations, and provide ongoing, relevant and thoughtfully prepared and delivered Pro D for all rank levels, up to and including LCol etc.
> 
> I don't know if 10/90 is the right proportion, of course, but the principle seems sound.


10/90 was too small IMHO - as the 10% did 90% of the work 
   Most of the 10% in my experience got caught up in the administration - and as a result very few of the 10% went into the field force.
 Those who did got the shaft - as the reg force 4 year to Cpl clashed with the 2year to Cpl in the Militia - and often there was a sever disparity in experience at the lowest ranks.
    Which meant that again those positions either ended up doing more work than their fair share - or got put into more senior jobs.
  Then at the SNCO level - the "day staff" ended up either with nearly nothing to do - or doing tasks that should have been done by all.
   The officers nearly all ended up sucked into HQ functions - as having been part of Res in the Before - During - After Phases of 10/90, it seemed that the HQ drain spiked during the 10/90 phase - which seems bizarre - given it shouldn't - but I suspect the higher level HQ's had adopted a Reg Force like aspect - and where expecting 5 days of work - in what used to be done either 1 weeknight a week and some RSS and Class B staff.

 ____________________________________________________

I think that in order for a XX/YY system to work - the time in grade requirements for the Reserves and the Regular Army needs to be equalled (IIRC the Navy Reserve does 4 years to LS - but I may be wrong).  And for dispersed units - some Reg personnel WSE Promoted (I'm a fan of WSE as I only made it to M/Cpl twice and both WSE by the RCR while teaching at their BSL) 

I also believe that Res Units need a real unit base - so using Edmonton as example - all the Edmonton area Res would be based out of CFB Edmonton (yes that can suck for travel times) 

  Most Reserve Armories (admittedly I am years out of date and only really familiar then with ones in Ottawa, Calgary, Edmonton) aren't ideal for Military Training - in order to create a true Integrated Force - there would be significant infastructure work needed - so troops could actually do some training - even if its just simulation based.


----------



## GR66

If we're not currently manning our rifle companies at full establishment then why not pair each Reg Force company with a Reserve Regiment to round out the numbers that way?


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> If we're not currently manning our rifle companies at full establishment then why not pair each Reg Force company with a Reserve Regiment to round out the numbers that way?


Quite often the personnel the Res have to offer, are not the ones the Regs need.
   Additionally there needs to be an operational ability to use the Res, otherwise they are just more empty #'s.

I don't see any solution to the CA's woes at this point, that can be done easily.

Every solution to making at real attempt at a credible Force 2025 is either ensnared by Cap Badge politics (Reg AND Res), or Political spinelessness, and budget issues.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> If we're not currently manning our rifle companies at full establishment then why not pair each Reg Force company with a Reserve Regiment to round out the numbers that way?



This might work where the units are co-located, like Edmonton. Otherwise it's a non-starter IMHO.


----------



## FJAG

Let me start of by saying how much I'm enjoying this thread as well as some similar ones. When I look back over the last two years I find that my approach to the overarching issue about how to fix the Army to maximize its capabilities through better utilizing of the Res F have changed quite a bit by virtue of some of the discussions here as well as through my stepped up research into army transformation brought on by the book Old Sweat and I are working on. There may be a few areas where I'm still digging in my heels but overall there are quite a few ideas here that have changed my mind or reinforced certain thoughts.


KevinB said:


> 10/90 was too small IMHO - as the 10% did 90% of the work
> Most of the 10% in my experience got caught up in the administration - and as a result very few of the 10% went into the field force.
> Those who did got the shaft - as the reg force 4 year to Cpl clashed with the 2year to Cpl in the Militia - and often there was a sever disparity in experience at the lowest ranks.
> Which meant that again those positions either ended up doing more work than their fair share - or got put into more senior jobs.
> Then at the SNCO level - the "day staff" ended up either with nearly nothing to do - or doing tasks that should have been done by all.
> The officers nearly all ended up sucked into HQ functions - as having been part of Res in the Before - During - After Phases of 10/90, it seemed that the HQ drain spiked during the 10/90 phase - which seems bizarre - given it shouldn't - but I suspect the higher level HQ's had adopted a Reg Force like aspect - and where expecting 5 days of work - in what used to be done either 1 weeknight a week and some RSS and Class B staff.


Agree absolutely for every reason that you state.

I'm also not a fan of the 90/10 concept which looks at individual reservists to fill holes in Reg F units. It doesn't incentivize the system to ever move beyond individual training because there simply is no reason to ever require collective training beyond that platoon/troop level which helps the soldier to see where he fits in as an individual. The system must be organized so that individual COs are responsible for the training and development of both the Reg F and Res F soldiers assigned to his unit.


KevinB said:


> I think that in order for a XX/YY system to work - the time in grade requirements for the Reserves and the Regular Army needs to be equalled (IIRC the Navy Reserve does 4 years to LS - but I may be wrong).  And for dispersed units - some Reg personnel WSE Promoted (I'm a fan of WSE as I only made it to M/Cpl twice and both WSE by the RCR while teaching at their BSL)


Yes but not only that, the DP1 and DP2 training should be identical which is relatively easy to achieve by maximizing the summer training time available for young high school and university students. BUT, having said that, the Army needs to very closely scrutinize their existing course structures from BMQ on up. Many courses have become bloated, and by working simply five-day weeks are entirely too long and unachievable for Res F soldiers. We need to concentrate courses more. In addition we need a better manage the recruiting/training system.


KevinB said:


> I also believe that Res Units need a real unit base - so using Edmonton as example - all the Edmonton area Res would be based out of CFB Edmonton (yes that can suck for travel times)
> 
> Most Reserve Armories (admittedly I am years out of date and only really familiar then with ones in Ottawa, Calgary, Edmonton) aren't ideal for Military Training - in order to create a true Integrated Force - there would be significant infastructure work needed - so troops could actually do some training - even if its just simulation based.


I'm somewhat with you but not all the way.

Let me start by saying that I'm not a fan of the Tuesday night, Thursday night, two weekends a month system. When I was an RSSO the unit did it that way. Tuesday nights were admin, Thurs night training one weekend were BMQ course and the other some form of gunnery. IMHO the only use for the weekday evening activities were to get people to the mess because admin and trg was crappy at best. I'm a fan of one weekend per month and two to three weeks in the summer and all obligatory and rigorously scheduled and planned trg.

In my perfect world there would be five or six depot battalions spread across the country each located at one of the primary divisional training centres. Each depot battalion would have one depot company at each of its major urban centres. Their responsibility would be Army wide recruiting and NCM DP 1 and DP 2 training for the whole Army, Reg F and Res F. Recruits would go onto a BTL managed by the depot bn and stay there until DP1 qualified at which point they would be "posted" to their Reg or Res F unit. Summers would be used for large scale training but some training would also be available over the winter months for both Reg F personnel and those Res F personnel available to take the training. All officer training and NCM DP3 and above training is conducted at centralized schools. Officer DP1 for the most part should align with MilCol summer training cycles and be identical for both.

If you reduce the focus of unit training to refresher training and annual collective training, then the local armouries become more of a gathering place and lecture hall. I wouldn't close any of them for starters but would certainly do a study to determine how best to consolidate facilities as one starts to consolidates and restructures units. Quite frankly though, a city like Montreal can generate around a 1,000 reservists (and should be able to generate more). Considering that these are split along about a dozen company sized battalions/regiments at this time you'll still need several armouries to accommodate them especially if each of a 30/70 bde HQ, inf bn HQ, engr regt HQ, Fd Amb HQ, Svc bn HQ and a dozen or more full company-sized subunits work out of there.

I see these armories as the place where the full-time administrative/training staffs work out of and as the gathering place for the Class As. Some training would be classroom oriented and take place there but for the most part its where the busses pick them up on a Friday night to go to the ranges for their one weekend per month; the place where their weapons are stored and where their QM/CQMS operates out of, and, to an extent where some of their vehicles and heavier gear might be stored.

As a final thought, there aren't many Edmontons around - maybe Toronto's Dennison - but most urban centres have no large bases or, like in Halifax, Victoria and Winnipeg, belong to the Navy or Air Force and aren't "fitted for" soldiers. Changing to "super centres" with adjacent training areas is impractical. Most of the ARNG and USAR armouries are even smaller company sized facilities in small urban centres with the advantage of decent sized parking lots for all their issued vehicles. They too have to travel to central range facilities and seem to have few command and control problems with these distributed subunits. Personally, if money was available for infrastructure changes, I'd like to see the Army buy up surplus shopping malls in the suburbs (especially if they have an old Canadian Tire service centre attached), fence in the parking lot and turn them into battalion/company bases.



KevinB said:


> Every solution to making at real attempt at a credible Force 2025 is either ensnared by Cap Badge politics (Reg AND Res), or Political spinelessness, and budget issues.


I don't see budget as a problem. Making a greater use of the reserves should be, at worst cost neutral, and, at best, could result in annual manpower cost savings. Initially these changes could also be made equipment neutral and again, a proper reorganization could rationalize equipment and result in maintenance cost savings.

We do have capability deficiencies which need to be addressed and which will cost $$$ but those are organizationally neutral. They are what they are.

Leaving aside the Chretien administration and the Trudeau administration who are not so much spineless but are folks who never truly understood the purpose of a military and both considered there is no need for it The Martin and, for the most part, the Harper administrations had spines but were let down by a military leadership whose visions were for the most part obsessed by the wrong imperatives. Their visions were limited to an extent in trying to define themselves as "not Cold War but OOTW". Yugoslavia for the most part was a success albeit it required the division of a nation into its ethnic parts. It gave our leadership the feeling that this was the way to go. They tried the same thing in Afghanistan but instead of dividing a fractious country into its constituent parts tried to make a whole western nation out of it. With perfect 20/20 hindsight one can say that was clearly doomed to fail big time. We spent a lot of treasure on that and learned a lot of false lessons. Throughout, the CAF leadership has progressed onward aimlessly spending billions to replace aging but useable equipment rather than buying critical equipment it abandoned as unnecessary during our infatuation with OOTW and in inflating its headquarters to the point where its a monstrous drain on the budget and a real stumbling block to progress.

As for cap badge politics. We'll that's just plain stupid. 15-18,000 reservists in 130 plus battalion sized units with all the trappings of regimental command and no plan for wartime expansion. That's just plain stupid. Three Reg F brigade groups based on three different infantry regiments who all need to have an identical piece of the pie. That's just plain stupid. Honestly, besides suspending GOFOs for their mishandling of sexual misconduct matters we should really be investigating them for negligent performance of duty. After 20 years of transformation they have built a military that is incapable of going to war if required.

Rant off. Leaving site to do other things.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> The system must be organized so that individual COs are responsible for the training and development of both the Reg F and Res F soldiers assigned to his unit.


Agreed - I also think for real growth in the Reserves - there needs to be a path forward beyond the Platoon as it where.



FJAG said:


> Yes but not only that, the DP1 and DP2 training should be identical which is relatively easy to achieve by maximizing the summer training time available for young high school and university students. BUT, having said that, the Army needs to very closely scrutinize their existing course structures from BMQ on up. Many courses have become bloated, and by working simply five-day weeks are entirely too long and unachievable for Res F soldiers. We need to concentrate courses more. In addition we need a better manage the recruiting/training system.


 I think a ton of streamlining needs to be done -- but I also think that one can run longer courses outside of those times - as some reservists will have availability.



FJAG said:


> Let me start by saying that I'm not a fan of the Tuesday night, Thursday night, two weekends a month system. When I was an RSSO the unit did it that way. Tuesday nights were admin, Thurs night training one weekend were BMQ course and the other some form of gunnery. IMHO the only use for the weekday evening activities were to get people to the mess because admin and trg was crappy at best. I'm a fan of one weekend per month and two to three weeks in the summer and all obligatory and rigorously scheduled and planned trg.


I've seen good and bad weeknight training at several reserve units.
   I think forcing real training plans - and having the ability to have simulators/trainers available is key to making use of that.



FJAG said:


> In my perfect world there would be five or six depot battalions spread across the country each located at one of the primary divisional training centres. Each depot battalion would have one depot company at each of its major urban centres. Their responsibility would be Army wide recruiting and NCM DP 1 and DP 2 training for the whole Army, Reg F and Res F. Recruits would go onto a BTL managed by the depot bn and stay there until DP1 qualified at which point they would be "posted" to their Reg or Res F unit. Summers would be used for large scale training but some training would also be available over the winter months for both Reg F personnel and those Res F personnel available to take the training. All officer training and NCM DP3 and above training is conducted at centralized schools. Officer DP1 for the most part should align with MilCol summer training cycles and be identical for both.


110% there



FJAG said:


> If you reduce the focus of unit training to refresher training and annual collective training, then the local armouries become more of a gathering place and lecture hall. I wouldn't close any of them for starters but would certainly do a study to determine how best to consolidate facilities as one starts to consolidates and restructures units.





FJAG said:


> As a final thought, there aren't many Edmontons around - maybe Toronto's Dennison - but most urban centres have no large bases or, like in Halifax, Victoria and Winnipeg, belong to the Navy or Air Force and aren't "fitted for" soldiers. Changing to "super centres" with adjacent training areas is impractical. Most of the ARNG and USAR armouries are even smaller company sized facilities in small urban centres with the advantage of decent sized parking lots for all their issued vehicles. They too have to travel to central range facilities and seem to have few command and control problems with these distributed subunits. Personally, if money was available for infrastructure changes, I'd like to see the Army buy up surplus shopping malls in the suburbs (especially if they have an old Canadian Tire service centre attached), fence in the parking lot and turn them into battalion/company bases.


Interesting -- I wasn't really thinking they needed a large training area - as I believe they would be till to small to be much good.
   What I was thinking is they need a Sim Center - with the ability to conduct virtual warfighting - either as a dismount - or vehicle crew - so one can conduct activities without the need for real bullets and range space - that while don't replace actual live training - can be used for instruction and refresher training.



FJAG said:


> I don't see budget as a problem. Making a greater use of the reserves should be, at worst cost neutral, and, at best, could result in annual manpower cost savings. Initially these changes could also be made equipment neutral and again, a proper reorganization could rationalize equipment and result in maintenance cost savings.


I wasn't thinking of Budget as being a Res issue - I was thinking of Budget as opposed to actually capital equipment shortfalls.



FJAG said:


> We do have capability deficiencies which need to be addressed and which will cost $$$ but those are organizationally neutral. They are what they are.


   I'm not sure many of them are actually Organizationally neutral.
 Recreating the Combat Support Combat in Inf Bn's surely isn't a neutral PY aspect.


FJAG said:


> Leaving aside the Chretien administration and the Trudeau administration who are not so much spineless but are folks who never truly understood the purpose of a military and both considered there is no need for it The Martin and, for the most part, the Harper administrations had spines but were let down by a military leadership whose visions were for the most part obsessed by the wrong imperatives. Their visions were limited to an extent in trying to define themselves as "not Cold War but OOTW". Yugoslavia for the most part was a success albeit it required the division of a nation into its ethnic parts. It gave our leadership the feeling that this was the way to go. They tried the same thing in Afghanistan but instead of dividing a fractious country into its constituent parts tried to make a whole western nation out of it. With perfect 20/20 hindsight one can say that was clearly doomed to fail big time. We spent a lot of treasure on that and learned a lot of false lessons. Throughout, the CAF leadership has progressed onward aimlessly spending billions to replace aging but useable equipment rather than buying critical equipment it abandoned as unnecessary during our infatuation with OOTW and in inflating its headquarters to the point where its a monstrous drain on the budget and a real stumbling block to progress.


 Agreed.
   I'm constantly confused as to some of the CF's choices to divest items - or what they double down on.


FJAG said:


> As for cap badge politics. We'll that's just plain stupid. 15-18,000 reservists in 130 plus battalion sized units with all the trappings of regimental command and no plan for wartime expansion. That's just plain stupid. Three Reg F brigade groups based on three different infantry regiments who all need to have an identical piece of the pie. That's just plain stupid. Honestly, besides suspending GOFOs for their mishandling of sexual misconduct matters we should really be investigating them for negligent performance of duty. After 20 years of transformation they have built a military that is incapable of going to war if required.
> 
> Rant off. Leaving site to do other things.
> 
> 🍻


Agreed


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> I'm not sure why one would add another rifle company.


Not that long ago, four rifle companies was the doctrinal standard.  Also, a Bn structure of just one Reg F rifle company results in a rather small gene pool to produce COs and RSMs, but two Reg F rifle companies in every Bn means 1/3 fewer Bns can be formed.  For your 50/50 concept, that would mean fewer PRes rifle companies unless each Bn has two PRes rifle companies.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> Not that long ago, four rifle companies was the doctrinal standard.  Also, a Bn structure of just one Reg F rifle company results in a *rather small gene pool* to produce COs and RSMs, but two Reg F rifle companies in every Bn means 1/3 fewer Bns can be formed.



Dude, I'm in the room


----------



## Kirkhill

WRT the discussion of Bases, Trg Support and Armouries

How did this joint effort in Windsor work out?





*Major FA Tilston Armoury & Police Training Centre*
4007 Sandwich St.
Windsor, ON

General Number
(519) 971-7301

 General Fax Number                                                                 
                                                                     (519) 971-9689

Our facility is a first of it's kind in Canada in partnership with the federal government's Department of National Defense (DND). This facility which opened in June of 2004, houses the F.A. Tilston Armoury as well as a comprehensive training facility for both the Windsor Police Service and the DND.  Other agencies will visit our training facility to provide their members with some of the top-notched training opportunities including a 10 position indoor and 20 position outdoor firing range, rappelling tower, and close quarters firearms training house.  This facility also provides housing and an extensive training centre for the Windsor Police Service Dog Unit.


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## GR66

FJAG said:


> As to cbt support companies, I think they are typically not needed for day-to-day usage and I wouldn't waste valuable full-time resources on them. I would keep just enough to be able to support the one full time Reg F company if it should need to deploy rapidly and to provide the SMEs needed to provide leadership and training to the Res F members. That's the same reasoning why I make all armoured and arty units 30/70 - the lower probability that they need to deploy.


IF we were able to make the transition to a mounted CS element within the HQ Company similar to the Swedish Mech Battalion model (and dropping the Platoon Weapons Detachments by shifting the CarlG's and C6's down into the Infantry Sections) the PY cost of maintaining it with Reg Force personnel wouldn't be too high.

1 x 4 vehicle LAV-Recce Platoon
2 x 4 vehicle LAV-120mm Mortar Platoons
1 x 4 vehicle LAV-SHORAD Platoon

Perhaps due to the importance of these support capabilities a Battalion should have two CS Companies...one Reg Force and one Reserves?


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## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I'm not sure many of them are actually Organizationally neutral.
> Recreating the Combat Support Combat in Inf Bn's surely isn't a neutral PY aspect.


You're right there. However if we closed down CMTC and gave those PYs back to the infantry...  


McG said:


> Also, a Bn structure of just one Reg F rifle company results in a rather small gene pool to produce COs and RSMs, but two Reg F rifle companies in every Bn means 1/3 fewer Bns can be formed. For your 50/50 concept, that would mean fewer PRes rifle companies unless each Bn has two PRes rifle companies


The overall number of Reg F companies, squadrons and batteries does not decrease (maybe a few) but are spread out amongst more units. On the other hand the number of Bn/Regt HQs requiring Reg F leadership does increase meaning we will need more COs and RSMs. Once more on the other hand, there are, give or take, about 190 Reg F LCols, 676 Majs, 117 CWOs and 553 MWOs in the Army (based on 2017 figures). That ought to be a sufficiently large enough gene pool to fill around 25-30 unit HQs.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> You're right there. However if we closed down CMTC and gave those PYs back to the infantry...
> 
> The overall number of Reg F companies, squadrons and batteries does not decrease (maybe a few) but are spread out amongst more units. On the other hand the number of Bn/Regt HQs requiring Reg F leadership does increase meaning we will need more COs and RSMs. Once more on the other hand, there are, give or take, about 190 Reg F LCols, 676 Majs, 117 CWOs and 553 MWOs in the Army (based on 2017 figures). That ought to be a sufficiently large enough gene pool to fill around 25-30 unit HQs.
> 
> 🍻


But what would happen to all those HQ's????


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> IF we were able to make the transition to a mounted CS element within the HQ Company similar to the Swedish Mech Battalion model (and dropping the Platoon Weapons Detachments by shifting the CarlG's and C6's down into the Infantry Sections) the PY cost of maintaining it with Reg Force personnel wouldn't be too high.
> 
> 1 x 4 vehicle LAV-Recce Platoon
> 2 x 4 vehicle LAV-120mm Mortar Platoons
> 1 x 4 vehicle LAV-SHORAD Platoon
> 
> Perhaps due to the importance of these support capabilities a Battalion should have two CS Companies...one Reg Force and one Reserves?


Armor Defense Platoon?

   I don't like the LAV as an Infantry Recce Vehicle
 Also your Snipers - are they housed back inside of Recce Platoon - or still a separate "Platoon Minus"

Doctrinally the 120mm Mortar is an Artillery weapon - but given the recent (last 20 years) changes - I am unsure if Doctrine matters anymore as no one else seems to follow it...


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> The overall number of Reg F companies, squadrons and batteries does not decrease (maybe a few) but are spread out amongst more units. On the other hand the number of Bn/Regt HQs requiring Reg F leadership does increase meaning we will need more COs and RSMs. Once more on the other hand, there are, give or take, about 190 Reg F LCols, 676 Majs, 117 CWOs and 553 MWOs in the Army (based on 2017 figures). That ought to be a sufficiently large enough gene pool to fill around 25-30 unit HQs.


The gene pool to select Infantry battalion COs is officers who have been rifle company OC. If you increase the number of battalions without increasing the number of rifle companies, then you are weakening the pool of potential COs. There will be more cases of people getting the job who do not deserve it. Single sub-unit battalions is a structural weakness that hampers generating good PRes COs; we should not import that to the Reg F even if the battalion is fleshed out with extra PRes companies.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> But what would happen to all those HQ's????


Do you mean all those HQs above brigade, wing and fleet level that I'd unilaterally cut by 25% across the board?

I don't care. 



KevinB said:


> I don't like the LAV as an Infantry Recce Vehicle


I've always liked something around the size of a VBL. I know we're still a bit IED shy but I grew up around Ferrets and loved the little buggers.





Works well as an ATGM carrier as well.




You could probably equip the whole cbt sp coy with them if you were prepared to use a towed 120 mm mortar.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> The gene pool to select Infantry battalion COs is officers who have been rifle company OC. If you increase the number of battalions without increasing the number of rifle companies, then you are weakening the pool of potential COs. There will be more cases of people getting the job who do not deserve it. Single sub-unit battalions is a structural weakness that hampers generating good PRes COs; we should not import that to the Reg F even if the battalion is fleshed out with extra PRes companies.



Commissioned Officers bound for Gurkha regiments go straight from Sandhurst to command rifle companies. I don't see any reason why we can't do that too.

Might be an opportunity to economize a bit that way.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> The gene pool to select Infantry battalion COs is officers who have been rifle company OC. If you increase the number of battalions without increasing the number of rifle companies, then you are weakening the pool of potential COs. There will be more cases of people getting the job who do not deserve it. Single sub-unit battalions is a structural weakness that hampers generating good PRes COs; we should not import that to the Reg F even if the battalion is fleshed out with extra PRes companies.


Here are my thoughts on that which I'll freely admit are not without disadvantages nor are my final thoughts on the concept:

With the prerequisite that all Res F officers have the same training as their Reg F counterparts, even if concentrated and streamlined, I consider the ordinarily achievable rank by the Res F to be captain, with a smaller number of majors and very, very few LCols who will reach battalion command. I do expect that in 70/30 battalions many DCOs will be Res F;
I expect most COs (and RSMs) to be Reg F regardless of whether they are 30/70 or 70/30 units;
Regimental bunching will be stopped. The best majors across the force will be selected for promotion to CO regardless of what cap badge they wear. They will change cap badge to that of their new unit on posting (quite frankly I'd like to reduce the PPCLI, RCR and R22eR to one battalion each if for no other reason than to break up the regimental cabals families that exist now);
You can reduce the need for new COs annually by increasing command tours to three years which concurrently provides more stability to the unit. With the increased number of units, the number of experienced COs for higher command or staff positions would still be greater than now even with a three year tour;
There are no single sub-unit battalions (although there are plenty of those right now in the Res F and when I was in the RCHA in the 70s we essentially had only six batteries feeding three regimental CO positions). Every unit, regardless of whether it is 30/70 or 70/30 has a full establishment of three to five company positions and a DCO that might be filled by Reg F majors and is fully manned albeit by a combination of Reg F and Res F.
If a lessened gene pool is the trade off for doubling the Army's number of formed and trained battalions and sub-units (and the elimination of a highly inefficient Res F command and training system),  I think I might accept pushing the gene pool a bit. My own experience within the Reg F artillery was that while there was the odd plug as a battery commander, the majority were capable of regimental command. I expect that is true for most classifications.

🍻


----------



## GR66

I've been re-reading a couple of these related threads and giving thought to various possible ways of reorganizing the Army and I'm going to suggest a contrarian opinion.

FJAG (and others) have regularly pointed to the US National Guard as a example of how a Reserve force can be equipped in the same way as the Regular Force and can be a cost effective way to expand the size of the expensive "break in case of fire" heavy force.  This makes total logical sense.  However, I think there are enough structural (and cultural) differences between the US Army/society and the Canadian Army/society that replicating that model here (at least in the short to medium term) would be difficult to impossible.  

Not only is there a general shortage of equipment (from vehicles to support weapons to comms to air/sea transport, etc., etc., etc.) but facilities are lacking, the balance of trades is out of whack, our units are spread out and typically not located near suitable training areas, etc.  There are also a deeply ingrained cultural issues between the Reg Force and the Reserves as well as difficulties posed by the Regimental system.

For these reasons I'd suggest that at least for the first stages of Army restructuring that the heavier, mechanized elements of the Army be concentrated in the Reg Force where they have better support and access to training areas while the Reserves concentrate on developing an effective light capability which is more in line with what can reasonably be achieved based on our current limitations.

These light Reserve forces can still follow a hybrid Reg Force/Reserve model, centralized depots can still be used to concentrate training and LAVs/Tanks can still be made available to Reservists to train augmentees.  

As long as we begin creating the basic structures that we can build upon later and start breaking down the cultural barriers to change then we can adjust the force balance, shift/add equipment and prepare for future expansion at a future date.


----------



## CBH99

I agree.  The American style would be un doable here, even if we went on a buying spree & provided reserve units with the same vehicles/equipment that the Reg Force uses.  The Americans have an integration with their society that is far ahead, and far deeper than most western countries could even fathom.  


Your idea on Reg vs Reserve in terms of structure - That is a good place to start and sounds logical.  The Reg Force can focus on mechanized and heavier forces, while the Reserve Force can focus on developing a more potent and substantial light capability.  


My question for you (genuinely, not being facetious) - isn’t that already the case?  Even if not intentional?

No Reserve units have LAVs or Tanks.  Mostly G-Wagons for recce units, and G-Wagons and Milcots for others.  Light/medium trucks to throw the troops into the back of, and can tow the odd C3 around when needed.  

(As for the reserve force, artillery units tend to be the heaviest, and only because they have the C3 to train on.)


So if I am understanding your suggestion correctly, are we not already doing something similar?


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> *So if I am understanding your suggestion correctly, are we not already doing something similar?*



Yes.

The Reserves are pretty much irrelevant and (mostly) play mainly with themselves in the corner using the left over toys the other kids didn't want.

Mission accomplished  

Having said that, once upon a time we were issued AVGPs and it was a complete waste of a resource, so I can see the rationale.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes.
> 
> The Reserves are pretty much irrelevant and (mostly) play mainly with themselves in the corner using the left over toys the other kids didn't want.
> 
> Mission accomplished
> 
> Having said that, once upon a time we were issued AVGPs and it was a complete waste of a resource, so I can see the rationale.


Yes but no integrated structure was honestly conducted - and I remember seeing the state of Mo AVGP's - they where sad sad sad.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Yes but no integrated structure was honestly conducted - and I remember seeing the state of Mo AVGP's - they where sad sad sad.



The available man days per month were a fraction of what was required to properly maintain and operate them #staffcheckfail


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes.
> 
> The Reserves are pretty much irrelevant and (mostly) play mainly with themselves in the corner using the left over toys the other kids didn't want.
> 
> Mission accomplished
> 
> Having said that, once upon a time we were issued AVGPs and it was a complete waste of a resource, so I can see the rationale.


The way I see it, the reserves don't just need a restructure, and new legislation. We need solid leadership with experience, officers need some kind of OJT package, and In the CSS world, a maint O is a requirement, if you don't have one, then one needs to be posted in. My unit had not had one in the entire time I have been in, finally got one last year and the difference in our ability to maintain kit and support others is night and day because we had someone who knew that side of things.

The second thing is we need SMART goals for every unit to reach, STARS started to get there but there needs to be more strict time lines, and plans to reach things like X Battalion will provide one platoon head quarters for deployment, and have consequences for misses targets if no reason is provided as to why it was missed, within reason. The reserves need to become force enablers, right now we are more force disablers due to our ad hoc nature.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The available man days per month were a fraction of what was required to properly maintain and operate them #staffcheckfail



Which is why the Bison was a much better option.  An armour plated box on wheels. It even swam.

Now if only it had been held in the District Service Battalions' transport companies along with the 400 Foremost assembled Bv206s.    And not borrowed by the Regs.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> For these reasons I'd suggest that at least for the first stages of Army restructuring that the heavier, mechanized elements of the Army be concentrated in the Reg Force where they have better support and access to training areas while the Reserves concentrate on developing an effective light capability which is more in line with what can reasonably be achieved based on our current limitations.



I'm not trying to fight for my ideas to the death here but let me make these observations:

With respect to culture and the ARNG - our Res F culture right now is a complete waste of oxygen. Notwithstanding the excellent contribution of many reservists in Afghanistan, those contributions were made in circumstances which will probably never occur again (i.e. six months of predeployment training) and will absolutely not serve us in the scenario of a break-glass-in-case-of-fire situation. Our Res F (and I dare say our Reg F) culture has to change if the Army wants to be at all relevant. The only reason the government supports the Army with cash right now is because they haven't realized yet that the emperor has no clothes. I don't want to duplicate the ARNG but use it as a model and adopt those things that work well. Culturally they are not much different from us. Systemically we are worlds apart. Cultures can be modified and structure must be changed when they have continuously proven to be defective; 
I tend to favour the Res F having the heavier equipment primarily because the heavier equipment (tanks and artillery and, to an extent, LAVs) are rarely used during peacetime day-to-day activities. If one keeps a large component of the Reg F manning heavy equipment, they are less useful in the day-to-day peacetime missions. As an example look at Latvia - a place where tanks and SP guns are a necessity yet all we have there is a LAV company and some dismounted TOWs. Light and to some extent medium infantry are much more versatile for the peacetime missions that our government favours. I expect to see more of the traditional peacekeeping type of missions and far fewer, if any, of the Afghanistan type commitments. The Army should be structured to have its full-time component oriented towards those lighter missions;
In business transformation there are two competing imperatives. The first is to resist immediate and large reorganization - instead try to find quick wins to help overcome resistance to change. Opposing that is the requirement to embed the changes in the new culture so that, amongst other things, there is no backsliding. When it comes to equipment, the Reg F has a voracious appetite in grabbing the goodies for itself (see the Bison as a prime example). Heavy equipment is very much coveted by the Reg F regardless as to whether or not it needs it on a day-to-day basis. If we start a cultural change to build the Res F as but leave the heavy equipment to the Reg F, while focusing the Res F on the light equipment backsliding becomes all to easy. The key here is to clearly focus on the vision of transformation of the Army to the notion that the Res F will take a predominant role in the heavy equipment side of the force, and start down the road to conversion in gradual stages that develop confidence in the ultimate achievability of the goal. That's not to say that the Res F will only be heavy. Other elements need to be more proficient at light and CSS. Again if you look at the ARNG and the USAR together, you will see that only a small portion is heavy armour. The majority are CSS, light manoeuvre, artillery, engineer and other specialties. That should be our goal as well;
Do not focus on current limitations. The plan has to be designed to pound those limitations into the dust. No reorganization plan will ever work until we first make some changes to the culture of the Res F - employee protection legislation is a part of that; some minor legislative changes to put some teeth into mandatory training requirements; absolutely a rehabilitated individual training structure; a defined collective training structure; a proper integrated leadership structure. I have a tendency to drive timelines but my guess would be that one could lay the foundation for the structural changes in one year. Transformation itself would probably take another four years but could be done within the resources which are available right now with existing personnel numbers, equipment holdings and infrastructure. To advance the total force by curing all its capability deficiencies would take additional time and resources.
It's obvious that I favour radical reform. I do this primarily because I have seen 55 years of fine tuning the Res F over-and-over again but with none of it leading to any change in the fundamental situation. Fine tuning a patently broken system is futile and as they say, "insanity is doing the same thing over-and-over again and expecting a different result". It's time to stop being insane and time to be bold.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> The way I see it, the reserves don't just need a restructure, and new legislation. We need solid leadership with experience, officers need some kind of OJT package, and In the CSS world, a maint O is a requirement, if you don't have one, then one needs to be posted in. My unit had not had one in the entire time I have been in, finally got one last year and the difference in our ability to maintain kit and support others is night and day because we had someone who knew that side of things.


The legal distinction between a reservist and a regular is "continuing" vs "other than continuing full-time service".

When it comes to maintenance of equipment "full-time service" is required. With "full-time" maintainers, equipment gets maintained while the reservists go on with their full-time civilian jobs. With "other than ... full-time" maintainers no maintenance is conducted simply because the maintainers are at their full-time civilian jobs. That's a really simple and obvious concept.

The trouble is the system has too few full-time maintainers and thus the solution to the problem, from a Reg F point of view, is don't give the reserves any equipment that needs maintaining. This also solves the budgeting problems when buying new equipment - if one only equips the Reg F then its cheaper in the long run.

IMHO, however, this is taking a short view when leadership should be looking at the long view. There is a need to leverage the substantial annual cost savings that are inherent in reserve service. So far that vision is distinctly absent.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

Raising a question, again: what capabilities can be learned and retained with "X" funded days per year (not including any administrative time whatsoever)?  (Assuming "training weekend" culture can be modified so that Sunday is not "morning: endex, packup, go home.)


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Raising a question, again: what capabilities can be learned and retained with "X" funded days per year (not including any administrative time whatsoever)?  (Assuming "training weekend" culture can be modified so that Sunday is not "morning: endex, packup, go home.)


I think we also underestimate the willingness of part-timers to self-educate.  This very site is a reflection of that.

Interesting information well presented would be read and viewed at home leaving training nights for validation and discussion.


----------



## dangerboy

Kirkhill said:


> I think we also underestimate the willingness of part-timers to self-educate.  This very site is a reflection of that.
> 
> Interesting information well presented would be read and viewed at home leaving training nights for validation and discussion.


Would they be paid to do this? It is not very fair to expect them to do this at home on their own time without being paid (I know the majority already do this, and it is not right).


----------



## Kirkhill

Adjust the pay scales accordingly if you feel so inclined.  Pay them a stipend rather than an hourly rate.

Having said that I do feel that many in the "volunteer" communities are more into avocations than vocations.  They are self motivated.  Until they get bored.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I'm not trying to fight for my ideas to the death here but let me make these observations:
> 
> With respect to culture and the ARNG - our Res F culture right now is a complete waste of oxygen. Notwithstanding the excellent contribution of many reservists in Afghanistan, those contributions were made in circumstances which will probably never occur again (i.e. six months of predeployment training) and will absolutely not serve us in the scenario of a break-glass-in-case-of-fire situation. Our Res F (and I dare say our Reg F) culture has to change if the Army wants to be at all relevant. The only reason the government supports the Army with cash right now is because they haven't realized yet that the emperor has no clothes. I don't want to duplicate the ARNG but use it as a model and adopt those things that work well. Culturally they are not much different from us. Systemically we are worlds apart. Cultures can be modified and structure must be changed when they have continuously proven to be defective;


I'm with you on the end goal we should be working toward, but I believe that there are simply too many obstacles to making this work in the Force 2025-2030 time frame.  Changes to legislation, infrastructure, doctrine, procurement, training, culture, etc. all take time and I believe if you try to do all of these things at once and too quickly you risk breaking the system altogether.  Some may say this isn't a bad thing...the system is broken already...but you could lose what Government support there still is if it turns into even more of a shyte-show than it already is.


FJAG said:


> I tend to favour the Res F having the heavier equipment primarily because the heavier equipment (tanks and artillery and, to an extent, LAVs) are rarely used during peacetime day-to-day activities. If one keeps a large component of the Reg F manning heavy equipment, they are less useful in the day-to-day peacetime missions. As an example look at Latvia - a place where tanks and SP guns are a necessity yet all we have there is a LAV company and some dismounted TOWs. Light and to some extent medium infantry are much more versatile for the peacetime missions that our government favours. I expect to see more of the traditional peacekeeping type of missions and far fewer, if any, of the Afghanistan type commitments. The Army should be structured to have its full-time component oriented towards those lighter missions;


Again, this makes total logical sense for the end result, but... 
1) we still need to maintain a useable force while all of the structural/organizational/legislative/material changes are being made.
2) The proposed "Heavy" Reg Force component is (as many have pointed out) is really a Medium force.  Our government has been (and will almost certainly continue to be) casualty adverse, so I see a LAV-based force continue to be the preferred type of deployment of non-CANSOF forces going forward.  Once the required organizational changes have been made to make the Reserves a deployable entity and we finally get around to purchasing actual Heavy force equipment, then one of the Light Reserve Brigades could take on that equipment to become your "break glass in case of fire" Heavy force...while the Reg Force LAV Brigade would now be your ongoing Medium force for OOTW deployments.


FJAG said:


> In business transformation there are two competing imperatives. The first is to resist immediate and large reorganization - instead try to find quick wins to help overcome resistance to change. Opposing that is the requirement to embed the changes in the new culture so that, amongst other things, there is no backsliding. When it comes to equipment, the Reg F has a voracious appetite in grabbing the goodies for itself (see the Bison as a prime example). Heavy equipment is very much coveted by the Reg F regardless as to whether or not it needs it on a day-to-day basis. If we start a cultural change to build the Res F as but leave the heavy equipment to the Reg F, while focusing the Res F on the light equipment backsliding becomes all to easy. The key here is to clearly focus on the vision of transformation of the Army to the notion that the Res F will take a predominant role in the heavy equipment side of the force, and start down the road to conversion in gradual stages that develop confidence in the ultimate achievability of the goal. That's not to say that the Res F will only be heavy. Other elements need to be more proficient at light and CSS. Again if you look at the ARNG and the USAR together, you will see that only a small portion is heavy armour. The majority are CSS, light manoeuvre, artillery, engineer and other specialties. That should be our goal as well;


I would embed the cultural changes by integrating the Reg Force and Reserves even in the absence of heavy equipment.  I'll try and sketch out a rough idea for a possible structure when I have more time but I'm envisioning a Reg Force LAV Brigade and two hybrid Reg Force/Reserve Light Brigades.  The Reserves wouldn't be left on their own as a separate entity from the Reg Force.  In fact, in the short term it's likely that the most development and new equipment might go to the Light forces.  

All the LAV Brigade really needs to become an effective Medium-weight force really is maybe a turreted mortar vehicle and some Remote Weapons Stations with ATGMs and SAMs.  On the Light end of the spectrum there are lots of opportunities for the development of new doctrine, TTPs and equipment...all of which are better suited to the current support capabilities of the Reserves.  Once the new equipment (real IFVs, new tanks, etc.?) start to come online in a decade+ the Reserve Brigade(s) will have already had a chance to work out the new structures and get the required support systems in place to be able to start taking on the Heavy role.


FJAG said:


> Do not focus on current limitations. The plan has to be designed to pound those limitations into the dust. No reorganization plan will ever work until we first make some changes to the culture of the Res F - employee protection legislation is a part of that; some minor legislative changes to put some teeth into mandatory training requirements; absolutely a rehabilitated individual training structure; a defined collective training structure; a proper integrated leadership structure. I have a tendency to drive timelines but my guess would be that one could lay the foundation for the structural changes in one year. Transformation itself would probably take another four years but could be done within the resources which are available right now with existing personnel numbers, equipment holdings and infrastructure. To advance the total force by curing all its capability deficiencies would take additional time and resources.


I envy your optimism regarding timelines but find it difficult to believe them.  It might take a swimming pool full of Kool-Aid to convince me but I hope you are right and I'm wrong.


FJAG said:


> It's obvious that I favour radical reform. I do this primarily because I have seen 55 years of fine tuning the Res F over-and-over again but with none of it leading to any change in the fundamental situation. Fine tuning a patently broken system is futile and as they say, "insanity is doing the same thing over-and-over again and expecting a different result". It's time to stop being insane and time to be bold.
> 
> 🍻


Again, I don't think we're really too far apart on the end state, but just on what we consider as realistic timelines and some of the specific intermediate steps required.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> Raising a question, again: what capabilities can be learned and retained with "X" funded days per year (not including any administrative time whatsoever)?  (Assuming "training weekend" culture can be modified so that Sunday is not "morning: endex, packup, go home.)


I start from the position that every recruit goes through full NCM DP1 training at a depot battalion before being "posted" to a unit. High school and university students should be able to do this in two summers and a winter DL period (so roughly 15 month after enrollment they are fully DP1 trained in their specialty.

Unit training works on 10 weekends of 2.5 paid days each. 8 weekends (Sep - Apr) dedicated to refresher training at the individual level and 2 weekends (May and Jun) to preparation for summer exercise. The summer exercise would be two (better yet 3 - Fri night to Sun night) weeks in August leaving all July free for vacations. Based on a three week exercise that's 48.5 training days per year. If one structures the training into a three year readiness cycle then each full cycle provides 145.5 training days which is the equivalent of 6 months of 5-day weeks.

NCM DP 2 courses are taught solely at depot battalions. Depot bns (and their regional companies) conduct training year round for the Reg F and those Res F personnel able to attend them including DL trg where appropriate. They ramp up in the summer to teach primarily Res F personnel during high school and university break periods. NCM DP 3 and above training and all officer trg is conducted at the CTC with DP1 offr training primarily during the university summer breaks.


Kirkhill said:


> I think we also underestimate the willingness of part-timers to self-educate. This very site is a reflection of that.
> 
> Interesting information well presented would be read and viewed at home leaving training nights for validation and discussion.


We should very much try to leverage DL wherever possible. Modules should be adjudged for time required, "attendance/comprehension" validated and paid for on that basis. That said, most DP1 and DP 2 skills are hands on. 

🍻


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> The available man days per month were a fraction of what was required to properly maintain and operate them #staffcheckfail





MilEME09 said:


> The way I see it, the reserves don't just need a restructure, and new legislation. We need solid leadership with experience, officers need some kind of OJT package, and In the CSS world, a maint O is a requirement, if you don't have one, then one needs to be posted in. My unit had not had one in the entire time I have been in, finally got one last year and the difference in our ability to maintain kit and support others is night and day because we had someone who knew that side of things.
> 
> The second thing is we need SMART goals for every unit to reach, STARS started to get there but there needs to be more strict time lines, and plans to reach things like X Battalion will provide one platoon head quarters for deployment, and have consequences for misses targets if no reason is provided as to why it was missed, within reason. The reserves need to become force enablers, right now we are more force disablers due to our ad hoc nature.





Kirkhill said:


> Which is why the Bison was a much better option.  An armour plated box on wheels. It even swam.
> 
> Now if only it had been held in the District Service Battalions' transport companies along with the 400 Foremost assembled Bv206s.    And not borrowed by the Regs.



Without a Regular Force Maintainer Platoon/Troop etc any significant equipment will not be able to be maintained IMHO at the Res level.

  However if the local armories have simulators - pooled equipment with Reg Force maintenance staff can keep the equipment going - and be available for collect training on Weekends/Summers - and the simulators can keep the Res force up to speed during the other times.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I start from the position that every recruit goes through full NCM DP1 training at a depot battalion before being "posted" to a unit. High school and university students should be able to do this in two summers and a winter DL period (so roughly 15 month after enrollment they are fully DP1 trained in their specialty.
> 
> Unit training works on 10 weekends of 2.5 paid days each. 8 weekends (Sep - Apr) dedicated to refresher training at the individual level and 2 weekends (May and Jun) to preparation for summer exercise. The summer exercise would be two (better yet 3 - Fri night to Sun night) weeks in August leaving all July free for vacations. Based on a three week exercise that's 48.5 training days per year. If one structures the training into a three year readiness cycle then each full cycle provides 145.5 training days which is the equivalent of 6 months of 5-day weeks.
> 
> NCM DP 2 courses are taught solely at depot battalions. Depot bns (and their regional companies) conduct training year round for the Reg F and those Res F personnel able to attend them including DL trg where appropriate. They ramp up in the summer to teach primarily Res F personnel during high school and university break periods. NCM DP 3 and above training and all officer trg is conducted at the CTC with DP1 offr training primarily during the university summer breaks.
> 
> We should very much try to leverage DL wherever possible. Modules should be adjudged for time required, "attendance/comprehension" validated and paid for on that basis. That said, most DP1 and DP 2 skills are hands on.
> 
> 🍻


With respect, I seem to remember a lot of time sitting in class-rooms, between smoke breaks, listening to instructors reading slides and quoting from Pams.  We got to fondle the occasional FN, SMG and HP.  Range time happened once a year.   I remember with particular fondness trying to make 40 minutes on Dental Hygiene interesting.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Without a Regular Force Maintainer Platoon/Troop etc any significant equipment will not be able to be maintained IMHO at the Res level.
> 
> *However if the local armories have simulators *- pooled equipment with Reg Force maintenance staff can keep the equipment going - and be available for collect training on Weekends/Summers - and the simulators can keep the Res force up to speed during the other times.



We already have SAT Trainers/simulators at the armouries. 

They're always broken and the guy from 2000 miles away, who is the only person allowed to mess with them, can never make it in to fix them. 

Although my experience is now a couple of years out of date, so some some kind of miracle might have happened since then.

Just sayin'


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> With respect, I seem to remember a lot of time sitting in class-rooms, between smoke breaks, listening to instructors reading slides and quoting from Pams.  We got to fondle the occasional FN, SMG and HP.  Range time happened once a year.   I remember with particular fondness trying to make 40 minutes on Dental Hygiene interesting.



Coincidentally, that was my experience when I participated in staff training as well.

Nothing like watching a LCol painstakingly read a slide word for word and all that's going through your mind is "I wonder what he's getting paid per word today", and "He'd soooo fail Gold Star".

Needless to say, I 'got busy' and couldn't attend after that


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Without a Regular Force Maintainer Platoon/Troop etc any significant equipment will not be able to be maintained IMHO at the Res level.
> 
> However if the local armories have simulators - pooled equipment with Reg Force maintenance staff can keep the equipment going - and be available for collect training on Weekends/Summers - and the simulators can keep the Res force up to speed during the other times.



I agree on the need for reg force maintainers.  I was alluding to pooling the Bisons and Bv206s so as to make them easier to maintain and keep ready.  Both the Bison and the Bv206, known in the US as the USMC's LAV-Logistics and the US Army's Small Unit Support Vehicle, are support and logistics vehicles.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I'm with you on the end goal we should be working toward, but I believe that there are simply too many obstacles to making this work in the Force 2025-2030 time frame.  Changes to legislation, infrastructure, doctrine, procurement, training, culture, etc. all take time and I believe if you try to do all of these things at once and too quickly you risk breaking the system altogether.  Some may say this isn't a bad thing...the system is broken already...but you could lose what Government support there still is if it turns into even more of a shyte-show than it already is.


Most of the NDA changes are very minor as much of the Act already provides the necessary mechanisms. The biggest issue is removing things such as s 294 Failure to attend parade and 295 Neglecting Personal Equipment from Offence Triable by a Civil Court and putting them into s 60 so that they are subject to the Code of Service Discipline. Everything else is pretty much regulatory changes in the QR&O which do not require the legislature. The most significant legislation required is employment protection legislation with teeth.


GR66 said:


> Again, this makes total logical sense for the end result, but...
> 1) we still need to maintain a useable force while all of the structural/organizational/legislative/material changes are being made.


Absolutely


GR66 said:


> 2) The proposed "Heavy" Reg Force component is (as many have pointed out) is really a Medium force.


Agreed but that doesn't make it useless, just less useful as a motor rifle regiment/brigade is.


GR66 said:


> Our government has been (and will almost certainly continue to be) casualty adverse, so I see a LAV-based force continue to be the preferred type of deployment of non-CANSOF forces going forward.


Agreed again and enough LAV medium forces should be available for day-to-day peacetime use.


GR66 said:


> Once the required organizational changes have been made to make the Reserves a deployable entity and we finally get around to purchasing actual Heavy force equipment, then one of the Light Reserve Brigades could take on that equipment to become your "break glass in case of fire" Heavy force...while the Reg Force LAV Brigade would now be your ongoing Medium force for OOTW deployments.


I think this ought to proceed as concurrent activity (We gunners are big on concurrent activity - its like our second motto - right after double check all data). Organize and train the force on existing equipment so that once true heavy equipment becomes available (if ever) then you only need to convert onto the equipment and not the doctrine.


GR66 said:


> I would embed the cultural changes by integrating the Reg Force and Reserves even in the absence of heavy equipment.  I'll try and sketch out a rough idea for a possible structure when I have more time but I'm envisioning a Reg Force LAV Brigade and two hybrid Reg Force/Reserve Light Brigades.  The Reserves wouldn't be left on their own as a separate entity from the Reg Force.  In fact, in the short term it's likely that the most development and new equipment might go to the Light forces.


I'll wait to see your structure - I might dabble with my own.


GR66 said:


> All the LAV Brigade really needs to become an effective Medium-weight force really is maybe a turreted mortar vehicle and some Remote Weapons Stations with ATGMs and SAMs.  On the Light end of the spectrum there are lots of opportunities for the development of new doctrine, TTPs and equipment...all of which are better suited to the current support capabilities of the Reserves.  Once the new equipment (real IFVs, new tanks, etc.?) start to come online in a decade+ the Reserve Brigade(s) will have already had a chance to work out the new structures and get the required support systems in place to be able to start taking on the Heavy role.
> 
> I envy your optimism regarding timelines but find it difficult to believe them.  It might take a swimming pool full of Kool-Aid to convince me but I hope you are right and I'm wrong.


I did a three year Class B callout in Ottawa running an IT project for JAG - I couldn't believe the lethargy that permeates every aspect of the place. Individually all the folks I worked with were good folks but the system as a whole .... It's a process driven hellhole and the genesis of many of the processes are lost in the mists of time but they have become inviolate. You only have to read Leslie's Transformation Report to get an understanding of what's wrong. I'm afraid the way that things are means that your and everyone else's appreciation of timelines is probably much more accurate than mine. On the other hand that system needs to change too. The Army's last transformation took twenty years. Armies whose thought processes and ability to react are that sluggish will die in the droves on the battlefield - if they ever get to it.


GR66 said:


> Again, I don't think we're really too far apart on the end state, but just on what we consider as realistic timelines and some of the specific intermediate steps required.


🍻


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Coincidentally, that was my experience when I participated in staff training as well.
> 
> Nothing like watching a LCol painstakingly read a slide word for word and all that's going through your mind is "I wonder what he's getting paid per word today", and "He'd soooo fail Gold Star".
> 
> Needless to say, I 'got busy' and couldn't attend after that


You obviously never attended one of my exhilarating "The Law of Armed Conflict for Commanding Officers" lectures.

😁


----------



## dapaterson

Putting 294 under part III Div 2 would do nothing, as s60(c) would prevent action.

And 295 can be eliminated, as it could fit under extant authorities in Div 2.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Based on a three week exercise that's 48.5 training days per year.



The assumptions are too rosy.  A two-week ex is reasonable.

A 2.5-day weekend is : Fri night (at best 5 hours of it), everyone shows up at armoury, loads kit and parades vehicles, and moves to training area, arriving sometime very late Fri/very early Sat.  Depending on distance, ex probably ends by 12:00 Sun.  Realistically, 1.5 days worth of training time and "1.0" days of prep, move, move, clean-up.

A concentration is: 1 or 2 days at the start to move everyone into camp and shake out who is going to be working with whom, and 1 or 2 days at the end for wrap-up activities (dumping jerrycans into haphazard piles in the middle of fields, going through canvas to ensure the most worn-out shit is turned back in, emptying EIS into dufflebags so that it can be converted to POMV use, parking vehicles where they can't be found so that someone must write those "where is 90125?" messages, etc).  Out of 16 days, get 14 max and probably only 12.

9 weekends (being realistic about Dec) plus the 2 weeks is, roughly, 27 days of training.

I suspect retention would improve with at most 6 range/field exercises, and remaining days expended as single Saturdays (two in a month with no range/field ex) - give people back more of their Fri evenings and Sundays.  And there is less time wastage.


----------



## KevinB

Brad Sallows said:


> The assumptions are too rosy.  A two-week ex is reasonable.
> 
> A 2.5-day weekend is : Fri night (at best 5 hours of it), everyone shows up at armoury, loads kit and parades vehicles, and moves to training area, arriving sometime very late Fri/very early Sat.  Depending on distance, ex probably ends by 12:00 Sun.  Realistically, 1.5 days worth of training time and "1.0" days of prep, move, move, clean-up.


Ideally they show up and get on a bus - the kit is ready for them to be signed for at the Trg area - and ideally one of the members of the section is a regular who can have ensure vehicle etc is GTG.


Brad Sallows said:


> A concentration is: 1 or 2 days at the start to move everyone into camp and shake out who is going to be working with whom, and 1 or 2 days at the end for wrap-up activities (dumping jerrycans into haphazard piles in the middle of fields, going through canvas to ensure the most worn-out shit is turned back in, emptying EIS into dufflebags so that it can be converted to POMV use, parking vehicles where they can't be found so that someone must write those "where is 90125?" messages, etc).  Out of 16 days, get 14 max and probably only 12.


 Again the benefit of a true total force entity - is the loss of the downtime at the start -- now that doesn't get rid of all the end Ex stuff - but does make it a lot easier.


Brad Sallows said:


> 9 weekends (being realistic about Dec) plus the 2 weeks is, roughly, 27 days of training.
> 
> I suspect retention would improve with at most 6 range/field exercises, and remaining days expended as single Saturdays (two in a month with no range/field ex) - give people back more of their Fri evenings and Sundays.  And there is less time wastage.


Student rentention is higher generally with more activities (based on my experience in the Mo 35 years ago - maybe not as valid today) - as they can have fun and make money - the drop off occurs when folks get alder and have families and other jobs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Ideally they show up and get on a bus - the kit is ready for them to be signed for at the Trg area - and ideally one of the members of the section is a regular who can have ensure vehicle etc is GTG.
> 
> Again the benefit of a true total force entity - is the loss of the downtime at the start -- now that doesn't get rid of all the end Ex stuff - but does make it a lot easier.
> 
> Student rentention is higher generally with more activities (based on my experience in the Mo 35 years ago - maybe not as valid today) - as they can have fun and make money - the drop off occurs when folks get alder and have families and other jobs.



The other part of retention, for people who've been in longer than 10 years or so, is properly organized and delivered Pro D.

About once annually someone runs a half day TEWT, that could have been delivered in 1983, as an excuse to get Officers/ SNCOs paid to attend/ cover their costs for an annual mess dinner, which is the highest priority of course. Given the complexities of leading in the CAF these days, I'm guessing that 'How to defend against the 6 MRR' is not the only thing that might qualify as Pro D.

Also, for weekend exercises and other concentrations, I don't know how many times we have been told 'If you're not a part of the PTA (e.g., 17 year old riflemen), don't turn up'.

Over time, your experienced people do as ordered: they don't turn up; sometimes forever


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Putting 294 under part III Div 2 would do nothing, as s60(c) would prevent action.
> 
> And 295 can be eliminated, as it could fit under extant authorities in Div 2.


The way that it is worded yes, but NDA s33(2) and the QR&O 9.04 have provisions that authorizes an order to attend training. If s 60(c) of the NDA was amended to add a subparagraph that states that a reservist is subject to the CSD at all times that he is ordered to attend training then the reservist would be subject to the CSD regardless of where he is. S 60(c) already provides for being subject to the CSD regardless of where the reservist is such as in uniform, or when placed on active service so a time that they are ordered to attend training is not a stretch.

I would actually be a bit more limiting and replace the provisions QR&O 9.04(2) with a provision for an annual obligatory training cycle at a set amount annually (in my mind a 2.5 day weekend per month starting in and 2 to 3 week period in the summer during the period Sep1 to Aug 31 annually) with the exact dates to be published in routine orders no later than 30 days prior to the commencement of the training cycle. 

That type of a system firmly sets the annual training cycle and prevents arbitrary abuse of the ability to order training.

The current QR&O 9.04(2) is mostly gutless. We shouldn't have regulations that are meaningless but replace them with ones that have meaning. 

We need to similarly firm up s 295 or, if as you think Part 2 is adequate, then eliminate it.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Ideally they show up and get on a bus - the kit is ready for them to be signed for at the Trg area - and ideally one of the members of the section is a regular who can have ensure vehicle etc is GTG.
> 
> Again the benefit of a true total force entity - is the loss of the downtime at the start -- now that doesn't get rid of all the end Ex stuff - but does make it a lot easier.
> 
> Student rentention is higher generally with more activities (based on my experience in the Mo 35 years ago - maybe not as valid today) - as they can have fun and make money - the drop off occurs when folks get alder and have families and other jobs.


That's a bingo.

In 2 RCHA we used to do exactly that. Ontario artillery units drove by bus to Petawawa on Friday evening where late in the evening they were met a a battery of kit laid out on the parade square each vehicle supervised by a Reg F DS. The reserve detachments signed for their kit and before midnight deployed to their first gun position and grabbed a night's sleep. The Reg F DS stayed with them and supervised the training. Rounds were down range at first light. Late Sunday afternoon the battery would return parade square, clean the guns and vehicles and sign the gear over. They'd board the busses for a ride home that got them back to their armouries before midnight.

It can be done. We did it for years. Today, 2 RCHA still takes the lead in developing their affiliated reservists.

It's not just changing the organization that matters. Its changing the culture.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> *It can be done. We did it for years. Today, 2 RCHA still takes the lead in developing their affiliated reservists.*
> 
> 🍻



Spectacular.

In over 30 years of service with the CAF reserves, I have never seen that kind of Reg F support ever provided to any reserve unit of which I've been a member.

Just sayin'...


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Spectacular.
> 
> In over 30 years of service with the CAF reserves, I have never seen that kind of Reg F support ever provided to any reserve unit of which I've been a member.
> 
> Just sayin'...


When I was in 30 RCA - we often got tasked to supply spots to 2 RCHA - it worked quite well at the lower ranks IMHO.
  For Res ex's - we would run an advance party - so everything was in Pet and engines running when the bus party arrived.
The advantage we had was Ottawa was a short hop to Pet, so we brought all our gear, unlike some of the other Res Arty in Ontario 

We would stage most gear the Wed night - the Friday advance party would finish the prep and mover to Pet and either get to the ranges and wait - or if working with 2RCHA directly - meet at their lines.

I went to RV 92 with 2RCHA - and was in the Div Arty CP when the guns went home - as well as went on Ex with D and E Bty and F (then Troop) Battery, as well as went to Cyprus with E Bty.

I think 2 RCHA was an anomaly for the most part - I never saw the same relationship occur when tasked to W Bty in Gagetown or in my time in the Patricia's with any of the Res units.   In 1 VP in Calgary we did 1 summer tasking to support Militia Training in Dundurin - but we just acted as Recce for the enemy force - and I couldn't tell you what we actually helped the Reserve units with - other than sneaking through their lines and cutting comms wire and stealing their SOI's out of their CP (and stealing a lot of their food at night).


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> When I was in 30 RCA - we often got tasked to supply spots to 2 RCHA - it worked quite well at the lower ranks IMHO.
> For Res ex's - we would run an advance party - so everything was in Pet and engines running when the bus party arrived.
> The advantage we had was Ottawa was a short hop to Pet, so we brought all our gear, unlike some of the other Res Arty in Ontario
> 
> We would stage most gear the Wed night - the Friday advance party would finish the prep and mover to Pet and either get to the ranges and wait - or if working with 2RCHA directly - meet at their lines.
> 
> I went to RV 92 with 2RCHA - and was in the Div Arty CP when the guns went home - as well as went on Ex with D and E Bty and F (then Troop) Battery, as well as went to Cyprus with E Bty.
> 
> I think 2 RCHA was an anomaly for the most part - I never saw the same relationship occur when tasked to W Bty in Gagetown or in my time in the Patricia's with any of the Res units.   In 1 VP in Calgary we did 1 summer tasking to support Militia Training in Dundurin - but we just acted as Recce for the enemy force - and I couldn't tell you what we actually helped the Reserve units with - other than sneaking through their lines and cutting comms wire and stealing their SOI's out of their CP (and stealing a lot of their food at night).




My weekend exercise experiences were usually along the lines of 'don't let the door hit your ass on the way out. I'll be watching the hockey game'


----------



## MilEME09

dangerboy said:


> Would they be paid to do this? It is not very fair to expect them to do this at home on their own time without being paid (I know the majority already do this, and it is not right).


How about this, half days pay to do online training prior to the training night/weekend. With the forces using ECN now, you can put PowerPoint online for people to do from home, along with videos, etc... use that as gateway training so in person time is better spent soldiering.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> How about this, half days pay to do online training prior to the training night/weekend. With the forces using ECN now, you can put PowerPoint online for people to do from home, along with videos, etc... use that as gateway training so in person time is better spent soldiering.



Maybe get a bit more adventurous?  Single person, multi-person shooter games incorporating the Laws of Armed Conflict?  A civilized version of Grand Theft Auto?

Driving games?  Incorporating Voice Procedures in Multi-Shooter games?

Anime instruction manuals?


----------



## Brad Sallows

> It can be done.



Depends.  Location matters, a lot.  Greater Vancouver is what - 3rd largest metro area in Canada?  Nearest artillery impact areas I know of are in WA state (Ft Lewis, YFC).  Also any ranges other than a basic 600m range and a grenade range.  Strictly speaking it's possible to get to Ft Lewis by "midnight" - barely - if the bus is rolling by 20:00.  

And the Vancouver Island units have an additional complication - BC Ferries.  No late afternoon Sun departure times for them if they want to get home at a reasonable hour.  And people with jobs, and perhaps students, expect to have time to be adequately rested for whatever they have to do on Mon.

Get timings wrong, and the drive through Seattle/Tacoma can be ... long.

I suppose either some units could be re-roled, or a new base large enough for requirements should be established within 3 hr drive of Seaforth Armoury.


----------



## dapaterson

Tasks must match geography... For both Reg and Res.  

Weekend exercises can be fun with Reg F units.  When the 2Lt duty officer reports on Monday morning that the Res unit brought out their Honorary Colonel, and that the retired LGen, former Army Commander, had a great time, the email chains are wonderful to read.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> Maybe get a bit more adventurous?  Single person, multi-person shooter games incorporating the Laws of Armed Conflict?  A civilized version of Grand Theft Auto?
> 
> Driving games?  Incorporating Voice Procedures in Multi-Shooter games?
> 
> Anime instruction manuals?


VBS is that you? So is DND going to pay for those computers for ever reservist? That system has many draw backs. Great in concept but I can't use a video game to fix an engine, or quickly transfer a load at a DP.


----------



## OldSolduer

KevinB said:


> When I was in 30 RCA - we often got tasked to supply spots to 2 RCHA - it worked quite well at the lower ranks IMHO.
> For Res ex's - we would run an advance party - so everything was in Pet and engines running when the bus party arrived.
> The advantage we had was Ottawa was a short hop to Pet, so we brought all our gear, unlike some of the other Res Arty in Ontario
> 
> We would stage most gear the Wed night - the Friday advance party would finish the prep and mover to Pet and either get to the ranges and wait - or if working with 2RCHA directly - meet at their lines.
> 
> I went to RV 92 with 2RCHA - and was in the Div Arty CP when the guns went home - as well as went on Ex with D and E Bty and F (then Troop) Battery, as well as went to Cyprus with E Bty.
> 
> I think 2 RCHA was an anomaly for the most part - I never saw the same relationship occur when tasked to W Bty in Gagetown or in my time in the Patricia's with any of the Res units.   In 1 VP in Calgary we did 1 summer tasking to support Militia Training in Dundurin - but we just acted as Recce for the enemy force - and I couldn't tell you what we actually helped the Reserve units with - other than sneaking through their lines and cutting comms wire and stealing their SOI's out of their CP (and stealing a lot of their food at night).


In 1992 2VP deployed to Wainwright to support Ex Western Challenge 92 - a reservist concentration. I think IMO it was a success, as many of those reservists came to us in early 1993 and stuck with us til about October 1993.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I think 2 RCHA was an anomaly for the most part - I never saw the same relationship occur when tasked to W Bty in Gagetown or in my time in the Patricia's with any of the Res units.   In 1 VP in Calgary we did 1 summer tasking to support Militia Training in Dundurin - but we just acted as Recce for the enemy force - and I couldn't tell you what we actually helped the Reserve units with - other than sneaking through their lines and cutting comms wire and stealing their SOI's out of their CP (and stealing a lot of their food at night).


I think it was as well. I was with 2 RCHA 72 to 76 and with 3 RCHA 70-72 and 78 to 81 ( as well I was RSSO with 26th Fd next door in Brandon 76 to 78). 3 RCHA never supported its regional reserve regiments the way 2 RCHA did with the exception of frequently providing safety officers. I can't speak for 5 RALC.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> Depends.  Location matters, a lot.  Greater Vancouver is what - 3rd largest metro area in Canada?  Nearest artillery impact areas I know of are in WA state (Ft Lewis, YFC).  Also any ranges other than a basic 600m range and a grenade range.  Strictly speaking it's possible to get to Ft Lewis by "midnight" - barely - if the bus is rolling by 20:00.
> 
> And the Vancouver Island units have an additional complication - BC Ferries.  No late afternoon Sun departure times for them if they want to get home at a reasonable hour.  And people with jobs, and perhaps students, expect to have time to be adequately rested for whatever they have to do on Mon.
> 
> Get timings wrong, and the drive through Seattle/Tacoma can be ... long.
> 
> I suppose either some units could be re-roled, or a new base large enough for requirements should be established within 3 hr drive of Seaforth Armoury.


I know this would never sell here but ...

When I went on a visit to the Italian 1st Mtn Arty Regt they went up into the Alps and had an uninhabited area there that they used as an impact area while shooting from farmers' fields or off mountain ridges that they'd mule hauled the guns up to. It was not a real full-time range. They just used it for their annual exercise.

I've done two tours on Op Palaci with AvconDet in Rogers Pass in BC and fired hundreds of rounds up into the mountains there (and the odd one over the mountain - easy to do when your shooting at the tip of a ridgeline in a blinding snowstorm at night - you know its gone over cause you only hear this really faint krump  😁.

So what say 5 BC and 15 Fd become mountain gunners. Maybe have the LG 1s change coasts. There's a lot of skill needed for that. You just need to find a nearby uninhabited mountain valley that isn't full of endangered species that the Feds still have a vested interest in.

The other choice is to turn into STA.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

Isn't 15 Fd a band with a secondary role as artillery?


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> If we're not currently manning our rifle companies at full establishment then why not pair each Reg Force company with a Reserve Regiment to round out the numbers that way?


The better question is why are we insisting on maintaining unit's who's manning numbers exceed our total PYs?


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Armor Defense Platoon?
> 
> I don't like the LAV as an Infantry Recce Vehicle
> Also your Snipers - are they housed back inside of Recce Platoon - or still a separate "Platoon Minus"
> 
> Doctrinally the 120mm Mortar is an Artillery weapon - but given the recent (last 20 years) changes - I am unsure if Doctrine matters anymore as no one else seems to follow it...


The few times Recce has had LAVs they were more like... mother ships for ATV based patrols if that makes sense. A bit more punch and filled to the brim with ammo, food, and water, or dip and contraband , to enable extended Ops.


----------



## CBH99

markppcli said:


> The better question is why are we insisting on maintaining unit's who's manning numbers exceed our total PYs?


Sorry, not tracking what you mean here?


----------



## markppcli

@CBH99  We don’t have enough PYs in the Army to fully man all three CMBG and our existing institutions.


----------



## McG

markppcli said:


> The better question is why are we insisting on maintaining unit's who's manning numbers exceed our total PYs?


When talking CAF organizations & establishments, “manning” is used to describe the number of people actually in the unit. If manning is low, then there are fewer people than PYs. If “ manning numbers exceed our total PYs” then there are more people than authorized on establishment. Language matters because the system will ignore a unit that complains of being undermanned while guardian shows it to be at 95% of establishment.

We need to be better at explaining that we are under established. So I think you are asking:


markppcli said:


> The better question is why are we insisting on maintaining unit's who's required establishment exceed our total PYs?


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> When talking CAF organizations & establishments, “manning” is used to describe the number of people actually in the unit. If manning is low, then there are fewer people than PYs. If “ manning numbers exceed our total PYs” then there are more people than authorized on establishment. Language matters because the system will ignore a unit that complains of being undermanned while guardian shows it to be at 95% of establishment.
> 
> We need to be better at explaining that we are under established. So I think you are asking:



Because you could actually field three Brigades of soldiers and a Div HQ, if the fulcrum was the field force - rather than redundant HQ's, and all sorts of other positions to hide Senior NCO's and Senior and General Officers.

Not enough equipment for a Div - and arguable not enough equipment for any credible Brigade in a High Intensity conflict.
  But enough for a Div in Low Intensity OOTW.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Isn't 15 Fd a band with a secondary role as artillery?



Close: last time I checked, they wore artillery uniforms but most have never knelt beside a gun 









						Band of the 15th Field Regiment, RCA - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

'Enemy' Unmanned Ground Vehicles Are Now Facing-Off Against Army Soldiers In Training
					

The unmanned vehicle made a helicopter landing zone unusable, which could happen during a real battle as adversaries field similar capabilities.




					www.thedrive.com
				











The U.S. Army says mock enemy troops, also known as the Opposing Force, or OPFOR, have employed unmanned ground vehicles in an exercise for the first time. The OPFOR used them to help deny access to possible helicopter landing zones and set up blocking positions along roads, among other tasks.

 The exercise in question took place at the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk in Louisiana in September. The JRTC's resident OPFOR unit is 1st Battalion (Airborne), 509th Infantry, which is also known by the nickname Geronimo. This battalion received two General Dynamics Land Systems (GLDS) unmanned Multi-Utility Tactical Transports (MUTT) to help it square off against soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division.

“With these units, the human survivability rate increases significantly,” Sergeant First Class Eugene Lackey, a soldier from Geronimo's Pathfinder Company, said about the exercise. “This system allowed us to close with and destroy the enemy safely from a distance. It [also enabled] us to the find the enemy before he could find us. It is a great tool and I wish we could have it for little bit longer to really see how we can change the way wars are fought.”

The MUTTs that Geronimo used in the exercise are 8x8 wheeled unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) in the one-and-a-half-ton class. GDLS also offers smaller 4x4 and 6x6 versions, as well as tracked variants in all three size classes. All of the members of the MUTT family have hybrid-electric propulsion systems that offer improved fuel efficiency compared to similarly-sized vehicles powered by more conventional internal combustion engines. In addition, this allows them to operate very quietly at low speeds and while in static positions, and reduces their thermal signature.

Geronimo's MUTTs were each configured with a Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS) equipped with a 7.62mm M240 machine gun and a Javelin anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launcher, as well as a tethered quadcopter unmanned aerial system. The drone has an array of video cameras that allow it to provide additional surveillance and reconnaissance capacity, as well as act as a signal relay, extending how far the UGVs can operate from their human operators.





US ARMY
One of the Army's MUTTs during a different exercise in 2020.

The operators control the UGVs through a software suite that can be installed on various types of computer systems, including ruggedized laptops. The MUTTs are capable of some degree of semi-autonomous operation, including moving to designated coordinates, but, at least at present, humans are in the loop at all times and are in direct control of the onboard weapons and sensor systems.

The MUTTs are part of an experimental fleet the Army has been using as part of Project Origin, an effort to explore future concepts of operations involving UGVs. The service is in the process of acquiring various tiers of unmanned ground platforms to support a variety of missions. In 2019, the Army had actually selected GLDS' MUTT as the winning design for its Squad Multipurpose Equipment Transport (SMET) program, but a formal protest from another entrant, Howe and Howe, led to the scrapping of that deal and the rebooting of the competition

"The Geronimo force used the Project Origin platform to block a key intersection for 36 hours, an effort that benefitted from Origin’s low heat signature while conducting long hours of battery-powered 'silent watch,'" according to the Army. "In addition, Geronimo used the Project Origin vehicles to deny helicopter landing zones and conduct route reconnaissance."


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Isn't 15 Fd a band with a secondary role as artillery?



I've seen them fire as a 6-gun battery, indirect and open sights, on the Yakima prairie.  Shame if that's no longer possible.  I wonder who bears responsibility for throwing that away.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Isn't 15 Fd a band with a secondary role as artillery?


All jokes aside, I like reserve and volunteer bands. They're a lot less expensive to the public purse and seen more in public than the Reg F ones. The Ceremonial Guard Band is one great example. The numerous volunteer Reg F bands are another. By my count we have six Reg F bands left and we have some 52 Res F and 15 volunteer Reg F ones.

I don't know if there is a critical mass of Reg F bandsmen required to keep the trade vibrant but it strikes me that we could do with a total of three or four Reg F bands. The Res F count would go down with the oh so necessary amalgamation of Res F units.

I'm not so concerned about the fact that they've never worked a gun; like cooks and admin clerks they have a separate purpose and most are volunteers and, unless things have changed, many are unpaid and/or civilian volunteers.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

Army reserve has more bandsmen than truck drivers, mechanics, or supply technicians.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Army reserve has more bandsmen than truck drivers, mechanics, or supply technicians.






> The trucking and logistics sector employs 3.6% of Canada’s workforce, translating to more than 650,000 workers. Truck drivers account for 300,000 employees, while 90,000 people are in shipping and receiving, 70,000 are courier service drivers, 38,000 are material handlers at warehouses and distribution staff. The remainder are managers, supervisors, administrative staff, and accounting personnel.
> 
> While the number of truck drivers has increased by more than 80,000 people in the past two decades, the rate of increase has slowed to an average of 4,100 drivers per year over the past decade, compared to 5,500 per year over the previous decade.



Rather than training these people, why aren't we recruiting them?  

And yes I know there is a general shortage



> Canada is expected to be short 25,000 truck drivers as early as 2023, representing a 25% increase over the unfilled vacancies in 2019, Trucking HR Canada reports.
> 
> Unfilled jobs in 2018 are also estimated to have cost the trucking industry about $3.1 billion in lost revenues, slowing planned expansions by 4.7%.











						Canada short 25,000 truck drivers by 2023: report - Truck News
					

TORONTO, Ont. – Canada is expected to be short 25,000 truck drivers as early as 2023, representing a 25% increase over the unfilled vacancies in 2019,




					www.trucknews.com


----------



## dapaterson

Because most folks looking at the part time reserve want something different from what they already do all day.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Army reserve has more bandsmen than truck drivers, mechanics, or supply technicians.



Paid positions?  Details are foggy, but my recollection is the Res F bands (in BC at least) became mostly volunteer; the 15 Fd band was chosen to be the one that would continue to be funded.  Mind, the way things are, I can believe that a platoon+ band might have more members than whatever remains of any one of those trades across all of 39 CBG.

Are there 52 funded Res F bands?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

As I mentioned in the C3 replacement thread, when the band was housed in the armoury, they also fielded a gun crew and took a lot of pride in doing so. Of course that was back in the day when as a reserve unit, 15th FD we could field a full 6 gun battery, two command posts, 2-3 Op teams, a flying kitchen, sigs truck, ambulance with a real doctor and nurse. Plus a ammo party with 1-2 trucks mostly made up from our OR female clerks who also did a damm good job.


----------



## dapaterson

There are more reserve pers in the three musician MOSIDs than in either MSE Op, Veh Tech or May Mgr Tech.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Because most folks looking at the part time reserve want something different from what they already do all day.



True enough.  So teach truck drivers how to be soldiers.   They already know how to be truck drivers - if and when they are needed.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> There are more reserve pers in the three musician MOSIDs than in either MSE Op, Veh Tech or May Mgr Tech.



Unconsciously and coincidentally, accurately reflecting the 'Vital Ground' for the reserves as defined by our highest levels of leadership 

"What you do speaks so loudly that I cannot hear what you say." Ralph Waldo Emerson


----------



## markppcli

McG said:


> When talking CAF organizations & establishments, “manning” is used to describe the number of people actually in the unit. If manning is low, then there are fewer people than PYs. If “ manning numbers exceed our total PYs” then there are more people than authorized on establishment. Language matters because the system will ignore a unit that complains of being undermanned while guardian shows it to be at 95% of establishment.
> 
> We need to be better at explaining that we are under established. So I think you are asking:


Yes thank you, that’s what I meant.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> 'Enemy' Unmanned Ground Vehicles Are Now Facing-Off Against Army Soldiers In Training
> 
> 
> The unmanned vehicle made a helicopter landing zone unusable, which could happen during a real battle as adversaries field similar capabilities.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.thedrive.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The U.S. Army says mock enemy troops, also known as the Opposing Force, or OPFOR, have employed unmanned ground vehicles in an exercise for the first time. The OPFOR used them to help deny access to possible helicopter landing zones and set up blocking positions along roads, among other tasks.
> 
> 
> 
> Spoiler
> 
> 
> 
> The exercise in question took place at the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk in Louisiana in September. The JRTC's resident OPFOR unit is 1st Battalion (Airborne), 509th Infantry, which is also known by the nickname Geronimo. This battalion received two General Dynamics Land Systems (GLDS) unmanned Multi-Utility Tactical Transports (MUTT) to help it square off against soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division.
> 
> “With these units, the human survivability rate increases significantly,” Sergeant First Class Eugene Lackey, a soldier from Geronimo's Pathfinder Company, said about the exercise. “This system allowed us to close with and destroy the enemy safely from a distance. It [also enabled] us to the find the enemy before he could find us. It is a great tool and I wish we could have it for little bit longer to really see how we can change the way wars are fought.”
> 
> The MUTTs that Geronimo used in the exercise are 8x8 wheeled unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) in the one-and-a-half-ton class. GDLS also offers smaller 4x4 and 6x6 versions, as well as tracked variants in all three size classes. All of the members of the MUTT family have hybrid-electric propulsion systems that offer improved fuel efficiency compared to similarly-sized vehicles powered by more conventional internal combustion engines. In addition, this allows them to operate very quietly at low speeds and while in static positions, and reduces their thermal signature.
> 
> Geronimo's MUTTs were each configured with a Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station (CROWS) equipped with a 7.62mm M240 machine gun and a Javelin anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launcher, as well as a tethered quadcopter unmanned aerial system. The drone has an array of video cameras that allow it to provide additional surveillance and reconnaissance capacity, as well as act as a signal relay, extending how far the UGVs can operate from their human operators.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> US ARMY
> One of the Army's MUTTs during a different exercise in 2020.
> 
> The operators control the UGVs through a software suite that can be installed on various types of computer systems, including ruggedized laptops. The MUTTs are capable of some degree of semi-autonomous operation, including moving to designated coordinates, but, at least at present, humans are in the loop at all times and are in direct control of the onboard weapons and sensor systems.
> 
> The MUTTs are part of an experimental fleet the Army has been using as part of Project Origin, an effort to explore future concepts of operations involving UGVs. The service is in the process of acquiring various tiers of unmanned ground platforms to support a variety of missions. In 2019, the Army had actually selected GLDS' MUTT as the winning design for its Squad Multipurpose Equipment Transport (SMET) program, but a formal protest from another entrant, Howe and Howe, led to the scrapping of that deal and the rebooting of the competition
> 
> "The Geronimo force used the Project Origin platform to block a key intersection for 36 hours, an effort that benefitted from Origin’s low heat signature while conducting long hours of battery-powered 'silent watch,'" according to the Army. "In addition, Geronimo used the Project Origin vehicles to deny helicopter landing zones and conduct route reconnaissance."


I find these various UGVs (as well as small, tube launched UAVs/Loitering Munitions) very interesting and they possibly have some great potential uses in our future force.  They are light and small compared to manned vehicles so well suited to an expeditionary Army like ours.  They have good speed (40mph/65km) and range (750km?).  They also have low detection signatures.  For an Army that spends a large percentage of its budget on personnel, trading boots for bolts might make good sense.

On the other hand, how well will they work in an EW environment?  Will their small size limit their ammo carrying capability too much so that their supporters are constantly having to re-arm them taking away their advantage of stealth and reduced risk to the troops?

How would you envision integrating machines like this into the Army in a significant way?  Is this something we should really consider for Force 2025/2030 as a way to leapfrog the CA into the future rather than just trying to catch ourselves up to yesterday?


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> I find these various UGVs (as well as small, tube launched UAVs/Loitering Munitions) very interesting and they possibly have some great potential uses in our future force.  They are light and small compared to manned vehicles so well suited to an expeditionary Army like ours.  They have good speed (40mph/65km) and range (750km?).  They also have low detection signatures.  For an Army that spends a large percentage of its budget on personnel, trading boots for bolts might make good sense.
> 
> On the other hand, how well will they work in an EW environment?  Will their small size limit their ammo carrying capability too much so that their supporters are constantly having to re-arm them taking away their advantage of stealth and reduced risk to the troops?
> 
> How would you envision integrating machines like this into the Army in a significant way?  Is this something we should really consider for Force 2025/2030 as a way to leapfrog the CA into the future rather than just trying to catch ourselves up to yesterday?


WRT the EW environment I note that most of them seem to have three modes of operation - autonomous, follow-me and tethered.  Tethered means that the operator is attached to the vehicle by a cable and directly controls it in some ways.  So unless we are look at an EMP environment, when everything goes dark, I am inclined to think that there is always some degree of manual over-ride.

As to where to use them?  Light infantry?  Platoon, Company Support?   Moreso than battalion?

The light UGVs are probably not compatible with the LAV fleet.  But the UGV technology might be compatible with the LAVs permitting support vehicles to operate autonomously, or remotely.  Separating the crew from the vehicle?   The Coyote started making some moves in that direction with its remote sensor suite.  I believe the Swingfire also had the ability to separate the crew from the vehicle and launch its ATGMs remotely.


----------



## Dale Denton

Lots of growth in UGVs judging by the concepts seen at defence conferences and news sites on AUSA.

Rheinmetall has a large presence in Canada, same with GDLS. 

Figure out how to best use this technology and get in on the ground floor with funding. Look at Loyal Wingman and Australia, we can replicate it but cheaply and for the army.


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:


> There are more reserve pers in the three musician MOSIDs than in either MSE Op, Veh Tech or May Mgr Tech.


part of this comes down to recruiting centers, an MSE op is more then just a truck driver, sure at the Cpl level that is a lot of it but when you get into fleet management and such it is a whole different ball game. From what people tell me as they come in, MSE is simply explained as driving trucks.....by recruiters who are infantry.......

we really need to get better at this is we are to attract in demand trades, and retain them.


----------



## Kirkhill

LoboCanada said:


> Lots of growth in UGVs judging by the concepts seen at defence conferences and news sites on AUSA.
> 
> Rheinmetall has a large presence in Canada, same with GDLS.
> 
> Figure out how to best use this technology and get in on the ground floor with funding. Look at Loyal Wingman and Australia, we can replicate it but cheaply and for the army.




That would require innovative thinking.  Deciding to do things differently with the tools available.


----------



## Kirkhill

LoboCanada said:


> Lots of growth in UGVs judging by the concepts seen at defence conferences and news sites on AUSA.
> 
> Rheinmetall has a large presence in Canada, same with GDLS.
> 
> Figure out how to best use this technology and get in on the ground floor with funding. Look at Loyal Wingman and Australia, we can replicate it but cheaply and for the army.



Funny you should mention the Aussies.  In my civvy career I have had great pleasure laughing at Aussie associates.   I blame the fact they hang upside down in the Southern Hemisphere.  In fact I am jealous of them.  They go out of their way to do things differently.   And sometimes they get it right.

Here's the Sten






Here's the Owen






Different.  Magazine on top, gravity assist.

A lot of that thinking comes out of their version of NRC, CSIRO.  Even there they seem to do things differently.  More applied science and less theory.





__





						Work with us - CSIRO
					






					www.csiro.au


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Funny you should mention the Aussies.  In my civvy career I have had great pleasure laughing at Aussie associates.   I blame the fact they hang upside down in the Southern Hemisphere.  In fact I am jealous of them.  They go out of their way to do things differently.   And sometimes they get it right.
> 
> Here's the Sten
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Here's the Owen
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Different.  Magazine on top, gravity assist.
> 
> A lot of that thinking comes out of their version of NRC, CSIRO.  Even there they seem to do things differently.  More applied science and less theory.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Work with us - CSIRO
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.csiro.au


Except the Owen was terrible.
   The Stench gun was what it was - a cheap no frills gun - and while not awesome it worked vastly better than the Owen.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Except the Owen was terrible.
> The Stench gun was what it was - a cheap no frills gun - and while not awesome it worked vastly better than the Owen.



Interesting.  That does bring to mind another aspect of the Aussie psyche.  Regardless of the merits the Aussie's support an Aussie.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Interesting.  That does bring to mind another aspect of the Aussie psyche.  Regardless of the merits the Aussie's support an Aussie.


The Aussies have made a number of unusual choices - the AUG, much like the British adoption of the SA-80 went 180 degrees from the user panels.   Both of those Armies conducted testing like the CF did with the "Weapons of the 80's Trial" - the CF at the time listened to the users, and test results - as opposed to higher ups deciding a shorter OAL length of a weapon was more important.
  It's interesting to see the Aussie SOF and Brit SOF didn't adhere to that - and went for M16/M4 variants like the CF did, with England eventually replacing their SOF M16's with C8 SFW and C8CQB from Diemaco ( now Colt Canada ) - while the Assies kept the M4A1 and added some Hk416's.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The Aussies have made a number of unusual choices - the AUG, much like the British adoption of the SA-80 went 180 degrees from the user panels.   Both of those Armies conducted testing like the CF did with the "Weapons of the 80's Trial" - the CF at the time listened to the users, and test results - as opposed to higher ups deciding a shorter OAL length of a weapon was more important.
> It's interesting to see the Aussie SOF and Brit SOF didn't adhere to that - and went for M16/M4 variants like the CF did, with England eventually replacing their SOF M16's with C8 SFW and C8CQB from Diemaco ( now Colt Canada ) - while the Assies kept the M4A1 and added some Hk416's.



Collins subs, non-nuclear nuclear subs from France, Thales Hawkei.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> WRT the EW environment I note that most of them seem to have three modes of operation - autonomous, follow-me and tethered.  Tethered means that the operator is attached to the vehicle by a cable and directly controls it in some ways.  So unless we are look at an EMP environment, when everything goes dark, I am inclined to think that there is always some degree of manual over-ride.
> 
> As to where to use them?  Light infantry?  Platoon, Company Support?   Moreso than battalion?
> 
> The light UGVs are probably not compatible with the LAV fleet.  But the UGV technology might be compatible with the LAVs permitting support vehicles to operate autonomously, or remotely.  Separating the crew from the vehicle?   The Coyote started making some moves in that direction with its remote sensor suite.  I believe the Swingfire also had the ability to separate the crew from the vehicle and launch its ATGMs remotely.


You could envision an entirely different type of Light Infantry construct that what we are currently envisioning.

Instead of simply transporting the traditional 9-10 person Section in something like a JLTV, ISV or Polaris Dagor and making use of the various guided handheld and/or RWS-mounted weapons you could perhaps envision a Section being 4 personnel in a MRZR-D4 paired with two Mission Master UGVs in different configurations based on the unit's role (Recce, Infantry, CCS, Medical, IF, etc.).

With a 4-person Section, 16-person Platoons and 64-person Companies you're now dealing with troop numbers that should be quite within the capability of the Reserves to augment Reg Force units with a Section on fairly short notice, a fully formed Platoon for larger scheduled deployments and full Companies for mobilization.

UGVs could be concentrated in regional training areas with unarmed versions provided to units to practice mobility and possibly simulators for weapon training.

The big question to me is whether the technology is mature and reliable enough for combat use in a contested environment.  Another concern is the risk that by losing the single command node you take out the entire unit...unless the autonomous operation system is effective enough to continue the planned mission without guidance, or if control of the units can be assumed by other command nodes in the case of a loss.

I'm still quite hesitant to see UGVs as a true alternative to having significant numbers of boots on the ground, but maybe it's just due to my lack of imagination and trust in technology.  But maybe I'm wrong and the Force 2025 debate is coming at just the right time to give the CA the opportunity to leap ahead of our peers by adopting a new style of warfare instead of just trying to catch up to them.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Thales Hawkei.


Thales is deeply ingrained in their Military -- their conventional army wanted to replace the F88 AusSteyr (AUG) a short while back and was basically told that any small arms work needed to view from a Thales based F88 upgrade as opposed to a C8 derivative.


			https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-11/ef88_lrip_poster_4.pdf
		






						F88 Austeyr - F88A2 with ring sight and F88A2 with ACOG RMR and GLA | Army.gov.au
					






					www.army.gov.au
				




But they managed an upgrade with rails and a Grenade Launcher that doesn't hang down a retarded amount "for safety" 
   So given the constraints of their Budget - their LCMM ran an upgrade that was head and shoulders above the CF's...


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> You could envision an entirely different type of Light Infantry construct that what we are currently envisioning.
> 
> Instead of simply transporting the traditional 9-10 person Section in something like a JLTV, ISV or Polaris Dagor and making use of the various guided handheld and/or RWS-mounted weapons you could perhaps envision a Section being 4 personnel in a MRZR-D4 paired with two Mission Master UGVs in different configurations based on the unit's role (Recce, Infantry, CCS, Medical, IF, etc.).
> 
> With a 4-person Section, 16-person Platoons and 64-person Companies you're now dealing with troop numbers that should be quite within the capability of the Reserves to augment Reg Force units with a Section on fairly short notice, a fully formed Platoon for larger scheduled deployments and full Companies for mobilization.
> 
> UGVs could be concentrated in regional training areas with unarmed versions provided to units to practice mobility and possibly simulators for weapon training.
> 
> The big question to me is whether the technology is mature and reliable enough for combat use in a contested environment.  Another concern is the risk that by losing the single command node you take out the entire unit...unless the autonomous operation system is effective enough to continue the planned mission without guidance, or if control of the units can be assumed by other command nodes in the case of a loss.
> 
> I'm still quite hesitant to see UGVs as a true alternative to having significant numbers of boots on the ground, but maybe it's just due to my lack of imagination and trust in technology.  But maybe I'm wrong and the Force 2025 debate is coming at just the right time to give the CA the opportunity to leap ahead of our peers by adopting a new style of warfare instead of just trying to catch up to them.



Nothing wrong with your imagination, or level of distrust.

I would reference the development of the tank though.  Some people berated Haig for putting the Tank into the field at all.  Others berated him for putting it in too early.  Still others were of the opinion, notably with the benefit of hindsight, that had he built up a humungous field force of tanks in secret he could have walked to Berlin in their wake.

A more recent example is the Azerbaijanis doing the different thing against the Armenians.  It worked.  Will it work twice?  That remains to be seen.  But then again the second use of the tank worked adequately.

Another example, from ancient history, is a chap name of William Wallace deciding to take on English cavalry with a field that had been covered in hidden horse traps by his engineers and a bunch of folks armed with pikes and formed into hedgehogs.  It worked at Stirling.  By Falkirk Edward stood back and let his archers wear down the schiltrons (hedgehogs).

And that is why the generals are supposed to get the big bucks.  And why Napoleon preferred that his generals were lucky.


----------



## Kirkhill

By the way, wrt putting the team into a MRZR and having the UGVs play follow the leader.

That seems to me to be a recipe for putting unarmoured players on the 40 mph armoured battlefield.

I see the best use of the light UGV as support on the 4 mph battlefield.  Where the foot cavalry excels.  We have a lot of that terrain in Canada.  My aim would be to try to divert the 40 mph behemoths into terrain where they are reduced to walking speed and they can't see past the next tree. Then the soldier on foot, with a CG84 and a UGV full of extra rounds, moves up the pecking order.

One of the, in my opinion, sillier requirements for the Light Force Enhancement Project's Tactical Mobility Platform was that it be able to keep up with the LAVs and the Leos on road moves. (It wasn't clear if the Leos were on tracks or on transporters).  In my opinion the whole purpose of the light force is to operate where the LAVs and Leos aren't - and aren't likely to be anytime soon.

The Light Force, and its support gear, should be compatible with the available air support - all the way down to the helicopters.  Nothing heavier than what a Griffon can lift at the section and platoon level.  A Chinook at company.  And what a Herc can airdrop at battalion.

408, 427, 430, 450.   1 CMBG Griffon, CANSOFCOM mixed, 5 GBMC Griffon, 2 CMBG Chinook.

I understand keeping the squadrons homogeneous for administration and training.  Same argument for centralizing Leos.  

But

Taking 427 out of the picture, as it is a special case,  what happens if

408 and 430 remain Griffon Squadrons and 450 a Chinook Squadron, administratively, but they regularly practice for operational deployments creating the helicopter equivalents of Combat Teams and remove a flight of Griffons from each of 408 and 430 an attach them to 450 while 450 donates a flight of Chinooks to each of 408 and 430.  The intent is to create three deployable squadrons of 12 Griffons and 4 Chinooks as a planning basis for supporting a Light Battalion.  Along with a Flight of Hercs perhaps?

I want the light troops in the forests and bogs and mountains and ice and, maybe, towns.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> I want the light troops in the forests and bogs and mountains and ice and, maybe, towns.



How generous of you 

Just make sure you don't maroon them there to meet their fate, which might happen without viable transport/ mobility options.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Taking 427 out of the picture, as it is a special case,  what happens if
> 
> 408 and 430 remain Griffon Squadrons and 450 a Chinook Squadron, administratively, but they regularly practice for operational deployments....The intent is to create three deployable squadrons of 12 Griffons and 4 Chinooks as a planning basis for supporting a Light Battalion.


1 Wing does this.  I worked with the "Aviation Battalion" during its work-ups one year.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> 1 Wing does this.  I worked with the "Aviation Battalion" during its work-ups one year.


Good to know.     Thanks.

And D&B... there's your ride home.


----------



## Good2Golf

No, D&B gets to look all suave and debonair gathering up his silk and walking home (in slow-motion)…


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> No, D&B gets to look all suave and debonair gathering up his silk and walking home (in slow-motion)…



Avec liquid  loot, of course


----------



## dimsum

Infanteer said:


> 1 Wing does this.  I worked with the "Aviation Battalion" during its work-ups one year.


Don't let the rest of the RCAF catch you saying those words!


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Don't let the rest of the RCAF catch you saying those words!



Maybe that's the key to solving personnel "issues".

Air force: any more shit out of you, and you're all re-roled to "battalions".

Navy: any more shit out of you, and all vessels are hereafter "boats" (except submarines, which will be "ships").

Army: any more shit out of you, and all units will be numbered only, starting from "Unit 1", "Unit 2" etc on the east coast and proceeding west.


----------



## Kirkhill

GBAD and Loitering Munitions developments from Korea and Israel









						South Korea seeks to develop missile defense against N. Korea’s artillery barrage
					

LIG Nex1, a South Korean precision missile developer, displayed this week a mock-up of a low-altitude missile defense system.




					www.defensenews.com
				






> LIG Nex1 displayed a missile that is expected to be modified from the company’s Korean Surface-to-Air Anti-Missile, or K-SAAM, co-developed by the Agency for Defense Development.
> 
> An LIG Nex1 official said the missile is to be fitted with an active radar seeker for terminal guidance and capable of intercepting targets up to 7 kilometers away at a maximum altitude of 5 kilometers. The launcher has 16 launch containers in a 4x4 arrangement and is expected to be mounted on a semi-trailer.











						Israel and South Korea to boost collaboration on loitering munitions
					

Israel Aerospace Industries, or IAI, and Korea Aerospace Industries, or KAI, have signed a memorandum of understanding on loitering munitions optimized for striking enemy air defenses.




					www.defensenews.com
				




It seems to me that NetFires was not so much cancelled as covered.  It seems to have become the basis of a lot of current thinking.  















						XM501 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> Maybe that's the key to solving personnel "issues".
> 
> Air force: any more shit out of you, and you're all re-roled to "battalions".
> 
> Navy: any more shit out of you, and all vessels are hereafter "boats" (except submarines, which will be "ships").
> 
> Army: any more shit out of you, and all units will be numbered only, *starting from "Unit 1", "Unit 2" etc on the east coast and proceeding west.*



Because Chinese and Arabic is read right to left, correct?


----------



## Kirkhill

USMC - Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations,  Adaptive Dispersed Operations.

A model for a national defence Militia?  Predicated on supplying a force of small security dets for remote locations - specifically the North Warning Sites.  Not necessarily because there is an imminent threat but because there is a potential threat against critical infrastructure.   And, I believe, the model is useful, reproducible and scaleable, and can be effectively employed by Militia in a low threat environment.   This would also supply a training and organization basis that would allow the Regular Force to exploit Militia personnel within their ranks.

47 North Warning Sites to defend.

Consider assigning a Platoon to each one of them.  Each Platoon comprising 3x Sections/Squads/Groups of 16 (including Medic).  One Squad assigned to a two week rotation.  The other Squads back at home.   The Platoon to be activated when the threat level demands.  Annual training to include one Section/Squad/Group at the site for a week or two.








Particular interest in the Carl Gustav.

Back to the Swedish Pansar model for a moment.  The Carl Gustav represents the basal element for the organization.  It is useful, flexible, compact, light and reloadable.   A great, inexpensive, training device that has operational value.

However, in the Swedish organization, the CG84 can be replaced with its single-shot cousin, the AT-4, or the larger more effective single-hot N-LAW system.    Or, and this gets to the heart of my issue, it can be replaced by something like the Javelin issued from Battalion stocks.

Which leads my wandering mind back to this article and the notion that the Javelin CLU could also be employed with the Stinger missile.  Or, fevered speculation, the 70mm APKWS - with the flechette warhead?  As an anti-drone option?









						Raytheon launches Stinger missile from Javelin launcher
					

Raytheon has successfully demonstrated firing a Stinger missile from a Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Unit (LWCLU) in a test that saw the missile engage and defeat an uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).  This could have potential for the CF.  In addition to hand-held Javelin launchers they are...




					www.army.ca
				




If a, lets call it Group, of 16, is on independent security tasking in the north, are they more likely to encounter tanks, or drones?  Would the Group CG-84 operator be better provided with the Stingers? Or even, in flight of fancy, Flechette loaded APKWs?   Either shoulder launched or launched from a UGV?






Or














						Rheinmetall unveils autonomous Mission Master UGV armed with Warmate combat drone
					

Rheinmetall adds tube-launched Warmate loitering UAV munitions to its modular Mission Master autonomous unmanned ground vehicle system




					www.thedefensepost.com
				





Edit, - By the way a force of 47 security, or Vital Point, Platoons, each of 3x Groups of 16 and an HQ of 3 = a force of 2397 in 47 Platoons, or 16 Companies or so, or 4 or 5 Battalions.  Or, if based on the 10 Territorial Battle Groups,  one large Company per TBG.  Ally those with the 4 Arctic Response Company Groups and you start to have a firmer base for national defence.

Have them operate in conjunction with the CRPG under JTF(N),  and cover them with 3 regular Light Infantry Battle Groups each associated with an "Aviation Battalion" of Griffons and Chinooks supported by the CC-138s, CC-130s, CC-177s and CC-150s (as well as the CF-35s ?)

Issue Bv206s and CB-90s to the CRPGs and to the Territorial Battle Group Transport Companies for local response.

The Regs then get to figure out what they want to do with their three Brigades of 4 Artillery Regiments, 4 Engineer Regiments, 3 Cavalry  Regiments and 3 Infantry Regiments of 6 Battalions.

CANSOFCOM - carry on.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> USMC - Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations,  Adaptive Dispersed Operations.
> 
> A model for a national defence Militia?  Predicated on supplying a force of small security dets for remote locations - specifically the North Warning Sites.  Not necessarily because there is an imminent threat but because there is a potential threat against critical infrastructure.   And, I believe, the model is useful, reproducible and scaleable, and can be effectively employed by Militia in a low threat environment.   This would also supply a training and organization basis that would allow the Regular Force to exploit Militia personnel within their ranks.
> 
> 47 North Warning Sites to defend.
> 
> Consider assigning a Platoon to each one of them.  Each Platoon comprising 3x Sections/Squads/Groups of 16 (including Medic).  One Squad assigned to a two week rotation.  The other Squads back at home.   The Platoon to be activated when the threat level demands.  Annual training to include one Section/Squad/Group at the site for a week or two.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Particular interest in the Carl Gustav.
> 
> Back to the Swedish Pansar model for a moment.  The Carl Gustav represents the basal element for the organization.  It is useful, flexible, compact, light and reloadable.   A great, inexpensive, training device that has operational value.
> 
> However, in the Swedish organization, the CG84 can be replaced with its single-shot cousin, the AT-4, or the larger more effective single-hot N-LAW system.    Or, and this gets to the heart of my issue, it can be replaced by something like the Javelin issued from Battalion stocks.
> 
> Which leads my wandering mind back to this article and the notion that the Javelin CLU could also be employed with the Stinger missile.  Or, fevered speculation, the 70mm APKWS - with the flechette warhead?  As an anti-drone option?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Raytheon launches Stinger missile from Javelin launcher
> 
> 
> Raytheon has successfully demonstrated firing a Stinger missile from a Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Unit (LWCLU) in a test that saw the missile engage and defeat an uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV).  This could have potential for the CF.  In addition to hand-held Javelin launchers they are...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.army.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If a, lets call it Group, of 16, is on independent security tasking in the north, are they more likely to encounter tanks, or drones?  Would the Group CG-84 operator be better provided with the Stingers? Or even, in flight of fancy, Flechette loaded APKWs?   Either shoulder launched or launched from a UGV?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Or
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Rheinmetall unveils autonomous Mission Master UGV armed with Warmate combat drone
> 
> 
> Rheinmetall adds tube-launched Warmate loitering UAV munitions to its modular Mission Master autonomous unmanned ground vehicle system
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.thedefensepost.com





What, no flamethrowers? 

The Thing | The Blood Test​


----------



## CBH99

The concept above sounds practical and useful, And the obvious skill sets taught could easily be employed elsewhere during a deployment.

If there was a fairly simple yet effective air defense capability  provide provided by the reserve force, it would also allow members of the reserve force (or small subunits) to deploy on both high intensity and medium intensity deployments on short notice, while also providing an extremely valuable capability.  * This could also quite easily be employed to provide loitering munitions from the same launching systems*


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> What, no flamethrowers?
> 
> The Thing | The Blood Test​




Awright man! Gin ye must!

Time to reintroduce this beast?






Although a lot of the younger cognoscenti seem to prefer their "enhanced blast" munitions (thermobarics if fielded by the bad guys).

By the way, if the training venues were moved north to the North Warning Sites - would there be more opportunities for range work?


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> A model for a national defence Militia? Predicated on supplying a force of small security dets for remote locations - specifically the North Warning Sites.


I see two issues.

The first is that I don't really feel a need to build 47 bespoke platoons to defend North Warning Sites. The sites biggest vulnerability is to EW or missile strikes and not sabotage or Spetsnaz raids. At what point in a warning phase do you deploy your six battalions up there and how many more battalions would you need to maintain reasonable rotations. If we do need a physical armed presence there can it be with enhanced Canadian Ranger forces?

The second deals with establishment. Like it or not six of our nine Reg F infantry battalions are LAV mounted and LAVs come with a space limitation that is significantly exceeded by a fifteen man section. Effectively you would need two LAVs per section which means a section in total (including each LAV's 3 man crew) would need to be 21 folks. That's a small platoon in its own right (and your platoon would grow to in excess of 70 personnel).

The answer might be to have two separate establishments: one for a LAV battalion and another for your USMC-like non-LAV "light" platoons albeit one still needs to work out the light platoons' vehicle structure. That's doable but does somewhat limit the usability of the leadership (and to an extent, the rank and file) of the non-LAV folks vis-a-vis operating as augmentees/replacements in a LAV-based unit because the section organizations and platoon tactics will be quite different. That's not to say it can't be overcome but it creates an unnecessary difficulty.

I tend to favour an infantry section organization that is identical in its basic numbers and in weapon configuration to that of the dismounts that will fit in a LAV. Those seven or eight people become both type of platoons' standard manoeuvre elements.

The first level where I see a difference is just above the dismounted rifle section in what constitutes the organic fire support availability of the two different platoons.

In a LAV platoon that fire support is based on the four LAVs and their three-man crews as well as the platoon's small weapons' detachment.

In a light platoon that fire support should be based on a much larger and fairly robust heavy weapons section that's organic to the light platoon (essentially one could add the equivalent the 12 LAV crewmen to the light platoon's weapons section which would end up in having both types of platoon with the same number of personnel). (To go a step further, if a light platoon's weapon section were to be cross-trained in LAV operation and a LAV platoon's LAV crew cross-trained as a dismounted weapons section, then converting from one type of platoon to the other type would be a fairly simple process)

The key here is that the rifle sections are identical and work the same way regardless of whether they are LAV dismounts or a light platoon's rifle sections while the LAV platoon's LAVs and weapons' det and the light platoon's weapons' section perform similar functions making the tactical handling of the two platoon types very similar and easily adaptable/convertible.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I see two issues.
> 
> The first is that I don't really feel a need to build 47 bespoke platoons to defend North Warning Sites. The sites biggest vulnerability is to EW or missile strikes and not sabotage or Spetsnaz raids. At what point in a warning phase do you deploy your six battalions up there and how many more battalions would you need to maintain reasonable rotations. If we do need a physical armed presence there can it be with enhanced Canadian Ranger forces?
> 
> The second deals with establishment. Like it or not six of our nine Reg F infantry battalions are LAV mounted and LAVs come with a space limitation that is significantly exceeded by a fifteen man section. Effectively you would need two LAVs per section which means a section in total (including each LAV's 3 man crew) would need to be 21 folks. That's a small platoon in its own right (and your platoon would grow to in excess of 70 personnel).
> 
> The answer might be to have two separate establishments: one for a LAV battalion and another for your USMC-like non-LAV "light" platoons albeit one still needs to work out the light platoons' vehicle structure. That's doable but does somewhat limit the usability of the leadership (and to an extent, the rank and file) of the non-LAV folks vis-a-vis operating as augmentees/replacements in a LAV-based unit because the section organizations and platoon tactics will be quite different. That's not to say it can't be overcome but it creates an unnecessary difficulty.
> 
> I tend to favour an infantry section organization that is identical in its basic numbers and in weapon configuration to that of the dismounts that will fit in a LAV. Those seven or eight people become both type of platoons' standard manoeuvre elements.
> 
> The first level where I see a difference is just above the dismounted rifle section in what constitutes the organic fire support availability of the two different platoons.
> 
> In a LAV platoon that fire support is based on the four LAVs and their three-man crews as well as the platoon's small weapons' detachment.
> 
> In a light platoon that fire support should be based on a much larger and fairly robust heavy weapons section that's organic to the light platoon (essentially one could add the equivalent the 12 LAV crewmen to the light platoon's weapons section which would end up in having both types of platoon with the same number of personnel). (To go a step further, if a light platoon's weapon section were to be cross-trained in LAV operation and a LAV platoon's LAV crew cross-trained as a dismounted weapons section, then converting from one type of platoon to the other type would be a fairly simple process)
> 
> The key here is that the rifle sections are identical and work the same way regardless of whether they are LAV dismounts or a light platoon's rifle sections while the LAV platoon's LAVs and weapons' det and the light platoon's weapons' section perform similar functions making the tactical handling of the two platoon types very similar and easily adaptable/convertible.
> 
> 🍻




There may not be a need for 47 platoons on the North Warning Line.  There is, in my view a need to create an organisational and training focus for the Canadian Militia - and hanging around waiting for the opportunity to climb in the back of a couple of dozen LAVs in Latvia isn't getting the job done.

47 Platoons?  51 Reserve Infantry battalions.  One Platoon per battalion, each one tasked to launch one Group of 16 every summer to the High Arctic for focused training, and to get familiar both with their site and their country.

And if somebody with a credit card and a wrench starts expressing interest in those sites (I believe sabotage is much more likely than an overt assault, or missile strike, or an EW strike - all of which leave trails) then there is a ready security force available for deployment.

Does the Reserves/Militia have any difficulty getting troops to sign up for the northern exercises and the Arctic Response Company Groups? I don't believe so? Despite the lack of a neighbourhood hofbraeuhaus. 

As to the infantry section being translatable to the LAVs.  Why isn't the 16 person group translatable to the LAVs?

16 people. 4 LAVS.  4 people per LAV.  1 C&S Team.   3 Fire Teams.   

C&S Team is Gp Ldr, Asst Gp Ldr (Laser Designator and Rear-Link), Gp Systems Op (Radio and UAVs with ISR payloads) and Medic-Orderly-Rfmn.

3 Fire Teams with 12 HB Auto Rifles, 3 M320 Grenade Launchers, 1 DMR rifle, 1 CG-84 (M2/M3/M4)

Such pyro and single use munitions are appropriate to the mission.  Very large selection available.


16 organized dismounts in a single Gp allied with 12 organized LAV crew. An organized, co-operative, flexible force of 28. Command structure and cap badges to be sorted out at the mess after the definitive crud match. 


14 LAVs = 1 Platoon of 3 Groups of Rifles and 3 Tps or Sections  of LAVs.

And 1917 Doctrine is chucked.

By the way - if each infantry battalion is tasked to secure a specific site then the Gp Systems Operators could be tasked to monitor remotely an EO/IR system surveilling (and recording) activities at the site.  I am going to speculate (hope) that somebody in the NORAD system is already doing that.    However just in the interest of creating ties, and situational awareness, like the monitors in the backs of the LAVs for the GIBs, I think it would be worthwhile letting the troops see what they are up against.


And, as stated above, the Regs can organize to suit their view of the situation.


----------



## Kirkhill

And, wrt the 6 LAV battalions - fill your boots.  Take the PYs you want and organize as you see fit.  I would reccomend the group configuration but that is just me.

WRT the Light Battalions, once the LAV battalions have taken what they want then form the LIBs around the remainder as XX:YY battalions formed from Regs and Militia (Class A, B and C service).


----------



## MilEME09

Brad Sallows said:


> Maybe that's the key to solving personnel "issues".
> 
> Air force: any more shit out of you, and you're all re-roled to "battalions".
> 
> Navy: any more shit out of you, and all vessels are hereafter "boats" (except submarines, which will be "ships").
> 
> Army: any more shit out of you, and all units will be numbered only, starting from "Unit 1", "Unit 2" etc on the east coast and proceeding west.


That last one is closer to reality then you think for the PRes


----------



## Kirkhill

Clarification

Calgary Highlanders Arctic Platoon tasked to the security of North Warning Station FOX-CA.

Calgary Highlanders required to raise 48 Class A volunteers trained to conduct security and defend a locality.

Proficient in the service pistol, service rifle and unit machine guns as are found in the local armoury, the service grenade launcher and the CG-84 M2 (also found in  the local armouries?) and such radios, EO/IR devices  and single use pyro and munitions as are on common issue.

Trained and equipped to operate in Canada at temperatures down to -50C.

Require  the Platoon's 3 Gp Systems Operators to maintain intermittent situational awareness of the site and its environs and update their command and their Gp.

Require the Calgary Highlands Arctic Platoon of 47 to launch a Gp of 15, augmented by a Militia Medic, to NWS FOX-CA every summer for a period of no more than two weeks.

In the event of the threat level rising then the Calgary Highlanders will consistently rotate Groups to NWS FOX-CA on a two week schedule with each Gp spending 2 weeks on site and 4 weeks in Calgary conducting their usual civilian routine.



The Remainder of the Calgary Highlanders will reorganize their Company Platoons on the Gp system.  Gps can be attached to the Arctic Rapid Response Company Gp,  the Territorial Battle Gp, the Light Infantry Battle Gp or to Reg Force LAV Battle Gps/Brigades.


----------



## Kirkhill

OK

My fever dreams continue.

If my Calgary Highland  Arctic Group System Operators can observe activities at NWS FOX-CA then they can control their UGVs at FOX-CA.

UGV options



A Search and Rescue Package for each NWS site?  Comms, ISTAR, Drone and Ambulance?


----------



## Kirkhill

An armed response package


----------



## Kirkhill

A Cargo Transport Package  



A site rover with UAS?


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> 47 North Warning Sites to defend.
> 
> Consider assigning a Platoon to each one of them.  Each Platoon comprising 3x Sections/Squads/Groups of 16 (including Medic).  One Squad assigned to a two week rotation.  The other Squads back at home.   The Platoon to be activated *when the threat level demands*.  Annual training to include one Section/Squad/Group at the site for a week or
> 
> . . .



Threat level response . . .

Your vision for current threat level response



A more realistic response


----------



## Good2Golf

dimsum said:


> Don't let the rest of the RCAF catch you saying those words!


CRCAF used that term (including when he was the AFG ATF Comd) in the past, so I’d say it’s more an issue with light-blue hotel dwellers getting all pissy over a term that all our Allie’s implicitly understand with great clarity.


----------



## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:


> Threat level response . . .
> 
> Your vision for current threat level response
> 
> View attachment 66863
> 
> A more realistic response
> 
> View attachment 66864



Agreed that much of the response, if not all, could be handled by a nightwatchman.

But.

My intention is to create a focus for organization and training in our backyard.   And, to prepare to defend the country, in the off-chance that someday somebody decides Canada is worth attacking (and defending).


----------



## Kirkhill

Soldiers from the Swedish Home Guard and U.S. Special Forces assigned to 10th Special Forces Group Airborne conduct mission planning during a bilateral exercise in Sweden, on November 25, 2020. The Home Guard is part of the Swedish Armed Forces and comprises nearly half of the Swedish Armed Forces’ body of personnel who are designed to operate across the entire conflict scale from providing peacetime assistance to society in times of crisis, to armed struggle in wartime. (U.S Army photo by Sgt. Patrik Orcutt)






Sweden








						Home Guard
					

The Home Guard is an integral part of the Armed Forces operational force, and at some 22,000-strong, accounts for almost half of Armed Forces personnel. The service is on high alert, with mobilisation times measured in hours rather than days or weeks. It..




					www.forsvarsmakten.se
				





Denmark


			https://www.hjv.dk/sider/english.aspx


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Soldiers from the Swedish Home Guard and U.S. Special Forces assigned to 10th Special Forces Group Airborne conduct mission planning during a bilateral exercise in Sweden, on November 25, 2020. The Home Guard is part of the Swedish Armed Forces and comprises nearly half of the Swedish Armed Forces’ body of personnel who are designed to operate across the entire conflict scale from providing peacetime assistance to society in times of crisis, to armed struggle in wartime. (U.S Army photo by Sgt. Patrik Orcutt)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sweden
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Home Guard
> 
> 
> The Home Guard is an integral part of the Armed Forces operational force, and at some 22,000-strong, accounts for almost half of Armed Forces personnel. The service is on high alert, with mobilisation times measured in hours rather than days or weeks. It..
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.forsvarsmakten.se
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Denmark
> 
> 
> https://www.hjv.dk/sider/english.aspx



We worked a bit with the Danish Home Guard, and the Norwegian equivalent.

My impression was that a good Canadian militia unit is better trained, in many ways.

However, their role was mainly point site defence e.g., bridges, communications nodes etc., and they were integrated with the overal national mobilization strategy. The plan was that they would hold the vital points while the standing army bought time - by striking the Russkies - for the conscripts to be mobilized, I think.

The Noggies could mobilize about a million troops in a week, so the Home Guards kept their weapons at home with enough CSupps on hand for about that length of time.


----------



## Kirkhill

*Danish Defence

Forsvaret

100px

Service branches Royal Danish Army—Hæren (HRN)

Royal Danish Navy—Søværnet (SVN)

Royal Danish Air Force—Flyvevåbnet (FLV)

Leadership

Commander-in-Chief Queen Margrethe II

Defence Minister Nicolai Wammen (Social Democrats)

Chief of Defence General Peter Bartram[1]

Manpower

Military age 18–49

Available for

military service 1,276,087 (2004 est.), age 15–49

Fit for

military service 1,088,751 (2004 est.), age 15–49

Active personnel 24,200 (2011)[2]

Reserve personnel 12,000 + 51,000 (unpaid – not conscripted) volunteers in the Home Guard

Deployed personnel 1,400[3]

Expenditures

Budget 4.33 billion USD (2009)[4]

Percent of GDP 1.4% (2009)*



*The Home Guard is a volunteer (Unpaid) military organisation*.

The Home Guard had 46,651 members as of October 2014 . (Population of Denmark 5.643 Million - < 1%)

The active force had 15,808 volunteer soldiers as of October, 2014. The remaining volunteers belong to the Home Guard Reserve.

Approximately 15 percent of all volunteer soldiers are women.

The task of the Home Guard is to support the Armed Forces – nationally as well as internationally. In addition, the Home Guard supports the police, the emergency services and other authorities in carrying out their duties.

1,845 people applied for enrollment in the Home Guard, and 1,301 volunteers signed a contract in 2014 (as of November 2014).

868 of the new volunteers (68 percent) were aged 18-32.

The appropriation allocated to the Home Guard in the Finance Bill amounted to 498,4 m. DKK in 2014.


The Home Guard has a dual military - civilian leadership:

The Commander of the Home Guard, major general Jens Garly, is responsible for the training and deployment of units and also for the overall supervision of the Home Guard

The Commissioner of the Danish Home Guard, Søren Espersen, is responsible for recruitment and gaining support for the Home Guard in the Danish population.



*The members of the Home Guard take part in the defence and support of the country on a voluntary and unpaid basis*.

Men and women from the age of 18 can apply for membership. A military background is not necessary. The wish to participate is more important.

When membership has been granted, members are admitted into one of the following branches:

The Army Home Guard (link to the site in Danish: Hærhjemmeværnet)

The Naval Home Guard (link to the site in Danish: Marinehjemmeværnet)

The Air Force Home Guard (link to site in Danish: Flyverhjemmeværnet)


*Home Guard Mission*

We contribute to the defence and protection of Denmark by providing a credible and flexible capability *to deliver military volunteer forces that benefit society's needs in all circumstances*.

*Home Guard Vision*

We strive to be an attractive and credible military partner for all who take part in the defence and protection of Denmark.

We want to develop and apply our capacities as part of the collective emergency preparedness.

We want *to create relevant and challenging activities for our volunteers in order to motivate the will to assist.*


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> We worked a bit with the Danish Home Guard, and the Norwegian equivalent.
> 
> My impression was that a good Canadian militia unit is better trained, in many ways.
> 
> However, their role was mainly point site defence e.g., bridges, communications nodes etc., and they were integrated with the overal national mobilization strategy. The plan was that they would hold the vital points while the standing army bought time - by striking the Russkies - for the conscripts to be mobilized, I think.
> 
> The Noggies could mobilize about a million troops in a week, so the Home Guards kept their weapons at home with enough CSupps on hand for about that length of time.



I don't doubt that a "good" Canadian militia unit can be better trained.

On the other hand the Danes and the Swedes are unpaid volunteers and the governments are using them in places where they can be useful.  Not filling the ranks of the Mercenaries hired by the state.


----------



## FJAG

The Swedish Home Guard and the Norwegian Home Guards are principally characterized by their being troops living within the local districts and familiar with its geography and population; able to react quickly within their AOs.

A large plus for them is the size of the population of each country's northern region: appx 500,000 for North Norway's 113,000 sq kms and 1.1 million in 262,000 sq km for Sweden's Norrland - a combined total of 1.6 million people over roughly 380,000 sq kms. 

By contrast the Yukon has 25,000 for 1/2 million sq km; Nunavut 39,000 for 2 million sq km; the Northwest territories 45,000 for 1.4 million sq kms; and Nord-du-Quebec 45,000 for 3/4 of a million sq kms - a combined population total of 150,000 spread over roughly 4.75 million sq kms. 

That's about a tenth of the population for twelve times the territory. One could never generate a large scale Home Guard to cover all of the north with those numbers.

On the other hand with the current 5,000 Rangers and NWS 47 stations one should be able to generate a 100-man Ranger company for each station - if that is the limited objective one wants to cover. IMHO that makes more sense than having 51 Res F infantry battalions in southern Canada dedicated to generating a northern defence platoon each. The local Ranger forces need to be backed up with a highly trained and and very well equipped airborne/airmobile quick reaction forces from the south which, again IMHO, would be a job better tasked to a specialized battalion or two of Reg F light infantry and special forces backed up by an even stronger US Army airborne contingent considering that the NWS resources are joint NORAD ones.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> I don't doubt that a "good" Canadian militia unit can be better trained.
> 
> On the other hand the Danes and the Swedes are unpaid volunteers and the governments are using them in places where they can be useful.  Not filling the ranks of the Mercenaries hired by the state.



IIRC that most Home Guard members are former conscripts, who rejoin after they get a civilian job following their mandatory service, so they have some prior training.

They are also intended to 'die in place', neatly arranged around vital points of course, so their training is almost wholly defensive in nature.

As I recall, they practise repelling various deep penetration 'coup de main' type attacks such as airborne/airmobile/spetznaz type operations.

I doubt we need anything like that here and, if we do, the Canadian Rangers could handle it.

Or, you know, the boys down at the pub wit their pickup trucks with full gun racks


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Or, you know, the boys down at the pub wit their pickup trucks with full gun racks


Does a RAM or an F250 make as good a "technical" as a Toyota Hilux?

😁


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> IIRC that most Home Guard members are former conscripts, who rejoin after they get a civilian job following their mandatory service, so they have some prior training.
> 
> They are also intended to 'die in place', neatly arranged around vital points of course, so their training is almost wholly defensive in nature.
> 
> As I recall, they practise repelling various deep penetration 'coup de main' type attacks such as airborne/airmobile/spetznaz type operations.



Perhaps they are expected to die in place because they have no place to run to?  Their kid sisters and grannies and grandpas live where you find it necessary to denigrate their messy sacrifice.

You said above that they were issued a rifle and week of rations and told to hold on....  You suggested they were waiting for the conscripts to be mobilized and show up.  No. The conscripts are mobilized, with whatever training and kit they have available on the day the Home Guard types are.  And they get used by the Army to do what they can.   

Either the enemy is repulsed in a week, or NATO arrives en masse (and I am not sure a couple of brigades of US, Dutch and British Marines is going to get the job done) or else those people that have not died in place will be deciding whether to collaborate or resist.

That isn't a choice that we Canadians are ever likely to face.  We already collaborate with the Americans.


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Does a RAM or an F250 make as good a "technical" as a Toyota Hilux?
> 
> 😁


Give me a tool box, a welding torch, and an weapons platform and my techs could whip something together


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> . . . the Danes and the Swedes are unpaid volunteers . . .



It's a bit of a stretch to try to make a comparison of Scandinavian "un-paid volunteers"  to "mercenary" Canada Militia.  As I noted with regard to another thread/topic/circumstance, we are not Europeans (Scandinavians), we don't think like them, our government (especially with regards to social and educational benefits) doesn't function like theirs, our histories and cultures are different, our demographics are different and our sense of community is vastly different.

Writing this I am reminded about a few newspaper articles that I came upon while researching something else.  The articles were from Newfoundland newspapers from the 1949/1950s timeframe following that country joining Canada and they dealt with the build-up of the Canadian Militia in the new province.  While veterans of the then recent war were obviously ideal candidates, criteria for selection (they expected more applicants than positions) in the Mo' was current employment (in a civilian job) or full-time attendance in post-secondary school (not that there was a lot of post secondary education in Nfld at the time).  The Militia (at least in Nfld of the time) was not meant to be a source of income for those otherwise unemployed.  By the way, my uncle (who would have been around age 21 at the time) enrolled in the RCE unit that was raised.


----------



## Kirkhill

> April 10-16 is National Volunteer Week, a time to celebrate and thank Canada’s volunteers. _“Volunteers are the roots of strong communities.”_
> 
> The next time you see a responding fire truck, consider this astonishing fact: over 90 per cent of communities across Canada are protected by volunteer firefighters. That’s not a misprint. Outside of a few major cities, you’re safeguarded by these dedicated, highly trained unsung heroes should you experience a roadside medical emergency, serious traffic collision or fire.
> 
> Ontario has 455 fire departments of which 227 are staffed by volunteers, 196 are composite, and only 32 are full-time. Composite departments have some full-time firefighters and a pool of volunteer firefighters on call for major emergencies.
> 
> 
> In human numbers, the province has 19,363 volunteer, 11,318 full-time, and 274 part-time firefighters.
> 
> Volunteer firefighters have paying jobs in other professions and family commitments, just like the rest of us. Yet, they are willing to answer an emergency call day or night and put their lives on the line to keep their community safe — all for little or no pay. (With few exceptions — “gas money” reimbursement seems a more fitting term than “pay.”)
> 
> Before all that can happen, there’s an extensive training commitment. Volunteer firefighters must complete 275 hours of training (Firefighter I) for smaller communities; another 120 hours of training (Firefighter II) for larger municipalities; and for cities with over 200,000 inhabitants, a vocational fire safety diploma is required. Remember, this is typically unpaid time.
> 
> 
> If you’re wondering why full-time firefighters aren’t the norm province-wide, it’s basic economics. A minuscule township with few inhabitants has a small tax base to cover all municipal needs, including basics like garbage removal, snow plowing, etc. They simply can’t afford a full-time fire department — and the ensuing massive hike in liability insurance premiums that service entails.
> 
> 
> For larger municipalities, a composite fire department cuts costs.











						Most Ontario communities are protected by volunteer firefighters
					

Outside of a few major cities, you’re safeguarded by these dedicated, highly trained unsung heroes.




					www.thestar.com
				







> Volunteers​
> The Auxiliary is made up of close to 4,000 dedicated volunteers. The members are primarily pleasure craft operators and commercial fishermen who use their own vessels or community owned vessels for safe boating education and SAR-related activities.
> 
> All CCGA members are dedicated to saving and protecting lives in distress. In addition to their everyday jobs, auxiliarists are ready to exchange leisure, comfort and sleep for cold, wet and fatigue in a range of situations that will test their skills, strength and nerve.
> 
> When taking part in authorized SAR activities, they are compensated only for the cost of their fuel and little else, save a thank-you from the victims or their families for their tireless efforts.
> 
> Fleet​
> Currently, the CCGA fleet includes over 1,130 vessels with a combined asset value of over 300 million dollars. Vessels are either privately owned, community owned or loaned by the Canadian Coast Guard to the Auxiliary.
> 
> All vessels must meet strict standards in order to become part of the Auxiliary fleet. Members are responsible for keeping their boats maintained. In addition, they are required to equip them with specialized search and rescue gear, which can run into the thousands of dollars.





			https://ccga-gcac.ca/about-us/
		




> WHAT WE DO
> Caring for communities from coast-to-coast St. John Ambulance Canada has more than 15,000 volunteers and coordinates one of the country’s largest volunteer networks. Our volunteers positively impact the lives of millions of Canadians each year.
> While the financial contribution of St. John Ambulance community service volunteers could be calculated in millions of dollars, the contribution to the safety of Canadians is immeasurable. When Canadians need them, our volunteers have an unmatched record of answering the call.
> 
> 
> 3,900
> 3,900 THERAPY DOG TEAMS
> 
> 
> 5,300
> 5,300 MEDICAL FIRST RESPONDERS
> 
> 
> 15,000
> 15,000 VOLUNTEERS








						Community Services | Become a Volunteer | St John Ambulance
					

More than 10,000 Canadians volunteer with SJA. Our volunteer Medical First Responders provide first aid at public events, our Therapy Dog handler teams provide friendly visits at hospitals and seniors homes. Become a volunteer and positively impact your




					www.sja.ca
				






> Our History​Established in 1996, the Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of Canada (SARVAC) is a federally incorporated registered Canadian Charity that provides a national voice for ground search and rescue volunteers in Canada.
> We address issues of common concern, to develop consistency, and promote standardization or portability of programs and volunteers, and deliver initiatives that benefit and support all ground search and rescue volunteers in Canada, as well as the general public.
> SARVAC represents the thirteen provincial and territorial volunteer Ground Search and Rescue Associations in Canada.  The Board of Directors is comprised of volunteer representatives from each of the provinces and territories.  Ultimately, SARVAC represents the interests of 9,000 Ground Search and Rescue (GSAR) volunteers throughout Canada who provide search and rescue services on land and inland waters.












						Volunteer | Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of Canada
					

Volunteer with SARVAC! Click the YouTube links to view brief videos of ground search and rescue in Canada.




					sarvac.ca
				




It seems that we don't lack willing bodies.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> If a, lets call it Group, of 16, is on independent security tasking in the north, are they more likely to encounter tanks, or drones?  Would the Group CG-84 operator be better provided with the Stingers? Or even, in flight of fancy, Flechette loaded APKWs?


They are extremely unlikely to encounter either.  What they could possibly face is incoming cruise missiles.  Or even more likely swarming blackflies.  The most effective "weapon" for infantry posted to northern radar sites would likely be DEET.

Defending the North realistically is a role for the RCAF and possibly the RCA if we ever get into the long range AD game, not infantry...no matter how you choose to arm them.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> They are extremely unlikely to encounter either.  What they could possibly face is incoming cruise missiles.  Or even more likely swarming blackflies.  The most effective "weapon" for infantry posted to northern radar sites would likely be DEET.
> 
> Defending the North realistically is a role for the RCAF and possibly the RCA if we ever get into the long range AD game, not *infantry*...no matter how you choose to arm them.



Unless you want to consider the Canadian Rangers as a kind of Infantry, I guess.

The Rangers' brand is so strong if we wanted to expand community engagement in sovereignty patrols it would make sense to build on that successful model, and stand up more units, than creating something else from scratch.


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> Most Ontario communities are protected by volunteer firefighters
> 
> 
> Outside of a few major cities, you’re safeguarded by these dedicated, highly trained unsung heroes.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.thestar.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://ccga-gcac.ca/about-us/
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Community Services | Become a Volunteer | St John Ambulance
> 
> 
> More than 10,000 Canadians volunteer with SJA. Our volunteer Medical First Responders provide first aid at public events, our Therapy Dog handler teams provide friendly visits at hospitals and seniors homes. Become a volunteer and positively impact your
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.sja.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Volunteer | Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of Canada
> 
> 
> Volunteer with SARVAC! Click the YouTube links to view brief videos of ground search and rescue in Canada.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> sarvac.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It seems that we don't lack willing bodies.


About 10 years ago I was involved in a multiple day SAR operation to locate a missing girl in the Rocky Mountains (Alberta side.)

I was absolutely blown away at how many unpaid volunteers not only showed up, but had solid and uniform kit, professional, and quite a few were just as well trained & competent as several paramedics I knew.  

At first I had assumed they were a sizeable contingent from a town nearby, or had been brought in from a larger, non-volunteer fire service.  Their working kit was high quality, bright, same shoulder patches, good radios, and were very professional.  

When I learned they were volunteers, to be honest I was just blown away and grateful for them.  Very appreciative.  

Most of them spent the whole 3 days out there with us, with an RCMP helicopter doing it’s thing in the evening using some kind of enhanced imaging/FLIR.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Thales is deeply ingrained in their Military -- their conventional army wanted to replace the F88 AusSteyr (AUG) a short while back and was basically told that any small arms work needed to view from a Thales based F88 upgrade as opposed to a C8 derivative.
> 
> 
> https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-11/ef88_lrip_poster_4.pdf
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> F88 Austeyr - F88A2 with ring sight and F88A2 with ACOG RMR and GLA | Army.gov.au
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.army.gov.au
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But they managed an upgrade with rails and a Grenade Launcher that doesn't hang down a retarded amount "for safety"
> So given the constraints of their Budget - their LCMM ran an upgrade that was head and shoulders above the CF's...


I remember seeing the Aussies show up when I was on exchange in NZ (the basis of my dislike of separate LAV Bns but I digress) and thinking it was an SF unit when they dismounted; much to my dismay they were just very well equipped infantry. Australia, in general, is an example of how to run a small military, but they have a bunch of neighbors that incentivize their defense investment.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Theoretically Canadians could almost be like one of the cultures of a nation that shared a border or neighbourhood with the Warsaw Pact, but not really given the amount of ice and water involved.  That accounts for some differences.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Unless you want to consider the Canadian Rangers as a kind of Infantry, I guess.
> 
> The Rangers' brand is so strong if we wanted to expand community engagement in sovereignty patrols it would make sense to build on that successful model, and stand up more units, than creating something else from scratch.


AND ... you could then stand up one or two southern SFCB units (either Reg F or Res F or both) whose primary task is to go north and year-by-year train the locals in the more esoteric aspects of basic infantry skills while learning from them the more esoteric aspects of life in the arctic. The SFCBs could then become your reaction force (I won't say quick because they probably won't be but they'll be experienced and more heavily equipped).

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Unless you want to consider the Canadian Rangers as a kind of Infantry, I guess.
> 
> The Rangers' brand is so strong if we wanted to expand community engagement in sovereignty patrols it would make sense to build on that successful model, and stand up more units, than creating something else from scratch.



Rangers were among the first forces organized with local manpower to protect settlements in the Carolinas (1657)



> Rangers were county officers in North Carolina from the colonial period until 1868. The post was a survival of British officialdom when royal parks and forests were patrolled against intruders and poachers. Their specific duties in North Carolina were defined by law at various times during the eighteenth century. Although rangers were expected to serve "for the Protection and Defense of the Frontier," it is unclear from the term whether some of them were engaged in the War of the Regulation to quell the uprising.
> 
> Rangers were appointed by the justices of the county court for a term of one year. One of their main county duties was to watch for stray livestock and to return it to its owner, for which they received specific compensation. They were also instructed to see that hunters did not leave deer that they had killed in the woods to attract vermin.



1675 - the first Ranger unit raised in North America



> *Benjamin Church* (c. 1639 – January 17, 1718) was an English colonist in North America. He was a military leader of the historic predecessor of the United States Army Rangers,[1] captain of the first Ranger force in America (1675).[2] Church was commissioned by Josiah Winslow, the Governor of the Plymouth Colony, to form the first ranger company for King Philip's War. He later commanded the company to raid Acadia during King William's and Queen Anne's wars in the early 1700s, as French and English hostilities played out in North America. The two powers were competing for control in colonial territories. He was promoted to major and ended his service at the rank of colonel, as noted on his gravestone.
> 
> Church designed his forces to emulate Indian practices of warfare. Toward this end, he worked to adopt Indian techniques of small, flexible forces that used the woods and ground for cover, rather than mounting frontal attacks in military formation.[1] English colonists developed as rangers under the tutelage of their Native American allies. (Until the end of the colonial period, rangers depended on Indians as both allies and teachers.)[3]
> 
> Church developed a special full-time unit that combined European colonists, selected for their frontier skills, with friendly Indians in order to carry out offensive strikes against hostile Indians and French in difficult terrain. He used such rangers as militia where the normal practices of having troops march and attack in formation were ineffective. His memoirs, _Entertaining Passages relating to Philip's War_, were published in 1716 and are considered to constitute the first American military manual.



1734 - Oglethorpe's Rangers in Georgia  (MacKay's Independent Coy of Rangers, the Highland Rangers, the Mounted Rangers)

1744 - Gorham's Rangers in Nova Scotia

1755 - Rogers' Rangers in New Hampshire

The various Rangers and Irregulars of the French and Indian Wars, the Revolutionary War and the war of 1812.

Arguably the Ranger "Brand" is synonymous with national defence and the militia in Canada and North America.



Question:  After all these years of preaching Total Force and designating the Militia as place fillers for the Regular Force is there space to consider re-instituting the Miilitia as a separate volunteer home guard entity, either as the Militia or adopting the Ranger umbrella?

Constitute the Regular Force, and its Reserves, as a separate entity with different contracts and terms of service, open to the population at large, including Rangers/Militia?

Perrin Beatty wanted to raise the Militia numbers to a strength of 90,000 volunteers.  The Danes, Swedes and Norwegians raise those kinds of numbers.  In Canada we raise those kinds of numbers of unpaid volunteers, who daily put themselves at risk of physical harm, in multiple para-military organizations. 



> NFPA estimates there were approximately 152,650 local firefighters in the Canada during the period 2014 to 2016. Of the total number of firefighters 26,000 (17%) were career firefighters and 126,650 (83%) were volunteer firefighters.
> 
> Most of the career firefighters worked in communities that protected 50,000 or more people. Most of the volunteer firefighters were in departments that protected fewer than 50,000 people. There is an estimated 3,672 fire departments in Canada. Of these, 66 departments were staffed by all career firefighters, 44 were mostly career, 501 were mostly volunteer and 3,061 were all volunteer. In Canada, 1,626 (44%) of departments provided no EMS service, 1,860 departments (51%) provided EMS service, and 186 (5 %) of departments provided EMS and advanced life support.








						NFPA report - Canadian Fire Department Profile
					

This report includes results on career and volunteer fire firefighters per 1,000 people protected, department type, stations and apparatus rates per 1,000 people, and whether EMS is provided.



					www.nfpa.org
				




I don't think we are short of potential volunteers.   We just need to give them a better reason to join.   And it isn't always about the money.  Kit, training and a useful role are more important.   And many of them would be content with access to a F-150 and an ATV, a radio and a decent rifle and good navigation and observation kit.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Theoretically Canadians could almost be like one of the cultures of a nation that shared a border or neighbourhood with the Warsaw Pact, but not really given the amount of ice and water involved.  That accounts for some differences.



Brad, we're starting to head into Saturday Night Live territory here.  If we are justified in saying that CFS Alert is in our backyard then was Sarah Palin, as governor of Alaska not justified as saying she could see Russia from her backyard?  Little Diomede is in her backyard just as much as Alert is in ours.   Big Diomede is in Russia and is only 3.8 km away.  Reachable by small boat and snowmobile.  The inhabitants are related to our Inuit and Dene.  We are tied to assist the US in the Continental Defence of North America via NorthCom and NORAD.  The Americans invest in arctic capable forces.  

I struggle to understand why we have such an aversion to at least matching their Arctic force with a Brigade of our own when most of our territory demands such a capability.   A capability that would help in peacetime in Canada and anywhere else in the Arctic Region in peace and war.

Are we that tied to the asphalt?








Reserve component units located throughout the state include:


Alaska Army National Guard:
Joint Force Headquarters
207th Multi-Function Training Regiment
Recruiting and Retention Battalion
Medical Detachment

38th Troop Command
1st Battalion, 207th Aviation Regiment (GSAB)
1st Battalion, 297th Infantry Regiment
49th Missile Defense Battalion

297th Regional Support Group
297th Military Police Company                       
208th Construction Management Team         
207th Engineer Utility Detachment
134th Public Affairs Detachment
49th Personnel Detachment


United States Army Reserve:
2nd Battalion, 196th Infantry Brigade
Company B, 411th Engineer Battalion


Alaska/Population
731,545 (2019)









						Army Alaska wants to recruit cold-weather lovers and have them train with Norwegians, Indians in Himalayas
					

Army Alaska wants to source more volunteers from soldiers still in training, rather than rely solely on picking soldiers at random to head to its northern outposts.




					www.armytimes.com


----------



## quadrapiper

CBH99 said:


> About 10 years ago I was involved in a multiple day SAR operation to locate a missing girl in the Rocky Mountains (Alberta side.)
> 
> I was absolutely blown away at how many unpaid volunteers not only showed up, but had solid and uniform kit, professional, and quite a few were just as well trained & competent as several paramedics I knew.
> 
> At first I had assumed they were a sizeable contingent from a town nearby, or had been brought in from a larger, non-volunteer fire service.  Their working kit was high quality, bright, same shoulder patches, good radios, and were very professional.
> 
> When I learned they were volunteers, to be honest I was just blown away and grateful for them.  Very appreciative.
> 
> Most of them spent the whole 3 days out there with us, with an RCMP helicopter doing it’s thing in the evening using some kind of enhanced imaging/FLIR.


Spent a number of years with volunteer SAR in the Cowichan Valley. Quite a busy part of the local emergency response apparatus, and that with a patchwork funding structure that's absolutely appalling (some provincial support and governance including JIBC coursing, some regional district (but not _much_) support, local SAR society fundraising, and provincial SAR society fundraising/resources - I might be missing a few, it's been a while).

Like you, was always impressed with the number of trained volunteers who'd turn out, especially for multi-day mutual aid events well outside their home area. SAR hat firmly on, it's a shame there's not a more direct link between the PRes and civvy ground SAR: even just something like adding the local Army Reserve to the call list should any wish to turn out as as-available volunteers.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I struggle to understand why we have such an aversion to at least matching their Arctic force with a Brigade of our own when most of our territory demands such a capability. A capability that would help in peacetime in Canada and anywhere else in the Arctic Region in peace and war.


I'll repeat here what I said in the Arctic Ops thread when you suggested having the existing "185" Res F units be formed into units of 100 paid troops and 500 unpaid volunteers with each generating a platoon to be paired with one of the 190 odd Ranger patrols.



FJAG said:


> I know that the 185 Reserve Units comes from an older CAF webpage but I think it's completely out to lunch.
> 
> The Army P Res has 115 Bn sized units (including arty, engr, sigs and service bns) and 10 Independent coys sized elements (incl arty and int) that may have unit status. There are an additional 4 MP Regiments and 15 H Svcs PRes units which do not belong to the Army. After that you have to start looking at 24 NavRes division and 3 AirRes squadrons and four flights. All of that combined isn't 185 Res F units
> 
> I'm not so sure of why you wish to share the misery joy of creating a large force of paid and unpaid personnel to take on both military and para or quasi military responsibilities when we can barely maintain 19,000 paid ones.
> 
> Japan is an excellent example of how the civilian population and volunteers are integrated into natural disaster programs. Canada has both federal and provincial Emergency Management organizations. It would behoove our government to leverage those systems with increased specialized and general service volunteers tailored to the most likely disasters specific to each district/region.
> 
> I know the Res F has once again started dabbling in the snakes and ladders field (I'm a victim and survivor of the 1960s Militia debacle) and quite frankly I'm agin' it. The Res F has little enough time and resources to become proficient in its military roles much less the personnel training and logistic requirements of HADR including the cat herding 90,000 volunteers. If the Army wants the Res F to be a pseudo ARNG then get them properly organized, equipped and trained in their military roles first.
> 
> The way the P Res functions now is dysfunctional. The suggested method is not only impractical but would gut any possibility of creating truly operational units. Sorry, IMHO, its a solution looking for a problem based on some vague European _Landwehr_ concept that has basically died out.



With respect to the "Alaska" proposal, the limitation is the same as for North Norway/Sweden - the lack of population vs the scale of the territory involved. Alaska has a population of 731,000 with an area of 1.7 million sq km compared to our North's 150,000 spread over roughly 4.75 million sq kms. Almost half of those people live around Anchorage which is also where the majority of the Alaska ARNG come from. There are only some 1,850 soldiers in the Alaska ARNG (which is admittedly a higher ratio that P Res personnel in Alberta). 

Should we designate a Reg F brigade for the Arctic. Yup. I've said this a long time ago - we should form into heavy, medium and light brigades (a Reg F brigade of each) with the heavy targeted at NATO, the medium to peacekeeping/failed states scenarios and the light to quick reaction and defence of Canada (including the Arctic). Right now there are three light battalions which amongst other things have a capability to deploy North including a para capability. On top of that we have a Special Forces Regiment that has even better capabilities to deal with small incursions and is advertised as being able to operate in harsh conditions with a mandate to be deployed domestically as well as abroad). 

But let's remember the scale here. The US has 2 of its 45 Active Army manoeuvre BCTs in Alaska. That's 5% of the Active US Army. 5% of Canada's 12 Reg F Manoeuvre bns/regts is a little over 1/2 a battalion. We already have JTF North in Yellowknife with some 314 staff plus some minor assigned units (1 Ranger Patrol Group [with roughly 50 full-time staff and 2,000 part-time Rangers], a coy of the LER, and 440 Trans Sqn). That's almost half a battalion right there. In addition there are 3 other Ranger Patrol Groups and their full-time staff and four northern response companies, one with each Division) That's a full battalion.

We might have a massive amount of territory to deal with but we only have a tiny military which seems to be doing what is reasonable as far as allocating troops. Do we need a better infrastructure and sustainment system - sure - we need a better system for a lot of things but that isn't to say we have an aversion to matching the US's Arctic force. Within the limits of what we can do, we're doing okay.

🍻


----------



## CBH99

quadrapiper said:


> Spent a number of years with volunteer SAR in the Cowichan Valley. Quite a busy part of the local emergency response apparatus, and that with a patchwork funding structure that's absolutely appalling (some provincial support and governance including JIBC coursing, some regional district (but not _much_) support, local SAR society fundraising, and provincial SAR society fundraising/resources - I might be missing a few, it's been a while).
> 
> Like you, was always impressed with the number of trained volunteers who'd turn out, especially for multi-day mutual aid events well outside their home area. SAR hat firmly on, it's a shame there's not a more direct link between the PRes and civvy ground SAR: even just something like adding the local Army Reserve to the call list should any wish to turn out as as-available volunteers.


Such a simple thing to do, as well.  It would be great if the CO of a unit, or the senior leadership of an Army Reserve area would reach out and do just that. 

-  Great PR to have the local Army Reserve involved in SAR.  Coordinate with responsible agency, re accommodations & meals

-  To add to the above, it would give the CAF some much needed positive PR, even if just local.  Good to remind people that a vast majority of our members are NOT involved with current scandals at the top.  

-  A great opportunity to be more in the public eye, which if played correctly could eventually mean decently useful reform, reliable funding, etc. 

-  Gives interested troops an opportunity to help with something meaningful, which is why I think most of us joined up in the first place


The best ideas are usually the simplest.  That’s a great one 👍🏻


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> Such a simple thing to do, as well.  It would be great if the CO of a unit, or the senior leadership of an Army Reserve area would reach out and do just that.
> 
> -  Great PR to have the local Army Reserve involved in SAR.  Coordinate with responsible agency, re accommodations & meals
> 
> -  To add to the above, it would give the CAF some much needed positive PR, even if just local.  Good to remind people that a vast majority of our members are NOT involved with current scandals at the top.
> 
> -  A great opportunity to be more in the public eye, which if played correctly could eventually mean decently useful reform, reliable funding, etc.
> 
> -  Gives interested troops an opportunity to help with something meaningful, which is why I think most of us joined up in the first place
> 
> 
> The best ideas are usually the simplest.  That’s a great one 👍🏻



No CO of any Reserve unit has the time, bandwidth or resources for that kind of reaching out, in my experience anyways. 

They tend to live in a world of belt fed emails with various urgent requirements, only about half of which seem relevant to their assigned tasks.

It's all they can do to keep their own troops 'engaged'. Regimental Family are a distant 2nd or 3rd, of course.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I'll repeat here what I said in the Arctic Ops thread when you suggested having the existing "185" Res F units be formed into units of 100 paid troops and 500 unpaid volunteers with each generating a platoon to be paired with one of the 190 odd Ranger patrols.
> 
> 
> 
> With respect to the "Alaska" proposal, the limitation is the same as for North Norway/Sweden - the lack of population vs the scale of the territory involved. Alaska has a population of 731,000 with an area of 1.7 million sq km compared to our North's 150,000 spread over roughly 4.75 million sq kms. Almost half of those people live around Anchorage which is also where the majority of the Alaska ARNG come from. There are only some 1,850 soldiers in the Alaska ARNG (which is admittedly a higher ratio that P Res personnel in Alberta).
> 
> Should we designate a Reg F brigade for the Arctic. Yup. I've said this a long time ago - we should form into heavy, medium and light brigades (a Reg F brigade of each) with the heavy targeted at NATO, the medium to peacekeeping/failed states scenarios and the light to quick reaction and defence of Canada (including the Arctic). Right now there are three light battalions which amongst other things have a capability to deploy North including a para capability. On top of that we have a Special Forces Regiment that has even better capabilities to deal with small incursions and is advertised as being able to operate in harsh conditions with a mandate to be deployed domestically as well as abroad).
> 
> But let's remember the scale here. The US has 2 of its 45 Active Army manoeuvre BCTs in Alaska. That's 5% of the Active US Army. 5% of Canada's 12 Reg F Manoeuvre bns/regts is a little over 1/2 a battalion. We already have JTF North in Yellowknife with some 314 staff plus some minor assigned units (1 Ranger Patrol Group [with roughly 50 full-time staff and 2,000 part-time Rangers], a coy of the LER, and 440 Trans Sqn). That's almost half a battalion right there. In addition there are 3 other Ranger Patrol Groups and their full-time staff and four northern response companies, one with each Division) That's a full battalion.
> 
> We might have a massive amount of territory to deal with but we only have a tiny military which seems to be doing what is reasonable as far as allocating troops. Do we need a better infrastructure and sustainment system - sure - we need a better system for a lot of things but that isn't to say we have an aversion to matching the US's Arctic force. Within the limits of what we can do, we're doing okay.
> 
> 🍻


To Kirkill's point - Alaska is 1 State, of 50, while Canada has a much larger portion of it's Provinces arctic facing/bordering.
  Which make the 5% number not comparable, and most likely should be a 25-33% number for Canada.

Additionally when one looks at Canada's coast line - and terrain across Canada - the lack of Amphibious, Arctic, Mountain etc troops is kind of confusing, as well as when one looks at the "Heavy" Bde, and it's lack of ATGM's etc -- one has to wonder what the CA is focused on - because it really is neither Fish nor Fowl.


----------



## Kirkhill

The Militia Regiment is a community unit.  The Honoraries are reflective of that.  CO's  May not have the bandwidth.  The Honoraries and the Regiment should have the bandwidth.

The Militia Unit is an administrative one.  One of its jobs is to raise soldiers for service with the Regs.   It is a marketing and recruiting agency.  Its primary  job is to get local youngsters engaged and keep volunteers available.  

To ask that each Militia Regiment maintain a Company of "Active" volunteers, with Regular Force trainers, is neither unrealistic nor is it without historical precedence.  In fact is the essence of the Militia system.  Preceding Sam Hughes by a millenia or two at least.

The Army has come to understand the advantages of Cadets and the Cadet Instructor Cadre.  They have welcomed both the Bold Eagle and the Junior Ranger programs which sit well with both Northern and Western First Nations.  The Militia Regiment could just as easily supply a formed GSAR element, or CCGA, or CASARA element that would raise the profile of the Regiment, and by extension, the Army.




> Are you an Indigenous person living in western Canada or north-western Ontario? Interested in a challenging summer experience that delivers hands-on skills development, encourages teamwork, provides physical fitness training and promotes cultural awareness?
> 
> If so, *Bold Eagle* is the program for you! This unique summer training program combines Indigenous culture and teachings with military training, that will help you *develop valuable skills such as self-confidence, self-discipline, teamwork, time management, respect and fitness*.
> 
> The program is made up of two parts.
> 
> The first week involves the Culture Camp, where you will learn traditional Indigenous values and teachings as demonstrated by Indigenous Elders or teachers. The Culture Camp *helps candidates understand the need for self-discipline and teamwork and instills pride and the sense of continuing the Indigenous tradition of military service.*
> 
> At the end of the first week, you will continue your *military training with CAF military instructors. The course itself is the standard five-week Army Reserve Basic Military Qualification (BMQ). During the BMQ course, you will learn a number of skills, including weapons handling, navigation with a map and compass, first aid,  drill, outdoor field craft and survival skills.*




What Junior Canadian Rangers do





__





						What Junior Canadian Rangers do - Canada.ca
					

Junior Canadian Ranger (JCR) program has three basic “circles” of training: ranger skills, life skills, and traditional skills.




					www.canada.ca
				




What Army (And Other) Cadets do





__





						Army Cadets - Canada.ca
					

Information regarding the Royal Canadian Army Cadet Program.




					www.canada.ca
				







__





						What Cadets do - Canada.ca
					

Skills that Cadets from all 3 elements can gain during the program.




					www.canada.ca
				




What Rangers do




> The Canadian Rangers are a part of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Reserves working in remote, isolated and coastal regions of Canada. They provide lightly-equipped, self-sufficient mobile forces to support CAF national security and public safety operations within Canada. They regularly train alongside other CAF members to remain prepared.
> 
> Their motto is ‘Vigilans,’ meaning ‘The Watchers.’
> 
> Some of the ways they protect Canada include:
> 
> 
> Conducting patrols;
> Reporting unusual activities or sightings;
> Collecting local data for the CAF;
> Performing sovereignty or national security duties;
> Assisting in search and rescue efforts;
> Assisting with natural disasters such as forest fires and floods.







> Training​
> *Canadian Rangers are considered trained on enrolme**n**t,* which is *based on the recognition th**a**t:*
> 
> _They are knowledgeable and personally equipped to survive and efficiently operate on the land;_
> _They are intimately familiar with the local population, industries, terrain, weather and other conditions within their area;_
> _They are able to recognize, observe and report on any unusual ships, aircraft or incidents within their area; and_
> _In the opinion of the Commanding Officer of the Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (CRPG), they possess useful skills for duties in their area._
> Canadian Rangers can chose to participate in two optional individual training courses:
> 
> Basic Military Indoctrination Training (10 days), which includes:
> 
> General Canadian Ranger service knowledge;
> How to function as a patrol member;
> Canadian Armed Forces benefits and administrative requirements;
> How to fire the service rifle; and
> How to employ bush craft and first aid.
> 
> Canadian Ranger Patrol Leaders Course (10 days), which includes:
> 
> Leading a patrol;
> Conducting patrol administration; and
> Conducting small arms ranges.
> Canadian Rangers also receive 12 days of collective patrol sustainment training each year which may involve advanced levels of first aid, flood and fire evacuation, search and rescue, disaster assistance, communications, marksmanship exercises, navigation, and setting up bivouac sites. While they support Canadian Armed Forces tactical maneuvers and other operations as guides or terrain experts, they are not tactically trained.



The "trained on enrolment" acceptance could apply equally to anybody who works in downtown Calgary or spends all their free time up the Forestry Trunk Road on the Eastern Slopes.



It is fashionable to laugh at Sam Hughes.  At the same time we revere Arthur Currie.  Both were products of the Militia and the Militia System.  Arguably Arthur Currie, and the Australian Monash, were exemplars of the Militia system.



For 150 years the Canadian Regular Force has lived in fear of being relegated to its roots and employed as a few thousand bodies in training companies scattered across the country.    It happened in 1886 after the NW Rebellion, in 1904 after the Boer War, in 1919 after the Great War, in 1945 after WW2.  And it is bound and determined it won't happen again.

And I agree.  It shouldn't happen again.

But the Militia is not the enemy.  It is an exploitable resource for the Regular Force.  A source of willing bodies, potentially with skill sets that can be employed when hired to operate "the Army Way".


And for the record, this is also soldiering.



























Just as much as this















So the dichotomy is not between 









Those are the same people.   Someday's all that's needed are a cell phone and a cool set of Raybans.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> To Kirkill's point - Alaska is 1 State, of 50, while Canada has a much larger portion of it's Provinces arctic facing/bordering.
> Which make the 5% number not comparable, and most likely should be a 25-33% number for Canada.


One factor that makes the Alaska situation different than the Canadian Arctic situation is the proximity of US military airfields in Alaska to the Bering Strait and Russian naval and air bases in the Russian Far East.  The Alaskan bases provide an offensive risk to Russian forces in a way that Canadian Arctic military facilities do not.  

That puts the Alaskan facilities more at risk to attack by Russian forces to eliminate that risk (thus requiring their own military forces to defend against such attacks) while by comparison Canadian Arctic facilities are primarily designed to detect an attack on North America by Russian strategic nuclear forces.  If the Russians attack our NWS facilities it means that ICBMs and nuclear cruise missiles are incoming.  If that happens we'll have much more to worry about than defending 47 remote radar sites against Spetznaz teams (and those 47 x Arctic Vital Point Defence Platoons will now likely be stranded in their remote Arctic locations with little hope of evacuation or relief).


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> To Kirkill's point - Alaska is 1 State, of 50, while Canada has a much larger portion of it's Provinces arctic facing/bordering.
> Which make the 5% number not comparable, and most likely should be a 25-33% number for Canada.
> 
> Additionally when one looks at Canada's coast line - and terrain across Canada - the lack of Amphibious, Arctic, Mountain etc troops is kind of confusing, as well as when one looks at the "Heavy" Bde, and it's lack of ATGM's etc -- one has to wonder what the CA is focused on - because it really is neither Fish nor Fowl.




From the 1 CRPG site.



> The* 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (1 CRPG)* is* responsible for Nunavut Territory, Yukon Territory, Northwest Territories, and Atlin, British Columbia*, which accounts for *about 40 percent of Canada's land mass*. 1 CRPG has an establishment of *1,800 Canadian Rangers in 60 patrols and more than 1,400 Junior Canadian Rangers (JCRs) in 44 patrols* located in communities across the north. 1 CRPG’s headquarters is located in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories and reports to 3rd Canadian Division.



Population of Nunavut - 38,780
Population of Yukon - 42,986
Population of Northwest Territories - 44,826
Population of Atlin, BC - 477

40% of Landmass of Canada - 4,000,000 km2 (2000 km x 2000 km square, or a circle of radius 1100 km)


So, to the point,  with 90,000 Homeguard Volunteers organized around the Militia Regiment, you are looking at 90,000 security guards with cell phones, 90,000 Cadet Instructors, 90,000 SAR volunteers, 90,000 emergency responders, 90,000 rangers, 90,000 active reservists if required, or, even 90,000 regular force gunners should the government decide that is what is required.

Currently the requirement of the Militia is that it provide 19,000 volunteers at various levels of readiness to reinforce the regular force in exchange for a generally stipendiary payment.


----------



## Kirkhill

To reiterate from the Danish Homeguard website



> *The task of the Home Guard is to support the Armed Forces *– nationally as well as internationally.  *In addition, the Home Guard supports the police, the emergency services and other authorities in carrying out their duties.*





> *The members of the Home Guard take part in the defence and support of the country on a voluntary and unpaid basi*s.
> 
> Men and women from the age of 18 can apply for membership. *A military background is not necessary. The wish to participate is more important.*


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> One factor that makes the Alaska situation different than the Canadian Arctic situation is the proximity of US military airfields in Alaska to the Bering Strait and Russian naval and air bases in the Russian Far East.  The Alaskan bases provide an offensive risk to Russian forces in a way that Canadian Arctic military facilities do not.


Yes and no - I'll explain my theory below


GR66 said:


> That puts the Alaskan facilities more at risk to attack by Russian forces to eliminate that risk (thus requiring their own military forces to defend against such attacks) while by comparison Canadian Arctic facilities are primarily designed to detect an attack on North America by Russian strategic nuclear forces.  If the Russians attack our NWS facilities it means that ICBMs and nuclear cruise missiles are incoming.  If that happens we'll have much more to worry about than defending 47 remote radar sites against Spetznaz teams (and those 47 x Arctic Vital Point Defence Platoons will now likely be stranded in their remote Arctic locations with little hope of evacuation or relief).


The Russians, Chinese etc are masters of discontent - they rarely just try the brute force rush these days -- they try to divide alliances, weaken a people, insert insurgents.   Global Nuclear War is generally a Lose - Lose proposition, the whole mutually assured destruction aspect.

 But sowing discontent - sabotage (as it's happened before) in the North, and 'squatters' aren't unrealistic options.   Also as the Ice Age continues to recede, the areas of the North become much more appealing -- China isn't alone in the ability to man make islands.

At the end of the day, possession is 9/10th's the law, and armed possession is the other tenth.
   If you can't credibly posses the territory - someone will eventually do that.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Yes and no - I'll explain my theory below
> 
> The Russians, Chinese etc are masters of discontent - they rarely just try the brute force rush these days -- they try to divide alliances, weaken a people, insert insurgents.   Global Nuclear War is generally a Lose - Lose proposition, the whole mutually assured destruction aspect.
> 
> But sowing discontent - sabotage (as it's happened before) in the North, and 'squatters' aren't unrealistic options.   Also as the Ice Age continues to recede, the areas of the North become much more appealing -- China isn't alone in the ability to man make islands.
> 
> At the end of the day, possession is 9/10th's the law, and armed possession is the other tenth.
> If you can't credibly posses the territory - someone will eventually do that.



In 2007, 7 years before little green men started taking vacations in the Crimea in 2014, I found reason to refer to  the 1998 book on the SAS.














						Iran Super Thread- Merged
					

I don’t disagree with you, Kirkhill, so long as we stipulate that the ‘democracy’ will look something like that which existed in England under Henry VII, 500ish years ago – when the Lords Spiritual still vastly outnumbered the Lords Temporal and the Commons, combined.  If it was good enough for...




					army.ca
				






> One of the "baseline" books that I  keep referring to is Ken O'Connor's "Ghost Force" about his time in the SAS and his reckoning that his SAS was out of the game these days.
> 
> His SAS was a combination of "Green Ops" as I believe you call the "conventional" military role and what I will call "under the radar" conventional ops.  Small units, militarily equipped, inserted into Operations Other Than War.
> 
> He reckoned that in future people in his business wouldn't be flying around the world with kitbags full of Small Arms and C4.  They would fly in in suits with American Express cards.  If they wanted to take down a refinery they would use their skills to enter undetected, use a locally purchased adjustable wrench to unbolt the appropriate critical gizmo and leave the way they came.  The refinery gets taken down but no one is to blame.  Likewise with power grids.  Slacken off the plug that keeps the cooling oil in the transformer then watch it drip away and the transformer overheats.  Careless maintenance, not an act of war.
> 
> Seems likely to result in people being mad at their government rather than the government that dropped the bomb or slapped on the embargo.



A wrench and a pinch of sand.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> To reiterate from the Danish Homeguard website



Typically Continental European .... some very fuzzy lines drawn between democracy and totalitarianism


----------



## Blackadder1916

quadrapiper said:


> . . .  it's a shame there's not a more direct link between the PRes and civvy ground SAR: even just something like adding the local Army Reserve to the call list should any wish to turn out as as-available volunteers.





CBH99 said:


> Such a simple thing to do, as well.  It would be great if the CO of a unit, or the senior leadership of an Army Reserve area would reach out and do just that.



I tried that once, many years ago (late 1990s).  Almost the first question asked when I brought it up in my unit was "when do we sign the pay sheet".  Almost the first question when I informally broached the subject with members of a local volunteer SAR group was "what equipment or funding are you going to give us".  It didn't go much past that.  There might have been one or two of my soldiers who looked into working with the SAR group, but generally it was a no-go.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Yes and no - I'll explain my theory below
> 
> The Russians, Chinese etc are masters of discontent - they rarely just try the brute force rush these days -- they try to divide alliances, weaken a people, insert insurgents.   Global Nuclear War is generally a Lose - Lose proposition, the whole mutually assured destruction aspect.
> 
> But sowing discontent - sabotage (as it's happened before) in the North, and 'squatters' aren't unrealistic options.   Also as the Ice Age continues to recede, the areas of the North become much more appealing -- China isn't alone in the ability to man make islands.
> 
> At the end of the day, possession is 9/10th's the law, and armed possession is the other tenth.
> If you can't credibly posses the territory - someone will eventually do that.


To be clear, I'm not against expanding our military presence in the Arctic.  I'm totally in favour of that.  It is absolutely required along with various other forms of non-military infrastructure and development in order to secure our ongoing control over the territory.

Do I think we need a Brigade specifically tasked for Arctic defence, or 90,000 volunteers rotating through remote Arctic postings annually to achieve that?  No.  Targeted specific and persistent capabilities to provide ongoing surveillance of our territory with the ability to forcefully respond (air, land and sea) if required.  From an Army perspective I think that can be achieved through ensuring we have the technical capability to deploy to and operate in the Arctic and we need to practice/demonstrate that capability on an ongoing basis.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Typically Continental European .... some very fuzzy lines drawn between democracy and totalitarianism


What?  So your Standing Army is more Anglo-Saxon than my Fyrd?

The Danes are more Anglo-Saxon than either the Franco-Normans or the Erse Highlanders.


----------



## Dale Denton

GR66 said:


> If that happens we'll have much more to worry about than defending 47 remote radar sites against Spetznaz teams (and those 47 x Arctic Vital Point Defence Platoons will now likely be stranded in their remote Arctic locations with little hope of evacuation or relief).



If that's the case, then the Regular Army - or anyone else - would be stranded anyways. It's also a likely scenario regardless, small isolated units with little mobility (maybe Twin Otters, whatever was close by?).


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Typically Continental European .... some very fuzzy lines drawn between democracy and totalitarianism


This is why it's always nice to have a partial conscript force that you can treat like crap, insert into the most inhospitable austere locations and not worry about retention because in a year they're all gone and you start with a new crop.

Home guards are nice if the strategic objective and the home they come from are all in the same place. We're not geographically blessed in that way. 

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Home guards are nice if the strategic objective and the home they come from are all in the same place. We're not geographically blessed in that way.
> 
> 🍻


I'd argue that we are geographically blessed in that we don't need a Home Guard to protect the majority of our population in their homes.

😉


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> I'd argue that we are geographically blessed in that we don't need a Home Guard to protect the majority of our population in their homes.
> 
> 😉



There's also the 'Constitutional Monarchy' thing


----------



## Kirkhill

So, to be clear, we do need a Standing Army?



> the Bill of Rights of 1689 requires parliamentary consent for the Crown to maintain a peacetime standing army.[10] Therefore, Parliament approves the army by passing an Armed Forces Act at least once every five years.



We do not need Volunteers?



> Number of volunteers growing faster than Canada's population​Over 13.3 million people—accounting for 47% of Canadians aged 15 and over—did volunteer work in 2010. They devoted almost 2.07 billion hours to their volunteer activities: a volume of work that is equivalent to just under 1.1 million full-time jobs (Table 1).
> 
> The number of volunteers in 2010 was significantly greater than in earlier years. The 13.3 million people who volunteered marked an increase of 6.4 % over 2007 and of 12.5% over 2004. In comparison, the rate of growth recorded for the general population aged 15 and over was 8.4% between 2004 and 2010.
> 
> While the increase in the number of volunteers continued the upward trend observed since 2004, the number of hours dedicated to volunteer work plateaued. After rising about 4% between 2004 and 2007, the total number of volunteer hours logged in 2010 remained essentially unchanged from 2007, at just under 2.07 billion.
> 
> Many Canadians become involved in volunteering because people they know are doing it. In 2010, 43% of volunteers said they did their volunteer work as part of a group project with friends, neighbours or co-workers; another 25% said they had joined members of their immediate family in their volunteer work. These proportions are essentially the same as those recorded in 2007 and 2004.
> 
> With the increasing use of the Internet for multiple purposes, one would expect to see more online volunteer activity than in previous survey years. In 2010, 14% of volunteers said they had sought out volunteering opportunities through the Internet, up from 10% in 2007 and 8% in 2004. And one-quarter of volunteers (25%) used the Internet to conduct activities on behalf of non-profit and charitable organizations, compared with 23% in 2007 and 20% in 2004. The Internet may prove a more valuable source of recruitment than these figures suggest—Canadian researchers have found that moderate Internet users recorded higher volunteer rates and more volunteer hours than non-users, even after controlling for sociodemographic characteristics such as age, sex, education and presence of children.2







__





						Volunteering in Canada
					






					www150.statcan.gc.ca
				






> Most of the work done by few volunteers​A small proportion of volunteers do most of the work (Chart 1). In fact in 2010, 10% of volunteers accounted for 53% of all volunteer hours given to non-profit and charitable organizations. They dedicated more than 390 hours to their volunteer activities, the equivalent of at least 10 weeks in a full-time job.3
> 
> Another 15% of volunteers logged between 161 and 390 hours, corresponding to between 4 and almost 10 full-time weeks of unpaid work; they contributed 24% of the total hours devoted to volunteer work in 2010.





> In general, younger Canadians are more likely to volunteer than older Canadians. Well over one-half of people aged 15 to 24 (58%) and 35 to 44 (54%), and close to one-half of those aged 25 to 34 (46%), reported doing volunteer work in 2010. In comparison, pre-retirees aged 55 to 64 had a volunteer rate of 41% in 2010 and seniors recorded a rate of 36% (Table 2). Adults aged 25 to 34 were the only age group to record an increase in volunteerism between 2007 and 2010.
> 
> While younger Canadians are more likely to volunteer, they devote fewer hours to their volunteer work. On average, youths aged 15 to 24 (130 hours) and younger adults aged 25 to 34 (109 hours) recorded only about one-half as many hours as seniors (223 hours). Average volunteer hours in 2010 remained unchanged for each age group compared to 2007.



Volunteering - "Sweat Equity",  "Taxation in Kind",  Donated effort.

All freely adhering to the basic principle - from each according to her ability.  And their organizations strive to make the best use of whatever hours the volunteers can put at the service of the organization and, indirectly, the community.

Is there any reason why the Atlin Ranger Patrol Group could not be allied with the Westies, after the GR66 suggestion and have the Westies bring the Rangers south for training and recreation.  With the Westies sending a group north for training and recreation.  And how about the Westies operating a volunteer 911 call centre for Atlin?  Monitoring local sites visually from their smart phones?  Monitoring comms?  Bringing the rangers south would allow them to see the locals and make personal connections. - all on an unpaid basis. 

And, maybe, somebody, somewhere, wants an AirB'n'B week long retreat at a NWS with nothing but her cell phone for company.


----------



## CBH99

GR66 said:


> To be clear, I'm not against expanding our military presence in the Arctic.  I'm totally in favour of that.  It is absolutely required along with various other forms of non-military infrastructure and development in order to secure our ongoing control over the territory.
> 
> Do I think we need a Brigade specifically tasked for Arctic defence, or 90,000 volunteers rotating through remote Arctic postings annually to achieve that?  No.  Targeted specific and persistent capabilities to provide ongoing surveillance of our territory with the ability to forcefully respond (air, land and sea) if required.  From an Army perspective I think that can be achieved through ensuring we have the technical capability to deploy to and operate in the Arctic and we need to practice/demonstrate that capability on an ongoing basis.


Agreed. 

Why not choose one or two companies from PPCLI or RCR to be tasked with ‘Arctic Operations’ if anything real world were to happen. 

Equip them for such, which wouldn’t be expensive or difficult. 

-  Our extreme cold-weather kit is pretty decent, our moderately cold-weather kit I found lacking.  Replace that kit using a UOR or write specs that only a few bidders can comply with.  (Lawsuits only seem to happen if specs are written to favour one bidder.)

-  Replace BV-206 with new vehicles of the same type.  Not up-armoured, easier to fly up and operate in deep snow/steep inclines sometimes.  

-  Keep the snow-mobile fleet modern and in good repair.  (Perhaps allow those units to purchase replacement vehicles as needed on their own.  Orders would be small.)

-  the new kitchen system coming online is impressive.  Keep one or two ready to deploy.  


Realistically, Big army is not going to be responding to anything in the arctic at more than company strength anyways. 

Instead of rotating various units through arctic warfare training, Operation Nanook, etc - just task those ops to one or two companies, and let those companies _excel_ at it.  


0.02 🤷🏼‍♂️


----------



## CBH99

“People are relying on us” — National Guard evolves to fight wars, secure homefront
					

The last two years have seen a rash of domestic crises and the National Guard has been on the frontline responding to everything from the Covid-19 pandemic to historic fires and flooding, and even widespread protests.




					www.armytimes.com
				




Some good easy reading that is relevant to the thread.  FJAG, I thought of you when I first read this 😉🤷🏼‍♂️


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> “People are relying on us” — National Guard evolves to fight wars, secure homefront
> 
> 
> The last two years have seen a rash of domestic crises and the National Guard has been on the frontline responding to everything from the Covid-19 pandemic to historic fires and flooding, and even widespread protests.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.armytimes.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Some good easy reading that is relevant to the thread.  FJAG, I thought of you when I first read this 😉🤷🏼‍♂️



Nothing new for me. This says it all.



> Cancian points to a need here for traditional warfighting skills — “tanks, planes, and ships,” as he puts it.
> 
> “Ninety-nine percent of what [the guard and the reserves] do are these traditional kinds of capabilities,” Cancian says. “If there were conflict in Europe against Russia, or conflict in the Western Pacific against China, or North Korea — pick your crisis spot, you’re going to be using a lot of reservists.”



This is the point that I keep carping about - the Res F needs to become capable at warfighting and the Army's leadership needs to get it into their thick heads that until they properly organize, equip and train the Res F they will not be able to form a proper defence capability.

An Army with forty plus thousand soldiers whose whole business plan is to be able to generate two battlegroups at a time is missing the point of what a national defence force is. To have half of that force unequipped and grossly undertrained is pure and simple professional negligence. 

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Nothing new for me. This says it all.
> 
> 
> 
> This is the point that I keep carping about - the Res F needs to become capable at warfighting and the Army's leadership needs to get it into their thick heads that until they properly organize, equip and train the Res F they will not be able to form a proper defence capability.
> 
> An Army with forty plus thousand soldiers whose whole business plan is to be able to generate two battlegroups at a time is missing the point of what a national defence force is. To have half of that force unequipped and grossly undertrained is pure and simple professional negligence.
> 
> 🍻



No more nor no less than improperly equipping them.  About which I keep carping.

Slainte.



> The same thing goes for equipment. Both *the guard and the reserves prize gear that can be used at war or in a domestic emergency — everything from aircraft and cargo trucks to things like bulk water tank racks*. The Army’s modernization priorities focus on air and land combat equipment and soldier lethality. According to a recent DOD report, the Army Guard’s air and weapons capabilities are generally more modern, in keeping with these priorities. Areas like *engineering, logistics, and transportation, which are critical for responding to natural disasters, have more older equipment or shortages of this dual-use gea*r, the report says. But as Covid continues to surge, and climate change brings more extreme weather, the guard’s domestic missions, and its reliance on gear like this, are unlikely to abate.


----------



## quadrapiper

Blackadder1916 said:


> I tried that once, many years ago (late 1990s).  Almost the first question asked when I brought it up in my unit was "when do we sign the pay sheet".  Almost the first question when I informally broached the subject with members of a local volunteer SAR group was "what equipment or funding are you going to give us".  It didn't go much past that.  There might have been one or two of my soldiers who looked into working with the SAR group, but generally it was a no-go.


That's discouraging, especially on the SAR side: there's a vast number of tasks* where "somewhat motivated, somewhat fit warm bodies with suitable clothes" are the missing piece.

*Most of which become or stay "fun" in direct proportion to how many people are available.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> To have half of that force unequipped and grossly undertrained is pure and simple professional negligence.
> 
> 🍻



I did my part... I hit CRA last year


----------



## CBH99

Blackadder1916 said:


> I tried that once, many years ago (late 1990s).  Almost the first question asked when I brought it up in my unit was "when do we sign the pay sheet".  Almost the first question when I informally broached the subject with members of a local volunteer SAR group was "what equipment or funding are you going to give us".  It didn't go much past that.  There might have been one or two of my soldiers who looked into working with the SAR group, but generally it was a no-go.


Outside of major urban centres, is it the RCMP that decides to initiate a search?


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> An Army with forty plus thousand soldiers whose whole business plan is to be able to generate two battlegroups at a time is missing the point of what a national defence force is. To have half of that force unequipped and grossly undertrained is pure and simple professional negligence.
> 
> 🍻


I'd argue ALL of the Force in under equipped.
   Training is significantly better than the allies in my experience at the regular level - and the junior level in the Res for the most part.

However, the lack of many items leads to being non mission capable for anything other than OOTW.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I'd argue ALL of the Force in under equipped.
> Training is significantly better than the allies in my experience at the regular level - and the junior level in the Res for the most part.
> 
> However, *the lack of many items* leads to being non mission capable for anything other than OOTW.



The main thing we are lacking is a mission, of course. As a result, any direction becomes the right one, and generally drifts towards 'train to excite'.

Whether or not 'excited' soldiers are successfully accomplishing our national defense mandate is not clear to me, however.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I'd argue ALL of the Force in under equipped.
> Training is significantly better than the allies in my experience at the regular level - and the junior level in the Res for the most part.
> 
> However, the lack of many items leads to being non mission capable for anything other than OOTW.


Absolutely.


daftandbarmy said:


> The main thing we are lacking is a mission, of course. As a result, any direction becomes the right one, and generally drifts towards 'train to excite'.
> 
> Whether or not 'excited' soldiers are successfully accomplishing our national defense mandate is not clear to me, however.


Amongst other things SSS refers to the threat of great power competition, names China and Russia specifically, reiterates the need for deterrence and specifies that this requires a capability to participate in full-spectrum, peer-to-peer conflict.

Any half-wit running DND/CAF should be able to figure out the mission from that. It's not the mission that's missing. What's missing is an ability within DND/CAF to translate the mission that's been given into a coherent force structure capable of meeting the threats.

What Canada's problem is that most of its senior leadership grew up in an age when there was an active rejection of a Cold War Army in favour of a new all-singing, all-dancing agile medium force aimed at fixing failed states. They continue to be in denial of the fact that we are back into the Cold War they've never themselves had to face, that the force that they've built over the last twenty years is the wrong one for this age and that fixing failed states is a hit and miss endeavor that folks will shy away from like the plague in the future.

For me the hallmarks came in the first half of the 2010s when DND rejected the necessity to streamline our national headquarters, divested itself of key capabilities such as air defence and anti armour weapons, turned off the IFV project in favour of rebuilding LAVs for a war we had just left behind and cavalierly ignored for the most part the tactical and strategic lessons coming out of the Ukraine and the Middle East.

One only has to look at the options and objectives of Force 2025 that they continue to live in denial. It's long ago ceased to be a budget issue. Its a vision issue.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Would you accept Budget AND Vision issue...

Frankly I think given the way of the world the CF needs to embrace Total Force - and Total JOINT Force 

1 Armored (Heavy) Bde  - 1/3 Reg.          - NATO Europe focused 
2 Medium (LAV) bde.      - 1/3rd Reg.      - 1 PAC/ASIA focused  - 1 Africa/ME/Europe
2 Light Bde                     - 2/3rds Reg.    - 1 Arctic/ Airmobile, 1 Amphibious 

Because the "willy nilly ness" of Canada's deployment - I would jam pack a ton of enablers into the Bde's - so they are basically Mini Div's that can self deploy (they will need Sea/AirLift to leave the North American continent) - but heavy CSS and CS support into those Bde.

CA, RCN, and RCAF needs to have a kumbaya session and figure out how they can operate and support each other for the next stages of conflict and competition.


----------



## Blackadder1916

CBH99 said:


> Outside of major urban centres, is it the RCMP that decides to initiate a search?



Does it really matter in the context of what the CO of a reserve unit can do?  Anyway, in most instances (and jurisdictions) the police are tasked by the provinces to be the lead agency for ground search and rescue (GSAR).

I related my before the turn of the century reminiscence as an example of how "unpaid volunteers" are not necessarily found in the Militia.

Participating in a GSAR with experienced and enthusiastic volunteer SAR groups may be great experience for soldiers, something that will trigger the "excite" button.  That actually was the reason why I made the few (but quickly halted) steps in trying to organize something.  And while my previous comment in regards the volunteer SAR group may have seemed less than complimentary, my opinion of them (then and now) is to hold them in the highest regard.  Just as my responsibility back then was to lead (and manage) a military organization and accomplish specific aims (mostly relating to IBTS and unit BTS) while staying within budget and not losing the limited equipment that we had, so too did the leadership of that group have similar aims.

My familiarity with existing protocols for local authorities requesting DND/CAF assistance is very dated.  But back then, IIRC, any request for such assistance (here, out West) had to go to LFWA (they weren't divisions back then) for approval.  Some limited authority may have been delegated down for quick response situations but no way did it trickle down to part-time PRes COs.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Would you accept Budget AND Vision issue...
> 
> Frankly I think given the way of the world the CF needs to embrace Total Force - and Total JOINT Force
> 
> 1 Armored (Heavy) Bde  - 1/3 Reg.          - NATO Europe focused
> 2 Medium (LAV) bde.      - 1/3rd Reg.      - 1 PAC/ASIA focused  - 1 Africa/ME/Europe
> 2 Light Bde                     - 2/3rds Reg.    - 1 Arctic/ Airmobile, 1 Amphibious
> 
> Because the "willy nilly ness" of Canada's deployment - I would jam pack a ton of enablers into the Bde's - so they are basically Mini Div's that can self deploy (they will need Sea/AirLift to leave the North American continent) - but heavy CSS and CS support into those Bde.
> 
> CA, RCN, and RCAF needs to have a kumbaya session and figure out how they can operate and support each other for the next stages of conflict and competition.


I'll get back to you on that. Remember my 30/70 // 70/30 proposal from above? I've been putting it down on a napkin org chart which I'll try to put up tomorrow - it needs some final touches and I'm putting in a new floor in my furnace room right now and have two book interviews this afternoon/evening so won't get it done until then.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I'll get back to you on that. Remember my 30/70 // 70/30 proposal from above? I've been putting it down on a napkin org chart which I'll try to put up tomorrow - it needs some final touches and I'm putting in a new floor in my furnace room right now and have two book interviews this afternoon/evening so won't get it done until then.
> 
> 🍻


Just don't forget to count up the number of ships, planes and warehouses we need as well.  Warehouses because it would be nice to have a bit of inventory on hand, somewhere, - just in case.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> CA, RCN, and RCAF needs to have a kumbaya session and figure out how they can operate and support each other for *the next stages of conflict and competition.*



These next stages will take place in Ottawa, and it's not likely to be pretty


----------



## Happy Guy

I've reading this discussion and I'm enjoying the lively debates.

I am a Logistics specialist.  Things for everyone to think about when you come up with orbats and equipment.  The Log/Maint/Comms org will ask you to answer these basic questions before they can support.

Tactical level

the more mechanized you are the need for fuel is exponentially grows.  The question now lies where will the fuel come from.  If you want it to come from Integral resources, how big will the fuel tanks be?  Big tanks = less mobility and big target.  Small tanks - more mobility but need to be refuelled more.  Does this veh need to keep up with the fighting force?
more mechanized means corresponding need to train more drivers.  The drivers must safely and expertly operate the vehicles efficiently without wasted effort.  However training drivers takes a long time and this eats into other training time for other necessary skills.
more mechanized more more maintenance - more maintainers, more time spent by operator to perform driver maintain. Does the maint veh need to keep up with the fighting force or should the veh cas be left behind for the maint to repair later on?  Driver maint takes training and time.  This eats up on other training time.
more mechanized = more parts.  How many, what type of parts and what type of veh is required.  Does the spare parts vehs needs to be close at hand to the fighting force?
how much should be fighting force carry themselves to sustain themselves?  Food? Ammo? Fuel? Parts?  Protective gear? Batteries?  The more you carry the more self-sufficient you are, but there is a corresponding decrease in mobility.  The more you carry the bigger the veh you need and the less space for other essential things
is the traditional 3 : 1 ratio still relevant?  Fighting carries three days worth of supplies and the CSS org carries one day of maint load for the Bde?
the more weapons, the different types the greater the requirement for vehs to carry ammunition. Don't forget that some ammunition types are not compatible so you may need separate vehs.
who is going to protect your A1/A2 echs? Can they defend themselves?

Operational level (deployed)
Bde
How should be Svc Bn be configured to support the Bde.  More maint, less supply and transport?  More maint, more transport but less supply?
Who is going to protect the Svc Bn in their area?  Remember the Svc Bn doesn't have much in terms of weapons to protect themselves.  it doesn't have a designated D&S organization for protection.

Div (deployed overseas)
How long should the lines of comms be?
Should there be large supply / fuel depots?  How many days should it hold?  This means specialized equipment and vehs.  For example a fuel depot means pipelines, pumping stations and so forth.
Personnel holding units.  Replacement person in these units until they can be assigned.
Who will protect this area?

For Res F CSS orgs, the questions comes down how well trained do you want them to be (amount of training days that can be alloted to them) before you can give them tasks and corresponding equipment.  Do you want them to operate a mobile warehouse, well they must be trained to be soldiers, operate the warehouse (this is not easy as there are many procedures and safety practices to follow) and give them the necessary IT equipment and support.
How about a Transportation Company?  Will you give them HSVWs or stay with the MSVS?  Should the Transportation Company be specialized : carry just general cargo; carry ammunition on PLS or tanker trucks.  Should the Maint Coy be specialized?  Training a tech takes years before they can be trusted to turn a wrench with limited supervision?  Does this fit the Army's needs?  I remember that these questions were posed to the Res Svc Bn in the late 1980s, early 1990s and they all wanted to be configured like the Reg F Svc Bn.  They wanted to be able to support their respective CBGs which was understandable but from a Reg F perspective not doable without extensively more training time and Reg F expertise for supervision and training.

For the Reg F Log pers, they will require significantly more training days.  They must receive more training to be a soldier before they become a Loggie.  The Environmental commanders must agree to this, but this will mean significantly longer time in the training system and there is a matter of cost.

When I was at CANOSCOM and CJOC the J1, J4 and J6 Staffs had to be linked hand in hand with the J3 to provide timely and effective support The J3 staff knew you can't just order / demand things and things just happen to be repaired, people fed and watered, and foreign Gov't and Allied Nation support to just magically happen.  In brief, you need the right people with the right experience at these HQ to staff.

Don't forget about the upcoming political fight to save Regts and or their traditional tasks.

You can go back to planning the ideal fighting force.

Cheers


----------



## Kirkhill

While muddying waters - and who doesn't enjoy a good wallow in the mud?






Strykers To Get New Counter-Drone Tech With General Dynamics, Epirus Partnership​The partnership will initially integrate onto Strykers, but as has an eye on future autonomous platforms.​








						Strykers To Get New Counter-Drone Tech With General Dynamics, Epirus Partnership - Breaking Defense
					

The partnership will initially integrate onto Strykers, but as has an eye on future autonomous platforms.




					breakingdefense.com
				






I'm sorry, but that MSHORAD beast still looks like a Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle to me.  But anyway...



The top picture shows an electronic device for killing drones, cheaply.  My question is this, given that these Short Range, Very Short Range and In Your Face devices are by definition short range, how many vehicles are going to be able to shelter under the moving umbrella they supply?  It is supposed to be a mobile system for a fluid battlefield after all.

That top wonder weapon doesn't seem to be compatible with mounting on every vehicle like a trophy C-RAM system.  It looks like it needs a carrier all to its self.  And if it is very short range does that suggest that every patrol needs its own covering vehicle?  

Lots of covering vehicles to permit 1 vehicle per troop, or even 1 per patrol,  or do squadron sized  patrols become the norm?  

And do we need to add that ATGM vehicle to the patrol as well?  Or do we stick a couple of reloadable ATGM tubes onto the patrol vehicle turrets?   How much space is left inside the vehicle for the patrolmen?

So, complicating Happy Guy's questionnaire, what kit do we need for the unknown, upcoming battlefield and how will we use it.

4 vehicles crammed with riflemen with bayonets joining 41 others on the objective is one thing.  But do we kit out those 45 vehicles so that they can also be used scattered all over Latvia, or Mali, or Taiwan?

It seems to me that Dispersed Operations means you need to add more specialist vehicles to the mix meaning fewer, larger, easier to detect, patrols.  Or do you forego patrols completely and leave the patrolling to the eyes in the skies with only the occasional, targeted, recce patrol?

Or do you limit yourself to what you can carry on your back and trust to the loggies to deliver what you need and pull you out of the fire if it comes to it?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> While muddying waters - and who doesn't enjoy a good wallow in the mud?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Strykers To Get New Counter-Drone Tech With General Dynamics, Epirus Partnership​The partnership will initially integrate onto Strykers, but as has an eye on future autonomous platforms.​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Strykers To Get New Counter-Drone Tech With General Dynamics, Epirus Partnership - Breaking Defense
> 
> 
> The partnership will initially integrate onto Strykers, but as has an eye on future autonomous platforms.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> breakingdefense.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 66901View attachment 66902
> 
> I'm sorry, but that MSHORAD beast still looks like a Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle to me.  But anyway...
> 
> 
> 
> The top picture shows an electronic device for killing drones, cheaply.  My question is this, given that these Short Range, Very Short Range and In Your Face devices are by definition short range, how many vehicles are going to be able to shelter under the moving umbrella they supply?  It is supposed to be a mobile system for a fluid battlefield after all.
> 
> That top wonder weapon doesn't seem to be compatible with mounting on every vehicle like a trophy C-RAM system.  It looks like it needs a carrier all to its self.  And if it is very short range does that suggest that every patrol needs its own covering vehicle?
> 
> Lots of covering vehicles to permit 1 vehicle per troop, or even 1 per patrol,  or do squadron sized  patrols become the norm?
> 
> And do we need to add that ATGM vehicle to the patrol as well?  Or do we stick a couple of reloadable ATGM tubes onto the patrol vehicle turrets?   How much space is left inside the vehicle for the patrolmen?
> 
> So, complicating Happy Guy's questionnaire, what kit do we need for the unknown, upcoming battlefield and how will we use it.
> 
> 4 vehicles crammed with riflemen with bayonets joining 41 others on the objective is one thing.  But do we kit out those 45 vehicles so that they can also be used scattered all over Latvia, or Mali, or Taiwan?
> 
> It seems to me that Dispersed Operations means you need to add more specialist vehicles to the mix meaning fewer, larger, easier to detect, patrols.  Or do you forego patrols completely and leave the patrolling to the eyes in the skies with only the occasional, targeted, recce patrol?
> 
> Or do you limit yourself to what you can carry on your back and trust to the loggies to deliver what you need and pull you out of the fire if it comes to it?



But what about the Courier Pigeons we need to keep comms going?


----------



## MilEME09

Happy Guy said:


> Tactical level
> 
> more mechanized more more maintenance - more maintainers, more time spent by operator to perform driver maintain. Does the maint veh need to keep up with the fighting force or should the veh cas be left behind for the maint to repair later on?  Driver maint takes training and time.  This eats up on other training time.
> more mechanized = more parts.  How many, what type of parts and what type of veh is required.  Does the spare parts vehs needs to be close at hand to the fighting force?
> how much should be fighting force carry themselves to sustain themselves?  Food? Ammo? Fuel? Parts?  Protective gear? Batteries?  The more you carry the more self-sufficient you are, but there is a corresponding decrease in mobility.  The more you carry the bigger the veh you need and the less space for other essential things
> is the traditional 3 : 1 ratio still relevant?  Fighting carries three days worth of supplies and the CSS org carries one day of maint load for the Bde?
> the more weapons, the different types the greater the requirement for vehs to carry ammunition. Don't forget that some ammunition types are not compatible so you may need separate vehs.
> who is going to protect your A1/A2 echs? Can they defend themselves?


Tactical level maintenance wise: 

1. Depends on the force, 1st line maint assets will always be with the F echalon, anything they can't deal with is sent to the ECP. One often overlooked thing RCEME does is route clearance, I am not talking engineers clearing, I mean as the battle moves forward collecting any battle damaged vehicles to be brought back for inspection and repair. This is why we have the lines of maintenance, we just need to practice it more in a field context.​2. Parts scaling is figured out as we go with new kit, you slowly adjust over time stock levels on an on going basis depending on what you need​3. Our standard ratio makes sense still F ech CQ  carries 24 hours worth of supplies, A ech another 24, and so on and so on. You end up with a fresh 24H worth of parts, technical stores, etc.. constantly moving to the front to maintain your 3 days stock with the fighting element, if we have more vehicles it changes our parts scaling and that's about it, 2nd line + components won't change much, and 1st line tasks are minor enough the increased scaling won't effect space on trucks by much.​4. Another long forgotten thing, CO service battalion is in charge of rear area security, that is why CSS still needs to know how to fight. The brigade can't always detech the infantry, armored, or Cav to protect or escort us, I haven;t read Log doctrine in awhile but I know we teach how to do internal escort duty within maintance if required and what the minimum is.​​


> Operational level (deployed)
> Bde
> How should be Svc Bn be configured to support the Bde.  More maint, less supply and transport?  More maint, more transport but less supply?
> Who is going to protect the Svc Bn in their area?  Remember the Svc Bn doesn't have much in terms of weapons to protect themselves.  it doesn't have a designated D&S organization for protection.



Maintenance would need to upscale and become an independent command, a Maint Coy won't keep up with the increased demands so we will need a maintenance battalion, which is 6 companies plus a platoon for training. We may not have the assets for self defense right now, but thats because we haven't followed our own rules, C6 on every in and out route, same for Carl G, gun trucks in every platoon for self defense, it's all written down, someone already thought of all of this before, we just do not want to listen.



> For Res CSS orgs, the questions comes down how well trained do you want them to be (amount of training days that can be alloted to them) before you can give them tasks and corresponding equipment.  Do you want them to operate a mobile warehouse, well they must be trained to be soldiers, operate the warehouse (this is not easy as there are many procedures and safety practices to follow) and give them the necessary IT equipment and support.
> How a Transportation Company?  Will you give them HSVWs or stay with the MSVS?  Should the Transportation company be specialized : carry just general cargo; carry ammunition on PLS or tanker trucks.  Should the Maint Coy be specialized?  Training a tech takes years before they can be trusted to turn a wrench wit limited supervision?  Does this fit the Army's needs?  I remember that these questions were posed to the Res Svc Bn in the late 1980s, early 1990s and they all wanted to be configured like the Reg F Svc Bn.  They wanted to be able to support their respective CBGs which was understandable but from a Reg F perspective not doable without extensively more training time and Reg F expertise for supervision and training.



Experience and qualifications are two different things, skill fade is also real, it is why every tech has manuals they follow like a bible. One of the big lines used against PRes techs getting the same qualifications is that we would never use it unless going over seas. The point of the reserves is augmentation, can't do that if we are not trained how to do the job. Secondly it happens in the reg force from time to time any way. Example a weapons tech posted to 1 RCHA spends 8 years working on the M777, gets posted to 3VP and only works on small arms for another 6, then is posted back to 1 RCHA. How good of a howitzer tech do you think this soldier is after 6 years of not touching the kit? answer is not a good one any more, but the delta to get that tech back up to speed will be that much smaller because of the prior experience. Same goes for the reserves, train them to do the job, sure they may not use it every day but that's what work up training is for any way to shake off the rust.

As for specializing the PRes techs, the way we are organized you can't too much, Weapons techs in the PRes are essentially Small arms specialists with a bit of C3 but thats useless overseas, Vtechs are essentially soft skin and TAPV specialists. That said we are not the US Army, we do not have the luxery in terms of personal or equipment being abundent enough to specialize our forces, and until the day the CAF breaks 400k we never should specialize any trade or role to an extreme.


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## Happy Guy

ACK about the RCEME classifications. I used to work closely with the RCEME Trade Advisors and I am aware of the issues for both Reg F and Res F.  For the Res F, I think that the best thing to do is simply concentrate on the Veh and Wpns Tech and this is based on the kit that the Res CBGs have.  Forget about Mat Teh or EO Tech.  The training and equipment that these trades needs are beyond the what a Res F Svc Bn can realistically handle.

The requirement for a Maint Bn has been a typical of discussion for years as well as need for a Tn and Sup Bn.  You can easily prove the requirement but it comes down to personnel positions and cost.  Will you grow the Army or cut positions from other classification?  Can the MND convince the gov't to grow the CAF and give it sufficient funds for personnel, equipment and infrastructure costs?  At the Bde level, the Comd has Inf, Armd, Arty, Cbt Eng, Tac Hel, Med and CSS Advisors.  While it may not seem much to add on a Maint Advisor the issue comes down to span of control, passage of information and coordination.

ACK about spares and kitting.  But recent experience and past experience in the Balkans have shown that the ech system have shown that sparing and kitting is highly dependant on the theatre AOR and vulnerability of the lines of comms.  In brief, depending on the situation, a unit may have to carry significantly more types of spares or major assemblies than it usually does because of the environmental conditions or vulnerability of the lines of comms.  Flexibility is the key and reduction of risk.

The Ech system works.  The DOS in the F, A1 and A2 Echs can and should vary depending on the circumstances.  A CO must be aware that having his unit carry much will hamper his/her ability to fight and this must be tempered with the actual operational conditions.  A Light Inf unit operating in a mountainous area but well supported by helicopters can carry limited DOS in contrast to a mech inf bn operatng in an open desert environment will wisely carry more water, fuel and filters.

CO Svc Bn is responsible for rear area security but this is not realistic.  I am well aware of what doctrine says, I was part of the board that wrote CSS doctrine.

As you know all Logistics NCMs are purple.  When I had a Pl, my Sgt was Air Force and was never trained to fight as a soldier.  The issue is the lack of training time allocated to the Logistics Trade and lack of positions.  That is why RCLS is purple.  A Sup Tech, HR Clerk can be expected to be posted to a ship, air base, Army unit or a Svc Bn.  You can train them to perform their logistics function but should you train a Sup Tech who wears a Navy blue uniform to be a soldier?  The same goes for an MSE OP.  Should an Army MSE OP be trained on airfield ops?  Should the Air Force Sup Tech be trained to fight fires on ship and do damage control.  There is simply not enough RCLS (Log Branch) personnel to have been permently assigned to an environment.  When the CAF stood up the Chinook Squadron, personnel positions were transferred from the Army to the RCAF.

If there is a Maint Bn should the CO be responsible for maint as well as rear area security?  The B ech / rear area is huge.  it is not tens but it could be hundreds of km big with a significant amount of traffic that flows through it and that needs to be controlled.

In brief a Svc Bn (Reg or Res) doesn't:

have sufficient trained pers to defend itself
have sufficient trained pers to defend the rear area
have the necessary weapons or vehicles to defend it self or the rear area.  When I was in 1 and 2 Svc Bn, only Maint Coy had GPMGs mounted on its armoured recovery vehs.  The question then becomes should Maint Coy perform rear area security or perform its maint function? Can it realistically do both?

For rear area security you either give the Svc Bn a D&S Coy to protect itself  and perhaps perform some rear area security tasks; create a org to provide rear security or assign it to an existing Cbt Arms unit.

The problem is known to the CDS and Environmental Comds.  The problem comes down to personnel positions, you need to create more positions by growing the CAF or grow the RCLS at the expense of the other classifications.  If you grow the CAF this of course will raise personnel costs (I believe this already constitutes over 50% of the current CAF budget), equipment costs and infrastructure costs.

As this generation of Officers and NCMs have learned, fighting is only one part of operations, support is one of the fundamental blocks  that it needs to get right or the success of any operation will be in jeopardy.

CSS will be a forever problem that will not be resolved unless Canada gets involved in another major conflict on the scale of a World War.

Thank God I'm retired now.


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## MilEME09

Agreed, and CSS is an area the CAF needs to focus Bd expand, no offense to those of you I'm combat arms but support trades, the majority of them atleast take longer to train than a infanteer, armoured crewman or a combat engineer. Meaning when shit hits the fan it takes a heck of a lot longer to expand us vs an infantry regiment


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## Good2Golf

daftandbarmy said:


> But what about the Courier Pigeons we need to keep comms going?


High-power microwave C-UAS says…


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## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:


> But what about the Courier Pigeons we need to keep comms going?



There are technical standards for that.


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## FJAG

So, I just finished six hours of the Artillery in Afghanistan interviews some dealing with deployed task forces and some with equipment procurements and the resultant issues of maintaining equipment bought under UORs and supplying things to the troops we don't have so that we needed to getting gifts of critical gear out of the kindness of our allies because Canada is to cheap to buy our own and, all-in-all, my cynic quotient continues to rise.

Did manage to rough in my 30/70 // 70/30 model which is built on the following criteria:

the whole idea behind 30/70 is to force the integration of the Res F with the Reg F so that it is no longer possible for the Reg F to ignore the Res F development and training;
The structure is built on the RFL levels put forward in Force 2025 and, since almost all units are one level of hybrid or another, are reflected down to the company level to show what companies within any given battalion are at what RFL level;
I've designated two types of RFL 1 - one for a unit/subunit that is 100% Reg F another for a unit that is a 70/30 organization and can function at Level 1 with reduced numbers or will need to be augmented by other RFL 1 elements to reach full strength (somewhat how many TFs in Afghanistan were augmented by a company from another battalion);
units types (like infantry) that are more likely to deploy in peacetime are generally staffed to a higher level of Reg F. Units less likely to deploy (like armour or artillery) are staffed to higher Res F levels;
all RFL 1 and 2 units have a high Reg F leadership component to them even if most of their troops are Res F. This is to ensure a level of ownership by the Reg F and to generate an increase in the capability to deploy the units or parts of them. In no case is the ratio of Reg F leadership less than 10% of strength;
Any unit/subunit marked as an RFL 1 is equipped. For example an RFL 2 Res F infantry battalion with a RFL 1 70/30 Inf coy will have that company fully equipped with LAV 6s for the purpose of training the whole battalion and being able to generate a single LAV company plus trained augmentees. Conversely a RFL 1 70/30 Reg F infantry battalion has only two companies of LAVs while the third coy made up of Res F personnel will not have LAVs and is expected to be trained on the other two companies' equipment;
All equipment holdings are predicated on current equipment holdings and those forecast under Force 2025 (such as GBAD by 2027, new indirect fires by 2028 and ATGM by 2029 (Hopefully that's not too much wishful thinking by the Army's Force 2025 team;
Note that there is now a mountain battlegroup on the West Coast and an amphibious battalion on the East. Airborne and Arctic capabilities exist within 2 CLBG as does a small public duties battalion to take care of Parliament Hill;
The service support element is a bit weak because the direction that's going is a bit in flux. I've taken some elements out of their options to create two divisional Sustainment Brigade structures which includes some additional maintenance and transportation elements but quite frankly I don't think the manpower is there at this time to generate what is needed. Basically its aspirational and simplified. I have added the a static Div Sup Gp into the chart;
Armoured Recce has been changed into a more diverse cavalry concept including recce, infantry, anti armour and drone based indirect fires;
While the KOCR form a second armoured regiment under 1 CABG, their purpose is to be 32 CABG's armoured regiment and are located in Alberta to train with and share equipment with the LdSH and simplify armour maintenance; 
The existing Comms Regts will provide the brigade sigs squadrons and Res F battalion sigs troops/sects and round out a second EW/Cyber Regt while H Svcs Res F will consolidate into more robust Field Ambulances, one for each brigade and a divisional field hospital;
All individual training has been put under the rubric of CADTC. Divisions are responsible only for collective training. Depot battalions with depot companies spread throughout the large urban centres will conduct all DP 1 and 2 training for both Reg F and Res F;
I have, for the fun of it, allocated Res F units to specific unit/subunits but not gone too far. For example in 32 CABG I haven't allocated every battalion to a position. In effect though every Res F battalion will be made up of one company from three or four separate existing battalions. Every Res F battalion listed as being the lead battalion, however, will be commanded by, or have a 2i/c, who is Reg F. All other Res F battalions that will be required to provide companies will be commanded by Reg F majors or have a Reg F 2i/c who will be under the command of the lead battalion in all respects and be established at roughly 125% of those required to fill a company. I'm willing to leave each of them an honourary LCol for historical ties to the community and frankly do not care if each company continues to wear its own regimental dress;



Let the merriment proceed.

🍻


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## KevinB

To confirm I am reading this correctly -- you took all the SVC Bn's out of the Cbt Bdes, and stuck them in a SVC Bde?


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## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> To confirm I am reading this correctly -- you took all the SVC Bn's out of the Bde, and stuck them in a SVC Bde?


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## Kirkhill

Happy Guy said:


> CO Svc Bn is responsible for rear area security but this is not realistic.  I am well aware of what doctrine says, I was part of the board that wrote CSS doctrine.
> 
> If there is a Maint Bn should the CO be responsible for maint as well as rear area security?  *The B ech / rear area is huge.  it is not tens but it could be hundreds of km big *with a significant amount of traffic that flows through it and that needs to be controlled.
> 
> For rear area security you* either* *give the Svc Bn a D&S Coy to protect itself*  and perhaps perform some rear area security tasks;* create a org to provide rear security* *or* *assign it to an existing Cbt Arms uni*t.
> 
> Thank God I'm retired now.



"Or" also implies "all of the above"

Dispersed Operations seem to demand Adaptation.   

Dispersed Operations seem to me to be "Theater-in-the-Round".   All backstage work has to be done in full view of the audience.  Sometimes even in the midst of the audience.  Even when it is a hostile audience.

Different strategies -

1 The Roman One - build an elaborate "underworld" beneath the "Coliseum" and keep the audience guessing.
2 Shakespeare's Globe - adds a roof to the Coliseum and exploits the "overhead" as well as the Roman "underworld"
3 Modern Minimalism - reduce light levels, shroud everything in black cloths that isn't meant to be seen, use lights to spotlight the actor or distract the audience from shrouded activity
4 CGI effects - live action, green screens and computer generated imagery
5 Shades of all of the above.

At all events, regardless of the strategies adopted, the production is a risky venture. You can never be sure the audience won't turn on you and start chucking beer bottles.  Or walk out.   Or the run will be cancelled. 

Or they might surprise and offer a standing ovation and the run is continued indefinitely.


I think I lean towards a focus on Modern Minimalism while exploiting all of the other options to the extent possible.

The first question is what to do with Scharnhorst's Axe.  And the Carrier Pigeons.  And the bucket of whitewash.  There may be circumstances where all of them come in handy and there will be regret if they are not available.  But how often are they required.  Does every soldier need one? Or are they best limited to one per platoon, or company, or battalion, or brigade?  Centrally held?  Or Distributed?  How best to exploit the CQ's local holding capacity?

Here I lean towards the soldiers being as lightly equipped as possible but with a little bit of everything within arm's reach. 

Once the enemy is engaged it seems to me it will become apparent which are the most useful tools in the CQ's (or Platoon Warrant's) kit.  They will be the ones that need to be replenished frequently and in large numbers.   Then the question becomes how does the Brigade, or Division get those things from the manufacturer, through the system, to the CQ,  And just about the time that has been resolved the enemy will have adapted resulting in a lesser demand for that piece of kit and a rushed effort by own troops to adapt to the enemy's adaptation resulting in new demands for or bits of kit in the inventory, or even new pieces of kit entirely.  Some of which might actually work and be worth exploiting.


So military examples of "Theater-in-the-Round".

The Navy - always operating in isolation, applying force from packages - at best it only has to contend with distance and bad weather - stuck with sticking out like a sore thumb and moving at a snail's pace. 

The Air Force - Big Wings replaced by individual F35s and Uninhabited Vehicles.  The pilots-in-contact reliant on their instruments to describe the extent of the bubble in which they can safely operate, and to predict the effect of the weapons they have at their disposal.  Some of which might actually be found on their aircraft.  Others may be delivered direct to the target, from the "warehouse" by means of an uninhabited hypervelocity transport system, also known as an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile.

The Army - Afghanistan. 

I don't think Afghanistan was the "exception".  I don't think  there will be a return to "real soldiering" now that that war has ended.  Napoleon's linear battlefield may reappear at the tactical level but strategically, and operationally, as well as tactically, "Dispersed Operations"  in A2AD environments will push the requirement to operate in small, agile, rapid, relocatable bubbles.   Bubbles that can be shrouded in black cloths while the "audience" is misdirected by effective use of lights, CGI and the ancient feint.


Anciently people have operated in insecure environments.  This is nothing new to us.  It precedes the horse and the dog to the world of Shank's Mare.

First requirement was "If you can't hack it don't pack it"  - only take the stuff you absolutely have to have - Do you really need that case of Coke and the Frozen Pizzas.

Second requirement was "Live off the land" - use the land to meet you needs as much as possible - for water and food, for warmth and shelter and to make things easy for you and hard for the enemy.

Third requirement was "Sacrifice" - be prepared to abandon anything and everything.  Which brings us to the advantage of the horse,  the camel, the ox, the dog and the pigeon.  When all else fails you can kill them and eat them.  And they are smart enough and fast enough to keep up with you on their own so there is always a spare on hand that you can hop on, or put into the traces.

Final requirement was "Pray to the gods for deliverance" - and hope that you have a direct line to your god, that your god is listening, and that she is effective and can deliver what you need or get you the heck out of there.



Horsemen conquered the world, in peace and war, exploiting these requirements.  They are as useful to the soldier as the trader seeking new markets to exploit.

It is the antithesis of the requirement to Save Henry VIII's Ships, or his Guns, or his Colours. 

Sometimes the right tactic is to hit the silk and watch another large chunk of Henry's bullion thunder in.   And pray to your gods for deliverance.


At what point does it stop being productive to build ever larger, more complex, more expensive vehicles that demand the sacrifice of soldiers' blood to protect?  With the loss of the vehicle putting a major dent in Henry's treasury reducing his ability to continue the fight?


Or putting it another way, when is the right answer not a mechanic but a chunk of C4 and cadging a ride off a buddy?


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## FJAG

KevinB said:


> To confirm I am reading this correctly -- you took all the SVC Bn's out of the Cbt Bdes, and stuck them in a SVC Bde?


Like I said, this is a form of one of the options being put forward by the Army's G4 as an early part of the Force 2025 CSS structure to deal with some of the issues they are facing - starting with that fact the managed readiness cycle is meaningless to CSS. 

In my model, the service battalions do not actually move physically. Its a reorganization to create a coordinated approach to CSS taking advantage of the reduced number of overall manoeuvre brigades to reassign Res F service bns to specific functions such as maintenance or transport or special troops. Think of it like a US Brigade Support Battalion construct where all the manoeuvre battalions CSS is actually on strength to the BSB but the BSB has Forward Support Companies each one of which is especially tailored to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battalion that its assigned to and is generally collocated with.

For COA 1 the CSS folks were looking at an Army wide overarching CSS Division with CDSGs being the subordinate sustainment brigades under which svc bns are grouped. COA 2 was a concentration of CSS resources still under a CSS Division with CDSGs as brigade level structures with base facilities under command but a looser connection to svc bns that remained with the manoeuvre brigades. COA 3 cuts out the CSS division structure but left brigade level CDSGs under command of the existing divisions but with a refined division of base tech svcs v svc bn functions.

The key issues are to create better control over Army wide CSS, to strengthen continuous base support and to allow svc bns to focus on force generation tasks by way of scalable deployed structures.

I'll admit that I had some trouble puzzling myself through the details on this but understood the basic conundrum facing the CSS under the existing cockamamie Army Force generation module which focuses on turning out scalable and modular battle groups which deploy on short six month cycles. On the one hand you need an enduring static CSS structure that is relieved of outside tasks to allow it to function in a stable way to continuously provide quality support to the "at home" force. On the other hand you also need an organization that focuses more on its own training and the generation of deployed forces to support deployed BGs in the field.

Remember that in the construct put together above, the Div HQ  for 2 and 3 Div are not deployable entities per se - its merely a force generation element. Similarly, the two divisional sustainment brigades are not seen as true deployable entities but merely the managers of CSS resources within the division including static Div Sup Gps and their various static base facilities as well as the of the deployable service bns. Essentially its the deployable svc and transport and maintenance battalions that create deployable elements to support up to a deployed brigade and even larger force. However, I think that there ought to be an oplan for the generation of a true deployable sustainment brigade headquarters in the unlikely event of the need for one. (Similarly, I do not see the CCSB or Arty bde headquarters to be deployable entities in the normal course of events but to have the ability to generate such a headquarters from within their resources with augmentation from organizations such as the Joint Comms Regt and the sustainment brigades.)

I've obviously thrown out COAs 1 and 2 calling for an overarching CSS Div structure and left the Army wide coordination of CSS resources at some form of Army HQ G4/COS Support level but accepted the creation of a brigade level structure at each of the two remaining FG divisions to manage overall CSS efforts across each of the divisions.

One thing that became abundantly clear in this little exercise is that there are far to few actual CSS personnel available for the job. If you want a stable static support structure you end up robbing the field units. That would lead to a larger reliance on the Res F but the Res F service bns are as weak in pers numbers as the line battalions are. We very definitely need a better system of generating CSS junior soldiers which in my mind can be done through leveraging much of the fundamental training of CSS pers through community colleges augmented by shorter and more focused conversion courses on specific military equipment. Leverage could be attained by paying for CC tuition (but not pay while at the CC), full paid summer DP 1 and 2 courses, all tied to periods of obligatory service which could be served out at static CSS facilities or at Res F CSS bns locally and with opportunities for a year or two of Class B service at a static CSS facility close to their civilian homes.

Incidentally, while I am still not a fan of lifelong Class B service as a way of bolstering Reg F establishments in static headquarters, I'm starting to think that we could do with two types of Reg F service. One type would be the thing we do now where they move to and live primarily at one of the three big (and a few small) bases. The other type would focus on the full-timers with Res F units in the larger urban communities who would not be posted outside of the urban region but could be moved between units, would still attend career courses and would be deployed on exercises and operations just as their counterparts on the larger bases are. Such a career profile would ameliorate some of the turmoil associated posting individuals into and out of high accommodation cost areas (I still think we should build small subdivisions of PMQs in the suburbs) and increase retention for people who value family stability. The same could be done for the Navy and Air Force as well. 

That needs a lot more thought but considering the CAF is 10% understrength right now its getting obvious that our current model is becoming unsustainable. At the rate we're going even the crop of currently short sighted leadership will recognize that a paradigm shift in how we do "military" is desperately needed.

🍻


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## Happy Guy

Sorry. Having technical issues.  I can't deleted this.


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## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Like I said, this is a form of one of the options being put forward by the Army's G4 as an early part of the Force 2025 CSS structure to deal with some of the issues they are facing - starting with that fact the managed readiness cycle is meaningless to CSS.


Understood - I would be concerned about removing a SVN BN from the command of it's supported Bde.
   Frankly I would support increasing the Svc Bn's - as I don't think the current Svc Bn structure is robust enough to support a Bde on Operations.
  *I think you also know how I feel the with entire Managed Readiness Cycle.


FJAG said:


> In my model, the service battalions do not actually move physically. Its a reorganization to create a coordinated approach to CSS taking advantage of the reduced number of overall manoeuvre brigades to reassign Res F service bns to specific functions such as maintenance or transport or special troops. Think of it like a US Brigade Support Battalion construct where all the manoeuvre battalions CSS is actually on strength to the BSB but the BSB has Forward Support Companies each one of which is especially tailored to meet the requirements of the manoeuvre battalion that its assigned to and is generally collocated with.


Ack, I remember when they split the Svc Bn into Svn Bn and GS Bn - while I thought the rationale for that was pretty thin, it seemed the theory was the Svn Bn that was left was not enough to support an Bde - and regardless of the Command structure it falls under - the Svn Bn TO&E needs a major rework if it supposed to support a Bde worth of maneuver units.



FJAG said:


> For COA 1 the CSS folks were looking at an Army wide overarching CSS Division with CDSGs being the subordinate sustainment brigades under which svc bns are grouped. COA 2 was a concentration of CSS resources still under a CSS Division with CDSGs as brigade level structures with base facilities under command but a looser connection to svc bns that remained with the manoeuvre brigades. COA 3 cuts out the CSS division structure but left brigade level CDSGs under command of the existing divisions but with a refined division of base tech svcs v svc bn functions.
> 
> The key issues are to create better control over Army wide CSS, to strengthen continuous base support and to allow svc bns to focus on force generation tasks by way of scalable deployed structures.


  I always cringe when I hear Force Generation tasks...


FJAG said:


> I'll admit that I had some trouble puzzling myself through the details on this but understood the basic conundrum facing the CSS under the existing cockamamie Army Force generation module which focuses on turning out scalable and modular battle groups which deploy on short six month cycles. On the one hand you need an enduring static CSS structure that is relieved of outside tasks to allow it to function in a stable way to continuously provide quality support to the "at home" force. On the other hand you also need an organization that focuses more on its own training and the generation of deployed forces to support deployed BGs in the field.
> 
> Remember that in the construct put together above, the Div HQ  for 2 and 3 Div are not deployable entities per se - its merely a force generation element. Similarly, the two divisional sustainment brigades are not seen as true deployable entities but merely the managers of CSS resources within the division including static Div Sup Gps and their various static base facilities as well as the of the deployable service bns.


The part that concerns me is it effectively makes another HQ function (the SP Bde), which to me is going to rob positions from the actual Bde's.
 * and what I see is the fascination with HQ's


FJAG said:


> Essentially its the deployable svc and transport and maintenance battalions that create deployable elements to support up to a deployed brigade and even larger force. However, I think that there ought to be an oplan for the generation of a true deployable sustainment brigade headquarters in the unlikely event of the need for one.


For a deployable SP Bde to be required - I would think that the CF will have mobilized, and invoked conscription.  Wouldn't the actually required personnel best be streamlined into 1 Can Div HQ - 
   The same aspect as to why I remain confused about the need for another Div Hq


FJAG said:


> (Similarly, I do not see the CCSB or Arty bde headquarters to be deployable entities in the normal course of events but to have the ability to generate such a headquarters from within their resources with augmentation from organizations such as the Joint Comms Regt and the sustainment brigades.)


 Again - given the CF # pers, can the CF afford an Arty Bde HQ?   Wouldn't Arty pers in 1 Can Div be sufficient?


FJAG said:


> I've obviously thrown out COAs 1 and 2 calling for an overarching CSS Div structure and left the Army wide coordination of CSS resources at some form of Army HQ G4/COS Support level but accepted the creation of a brigade level structure at each of the two remaining FG divisions to manage overall CSS efforts across each of the divisions.
> 
> One thing that became abundantly clear in this little exercise is that there are far to few actual CSS personnel available for the job. If you want a stable static support structure you end up robbing the field units. That would lead to a larger reliance on the Res F but the Res F service bns are as weak in pers numbers as the line battalions are. We very definitely need a better system of generating CSS junior soldiers which in my mind can be done through leveraging much of the fundamental training of CSS pers through community colleges augmented by shorter and more focused conversion courses on specific military equipment. Leverage could be attained by paying for CC tuition (but not pay while at the CC), full paid summer DP 1 and 2 courses, all tied to periods of obligatory service which could be served out at static CSS facilities or at Res F CSS bns locally and with opportunities for a year or two of Class B service at a static CSS facility close to their civilian homes.


The lack of CSS personnel has been a major issue in the CF since I believe Korea.
   The low level of deployments, has given a very artificially low view of the need for these roles - and I think it is significantly to the detriment of the CF.


FJAG said:


> Incidentally, while I am still not a fan of lifelong Class B service as a way of bolstering Reg F establishments in static headquarters, I'm starting to think that we could do with two types of Reg F service. One type would be the thing we do now where they move to and live primarily at one of the three big (and a few small) bases. The other type would focus on the full-timers with Res F units in the larger urban communities who would not be posted outside of the urban region but could be moved between units, would still attend career courses and would be deployed on exercises and operations just as their counterparts on the larger bases are. Such a career profile would ameliorate some of the turmoil associated posting individuals into and out of high accommodation cost areas (I still think we should build small subdivisions of PMQs in the suburbs) and increase retention for people who value family stability. The same could be done for the Navy and Air Force as well.
> 
> That needs a lot more thought but considering the CAF is 10% understrength right now its getting obvious that our current model is becoming unsustainable. At the rate we're going even the crop of currently short sighted leadership will recognize that a paradigm shift in how we do "military" is desperately needed.
> 
> 🍻


I have an outlandish napkin army I have been working on - I am a little leery of posting it but I think it would be a doable project for 2025, and given the current equipment state of the CF, I think it's fairly realistic.

It isn't symmetrical - and it's fairly ruthless to the Regimental System.

I am hoping to get it done in the next day or 2.


----------



## Kirkhill

A notion wrt Reserve Units (Battalions, Regiments, Battle Groups)

Key Elements

The Adjutant (Responsible for putting bodies on the armoury floor and keeping track of their skills)
Training Officer (Responsible for adding as many skills as possible to unit volunteers)

OC Adm (Responsible for ensuring that the unit has all the kit it is supposed to have, and it is in good working order)

Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills.  May be able to fire a rifle safely.

Int O (Situational Awareness)

Sigs O (Comms in peace and war, to higher and lower - Signallers supplemented by unit communicators/runners) 

CO/RSM,
OCs/CSMs

Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills.  May be able to fire a rifle safely.

CO/RSM,
OCs/CSMs


Dogs Bodies and Jr Officers - do what they can with what they have when so ordered


Everybody trained to use a rifle safely and with confidence.
Everybody trained to drive in a military fashion
Everybody trained to communicate in a military fashion  

Long service riflemen/drivers with the skills and inclination trained in heavy, crew-served and special weapons as well as capabilities like defences, patrolling, reconnaissance, breaching, counter-mobility and mobility


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> A notion wrt Reserve Units (Battalions, Regiments, Battle Groups)
> 
> Key Elements
> 
> The Adjutant (Responsible for putting bodies on the armoury floor and keeping track of their skills)
> Training Officer (Responsible for adding as many skills as possible to unit volunteers)
> 
> OC Adm (Responsible for ensuring that the unit has all the kit it is supposed to have, and it is in good working order)
> 
> Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills.  May be able to fire a rifle safely.
> 
> Int O (Situational Awareness)
> 
> Sigs O (Comms in peace and war, to higher and lower - Signallers supplemented by unit communicators/runners)
> 
> CO/RSM,
> OCs/CSMs
> 
> Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills.  May be able to fire a rifle safely.
> 
> CO/RSM,
> OCs/CSMs
> 
> 
> Dogs Bodies and Jr Officers - do what they can with what they have when so ordered
> 
> 
> Everybody trained to use a rifle safely and with confidence.
> Everybody trained to drive in a military fashion
> Everybody trained to communicate in a military fashion
> 
> Long service riflemen/drivers with the skills and inclination trained in heavy, crew-served and special weapons as well as capabilities like defences, patrolling, reconnaissance, breaching, counter-mobility and mobility



Except that most units don't have half those positions, or people who know how to do them properly, but yeah....


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Understood - I would be concerned about removing a SVN BN from the command of it's supported Bde.
> Frankly I would support increasing the Svc Bn's - as I don't think the current Svc Bn structure is robust enough to support a Bde on Operations.
> *I think you also know how I feel the with entire Managed Readiness Cycle.
> 
> Ack, I remember when they split the Svc Bn into Svn Bn and GS Bn - while I thought the rationale for that was pretty thin, it seemed the theory was the Svn Bn that was left was not enough to support an Bde - and regardless of the Command structure it falls under - the Svn Bn TO&E needs a major rework if it supposed to support a Bde worth of maneuver units.


I can see that concern although I'm not advocating a return to a US Army DISCOM. I tend to like artillery grouping terminology and in that respect I see a bde svc bn under command of the Sust Bde but in direct support of the manoeuvre bde. What one wants to establish and maintain is the relationship as between the two although I think that becomes less of an issue when bns in garrison rely on the static support elements for their day-to-day 2nd line and above support requirements. With our current NES system svc bns are constantly being raided for pers to deploy without an overly strong concern for how that effects the bde. In a perfect world a deployed battlegroup would have an NSE from its svc bn anyway. (actually in a perfect world there would be no NSE's but a composite company from the svc bn to support the battle groups organic CSS coy)


KevinB said:


> I always cringe when I hear Force Generation tasks...
> 
> The part that concerns me is it effectively makes another HQ function (the SP Bde), which to me is going to rob positions from the actual Bde's.
> * and what I see is the fascination with HQ's


I'm with you on that. Think of it this way. Right now we have 4 non deployable division headquarters, 3 bde HQ capable of deployment and 11 incapable of it. My construct is 2 non deployable division hqs, 3 bde headquarters capable of high readiness deployment, 2 of low readiness deployability and 3 non deployable except with augmentation. That's reducing 18 headquarters into 10 all while increasing bde hq deployability amongst them from 3 to 5. That's still a win-win situation.


KevinB said:


> For a deployable SP Bde to be required - I would think that the CF will have mobilized, and invoked conscription.  Wouldn't the actually required personnel best be streamlined into 1 Can Div HQ -
> The same aspect as to why I remain confused about the need for another Div Hq


There are some command hq that simply do not need to be deployable but are very much needed for coordinating functions and continuous force generation after the deployable force has gone.

I have no problem seeing 1 Div as a hq that concerns itself with day to day operational force employment while having a capability to deploy a portion of itself as an operationally deployed HQ and having two divisional hq solely concerned with force generation. (four I have big problems with - for an army of our size, two is optimal)


KevinB said:


> Again - given the CF # pers, can the CF afford an Arty Bde HQ?   Wouldn't Arty pers in 1 Can Div be sufficient?


There may be gunners spread throughout 1 Div HQ but I don't believe that there is a functional Div Arty HQ - I could be wrong but I think that disappeared around the time we stood down 4 CMBG. On the other hand, one of the responsibilities of 4 GS Regt in Gagetown is to augment 1 Cdn Div HQ in order to create a Fires Coord Centre. That's adequate when, like today, all you have is 24 guns in total to coordinate (That used to be 3/4s of a regiment when I started in this game). However, if one is looking down the road to re-establishing more guns in the regiment, adding air defence and possibly a HIMARSish capability and more STA (as you should) then something more robust is needed to coordinate those units in peacetime and to bolster 1 Div in wartime.


KevinB said:


> The lack of CSS personnel has been a major issue in the CF since I believe Korea.
> The low level of deployments, has given a very artificially low view of the need for these roles - and I think it is significantly to the detriment of the CF.


That's plagued the guns as well. The folks running this hockey sock grew up during the post cold war era when artillery and tanks and all the things you need to fight weren't a necessity. The result is deploying into Afghanistan with no tanks when they were definitely useful and a handful of artillery but frequently running low on ammo because people just didn't understand that shit. Just did an interview with some folks where one of the infantry company commanders grew very skillful at using his company as "beaters" to push the Taliban into artillery kill zones. Betcha he didn't learn that on his combat team commanders course but picked it up pretty quickly once he saw how things worked in real life. There a distinct difference between our method of warfare where fires support manoeuvre and Russian tactics where manoeuvre supports fires. This is why a Russian brigade has four smallish manoeuvre bns and 2 arty gun bns, one arty rocket launcher bn, one arty anti-tank battalion and two arty AD battalions. I don't think that gets analyzed near enough amongst our infantry centric leadership.


KevinB said:


> I have an outlandish napkin army I have been working on - I am a little leery of posting it but I think it would be a doable project for 2025, and given the current equipment state of the CF, I think it's fairly realistic.
> 
> It isn't symmetrical - and it's fairly ruthless to the Regimental System.


Symmetry is just plain stupid and based on regimental narcissism. That's one of the many reasons I'm putting 1/3 of the Reg F into Res F battalions and having them change cap badges. Quite frankly, if I were king, several of the current Reg F battalions would revert to QOR, RHR, and CanGds and maybe a few others so that there would be no more than one battalion of each regiment. Cap badges and accoutrements are dirt cheap compared to the proper field equipment. I just want to break up the cabals that are currently running the brigades.

Quite frankly I'd happily give up the odd Reg F infantry bn in order to create more maintainer, artillery and cyber PYs.


KevinB said:


> I am hoping to get it done in the next day or 2.


Looking forward to it.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Symmetry is just plain stupid and based on regimental narcissism. That's one of the many reasons I'm putting 1/3 of the Reg F into Res F battalions and having them change cap badges. Quite frankly, if I were king, several of the current Reg F battalions would revert to QOR, RHR, and CanGds and maybe a few others so that there would be no more than one battalion of each regiment. Cap badges and accoutrements are dirt cheap compared to the proper field equipment. *I just want to break up the cabals that are currently running the brigades.*
> 
> Quite frankly I'd happily give up the odd Reg F infantry bn in order to create more maintainer, artillery and cyber PYs.
> 
> Looking forward to it.
> 
> 🍻



Build it and they will come.

And if 'it' happened to be connected to _personal ego enhancemen_t in some way, then it will be even more effective


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Except that most units don't have half those positions, or people who know how to do them properly, but yeah....




And thereby hang the complete works of Grimm's tales.


Kirkhill said:


> A notion wrt Reserve Units (Battalions, Regiments, Battle Groups)
> 
> Key Elements
> 
> The Adjutant (Responsible for putting bodies on the armoury floor and keeping track of their skills)
> Training Officer (Responsible for adding as many skills as possible to unit volunteers)
> 
> OC Adm (Responsible for ensuring that the unit has all the kit it is supposed to have, and it is in good working order)
> 
> Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills.  May be able to fire a rifle safely.
> 
> Int O (Situational Awareness)
> 
> Sigs O (Comms in peace and war, to higher and lower - Signallers supplemented by unit communicators/runners)
> 
> CO/RSM,
> OCs/CSMs
> 
> Transport Officer (Tpt or TN) and Platoon/Tp (Key to all aspects of Operations and Training and critically important to ability to respond to local emergencies - Domestic Immediate Reaction Force - filled with willing unit drivers in uniform who have some soldiering skills.  May be able to fire a rifle safely.
> 
> CO/RSM,
> OCs/CSMs
> 
> 
> Dogs Bodies and Jr Officers - do what they can with what they have when so ordered
> 
> 
> Everybody trained to use a rifle safely and with confidence.
> Everybody trained to drive in a military fashion
> Everybody trained to communicate in a military fashion
> 
> Long service riflemen/drivers with the skills and inclination trained in heavy, crew-served and special weapons as well as capabilities like defences, patrolling, reconnaissance, breaching, counter-mobility and mobility




As I understand it there is difficulty recruiting drivers.  There also seems to be difficulty training drivers.  Why?

Once upon a time troopers were only hired if they could ride already.  This was expecially true of the Mounties, Mounted Rifles, Scouts, Lord Strathcona's, Aussie Light Horse and various other irregulars.

These people drive vehicles recreationally.  They do it in extreme conditions trying very very hard not to die and not to break their vehicles.

How do you recruit them?  Give them opportunities to do what they want to do with good kit?  Have the local units sponsor trials teams?   Sponsor trials events?

When discussing the Adjutant's role and keeping track of the skills of the volunteers in the unit the individual records should reflect the totality of their skills, regardless of which seminary they attended and what catechism they learned.




8x8 Off Roader Trials Competition






Climbing Walls in a Jeep






Quads Rock Crawling






Motorcycle Trials - no time limits - penalties for putting your feet down - fewest penalties wins








And recoveries







 So how do you get people like these through the armoury doors?

And how much training do you need to give them?

It might be a bit difficult to get them to start whitewashing rocks.  But  regardless they might come in handy.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> And thereby hang the complete works of Grimm's tales.
> 
> 
> 
> As I understand it there is difficulty recruiting drivers.  There also seems to be difficulty training drivers.  Why?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So how do you get people like these through the armoury doors?
> 
> And how much training do you need to give them?
> 
> It might be a bit difficult to get them to start whitewashing rocks.  But  regardless they might come in handy.


You don't recruit them -- you hire them to put on classes.
   BSR operated the Assault Hummer Driver Course - I don't think anyone outside of JTF-2 went from the CF, but it was a fantastic class - the CF should have had something like that run for GWagon drivers before deploying etc.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> You don't recruit them -- you hire them to put on classes.
> BSR operated the Assault Hummer Driver Course - I don't think anyone outside of JTF-2 went from the CF, but it was a fantastic class - the CF should have had something like that run for GWagon drivers before deploying etc.




Plausible idea Kevin.  But expensive. And this being Canada, and me being a Scot, I want to do national defence on the cheap.

I want to exploit the self-interest of others.   It is to my benefit if people volunteer to do the things I want them to do.   And if it requires a bit of enticement, in the form of training spaces and a bit of regulation to create "a well regulated militia"  then that's fine.

I don't want to buy kids off the street that know nothing and then have to hire instructors to show them how to tie their boots.  I'd sooner people tied their boots any which way that kept the boots on their feet.  Talking to their mates about important stuff like boot laces while having a beer will result in uniformity (except for that man Jones who insists on being different).

The legacies that I wish to exploit are the bowmen of Agincourt, Crecy and Poitiers who were encouraged to do what they were going to do any way.  The laws demanding that every man learn to use a bow were easy to enforce because every man in the countryside already had a bow.   The bigger problem was poaching.   Better to divert their energies through competitions and Wappenschaws (Weapon Shows) to being useful to the King.

The Victorian follow on to that was Bisley.   My Scots grandfather was particularly proud of that English medal for shooting he had won as a Boys Brigade Cadet in about 1919.   Bisley, and Baden Powell, and the Territorials were the height of Sam Hughes's well regulated militia.   Adam Ferguson would have approved.  My other grandfather, from Devon, he joined the Territorials about 1907.  He was about 15 at the time. He joined the Cyclist Battalion of the local County Regiment, the Devons.   The bicycle, with its spoked wheels and its Dunlop pneumatic tyres was the latest high tech toy.   It permitted the common man, and woman, to exploit their need for speed and travel great distances.  His Devon battalion eventually ended up patrolling the coast of Yorkshire on their bicycles.  (He met his wife while doing it).

The other legacy I want to exploit is that which Wolseley exploited.  When he went up the Nile to relieve Gordon at Khartoum he hired Canadian boatmen because of what he had seen them do on the seasonal rivers of the Prairies with canoes, York boats and stern wheelers.

And finally wagon trains have historically been civilians brought into military service.



In many ways Canada's formative war was an aberation.   WW 1 sticks out in history for the massive change in technology it heralded.

Going into WW 1 the country side all over the world was powered by horses.    Every country man, and most women,  could ride a horse,  put it into the traces of a wagon, and drive a pair of them.    Nobody knew how to drive a truck.  Or for that matter use a telegraph. Or a machine gun.  But most knew which end of the rifle to point to the enemy.

The army had to train people to operate this science fiction stuff that HG Wells had been going on about.  And what was a Tank anyway?

Clydesdale horses reached their apex just in time to be totally replaced by the tractor.   The army having provided millions of spare engines and trained driver-mechanics.

By WW2 most inductees were at least familiar with motor vehicles and required very little training in that area.


These days there isn't a Canadian, or American youngster (at least outside of the cities) that doesn't know how to drive.  And many enjoy it.  And many more waste their time and money on gas or diesel, and parts, to keep them running.


I want to give them a local ground for them to play on and hone their skills.   I want to give them a "parking lot" where they can practice sliding in the snow, do doughnuts, drifting, hand-brake turns.    Just the same way I want to give them a range where they can waste their time plinking at targets.

I figure, in the long run, it is cheaper to keep the youngsters supplied with bullets and gas, and to replace the occasional broken truck or rifle, than it is to put them on the payroll to teach them how to do those things.

The good ones can be hired as trainers.  The useful ones can be appealed to to fill the ranks of the active forces when the Government has needs of qualified manpower - even if it just to pull their neighbours out of a flood.


Beatty called for 90,000 volunteers.  We pay 19,000 volunteers.  Those two figures are not incompatible, nor mutually exclusive.  Just like the 10/90, 30/70, 50/50, 75/25, 90/10, 100/0 units are not mutually exclusive.  Supp List, Class A, Class B, Class C, Full Time, Duty bonuses, special service pay, contract, career..... it becomes difficult to separate the flyshit from the pepper.  The spectrum of volunteers extends to the CANSOFCOM regs.  I argue it should also extend to cover the willing, unpaid volunteer.

It works for many other organizations including government organizations.


We just have to get rid of this silly notion of turning in your kit in the same state you found it, or get charged.

War is the ultimate in disposable enterprises.  We have grown up in a disposable society.  Nobody repairs lap tops or smart phones unless it is a very low cost repair.   We buy new ones on credit.  Or "on tick" as we used to say.

Cheaper to buy a new truck than maintain the maintainers necessary to maintain an old one.  Likewise for a new rifle.

And if the person that broke it did it out of sheer bloody mindedness then you can always charge them for the replacement.  On tick.


----------



## Kirkhill

By the way.  Can you put a Picatinny Rail on to a _Rheinmetall_ Rh-120 L/44 _120mm,  _or an M126 howitzer cannon?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> By the way.  Can you put a Picatinny Rail on to a _Rheinmetall_ Rh-120 L/44 _120mm,  _or an M126 howitzer cannon?


Why?
  Anything is possible - 1913 rails where added to the Hk21's and PSG-1's for some folks, which had a lot less metal -- the tank gun would be easy - as the muzzle has the boresight collimator - and one could add that to the shroud for that easily - but I am not sure of the why -- the M126 cannon on the M109 has a large muzzle break that could be used for a mount - but both would be very susceptible to the shock - as they recoil under firing - and I suspect the load would be a tad rough on most mounted items -


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Why?
> Anything is possible - 1913 rails where added to the Hk21's and PSG-1's for some folks, which had a lot less metal -- the tank gun would be easy - as the muzzle has the boresight collimator - and one could add that to the shroud for that easily - but I am not sure of the why -- the M126 cannon on the M109 has a large muzzle break that could be used for a mount - but both would be very susceptible to the shock - as they recoil under firing - and I suspect the load would be a tad rough on most mounted items -



Because 1970s technology integrated everything into a fixed, unchanging package.  If one part broke the whole system was out of commission and had to be withdrawn from the field.

The Picatinny system, as applied to small arms means that people can do silly things like replacing perfectly good bayonets with a forestock hand grip .   But they can also swap Red Dots for other EO magicry.  Or just replace a broken one with a new one.  In the field.  During the fight.  From their webbing.  Or from the CQ.  Or added to disposable single shot weapons like the AT4 or the N-LAW.


----------



## Kirkhill

And to further structural discussion 

Light Infantry at work in Ukraine


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> The main thing we are lacking is a mission, of course. As a result, any direction becomes the right one, and generally drifts towards 'train to excite'.
> 
> Whether or not 'excited' soldiers are successfully accomplishing our national defense mandate is not clear to me, however.



What we're actually doing is train to validate, Majors have to become Lt Cols of course, which means that despite what @KevinB says about our training relative our allies, there has been a serious decline in the complexity of ranges from the section and platoon perspective. Troops don't get those ply wood houses as objectives, because the end state is the successful execution of a breach by the combat team, not the development of soldiers skills. Of course this is totally unrelated to our retention, obviously troops are getting out because no one wants a guaranteed income during a pandemic... but I digress.


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> So, I just finished six hours of the Artillery in Afghanistan interviews some dealing with deployed task forces and some with equipment procurements and the resultant issues of maintaining equipment bought under UORs and supplying things to the troops we don't have so that we needed to getting gifts of critical gear out of the kindness of our allies because Canada is to cheap to buy our own and, all-in-all, my cynic quotient continues to rise.
> 
> Did manage to rough in my 30/70 // 70/30 model which is built on the following criteria:
> 
> the whole idea behind 30/70 is to force the integration of the Res F with the Reg F so that it is no longer possible for the Reg F to ignore the Res F development and training;
> The structure is built on the RFL levels put forward in Force 2025 and, since almost all units are one level of hybrid or another, are reflected down to the company level to show what companies within any given battalion are at what RFL level;
> I've designated two types of RFL 1 - one for a unit/subunit that is 100% Reg F another for a unit that is a 70/30 organization and can function at Level 1 with reduced numbers or will need to be augmented by other RFL 1 elements to reach full strength (somewhat how many TFs in Afghanistan were augmented by a company from another battalion);
> units types (like infantry) that are more likely to deploy in peacetime are generally staffed to a higher level of Reg F. Units less likely to deploy (like armour or artillery) are staffed to higher Res F levels;
> all RFL 1 and 2 units have a high Reg F leadership component to them even if most of their troops are Res F. This is to ensure a level of ownership by the Reg F and to generate an increase in the capability to deploy the units or parts of them. In no case is the ratio of Reg F leadership less than 10% of strength;
> Any unit/subunit marked as an RFL 1 is equipped. For example an RFL 2 Res F infantry battalion with a RFL 1 70/30 Inf coy will have that company fully equipped with LAV 6s for the purpose of training the whole battalion and being able to generate a single LAV company plus trained augmentees. Conversely a RFL 1 70/30 Reg F infantry battalion has only two companies of LAVs while the third coy made up of Res F personnel will not have LAVs and is expected to be trained on the other two companies' equipment;
> All equipment holdings are predicated on current equipment holdings and those forecast under Force 2025 (such as GBAD by 2027, new indirect fires by 2028 and ATGM by 2029 (Hopefully that's not too much wishful thinking by the Army's Force 2025 team;
> Note that there is now a mountain battlegroup on the West Coast and an amphibious battalion on the East. Airborne and Arctic capabilities exist within 2 CLBG as does a small public duties battalion to take care of Parliament Hill;
> The service support element is a bit weak because the direction that's going is a bit in flux. I've taken some elements out of their options to create two divisional Sustainment Brigade structures which includes some additional maintenance and transportation elements but quite frankly I don't think the manpower is there at this time to generate what is needed. Basically its aspirational and simplified. I have added the a static Div Sup Gp into the chart;
> Armoured Recce has been changed into a more diverse cavalry concept including recce, infantry, anti armour and drone based indirect fires;
> While the KOCR form a second armoured regiment under 1 CABG, their purpose is to be 32 CABG's armoured regiment and are located in Alberta to train with and share equipment with the LdSH and simplify armour maintenance;
> The existing Comms Regts will provide the brigade sigs squadrons and Res F battalion sigs troops/sects and round out a second EW/Cyber Regt while H Svcs Res F will consolidate into more robust Field Ambulances, one for each brigade and a divisional field hospital;
> All individual training has been put under the rubric of CADTC. Divisions are responsible only for collective training. Depot battalions with depot companies spread throughout the large urban centres will conduct all DP 1 and 2 training for both Reg F and Res F;
> I have, for the fun of it, allocated Res F units to specific unit/subunits but not gone too far. For example in 32 CABG I haven't allocated every battalion to a position. In effect though every Res F battalion will be made up of one company from three or four separate existing battalions. Every Res F battalion listed as being the lead battalion, however, will be commanded by, or have a 2i/c, who is Reg F. All other Res F battalions that will be required to provide companies will be commanded by Reg F majors or have a Reg F 2i/c who will be under the command of the lead battalion in all respects and be established at roughly 125% of those required to fill a company. I'm willing to leave each of them an honourary LCol for historical ties to the community and frankly do not care if each company continues to wear its own regimental dress;
> View attachment 66908
> View attachment 66909
> 
> Let the merriment proceed.
> 
> 🍻


small point, but the extra Strat squadron should be co located in Edmonton, so they can make use of existing simulators and maximize their training time.


----------



## KevinB

So the first swipe at my Napkin Army -- I got ambitious while I was doing this - and this isn't really my 2025 one - more of a 2030.

As I originally didn't have the AH Squadrons - and I have noted in the Armoured BDE that the vehicles where TLAV (interim), I also got ambitious with the Artillery.
   I am still working on the BDE HQ constructs - and detailed break downs on the BN's.
   For purposes of this I have stuck all the Sigs (Comms), Sigs (EW), NBCW Recce, AND Air Defence) into the Bde HQ's (plus Div HQ), as well as the Aviation CS/CSS.

My goal was PY Neutral - but a increase in the actual "fieldable" force - and major gains to support structures.
  Also looking at the size of the CA, I opted for 1 DIV as both the admin side of the Army - and with a Deployable HQ portion if needed).

Each Bde has 4 INF BN's - but pay attention to any Regimental names , each Bde has 2 Gun Regt, Armored Bde and Mech Bde have 2 Gun Regt and 1 Rocket Regt (and eventually all will have 1 LR PF Regt)
  Inf BN 4x Line Coy, 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
  Armored Reg't 4x Tank Sqn, 1x ARV Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
  Armored Car/CAV BN - 4 LAV Coy (Crew only) 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
  Engineer Regt 3x Fd Sqn, 1x C-IED/EOD Sqn, 1x Cbt Spt Sqn, 1 Maint Sqn, 1 Trans Sqn, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Sqn
 Artillery Regt 3x8 gun Bty, 2x STA/UAV Bty, 1 Maint Bty, 1 Trans Bty, 1 HHQ Bty, 1 Admin Bty



1 CDN Para BDE (CFB Petawawa - off base units noted in their description) 
  I opted for a Para Bde - simply because it allows for force employment worldwide rapidly.   This is a 70/30 Reg/Res construct.

 1 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse)  of Armoured Recce (Airborne capable) - a very light tracked vehicle - I am agnostic to what - but all terrain capable of high speeds - low on armor - high on stealth and surveillance.
 1 Sqn of Light UH, and 1 Sqn of Chinooks (plus my dreamed AH Squadron) - these are direct BDE assets, I didn't get into naming the Tac Hel Sqn's - as the fight for those is such bigger than what they are called).

CDN Para Regiment 
  1-4 BN's of Paras (1&2 Para have secondary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 Para have Mountain taskings)
    1 Para is 100% Reg Force 
    2 Para (CFB Trenton) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - Ottawa, Kingtson, and Toronto Res units) 
    3 Para (CFB Merrit or somewhere in BC) is 100% reg force 
    4 Para (CFB same as 3 Para) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Alberta/ Eastern BC Mountain Res Units)

1-2 CER 
  1 CER - 70/30 - same recurring zone as 2 Para
  2 CER *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para

1-2 RCHA
   1 RCHA 70/30 - same recruiting as 2 Para
   2 RCHA *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para

1 FSB 100% Reg
2 FSB 100% Reg
1 MSB 100% Reg 

2 CDN Light BDE (CFB Gagetown - off base units noted in their description) 
  This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.

 2 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse)  of Armoured Recce (I missed the "Armoured in my unit symbol above)  - same vehicle and orbit - minus jump tasking as 1CLH
 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron) 

CDN Light Infantry
  1-4 BN's of CLI (1&2 CLI have a primary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 CLI have Amphibious taskings)
    1 BN CLI is 70% Reg Force - 30% Res
    2 CLI (CFB North Bay) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - other Ontario Res units, not tasked to the Paras) 
    3 CLI (CFB Vancouver or somewhere in BC) is 50% reg force 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Western BC Res Units)
    4 CLI is 50% Reg - 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Maritime Res Units)

1-2 Bn Cdn CAV Regiment (CFB Wainwright) 20/80% Reg/Res)
  LAV BN without troops - for mobility/protection tasks - otherwise assisting with 3 CAB training.

3-4 CER 
  3 CER - 50/50 Reg/Res - (Arctic Task) same recruiting zone as 2 CLI
  4 CER *CFB same as 3 CLI 50/50 Reg/Res (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI

3-4 RCHA
   3 RCHA 30/70 - (Arctic Task) same recruiting as 2 CLI
   4 RCHA *CFB same as 3 CLI 30/70 (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI

3 FSB Arctic Task 100% Reg
4 FSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task 100% Reg
3 MSB 100% Reg 
4 MSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task

3 CDN Armored BDE (CFB Wainwright) - off base units noted in their description) 
  This is a 20/80 Reg/Res construct.
  Reg Force Housed at CFB Edmonton - with Simulators - vehicles held in Wainwright - Res Recruiting from Prairie provinces 


 3 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon - ideally a small tracked Recce Vehicle - but using LAV for now.

 OPCON (CFB Edmonton) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron) 

1-2 Regiment Canadian Dragoons (no Royal) 

  4 Sqn x Regt 

CDN Infantry Regiment 
  1-4 BN's of CI 
 1-2 in a IFV - tracked heavy gun/missile system (modern Bradley)
 3-4 in LAV or TLAV (until entire Bde converted to Heavy IFV)

5-6 CER 

1 ADATS Regiment

5-7 RCHA  (5/6 RCHA with SPA, 7 with Armored Tracked Rocket system like MLRS)



5 FSB 100% Reg
6 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
5 MSB 100% Reg 
6 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res

4 CDN Mechanized BDE (CFB Valcartier) - off base units noted in their description) 
  This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.
  Res Recruiting from Quebec, and surrounding provinces if needed


 4 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon - 

 OPCON (CFB Valcartier) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron) 


CDN Infantry Regiment 
    LAV BN's (3x) naming continues 5-7 from the Armoured CIR

CDN Light Infantry 
     1 x BN 

3rd Cdn CAV Bn 



8-10 RCHA  (8/9 RCHA with SPA Wheeled, 10 with Armored wheeled Rocket system like MLRS/HIMARS)



7 FSB 100% Reg
8 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
7 MSB 100% Reg 
8 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res




So much more - but this was a pretty brutal wall of text -and I still have 7 more slides with more verbal diarrhea to go


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> View attachment 66920
> So the first swipe at my Napkin Army -- I got ambitious while I was doing this - and this isn't really my 2025 one - more of a 2030.
> 
> As I originally didn't have the AH Squadrons - and I have noted in the Armoured BDE that the vehicles where TLAV (interim), I also got ambitious with the Artillery.
> I am still working on the BDE HQ constructs - and detailed break downs on the BN's.
> For purposes of this I have stuck all the Sigs (Comms), Sigs (EW), NBCW Recce, AND Air Defence) into the Bde HQ's (plus Div HQ), as well as the Aviation CS/CSS.
> 
> My goal was PY Neutral - but a increase in the actual "fieldable" force - and major gains to support structures.
> Also looking at the size of the CA, I opted for 1 DIV as both the admin side of the Army - and with a Deployable HQ portion if needed).
> 
> Each Bde has 4 INF BN's - but pay attention to any Regimental names , each Bde has 2 Gun Regt, Armored Bde and Mech Bde have 2 Gun Regt and 1 Rocket Regt (and eventually all will have 1 LR PF Regt)
> Inf BN 4x Line Coy, 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
> Armored Reg't 4x Tank Sqn, 1x ARV Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
> Armored Car/CAV BN - 4 LAV Coy (Crew only) 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
> Engineer Regt 3x Fd Sqn, 1x C-IED/EOD Sqn, 1x Cbt Spt Sqn, 1 Maint Sqn, 1 Trans Sqn, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Sqn
> Artillery Regt 3x8 gun Bty, 2x STA/UAV Bty, 1 Maint Bty, 1 Trans Bty, 1 HHQ Bty, 1 Admin Bty
> 
> 
> 
> 1 CDN Para BDE (CFB Petawawa - off base units noted in their description)
> I opted for a Para Bde - simply because it allows for force employment worldwide rapidly.   This is a 70/30 Reg/Res construct.
> 
> 1 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse)  of Armoured Recce (Airborne capable) - a very light tracked vehicle - I am agnostic to what - but all terrain capable of high speeds - low on armor - high on stealth and surveillance.
> 1 Sqn of Light UH, and 1 Sqn of Chinooks (plus my dreamed AH Squadron) - these are direct BDE assets, I didn't get into naming the Tac Hel Sqn's - as the fight for those is such bigger than what they are called).
> 
> CDN Para Regiment
> 1-4 BN's of Paras (1&2 Para have secondary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 Para have Mountain taskings)
> 1 Para is 100% Reg Force
> 2 Para (CFB Trenton) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - Ottawa, Kingtson, and Toronto Res units)
> 3 Para (CFB Merrit or somewhere in BC) is 100% reg force
> 4 Para (CFB same as 3 Para) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Alberta/ Eastern BC Mountain Res Units)
> 
> 1-2 CER
> 1 CER - 70/30 - same recurring zone as 2 Para
> 2 CER *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para
> 
> 1-2 RCHA
> 1 RCHA 70/30 - same recruiting as 2 Para
> 2 RCHA *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para
> 
> 1 FSB 100% Reg
> 2 FSB 100% Reg
> 1 MSB 100% Reg
> 
> 2 CDN Light BDE (CFB Gagetown - off base units noted in their description)
> This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.
> 
> 2 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse)  of Armoured Recce (I missed the "Armoured in my unit symbol above)  - same vehicle and orbit - minus jump tasking as 1CLH
> 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)
> 
> CDN Light Infantry
> 1-4 BN's of CLI (1&2 CLI have a primary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 CLI have Amphibious taskings)
> 1 BN CLI is 70% Reg Force - 30% Res
> 2 CLI (CFB North Bay) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - other Ontario Res units, not tasked to the Paras)
> 3 CLI (CFB Vancouver or somewhere in BC) is 50% reg force 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Western BC Res Units)
> 4 CLI is 50% Reg - 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Maritime Res Units)
> 
> 1-2 Bn Cdn CAV Regiment (CFB Wainwright) 20/80% Reg/Res)
> LAV BN without troops - for mobility/protection tasks - otherwise assisting with 3 CAB training.
> 
> 3-4 CER
> 3 CER - 50/50 Reg/Res - (Arctic Task) same recruiting zone as 2 CLI
> 4 CER *CFB same as 3 CLI 50/50 Reg/Res (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI
> 
> 3-4 RCHA
> 3 RCHA 30/70 - (Arctic Task) same recruiting as 2 CLI
> 4 RCHA *CFB same as 3 CLI 30/70 (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI
> 
> 3 FSB Arctic Task 100% Reg
> 4 FSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task 100% Reg
> 3 MSB 100% Reg
> 4 MSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task
> 
> 3 CDN Armored BDE (CFB Wainwright) - off base units noted in their description)
> This is a 20/80 Reg/Res construct.
> Reg Force Housed at CFB Edmonton - with Simulators - vehicles held in Wainwright - Res Recruiting from Prairie provinces
> 
> 
> 3 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon - ideally a small tracked Recce Vehicle - but using LAV for now.
> 
> OPCON (CFB Edmonton) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)
> 
> 1-2 Regiment Canadian Dragoons (no Royal)
> 
> 4 Sqn x Regt
> 
> CDN Infantry Regiment
> 1-4 BN's of CI
> 1-2 in a IFV - tracked heavy gun/missile system (modern Bradley)
> 3-4 in LAV or TLAV (until entire Bde converted to Heavy IFV)
> 
> 5-6 CER
> 
> 1 ADATS Regiment
> 
> 5-7 RCHA  (5/6 RCHA with SPA, 7 with Armored Tracked Rocket system like MLRS)
> 
> 
> 
> 5 FSB 100% Reg
> 6 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 5 MSB 100% Reg
> 6 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 
> 4 CDN Mechanized BDE (CFB Valcartier) - off base units noted in their description)
> This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.
> Res Recruiting from Quebec, and surrounding provinces if needed
> 
> 
> 4 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon -
> 
> OPCON (CFB Valcartier) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)
> 
> 
> CDN Infantry Regiment
> LAV BN's (3x) naming continues 5-7 from the Armoured CIR
> 
> CDN Light Infantry
> 1 x BN
> 
> 3rd Cdn CAV Bn
> 
> 
> 
> 8-10 RCHA  (8/9 RCHA with SPA Wheeled, 10 with Armored wheeled Rocket system like MLRS/HIMARS)
> 
> 
> 
> 7 FSB 100% Reg
> 8 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 7 MSB 100% Reg
> 8 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So much more - but this was a pretty brutal wall of text -and I still have 7 more slides with more verbal diarrhea to go




You don't know from verbal diarrhea.   I know verbal diarrhea.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> You don't know from verbal diarrhea.   I know verbal diarrhea.


We'll I had to keep going back and changing the autocorrects of my US English keyboards.
   That delayed me a tad.


----------



## KevinB

While I am still working on my graphic for the Bde HQ 

Some explanation on KNA (Kevin's Napkin Army)
I chose 4 rifle BN's - as it allows for 1 to rest/refit while using a 2 up 1 back and not have a significant hole.
  Plus my experience in Iraq and Afghanistan leads to be believe that a Bn will be needed to conduct D&S work (or at least parts of one) in the Bde area to ensure the safety and security of everyone in the AOR.
  Plus you don't want to have to use MP's, MSE OPs etc as Convoy Security - or QRF's - or FARP Security Teams etc.

I doubled (or even tripled) the Arty - as my belief is in a shooting war - one can actually never have enough.

Then the FSB/MSB: I don't honestly think that 2 Forward Service BN are enough for a Bde on operations - the Main Service BN's where to ensure a reasonable ability to keep equipment running, fuel, bullets, food etc moving - and allow the FSB to support the forward troops, and as well recover battle damaged discarded/abandoned equipment.

- I did stick 3 LAV-CAV BN's in there - mainly to support the Light BN's in 2 LB with some protection and mobility - - as well as 1 for the other LIB in 4 CMBG that I had tossed in as a D&S.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> small point, but the extra Strat squadron should be co located in Edmonton, so they can make use of existing simulators and maximize their training time.


Yeah. The armoured corps is a bit of a puzzle starting with the fact that there aren't any in Edmonton to start with. That's why the KOCR is 32 CABG's armoured regiment rather than various units from Ontario.

In this little project I tried not to re-role any units but quite frankly I've considered turning either the CalgH or the LEdmR into a tank squadron for that very purpose.

One thing too, I don't see any real armoured training taking place throughout the winter month. It's more a time dedicated to individual refresher training. The real heavy equipment training takes place during the summers at Wainwright.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Yeah. The armoured corps is a bit of a puzzle starting with the fact that there aren't any in Edmonton to start with. That's why the KOCR is 32 CABG's armoured regiment rather than various units from Ontario.
> 
> In this little project I tried not to re-role any units but quite frankly I've considered turning either the CalgH or the LEdmR into a tank squadron for that very purpose.
> 
> One thing too, I don't see any real armoured training taking place throughout the winter month. It's more a time dedicated to individual refresher training. The real heavy equipment training takes place during the summers at Wainwright.
> 
> 🍻


South Alberta Light Horse, B Squadron is in Edmonton, they used to be the Alberta Dragoons until the 90s.


----------



## Ostrozac

Well, now you’ve stumbled into one of our sacred cows that is being kept alive in its pasture by the regimental system. How many types of close combat/maneuver soldiers do you actually need?

Currently we have 2 MOSIDs — but 5 types of sub-units. 
Tank Squadron
Armoured Recce/Cavalry Squadron
LAV/Mechanized Infantry Company
Light Infantry Company
Parachute Infantry Company

Can’t these jobs all be done by a single MOSID — Combat Arms Soldier? With appropriate special-to-role training? The RCAC in particular seems to struggle with its identity, with pressure from two directions — lots of people fight from AFVs regardless of capbadge, and there are large numbers of RCAC personnel (particularly in the reserves) that lack AFV expertise.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> South Alberta Light Horse, B Squadron is in Edmonton, they used to be the Alberta Dragoons until the 90s.


Problem solved. See v 2.0 below



🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> Well, now you’ve stumbled into one of our sacred cows that is being kept alive in its pasture by the regimental system. How many types of close combat/maneuver soldiers do you actually need?
> 
> Currently we have 2 MOSIDs — but 5 types of sub-units.
> Tank Squadron
> Armoured Recce/Cavalry Squadron
> LAV/Mechanized Infantry Company
> Light Infantry Company
> Parachute Infantry Company
> 
> Can’t these jobs all be done by a single MOSID — Combat Arms Soldier? With appropriate special-to-role training? The RCAC in particular seems to struggle with its identity, with pressure from two directions — lots of people fight from AFVs regardless of capbadge, and there are large numbers of RCAC personnel (particularly in the reserves) that lack AFV expertise.




I think I've offered before the notion of "motors not muscles".   My broad sense is that if you have an AFV you fight the AFV.  A few troops in back can make themselves useful but if the ground favours dismounts it doesn't favour AFVs.   Conversely if the ground favours AFVs it doesn't favour dismounts.

The LAV units should be emphasizing their vehicles in their tactics and most of the "muscle" in the back should be allocated to the foot-borne army.   

That leaves you with Black Hat LAVs (and tanks) and infantry on their feet with light vehicles that can be carried by helicopter in support.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> While I am still working on my graphic for the Bde HQ
> 
> Some explanation on KNA (Kevin's Napkin Army)
> I chose 4 rifle BN's - as it allows for 1 to rest/refit while using a 2 up 1 back and not have a significant hole.
> Plus my experience in Iraq and Afghanistan leads to be believe that a Bn will be needed to conduct D&S work (or at least parts of one) in the Bde area to ensure the safety and security of everyone in the AOR.
> Plus you don't want to have to use MP's, MSE OPs etc as Convoy Security - or QRF's - or FARP Security Teams etc.
> 
> I doubled (or even tripled) the Arty - as my belief is in a shooting war - one can actually never have enough.
> 
> Then the FSB/MSB: I don't honestly think that 2 Forward Service BN are enough for a Bde on operations - the Main Service BN's where to ensure a reasonable ability to keep equipment running, fuel, bullets, food etc moving - and allow the FSB to support the forward troops, and as well recover battle damaged discarded/abandoned equipment.
> 
> - I did stick 3 LAV-CAV BN's in there - mainly to support the Light BN's in 2 LB with some protection and mobility - - as well as 1 for the other LIB in 4 CMBG that I had tossed in as a D&S.




And I like the Square formulation although, as you identify, in the circular battle it would actually be a 3+1 configuration.

In the defence it gives you a perimeter of 10 to 2, 2 to 6 and 6 to 10 with a reserve unit in the centre.

In the advance the same arcs are covered with strike force in the centre.

And no obvious seams for the enemy to split and exploit.


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:


> Well, now you’ve stumbled into one of our sacred cows that is being kept alive in its pasture by the regimental system. How many types of close combat/maneuver soldiers do you actually need?
> 
> Currently we have 2 MOSIDs — but 5 types of sub-units.
> Tank Squadron
> Armoured Recce/Cavalry Squadron
> LAV/Mechanized Infantry Company
> Light Infantry Company
> Parachute Infantry Company
> 
> Can’t these jobs all be done by a single MOSID — Combat Arms Soldier? With appropriate special-to-role training? The RCAC in particular seems to struggle with its identity, with pressure from two directions — lots of people fight from AFVs regardless of capbadge, and there are large numbers of RCAC personnel (particularly in the reserves) that lack AFV expertise.


This type of thinking creates problems. There was a time early this century where artillery operated in career streams of field, AD and STA. It's generally not an issue while you work within your career stream but there comes a point where SrNCMs and officers are looked at as generic items. You could end up with an AD MWO getting posted as a BSM to a gun battery or a gun line/FOO gets appointed an AD Bty commander. It would be fine if these folks had no responsibility other than pers management but a BSM is THE expert on all things gunnery and has to maintain the absolutely highest standards amongst his gunners. An AD Bty commander has the responsibility for managing and advising on all things AD. The experience gained within your occupation/classification is absolutely critical to properly leading/commanding units.

I think for infantry perhaps you can start off with a common light infantry module and then add mech and para modules for those destined to go that way and there might be some crossover possible based on the common skills. On the other hand, the mere attendance that I had, as a gunner, on the combat team commanders course would have been barely adequate for me to take command of either a mech infantry company or a tank squadron.  While I had a good grasp of the fundamentals from the course and my time as a FOO had given me some experience in how a company operates, I was far short of the experience needed to properly run one (I did run a Militia company that was really a platoon - but that's another story).

I'm starting to think that perhaps armour and "cavalry" should also be separate occupations/classifications. That said though, the Army is so small that these separate streams make it very difficult to maintain proper career progression when all there is is one tank regiment. It's tough and my guess is that will simply never happen.

One MOSID, however, for all ... what would it accomplish? Soldiers already take a standardized module to teach all the common skills required across the board. And as armour and infantry currently stand they are each large enough to sustain themselves. I can't see any benefit to merging them.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Ostrozac said:


> Can’t these jobs all be done by a single MOSID — Combat Arms Soldier? With appropriate special-to-role training? The RCAC in particular seems to struggle with its identity, with pressure from two directions — lots of people fight from AFVs regardless of capbadge, and there are large numbers of RCAC personnel (particularly in the reserves) that lack AFV expertise.



FWIW, 'Close with and Destroy' is not, and probably should not, be owned wholly by the Infantry.

However, it's a mission that is 100% of the Infantry's job.


----------



## MilEME09

Here's a thought to increase the ability of the reserves, three week summer concentrations every year, 1 week in garrison, two in the field. Augment with a small Reg F Cadre to help mentor.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Here's a thought to increase the ability of the reserves, three week summer concentrations every year, 1 week in garrison, two in the field. Augment with a small Reg F Cadre to help mentor.



Better start with a 'mission', or good money will continue to follow bad


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Better start with a 'mission', or good money will continue to follow bad


Is it worthwhile looking at how the Cadets manage to run annual "concentrations"?  Or the Bold Eagle program?

No snark.


----------



## KevinB

Ostrozac said:


> Well, now you’ve stumbled into one of our sacred cows that is being kept alive in its pasture by the regimental system. How many types of close combat/maneuver soldiers do you actually need?
> 
> Currently we have 2 MOSIDs — but 5 types of sub-units.
> Tank Squadron
> Armoured Recce/Cavalry Squadron
> LAV/Mechanized Infantry Company
> Light Infantry Company
> Parachute Infantry Company
> 
> Can’t these jobs all be done by a single MOSID — Combat Arms Soldier? With appropriate special-to-role training? The RCAC in particular seems to struggle with its identity, with pressure from two directions — lots of people fight from AFVs regardless of capbadge, and there are large numbers of RCAC personnel (particularly in the reserves) that lack AFV expertise.


Absolutely not.

I would argue that you probably should have 4 different MOSID for that.
1) Tanker
2) Armoured Recce/Cav
3) Mech Inf
4) Light Inf

I could be convinced that only three are needed if the LAV Crews are from Armoured Cav, and the Inf aspect to the LAV is just as GIB's- but based on how many of us have seen the Armoured run the LAV - versus the Inf run the LAV - I don't think it would work -- unless those CAVpers are permanently attached in to a LAV unit - and frankly at that point - they have lost the AR aspect.

The other aspect is a lot of folks like to act like LI is just a LAV BN without LAV's - but the entire approach to Warfighting is different (or needs to be) when you do not have an IFV (I don't think the LAV is a good IFV - but for what the CF has been doing - it is basically an IFV).


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I could be convinced that only three are needed if the LAV Crews are from Armoured Cav, and the Inf aspect to the LAV is just as GIB's- but based on how many of us have seen the Armoured run the LAV - versus the Inf run the LAV - I don't think it would work -- unless those CAVpers are permanently attached in to a LAV unit - and frankly at that point - they have lost the AR aspect.



Kevin, is the principal difference between the Armd and Inf  the fact that one tends to fight on the move against moving targets while the other tends to fight from fixed positions against fixed targets?  I accept that that is an over-simplification and that between those two extremes there is a universe of gray/grey.

That is why I asked at the beginning of this thread how many people you need in the crew.  2 or 3?   I think the infantry can get away with 2 because once the GIBs dismount the LAVs are tied geographically to the ground on which the infantry is fighting.  The turret becomes a relocatable machine gun post.  The carriers then effectively become the battalion's MG platoon.  

Meanwhile the Mounted soldiers, especially when mounted in lightly armoured vehicles see the need to keep on the move, use the ground and maintain situational awareness in a moving bubble at a constant rate of  60 mph.


----------



## GR66

Here's a possible different approach.  There are 36 x Companies in the Reg Force Infantry (3 x Infantry Companies and 1 x CS Company per Battalion).  There are 48 x Reserve Infantry Regiments (really Company-sized units).

What if you simply paired one Reserve Infantry Regiment/Company with each Reg Force Company.  This could be done by either doubling the number of Companies in each Battalion (4 x Reg Force and 4 x Reserve Companies per Battalion) or by effectively doubling the manning of each of the 4 x Companies by having a mix of Reg Force and Reserve troops in each.  

Now instead of having two separate Components of the Army you now have a Total Force which is integrated.  Battalions would coordinate the training of their Companies to include both their full-time and part-time soldiers and the Reg Force equipment would be available to the Reservists within their own unit. 

It would also open up the units to greater potential recruiting.  If say for example A Coy, 1 RCR were to be paired with the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, then a Reservist could be recruited to the unit from either their satellite location in Ottawa or from the Petawawa area.

There are a couple of options for the remaining 12 x Reserve Infantry Regiments that don't get paired with a Reg Force Company.  Twelve Reserve Companies is enough to form a Reserve Brigade.  It could be tasked as an Arctic Response Brigade or possibly a Security Force Brigade to provide rear area support the the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (or individual Battalions to support each of the Reg Force Brigade Service Battalions).  Alternately, these units could be re-rolled to fill badly needed CSS roles.

If the 10 x Reserve Infantry Brigades are eliminated (or reduced to a single Reserve Brigade) then that staff can be re-directed to RSS support to the Reserve Company locations, extra training support or additional admin support within the Reg Force Battalions to assist with the added administrative overhead.

Support for the units would now be under the umbrella of the Reg Force Service Battalions and the now unneeded Reserve Service Battalions could be rolled into these units as well.  That would give greater depth to our Service Battalions as we'd now only have three (or possibly 4) Brigades to support instead of 13.

As part of this re-org you could also tackle the so called "Regimental Mafia" if you wish by switching from 1-3 PPCLI, 1-3 RCR and 1-3 R22eR to nine separately named Battalions (PPCLI, RCR, R22eR, Governor General's Foot Guards, Queens Own Rifles, Les Voltigeurs de Quebec, etc.).


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> View attachment 66920
> So the first swipe at my Napkin Army -- I got ambitious while I was doing this - and this isn't really my 2025 one - more of a 2030.
> 
> As I originally didn't have the AH Squadrons - and I have noted in the Armoured BDE that the vehicles where TLAV (interim), I also got ambitious with the Artillery.
> I am still working on the BDE HQ constructs - and detailed break downs on the BN's.
> For purposes of this I have stuck all the Sigs (Comms), Sigs (EW), NBCW Recce, AND Air Defence) into the Bde HQ's (plus Div HQ), as well as the Aviation CS/CSS.
> 
> My goal was PY Neutral - but a increase in the actual "fieldable" force - and major gains to support structures.
> Also looking at the size of the CA, I opted for 1 DIV as both the admin side of the Army - and with a Deployable HQ portion if needed).
> 
> Each Bde has 4 INF BN's - but pay attention to any Regimental names , each Bde has 2 Gun Regt, Armored Bde and Mech Bde have 2 Gun Regt and 1 Rocket Regt (and eventually all will have 1 LR PF Regt)
> Inf BN 4x Line Coy, 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
> Armored Reg't 4x Tank Sqn, 1x ARV Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
> Armored Car/CAV BN - 4 LAV Coy (Crew only) 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
> Engineer Regt 3x Fd Sqn, 1x C-IED/EOD Sqn, 1x Cbt Spt Sqn, 1 Maint Sqn, 1 Trans Sqn, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Sqn
> Artillery Regt 3x8 gun Bty, 2x STA/UAV Bty, 1 Maint Bty, 1 Trans Bty, 1 HHQ Bty, 1 Admin Bty
> 
> 
> 
> 1 CDN Para BDE (CFB Petawawa - off base units noted in their description)
> I opted for a Para Bde - simply because it allows for force employment worldwide rapidly.   This is a 70/30 Reg/Res construct.
> 
> 1 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse)  of Armoured Recce (Airborne capable) - a very light tracked vehicle - I am agnostic to what - but all terrain capable of high speeds - low on armor - high on stealth and surveillance.
> 1 Sqn of Light UH, and 1 Sqn of Chinooks (plus my dreamed AH Squadron) - these are direct BDE assets, I didn't get into naming the Tac Hel Sqn's - as the fight for those is such bigger than what they are called).
> 
> CDN Para Regiment
> 1-4 BN's of Paras (1&2 Para have secondary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 Para have Mountain taskings)
> 1 Para is 100% Reg Force
> 2 Para (CFB Trenton) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - Ottawa, Kingtson, and Toronto Res units)
> 3 Para (CFB Merrit or somewhere in BC) is 100% reg force
> 4 Para (CFB same as 3 Para) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Alberta/ Eastern BC Mountain Res Units)
> 
> 1-2 CER
> 1 CER - 70/30 - same recurring zone as 2 Para
> 2 CER *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para
> 
> 1-2 RCHA
> 1 RCHA 70/30 - same recruiting as 2 Para
> 2 RCHA *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para
> 
> 1 FSB 100% Reg
> 2 FSB 100% Reg
> 1 MSB 100% Reg
> 
> 2 CDN Light BDE (CFB Gagetown - off base units noted in their description)
> This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.
> 
> 2 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse)  of Armoured Recce (I missed the "Armoured in my unit symbol above)  - same vehicle and orbit - minus jump tasking as 1CLH
> 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)
> 
> CDN Light Infantry
> 1-4 BN's of CLI (1&2 CLI have a primary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 CLI have Amphibious taskings)
> 1 BN CLI is 70% Reg Force - 30% Res
> 2 CLI (CFB North Bay) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - other Ontario Res units, not tasked to the Paras)
> 3 CLI (CFB Vancouver or somewhere in BC) is 50% reg force 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Western BC Res Units)
> 4 CLI is 50% Reg - 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Maritime Res Units)
> 
> 1-2 Bn Cdn CAV Regiment (CFB Wainwright) 20/80% Reg/Res)
> LAV BN without troops - for mobility/protection tasks - otherwise assisting with 3 CAB training.
> 
> 3-4 CER
> 3 CER - 50/50 Reg/Res - (Arctic Task) same recruiting zone as 2 CLI
> 4 CER *CFB same as 3 CLI 50/50 Reg/Res (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI
> 
> 3-4 RCHA
> 3 RCHA 30/70 - (Arctic Task) same recruiting as 2 CLI
> 4 RCHA *CFB same as 3 CLI 30/70 (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI
> 
> 3 FSB Arctic Task 100% Reg
> 4 FSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task 100% Reg
> 3 MSB 100% Reg
> 4 MSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task
> 
> 3 CDN Armored BDE (CFB Wainwright) - off base units noted in their description)
> This is a 20/80 Reg/Res construct.
> Reg Force Housed at CFB Edmonton - with Simulators - vehicles held in Wainwright - Res Recruiting from Prairie provinces
> 
> 
> 3 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon - ideally a small tracked Recce Vehicle - but using LAV for now.
> 
> OPCON (CFB Edmonton) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)
> 
> 1-2 Regiment Canadian Dragoons (no Royal)
> 
> 4 Sqn x Regt
> 
> CDN Infantry Regiment
> 1-4 BN's of CI
> 1-2 in a IFV - tracked heavy gun/missile system (modern Bradley)
> 3-4 in LAV or TLAV (until entire Bde converted to Heavy IFV)
> 
> 5-6 CER
> 
> 1 ADATS Regiment
> 
> 5-7 RCHA  (5/6 RCHA with SPA, 7 with Armored Tracked Rocket system like MLRS)
> 
> 
> 
> 5 FSB 100% Reg
> 6 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 5 MSB 100% Reg
> 6 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 
> 4 CDN Mechanized BDE (CFB Valcartier) - off base units noted in their description)
> This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.
> Res Recruiting from Quebec, and surrounding provinces if needed
> 
> 
> 4 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon -
> 
> OPCON (CFB Valcartier) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)
> 
> 
> CDN Infantry Regiment
> LAV BN's (3x) naming continues 5-7 from the Armoured CIR
> 
> CDN Light Infantry
> 1 x BN
> 
> 3rd Cdn CAV Bn
> 
> 
> 
> 8-10 RCHA  (8/9 RCHA with SPA Wheeled, 10 with Armored wheeled Rocket system like MLRS/HIMARS)
> 
> 
> 
> 7 FSB 100% Reg
> 8 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 7 MSB 100% Reg
> 8 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So much more - but this was a pretty brutal wall of text -and I still have 7 more slides with more verbal diarrhea to go


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Here's a thought to increase the ability of the reserves, three week summer concentrations every year, 1 week in garrison, two in the field. Augment with a small Reg F Cadre to help mentor.


I've also come to that conclusion. I tend to find that much of the winter weeknight and even weekend training is less than optimal. If you reduce that you'll find the paid days to generate an extra week in the field. With between 45-50 days annual training (but all of it quality trg and focused on refresher and collective) you can keep a unit adequately trained over a three-four year cycle.

The difficulty is getting everyone out for it. That requires legislation that both protects jobs as well as mandates reservists be entitled to both the statutory time off for training (unpaid by the employer) and statutory time off for paid summer vacation with their family.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I've also come to that conclusion. I tend to find that much of the winter weeknight and even weekend training is less than optimal. If you reduce that you'll find the paid days to generate an extra week in the field. With between 45-50 days annual training (but all of it quality trg and focused on refresher and collective) you can keep a unit adequately trained over a three-four year cycle.
> 
> The difficulty is getting everyone out for it. That requires legislation that both protects jobs as well as mandates reservists be entitled to both the statutory time off for training (unpaid by the employer) and statutory time off for paid summer vacation with their family.
> 
> 🍻




Or, respectfully, FJAG - increase the size of the pool of volunteers available.    Accept the inefficiencies in the system and try to engage 100 people to generate a trained body of 10 to 20.  Not all of those people will be available all of the time.   And the faces of the 10 to 20 will change but likely include a solid knot of people that always turn out.

The fact that only 10 to 20 turn out does not mean that there is no value in the other 80 to 90 people.  They too are willing - in the right circumstances.

If you had a pool of 1000 volunteers then the odds of fielding 100 improve considerably.

And the pairing of a Reg Force company, as suggested by GR66, is not incompatible with a largely volunteer Militia Regiment fielding a paid, active component of 100 Class A/B/C soldiers.  Nor is it incompatible with pairing the same Militia Regiment with a Ranger Patrol or two.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Except that most units don't have half those positions, or people who know how to do them properly, but yeah....



If Reserve units don't have those positions then why not?

The Adjt usually exist - He is responsible for ensuring that junior officers can promenade nicely in the appropriate footwear.   He might have some time to spare for personnel issues.  Having said that, it is a full time position regardless of whether the unit is a regular or reserve unit.

The Training Officer - surely she exists?  There used to be one.  The only problem was it was often assigned to a junior platoon officer as a secondary tasking.  Like the Adjt she should be on the job full time.  And especially aware of the particular problems of working with a group of volunteers that are only under discipline for as long as they so choose.

OC Adm  is another position that needs to be full time position (or at least the RQMSM needs to be)


Those three positions are the heart and soul of any organization no matter what names, ranks, titles are given to them.



The CO and his OCs and their subordinates, assisted by the Sr NCOs supply an operational framework, a cadre if you like, that should be able to use the resources, including volunteers, to the best extent possible when given a tasking.


The Int O in a reserve unit can be a part time position even though it is a critical position for maintaining unit situational awareness.   Most people on this site are already voluntarily doing what a reserve Int O should be doing.  Staying on top of Open Source Intelligence and CF bulletins and disseminating them.  He can keep his opinions to himself unless specifically requested.

The Sigs O does not have to be a Signaller.  She just needs to know where to find one.  And how to use her laptop, tablet, cell phone and a tactical radio.  And maintain the Net.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> We just have to get rid of this silly notion of turning in your kit in the same state you found it, or get charged.
> 
> War is the ultimate in disposable enterprises.  We have grown up in a disposable society.  Nobody repairs lap tops or smart phones unless it is a very low cost repair.   We buy new ones on credit.  Or "on tick" as we used to say.
> 
> Cheaper to buy a new truck than maintain the maintainers necessary to maintain an old one.  Likewise for a new rifle.
> 
> And if the person that broke it did it out of sheer bloody mindedness then you can always charge them for the replacement.  On tick.




Why are we worried about repairing pistols and rifles in the field?  Or radios?

If the CQ is toting around the batteries, ammunition, pyro, explosives, single shot weapons and alternate weapons (DMRs, LMGs, GPMGs, CGs, (mortars?)) then why not half a dozen or so spare 3 kg rifles?


----------



## Kirkhill

Another comment that caught my eye upthread related to career progression and the movement within trades from technician to manager.

I strongly believe that managers are created but that not everybody is cut out to be a manager.

I also strongly believe that a good manager in a technical field needs to have been a technician first.  He has to know the requirements of the technical trade she is managing.

I also believe that being a technical adviser is a very different thing than being either a technician or a technical manager.  An adviser is as much diplomat as SME.

Finally, having progressed through a career from technician, to technical manager, to technical adviser and watched the solutions available constantly change while the problems remain the same I have come to see my role as a senior to try to act as a calming influence.  Let the youngsters know that this has happened before, that the problems were managed with the tools that were available,  that those tools are still available.  The problem can still be managed the old way.   But with the new magic tools that the youngsters have at their disposal, and about which I have very little understanding and less facility, they can probably manage the problem differently and possibly better.  But regardless there is an ancient fall back plan available if they need it.  My job becomes a simple one of creating space to allow them to get on with their jobs.


Leadership is a separate issue entirely.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Kevin, is the principal difference between the Armd and Inf  the fact that one tends to fight on the move against moving targets while the other tends to fight from fixed positions against fixed targets?  I accept that that is an over-simplification and that between those two extremes there is a universe of gray/grey.
> 
> That is why I asked at the beginning of this thread how many people you need in the crew.  2 or 3?   I think the infantry can get away with 2 because once the GIBs dismount the LAVs are tied geographically to the ground on which the infantry is fighting.  The turret becomes a relocatable machine gun post.  The carriers then effectively become the battalion's MG platoon.
> 
> Meanwhile the Mounted soldiers, especially when mounted in lightly armoured vehicles see the need to keep on the move, use the ground and maintain situational awareness in a moving bubble at a constant rate of  60 mph.


More in how to support the troops on the ground - I am not a fan of running the LAV with 2 - regardless, the gunner alone doesn't have enough SA to control fire, give vehicle directions and communicate - it needs a CC.

Infantrymen turned LAV crew still know what it is like on the ground - and being part of that unit makes the relationship smoother.

   The only time I would consider a non 031 Crew is for a district CAV grouping - where they are agnostic to their crew - and used more as Armored Transport than a fighting vehicle.
   Truly the only role I see for a LAV in a Armored formation is running convoy escorts for non bleeding edge support - and that was my goal of the non Asymetrical Bde construct I came up with.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Why are we worried about repairing pistols and rifles in the field?  Or radios?
> 
> If the CQ is toting around the batteries, ammunition, pyro, explosives, single shot weapons and alternate weapons (DMRs, LMGs, GPMGs, CGs, (mortars?)) then why not half a dozen or so spare 3 kg rifles?


Some spares - but spare parts are needed for protracted conflicts.
   If you are replacing action springs, buffers, extractors and extractor springs at 5k on a C8 - at some point in a conflict - you won't have enough weapons if you don't have parts and maintainers - the same goes for all items.

You need to have your Army setup for a protracted conflict -- or you end up in this ad hoc dumpster fire the CF is in now.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Even on our exercises to Yakima, as the QM, I always brought a toolbox of spare parts we had built up with the help of the weapons techs in Chilliwack, springs, screws, pins, firing pins, gas plugs, mag bodies, etc. You always ended up fixing at least one weapon per exercise.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> Even on our exercises to Yakima, as the QM, I always brought a toolbox of spare parts we had built up with the help of the weapons techs in Chilliwack, springs, screws, pins, firing pins, gas plugs, mag bodies, etc. You always ended up fixing at least one weapon per exercise.



Dude, you just kicked over about a dozen rice bowls


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I've also come to that conclusion. I tend to find that much of the winter weeknight and even weekend training is less than optimal. If you reduce that you'll find the paid days to generate an extra week in the field. With between 45-50 days annual training (but all of it quality trg and focused on refresher and collective) you can keep a unit adequately trained over a three-four year cycle.
> 
> The difficulty is getting everyone out for it. That requires legislation that both protects jobs as well as mandates reservists be entitled to both the statutory time off for training (unpaid by the employer) and statutory time off for paid summer vacation with their family.
> 
> 🍻


I think a better idea would be 1 Fall 10 day Ex (2 days to pre and deploy - 1 day to return and End Ex), 1 Summer 18 day (2 day prep and deploy - 14 days - 2 days return and End Ex) -- mainly because I do think that only 1 "real" ex a year isn't enough.

Nothing will fly in Canada without legislation - and public support - otherwise it is best to shutter the reserves and use the money to get the Reg force kitted out.

I do think for the CBT Arms Res - a lot of weeknight and weekend training can be done on Simulators - either vehicle - or in a dismounted VR Battlefield setting


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Some spares - but spare parts are needed for protracted conflicts.
> If you are replacing action springs, buffers, extractors and extractor springs at 5k on a C8 - at some point in a conflict - you won't have enough weapons if you don't have parts and maintainers - the same goes for all items.
> 
> You need to have your Army setup for a protracted conflict -- or you end up in this ad hoc dumpster fire the CF is in now.





Colin Parkinson said:


> Even on our exercises to Yakima, as the QM, I always brought a toolbox of spare parts we had built up with the help of the weapons techs in Chilliwack, springs, screws, pins, firing pins, gas plugs, mag bodies, etc. You always ended up fixing at least one weapon per exercise.



Fair enough.  Do what you can with what's available.  

But to the point of a protracted war - surely it is likely that the production lines will be turning out assembled weapons at a high rate of knots?  And given the relatively low mass and volume of a rifle doesn't it seem just as reasonable to have a whole new rifle Fed Exed to the CQ?   A protracted war is not won from the stores or even the warehouse.  It won from the factory production line.  And a great transport and supply line.

I can see that that is not a realistic approach for all things.   But most/many things used today are not fixable.  It is difficult for the average citizen or soldier to repair a tablet.  When it breaks a new one is bought.

That is why I was asking about Picatinny rails.  Your 1945 vintage guns, Colin,  were held together by precision threads.  And often much disassembly was required to get at the ripped up piece of hardware you wanted to unbolt or replace.  On the other hand the Picatinny, Plug'n'Play system kind of splits the difference between repair and replace.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> View attachment 66920
> So the first swipe at my Napkin Army -- I got ambitious while I was doing this - and this isn't really my 2025 one - more of a 2030.


Definitely 2030. The IFVs will take you beyond that.


KevinB said:


> As I originally didn't have the AH Squadrons - and I have noted in the Armoured BDE that the vehicles where TLAV (interim), I also got ambitious with the Artillery.


I presume that your battalion level symbol on the aviation elements is meant to represent a squadron rather than a US level of Aviation Bn. We currently have six operational TacHel sqns while your construct calls for nine. At roughly 15 aircraft per squadron that means we have roughly a hundred plus. A US Divisional heavy CAB has roughly 110 helicopters and a bunch of UAVs. In short your construct is doable (albeit we have to decide what really makes an AH) as far as numbers go. I tend to strongly favour a single aviation brigade if for no other reason than the need to concentrate maintenance capabilities. 


KevinB said:


> I am still working on the BDE HQ constructs - and detailed break downs on the BN's.
> For purposes of this I have stuck all the Sigs (Comms), Sigs (EW), NBCW Recce, AND Air Defence) into the Bde HQ's (plus Div HQ), as well as the Aviation CS/CSS.


Fair enough although I would tend to put AD under the arty and everyone else under something else. The US uses the Engr bn as a catch all for the purpose of providing the unit administrative support to all those disparate elements - it relieves the Bde HQ from having to look after the admin minutiae of keeping everyone fed and fueled and ammo'd up and the BSB's forward support company for the Engr bn is scaled to look after all those needs. I think that's a more practical solution than creating a Bde HQ Bn


KevinB said:


> My goal was PY Neutral - but a increase in the actual "fieldable" force - and major gains to support structures.
> Also looking at the size of the CA, I opted for 1 DIV as both the admin side of the Army - and with a Deployable HQ portion if needed).
> 
> Each Bde has 4 INF BN's - but pay attention to any Regimental names , each Bde has 2 Gun Regt, Armored Bde and Mech Bde have 2 Gun Regt and 1 Rocket Regt (and eventually all will have 1 LR PF Regt)
> Inf BN 4x Line Coy, 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
> Armored Reg't 4x Tank Sqn, 1x ARV Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
> Armored Car/CAV BN - 4 LAV Coy (Crew only) 1x Cbt Spt Coy, 1 Maint Coy, 1 Trans Coy, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Coy
> Engineer Regt 3x Fd Sqn, 1x C-IED/EOD Sqn, 1x Cbt Spt Sqn, 1 Maint Sqn, 1 Trans Sqn, 1 HHQ Coy, 1 Admin Sqn
> Artillery Regt 3x8 gun Bty, 2x STA/UAV Bty, 1 Maint Bty, 1 Trans Bty, 1 HHQ Bty, 1 Admin Bty


Doing some meatball math based on 100 pers per company and the 9 companies per bn/regt set out multiplied by 61 (57 units plus four bde HQ) brings us to 55,000 all ranks not counting the training and static base support infrastructure.


KevinB said:


> 1 CDN Para BDE (CFB Petawawa - off base units noted in their description)
> I opted for a Para Bde - simply because it allows for force employment worldwide rapidly.   This is a 70/30 Reg/Res construct.


My gut reaction was "what the hell". Then I thought about it and said "why not?" I like the use of the 30/70//70/30 construct. IMHO without something like (plus some legislative/regulatory changes) that our Res F will never reach its full potential.


KevinB said:


> 1 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse)  of Armoured Recce (Airborne capable) - a very light tracked vehicle - I am agnostic to what - but all terrain capable of high speeds - low on armor - high on stealth and surveillance.
> 1 Sqn of Light UH, and 1 Sqn of Chinooks (plus my dreamed AH Squadron) - these are direct BDE assets, I didn't get into naming the Tac Hel Sqn's - as the fight for those is such bigger than what they are called).
> 
> CDN Para Regiment
> 1-4 BN's of Paras (1&2 Para have secondary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 Para have Mountain taskings)
> 1 Para is 100% Reg Force
> 2 Para (CFB Trenton) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - Ottawa, Kingtson, and Toronto Res units)
> 3 Para (CFB Merrit or somewhere in BC) is 100% reg force
> 4 Para (CFB same as 3 Para) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Alberta/ Eastern BC Mountain Res Units)


I try to avoid new infrastructure. Edmonton is close enough to the mountains and the north and there was a reason why the Airborne started there.


KevinB said:


> 1-2 CER
> 1 CER - 70/30 - same recurring zone as 2 Para
> 2 CER *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para
> 
> 1-2 RCHA
> 1 RCHA 70/30 - same recruiting as 2 Para
> 2 RCHA *CFB same as 3-4Para 30/70 (Jump/Mountain Tasks) - same recruiting as 4 Para
> 
> 1 FSB 100% Reg
> 2 FSB 100% Reg
> 1 MSB 100% Reg


FSBs and MSBs take us back to a Cold War US divisional organization which is fair enough as I see each of your brigades at around 10 - 12,000 folks which is a mini-div in and of itself. Let me add that I think some of your support structure could be 30/70 and 70/30 as well. Maint should definitely be 100%. Supply could probably manage in peacetime at around 70/30 and Tn could probably function at 30/70. It all depends on how you see the normal peacetime operational deployment cycle working.

One thought on artillery. In every brigade I would make one regt the close support regiment and concentrate all the FSCCs and FOOs required for the bde in one OP Bty. The same for all STA and STACC and ASCC resources. The second regiment could be pure general support and simply provide more fire delivery units (whether guns or rockets or UAVs) The CS Regt could be 70/30 while the GS Regt would be 10/90.


KevinB said:


> 2 CDN Light BDE (CFB Gagetown - off base units noted in their description)
> This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.
> 
> 2 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse)  of Armoured Recce (I missed the "Armoured in my unit symbol above)  - same vehicle and orbit - minus jump tasking as 1CLH
> 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)
> 
> CDN Light Infantry
> 1-4 BN's of CLI (1&2 CLI have a primary Arctic tasking, and 3&4 CLI have Amphibious taskings)
> 1 BN CLI is 70% Reg Force - 30% Res
> 2 CLI (CFB North Bay) is 30% Reg - 70% Res (res only at PL and below level - other Ontario Res units, not tasked to the Paras)
> 3 CLI (CFB Vancouver or somewhere in BC) is 50% reg force 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Western BC Res Units)
> 4 CLI is 50% Reg - 50% Res (Res only at PL and below level - Maritime Res Units)


I like the way the light bns specialize in airborne, mountain arctic and amphibious. My only question is: should the arctic role go to the para brigade so that there is a capability to jump into the Arctic. That could leave two of the leg light battalions to specialize in ... let's say urban ops.


KevinB said:


> 1-2 Bn Cdn CAV Regiment (CFB Wainwright) 20/80% Reg/Res)
> LAV BN without troops - for mobility/protection tasks - otherwise assisting with 3 CAB training.
> 
> 3-4 CER
> 3 CER - 50/50 Reg/Res - (Arctic Task) same recruiting zone as 2 CLI
> 4 CER *CFB same as 3 CLI 50/50 Reg/Res (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI
> 
> 3-4 RCHA
> 3 RCHA 30/70 - (Arctic Task) same recruiting as 2 CLI
> 4 RCHA *CFB same as 3 CLI 30/70 (Amphibious Tasks) - same recruiting as 3 CLI


Having served in both 2 and 3 RCHA as well as two Res F regts and one bn I welcome the reappearance of the 3rd Herd. That said, the fact that sometime in the 1950's some twit decided that the Reg F fd regts (79 and 81 Fd Regt RCA) should become 3 and 4 RCHA has always rankled me. I actually liked the fact that 5 RALC was RALC and not RCHA. While I'm not fond of the Reg F infantry cabals I do think that we shouldn't throw out the fine wartime lineage/history and connection to local regions that many of our Res F bns/regts have. I know this is just a napkin org but whenever I do this game I like to throw traditional units into the mix. (I could never understand why there are now eight Rifles and seven Scots and four each Mercs and Lancs and Yorks - like I said, cap badges are cheap)

Had to get that off my chest.


KevinB said:


> 3 FSB Arctic Task 100% Reg
> 4 FSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task 100% Reg
> 3 MSB 100% Reg
> 4 MSB (CFB Vancouver) Amphibious Task


If you take your amphibious force to the east coast you can leverage 2 RCR and a whole bunch of Maritimes inf bns and their infrastructure already there. Same if you put your Mountain troops into Vancouver/Edmonton.



KevinB said:


> 3 CDN Armored BDE (CFB Wainwright) - off base units noted in their description)
> This is a 20/80 Reg/Res construct.
> Reg Force Housed at CFB Edmonton - with Simulators - vehicles held in Wainwright - Res Recruiting from Prairie provinces
> 
> 
> 3 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon - ideally a small tracked Recce Vehicle - but using LAV for now.
> 
> OPCON (CFB Edmonton) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)
> 
> 1-2 Regiment Canadian Dragoons (no Royal)
> 
> 4 Sqn x Regt
> 
> CDN Infantry Regiment
> 1-4 BN's of CI
> 1-2 in a IFV - tracked heavy gun/missile system (modern Bradley)
> 3-4 in LAV or TLAV (until entire Bde converted to Heavy IFV)


I'm with you on IFVs albeit that's a road the Army tends to continuously screw up. Scrapping the project in 2013 (I might be a bit off on my date) was one of the most shortsighted moves. Any one who thinks the LAV 6 was an adequate replacement - well I won't say more. 

I'm also on for maintaining the TLAVs. There a perfectly adequate vehicle for dozens of roles and we already have them. Maintenance of them isn't the problem. Lack of maintainers is. Divestment isn't the solution. Creating a viable recruiting and training stream for maintainers and a viable and sustainable parts supply system is the solution and should be one of the top priorities for the CAF across the board. Personally I'd take 2,000 PYs out of NDHQ for that but if push came to shove I'd convert two or three Reg F bns/regts to Res F for that.


KevinB said:


> 5-6 CER
> 
> 1 ADATS Regiment


Call it GBAD


KevinB said:


> 5-7 RCHA  (5/6 RCHA with SPA, 7 with Armored Tracked Rocket system like MLRS)
> 
> 
> 
> 5 FSB 100% Reg
> 6 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 5 MSB 100% Reg
> 6 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 
> 4 CDN Mechanized BDE (CFB Valcartier) - off base units noted in their description)
> This is a 30/70 Reg/Res construct.
> Res Recruiting from Quebec, and surrounding provinces if needed


I think you might want to up the Reg F ratio. I see these folks pretty busy on deployments once we get over our Afghan shock. For me, a mech force like this is the right force for the peacekeeping/support to nation building that our politicians so dearly love to get into. I'd up the ratio on the inf bns, recce and engrs to around 70/30 and cut back the ratio on the heavy weapons to 10/90


KevinB said:


> 4 Sqn (Canadian Light Horse) Armoured Recce - LAV-Recce Squardon -
> 
> OPCON (CFB Valcartier) 1 Sqn of Light UH (ideally another and a Chinook Sqn too) -- (plus my dreamed AH Squadron)
> 
> 
> CDN Infantry Regiment
> LAV BN's (3x) naming continues 5-7 from the Armoured CIR
> 
> CDN Light Infantry
> 1 x BN
> 
> 3rd Cdn CAV Bn
> 
> 
> 
> 8-10 RCHA  (8/9 RCHA with SPA Wheeled, 10 with Armored wheeled Rocket system like MLRS/HIMARS)
> 
> 
> 
> 7 FSB 100% Reg
> 8 FSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 7 MSB 100% Reg
> 8 MSB 70-30 Reg/Res
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So much more - but this was a pretty brutal wall of text -and I still have 7 more slides with more verbal diarrhea to go


I'm glad to see the integration and weighing of the Reg F/Res F ratios as well as the asymmetry. 

I think our biggest difference lies in the number of brigade headquarters. Your bdes have a larger number of units which, I suppose is based on the idea that only a portion of the brigade deploys and the rest are used to generate augmentees or replacements within the brigade. While there is a div HQ it would be hard to make it deployable unless one generated the divisional enablers by taking enablers from the brigades.

I tend to create more bde HQs (5 v 4) to facilitate deploying an additional manoeuvre bde if necessary and putting enablers into support brigades so that there is flexibility in either augmenting deployed brigades to tailor them to a given situation or to facilitate the deployment of a full division if that should ever become necessary.

I think I would also stay with the two Div FG headquarters to allow one to build an "in case of war, break glass" force which is heavily weighted towards Res F and the other to build a lighter "day-to-day ops" force a bit more weighted to full-timers. I'm not sure that can be done with just one FG Div HQ. Whether we keep 1 Cdn Div as the CJOC based deployed forces HQ or not is another question for another day. 

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Definitely 2030. The IFVs will take you beyond that.


I am sure the US Army would toss a few hundred cheap to the CF if they would go to forward deployed Bde in Europe...
  Plus a bunch of M1A2 that the USMC is divesting.


FJAG said:


> I presume that your battalion level symbol on the aviation elements is meant to represent a squadron rather than a US level of Aviation Bn. We currently have six operational TacHel sqns while your construct calls for nine. At roughly 15 aircraft per squadron that means we have roughly a hundred plus. A US Divisional heavy CAB has roughly 110 helicopters and a bunch of UAVs. In short your construct is doable (albeit we have to decide what really makes an AH) as far as numbers go. I tend to strongly favour a single aviation brigade if for no other reason than the need to concentrate maintenance capabilities.


 Yes - I wish it was larger - but 2030 wouldn't give the time.


FJAG said:


> Fair enough although I would tend to put AD under the arty and everyone else under something else. The US uses the Engr bn as a catch all for the purpose of providing the unit administrative support to all those disparate elements - it relieves the Bde HQ from having to look after the admin minutiae of keeping everyone fed and fueled and ammo'd up and the BSB's forward support company for the Engr bn is scaled to look after all those needs. I think that's a more practical solution than creating a Bde HQ Bn.


  In the same way the Tac Hel crowd takes it from both the CA and RCAF, the RAC tend to bend over the AD side - so I chose to divest it from the Field Arty.


FJAG said:


> Doing some meatball math based on 100 pers per company and the 9 companies per bn/regt set out multiplied by 61 (57 units plus four bde HQ) brings us to 55,000 all ranks not counting the training and static base support infrastructure.


 I started running out of PY's admittedly - which was why I was rather ruthless on HQ's
   No Res forces above a Platoon - 


FJAG said:


> My gut reaction was "what the hell". Then I thought about it and said "why not?" I like the use of the 30/70//70/30 construct. IMHO without something like (plus some legislative/regulatory changes) that our Res F will never reach its full potential.


 Agreed - and neither will the Reg Force - as it cannot sustain operations without the Res.


FJAG said:


> I try to avoid new infrastructure. Edmonton is close enough to the mountains and the north and there was a reason why the Airborne started there.


 You may remember elsewhere where I suggested Edmonton as the Light Bde center - and was heavily criticized.



FJAG said:


> FSBs and MSBs take us back to a Cold War US divisional organization which is fair enough as I see each of your brigades at around 10 - 12,000 folks which is a mini-div in and of itself. Let me add that I think some of your support structure could be 30/70 and 70/30 as well. Maint should definitely be 100%. Supply could probably manage in peacetime at around 70/30 and Tn could probably function at 30/70. It all depends on how you see the normal peacetime operational deployment cycle working.


    Yeah I always viewed the ideal Bde as a Mini Div - mainly as the troop levels Canada has had since WW2 don't support Multi Div's - and I think the Bde needs to be viewed as the Basic Deployable structure - pieces of it can be deployed - but it should be self sufficient for the most part.


FJAG said:


> One thought on artillery. In every brigade I would make one regt the close support regiment and concentrate all the FSCCs and FOOs required for the bde in one OP Bty. The same for all STA and STACC and ASCC resources. The second regiment could be pure general support and simply provide more fire delivery units (whether guns or rockets or UAVs) The CS Regt could be 70/30 while the GS Regt would be 10/90.


 I will default to you on that - I grew up as the FOO Party as part of the Bty so I just defaulted to that - but whatever works best.



FJAG said:


> I like the way the light bns specialize in airborne, mountain arctic and amphibious. My only question is: should the arctic role go to the para brigade so that there is a capability to jump into the Arctic. That could leave two of the leg light battalions to specialize in ... let's say urban ops.


 I put the Airborne as a secondary Arctic Task -- mainly I see them getting up quickly in times of crisis - but long term it is a waste as they lost their mobility, and other "Light" Inf can be better equipped for that.


FJAG said:


> Having served in both 2 and 3 RCHA as well as two Res F regts and one bn I welcome the reappearance of the 3rd Herd. That said, the fact that sometime in the 1950's some twit decided that the Reg F fd regts (79 and 81 Fd Regt RCA) should become 3 and 4 RCHA has always rankled me. I actually liked the fact that 5 RALC was RALC and not RCHA. While I'm not fond of the Reg F infantry cabals I do think that we shouldn't throw out the fine wartime lineage/history and connection to local regions that many of our Res F bns/regts have. I know this is just a napkin org but whenever I do this game I like to throw traditional units into the mix. (I could never understand why there are now eight Rifles and seven Scots and four each Mercs and Lancs and Yorks - like I said, cap badges are cheap)
> 
> Had to get that off my chest.
> 
> If you take your amphibious force to the east coast you can leverage 2 RCR and a whole bunch of Maritimes inf bns and their infrastructure already there. Same if you put your Mountain troops into Vancouver/Edmonton.


I wanted an Amphibious force on each coast - just to force Jointness with the other services - and I think the PANASIAN area is more likely for an Amphibious tasking - so regular work with the West Coast RCN Fleet


FJAG said:


> I'm with you on IFVs albeit that's a road the Army tends to continuously screw up. Scrapping the project in 2013 (I might be a bit off on my date) was one of the most shortsighted moves. Any one who thinks the LAV 6 was an adequate replacement - well I won't say more.
> 
> I'm also on for maintaining the TLAVs. There a perfectly adequate vehicle for dozens of roles and we already have them. Maintenance of them isn't the problem. Lack of maintainers is. Divestment isn't the solution. Creating a viable recruiting and training stream for maintainers and a viable and sustainable parts supply system is the solution and should be one of the top priorities for the CAF across the board. Personally I'd take 2,000 PYs out of NDHQ for that but if push came to shove I'd convert two or three Reg F bns/regts to Res F for that.


I absolutely despise the TLAV - mainly as how some project office folks tried to sell it - but it does offer better mobility in a lot of terrain than the LAV - so until a real IFV can be acquired I would suggest it be retained - and even after it can have uses - even if kicked to mothballs to be used by a LI entity if they need some moderate protected mobility later.



FJAG said:


> Call it GBAD


I said ADATS because I wanted to remind the CA that it criminally lost that.



FJAG said:


> I think you might want to up the Reg F ratio. I see these folks pretty busy on deployments once we get over our Afghan shock. For me, a mech force like this is the right force for the peacekeeping/support to nation building that our politicians so dearly love to get into. I'd up the ratio on the inf bns, recce and engrs to around 70/30 and cut back the ratio on the heavy weapons to 10/90


  I am unsure if in the Post Afghan world - we shall see the same interest, but I think that if that CMBG was needed - the first rotation would be mostly reg - and further done by Res - 


FJAG said:


> I'm glad to see the integration and weighing of the Reg F/Res F ratios as well as the asymmetry.
> 
> I think our biggest difference lies in the number of brigade headquarters. Your bdes have a larger number of units which, I suppose is based on the idea that only a portion of the brigade deploys and the rest are used to generate augmentees or replacements within the brigade. While there is a div HQ it would be hard to make it deployable unless one generated the divisional enablers by taking enablers from the brigades.


 Oh I have a ton of Div level enablers - but most are 10/90 as I see the likelihood of the CF deploying a Div in peacetime as low 



FJAG said:


> I tend to create more bde HQs (5 v 4) to facilitate deploying an additional manoeuvre bde if necessary and putting enablers into support brigades so that there is flexibility in either augmenting deployed brigades to tailor them to a given situation or to facilitate the deployment of a full division if that should ever become necessary.
> 
> I think I would also stay with the two Div FG headquarters to allow one to build an "in case of war, break glass" force which is heavily weighted towards Res F and the other to build a lighter "day-to-day ops" force a bit more weighted to full-timers. I'm not sure that can be done with just one FG Div HQ. Whether we keep 1 Cdn Div as the CJOC based deployed forces HQ or not is another question for another day.
> 
> 🍻


As far as the Div goes --- if it needed to deploy - then there is war time measures - and recruiting and maybe conscription/draft.

So at same time it would be deploying, the Bde's would be getting filled by new recruits - and you could swell "one up" so the Div would be a Corps - and the Bde Div's, and so on.

My Bde would have a 1* as Brigade Commander - a COL as COS, and S-3 - and POST Command LCOL's as the other Staff positions.
   That way by the time one makes COL they should have a pretty solid grip on both the Leadership/Command and Staffing Requirements.

 I would also have 1 Div as a MG (as CCA) and the CDS as a 3* - so I saved a slew on GOFO's so I can get a bunch more PY at the PTE/CPL level


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Or, respectfully, FJAG - increase the size of the pool of volunteers available.    Accept the inefficiencies in the system and try to engage 100 people to generate a trained body of 10 to 20.  Not all of those people will be available all of the time.   And the faces of the 10 to 20 will change but likely include a solid knot of people that always turn out.
> 
> The fact that only 10 to 20 turn out does not mean that there is no value in the other 80 to 90 people.  They too are willing - in the right circumstances.
> 
> If you had a pool of 1000 volunteers then the odds of fielding 100 improve considerably.
> 
> And the pairing of a Reg Force company, as suggested by GR66, is not incompatible with a largely volunteer Militia Regiment fielding a paid, active component of 100 Class A/B/C soldiers.  Nor is it incompatible with pairing the same Militia Regiment with a Ranger Patrol or two.


There are a lot of things that you and I agree on but on this issue - no way.

I view our Res F structure as fundamentally flawed. Pretty much every occupation/classification in the Army these days is much more complex than it was fifty years ago. Each one of them needs a fairly detailed individual training regime and a system of regular refresher training as well as advanced collective training (and by advanced I mean at the company level for the vast bulk of reservists and at bn level for a selected group)

We are utterly unable to do that with a "come when you feel like it" philosophy. Increasing the pool might - maybe - increase that pool of available folks but I think that when you are already falling short of your manning levels then you will never achieve the numbers that you need. To create those additional numbers (assuming that you can even get them) places a massive burden on the system which starts with the clear increase in pay for the new candidates but much more so in the administrative burden placed on the training and administrative cadre that is needed to feed them through the system. If you plan to increase your pool ten fold then you will need a ten fold training and admin effort just for starters.

Sometimes when you see a problem you have to come to the realization that the only way through it is an unpopular path. For me the solution comes down to a very tightly controlled system of obligatory training that balances the needs of the military with that of the civilian employer and the soldiers family. 

I break that into phases. The first is to use the young soldiers student status to the utmost by using every spare summer school break session to the utmost to train them to Reg F DP 1 standards while giving them a maximum summer job. Secondly you leverage financial support for university and community college courses to off-load critical skills training (mechanics, medics, truckers, administrators, food services) onto civilian instructors while giving the soldier a marketable civilian qualification and locking them into a period of obligatory service.

Once fully trained as an individual to DP 1 and some DP 2 standards you move to phase 2 whereby you cut back on the obligatory activities they are required to participate in to the minimum necessary to maintain those skills and to keep the unit (I put that at roughly 45 days annually) This is where the balancing act is critical because you want to maintain a critical core of leadership especially at the senior NCO level.

Fundamental to any system like this is the need for a much greater integration of Reg F leadership in actually leading at the Res F level and a much greater involvement by Reg F personnel in all of the training of the Res F. Simply put, training the Res F must be part and parcel to every Reg F units annual training cycle.

The concept of predeployment training that was developed for the Afghan War is simply ludicrous. If one has six months to deploy, one could take civilians off the street and have them trained to a DP 1 rifleman or gunner or crewman standard in time for deployment. You do not need a Res F for that. The issue is that we shouldn't need six months. We should have a pool of people who can go on deployments with one or two months of theatre specific training because they already have a known and acceptable basic standard. And when the chips are really down, they should be able to get on a plane within 48 hours and be useable by the time that they land.

Sorry, K. We'll never agree on your model. We need to aim much higher. Like I said, the path ahead is not a popular one but it is a necessary one. This is one pig where a coat of lipstick just isn't going to cut it. We've been trying and failing since the fifties.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Also I


Kirkhill said:


> Fair enough.  Do what you can with what's available.
> 
> But to the point of a protracted war - surely it is likely that the production lines will be turning out assembled weapons at a high rate of knots?  And given the relatively low mass and volume of a rifle doesn't it seem just as reasonable to have a whole new rifle Fed Exed to the CQ?   A protracted war is not won from the stores or even the warehouse.  It won from the factory production line.  And a great transport and supply line.
> 
> I can see that that is not a realistic approach for all things.   But most/many things used today are not fixable.  It is difficult for the average citizen or soldier to repair a tablet.  When it breaks a new one is bought.
> 
> That is why I was asking about Picatinny rails.  Your 1945 vintage guns, Colin,  were held together by precision threads.  And often much disassembly was required to get at the ripped up piece of hardware you wanted to unbolt or replace.  On the other hand the Picatinny, Plug'n'Play system kind of splits the difference between repair and replace.


Look at it more this way -- that Tablet - that might be part of the FCS or the entire thing, but not the entire LAV...
    As the cost/scale of the item increases, the more it requires modular replacement, as opposed to sheer replacement.

Most new equipment is designed for modular replacement - it requires a tech for the most part, but the entire item isn't disposable.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> More in how to support the troops on the ground - I am not a fan of running the LAV with 2 - regardless, the gunner alone doesn't have enough SA to control fire, give vehicle directions and communicate - it needs a CC.
> 
> Infantrymen turned LAV crew still know what it is like on the ground - and being part of that unit makes the relationship smoother.
> 
> The only time I would consider a non 031 Crew is for a district CAV grouping - where they are agnostic to their crew - and used more as Armored Transport than a fighting vehicle.
> Truly the only role I see for a LAV in a Armored formation is running convoy escorts for non bleeding edge support - and that was my goal of the non Asymetrical Bde construct I came up with.


I fully agree. We in Canada have given our infantry carriers a much bigger role then they merit since we first gave M113s to the mech bns. It was a battle taxi and not an adequate fighting support vehicle. Being given a LAV with a 25mm upped the ante on that but it's still far short of being an IFV. I get drawn to FM 3-96 respecting the BCT which says this about the SBCT:



> SBCTs balance combined arms capabilities with significant mobility. The SBCT primarily fights as a dismounted Infantry formation that includes three SBCT Infantry battalions.


Whether the Stryker bns still have a "combined arms" capability since the MGSs have been withdrawn is questionable but they certainly still come with a much more powerful mortar and anti-armour capability then our mech bns. Admittedly they don't have the 25mm but that is changing.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I fully agree. We in Canada have given our infantry carriers a much bigger role then they merit since we first gave M113s to the mech bns. It was a battle taxi and not an adequate fighting support vehicle. Being given a LAV with a 25mm upped the ante on that but it's still far short of being an IFV. I get drawn to FM 3-96 respecting the BCT which says this about the SBCT:
> 
> SBCTs balance combined arms capabilities with significant mobility. The SBCT primarily fights as a dismounted Infantry formation that includes three SBCT Infantry battalions.


Part of the problem is the SBCT's used them like IFV's in Afghanistan and Iraq (they had either Mk19 or M2 in the RWS) - because it wasn't a Peer/Near Peer threat - the same way the CF ran the LAV in Afghanistan.

   The US Army at least codified their doctrine as they acknowledged that it wasn't an IFV based on their experiences with the Bradley - which the M2A3 is a pretty potent IFV.

  I think the CF having never had an IFV, hasn't fully understood how vulnerable the LAV is.


FJAG said:


> Whether the Stryker bns still have a "combined arms" capability since the MGSs have been withdrawn is questionable but they certainly still come with a much more powerful mortar and anti-armour capability then our mech bns. Admittedly they don't have the 25mm but that is changing.
> 
> 🍻


They have AH's 
  Which IMHO is better than a tank


----------



## FJAG

I really have to get on with doing other things today.


KevinB said:


> No Res forces above a Platoon


I could see some in Coy HQ and even the odd company commander and CSM assuming he's taken the requisite courses and has worked his way through the lower command positions.


KevinB said:


> You may remember elsewhere where I suggested Edmonton as the Light Bde center - and was heavily criticized.


I think what we criticized was taking the armour out of Edmonton/Wainwright. You could always squeeze in another light battalion. What makes it trickier now is that the RCAF no longer has Hercs in Edmonton. But that's a problem everywhere except eastern Ontario.


KevinB said:


> Yeah I always viewed the ideal Bde as a Mini Div - mainly as the troop levels Canada has had since WW2 don't support Multi Div's - and I think the Bde needs to be viewed as the Basic Deployable structure - pieces of it can be deployed - but it should be self sufficient for the most part.


We agree on the concept if not the methodology


KevinB said:


> I will default to you on that - I grew up as the FOO Party as part of the Bty so I just defaulted to that - but whatever works best.


Things have changed since your day. I actually think creating an observation battery and reducing the gun batteries to "just guns" is one of the positive moves made. Unfortunately we've only gone part way. While all the FOOs and their teams are in one battery, we've left the BCs and their FSCCs with the gun batteries. That makes no sense tactically but was designed to leave majors in charge of each battery. This is what you get when you can't get over yourself and accept the fact that with the FOOs gone, a senior Battery Captain could very easily run the battery and that senior captains would also work quite well as fire support coordinators at the bn FSCC. But then that would have upset the rank pyramid.


KevinB said:


> I absolutely despise the TLAV - mainly as how some project office folks tried to sell it - but it does offer better mobility in a lot of terrain than the LAV - so until a real IFV can be acquired I would suggest it be retained - and even after it can have uses - even if kicked to mothballs to be used by a LI entity if they need some moderate protected mobility later.


Even when I worked with German Leopard and Marder bns there were always a herd of M113s swarming around filling a lot of B Veh roles. It was always fun to watch them fall behind because they simply couldn't keep up with tanks and IFVs even on bald-ass prairie.


KevinB said:


> I said ADATS because I wanted to remind the CA that it criminally lost that.


😁


KevinB said:


> I am unsure if in the Post Afghan world - we shall see the same interest, but I think that if that CMBG was needed - the first rotation would be mostly reg - and further done by Res -
> 
> Oh I have a ton of Div level enablers - but most are 10/90 as I see the likelihood of the CF deploying a Div in peacetime as low





KevinB said:


> As far as the Div goes --- if it needed to deploy - then there is war time measures - and recruiting and maybe conscription/draft.
> 
> So at same time it would be deploying, the Bde's would be getting filled by new recruits - and you could swell "one up" so the Div would be a Corps - and the Bde Div's, and so on.


Not so sure that there'd be time.


KevinB said:


> My Bde would have a 1* as Brigade Commander - a COL as COS, and S-3 - and POST Command LCOL's as the other Staff positions.
> That way by the time one makes COL they should have a pretty solid grip on both the Leadership/Command and Staffing Requirements.


You'd need that for the size and complexity of these organizations. Almost thinking that your G4 should be a Col who would also run all of the static base infrastructure.


KevinB said:


> I would also have 1 Div as a MG (as CCA) and the CDS as a 3* - so I saved a slew on GOFO's so I can get a bunch more PY at the PTE/CPL level


I'm still of the view that you could take 10,000 folks out headquarters above brigade level and not suffer any ill effects as long as you massively revise the processes and all the decision making minutiae that Ottawa refuses to delegate to the appropriate lower command levels.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Part of my BDE HQ Construct.
    I stuck the Bde Recon Assets into the MI - and grew it to a BN - as I feel UAV's need to be part of the Int package - as well as all the other ISR assets - so they can be better monitored - and used more seamlessly by the G2 and G3 

@FJAG you now see my mini Div horror show -- I was still working on the Sig's Reg't layout - but as I am not being paid for a TO&E - I think this gets my point across without a bunch more time devoted to pictograms


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I really have to get on with doing other things today.



Me too 



FJAG said:


> I could see some in Coy HQ and even the odd company commander and CSM assuming he's taken the requisite courses and has worked his way through the lower command positions.


Agreed - but I was doing the Crawl - Walk - Run.
  So at the start I was just going to ground level Platoons.


FJAG said:


> I think what we criticized was taking the armour out of Edmonton/Wainwright. You could always squeeze in another light battalion. What makes it trickier now is that the RCAF no longer has Hercs in Edmonton. But that's a problem everywhere except eastern Ontario.


A C17 should be able to get to Edmonton in 3.5hrs - which should be enough time to demo the FIBUA block house and the range gate - and have it land on the base runway 
   As much as I would love to have a Coy on IRU at <60min NTM - I think that needs to fall under CANSOFCOM -  I think 1 Coy on 4hrs NTM is able for a Para Reg't - and that allows for the C-17 to fly across Canada to get them if need be - while they draw mission items.



FJAG said:


> We agree on the concept if not the methodology
> 
> Things have changed since your day. I actually think creating an observation battery and reducing the gun batteries to "just guns" is one of the positive moves made. Unfortunately we've only gone part way. While all the FOOs and their teams are in one battery, we've left the BCs and their FSCCs with the gun batteries. That makes no sense tactically but was designed to leave majors in charge of each battery. This is what you get when you can't get over yourself and accept the fact that with the FOOs gone, a senior Battery Captain could very easily run the battery and that senior captains would also work quite well as fire support coordinators at the bn FSCC. But then that would have upset the rank pyramid.


Roger - I see it now.


FJAG said:


> You'd need that for the size and complexity of these organizations. Almost thinking that your G4 should be a Col who would also run all of the static base infrastructure.


Good point - plus it makes for 3 Col competing for 1 BGen Command slot.



FJAG said:


> I'm still of the view that you could take 10,000 folks out headquarters above brigade level and not suffer any ill effects as long as you massively revise the processes and all the decision making minutiae that Ottawa refuses to delegate to the appropriate lower command levels.
> 
> 🍻


I totally agree


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Part of the problem is the SBCT's used them like IFV's in Afghanistan and Iraq (they had either Mk19 or M2 in the RWS) - because it wasn't a Peer/Near Peer threat - the same way the CF ran the LAV in Afghanistan.
> 
> The US Army at least codified their doctrine as they acknowledged that it wasn't an IFV based on their experiences with the Bradley - which the M2A3 is a pretty potent IFV.
> 
> I think the CF having never had an IFV, hasn't fully understood how vulnerable the LAV is.


I've only ever read about 2 Inf Div's 5th SBCT adventure in Afghanistan in 2009/10. This is actually a good booklet on events there:


> https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/StrykersInAfghanistan.pdf


A lot of their problems stemmed from really poor leadership. 

As far as Canada was concern the difference in attitude was that for the US, the Stryker is an interim middle-weight solution while for Canada its an agile, all-singing, all-dancing, full spectrum top of the line tool.



KevinB said:


> They have AH's
> Which IMHO is better than a tank


And that, sir, is the real issue which we just can't seem to get our heads around. I'm not so sure how they'd fare in a proper peer conflict these days but there's a definite advantage in them until we get all the appropriate autonomous ground and air vehicles up and running.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Part of the problem is the SBCT's used them like IFV's in Afghanistan and Iraq (they had either Mk19 or M2 in the RWS) - because it wasn't a Peer/Near Peer threat - the same way the CF ran the LAV in Afghanistan.
> 
> The US Army at least codified their doctrine as they acknowledged that it wasn't an IFV based on their experiences with the Bradley - which the M2A3 is a pretty potent IFV.
> 
> I think the CF having never had an IFV, hasn't fully understood how vulnerable the LAV is.
> *
> They have AH's
> Which IMHO is better than a tank*



.... For short periods of time in favourable weather conditions during permissive air superiority windows


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I've only ever read about 2 Inf Div's 5th SBCT adventure in Afghanistan in 2009/10. This is actually a good booklet on events there:
> 
> A lot of their problems stemmed from really poor leadership.
> 
> As far as Canada was concern the difference in attitude was that for the US, the Stryker is an interim middle-weight solution while for Canada its an agile, all-singing, all-dancing, full spectrum top of the line tool.
> 
> 
> And that, sir, is the real issue which we just can't seem to get our heads around. I'm not so sure how they'd fare in a proper peer conflict these days but there's a definite advantage in them until we get all the appropriate autonomous ground and air vehicles up and running.
> 
> 🍻


Given the power than some EW systems can put out -- unless it's a massively shielded totally IA user independent system - I wouldn't put a ton of faith in any autonomous systems.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> There are a lot of things that you and I agree on but on this issue - no way.
> 
> I view our Res F structure as fundamentally flawed. Pretty much every occupation/classification in the Army these days is much more complex than it was fifty years ago. Each one of them needs a fairly detailed individual training regime and a system of regular refresher training as well as advanced collective training (and by advanced I mean at the company level for the vast bulk of reservists and at bn level for a selected group)
> 
> We are utterly unable to do that with a "come when you feel like it" philosophy. Increasing the pool might - maybe - increase that pool of available folks but I think that when you are already falling short of your manning levels then you will never achieve the numbers that you need. To create those additional numbers (assuming that you can even get them) places a massive burden on the system which starts with the clear increase in pay for the new candidates but much more so in the administrative burden placed on the training and administrative cadre that is needed to feed them through the system. If you plan to increase your pool ten fold then you will need a ten fold training and admin effort just for starters.
> 
> Sometimes when you see a problem you have to come to the realization that the only way through it is an unpopular path. For me the solution comes down to a very tightly controlled system of obligatory training that balances the needs of the military with that of the civilian employer and the soldiers family.
> 
> I break that into phases. The first is to use the young soldiers student status to the utmost by using every spare summer school break session to the utmost to train them to Reg F DP 1 standards while giving them a maximum summer job. Secondly you leverage financial support for university and community college courses to off-load critical skills training (mechanics, medics, truckers, administrators, food services) onto civilian instructors while giving the soldier a marketable civilian qualification and locking them into a period of obligatory service.
> 
> Once fully trained as an individual to DP 1 and some DP 2 standards you move to phase 2 whereby you cut back on the obligatory activities they are required to participate in to the minimum necessary to maintain those skills and to keep the unit (I put that at roughly 45 days annually) This is where the balancing act is critical because you want to maintain a critical core of leadership especially at the senior NCO level.
> 
> Fundamental to any system like this is the need for a much greater integration of Reg F leadership in actually leading at the Res F level and a much greater involvement by Reg F personnel in all of the training of the Res F. Simply put, training the Res F must be part and parcel to every Reg F units annual training cycle.
> 
> The concept of predeployment training that was developed for the Afghan War is simply ludicrous. If one has six months to deploy, one could take civilians off the street and have them trained to a DP 1 rifleman or gunner or crewman standard in time for deployment. You do not need a Res F for that. The issue is that we shouldn't need six months. We should have a pool of people who can go on deployments with one or two months of theatre specific training because they already have a known and acceptable basic standard. And when the chips are really down, they should be able to get on a plane within 48 hours and be useable by the time that they land.
> 
> Sorry, K. We'll never agree on your model. We need to aim much higher. Like I said, the path ahead is not a popular one but it is a necessary one. This is one pig where a coat of lipstick just isn't going to cut it. We've been trying and failing since the fifties.
> 
> 🍻



I understand that we won't come to terms with this.  But I'm going to make an effort to put my thoughts in a coherent form.

That may take a day or two.

In the meantime I came across this factoid which I thought worth sharing.

In the US, the National Guard is the well regulated militia funded by the State and at the disposal of the Governor.  I trust we can agree on that.

The National Guard is in part funded by, and equipped by the Federal Government.  In return for that support the National Guard agrees to be "federalized", in whole or in part, when the President signs the appropriate papers.

The armies of the individual states are then united in support of the federal army.  

Somebody will correct me when I swerve, I know.



So.  

In looking at the Militia model a came to the conclusion that the critical roles are not the CO and the OCs  Rather the critical roles are the Adjutant and, as I described it, the OC Adm.  And as usual I am a dollar short and a day late.

The appropriate terms are well enough known as Adjutant and Quartermaster.  Whodathunkit.

The Adj handles recruiting. personnel records, pay, surgeons and chaplains

He is assisted by the QuarterMaster who handles quarters (armouries), uniforms, kit and vehicles.


The next two critical positions, as I came to see them, were the Training Officer and the Int O with honourable mention going to the Sigs O.



Now if you have a bunch of units you need a bunch of Adjs.  A bunch of Adjs equals a Corps.  Once you have a Corps you need a General.  Likewise for the QM, the QM Corps and the QM General.

Peculiarly the British adopted this system in the early 1900s, using 18th century terminology,  while the US Army adopted the Prussian system.  Something to do with a misplaced loyalty to a chap name of von Steuben, perhaps.

Interestingly the National Guard, at least in some states, seem to have adhered to the more venerable terminology.

And thus this bit of promised info from Washington State.


Lo and behold the senior officer in charge of the National Guard is ..... the Adjutant-General

And his first duties are, as "he commands all Washington Army and Air National Guard force*s*" to act as "Director of the State’s Emergency Management and Enhanced 911 programs."  General Daugherty also serves as Homeland Security Advisor to the Governor of Washington and as State Administrative Agent for all United States Department of Homeland Security grants awarded to Washington’s state, local, tribal and non-profit agencies and organizations*.*

That is his day job.  Which explains 




> For most of its history, the National Guard’s mission was focused primarily on the homefront





> "The guard’s dual mission at home and abroad means that equipment and training that can pull double-duty is particularly important. Federal missions — which often mean war, or training for it — come first, but the logistics, skills, and structure needed in domestic emergency response can mirror those on the battlefield, or in an overseas humanitarian response. Things like setting up a security perimeter, clearing a route, or moving into an area quickly and setting up shop have some basic similarities, whether troops are fighting insurgents in Afghanistan, responding to an earthquake in Haiti, or preparing for a hurricane in New Orleans, Benton says.
> 
> “The template that says, ‘Build the tents, bring the shower, and have the portalets,’ can be a mobile hospital, or it can be an engineer village for a levee breach, or it could be any security mission,” Benton says. “Those templates don’t change. Those become muscle memory.”
> 
> The same thing goes for equipment. Both the guard and the reserves prize gear that can be used at war or in a domestic emergency — everything from aircraft and cargo trucks to things like bulk water tank racks. The Army’s modernization priorities focus on air and land combat equipment and soldier lethality. According to a recent DOD report, the Army Guard’s air and weapons capabilities are generally more modern, in keeping with these priorities. Areas like engineering, logistics, and transportation, which are critical for responding to natural disasters, have more older equipment or shortages of this dual-use gear, the report says. But as Covid continues to surge, and climate change brings more extreme weather, the guard’s domestic missions, and its reliance on gear like this, are unlikely to abate.





> Over the last two years, the National Guard’s “Swiss army knife” capabilities were on display somewhere else: back home.











						“People are relying on us” — National Guard evolves to fight wars, secure homefront
					

The last two years have seen a rash of domestic crises and the National Guard has been on the frontline responding to everything from the Covid-19 pandemic to historic fires and flooding, and even widespread protests.




					www.armytimes.com
				











The Adjutant General, Washington​Maj. Gen. Bret D. Daugherty​

Major General Bret D. Daugherty assumed duties as The Adjutant General, Washington on July 28, 2012. As The Adjutant General, he commands all Washington Army and Air National Guard forces and is Director of the State’s Emergency Management and Enhanced 911 programs. General Daugherty also serves as Homeland Security Advisor to the Governor of Washington and as State Administrative Agent for all United States Department of Homeland Security grants awarded to Washington’s state, local, tribal and non-profit agencies and organizations.

General Daugherty attended Seattle University where he was awarded an Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps scholarship. Upon graduating as a Distinguished Military Graduate in June of 1980, he was commissioned as a Regular Army Second Lieutenant. He left active duty in 1989 and joined the Washington Army National Guard in 1990.



Education:​
1980 Seattle University, Bachelor of Science, Psychology, Seattle, Washington
1986 American Technological University, Master of Science, Counseling Psychology, Killeen, Texas
1989 Seattle University, Master of Public Administration, Seattle, Washington
2000 United States Army War College, Master of Science, Strategic Studies, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
2009 Joint Task Force Commander Training Course, Certificate, United States Northern Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado
2011 Dual Status Commander Qualification Program, Certificate, United States Northern Command, Colorado Springs, Colorado
Assignments:​
June 1980 - October 1980, Student, Armor Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, Kentucky
October 1980 - July 1981, Student, Initial Entry Rotary Wing, Fort Rucker, Alabama
July 1981 - May 1985, Attack Helicopter Platoon Leader, Troop B, 7/17 Cavalry (Attack), 6th Air Cavalry Combat Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas
June 1985 - August 1989, Assistant Professor of Military Science (Recruiting Team Chief), 4th Reserve Officers' Training Corps Region, Fort Lewis, Washington
August 1989 - February 1990, United States Army Reserve Control Group (Reinforcement), Saint Louis, Missouri
February 1990 - February 1991, Assistant S-4, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
February 1991 - September 1992, Commander, Headquarters Company, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
September 1992 - July 1993, Executive Officer, 1-168 Aviation Battalion (Attack), Fort Lewis, Washington
July 1993 - December 1993, Student, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
December 1993 - September 1995, Executive Officer, 1-168 Aviation Battalion (Attack), Fort Lewis, Washington
September 1995 - July 1996, Assistant S-3, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
July 1996 - July 1999, Commander, 1-168 Aviation Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington
July 1999 - June 2000, Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
July 2000 - September 2001, State Aviation Officer, Headquarters State Area Regional Command, Camp Murray, Washington
September 2001 - March 2002, Executive Officer, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
March 2002 - August 2002, Commander, Task Force United States Army Forces Command, Border Support -Washington, Camp Murray, Washington
August 2002 - February 2003, Director of Security and Intelligence, Headquarters State Area Regional Command, Camp Murray, Washington
February 2003 - March 2004, Deputy Commander, 66th Aviation Brigade, Fort Lewis, Washington
March 2004 - June 2005, Deputy Commander (Rear), 81st Brigade Combat Team, Fort Lewis, Washington,
June 2005 - May 2008, Commander, 205th Regiment (Leadership), Camp Murray, Washington
June 2008 - June 2009, Commander, 66th Theater Aviation Command, Camp Murray, Washington
June 2009 - July 2012, Assistant Adjutant General - Army, Washington National Guard, Camp Murray, Washington
August 2012 - Present, The Adjutant General of the State of Washington, Camp Murray, Washington
Flight Information:​Rating: Senior Army Aviator
Flight Hours: More than 1,300
Aircraft flown: TH-55, UH-1, AH-1, OH-58, UH-60
Pilot wings from: Fort Rucker, Alabama

Awards and Decorations​
Legion of Merit
Meritorious Service Medal (with 3 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal (with 1 Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal (with 2 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (with 2 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
National Defense Service Medal (with 1 Bronze Service Star)
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Silver Hourglass and M Device)
Army Service Ribbon
Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon
Washington National Guard Commendation Medal
Washington State Emergency Service Medal (with 4 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
National Guard Service Ribbon
Senior Army Aviator Badge
Parachutist Badge
Civilian Occupation:​The Adjutant General, Washington Military Department

Professional Memberships and Affiliations:​
National Guard Association of the United States
Reserve Officer's Association
Army Aviation Association of America
Army War College Alumni Association
Effective Date of Promotions:​(Current as of November 2012)


Second Lieutenant 28 May 1980
First Lieutenant 28 November 1981
Captain 1 March 1984
Major 20 October 1992
Lieutenant Colonel 4 June 1997
Colonel 3 September 2002
Brigadier General (Line) 7 November 2008
Major General







						The Adjutant General | Washington State Military Department, Citizens Serving Citizens with Pride & Tradition
					






					mil.wa.gov
				





You are short of bodies.  You can't get sailors to fill berths.  You can't get soldiers to fill the billets available in even your small battalions.  You need bodies.

Even when you open the ranks to the general population you can't get women through the armoury doors.  Or natives. Or minorities. Or the youngsters generally.

Perhaps, as Bread Guy has noted, more people would be attracted if the job were more local.



Or put it another way.  How do we Canadianize the National Guard model?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Or put it another way.  How do we Canadianize the National Guard model?



Lose the war of 1812?


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Lose the war of 1812?



No Daddy! Pleeeease! No more daddy jokes!


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Or put it another way. How do we Canadianize the National Guard model?


In short we don't.

Basically the Adjutant General's Corps in most armies is the one responsible for personnel. Effectively Canada's most reasonable facsimile would be Chief Military Personnel.

As far as the Adjutant Generals of the State National Guards are concerned, this goes back to the US Federal Militia Act of 1792. The purpose of this act was to standardize the Militias of the several states. Article VI provides:



> VI. And be it further enacted, That there shall be an adjutant general appointed in each state, whose duty it shall be to distribute all orders for the Commander in Chief of the State to the several corps; to attend all publick reviews, when the Commander in Chief of the State shall review the militia, or any part thereof; to obey all orders from him relative to carrying into execution, and perfecting, the system of military discipline established by this Act; to furnish blank forms of different returns that may be required; and to explain the principles of which they should be made; to receive from the several officers of the different corps throughout the state, returns of the militia under their command, reporting the actual situation of their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, their delinquencies, and every other thing which relates to the general advancement of good order and discipline: All which, the several officers of the division, brigades, regiments, and battalions are hereby required to make in the usual manner, so that the said adjutant general may be duly furnished therewith: From all which returns be shall make proper abstracts, and by the same annually before the Commander in Chief of the State.





> Militia Act of 1792
> 
> 
> The Militia Act of 1792 allowed the President to temporarily take control of state militias in times of crises. This was later expanded in 1795, permanently allowing the President to call out the militia. Transcript: Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.mountvernon.org



Each State's constitution therefore creates such a position and makes the AG responsible to the State's Commander in Chief who is the Governor. As you can see the position is highly administrative in nature.

You should note as well that the same Act provided for the call out of State Militias on Federal Service.

Canadian Militias developed differently and basically borrowed off the UK's Militia systems. There's a fairly detailed history of them here:



> The Canadian Militia : a history of the origin and development of the Force : Chambers, Ernest J., 1862-1925 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> archive.org



Long story short, and as you well know, all of Canada's military, Reg and Res, is federal but with several provisions which provide for assistance to provincial authorities when requested or requisitioned. Both countries have had two centuries of their particular system and it seems to be working for each of them. If anyone needed to change the system it was the US whose little adventure in 1861-5 should have resulted in changes - but didn't.

Add to that our constitution which firmly puts defence and residual powers into the hands of the feds and sure as shootin' there will never be a way to Guardize our Reserves. The best we can do is structure our Reserves like the Guard with formed and equipped units and formations and an appropriate legislative framework which provides good job protection. I've been advocating that for decades without success.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

I will stipulate that you are legally correct.

But my point doesn't go to the question of ranks, titles and paraphernalia so much as the field organization they represent.   As a result of their organization they manage to store large amounts of useful kit (predominantly logistical stuff like Humvees, Trucks, Helicopters, Hercs, Generators, Water Purifiers and Fire Fighting Gear) in depots across the country within arms reach of willing local volunteers.  Local Volunteers that are also available to bolster the Federal forces against all enemies foreign and domestic.

We have a 2% of GDP target that we can't sell to the population or the politicians. 

As a marketing ploy I would suggest pledging to spend the difference between the current budget and the two percent on the missing logistical support and distribute it nationally in depots accessible to the local Territorial Groups.  That would relieve the regs of domestic emergency response, supply a body of militia that could be dragooned (if you so require) into support of the regs, and might even get you some kudos and the enthusiastic support of people willing to sign a limited "local" contract with Her Majesty.

Meanwhile the rest of the budget gets to be focused on the Regular Force, and its highly trained and specialized technicians.

(Add in shelters, kitchens, ambulances, field hospitals and CBRN facilities to the list of goodies on hand)


----------



## FJAG

Just for the fun of it I randomly selected Ohio (its not far from me) to see what their NG budget is.

They have roughly 17,000 Army and Air Guard and their annual budget for 2018 was US$666 million. Of that there was a direct federal allotment of US$616 million leaving the Ohio to pony up US$49 million. Of that the Feds gave Ohio a further grant of US$37.3 million (primarily for the maintenance and operation by Ohio of various military facilities) leaving to come up with US$10.4 million from General Revenue and another US$1.7 million from something called a Dedicated Purpose.



> https://www.lsc.ohio.gov/documents/budget/134/MainOperating/redbook/ADJ.PDF



So we have about a net inflow into Ohio of over US$600 million. A large chunk of that is pay which benefits the State. Undoubtedly there are ammo costs as well which probably doesn't. But then there is fuel and numerous other supplies from State businesses. Lima, Ohio has a nice tank plant. Long story short Fed military money makes a big impact in the State  ... which means that the Governor, senators and representatives will be big boosters and advocates for their Guard.

Ohio has a population of 11.7 million. Quebec hits 8.5 million and Ontario 15.5 million and generate by the last info available to me 4,200 and 5,300 reservists - probably a couple of hundred air reserve and probably a goodly share of some 5,000 Naval Reservists (13 of 24 divisions). So roughly 2/3 of the number of folks for a little over twice the population.

I sincerely doubt as to whether anyone in Quebec's or Ontario's government has a clue as to what dollar value their reservists bring into the local economy. I also expect no one has an interest to find out until there is a threat of an armoury closing at which point we're dealing with tiny dollars. I'm pretty sure the Feds don't know either because they tend to allocate every nickel they can against the reserve budget even if it doesn't impact the reserves. The last figures I saw with any level of credibility was the 2016 Auditor General report on reserves which said the Army budgeted CA$335 million for 21,000 reservists - roughly CA$202 million for 19,500 part-time reservists, CA$91 million for 1,500 full-timers and CA$41 million for operating costs. Think about it. Half the money for all Canada's Army reserves as is spent on a roughly equal number of Ohio's NG. And we spent 1/3 of the pay budget on 7% of the reservists who are basically doing the job that should legally be done by the Reg F (continuous full-time service = Reg F).

I'm afraid I'm starting to ramble here but my point is if you ever convince anyone to pony up 2% of GDP (which we both know its a pipe dream) then the robber barons running the Forces will spend it on another 7,000 cubicles at Carling Campus. These are the folks that are getting CA$50 million annually for the next five years to combat sexual misconduct. They won't spend any new funds on anything as valuable as equipment or storage depots of any nature whatsoever. How did that whole national stockpile of medical supplies for a pandemic work out?


----------



## MilEME09

KevinB said:


> Some spares - but spare parts are needed for protracted conflicts.
> If you are replacing action springs, buffers, extractors and extractor springs at 5k on a C8 - at some point in a conflict - you won't have enough weapons if you don't have parts and maintainers - the same goes for all items.
> 
> You need to have your Army setup for a protracted conflict -- or you end up in this ad hoc dumpster fire the CF is in now.


Our amount of techs works for a low intensity conflict, and that's about it. Example, I comfortable supported 14 courses during the summer of 2020 in Wainwight because little was breaking at a pace I could easily keep up with. Recent tours over seas have only one or two techs for a company plus, because the break down in weapons is not at combat levels. If it were you would need atlesst 2 sections of techs.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Just for the fun of it I randomly selected Ohio (its not far from me) to see what their NG budget is.
> 
> They have roughly 17,000 Army and Air Guard and their annual budget for 2018 was US$666 million. Of that there was a direct federal allotment of US$616 million leaving the Ohio to pony up US$49 million. Of that the Feds gave Ohio a further grant of US$37.3 million (primarily for the maintenance and operation by Ohio of various military facilities) leaving to come up with US$10.4 million from General Revenue and another US$1.7 million from something called a Dedicated Purpose.
> 
> 
> 
> So we have about a net inflow into Ohio of over US$600 million. A large chunk of that is pay which benefits the State. Undoubtedly there are ammo costs as well which probably doesn't. But then there is fuel and numerous other supplies from State businesses. Lima, Ohio has a nice tank plant. Long story short Fed military money makes a big impact in the State  ... which means that the Governor, senators and representatives will be big boosters and advocates for their Guard.
> 
> Ohio has a population of 11.7 million. Quebec hits 8.5 million and Ontario 15.5 million and generate by the last info available to me 4,200 and 5,300 reservists - probably a couple of hundred air reserve and probably a goodly share of some 5,000 Naval Reservists (13 of 24 divisions). So roughly 2/3 of the number of folks for a little over twice the population.
> 
> I sincerely doubt as to whether anyone in Quebec's or Ontario's government has a clue as to what dollar value their reservists bring into the local economy. I also expect no one has an interest to find out until there is a threat of an armoury closing at which point we're dealing with tiny dollars. I'm pretty sure the Feds don't know either because they tend to allocate every nickel they can against the reserve budget even if it doesn't impact the reserves. The last figures I saw with any level of credibility was the 2016 Auditor General report on reserves which said the Army budgeted CA$335 million for 21,000 reservists - roughly CA$202 million for 19,500 part-time reservists, CA$91 million for 1,500 full-timers and CA$41 million for operating costs. Think about it. Half the money for all Canada's Army reserves as is spent on a roughly equal number of Ohio's NG. And we spent 1/3 of the pay budget on 7% of the reservists who are basically doing the job that should legally be done by the Reg F (continuous full-time service = Reg F).
> 
> I'm afraid I'm starting to ramble here but my point is if you ever convince anyone to pony up 2% of GDP (which we both know its a pipe dream) then the robber barons running the Forces will spend it on another 7,000 cubicles at Carling Campus. These are the folks that are getting CA$50 million annually for the next five years to combat sexual misconduct. They won't spend any new funds on anything as valuable as equipment or storage depots of any nature whatsoever. How did that whole national stockpile of medical supplies for a pandemic work out?




Which rather raises the advantages of competition.


The Forces are responsible to the sovereign authority of  Governor-General.  MacDonald wanted the provinces subordinate to the federal government.  That required the Lieutenant Governors (or Lieutenants Governor) of the Provinces to be subordinated to the Governor General.  But the Lieutenants Governor ante-dated the Governor-General as did their powers over their autonomous charges.  The Lieutenants Governor were appointed by the Crown and granted all the powers of the Crowns Lieutenants.



> "A *lord-lieutenant* (UK: /lɛfˈtɛnənt/[1]) is the British monarch's personal representative in each lieutenancy area of the United Kingdom. Historically, each lieutenant was responsible for organising the county's militia. In 1871, the lieutenant's responsibility over the local militia was removed. However, it was not until 1921 that they formally lost the right to call upon able-bodied men to fight when needed.[2]"





> *Lord Lieutenant of Ireland* (UK: /lɛfˈtɛnənt/[n 1]), or more formally *Lieutenant General and General Governor of Ireland*, was the title of the chief governor of Ireland from the Williamite Wars of 1690 until the Partition of Ireland in 1922. This spanned the Kingdom of Ireland (1541–1800) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (1801–1922). The office, under its various names, was often more generally known as the *Viceroy*, and his wife was known as the vicereine.[n 1] The government of Ireland in practice was usually in the hands of the Lord Deputy up to the 17th century, and later of the Chief Secretary for Ireland.





Apparently, however (you're the lawyer), a couple of decisions in 1882 and 1892 confirmed that the Lieutenants-Governor were equal to the Governor-General in their separate Provinces.   This was subsequently confirmed in 1931, 1947 and 1982.

Also confirmed was that when King George VI devolved his sovereign authority in 1947 he did it directly and severally to the Governor-General with respect to the federal government and to each, individual Lieutenant-Governor of each separate Province.   That would seem to suggest that Canada's Provinces are autonomous, co-equal entities, equal to the federal government and not creatures of them.  I seem to recall hearing that point being argued in the press once or twice.



> From the outset, the vice-regal offices were created to protect the greater interests
> of unity while at the same time permit a greater autonomy and self-governance. Thus, the
> Lieutenant Governors were appointed by and expected to be agents of the Dominion
> government in Ottawa, while the Governor General was appointed by and expected to be
> an agent of the Imperial government in London. This arrangement, however, officially
> changed due to two separate events. The first occurred in 1892 when the Judicial
> Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court in the British Empire, ruled that in the
> case of The Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v The Receiver General of New
> Brunswick, “the Lieutenant Governor…as much the representative of His Majesty for all
> purposes of Provincial Government as the Governor General himself is, for all Dominion
> Government.”7 This ruling went clearly against Macdonald’s dream of a centrist nation,
> as *the law lords declared that the crown of the provinces was equal to, rather than
> subordinate to the federal crown; *no longer would the Lieutenant Governors be agents of
> the federal government. 8





> *Section 12 of the British North America Act essentially transfers all of the powers*
> *of the former Governors and Lieutenant Governors of the former colonies to their*
> *respective federal and provincial governors in the new Canadian confederation*. But the
> vagueness of the office seems to arise in the provision which reads, “By the Governor
> General with the Advice, or with the Advice and Consent of or in conjunction with the
> Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, or any member thereof, or by the Governor General
> individually.”10 J.R. Mallory notes that, “the power of the Governor General, as set in the
> Constitution [especially Section twelve], are formidable, though vague…it is by no
> means clear where the line is between powers exercised on advice and on the
> responsibility of the government of the day and powers the Governor General may
> exercise on his or her discretion.”11



I gather that the assertion has not been successfully challenged. 

Effectively Canada is a free association of sovereign Provinces who jointly agreed to follow the rules of the Club they established in Ottawa.

And each of the separate Lieutenants-Governor independently retains the original reserved sovereign powers of the Crown as the Governor-General.  All the Governors, Lieutenant and General are equally loyally subject to the Canadian Crown.

Am I swerving too much yet?



The reserved powers are not without limitation. They are limited by convention, as I understand it, and public opinion, but




> *while convention is a quite powerful ‘understanding’ in the minds of
> political players, the conventional rules of the constitution have no legal standing*. In fact,
> the Supreme Court ruling, Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1
> S.C.R. 753, stated that;





> In contradistinction to the laws of the constitution, they [constitutional conventions] are not
> enforced by the courts…Perhaps the main reason why conventional rules cannot be
> enforced by the courts is that they are generally in conflict with the legal rules which they
> postulate and the courts are bound to enforce the legal rules…As a matter of law, the
> Queen, or the Governor General or the Lieutenant Governor could refuse assent to every
> bill passed by both Houses of Parliament or by a Legislative Assembly as the case may be.
> But by convention they cannot of their own motion refuse to assent to any such bill on any
> ground, for instance because they disapprove of the policy of the bill. We have here a
> conflict between a legal rule which creates a complete discretion and a conventional rule
> which completely neutralizes it. But conventions, like laws, are sometimes violated. And if
> this particular convention were violated and assent were improperly withheld, the courts
> would be bound to enforce the law, not the convention. They would refuse to recognize the
> validity of a vetoed bill…This conflict between convention and law which prevents the
> courts from enforcing conventions also prevents conventions from crystallizing into laws,
> unless it be by statutory adoption.23





> *Thus, while in many respects, convention curtails the power of Canada’s vice-regals,
> convention is not legally enforceable.*






So what are the reserved powers of the Governors?  As I understand it



> It is the Governor General that to appoints Senators as well as the Speaker of the Senate. The Governor General summons and dissolves sessions of
> Parliament and “any Vote, Resolution, Address or Bill for the Appropriation of any Part
> of the Public Revenue, or of any Tax or Impost,” must first be recommended by the
> Governor General beforehand.13 Also, Section 55 clearly states that a bill may only
> become law after it receives Royal Assent from the Governor General.
> In regards to the Lieutenant Governors, the British North America Act provides
> Executive Councils to fulfil the role of the Privy Council in the provinces and the Act
> clarifies their role in the provincial legislative branches*. In essence, Section 90 bestows*
> *many of the same powers granted to the Governor General to the Lieutenant Governors in*
> *respect to their province.*






> As discussed previously, the British North America Act, 1867 permits Canada’s
> vice-regals to disallow or refuse Royal Assent to bills and to reserve the legislation for
> the jurisdiction above. For example, Lieutenant Governors may reserve legislation for the
> review of the Governor General, and the Governor General may reserve legislation for
> the Queen. In fact, upon;
> 
> …Confederation an explicit restraint on Canadian autonomy took the form of eight classes
> of legislation upon which the governor general’s instructions required him to reserve the
> royal assent; that is, to refer bills in question to Britain for a decision on assent. The items
> so affected included, among other subjects, divorce, legal tender, imposition of differential
> duties, *and control of the military.*




So, to try and wrap this up, there doesn't seem to me to be much to stop each of the Crown's Lieutenants governing in Her Majesty's Provinces from exercising their pre-existing responsibility to raise a Militia for the protection of the separate provinces under their governance.  With the conventional approval of the local legislature of course.

And all of this can be done under the umbrella of



> "I ......... (full name), do swear (or for a solemn affirmation, "solemnly affirm") that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her heirs and successors according to law. So help me God."



So a citizen serving in the CAF could freely transfer their services to a Provincial Militia (and back again) without breaking their oath.  There command would shift from Her Majesty's federal Commander-in-Chief of Her armed forces, the Governor-General,  to one, or any, of Her Majesty's provincial Commanders-in-Chief, her Lieutenants-Governor.


Now, to be clear, I am not recommending the establishment of separate Provincial militias.  I am suggesting that there seems to be a workable path to the establishment of a Provincial Guard after the fashion of US National Guards.

And now you are looking at 10 (or is it 13) Premiers angling for more federal dollars and more federal presence to bolster their voters abilities to manage and survive local emergencies.

(Wow! I out did myself - Time for you to give me a proper schooling on constitutional law ) 








.

Cheers.



			https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2009/Donovan.pdf


----------



## Weinie

Kirkhill said:


> Which rather raises the advantages of competition.
> 
> 
> The Forces are responsible to the sovereign authority of  Governor-General.  MacDonald wanted the provinces subordinate to the federal government.  That required the Lieutenant Governors (or Lieutenants Governor) of the Provinces to be subordinated to the Governor General.  But the Lieutenants Governor ante-dated the Governor-General as did their powers over their autonomous charges.  The Lieutenants Governor were appointed by the Crown and granted all the powers of the Crowns Lieutenants.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Apparently, however (you're the lawyer), a couple of decisions in 1882 and 1892 confirmed that the Lieutenants-Governor were equal to the Governor-General in their separate Provinces.   This was subsequently confirmed in 1931, 1947 and 1982.
> 
> Also confirmed was that when King George VI devolved his sovereign authority in 1947 he did it directly and severally to the Governor-General with respect to the federal government and to each, individual Lieutenant-Governor of each separate Province.   That would seem to suggest that Canada's Provinces are autonomous, co-equal entities, equal to the federal government and not creatures of them.  I seem to recall hearing that point being argued in the press once or twice.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I gather that the assertion has not been successfully challenged.
> 
> Effectively Canada is a free association of sovereign Provinces who jointly agreed to follow the rules of the Club they established in Ottawa.
> 
> And each of the separate Lieutenants-Governor independently retains the original reserved sovereign powers of the Crown as the Governor-General.  All the Governors, Lieutenant and General are equally loyally subject to the Canadian Crown.
> 
> Am I swerving too much yet?
> 
> 
> 
> The reserved powers are not without limitation. They are limited by convention, as I understand it, and public opinion, but
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So what are the reserved powers of the Governors?  As I understand it
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So, to try and wrap this up, there doesn't seem to me to be much to stop each of the Crown's Lieutenants governing in Her Majesty's Provinces from exercising their pre-existing responsibility to raise a Militia for the protection of the separate provinces under their governance.  With the conventional approval of the local legislature of course.
> 
> And all of this can be done under the umbrella of
> 
> 
> 
> So a citizen serving in the CAF could freely transfer their services to a Provincial Militia (and back again) without breaking their oath.  There command would shift from Her Majesty's federal Commander-in-Chief of Her armed forces, the Governor-General,  to one, or any, of Her Majesty's provincial Commanders-in-Chief, her Lieutenants-Governor.
> 
> 
> Now, to be clear, I am not recommending the establishment of separate Provincial militias.  I am suggesting that there seems to be a workable path to the establishment of a Provincial Guard after the fashion of US National Guards.
> 
> And now you are looking at 10 (or is it 13) Premiers angling for more federal dollars and more federal presence to bolster their voters abilities to manage and survive local emergencies.
> 
> (Wow! I out did myself - Time for you to give me a proper schooling on constitutional law )
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> .
> 
> Cheers.
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2009/Donovan.pdf


Excuse my ignorance, but is there an actual Force 2025 doc that I can get my hands on, or is it a concept wrapped within Army Future Force models


----------



## daftandbarmy

Weinie said:


> Excuse my ignorance, but is there an actual Force 2025 doc that I can get my hands on, or is it a concept wrapped within Army Future Force models



This article suggests it's 'Advancing with Purpose'





			https://ca
		

*When Lieutenant-General Wayne Eyre assumed command of the Canadian Army in August 2019, numerous initiatives were underway to modernize the force. With the release in January 2021 of Advancing with Purpose: The Canadian Army Modernization Strategy*_*, those initiatives are now aligned and knitted together under “one umbrella” *providing a five-year change agenda. In the Fall 2020 issue, LGen Eyre spoke about the strategy and one of it’s two key initiatives, an adapted Managed Readiness Plan to inform how forces are generated. Shortly before he was named Acting Chief of the Defence Staff in February, he spoke with editor Chris Thatcher about the second, Force 2025, a wide-ranging effort to analyze force structure._

nadianarmytoday.com/force-2025-informing-the-armys-future-structure/


Viz:

Advancing with Purpose: The Canadian Army Modernization Strategy​






						Canadian Army - Canada.ca
					

Official Canadian Army website. News and photos about soldiers and Canadian Armed Forces. Jobs for Reservists.




					www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Yeah. The armoured corps is a bit of a puzzle starting with the fact that there aren't any in Edmonton to start with. That's why the KOCR is 32 CABG's armoured regiment rather than various units from Ontario.


SALH


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Part of the problem is the SBCT's used them like IFV's in Afghanistan and Iraq (they had either Mk19 or M2 in the RWS) - because it wasn't a Peer/Near Peer threat - the same way the CF ran the LAV in Afghanistan.
> 
> The US Army at least codified their doctrine as they acknowledged that it wasn't an IFV based on their experiences with the Bradley - which the M2A3 is a pretty potent IFV.
> 
> I think the CF having never had an IFV, hasn't fully understood how vulnerable the LAV is.
> 
> They have AH's
> Which IMHO is better than a tank


The LAV is an IFV, while the lines can be fuzzy, the definition in the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe is pretty clear on it. The vulnerability... eh, its about as well protect as anything else out there when it's up armoured, especially in the 6 variant, size notwithstanding. I'd agree we don't treat them the way we should, the lessons learned coming out of Ukraine point out that running IFVs into each other is going to the a slaughter.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> The LAV is an IFV, while the lines can be fuzzy, the definition in the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe is pretty clear on it. The vulnerability... eh, its about as well protect as anything else out there when it's up armoured, especially in the 6 variant, size notwithstanding. I'd agree we don't treat them the way we should, the *lessons learned coming out of Ukraine point out that running IFVs into each other is going to the a slaughter.*



And, sadly, this is sometimes the only way we manage to do the right thing - after a few hundred combat arms kids are KIA.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> SALH


MilEME09 suggested that above and I thought it was a brilliant idea and already made the edit. Thanks.

FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure

🍻


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> And, sadly, this is sometimes the only way we manage to do the right thing - after a few hundred combat arms kids are KIA.


Agreed, now that being said, the difference in protection between BTRs / BMP2s/ MTLBs / any BMD/ ect and a western IFV is pretty shocking.

@FJAG sorry i responded before seeing the change, my bad


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Which rather raises the advantages of competition.
> 
> ...
> 
> Now, to be clear, I am not recommending the establishment of separate Provincial militias.  I am suggesting that there seems to be a workable path to the establishment of a Provincial Guard after the fashion of US National Guards.
> 
> And now you are looking at 10 (or is it 13) Premiers angling for more federal dollars and more federal presence to bolster their voters abilities to manage and survive local emergencies.
> 
> (Wow! I out did myself - Time for you to give me a proper schooling on constitutional law )
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> .
> 
> Cheers.
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2009/Donovan.pdf


Wow. You did outdo yourself. Far be it for me to argue with a paper from the Canadian Political Science Association.

I'll just leave it here from the British North America Act.



> Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom:
> 
> ...
> 
> Be it therefore enacted and declared by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, as follows:
> 
> _Powers of the Parliament._​Legislative Authority of Parliament of Canada
> *91.* It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, --
> 
> 7. Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence.
> ....
> 29. Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.
> And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces.



These of course are legislative powers and the Federal government has already legislated expensively in the field of national defence and militias. 

Note in particular s. 70 of the Criminal Code:


> *70* (1) The Governor in Council may, by proclamation, make orders
> (a) to prohibit assemblies, without lawful authority, of persons for the purpose
> (i) of training or drilling themselves,
> (ii) of being trained or drilled to the use of arms, or
> (iii) of practising military exercises; or
> (b) to prohibit persons when assembled for any purpose from training or drilling themselves or from being trained or drilled.
> (2) An order that is made under subsection (1) may be general or may be made applicable to particular places, districts or assemblies to be specified in the order.
> (3) Every person who contravenes an order made under this section is guilty of
> (a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or
> (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.



I'm not aware as to whether or not any such OiC specifically exists (a cursory search didn't pick one up) but in the event that any Lieutenant Governor attempted to use whatever residual power there might be, the Feds could shut the system down instantly.



Kirkhill said:


> So a citizen serving in the CAF could freely transfer their services to a Provincial Militia (and back again) without breaking their oath



Just a reminder: The NDA provides - 



> *23* (1) The enrolment of a person binds the person to serve in the Canadian Forces until the person is, in accordance with regulations, lawfully released.
> *30* (1) Except during an emergency, an officer or non-commissioned member who is not on active service is entitled to be released at the expiration of the term of service for which the officer or non-commissioned member is enrolled or re-engaged.



Accordingly, a CAF member cannot "transfer their service" by a unilateral act. There is no provision, legally enacted by the Feds that would permit any such transfer.

An interesting theory, Kirkhill, but the constitutional structure of the country and the laws enacted under it would tend to make a "provincial militia" highly unlikely unless the Feds agreed to it.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

>Advancing with Purpose​
Gerund with Noun: How to Design Swell-Sounding Slogans


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> This article suggests it's 'Advancing with Purpose'


Specifically Line of Effort 4 - Initiative 4.1 at pages 45 and 46 set the parameters

Advancing with Purpose 4th Edition

Things have progressed beyond that mission statement, however, and there are a number of documents that have been circulating since then many of which, to my understanding, are readily available on the DWAN (which, as a retired nobody, I no longer have access to)

By the way, I also found Initiative 4.3 on International Engagement interesting



> The Canadian Army will achieve an integrated level of interoperability with its ABCANZ partners by 2027, focusing on a Canadian Army brigade in a multinational division and a multinational battle group in a Canadian Army brigade.27





> 27 The Canadian Army seeks interoperability with allies and partners to better secure success on operations. The Canadian Army recognizes three levels of interoperability: de-conflicted, compatible, and integrated. De-conflicted integration exists when forces can co-exist but do not interact together. Compatible integration denotes circumstances where forces are able to interact in the same geographic area in pursuit of a common goal. Integrated interoperability occurs when forces are able to merge seamlessly and are interchangeable.


----------



## Kirkhill

Weinie said:


> Excuse my ignorance, but is there an actual Force 2025 doc that I can get my hands on, or is it a concept wrapped within Army Future Force models




I understand there is something like that on restricted circulation in the internal net.  I don't know if there is anything available to the general public yet.   If there is I would love to see it too.

In the meantime the Force 2025 focus allows room a lot of related matters to be discussed.... of course "related" is in the eye of the beholder.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Wow. You did outdo yourself. Far be it for me to argue with a paper from the Canadian Political Science Association.
> 
> I'll just leave it here from the British North America Act.
> 
> 
> 
> These of course are legislative powers and the Federal government has already legislated expensively in the field of national defence and militias.
> 
> Note in particular s. 70 of the Criminal Code:
> 
> 
> I'm not aware as to whether or not any such OiC specifically exists (a cursory search didn't pick one up) but in the event that any Lieutenant Governor attempted to use whatever residual power there might be, the Feds could shut the system down instantly.
> 
> 
> 
> Just a reminder: The NDA provides -
> 
> 
> 
> Accordingly, a CAF member cannot "transfer their service" by a unilateral act. There is no provision, legally enacted by the Feds that would permit any such transfer.
> 
> An interesting theory, Kirkhill, but the constitutional structure of the country and the laws enacted under it would tend to make a "provincial militia" highly unlikely unless the Feds agreed to it.
> 
> 🍻




But  that is why we have lawyers, surely?  And Constitutional Conferences and The Council of the Federation.    

If Ontario and Quebec can have their own provincial armed police force, equivalent to the federal armed police force, originally raised as a military force complete with horse and rifle, pistol and saber, colours and cannon, then why not a provincial militia?   One that, like the National Guard would be logistically heavy, locally "inhabited", and predominantly part time.   One that could also supply local security.  One that, in return for federal supply of the appropriate useful hardware - like trucks and helicopters, radios and field hospitals, shelters, water, waste and power, CBRN/HAZMAT, water bags for fighting forest fires from helicopters - that in return for access to the local federal depots of that kit in time of emergency, and limited access for training, - that in return for the federal beneficence agrees to supply drivers and operators for all that kit when the federal government asks.   The National Guards agree to act as a reserve force to supplement the Army's permanently instituted reserve force the US Army Reserve.

And the federal government in the US calls on the National Guard to use that federal kit to support not just the US Army in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia, but also in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in places like New Orleans after a hurricane or California and Montana in wildfire season.


So, we could keep lots of lawyers happy debating the constitutional authority of a Provincial Militia, raised by provincial premiers under the reserve powers of Her Majesty's Lieutenants Governor.

Or.

The Army could start focusing on using the Militia as a logistically well equipped organization, requiring the creation of well stocked federal depots for each of the 10 provinces, one per Lieutenant Governor.  An organization staffed by local volunteers under various contractual obligations ranging from the full time to the unpaid.  And one focusing on beans, bullets and bandages.  And transport.  Lots and Lots of Transport.

If the southern population reacted to the Local Militia with the same enthusiasm the northerners support the Canadian Rangers, unpaid volunteers,  then your recruiting problems would disappear.  And if your recruiting problems disappear because of public support then your budget problems will disappear.  And if your budget problems disappear then you can start buying all the kit  necessary to fight a modern war overseas.  Kit operated by well trained technicians in support of well trained, professional soldiers.

And logistics equally implies access to vessels like Asterix just as much as vessels like the JSS.  And to transport aircraft that can equally be used for Search and Rescue as well as Emergency Response.   Aircraft (and ships)  big enough to load helicopters.  Helicopters that don't have to be reduced to nuts and bolts to ship but can be rolled out ready to fly.


So, in my universe, the choice would be between the Army spending appropriately on meeting its logistical requirements via the local Militia and emphasizing the value of the local volunteer or continuing to wonder why it can't find dollars and people to do what it thinks needs to be done while lawyers debate the relative authorities of the Governors, both Lieutenant and General.

And the local volunteers, in the US, are also heavily invested in Ground Based Air Defenc(s)e units of the Artillery.  As much as the Army likes to knock down Scuds in Iraq the denizens of Washington like to know they can hold their meetings without worrying too much about the occasional radio-controlled Cessna flying overhead.

You never know.  Supporting the local militia and its volunteers might even allow you to attract those women, natives and minorities the politicians say your short of.  Personally I wouldn't say you were short of them.  I would just say you are missing an opportunity because they aren't coming through the armoury doors.

Slainte.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further 

Investment in logistics and support.

Whatever the Army's perceived requirement is for capital investment in B Vehicles and projects like DAME,  for projects like whatever the Air Force's perceived requirement is for Chinooks, Hercs and C17 replacements, and Griffons and their replacements,  for projects like Big Honking Ships, - whatever the capital requirement is, I would double it and add 10% more and then another 10%.  

And  I would sell the additional investment as domestic emergency management requirements, to be locally stocked provincially in depots and armouries and municipal airports and managed by the Militia.  The Canadian Army working for you.   And then open the doors to the locals and ask for willing volunteers with the offer of part time and full time jobs.

Additional Emergency Management Projects that could be funneled through the Militia and the domestic agenda.



*A*dvanced Sub-Unit Water Purification System​Advanced Water Supply System​Air Force Expeditionary Capability
Airspace Coordination Center Modernization​Automatic Identification Technology​Aviation Capable Weather Observation System​Biological Warfare Threat Medical Counter Measures​Bridge and Gap Crossing Modernization​Camp Sustain​Canadian Forces Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Decontamination System​CH-149 Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade​Chemical Agent Sensor​Combined/Joint Intelligence Modernization​Commercial Pattern Armoured Vehicles​Common Heavy Equipment Replacement​Defence Resource Management Information System​Domestic Arctic Mobility Enhancement​Enhanced Recovery Capability​Headquarters Shelter System (HQSS)​Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) General Service Respirator​The Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Sensor Integration and Decision Support Project (SI&DS)​High Risk Search Capability​Information Technology Infrastructure in Support of Command and Control​Interdepartmental Maritime Integrated Command, Control, and Communications (IMIC3) Project​Joint Deployable HQ and Signal Regiment Modernization​*Land Command Support System Tactical Command and Control Information System Modernization*​*Light Utility Vehicle*​*Logistics Vehicle Modernization*​*Logistics Vehicle Recapitalization*​*Maritime Satellite Communications Upgrade*​*Meridian Standard*​*Multi Role Boat*​*Naval Large Tug*​*Remote Minehunting and Disposal System*​*Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Project*​*Snow and Ice Control Capability Recapitalization Project*​*Tactical Integrated Command, Control and Communication Air Project*​*Tactical Power System*​*Virtually the entire budget of the RCAF, including MMA, RPAS, Otters, Helicopters and RPAS.*

And the GBAD systems.




Military Expenditure  1.4151% of GDP

Defence Budget Main Estimates 23.31 BCAD

Capital expenditure 5.1 BCAD


Result of "Doubling the Capital Budget and adding 10% and 10% more"  - 

Capital expenditure 12.3 BCAD

Defence Budget  30.5 BCAD

Military Expenditure 1.85% of GDP


Still under the 2% NATO cap but near enough to keep them and the Americans happy (especially if buying American gear with Canadian components).

Under the 2% so not war-mongering.

7 BCAD of additional gear built to military standards sitting in warehouses across Canada.   Available for both active service and local emergencies.

A 7 BCAD investment in the safety of Canadians in the perilous world created by "Climate Change"

A 7 BCAD investment in local communities.

A 7 BCAD investment in manufacturing jobs for Canadians

A 7 BCAD investment in votes for politicians

A 7 BCAD opportunity to help Canadians feel good about themselves by contributing to foreign disaster relief


A 7 BCAD investment in Joint and Logistic support critical to deploying, sustaining and operating a modern, well-trained, efficient armed force.


When we talk about buying new kit the argument usually ends up about bodies - bodies to operate, bodies to maintain it.

Well forget about that.  

Build inventory.  And warehouses to store it in.

And make the inventory available to a broader public than the 65,000 members of the Regs or the 20,000 members of the Reg Force Army.


And building the vehicles and the warehouses will supply local jobs.

And jobs for night watchmen.


​


----------



## Kirkhill

Don't you guys have any salesmen on staff?


----------



## Kirkhill

'Nudder thought.

How do you keep the inventory in the warehouse fresh.  Turnover.

You exploit the National Defence Act



> Materiel​Marginal noteelivery of materiel for sale or disposal
> 
> *11* The Governor in Council may authorize the Minister to deliver to any department or agency of the Government of Canada, for sale or disposal to any countries or international welfare organizations and on any terms that the Governor in Council may determine, any materiel that has not been declared surplus and is not immediately required for the use of the Canadian Forces or for any other purpose under this Act.
> 
> 
> R.S., 1985, c. N-5, s. 11
> 1998, c. 35, s. 3



This will also keep the production lines in Canadian factories open.  8x8 trucks from Quebec.  Utility ACSVs from London.  etc.

Sell or donate a portion of the inventory to Global Affairs for international donations, to the provinces, to municipalities, NGOs, Crown Surplus for sale of secure items to the general public.

That office already exists somewhere in your structure.  The poor buggers just have nothing to sell except beaten and abused crap.


----------



## Kirkhill

So.

In summary.

Buy lots of utilitarian support stuff from Canadian suppliers.
Park it in Canadian warehouses scattered across Canada
Establish a sales plan to keep turning the inventory.

Make the inventory available to qualified personnel for domestic crisis management.
Establish the Militia as the key to warehouse and the source of qualifications for volunteers
In exchange to access to this federal largesse the volunteers of the Militia agree to supply a supplement to the Regular Force and also to provide a Reserve in time of Federally declared emergency.

The Regs get a reserve force, augmentation, access to a solid logistical base, freedom from domestic crisis concerns, while gaining kudos and creating an employment situation more likely to attract those that would rather serve locally in a field ambulance than in a rifle platoon in Afghanistan.  A situation more likely to attract the service volunteers and the local women of Canada.  And the Army gets political credit and budget relief and freedom to concentrate on developing its Expeditionary Force - with the kit immediately available in warehouses all across Canada.

And coming soon to a Theatre near you - Obelix - your floating warehouse and show room.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> So.
> 
> In summary.
> 
> Buy lots of utilitarian support stuff from Canadian suppliers.
> Park it in Canadian warehouses scattered across Canada
> Establish a sales plan to keep turning the inventory.
> 
> Make the inventory available to qualified personnel for domestic crisis management.
> Establish the Militia as the key to warehouse and the source of qualifications for volunteers
> In exchange to access to this federal largesse the volunteers of the Militia agree to supply a supplement to the Regular Force and also to provide a Reserve in time of Federally declared emergency.
> 
> The Regs get a reserve force, augmentation, access to a solid logistical base, freedom from domestic crisis concerns, while gaining kudos and creating an employment situation more likely to attract those that would rather serve locally in a field ambulance than in a rifle platoon in Afghanistan.  A situation more likely to attract the service volunteers and the local women of Canada.  And the Army gets political credit and budget relief and freedom to concentrate on developing its Expeditionary Force - with the kit immediately available in warehouses all across Canada.
> 
> And coming soon to a Theatre near you - Obelix - your floating warehouse and show room.



We can get all of that stuff already on contract, I think, without having to incur the overhead commitment.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> We can get all of that stuff already on contract, I think, without having to incur the overhead commitment.


Mate, you have already committed the overhead.  You have the Generals, the staff, the bureaucrats and the real estate.

You're warehouses are empty.  And you can't get people into your stores.


Oh..... and you're not signing the contracts.


----------



## Kirkhill

And here is your Sales Department






						GCMil
					

Bidding on and buying federal government surplus such as trucks, office equipment, machinery and appliances




					www.gcsurplus.ca
				








> Canadian Military Surplus Assets
> GCMil, a group within GCSurplus, sells surplus military assets on behalf of the Department of National Defence (DND).
> Assets are sold exclusively to pre-approved foreign governments, original equipment manufacturers, and their licensed representatives. Due to the controlled nature of the assets, GCMil does not sell any assets to individual persons.
> Do you represent any of the following?
> 
> A pre-approved foreign government
> An Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) within the defence industry
> A licensed representative of an OEM within the defence industry
> A Canadian business registered with the Controlled Goods Program
> An authorized Canadian collector or museum registered with the Controlled Goods Program
> If your answer is no:
> 
> Occasionally, surplus military assets that have been demilitarized, and no longer considered controlled goods, are posted for sale on GCSurplus.ca.
> Please visit GCSurplus.ca to view sales listings for non-controlled assets that may interest you.
> If your answer is yes:
> 
> Please contact GCMil@PWGSC-TPSGC.GC.CA by email for more information.








						Condensed future-oriented statement of operations - Canada.ca
					






					www.canada.ca
				




​*National Defence consolidated future-oriented statement of operations 2020–21 Departmental Plan (unaudited)*​Consolidated future-orientated statement of operations (unaudited)​For the year ending 31 March​(in thousands of dollars)

 *Forecast results 2019-20**Planned results 2020-21**Expenses*  Operations1,541,9641,232,798Ready forces9,875,8209,938,978Defence team3,417,5183,530,954Future force design770,628674,373Procurement of capabilities3,249,8893,431,059Sustainable bases and information technology systems and platforms3,072,2403,457,848Internal services619,782679,461*Total expenses**22,547,841**22,945,471*   *Revenues*  Sale of goods and services392,508387,286Gains on disposals of assets20,56720,294Interest and gains on foreign exchange15,82415,613Other13,37513,197Revenues earned on behalf of government(11,637)(11,482)*Total revenues**430,637**424,908*   *Net cost of operations**22,117,204**22,520,563*


Note that there is a mandated and accepted Revenue stream.  And that it is exploited.  Poorly.  But it is exploited.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> If Ontario and Quebec can have their own provincial armed police force, equivalent to the federal armed police force, originally raised as a military force complete with horse and rifle, pistol and saber, colours and cannon, then why not a provincial militia?


The reason any province can have a provincial police force is because such a force follows in part within the provisions of s 92(14) (the administration of justice in the Province) and the right of the provinces and the federal government to create police forces within their respective jurisdiction.

The North West Mounted Police were never a "military force". Pursuant to "An Act Respecting the Administration of Justice and the Establishment of a Police Force for the North West Territories" of 1873, the Canadian legislature authorized:



> 10. The Governor in Council may constitute a Police Force in and for the North West Territories, and the Governor may from time to time, as may be found necessary, appoint by commission, a Commissioner of Police, and one or more Superintendents of Police, together with a Paymaster, Surgeon and Veterinary Surgeon, each of whom shall hold office during pleasure.





> https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-ISC-SAC/DAM-CORP/STAGING/texte-text/b73c35_1100100010229_eng.pdf



Note in particular the authority is for a "police force". There are clear distinctions between the terms police force, militia, military etc.

The structure of the force was primarily due to its first commissioner, Col George Arthur French, a gunner and at the time the head of the School of Gunnery in Kingston and Prime Minister MacDonald's being influenced by the structure of the Royal Irish Constabulary. This resulted in a para-military structure but first and foremost its purpose was that of a police force. Of note too is that the force relied heavily on recruiting retired militiamen including a fairly large number of gunners. While the initial force to deploy took with them two field guns and two mortars they were non-the-less a civil police force. A rather robust police force but a police force nonetheless.  😁



> https://electriccanadian.com/forces/ridersofplainsre00hayduoft.pdf



Just as an aside. The RCMP functions as a federal police force and, where contracted to do so within provinces as the province's provincial police as well as in some cases as municipal police.

As to why not a militia. See s 91(7) of the Constitution Act cited earlier. Apples and Oranges, Kirkhill. Apples and Oranges.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> By the way, I also found Initiative 4.3 on International Engagement interesting


Sounds like the old commonwealth divisions we saw in the late 40s, and 50s. I haven't seen anything my self but I would be interested to see how much this multinational division is playing into Force 2025, and is there a specific role for us in said division.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> The structure of the force was primarily due to its first commissioner, Col George Arthur French, a gunner and at the time the head of the School of Gunnery in Kingston and Prime Minister MacDonald's being *influenced by the structure of the Royal Irish Constabulary*. This resulted in a para-military structure but first and foremost its purpose was that of a police force. Of note too is that the force relied heavily on recruiting retired militiamen including a fairly large number of gunners. While the initial force to deploy took with them two field guns and two mortars they were non-the-less a civil police force. A rather robust police force but a police force nonetheless. 😁



When I was in Belfast in '86 the RUC SNCO I did joint patrol planning with, when he found out I was Canadian, gave me a very interesting history lesson about how that all played out, right down to the similarities in uniforms.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The reason any province can have a provincial police force is because such a force follows in part within the provisions of s 92(14) (the administration of justice in the Province) and the right of the provinces and the federal government to create police forces within their respective jurisdiction.
> 
> The North West Mounted Police were never a "military force". Pursuant to "An Act Respecting the Administration of Justice and the Establishment of a Police Force for the North West Territories" of 1873, the Canadian legislature authorized:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Note in particular the authority is for a "police force". There are clear distinctions between the terms police force, militia, military etc.
> 
> The structure of the force was primarily due to its first commissioner, Col George Arthur French, a gunner and at the time the head of the School of Gunnery in Kingston and Prime Minister MacDonald's being influenced by the structure of the Royal Irish Constabulary. This resulted in a para-military structure but first and foremost its purpose was that of a police force. Of note too is that the force relied heavily on recruiting retired militiamen including a fairly large number of gunners. While the initial force to deploy took with them two field guns and two mortars they were non-the-less a civil police force. A rather robust police force but a police force nonetheless.  😁
> 
> 
> 
> Just as an aside. The RCMP functions as a federal police force and, where contracted to do so within provinces as the province's provincial police as well as in some cases as municipal police.
> 
> As to why not a militia. See s 91(7) of the Constitution Act cited earlier. Apples and Oranges, Kirkhill. Apples and Oranges.
> 
> 🍻


Apples and Oranges - except when both the Police and the Militia are called out to shoot at the restless - and both of them take on citizen volunteers and employ artillery.  Will you accept Apples and Para-Apples?



> The *North-West Mounted Police* (*NWMP*) was a Canadian para-military police force, established in 1873, to maintain order in the new Canadian North-West Territories (NWT) following the 1870 transfer of Rupert’s Land and North-Western Territory to Canada from the Hudson’s Bay Company, the Red River Rebellion and in response to lawlessness, demonstrated by the subsequent Cypress Hills Massacre and fears of United States military intervention. The NWMP combined military, police and judicial functions along similar lines to the Royal Irish Constabulary. A small, mobile police force was chosen to reduce potential for tensions with the United States and First Nations. The NWMP uniforms included red coats deliberately reminiscent of British and Canadian military uniforms.
> 
> The NWMP was established by the Canadian government during the ministry of Prime Minister Sir John Macdonald who defined its purpose as "the preservation of peace and the prevention of crime" in the vast NWT.[2] Macdonald envisioned the police force as a para-military force, writing that* the "best force would be mounted rifleman, trained to act as cavalry... and styled police*".[2



Words mean a lot to you lawyers (like MacDonald) except when you want them to mean something else.

As is the specific designators for the North West Mounted Rifles, later style North West Mounted Police.  Steele's Scouts.  Royal Irish Constabulary,  British South Africa Police.  And any dragoons including the RCMP regiment.

In 1885, Police, Army, Militia and civilian Volunteers all acted jointly in a military campaign.  The police and the army both employed cannons, mortars and gatling guns.  Command was initially under the police but passed to the Army.

Now who is a soldier and who is a constable?  And what is an Army?


Enjoy your day in court.  The battles were fought and the Generals and Commissioners, gunners, constables, militiamen and irregulars returned home.


Your Good Health!


----------



## Kirkhill

Can you draw  clear distinction amongst Sheriffs, Rangers, Constables, Wardens, Foresters, Regulators, County Militia, County Dragoons, Territorials, Volunteers, Irregulars and Soldiers? And their tasks, duties and responsibilities?

Acta non Verba.  Let the deed shaw.


----------



## lenaitch

Interesting discussion to armchair.  The fact that the RCMP was initially formed along military lines is unsurprising, given the inherent similarities (deployed, leadership, uniformity, rules-based, etc.) and the reality that the skills and structure were unlikely to be available in the broader society of the day.  The first two Commissioners of the OPP were similarly ex-military. as, I imagine, were many police leaders back then.  Seeing as the country was only a few years old, the laws and means to enforce them were still in their infancy; the Criminal Code - as a unified body of law - didn't come into force until the 1890s.

The Northwest Territories, as it was back then, was under federal jurisdiction.  As provinces were formed, responsibility for law enforcement would have shifted, under the terms of the BNA.  While the bulk of the country is currently policed by the RCMP, largely under contract, that wasn't always so.  At one time or another, all of the western provinces had provincial forces (not sure about Manitoba).  I don't think any of the more established Maritime provinces ever had provincial forces - they were policed by the Dominion before it merged with the NWMP.  The SQ (PPQ) was established in 1870; the OPP in 1909.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Can you draw  clear distinction amongst Sheriffs, Rangers, Constables, Wardens, Foresters, Regulators, County Militia, County Dragoons, Territorials, Volunteers, Irregulars and Soldiers? And their tasks, duties and responsibilities?
> 
> Acta non Verba.  Let the deed shaw.



Only if you can tell me how this relates to the title of this thread.

I'd like to debate the merits of the fyrd, seriously, but the Reg Force is probably the main target/ victim for any planned reworking of the force generation/ employment schemes currently in the hopper, so it would be interesting if we could tear them apart  think about that as a priority


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Can you draw  clear distinction amongst Sheriffs, Rangers, Constables, Wardens, Foresters, Regulators, County Militia, County Dragoons, Territorials, Volunteers, Irregulars and Soldiers? And their tasks, duties and responsibilities?
> 
> Acta non Verba.  Let the deed shaw.


Yes.
   Larger than Small Arms holdings at this current moment = Not a LE entity...

The CF Reserves are much closer akin to the National Guard, and making a Provincial Guard is IMHO a train wreck ready to happen.
   The question should be why, and for what purpose -- right now the Militia serves that purpose - and adding a Provincially funded Army wouldn't bode well IMHO -- Especially when the Alberta Guard decided to seize 1 CMBG when Alberta separates, or the when the Vandoos join the Quebec Guard and help dynamite any bridges to Ontario...

Honestly that would be the one point I would see a guard like that being used for -- none beneficial to Canada as a whole.


----------



## FJAG

Just one more post on this aspect and then I'll quit. I promise.



Kirkhill said:


> As is the specific designators for the North West Mounted Rifles, later style North West Mounted Police.



According to the sources on the North West Mounted Rifles that I could find, they were an entirely different organization formed at Duck Lake in 1879, several years after the NWMP had already been formed. One of its lieutenants was Gabriel Dumont.  Their strength seemed to hover around 3 officers and 43 other ranks which seemed to be the establishment for a mounted company at the time. They were disbanded in 1884.

The Northwest Resistance

State of the Militia 1879 see pg li

This report also discusses the troubles expected in the NW due to the disappearance of the Buffalo and the resultant starvation leading to a move to expand the Militia in the territories.

State of the Militia 1881 at p 164

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Going back to Force 2025

We have available a small force of regular troops with a small, and incomplete inventory of weapons, lacking in ammunition and a significantly larger "cadre" of instructors, staff and bureaucrats who seem to depend, for their existence, on demonstrating their future ability to raise the entire population of Canada in arms and organizing it for deployment to Eastern Europe without them ever setting foot aboard a ship or plane.

In the meantime, in practice, they actually manage to maintain a company in Latvia and occasionally send out half a dozen troopies with snow shovels to clean the streets of Toronto, always ensuring that the detail includes a photographer.

Meanwhile, most of the regularly employed soldiery seems to see the Militia as useful Power Point augmentees.  There they have the advantage of costing no rations and no training time but looking good on parade.


If the Army wants to create a Force 2025 within the next 2 years then it has to decide to work with the paid strength available to it as a result of the decisions it has made on where to spend its payroll.  And with that limitation in mind decide what it can do, what it is able to do.  Not what it would like to do.  And once that is finalized communicate clearly to the Government the extent of its abilities abroad on expedition and also at home.

My contention is that if it wants to do anything other than that then it needs to expand its thinking beyond the needs and capabilities of the Expeditionary Company to actually engage the Canadian population employing the legal tools already in place.

Those legal tools, with a bit of imagination, allow for a great degree of creativity.  But I don't see much wilingness to embrace doing things differently.  Even when we can't do things the same.  And all around us everybody else is changing.


Soldier.  Constable.  Irregular.

Where on that continuum is the Special Forces Operative?  The Security Force Assistance Battalion - designed to assist the forces of foreign governments?  The Rangers of Britain and the Green Berets of  the US - designed to assist the irregular volunteers to oppose their foreign government?  The Cyber warrior working from home?  The UAS/RPAS controllers?  The civilian radar and satellite people?  The Little Green Men?  Commandos?


Camelot.  For one brief, glorious moment.... people decided to codify war, make laws and obey them while they were killing people.  Except when they weren't obeying the laws.


We are trying to assign grey tasks to entities we want to be Black and White.   The Black and White is new.  The Grey is ancient.


The difference between the British King's men, booted and spurred dragoons,  pacifying the Anglo-Scots border, and the mounted, booted and spurred mobs of Armstrongs, Nixons, Grahams and Johnsons and the French King's men, booted and spurred operating with the Scots rustlers against the constabulary dragoons, was vanishingly small.

Hobbesian if you will.

We can aspire to maintain the clarity of our Black and White codes and standards but everywhere is grey.


In that greyness black and white can get lost.   But equally, in that greyness there are opportunities to do things differently.  And sometimes it is worth looking back to history to see how protracted periods of instability were managed previously.


As to the 2 year time limit.  Yes it is short.  But drastic reorg in that time span is not impossible nor is it without historical precedent.  Even in Canada.

The King's Men don't just include those who have taken the King's Shilling and put on a uniform.  They include, at least in many other countries, people that are more active in foreign service but never leave the civilian realm.  

Do I want a Provincial Guard? No.  But I do want the Regular Force to spend at least as much time contemplating how to engage with its own civilian population as it does contemplating OMLTs and PRCs an SFORs an SFABs and ASOBs and the billion other acronyms for civilian engagement overseas.


That is what that list of names has to do with Force 2025.  The exercise may be an Army exercise.  But the Army will only function, adapt, and exist if it learns how to do things differently .... and take risks.  Accept the 70% solution if you will.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Just one more post on this aspect and then I'll quit. I promise.
> 
> 
> 
> According to the sources on the North West Mounted Rifles that I could find, they were an entirely different organization formed at Duck Lake in 1879, several years after the NWMP had already been formed. One of its lieutenants was Gabriel Dumont.  Their strength seemed to hover around 3 officers and 43 other ranks which seemed to be the establishment for a mounted company at the time. They were disbanded in 1884.
> 
> The Northwest Resistance
> 
> State of the Militia 1879 see pg li
> 
> This report also discusses the troubles expected in the NW due to the disappearance of the Buffalo and the resultant starvation leading to a move to expand the Militia in the territories.
> 
> State of the Militia 1881 at p 164
> 
> 🍻



After the NWMP were formed Gabriel Dumont joined a group of Prince Albert volunteers that were raised as the North West Mounted Rifles.  That is correct.

However I am looking, unsuccessfully, for the reference I have somewhere to the discussions that John A had when contemplating raising the Police force for the prairies.   As noted above, he recognized that what was needed was a patrolling organization based on the lines of Cavalry, Dragoons or Mounted Rifles.   But he didn't want to call them by any of those names.  Because he didn't want to have a British Cavalry unit confronting an American Cavalry unit on the medicine line over the natives.  He didn't want to be seen to be defending the west by direct confrontation.  He wanted to be seen to be claiming in by policing it.   The tools were identical.  The only difference was the name.  

Oh, that and the fact that his Police Cavalry were given written authorization to implement Jeddart Justice.  They were authorized to make summary judgements on the spot.  It worked on the Anglo-Scots border.   And in Ireland. Why not in Southern Alberta?


----------



## Kirkhill

For the record, I am strongly of the opinion that the future of armed conflict looks a lot more like our North West Rebellion and Afghanistan, in all its phases, than the conflicts of Verdun, of the Hitler Line and the Inner German Border.


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


>



Pedantic point but the lazy E inside an arena has always been used to indicate Armoured Engineers in Canada and never just Combat Engineers.






I know US doctrine has identified it as tracked mechanized combat engineers, but the US also used the name "combat engineer vehicle" to describe what Canada calls an armoured engineer vehicle. I am also aware that NATO doctrine from October 1998 until May 2011 was consistent with US but otherwise, both before and after that time, the lazy E inside an arena is explicitly Armoured Engineers.  But Canadian engineers didn't change the map symbols to identify themselves through that 13 year blip.  CERs and Fd Sqns shouldn't be out fighting their vehicles, so it is the mobility differences that matter to capabilities of these organizations and it was mobility that featured in the tac sign of CER, Fd Sqn, and Fd Tp:









MTVE based troops continue to use the lazy E over a tracked mobility indicator, but by about 2010 we had started importing symbols used by US SBCT Engineers for our LAV based Sqns and Tps ... but the US Army has since gotten away from using this symbol and invented something new:



The current US symbol is not in step with NATO standards. If we really, really feel that the map symbol for Cbt Engr need to show the armour protected status of mechanized elements, then NATO standards would suggest we use these:









Also, a support squadron should never be show as mechanized because they never are.  They are always primarily mounted in very heavy logistics vehicles.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> 'Nudder thought.
> 
> How do you keep the inventory in the warehouse fresh.  Turnover.
> 
> You exploit the National Defence Act
> 
> 
> 
> This will also keep the production lines in Canadian factories open.  8x8 trucks from Quebec.  Utility ACSVs from London.  etc.
> 
> Sell or donate a portion of the inventory to Global Affairs for international donations, to the provinces, to municipalities, NGOs, Crown Surplus for sale of secure items to the general public.
> 
> That office already exists somewhere in your structure.  The poor buggers just have nothing to sell except beaten and abused crap.





McG said:


> Pedantic point but the lazy E inside an arena has always been used to indicate Armoured Engineers in Canada and never just Combat Engineers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I know US doctrine has identified it as tracked mechanized combat engineers, but the US also used the name "combat engineer vehicle" to describe what Canada calls an armoured engineer vehicle. I am also aware that NATO doctrine from October 1998 until May 2011 was consistent with US but otherwise, both before and after that time, the lazy E inside an arena is explicitly Armoured Engineers.  But Canadian engineers didn't change the map symbols to identify themselves through that 13 year blip.  CERs and Fd Sqns shouldn't be out fighting their vehicles, so it is the mobility differences that matter to capabilities of these organizations and it was mobility that featured in the tac sign of CER, Fd Sqn, and Fd Tp:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> MTVE based troops continue to use the lazy E over a tracked mobility indicator, but by about 2010 we had started importing symbols used by US SBCT Engineers for our LAV based Sqns and Tps ... but the US Army has since gotten away from using this symbol and invented something new:
> 
> View attachment 66955
> 
> The current US symbol is not in step with NATO standards. If we really, really feel that the map symbol for Cbt Engr need to show the armour protected status of mechanized elements, then NATO standards would suggest we use these:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Also, a support squadron should never be show as mechanized because they never are.  They are always primarily mounted in very heavy logistics vehicles.



I luv a good pedant on the weekend!    

Thanks for the info McG.


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> I can see that concern although I'm not advocating a return to a US Army DISCOM. I tend to like artillery grouping terminology and in that respect I see a bde svc bn under command of the Sust Bde but in direct support of the manoeuvre bde.


Canadian terminology was Division Support Group (DISGP). There was also a division engineer group (Div Engr Gp) and a division medical group (Div Med Gp).

At the time, brigades would have been commanded by brigadier generals but groups were only commanded by colonels. I don’t meant to advocate that we should or should not go back to this, but I do like the idea that sometimes maybe a smaller level of HQ is okay.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> Pedantic point but the lazy E inside an arena has always been used to indicate Armoured Engineers in Canada and never just Combat Engineers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I know US doctrine has identified it as tracked mechanized combat engineers, but the US also used the name "combat engineer vehicle" to describe what Canada calls an armoured engineer vehicle. I am also aware that NATO doctrine from October 1998 until May 2011 was consistent with US but otherwise, both before and after that time, the lazy E inside an arena is explicitly Armoured Engineers.  But Canadian engineers didn't change the map symbols to identify themselves through that 13 year blip.  CERs and Fd Sqns shouldn't be out fighting their vehicles, so it is the mobility differences that matter to capabilities of these organizations and it was mobility that featured in the tac sign of CER, Fd Sqn, and Fd Tp:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> MTVE based troops continue to use the lazy E over a tracked mobility indicator, but by about 2010 we had started importing symbols used by US SBCT Engineers for our LAV based Sqns and Tps ... but the US Army has since gotten away from using this symbol and invented something new:
> 
> View attachment 66955
> 
> The current US symbol is not in step with NATO standards. If we really, really feel that the map symbol for Cbt Engr need to show the armour protected status of mechanized elements, then NATO standards would suggest we use these:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Also, a support squadron should never be show as mechanized because they never are.  They are always primarily mounted in very heavy logistics vehicles.


No problems and I've made some changes.

In 1 CER, I intended that one of the squadrons be an armoured engineer squadron. The SUP squadrons should quite rightly not be "armoured" and I've changed them to wheeled. The remaining squadron in the Res F armoured brigade and in the two mech brigades were intended to be LAV based engineer vehicles hence "engineer" inside "armoured" over "wheeled cross country/all terrain" which is why I stayed with the earlier version of the SBCT Engineer unit. My software package doesn't facilitate the 2020 Stryker version although I could probably fool around with the "tracked" modifier to achieve something like that but find it confusing. Somewhat the same with using a "CBT" modifier which I felt redundant.

Thanks for pointing it out.



McG said:


> Canadian terminology was Division Support Group (DISGP). There was also a division engineer group (Div Engr Gp) and a division medical group (Div Med Gp).
> 
> At the time, brigades would have been commanded by brigadier generals but groups were only commanded by colonels. I don’t meant to advocate that we should or should not go back to this, but I do like the idea that sometimes maybe a smaller level of HQ is okay.



In essence I'm not advocating a return to a DISGP either although some of the Force 2025 COAs mimic some of that structure but not the terminology. 

Unless my memory is failing me, the DISGP was a hypothetical structure in support of Corps 86 doctrine, unlike the US DISCOM which was a very real organization which the US subsequently broke up into Sustainment Brigades once CBTs were formed at the turn of the century. 

Even the Brits had a SISGPish structure whereby under Army 2020 Refine, the manoeuvre brigades did not have either a logistic element nor an artillery element. Those were contained within 101 Logistics Brigade which had some 21 bn sized logistics, maintenance, and transport regiments to be parceled out as needed. All the artillery was found in 1st Artillery Brigade's nine regiments and 7th Air Defence Group's three regiments. The Brits Army restructure under Integrated Review seems to get rid of the Logistics Brigade in favour of dividing up the logistics resources amongst the Manoeuvre combat teams (like we and the US have now) and retaining the more esoteric artillery (including air defence) in an artillery brigade while distributing close support artillery to the manoeuvre combat teams. I say "seems" because the restructure is still new and ongoing and I'm not sure where it will end up.

Personally I think getting rid of the Logistics brigade or Sustainment brigade is a mistake. It makes providing logistics support behind the brigade difficult regardless as to whether the brigade deploys independently or as part of a division. I'm firmly in the camp of each battlegroup having its own organic CSS A and B Echs, a brigade having its own Service bn and the Army having further logistics units to provide the core of a divisional CSS support (in an emergency) as well as theatre level national support during day-to-day operations to whatever sized force is deployed so that we do not have to rob the A Echs to form NSEs.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Personally I think getting rid of the Logistics brigade or Sustainment brigade is a mistake. It makes providing logistics support behind the brigade difficult regardless as to whether the brigade deploys independently or as part of a division.


 My problem is it make more higher HQ when there really isn't a need/
   Both those Bde's then require HQ's - and IMHO that staff should be either part of the Div G4 - or not needed.


FJAG said:


> I'm firmly in the camp of each battlegroup having its own organic CSS A and B Echs, a brigade having its own Service bn and the Army having further logistics units to provide the core of a divisional CSS support (in an emergency) as well as theatre level national support during day-to-day operations to whatever sized force is deployed so that we do not have to rob the A Echs to form NSEs.
> 
> 🍻


Personally I have a hard time with NCE and NSE entities. 
  Simply because I see 99% of them as a waste.
 Regardless of the size of the deployed entity - it should be setup to operate in a up/down construct.
   If a Bde is deployed - it should be communicating with it's parent Div for C2- it shouldn't matter if the Div is deployed or not.
     If a Cdn Bde is deployed with a MultiNational Div - it may require more LO pers, but it really shouldn't change that much.

 The same thought goes into the NSE - if the Bde is deployed it should have robust enough support network to sustain itself - which admittedly I favor a heavy support ratio already.   

 The only real issue comes up with smaller than Bde organizations are deployed - and those should be supportable by the Bde forward deploying assets in support, either a Support Structure - or a Bde HQ segment - as opposed to a separate from the Bde structure.


----------



## Halifax Tar

KevinB said:


> My problem is it make more higher HQ when there really isn't a need/
> Both those Bde's then require HQ's - and IMHO that staff should be either part of the Div G4 - or not needed.
> 
> Personally I have a hard time with NCE and NSE entities.
> Simply because I see 99% of them as a waste.
> Regardless of the size of the deployed entity - it should be setup to operate in a up/down construct.
> If a Bde is deployed - it should be communicating with it's parent Div for C2- it shouldn't matter if the Div is deployed or not.
> If a Cdn Bde is deployed with a MultiNational Div - it may require more LO pers, but it really shouldn't change that much.
> 
> The same thought goes into the NSE - if the Bde is deployed it *should* have robust enough support network to sustain itself - which admittedly I favor a heavy support ratio already.
> 
> The only real issue comes up with smaller than Bde organizations are deployed - and those should be supportable by the Bde forward deploying assets in support, either a Support Structure - or a Bde HQ segment - as opposed to a separate from the Bde structure.



Should.  I was part of 2 NSE rotos for Afghanistan.  I do not think these organizations would have been able to achieve any success had it not been for the augmentation from the rest of the CAF Logistics and RCEME communities.  

I floored at how broken the Svc Bns were and how filled with the sick, lame and lazy they were.  

It was concerning to form up for Coy or BN PT and watch the separation of those on MELs and those fit.  

Little feather in my cap, I remember my CSM on TF 1-10 telling me "LS K_____ , I don't know why by my sailors are my best soldiers".  

We have issues in the RCN as well, not skirting that.


----------



## KevinB

Halifax Tar said:


> Should.  I was part of 2 NSE rotos for Afghanistan.  I do not think these organizations would have been able to achieve any success had it not been for the augmentation from the rest of the CAF Logistics and RCEME communities.
> 
> I floored at how broken the Svc Bns were and how filled with the sick, lame and lazy they were.
> 
> It was concerning to form up for Coy or BN PT and watch the separation of those on MELs and those fit.
> 
> Little feather in my cap, I remember my CSM on TF 1-10 telling me "LS K_____ , I don't know why by my sailors are my best soldiers".
> 
> We have issues in the RCN as well, not skirting that.


That is part of my point -- it shouldn't be that way.


----------



## MilEME09

Halifax Tar said:


> Should.  I was part of 2 NSE rotos for Afghanistan.  I do not think these organizations would have been able to achieve any success had it not been for the augmentation from the rest of the CAF Logistics and RCEME communities.
> 
> I floored at how broken the Svc Bns were and how filled with the sick, lame and lazy they were.
> 
> It was concerning to form up for Coy or BN PT and watch the separation of those on MELs and those fit.
> 
> Little feather in my cap, I remember my CSM on TF 1-10 telling me "LS K_____ , I don't know why by my sailors are my best soldiers".
> 
> We have issues in the RCN as well, not skirting that.


If it is any consolation they have finally admitted CSS is broken and can't support it self.

In all seriousness though it pains me that our system is so broken, and yet it is so difficult as a tech to also augment the Reg force. CSS needs a complete over haul of how we train and manage our personal. We also need to make it easier for ARes support to work along side the reg force. There should be no reason why, with enough lead time I can't send techs to 1 SVC for a couple weeks. Frankly if I could send my platoon to 1 Svc or base maintenance in wainwright for two weeks, it would be far more beneficial for all then a brigade exercise.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> My problem is it make more higher HQ when there really isn't a need/
> Both those Bde's then require HQ's - and IMHO that staff should be either part of the Div G4 - or not needed.


We'll continue to disagree on that. The issue is the size of the staff involved. If a Div G4 staff is required to look after the minutiae of administering and training the various logistics battalions and companies, it will soon grow to the size of a brigade headquarters in its own right.

Like you I despise the number of headquarters that we have. I think the Army's divisional headquarters and its numerous Res F brigade headquarters are an absolute waste of resources and an impediment to efficient administration and training. In the same way, the RCAF has a total strength of 17,000 Reg F and Res F personnel broken into 14 wings and 38 flying and 21 non flying squadrons for roughly 400 aircraft. It strikes me that functionally both the Army and the Air Force could operate more efficiently with half the number of each (and in the case of Army divisions no more than two)

But sometimes you do need an interposed headquarters to maintain overarching responsibilities for the training (and thereby maintenance of standards) and organization of its various battalions and to offload those responsibilities from the line commander and his staff. CSS and artillery comes under that rubric for me. Engineers too. Maybe what we really need is to get rid of "branches" for any of the agencies where there is a possible need to deploy them as an entity of an aggregate of several of its units. It works at all levels. Would you really want to take away a support company and a CSS company from an infantry battalion just to save the cost of two majors and their staff just because there is already an S3 and S4 in the battalion HQ? (and yes I know, our bn HQs are slightly different, but the same principle applies)


KevinB said:


> The same thought goes into the NSE - if the Bde is deployed it should have robust enough support network to sustain itself - which admittedly I favor a heavy support ratio already.
> 
> The only real issue comes up with smaller than Bde organizations are deployed - and those should be supportable by the Bde forward deploying assets in support, either a Support Structure - or a Bde HQ segment - as opposed to a separate from the Bde structure.


Again I'll keep disagreeing. Our bns, regiments etc are doctrinally designed to plug into a rear CSS element which, within the brigade, is currently the Bde svc bn. If a bn deploys independently then it needs to have a rear element supplied that takes the place of a svc bn and relieves it of the complexity of having to deal with numerous national CSS agencies and HQs. And yes, a forward deployed element of the svc bn could do that but it would do so at the cost of taking those resources away from the remainder of the brigade.

The alternative way is to have a CSS structure in Canada that is tasked with providing that forward support element and which has the resources to augment the theatre level support with additional logistics, transport etc resources regardless of the size of the deployed force or its location. In other words it has the ability to scale up if that deployed battle group needs to be expanded.

I can live with your systems by prefer my option simply because it has additional resources to draw on (in the way of its own organic Res F CSS units) without robbing resources from other manoeuvre brigades. What I can't abide is the current NSE methodology.

🍻


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


>


I do wonder why you have a division support group nested inside a division support brigade.
Would this not have the effect of unnecessarily inflating the higher level HQ?


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> We'll continue to disagree on that.


My belief is that everything should be setup in a deployable state - not the deplorable state that things currently are.


I'm a firm believer in J bases - in fact my only "purple" tasking would be to people posted to a base/station etc.
   They don't truly belong to any element themselves - 


FWIW while I am vehemently opposed to Regimental HQ's for the CBT Arms, and most HQ's,  I would not remove a CSS Coy from a BN.

 I am just not truly tracking what a Supply Bde would do in an Army with only 1 field Div. 
   I would accept Supply Depot - but I feel Bde is a deployable formation - and maybe that this where I get caught on the lingo.



FJAG said:


> I can live with your systems by prefer my option simply because it has additional resources to draw on (in the way of its own organic Res F CSS units) without robbing resources from other manoeuvre brigades. What I can't abide is the current NSE methodology.
> 
> 🍻


My belief is that each Bde should have enough organic support - that it can deploy 3-4 Cbt Team Task Forces - and not need to reach outside itself - other than for transport to a location via the RCN or RCAF (or allies).
   IF the Bde cannot do that -- how during a full Bde deployment could it truly support all its assets?


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> I do wonder why you have a division support group nested inside a division support brigade.
> Would this not have the effect of unnecessarily inflating the higher level HQ?


It's not so much putting a division support group inside a division support group. It's more a desire to differentiate between static and deployable resources within a single CSS CoC.

I wanted to build deployable Sustainment brigades. In my previous though processes I got rid of the CCSB and built a sustainment brigade, an artillery brigade and a manoeuvre enhancement brigade.

In this one I kept the CCSB rather than a manoeuvre enhancement brigade - tomatoe/tomahtow - and found I wanted more CSS so I took the CSS that I had previously in my manoeuvre enhancement brigade and added a few things to it and said - okay that should do BUT I then took a look at the static DSGs and said to myself why should they be a separate element. Why not have them subordinate to the sustainment brigade and if the brigade should ever need to deploy, in whole or in part, then the DSGs stay behind and provide the ongoing technical and base support for whatever elements of the division are left behind or whatever new force is constituting. Basically I wanted one chain of command for CSS within the division even if part of the structure was deployable and the other was static.

Remember too that the deployment of a full support brigade is IMHO an unlikely event. I use it more as an organization, heavy on Res F elements designed to provide individual or coy size deployed theatre level CSS support elements.

I see this bde with a BGen as bde commander (all manoeuvre bdes are Cols), a Col in charge of the DSG and every other unit a LCol. I mostly see the DSG as a Col level because by reducing the number of divisions there are now several existing DSGs being amalgamated across the regions - I thought that was beyond the scope of a single LCol to run. I could easily be talked down on all those ranks by someone more in tune with CSS than me. I could also be talked into having the DSG in overall command of all CSS in the division so long as there are several static support "bns" to look after the division's day-to-day CSS needs and several "deployable" CSS units to provide bde svc bns and other deployable CSS divisional support and so long as the DSG is capable of generating a deployable Sustainment brigade HQ to manage deployed divisional CSS elements.

I'm open to suggestions.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> It's not so much putting a division support group inside a division support group. It's more a desire to differentiate between static and deployable resources within a single CSS CoC.
> 
> I wanted to build deployable Sustainment brigades. In my previous though processes I got rid of the CCSB and built a sustainment brigade, an artillery brigade and a manoeuvre enhancement brigade.
> 
> In this one I kept the CCSB rather than a manoeuvre enhancement brigade - tomatoe/tomahtow - and found I wanted more CSS so I took the CSS that I had previously in my manoeuvre enhancement brigade and added a few things to it and said - okay that should do BUT I then took a look at the static DSGs and said to myself why should they be a separate element. Why not have them subordinate to the sustainment brigade and if the brigade should ever need to deploy, in whole or in part, then the DSGs stay behind and provide the ongoing technical and base support for whatever elements of the division are left behind or whatever new force is constituting. Basically I wanted one chain of command for CSS within the division even if part of the structure was deployable and the other was static.
> 
> Remember too that the deployment of a full support brigade is IMHO an unlikely event. I use it more as an organization, heavy on Res F elements designed to provide individual or coy size deployed theatre level CSS support elements.
> 
> I see this bde with a BGen as bde commander (all manoeuvre bdes are Cols), a Col in charge of the DSG and every other unit a LCol. I mostly see the DSG as a Col level because by reducing the number of divisions there are now several existing DSGs being amalgamated across the regions - I thought that was beyond the scope of a single LCol to run. I could easily be talked down on all those ranks by someone more in tune with CSS than me. I could also be talked into having the DSG in overall command of all CSS in the division so long as there are several static support "bns" to look after the division's day-to-day CSS needs and several "deployable" CSS units to provide bde svc bns and other deployable CSS divisional support and so long as the DSG is capable of generating a deployable Sustainment brigade HQ to manage deployed divisional CSS elements.
> 
> I'm open to suggestions.
> 
> 🍻


One thing I have noticed with CSS, look at a service battalion ORBAT, it should be a much larger organization. However it seems like we try to apply a combat arms ORBAT structure to non combat organizations.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> My belief is that everything should be setup in a deployable state - not the deplorable state that things currently are.
> 
> I'm a firm believer in J bases - in fact my only "purple" tasking would be to people posted to a base/station etc.
> They don't truly belong to any element themselves -
> 
> FWIW while I am vehemently opposed to Regimental HQ's for the CBT Arms, and most HQ's,  I would not remove a CSS Coy from a BN.


For the record - neither would I.


KevinB said:


> I am just not truly tracking what a Supply Bde would do in an Army with only 1 field Div.
> I would accept Supply Depot - but I feel Bde is a deployable formation - and maybe that this where I get caught on the lingo.


A sustainment brigade is a deployable asset. Here's a couple of snippets from "ATP 4-93 - Sustainment Brigade"



> 1.1 The sustainment brigade is a multifunctional headquarters integrating and employing all assigned and attached units while planning and synchronizing sustainment operations. It is the Army's primary brigade level sustainment headquarters. The sustainment brigade supports Army forces at the tactical and operational levels, providing support to brigade combat teams (BCTs), multifunctional and functional support brigades, deployable, self-contained division and corps headquarters, and other units operating in its assigned support area. Depending upon operational and mission variables, the sustainment brigade commands between three and seven battalions. Sustainment brigades are usually assigned or attached to a sustainment command. The sustainment brigade and its attached units will normally have a general support relationship with supported organizations.





> 1-10 The sustainment brigade executes logistics and personnel services functions associated with theater opening, sustainment, distribution, and theater closing missions. A function is a practical grouping of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose (ADP 1-01).
> Properly task organized, a sustainment brigade could be conducting theater opening tasks, sustainment and theater distribution tasks during the early phases of an operation or if it is the only sustainment brigade in the joint operations area (JOA). This same sustainment brigade, with a different task organization, can transition
> to conducting a theater distribution mission or sustainment mission.


A sustainment brigade is fully deployable and designed to be specifically tailored through atts to the mission. In the US there are numerous CSS bns, coys and dets that can be grafted into a Sustainment Brigade. Because of the small size of our Army I have given some of those a home within the brigade itself. Whether or not any or all of those elements deploy in any given circumstance depends on the situation.


KevinB said:


> My belief is that each Bde should have enough organic support - that it can deploy 3-4 Cbt Team Task Forces - and not need to reach outside itself - other than for transport to a location via the RCN or RCAF (or allies).
> IF the Bde cannot do that -- how during a full Bde deployment could it truly support all its assets?


That's not the question though. 

I agree fully that the Bde, through its svc bn should be able to support itself with all of its 1st and 2nd line needs whether deployed in whole or in part. But, even an Army as small as ours needs to fulfil the functions being provided by a US Sustainment brigade. We do it in part through CFJOG, 1 Cdn Div HQ and ad hoc Theatre Activation Teams, NSEs and Mission Draw-Down Teams. All I'm doing is putting those existing elements into a deployable formation which uses existing Reg F personnel already providing those functions as its core and adding a Res F structure around that specifically so that the activities can be scaled up in time of need.

To put all of those capabilities into Bde Svc bns is inefficient. The existing Svc bns are not structured for that and would be overwhelmed, and if so structured would have resources that would sit idle for most of the time when the brigade has no elements forward deployed.



MilEME09 said:


> One thing I have noticed with CSS, look at a service battalion ORBAT, it should be a much larger organization. However it seems like we try to apply a combat arms ORBAT structure to non combat organizations.


Agreed to an extent. 

I take a look at things from the viewpoint of a US brigade support battalion (BSB) and factor out that it includes a medical company, which in our establishment is the Field Ambulance. I also factor out the Forward Support Companies, which in our establishments are the HQ or admin or CSS companies organic to each regiment or battalion. 

That basically leaves an ABCT's BSB with

a headquarters company (85 all ranks, 24 vehicles);
a field maintenance company (118 all ranks, 46 vehicles); and 
a distribution company (140 all ranks, 75 vehicles) 
Total 343 all ranks and 145 vehicles 
(and just as an aside each of the six FSCs have approximately 150 pers in them for an additional appx 900 personnel and another 170, give or take, vehicles). 
By contrast a Reg F Cdn Svc Bn already hovers between 800 and 900 all ranks (even though it has no FSCs) and I have no idea how many vehicles, nor do I have any idea as to how many of those personnel are in static only roles. If my memory serves me correctly, the deployable element of a Cdn Service Bn now has a transport company, a supply company, a maintenance company and an administration company. That's a bit of a change because in my day transportation and supply, if I recall correctly, was combined in one S&T company which operated like a US distribution company. 

I have absolutely no idea why a Svc bn needs an admin company at all. But then again I'm not knowledgeable enough to argue the case one way or the other - I'm just left wondering why a full sized armoured BCT can get by with 343 people fulfilling all functions of the brigade's 2nd line support as well as its own 1st line without the need of its own admin coy. It should be sufficient to just have a small HQ and two companies - one S&T and one maintenance.

I'm a great fan of CSS but our structure leaves me wondering as to its efficiencies.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> For the record - neither would I.
> 
> A sustainment brigade is a deployable asset. Here's a couple of snippets from "ATP 4-93 - Sustainment Brigade"
> 
> 
> 
> A sustainment brigade is fully deployable and designed to be specifically tailored through atts to the mission. In the US there are numerous CSS bns, coys and dets that can be grafted into a Sustainment Brigade. Because of the small size of our Army I have given some of those a home within the brigade itself. Whether or not any or all of those elements deploy in any given circumstance depends on the situation.
> 
> That's not the question though.
> 
> I agree fully that the Bde, through its svc bn should be able to support itself with all of its 1st and 2nd line needs whether deployed in whole or in part. But, even an Army as small as ours needs to fulfil the functions being provided by a US Sustainment brigade. We do it in part through CFJOG, 1 Cdn Div HQ and ad hoc Theatre Activation Teams, NSEs and Mission Draw-Down Teams. All I'm doing is putting those existing elements into a deployable formation which uses existing Reg F personnel already providing those functions as its core and adding a Res F structure around that specifically so that the activities can be scaled up in time of need.
> 
> To put all of those capabilities into Bde Svc bns is inefficient. The existing Svc bns are not structured for that and would be overwhelmed, and if so structured would have resources that would sit idle for most of the time when the brigade has no elements forward deployed.
> 
> 
> Agreed to an extent.
> 
> I take a look at things from the viewpoint of a US brigade support battalion (BSB) and factor out that it includes a medical company, which in our establishment is the Field Ambulance. I also factor out the Forward Support Companies, which in our establishments are the HQ or admin or CSS companies organic to each regiment or battalion.
> 
> That basically leaves an ABCT's BSB with
> 
> a headquarters company (85 all ranks, 24 vehicles);
> a field maintenance company (118 all ranks, 46 vehicles); and
> a distribution company (140 all ranks, 75 vehicles)
> Total 343 all ranks and 145 vehicles
> (and just as an aside each of the six FSCs have approximately 150 pers in them for an additional appx 900 personnel and another 170, give or take, vehicles).
> By contrast a Reg F Cdn Svc Bn already hovers between 800 and 900 all ranks (even though it has no FSCs) and I have no idea how many vehicles, nor do I have any idea as to how many of those personnel are in static only roles. If my memory serves me correctly, the deployable element of a Cdn Service Bn now has a transport company, a supply company, a maintenance company and an administration company. That's a bit of a change because in my day transportation and supply, if I recall correctly, was combined in one S&T company which operated like a US distribution company.
> 
> I have absolutely no idea why a Svc bn needs an admin company at all. But then again I'm not knowledgeable enough to argue the case one way or the other - I'm just left wondering why a full sized armoured BCT can get by with 343 people fulfilling all functions of the brigade's 2nd line support as well as its own 1st line without the need of its own admin coy. It should be sufficient to just have a small HQ and two companies - one S&T and one maintenance.
> 
> I'm a great fan of CSS but our structure leaves me wondering as to its efficiencies.
> 
> 🍻


FJAG, Admin Coy looks after the battalion it self, while the Coys look after the brigade. One could argue admin coy could be folded into the companies and just provide all support regardless.

This would reduce battalion HQ to essentially being LogOPs,


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> FJAG, Admin Coy looks after the battalion it self, while the Coys look after the brigade. One could argue admin coy could be folded into the companies and just provide all support regardless.


I prefer to call it HQ Coy 
   I detest the term Admin - as it removes the Command aspect, unless you are making yet another Coy for the sake of making a Coy.

I guess I will concede to @FJAG as his Bde does make sense in the larger construct.

Because If I have a:
BN with a: HQ Coy, Point Stick Coy's, Support Coy
Bde with a: HQ, Pointy Stick Bn's, Reg't etc and a Support/Service Bn (and hopefully a few other those)

I guess it follows that the Div will have:
DIV HQ, Pointy Stick Bde's, a Support Bde
and higher etc.


----------



## Kirkhill

And working from the macro to the micro

Following the all arms construct, then each section will have its own Fire Controller and its Communicator.  Much like the USMCs new Expeditionary Squads of 16.

Squads that are dispersed ISR packages that can concentrate fires from all launchers in range.

In fact you could call a new Littoral Battalion an ISR Battalion.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> FJAG, Admin Coy looks after the battalion it self, while the Coys look after the brigade. One could argue admin coy could be folded into the companies and just provide all support regardless.
> 
> This would reduce battalion HQ to essentially being LogOPs,





KevinB said:


> I prefer to call it HQ Coy
> I detest the term Admin - as it removes the Command aspect, unless you are making yet another Coy for the sake of making a Coy.
> 
> I guess I will concede to @FJAG as his Bde does make sense in the larger construct.
> 
> Because If I have a:
> BN with a: HQ Coy, Point Stick Coy's, Support Coy
> Bde with a: HQ, Pointy Stick Bn's, Reg't etc and a Support/Service Bn (and hopefully a few other those)
> 
> I guess it follows that the Div will have:
> DIV HQ, Pointy Stick Bde's, a Support Bde
> and higher etc.


I dislike the term Admin coy as well but at the same time dislike the term HQ Coy too. We're anything but consistent in the use of our terminology.

Back when I was a young pup all we had was a regimental headquarters and three gun batteries. Part and parcel to the regimental headquarters were the Maint O, the RQM, the MO together with the Sigs O, the Adjt, the Ops O and the RCPO. All captains with their own troops or sections and all but the Ops O and the RCPO (who generally responded direct to the CO) generally corralled under the DCOs direction. - and it worked fine. I think there was a time when every battalion level and even brigades worked that way.

And then someone said, let's form a Regt HQ Bty which did nothing really except add a new major and another MWO and another clerk to the organization. I see the service bn something like that. With the main CSS functions already inherent within the S&T company and the maintenance company, all you really need to do is add a sig troop to the svc bn headquarters and Bob's your uncle.

So I do see your point too, Kevin. We don't always need a new HQ entity if you already have functioning hierarchy inherent in the basic organization. Mind you it makes the line diagram look neater.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

I have also seen the Command and Support reference.

But then that can either be Command and Staff with the Sigs and Recce

Or it could be Command and Staff with the Sigs and Service Support  while  Recce and Mortars and Anti Air join Machine Guns and Anti Tank in  Combat Support.

Or the mortars can be in the C&S as well while Recce and Sigs go to CS.  And occasionally Pioneers find themselves in CSS rather than CS or, even sometimes C&S.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> And working from the macro to the micro
> 
> Following the all arms construct, then each section will have its own Fire Controller and its Communicator.  Much like the USMCs new Expeditionary Squads of 16.
> 
> Squads that are dispersed ISR packages that can concentrate fires from all launchers in range.
> 
> *In fact you could call a new Littoral Battalion an ISR Battalion.*



As they have removed all the USMC integral heavy fire support, unless everyone else is doing their job, you will probably call them 'the victims.'


----------



## Blackadder1916

FJAG said:


> I have absolutely no idea why a Svc bn needs an admin company at all. But then again I'm not knowledgeable enough to argue the case one way or the other - I'm just left wondering why a full sized armoured BCT can get by with 343 people fulfilling all functions of the brigade's 2nd line support as well as its own 1st line without the need of its own admin coy. It should be sufficient to just have a small HQ and two companies - one S&T and one maintenance.
> 
> I'm a great fan of CSS but our structure leaves me wondering as to its efficiencies.
> 
> 🍻



If you didn't have an Admin Coy then there would be one less slot (per bn) for a Log Branch Major to check the box of sub-unit command of a field force unit. (_And you should have seen the ragpicker heads explode when a Medical Officer was given the position "temporarily/acting" in 4 Svc Bn back a few decades ago and later double-hatted as OC NSE in Yugo because she was the most competent/qualified officer for the job._)

Okay, I'm being a bit sarcastic but there is an element of truth to it.  It's just like the proliferation of GOFOs in HQs both Canadian and OUTCAN (especially in US formations) - they need a certain rank level to do the job, but often the job is created so that they can gain experience to justify advancement.

The question (or a similar question) was asked of me a few decades ago when I was a student on the OAC at Ft Sam Houston.  While giving a presentation about the structure of our field forces (_unfortunately most of my "official" references were still fresh Corps 86 wet dreams_) one of my classmates did bring up the differences in pers numbers and rank levels for bde/div organizations between our respective armies.  My typical response was "well, you're Walmart, we're a boutique shop, we just provide a different level of service".  Getting past the obvious of "it's always been done that way" and "all battalion level organizations are similarly structured",  there is an element of "different level of service".  Some of it is a more intimate connection but often it was a necessary requirement for Canadian organizations to have a built in redundancy with 2nd line CSS because there were little to no permanent 3rd line organizations.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> As they have removed all the USMC integral heavy fire support, unless everyone else is doing their job, you will probably call them 'the victims.'




Their artillery is afloat.   Not on wheels or tracks.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Their artillery is afloat.   Not on wheels or tracks.



And there's the rub.


----------



## FJAG

Blackadder1916 said:


> ... Some of it is a more intimate connection but often it was a necessary requirement for Canadian organizations to have a built in redundancy with 2nd line CSS because there were little to no permanent 3rd line organizations.


I tend to view this as the key difference as between the US structures and ours. Firstly we don't have the numerous 2nd and 3rd line enablers that a US BCT can have provided to it. That lets them strip a BCT down to the essential organic elements needed to function rather than stuff them into the BCT itself. Secondly, not having those external enablers then whenever we see a shortcoming in the bde structure we seem to plug it in there - whether another staff officer or CC cell or vehicle; what have you.

An added factor perhaps is that considering we have only three brigades, adding a components to it is a fairly minor affair. Considering the size of US forces, every time you add an asset to one brigade, whether a person or a truck, you have to multiply it by 45 for BCTs and 83 for support bdes. I always found comparable US units and formations leaner than ours when it came to the "luxury" add-ons albeit better equipped when it came to the necessities. Having only two majors, eight captains, four lieutenants and twelve 2nd lieutenants on the establishment of an infantry battalion rather than seven majors, seventeen captains, five capt/lts and 9 lieutenant/2nd lts is one example of that (all number subject to variation).

🍻


----------



## MJP

FJAG said:


> I have absolutely no idea why a Svc bn needs an admin company at all. But then again I'm not knowledgeable enough to argue the case one way or the other - I'm just left wondering why a full sized armoured BCT can get by with 343 people fulfilling all functions of the brigade's 2nd line support as well as its own 1st line without the need of its own admin coy. It should be sufficient to just have a small HQ and two companies - one S&T and one maintenance.
> 
> I'm a great fan of CSS but our structure leaves me wondering as to its efficiencies.
> 
> 🍻


The Americans can get away with it because they have a much deeper higher level support base and actual base supports are in most cases hived and not dependent on personnel in actual support units. Whereas in Canada all 3 Svc Bns are both tasked with General and Close support tasks meaning many of the folks in those battalions are double hatted or are robbed from one area to support another during the year.  We largely have no idea how Divisional and Corps sustainment works because in Canada we haven't seen it since WWII/Korea. I got to watch a divisional support in play in Alaska and it was amazing to see them support three Bdes (1 OPFOR/2BLUFOR) with almost no requirement (except in some very small areas) for additional resources

As for why does the Svc Bn have its own Admin Coy it is because the Svc Bn Maint & S&T Coy's task lines and holdings are Bde assets and are controlled IAW Bde priorities. Those priorities don't always line up with Svc Bn needs nor should Svc Bn be dipping into Bde task lines/resources to support itself.  Admin Coy takes care of the Svc Bn so the other Coys can focus on taking care of the Bde


----------



## KevinB

MJP said:


> As for why does the Svc Bn have its own Admin Coy it is because the Svc Bn Maint & S&T Coy's task lines and holdings are Bde assets and are controlled IAW Bde priorities. Those priorities don't always line up with Svc Bn needs nor should Svc Bn be dipping into Bde task lines/resources to support itself.  Admin Coy takes care of the Svc Bn so the other Coys can focus on taking care of the Bde


<ike,

I don't think we where quibbling about the Svc Bn - it was more of a if there are more Svc Bn in a Bde - should they have their own sub command - or at the Div level - should there be a Svc Bde (and its own HQ)

 My concern about the Svc Bde is some joker will then try to fill it from the Svc Bn's - as opposed to making them more robust - and creating more units.

 I have decided that if I was King (okay I am a US Citizen now - so maybe Grande Galactic Emperor sounds better) - that everyone would join for a 2 year BE - as a 031, -- EVERYONE -- 
   After the 2 years, those who want to become and officer can attempt to compete for a Military University - or for those who already have a degree can apply for OCS.
   The rest can either stay in the Infantry toward and NCO stream - or take another 2 BE into another trade.

That way everyone who joins another trade at least has some idea how it can suck if you don't have the correct support...


----------



## MJP

KevinB said:


> <ike,
> 
> I don't think we where quibbling about the Svc Bn - it was more of a if there are more Svc Bn in a Bde - should they have their own sub command - or at the Div level - should there be a Svc Bde (and its own HQ)


Tracking and not getting involved in that aspect mostly because it is an empty pipe dream IMHO, more just addressing the minor quibbles on the edges regarding Admin coys.


----------



## KevinB

MJP said:


> Tracking and not getting involved in that aspect mostly because it is an empty pipe dream IMHO, more just addressing the minor quibbles on the edges regarding Admin coys.


Well actually in True Canadian Fashion - they may stand up a SVC DIV - the HQ for it will require all the folks in the SVC BN;s current and thus leave the CA with no actual Svc Bn's or support personnel outside of a HQ at any level


----------



## Kirkhill

Sorry for jumping in again with some tangential context.




Playing with what CANADA means.


And where the Canadian Army fits in to the discussion.


WRT the discussion - My inclination is to have the Canadian Army focus exclusively on the immediate operational priorities as they apply to the three regular brigades and their support and how the will co-operate with CANSOFCOM, the RCN, the RCAF and the other less well known operational elements of DND.

Domestically there needs to be a continuing effort to join the operations of the RCMP, the Coast Guard,  the SAR community, the Rangers, the Territorial Brigades, the Militia units located within the provinces and the Provincial Sheriffs and Constabularies.   That is a separate discussion and requires a separate focus.

The third discussion is the active defence of Canada and national mobilization.  That discusssion, I suggest, should be predicated on the RCAF and the RCA with involvement of the RCN.   Those are the elements that have the bandwidth to manage the technicalities of defending against aerial bombardment - whether by means of Fractional Orbital Bombardment, ICBMS, stealth missiles launched from container ships or swarms or drones deployed by Hells Angels. 

The Territorial Brigades, the Militia, the Areas, the Rangers and the Joint Task Forces will, of course, find gainful employment under those circumstances.


I am not sure that devising a National Defence plan predicated on recreating the Canadian Expeditionary Force for service in either Latvia or Taiwan is necessarily the best use of resources.


PS - the BCAD figures represent the Provincial and Territorial GDPs.   Canada is assumed not to have a GDP beyond the sum total of all of its elements.  On the other hand Canada does have a Budget.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Sorry for jumping in again with some tangential context.
> 
> 
> 
> Playing with what CANADA means.
> 
> 
> And where the Canadian Army fits in to the discussion.
> 
> 
> WRT the discussion - My inclination is to have the Canadian Army focus exclusively on the immediate operational priorities as they apply to the three regular brigades and their support and how the will co-operate with CANSOFCOM, the RCN, the RCAF and the other less well known operational elements of DND.


So you are ignoring the Reserves as part of the CF construct?



Kirkhill said:


> Domestically there needs to be a continuing effort to join the operations of the RCMP, the Coast Guard,  the SAR community, the Rangers, the Territorial Brigades, the Militia units located within the provinces and the Provincial Sheriffs and Constabularies.   That is a separate discussion and requires a separate focus.


 As well given as Canada doesn't have any regulations forbidding it - the Regular Force is also available - often better equipped and definitely more easily mobilized for that.



Kirkhill said:


> The third discussion is the active defence of Canada and national mobilization.  That discusssion, I suggest, should be predicated on the RCAF and the RCA with involvement of the RCN.   Those are the elements that have the bandwidth to manage the technicalities of defending against aerial bombardment - whether by means of Fractional Orbital Bombardment, ICBMS, stealth missiles launched from container ships or swarms or drones deployed by Hells Angels.


 Both the RCAF, and RCN require long lead time items - and current the RCA has no real skin in the game for that either.
   If you are mobilizing these days - it's not like WWI or WW2 where certain industries can shift and churn items out.
 All you can really mobilize is poorly equipped Light Infantry 


Kirkhill said:


> The Territorial Brigades, the Militia, the Areas, the Rangers and the Joint Task Forces will, of course, find gainful employment under those circumstances.
> 
> 
> I am not sure that devising a National Defence plan predicated on recreating the Canadian Expeditionary Force for service in either Latvia or Taiwan is necessarily the best use of resources.
> 
> 
> PS - the BCAD figures represent the Provincial and Territorial GDPs.   Canada is assumed not to have a GDP beyond the sum total of all of its elements.  On the other hand Canada does have a Budget.


 Given the mandate to the CF by the Canadian Government - it needs to be prepared for a large amount of different contingencies.
Since Canada is still willing to accept being thrust into a NATO "heavy" requirement - the CF needs to prepare (and equip) a Bde for that.


----------



## Kirkhill

Yes. I am ignoring the Reserves as part of the CAF construct.

Given what they can add in real life I have come to see them as a real life, and needless, complication to sorting out the CAF.  The Army in particular, and the CAF in general seem to have enough on their plate getting the people they have sorted out and marching in the one direction.

Once 1 Division/CJOCC gets itself organized, and figures out how to work with the RCAF and the RCN.... and CANSOFCOM then it will be time enough to figure out how the Calgary Highlanders can contribute.   In the meantime there is nothing preventing individual Calgary Highlanders from applying for Class B and C service with the 1 Division units.

As to the light, medium, heavy mandate - I recuse myself completely from the discussion.   

The discussion has become less about needs, perceived or real and is tending towards wants.  I have no further ability to offer comment, fair or otherwise.  So, better to leave it up to the professionals and wait for them to tell me what they are capable of doing.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Once 1 Division/CJOCC gets itself organized, and figures out how to work with the RCAF and the RCN.... and CANSOFCOM then it will be time enough to figure out how the Calgary Highlanders can contribute.  * In the meantime there is nothing preventing individual Calgary Highlanders from applying for Class B and C service with the 1 Division units.*



FWIW, as I recall, this is impossible in most cases as the vacancies are very few and far between.

Unless there's a war on and you really, really need some fit, keen, teenage cannon fodder to fill up the LAVs etc because half the (aging, decrepit) Regular Army is non-deployable due to various ailments (real or imagined) of course


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Bde with a: HQ, Pointy Stick Bn's, Reg't etc and a Support/Service Bn (and hopefully a few other those)





> I guess it follows that the Div will have:
> DIV HQ, Pointy Stick Bde's, a Support Bde



If we had a division, many of the assets customarily held by brigades expected to operate independently would instead belong to the division.  The CAF isn't going to jump from doing managed readiness for battalion groups to managed readiness for independent brigades, let alone divisions, so "support bde" is, like all the divisional HQs, something between a purely administrative entity (we used to call them districts) and a fanciful wish.


----------



## KevinB

Brad Sallows said:


> If we had a division, many of the assets customarily held by brigades expected to operate independently would instead belong to the division.  The CAF isn't going to jump from doing managed readiness for battalion groups to managed readiness for independent brigades, let alone divisions, so "support bde" is, like all the divisional HQs, something between a purely administrative entity (we used to call them districts) and a fanciful wish.


My concern too...

IF the CA was organized in a practical manner - it could very easily do Readiness in Bde cycles.
  However my biggest heart burn from all of this is the fact I believe that all Regular units should be ready at all times.
    Only certain theatre specific issues should need to be addressed for deployments.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> FWIW, as I recall, this is impossible in most cases as the vacancies are very few and far between.
> 
> Unless there's a war on and you really, really need some fit, keen, teenage cannon fodder to fill up the LAVs etc because half the (aging, decrepit) Regular Army is non-deployable due to various ailments (real or imagined) of course


In the words of my English teacher and rugby coach, "Rock" Quarrie, on the occasion of my graduation:  "Hang by your thumbs and write if you get work!"


----------



## ueo

Kirkhill said:


> In the words of my English teacher and rugby coach, "Rock" Quarrie, on the occasion of my graduation:  "Hang by your thumbs and write if you get work!"


Imho all the above is rendered moot. We cannot attract, process and train sufficient new mbrs to fill the slots we have. Fix the recruiting and attraction system (12 months to process a pres infm is not acceptable!), design and implement a realistic training std and spend about 5 years rebuilding what exists ( maybe reconsider the more balanced force of the 80's?). Then, maybe, we could consider redesign/reengineering. We also have the myriad of other probs to deal with as well.


----------



## Halifax Tar

KevinB said:


> I have decided that if I was King (okay I am a US Citizen now - so maybe Grande Galactic Emperor sounds better) - that everyone would join for a 2 year BE - as a 031, -- EVERYONE --
> After the 2 years, those who want to become and officer can attempt to compete for a Military University - or for those who already have a degree can apply for OCS.
> The rest can either stay in the Infantry toward and NCO stream - or take another 2 BE into another trade.
> 
> That way everyone who joins another trade at least has some idea how it can suck if you don't have the correct support...



Thats the most CAF thing I have ever seen written.  If its not Army and its not 031 its stupid, basically.  And really just goes to show my bassline opinion of the Army is true in that its all just a penis size contest to see who can be as infantry hard as possible with out being infantry.

031 is over rated.  Just a cog in the wheel like the rest.



Blackadder1916 said:


> (_And you should have seen the ragpicker heads explode when a Medical Officer was given the position "temporarily/acting" in 4 Svc Bn back a few decades ago and later double-hatted as OC NSE in Yugo because she was the most competent/qualified officer for the job._)



Why cant the Log branch be protective of its billets  ?  Everyone else is.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Yes. I am ignoring the Reserves as part of the CAF construct.
> 
> Given what they can add in real life I have come to see them as a real life, and needless, complication to sorting out the CAF.  The Army in particular, and the CAF in general seem to have enough on their plate getting the people they have sorted out and marching in the one direction.
> 
> Once 1 Division/CJOCC gets itself organized, and figures out how to work with the RCAF and the RCN.... and CANSOFCOM then it will be time enough to figure out how the Calgary Highlanders can contribute.   In the meantime there is nothing preventing individual Calgary Highlanders from applying for Class B and C service with the 1 Division units.
> 
> As to the light, medium, heavy mandate - I recuse myself completely from the discussion.
> 
> The discussion has become less about needs, perceived or real and is tending towards wants.  I have no further ability to offer comment, fair or otherwise.  So, better to leave it up to the professionals and wait for them to tell me what they are capable of doing.




Final Comment 

Attach 1 Division to CANSOFCOM in perpetuity.  If they would have it.

CANSOFCOM seems particularly well versed in managing Ottawa and turning out a useful product.


----------



## KevinB

Halifax Tar said:


> Thats the most CAF thing I have ever seen written.  If its not Army and its not 031 its stupid, basically.  And really just goes to show my bassline opinion of the Army is true in that its all just a penis size contest to see who can be as infantry hard as possible with out being infantry.
> 
> 031 is over rated.  Just a cog in the wheel like the rest.
> 
> 
> 
> Why cant the Log branch be protective of its billets  ?  Everyone else is.


Not my intent at all - the point was the 031 is physically hard - and churn should be encouraged to other trades.
  It gives everyone a base understand of ground combat at the rudimentary level - which can be used later, when when Cpl Bloggins is on a supply run and the convoy is ambushed - he at least has a background to know fire and maneuver.

 You will see more and more Asymetrical battlefields with the dispersed Multi-domain operation concepts current being conducted by the Allies.


It also ensures that everyone starts off on a level playing field.


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> FWIW, as I recall, this is impossible in most cases as the vacancies are very few and far between.
> 
> Unless there's a war on and you really, really need some fit, keen, teenage cannon fodder to fill up the LAVs etc because half the (aging, decrepit) Regular Army is non-deployable due to various ailments (real or imagined) of course


What might be done to clear the decrepit out of LAV-filling billets on a routine basis? Stronger remuster opportunities? More vigorous ongoing training within the battalions? Revision of how MEL'd members are handled?


KevinB said:


> Not my intent at all - the point was the 031 is physically hard - and churn should be encouraged to other trades.
> It gives everyone a base understand of ground combat at the rudimentary level - which can be used later, when when Cpl Bloggins is on a supply run and the convoy is ambushed - he at least has a background to know fire and maneuver.
> 
> You will see more and more Asymetrical battlefields with the dispersed Multi-domain operation concepts current being conducted by the Allies.
> 
> 
> It also ensures that everyone starts off on a level playing field.


Seems like, if mismanaged, a good way to have even more knackered backs and knees in rifle green.

Worth chinning off CAF BMQ and returning to service (or maybe branch?) initial training? Ditto the other common career courses.


----------



## Ostrozac

The Canadian Army doesn‘t even believe in teaching tactical skills to its own support trades anymore, so giving every sailor and airman a basic ground combat capability is pretty clearly not on the table.

And given my understanding of our current CAF personnel situation, both current and forecasted, the situation is dire, and it’s particularly bad for the army, a fundamentally people-hungry organization. There are going to have to be hard choices made, and made quickly — and making tough decisions quickly isn’t usually our strongest attribute. But the alternative may be letting the army fade into irrelevance.

”All the chickens have come home to roost, but there’s no room for them to land because the field is full of sacred cows” — Antony Beevor said this about the British Army at the end of the Cold War, but it could easily have been said about us.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

> FWIW, as I recall, this is impossible in most cases as the vacancies are very few and far between.



In practice we often have more opportunities than soldiers able to fill them. 1VP has been very generous in inviting our soldiers to participate in training and 41 Bde is happy to pay, the issue is often troops can't get away for 4-6wk exercises or courses.

This is the nature of reserve service, reservists have obligations that prevent them from regularily taking large blocks of time away (sometimes on fairly short notice) otherwise they would likley be in the reg force. This inherent constraint is going to be a major stumbling block for many of the Force 2025 COAs that the army is considering. How do you put a 30/70 sub-unit on high readiness every three years..? Without changing the terms of service (or alternatively growing the reserves to have a larger pool of pers to draw upon) this approach seems unlikely to succeed.


----------



## Kirkhill

(or alternatively growing the reserves to have a larger pool of pers to draw upon)

Could you say that bit a little louder please?


----------



## Halifax Tar

KevinB said:


> Not my intent at all - the point was the 031 is physically hard - and churn should be encouraged to other trades.
> It gives everyone a base understand of ground combat at the rudimentary level - which can be used later, when when Cpl Bloggins is on a supply run and the convoy is ambushed - he at least has a background to know fire and maneuver.
> 
> You will see more and more Asymetrical battlefields with the dispersed Multi-domain operation concepts current being conducted by the Allies.
> 
> 
> It also ensures that everyone starts off on a level playing field.



We already do that with a year's worth of work up training, and SQ and convoy courses.  

This concept is just silly.  And implying everyone needs to spend time in the infantry simply builds into our mafias and silos that need to be torn down.


----------



## MilEME09

Loch Sloy! said:


> In practice we often have more opportunities than soldiers able to fill them. 1VP has been very generous in inviting our soldiers to participate in training and 41 Bde is happy to pay, the issue is often troops can't get away for 4-6wk exercises or courses.
> 
> This is the nature of reserve service, reservists have obligations that prevent them from regularily taking large blocks of time away (sometimes on fairly short notice) otherwise they would likley be in the reg force. This inherent constraint is going to be a major stumbling block for many of the Force 2025 COAs that the army is considering. How do you put a 30/70 sub-unit on high readiness every three years..? Without changing the terms of service (or alternatively growing the reserves to have a larger pool of pers to draw upon) this approach seems unlikely to succeed.


Or the other end, a reservist manages to get the time off for a course to be canceled at the 11th hour, oh and your position at work is filled, see you in six weeks.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Once 1 Division/CJOCC gets itself organized, and figures out how to work with the RCAF and the RCN.... and CANSOFCOM then it will be time enough to figure out how the Calgary Highlanders can contribute.


What makes you think that they don't know how to work with the RCAF or RCN, now. Besides 1 Div and CJOC have nothing to do with structuring the force. They're force employers. Solving the issue of the Cal Highs is way above their pay grade.



KevinB said:


> IF the CA was organized in a practical manner - it could very easily do Readiness in Bde cycles.
> However my biggest heart burn from all of this is the fact I believe that all Regular units should be ready at all times.


100% agree. A system that is designed in such a way so that 2/3 of the force is continuously not ready is a failure and needs to be corrected.



ueo said:


> Imho all the above is rendered moot. We cannot attract, process and train sufficient new mbrs to fill the slots we have. Fix the recruiting and attraction system (12 months to process a pres infm is not acceptable!), design and implement a realistic training std and spend about 5 years rebuilding what exists ( maybe reconsider the more balanced force of the 80's?). Then, maybe, we could consider redesign/reengineering. We also have the myriad of other probs to deal with as well.


Everything is fixable given the right vision and direction from the top. The fact that it hasn't been is the CAF's greatest shame. That said, there is no reason why we can't redesign concurrently. In fact we need to.



Kirkhill said:


> Attach 1 Division to CANSOFCOM in perpetuity. If they would have it.
> 
> CANSOFCOM seems particularly well versed in managing Ottawa and turning out a useful product.


Assuming that your opinion about CANSOFCOM is true then it just reinforces the basic opinion about special forces that they bleed all the talent away from the Regular Army leaving the second team behind. If CANSOFCOM's leadership is so great then make their boss CDS.

IMHO we have an inflated opinion of CANSOFCOM which comes in part from their secretive nature which hides all the warts. On top of that they have all the resources which makes it easier to stay focused on their limited mission sets and able to work full time on their skills while the rest of the forces has to deal with the turmoil of the bureaucracy. If the friction which effects the rest of the CAF was stripped away it to could turn out a useful product.


Ostrozac said:


> ... making tough decisions quickly isn’t usually our strongest attribute. But the alternative may be letting the army fade into irrelevance.


So true. Lack of vision and lack action. In my favourite quote from Charlie Belzile: "_The Canadian Forces needs a plan". _And not just a plan but a good plan for once.



Loch Sloy! said:


> This is the nature of reserve service, reservists have obligations that prevent them from regularily taking large blocks of time away (sometimes on fairly short notice) otherwise they would likley be in the reg force. This inherent constraint is going to be a major stumbling block for many of the Force 2025 COAs that the army is considering. How do you put a 30/70 sub-unit on high readiness every three years..? Without changing the terms of service (or alternatively growing the reserves to have a larger pool of pers to draw upon) this approach seems unlikely to succeed.


This hits the whole Reg F/Res F dichotomy nail on the head. The Reg F undervalues the Res F because it isn't available when the Reg F wants to train with it rather than the Reg F recognizing the limitations of the Res F and structure its training, or at least its support to the Res F based on the Res F availability.

You can easily form a 30/70 unit which will have 30% on high readiness (and in my opinion not just every third year but every year) BUT you also need to accept as part of the plan that 70% of that unit will not be on high readiness, probably ever, but be on low readiness and capable of a) supporting the 30% with a few selected volunteers and b) being capable of being mobilized in an emergency with some lead time.

There is no major need to change "terms of service" legislation. The vast majority of the constraints on the Res F (other than the fundamental truism of Res F service that you pointed out above) are imposed within the department's own regulations and attitudes of its Reg F leadership.



KevinB said:


> I have decided that if I was King (okay I am a US Citizen now - so maybe Grande Galactic Emperor sounds better) - that everyone would join for a 2 year BE - as a 031, -- EVERYONE --


This is my day to be contrary. Totally disagree with that. IMHO we already do too much training on things that don't matter. IMHO again, I'd take the Army guys out of the BMQ circus entirely and run a decent combined BMQ/SQ that combines all the fundamental knowledge and skills every soldier needs in less time than the two currently take by a) getting rid of the chaff and b) driving the body 6.5 days a week. The .5 day off is to get their kit back in order. That should be immediately followed by equally concentrated and trimmed DP1 specialty courses followed by an immediate posting to their unit. No slack time, no voluntary releases until the end of their initial BE. I agree totally that there needs to be a tough indoctrination into the Army which inculcates each soldier with core Army values from day one but disagree that the 031s have any magic that does this universally not to mention that it wastes valuable time for gaining experience in the individual's chosen trade.

🍻


----------



## Halifax Tar

FJAG said:


> This is my day to be contrary. Totally disagree with that. IMHO we already do too much training on things that don't matter. IMHO again, I'd take the Army guys out of the BMQ circus entirely and run a decent combined BMQ/SQ that combines all the fundamental knowledge and skills every soldier needs in less time than the two currently take by a) getting rid of the chaff and b) driving the body 6.5 days a week. The .5 day off is to get their kit back in order. That should be immediately followed by equally concentrated and trimmed DP1 specialty courses followed by an immediate posting to their unit. No slack time, no voluntary releases until the end of their initial BE. I agree totally that there needs to be a tough indoctrination into the Army which inculcates each soldier with core Army values from day one but disagree that the 031s have any magic that does this universally not to mention that it wastes valuable time for gaining experience in the individual's chosen trade.
> 
> 🍻



I know the RCN would like to do something similar involving DC and seamanship.  We are already running BMQs and PLQs on the coasts.

I hope some day we can finally shed the last vestiges of unification.


----------



## FJAG

Halifax Tar said:


> I know the RCN would like to do something similar involving DC and seamanship.  We are already running BMQs and PLQs on the coasts.
> 
> I hope some day we can finally shed the last vestiges of unification.


And so they should. I'm sure that the RCAF and the RCN could run better BMQ for their own individuals than what we run now. For those who are in purple trades, let them attend the course for the uniform they chose or were shoehorned into to give them a solid connection to that uniform.

🍻


----------



## Halifax Tar

FJAG said:


> And so they should. I'm sure that the RCAF and the RCN could run better BMQ for their own individuals than what we run now. For those who are in purple trades, let them attend the course for the uniform they chose or were shoehorned into to give them a solid connection to that uniform.
> 
> 🍻



Or... Just get rid of the purple-ness in those trades ?


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> What makes you think that they don't know how to work with the RCAF or RCN, now. Besides 1 Div and CJOC have nothing to do with structuring the force. They're force employers. Solving the issue of the Cal Highs is way above their pay grade.
> 
> 
> 100% agree. A system that is designed in such a way so that 2/3 of the force is continuously not ready is a failure and needs to be corrected.
> 
> 
> Everything is fixable given the right vision and direction from the top. The fact that it hasn't been is the CAF's greatest shame. That said, there is no reason why we can't redesign concurrently. In fact we need to.
> 
> 
> Assuming that your opinion about CANSOFCOM is true then it just reinforces the basic opinion about special forces that they bleed all the talent away from the Regular Army leaving the second team behind. If CANSOFCOM's leadership is so great then make their boss CDS.
> 
> IMHO we have an inflated opinion of CANSOFCOM which comes in part from their secretive nature which hides all the warts. On top of that they have all the resources which makes it easier to stay focused on their limited mission sets and able to work full time on their skills while the rest of the forces has to deal with the turmoil of the bureaucracy. If the friction which effects the rest of the CAF was stripped away it to could turn out a useful product.
> 
> So true. Lack of vision and lack action. In my favourite quote from Charlie Belzile: "_The Canadian Forces needs a plan". _And not just a plan but a good plan for once.
> 
> 
> This hits the whole Reg F/Res F dichotomy nail on the head. The Reg F undervalues the Res F because it isn't available when the Reg F wants to train with it rather than the Reg F recognizing the limitations of the Res F and structure its training, or at least its support to the Res F based on the Res F availability.
> 
> You can easily form a 30/70 unit which will have 30% on high readiness (and in my opinion not just every third year but every year) BUT you also need to accept as part of the plan that 70% of that unit will not be on high readiness, probably ever, but be on low readiness and capable of a) supporting the 30% with a few selected volunteers and b) being capable of being mobilized in an emergency with some lead time.
> 
> There is no major need to change "terms of service" legislation. The vast majority of the constraints on the Res F (other than the fundamental truism of Res F service that you pointed out above) are imposed within the department's own regulations and attitudes of its Reg F leadership.
> 
> 
> This is my day to be contrary. Totally disagree with that. IMHO we already do too much training on things that don't matter. IMHO again, I'd take the Army guys out of the BMQ circus entirely and run a decent combined BMQ/SQ that combines all the fundamental knowledge and skills every soldier needs in less time than the two currently take by a) getting rid of the chaff and b) driving the body 6.5 days a week. The .5 day off is to get their kit back in order. That should be immediately followed by equally concentrated and trimmed DP1 specialty courses followed by an immediate posting to their unit. No slack time, no voluntary releases until the end of their initial BE. I agree totally that there needs to be a tough indoctrination into the Army which inculcates each soldier with core Army values from day one but disagree that the 031s have any magic that does this universally not to mention that it wastes valuable time for gaining experience in the individual's chosen trade.
> 
> 🍻


You mean like… QL2 & QL3, back to back??  😈😉

_I agree with you entirely btw_

It takes way too much time to train a brand new person the way BMQ is run now.  (I was instructor staff on BMQ for a few courses, but I also released in 2011…so I’m sure there have been a few tweaks and changes since then.)

Less chaff.  More ‘to the point.  This is basic stuff.’  Wake up early.  Get fit.  Learn the basics of drill, uniform, policies, C7A2 rifle, C9A2, navigation, first aid, basic field craft.

People don’t join the military only to go on ‘basic training’ and have it be easy as hell.  They join for the challenge and adventure.  

I found myself explaining to several cereals that well the course may be challenging at times, the real challenge was DP1 for those who went combat arms.  (I was teaching on Army BMQs.)   I almost felt like I had to apologize for how easy BMQ had become. 

I like the idea of concentrated & trimmed (aka more efficient?) courses.   That alone would help relieve _some_ personnel generation issues.  


0.02


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Assuming that your opinion about CANSOFCOM is true then it just reinforces the basic opinion about special forces that they bleed all the talent away from the Regular Army leaving the second team behind. If CANSOFCOM's leadership is so great then make their boss CDS.
> 
> IMHO we have an inflated opinion of CANSOFCOM which comes in part from their secretive nature which hides all the warts. On top of that they have all the resources which makes it easier to stay focused on their limited mission sets and able to work full time on their skills while the rest of the forces has to deal with the turmoil of the bureaucracy. If the friction which effects the rest of the CAF was stripped away it to could turn out a useful product.



I don't think that the talent is any better than that available to the army at large (regs or reserves).  Nor do I know if they are more capable operationally.  Because secret.

The reason I believe they are better than the "Conventional" army is that they operate more frequently and manage to have found a mechanism by which they can secure useful kit for their missions.

This, I believe, does not come from better people.  It comes from fewer people.  Specifically the lack of black, green, blue, maroon, and purple hats at the table.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I don't think that the talent is any better than that available to the army at large (regs or reserves).  Nor do I know if they are more capable operationally.  Because secret.
> 
> The reason I believe they are better than the "Conventional" army is that they operate more frequently and manage to have found a mechanism by which they can secure useful kit for their missions.
> 
> This, I believe, does not come from better people.  It comes from fewer people.  Specifically the lack of black, green, blue, maroon, and purple hats at the table.



I'm just guessing here but I'm pretty sure the "method" is having a fair amount of open funding and using UORs to acquire small quantities of "operationally required kit" rather than the normal life cycle-based structured acquisition the rest of the CAF has to use.

🍻


----------



## Halifax Tar

Kirkhill said:


> I don't think that the talent is any better than that available to the army at large (regs or reserves).  Nor do I know if they are more capable operationally.  Because secret.
> 
> The reason I believe they are better than the "Conventional" army is that they operate more frequently and manage to have found a mechanism by which they can secure useful kit for their missions.
> 
> This, I believe, does not come from better people.  It comes from fewer people.  Specifically the lack of black, green, blue, maroon, and purple hats at the table.



I'm pretty sure some recent articles have shown a light on the poor material management practices in our SOF world.

My limited time in that sphere and the Clearance Diver sphere really gave me a deeper appreciation for those day in day out sailors doing the unglamorous work, with poor equipment, poor pay and little recognition.


----------



## Weinie

FJAG said:


> Assuming that your opinion about CANSOFCOM is true then it just reinforces the basic opinion about special forces that they bleed all the talent away from the Regular Army leaving the second team behind. If CANSOFCOM's leadership is so great then make their boss CDS.
> 
> IMHO we have an inflated opinion of CANSOFCOM which comes in part from their secretive nature which hides all the warts. On top of that they have all the resources which makes it easier to stay focused on their limited mission sets and able to work full time on their skills while the rest of the forces has to deal with the turmoil of the bureaucracy. If the friction which effects the rest of the CAF was stripped away it to could turn out a useful product.
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻


FJAG,

I agree with you on some of your diatribe above. Your attack on CANSOFCOM is without basis.

They regularly get tasked with some of the most difficult/shitty/hard stuff that exists, and they deliver. Success begets recognition, approbation, and funding. And they don't stand for bureaucracy, because it limits their effectiveness. That is the more cogent lesson to take away, as I think you implied.


----------



## dapaterson

Loch Sloy! said:


> In practice we often have more opportunities than soldiers able to fill them. 1VP has been very generous in inviting our soldiers to participate in training and 41 Bde is happy to pay, the issue is often troops can't get away for 4-6wk exercises or courses.



Short notice is the failure.   If the Army is unable to plan, it needs fewer, better leaders and managers.  Last minute is the mark of amateurs.

A Res unit should be able, on first parade in September, to give its soldiers a list of all weekends exercises and their training objectives for the Sept to May timeframe.

If the unit (or its HHQs) do not enable that, then they have failed.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Short notice is the failure.   If the Army is unable to plan, it needs fewer, better leaders and managers.  Last minute is the mark of amateurs.
> 
> A Res unit should be able, on first parade in September, to give its soldiers a list of all weekends exercises and their training objectives for the Sept to May timeframe.
> 
> If the unit (or its HHQs) do not enable that, then they have failed.



This. A thousand times this.

Although not always the case, the only reservists who can respond to short notice 'good goes' are generally unemployed, and may not the best people to send on these opportunities.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Short notice is the failure.   If the Army is unable to plan, it needs fewer, better leaders and managers.  Last minute is the mark of amateurs.
> 
> A Res unit should be able, on first parade in September, to give its soldiers a list of all weekends exercises and their training objectives for the Sept to May timeframe.
> 
> If the unit (or its HHQs) do not enable that, then they have failed.


Why is that a unit responsibility?  

Shouldn't higher have been able to generate an area wide training plan for distribution before last parade in May?


----------



## Brad Sallows

> A Res unit should be able, on first parade in September, to give its soldiers a list of all weekends exercises and their training objectives for the Sept to May timeframe.



Unit training plans/calendars were routinely developed and approved Apr/May when I was in.  However, nothing units do is proof against fuckery by 1- and 2-up.


----------



## dapaterson

Units are tasked to train their troops.  With the Bde plan, they then plan their own training in accordance with the Bde plan.

Higher should let units know what dates they have in what training areas, and when they train with other units.  Beyond that, it's the unit's mandate to draft their plan to meet the objectives as laid out by higher.


----------



## Good2Golf

…maybe one day the Army, both the full-timers and the young part-timers trying to find excitement and the old part-timers trying to re-live their excitement, will figure out what it thinks it needs to be and how to look doing it, perhaps before Force 2030, or Force 2035, or Force 2040, or Force 2045, or…well…I’d be amazed if it even figures out light forces, let alone how many divisions it will be, or how many soldiers to a section, and how AT, AD, DF, CS, EW, etc. gets accomplished.

Interesting to see the slagging of others, as though the Army is the pinnacle of having its poop in a group.  I just look at how the Army championed its funding responsibility for aviation in the late-80s/early-90s.  CANSOF took Aviation seriously, played nice with the RCAF and it works well.  I worked with them in a number of protects that were more than just rectal plucks with galleons filled with gold doubloons thrown at them.  Lots of UORs perhaps in the early days, but experience and appropriate program discipline followed establishing a balanced capabilities-funding framework that fits within assigned constraints.  Maybe the Army needs to have a somewhat revolutionary introspection, vice internally-thrashing evolution.

Good luck, Army.


----------



## FJAG

Weinie said:


> Your attack on CANSOFCOM is without basis.


I think I might have used the wrong word with "inflated". I think you understood the point though. If you take a select group of people, give them solid budgets and continuous excellent training and keep them out of the worst of the turbulence that runs rampant through the CAF then you can't help but turn out a consistently higher product (even without the secrecy that keep whatever failings they have out of the general eye). I would think as well that if you saddled them with the burden of managing the rest of the organization and thus have to deal with everything the results would be no better - General Rouleau is a small example of that.

And yes, I was having a diatribe moment.  😉



dapaterson said:


> Units are tasked to train their troops.  With the Bde plan, they then plan their own training in accordance with the Bde plan.
> 
> Higher should let units know what dates they have in what training areas, and when they train with other units.  Beyond that, it's the unit's mandate to draft their plan to meet the objectives as laid out by higher.


For a long time now we've had Reg F and Res F in a given region consolidated under a common headquarters. If nothing else the divisional system should have brought some coherence to the effort of integrated system.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

FJAG said:


> For a long time now we've had Reg F and Res F in a given region consolidated under a common headquarters. If nothing else the divisional system should have brought some coherence to the effort of integrated system.
> 
> 🍻


You must be new here.  We don't plan, we react.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> You must be new here.  We don't plan, we react.


I did say "should have".

😉


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> If you take a select group of people, give them solid budgets and continuous excellent training and keep them out of the worst of the turbulence that runs rampant through the CAF then you can't help but turn out a consistently higher product (even without the secrecy that keep whatever failings they have out of the general eye). I would think as well that if you saddled them with the burden of managing the rest of the organization and thus have to deal with everything the results would be no better - General Rouleau is a small example of that.


The mark or a professional learning organization would probably be closer to assess long what worked for other organizations, and see what could be scaled applicably; vice seeing it as a win that a larger organization’s long-time disfunction would inert or demoralize some who had succeeded in other challenging, albeit reasonably supported organizations…it seems that some organizations actually revel, if not take pride in disfunction.


----------



## Kilted

I mentioned this somewhere else, but it seems relevant here.  We were told that the terms of service for the reserves were changing.  We weren't given specifics, but were told that it was;t going to be one night a week and one weekend a month anymore, that the army was going to expect more of us.  Does anyone know anything about this?


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Units are tasked to train their troops.  With the Bde plan, they then plan their own training in accordance with the Bde plan.
> 
> Higher should let units know what dates they have in what training areas, and when they train with other units.  Beyond that, it's the unit's mandate to draft their plan to meet the objectives as laid out by higher.


Any validity in a standard curriculum to which all units can train?  Might that not allow the unit to at least credibly identify its structural gaps (inadequate numbers with insufficient training)?  They might not be the most effective unit but they would knoe what gaps they need to fill for next year's training plan.

Or is there already something like this in place?


----------



## Kirkhill

Based on what I see now I would suggest the following:

Get rid of the notion of Force Generation and Force Employment
Put all the regular brigades on an operational basis and treat foreign exercises as operations
Separate the Reg Brigades from the Area Divisions and put all of them under an active, operational 1 Cdn Div, with CSSB, OSG and Sigs Regt, and with 1 Wing RCAF under operational control.
Have 1 Cdn Div (MGen) report to CJOC (VAdm)
And have 1 Cdn Div take lessons from CANSOFCOM (MGen)


Oh.  And put everybody in a Khaki Beret.









Leave the Areas to manage their militia and ranger units and liaise with provincial authorities.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kilted said:


> I mentioned this somewhere else, but it seems relevant here.  We were told that the terms of service for the reserves were changing.  We weren't given specifics, but were told that it was;t going to be one night a week and one weekend a month anymore, that the army was going to expect more of us.  Does anyone know anything about this?



Based on the dozens of emails I received throughout the week from various micromanaging COs, hopefully this legislation will actually cut back on some of the stupidity 

What if it were against the law for your boss to bug you after hours?​


			https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/work-emails-disconnect-ontario-legislation-1.6224826


----------



## CBH99

Good2Golf said:


> …maybe one day the Army, both the full-timers and the young part-timers trying to find excitement and the old part-timers trying to re-live their excitement, will figure out what it thinks it needs to be and how to look doing it, perhaps before Force 2030, or Force 2035, or Force 2040, or Force 2045, or…well…I’d be amazed if it even figures out light forces, let alone how many divisions it will be, or how many soldiers to a section, and how AT, AD, DF, CS, EW, etc. gets accomplished.
> 
> Interesting to see the slagging of others, as though the Army is the pinnacle of having its poop in a group.  I just look at how the Army championed its funding responsibility for aviation in the late-80s/early-90s.  CANSOF took Aviation seriously, played nice with the RCAF and it works well.  I worked with them in a number of protects that were more than just rectal plucks with galleons filled with gold doubloons thrown at them.  Lots of UORs perhaps in the early days, but experience and appropriate program discipline followed establishing a balanced capabilities-funding framework that fits within assigned constraints.  Maybe the Army needs to have a somewhat revolutionary introspection, vice internally-thrashing evolution.
> 
> Good luck, Army.


CANSOF enjoys many perks that the regular forces don’t, that’s no secret to any of us.  

I agree with the notion that one should look at how CANSOF continuously puts out a high quality product, and manages it’s resources.  

Plenty of UOR’s when CSOR was first being stood up.  Which made perfect sense.  They knew from their JTF2 brethren what kit worked, where to source it, why it would work (or not) given their mandate/tasks - and as a new unit, it made sense to buy what you wanted and needed without the headache.  

Something we have done as a country (government) is we have created such a bureaucratic environment that it hinders us.  The Government of Canada can’t even buy what the Government of Canada wants, because the GoC is too busy enforcing their own rules and telling themselves ‘no’. 

CANSOF works because they have a clear set of tasks/missions, fund the capabilities, and keep themselves busy.  

The Regular Army right now seems to be in flux because it doesn’t have a clear structure or mandate given to it — so it’s trying to be a little bit of everything just incase it’s called on to do this, or do that.  

Are some capability gaps glaring and obvious?  Yes.  Easily fixable?  Also yes.  


I’ve said a few times now - and I don’t proclaim to be right - that if we gave the Army a clear set of expectations, talked with our allies about what capabilities we could bring to the fight that would be actually useful, and excelled at those….  We would simplify things for ourselves, and also be exceptionally good at what we do.  

Morale.  Training.  Equipment procurement.   Everything would improve once we have a more defined goal.  


0.02


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> Based on the dozens of emails I received throughout the week from various micromanaging COs, hopefully this legislation will actually cut back on some of the stupidity
> 
> What if it were against the law for your boss to bug you after hours?​
> 
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/work-emails-disconnect-ontario-legislation-1.6224826


Oh one could only wish


----------



## Good2Golf

CBH99 said:


> I’ve said a few times now - and I don’t proclaim to be right - that if we gave the Army a clear set of expectations, talked with our allies about what capabilities we could bring to the fight that would be actually useful, and excelled at those….  We would simplify things for ourselves, and also be exceptionally good at what we do.


CBH99, I’ll go half-way with you here…yes some higher guidance and direction, but the Army is also significantly part of its own destiny (as are the other elements/services) so it also has a professional, institutional responsibility to Government to have itself squared away, providing the most (or at least reasonably close to optimal) bang for the buck it does get.  Personally, I think the other elements/services to a notably better job making a case to Government (and the people) for what and how they do things than the Army does. CANSOF is reasonably squared away and lifts the kimono enough (W5 special, opening hockey games by rappelling from the roof to be seen…just enough); the RCAF is fairly visible and deployed globally and flexibly when needed and really just had NORAD modernization, but otherwise sorted out, one big Div to conduct all FE and op FG and a smaller Div to conduct ab initio FE and PD; the Navy is structured reasonably well, just that it’s major capability lines (FFG, SSK, MCDV, AOR) are partway through elongating service live, but there’s a National plan to resolve FFG and AOR and we’ll see how the government’s take on SSK develops in the coming years)…so it comes back to the Army with how it want to shape itself for the future and make a compelling case for how it should look (orbat) and what capability composition it should have.  I often use light forces as an example of the less-focused nature of the Army, but that alone represents the apparently never-ending challenge of the Army having a hard time even agreeing internally.  I have lost track of how many LFWGs I sat on, or at the higher level ACDBs, and felt I was at a tennis match watching the back and forth of different factions that seemed focused on winning some type of argument, rather than walking away having found an agreed way ahead for that type of force.  Scale that up, and it seems the Army is seized of…getting more Divisions and piece-mealing capabilities throughout, and the integral connectors we used to see in the field force, such as it was, the mortars, DF, CS, AD, pioneers, etc. are off elsewhere in a structure that still hasn’t settled to whatever it needs to be.  I do hope the Army figures it all out, and as a non-Army guy who spent two full tours in institutional Army organizations as a trusted agent to help it fit in, I honestly mean that.  My concern, also from having spent two full tours in the Army’s lines, is that it can be myopically parochial, to its own detriment.

$0.02


----------



## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> I often use light forces as an example of the less-focused nature of the Army, but that alone represents the apparently never-ending challenge of the Army having a hard time even agreeing internally.  I have lost track of how many LFWGs I sat on, or at the higher level ACDBs, and felt I was at a tennis match watching the back and forth of different factions that seemed focused on winning some type of argument, rather than walking away having found an agreed way ahead for that type of force.  Scale that up, and it seems the Army is seized of…getting more Divisions and piece-mealing capabilities throughout, and the integral connectors we used to see in the field force, such as it was, the mortars, DF, CS, AD, pioneers, etc. are off elsewhere in a structure that still hasn’t settled to whatever it needs to be.  I do hope the Army figures it all out, and as a non-Army guy who spent two full tours in institutional Army organizations as a trusted agent to help it fit in, I honestly mean that.  My concern, also from having spent two full tours in the Army’s lines, is that it can be myopically parochial, to its own detriment.
> 
> $0.02


One day the CA will grow up and decide what it wants to be...
  Right now it acts like it is still in Kindergarten Recess and having internal temper tantrums.


----------



## CBH99

I had hoped - sincerely - that a lot of junior officers and NCOs would be rising in the ranks after Afghanistan was over, and a new culture at the middle to top would quickly reveal itself. 

From my own (limited) experience a lot of those people who would have been the backbone of that change got out instead.  Police services scooped up a lot of them, or the members got out and did something else entirely.  

It’s a shame.


----------



## FJAG

CBH99 said:


> I had hoped - sincerely - that a lot of junior officers and NCOs would be rising in the ranks after Afghanistan was over, and a new culture at the middle to top would quickly reveal itself.
> 
> From my own (limited) experience a lot of those people who would have been the backbone of that change got out instead.  Police services scooped up a lot of them, or the members got out and did something else entirely.
> 
> It’s a shame.



I tend to think that Yugoslavia and Afghanistan are part of the Army's problem.

In having left behind the Cold War culture and doctrine that underlay its force structure for the second half of the 20th century, it went through an existential crisis in redefining itself. Yugoslavia taught one lesson that begat a transformation process that gave birth to Advancing with Purpose which then went through its formative years in Afghanistan. Having had a childhood and teenagerhood in that environment gave rise to all of its current senior leadership whose only experience with a more traditional peer conflict were those on exchange with foreign forces who were equally embroiled if not enamoured by OOTW.

Each of the US and UK Armies (basically our role models) are trying to reset (The Americans more so than the Brits). We're still lagging far behind for various reasons but I tend to think G2G has the best point. Canadians in government (including the Army) are ruled by committees rather than dynamic leaders. Committees are great at protecting the status quo and rice bowls but are a curse when the times call for paradigm shifts.

My concern isn't that just the Army's current leadership is moribund but that the whole chain, well past the second and third string are all cast in the same mould - after all the trend in promoting your juniors is to promote someone who fits your own image. I think that there are a few bright sparks out there but their ability to break out of the constraints that is our military bureaucracy will stifle them for years to come.

🍻


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> I tend to think that Yugoslavia and Afghanistan are part of the Army's problem.
> 
> In having left behind the Cold War culture and doctrine that underlay its force structure for the second half of the 20th century, it went through an existential crisis in redefining itself. Yugoslavia taught one lesson that begat a transformation process that gave birth to Advancing with Purpose which then went through its formative years in Afghanistan. Having had a childhood and teenagerhood in that environment gave rise to all of its current senior leadership whose only experience with a more traditional peer conflict were those on exchange with foreign forces who were equally embroiled if not enamoured by OOTW.
> 
> Each of the US and UK Armies (basically our role models) are trying to reset (The Americans more so than the Brits). We're still lagging far behind for various reasons but I tend to think G2G has the best point. Canadians in government (including the Army) are ruled by committees rather than dynamic leaders. Committees are great at protecting the status quo and rice bowls but are a curse when the times call for paradigm shifts.
> 
> My concern isn't that just the Army's current leadership is moribund but that the whole chain, well past the second and third string are all cast in the same mould - after all the trend in promoting your juniors is to promote someone who fits your own image. I think that there are a few bright sparks out there but their ability to break out of the constraints that is our military bureaucracy will stifle them for years to come.
> 
> 🍻


You aren’t wrong by any means.  Not at all.    

I don’t have any experience with the mentality or change in culture as a pertains to operations in Yugoslavia.  

But when it comes to Afghanistan I saw a lot of focus on producing capabilities and results, with the operational requirements being put ahead of petty politics.  (I mean this from the perspective of middle and senior leaders.)

For example, the Cpl - Sgt ranks (and _some_ WO’s) who were in the fight, living in the FOBs, doing the fighting patrols, etc - saw and experienced first hand what was needed to fight an enemy like the Taliban.   

The officer ranks when I was in theatre seemed to ‘get it’ also.  (although I did see & experience officers who were well regarded micro-manage the hell out of combat operations to the point of being a serious detriment to effectiveness.)

The mindset that ‘we need basic capability A, B, C in order to win the tactical fight against an enemy ground force’ was very much present.  Common sense and a results oriented mindset seemed to be a solid foundation for members who were ‘in the thick of it.’  A more combat oriented mindset, is perhaps what I’m trying to describe.  

In 2011, and onwards - as combat operations ended and the transition to other operations commenced - A lot of those same people left the Army in droves.  

We went from having a waiting list in recruiting, to being short of people, in a very short period of time.  

But you know who didn’t leave?  The folks who are already in when everything Afghanistan-related started.  (Relatively speaking)


There are plenty of fantastic members throughout the CAF, including senior leaders we don’t hear about.  

And I’m not suggesting that one theatre produces better leaders than another.  But the intensity of one theatre seemed to drive a more capability/results mindset over what I find now to be a ‘cap badge/squabbling’ mindset.  


0.02


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> I tend to think that Yugoslavia and Afghanistan are part of the Army's problem.


Probably better to see it more neutrally as part of our history than as good or bad for for where we are today. We learned and implement a lot of good things over those periods and will benefit from this into the future. We also set aside (an in some cases since forgotten) a lot of capabilities & doctrine that would serve us well had they still been in place today. Other things that were lost & forgotten fall into the category of we’re better without it.

For any army that likes to cling to things (organizations, doctrine, TTPs, equipment, etc) of tenuous relevance, maybe the cleaned slate will help us see better ways of moving forward against a peer threat than if we still had the Cold War this is how its always been done thing.

But, we would be well served by a few tactical historians who can support concept development phase by advising how our parents or grandparents would have managed an old tactical problem that has not been seen in a generation.


----------



## KevinB

May be of interest for the CF...








						Trophy interceptor undergoes live-fire tests on Germany’s Leopard tanks
					

The Israeli government said the system achieved a threat interception rate exceeding 90 percent.




					www.defensenews.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Based on what I see now I would suggest the following:
> 
> Get rid of the notion of Force Generation and Force Employment
> Put all the regular brigades on an operational basis and treat foreign exercises as operations
> Separate the Reg Brigades from the Area Divisions and put all of them under an active, operational 1 Cdn Div, with CSSB, OSG and Sigs Regt, and with 1 Wing RCAF under operational control.
> Have 1 Cdn Div (MGen) report to CJOC (VAdm)
> And have 1 Cdn Div take lessons from CANSOFCOM (MGen)
> 
> 
> Oh.  And put everybody in a Khaki Beret.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Leave the Areas to manage their militia and ranger units and liaise with provincial authorities.




Or better yet - put the whole militia structure under the RCAF to integrate it into the NORAD-NorthCOM system.

Primary focus would be the 30 RCA armouries across the country.  Have the RCA regiments focus on GBAD in the local context.

With that established equip the 24 Naval Reserve Divisions with Dual Function Ship-Shore AD systems in containers.

Form the Territorial Reaction Groups around Engineer Regiments with a Group HQ & Sigs Sqn and a Supply and Transport Battalion.

Infantry to form into 51 RAF Regiment type companies to supply local security for the AD units.
Cavalry to form into Squadrons for roving security patrols.

Rangers to continue to work unchanged with the Joint Task Forces.



That leaves the Army to figure out how to create an employable Expeditionary Force that could build on the activities of the CANSOF.   And figure out how to expedite their expeditionary force.

Maybe, in return for the NORAD GBAD Militia the RCAF would consider more integration of 1, 2 and 8 Wings with the Expeditionary Force.


And the GBAD assets might be considered as a useful expeditionary asset by our allies.


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> Or better yet - put the whole militia structure under the RCAF to integrate it into the NORAD-NorthCOM system.
> 
> Primary focus would be the 30 RCA armouries across the country.  Have the RCA regiments focus on GBAD in the local context.
> 
> With that established equip the 24 Naval Reserve Divisions with Dual Function Ship-Shore AD systems in containers.
> 
> Form the Territorial Reaction Groups around Engineer Regiments with a Group HQ & Sigs Sqn and a Supply and Transport Battalion.
> 
> Infantry to form into 51 RAF Regiment type companies to supply local security for the AD units.
> Cavalry to form into Squadrons for roving security patrols.
> 
> Rangers to continue to work unchanged with the Joint Task Forces.
> 
> 
> 
> That leaves the Army to figure out how to create an employable Expeditionary Force that could build on the activities of the CANSOF.   And figure out how to expedite their expeditionary force.
> 
> Maybe, in return for the NORAD GBAD Militia the RCAF would consider more integration of 1, 2 and 8 Wings with the Expeditionary Force.
> 
> 
> And the GBAD assets might be considered as a useful expeditionary asset by our allies.


Let's remember this is Force 2025, not Force 2040    jk jk  

A GBAD capability I think will be a given, regardless of the deployment.  Whoever rules the air, rules the war.  While you may not be able to hold ground with aircraft, you can sure bomb the hell out of whoever is holding the ground & limit their ability to do anything.  (Move, Communicate, Shoot?  Nope.)

Just my own opinion here... but GBAD for low to medium level air threats is essential for any deploying forces, from any country.  Everybody should be able to make sure the skies above them are clear of low flying threats.  

Armed drones, loitering munitions/drones, helicopters, low flying aircraft, etc etc - can all be engaged pretty quickly, without having to coordinate a bunch of whiz-bang stuff.  (Coordination is obviously necessary, but in this context I am talking about the tactical fight.  I.e., enemy helicopter transporting enemy troops, seen by friendly forces, and directly shot down by friendly forces.)




Where we should coordinate with our allies is in regards to long-range precision fires, strategic level ISR assets, EW assets, etc.  Why spend generous money on a decent EW system if, when we deploy, an advanced EW system is to be provided by someone else?  

Why deploy 6 MLRS when the US has already deployed 60 in theatre, and has that base covered?  

Why deploy 2 Heron-type UAV's when NATO/US/Allies are deploying armed UAV's with better cameras, higher operating altitudes, and a bunch of fancy EW gear?

Why buy 'the radar part' of Iron Dome when the alliance will already have the latest Iron Dome version, complete with the part that actually shoots down the incoming threat.  Along with the latest Patriot systems, sea-cannister based SM-2, ESSM, perhaps SM-6, etc.



Do we need to be able to operate independently of a coalition?  Yes.

Even in a coalition environment, are countries guaranteed to show up with what the coalition had agreed was their responsibility?  No.

Will that leave us with some potential massive & deadly capability gaps, if Country X shows up without the burgers everybody thought they were responsible for bringing?  Yes.

Is my 'random thought' of sorts perfect?  No.   Reasonable?  Perhaps.  Doable?  Yes.



If we look to NORAD as an example of the kind of alliance planning I'm talking about, it is clearly stated that Canada must provide X-number of aircraft to the NORAD mission, with Y available at any given time in case of an emergency.  We provide the capability we agreed to.  Whatever other ambitions we have, we know that our NORAD commitment must be provided for first & foremost.

If NATO said 'Canada is required to contribute 1 squadron of utility helicopters, with X number of aircraft available in the case of an emergency'...or... 'Canada is required to contribute 20 MRLS-type vehicles and provide it's own GBAD cover' - it would give the Army a clear objective to plan for, which would guide our purchases, force structure, other capabilities we'd want, etc.




I agree with G2G that it is a matter of professionalism, that the Army be able to provide a wide range of capabilities to the government when the government is looking at options.  However, given the size of the country and the size of the armed forces/population, we literally can't afford to be all things, all the time.  (A modern ATGM, or GBAD capability, would be easy as hell to acquire if someone showed some leadership and pushed it through.  It wouldn't break the bank.  And should be acquired regardless.)

Capable of providing a wide range of capabilities?  Yes.  But we can't excel at everything.  We should consult with our allies, find out what would be most useful or valued in a coalition fight, and strive to excel at _that_ thing.



Again, just my 0.02 -- just in the context of what is doable by 2025.


----------



## Kirkhill

CBH99 said:


> Let's remember this is Force 2025, not Force 2040    jk jk
> 
> A GBAD capability I think will be a given, regardless of the deployment.  Whoever rules the air, rules the war.  While you may not be able to hold ground with aircraft, you can sure bomb the hell out of whoever is holding the ground & limit their ability to do anything.  (Move, Communicate, Shoot?  Nope.)
> 
> Just my own opinion here... but GBAD for low to medium level air threats is essential for any deploying forces, from any country.  Everybody should be able to make sure the skies above them are clear of low flying threats.
> 
> Armed drones, loitering munitions/drones, helicopters, low flying aircraft, etc etc - can all be engaged pretty quickly, without having to coordinate a bunch of whiz-bang stuff.  (Coordination is obviously necessary, but in this context I am talking about the tactical fight.  I.e., enemy helicopter transporting enemy troops, seen by friendly forces, and directly shot down by friendly forces.)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Where we should coordinate with our allies is in regards to long-range precision fires, strategic level ISR assets, EW assets, etc.  Why spend generous money on a decent EW system if, when we deploy, an advanced EW system is to be provided by someone else?
> 
> Why deploy 6 MLRS when the US has already deployed 60 in theatre, and has that base covered?
> 
> Why deploy 2 Heron-type UAV's when NATO/US/Allies are deploying armed UAV's with better cameras, higher operating altitudes, and a bunch of fancy EW gear?
> 
> Why buy 'the radar part' of Iron Dome when the alliance will already have the latest Iron Dome version, complete with the part that actually shoots down the incoming threat.  Along with the latest Patriot systems, sea-cannister based SM-2, ESSM, perhaps SM-6, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> Do we need to be able to operate independently of a coalition?  Yes.
> 
> Even in a coalition environment, are countries guaranteed to show up with what the coalition had agreed was their responsibility?  No.
> 
> Will that leave us with some potential massive & deadly capability gaps, if Country X shows up without the burgers everybody thought they were responsible for bringing?  Yes.
> 
> Is my 'random thought' of sorts perfect?  No.   Reasonable?  Perhaps.  Doable?  Yes.
> 
> 
> 
> If we look to NORAD as an example of the kind of alliance planning I'm talking about, it is clearly stated that Canada must provide X-number of aircraft to the NORAD mission, with Y available at any given time in case of an emergency.  We provide the capability we agreed to.  Whatever other ambitions we have, we know that our NORAD commitment must be provided for first & foremost.
> 
> If NATO said 'Canada is required to contribute 1 squadron of utility helicopters, with X number of aircraft available in the case of an emergency'...or... 'Canada is required to contribute 20 MRLS-type vehicles and provide it's own GBAD cover' - it would give the Army a clear objective to plan for, which would guide our purchases, force structure, other capabilities we'd want, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I agree with G2G that it is a matter of professionalism, that the Army be able to provide a wide range of capabilities to the government when the government is looking at options.  However, given the size of the country and the size of the armed forces/population, we literally can't afford to be all things, all the time.  (A modern ATGM, or GBAD capability, would be easy as hell to acquire if someone showed some leadership and pushed it through.  It wouldn't break the bank.  And should be acquired regardless.)
> 
> Capable of providing a wide range of capabilities?  Yes.  But we can't excel at everything.  We should consult with our allies, find out what would be most useful or valued in a coalition fight, and strive to excel at _that_ thing.
> 
> 
> 
> Again, just my 0.02 -- just in the context of what is doable by 2025.



OK - Following G2G's lead:  Force 2050.  Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill

Info on NorthCOM, overarching NORAD






						NORTHCOM Area of Responsibility | U.S. Geological Survey
					






					www.usgs.gov
				






			Our Story
		




			About NORAD
		










						NORAD - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Info on NorthCOM, overarching NORAD


Not sure what you mean there?

But Yes part of NorthCOM's role is Defense of Canada - which shows you how much faith we have you guys these days


----------



## Kirkhill

CBH99 said:


> Let's remember this is Force 2025, not Force 2040    jk jk
> 
> A GBAD capability I think will be a given, regardless of the deployment.  Whoever rules the air, rules the war.  While you may not be able to hold ground with aircraft, you can sure bomb the hell out of whoever is holding the ground & limit their ability to do anything.  (Move, Communicate, Shoot?  Nope.)
> 
> Just my own opinion here... but GBAD for low to medium level air threats is essential for any deploying forces, from any country.  Everybody should be able to make sure the skies above them are clear of low flying threats.
> 
> Armed drones, loitering munitions/drones, helicopters, low flying aircraft, etc etc - can all be engaged pretty quickly, without having to coordinate a bunch of whiz-bang stuff.  (Coordination is obviously necessary, but in this context I am talking about the tactical fight.  I.e., enemy helicopter transporting enemy troops, seen by friendly forces, and directly shot down by friendly forces.)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Where we should coordinate with our allies is in regards to long-range precision fires, strategic level ISR assets, EW assets, etc.  Why spend generous money on a decent EW system if, when we deploy, an advanced EW system is to be provided by someone else?
> 
> Why deploy 6 MLRS when the US has already deployed 60 in theatre, and has that base covered?
> 
> Why deploy 2 Heron-type UAV's when NATO/US/Allies are deploying armed UAV's with better cameras, higher operating altitudes, and a bunch of fancy EW gear?
> 
> Why buy 'the radar part' of Iron Dome when the alliance will already have the latest Iron Dome version, complete with the part that actually shoots down the incoming threat.  Along with the latest Patriot systems, sea-cannister based SM-2, ESSM, perhaps SM-6, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> Do we need to be able to operate independently of a coalition?  Yes.
> 
> Even in a coalition environment, are countries guaranteed to show up with what the coalition had agreed was their responsibility?  No.
> 
> Will that leave us with some potential massive & deadly capability gaps, if Country X shows up without the burgers everybody thought they were responsible for bringing?  Yes.
> 
> Is my 'random thought' of sorts perfect?  No.   Reasonable?  Perhaps.  Doable?  Yes.
> 
> 
> 
> If we look to NORAD as an example of the kind of alliance planning I'm talking about, it is clearly stated that Canada must provide X-number of aircraft to the NORAD mission, with Y available at any given time in case of an emergency.  We provide the capability we agreed to.  Whatever other ambitions we have, we know that our NORAD commitment must be provided for first & foremost.
> 
> If NATO said 'Canada is required to contribute 1 squadron of utility helicopters, with X number of aircraft available in the case of an emergency'...or... 'Canada is required to contribute 20 MRLS-type vehicles and provide it's own GBAD cover' - it would give the Army a clear objective to plan for, which would guide our purchases, force structure, other capabilities we'd want, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I agree with G2G that it is a matter of professionalism, that the Army be able to provide a wide range of capabilities to the government when the government is looking at options.  However, given the size of the country and the size of the armed forces/population, we literally can't afford to be all things, all the time.  (A modern ATGM, or GBAD capability, would be easy as hell to acquire if someone showed some leadership and pushed it through.  It wouldn't break the bank.  And should be acquired regardless.)
> 
> Capable of providing a wide range of capabilities?  Yes.  But we can't excel at everything.  We should consult with our allies, find out what would be most useful or valued in a coalition fight, and strive to excel at _that_ thing.
> 
> 
> 
> Again, just my 0.02 -- just in the context of what is doable by 2025.



A bit of digging on the RAF Regiment turned up this on their Field Squadrons (different to the Air Defence bit)

A Reg Force RAFR Sqn expects to patrol an area of 140 km2 (10 x 14 km)
It has a strength of 171 including CSS atts.

It is mounted in Landrovers (unarmoured) and Jackals (armoured) - both with Weapon Mounting Kits for GPMGs, HMGs, GMGs and ATGMs.

It has its own ISTAR assets along with GPMGs, HMGs, Javelins or N-LAWS and 81mm mortars.

It is organized into an HQ Flt (Pl), a Spt Wpns Flt (Pl) and 3 or 4 Rifle Flts (Pls).

It is expected to be deployable and operate independently for an extended period of time but anchored to the base it is protecting.


A Royal Auxilliary Air Force Field Squadron, manned by reservists for home defence duties, dispenses with both the CSS atts and the Spt Wpns flt. 

It has a strength of 120 organized into an HQ Flt (Pl) and 4 Rifle Flts (Plt).  2 of the platoons are mobile and mounted in Landrovers, while the other 2 are static, gate guard platoons.

The cost of maintaining and operating  the RAuxAF Fd Sqn is apparently 500,000 UKP per Sqn per year.


In a Canadian Reserve context, the combination of the RCA GBAD Tps and the RCIC/RCAC Security elements would result in both a useful service and also a focus of training and recruiting.  Perhaps the RCAC could supply TAPV Tps instead of the WMIK Flts.  Perhaps  some of the Companies could be equipped with the Spt Wpns and ISTAR elements while the rest were closer to the RAuxAF model.

My sense is that with a defined rationale on which to focus recruiting, equipping and training - and doing it locally - then it would be easier to find and maintain troops and justify equipment and training budgets.

It would also result in the units being in good shape to handle local domestic emergencies.

Finally, I see nothing to prevent the soldiers, who will have developed some military skills including handling a variety of weapons, ISTAR and comms gear, driving, conducting patrols and establishing a fixed defence, and even just standing gate guard, from applying as individuals to assist the Regs.  Or they could be called up in formed bodies for D&S or LOC duties.

Or, some privileged few, could perhaps be permitted to ride in the back of a LAV at Meaford once a year.


----------



## Kirkhill

So what might a company team be defending?  How about something like this?







Either at the local armouries or the municipal airfield.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> Not sure what you mean there?
> 
> But Yes part of NorthCOM's role is Defense of Canada - which shows you how much faith we have you guys these days


Oooofffff… 😅

Well in our defence (no pun intended) - the Arctic is a lot bigger than people realize, and the Russians ain’t comin’.  😈😉

You can’t get very far when your vehicles won’t start, food supplies are frozen, water supplies are frozen, batteries are all dead (even spares) - no comms -  fighting vehicles sink or end up as pillboxes, etc.  

Our best defence to a ground incursion is almost to just take her sweet time and let nature either win the battle for us, or render them completely ineffective.  Second best?  Let the F-18’s unleash hell from above 😈


Also, what motivation do we _really_ have when you guys park a squadron of F-22s, multiple F-35 squadrons, and F-15C’s in Alaska?  Literally the ‘crappiest’ jet you guys have up there is one of the best fighters in the entire world 😅

Things are fine up here.  Totally fine.  Everything is juuusssttttt fine… 😐🤥


----------



## Kirkhill

CBH99 said:


> Oooofffff… 😅
> 
> Our best defence to a ground incursion is almost to just take her sweet time and let nature either win the battle for us, or render them completely ineffective.  Second best?  *Let the F-18’s unleash hell from above* 😈



So you want to train the Rangers to be FACs?


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> Our best defence to a ground incursion is almost to just take her sweet time and let nature either win the battle for us, or render them completely ineffective.  Second best?  Let the F-18’s unleash hell from above 😈


I think the RCAF's CF-18's are getting a tad long in the tooth


CBH99 said:


> Also, what motivation do we _really_ have when you guys park a squadron of F-22s, multiple F-35 squadrons, and F-15C’s in Alaska? Literally the ‘crappiest’ jet you guys have up there is one of the best fighters in the entire world 😅


 It's the Catch-22, we stick a lot of stuff to guard the North because you don't - and you don't because we do...


CBH99 said:


> Things are fine up here.  Totally fine.  Everything is juuusssttttt fine… 😐🤥


I remember a Grade 9 History Textbook that suggested the Canadian Anthem should actually be for the US Mil.
   I was embarrassed at the time as a Canadian, now I am just an unamused American.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> I think the RCAF's CF-18's are getting a tad long in the tooth
> 
> It's the Catch-22, we stick a lot of stuff to guard the North because you don't - and you don't because we do...
> 
> I remember a Grade 9 History Textbook that suggested the Canadian Anthem should actually be for the US Mil.
> I was embarrassed at the time as a Canadian, now I am just an unamused American.


1.  A wee bit, yes.  But they can still bum the heck out of whoever is dumb enough to set up shop in the Arctic in winter.  

2.  It is a catch 22.  Which sucks that our bilateral agreement isn’t more equal when it comes to defending the North.  

We can obviously never hope to compete with the United States overall in terms of military capability.  But we should be able to share the responsibility or equally when it comes to defending northern approaches.  

At least her F-18s will be there to greet the enemy if they somehow managed to fight their way through multiple squadrons of high-end assets coming out of Alaska?  😐👍🏻


3.  Well for what it’s worth, there are tens of millions of unamused Canadians with similar sentiments.  Some perhaps with even more intensity.  

If a single politician who was running for office demonstrated real leadership, I imagine they would be elected by a very healthy margin.  

Like a Jocko Willink type.  Instead we are stuck with some fratboy/hippie named Justin… 🤦🏼‍♂️


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I think the RCAF's CF-18's are getting a tad long in the tooth



That must be the reason why we bought used Australian F-18s


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> That must be the reason why we bought used Australian F-18s


The Aussies get more life out of theirs.  They don't use salt!


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> So what might a company team be defending?  How about something like this?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Either at the local armouries or the municipal airfield.




Also, in considering this construct, the antecedent of the TAPV was designed by Cadillac Gage for the US Military Police and was employed by the USAF in Vietnam to conduct .... airfield security.  Cadillac Gage built a one man, one meter turret for the vehicles, which ended up on the Mowag Piranha to become the AVGP Grizzly.  The USNG uses the M1117 as a Security Vehicle.












And the Rheinmetal SkyShield is simply the latest iteration of the Oerlikon SkyGuard previously operated by 4 RCA in conjunction with the ADATS system back in the 90s.  And need we remind ourselves that Rheinmetal is a Quebec company.









						Skyguard I 1 Oerlikon air defense system cannon missile data fact sheet | Germany German army artillery vehicles systems UK | Germany German army military equipment UK
					

Skyguard I 1 Oerlikon air defense system cannon missile technical data sheet specifications information description intelligence pictures photos images identification Germany German army Rheinmetall defense industry army military technology




					www.armyrecognition.com
				





Rheinmetal also puts their guns on armoured boxes with wheels and calls the system SkyRanger






						Rheinmetall Defence - Mobile Air Defence
					

Rheinmetall's mobile air defence systems - Self-propelled air defence systems for mobile vital assets such as mechanized forces or convoys.




					rheinmetall-defence.com
				









The same kit fits on ships


----------



## foresterab

Afternoon all,

Again trying to follow the discussion from a civilian perspective and it seems like it's either a top down mission goal starting with Reg. Force assignments (which frankly confuses me quickly when you get into the sub-unit specialist roles)  or bottom up Res. Force and drive towards the end goal through attrition? alignment. 

But for me the background is in emergency management and the standard Incident Command System (ICS) that is used not just across Canada but also the US, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Europe etc. and while they are similar to the Armed Forces they are not the same.   Am I setting up incident command based upon function roles (armor, artillery, infantry, aviation branches), location (Division Alberta, Ontario, Maritime) or do I need some blend of both.   For example on a major wildfire we would have an Operations Section Chief (Col? General) who might have 1,000 personnel within it...but they are in turn also split by Air Operations Branch Director (and associated helibases), Wildland Urban Interface (Structural fire fighters arranged via the Office of the Fire Commissioner),  and Branches for each group of divisions of people (Think Regiment for Branch), who in turn supervises multiple Divisions (Company? command of 1-300 men), who supervises multiple task force leaders (Platoon commander), who supervises multiple subunits of crews. 

Logistics (the infrastructure and equipment needed), Plans (the tactics and personal assignments), and Finance (cost tracking) are all smaller units operating under the Incident Commander.    Liaison/Safety/Agency Representatives report to IC. 

Why mention all this...because it shows how alternative civilian organizations adjust to the mission.   So how to apply to Forces 2025 question:
1. Reg. Force/Class B Reserve.  Sorry I've combined them but if you're spending most of the time in the role you're full time.     This is benchmark for not just command but also planning/logistics/admin and depending on how you assign manpower can be the key.    An HQ heavy on brass but focused on planning and logistics support is way different than having a line command with a supervisor for every grunt/seaman/airman.    How many officers are needed for each function and truly prune roles back to the needed, not desired, numbers and invest in training junior staff for replacing those present as the Afghanistan/Piracy Patrols/Air Space missions experience is lost through attrition.   For reference the United States Forest Service uses a 30% rule of thumb in logistics which includes all cooks/cleaners/warehouse/stevedores/drivers/mechanics etc. which significant smaller numbers in Plans, Finance, and Command roles.   Most are in operations. 

2. Recruitment and training.   Needs to be fast recruitment for entry level and clearly communicated training.   You can only do so many "emergency" deployments for training before it's a toll and especially if not clearly aligned with the big picture mission before people get out.   While both Reg. and Res. Forces appear to be suffering from this issue it has to be a clear focus.   We recruit in January for April jobs...and probably lose 10-15% of good applicants due to delays.    If it's 8 months for a reserve unit that's' potentially 25% of a university student employment window lost due to waiting...before waiting for the next training que. 

3.  Review training to provide both clearer direction but also leverage technology changes.   If I can see air tankers conducting refresher training via simulators linked in multiple provinces what are the options for the Armed Forces?  Can 3x reserve battalions  in 3 different cities use a LAV trainer to conduct digital operations or do we have to always touch iron to be able to train effective.   Online/interlinked is good but does not replace the need for larger scale pre-planned exercises and as others have mentioned the years efforts should be focused towards an annual exercise (or two). 

4.   If the pre-deployment mission standard is a 6 month work up then be realistic on what that means for Res. Forces.  It means you're not deploying units or specialists and instead train up to a basic competency level (rifleman/driver/seaman?) and either do two things - A) increase Class B contracts for those specialists needed to maintain unit effectiveness (signals? gun commander?) or B) accept that you have created a "home guard" level training force that can deploy in numbers wearing a uniform and work to strengthen the emergency relief taskings of Flood/Fire/Snow/COVID etc.   If a reserve unit is called out as a unit then it could/should be considered equivalent to Point #3. 

5. Res.Force Plans/Logistics staff.  Almost every province has some form of an Emergency Operations Center usually in the capital.    Work to establish a small number of liaison roles here to better apply on either a pre-identified roster or Class B. position to align the armed forces with provincial response.   Tons of opportunities for both sides to learn more and the ex-members I've worked with have been able to apply many of their experiences, from whatever uniform they wore, to the task at hand and have been a big positive assets.

6. review resource needs.  I still think we over complicate our supply and logistics often for the 5% scenario and instead over build our organization charts, vehicle needs, and training for the unexpected rather than accepting that the unexpected will happen and focus on training for the 90% of common tasks we do often so we're confident enough to adjust to the unexpected.   Weather alone changes everything and the first time you fight fire in a July snowstorm you learn to adapt and adjust tactics as a result...but you don't gear up for snow in July just because "it might" happen. 

Regardless of what side of the fence you're on everyone is struggling with recruitment, training, budgets and mission creep.   So keep throwing the ideas out there because the more ideas tossed around the cleaner the end product should be.

foresterab


----------



## KevinB

foresterab said:


> Afternoon all,
> 
> Again trying to follow the discussion from a civilian perspective and it seems like it's either a top down mission goal starting with Reg. Force assignments (which frankly confuses me quickly when you get into the sub-unit specialist roles)  or bottom up Res. Force and drive towards the end goal through attrition? alignment.
> 
> But for me the background is in emergency management and the standard Incident Command System (ICS) that is used not just across Canada but also the US, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Europe etc. and while they are similar to the Armed Forces they are not the same.   Am I setting up incident command based upon function roles (armor, artillery, infantry, aviation branches), location (Division Alberta, Ontario, Maritime) or do I need some blend of both.   For example on a major wildfire we would have an Operations Section Chief (Col? General) who might have 1,000 personnel within it...but they are in turn also split by Air Operations Branch Director (and associated helibases), Wildland Urban Interface (Structural fire fighters arranged via the Office of the Fire Commissioner),  and Branches for each group of divisions of people (Think Regiment for Branch), who in turn supervises multiple Divisions (Company? command of 1-300 men), who supervises multiple task force leaders (Platoon commander), who supervises multiple subunits of crews.
> 
> Logistics (the infrastructure and equipment needed), Plans (the tactics and personal assignments), and Finance (cost tracking) are all smaller units operating under the Incident Commander.    Liaison/Safety/Agency Representatives report to IC.



One problem you re going to face is the CF isn't organized to make any sense in that manner.
  Part of the issue is Who Owns what, Versus Who Employs What, and Who Pays for What.
   The above don't always mesh in a manner that make sense any more.
As a result you get the Services (RCAF, RCN, CA) then in the CA the Branches, Schools, and Units/Formations.
  Of all which have HQ staff of some sort.




foresterab said:


> Why mention all this...because it shows how alternative civilian organizations adjust to the mission.   So how to apply to Forces 2025 question:
> 1. Reg. Force/Class B Reserve.  Sorry I've combined them but if you're spending most of the time in the role you're full time.     This is benchmark for not just command but also planning/logistics/admin and depending on how you assign manpower can be the key.    An HQ heavy on brass but focused on planning and logistics support is way different than having a line command with a supervisor for every grunt/seaman/airman.    How many officers are needed for each function and truly prune roles back to the needed, not desired, numbers and invest in training junior staff for replacing those present as the Afghanistan/Piracy Patrols/Air Space missions experience is lost through attrition.   For reference the United States Forest Service uses a 30% rule of thumb in logistics which includes all cooks/cleaners/warehouse/stevedores/drivers/mechanics etc. which significant smaller numbers in Plans, Finance, and Command roles.   Most are in operations.



Ideally there would be no Class B, except summer concentrations/schools.
  Reg Force  - Class C Res support to Reg Force, or just Class A Res.

30% isn't enough for a Military - but how that support in structured is vastly important - as you can end up with a massive tail that doesn't offer any real support to the teeth.





foresterab said:


> 2. Recruitment and training.   Needs to be fast recruitment for entry level and clearly communicated training.   You can only do so many "emergency" deployments for training before it's a toll and especially if not clearly aligned with the big picture mission before people get out.   While both Reg. and Res. Forces appear to be suffering from this issue it has to be a clear focus.   We recruit in January for April jobs...and probably lose 10-15% of good applicants due to delays.    If it's 8 months for a reserve unit that's' potentially 25% of a university student employment window lost due to waiting...before waiting for the next training que.


 I fail to see how it can take that long -- When I joined the Res in 1987 it took three months, it took 5 Months for me to transfer to the Regs - and it took 4 months to rejoin after 9/11
    It should be a very easy process.
 Paperwork (background check etc) - Aptitude Test - Physical - then find a slot and get Sworn In.



foresterab said:


> 3.  Review training to provide both clearer direction but also leverage technology changes.   If I can see air tankers conducting refresher training via simulators linked in multiple provinces what are the options for the Armed Forces?  Can 3x reserve battalions  in 3 different cities use a LAV trainer to conduct digital operations or do we have to always touch iron to be able to train effective.   Online/interlinked is good but does not replace the need for larger scale pre-planned exercises and as others have mentioned the years efforts should be focused towards an annual exercise (or two).


Depending on the Simulator - yes you can network them - the US National Guard uses Sims at Armories that don't have local vehicle storage (of A Vehicles) - and can "play" with others in the network.
   My experiences with the CF is fairly dated - but there where not a lot of Sims around - and where very limited even in Reg Force units.



foresterab said:


> 4.   If the pre-deployment mission standard is a 6 month work up then be realistic on what that means for Res. Forces.  It means you're not deploying units or specialists and instead train up to a basic competency level (rifleman/driver/seaman?) and either do two things - A) increase Class B contracts for those specialists needed to maintain unit effectiveness (signals? gun commander?) or B) accept that you have created a "home guard" level training force that can deploy in numbers wearing a uniform and work to strengthen the emergency relief taskings of Flood/Fire/Snow/COVID etc.   If a reserve unit is called out as a unit then it could/should be considered equivalent to Point #3.


 Pre-Deployment should be a realistic 2-3 weeks period of Theatre Specific Training for the Reg Force -- if the Reg Force isn't combat ready - why have them?
  Res Class C work up - should be 3-4 months attached to the Reg unit they are augmenting.



foresterab said:


> 5. Res.Force Plans/Logistics staff.  Almost every province has some form of an Emergency Operations Center usually in the capital.    Work to establish a small number of liaison roles here to better apply on either a pre-identified roster or Class B. position to align the armed forces with provincial response.   Tons of opportunities for both sides to learn more and the ex-members I've worked with have been able to apply many of their experiences, from whatever uniform they wore, to the task at hand and have been a big positive assets.


 Those jobs shouldn't be Res IMHO - again the whole class B "bum" issue is a detriment to the mission of both Reg and Res Forces.



foresterab said:


> 6. review resource needs.  I still think we over complicate our supply and logistics often for the 5% scenario and instead over build our organization charts, vehicle needs, and training for the unexpected rather than accepting that the unexpected will happen and focus on training for the 90% of common tasks we do often so we're confident enough to adjust to the unexpected.   Weather alone changes everything and the first time you fight fire in a July snowstorm you learn to adapt and adjust tactics as a result...but you don't gear up for snow in July just because "it might" happen.


 The Army (and CF as a whole) faces a significantly broader mission set - as a result it needs to be able to:
Fight a High Intensity Conflict agains a Peer/Near Peer threat - from Arctic to Equator to Antarctica.
  It also needs to prepare for OOTW, and NEO Tasks along the entire geographic spread as well.
  Plus Humanitarian Missions - and Aid to Civil Power and Defence of Canada Missions.

As a result it ends up NEEDING a lot more equipment for the personnel it actually has to be able to conduct any of its assigned missions from the Canadian Government.



foresterab said:


> Regardless of what side of the fence you're on everyone is struggling with recruitment, training, budgets and mission creep.   So keep throwing the ideas out there because the more ideas tossed around the cleaner the end product should be.
> 
> foresterab


The CF and CA specifically to this thread has plethora of issues - on top of the ones you mention.
   Part of it is internally created - IMHO a lot of it is, but it is IMHO also exceptionally wasteful with a lot of it's personnel and capital acquisitions.

   The First thing the Army needs to do is restructure 
 Scrap the Reserve system into a functional system that can effectively Force Generate units-subunits.
 Reorg the Regular Army to make effective use of the equipment it does have - scrap symmetrical Brigades,

 Then sit down and look at what those Brigades need from a Manning side - and how to incorporate Reserves into them
   Then what it needs for equipment to those three different Brigades.

 In doing that - as well as actually following through with other reforms - that will help with morale, and thus retention - as well as make recruiting easier IMHO.


----------



## CBH99

Halifax Tar said:


> I'm pretty sure some recent articles have shown a light on the poor material management practices in our SOF world.
> 
> My limited time in that sphere and the Clearance Diver sphere really gave me a deeper appreciation for those day in day out sailors doing the unglamorous work, with poor equipment, poor pay and little recognition.


I'm curious, what would one google to find some of these articles?

Genuinely curious.  Usually we don't hear much about the SOF side of things, and on the surface they always appear to have solid personal kit & weapons.  

Just wondering where one would start to dig to find these articles?


----------



## Brad Sallows

> I fail to see how it can take that long



SYEP.  Walked in the door sometime in May.  Paperwork, part I, off to a contracted doc for part II, sworn in, started course in July.  Didn't release at end of summer.  No additional admin that I can recall.

[For those wondering: no, there was no psychological screening.]


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> I'm curious, what would one google to find some of these articles?
> 
> Genuinely curious.  Usually we don't hear much about the SOF side of things, and on the surface they always appear to have solid personal kit & weapons.
> 
> Just wondering where one would start to dig to find these articles?


I am aware of a few early issues back when DHTC first was starting off.
    I would put those down to teething pains - and while I think some Requirements have been a little "odd" I wouldn't say that there are poor material management issues in CANSOFCOM.


----------



## CBH99

Brad Sallows said:


> SYEP.  Walked in the door sometime in May.  Paperwork, part I, off to a contracted doc for part II, sworn in, started course in July.  Didn't release at end of summer.  No additional admin that I can recall.


During the Afghan war years, I was a recruiter for 41CBG.  We pumped recruits through pretty quickly and easily.


Submitted their application online.  Basic clearance was pretty quick to get, as it was just a police check & credit check.
We brought them in for their CFAT in the morning, lunch, interview in the afternoon.  Medicals were usually done right after the interview, or the next day.  (If recruits were coming in from out of town, we made sure they got it all done in one bang.)
Submitted their file to Ottawa for approval.  Usually received the green-light fairly quickly.
Applicant was contacted, and either sworn in at the unit, or sworn in at a slightly larger ceremony in the same building our recruiting office was.

Boom.  Done.

-  Arrangements were made for new member to attend ASU to draw all of their kit, uniform, etc.  Off to their unit they went, and they would make arrangements for BMQ, etc.



I honestly don't know how the f**k it takes so long for an application to go through these days.  

If an applicant warrants further review (usually due to moving here from another country, hence additional checks need to be made) so be it.  Otherwise, get the CFAT out of the way, interview, medical, fitness test, etc - and get them rolling.  There is _no excuse_ for us to be less efficient now than we were 10-20+ years ago.


Question - are reserve units still allowed to run their own recruiting?  I know there was a trial idea a few years back, where reserve units were given authority to speed up applications.  I believe the goal was 'from first walk in, to sworn in, within 30 days.'  Is that still a thing?


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> Question - are reserve units still allowed to run their own recruiting?  I know there was a trial idea a few years back, where reserve units were given authority to speed up applications.  I believe the goal was 'from first walk in, to sworn in, within 30 days.'  Is that still a thing?



Yes, we can 'attract'. CFRC does most of the leg work after that and our recruits are usually at the bottom of the pile.

They don't get 'recognized' for pushing us toons through, of course, as the MillColl and technical trades are usually a much higher priority, which gets them the Brownie points from on high.

To be fair to CFRC, the medical stages (out of their control) are insanely long and can increase delays by months, usually to the point that people drop out as they can't stand it anymore.

Now, if there's a Rootin' Tootin' Shootin' War on, and you need to fill up the LAVs with teenaged bayonets as a priority then yes, they'll gladly stream the death techs through faster.

Having said all that, there will probably be someone along in a minute who will tell me I'm mistaken, which is highly likely in some respects!


----------



## Halifax Tar

KevinB said:


> I am aware of a few early issues back when DHTC first was starting off.
> I would put those down to teething pains - and while I think some Requirements have been a little "odd" I wouldn't say that there are poor material management issues in CANSOFCOM.



Can't post them on this site.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> SYEP.  Walked in the door sometime in May.  Paperwork, part I, off to a contracted doc for part II, sworn in, started course in July.  Didn't release at end of summer.  No additional admin that I can recall.
> 
> [For those wondering: no, there was no psychological screening.]



Walked in the door in Mewata.  Volunteered my services.  CO asked me if I wanted to become an officer.  I told him I would be happy to help out if that's where he needed me.   Marched over to the unit MO (a psychiatrist volunteering his time).  Declared fit.  Attested and told to turn up next week.  My training officer, the night I was attested, handed me a pair of his old combats and a pair of boots were scrounged.  Showed up the following week in the combats with no headdress.  Rushed to stores.  Balmoral clapped on top.  Joined the ORs in the classroom learning whatever it was they were learning.  Fell in in the ranks when they did.  Spent the rest of the year learning with the ranks.  After a couple of months the CO informed me my parchment had arrived.  I returned to class. Dragged out of class (where I had got my first salute) to the Officer's Mess where I was told that I owed everyone a round ..... and then another one for having kept the CO waiting.

Security clearances done sometime that first year.  A trip to the stores at Currie.  Officer type training from the Adj, the RSM and the OC Training Coy.  And off to the Ontario Hydro training facility at Orangeville, ON for my first two week MITCP session.   

And so began my short, and insubstantial, military career.

Fortunately the Sea Cadets had taught me how to salute, march and iron my gear.


----------



## Brad Sallows

I never saluted my gear, let alone marched it anywhere.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> I never saluted my gear, let alone marched it anywhere.



That's the Sea Cadets for you.


----------



## CBH99

That infamous British sergeant I had when I first joined - he hated the great coveralls.  He just had us attend in some thing that looked somewhat professional but was also comfortable, until we had uniforms issued any chance to draw kit.  

I haven’t thought about that guy in years to be honest.  And then the other day I thought of him because of something I read on here.  I think about it the more I chuckle.  (I joined in 2000, the day after my 16th birthday, as a reservist.)


One MCpl ‘aspiring to be a Sergeant one day’ quietly approached him while he was standing about with his hands in his pockets, watching and tailoring some of our basic drills…

“Sorry Sarge, but we can’t have our hands in our pockets.  The CO is right over there!”

Our sarge… “F**k off…”   In the thickest of British accents.  End of convo.  


Another poor soul sent his way another night… “The QM wants to know if you want the new recruits in grey coveralls, so everybody is looking uniform…?”

Our sarge - “ The gray coveralls look dumb, they didn’t join up to look like janitors.  No.”   End of convo.  


Sgt Tucker & Sgt Lapthorne were the only 2 guys in the entire armoury (also Mewata) that weren’t intimidated by him & could joke about.  Not that our Sarge ever intentionally intimidated anybody, he was just a scary guy on the surface 😅


----------



## Kirkhill

Still in Mewata - sent by Adj to make a request of the RSS Sgt.

The Sgt responded:   DILLIGAS!  

When I proceeded to look puzzled he took pity on me.

He informed me that DILLIGAS! could be roughly translated as "Do I Look Like I Give A Shit!"  .... "Sir."

I returned to the Adj.


----------



## CBH99

Kirkhill said:


> Still in Mewata - sent by Adj to make a request of the RSS Sgt.
> 
> The Sgt responded:   DILLIGAS!
> 
> When I proceeded to look puzzled he took pity on me.
> 
> He informed me that DILLIGAS! could be roughly translated as "Do I Look Like I Give A Shit!"  .... "Sir."
> 
> I returned to the Adj.


Was his last name Reaper by chance??

(No, I kid you not.  Our super scary yet awesome British Army turned Canadian Army Sgt… his last name was Reaper.  Go figure.)


----------



## Kirkhill

Not Reaper.  Long time before your time

CO Paul Hughes
Adj Dennis Mascardelli
RSM Marty McCumber
CSM Joe Doucette
Training Officers Derek Nice and Rob Rooney.

ca 1980

Gentlemen all.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Not my intent at all - the point was the 031 is physically hard - and churn should be encouraged to other trades.
> It gives everyone a base understand of ground combat at the rudimentary level - which can be used later, when when Cpl Bloggins is on a supply run and the convoy is ambushed - he at least has a background to know fire and maneuver.
> 
> You will see more and more Asymetrical battlefields with the dispersed Multi-domain operation concepts current being conducted by the Allies.
> 
> 
> It also ensures that everyone starts off on a level playing field.


Surely you mean 001-01, and I’m off to my pedant cave again.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> Surely you mean 001-01, and I’m off to my pedant cave again.


Is that the new MOC/MOSID for Infantry - I don't keep up with useless changes for the sake of change


----------



## Good2Golf

markppcli said:


> Surely you mean 001-01, and I’m off to my pedant cave again.


Pedant?

Hold my beer.


Your number is wrong…and there is no hyphen.

MOSID 00010 - INFMN.

A-MD-154-000/FP-000, Annex D, Appendix 1 refers: 😉


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> Pedant?
> 
> Hold my beer.
> 
> 
> Your number is wrong…and there is no hyphen.
> 
> MOSID 00010 - INFMN.
> 
> A-MD-154-000/FP-000, Annex D, Appendix 1 refers: 😉


----------



## Kirkhill

And back to the world of toys.









						Robot wars: The battle for automated ground capability
					

Experimenting with and investing in uncrewed ground vehicles is growing, suggesting they will play a key role in near-future land warfare.




					www.army-technology.com


----------



## CBH99

Soon there won’t be any point in warfare between states at all.  (Not that there ever really was… 99% of the world’s problems could be solved if people just sat down, listened to each other, and worked together for common good.)

But.  Alas.  My imaginary world doesn’t exist.  


But if everything is automated, there isn’t any real price to pay for warfare.  Even if one side’s uncrewed systems completely overwhelm another’s…. Eventually the other side will just manufacture more of their own.  

Each side can produce unmanned systems in mass quantities, and replace destroyed systems quickly.  

Any territory lost can be regained eventually, and that line will be moving back and forth based on industrial capacity alone.


----------



## markppcli

Good2Golf said:


> Pedant?
> 
> Hold my beer.
> 
> 
> Your number is wrong…and there is no hyphen.
> 
> MOSID 00010 - INFMN.
> 
> A-MD-154-000/FP-000, Annex D, Appendix 1 refers: 😉


I stand corrected and proclaim the high pedant.


----------



## Good2Golf

markppcli said:


> I stand corrected and proclaim the high pedant.


Don’t worry. I’m sure @dapaterson will be along any time to point out that I only referred to a medical spec for MOSIDs, not the MOSID OSS/OSQ reference itself. 

#theresalwaysapedantierpedant  😆


----------



## Infanteer

Good2Golf said:


> Pedant?
> 
> Hold my beer.
> 
> 
> Your number is wrong…and there is no hyphen.
> 
> MOSID 00010 - INFMN.
> 
> A-MD-154-000/FP-000, Annex D, Appendix 1 refers: 😉



Hold my beer pitcher.

Your number is right, but your occupation name is wrong, probably because your reference is dated from 2017.

MOSID 00010 - Infanteer (INFTR)

Do I win?


----------



## Good2Golf

Infanteer said:


> Hold my beer pitcher.
> 
> Your number is right, but your occupation name is wrong, probably because your reference is dated from 2017.
> 
> MOSID 00010 - Infanteer (INFTR)
> 
> Do I win?


For now, Infantrymanteer, for now…


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:


> Hold my beer pitcher.
> 
> Your number is right, but your occupation name is wrong, probably because your reference is dated from 2017.
> 
> MOSID 00010 - Infanteer (INFTR)
> 
> Do I win?



Which is also a postal code for the region NE of Rome:









						Google Maps
					

Find local businesses, view maps and get driving directions in Google Maps.




					www.google.com


----------



## KevinB

CBH99 said:


> Soon there won’t be any point in warfare between states at all.  (Not that there ever really was… 99% of the world’s problems could be solved if people just sat down, listened to each other, and worked together for common good.)
> 
> But.  Alas.  My imaginary world doesn’t exist.
> 
> 
> But if everything is automated, there isn’t any real price to pay for warfare.  Even if one side’s uncrewed systems completely overwhelm another’s…. Eventually the other side will just manufacture more of their own.
> 
> Each side can produce unmanned systems in mass quantities, and replace destroyed systems quickly.
> 
> Any territory lost can be regained eventually, and that line will be moving back and forth based on industrial capacity alone.


High Power EW systems will reduce most systems to Ash - and even highly shielded systems will be pretty useless unless they have some sort of AI/ML function that can operate independent from "controller" instructions - which of course gets us to Terminator and SkyNet -- we will build the machines that destroy us...


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> High Power EW systems will reduce most systems to Ash - and even highly shielded systems will be pretty useless unless they have some sort of AI/ML function that can operate independent from "controller" instructions - which of course gets us to Terminator and SkyNet -- we will build the machines that destroy us...


Between super volcanoes potentially erupting & killing off massive amounts of vegetation/animals, creating AI that is faster, smarter, and progresses in maturity and complexity exponentially faster than we can - and is connected to ever thing via internet - screwing around with viruses we have no business tampering with, a giant space rock (just takes one), astronomical phenomena that could destroy us in the blink of an eye, etc etc.  

I don’t want to sound doom & gloom.  But realistically I’m not sure about our odds…

If Skynet takes me out?  Man, I’ll just have to chuckle and say “I didn’t see that coming…” once I wake up on the other sice 😅


----------



## KevinB

My point was more along the lines of I wouldn't be dumping my eggs all into the Autonomous Vehicle basket...


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> My point was more along the lines of I wouldn't be dumping my eggs all into the Autonomous Vehicle basket...


Oh I know...  Sorry, my brain and fingers need to connect from each other sometimes.  Especially when I have an actual keyboard infront of me, and not my smart phone which 'autocorrects' my sentences into sounding like jibberish sometimes.  You mentioned 'Skynet' and 'destroy us' and - BOOM - my brain took those very select key words and just ran with it 🤷‍♂️ 🤦‍♂️


I wouldn't put all of my eggs in that basket either.  

However, as they become cheaper & cheaper to produce (exponentially cheaper when you factor in it doesn't need a pension, training time, instructors, benefits, a salary, death benefits, etc) - it offers a far cheaper solution than deploying actual members, and doesn't risk voter blowback because of friendly casualties.  

So on this note, I think we will gradually see their expanded use as time goes on.  Not just initially, but I do believe that expanded use will continue for the next several decades, as politicians and field commanders alike would rather deploy those in harm's way than people.  Especially if militaries want to maintain certain capabilities during times of aggressive budget cuts.


Right now, I think of this type of tech as almost like the biplane of WW1.  A flying machine that could strafe enemy positions from the relative safety of the sky was mind-blowing at the time.  That platform then became necessary to rid the skies of enemy planes, and blah blah blah...

I doubt anybody who was alive at the time of that revolution in warfare ever imagined F-22's operating at 50,000ft plus just cruising around at Mach 2.  


Some optics, a machine gun or two (backup incase one jams or is disabled), on a cheap to manufacture chassis that is commercially already in production.  Replacing the machine gun with ATGM or automatic grenade launcher could probably be coded for/done by tomorrow if industry wanted to, along with passive sensors to minimize it's own electronic signatures.  I suspect it's only a matter of time - and not much time - before we start to see passive AD systems, EW systems, etc all deployed on un-crewed vehicles.  

And I suspect it's only a matter of time - and again, not much time - before we start to see commanders pushing for *'able to identify between friendly and non-friendly targets, and engage targets on it's own, in the case that communications/link is lost between the vehicle and it's host'* as a safety feature of sorts.  

Understanding that future state vs. state warfare will include some pretty effective EW, it wouldn't surprise me if this feature makes it's way into these vehicles within a decade or so.  (As Russia demonstrated in the opening months of it's operations in Donbass, their EW capabilities were far ahead of what we thought they would be.)  It could be argued that having autonomous systems able to take over in a comms-denied environment is critical in some circumstances, and thus we ignorantly get closer to Skynet, one step at a time.

In a land warfare context, these vehicles tend to be pretty basic.  You could literally ship dozens of 8x8 vehicles to a theatre, and their weaponry, on the same plane and have them put together by folks on the ground, ready to deploy fairly quickly.  

However in a sea warfare context, some of these vehicles will almost absolutely have to go down the autonomous path almost right off the bat in order for them to be effective.  (Autonomous underwater vehicles, for example, or even the larger uncrewed sensor/missile platforms the USN is pursuing.)




KevinB said:


> High Power EW systems will reduce most systems to Ash - and even highly shielded systems will be pretty useless unless they have some sort of AI/ML function that can operate independent from "controller" instructions - which of course gets us to Terminator and SkyNet -- we will build the machines that destroy us...



While I wouldn't put all of my eggs into the  Autonomous Vehicle basket, this is perhaps a reason to keep a few more eggs aside for that basket than perhaps initially thought.

Every platform we field these days, especially those platforms designed for state vs. state warfare, are pretty high-tech.  And high-power EW systems will absolutely fry some of the systems in these platforms to the point where they will be extremely expensive, yet useless hunks of metal.  (Fry one system with EW, the whole platform is disabled.  Perhaps an F-35 vulnerability?)

If this is the case, having those platforms get fried without a human present is obviously preferential than having them fried with a human present.  

So I see the proliferation of 'optionally crewed vehicles' very much on the horizon, and the likely direction warfare will go.  And when you factor in 'able to operate independently in a EW heavy environment' - and the expanded use of EW systems by our potential adversaries - our generation may be quite surprised at how quickly these types of systems are fielded, advanced, and at the least operate in quantities equal to people.



Literally my 0.02 of contemplating with my fingers


----------



## GR66

An interesting perspective in this article from the Modern War Institute website.

If you believe the premise of this article then the CA is uniquely unprepared for a modern conflict.  We have neither the massed nor precision fires available to target enemy offensive forces, woefully inadequate ISR assets to detect enemy forces, zero capability to defend against enemy fires and a force structure that is based around traditional Cold War type formations with centralized support and logistics.

One small point where I _somewhat _disagree with the author is that while US (and Canadian) military activities will technically be expeditionary in nature, they in many cases (in particular against a peer enemy) will ultimately be defensive in nature.  That means that while our ports of entry and supply infrastructure will certainly be vulnerable to enemy attack, once we are in theatre we will be the defending force and it will be the enemy forces that are required to mass their forces for offensive maneuver and push their logistical elements forward into enemy territory to support their attack.  This will make them vulnerable to the same types of forces/weapons that he points out as being a threat to our own military operations.

How different would many of the suggestions put forward in this thread be if we were to take this author's point of view?


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> An interesting perspective in this article from the Modern War Institute website.
> 
> If you believe the premise of this article then the CA is uniquely unprepared for a modern conflict.


He isn't wrong...



GR66 said:


> We have neither the massed nor precision fires available to target enemy offensive forces, woefully inadequate ISR assets to detect enemy forces, zero capability to defend against enemy fires and a force structure that is based around traditional Cold War type formations with centralized support and logistics.


It isn't even based on that.


GR66 said:


> One small point where I _somewhat _disagree with the author is that while US (and Canadian) military activities will technically be expeditionary in nature, they in many cases (in particular against a peer enemy) will ultimately be defensive in nature.  That means that while our ports of entry and supply infrastructure will certainly be vulnerable to enemy attack, once we are in theatre we will be the defending force and it will be the enemy forces that are required to mass their forces for offensive maneuver and push their logistical elements forward into enemy territory to support their attack.  This will make them vulnerable to the same types of forces/weapons that he points out as being a threat to our own military operations.
> 
> How different would many of the suggestions put forward in this thread be if we were to take this author's point of view?


Still massively extended supply lines with inadequate resources to even support theatre UNCONTESTED - let alone support the theatre if contested.
   Secondly since the CA doesn't forward deploy significant forces - it can't even guarantee it would even get to a conflict given the assets it doesn't have.


----------



## Kirkhill

Returning to this thread,  separate from the expeditionary diversion of ArmyRick's Napkin Force, I want to come back to the LAV/Stryker Force.

Our Canadian LAV force, I believe, is well constituted for the internal security role and lines of communication work.  The US Stryker force is better equipped for the offensive role in certain circumstances but would likely be a follow-on force in an armoured war.  The USMC LAV force is explicitly a recce force.

The primary shortfall in the Canadian LAV force, in my opinion, is the lack of fire support.  Of all types.  Doing a bit of "catalogue shopping" with what is currently on offer I have come up with three "must haves".

Priority 1 - Air Defence

I have changed my mind on this one and come to recognize that the risk of air attack in even an internal security situation is high.  Certainly much higher than the risk of an armoured attack

Accordingly I put the MSHORAD requirement as Priority 1















						Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) | Leonardo DRS
					

With the M-SHORAD Mission Equipment Package (MEP) on a purpose-built Stryker, Warfighters maneuver with tactical units to detect, identify, track and defeat air threats.



					www.leonardodrs.com
				




In a dispersed battlefield, where I anticipate platoons will be roving with wide separations (beyond gun fire ranges), then I would anticipate adding an MSHORAD vehicle to each platoon based team.

Priority 2 - Armoured Defence

This would be combined with Anti-Structural Attack.  I propose, in addition to arming the Platoon LAVs with mounted ATGMs and equipping their dismounts with ATGMs, and adding the MSHORAD with its ATGMs to add the USMCs Hero-120 Loitering Attack Munition LAV.  This would replace not just the TOW LAVs but also the Mortar LAVs it being anticipated that in the internal security and follow on force cases that precision fires are going to be more common than massed fires.  Massed fires would be supplied by coalition forces.















						This Is Our First Look At The Marines' Loitering Munition-Armed Light Armored Vehicle
					

The 'suicide drones' will allow Marine light armored units to surveil the battlefield and strike targets with pinpoint precision from up above.




					www.thedrive.com
				












						Marines Pick Loitering Munition To Arm Light Vehicles And Drone Boats
					

So-called "suicide drones" will give Marine units a new option for finding threats and engaging them precisely on land and at sea.




					www.thedrive.com
				












						Hero-120, Loitering Weapon Systems
					

Ideal for anti-tank missions, or other strategic objectives, the Hero-120 is the largest of the short-range systems. It carries a 4.5 kg warhead and can endure an extended flight time of 60 minutes. Weight (with canister): 18 kg Warhead: 4.5 kg Range: 60+ km Endurance: 60 min Engine: Electrical...




					uvisionuav.com
				





Priority 3 - Fire Support

And here I mean conventional gunfire support that can supply both precision (if close enough) and mass.  For that  I am offering something that advanced to prototype stage but hasn't made it into the catalogues yet.   The Denel 105mm turret on the GDLS Stryker.  A self-propelled howitzer that fires existing NATO ammunition over the forward arc ( and the counter arc to the rear) at both low and high angles.  This would not just add to the artillery support base but would also replace the 105mm MGS vehicle in the low angle Direct Fire role against structures.







Lightly armoured (to the equivalent standard of the MGS and the infantry LAVs it is accompanying). Transportable by C-130.

 Automatic Handling System with 42 MAC charges and 56 separate projectiles.
Range up to 30 km.  Ability to put 3 rounds through the same hole at 1 km in the low angle Direct Fire mode.



> The 105mm LSPH demonstrator has a crew of three (driver, commander/gunner and loader). As the system fires off its wheels (no outriggers necessary), it provides for faster in- and out of action times than comparable systems. The basic armor of the LAV III ,covering the Standardization Agreement STANAG 4569 level III ,which provides a all-round protection against 7.62x51mm NATO small calibre rounds. A ceramic appliqué armor (MEXAS) can be added, which protects against 14.5x114mm heavy calibre rounds from 500 meters.












						LAV III Stryker T7 105 mm self-propelled howitzer technical data sheet specifications pictures | South Africa African artillery vehicles systems UK | South Africa African army military equipment UK
					

LAV III Stryker T7 105 mm self-propelled howitzer technical data sheet specifications description information intelligence pictures photos images identification South Africa African defence industry military technology Denel artillery




					www.armyrecognition.com
				








__





						Denel Stryker LAV III 105 mm howitzer can directly fire three shells through the same hole 0908113 | August 2011 news defense army military industry UK | Military army defense industry news year 2011
					

Denel Land Systems has developed an artillery piece that can directly fire three shells through the same hole  at a distance of one kilometre. The accuracy of this locally developed piece of artillery is equally impressive. This system fire at a range of 30km and deliver 50% of its projectiles...




					www.armyrecognition.com
				





GENERAL DYNAMICS - 105mm LAV III Artillery Weapon System​https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net › ...







						Army Eyeing New Artillery Systems
					

Army Eyeing New Artillery Systems




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				





Oh,  And Priority 4.

The Platoon gets its 60mm mortar back.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> He isn't wrong...



No he's not. To put it politely, we -- the Canadian Army - is wrong.

Without having to go back to the Roman army and French knight analogies, one simply has to look at NATO v the Soviet models: NATO believes in manoeuvre supported by fires while the Warsaw Pact saw fires supported and exploited by manoeuvre. 

In Canada our infantry centric leadership has abandoned not only fires but was in the process of throwing the predominant manoeuvre arm - the tanks - under the bus in the belief that modern warfare just doesn't need that stuff and we can't afford it anyway. It still hasn't taken any steps to correct these egregious errors other than some theoretic musings.

What is scary is that Force 2025 (which appears to be a reorganizational stepping stone to a more extensive Force 2030) does virtually nothing to correct this situation. The lack of vision appears profound. Where is the open debate that should be at the forefront of all our military journals? Is the Army really that asleep and disinterested? Or are we simply that intellectually bankrupt?

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> No he's not. To put it politely, we -- the Canadian Army - is wrong.





FJAG said:


> In Canada our infantry centric leadership has abandoned not only fires but was in the process of throwing the predominant manoeuvre arm - the tanks - under the bus in the belief that modern warfare just doesn't need that stuff and we can't afford it anyway. It still hasn't taken any steps to correct these egregious errors other than some theoretic musings.


There where some TrackToads up there tossing stuff away as well, I don't think it can be solely blamed on the Infantry.


FJAG said:


> What is scary is that Force 2025 (which appears to be a reorganizational stepping stone to a more extensive Force 2030) does virtually nothing to correct this situation. The lack of vision appears profound. Where is the open debate that should be at the forefront of all our military journals? Is the Army really that asleep and disinterested? Or are we simply that intellectually bankrupt?
> 
> 🍻


I tend to believe the Army leaders that aren't intellectually or morally bankrupt are either jaded or muzzled.
   We have seen clear indications from the A/CDS that he knows the CAF is in dire straights - it seems the PMO is quite happy to keep the CAF on  starvation rations at this point - and I am not sure what can be done without some signifiant funding changes, and a PM that actually cares.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> There where some TrackToads up there tossing stuff away as well, I don't think it can be solely blamed on the Infantry.


Hillier being # 1 on that list - the debate was intense though.

I've been interviewing quite a number of senior gunners from the time and as yet I have not found anyone who was prepared to say "Yup - I told everyone that we needed less guns". I've got a lot of "we couldn't afford to keep them", though.



KevinB said:


> I tend to believe the Army leaders that aren't intellectually or morally bankrupt are either jaded or muzzled.


Yeah - I don't think so. Our lack of leadership on the capabilities issues long precedes the Night of the Long Knives. I guess they could have been jaded and muzzled for quite a while now but that, in my eyes, means that they really aren't leaders in the first place.



KevinB said:


> We have seen clear indications from the A/CDS that he knows the CAF is in dire straights - it seems the PMO is quite happy to keep the CAF on  starvation rations at this point - and I am not sure what can be done without some signifiant funding changes, and a PM that actually cares.


$23 Billion isn't chickenfeed. The way it's being spent delivers few bangs for the bucks. Honestly, if I was in the PMO I wouldn't give DND another nickel either until they sort their own crap out first. Why spend more money to promote more GOFOs and fill yet more cubicles in Ottawa?

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Hillier being # 1 on that list - the debate was intense though.
> 
> I've been interviewing quite a number of senior gunners from the time and as yet I have not found anyone who was prepared to say "Yup - I told everyone that we needed less guns". I've got a lot of "we couldn't afford to keep them", though.
> 
> 
> Yeah - I don't think so. Our lack of leadership on the capabilities issues long precedes the Night of the Long Knives. I guess they could have been jaded and muzzled for quite a while now but that, in my eyes, means that they really aren't leaders in the first place.
> 
> 
> $23 Billion isn't chickenfeed. The way it's being spent delivers few bangs for the bucks. Honestly, if I was in the PMO I wouldn't give DND another nickel either until they sort their own crap out first. Why spend more money to promote more GOFOs and fill yet more cubicles in Ottawa?
> 
> 🍻


The CAF as a whole and the CA specifically really needs to do some introspection as what it wants to be.
   The amount of baggage the CF has in HQ/Staff positions is exorbitant.
 I'd argue the way the money is spent isn't always the fault of the green suiters though - there have been a slew of politically directed programs, and if your not GDLS or Bell, you don't have a hope in those markets regardless of Best Performer, or Best Value for the Government is considered.

 Anyone who was cool with divesting M109's, ADATS, and the original Hook capability - as well as making more HQ's when the field army starves should probably have been taken out back and shot in the ear.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I've been interviewing quite a number of senior gunners from the time and as yet I have not found anyone who was prepared to say "Yup - I told everyone that we needed less guns". I've got a lot of "we couldn't afford to keep them", though.
> 
> 🍻



For how could you not afford to keep them?  What is it 17 Reserve Units?  With 76 M109s?  Park 4 M109s in each Artillery Armoury and have the local unit polish them up and grease the nipples once a week.  At least they would stay warm and dry.   And if they took too much space well distribute them more broadly in infantry and armoured armouries, or reserve brigade depots, or training depots, or all of the above.

And I know I am going to get a beating for laying into my drum again but, in fairness to the decision makers, I don't think anybody is going to be convinced the Canadian Government, and the Canadian Armed Forces, are serious about deploying a heavy force, or even a medium force, until the means of delivery are secured.

Big Honking Ships with Leos and M109s.  Or MGSs and MMEVs that can be lifted by CC-177s - if there are enough purchased.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> The CAF as a whole and the CA specifically really needs to do some introspection as what it wants to be.
> The amount of baggage the CF has in HQ/Staff positions is exorbitant.
> I'd argue the way the money is spent isn't always the fault of the green suiters though - there have been a slew of politically directed programs, and if your not GDLS or Bell, you don't have a hope in those markets regardless of Best Performer, or Best Value for the Government is considered.
> 
> Anyone who was cool with divesting M109's, ADATS, and the original Hook capability - as well as making more HQ's when the field army starves should probably have been taken out back and shot in the ear.


Thank You!  Yes!  This.  Exactly this.  

We don’t have the size or budget to be ‘all things, all the time, to respond to all problems.’

With our limited size & budget, we really do need to do some deep introspection and soul searching to decide what capabilities serve us best, and the most effective way to generate those capabilities.  

Being ‘general purpose, combat capable’ sounds flexible, adaptable, catchy, etc.  But as this thread has painfully reminded all of us - that phrase is actually pretty useless and sometimes downright harmful when it comes to effective planning.


Do some introspection.  Decide what capabilities serve us best.  Talk to our NATO partners to see what capabilities are needed/desired, and formulate a plan so that we can provide a useful part of the puzzle.  (Rather than everybody duplicating everybody else’s capabilities.)


0.02


----------



## Weinie

FJAG said:


> Hillier being # 1 on that list - the debate was intense though.
> 
> I've been interviewing quite a number of senior gunners from the time and as yet I have not found anyone who was prepared to say "Yup - I told everyone that we needed less guns". I've got a lot of "we couldn't afford to keep them", though.
> 
> 
> Yeah - I don't think so. Our lack of leadership on the capabilities issues long precedes the Night of the Long Knives. I guess they could have been jaded and muzzled for quite a while now but that, in my eyes, means that they really aren't leaders in the first place.
> 
> 
> $23 Billion isn't chickenfeed. The way it's being spent delivers few bangs for the bucks. Honestly, if I was in the PMO I wouldn't give DND another nickel either until they sort their own crap out first. Why spend more money to promote more GOFOs and *fill yet more cubicles in Ottawa?*
> 
> 🍻


FJAG,

As a soldier, then officer, I spent my first 23 years in uniform doing everything I could to avoid Ottawa,  It took an Ottawa posting of my then fiancee, now spouse, to change my mind. I arrived jaded, and convinced that NDHQ was a waste of time/oxygen. I heartily agreed with your loathing of all things Ottawa.

Having been here since 2005, I have come to the pragmatic realization that the HQ is bound by bureaucracy, but little of it is of it's own making. The HQ has some fat, but not a lot. Instead it is constrained(overwhelmed) by legislation/acts/statutes/legal findings/orders/commissions/other departments/governmental whims/societal pressures/real world events that mandates that it will provide innumerable reports, will abide by hundreds of acts, provide on-demand information to Parliament and the public, FG soldiers, sailors, and airmen/women, evolve to fit the Op environment, and *provide C2*. Everything but the last in bold requires people, and lots of them, to ensure compliance .

So,, go ahead with your lament to cut the HQ and push the PY's to the field force. Please do so by lobbying your MP, and Parliament, to exempt the CAF from 80% of the above phucking bullshyte, and ask them to just allow us to sit in the corner and plan for Ops and the next war.
I wish you luck.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Park 4 M109s in each Artillery Armoury and have the local unit polish them up and grease the nipples once a week.



And what do they do with the 4 M109s?


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> And what do they do with the 4 M109s?



F-all.  Just keep them warm and dry and turn them over from time to time.  Just in case they come in handy some day.  We already own the things.  And who knows - somebody might figure out how to get a couple of Big Honking Ships.

(My personal favourite idea of the day is to buy Marine Atlantic three more ferries than they need so they can release one or two on occasion. Meantime they are extending the lives of the remaining vessels in the fleet.  BC Ferries buys ferries with too many holes in them.)


----------



## CBH99

Oh I am 100% using ‘phucking bullshyte’ in a report I’m actually working on tomorrow.  

Royalty cheque inbound


----------



## FJAG

Weinie said:


> FJAG,
> 
> As a soldier, then officer, I spent my first 23 years in uniform doing everything I could to avoid Ottawa,  It took an Ottawa posting of my then fiancee, now spouse, to change my mind. I arrived jaded, and convinced that NDHQ was a waste of time/oxygen. I heartily agreed with your loathing of all things Ottawa.
> 
> Having been here since 2005, I have come to the pragmatic realization that the HQ is bound by bureaucracy, but little of it is of it's own making. The HQ has some fat, but not a lot. Instead it is constrained(overwhelmed) by legislation/acts/statutes/legal findings/orders/commissions/other departments/governmental whims/societal pressures/real world events that mandates that it will provide innumerable reports, will abide by hundreds of acts, provide on-demand information to Parliament and the public, FG soldiers, sailors, and airmen/women, evolve to fit the Op environment, and *provide C2*. Everything but the last in bold requires people, and lots of them, to ensure compliance .
> 
> So,, go ahead with your lament to cut the HQ and push the PY's to the field force. Please do so by lobbying your MP, and Parliament, to exempt the CAF from 80% of the above phucking bullshyte, and ask them to just allow us to sit in the corner and plan for Ops and the next war.
> I wish you luck.



Weinie

I actually never loathed Ottawa during my first 30 years. I served in field units and then benign regional reserve legal officer stuff. All fun and innocuous. Through those years my legal practice was litigation which put me in touch with numerous business structures from low to high where things had gone wrong and needed sorting out but which in general gave me a fairly comprehensive view of how the inner workings of business structures that need to make profits function. 

Then someone made me DJAG/Res and I had to go to Ottawa monthly for meetings with Chief of Reserves and other things and in 2006 I took a three year Class B contract there to ramrod an IT project for JAG.

I came about my loathing honestly, IMHO. Everything that I saw and was involved in in Ottawa showed me a culture obsessed with a bureaucracy. Processes were Byzantine. Hiring civilian staff takes a ridiculously long time. Thousands of people spend countless hours generating reports which no one reads beyond a very few who might scan the executive summary. Everyone protects their rice bowl. The bloat, the needlessly complex structures have been reviewed countless times and few, if any, attempts have been made to correct things.

The problem, at its root, like with most government bureaucracies, is that there is absolutely no incentive for anyone to streamline the system. Since DND makes no profit, there is nothing to measure performance against that would demonstrate if the bureaucracy is delivering value for money. DND puts together numerous performance measurement systems but if the people in the system were honest with each other they would soon admit that every one of the many dashboards displayed is meaningless as to true performance. IMHO the only performance measure that every DG should have (and on which his/her retention and pay should be based is: Have you streamlined your processes so that they can be continued uninterrupted with 10% less staff in the next FY? If 'yes', the DG keeps his job and the 10% go; if 'no' then the DG becomes a civilian and 5% of the staff go. I know that sounds stupid but can you honestly think of any other way that we will ever reduce the complexity. 

Since 2000 we have given up any pretense of measuring our defence outputs. Mike Jeffery went before SCONDA and pretty much everyone else and made it clear that out of an army of over 20,000 and an equally sized reserve force we couldn't generate a full brigade as required under current defence plans. Did we correct the system so that we could? No we lowered the standard to battlegroups. In other words since we couldn't meet our performance standard we lowered the standard so that we could. Did we get more people. Yes we did and then rapidly increased the size of our headquarters above brigade and wing level by 46% from 2004 to 2010. Instead of fixing the VCDS 's oversight over operations we created a herd of new .coms because the CDS didn't like the way he was controlled when he went to Kabul. Every time DND is faced with an issue the response is to increase the bureaucracy to deal with it. It's almost Pavlovian.

I know that there are some outside factors which require some administrative effort but for the most part we're our own enemy. We don't trust our subordinates so we create more and more central departments and directorates that have to be consulted or, worse yet, that are the decision makers for trivial matters. We have majors and lieutenant colonels who are empowered to make life and death decisions on the battlefield who are not allowed to make minor disciplinary decisions or take release actions. We have four actual brigade headquarters and five divisional ones in the Army. The RCAF has 14 Wings and 38 flying and 20 non flying squadrons for some 390 aircraft. And there's really no sense in mentioning the ridiculousness of an Army Reserve that sports hundred-man battalions with no equipment worth speaking of. The Army has a managed readiness system that basically makes 2/3 of the force non-ready at any given time and the Navy has trouble manning and fixing its ships. Those are all internal problems that DND has imposed on itself.

I've always been particulalry struck by these words from the Leslie Report:



> Based on a series of brain-storming sessions over the winter with a network of some of the best and brightest officers and civil servants destined for more senior leadership roles, a variety of organizational models were discussed and some big ideas were developed to realize efficiencies and new ways of doing things.  Some of these were presented at a large meeting in December 2010 involving the generals, admirals and senior DND civil servants, and it became apparent that the tendency was to argue for the preservation of the status quo within any one particular organization, which is perfectly natural.  Though grimly amusing, these interactions proved that consensus has not and will probably never be achieved on any significant change as we are large and complicated, and the different organizations that make up the whole do different things, each of which is believed to be very important by those who are in them.



Sorry. I'm running on too long. I think what bothers me most about this whole situation is that so much of the _Yes, Minister_ defence hierarchy is complacent with where it's at. It needs a very firm shake up or else it will continue to spiral into irrelevancy until the government finally gets smart to the fact that this emperor, who costs Canada $23 Billion annually, has no clothes. 

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

> Based on a series of brain-storming sessions over the winter with a network of some of the best and brightest officers and civil servants destined for more senior leadership roles, a variety of organizational models were discussed and some big ideas were developed to realize efficiencies and new ways of doing things. Some of these were presented at a large meeting in December 2010 involving the generals, admirals and senior DND civil servants, and it became apparent that the tendency was to argue for the preservation of the status quo within any one particular organization, which is perfectly natural. Though grimly amusing, these interactions proved that consensus has not and will probably never be achieved on any significant change as we are large and complicated, and the different organizations that make up the whole do different things, each of which is believed to be very important by those who are in them.



So what you and General Leslie seem to be describing is a dialog of the deaf amongst blind men trying to describe an elephant in the absence of the elephant.

The RCAF reports to NORAD.  The RCN reports to the USN.  Canadian Army reports to III ( and XVIII) Corps.  CANSOFCOM reports to USSOCOM.

No Canadian exerts sufficient pull to tie the bits together.

And I use the term reports advisedly.  NORAD Deputy.  III Corps Deputy. Not so sure about the RCN and CANSOFCOM but the RCN seems to be happy enough slotting itself into US carrier groups and the CANSOFCOM slots in with the USSOCOM.

Nobody seems to be overly bothered about Mission Impossible: The Defence of Canada.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> What is it 17 Reserve Units? With 76 M109s? Park 4 M109s in each Artillery Armoury and have the local unit polish them up and grease the nipples once a week.



The M109 story is actually quite complex and there were numerous attempts to keep a fair number of them in preservation. In fact ADM(Mat) in 2005 was in favour of keeping them and directed that 26 of them go into long term storage (together with six M578 recovery vehicles). That was done and others were also kept in lesser stages of preservation while a few others were cut up for scrap. 

There were issues too in that our guns were the A4+ version and the A5 was already starting to take a new line of 155mm ammunition that included higher pressures and modular charges that the A4+ couldn't fire. It wasn't too long after our guns were taken out of service before the US production lines changed to the A6 Paladin and a technical evaluation concluded that an A6 upgrade was probably a step too far for our A4+. Included in the consideration was that the M777 was already in service by then and the immediate pressure with the previously failing LG1 and C3 fleet was therefore no longer a critical concern. The big plus factor with the M777 at the time was the new gun management system and the new line of munitions it could fire including Excalibur which made it a very desirable piece of kit for the type of close support that was prevalent in Afghanistan (and the Russians and Chinese still looked like nice folks)

Eventually in 2008 the forces of darkness won and a new ADM(Mat) directed divestment of the remainder of the M109 fleet which ended up with them being demilitarized and turned into monuments.

While I fully understand some of the technical considerations, I can't see why one needs to divest a perfectly useable M109 because it can't be upgraded to the latest version (after all the older 155 mm is still in large supply) when we decided to keep C3s which are 60 years old and LG1s with cracking barrels. Yup, there's a maintenance cost and an ammunition cost if they're fired (and I think they should be) but essentially one could have kept a goodly number of them serviceable at the cost of a 1/2 time weapon tech and a vehicle tech and a dozen Class B's as apprentice maintainers. 

But that's just me.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

CBH99 said:


> Do some introspection.  Decide what capabilities serve us best.  Talk to our NATO partners to see what capabilities are needed/desired, and formulate a plan so that we can provide a useful part of the puzzle.  (Rather than everybody duplicating everybody else’s capabilities.)



NATO has already said what it wants from us, CAF has turned around and said okay, but we wanna have everything else too! thus is why we are moving towards a light, medium and heavy brigade when only one of those three has been requested by NATO. We canèt do everything but some capabilities need to have some assets, AD? low level sure, patriot batteries? no, NATO wants to turn us into a break through Force, a knife. the CAF wants to be the swiss army knife with half the tools are broken.


----------



## CBH99

MilEME09 said:


> NATO has already said what it wants from us, CAF has turned around and said okay, but we wanna have everything else too! thus is why we are moving towards a light, medium and heavy brigade when only one of those three has been requested by NATO. We canèt do everything but some capabilities need to have some assets, AD? low level sure, patriot batteries? no, NATO wants to turn us into a break through Force, a knife. the CAF wants to be the swiss army knife with half the tools are broken.


That’s a pretty fair analogy & mental image actually.  Puts it in perspective 😅👍🏻


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> NATO has already said what it wants from us, CAF has turned around and said okay, but we wanna have everything else too! thus is why we are moving towards a light, medium and heavy brigade when only one of those three has been requested by NATO. We canèt do everything but some capabilities need to have some assets, AD? low level sure, patriot batteries? no, NATO wants to turn us into a break through Force, a knife. the CAF wants to be the swiss army knife with half the tools are broken.


Perhaps because Canadian doesn't have a Heavy Bde - and hasn't since 4CMBG (which was getting old at that point and no longer a modern heavy Bde).
   All the Heavy CDN Bde is there for is sharing casualties - not a knife but an anvil (at best)

 Most countries built the force they want - and they tell NATO - hey, we can give you XYZ what do you want to do with it.
   Canada for whatever reason seem to like to half ass things on both ends.


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> Since DND the GoC makes no profit, there is nothing to measure performance against that would demonstrate if the bureaucracy is delivering value for money. DND Every GoC Department puts together numerous performance measurement systems but if the people in the system were honest with each other they would soon admit that every one of the many dashboards displayed is meaningless as to true performance.


FJAG, not intended as a “what about” defence, but I am certain you would consider the above changes to be valid.  DND is not uniquely Byzantine as a department within Canadian federal government. I’d argue that the issue isn’t even limited to the federal level. It is a construct that has mutated the Westminster parliamentary model and associated mechanisms of government over decades and decades. Canadian government makes Sir Humphrey and his colleagues look like amateurs.  

The Leslie Report wasn’t the tome of great wisdom from a succedent of Canada’s legacy of warfare transformers that many think it is.  It was a test by an aspirant politician to see if the system that spawned a major department of government as it had, was resistant enough to change that one might be able to survive in the brave new world once the chrysalis of familial service to state was broken and the newly-winged transformative creature flourished…albeit for a period far shorter than intended…


----------



## FJAG

Good2Golf said:


> FJAG, not intended as a “what about” defence, but I am certain you would consider the above changes to be valid.  DND is not uniquely Byzantine as a department within Canadian federal government. I’d argue that the issue isn’t even limited to the federal level. It is a construct that has mutated the Westminster parliamentary model and associated mechanisms of government over decades and decades. Canadian government makes Sir Humphrey and his colleagues look like amateurs.
> 
> The Leslie Report wasn’t the tome of great wisdom from a succedent of Canada’s legacy of warfare transformers that many think it is.  It was a test by an aspirant politician to see if the system that spawned a major department of government as it had, was resistant enough to change that one might be able to survive in the brave new world once the chrysalis of familial service to state was broken and the newly-winged transformative creature flourished…albeit for a period far shorter than intended…



I agree entirely with the first paragraph and it would be lovely to see reform across the entire government bureaucracy but I tend to focus on more manageable chunks and I honestly think DND needs to fix itself internally and strive for the most affordable structure it can be. And yes, I do realize that when I say "manageable" I'm being highly optimistic. On the other hand, unlike other government departments we have a profession that truly has a higher calling in the matter of defence of the nation. Every fibre of our being should be directed to converting every nickel that the government allocates to improving our defence capabilities and defence outputs. I may have a skewed view because I've been outside of the process for over a decade now and don't know the details of what is happening but the view I do have is that we are falling well short of our mark. I must admit that the Navy seems the most visionary at the moment with the CSC although I get frustrated every time I see another Navy hull slip into the water with minimal weapon systems; the air force may have some excuse with respect to the government's foot dragging on the new fighter but its decade and a half  long lack of major progress on UAVs is disturbing; and the Army ... well, I've said enough in the past about my distain for how it is equipped and postured - it's abysmal. 

I'm of mixed minds on Leslie's Report. I can see where your skepticism is coming from although I think at the time he was given a job to do and did it well within the constraints imposed on him.  I do accept its statistical analysis and I do accept that it is yet another in a long line of failed attempts to reform the central core of the defence bureaucracy because the bureaucracy doesn't want to be reformed.

There are hundreds of excellent articles on what conditions need to be present and what actions need to be taken to successfully accomplish any major business transformation. Very few of those were made available to Leslie. Chief amongst them is an empowered leader to champion the process. We have had no minister or CDS in the last few decades (and I include Hillier in that who had an initial credibility but quickly squandered his political capital) who has enough energy or dedication to take on the task of breaking down the bureaucracy. Some took on smaller goals but as I've said repeatedly: you can't fine tune a system that is patently broken - radical action is needed.

🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

Shame Leslie effectively squandered his power as an MP to be a meaningful change agent for DND and the CAF…


----------



## Kirkhill

Just thinking about the current stramash that is BC.

Has anybody given any thought to the business of getting rail traffic from Wainwright to Vancouver under the current circumstances?  It looks like it will be the end of the month before the engineers have completed their recce on Highways 1, 2 and 5.   And Highway 1 was already under a multi-month diversion at Golden.

I can't think that the LAVs will make much better progress over those washouts.

Too bad there isn't a logistics vehicle depot in the Vancouver area that troops could fly in to and fall in on the vehicles.   Heck.  You might even be able to find a bit of waterfront to park a floating depot.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> Just thinking about the current stramash that is BC.
> 
> Has anybody given any thought to the business of getting rail traffic from Wainwright to Vancouver under the current circumstances?  It looks like it will be the end of the month before the engineers have completed their recce on Highways 1, 2 and 5.   And Highway 1 was already under a multi-month diversion at Golden.
> 
> I can't think that the LAVs will make much better progress over those washouts.
> 
> Too bad there isn't a logistics vehicle depot in the Vancouver area that troops could fly in to and fall in on the vehicles.   Heck.  You might even be able to find a bit of waterfront to park a floating depot.


Would you want a depot in Vancouver that could be taken out by a tsunami?


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> Would you want a depot in Vancouver that could be taken out by a tsunami?




All the more reason to have it afloat in Esquimalt and manned.  Gain some sea room.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> All the more reason to have it afloat in Esquimalt and manned.  Gain some sea room.


Or build it underground on the east side of the island


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> Or build it underground on the east side of the island


That would be my solution - afloat causes it's own issues due to Salt water and the fact you would need a lot of various supply ships for that task, that while they would be a great assets - would drive a lot of costs.


----------



## MilEME09

KevinB said:


> That would be my solution - afloat causes it's own issues due to Salt water and the fact you would need a lot of various supply ships for that task, that while they would be a great assets - would drive a lot of costs.


Agrees, underground you can climate control to allow for minimal wear on the equipment


----------



## daftandbarmy

Meanwhile, where have we landed on this topic... doctrine wise that is?


----------



## CBH99

daftandbarmy said:


> Meanwhile, where have we landed on this topic... doctrine wise that is?
> 
> View attachment 67262


😅  Pentagon Wars!


----------



## Kirkhill




----------



## FSTO

Colin Parkinson said:


> Events will interfere with the best laid plans, such as the Falklands whee the ships had to come into restricted waters to perform their tasks.





Good2Golf said:


> Shame Leslie effectively squandered his power as an MP to be a meaningful change agent for DND and the CAF…


I think Leslie was not part of the "in" crowd at Liberal Caucus and therefore was shunted off to the side and told to be a trained seal.


----------



## Ostrozac

FSTO said:


> I think Leslie was not part of the "in" crowd at Liberal Caucus and therefore was shunted off to the side and told to be a trained seal.


Well, with Leslie agreeing to testify in the Mark Norman case, and not on the side of his PM, if he wasn’t on the “outs” before that, he certainly was after. A charitable interpretation would be that he was unable to balance loyalty between a respected colleague and loyalty to his party. A more cynical interpretation was that he should have known better, and that he was incredibly naive to even think he could try to balance those two loyalties.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> Well, with Leslie agreeing to testify in the Mark Norman case, and not on the side of his PM, if he wasn’t on the “outs” before that, he certainly was after. A charitable interpretation would be that he was unable to balance loyalty between a respected colleague and loyalty to his party. A more cynical interpretation was that he should have known better, and that he was incredibly naive to even think he could try to balance those two loyalties.



I wonder if the term "friendship" enters into the discussion.

"Balancing loyalties" feels kind of transactional.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> I wonder if the term "friendship" enters into the discussion.
> 
> "Balancing loyalties" feels kind of transactional.



It's lonely at the (almost) top:

Loneliness: The Executive Challenge No One Talks About​
As a leadership and culture coach, I’m often asked: what is the hardest part about being a CEO? Although as a CEO you get to shape a company in your image, hire people to work with you, and receive recognition for your accomplishments...

…It’s also incredibly lonely.

CEOs claim the biggest issue they face in their roles is not having anyone to confide in. Given the overwhelming responsibility and pressure to appear calm for employees, to consistently deliver results and to be where the proverbial buck stops, it’s no wonder CEOs have a tendency to isolate themselves.

And it’s a problem.









						Loneliness: The Executive Challenge No One Talks About
					

It can be incredibly lonely as a CEO ... but it doesn't have to be. Check out my three tips for overcoming loneliness as a CEO.




					www.forbes.com


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> It's lonely at the (almost) top:
> 
> Loneliness: The Executive Challenge No One Talks About​
> As a leadership and culture coach, I’m often asked: what is the hardest part about being a CEO? Although as a CEO you get to shape a company in your image, hire people to work with you, and receive recognition for your accomplishments...
> 
> …It’s also incredibly lonely.
> 
> CEOs claim the biggest issue they face in their roles is not having anyone to confide in. Given the overwhelming responsibility and pressure to appear calm for employees, to consistently deliver results and to be where the proverbial buck stops, it’s no wonder CEOs have a tendency to isolate themselves.
> 
> And it’s a problem.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Loneliness: The Executive Challenge No One Talks About
> 
> 
> It can be incredibly lonely as a CEO ... but it doesn't have to be. Check out my three tips for overcoming loneliness as a CEO.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.forbes.com


They always have the Stonecutters' Lodge to go to:






😁


----------



## Fabius

In theory the A/CCA, with Army Council, is picking a COA today.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Fabius said:


> In theory the A/CCA, with Army Council, is picking a COA today.


----------



## MilEME09

‎Canadian Army Podcast: Army Reserve Individual Readiness (S3 E3) on Apple Podcasts
					

‎Show Canadian Army Podcast, Ep Army Reserve Individual Readiness (S3 E3) - Dec 15, 2021



					podcasts.apple.com
				




So as part of F2025 the reserve force is being modernized. We are getting a defined TOS finally for the reserves, as well hints of changes to make the administrative processes easier, specifically mentioned is pay system changes to make it easier.


----------



## dapaterson

Do not announce details of transformation before they are final or before there are at least reasonable schedules for implementation.


----------



## McG

But then how would leaders make promises over which they don’t have power to deliver but which may appeal to subordinates? I mean, should one really have to choose between patience vs feeling the love?


----------



## WestIsle

To add to this it looks like they have approved a COA with minor changes


----------



## MilEME09

WestIsle said:


> To add to this it looks like they have approved a COA with minor changes


I've seen part of which COA was selected, but not which COA is being picked in regards to the CDSG's. Either way we are playing a shell game that I don't know if it will effect change or just build new empires


----------



## WestIsle

MilEME09 said:


> I've seen part of which COA was selected, but not which COA is being picked in regards to the CDSG's. Either way we are playing a shell game that I don't know if it will effect change or just build new empires


None of these deal with NDHQ or MILPERCOM being their own separate empires with people the 3 services need. As many  have mentioned here before the entire process was critically lacking in imagination and doesnt address what is actually needed for defense. Hopefully the NATO remit for 1 heavy and 3 medium brigades doesnt get dropped by the alliance and this country can suffer the consequences of that as the  army is force generating for these 4 brigades  atm and its killing moral.


----------



## FJAG

"It came as a bit of a surprise to us a few years ago that we actually don't have a policy that states what the minimum requirements are for being a reservist"  

🍻


----------



## MJP

My favorite part of the entire podcast is when the fine general made the slip of saying platoon exercises when referring to unit reserve exercises
 It was just so sweet because it's so true


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> ‎Canadian Army Podcast: Army Reserve Individual Readiness (S3 E3) on Apple Podcasts
> 
> 
> ‎Show Canadian Army Podcast, Ep Army Reserve Individual Readiness (S3 E3) - Dec 15, 2021
> 
> 
> 
> podcasts.apple.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So as part of F2025 the reserve force is being modernized. We are getting a *defined TOS* finally for the reserves, as well hints of changes to make the administrative processes easier, specifically mentioned is pay system changes to make it easier.



Of course they are aware that, to the Reserves, the term 'TOS' means something different from the usual definition ...


----------



## FJAG

Just thought I'd put this out there - as an old Cold War guy - no particular agenda here - nope - none:


> Rebirth of the Divisions​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> By Drew Brooks
> October 23, 2020
> ShareFacebookTwitterEmail
> To better prepare for future fights, Army Guard leaders are reforming the force to look more like the Guard of a century ago.
> Under the National Guard’s division alignment plans, the current eight division headquarters are adopting training-oversight relationships with other units to include brigade combat teams, aviation brigades, sustainment brigades and other support elements that would be part of a more traditional division structure.
> The goal, officials say, is to build out enough full Guard divisions to effectively give the Army 18 true, combat-ready divisions.
> Lt. Gen. Jon A. Jensen, the director of the Army Guard, says the changes are being driven by the National Defense Strategy and the need to prepare for great power competition, which could include more large-scale combat than what was seen during the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
> Such a shift means the Army is focusing on the division as the key combat formation, instead of the brigade combat team.
> Currently, Guard divisions are divisions in name only. “Divisions, as we refer to them [now], are really division headquarters, not division formations,” Jensen says.
> The units typically include about 300 soldiers. They have deployed regularly in recent years to support overseas and stability operations, to include Operation Spartan Shield, which covers all U.S. Army forces across the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
> Guard division headquarters have commanded the Spartan Shield mission since 2016. The headquarters of the 42nd Infantry Division from New York has the responsibility now. The headquarters of the 36th Infantry Division from Texas mobilized recently to take the mission next.
> Jensen says reforming the Guard to more look like its active counterparts — with intact divisions of approximately 20,000 soldiers each — is important not just for future fights, but also for ongoing modernization efforts.
> “We need to look and operate like the active Army,” Jensen says. “We need to make sure that as the Army moves forward, we do as well.“The Army Guard is strongest when we look like the Army,” he adds.
> “The Army Guard is strongest when we are moving along with the Army as a full partner. When we get left behind — either by our own inactivity or by the Army moving forward without us, that’s when we’re at risk. We’re at risk to force structure, we’re at risk to relevancy and we’re at risk at home in our ability to conduct our domestic missions.”
> The Guard’s division headquarters are in California, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Texas.
> 
> 
> 
> Divisions, as we refer to them [now], are really division headquarters, not division formations.
> _—Lt. Gen. Jon A. Jensen, the director of the Army National Guard_​
> 
> 
> 
> A COMPLETE GUARD DIVISION has not deployed into combat since Harry Truman was president, when California’s 40th Infantry Division and Oklahoma’s 45th Infantry Division were sent to fight in Korea.
> But Guard divisions have a distinguished combat history.
> The Army created 18 Guard divisions from state regiments in 1917 as it prepared to enter World War I. All of them deployed to Europe; three were among the first five U.S. Army divisions to reach the front lines. And many won the respect of their enemy. Six of the eight U.S. divisions rated “superior” or “excellent” by the German General Staff were Guard divisions.
> During World War II, 19 Guard divisions saw action, including the first five full divisions to enter the fight. They distinguished themselves with storied fighting across Pacific jungle islands, onto the beaches of Normandy and amid the push to Germany to end the war.
> Guard divisions also likely would have been critical to turning back a Soviet invasion of Western Europe had the Cold War turned hot.
> Guard leaders, including the chief of the National Guard Bureau, Gen. Daniel R. Hokanson, often reference the accomplishments of past Guard units when discussing the ongoing transformation of the force.
> “Like those who have served before us, we must be prepared to fight and win our nation’s wars,” Hokanson said during NGAUS virtual conference late last month. Hokanson announced the division alignment while serving as the director of the Army Guard last year.
> Reconstituting the Guard divisions will better prepare the force for potential large-scale operations like those in World War I, World War II and Korea, he said. It also provides an opportunity to improve readiness and talent management across the entire Guard, not just in states that house one of the eight current Guard divisions.
> “Through coordination between adjutants general and division commanders, our soldiers will have opportunities for key leader development positions previously hampered by geography,” Hokanson said.
> The opportunities will work both ways. Soldiers previously limited by opportunities in their own state will be available to serve at the division level. And divisions will welcome a larger pool of candidates for their top positions.
> Jensen says the alignment provides the opportunity to develop a more diverse cast of Guard leaders and provide young leaders more opportunities to build careers that could eventually lead to senior positions at the top of the Guard.
> “The opportunity to serve at a division level, I think it can change your career,” says Jensen, who had four assignments in the 34th Infantry Division, culminating as the division commander.
> Such assignments can increase a soldier’s understand of the Army and complex battlespace, he says. “It’s an opportunity for the 54 to come together and really contribute to each other’s success.”
> 
> 
> 
> Like those who have served before us, we must be prepared to fight and win our nation's wars.
> _—Gen. Daniel R. Hokanson, the chief of the National Guard Bureau_​
> 
> Click to expand...
> 
> SOME GUARD DIVISIONS already have formed the ties that will be the basis of the ongoing alignment.
> The Virginia-based 29th Infantry Division has training and readiness oversight with the 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team from Florida and Alabama, the 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team from North Carolina and West Virginia, the 29th Combat Aviation Brigade from Maryland and Virginia, the 226th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade from Alabama, the 113th Sustainment Brigade from North Carolina and the 142nd Fires Brigade from Arkansas.
> The units greatly expand the footprint of a division that has historically been comprised largely of units from Maryland and Virginia, but they are in keeping with the plan to align brigades with divisions in their general regions of the country.
> Jensen issued instructions for the alignment as one of his first actions as Army Guard director. He said building training relationships and developing the necessary relationships between leaders in all states were necessary first steps before the Army Guard can field a fully deployable, combat-ready division force.
> He said aligning for training was the first step in a process that would likely see the first combat-ready Guard division formations in decades be fully operational in 2024.
> Alignment will only be a success if the concept is embraced by senior leaders — including both adjutants general and division commanders, Jensen says.
> But the new alignment will not change the roles of either group, Jensen stresses.
> “The adjutant general is responsible for manning, equipping and training for all forces in their state,” he says. “This doesn’t take away any authority or responsibility of the TAG.”
> The division commanders will be working to support the adjutants general of all 54 states, territories and the District of Columbia, Jensen says. “They’re working to support the TAG, not the other way around.”
> A former adjutant general of Minnesota and former commander of the 34th Infantry Division, Jensen says fully developed divisions will make the Guard a better com-bat reserve.“
> We need to look and operate like the Army,” he says. Doing so ensures that the Guard is not only an interchangeable combat reserve, but also a part of modernization efforts and is included in new doctrine, like multidomain operations.
> Multidomain operations against China and Russia are the focus of Army leaders and a driving force behind the push for combat-ready Guard divisions.
> Unlike the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in much brigade combat teams were the primary fighting force, multidomain operations require a higher level of complexity and command that positions the division as the key element.
> It involves navigating several combat domains simultaneously, including land, air, sea, cyber and space. And requires more specialized skillsets and units than those typically found at the brigade level.
> The focus on a higher echelon is prompting a return, of sorts, for the Army Guard, Jensen says.
> “Prior to 9/11 we were a division-centric Army. We had division formations, we had brigades assigned to divisions. We were a division-centric organization, just like the larger Army,” he says. “But we became a much more focused, brigade-centric organization.”
> Organizing the force more like the active component will allow Army officials to use Guard and active divisions interchangeably, Jensen says. Ultimately, Guard divisions could be deployed with active brigades assigned to them, or vice versa.
> “After nearly two decades of counter-insurgency operations, the division has been reborn as the decisive echelon,” Maj. Gen. John M. Epperly said on Oct. 3, as he left command of Virginia’s 29th Infantry Division.
> “Reforming the division by realigning the brigades was no easy task, but today it impacts everything from how we select our leaders to how we train, equip and fight,” he said. “By creating a full division of cohesive brigades, we have created a far more lethal and survivable unit for the modern battlefield.”
Click to expand...




> Rebirth of the Divisions
> 
> 
> To better prepare for future fights, Army Guard leaders are reforming the force to look more like the Guard of a century ago.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.ngaus.org



And then there's us - sigh.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

France takes command of Nato's military task force as Russian tension builds
					

France has taken over from Turkey in heading up Nato's highest-readiness military task force. The change at the helm comes at a time of heightened concern that Russia may be preparing to invade Ukraine.




					www.rfi.fr
				




Here's a thought for cheap collective defense,  why not contribute our tiny armoured forces to the NATO VJTF? stage them in Europe permanently and rotate crews in.


----------



## markppcli

Maybe do something really radical like make it a three year posting for a battalion and an armoured regiment ?


----------



## GR66

If we were to preposition our tank regiment in Eastern Europe then the Polish 1st Warsaw Armoured Brigade might be a good host nation unit to co-locate with.

It looks like the original planned structure for the Brigade was 2 x Leopard Battalions and a Mechanized Infantry Battalion, but all the info I'm seeing on the web now looks like it's changed to a single Leopard Battalion and 2 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions.  Our fly-over Regiment could be the 2nd Tank Battalion for the Brigade.

The location of the unit is potentially good as well...in the Wesola district of Warsaw.  This places the unit within 200km of the point where the Polish, Ukrainian and Belarusian borders meet.  However, Russia might be loath to attack the capital of a NATO nation if they are looking to make a limited offensive and trying to minimize any potential NATO response, so they'd be close enough to have a deterrent effect, but somewhat safe from attack at the outset of hostilities.  Being located in Poland's capital region would also give them good visibility which would enhance the political impact of the deployment.


----------



## ueo

GR66 said:


> If we were to preposition our tank regiment in Eastern Europe then the Polish 1st Warsaw Armoured Brigade might be a good host nation unit to co-locate with.
> 
> It looks like the original planned structure for the Brigade was 2 x Leopard Battalions and a Mechanized Infantry Battalion, but all the info I'm seeing on the web now looks like it's changed to a single Leopard Battalion and 2 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions.  Our fly-over Regiment could be the 2nd Tank Battalion for the Brigade.
> 
> The location of the unit is potentially good as well...in the Wesola district of Warsaw.  This places the unit within 200km of the point where the Polish, Ukrainian and Belarusian borders meet.  However, Russia might be loath to attack the capital of a NATO nation if they are looking to make a limited offensive and trying to minimize any potential NATO response, so they'd be close enough to have a deterrent effect, but somewhat safe from attack at the outset of hostilities.  Being located in Poland's capital region would also give them good visibility which would enhance the political impact of the deployment.


Smacks of 4 Bde 60's and 70's. Either we go big or stay at home and IMHO we ain't coming big!


----------



## GR66

ueo said:


> Smacks of 4 Bde 60's and 70's. Either we go big or stay at home and IMHO we ain't coming big!


As I mentioned up thread....IF we were to determine that deploying tanks to Europe were the best course of action for deterrence then this would be a possible option to explore.

I don't think that any Canadian government of any political party will approve of deploying a full Brigade Group to Europe unless the situation there drastically changes.  I just don't see it being politically or economically viable.

I personally feel that there are other things within our current budget constraints which could have a greater potential military and political impact than pre-positioning a tank regiment, however I think that this option does check a number of political boxes...in particular a firm commitment of militarily useful ground forces to the defence of our Eastern European allies.


----------



## Brad Sallows

It's viable, just not favourable.


----------



## GR66

Brad Sallows said:


> It's viable, just not favourable.


Sounds like the quintessential CF course of action then!


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> NATO asked Canada for a Heavy Bde - and Canada said yes.
> Therefore it is the Canadian Government's responsibility to provide it.



Canada committed a Heavy Bde to NATO.
Denmark has committed a Medium Bde to NATO

One of the two is striving to meet their obligations.

Canada comes up short even at the Medium Bde level.


*anti-armour weapon systems for the combat battalions*
*equipment for electronic warfare*
*new sensors*
*a UAS capability and logistics*
*command support engineering equipment*
*a GBAD (or SHORAD) system*








						Mobile GBAD Capabilities for Denmark - European Security & Defence
					

To enable the country's new medium brigade to operate with NATO, GBAD Capabilities are required for Denmark.




					euro-sd.com
				






> *For more than 15 years, the Danish Armed Forces have lacked a Short-Range Air Defence System (SHORAD) despite NATO prescribing these as a significant part of the required medium infantry brigade. However, Denmark will deploy these weapon systems with the newly-formed 2nd Battalion of the Artillery Regiment. According to experts, the mobility of such Ground-Based Air Defence (GBAD) systems will be a particular focus in the future.*
> 
> In the phase between the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, GBAD systems played a central role in defence strategies. Currently, experts are observing a change in the military strategic situation and thus a renewed high interest of armed forces in equipping themselves with mobile GBAD systems. Over the past 30 years, Western nations have relied on air superiority and assumed that all air threats could be countered by air power.
> 
> Adversaries nowadays employ tactics that reduce an air force’s ability to suppress enemy actions such as Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2AD). This comes alongside new threats such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and the increasing use of loitering and guided munitions. GBAD systems need to be updated because they are either close to end of life or require enhanced capabilities.
> 
> *The Baltic area* is the focus for NATO assurance and deterrence measures. As this area is in Denmark´s backyard,* military contribution to the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)* is a natural and high priority task for* the Danish Army.* Therefore, the service *is striving to establish a medium brigade for NATO operation*s, says the Danish defence expert Hans Peter Michaelsen, who has many years of experience in the Royal Danish Air Force in air surveillance, air defence, acquisition and academic research.* This requires the acquisition of* several weapon systems that were not in Denmark´s inventory for years, including:
> 
> 
> *anti-armour weapon systems for the combat battalions*
> *equipment for electronic warfare*
> *new sensors*
> *a UAS capability and logistics*
> *command support engineering equipment*
> *a GBAD (or SHORAD) system*


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Canada committed a Heavy Bde to NATO.
> Denmark has committed a Medium Bde to NATO
> 
> One of the two is striving to meet their obligations.
> 
> Canada comes up short even at the Medium Bde level.
> 
> 
> *anti-armour weapon systems for the combat battalions*
> *equipment for electronic warfare*
> *new sensors*
> *a UAS capability and logistics*
> *command support engineering equipment*
> *a GBAD (or SHORAD) system*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Mobile GBAD Capabilities for Denmark - European Security & Defence
> 
> 
> To enable the country's new medium brigade to operate with NATO, GBAD Capabilities are required for Denmark.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> euro-sd.com



Re Force 2025 and Force 2030

Stumbled across this from Nov 30 2021

ABES.PROD.PW$$BW.B005.E28363.ATTA001.PDF

Interesting bit is about the LVM (Hvy) requirement.

It calls for

22x 72T transporters
48x 45T transporters
73x Bridging Pallet (BAP) transporters

22x Leo2?
48x Puma Level C or CV90 Mk IV?

Does that suggest the ability to move a Heavy Armoured Battle Group by road?
22x?  Does that suggest a Leo Sqn + ARV +AEVs?  

And if the intention is to have the ability to move 1/3 to 1/4 of the MBT fleet might that suggest a purchase of 3-4x 48 = 144-192 Pumas or CV90s?  Or would the Heavies be simply for a single battalion for field deployment?

Either way is seems like some elements of the Heavy Brigade are finding their way into the planning.


*December 9, 2021*
The Government of Canada issued the Request for Proposal to qualified suppliers.

*November 29, 2021*
The Government of Canada hosted an Industry Day event which was open to all interested companies.


Project approval: 2022/23
Contract award: 2022/23
First delivery: As early as 2025/26
Initial operational capability: As early as 2026/27
Full operational capability: As early as 2029/30






						Logistics Vehicle Modernization Project (LVM) - Canada.ca
					

The Logistics Vehicle Modernization project will acquire new fleets of light and heavy logistics vehicles, trailers, vehicle modules, armour protection kits, initial in-service and logistics support.




					www.canada.ca


----------



## Fabius

The 22 72T transporters could be enough to lift a Squadron plus ARVs and AEVs in about 1.5 lifts if we grouped them together in a Tank Tn Coy. Doubtful we have that in mind though, although maybe with the coming centralization of the tanks. 
Such a Coy would be a perfect reserve Svc Bn task in my mind. 

I suspect that the 48T will be parcelled out across the CA for moving primary our construction equipment, dozers, excavators etc. as well as LAVs for routine administrative equipment exchanges.


----------



## MilEME09

While there is a hap of having no heavy IFV to truly be a heavy brigade, I doubt someone had enough fore thought that that is what the 48 x 45T ones are for.


----------



## Kirkhill

Fabius said:


> The 22 72T transporters could be enough to lift a Squadron plus ARVs and AEVs in about 1.5 lifts if we grouped them together in a Tank Tn Coy. Doubtful we have that in mind though, although maybe with the coming centralization of the tanks.
> Such a Coy would be a perfect reserve Svc Bn task in my mind.
> 
> I suspect that the 48T will be parcelled out across the CA for moving primary our construction equipment, dozers, excavators etc. as well as LAVs for routine administrative equipment exchanges.



Perhaps that is another argument against symmetry.  The argument has been made that insufficient attention is paid to Combat Service Support and Logistics.

If the Armour and Engineer heavy equipment is dispersed and co-located with their training areas then there is little need for support vehicles to transport them.  Therefore they get little opportunity to exercise and train, and, instead, sit idle.

On the other hand, if the Armour and Engineering were centralized in the Combat Support Brigade (or a single Heavy Brigade) then the support vehicles would have ample opportunity to operate/execise moving both Armour and Engineering plant.

Anywho.

Back to Force 2025-2030 options

This Army Technology article from May 4, 2021 on British anti-armour plans and developments.









						UK outlines future anti-armour requirements
					

The UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) has unveiled the requirements for its future Battle Group Organic Anti-Armour (BGOAA) project, which aims to provide the British Army with a suite of anti-armour capabilities from around the 2030s.




					www.army-technology.com
				






MBDA's Boxer Brimstone Mounted Close Combat Overwatch (MCCO) concept. Image: MBDA.  (A >20km Battle Group Asset?)









						Brimstone | Missile Threat
					

The Brimstone missile family is comprised of fixed-wing-, rotary-, and surface launched missiles developed and deployed by the United Kingdom.




					missilethreat.csis.org
				







> UK outlines future anti-armour requirements​The UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) has unveiled the requirements for its future *Battle Group Organic Anti-Armour (BGOAA*) project, which aims to provide the British Army with a suite of anti-armour capabilities from around the 2030s.
> 
> *BGOAA is split across four areas: a Close-In Self Defence (CISD) capability, a long-range Mounted Close Combat Overwatch (MCCO) capability akin to the Swingfire system of the past, and mounted and dismounted Close Combat Anti-Armour Weapons (CCAAW), which will form the successor to the in-service Javelin.*
> The project aims to deliver commonality between effectors and launchers to drive down costs while allowing a smaller, more dispersed British force to achieve overmatch against peer threats into the 2050s.
> Commenting on the existing capabilities BGOAA is seeking to replace, British Army Lieutenant Colonel Mike Baxter, S01 for Light and Medium Forces, said: “These systems were designed in the 90s and 00s, typically as dismounted systems and not optimised for fire-on-the-move. One could also suggest that, during the lifetime of these systems, they have not really faced a significant armour threat.
> 
> “But armour or threats that have to be engaged by these weapons systems have been present throughout that time, and the scale and the complexity of use of those systems have probably exceeded the designers’ thoughts when they first brought those systems into use.”
> Key to developing the four BGOAA project lines is developing a Ministry of Defence-owned architecture for effectors and fire control systems that would allow anti-armour systems to be rapidly upgraded to maintain their relevance.
> Stopping power​​​Baxter said: “BGOAA takes the experience of the last few years with the aim of providing accurate, long-range engagement capabilities down to the section level against armoured and non-armoured targets, It also keeps in mind the potential for state-on-state or peer-on-peer conflict and the great power competition that seems to be making a comeback in world dynamics”.
> 
> “We still need to have lethality against armoured systems because, although not all may be top of the range vehicles, there is a prevalence and a proliferation of armour, right down to some relatively less well-developed nations.”
> De-risking is currently underway on technologies to enable a new generation of seekers, systems that can defeat active protection systems, new launchers and warheads.
> 
> Dstl is also looking at critical enablers, including smaller, wider spectrum, low-cost sensors; non-line of sight capabilities; third-party handoff of targeting and fire control.
> Dstl is also exploring how modular systems can allow for launchers and missiles to be diffused across platforms from trucks, the Boxer Mechanised Infantry Vehicle, the Ajax family of vehicles and uncrewed systems.
> Dstl is working within the Weapon Systems Research Framework and with prime contractors, Lockheed Martin, MBDA and Thales, collaborating to develop potential concepts for the project’s work areas.
> 
> Mark Pickering, Dstl’s close combat guided weapons science and technology lead, said: *“We often look at the conflicts we’ve fought over the last decade, and our future developments are slanted towards dealing with what the recent experience has shown us where we need the capability.
> “The problem is that often means that we have the wrong equipment for the next generation of conflict. As part of the challenges, we need to look at being adaptable and being able to adapt to the changing environment around us, especially with the escalation of cyber technologies and similar.”*
> 
> BGOAA aims to help the British Army meet several challenges, including keeping pace with rapidly developing technology, the proliferation of Active Protection Systems, and new imaging systems, making it harder to hide forces from adversaries.
> Pickering added: “In the world of anti-armour, broadly we can say there have been incremental improvements in physical armour, but we’ve not seen any world-changing differences.
> “However, what we have seen is quite a large proliferation in the integration of active protection systems [APS], and therefore future systems must be able to be highly capable against future APS.”
> Other challenges facing the army are that dismounted systems can be too heavy, technology generally reserved for peer threats finding its way into the hands of traditionally sub-peer adversaries, and a need for the British Army to increase its combat mass.
> BGOAA is currently in the pre-concept phase, with Dstl aiming to down-select from a pool of concepts over the next six month and generate a shortlist of ideas that would then undergo detailed analysis likely from 2022/23 onwards.
> 
> _MCCO is seen as a capability akin to the Swingfire system (pictured). Image: MOD/ Crown Copyright._
> MCCO – long-range support​Dstl is prioritising the MCCO capability with Lockheed Martin, MBDA and Thales, all providing insight into potential concepts, including a Boxer-mounted VLS system previously covered by Army Technology and an Ajax vehicle equipped with a 50kg missile such as Brimstone or Hellfire. A key part of the architecture is to enable platforms to accommodate any missile or rapid adaption to different missile systems.
> Commenting on MCCO, Pickering said: “If we took Swingfire nowadays, the Swingfire missile system would, noting the detectability of the host platform, would not provide anywhere near sufficient range. This is looking at providing an organic battle group anti-armour capability with a range in excess of 10 km.
> “The idea is MCCO would be in a position to provide dedicated anti-armour support to any user within the battle group… to allow a dismounted force to be able to call in an MCCO-class effector.”
> 
> _Lockheed Martin’s Boxer-based MCCO concept. Image: Lockheed Martin UK._
> 
> MCCO is envisioned as a long-range anti-armour capability that would engage targets at a range of 10km and above, with threats cued by third-party systems within a battle group. Current work envisions the system carrying 50kg effectors – for example, the weight of a Brimstone missile – but concept work has also explored the potential of effectors up to 80kg in weight.
> The MCCO capability would deliver ‘overwhelming’ anti-armour capabilities and is a move away from the past-decades reliance on only dismounted anti-armour systems.
> Current concepts being explored would see effectors distributed across uncrewed ground vehicles able to carry two missiles, remote turrets fitted to existing vehicles carrying eight missiles, or vertical launch system capabilities able to carry 36 or more missiles.
> 
> _MBDA concept showing Brimstone equipped uncrewed ground vehicles, Boxer and Ares. Image: MBDA._
> 
> These systems could sit behind front line forces, or, safely hidden by terrain, receive targets from other vehicles and fire missiles in support of them.
> During a presentation on the capability, Dstl showcased concepts from MBDA detailing an Ares vehicle carrying eight Brimstone missiles on a swing launcher as well as a Boxer module carrying 16 Brimstone missiles on one side of the vehicle as well as its previously shown concept of a TheMIS UGV carrying a Brimstone launcher.
> Dstl also showed a concept developed by Thales showing an Ares vehicle equipped with a remote turret that does not protrude into the vehicle’s hull and carried eight missiles. Thales has also developed a long-term concept for a future Light VLS vehicle.
> _Thales Ares remote turret concept. Image: Thales._
> As well as devising the Boxer module, Lockheed Martin has also developed a concept for an ISO container filled with VLS tubes and carried on a MAN SV truck. This MAN SV-based system would be able to carry 50 plus missiles.
> The project is also exploring how some loitering capabilities could be added to effectors, not to allow for long-term loitering of a location, but rather to let it circle a target while a smoke-screen clears. This fits into BGOAA’s ambition to develop systems that have a high one-shot-kill probability.
> Additionally, MCCO is working with an ambition to engage attack helicopters as a secondary capability.
> 
> _Lockheed Martin’s ISO container-based MCCO concept. Image: Lockheed Martin UK._
> CISD – following on from NLAW and ASM​At the closer range end of the spectrum, the CISD capability would form a successor to the Next-generation Light Anti-Armour Weapon (NLAW) and Anti-Structure Munition (ASM). Like other BGOAA lines of effort, plans for this capability would see a system with a significantly extended range when compared to in-service systems.
> Dstl is exploring several lines of effort for the potential solution, including whether it would be best to optimise for the anti-armour fight or provide multiple effects and researching whether two systems delivering both capabilities would be more effective.
> The ambition is that the CISD capability could be deployed anywhere within a battlegroup.
> 
> _NLAW firing. Image: MOD/ Crown Copyright._
> CCAAW – mounted and dismounted effects​The CCAAW capability, the successor to the Javelin, would see a common effector fireable from either a mounted or dismounted launcher. Dstl envisages the system having at least twice the range of the in-service Javelin – bolstering its potential to be used in non-line of sight engagements.
> The idea behind making CCAAW effective in the non-line of sight fight is that while adversary vehicle commanders can currently detect potential lines of fire and mitigate threats, this system would put adversary armoured vehicles on the back foot as they could effectively be hit from anywhere.
> Current research is also looking at how non-conventional guidance systems could be developed for this capability to make adversaries defensive capabilities redundant. However, this is described as a high-risk, high-reward endeavour.
> 
> _Javelin firing. Image: MOD/ Crown Copyright._


----------



## Kirkhill

the government’s thematic guidance for the experiment was for expeditionary forces at the company level and smaller.​
Raytheon Technologies and Northrop Grumman recently demonstrated the ability for a single user to control over 100 unmanned systems as part of a swarm in an urban battlefield setting.
​







						Contractors demonstrate single-user drone swarm at DARPA experiment
					

Raytheon Technologies and Northrop Grumman recently demonstrated that a single user could control a swarm of over 100 unmanned systems in an urban environment.




					www.c4isrnet.com
				


​​Contractors demonstrate single-user drone swarm at DARPA experiment​By Mark Pomerleau
 Jan 20, 12:02 PM







Raytheon Technologies and Northrop Grumman recently demonstrated that a single user could control a swarm of over 100 unmanned systems in an urban environment. (Sgt. 1st Class Brent C. Powell/Army)

WASHINGTON — Raytheon Technologies and Northrop Grumman recently demonstrated the ability for a single user to control over 100 unmanned systems as part of a swarm in an urban battlefield setting.

The experiment was part of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OFFSET) program, which envisions smaller units able to amass up to 250 small aerial and ground unmanned systems in urban areas.

During the November experiment at Fort Campbell, Raytheon’s system allowed a single operator to successfully control a swarm of 130 physical drones and 30 simulated drones while Northrop demonstrated a user controlling a swarm of 174 platforms.
“Combined air and ground behaviors, such as intel recon and area patrol, are some of the swarm tactics employed. We also were able to sustain swarm operations for up to 3.5 hours,” Erin Cherry, senior technical program manager of emerging capabilities development at Northrop, said in a statement.
She added that Northrop’s swarm was able to detect about 600 “artifacts” — intelligence, environmental information and mission scenario elements created by DARPA for the event — in roughly 20 minutes.

The Raytheon BBN-led team’s used a combination of commercial off-the-shelf and custom built hardware and software for its swarming technology, even incorporating a virtual reality head set for the user to control the systems.
“We built this custom interface that uses that off the shelf hardware to provide a single person with this flexible God’s eye view of the environment and all of the drones operating within it so that they can manage that larger swarm,” Shane Clark, Raytheon BBN principal investigator for the OFFSET program, said in an interview, adding they had multiple interfaces to include ones that integrated with Android Team Awareness Kit.
Their system also had autonomous elements. For instance, if a user tasked a swarm to investigate or map a building, the system would choose the best or closest ground or air asset to respond without further human input.
While Clark couldn’t speak directly to how this system would be used by the military specifically, he noted the government’s thematic guidance for the experiment was for expeditionary forces at the company level and smaller.
Both companies intend to take their systems to the annual Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment in March at Fort Benning. Clark said they’ll be doing a demonstration where they’ll be training active duty operators on how to use the system and getting their feedback on how well it works for them and whether the prototypes match with the tactical priorities and workflows they’re familiar with.


----------



## Kirkhill

The larger cousins of the Company Swarm.

What formation is 174 UCAV/Fighters?  A Squadron? Wing? Group? Division? Force?

And what is the person getting the God's Eye view through their virtual reality head set?  A pilot?  A commander?  A Warrant Officer?  A Corporal?  A General?

600 targets identified in 20 minutes.

174 autonomous platforms under command (or is that control?)

Mission time 3.5 hours.

Wrapped up in a virtual reality universe.




> JUST IN: Air Force Looking at How to Scale New Combat Drone Programs​*1/19/2022*
> By Meredith Roaten
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Lockheed Martin concept
> 
> The Air Force will work with industry to determine how to scale its new secretive combat drone programs, the head of the service said Jan. 19.
> 
> Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall revealed plans in December for two unmanned aircraft programs that could complement the service’s Next-Generation Air Dominance effort, also known as NGAD. The initiatives — which include concepts for partnering multiple drones with a crewed aircraft such as an NGAD platform or an F-35 joint strike fighter — will seek input from contractors, he said.
> 
> “There's a question of how much [platform teaming there should be], at what scale and to what extent — that we're gonna have to work on, but I want to move forward on this in a way which gets us to real operational capability,” he said at an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security.
> 
> “We're gonna bring people in — this is going to be largely a special access program level — and we're going to figure out how to do this as effectively as possible,” he added.
> 
> The NGAD program is expected to yield a family of systems — to potentially include a sixth-generation fighter jet and drones — that are intended to give the U.S. military an edge against advanced adversaries such as China and Russia.
> 
> While Kendall declined to provide more details about the programs publicly, he noted the concept of teaming manned and unmanned platforms is not new. The Defense Department and U.S. allies have done enough experimentation that Kendall said he is confident the programs will succeed.
> 
> “There's enough technology or existence from programs that we've already conducted that convinces me that's not a crazy idea, that it's something we can achieve,” he said.
> 
> It is imperative for the drones to be cheaper than manned aircraft in order to expand the Air Force’s tactical options, he noted.
> 
> “If we only do very expensive aircraft for the Air Force, we're not going to be able to forward at ... anywhere near the size that we either need or have today,” he said.
> 
> The new platforms should also be “attritible if not expendable,” he added
> 
> “That opens up a whole range of tactics that we currently would not contemplate because we'd be sacrificing manned aircraft and we're not going to do that,” he said.
> 
> Kendall told _Politico_ in December that he wanted to get the new combat drone programs into the fiscal year 2023 budget. President Joe Biden is expected to submit his budget request to Congress in the coming months.








						Classified Air Force Drone Teaming Programs to Face Questions of Scale
					

Classified Air Force Drone Teaming Programs to Face Questions of Scale




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org


----------



## FJAG

Getting back to manpower issues. The National Guard seems to be doing well.



> National Guard sees troops reupping despite COVID, hard year
> 
> 
> All over the U.S., state National Guard units are seeing dramatic reenlistment rates, even as their troops juggle near constant duties with COVID-19, natural disasters and other military deployments
> 
> 
> 
> 
> abcnews.go.com



🍻


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> While there is a hap of having no heavy IFV to truly be a heavy brigade, I doubt someone had enough fore thought that that is what the 48 x 45T ones are for.


They missed the memo that the IFV program was cancelled - or the memo it's back isn't public yet.
    Given the latest in Ukraine - I wouldn't bet against a quick refresh on CCAV or whatever it was called.
 But you probably don't want to buy anything German these days, they want to be able to tell you where you can use it...


----------



## MilEME09

KevinB said:


> They missed the memo that the IFV program was cancelled - or the memo it's back isn't public yet.
> Given the latest in Ukraine - I wouldn't bet against a quick refresh on CCAV or whatever it was called.
> But you probably don't want to buy anything German these days, they want to be able to tell you where you can use it...


We kinda did the same thing to the Philippines....


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> We kinda did the same thing to the Philippines....


Ironic considering it was a Trudeau saying it...


----------



## Kirkhill

The article discusses the Army's successful transition from the COIN-centric army of the Vietnam era to the Euro-centric Air-Land force of the Reagan era.

It considers Equipment, Personnel and Doctrine and uses my second favourite word.

Iteration.









						Be All You Can Be: Why the Marine Corps Should Look to the Army for Lessons on Force Design - Modern War Institute
					

The United States Marine Corps has embarked upon a campaign of change as significant as any since the end of the Vietnam War. The Marine Corps’s collective efforts, named Force […]




					mwi.usma.edu
				




There is a plan.  There are desires.  There is reality.

The binding element is my favourite word:

Intent.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> The article discusses the Army's successful transition from the COIN-centric army of the Vietnam era to the Euro-centric Air-Land force of the Reagan era.
> 
> It considers Equipment, Personnel and Doctrine and uses my second favourite word.
> 
> Iteration.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Be All You Can Be: Why the Marine Corps Should Look to the Army for Lessons on Force Design - Modern War Institute
> 
> 
> The United States Marine Corps has embarked upon a campaign of change as significant as any since the end of the Vietnam War. The Marine Corps’s collective efforts, named Force […]
> 
> 
> 
> 
> mwi.usma.edu
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There is a plan.  There are desires.  There is reality.
> 
> The binding element is my favourite word:
> 
> Intent.


A very good article and very much confirms my own biases. In short the need for a "plan". 

There are two areas where I diverge a little bit. 

To me doctrine is everything. When you properly define the doctrine then the equipment and personnel requirements, as well as organization, concepts of operation, the operational procedures, and moral foundation, are shaped by that.

Just as importantly, we need two doctrines: one for the less likely but possible full spectrum war scenario and one for more likely day-to-day OOTW situations. One can argue that these are at the opposite ends of a single continuum but I think if one does that then one ends up with the muddle of a middle weight force with major capability gaps that is neither fish nor fowl like the one we have now.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Your assertion that "Doctrine is Everything" comes as a surprise.  I would never have guessed that you would be a stickler for "The Word".  

I prefer to pursue the Intent rather than the Ideal.   I'd rather approach my intent in this world while I'm still breathing, and be satisfied with a job done well enough. 

For me doctrine has to be malleable to meet the exigencies of the current situation.

I'd sooner a short, clear statement of Intent with doctrine changing than try to define a multifarious doctrine that defines a solution for every situation.

But then I don't like poring over the NDA, QR&Os, CFAOs and DAODs either.   I understand there are people so inclined.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Your assertion that "Doctrine is Everything" comes as a surprise.  I would never have guessed that you would be a stickler for "The Word".
> 
> I prefer to pursue the Intent rather than the Ideal.   I'd rather approach my intent in this world while I'm still breathing, and be satisfied with a job done well enough.
> 
> For me doctrine has to be malleable to meet the exigencies of the current situation.
> 
> I'd sooner a short, clear statement of Intent with doctrine changing than try to define a multifarious doctrine that defines a solution for every situation.
> 
> But then I don't like poring over the NDA, QR&Os, CFAOs and DAODs either.   I understand there are people so inclined.


Doctrine codifies the Intent.  
  Without Doctrine, there is chaos.   Intent can often be fuddled with, and you end up with the 1 million LAV Army…


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Doctrine codifies the Intent.
> Without Doctrine, there is chaos.   Intent can often be fuddled with, and you end up with the 1 million LAV Army…



On the other hand, in the real world, I have 1 million LAVs.  I don't have any of the other stuff I would like.

My primary realpolitik intent can be summarized as:

If we fight, then we win.

If we are taking the fight to somebody else then we can choose to fight or not fight and choose to fight with 1 million LAVs or not.

But

If someone brings the fight to us then we can only choose to fight with what we have available or surrender.

Doctrine is conditional on resources.

That is why I agree with the article that it is a chicken and egg process.  It is iterative.

As the article pointed out Doctrine was generated to describe the shift from Co-In to Air-Land.  Efforts were made to adjust equipment and personnel to the doctrine.  It was observed that the doctrine was incompatible with the equipment and personnel.  The doctrine was adjusted. 

The equipment and personnel were adjusted.  OODA applied.  Doctrine adjusted.

Doctrine was adjusted to conform to current circumstances at least 4 times (one to generate FM100-5 and three more times to revise it).

And then the process settled and a couple of wins were scored.  (Cold War, Kuwait, Iraq entrance).

Then the other team stopped playing the same game and new rules had to be developed and doctrine adjusted.


Is there any coach, football or basketball, that doesn't adjust their playbook annually to take advantage of new rules, new players and new opponents?   Or do they insist in sticking to last year's game plan?

I would note that Rugby has no coaches or playbooks.  It has managers that build skills.


----------



## KevinB

Doctrine Evolves, and needs to, as well as needs to be based on reality.  
   But you can’t blame doctrine when the Army doesn’t follow it. 

My point is, if you base your Doctrine for a Peer/Near Peer conflict based on a Heavy Bde, then you need to have a Heavy Bde.  

I think the CA has missed the boat in this respect.  Playing too much with the US Army Heavy Forces has led to Heavy thinking, without the Heavy Forces to go along.  

IMHO the CAF would be better suited to look at the USMC and 18th ABN rather than III Corps for a role model.   Which would also mean telling NATO that there isn’t a CAF Heavy Bde for them - which there isn’t anyway.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Doctrine Evolves, and needs to, as well as needs to be based on reality.
> But you can’t blame doctrine when the Army doesn’t follow it.
> 
> My point is, if you base your Doctrine for a Peer/Near Peer conflict based on a Heavy Bde, then you need to have a Heavy Bde.
> 
> I think the CA has missed the boat in this respect.  Playing too much with the US Army Heavy Forces has led to Heavy thinking, without the Heavy Forces to go along.
> 
> IMHO the CAF would be better suited to look at the USMC and 18th ABN rather than III Corps for a role model.   Which would also mean telling NATO that there isn’t a CAF Heavy Bde for them - which there isn’t anyway.



Heck they could even look at Stryker units and formations as models.  The step up from what we have to those units wouldn't be ridiculous.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Heck they could even look at Stryker units and formations as models.  The step up from what we have to those units wouldn't be ridiculous.


True - but those units either support XVIII or Heavy forces.  They are ‘gap fillers’. 



			https://www.usarpac.army.mil/docs/Whatis_SBCT.pdf
		


Neither Fish Nor Fowl, and while great to help either - they aren’t a solo entity.  

I’d rather have 1 Reg Heavy Bde, a Reg Light Bde and move the LAV’s to Reserves on 30/70 Medium Bde’s.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> True - but those units either support XVIII or Heavy forces.  They are ‘gap fillers’.
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.usarpac.army.mil/docs/Whatis_SBCT.pdf
> 
> 
> 
> Neither Fish Nor Fowl, and while great to help either - they aren’t a solo entity.
> 
> I’d rather have 1 Reg Heavy Bde, a Reg Light Bde and move the LAV’s to Reserves on 30/70 Medium Bde’s.



I agree they aren't a solo entity.  But apparently we aren't going to fight solo.  And we also don't seem to feel the need to operate independently on our home turf.



I've posted this map before 

The orange are the Ranger Patrols - predominantly First Nations.  The green are the Militia Armouries - predominantly settlers.

The Green Territory would be well managed by a Bison fleet and a few Bv206s.

The Orange Territory, IMO, is Bv territory with backing from lots of helicopters and aereoplanes.

In both cases the vehicles are more important than the guns they might, on occasion, have to transport.

Batteries, Bandages, Blankets and Beans.   And good radios.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I agree they aren't a solo entity.  But apparently we aren't going to fight solo.  And we also don't seem to feel the need to operate independently on our home turf.
> 
> 
> In both cases the vehicles are more important than the guns they might, on occasion, have to transport.
> 
> Batteries, Bandages, Blankets and Beans.   And good radios.


Frankly the Reserves as they stand currently are useless.
   I would never given them those vehicles - as they cannot maintain them.
 I would rather make Depot Centers with Reg Force Garrisons that have vehicles for Res Forces if they come out to play.   But honestly until the Reserves are fixed, giving them stuff is just tossing away good money.


----------



## dapaterson

The Reserves uselessness is an order of magnitude cheaper than the Regular Force uselessness.


----------



## Kirkhill

If you don't give them kit to work with and jobs to do it won't attract useful people.


----------



## Ostrozac

Kirkhill said:


> The orange are the Ranger Patrols - predominantly First Nations.


Only 26% of Canadian Rangers are indigenous, according to a 2019 statement by the Army Commander to a parliamentary committee. Whatever the Rangers are, and they are many things, they are not predominantly First Nations.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> Only 26% of Canadian Rangers are indigenous, according to a 2019 statement by the Army Commander to a parliamentary committee. Whatever the Rangers are, and they are many things, they are not predominantly First Nations.



Thank you very much for that.  I didn't know that.  It puts a considerably different slant on things.  I wonder if that split is evident in the northern communities as well.

Regardless, in terms of living and working in the environment suitable mobility would seem to be first and foremost.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Frankly the Reserves as they stand currently are useless


The key words there are "as they stand". Even then they are not entirely useless as they can still provide augmentation given enough integration and time.

I keep banging my head into a wall. We have some 10,000 to 15,000 folks (and authority for a bunch more) and yet we constantly refuse to do anything about the obvious shortcomings that this component has. If stupidity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result then what is doing the same thing over and over again knowing full well that the product is of marginal value and will never improve?

One of my biggest gripes is the old chestnut about not giving the reserves equipment because they can't maintain it. Well duh! The answer is simple, augment the reserves with sufficient full-time personnel and facilities to maintain that equipment. If equipment is needed to properly train the reserves for their intended employment then the system must be design to ensure the equipment is there and maintained.

A lack of proper doctrine let's us play with the fiction that the reserves do not need equipment and that there will be time to train and integrate them.

In any proper corporate structure, a board of directors who would see that they had a vital, necessary and cost saving division underperforming like this they would fire the CEO and directors responsible for its stagnation.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> One of my biggest gripes is the old chestnut about not giving the reserves equipment because they can't maintain it. Well duh! The answer is simple, augment the reserves with sufficient full-time personnel and facilities to maintain that equipment. If equipment is needed to properly train the reserves for their intended employment then the system must be design to ensure the equipment is there and maintained.
> 
> 🍻


Or do what other nations do and have the manufacturer come in annually to not only do the annual maintenance, but do it with the troops to show them how to maintain the kit.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Frankly the Reserves as they stand currently are useless.
> I would never given them those vehicles - as they cannot maintain them.
> I would rather make Depot Centers with Reg Force Garrisons that have vehicles for Res Forces if they come out to play.   But honestly until the Reserves are fixed, giving them stuff is just tossing away good money.



We did a pretty good job augmenting the Reg F during various operations, like Yugo and Afghanistan. 

IMHO that should be our main role: rapid and effective augmentation of the Reg F. 

Start with individual augmentees then, over time, build up the experience and relationships to 'plug and play' coy/sqn sized elements. This is totally doable within the scale of equipment issued, and training time/courses available, for most reserve units right now.

For some reason, and it may be mostly on the Reserve side of the house, there seems to be a movement to build a 'parallel CAF' of reservists who think they can do what the Reg F can do. 

This is obviously blatant careerism from some part timers, augmented by Reg F leaders who want to ingratiatie themselves to the political whims of Ottawa.

Or maybe a little of both, plus some insanity thrown in for texture


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> to 'plug and play' coy/sqn sized elements


That's kind of my viewpoint. I think that if one ensures that DP 1 training at both the OR and offr level contains all the "must know" and "should know" elements of regular force training and if supported within the company by some regular force command staff then one can create formed sub-units that can plug into a regular force battalion size unit.

That's why I've come to the conclusion that creating a total force of 70/30 and 30/70 battalions is achievable and sustainable and would essentially double the number of deployable units that the Army could field in an emergency while maintaining the ability to generate at least as many battlegroups in peacetime as we do now. I think that should be the objective of any Army reorganization plan. Anything else is less than optimal.

While I'm sure that there are individual res f officers and NCMs that have the ability to rise to be able to fill a position of CO or RSM, if they took the time for the training and gain the experience, my view is that it's essentially a fiction to think that reservists in general will ever command battalions or more in combat, or quite frankly, during proper unit training.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> If you don't give them kit to work with and jobs to do it won't attract useful people.


But giving them kit they can’t maintain is just as bad.   It creates false hopes and dreams.


----------



## Ostrozac

KevinB said:


> But giving them kit they can’t maintain is just as bad.   It creates false hopes and dreams.


Isn‘t that what we do to regulars? Destroying their hopes and dreams? One army-one standard, after all.

More seriously, as equipment becomes more complicated, we have a bad habit of simultaneously running our technical trades right into the ground. Any talk of buying more equipment for the reserves, to be maintained by regulars, is a non starter when the reg force struggles to maintain what gear we currently have.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> More seriously, as equipment becomes more complicated, we have a bad habit of simultaneously running our technical trades right into the ground. Any talk of buying more equipment for the reserves, to be maintained by regulars, is a non starter when the reg force struggles to maintain what gear we currently have.



But does equipment need to become more complicated?  Why can't the Reserves be equipped with a simple Bv206 or a simple LAVII/Bison/LAV-Log type vehicle without all the nick-nacks and gew-gaws that complicate the lives of Reg Force techs?




Likewise the Bv206, the empty, unarmoured box that goes anywhere and floats - that doesn't seem to require a PEng or a PhD to maintain.  Not that I would let either on anywhere near a machine of mine.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> But giving them kit they can’t maintain is just as bad.   It creates false hopes and dreams.


That's true enough but it leads to the usual canard that the reserves can't be given equipment because they can't maintain it. The key thing in my post above is that the requisite equipment must come with the requisite maintenance capability.

Everything depends on the type of unit you are creating. If its a light rifle company it's one thing; a transportation company another; a UCAV unit another still; and a tank unit, yet another. If the intent is to create a trained deployable reserve company then it must have access to the equipment to train on. Further, the system must hold the equipment to deploy with. That get's us all back to the "you go to war with the army you have" truism.

Whatever equipment that subunit requires must be provided, whether its held at a local armoury or a training center or with its regular force battalion parent is irrelevant and adaptable, but it must be there. And ... if it must be there then there must be a maintenance system for it. That's a sine quo non. 

In theory we have a life cycle management plan for every piece of equipment we acquire (except the UOR stuff) but we frequently cheap-out on things for the reserves or simply don't provide it to them. My expectation is reserve equipment requires less maintenance because it receives significantly less use but it will require appropriate maintenance and that must be factored into the Total force structure from day one.



Ostrozac said:


> Isn‘t that what we do to regulars? Destroying their hopes and dreams? One army-one standard, after all.
> 
> More seriously, as equipment becomes more complicated, we have a bad habit of simultaneously running our technical trades right into the ground. Any talk of buying more equipment for the reserves, to be maintained by regulars, is a non starter when the reg force struggles to maintain what gear we currently have.



You're absolutely right. There is a significantly greater complexity to keeping an infantry battalion equipped with LAV 6.0s on the road then there was in one equipped with 3/4 ton trucks or even M113s. But doesn't that just lead us to the inescapable conclusion that we should sacrifice one armoured recce regiment, for example, to form a maintenance battalion? Or much better yet, pull six hundred positions out of NDHQ?

🍻


----------



## PuckChaser

Kirkhill said:


> But does equipment need to become more complicated?  Why can't the Reserves be equipped with a simple Bv206 or a simple LAVII/Bison/LAV-Log type vehicle without all the nick-nacks and gew-gaws that complicate the lives of Reg Force techs?


Because it's the vehicle itself that complicates the lives of RegF techs. Armd vehicles suffer a lot more from lot rot because when they're finally taken out, we beat the crap out of them off road. You'd be taking a couple training days a month away from every unit that has them for crew maint, and they need those days for GBA+ and CTAT refreshers.


----------



## KevinB

Also a ‘streamlined’ version will often be more problematic as it is different. 
  It’s easier to maintain more of the same - than different variations.


----------



## Kirkhill

PuckChaser said:


> Because it's the vehicle itself that complicates the lives of RegF techs. Armd vehicles suffer a lot more from lot rot because when they're finally taken out, we beat the crap out of them off road. You'd be taking a couple training days a month away from every unit that has them for crew maint, and they need those days for GBA+ and CTAT refreshers.



FJAG pretty much has my answer covered.

I believe that a critical piece of the puzzle is a simple, tactical logistic vehicle.   Something that works in the echelons and makes no pretensions a being a fighting vehicle.   The maligned Infantry Squad Vehicle (properly an Infantry Support Vehicle) is one example.  The Bv206 is another.  The LAV II Amphibious is another option but I would sooner that GDLS Canada looked at adding something like the Alvis Stalwart to its production line, based on the LAV II chassis.

That tactical transport should be a key, and separate, component of the Reserves with Transport Battalions, Companies and Platoons widely distributed nationally, with a large war stock of spare vehicles, and individual augmentation of the regular forces on deployment.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Also a ‘streamlined’ version will often be more problematic as it is different.
> It’s easier to maintain more of the same - than different variations.



Not true Kev.  

The more Byzantine the kit becomes the more bits there are to break and the more spares that have to be kept in the system.

A stripped hull, with the same running gear, transmission, engine, power train and driver's station is going to produce driver/mechanic/communicators/navigators that can transition to more complex systems with additional training.  But the vehicle itself, and its entry level crew,  will provide utility just as simple transport.


----------



## Good2Golf

The Army needs to work out the day to day collaboration between its components.  The to’ing and fro’ing of what kit should the PRes be entrusted with, vice held back from them by the RegF is a head scratcher.  Hard to take the ‘gravity of the conundrum’ seriously when other environments can make it work.  It’s not like aircraft/helicopters and ships are simple/non-complex systems…geez, it’s as though the Army writ large either doesn’t want it to work, or isn’t institutionally mature enough to make the effort.  It seems more interested in hand-wringing and blaming unsupportive legislation. 

🤷🏻‍♂️


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> Not true Kev.
> 
> The more Byzantine the kit becomes the more bits there are to break and the more spares that have to be kept in the system.
> 
> A stripped hull, with the same running gear, transmission, engine, power train and driver's station is going to produce driver/mechanic/communicators/navigators that can transition to more complex systems with additional training.  But the vehicle itself, and its entry level crew,  will provide utility just as simple transport.


I'd agree, a stripped down LAV without all the bells and whistles still allows troops to practice their drills. Besides we need to teach without all the bells and whistles anyway, cause you need to know how to operate when all your fancy shit breaks.


----------



## PuckChaser

We need the Army PRes to know what it's mission is before we start dreaming about buying them LAVs and BV206s. If we're going to require 8-10 months of predeployment training for formed Task Forces (like Afghanistan), then there's no need to hold any major equipment at the PRes level because they'll get the training in that monstrosity of a Road to High Readiness. If we're going to expect them to integrate into a TF with no notice, then they need all the same equipment they can expect to use with the RegF.

There's also the issue of training area space, because having an A-Veh sit in Downtown Toronto for 2 months and then drive to Meaford/Petawawa a couple times a year is a recipe for disaster.

At the end of the day, we cannot and should not buy equipment and then build an employment concept for it. We need to figure out what the heck the PRes is for, what is their employment concept and then kit them to that requirement. Otherwise you're pissing valuable finite defense dollars into the wind.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> The Army needs to work out the day to day collaboration between its components.  The to’ing and fro’ing of what kit should the PRes be entrusted with, vice held back from them by the RegF is a head scratcher.  Hard to take the ‘gravity of the conundrum’ seriously when other environments can make it work.  It’s not like aircraft/helicopters and ships are simple/non-complex systems…geez, it’s as though the Army writ large either doesn’t want it to work, or isn’t institutionally mature enough to make the effort.  It seems more interested in hand-wringing and blaming unsupportive legislation.
> 
> 🤷🏻‍♂️



Dude...

You clearly don't 'get' the Army.

Next thing you know you'll be wanting us to wear the same uniforms too.


----------



## FJAG

PuckChaser said:


> At the end of the day, we cannot and should not buy equipment and then build an employment concept for it. We need to figure out what the heck the PRes is for, what is their employment concept and then kit them to that requirement. Otherwise you're pissing valuable finite defense dollars into the wind.



You are absolutely right in the first sentence. I would expand the second sentence to "1. We need to figure out what the heck the Army is for; 2. We need to determine which part of that is a day to day requirement that demands full-time personnel and which part is for emergency use that can be fulfilled by part-time personnel; and 3) organize, kit and train them them accordingly.

I think I'm going to write a little paper on that 70/30 thing I floated some months ago and another on how to sustain a more capable ARes and Army.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> One of my biggest gripes is the old chestnut about not giving the reserves equipment because they can't maintain it. Well duh! *The answer is simple, augment the reserves with sufficient full-time personnel* and facilities to maintain that equipment*.* If equipment is needed to properly train the reserves for their intended employment then the system must be design to ensure the equipment is there and maintained.



"Full-time personnel"

Which brings us back to the question of what is the difference between a Class C Reservist and a Regular Soldier.  

I believe that the heart of the problem lies in the identity of the Canadian Army.   It suffers from the British tradition of their being no army.  There is a collection of local regiments that are annually authorized and that operate under the command and control of a single General Staff.

The British Army gains its corporate identity because it is regularly brigaded and employed.  It is rare for a year  to go by without a Brit soldier being shot at.

The Canadian Army is a Militia.  And it hates that.  

Until 1940 the Regular Force was known as the Permanent Active Militia, in other words a slice of the Militia that was permanently available for active service.  That constituted three Infantry Battalions and a few Cavalry Squadrons.   

Most of the rest of the Permanent Militia were instructor cadres supposedly dedicated to training the Sedentary Militia.

With WWI the Permanent Militia found, and lost, a voice and a role that actually converted it into a real army.

When WWII came along it was the answer to the ancient prayer "Dear Lord, let me do it again.  I promise not to screw it up this time."  Korea and 4 CMBG cemented the Army as an institution and separated it from its Militia roots.   The loss of Army identity in Unification was particularly problematic but the Army survived and managed to recreate itself.  Eventually it managed to eliminate the Militia entirely by simply calling it the Reserves - and removing it as a separate, competing entity.

But institutions don't die easy.  The Militia, even when called the Reserves, still exists in thought, deed and word.

So the answer to the question of the difference between the Class C Reservist (Militiaman) and the Regular Soldier (Permanent Active Militiaman) is that they are both full time employees but employees of two separate, competing, institutions.  And the Militia is reliant on support from an entity that would rather not be reminded that the other exists and would prefer that it didn't have to support it.

It sees every dollar spent on the Militia as a dollar lost to the "Real" Army, the regular force of the Permanent Active Militia.


----------



## Kirkhill

PuckChaser said:


> We need the Army PRes to know what it's mission is before we start dreaming about buying them LAVs and BV206s.



Agreed.

The point though is that I, personally, see a role for the Army PRes (aka The Militia) in service of the domestic community that would benefit both the domestic and military communities by having it equipped with, and operating, vehicles like LAVs and Bv206s.

Just like the Air Force benefits from its Air Reserve in operating and maintaining its vehicles and provides much needed service domestically when it isn't being required overseas.

Just like the Navy benefits from its Navy Reserve in operating and maintaining its vehicles and provides much needed service domestically when it isn't being required overseas.

The problem is that many nations find benefit in the Militia/Home Guard/National Guard as both a reserve warfighting capability and as a community emergency response capability.  

The Canadian Army is single-mindedly focused on its war fighting capability.  And I am glad it is.  But National Defence needs a broader purview.  It can benefit from a well regulated Militia/Home Guard/National Guard that supplies service in peace and war.

If the Militia were separated from the Army, but with a porous wall between them, in the same way the Americans have a porous wall between their Guards, Reserves and federal forces, then I believe that would be beneficial.

With respect to the perennial budget squabbles I continue to believe that it would be defensible to have the Army keep its existing budget while having a new budget created for the Militia as a National Emergency Force.  And yes ropes and ladders would be involved but so would rifles, radios, guns and trucks.  Many of which could also be put at the service of the regular Canadian Army.

I know that a lot of people on both sides of the divide don't like this prescription.  But I haven't heard of any prescription that doesn't cause somebody, somewhere to gag.    At the end both parties, whatever the final solution, are just going to have to choke it down and soldier on.


----------



## Kirkhill

null
					

null




					defence24.com
				












						Green Goddess - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				









						AVGP Grizzly 6x6 APC (1976)
					

AVGP Grizzly, armoured personel carrier (1976)



					tanks-encyclopedia.com
				




There are many more examples of vehicles withdrawn from service, or put into long term storage, that are put back into service, even temporarily.

I believe even Air Forces and Navies do it.

Yes.  It costs money.  The question is: who sees that money as being well spent?


----------



## Kirkhill

I found this comment in the Ukrainian Saxon article particularly interesting given the debates about TAPVs and Airmobile forces, and wheels and tracks 



> *Saxon vehicles*, in a wide variety of versions, *were firstly delivered to the elite tactical units (25th Airborne Brigade, 79th, 81st and 95th Airmobile Brigades and 36th Naval Infantry Brigade (which is also considered to be a coastal defence unit)*. Some examples of the vehicles were also received by other units, including the Kharkiv based military police elements.
> 
> *Saxon Surprises*
> 
> At the first glance, the AT-105 seems to be an obsolete vehicle. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian soldiers using the platform cannot speak of it highly enough. *One of the soldiers of the Airmobile Brigade appreciated the Saxon’s good performance on the road and in an off-road context, since the performance characteristics of the British vehicle, in certain situations, exceed those of the contemporary BTR vehicles used by the Ukrainians*. The interviewed soldier claimed that AT-105, in off-road conditions, turned out to have* better mobility than the BTR-4* platform. The second example shows that *AT-105 4x4 vehicle has all-terrain capabilities which are no worse than those of the track-chassis platforms (2S3 Akatsiya), while on hardened surfaces the vehicle is even more mobile*. This type of comparisons takes place because of the fact that the aforementioned airmobile units use a quite varied and surprising inventory.​



Saxon, BTR-80, 2S3 Akatsiya 152mm SPH,  all operated by "Airborne" and "Air Mobile" troops.  With the  4x4 Saxon able to keep up with the 8x8 and the Track.   Funny stuff.


----------



## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> The Army needs to work out the day to day collaboration between its components.  The to’ing and fro’ing of what kit should the PRes be entrusted with, vice held back from them by the RegF is a head scratcher.  Hard to take the ‘gravity of the conundrum’ seriously when other environments can make it work.  It’s not like aircraft/helicopters and ships are simple/non-complex systems…geez, it’s as though the Army writ large either doesn’t want it to work, or isn’t institutionally mature enough to make the effort.  It seems more interested in hand-wringing and blaming unsupportive legislation.
> 
> 🤷🏻‍♂️


It doesn't want to work.
  If it did want the Reserves to work - they would have followed through beyond 10/90.

But the Nav Res is a bad example - and the TacHel units are at major airports/bases.

 IF the CA wanted the Army Res to work - they would have equipment at certain spots - and create 30/70 units, and larger amounts of maintenance support.



Kirkhill said:


> Not true Kev.
> 
> The more Byzantine the kit becomes the more bits there are to break and the more spares that have to be kept in the system.
> 
> A stripped hull, with the same running gear, transmission, engine, power train and driver's station is going to produce driver/mechanic/communicators/navigators that can transition to more complex systems with additional training.  But the vehicle itself, and its entry level crew,  will provide utility just as simple transport.


 But that doesn't exist - its not simply a Bison 6.0.
    The "bells and whistles" are a key part of Reg integration -- or you just have the stupid Cougar Tankette - and serves no purpose.

 If you just want a Vehicle - there are much cheaper options than a LAV hull.


Frankly I think based on the LAV numbers that the CAF has acquired - its pretty much inexcusable that each Militia District doesn't have at least a PL worth for fam training -


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> "Full-time personnel"
> 
> Which brings us back to the question of what is the difference between a Class C Reservist and a Regular Soldier.
> ...
> So the answer to the question of the difference between the Class C Reservist (Militiaman) and the Regular Soldier (Permanent Active Militiaman) is that they are both full time employees but employees of two separate, competing, institutions.  And the Militia is reliant on support from an entity that would rather not be reminded that the other exists and would prefer that it didn't have to support it.
> 
> It sees every dollar spent on the Militia as a dollar lost to the "Real" Army, the regular force of the Permanent Active Militia.


I don't agree with your Militia premise.

I think today's Reg F / ResF dichotomy arises from Gen Guy Simonds when he was appointed Chief of the General Staff in 1952. At that time the UN had just committed to Korea and the Western European countries, the US and Canada felt that they were on the brink of war with Russia. Eisenhower came to Canada and asked for a commitment of two divisions for Europe which Canada agreed to. Simonds was of the view then and maintained the view that it would be impossible to send such a force to Europe when a war started so it was necessary to have it there before hand. The "forces in being concept" was formed which led to the inexorable rise of the RegF and a consequential degradation of the importance of the Militia. Canada eventually deployed a full-time air division of 12 squadrons and a full mechanized brigade to BAOR. Concurrently 1 Cdn Div HQ was reactivated and two additional brigades were built in Canada effectively creating the two divisions called for (one air, one land) albeit no more than one brigade was ever stationed in Europe.

The "forces in being" concept remained our focus through the Sixties and even after reductions in the RegF structure started happening in that decade and throughout the 70s and 80s as long as the Soviets were our primary threat. As RegF numbers were reduced, the CF - and the Army in particular - scrambled to maintain "forces in being" capabilities. This naturally favoured RegF entities and equipment. As budgets became tighter the disparity grew. The budget crunch on equipment acquisition essentially negated the "mobilization" concept. Individual augmentation became the budget conscious alternative. Even maintaining older equipment as a reserve became impractical as the costs of such maintenance jeopardized new equipment funding. The "divestment" concept became and remains the standard. All of this is comes with the risk that the "force in being" is based on the equipment we can man which is limited to the equivalent of two underequipped mechanized and one light brigade regardless of how many people, RegF or ResF, we actually have. Mobilization is an impossibility under the current construct and in fact we're at the point where we are hard pressed to fully man those three brigades at any time. In fact during Afghanistan we were hard pressed to maintain a battlegroup in the field without ResF augmentation (in fairness we would have been far less stressed if we'd gone to 12 to 15 month rotos like the US.)

The RegF attitudes remain rooted in the 'forces in being" concept. It values anything that is immediately available for utilization to meet defence policy requirements. It accepts as a risk (or possibly ignores the risk) that the force cannot grow. Unfortunately, it is also hamstrung by a bureaucracy mentality when it comes to management. The standard solution for virtually any issue within DND is to create an agency to handle it. As a result we have grown the headquarters above brigade level at a faster rate than the force itself. In fact as the field force shrinks the headquarters continue to grow.

Your question is: what is the difference between a Class C and a RegF soldier? The answer is that after having done his tour the Class C soldier reverts to a much less expensive Class A soldier while the RegF continues to cost full price. But you are asking the wrong question. The real question is, how much of the RegF personnel and equipment can be reasonably transferred to a part-time, low-cost Class A reserve status and how much must be retained as full-time RegF "forces in being". (Not to mention how many people can we realistically fire out of higher headquarters.)

I have no issue whatsoever with the Class C reservist. He/she is fulfilling the duty of being a low cost part-time asset that fills a full-time need when required.

My issue is with the Class B concept as we use it to bulk up thousands of full-time butts in cubicles and as a result degrade part-time capabilities both directly and indirectly. (and don't even get me started on the travesty that is ten brigade headquarters, some 130 or so ResF battalions each of which is stressed to marshal a platoon on exercises)

The system is dysfunctional to the point of corruption. That said, a proper ResF system is vital to a peacetime army that wants to save costs yet have the ability to mobilize to defend the country's interest when it becomes necessary. Our ResF system and the RegF and the ResF attitudes towards it need to change drastically. I'm wondering whether or not the current Russian belligerence will create a wake-up call on Parliament Hill and, more importantly, in the twin towers.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Frankly the Reserves as they stand currently are useless



Sure.  As they stand, it's hard for them to do well at anything.  That they don't do well is a reason not to waste resources on them.  Which means they don't do well at anything...


----------



## Kirkhill

From Michael Dorosh's canadiansoldiers.com

The entire Militia was reorganized in 1968/1969 into 5 Areas, comprising 21 Militia Districts.​

*Area*​*Districts*​Atlantic Militia AreaEastern New Brunswick Militia District
Western New Brunswick Militia District
Western Nova Scotia Militia District
Cape Breton Militia District
Prince Edward Island Militia District
Newfoundland Militia Districtsecteur de l'EstMilitia District Number 1
Militia District Number 2
Militia District Number 3Central Militia AreaOttawa Militia District (OMD)
Toronto Militia District (TMD)
London Militia District (LMD)
Northern Ontario Militia District (NOMD)
Windsor Militia District (WMD)
Hamilton Militia District (HMD)Prairie Militia AreaNorthern Alberta Militia District (NAMD)
Southern Alberta Militia District (SAMD)
Saskatchewan Militia District (SMD)
Thunder Bay Militia District
Manitoba(-Lakehead) Militia DistrictPacific Militia AreaVancouver Militia District
Victoria Militia District

1968 to 1989 (actual 1980 to 1984) was the era of my Militia (and MITCP training).

5 Areas.  21 Districts.  Each District had a disparate bunch of Combat Arms but they each had a Service Battalion, a Field Ambulance and an MP Pl.  I contend that that Combat Service Support, together with the co-located Communication Squadrons of the era, was the real backbone of Canada's "potential" national emergency response capabiliity.

If I take the 199 Bison and the 820 Northern Terrain Vehicles, intended for purchase in that era, and allocated them to the Service Battalions then each of the 21 Battalions would have had 9-10 Bisons and 40 or so NTVs on charge.  Or approximately a platoon's worth of LAV-Logs capable of supplying an expedient armoured transport capability and a separate company's worth of all terrain transport capability.  

Keep that kit away from the combat arms and day to day usage.  Put it solely under the Service Battalion just as the older Transport Companies were supplied by the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps - which was the prime mover for all infantry.

Let the infantry in garrison continue to work with the MilCOTS vehicles for administrative duties.  Leave the specialized vehicles, including the SMP variants, with the Service Battalion(s) and their Transport Company(ies).  The infantry, with the time available in the reserves, has got enough on its plate without worrying about vehicles.

The "cavalry", artillery and engineers require separate consideration with a mix of MilCOTS for admin and SMPs for taskings.  For them their vehicles are their specialization.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I don't agree with your Militia premise.
> 
> I think today's Reg F / ResF dichotomy arises from Gen Guy Simonds when he was appointed Chief of the General Staff in 1952. At that time the UN had just committed to Korea and the Western European countries, the US and Canada felt that they were on the brink of war with Russia. Eisenhower came to Canada and asked for a commitment of two divisions for Europe which Canada agreed to. Simonds was of the view then and maintained the view that it would be impossible to send such a force to Europe when a war started so it was necessary to have it there before hand. The "forces in being concept" was formed which led to the inexorable rise of the RegF and a consequential degradation of the importance of the Militia. Canada eventually deployed a full-time air division of 12 squadrons and a full mechanized brigade to BAOR. Concurrently 1 Cdn Div HQ was reactivated and two additional brigades were built in Canada effectively creating the two divisions called for (one air, one land) albeit no more than one brigade was ever stationed in Europe.
> 
> The "forces in being" concept remained our focus through the Sixties and even after reductions in the RegF structure started happening in that decade and throughout the 70s and 80s as long as the Soviets were our primary threat. As RegF numbers were reduced, the CF - and the Army in particular - scrambled to maintain "forces in being" capabilities. This naturally favoured RegF entities and equipment. As budgets became tighter the disparity grew. The budget crunch on equipment acquisition essentially negated the "mobilization" concept. Individual augmentation became the budget conscious alternative. Even maintaining older equipment as a reserve became impractical as the costs of such maintenance jeopardized new equipment funding. The "divestment" concept became and remains the standard. All of this is comes with the risk that the "force in being" is based on the equipment we can man which is limited to the equivalent of two underequipped mechanized and one light brigade regardless of how many people, RegF or ResF, we actually have. Mobilization is an impossibility under the current construct and in fact we're at the point where we are hard pressed to fully man those three brigades at any time. In fact during Afghanistan we were hard pressed to maintain a battlegroup in the field without ResF augmentation (in fairness we would have been far less stressed if we'd gone to 12 to 15 month rotos like the US.)
> 
> The RegF attitudes remain rooted in the 'forces in being" concept. It values anything that is immediately available for utilization to meet defence policy requirements. It accepts as a risk (or possibly ignores the risk) that the force cannot grow. Unfortunately, it is also hamstrung by a bureaucracy mentality when it comes to management. The standard solution for virtually any issue within DND is to create an agency to handle it. As a result we have grown the headquarters above brigade level at a faster rate than the force itself. In fact as the field force shrinks the headquarters continue to grow.



I won't entirely disagree.  I would suggest however that Simmonds grasped the opportunity presented by a crisis and refused to let it go to waste.  The Force in Being would have been the capstone to the previous hundred years of trying to establish an army in a country whose politicians were adamant they didn't need or want one.



FJAG said:


> Your question is: what is the difference between a Class C and a RegF soldier? The answer is that after having done his tour the Class C soldier reverts to a much less expensive Class A soldier while the RegF continues to cost full price. But you are asking the wrong question. The real question is, how much of the RegF personnel and equipment can be reasonably transferred to a part-time, low-cost Class A reserve status and how much must be retained as full-time RegF "forces in being". (Not to mention how many people can we realistically fire out of higher headquarters.)
> 
> I have no issue whatsoever with the Class C reservist. He/she is fulfilling the duty of being a low cost part-time asset that fills a full-time need when required.



We agree on the utility.  And I particularly think this type of soldier is extremely well suited to the Artillery and the Engineers as a reserve.  Someone that holds highly specialized skills, that are used very infrequently but need occasional exercising to remain current.



FJAG said:


> My issue is with the Class B concept as we use it to bulk up thousands of full-time butts in cubicles and as a result degrade part-time capabilities both directly and indirectly. (and don't even get me started on the travesty that is ten brigade headquarters, some 130 or so ResF battalions each of which is stressed to marshal a platoon on exercises)



I agree re "Butts in cubicles".  I can't help but wonder how many of those should actually be in uniform and shouldn't be civilians, or civilians with previous service.

WRT Class B - I think an appropriate use of Class B service would be to take a Service Bn driver/mechanic on strength for two weeks a year to conduct annual maintenance on trucks, boats, ATVs and LAVs.  Similarly for Comms techs and Gunners.



FJAG said:


> The system is dysfunctional to the point of corruption. That said, a proper ResF system is vital to a peacetime army that wants to save costs yet have the ability to mobilize to defend the country's interest when it becomes necessary. Our ResF system and the RegF and the ResF attitudes towards it need to change drastically.



Agreed. Entirely.



FJAG said:


> I'm wondering whether or not the current Russian belligerence will create a wake-up call on Parliament Hill and, more importantly, in the twin towers.
> 
> 🍻



I'm not willing to hold my breath.

So final thought.

Should the Reserves be organized differently for each of the Service elements, the Support (Ordnance) elements and the Infantry and Cavalry?

The Service elements are the ones that have general utility and need constant maintenance.   The Support elements, guns and engineers, following the dictum "it is with guns that war is made", have a very distinct set of needs and capabilities that may never be operationalized in any given gunner's career.

Meanwhile the infantry are the General Duties people.  It is more important that they be available and organized than that they have specific sets of skills,  although some portions of them may be specially trained.

The cavalry, with its vehicles, actually has more in common with the Guns and Engineers these days.  They are a technical organization.  But they get more use than the guns because of their utility in maintaining Situational Awareness.


----------



## Good2Golf

KevinB said:


> But the Nav Res is a bad example - and the TacHel units are at major airports/bases.


Well, Pet is up to 15-16,000 residents these days…so I guess that’s ‘Major’… 😉


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## Kirkhill

Comox - 14,828
Edmonton - 981,280
Cold Lake - 14,961
Yellowknife - 19,569
Moose Jaw - 33,890
Portage la Prairie - 13,304
Winnipeg - 749,534
North Bay - 51,533
Ottawa - 994,837
Petawawa - 17,187
Borden - 12,640
Trenton - 21,972
St-Hubert - 1,780,000
Bagotville - 148,497
Oromocto - 9,223
Greenwood - 5,369
Shearwater - 431,479
Gander - 11,688
Goose Bay - 8,109
Iqaluit - 7,740
Rankin Inlet - 2,842
Inuvik - 3,243
Resolute - 198
Alert - 0

Major Metropoli of the RCAF?


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> The entire Militia was reorganized in 1968/1969 into 5 Areas, comprising 21 Militia Districts.​​...
> 1968 to 1989 (actual 1980 to 1984) was the era of my Militia (and MITCP training).
> 
> 5 Areas. 21 Districts. Each District had a disparate bunch of Combat Arms but they each had a Service Battalion, a Field Ambulance and an MP Pl. I contend that that Combat Service Support, together with the co-located Communication Squadrons of the era, was the real backbone of Canada's "potential" national emergency response capabiliity.



Hate to disagree with you but ... not so much.

I was in the Militia from 65 to 69, RegF from 69 to 81 with RSSO from 76 to 78 all at the height of the Mil Area system. It was a hollow shell. 

The Suttie Commission of 1964 started the road to gutting the Militia. At its start there were about 47,000 militiamen. The commission started with the closure of 114 armouries and eliminated 72 units which brought the number of units down to very roughly what is left today. That would have been okay if the personnel had all been retained in the amalgamated units but  with the cut in units came an even larger cut in paid strength and by 1971 the Militia was down to just under 13,000. Concurrently the RegF Army went from just under 50,000 to just over 40,000.

You make the 5 areas and 21 districts sound like a balanced force. They weren't. There was some compatibility with the RegF during that time frame as the Militia generally had the same vehicles and equipment (primarily light infantry and 105 mm howitzers and some tanks - just a lot less of it) but that was about to change as the RegF started getting new gear at that time while the Militia was frozen in time. There was a brief fling at National Survival taskings (the infamous Snakes and Ladders) but that was mostly ignored in favour of general warfighting training.

It was anything but a backbone.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Hate to disagree with you but ... not so much.
> 
> I was in the Militia from 65 to 69, RegF from 69 to 81 with RSSO from 76 to 78 all at the height of the Mil Area system. It was a hollow shell.
> 
> The Suttie Commission of 1964 started the road to gutting the Militia. At its start there were about 47,000 militiamen. The commission started with the closure of 114 armouries and eliminated 72 units which brought the number of units down to very roughly what is left today. That would have been okay if the personnel had all been retained in the amalgamated units but  with the cut in units came an even larger cut in paid strength and by 1971 the Militia was down to just under 13,000. Concurrently the RegF Army went from just under 50,000 to just over 40,000.
> 
> You make the 5 areas and 21 districts sound like a balanced force. They weren't. There was some compatibility with the RegF during that time frame as the Militia generally had the same vehicles and equipment (primarily light infantry and 105 mm howitzers and some tanks - just a lot less of it) but that was about to change as the RegF started getting new gear at that time while the Militia was frozen in time. There was a brief fling at National Survival taskings (the infamous Snakes and Ladders) but that was mostly ignored in favour of general warfighting training.
> 
> It was anything but a backbone.
> 
> 🍻



I'll accept it was a shell.  But a shell is a structure.

I'll accept it was a structure rejected by a large portion of the serving militia.  But it was a structure.

I'll accept that it wasn't a functional capability.  But there was a structure.

I'll accept that the Service Battalions were generally poorly resourced and by and large disparaged as second class citizens by the infantry and armoured types. (I actually never came across many gunners and engineers in my short career - tangent).

However, I will still contend that when trying to organize the Militia as a National Defence/Civil Defence Force the key, even if belittled, element in such a force is the Service Battalion, with its associated Fd Ambulance.

The infantry and the gunners may find hewing wood and drawing water beneath them but that is what the Service Battalion is paid to do.

If the Infantry, Armoured(Cavalry) and Gunners had supported the Service Battalions, and investment in its equipment, then there might have been an opportunity to generate a support capability that would have served the needs of the combat arms AND the civil defence needs of the government.

And I'll accept our continuing adversarial debating style and enjoy it for what it is.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Hate to disagree with you but ... not so much.
> 
> I was in the Militia from 65 to 69, RegF from 69 to 81 with RSSO from 76 to 78 all at the height of the Mil Area system. It was a hollow shell.
> 
> The Suttie Commission of 1964 started the road to gutting the Militia. At its start there were about 47,000 militiamen. The commission started with the closure of 114 armouries and eliminated 72 units which brought the number of units down to very roughly what is left today. That would have been okay if the personnel had all been retained in the amalgamated units but  with the cut in units came an even larger cut in paid strength and by 1971 the Militia was down to just under 13,000. Concurrently the RegF Army went from just under 50,000 to just over 40,000.
> 
> You make the 5 areas and 21 districts sound like a balanced force. They weren't. There was some compatibility with the RegF during that time frame as the Militia generally had the same vehicles and equipment (primarily light infantry and 105 mm howitzers and some tanks - just a lot less of it) but that was about to change as the RegF started getting new gear at that time while the Militia was frozen in time. There was a brief fling at National Survival taskings (the infamous Snakes and Ladders) but that was mostly ignored in favour of general warfighting training.
> 
> It was anything but a backbone.
> 
> 🍻



You could probably run the Militia in Western Canada from a 'Project Management Cell' at 3 Div HQ, managed by a Reg F LCol and a few senior and junior staffers.

The inconvenient truth about the vast overhead/infrastructure we artifically maintain now is, I'm guessing, politics.


----------



## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> Well, Pet is up to 15-16,000 residents these days…so I guess that’s ‘Major’… 😉


I meant Major Airports (ish) and Bases - there are exactly zero CAF bases I would consider Major - like Ft Bragg, Ft Drum, Ft Benning etc.
   Heck some Camps down here are larger and have more troops than a CFB.

In my town - we have a NG Inf Coy - pretty much nothing is done there - they go to training centers on the weekend that have the Equipment etc.   Most of the more interested folks do a two hour drive to WV to the SF unit there.
    The NG Aviation unit nearby has more Blackhawks and Hooks than the entire CF.

It is very clear that WITH a WILL one can equip and train Reserve forces very easily.
   It is also clear the CA has little interest unlike the RCN and RCAF, or down here...


----------



## Good2Golf

KevinB said:


> The NG Aviation unit nearby has more Blackhawks and Hooks than the entire CF.


Fort Rucker has more Chinooks than pretty much the rest of the world… 😆


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> It is very clear that WITH a WILL one can equip and train Reserve forces very easily.



Yes one can.

And one can come up with a hundred excuses why Canada can't, but you can't come up with one valid reason.

🍻


----------



## ballz

daftandbarmy said:


> You could probably run the Militia in Western Canada from *a 'Project Management Cell' at 3 Div HQ, managed by a Reg F LCol and a few senior and junior staffers.*
> 
> The inconvenient truth about the vast overhead/infrastructure we artifically maintain now is, I'm guessing, politics.



Everyone in 1 CMBG HQ just felt that "punch in the guts" feeling for yet another incoming task that 3 Div staff "don't have enough staff" for.............


----------



## daftandbarmy

ballz said:


> Everyone in 1 CMBG HQ just felt that "punch in the guts" feeling for yet another incoming task that 3 Div staff "don't have enough staff" for.............



Well, if they folded the tents of both 39 CBG and 41 CBG HQs that would give you well over 100 full timers to choose from to help out a bit, I'm guessing.






						Canadian Army - Canada.ca
					

Official Canadian Army website. News and photos about soldiers and Canadian Armed Forces. Jobs for Reservists.




					www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca
				









						Canadian Army - Canada.ca
					

Official Canadian Army website. News and photos about soldiers and Canadian Armed Forces. Jobs for Reservists.




					www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Well, if they folded the tents of both 39 CBG and 41 CBG HQs that would give you well over 100 full timers to choose from to help out a bit, I'm guessing.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Canadian Army - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> Official Canadian Army website. News and photos about soldiers and Canadian Armed Forces. Jobs for Reservists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Canadian Army - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> Official Canadian Army website. News and photos about soldiers and Canadian Armed Forces. Jobs for Reservists.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca


Is there a reason why you are keeping 38 CBG? Or is it that distance makes the heart grow fonder?

😉


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Is there a reason why you are keeping 38 CBG? Or is it that distance makes the heart grow fonder?
> 
> 😉



Forgive my error. There are so many of them....


----------



## ballz

daftandbarmy said:


> Well, if they folded the tents of both 39 CBG and 41 CBG HQs that would give you well over 100 full timers to choose from to help out a bit, I'm guessing.



You mean 100 full-timers to reside in Div HQ so they can draft and email us a drafted, unsigned order telling 1 CMBG HQ they're the OPI for Pres Project Management and the only coordinating instruction grants us them DIRLAUTH, and then go for their 3 hour lunch break.


----------



## WestIsle

I think the bigger point here is the amateur leadership of the Canadian Army and Forces in general over the decades has resulted in a full time element that cant and never has been able to support overseas operations alone, a complete lack of war stores, and a pittance reserve force that is not organized or utilized anywhere near where it should be like our allies. 

The reserves are the way they are because a lack of vision and small minds thought that it was more important to have a "large" full time element that would somehow magically appear for war in Europe from across the ocean despite the fact as many have mentioned that historically this has not been the case for this country. There was no effort to retain people in reserve after WW2 despite the experiences endured from the last build up. While much of this could be seen as budget related the truth is no matter how much money the army has the reserves wont get any of this. When people talked about their ability to operate with their reg force peers how can they when all the tools they have had have been taken by the reg force. When we burn through the AVGP,LAV 2, and LAV 3 just in time to get new toys while throwing away the old leaving nothing for war stocks or the reserves. Maybe this all stems from the original sin of the Can Exp Force Battalions and the Minister of the Militia and the full time force feels they need to keep them down so they dont have a repeat or maybe its all about the full time headquarters because our CMBG are hollow with a battery pretending to be a regiment with all the staff fixings needed. But things need to change because its the army is nowhere where it needs to be. 

Everyone seems to be pointing fingers at each other when really they should be pointing them at the people who refused to make any sort of cuts that might not be the best for them but would be for the institution. Hollow unit lines and hollow brigades across the board and the latest reshuffle makes sure that no headquarters are cut, the arty regiments are still battery's, we still have 5 "divisions", the reserves are still the reserves but now the brigades are really just large battle groups. We have people in Ottawa to fill out this army but the leadership doesn't want to make hard calls and save the place as its tradition to cut a chunk off the carcass every couple years to feed the creature that is headquarters.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Is there a reason why you are keeping 38 CBG? Or is it that distance makes the heart grow fonder?
> 
> 😉


Is there a reason for keeping any Res HQ?

 I mean there are already 10x more Reg HQ's than needed - they may as well do something.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Is there a reason for keeping any Res HQ?
> 
> I mean there are already 10x more Reg HQ's than needed - they may as well do something.



IMHO there's no reason  to keep a full Res Bde HQ for anything other than succession management to General for Reservists, and to guarantee some lifetime duration Class B employment for Reservists.

At one time I thought they performed some kind of valuable leadership, coordination or training function, but I was clearly mistaken. Most 'collective training' events are downloaded to the units to lead anyways, with Bde staff 'tutt tutting' from the sidelines.

Any audit/ oversight role they perform on behalf of the CAF could likely easily be conducted by anyone else, from anywhere.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> IMHO there's no reason  to keep a full Res Bde HQ for anything other than succession management to General for Reservists, and to guarantee some lifetime duration Class B employment for Reservists.
> 
> At one time I thought they performed some kind of valuable leadership, coordination or training function, but I was clearly mistaken. Most 'collective training' events are downloaded to the units to lead anyways, with Bde staff 'tutt tutting' from the sidelines.
> 
> Any audit/ oversight role they perform on behalf of the CAF could likely easily be conducted by anyone else, from anywhere.


My personal opinion, is that at Capt level, a Reservist should decide do they want to continue in the Army and progress upwards, or finish their time as Class A Support Personnel, with the occasional option for Class C, but if they want to progress further - then they need to join the Regular Army.
   The same goes for Sgt.

One would need to make it easier to CT - but frankly I don't see the need to the HQ bloat, and these days it doesn't appear any Res units can field more than a Platoon.

Based on the Manning Levels of the CA, it seems to make a LOT more sense to consolidate the units under the Reg Brigades.
  Worse case you will need some satellite entities from the Bde's, but that's hardly a deal breaker.

Preposition Equipment at Regional Training Centers - than can have a full time maintenance and support team in position - as well as training staff.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Forgive my error. There are so many of them....



It is entirely understandable.  Your inclusion of 41 CBG is commendable.  There is Hope beyond the Port Mann Bridge.


----------



## Rifleman62

The creation of 10 P Res "Bde HQ's" created 10 new Reg F LCol posns, and 20 new Reg F Maj posns among other changes to the HQ bloat. 

DAP would know.


----------



## Kat Stevens

Kirkhill said:


> It is entirely understandable.  Your inclusion of 41 CBG is commendable.  There is Hope beyond the Port Mann Bridge.


... and Abbotsford, and Chilliwack, and Agassiz...


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> My personal opinion, is that at Capt level, a Reservist should decide do they want to continue in the Army and progress upwards, or finish their time as Class A Support Personnel, with the occasional option for Class C, but if they want to progress further - then they need to join the Regular Army.
> The same goes for Sgt.
> 
> One would need to make it easier to CT - but frankly I don't see the need to the HQ bloat, and these days it doesn't appear any Res units can field more than a Platoon.
> 
> Based on the Manning Levels of the CA, it seems to make a LOT more sense to consolidate the units under the Reg Brigades.
> Worse case you will need some satellite entities from the Bde's, but that's hardly a deal breaker.
> 
> Preposition Equipment at Regional Training Centers - than can have a full time maintenance and support team in position - as well as training staff.



I like the administrative solutions and I agree they can work.  I still think there needs to be some tension introduced into the decision making process that values the National Defence as much as it does Expeditionary Efforts.

We know that it is possible because of the existence of the SAR squadrons in the same Air Force that supplies NORAD overwatch and acts overseas when called on.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kat Stevens said:


> ... and Abbotsford, and Chilliwack, and Agassiz...


You forgot Aldergrove.... my home of 15 years.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> I like the administrative solutions and I agree they can work.  I still think there needs to be some tension introduced into the decision making process that values the National Defence as much as it does Expeditionary Efforts.
> 
> We know that it is possible because of the existence of the SAR squadrons in the same Air Force that supplies NORAD overwatch and acts overseas when called on.



Here's a thought, how about we remove the administration of the militia units from the Areas/Divisions and hand them back to their parent corps's?

Make the Areas/Divisions Force Employers rather than Force Generators with the responsibility to keep an eye on the local situation and maintain a plan to utilize the assets available to it in the Area.

Then the RRCA, RCAC and RCIC can manage their own pipelines to support their expeditionary needs while creating long term domestic positions, other than Ottawa positions, that would allow long-serving members alternatives to constant movement and permit solid family lives.

At the same time the Purple Trades, and the Sigs and Engineers, who seem less afflicted by tribalism and are more immediately critical components of any Crisis Response Plan could be tasked with the maintenance of a dispersed inventory of assets.   Dispersion being good for local support, speed of response and security of supply.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I like the administrative solutions and I agree they can work.  I still think there needs to be some tension introduced into the decision making process that values the National Defence as much as it does Expeditionary Efforts.
> 
> We know that it is possible because of the existence of the SAR squadrons in the same Air Force that supplies NORAD overwatch and acts overseas when called on.


I think thats easily done though, however I believe that National Defense is best solved by Expeditionary Armies, - and a robust RCN and RCAF.

   The Regional "Depots" would be used for Domestic Support Missions, you should have the infrastructure in those to host a Bde+ HQ and Support Elements - even if those Depots aren't the native home to the Bde HQ.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Then the RRCA, RCAC and RCIC can manage their own pipelines to support their expeditionary needs while creating long term domestic positions, other than Ottawa positions, that would allow long-serving members alternatives to constant movement and permit solid family lives.


I would saying that the OTO (Other than Ottawa) is a good idea, but if left regionally that it would just make more Regimental Mafia issues.

 If I was King, I'd burn the Regimental System down - and frankly I think routine posting (4-5 years outside of command staff) is healthy and ensures you aren't creating cliques.


----------



## ueo

Kirkhill said:


> If you don't give them kit to work with and jobs to do it won't attract useful people.


We, the corporate one, tried this with Cougars and Grizzlys in the early/mid 80's. Lasted about 2 years or so with the vehicles finally being centralized, maintained and allocated for training by a dedicated fulltime staff. This worked well until NATO committments showed the RF shortfall and the majority were reissued to RF deployment units. After that the thought was to reestablish this militia support center. Meaford was to have been the model under LFRMP but that got overtaken by events with the project being almost given to the RF infantry as a basic trg loc with some reserve trg usually in the summer months. We have to make the PRes  viable option for those desiring a part time career ($$$$) or turn it into another political money pit the yeilds little value.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I think thats easily done though, however I believe that National Defense is best solved by Expeditionary Armies, - and a robust RCN and RCAF.



I understand the need to prepare for the worst case of peer to peer warfare, and in Canada's case such warfare will be expeditionary.  (Assuming that the Arctic is considered an Expeditionary Theatre).

But we continue to confront the question of what do you do with unemployed soldiers?  For starters, we want unemployed soldiers.  And we want lots of them, all of them qualified.   We don't want to have all of our qualified soldiers employed overseas.  You can't keep training the same bunch of soldiers over and over again or they become bored and stale.   This is the real value of the Reserves.  Not the Militia but the Reserves - trained soldiers that we want to hang on to for a time after they have decided that the grind of garrison is too much for them.

The Militia may be a Reserve Force, a Reserve Capability but its soldiers are not Reserves in the sense that most of the world uses it.   I think there is value in the separate Militia/Home Guard/National Guard when accepted on its own terms.  But it is not a Ready Reserve for the Expeditionary Forces.



KevinB said:


> The Regional "Depots" would be used for Domestic Support Missions, you should have the infrastructure in those to host a Bde+ HQ and Support Elements - even if those Depots aren't the native home to the Bde HQ.



That I like.

I might quibble on the continued use of the term "Brigade".   That pushes us into discussions of Divisions and Generals.   I'm becoming partial to the terms Area, District and Group to emphasise that these administrative and ad hoc relations are separate from the Field Army formations and their command structure.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I understand the need to prepare for the worst case of peer to peer warfare, and in Canada's case such warfare will be expeditionary.  (Assuming that the Arctic is considered an Expeditionary Theatre).
> 
> But we continue to confront the question of what do you do with unemployed soldiers?  For starters, we want unemployed soldiers.  And we want lots of them, all of them qualified.   We don't want to have all of our qualified soldiers employed overseas.  You can't keep training the same bunch of soldiers over and over again or they become bored and stale.   This is the real value of the Reserves.  Not the Militia but the Reserves - trained soldiers that we want to hang on to for a time after they have decided that the grind of garrison is too much for them.
> 
> The Militia may be a Reserve Force, a Reserve Capability but its soldiers are not Reserves in the sense that most of the world uses it.   I think there is value in the separate Militia/Home Guard/National Guard when accepted on its own terms.  But it is not a Ready Reserve for the Expeditionary Forces.
> 
> 
> 
> That I like.
> 
> I might quibble on the continued use of the term "Brigade".   That pushes us into discussions of Divisions and Generals.   I'm becoming partial to the terms Area, District and Group to emphasise that these administrative and ad hoc relations are separate from the Field Army formations and their command structure.


I used Brigade intentionally - I view it as a field formation, and to continue to use the same entity to employ the forces internally or externally.  They don't (and IMHO shouldn't) need to be ad hoc.

Area, etc just adds a layer of HQ that is not really needed.   I'd rather have LO's at the Province - and even Municipal level - than form more HQ's.


For Example -- lets say we move 3 VP back to BC.  for purposes of this discussion we will call it a 30/70 Mountain unit.
   It has 1 Regular Force Rifle Coy, 3 Res Rifle Coy's, a Mixed Combat Support Coy, Reg Admin & Maint Coy and a mostly Reg Leadership Cadre.
 They run training at the central depot for all BC Army Reserves for Recruit&Basic - as well as Infanteer specific trade course to the ISCC level, and non trade specific secondary trade courses (Comms, DrvWhl etc.).

  That Deport also houses various Support and Training Personnel from other trades - and maybe Reg Force Sub-Units, but the Depot is run by Maj who while not in the CO of 3VP direct chain - does support him, and other lodger units.
  Now because it is a small garrison - it won't have some of the support feature of the larger bases (no Base Hospital, Dental etc) - and that would need to be worked out with the Province.


 When 3 VP goes on IRU, they offer 60 day Class C contracts to their personnel - and backfill from other Res units across BC.
    In the event of a Regional issue - the IRU is deployed - and while other Res are called up - Reg units can be moved in - staged out of the Depot - and the Deport be used as a base for the Higher HQ that comes in if needed.

In 2022, I find it hard to believe that one needs any layers between - it should be entirely possible to do 90% of recruiting virtually - so you don't even need a significant recruiting PY allocation.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Is there a reason for keeping any Res HQ?
> 
> I mean there are already 10x more Reg HQ's than needed - they may as well do something.


Here's my thought which I've already floated a month or so ago.

The Army has enough folks for about two divisions or so and enough equipment for one if everyone and everything was mobilized and deployed at once. So from a tactical viewpoint do we need more than one deployable divisional headquarters? No. Do we need administrative headquarters below Army level? - probably, 40,000+ folks need to be broken up in clumps so how many clumps can Army HQ manage. 40,000 folks add up to about 8 brigade size clumps (based on a brigade being roughly 3-5,000 folks depending on type). Can one headquarters control 8 clumps. Sure they can - it's a bit over optimum but quite doable and in not having an intermediate headquarters you have tighter control (not to mention saving the resources of the intermediate headquarters).

Based on manpower authorizations (ignore standards of training for the time being) we have people for roughly 4 equipped RegF brigades and 4 ResF underequipped ones. 

So why bother keeping a ResF brigade headquarters at all? Well here's where I go in a different direction based, not on mobilization needs, but based on day to day Army deployment roles during peacetime. 

Afghanistan built us a model where we deploy individual battlegroups supervised by brigade headquarters for periods of six months and nine months. SSE says we need to be able to deploy simultaneously two sustained battlegroups and one short duration battlegroup as well as two sustained and one short term force of less than battlegroup size. That's the potential for up to six elements simultaneously which means we need a generous command and control capability.

Canada currently has three (and one CS) bde HQs and 12 battle group HQ which are adequately staffed and trained for deployments. The other ten brigades and seventy some odd battalion HQs are entirely inadequate for that. That's not enough to sustain the SSE model adequately without much ad hocery and wearing out people. On the other hand, with a total of eight properly staffed brigades and 24 or so properly staffed battlegroup HQs we double that peacetime deployment capability. The key here is "properly staffed". That means full-time Reg F leadership and staffs.

Just one aside here. I do not see all the brigades and battle groups here as manoeuvre ones. If we properly analyze our defence needs and structure, I see retaining three Reg F manoeuvre brigades with 12 battlegroups, two Res F brigades with 8 battlegroups. one RegF CS brigade with one battlegroup, one ResF CS brigade with one battlegroup and one ResF CSS brigade with one battlegroup (the colocation of battlegroups with the CS and CSS brigades is mostly due to geographic factors and existing locations of sufficient combat arms reservists in those locals)

Again, a key here is "battlegroup HQs" as these are the entities we wish to be the C&C elements on deployment. I do not think that a given RegF battlegroup needs a full complement of RegF manoeuvre companies. Again, Afghanistan has given us a model of building block battlegroups formed by company size elements from a disparate group of battalions. IMHO in order to be a properly trained battlegroup headquarters it needs: a mostly fully staffed full-time headquarters; at least one full-time company to train and generate career development through and to provide a rapid reaction force; at least one ResF company to be augmented from and to provide additional company HQ staff to allow exercising at battle group level; access to appropriate battle group CSS elements to train with and draw on for deployment; access to appropriate CS elements to train with and draw on for deployment.

The point here is that with enough full-time brigade, battlegroup and company level staff you can train for all natures of operations even when many of the troops themselves are part-time reservists who only train and deploy occasionally. It's kind of a TEWT thing but with enough troops to add an additional layer of complexity. In effect the full-time Bde and BG HQs and Reg F Coy leadership form the backbone while RegF and ResF companies form the flesh in varying ratios.

This effectively is where the 70/30 concept comes from - every brigade and battalion has a deployable headquarters and at least one deployable sub-unit.  Headquarters and deployable RegF subunits are fully equipped and share their equipment with their ResF counterparts. There are no longer any administrative bde or battalion HQs. Generally speaking, RegF 70/30 units have two RegF deployable subunits and a larger share of CS and CSS while ResF 30/70 units have one deployable RegF subunit and a lesser share of CS and CSS elements. Sub units become plug and play elements added to a given mission. In a major emergency, the entire force can be mobilized in whole or in part with the only real limitation being equipment available. The overall objective should be to start acquiring new equipment on a scale to equip ever larger elements of the total force and thereby enhance deployability. And I should mention that "deployable" is not synonymous with "expeditionary". Any unit should be capable of deploying internationally or domestically using its core RegF personnel as well as either volunteer or mobilized ResF members from its own or other units.

Training facilities and base infrastructure is consolidated under Army HQ. I would have CADTC control all recruiting and training through it's existing facilities as well as through depot battalions located at each of the current training centres and who also command depot companies, platoons and detachments down to local armoury level - one overarching individual and collective training system. Similarly all infrastructure remains under Army HQ. In a worse case scenario, an entire brigade could pack up and deploy and yet the training and support infrastructure would remain in place and be capable of recruiting and generating a new brigade insitu.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Here's my thought which I've already floated a month or so ago.
> 
> The Army has enough folks for about two divisions or so and enough equipment for one if everyone and everything was mobilized and deployed at once.



You are a lot more generous than me.
     I don't see equipment for 2 Brigades - let alone a Div.
Which is why I don't honestly see 1 Cdn Div ever being deployable.


FJAG said:


> So from a tactical viewpoint do we need more than one deployable divisional headquarters? No. Do we need administrative headquarters below Army level? - probably, 40,000+ folks need to be broken up in clumps so how many clumps can Army HQ manage. 40,000 folks add up to about 8 brigade size clumps (based on a brigade being roughly 3-5,000 folks depending on type). Can one headquarters control 8 clumps. Sure they can - it's a bit over optimum but quite doable and in not having an intermediate headquarters you have tighter control (not to mention saving the resources of the intermediate headquarters).
> 
> Based on manpower authorizations (ignore standards of training for the time being) we have people for roughly 4 equipped RegF brigades and 4 ResF underequipped ones.


  Would you accept 1 Equipped Reg Bde - 3 Under Equipped - and 4 Res non equipped 



FJAG said:


> So why bother keeping a ResF brigade headquarters at all? Well here's where I go in a different direction based, not on mobilization needs, but based on day to day Army deployment roles during peacetime.
> 
> Afghanistan built us a model where we deploy individual battlegroups supervised by brigade headquarters for periods of six months and nine months. SSE says we need to be able to deploy simultaneously two sustained battlegroups and one short duration battlegroup as well as two sustained and one short term force of less than battlegroup size. That's the potential for up to six elements simultaneously which means we need a generous command and control capability.


 SSE also promised a Heavy Div to NATO for Europe, color me not impressed with a lot of the SSE demands, when compared to the actual reality of the CA on the ground.



FJAG said:


> Canada currently has three (and one CS) bde HQs and 12 battle group HQ which are adequately staffed and trained for deployments. The other ten brigades and seventy some odd battalion HQs are entirely inadequate for that. That's not enough to sustain the SSE model adequately without much ad hocery and wearing out people. On the other hand, with a total of eight properly staffed brigades and 24 or so properly staffed battlegroup HQs we double that peacetime deployment capability. The key here is "properly staffed". That means full-time Reg F leadership and staffs.


Looking at the PY's - the current Cdn CMBG model allows for 2 of those to be filled with Regular Force personnel - yes it is bloated and x1.5-2 of what most other Bde consist of - but even if you have 8 properly staffed Bde's - you don't have any troops to fill them.
  All I see is the CA HQ Cart attempting to pull a horse.


FJAG said:


> Just one aside here. I do not see all the brigades and battle groups here as manoeuvre ones. If we properly analyze our defence needs and structure, I see retaining three Reg F manoeuvre brigades with 12 battlegroups, two Res F brigades with 8 battlegroups. one RegF CS brigade with one battlegroup, one ResF CS brigade with one battlegroup and one ResF CSS brigade with one battlegroup (the colocation of battlegroups with the CS and CSS brigades is mostly due to geographic factors and existing locations of sufficient combat arms reservists in those locals)
> 
> Again, a key here is "battlegroup HQs" as these are the entities we wish to be the C&C elements on deployment. I do not think that a given RegF battlegroup needs a full complement of RegF manoeuvre companies. Again, Afghanistan has given us a model of building block battlegroups formed by company size elements from a disparate group of battalions. IMHO in order to be a properly trained battlegroup headquarters it needs: a mostly fully staffed full-time headquarters; at least one full-time company to train and generate career development through and to provide a rapid reaction force; at least one ResF company to be augmented from and to provide additional company HQ staff to allow exercising at battle group level; access to appropriate battle group CSS elements to train with and draw on for deployment; access to appropriate CS elements to train with and draw on for deployment.
> 
> The point here is that with enough full-time brigade, battlegroup and company level staff you can train for all natures of operations even when many of the troops themselves are part-time reservists who only train and deploy occasionally. It's kind of a TEWT thing but with enough troops to add an additional layer of complexity. In effect the full-time Bde and BG HQs and Reg F Coy leadership form the backbone while RegF and ResF companies form the flesh in varying ratios.
> 
> This effectively is where the 70/30 concept comes from - every brigade and battalion has a deployable headquarters and at least one deployable sub-unit.  Headquarters and deployable RegF subunits are fully equipped and share their equipment with their ResF counterparts. There are no longer any administrative bde or battalion HQs. Generally speaking, RegF 70/30 units have two RegF deployable subunits and a larger share of CS and CSS while ResF 30/70 units have one deployable RegF subunit and a lesser share of CS and CSS elements. Sub units become plug and play elements added to a given mission. In a major emergency, the entire force can be mobilized in whole or in part with the only real limitation being equipment available. The overall objective should be to start acquiring new equipment on a scale to equip ever larger elements of the total force and thereby enhance deployability. And I should mention that "deployable" is not synonymous with "expeditionary". Any unit should be capable of deploying internationally or domestically using its core RegF personnel as well as either volunteer or mobilized ResF members from its own or other units.


I fully embrace the 70/30 or 30/70 outlook, but I don't see the Bodies available for more than 4 Bde total.



FJAG said:


> Training facilities and base infrastructure is consolidated under Army HQ. I would have CADTC control all recruiting and training through it's existing facilities as well as through depot battalions located at each of the current training centres and who also command depot companies, platoons and detachments down to local armoury level - one overarching individual and collective training system. Similarly all infrastructure remains under Army HQ. In a worse case scenario, an entire brigade could pack up and deploy and yet the training and support infrastructure would remain in place and be capable of recruiting and generating a new brigade insitu.
> 
> 🍻


I agree there.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Here's my thought which I've already floated a month or so ago.
> 
> The Army has enough folks for about two divisions or so and enough equipment for one if everyone and everything was mobilized and deployed at once. So from a tactical viewpoint do we need more than one deployable divisional headquarters? No. Do we need administrative headquarters below Army level? - probably, 40,000+ folks need to be broken up in clumps so how many clumps can Army HQ manage. 40,000 folks add up to about 8 brigade size clumps (based on a brigade being roughly 3-5,000 folks depending on type). Can one headquarters control 8 clumps. Sure they can - it's a bit over optimum but quite doable and in not having an intermediate headquarters you have tighter control (not to mention saving the resources of the intermediate headquarters).
> 
> Based on manpower authorizations (ignore standards of training for the time being) we have people for roughly 4 equipped RegF brigades and 4 ResF underequipped ones.
> 
> So why bother keeping a ResF brigade headquarters at all? Well here's where I go in a different direction based, not on mobilization needs, but based on day to day Army deployment roles during peacetime.
> 
> Afghanistan built us a model where we deploy individual battlegroups supervised by brigade headquarters for periods of six months and nine months. SSE says we need to be able to deploy simultaneously two sustained battlegroups and one short duration battlegroup as well as two sustained and one short term force of less than battlegroup size. That's the potential for up to six elements simultaneously which means we need a generous command and control capability.
> 
> Canada currently has three (and one CS) bde HQs and 12 battle group HQ which are adequately staffed and trained for deployments. The other ten brigades and seventy some odd battalion HQs are entirely inadequate for that. That's not enough to sustain the SSE model adequately without much ad hocery and wearing out people. On the other hand, with a total of eight properly staffed brigades and 24 or so properly staffed battlegroup HQs we double that peacetime deployment capability. The key here is "properly staffed". That means full-time Reg F leadership and staffs.
> 
> Just one aside here. I do not see all the brigades and battle groups here as manoeuvre ones. If we properly analyze our defence needs and structure, I see retaining three Reg F manoeuvre brigades with 12 battlegroups, two Res F brigades with 8 battlegroups. one RegF CS brigade with one battlegroup, one ResF CS brigade with one battlegroup and one ResF CSS brigade with one battlegroup (the colocation of battlegroups with the CS and CSS brigades is mostly due to geographic factors and existing locations of sufficient combat arms reservists in those locals)
> 
> Again, a key here is "battlegroup HQs" as these are the entities we wish to be the C&C elements on deployment. I do not think that a given RegF battlegroup needs a full complement of RegF manoeuvre companies. Again, Afghanistan has given us a model of building block battlegroups formed by company size elements from a disparate group of battalions. IMHO in order to be a properly trained battlegroup headquarters it needs: a mostly fully staffed full-time headquarters; at least one full-time company to train and generate career development through and to provide a rapid reaction force; at least one ResF company to be augmented from and to provide additional company HQ staff to allow exercising at battle group level; access to appropriate battle group CSS elements to train with and draw on for deployment; access to appropriate CS elements to train with and draw on for deployment.
> 
> The point here is that with enough full-time brigade, battlegroup and company level staff you can train for all natures of operations even when many of the troops themselves are part-time reservists who only train and deploy occasionally. It's kind of a TEWT thing but with enough troops to add an additional layer of complexity. In effect the full-time Bde and BG HQs and Reg F Coy leadership form the backbone while RegF and ResF companies form the flesh in varying ratios.
> 
> This effectively is where the 70/30 concept comes from - every brigade and battalion has a deployable headquarters and at least one deployable sub-unit.  Headquarters and deployable RegF subunits are fully equipped and share their equipment with their ResF counterparts. There are no longer any administrative bde or battalion HQs. Generally speaking, RegF 70/30 units have two RegF deployable subunits and a larger share of CS and CSS while ResF 30/70 units have one deployable RegF subunit and a lesser share of CS and CSS elements. Sub units become plug and play elements added to a given mission. In a major emergency, the entire force can be mobilized in whole or in part with the only real limitation being equipment available. The overall objective should be to start acquiring new equipment on a scale to equip ever larger elements of the total force and thereby enhance deployability. And I should mention that "deployable" is not synonymous with "expeditionary". Any unit should be capable of deploying internationally or domestically using its core RegF personnel as well as either volunteer or mobilized ResF members from its own or other units.
> 
> Training facilities and base infrastructure is consolidated under Army HQ. I would have CADTC control all recruiting and training through it's existing facilities as well as through depot battalions located at each of the current training centres and who also command depot companies, platoons and detachments down to local armoury level - one overarching individual and collective training system. Similarly all infrastructure remains under Army HQ. In a worse case scenario, an entire brigade could pack up and deploy and yet the training and support infrastructure would remain in place and be capable of recruiting and generating a new brigade insitu.
> 
> 🍻



Just sayin'....

In my business we are able to work with a couple of dozen clients concurrently across Canada, using email, Zoom and/or MS Teams, for fairly complex large scale projects involving high levels of change management and business performance improvement.

My clients, large, geographically and culturally diverse organizations, do the same in their businesses. Many of them have more employees than all of the reservists in Alberta and BC combined - that's full time employees.

I have no idea why we need hundreds of full time staff to keep tabs on a couple of dozen part time units that already have, embedded, full time Reg F/ Class B staff in their HQs.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> But we continue to confront the question of what do you do with unemployed soldiers?  For starters, we want unemployed soldiers.  And we want lots of them, all of them qualified.   We don't want to have all of our qualified soldiers employed overseas.  You can't keep training the same bunch of soldiers over and over again or they become bored and stale.   This is the real value of the Reserves.  Not the Militia but the Reserves - trained soldiers that we want to hang on to for a time after they have decided that the grind of garrison is too much for them.
> 
> The Militia may be a Reserve Force, a Reserve Capability but its soldiers are not Reserves in the sense that most of the world uses it.   I think there is value in the separate Militia/Home Guard/National Guard when accepted on its own terms.  But it is not a Ready Reserve for the Expeditionary Forces.
> 
> That I like.


We already have such a force in the Supplementary Reserve. The problem is that it is mostly unused and voluntary. One could easily change that by making it a term of service that any retired RegF or Primary Reserve soldier must serve in the Supplementary Reserve for X years. That's the easy part. The hard part is finding a role and the requisite equipment for them. (There's also that NDA provision which says that they can't be called out for training or duty unless they first consent or are placed on active service)

They are valuable for bulking up the Army when its committed full in and strapped for resources but it seems we've avoided situations like that since WW2. 

For me the limitation is infrastructure and equipment. Unless you are looking at a pure labour pool activated Supp reservists must have  task to fulfill and equipment to do it with. I'm hard pressed to find a use for them beyond the filling in in combat or CS or CSS units that are short on manpower.



Kirkhill said:


> I might quibble on the continued use of the term "Brigade".   That pushes us into discussions of Divisions and Generals.   I'm becoming partial to the terms Area, District and Group to emphasise that these administrative and ad hoc relations are separate from the Field Army formations and their command structure.



I'm not and that's primarily because I think every element of the Army should be capable of combat and, if so, it should use terminology commensurate with that of our allies. It avoids confusion.

We already have LOs assigned to Provincial EMOs and Army, Bde and CJOC staff that have op plans to support domestic ops within their assigned territories. We are not a large enough organization to either need or afford separate administrative staffs solely for that function.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Here's my thought which I've already floated a month or so ago.
> 
> The Army has enough folks for about two divisions or so and enough equipment for one if everyone and everything was mobilized and deployed at once. So from a tactical viewpoint do we need more than one deployable divisional headquarters? No. Do we need administrative headquarters below Army level? - probably, 40,000+ folks need to be broken up in clumps so how many clumps can Army HQ manage. 40,000 folks add up to about 8 brigade size clumps (based on a brigade being roughly 3-5,000 folks depending on type). Can one headquarters control 8 clumps. Sure they can - it's a bit over optimum but quite doable and in not having an intermediate headquarters you have tighter control (not to mention saving the resources of the intermediate headquarters).
> 
> Based on manpower authorizations (ignore standards of training for the time being) we have people for roughly 4 equipped RegF brigades and 4 ResF underequipped ones.
> 
> So why bother keeping a ResF brigade headquarters at all? Well here's where I go in a different direction based, not on mobilization needs, but based on day to day Army deployment roles during peacetime.
> 
> Afghanistan built us a model where we deploy individual battlegroups supervised by brigade headquarters for periods of six months and nine months. SSE says we need to be able to deploy simultaneously two sustained battlegroups and one short duration battlegroup as well as two sustained and one short term force of less than battlegroup size. That's the potential for up to six elements simultaneously which means we need a generous command and control capability.
> 
> Canada currently has three (and one CS) bde HQs and 12 battle group HQ which are adequately staffed and trained for deployments. The other ten brigades and seventy some odd battalion HQs are entirely inadequate for that. That's not enough to sustain the SSE model adequately without much ad hocery and wearing out people. On the other hand, with a total of eight properly staffed brigades and 24 or so properly staffed battlegroup HQs we double that peacetime deployment capability. The key here is "properly staffed". That means full-time Reg F leadership and staffs.
> 
> Just one aside here. I do not see all the brigades and battle groups here as manoeuvre ones. If we properly analyze our defence needs and structure, I see retaining three Reg F manoeuvre brigades with 12 battlegroups, two Res F brigades with 8 battlegroups. one RegF CS brigade with one battlegroup, one ResF CS brigade with one battlegroup and one ResF CSS brigade with one battlegroup (the colocation of battlegroups with the CS and CSS brigades is mostly due to geographic factors and existing locations of sufficient combat arms reservists in those locals)
> 
> Again, a key here is "battlegroup HQs" as these are the entities we wish to be the C&C elements on deployment. I do not think that a given RegF battlegroup needs a full complement of RegF manoeuvre companies. Again, Afghanistan has given us a model of building block battlegroups formed by company size elements from a disparate group of battalions. IMHO in order to be a properly trained battlegroup headquarters it needs: a mostly fully staffed full-time headquarters; at least one full-time company to train and generate career development through and to provide a rapid reaction force; at least one ResF company to be augmented from and to provide additional company HQ staff to allow exercising at battle group level; access to appropriate battle group CSS elements to train with and draw on for deployment; access to appropriate CS elements to train with and draw on for deployment.
> 
> The point here is that with enough full-time brigade, battlegroup and company level staff you can train for all natures of operations even when many of the troops themselves are part-time reservists who only train and deploy occasionally. It's kind of a TEWT thing but with enough troops to add an additional layer of complexity. In effect the full-time Bde and BG HQs and Reg F Coy leadership form the backbone while RegF and ResF companies form the flesh in varying ratios.
> 
> This effectively is where the 70/30 concept comes from - every brigade and battalion has a deployable headquarters and at least one deployable sub-unit.  Headquarters and deployable RegF subunits are fully equipped and share their equipment with their ResF counterparts. There are no longer any administrative bde or battalion HQs. Generally speaking, RegF 70/30 units have two RegF deployable subunits and a larger share of CS and CSS while ResF 30/70 units have one deployable RegF subunit and a lesser share of CS and CSS elements. Sub units become plug and play elements added to a given mission. In a major emergency, the entire force can be mobilized in whole or in part with the only real limitation being equipment available. The overall objective should be to start acquiring new equipment on a scale to equip ever larger elements of the total force and thereby enhance deployability. And I should mention that "deployable" is not synonymous with "expeditionary". Any unit should be capable of deploying internationally or domestically using its core RegF personnel as well as either volunteer or mobilized ResF members from its own or other units.
> 
> Training facilities and base infrastructure is consolidated under Army HQ. I would have CADTC control all recruiting and training through it's existing facilities as well as through depot battalions located at each of the current training centres and who also command depot companies, platoons and detachments down to local armoury level - one overarching individual and collective training system. Similarly all infrastructure remains under Army HQ. In a worse case scenario, an entire brigade could pack up and deploy and yet the training and support infrastructure would remain in place and be capable of recruiting and generating a new brigade insitu.
> 
> 🍻



And the battle group has become the new metric it seems.  

Dispersed Operations.




> TASS,
> 
> 10 AUG 2021, 07:50
> Russian Army operates around 170 battalion tactical groups — defense chief​These are the forces that are ready for deployment in an hour after an alert signal, Sergey Shoigu pointed out
> 
> SOLNECHNOGORSK /Moscow Region/, August 10. /TASS/.
> 
> Around 170 battalion tactical groups are operational in the Russian Army today, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said on Tuesday.
> 
> "Today we actually have constant alert troops. Today we have no forces that we need to gather and find. All the troops are on constant alert. We have formations called battalion tactical groups. These are the forces that are ready for deployment in an hour after an alert signal. We have 168 such groups today and this is a very high figure," the defense chief said at the Territory of Senses educational youth forum.
> 
> A battalion tactical group is a temporary operationally flexible formation set up on the basis of a battalion and attached artillery, air defense, engineering and logistics support units for combat operations as part of motor rifle and tank brigades. Aviation groups, special operations forces and other units can also be attached to a battalion tactical group to accomplish assigned missions.





> Ukraine: How big is Russia's military build-up?​*By David Brown*
> BBC News
> 
> 19 January, 2022
> 
> *Russia has moved about 100,000 troops - equipped with everything from tanks and artillery to ammunition and air power - to Ukraine's border but denies it is planning an invasion.*
> 
> About 35,000 Russian personnel are permanently stationed near Ukrainian territory.
> 
> Some newly arrived units have travelled almost 4,000 miles, from the Russian Far East.
> 
> Most estimates put the number of Russian troops deployed around Ukraine - to the country's north, south and east - at about 100,000.
> But one Ukrainian assessment, reported by CNN, says there are 106,000 ground troops and 21,000 navy and air-force personnel.
> 
> On Tuesday, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson said: "The intelligence is very clear that there are 60 Russian battle groups on the borders of Ukraine," about a third of the total available numbers.
> 
> In addition to the regular Russian troops, there are thought to be about 15,000 Russian separatists in Ukraine's Luhansk and Donetsk regions.



We used to talk about Army Groups.  Now we talk about Battlegroups.  That in and of itself is a significant de-escalation in the temper of human affairs.


----------



## RangerRay

As much as it pains me as a former member of a “battalion” that fielded close to a platoon once, I think the Reserves are long overdue for some unit consolidation. My old regiment with over 100 years of local history will likely disappear, but it would probably be for the best.  Maybe there’s a reason to have a bn HQ for a unit that struggles to field a platoon, but no one has been able to articulate one to me.


----------



## Good2Golf

@FJAG, of course one should take care not to inadvertently inject/force ‘Silent-J Jarmy (reserve)’ issues/problems/challenges/shortfalls into the Supp Res construct.


----------



## Kirkhill

Back to my favourite model for a Militia.  Although there is a permanent command and suppor structured the highest rank for a volunteer (all unpaid) is that of Captain, commanding a regional company.  









						Home Guard (Denmark)
					

The Danish Home Guard (Danish language: Hjemmeværnet ) (HJV) is the fourth service of the Danish military, formerly concerned only with the defence of Danish territory, but since 2008, it has also supported the Danish military efforts in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Service is voluntary and unpaid...




					military-history.fandom.com
				







> Contents​
> 1 Organization
> 1.1 Army Home Guard
> 1.2 Naval Home Guard
> 1.3 Air Force Home Guard
> 1.4 Police Home Guard
> 1.5 Infrastructure Home Guard
> 
> 2 History
> 3 The Home Guard in civil society
> 4 See also
> 5 References
> 6 External links
> 6.1 HJV international operations
> 6.2 LRSU/LRSC related links
> 6.3 HomeGuard Scoutplatoon related links



I find the Infrastructure Home Guard particularly interesting



> Infrastructure Home Guard​The Infrastructure Home Guard (_Virksomhedshjemmeværnet_) VHV ensures that civilian companies and authorities continue operating during times of crisis or catastrophe.
> 
> 
> Employees at power plants, water works and purification plants can participate in the four _Energihjemmeværnet_ HJVK VE-companies.
> Employees at railway companies can participate in the six _Jernbanehjemmeværnet_ HJVK VJ-companies. Predecessor founded in 1913.
> Employees at telecommunications companies can participate in the eight _Telehjemmeværnet_ HJVK VT-companies. Predecessor founded in 1914.
> They assist in keeping their places of work intact and prevent sabotage with use of lethal force.
> Until 2008 the Danish Post also had a Home Guard detachment, but this was closed in preparation for the merge between the Danish and Swedish postal services. Members of the postal service were offered transfer to the railway home guard, and can still (with greater limitations) get time off from their job, when performing home guard duties.





> Created after World War II, the Danish Home Guard was inspired by the Danish Resistance Movement during the war. It was always implied (though never explicitly stated) that the primary objective was defence and guerrilla activity against a Soviet invasion.
> 
> When founded on 11 June 1945 in the city of Odense, the 250 representatives of resistance movements and those of the government, both had demands to the new Home Guard. The resistance movements were not interested in a people's army run by the government and the government was not interested in a people's army being independent and run solely by a military figure without parliament representation. Because of these bi-lateral demands, a simple solution to the problem was made. The Home Guard would have two chief executives: A Major General and a representative chosen by parliament.
> 
> Naturally, the organization would be funded by parliament, but organized directly under the Ministry of Defence, so that both sides had an overview of what the Home Guard was doing.
> 
> For some very simple reasons, the Danish Home Guard would ultimately owe its loyalty to the will of the people, and not the government. The reason for this was, that if a situation like that of World War II was ever to occur again, whether in peace or wartime, the Home Guard would be a guarantee brought by the people, for the people, that the organization do all in its power to protect the individual citizen from crimes against humanity. Among these would be persecution due to political and religious stands, direct oppression and genocide. It would above all ensure that democracy, or people's rule, would be enforced. The Home Guard was well respected among the public as many members were former resistance fighters; people who fought for and had an interest in the individual person, their families, friends and loved ones.











						Home Guard (Denmark) - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> You are a lot more generous than me.
> I don't see equipment for 2 Brigades - let alone a Div.
> Which is why I don't honestly see 1 Cdn Div ever being deployable.


Yeah. But let's ignore arty, air defence and ATGMs and all those other things we don't have because quite rightly, we're screwed on that until we get our equipment crap together  - I guess one could always make 18 gun C3 regiments and watch one's people die.

I'm looking at the mech side which should provide six LAV battalions (or more accurately 18 LAV companies). And I agree that a LAV isn't an IFV but that's enough for two Stryker brigades. the third brigade is light and at this point (barring the above CS equipment) we're at the equipment level of an IBCT - so that gives us three "equipped" brigades.

I do not see a deployable division either ... but ... I want to see a deployable Div HQ if for no other reason that Europe needs some and it doesn't matter if the division is made up with two brigades and CS from another country. On top of that one needs to keep the staff skills alive both from the view of our brigade HQs being exercised within a divisional context as well as having sufficient staff that when we do get our crap together we'll be able to run one of those without stepping on our d**ks. I've seen too many skills fade only to see them having to be revived through a torturous process that was highly dysfunctional. Quite frankly I'm more concerned about the inability of our CSS system to function at higher levels than the div headquarters and brigades but anything to help keep the mentality of a higher field force alive is of value even if it is not a practical deployable entiry.



KevinB said:


> Would you accept 1 Equipped Reg Bde - 3 Under Equipped - and 4 Res non equipped


No. The only way that I see the ResF regaining its utility would be through blended battalions and for blended battalions to keep theirs is in blended brigades.


KevinB said:


> SSE also promised a Heavy Div to NATO for Europe, color me not impressed with a lot of the SSE demands, when compared to the actual reality of the CA on the ground.


I actually don't see that in the SSE. I've seen that discussed in F2025 literature but someone has yet to show me the definitive document that says that. What I see in SSE is i.e. "two sustained deployments of 500 - 1500 personnel, including one as a lead nation" etc language which speaks to me of battlegroups with an NCE/NSE "brigade" construct in some cases. That's why my focus is on more "deployable" brigade and battalion/regiment headquarters with plug an play companies. Believe me, that's not my optimum solution for real life but the one for what the SSE points us to.


KevinB said:


> Looking at the PY's - the current Cdn CMBG model allows for 2 of those to be filled with Regular Force personnel - yes it is bloated and x1.5-2 of what most other Bde consist of - but even if you have 8 properly staffed Bde's - you don't have any troops to fill them.
> All I see is the CA HQ Cart attempting to pull a horse.


This reminds me of my trip to Italy with a mule equipped mountain artillery regiment at a time where everyone up to and including the ranks of sergeant and second lieutenants were draftees who serve a year. The guys who took the longest training were the mule drivers and not the sergeants or officers. Mule production itself was very lengthy as first you had to get a horse and a donkey together in a field and then wait.

My point here is that there are certain choke points in career development where you either have trained staff in place or you need to get a donkey and a horse together in a field in order to produce the right staff officer for the job. A lot of the young privates who went to Afghanistan were fresh off of their DP1 infantry training when they started their predeployment training. You can generate the necessary privates and even corporals and 2nd lieutenants given a year or so lead time but unless you have sufficient rained sergeants and captains and above it's hard to put any mass together above a company. That takes time and a combination of book learning and experience to get there.

I think we need to see more brigade and battalion HQs because at the rate we are going (especially with our short six month tours) our critical middle management is seeing itself coming and going on deployments and burning out without the ability to regenerate properly. I think the only way that you can fix that is to slow down those deployments for individual units and give them time to progress naturally during training.

I also worry about the lower ranks but they're not as heavily involved as the middle leadership. In effect the Ukraine is instructor level ranks and Latvia is just a company plus so their pace is currently not as challenging.


KevinB said:


> I fully embrace the 70/30 or 30/70 outlook, but I don't see the Bodies available for more than 4 Bde total.


I'm looking purely at total PYs and ResF paid ceilings and not the actual numbers we're short. IMHO, if the situation is as dire as some on this site (who have much better information than I do) say it is then a whole lot of our senior leadership needs firing. There are armies large enough to absorb such losses for a while but we're not one of them. I lived through the massive downsizing of the late Sixties and early Seventies which caused massive rank stagnation which itself resulted in good people voting with their feet. It, like cutting capabilities, is very hard to recover from.

Let's just say my model is "aspirational" based on available numbers. It is far from simple to achieve under the present unfit for purpose system.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Back to my favourite model for a Militia.  Although there is a permanent command and suppor structured the highest rank for a volunteer (all unpaid) is that of Captain, commanding a regional company.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Home Guard (Denmark)
> 
> 
> The Danish Home Guard (Danish language: Hjemmeværnet ) (HJV) is the fourth service of the Danish military, formerly concerned only with the defence of Danish territory, but since 2008, it has also supported the Danish military efforts in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Service is voluntary and unpaid...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> military-history.fandom.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I find the Infrastructure Home Guard particularly interesting
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Home Guard (Denmark) - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org




Interesting that as I re-read that bit about the history of the Danish Homeguard is that it is effectively the army of the Danish Parliament rather than the army of the Danish Government, which exists separately.

Kind of changes the dynamics and tensions in both the Armed Forces and on Parliament Hill (the Folketing) I would think.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Just sayin'....
> 
> In my business we are able to work with a couple of dozen clients concurrently across Canada, using email, Zoom and/or MS Teams, for fairly complex large scale projects involving high levels of change management and business performance improvement.
> 
> My clients, large, geographically and culturally diverse organizations, do the same in their businesses. Many of them have more employees than all of the reservists in Alberta and BC combined - that's full time employees.
> 
> I have no idea why we need hundreds of full time staff to keep tabs on a couple of dozen part time units that already have, embedded, full time Reg F/ Class B staff in their HQs.


We agree entirely. In my thinking, for an army our size and other than Army headquarters itself, the recruiting and training system and the base support infrastructure, if a headquarters isn't designed, equipped and trained to be deployable, it shouldn't exist. 

There are enough RegF personnel in the divisional and reserve brigade HQs and RSS staff to fill all the leadership positions within my contemplated 30/70 battalions and their four (and I sometimes toy with an additional CSS brigade) brigade and additional battalion headquarters to make the changeover PY neutral. They may need to weed out the physically unfit though.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

> I'm looking at the mech side which should provide six LAV battalions (or more accurately 18 LAV companies). And I agree that a LAV isn't an IFV but that's enough for two Stryker brigades. the third brigade is light and at this point (barring the above CS equipment) we're at the equipment level of an IBCT - so that gives us three "equipped" brigades.



With respect FJAG I'm looking a 38 Coys in an SBCT.   13 of them are Close Combat Companies (10 Inf and 3 Cav) and 3 of them are Fires Companies.  

16 out of 38 with the remainder being Command and Support.





I'm closer to Kevin on this one.  One Reinforced Stryker Brigade is about our limit.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> We already have such a force in the Supplementary Reserve. The problem is that it is mostly unused and voluntary. One could easily change that by making it a term of service that any retired RegF or Primary Reserve soldier must serve in the Supplementary Reserve for X years. That's the easy part. The hard part is finding a role and the requisite equipment for them. (There's also that NDA provision which says that they can't be called out for training or duty unless they first consent or are placed on active service)
> 
> They are valuable for bulking up the Army when its committed full in and strapped for resources but it seems we've avoided situations like that since WW2.
> 
> For me the limitation is infrastructure and equipment. Unless you are looking at a pure labour pool activated Supp reservists must have  task to fulfill and equipment to do it with. I'm hard pressed to find a use for them beyond the filling in in combat or CS or CSS units that are short on manpower.



Agreement



FJAG said:


> I'm not and that's primarily because I think every element of the Army should be capable of combat and, if so, it should use terminology commensurate with that of our allies. It avoids confusion.
> 
> We already have LOs assigned to Provincial EMOs and Army, Bde and CJOC staff that have op plans to support domestic ops within their assigned territories. We are not a large enough organization to either need or afford separate administrative staffs solely for that function.
> 
> 🍻



And if that then separate the Army from the Militia.  And give the Militia a secondary wartime role in support of the Canadian Armed Forces (and not just the Army).

The Alternate Solution to the Defence Staff

Miller, Allard, Sharp, Dextraze, Theriault, Manson, Boyle, Henault, Lawson.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> With respect FJAG I'm looking a 38 Coys in an SBCT.   13 of them are Close Combat Companies (10 Inf and 3 Cav) and 3 of them are Fires Companies.
> 
> 16 out of 38 with the remainder being Command and Support.
> 
> 
> View attachment 68392
> 
> 
> I'm closer to Kevin on this one.  One Reinforced Stryker Brigade is about our limit.


If you take the three existing CMBGs and exchange the two mech battalions from one of those brigades with the two light battalions in the other two then you end up with three full brigades, one light and two mech with three battalions each. Each of those brigades will also have the command and control element and the assets of an engineer regiment, an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance regiment with some tanks added in, a HQ and Sigs sqn, and a service battalion. 

Its three full brigades - two mech and one light. Yes they are short guns and ATGMs and need to be brought up to strength with people but the equipment and command and control structure and the PY allocation is there. Each of the mech brigades is fully equipped with nine LAV companies (I'm not sure where you see the tenth in the SBCT). You should note that there is no longer an ATGM company in the SBCT engineer battalion. Further, the SBCT Cavalry squadron's recce cars are Strykers not much different from what we employ albeit that now the three armoured car troops are supported by a 12 gun MGS troop - we seem to be flirting in strange ways with tanks in that role while we also pretend that our LAVs measure up as IFVs. Obviously the SBCT and the reorganized mech brigade are not identical but close enough for government work and certainly equipped well enough to be considered a brigade.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Task and Purpose.... 

But a neat video by an ex-Stryker soldier who loved his ride on the Stryker, the BCT and the mods coming.






Best line.

"Our Army Sux.  But it doesn't suck as bad as the other guys!" 

And the follow up video?  "Who names a recoilless rifle Carl?"


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Task and Purpose....
> 
> But a neat video by an ex-Stryker soldier who loved his ride on the Stryker, the BCT and the mods coming.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Best line.
> 
> "Our Army Sux.  But it doesn't suck as bad as the other guys!"
> 
> And the follow up video?  "Who names a recoilless rifle Carl?"


That's actually a very good video. He's nailed the development and purpose and tactics of the Stryker very well. I've always thought of the difference between the unturreted Stryker v the turreted LAV and what this means as far as dismounts and small team tactics and employment goes. His brief comments about the basic Stryker and the Dragoon and the heavy v light Stryker brigades interesting - wish he'd gone further with that.


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> And the follow up video?  "Who names a recoilless rifle Carl?"



If he's going to dis the Carl Gustaf name, he should get his history right.  While the wpn is currently made by Saab Bofors Dynamics, that company (under that name) is relatively recent and came by the name (and this particularly product) through mergers and acquisitions.  The company (which dated from the early 1800s) that developed the 84mm was Carl Gustafs Stads Gevärsfaktori ("Rifle Factory of Carl Gustaf's Town").  That's who names a recoiless rifle Carl.

In the same vein . . . Who names a rifle Garand?


----------



## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:


> If he's going to dis the Carl Gustaf name, he should get his history right.  While the wpn is currently made by Saab Bofors Dynamics, that company (under that name) is relatively recent and came by the name (and this particularly product) through mergers and acquisitions.  The company (which dated from the early 1800s) that developed the 84mm was Carl Gustafs Stads Gevärsfaktori ("Rifle Factory of Carl Gustaf's Town").  That's who names a recoiless rifle Carl.
> 
> In the same vein . . . Who names a rifle Garand?



I couldn't finish watching the Carl video -the constant reference to it as a rocket launcher and launching rockets did me in.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I couldn't finish watching the Carl video -the constant reference to it as a rocket launcher and launching rockets did me in.


Most of the rounds down here are RAP - so he's partially right - as it is launching a rocket assisted projectile (what most would call a rocket)  - Also anyone who calls it "recoilless" rifle, I have a bone to pick with.   While it is rifled, the whole lack of recoil (especially when firing RAP rounds) isn't totally true - and the M3 and M4 versions significantly more than the M2.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Most of the rounds down here are RAP - so he's partially right - as it is launching a rocket assisted projectile (what most would call a rocket)  - Also anyone who calls it "recoilless" rifle, I have a bone to pick with.   While it is rifled, the whole lack of recoil (especially when firing RAP rounds) isn't totally true - and the M3 and M4 versions significantly more than the M2.



I can see that, I guess.   I suppose it would be particularly true if, in addition to the RAP rounds, you are also looking at the Confined Space rounds and the Guided Projectile.

It just that it grates on the ear after years of it being emphasized that the CG was not a "Bazooka", not a "Rocket Launcher" but a Recoilless Rifle.

I guess, these days, it isn't inappropriate to describe it as a Rifled Rocket Launcher.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> Only 26% of Canadian Rangers are indigenous, according to a 2019 statement by the Army Commander to a parliamentary committee. Whatever the Rangers are, and they are many things, they are not predominantly First Nations.




Your comment caught my attention and I went looking for the report.  The report apparently caught the attention of others.



			https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Lackenbauer_Rgr-Diversity-Statistics-final.pdf
		


It suggests an alternate reading of the information available would suggest



With representation among First Nations being particularly strong North of 60 (1 CRPG) and in North West Ontario (3 CRPG).   

5 CRPG is a bit anomalous for historical reasons.  The Rangers of Newfoundland are predominantly not indigenous there being a distinct lack of Beothuk residents on the Rock.

2 CRPG has a strong First Nations component.   I think the Lower St Lawrence Rangers may also have a strong non-indigenous component, again for historical reasons.

That leaves 4 CRPG, or BC and the Prairies as being worth taking another look at.

Regardless, identification of the Rangers with First Nations is not completely implausible.

The discussion actually has a knock on effect wrt Diversity and Recruiting in the CAF/CF.



With enhanced Ranger numbers and including the Rangers in the CAF structure then the indigenous participation rate rises





The Author:


*Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer:* Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University. He is on leave as a Professor in the Department of History at St. Jerome’s University in the University of Waterloo, Ontario, where he remains co-director of the Centre for Foreign Policy and Federalism. He is Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group based in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories. He is also a Fellow with the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary History at the University of Toronto; the Arctic Institute of North America; the Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; and an adjunct professor with the Mulroney Institute for Government at St. Francis Xavier University. Whitney specializes in Arctic security, sovereignty and governance issues, modern Canadian military and diplomatic history, and Aboriginal-state relations.
The Organization

NAADSN/RDSNAA addresses three core policy challenges – the Defence role in the Arctic, NORAD modernization and the future of North American defence, and the evolving role of major powers in global strategic competition – and their many intersection points by:


conducting leading-edge research with students, emerging scholars, and Northern stakeholders/rightsholders that tests core assumptions and prompts policy innovation
convening conferences, workshops, and symposia that bring together diverse stakeholders on issues of core interest to the Defence Team
educating the next generation of policy thinkers and analysts
Researchers work in multi-/inter-disciplinary research clusters organized across three scales (circumpolar and international security, defence of North America, and defence of Canada) and specific topic areas. Our network structure is deliberately elastic so that we can respond efficiently to emerging issues and mobilize small expert teams to present relevant and timely advice to the Defence Team.





__





						NAADSN – North American and Arctic Defense Security Network
					





					www.naadsn.ca


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> I actually don't see that in the SSE. I've seen that discussed in F2025 literature but someone has yet to show me the definitive document that says that. What I see in SSE is i.e. "two sustained deployments of 500 - 1500 personnel, including one as a lead nation" etc language which speaks to me of battlegroups with an NCE/NSE "brigade" construct in some cases.


It's in SSE, under the clause "_meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty_."


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> It's in SSE, under the clause "_meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty_."



So there is a NATO or Canadian Government document specifically referencing a Heavy Division and its deployment?


----------



## MilEME09

RangerRay said:


> As much as it pains me as a former member of a “battalion” that fielded close to a platoon once, I think the Reserves are long overdue for some unit consolidation. My old regiment with over 100 years of local history will likely disappear, but it would probably be for the best.  Maybe there’s a reason to have a bn HQ for a unit that struggles to field a platoon, but no one has been able to articulate one to me.


Luckily it's finally happened from what I've been reading


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Luckily it's finally happened from what I've been reading



Really? Where did you see any information about the consolidation of militia units?

I've only ever seen plans for expansion, usually wholly unsupported by organizational realities of course


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> Really? Where did you see any information about the consolidation of militia units?
> 
> I've only ever seen plans for expansion, usually wholly unsupported by organizational realities of course


F2025 is looking at different options but the end result is different flavourful of the same thing but units will keep their identity. Funny enough it's something suggested on here long ago


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> It's in SSE, under the clause "_meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty_."


Thanks. I've always taken that as referring to our general obligations under the NATO agreement.

Is there a specific agreement or tasking or MOU or something that spells out the specific obligation for a division?


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Thanks. I've always taken that as referring to our general obligations under the NATO agreement.
> 
> Is there a specific agreement or tasking or MOU or something that spells out the specific obligation for a division?


Part of the issue is the CA seems to think they have a Heavy Force in some areas already.

_The Canadian Army is an increasingly network-enabled, medium land force augmented by light and heavy forces. Its composition optimizes versatility across the spectrum of missions and unique environments. The medium force allows the Canadian Army to provide task-tailored forces ready to respond broadly to many conflict types. The light forces offer strategic and operational agility, especially in rapidly evolving situations and in complex terrain. The heavy capabilities remain essential to enabling combat-effective medium weight forces and sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise._


----------



## Good2Golf

A few MBTs…a Heavy Force. 

You know, like how the RCAF is a global strategic heavy lift airforce…C-17s and all… 😉


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Part of the issue is the CA seems to think they have a Heavy Force in some areas already.
> 
> _The Canadian Army is an increasingly network-enabled, medium land force augmented by light and heavy forces. Its composition optimizes versatility across the spectrum of missions and unique environments. The medium force allows the Canadian Army to provide task-tailored forces ready to respond broadly to many conflict types. The light forces offer strategic and operational agility, especially in rapidly evolving situations and in complex terrain. The heavy capabilities remain essential to enabling combat-effective medium weight forces and sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise._


Don't confuse "seem to think" with "putting a spin on things".

If you carefully parse the language at the end, "heavy capabilities" only means "we have some tanks" not "we have a heavy force". Similarly do not confuse "sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise" with "we have close combat capabilities". What it means is that we can practice for close combat with what we have; something in the nature of how armies prior to WW2 were practicing close armoured combat with plywood tanks mounted on cars. It does not say we can actually do close combat in a high intensity conflict.

I guess the real question is are they fooling themselves or just trying to fool others? The phrase "versatility across the spectrum of missions" goes a bit far IMHO.

And just let me say as an aside, I do think that LAV 6.0s with Leopards and even the limited artillery and other CS enablers that we have do have some utility (like a BTR equipped Motor Rifle Battalion has - less the artillery) but just not at the high end.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Don't confuse "seem to think" with "putting a spin on things".


Spun out of control ?


FJAG said:


> If you carefully parse the language at the end, "heavy capabilities" only means "we have some tanks" not "we have a heavy force". Similarly do not confuse "sustaining close combat manoeuvre expertise" with "we have close combat capabilities". What it means is that we can practice for close combat with what we have; something in the nature of how armies prior to WW2 were practicing close armoured combat with plywood tanks mounted on cars. It does not say we can actually do close combat in a high intensity conflict.
> 
> I guess the real question is are they fooling themselves or just trying to fool others? The phrase "versatility across the spectrum of missions" goes a bit far IMHO.
> 
> And just let me say as an aside, I do think that LAV 6.0s with Leopards and even the limited artillery and other CS enablers that we have do have some utility (like a BTR equipped Motor Rifle Battalion has - less the artillery) but just not at the high end.
> 
> 🍻


I agree with you, my main issue is when NATO asked for a Heavy Bde, the CAF, if being honest would have said, sorry we don't have that.
  We can offer X, Y, Z, but as we don't have a Heavy Bde - we can't give you blood from a stone.

 It is a Medium Bde (Minus some Key Enablers) with Tanks -- Heavium Brigade maybe?

Back when 4 CMBG was in Germany and the AMF(L) was a thing, the CA had a dual role, for a Heavy Bde and a Light Bde-, something went sideways in the last 30 years.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Spun out of control ?
> 
> I agree with you, my main issue is when NATO asked for a Heavy Bde, the CAF, if being honest would have said, sorry we don't have that.
> We can offer X, Y, Z, but as we don't have a Heavy Bde - we can't give you blood from a stone.
> 
> It is a Medium Bde (Minus some Key Enablers) with Tanks -- Heavium Brigade maybe?
> 
> Back when 4 CMBG was in Germany and the AMF(L) was a thing, the CA had a dual role, for a Heavy Bde and a Light Bde-, something went sideways in the last 30 years.



Kevin, can you point me in the direction of this agreement?  What exactly have we signed up for?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Kevin, can you point me in the direction of this agreement?  What exactly have we signed up for?


See PM


----------



## FJAG

While this article might fit better into the Brit Military thread, it raises many questions about the Future Soldier structure (and where the Brit Army has been) which are very relevant to the Canadian Army today and the F2025 construct. The dichotomy between a "useful" army and a "ready" army and whether one can be both at the same time is perhaps the biggest question ours needs to come to grips with.



> More range or more Rangers – the fight for the future of the British Army. »
> 
> 
> The British Army is at a cross roads. The army can't do everything, the question is: What does it want to do next?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> wavellroom.com



🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> While this article might fit better into the Brit Military thread, it raises many questions about the Future Soldier structure (and where the Brit Army has been) which are very relevant to the Canadian Army today and the F2025 construct. The dichotomy between a "useful" army and a "ready" army and whether one can be both at the same time is perhaps the biggest question ours needs to come to grips with.
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻



A useful Army is a ready Army, IMHO. These are not mutually exclusive.

Despite the challenges in the CAF, I wouldn't point to the UK as a great example of how to organize an Army.

Things like multiple rounds of regimental amalgamations, successfully avoided here, and cranking up 'special' brigades for tasks that seem to barely exist - to apparently mollify vicarious political whims and address questionable financial managment practises - are not great ways to 'run a railroad' as it were.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> A useful Army is a ready Army, IMHO. These are not mutually exclusive.
> 
> Despite the challenges in the CAF, I wouldn't point to the UK as a great example of how to organize an Army.
> 
> Things like multiple rounds of regimental amalgamations, successfully avoided here, and cranking up 'special' brigades for tasks that seem to barely exist - to apparently mollify vicarious political whims and address questionable financial managment practises - are not great ways to 'run a railroad' as it were.


Being a great believer in confirmation bias I took "ready" army and "useful" army to meet my definition of "army in reserve" and "day-to-day army" simply because that is the way that Army 2020 Refine was structured. Those I do believe to be mutually exclusive.

On the one hand you have a core of forces that are equipped for and train for high intensity warfare that you hope will never come and at the other end you have the light and medium rapid reaction forces that are deployed on the myriad of COIN or foreign assistance or UN peacekeeping missions that governments are so fond of rushing off to.

For me that forms the dividing line between where our ResF should be concentrated and where the RegF should be focused on (with an appropriate ratio of each with the other as required to make them effective)

I tend to agree with the other points you make. Size alone makes it difficult for us to use the Brits as a model. On the other hand size also makes it impossible to stay as a multipurpose force while specialization has a negative impact on career development, a factor that really impacts the RegF negatively.

As to amalgamation: the ResF needs it while the RegF would be well served by taking apart the three infantry regiments. I have a great deal of time for the American regimental system with its tiny unit badges which makes it very easy and accepted to have people posted wherever they are needed rather than kept inside regimental silos.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Being a great believer in confirmation bias I took "ready" army and "useful" army to meet my definition of "army in reserve" and "day-to-day army" simply because that is the way that Army 2020 Refine was structured. Those I do believe to be mutually exclusive.
> 
> On the one hand you have a core of forces that are equipped for and train for high intensity warfare that you hope will never come and at the other end you have the light and medium rapid reaction forces that are deployed on the myriad of COIN or foreign assistance or UN peacekeeping missions that governments are so fond of rushing off to.


110% 


FJAG said:


> For me that forms the dividing line between where our ResF should be concentrated and where the RegF should be focused on (with an appropriate ratio of each with the other as required to make them effective)


 This where the amalgamation aspect works - because you need some ready and some in reserve on both ends.



FJAG said:


> I tend to agree with the other points you make. Size alone makes it difficult for us to use the Brits as a model. On the other hand size also makes it impossible to stay as a multipurpose force while specialization has a negative impact on career development, a factor that really impacts the RegF negatively.


Multipurpose often means good at nothing...
   Or extremely expensive.  In the 80's and early 90's I think the CA had a very solid MultiPurpose Force - that could do Light, or Mech very well.
   Certain Specialization comes with the understanding that one will likely have slower career growth - but generally those going into those trades understand and accept that as part of the price.


FJAG said:


> As to amalgamation: the ResF needs it while the RegF would be well served by taking apart the three infantry regiments. I have a great deal of time for the American regimental system with its tiny unit badges which makes it very easy and accepted to have people posted wherever they are needed rather than kept inside regimental silos.
> 
> 🍻


I would not stop at just the Infantry - the Armoured in Canada can be almost as bad, and honestly the Reg Force Regimental Mafia issues are not nearly as bad as the Reserves.


However when you end up with a Mech (Heavy or Medium) entity - and a Light entity, there is going to be some clique built on that.   Or simply making all Infantry Light - and a Cavalry trade for those who crew the bus, but I don't think that works well.   The Artillery and Engineers seem to do okay when changing from Light Reg't to Mech though - so perhaps all that really needs to be done is #rd Inf Bn's and #'rd Armoured Regiments.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> so perhaps all that really needs to be done is #rd Inf Bn's and #'rd Armoured Regiments.


You know, I kind of like to stay with the old names of regiments that saw combat for this country. I always thought amalgamating the Reg F into three was a bit of a travesty in loosing the RegF QOR and Black Watch and even the 8CH and FGH - The Cdn Gds not so much because they were a recent, post war invention anyway.

The engineers and guns have differently numbered regiments and its easy to transfer between them because there isn't much accoutrement and badging stuff to change around. (The odd RCA to RCHA shoulder flash and blazer button)

If we had a standard uniform with removal cap badges and shoulder flashes on slip-ons with common career managers and a single point of promotion that would be good.

My guess is that we could eliminate much of the heartburn in amalgamating the ResF and injecting RegF command is if a given aggregated ResF battalion had companies from four different ResF regiments and each was allowed to retain some old regimental affiliation and maybe their old armoury and an honourary lieutenant colonel. I know, I know. It's silly but baby steps, baby steps. Negotiating change is making allies and knowing which battles are worth fighting and where you can make concessions without compromising the objective.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

Interesting thing to note CANFORGEN 010/22 came out a few days ago announcing a 2vyear pause on CAF participation In the Nijmegen march in order to focus on CAF reconstitution.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Interesting thing to note CANFORGEN 010/22 came out a few days ago announcing a 2vyear pause on CAF participation In the Nijmegen march in order to focus on CAF reconstitution.


Did they mention anything about shutting down any directorates in Ottawa? Asking for a friend.

😉


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Interesting thing to note CANFORGEN 010/22 came out a few days ago announcing a 2vyear pause on CAF participation In the Nijmegen march in order to focus on CAF reconstitution.



Of course, becasue going places where everyone regards Canadian troops as God-like saviours is a bad thing when you've donned the hair shirt


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Did they mention anything about shutting down any directorates in Ottawa? Asking for a friend.
> 
> 😉


That would require many of them to not work from home


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Did they mention anything about shutting down any directorates in Ottawa? Asking for a friend.
> 
> 😉


They would probably stand more up to study the effects of pausing non core tasks


----------



## Good2Golf

MilEME09 said:


> They would probably stand more up to study the effects of pausing non core tasks


How many PYs are expended working the Army Ball and staffing the associated honours and awards each year? 🤔


----------



## Ostrozac

Good2Golf said:


> How many PYs are expended working the Army Ball and staffing the associated honours and awards each year? 🤔


The Army Ball at least has an achievable objective — to raise the profile of the Army at the expense of the other L1s. Hence why the RCAF has retaliated with the Air Force Ball, in a seemingly never ending arms race of inter-command posturing.

I do wonder how many Hilton reward points you get from booking a ballroom. I’m sure the RCAF know.


----------



## Good2Golf

The Army knows for sure.  

Not sure the Air Force has handed out any OMMs yet…


----------



## MilEME09

If reconstitution is such an important task right now, as it should be. One would hope a lot more is on the chopping block while we reorganize. One of the major objectives of F2025 is to move more PYs to the schools to increase our through put by no longer having boom and bust cycles of avaliable personal. By making the schools always fully manned the other units will eventually equal out as we start getting bodies through courses.


----------



## GR66

So here's a possible Force 2025 structure that takes into account some of the points raised by various members on here.

There are too many headquarters
The Reg Force units are under staffed
The Reg Force is stuck in the fuzzy middle...not heavy enough for a peer fight and too heavy for rapid deployment
We are missing several key enablers to make us a combat effective force
There are too may Reserve units for the number of Reservists we have
The Reserves are under equipped (unequipped?) to fulfill any type of useful combat role
Our logistics system has difficulty supporting deployed forces of any significant size.
This proposed force structure attempts to solve some of these problems (or at least start us on the path of solving these problems) by taking the following steps.


Maintaining 3 x Divisional HQ.  This is both for administrative purposes due to the geographical distribution of our forces in peacetime, but also to maintain the core ability to command a deployed Division as the long term aspirational goal.
Eliminating the Brigade Level HQs for the Reserves and bringing the units under the command umbrella of the Reg Force Brigades.  The manpower savings can be fed back into the combat units & schools.
Concentrating our heavier forces (1 x Tank Regiment, 3 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions and an Artillery Regiment equipped with an SP 155mm Howitzer) in 1 Brigade to concentrate on a conventional, European-style peer conflict and our light forces (using air-transportable vehicles and M777s in the Artillery Regiment) in 2 Brigade to concentrate on a potential dispersed, Pacific-style peer conflict.
5 Brigade would transform into a Fire Support Brigade type of structure supplying the other two Brigades with the types of combat support roles that the CF is currently missing.
12 RBC would be a Recce Regiment combining both surveillance vehicles and expanding to include UAVs launching vehicles to provide Brigade-level recce assets.
1 R22eR would stay as a Mechanized Infantry Battalion in order to provide security for the FS Brigade and/or a 4th Mechanized Battalion for 1 Brigade for strategic depth.
2 R22eR would convert to an Anti-Tank Battalion.  They could start with dismounted TOW/Carl-G teams mounted in standard LAV6.0's until a dedicated ATGM vehicle solution is procured.  A good potential option is replacing the LAV turrets with the same RWiP used on the US Army's Stryker IM-SHORAD which can mount various combinations of AT missiles (TOW, Javelin, Hellfire, etc.)
3 R22eR would convert to a SHORAD Battalion.  Ideally I'd have their LAV turrets replaced with the same RWS as the Stryker IM-SHORAD to maintain commonality with our major ally.  In the short term we could purchase some Stinger Missiles and establish an interim capability with dismounted AD missiles teams mounted in LAV 6.0's.  
5 RALC would become our long-range precision fires unit with the purchase of HIMARS for the Regiment.
The AT and SHORAD Battalions should require less manpower than an Infantry Battalion so the PY's saved could be fed back into the combat units & schools.

There are enough Reserve Units in each Divisional area that they could be amalgamated into force generators for 2 x Combined Arms Light Battle Groups per Reg Force Brigade (plus a single additional Battle Group for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade).  
Each Battle Group would have a mixed Reg Force/Reserve Command Element as well as the following additional units:
2-3 Reserve Armoured Regiments per Battle Group to force generate an Armoured Squadron
5-6 Reserve Infantry Regiments to force generate 2 x Infantry Companies and a Combat Support Company
2 x Reserve Artillery Regiments/Ind. Batteries (with minor exceptions) to force generate an Artillery Battery
1 x Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment to force generate an Engineer Platoon
1 x Reserve Signal Regiment to force generate a Signal Platoon
1 x Reserve Service Battalion for force generate a Forward Support Company

This structure would provide an attainable mobilization goal for Reserve units to force generate sub-sub units in order to field a Reserve Battle Group as part of a Reg Force Brigade...or provide the same sub-sub units as augmentees to a Reg Force deployment.  
This also leaves enough Reserve Regiments to provide mobilization augmentation to Reg Force Units:
2-4 Reserve Infantry Regiments to provide a 4th Rifle Company to the Reg Force Light Infantry Battalions
2 x Reserve Armoured Regiments to man a 4th (Reserve) Tank Squadron for Lord Strathcona's Horse
1 x Reserve Signal Regiment to augment the Signal Squadrons of each Reg Force Brigade HQ
2-3 Reserve Artillery Regiments/Ind. Batteries to man a 3rd Battery for each of the Reg Force Howitzer Regiments
1 x Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment to augment each Reg Force Combat Engineer Regiment
1 x Reserve Service Battalion to augment each Reg Force Service Battalion


Once this basic structure is in place it can be used to expand the capabilities of both the Reg Force and the Reserves.

If the Reg Force Mechanized Battalions ever get a proper IFV then the 1 Brigade/5 Brigade Reserve units could take over the LAV 6.0's
The 1 Brigade Reserve Artillery Regiments could take on the same SP 155mm Howitzer as 1 RCHA.
Each 2 Brigade Artillery Battery could be equipped with 6 x M777's (5 x Batteries = 30 guns total) which is totally doable with our existing stocks.
Alternately the Reserve Battle Groups could specialize for specific roles (Arctic Warfare, Mountain Warfare, Airborne/Air Mobile, AT, SHORAD, etc.)
Eventually, if the Reserve Force transformation works well and the units can reliably force generate combat effective Battle Groups, then with some expansion (and proper equipment) those Battle Groups could transform into a 2nd (Reserve) Brigade within each Division.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> So here's a possible Force 2025 structure that takes into account some of the points raised by various members on here.
> 
> There are too many headquarters
> The Reg Force units are under staffed
> The Reg Force is stuck in the fuzzy middle...not heavy enough for a peer fight and too heavy for rapid deployment
> We are missing several key enablers to make us a combat effective force
> There are too may Reserve units for the number of Reservists we have
> The Reserves are under equipped (unequipped?) to fulfill any type of useful combat role
> Our logistics system has difficulty supporting deployed forces of any significant size.
> This proposed force structure attempts to solve some of these problems (or at least start us on the path of solving these problems) by taking the following steps.
> 
> 
> Maintaining 3 x Divisional HQ.  This is both for administrative purposes due to the geographical distribution of our forces in peacetime, but also to maintain the core ability to command a deployed Division as the long term aspirational goal.
> Eliminating the Brigade Level HQs for the Reserves and bringing the units under the command umbrella of the Reg Force Brigades.  The manpower savings can be fed back into the combat units & schools.
> Concentrating our heavier forces (1 x Tank Regiment, 3 x Mechanized Infantry Battalions and an Artillery Regiment equipped with an SP 155mm Howitzer) in 1 Brigade to concentrate on a conventional, European-style peer conflict and our light forces (using air-transportable vehicles and M777s in the Artillery Regiment) in 2 Brigade to concentrate on a potential dispersed, Pacific-style peer conflict.
> 5 Brigade would transform into a Fire Support Brigade type of structure supplying the other two Brigades with the types of combat support roles that the CF is currently missing.
> 12 RBC would be a Recce Regiment combining both surveillance vehicles and expanding to include UAVs launching vehicles to provide Brigade-level recce assets.
> 1 R22eR would stay as a Mechanized Infantry Battalion in order to provide security for the FS Brigade and/or a 4th Mechanized Battalion for 1 Brigade for strategic depth.
> 2 R22eR would convert to an Anti-Tank Battalion.  They could start with dismounted TOW/Carl-G teams mounted in standard LAV6.0's until a dedicated ATGM vehicle solution is procured.  A good potential option is replacing the LAV turrets with the same RWiP used on the US Army's Stryker IM-SHORAD which can mount various combinations of AT missiles (TOW, Javelin, Hellfire, etc.)
> 3 R22eR would convert to a SHORAD Battalion.  Ideally I'd have their LAV turrets replaced with the same RWS as the Stryker IM-SHORAD to maintain commonality with our major ally.  In the short term we could purchase some Stinger Missiles and establish an interim capability with dismounted AD missiles teams mounted in LAV 6.0's.
> 5 RALC would become our long-range precision fires unit with the purchase of HIMARS for the Regiment.
> The AT and SHORAD Battalions should require less manpower than an Infantry Battalion so the PY's saved could be fed back into the combat units & schools.
> 
> There are enough Reserve Units in each Divisional area that they could be amalgamated into force generators for 2 x Combined Arms Light Battle Groups per Reg Force Brigade (plus a single additional Battle Group for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade).
> Each Battle Group would have a mixed Reg Force/Reserve Command Element as well as the following additional units:
> 2-3 Reserve Armoured Regiments per Battle Group to force generate an Armoured Squadron
> 5-6 Reserve Infantry Regiments to force generate 2 x Infantry Companies and a Combat Support Company
> 2 x Reserve Artillery Regiments/Ind. Batteries (with minor exceptions) to force generate an Artillery Battery
> 1 x Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment to force generate an Engineer Platoon
> 1 x Reserve Signal Regiment to force generate a Signal Platoon
> 1 x Reserve Service Battalion for force generate a Forward Support Company
> 
> This structure would provide an attainable mobilization goal for Reserve units to force generate sub-sub units in order to field a Reserve Battle Group as part of a Reg Force Brigade...or provide the same sub-sub units as augmentees to a Reg Force deployment.
> This also leaves enough Reserve Regiments to provide mobilization augmentation to Reg Force Units:
> 2-4 Reserve Infantry Regiments to provide a 4th Rifle Company to the Reg Force Light Infantry Battalions
> 2 x Reserve Armoured Regiments to man a 4th (Reserve) Tank Squadron for Lord Strathcona's Horse
> 1 x Reserve Signal Regiment to augment the Signal Squadrons of each Reg Force Brigade HQ
> 2-3 Reserve Artillery Regiments/Ind. Batteries to man a 3rd Battery for each of the Reg Force Howitzer Regiments
> 1 x Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment to augment each Reg Force Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1 x Reserve Service Battalion to augment each Reg Force Service Battalion
> 
> 
> Once this basic structure is in place it can be used to expand the capabilities of both the Reg Force and the Reserves.
> 
> If the Reg Force Mechanized Battalions ever get a proper IFV then the 1 Brigade/5 Brigade Reserve units could take over the LAV 6.0's
> The 1 Brigade Reserve Artillery Regiments could take on the same SP 155mm Howitzer as 1 RCHA.
> Each 2 Brigade Artillery Battery could be equipped with 6 x M777's (5 x Batteries = 30 guns total) which is totally doable with our existing stocks.
> Alternately the Reserve Battle Groups could specialize for specific roles (Arctic Warfare, Mountain Warfare, Airborne/Air Mobile, AT, SHORAD, etc.)
> Eventually, if the Reserve Force transformation works well and the units can reliably force generate combat effective Battle Groups, then with some expansion (and proper equipment) those Battle Groups could transform into a 2nd (Reserve) Brigade within each Division.
> View attachment 68517




I vacillate, in case you haven't noticed, between 'the Reserves can be relied upon as a supply chain of qualified troops for the Reg F' to 'you are out of your friggin' mind'.

Just looking at my old unit, from year to year, readiness levels swing wildly from good to awful, all mainly based on who is available to fill what positions. 

Things could be looking really good and then, after a couple of retirements and a couple of other people stop showing up for whatever reason, you could be back in rebuilding mode. Seriously, if 4 - 6 key leads (at whatever level) disappear, you could go right back to square 1. If you are also unlucky enough to have a lousy CO/RSM etc, which is highly likley more than 50% of the time, adverse impacts are astronomically worse as people vote with their feet.

It's a very fragile and unreliable way to run a combat capability, no matter how many full timers you post in.

All that to say .... IMHO anyone who builds an org chart relying on The 43rd Underground Blloon Regiment to reliably provide a Pl/Tp/Coy/Sqn etc, given the current terms of service and leadership quality control, for Class A reservists is making a big mistake.


----------



## Ostrozac

GR66 said:


> So here's a possible Force 2025 structure that takes into account some of the points raised by various members on here.


Putting the administration of reserve units under the regular force brigade headquarters completely removes the ability of that headquarters and it’s commander to deploy to the field as a fighting headquarters. It would instead become purely administrative, keeping track of the needs and admin of dozens of reserve units in addition to the 8 regular units already assigned. Unless you give it a huge nondeployable brigade (rear) element — but that’s just confusing.

I can remember when all of the brigade headquarters were direct reports to Mobile Command HQ in St Hubert, I’d bring back that model, keep the reserve brigade HQs for now and disband all 4 of of the division HQs in the army. Those middleman headquarters, full of staff officers, are an expensive manpower burden, and don’t seem to give much value added to the Army.


----------



## MilEME09

Part of the problem with the reserves and their BTS, atleast to me is, on paper you can say we are trained to XYZ standard but are we really? I've seen it before where the bare minimum is planned and executed to get a check in a box. Is there an organization I'm the CAF that preforms spot checks on units to ensure the training is actually being carried out correct? Sort of like standards does for the conduct of courses? If not, while I loath new organizations, perhaps something like that is needed for the reserves to make sure troops are trained to an acceptable level.

I also agree reserves CBG hqs need to go, the purpose they serve would likely be better served if there was a reserve cell at the div level to coordinate all reserve activities.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> So here's a possible Force 2025 structure that takes into account some of the points raised by various members on here.


Just having a quick look at this one, I see a lot of positives here. In a lot of ways this structure (at least within the brigades) mimics the Brits' Army 2020 Refine. I'm not sure how well their having reserve "feeder" battalions within RegF brigades works out in practice but it would seem they liked it enough so that they have stayed with the concept for 3 UK Div for Future Soldier.

Two off the top comments is that the Div HQs are superfluous. Yes there needs to be an admin wing to look after numerous issues such as fixed facilities and personnel management that will allow the brigade to be free to concentrate on its warfighting role, but I think that can be an organization that is subordinate to the brigade or alternatively subordinate to Army HQ and with overarching authority over all of Canada. An intermediate HQ between 3 brigades and Army HQ is not necessary.

At the risk of incurring KevinB's ire, I believe you need additional brigade HQs. They need to be RegF and deployable. Three is too few if any of them are sent on actual deployments to manage expeditionary deployments. Even at nine month rotations, that pace can't be kept up without degrading the rest of the brigade through lack of leadership. The Army is large enough to justify a "few" more than 3 manoeuvre brigade HQs 



daftandbarmy said:


> I vacillate, in case you haven't noticed, between 'the Reserves can be relied upon as a supply chain of qualified troops for the Reg F' to 'you are out of your friggin' mind'.


The "you are out of your friggin' mind" aspect only applies if the Army continues on with its seventy year old program to not address the elephant in the room. Anyone who maintains the current reserve system is "out of their friggin' mind" and should be fired out of hand as either CDS or CLS. How well a transformed reserve system would work depends very much on the degree to which the transformation goes. "Fine tuning" will not work.



MilEME09 said:


> I also agree reserves CBG hqs need to go, the purpose they serve would likely be better served if there was a reserve cell at the div level to coordinate all reserve activities.


Yes. "Reserve CBGs" need to go but see my comment above about needing a few more deployable brigade headquarters. 



Ostrozac said:


> I can remember when all of the brigade headquarters were direct reports to Mobile Command HQ in St Hubert, I’d bring back that model, keep the reserve brigade HQs for now and disband all 4 of of the division HQs in the army. Those middleman headquarters, full of staff officers, are an expensive manpower burden, and don’t seem to give much value added to the Army.


I agree that all brigades should report direct to the Army HQ. I agree that the Div HQ need to disappear with the exception that CJOC should have the capability to deploy a div level HQ using its own staff and CFJSR resources. I think the sooner that we reduce the CBGs to maybe 3 or 4 but with deployable RegF staff the better.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> Maintaining 3 x Divisional HQ.  This is both for administrative purposes due to the geographical distribution of our forces in peacetime, but also to maintain the core ability to command a deployed Division as the long term aspirational goal.


Your organization has created a span of control fiasco in both ways.  Why would you want a HQ to command a single brigade?  What would it do, aside from be a mailbox.  Conversely, your brigades have too much, and would be neutered by the span of control they are responsible for.



FJAG said:


> I agree that all brigades should report direct to the Army HQ.


This fundamentally misses the point of what Army HQ is supposed to be doing, and would only inhibit its ability to see farther then the end of its nose.


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## Brad Sallows

> Things could be looking really good and then, after a couple of retirements and a couple of other people stop showing up for whatever reason, you could be back in rebuilding mode.



Amen.  Sudden budget cut from on high or necessitated by one unit wildly overspending leads to a couple of months of cancelled training.  People go on a roto, come home, apply for CT or to work with a federal agency.  Wildly variable leadership.  People posted in who don't play well with others.  People finish undergrad degrees and move to different cities to continue education or start work.  Get stiffed one year on recruiting or entry-level courses.  Etc.

Units aren't large enough to easily tolerate disruptions or provide a feed of consistently competent and ethical leaders all the way to the top of the over-promotion chain.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Go back to district HQs.  Stop calling the Res F formations "brigades" and eliminate the temptation to mimic brigades in structure and purpose and aspirations of the people therein.  Redesign the district HQs for exactly what they need to do: Res F, and maybe some assistance prep.  Downstream from that, deduce what the next level above district HQs should be other than "divisions".


----------



## MilEME09

Brad Sallows said:


> Go back to district HQs.  Stop calling the Res F formations "brigades" and eliminate the temptation to mimic brigades in structure and purpose and aspirations of the people therein.  Redesign the district HQs for exactly what they need to do: Res F, and maybe some assistance prep.  Downstream from that, deduce what the next level above district HQs should be other than "divisions".


I'd renaming something really solving the problem? We don't need to change the names of anything, we need to actually be realistic eith what we have. I feel like NDHQ is becoming like the Germany armys command bunker in Berlin  in 1945, commanding fictional formations that are no where near what they actually are.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> I'd renaming something really solving the problem? We don't need to change the names of anything, we need to actually be realistic eith what we have. I feel like NDHQ is becoming like the Germany armys command bunker in Berlin  in 1945, commanding fictional formations that are no where near what they actually are.



And that problem is made worse with mythical brigades commanded by Colonels (acting, unpaid Brigadiers).  Brad is right.  The Reserves are not going to generate Brigades in peacetime or in war.  At least not the Brigades that are being talked about here.  And I have no idea what the future Brigade will look like either.

They are regional administrations.  The head of HR should be retasked as a proper military office - Adjutant-General - and the districts and regions reassigned to their direct command.

Primary responsibility - maintaining a supply of trained troops and ensuring they know the individual capabilities and availability of those under their command.


----------



## Kirkhill

Adjutant-General to the Forces - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> And that problem is made worse with mythical brigades commanded by Colonels (acting, unpaid Brigadiers).  Brad is right.  The Reserves are not going to generate Brigades in peacetime or in war.  At least not the Brigades that are being talked about here.  And I have no idea what the future Brigade will look like either.
> 
> They are regional administrations.  The head of HR should be retasked as a proper military office - Adjutant-General - and the districts and regions reassigned to their direct command.
> 
> Primary responsibility - maintaining a supply of trained troops and ensuring they know the individual capabilities and availability of those under their command.



But what about the career aspirations of retired Reg F Captains who join the militia so they can become a Junior General?


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## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> But what about the career aspirations of retired Reg F Captains who join the militia so they can become a Junior General?



There is more money as a pundit.  And probably more free drinks in the mess.









						B. H. Liddell Hart - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> This fundamentally misses the point of what Army HQ is supposed to be doing, and would only inhibit its ability to see farther then the end of its nose.


I don't see that as an issue. The Army HQ already has many functions including force development; requirement definition and fulfillment; training; infrastructure management; personnel management and several others. I fail to see what added value an administrative intermediate "divisional" headquarters brings to the table beyond creating regional stovepipes. There clearly are "regional" requirements but these could be handled in other ways (such as an adjunct of the four RegF brigades or an added or expanded element of the Army HQ itself.) Army HQ should be able to separate its forward leaning activities from the management of its current ones.

I know that a headquarters, once created, will find numerous ways of justifying its existence but doesn't mean it should continue indefinitely. The fact of the matter is that there hasn't always been an intermediate level headquarters between the brigades and the Army HQ. Prior to the area Land Force HQs in 1991 RegF brigades reported directly to Mobile Command which also managed the Army's infrastructure directly. Militia units reported through district to area HQs but their role was limited. 

IMHO the 1991 reorganization was a "shuffle of the deck chairs on the Titanic" scenario while the 2013 reshuffle to Div HQs was a "lipstick" exercise. These brought a veneer of integration of RegF and ResF elements to the table but without any concrete changes.

I don't know how much smaller the Army is today from when Force Mobile Command and Mobile Command existed but the CF RegF shrank from over 120,000 just before unification to 88,000 in 1989 to an authorized strength of 71,500 today. Why we need ever more nondeployable headquarters and people in nondeployable headquarters as the size of the military declines escapes me.

I'm sure there are reasons for the divisional headquarters but I see it hard to justify them to a reasonable, disinterested third party considering the circumstances of the CF as a whole.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

> I'd renaming something really solving the problem?



It changes the perception of what the "something" should be.  We had areas when I joined, and districts at some earlier time.  A question is, why the name change to "brigade" if it wasn't meant to mean something?  But I do remember how enthusiastically some of the officer crowd talked about being a "brigade" and training as a "brigade" and exercising as a "brigade".  Ask some of the people who attended how well the "brigade" performed during the 1990 summer concentration in Wainwright.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> It changes the perception of what the "something" should be.  We had areas when I joined, and districts at some earlier time.  A question is, why the name change to "brigade" if it wasn't meant to mean something?  But I do remember how enthusiastically some of the officer crowd talked about being a "brigade" and training as a "brigade" and exercising as a "brigade".  Ask some of the people who attended how well the "brigade" performed during the 1990 summer concentration in Wainwright.


So we shouldn't bring up the four divisions?


----------



## MilEME09

Brad Sallows said:


> It changes the perception of what the "something" should be.  We had areas when I joined, and districts at some earlier time.  A question is, why the name change to "brigade" if it wasn't meant to mean something?  But I do remember how enthusiastically some of the officer crowd talked about being a "brigade" and training as a "brigade" and exercising as a "brigade".  Ask some of the people who attended how well the "brigade" performed during the 1990 summer concentration in Wainwright.


Then really we should just call reserve brigade's administrative groups (since battle group implies they deploy into combat), reduce all units to company's in actuality since they are in paper any way. Only 1 LCol per admin group, every other unit is commanded by a captain or major.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Your organization has created a span of control fiasco in both ways.  Why would you want a HQ to command a single brigade?  What would it do, aside from be a mailbox.  Conversely, your brigades have too much, and would be neutered by the span of control they are responsible for.


Those are really big Bde's  = even more me, the Mini-Div Brigade guy.


Infanteer said:


> This fundamentally misses the point of what Army HQ is supposed to be doing, and would only inhibit its ability to see farther then the end of its nose.


When your Army isn't much more than 3 real Brigades- what is Army HQ doing that is occupying them so much?
   It definitely isn't planning for the future - because if it is, well I can find a lot more PY to axe from HQ's


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Then really we should just call reserve brigade's administrative groups (since battle group implies they deploy into combat), reduce all units to company's in actuality since they are in paper any way. Only 1 LCol per admin group, every other unit is commanded by a captain or major.


You all know my preference: restructure them as real deployable entities. DO NOT MAKE ANY MORE ADMIN HQs. 

😣


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> It changes the perception of what the "something" should be.  We had areas when I joined, and districts at some earlier time.  A question is, why the name change to "brigade" if it wasn't meant to mean something?  But I do remember how enthusiastically some of the officer crowd talked about being a "brigade" and training as a "brigade" and exercising as a "brigade".  Ask some of the people who attended how well the "brigade" performed during the 1990 summer concentration in Wainwright.



On Guard/ Oh God 90.... I was there. What a mess. That, and the 'Waincon' I attended in '91, convinced me to never go back.  

I was told that the exercise in '89 was pretty good though, so experiences may vary....


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> On Guard/ Oh God 90.... I was there. What a mess. That, and the 'Waincon' I attended in '91, convinced me to never go back.
> 
> I was told that the exercise in '89 was pretty good though, so experiences may vary....


Can't speak for the infantry and recce, but when you have a couple of full Militia batteries firing as a regiment, that feels pretty good.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Can't speak for the infantry and recce, but when you have a couple of full Militia batteries firing as a regiment, that feels pretty good.



As I recall we were just - as independent companies - bounced from 'stand to stand' with no Battle Prep, advanced warning, or rehearsals in a way that I felt humiliated most people and resulted in very little learning or improvement opportunities. 

Where there was a BGp/Bde context, higher HQ was pretty much completely absent, or useless. 

If I was to follow the example of my higher level commanders I would have, for example, left my troops in the field to go for a shower (while they wallowed in mud) whenever I felt like it, which I did not do of course.

But yeah, train to excite. Or Incite


----------



## markppcli

Brad Sallows said:


> Amen.  Sudden budget cut from on high or necessitated by one unit wildly overspending leads to a couple of months of cancelled training.  People go on a roto, come home, apply for CT or to work with a federal agency.  Wildly variable leadership.  People posted in who don't play well with others.  People finish undergrad degrees and move to different cities to continue education or start work.  Get stiffed one year on recruiting or entry-level courses.  Etc.
> 
> Units aren't large enough to easily tolerate disruptions or provide a feed of consistently competent and ethical leaders all the way to the top of the over-promotion chain.


This is why we need to stop obsessing about one town, on armpit, one Regiment with regional recruiting boundaries and have soldiers report to training centres for their reserve training. If Toronto can support 2 Bns, fantastic they have two Bns training out of their depots. If the whole of the interior of BC needs to mass for a weekend a month instead of every Thursday to hit a reasonable critical mass, that’s what we should do. But all of these requires a look at the reserves mission, and a strong re-examine of if their structure fits that mission. I can’t imagine the answer is yes.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> As I recall we were just - as independent companies - bounced from 'stand to stand' with no Battle Prep, advanced warning, or rehearsals in a way that I felt humiliated most people and resulted in very little learning or improvement opportunities.



That too.  A couple of seasoned people not inclined to play along with silly schemes summed it up as, "We were set up to fail".


----------



## Mortar guy

Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?


----------



## Good2Golf

Mortar guy said:


> Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?


MG, it’s a baseline so that Army leadership can put an “improve things with a robust development plan” spin on FORCE 2030…


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> This is why we need to stop obsessing about one town, on armpit, one Regiment with* regional recruiting boundaries and have soldiers report to training centres for their reserve training*. If Toronto can support 2 Bns, fantastic they have two Bns training out of their depots. If the whole of the interior of BC needs to mass for a weekend a month instead of every Thursday to hit a reasonable critical mass, that’s what we should do. But all of these requires a look at the reserves mission, and a strong re-examine of if their structure fits that mission. I can’t imagine the answer is yes.



This kind of happens right now where, for example, BMQ is run out of the armoury in Nanaimo and units contribute instructors based on whether they have recruits going through training or not.


----------



## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> This kind of happens right now where, for example, BMQ is run out of the armoury in Nanaimo and units contribute instructors based on whether they have recruits going through training or not.


Pretty similar in calgary, though I believe here it is asked that every unit provide atleast one instructor to the battle school. Sometimes that doesn't happen though due to other conflicts, like when you are asked to run a Driver Wheeled, MSVS course, and a CRTT course but somehow find a spare MCpl or Sgt to help a BMQ without affecting unit training.....


----------



## McG

Mortar guy said:


> Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB


I have not seen anything saying this Bn is being given to CANSOF.  Instead of three light battalions done half-assed, the Army is saying it will do one right ... which should mean properly structured resourced CS and CSS to go with it for the first time since the 90's.  There is a role for such a unit, we just need a little institutional discipline to not allow individual COs to prance-off after a personal fantasy of pseudo-SOF.


----------



## Mortar guy

McG said:


> I have not seen anything saying this Bn is being given to CANSOF. Instead of three light battalions done half-assed, the Army is saying it will do one right ... which should mean properly structured resourced CS and CSS to go with it for the first time since the 90's. There is a role for such a unit, we just need a little institutional discipline to not allow individual COs to prance-off after a personal fantasy of pseudo-SOF.


OK, so "gets a LIB" is unclear. On the presentations I have seen it shows the one and only LIB as "earmarked for SOF support" - albeit under CCSB. Also, the structure presented is hardly properly structured and resourced - small rifle sections, small weapons platoons in the rifle coys, small mor pls (only 6 tubes), small DFS platoon (3 sects vice doctrinal 6). Don't let anyone blow smoke where they shouldn't - the RCIC is being decimated for no appreciable gain in combat capability anywhere. Our Army will be hollowed out so we can build faddish, boutique units that are too precious or specialized to deploy - all enablers and no enabled.


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> I don't see that as an issue. The Army HQ already has many functions including force development; requirement definition and fulfillment; training; infrastructure management; personnel management and several others. I fail to see what added value an administrative intermediate "divisional" headquarters brings to the table beyond creating regional stovepipes. There clearly are "regional" requirements but these could be handled in other ways (such as an adjunct of the four RegF brigades or an added or expanded element of the Army HQ itself.) Army HQ should be able to separate its forward leaning activities from the management of its current ones.



I'll throw the challenge out to those arguing that the Divisions/Areas/Whatever in the CA are superflous.  If your brigades are focused on managing the generation of combat power, and the CA is focused on corporate requirements, business planning, and force development, why would you eliminate a layer of HQ that handles the following (paraphrasing from a previous experienced poster):

Provides proper "span of control" to the CA's numerous Regular and Reserve formations;
Provides a regional structure for Dom Ops, and speaks with the provinces;
Manages infrastructure and interfaces with Real Property Management;
Manages the Reserves and much of its administration.
If you think this is going to be centrally managed from Ottawa, or handled by a CMBG, then I'd counter that your argument fails to consider what each echelon of command does from day-to-day.


----------



## Infanteer

Mortar guy said:


> the RCIC is being decimated for no appreciable gain in combat capability anywhere. Our Army will be hollowed out so we can build faddish, boutique units that are too precious or specialized to deploy - all enablers and no enabled.


How many PYs is the infantry losing?


----------



## Ostrozac

A single small light unit, parked off to the side of an otherwise motorized force? That will have no clear doctrine, undefined tactical roles and an unclear impact on career progression? It’s just like when I joined, the circle is complete.

Can we please please call it the Enrobria Regiment?


----------



## MilEME09

Mortar guy said:


> - the RCIC is being decimated for no appreciable gain in combat capability anywhere. Our Army will be hollowed out so we can build faddish, boutique units that are too precious or specialized to deploy - all enablers and no enabled.


Funny you day that, in a recent interview with Canadian Defense Review, the commander of the army also described us as a hallow force, ill see if I can post the excerpt from the interview


----------



## markppcli

Mortar guy said:


> Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?


What’s being lost here is that we simply do not have the established numbers, even when full, to fill out these units. We rob the Bns to deploy a single company, and used to have to rob every unit in a Bde to deploy a BG. Ending the farce of being able to man these units is, in my mind, a good thing.

Also while I appreciate that we have doctrine, the Inf BN in Operations still talks about four rifle companies and an AT coy, so let’s not pretend it’s this up to date, we’ll thought out plan.



daftandbarmy said:


> This kind of happens right now where, for example, BMQ is run out of the armoury in Nanaimo and units contribute instructors based on whether they have recruits going through training or not.


Right but my point is that this should be the norm of operations. The Rocky Mountain Rangers and BCRs are going to get a lot more value out of 2 full days in a weekend massed then 4 week days of being less than a section. I’d add that this would also allow us to recruit multiple trades across smaller centres.


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> Right but my point is that this should be the norm of operations. The Rocky Mountain Rangers and BCRs are going to get a lot more value out of 2 full days in a weekend massed then 4 week days of being less than a section. I’d add that this would also allow us to recruit multiple trades across smaller centres.


Talking to my wife's grandfather who was in during the late 50s, early 60s. It used to be back then 2 x evenings a week, 1 Saturday and one full weekend a month. That is a significant increase over current day, and frankly might be required just to get through all the required training that isn't related to our actual trades and jobs. Unfortunately budget won't allow for any increase in time.


----------



## markppcli

So the reserve pay system of half days and full days means that 1 full weekend (48 hours, let’s be reasonable and say 16 working hours) costs the same as 4 3 hour long half days right ? So we’re actually getting more training time at similar costs, obviously there’s some feeding issues and mileage that come into play but still, it’s much more effective use of time.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> What’s being lost here is that we simply do not have the established numbers, even when full, to fill out these units. We rob the Bns to deploy a single company, and used to have to rob every unit in a Bde to deploy a BG. Ending the farce of being able to man these units is, in my mind, a good thing.
> 
> Also while I appreciate that we have doctrine, the Inf BN in Operations still talks about four rifle companies and an AT coy, so let’s not pretend it’s this up to date, we’ll thought out plan.
> 
> 
> Right but my point is that this should be the norm of operations. The Rocky Mountain Rangers and BCRs are going to get a lot more value out of 2 full days in a weekend massed then 4 week days of being less than a section. I’d add that this would also allow us to recruit multiple trades across smaller centres.



Mark, you're not wrong in your point but the logistics continue to get in the way.

Where is the massing going to occur? 
Do the troops use PMVs to get to the training point?
Do you lay on DND transport to pick them up at the armouries?
Time to reach the training ground?
Time to return?

My personal experience is that even a well-executed, planned weekend (Calgary-Waiwright or Calgary-Suffield - moved by military bus, pmv, unit transport (AVGPs) or on one glorious occasion CH-47D) resulted in the following.

Gather at 17:00 - 19:00 of Friday with kit issue.
Depart circa 19:00
Arrive circa 24:00, find quarters and doss down.

Saturday
Wake up call at 04:00 (Thanks for Armageddon Corporal Rodgers)
Settle down ex reg-sergeant who returned from visiting mates on base at 03:30
Clean up quarters
Report to mess for breakfast
On to the ranges and establish butts
First round down range at 08:00

Alternate Saturday
Start digging section L trenches at Suffield with pick and shovel - after a day of digging generate two shell scrapes and one L trench excavated to the hard pan (3 foot depth) with no further progress possible.  Section sleeps under  a lean to of two shelter halves held up by the two  shovels that were issued to you.  Shovels used as tent poles.  This being Suffield and no lone pines let alone forests or scrub to rig shelters.

Squeeze in additional activities as possible.

Sunday

Training from first light to mid day.   With breakfast and lunch.  Pack up and stow.  Leave no later than 14:00.  Return to armouries.  Clean and turn in kit. 

Dismiss 18:00 on Sunday and hope that all your dead beat, sleep deprived kids make it home safe once they leave the armouries.


(Thanks for the trip down memory lane)

The common situation is that Canada is big.  Until that fact is faced by all parties then we will continue to apply other nation's solutions in a place where those solutions can not work.

The first consideration about any activity in Canada is that it takes more time, more space, more energy and more money than anywhere else in the Western World.  Even the Aussies don't have the same problems because they don't have to keep warm.

If we want to hold onto the entirety of the United States with a population the size of, and with the political proclivities of, California, then it is going to cost each of us a lot of money.


----------



## Kirkhill

PS 

On one grand occasion I discovered, on arrival at the training area circa 22:00, that I had been designated OPI for the weekend and I was responsible for having the unit (platoon sized), up, washed, barracks cleaned, breakfast organized along with box lunches, transport found, troops delivered to the ranges, butts party created, butts established and manned for the day with first round down range at 08:00.

To my personal satisfaction it was a good, safe day at the ranges.


----------



## markppcli

I prefer that schedule to arrive at armoured at 1830, get changed. Form up for roll call / parade at 1900 because the CO wants to see his “regiment” finish that at 1930. Draw weapons / required kit and set up for training 2030 if your lucky. Training for an hour till it’s time to return kit and be dismissed to the mess at 2145. 3 paid hours for 1:15-1:30 of actually productive time. 

Reimagine armoured as training centres, most are actually big enough to take a full company. Troops can drive themselves from their homes. There is no more “regimental armoury,” you report to a train at the regional depot or training centre. If you are unable to drive it’s on you to secure transport; this is a job just like any other, subway doesn’t subsidize its sandwich artists getting to work it’s just expected. We ought to be the same.


----------



## dapaterson

I'm always impressed with the desire to wring every available second out of a reserve half-day paysheet (that's 92.8% of 1/14 of a Reg F week of pay.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> Mark, you're not wrong in your point but the logistics continue to get in the way.
> 
> Where is the massing going to occur?
> Do the troops use PMVs to get to the training point?
> Do you lay on DND transport to pick them up at the armouries?
> Time to reach the training ground?
> Time to return?
> 
> My personal experience is that even a well-executed, planned weekend (Calgary-Waiwright or Calgary-Suffield - moved by military bus, pmv, unit transport (AVGPs) or on one glorious occasion CH-47D) resulted in the following.
> 
> Gather at 17:00 - 19:00 of Friday with kit issue.
> Depart circa 19:00
> Arrive circa 24:00, find quarters and doss down.
> 
> Saturday
> Wake up call at 04:00 (Thanks for Armageddon Corporal Rodgers)
> Settle down ex reg-sergeant who returned from visiting mates on base at 03:30
> Clean up quarters
> Report to mess for breakfast
> On to the ranges and establish butts
> First round down range at 08:00
> 
> Alternate Saturday
> Start digging section L trenches at Suffield with pick and shovel - after a day of digging generate two shell scrapes and one L trench excavated to the hard pan (3 foot depth) with no further progress possible.  Section sleeps under  a lean to of two shelter halves held up by the two  shovels that were issued to you.  Shovels used as tent poles.  This being Suffield and no lone pines let alone forests or scrub to rig shelters.
> 
> Squeeze in additional activities as possible.
> 
> Sunday
> 
> Training from first light to mid day.   With breakfast and lunch.  Pack up and stow.  Leave no later than 14:00.  Return to armouries.  Clean and turn in kit.
> 
> Dismiss 18:00 on Sunday and hope that all your dead beat, sleep deprived kids make it home safe once they leave the armouries.
> 
> 
> (Thanks for the trip down memory lane)
> 
> The common situation is that Canada is big.  Until that fact is faced by all parties then we will continue to apply other nation's solutions in a place where those solutions can not work.
> 
> The first consideration about any activity in Canada is that it takes more time, more space, more energy and more money than anywhere else in the Western World.  Even the Aussies don't have the same problems because they don't have to keep warm.
> 
> If we want to hold onto the entirety of the United States with a population the size of, and with the political proclivities of, California, then it is going to cost each of us a lot of money.


Sounds about right  though in recent memory MSE safety has being coming down harder on making sure drivers have 8 hours of rest. So I've seen later starts on Sundays, but and this may just be my CoC, a strong desire to leave Wainwright by no later than 1100 to get back to Calgary. There are ways to make things quicker, advance party getting everything set up prior to, orders prior to Friday night so it's literally arrive and get on the bus and go, etc.... where I usually see things fall apart is when we hit the ground Saturday morning timings go out the window because people start wanting to do things their "faster" way instead of the army way, and we loose time. I've had ranges many times where we arrive at 0800 but rounds aren't down range till 10 or 1100, then more delays as serials go on.


----------



## markppcli

dapaterson said:


> I'm always impressed with the desire to wring every available second out of a reserve half-day paysheet (that's 92.8% of 1/14 of a Reg F week of pay.


Well I remember my reserve time, a decade ago now, and I seem to recall a great many parade nights where I achieved fuck all beyond making about 80% of my my mess bar tab. While that was all fun and what not, I’m not sure it really contributed to the defence of Canada in any meaningful way.


----------



## dapaterson

There is a need to properly use the training time; a properly planned evening should let four 40 minute periods of instruction be delivered / 2.5 hours of stables or prep for an upcoming exercise or cleanup after a recent exercise.

It should not be "Shit, it's 1855, quick, someone figure out what we're doing."


----------



## MilEME09

dapaterson said:


> There is a need to properly use the training time; a properly planned evening should let four 40 minute periods of instruction be delivered / 2.5 hours of stables or prep for an upcoming exercise or cleanup after a recent exercise.
> 
> It should not be "Shit, it's 1855, quick, someone figure out what we're doing."


Oh I've had it where it's "ex prep" for convoy ops, I have 50+ troops show up so all the work gets done in a hour. Meanwhile the chain is in an O group 2/3 of the night so deliver an ad hoc lecture on the fly.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> There is a need to properly use the training time; a properly planned evening should let four 40 minute periods of instruction be delivered / 2.5 hours of stables or prep for an upcoming exercise or cleanup after a recent exercise.
> 
> It should not be "Shit, it's 1855, quick, someone figure out what we're doing."



Or one memorable occasion in Regina when the juniorest of junior subbies was tasked to oversee training of recruits.  At circa 09:00 on a Saturday morning he discovered that his assigned Master Corporal Instructors, after a night in the JRs, had decided they didn't like their new master and took it upon themselves to "mutiny" and failed to parade the next morning.   The CO was all over the OC.  The OC was all over the Subbie.  The Subbie was in tears trying to figure out how to conduct classes for recruits, iaw CO's instructions, when he hadn't received recruit training himself.  OC then grabs me and tells me to sort out the Subbie.  PS I was the experienced MITCP Subbie with 3 years of Militia service in Calgary. 

The Master Corporals continued to fail to work for the Subbie.  The recruits lost out.  The regiment lost the recruits and the Subbie.  The Master Corporals continued to drink in the JRs, parading when, and for whom, they liked.  No disciplinary measures of any sort at any time.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> The Master Corporals continued to fail to work for the Subbie.  The recruits lost out.  The regiment lost the recruits and the Subbie.  The Master Corporals continued to drink in the JRs, parading when, and for whom, they liked.  No disciplinary measures of any sort at any time.


There is part of the problem, an unwillingness to use administrative and disciplinary measure. I cannot tell you how many times I haven't been allowed to write up a soldier formally because "we don't want to hurt the members career", to which my response always is if they didn't want to ruin their career then they should not of done XYZ.


----------



## markppcli

dapaterson said:


> There is a need to properly use the training time; a properly planned evening should let four 40 minute periods of instruction be delivered / 2.5 hours of stables or prep for an upcoming exercise or cleanup after a recent exercise.
> 
> It should not be "Shit, it's 1855, quick, someone figure out what we're doing."


4x40 = 160 minutes out 180 total minutes, so no breaks if you have any kind of roll call / form up / see who’s doing what, who’s squeezing out time now?. Further when do you instructors prep these classes / set up for them? This is the problem with 3 hours a week, and why I’m much more in favour of having two 8 hour days, hell you could push that if you need to, where training can be conducted in much more meaningful way. 

Lastly I’d say if your weekly parade night is a two and a half hours of lectures or cleaning your going to start seeing a serious drop in interest. Most of these jobs need hands in the tools.


----------



## Mortar guy

Infanteer said:


> How many PYs is the infantry losing?


As best I can tell from my ACIMS recce and phone calls - about 1000 PYs. But, as you may know, no one has any granularity on the exact PY distribution yet.


----------



## dapaterson

Again, it comes down to planning ahead.  Obviously instructors should be told weeks or months in advance, and given paid time to prepare.  And "instruction" does not mean "death by PowerPoint or OHP"; one classroom session followed by two hours of practicing skills - patrol formations on the parade square?  Setting up and pulling down tents in the parking lot? Or any number of other skills practice / refresher type activities.

There should be deliberate planning, sequencing training leading up to exercises, prepping equipment for exercises...

And frankly, keeping equipment clean and serviceable is a key part of being a soldier. And a leadership responsibility to instil in their troops.


----------



## Mortar guy

markppcli said:


> What’s being lost here is that we simply do not have the established numbers, even when full, to fill out these units.


I remember talking to a hydrologist in Afghanistan who told me "Afghanistan doesn't have a water shortage problem, it has a water distribution problem." The CA is sort of the same - fully 20% of those who wear the Army DEU serve outside the CA - mostly in bloated bureaucracies in Ottawa. As many have said here, we have far too many HQs in the CA for the force we have. I have often said that the CAF has not encountered a problem since 9/11 that has not required a larger HQ to solve. We have consistently hollowed out our Army so we can grow obscenely large HQs like CJOC, or so we can build CCSB, or whatever. If the CAF were really interested in filling out hollow units, they could do so next APS. I promise you: you could take 1000 PYs out of our 22 L1 HQs and no one outside Ottawa would notice. What's more, most in the L1s wouldn't notice!


----------



## MilEME09

Mortar guy said:


> I remember talking to a hydrologist in Afghanistan who told me "Afghanistan doesn't have a water shortage problem, it has a water distribution problem." The CA is sort of the same - fully 20% of those who wear the Army DEU serve outside the CA - mostly in bloated bureaucracies in Ottawa. As many have said here, we have far too many HQs in the CA for the force we have. I have often said that the CAF has not encountered a problem since 9/11 that has not required a larger HQ to solve. We have consistently hollowed out our Army so we can grow obscenely large HQs like CJOC, or so we can build CCSB, or whatever. If the CAF were really interested in filling out hollow units, they could do so next APS. I promise you: you could take 1000 PYs out of our 22 L1 HQs and no one outside Ottawa would notice. What's more, most in the L1s wouldn't notice!


The fact we have 22 L1s, shoes how bloated we are


----------



## markppcli

Mortar guy said:


> I remember talking to a hydrologist in Afghanistan who told me "Afghanistan doesn't have a water shortage problem, it has a water distribution problem." The CA is sort of the same - fully 20% of those who wear the Army DEU serve outside the CA - mostly in bloated bureaucracies in Ottawa. As many have said here, we have far too many HQs in the CA for the force we have. I have often said that the CAF has not encountered a problem since 9/11 that has not required a larger HQ to solve. We have consistently hollowed out our Army so we can grow obscenely large HQs like CJOC, or so we can build CCSB, or whatever. If the CAF were really interested in filling out hollow units, they could do so next APS. I promise you: you could take 1000 PYs out of our 22 L1 HQs and no one outside Ottawa would notice. What's more, most in the L1s wouldn't notice!


I don’t disagree, but 2025 is a short term solution, and this is PY neutral. My understanding if CMTC is dead, so let’s all be happy for small miracles.


----------



## dapaterson

MilEME09 said:


> The fact we have 22 L1s, shoes how bloated we are



There are both CAF L1s, and DND L1s.  While some could be removed easily, other fulfil different requirements.  So, for example, merge DIA and IM, but remove the military sigs functions from IM and place them into CJOC.  Take the '2 function, Int Command, and make them the CAF '2, again under CJOC.  Voila.  With minimal effort, I killed off two L2s.

The integrated HQ has been somewhat disastrous, with unnecessary military GOFOs infesting the Department.  The lack of CAF trust of non-uniformed personnel is extremely problematic, and drives much of the current problem space... and creates issues where generalist officers get posted into jobs requiring specific knowledge that they lack.


----------



## markppcli

dapaterson said:


> Again, it comes down to planning ahead.  Obviously instructors should be told weeks or months in advance, and given paid time to prepare.  And "instruction" does not mean "death by PowerPoint or OHP"; one classroom session followed by two hours of practicing skills - patrol formations on the parade square?  Setting up and pulling down tents in the parking lot? Or any number of other skills practice / refresher type activities.
> 
> There should be deliberate planning, sequencing training leading up to exercises, prepping equipment for exercises...
> 
> And frankly, keeping equipment clean and serviceable is a key part of being a soldier. And a leadership responsibility to instil in their troops.


Yes keeping equipment clean is important; but brining in guys to clean for 2.5 hours for the sake of it is a waste of class a days. I accept that I’m probably reading far to much into what was more likely an off hand remark.

I maintain that admin time eats up far to much time when you parade for 3 hours at a time. One weekend has the same amount of time spent drawing weapons, cleaning the armoury, ect as a single parade night with far more available training time. Again 16 for the cost of 12.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> There are both CAF L1s, and DND L1s.  While some could be removed easily, other fulfil different requirements.  So, for example, merge DIA and IM, but remove the military sigs functions from IM and place them into CJOC.  Take the '2 function, Int Command, and make them the CAF '2, again under CJOC.  Voila.  With minimal effort, I killed off two L2s.
> 
> The integrated HQ has been somewhat disastrous, with unnecessary military GOFOs infesting the Department.  The lack of CAF trust of non-uniformed personnel is extremely problematic, and drives much of the current problem space... and creates issues where generalist officers get posted into jobs requiring specific knowledge that they lack.




This is the other side to the L1 discussions.

More often than not the L1 is not driven by the need to create a position for someone to fill.  It is driven by the need to find someone to supply a capability.   As I have said before the problem is not unique to the military.   It is the problem that all small to medium businesses encounter.

Every business needs to work legally.  One lawyer doesn't get it done though because almost every required activity is heavily regulated at municipal, provincial, national and international levels, often with commercial conventions being required as well.

You need to find money and spend money and track money.
You need to find people, train them and retain them, discipline them and release them, and manage continuing obligations
Buildings, Machinery, Consummables, Material.
Operations, Maintenance, Logistics, Relations.

The point is that in a complex world you need a lot of SMEs.   Some of them are worth their keep.  The best of them talk to their associates.

The worst of them live in splendid isolation within their own empires.


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> Yes keeping equipment clean is important; but brining in guys to clean for 2.5 hours for the sake of it is a waste of class a days. I accept that I’m probably reading far to much into what was more likely an off hand remark.
> 
> I maintain that admin time eats up far to much time when you parade for 3 hours at a time. One weekend has the same amount of time spent drawing weapons, cleaning the armoury, ect as a single parade night with far more available training time. Again 16 for the cost of 12.


Being that we have to cram a lot into a weekend, I'd argue on a Saturday if staying in garrison, we should go till 8 or 9pm, have the unit provide dinner. Nothing says it has to be an 8 hour day.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Yes keeping equipment clean is important; but brining in guys to clean for 2.5 hours for the sake of it is a waste of class a days. I accept that I’m probably reading far to much into what was more likely an off hand remark.
> 
> I maintain that admin time eats up far to much time when you parade for 3 hours at a time. One weekend has the same amount of time spent drawing weapons, cleaning the armoury, ect as a single parade night with far more available training time. Again 16 for the cost of 12.



Cleaning kit is a learning experience.  It builds familiarity with the gear, the critical components, how it can be manipulated, what needs to be serviced, what needs to be replaced.  It builds muscle memory.  

Cleaning is not a punishment.  It is a critical component in any process.  It returns the equipment to a fully functional state so that it can be reused.

So, no, I don't think bringing guys in for 2.5 hours of Class A service is a waste.  It is often the primary opportunity for the militia troops to become familiar with the tools of the trade available to them in the armoury.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> So, no, I don't think bringing guys in for 2.5 hours of Class A service is a waste.  It is often the primary opportunity for the militia troops to become familiar with the tools of the trade available to them in the armoury.


It's only a problem if that's the only thing the troops end up doing, which shows a lack of planning and leadership


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Cleaning kit is a learning experience.  It builds familiarity with the gear, the critical components, how it can be manipulated, what needs to be serviced, what needs to be replaced.  It builds muscle memory.
> 
> Cleaning is not a punishment.  It is a critical component in any process.  It returns the equipment to a fully functional state so that it can be reused.
> 
> So, no, I don't think bringing guys in for 2.5 hours of Class A service is a waste.  It is often the primary opportunity for the militia troops to become familiar with the tools of the trade available to them in the armoury.


If all you can think of for a weekly training even is cleaning, I would recommend you need some PD. Cleaning car of course be part of it but have it happen after some training, of some kind, be that class room or practical.


----------



## Good2Golf

dapaterson said:


> The integrated HQ has been somewhat disastrous, with unnecessary military GOFOs infesting the Department.


Oops…I mean integration of CAFCOM and DND was supposed to make those generals/admirals more like their civilian counterparts.  You mean they weren’t completely subsumed into the bureaucracy?  😆

Maybe the United Federation came back in time and observed early-21st Century Canadian Defence to gain insight on how to vanquish the Borg? 🤔


----------



## AmmoTech90

markppcli said:


> Yes keeping equipment clean is important; but brining in guys to clean for 2.5 hours for the sake of it is a waste of class a days. I accept that I’m probably reading far to much into what was more likely an off hand remark.
> 
> I maintain that admin time eats up far to much time when you parade for 3 hours at a time. One weekend has the same amount of time spent drawing weapons, cleaning the armoury, ect as a single parade night with far more available training time. Again 16 for the cost of 12.


The unit I was with in the Reserve was lucky because our training parade night was Friday.  So out of the four Fridays a month one was taken up loading vehicles and road moving to a training area for an exercise.  In the other three, one would be boring stuff- practice putting up tents/penthouses/cleaning weapons/parade practice.  One would be post-ex maint, the other two would be something like .22 subcal range in another units armoury, or professional development- operators working with techs, tel troop going to remote location and doing a line check, rad troop using the stationary HF set to talk somewhere else in the world.  Sometimes a CO's parade at another armoury with a drill hall that the unit could actually form up in (usually Regt d'Hull).

All of this could be accomplished in 3-4 hours and only a bit was cleaning and drill.  Morale was generally high and considering we were a Sigs unit that's saying a lot 

Followed by more morale building in the Byward Market and Hull.


----------



## markppcli

AmmoTech90 said:


> The unit I was with in the Reserve was lucky because our training parade night was Friday.  So out of the four Fridays a month one was taken up loading vehicles and road moving to a training area for an exercise.  In the other three, one would be boring stuff- practice putting up tents/penthouses/cleaning weapons/parade practice.  One would be post-ex maint, the other two would be something like .22 subcal range in another units armoury, or professional development- operators working with techs, tel troop going to remote location and doing a line check, rad troop using the stationary HF set to talk somewhere else in the world.  Sometimes a CO's parade at another armoury with a drill hall that the unit could actually form up in (usually Regt d'Hull).
> 
> All of this could be accomplished in 3-4 hours and only a bit was cleaning and drill.  Morale was generally high and considering we were a Sigs unit that's saying a lot
> 
> Followed by more morale building in the Byward Market and Hull.


Only a signaller would look forward to spending Friday night practicing radio procedure.


----------



## Infanteer

Mortar guy said:


> As best I can tell from my ACIMS recce and phone calls - about 1000 PYs. But, as you may know, no one has any granularity on the exact PY distribution yet.


I haven't seen anything close to that estimate.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> I haven't seen anything close to that estimate.


I suspect he’s just looking and units stood down and not seeing the redistribution


----------



## Good2Golf

Someone’s going to get an MMM (vice OMM, since it will likely be an HRA Cpl tasked) for doing the AER amendment.


----------



## dapaterson

Good2Golf said:


> Someone’s going to get an MMM (vice OMM, since it will likely be an HRA Cpl tasked) for doing the AER amendment.



Don't be absurd.

The AER data entry clerk in the Army HQ (when I was there) was a Major.

And you're assuming that the data will be properly amended and updated, with proper ministerial signature on amended MOOs.  I once sat in  a long, long meeting with heated arguments about transferring a unit from one formation back to another that it had been moved from a decade or more before.

Fortunately, most of the staff work could be avoided, since the original transfer was never legally completed in the first place.


----------



## AmmoTech90

markppcli said:


> Only a signaller would look forward to spending Friday night practicing radio procedure.


Followed by drinking...


----------



## Good2Golf

dapaterson said:


> Don't be absurd.
> 
> The AER data entry clerk in the Army HQ (when I was there) was a Major.
> 
> And you're assuming that the data will be properly amended and updated, with proper ministerial signature on amended MOOs.  I once sat in  a long, long meeting with heated arguments about transferring a unit from one formation back to another that it had been moved from a decade or more before.
> 
> Fortunately, most of the staff work could be avoided, since the original transfer was never legally completed in the first place.


Well….influencer/social events planner = LCol, so I suppose a data entry clerk Major isn’t much of a shock…


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> Only a signaller would look forward to spending Friday night practicing radio procedure.


In my experience that is because we don't have working radios. When you do not regularly use the skill of course the troops will be bored refreshing a skill they don't use.


----------



## AmmoTech90

MilEME09 said:


> In my experience that is because we don't have working radios. When you do not regularly use the skill of course the troops will be bored refreshing a skill they don't use.


It was pretty fun.  We had a regular contact with a Texas Guard or AR unit.  Could reach them with a 106 (guess which one) from our vehicle compound as well.

Any way, sorry for hijack about how awesome the Reserves can be.


----------



## Good2Golf

AmmoTech90 said:


> It was pretty fun.  We had a regular contact with a Texas Guard or AR unit.  Could reach them with a 106 (guess which one) from our vehicle compound as well.
> 
> Any way, sorry for hijack about how awesome the Reserves can be.


I was actually talking with some Colombians on FM from Petawawa back in the 90s…skippity-skippity-skip-skip!


----------



## FJAG

The thread has moved on a bit but I've been busy so I'm coming back to this.


Infanteer said:


> I'll throw the challenge out to those arguing that the Divisions/Areas/Whatever in the CA are superflous.  If your brigades are focused on managing the generation of combat power, and the CA is focused on corporate requirements, business planning, and force development, why would you eliminate a layer of HQ that handles the following (paraphrasing from a previous experienced poster):


Because intermediate HQ are unnecessary for the following reasons:


Infanteer said:


> Provides proper "span of control" to the CA's numerous Regular and Reserve formations;


The span of control might be appropriate if in fact the Army had 20 brigades or even the 14 brigades it pretends to have. It doesn't. It has the people for approximately eight brigades. That could conceivably warrant two divisions if, in fact, there was a plan for the Army to operationally deploy a division and each division had a role to prepare for. The Army does not have such a plan. In fact we do have a deployable div HQ within CJOC which would fill that role but that Div HQ is not an "Army" resource. There is no plan to equip or give an operational role to an additional divisional headquarters which leaves the question solely about whether an administrative intermediate HQ is required to facilitate the "administrative span of control" of what ought to be eight brigades.

If we look at other organizations, eight brigades is not too many for one entity to control administratively. As an example, under the Brit Army 2020 Refine, 3 UK Div held five brigades; 1 UK Div held eight brigades and Force Troops held nine or ten brigades/groups. That has been changed under Future Soldier where the Army may have shortened its span of control but increased that of the brigades' to the point where some control up to 12 battalions. 

The question though when dealing with an organization's span of control is whether it is best served by a flatter or taller structure. When the US Army was faced with a mandated reduction of its headquarters size in 2014, it settled on opting for a flatter structure with a median span of control of eight and found significant improvement in its effectiveness and its efficiency due in part to shorter reporting lines.


Infanteer said:


> Provides a regional structure for Dom Ops, and speaks with the provinces;


This is easily a function that can be held by the G9 cell of a given brigade (tied into other cells). A portion of that cell can be a stay behind element if the brigade headquarters is required to deploy.


Infanteer said:


> Manages infrastructure and interfaces with Real Property Management;


That too could be a stay behind function of a portion of the brigade's G4 cell although I personally favour that all Army infrastructure be managed a by a single cell at Army HQ because infrastructure and its associated core manning does not move when the brigade deploys. I have the same view as to current divisional training infrastructure which in my mind should all fall under CADTC.


Infanteer said:


> Manages the Reserves and much of its administration.


The districts, areas and brigades managed adequately before there were Land Force regional areas. More importantly, management issues would be reduced if the ARes brigades were reduced in number and their current RSS brigade and unit staffs properly organized with both command, administrative and training duties.

Personally I'd like to see all brigades be a mixture of RegF and ARes personnel in varying ratios with responsibility for managing all of the brigade's administration. Personnel management ought to happen through the brigade's G1 cell. Again, there should be a G1-x stay behind cell to continue personnel management for non deployed RegF and ARes pers. Generally we never deploy a whole brigade and have a need for there to be command and control of what stays behind anyway but the system should be designed for a worst case scenario where a brigade in total goes but has to be able to deal with LOBs.


Infanteer said:


> If you think this is going to be centrally managed from Ottawa, or handled by a CMBG, then I'd counter that your argument fails to consider what each echelon of command does from day-to-day.


I'd argue that what each echelon does from day-to-day is a function of an established routine of what it has been doing for the last thirty years without ever actually doing a serious review of how to improve the system. It isn't that there aren't better ideas and ways of doing things but that the military is highly resistant to change.


> B. H. Liddell Hart probably said it best: “The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.”3 Many military leaders would agree that their organizations are highly resistant to change as a result of their size, complexity, and culture. Yet despite a general awareness of this challenge, even seasoned defense leaders underestimate the degree of inertia and resistance to change within their organization. Five principles to manage change in the military


Andrew Leslie made note of that in his Report on Transformation back in 2011.

We'll probably never agree on this issue. I'm firmly of the view that the CF and the Army are bound up in a complex bureaucracy that is inherently inefficient. Most business entities who look at radical change find that flattening the organizational structure and reducing the numbers of intermediate reporting echelons increases efficiency. The divisional headquarters offers absolutely zero deployable combat capability which should make it superfluous unless it adds significant administrative efficiency. Judging by the anecdotal evidence just in this forum, it doesn't; it adds complexity and inefficiency. Do the divisions remove some of the work from the Army HQ's G Cells - probably. But, general experience in industry shows that flattening the reporting structure reduces overall workload and personnel requirements while speeding and standardizing decision making.

Can the Army headquarters absorb the divisions' administrative functions? Of course it can. The military branch staff structure provide a soup to nuts coverage of all necessary functions required. These are already broadly divided into current operations (in the Army's case  - force generation) and future planning (in the Army's case - force structure, doctrine etc).

So what's missing - back to Liddell Hart - the will to change or even contemplate it. IMHO headquarters structures are to the Canadian Army today what the horse was in the 1930s.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

The Militia districts and areas were not adequate C2 structures.  Because what they commanded was and continues to be inadequate.  There are not 51 infantry battalions in the Army Reserve.  Nor are there 17 artillery regiments, nor 10 engineer regiments nor... well, you get my point.  C2 rationalization has to begin at the lowest levels to permit C2 rationalization at the higher levels.

So, for example, 32 CBG: Convert to a single battalion (perhaps two, I haven't looked at detailed numbers recently).   With a recce platoon for the black hats, and mortars to perpetuate 7 Toronto RCA etc etc ... and a single LCol to report to higher (or two, if there are trained numbers to make two battalions).

The current sprawling C2 of the Army Reserve, where trained platoons minus that perpetuate units with tenuous histories filled more with self declared glory than fact insist that "We must have a LCol in command to talk to the mayor" is its fundamental problem.  Cull the LCols and above (and a good chunk of the CWOs as well) and suddenly the model is sustainable, supportable, and you can rid the system of many of the intermediate C2 levels.


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## Good2Golf

Too many of those emotionally invested in the Army Reserves would likely rather die on the hill than see ‘units’ lowered to Maj or even Capt command level.  FJAG’s point of the institution being incapable of contemplating change will likely be something discussed in 40-50 years time…


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## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> So the reserve pay system of half days and full days means that 1 full weekend (48 hours, let’s be reasonable and say 16 working hours) costs the same as 4 3 hour long half days right ? So we’re actually getting more training time at similar costs, obviously there’s some feeding issues and mileage that come into play but still, it’s much more effective use of time.



I have been with units that tried every possible permutation and combination of parading schedules.

We always went back to one weekend a month and four weeknights, mainly to make sure that all types of soldier could make it in at least a couple of times per month.

Most people's work, school, and social/family lives were disrupted to unacceptable levels if we ran two weekends per month. And we had to have meetings during the week anyways to keep Bde HQ satisfied (Class B turns into pumpkins on weekends) anyways as all the usual admin, that can't be done during range exercises or section attacks 80kms away from the armoury, had to be pushed along. This led to senior leader burnout.

If every militia soldier was an 18 year old college student being trained by full timers it would work fine, maybe


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## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> The Militia districts and areas were not adequate C2 structures.  Because what they commanded was and continues to be inadequate.  There are not 51 infantry battalions in the Army Reserve.  Nor are there 17 artillery regiments, nor 10 engineer regiments nor... well, you get my point.  C2 rationalization has to begin at the lowest levels to permit C2 rationalization at the higher levels.
> 
> So, for example, 32 CBG: Convert to a single battalion (perhaps two, I haven't looked at detailed numbers recently).   With a recce platoon for the black hats, and mortars to perpetuate 7 Toronto RCA etc etc ... and a single LCol to report to higher (or two, if there are trained numbers to make two battalions).
> 
> The current sprawling C2 of the Army Reserve, where trained platoons minus that perpetuate units with tenuous histories filled more with self declared glory than fact insist that "We must have a LCol in command to talk to the mayor" is its fundamental problem.  Cull the LCols and above (and a good chunk of the CWOs as well) and suddenly the model is sustainable, supportable, and you can rid the system of many of the intermediate C2 levels.


When I said they were adequate at the time I meant that they were adequate to do the little that they were required to do with the limited resources that they and their subordinate units had. 

The system then and the system now, regardless of the terminology is, a travesty and a waste of valuable human capital. When I looked at this a few years ago using highly questionable numbers, 32 CBG was said to have 2,000 people. I had no data on how many were pre DP1 in training nor did I have data on how many were NES. Frankly the fact that we can't run off a current and accurate strength report on these statistics is damning in itself.

When I started the game of resource reallocation to structure I reached the conclusion that taking the recent historical numbers of the ARes and the HSvcs and MP reserves should allow you to generate two 5,000 man manoeuvre brigades plus one combat support and two combat service support brigades of 3,000 people each. That cuts the number of ResF units from roughly 135 to roughly 43 of which only 15 are armour or infantry.

That said, to properly train and sustain those five brigades as "adequately" capable would require a complete restructure of the ResF C2 and Trg system by making much of it (at even the company level and above) RegF. In addition it would require RegF augmentation during the intense summer training period. One can't have ones cake and eat it too. We have the ability to and should train reservists to RegF DP1 standards (the RegF may need to see if their current standards are themselves sustainable). 

On the other hand, I think its extremely difficult to give even a ResF company commander both the necessary training and experience needed for the job on Class A time unless we become considerably less risk averse then we currently are. My guess is we won't change (and probably shouldn't lower our standards) which means there will have to be RegF company and above commanders for ResF units. Similarly the strength of our NCO corps comes from its experience. That also makes it virtually impossible to generate effective RSMs and CSMs within the Class A system. 

I do believe a proper hybrid system can be formed which ensures that ResF personnel are well led and trained and RegF personnel can have a proper career experience notwithstanding that they are part of a ResF unit.

For me the problem is that the CF does not think in terms of maximizing defence outputs for the relatively large inputs being put into DND these days. A properly structured ResF would increase mobilizable outputs at a significantly lower annual cost. We are not properly calculating the opportunity costs of a properly organized, trained and equipped ResF. As an example converting an Active Army Brigade Combat Team to an ARNG one provides a systemwide US$2.1 to 2.2 billion annual operating cost saving depending on the type of BCT. 

We need to be very careful in defining what forces we absolutely need to have full-time and which can safely be relegated to a properly trained and equipped part-time force.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> 4x40 = 160 minutes out 180 total minutes, so no breaks if you have any kind of roll call / form up / see who’s doing what, who’s squeezing out time now?. Further when do you instructors prep these classes / set up for them? This is the problem with 3 hours a week, and why I’m much more in favour of having two 8 hour days, hell you could push that if you need to, where training can be conducted in much more meaningful way.
> 
> Lastly I’d say if your weekly parade night is a two and a half hours of lectures or cleaning your going to start seeing a serious drop in interest. Most of these jobs need hands in the tools.



There is a relatively simple solution to all of this.

First of all the schedule of 4x 40 min schedules every Wednesday night, complete with parade for orders is doable and sustainable.  It even allowed for smoke breaks between classes.

Second is the establishment of a standard curriculum across the force.  With standard lesson plans.

Third, is to start training the trainers early in their careers and ensuring that Methods of Instruction are taught at the beginning and that recruits start learning how to present lessons from the standard curriculum.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> *On the other hand, I think its extremely difficult to give even a ResF company commander both the necessary training and experience needed for the job on Class A time unless we become considerably less risk averse then we currently are. *



I think this is absolutely doable within the scope of currently available courses, as well as training time back at the units.

The main issue is ensuring that there are enough troops, with a viable chain of command, to form a company/ squadron. As well, the 'OCs in training' need proper mentorship from senior leaders, which is non-existent as once a reservist hits LCol their main goal in life seems to be covering their own asses and answering panicky emails from other reservist senior Officers, and _not _to train their subordinate officers.

To be fair, there is no expectation or capacity to help most of them out in this regard, even of they'd like to do such training and mentoring.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> I think this is absolutely doable within the scope of currently available courses, as well as training time back at the units.
> 
> The main issue is ensuring that there are enough troops, with a viable chain of command, to form a company/ squadron. As well, the 'OCs in training' need proper mentorship from senior leaders, which is non-existent as once a reservist hits LCol their main goal in life seems to be covering their own asses and answering panicky emails from other reservist senior Officers, and _not _to train their subordinate officers.
> 
> To be fair, there is no expectation or capacity to help most of them out in this regard, even of they'd like to do such training and mentoring.




How about making the Captains OCs instead of 2iCs and turning the Majors into mentors and inspectors?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> How about making the Captains OCs instead of 2iCs and turning the Majors into mentors and inspectors?



Because the LCols need a break? I don't think so.

In the CAF an OC is a Major. We need systems in place to train these people properly, or we won't have viable Coys/Sqns. An untrained Major mentoring a Captain wouldn't help much at all.

I could see an opportunity to reform the 'paltoon or so' of Post-Command LCols, currently sheltering under the skirts of Bde HQ doing various pointless little 'special projects' until their chance at Bde Comd pops up, into a proper training and mentoring Cadre to develop Officers throughout the Bde. The same could happen for post-RSM/CWO bods, who could mentor the Bde SNCOS while they wait for the Bde RSM slot to open up.

Or something like that....


----------



## IRepoCans

Mortar guy said:


> Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?


Where was this posted under? A near full strength light infantry battalion with all the dedicated CS and CSS enablers it would require would follow with what I've been hearing out of Gagetown with the DICE program and some of the new LF doctrine that will be formally updated/introduced in the BG-Ls.


----------



## Mortar guy

IRepoCans said:


> Where was this posted under? A near full strength light infantry battalion with all the dedicated CS and CSS enablers it would require would follow with what I've been hearing out of Gagetown with the DICE program and some of the new LF doctrine that will be formally updated/introduced in the BG-Ls.


I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "posted under". I am getting my info from within the RCIC and from my work writing infantry doctrine.

"Near full strength light infantry battalion" - another word for that is "understrength light infantry battalion". As I said above, the CS platoons are to be understrength in this, the one and only LIB. The weapons platoons in the rifle coys are similarly understrength (only two wpns sects).


----------



## IRepoCans

Was referring to where on ACIMS, but if it isn't there it doesn't matter.

I wonder which capbadge will end up owning the LIB, or are they just going to bring up a new one.


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## Good2Golf

IRepoCans said:


> I wonder which capbadge will end up owning the LIB, or are they just going to bring up a new one.


Non-green guy guess?


----------



## daftandbarmy

IRepoCans said:


> Was referring to where on ACIMS, but if it isn't there it doesn't matter.
> 
> I wonder which capbadge will end up owning the LIB, or are they just going to bring up a new one.



As I recall, there's one Infantry Regiment with the word 'Light' in their name...


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> I think this is absolutely doable within the scope of currently available courses, as well as training time back at the units.
> 
> The main issue is ensuring that there are enough troops, with a viable chain of command, to form a company/ squadron. As well, the 'OCs in training' need proper mentorship from senior leaders, which is non-existent as once a reservist hits LCol their main goal in life seems to be covering their own asses and answering panicky emails from other reservist senior Officers, and _not _to train their subordinate officers.
> 
> To be fair, there is no expectation or capacity to help most of them out in this regard, even of they'd like to do such training and mentoring.


I would like to believe that we could turn out proper Class A majors in the ResF. I'll grant you that enough troops to "practice" on and proper mentorship is vital but I'm assuming under a reformed system that will happen.

The weakness that I see is that a Class A reservist moving from captain to major will be at a point in his career where the competing family and business interests will be too great to dedicate the time to take the RegF courses needed for that. I find the ResF courses as inadequate (but admit the RegF side could be trimmed back to the bare essentials)

I'm actually having the same argument with myself about artillery FOOs. Once you add in the need to master crew commanding the LAV OPV and being a JTAC over and above just pulling rounds down the skill set becomes pretty intense. One might need to break up the skills within the team amongst several folks into manageable chunks. We already train our Reg F NCO FOO techs pretty well but that's for concurrent activity and redundancy. Hard to do with reservists. And don't get me started on the skill sets needed now by arty majors running battlegroup FSCCs with all the stuff that's there now.

It's been 40 years since I commanded a rifle company (platoon) but I imagine things have gotten progressively more complex for the company commanders as well.

🍻




daftandbarmy said:


> As I recall, there's one Infantry Regiment with the word 'Light' in their name...


I have that laugh every time I do a paper napkin org chart and see that the "heavy" brigade has the "Light Infantry".

😁


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## MilEME09

daftandbarmy said:


> As I recall, there's one Infantry Regiment with the word 'Light' in their name...


Except 3 Div is the Heavy div now....clearly we need to bring the Black Watch back


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## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Because the LCols need a break? I don't think so.
> 
> In the CAF an OC is a Major. We need systems in place to train these people properly, or we won't have viable Coys/Sqns. An untrained Major mentoring a Captain wouldn't help much at all.
> 
> I could see an opportunity to reform the 'paltoon or so' of Post-Command LCols, currently sheltering under the skirts of Bde HQ doing various pointless little 'special projects' until their chance at Bde Comd pops up, into a proper training and mentoring Cadre to develop Officers throughout the Bde. The same could happen for post-RSM/CWO bods, who could mentor the Bde SNCOS while they wait for the Bde RSM slot to open up.
> 
> Or something like that....




Not because the LCols need a break.  Because the Militia has too many of them.

A Captain can train a single trade company.  The Major gets to manage the Capt in training and plan to manage all the atts and dets associated with a Coy Cbt Tm.

The LCol?  In the Militia? Where Lieutenants have been Captains for 60 years courtesy of Paul Hellyer trying to game the Civil Service and Treasury?


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## Kirkhill

This being Canada it would not surprise to see the LIB tasked to the RRCA as Fusiliers.


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## markppcli

FJAG said:


> I would like to believe that we could turn out proper Class A majors in the ResF. I'll grant you that enough troops to "practice" on and proper mentorship is vital but I'm assuming under a reformed system that will happen.
> 
> The weakness that I see is that a Class A reservist moving from captain to major will be at a point in his career where the competing family and business interests will be too great to dedicate the time to take the RegF courses needed for that. I find the ResF courses as inadequate (but admit the RegF side could be trimmed back to the bare essentials)
> 
> I'm actually having the same argument with myself about artillery FOOs. Once you add in the need to master crew commanding the LAV OPV and being a JTAC over and above just pulling rounds down the skill set becomes pretty intense. One might need to break up the skills within the team amongst several folks into manageable chunks. We already train our Reg F NCO FOO techs pretty well but that's for concurrent activity and redundancy. Hard to do with reservists. And don't get me started on the skill sets needed now by arty majors running battlegroup FSCCs with all the stuff that's there now.
> 
> It's been 40 years since I commanded a rifle company (platoon) but I imagine things have gotten progressively more complex for the company commanders as well.
> 
> 🍻
> 
> 
> 
> I have that laugh every time I do a paper napkin org chart and see that the "heavy" brigade has the "Light Infantry".
> 
> 😁


Well not every FOO is a JTAC nor every JTAC a Foo.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Not because the LCols need a break.  Because the Militia has too many of them.
> 
> A Captain can train a single trade company.  The Major gets to manage the Capt in training and plan to manage all the atts and dets associated with a Coy Cbt Tm.
> 
> The LCol?  In the Militia? Where Lieutenants have been Captains for 60 years courtesy of Paul Hellyer trying to game the Civil Service and Treasury?


This is why I fully agree with @KevinB s suggestion that there needs to be rank caps in the reserves. We’ll maybe, the reserves is probably the only case where I truly thinking it should be mandated NCM -> Officer, because when you just recruit both streams, especially students, you end up with an ungodly amount of Captains just sitting around. The officer positions should be CFRs hired on an as needed basis.


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## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> *It's been 40 years since I commanded a rifle company (platoon) but I imagine things have gotten progressively more complex for the company commanders as well.*



Someone here will probably correct me but no, it's not that much different especially in the dismounted role.

I've run fairly OK company level weekend exercises, with up to 60 troops or so, on occasion and it worked well as long as you prepare properly for it during preceding parade nights. If you can get a FOO, which we did sometimes, it adds huge value on terms of learning about fire planning.

Just running company battle procedure is a huge learning for everyone, I found.

IMHO the key is having trained Pl Comds, Pl WOs and a solid CSM. If you don't, you can still run a pretty good patrolling ex in a company context.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Well not every FOO is a JTAC nor every JTAC a Foo.


Every RegF FOO is trained as a JTAC as are many of our FOO tech sergeants but its very difficult to keep the qualifications current. To the best of my knowledge none of our ResF FOOs or techs are trained as JTACs. And therein lies the problem. Because our ResF FOOs don't have access to LAV OPVs, they are considered "dismounted" FOOs and when you think about it, light forces probably need JTACs more than mech ones.

I know that during Afghanistan after the MEDUSA incident we trained and used non artillery JTACs from the combat arms and TACPs. We created the regular FOO/FAC party where FACing was a secondary function to the usual FOO functions and FAC/FOO parties which were smaller and concentrated on FACing as the primary function.  It was my understanding that concept petered out do to lack of interest and career flow issues across the board; not to mention the RCAF doesn't like providing resources to support the final stages of training. I presume that CANSOFCOM still runs quite a few of non-gunner JTACs through the system.

I know that after Afghanistan, the problem in training and retaining JTACs was considered a capability deficiency issue which received a lot of staff time and I'm pretty sure it was never solved satisfactorily.

IMHO we're on the cusp of a whole new issue what with what should be a major growth in UAV and Armed UAV systems which will augment and, in large part, replace the more traditional air support and the Predator-type of drone support we're used to from the last war as they becomes more vulnerable in high intensity conflict scenarios.



daftandbarmy said:


> I've run fairly OK company level weekend exercises, with up to 60 troops or so, on occasion and it worked well as long as you prepare properly for it during preceding parade nights.


I'm trying to think next step. Not just the company commander as a trainer of his company, but as a deployable asset in the role of company commander. I knew several ResF majors (and captains) who could prepare and run a pretty good exercise but I would question their ability to command a company in combat. I don't for a second doubt that there are some who might be able to do the training and get the experience to do the job, but as an across the board standard - I have my doubts.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I'm trying to think next step. Not just the company commander as a trainer of his company, but as a deployable asset in the role of company commander. I knew several ResF majors (and captains) who could prepare and run a pretty good exercise but I would question their ability to command a company in combat. I don't for a second doubt that there are some who might be able to do the training and get the experience to do the job, but as an across the board standard - I have my doubts.
> 
> 🍻



Unlike many reservists I've had the dubious distinction of having been part of dismounted rifle companies in 'combat'. During a few COIN style tours at any rate. Even then, there's no way I would consider myself 'good to go' without a work up period of some kind, of course. I don't doubt that many Reg F companies would be in the same boat.

Regardless, the 'next step', if there is one, should probably be to - first - confirm that the CAF expects the militia to field competent Coys/Sqns/Btys, and - next - set up the ability to develop these sub-units as an SOP as opposed to, what I was able to achieve a handful of times over a couple of decades, a few 'happy accidents'.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Unlike many reservists I've had the dubious distinction of having been part of dismounted rifle companies in 'combat'. During a few COIN style tours at any rate. Even then, there's no way I would consider myself 'good to go' without a work up period of some kind, of course. I don't doubt that many Reg F companies would be in the same boat.


That experience is why I pay attention when you say things. Mine in the seventies was different in that we rarely did or had time for "work up training". We all understood the concept of rehearsals but something like the six months of predeployment training for an op was a non starter. For the Octoberfest we just got on the bus and went. For the 1976 Olympics we did do some specialized training but that was the Olympics immediately after Munich so we were on edge. Battalions going to Cyprus did some work up but those of us on flyover status for either AMF/CAST or 4 CMBG did nothing in particular other than our ordinary training.

I know we all think of SOP per the last war but my thought is that the 6 months of predeployment training with a 6 month rotation model is probably not what the next major event for Canada's Army will look like. IMHO, we should be looking more at something in the nature of REFORGER operations with predeployed equipment and short notice flyover manning as the extreme end of the capability with something in the nature of routine and sustained Op Unifer and Latvia commitments as part of the day-to-day missions to prepare for. The latter ops have predeployment training time the former not so much.

This is where my thought process departs from what Canada's Army does. We seem to be in a rut where we believe we will always have time. And maybe I'm wrong and we always will. Let's face it we've had a tremendously long period of peace where our security as a nation or alliance hasn't been threatened. During the sixties to eighties we felt that the likelihood of having to go quickly was more real so we trained like we would and could. With 20/20 hindsight I'm not so sure that we could have, but at the time it felt like we could.

At the turn of the century the Army's tasking from the government was still to have an IRU light battalion on 10 days notice to move, a mechanized battlegroup on 21 days notice to move and a full mechanized brigade group on 90 days notice to move. LGen Jeffery, the CLS then, said we could do the first, would be challenged to do the second would be a challenge but achievable in six months. He was wishy washy on the brigade issue saying it depended on what you called a "brigade". A small one was doable but a full up brigade - nope - and even a smaller one had sustainment issues.

IMHO, this inability to "mobilize" substantial elements of even our RegF rapidly is a severe capability deficiency. I actually sometimes wonder if that's a real inability or an imagined one brought on by risk aversion. I have a hard time imagining that given a week or two you couldn't assemble a full-up equipped and manned brigade from the resources we have available. I'm not sure whether we have the ability to do the staff work and logistics required to launch it, but assembling it ... I'd be surprised if we couldn't do that. 

Anyway that a long roundabout way to get me to my point. Reserves should be there for the big surprise events. And those come with shorter lead times than the low key routine ones. We spend all this money on an army to provide us with an ability to respond rapidly to big events - whether a flood, forest fire or war. We should aim for and build a force that can be called up with an acceptable amount of risk and that means certain levels of individual and group capabilities. Which brings me to:



daftandbarmy said:


> Regardless, the 'next step', if there is one, should probably be to - first - confirm that the CAF expects the militia to field competent Coys/Sqns/Btys, and - next - set up the ability to develop these sub-units as an SOP as opposed to, what I was able to achieve a handful of times over a couple of decades, a few 'happy accidents'.


Fully agree. Over and over again we have had happy accidents like what ResF members did in the Medak pocket or in small groups during Afghanistan and the odd mortar platoon to Latvia but the overarching RegF leadership attitude is not to expect too much from the ResF beyond individual augmentees and to do nothing to build on those successes. There are dozens of things that could and ought to be done and I see some opportunity in F2025 in that but nowhere near enough. 

Since I joined in 1965 I've watched the Army slowly die by a thousand cuts (and I don't mean financial; there's more money going into DND than ever before). Much of the gear is better and I think individually, the soldiers are every bit as good, but as a force, we are a shadow of our former selves and the slip to complete irrelevance is shorter than ever before. Something big needs doing. I don't see F2025 as it.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Every RegF FOO is trained as a JTAC as are many of our FOO


Sorry FJAG but that is completely false, I’m breaking into that world right now and yeah… simply not true.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Sorry FJAG but that is completely false, I’m breaking into that world right now and yeah… simply not true.


Then things have changed recently. I'd be very interested in knowing in which way they have changed.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FAC is not the same as JTAC is probably where your confusion is coming from, or maybe you got bad int. The pass rate / ref requirements necessitate that you can’t have every FOO certified and qualified. But I’m not in a position to describe the JTAC MOAs history in Canada and how it relates to the Artillery Officer career path frankly.


----------



## Pewpews521

Kirkhill said:


> There is a relatively simple solution to all of this.
> 
> First of all the schedule of 4x 40 min schedules every Wednesday night, complete with parade for orders is doable and sustainable.  It even allowed for smoke breaks between classes.
> 
> Second is the establishment of a standard curriculum across the force.  With standard lesson plans.
> 
> Third, is to start training the trainers early in their careers and ensuring that Methods of Instruction are taught at the beginning and that recruits start learning how to present lessons from the standard curriculum.


Yes, a standard curriculum. Assigning some PYs at Army HQ to work on pumping out model training materials for the PRes would be great. Unit rep selects an exercise package from the library, adapt it to local conditions and go. Pamphlets, posters, lesson plans, and yes PowerPoint slides, available to download. Let’s accept there is only so much time to accomplish training.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> FAC is not the same as JTAC is probably where your confusion is coming from, or maybe you got bad int. The pass rate / ref requirements necessitate that you can’t have every FOO certified and qualified. But I’m not in a position to describe the JTAC MOAs history in Canada and how it relates to the Artillery Officer career path frankly.


I'm not confused and know the difference quite well.

Short lesson for you.

Historically the term is Forward Air Controller (FAC). This was and continued to be the term in general usage well into the war. Within NATO there are certain standards set and the universal STANAG within NATO was for FACs until 2016.

Up until the spring of 2002 the RCAF was responsible for FAC training in Canada but became bored with it (in fact they adopted the USAF post Gulf War belief that FACs were no longer relevant because of the effect that precision guided munitions brought to the game.) and turned the training over to the Royal Canadian School of Artillery. (As an aside the Army wasn't too happy with the product the RCAF was turning out anyway.) Artillery officers attending the Advanced Gunnery course and subsequently the FOO course were all trained as FACs (Your truly became one back in the seventies and in did a month in Germany as a member of a divisional TACP FACing my little heart out between beers).

A team of two artillery officers became Air to Ground Weapon Range Safety Officers and certified as both Canadian and NATO FAC Instructors and started rebuilding the Canadian FAC training system.

Just as the RCAS was defining and rewriting the training standards for the new and refreshed FAC course, the US around the fall of 2003 adopted the JTAC terminology and standards culminating in an MOA being signed between the US services. With that in play and the reality that in all probability in the light of the developing War on Terror that most aircraft to be dealt with would be American, the Canadian RCAS also moved towards certifying JTACs and signed the US JTAC MOU to ensure that all subsequent Canadian FACs would be JTAC certified. There is in fact a fairly rigorous certification process demanded under the MOU which is closely observed in theatre.

Over the next several years as the RCAS took charge of the process, the training at the school, the certification of brigade and TACP FACs and the establishment of a certification program within special forces took hold with the new FACs all qualifying to and certified as JTACs.

A problem occurred as a result of the A10 incident on Op Medusa. The resulting BOI/Ball Report pointed out that the forward air control in that incident wasn't a cause of the incident but that there were certain deficiencies. One key one was that the NATO STANAG didn't require training with live ordnance, attack helicopters or multiple sorties. It also made mention of the fact that for Canadian FOO/FACs, FACing was a secondary task.

Note that even before the report was out, the FAC/JTAC training for the next roto - 1-07 - was considered inadequate and it just so happened that part of that deploying roto included one of the instructors-in-gunnery who had been working at the RCAS on the FAC project for the last few years. Just before Christmas of 2006 he spun up a very major exercise in the US involving US helicopters, Canadian jets and US FAC trainers, a mortar platoon and all of the FOO/FACs who would deploy to get them fully JTAC certified.

In the aftermath of the BOI, several changes were made including an endorsement in July of 2007 by the CLS authorizing the attachment to each artillery regiment of 4 combat arms officers for FAC/FOO parties (their words, not mine) for a total of 9-12 PYs in addition to the existing 36 artillery FOO/FAC parties (again, the system's words, not mine). The resultant FAC/FOO party would consist of a combat arms officer (capt/lt) and an artillery senior NCO, both FAC qualified and two other gunners as driver/sigs. In contrast the the FOO/FAC party consists of an artillery capt FOO, an artillery sergeant FAC, and four other artillerymen. There was also a provision for the brigade TACP.

It's around this time too that terminology starts changing. Official documents still referred to the common term of FAC even though the certification was already under the JTAC MOU and the designation of an individual in the field was commonly as JTAC. FAC remained the NATO term under STANAG 3797 "Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers & Laser Operators for Forward Air Controllers" until it's title and content was changed to "Joint Terminal Attack Controller Program" in 2016.

The high water mark was when TF 1-10 deployed 13 JTACs on their roto. However, with the end of the war things started to go sour again. It costs a lot to make and keep a JTAC qualification - especially F-18 hours which the RCAF is loath to spend on lowly ground pounders. There's also a fairly high failure rate so from 2010 on there's a constant reevaluation as to how many courses need to be run and how many current JTACs are needed at any given time. Just as a statistic by 2015, Canada had trained a total of 267 JTACs at a cost of some $600,000 apiece to Limited Combat Ready status and an additional $400,000 to Combat Ready status. The retention rate was some 17%. The problem is that after training and initial deployment the individuals generally moved on to other aspects of their career.

By 2016 there were several pushes to resolve the issue - and that's roughly where my currency on the matter ends.

The math simply doesn't work. For the Army there were at that time 62 authorized JTAC positions yet the Army's throughput was 9 per year which meant that to keep positions filled a given person would need to spend on average 7 years in the job. They don't. Artillery officers spend roughly 2 years in the job as FOO so that's no longer a good fit. It's not much better for arty NCO techs as generally anyone smart enough to be a good JTAC will probably also get promoted out of the job fairly quickly. CSOR has a much better situation than the Army because an operator can spend quite some time in the job. So at this point, I'm not sure what direction the Army has gone with training FOOs as JTACs. I'll probably be speaking to someone who knows later this week and bring myself up to date.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> I'm not confused and know the difference quite well.
> 
> Short lesson for you.
> 
> Historically the term is Forward Air Controller (FAC). This was and continued to be the term in general usage well into the war. Within NATO there are certain standards set and the universal STANAG within NATO was for FACs until 2016.
> 
> Up until the spring of 2002 the RCAF was responsible for FAC training in Canada but became bored with it (in fact they adopted the USAF post Gulf War belief that FACs were no longer relevant because of the effect that precision guided munitions brought to the game.) and turned the training over to the Royal Canadian School of Artillery. (As an aside the Army wasn't too happy with the product the RCAF was turning out anyway.) Artillery officers attending the Advanced Gunnery course and subsequently the FOO course were all trained as FACs (Your truly became one back in the seventies and in did a month in Germany as a member of a divisional TACP FACing my little heart out between beers).
> 
> A team of two artillery officers became Air to Ground Weapon Range Safety Officers and certified as both Canadian and NATO FAC Instructors and started rebuilding the Canadian FAC training system.
> 
> Just as the RCAS was defining and rewriting the training standards for the new and refreshed FAC course, the US around the fall of 2003 adopted the JTAC terminology and standards culminating in an MOA being signed between the US services. With that in play and the reality that in all probability in the light of the developing War on Terror that most aircraft to be dealt with would be American, the Canadian RCAS also moved towards certifying JTACs and signed the US JTAC MOU to ensure that all subsequent Canadian FACs would be JTAC certified. There is in fact a fairly rigorous certification process demanded under the MOU which is closely observed in theatre.
> 
> Over the next several years as the RCAS took charge of the process, the training at the school, the certification of brigade and TACP FACs and the establishment of a certification program within special forces took hold with the new FACs all qualifying to and certified as JTACs.
> 
> A problem occurred as a result of the A10 incident on Op Medusa. The resulting BOI/Ball Report pointed out that the forward air control in that incident wasn't a cause of the incident but that there were certain deficiencies. One key one was that the NATO STANAG didn't require training with live ordnance, attack helicopters or multiple sorties. It also made mention of the fact that for Canadian FOO/FACs, FACing was a secondary task.
> 
> Note that even before the report was out, the FAC/JTAC training for the next roto - 1-07 - was considered inadequate and it just so happened that part of that deploying roto included one of the instructors-in-gunnery who had been working at the RCAS on the FAC project for the last few years. Just before Christmas of 2006 he spun up a very major exercise in the US involving US helicopters, Canadian jets and US FAC trainers, a mortar platoon and all of the FOO/FACs who would deploy to get them fully JTAC certified.
> 
> In the aftermath of the BOI, several changes were made including an endorsement in July of 2007 by the CLS authorizing the attachment to each artillery regiment of 4 combat arms officers for FAC/FOO parties (their words, not mine) for a total of 9-12 PYs in addition to the existing 36 artillery FOO/FAC parties (again, the system's words, not mine). The resultant FAC/FOO party would consist of a combat arms officer (capt/lt) and an artillery senior NCO, both FAC qualified and two other gunners as driver/sigs. In contrast the the FOO/FAC party consists of an artillery capt FOO, an artillery sergeant FAC, and four other artillerymen. There was also a provision for the brigade TACP.
> 
> It's around this time too that terminology starts changing. Official documents still referred to the common term of FAC even though the certification was already under the JTAC MOU and the designation of an individual in the field was commonly as JTAC. FAC remained the NATO term under STANAG 3797 "Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers & Laser Operators for Forward Air Controllers" until it's title and content was changed to "Joint Terminal Attack Controller Program" in 2016.
> 
> The high water mark was when TF 1-10 deployed 13 JTACs on their roto. However, with the end of the war things started to go sour again. It costs a lot to make and keep a JTAC qualification - especially F-18 hours which the RCAF is loath to spend on lowly ground pounders. There's also a fairly high failure rate so from 2010 on there's a constant reevaluation as to how many courses need to be run and how many current JTACs are needed at any given time. Just as a statistic by 2015, Canada had trained a total of 267 JTACs at a cost of some $600,000 apiece to Limited Combat Ready status and an additional $400,000 to Combat Ready status. The retention rate was some 17%. The problem is that after training and initial deployment the individuals generally moved on to other aspects of their career.
> 
> By 2016 there were several pushes to resolve the issue - and that's roughly where my currency on the matter ends.
> 
> The math simply doesn't work. For the Army there were at that time 62 authorized JTAC positions yet the Army's throughput was 9 per year which meant that to keep positions filled a given person would need to spend on average 7 years in the job. They don't. Artillery officers spend roughly 2 years in the job as FOO so that's no longer a good fit. It's not much better for arty NCO techs as generally anyone smart enough to be a good JTAC will probably also get promoted out of the job fairly quickly. CSOR has a much better situation than the Army because an operator can spend quite some time in the job. So at this point, I'm not sure what direction the Army has gone with training FOOs as JTACs. I'll probably be speaking to someone who knows later this week and bring myself up to date.
> 
> 🍻


From the briefings I’ve gotten, the new system is that JTAC is open to All Combat arms mosid MCpl - Capt, and comes with a minimum time posted of 3 years, extended if you qualify as an instructor.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> From the briefings I’ve gotten, the new system is that JTAC is open to All Combat arms mosid MCpl - Capt, and comes with a minimum time posted of 3 years, extended if you qualify as an instructor.


To me personally it makes a lot more sense for the regular Canadian Army  to post folks into US formations for 3-4 years first - I don't see the RCAF dedicating enough time to keep folks current if they don't have a solid grasp.  

CANSOFCOM has the advantage that in both CSOR and JTF-2 personnel are in positions much longer - as well as a training budget, and as importantly allies with fixed and rotary attack assets who don't view ground attack as an insignificant side job.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> To me personally it makes a lot more sense for the regular Canadian Army  to post folks into US formations for 3-4 years first - I don't see the RCAF dedicating enough time to keep folks current if they don't have a solid grasp.
> 
> CANSOFCOM has the advantage that in both CSOR and JTF-2 personnel are in positions much longer - as well as a training budget, and as importantly allies with fixed and rotary attack assets who don't view ground attack as an insignificant side job.


Of all the JTACs I’ve talked to, most do the majority of their training outside of Canada. Or with contracted Alpha Jets, because yeah the F-18s don’t like cas, and don’t value it. Probably why they were about the only combat units not involved in Afghanistan… but I digress.


----------



## Halifax Tar

markppcli said:


> Of all the JTACs I’ve talked to, most do the majority of their training outside of Canada. Or with contracted Alpha Jets, because yeah the F-18s don’t like cas, and don’t value it. Probably why they were about the only combat units not involved in Afghanistan… but I digress.



Iraq ?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

markppcli said:


> Of all the JTACs I’ve talked to, most do the majority of their training outside of Canada. Or with contracted Alpha Jets, because yeah the F-18s don’t like cas, and don’t value it. Probably why they were about the only combat units not involved in Afghanistan… but I digress.


That is not entirely fair.

I was trained as a FAC (before the JTAC name change). There is no point giving students a high priced asset to learn on when they still have their training wheels on. I learned on T-33s before I got CF-18 sorties and I still found the Hornets frustrating because they moved faster than I could manage. Their On Station time was measured in 10s of minutes (giving you time for maybe 2-3 passes)  where I could get about an hour out of each T-bird pair.

As for variety of airframes, on my course, I controlled T-33s, CF-18s, A-4s and A-10s. I watched AC-130 gunships, A-6 Intruders and a B52 strike, but did not get control time on any of them (luck of the draw).


----------



## daftandbarmy

SeaKingTacco said:


> That is not entirely fair.
> 
> I was trained as a FAC (before the JTAC name change). There is no point giving students a high priced asset to learn on when they still have their training wheels on. I learned on T-33s before I got CF-18 sorties and I still found the Hornets frustrating because they moved faster than I could manage. Their On Station time was measured in 10s of minutes (giving you time for maybe 2-3 passes)  where I could get about an hour out of each T-bird pair.
> 
> As for variety of airframes, on my course, I controlled T-33s, CF-18s, A-4s and A-10s. I watched AC-130 gunships, A-6 Intruders and a B52 strike, but did not get control time on any of them (luck of the draw).



Spectre approves....


----------



## SeaKingTacco

The AC-130 is pretty bad-assed…


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

FJAG said:


> That experience is why I pay attention when you say things. Mine in the seventies was different in that we rarely did or had time for "work up training". We all understood the concept of rehearsals but something like the six months of predeployment training for an op was a non starter. For the Octoberfest we just got on the bus and went. For the 1976 Olympics we did do some specialized training but that was the Olympics immediately after Munich so we were on edge. Battalions going to Cyprus did some work up but those of us on flyover status for either AMF/CAST or 4 CMBG did nothing in particular other than our ordinary training.
> 
> I know we all think of SOP per the last war but my thought is that the 6 months of predeployment training with a 6 month rotation model is probably not what the next major event for Canada's Army will look like. IMHO, we should be looking more at something in the nature of REFORGER operations with predeployed equipment and short notice flyover manning as the extreme end of the capability with something in the nature of routine and sustained Op Unifer and Latvia commitments as part of the day-to-day missions to prepare for. The latter ops have predeployment training time the former not so much.
> 
> This is where my thought process departs from what Canada's Army does. We seem to be in a rut where we believe we will always have time. And maybe I'm wrong and we always will. Let's face it we've had a tremendously long period of peace where our security as a nation or alliance hasn't been threatened. During the sixties to eighties we felt that the likelihood of having to go quickly was more real so we trained like we would and could. With 20/20 hindsight I'm not so sure that we could have, but at the time it felt like we could.
> 
> At the turn of the century the Army's tasking from the government was still to have an IRU light battalion on 10 days notice to move, a mechanized battlegroup on 21 days notice to move and a full mechanized brigade group on 90 days notice to move. LGen Jeffery, the CLS then, said we could do the first, would be challenged to do the second would be a challenge but achievable in six months. He was wishy washy on the brigade issue saying it depended on what you called a "brigade". A small one was doable but a full up brigade - nope - and even a smaller one had sustainment issues.
> 
> IMHO, this inability to "mobilize" substantial elements of even our RegF rapidly is a severe capability deficiency. I actually sometimes wonder if that's a real inability or an imagined one brought on by risk aversion. I have a hard time imagining that given a week or two you couldn't assemble a full-up equipped and manned brigade from the resources we have available. I'm not sure whether we have the ability to do the staff work and logistics required to launch it, but assembling it ... I'd be surprised if we couldn't do that.
> 
> Anyway that a long roundabout way to get me to my point. Reserves should be there for the big surprise events. And those come with shorter lead times than the low key routine ones. We spend all this money on an army to provide us with an ability to respond rapidly to big events - whether a flood, forest fire or war. We should aim for and build a force that can be called up with an acceptable amount of risk and that means certain levels of individual and group capabilities. Which brings me to:
> 
> 
> Fully agree. Over and over again we have had happy accidents like what ResF members did in the Medak pocket or in small groups during Afghanistan and the odd mortar platoon to Latvia but the overarching RegF leadership attitude is not to expect too much from the ResF beyond individual augmentees and to do nothing to build on those successes. There are dozens of things that could and ought to be done and I see some opportunity in F2025 in that but nowhere near enough.
> 
> Since I joined in 1965 I've watched the Army slowly die by a thousand cuts (and I don't mean financial; there's more money going into DND than ever before). Much of the gear is better and I think individually, the soldiers are every bit as good, but as a force, we are a shadow of our former selves and the slip to complete irrelevance is shorter than ever before. Something big needs doing. I don't see F2025 as it.
> 
> 🍻


The RCN actually has a pretty good training program for getting Ships ready to go out the door.  The training is well run and by the end, you feel worked up and ready to do what you need to do.

The workup training I did consisted of three separate programs:

Mar-Apr-May 2020 - Basic Ship Readiness Training (BSRT) - When I say basic, I mean basic......
basic battle damage scenarios, some damage control stuff, man overboards, alongsides, moorings, anchorages, some basic screenexs, basic gunnery and ranges, etc.

Oct-Nov 2020 - Intermediate Multiship Readiness Training (IMSRT) - Prep for fighting a war - screenexs, working with consort ships, Air Defence Ex, ASW Exs, AsuW Exs, complex damage control, force protection scenarios, boardings, Lots of Helo Ops, working with MPAs, HADR, SOLAS Missions, Lots of warfighting scenarios.

Jan-Feb 2021 - Mission Specific Readiness Training (MSRT) - Training for the specific missions, in our case lots of Boardings, Force Protection, Air Defence Stuff, Missile Shoots.

Feb-Sep 2021 - Deployment, we also do additional training enroute to the AO.  The seven weeks it took to get to our AO for ARTEMIS were spent studying the theatre, reading intelligence reports, building guides for the Ops Team on all manners of equipment our potential adversaries possess as well as guides for the various organizations in the AO that conduct illicit smuggling activity, what types of ships they use, what they look like, etc.

I have also now seen the difference between a worked up and seasoned crew and a brand new crew with tonnes of trainees.  The difference is stark.

The training is good, the only problem the Navy has is they don't have enough sailors and because they don't have enough sailors, it's the same people doing workups over and over again which results in burnout and people being unfit for further service, further exacerbating the lack of personnel.

The above tells me that what we are doing isn't sustainable and needs to be rationalized.  I think a lot of our issues come from trying to do more with less.  We have less Ships than we did even a decade ago and we are tacking on more to every program.  It's the same with all the services really.


----------



## FJAG

SeaKingTacco said:


> That is not entirely fair.
> 
> I was trained as a FAC (before the JTAC name change). There is no point giving students a high priced asset to learn on when they still have their training wheels on. I learned on T-33s before I got CF-18 sorties and I still found the Hornets frustrating because they moved faster than I could manage. Their On Station time was measured in 10s of minutes (giving you time for maybe 2-3 passes)  where I could get about an hour out of each T-bird pair.
> 
> As for variety of airframes, on my course, I controlled T-33s, CF-18s, A-4s and A-10s. I watched AC-130 gunships, A-6 Intruders and a B52 strike, but did not get control time on any of them (luck of the draw).


I'm a tad older and the FAC portion of my Advanced Artillery Officer Course was with the CF-5D which included one day of flying in the backseat to see it from the pilot's point of view.

🍻


----------



## SeaKingTacco

FJAG said:


> I'm a tad older and the FAC portion of my Advanced Artillery Officer Course was with the CF-5D which included one day of flying in the backseat to see it from the pilot's point of view.
> 
> 🍻


I also did a backseat ride in a T-bird, on a hot September Day over Gagetown. I have never been so happy to get out of an aircraft, in my life.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Mortar guy said:


> Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. *We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy).* The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?


This is exactly what I was talking about a few pages ago.  The Canadian Army has never been able to shake the habit of using creative accounting to project to others, its capabilities or lack thereof.

This is actually the biggest reason why our Readiness, Training, Personnel Management Plans don't actually work.

2xRifle Companies with an Imaginary Company made up of Reservist Pixie Dust isn't a Battalion, and by definition, it can never be at high readiness because it doesn't have the necessary pieces to actually create a formed unit.

That's like a Frigate sailing without one of its combat departments, conducting a set of workups without said combat department, then parachuting in a bunch of randoms at the 11th hour.

When your entire training and readiness plan is based on generating formed units, it will never work as intended because the units will need to take from others not in the cycle to bring itself up to allocated strength.

Doctrinally, the Army only has 4 actual Infantry Battalions worth of Companies by allocated personnel.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> To me personally it makes a lot more sense for the regular Canadian Army  to post folks into US formations for 3-4 years first - I don't see the RCAF dedicating enough time to keep folks current if they don't have a solid grasp.
> 
> CANSOFCOM has the advantage that in both CSOR and JTF-2 personnel are in positions much longer - as well as a training budget, and as importantly allies with fixed and rotary attack assets who don't view ground attack as an insignificant side job.


That just compounds the career flow problem, Kevin. Switched on guys move onward and upward so don't spend enough time in the job after training to make it worth the money for the bean counters to invest in. The problem is how many of these guys can you afford to have ready to go when they are not actually dropping ordnance for real, just training. It's the same problem across the board for the Army - why do we scrap air defence? No one is attacking us with planes and its expensive.

Its a perpetual problem for expensive capabilities. You set standards and mandate x number of individuals or units are required and then you starve it of resources so that there is an ever growing delta as between the plan and reality.



SeaKingTacco said:


> I also did a backseat ride in a T-bird, on a hot September Day over Gagetown. I have never been so happy to get out of an aircraft, in my life.


Took mine in Gagetown as well but that reminded me that on an earlier course they trained as an Air Contact Officer which was a kind of mini-me version of FAC. That took us to Bagotville to call jets down on the poor farmers in the valley. What impressed me most of all though was when we were in the hangar, they had an F-5 sitting next to an engine from a Voodoo and they were roughly the same size. That impressed me.

I liked my time in the F-5. Edited to add: On the FAC course, to get us from Gagetown to Summerside (I think that's where we flew out of) - they flew us a couple at a time in the last of the Trackers. That was fun too.

🍻


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

FJAG said:


> That just compounds the career flow problem, Kevin. Switched on guys move onward and upward so don't spend enough time in the job after training to make it worth the money for the bean counters to invest in. The problem is how many of these guys can you afford to have ready to go when they are not actually dropping ordnance for real, just training. It's the same problem across the board for the Army - why do we scrap air defence? No one is attacking us with planes and its expensive.
> 
> Its a perpetual problem for expensive capabilities. You set standards and mandate x number of individuals or units are required and then you starve it of resources so that there is an ever growing delta as between the plan and reality.


You're first problem is assuming the Canadian Armed Forces invests ANY TIME having bean counters look at the cost to train, equip and employ any person in uniform. 

From what I've seen, the CAF could spend $millions of dollars training someone and wouldn't care if they got exactly $0.00 ROI on their principal.


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> I'm a tad older and the FAC portion of my Advanced Artillery Officer Course was with the CF-5D which included one day of flying in the backseat to see it from the pilot's point of view.
> 
> 🍻


Back when FMC/10TAG flew the ‘5s…


🦕 😉


----------



## FJAG

Humphrey Bogart said:


> This is exactly what I was talking about a few pages ago.  The Canadian Army has never been able to shake the habit of using creative accounting to project to others, its capabilities or lack thereof.
> 
> This is actually the biggest reason why our Readiness, Training, Personnel Management Plans don't actually work.
> 
> 2xRifle Companies with an Imaginary Company made up of Reservist Pixie Dust isn't a Battalion, and by definition, it can never be at high readiness because it doesn't have the necessary pieces to actually create a formed unit.
> 
> That's like a Frigate sailing without one of its combat departments, conducting a set of workups without said combat department, then parachuting in a bunch of randoms at the 11th hour.
> 
> When your entire training and readiness plan is based on generating formed units, it will never work as intended because the units will need to take from others not in the cycle to bring itself up to allocated strength.
> 
> Doctrinally, the Army only has 4 actual Infantry Battalions worth of Companies by allocated personnel.


This though is the false concept we were building at the turn of the century and confirmed in Afghanistan.

We created Frankensteinian battle groups which sewed together a battalion headquarters with company sized elements from all over the place. To cater to that, and on the assumption we would only ever deploy a battery, artillery regiments became solely force generators and the battery the force employer. In turn the battery was a cobbled together task oriented amalgamation of one or more troops from the observer battery, the gun batteries and an STA battery. Every time they put a roto out the door it would be formed under the command team from a given battery and personnel from all over the regiment ( and sometimes other RegF regiments) as well as ASCC folks from 4 AD/GS, and reservists from the LF area. It's no wonder it takes six months of training to put such a group out the door.

It was the same for the battalions. Most were augmented by individuals and companies from other battalions (sometimes from other brigades e.g. TF 1-07 with 2 RCR with its H and I Coys and C Coy 3 PPCLI) plus reservists.

If the plan is to reduce a battalion to two full companies, then its nothing more than what has been happening in practice. To reach a high readiness status for that battalion then all that needs doing is to designate the add-on company early in the cycle and have it participate in training as required. That is absolutely not optimal but essentially is business as usual.

My only concern is that every time that the Army has tightened up the establishments to reduce the hollow companies problem, it is only a matter of time that the hollowness returns to the now smaller establishment. 

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Good2Golf said:


> Back when FMC/10TAG flew the ‘5s…
> 
> 
> 🦕 😉


Yup and I love the 🦕 emoji and will wear it with pride even though I'm not a herbivore - this one's more me 🦖

😁


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

FJAG said:


> This though is the false concept we were building at the turn of the century and confirmed in Afghanistan.
> 
> We created Frankensteinian battle groups which sewed together a battalion headquarters with company sized elements from all over the place. To cater to that, and on the assumption we would only ever deploy a battery, artillery regiments became solely force generators and the battery the force employer. In turn the battery was a cobbled together task oriented amalgamation of one or more troops from the observer battery, the gun batteries and an STA battery. Every time they put a roto out the door it would be formed under the command team from a given battery and personnel from all over the regiment ( and sometimes other RegF regiments) as well as ASCC folks from 4 AD/GS, and reservists from the LF area. It's no wonder it takes six months of training to put such a group out the door.
> 
> It was the same for the battalions. Most were augmented by individuals and companies from other battalions (sometimes from other brigades e.g. TF 1-07 with 2 RCR with its H and I Coys and C Coy 3 PPCLI) plus reservists.
> 
> If the plan is to reduce a battalion to two full companies, then its nothing more than what has been happening in practice. To reach a high readiness status for that battalion then all that needs doing is to designate the add-on company early in the cycle and have it participate in training as required. That is absolutely not optimal but essentially is business as usual.
> 
> My only concern is that every time that the Army has tightened up the establishments to reduce the hollow companies problem, it is only a matter of time that the hollowness returns to the now smaller establishment.
> 
> 🍻


But this is the crux of the problem, a Battalion with 2 rifle companies, isn't a Battalion.  Calling it a Battalion is dishonest.  

You then run in to the problem of when you tell the Government you have a battalion "AVAILABLE TO DEPLOY"  you end up having to take people from elsewhere, that actually have another task and set of responsibilities they are supposed to be looking after.

Do this once and you create a small problem, make this your SOP and the small problems begin to compound in to bigger problems.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

I'll use another term to describe the way our Military organizes and projects itself:

FALSE ADVERTISING


----------



## KevinB

Humphrey Bogart said:


> I'll use another term to describe the way our Military organizes and projects itself:
> 
> FALSE ADVERTISING


Agreed




FJAG said:


> That just compounds the career flow problem, Kevin. Switched on guys move onward and upward so don't spend enough time in the job after training to make it worth the money for the bean counters to invest in. The problem is how many of these guys can you afford to have ready to go when they are not actually dropping ordnance for real, just training. It's the same problem across the board for the Army - why do we scrap air defence? No one is attacking us with planes and its expensive.


Having a Military is expensive.
   But not as expensive as not having one...

WRT JTAC's - make it a career field, kind of like how the USAF does.   Put them in CANSOFCOM with extra Tan hat pay.
   Then you can kick them out to whatever entity needs them - knowing you have a trained and current JTAC - who isn't out trying to also be a gunfighter etc.

The entire aspect of the AD trade and lack of CA AD capability is in its own mind boggling event.



FJAG said:


> Its a perpetual problem for expensive capabilities. You set standards and mandate x number of individuals or units are required and then you starve it of resources so that there is an ever growing delta as between the plan and reality.


Because the CAF will have built 2x more HQ's to do less...


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

FJAG said:


> My only concern is that every time that the Army has tightened up the establishments to reduce the hollow companies problem, it is only a matter of time that the hollowness returns to the now smaller establishment.
> 
> 🍻


I've heard this dozens of times and have heard the same words come out of multiple Officer's mouths. 

"We can't cut units because we will never get back what we lost" 

So I think the general consensus seems to have been that we should just hollow out said units in anticipation we might need them again some day as opposed to striking them from the order of battle.

Hmmmmmm 🤔

Sounds a lot like the entire reason we have both Reserve Order of Battle and a Supplementary Order of Battle 🤨 for this exact purpose.


----------



## KevinB

Humphrey Bogart said:


> I've heard this dozens of times and have heard the same words come out of multiple General Officer's mouths.
> 
> "We can't cut units because we will never get back what we lost"
> 
> So I think the general consensus seems to have been that we should just hollow out said units in anticipation we might need them again some day as opposed to striking them from the order of battle.
> 
> Hmmmmmm 🤔
> 
> Sounds a lot like the entire reason we have both Reserve Order of Battle and a Supplementary Order of Battle 🤨 for this exact purpose.


Agreed.

   The only way to get back what has been lost is showing what exists now.
Showing multiple Regiments with 3 Bn's etc is a farce - as it's just Col's moving deck chairs on the Titanic.

Better to be honest - doesn't matter if that ends up being just Reg Force Bde at full strength and equipment - at least it's there and readily deployable, that way the gaps in the wall are very visible.

IMHO the CA would be better off that current with 1 Bn from each Inf Reg't fully manned - and the other 2 being 30/70, same with the rest of the Arms Reg'ts and support functions .
  That still wouldn't find AT or AD assets etc, but it would offer an actually immediately deployable Bde - and 2 other Bde's able to be brought to readiness to relieve the deployed one as needed.


----------



## Kirkhill

Question: 

What is a Full Brigade?

Is it defined by the number of boots on parade?  The number of LAVs available?  Or the number of Guns?

Or to ask it another way,

965 LAVs and ASCVs with minimal crews?  Or 3 Battalions of boots?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Kirkhill said:


> Question:
> 
> What is a Full Brigade?
> 
> Is it defined by the number of boots on parade?  The number of LAVs available?  Or the number of Guns?
> 
> Or to ask it another way,
> 
> 965 LAVs and ASCVs with minimal crews?  Or 3 Battalions of boots?


Generally a Brigade formation composed of 3 or more battalions + supporting elements. 









						Modern Military Force Structures
					

Classic military unit groupings differ greatly in their specialization and size, and from country to country. Here is a basic look at how modern ground, naval, and air units break down in terms of si…




					www.cfr.org


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Question:
> 
> What is a Full Brigade?


Something missing from the Canadian Army...



Kirkhill said:


> Is it defined by the number of boots on parade?  The number of LAVs available?  Or the number of Guns?
> 
> Or to ask it another way,
> 
> 965 LAVs and ASCVs with minimal crews?  Or 3 Battalions of boots?


@Humphrey Bogart answered already - but you need both the soldiers and the equipment to consider it to be a full combat capable Brigade.

For a Heavy Bde that would be: Tanks, IFV's (Tracked), SPA (Tracked), SPAA (Tracked), AEV's etc.
  For a Medium that would be LAV's, Armor of some sort - maybe tanks and LAV Recce, SPA (Wheeled) SPAA (Wheeled), LAV-Eng etc.
 Light generally has mobility enablers (either soft skin or unarmored wheeled), Towed Arty, all generally Airmobile or Airborne capable systems of support.

Of course robust system to support it all would be good too...


----------



## Kirkhill

Humphrey Bogart said:


> Generally a Brigade formation composed of 3 or more battalions + supporting elements.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Modern Military Force Structures
> 
> 
> Classic military unit groupings differ greatly in their specialization and size, and from country to country. Here is a basic look at how modern ground, naval, and air units break down in terms of si…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.cfr.org




I get that but, just for example, we were to consider a brigade of tanks, or a brigade of armoured cars instead of a brigade of infantry.

How many brigades of armoured cars could we field with the number of LAVs in stock and on order?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I get that but, just for example, we were to consider a brigade of tanks, or a brigade of armoured cars instead of a brigade of infantry.


Brigades like Battle Groups and Combat Teams are generally combined Arms formations.
   An Armored Brigade will still have an Infantry component.




Kirkhill said:


> How many brigades of armoured cars could we field with the number of LAVs in stock and on order?



Snarky answer - zero it will still be missing the combined arms enablers


----------



## KevinB

@Kirkhill has a post on the CH-148 thread that jogged my memory.

One aspect I think the CA does terribly is G-8 (Force Mod), with the DLR types in Ottawa fairly far removed from the coal face that a lot of requirements never seem to see the light of day.

I think the CA would deal with evolution a lot better if they had G-8 cells at the Bn level -- it doesn't even need to be a full time job.
  Weapons, VAS, Clothing/PPE, Comms/Network .   Each Bde would then collate the work and push it to DLR.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Despite the formal-establishment-fixated views that have developed over the past decades, brigades are just formations composed of whatever elements are thought necessary for the envisioned tasks.  Nothing prevents Canada from taking 6 units and having one 4-unit brigade and one 2-unit brigade.


----------



## Kirkhill

Definition of _brigade_​ (Entry 1 of 2)
1a*: *a large body of troops
b*: *a tactical and administrative unit composed of a headquarters, one or more units of infantry or armor, and supporting units
2*: *a group of people organized for special activity

brigade
verb
brigaded; brigading
Definition of _brigade_ (Entry 2 of 2)
transitive verb
*: *to form or unite into a brigade

... as in brigading the company's machine guns into a platoon.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Definition of _brigade_​(Entry 1 of 2)
> 1a*: *a large body of troops
> b*: *a tactical and administrative unit composed of a headquarters, one or more units of infantry or armor, and supporting units
> 2*: *a group of people organized for special activity
> 
> brigade
> verb
> brigaded; brigading
> Definition of _brigade_ (Entry 2 of 2)
> transitive verb
> *: *to form or unite into a brigade
> 
> ... as in brigading the company's machine guns into a platoon.


pedantic​[ puh-dan-tik ]SHOW IPA

See synonyms for pedantic on Thesaurus.com
📙 Middle School Level
adjective
ostentatious in one's learning.
overly concerned with minute details or formalisms, especially in teaching.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Brad Sallows said:


> Despite the formal-establishment-fixated views that have developed over the past decades, brigades are just formations composed of whatever elements are thought necessary for the envisioned tasks.  Nothing prevents Canada from taking 6 units and having one 4-unit brigade and one 2-unit brigade.


Something can be whatever you want it to be but it's important that you codify, preferably in writing, aka Doctrine, what that something is. 

Once you codify exactly what that something is, you can assign tasks for what you expect that something to be able to reasonably accomplish and do.

I know, by reading doctrine what a Stryker Company in an SBCT looks like:








I know what an Armoured Brigade Combat Team looks like:






I can go right down to the individual sqns/companies/batteries and see exactly how many guns, personnel, vehicles, equipment they have.  This is useful because it gives me actual figures to plan with, think water, rations, bullets, fuel, etc.

Even our potential adversaries have pretty succinct documentation that lays out exactly what their respective formations and manoeuvre elements look like:






Nice little publication published by our Allies here:

https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG-RussianNewWarfareHandbook.pdf

Ironically, we have an organization in Kingston that is staffed with an Army of Majors that is supposed to look after all of this.  I currently have no idea what they are doing? 

hmmmmm 

I find it funny that when I joined, I was given training that provided a fairly succinct overview of what Platoons, Company's, Battalion's, etc were supposed to look like.  This was codified in Doctrine that I could refer to when I had questions or needed to fact check something.  Sure some of it was notional but there was at least a framework that we had to work with.

Now?  It seems something can be whatever the flaveur de jour is and there is no requirement to document any of it.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

This isn't to say that everything has to look like Doctrine either, obviously vehicles will break down and there may be times when you need to reallocate resources.

Right now though, I wouldn't be able to even tell you what a Canadian Brigade looks like, what vehicles it has.  We bought 500 TAPVs, where are they supposed to reside in our ORBAT?  What about the random assortment of LAV ACSV?

Imagine Midland Trucking owning 500 18-Wheelers and having no idea where they are supposed to be and what they are supposed to be doing with them?


----------



## Kirkhill

Humphrey Bogart said:


> Something can be whatever you want it to be but it's important that you codify, preferably in writing, aka Doctrine, what that something is.
> 
> Once you codify exactly what that something is, you can assign tasks for what you expect that something to be able to reasonably accomplish and do.
> 
> I know, by reading doctrine what a Stryker Company in an SBCT looks like:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I know what an Armoured Brigade Combat Team looks like:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I can go right down to the individual sqns/companies/batteries and see exactly how many guns, personnel, vehicles, equipment they have.  This is useful because it gives me actual figures to plan with, think water, rations, bullets, fuel, etc.
> 
> Even our potential adversaries have pretty succinct documentation that lays out exactly what their respective formations and manoeuvre elements look like:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Nice little publication published by our Allies here:
> 
> https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG-RussianNewWarfareHandbook.pdf
> 
> Ironically, we have an organization in Kingston that is staffed with an Army of Majors that is supposed to look after all of this.  I currently have no idea what they are doing?
> 
> hmmmmm
> 
> I find it funny that when I joined, I was given training that provided a fairly succinct overview of what Platoons, Company's, Battalion's, etc were supposed to look like.  This was codified in Doctrine that I could refer to when I had questions or needed to fact check something.  Sure some of it was notional but there was at least a framework that we had to work with.
> 
> Now?  It seems something can be whatever the flaveur de jour is and there is no requirement to document any of it.




The difference between them and us is that they have a plan and they work the plan until the plan doesn't work anymore.  And when the plan doesn't work anymore they come up with a different plan and work that one.  And spend money to do it.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> pedantic​[ puh-dan-tik ]SHOW IPA
> 
> See synonyms for pedantic on Thesaurus.com
> 📙 Middle School Level
> adjective
> ostentatious in one's learning.
> overly concerned with minute details or formalisms, especially in teaching.



Pedants come in all shapes and sizes.  Some even wear green clothes to work.


----------



## Fabius

The CAF and therefore the CA have I think decided that we don’t want to have firm TO&E or ORBATS. 
Such things would require us to admit to certain truths and would constrain our ability to deny reality. 
Sadly we do not use any such fixed items for high readiness forces. We remain firmly wedded to building bespoke constructs for operations. 
Right now the CA is managing its force generation literally by individual people not formations, units or sub units. 
I don’t think the institution really thinks this is a problem.  F2025 may pretend that the Army understands it’s a problem but honestly day to day decisions by the CA, CJOC and the SJS don’t support that view. 
🤷‍♂️ Oh well


----------



## McG

Humphrey Bogart said:


> when I joined, I was given training that provided a fairly succinct overview of what Platoons, Company's, Battalion's, etc were supposed to look like. This was codified in Doctrine that I could refer to when I had questions or needed to fact check something. Sure some of it was notional but there was at least a framework that we had to work with.


The doctrine folk today seem allergic to the idea of codifying organizational structures.


----------



## FJAG

Humphrey Bogart said:


> I've heard this dozens of times and have heard the same words come out of multiple Officer's mouths.
> 
> "We can't cut units because we will never get back what we lost"
> 
> So I think the general consensus seems to have been that we should just hollow out said units in anticipation we might need them again some day as opposed to striking them from the order of battle.
> 
> Hmmmmmm 🤔
> 
> Sounds a lot like the entire reason we have both Reserve Order of Battle and a Supplementary Order of Battle 🤨 for this exact purpose.


Maybe I'm a bit jaded here but isn't the real issue PYs. Losing PYs is a problem; losing a unit only concerns the mafia that dominates that unit. If we convert an infantry battalion to a more needed maintenance battalion then the CAF wins but the Roping and Riding Fusiliers will have one less LCol on their regimental board of governors and one less vote at the Army's big boys table.

I'm on the side of breaking up the three mafias. Cut them down to one battalion each and component transfer six battalions from the ResF to the RegF.

Just as an aside. How's that having a ResF RFL 2 company in a Reg F battalion going to work out? Last time I looked NDA s 31(2)(a) provided that:



> (2) An officer or non-commissioned member who
> 
> (a) is a member of, serving with, or attached or seconded to, a component, unit or other element of the Canadian Forces that has been placed on active service, ...
> shall be deemed to be on active service for all purposes.



All Reg F units are on active service at all times; reserve units and members aren't unless outside Canada or unless specifically placed on active service.

Just sitting here thinking like a lawyer  

Oh and by the way, most of you seem to be becoming as cynical as I am.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Maybe I'm a bit jaded here but isn't the real issue PYs. Losing PYs is a problem; losing a unit only concerns the mafia that dominates that unit. If we convert an infantry battalion to a more needed maintenance battalion then the CAF wins but the Roping and Riding Fusiliers will have one less LCol on their regimental board of governors and one less vote at the Army's big boys table.
> 
> I'm on the side of breaking up the three mafias. Cut them down to one battalion each and component transfer six battalions from the ResF to the RegF.
> 
> Just as an aside. How's that having a ResF RFL 2 company in a Reg F battalion going to work out? Last time I looked NDA s 31(2)(a) provided that:
> 
> 
> 
> All Reg F units are on active service at all times; reserve units and members aren't unless outside Canada or unless specifically placed on active service.
> 
> Just sitting here thinking like a lawyer
> 
> 🍻



Go ahead, I dare you....

Just try and get rid of - or seriously downsize - a Regiment that has a former Speaker of the House of Commons, and a former Prime Minister, on their list of Honouraries.

It's OK, they'll warm up the electrodes before attaching them to your quivering frame...


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

FJAG said:


> Maybe I'm a bit jaded here but isn't the real issue PYs. Losing PYs is a problem; losing a unit only concerns the mafia that dominates that unit. If we convert an infantry battalion to a more needed maintenance battalion then the CAF wins but the Roping and Riding Fusiliers will have one less LCol on their regimental board of governors and one less vote at the Army's big boys table.
> 
> I'm on the side of breaking up the three mafias. Cut them down to one battalion each and component transfer six battalions from the ResF to the RegF.
> 
> Just as an aside. How's that having a ResF RFL 2 company in a Reg F battalion going to work out? Last time I looked NDA s 31(2)(a) provided that:
> 
> 
> 
> All Reg F units are on active service at all times; reserve units and members aren't unless outside Canada or unless specifically placed on active service.
> 
> Just sitting here thinking like a lawyer
> 
> 🍻


And I'm sure someone will use that little tidbit to get paid more money 😁


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Go ahead, I dare you....
> 
> Just try and get rid of - or seriously downsize - a Regiment that has a former Speaker of the House of Commons, and a former Prime Minister, on their list of Honouraries.
> 
> It's OK, they'll warm up the electrodes before attaching them to your quivering frame...


I'd love to have the chance. Use all your influence to get me made MND. I don't think you have to be a member of Parliament.

I'd appoint you and DAP as deputy ministers. My guess is that half of the GOFOs would quit immediately which would take care of item #1 on our To Do list.

 😉


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I'd love to have the chance. Use all your influence to get me made MND. I don't think you have to be a member of Parliament.
> 
> I'd appoint you and DAP as deputy ministers. My guess is that half of the GOFOs would quit immediately which would take care of item #1 on our To Do list.
> 
> 😉



Count me in!


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> I'd love to have the chance. Use all your influence to get me made MND. I don't think you have to be a member of Parliament.
> 
> I'd appoint you and DAP as deputy ministers. My guess is that half of the GOFOs would quit immediately which would take care of item #1 on our To Do list.
> 
> 😉


Being a elected member is just a formality people accept. It is an appointment, it can be a member of the senate or anyone else.


FJAG for MND!


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> Being a elected member is just a formality people accept. It is an appointment, it can be a member of the senate or anyone else.
> 
> 
> FJAG for MND!


----------



## GR66

Humphrey Bogart said:


> But this is the crux of the problem, a Battalion with 2 rifle companies, isn't a Battalion.  Calling it a Battalion is dishonest.
> 
> You then run in to the problem of when you tell the Government you have a battalion "AVAILABLE TO DEPLOY"  you end up having to take people from elsewhere, that actually have another task and set of responsibilities they are supposed to be looking after.
> 
> Do this once and you create a small problem, make this your SOP and the small problems begin to compound in to bigger problems.


This COA seems crazy to me.  Designing a formation that can only be deployed by gutting a whole series of other formations.

To my mind, if you're going to only maintain 12 x Mech Companies then you'd be better off having a single Brigade with 3 x fully manned Mech Battalions along with all the tanks and a full Artillery Regiment with 3 x 6-gun Batteries.  The remaining 3 x Mech Battalions could be your "Force Protection" Battalion which would also provide some extra depth if you ever had to deploy the Brigade.  On top of that you'd have the single, fully-manned Light Infantry Battalion.

The "surplus" 4 x Infantry Battalion HQ's (along with the remaining RCHA HQ's and STA/FO Batteries) could provide the command elements of a pair of Reserve Brigades, each consisting of 2 x Territorial Infantry Battalions, an Artillery Regiment and consolidated Armoured Recce/Combat Engineer/Service units.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> This COA seems crazy to me.  Designing a formation that can only be deployed by gutting a whole series of other formations.
> 
> To my mind, if you're going to only maintain 12 x Mech Companies then you'd be better off having a single Brigade with 3 x fully manned Mech Battalions along with all the tanks and a full Artillery Regiment with 3 x 6-gun Batteries.  The remaining 3 x Mech Battalions could be your "Force Protection" Battalion which would also provide some extra depth if you ever had to deploy the Brigade.  On top of that you'd have the single, fully-manned Light Infantry Battalion.
> 
> The "surplus" 4 x Infantry Battalion HQ's (along with the remaining RCHA HQ's and STA/FO Batteries) could provide the command elements of a pair of Reserve Brigades, each consisting of 2 x Territorial Infantry Battalions, an Artillery Regiment and consolidated Armoured Recce/Combat Engineer/Service units.


Apparently not in Canada...

I'll be honest I am appalled at the "transformation" in Farce 2025.
   The Asymetrical vision apparently died on the vine - and rearranging deck chairs option was chosen.

I see zero net gain for the CA in this at all, and generally a Loss.
  5 Divisions?  Someone should give CCA a sword so he can disembowel himself.
2 Divisions - is pushing it already with the CA actual numbers.

I am heavily in favor of restructuring the Res Force - but all I see being done is a shuffling of paper - and no actual restructure.

12 Mech Companies - used to mean 3 Battalions (4 Rifle Coy / BN).
So that would be 1 Medium Bde of LAV Inf, if you go to the 3 Rifle Coy/BN then you get 4 BN's 

I am legitimately at a loss, it appears to me that the CA is completely it's own worst enemy.  All that exist now is a Force that is too Light to fight, and too Heavy to rapidly deploy.

  F- from me.


----------



## GR66

Mortar guy said:


> Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?


What does COA 3.1 propose for the Reg Force Armoured and Artillery Regiments?


----------



## Mortar guy

KevinB said:


> I am legitimately at a loss, it appears to me that the CA is completely it's own worst enemy. All that exist now is a Force that is too Light to fight, and too Heavy to rapidly deploy.
> 
> F- from me.


Amen Kev. What's craziest to me are the apologists and ugly-baby syndrome sufferers who cannot see what a gong-show this is. We will fail to achieve what we were told to do in SSE (concurrency, light forces) and we will struggle mightily to generate forces for current named operations, IRUs, NATO commitments, and extant CONPLANs. All of that was true before this COA, but now it will be much harder - not easier. None of the cuts to the RCIC make us more "relevant" or "combat capable", nor do any of the additions to the other Corps/branches.

It is a very dispiriting time to be in the Army.


----------



## Mortar guy

McG said:


> The doctrine folk today seem allergic to the idea of codifying organizational structures.


As a guy currently writing infantry doctrine, I respectfully disagree. We put quite a bit of effort into getting the organizational structures right - the problem is that our work and advice is ignored. I will concede that we try to impart some flexibility into the doctrine so that we don't get stuck at one point in history. But, for example, our doctrine has consistently said that we need 4 x coys in an inf bn.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Mortar guy said:


> As a guy currently writing infantry doctrine, I respectfully disagree. We put quite a bit of effort into getting the organizational structures right - the problem is that *our work and advice is ignored.* I will concede that we try to impart some flexibility into the doctrine so that we don't get stuck at one point in history. But, for example, our doctrine has consistently said that we need 4 x coys in an inf bn.



This is normal, unfortunately.

I can't count the times we've been engaged by an organization, to help make it better and, during the information gathering phase, turn up good work done before we arrived that was generally ignored by leadership, mainly for internal political reasons I think.

'Do what you told yourselves to do a couple of years ago', is a fun message to deliver as an outsider


----------



## dapaterson

So, in the current resource constraints of the Army, how many such battalions are possible?

With base support, other arms, and other capabilities required from within that same resource base, I suspect N is less than nine.

So where, then, can and should the Army as an institution take risk?  Which capabilities must be full time to generate readiness, which ones can be part time to build up to readiness, and which ones can be zero loaded and created as needed?

Perfect doctrine that ignores resourcing constraints?  Already have Corps 86 to fill that need, thanks.


----------



## Brad Sallows

I understood Corps 86 to be incomplete - had not gone through a scrub-down after everyone submitted their starting wish lists.  At least it was understood to be unrealistic and treated accordingly.  How should we characterize organizations that have gone through various reviews and still ignores resourcing constraints?


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> This is normal, unfortunately.
> 
> I can't count the times we've been engaged by an organization, to help make it better and, during the information gathering phase, turn up good work done before we arrived that was generally ignored by leadership, mainly for internal political reasons I think.
> 
> 'Do what you told yourselves to do a couple of years ago', is a fun message to deliver as an outsider




Ici aussi.

Nothing clients seem to like more than spending government money to review their commercial operations only to studiously ignore any and all findings.


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> So, in the current resource constraints of the Army, how many such battalions are possible?
> 
> With base support, other arms, and other capabilities required from within that same resource base, I suspect N is less than nine.
> 
> So where, then, can and should the Army as an institution take risk?  Which capabilities must be full time to generate readiness, which ones can be part time to build up to readiness, and which ones can be zero loaded and created as needed?
> 
> Perfect doctrine that ignores resourcing constraints?  Already have Corps 86 to fill that need, thanks.




I'll go.

Three regiments.  Each of 1 singular 1980 vintage battalion and a couple of independent companies.  

Add a LAV Squadron to each Armoured Regiment.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> To my mind, if you're going to only maintain 12 x Mech Companies then you'd be better off having a single Brigade with 3 x fully manned Mech Battalions along with all the tanks and a full Artillery Regiment with 3 x 6-gun Batteries. The remaining 3 x Mech Battalions could be your "Force Protection" Battalion which would also provide some extra depth if you ever had to deploy the Brigade. On top of that you'd have the single, fully-manned Light Infantry Battalion.





KevinB said:


> 12 Mech Companies - used to mean 3 Battalions (4 Rifle Coy / BN).
> So that would be 1 Medium Bde of LAV Inf, if you go to the 3 Rifle Coy/BN then you get 4 BN's





KevinB said:


> I see zero net gain for the CA in this at all, and generally a Loss.


I agree that this is a net zero gain. In fact I think it's a loss but not for the reason that there isn't a full three or four company battalion. I's because there are, IMHO "useless" divisional headquarters, too many "useless" brigade headquarters and barely enough "useful" battalion headquarters.

The major problem facing the CA is a lack of people in the RegF while the ARes is relegated to providing infill to RegF units. Concurrently we are doing day-to-day deployed missions that are built around less than full battalions and on occasion supervised by a truncated brigade headquarters. During Afghanistan those brigade headquarters were overstuffed but the long and the short of it was that to maintain sustained deployments (whether peacetime or wartime) at six month rotations, we had to adopt destructive readiness cycles which had units rotating and reconstituting at a furious rate.

I know that most here see the solution to the CAs problems as "full" battalions. I don't. I think that "undermanned" battalions, and brigades, but more of them, are the answer.

Firstly, If there is no deployable role for a division headquarters (other than 1 Cdn Div in CJOC) then get rid of them and harvest the PYs out of them.

Second, get rid of the superfluous nondeployable ARes Bde headquarters. If it doesn't deploy then it shouldn't exist. Again, harvest the PYs. That to me means calculate what constitutes a reasonable number of deployable bde headquarters that the total number of personnel in the CA could fill and maintain the appropriate number of bde hq properly manned for that task. One can debate the numbers but IMHO we can sustain eight deployable bde HQs and the nondeployable CADTC as a brigade equivalent entity with our current RegF and ARes authorized strengths.

Again while one can debate the brigade mix as between manoeuvre and support, but I think a reasonable one which allows for both the operation on a day-to-day basis as well as the expansion to a full 1 Cdn Div, if ever required, would be a mix of five manoeuvre brigades, a sustainment brigade, a combat support brigade and an artillery brigade. That would create a full division with two manoeuvre brigades left over as a reinforcement capability.

The switch over from the current three deployable and 11 non deployable brigades means a reduction in the number of total manoeuvre battalion headquarters from 12 deployable manoeuvre bn headquarters and roughly sixty-eight non deployable ones to a total of 23 deployable manoeuvre battalion headquarters. I count infantry battalions, armoured regiments and recce/cavalry regiments as manoeuvre battalions.

Obviously the manpower to fill out 23 deployable manoeuvre battalions with a full complement of full time soldiers isn't there. But there is more than enough staff there to fill the battalion headquarters with full-time leadership when one adds up the PYs associated with the deleted divisional headquarters, the non deployable brigade headquarters and the number of personnel currently in the RSS.

That leaves the question of how many full-time and/or part-time companies does each manoeuvre battalion need. And I emphasis need here for day-to-day training and career progression and not for operational deployments. The question of what a battalion needs in garrison and what does it need on operations are two very distinct ones and should not be confused. IMHO, each battalion is adequately served with both career progression and training capability if it has a minimum of one full-time, fully equipped company as well as skeleton full-time leadership staff for the remaining companies which are manned by reservists. A battalion with just one company is obviously not on high readiness by itself, while a battalion with two full companies would be at a higher level. To create a battalion at very high readiness could require the designation of a third company from another battalion in the brigade or having a "ready" company fleshed out by reservists.

Effectively, battalions with a reduced number of soldiers but with at least one company of full-timers and the cadre headquarters for the other companies could still train both the full-time and part-time components in up to full battalion exercises. This would be a steady state activity to bring the entire force (not just the RegF component) to an overall higher state of readiness and capability than it has now and would also give an end-state overarching structure to the force which would be the goal for the development of doctrine and equipment programs.

To sustain operations, a program of managed readiness would be superimposed on only a part of the force depending on the missions selected. Specific battalion headquarters would be designated for deployment well in advance and would be filled out with the requisite manpower from with their organic RegF component augmented, if necessary, by additional RegF or ARes companies from across the force. Since there are now a total of 23 rather than 12 deployable battalion headquarters such rotations are more easily managed across the entire force structure. Similarly, if there is a need for a brigade headquarters there are now five manoeuvre brigade and three support brigade headquarters to choose from.

As a result of having a larger pool of brigade and manoeuvre battalions headquarters to choose from for deployments, the force as a whole would have less interruption allowing it to train both its RegF and ARes companies to a higher state of individual and collective training.

I've previously put up a potential org chart for such a force to illustrate the concept. Quite frankly I've been rethinking aspects of it particulalry from the service support side (I'm leaning more towards a US brigade support battalion concept) but the old model will do.

The one thing you'll have to admit is that this isn't a mere rearranging of deck chairs proposal.  



🍻


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> So, in the current resource constraints of the Army, how many such battalions are possible?


To be brutal honest perhaps an honest look at what is needed comes first.
   Buying more and more and more LAV variants is a major expense.
 I don't know how the XXXX the CA prioritizes capital acquisition projects - but how can someone sit straight faced in front of a room and ask for more LAV's - when the CA is missing other major items.



dapaterson said:


> With base support, other arms, and other capabilities required from within that same resource base, I suspect N is less than nine.


N can be less than 9 and that is fine -- maybe it should be 6, but no fricken way should it be 6 cookie cutter LAV clones, as it misses a lot of the marks the CDN GOV set for the CA to do in their missions.


dapaterson said:


> So where, then, can and should the Army as an institution take risk?  Which capabilities must be full time to generate readiness, which ones can be part time to build up to readiness, and which ones can be zero loaded and created as needed?


The Army doesn't get to decide that in a vacuum - they are given a Mission by the Gov of Canada.
  If the mission exceeds what is possible, then the CCA needs to make a case as to why.
     Right now all I see is people patting themselves on the back for a job well done, when they probably should be asked for their resignation.



dapaterson said:


> Perfect doctrine that ignores resourcing constraints?  Already have Corps 86 to fill that need, thanks.


The have 1 Bde with actual equipment and personnel.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> The Army doesn't get to decide that in a vacuum


I've spent the last year examining and interviewing folks about Army Transformation just before and during the Afghanistan years. I still do not have a clear picture of how the process worked and who made what decisions. In some cases its clear. In others there are gaps and fog. The problem is that every step of the way is a collaborative process where there are champions for whatever opposing viewpoints there are. It's hard, however, to assign blame even when you know, with 20/20 hindsight that blame should be assigned and that, at the time, the poor outcome was reasonably foreseeable.

Where we are today is mostly as a result of decisions made in the first six years of this century followed by the reluctance of a later generation to change course when it should have become obvious that the course was not optimal. My view of F2025 is that we're still in that same rut.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I've spent the last year examining and interviewing folks about Army Transformation just before and during the Afghanistan years. I still do not have a clear picture of how the process worked and who made what decisions. In some cases its clear. In others there are gaps and fog. The problem is that every step of the way is a collaborative process where there are champions for whatever opposing viewpoints there are. It's hard, however, to assign blame even when you know, with 20/20 hindsight that blame should be assigned and that, at the time, the poor outcome was reasonably foreseeable.
> 
> Where we are today is mostly as a result of decisions made in the first six years of this century followed by the reluctance of a later generation to change course when it should have become obvious that the course was not optimal. My view of F2025 is that we're still in that same rut.
> 
> 🍻


 Just looking at the language of SSE makes it pretty clear to me that the Mandate to the Army wasn't a LAV centric force.
   It needs to be capable of Full Spectrum Operations - which requires both Heavier and Lighter forces than the Symmetrical LAV army offers.

It was painfully obvious to me on the previous infinite Light working groups that the Army didn't understand what it should be, and was making some terrible choices because of that.

I'd be fully happy (and most of you know my distain for heavy forces) if the Army went ahead and got 2 BN worth of AJAX (because GDLS), and a Reg't worth of SPA.
  1 CABG. - boom done.
 1 Armored Battle Group in High Readiness - the other not, with the plan to get 2 more at a later date for the Res units in 1 CABG.

  The LAV's then go to 2 medium Bde (maybe 3), that are 30/70, and you have 1-2 Light Bde, and the CS Bde


----------



## Infanteer

Mortar guy said:


> I will concede that we try to impart some flexibility into the doctrine so that we don't get stuck at one point in history. But, for example, our doctrine has consistently said that we need 4 x coys in an inf bn.



Yeah, but what is that grounded in?  Because the doctrine guy says so, or the general signs off on it?  "4x Coys in an Inf Bn because that's what we had in 1944?"  There are numerous examples of Battalions being combat capable with 3 x coys - the entire US and German armies fought the Second World War with this organization, and there are numerous modern cases as well.  I've also seen cases where doctrine is justified by rules; "Rule of Four - 1 find, 1 fix, 1 strike, 1 exploit" but when you dig into these, you'll find there is no historical justification to support the statement.  Someone just thought it sounded right.

Our doctrine needs to be:

1. Grounded in something other than "this is how we've always done it."  Our organizations should be built off operational analysis and experimentation.  For example, is the anti-armour capability of a battalion better off bolted onto every section carrier or concentrated into a platoon?  Don't know, but we should have something objective to validate the decision.
2. Related to reality.  I had one doctrine guy tell me that "doctrine must be what should be, and not influenced by peacetime resource constraints" but if Kingston builds unicorns that will never see the light of day, then the manual and the dreamed up organization is toilet paper and will be ignored by those who have to apply it.  We've had four companies in our outdated infantry manual for decades, but its never been implemented in peacetime or on operations in decades, so its not helpful to the practitioner.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> "doctrine must be what should be, and not influenced by peacetime resource constraints"



I wonder what he would have made of the wartime resource constraints of the Western Desert Force and the 14th Army?  The WDF in particular was using anything and everything, including the enemy's.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> [SNIP]Obviously the manpower to fill out 23 deployable manoeuvre battalions with a full complement of full time soldiers isn't there. But there is more than enough staff there to fill the battalion headquarters with full-time leadership when one adds up the PYs associated with the deleted divisional headquarters, the non deployable brigade headquarters and the number of personnel currently in the RSS.
> 
> That leaves the question of how many full-time and/or part-time companies does each manoeuvre battalion need. And I emphasis need here for day-to-day training and career progression and not for operational deployments. The question of what a battalion needs in garrison and what does it need on operations are two very distinct ones and should not be confused. IMHO, each battalion is adequately served with both career progression and training capability if it has a minimum of one full-time, fully equipped company as well as skeleton full-time leadership staff for the remaining companies which are manned by reservists. A battalion with just one company is obviously not on high readiness by itself, while a battalion with two full companies would be at a higher level. To create a battalion at very high readiness could require the designation of a third company from another battalion in the brigade or having a "ready" company fleshed out by reservists.
> 
> Effectively, battalions with a reduced number of soldiers but with at least one company of full-timers and the cadre headquarters for the other companies could still train both the full-time and part-time components in up to full battalion exercises. This would be a steady state activity to bring the entire force (not just the RegF component) to an overall higher state of readiness and capability than it has now and would also give an end-state overarching structure to the force which would be the goal for the development of doctrine and equipment programs.
> 
> To sustain operations, a program of managed readiness would be superimposed on only a part of the force depending on the missions selected. Specific battalion headquarters would be designated for deployment well in advance and would be filled out with the requisite manpower from with their organic RegF component augmented, if necessary, by additional RegF or ARes companies from across the force. Since there are now a total of 23 rather than 12 deployable battalion headquarters such rotations are more easily managed across the entire force structure. Similarly, if there is a need for a brigade headquarters there are now five manoeuvre brigade and three support brigade headquarters to choose from.
> 
> As a result of having a larger pool of brigade and manoeuvre battalions headquarters to choose from for deployments, the force as a whole would have less interruption allowing it to train both its RegF and ARes companies to a higher state of individual and collective training.
> 
> I've previously put up a potential org chart for such a force to illustrate the concept. Quite frankly I've been rethinking aspects of it particulalry from the service support side (I'm leaning more towards a US brigade support battalion concept) but the old model will do.
> 
> The one thing you'll have to admit is that this isn't a mere rearranging of deck chairs proposal.
> 
> View attachment 68614
> 
> 🍻


Couple of questions...

1) If every Brigade-sized (or Battle Group-sized for that matter) deployment is going to either require Ad Hoc assignments of sub-units from other Battalions or will require mobilization of Reserves, then is there any need to group the Battalions into permanent, domestically based Brigades at all...or could you simply group a handful of deployable Brigade HQs (with no permanent Battalions attached) and a number of "independent" Battalions within a Regional support structure and build your Battle Groups/Brigades as required for deployment?

2) Some of your Battalions have support companies (e.g. AT Companies or UAV/Loitering Munition Companies).  Does this give the required mass to develop and support these specialist capabilities, or would it be better to group these units into their own Battalions so they can concentrate their equipment and expertise geographically and post out individual Companies/Platoons as required.

3) There have been questions raised in this thread about what realistic force generation capabilities the Reserve regiments have.  What's your sense to at what level an individual Reserve Regiment could generate a Company-sized grouping for deployment?   Would it only become viable at say the 30/70 level?  Is a 10/90 split realistically enough Reg Force staffing in a unit to be able to force generate a Company?  How do you see a 70/30 split working...would it be formed Reserve Sections into a Platoon for example or more like individual augmentation?


----------



## Mortar guy

Infanteer said:


> Yeah, but what is that grounded in? Because the doctrine guy says so, or the general signs off on it? "4x Coys in an Inf Bn because that's what we had in 1944?" There are numerous examples of Battalions being combat capable with 3 x coys - the entire US and German armies fought the Second World War with this organization, and there are numerous modern cases as well. I've also seen cases where doctrine is justified by rules; "Rule of Four - 1 find, 1 fix, 1 strike, 1 exploit" but when you dig into these, you'll find there is no historical justification to support the statement.


Infanteer, where is this hubristic dismissal of history and doctrine coming from? Are you so dead set on making the F2025 COA work that you will throw away common sense? I know it's fun to bash doctrine writers, but do you honestly believe that we get to just make up whatever structure we want and throw it in a book? Do you believe that those who write doctrine aren't aware of history? I have an MA in War Studies and have written a bit about infantry doctrine and organization - how much more do I need to know before I am qualified to write? Besides, I am given no free hand whatsoever in what I write but am bound by the wishes of the CA leadership, history, future concepts, NATO doctrine, and a dash of common dog.

You reveal a misunderstanding of how doctrine is written when you say: "our organizations should be built off operational analysis and experimentation". Great idea! In fact, ADC and CALWC are going to go back in time 30 years and retroactively apply your insightful suggestion. But all ribbing aside, exercises and experimentation have been run almost continuously by CALWC, ADC, ALLC, CORA, AEC (and their previous iterations). What is more, we participate in allied experimentation and keep up to speed with developments in allied doctrine. Should a battalion have four companies? Yes. Any 2Lt with a rudimentary understanding of math can reach that conclusion. But does a battalion have to have four coys (as we did when I was a subbie)? Of course not. But should our doctrine change every time some some fad or resource pressure comes along? No, that would be as dumb as dismissing the long history of military and academic thought that got us to our current structures. So, our four-company-plus-combat-support model is based off of 70+ years of learning, study, and common sense. What's the two-company battalion model in F2025 based off?

You mention the US Army's structure in WWII - good point. In October 1940 the US Infantry restructured their battalions from four to three rifle companies. This wasn't because 'three is gooder than four', but because they consciously re-invested in heavy support weapons. The weapons company in a WW2 US infantry battalion, and the weapons companies at the Regimental level made ours look puny. Machineguns, anti-tank guns, mortars, howitzers (later self-propelled howitzers - manned by infantry!) galore; it more than offset the lack of manoeuvre companies in US Army eyes. That worked for them, based on their tactics. US battalions almost never operated without substantial reinforcement of regimental, divisional, and non-divisional combat support elements. Saying "three companies worked for the US Army" doesn't really matter for us as the context is different.

I hope you can see the irony of saying  "...the dreamed up organization is toilet paper and will be ignored by those who have to apply it." while discussing the infantry battalion structures in F2025.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Infanteer said:


> Yeah, but what is that grounded in?  Because the doctrine guy says so, or the general signs off on it?  "4x Coys in an Inf Bn because that's what we had in 1944?"  There are numerous examples of Battalions being combat capable with 3 x coys - the entire US and German armies fought the Second World War with this organization, and there are numerous modern cases as well.  I've also seen cases where doctrine is justified by rules; "Rule of Four - 1 find, 1 fix, 1 strike, 1 exploit" but when you dig into these, you'll find there is no historical justification to support the statement.  Someone just thought it sounded right.
> 
> Our doctrine needs to be:
> 
> 1. Grounded in something other than "this is how we've always done it."  Our organizations should be built off operational analysis and experimentation.  For example, is the anti-armour capability of a battalion better off bolted onto every section carrier or concentrated into a platoon?  Don't know, but we should have something objective to validate the decision.
> 2. Related to reality.  I had one doctrine guy tell me that "doctrine must be what should be, and not influenced by peacetime resource constraints" but if Kingston builds unicorns that will never see the light of day, then the manual and the dreamed up organization is toilet paper and will be ignored by those who have to apply it.  We've had four companies in our outdated infantry manual for decades, but its never been implemented in peacetime or on operations in decades, so its not helpful to the practitioner.


I think I spoke with the same fellow. "_We aren't going to write a new Infantry Battalion in Battle because we don't want to enshrine what is in effect now_." I get fighting a guerrilla battle against change, but come on. Its a doctrine manual. It has no real independent life outside of application. We aren't monks guarding sacred texts in some monastery.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I think I spoke with the same fellow. "_We aren't going to write a new Infantry Battalion in Battle because we don't want to enshrine what is in effect now_." I get fighting a guerrilla battle against change, but come on. Its a doctrine manual. It has no real independent life outside of application. We aren't monks guarding sacred texts in some monastery.



Unless, of course, it's books like 'The Three Block War' or 'On Killing', then you'd better be able to quote chapter and verse for certain people or your career might be at stake


----------



## Fabius

Based on a few comments from some people rather senior and/or experienced in the ways of Ottawa I am beginning to think the reason we have F2025 making no sense and Bns with two Coys is that our premise of combat power mattering is in fact wrong. Or at least wrong in some minds. The thing that matters is CONTRIBUTING and therefore 100 people sent overseas is as good as a LAV Coy.  The CAF and the CA is organizing so as to participate in waving the flag.  SSE may not reflect that but that's the GoC's day to day decision making it seems.


----------



## dapaterson

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I think I spoke with the same fellow. "_We aren't going to write a new Infantry Battalion in Battle because we don't want to enshrine what is in effect now_." I get fighting a guerrilla battle against change, but come on. Its a doctrine manual. It has no real independent life outside of application. We aren't monks guarding sacred texts in some monastery.


----------



## Brad Sallows

So the reason for four-company battalions is due to having fewer add-on capabilities?  Riflemen are cheap; equipment and munitions are expensive?


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> So the reason for four-company battalions is due to having fewer add-on capabilities?  Riflemen are cheap; equipment and munitions are expensive?




Judging from the comments, especially pertaining to the lack of "Middle Management"  it seems that we are heading back to 1914 all over again.

We went from 10 companies of 50 commanded by Captains to 4 companies of 200 commanded by Captains that were promoted to Majors because we didn't have enough Captains to go around.  Captain/Majors were augmented by Sgts promoted to Lts.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Doctrine should be principles that guide us to the attainment of our objectives. Barring a real change in the character of war, those principles should remain relevant even when the details of organization change.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> We went from...



I doubt we're going back that far, and my comment was glib, but looking at some of the decisions in recent years regarding how some capabilities were moved around (if not close to extinguished), I have to wonder how often the decisions are rigorously driven by history, evaluation, operational analysis, allied experience, etc.  And I admit to being a bit of a fan of more firepower, fewer line grunts.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> I doubt we're going back that far, and my comment was glib, but looking at some of the decisions in recent years regarding how some capabilities were moved around (if not close to extinguished), I have to wonder how often the decisions are rigorously driven by history, evaluation, operational analysis, allied experience, etc.  And I admit to being a bit of a fan of more firepower, fewer line grunts.



I wouldn't be averse to self propelled weapons companies with one inhabitant per vehicle and let AI do the rest.  It has worked for the Air Force for a while.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> I wouldn't be averse to self propelled weapons companies with one inhabitant per vehicle and let AI do the rest.  It has worked for the Air Force for a while.



High-value weapons systems are high-value targets.   Is a regimental (brigade) cannon company (or a battalion DFS vehicle platoon in addition to everything else) really worth more than several Carl G in each rifle platoon?

[Add: what I have in mind as "more firepower" is artillery and AD.  If I could have 6 more guns, I'd want them in the brigade or divisional artillery.]


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> High-value weapons systems are high-value targets.   Is a regimental (brigade) cannon company (or a battalion DFS vehicle platoon in addition to everything else) really worth more than several Carl G in each rifle platoon?
> 
> [Add: what I have in mind as "more firepower" is artillery and AD.  If I could have 6 more guns, I'd want them in the brigade or divisional artillery.]



I suggest that the Carl G's then become high value targets

Like these guys (edited for a better clip)


----------



## Infanteer

There is a lot of mixing of concepts here.  Many of you are mixing Force Generation (which is how the CA organizes forces at home to garrison and train to various levels) and Force Employment (which is how we tailor forces to fight).  Force 2025 does not lay out specific force employment concepts, nor does it argue that its organizations are intended to fight as organized in Canada.


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Doctrine should be principles that guide us to the attainment of our objectives. Barring a real change in the character of war, those principles should remain relevant even when the details of organization change.


And those objectives include organization, equipping and training.

I'll harken back to what I said about one and two company battalions above. That's doable in a peacetime environment if, for example, we make commitments like a single company battalion in Latvia.

But, the big factor should be that for full spectrum warfare the organization will be for a full doctrinal battalion supported by a mobilization system that both staffs, equips and trains the additional elements to be mobilized within a given time frame. And just as important the battalion needs to be supported by the appropriate system of enablers that are habitually outside of the battalion.

I think that is where there is a disconnect. One needs to have a clear understanding of what the doctrinal end state is and have a path to it. It's been some time since I did Command and Staff but in my day that taught us doctrinal establishments and tactics but there was no actual path to create or equip those doctrinal organizations in fact. My guess is, and you'll know much better than I, that we still have one organization that we teach in theory (and perhaps falls in line with our doctrinal documents), but no actual path to achieving that structure if and when required.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> There is a lot of mixing of concepts here.  Many of you are mixing Force Generation (which is how the CA organizes forces at home to garrison and train to various levels) and Force Employment (which is how we tailor forces to fight).  Force 2025 does not lay out specific force employment concepts, nor does it argue that its organizations are intended to fight as organized in Canada.


That's why I was questioning why all the ORBATS we see here (including mine) tend to be set up showing Force Employment Brigades as if that's the way we'll deploy them.  Instead of Divisions and Brigades with assigned units mirroring deployed entities in Canada, could we instead just have regional support units (mirroring the Regional Joint Task Force boundaries?) to manage facilities and infrastructure with a variety of independent Brigade HQ's and Battalions hosted there and focusing on force generation for deployments.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Infanteer said:


> There is a lot of mixing of concepts here.  Many of you are mixing Force Generation (which is how the CA organizes forces at home to garrison and train to various levels) and Force Employment (which is how we tailor forces to fight).  Force 2025 does not lay out specific force employment concepts, nor does it argue that its organizations are intended to fight as organized in Canada.



I'm just reading this and about half way down it mentions Force 2025 as follows, which makes it sound like a blend of FG and FE. And I could be very wrong, naturally  :

Ready Forces​

Force 2025 will review all components of the CA and will seek to optimize and modernize its structures to meet current and projected operational requirements as well as support SSE initiatives. One of the objectives of Force 2025 is to continue the integration of the Primary Reserves, Canadian Rangers, civilians and the Regular Force into a single, integrated team. This integration will enhance command and control relationships and training opportunities, and clarify assigned tasks and integration points, ensuring that the CA is prepared to carry out assigned tasks and support concurrent operations. This will be achieved, in part, through efforts to refine attraction, recruiting, and retention initiatives, implement policies that enable the operational capability of Reserve personnel, while ensuring that administration is streamlined, and continue developing and integrating Reserve Mission Tasks to build capacity and depth. During FY 2021-22, Force 2025 work will include options analysis and selection of a course of action;





__





						Ready Forces - Canada.ca
					

The plan’s focus is on the work the Defence team will do in the year ahead to serve Canada.




					www.canada.ca


----------



## Brad Sallows

> I suggest that the Carl G's then become high value targets



We're down in the weeds again.  Yes, we can reduce things to absurdity.  But for that specific example it's harder to kill 54 section-level weapons than a 6-gun cannon company (assume a triangular formation), and I see advantages in decentralizing some kind of direct fire capability (HE, anti-armour, markers, etc).  For similar reasons, I'd favour keeping dismounted machine guns in the platoons if someone suggested consolidating them all as vehicle-mounted (but dismountable) weapons.  NLOS dismountable ATGW sounds attractive, though.


----------



## Weinie

Doctrine addresses the “what” and the “why.” The “how” and the “who” can be addressed in a multitude of ways.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> We're down in the weeds again.  Yes, we can reduce things to absurdity.  But for that specific example it's harder to kill 54 section-level weapons than a 6-gun cannon company (assume a triangular formation), and I see advantages in decentralizing some kind of direct fire capability (HE, anti-armour, markers, etc).  For similar reasons, I'd favour keeping dismounted machine guns in the platoons if someone suggested consolidating them all as vehicle-mounted (but dismountable) weapons.  NLOS dismountable ATGW sounds attractive, though.


You're not the first person to legitimately make that observation.  I do tend to go granular at times.

And yes, I agree entirely with the value of dismountable weapons and weapons carriers vice special purpose mounted weapons.


----------



## Fabius

If the CA can’t generate forces that can be employed without a complete adhoc reorganization of the individual manpower of its units and formations then we can’t realistically have units and formations on readiness timelines of 5-30 days.
Furthermore our high readiness training is then not actual high readiness training if none of the units or formations will fight in their training configurations nor with the personnel that went through the training in their specific positions.


----------



## FJAG

Weinie said:


> Doctrine addresses the “what” and the “why.” The “how” and the “who” can be addressed in a multitude of ways.


I've always prescribed to the position that a complete doctrine has cognitive, procedural, organizational, material and moral components.

See here at page 20. 

🍻


----------



## Weinie

FJAG said:


> I've always prescribed to the position that a complete doctrine has cognitive, procedural, organizational, material and moral components.
> 
> See here at page 20.
> 
> 🍻


That is your position. I would describe that as incorrect.


----------



## Infanteer

Doctrine is merely that which is taught.  However you doctrinistas want to describe it, I need to flip open the manual to see what the accepted baseline organization is for "X."  If "X" is a company, I need doctrine to say "this is a company" so that the Army Commander, the Brigade Commander, and the Platoon Company all understand the same thing when the term "company" is used.

Someone posted the SBCT doctrine pub image a bit earlier, which is a good example.


----------



## FJAG

Weinie said:


> That is your position. I would describe that as incorrect.


To be fair and giving credit where it is due, it was Ian Hope's position. I subscribe to it.

🍻


----------



## Weinie

FJAG said:


> To be fair and giving credit where it is due, it was Ian Hope's position. I subscribe to it.
> 
> 🍻


Operational Doctrines are just fat and verbose PAM's from which TTP's (how and who) are derived. I know Ian, and he is brilliant in many ways, but Joint Doctrine is a level above what he ascribes to.

My .02.


----------



## Weinie

Infanteer said:


> Doctrine is merely that which is taught.  However you doctrinistas want to describe it, I need to flip open the manual to see what the accepted baseline organization is for "X."  If "X" is a company, I need doctrine to say "this is a company" so that the Army Commander, the Brigade Commander, and the Platoon Company all understand the same thing when the term "company" is used.
> 
> Someone posted the SBCT doctrine pub image a bit earlier, which is a good example.


Doctrine is a form of catechism. But at the Joint/Keystone level, it should not describe what a Coy looks like.


----------



## FJAG

Weinie said:


> Operational Doctrines are just fat and verbose PAM's from which TTP's (how and who) are derived. I know Ian, and he is brilliant in many ways, but Joint Doctrine is a level above what he ascribes to.
> 
> My .02.


PAMs can be as thick or as fat as the writer makes it. Our current trend seems to be teaching people how to suck eggs and I agree that they are verbose.

His though and mine is that doctrine unifies and is the foundation for everything. When you know how you want to fight then you can form your organization;  Once you know how to fight and how to organize then you know what equipment you need and can acquire the type and quantity needed; Once you know how you want to fight and the organization and the equipment then you know how to train on it; and so on. As conditions change you reset and adjust.

The Army's problem right now, as I see it, seems to be that the way we fight is because independently arranged equipment, organization and training schemes flounder around and converge in the middle. The Army is more a product of serendipity than coherent and comprehensive planning.



Weinie said:


> Doctrine is a form of catechism. But at the Joint/Keystone level, it should not describe what a Coy looks like.


Doctrine is overarching and should certainly dictate what the company should look like. Obviously not at the Joint/Keystone level but doctrine isn't limited to only one level. And similarly there can be differing doctrines that dictate how a company looks. A heavy combined arms company should obviously look and operate very differently from how an airborne company looks and operates.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

Weinie said:


> Doctrine is a form of catechism. But at the Joint/Keystone level, it should not describe what a Coy looks like.


Sure, but this is a thread on tactical organizations.  You're the only one talking about joint keystone doctrine.


----------



## Weinie

Infanteer said:


> Sure, but this is a thread on tactical organizations.  You're the only one talking about joint keystone doctrine.


Ok, then keep it at the tactical, and don't introduce doctrine into the mix.


----------



## Kirkhill

So.  5th Brigade.  Black Watch, Calg Highrs, Maisonneuves.

Verrieres Ridge, The Scheldt, Hoogerheide, Bergen Op Zoom, Walcheren.

Companies reduced and reorg'd.  Sergeants as OCs.  Lts as COs.  Replacements with no infantry training.

Where is the instruction that teaches soldiers how to manage that constant flux?  How to create a fighting force out of the tools at hand?

Is it so much different when the bullets are flying?  Shouldn't it be easier when it is just civil servants deciding how many troops you have on parade and what weapons are available?


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> Doctrine is merely that which is taught.  However you doctrinistas want to describe it, I need to flip open the manual to see what the accepted baseline organization is for "X."  If "X" is a company, I need doctrine to say "this is a company" so that the Army Commander, the Brigade Commander, and the Platoon Company all understand the same thing when the term "company" is used.
> 
> Someone posted the SBCT doctrine pub image a bit earlier, which is a good example.


I couldn’t agree more, we used to be able to teach the organization of an Infatry Bn out of the Platoon in Battle, try doing that now. No one in the bloody thing has ever seen 4 companies let alone the anti tank company. It’s absurd. And I agree with you that this works up, what a Bn is should be codified so that the CDS can be show an document that clearly lays it out.


----------



## markppcli

Mortar guy said:


> Infanteer, where is this hubristic dismissal of history and doctrine coming from? Are you so dead set on making the F2025 COA work that you will throw away common sense? I know it's fun to bash doctrine writers, but do you honestly believe that we get to just make up whatever structure we want and throw it in a book? Do you believe that those who write doctrine aren't aware of history? I have an MA in War Studies and have written a bit about infantry doctrine and organization - how much more do I need to know before I am qualified to write? Besides, I am given no free hand whatsoever in what I write but am bound by the wishes of the CA leadership, history, future concepts, NATO doctrine, and a dash of common dog.
> 
> You reveal a misunderstanding of how doctrine is written when you say: "our organizations should be built off operational analysis and experimentation". Great idea! In fact, ADC and CALWC are going to go back in time 30 years and retroactively apply your insightful suggestion. But all ribbing aside, exercises and experimentation have been run almost continuously by CALWC, ADC, ALLC, CORA, AEC (and their previous iterations). What is more, we participate in allied experimentation and keep up to speed with developments in allied doctrine. Should a battalion have four companies? Yes. Any 2Lt with a rudimentary understanding of math can reach that conclusion. But does a battalion have to have four coys (as we did when I was a subbie)? Of course not. But should our doctrine change every time some some fad or resource pressure comes along? No, that would be as dumb as dismissing the long history of military and academic thought that got us to our current structures. So, our four-company-plus-combat-support model is based off of 70+ years of learning, study, and common sense. What's the two-company battalion model in F2025 based off?
> 
> You mention the US Army's structure in WWII - good point. In October 1940 the US Infantry restructured their battalions from four to three rifle companies. This wasn't because 'three is gooder than four', but because they consciously re-invested in heavy support weapons. The weapons company in a WW2 US infantry battalion, and the weapons companies at the Regimental level made ours look puny. Machineguns, anti-tank guns, mortars, howitzers (later self-propelled howitzers - manned by infantry!) galore; it more than offset the lack of manoeuvre companies in US Army eyes. That worked for them, based on their tactics. US battalions almost never operated without substantial reinforcement of regimental, divisional, and non-divisional combat support elements. Saying "three companies worked for the US Army" doesn't really matter for us as the context is different.
> 
> I hope you can see the irony of saying  "...the dreamed up organization is toilet paper and will be ignored by those who have to apply it." while discussing the infantry battalion structures in F2025.


I suppose the question comes down to what is the purpose of publishing doctrine that describes organizations that do not exist in reality? I understand they should, but they don’t, and I’d be curious to know that last time any Bn had 4 companies and an anti tank company. Surely this has to effect the way we plan and think somewhere down the line.


----------



## Good2Golf

What’s the latest effective date on “The Battle Group in Operations?”

Is it even a current document?


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> I suppose the question comes down to what is the purpose of publishing doctrine that describes organizations that do not exist in reality? I understand they should, but they don’t, and I’d be curious to know that last time any Bn had 4 companies and an anti tank company. Surely this has to effect the way we plan and think somewhere down the line.



One source I've found is that they were chopped in 1969 when the European commitment was rolled back (Kasurak, _Canada's Mechanized Infantry_ and I think Maloney's _War Without Battles_ as well).  There was a brief return in the late 1990s as 4 CMBG and the Airborne Regiment were collapsed, but FRP quickly took those away.

I've never found a source that suggests Anti-Armour Companies were a thing outside of the publication.  For a while, 3 R22eR was an Anti-Armour Battalion in 4 CMBG, but that was done away with as well.



Good2Golf said:


> What’s the latest effective date on “The Battle Group in Operations?”
> 
> Is it even a current document?



2011, which makes it fresh paint in our doctrine library.  But this does not speak to unit organization, only to tactical groupings.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> One source I've found is that they were chopped in 1969 when the European commitment was rolled back (Kasurak, _Canada's Mechanized Infantry_ and I think Maloney's _War Without Battles_ as well).  There was a brief return in the late 1990s as 4 CMBG and the Airborne Regiment were collapsed, but FRP quickly took those away.
> 
> I've never found a source that suggests Anti-Armour Companies were a thing outside of the publication.  For a while, 3 R22eR was an Anti-Armour Battalion in 4 CMBG, but that was done away with as well.
> 
> 
> 
> 2011, which makes it fresh paint in our doctrine library.  But this does not speak to unit organization, only to tactical groupings.


Thank you I very much appreciate that.


----------



## Kirkhill

My recollection is that we were still being instructed on 4 company battalions in 309(3) at Gagetown in 1982.  

Also the Anti-Tank Platoon could have anything from 4 to 12 TOW.  At 12 I have some vague recollection of it being able to act as a Coy but it was still part of the Combat Support Coy along with the 8 mors, the Pioneers, the 7 to 14 Lynxes in the Recce Pl and a number of Obs Dets with radars and NOD-LRs. 

Maybe some of the other old geezers have got better recall.   But, I know for sure, we were still talking about 4 Rifle Companies in 1983,  5-132 sticks in my mind as an organization.  10 man sections - although usually 9.   Rifle Group and Gun Group (2x FNC2)   4 Wpns Dets to the Coy (1/coy and 1/pl)  - 60mm, CG-84 and Browning 7.62.  1 Obs Det per coy.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> My recollection is that we were still being instructed on 4 company battalions in 309(3) at Gagetown in 1982.


What was being instructed at a school is beside the point, and the extant publication still has 4x companies.  These weren't actual organizations from the late 60s on, as the sources I provided above indicated.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> What was being instructed at a school is beside the point, and the extant publication still has 4x companies.  These weren't actual organizations from the late 60s on, as the sources I provided above indicated.


So tell me again about doctrine/dogma if even your schools can't adhere to it.

Fugg me gently.


----------



## markppcli

Well it does appear that it’s functionally all that different than what goes on in this thread. Given that it doesn’t, and hasn’t for 60 years, reflect reality.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I couldn’t agree more, we used to be able to teach the organization of an Infatry Bn out of the Platoon in Battle, try doing that now. No one in the bloody thing has ever seen 4 companies let alone the anti tank company. It’s absurd. And I agree with you that this works up, what a Bn is should be codified so that the CDS can be show an document that clearly lays it out.


1 VP had 4 Coy and Cbt Spt Coy in the mid 90's - as did some of the other 1-2 BN's - but simply because removal of the MG Platoons from Cbt Spt Coy, 4 CMBG close out, zero manning the 3rd BN's and the CAR disbandment, as soon as the 3rd Bn's where reactivated - the 4th Coy went away - and much thinner Coy's occurred.

I have never seen an Anti-Armor Coy - was always ADP (Armor Defence Platoon), or just called TOW Platoon.



I'd like to point out that the CAR had a better ATGM arrangement in 1990 with the TOW on the Iltis than anyone outside of CANSOF does currently in the CA.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I'd like to point out that the CAR had a better ATGM arrangement in 1990 with the TOW on the Iltis than anyone outside of CANSOF does currently in the CA.



Another pet solution to Canada's Militia Conundrums has been to use the CAR Cdo model as the basis for a Militia Unit.

1  It reduces the Rank structure by putting a major in charge.
2 It reduces the recruiting requirement by dropping the numbers from the 600-1000 range to the 200-250 range
3 It combines rifles with mobile combat support (81s, ATGMs, HMG/GMG)
4 The combat support can be brigaded, as can the rifles, either together or separately
5 The unit can be self-contained and employable as a single entity
6 The unit can hive off formed elements to support regular force taskings.
7 You would end up with 48-51 Company Cbt Tms (Theoretical)

I believe that creating a small, local, functional, light organization would improve recruiting and thus improve you chances of finding 51 deployable platoons from your 51 coys, or even just 51 sections.


Canada suffers from Geography.  This puts a lot of trades and trainers into small, widely dispersed packets that are broadly accessible.   
Let the MCpls train their teams and sections.  With the rudiments then the Militia troops tasked to the regs for deployments and exercises can the be brought up to standards.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> 1 VP had 4 Coy and Cbt Spt Coy in the mid 90's - as did some of the other 1-2 BN's - but simply because removal of the MG Platoons from Cbt Spt Coy, 4 CMBG close out, zero manning the 3rd BN's and the CAR disbandment, as soon as the 3rd Bn's where reactivated - the 4th Coy went away - and much thinner Coy's occurred.
> 
> I have never seen an Anti-Armor Coy - was always ADP (Armor Defence Platoon), or just called TOW Platoon.
> 
> 
> 
> I'd like to point out that the CAR had a better ATGM arrangement in 1990 with the TOW on the Iltis than anyone outside of CANSOF does currently in the CA.


RIP my briefing note about divested G Wagons and tow systems.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Another pet solution to Canada's Militia Conundrums has been to use the CAR Cdo model as the basis for a Militia Unit.
> 
> 1  It reduces the Rank structure by putting a major in charge.
> 2 It reduces the recruiting requirement by dropping the numbers from the 600-1000 range to the 200-250 range
> 3 It combines rifles with mobile combat support (81s, ATGMs, HMG/GMG)
> 4 The combat support can be brigaded, as can the rifles, either together or separately
> 5 The unit can be self-contained and employable as a single entity
> 6 The unit can hive off formed elements to support regular force taskings.
> 7 You would end up with 48-51 Company Cbt Tms (Theoretical)
> 
> I believe that creating a small, local, functional, light organization would improve recruiting and thus improve you chances of finding 51 deployable platoons from your 51 coys, or even just 51 sections.
> 
> 
> Canada suffers from Geography.  This puts a lot of trades and trainers into small, widely dispersed packets that are broadly accessible.
> Let the MCpls train their teams and sections.  With the rudiments then the Militia troops tasked to the regs for deployments and exercises can the be brought up to standards.


The Army Reserve has enough problems without being shoehorned into yet another purposeless and unstructured model.

First of all, the CAR's establishment varied with the season. It was constantly rejigged and, more often than not, for no reason that had its genesis in an actual attempt to improve its organizational efficiency. Usually the reorgs were based on issued relating back to its three parent regiments, CAF manpower issues and a changing CAF mission focus.

Secondly the CAR's organizational structure offers zero advantage over a light infantry battalion once you strip away the airborne aspect. In many ways its not as robust. As far as the Cdo itself is concerned it was nothing but, more or less (depending on time and place), than a light rifle company.

There is no advantage to having self-contained sub-units (with engr, arty, armour etc grafted in). It reduces flexibility while putting an excessive burden on the sub-unit in developing the technical expertise of these specialists. A commando is no more self sufficient or able to operate independently than a light rifle company. It needed the CS and CSS that the CAR and higher formations provided.

There is nothing that the suggested model could do that couldn't be done by fully manned brigades whose battalions and regiments have company sized sub-units distributed in small armories around the region.

On the other hand there is one thing such distributed brigades can do which your 51 commandos can't do - come together as fully functioning battalions or brigades if and when necessary.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Another pet solution to Canada's Militia Conundrums has been to use the CAR Cdo model as the basis for a Militia Unit.
> 
> 1  It reduces the Rank structure by putting a major in charge.
> 2 It reduces the recruiting requirement by dropping the numbers from the 600-1000 range to the 200-250 range
> 3 It combines rifles with mobile combat support (81s, ATGMs, HMG/GMG)
> 4 The combat support can be brigaded, as can the rifles, either together or separately
> 5 The unit can be self-contained and employable as a single entity
> 6 The unit can hive off formed elements to support regular force taskings.
> 7 You would end up with 48-51 Company Cbt Tms (Theoretical)



It didn't -- the original organization of 2 Cdo's had Light Col's commanding them and where significantly larger than a Coy sized entity -- later with the regimental change to  go to a 3 Cdo system, it was much more akin to a conventional infantry unit - as it removed the support part of the Commando and they really where no longer a self contained entity (major fail IMHO - as Paratroops need to have that organic support).




Kirkhill said:


> I believe that creating a small, local, functional, light


Pick 2 of those 



Kirkhill said:


> organization would improve recruiting and thus improve you chances of finding 51 deployable platoons from your 51 coys, or even just 51 sections.
> 
> 
> Canada suffers from Geography.  This puts a lot of trades and trainers into small, widely dispersed packets that are broadly accessible.
> Let the MCpls train their teams and sections.  With the rudiments then the Militia troops tasked to the regs for deployments and exercises can the be brought up to standards.


I think the CA needs significant rationalization - making smart choices in units based on location/geography for the reserves is one.
   But they need to be effective - and a Commandoesque entity that can parade 22 troops isn't going to do anything effectively.


----------



## Brad Sallows

The battalion anti-tank platoon evolution is interesting.  I've always thought of it as necessary and sufficient to prevent the battalion from being embarrassed (dislodged) by a few tanks (coy gp or less).  A 12-piece platoon strikes me as a company.  A guess: the larger number of pieces was a response to the Cold War expectation of one day facing hordes of T-whatevers and being expected to defend against a TR or MRR.

If the infantry companies have enough AT capability to look after themselves against a few tanks, you don't need the platoon.  If you're facing down a force built around a tank battalion or more, you'd want backup from a div AT bn (or bde AT bty) if the coy weapons aren't enough.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> The battalion anti-tank platoon evolution is interesting.  I've always thought of it as necessary and sufficient to prevent the battalion from being embarrassed (dislodged) by a few tanks (coy gp or less).  A 12-piece platoon strikes me as a company.  A guess: the larger number of pieces was a response to the Cold War expectation of one day facing hordes of T-whatevers and being expected to defend against a TR or MRR.
> 
> If the infantry companies have enough AT capability to look after themselves against a few tanks, you don't need the platoon.  If you're facing down a force built around a tank battalion or more, you'd want backup from a div AT bn (or bde AT bty) if the coy weapons aren't enough.



Just going from memory here but, in dismounted inf Bn I've been part of in the past, each pl/ tp had 1 x 84mm.

The Bn had a MILAN platoon, equipped with 16 x firing posts. Yes, this was a big pl/tp.

On deployment, each rifle company usually had a 4 post det attached, and there was one in reserve/ one extra allocated to the main axis. The CO could, and often did, reallocate as required based on factors like the enemy and ground.

That gave pretty good Anti-tank coverage out to 1850m, as I recall, and the MIRA TI sight was invaluable for surveillance well beyond that range.

Whenever possible, dets from the MMG Platoon were co-located with the MILAN dets. The MMG Pl had 9 x GPMG SF teams, which were usually allocated on a basis of 2 per Coy, with 3 in reserve/ on the main axis etc. Their main task was to chop up the crews bailing out of busted tanks, separating the dismounted infantry from the tanks etc. This augmented the 4 x GPMGs each platoon fielded, of course.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> The battalion anti-tank platoon evolution is interesting.  I've always thought of it as necessary and sufficient to prevent the battalion from being embarrassed (dislodged) by a few tanks (coy gp or less).  A 12-piece platoon strikes me as a company.  A guess: the larger number of pieces was a response to the Cold War expectation of one day facing hordes of T-whatevers and being expected to defend against a TR or MRR.
> 
> If the infantry companies have enough AT capability to look after themselves against a few tanks, you don't need the platoon.  If you're facing down a force built around a tank battalion or more, you'd want backup from a div AT bn (or bde AT bty) if the coy weapons aren't enough.


While we held additional anti-tank regiments at the divisional level in WW2, I'm not aware of any modern army holding any ground based anti-armour resources above the brigade level. 

As an example, the current SBCT considers the MGSs which have all been moved into one company in the cavalry squadron as an anti-tank company. The IBCT's heavier anti-armour weapons are in the weapons companies of the infantry battalions. ABCTs have tanks and lots of TOWs on the Bradleys and then all BCTs have lots of Javelins everywhere. 

In a larger sense you can consider the attack helicopters as the division's anti-armour forces. 

Things will well change as we go more to AUAVs and anti-armour precision projectiles with long range artillery. Things are in a state of flux - except in Canada where we're in a state of f***ks.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The Army Reserve has enough problems without being shoehorned into yet another purposeless and unstructured model.
> 
> First of all, the CAR's establishment varied with the season. It was constantly rejigged and, more often than not, for no reason that had its genesis in an actual attempt to improve its organizational efficiency. Usually the reorgs were based on issued relating back to its three parent regiments, CAF manpower issues and a changing CAF mission focus.
> 
> Secondly the CAR's organizational structure offers zero advantage over a light infantry battalion once you strip away the airborne aspect. In many ways its not as robust. As far as the Cdo itself is concerned it was nothing but, more or less (depending on time and place), than a light rifle company.
> 
> There is no advantage to having self-contained sub-units (with engr, arty, armour etc grafted in). It reduces flexibility while putting an excessive burden on the sub-unit in developing the technical expertise of these specialists. A commando is no more self sufficient or able to operate independently than a light rifle company. It needed the CS and CSS that the CAR and higher formations provided.
> 
> There is nothing that the suggested model could do that couldn't be done by fully manned brigades whose battalions and regiments have company sized sub-units distributed in small armories around the region.
> 
> On the other hand there is one thing such distributed brigades can do which your 51 commandos can't do - come together as fully functioning battalions or brigades if and when necessary.
> 
> 🍻



We will continue to disagree.

I don't see a problem with brigading company combat teams.  A Brigade could just as easily be filled with a Regimental Group of Company Combat Teams, an Artillery Regiment, a Cavalry Regiment and a Service Support Group.

Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver (maybe - given the Left Coasts inability to organize much of anything) could possibly support a Brigade Structure.

The rest of us are spread hither and yon.   It makes no sense to put all the engineers in one town, all the cavalry in another and no infantry units for hours in either direction.

You lot in the arty have your independent batteries.  Why not independent companies?

No matter how many games we play we are never going to raise the nation en masse, reinstitute conscription and send the 1st Canadian Army back into the field.  It ain't gonna happen.  We need to do the other thing.   Whatever that is.


----------



## Ostrozac

FJAG said:


> While we held additional anti-tank regiments at the divisional level in WW2, I'm not aware of any modern army holding any ground based anti-armour resources above the brigade level.


I believe that the Russians still have a divisional level anti-tank battalion in their motor rifle division structure. As I recall, it’s mostly used to cover obstacles with direct fire. But this structure may have been because the Russians prefer to centralize their attack helicopter force, unlike the US, who push AH-64 Apache down to divisions.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> We will continue to disagree.
> 
> I don't see a problem with brigading company combat teams.  A Brigade could just as easily be filled with a Regimental Group of Company Combat Teams, an Artillery Regiment, a Cavalry Regiment and a Service Support Group.
> 
> Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver (maybe - given the Left Coasts inability to organize much of anything) could possibly support a Brigade Structure.


In larger areas yes - simply because you have a much larger pool of manpower.



Kirkhill said:


> The rest of us are spread hither and yon.   It makes no sense to put all the engineers in one town, all the cavalry in another and no infantry units for hours in either direction.


  It actual does - because then you actually have a Platoon, as opposed to a gaggle of different trades.
   If you have 45 folks - 7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train?  Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.
  Or do they simply go to the mess and drink?



Kirkhill said:


> You lot in the arty have your independent batteries.  Why not independent companies?
> 
> No matter how many games we play we are never going to raise the nation en masse, reinstitute conscription and send the 1st Canadian Army back into the field.  It ain't gonna happen.  We need to do the other thing.   Whatever that is.


  Independent entities really don't exist - they eventually fall under something.
 I think the first step for 99.99% of the Reserve force is to get a viable Platoon sized organization that can be relied upon.  Then expand it as circumstances allow.
   Personally, I would stick them all under a Reg Force umbrella - and reroll them as needed and applicable.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> In larger areas yes - simply because you have a much larger pool of manpower.
> 
> 
> It actual does - because then you actually have a Platoon, as opposed to a gaggle of different trades.
> If you have 45 folks - 7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train?  Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.
> Or do they simply go to the mess and drink?
> 
> 
> Independent entities really don't exist - they eventually fall under something.
> I think the first step for 99.99% of the Reserve force is to get a viable Platoon sized organization that can be relied upon.  Then expand it as circumstances allow.
> Personally, I would stick them all under a Reg Force umbrella - and reroll them as needed and applicable.



Agreed that independent entities eventually fall under something.  And that is a good thing.

As to mixed trades?

 7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train?  Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.

7 armoured ? - 7 drivers and VCs - 4 vehicles with GPMGs/GMGs
7 gunners? - 7 mortarmen (7 infanteers with 2 tubes)
7 engineers? - 7 pioneers (7 infanteers that can blow things up real good)
7 medics? - 7 combat aid types (7 infanteers that can patch up people)
7 comms? - 7 signallers (7 infanteers that can communicate (and drive))
1 Vehicle tech? - excellent - somebody to keep the running gear running
2 Weapons techs?  - ideal -
7 infantry - well, its a start. useful scouts if nothing else.

And if that lot can't train themselves with on line resources, a couple of officers and some RSS, and keep themselves busy then I don't know what would engage them.

All of the members have a foot on the rung to their next corps transfer.

And by the way, my expectation is of 200 to 250 on the rolls for each local sub-unit.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Agreed that independent entities eventually fall under something.  And that is a good thing.
> 
> As to mixed trades?
> 
> 7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train?  Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.
> 
> 7 armoured ? - 7 drivers and VCs - 4 vehicles with GPMGs/GMGs
> 7 gunners? - 7 mortarmen (7 infanteers with 2 tubes)
> 7 engineers? - 7 pioneers (7 infanteers that can blow things up real good)
> 7 medics? - 7 combat aid types (7 infanteers that can patch up people)
> 7 comms? - 7 signallers (7 infanteers that can communicate (and drive))
> 1 Vehicle tech? - excellent - somebody to keep the running gear running
> 2 Weapons techs?  - ideal -
> 7 infantry - well, its a start. useful scouts if nothing else.
> 
> And if that lot can't train themselves with on line resources, a couple of officers and some RSS, and keep themselves busy then I don't know what would engage them.
> 
> All of the members have a foot on the rung to their next corps transfer.
> 
> And by the way, my expectation is of 200 to 250 on the rolls for each local sub-unit.


Historically that really doesn't happen - Inf BN's get Platoons on ex or less, Arty Regiments field a gun, Armoured Regiments field a MilCot or two...
  The Ary independent FD Bty's used to generally provide a gun...

The reason that they made units specifics to townships etc was to amass the recruit pool into one unit. 
   Generally not done anymore for regular units due to casualties wiping out entire villages effectively, but it is still necessary in the Res since the numbers are generally low.


----------



## daftandbarmy

The Commando 21 Orbat is interesting.

It centres on two 'Close Combat' companies and two 'Stand Off' companies based on the assumption (I suppose) that one fires, while one moves, kind of like a larger scale fire team:

The Commandos​The primary fighting elements of the Royal Marines are the battalion-sized Commando units.


40 Commando
(based at Norton Manor Barracks, Taunton, Somerset)
45 Commando
(based at Condor Barracks, Arbroath, Angus, Scotland)
Each Commando is organised into 6 companies. Each company is made up of platoon-sized Troops:


1 Command Company:
Main HQ
Tactical HQ
Reconnaissance Troop (includes a sniper section)
Signals Troop
Mortar Troop
(9 x 81mm mortars + 4 Mortar Fire Control parties)
Anti-Tank (AT) Troop
(6 x Javelin)
Medium Machine Gun Troop
(6 x GPMG (SF mode)

1 Logistic Company:
A Echelon 1 (A Ech1)
A Echelon 2 (A Ech2)
Forward Repair Team (FRT)
Regimental Aid Post (RAP)
B Echelon (B Ech)

2 Close Combat Companies :
Company Headquarters
(Coy HQ)
3 Close Combat Troops
(Troop HQ, 3 Rifle Sections, Manoeuvre Support Section)

2 Stand Off Companies
(1 x tracked, 1 x wheeled)
consisting of :
Company Headquarters (Coy HQ)
Heavy Machine Gun Troop
(6 x HMG / GMG)
AT Troop
(6 x Javelin)
1x Close Combat Troop
(5 officers + 78 other ranks)







						Royal Marines | Commandos
					

The Royal Marines - in-depth info, photos and video of the Royal Navy's amphibious assault force. The Royal Marines Commandos are just one elite unit profiled on Elite UK Forces.



					www.eliteukforces.info
				









						Commando 21 - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Historically that really doesn't happen - Inf BN's get Platoons on ex or less, Arty Regiments field a gun, Armoured Regiments field a MilCot or two...
> The Ary independent FD Bty's used to generally provide a gun...
> 
> The reason that they made units specifics to townships etc was to amass the recruit pool into one unit.
> Generally not done anymore for regular units due to casualties wiping out entire villages effectively, but it is still necessary in the Res since the numbers are generally low.



But we are talking about the Militia here.  We are talking about recruiting and organizing people locally.

Those that want are free to join the Regs for full time pay.

The Regs and their requirements are not the same as those of the Militia.   Which is at the heart of the problem with the Canadian Army.   The Regs think the Militia exists to serve them.

This article from the National Post a couple of days ago is interesting.  Primarily because it addresses the very question I had about the role of the Militia as a Provincial National Guard.




> Greg Taylor: Despite what Trudeau says, sending the Army into Ottawa is not his decision to make​*Military assistance to a provincial government* or its police services to maintain public order* does not require an agreement from the federal government*











						Greg Taylor: Despite what Trudeau says, sending the Army into Ottawa is not his decision to make
					

Military assistance to a provincial government or its police services to maintain public order does not require an agreement from the federal government




					nationalpost.com
				






> *The provinces are responsible for public order:* the Ottawa Police Service exists* under policies and regulations set by the provincial Ministry of the Solicitor Genera*l. Police do* sometimes request military assistance*, referred to as “*support to law enforcement*,” but it is usually relatively minor, such as providing an unarmed armoured vehicle to transport police responding to an armed standoff.
> 
> If Ottawa’s chief of police was thinking about such minor support from the military, then Trudeau’s comments would be valid. However, given the situation that has unfolded in Ottawa over the past week, it is likely that Ottawa is contemplating far more substantial military involvement, referred to as “aid of the civil power.”
> 
> *Aid of the civil power — i.e., military assistance to a provincial government or its police services to maintain public order — does not require an agreement from the federal government. Under the National Defence Act, provinces have the right to **“requisition”** military aid of the civil powe**r.* The word “requisition” is extremely important. During a public welfare emergency, such as a flood, provinces may request military assistance, and that request can be denied. A requisition is quite different.
> 
> *The right of provinces to requisition military support is laid out in Part VI of the National Defence Act. Section 277 states that, in the event of a riot or disturbance, provincial ministers responsible for public order may “by requisition in writing addressed to the Chief of the Defence Staff, require the Canadian Forces … to be called out on service in aid of the civil power.”*



If the Provincial Solicitors General can "require", not "request" but "require" military assistance it can only be because the Provincial governments, in particular the Lieutenants Governor, have equal authority over the available military forces, including the Militia, as the Governor General.

The answer to the question concerning the lack of a Provincial National Guard is that the Provinces already have one, the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Militia.

The Militia does not exist to serve the Regs.  The Regs, and the Militia, exist to serve the Provincial and Federal governments.  At their discretion.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The Commando 21 Orbat is interesting.
> 
> It centres on two 'Close Combat' companies and two 'Stand Off' companies based on the assumption (I suppose) that one fires, while one moves, kind of like a larger scale fire team:
> 
> The Commandos​The primary fighting elements of the Royal Marines are the battalion-sized Commando units.
> 
> 
> 40 Commando
> (based at Norton Manor Barracks, Taunton, Somerset)
> 45 Commando
> (based at Condor Barracks, Arbroath, Angus, Scotland)
> Each Commando is organised into 6 companies. Each company is made up of platoon-sized Troops:
> 
> 
> 1 Command Company:
> Main HQ
> Tactical HQ
> Reconnaissance Troop (includes a sniper section)
> Signals Troop
> Mortar Troop
> (9 x 81mm mortars + 4 Mortar Fire Control parties)
> Anti-Tank (AT) Troop
> (6 x Javelin)
> Medium Machine Gun Troop
> (6 x GPMG (SF mode)
> 
> 1 Logistic Company:
> A Echelon 1 (A Ech1)
> A Echelon 2 (A Ech2)
> Forward Repair Team (FRT)
> Regimental Aid Post (RAP)
> B Echelon (B Ech)
> 
> 2 Close Combat Companies :
> Company Headquarters
> (Coy HQ)
> 3 Close Combat Troops
> (Troop HQ, 3 Rifle Sections, Manoeuvre Support Section)
> 
> 2 Stand Off Companies
> (1 x tracked, 1 x wheeled)
> consisting of :
> Company Headquarters (Coy HQ)
> Heavy Machine Gun Troop
> (6 x HMG / GMG)
> AT Troop
> (6 x Javelin)
> 1x Close Combat Troop
> (5 officers + 78 other ranks)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Royal Marines | Commandos
> 
> 
> The Royal Marines - in-depth info, photos and video of the Royal Navy's amphibious assault force. The Royal Marines Commandos are just one elite unit profiled on Elite UK Forces.
> 
> 
> 
> www.eliteukforces.info
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Commando 21 - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org




But that organization didn't survive contact in Afghanistan.   Commandos were reorganized into Combat Teams with the MGs, ATGMs and Mors distributed among the Companies.   And that seems to be the basis for the 150 man Vanguard Strike Company which will form part of the RN's Littoral Response Groups.



> The Royal Marines are currently undergoing a bold modernisation project – known as the Future Commando Force programme – which will overhaul how the world-famous green berets operate.
> 
> As part of this restructuring, *more than 150 Royal Marines and Army Commandos will come together this autumn to form the Vanguard Strike Compan*y.
> 
> The company will head on its maiden deployment in mid-2021 after further trials later this year and ongoing equipment, structural and tactical experimentation associated with the Future Commando Force.
> 
> Commandant General Royal Marines, Major General Matt Holmes, said: “The Vanguard Strike Company will lead and inform how the Royal Marines and Army Commandos will operate and fight in a dynamic, technological era of warfare.
> 
> *“We envisage several of these networked sub-units persistently forward deployed around the globe*, with an array of sophisticated enabling capabilities, to present dilemmas to adversaries whilst supporting partners. These will all be at high-readiness, as a capable forward contingency force at the core of the Royal Navy’s Littoral Response Groups.”
> 
> The deployment next year will see the first practical demonstration of kit, equipment, training and organisational change necessary to shape the concept further and bring it quickly to the forefront of the Royal Navy’s contribution to national security.
> 
> The elite commandos will work in small, versatile teams that will be tailored for the respective mission they will be facing – calling on areas of expertise and hone skills necessary to bring an advantage depending on the type of operation.











						Royal Marines Commando unit created to shape the Future Commando Force
					

A select group of commandos will form a new Vanguard Strike Company to shape how the Royal Marines Commandos of the future will operate around the globe.




					www.royalnavy.mod.uk
				




A large number of capable sub-units rather than one, singular, brigade.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> But that organization didn't survive contact in Afghanistan.   Commandos were reorganized into Combat Teams with the MGs, ATGMs and Mors distributed among the Companies.   And that seems to be the basis for the 150 man Vanguard Strike Company which will form part of the RN's Littoral Response Groups.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Royal Marines Commando unit created to shape the Future Commando Force
> 
> 
> A select group of commandos will form a new Vanguard Strike Company to shape how the Royal Marines Commandos of the future will operate around the globe.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.royalnavy.mod.uk
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A large number of capable sub-units rather than one, singular, brigade.



'Vanguard Strike'.... because just one warry adjective isn't enough 

I recall, post-Falklands, and especially in 45 CDO, there was this lingering and general dissatisfaction with the Cold War orbat, mainly because going up against well entrenched near peer Infantry (who had some pretty good/ better kit and even or better numbers) scared the hell out of them. 

At the time, we focused mainly on getting extra GPMGs to the sections as that was all we had, pretty much.

I assume this effort to drive heavier fire power further down the food chain by employing lightweight heavy hitters like Javelin, is part of this legacy.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> But we are talking about the Militia here.  We are talking about recruiting and organizing people locally.
> 
> Those that want are free to join the Regs for full time pay.
> 
> The Regs and their requirements are not the same as those of the Militia.   Which is at the heart of the problem with the Canadian Army.   The Regs think the Militia exists to serve them.
> 
> This article from the National Post a couple of days ago is interesting.  Primarily because it addresses the very question I had about the role of the Militia as a Provincial National Guard.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Greg Taylor: Despite what Trudeau says, sending the Army into Ottawa is not his decision to make
> 
> 
> Military assistance to a provincial government or its police services to maintain public order does not require an agreement from the federal government
> 
> 
> 
> 
> nationalpost.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If the Provincial Solicitors General can "require", not "request" but "require" military assistance it can only be because the Provincial governments, in particular the Lieutenants Governor, have equal authority over the available military forces, including the Militia, as the Governor General.
> 
> The answer to the question concerning the lack of a Provincial National Guard is that the Provinces already have one, the Canadian Armed Forces, including the Militia.
> 
> The Militia does not exist to serve the Regs.  The Regs, and the Militia, exist to serve the Provincial and Federal governments.  At their discretion.


The Militia at this point in time exists to lick itself.
   It is only viable currently in supporting the Regs in small numbers - now a lot of the fault of the Reg Force, or former Reg Force retirees, but it's not providing any units whatsoever to anyone.
   Sure they have been Militia companies fielded with the Reg's for overseas deployment, but it hasn't been an actual unit -- its been troops gather from all over the country.

Until the Reserves are sorted - there is zero point to discussion them in Farce 2025.

The fact there are going to be 5 Divisions for an Army that doesn't have enough troops for 1 would be my first area of concern...


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The Militia at this point in time exists to lick itself.
> It is only viable currently in supporting the Regs in small numbers - now a lot of the fault of the Reg Force, or former Reg Force retirees, but it's not providing any units whatsoever to anyone.
> Sure they have been Militia companies fielded with the Reg's for overseas deployment, but it hasn't been an actual unit -- its been troops gather from all over the country.
> 
> Until the Reserves are sorted - there is zero point to discussion them in Farce 2025.
> 
> The fact there are going to be 5 Divisions for an Army that doesn't have enough troops for 1 would be my first area of concern...


The Militia exists only so far as the Regs have left any breath in its bones.

The determination is to ensure that Sam Hughes never happens again.  Unfortunately Canadian politicians and politics have changed less since Sam's day than the Generals have.

WRT the 5 divisions - I agree entirely 

48 Infantry companies - 6 Infantry Regiments of 8 independent companies
48 AD troops - one per major port/urban centre
Add other troops to taste

6 Brigades for the country.

The Regs are the expeditionary force.  See what money you can get out of parliament.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> The Militia exists only so far as the Regs have left any breath in its bones.
> 
> The determination is to ensure that Sam Hughes never happens again.  Unfortunately Canadian politicians and politics have changed less since Sam's day than the Generals have.
> 
> WRT the 5 divisions - I agree entirely
> 
> 48 Infantry companies - 6 Infantry Regiments of 8 independent companies
> 48 AD troops - one per major port/urban centre
> Add other troops to taste
> 
> 6 Brigades for the country.
> 
> The Regs are the expeditionary force.  See what money you can get out of parliament.


I've been on both sides of the Reg and Res coin, the Res in itself loves to shoot itself in the foot constantly.
   Units should have been way more honest and their commanders and higher reserve commands should have made many of them downsize rather than trying to pretend they where still at WWII strength.
   A Platoon doesn't need a Lt. Col. 5 Maj, and 21 Captains -- it needs a Lt/Capt and a WO.
 Two Platoons don't need a Lt. Col etc.

 Burning the Res CoC to the ground would free up a lot of PY's to actually have soldiers - and instead of the Col's and other senior officers burning up the budget - they could actually do things.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I've been on both sides of the Reg and Res coin, the Res in itself loves to shoot itself in the foot constantly.
> Units should have been way more honest and their commanders and higher reserve commands should have made many of them downsize rather than trying to pretend they where still at WWII strength.
> *A Platoon doesn't need a Lt. Col. 5 Maj, and 21 Captains* -- it needs a Lt/Capt and a WO.
> Two Platoons don't need a Lt. Col etc.
> 
> Burning the Res CoC to the ground would free up a lot of PY's to actually have soldiers - and instead of the Col's and other senior officers burning up the budget - they could actually do things.



Dude... some of those platoons have MGENs now too, you know


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I've been on both sides of the Reg and Res coin, the Res in itself loves to shoot itself in the foot constantly.
> Units should have been way more honest and their commanders and higher reserve commands should have made many of them downsize rather than trying to pretend they where still at WWII strength.
> A Platoon doesn't need a Lt. Col. 5 Maj, and 21 Captains -- it needs a Lt/Capt and a WO.
> Two Platoons don't need a Lt. Col etc.
> 
> Burning the Res CoC to the ground would free up a lot of PY's to actually have soldiers - and instead of the Col's and other senior officers burning up the budget - they could actually do things.



Absolutely and entirely agree.  That is why I am starting with Sub-Units.  200 on parade strength is a stretch but it is a lot closer to being doable than a battalion.   And a slightly understrength company is a lot less silly than a ridiculously understrength battalion.

I would just as soon see the Captains and below be Militiamen.  The Major and his MWO, together with their instructional cadre should be Reg Force Regimental Appointments.   Admin is a Class B/C Militia function or even a civilian function.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> But we are talking about the Militia here.  We are talking about recruiting and organizing people locally.



But we're not really interested in a local defence organization which assembles spontaneously in response to enemy attack.  We could get that for nothing by simply amending the Charter to include a right to keep and bear arms.

The historical purpose of providing a framework for mobilization has essentially vanished, because the framework always placed perpetuation of units according to some end state coming out of an old war over regularly tweaking the framework to ensure the numbers and types of units necessary to fill out the mobilization target of the army of the day.

Since too much of the Res F and the cadre of old warhorses who can't shut up and just enjoy the view of the paintings in the mess has never been able to lean into any useful reinforcement scheme except providing volunteers who don't have to start from being taught how to shape a beret, it will have to be forced into becoming a useful reinforcing component.  A logical next step up from individual volunteers is attempting to fill small blank spaces left in Reg F establishments.  But those needs are specific, not "however many people want to do trade X, may sign on to do trade X".



> The Regs think the Militia exists to serve them.



Sure.  Resources are limited, and the list of things the Militia can do as modern soldiers without resources and training is pretty damn short, and consists mostly of menial tasks.  What's the point of giving anything more complex than a Lee Enfield to a reservist if the Res F isn't going to aspire to be able to fit into employable units without somewhat less than the time needed to train a soldier from scratch?  There are things that need to be done; the Reg F does almost all of them; the Res F has to be more than a drain on available resources.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> You lot in the arty have your independent batteries. Why not independent companies?


Independent batteries exist for the usual reasons, political influence. Usually they were wartime regiments who couldn't manage to keep going at a strength big enough to form even a Militia regiment but unwilling to come under anyone's thumb.

A typical example is 116 Ind Fd Bty in Kenora which has for many decades had its exercises with 26 Fd Regt from Brandon in order to make up one battery. Kenora typically had less than 25 members and generally could furnish one gun det. Brandon was actually quite happy to not take them under their thumb because it didn't want the hassle of dealing with them administratively - poor return on investment. Now things have gotten so bad that 116 and 26 have to work together with 10th Fd Regt in Regina to make one good exercise - it's now termed 38 Canadian Brigade Group Artillery Tactical Group and they share one CO.

Long story short, they are anything but independent other than they have their own HLCol.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> If the Provincial Solicitors General can "require", not "request" but "require" military assistance it can only be because the Provincial governments, in particular the Lieutenants Governor, have equal authority over the available military forces, including the Militia, as the Governor General.


Take note though that article does mention the 2004 amendment which inserts the phrase "subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province" into s 278. That does put a level of Federal government interference into the process.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Independent batteries exist for the usual reasons, political influence. Usually they were wartime regiments who couldn't manage to keep going at a strength big enough to form even a Militia regiment but unwilling to come under anyone's thumb.
> 
> A typical example is 116 Ind Fd Bty in Kenora which has for many decades had its exercises with 26 Fd Regt from Brandon in order to make up one battery. Kenora typically had less than 25 members and generally could furnish one gun det. Brandon was actually quite happy to not take them under their thumb because it didn't want the hassle of dealing with them administratively - poor return on investment. Now things have gotten so bad that 116 and 26 have to work together with 10th Fd Regt in Regina to make one good exercise - it's now termed 38 Canadian Brigade Group Artillery Tactical Group and they share one CO.
> 
> Long story short, they are anything but independent other than they have their own HLCol.
> 
> 🍻



And I have no problem at all with "brigading/grouping/regimenting" companies - without an HLCol.  Or HCol or Lt Col and RSM.

We are already talking about variably sized battalions, with ad hoc capabilities and the lack of an effective doctrine/dogma for at least 60 years.  The Battalion has lost its centrality except as a political structure.

Time to revert to a collection of regimented companies that can be brigaded to meet the demands of the situation.   The Battalion reverts to what it was - a battle organization.

The Arty is one Regiment of many batteries - some of which are grouped together.   Likewise for the Engineers.  

The Service Support elements are similarly composed.

Why not the Infantry and the Cavalry?


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Take note though that article does mention the 2004 amendment which inserts the phrase "subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province" into s 278. That does put a level of Federal government interference into the process.
> 
> 🍻




Noted - a modernism that contravenes an earlier spirit and intention - and which would be an interesting court case.  No?

Not that novelty has ever been a problem for jurists.

Interesting that they felt the need for the Minister to recruit other Provincial Attorneys General into the fray.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> Since too much of the Res F and the cadre of old warhorses who can't shut up and just enjoy the view of the paintings in the mess has never been able to lean into any useful reinforcement scheme except providing volunteers who don't have to start from being taught how to shape a beret, it will have to be forced into becoming a useful reinforcing component.





Brad Sallows said:


> What's the point of giving anything more complex than a Lee Enfield to a reservist if the Res F isn't going to aspire to be able to fit into employable units without somewhat less than the time needed to train a soldier from scratch? There are things that need to be done; the Reg F does almost all of them; the Res F has to be more than a drain on available resources.


I guess I'm failing in my duties as an old warhorse in that since I retired I haven't spent one day in the mess enjoying the paintings. As for not shutting up part - guilty as charged.

Look, I don't for a minute hold the ResF blameless. Reserves 2000 has done as much harm as it has done good - and yes they did some good.

The real problem, however, is that everything that the ResF is or isn't comes from the RegF: their pay, their organization; their equipment; their mission - or more accurately their lack of all of these. ResF leaders, regardless of their rank command and control very little in the way of people, resources and, least of all, influence. 

If a given reservist is only capable of shaping his beret then that's because of the resources and training system that the RegF has laid on that soldier. And yes, the haphazard training system that the ResF has is the way it is because of the way the RegF resources it.

The RegF has created a two tier system that it should be ashamed of and held accountable for. It can be fixed and easily fixed and the fact that it hasn't is institutional negligence of the worst order. Blaming the ResF for its state over the last half century is for the most part victim shaming.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> And I have no problem at all with "brigading/grouping/regimenting" companies - without an HLCol. Or HCol or Lt Col and RSM.


We agree in general that there remains a role for company sized sub-units can and should exist in smaller rural centres. Where we disagree is on the next level.

Your presentation puts forward a mode of employment of independent action with a possibility of some vague regimenting into groups as required. My view is that from square one they need to belong to a tactical command structure that trains and employs the companies. We already have such a structural model in the brigade groups (real brigade groups not the administrative ones that are there now). We don't need to invent a new structure. We just need to properly implement the existing one. It can handle all natures of missions from the smallest company action on up.


Kirkhill said:


> interesting that they felt the need for the Minister to recruit other Provincial Attorneys General into the fray.


You misunderstood me. The section only requires that the MND consult with the attorney general who raised the requisition and any attorney general of a province that is affected. One should note that this was the Martin Liberal government.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> We agree in general that there remains a role for company sized sub-units can and should exist in smaller rural centres. Where we disagree is on the next level.
> 
> Your presentation puts forward a mode of employment of independent action with a possibility of some vague regimenting into groups as required. My view is that from square one they need to belong to a tactical command structure that trains and employs the companies. We already have such a structural model in the brigade groups (real brigade groups not the administrative ones that are there now). We don't need to invent a new structure. We just need to properly implement the existing one. It can handle all natures of missions from the smallest company action on up.



Ir you're talking about this - blame Kevin.  



Kirkhill said:


> Agreed that independent entities eventually fall under something.  And that is a good thing.
> 
> As to mixed trades?
> 
> 7 of which are Armoured, 7 of Infantry, 7 Gunners, 7 Engineers, 7 Medics, 7 Comms, 1 Vehicle Tech, and 2 Weapons Tech's - how to they train?  Who teaches them, what sort of refresher courses can they do.
> 
> 7 armoured ? - 7 drivers and VCs - 4 vehicles with GPMGs/GMGs
> 7 gunners? - 7 mortarmen (7 infanteers with 2 tubes)
> 7 engineers? - 7 pioneers (7 infanteers that can blow things up real good)
> 7 medics? - 7 combat aid types (7 infanteers that can patch up people)
> 7 comms? - 7 signallers (7 infanteers that can communicate (and drive))
> 1 Vehicle tech? - excellent - somebody to keep the running gear running
> 2 Weapons techs?  - ideal -
> 7 infantry - well, its a start. useful scouts if nothing else.
> 
> And if that lot can't train themselves with on line resources, a couple of officers and some RSS, and keep themselves busy then I don't know what would engage them.
> 
> All of the members have a foot on the rung to their next corps transfer.
> 
> And by the way, my expectation is of 200 to 250 on the rolls for each local sub-unit.



I just took the bodies he gave me, with the trades he assigned and asked myself what I could do with that motley assortment.  It turned out, in my fevered mind at least, that there is a small, functional capability even at that level of absurdity.  I would still be playing for a larger structure.   A company combat team,  perhaps, or a company with a strong weapons platoon (including 81mm tubes) or, as also suggested, something like a CAR Commando.   Or, the Strike Company of the RM.  

An entity that can train independently within itself, with its own resources, learning how to exploit capabilities beyond direct fire,  but which can be grouped into a larger formation, and possibly separated from its support.



FJAG said:


> You misunderstood me. The section only requires that the MND consult with the attorney general who raised the requisition and any attorney general of a province that is affected. One should note that this was the Martin Liberal government.
> 
> 🍻



And thanks, as always for the clarification.  How does the Martin reference fit in here?


----------



## Blackadder1916

FJAG said:


> Take note though that article does mention the 2004 amendment which inserts the phrase "subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province" into s 278. *That does put a level of Federal government interference into the process.*





FJAG said:


> You misunderstood me. The section only *requires that the MND consult with the attorney general who raised the requisition* and any attorney general of a province that is affected. One should note that this was the Martin Liberal government.



I read that section somewhat differently from you. 



> *278* On receiving a requisition in writing made by an attorney general under section 277, *the Chief of the Defence Staff*, or such officer as the Chief of the Defence Staff may designate, *shall, subject to such directions *as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances *and in consultation with* that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province that may be affected, *call out such part of the Canadian Forces* as the Chief of the Defence Staff or that officer considers necessary for the purpose of suppressing or preventing any actual riot or disturbance or any riot or disturbance that is considered as likely to occur.



My take (as I have bolded) is that the subjecting to and the consulting with rests with the CDS and that the inclusion of the Minister did not introduce governmental interference in the process.  Rather it codified reality, and recognized that the military is responsible to civilian oversight.  Or as noted in the summary to the legislation that amended that part of the NDA:






						SC 2004, c 15 | An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures for implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in order to enhance public safety | CanLII
					

Access all information related to this legislation on CanLII.



					canlii.ca
				





> Part 13 amends the National Defence Act to allow for the identification and prevention of the harmful unauthorized use of, or interference with, computer systems and networks of the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Forces, and to ensure the protection of those systems and networks. The amendments also clarify the provisions dealing with active service and the definition of “emergency”. *In cases of aid to the civil power, the amendments allow the Minister to provide direction to the Chief of the Defence Staff on how to respond to provincial requisitions.* The amendments provide for a member of the reserve force who is called out on service during an emergency to be reinstated with their former employer at the conclusion of the period of call out. The amendments also establish the Reserve Military Judges Panel, thus making it possible to increase, according to the needs of the military justice system, the number of officers who can be selected to hear military cases.



I tried to find any applicable minutes of House debate or committee meetings in Hansard but it has so far defeated me.


----------



## FJAG

Blackadder1916 said:


> I read that section somewhat differently from you.


Firstly, you are absolutely correct that I misstated the consultation process. It's the CDS that consults with the provincial attorney(ies) general and not the MND.



Blackadder1916 said:


> My take (as I have bolded) is that the subjecting to and the consulting with rests with the CDS and that the inclusion of the Minister did not introduce governmental interference in the process. Rather it codified reality, and recognized that the military is responsible to civilian oversight.


This part I disagree with. While the MND has responsibility for the whole department, the legislation as it was first written created a direct link as between the requisitioning AG and the CDS. The CDS was given the sole power to decide with what force to respond to the request. Kirkhill in his writings discusses the state and National Guard in it's state militia capacity and in fact I think this is exactly what the Canadian legislation was providing for - an ability of the provincial authorities to call out the military for assistance.

The prior legislation did not fetter the CDS's discretion on how to respond. The revised version mandates that he is fettered by the directions received from the MND.

I think what's important is that when called out in aid of the civil power, the military is no longer acting in its role of a national defence force but in the capacity of the administration of justice within the province and which is constitutionally a provincial power. The MND has no role with policing in a province.

Remember that this power goes back over a century to the Militia Acts where provincial AGs could requisition assistance from officers commanding the local Active Militia districts. If one goes back to s. 27 of the old 1868 Militia Act the officer responding was the Adjutant General of the district (or appropriate subordinate) and the requisition could come from the mayor or head of municipality or by two magistrates etc.

In each case there was a direct link as between the local official and the local military without reference to the federal government.

The 2004 amendment in my mind is an interference with the long-standing constitutional provision that recognizes the military's roles in the individual provinces before confederation and continued that relationship notwithstanding that all provincial militias had become a federal responsibility.

For Kirkhill: I mentioned that it was a Liberal government because I associate them with a government that a) doesn't respect old constitutional conventions; b) works hard to centralize power wherever it suits them; and c) doesn't trust their subordinate agencies to do their job without meddling in.

🍻


----------



## Pewpews521

KevinB said:


> The Militia at this point in time exists to lick itself.
> It is only viable currently in supporting the Regs in small numbers - now a lot of the fault of the Reg Force, or former Reg Force retirees, but it's not providing any units whatsoever to anyone.
> Sure they have been Militia companies fielded with the Reg's for overseas deployment, but it hasn't been an actual unit -- its been troops gather from all over the country.
> 
> Until the Reserves are sorted - there is zero point to discussion them in Farce 2025.
> 
> The fact there are going to be 5 Divisions for an Army that doesn't have enough troops for 1 would be my first area of concern...


Damn, pulled me into comment. I just wanted to read this thread in peace Lol 
The Army Reserve provides the CAF what it wants it to provide based on its current structure and equipment, under-resourced and inefficient as it is. Something like 8000 PRes and CRs for Op Laser, thousands for Op Lentus over the past few years, say nothing of those on overseas operations. We will never be the like the US national guard, it’ll always be composite units. 

Ok here’s a controversial opinion, but main problem with the ARes is not it’s structure. Don’t mistake that I am here to argue to retain every cap badge or unit in its current role. Disbanding CBG HQs, firing half the COs and RSMs and making bigger regiments will not increase the number of soldiers on the parade square. There is no shortage of people wanting to join however there seems to be an upper limit on the average reserve unit’s strength. Few units exceed 250. The whole process of recruiting and getting a troop to DP 1 faster than others are departing out the other side needs to go back to first principles. Taking recruiting from CFRC was a decent first step. Letting go of the need to do every DP1 course at the CDTC was another.


----------



## Kirkhill

Pewpews521 said:


> Damn, pulled me into comment. I just wanted to read this thread in peace Lol
> The Army Reserve provides the CAF what it wants it to provide based on its current structure and equipment, under-resourced and inefficient as it is. Something like 8000 PRes and CRs for Op Laser, thousands for Op Lentus over the past few years, say nothing of those on overseas operations. We will never be the like the US national guard, it’ll always be composite units.
> 
> Ok here’s a controversial opinion, but main problem with the ARes is not it’s structure. Don’t mistake that I am here to argue to retain every cap badge or unit in its current role. Disbanding CBG HQs, firing half the COs and RSMs and making bigger regiments will not increase the number of soldiers on the parade square. There is no shortage of people wanting to join however there seems to be an upper limit on the average reserve unit’s strength. Few units exceed 250. The whole process of recruiting and getting a troop to DP 1 faster than others are departing out the other side needs to go back to first principles. Taking recruiting from CFRC was a decent first step. Letting go of the need to do every DP1 course at the CDTC was another.


I have recollections of the Calgary Highlanders being denied the opportunity to sign on more than some 200 troops or being allowed to open remote platoons in the 80s.  Drumheller as considered as one possible site.

I also have recollections of parade nights being cut due to lack of available funds.


----------



## KevinB

Pewpews521 said:


> Damn, pulled me into comment. I just wanted to read this thread in peace Lol
> The Army Reserve provides the CAF what it wants it to provide based on its current structure and equipment, under-resourced and inefficient as it is. Something like 8000 PRes and CRs for Op Laser, thousands for Op Lentus over the past few years, say nothing of those on overseas operations. We will never be the like the US national guard, it’ll always be composite units.


I don't accept that answer.   The USNG wasn't always like that - it was looked at as a joke for years, a way to avoid RVN etc service.
  Only a very few USNG units where activated for 1991 Desert Shield - Desert Storm, not because they where not wanted or needed, but because their training/numbers etc was abysmal.



Pewpews521 said:


> Ok here’s a controversial opinion, but main problem with the ARes is not it’s structure. Don’t mistake that I am here to argue to retain every cap badge or unit in its current role. Disbanding CBG HQs, firing half the COs and RSMs and making bigger regiments will not increase the number of soldiers on the parade square.


Few of us are saying bigger Regiments are needed - because frankly right now I wouldn't Trust the Res to run anything over a Platoon without max supervision.  I think the Capbadge mafia needs to be killed with fire (in the Regs too).   


Pewpews521 said:


> There is no shortage of people wanting to join however there seems to be an upper limit on the average reserve unit’s strength. Few units exceed 250.


 Which is great - an operational company - and a training company.  Because lets face it a lot of the Res numbers are are Pte's who are summer students and a large amount drop off the face of the planet by October.



Pewpews521 said:


> The whole process of recruiting and getting a troop to DP 1 faster than others are departing out the other side needs to go back to first principles. Taking recruiting from CFRC was a decent first step. Letting go of the need to do every DP1 course at the CDTC was another.


When I joined the Reserves in 1987 - recruiting was done internally and Recruit and Basic where done that way too.
   Recruit on Weeknights (Mon and Wed) and Weekends - and then oddly our basic trade training - and then basic (was very weird for those of us who hadn't finished basic not to be able to wear our capbadges at the end, and needed to complete Basic to be able to wear them.

I do think that in order to better integrate the Reg and Res structures that courses need to be the same - and Res promotions slowed down.
   Nothing is more frustrating that working for someone a few months later when you taught their ISCC that summer.    There is also an experience depth often missing from some Res O and NCO's who haven't done Class C Deployments, as they often do not know how to deal with soldiers in a 24/7 environment.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Firstly, you are absolutely correct that I misstated the consultation process. It's the CDS that consults with the provincial attorney(ies) general and not the MND.
> 
> 
> This part I disagree with. While the MND has responsibility for the whole department, the legislation as it was first written created a direct link as between the requisitioning AG and the CDS. The CDS was given the sole power to decide with what force to respond to the request. Kirkhill in his writings discusses the state and National Guard in it's state militia capacity and in fact I think this is exactly what the Canadian legislation was providing for - an ability of the provincial authorities to call out the military for assistance.
> 
> The prior legislation did not fetter the CDS's discretion on how to respond. The revised version mandates that he is fettered by the directions received from the MND.
> 
> I think what's important is that when called out in aid of the civil power, the military is no longer acting in its role of a national defence force but in the capacity of the administration of justice within the province and which is constitutionally a provincial power. The MND has no role with policing in a province.
> 
> Remember that this power goes back over a century to the Militia Acts where provincial AGs could requisition assistance from officers commanding the local Active Militia districts. If one goes back to s. 27 of the old 1868 Militia Act the officer responding was the Adjutant General of the district (or appropriate subordinate) and the requisition could come from the mayor or head of municipality or by two magistrates etc.
> 
> In each case there was a direct link as between the local official and the local military without reference to the federal government.
> 
> The 2004 amendment in my mind is an interference with the long-standing constitutional provision that recognizes the military's roles in the individual provinces before confederation and continued that relationship notwithstanding that all provincial militias had become a federal responsibility.
> 
> For Kirkhill: I mentioned that it was a Liberal government because I associate them with a government that a) doesn't respect old constitutional conventions; b) works hard to centralize power wherever it suits them; and c) doesn't trust their subordinate agencies to do their job without meddling in.
> 
> 🍻



Given your background, and as well read as you are, I suspect that this book will not be a revelation to you.  On the other hand it is a new discovery to me.

Clode, 1869 "The Military Forces of the Crown"









						The Military Forces of the Crown, Their Administration and Government - Google Play
					






					play.google.com
				





Two quotes stuck out for me.



> CHAP , III .
> THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MILITIA .1
> 
> 1. *The Constitutional Force for the Defence of the realın is the **Militia* . By an early statute every freeman between the ages of fifteen and sixty years was obliged to be provided with armour to preserve the peace ; but he was protected from leaving his county or shire , “ save upon the coming of strange enemies into the realm . ” 2





> 2 13 Edw . I. , c . 6 ; 1 Stat . Realm , p . 97 .


And


> 1 This word originated with the controversy which the force itself , namely , the Trained Bands — gave rise to . The first entry in the Commons Journal in which the word is used , is under date of 31st of Jan. , 1641. ( See vol . ii . pp . 316 and 406 ) . “ I do heartily wish , " said Whitlock , addressing the Commons , on 1st March 1641 , “ that this great word — this new word — the Militia — this harsh word , might never have come within these walls . ” — 4 Rush . , Coll . , p . 525




Which leads to this



> The *Militia Ordinance* was passed by the Parliament of England on 15 March 1642. By claiming the right to appoint military commanders without the king's approval, it was a significant step in events leading to the outbreak of the First English Civil War in August.[1]
> 
> The 1641 Irish Rebellion meant there was widespread support in England for raising military forces to suppress it.[2] However, as relations between Charles I and Parliament deteriorated, neither side trusted the other, fearing such an army might be used against them.[3]
> 
> The only permanent military force available were the Trained bands, or county militia, controlled by Lord lieutenants, who in turn were appointed by the king. In December 1641, Sir Arthur Haselrige introduced a militia bill giving Parliament the right to nominate its commanders, not Charles, which was passed by the House of Commons.











						Militia Ordinance - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				








__





						The Militia Ordinance, 1642
					






					bcw-project.org
				




And to this



> In Canada, a *lieutenant governor* (/lɛfˈtɛnənt/; French [masculine]: _lieutenant-gouverneur_, or [feminine]: _lieutenant-gouverneure_) is the viceregal representative in a provincial jurisdiction of the Canadian monarch and head of state, Queen Elizabeth II. On the advice of his or her prime minister, the Governor General of Canada appoints the lieutenant governors to carry out most of the monarch's constitutional and ceremonial duties for an unfixed period of time[1]—known as serving _at Her Excellency's pleasure_—though five years is the normal convention. Similar positions in Canada's three territories are termed _Commissioners_ and are representatives of the federal government, not the monarch directly.
> 
> The offices have their roots in the 16th and 17th century colonial governors of New France and British North America, though the present incarnations of the positions emerged with Canadian Confederation and the _British North America Act_ in 1867, which defined the viceregal offices as the "Lieutenant Governor of the Province acting by and with the Advice the Executive Council thereof."[2] The posts still ultimately represented the government of Canada (that is, the Governor-General-in-Council) until the ruling in 1882 of the Lord Watson of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Maritime Bank v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick,[3] whereafter the lieutenant governors were recognized as the direct representatives of the monarch.[4][5][6] The _Constitution Act, 1982_ provides that any constitutional amendment that affects the office of the lieutenant governor requires the unanimous consent of each provincial Legislative Assembly as well as the House of Commons and the Senate.




All of which, in my mind puts the 2004 ruling as yet one more power play in a discussion that is more than 800 years old, predating the Edward I's Statutes of Westminster of 1285.

The Crown's Lieutenants, be they Lords-Lieutenant, Lieutenants Governor or Governors are by history, law and tradition the agents of the Crown and are responsible for the maintenance of Peace, Order and Good Governance, as we have it in Canada.  The Crown is advised by the Executive Council, now democratically elected, but it is the Crown that holds the authority.  That authority includes the right to administer justice and to call out the entire male community, between the ages of 15 and 60 to support the Crown.

That body, by 1641, had come to be known as a militia.  And by 1869, two years after Confederation, while British Law was still the controlling law in Canada, Clode was comfortable stating, unequivocally, "*The Constitutional Force for the Defence of the realın is the **Militia".*

That position was the accepted position, even in Canada, until the innovations of the 1940s and the establishment of the Sedentary, Non-Permanent Active, and Permanent Active Militias as the Canadian Army (Regular) and the Canadian Army (Reserve).  The Militia resurfaced briefly as an Army Reserve between 1954 and 1968.



> The two Canadian Army components that were previously PAM and NPAM were renamed following World War II as Canadian Army Regular Force and Canadian Army Reserve Force respectively. However in 1954, the Reserve Force was once again renamed Canadian Army (Militia) as a result of the Kennedy Report on the Reserve Army.[29] Following the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968, the Canadian Army became Mobile Command, with its reserve component becoming Mobile Command (Reserve). In 1993, Mobile Command (Reserve) was renamed Land Force Command (Reserve), changing its name to match its Regular Force counterparts (also renamed Land Force Command). In 2011, the service elements of the Canadian Armed Forces reverted to their pre-1968 names, with Land Force Command (Reserve) reverting its name to the Canadian Army Reserve.
> 
> Since the unification of the armed forces in 1968, the term _militia_ has not been used to formally describe a Canadian military force. However, the term is used colloquially in Canada in reference to the Canadian Army Reserve.[30][31]



The related problem is: "who has the authority to call out the "Militia"" regardless of what it is called.  The historical, traditional, answer is that the Crown's agent, specifically its Lieutenant (either Lord-Lieutenant or Lieutenant-Governor) or its Attorney (the Attorney General) and the Attorney's deputy, his Solicitor (the Solicitor General) have the authority to raise the Militia in defence of the Peace, Order and Good Governance within the realm.

On January 1 1867 Canada was not a realm.  A collection of realms, each with their own Crown Lieutenant, Attorney and Solicitor, and their own Executive Council capable of making laws and advising their Crown Lieutenant, all permitted to arm and equip their citizenry to defend themselves and keep order, were debating how much sovereignty to cede to John A MacDonald and his proposed government.

John A.  was determined to have a powerful central government.  The Provinces demurred.

Regardless John A.  managed to establish his authority under his own Crown Lieutenant.  His Crown Lieutenant, his Lieutenant-Governor, however, was to be titled Governor-General.  His intent was that this would the First Among Equals and be the senior Crown Lieutenant in Canada.  That was the official position until 1882



> A ruling by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1882 altered this view,[3] establishing that the lieutenant governors represented the Queen in the provinces as much as the governor general did in the federal jurisdiction.[4][6][17]







__





						Canadian Militia - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




That ruling stands.

Despite the wishes of the Federal Government and Wikipedia, the Provinces, their Lieutenants Governor, their Attorneys and Solicitors General, and their Executive Councils and Legislators, and their Militias, are not subordinate to Federal Authority. They are Co-Equal.  And that includes maintaining the ability to call out the Miliitia,  even when that Militia is centralized as a common good, renamed as the Canadian Forces, and jointly commanded by the Chief of the Defence Staff who finds him/her self in the invidious position of having to serve 11 masters.

It would be an interesting day at the office if the Quebec Attorney General called out the Army to support the Surete de Quebec at the same time as the Attorney General of Canada called out the Army to support the RCMP over a dispute in the Province of Quebec.

No doubt the 2004 ruling, concurrent with the debates over Quebec sovereignty,  was influenced by considerations of that thought. But what appears to by a minor administrative change is actually a major rebalancing of the Crown authority within Canada.

The definition of sovereignty is the arrogation of lethal force in support of the government.  Prior to 2004 and this modification it was clear that the Provinces had sovereign authority, even if they were temperate in how they interpreted that.  After the modification they had been stripped of that sovereign authority and now had to justify their claim to the Federal government. 

The could no longer "requisition".  They could only "request".  The CDS was no longer their employee.  He served strictly as an employee of the Federal government.





Note -

One problem I have with the study of history in Canada, especially as perceived by modern community, is the failure to teach context.  Especially historical context.    Laws do not arise out of nothingness.  They are created in a specific time and place to address a specific problem. 

Three examples that engage me are slavery, religion and the militia.   I regularly hear the discussion about both and their isolated impacts in the modern world of  Canada, or the US, or the UK or France etc.  But  all of them are mixed over time and space and do not respect borders. 

There were slavers and abolitionists of all religions and under all governments in all places.  There were French and Irish protestants as much as there were English Roman Catholics.   And the Militia Act of 1855 was not a purely Canadian Bill,  it was part of an Empire wide response to concerns about Louis Napoleon and his desire to re-establish French Empire - a desire that manifested itself in the French-Mexican wars and support of the Vatican against the "liberal" forces of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel of Savoy.

Context matters.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Given your background, and as well read as you are, I suspect that this book will not be a revelation to you.  On the other hand it is a new discovery to me.
> 
> Clode, 1869 "The Military Forces of the Crown"
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Military Forces of the Crown, Their Administration and Government - Google Play
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> play.google.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Two quotes stuck out for me.
> 
> 
> 
> And
> 
> 
> 
> Which leads to this
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Militia Ordinance - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Militia Ordinance, 1642
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> bcw-project.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And to this
> 
> 
> 
> 
> All of which, in my mind puts the 2004 ruling as yet one more power play in a discussion that is more than 800 years old, predating the Edward I's Statutes of Westminster of 1285.
> 
> The Crown's Lieutenants, be they Lords-Lieutenant, Lieutenants Governor or Governors are by history, law and tradition the agents of the Crown and are responsible for the maintenance of Peace, Order and Good Governance, as we have it in Canada.  The Crown is advised by the Executive Council, now democratically elected, but it is the Crown that holds the authority.  That authority includes the right to administer justice and to call out the entire male community, between the ages of 15 and 60 to support the Crown.
> 
> That body, by 1641, had come to be known as a militia.  And by 1869, two years after Confederation, while British Law was still the controlling law in Canada, Clode was comfortable stating, unequivocally, "*The Constitutional Force for the Defence of the realın is the **Militia".*
> 
> That position was the accepted position, even in Canada, until the innovations of the 1940s and the establishment of the Sedentary, Non-Permanent Active, and Permanent Active Militias as the Canadian Army (Regular) and the Canadian Army (Reserve).  The Militia resurfaced briefly as an Army Reserve between 1954 and 1968.
> 
> 
> 
> The related problem is: "who has the authority to call out the "Militia"" regardless of what it is called.  The historical, traditional, answer is that the Crown's agent, specifically its Lieutenant (either Lord-Lieutenant or Lieutenant-Governor) or its Attorney (the Attorney General) and the Attorney's deputy, his Solicitor (the Solicitor General) have the authority to raise the Militia in defence of the Peace, Order and Good Governance within the realm.
> 
> On January 1 1867 Canada was not a realm.  A collection of realms, each with their own Crown Lieutenant, Attorney and Solicitor, and their own Executive Council capable of making laws and advising their Crown Lieutenant, all permitted to arm and equip their citizenry to defend themselves and keep order, were debating how much sovereignty to cede to John A MacDonald and his proposed government.
> 
> John A.  was determined to have a powerful central government.  The Provinces demurred.
> 
> Regardless John A.  managed to establish his authority under his own Crown Lieutenant.  His Crown Lieutenant, his Lieutenant-Governor, however, was to be titled Governor-General.  His intent was that this would the First Among Equals and be the senior Crown Lieutenant in Canada.  That was the official position until 1882
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Canadian Militia - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That ruling stands.
> 
> Despite the wishes of the Federal Government and Wikipedia, the Provinces, their Lieutenants Governor, their Attorneys and Solicitors General, and their Executive Councils and Legislators, and their Militias, are not subordinate to Federal Authority. They are Co-Equal.  And that includes maintaining the ability to call out the Miliitia,  even when that Militia is centralized as a common good, renamed as the Canadian Forces, and jointly commanded by the Chief of the Defence Staff who finds him/her self in the invidious position of having to serve 11 masters.
> 
> It would be an interesting day at the office if the Quebec Attorney General called out the Army to support the Surete de Quebec at the same time as the Attorney General of Canada called out the Army to support the RCMP over a dispute in the Province of Quebec.
> 
> No doubt the 2004 ruling, concurrent with the debates over Quebec sovereignty,  was influenced by considerations of that thought. But what appears to by a minor administrative change is actually a major rebalancing of the Crown authority within Canada.
> 
> The definition of sovereignty is the arrogation of lethal force in support of the government.  Prior to 2004 and this modification it was clear that the Provinces had sovereign authority, even if they were temperate in how they interpreted that.  After the modification they had been stripped of that sovereign authority and now had to justify their claim to the Federal government.
> 
> The could no longer "requisition".  They could only "request".  The CDS was no longer their employee.  He served strictly as an employee of the Federal government.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Note -
> 
> One problem I have with the study of history in Canada, especially as perceived by modern community, is the failure to teach context.  Especially historical context.    Laws do not arise out of nothingness.  They are created in a specific time and place to address a specific problem.
> 
> Three examples that engage me are slavery, religion and the militia.   I regularly hear the discussion about both and their isolated impacts in the modern world of  Canada, or the US, or the UK or France etc.  But  all of them are mixed over time and space and do not respect borders.
> 
> There were slavers and abolitionists of all religions and under all governments in all places.  There were French and Irish protestants as much as there were English Roman Catholics.   And the Militia Act of 1855 was not a purely Canadian Bill,  it was part of an Empire wide response to concerns about Louis Napoleon and his desire to re-establish French Empire - a desire that manifested itself in the French-Mexican wars and support of the Vatican against the "liberal" forces of Garibaldi and Victor Emmanuel of Savoy.
> 
> Context matters.




Other relevant historical laws

The Assize of Arms - 1181 by Henry II
The Ordinance - 1233 by Henry III
The Assize of Arms - 1252(1242) by Henry III


----------



## Infanteer

You guys really know how to kill a thread.


----------



## PuckChaser




----------



## Good2Golf

Infanteer said:


> You guys really know how to kill a thread.


Well if it’s going to die, ironic that it would die on page number (CH-)147…. 😆


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> You guys really know how to kill a thread.




Shoot!  I thought it was just getting interesting.


----------



## KevinB

Going back to the SSE Mandate to the CAF.


_CONCURRENT OPERATIONS
At any given time, the Government of Canada can call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to undertake missions for the protection of Canada and Canadians and the maintenance of international peace and stability. It will often call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to deploy on multiple operations at the same time. This policy ensures the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously:

defend Canada, including responding concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies in support of civilian authorities;
meet its NORAD obligations, with new capacity in some areas;
meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and
_
_contribute to international peace and stability through:_
_o two sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel in two different theatres of operation, including one as a lead nation;
o one time-limited deployment of ~500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
o two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel;
o two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~100-500 personnel;
o one Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, with scaleable additional support; and
o one Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation with scaleable additional support._

So based on that, considering that applies to the entire CAF - it's time to give a lot of people pink slips.

1,500+1,500+1,500+1,000+1000 = 6,500 personnel required (outside of DART and NEO tastings) for available peace and stability commitments.
and 3,000+3,000+1,000+1,000 =8,000 personnel required for rotation (1 on 2 off) for sustained operations.

14,500 personnel needed for minimum CAF operational commitments, plus whatever us needed for NORAD, and NATO.

so + 1 Heavy Bde to NATO, if you don't think that one would cull P&S OPs if there was a major NATO issue (so I don't see the need to actually count it separately) and whatever is for the RCN and RCAF for their obligations as well.



My Point is simply that SSE only really demands 14,500+ members of the CAF...


Dissecting it further - 6,500 Ready/Deployed Troops, and 8,000 spares - I'd look to a 9 month on 18 month off rotation for sustained operations (I'm not totally heartless).  
+DART and NEO, and NORAD/NATO Commitments.

So TWO Regular Force Army Bde - and 4 Res. 
Now due to the nature of what may be asked, it makes sense to me to have 3 Regular Force Bde - and 6 Res Force Bde.
1 Heavy Regular - with 2 Res --> 1 Cdn Armored Div 
1 Medium Regular - with 2 Res --> 2 Cdn Mech Div
1 Light Regular - with 2 Res. --> 3 Cdn Light Div 

  But it requires a massive restructure - and a lot of missing equipment


----------



## AvroArrow92

KevinB said:


> Going back to the SSE Mandate to the CAF.
> 
> 
> _CONCURRENT OPERATIONS
> At any given time, the Government of Canada can call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to undertake missions for the protection of Canada and Canadians and the maintenance of international peace and stability. It will often call upon the Canadian Armed Forces to deploy on multiple operations at the same time. This policy ensures the Canadian Armed Forces will be prepared to simultaneously:
> 
> defend Canada, including responding concurrently to multiple domestic emergencies in support of civilian authorities;
> meet its NORAD obligations, with new capacity in some areas;
> meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and
> _
> _contribute to international peace and stability through:_
> _o two sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel in two different theatres of operation, including one as a lead nation;
> o one time-limited deployment of ~500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
> o two sustained deployments of ~100-500 personnel;
> o two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~100-500 personnel;
> o one Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) deployment, with scaleable additional support; and
> o one Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation with scaleable additional support._
> 
> So based on that, considering that applies to the entire CAF - it's time to give a lot of people pink slips.
> 
> 1,500+1,500+1,500+1,000+1000 = 6,500 personnel required (outside of DART and NEO tastings) for available peace and stability commitments.
> and 3,000+3,000+1,000+1,000 =8,000 personnel required for rotation (1 on 2 off) for sustained operations.
> 
> 14,500 personnel needed for minimum CAF operational commitments, plus whatever us needed for NORAD, and NATO.
> 
> so + 1 Heavy Bde to NATO, if you don't think that one would cull P&S OPs if there was a major NATO issue (so I don't see the need to actually count it separately) and whatever is for the RCN and RCAF for their obligations as well.
> 
> 
> 
> My Point is simply that SSE only really demands 14,500+ members of the CAF...
> 
> 
> Dissecting it further - 6,500 Ready/Deployed Troops, and 8,000 spares - I'd look to a 9 month on 18 month off rotation for sustained operations (I'm not totally heartless).
> +DART and NEO, and NORAD/NATO Commitments.
> 
> So TWO Regular Force Army Bde - and 4 Res.
> Now due to the nature of what may be asked, it makes sense to me to have 3 Regular Force Bde - and 6 Res Force Bde.
> 1 Heavy Regular - with 2 Res --> 1 Cdn Armored Div
> 1 Medium Regular - with 2 Res --> 2 Cdn Mech Div
> 1 Light Regular - with 2 Res. --> 3 Cdn Light Div
> 
> But it requires a massive restructure - and a lot of missing equipment


I would argue the need for that many brigade headquarters is unnecessary as well. The way I see it the Canadian Army needs at most 4 actual field deployable brigade groups. You can throw in the remaining class c reservist and some class b into reserve districts or the alike. I cannot not see the Canadian government every deploying more than divisional sized force in the next ten years, and even if they do it would be overseas. A  domestic operation would not require a upwards of eight field deployable brigades, and if that was the case world war three just became a reality. Most command, logistics, and communications functions could be done through the divisional HQ as needed during an aid to civil power. The brigade group should be the building block for a field deployable formation not as a silo for a collection of reservists and boutique geographical isolated units. Ill try to expand my thoughts on the structure later hopefully but I would see the Canadian Army as something like this three years from now:

Canadian Army, 2025

-2 active mechanized brigade groups
-2 active-reserve motorized brigade groups
-1 active-reserve combat support services brigade
-1 active-reserve logistical brigade
-6 reserve territorial districts/ or equivalent

-1 active sof battalion (CSOR)
-1 active sf battalion (JTF2)

-1 static divisional command
-1 deployable divisional command


----------



## KevinB

AvroArrow92 said:


> I would argue the need for that many brigade headquarters is unnecessary as well. The way I see it the Canadian Army needs at most 4 actual field deployable brigade groups. You can throw in the remaining class c reservist and some class b into reserve districts or the alike. I cannot not see the Canadian government every deploying more than divisional sized force in the next ten years, and even if they do it would be overseas. A  domestic operation would not require a upwards of eight field deployable brigades, and if that was the case world war three just became a reality. Most command, logistics, and communications functions could be done through the divisional HQ as needed during an aid to civil power. The brigade group should be the building block for a field deployable formation not as a silo for a collection of reservists and boutique geographical isolated units. Ill try to expand my thoughts on the structure later hopefully but I would see the Canadian Army as something like this three years from now:


I absolute hate additional HQ units - but I hate Ad Hoc piece meal even more.



AvroArrow92 said:


> Canadian Army, 2025
> 
> -2 active mechanized brigade groups
> -2 active-reserve motorized brigade groups
> -1 active-reserve combat support services brigade
> -1 active-reserve logistical brigade
> -6 reserve territorial districts/ or equivalent


It is my opinion that Logistics are more pressing that Cbt Arms troops - I am willing to allow a much larger portion of Reserve Slots to Cbt Arms than Support side operations.

 The CAF current CMBG's are effectively Motorized Brigades - there is no heavy presence - tanks alone don't make an entity heavy.
   Honestly I really question the sanity of anything who thinks the current CA allocation makes any sense
 Tanks - some
 LAV's - lots - none with an ATGM
 Arty - towed 
   The tanks cannot be as effective as they could with a tracked IFV and tracked SPA (and other enablers) - as their off road mobility will be reduced if they allow the LAV's to keep up.



AvroArrow92 said:


> -1 active sof battalion (CSOR)
> -1 active sf battalion (JTF2)


 CANSOF doesn't belong to the CA - and the terms SF versus SOF have a variety of different connotations and meanings.
   I'll also put out that the term BN and JTF-2 shouldn't be used together 



AvroArrow92 said:


> -1 static divisional command
> -1 deployable divisional command


I see zero use for any Static HQ - outside of a Joint Permanent Command entity.
   Regardless of the likleyhood of deploying a DIV - you need to have a deployable entity - if you do -- or just get rid of the extra troops if you never are going to use them.

 SSE is the bare minimum - if you just want to stick to that - then yes you don't even need ANY DIV forces - and can toss away most of the Bde HQ's and honestly most of the troops.


----------



## Kirkhill

Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 1 (Sustained) - 1000
Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 2 (Sustained) - 1000
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 1 (Sustained) - 300
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 2 (Sustained) - 300

Sustained Deployments - 2600 x 5 = 13,000

Ready Forces - DART = ???
Ready Forces - NEO = ???

Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 3 (Limited) - 1000
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 3 (Limited) - 300
Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 4 (Limited) - 300


My understanding is that these are joint commitments of the entire CAF, not just the ground forces.

Also when the Cdn Govt says two of 500 to 1500 I am pretty sure that means one of 500 and one of a maximum of 1500.  So an average of 1000 per deployment.  Or less.

And I have heard the number 5 wrt rotations bandied about on this site for a long time.

So the commitments could be met with a supported RCAF squadron on permanent deployment, a Standing Naval Task Force, a Standing contribution to an allied Naval Task Force and an RCAF Helicopter Flight with ground support and security.

Leaving the option to deploy a fighter force with support and security and a couple of combat teams in support of a DART and a NEO operation.

Job done.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 1 (Sustained) - 1000
> Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 2 (Sustained) - 1000
> Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 1 (Sustained) - 300
> Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 2 (Sustained) - 300
> 
> Sustained Deployments - 2600 x 5 = 13,000
> 
> Ready Forces - DART = ???
> Ready Forces - NEO = ???
> 
> Task Force/Wing/Battlegroup 3 (Limited) - 1000
> Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 3 (Limited) - 300
> Ship/Squadron/Combat Tm 4 (Limited) - 300
> 
> 
> My understanding is that these are joint commitments of the entire CAF, not just the ground forces.
> 
> Also when the Cdn Govt says two of 500 to 1500 I am pretty sure that means one of 500 and one of a maximum of 1500.  So an average of 1000 per deployment.  Or less.
> 
> And I have heard the number 5 wrt rotations bandied about on this site for a long time.
> 
> So the commitments could be met with a supported RCAF squadron on permanent deployment, a Standing Naval Task Force, a Standing contribution to an allied Naval Task Force and an RCAF Helicopter Flight with ground support and security.
> 
> Leaving the option to deploy a fighter force with support and security and a couple of combat teams in support of a DART and a NEO operation.
> 
> Job done.


 The problem is if you only plan for an average you get bit, yes you could shade it on the cheap - but it really doesn't affect the bottom line at the end of the day.
    Yes it is CAF wide - but quite honestly the bulk of deployed forces for Stability Operations are from the Army.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The problem is if you only plan for an average you get bit, yes you could shade it on the cheap - but it really doesn't affect the bottom line at the end of the day.
> Yes it is CAF wide - but quite honestly the bulk of deployed forces for Stability Operations are from the Army.


All true Kevin.  But that isn't what the Government of the Day signed up for as near as I can see.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> All true Kevin.  But that isn't what the Government of the Day signed up for as near as I can see.


If you where the CCA, would you err on the side of caution?
  I would go for more not less...


----------



## Blackadder1916

FJAG said:


> This part I disagree with. While the MND has responsibility for the whole department,* the legislation as it was first written* created a direct link as between the requisitioning AG and the CDS. The CDS was given the sole power to decide with what force to respond to the request. Kirkhill in his writings discusses the state and National Guard in it's state militia capacity and in fact I think this is exactly what the Canadian legislation was providing for - an ability of the provincial authorities to call out the military for assistance.
> 
> The prior legislation did not fetter the CDS's discretion on how to respond. The revised version mandates that he is fettered by the directions received from the MND.
> 
> I think what's important is that when called out in aid of the civil power, the military is no longer acting in its role of a national defence force but in the capacity of the administration of justice within the province and which is constitutionally a provincial power. The MND has no role with policing in a province.
> 
> Remember that this power goes back over a century to the Militia Acts where provincial AGs could requisition assistance from officers commanding the local Active Militia districts. If one goes back to s. 27 of the old 1868 Militia Act the officer responding was the Adjutant General of the district (or appropriate subordinate) and the requisition could come from the mayor or head of municipality or by two magistrates etc.
> 
> In each case there was a direct link as between the local official and the local military without reference to the federal government.
> 
> The 2004 amendment in my mind is an interference with the long-standing constitutional provision that recognizes the military's roles in the individual provinces before confederation and continued that relationship notwithstanding that all provincial militias had become a federal responsibility.
> 
> For Kirkhill: I mentioned that it was a Liberal government because I associate them with a government that a) doesn't respect old constitutional conventions; b) works hard to centralize power wherever it suits them; and c) doesn't trust their subordinate agencies to do their job without meddling in.
> 
> 🍻



Risking further accusation as a thread killer (though not objecting to the splitting and creation of a separate thread, since I don't have to provide the labour), I'll respond.

While you raise some good points, I think that the "legislation as first written" was as much because of the limitations in communication for the time as it might have been to acknowledge separation of powers.  Much further research would be necessary to provide detailed comment about the incremental changes that led from mayors and magistrates requesting call-out from the local militia commander (_who would've most likely been part of the "local establishment" with already existing personal and/or working relationships with the requestor_) who was required to provide troops (_in the absence of ability to refer to higher_) "at the expense of the municipality/county" to the current situation of AGs requisitioning through the CDS with the butcher's bill landing on the MND's desk.

With that limitation, I'll impart what I was able to glean about the circumstances that resulted in the NDA amendment in question.  The legislative summary from the Library of Parliament provides some background about Bill C-7 which was an omnibus bill known as the Public Safety Act 2002 and amended 23 existing acts.  While the change to S. 278 wasn't the most innocuous it was surely among the least discussed or questioned.



> On 11 February 2004, the Honourable Tony Valeri, Minister of Transport, introduced in the House of Commons Bill C-7, An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures for implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in order to enhance public safety – known as the Public Safety Act, 2002. The Bill is the former Bill C-17, and was reinstated as C-7 pursuant to the motion adopted by the House of Commons on 10 February 2004.(1) It was referred to the Senate the same day.
> 
> The former Bill, C-17, in turn, had replaced Bill C-55,which died on the _Order Paper_ when the first session of the 37th Parliament ended on 16 September 2002. Bill C‑55, in turn, replaced Bill C‑42, which was given first reading on 22 November 2001. Bill C-42 received significant criticism, however, and the Government did not proceed with it. Significant differences between Bill C-7 and its predecessors will be noted in this document. The Bill is one of three in the Government’s legislative response to the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States. Bill C-36, the _Anti-terrorism Act_, most provisions of which received royal assent on 18 December 2001, was the first. On 28 November 2001, the House of Commons unanimously consented to a motion to delete from Bill C-42 section 4.83 in clause 5 amending the _Aeronautics Act_. The same day, that section was introduced as Bill C-44 in order to provide for speedier passage than consideration as part of Bill C-42 would have allowed for. It received royal assent on 18 December 2001.
> 
> Bill C-7 amends 23 existing Acts, and enacts a new statute to implement the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which entered into force on 26 March 1975.
> 
> The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of the various aspects of the Bill. In general, the statutes being amended will be discussed in the alphabetical order in which they appear in the Bill. A number of statutes, however, are amended in a similar manner to provide for the making of interim orders if immediate action is required and these have been grouped together. The two parts dealing with information sharing in relation to immigration matters are also discussed together.​


The summary addresses the specific amendment to s.278 with;


> Clause 79 amends section 278 in Part VI (Aid to the Civil Power), which deals with the call-up of the Canadian Forces “for the purpose of suppressing or preventing any actual riot or disturbance or any riot or disturbance that is considered as likely to occur.” At the present time, when the attorney general of a province requests the help of the Forces to aid the civil power, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) (or an officer designated by the CDS) can call up the number of military personnel and units considered necessary to deal with the actual or likely riot or disturbance. Clause 79 amends section 278 by adding the words “subject to such directions as the Minister considers appropriate in the circumstances and in consultation with that attorney general and the attorney general of any other province that may be affected …” *The purpose of the amendment is to allow the Minister of National Defence to give some direction to the CDS when dealing with a request for assistance from a provincial attorney general, for example in the case of simultaneous requests for aid from other provinces.*​



With Bill C-7 introduced in the House, gone through three readings and committee (of the whole), passed and the same happening in the Senate all on the same day, there isn't much record of debate.  Thus, one has to go back to the earlier session and Bill C-17 to find what was discussed re this particular amendment.  In the one committee meeting where witnesses from DND provided evidence the following attended from the department;  Hon. John McCallum, Minister of National Defence,  Colonel Dominic McAlea, Deputy Legal Advisor (Military), Office of the National Defence and Canadian Forces Legal Advisor; Colonel Robert Leitch, Commander, Canadian Forces Information Operations Group.

The Minister's opening statement included this discussion of the s.278 amendment.




__





						Evidence - C-17 (37-2) - No. 4 - House of Commons of Canada
					

Evidence - C-17 (37-2) - No. 4 - House of Commons of Canada



					www.ourcommons.ca
				





> The third point I'd like to address is aid of the civil power. Something else that is part of this new security environment is the increased potential for the government to have to manage multiple requests from the provinces for aid of the civil power. In fact, we've already learned that this could be a real possibility when we were planning for the Canadian Forces response to the anticipated year 2000 problem.
> 
> While such a situation did not occur in that case, it is not difficult to imagine the scenario where we would have less time to plan and more demands to respond to. This amendment would therefore allow the Minister of National Defence to provide appropriate direction to the Chief of the Defence Staff, particularly in circumstances when there were multiple and simultaneous requests for assistance from the provinces. And in doing so this would ensure that the Government of Canada had the ability to respond effectively to multiple demands from the provinces.
> 
> I would note, however, that requests for aid of the civil power would continue to be made directly to the Chief of the Defence Staff.


And during later questioning, this was the only reference of "aid to the civil power".


> Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
> 
> Mr. Minister, I have just a quick question.
> 
> In your speech here, when you say “aid of the civil power”, we know that in order for the army, or the Canadian Armed Forces, to go into a province, the Minister of Justice or the Solicitor General from that province has to make a request to the Minister of National Defence. If we were to need American help to go into a province, who asks the Americans to come over? Is it the province, or do you do it?
> 
> Mr. John McCallum: The request comes from the provincial government, actually not to me, the minister, but to the Chief of Defence Staff, who then consults.... Well, under the new legislation I, the minister, would have to approve what the response would be, but on the recommendation of the chief.
> 
> In the unlikely event that the situation is so grave that we want to call upon the Americans, then the request would come from the Government of Canada, through I'm not sure exactly which individual, but it would not go from the province to the United States. It would come from the Government of Canada to the Government of the United States, requesting that U.S. military assistance. It would have to be approved by the Government of Canada.
> 
> Mr. Robert Bertrand: And they would be allowed to go into whichever province has made the request.
> 
> Mr. John McCallum: Yes, but we're already assuming that the province has made the request, and should it be grave enough--
> 
> Mr. Robert Bertrand: The Canadian Armed Forces.
> 
> Mr. John McCallum: Yes.
> 
> Mr. Robert Bertrand: But not for the Americans.
> 
> Mr. John McCallum: The request would have to go from the Government of Canada to the American side, if we wanted to go as far as that.
> 
> Mr. Robert Bertrand: Okay.



That's the extent (as far as I've been able to ascertain) of legislators' concern about this particular amendment, despite many criticisms (usually from opposition members) of many other aspects of the omnibus bill.



Kirkhill said:


> *No doubt the 2004 ruling, concurrent with the debates over Quebec sovereignty,  was influenced by considerations of that thought*. But what appears to by a minor administrative change is actually a major rebalancing of the Crown authority within Canada.



A couple of points, it was not a ruling in 2004 but passage of legislation and when the first bill (_that later died, but not because of this clause_) that included this amendment was introduced in the House, it was December 2001 and Quebec sovereignty was not the consideration of the day, but 9-11.





						Debates (Hansard) No. 123 - December 3, 2001 (37-1) - House of Commons of Canada
					

Debates (Hansard) No. 123 - December 3, 2001 (37-1) - House of Commons of Canada



					www.ourcommons.ca


----------



## FJAG

Blackadder1916 said:


> Risking further accusation as a thread killer (though not objecting to the splitting and creation of a separate thread, since I don't have to provide the labour), I'll respond.


To keep it short, this doesn't change anything. It's an amendment which overturns 140 years of previous practice for the purpose of imposing federal government direction into a process that used to be strictly between the province and the military. Does anyone really think that the CDS is not able to deal with multiple circumstances without the MND having to give directions? Bull feathers.

🍻


----------



## Blackadder1916

FJAG said:


> To keep it short, this doesn't change anything. It's an amendment which overturns 140 years of previous practice for the purpose of imposing federal government direction into a process that used to be strictly between the province and the military. Does anyone really think that the CDS is not able to deal with multiple circumstances without the MND having to give directions? Bull feathers.
> 
> 🍻



That would be so if in that 140 years there had been no mention of the Minister in the part of the NDA dealing with aid to the civil power.  However, in the National Defence Act 1950 (pp. 92-96 of pdf), consultation with, and agreement of the Minister was required if resources of the RCAF and/or RCN were deemed necessary.


----------



## FJAG

Blackadder1916 said:


> That would be so if in that 140 years there had been no mention of the Minister in the part of the NDA dealing with aid to the civil power.  However, in the National Defence Act 1950 (pp. 92-96 of pdf), consultation with, and agreement of the Minister was required if resources of the RCAF and/or RCN were deemed necessary.


I was really wanting to bail this discussion from this thread, but ...

As of 1950 there were three separate services. The Army dealt with aid of the civil power and within the Army there was no need to consult the MND on a requisition and the MND had no legislative authority to give the Army directions.

Aid of the Civil Power concerns riots and disturbances of the peace. The need to use RCAF or RCN would be a very unusual force but more importantly the Army chain of command had no authority to call out either the RCN or the RCAF. Accordingly if the Army needed either RCAF or RCN involvement they would need to go through the MND to coordinate what would now be a joint op.

What is important here though is that as of the 1950 Act there is still no power in the MND to give directions to the Army district commander or Chief of General Staff as to the use of the Army during the operation. The MND's power was limited to call out such elements of the RCN or RCAF he considered appropriate.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

With at least one current premier convicted of killing someone while driving drunk, perhaps it's for the best that MND can intervene to provide some level of adult supervision.


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:


> to provide some level of adult supervision.


So, your specifically talking about the current MND.


----------



## Kirkhill

Effectively the government of the day inserted itself into the process so that it can ration the resources available to the provinces through the Chief of Defence Staff.   Much of a sameness with the current Covid response. 

Rather than maintaining the resources necessary to manage a broad emergency the federal government, who took on the responsibility for managing the Militia on behalf of the Provinces in 1868, has reneged on its obligations and decided to ration resources rather than pay for the necessary resources.

I appreciate the depth of Blackadder's research, and I take note that the legislation came in the wake of 9/11.   On the other hand I would note that the Quebec Referendum of 1995, the Quebec General Election of 1998 and the Clarity Act of 1999 were recent events in 2001-2003 and probably not completely overshadowed by 9/11 when discussing terrorism, counter-terrorism and public safety in a Canadian context.

As for Federal ministers offering better supervision than Provincial ministers, I hope tongue was firmly in cheek.  Fluffy hair and my daughter's socks on my Prime Minister don't inspire my confidence.

I side with FJAG on this one wrt to precedence. 

The Army is not just the government's diplomatic plaything.  It has real domestic responsibilities.  Responsibilities it owes to the provinces to fulfil the roles of the state National Guards in the US.

The Provinces should be ensuring that the federal government provisions the Army with the necessary resources to meet their needs.  Like, during a pandemic, supplying enough field hospitals and ambulances to augment the standard level of health care.  Or, during floods and washouts, supplying emergency transport, shelter, beans and bandages.

And Kevin, if I were CDS, I would be preparing for the unexpected to the extent I could, but if the PM isn't funding him there isn't a lot of preparing he can do.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> And Kevin, if I were CDS, I would be preparing for the unexpected to the extent I could, but if the PM isn't funding him there isn't a lot of preparing he can do.


When you look at the CAF budget - one could and should field a lot more that one what has.

 The issue is that the CAF seems to be told what to get - as we have seen with the Griffon, and the 1 Million LAV Army.
I gather no one wants to die on their sword about fixing the acquisition process with PSPC, but they should at least make an attempt to reform the Military into a viable force.

Right now neither number you or I have thrown out is currently supported.
  Even the bare min with a 1 on 1 off rotation isn't supported with key equipment, admittedly even the Roto 0 doesn't have the equipment needed...


----------



## MilEME09

speaking of resources, i think the CAF is living in a pipe dream right now for wanting two RFL2 rifle coy's coming out of 38,39,and 41 CBG to support ops. unless there is some major changes going on over the next few years getting two platoons out of the reserves will be a hard battle, let alone two companies.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MilEME09 said:


> speaking of resources, i think the CAF is living in a pipe dream right now for wanting two RFL2 rifle coy's coming out of 38,39,and 41 CBG to support ops. unless there is some major changes going on over the next few years getting two platoons out of the reserves will be a hard battle, let alone two companies.



Two platoons (of Officers and SNCOs) should be easy enough to manage


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Two platoons (of Officers and SNCOs) should be easy enough to manage


Don’t forget the MGen running the Platoon


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Don’t forget the MGen running the Platoon



I think that most of those have a job, at least, unlike the slack handful of post-command LCols hanging around in each CBG


----------



## Rifleman62

How France Fought a Lightning War in Mali (Op Serval)


----------



## Kirkhill

Can we have some of our people spend a bit more time with the French?


----------



## Kirkhill

And this suggestion about loitering munitions use by the USMC BLT looks interesting.






						Strike Platoon: Employment of Loitering Munitions in the Battalion Landing Team | Small Wars Journal
					

Infantry units have always required indirect fire in support of maneuver. Javelins and slings gave way to bows and arrows, and so on throughout history. While modern artillery and mortar systems offer relatively imprecise fire support to the modern warrior, surgical fires in support of maneuver...




					smallwarsjournal.com


----------



## Kirkhill

The Strike Platoon's "spotter"?  As suggested by the author of the BLT article.









						V-BAT - Shield AI
					

From securing borders, hunting drugs, to finding threats. Shield AI’s V-BAT is the future of next-generation UAS.




					shield.ai
				




Hivemind looks kind of interesting as well "No GPS. No comms. No problem"









						Hivemind - Shield AI
					

Similar to a human pilot, Hivemind reads and reacts to the battlefield, and does not require GPS, way-points, or comms to make decisions.




					shield.ai


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Can we have some of our people spend a bit more time with the French?




I love that an infantry section is an infantry section regardless of the vehicle they ride.  They all operate on the same command and control system.
SL and DMR,  Gnr and Driver, A Tm of 3 and B Tm of 3.  Likewise for the Platoon.  Vehicle independent.

I also love their come as you are mentality.  Work with what is at hand and lock them together as you can.  "Fustest with the mostest".

And there is more than a little of that spirit of "elan" - maintain the momentum.


----------



## Dale Denton

But everyone else is doing it...


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/MilitaryPorn/comments/st9tbr


----------



## Kirkhill

More on V-Bat.

A 2017 USMC Demonstration video.









Moving on with Flights of Fancy






Just thinking about how similar the flight regime is for the Zapata Flyboard and the Martin V-Bat.  Looking for the crossover.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Can we have some of our people spend a bit more time with the French?


I don’t know that we really need section knee mortars. I’d be happy with an Italian style company with a two car company atgm section.

In addition, I get the section is always the same benefit, but that requires you build you vehicles to do that. I’m not convinced in a one man turret and a dual hatred gunner / CC; but if you want to do it you need to have vehicles built to do it. Yeah


----------



## daftandbarmy

Dale Denton said:


> But everyone else is doing it...
> 
> 
> __
> https://www.reddit.com/r/MilitaryPorn/comments/st9tbr



That's quite the achievement for the Dutch. 

The Rangers starve people during their course and the Dutch Commandos are the biggest eaters I've ever seen


----------



## FJAG

All right. I've threatened to add another Force 2025 napkin orbat into the system and here it is. I call it Force 2027 V2.0.

It still works on the basis that every headquarters and company designated RFL 1 or 1.1 is a fully equipped and rapidly deployable entity with 100% to 70% RegF staffing. (RFL 1.1 is a slight modification which indicates the headquarters or company is fully equipped and deployable in peace or war with minimal augmentation from either it's organic reserve personnel or from another RegF or ResF organization.) 

RFL 2 and 3 headquarters and companies form augmentation pools and are designed to be mobilizational with varying levels of equipment but designed with an expectation to be equipped at some point in the future.

Changes include the following:

a) artillery close support regiments lose their observation and STA batteries. FSCCs and observers return to the close support batteries to simplify training and career progression. STA batteries are reduced to STA troops contained within the Regt'l headquarters. Each brigade has two loitering AUAV batteries, one permanently assigned to the cavalry regiment as close support, the other to the artillery regiment as general support.

b) tank squadrons are three platoons of four tanks to permit equipping of two full regiments from current stocks

c) all infantry battalions have a weapons company for mortars, recce, anti-armour and pioneers.

d) transport companies and supply companies in the brigade service battalions have been amalgamated back into S&T companies.

e) while not apparent from the diagram, all Regt'l and Bn service support companies within a manoeuvre brigade are under command of the service battalion but attached in direct support of the units that they are assigned to. The purpose is to allow one central agency to control both staffing and career management for CSS personnel within the brigade while retaining the response relationship with the supported unit.

f) while not an army resource, HSvc and MP elements have been included for information purposes. The sole MP regiment assigns MP platoons to brigade HQs as required and maintains additional resources for above brigade tasks such as PW handling etc. Medical resources assigned to brigades as Fd Ambs will be attached for administration to the Svc Bn. A Medical battalion is located within 1 CSustB with a Fd Hosp and three Evac platoons.

g) a Canadian Army Support Group has been added to contain all base support functions. It is divided into three regional regiments of four battalions each.



🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> All right. I've threatened to add another Force 2025 napkin orbat into the system and here it is. I call it Force 2027 V2.0.
> 
> It still works on the basis that every headquarters and company designated RFL 1 or 1.1 is a fully equipped and rapidly deployable entity with 100% to 70% RegF staffing. (RFL 1.1 is a slight modification which indicates the headquarters or company is fully equipped and deployable in peace or war with minimal augmentation from either it's organic reserve personnel or from another RegF or ResF organization.)
> 
> RFL 2 and 3 headquarters and companies form augmentation pools and are designed to be mobilizational with varying levels of equipment but designed with an expectation to be equipped at some point in the future.
> 
> Changes include the following:
> 
> a) artillery close support regiments lose their observation and STA batteries. FSCCs and observers return to the close support batteries to simplify training and career progression. STA batteries are reduced to STA troops contained within the Regt'l headquarters. Each brigade has two loitering AUAV batteries, one permanently assigned to the cavalry regiment as close support, the other to the artillery regiment as general support.
> 
> b) tank squadrons are three platoons of four tanks to permit equipping of two full regiments from current stocks
> 
> c) all infantry battalions have a weapons company for mortars, recce, anti-armour and pioneers.
> 
> d) transport companies and supply companies in the brigade service battalions have been amalgamated back into S&T companies.
> 
> e) while not apparent from the diagram, all Regt'l and Bn service support companies within a manoeuvre brigade are under command of the service battalion but attached in direct support of the units that they are assigned to. The purpose is to allow one central agency to control both staffing and career management for CSS personnel within the brigade while retaining the response relationship with the supported unit.
> 
> f) while not an army resource, HSvc and MP elements have been included for information purposes. The sole MP regiment assigns MP platoons to brigade HQs as required and maintains additional resources for above brigade tasks such as PW handling etc. Medical resources assigned to brigades as Fd Ambs will be attached for administration to the Svc Bn. A Medical battalion is located within 1 CSustB with a Fd Hosp and three Evac platoons.
> 
> g) a Canadian Army Support Group has been added to contain all base support functions. It is divided into three regional regiments of four battalions each.
> 
> View attachment 68735
> 
> 🍻


Any reason you don't have any units at 100% Regular?
  I see Sub Units - but is the assumption that a IRU would be a BattleGroup (Inf or Armor Heavy) and not a sole unit?


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Any reason you don't have any units at 100% Regular?
> I see Sub Units - but is the assumption that a IRU would be a BattleGroup (Inf or Armor Heavy) and not a sole unit?



Probably because the foolish boy still holds out some hope for the 'Class A Commando' mob


----------



## OldSolduer

Kirkhill said:


> Moving on with Flights of Fancy
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Just thinking about how similar the flight regime is for the Zapata Flyboard and the Martin V-Bat.  Looking for the crossover.


Lets hire a bunch of Mandalorians. They seem to have the expertise on this.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Any reason you don't have any units at 100% Regular?
> I see Sub Units - but is the assumption that a IRU would be a BattleGroup (Inf or Armor Heavy) and not a sole unit?


Yes.

I wanted to stay within roughly equivalent authorized PYs and authorized ResF strengths. To create the necessary RegF levels across the force required a scaling back of 100% full time companies per battalion. 

I'm also persuaded by the fact that we rarely deploy full-sized battalions these days but rather a battle group formed from one or two company sized elements with attachments from other arms. The overall aim is to create more rotatable battle group headquarters and a more intimate relationship within brigades and battalions as between RegF and ResF elements to increase training and experience levels.

The risk is that at some point a full-sized battalion must be generated. This risk is mitigated by the fact that, if required, every manoeuvre brigade could immediately field one or two full sized battalions plus attachments from within it's own resources.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Probably because the foolish boy still holds out some hope for the 'Class A Commando' mob


Class A Commandos is some other guy. I'm aiming for run-of-the-mill line battalions.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Yes.
> 
> I wanted to stay within roughly equivalent authorized PYs and authorized ResF strengths. To create the necessary RegF levels across the force required a scaling back of 100% full time companies per battalion.
> 
> I'm also persuaded by the fact that we rarely deploy full-sized battalions these days but rather a battle group formed from one or two company sized elements with attachments from other arms. The overall aim is to create more rotatable battle group headquarters and a more intimate relationship within brigades and battalions as between RegF and ResF elements to increase training and experience levels.
> 
> The risk is that at some point a full-sized battalion must be generated. This risk is mitigated by the fact that, if required, every manoeuvre brigade could immediately field one or two full sized battalions plus attachments from within it's own resources.
> 
> 🍻


Kevin going further heretic - any reason not to form them as BattleGroups from the get go?


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Kevin going further heretic - any reason not to form them as BattleGroups from the get go?


Oh yeah.

I'm firmly in the camp against permanent battlegroups. They are administratively hard to run - to many specialist skills under one hat - and greatly impede the flexibility that comes out of having brigade (and higher resources). As an example a battery that doesn't organize and train as part of a regiment and larger organization losses 50% or more of its value as a massed indirect fire support capability. Same with tanks, recce and so on.

The aim here is to be able to easily form smaller tailor made organizations for peacetime missions but have the ability to generate larger and more capable formations for war time. (This establishment also presupposes a continued 1 Cdn Div HQ with CJOC)

Another point I failed to mention earlier is equipment. The organization is based on an initial equipment holding of what the CA currently has but distributed in such a way that ResF personnel have a greatly improved access to the type of equipment they will man when augmenting or mobilized. The intent is that future equipment acquisitions would be made to fill the holes. As an example, properly equipping the heavy brigades will loosen up sufficient LAVs etc to equip the second medium brigade and so on.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

It's easier to build down with task tailored groupings than it is to build up with a critical mass for core skill development.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> All right. I've threatened to add another Force 2025 napkin orbat into the system and here it is. I call it Force 2027 V2.0.
> 
> It still works on the basis that every headquarters and company designated RFL 1 or 1.1 is a fully equipped and rapidly deployable entity with 100% to 70% RegF staffing. (RFL 1.1 is a slight modification which indicates the headquarters or company is fully equipped and deployable in peace or war with minimal augmentation from either it's organic reserve personnel or from another RegF or ResF organization.)
> 
> RFL 2 and 3 headquarters and companies form augmentation pools and are designed to be mobilizational with varying levels of equipment but designed with an expectation to be equipped at some point in the future.
> 
> Changes include the following:
> 
> a) artillery close support regiments lose their observation and STA batteries. FSCCs and observers return to the close support batteries to simplify training and career progression. STA batteries are reduced to STA troops contained within the Regt'l headquarters. Each brigade has two loitering AUAV batteries, one permanently assigned to the cavalry regiment as close support, the other to the artillery regiment as general support.
> 
> b) tank squadrons are three platoons of four tanks to permit equipping of two full regiments from current stocks
> 
> c) all infantry battalions have a weapons company for mortars, recce, anti-armour and pioneers.
> 
> d) transport companies and supply companies in the brigade service battalions have been amalgamated back into S&T companies.
> 
> e) while not apparent from the diagram, all Regt'l and Bn service support companies within a manoeuvre brigade are under command of the service battalion but attached in direct support of the units that they are assigned to. The purpose is to allow one central agency to control both staffing and career management for CSS personnel within the brigade while retaining the response relationship with the supported unit.
> 
> f) while not an army resource, HSvc and MP elements have been included for information purposes. The sole MP regiment assigns MP platoons to brigade HQs as required and maintains additional resources for above brigade tasks such as PW handling etc. Medical resources assigned to brigades as Fd Ambs will be attached for administration to the Svc Bn. A Medical battalion is located within 1 CSustB with a Fd Hosp and three Evac platoons.
> 
> g) a Canadian Army Support Group has been added to contain all base support functions. It is divided into three regional regiments of four battalions each.
> 
> View attachment 68735
> 
> 🍻



Two questions:


What is the advantage of the RFL1.1 (70/30) construct?  It's a sub-unit that isn't manned with enough Reg Force personnel to be immediately deployable and still takes up 70% of the PYs as a RFL1 unit when in barracks as well as requiring either Reserve augmentation/mobilization or stripping of other units of staff in order to deploy.  I'd think you'd be better off making sure that you have enough RFL1 sub-units to handle your expected (SSE mandated) deployments and count on your RFL2 and RFL3 units for the exceptional deployment requirements.  It may mean an overall reduction in the total number of units/sub-units in the org chart, but may be a more efficient use of Reg Force PYs in peacetime and ultimately doesn't change the total number of troops available.
In your chart you show various Reserve Regiments contributing sub-units to the ORBAT.  From everything I've read on these forums that is a huge stretch for any of the AR units and would likely require full national mobilization to achieve.  Would you be better off treating the Reserve units as Company/Squadron/Battery sized force generators for the required Plantoon/Troop/Gun Detachment sized units required to augment the Reg Force units.   For example, if 1PPCLI has 2 x RFL1 Companies and 1 x RFL2 Company (Reg force HQ and a single Platoon) then the King's Own Calgary Rifles and the Loyal Edmonton Regiment could each be tasked to supply a single Rifle Platoon to round out the RFL2 Company.  This would reduce the training burden on the Reserve units (only need to train up to the Platoon leadership level rather than Company leadership) and also potentially provides for improved sustainment for longer Reserve deployments.  If a Reserve Regiment has to fully mobilize in order to provide a Company then it is a one-shot deal.  However, if they only need to be able to deploy a Platoon, then they can maintain their home armoury training structure, take in new recruits and begin training a replacement Platoon/individual augmentees in order to prolong the deployment.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Two questions:
> 
> 
> What is the advantage of the RFL1.1 (70/30) construct?  It's a sub-unit that isn't manned with enough Reg Force personnel to be immediately deployable and still takes up 70% of the PYs as a RFL1 unit when in barracks as well as requiring either Reserve augmentation/mobilization or stripping of other units of staff in order to deploy.



The main advantage, IMHO, is that everyone (not just the Cpl/Ptes) gets the training they need - up to date and properly resourced training - that is well planned and led in a consistent, reliable, repeatable fashion.

To best achieve this, I would suggest _*not *_relying on any current reserve unit to sponsor/ lead/ house this capability as it would be in danger of falling under the spell/adverse influence of the existing Bde/Regimental mess. We don't need the power of this tool to be frittered away helping any particular CO lead a Regimental Family Day, Freedom of the City Parade, or something like that.

I would, for example, locate a Reg F/ Class B training team in a centralized location (with a training area and a range) that all units would send troops to on a regular basis for training, probably centred on the weekend periods. Concurrently, units can run the preparation and continuation training required to be successful at these collective weekend training events.

In the lower mainland of BC, for example, the training team (call it the OMLT? ) could be located in Chilliwack. Units in the lower mainland could then send their troops there for the weekend training periods. As a result, the OMLT would need to consist of a cross section of skills e.g., Inf, Engr, Sigs, Log, Arty etc.

It would also be a pretty fun job, I would think, for an up and coming Maj/MWO team


----------



## Kirkhill

I generally like it.

The modifiers I would add would be:

Every Company has a transport section under command of its CQ and a separate Weapons Platoon for MG, AT and Indirect Fires (pick your poison wrt weapons)

Every Squadron has a separate Support Troop with dismounted personnel, MGs and AT.

Every Battery has a separate AD Troop with an MRAD Section in every Reserve Battery.   I would put the AD troops at a higher RFL than the Field troops.

These are all in addition to unit, brigade and army assets.

I figure the RCAC and RRCA don't need more trucks.


The other thing I would like to see a lot more of is Reserve S&T Coys, Fd Ambulance and Fd Hospitals at RFL 3.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Two questions:
> 1. What is the advantage of the RFL1.1 (70/30) construct?  It's a sub-unit that isn't manned with enough Reg Force personnel to be immediately deployable and still takes up 70% of the PYs as a RFL1 unit when in barracks as well as requiring either Reserve augmentation/mobilization or stripping of other units of staff in order to deploy.  I'd think you'd be better off making sure that you have enough RFL1 sub-units to handle your expected (SSE mandated) deployments and count on your RFL2 and RFL3 units for the exceptional deployment requirements.  It may mean an overall reduction in the total number of units/sub-units in the org chart, but may be a more efficient use of Reg Force PYs in peacetime and ultimately doesn't change the total number of troops available.


The RFL 1.1 isn't meant to be immediately deployable like an IRU but is designed, as D&B alludes, to be able to train in the key areas as a full unit and, with minor augmentation, take their place as a roto on a deployment - for example a 1.1 battalion could take a scheduled Latvia roto. Each RFL 1.1 Bn HQ has at least one RFL 1 company so that much of the training and career progression needed by a bn could go on day-to-day. The RegF pers in each of the RFL2 and RFL 3 companies within that battalion would provide not only the core of the leadership of the ResF members in the company but also be the TEWT element of that company on battalion exercises whether computer assisted or in the field.

I thik the expected SSE mandated deployments are met even better than now. Now we have 12 Regt/bn HQs the proposal gives us 12 RFL 1 and 10 RFL1.1. Currently we have 27 rifle companies. Under this proposal you have 23 RFL 1 rifle companies and another 23 RFL3 rifle companies with a leadership cadre that could be brough up to strength with augmentees for planned rotations.

Your right that it doesn't change the total number of troops available. The intent was to see what could be built out of the existing number of people. The main difference is that the full-time leadership personnel from 4 divisional headquarters, 6 ResF brigade headquarters and all the RSS staff are reassigned to leadership roles in battalions and companies.


GR66 said:


> 2. In your chart you show various Reserve Regiments contributing sub-units to the ORBAT.  From everything I've read on these forums that is a huge stretch for any of the AR units and would likely require full national mobilization to achieve.  Would you be better off treating the Reserve units as Company/Squadron/Battery sized force generators for the required Plantoon/Troop/Gun Detachment sized units required to augment the Reg Force units.   For example, if 1PPCLI has 2 x RFL1 Companies and 1 x RFL2 Company (Reg force HQ and a single Platoon) then the King's Own Calgary Rifles and the Loyal Edmonton Regiment could each be tasked to supply a single Rifle Platoon to round out the RFL2 Company.  This would reduce the training burden on the Reserve units (only need to train up to the Platoon leadership level rather than Company leadership) and also potentially provides for improved sustainment for longer Reserve deployments.  If a Reserve Regiment has to fully mobilize in order to provide a Company then it is a one-shot deal.  However, if they only need to be able to deploy a Platoon, then they can maintain their home armoury training structure, take in new recruits and begin training a replacement Platoon/individual augmentees in order to prolong the deployment.


I understand your point. My aim is that there are no RegF nor ResF units anymore; rather all units are hybrid units with varying ratios of RegF to ResF personnel based on the likelihood the unit will need to be employed in peacetime. The higher the peacetime role (eg infantry, SFCB) the more RegF, the lower the peacetime role (eg artillery) the lower the RegF ratio. (legally one still has RegF and ResF units albeit units can be transferred from one component to the other just like personnel)

I prefer to think in companies. But, since there is a strong Reg F leadership element within even RFL3 companies, the leadership will be capable of operating as a company while the platoons in such a unit will train mostly as platoons with just enough training as a company to understand the concept. The point is that most of the annual training cycle for the ResF members is at the platoon level while their RegF leadership trains above that level year round.

I frankly do not see much mobilization of RFL 3 companies as part of day-to-day operations. I see a continuing process of augmentation by individuals. The change is that those individual augmentees will have been better trained and led and have the capability of being mobilized in an extreme situation.



daftandbarmy said:


> To best achieve this, I would suggest _*not *_relying on any current reserve unit to sponsor/ lead/ house this capability as it would be in danger of falling under the spell/adverse influence of the existing Bde/Regimental mess. We don't need the power of this tool to be frittered away helping any particular CO lead a Regimental Family Day, Freedom of the City Parade, or something like that.


Absolutely. The vast majority of the proposed units have a battalion HQ that is either 100% or 70% RegF so the leadership is full time. I would see very few ResF COs but don't completely dismiss that for a ResF individual who has the training and experience and is prepared to do a full time command cycle. I do see some higher ResF staff officers (LCol to Maj) in certain brigade and even bn roles.

As it is many ResF units would go to the Supp order of battle. I see nothing wrong with retaining a ResF units name and geographical affiliation, but you are right the power focus has to shift if this is to be successful. That means attitude adjustments to a total force concept by both sides. Commanding an RFL 1.1 unit or brigade carries the same capability and responsibility as commanding an RFL 1 one because both of them may be required to deploy on an operational roto.

I tend to think that we should be able to keep some affiliation to ResF unit genealogy at the company level (e.g the BC battle group having a company linked to the Seaforths, the Westies the BCR ... whatever) to keep the ties to both history and the local community. That's going to take a gentle touch to get both buy-in while moving the yardsticks forward. There are choices for this, and I don't profess to know what the best one is but I do know it can't stay the way it is.



Kirkhill said:


> The modifiers I would add would be:


I know where you are going with this and I've pretty well stayed away from detailed organization principally because I'm starting equipment neutral - using what we have. For example 1 RCHA's RFL 1 bty has 6 x M777 while the two RFL 3 batteries have 6 x C3. The AUAV battery will only have Skylarks for the time being. Eventually that should change.

The same for transport and support weapons. Each brigade/bn has transport. Each inf bn has mortars, recce, ATGM and pioneers which can be allocated downward as required for exercise and operations is required and desired.

I definitely want to see roughly our current distribution throughout the local communities across Canada. What might be a battalion now would end up becoming a company but using the same armoury. That said, some rationalization for modern shifts in population centres which have taken place since the 1880s and the needs of modernizing armouries needs to be planned for.



Kirkhill said:


> The other thing I would like to see a lot more of is Reserve S&T Coys, Fd Ambulance and Fd Hospitals at RFL 3.


I've been thinking about those as well. My very rough calculation puts this field force at roughly 30-35,000 folks which I think the current PY and ResF establishment could manage. I must admit if there were more people available they would go to CS and CSS before any further manoeuvre elements. More RFL 3 S&T, medical, maintainers and vertical and horizontal engineers would be high on my wish list - most of them you could generate through a partnership with community colleges and a decent incentive system through paid education.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I know where you are going with this and I've pretty well stayed away from detailed organization principally because I'm starting equipment neutral - using what we have. For example 1 RCHA's RFL 1 bty has 6 x M777 while the two RFL 3 batteries have 6 x C3. The AUAV battery will only have Skylarks for the time being. Eventually that should change.
> 
> The same for transport and support weapons. Each brigade/bn has transport. Each inf bn has mortars, recce, ATGM and pioneers which can be allocated downward as required for exercise and operations is required and desired.
> 
> I definitely want to see roughly our current distribution throughout the local communities across Canada. What might be a battalion now would end up becoming a company but using the same armoury. That said, some rationalization for modern shifts in population centres which have taken place since the 1880s and the needs of modernizing armouries needs to be planned for.
> 
> 
> I've been thinking about those as well. My very rough calculation puts this field force at roughly 30-35,000 folks which I think the current PY and ResF establishment could manage. I must admit if there were more people available they would go to CS and CSS before any further manoeuvre elements. More RFL 3 S&T, medical, maintainers and vertical and horizontal engineers would be high on my wish list - most of them you could generate through a partnership with community colleges and a decent incentive system through paid education.
> 
> 🍻





> I know where you are going with this and I've pretty well stayed away from detailed organization



Lego blocks.  The key to the their rigidity is all those integral little knobs that project into the next block.

I think we need little knobs.  Useful ones.

The best example I think is the Infantry Battalion Mortar Platoon, in particular the Platoon HQ acting as the knob to which the Fire Support Coordination Centre attaches.  The fact that there is a real battery at the other end of the phone is gravy.

With a company having a key to the DFS plan, the AT plan and the Fires plan then I think the integration to the Battalion and the Brigade would be smoother.  Similarly if the Cavalry had its own dismounts.   And the Artillery - (Field, Garrison, Siege, Air Defence, EW-Directed Energy) well, I think the Royal Regiment needs the opportunity to spread the wealth, and a bit more wealth to spread.


----------



## FJAG

It's kind of funny actually. I haven't really been concerning myself with organizational and tactical issues for many decades now. When I left the combat arms (and in those days artillery and engineers were combat arms) in the mid '80s I left that thinking behind. It's since I retired and started writing and joining this forum and particulalry this last year with the Afghanistan book that I have started pondering this stuff again in detail. 

In a lot of ways its really helpful that I learned cold war stuff way back then and am now looking at how things are being done today. It let's me analyze critically in both directions. I see things we did quite wrong back then and I see how the 1990's influenced the Army to go the way they did before and during Afghanistan without actually having had to go through the trauma of the decade of darkness. 

The FSCC and the mortar platoon is a perfect example. What worked perfectly well for us back then - a mortar platoon FSCC that stayed with the battalion and two battery commanders that had to rove back and forth between four battle groups to work with the ones having the highest priority worked okay but wasn't optimum by any stretch of the imagination. Our FACing was primitive and airspace coordination worked basically on the principle of "big sky; little bullet".

We've upped the BCs to three and the FOO/JTAC parties per brigade to nine which is an improvement but still not optimum. At the same time the complexity of managing indirect fire support and all that means with FSCCs and ASCCs and STACCs and gods know what else is something that doesn't work too well anymore either. In Afghanistan we made most of that a battlegroup asset - well it can't stay that way - but at the same time since we still deploy standalone battlegroups it must. I think folks are struggling right now with what is the proper organizational structure to work throughout the full spectrum of ops. I can tell you there were numerous structural screw-ups in Afghanistan - not my words but the words of folks who were there. Our doctrine, IMHO, is not coherent and in the absence of that people tend to fall back on their past experiences which, if I'm understanding people correctly varies extensively.

There are some folks on this forum who have a very good grasp on things and can synthesize very well between the way things are and the way things ought to be. In my experience most folks can't. They tend to follow dogma - call it drills or SOPs or what have you. They need stability and certain fixed points to work off of.

That's one reason I tend to lean more towards a standard hierarchical structure that is based on the high end of conflict. Its my belief that if you organize and train for high end conflict then you can handle the stuff below that easily. The same isn't true in the opposite direction. That also means that the more diverse entities that any given commander has to handle (particulalry at the company and even battalion level) the more likely it is some of those will not be used to their optimum effect. In many cases it is better to have specialist cells working outside the battalion or company but whose effects are superimposed on it to allow solid coverage. EW, indirect fire support, ASCC, etc are some of those. Effectively the battalion shouldn't have to concern itself about it, it's effects should just be there. The TTPs of how that should happen obviously vary.

So when it comes to those Lego blocks there are several areas where I'm not so sure where we need to be anymore.

For Recce squadrons, I see a role for organic drones and anti armour weapons. In my days recce squadrons had support platoons (which were a form of dismounts) but I never really saw them doing anything that couldn't be done by a Lynx crew. I'm not sure what dismounts would do now beyond handling drones and anti armour weapons. I certainly believe that recce should participate more in the deep battle than they did in my day but a lot of that is equipment dependent; equipment we do not have. I think the recce (or better yet cavalry) regiment is due for a redesign from the ground up.

I'm still a 100% fan of battalion mortars but am leaning away from them being the knob to hang indirect fire support onto. Mainly that's because of fire supports growing complexity what with air and long range strike and UAV/AUAVs etc etc. It's more specialty now than a temporary assignment in an infantry officer's career. That said, I think there needs to be a stronger link between a battalion and its fire support coordination elements than we have now. A tad more towards the US system with an FSO and team at battalion/regiment HQ and at each company/squadron with links to all the resources that can be mustered in the theatre, both STA and fires. Empire building? Maybe, but it needs to be a big and coordinated network in order to deliver the necessary effects. (That's a lesson we lost during Afghanistan where a little fire support went a long way - it won't at the high end of the spectrum)

My general view when it comes to those Legos is that you have to start with a moderate sized structure made up of sections of different colours and functions that comes preassembled but that you use h=just as it is or that you can take apart and build smaller multicoloured structures from if required.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

I remember noting back in the Cold War days that some armies formed brigade mortar companies rather than battalion mortar platoons.

The other difference I noted was between the British tendency to either/or resources vs the US tendency to replicate all resources at all levels.  Now some of that relates to budget and some relates to proficiency.

To be fair though, I would sooner an imperfectly handled mortar at my side than a perfectly handled one a thousand miles away.

The one at my side can be improved.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Is there some reason (other than administrative/resource, such as PYs) a unit mortar platoon can't be filled entirely with artillery classifications and trades?


----------



## KevinB

Brad Sallows said:


> Is there some reason (other than administrative/resource, such as PYs) a unit mortar platoon can't be filled entirely with artillery classifications and trades?


Got sold that Bridge once before...


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Is there some reason (other than administrative/resource, such as PYs) a unit mortar platoon can't be filled entirely with artillery classifications and trades?


Shhh! Next thing you will be wanting Infantry Drivers to wear Black Hats.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> Is there some reason (other than administrative/resource, such as PYs) a unit mortar platoon can't be filled entirely with artillery classifications and trades?





KevinB said:


> Got sold that Bridge once before...


The artillery didn't sell that bridge. They got roped into the deal - like the engineers got roped into being ersatz pioneers.

The US army does it a bit differently. The infantry has an 11B MOS for infantryman while 11C is called indirect fire infantryman. Its a separate MOS and not just a subclassification. Training for each of the two MOSs is different and now consists of 22 weeks (up from 14 weeks) of One station training which includes both the basic training and the advanced individual training for the MOS.

To answer your question directly, Brad; there is no reason why it couldn't be an artillery trade and in some armies it is. My personal opinion is that mortars are more intimately and permanently involved with their battalion and the skill levels of the infantryman are the more important. The mortars are just another tool like a machine gun or an ATGM or a sniper rifle that needs basic infantry skills and then an add-on skill. It provides better cohesion and career flow to be part of the Inf classification. But that's just me - like I said, other countries differ and even we did for a while.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Shhh! Next thing you will be wanting Infantry Drivers to wear Black Hats.


Australian M113 APC drivers and crew commanders during Vietnam used to be armoured corps. I don't think they do anymore. 

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The artillery didn't sell that bridge. They got roped into the deal - like the engineers got roped into being ersatz pioneers.
> 
> The US army does it a bit differently. The infantry has an 11B MOS for infantryman while 11C is called indirect fire infantryman. Its a separate MOS and not just a subclassification. Training for each of the two MOSs is different and now consists of 22 weeks (up from 14 weeks) of One station training which includes both the basic training and the advanced individual training for the MOS.
> 
> To answer your question directly, Brad; there is no reason why it couldn't be an artillery trade and in some armies it is. My personal opinion is that mortars are more intimately and permanently involved with their battalion and the skill levels of the infantryman are the more important. The mortars are just another tool like a machine gun or an ATGM or a sniper rifle that needs basic infantry skills and then an add-on skill. It provides better cohesion and career flow to be part of the Inf classification. But that's just me - like I said, other countries differ and even we did for a while.
> 
> 🍻



I don't see why a rifleman can't progress to MG/Gdr in the Section, MG/CG in the Platoon and MG/AT/Mor( LOS) in the Coy then be sent on an arty course for Spotting and Indirect Fires.   Also, I note that some armies,  especially in Europe, consider the 81 to be a company weapon.  




To me that looks like a perfectly good baseline solution.  3 ATVs, Two Trailers, Two Tube and 6 soldiers.  Only two soldiers per tube.  

You can't hang around for long in any case so I'm assuming one man beds in the tube while the other preps the bombs,  the bombs get dropped and everybody buggers off to prep the next stonk.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I don't see why a rifleman can't progress to MG/Gdr in the Section, MG/CG in the Platoon and MG/AT/Mor( LOS) in the Coy then be sent on an arty course for Spotting and Indirect Fires.   Also, I note that some armies,  especially in Europe, consider the 81 to be a company weapon.
> 
> 
> View attachment 68751
> 
> To me that looks like a perfectly good baseline solution.  3 ATVs, Two Trailers, Two Tube and 6 soldiers.  Only two soldiers per tube.
> 
> You can't hang around for long in any case so I'm assuming one man beds in the tube while the other preps the bombs,  the bombs get dropped and everybody buggers off to prep the next stonk.


It's been a long time since I looked at this and in the interval there was all the crap with taking the mortars away from the infantry but I seem to vaguely recall a three stage training - a basic course of roughly three weeks for basic mortarman, another three to four week intermediate course that taught basic mortar line leadership and firing data production and an advanced course that taught fire controller and FSCC duties. I might be wrong about MFC and that might have been on the intermediate.

You really need three people on a tube, a layer, a loader and an ammo number to prep the rounds for the loader to ensure a rapid rate of fire. Generally the group is deployed and prepared before the mission is received. Whether the group moves after the mission is dependent on the circumstances. In Afghanistan they generally didn't because CB was pretty much non-existent most of the time. Some missions would be done from within FOBs. Where there is active CB you would definitely pull-pole for an alternate position after "rounds complete". That's where group deployments are handy in keeping one foot on the ground wile the other is moving.

Back in my days while you could deploy two tubes the usual way was to deploy a four-tube group or a full eight-tube platoon. One thing most people seem to forget about indirect fire is the effectiveness of indirect fire is based on what arrives on the target rapidly. The more rounds you can put down in the first volley, the more effective the fire becomes. The lethal burst diameter for an 81mm round is roughly 35 metres so four tubes gives you a rough line of around 150m by 40m for planning purposes which would barely suppress a platoon. To cover a 150m by 100m area you need a whole mortar platoon. Similarly to neutralize a target of that size you would need a six gun 105mm battery or slightly larger for 155mm. Remember we're talking lethality here - splinters obviously fly further than that and you can always get lucky but the first rounds within the lethal area do the most damage which is why we mass fires and try to reach first round surprise. M777s are fairly easy to mass from multiple positions. Mortars are much harder to mass accurately from distributed positions - not impossible - but harder. (as an aside I've asked various gunners in Afghanistan how often they massed the fire from more than one troop and the answer so far is - not. They usually fired single or two-gun missions on very small targets - like your stereotypical grape hut. They rarely saw what one could call a platoon or company position - Medusa was a bit different as none of the targets were what one would call identified and defined targets)

Also, neutralization doesn't mean the target is dead. It means it can't do anything while under fire. If you create enough casualties so much the better, the target might become combat ineffective but don't count on that. Usually after the fire stops, the target gets on with business.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

With respect FJAG, you may really need three people on a tube but 



> *Indirect fire weapon*
> 
> The 81mm Mortar is an indirect fire weapon which is operated by 2 commandos and has a range of 5,650 metres. The mortar can fire a number of different types of round, including fire smoke, illuminating and high explosive rounds.











						Support Weaponry | Royal Navy
					

Specialised firepower, immediately available to counter enemy vehicles, aircraft or boats. Get the full story here.




					www.royalnavy.mod.uk
				












						Royal Marines Trial Can-Am 6x6 ATV For Mortars | Joint Forces News
					

Royal Marines from 45 Commando have been trialling Can-Am OUTLANDER MAX 6x6 all-terrain vehicles in the mortar transport role.




					www.joint-forces.com
				






It may work better with three but, needs must, apparently it can work with two.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Got sold that Bridge once before...



I don't mean that way, any more than I would have chosen to pull the admin companies out and hand them to the service battalions.  I mean the units keep the equipment and the platoons, but the platoons are staffed the same way the admin companies are staffed.  Could also do black hats in the recce and anti-armour platoons, and, yes, engineers in the pioneer platoons.  Also, gunners and engineers in the armoured units.

I'd be inclined to view those as career-enhancing positions for promising soldiers and officers - people who would benefit from working closely with or across manoeuvre units early on, because they are good prospects for key positions further down the road.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> With respect FJAG, you may really need three people on a tube but
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Support Weaponry | Royal Navy
> 
> 
> Specialised firepower, immediately available to counter enemy vehicles, aircraft or boats. Get the full story here.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.royalnavy.mod.uk
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Royal Marines Trial Can-Am 6x6 ATV For Mortars | Joint Forces News
> 
> 
> Royal Marines from 45 Commando have been trialling Can-Am OUTLANDER MAX 6x6 all-terrain vehicles in the mortar transport role.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.joint-forces.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 68752
> 
> It may work better with three but, needs must, apparently it can work with two.


And in the US Army the crew for an 81mm mortar is 4. When the airborne battery deployed with mortars rather than L5s, each seven man detachment manned 2 tubes. I don't doubt that during manpower starvation times platoons went out short mortars and people and my guess is they probably do so now. I can go on. You can operate a mortar with one man if you want, and if the Marines are so manpower poor that they give those things two two blokes, then the trade-off is that the weight of fire that the tube can deliver is either slow getting off the mark because rounds need to be unpacked, charges selected and possibly a fuze set and fire is delayed until that happens or alternatively the rate of fire is slowed from what it could be while the loader is busy doing that.  

You can squeeze any detachment, section, platoon etc down to the bare minimum to make the weapon function but that usually means it operates below optional capability, can't work 24/7 and can't absorb casualties. 

I'll let D&B explain why Marines put two guys on a mortar - maybe they are supermen but my guess is they are PY starved.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> And in the US Army the crew for an 81mm mortar is 4. When the airborne battery deployed with mortars rather than L5s, each seven man detachment manned 2 tubes. I don't doubt that during manpower starvation times platoons went out short mortars and people and my guess is they probably do so now. I can go on. You can operate a mortar with one man if you want, and if the Marines are so manpower poor that they give those things two two blokes, then the trade-off is that the weight of fire that the tube can deliver is either slow getting off the mark because rounds need to be unpacked, charges selected and possibly a fuze set and fire is delayed until that happens or alternatively the rate of fire is slowed from what it could be while the loader is busy doing that.
> 
> You can squeeze any detachment, section, platoon etc down to the bare minimum to make the weapon function but that usually means it operates below optional capability, can't work 24/7 and can't absorb casualties.
> 
> I'll let D&B explain why Marines put two guys on a mortar - maybe they are supermen but my guess is they are PY starved.
> 
> 🍻



My guess is that you are correct on being PY starved.  My second guess is that they are replacing muscles with motors where they can and have decided that they are either going to work from the back of a BV or else from an ATV and trailer.  And try and make up some of the difference that way.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> I don't mean that way, any more than I would have chosen to pull the admin companies out and hand them to the service battalions.  I mean the units keep the equipment and the platoons, but the platoons are staffed the same way the admin companies are staffed.  Could also do black hats in the recce and anti-armour platoons, and, yes, engineers in the pioneer platoons.  Also, gunners and engineers in the armoured units.
> 
> I'd be inclined to view those as career-enhancing positions for promising soldiers and officers - people who would benefit from working closely with or across manoeuvre units early on, because they are good prospects for key positions further down the road.



That would work....

Right up until the point where you need to walk from A to B with all your stuff and, by the time you get to B, you only have Infantry types ...


----------



## Brad Sallows

Admin coy types can do it, though?


----------



## FJAG

Quick and probably obvious question in relation to Force 2025. I've come across these two military symbols in Force 2025 documentation:



To me the one on the left is motorized recce and the one on the right is motorized infantry. I've seen the former in Force 2025 in relation to the recce platoon in a mech battalion and the other in relation to Force Protection organizations.

The point though is that we have typically not used the "motorized" modifier when dealing with e.g light battalions and recce elements whether motorized or not. Is there a reason why these are showing up now? Do they have some hidden meaning that only Freemason's know about?


----------



## McG

I suspect it emphasizes that the represented entity has integral highway capable vehicles and that it is not light. But …

The Force 2025 work seems to be full of misleading symbols (tracked SP mortars) and symbols that NATO discontinued as far back as the 1990s. I would not put too much weight into the nuanced doctrinal meaning of any icon in the 2025 org charts.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> That would work....
> 
> Right up until the point where you need to walk from A to B with all your stuff and, by the time you get to B, you only have Infantry types ...


Kinda like how 29 RA aren't real Commandos and 7 RHA aren't real Paras?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Kinda like how 29 RA aren't real Commandos and 7 RHA aren't real Paras?



Until they beat everyone at boxing, rugby and any one of a dozen other sports, yes


----------



## Fabius

Given we haven't defined what exact tasks we expect the FP things to do I suspect the only real rational behind the motorized symbol is that we know they won't be based in LAVs.


----------



## KevinB

Fabius said:


> Given we haven't defined what exact tasks we expect the FP things to do I suspect the only real rational behind the motorized symbol is that we know they won't be based in LAVs.


Well I for one wouldn't bet against LAV's, GDLS needs to keep the line running and all that


----------



## Kirkhill

If LAVs then Bison aka LAV-L  - an amphibious, air-portable Deuce and a Half (payload of 5248 lbs) that is lightly armoured  -  Just don't confuse it with an Infantry Fighting Vehicle.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> If LAVs then Bison aka LAV-L  - an amphibious, air-portable Deuce and a Half (payload of 5248 lbs) that is lightly armoured  -  Just don't confuse it with an Infantry Fighting Vehicle.
> 
> View attachment 68764View attachment 68766


To me Amphibious should not require 30min plus of prep work...


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> To me Amphibious should not require 30min plus of prep work...



Fair enough.  Make it better.  Spend less money on making the thing heavier and more on making it more broadly utilitarian.  An 8x8 Jeep (GP-General Purpose).


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Fair enough.  Make it better.  Spend less money on making the thing heavier and more on making it more broadly utilitarian.  An 8x8 Jeep (GP-General Purpose).


Armored Vehicles never get lighter...
   Entities are not willing to accept the risk.

You'd need to start with a new platform - and have a certain level of armor in some places (or soft skin).   I think however that the ship has said for soft skin Military vehicles outside of special purpose and low vis items for SOF.


----------



## Kirkhill

An amphibious Deuce and a Half.  

And how much armour plate is there on this?



It is a matter of prioritizing.


----------



## KevinB

Why Amphibious? 
    Hostile crossings are an absolute massacre in something slow like a LAV/AARV - why people have Engineers and AVLB’s or Modular Bridging. 

Domestically a tracked amphibious system will do better in Canadian terrain - as wheeled systems hate bogs - unless they are exceptionally light.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Why Amphibious?
> Hostile crossings are an absolute massacre in something slow like a LAV/AARV - why people have Engineers and AVLB’s or Modular Bridging.
> 
> Domestically a tracked amphibious system will do better in Canadian terrain - as wheeled systems hate bogs - unless they are exceptionally light.



Hostile crossing is not on the agenda.

I am suggesting that if we are stuck with the GDLS catalogue then I would be getting the militia something that moves stuff by road as quickly as possible (wheeled - which GDLS makes). Something which can go at least as far off the highway as any civilian vehicle.   Something which can protect the contents from sun, wind, rain, sleet, snow and the occasional hunter's bullet and shot gun blast.   And something which doesn't need Engineer Squadron to cross a puddle when it runs out of dry land.

Would I prefer a Bv?  Yup.

But GDLS doesn't make a Bv.  Although they do make a nice knock off from Singapore.


PS - and if the Army does decided to steal them again and use them overseas they will offer a bit more protection than an unarmoured Navistar or a Mack.


----------



## KevinB

I don’t think the CAF needs more LAV’s. 
   Maybe the old DDGM turned GDLS plant needs to expand its portfolio.  

GDLS makes a bunch of items the CAF could actually use more effectively than more LAV’s.  

I’m sure if they ran an AJAX line, the CaF would have at least 3 Heavy Brigades worth in short order.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I don’t think the CAF needs more LAV’s.
> Maybe the old DDGM turned GDLS plant needs to expand its portfolio.
> 
> GDLS makes a bunch of items the CAF could actually use more effectively than more LAV’s.
> 
> I’m sure if they ran an AJAX line, the CaF would have at least 3 Heavy Brigades worth in short order.




This AJAX?









						Shaken and stirred: British Army’s Ajax troubles cast a long shadow
					

General Dynamics’ land systems operation in Spain has already built half of the hulls for the British Army’s Ajax armored cavalry program, even as the future of the vehicle is threatened by noise and vibration problems.




					www.defensenews.com


----------



## KevinB

I’d argue teething pains.   Remember the ruckus about the Bradley…


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I’d argue teething pains.   Remember the ruckus about the Bradley…




I'd rather wait until their not pouring the Brits out the back.

Have you got anything in a nice CV90 you can offer?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I'd rather wait until their not pouring the Brits out the back.
> 
> Have you got anything in a nice CV90 you can offer?


Well, if you where allowed to look at another dealership across the street, it’s right next to the Blackhawks and Apaches…


----------



## Pewpews521

MilEME09 said:


> speaking of resources, i think the CAF is living in a pipe dream right now for wanting two RFL2 rifle coy's coming out of 38,39,and 41 CBG to support ops. unless there is some major changes going on over the next few years getting two platoons out of the reserves will be a hard battle, let alone two





FJAG said:


> Australian M113 APC drivers and crew commanders during Vietnam used to be armoured corps. I don't think they do anymore.
> 
> 🍻


They don’t do that anymore, except in the reserves where the armoured run the Bushmaster PMVs in the reinforcing battle group


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Quick and probably obvious question in relation to Force 2025. I've come across these two military symbols in Force 2025 documentation:
> 
> View attachment 68753
> 
> To me the one on the left is motorized recce and the one on the right is motorized infantry. I've seen the former in Force 2025 in relation to the recce platoon in a mech battalion and the other in relation to Force Protection organizations.
> 
> The point though is that we have typically not used the "motorized" modifier when dealing with e.g light battalions and recce elements whether motorized or not. Is there a reason why these are showing up now? Do they have some hidden meaning that only Freemason's know about?


Differentiates that recce platoons are in TAPV / G Wagons, I imagine the same for the FP Bn.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> I’d argue teething pains.   Remember the ruckus about the Bradley…


Very much this, AJAXs problems are it’s speciality suites. The same chassis is being used with no issues by the Austrians and Spanish.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Very much this, AJAXs problems are it’s speciality suites. The same chassis is being used with no issues by the Austrians and Spanish.



I would remind both of you, Mark and Kevin, that this is Canada.  And if the Brits can muck a perfectly functional vehicle ... well, hold our Moosehead.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> I would remind both of you, Mark and Kevin, that this is Canada.  And if the Brits can muck a perfectly functional vehicle ... well, hold our Moosehead.



What are you talking about, old chap? 





At least they off loaded the Saxons to the Ukrainians, poor things:
​The Telegraph is reporting that the former head of the British Army has condemned a decision to deliver dozens of retired British Saxon armored personal carriers to the Ukrainian government as “nothing short of immoral”.  General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff between 2006 and 2009, described the Saxon armored vehicles are “quite useless”.  Said Dannatt: “_I took these out of service by the UK Army in 2005/6 as completely unsuitable for current operations, so I find it incredible that they are being sold/gifted to Ukraine. I am incensed by the thought we are supplying, even via a 3rd party, SAXON APCs to the hapless Ukrainians.”  _Ukranian sources said that 20 Saxons have been delivered to Ukraine, with another 55 expected to arrive soon. 









						British General condemns transfer of Saxon APC to Ukraine
					

The Telegraph is reporting that the former head of the British Army has condemned a decision to deliver dozens of retired British Saxon armored personal carriers to the Ukrainian government as “not…




					tankandafvnews.com


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> What are you talking about, old chap?
> 
> View attachment 68780
> 
> 
> 
> At least they off loaded the Saxons to the Ukrainians, poor things:
> ​The Telegraph is reporting that the former head of the British Army has condemned a decision to deliver dozens of retired British Saxon armored personal carriers to the Ukrainian government as “nothing short of immoral”.  General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff between 2006 and 2009, described the Saxon armored vehicles are “quite useless”.  Said Dannatt: “_I took these out of service by the UK Army in 2005/6 as completely unsuitable for current operations, so I find it incredible that they are being sold/gifted to Ukraine. I am incensed by the thought we are supplying, even via a 3rd party, SAXON APCs to the hapless Ukrainians.”  _Ukranian sources said that 20 Saxons have been delivered to Ukraine, with another 55 expected to arrive soon.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> British General condemns transfer of Saxon APC to Ukraine
> 
> 
> The Telegraph is reporting that the former head of the British Army has condemned a decision to deliver dozens of retired British Saxon armored personal carriers to the Ukrainian government as “not…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> tankandafvnews.com




But as gawdawful as they might have been apparently they were better than what the Ukrainians (/Russians) had.... Which might give somebody pause when considering current force dispositions.



> At the first glance, the AT-105 seems to be an obsolete vehicle. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian soldiers using the platform cannot speak of it highly enough. One of the soldiers of the Airmobile Brigade appreciated the Saxon’s good performance on the road and in an off-road context, since the performance characteristics of the British vehicle, in certain situations, exceed those of the contemporary BTR vehicles used by the Ukrainians. The interviewed soldier claimed that AT-105, in off-road conditions, turned out to have better mobility than the BTR-4 platform. The second example shows that AT-105 4x4 vehicle has all-terrain capabilities which are no worse than those of the track-chassis platforms (2S3 Akatsiya), while on hardened surfaces the vehicle is even more mobile. This type of comparisons takes place because of the fact that the aforementioned airmobile units use a quite varied and surprising inventory.











						null
					

null




					defence24.com
				




It's crap. But not as crap as the other guys.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> But as gawdawful as they might have been apparently they were better than what the Ukrainians (/Russians) had.... Which might give somebody pause when considering current force dispositions.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> null
> 
> 
> null
> 
> 
> 
> 
> defence24.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It's crap. But not as crap as the other guys.


The other crap has a lot more armor than the Saxon.
   I have a low opinion of most of the WP vehicles - but having driven in a Saxon once - I'm not sure I'd want to be in any of those options when stuff starts flying.


----------



## markppcli

Say what you will about the BTR 80, but it’s at least off road capable and has an automatic cannon.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> The other crap has a lot more armor than the Saxon.
> I have a low opinion of most of the WP vehicles - but having driven in a Saxon once - I'm not sure I'd want to be in any of those options when stuff starts flying.



The Saxon is a good old 4 tonner, ruined by putting a stupid armoured box around it so they could move the Reserves from the UK to the Central Front, after the Soviets crossed the IGB, without getting whacked by Soviet arty shrapnel.

It was obsolete as soon as  The Wall came down. Maybe a bit before that...


----------



## KevinB

So small elephant in the room, anyone thinking a Symmetrical Medium Force is a solid option anymore?

Bueller, Bueller, Bueller?

Thought not.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> So small elephant in the room, anyone thinking a Symmetrical Medium Force is a solid option anymore?
> 
> Bueller, Bueller, Bueller?
> 
> Thought not.


Maybe heliborne seizures of airfields for an airhead needs retooling too.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Maybe heliborne seizures of airfields for an airhead needs retooling too.
> 
> 🍻


That's still head scratcher for me -- usually one seizes airfields with paratroopers.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

KevinB said:


> That's still head scratcher for me -- usually one seizes airfields with paratroopers.


Hubris?


----------



## Ostrozac

KevinB said:


> That's still head scratcher for me -- usually one seizes airfields with paratroopers.


Fixed wing transport crews tend to get itchy in a contested air environment. If you don’t have full control of the air, then helicopters at low level are what you have to use. But you’re right, that means going in light — and without the airdropped tracked vehicles so beloved of the Russian Airborne.


----------



## KevinB

Ostrozac said:


> Fixed wing transport crews tend to get itchy in a contested air environment. If you don’t have full control of the air, then helicopters at low level are what you have to use. But you’re right, that means going in light — and without the airdropped tracked vehicles so beloved of the Russian Airborne.


Clearly no control of the skies, which also makes an Air Assault as massive gamble. 

I’d have chalked that one up in risks outweigh reward.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Maybe heliborne seizures of airfields for an airhead needs retooling too.
> 
> 🍻



OTOH - light troops with lots of ATGMs seem to be credible.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> OTOH - light troops with lots of ATGMs seem to be credible.


Are you referring to the Ukrainians as light ?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Are you referring to the Ukrainians as light ?




I am saying I have not seen reported evidence of many Ukrainian AFVs in direct combat.  On the other hand I am seeing and hearing lots of tales of soldiers, on their feet, achieving successes with NLAWs and Javelins.  I am also hearing lots of reports of the initial air assaults, and acts of sabotage, being countered by Territorial Defence Units.

My suggestion is that Ukraine, despite its circumstances, is still husbanding its heavy forces and not committing them yet.  The few images I have seen of Ukrainian tanks and SPGs  have been of them sitting on the backs of Tank Transporter Trucks, either in parks or on highways being redeployed.

So, no I am not referring to the Ukrainians as light.  I am suggesting that they seem to  have not yet felt the need to commit heavy forces, at least none that they are willing to advertise, and instead are letting/reporting light forces (regular and territorial) absorb the initial impetus.  And they seem to be having some, reported, success in the early going.

The Russian penetrations have not achieved Blitzkrieg effectiveness, in my opinion, from what I can see, from available Open Source information.

Cheers, Mark.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I am saying I have not seen reported evidence of many Ukrainian AFVs in direct combat.  On the other hand I am seeing and hearing lots of tales of soldiers, on their feet, achieving successes with NLAWs and Javelins.  I am also hearing lots of reports of the initial air assaults, and acts of sabotage, being countered by Territorial Defence Units.
> 
> My suggestion is that Ukraine, despite its circumstances, is still husbanding its heavy forces and not committing them yet.  The few images I have seen of Ukrainian tanks and SPGs  have been of them sitting on the backs of Tank Transporter Trucks, either in parks or on highways being redeployed.
> 
> So, no I am not referring to the Ukrainians as light.  I am suggesting that they seem to  have not yet felt the need to commit heavy forces, at least none that they are willing to advertise, and instead are letting/reporting light forces (regular and territorial) absorb the initial impetus.  And they seem to be having some, reported, success in the early going.
> 
> The Russian penetrations have not achieved Blitzkrieg effectiveness, in my opinion, from what I can see, from available Open Source information.
> 
> Cheers, Mark.


So in other words. Yes


----------



## daftandbarmy

SeaKingTacco said:


> Hubris?



IIRC that it worked for them in Crimea in 2014...


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> IIRC that it worked for them in Crimea in 2014...


Fool me once...


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> So in other words. Yes


Da, tovarisch!.


----------



## Fabius

31(1) The Governor in Council may place the Canadian Forces or any component, unit or other element thereof or any officer or non-commissioned member thereof on active service anywhere in or beyond Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so

(a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada;

(b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter; or

(c) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the North Atlantic Treaty, the North American Aerospace Defence Command Agreement or any other similar instrument to which Canada is a party.

In relation to all the F2025 discussion in the Army there seems to be a reluctance to admit that the NDA actually has the above item within it. There also seems to be thinking that this can only be used in extremis, World War 3 has been declared etc. and that it can’t be used to mobilize a TBG for domestic operations nor to mobilize a Reserve Bn to do a named mission rotation.

This thinking is odd since the federal cabinet literally approves OICs every month for everything from individual appointments to agencies to sanctions against Russia. OICs are not an in extremis tool.

The only rational I can think of for the reluctance is that the NDA has no job protection, but is there any reason the OIC can’t have job protection written into it? At least until the NDA is amended.


----------



## FJAG

Fabius said:


> This thinking is odd since the federal cabinet literally approves OICs every month for everything from individual appointments to agencies to sanctions against Russia. OICs are not an in extremis tool.
> 
> The only rational I can think of for the reluctance is that the NDA has no job protection, but is there any reason the OIC can’t have job protection written into it? At least until the NDA is amended.


Boy, that's a hard one. Personally I have thought for a long time that the Feds have all the power they need to create comprehensive job protection legislation pursuant to their exclusive powers to legislate in matters of "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence." under article 7 of s 91. Ordinarily labour law is considered an exclusively provincial matter under "Property and Civil Rights in the Province." under article 13 of s 92. However, the Feds legislate all manners of labour issues under industries which fall under Fed jurisdiction like banks, railroads, navigation etc.

I see absolutely no reason why the Feds could not enact a nationwide labour code related to military service. Rather than doing so, however, they negotiated very weak provincial legislation to be enacted across the country. I can only assume that some genius in DoJ has a different opinion than me or for whatever reason DND thinks that this is not the hill to die on. Considering the relatively low level of priority that the CAF places on reservists as a whole it doesn't surprise me that CAF has never pushed DND to push DoJ to make this a matter worth spending an effort on. It would be a significant undertaking to create a proper law, regulations and an enforcement infrastructure to do so. My guess is that the appetite to do so simply isn't there. @dapaterson may have some additional insight into the matter.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Boy, that's a hard one. Personally I have thought for a long time that the Feds have all the power they need to create comprehensive job protection legislation pursuant to their exclusive powers to legislate in matters of "Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence." under article 7 of s 91. Ordinarily labour law is considered an exclusively provincial matter under "Property and Civil Rights in the Province." under article 13 of s 92. However, the Feds legislate all manners of labour issues under industries which fall under Fed jurisdiction like banks, railroads, navigation etc.
> 
> I see absolutely no reason why the Feds could not enact a nationwide labour code related to military service. Rather than doing so, however, they negotiated very weak provincial legislation to be enacted across the country. I can only assume that some genius in DoJ has a different opinion than me or for whatever reason DND thinks that this is not the hill to die on. Considering the relatively low level of priority that the CAF places on reservists as a whole it doesn't surprise me that CAF has never pushed DND to push DoJ to make this a matter worth spending an effort on. It would be a significant undertaking to create a proper law, regulations and an enforcement infrastructure to do so. My guess is that the appetite to do so simply isn't there. @dapaterson may have some additional insight into the matter.
> 
> 🍻





Fabius said:


> The only rational I can think of for the reluctance is that the NDA has no job protection, but is there any reason the OIC can’t have job protection written into it? At least until the NDA is amended.



If the GoC can't interfere with provincial labour law, although they seem to find ways to interfere in many other provincial jurisdictions, can they manage the dislocation caused through "post-service" compensation?  IE once the emergency is over manage the compensation so as to ensure that the member is made whole and allowed to pick up their life before the emergency?  That may not mean the same job with the same employer but....


----------



## lenaitch

Kirkhill said:


> If the GoC can't interfere with provincial labour law, although they seem to find ways to interfere in many other provincial jurisdictions, can they manage the dislocation caused through "post-service" compensation?  IE once the emergency is over manage the compensation so as to ensure that the member is made whole and allowed to pick up their life before the emergency?  That may not mean the same job with the same employer but....


That sounds like an enhanced or modified EI program, except the loss of employment was voluntary.  I'm not sure compensation and picking up one's life are completely equivalent.  Would part-time military service (the apparent goal of such legislation) be made more attractive if I lost my job at the Honda plant in Ontario but was told there was a job for the same money in Manitoba sorting eggs?

I get the magnitude of the issue (or at least the magnitude it should have), I'm just not sure of a workable solution.  I'm not even sure the federal government would even try to reach some sort of pan-provincial agreement given that it would burn a lot of political capital for little political return.  

Typically, federal incursion into provincial playgrounds come with a bag-o-money, and I'm not sure how well that would work in this regard.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> If the GoC can't interfere with provincial labour law, although they seem to find ways to interfere in many other provincial jurisdictions, can they manage the dislocation caused through "post-service" compensation?  IE once the emergency is over manage the compensation so as to ensure that the member is made whole and allowed to pick up their life before the emergency?  That may not mean the same job with the same employer but....


I think that they could if they chose to make the cash available.

Just to be clear though, I do not think that a Federal law respecting reserve service would be "interfering in provincial labour law". It would be a stand alone Federal law to protect reservists from discriminatory practices by anyone within Canada. It would be national in character. One of the usual arguments that gets trucked out is that such legislation would cause reservists not being hired. I tend to think that's a bit of a canard and could be tempered by having incentive programs for employers accompany any the offence provisions.

IMHO one of the biggest challenges that reservists face vis a vis their employers is the almost randomness of reserve service. This could be tempered by having obligatory training set to a rigid training schedule established well in advance. I think something in the nature of ten weekends per year and a two - three week summer concentration would be acceptable because generally weekends are non working days and if set in advance could be easily worked around. Unpaid military time off during the summer over and above a mandatory provincial paid holiday period is a bit more challenging but not insurmountably so.

Incentives for employers do have a cost aspect for the Federal government, however, such incentives would still be significantly less expensive than the cost of a full-time soldier. Remember too that if one leveraged students' needs for paid summer work and subsidized education, one could create a reservist trained to full DP1 and even DP2 standards so that subsequent obligatory service would, for the most part, just be annual collective refresher training. Add to this that many of the leadership and administrative functions be taken over by full-timers and you end up with a capable hybrid unit.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

> This could be tempered by having obligatory training set to a rigid training schedule established well in advance.



If Churches, Masons and Rotarians can maintain a rigid schedule surely the CAF can manage that as well.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I think that they could if they chose to make the cash available.
> 
> Just to be clear though, I do not think that a Federal law respecting reserve service would be "interfering in provincial labour law". It would be a stand alone Federal law to protect reservists from discriminatory practices by anyone within Canada. It would be national in character. *One of the usual arguments that gets trucked out is that such legislation would cause reservists not being hired. I tend to think that's a bit of a canard and could be tempered by having incentive programs for employers accompany any the offence provisions.*



I know several employers, some of them ex-military, who refuse to hire reservists because they always want time off to go do military stuff and leave behind extra work for everyone else. They are also unpredictable where, for example, a soldier gets two weeks off for a course and the employer backfills the job but then the course in cancelled (usually at the last minute) so now he has an extra employee to pay, with no recourse to recover the lost cash he pays out.

No other employees are like this, AFAIK.

If the employer is compensated by, for example, having the wages of the 'missing military member' covered by Canada, it would mean a little less pain and a greater incentive to hire and retain reservists.

RIght now the CAF is getting what it pays for, which isn't much.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> I know several employers, some of them ex-military, who refuse to hire reservists because they always want time off to go do military stuff and leave behind extra work for everyone else. They are also unpredictable where, for example, a soldier gets two weeks off for a course and the employer backfills the job but then the course in cancelled (usually at the last minute) so now he has an extra employee to pay, with no recourse to recover the lost cash he pays out.
> 
> No other employees are like this, AFAIK.
> 
> If the employer is compensated by, for example, having the wages of the 'missing military member' covered by Canada, it would mean a little less pain and a greater incentive to hire and retain reservists.
> 
> RIght now the CAF is getting what it pays for, which isn't much.


I quite understand and IMHO much of the fault with this rests with a reserve unit which puts what I consider unreasonable demands on individual reservists to do things during hours that ought to be the employer's.

I think the CAF needs to build a system where there is a covenant between the CAF, the reservist, the employer and the reservist's family which says "here's what we demand". One weekend a month, for example, interferes with very few employers and leaves the reservist's family with three weekends.  When you start having them show up every two weekends and every Tuesday and Thursday night you can see a clear impact on both family and even employer. 

Two weeks in the summer can be rough without some protective/incentivizing legislation. That needs working on.

For me, the big factor, as I alluded to above, is to absolutely maximize the training effort during the reservists school years when there are no competing family and employer concerns. Once trained, the only real necessity is to do a form of refresher training for the bulk of the unit.

Obviously, I think that there is very little ability to turn out the key officers and NCOs in the collective training needed to lead reserve companies within a battalion. That's why I think there is a need for integrating RegF personnel at that level. I would expect only a very few reservists would be able to graduate beyond captain and warrant officer level. I think that's an essential trade-off if we ever want to have a deployable reserve force without an unnecessary risk level.

But we've had this discussion before.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

Hey CAF, never waste the opportunity in a good crisis....


*Canada's troop commitment to eastern Europe is exposing weak points in its military

Canada relies on allies for air defence — and its CF-18s are too old to go up against Russian defences*

For years, people in the defence community have been warning that the next big war would be a "come as you are" event — with each nation showing up and fighting with what it has.

The difference between victory and defeat would depend on how quickly and effectively a country could mobilize and manoeuvre its forces.

That sort of mentality permeated the Cold War. It divided Europe into two heavily armed camps for decades and cast a long shadow of nuclear terror across three generations.

The tanks, barbed wire and big guns have been gone since the early 1990s. The Liberal government's recent activation of 3,400 soldiers, sailors and aircrew for duty with the NATO Response Force (NRF) brought with it a chilling echo of those long-ago times.

It also exposed some of the major shortfalls facing the Canadian military in both personnel and equipment.

The Canadian Army, for example, has no dedicated air defence to keep soldiers on the ground safe from attack helicopters and fighter-bombers. As former army commander and now chief of the defence staff Gen. Wayne Eyre told CBC News two years ago, Canada relies on its allies for that kind of protection.

According to several defence analysts, Canada's four-decade old CF-18s would be vulnerable to Russia's modern S-400 Triumf air defence system.

The Royal Canadian Navy, with its newly modernized frigates, is hamstrung when it comes to forming task forces because its dedicated replenishment ship has little in the way of defensive systems needed for a war zone. It would have to be outfitted to defend itself and senior defence officials have long argued that makes the MV Asterix unsuitable and highlights the need to construct dedicated joint support ships.

Canada's current military representative at NATO, Vice-Admiral Scott Bishop, focused on the positive while testifying before a House of Commons committee on Wednesday. He was asked about the serviceability of the fighter jet fleet and noted the country has been called upon to perform a number of NATO air policing missions.

"We get a lot of credit from our allies for the job our men and women are doing in those missions," Bishop said. "I would say we do not see any impact in terms of our ability to deliver to NATO what we have committed."

When asked recently about the possible commitment of thousands of additional military members to Europe, Defence Minister Anita Anand said Canada has the capacity to meet its alliance commitments, even with its relatively small force of roughly 65,000 regular members and 30,000 reservists.

But there's a difference between military capacity and sustainability.

*The pandemic's effects on military readiness*

In 2019-20, before the pandemic hit, the Department of National Defence (DND) estimated that 80.3 per cent of the military could meet its operational obligations when called upon, according to federal budget documents tabled last spring. A target of 100 per cent readiness was to be achieved by 2025.

But COVID-19 has played havoc with the training exercises and courses meant to keep soldiers, sailors and aircrew ready and sharp.

Exactly how the pandemic has affected military operational readiness is not clear because the department says no up-to-date figures are available. Personnel may be generally ready to go, but there are concerns about the state of Canada's military equipment.

*Analyzing Russia's strategy as convoy stalls north of Kyiv*

"There is a risk that DND/CAF may have difficulty maintaining its materiel capabilities at the right level to support operations," the defence department's plans warned.

The budget documents show that in 2019-20, 98 per cent of the navy's ships and equipment were serviceable and ready to deploy as required.

*Army, air force see decline in readiness*

The army and air force were a different story. Only 65.4 per cent of army equipment and vehicles were considered serviceable — a steep decline from the previous budget year. The air force could muster only 60.8 per cent of its fleet for active service in the 2019-20 timeframe.

Canadian troops in Afghanistan used a phrase cribbed from the Americans to describe the Ottawa establishment's approach to the war: "The army is at war and the nation is at the mall."

It's that peacetime mentality that one former top army commander says Canada needs to set aside as it confronts the current crisis.

Retired lieutenant-general Andrew Leslie says the stakes for Ukraine and the world are unimaginably high. (CBC)

Retired lieutenant-general and former Liberal MP Andrew Leslie said previous Liberal and Conservative governments did move swiftly in some cases to equip the army for Afghanistan — but the effort quickly bogged down.

It took an independent, blue-ribbon panel led by former Liberal cabinet minister John Manley to demand that the military get all of the equipment it needed — including helicopters and leased drones — to fight the Taliban.

Leslie said the circumstances today are much more dire.

"This is different," he said. "This has the potential to be World War Three if we get it wrong, if we don't let deterrence do its job.

"And to make deterrence effective we have to do our job, which is to treat it with the urgency and the gravitas it deserves."

If western democracies like Canada "get this wrong, the sociopath that is leading this assault on the innocent people of Ukraine may think he can keep going," Leslie said, referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

*Send the troops in now, says Leslie*

There is a Canadian battle group of 500 troops in Latvia and a commitment to send an artillery battery of 120 troops, along with another frigate for the alliance's standing fleet and an air force maritime surveillance plane.

Anand has said Canada is waiting for NATO's call to deliver the 3,400 additional soldiers, sailors and aircrew. But Leslie said he believes they should go now, following the unilateral reinforcement of garrisons in eastern Europe by the U.S. and the United Kingdom.

"We need the maximum number of troops that we've been promising NATO for years," he said. "So let's deliver as soon as possible.

"And by as soon as possible, I don't mean 30, 60, 90 days. I mean within a week, two weeks."

The equipment could follow those troops overseas, he added.

Canada's Ambassador to NATO David Angell, testifying before the Commons defence committee on Wednesday, said that the alliance has not yet seen any sign that Russia is prepared to attack targets outside of Ukraine.

NATO says it is prepared and has activated five defensive plans to respond should the situation escalate.

Because the Canadian military is small, Leslie said, it should change some of its regular routines in order to meet the challenge in eastern Europe.

For decades, the Canadian army has rotated its battalions through war zones and peacekeeping duties in deployments of six to nine months. With such a relatively large force going into eastern Europe, Leslie said, the army should recognize it needs to keep troops in theater — possibly for the duration, as it did during the Second World War.

"Worry about rotations later," Leslie said. "If they're going to be there for years, fine. If the troops are needed for six months or a year, they can go and they stay.

"This is an emergency. Just ask the people of Ukraine."

https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-ukraine-russia-putin-canadian-armed-forces-1.6370874


----------



## FJAG

I read the article this morning and my immediate impression was that Brewster was just skimming the surface. Honestly, I think he could be writing several months' worth of feature articles on this subject if he just put a little bit of effort into it.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I read the article this morning and my immediate impression was that Brewster was just skimming the surface. Honestly, I think he could be writing several months' worth of feature articles on this subject if he just put a little bit of effort into it.
> 
> 🍻


Skimming is too deep a word


----------



## GK .Dundas

KevinB said:


> Skimming is too deep a word


I am still astounded by the fact that this is given so little coverage given everything that is happening. It's gotten to the point that  I've begun to believe that if you look up the definition of insular in the dictionary you'd find a map of Canada.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Does.anyone know what happened to all those M113s as well as the 60 odd Leos ?
Looks like we.might still need them.
If not there is always all those Abrams sitting in open air storage in California and Texas.


----------



## MJP

GK .Dundas said:


> Does.anyone know what happened to all those M113s as well as the 60 odd Leos ?
> Looks like we.might still need them.
> If not there is always all those Abrams sitting in open air storage in California and Texas.


I see what is left of the LEO 1s everyday but they are not coming back from the dead.  Not many left and the rest are at a contractor getting ready to be targets in Cold Lake









						Repurposed Leopard 1 tanks invade Vegreville  | Globalnews.ca
					

The central Alberta town has been invaded by a part of Canadian military history.




					globalnews.ca


----------



## GK .Dundas

I know the Leo's are a dead issue but I suspect we may not be able to access Leo2s as Germany I suspect is going to be trying rebuild their panzer korps.
That is why I mentioned the Abrams.
I suspect that we may very well have to rebuild in a hurry the question is where are we going to get all that gear.


----------



## MJP

GK .Dundas said:


> I know the Leo's are a dead issue but I suspect we may not be able to access Leo2s as Germany I suspect is going to be trying rebuild their panzer korps.
> That is why I mentioned the Abrams.
> I suspect that we may very well have to rebuild in a hurry the question is where are we going to get all that gear.


Not to say it isn't doable but we are literally not set up in any way shape or form to take on the Abrams. The easiest part would likely be getting them, marrying up the Armoured with the vehs and getting them trained to fight them. The STTE (testing and tooling equipment), parts, infra, support vehs and technicians needs are the hidden part of the iceberg in that equation.  

Canada can ill afford to run two tank fleets, as it is we already run 3 variants within a our single fleet and it is killing us


----------



## KevinB

MJP said:


> Not to say it isn't doable but we are literally not set up in any way shape or form to take on the Abrams. The easiest part would likely be getting them, marrying up the Armoured with the vehs and getting them trained to fight them. The STTE (testing and tooling equipment), parts, infra, support vehs and technicians needs are the hidden part of the iceberg in that equation.
> 
> Canada can ill afford to run two tank fleets, as it is we already run 3 variants within a our single fleet and it is killing us


Maybe trade the Leo 2’s back to the Germans. 
  Get M1A2 PIP or whatever the current line variant is being called.


----------



## MJP

KevinB said:


> Maybe trade the Leo 2’s back to the Germans.
> Get M1A2 PIP or whatever the current line variant is being called.


We had the Leo 2s since let's say 2010 ( there are nuances to that date as we had them before then but they were on loan)

Regardless in the decade and a bit since we fielded the Leo to we can still barely keep them running in a sustainable way. We have barely even addressed a number of the concerns including recovery,  transportation, overhaul and most importantly infrastructure needed to support tanks. We have we have stretched the technician line to the point that the Canadian Army almost individually manages technicians that are qualified to repair tanks.  We have no capacity to turn that all over and ramp up another line without some significant significant effort. 

I know war might be that significant effort but we're not at that stage nor do I think we will go down that road anytime soon.


----------



## FJAG

MJP said:


> We had the Leo 2s since let's say 2010 ( there are nuances to that date as we had them before then but they were on loan)
> 
> Regardless in the decade and a bit since we fielded the Leo to we can still barely keep them running in a sustainable way. We have barely even addressed a number of the concerns including recovery,  transportation, overhaul and most importantly infrastructure needed to support tanks. We have we have stretched the technician line to the point that the Canadian Army almost individually manages technicians that are qualified to repair tanks.  We have no capacity to turn that all over and ramp up another line without some significant significant effort.
> 
> I know war might be that significant effort but we're not at that stage nor do I think we will go down that road anytime soon.


This is what makes me hot under the collar every time the CAF divests another capability.

When I was with G Bty in the early eighties not only was 10% of the battery's manpower made up by our 15 man maintenance detachment but because we were a flyover force for 4 CMBG, there were another 15 maintainers looking after the Z Bty guns that we would fly on to. 

It takes time to build and train a team like that and while I could probably rebuild the artillery component of a new SP battery these days in a matter of three to six months, I sincerely doubt that one could get a sufficiently well trained maintenance team together that could look after the heavy tracks, the weapons systems, and the electronics and optics in under a year - more like two probably.

🍻


----------



## Fabius

MJP said:


> We had the Leo 2s since let's say 2010 ( there are nuances to that date as we had them before then but they were on loan)
> 
> Regardless in the decade and a bit since we fielded the Leo to we can still barely keep them running in a sustainable way. We have barely even addressed a number of the concerns including recovery,  transportation, overhaul and most importantly infrastructure needed to support tanks. We have we have stretched the technician line to the point that the Canadian Army almost individually manages technicians that are qualified to repair tanks.  We have no capacity to turn that all over and ramp up another line without some significant significant effort.
> 
> I know war might be that significant effort but we're not at that stage nor do I think we will go down that road anytime soon.


Its a sad commentary on the state of DND, the CAF and the Army when that is the reality. We can't sort out a relatively small capability on one item in a longer period of time than it took to mobilize the state and defeat the axis powers in WW2.
If we were a corporation that would result in the CEO, CFO, half the executive and likely some of the board of directors being fired/replaced. lol

What makes the F2025 plan more likely to succeed?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Fabius said:


> Its a sad commentary on the state of DND, the CAF and the Army when that is the reality. We can't sort out a relatively small capability on one item in a longer period of time than it took to mobilize the state and defeat the axis powers in WW2.
> If we were a corporation that would result in the CEO, CFO, half the executive and likely some of the board of directors being fired/replaced. lol


----------



## KevinB

Fabius said:


> Its a sad commentary on the state of DND, the CAF and the Army when that is the reality. We can't sort out a relatively small capability on one item in a longer period of time than it took to mobilize the state and defeat the axis powers in WW2.
> If we were a corporation that would result in the CEO, CFO, half the executive and likely some of the board of directors being fired/replaced. lol
> 
> What makes the F2025 plan more likely to succeed?


The glossy paper it was printed on...


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> The glossy paper it was printed on...


----------



## Colin Parkinson

How about a civilian manned facility where the tanks are rotated through frequently for upgrades and new parts, reducing the line maintenance burden on the military maintainers?


----------



## KevinB

Colin Parkinson said:


> How about a civilian manned facility where the tanks are rotated through frequently for upgrades and new parts, reducing the line maintenance burden on the military maintainers?


Like most other NATO countries do...


----------



## FJAG

Colin Parkinson said:


> How about a civilian manned facility where the tanks are rotated through frequently for upgrades and new parts, reducing the line maintenance burden on the military maintainers?


I kind of like military maintainers because you can take them to war with you. That said, a good static and well equipped civilian maintenance facility with a stable workforce is very valuable.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I kind of like military maintainers because you can take them to war with you. That said, a good static and well equipped civilian maintenance facility with a stable workforce is very valuable.
> 
> 🍻



Even in a production plant I prefer an idle, on line spare to waiting for a mechanic to fix a pump and get my plant up and running again.


----------



## dapaterson

Colin Parkinson said:


> How about a civilian manned facility where the tanks are rotated through frequently for upgrades and new parts, reducing the line maintenance burden on the military maintainers?


We could call it 202 workshop, and locate it in Longue Pointe.


----------



## Kirkhill

__





						Rheinmetall Canada - Services
					

Rheinmetall Canada’s services include long-term, in-service support for our broad range of solutions, as well as components and subassemblies production, and Industrial and technological benefits management.




					www.rheinmetall.ca


----------



## MJP

Colin Parkinson said:


> How about a civilian manned facility where the tanks are rotated through frequently for upgrades and new parts, reducing the line maintenance burden on the military maintainers?


That is exactly what they're doing. A decade and a half later than it probably should have been put in place.  Essentially because they burnt out every maintainer across the CAF that had a tank qualification and on top of it we just literally don't have the infrastructure to do that kind of repair and overhaul work.



dapaterson said:


> We could call it 202 workshop, and locate it in Longue Pointe.


Even they don't have the capacity to take care of the tanks.

As Kevin said, regular R&O at a civilian facility needs to be part and parcel of the program. Every other NATO country seems to grasp this concept except us.  We tried to do it on the cheap or more likely "Oh we'll just get to it later" and in doing so did some serious damage to the fleet and our people


----------



## Kirkhill

MJP said:


> That is exactly what they're doing. A decade and a half later than it probably should have been put in place.  Essentially because they burnt out every maintainer across the CAF that had a tank qualification and on top of it we just literally don't have the infrastructure to do that kind of repair and overhaul work.
> 
> 
> Even they don't have the capacity to take care of the tanks.
> 
> As Kevin said, regular R&O at a civilian facility needs to be part and parcel of the program. Every other NATO country seems to grasp this concept except us.  We tried to do it on the cheap or more likely "Oh we'll just get to it later" and in doing so did some serious damage to the fleet and our people



Rule of three applies - Grandma's version

One on, one in the wash, one in the drawer.

For every vehicle you field you need two more.  One being used, one being maintained and one in nice pristine condition ready to go.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MJP said:


> That is exactly what they're doing. A decade and a half later than it probably should have been put in place.  Essentially because they burnt out every maintainer across the CAF that had a tank qualification and on top of it we just literally don't have the infrastructure to do that kind of repair and overhaul work.
> 
> 
> Even they don't have the capacity to take care of the tanks.
> 
> As Kevin said, regular R&O at a civilian facility needs to be part and parcel of the program. Every other NATO country seems to grasp this concept except us.  We tried to do it on the cheap or more likely "Oh we'll just get to it later" and in doing so did some serious damage to the fleet and our people


Not to mention a mountain of spares, including extra engine packs, several extra turrets. With extra turrets and packs, you can upgrade those at your leisure, replace the packs, final drives, torsion bars, wheels and tracks, do some upgrades to the hull, drop the new turret in and out it goes, that turret goes for refurbishment and upgrades.
At first you be behind and eat a lot of parts, but eventually the operational rate of the tanks and the condition of the vehicles coming in will be improved, so your costs go down again.


----------



## Fabius

Any idea where the civilian maint facility will be?


----------



## MJP

Fabius said:


> Any idea where the civilian maint facility will be?


I don't think the project has gone to tender so unable to give definitive answer but likely either Germany or Bathhurst NB given that FFG is our main supplier for the tanks.  I think it will really boil down to if the NB facility can be upgraded (if needed) and the amount of CANCON needed on the project


----------



## Fabius

Thanks, interesting but not surprising that it’s no where close to where the tanks are based. Hopefully it will at least be in NB vs Germany.


----------



## MJP

Fabius said:


> Thanks, interesting but not surprising that it’s no where close to where the tanks are based. Hopefully it will at least be in NB vs Germany.


Many countries R&O lines are no where near where tanks are used, it is a red herring. Hell many heavy equip R&O lines are not near their customers or their customers are too spread out. Transport generally isn't that expensive or at least isn't the expensive aspect of R&O or overly hard to do. Only the CAF struggles to send heavy equipment to far flung places, industry seems to be able to do it with ease.

What would make no sense is to build infrastructure from scratch just to support closeness.  Unless forced too companies are smart and will leverage/upgrade already owned infra vice building new.


----------



## GK .Dundas

We really did miss out back in the day when we cancelled those 300 M1A1HA .But we really needed to.save that money and it's not like the Russians are really  a threat.


----------



## McG

MJP said:


> I don't think the project has gone to tender so unable to give definitive answer but likely either Germany or Bathhurst NB given that FFG is our main supplier for the tanks.  I think it will really boil down to if the NB facility can be upgraded (if needed) and the amount of CANCON needed on the project


Biggest down side of NB is that our AEV are so heavy that QC will not accept them as highway loads for months around spring and fall each year.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

GK .Dundas said:


> We really did miss out back in the day when we cancelled those 300 M1A1HA .But we really needed to.save that money and it's not like the Russians are really  a threat.


I bet a lot of people in DND/CAF are eating g crow over that prevailing sentiment.


----------



## MJP

McG said:


> Biggest down side of NB is that our AEV are so heavy that QC will not accept them as highway loads for months around spring and fall each year.


Been involved in that file just a little bit and Quebec is the extreme example, but even in Alberta you can't move the tanks back from Wainwright to Edmonton until spring road restrictions have been lifted.  There have been exceptions but it takes some finagling to get done.


----------



## markppcli

Solution - post the Strathconnas to Wainwright where they have access to a rail head and a suitable training area.


----------



## Rifleman62

With an apology.


----------



## dapaterson

Me: starts googling real estate to find a location to build a gravy factory in Wainwright.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Rule of three applies - Grandma's version
> 
> One on, one in the wash, one in the drawer.
> 
> For every vehicle you field you need two more.  One being used, one being maintained and one in nice pristine condition ready to go.


I think that's a bit of a myth that grew out of the Army's managed readiness system for both people and materiel. Back in the seventies (yeah, I know, here I go again) our regiments were equipped up to their full establishment. That equipment formed our training stock and was also what we were expected to deploy with. The big difference was that we were staffed to maintain it. Yes there was a small reserve of replacement equipment and yes, every once in a while you were short a gun out for maintenance or had to use the troop sergeant major's vehicle as your alternate command post because the real one was down, but if anything that taught us how to continue functioning with battle casualties.

If you have a proper scale of equipment and maintenance capability within the units, then you do not need that 2/3 overage. When people deploy, they take their gear (or if you're a subsequent roto, transfer your gear in Canada to the returning unit while you RIP onto theirs). Need to do large scale refurbishment or upgrades, cycle it through in sub-unit lots. Trade your old gear for new gear coming off the line. We did that several times with artillery refurbishments/upgrades.

I know that there are people who think that managed readiness and whole fleet management are critical. To this point I'm unconvinced. I'm part of the group that believes it only ensures that 2/3 of the force at any given time is "unready".

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I think that's a bit of a myth that grew out of the Army's managed readiness system for both people and materiel. Back in the seventies (yeah, I know, here I go again) our regiments were equipped up to their full establishment. That equipment formed our training stock and was also what we were expected to deploy with. The big difference was that we were staffed to maintain it. Yes there was a small reserve of replacement equipment and yes, every once in a while you were short a gun out for maintenance or had to use the troop sergeant major's vehicle as your alternate command post because the real one was down, but if anything that taught us how to continue functioning with battle casualties.
> 
> If you have a proper scale of equipment and maintenance capability within the units, then you do not need that 2/3 overage. When people deploy, they take their gear (or if you're a subsequent roto, transfer your gear in Canada to the returning unit while you RIP onto theirs). Need to do large scale refurbishment or upgrades, cycle it through in sub-unit lots. Trade your old gear for new gear coming off the line. We did that several times with artillery refurbishments/upgrades.
> 
> I know that there are people who think that managed readiness and whole fleet management are critical. To this point I'm unconvinced. I'm part of the group that believes it only ensures that 2/3 of the force at any given time is "unready".
> 
> 🍻



Nothing to do with managed readiness.

It has everything to do with life lessons learned, starting from the time I could haul on my jocks myself.

Learned from my English Grandmother, the First and Second World War nurse.

Divide your resources in three piles. 

What you are using.
What is ready to grab and use.
What you are repairing.

And replace with new gear when necessary.

I think the biggest disagreement we have is what constitutes a force, and what constitutes ready.

I believe you envisage a ready force as being a body fully trained and equipped to meet a particular set of circumstances at a moment's  notice.

My belief is that a force can be more broadly interpreted.  I would sooner have a body of the willing, able to pick up suitable arms made available to them in a timely fashion to deal with ANY situation.  

We agree on the need for your force.  And I agree it should be fully resourced.

But we disagree, I believe, on the value of broadening the envelope of responses available.  I believe there is value in that.

I am not an acolyte of efficiency.  I have spent enough time on other people's projects chasing 95% efficiency to know that 70% is the norm and, when suitably exploited, is capable of generating a profitable winning strategy.

Or in the words of a song:

"Two out of Three Ain't Bad".


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Nothing to do with managed readiness.
> 
> It has everything to do with life lessons learned, starting from the time I could haul on my jocks myself.
> 
> Learned from my English Grandmother, the First and Second World War nurse.
> 
> Divide your resources in three piles.
> 
> What you are using.  100% Reg Force Units?
> What is ready to grab and use.  70/30 Reg Force/Reserve Units?
> What you are repairing.  30/70 Reg Force/Reserve Units?


Not 3 x the kit for each unit but rather 3 x units with full kit in different stages of readiness?


----------



## Kirkhill

MJP said:


> Been involved in that file just a little bit and Quebec is the extreme example, but even in Alberta you can't move the tanks back from Wainwright to Edmonton until spring road restrictions have been lifted.  There have been exceptions but it takes some finagling to get done.



Most (all?) of the Prairies have seasonal movement restrictions on their gravel and grid roads.  Precisely because of what the Russians are experiencing in Ukraine.









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And this is how the Oil Patch works.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Not 3 x the kit for each unit but rather 3 x units with full kit in different stages of readiness?



Another viable way of tackling the problem.


----------



## MJP

Kirkhill said:


> Most (all?) of the Prairies have seasonal movement restrictions on their gravel and grid roads.  Precisely because of what the Russians are experiencing in Ukraine.


They do but we generally don't try and move tanks across any of the other provinces in the spring only in Alberta.  Which is why I  provided that very specific example.  

As McG points out Quebec is a nightmare, pretty much year-round though


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Nothing to do with managed readiness.
> 
> It has everything to do with life lessons learned, starting from the time I could haul on my jocks myself.
> 
> Learned from my English Grandmother, the First and Second World War nurse.
> 
> Divide your resources in three piles.
> 
> What you are using.
> What is ready to grab and use.
> What you are repairing.
> 
> And replace with new gear when necessary.
> 
> I think the biggest disagreement we have is what constitutes a force, and what constitutes ready.
> 
> I believe you envisage a ready force as being a body fully trained and equipped to meet a particular set of circumstances at a moment's  notice.
> 
> My belief is that a force can be more broadly interpreted.  I would sooner have a body of the willing, able to pick up suitable arms made available to them in a timely fashion to deal with ANY situation.
> 
> We agree on the need for your force.  And I agree it should be fully resourced.
> 
> But we disagree, I believe, on the value of broadening the envelope of responses available.  I believe there is value in that.
> 
> I am not an acolyte of efficiency.  I have spent enough time on other people's projects chasing 95% efficiency to know that 70% is the norm and, when suitably exploited, is capable of generating a profitable winning strategy.
> 
> Or in the words of a song:
> 
> "Two out of Three Ain't Bad".


With the exception of "what you are repairing" we're in agreement but that's not how the CAF is doing things.

I do agree that one pile of your kit should be to equip the full-timers for day to day training and deployment.

I also agree that there should be a second pile of kit which equips a reserve force (regardless of whether its an Army ResF or a territorial force) which is held "in reserve" and only used for training occasionally and is intended to expand the full-time force when required.

I do not think that needs to be on a 1:1 ratio. It could be 1:6 or 3:1 depending on an analysis of what is needed and what we can afford.

As to the "what you are repairing" portion, I also disagree with the 1/3 ratio. Refurbishment needs vary depending on the equipment and how it is used. "Reserve" equipment undergoes much less wear and tear and requires much less refurbishment. Equipment from units with a proper running maintenance program do not need factory level refurbishment as frequently as ones that are run into the ground without line maintenance. Rifles require less refurbishment than tanks. And so on. Major upgrades of even the heaviest equipment can be done in small batches over time. This is preferable as a smaller maintenance facility will then have a long term guaranteed workflow allowing for a stable and knowledgeable workforce. Very little equipment has a guaranteed lifecycle that fits neatly into a 1 in 3 ratio. It's a case by case basis.

I'm not arguing with the three concepts - I'm arguing with the rule of three as a proper ratio.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Nothing to do with managed readiness.
> 
> It has everything to do with life lessons learned, starting from the time I could haul on my jocks myself.
> 
> Learned from my English Grandmother, the First and Second World War nurse.
> 
> Divide your resources in three piles.
> 
> What you are using.
> What is ready to grab and use.
> What you are repairing.
> 
> And replace with new gear when necessary.
> 
> I think the biggest disagreement we have is what constitutes a force, and what constitutes ready.
> 
> I believe you envisage a ready force as being a body fully trained and equipped to meet a particular set of circumstances at a moment's  notice.
> 
> My belief is that a force can be more broadly interpreted.  I would sooner have a body of the willing, able to pick up suitable arms made available to them in a timely fashion to deal with ANY situation.
> 
> We agree on the need for your force.  And I agree it should be fully resourced.
> 
> But we disagree, I believe, on the value of broadening the envelope of responses available.  I believe there is value in that.
> 
> I am not an acolyte of efficiency.  I have spent enough time on other people's projects chasing 95% efficiency to know that 70% is the norm and, when suitably exploited, is capable of generating a profitable winning strategy.
> 
> Or in the words of a song:
> 
> "Two out of Three Ain't Bad".



Further to the above.

I worked a lot with Japanese companies.  

One of the differences between their style of doing things and the Euro-American way of doing things was that they were comfortable operating plants with a lot of small units.   The Americans tended to put all their eggs in one basket and go with one large piece of kit.   The Europeans were somewhere in the middle.

The American position was to create one highly efficient, low cost, low manpower, low skill plant.  The would create a plant out of a single line of highly efficient pieces.  This plan is profitable when it works but it highly vulnerable to the unexpected.

The Japanese position was to create multiple parallel lines of equipment that was inherently less efficient, cost more, required more labour and demanded a lot of skill of the operators.  Profits were good despite high labour costs and frequent breakdowns.  But the plant continued to operate, working around any temporary bottlenecks.  Regardless of what happened the plant continued to produce, raw material and production contracts were honoured without pause.  They were reliable partners.

The European position bridged that of the Americans and the Japanese.  They generally applied the rule of three.

They built three parallel lines, each operating at 66% of design capacity.  Then they scheduled cleaning and maintenance times and took one of the three lines off line for a limited time and relied on the other two to maintain production flow at 66%.  Warehousing managed the surges as lines went in and out of service.

In the event that one of the three lines broke down unexpectedly, and a repair could not be eventuated before the Warehouse lost inventory, then the other two lines would speed up, for the duration, to operate at 100% of capacity.  Once all three lines were back up and running and inventory renewed then the lines and the operators would return to loafing at 66% of capacity.

3x 100 = 300 = Max Capacity
3x 66 = 200 = Design Capacity
2x 100 = 200 = Design Capacity in extremis.

Different ways of tackling the same problem.  All have their merits and all are exploited, with variations, by successful companies.


----------



## Kirkhill

MJP said:


> They do but we generally don't try and move tanks across any of the other provinces in the spring only in Alberta.  Which is why I  provided that very specific example.
> 
> As McG points out Quebec is a nightmare, pretty much year-round though



Seen. Sorry for misreading your intent.

As to Quebec.  Many companies I have worked with limit the places that they will sign contracts and honour local law.  Two of the most common, in North America are Louisiana and Quebec.  It is only partly due to Code Civile.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> With the exception of "what you are repairing" we're in agreement but that's not how the CAF is doing things.
> 
> I do agree that one pile of your kit should be to equip the full-timers for day to day training and deployment.
> 
> I also agree that there should be a second pile of kit which equips a reserve force (regardless of whether its an Army ResF or a territorial force) which is held "in reserve" and only used for training occasionally and is intended to expand the full-time force when required.
> 
> I do not think that needs to be on a 1:1 ratio. It could be 1:6 or 3:1 depending on an analysis of what is needed and what we can afford.
> 
> As to the "what you are repairing" portion, I also disagree with the 1/3 ratio. Refurbishment needs vary depending on the equipment and how it is used. "Reserve" equipment undergoes much less wear and tear and requires much less refurbishment. Equipment from units with a proper running maintenance program do not need factory level refurbishment as frequently as ones that are run into the ground without line maintenance. Rifles require less refurbishment than tanks. And so on. Major upgrades of even the heaviest equipment can be done in small batches over time. This is preferable as a smaller maintenance facility will then have a long term guaranteed workflow allowing for a stable and knowledgeable workforce. Very little equipment has a guaranteed lifecycle that fits neatly into a 1 in 3 ratio. It's a case by case basis.
> 
> I'm not arguing with the three concepts - I'm arguing with the rule of three as a proper ratio.
> 
> 🍻



I agree with your point on the numbers and ratios.

I will still stipulate that regardless of how many pairs of drawers you have in each pile, it helps to divide things into three piles.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Further to the above.
> 
> I worked a lot with Japanese companies.
> 
> One of the differences between their style of doing things and the Euro-American way of doing things was that they were comfortable operating plants with a lot of small units.   The Americans tended to put all their eggs in one basket and go with one large piece of kit.   The Europeans were somewhere in the middle.
> 
> The American position was to create one highly efficient, low cost, low manpower, low skill plant.  The would create a plant out of a single line of highly efficient pieces.  This plan is profitable when it works but it highly vulnerable to the unexpected.
> 
> The Japanese position was to create multiple parallel lines of equipment that was inherently less efficient, cost more, required more labour and demanded a lot of skill of the operators.  Profits were good despite high labour costs and frequent breakdowns.  But the plant continued to operate, working around any temporary bottlenecks.  Regardless of what happened the plant continued to produce, raw material and production contracts were honoured without pause.  They were reliable partners.
> 
> The European position bridged that of the Americans and the Japanese.  They generally applied the rule of three.
> 
> They built three parallel lines, each operating at 66% of design capacity.  Then they scheduled cleaning and maintenance times and took one of the three lines off line for a limited time and relied on the other two to maintain production flow at 66%.  Warehousing managed the surges as lines went in and out of service.
> 
> In the event that one of the three lines broke down unexpectedly, and a repair could not be eventuated before the Warehouse lost inventory, then the other two lines would speed up, for the duration, to operate at 100% of capacity.  Once all three lines were back up and running and inventory renewed then the lines and the operators would return to loafing at 66% of capacity.
> 
> 3x 100 = 300 = Max Capacity
> 3x 66 = 200 = Design Capacity
> 2x 100 = 200 = Design Capacity in extremis.
> 
> Different ways of tackling the same problem.  All have their merits and all are exploited, with variations, by successful companies.


All three of those systems are workable - even the American one which could have flexibility through excess capacity in its one plant or through shift management. They are ways of allocating cost and risk.

That's different though from Grandma's rule of three described above.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> All three of those systems are workable - even the American one which could have flexibility through excess capacity in its one plant or through shift management. They are ways of allocating cost and risk.
> 
> That's different though from Grandma's rule of three described above.
> 
> 🍻



Perception I guess.

Cheers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

MJP said:


> Been involved in that file just a little bit and Quebec is the extreme example, but even in Alberta you can't move the tanks back from Wainwright to Edmonton until spring road restrictions have been lifted.  There have been exceptions but it takes some finagling to get done.



But if we take the train....


----------



## GK .Dundas

As per grandma's rule three That just triggered a memory. I seem to recall reading that when Guy Simonds was CDS we supposed to purchase either 850 Centurions or work our way up to that number. 
But treasury balked at the cost.


----------



## FJAG

GK .Dundas said:


> As per grandma's rule three That just triggered a memory. I seem to recall reading that when Guy Simonds was CDS we supposed to purchase either 850 Centurions or work our way up to that number.
> But treasury balked at the cost.


I do not recall that number but knowing Simonds it's not illogical at all. My favourite quote of his - one which we seem to have lost sight of over time particulalry as it relates to the ResF is:



> In 1972 Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds put it this way: “The armed forces should primarily be trained and equipped for the possibility of conflict with a first-class power - the most severe testing they may have to face. It has been proven over and over again, that well trained and well disciplined military forces, trained primarily for major warfare, can easily and effectively adapt to lesser roles of aid to civil power or peacekeeping. The reverse is not the case.” 2



At the time that he was CGS in the early Fifties, there was a great expansion in the RegF to it's Cold War ceiling. At the time there were significant numbers of Militia personnel whose equipment was pretty much of the same type and quality as the RegF - Sherman tanks, 25 pounders and motorized infantry. The artillery transitioned at that time to the 105mm and 155 mm as common standards for both components. When the newly regenerated armoured corps stood up and Centurions were purchased initially in 1952, the Militia was still running Shermans. By 1971 we had just over 300 Centurions in various Marks in four full RegF regiments. Unfortunately just before that time, the Militia armoured units were losing their tanks and their tank role in favour of recce.

Four or five hundred additional Centurions would have complemented the existing Militia artillery and infantry (which was heavily 3/4 ton truck bound motorized units) structure of the day. Without the Centurions the "deployable reserve" concept really started to fall apart.

🍻


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Most (all?) of the Prairies have seasonal movement restrictions on their gravel and grid roads. Precisely because of what the Russians are experiencing in Ukraine.


Yeah, our AEV are so heavy that they are not allowed to be carried over paved roads in the black out seasons.


----------



## GK .Dundas

FJAG said:


> I do not recall that number but knowing Simonds it's not illogical at all. My favourite quote of his - one which we seem to have lost sight of over time particulalry as it relates to the ResF is:
> 
> 
> 
> At the time that he was CGS in the early Fifties, there was a great expansion in the RegF to it's Cold War ceiling. At the time there were significant numbers of Militia personnel whose equipment was pretty much of the same type and quality as the RegF - Sherman tanks, 25 pounders and motorized infantry. The artillery transitioned at that time to the 105mm and 155 mm as common standards for both components. When the newly regenerated armoured corps stood up and Centurions were purchased initially in 1952, the Militia was still running Shermans. By 1971 we had just over 300 Centurions in various Marks in four full RegF regiments. Unfortunately just before that time, the Militia armoured units were losing their tanks and their tank role in favour of recce.
> 
> Four or five hundred additional Centurions would have complemented the existing Militia artillery and infantry (which was heavily 3/4 ton truck bound motorized units) structure of the day. Without the Centurions the "deployable reserve" concept really started to fall apart.
> 
> 🍻


one of my goals (Utterly unobtainable of course lack the room to put it together much less display. ) was a what if model display of a militia armour unit sort of an a armoured cavalry .
upgraded centurioun and lynx and some 74 pattern jeeps.
We'd used tank based recce during the war and it tended to fascinate me.


----------



## suffolkowner

a buddy sent me some pictures of a bunch of our leos on the move today. So we can and do move them. An exercise upcoming or maintenance?


----------



## MJP

suffolkowner said:


> a buddy sent me some pictures of a bunch of our leos on the move today. So we can and do move them. An exercise upcoming or maintenance?


If it was on rails likely coming from Gagetown to Wx for Ex MR.  If I understand the intent for once 1CMBG/LdSH(RC) are not destroying their tanks further supporting MR, although unknown if that charity extends to the ARVs and AEVs in 1 CMBG


----------



## KevinB

2 is 1, 1 is none.


----------



## suffolkowner

MJP said:


> If it was on rails likely coming from Gagetown to Wx for Ex MR.  If I understand the intent for once 1CMBG/LdSH(RC) are not destroying their tanks further supporting MR, although unknown if that charity extends to the ARVs and AEVs in 1 CMBG


yes via rail


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Your friend was fortunate enough to see C Sqn RCD.


----------



## FJAG

GK .Dundas said:


> one of my goals (Utterly unobtainable of course lack the room to put it together much less display. ) was a what if model display of a militia armour unit sort of an a armoured cavalry .
> upgraded centurioun and lynx and some 74 pattern jeeps.
> We'd used tank based recce during the war and it tended to fascinate me.


Those were all runners during my days. I was part of the anti-Lynx crowd because I always really liked the Ferrets more. I had a Ferret sneak up on me one night when I was inspecting one of my guard posts during the Oktoberfest in Montreal in 1970. How quiet it was impressed the hell out of me.  Lynx don't sneak notwithstanding their name.  

🍻


----------



## GK .Dundas

Tell me have you ever been inside a ferret ?


----------



## lenaitch

Ontario to Improve Job Protection for Reservists:





__





						Ontario Newsroom
					






					news.ontario.ca


----------



## daftandbarmy

GK .Dundas said:


> Tell me have you ever been inside a ferret ?



I have.

Well, to be honest, as I'm over 6 ft tall I was able to get part of me in a Ferret


----------



## FJAG

GK .Dundas said:


> Tell me have you ever been inside a ferret ?


I have not. But have stood beside one a few times and looked inside and if your point is that they are tiny and cramped than I heartily agree. (I have tried to squeeze into the driver's seat of a bren gun carrier once and I think that's even tighter. This is why tankers should be men or women under five foot six and weighing under 140 lbs. The Ferret did have room for a 42/45 set in those days so that should give enough room for a microwave or a small electronics stack these days.

Actually, if I were king, I'd buy (or better yet, build) these for our ResF recce folks.


----------



## GK .Dundas

On my yes , if you're going to do mud recce with wheels that is probably the best way you can do it.


----------



## KevinB

Or maybe the thing the US MIL buys a ton of.




__





						Joint Light Tactical Vehicle | JLTV | Oshkosh Defense
					

The Oshkosh Defense Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is designed for protection and extreme mobility in any mission.




					oshkoshdefense.com


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Or maybe the thing the US MIL buys a ton of.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Joint Light Tactical Vehicle | JLTV | Oshkosh Defense
> 
> 
> The Oshkosh Defense Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is designed for protection and extreme mobility in any mission.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> oshkoshdefense.com


A JLTV comes in at around 22,000 lbs (makes you kind of wonder about the "L" in "JLTV"). A VBL at around 8,000. I expect a lot of that weight moves the JTLV up from the Stanag Level 1 armour of the VBL. I 'm not really sure what level the JLTV comes in at - I saw a foreign sale talk about Level 2 but I think there may be options for higher levels.

My guess is that a VBL also comes in at a lot less than the $1/2 million that a JTLV costs.

But let me simply tell you how shallow I really am; I just think that the VBL looks neat and falls into my concept of the sneak and peak element of reconnaissance. Two or three guys (at least one trained as an FO/JTAC) a tiny, quiet truck, a small suite of sensors, a UAV and radios connected to an FSCC/TACP connected to batteries of AUAVs, guns, rockets, planes and helicopters. To me, that's recce - all the other stuff with tanks and ATGMs etc is cavalry. Whole different role.

Make it a hybrid unit with the FO/JTAC RegF and the rest of the crew ResF. Bob's your uncle.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> A JLTV comes in at around 22,000 lbs (makes you kind of wonder about the "L" in "JLTV"). A VBL at around 8,000. I expect a lot of that weight moves the JTLV up from the Stanag Level 1 armour of the VBL. I 'm not really sure what level the JLTV comes in at - I saw a foreign sale talk about Level 2 but I think there may be options for higher levels.
> 
> My guess is that a VBL also comes in at a lot less than the $1/2 million that a JTLV costs.
> 
> But let me simply tell you how shallow I really am; I just think that the VBL looks neat and falls into my concept of the sneak and peak element of reconnaissance. Two or three guys (at least one trained as an FO/JTAC) a tiny, quiet truck, a small suite of sensors, a UAV and radios connected to an FSCC/TACP connected to batteries of AUAVs, guns, rockets, planes and helicopters. To me, that's recce - all the other stuff with tanks and ATGMs etc is cavalry. Whole different role.
> 
> Make it a hybrid unit with the FO/JTAC RegF and the rest of the crew ResF. Bob's your uncle.



Scimitar was a nice ride... not that I'm an armoured recce bod or anything:









						FV107 Scimitar - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## GK .Dundas

Altho' given my druthers I'd  like the Wiesel family.


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:


> Scimitar was a nice ride... not that I'm an armoured recce bod or anything:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> FV107 Scimitar - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


There is however something to be said for a vehicle that will drive over a deep snow covered trail that a man on foot will sink into up to his waist .
And naturally enough it comes with a  vessel boiling.


----------



## Kirkhill

GK .Dundas said:


> There is however something to be said for a vehicle that will drive over a deep snow covered trail that a man on foot will sink into up to his waist .
> And naturally enough it comes with a  vessel boiling.



I seem to recall a typically Canadian either/or debate back in the 70s.

Leos or Scimitars.

IIRC we ended up leasing Leos and buying Cougars.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GK .Dundas said:


> There is however something to be said for a vehicle that will drive over a deep snow covered trail that a man on foot will sink into up to his waist .
> And naturally enough it comes with a  vessel boiling.



It was a handy little range of light armoured vehicles, and were 'floaty' enough to get over some types of boggy ground and snow:


----------



## Dale Denton

Does anyone have any sources for the Canadian M1A1 offer? News to me.

This seems cold but, perhaps the gov't could let it be known at a certain time in a possible Ukraine Army rebuild that we offer up our Leopard Fleets in their current state? If Ukraine is independent at the end of this, Europe would continue to escalate and rearm Ukraine after the war to be a bigger deterrent as NATO membership and standardization is finalized (Leo 2s would help this). They get a nice cheap/free fleet of Leo 2s from other nations too i'm sure.

We could take the chance to develop/reorganise/rebuild a "Canadian Cavalry", complete with Canadian (ex-USMC) M1CAs 'Rams', and an IFV (with variants) for depth. Make them visually distinct for identification and Canadianize them / help industry. Get a cheap industrial capability and job creator in X province with another Canadian GDLS subsidiary plant that would do XYZ level maintenance and repair of our new M1 fleet with commitment to US-based contracts for long-term maintenance and repair (lord knows we'll keep them long...). Heck, make that GDLS plant develop hybrid electric propulsion or something. GDLS invests long-term into Canada again, securing a market for investors with long-term commitments. CAF gets a renewed fleet with a close-to-home logistical footprint. America sees a willing Canada, Europe and NATO would notice the contribution size of the Leopards for our political gain.

IMHO, maybe it's time for our vehicle fleets to be closer in similarity to the US? Something designed and built in the US has simply got to be easier to maintain than something built in Germany.

Crew swaps with Australian and US M1s. A cheap mix in with the US's M1 storage in Europe, and crew exchanges in Europe too. Maybe take a leading role in the rebuilding of a NATO-Ukraine armour rebuild/training school with our old Leopards too.

All this for the cost of how many M1s the US has laying around that they'd love to sell?? Buy 300+ with batches in Aus, Ger, and Ukr.


----------



## MilEME09

Dale Denton said:


> Does anyone have any sources for the Canadian M1A1 offer? News to me.
> 
> This seems cold but, perhaps the gov't could let it be known at a certain time in a possible Ukraine Army rebuild that we offer up our Leopard Fleets in their current state? If Ukraine is independent at the end of this, Europe would continue to escalate and rearm Ukraine after the war to be a bigger deterrent as NATO membership and standardization is finalized (Leo 2s would help this). They get a nice cheap/free fleet of Leo 2s from other nations too i'm sure.
> 
> We could take the chance to develop/reorganise/rebuild a "Canadian Cavalry", complete with Canadian (ex-USMC) M1CAs 'Rams', and an IFV (with variants) for depth. Make them visually distinct for identification and Canadianize them / help industry. Get a cheap industrial capability and job creator in X province with another Canadian GDLS subsidiary plant that would do XYZ level maintenance and repair of our new M1 fleet with commitment to US-based contracts for long-term maintenance and repair (lord knows we'll keep them long...). Heck, make that GDLS plant develop hybrid electric propulsion or something. GDLS invests long-term into Canada again, securing a market for investors with long-term commitments. CAF gets a renewed fleet with a close-to-home logistical footprint. America sees a willing Canada, Europe and NATO would notice the contribution size of the Leopards for our political gain.
> 
> IMHO, maybe it's time for our vehicle fleets to be closer in similarity to the US? Something designed and built in the US has simply got to be easier to maintain than something built in Germany.
> 
> Crew swaps with Australian and US M1s. A cheap mix in with the US's M1 storage in Europe, and crew exchanges in Europe too. Maybe take a leading role in the rebuilding of a NATO-Ukraine armour rebuild/training school with our old Leopards too.
> 
> All this for the cost of how many M1s the US has laying around that they'd love to sell?? Buy 300+ with batches in Aus, Ger, and Ukr.


 If it's a real offer, I bet it's more NATO shell game, our tanks to Poland,polish PT91s to Ukraine, we get new M1s.


----------



## Blackadder1916

daftandbarmy said:


> I have.
> 
> Well, to be honest, as I'm over 6 ft tall I was able to get part of me in a Ferret



Seems an appropriate link


----------



## GK .Dundas

MilEME09 said:


> If it's a real offer, I bet it's more NATO shell game, our tanks to Poland,polish PT91s to Ukraine, we get new M1s.


The only Abrams offer that I am aware of i s our purchase plan in the early eighties cancelled some time in 83 - 84.


----------



## MilEME09

GK .Dundas said:


> The only Abrams offer that I am aware of i s our purchase plan in the early eighties cancelled some time in 83 - 84.


There was also the offer during the first gulf war


----------



## FJAG

Dale Denton said:


> IMHO, maybe it's time for our vehicle fleets to be closer in similarity to the US? Something designed and built in the US has simply got to be easier to maintain than something built in Germany.


Historically we've been a bit of a lost child. Up until the end of WW2 we mimicked the British in both equipment and establishments. When Korea and then NATO came we had a choice of which way to go. For many reasons (chief among them that Simonds was an anglophile) we chose to stay British, joined the Commonwealth Division in Korea and the BAOR in Germany.

We did do some moves at that time to become more American. Our guns went from 25 pounders to American 105 and 155 millimeter. As did our vehicle fleet with the 1/4, 3/4, 2 1/2 and 5 ton lines. Our jets became Sabres and then Starfighters. But we still bought Centurions while a bit later we went to American M113 APCs and M109 self propelled artillery. We were starting to draw away from commonality with the Brits but didn't go whole hog to Americanize. The 1960s started the move to a unique Canadian identity which made us a bit of a mongrel in the weapons holding and acquisition process - in the seventies we even bought German tanks.

I'm with you. I think we should take cognizance of the fact that we share a continent with the US and we should, as much as possible, integrate ourselves in their defence industry and organizational structure. I'm not saying give up our independence or operational control to the US but consciously decide to create a common standard. If it ever comes to a defence of North America (which is highly unlikely but not a zero probability) then particulalry our Air Force and Navy ought to be able to interoperate - they already do on a tactical level but my mind is turning more to logistics in that we have common weapons and command and control links so that joint sustainment and operations are seamless)

As far as the Army is concerned, I sincerely doubt that we will ever do a major expeditionary operation where the US isn't the major partner. Here again we would be greatly served if there was the ability to share a common logistics and command and control system. I'd go even further. I think our doctrine is incoherent. I can't understand why we try to develop everything from first principles when someone else with much greater resources has already done so. The US Army is built on modularity based on brigades. Why do we not simply adopt the Brigade Combat Team, artillery brigade, sustainment brigade etc etc construct for both our RegF and ResF right down to equipment, manning and tactics so that we can seamlessly integrate fully into a US division or corps. It would give us a clear direction as to how to arm and train instead of floundering around reinventing the wheel every few years.

Frankly, there is enough major US equipment sitting in storage in the desert down south to completely equip the Canadian Army several times over. It would need some refurbishment and upgrading over time but that's doable.

Yup. We'd lose a bit of control and a bit of our national identity but in the long run we would gain so much in interoperability and efficiency that it would far outweigh that.

$.02


----------



## KevinB

GK .Dundas said:


> The only Abrams offer that I am aware of i s our purchase plan in the early eighties cancelled some time in 83 - 84.


Conventional Forces Europe Treaty Drawdown - the US effectively offered an Armored DIV worth of Equipment to the CAF if it stayed in Europe.
  I've put the link here before, I'm too lazy at the moment to go dig it out again.


----------



## suffolkowner

Yes I've read of multiple offers over the decades for Abrams/Bradleys/and hummers that were apparently turned down due to operating costs


----------



## GK .Dundas

Oops my bad!
I'd forgotten about those.


----------



## KevinB

suffolkowner said:


> Yes I've read of multiple offers over the decades for Abrams/Bradleys/and hummers that were apparently turned down due to operating costs


CAF didn’t want to put 80% of the regs in Germany and already wanted to pull 4 CMBG, so the idea of 1 BDE active and the rest reserve/fly over wasn’t considered.  

Hindsight’s always 20/20


----------



## MilEME09

suffolkowner said:


> Yes I've read of multiple offers over the decades for Abrams/Bradleys/and hummers that were apparently turned down due to operating costs


Cost is always a factor because our defense apparatus is so inefficient most of our dollars are eaten by the red tape.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Cost is always a factor because our defense apparatus is so inefficient most of our dollars are eaten by the red tape.


And manpower costs. Man, we've got to break the back of the manpower cost issue.


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> And manpower costs. Man, we've got to break the back of the manpower cost issue.


Give the officers the same working conditions as the enlisted, half will VR in a week


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Give the officers the same working conditions as the enlisted, half will VR in a week


That would be part of my answer for breaking the manpower costs - cull the leadership herd; especially the cubicle denizens.

😉


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> And manpower costs. Man, we've got to break the back of the manpower cost issue.



Buy Manpads and ATGMs and Rifles and have monthly field days where the public gets to shoot at targets.

We used to call them Wappenshaws in Scotland.  But they were a mediaeval institution.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

suffolkowner said:


> Yes I've read of multiple offers over the decades for Abrams/Bradleys/and hummers that were apparently turned down due to operating costs


Not to mention the German offer of Leo2's and Marders in Shilo, with parts, shops, etc


----------



## MilEME09

Colin Parkinson said:


> Not to mention the German offer of Leo2's and Marders in Shilo, with parts, shops, etc


We gotta pick a chassis and stick with it, if we use Leopards, get PzH2000s as SPGs


----------



## KevinB

MilEME09 said:


> We gotta pick a chassis and stick with it, if we use Leopards, get PzH2000s as SPGs


100 odd vehicles is not a fleet.
   I am a tad biased - but I would look south - as frankly it's easier to drive/fly stuff from here to you, than any other country could supply you parts.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The Biggest challenge with the M1's is keeping them fuelled, the Chieftain (Nick Moran) mentioned this point that to get the most out of this platform you need a good logistical system for bringing up fuel in large quantities. Now things have improved since they add APU's so they are not sitting their sucking 60 gals an hour at idle for 12 hours a day. That's the challenge with a turbine, it's thirsty all the time.


----------



## FJAG

If anyone is still wondering why I dislike the M777 as being part of a mechanized force rather than a niche gun in a light force, here's what happened to a Russian D-30 (122mm) battery.



> __ https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=368349041576618



'Nuff said.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> If anyone is still wondering why I dislike the M777 as being part of a mechanized force rather than a niche gun in a light force, here's what happened to a Russian D-30 (122mm) battery.
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻


I mean who'd have guess that non Armored systems would be so vulnerable - it's almost like the CAF never had M109's before


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> If anyone is still wondering why I dislike the M777 as being part of a mechanized force rather than a niche gun in a light force, here's what happened to a Russian D-30 (122mm) battery.
> 
> 
> 
> 'Nuff said.
> 
> 🍻



That is an impressive stonking.

It looks like it might have been rocket type counter battery fire?


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I mean who'd have guess that non Armored systems would be so vulnerable - it's almost like the CAF never had M109's before


The interesting part about this scene is that the guns themselves appear generally undamaged and there are no significant impact craters to be seen while all the vehicles are cut to shreds. Looking in from a distance at a not very sharp image it strikes me this position was hit by a lot of airburst (gun or rocket) and perhaps more into the wagon lines than the gun line. 

Incidentally I count nine guns and it looked like another being towed away in the distance. Russian batteries come in sixes so they may have adopted a few guns from another or two batteries. This might be the remnants of a battalion.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Scimitar was a nice ride... not that I'm an armoured recce bod or anything:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> FV107 Scimitar - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


Speaking of Scimitar yesterday:



> Latvian CVR-T Fleet on ALLIED SPIRIT 22 | Joint Forces News
> 
> 
> Latvia deployed a fleet of former British CVR-T or Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked) armour on ALLIED SPIRIT 22 in Germany,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.joint-forces.com


----------



## GK .Dundas

FJAG said:


> The interesting part about this scene is that the guns themselves appear generally undamaged and there are no significant impact craters to be seen while all the vehicles are cut to shreds. Looking in from a distance at a not very sharp image it strikes me this position was hit by a lot of airburst (gun or rocket) and perhaps more into the wagon lines than the gun line.
> 
> Incidentally I count nine guns and it looked like another being towed away in the distance. Russian batteries come in sixes so they may have adopted a few guns from another or two batteries. This might be the remnants of a battalion.
> 
> 🍻


Cluster Bombs and a fair number of them being airburst if not all.
Stupidest thing we've ever done was signing that damned treaty. That and the ap land mine treaty.
What is the point of a treaty if we're the only ones who actually follow it ?


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Speaking of Scimitar yesterday:



Whoa... upgraded with a Cummins diesel engine.

Nice


----------



## KevinB

GK .Dundas said:


> Cluster Bombs and a fair number of them being airburst if not all.
> Stupidest thing we've ever done was signing that damned treaty. That and the ap land mine treaty.
> What is the point of a treaty if we're the only ones who actually follow it ?








						Convention on Cluster Munitions – UNODA
					






					www.un.org
				




FWIW - you can use an airbusting sub-bomblet - the way the cluster munition treaty was written, it only affects scatterable submunitions from aircraft.
  NATO has a number of "Cluster" munitions in it's inventories - that are not banned by convention.

It also doesn't apply to rocket or tube artillery.

Convention+on+Cluster+Munitions+E.pdf
_1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: (a) Use cluster munitions;
Article 1_

_(b)  Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;_
_(c)  Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention._
_2. Paragraph 1 of this Article applies, mutatis mutandis, to explosive bomblets that are specifically designed to be dispersed or released from dispensers affixed to aircraft.
3. This Convention does not apply to mines.

2. “Cluster munition” means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following:_

_(a)  A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role;_
_(b)  A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects;_
_(c)  A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:

(i)  Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
(ii)  Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
(iii)  Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object;
(iv)  Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism;
(v)  Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self- deactivating feature;
_
_3. “Explosive submunition” means a conventional munition that in order to perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact;
4. “Failed cluster munition” means a cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so;
5. “Unexploded submunition” means an explosive submunition that has been dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and has failed to explode as intended;_


----------



## McG

Mortar guy said:


> Awesome discussion here. I note that COA 3.1 was selected and we are losing light battalions - well we are really losing half of the Reg F infantry (27 rifle coys to 12) in the Army. We will be left with 6 x 'mech' bns with 2 x coys each (along with a ARes coy). The Army seems to gain a PSYOPS Bn and a FP Bn. Oh, and CANSOF gets a LIB that they don't want. Am I right in feeling this is the stupidest possible COA?





McG said:


> I have not seen anything saying this Bn is being given to CANSOF.  Instead of three light battalions done half-assed, the Army is saying it will do one right ... which should mean properly structured resourced CS and CSS to go with it for the first time since the 90's.  There is a role for such a unit, we just need a little institutional discipline to not allow individual COs to prance-off after a personal fantasy of pseudo-SOF.





Mortar guy said:


> OK, so "gets a LIB" is unclear. On the presentations I have seen it shows the one and only LIB as "earmarked for SOF support" - albeit under CCSB. Also, the structure presented is hardly properly structured and resourced - small rifle sections, small weapons platoons in the rifle coys, small mor pls (only 6 tubes), small DFS platoon (3 sects vice doctrinal 6). Don't let anyone blow smoke where they shouldn't - the RCIC is being decimated for no appreciable gain in combat capability anywhere. Our Army will be hollowed out so we can build faddish, boutique units that are too precious or specialized to deploy - all enablers and no enabled.





Infanteer said:


> I'll throw the challenge out to those arguing that the Divisions/Areas/Whatever in the CA are superflous.  If your brigades are focused on managing the generation of combat power, and the CA is focused on corporate requirements, business planning, and force development, why would you eliminate a layer of HQ that handles the following (paraphrasing from a previous experienced poster):
> 
> Provides proper "span of control" to the CA's numerous Regular and Reserve formations;
> Provides a regional structure for Dom Ops, and speaks with the provinces;
> Manages infrastructure and interfaces with Real Property Management;
> Manages the Reserves and much of its administration.
> If you think this is going to be centrally managed from Ottawa, or handled by a CMBG, then I'd counter that your argument fails to consider what each echelon of command does from day-to-day.











						'We've got to grow': Anand says CAF must recruit more troops amid heightened global uncertainty
					

National Defence Minister Anita Anand says there is an urgent need to attract more Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel amid a 'clear and present' danger to the rules based international order.




					www.ctvnews.ca
				



So, with the launch of Putin's war in Ukraine, has the situation changed on the Army's F2025 estimate? Even recognizing that new capabilities are required and the existing structure spreads PYs so thin that it is perpetually hollow, is the elimination of an infantry battalion politically viable in the current climate?


----------



## dapaterson

I'd invite the three regimental colonels to the Citadel, feed them a nice goat stew, and explain that the current situation with our Russian battalions that are culminated before they do anything is unsustainable.


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:


> I'd invite the three regimental colonels to the Citadel, feed them a nice goat stew, and explain that the current situation with our Russian battalions that are culminated before they do anything is unsustainable.


I think that argument can be made within the Army, but will the Canadian public/media accept that proposal right now?


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> I think that argument can be made within the Army, but will the Canadian public/media accept that proposal right now?



Do you really think the Canadian public really know or care?

Some of the people I've talked to recently are convinced that we are going to start conscripting people to send to the front, by about next week. 

My attempt to share with them the spotted history of conscription in Canada didn't seem to allay their fears by much.


----------



## GK .Dundas

I've had variants of this conversation with various people over the years.
The understanding of this Country 's history is utterly appalling. Assuming that they have any knowledge whatsoever.
I have a strong urge to go through this Country's provincial education ministries with a ....flame thrower.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GK .Dundas said:


> I've had variants of this conversation with various people over the years.
> The understanding of this Country 's history is utterly appalling. Assuming that they have any knowledge whatsoever.
> I have a strong urge to go through this Country's provincial education ministries with a ....flame thrower.



I felt the same way until I saw what my kids were learning about WW1 & WW2 in High School recently. The curriculum has actually given me some hope.

It was certainly better laid out and presented than I experienced many years ago.


----------



## PuckChaser

dapaterson said:


> I'd invite the three regimental colonels to the Citadel, feed them a nice goat stew, and explain that the current situation with our Russian battalions that are culminated before they do anything is unsustainable.


Cap Badge Squid Game????


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> I'd invite the three regimental colonels to the Citadel, feed them a nice goat stew, and explain that the current situation with our Russian battalions that are culminated before they do anything is unsustainable.



Dude, you missed a few dozen of the Regimental Colonels who are attached to the units on this list, I think:






						List of units of the Canadian Army - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Do you really think the Canadian public really know or care?
> 
> Some of the people I've talked to recently are convinced that we are going to start conscripting people to send to the front, by about next week.
> 
> My attempt to share with them the spotted history of conscription in Canada didn't seem to allay their fears by much.



Left Coast....


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:


> Do you really think the Canadian public really know or care?


As on 01 Feb 2022, no. 
As of 01 Mar 2022, the situation is changed. Many Canadians are realizing for the first time that you can’t keep the peace and prevent atrocity with good will and a blue hat. Many Canadians are experiencing for the first time a realization of the risks and dangers of global war. Some are looking to Europe with worry that f what may come next, while others feel frustration at our inability to make things right and to make them right now. There is a growing recognition that the west may need to use to protect itself or to act in the interests of humanity.

There will still be plenty of apathetic individuals and many more still actively opposed to the existence of a Canadian military. But I think that right now there is a large plurality of Canadians who would be unhappy to hear Canada is reducing the total number of combat units.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> As on 01 Feb 2022, no.
> As of 01 Mar 2022, the situation is changed. Many Canadians are realizing for the first time that you can’t keep the peace and prevent atrocity with good will and a blue hat. Many Canadians are experiencing for the first time a realization of the risks and dangers of global war. Some are looking to Europe with worry that f what may come next, while others feel frustration at our inability to make things right and to make them right now. There is a growing recognition that the west may need to use to protect itself or to act in the interests of humanity.
> 
> There will still be plenty of apathetic individuals and many more still actively opposed to the existence of a Canadian military. But I think that right now there is a large plurality of Canadians who would be unhappy to hear Canada is reducing the total number of combat units.



Polls seem to say stay out and send money, while clutching pearls and sending sternly worded messages, but not much about 'Stand to and tool up':


Ukraine war opinion synopsis

What Canadians want done

That grim realization of a potential nuclear conflict now governs how Canadians believe Canada should be responding to the crisis. A combined majority (73%) believe we should stay out of direct military contact altogether—Canada and its NATO allies should send as many weapons and as much funding as possible to fight the Russians without directly entering the country with troops and armaments (48%) or only use other means like imposing financial/economic sanctions (25%). The remainder (27%) are split between those (13%) who say Canada and its NATO allies should cross the Ukraine border or enter its airspace and commence fighting with the Russian forces, most likely triggering a broader war with potential nuclear consequences, and an equal group (14%) at the other end of the table who say we should stay out of everything altogether.



			https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a17333eb0786935ac112523/t/6222f58902c91337fb2c794e/1646458249558/Ukraine+Sum++04+22+F.pdf


----------



## McG

A poll question about if we should go into a war is not the same as a poll question asking if we need to be ready (or more ready) for a war.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Hello everyone, 

I'd just like to preface this with the fact that I'm a completely ignorant civilian. My only exposure to the military is the internet (lurking this board off and on since ~06 when I was considering RMC), an uncle that served for his entire adult life, and fiction.

Been reading more and more lately, and wanted to take a shot at this as a resource allocation puzzle.  I'm sure that some/many of my assumptions and ideas will be horrifically wrong and full of holes, but when you fine people point them out I'll come out of it a more understanding citizen.

Some of my underlying assumptions/requirements
1. Manpower is going to stay relatively constant
2. The regimental structure and division of combat arms/cap badges is going nowhere
3.The LAV is going nowhere
4. We need to be able to field a Bde size force somewhere in the world (presently the Baltics)
5. Purchasing needs to be kept "Canadian realistic"
6. This needs to happen fast

First step- Gain true heavy armour combined arms capability
How- abandon the idea of 3 symmetrical regiments, turn one of them into a US style cavalry battalion/regiment, and have a 2nd full set of kit that can be pre-positioned where we think they need to be.  Use the Leo4+'s for domestic duty, the 6's as the prepositioned.  UOR to get a proper tracked vehicle with integrated ATGM to support them in the short term, followed by a competition for replacement.  My thought is to lease M3A3 Bradley's to gain near immediate capability, then choose between CV9035, Lynx, and Redback. 

Set up the Regiment with a 3x3 squadron structure and a 2 vehicle command element:
1st Squadron = 11 Leo's
2nd and 3rd = 8 CFV's + 3 Leo's 
Total 17 Leo's + 16 CFV's.   Assuming a round purchase number both the "home" and forward sets would have 3 spare tanks from our existing stocks, and a UOR for 40 CFV's would have it up and running.

2nd Step- Outfit the rest of the RCAC
How- return to the turn of the century LAV as thing single chassis model, but follow through with the turrets.  I'd use the same vehicle/platoon/squadron mix, with the LAV LRSS taking the place of the tracked CFV.  16+ spares allows for 3 full sets and 6+ left over.  To replace the Leo's take 60 LAV ISC's from the RCIC, remove the current turret and replace with either Cockerill CVCT /3105 or at Kongsberg RT60 with the new 40mm + dual ATGM.   I'm under no illusions that this LAV mounted force could fight as heavy armour, but would give us a lighter screening/cavalry formation with greater strategic mobility.  3 sets of kit again allows for pre-positioning one for swift deployment. 

3rd Step- Restructure the infantry around remaining LAV ISC's and CP's, once again coming up with a full battalion set extra, UOR one Javelin CLU per platoon, and gain some mortars.
Platoon = 3x Lav ISC (2x 6man rifle section, one weapons section with CarlG/Javelin team,  DMR, protection) + Lav CP (Platoon down to 34 from 40 to free up PY's)
2Lav CP's at company headquarters, battalion = 27 Lav ISC, 15 LAV CP.  Times 7 battalions = 189 and 105,  ~30 spare ISC's and 76 CP's for other uses. 
Chop up the roofs of the next 35 ACSV's or some LAV CP's to make our version of the M1129.  I'd love to mount NEMO or AMOS turrets, but you know, money.

4th Step- SP Artillery  - I wanted the Archer, but given the low number in use currently and the number of existing orders it seems like that would take too long.  We could probable get Paladin's as fast as the Brad's out of US stocks, but that comes with the weight, maintenance, and mobility issues of tracked and armoured system.  I think the way out would be to leverage the Saudi LAV deal to talk them out of 48 Used Cesar's. (again spare prepositioned battery).

5th Step -GBAD-  use the PY's saved from switching from M777 to Cesar to standup an additional battery per regiment, find the TAPV a home and beg our way in to mount the MADIS system - covers off counter UAV as well as traditional GBAD.


I may be completely out to lunch,  but would this not allow us to have a semi-permanent infantry based battlegroup (with organic AT and mortars plus SP artillery and GBAD) stationed in Latvia, and the ability to surge to a full Bde?

Also, how unreasonable is a shopping list of 
40x tracked IFV's
60x off the shelf turrets
50x  used wheeled SPG's
35x LAV conversions + Mortars
50 dual station GBAD pairs?


----------



## suffolkowner

Canadian Military Journal
					






					www.journal.forces.gc.ca
				




This article from the CMJ deals with our struggle on how to outfit and organize.  One thing for sure we need to upgrade(create) our anti tank and air defence capabilities as weve known for decades now


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> Hello everyone,
> 
> I'd just like to preface this with the fact that I'm a completely ignorant civilian. My only exposure to the military is the internet (lurking this board off and on since ~06 when I was considering RMC), an uncle that served for his entire adult life, and fiction.
> 
> Been reading more and more lately, and wanted to take a shot at this as a resource allocation puzzle.  I'm sure that some/many of my assumptions and ideas will be horrifically wrong and full of holes, but when you fine people point them out I'll come out of it a more understanding citizen.
> 
> Some of my underlying assumptions/requirements
> 1. Manpower is going to stay relatively constant
> 2. The regimental structure and division of combat arms/cap badges is going nowhere
> 3.The LAV is going nowhere
> 4. We need to be able to field a Bde size force somewhere in the world (presently the Baltics)
> 5. Purchasing needs to be kept "Canadian realistic"
> 6. This needs to happen fast
> 
> First step- Gain true heavy armour combined arms capability
> How- abandon the idea of 3 symmetrical regiments, turn one of them into a US style cavalry battalion/regiment, and have a 2nd full set of kit that can be pre-positioned where we think they need to be.  Use the Leo4+'s for domestic duty, the 6's as the prepositioned.  UOR to get a proper tracked vehicle with integrated ATGM to support them in the short term, followed by a competition for replacement.  My thought is to lease M3A3 Bradley's to gain near immediate capability, then choose between CV9035, Lynx, and Redback.
> 
> Set up the Regiment with a 3x3 squadron structure and a 2 vehicle command element:
> 1st Squadron = 11 Leo's
> 2nd and 3rd = 8 CFV's + 3 Leo's
> Total 17 Leo's + 16 CFV's.   Assuming a round purchase number both the "home" and forward sets would have 3 spare tanks from our existing stocks, and a UOR for 40 CFV's would have it up and running.
> 
> 2nd Step- Outfit the rest of the RCAC
> How- return to the turn of the century LAV as thing single chassis model, but follow through with the turrets.  I'd use the same vehicle/platoon/squadron mix, with the LAV LRSS taking the place of the tracked CFV.  16+ spares allows for 3 full sets and 6+ left over.  To replace the Leo's take 60 LAV ISC's from the RCIC, remove the current turret and replace with either Cockerill CVCT /3105 or at Kongsberg RT60 with the new 40mm + dual ATGM.   I'm under no illusions that this LAV mounted force could fight as heavy armour, but would give us a lighter screening/cavalry formation with greater strategic mobility.  3 sets of kit again allows for pre-positioning one for swift deployment.
> 
> 3rd Step- Restructure the infantry around remaining LAV ISC's and CP's, once again coming up with a full battalion set extra, UOR one Javelin CLU per platoon, and gain some mortars.
> Platoon = 3x Lav ISC (2x 6man rifle section, one weapons section with CarlG/Javelin team,  DMR, protection) + Lav CP (Platoon down to 34 from 40 to free up PY's)
> 2Lav CP's at company headquarters, battalion = 27 Lav ISC, 15 LAV CP.  Times 7 battalions = 189 and 105,  ~30 spare ISC's and 76 CP's for other uses.
> Chop up the roofs of the next 35 ACSV's or some LAV CP's to make our version of the M1129.  I'd love to mount NEMO or AMOS turrets, but you know, money.
> 
> 4th Step- SP Artillery  - I wanted the Archer, but given the low number in use currently and the number of existing orders it seems like that would take too long.  We could probable get Paladin's as fast as the Brad's out of US stocks, but that comes with the weight, maintenance, and mobility issues of tracked and armoured system.  I think the way out would be to leverage the Saudi LAV deal to talk them out of 48 Used Cesar's. (again spare prepositioned battery).
> 
> 5th Step -GBAD-  use the PY's saved from switching from M777 to Cesar to standup an additional battery per regiment, find the TAPV a home and beg our way in to mount the MADIS system - covers off counter UAV as well as traditional GBAD.
> 
> 
> I may be completely out to lunch,  but would this not allow us to have a semi-permanent infantry based battlegroup (with organic AT and mortars plus SP artillery and GBAD) stationed in Latvia, and the ability to surge to a full Bde?
> 
> Also, how unreasonable is a shopping list of
> 40x tracked IFV's
> 60x off the shelf turrets
> 50x  used wheeled SPG's
> 35x LAV conversions + Mortars
> 50 dual station GBAD pairs?


Please go no CPs in the Pls, just please no.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> Please go no CPs in the Pls, just please no.



I thought that I had read in this thread that they already were? (The 6.0's, not the ACSV's)


----------



## markppcli

@IKnowNothing  CPs are coy and up; the backs are not suitable for much below that. We had issues with the initial delivery of 6.0s with CFRs being assigned regardless of if they were CP or ISC.

I’d also argue very strongly against dropping to two sections and loosing the platoon’s ability to maintain its own depth. I’d rather see the platoon drop it’s weapons detachment and each LAV carry an 84 and a C6 to be used as needed. Those PYs would be reassigned to fill out a Javeline / Spike / MMP equipped Anti Armour platoon.


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> Hello everyone,
> 
> I'd just like to preface this with the fact that I'm a completely ignorant civilian. My only exposure to the military is the internet (lurking this board off and on since ~06 when I was considering RMC), an uncle that served for his entire adult life, and fiction.
> 
> Been reading more and more lately, and wanted to take a shot at this as a resource allocation puzzle.  I'm sure that some/many of my assumptions and ideas will be horrifically wrong and full of holes, but when you fine people point them out I'll come out of it a more understanding citizen.
> 
> Some of my underlying assumptions/requirements
> 1. Manpower is going to stay relatively constant


The CAF issue isn't really manpower - it is the way the CAF employs it's manpower


IKnowNothing said:


> 2. The regimental structure and division of combat arms/cap badges is going nowhere


Which is a major problem


IKnowNothing said:


> 3.The LAV is going nowhere


Another major problem


IKnowNothing said:


> 4. We need to be able to field a Bde size force somewhere in the world (presently the Baltics)


At least


IKnowNothing said:


> 5. Purchasing needs to be kept "Canadian realistic"


Purchasing needs to be realistic - suitable equipment for a combat peer v peer environment - which sadly hasn't occurred for some time.


IKnowNothing said:


> 6. This needs to happen fast


It can't - it may be fast for Canadian terms, but there are some many missing gaps that procurment, and training will take some time.


IKnowNothing said:


> First step- Gain true heavy armour combined arms capability
> How- abandon the idea of 3 symmetrical regiments, turn one of them into a US style cavalry battalion/regiment, and have a 2nd full set of kit that can be pre-positioned where we think they need to be.  Use the Leo4+'s for domestic duty, the 6's as the prepositioned.  UOR to get a proper tracked vehicle with integrated ATGM to support them in the short term, followed by a competition for replacement.  My thought is to lease M3A3 Bradley's to gain near immediate capability, then choose between CV9035, Lynx, and Redback.


Consider selling the Leo back to Germany.
  Yes there has been a considerable amount of work gone into them, and support, but not enough to make it worth keeping that fleet IMHO, when thousands of M1A2 exist a few miles south and have a robust spare parts and maintenance system - including OEM Maintenance contractors etc.

I don't see the gain to retain Leo’s in the number the CAF has. 



IKnowNothing said:


> Set up the Regiment with a 3x3 squadron structure and a 2 vehicle command element:
> 1st Squadron = 11 Leo's
> 2nd and 3rd = 8 CFV's + 3 Leo's
> Total 17 Leo's + 16 CFV's.   Assuming a round purchase number both the "home" and forward sets would have 3 spare tanks from our existing stocks, and a UOR for 40 CFV's would have it up and running.


No your dropping a lot losing a tank from a troop.  A 2x2 force can cover each other in bounds and isn’t immediately combat ineffective at one loss. 

CFV is a bad name, I think the idea of a Light Armor screen has gone the way of the Dodo. 



IKnowNothing said:


> 2nd Step- Outfit the rest of the RCAC
> How- return to the turn of the century LAV as thing single chassis model, but follow through with the turrets.  I'd use the same vehicle/platoon/squadron mix, with the LAV LRSS taking the place of the tracked CFV.  16+ spares allows for 3 full sets and 6+ left over.  To replace the Leo's take 60 LAV ISC's from the RCIC, remove the current turret and replace with either Cockerill CVCT /3105 or at Kongsberg RT60 with the new 40mm + dual ATGM.   I'm under no illusions that this LAV mounted force could fight as heavy armour, but would give us a lighter screening/cavalry formation with greater strategic mobility.  3 sets of kit again allows for pre-positioning one for swift deployment.


Again a screening force isn’t.  It needs to be able to fight - you can conduct mud Recce and ISR without committing target vehicles.  



IKnowNothing said:


> 3rd Step- Restructure the infantry around remaining LAV ISC's and CP's, once again coming up with a full battalion set extra, UOR one Javelin CLU per platoon, and gain some mortars.
> Platoon = 3x Lav ISC (2x 6man rifle section, one weapons section with CarlG/Javelin team,  DMR, protection) + Lav CP (Platoon down to 34 from 40 to free up PY's)


Terrible idea. 
    You just robbed a Platoon of 1/2 of its dismounted fighters.  



IKnowNothing said:


> 2Lav CP's at company headquarters, battalion = 27 Lav ISC, 15 LAV CP.  Times 7 battalions = 189 and 105,  ~30 spare ISC's and 76 CP's for other uses.
> Chop up the roofs of the next 35 ACSV's or some LAV CP's to make our version of the M1129.  I'd love to mount NEMO or AMOS turrets, but you know, money.


As Mark said, the CP doesn’t belong at the Platoon.  The only way that works is a 12 man section with 2 Lav / section and one of the HQ section LAVs being a CP. 
   It may work with a dispersed environment and pushing other enablers like a Class 1/2 UAV to the Platoon to link with higher G2 



IKnowNothing said:


> 4th Step- SP Artillery  - I wanted the Archer, but given the low number in use currently and the number of existing orders it seems like that would take too long.  We could probable get Paladin's as fast as the Brad's out of US stocks, but that comes with the weight, maintenance, and mobility issues of tracked and armoured system.  I think the way out would be to leverage the Saudi LAV deal to talk them out of 48 Used Cesar's. (again spare prepositioned battery).


Canada at least has historical knowledge with the M109, and tracks do better on debris field areas. 



IKnowNothing said:


> 5th Step -GBAD-  use the PY's saved from switching from M777 to Cesar to standup an additional battery per regiment, find the TAPV a home and beg our way in to mount the MADIS system - covers off counter UAV as well as traditional GBAD.


777 is a light role gun, it should never been adopted for a CMBG.  



IKnowNothing said:


> I may be completely out to lunch,  but would this not allow us to have a semi-permanent infantry based battlegroup (with organic AT and mortars plus SP artillery and GBAD) stationed in Latvia, and the ability to surge to a full Bde?
> 
> Also, how unreasonable is a shopping list of
> 40x tracked IFV's
> 60x off the shelf turrets
> 50x  used wheeled SPG's
> 35x LAV conversions + Mortars
> 50 dual station GBAD pairs?


I still stand by the point I think the CAF needs a HEAVY Bde for prepositioning. 

200+ CV90 or M2A3 Bradley 
120 M1A2 
 18 M109A6 
  18 M270A1 MLRS 
  Tracked GBAD (M and S) 
   THAAD 
   Plus ARV, ALVB, and 100 or so HEMTT-A4 for logistics 

Plus RCAF assets of real UH Squadron a AH Squadron, a MH Squadron And 2 F-35 Squadrons 

Have 1/3rd of the troops prepositioned 
  The rest have sims back at home station and 1-2 fly overs per year for a Bde level ex -and at least every 2 years have a Multi-National DIV ex.


----------



## Fabius

The comments about how we are committed to the LEO fleet is interesting when you look at how ready, willing and able to abandon underperforming equipment (for various reasons) the Australians are. They are basically abandoning European equipment due to supply issues and performance issues, equipment that they only recently purchased. 
Not saying they are right or wrong, their mindset is what is interesting here compared to ours as an institution.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> @IKnowNothing  CPs are coy and up; the backs are not suitable for much below that. We had issues with the initial delivery of 6.0s with CFRs being assigned regardless of if they were CP or ISC.
> 
> I’d also argue very strongly against dropping to two sections and loosing the platoon’s ability to maintain its own depth. I’d rather see the platoon drop it’s weapons detachment and each LAV carry an 84 and a C6 to be used as needed. Those PYs would be reassigned to fill out a Javeline / Spike / MMP equipped Anti Armour platoon.


Thanks for your reply.  Once again - completely ignorant.  The post that informed my thinking was this and those around it
FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure
Gave my the impression that the 6.0 CP was functional very similar to the ISC, could provide a 4th 25mm and the back would be able to house the platoon command element.   If my idea were to happen, could the CP's be returreted and converted to go to the armoured regiments to leave the ISC's at the platoon level?

Regarding your second paragraph, would you then say that you completely disagree with the discussion earlier in the thread to transition to the Swedish/ weapons locker model with better equipped but smaller platoons?  I was trying to make use of that concept.


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## IKnowNothing

@KevinB 
Thank-you very much for your reply.  Could you elaborate on the death of the light armoured screening force?
I was thinking that what we're seeing in Ukraine is showing the reverse, that with training, logistics support, and the right kit (ATGM) that a lighter force has role in defending against heavy armour.

Re- the heavy regiment (Leo vs M1 aside), if it were revised to be 4x3 (+2) with 9 tanks (4x2 +1 command) and 5 Brad's in 1st squadron, 4 tanks and 10 Brads in 2nd and 3rd would that work?  Still fits inside the existing Leo complement just needs more Bradleys - I was trying to keep new vehicles to a minimum.

Re- disregarding the assumptions / constraints as "problems" and your proposal,  as a taxpayer I'd absolutely love if we went completely asymmetrical with a light brigade, lav brigade, properly outfitted combined arms heavy brigade, with a full  prepositioned 2nd set of kit for the heavy and a spare battle group set for the LAV, but (and with all respect)
-I think that stands as much chance of happening  as  my protestant ass being elected Pope, 
-erasing all the constraints makes for a much less challenging puzzle
-as an outsider, refusing to acknowledge them and having my first post be a pie in the sky complete reimagining of the army seemed like a good way to piss people off


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> @KevinB
> Thank-you very much for your reply.  Could you elaborate on the death of the light armoured screening force?
> I was thinking that what we're seeing in Ukraine is showing the reverse, that with training, logistics support, and the right kit (ATGM) that a lighter force has role in defending against heavy armour.


What is occurring in public in the Ukraine is Armored formations road bound and spread out - they aren't able to use their mobility - or to bring effective fire to bear while moving.

NATO MBT's remain fairly resilient against enemy (Russian) ATGM's and RPG's - but lighter vehicles are not.
  As such I am not a fan of light armor screens - I would have a heavy armor unit backed up with AH and UAV's - with HIVF Infantry - maybe with some dismount Inf Recce - but definitely STA/ISR assets - and both ATGM, and AD assets.



IKnowNothing said:


> Re- the heavy regiment (Leo vs M1 aside), if it were revised to be 4x3 (+2) with 9 tanks (4x2 +1 command) and 5 Brad's in 1st squadron, 4 tanks and 10 Brads in 2nd and 3rd would that work?  Still fits inside the existing Leo complement just needs more Bradleys - I was trying to keep new vehicles to a minimum.


People smarter than me have made points that peacetime Composite Combat Teams don't work well, and that by keeping the units separate they get better individual and collective training, as well as retaining the ability to force Inf or Arm heavy Cbt Teams/Btl Groups.



IKnowNothing said:


> Re- disregarding the assumptions / constraints as "problems" and your proposal,  as a taxpayer I'd absolutely love if we went completely asymmetrical with a light brigade, lav brigade, properly outfitted combined arms heavy brigade, with a full  prepositioned 2nd set of kit for the heavy and a spare battle group set for the LAV, but (and with all respect)
> -I think that stands as much chance of happening  as  my protestant ass being elected Pope,


Yeah same - but I love titling at windmills.



IKnowNothing said:


> -erasing all the constraints makes for a much less challenging puzzle
> -as an outsider, refusing to acknowledge them and having my first post be a pie in the sky complete reimagining of the army seemed like a good way to piss people off


I pissed people off when I was in the CAF, I wouldn't want to change from the outside


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## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> Thanks for your reply.  Once again - completely ignorant.  The post that informed my thinking was this and those around it
> FORCE 2025: Informing the Army’s future structure
> Gave my the impression that the 6.0 CP was functional very similar to the ISC, could provide a 4th 25mm and the back would be able to house the platoon command element.   If my idea were to happen, could the CP's be returreted and converted to go to the armoured regiments to leave the ISC's at the platoon level?
> 
> Regarding your second paragraph, would you then say that you completely disagree with the discussion earlier in the thread to transition to the Swedish/ weapons locker model with better equipped but smaller platoons?  I was trying to make use of that concept.


The difference between a LAV CP and ISC is the layout of the troop compartment. Infantry platoon commanders don’t need a map board in the back, having the ISC means weapons det goes with the Pl Comd and sits in their back pocket. 

Smaller platoons a la Sweden ? Maybe, but they don’t have a weapons section, they have three squads, which gives them the ability to fight 2 up 1 back. A weapons squad will support by fire, but won’t be able to rapidly shift to fill the gap left by casualties or new enemy positions. 

I find the Swedish model interesting, but I also remind myself they haven’t been in a war since the invention of the combustion engine.


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## WestIsle

An interesting proposal for possible light forces, particularly expeditionary. 





__





						Developing an Experimental Joint Airborne Division for Hybrid Warfare and Great Power Competition | Small Wars Journal
					

This article details the advantages the US military can gain by developing an experimental joint airborne division for use in current or future hybrid conflicts while simultaneously countering emerging proxy threats during Great Power Competition. It highlights the current capability gap in our...




					smallwarsjournal.com


----------



## daftandbarmy

WestIsle said:


> An interesting proposal for possible light forces, particularly expeditionary.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Developing an Experimental Joint Airborne Division for Hybrid Warfare and Great Power Competition | Small Wars Journal
> 
> 
> This article details the advantages the US military can gain by developing an experimental joint airborne division for use in current or future hybrid conflicts while simultaneously countering emerging proxy threats during Great Power Competition. It highlights the current capability gap in our...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> smallwarsjournal.com



You had me at 'Shock Trooper'


----------



## IKnowNothing

Scenario:
In a politically motivated move, PMJT "contributes" our Leo fleet to NATO allies, with no plans for a replacement MBT.  What there is funding for:
-A Spike/Javelin Launcher added to 120 LAV ISC/LRSS turrets
-100 new LAV hulls, with a mix of 120mm mortar (turret or carrier),  105mm gun, ATGM UA, UAV UA
-MANPAT, GBAD, SPG looked after separately.

Given a free hand to reorganize the armoured regiments and LAV battalions:
-where do you put the strap on ATGM's
-what is your mix for the new LAV hulls
-how do you set it all up
-is the Army better for it?

(Edit- "it" being the Leo for 100 various specialty lav's + 120 ATGM turrets, hold MANPAT/GBAD/SPG equal)

@Kirkhill @FJAG @GR66


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## FJAG

IKnowNothing said:


> Scenario:
> In a politically motivated move, PMJT "contributes" our Leo fleet to NATO allies, with no plans for a replacement MBT.  What there is funding for:
> -A Spike/Javelin Launcher added to 120 LAV ISC/LRSS turrets
> -100 new LAV hulls, with a mix of 120mm mortar (turret or carrier),  105mm gun, ATGM UA, UAV UA
> -MANPAT, GBAD, SPG looked after separately.
> 
> Given a free hand to reorganize the armoured regiments and LAV battalions:
> -where do you put the strap on ATGM's
> -what is your mix for the new LAV hulls
> -how do you set it all up
> -is the Army better for it?
> 
> (Edit- "it being the Leo for 100 various specialty lav's + 120 ATGM turrets, hold MANPAT/GBAD/SPG equal)
> 
> @Kirkhill @FJAG @GR66


Not 100% sure I follow the scenario and question but I'll put my views forward.

1) We should not contribute a force that doesn't have tanks. The eFP in Latvia has tanks from other countries and I can live with that. However, our own army needs tanks. If we give up tanks to NATO allies then we need to acquire new ones. Both the M1 and the Leo2 are good tanks. I tend to give the Leo the edge because of its lower fuel consumption but I prefer the M1 for the reason of compatibility with our North American ally/industry/maintenance base. I prefer standardizing more with the US. IMHO, a LAV with a 105 mm gun is an invitation to misuse it as a tank - that won't work. The US removed them from their Stryker companies and put a few into their Stryker cavalry squadron together with ATGMs as a support arm for their scouts. Conceptually that is more acceptable.

2) I'm not a LAV fan. I'm an HIFV fan because I believe in combined arms battalions for offensive action. There are several types I would take. I'll tolerate the LAV 6.0 because we have them and realistically we won't change that for a long time. Tolerating the LAV 6.0 means accepting the casualties that will come with them if they are used in offensive combined arms operations. 

3) I wouldn't change the organization of the infantry companies and armoured squadrons very much. I tend to favour combined arms battalions as configured in a US ABCT. Both our concept and theirs allows for reconfiguring battalions for specific tasks by moving a company or squadron to another battalion. However, I prefer the US combined arms battalion because that way the battalion's CSS echelon is set up from day one to cater to supporting both tanks and HIFVs. The problem for Canada is that we generally do not go with a standard configuration and doctrine when we deploy. We tend to tailor build a force as needed. That type of a force employment model, where for example you don't always want to deploy your tanks with the infantry on a given mission, makes combined arms battalions a little less flexible.

4) IMHO, CS systems are vital for an infantry battalion. 120mm mortars under armour, ATGM under armour, are critical. I'm an old guy used to seeing mortars and heavy ATGMs in platoons at the battalion level but am wide open to a wider distribution down to company level. medium ATGMs should be widely deployed both in turret mounts and as man portables.

5) As far as set-up is concerned, I trend towards the US ABCT and SBCT organizations. What's clear is those organizations have very different roles and equipment. For a European theatre I favour the ABCT set up because it has a much greater counter attack capability than the SBCT and from what I've been seeing in Ukraine one needs that. 

One final thought. Your scenario is based on trading off old capabilities for new ones. Canada has done that for over twenty years now and IMHO that has been a fundamental error. We've been giving up critical capabilities - SPs, armour for a time, GBAD, ATGMs - because we didn't think we would ever need them and didn't feel we had the $ to maintain and support them. That's a mug's game and it was obvious as we were looking at giving the Ukrainians weapon systems. The ones they needed most were the ones not in our inventory. 

Building a force is a detailed and intellectually challenging exercise which starts with defining the effect you wish to have and then working backwards to determine which of all the many interrelated moving parts you need to deliver that. If you start the exercise by cherry picking a piece of gear here and another piece of gear there (and even worse, cutting something out) then you won't get to having a coherent or credible force structure.

I know there are others in this forum that have a different view of things, but for me the effect that the Canadian Army needs to deliver includes an armoured brigade group capable of conducting offensive operations (principally counter attacks) in a high intensity conflict in the European theatre against enemy armoured formations. There are also, lesser missions that we may need to perform which might require a lower standard of equipment and a different organization, but the ability to deploy and sustain that single Armoured brigade group is the minimum standard to aim for.

🍻


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## WestIsle

To add to FJAG above this I dont really see much of the point of the medium weight brigade ala LAVs. It can take small arms fire but can take anything. Would probably be cheaper to move to IMV like the griffon and jaguar France has. The 105mm is going to be covered off by the new US light tank. 105mm on a chasis that cant take a hit from the vehicles it needs to take out itself makes little sense. You are effectively doing the same thing the Royal Navy did with the Type 21.


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## daftandbarmy

I'm shocked, shocked I tell you. That new Gender Neutral Dress code should fill up the armoured brigades  


Canadian Military reports sagging recruitment as NATO ramps up deployment in eastern Europe​
The Canadian Armed Forces says it's still struggling to recruit women


Canada's military reports that it's roughly 7,600 members short of full strength — just as NATO is deploying more troops to eastern Europe in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The latest figure was recorded on Feb. 15 and shows a major shortfall in what the military calls its "trained, effective strength." The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has roughly 65,000 regular members.

"This is of course a number one priority for all of us, ensuring readiness is not affected by our current trained, effective strength," said Brig.-Gen. Simon Bernard, the military's lead on reconstituting the forces.

Gen. Wayne Eyre, chief of defence staff, said earlier this month that operational readiness is "one of the things that keeps me awake at night" as he laid out his plans to rebuild the military for an "increasingly dangerous future."

NATO's Sec. Gen. Jens Stoltenberg said Wednesday the alliance is deploying four more battle groups to Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria as a show of unity and force in the face of Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine. NATO leaders are expected to discuss whether to make that deployment permanent when they meet in Brussels on Thursday.

David Perry, the president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said CAF's membership shortfall is "significant." 
"[The military] always put the highest priority on operational commitments, including NATO, so the short-term impacts will probably be low," said Perry. "But if we can't quickly fix that shortfall, it will impact what we can commit to NATO in the medium and long term."

Conservative MP Pierre Paul-Hus, vice-chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, said the shortfall is a "huge problem" and raises questions about Canada's ability to deploy the 3,400 military personnel now on standby to join NATO's high-readiness force.

"I think the government needs to change things quickly," said Hus. "We need to recruit."

The military has seen a drop in numbers during the pandemic and over the course of its recent sexual misconduct crisis. Multiple senior male leaders have been sidelined, investigated or forced into retirement in connection with sexual misconduct claims.

The military said it does not yet know how many members have left in response to sexual misconduct claims.

Lt.-Gen. Jennie Carignan was appointed the military's chief of professional conduct and culture a year ago. She gave a briefing Wednesday with acting chief of military personnel Maj.-Gen. Lise Bourgon.

"We've seen an impact, sadly. I wish I could tell you that we've not, but we've seen an impact, and we need to work on that," Bourgon said of the effect of sexual misconduct allegations on recruitment and retention.


Maj.-Gen. Lise Bourgon said the Canadian Armed Forces will adopt a gender-neutral dress code and relax rules banning long or colourful hair. (OP Impact/DND)

Bourgon said 71 per cent of the military's workforce is made up of "white males."

"The bottom line ... is that diversity enhances readiness and, in turn, our operational effectiveness," Bourgon said.

"So as an organization, we must attract, recruit, retain and develop talent that is representative of our Canadian society. The situation requires serious attention and clear leadership."

Women, minority groups and Indigenous members "continue to be under-represented" in the military, she said.

Only 631 women enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in the 2021-2022 fiscal year — roughly 15 per cent of all new recruits into the regular forces. The number of women who enrolled over the year is the lowest recorded since 2015-2016 and represents a 10 per cent drop from the previous fiscal year.

In 2016, the military committed to increasing the number of women in uniform and is striving to reach the goal of 25 per cent of all military personnel by 2026.

CAF said it's taking steps to diversify the forces. It said it's adopting a gender-neutral dress code and relaxing rules banning long hair and hair dyed in bright colours.

"It's going to be the first visual change of our culture change," said Bourgon. "We can't define our soldiers by short hair anymore. The colour and the length of the hair does not define your quality as a solider, an aviator, and a sailor. So this is going to be a big departure."



			https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-armed-forces-staff-shortfall-1.6395131


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## WestIsle

daftandbarmy said:


> I'm shocked, shocked I tell you. That new Gender Neutral Dress code should fill up the armoured brigades
> 
> 
> Canadian Military reports sagging recruitment as NATO ramps up deployment in eastern Europe​
> The Canadian Armed Forces says it's still struggling to recruit women
> 
> 
> Canada's military reports that it's roughly 7,600 members short of full strength — just as NATO is deploying more troops to eastern Europe in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
> 
> The latest figure was recorded on Feb. 15 and shows a major shortfall in what the military calls its "trained, effective strength." The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has roughly 65,000 regular members.
> 
> "This is of course a number one priority for all of us, ensuring readiness is not affected by our current trained, effective strength," said Brig.-Gen. Simon Bernard, the military's lead on reconstituting the forces.
> 
> Gen. Wayne Eyre, chief of defence staff, said earlier this month that operational readiness is "one of the things that keeps me awake at night" as he laid out his plans to rebuild the military for an "increasingly dangerous future."
> 
> NATO's Sec. Gen. Jens Stoltenberg said Wednesday the alliance is deploying four more battle groups to Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria as a show of unity and force in the face of Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine. NATO leaders are expected to discuss whether to make that deployment permanent when they meet in Brussels on Thursday.
> 
> David Perry, the president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said CAF's membership shortfall is "significant."
> "[The military] always put the highest priority on operational commitments, including NATO, so the short-term impacts will probably be low," said Perry. "But if we can't quickly fix that shortfall, it will impact what we can commit to NATO in the medium and long term."
> 
> Conservative MP Pierre Paul-Hus, vice-chair of the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association, said the shortfall is a "huge problem" and raises questions about Canada's ability to deploy the 3,400 military personnel now on standby to join NATO's high-readiness force.
> 
> "I think the government needs to change things quickly," said Hus. "We need to recruit."
> 
> The military has seen a drop in numbers during the pandemic and over the course of its recent sexual misconduct crisis. Multiple senior male leaders have been sidelined, investigated or forced into retirement in connection with sexual misconduct claims.
> 
> The military said it does not yet know how many members have left in response to sexual misconduct claims.
> 
> Lt.-Gen. Jennie Carignan was appointed the military's chief of professional conduct and culture a year ago. She gave a briefing Wednesday with acting chief of military personnel Maj.-Gen. Lise Bourgon.
> 
> "We've seen an impact, sadly. I wish I could tell you that we've not, but we've seen an impact, and we need to work on that," Bourgon said of the effect of sexual misconduct allegations on recruitment and retention.
> 
> 
> Maj.-Gen. Lise Bourgon said the Canadian Armed Forces will adopt a gender-neutral dress code and relax rules banning long or colourful hair. (OP Impact/DND)
> 
> Bourgon said 71 per cent of the military's workforce is made up of "white males."
> 
> "The bottom line ... is that diversity enhances readiness and, in turn, our operational effectiveness," Bourgon said.
> 
> "So as an organization, we must attract, recruit, retain and develop talent that is representative of our Canadian society. The situation requires serious attention and clear leadership."
> 
> Women, minority groups and Indigenous members "continue to be under-represented" in the military, she said.
> 
> Only 631 women enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in the 2021-2022 fiscal year — roughly 15 per cent of all new recruits into the regular forces. The number of women who enrolled over the year is the lowest recorded since 2015-2016 and represents a 10 per cent drop from the previous fiscal year.
> 
> In 2016, the military committed to increasing the number of women in uniform and is striving to reach the goal of 25 per cent of all military personnel by 2026.
> 
> CAF said it's taking steps to diversify the forces. It said it's adopting a gender-neutral dress code and relaxing rules banning long hair and hair dyed in bright colours.
> 
> "It's going to be the first visual change of our culture change," said Bourgon. "We can't define our soldiers by short hair anymore. The colour and the length of the hair does not define your quality as a solider, an aviator, and a sailor. So this is going to be a big departure."
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-armed-forces-staff-shortfall-1.6395131


Sad that they think short and bland colored hair is the issue in the CAF that needs to change. I think we're done in for


----------



## rmc_wannabe

While I support these initiatives wholly, I don't think they're going to do anything damn thing.

Dress and inclusivity are easy things to fix; but actual solutions cost money no one is willing to spend. 

Hell a lot of people that would even consider a job in the CAF are turned off by:

-terrible pay for comparable civilian jobs
-arbitrary postings
-decrepit infrastructure 
-having to crew and maintain vehicles and systems that are older than most recruits by many years
-lack of equivalencies for training/civilian crossover
-our inability to provide members with adequate clothing, equipment, weapons systems, protective gear, let alone dress uniforms that fit or look "cool"

Trying to sell the Old Lie is hard in the Information Age. Zoomers can see all our faults and are taking a pass. Until we provide a viable option, doesn't matter if you want to recruit a Battalion of minorities... they won't come because we aren't a winning horse to bet on.


----------



## Good2Golf

Perhaps CMP can release enough undesirable demography until the proper % is reached.


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Not 100% sure I follow the scenario and question but I'll put my views forward.
> 
> 1) We should not contribute a force that doesn't have tanks. The eFP in Latvia has tanks from other countries and I can live with that. However, our own army needs tanks. If we give up tanks to NATO allies then we need to acquire new ones. Both the M1 and the Leo2 are good tanks. I tend to give the Leo the edge because of its lower fuel consumption but I prefer the M1 for the reason of compatibility with our North American ally/industry/maintenance base. I prefer standardizing more with the US. IMHO, a LAV with a 105 mm gun is an invitation to misuse it as a tank - that won't work. The US removed them from their Stryker companies and put a few into their Stryker cavalry squadron together with ATGMs as a support arm for their scouts. Conceptually that is more acceptable.
> 
> 2) I'm not a LAV fan. I'm an HIFV fan because I believe in combined arms battalions for offensive action. There are several types I would take. I'll tolerate the LAV 6.0 because we have them and realistically we won't change that for a long time. Tolerating the LAV 6.0 means accepting the casualties that will come with them if they are used in offensive combined arms operations.
> 
> 3) I wouldn't change the organization of the infantry companies and armoured squadrons very much. I tend to favour combined arms battalions as configured in a US ABCT. Both our concept and theirs allows for reconfiguring battalions for specific tasks by moving a company or squadron to another battalion. However, I prefer the US combined arms battalion because that way the battalion's CSS echelon is set up from day one to cater to supporting both tanks and HIFVs. The problem for Canada is that we generally do not go with a standard configuration and doctrine when we deploy. We tend to tailor build a force as needed. That type of a force employment model, where for example you don't always want to deploy your tanks with the infantry on a given mission, makes combined arms battalions a little less flexible.
> 
> 4) IMHO, CS systems are vital for an infantry battalion. 120mm mortars under armour, ATGM under armour, are critical. I'm an old guy used to seeing mortars and heavy ATGMs in platoons at the battalion level but am wide open to a wider distribution down to company level. medium ATGMs should be widely deployed both in turret mounts and as man portables.
> 
> 5) As far as set-up is concerned, I trend towards the US ABCT and SBCT organizations. What's clear is those organizations have very different roles and equipment. For a European theatre I favour the ABCT set up because it has a much greater counter attack capability than the SBCT and from what I've been seeing in Ukraine one needs that.
> 
> One final thought. Your scenario is based on trading off old capabilities for new ones. Canada has done that for over twenty years now and IMHO that has been a fundamental error. We've been giving up critical capabilities - SPs, armour for a time, GBAD, ATGMs - because we didn't think we would ever need them and didn't feel we had the $ to maintain and support them. That's a mug's game and it was obvious as we were looking at giving the Ukrainians weapon systems. The ones they needed most were the ones not in our inventory.
> 
> Building a force is a detailed and intellectually challenging exercise which starts with defining the effect you wish to have and then working backwards to determine which of all the many interrelated moving parts you need to deliver that. If you start the exercise by cherry picking a piece of gear here and another piece of gear there (and even worse, cutting something out) then you won't get to having a coherent or credible force structure.
> 
> I know there are others in this forum that have a different view of things, but for me the effect that the Canadian Army needs to deliver includes an armoured brigade group capable of conducting offensive operations (principally counter attacks) in a high intensity conflict in the European theatre against enemy armoured formations. There are also, lesser missions that we may need to perform which might require a lower standard of equipment and a different organization, but the ability to deploy and sustain that single Armoured brigade group is the minimum standard to aim for.
> 
> 🍻


I see this HIFV comment fly around here quite a bit. Can you provide examples of an HIFV and define its protection ? I feel like most of the not a LAV fan posters here have a somewhat … inaccurate view of its frontal and side arc protection and very glossy views of the competition.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> Scenario:
> In a politically motivated move, PMJT "contributes" our Leo fleet to NATO allies, with no plans for a replacement MBT.  What there is funding for:
> -A Spike/Javelin Launcher added to 120 LAV ISC/LRSS turrets
> -100 new LAV hulls, with a mix of 120mm mortar (turret or carrier),  105mm gun, ATGM UA, UAV UA
> -MANPAT, GBAD, SPG looked after separately.
> 
> Given a free hand to reorganize the armoured regiments and LAV battalions:
> -where do you put the strap on ATGM's
> -what is your mix for the new LAV hulls
> -how do you set it all up
> -is the Army better for it?
> 
> (Edit- "it" being the Leo for 100 various specialty lav's + 120 ATGM turrets, hold MANPAT/GBAD/SPG equal)
> 
> @Kirkhill @FJAG @GR66


ATGMs held at Coy level weapon detachments in the Italian model of  2x IFV with a turret equipped system and a det with a stand in the back each. Ideally this is a LAV 6.0 with a reconfigured back, but I’d accept a ACSV with an rws system for the atgm carrier. 

Mortars massed at Bn as a separate platoon.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> diversity enhances readiness



How, exactly?


----------



## IKnowNothing

@FJAG
Thank-you for taking the time to respond in such detail.

Basically the scenario was that if the government were to unilaterally take away heavy armour (to remove the debate on whether it's the right thing for the army) how well could the army move forward, and could it end up better than the status quo?

While I share the idea that we _should_ be able to field an armoured brigade, as a semi-informed voter I look at the current state of things vs. what would need to happen, and quite frankly the idea of equipping and fielding an ABCT equivalent seems downright aspirational.  At this point the odds of replacing the LAV with a proper HIFV are slim to none. So even if were were able to equip enough tanks, keep them maintained, deploy them to theatre in a timely fashion, and keep them supplied, (all of which would stretch the army to the max- or beyond) it's going to be part of an armoured brigade that is such in name only, and either
-won't be able to perform
-will only do so at the cost of a disproportionate number of Canadian lives
Doesn't seem like a good aspiration.

If the defined effect was the ability to have a semi-permanent fully kitted LAV battlegroup in Latvia with pre-positioned equipment to have a flyover force surge it to a heavily upgunned SBCT, well trained and fully equipped to fill its role, would that be an improvement over the current state of affairs?


----------



## dapaterson

rmc_wannabe said:


> Hell a lot of people that would even consider a job in the CAF are turned off by:
> 
> -terrible pay for comparable civilian jobs
> -arbitrary postings
> -decrepit infrastructure
> -having to crew and maintain vehicles and systems that are older than most recruits by many years
> -lack of equivalencies for training/civilian crossover
> -our inability to provide members with adequate clothing, equipment, weapons systems, protective gear, let alone dress uniforms that fit or look "cool"


I'll argue two of your points.  

Training equivalencies: Have you looked at the CAF ACE website?  Use the MySET button to investigate what accreditation is available for your training.  Welcome to the Canadian Armed Forces - Accreditation Certification Equivalency (CAF-ACE) - CAF-ACE

Pay.  Most CAF members receive superior compensation to what they would receive for similar skillsets outside the military; particularly when you consider that non-military members in those fields paid for their training, rather than being paid to receive it.  For example, the two pilots in the cabin of a Porter Q400 flying Toronto to Halifax combined make less than a single RCAF pilot Major.  A defence lawyer in the JAG branch is responsible for an order of magnitude fewer cases than a public defender working for less money for a provincial crown attorney.

In addition, the CFSA part I pension plan is among the more lucrative defined benefit plans available.  Retirement at 25 years of service - unreduced, regardless of age - is extremely rare.  And on a current service cost basis, for ever dollar contributed by CAF members, the government is responsible for $1.73 (see: OSFI report 2019, page 10 https://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/Eng/Docs/CFSA19.pdf)

Are there some areas where compensation needs review?  Definitely.  But CAF compensation is competitive and often outstrips the marketplace.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> ATGMs held at Coy level weapon detachments in the Italian model of  2x IFV with a turret equipped system and a det with a stand in the back each. Ideally this is a LAV 6.0 with a reconfigured back, but I’d accept a ACSV with an rws system for the atgm carrier.
> 
> Mortars massed at Bn as a separate platoon.


Oddly enough bringing 120 existing turrets to a Canadianized Hitfist /Frescia Anti-Tank was exactly what I had in mind.
For the 100 new 6.0 Hulls, how many would be mortars (and turreted or M1129 style) and what would you do with the rest?


----------



## markppcli

Each mortar platoon is what ? 8 tubes ? So across 6 battalions that’s 24. Keep 8 for deployable stock 32. 68 potential atgm carriers.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I see this HIFV comment fly around here quite a bit. Can you provide examples of an HIFV and define its protection ? I feel like most of the not a LAV fan posters here have a somewhat … inaccurate view of its frontal and side arc protection and very glossy views of the competition.


To me a HIFV is something like the Namer type HAPC with a 30mm or greater auto cannon/chain gun and an integral UA ATGM  

The CV-90/AJAX type IFV’s are lighter armored but have larger cannon and UA ATGM’s - the Bradley is a good example of a Legacy IFV with the same 25mm cannon as the LAV, but also TOW ATGM.  All still have greater armor than the LAV6.0, but are still susceptible to Russian ATGM/RPG fire unlike the Leo2 or M1A2 MBT’s and NAMER HAPC

Tracks have lower ground pressure than wheeled vehicles due to weight distribution and all else being equal offer move off-road mobility.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> To me a HIFV is something like the Namer type HAPC with a 30mm or greater auto cannon/chain gun and an integral UA ATGM
> 
> The CV-90/AJAX type IFV’s are lighter armored but have larger cannon and UA ATGM’s - the Bradley is a good example of a Legacy IFV with the same 25mm cannon as the LAV, but also TOW ATGM.  All still have greater armor than the LAV6.0, but are still susceptible to Russian ATGM/RPG fire unlike the Leo2 or M1A2 MBT’s and NAMER HAPC
> 
> Tracks have lower ground pressure than wheeled vehicles due to weight distribution and all else being equal offer move off-road mobility.


If by AJAX you mean the actual in service uhlan or Pizarro IFVs you’d be wrong about the protection. Bradley’s are about on par in my research. LAV 6.0 and Brady will take 30 mm off the frontal arc while Pizarro will not, I agree about the TOW / UA ATGM.

The Namer is… well to be me it’s a bit like the Armata, and while it works it’s been produced in very limited numbers. It’s also going to die to a Kornet the same way a LAV will.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> I see this HIFV comment fly around here quite a bit. Can you provide examples of an HIFV and define its protection ? I feel like most of the not a LAV fan posters here have a somewhat … inaccurate view of its frontal and side arc protection and very glossy views of the competition.


Sure.

There are numerous examples of Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicles. I think you could probably go back to WW2 when Canada took the guns out of M7 Priests (which were basically Sherman tanks with the turrets removed and with artillery installed) and used them to carry infantry. They were more armoured personnel carriers instead of fighting vehicles but essentially had the key characteristic being that they had the same cross country capability as the tank and close to the same armour protection but in a very basic way.

The more relevant and modern equivalent is the Namer which effectively uses the Merkava IV tank chassis without a turret and reconfigured for a crew of three with 9 dismounts. Again the key characteristic is that it has the same mobility as the tank it accompanies and has very similar armour protection. The Namer isn't the only HIFV in the Israeli service. They have also converted older tanks to the role - the Achzaritz is a converted T54; the Nagpadon is a converted Centurion. Most Namers have light weaponry and function primarily as infantry carriers but there are also versions with a turreted 30mm and Spike missile launcher capabilities. Rather than turrets I prefer to see something like the Moog Reconfigurable Integrated weapons Platform although I say that with a caveat. I'm not sure how robust these systems would be once artillery splinters start whipping around and I'd like something with some more survivability.

I'd go a step further and say that I'd also like to see armoured engineer vehicles, fitters and recovery vehicles ambulances, CPs and self propelled artillery all on the same chassis to simplify maintenance across the brigade. Armour levels would not need to be the same levels for the vehicles not in direct contact with the enemy. The Russians use basic T72 chassis for many of their CS vehicles.

One big downside. Very heavy fuel consumption and the need for continuous crew maintenance.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Sure.
> 
> There are numerous examples of Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicles. I think you could probably go back to WW2 when Canada took the guns out of M7 Priests (which were basically Sherman tanks with the turrets removed and with artillery installed) and used them to carry infantry. They were more armoured personnel carriers instead of fighting vehicles but essentially had the key characteristic being that they had the same cross country capability as the tank and close to the same armour protection but in a very basic way.
> 
> The more relevant and modern equivalent is the Namer which effectively uses the Merkava IV tank chassis without a turret and reconfigured for a crew of three with 9 dismounts. Again the key characteristic is that it has the same mobility as the tank it accompanies and has very similar armour protection. The Namer isn't the only HIFV in the Israeli service. They have also converted older tanks to the role - the Achzaritz is a converted T54; the Nagpadon is a converted Centurion. Most Namers have light weaponry and function primarily as infantry carriers but there are also versions with a turreted 30mm and Spike missile launcher capabilities. Rather than turrets I prefer to see something like the Moog Reconfigurable Integrated weapons Platform although I say that with a caveat. I'm not sure how robust these systems would be once artillery splinters start whipping around and I'd like something with some more survivability.
> 
> I'd go a step further and say that I'd also like to see armoured engineer vehicles, fitters and recovery vehicles ambulances, CPs and self propelled artillery all on the same chassis to simplify maintenance across the brigade. Armour levels would not need to be the same levels for the vehicles not in direct contact with the enemy. The Russians use basic T72 chassis for many of their CS vehicles.
> 
> One big downside. Very heavy fuel consumption and the need for continuous crew maintenance.
> 
> 🍻


I more meant in service, which leads us to the Namer. There’s only 120 in service so I don’t know that that’s really a successful role out.


----------



## KevinB

UpArmor M2A3 Bradley is a significantly greater armored beast than LAV 6.0 
   But it still isn’t going to survive a 30mm cannon hit with APFSDS-DU. 

I’m talking about the GD AJAX 
 Which has more armor (effective armor due to angle) than the M2A3 Bradley on the front glacis.  
AJAX and CV-90 are quite a bit shorter in the hull than the LAV in height.  AJAX sensors and ATGM do raise the height though to a few inches above the LAV turret.  


I think for a Medium force the LAV is a fantastic vehicle.   I just don’t think any Army can exist effectively with just a medium force.  

I’d create a Hvy Bde, 2 Med Bde and a Light Bde if I was King.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> UpArmor M2A3 Bradley is a significantly greater armored beast than LAV 6.0
> But it still isn’t going to survive a 30mm cannon hit with APFSDS-DU.
> 
> I’m talking about the GD AJAX
> Which has more armor (effective armor due to angle) than the M2A3 Bradley on the front glacis.
> AJAX and CV-90 are quite a bit shorter in the hull than the LAV in height.  AJAX sensors and ATGM do raise the height though to a few inches above the LAV turret.
> 
> 
> I think for a Medium force the LAV is a fantastic vehicle.   I just don’t think any Army can exist effectively with just a medium force.
> 
> I’d create a Hvy Bde, 2 Med Bde and a Light Bde if I was King.
> 
> 
> KevinB said:
> 
> 
> 
> UpArmor M2A3 Bradley is a significantly greater armored beast than LAV 6.0
> But it still isn’t going to survive a 30mm cannon hit with APFSDS-DU.
> 
> I’m talking about the GD AJAX
> Which has more armor (effective armor due to angle) than the M2A3 Bradley on the front glacis.
> AJAX and CV-90 are quite a bit shorter in the hull than the LAV in height.  AJAX sensors and ATGM do raise the height though to a few inches above the LAV turret.
> 
> 
> I think for a Medium force the LAV is a fantastic vehicle.   I just don’t think any Army can exist effectively with just a medium force.
> 
> I’d create a Hvy Bde, 2 Med Bde and a CD
Click to expand...

Well that’s some weird formatting I just did.

Every piece of data I have places an up armoured LAV 6 as taking 30mm across the frontal arc. That puts it on the upper end of IFVs in terms of protection. We can debate the size / capacity / track vs wheeled all day, but if protection is the defining feature then generally speaking any and all IFVs ( Namer included) are going to get destroyed by dedicated AT weapons. Most will resist 14.5 mm, and upper end of protection is 30mm.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> I more meant in service, which leads us to the Namer. There’s only 120 in service so I don’t know that that’s really a successful role out.


I don't think there's anything really in the HIFV class other than that. There are several that come close. CV90 is a purpose built vehicle but not off a tank chassis. The German Puma is getting there. The German Marder and the US M2 Bradley were/are also close. The Ukrainians have done interesting work upgrading old T55s into BMP-55s.

The problem is that most of these are lighter and a different chassis.

I like the idea of a common chassis because if you already have a production line for that then the various variants becomes an easier job, especially subsequent maintenance. The complication with that is that most tanks are rear engine while carriers are front engine. This is where the Merkva/Namer line is different in that both are front engine. That for me is important because the common front engine configuration also allows SP artillery and all other CS and CSS vehicles to get on the same chassis and also provides a bit more protection in that a frontal hit is less likely to enter the fighting compartment. A mobility kill is preferable to an outright kill. Yes, there are now missiles that go for a top kill but that's a redesign and active protection issue that needs addressing. 

I sometimes wonder how easily one could reconfigure a Leo 2 chassis to put the engine up front. The Panzerhaubitze 2000 shares many Leo components and runs with the engine up front. In some respects I wonder how far one could go in simply reversing the chassis. I'm sure its not that simple but don't think it's that complex either. 

If I had to choose today I'd probably go for two to four battalions a Class C protected Puma with Spike added. If we couldn't buy then I'd lease 2-4 battalions of M2's off the Yanks. I'm more interested in seeing where the US is going with their Next Generation Combat Vehicle Program.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

How heavy do you want the Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle to be?


----------



## FJAG

IKnowNothing said:


> ... the idea of equipping and fielding an ABCT equivalent seems downright aspirational


Yup. There's a lot of folks that think that.

On the other hand good deterrence is making the other guy think that if he attacks you he's going to get his ass handed to him. Further, if, on a bad day, he does decide to attack you then you want to be able to hand him his ass. Either way, you need a credible force.

Yup again, you can defend with light infantry and LAV bound infantry but every defence depends on being able to counterattack when there are breakthroughs (and its always when and not if). The short answer is that Strykers were built to transport mounted but fight dismounted. Our LAVs have gotten better armoured and heavier and have a 25mm but essentially its a support vehicle for a dismounted fight. 

Heavy forces aren't invulnerable, but they'll soak up a lot more stuff and remain viable longer than a middle weight force especially a wheeled one which has less mobility.

We've lived with the illusion for the last twenty years where our defence policy says we need to prepare for high intensity combat but lived with the illusion that we wouldn't ever be called on to do that. Hence divesting three regiments of self propelled artillery, one air defence regiment and almost all of our ATGM capability.

We've been quite stupid in that even with some of the failed state scenarios we were up against forces that had heavy but older Soviet armour - Bosnia, Serbia et al. Even Afghanistan had a lot of tanks, BM21s and even FROGs hanging around (luckily really badly managed). Old Soviet armour is everywhere and is still capable of giving you a bad day at the office. 

Sure. It costs more to buy a modern armoured brigade but it doesn't cost much more to run and maintain one than a LAV brigade. The big ticket item year after year is people and an armoured brigade 2 Inf /1 Tank battalion is around 10% lighter on people than a three infantry battalion Stryker brigade. There is virtually no difference in the annual operating cost as between an active army ABCT and an SBCT. Even better, the annual operating cost of a National Guard ABCT and SBCT are the same and are both 1/4 to 1/3 of the cost of an Active army brigade.

There are numerous cost saving options but don't ever cheap out on the gear our people need to fight with. Honestly we could save a whole lot more money if we made much better use of our reserves.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 69661
> 
> How heavy do you want the Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle to be?


That proves nothing vis a vis heavy and light forces.

Would you like me to show you the picture of a soldier ripped to shreds by a 12.5mm?

Everything on a modern battlefield can be killed. Heavy protects you longer and lets you fight back harder.

🍻


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 69661
> 
> How heavy do you want the Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle to be?


Does Russia employ insensitive munitions? These catastrophic kills look like every munition in the vehicle had a sympathetic detonation.


----------



## markppcli

McG said:


> Does Russia employ insensitive munitions? These catastrophic kills look like every munition in the vehicle had a sympathetic detonation.


Oh please no, I can’t be giving dln sensitivity training to belts of 25mm.


----------



## McG

Insensitive munition - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> That proves nothing vis a vis heavy and light forces.
> 
> Would you like me to show you the picture of a soldier ripped to shreds by a 12.5mm?
> 
> Everything on a modern battlefield can be killed. Heavy protects you longer and lets you fight back harder.
> 
> 🍻



I keep hearing that the death of the tank has been predicted before.  And its still here.

That it was predicted when Saggers killed a bunch of WW2 Shermans and Centurions in the Sinai, when Attack Helicopters appeared, when Hellfire replaced TOW, when Brimstone was added to Fighters, with Javelin Fire and Forget, when NLOS/FOG-M became a thing, with the arrival of Drones, with the arrival of Loitering Attack Munitions, and now with NLAWs.  But the tank is still here.

And the common refrain is the Combined Arms Team saves all.

But the other side will use the Combined Arms Team as well.  It too will use weather and terrain and time of day to its advantage.  It too will use artillery to its advantage.  It too will have machine guns to strip away dismounted personnel.  And it may well be dug in with overhead protection in well-sited positions.

And/Or it may pushing hunting teams out to engage in some long range sniping forcing buttoning up, slower advances, more deliberate attacks. Dismounting further from the objectives exposing the dismounts to more of the defender's artillery at safer distances, not having to rely on danger close FPFs and a deep trench.

The fact is that every iteration has seen the defence become more effective, cheaper and lighter and with longer range, while the armour has become thicker, heavier, more complex and more expensive.  And its ability to advance in the face of well supplied light infantry has been degraded.

The tank is not dead.  But it is no longer as dominant on the battlefield as it used to be.  And that is reflected in the declining number of tanks and tank factories in existence.

A $30,000 NLAW with an 800 m range means that a Battalion doesn't have to rely on it 2-4km Javelins at $175,000 a shot to degrade a Combined Arms Attacker.  It doesn't have to rely on the 84mm round for the close battle at 250m.

It can afford to put three or four NLAWs into every fighting trench.  With overhead cover.  From which the NLAW can be fired without the troops having to expose themselves.  And engage any armoured vehicle, light, medium, heavy or Tank, at 800m.   With Javelins being sited for depth fires.

In the hunting mode, ambushes become more survivable by the ambushers because they can engage at longer distances and be more spread out.  This forces the armoured attacker to search more ground more carefully.  To prep more ground with more artillery.  To take more time to find targets and engage them.  To deploy more troops over wider areas to find the ambushers and engage them effectively

It all makes the attacker's job harder while making the defender's job easier.

I think, that while the tank is not dead, that the advantage of heavy armour, over light armour, or even unarmoured vehicles is being reduced to the point where it may not be worth the effort.  Dismount on the objective is not a thing anymore.  If it ever was. 

What has happened is that infantry is going to have to dismount a kilometer off the objective and then use cover and concealment to approach while they are shot onto the objective by all available fires.  Just like they always have.  And tanks, heavy and expensive as they are, are going to have to exercise more care and caution in manoeuvering.

I don't think the tank is dead.  But it will be used with more discretion.
I do think that the logistic cost of a Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle is even less justifiable now than it was previously.
I also think though, that the argument for the LAV6, CV90, PUMA, Bradley, BMPs of the world is getting weaker.  All of them will blow up as easily as a Bison, Grizzly or Saxon or M113.
But all of those had the advantage of being cheap, and so widely distributed, transportable, and amphibious (except for the Saxon).  They enabled troops, infantry and their support, to rapidly get within 1 or 2 km of the enemy, and then decide whether to hold, engage or hit and run.

I wouldn't be building more LAV6s  or ACSVs or Boxers.  I would be building more Bisons.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I don't think the tank is dead. But it will be used with more discretion.


I'll focus on these points. It isn't. It will be. More importantly there will be more development to build anti-ATGM systems. These can be anything for better and more effective armour to cause premature detonation to active defense systems to whatever. If you are already building a five to eight million dollar vehicle it makes sense to throw a few more bucks at it to protect it.



Kirkhill said:


> I do think that the logistic cost of a Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle is even less justifiable now than it was previously.


Let me get back to attack basics 101. What you are seeing here is a great miscalculation of the effects of terrain. Because of the condition of the ground there is very limited manoeuvre going on other than defined roads where ambushes are likely. Combined arms isn't just tanks and HIFV/HAPCs moving down roads. It includes artillery, recce (ground and air), and your own anti-armour and AD. All of these work in concert to create as much of a protective envelope around the attacking force as possible. Recce finds and fixes the enemy's defence positions. Artillery neutralizes those while the attack elements manoeuvre into close contact where they can overrun and overwhelm the opposition.

All those unarmoured tank hunting teams you place in the woods should be cut to shreds by artillery while the heavy elements close.

Of course there will be losses because that's the nature of war. You can't properly prepare for everything. BUT. Without heavy forces you simply cannot attack well in most situations. Where tanks are being blown up now, light infantry advancing would be destroyed by artillery - and even more importantly, mortars - and machine guns. Any supporting light vehicles will be destroyed by very light anti armour weapons including heavy machine guns. Just as importantly you can't do sweeping manoeuvres to bypass kill zones and attack and roll up weak points before they can reform. 

The key to any modern war is a robust command and control system working within a doctrine of true combined arms warfare of all its various components working in harmony. Leave out or misuse any one component and you will take many more casualties than you need to regardless of whether your force is light, medium or heavy. One needs a balanced force.



Kirkhill said:


> I also think though, that the argument for the LAV6, CV90, PUMA, Bradley, BMPs of the world is getting weaker. All of them will blow up as easily as a Bison, Grizzly or Saxon or M113.


The issue is how each is being used. In it's day, the M113 adequately fulfilled its role which was to bring infantry through artillery fire to a dismount area from which they could fight dismounted. It was never designed to be a fighting or fire support vehicle. It's machine gun was a defensive tool. It's only purpose was to stop artillery shell splinters. 

We used AVGPs as a training vehicle for light mechanized warfare but understood quite well that, if required, we would deploy with them - although not Europe. 4 CMBG and CAST were M113 equipped. Again, they stop shell splinters and (maybe) rifle fire but certainly not an HMG.

To be honest we did use them to train in combined arms operations with Cougars. I can't say for sure if this was a legitimate training scenario (if so then what would we use for the real thing - Centurions/Leo1s and M113s?) or just a misuse of the capability. In any event just about anything that can stop a shell splinter is a valuable infantry transport vehicle so long as you do not take it into close contact with the enemy.

Strykers are exactly that. Battlefield taxis with a limited defensive capability. LAVIIIs upped the anti by adding a turret which provided greater firepower but reduced the number of dismounts. IMHO it was bad compromise. The Stryker battalion concept of having a 105mm DFS vehicle in the company was a better solution as it could stand off a good distance. Better yet was the integral 120mm mortar under armour support that every Stryker company had. It was a balanced system which, when further supported by artillery, scouts and air operated as a balanced dismounted infantry force. In contrast Canadian infantry had little artillery, few to no mortars, no stand off direct fire support but did have a honking 25mm which suckered the infantry battle taxis ever closer into the fight. It was doable in Afghanistan against very light infantry but even there they were vulnerable in a more conventional fight like Medusa. Afterwards the enemy changed tactics.

My long winded point here is regardless of what you buy, if you misuse it from its intended purpose and without its intended suite of supporting actors, it will blow up. 

Canada's biggest error was in thinking that artillery in very small numbers using precision guided munitions complemented by drones using the same are the answer. Hitting single targets is great, but when you are up against a dismounted company with a selection of ATGMs then you need to blanket a large area (and frequently multiple outposts) with suppressive artillery and mortar fire so that they can't use those neat little weapons while your tanks and infantry close with great violence onto the objective as the final splinters are still falling. Their armour needs to be strong to protect them from the rain of the enemy's final protective artillery fire which will be raining down on them and whatever direct fire they manage to get off.

I'm not going to try to interpret the final lessons of Ukraine. It's far to early for that. I will say that IMHO we will need to be very careful in the tactical lessons because I think much of what we are seeing here is the result of bad pre-operation intelligence; bad timing vis a vis the condition of the ground and how that would limit operations; and a flawed operational plan that grossly misapprehended the opponent's will and ability to resist. I'll add into that a suspicion that poorly maintained equipment, poorly trained and motivated troops, a crappy logistics system and flawed combined arms tactics also played a role but I'll let others pontificate on that in due course.



Kirkhill said:


> I wouldn't be building more LAV6s or ACSVs or Boxers. I would be building more Bisons.


I actually agree with you on that. Bisons have a valid purpose as I alluded to with respect to my earlier comments about the initial Stryker. I think LAVs and Boxers are Bisons with pretensions of being more than what they are. ACSVs on the other hand I think are very useful, even for a heavy force in that they provide adequate protection for elements that are in passing contact with the enemy. One can argue about how much armour is enough but what bothers me is the loss of dismounts in exchange for a turreted weapons system that draws the vehicle too far forward.

I could see a rifle company with three platoons of large capacity battle taxis to maximize dismounts supported by a weapons platoon using mortars under armour and some form of direct fire support vehicle (more anti bunker/materiel than anti-armour; anti-armour can come from hand held weapons liberally distributed around the company). That's your multi-purpose force. BUT. There needs to be a heavy force as well. Whether that's a combined arms battalion within a mechanized general purpose brigade or, better yet an armoured brigade in a mechanized division depends on the scale you want to look at. Just make sure both of them are adequately supported by cavalry, artillery, a plethora of things that fly and spy and bomb, and CSS. Effectively in defence the heavy element acts as a guard and subsequently reserve and counter attack force while the general purpose elements form your main defensive line. In the attack the heavy force is the spearpoint and the other two the follow-up consolidation force.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

It looks like the BTR-4 is a good piece of kit, kind of like a LAV 6 but with an unmanned, remote control turret.

I don't know how we can justify producing an unarmed APC after what we're seeing happen in this war.


Meet The BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles​
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has produced thousands of images and videos of armored vehicles getting ambushed, destroyed, and abandoned. But there has been relatively little imagery of combat _between_ fighting vehicles.

One notable exception is a recording that surfaced on March 14, taken inside a Ukrainian eight-wheeled BTR-4E infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) skittering frenetically in the streets of Mariupol, a besieged coastal port surrounded by Russian forces.

The recording shows the video feed from the BM-7 _Parus _(“Sail”) weapons turret on top of the vehicle. The gunner remotely controlling the turret is faintly reflected on the monitor.

As indicated on the top left corner of the monitor, the BTR-4’s turret is turned 90 degrees to one side, allowing the vehicle to quickly roll forward and engage adversaries across side streets, then scoot away to escape retaliation.

In the first recorded engagement, the gunner spots a hostile T-72B3 main battle tank a short distance away that could swat the Ukrainian troop carrier like a fly with its 125-millimeter gun.

While the driver hastily rolls away, the gunner has time to rake the unsuspecting T-72’s side armor with 30-millimeter shells, causing small explosions—possibly detonating explosive-reactive armor bricks girding the behemoth.

In the second engagement, the Ukrainian crew ‘peak’ around another intersection and discover a more suitable adversary just around the corner: a BMP-series fighting vehicle (or the BRM-reconnaissance subvariant), its gun turret slewed aside, the feet of disembarked infantry visible beneath its hull.

Being first to spot and shoot is the best predictor of victory in an armored battle. And that’s exactly what happens—before the BMP crew can react, the Ukrainian gunner rotates the turret and pummels the vehicle with cannon fire, causing glowing metal fragments to spray in the air and equipment to fly off.

After overcorrecting the aim downwards, a shot finally slams through the vehicle’s front hull, causing it to erupt in flames. The BTR-4 then rolls back out of the line of fire.

*Ukraine’s troubled warhorse*

This engagement marks a triumph for a truly Ukrainian armored vehicle that has ridden an especially bumpy path over the years.

In the mid-2000s, Ukraine’s arms industry saw an opportunity to sell wheeled infantry fighting vehicles that were more heavily armed and advanced than Russian Soviet-era BTRs then available—but cheaper than Western ones.

It had already developed two evolutions of the Soviet eight-wheeled BTR-80 APC: the BTR-94 armed with a 23-millimeter gun (50 exported to Jordan/Iraq), and the 30-millimeter armed BTR-3, hundreds of which were sold to Myanmar, Nigeria, Thailand, and the UAE.

But these inherited BTR-80’s configuration with the engine situated in the rear, meaning onboard infantry had to awkwardly disembark from a side hatch, rather than more safely from the rear, shielded by the vehicle’s bulk.

For the BTR-4, dubbed the Bucephalus after Alexander the Great’s fierce black warhorse, the Kharkiv Morozov Engineering Design Bureau sought to move past the Soviet design paradigm by situating the engine between the crew (who could exit from slanted side doors at the front) and the infantry, who could now exit via doors to the rear. This also made it easier to install varied modular systems in the hull.

*Indeed, the Bucephalus could mount a variety of weapons turrets, but the only operational configuration uses the remote-control BM-7 Parus turret, which doesn’t take up space inside the hull, leaving room for 7-8 embarked infantry.*

The BM-7 sports a 30-millimeter autocannon, a KT 7.62-millimeter machinegun, and six 81-millimeter smoke grenade dischargers. The cannon (akin to Russian 2A72) is effective out to 1.24 miles, and can penetrate just over 1” of armor at 1 kilometer: adequate to threaten other Soviet-era IFVs and APCs, less so heavier IFVs like the M2 Bradley.









						Meet the BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles
					

Ukraine’s BTR-4E will play an important role not only in defending Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Mariupol, but by transporting infantry as well.




					www.19fortyfive.com


----------



## WLSC

Brad Sallows said:


> How, exactly?


By having the leadership mind set on the job and focussing on op’s, training etc instead of dealing with toxic work atmosphere. Here something that comes from wayyyyyy back when:


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I'll focus on these points. It isn't. It will be. More importantly there will be more development to build anti-ATGM systems. These can be anything for better and more effective armour to cause premature detonation to active defense systems to whatever. If you are already building a five to eight million dollar vehicle it makes sense to throw a few more bucks at it to protect it.



Apparently the Trophy system adds 900,000 to a 4,500,000 Merkava.  So that means that adding Trophy to 5 tanks means you can't afford to buy the 6th one.  It all tends to reduce the number of 120mm guns available at the front of the column.   And it makes the tanks harder to keep on line and to repair and replace.

I still claim advantage defence.



FJAG said:


> Let me get back to attack basics 101. What you are seeing here is a great miscalculation of the effects of terrain. Because of the condition of the ground there is very limited manoeuvre going on other than defined roads where ambushes are likely.


My read is similar.









						Operation Market Garden - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




10 days to advance 100 km on elevated roads in flat, swampy ground dotted with farms, hamlets, villages and towns, broken by bridges and culverts and with a carpet of an Airborne Corps of 42,000 to prepare the way.

The difference now is that the anti-tank weaponry is more numerous and more effective.




FJAG said:


> Combined arms isn't just tanks and HIFV/HAPCs moving down roads.



Agreed



FJAG said:


> It includes artillery, recce (ground and air), and your own anti-armour and AD. All of these work in concert to create as much of a protective envelope around the attacking force as possible.



Accepted



FJAG said:


> Recce finds and fixes the enemy's defence positions.



Except than now Recce has to look for two people with a Javelin in the tall grass 4 km away.



FJAG said:


> Artillery neutralizes those



Except that Artillery now has to suppress 4 km in front of the lead elements and 4 km to either side of the elevated road down the entire length of the column and 4 km to its rear.  Requiring more shells and more time and more trucks and more guns.  All of which are more vulnerable to two women with a Javelin or an NLAW that could be anywhere from 20m away, in a shed, a hole in the ground or behind a bush to 4000 m.

You're going to need more ground pounders advancing at 1-4 km/h over an 4 km frontage to sweep that ground and keep it clear.  Your guns and ammo dumps are also going to need more security.  As will your ammo trucks - and you will need to allow for more wastage due to undelivered cargo.



FJAG said:


> while the attack elements manoeuvre into close contact where they can overrun and overwhelm the opposition.



And that will take more time allowing the defenders more time to improve their defences, thicken their overhead cover and stock up on NLAWs and Javelins.




FJAG said:


> All those unarmoured tank hunting teams you place in the woods should be cut to shreds by artillery while the heavy elements close.



See comments above on the impact of suppressing a wider area.



FJAG said:


> Of course there will be losses because that's the nature of war. You can't properly prepare for everything.



Agreed



FJAG said:


> BUT. Without heavy forces you simply cannot attack well in most situations.



Despite your caveats I disagree.  If need be effective attacks can be launched with clubs and rocks.



FJAG said:


> Where tanks are being blown up now, light infantry advancing would be destroyed by artillery - and even more importantly, mortars - and machine guns.



Agreed.



FJAG said:


> Any supporting light vehicles will be destroyed by very light anti armour weapons including heavy machine guns.



Agreed



FJAG said:


> Just as importantly you can't do sweeping manoeuvres to bypass kill zones and attack and roll up weak points before they can reform.



Disagreed.

You can sweep out of contact in a light vehicle just as well as, if not better than, in a heavy vehicle.  Or you can sweep out of contact in a helicopter.  And use ground to get within  2 to 4 km of the enemy.

And, on the gruesome subject of losses, infantry are easier to replace than tanks.  And, again, with longer ranged, more accurate, more effective weapons available to the infantry they can be dispersed over a wider area.  Again necessitating more artillery to effectively suppress the area.

And we need to remember the defenders will likely have artillery.  And while the defender can be more dispersed the attacker still has to concentrate making an easier target.




FJAG said:


> The key to any modern war is a robust command and control system working within a doctrine of true combined arms warfare of all its various components working in harmony. Leave out or misuse any one component and you will take many more casualties than you need to regardless of whether your force is light, medium or heavy. One needs a balanced force.



Absolutely


FJAG said:


> The issue is how each is being used.


We agree




FJAG said:


> In it's day, the M113 adequately fulfilled its role which was to bring infantry through artillery fire to a dismount area from which they could fight dismounted. It was never designed to be a fighting or fire support vehicle. It's machine gun was a defensive tool. It's only purpose was to stop artillery shell splinters.


The difference is that I think we have pursued the IFV to its logical evolutionary conclusion, just as pavis, mantlet and cuirasse all reached theirs.  
I believe that the M113s still in American, Italian and Spanish inventory, and Stormers and Scimitars and Strikers and Scorpions also all have value.   As does the Bison.

The Germans touted the Leo 1 over the Challenger on the basis that it traded Protection for Mobility.  I am saying that they were right.  That it is more important to be able to get a 120mm gun to the fight than it is to be able to protect the gun in the fight.



Italy hedges its bets by making and deploying both.




FJAG said:


> We used AVGPs as a training vehicle for light mechanized warfare but understood quite well that, if required, we would deploy with them - although not Europe. 4 CMBG and CAST were M113 equipped. Again, they stop shell splinters and (maybe) rifle fire but certainly not an HMG.



Stipulated.  But they got the infantry to the fight, allowed them to debus out of contact in a concealed position so that they didn't have to advance to contact after a 40 mile, 24 hour hike like their WW1 forebears.



FJAG said:


> To be honest we did use them to train in combined arms operations with Cougars. I can't say for sure if this was a legitimate training scenario (if so then what would we use for the real thing - Centurions/Leo1s and M113s?) or just a misuse of the capability.



Every time I saw a Boat with the doors opening I saw troops storming Dieppe, Juno or Kwajalein.  In all those amphibious scenarios there was no option than to dismount on the objective (although even that is debatable).  In land warfare I don't think it is too much to ask a well rested, well fed and refreshed infanteer dismounting from a nice comfortable AVGP or Griffon to hike 5 km in Fighting Order to reach a Form Up Point.



FJAG said:


> In any event just about anything that can stop a shell splinter is a valuable infantry transport vehicle so long as you do not take it into close contact with the enemy.



Agreed


FJAG said:


> Strykers are exactly that. Battlefield taxis with a limited defensive capability.


Yep.



FJAG said:


> LAVIIIs upped the anti by adding a turret which provided greater firepower but reduced the number of dismounts. IMHO it was bad compromise.


Agreed



FJAG said:


> The Stryker battalion concept of having a 105mm DFS vehicle in the company was a better solution as it could stand off a good distance. Better yet was the integral 120mm mortar under armour support that every Stryker company had.


Agreed and Agreed



FJAG said:


> It was a balanced system which, when further supported by artillery, scouts and air operated as a balanced dismounted infantry force.


Agreed again.



FJAG said:


> In contrast Canadian infantry had little artillery, few to no mortars, no stand off direct fire support but did have a honking 25mm which suckered the infantry battle taxis ever closer into the fight. It was doable in Afghanistan against very light infantry but even there they were vulnerable in a more conventional fight like Medusa. Afterwards the enemy changed tactics.


Agreed.



FJAG said:


> My long winded point here is regardless of what you buy, if you misuse it from its intended purpose and without its intended suite of supporting actors, it will blow up.



Absolutely and that is true of everything from PBI to MBT.



FJAG said:


> Canada's biggest error was in thinking that artillery in very small numbers using precision guided munitions complemented by drones using the same are the answer.



Agreed.



FJAG said:


> Hitting single targets is great, but when you are up against a dismounted company with a selection of ATGMs then you need to blanket a large area (and frequently multiple outposts) with suppressive artillery and mortar fire so that they can't use those neat little weapons while your tanks and infantry close with great violence onto the objective as the final splinters are still falling.



I think we disagree on the area that needs blanketing and the logistic effort necessary to sustain that blanket.  It is not good enough to sweep the area.  It has to be kept swept.   And all those guns, shells, trucks and ammo dumps are vulnerable to a lucky shot from two kids 800 m away.



FJAG said:


> Their armour needs to be strong to protect them from the rain of the enemy's final protective artillery fire which will be raining down on them and whatever direct fire they manage to get off.



You may be protected from FPF but buttoned up, in the absence of infantry who, even if they are with you in HIFVs, are also buttoned up, you are vulnerable from 800 m to NLAWs in foxholes fired from enclosed spaces while protected from your own offensive fires.

They are moving to the point where the ATGMs will do to the Tanks what Maxims did on the First Day of the Somme.

Machine guns didn't stop the infantry fight but it changed it.  ATGMs are not stopping the armoured fight but they are changing it.



FJAG said:


> I'm not going to try to interpret the final lessons of Ukraine. It's far to early for that. I will say that IMHO we will need to be very careful in the tactical lessons because I think much of what we are seeing here is the result of bad pre-operation intelligence; bad timing vis a vis the condition of the ground and how that would limit operations; and a flawed operational plan that grossly misapprehended the opponent's will and ability to resist. I'll add into that a suspicion that poorly maintained equipment, poorly trained and motivated troops, a crappy logistics system and flawed combined arms tactics also played a role but I'll let others pontificate on that in due course.



Agreed.


FJAG said:


> I actually agree with you on that. Bisons have a valid purpose as I alluded to with respect to my earlier comments about the initial Stryker. I think LAVs and Boxers are Bisons with pretensions of being more than what they are. ACSVs on the other hand I think are very useful, even for a heavy force in that they provide adequate protection for elements that are in passing contact with the enemy. One can argue about how much armour is enough but what bothers me is the loss of dismounts in exchange for a turreted weapons system that draws the vehicle too far forward.






FJAG said:


> I could see a rifle company with three platoons of large capacity battle taxis to maximize dismounts supported by a weapons platoon using mortars under armour and some form of direct fire support vehicle (more anti bunker/materiel than anti-armour; anti-armour can come from hand held weapons liberally distributed around the company). That's your multi-purpose force. BUT. There needs to be a heavy force as well. Whether that's a combined arms battalion within a mechanized general purpose brigade or, better yet an armoured brigade in a mechanized division depends on the scale you want to look at. Just make sure both of them are adequately supported by cavalry, artillery, a plethora of things that fly and spy and bomb, and CSS. Effectively in defence the heavy element acts as a guard and subsequently reserve and counter attack force while the general purpose elements form your main defensive line. In the attack the heavy force is the spearpoint and the other two the follow-up consolidation force.
> 
> 🍻



I don't disagree with the need for the Heavy Force.  I just think that they are more likely to be reserved in the rear for the counter strike, advancing, or defending,  behind a light, widely dispersed force eating away at the enemy and creating the opportunity for that counter attack to be as effective as possible.

But I am still not convinced of the value of a HIFV.   LAV6s, Pumas, CV90s, Bradleys will probably suffice to protect the occupants from that rain of Artillery FPFs you were concerned about.  But HIFV or LAV6 or Bison.  The infantry will still be advancing on their feet, in the open, making whatever use they can of the terrain.  Dodging shot and shell.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> It looks like the BTR-4 is a good piece of kit, kind of like a LAV 6 but with an unmanned, remote control turret.
> 
> I don't know how we can justify producing an unarmed APC after what we're seeing happen in this war.
> 
> 
> Meet The BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles​
> Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has produced thousands of images and videos of armored vehicles getting ambushed, destroyed, and abandoned. But there has been relatively little imagery of combat _between_ fighting vehicles.
> 
> One notable exception is a recording that surfaced on March 14, taken inside a Ukrainian eight-wheeled BTR-4E infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) skittering frenetically in the streets of Mariupol, a besieged coastal port surrounded by Russian forces.
> 
> The recording shows the video feed from the BM-7 _Parus _(“Sail”) weapons turret on top of the vehicle. The gunner remotely controlling the turret is faintly reflected on the monitor.
> 
> As indicated on the top left corner of the monitor, the BTR-4’s turret is turned 90 degrees to one side, allowing the vehicle to quickly roll forward and engage adversaries across side streets, then scoot away to escape retaliation.
> 
> In the first recorded engagement, the gunner spots a hostile T-72B3 main battle tank a short distance away that could swat the Ukrainian troop carrier like a fly with its 125-millimeter gun.
> 
> While the driver hastily rolls away, the gunner has time to rake the unsuspecting T-72’s side armor with 30-millimeter shells, causing small explosions—possibly detonating explosive-reactive armor bricks girding the behemoth.
> 
> In the second engagement, the Ukrainian crew ‘peak’ around another intersection and discover a more suitable adversary just around the corner: a BMP-series fighting vehicle (or the BRM-reconnaissance subvariant), its gun turret slewed aside, the feet of disembarked infantry visible beneath its hull.
> 
> Being first to spot and shoot is the best predictor of victory in an armored battle. And that’s exactly what happens—before the BMP crew can react, the Ukrainian gunner rotates the turret and pummels the vehicle with cannon fire, causing glowing metal fragments to spray in the air and equipment to fly off.
> 
> After overcorrecting the aim downwards, a shot finally slams through the vehicle’s front hull, causing it to erupt in flames. The BTR-4 then rolls back out of the line of fire.
> 
> *Ukraine’s troubled warhorse*
> 
> This engagement marks a triumph for a truly Ukrainian armored vehicle that has ridden an especially bumpy path over the years.
> 
> In the mid-2000s, Ukraine’s arms industry saw an opportunity to sell wheeled infantry fighting vehicles that were more heavily armed and advanced than Russian Soviet-era BTRs then available—but cheaper than Western ones.
> 
> It had already developed two evolutions of the Soviet eight-wheeled BTR-80 APC: the BTR-94 armed with a 23-millimeter gun (50 exported to Jordan/Iraq), and the 30-millimeter armed BTR-3, hundreds of which were sold to Myanmar, Nigeria, Thailand, and the UAE.
> 
> But these inherited BTR-80’s configuration with the engine situated in the rear, meaning onboard infantry had to awkwardly disembark from a side hatch, rather than more safely from the rear, shielded by the vehicle’s bulk.
> 
> For the BTR-4, dubbed the Bucephalus after Alexander the Great’s fierce black warhorse, the Kharkiv Morozov Engineering Design Bureau sought to move past the Soviet design paradigm by situating the engine between the crew (who could exit from slanted side doors at the front) and the infantry, who could now exit via doors to the rear. This also made it easier to install varied modular systems in the hull.
> 
> *Indeed, the Bucephalus could mount a variety of weapons turrets, but the only operational configuration uses the remote-control BM-7 Parus turret, which doesn’t take up space inside the hull, leaving room for 7-8 embarked infantry.*
> 
> The BM-7 sports a 30-millimeter autocannon, a KT 7.62-millimeter machinegun, and six 81-millimeter smoke grenade dischargers. The cannon (akin to Russian 2A72) is effective out to 1.24 miles, and can penetrate just over 1” of armor at 1 kilometer: adequate to threaten other Soviet-era IFVs and APCs, less so heavier IFVs like the M2 Bradley.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Meet the BTR-4: Watch Ukraine’s “Bucephalus” Blast Russian Armored Vehicles
> 
> 
> Ukraine’s BTR-4E will play an important role not only in defending Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Mariupol, but by transporting infantry as well.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.19fortyfive.com



But does the vehicle with the 30mm cannon need to be carrying a section of troops in the rear while it is "skittering" around streets?

Or would a Scimitar (with a Bushmaster) get the same job done without putting a section of infantry at risk?  And the Scimitar would make a smaller target.

The infantry could be in the area in a Stormer, or Bison.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> But does the vehicle with the 30mm cannon need to be carrying a section of troops in the rear while it is "skittering" around streets?
> 
> Or would a Scimitar (with a Bushmaster) get the same job done without putting a section of infantry at risk?  And the Scimitar would make a smaller target.
> 
> The infantry could be in the area in a Stormer, or Bison.


Stormer with with RT60 (the 40mm and a pair of spikes) for  "skittering"
Stormer with an RS4 for the full 8 man section's in the area
Stormer with HMV
Stormer with a Nemo turret


----------



## Brad Sallows

> By having the leadership mind set on the job and focussing on op’s, training etc instead of dealing with toxic work atmosphere. Here something that comes from wayyyyyy back when:



Sure. But "diversity" is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for that.


----------



## WLSC

Brad Sallows said:


> Sure. But "diversity" is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for that.


Forget the « quotas ».  Diversity is link with inclusiveness, that’s it.  The way it’s coming out is not totally what it’s all about.  Read the pic I’ve put above.  It’s a modern, cloud shoveler version of what that pic says, that’s it.


----------



## Brad Sallows

If it's about something else, the people in charge should stop burping up bullsh!t talking points, then, and be specific about what it really does that is useful.


----------



## KevinB

Right now our enemies don’t have items like NLAW, Javelin or Spike - so NATO tanks are still fairly immune \ and have time to perfect a active Anti Missile system.


----------



## MilEME09

I am hoping it's safe to sat the CAF assumption of no new funding for F2025 is now out the window. There are a number of projects being discussed that if they were fast tracked (and some would be simple sole sourcing) could get us upto speed very quickly with addition kit needed including AA, more AT, motor carriers, etc...


----------



## dapaterson

Industry capacity is a concern, along with availability of raw materials.

And any ramp up needs infra investment and divestment, and people to manage the projects... There's no "Easy!" button.


----------



## KevinB

Good WP tube BNVD’s 
Suppressors for individual weapons, and belt feds 
MFAL (multi function aiming laser - I’m predisposed to the BE Meyers MAWL-DA) 
   For everyone


----------



## WLSC

Brad Sallows said:


> If it's about something else, the people in charge should stop burping up bullsh!t talking points, then, and be specific about what it really does that is useful.


L0 and L1 are saying it.  As soon it’s out the door, it’s like everything else, it’s distorted.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Surely people that highly placed have figured out that paeans to "diversity" are meaningless, and that meaningless babble does nothing to reassure people that the babblers have things in hand?


----------



## WLSC

Brad Sallows said:


> Surely people that highly placed have figured out that paeans to "diversity" are meaningless, and that meaningless babble does nothing to reassure people that the babblers have things in hand?


We are sooooo good in comms/talking points…  They know it’s badly, really badly sell.


----------



## WLSC

Brad Sallows said:


> Surely people that highly placed have figured out that paeans to "diversity" are meaningless, and that meaningless babble does nothing to reassure people that the babblers have things in hand?


The point is there’s a reshuffle of all these word IOT make everything digestible so we stop changing everything for buss word and the taste of the day.  We are not the only one is this boat it’s just that everything seems/are stopping for that.  It should be simple thing like respect everyone, be fair, be just etc so we can do our job.


----------



## IKnowNothing

So lets say the government -in conjunction with the CDS- comes out tomorrow with the requirement (and funding) for
All 3 armoured regiments to be fully tracked, two 14 tank squadrons, two 14 veh of cav or mech infantry
All the Lav battions to have organic mortars and AT
Artillery to have self propelled guns
Artillery to stand up a battery of GBAD per CMBG
a 4th full CMBG set of kit to the above standards to be prepositioned in Europe

What are the avenues to do so and how fast could it be done, ex.
      How long for GDLS to crank out the AT and Mortar Lav hulls and ISC's for two more battalions?
      Will anyone sell us surplus equipment with all of Europe rearming (and if so, what?)
       If not, how long would procurement of stuff off the production line take? (assuming UOR issued within the month)
      Could we meet the maintenance and logistics requirements to field that, and if not, how long to add that capability?
      How long to integrate these capabilities and train to a deployable level?

Thanks


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> But does the vehicle with the 30mm cannon need to be carrying a section of troops in the rear while it is "skittering" around streets?
> 
> Or would a Scimitar (with a Bushmaster) get the same job done without putting a section of infantry at risk?  And the Scimitar would make a smaller target.
> 
> The infantry could be in the area in a Stormer, or Bison.


1. No but it’s sure nice that it can when needed.
2. Yes, but it’s sure nice that the infantry is there to secure and clear that build up area around it (something about at teams?)
3. Could be but then we’re talking about just more “stuff.”


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> What are the avenues to do so and how fast could it be done, ex.
> How long for GDLS to crank out the AT and Mortar Lav hulls and ISC's for two more battalions?
> Will anyone sell us surplus equipment with all of Europe rearming (and if so, what?)
> If not, how long would procurement of stuff off the production line take? (assuming UOR issued within the month)
> Could we meet the maintenance and logistics requirements to field that, and if not, how long to add that capability?
> How long to integrate these capabilities and train to a deployable level?
> 
> Thanks


It’s take multiple years unless we decide to rapidly transition the ACSVs to mortar and atgm carriers. A single fleet would mitigate the maintenance cost but the real problem there is actually keeping maintainers around, that’s a separate issue.

Training will take time; we’re 4 year in to the return of TOW and I just saw an AAR point from an ex in Ft Polk referencing the need to have a 79A in the Bn CP. We have the play books but have forgotten how to play the sport.

A note on the mortar carriers: under armour is obviously ideal, but the option to tow heavy mortars behind a protected carrier also exists and still allows for rapid redeployment. The Slovenians had a really good set up for theirs, the trailers even had slots for ready rounds.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> 1. No but it’s sure nice that it can when needed.
> 2. Yes, but it’s sure nice that the infantry is there to secure and clear that build up area around it (something about at teams?)
> 3. Could be but then we’re talking about just more “stuff.”



I speak from the perspective of a guy with claustrophobic tendencies that prefers to see what's going on around him rather than being locked in a filing cabinet in case he comes in handy some day.

I get the need for the infantry to be there to assist with the team work, but frankly I would rather be on my feet than in a can.  And if I am hit then I won't be taking half-a-dozen or so of my buddies with me.  You'll still have five team mates to work with.   And as big as I am these days, I still make a smaller target than a LAV.

So, if you are giving me a lift into town, let me out before you start getting into a discussion with the locals.  It'll probably do us both more good.

I still think you would be better off with me getting a lift in an armoured truck and getting out while you get something smaller, and more manoeuverable than a LAV to tackle the locals.


----------



## Ostrozac

IKnowNothing said:


> All 3 armoured regiments to be fully tracked, two 14 tank squadrons, two 14 veh of cav or mech infantry


As it stands now? This dies on the twins altar of corps/regimental politics and infrastructure. Petawawa and Valcartier are grossly insufficient for heavy forces — they could each barely support a single squadron of Leopard 1. A regiment of Leopard 2? Each? When you’ve already ripped up the railheads? You’ll be upgrading roads and bridges for decades. That was, as I understand it, what was driving the push to ‘heavy’ up 1 Brigade, but that leads to an unbalanced asymmetrical army, and also violates two more of our sacred cows, the regimental system and bilingualism —if you put the RCD and 12RBC in Edmonton, and move 1VP and 3VP to Pet and Val, you have mixed infantry battalions on the same garrisons, French families in Edmonton and English families in Valcartier.

Not that you can’t do these things. But the barriers are more than fiscal, they are deeply cultural.


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:


> As it stands now? This dies on the twins altar of corps/regimental politics and infrastructure. Petawawa and Valcartier are grossly insufficient for heavy forces — they could each barely support a single squadron of Leopard 1. A regiment of Leopard 2? Each? When you’ve already ripped up the railheads? You’ll be upgrading roads and bridges for decades. That was, as I understand it, what was driving the push to ‘heavy’ up 1 Brigade, but that leads to an unbalanced asymmetrical army, and also violates two more of our sacred cows, the regimental system and bilingualism —if you put the RCD and 12RBC in Edmonton, and move 1VP and 3VP to Pet and Val, you have mixed infantry battalions on the same garrisons, French families in Edmonton and English families in Valcartier.
> 
> Not that you can’t do these things. But the barriers are more than fiscal, they are deeply cultural.


Sacred cows should be butchered for the post exercise barbecue.

I don't think that you need three tank regiments in Canada unless you have three armoured brigades. I think you can get by with two Total Force tank regiments: one in Edmonton with two RegF and one ResF squadron  under 1 CMBG as an armoured brigade together with two LAV battalions and the second a Total Force regiment in Alberta using one RegF squadron and two ResF squadrons. It can be part of a Total Force, ResF heavy armoured brigade from western Canada and parts of Ontario to round out the numbers. 

Let 5 CMBG be a medium brigade with three LAV battalions and a cavalry regiment and 2 CMBG be something light.

🍻


----------



## WLSC

FJAG said:


> Sacred cows should be butchered for the post exercise barbecue.
> 
> I don't think that you need three tank regiments in Canada unless you have three armoured brigades. I think you can get by with two Total Force tank regiments: one in Edmonton with two RegF and one ResF squadron  under 1 CMBG as an armoured brigade together with two LAV battalions and the second a Total Force regiment in Alberta using one RegF squadron and two ResF squadrons. It can be part of a Total Force, ResF heavy armoured brigade from western Canada and parts of Ontario to round out the numbers.
> 
> Let 5 CMBG be a medium brigade with three LAV battalions and a cavalry regiment and 2 CMBG be something light.
> 
> 🍻


That’s the pragmatic view.  Emotion will sadly bring that back to status quo.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I speak from the perspective of a guy with claustrophobic tendencies that prefers to see what's going on around him rather than being locked in a filing cabinet in case he comes in handy some day.
> 
> I get the need for the infantry to be there to assist with the team work, but frankly I would rather be on my feet than in a can.  And if I am hit then I won't be taking half-a-dozen or so of my buddies with me.  You'll still have five team mates to work with.   And as big as I am these days, I still make a smaller target than a LAV.
> 
> So, if you are giving me a lift into town, let me out before you start getting into a discussion with the locals.  It'll probably do us both more good.
> 
> I still think you would be better off with me getting a lift in an armoured truck and getting out while you get something smaller, and more manoeuverable than a LAV to tackle the locals.


You’re implying that this is a one or the other situation. That mechanized forces don’t dismount their guys before a built up area and then have mutually supporting elements. Ie the Infantry clearing the buildings while the IFVs are cut offs and in this case able to destroy the other AFVs. All in one tidy package, that can get places quickly, and protected from artillery.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Thanks @Ostrozac .  I didn't know about the limitations of those two bases.  That makes the situation incredibly frustrating as an outsider/tax payer. If symmetry is a functional impossibility, why are we even paying lip service to it? I apologize if this comes off as ignorant/arrogant, but it seems like if you toss aside symmetry and allow PY's to be re-assigned within CMBG's regardless of cap badge it becomes a fairly straight forward exercise.

De- Lav one of the eastern brigade groups.  Three pure and air mobile LIB's, with M777's and the armoured regiment in TAPV's (with some/many upgunned with RS6 low recoil 30mm and Javelin).

Frees up 2 battalions worth of Lavs (~80 ISC and 25~CP?) and two LIB's worth of PY's (National need for LIB's is covered from the light brigade)

Armour 
use PY's from the LIB's to reinforce the regiments to 4x 14 vehicle squadrons with the same structure, one heavy (out west) one medium
1x Recce (LRSS)
2x Tank/ FSV (Leo / Lav FSV)
1x Mech Infantry (IFV /Lav 6)

For the IFV UOR _something_ in the short term. M2A3's, CV9035's, anything with tracks, ATGM, and the requisite protection level, to support and keep up with the tanks in the attack
For the Lav FSV re-turret 30 of the now surplus 6's with RT60 40mm w/ twin ATGM.  No temptation for anyone to pretend it's a tank, but enough teeth to matter
Tanks -upgrade or trade, standardize the damn fleet (just the 40 gun tanks)

Infantry
Take 36 of the remaining surplus lav's -18 get re-turreted with the NEMO (or preferably AMOS) mortar system, 18 get upgraded with dual ATGM added to the turret, a dismount firing post in the back.  Crew these from the LIB's (roughly 2 of the 3 companies accounted for). Platoon each per batallion.   That's 66 of 105 surplus lavs accounted for. Take 34 and re-turret with IM-SHORAD, use the remaining light company to crew it.


2 Brigades, both with GBAD one with a heavy combined arms battalion, one with a medium, all lav battalions with AT and mortars under armour, only fleet (chassis) addition is the tracked IFV's, total fleet only goes up by 15.

Now, assuming 2 tanks and two 2 LRSS left as spares with the Brigades, that leaves 10 tanks, 36 LRSS, 15 LAV. 
Option A- keep as stock
Option B- an extra tank platoon to each of the tank squadrons, a recce troop to all 5 lav based battalions/regiment, remainder to stock
Option C- Purchases of an additional 20 tanks, 14 IFV's, and 28 Lav FSV allow for the  preposition of a full set of regimental kit for both armoured regiments.

SPG's looked after by diverting the 3rd Lav brigade's ACSV production to be married with the artillery gun module as fast as can be done.


I'm sure I missed things, I know none of it is as easy as I wrote it, and that it will never happen for a myriad of reasons. But if an idiot civilian like me can get anywhere in the ballpark (I think I am?) of delivering a more capable and comprehensive force structure without changing manpower or the number of vehicles in the fleet, while staying committed to the LAV and the regimental structure, why are we not there?

Sorry.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> Thanks @Ostrozac .  I didn't know about the limitations of those two bases.  That makes the situation incredibly frustrating as an outsider/tax payer. If symmetry is a functional impossibility, why are we even paying lip service to it? I apologize if this comes off as ignorant/arrogant, but it seems like if you toss aside symmetry and allow PY's to be re-assigned within CMBG's regardless of cap badge it becomes a fairly straight forward exercise.
> 
> De- Lav one of the eastern brigade groups.  Three pure and air mobile LIB's, with M777's and the armoured regiment in TAPV's (with some/many upgunned with RS6 low recoil 30mm and Javelin).
> 
> Frees up 2 battalions worth of Lavs (~80 ISC and 25~CP?) and two LIB's worth of PY's (National need for LIB's is covered from the light brigade)
> 
> Armour
> use PY's from the LIB's to reinforce the regiments to 4x 14 vehicle squadrons with the same structure, one heavy (out west) one medium
> 1x Recce (LRSS)
> 2x Tank/ FSV (Leo / Lav FSV)
> 1x Mech Infantry (IFV /Lav 6)
> 
> For the IFV UOR _something_ in the short term. M2A3's, CV9035's, anything with tracks, ATGM, and the requisite protection level, to support and keep up with the tanks in the attack
> For the Lav FSV re-turret 30 of the now surplus 6's with RT60 40mm w/ twin ATGM.  No temptation for anyone to pretend it's a tank, but enough teeth to matter
> Tanks -upgrade or trade, standardize the damn fleet (just the 40 gun tanks)
> 
> Infantry
> Take 36 of the remaining surplus lav's -18 get re-turreted with the NEMO (or preferably AMOS) mortar system, 18 get upgraded with dual ATGM added to the turret, a dismount firing post in the back.  Crew these from the LIB's (roughly 2 of the 3 companies accounted for). Platoon each per batallion.   That's 66 of 105 surplus lavs accounted for. Take 34 and re-turret with IM-SHORAD, use the remaining light company to crew it.
> 
> 
> 2 Brigades, both with GBAD one with a heavy combined arms battalion, one with a medium, all lav battalions with AT and mortars under armour, only fleet (chassis) addition is the tracked IFV's, total fleet only goes up by 15.
> 
> Now, assuming 2 tanks and two 2 LRSS left as spares with the Brigades, that leaves 10 tanks, 36 LRSS, 15 LAV.
> Option A- keep as stock
> Option B- an extra tank platoon to each of the tank squadrons, a recce troop to all 5 lav based battalions/regiment, remainder to stock
> Option C- Purchases of an additional 20 tanks, 14 IFV's, and 28 Lav FSV allow for the  preposition of a full set of regimental kit for both armoured regiments.
> 
> SPG's looked after by diverting the 3rd Lav brigade's ACSV production to be married with the artillery gun module as fast as can be done.
> 
> 
> I'm sure I missed things, I know none of it is as easy as I wrote it, and that it will never happen for a myriad of reasons. But if an idiot civilian like me can get anywhere in the ballpark (I think I am?) of delivering a more capable and comprehensive force structure without changing manpower or the number of vehicles in the fleet, while staying committed to the LAV and the regimental structure, why are we not there?
> 
> Sorry.





IKnowNothing said:


> Thanks @Ostrozac .  I didn't know about the limitations of those two bases.  That makes the situation incredibly frustrating as an outsider/tax payer. If symmetry is a functional impossibility, why are we even paying lip service to it? I apologize if this comes off as ignorant/arrogant, but it seems like if you toss aside symmetry and allow PY's to be re-assigned within CMBG's regardless of cap badge it becomes a fairly straight forward exercise.
> 
> De- Lav one of the eastern brigade groups.  Three pure and air mobile LIB's, with M777's and the armoured regiment in TAPV's (with some/many upgunned with RS6 low recoil 30mm and Javelin).
> 
> Frees up 2 battalions worth of Lavs (~80 ISC and 25~CP?) and two LIB's worth of PY's (National need for LIB's is covered from the light brigade)
> 
> Armour
> use PY's from the LIB's to reinforce the regiments to 4x 14 vehicle squadrons with the same structure, one heavy (out west) one medium
> 1x Recce (LRSS)
> 2x Tank/ FSV (Leo / Lav FSV)
> 1x Mech Infantry (IFV /Lav 6)
> 
> For the IFV UOR _something_ in the short term. M2A3's, CV9035's, anything with tracks, ATGM, and the requisite protection level, to support and keep up with the tanks in the attack
> For the Lav FSV re-turret 30 of the now surplus 6's with RT60 40mm w/ twin ATGM.  No temptation for anyone to pretend it's a tank, but enough teeth to matter
> Tanks -upgrade or trade, standardize the damn fleet (just the 40 gun tanks)
> 
> Infantry
> Take 36 of the remaining surplus lav's -18 get re-turreted with the NEMO (or preferably AMOS) mortar system, 18 get upgraded with dual ATGM added to the turret, a dismount firing post in the back.  Crew these from the LIB's (roughly 2 of the 3 companies accounted for). Platoon each per batallion.   That's 66 of 105 surplus lavs accounted for. Take 34 and re-turret with IM-SHORAD, use the remaining light company to crew it.
> 
> 
> 2 Brigades, both with GBAD one with a heavy combined arms battalion, one with a medium, all lav battalions with AT and mortars under armour, only fleet (chassis) addition is the tracked IFV's, total fleet only goes up by 15.
> 
> Now, assuming 2 tanks and two 2 LRSS left as spares with the Brigades, that leaves 10 tanks, 36 LRSS, 15 LAV.
> Option A- keep as stock
> Option B- an extra tank platoon to each of the tank squadrons, a recce troop to all 5 lav based battalions/regiment, remainder to stock
> Option C- Purchases of an additional 20 tanks, 14 IFV's, and 28 Lav FSV allow for the  preposition of a full set of regimental kit for both armoured regiments.
> 
> SPG's looked after by diverting the 3rd Lav brigade's ACSV production to be married with the artillery gun module as fast as can be done.
> 
> 
> I'm sure I missed things, I know none of it is as easy as I wrote it, and that it will never happen for a myriad of reasons. But if an idiot civilian like me can get anywhere in the ballpark (I think I am?) of delivering a more capable and comprehensive force structure without changing manpower or the number of vehicles in the fleet, while staying committed to the LAV and the regimental structure, why are we not there?
> 
> Sorry.


Functionally we’re supposed to be able to provide a heavy / medium brigade to NATO, so I suspect symmetry is about being able to rotate those units readiness postures.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> Functionally we’re supposed to be able to provide a heavy brigade to NATO, so I suspect symmetry is about posturing.


FIFY.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> You’re implying that this is a one or the other situation. That mechanized forces don’t dismount their guys before a built up area and then have mutually supporting elements. Ie the Infantry clearing the buildings while the IFVs are cut offs and in this case able to destroy the other AFVs. All in one tidy package, that can get places quickly, and protected from artillery.


I don't disagree with the tidy package.  I just think it is a very large and unwieldy package and that the advantage it brings to the fight, the turreted gun, could be supplied in a smaller, tidier package.  In fact, it could be supplied in an unmanned/optionally manned package.  Especially in the urban fight.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I don't disagree with the tidy package.  I just think it is a very large and unwieldy package and that the advantage it brings to the fight, the turreted gun, could be supplied in a smaller, tidier package.  In fact, it could be supplied in an unmanned/optionally manned package.  Especially in the urban fight.


The package I mean is the single transport and fire support. Your talking about adding bits and pieces, single purposes additions that have to be there some how.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> The package I mean is the single transport and fire support. Your talking about adding bits and pieces, single purposes additions that have to be there some how.



And your're talking about a single target that eliminates a lot of bits and pieces all at one time when hit.


----------



## markppcli

Well this has become pointless.


----------



## KevinB

Namer style HIFV that can do both - but also has a support Optionally Manned MiniIFV rover to tread along (or in front).  

I had an informative week this week, and based on some of it I expect that in a few years that several of the dismounts won’t be actual people but Optionally Controlled ‘terminator’ type robots


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> And your're talking about a single target that eliminates a lot of bits and pieces all at one time when hit.


Would you rather we go all light infantry and walk everywhere?


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> Would you rather we go all light infantry and walk everywhere?


No.  I'd rather that you got a lift to the fight and that you use the terrain to your best advantage.  And I can hide behind a smaller bump than a LAV can.

In urban terrain a small vehicle like a Scimitar or a UGV that can do a pivot turn, or reverse as fast as it can go forwards, seems to me to be likely to be a lot more survivable, and able to supply the PBI with support a lot longer than a behemoth like a LAV6 with a 3 mile turning radius and that stands a meter (3 feet) taller.

LAV 6 = 3.16m ht
Scorpion =2.1 m ht.


----------



## suffolkowner

Kirkhill said:


> No.  I'd rather that you got a lift to the fight and that you use the terrain to your best advantage.  And I can hide behind a smaller bump than a LAV can.
> 
> In urban terrain a small vehicle like a Scimitar or a UGV that can do a pivot turn, or reverse as fast as it can go forwards, seems to me to be likely to be a lot more survivable, and able to supply the PBI with support a lot longer than a behemoth like a LAV6 with a 3 mile turning radius and that stands a meter (3 feet) taller.
> 
> LAV 6 = 3.16m ht
> Scorpion =2.1 m ht.


They all look the same height from a TB2 or Predator don't they?


----------



## KevinB

suffolkowner said:


> They all look the same height from a TB2 or Predator don't they?


Which is why AD abilities are critical


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Which is why AD abilities are critical



Every AFV replaces its turret with a CIWS?


----------



## Kirkhill

suffolkowner said:


> They all look the same height from a TB2 or Predator don't they?



Yes, but you can still dodge some of those Javelins and NLAWs.  And a 4.9m x 2.2m Scimitar  is  50% the target of a 7.62m x 2.68m LAV6 to a Bayraktar or Predator.

And if detonated it is only 3 troops gone. Not 10.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Yes, but you can still dodge some of those Javelins and NLAWs.


In that their a smaller target ? Maybe ? But not really much difference in practical terms.

You want a vehicle to deliver troops to the battle field, then you want one to support them. Adding more and more single purpose vehicles is not the way forward. That vehicle that’s going to deliver them, ideally a K out under cover, is going to be armed, and armoured. It’s silly to just leave it back. Also, look at the BTR 4 video, wheeled IFVs are still nimble and able to maneuver in urban terrain while packing a punch. Now if you’ll excuse me I’m going to see if I can make some progress banging my head on a brick wall.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Every AFV replaces its turret with a CIWS?


No, you just need a Shorad asset, people make mistakes conflating TB2s and Quad Copters.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> No, you just need a Shorad asset, people make mistakes conflating TB2s and Quad Copters.



Actually I was more thinking about MAMs and Hellfires.  I assume the TB2s and Predators are out of reach of all but SHORAD/MRAD missiles.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> In that their a smaller target ? Maybe ? But not really much difference in practical terms.
> 
> You want a vehicle to deliver troops to the battle field, then you want one to support them. Adding more and more single purpose vehicles is not the way forward. That vehicle that’s going to deliver them, ideally a K out under cover, is going to be armed, and armoured. It’s silly to just leave it back. Also, look at the BTR 4 video, wheeled IFVs are still nimble and able to maneuver in urban terrain while packing a punch. Now if you’ll excuse me I’m going to see if I can make some progress banging my head on a brick wall.



Bash on regardless...


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> In that their a smaller target ? Maybe ? But not really much difference in practical terms.
> 
> You want a vehicle to deliver troops to the battle field, then you want one to support them. Adding more and more single purpose vehicles is not the way forward. That vehicle that’s going to deliver them, ideally a K out under cover, is going to be armed, and armoured. It’s silly to just leave it back. Also, look at the BTR 4 video, wheeled IFVs are still nimble and able to maneuver in urban terrain while packing a punch. Now if you’ll excuse me I’m going to see if I can make some progress banging my head on a brick wall.


Mark, honestly tracks can pivot way easier than wheels can turn - the LAV III wasn’t nimble and the 6.0 can’t be any better.  

Regardless anything man made can be destroyed given enough explosives.  

Also I’ve of them opinion that BTR 4 was extremely lucky.   Having driven around Fallujah, MASOC was a lot more mobile in their Hummers than the LAV-25’s because the rubble was a killer for the LAV’s the Abrams could go over/through it - and the Hummers could usually eek out a precarious path, or just got out and walked  - while the LAV’s needed a dozer to clear some of the rubble off the road - chucks of concrete are brutal accidental roadblocks.  

Army Bradleys didn’t have nearly the same issues as the LAV’s did.  
    Plus nothing like seeing a LAV listing like a sinking ship with 4 right side shredded tires as the commander and driver though some of the rubble was negotiable


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile, I think the answer to lots of Javelins and NLAWs and Loitering Munitions is lots of low cost targets.

Lots of little unmanned and optionally manned little tankettes running around all over the place.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Mark, honestly tracks can pivot way easier than wheels can turn - the LAV III wasn’t nimble and the 6.0 can’t be any better.
> 
> Regardless anything man made can be destroyed given enough explosives.
> 
> Also I’ve of them opinion that BTR 4 was extremely lucky.   Having driven around Fallujah, MASOC was a lot more mobile in their Hummers than the LAV-25’s because the rubble was a killer for the LAV’s the Abrams could go over/through it - and the Hummers could usually eek out a precarious path, or just got out and walked  - while the LAV’s needed a dozer to clear some of the rubble off the road - chucks of concrete are brutal accidental roadblocks.
> 
> Army Bradleys didn’t have nearly the same issues as the LAV’s did.
> Plus nothing like seeing a LAV listing like a sinking ship with 4 right side shredded tires as the commander and driver though some of the rubble was negotiable


That BTR 4 was doing a very good job against what looked like bad opponents. I imagine luck played in quite a bit. 

I probably overstated a bit, we definitely found roads that LAVs couldn’t take in Kandahar. It was more a response to Kirkill’s hyperbole frankly.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> That BTR 4 was doing a very good job against what looked like bad opponents. I imagine luck played in quite a bit.
> 
> I probably overstated a bit, we definitely found roads that LAVs couldn’t take in Kandahar. It was more a response to Kirkill’s hyperbole frankly.


Hyperbole!!!!  (need to add couple more exclamation points !!)

I am stunned. Shocked.  Flabbergasted.  Nay even gobsmacked.  

I still prefer to walk thanks.


----------



## Dale Denton

Speaking of LAVs, since slat armour has proved so effective lately (sarcastic), maybe slat armour will be the next "Double V/IED-proof" topic n the next conflict. 

Maybe this is the time to be looking into the CCV 2.0 project and for someone to look at the future of Tanks and if Active Protection is worth it, and for which fleet?

It's worth it to start building an Army NSS where we think of how to Canadianize different MOTS APC/Tanks of all types?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Dale Denton said:


> Speaking of LAVs, since slat armour has proved so effective lately (sarcastic), maybe slat armour will be the next "Double V/IED-proof" topic n the next conflict.
> 
> Maybe this is the time to be looking into the CCV 2.0 project and for someone to look at the future of Tanks and if Active Protection is worth it, and for which fleet?
> 
> It's worth it to start building an Army NSS where we think of how to Canadianize different MOTS APC/Tanks of all types?



Or maybe we should focus mainly on selecting and developing the highest quality operational and strategic level leaders who, as history shows, can generally figure out how to overcome the many and various kit (and other) defficiencies we will always experience in any peer-peer conflict.


----------



## Dale Denton

I've read lots of these sort of responses to some good ideas for change and it's pretty cyclical.
"We should/n't do XYZ in the future because reasons."

Reply: "Yes, but what about this valid thing as well?"

Then repeat. Everything really needs to be given attention, thought, and responded to; it's all about which priorities first (*B,A or A,B?*) and shouldn't be boiled down (*A vs. B*).

----------------

We should really articulate how we want to do all of the things the CAF has to do.

How do we drive the discussion for Canadians' need to accept a level of capability that we can fund and sustain for the CAF?

How do we balance commitments to: NATO, NORAD, Arctic, 5EYES _and _meaningful UN Peacekeeping?
​How do we sell this to the public and prove this needs to be funded over many other needs? ("Build-in-Canada" costs, post-COVID rebuild, healthcare commitments, deficit, etc...).​
On top of all of this, we need many decisions made in short order for:

People Power: Retention, recruitment, culture maturity and diversity,
Arctic: Capability, infrastructure, the future of CAF in the Arctic, ASW?
NORAD commitments: Future of DEW, Hypersonic defence, fighter commitment/availability/infrastructure,
Mobility: Sealift? 2 AORs enough?, enough airlift? Foreign basing/leases?
Marquee large projects: Fighters, submarines, FORC2025/30 changes in this thread.


----------



## GR66

Throwing this out as an idea...

What if we used our Edmonton-based units (plus 1 RCHA in Shilo) as the basis for a Canadian Armoured Brigade Combat Team in Latvia?

We could re-organize the Strathconas as a straight tank Regiment using 15-tank Squadrons (same as US Tank Companies).  This would allow us to have 5 x Tank Squadrons with 7 tanks as spares.

We could deploy 1 Brigade HQ along with a single Armoured Battalion (2 x Tank Squadrons from the Strathconas and 1 x LAV Company from 1 PPCLI).  We could pre-position the vehicles for the 2nd Armoured Battalion there for fly-over troops.  The eFP Latvia Battlegroup would act as the 3rd (Mechanized Infantry) Battalion of the Brigade.

The 3rd Squadron personnel from the Strathconas plus a Reserve Squadron made up from troops from the South Alberta Light Horse and the King's Own Calgary Regiment would have the 5th Squadron of tanks in Wainwright to train on and they would fly over to Latvia to man the 2nd Armoured Battalion vehicles when required.

1 PPCLI would provide the LAV Company for the 1st Armoured Battalion as well as the LAV Company for the eFP Latvia Battlegroup.  The 3rd Company would remain in Edmonton and would be tasked to fly over to be the LAV Company for the 2nd Armoured Battalion.

We already have deployed a single Artillery Battery deployed to Latvia in support of the eFP Battlegroup.  It would remain there as the forward element of the Brigade's Artillery Regiment with pre-positioned guns for the other two Batteries.

Additional elements of 1 RCHA, 1 CER and 1 Service would be stationed in Latvia as required, with the remaining elements flying over as required.

The rest of the Canadian Army would be re-organized into 2 x Infantry Brigades (2 Brigade in Shilo & Petawawa and 5 Brigade in Valcartier & Gagetown).  Each Brigade would have an Armoured Recce Regiment, an Artillery Regiment and a Service Battalion along with 4 x Infantry Battalions (a Reg Force Mechanized Infantry Battalion and a 30/70 Reg Force/Reserve Light Infantry Battalion at each of the four CFBs).


----------



## KevinB

Light forces are easier and quicker to deploy, they get there first while your heavy and medium units are packing up to deploy.  
    Make Pet a Light Bde 


I think the LAV is a terrible vehicle for Europe, but you could make 5Bde a LAV Bde and have a LAV res Bde 

Get 200 ish CV90 for Europe with all the Leo 2 and get 18 M109 etc For a CABG, then have a 20 pool CV90 and 6 M109 in Wainwright for training for fly over forces.  

Invest in a lot of simulators so the at home CABG can conduct virtual Bde and higher training


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Light forces are easier and quicker to deploy, they get there first while your heavy and medium units are packing up to deploy.
> Make Pet a Light Bde


The point of the above is that you'd have your heavy equipment (4 x Tank Squadrons, 2 x LAV Companies, 1 x Arty Battery and Engineer/Service support for those...plus our eFP contribution) already deployed to Latvia.  The troops for the 2nd Armoured Battalion and the additional Gunners, Sappers, etc. would be flyover troops to take over the equipment already in position.


KevinB said:


> I think the LAV is a terrible vehicle for Europe, but you could make 5Bde a LAV Bde and have a LAV res Bde
> 
> Get 200 ish CV90 for Europe with all the Leo 2 and get 18 M109 etc For a CABG, then have a 20 pool CV90 and 6 M109 in Wainwright for training for fly over forces.
> 
> Invest in a lot of simulators so the at home CABG can conduct virtual Bde and higher training


You may be right about the LAV, but politically it's likely here to stay at least for the short to mid-term.  As Ukraine has shown, dismounted infantry can be quite effective against attacking armour, so the LAV as a battle taxi could be serviceable in a defensive scenario defending the Baltics IF we also properly equip our dismounts with the anti-armour and AA manpads required to do their job.  In the counter attack...maybe not so much.

We'd also need to provide the other support vehicles (AT, SHORAD, UAV/Loitering Munition/Mortars) required for a peer fight.  All of these are available as LAV existing variants and could be added to the CF without much difficulty if the will and money are there.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> The point of the above is that you'd have your heavy equipment (4 x Tank Squadrons, 2 x LAV Companies, 1 x Arty Battery and Engineer/Service support for those...plus our eFP contribution) already deployed to Latvia.  The troops for the 2nd Armoured Battalion and the additional Gunners, Sappers, etc. would be flyover troops to take over the equipment already in position.
> 
> You may be right about the LAV, but politically it's likely here to stay at least for the short to mid-term.  As Ukraine has shown, dismounted infantry can be quite effective against attacking armour, so the LAV as a battle taxi could be serviceable in a defensive scenario defending the Baltics IF we also properly equip our dismounts with the anti-armour and AA manpads required to do their job.  In the counter attack...maybe not so much.
> 
> We'd also need to provide the other support vehicles (AT, SHORAD, UAV/Loitering Munition/Mortars) required for a peer fight.  All of these are available as LAV existing variants and could be added to the CF without much difficulty if the will and money are there.


Let me throw something out there and in this respect I do not know what the present arrangement for the Latvian eFB BG nor the artillery support it gets currently but let's do a hypothetical.

In short, Latvia has one mechanized brigade (without tanks) and four National Guard brigades (essentially light infantry).

The eFP BG is a heavy BG with four mech coys (two of which have their own integral tanks platoons) and a further armoured company. It also has a mortar platoon but no integral artillery (notwithstanding the four M777s just sent over.)

Latvia does now have enough M109A5OS to form three  x 18-gun battalions; which is interesting.

Lets just play with numbers.

If one were to add that brigade HQ and those four tank squadrons and two LAV companies that you recommend then you could clearly form two combined arms battalions  which, together with the eFP BG (also a combined arms battalion) would give you the manoeuvre elements of an American ABCT (notwithstanding the issue of the LAV as an IFV - you play with what you've got).

If Latvia/Multinational Division North would then put one Latvian M109 battalion in direct support of that brigade then all that would be needed to complete it is a cavalry regiment, a CER, a Svc Bn and some SHORAD. (Some if not most, of the cavalry elements could come from the overly strong eFP BG - it would need some rejigging) You could even send those M777s home or assign them to work with the light Latvian National Guard brigades which would suit their role better.

Another benefit of getting a commitment of an M109A5OS battalion assigned by Latvia would allow 1 RCHA's M777s to be redistributed to up gun 2 RCHA and 5 RALC. 1 RCHA could be reduced to a brigade FSCC, An OP Bty with three tactical groups (a BG FSCC and three FOO/JTACs), an STA battery and a small gun battery with C3 howitzers to provide live fire trg support to the FOOs. 

Whether there is a need or not to deploy more elements to Latvia (other than the obvious maintainers and log/admin staff to keep the prepositioned equipment maintained, is an open question. My personal preference is to keep the rest of the force in Canada but flyover frequently to exercise the equipment, the personnel and the plan.

What is necessary is to ensure that 1 CMBG maintains enough tanks and LAVs to train itself throughout the year as well as a brigade's worth of reservists as augmentees/replacements. That would entail stripping 2 CMBG of at least one LAV bn (I would prefer both and sending the second to 5 CMBG thus making 2 CMBG a light brigade) 2 CMBG would therefore be relieved of the Latvia rotation role and look at other missions while 5 CMBG would still take part in eFP BG rotations but not the flyover role.

That really only leaves one major question. Are there enough tanks left in Canada to train the LdSH as well as at the CTC (and should those functions be combined in Edmonton?) One solution might be to reduce the number of tank squadrons in Latvia to three and increase the LAV companies to three. That would make the forward deployed brigade slightly tank lighter than an ABCT but still viable. Another is to pick up another squadron of Leos - there are still some in storage around Europe. 

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Let me throw something out there and in this respect I do not know what the present arrangement for the Latvian eFB BG nor the artillery support it gets currently but let's do a hypothetical.
> 
> In short, Latvia has one mechanized brigade (without tanks) and four National Guard brigades (essentially light infantry).
> 
> The eFP BG is a heavy BG with four mech coys (two of which have their own integral tanks platoons) and a further armoured company. It also has a mortar platoon but no integral artillery (notwithstanding the four M777s just sent over.)
> 
> Latvia does now have enough M109A5OS to form three  x 18-gun battalions; which is interesting.
> 
> Lets just play with numbers.
> 
> If one were to add that brigade HQ and those four tank squadrons and two LAV companies that you recommend then you could clearly form two combined arms battalions  which, together with the eFP BG (also a combined arms battalion) would give you the manoeuvre elements of an American ABCT (notwithstanding the issue of the LAV as an IFV - you play with what you've got).
> 
> If Latvia/Multinational Division North would then put one Latvian M109 battalion in direct support of that brigade then all that would be needed to complete it is a cavalry regiment, a CER, a Svc Bn and some SHORAD. (Some if not most, of the cavalry elements could come from the overly strong eFP BG - it would need some rejigging) You could even send those M777s home or assign them to work with the light Latvian National Guard brigades which would suit their role better.
> 
> Another benefit of getting a commitment of an M109A5OS battalion assigned by Latvia would allow 1 RCHA's M777s to be redistributed to up gun 2 RCHA and 5 RALC. 1 RCHA could be reduced to a brigade FSCC, An OP Bty with three tactical groups (a BG FSCC and three FOO/JTACs), an STA battery and a small gun battery with C3 howitzers to provide live fire trg support to the FOOs.
> 
> Whether there is a need or not to deploy more elements to Latvia (other than the obvious maintainers and log/admin staff to keep the prepositioned equipment maintained, is an open question. My personal preference is to keep the rest of the force in Canada but flyover frequently to exercise the equipment, the personnel and the plan.
> 
> What is necessary is to ensure that 1 CMBG maintains enough tanks and LAVs to train itself throughout the year as well as a brigade's worth of reservists as augmentees/replacements. That would entail stripping 2 CMBG of at least one LAV bn (I would prefer both and sending the second to 5 CMBG thus making 2 CMBG a light brigade) 2 CMBG would therefore be relieved of the Latvia rotation role and look at other missions while 5 CMBG would still take part in eFP BG rotations but not the flyover role.
> 
> That really only leaves one major question. Are there enough tanks left in Canada to train the LdSH as well as at the CTC (and should those functions be combined in Edmonton?) One solution might be to reduce the number of tank squadrons in Latvia to three and increase the LAV companies to three. That would make the forward deployed brigade slightly tank lighter than an ABCT but still viable. Another is to pick up another squadron of Leos - there are still some in storage around Europe.
> 
> 🍻


Or go to the US Army and ask to lease a ABCT for Europe - and get a time share on a ABCT down here for training.


----------



## WestIsle

KevinB said:


> Or go to the US Army and ask to lease a ABCT for Europe - and get a time share on a ABCT down here for training.


No we must continue to buy European equipment that is expensive and hard to maintain. Just look at the aussies and all the cool European stuff they got/s


----------



## markppcli

WestIsle said:


> No we must continue to buy European equipment that is expensive and hard to maintain. Just look at the aussies and all the cool European stuff they got/s


If we’re talking about Force 2025-30 it’s going to stay Leopards. Nothing wrong with Leo 2 A4-6 , it’s just that we bought surplus tanks that were old when we got them and the UOR didn’t adequately provide for parts 15 years later.


----------



## daftandbarmy

WestIsle said:


> No we must continue to buy European equipment that is expensive and hard to maintain. Just look at the aussies and all the cool European stuff they got/s



Or design and build our own tank 









						Ram tank - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> Or design and build our own tank
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ram tank - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


Wonder if KMW could be induced to open a plant in Canada, especially if the PzH 2000 were to be chosen as a much-belated SPG replacement. There's some appeal to both not being tied to the US design and build cycle, and to having a better resident, if not fully domestic, capability.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> Wonder if KMW could be induced to open a plant in Canada, especially if the PzH 2000 were to be chosen as a much-belated SPG replacement. There's some appeal to both not being tied to the US design and build cycle, and to having a better resident, if not fully domestic, capability.



There is a lesson hidden somewhere in the tale of the Ram tank.

Like: When you're a major industrialized nation and you're in a war, and your major allies can't spare any tanks, you need to be able to build your own.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Or go to the US Army and ask to lease a ABCT for Europe - and get a time share on a ABCT down here for training.


This is just phase 2. I'm looking at an immediate action drill using equipment we have and do not need to retrain on.

For Phase 2 it would be to obtain a complete ABCT for Europe (less the international component of the eFP BG). I'm not even sure that we'd have to lease it. My guess would be that the US would be happy to provide it from their surplus stocks so long as we man and maintain it. The Canadian equipment in Europe could then come back to Canada and bulk up the eastern brigades.

We would probably need to lease enough gear for individual training in Canada although an arrangement could probably be worked out to train with the 116th Cavalry BCT mostly out of Idaho, Montana and Oregon.

I really can't see any other way to go for the time being than leasing. There is a new generation of gear coming out in the next decade and to buy into older generation equipment doesn't make sense. We've also got more than enough equipment vis a vis LAVs to equip two full medium brigade groups which are a viable force if rounded out with appropriate artillery, SHORAD and ATGMs which ought to be good for the next 15 to 20 years easy.

One armoured brigade in Europe with two brigades worth (one RegF one ResF) of trained people to man it and sustain it, two equipped light brigades (one RegF one ResF) and two equipped LAV brigades (One RegF one ResF) are all the manoeuvre brigades we could hope to sustain. Time to concentrate on the CS and CSS formations and units.

Easily done in two phases; the first concentrating on using the mechanized equipment what we have but focusing on retuning the structuring of the people component of the force and retooling our training system; the second implementing the equipment restructure. 

When you think about it there's not much being done in expanding the size of the force. Its already critical to fill the capability gaps for SHORAD, ATGM and artillery. Beyond that we have almost all the gear for two medium mech brigades (The idea for having one of those a ResF heavy total force brigade probably won't sell because the RCR mafia would whine at becoming light - even if we give many of them parachutes to play with). In essence all we really need is the equipment for one heavy brigade (plus the training gear) - and a better CS and CSS.



quadrapiper said:


> Wonder if KMW could be induced to open a plant in Canada, especially if the PzH 2000 were to be chosen as a much-belated SPG replacement. There's some appeal to both not being tied to the US design and build cycle, and to having a better resident, if not fully domestic, capability.



Why not leverage the SW Ontario automotive triangle and build on the existing facilities in London linked to the facilities in Lima Ohio. I'm with @WestIsle - cut the ties with European manufacturers. Build our own with ties into the US industry. If we buy and build American we tie into the largest weapons R&D and manufacturing industrial complex in the world. If we can manufacture parts and assemble our own gear here and stream parts into the US and foreign users then we might just might be able to sustain a defence industry here.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

And yet the demise of the Ram was in substantial part because of the ability of the US to mass produce Shermans.


----------



## FJAG

quadrapiper said:


> PzH 2000 were to be chosen as a much-belated SPG replacement.


Thanks but no thanks. I'll wait for the production runs of the M1299.

🍻


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> There is a lesson hidden somewhere in the tale of the Ram tank.
> 
> Like: When you're a major industrialized nation and you're in war, and your major allies can't spare any tanks, you need to be able to build your own.


Exactly that. Wonder, too, if Germany would be keen on the notion of a plant somewhere that's _not Germany_, as a bonus.


FJAG said:


> Why not leverage the SW Ontario automotive triangle and build on the existing facilities in London linked to the facilities in Lima Ohio. I'm with @WestIsle - cut the ties with European manufacturers. Build our own with ties into the US industry. If we buy and build American we tie into the largest weapons R&D and manufacturing industrial complex in the world. If we can manufacture parts and assemble our own gear here and stream parts into the US and foreign users then we might just might be able to sustain a defence industry here.


Linking to the US that firmly would seem to leave you at the mercy of decisions made to get Representative or Senator Bloggins donations and votes. At least the European manufacturers aren't operating in a feedback loop driven by one country's trough.


----------



## quadrapiper

FJAG said:


> Thanks but no thanks. I'll wait for the production runs of the M1299.
> 
> 🍻


For the sake of the range?


----------



## FJAG

quadrapiper said:


> ... Linking to the US that firmly would seem to leave you at the mercy of decisions made to get Representative or Senator Bloggins donations and votes. At least the European manufacturers aren't operating in a feedback loop driven by one country's trough.


This would be worse than the crap fest we have now? How?

Our aviation industry has worked for decades with such arrangements ever since the Arrow was dropped.

🍻


quadrapiper said:


> For the sake of the range?


That too. Also for volume of production and a North American maintenance base.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

quadrapiper said:


> Exactly that. Wonder, too, if Germany would be keen on the notion of a plant somewhere that's _not Germany_, as a bonus.
> 
> Linking to the US that firmly would seem to leave you at the mercy of decisions made to get Representative or Senator Bloggins donations and votes. At least the European manufacturers aren't operating in a feedback loop driven by one country's trough.


You already are and you don't know it.  

I do not see a cost effective manner of acquisition for the CA and RCAF that doesn't come out of the US, and there is the NSS for the RCN.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> You already are and you don't know it.
> 
> I do not see a cost effective manner of acquisition for the CA and RCAF that doesn't come out of the US, and there is the NSS for the RCN.



I was just reading an article on food processing in Canada.  

In the 15 years prior to 2021 Canada built 20 "national scale" plants.  
In the same time period the US built 4000.

The US plants buy 100% of Canadian raw materials.
They supply 9% of their output to meet 100% of our needs.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I was just reading an article on food processing in Canada.
> 
> In the 15 years prior to 2021 Canada built 20 "national scale" plants.
> In the same time period the US built 4000.
> 
> The US plants buy 100% of Canadian raw materials.
> They supply 9% of their output to meet 100% of our needs.


We are still the Arsenal of Democracy...

   10k plus M1 Abrams tanks produced.
3,500 of which are in war stock (well were - we broke out V Corps German storage recently...)


----------



## GR66

The big question to my mind regarding tanks is if Canada decides to permanently station additional forces in Europe beyond our eFP Latvia commitment or not.

The main theater where we would be likely NEED to use tanks is Europe and after this Ukraine fiasco I can't imagine Russia any time in the near future conducting any attack against NATO which isn't a surprise attack (to avoid NATO reinforcing prior to the invasion).

So to my mind, if the government makes the decision to pre-deploy forces in Europe (either manned or pre-positioned) then tanks make sense.  If not, then since we don't have the capability to rapidly move heavy forces into Europe then we should focus on light forces that we can quickly move to theatre in response to an attack.

As has been mentioned on these forums a million times or more previously (by numerous people), what we really need is proper Foreign Policy and Defence White Papers to define what the government wants the CF to do.  Without that force design is like trying to do a jigsaw puzzle without a picture to follow.


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile the US Army budge 2022-23



> Army’s proposed budget calls for fewer soldiers but more money​BY
> JOHN VANDIVER
> • STARS AND STRIPES • MARCH 28, 2022
> 
> The Army’s budget request for 2023 calls for fewer soldiers in uniform even as the service seeks $3 billion more in annual funding, according to budget documents released Monday.
> 
> The $177.5 billion spending proposal, up from last year’s $174.7 billion, reverses multiple years of budget cutbacks for the Army, which is during a weapons modernization push that has been challenged by budget constraints.
> 
> But while spending is going up, the number of soldiers slated to serve in the Army would fall if the budget request becomes law. The Army’s end strength would be reduced from 1,010,500 to 998,500, making a force of 473,000 active-duty soldiers, 336,000 National Guard troops and 189,500 in the Reserve.
> 
> _KH Edit (US Population of 329 million to our 38 million - a factor of 8.6
> 
> (998,500/8.6 = 116,000 Canadian Army
> (473,000/8.6 = 55,000 Canadian Regs
> (336,000/8.6 = 39,000 Canadian Militia and Rangers
> (189,500/8.6 = 22,000 Canadian Reserves (ex-service personnel liable for recall)_
> 
> Pentagon officials said one reason for the Army seeking a smaller active force is a tough recruiting environment in which the military is struggling to compete for recruits given historically low unemployment rates.
> 
> “This is not a budget driven decision. It is about maintaining the high quality of our talent,” Undersecretary of the Army Gabe Camarillo said.
> 
> He said the Army will build the active force back up as the recruiting environment improves. Other military branches also have faced difficulties in recruiting new members given increased competition in the civilian sector.
> 
> One of the drivers of growth is the Army’s operation budget, which calls for $58.3 billion, up from $55.3 billion in 2022. That will support increased flying hours for aviators and 22 combat training center rotations, up from 20 last year and other initiatives.
> 
> _KH Edit (More Training)_
> 
> There also is a $3.2 billion increase for military personnel, adding up to $69.1 billion overall. This is connected to a pay increase for troops.
> 
> The Army said it also is upping funds to support “climate resilience,” expanding nontactical electric vehicles and training in extreme weather conditions.
> 
> _KH Edit (Arctic training - new meaning to "it ain't training if it ain't raining" and "infantry sunshine")_
> 
> 
> The Army said it will be able to “maintain momentum” with its modernization push, prioritizing things such as advances in long-range precision fires, missile defense and next-generation combat vehicles. The Army also wants funding for a prototype of a long-range hypersonic missile system with the aim of fielding the first battery in the 2023 fiscal year.
> 
> The Army also wants to spend more on missile procurement, $21.3 billion, including more investments in aircraft and munitions, while scaling back on new investments in Abrams tanks and Stryker combat vehicles.
> 
> Overseas, the Army is requesting $14.6 billion for operations, more than $4 billion of which supports the European Deterrence Initiative focused on deterring Russian aggression.











						Army’s proposed budget calls for fewer soldiers but more money
					

The $177.5 billion spending proposal, up from last year’s $174.7 billion, reverses multiple years of budget cutbacks for the Army, which is during a weapons modernization push that has been challenged by budget constraints.




					www.stripes.com


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Meanwhile the US Army budge 2022-23
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Army’s proposed budget calls for fewer soldiers but more money
> 
> 
> The $177.5 billion spending proposal, up from last year’s $174.7 billion, reverses multiple years of budget cutbacks for the Army, which is during a weapons modernization push that has been challenged by budget constraints.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.stripes.com


12k personnel cut for Big Army -- maybe the CA could ask nicely for the equipment that was there for those guys


----------



## Kirkhill

Following from my belief that our Prime Minister's team is adopting their cues from Germany these days - Force 2025 it'll be.

I wonder what the world will look like in three years?  The F35 decision, the AOPSs, the JSSs and the CSCs, together with an early decision on the North Warning System will buy time until the next election.  The F35 will start delivery just in time for the photo ops.



> Germany military to quicken push for combat readiness, defmin says​Author of the article:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Reuters
> 
> Publishing date:
> Mar 29, 2022  •  3 hours ago  •  1 minute read  •   Join the conversation
> Article content​BERLIN — Germany will build up its military quicker than planned by bringing a division to combat-readiness two years ahead of schedule, Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht said on Tuesday, detailing Berlin’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
> 
> *“Germany will reach NATO’s planning targets faster than promised*,” she said, according to the draft text of a speech she was due to deliver at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington.
> 
> *“We will have the planned division of the army combat-ready in 2025*, two years ahead of time.”
> 
> While Germany does not have a single combat-ready army division at the moment, it had 12 such divisions in the 1980s during the Cold War.
> 
> According to its original schedule, Berlin was aiming for one combat-ready division in 2027 and a total of three combat-ready divisions in 2032.
> 
> German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, in a major policy shift for the country after decades of attrition, pledged to inject 100 billion euros ($111.15 billion) into the Bundeswehr after the start of the war in Ukraine.
> 
> The money is earmarked for ramping up the German military’s readiness, mainly by buying weapons and equipment that troops have so far lacked.
> 
> Since Scholz’s landmark speech on Feb. 27, three days after the invasion, *Berlin has announced the purchase of F-35 fighter jets from the United States and said it is aiming to buy a missile defense system*. Scholz also said *Germany would sharply raise defense spending to more than 2% of its economic output*. ($1 = 0.8997 euros) (Reporting by Sabine Siebold, Editing by Miranda Murray, William Maclean)







__





						Germany military to quicken push for combat readiness, defmin says
					

BERLIN — Germany will build up its military quicker than planned by bringing a division to combat-readiness two years ahead of schedule, Defence Minister…




					financialpost.com


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Following from my belief that our Prime Minister's team is adopting their cues from Germany these days - Force 2025 it'll be.
> 
> I wonder what the world will look like in three years?  The F35 decision, the AOPSs, the JSSs and the CSCs, together with an early decision on the North Warning System will buy time until the next election.  The F35 will start delivery just in time for the photo ops.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Germany military to quicken push for combat readiness, defmin says
> 
> 
> BERLIN — Germany will build up its military quicker than planned by bringing a division to combat-readiness two years ahead of schedule, Defence Minister…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> financialpost.com


He can’t get more Leopards those are being used domestically. 

I’m waiting for the Abrams shift


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> He can’t get more Leopards those are being used domestically.
> 
> I’m waiting for the Abrams shift



These ones?  The ones that the US Army is scaling back on?



> The Army also wants to spend more on missile procurement, $21.3 billion, including more investments in aircraft and munitions, while scaling back on new investments in Abrams tanks and Stryker combat vehicles.











						Army’s proposed budget calls for fewer soldiers but more money
					

The $177.5 billion spending proposal, up from last year’s $174.7 billion, reverses multiple years of budget cutbacks for the Army, which is during a weapons modernization push that has been challenged by budget constraints.




					www.stripes.com
				




Can you get me a deal on an Edsel?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> These ones?  The ones that the US Army is scaling back on?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Army’s proposed budget calls for fewer soldiers but more money
> 
> 
> The $177.5 billion spending proposal, up from last year’s $174.7 billion, reverses multiple years of budget cutbacks for the Army, which is during a weapons modernization push that has been challenged by budget constraints.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.stripes.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Can you get me a deal on an Edsel?


When you have an extra 3,500 in war stock and others are still buying the platform, why would we need a lot more?   We used to buy them just to keep the line open for a rainy day.  

We are in process of divesting an ABCT and SBCT worth of folks, and unlike Canada we have equipment in War Stock and equipment for National Guard/Reserves


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> When you have an extra 3,500 in war stock and others are still buying the platform, why would we need a lot more?   We used to buy them just to keep the line open for a rainy day.


Or to keep Senator Mike Turner's (R-Ohio - where Lima is) voters happy.



> Congress Again Buys Abrams Tanks the Army Doesn't Want
> 
> 
> The Army lost again in the annual debate with Congress on building more tanks.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.military.com





KevinB said:


> We are in process of divesting an ABCT and SBCT worth of folks, and unlike Canada we have equipment in War Stock and equipment for National Guard/Reserves


Sigh - if I were king. 😢

🍻


----------



## Fabius

Seems like F2025 has experienced a still birth. Non rumor rumor is that F2025 is now dead and the Army is going to develop a new plan.  No disbandment of the Light Battalions is apparently going to be part of the new plan. 
Glad to see our planning and follow through continues to be world class. 

At this point I would like to just see a plan seen through to its end.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Fabius said:


> Seems like F2025 has experienced a still birth. Non rumor rumor is that F2025 is now dead and the Army is going to develop a new plan.  No disbandment of the Light Battalions is apparently going to be part of the new plan.
> Glad to see our planning and follow through continues to be world class.
> 
> At this point I would like to just see a plan seen through to its end.


On the contrary, I am glad to see it's being rewritten.

The final part of any mission analysis is "Has the situation changed? If yes, start over." 

Our strategic vision for the CA most definitely should change if the geopolitical conditions have changed.


----------



## Fabius

Yes, but the start point of F2025 was that the CA was not structured properly for the expected threat and major large scale combat.  Even the Russian invasion of Ukraine has not changed that, if anything its reinforced that.  I would accept an acceleration of F2025 timelines as being a relevant change etc.  
Throwing the entire thing out though indicates to me that our planning was seriously deficient if that is indeed what we are doing.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Fabius said:


> Yes, but the start point of F2025 was that the CA was not structured properly for the expected threat and major large scale combat.  Even the Russian invasion of Ukraine has not changed that, if anything its reinforced that.  I would accept an acceleration of F2025 timelines as being a relevant change etc.
> Throwing the entire thing out though indicates to me that our planning was seriously deficient if that is indeed what we are doing.


We were working on the assumption we had time to implement change. That in and of itself is a significant factor to consider if the plan is still viable.


----------



## FJAG

Both of you are touching on the same problem. F2025 was underwhelming at best. It's been clear since 2014 that the Army is poorly structured and inadequately equipped for all the wrong reasons.

F2025 never seemed to have sufficient buy-in within the Army for the radical change agenda needed. What's required are some serious champions with enough weight behind them, a clear vision and a sense of urgency.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

rmc_wannabe said:


> On the contrary, I am glad to see it's being rewritten.
> 
> The final part of any mission analysis is "Has the situation changed? If yes, start over."
> 
> Our strategic vision for the CA most definitely should change if the geopolitical conditions have changed.





Fabius said:


> Yes, but the start point of F2025 was that the CA was not structured properly for the expected threat and major large scale combat. Even the Russian invasion of Ukraine has not changed that, if anything its reinforced that. I would accept an acceleration of F2025 timelines as being a relevant change etc.
> Throwing the entire thing out though indicates to me that our planning was seriously deficient if that is indeed what we are doing.





rmc_wannabe said:


> We were working on the assumption we had time to implement change. That in and of itself is a significant factor to consider if the plan is still viable.



And there is the big problem.  

Time.

Not the lack of time but the amount of time it takes the Canadian Army to complete an iteration.  There will always be too little time.  So decisions need to be made faster.   And the problem gets worse if you only prepare for one Course of Action in your organization and training.  The odds are you will always be 100% ready for the wrong thing and 0% ready for the right thing.


----------



## Dale Denton

FJAG said:


> Both of you are touching on the same problem. F2025 was underwhelming at best. It's been clear since 2014 that the Army is poorly structured and inadequately equipped for all the wrong reasons.
> 
> F2025 never seemed to have sufficient buy-in within the Army for the radical change agenda needed. What's required are some serious champions with enough weight behind them, a clear vision and a sense of urgency.
> 
> 🍻



I find it increasingly difficult to disagree with you.

Makes sense seeing how few people have ever even heard of Force 2025 speaks to this. If someone were to articulate a gradual plan to enact policy change in 5 year increments, it would be very easy for civilians to understand where over $20B of their GDP is going towards.


----------



## KevinB

Dale Denton said:


> I find it increasingly difficult to disagree with you.
> 
> Makes sense seeing how few people have ever even heard of Force 2025 speaks to this. If someone were to articulate a gradual plan to enact policy change in 5 year increments, it would be very easy for civilians to understand where over $20B of their GDP is going towards.


Civilians generally aren’t interested. 

People expect their Military are ready.  Most don’t believe horror stories of rust out etc until something terrible happens, then they blame the Military for allowing that to occur.


----------



## markppcli

Fabius said:


> Seems like F2025 has experienced a still birth. Non rumor rumor is that F2025 is now dead and the Army is going to develop a new plan.  No disbandment of the Light Battalions is apparently going to be part of the new plan.
> Glad to see our planning and follow through continues to be world class.
> 
> At this point I would like to just see a plan seen through to its end.


Oh good so we can continue to expect half manned Bns to back fill half filled schools and wonder why our training standards are dropping.


----------



## quadrapiper

markppcli said:


> Oh good so we can continue to expect half manned Bns to back fill half filled schools and wonder why our training standards are dropping.


At what point does it make more sense to close "the school" and instead deliver the training within the battalion(s)?


----------



## markppcli

quadrapiper said:


> At what point does it make more sense to close "the school" and instead deliver the training within the battalion(s)?


At no point should a Bn be trying to train for war while delivering base line DP 1 training.


----------



## Dale Denton

If the new SSE 2.0 is being rushed out, wouldn't it be easier to just meld F2025 to it? Or are they incompatible?


----------



## Kirkhill

When does the Canadian Army anticipate employing new technologies to reduce manning requirements?

Replacing/modifying  the 1940s vintage 3 man turret on the tank.
Replacing/modifying the 1970s vintage 2 man Delco turret on all other vehicles
Downsizing crews to 2 people average
Keeping crews in the hull
Applying optionally manned technologies for front line vehicles
Applying follow the leader technologies for convoys

These are no longer revolutionary concepts.  They are being fielded.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> When does the Canadian Army anticipate employing new technologies to reduce manning requirements?
> 
> Replacing/modifying  the 1940s vintage 3 man turret on the tank.
> Replacing/modifying the 1970s vintage 2 man Delco turret on all other vehicles
> Downsizing crews to 2 people average
> Keeping crews in the hull
> Applying optionally manned technologies for front line vehicles
> Applying follow the leader technologies for convoys
> 
> These are no longer revolutionary concepts.  They are being fielded.


Plenty of modern vehicles with 2 man turrets; it’s a pro / con and everyone but the French sees the pro. Aside from you that is. I’d be curious to see a list you have of IFV / AFVs operating with a double hatted CC / Gunner ?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Plenty of modern vehicles with 2 man turrets; it’s a pro / con and everyone but the French sees the pro. Aside from you that is. I’d be curious to see a list you have of IFV / AFVs operating with a double hatted CC / Gunner ?



Mark, the Canadian Forces generally suffer from a lack of manpower.  You have said so yourself.  Equally they have lots of vehicles that they can't man the way they want to.  Something has to give.


----------



## Kirkhill

BTW






						M1296 Dragoon Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com
					

The M1296 Dragoon is an upgraded version of the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle with significantly improved lethality. It is fitted with unmanned turret armed with a 30 mm cannon. Its official designation is Infantry Carrier Vehicle - Dragoon, or ICVD.



					www.military-today.com
				




Which I note, while very similar to the LAV is referred to as an Armoured Personnel Carrier and not an Infantry Fighting Vehicle.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> BTW
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> M1296 Dragoon Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com
> 
> 
> The M1296 Dragoon is an upgraded version of the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle with significantly improved lethality. It is fitted with unmanned turret armed with a 30 mm cannon. Its official designation is Infantry Carrier Vehicle - Dragoon, or ICVD.
> 
> 
> 
> www.military-today.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Which I note, while very similar to the LAV is referred to as an Armoured Personnel Carrier and not an Infantry Fighting Vehicle.


Well far be it for me to use a legal definition from the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe as opposed to military-today.com. Additionally yes, you absolutely could have a one man show, it is possible, but that is a massive cognitive load to play on the guy in that turret. Given the authority from which you speak I’m sure your familiar which crew commanding a vehicle while engaging targets. Frankly the Dragoon arrives at a two man crew because that is what strykers, which are armed for self defence much like an m113, already have and this is a stop gap. It is not a purpose built platform. Finally the 2 man crew is disingenuous at best, while mounted the Squad Leader is the crew commander, has his own special seat and everything, he gets out and the gunner becomes the CC.

What has to give is simply the number of units we have; we aren’t gaining anything from pinch a man out of each turret. The doctrinal size of a section, plus or minus a soldier is frankly irrelevant when we’re institutionally limited to filling the Bn to less than full. And frankly I’d rather pull out the weapons dets from mechanized platoons and manning the support companies. What Force 2025 addressed, and we can argue how well it did that, was that we are mandated to X number of soldiers and yet have an establishment of X+, that’s simply not sustainable.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Well far be it for me to use a legal definition from the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe as opposed to military-today.com. Additionally yes, you absolutely could have a one man show, it is possible, but that is a massive cognitive load to play on the guy in that turret. Given the authority from which you speak I’m sure your familiar which crew commanding a vehicle while engaging targets. Frankly the Dragoon arrives at a two man crew because that is what strykers, which are armed for self defence much like an m113, already have and this is a stop gap. It is not a purpose built platform. Finally the 2 man crew is disingenuous at best, while mounted the Squad Leader is the crew commander, has his own special seat and everything, he gets out and the gunner becomes the CC.
> 
> What has to give is simply the number of units we have; we aren’t gaining anything from pinch a man out of each turret. The doctrinal size of a section, plus or minus a soldier is frankly irrelevant when we’re institutionally limited to filling the Bn to less than full. And frankly I’d rather pull out the weapons dets from mechanized platoons and manning the support companies. What Force 2025 addressed, and we can argue how well it did that, was that we are mandated to X number of soldiers and yet have an establishment of X+, that’s simply not sustainable.


Fine

Actually the Stryker was purpose built. As an APC. For carting a full infantry section.  The Crew Commander got an RWS with a fifty as an upgrade from the pintle mount he used to have on the Bison.  The 30mm is an upgrade on the 50.  And so the APC approaches the IFV from the other direction.


----------



## Kirkhill




----------



## markppcli

I said the dragoon, which you specified, wasn’t purpose built. And like I said, it crews three when it’s advancing, 2 once they kick the squad out. I’m asking a NG mechanized infantry officer if that has changed with the dragoon, no doctrine for it as of yet. Don’t know why you’re tracing a line from Bison to Stryker unless you mean in their general development? No one ever used the Bison as a section carrier, Grizzly yes. Well I suppose maybe at some point they were.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 69955


Yes thank you I’m familiar with what they look like, I walk by them at work everyday.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I said the dragoon, which you specified, wasn’t purpose built. And like I said, it crews three when it’s advancing, 2 once they kick the squad out. I’m asking a NG mechanized infantry officer if that has changed with the dragoon, no doctrine for it as of yet. Don’t know why you’re tracing a line from Bison to Stryker unless you mean in their general development? No one ever used the Bison as a section carrier, Grizzly yes. Well I suppose maybe at some point they were.



Mark, the Bison was bought as a section carrier for the Militia.

Then you lot scavenged the lot and turned them into other things.

The Bison was a WAPC - a wheeled armoured personnel carrier.  It was a wheeled version of the M113 APC which also had a pintle mount for the section commander to mount his section MG on when in transit to defend the column on the move.

The AVGP Grizzly was an APC with a penetrating one man turret for self-defence that kind of looked like it might be an IFV if you looked at it cock-eyed.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Mark, the Bison was bought as a section carrier for the Militia.
> 
> Then you lot scavenged the lot and turned them into other things.
> 
> The Bison was a WAPC - a wheeled armoured personnel carrier.  It was a wheeled version of the M113 APC which also had a pintle mount for the section commander to mount his section MG on when in transit to defend the column on the move.
> 
> The AVGP Grizzly was an APC with a penetrating one man turret for self-defence that kind of looked like it might be an IFV if you looked at it cock-eyed.


Well I’m not going to argue in favour of the Grizzly, or frankly the entire AVGP family, at any point in time. I’m aware of the pintle mounts on m113s and Bisons, I’m struggling to see where you’re going here.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> Well I’m not going to argue in favour of the Grizzly, or frankly the entire AVGP family, at any point in time. I’m aware of the pintle mounts on m113s and Bisons, I’m struggling to see where you’re going here.


I might be wrong, but I think the point he's making is that you can argue (regardless of gun size) that conceptually the LAV/stryker is a battle taxi with a self defense weapon (that if big enough do double duty as direct fire support) and therefore could be crewed and thought of as such rather than as IFV with the increased demands for the mobile fight.

Edit- I disagree with this.  While it may be functionally irrelevant in the present, it's very relevant to mapping out a plan that works to add the capacities needed. 
Ex.  Say you align that X and X+ into Y,  and recruitment delivers.  All battalions filled with 4 vehicle 40 man platoons.  But still no organic SP mortars or ATGM under armour.  So back to the drawing board, to fully man the battalions we need Y+, force needs to expand, budget needs to change, more recruitment needs to happen.  But, if you plan to "pinch a man out of each turret" from the outset (12 per company), that man's 4x each M1129 and M1134 at the battalion level, so that the capabilities are feasible when you reach establishment numbers


> What has to give is simply the number of units we have; we aren’t gaining anything from pinch a man out of each turret. The doctrinal size of a section, plus or minus a soldier is frankly irrelevant when we’re institutionally limited to filling the Bn to less than full. And frankly I’d rather pull out the weapons dets from mechanized platoons and manning the support companies. What Force 2025 addressed, and we can argue how well it did that, was that we are mandated to X number of soldiers and yet have an establishment of X+, that’s simply not sustainable.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Well I’m not going to argue in favour of the Grizzly, or frankly the entire AVGP family, at any point in time. I’m aware of the pintle mounts on m113s and Bisons, I’m struggling to see where you’re going here.


The point is what do you want the vehicle to do.  I am of the opinion that combining the APC with the AFV (lt tank - armoured car) was a step too far.

I prefer, still, the distinction offered by the Saladin Saracen line of vehicles.

Saladins were fighting vehicles.  Saracens were transports that could keep up.

Saladins exposed  three men to the risks of the advance to contact.  The section was a bound to the rear.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> I might be wrong, but I think the point he's making is that you can argue (regardless of gun size) that conceptually the LAV/stryker is a battle taxi with a self defense weapon (that if big enough do double duty as direct fire support) and therefore could be crewed and thought of as such rather than as IFV with the increased demands for the mobile fight.
> 
> Edit- I disagree with this.  While it may be functionally irrelevant in the present, it's very relevant to mapping out a plan that works to add the capacities needed.
> Ex.  Say you align that X and X+ into Y,  and recruitment delivers.  All battalions filled with 4 vehicle 40 man platoons.  But still no organic SP mortars or ATGM under armour.  So back to the drawing board, to fully man the battalions we need Y+, force needs to expand, budget needs to change, more recruitment needs to happen.  But, if you plan to "pinch a man out of each turret" from the outset (12 per company), that man's 4x each M1129 and M1134 at the battalion level, so that the capabilities are feasible when you reach establishment numbers


Yes I understand what he’s trying to say generally, the delivery is a bit… meandering. Im arguing the points he’s trying to make to support it such as turret manning general and Stryker specific. Now I’m regards to numbers and manning, if you looked at the Force 2025 manning plan they accounted for increased combat support compiles with the two Bns becoming inactive. If you want to pull four guys from the platoon, by all means take the weapons det and keep some C6s and Carl Gs in the car as needed. Nothing sillier than a man bounding with the gpmg beside a stabilized turret.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> The point is what do you want the vehicle to do.  I am of the opinion that combining the APC with the AFV (lt tank - armoured car) was a step too far.
> 
> I prefer, still, the distinction offered by the Saladin Saracen line of vehicles.
> 
> Saladins were fighting vehicles.  Saracens were transports that could keep up.
> 
> Saladins exposed  three men to the risks of the advance to contact.  The section was a bound to the rear.


 I matter how you play it, that vehicle is going to be engaged in a fight at some point, I’d rather they be capable of doing that well. The Saracen was meant to drive reserve Bns from England to Germany, never to actually be used anywhere near a front line.


----------



## Kirkhill

My preferred solution.  Saladin Heavy Armoured Car, Saracen APC, Stalwart Logistics - all share common running gear

The Canadian Version



The current version



The original version employed a common chassis with common running gear and motor and created 3 different vehicles, one of which was small and more heavily armoured and one of which was amphibious for logistics.  The AFV had a 76mm gun and a coax.

The Canadian version 1980 took the Mowag monocoque hull, which was a good starting point for an APC and added the original Textron TAPV one-man turret to create the amphibious Grizzly WAPC.  But things started to go wrong when trying to create a Saladin knock off.  They took the Saladin 76mm turret and added it to the same monocoque hull as the Grizzly.  But the Saladin was built on a frame, a chassis, like a truck.  That meant that the hull could be reconfigured to create a smaller target.  The Cougar was stuck with the large monocoque hull because monocoques spread their load throughout the hull and are dependent on the shape for their strength.  Thus big target, small gun.

Next step was the monocoque amphibious Bison with an extra set of wheels to carry more troops, a WAPC.

That became the Coyote by adding the Delco Turret used by the USMC on their LAV-25s.

Then the LAV3 with the Delco Turret was adopted for infantry use - and - in my opinion - confusion reigned. Both the Infantry and the "Cavalry" were equipped with the same vehicle - a 25mm armed armoured pickup truck.

Canada's original sin.

The LAV 3.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I matter how you play it, that vehicle is going to be engaged in a fight at some point, I’d rather they be capable of doing that well. The Saracen was meant to drive reserve Bns from England to Germany, never to actually be used anywhere near a front line.



The Saladin and Saracen were bought as a set to be used in the F Echelon.  The Stalwart was created later to allow the logistics to keep up.

Don't confuse the Saracen with Saxon. The Saxon was designed, as you suggest, just to get from garrison to the battlefield on highways.



None of which should be confused with the Scorpion,  Striker, Spartan, Samaritan, Sultan, Samson, Scimitar, Sabre, Sturgeon, Salamander or Stormer.

Blame the Brits.


----------



## Kirkhill

And with respect to being engaged in a fight - battle taxis, like the M113, do not engage.  They dismount their troops before the fight and go into Zulu harbour.  The troops take their pintle mounted gun with them.  That was one of the problems with the Grizzly.  The guns stayed with the vehicle.  As a result the vehicle was drawn into the fight.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Then the LAV3 with the Delco Turret was adopted
> Canada's original sin.
> 
> The LAV 3.


Or the only relevant, successful piece of military equipment we’ve produced in twenty years.

For the record, ignoring information and restating  your point at greater length gets grating. Vehicles have all gotten larger to add bigger guns and more armour. Now instead of assuming incompetence, as is your custom, perhaps we could consider that optics and TI have gotten drastically more sophisticated and the ability to hide, yes even dismounts, has been reduced. At the same time the effectiveness or man portable AT weapons makes a Saracen little more than a death trap, and while ideally yes the armoured recce will identify the enemy first, some times they don’t really want to be found or you don’t merit the Bde’s recce assets.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> And with respect to being engaged in a fight - battle taxis, like the M113, do not engage.  They dismount their troops before the fight and go into Zulu harbour.  The troops take their pintle mounted gun with them.


Oh well how sporting of the enemy.


----------



## Kirkhill

Tata Mark.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Yes I understand what he’s trying to say generally, the delivery is a bit… meandering. Im arguing the points he’s trying to make to support it such as turret manning general and Stryker specific. Now I’m regards to numbers and manning, if you looked at the Force 2025 manning plan they accounted for increased combat support compiles with the two Bns becoming inactive. If you want to pull four guys from the platoon, by all means take the weapons det and keep some C6s and Carl Gs in the car as needed. Nothing sillier than a man bounding with the gpmg beside a stabilized turret.


I'd love to hear more thoughts on this idea from our Mech Infantry types.

IF we were to have proper CS support at the CS Company level for the LAV Battalions (ideally I'm thinking a LAV-AT Platoon, LAV-Mortar Platoon, LAV-SHORAD Platoon and even a LAV-DFS Platoon) and have a "weapons locker" for GPMGs/AT Weapons in each of the Section vehicles could we then drop the Platoon HQ LAV from the platoon?


----------



## Good2Golf

markppcli said:


> Or the only relevant, successful piece of military *land* equipment we’ve produced in twenty years.


😉


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> I'd love to hear more thoughts on this idea from our Mech Infantry types.
> 
> IF we were to have proper CS support at the CS Company level for the LAV Battalions (ideally I'm thinking a LAV-AT Platoon, LAV-Mortar Platoon, LAV-SHORAD Platoon and even a LAV-DFS Platoon) and have a "weapons locker" for GPMGs/AT Weapons in each of the Section vehicles could we then drop the Platoon HQ LAV from the platoon?


Where would you sit the platoon commander, Signaler, and WO? One of the reasons for going to six dismounts was giving up a seat for attachments ( medics, a foo, what have you) loose the car and we loose that. We’d have to fight our LAVs differently as well, which isn’t a bad thing, it’s just different.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Yes I understand what he’s trying to say generally, the delivery is a bit… meandering. Im arguing the points he’s trying to make to support it such as turret manning general and Stryker specific. Now I’m regards to numbers and manning, if you looked at the Force 2025 manning plan they accounted for increased combat support compiles with the two Bns becoming inactive. If you want to pull four guys from the platoon, by all means take the weapons det and keep some C6s and Carl Gs in the car as needed. *Nothing sillier than a man bounding with the gpmg beside a stabilized turret.*



I'll try to be a bit less meandering. 

We have LAV 6.0s for the infantry.  That is not going away. 
We have a manning problem.  That doesn't seem to be going away.
Without a change in technology, meaning a major capital investment and a number of years, technology is not going to change either of those situations.

So I'm going to make a suggestion based on Mark's observations.

If the GPMG is silly how much sillier is a C7?   And yet the C7, C9 and C6 are the primary weapons of the dismounted infantry.
If the vehicle is going to be a carrier for weapons that might come in handy (the CG, the C6) then you are effectively turning the section in the back into a Weapons Det.

Suggestion - rather than eliminating the Weapons Dets and keeping the Sections why not convert the Sections into Weapons Dets.

The result would be 6 soldiers in a LAV 6.0 with 4 empty seats and room for the C6, the CG, a Javelin a DMR and perhaps even a 60mm mortar (or perhaps as few Switchblades or NLAWs are more appropriate these days).
The LAV commander would still have 3 Rifles in each LAV, or a dismount group of 12.   And would also be able to man an operationally relevant assortment of weapons that could assist the stabilized turrets.

Meanwhile the other 4 soldiers currently in the LAVs could be concentrated into an Assault Company or a straight Rifle Company transported in ACSV-TCVs.

That Rifle Company could be refilled from the Light Battalions or from the Reserves or be the RFL2/3 Companies referenced in Force 2025.

If the Ukrainian effort is demonstrating anything it is that distributing everything equally across the entire force is not a recipe for success.  There continues to be a strong need for concentrations of forces in reserve which can be allocated according to need.  Perhaps keeping a concentration of rifles in reserve within the battalion is one place to start?


----------



## markppcli

You misunderstood my point about the C6 in the offence entirely. The purpose of that dismounted platoon is to clear objectives out, having a guy running along side 4 stabilized machine guns with his gpmg isn’t providing a valuable tool in that context. The sections already have their ability to suppress when the turrets can’t, and the geometry will likely not work for the dismounted C6. 

Now why I would keep the C6 in the LAVs is for deliberate attacks and defensive operations where the cars are cut away to provide counter moves or cut offs, a feint, what have you. Critically however I don’t think you gain a whole lot of anything by pulling half the dismounts out of 3 companies to form a 4th company that is now going to be tasked out to clear those objectives the other companies lack the bayonets to deal with.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I'll try to be a bit less meandering.
> 
> We have LAV 6.0s for the infantry.  That is not going away.
> We have a manning problem.  That doesn't seem to be going away.
> Without a change in technology, meaning a major capital investment and a number of years, technology is not going to change either of those situations.
> 
> So I'm going to make a suggestion based on Mark's observations.
> 
> If the GPMG is silly how much sillier is a C7?   And yet the C7, C9 and C6 are the primary weapons of the dismounted infantry.


The C6 isn’t an individual weapon.  Sure I’ve run one solo with an assault pack with belts in it - but it’s just a heavy LMG at that point. 

The LAV has a C6 coax, a 25mm and a C6/9 commander MG Pintel mounted. 

Dismounting the C6 works fine for dismounted operations away from the LAV’s but is generally pointless when working with LAV’s. 

Frankly the C7 is pointless to, ideally everyone would have a C8 other than a Platoon DMR.  




Kirkhill said:


> If the vehicle is going to be a carrier for weapons that might come in handy (the CG, the C6) then you are effectively turning the section in the back into a Weapons Det.


The Weapons DET is a Platoon HQ function. 



Kirkhill said:


> Suggestion - rather than eliminating the Weapons Dets and keeping the Sections why not convert the Sections into Weapons Dets.


Adopting an Arms Room principle isn’t necessarily a bad thing, but you don’t do it to strip manpower.  



Kirkhill said:


> The result would be 6 soldiers in a LAV 6.0 with 4 empty seats and room for the C6, the CG, a Javelin a DMR and perhaps even a 60mm mortar (or perhaps as few Switchblades or NLAWs are more appropriate these days).


6 GIB’s plus the three crew? 


Kirkhill said:


> The LAV commander would still have 3 Rifles in each LAV, or a dismount group of 12.   And would also be able to man an operationally relevant assortment of weapons that could assist the stabilized turrets.


I’m really having a tough time understanding you here. 

I’m no longer following what you consider the section 

If you are talking about 6 dismounts / car 
  That leaves 18 Dismounts plus Pl Commander, Pl WO, Sig, 3 man weapon DET 

That’s not an infantry platoon at that point. 




Kirkhill said:


> Meanwhile the other 4 soldiers currently in the LAVs could be concentrated into an Assault Company or a straight Rifle Company transported in ACSV-TCVs.
> 
> That Rifle Company could be refilled from the Light Battalions or from the Reserves or be the RFL2/3 Companies referenced in Force 2025.
> 
> If the Ukrainian effort is demonstrating anything it is that distributing everything equally across the entire force is not a recipe for success.  There continues to be a strong need for concentrations of forces in reserve which can be allocated according to need.  Perhaps keeping a concentration of rifles in reserve within the battalion is one place to start?


Which is a reason for having a 2 up one back company layout, to give some depth.  Bn should not penny pinch out of Companies and Platoons as that would just make those weaker forcing any ‘extras’ to be committed earlier.


----------



## Kirkhill

@markppcli 

To help me understand better,

Can you clarify the primary purpose of the LAV mounted infantry?  What operations dominate your training schedule?


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> @markppcli
> 
> To help me understand better,
> 
> Can you clarify the primary purpose of the LAV mounted infantry?  What operations dominate your training schedule?



No different than any other infantry.  Close with and destroy the enemy.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> @markppcli
> 
> To help me understand better,
> 
> Can you clarify the primary purpose of the LAV mounted infantry?  What operations dominate your training schedule?



Our training schedule focuses on the build up to Cmbt Team attacks, we sometimes call this a level 5 range. Our tasks, as a platoon, within a combat team context are as such (@Infanteer feel free  to correct me here): clear enemy positions on the objective during a combat team attack, conduct hasty attacks and defile drills to clear the axis of advance, provide flank security on the advance.


----------



## Kirkhill

I am asking, not proposing, if there is a different way of organizing things.

I am asking if putting everything in the battalion up front in the LAVs, equally divided, is the only way to create an effective LAV Battalion.  Is there an advantage to doing that?

What I am seeing from my distant perspective is vehicles that are crowded and capabilities that are distributed.  When concentration of one, or any of those capabilities is required is that easily accomplished and regularly practiced.

When I said that the LAV 3.0 was Canada's Original Sin that was not a knock against the LAV.  What I meant by that is that, in my opinion, it blurred the line between the RCAC roles and the RCIC roles.

The RCAC has a history that emphasises the vehicle in the operations.  The RCIC history emphasises the man.  There is no reason why both the RCAC and the RCIC can't be equipped with the same vehicle but I would expect them to use them differently.

The Armoured Recce used to keep their "infantry" in the rear of the Squadron/Regiment in as separate "assault" element to be called on when that capability was required.  Just like they could call on their Troop/Squadron to add additional weight to their fires.

The infantry use to keep their support in the rear of the Platoon/Company/Battalion in separate weapons dets, sections, platoons, companies to be called on when required.

I have long argued that the LAV's stabilized turret overshadows the support weapons of the Canadian infantry battalion and renders many of them redundant.  In my view when the LAV 3.0 was adopted it swung the Infantry Battalion away from the rifleman centred organization to something that was looking more like an RCAC Armoured Car Regiment.

Which is why I am wondering about seeing the Battalion as 2 or 3 Support Companies with a Rifle company attached rather than 2 or 3 Rifle Companies with a Support Company attached.

Carl Gustav vs BMP-1 in Mariupol









						Полк АЗОВ – офіційний канал
					

"Азов" б'є влучно в ціль. Ціль "Азову" - знищення російських окупаційних військ. Бійцями полку в Маріуполі знищено ворожу БМП з екіпажем. російська піхота також навоювалася та прилягла довічно відпочити на одній з вулиць українського міста.




					t.me


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Our training schedule focuses on the build up to Cmbt Team attacks, we sometimes call this a level 5 range.



That actually raises a slightly off-topic question in my mind.

I always found that the best exercises for actually training troops ended with the combat team level. Battalion and brigade and division exercises became important for the battalion and above staff but generally were uninspiring and marginally useful for the people at the company and below level. It was something like a cross-over point between training for warfighting and battle management.

While I found the German live-fire battlegroup in Shilo fun, they were pretty scripted and routine (probably useful for the conscript army that they were in those days). The majority of the battlegroup and brigade exercises and the RV exercise I attended were fairly boring for the bulk of the troops.

I've never been on a Maple Resolve or to BATUS so can't talk about them.

My question for those in battalions and armoured regiments is: is there sufficient training value in a battlegroup and above exercise with troops? Or would we be better off having live exercises with troops end at the combat team level while battalion and above exercises focus on TEWTs and CAXs and perhaps field exercises that only involve the command teams from the coy level on up?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Our training schedule focuses on the build up to Cmbt Team attacks, we sometimes call this a level 5 range. Our tasks, as a platoon, within a combat team context are as such (@Infanteer feel free  to correct me here): clear enemy positions on the objective during a combat team attack, conduct hasty attacks and defile drills to clear the axis of advance, provide flank security on the advance.



FJAG's thought got me to wondering as well if there is an equivalent emphasis on the defence?  Both static defence and manoeuvering?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I am asking, not proposing, if there is a different way of organizing things.
> 
> I am asking if putting everything in the battalion up front in the LAVs, equally divided, is the only way to create an effective LAV Battalion.  Is there an advantage to doing that?
> 
> What I am seeing from my distant perspective is vehicles that are crowded and capabilities that are distributed.  When concentration of one, or any of those capabilities is required is that easily accomplished and regularly practiced.
> 
> When I said that the LAV 3.0 was Canada's Original Sin that was not a knock against the LAV.  What I meant by that is that, in my opinion, it blurred the line between the RCAC roles and the RCIC roles.
> 
> The RCAC has a history that emphasises the vehicle in the operations.  The RCIC history emphasises the man.  There is no reason why both the RCAC and the RCIC can't be equipped with the same vehicle but I would expect them to use them differently.
> 
> The Armoured Recce used to keep their "infantry" in the rear of the Squadron/Regiment in as separate "assault" element to be called on when that capability was required.  Just like they could call on their Troop/Squadron to add additional weight to their fires.
> 
> The infantry use to keep their support in the rear of the Platoon/Company/Battalion in separate weapons dets, sections, platoons, companies to be called on when required.
> 
> I have long argued that the LAV's stabilized turret overshadows the support weapons of the Canadian infantry battalion and renders many of them redundant.  In my view when the LAV 3.0 was adopted it swung the Infantry Battalion away from the rifleman centred organization to something that was looking more like an RCAC Armoured Car Regiment.
> 
> Which is why I am wondering about seeing the Battalion as 2 or 3 Support Companies with a Rifle company attached rather than 2 or 3 Rifle Companies with a Support Company attached.
> 
> Carl Gustav vs BMP-1 in Mariupol
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Полк АЗОВ – офіційний канал
> 
> 
> "Азов" б'є влучно в ціль. Ціль "Азову" - знищення російських окупаційних військ. Бійцями полку в Маріуполі знищено ворожу БМП з екіпажем. російська піхота також навоювалася та прилягла довічно відпочити на одній з вулиць українського міста.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> t.me


Emphasis is still on the man, the LAVs get you there with fire and movement, and protection from fire. 

@FJAG i would agree in general; but it takes a Bde to run a combat team range so functionally not much different.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG's thought got me to wondering as well if there is an equivalent emphasis on the defence?  Both static defence and manoeuvering?


We do defensives on MR, and on Bde live exercises as well, usually as a “waiting” period.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Emphasis is still on the man, the LAVs get you there with fire and movement, and protection from fire.
> 
> @FJAG i would agree in general; but it takes a Bde to run a combat team range so functionally not much different.


So that makes me wonder if the Army would be better served by CMTC becoming a traveling road show that takes well designed cbt tm level exercises around to the brigades? 

I seem to be having a what could we do moment here now that the budget has been a disappointment.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> We do defensives on MR, and on Bde live exercises as well, usually as a “waiting” period.



Is it fair to say that you see your primary role as an offensive force?  Carrying the fight to the enemy?


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> So that makes me wonder if the Army would be better served by CMTC becoming a traveling road show that takes well designed cbt tm level exercises around to the brigades?
> 
> I seem to be having a what could we do moment here now that the budget has been a disappointment.



Or, what would it take to make Combat Team exercises the norm in the context of the existing Brigade training areas?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Or, what would it take to make Combat Team exercises the norm in the context of the existing Brigade training areas?


They already are, it’s just it takes a Bde to get it going by the time you add all the pieces and range staffs.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Is it fair to say that you see your primary role as an offensive force?  Carrying the fight to the enemy?


Yes, but I’d argue that the training focus is largely a factor of where the skills get developed, maneuvering LAVs in a combat team formation vs digging a hole, and the relative complexity required for a live offensive range vs doing a dry defensives


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Or, what would it take to make Combat Team exercises the norm in the context of the existing Brigade training areas?


Most of our training areas are already adequate for live fire combat team exercises.

I've always thought that tactical "dry" exercises need to get off the ranges and into the terrain where we will need to actually fight as we did in 4 CMBG. Whether that's farmland and towns in Canada or Latvia or Poland is irrelevant although Europe is preferable on several levels.

This gets me back to force structures.

If you were to redesign CMTC and put it into Europe with a prepositioned combat team of equipment, you could fly over two-week training rotos on a single C17. That's up to 26 combat teams per year which equates fairly well with our 27 RegF rifle companies. If you break that into two one-week phases that could be run concurrently on alternating weeks then you could up to double the throughput and build in additional "break" times for maintenance etc. - you could couple that with the CMTC "travelling roadshow" to prep the deploying roto.


----------



## Brad Sallows

I doubt current manning problems can ever be solved by moving pieces around within the sub-units or even the units or trying to figure out ways to make the equipment suit the manning level.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> I doubt current manning problems can ever be solved by moving pieces around within the sub-units or even the units or trying to figure out ways to make the equipment suit the manning level.



So what do we do Brad?  If "Despair is a sin".


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> I doubt current manning problems can ever be solved by moving pieces around within the sub-units or even the units or trying to figure out ways to make the equipment suit the manning level.


I've always said that manning problems should lead to two effects:

1) the first is that you can/must train on what to do once you start taking LOBs and casualties and you have a reduced force to work with. That an incidental teaching point; and

2) the second is that it should teach the Army that it needs to have a viable plan to fill the blank files before deployments from other sources both RegF and ResF. We do both now but with long ramp up lead times which are not realistic in an emergency. We need, and need to exercise regularly, a plan on how to quickly round out the deploying force right up to the maximum sized force that our equipment holdings would allow us to deploy. Heck. Call it a mobilization plan. "Mobilization" is not really a dirty word. Ukraine just showed us how to do it.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

Embrace the "doctrine" of managed readiness more fully.  Accept that every mission going out the door will be a force that has been filled out and kitted out by taking people and equipment from elsewhere.  And then add back into the doctrinal (paper) establishments all the positions and equipment taken out for "reasons" that were not really grounded in "we don't need that capability anymore", but were more along the lines of "we need to move some people" or "we want to go a bit more cheap on equipment".


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Regarding collective, in the interests of context the Canadian Army employs the following framework and terminology:

Level 2 - Section/Tank/Gun Det (because saying sub-sub-sub-unit is awkward)
Level 3 - Platoon/Troop
Level 4 - Company/Squadron/Battery (sub-unit)
Level 5 - Combat Team
Level 6 - Battle Group and Unit
Level 7 - Formation (Bde)

Training should be progressive - a unit should not try to start the training year with a Battle Group live-fire attack at night. You build up, and I have found that time invested at the lower levels pays dividends when you get to the higher levels. You know: crawl, walk run instead of run, stumble, fall.  

The annual Operating Plan will direct the level of training that each formation (and unit) will achieve. These levels are driven by the managed readiness plan. Folks in the Build phase will train to higher levels.  Basically we don't have the whole army trying to train to the same level every year. 

Just because a unit is training at Level 3 does not mean that only a single Platoon or Troop is out in the field. The whole unit will likely be in the field, but the emphasis will be on the Platoons or Troops. We talk about Level 3 in a Level 4 context meaning there may well be Company level manouevre, but the OC is not the focus. His tactical plan is there to provide context for the Platoon commanders. If there are compromises to be made they are made at the Company level. A unit should run its own exercises to Level 4, although it would only validate itself to Level 3. We validate two levels down so an OC will validate Sections while the CO will validate the Platoons or Troops. Not all elements in the army will be Validated each year - that is generally reserved for the folks in the Build phase with exceptions as always for the unique units/capabilities. The unit HQ will likely conduct a CAX (Computer Assisted Exercise) each year and each Bde HQ will be part of Ex UNIFIED RESOLVE, although the level of participation by the HQ (and supporting unit HQs) will be driven by the phase that the Bde finds itself in.  

Level 5 Live, Level 6 and Level 7 field training exercises (FTX) are generally reserved for the Build Phase. I have seen (and indeed run) such a thing as a Level 3.5 Live where you have a Platoon or Troop conducting a live fire with some combined arms elements included. Live fire is important but it can also be overly scripted. To me, we get diminishing marginal returns on live fire as the Level increases but some may fight me on that. 

To bring this back to the start, the troops in the sections and panzers may find a Level 7 exercise somewhat underwhelming with lots of time spent in battle procedure and waiting around. In theory, those troops have already been put through their paces in the previous exercises. CAXs are great for BG, Bde and Div HQs and are my preference for ironing out HQ procedures and tactics; but there is absolutely value in actually moving and sustaining an actual brigade in the actual field. A long-dead German guy said simple things are hard sometimes. 

Anyhoo.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> 1) the first is that you can/must train on what to do once you start taking LOBs and casualties and you have a reduced force to work with. That an incidental teaching point; and



Full agreement.  To me it's pointless to fret over whether vehicles should/can be crewed by 2 rather than 3, or how many dismounts should be formally assigned to a section.  That's of interest mainly to people designing "buy lists" for DYO tactical wargame scenarios.  Day-by-day and mission-by-mission,leaders are going to be restructuring and juggling whatever they happen to have in hand, which is with very few exceptions going to be less than "full".  What's more important is that all the people in a sub-unit (at least) are a tight community capable of working with each other even if suddenly reassigned.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> So what do we do Brad?  If "Despair is a sin".


I'll take a shot...

We consolidate.

1 x Heavy Brigade in the West.  1/2/3 PPCLI all LAV Battalions and LdSH a Cavalry Regiment along the lines being discussed in the Armoured Recce threads (Tanks & Recce elements).  1RCHA would get a 3rd Battery (from 5RALC) and be equipped with SP 155mm.

1 x Light Brigade in the East with 1RCR (Petawawa)/1R22eR (Valcartier)/2RCR (Gagetown) all Light Battalions.   The infantry, RCD, 2RCHA, 2 CER and 2 Service all equipped to be air transportable as our Rapid Reaction Force.  2RCHA would get a 3rd Battery (from 5RALC) and be equipped with M777s.

The following units would move to the Canadian Combat Support Brigade and be re-roled and re-equipped as follows:

12RBC - Re-roles as a Sense/Strike Regiment with LAV LRSS and LAV-UAV/Loitering Munitions vehicles.
2R22eR - Re-roles as an AT Battalion with LAV-ATGMs
3R22eR - Re-roles as an AA Battalion with LAV-SHORAD (vehicles from 2RCR)
5RACL - HQ and STA Batteries remain.  2 x Reg Force Gun Batteries to 1RCHA and 2RCHA.  Gains 3 x Reserve Gun Batteries equipped with SP 155mm.  Regiment to act as General Support artillery for any deployed Brigade Group.
5CER - Becomes the Combat Engineer Regiment for the CCSB
5Svc - Becomes the Service Battalion for the CCSB
3RCR would be disbanded and the troops distributed to the 6 x remaining Infantry Battalions (along with the surplus infantry troops from 2 & 3R22eR as the specialized battalions will not require as many personnel as an Infantry Battalion).

Consolidate the Reserves into 3 x Reserve Light Infantry Brigade Groups. The Infantry Regiments from each existing Reserve Brigade would be consolidated into a single Infantry Battalion.  The Armoured, Artillery, Combat Engineer and Service Regiments/Battalions would be composite units from across all the existing Brigades.

3 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 31/32/33 Brigades)
4 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 38/39/41 Brigades)
5 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 34/35/36/37 Brigades)
All this can be done with minimal new equipment.  SP 155's are already part of an indirect fire program.  The LAV-AT, LAV-SHORAD and LAV-UAV's can all be obtained by using existing LAV hulls plus the same RiWP Remote Weapon Station with different weapon mounting options, but as a short-term expedient these specialty units could still be re-roled using MANPAD AT/SAM/UAV launchers until dedicated vehicle upgrades are possible.

Not a perfect solution, but a good short-term solution to reduce manning pressures, HQ overhead and key capability gaps.


----------



## markppcli

What role do you see for an AT Bn? I don’t see that in our or any other NATO doctrine. AT should be held by Bns or Bde at highest.

Functionally I agree though we need to rationalize the number of units we have with the number of people we are allotted. We’ve expanded the number of PYs in the forces because we’ve take Class B for granted and now we’re unwilling to case a Bns colours to keep core capabilities.


----------



## Kirkhill

A follow on question?

What constitutes a Level 5 Combat Team?  

In some armies it could be half of one of our Tank Squadrons with an attached LAV Platoon and a FOO Det.  Or a LAV Company minus plus a Tank Troop and a FOO Det. They usually have some sort of GBAD capability as well.

It strikes me from following conversations here that our Combat Team, with 20 tanks, and 15 LAVs and maybe a Recce Troop, but minus FOO/FACs (???) is more akin to what some armies would consider a Battalion.

The presence of a Heavy Armoured Car (DFS) to supplement the Tank (something like the new Italian Centauro 2)  - would that change the possibilities?

I'm thinking that the larger the Combat Team the larger the training area required.  If small Combat Teams could be organized within the Brigade's resources then the interactions between the RRCA/RCAC/RCIC could become more frequent and more "natural"?



Brad Sallows said:


> Full agreement.  To me it's pointless to fret over whether vehicles should/can be crewed by 2 rather than 3, or how many dismounts should be formally assigned to a section.  That's of interest mainly to people designing "buy lists" for DYO tactical wargame scenarios.  Day-by-day and mission-by-mission,leaders are going to be restructuring and juggling whatever they happen to have in hand, which is with very few exceptions going to be less than "full".  *What's more important is that all the people in a sub-unit (at least) are a tight community capable of working with each other even if suddenly reassigned.*



You and I were typing at the same time Brad.

The primary difference between your prescription and my thought is that that community should extend outside of the Regiment.  The thought is the same though.  The community (ies) needs to regularly work together in multiple configurations on multiple tasks with the equipment avaialable.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> A follow on question?
> 
> What constitutes a Level 5 Combat Team?
> 
> In some armies it could be half of one of our Tank Squadrons with an attached LAV Platoon and a FOO Det.  Or a LAV Company minus plus a Tank Troop and a FOO Det. They usually have some sort of GBAD capability as well.
> 
> It strikes me from following conversations here that our Combat Team, with 20 tanks, and 15 LAVs and maybe a Recce Troop, but minus FOO/FACs (???) is more akin to what some armies would consider a Battalion.
> 
> The presence of a Heavy Armoured Car (DFS) to supplement the Tank (something like the new Italian Centauro 2)  - would that change the possibilities?
> 
> I'm thinking that the larger the Combat Team the larger the training area required.  If small Combat Teams could be organized within the Brigade's resources then the interactions between the RRCA/RCAC/RCIC could become more frequent and more "natural"?
> 
> 
> 
> You and I were typing at the same time Brad.
> 
> The primary difference between your prescription and my thought is that that community should extend outside of the Regiment.  The thought is the same though.  The community (ies) needs to regularly work together in multiple configurations on multiple tasks with the equipment avaialable.


A Cmbt Team is defined in Canada as either a Tank Sqn or an Infantry company supported by other arms. That usually takes the form of an infantry company supported by half a tank Sqn, an engineer tp, and foo det. Plus CSS of course.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> What role do you see for an AT Bn? I don’t see that in our or any other NATO doctrine. AT should be held by Bns or Bde at highest.
> 
> Functionally I agree though we need to rationalize the number of units we have with the number of people we are allotted. We’ve expanded the number of PYs in the forces because we’ve take Class B for granted and now we’re unwilling to case a Bns colours to keep core capabilities.


I see an AT Battalion as a replacement for a Tank Regiment which we are extremely unlikely to get.

We have a total of 82 tanks (of various standards).  As noted in a previous thread, not even enough to equip a Canadian equivalent of a single ABCT even if we reduced our Squadron size to 15 from 19.  And that leaves us with ZERO replacements, etc.

Equipping a single Cavalry Regiment with 2 x Tank Squadrons leaves enough for a training squadron and an additional squadron worth of spares. maintenance losses, etc. 

An ATGM-equipped AT Battalion could have Companies issued out to deployed Brigades to fill a defensive AT role similar to what a Tank Squadron would in a properly equipped mechanized Army.


----------



## Infanteer

The last thing we need are boutique units like Anti-Tank Battalions.



Kirkhill said:


> What constitutes a Level 5 Combat Team?



Level 5 (from B-GL 300-008): combined arms sub-unit training.

Combat Team (from B-GL 321-006): an ad hoc and temporary combined arms organization based on a manoeuvre sub-unit headquarters and consisting of integral and attached infantry and armour sub-sub-units.

These are not necessarily the same thing.  All Combat Team training is level 5, but not all level 5 training requires a combat team.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> I see an AT Battalion as a replacement for a Tank Regiment which we are extremely unlikely to get.
> 
> We have a total of 82 tanks (of various standards).  As noted in a previous thread, not even enough to equip a Canadian equivalent of a single ABCT even if we reduced our Squadron size to 15 from 19.  And that leaves us with ZERO replacements, etc.
> 
> Equipping a single Cavalry Regiment with 2 x Tank Squadrons leaves enough for a training squadron and an additional squadron worth of spares. maintenance losses, etc.
> 
> An ATGM-equipped AT Battalion could have Companies issued out to deployed Brigades to fill a defensive AT role similar to what a Tank Squadron would in a properly equipped mechanized Army.


Might as well just have Bn AT platoons, per our existing doctrine, if your going to employ it that way.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> I'll take a shot...
> 
> We consolidate.
> 
> 1 x Heavy Brigade in the West.  1/2/3 PPCLI all LAV Battalions and LdSH a Cavalry Regiment along the lines being discussed in the Armoured Recce threads (Tanks & Recce elements).  1RCHA would get a 3rd Battery (from 5RALC) and be equipped with SP 155mm.
> 
> 1 x Light Brigade in the East with 1RCR (Petawawa)/1R22eR (Valcartier)/2RCR (Gagetown) all Light Battalions.   The infantry, RCD, 2RCHA, 2 CER and 2 Service all equipped to be air transportable as our Rapid Reaction Force.  2RCHA would get a 3rd Battery (from 5RALC) and be equipped with M777s.
> 
> The following units would move to the Canadian Combat Support Brigade and be re-roled and re-equipped as follows:
> 
> 12RBC - Re-roles as a Sense/Strike Regiment with LAV LRSS and LAV-UAV/Loitering Munitions vehicles.
> 2R22eR - Re-roles as an AT Battalion with LAV-ATGMs
> 3R22eR - Re-roles as an AA Battalion with LAV-SHORAD (vehicles from 2RCR)
> 5RACL - HQ and STA Batteries remain.  2 x Reg Force Gun Batteries to 1RCHA and 2RCHA.  Gains 3 x Reserve Gun Batteries equipped with SP 155mm.  Regiment to act as General Support artillery for any deployed Brigade Group.
> 5CER - Becomes the Combat Engineer Regiment for the CCSB
> 5Svc - Becomes the Service Battalion for the CCSB
> 3RCR would be disbanded and the troops distributed to the 6 x remaining Infantry Battalions (along with the surplus infantry troops from 2 & 3R22eR as the specialized battalions will not require as many personnel as an Infantry Battalion).
> 
> Consolidate the Reserves into 3 x Reserve Light Infantry Brigade Groups. The Infantry Regiments from each existing Reserve Brigade would be consolidated into a single Infantry Battalion.  The Armoured, Artillery, Combat Engineer and Service Regiments/Battalions would be composite units from across all the existing Brigades.
> 
> 3 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 31/32/33 Brigades)
> 4 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 38/39/41 Brigades)
> 5 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 34/35/36/37 Brigades)
> All this can be done with minimal new equipment.  SP 155's are already part of an indirect fire program.  The LAV-AT, LAV-SHORAD and LAV-UAV's can all be obtained by using existing LAV hulls plus the same RiWP Remote Weapon Station with different weapon mounting options, but as a short-term expedient these specialty units could still be re-roled using MANPAD AT/SAM/UAV launchers until dedicated vehicle upgrades are possible.
> 
> Not a perfect solution, but a good short-term solution to reduce manning pressures, HQ overhead and key capability gaps.



An armoured car regiment used to consist of 3 Recce Squadrons equipped with lightly crewed but "heavily" armed vehicles (when compared to a Rifle Company) and a lightly armed Rifle Company in support reinforced by a large gun Support Troop.

An infantry battalion was 4 lightly armed Rifle Companies and a heavily armed Support Company reinforced by a Mortar Platoon.  Together with its machine guns, Anti-Tank Platoon and its own light cavalry (the Recce Platoon) it, like the armoured car regiment was a Combined Arms organization.

Both entities internally had the components to practice Combined Arms operations.  Tanks attached to the AT and Recce Platoons.  Arty attached to the Mortar Platoons.  Infantry attached to the Assault Troops.

People were moved from troop to troop, platoon to platoon as the required skills changed.  Mortars, Pioneers and AT Gunners could become rifles if necessary.

I think there is still a rational argument to be made in that regard for separating the vehicle crews from the rifle sections and treating the vehicle crews as the Support Company.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> A Cmbt Team is defined in Canada as either a Tank Sqn or an Infantry company supported by other arms. That usually takes the form of an infantry company supported by half a tank Sqn, an engineer tp, and foo det. Plus CSS of course.



In terms of capabilities how would that stack up with, for example, the Swedish Pansarbattalion?


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Might as well just have Bn AT platoons, per our existing doctrine, if your going to employ it that way.


One should not be exclusive of the other.  In fact, if there were the money to equip at least one or two LAVs per Platoon with a vehicle mounted ATGM you probably wouldn't need a separate AT unit.



Infanteer said:


> The last thing we need is boutique units like Anti-Tank Battalions.


You're probably correct.  What we need is one (or more) Tank Regiments with enough tanks to field the full complement of vehicles and have spares, reserves, a replacement Regiment, etc.  We also need APCs that are equipped with ATGMs but unfortunately we don't have either.

An AT-Battalion would be the poor man's solution to a missing key capability.  If that capability could adequately be devolved into the Infantry Battalion structure then drop the AT-Battalion and roll those PYs back into the remaining Infantry Battalions to ensure full manning, complete CS units (Pioneers, Mortars, AT, etc.) and staff for the schools.


----------



## Infanteer

A tank and an ATGM are two different things that offer two separate capabilities.  One should not confuse one with the other.



Kirkhill said:


> In terms of capabilities how would that stack up with, for example, the Swedish Pansarbattalion?



This is a pointless exercise.  To paraphrase a very smart analyst "you can't evaluate capability without context."


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> The last thing we need are boutique units like Anti-Tank Battalions.
> 
> 
> 
> Level 5 (from B-GL 300-008): combined arms sub-unit training.
> 
> Combat Team (from B-GL 321-006): an ad hoc and temporary combined arms organization based on a manoeuvre sub-unit headquarters and consisting of integral and attached infantry and armour sub-sub-units.
> 
> These are not necessarily the same thing.  All Combat Team training is level 5, but not all level 5 training requires a combat team.



So how often does Level 5 get exercised?  And in how many of the infinite combinations and permutations that that formulation permits?

A Recce squadron minus with a LAV platoon attached?  An artillery battery with a Recce troop attached?  An Engineer Squadron with a LAV troop?


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> This is a pointless exercise.  To paraphrase a very smart analyst "you can't evaluate capability without context."



I agree.  So, in how many different contexts does the Canadian Army exercise its available assets?


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> So how often does Level 5 get exercised?



Depends on what phase of the managed readiness plan a unit/brigade is in.



Kirkhill said:


> And in how many of the infinite combinations and permutations that that formulation permits?



Whatever makes tactical sense.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> So how often does Level 5 get exercised?  And in how many of the infinite combinations and permutations that that formulation permits?
> 
> A Recce squadron minus with a LAV platoon attached?  An artillery battery with a Recce troop attached?  An Engineer Squadron with a LAV troop?


Almost always a maneuver sub unit, with enabling attachments. So infantry or tanks with the rest. An artillery battery isn’t usually conducting  an attack unless it’s an attack by fire so that interaction would be characterized the same way. Similarly recce Sqn may be involved but likely in find the objective and reporting it up.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> This is a pointless exercise.


Well yeah, it’s talking about the army in the internet. I don’t think anyone is under the impression the CDS is taking this thread into account; nor is it the army journal or some other academic publications. Just people talking, no point really required.


----------



## WLSC

Kirkhill said:


> An armoured car regiment used to consist of 3 Recce Squadrons equipped with lightly crewed but "heavily" armed vehicles (when compared to a Rifle Company) and a lightly armed Rifle Company in support reinforced by a large gun Support Troop.
> 
> An infantry battalion was 4 lightly armed Rifle Companies and a heavily armed Support Company reinforced by a Mortar Platoon.  Together with its machine guns, Anti-Tank Platoon and its own light cavalry (the Recce Platoon) it, like the armoured car regiment was a Combined Arms organization.
> 
> Both entities internally had the components to practice Combined Arms operations.  Tanks attached to the AT and Recce Platoons.  Arty attached to the Mortar Platoons.  Infantry attached to the Assault Troops.
> 
> People were moved from troop to troop, platoon to platoon as the required skills changed.  Mortars, Pioneers and AT Gunners could become rifles if necessary.
> 
> I think there is still a rational argument to be made in that regard for separating the vehicle crews from the rifle sections and treating the vehicle crews as the Support Company.


We've thru that separation route couple of years ago.  You have to understand than in mecanised inf, the section is consider fully deployed when debuss of the now Zulu.  That need some synergy that tag along group do acheive well quickly.

You will not ask the same task to a Ligth Inf Batt than to a Mech in the same theater.  Their employement is different.  For example, think of the Falkland war which was Light vs Light or if you need to send a Bn to protect something and wait to be releive.  You cannot compare the to and mix their individual capability.


----------



## Kirkhill

WLSC said:


> We've thru that separation route couple of years ago.  You have to understand than in mecanised inf, the section is consider fully deployed when debuss of the now Zulu.  That need some synergy that tag along group do acheive well quickly.
> 
> You will not ask the same task to a Ligth Inf Batt than to a Mech in the same theater.  Their employement is different.  For example, think of the Falkland war which was Light vs Light or if you need to send a Bn to protect something and wait to be releive.  You cannot compare the to and mix their individual capability.



Thanks Winston

But we have spent years trying to figure out how to make 9 battalions out of 5 battalions worth of equipment AND at the same time make sure that all 9 battalions can do everything infantry - being able to drive LAVs and drop out of planes and be deployed by ship.

I haven't seen much evidence of a hardening of a course of action.


----------



## WLSC

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks Winston
> 
> But we have spent years trying to figure out how to make 9 battalions out of 5 battalions worth of equipment AND at the same time make sure that all 9 battalions can do everything infantry - being able to drive LAVs and drop out of planes and be deployed by ship.
> 
> I haven't seen much evidence of a hardening of a course of action.


Your welcome 

We tried to reinvent the wheel to fit our ressource when it's suppose to be the opposite, we like the luxury of having the 9 Bn ''equal''.  Formalizing the LIB was a step in the good direction.  Then, Cap badge... so we are stuck with 3 x CMBC with a LIB.

We know the solution because it already exist.  Look around, it's all a variation on the same theme.

I'll go further, LIB and Mech, even if both infantry the required skill set are the same, the depth is not equal in each type.  Not better, different.  Going from one to the other was also tried.  You have if you do that unit of lesser quality because of skill fade.


----------



## Kirkhill

WLSC said:


> ....  Then, Cap badge...



It begins and ends there.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks Winston
> 
> But we have spent years trying to figure out how to make 9 battalions out of 5 battalions worth of equipment AND at the same time make sure that all 9 battalions can do everything infantry - being able to drive LAVs and drop out of planes and be deployed by ship.
> 
> I haven't seen much evidence of a hardening of a course of action.


When have we tried to do that? We have 3 jumpable companies, that’s it’s, an no one trains for amphibious operations. We have 6 mechanized Bns that very much do mechanized things, and 3 light Bns that do light stuff. We move people between the two for cross integrations, and they have re roled for deployments. Additionally mechanized infantry will do light tasks, and guys from light Bns will cover mechanized  stuff on 5b.


----------



## WLSC

Kirkhill said:


> It begins and ends there.


It's not a bad thing.  It demand only that the '' Canada first'' thing being apply...


----------



## WLSC

markppcli said:


> When have we tried to do that? We have 3 jumpable companies, that’s it’s, an no one trains for amphibious operations. We have 6 mechanized Bns that very much do mechanized things, and 3 light Bns that do light stuff. We move people between the two for cross integrations, and they have re roled for deployments. Additionally mechanized infantry will do light tasks, and guys from light Bns will cover mechanized  stuff on 5b.


We are two small right now to ''specialise'' even if it has been discuss.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> When have we tried to do that? We have 3 jumpable companies, that’s it’s, an no one trains for amphibious operations. We have 6 mechanized Bns that very much do mechanized things, and 3 light Bns that do light stuff. We move people between the two for cross integrations, and they have re roled for deployments. Additionally mechanized infantry will do light tasks, and guys from light Bns will cover mechanized  stuff on 5b.



We/You/They have experimented with companies and battalions working with the USMC and the USN, (R22eR and PPCLI),  with allied light and airborne troops, with mountain troops, with helicopters....and with LAVs.


----------



## Kirkhill

Canadian Armed Forces and USMC conduct Amphibious Assault Training During RIMPAC 2018
					

180627-O-N0842-3004 CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (June 27, 2018) – Staff Sergeant Steven Mathews of the United States Marine Corps briefs members of the Canadian 2nd Battalion Royal 22e Régiment Bravo on the AAVP7A1 RAM/RS Assault Amphibious Vehicles during the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)...




					www.dvidshub.net


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> We/You/They have experimented with companies and battalions working with the USMC and the USN, (R22eR and PPCLI),  with allied light and airborne troops, with mountain troops, with helicopters....and with LAVs.


Doing a single RIMPAC training event is hardly “expecting everyone todo everything.” Although it does prove that getting off a landing vessel isn’t rocket science, in the same way that getting out of a helicopter isn’t.


----------



## MilEME09

Okay long term idea here, get in on the US armys light tank project. Once production starts, we equip the RCDs, and 12 RBC with them. That will give us 1 x heavy brigade with our Leopards, and 2 x brigades with light tanks with faster mobility. 

Get AT/AA pods for our LAVs. Combining these elements together would create one brigade for Spear head operations, and 2 x brigades that have a flexibility, mobility and can hopefully transported quickly by air.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> So how often does Level 5 get exercised? And in how many of the infinite combinations and permutations that that formulation permits?


I think that you need to remember that the activities conducted at the different training levels varies by corps. We used to have separate "gun" camps for the artillery and armoured corps where we just did our thing - live fire. For artillery that would be progressive training from troop (when we had them) to battery to regiment. We did that twice a year - a fall and spring "practice camp". In addition to that the Bty Comds and FOOs would probably do three maybe four  level 5 & 6 exercises with our supported battalions and 1 x Level 7 per year. We did that many because each battery supported two battalions but those would generally not involve the guns or arty live fire. I can only remember doing two exercises like that with the RCR in my two years as an FOO. Did a lot more with the Germans but that doesn't address Canadian training.

The only time I ever did any real work with Canadian tanks would have been during my Cbt Team Commanders course and on a flyover exercise to 4 CMBG. They pretty much disappeared in Canada during my years and I don't count Cougars.

Just an observation. Canada being infantry centric generally deals with square or infantry heavy combat teams. The Germans tended not to deal very much with mixed companies. I only remember one small exercise in their three week cycle where they did that. Generally they trained as unmixed companies and built up to a battlegroup exercise with two tank companies and one Marder company. The Americans seem to at least have a whole manual (ATP 3-90.1) on what they call the Armored and Mechanized Infantry Company Team.

🍻


----------



## GR66

GR66 said:


> I'll take a shot...
> 
> We consolidate.
> 
> 1 x Heavy Brigade in the West.  1/2/3 PPCLI all LAV Battalions and LdSH a Cavalry Regiment along the lines being discussed in the Armoured Recce threads (Tanks & Recce elements).  1RCHA would get a 3rd Battery (from 5RALC) and be equipped with SP 155mm.
> 
> 1 x Light Brigade in the East with 1RCR (Petawawa)/1R22eR (Valcartier)/2RCR (Gagetown) all Light Battalions.   The infantry, RCD, 2RCHA, 2 CER and 2 Service all equipped to be air transportable as our Rapid Reaction Force.  2RCHA would get a 3rd Battery (from 5RALC) and be equipped with M777s.
> 
> The following units would move to the Canadian Combat Support Brigade and be re-roled and re-equipped as follows:
> 
> 12RBC - Re-roles as a Sense/Strike Regiment with LAV LRSS and LAV-UAV/Loitering Munitions vehicles.
> 2R22eR - Re-roles as an AT Battalion with LAV-ATGMs  [Edit: Dropped per informed comments.  Integrate LAV-AT vehicles into existing CS elements]
> 2R22eR - Re-roles as an AA Battalion with LAV-SHORAD
> 5RACL - HQ and STA Batteries remain.  2 x Reg Force Gun Batteries to 1RCHA and 2RCHA.  Gains 3 x Reserve Gun Batteries equipped with SP 155mm.  Regiment to act as General Support artillery for any deployed Brigade Group.
> 5CER - Becomes the Combat Engineer Regiment for the CCSB
> 5Svc - Becomes the Service Battalion for the CCSB
> 3RCR and 3R22eR [added] would be disbanded and the troops distributed to the 6 x remaining Infantry Battalions and the 3 x Reserve Brigade HQ's [added] (along with the surplus infantry troops from 2R22eR as the SHORAD battalion will not require as many personnel as an Infantry Battalion).
> 
> Consolidate the Reserves into 3 x Reserve Light Infantry Brigade Groups. The Infantry Regiments from each existing Reserve Brigade would be consolidated into a single Infantry Battalion.  The Armoured, Artillery, Combat Engineer and Service Regiments/Battalions would be composite units from across all the existing Brigades.
> 
> 3 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 31/32/33 Brigades)
> 4 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 38/39/41 Brigades)
> 5 (Res.) Brigade (from existing 34/35/36/37 Brigades)
> All this can be done with minimal new equipment.  SP 155's are already part of an indirect fire program.  The LAV-AT, LAV-SHORAD and LAV-UAV's can all be obtained by using existing LAV hulls plus the same RiWP Remote Weapon Station with different weapon mounting options, but as a short-term expedient these specialty units could still be re-roled using MANPAD AT/SAM/UAV launchers until dedicated vehicle upgrades are possible.
> 
> Not a perfect solution, but a good short-term solution to reduce manning pressures, HQ overhead and key capability gaps.


Here's what the consolidation would look like:


----------



## rmc_wannabe

GR66 said:


> Here's what the consolidation would look like:


Can we right a historical wrong and encorporate a Sigs Regiment into CCSB? 21 EW is not equipped to support Brigade level comms.


----------



## McG

rmc_wannabe said:


> Can we right a historical wrong and encorporate a Sigs Regiment into CCSB? 21 EW is not equipped to support Brigade level comms.


Why does every cap badge need a silo of greatness? If we want brigades properly resourced for comms, then properly resource the signals squadrons in the brigades and the signals platoons/troops in every unit.


----------



## dapaterson

rmc_wannabe said:


> Can we right a historical wrong and encorporate a Sigs Regiment into CCSB? 21 EW is not equipped to support Brigade level comms.



I don't know, I think a Bde with a Sigs unit dedicated to denying the use of the EM spectrum is a refreshing bit of truth in advertising.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

McG said:


> Why does every cap badge need a silo of greatness? If we want brigades properly resourced for comms, then properly resource the signals squadrons in the brigades and the signals platoons/troops in every unit.


Great for a VHF based, mechanized Rifle Coy, terrible for a C5iSR heavy formation like CCSB. 

All the recce sensors, AD, and IA(especially if you're in the Cyber Realm) need interconnectivity, with a lot of specialization. 

And with the way our manning is currently set up, you will most likely see Jimmy badged folks consolidated to a Brigade unit do 2nd and 3rd line support before you see more folks in a Bn Sigs Pl.


----------



## McG

rmc_wannabe said:


> Great for a VHF based, mechanized Rifle Coy, terrible for a C5iSR heavy formation like CCSB.
> 
> All the recce sensors, AD, and IA(especially if you're in the Cyber Realm) need interconnectivity, with a lot of specialization.


So your proposal is based on the premise that the CCSB will deploy and fight as a CCSB?



rmc_wannabe said:


> And with the way our manning is currently set up, you will most likely see Jimmy badged folks consolidated to a Brigade unit do 2nd and 3rd line support before you see more folks in a Bn Sigs Pl.


Units need to do first line, and a brigade needs the ability to do second line.  Third line is a higher function.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

dapaterson said:


> I don't know, I think a Bde with a Sigs unit dedicated to denying the use of the EM spectrum is a refreshing bit of truth in advertising.


Oh believe me I'm not denying we have historically put our EW eggs in one basket since before Afghanistan. I was merely stating that within CCSB, there aren't enough operators and technicians to support Brigade level comms, especially within a tech heavy Bde like CCSB.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

McG said:


> So your proposal is based on the premise that the CCSB will deploy and fight as a CCSB?


Not at all. Day 1 and Day 2 Comms can be handled by whatever Ad Hoc formation gets sent out the door. It's the Day zero and before work that requires a unit capable of stringing together all the complex effects (which most have a high Tac2IS footprint) together to make them talk together.

That Day 0 work is what sets the SOPs for the Day 1 Day 2 attached elements when it's the piecemeal deployed force.


McG said:


> Units need to do first line, and a brigade needs the ability to do second line.  Third line is a higher function.


3rd line, in a traditional sense, doesn't currently exist withing our current Army establishment. It becomes a beast with 4 or 5 masters to fix a 3rd line fault. Depending on equipment or policy, it can either go to DLCI, 7 Comm Grp, Adm(Mat), or  in most cases, BLR, returned to the Vendor, and replaced with a new one.


----------



## markppcli

rmc_wannabe said:


> Can we right a historical wrong and encorporate a Sigs Regiment into CCSB? 21 EW is not equipped to support Brigade level comms.


Maybe we could get really wild and have the brigades fall under our deployable divisional command and the joint signals regiment could support.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Here's what the consolidation would look like:
> 
> View attachment 69984


Is there a reason the strata would be recce ? I thought we went over the absurdity of anti tank battalions already?


----------



## rmc_wannabe

markppcli said:


> Maybe we could get really wild and have the brigades fall under our deployable divisional command and the joint signals regiment could support.


That has been the dream for the last 15 years. CJOC won't let go of its death grip on that unit and capabilities, as the RCAF and RCN won't step up and fill the gap operationally.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> So how often does Level 5 get exercised?  And in how many of the infinite combinations and permutations that that formulation permits?
> 
> A Recce squadron minus with a LAV platoon attached?  An artillery battery with a Recce troop attached?  An Engineer Squadron with a LAV troop?


As has been said, this is going to depend. The seasons (planetary, posting, managed readiness plan etc) have an effect on training. Units will tend to conduct field training in the fall and spring. They will conduct winter warfare and heavy weapons ranges plus computer assisted exercises in the winter. The summer will not have much going on due to the posting season and the demand for support to Reserve courses. 

Going back 10 years or so, I was OC of a Recce Sqn that was not earmarked for deployment but was otherwise busy. In September we supported the Combat Team Commander's Course and then in October found ourselves on a Level 3.5 Live Fire range where a Patrol would support a LAV Platoon with an Engineer Section attached. From Nov until Mar we were occupied with the Olympics. From April until June we conducted a series of Patrol and Troop level exercises, culminating in our support to a Tank Squadron validation exercise. We switched gears for the summer and early fall to a busy PCF (Primary Combat Function - Gunner, Surv Op etc, Air Brakes, FAR operator etc) cycle but also executed a Level 3.5 Live Fire again. We spent part of the winter in the US using their Close Combat Tactical Trainer system as part of our conversion to a tank squadron that was slated to occur the following year. We closed out the two years with another Combat Team Commander's Course in May.

So over that two year period we conducted three significant "Combat Team" level exercises and two Level 3.5 live fire ranges. For the leadership we also executed two fairly major Computer Assisted Exercises (CAXs) where we were training at Level 6. 

I would expect that a infantry battalion entering a Build Year now would conduct training to Level 5 Dry in the fall, although this might be delayed if they entered that year with a significant deficit in PCF qualifications. They might then conduct Level 5 Live in the late winter/early spring followed by Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE where they would be validated at Level 6. Sequencing this part can be tricky. The Brigade HQ and units with HQs that are closely involved with them (Guns, Svc Bn, CER) would have conducted the UNIFIED RESOLVE series from September to February. 

That unit would then enter the Hold or Contingency phase of the three-year cycle. They could be tapped to execute unforeseen international commitments. They would conduct training to maintain their training level throughout the year. The Ship of Theseus paradox comes into play - as you change people is the unit still the same unit at the same readiness? Our rather gold-plated individual training system produces Privates and Second Lieutenants that are ready to be dropped into a given unit and go. A major posting season, though, can disrupt key leadership positions right down to Section/Crew level so the Hold Year will see some progressive training. 

Collective Training consumes things like parts that we often don't think about. If everyone wants to exercise at the same high intensity at the same time the parts run out.  CT builds people's capacities but it also wears them out. They need a rest/change as well. We have big training areas, but space runs out quickly at the peak training demand times when you factor in courses etc.  So the need for training discipline comes in. 

I recall our CO (who was later the CDS) telling us young Lieutenants at an afternoon gathering that while we were no doubt keen to have the "best training year ever", to our troops it would be yet another such year in a row. His message was to train hard but to preserve our people. Its a long game - don't risk breaking the troops for reasons of ego.


----------



## quadrapiper

markppcli said:


> At no point should a Bn be trying to train for war while delivering base line DP 1 training.


That makes sense.

Noting that recruiting, retention, and career management should be set up so this isn't a problem: I'm assuming neither should a Bn be (as seemed to have been described) full of gaps to support other establishments.


----------



## PuckChaser

markppcli said:


> Maybe we could get really wild and have the brigades fall under our deployable divisional command and the joint signals regiment could support.


We could get really wild and realize our only Signal Regiment in Canada shouldn't just be doing rear link comms and supporting a HQ that will never deploy. JSR needs a massive role change as it's basically an irrelevant waste of precious Sigs PYs in its current construct.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

PuckChaser said:


> We could get really wild and realize our only Signal Regiment in Canada shouldn't just be doing rear link comms and supporting a HQ that will never deploy. JSR needs a massive role change as it's basically an irrelevant waste of precious Sigs PYs in its current construct.


We both chewed a lot of the same dirt. 

CJOC (and in turn, CFJOSG) made CFJSR into their own personal GD Battalion/Sigs Support Unit. Is it easier from a Force Employment model? Hell yes. Force Generation on the other hand... it becomes a nightmare.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Is there a reason the strata would be recce ? I thought we went over the absurdity of anti tank battalions already?


Because we don't have enough tanks to support a full Tank Regiment?  Unless you want to give up our tank capability all together it's best to find a use for them.  Gives some weight for recce in force as well as providing the opportunity for the Brigade commander to parcel out the squadrons to Combat Teams.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> As has been said, this is going to depend. The seasons (planetary, posting, managed readiness plan etc) have an effect on training. Units will tend to conduct field training in the fall and spring. They will conduct winter warfare and heavy weapons ranges plus computer assisted exercises in the winter. The summer will not have much going on due to the posting season and the demand for support to Reserve courses.
> 
> Going back 10 years or so, I was OC of a Recce Sqn that was not earmarked for deployment but was otherwise busy. In September we supported the Combat Team Commander's Course and then in October found ourselves on a Level 3.5 Live Fire range where a Patrol would support a LAV Platoon with an Engineer Section attached. From Nov until Mar we were occupied with the Olympics. From April until June we conducted a series of Patrol and Troop level exercises, culminating in our support to a Tank Squadron validation exercise. We switched gears for the summer and early fall to a busy PCF (Primary Combat Function - Gunner, Surv Op etc, Air Brakes, FAR operator etc) cycle but also executed a Level 3.5 Live Fire again. We spent part of the winter in the US using their Close Combat Tactical Trainer system as part of our conversion to a tank squadron that was slated to occur the following year. We closed out the two years with another Combat Team Commander's Course in May.
> 
> So over that two year period we conducted three significant "Combat Team" level exercises and two Level 3.5 live fire ranges. For the leadership we also executed two fairly major Computer Assisted Exercises (CAXs) where we were training at Level 6.
> 
> I would expect that a infantry battalion entering a Build Year now would conduct training to Level 5 Dry in the fall, although this might be delayed if they entered that year with a significant deficit in PCF qualifications. They might then conduct Level 5 Live in the late winter/early spring followed by Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE where they would be validated at Level 6. Sequencing this part can be tricky. The Brigade HQ and units with HQs that are closely involved with them (Guns, Svc Bn, CER) would have conducted the UNIFIED RESOLVE series from September to February.
> 
> That unit would then enter the Hold or Contingency phase of the three-year cycle. They could be tapped to execute unforeseen international commitments. They would conduct training to maintain their training level throughout the year. The Ship of Theseus paradox comes into play - as you change people is the unit still the same unit at the same readiness? Our rather gold-plated individual training system produces Privates and Second Lieutenants that are ready to be dropped into a given unit and go. A major posting season, though, can disrupt key leadership positions right down to Section/Crew level so the Hold Year will see some progressive training.
> 
> Collective Training consumes things like parts that we often don't think about. If everyone wants to exercise at the same high intensity at the same time the parts run out.  CT builds people's capacities but it also wears them out. They need a rest/change as well. We have big training areas, but space runs out quickly at the peak training demand times when you factor in courses etc.  So the need for training discipline comes in.
> 
> I recall our CO (who was later the CDS) telling us young Lieutenants at an afternoon gathering that while we were no doubt keen to have the "best training year ever", to our troops it would be yet another such year in a row. His message was to train hard but to preserve our people. Its a long game - don't risk breaking the troops for reasons of ego.



Thanks for that T2B.  It helps a lot.

If increased field work isn't a viable proposition are there other opportunities to increase familiarity and integration at low levels across cap-badges and corps?

On the other hand is the problem as simple as a lack of money to maintain, repair, replace equipment necessary to sustain an appropriate level of training?

The posting rhythm is something that is often mentioned.  Is there a fix for that so that once the unit is validated it can be kept intact at a high readiness until its replacement is ready?  And while I'm thinking about it, is it just single cap-badge entities that are validated and readied for deployment or are combat teams and battlegroups validated and readied?

And I completely understand not wanting to wear out the troops (although I suspect a married sergeant sees things differently than a first year private). I'm going to guess that the young private would rather be out and doing rather than sitting in barracks while the sergeant has a life at home on top of his administrative duties.  For the sergeant a field exercise is as likely to be seen as an imposition as an excursion?


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> If increased field work isn't a viable proposition are there other opportunities to increase familiarity and integration at low levels across cap-badges and corps?



Are you assuming that this is an issue that needs to be fixed in the first place?



Kirkhill said:


> The posting rhythm is something that is often mentioned.  Is there a fix for that so that once the unit is validated it can be kept intact at a high readiness until its replacement is ready?  And while I'm thinking about it, is it just single cap-badge entities that are validated and readied for deployment or are combat teams and battlegroups validated and readied?



Level 5-7 are the milestones for a Brigade in the Build phase, so by definition, it is combined arms groupings (anything above level 4) that are readied.

In the other years, the Foundation Training (level 4) is all that is mandated, but cross-functional training is always achieved through efficient planning.


----------



## markppcli

rmc_wannabe said:


> That has been the dream for the last 15 years. CJOC won't let go of its death grip on that unit and capabilities, as the RCAF and RCN won't step up and fill the gap operationally.


I have a dream


GR66 said:


> Because we don't have enough tanks to support a full Tank Regiment?  Unless you want to give up our tank capability all together it's best to find a use for them.  Gives some weight for recce in force as well as providing the opportunity for the Brigade commander to parcel out the squadrons to Combat Teams.


So as was explained to you previously, divisional anti tank Bns (which is what you’ve described), do no provide the same role as armour. Anti Tank capabilities are best managed by the Bns with integral anti tank assets. There is a good reason why the bespoke Anti Armour Bns went away 60 years ago.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks for that T2B.  It helps a lot.
> 
> If increased field work isn't a viable proposition are there other opportunities to increase familiarity and integration at low levels across cap-badges and corps?
> 
> On the other hand is the problem as simple as a lack of money to maintain, repair, replace equipment necessary to sustain an appropriate level of training?
> 
> The posting rhythm is something that is often mentioned.  Is there a fix for that so that once the unit is validated it can be kept intact at a high readiness until its replacement is ready?  And while I'm thinking about it, is it just single cap-badge entities that are validated and readied for deployment or are combat teams and battlegroups validated and readied?
> 
> And I completely understand not wanting to wear out the troops (although I suspect a married sergeant sees things differently than a first year private). I'm going to guess that the young private would rather be out and doing rather than sitting in barracks while the sergeant has a life at home on top of his administrative duties.  For the sergeant a field exercise is as likely to be seen as an imposition as an excursion?


The problem is days in a year; during the build phase units will be in the field for upwards of 3-4 months, they still have PCF course to conduct, tastings to fill, and some may want to remind their families what they look like.


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> There is a good reason why the bespoke Anti Armour Bns went away 60 years ago.


That isn't entirely true.  Many armies still employ these types of organizations.  The Russians (and I believe the Chinese) have AT Bns as part of their Artillery Regiments.  It's a divisional asset that may or may not be used en masse, situation dependent.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> I have a dream
> 
> So as was explained to you previously, divisional anti tank Bns (which is what you’ve described), do no provide the same role as armour. Anti Tank capabilities are best managed by the Bns with integral anti tank assets. There is a good reason why the bespoke Anti Armour Bns went away 60 years ago.


You will note that when I posted the ORBAT I removed the dedicated AT Battalion.  The LdSH remain an Armoured Recce Regiment...but with a mix of tanks and recce vehicles.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> That isn't entirely true.  Many armies still employ these types of organizations.  The Russians (and I believe the Chinese) have AT Bns as part of their Artillery Regiments.  It's a divisional asset that may or may not be used en masse, situation dependent.


Well given that the Russians employ those Bns with Sprut AT guns, not the self propelled kind, I tend to see them as an anachronism in general. That being said, if the suggestion was Bde ATGM battery I’d be all for it.

(Yes I’m aware it’s 2x atgm 1 x gun for that at Bn)


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> You will note that when I posted the ORBAT I removed the dedicated AT Battalion.  The LdSH remain an Armoured Recce Regiment...but with a mix of tanks and recce vehicles.


3 x tank Sqns doesn’t make a tank regiment for you?


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Why does every cap badge need a silo of greatness? If we want brigades properly resourced for comms, then properly resource the signals squadrons in the brigades and the signals platoons/troops in every unit.



Is it a silo of greatness or an organizing principle around which the capability can coalesce?

The Brigade has a Sigs Squadron
It also needs Sigs Troops for 1x Armd, 3x Inf, 1x Arty, 1x Eng, 1x CSS Units.  That seems to mean that the Brigade needs a Squadron plus 7 addtional Troops.   Is that a Regiment's worth of signallers?

And if you go to Division, with 3 Brigades and the CCSB

NSE
1 Div Regt
3 Bde Sigs Squadrons,
21 Unit Troops
A Unit Troop for every CCSB entity
and an EW capability.

It seems to me that if any organization needs to be integrated from top to bottom it needs to be Sigs.  Everybody else literally plugs into their net.


----------



## Infanteer

A Sig Sqn and 7x Pls in a Bde is fundamentally different than a Sig Regt in a Bde.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> There is a good reason why the bespoke Anti Armour Bns went away 60 years ago.



Cynical me believes that was a response to a particular solution - hordes of armoured and mechanized formations crossing a frontier, necessitating everyone to have AT in hand rather than consolidated somewhere to either be distributed out or concentrated to deal with a breach.

I can only guess that with the chief purchaser of hordes of armoured and mechanized formations having downsized, that threat no longer really exists.  Large divisional/corps AT units aren't needed, but neither is it obvious that large numbers of AT platforms have to be distributed everywhere.

[Add: and of course aviation alters the answer to "how do we get the AT force in front of the breakout" entirely.]


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Are you assuming that this is an issue that needs to be fixed in the first place?



I guess I am making that assumption.  Capbadges seem to feature regularly in discussions on this board. 



Infanteer said:


> Level 5-7 are the milestones for a Brigade in the Build phase, so by definition, it is combined arms groupings (anything above level 4) that are readied.
> 
> In the other years, the Foundation Training (level 4) is all that is mandated, but cross-functional training is always achieved through efficient planning.



Thank you.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Regarding our ability to form an armoured unit or formation and still have a training establishment, we're still wedded to a very large number of tanks in an armoured unit.  Do we know, or have we validated, something that many others have not?


----------



## markppcli

Brad Sallows said:


> Cynical me believes that was a response to a particular solution - hordes of armoured and mechanized formations crossing a frontier, necessitating everyone to have AT in hand rather than consolidated somewhere to either be distributed out or concentrated to deal with a breach.
> 
> I can only guess that with the chief purchaser of hordes of armoured and mechanized formations having downsized, that threat no longer really exists.  Large divisional/corps AT units aren't needed, but neither is it obvious that large numbers of AT platforms have to be distributed everywhere.


I see your point there but we’re _supposed_ to have anti armour platoons. With ALAWS and the atgm replacement coming, albeit slowly, I’d rather see that manned than a divisional atgm Bn.


----------



## markppcli

Brad Sallows said:


> Regarding our ability to form an armoured unit or formation and still have a training establishment, we're still wedded to a very large number of tanks in an armoured unit.  Do we know, or have we validated, something that many others have not?


Are we really that far outside the general NATO tank Bn / Rgt size ?


----------



## Brad Sallows

Agreed.  Just not certain that the "middle" solution - brigade AT "company/squadron/battery" isn't better for the heavy SP weapons than unit platoons.


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> Are we really that far outside the general NATO tank Bn / Rgt size ?


Yes.  We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.

Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> A Sig Sqn and 7x Pls in a Bde is fundamentally different than a Sig Regt in a Bde.



I wasn't referring specifically to organization as much as I was referring to the resourcing of capablities.  

From here it looks as if every field unit needs the means to communicate with every other field unit, as well as RCAF, RCN, SOF and allied assets as well as higher.

Is the Sigs Platoon a Battalion asset or is it a Brigade asset on loan to the Battalion?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks for that T2B.  It helps a lot.
> 
> If increased field work isn't a viable proposition are there other opportunities to increase familiarity and integration at low levels across cap-badges and corps?
> 
> On the other hand is the problem as simple as a lack of money to maintain, repair, replace equipment necessary to sustain an appropriate level of training?
> 
> The posting rhythm is something that is often mentioned.  Is there a fix for that so that once the unit is validated it can be kept intact at a high readiness until its replacement is ready?  And while I'm thinking about it, is it just single cap-badge entities that are validated and readied for deployment or are combat teams and battlegroups validated and readied?
> 
> And I completely understand not wanting to wear out the troops (although I suspect a married sergeant sees things differently than a first year private). I'm going to guess that the young private would rather be out and doing rather than sitting in barracks while the sergeant has a life at home on top of his administrative duties.  For the sergeant a field exercise is as likely to be seen as an imposition as an excursion?


Plenty of low-level training and familiarization occurs within the CMBGs every year. At a minimum, the UR series tends to involve most of the junior officers where they will work together. Units look for opportunities to include other arms and Bde Comds also tend to mandate that this occurs.

Tempo is a question of balance. Folks in the army do like to train, but they don't necessarily want to be in the field forever. Repetition is good to get things down, but doing the same thing every time in the same place can get wearing. Some variety and imagination is useful as long as the requirements are met.

Postings are a fact of life - we are an army of people. We try to avoid too much churn between Build and Hold but it happens. The alternative is a shorter cycle like we had earlier which had a lot of training churn (2 x Ex MR a year). The training conducted during the Hold year compensates for skill fade and posting churn.  

In all honesty I think that training is one thing that we do well.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Kirkhill said:


> Is it a silo of greatness or an organizing principle around which the capability can coalesce?
> 
> The Brigade has a Sigs Squadron
> It also needs Sigs Troops for 1x Armd, 3x Inf, 1x Arty, 1x Eng, 1x CSS Units.  That seems to mean that the Brigade needs a Squadron plus 7 addtional Troops.   Is that a Regiment's worth of signallers?
> 
> And if you go to Division, with 3 Brigades and the CCSB
> 
> NSE
> 1 Div Regt
> 3 Bde Sigs Squadrons,
> 21 Unit Troops
> A Unit Troop for every CCSB entity
> and an EW capability.
> 
> It seems to me that if any organization needs to be integration from top to bottom it needs to be Sigs.  Everybody else literally plugs into their net.


100 percent. The problem I have seen is that in the dispersed model, the Brigade's workload is not evenly managed by having "Out Dets."

Sigs Pl 1 RCR may have little to do apart from "Set up CP, maintain comms, ensure eqpt is serviceable..." while the Bde HQ & Sigs Sqn is trying to accomplish everything with nothing, including RRB, HC/B LOS, TacNet, and any other C5ISR affects you want at the Bde Level.

I would love to see a robust Sigs Regiment at all Bdes, with strategic comms assets as well. I would also love to take the Brit model and apply it to our forces: Bn comms and below are operated and set up by Bn CP operators (Infantry who know how to comms), with maintenance and repair capabilites on demand from  the Bde Signals Regiment. This would allow the Bde G6 the ability to prioritize capabilities and staffing, without having a platoon of Jimmies under employed at a Bn, while their HQ & Sigs brethren are running around like chickens with their heads cut off putting out fires.


----------



## markppcli

Brad Sallows said:


> Agreed.  Just not certain that the "middle" solution - brigade AT "company/squadron/battery" isn't better for the heavy SP weapons than unit platoons.


Yeah I’ll buy that for a dollar. I don’t know how “heavy” atgms need to be effective anymore though. Javelins are proving to be very effective and have a range band that’s near enough to tow as to make no difference.


----------



## markppcli

TangoTwoBravo said:


> In all honesty I think that training is one thing that we do well.


Agree to disagree, but it’s probably outside the topic here.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Yes.  We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.
> 
> Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.



The Swedes are at 11 with their Pansarbattalions.  Effectively they get two Tank companies out of one of our Tank Squadrons.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> Yes.  We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.
> 
> Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.


British type 56 isn’t 4 x 4 Sqns ? But point taken, I guess it’s about roles, with Sqns expecting to be split between two combat teams. Then again I suppose we could achieve that with 3 Tps vs 4 and 1 less tank in the HQ.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Plenty of low-level training and familiarization occurs within the CMBGs every year. At a minimum, the UR series tends to involve most of the junior officers where they will work together. Units look for opportunities to include other arms and Bde Comds also tend to mandate that this occurs.
> 
> Tempo is a question of balance. Folks in the army do like to train, but they don't necessarily want to be in the field forever. Repetition is good to get things down, but doing the same thing every time in the same place can get wearing. Some variety and imagination is useful as long as the requirements are met.
> 
> Postings are a fact of life - we are an army of people. We try to avoid too much churn between Build and Hold but it happens. The alternative is a shorter cycle like we had earlier which had a lot of training churn (2 x Ex MR a year). The training conducted during the Hold year compensates for skill fade and posting churn.
> 
> In all honesty I think that training is one thing that we do well.




Thanks again.

King for a day T2B.

Where do you think effort needs to be expended?


----------



## Infanteer

I have to find the reference, but I believe the Brits are moving away from the Type 56.



Kirkhill said:


> The Swedes are at 11 with their Pansarbattalions.  Effectively they get two Tank companies out of one of our Tank Squadrons.



Yes, and in many cases, a Cdn Tank Squadron usually gets busted up into a sqn(-) and a half sqn.



Kirkhill said:


> Is the Sigs Platoon a Battalion asset or is it a Brigade asset on loan to the Battalion?



Unit.  Belongs to the CS/HQ sub-unit of the unit.



rmc_wannabe said:


> I would love to see a robust Sigs Regiment at all Bdes, with strategic comms assets as well. I would also love to take the Brit model and apply it to our forces: Bn comms and below are operated and set up by Bn CP operators (Infantry who know how to comms), with maintenance and repair capabilites on demand from  the Bde Signals Regiment. This would allow the Bde G6 the ability to prioritize capabilities and staffing, without having a platoon of Jimmies under employed at a Bn, while their HQ & Sigs brethren are running around like chickens with their heads cut off putting out fires.



A brigade doesn't need "strategic comms assets" as it is not a brigade's job to "strategically communicate" (whatever that means).  A Bde does not need a Sig Regt either - this is simply overkill and adding needless appendages onto a formation that needs to be lean and mobile.

As for turning Unit Sig Pls into "occ filled" organizations vice "sig filled" organizations, this is how we used to do it as well.  It's something that could be done, and would have to result in a PY transfer to the other Corps and Branches as these organizations are largely handed off.  A caution to this - in talking to a lot of Sig NCMs, service in a Pl/Tp in a front line unit is a good thing for them, and jettisoning this opportunity might not help the Sig Branch with retention.


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:


> That isn't entirely true.  Many armies still employ these types of organizations.  The Russians (and I believe the Chinese) have AT Bns as part of their Artillery Regiments.  It's a divisional asset that may or may not be used en masse, situation dependent.


The AFU had this type of organization going into the war. It would be interesting to see how it has served them (or not).



Infanteer said:


> Yes.  We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.
> 
> Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.


A lot of those countries also have captains commanding manoeuvre sub-units. If we significantly tinker with the size of the organization, we may want to relook at the ranks (officer & WO) that are needed for C2.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Infanteer said:


> A brigade doesn't need "strategic comms assets" as it is not a brigade's job to "strategically communicate" (whatever that means).  A Bde does not need a Sig Regt either - this is simply overkill and adding needless appendages onto a formation that needs to be lean and mobile.


Then we need to manage expectations at the Brigade HQ level. Commanders and staff have gotten used to the sprawling TOCs of eFP Latvia and TFK over the last 20 years , which have Strategic level comms (NRL, CSNI, LFPST, from the CFJSR) embedded into their Sigs Sqn. If they need to be lean and mean, that means austere. Tough cell to the Ops Staff that want the information inputs provided over more than just a CNR net.



Infanteer said:


> A caution to this - in talking to a lot of Sig NCMs, service in a Pl/Tp in a front line unit is a good thing for them, and jettisoning this opportunity might not help the Sig Branch with retention.


Part of this is because of the exact reason I referenced. The HQ and Sigs Sqns are chronically understaffed and over employed. Folks love heading out to one of the Battalions is not strictly because " it's a new and exciting experience"; it's an escape from the fuckery that is a sub-unit understaffed and poorly managed. Atts and Dets should be for the amount of time required, not a 4 year posting.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> I have to find the reference, but I believe the Brits are moving away from the Type 56.
> 
> 
> 
> Yes, and in many cases, a Cdn Tank Squadron usually gets busted up into a sqn(-) and a half sqn.
> 
> 
> 
> Unit.  Belongs to the CS/HQ sub-unit of the unit.
> 
> 
> 
> A brigade doesn't need "strategic comms assets" as it is not a brigade's job to "strategically communicate" (whatever that means).  A Bde does not need a Sig Regt either - this is simply overkill and adding needless appendages onto a formation that needs to be lean and mobile.
> 
> As for turning Unit Sig Pls into "occ filled" organizations vice "sig filled" organizations, this is how we used to do it as well.  It's something that could be done, and would have to result in a PY transfer to the other Corps and Branches as these organizations are largely handed off.  A caution to this - in talking to a lot of Sig NCMs, service in a Pl/Tp in a front line unit is a good thing for them, and jettisoning this opportunity might not help the Sig Branch with retention.


Hmm, I only found one article but it was about reduction in Tank Regiments as opposed to changing the structure. The Ajax will stay as 4X4 but with only 1 “command” Ajax for HQ as well, what ever that’s worth. I’d love to have a more clear picture of what a French, Spanish, or Italian tank sub unit broke down like.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

markppcli said:


> Agree to disagree, but it’s probably outside the topic here.


I think we can do something well and still have room for improvement. So training can be imperfect but can have still been done well.

If we consider doctrine, organization, training, material (equipment), personnel, policy and facilities; how would you prioritize our efforts in terms of fixing problems faced by the Canadian Army today? 

Seen in that framework, I think that training fixes are a lower priority than some of the other areas. That is not to say that training is a lower priority than those other areas! I just think that we have more severe problems in areas of personnel, equipment and organization (not to mention policy and facilities).


----------



## markppcli

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I think we can do something well and still have room for improvement. So training can be imperfect but can have still been done well.
> 
> If we consider doctrine, organization, training, material (equipment), personnel, policy and facilities; how would you prioritize our efforts in terms of fixing problems faced by the Canadian Army today?
> 
> Seen in that framework, I think that training fixes are a lower priority than some of the other areas. That is not to say that training is a lower priority than those other areas! I just think that we have more severe problems in areas of personnel, equipment and organization (not to mention policy and facilities).


I’ll reply but probably better this be a side bar.

My issues are mostly about the focus on large collective training, and it’s rigidity. And I understand the response to that will always be “we’ll train soldiers in garrison,” but that sort of ignores reality. Between PCF, tasks, exercise, leave, and budget I may have 2-3 days a month to actually train my guys… which they likely need to do their DLN on my platoons 2 computers. Sorry I’m digressing.

The combat team attack dominates our training cycle, which is fine I suppose. What irks me is that when we do those the breach happens, we move through, and then the attack is all but over as the objective is always an extremely simple open field with banks of fig 11s, maybe 12s if we’re being spicy. We need to train people to deal with complex objectives: trenches, string points, dense tree lines. The things we teach as anchors to defensive positions. I had a conversation with my OC a few weeks ago about our devotion to validation; and I asked him if he’d ever led a company or platoon through an urban objective or a trench system. The answer was no, and neither had any of his peers. Now that’s also fine I suppose but in MR 2019 1 CMBG complete died at Rocky Ford, to include 1 CER tasked as extra infantry. We had to reset and do it again. Same with at the more conventional defensive position at Vertical Village.

So we have a formation failing to take complicated defended terrain, and thanks to the systems at CMTC we can actually see where each person died, what killed them, from what angle ect. In short we have a system of statistical, play by play analysis that would be the envy of a professional sports team.  Did that inform any changes in training for 1 CMBG going forward ? Oh course not, because we have to validate.


----------



## WLSC

McG said:


> The AFU had this type of organization going into the war. It would be interesting to see how it has served them (or not).
> 
> 
> A lot of those countries also have captains commanding manoeuvre sub-units. If we significantly tinker with the size of the organization, we may want to relook at the ranks (officer & WO) that are needed for C2.


I have this idea for a while.    I wondering if it could work. Feel free to comment on it.

In a heavy mech bn, why not go from 3 x coy (9 plt) to 2 x coy of 8 plt train to work like our sabre squadron.   We really lose only 2 plt.

I see that brigade with the normal unit (Eng, guns, Svc Bn, etc).  The manouver unit would look like this

*Tank regiment:*
-4 *2* x sabre squadron,
-recce sqn
-Assault tpt (?)

*2 heavy mech inf bn* with each:
-2 x coy (8 plt)
-cbt support coy


----------



## McG

Plt = pilot
Pl = platoon

Eng = English
Engr = engineer


----------



## Brad Sallows

You also lost a sub-unit, giving the unit commander only 2 manoeuvre sub-units.


----------



## WLSC

McG said:


> Plt = pilot
> Pl = platoon
> 
> Eng = English
> Engr = engineer


Oups!


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> I’ll reply but probably better this be a side bar.
> 
> My issues are mostly about the focus on large collective training, and it’s rigidity. And I understand the response to that will always be “we’ll train soldiers in garrison,” but that sort of ignores reality. Between PCF, tasks, exercise, leave, and budget I may have 2-3 days a month to actually train my guys… which they likely need to do their DLN on my platoons 2 computers. Sorry I’m digressing.


This is why we need 6 months work up training.......and it's sad


----------



## WLSC

Brad Sallows said:


> You also lost a sub-unit, giving the unit commander only 2 manoeuvre sub-units.


I consider that.  I was thinking that since it would work in a cbt team format, the lost of that sub unit was offset by having extra pl for the tasks.


----------



## markppcli

WLSC said:


> I have this idea for a while.    I wondering if it could work. Feel free to comment on it.
> 
> In a heavy mech bn, why not go from 3 x coy (9 plt) to 2 x coy of 8 plt train to work like our sabre squadron.   We really lose only 2 plt.
> 
> I see that brigade with the normal unit (Eng, guns, Svc Bn, etc).  The manouver unit would look like this
> 
> *Tank regiment:*
> -4 x sabre squadron,
> -recce sqn
> -Assault tpt (?)
> 
> *2 heavy mech inf bn* with each:
> -2 x coy (8 plt)
> -cbt support coy


Well you loose your depth is one


----------



## WLSC

markppcli said:


> Well you loose your depth is one


Corrected my earlier post.  Not 4 but 2 sabres sqn.  You can have 2 cbt teams up and one down.  Depending on how you form your cbt team, you can have a half coy in depth without tanks.


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> What irks me is that when we do those the breach happens, we move through, and then the attack is all but over as the objective is always an extremely simple open field with banks of fig 11s, maybe 12s if we’re being spicy. We need to train people to deal with complex objectives: trenches, string points, dense tree lines. The things we teach as anchors to defensive positions. I had a conversation with my OC a few weeks ago about our devotion to validation; and I asked him if he’d ever led a company or platoon through an urban objective or a trench system. The answer was no, and neither had any of his peers.



This is not a structural problem, its a problem with creativity.  I recall the last company I was in did section and platoon attacks in urban settings, live fire clearance of a trench system (not trenches, but a system with communication trenches), and force on force offensive and defensive tasks.


----------



## markppcli

MilEME09 said:


> This is why we need 6 months work up training.......and it's sad


That was my work up training…


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> 3 x tank Sqns doesn’t make a tank regiment for you?


If we had 60 of the same model of Leopard and enough serviceable at any given time to deploy all of them and still have enough for training, combat replacements and reserves, then yes.  But 20 x 2A6Ms, 20 x 2A4M CANs and 42 x 2A4's makes for a pretty enemic tank force with no depth.  Dropping from 3 squadrons to 2 squadrons gives you some depth and would have us using only the upgraded mine-resistant models.  

Reducing the Squadron size from 19 to the US model of 15 would help somewhat but would still leave us pretty thin.  Without increasing our fleet we are really kidding ourselves saying we've got a fully combat effective Tank Regiment as per our doctrine (like many other parts of our Army I guess).


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> This is not a structural problem, its a problem with creativity.  I recall the last company I was in did section and platoon attacks in urban settings, live fire clearance of a trench system (not trenches, but a system with communication trenches), and force on force offensive and defensive tasks.


So I can see that, but at the same time these are issues that I know are common across the board. I don’t think I’ve met anyone who’s done live trench system clearances more recently that 2014.  Force on force is an aside, my general comment was that we are in a constant state or requiring to hit validation targets. I don’t know when you were last in a rifle company, but I can say the creativity of what our objectives look like has been constant since at least 2013 ? Before that we had a bit more complexity. Either way this is very odd topic.


----------



## Infanteer

markppcli said:


> So I can see that, but at the same time these are issues that I know are common across the board. I don’t think I’ve met anyone who’s done live trench system clearances more recently that 2014.



Needless to say, this isn't something that Force 2025 is going to (or needs to) fix - a unit could design a trench clearance range pretty quickly.


----------



## MilEME09

Infanteer said:


> Needless to say, this isn't something that Force 2025 is going to (or needs to) fix - a unit could design a trench clearance range pretty quickly.


Unimaginative leadership in some cases


----------



## Kirkhill

Courtesy of FJAG.

Is there a comparison to be made with the LAV-Leo combination? 


ATP 3-90.1
Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team
JANUARY 2016

Capabilities




> The mechanized Infantry company has the following capabilities:
>  Seizes and retains key terrain.
>  Assaults enemy positions.
>  Infiltrates enemy positions.
>  Conducts combat operations under limited visibility.
>  Clears enemy from restricted and urban terrain.
>  Blocks mounted/dismounted avenues of approach.
>  Conducts dismounted or mounted patrols.
>  Conducts reconnaissance and security operations.
> Participates in air assault operations
>  Repels enemy attacks with close combat.
>  Establishes strong points to deny the enemy key terrain or flank positions.
>  Establishes battle positions and engagement areas as part of a larger defense.
>  Operates in a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environment.
> 
> 
> The Armor company has the following capabilities:
>  Conducts operations requiring firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect.
>  Reduces mine and wire obstacles when equipped with mine rollers and mine plows.
>  Employs a combination of fire and maneuver to destroy enemy tanks, fighting vehicles, anti-armor
> systems, and emplacements.
>  Seizes key terrain.
>  Assaults enemy positions.
>  Provides support, in the form of Armor protection and fires, to Infantry and engineer elements in
> restricted or urban terrain or during an assault.
>  Conducts combat operations under limited visibility.
>  Conducts mounted patrols.
>  Blocks mounted avenues of approach.
>  Conducts security, screen, and guard operations.
>  Operates effectively as a counter-attack or penetration force as part of a larger operation.
>  Establishes battle positions and engagement areas as part of a larger defense.
>  Establishes strong points to deny the enemy key terrain or flank positions.
>  Operates in a CBRN environment.





Limitations




> The mechanized Infantry company has these limitations:
>  High consumption rate of Class III, V, and IX.
>  Dependency on logistics packages from the forward support company (FSC) to maintain
> continuous operations.
>  Lack of organic mortars.
>  Built-up areas, dense woods, and other restricted terrain reduce the mobility of BFVs.
>  Existing or reinforcing obstacles can restrict or reduce BFV mobility.
>  BFVs pose a variety of challenges in gap (wet and dry) crossing operations. (The company may
> experience difficulty finding adequate fording sites or a bridge with sufficient weight
> classification.)
> 
> The Armor company has these limitations:
>  Very high consumption rate of Class III, V, and IX.
>  Dependency on logistics packages from the FSC to maintain continuous operations.
>  Vulnerability to enemy infantry antiarmor when built-up areas, dense woods, and other restricted
> terrain significantly reduce the mobility and maneuverability of tanks.
>  Restricted, reduced, or ceased tank mobility when overcoming existing or reinforcing obstacles.
>  Significant challenges in gap (wet and dry) crossing operations. (The company may experience
> difficulty finding adequate fording sites or a bridge with sufficient weight classification.)
>  Limited capability to retain ground without Infantry support.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> Needless to say, this isn't something that Force 2025 is going to (or needs to) fix - a unit could design a trench clearance range pretty quickly.


No which is why I said as much, very off topic and a reply to T2B saying we have a good training system. I will say that range can be built, of course, but it’s going to be budgeted against hitting those validation points / PCF course requirements.


----------



## suffolkowner

What does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for the UK’s Integrated Review and the British Army?
					

By Nicholas Drummond The Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper were a necessary reset of UK defence priorities. In order to make defence affordable and sustainable going forward, short-term e…




					uklandpower.com
				




similar issues on a slightly larger scale i think


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks for that T2B.  It helps a lot.
> 
> If increased field work isn't a viable proposition are there other opportunities to increase familiarity and integration at low levels across cap-badges and corps?
> 
> On the other hand is the problem as simple as a lack of money to maintain, repair, replace equipment necessary to sustain an appropriate level of training?
> 
> The posting rhythm is something that is often mentioned.  Is there a fix for that so that once the unit is validated it can be kept intact at a high readiness until its replacement is ready?  And while I'm thinking about it, is it just single cap-badge entities that are validated and readied for deployment or are combat teams and battlegroups validated and readied?
> 
> And I completely understand not wanting to wear out the troops (although I suspect a married sergeant sees things differently than a first year private). I'm going to guess that the young private would rather be out and doing rather than sitting in barracks while the sergeant has a life at home on top of his administrative duties.  For the sergeant a field exercise is as likely to be seen as an imposition as an excursion?


That used to be a problem and I expect it still is. For us it was the keen young gunners and subalterns that couldn't get enough time in the field while the senior NCO and WO ranks had seen it all before for over a decade. That sometimes makes things challenging.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> Yes.  We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.
> 
> Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.


I think the Brits still run a Type 56 regiment where there are three squadrons of 18 tanks plus 2 regt'l HQ tanks since Army 2020 Refine. I haven't seen anything changing that.



> Combat Vehicles
> 
> 
> Firepower - mobility - protection: the three key aspects of any fighting vehicle.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.army.mod.uk



🍻


----------



## Infanteer

I thought they had changed to a Type 44 regiment.  I'll have to check with the tankers at work.


----------



## PuckChaser

rmc_wannabe said:


> Sigs Pl 1 RCR may have little to do apart from "Set up CP, maintain comms, ensure eqpt is serviceable..." while the Bde HQ & Sigs Sqn is trying to accomplish everything with nothing, including RRB, HC/B LOS, TacNet, and any other C5ISR affects you want at the Bde Level.
> 
> I would love to see a robust Sigs Regiment at all Bdes, with strategic comms assets as well. I would also love to take the Brit model and apply it to our forces: Bn comms and below are operated and set up by Bn CP operators (Infantry who know how to comms), with maintenance and repair capabilites on demand from  the Bde Signals Regiment. This would allow the Bde G6 the ability to prioritize capabilities and staffing, without having a platoon of Jimmies under employed at a Bn, while their HQ & Sigs brethren are running around like chickens with their heads cut off putting out fires.





Infanteer said:


> A brigade doesn't need "strategic comms assets" as it is not a brigade's job to "strategically communicate" (whatever that means).  A Bde does not need a Sig Regt either - this is simply overkill and adding needless appendages onto a formation that needs to be lean and mobile.
> 
> As for turning Unit Sig Pls into "occ filled" organizations vice "sig filled" organizations, this is how we used to do it as well.  It's something that could be done, and would have to result in a PY transfer to the other Corps and Branches as these organizations are largely handed off.  A caution to this - in talking to a lot of Sig NCMs, service in a Pl/Tp in a front line unit is a good thing for them, and jettisoning this opportunity might not help the Sig Branch with retention.


To be frank, status quo is not going to be able to provide Signal Support to the Bde for F2025, F2030 or whatever else we call it. I see your point that we don't want to be growing more overhead, but do you honestly think the Bdes are served well with whatever god awful mess we have right now? I think we're kidding ourselves if we don't think Bdes need an integral ability for strat rear link because we're never, ever, going to force generate an entire Div HQ. The crazy part is that Sigs can maintain a lean and mobile Bde Main with strat rear link, but its the non-Jimmy appendages that are creating the bloat of 40 sections of Mod Tent

Sigs is the only unit in the Bde with a Maj in Comd. That individual is not a peer at whatever Stonecutters meeting of COs the Bde Comd hosts. Sigs is also vitally important with everything the CAF and CA is pushing for future tech, the proof is in the live action role play we're all watching right now with the abject failure of the Russian C4ISR construct. I completely concur that cutting Sigs postings out of line units is the absolute last thing we need to do. In fact, I'd rather we syphon folks out of CFJSR, Garrison and even Bde HQ&Sigs (as a last resort) to fill out those Sigs Pl/Tp positions, but only after we've done a fulsome review of whether we need Line Techs or IT Techs there. Our entire job exists to provide Combat Support to those line units, and hiding at Bde Main does the exact opposite. In my view, there is a viable COA to create a Sigs Regt for each Bde, in which all Sigs Pl/Tps fall under that CO but are OPCOM to the individual units. It'd be fairly transparent to those line units as the Bde CCO/FISM/LCS/FOS is managing movement between then in concert with Bde HQ&Sigs RSM anyways.

This is the inherent problem with F2025. Maybe I just haven't seen enough detailed documentation and backgrounders, but there's tons of unit reorgs and task changes going around coupled with a whole ton of "Sigs make it work with no changes on your structure". If CCSB is expected to deploy on its own, it needs a HQ&Sig Sqn. 21 EW is barely capable of providing its own Regt HQ, let alone covering off an entire Bde based around data links as a requirement to its core functions.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> If we had 60 of the same model of Leopard and enough serviceable at any given time to deploy all of them and still have enough for training, combat replacements and reserves, then yes.  But 20 x 2A6Ms, 20 x 2A4M CANs and 42 x 2A4's makes for a pretty enemic tank force with no depth.  Dropping from 3 squadrons to 2 squadrons gives you some depth and would have us using only the upgraded mine-resistant models.
> 
> Reducing the Squadron size from 19 to the US model of 15 would help somewhat but would still leave us pretty thin.  Without increasing our fleet we are really kidding ourselves saying we've got a fully combat effective Tank Regiment as per our doctrine (like many other parts of our Army I guess).


So lets play with numbers a little bit.

First off, a US tank coy has 14 tanks - three four tank platoons and a 2 in coy hq. There are 6 tank coys in an ABCT (2 combined arms bns with two tank coys, one combined arms bn with one tank coy and the cavalry squadron with one coy) for a total of 64 tanks. Plus one tank in each combined arms bn hq for a grand total of 67 tanks.

I'm not sure if there is any fundamental difference between the Leo2A4 and A4M other than its mine protection armour so I count those pretty much the same type. 

Essentially if one went to an amended ABCT structure with one tank heavy and two inf heavy combined arms battalions with a total of 4 tank coys (59 A4s) and the cavalry squadron with 14 A6Ms one would have 3 A4s and 6 A6Ms as spares. (essentially LdSH becomes the tank heavy battalion and two PPCLI bns become infantry heavy bns. The light PPCLI bn can become the cavalry squadron. It's more or less PY neutral although some cap badges may change.

Note that the infantry would need 5 coys of LAV6 and there are already 6 coys in 1 CMBG which leaves 1 coy for spares that could go to the cavalry squadron along with the LdSHs recce LAVs and TAPVs.

One would need a new paradigm for training as there are not enough of the A4 type to have a separate training establishment. Personally I see no problem in having vehicles double tasked to be available for training courses (within the unit) - yes it's maintenance heavy but it needs doing and its not like these tanks are in use every day. Its a matter of coordination. If push comes to shove, it's not like there aren't spare A4s available on the resale market.

I won't speak as to the capability of the A4 in a stand up fight with Soviet Russian armour but then again one expects the gunners to go up against Russian artillery with M777s so we don't all get what we want. It would certainly do as a brigade structure that would work well for training and which would, in a pinch, be deployable.

Like I said playing with numbers and what we have. Sometimes you just have to do the best you can with what you have available. But it's basically doable.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> I thought they had changed to a Type 44 regiment.  I'll have to check with the tankers at work.


I've read that that was being considered which is why I went to their web page which still refers to a Type 56 (and we all know web pages are never wrong)

My guess is with the limited number of tanks being upgraded they may try to keep a cap badge alive with tanks by spreading them out further. with 148 being upgraded to Mk3, one would get either 2 x Type 56 regts +36 or  3 x Type 44 regts + 16. The latter makes more sense. Also I would guess the whole thinking process in their force restructure is probably up in the air with the Ukraine scenario. 

As it stands, Future Soldier calls for three tank regiments (2 RegF and 1 ResF) plus the Armour Trials and Development Unit. I don't think that the Brits are in the habit of equipping their ResF units with heavy equipment any more than Canada is. That draws me to the Type 56 model.

Watch and shoot.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

PuckChaser said:


> To be frank, status quo is not going to be able to provide Signal Support to the Bde for F2025, F2030 or whatever else we call it. I see your point that we don't want to be growing more overhead, but do you honestly think the Bdes are served well with whatever god awful mess we have right now? I think we're kidding ourselves if we don't think Bdes need an integral ability for strat rear link because we're never, ever, going to force generate an entire Div HQ. The crazy part is that Sigs can maintain a lean and mobile Bde Main with strat rear link, but its the non-Jimmy appendages that are creating the bloat of 40 sections of Mod Tent
> 
> Sigs is the only unit in the Bde with a Maj in Comd. That individual is not a peer at whatever Stonecutters meeting of COs the Bde Comd hosts. Sigs is also vitally important with everything the CAF and CA is pushing for future tech, the proof is in the live action role play we're all watching right now with the abject failure of the Russian C4ISR construct. I completely concur that cutting Sigs postings out of line units is the absolute last thing we need to do. In fact, I'd rather we syphon folks out of CFJSR, Garrison and even Bde HQ&Sigs (as a last resort) to fill out those Sigs Pl/Tp positions, but only after we've done a fulsome review of whether we need Line Techs or IT Techs there. Our entire job exists to provide Combat Support to those line units, and hiding at Bde Main does the exact opposite. In my view, there is a viable COA to create a Sigs Regt for each Bde, in which all Sigs Pl/Tps fall under that CO but are OPCOM to the individual units. It'd be fairly transparent to those line units as the Bde CCO/FISM/LCS/FOS is managing movement between then in concert with Bde HQ&Sigs RSM anyways.
> 
> This is the inherent problem with F2025. Maybe I just haven't seen enough detailed documentation and backgrounders, but there's tons of unit reorgs and task changes going around coupled with a whole ton of "Sigs make it work with no changes on your structure". If CCSB is expected to deploy on its own, it needs a HQ&Sig Sqn. 21 EW is barely capable of providing its own Regt HQ, let alone covering off an entire Bde based around data links as a requirement to its core functions.



There are a few different ideas here, which I'm happy to go into so we can get away from 110 pages of how many LAVs can dance on the head of a pin:

A Bde, organized as a tactical formation, should not need a "strategic link" (which I am assuming we mean a reachback to Canada) because it either links into a parent formation or back to a NCE with a theatre level signal organization.  Now, comms are sophisticated enough these days that any element has reachback to Canada - just give them an Sat Phone.  Hell, every infanteer in a section has reachback with their mobile devices.  What we are really discussing here is comms process and reporting, and not equipment.  If a Bde is operating as a tactical formation, it can't be encumbered with national reporting.  If it is operating as an NCE/Task Force HQ, like we saw in Afghanistan, then its role is different and it needs reachback for national level C2.  But this isn't the default organization for a fighting formation HQ, nor should it be.
The argument that a Sig Sqn CO needs to be a LCol because the other unit COs are LCols is silly.  There is no logic to it, and its simply rank inflation for the sake of appearances.
The notion that CMBG HQs are massive mod tent complexes isn't necessarily accurate.  In the past, this was partly forced on the CMBGs by the self-divestment of the Bison CP fleet, and partially by Afghan hangover/silly post-Afghan concepts which see Brigades as static CPs managing every capability in the inventory.  As we get back to the core business, this is going away; one of the CMBGs is using a mobile CP on a half-dozen MSVS and has no mod tentage.  This is essential, as big CPs and the life support systems that go with them (heaters, generators, etc) just create the need for GDs, and the Sig Op trade has turned into a partial GD trade over the last decade due to point (3) above.  We need to fix this.
The CMBG Sig Sqn structure is under review in Force 2025.  The CCSB is a force generator, and not a tactical formation HQ, so it does not require a tactical HQ and Sig Sqn.
Force 2025 looks at positions.  The real problem that the Sig Corps faces right now isn't organizational, its that 50% of the seats it has have no butts in them - there are a host of issues behind this, of which organization is only one.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> The argument that a Sig Sqn CO needs to be a LCol because the other unit COs are LCols is silly.  There is no logic to it, and its simply rank inflation for the sake of appearances.



The flaw here is treating the rank as if it's more important than the appointment.  A bit of cultural shift might be needed.


----------



## Infanteer

You are right, and there is no flaw to be fixed, because the system works fine.  The CO of a Sig Sqn sits at the table with the other COs, and they all answer to the same boss.  The CO of a Sig Sqn is outranked by the Bde COS, but it doesn't matter, because the CO has the legal authority and is in charge of the unit.  For example, any authority for the COS to sign a leave pass for the HQ staff is delegated by the Sig Sqn CO.


----------



## McG

Instead of going down the path that all COs must be LCol because most CO are LCol, we should really be asking why more CO are not majors. It is a senior officer rank and if people holding the rank can’t do the job then we are promoting the wrong people.

A lot of PRes units should probably have majors as COs. There are also units (Reg and PRes) which are spread across distant places and that would benefit from being broken into multiple units each under a major CO.  

It would be more than just setting thresholds by numbers of people, but we should set a few metrics that help us judge when does a unit really need a LCol for CO, and when does a sub-unit really need a major as OC.


----------



## WLSC

McG said:


> Instead of going down the path that all COs must be LCol because most CO are LCol, we should really be asking why more CO are not majors. It is a senior officer rank and if people holding the rank can’t do the job then we are promoting the wrong people.
> 
> A lot of PRes units should probably have majors as COs. There are also units (Reg and PRes) which are spread across distant places and that would benefit from being broken into multiple units each under a major CO.
> 
> It would be more than just setting thresholds by numbers of people, but we should set a few metrics that help us judge when does a unit really need a LCol for CO, and when does a sub-unit really need a major as OC.


We might have to review how someone becomes Capt then.  At least make sure he did everything he need to do BEFORE becoming an OC.  If not it will becomes a acting/lacking nightmare like the current WO ranks.


----------



## Infanteer

CAF Rank policies isn't a Force 2025 initiative.  ARes unit structures are.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> Instead of going down the path that all COs must be LCol because most CO are LCol, we should really be asking why more CO are not majors. It is a senior officer rank and if people holding the rank can’t do the job then we are promoting the wrong people.
> 
> A lot of PRes units should probably have majors as COs. There are also units (Reg and PRes) which are spread across distant places and that would benefit from being broken into multiple units each under a major CO.
> 
> It would be more than just setting thresholds by numbers of people, but we should set a few metrics that help us judge when does a unit really need a LCol for CO, and when does a sub-unit really need a major as OC.


The answer is simple. A unit needs a LCol to be a CO when the unit needs multiple majors to lead its various subunits. If all you are by function or numbers is a subunit where captains are the appropriate ranks to lead the platoons or sections or whatever then all that you need is a major.

Which brings us to ResF structures. By authorized numbers and actual numbers many ResF units are actually just subunits. Organizationally they are usually established with multiple subunits and therefore are units requiring a LCol CO. That should all be reviewed if the politics wouldn't get in the way. That needs a carrot not a stick approach.

🍻


----------



## WLSC

Infanteer said:


> CAF Rank policies isn't a Force 2025 initiative.  ARes unit structures are.


Absolutly, doesn't mean anybody that is a Capt for 24 hrs is suite to be an OC, what ever the type of unit in the CAF.  Experience, competency and age comes in to play.


----------



## Brad Sallows

In the Res F, ranks above Lt are pretty much just for positions which are administrative.  A trained Res F capt has all the formal training needed for doing the things a Res F unit needs an officer above Lt to do.  A Res F sub-unit can function adequately with a Capt OC, Lt 2I/C, and Lt platoon commanders.  Any Lt not grownup enough to respect the appointment differentials despite the flat rank hierarchy shouldn't be there.


----------



## WLSC

Brad Sallows said:


> In the Res F, ranks above Lt are pretty much just for positions which are administrative.  A trained Res F capt has all the formal training needed for doing the things a Res F unit needs an officer above Lt to do.  A Res F sub-unit can function adequately with a Capt OC, Lt 2I/C, and Lt platoon commanders.  Any Lt not grownup enough to respect the appointment differentials despite the flat rank hierarchy shouldn't be there.


I beg to differ.  Automatic promotion base on time doesn't cut it for me, sorry.  Cant they do it, yes.  Can they manage, yes.  Doesn't mean it's good for attrition and for the Capt (talking about a fresh one here) when it happen.  

I have no issue with having Capt as OC however saying they don't need to be prepare because it's only PRes.  We all know what bad planning can do


----------



## Brad Sallows

Did you read what I wrote?  "A trained Res F capt".


----------



## Underway

Infanteer said:


> Yes.  We are the only NATO Army that maintains a 19-tank sub-unit as a doctrinal template.
> 
> Most armies use something between 12-15, and the Russians use 10.


Wonder what the reasoning is behind this?  Or is it in all practicality just allowing us to split the formation into smaller components?


----------



## Brad Sallows

If "we" can and "we" almost always do split it, then maybe having the two distinct manoeuvre sub-units makes more sense.  But then someone would be tempted to add a third troop to each to increase combat power above a measly two troops, and then someone would argue that it's hard to split three troops into two equal elements...


----------



## Kirkhill

But if you throw Combat Teams into the mix then you might get:

Captain i/c Coy/Sqn 
Major i/c Combat Team (with a Captain and mulitple Atts under command)
Lt Col i/c Battalion Equivalent
Col i/c Battle Group
Brigadier i/c Brigade (Group)

Captain is a single corps leader
Major is the first Combined Arms leader


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Wonder what the reasoning is behind this?  Or is it in all practicality just allowing us to split the formation into smaller components?



I think the reference might be  to Train as you Fight.

If you are habitually going to split 19 tanks into 10 and 9 and apportion them that way then why not organize on those lines from the beginning?

And if that then 1+1+4+4 and 1+4+4 or would 2x (1+3+3+3) be better tactically in a greater variety of situations?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> But if you throw Combat Teams into the mix then you might get:
> 
> Captain i/c Coy/Sqn
> Major i/c Combat Team (with a Captain and mulitple Atts under command)
> Lt Col i/c Battalion Equivalent
> Col i/c Battle Group
> Brigadier i/c Brigade (Group)
> 
> Captain is a single corps leader
> Major is the first Combined Arms leader


Combat Teams being adhoc are lead by the leading sub unit. So if it’s built on an Armoured Sqn it’s the Sqn OC, on a rifle company than it’s their OC. No need to insert an extra officer.


----------



## markppcli

WLSC said:


> I beg to differ.  Automatic promotion base on time doesn't cut it for me, sorry.  Cant they do it, yes.  Can they manage, yes.  Doesn't mean it's good for attrition and for the Capt (talking about a fresh one here) when it happen.
> 
> I have no issue with having Capt as OC however saying they don't need to be prepare because it's only PRes.  We all know what bad planning can do


Not at all what was said. And frankly if moving up the ranks is what’s keeping you in the military I’d argue you should move to a full time career.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Combat Teams being adhoc are lead by the leading sub unit. So if it’s built on an Armoured Sqn it’s the Sqn OC, on a rifle company than it’s their OC. No need to insert an extra officer.



I'm suggesting that the Major become a Lt Col in training vice a Senior Captain.

The Captain, with single corps responsibility gets to learn how to manage multiple Lts, but all within the corps with which the Captain is familiar.

Meanwhile the Captain gets to observe and assist the Major as the Major co-ordinates all the Ad Hoc atts and dets assigned by the Lt Col responsible for the Ad Hoc Combined Arms Battle Group.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> Combat Teams being adhoc are lead by the leading sub unit. So if it’s built on an Armoured Sqn it’s the Sqn OC, on a rifle company than it’s their OC. No need to insert an extra officer.


I don't think he was -- he was just making the point on the various ranks of the structures - and the fact that a Maj is the lowest level of combined arms command.


----------



## WLSC

Brad Sallows said:


> Did you read what I wrote?  "A trained Res F capt".


Yes.  I interpreted that wrongly.  My bad.  If trained accordingly then yes.


----------



## WLSC

markppcli said:


> Not at all what was said. And frankly if moving up the ranks is what’s keeping you in the military I’d argue you should move to a full time career.


It's not about being a Maj vs a Capt.  I'm fine with a trained Capt.  When I said wrong for the member is throwing someone on a job to early in is career.  One it's 1 of x, it's one thing, the OC will help.  If it's 1 of 1, the help is not the same.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Underway said:


> Wonder what the reasoning is behind this?  Or is it in all practicality just allowing us to split the formation into smaller components?


Regarding the 19 tank squadron, I am no historian but I will give it a swing. Canadian armour in WW2 was organized along British lines. Cruiser tank squadrons had five Troops each with three tanks along with a Squadron Headquarters with four tanks. As the Normandy Campaign progressed some Canadian armoured regiments (and perhaps the UK folks as well) reorganized into four Troops of four tanks with three in the HQ. In the 1st Hussars, for example, this is reported to have occurred mid-July just before ATLANTIC. My read is that this continued through the war and the four squadron with four Troops each of four tanks was our establishment at the end of the war. 

The post-war architects of our Armoured Corps would have all been veterans and most would have been in NWE. Perhaps they brought the idea with them. The 19 tank squadron has been around since before I joined in 1989.

What are the benefits? With a square organization of four Troops you are balanced which gives you flexibility. Advancing you can have two Troops stationary supporting two other Troops who are moving. You can then switch back to internal movement as required. I believe that the UK went with four Troops of three tanks each. The advantage of four tanks in the Troop is that if the Troop is on its own for a bit (perhaps due to canalizing terrain) you can have two tanks supporting while two move. You can also lose one tank and still have three. A Troop with only three tanks gets awful lonely awful quick: lose one to breakdown or fire and now you are just two tanks. So our 19 tank squadron was balanced and robust. Not surprising that it was the result of war. 

In 2002/2003 I was a Tank Squadron BC with the B Sqn RCD. *It was decided t*hat we would have two Tank Squadrons for the BTE. So we gave a Troop of tanks to A Sqn who had a weird blend of vehicles anyway and we both reorganized as two Squadrons of three Troops. We borrowed tanks from other regiments as we did gateway training and borrowed Panzers from LdSH for the BTE to enable us to have two Squadrons of three Troops. Aaaaaand then left them all there. I preferred having four Troops, but I would rather have a Troop of four tanks than a Troop of three tanks to have more Troops. If that makes any sense to the reader. We had to adapt our tactics to only ever having three Troops for attacks (breaches were a challenge), but I was somewhat used to that having trained with the US Army. 

Is the 19 tank Squadron a result of a small army making compromises everywhere but if it is going to have a tank regiment then by golly its tank squadrons are going to be as good as we can make them? Perhaps. One downside is the lamentable tendency for folks to break up the squadron. "_Oooh - it comes in half-squadrons? I'll take two of those to help me not have to make a decision about where to place my tanks!_"


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## PuckChaser

I hate how this renumbers your points when I split them, they're in the same order.


Infanteer said:


> There are a few different ideas here, which I'm happy to go into so we can get away from 110 pages of how many LAVs can dance on the head of a pin:
> 
> A Bde, organized as a tactical formation, should not need a "strategic link" (which I am assuming we mean a reachback to Canada) because it either links into a parent formation or back to a NCE with a theatre level signal organization.  Now, comms are sophisticated enough these days that any element has reachback to Canada - just give them an Sat Phone.  Hell, every infanteer in a section has reachback with their mobile devices.  What we are really discussing here is comms process and reporting, and not equipment.  If a Bde is operating as a tactical formation, it can't be encumbered with national reporting.  If it is operating as an NCE/Task Force HQ, like we saw in Afghanistan, then its role is different and it needs reachback for national level C2.  But this isn't the default organization for a fighting formation HQ, nor should it be.


I think the problem lies in how we define strategic reachback or any sort of strat comms. Right now those assets get held at CFJSR, for use in a fictional Div HQ. I agree that we cannot plan a construct around an Afghan deployment, but to hoard sat dishes and deployable CSNI equipment is just absolutely silly and empire building.


Infanteer said:


> The argument that a Sig Sqn CO needs to be a LCol because the other unit COs are LCols is silly.  There is no logic to it, and its simply rank inflation for the sake of appearances.


Can you hand on heart say it's never been an issue? We rank inflate literally everything else, but the Sigs Sqn CO is a sacred cow that cannot be elevated to a proper LCol rank? Heck, it was only a decade or so ago the Sig Sqn SM was elevated to CWO RSM precisely for the reasons I stated, it made that member a peer at the RSM's table.


Infanteer said:


> The notion that CMBG HQs are massive mod tent complexes isn't necessarily accurate.  In the past, this was partly forced on the CMBGs by the self-divestment of the Bison CP fleet, and partially by Afghan hangover/silly post-Afghan concepts which see Brigades as static CPs managing every capability in the inventory.  As we get back to the core business, this is going away; one of the CMBGs is using a mobile CP on a half-dozen MSVS and has no mod tentage.  This is essential, as big CPs and the life support systems that go with them (heaters, generators, etc) just create the need for GDs, and the Sig Op trade has turned into a partial GD trade over the last decade due to point (3) above.  We need to fix this.


I think each CMBG is doing things differently, and you may not have seen the bloat where you are. At 2CMBG under a recent previous Bde Comd, that thing was monstrous. I really do think your MSVS SMP concept coupled with the LAV6 CP (I knew I'd get a LAV reference in here somewhere) will certainly help reduce the size and increase capability while keeping us positioned to fight a peer force. An Afghan static Bde Main is easy, mobile is hard and what we should train to.


Infanteer said:


> The CMBG Sig Sqn structure is under review in Force 2025.  The CCSB is a force generator, and not a tactical formation HQ, so it does not require a tactical HQ and Sig Sqn.


It's good to hear CCSB won't be deployed on its own, that would honestly be the straw that broke RCCS' back. I'd be interested to see any docs you have on the Sig Sqn restructure, as is tradition the Signal Corps is terrible at passing messages to itself...


Infanteer said:


> Force 2025 looks at positions.  The real problem that the Sig Corps faces right now isn't organizational, its that 50% of the seats it has have no butts in them - there are a host of issues behind this, of which organization is only one.


Concur here, but I submit organizational issues are something we can fix right now as a tourniquet while we figure out how to get RCCS to the Role 3 for actual life saving repairs. Otherwise the forecasted bottom of the barrel (40% PML) in FY26/27 might come a lot sooner.


----------



## Kirkhill

@Tango2Bravo

Do you reckon this might have fitted into the history someplace?  I remembered seeing something about the 17 Pdr Firefly being incorporated into each troop.  The other tanks in the troops were still the 76mm versions.









						Sherman Firefly - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






> Production of the Firefly started in January 1944 and, by 31 May, some 342 Sherman Fireflies had been delivered to the 21st Army Group for the D-Day landings.[8] As a result, British tank troops were composed of three standard Shermans and one Firefly. The same distribution occurred in Cromwell units, but this caused logistical problems, as each Cromwell troop then needed to be supplied with parts for two different tanks. The Firefly was also slower than the Cromwell. Churchill units received no Fireflies, and as a result often had to rely on any attached M10 or M10 Achilles units to provide increased firepower to deal with tanks their own guns could not eliminate.[3]



I remembered seeing this because I was wondering if it wasn't an alternate method of distributing the 2A6s among the 2A4s.  They also are in a 1:3 ratio.


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## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> @Tango2Bravo
> 
> Do you reckon this might have fitted into the history someplace?  I remembered seeing something about the 17 Pdr Firefly being incorporated into each troop.  The other tanks in the troops were still the 76mm versions.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sherman Firefly - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I remembered seeing this because I was wondering if it wasn't an alternate method of distributing the 2A6s among the 2A4s.  They also are in a 1:3 ratio.


Donate Leo's to Ukraine -- get screaming deal on M1A2BlockIV Abrams...


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## Brad Sallows

Keep in mind that for a long interval of the war, for many of the "types" of British armoured/tank regiments, 2 of the tanks in a squadron HQ were "close support" - armed with something that threw a heavier weight of HE.  With modern battle tanks, that's not needed.

Firefly Shermans were in short supply, so 1 per troop was allocated.  Sometimes used that way; sometimes consolidated into single troops.  [Add: and the employment of brigades in divisions - Sherman, Cromwell - was different than the independents - Churchills - still influenced by early war "cruiser" / "infantry" bias.]

Looking at all the fudging around they did and poor results in many cases, if I were designing an armoured force I wouldn't start with the British as my template.

Done rationally, you'd start with a "literature survey" : pick some nations (eg. Germany, US, USSR, UK, France), and pay historians (one or two per country) to do a deep dive on the evolution of each nation's armoured forces (troop to division) from immediately pre-WWII until now, and report back in 6 months.  Find all the points at which any kinds of organizational changes were introduced (from troop to division) and identify the reasons.  Would include surveying all the published doctrine, SOPs, and AARs.  Winnow out the ones decided by experience in battle and focus on those (ie. ignore budget cutbacks, equipment shortfalls, tradition, wild hair up the senior black hat's ass, etc ).

Then come up with some proposed designs, try them out with a hockey sock of map/estimate exercises, and proceed with the best candidates to force-on-force trials.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Brad Sallows said:


> Keep in mind that for a long interval of the war, for many of the "types" of British armoured/tank regiments, 2 of the tanks in a squadron HQ were "close support" - armed with something that threw a heavier weight of HE.  With modern battle tanks, that's not needed.
> 
> Firefly Shermans were in short supply, so 1 per troop was allocated.  Sometimes used that way; sometimes consolidated into single troops.  [Add: and the employment of brigades in divisions - Sherman, Cromwell - was different than the independents - Churchills - still influenced by early war "cruiser" / "infantry" bias.]
> 
> Looking at all the fudging around they did and poor results in many cases, if I were designing an armoured force I wouldn't start with the British as my template.
> 
> Done rationally, you'd start with a "literature survey" : pick some nations (eg. Germany, US, USSR, UK, France), and pay historians (one or two per country) to do a deep dive on the evolution of each nation's armoured forces (troop to division) from immediately pre-WWII until now, and report back in 6 months.  Find all the points at which any kinds of organizational changes were introduced (from troop to division) and identify the reasons.  Would include surveying all the published doctrine, SOPs, and AARs.  Winnow out the ones decided by experience in battle and focus on those (ie. ignore budget cutbacks, equipment shortfalls, tradition, wild hair up the senior black hat's ass, etc ).
> 
> Then come up with some proposed designs, try them out with a hockey sock of map/estimate exercises, and proceed with the best candidates to force-on-force trials.


Perhaps the armour veterans of a major shooting war were actually quite well situated to come up with the organization for their forces post-war? Maybe they knew what they were on about?

Don't want to derail this into a historical tank discussion, as fun as it would be! Tracking the fun distinctions between various British armoured organizations through the war. Someone asked where 19 tanks came from. I have offered a possible explanation as well as why I actually quite like the 19 tank squadron in practice.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Perhaps the armour veterans of a major shooting war were actually quite well situated to come up with the organization for their forces post-war? Maybe they knew what they were on about?



Yes; maybe, assuming that the last organization was the "correct" one and would not have changed again had the war gone on.  The US knew what they were on about also - '44-45 medium company orbat was CO, CS (105mm), "spare", and 3x5.

The 18- (OC, 2xCs, 5x3) and 19- (OC, 2xCS, 4x4) tank squadrons are of the past; no harm arises from checking the work again.

Nevertheless, it'd be worth validating the organization.  2 units totalling 6 sub-units of 3x4 (2 of 3 of 14=84) has some advantages over 1 of 4 sub-units of 4x4 (4 of 19=76).  2025 is three years away; lots of time.


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## GR66

Brad Sallows said:


> Yes; maybe, assuming that the last organization was the "correct" one and would not have changed again had the war gone on.  The US knew what they were on about also - '44-45 medium company orbat was CO, CS (105mm), "spare", and 3x5.
> 
> The 18- (OC, 2xCs, 5x3) and 19- (OC, 2xCS, 4x4) tank squadrons are of the past; no harm arises from checking the work again.
> 
> Nevertheless, it'd be worth validating the organization.  2 units totalling 6 sub-units of 3x4 (2 of 3 of 14=84) has some advantages over 1 of 4 sub-units of 4x4 (4 of 19=76).  2025 is three years away; lots of time.


Much better to review and validate the organization then equip properly to match that requirement (including planning for Armour School/RCEME requirements, VOT allowances, spares, etc.) than to organize to suit the numbers you have.  Sadly, that's not the Canadian way seemingly.


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## GK .Dundas

There is a reason and let's be honest the reason we are debating this issue at all is because we're too damn cheap to buy a sufficient number of tanks. Not because we're tactical/strategic geniuses.
And one the.main reasons we have a 19 vehicle squadron at all is the need to continue to operate in spite of casualties. And make no mistake there WIll BE casualties.
There's an old saying when the steel begins to sing,all plans turn to water.


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## Brad Sallows

What's the magic number for over-equipping in order to carry on in spite of casualties?  Why not 29?


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## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> What's the magic number for over-equipping in order to carry on in spite of casualties?  Why not 29?



Question - does the unit get degraded first or does the command element die first?  And when do you take a degraded/decapitated element out of combat and replace it with a fresh one?


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## Kirkhill

Here's s another question - much of our debating over the years has been of this nature.  In the realm of equipment the debate has not been so much about organizational numbers as about which system, which caliber, which range band.   I think the Ukrainians are demonstrating that futility of those arguments.  Their answer seems to be anything and everything that works.   All of the above and lots of them.  

Capbadge identity doesn't seem to be an issue nor does long term logistics.  Soviet pattern kit, local mods, Polish mods, Slovak mods, Swedish mods, British kit, MRAPs, Aussie Bushmasters, Leo 1s and 2s (there's one for FJAG's retention argument) and Abrams if they can get their hands on them.  1908 Maxims.  Anything that will put a round downrange.


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## Brad Sallows

> I think the Ukrainians are demonstrating that futility of those arguments.



Impossible (too soon) to tell.  Throwing everything at hand into a defensive fight for a few weeks, when the attacker can't freely use the vast, sodden steppes, doesn't validate anything.


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## WLSC

Any organisation will have is advantages and is disadvantages.  There's a need for a doctrinal solution and build the ''need'' around it.  I really do like the square Cbt Team, damn it's impressive power when you see one.  Is there other solution, of course with there own plus/minus.  Probably that real connaisseur will be able to argue on details for years.

At the end of the day, all variants will win destroy the enemy, with their own style and plus/minus.

The one we have is big but damn effective.  The question is more about do we want less and bigger Cbt team of more and smaller?


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## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Impossible (too soon) to tell.  Throwing everything at hand into a defensive fight for a few weeks, when the attacker can't freely use the vast, sodden steppes, doesn't validate anything.



On the other hand it is a pattern often replicated, especially in WW2.

Israel 1947 to 1973.
Britain, all theaters 1939 to 1945.
Russia, all theaters (domestic, captured and lend/lease)
Germany, all theaters (domestic, occupied, captured, allied)

Heck, even Britain's adoption of the 9mm and the Sten was to accommodate German ammunition which was expected to be available in abundance on the continent.

Stens
Blacker Bombards, PIAT and other Spigot Mortars.
Lewis Guns


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## Kirkhill

Canadian Square Combat Team

19 MBT
15 LAV
+Atts

9x Sections with 7 Dismounts = 63 Dismounts + Pl HQ and Wpns Dets

Swedish Pansar Battalion

23 MBT
23 CV90
4x FOO
4x AA
4x Recce
8x Mor

18x Sections with 6 Dismounts = 108 Dismounts + 6 Ground Commanders + Recce Pl.


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## Brad Sallows

> On the other hand it is a pattern often replicated, especially in WW2.



Sure, but if you have the industrial capacity, you want to be the US.  Shermans.  Deuce-and-a-halfs.  C-47s.  Liberty ships.



> The one we have is big but damn effective.



Sure, but as Infanteer pointed out, "square combat team" == best part of the combat power of the battle group out of the hands of the CO and into the hands of one OC, and another OC sidelined.


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## KevinB

Brad Sallows said:


> Sure, but as Infanteer pointed out, "square combat team" == best part of the combat power of the battle group out of the hands of the CO and into the hands of one OC, and another OC sidelined.


Or in current CA terms takes a Inf Bn and a Armd Reg’t and leaves nothing left over…


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## WLSC

Brad Sallows said:


> Sure, but if you have the industrial capacity, you want to be the US.  Shermans.  Deuce-and-a-halfs.  C-47s.  Liberty ships.
> 
> 
> 
> Sure, but as Infanteer pointed out, "square combat team" == best part of the combat power of the battle group out of the hands of the CO and into the hands of one OC, and another OC sidelined.


Yep because it's a temporary plug and play.  It's in the pro vs con columns.  There's how many variant of Cbt teams?  I would like to see a comparative study of the most commun one. 

I'm more attach to the effect of the inf/tank team than our cbt team per say, even if I'm a big fan.


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## KevinB

One reason I like 4 Rifle Coy’s in a Bn. 
  You can field a Inf Heavy Cbt Team, kick another for a Armor Heavy Cbt Team, and have a spare.   
    Now is it more logical to have that spare in another separate Bn, maybe, but ideally you can have both


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## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Sure, but if you have the industrial capacity, you want to be the US.  Shermans.  Deuce-and-a-halfs.  C-47s.  Liberty ships.



Agreed, but that only works if your factories are out of range of the enemy and you have got slews of gold and IOUs for gold coming into the country from banks in Montreal.


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## Brad Sallows

No, it works if you settle on a few types and, after the competitions, you tell the losers they can either manufacture (for example) Shermans instead of Valentines and Churchills and Cromwells and and Comets and whatnot, or go without work.  Unless their shops are primitive and still use non-mass-production methods which produce equipments which can not necessarily exchange major pieces because they don't quite fit the same...

Ukraine enjoys the benefit of a bunch of countries being willing to send it stuff, so that it can use up a one-off distribution and move onto the next one.  It isn't burdened with having to maintain it all for months, yet.


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## Brad Sallows

Underlying weakness almost without regard to particular branch/role/function/capability being spitballed: insufficient time/money to experiment with doctrine; no recent history of severely bloody nose to motivate us if we can't find it within ourselves.


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## WLSC

KevinB said:


> One reason I like 4 Rifle Coy’s in a Bn.
> You can field a Inf Heavy Cbt Team, kick another for a Armor Heavy Cbt Team, and have a spare.
> Now is it more logical to have that spare in another separate Bn, maybe, but ideally you can have both


That's one of the reason that made me suggest a brigade with 1 tank regiment of 2 (19 tanks) sqn and 2 inf bn with 2 x (4 x pl) coys.  Same principle but bigger.


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## Kirkhill

WLSC said:


> That's one of the reason that made me suggest a brigade with 1 tank regiment of 2 (19 tanks) sqn and 2 inf bn with 2 x (4 x pl) coys.  Same principle but bigger.



On the other hand, if the Square Combat Team is the common form of use then why not organize some portion, (1/3? 1/4? 1/2?) of the standing army in permanent teams.  If we created organized 1/4 of the force in Permanent Combat Team (3 Battle Groups?) then you would still have 9 Battle Groups worth of General Duties units that could be employed in other tasks or converted to Combat Teams based on Lessons Learned.


----------



## Brad Sallows

1 regt of 2, plus 2 bn of 2, equals 6 sub-units.  For anyone worried about fragility, that's a pretty fragile brigade.

I instinctively favour triangular as a minimum, so 3 of 3 for total 9 sub-units.  "Square" (increase) some of it, maybe, but don't shrink below that.

Consider:
a one-armd-regt (square, 1x4x19 + 2 = 78 gun tanks), three-inf-bn (triangular) mixed brigade (13 sub-units)
a two-armed-regt (triangular, 14 per sub-unit, 2x3x14=84 + 2 =86 gun tanks), two-inf-bn (triangular) mixed brigade (12 sub-units)

Play them off against each other or through same set of tactical problems; see how they do.  But note that the second choice adds only 8 gun tanks and leaves an entire infantry bn left over, including a huge PY difference.


----------



## KevinB

WLSC said:


> That's one of the reason that made me suggest a brigade with 1 tank regiment of 2 (19 tanks) sqn and 2 inf bn with 2 x (4 x pl) coys.  Same principle but bigger.


How about Bde with 1 Tank Reg't of 4 (19) tank Sqn, and 3 IFV equipped  Inf Bn with 3 x 3 Rifle Platoon Coy's 

You can made 3 Inf Heavy Cbt Teams - and have a Spare Tank Sqn and 3 Spare Rifle Coy


----------



## Brad Sallows

> why not organize some portion, (1/3? 1/4? 1/2?) of the standing army in permanent teams.



Because as with everything else, a unit that can detach parts is preferable to cobbling a unit together from smaller elements when the larger element is needed.


----------



## WLSC

KevinB said:


> How about Bde with 1 Tank Reg't of 4 (19) tank Sqn, and 3 IFV equipped  Inf Bn with 3 x 3 Rifle Platoon Coy's
> 
> You can made 3 Inf Heavy Cbt Teams - and have a Spare Tank Sqn and 3 Spare Rifle Coy


I knooow!  But hey, while it might not be practical, it exercise the brain.  A bit like defending bases against zombies.

Seriously, we have a good system right now and every body know’s how it work.  So we have really 2 options, 1 keep what we have and built them back or do something else.  All there rest is just brain gymnastics.


----------



## Kirkhill

WLSC said:


> I knooow!  But hey, while it might not be practical, it exercise the brain.  A bit like defending bases against zombies.
> 
> Seriously, we have a good system right now and every body know’s how it work.  So we have really 2 options, 1 keep what we have and built them back or do something else.  All there rest is just brain gymnastics.


OR

More dollars for training to allow young field commanders to figure out how to manage situations where the book response isn't available to them.


----------



## WLSC

Kirkhill said:


> OR
> 
> More dollars for training to allow young field commanders to figure out how to manage situations where the book response isn't available to them.



Before being imagiative, you need to be solid on the basics principles of the receipts.  When you know we’ll your tools, imagination will come if they are encourage to do it.


----------



## Kirkhill

WLSC said:


> Before being imagiative, you need to be solid on the basics principles of the receipts.  When you know we’ll your tools, imagination will come if they are encourage to do it.



I don't disagree with ensuring there is a solid base from which to work.  However at some point you need to let people free and give them the opportunity to experiment.  Other wise everything becomes rote and ritual.  Dare I say, Russian.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> On the other hand, if the Square Combat Team is the common form of use then why not organize some portion, (1/3? 1/4? 1/2?) of the standing army in permanent teams.  If we created organized 1/4 of the force in Permanent Combat Team (3 Battle Groups?) then you would still have 9 Battle Groups worth of General Duties units that could be employed in other tasks or converted to Combat Teams based on Lessons Learned.


I don't favour standing combat teams. Too rigid. The only reason the square combat team is common is because Canada doesn't think well at battalion level but it can think well at coy/cbt team level. Its a scale and limited scope thing. We need battalion commanders that can fight battalions rather than managing the company commanders to fight.


Brad Sallows said:


> 1 regt of 2, plus 2 bn of 2, equals 6 sub-units.  For anyone worried about fragility, that's a pretty fragile brigade.
> 
> I instinctively favour triangular as a minimum, so 3 of 3 for total 9 sub-units.  "Square" (increase) some of it, maybe, but don't shrink below that.


I too think three by three is the key simply from the point of view that it provides a two frontage and a depth/reserve element. That's always critical. One can always play with the concept if the situation demands it but from a doctrinal point of view one shouldn't amend the establishment from that.


Brad Sallows said:


> Consider:
> a one-armd-regt (square, 1x4x19 + 2 = 78 gun tanks), three-inf-bn (triangular) mixed brigade (13 sub-units)
> a two-armed-regt (triangular, 14 per sub-unit, 2x3x14=84 + 2 =86 gun tanks), two-inf-bn (triangular) mixed brigade (12 sub-units)
> 
> Play them off against each other or through same set of tactical problems; see how they do.  But note that the second choice adds only 8 gun tanks and leaves an entire infantry bn left over, including a huge PY difference.


I've thought about it for a long time and I've become a believer in the US combined arms battalion concept. You can still form coy cbt teams if you need to but organizationally you start with the concept that the battalion itself is designed from square one to have its own organic armour and mech infantry elements capable at being fought as a battalion without the need to regroup anything.

The differences between a 2armour/1Inf and 2Inf/1armour combined arms battalion in the brigade also gives some flexibility for deploying armour heavy or infantry heavy battalions to suit the situation or, alternatively if required, still regrouping companies. Effectively though that shouldn't be necessary often.

My own view is that our CMBGs need regrouping for 2025 with one brigade becoming heavy with the armoured regiment having two tank sqns/one LAV company/1 sp coy; two mech battalions each having 2 LAV coys/1 tank squadron/ 1sp coy and the light inf bn being converted together with the brigade's armoured recce sqn into a cavalry bn. Essentially no change in PYs, very little change in equipment (other than some TAPVs and other gear for the cavalry) but a big change in attitude. I'll accept the fourteen-tank company because we have the numbers to arm a brigade with those.

As I've previously stated many times, the two remaining brigades should reshuffle their LAVs to make a 3 LAV bn a medium brigade with its armoured regiment being pure cavalry and the second a light brigade with its armoured regt also becoming cavalry.

Just as importantly, the Managed readiness system requires either elimination or adjustment. If adjusted it should be so that the three cycles occur within each brigade so that each brigade has one high ready battalion at all times.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I don't favour standing combat teams. Too rigid. The only reason the square combat team is common is because Canada doesn't think well at battalion level but it can think well at coy/cbt team level. Its a scale and limited scope thing. We need battalion commanders that can fight battalions rather than managing the company commanders to fight.
> 
> I too think three by three is the key simply from the point of view that it provides a two frontage and a depth/reserve element. That's always critical. One can always play with the concept if the situation demands it but from a doctrinal point of view one shouldn't amend the establishment from that.
> 
> I've thought about it for a long time and I've become a believer in the US combined arms battalion concept. You can still form coy cbt teams if you need to but organizationally you start with the concept that the battalion itself is designed from square one to have its own organic armour and mech infantry elements capable at being fought as a battalion without the need to regroup anything.
> 
> The differences between a 2armour/1Inf and 2Inf/1armour combined arms battalion in the brigade also gives some flexibility for deploying armour heavy or infantry heavy battalions to suit the situation or, alternatively if required, still regrouping companies. Effectively though that shouldn't be necessary often.
> 
> My own view is that our CMBGs need regrouping for 2025 with one brigade becoming heavy with the armoured regiment having two tank sqns/one LAV company/1 sp coy; two mech battalions each having 2 LAV coys/1 tank squadron/ 1sp coy and the light inf bn being converted together with the brigade's armoured recce sqn into a cavalry bn. Essentially no change in PYs, very little change in equipment (other than some TAPVs and other gear for the cavalry) but a big change in attitude. I'll accept the fourteen-tank company because we have the numbers to arm a brigade with those.
> 
> As I've previously stated many times, the two remaining brigades should reshuffle their LAVs to make a 3 LAV bn a medium brigade with its armoured regiment being pure cavalry and the second a light brigade with its armoured regt also becoming cavalry.
> 
> Just as importantly, the Managed readiness system requires either elimination or adjustment. If adjusted it should be so that the three cycles occur within each brigade so that each brigade has one high ready battalion at all times.
> 
> 🍻




The difference between a Permanent Square Combat Team with 19 MBT and 15 LAV and a Combined Arms Battalion with 14 MBT and 28 LAV is how much? 

I am agreeing with you FJAG.

What I am saying is that with our 12 Manoeuvre Units we could easily make at least 3 of them permanent Combined Arms establishments and leave the rest of the force as unitary elements that could adapt to the situation, including making additional PSCTs or CABs.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I don't disagree with ensuring there is a solid base from which to work.  However at some point you need to let people free and give them the opportunity to experiment.  Other wise everything becomes rote and ritual.  Dare I say, Russian.


Have to learn the play book before you can call an audible.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Have to learn the play book before you can call an audible.


Just need lots of scrimmaging.


----------



## FJAG

I've been threatening to do this for some time now so here goes with my revised Canadian Army for 2027 ('cause 2025 is almost here)

Here are the ground rules:

1. No new PYs and using existing ResF authorized strength; and

2. No new major equipment but place markers for future capabilities indicated; and

3. An assumption that organizational/legislative changes are made to enable an effective ResF element.

Major objectives:

1. Increase the number of brigade headquarters and manoeuvre battalion headquarters that are capable of deploying on peacetime rotations;

2. Increase the number of trained company level organizations that can deploy on rotations;

3. Decrease the number of PYs allocated to RegF capabilities that do not deploy frequently during peacetime;

4. Eliminating unnecessary and non deployable headquarters; and

5. Assigning RegF command authority and responsibility for ResF training and organization.


Notes:

1. All divisional headquarters and six of ten ResF headquarters have been elliminated and their RegF personnel reallocated. While 1 Cdn Div is not an Army resource, it should in name be elliminated and its staff integrated into CJOC to manage deployments. The only potential role for any divisional command elements for Canada are with one of the NATO Multinational corps. Accordingly a company size divisional HQ staff assigned to the MND-N has been included with 33 CSB in Kingston.

2. All RegF units have been broken up leaving appx 70% of the manpower with their original units/formations while the remaining 30% together with PYs from div HQs, Disbanded ResF brigades and all RSS positions have been reallocated across the entire force. so  that  all manoeuvre battalions have a minimum RegF strength of 30% to 70%. In total, deployabel brigade headquarters have increased for three to five and deployable manoeuvre battalion headquarters from 12 to 22. Each manoeuvre battalion (including cavalry) has at least one full-time RegF company which provides sufficient strength to train the unit's personnel. There are 31 full-time RegF deployable manoeuvre companies augmented by 37 Res F Manoeuvre companies.

3 RegF artillery and Engineer regiments generally do not deploy in peacetime and therefore have had their PYs redistributed but within their branch to support ResF regiments. 

4. Company/squadron/battery structures have been reduced as follows: CS companies have been elliminated from combined arms ans LAV battalions (bn mortars and recce now fall under bn HQ); FOO batteries and STA batteries have been removed from CS artillery regiments (Fsccs/FOOs return to gun batteries, STA becomes a troop within RegtHQ. A GS medium UCAV anti-armour battery has been added to each CS regiment; Bde Engineer Regiments are reduced to two field sqns but have the brigade Sigs Sqn and a new MI compnay under command for administration. Sp/Adm coys are removed from the Bde Svc Bns - all support for the battalion comes from the remaining maintenace and supply and tpt  coys. The Bde Fd Amb is attached to the Svc Bn for admin.

5. A cavalry regiment has been added to each manoeuvre brigade consisting of a recce sqn (with recce UAVs), an infantry company (with ATGMs) and a ground and light UCAV anti-armour squadron)

6. Every 100% RegF unit is fully equiped from current weapon allocations except (HIMARS and AD batteries are notional at this point)

7. All dividional support establishments are reassigned to the Cdn Army Support Group which is a non deployable, base support entity

8  Individual trg remains the primary responsibility of CADTC with much of it delivered through Depot Bns and companies located close to RegF and ResF units. Recruiting for Army personnel and all BMQ/BMOQ training shall also fall to the Depot Bns.

9. The current CSSB and two of the Res F brigades shall be restructured as two CCSBs and a Sustainment Brigade. to provide above brigade level deployable resources.

10. ResF battalions and regiments shall be reorganized as company sized entities which shall be assigned to one or another battalion within one of the various brigades. Each Bn/Regt HQ shall be responsible for sharing its existing equipment and collective training of their various RegF and ResF members albeit such training will be done at times most appropriate to the members concerned (eg. ResF training shall be primarily during summer months and on one weekend per month)

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I've been threatening to do this for some time now so here goes with my revised Canadian Army for 2027 ('cause 2025 is almost here)


I look at these various ORBATS (and have posted several of my own) and more and more I'm beginning to wonder if we're missing what our politicians, public (and to some extent the war in Ukraine) are trying to tell us.

The real reason Canadian's (and by extension our politician's) support for the military is "a mile wide and an inch deep" is because realistically we face no (non-nuclear) military threat to our existence.  Yes there are security threats, threats to elements of our sovereignty and threats to our national interests (both economic and political), but there are no "barbarians at our gates".

For that reason our involvement in military actions are by our choice as opposed to by need.  So it's really not shocking that the appetite of Canadians for a large, expensive military in peacetime or for significant casualties in deployments is low.  Canadians view the participation of the military as "providing assistance".  Assisting those affected by a natural disaster/pandemic.  Assisting the police with security.  Assisting other countries develop their own capabilities.  Assisting in securing/maintaining peace between warring parties.  Assisting other countries to defend themselves against invasion.  Assisting our allies to defeat an evil dictator/terrorist organization.  That's not the kind of mindset the screams support for things like Armoured Brigades, Tanks, Attack Helicopters, Aircraft Carriers, Assault Ships, etc.  

Something the Ukraine war _seems_ to be telling us (and yes I'm wary of reading too much into a single conflict which has its own very particular context) is that modern war is not on the same scale as it was in WWII or was expected to be during the Cold War.  Partially this is because nuclear weapons put limits on how far the major powers can be existentially threatened before reaching the threshold of nuclear war, but also because the cost of the technology of war has put limits on the size of military that a nation can afford to equip.  

I think it's noteworthy that Ukraine has not asked for direct foreign military intervention in the war.  They are saying they have the people they need to fight the Russians but what they need is the weapons.  In particular they are looking for specific capabilities:  Primarily Anti-Aircraft systems, Anti-Tank systems and Fighter aircraft to secure air superiority.  They are more recently asking for tanks, AFVs and artillery.  Typically unspoken is also the need for ISR assets to make all of the above more effective.

What can we take away from all of the above?  By shuffling around various combinations of more or less traditional Battalions, Brigades and Divisions are we missing both what Canadians are saying they want (and are willing to pay) us to have?  Are we also possibly missing what things could REALLY be of military value if we are ever directly involved in a major conflict again?


----------



## KevinB

ISR they don’t need as we have directly fed them everything they need on that front since before Day 0

All one needs to do is look carefully at the airspace over Europe. 
  Lots of ELINT, SIGINT, GeoSpacial, ISR etc items are providing Ukraine with more information that they can actually deal with at this time.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> ISR they don’t need as we have directly fed them everything they need on that front since before Day 0
> 
> All one needs to do is look carefully at the airspace over Europe.
> Lots of ELINT, SIGINT, GeoSpacial, ISR etc items are providing Ukraine with more information that they can actually deal with at this time.


That's exactly what I'm referring to.  Supply of the end product of ISR assets...not necessarily the ISR assets themselves.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> I look at these various ORBATS (and have posted several of my own) and more and more I'm beginning to wonder if we're missing what our politicians, public (and to some extent the war in Ukraine) are trying to tell us.
> 
> The real reason Canadian's (and by extension our politician's) support for the military is "a mile wide and an inch deep" is because realistically we face no (non-nuclear) military threat to our existence.  Yes there are security threats, threats to elements of our sovereignty and threats to our national interests (both economic and political), but there are no "barbarians at our gates".
> 
> For that reason our involvement in military actions are by our choice as opposed to by need.  So it's really not shocking that the appetite of Canadians for a large, expensive military in peacetime or for significant casualties in deployments is low.  Canadians view the participation of the military as "providing assistance".  Assisting those affected by a natural disaster/pandemic.  Assisting the police with security.  Assisting other countries develop their own capabilities.  Assisting in securing/maintaining peace between warring parties.  Assisting other countries to defend themselves against invasion.  Assisting our allies to defeat an evil dictator/terrorist organization.  That's not the kind of mindset the screams support for things like Armoured Brigades, Tanks, Attack Helicopters, Aircraft Carriers, Assault Ships, etc.



Three thumbs up!



GR66 said:


> Something the Ukraine war _seems_ to be telling us (and yes I'm wary of reading too much into a single conflict which has its own very particular context) is that modern war is not on the same scale as it was in WWII or was expected to be during the Cold War.  Partially this is because nuclear weapons put limits on how far the major powers can be existentially threatened before reaching the threshold of nuclear war, but also because the cost of the technology of war has put limits on the size of military that a nation can afford to equip.



Yes! And yes again!

With the added observation that people and weapons move farther and faster and more precisely so fewer weapons have greater effect.

And.

It is virtually impossible to do anything without it being observed.  



GR66 said:


> I think it's noteworthy that Ukraine has not asked for direct foreign military intervention in the war.  They are saying they have the people they need to fight the Russians but what they need is the weapons.  In particular they are looking for specific capabilities:  Primarily Anti-Aircraft systems, Anti-Tank systems and Fighter aircraft to secure air superiority.  They are more recently asking for tanks, AFVs and artillery.  Typically unspoken is also the need for ISR assets to make all of the above more effective.
> 
> What can we take away from all of the above?  By shuffling around various combinations of more or less traditional Battalions, Brigades and Divisions are we missing both what Canadians are saying they want (and are willing to pay) us to have?  Are we also possibly missing what things could REALLY be of military value if we are ever directly involved in a major conflict again?


----------



## Brad Sallows

> the cost of the technology of war has put limits on the size of military that a nation can afford to equip



Is that true?  More complex and advanced equipment is relatively more expensive, but economies have grown.

All figures approximate and nominal.
Upper bound cost of Sherman tank in 1945: $65000
US GDP in 1945: $228B
US GDP in 2021: $22996B

GDP has increased by roughly 100 times.
If the cost of a MBT increased 100 times, it would be $6.5M.  That doesn't sound too far off.  I'd guess if similar comparisons were made with respect to aircraft, ships, etc, we'd find that most things are, in fact, more expensive.  But capability must also be compared, and if we could somehow reduce that to a quantity, I suspect we'd find several orders of magnitude of difference.

Capability differences can be hugely influential.  (Just ask anyone who is lagging in the race to climb a tech tree...)



> What can we take away from all of the above?



I suppose we'd find that it is vital to have the most capable equipment, otherwise we're just wasting money on targets.


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> I think it's noteworthy that Ukraine has not asked for direct foreign military intervention in the war.


That is untrue.  The Ukrainian President and other government officials have repeatedly and publically chided NATO and the West for just leaving weapons at the door, and not taking more direct forms of participation such as aerial intervention.



			https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-the-tuesday-edition-1.6385827/why-zelensky-won-t-stop-pushing-for-a-no-fly-zone-according-to-his-former-adviser-1.6385830


----------



## Infanteer

Brad Sallows said:


> Is that true?  More complex and advanced equipment is relatively more expensive, but economies have grown.



I wonder what the production line time of a Sherman is vs an Abrams?


----------



## Brad Sallows

> I wonder what the production line time of a Sherman is vs an Abrams?



That, too.  "Quantity has a quality...".  But, also, "targets".  Complex...


----------



## suffolkowner

Brad Sallows said:


> Is that true?  More complex and advanced equipment is relatively more expensive, but economies have grown.
> 
> All figures approximate and nominal.
> Upper bound cost of Sherman tank in 1945: $65000
> US GDP in 1945: $228B
> US GDP in 2021: $22996B
> 
> GDP has increased by roughly 100 times.
> If the cost of a MBT increased 100 times, it would be $6.5M.  That doesn't sound too far off.  I'd guess if similar comparisons were made with respect to aircraft, ships, etc, we'd find that most things are, in fact, more expensive.  But capability must also be compared, and if we could somehow reduce that to a quantity, I suspect we'd find several orders of magnitude of difference.
> 
> Capability differences can be hugely influential.  (Just ask anyone who is lagging in the race to climb a tech tree...)
> 
> 
> 
> I suppose we'd find that it is vital to have the most capable equipment, otherwise we're just wasting money on targets.


The capability progress over time only matters if there is a capability difference between antagonists otherwise we  are all just running as fast as we can to stay in the same place. This will be the strategic imperative going forward with respect to China especially. Can the US led west maintain its technological advantage as China and others continue to(?) grow economically?


----------



## Brad Sallows

Maintaining the capability difference is the essence of the "strategy of technology".  Conveniently, the side with the most individual liberty has advantages.


----------



## suffolkowner

Brad Sallows said:


> Maintaining the capability difference is the essence of the "strategy of technology".  Conveniently, the side with the most individual liberty has advantages.


I tend to agree but sometimes worry that this isn't more of a hope in this grand democratic experience that we are undertaking. The recent Russian adventure in Ukraine does tend to support this and again I hope it is not put to the test again on a larger scale against China


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Is that true?  More complex and advanced equipment is relatively more expensive, but economies have grown.
> 
> All figures approximate and nominal.
> Upper bound cost of Sherman tank in 1945: $65000
> US GDP in 1945: $228B
> US GDP in 2021: $22996B
> 
> GDP has increased by roughly 100 times.
> If the cost of a MBT increased 100 times, it would be $6.5M.  That doesn't sound too far off.  I'd guess if similar comparisons were made with respect to aircraft, ships, etc, we'd find that most things are, in fact, more expensive.  But capability must also be compared, and if we could somehow reduce that to a quantity, I suspect we'd find several orders of magnitude of difference.
> 
> Capability differences can be hugely influential.  (Just ask anyone who is lagging in the race to climb a tech tree...)
> 
> 
> 
> I suppose we'd find that it is vital to have the most capable equipment, otherwise we're just wasting money on targets.











						Here’s how much housing prices have skyrocketed over the last 50 years
					

In 1940, the median home price in the U.S. was less than $3,000.




					www.cnbc.com
				






> If you want to buy a house this year, you may well be paying around $199,200, the median price for a home in the U.S., according to Zillow.
> 
> Houses weren’t always this expensive. In 1940, the median home value in the U.S. was just $2,938. In 1980, it was $47,200, and by 2000, it had risen to $119,600. Even adjusted for inflation, the median home price in 1940 would only have been $30,600 in 2000 dollars, according to data from the U.S. Census.



So a Sherman in 1945 cost $65,000
A house in the US in 1940 cost $3,000
So in 1940-45 a single tank would house 21 families

In 2022 a Merkava with Trophy costs $5,000,000
A house in the US costs $200,000
So in 2022 a single tank would house 25 families

So, is it that things cost more or more things cost?  There are more things to spend money on?

It would be interesting to see how much of the budget now gets spent on "flying machines" - to include planes but also helicopters, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, guided missiles of all sorts, glide bombs, UAS's and smart artillery rounds.

Versus 1940-45 and the only "aircraft" in the sky were piloted and dumb bombs and shells.

And






						Prices over the decades
					






					www150.statcan.gc.ca


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Versus 1940-45 and the only "aircraft" in the sky were piloted and dumb bombs and shells.



Werner Von Braun, the V1, and the V2 say "Pardon?"


----------



## Brad Sallows

I'll stipulate that everything is more expensive now.

I'll contend that an expensive peacetime force is cheaper than war, and that an expensive peacetime force is most effective if it demonstrates clear technological superiority.

A subsidiary contention is that an expensive peacetime force that fits well with allies and can operate abroad produces international security and trade benefits that are hard to measure, but exceed the cost of the force.


----------



## suffolkowner

Kirkhill said:


> Here’s how much housing prices have skyrocketed over the last 50 years
> 
> 
> In 1940, the median home price in the U.S. was less than $3,000.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.cnbc.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So a Sherman in 1945 cost $65,000
> A house in the US in 1940 cost $3,000
> So in 1940-45 a single tank would house 21 families
> 
> In 2022 a Merkava with Trophy costs $5,000,000
> A house in the US costs $200,000
> So in 2022 a single tank would house 25 families
> 
> So, is it that things cost more or more things cost?  There are more things to spend money on?
> 
> It would be interesting to see how much of the budget now gets spent on "flying machines" - to include planes but also helicopters, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, guided missiles of all sorts, glide bombs, UAS's and smart artillery rounds.
> 
> Versus 1940-45 and the only "aircraft" in the sky were piloted and dumb bombs and shells.
> 
> And
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Prices over the decades
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www150.statcan.gc.ca


In Canada is not the average house something like $850,000? If the US is under $250,000 still that tells you how much trouble we are exposed to


----------



## Blackadder1916

suffolkowner said:


> In Canada is not the average house something like $850,000? If the US is under $250,000 still that tells you how much trouble we are exposed to



Keep in mind that Kirkhill quoted a nearly five year old article (23 Jun 2017).


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Werner Von Braun, the V1, and the V2 say "Pardon?"



V1 June 13, 1944 - 8,025 missiles launched
V2 September 7, 1944 - 3,172 missiles launched
And the first military helicopter flew in 1941 - also German
The first military jet also flew in 1941 - also German
And guidance systems came into vogue.

However as revolutionary as all those technologies were, in my opinion, they had minimal impact on a war that was primarily fought with the technologies of 1900-1940.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> That is untrue.  The Ukrainian President and other government officials have repeatedly and publically chided NATO and the West for just leaving weapons at the door, and not taking more direct forms of participation such as aerial intervention.
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-the-tuesday-edition-1.6385827/why-zelensky-won-t-stop-pushing-for-a-no-fly-zone-according-to-his-former-adviser-1.6385830


This is true, but they were specifically requesting enforcement of a No-Fly Zone which is (primarily) an Air Force intervention, not a ground force intervention.  That lies outside our discussion of Army force structure under Force 2025 and beyond. 

I've expressed my opinion on the balance of Air/Sea/Land forces for Canada previously and definitely belong to the camp that would prioritize Air/Sea over Land.


----------



## GR66

Another thing to keep in mind is that not only has the cost of equipping the military gone up, but the cost of manning that equipment has gone up greatly as well.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Another thing to keep in mind is that not only has the cost of equipping the military gone up, but the cost of manning that equipment has gone up greatly as well.



In 1944, privates serving in World War II made $50 a month, or $676.51 in 2016 dollars.









						Here's how much US troops have been paid in every American war
					

The troops who have fought America's wars did so for relatively low pay — when they got paid at all.




					www.businessinsider.com
				




So a $65,000 Sherman would buy you 1300 privates for a month or roughly a company of infantry (118) from D-Day to VE-Day.

A Canadian Private PI3 now costs $4650 a month.  Or, again, about 100 times what a 1944 US private cost. +or-.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I look at these various ORBATS (and have posted several of my own) and more and more I'm beginning to wonder if we're missing what our politicians, public (and to some extent the war in Ukraine) are trying to tell us.
> 
> The real reason Canadian's (and by extension our politician's) support for the military is "a mile wide and an inch deep" is because realistically we face no (non-nuclear) military threat to our existence. Yes there are security threats, threats to elements of our sovereignty and threats to our national interests (both economic and political), but there are no "barbarians at our gates".
> 
> For that reason our involvement in military actions are by our choice as opposed to by need. So it's really not shocking that the appetite of Canadians for a large, expensive military in peacetime or for significant casualties in deployments is low. Canadians view the participation of the military as "providing assistance". Assisting those affected by a natural disaster/pandemic. Assisting the police with security. Assisting other countries develop their own capabilities. Assisting in securing/maintaining peace between warring parties. Assisting other countries to defend themselves against invasion. Assisting our allies to defeat an evil dictator/terrorist organization. That's not the kind of mindset the screams support for things like Armoured Brigades, Tanks, Attack Helicopters, Aircraft Carriers, Assault Ships, etc.


All of the above are very valid and accurate reasons for where we are but I do think that at the heart of our problem is the Canadian military itself.

I've whinged about this many times before, but Canada is already contributing well towards the military. True it's not the NATO 2% standard Canada has agreed to, but $26 some odd billion isn't chickenfeed. 

To be useful, a military needs both people and modern equipment. We spend roughly half of our budget on people and the lion's share of that goes to full-time people, both military and reserve.

It's dead simple math to conclude that if you cannot afford the level of equipment needed then the people, or many of them, become mostly useless on both a day-to-day basis and in an emergency when you really need them and their gear.

The mathematical answer is also dead simple; reduce your people costs and invest in equipment that you foresee might be necessary in a worst case scenario.

Since the late Fifties and Sixties the CAF has been enamoured with the "Forces in Being" concept which lead to the rapid expansion of the RegF and its resultant people costs. Ever since then we have not changed that paradigm. We basically keep a full-time force equipped with the money allocated. That might make sense to an extent for the RCAF and the RCN but it makes zero sense for the Army. 

On a day to day basis the bulk of the Army, and to extent the RCN, spends its time in training and continuously regenerating itself through turnover and, most of all, administrating itself. There are some deployments but they generally involve only a small fraction of the force.

It's blindingly obvious that much of the Army and, to an extent, some of the Navy could put much of its manpower into a "reserve" status for much of the time. The key is finding the right balance in the RegF to ResF ratio and, absolutely critical, building a reserve force structure that turns out a credible and reliable product.

Whenever I'm at my tinfoil hat worst, I conclude that the very reason that the Army has not reformed its reserve component over the last seven decades is precisely for the reason that it would cause the government to conclude that it could do with a lot fewer of the expensive full-time PYs ... and they'd be right.

The model I built above uses existing numbers to create five deployable manoeuvre and three support brigades using existing manpower levels. It only has the equipment for three brigades though. One could as easily use the same 30/70 model to cut ten thousand full-time Army positions while retaining the reserve numbers as is and retain the three manoeuvre brigades we have equipment for. That would save in excess of $1 billion each year that could go to buying the anti armour and air defence systems we need to actually be able to fight the first year, tanks the second, artillery the third and IFVs the fourth.

The primary requirement for all of that though is to have a ResF structure that works and to have a tad less risk aversion. We can see what badly trained and badly equipped Russian full-timers are accomplishing against motivated hybrid force of Ukrainian part and full-timers given the right modern weapon systems. I'm spitballing here but my guess is that a Canadian brigade with the equipment it has and facing the Ukrainians would be blown out of the water as well because of its lack a artillery, ATGMs, air support, and air defence notwithstanding their superior training.

I'll repeat it again. Canada's problem isn't so much the lack of funding provided by the government but the lack of defence outputs that the combined military and civilian bureaucracy outputs with that funding. A solid hybrid 30/70 RegF/ResF structure in the Army (and a lesser extent in the RCN) would be much more suitable agency to meet the governments actual defence needs.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> I wonder what the production line time of a Sherman is vs an Abrams?


Or more accurately what could the production of Abrams be? 

We aren’t in a wartime economy, and only recently did we seek to expand production of ‘consumables’.  

No direct effort has been made to speed/streamline the production of significant military items.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> In Canada is not the average house something like $850,000? If the US is under $250,000 still that tells you how much trouble we are exposed to



Median and average are not the same thing.


----------



## GAP

Kirkhill said:


> In 1944, privates serving in World War II made $50 a month, or $676.51 in 2016 dollars.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Here's how much US troops have been paid in every American war
> 
> 
> The troops who have fought America's wars did so for relatively low pay — when they got paid at all.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.businessinsider.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So a $65,000 Sherman would buy you 1300 privates for a month or roughly a company of infantry (118) from D-Day to VE-Day.
> 
> A Canadian Private PI3 now costs $4650 a month.  Or, again, about 100 times what a 1944 US private cost. +or-.


In 1967-68 & 69 as a Sargent I received 200.00/month plus $65.00 Danger pay


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> To be useful, a military needs both people and modern equipment. We spend roughly half of our budget on people and the lion's share of that goes to full-time people, both military and reserve.



Regulars - 68,000
Reserves - 27,000
Rangers - 5,000

Civilians - 27,000






						DND/CAF Footprint - Canada.ca
					

March 2020 - Essential information to familiarize the Minister with the Department.




					www.canada.ca
				




It is not just the Regs that eat up the cash.  It is also the government mandated civilians.

And we can't forget about the 17,000 civilians at  Public Services and Procurement, and whatever other there are in Innovation, Industry etc.

There are an awful lot of civilians feeding at the trough as well.


----------



## McG

Does everyone collecting a government pay check need to be presented as an extraneous pig at the trough? We can’t spend our budget on major equipment & war essential consumables for lack of people, but we should manage the budget by cutting the too few who we have?


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Does everyone collecting a government pay check need to be presented as an extraneous pig at the trough? We can’t spend our budget on major equipment & war essential consumables for lack of people, but we should manage the budget by cutting the too few who we have?


Fair comment.

If I could edit my remark I would.  

Having said that there are a lot of people drawing salaries that are related to National Defence and that don't show up directly in the National Defence budget while a lot of those civilians employed by DND are not seen to be directly contributing to the frontline effort.

FJAG wants to supply more Reserve Troops at the expense of the Regular Troops.  I'm wondering if there is opportunity for savings in the civilian sector of DND.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> All of the above are very valid and accurate reasons for where we are but I do think that at the heart of our problem is the Canadian military itself.
> 
> I've whinged about this many times before, but Canada is already contributing well towards the military. True it's not the NATO 2% standard Canada has agreed to, but $26 some odd billion isn't chickenfeed.
> 
> To be useful, a military needs both people and modern equipment. We spend roughly half of our budget on people and the lion's share of that goes to full-time people, both military and reserve.
> 
> It's dead simple math to conclude that if you cannot afford the level of equipment needed then the people, or many of them, become mostly useless on both a day-to-day basis and in an emergency when you really need them and their gear.
> 
> The mathematical answer is also dead simple; reduce your people costs and invest in equipment that you foresee might be necessary in a worst case scenario.
> 
> Since the late Fifties and Sixties the CAF has been enamoured with the "Forces in Being" concept which lead to the rapid expansion of the RegF and its resultant people costs. Ever since then we have not changed that paradigm. We basically keep a full-time force equipped with the money allocated. That might make sense to an extent for the RCAF and the RCN but it makes zero sense for the Army.
> 
> On a day to day basis the bulk of the Army, and to extent the RCN, spends its time in training and continuously regenerating itself through turnover and, most of all, administrating itself. There are some deployments but they generally involve only a small fraction of the force.
> 
> It's blindingly obvious that much of the Army and, to an extent, some of the Navy could put much of its manpower into a "reserve" status for much of the time. The key is finding the right balance in the RegF to ResF ratio and, absolutely critical, building a reserve force structure that turns out a credible and reliable product.
> 
> Whenever I'm at my tinfoil hat worst, I conclude that the very reason that the Army has not reformed its reserve component over the last seven decades is precisely for the reason that it would cause the government to conclude that it could do with a lot fewer of the expensive full-time PYs ... and they'd be right.
> 
> The model I built above uses existing numbers to create five deployable manoeuvre and three support brigades using existing manpower levels. It only has the equipment for three brigades though. One could as easily use the same 30/70 model to cut ten thousand full-time Army positions while retaining the reserve numbers as is and retain the three manoeuvre brigades we have equipment for. That would save in excess of $1 billion each year that could go to buying the anti armour and air defence systems we need to actually be able to fight the first year, tanks the second, artillery the third and IFVs the fourth.
> 
> The primary requirement for all of that though is to have a ResF structure that works and to have a tad less risk aversion. We can see what badly trained and badly equipped Russian full-timers are accomplishing against motivated hybrid force of Ukrainian part and full-timers given the right modern weapon systems. I'm spitballing here but my guess is that a Canadian brigade with the equipment it has and facing the Ukrainians would be blown out of the water as well because of its lack a artillery, ATGMs, air support, and air defence notwithstanding their superior training.
> 
> I'll repeat it again. Canada's problem isn't so much the lack of funding provided by the government but the lack of defence outputs that the combined military and civilian bureaucracy outputs with that funding. A solid hybrid 30/70 RegF/ResF structure in the Army (and a lesser extent in the RCN) would be much more suitable agency to meet the governments actual defence needs.
> 
> 🍻


I'm not going to disagree with your argument that the Army has its Reg/Reserve balance wrong.  I do however question the fact that you're really just changing the manning of the same basic force structures from full-time to part-time...using the Reg Force PY savings to create Res Force Brigades (admittedly with the key enablers that we're currently missing put back).  

We're currently seeing Russia in a full-scale shooting war with a NATO partner nation.  A nation that until just before the initiation of hostilities was hosting our military trainers.  Even this extreme situation hasn't led the Canadian government to deploy any significant new troops and equipment to Europe.  Hasn't led to some dramatic increase in Reserve activity.  No scramble to urgently acquire vital military equipment.  No serious talk about re-activating a Canadian Brigade Group in Europe.  No loading of LAVs and tanks onto Ro-Ro's so they're ready to deploy if needed.

You might write this off as just another example of the talk-much, do-nothing leadership of an anti-military government.  However, do you see any of those actions taking place in the UK?  In France?  Germany?  Sure, the Germans are increasing their defence spending, but are they pushing Brigades forward?  That's what's making me wonder if your model of using the savings to just create more of the same old Brigade Groups is the right path?


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Or more accurately what could the production of Abrams be?
> 
> We aren’t in a wartime economy, and only recently did we seek to expand production of ‘consumables’.
> 
> No direct effort has been made to speed/streamline the production of significant military items.



IIRC the Lima plant can produce 120/month.

I assume that, should the demand increase, they could double that if required.... at least.


In February 1980, the first M1 Abrams rolled out of LATP. After a contract the plant began producing the Abrams at a rate of 30 a month.

Chrysler subsequently sold the Defense subsidiary to General Dynamics in 1982.[3] In January 1985, the last M1 rolled off the assembly line, and in October, production began on the improved M1 (IPM1). The plant later manufactured the M1A1, with the first pilot vehicle built in August 1985. The M1A1 was produced at a rate of 120 a month.[4]









						Lima Army Tank Plant - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> IIRC the Lima plant can produce 120/month.
> 
> I assume that, should the demand increase, they could double that if required.... at least.
> 
> 
> In February 1980, the first M1 Abrams rolled out of LATP. After a contract the plant began producing the Abrams at a rate of 30 a month.
> 
> Chrysler subsequently sold the Defense subsidiary to General Dynamics in 1982.[3] In January 1985, the last M1 rolled off the assembly line, and in October, production began on the improved M1 (IPM1). The plant later manufactured the M1A1, with the first pilot vehicle built in August 1985. The M1A1 was produced at a rate of 120 a month.[4]
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Lima Army Tank Plant - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org



120 M1A1 a month is 3 US Tank Battalions a month.


----------



## dapaterson

Kirkhill said:


> Fair comment.
> 
> If I could edit my remark I would.
> 
> Having said that there are a lot of people drawing salaries that are related to National Defence and that don't show up directly in the National Defence budget while a lot of those civilians employed by DND are not seen to be directly contributing to the frontline effort.
> 
> FJAG wants to supply more Reserve Troops at the expense of the Regular Troops.  I'm wondering if there is opportunity for savings in the civilian sector of DND.



Sgt (non-spec, basic IPC) = $73K.
PS equivalent = CR4.  Max pay = $55K


----------



## suffolkowner

Brad Sallows said:


> Median and average are not the same thing.


which is which? is the Canadian number the median? Is the American?

Or by average do you mean the mean or mode instead of median?


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> Does everyone collecting a government pay check need to be presented as an extraneous pig at the trough? We can’t spend our budget on major equipment & war essential consumables for lack of people, but we should manage the budget by cutting the too few who we have?


No one is suggesting, well I'm not, that everyone is at the trough. What I am suggesting is that we have far too many people administering the forces than actually being the forces. Every military needs to tails; one being the immediate logistics tail and the other the overarching administrative one. IMHO the administrative one has completely outgrown its usefulness. There are far too many leaders with far too much staff. IMHO they need a significant culling as well.



GR66 said:


> I'm not going to disagree with your argument that the Army has its Reg/Reserve balance wrong. I do however question the fact that you're really just changing the manning of the same basic force structures from full-time to part-time...using the Reg Force PY savings to create Res Force Brigades (admittedly with the key enablers that we're currently missing put back).


Effectively, in peacetime, all armies are "in reserve". The issue should be how many people do you need in full-time positions to develop doctrine, achieve leadership proficiency, manage the organization and its gear and react rapidly in an emergency and how many people can you safely put into part-time positions to round out the force when needed and time is available. Canada has skewed that ratio beyond all logic.



GR66 said:


> We're currently seeing Russia in a full-scale shooting war with a NATO partner nation. A nation that until just before the initiation of hostilities was hosting our military trainers. Even this extreme situation hasn't led the Canadian government to deploy any significant new troops and equipment to Europe. Hasn't led to some dramatic increase in Reserve activity. No scramble to urgently acquire vital military equipment. No serious talk about re-activating a Canadian Brigade Group in Europe. No loading of LAVs and tanks onto Ro-Ro's so they're ready to deploy if needed.


Can't argue with that. Democracies being what they are we'll always be burdened by those who consider re-election more important than national survival. That said, many of the decisions that I criticize are not made by elected officials but the mandarins, civilian and military, who are the stewards of the CAF. Frankly with the state the CAF is in we don't even have the equipment and capabilities to send any weapons or deploy a brigade in Europe.



GR66 said:


> You might write this off as just another example of the talk-much, do-nothing leadership of an anti-military government. However, do you see any of those actions taking place in the UK? In France? Germany? Sure, the Germans are increasing their defence spending, but are they pushing Brigades forward?


They actually are and will be. There's much movement to expand enhanced forward presence southeast and moving closer to borders. The UK has just refocused its defence view towards the Pacific and is in need of a quick rethink. The US has certainly sent large elements forward and my guess is that the Poles are adding to their already forward thinking deployments



GR66 said:


> That's what's making me wonder if your model of using the savings to just create more of the same old Brigade Groups is the right path?


I try to be weapon neutral in my thinking except in the way of obvious forces. As an example, I've thought for a while that our brigades need a more robust cavalry force which can do more than simply gather information; I think entity structures based on threes (platoons, companies, battalions) just make sense; I think both direct and indirect fire support is critical and that anyone who builds an army around riflemen without adequate ATGMs, mortars, tanks, artillery, air defence and a sustainable logistics system is a simpleton. Basically the combined arms brigade group structure is sound whether its in the light, medium or heavy category. It's not rocket science. Some day we'll have weapon systems that will have us go in a different direction but for the time being that's it.

The issue for us is to have a doctrine and equip the force in full. The flexibility comes from the RegF/ResF mix. You might need two full rifle companies in a battalion and no artillery for day to day needs but you'd better have trained reservists to fill out that third company and the artillery regiment when the time comes. It's too late when you see the Russians doing a three month exercise at the Latvian border.



Kirkhill said:


> FJAG wants to supply more Reserve Troops at the expense of the Regular Troops. I'm wondering if there is opportunity for savings in the civilian sector of DND.


I quite frankly do not want to see any full-timer from the field force Army go at all. My example does two things - one expand the capabilities with existing numbers and the second, more radical, shows how a reduction of full-time field force could leave the same capabilities if properly trained and organized reservists were available and provide sufficient funding to buy the essential material needed. Particularly in a country that seems to profess an aversion for a standing army.

I do not want to target civilians. We need many of their skills as much as service members. IMHO we have far too many military and civilians in full-time salaried positions that do not advance the effort to deliver defence capabilities. We need to cull the full-time salaried by better, smarter more agile management practices. No one wants that though.

It reminds me of Leslie's attempt back in 2010/11. The first thing that happened right out the gate is that the DND HQ side of the house refused to take part. After that everyone fought for their turf. The only way to address that is with a top down directed, time limited arbitrary culling of the herd leaving it to sort itself out afterward.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Sgt (non-spec, basic IPC) = $73K.
> PS equivalent = CR4.  Max pay = $55K



Thanks DAP.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Ignorant civilian question:

How impractical is it to look at the CMBG's as purely force generation/ administrative commands, with largely self contained battalions and any actual Bde level deployment being "hand picked" to develop the force needed for a given mission?


----------



## AmmoTech90

dapaterson said:


> Sgt (non-spec, basic IPC) = $73K.
> PS equivalent = CR4.  Max pay = $55K


Hahaha.
Sgt=Chief Clerk at small unit.
Very small unit OR that is run by civilians (DRDC, RMC spring to mind) are run by an AS1 or AS2 with AS1, CR3 and 4s working for them, so the civil service equivalent would be 61 to 65k per year.  You get pretty good value for that extra 8k from the Sgt.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> No one is suggesting, well I'm not, that everyone is at the trough. What I am suggesting is that we have far too many people administering the forces than actually being the forces. Every military needs to tails; one being the immediate logistics tail and the other the overarching administrative one. IMHO the administrative one has completely outgrown its usefulness. There are far too many leaders with far too much staff. IMHO they need a significant culling as well.



Tend to  agree.



FJAG said:


> Effectively, in peacetime, all armies are "in reserve". The issue should be how many people do you need in full-time positions to develop doctrine, achieve leadership proficiency, manage the organization and its gear and react rapidly in an emergency and how many people can you safely put into part-time positions to round out the force when needed and time is available. Canada has skewed that ratio beyond all logic.



Key element missing there I think.  What portion of the standing force should be put onto foreign battlefields to maintain currency with modern operations?  Related is how much should be spent on innovative structures, doing things differently.



FJAG said:


> Can't argue with that. Democracies being what they are we'll always be burdened by those who consider re-election more important than national survival. That said, many of the decisions that I criticize are not made by elected officials but the mandarins, civilian and military, who are the stewards of the CAF. Frankly with the state the CAF is in we don't even have the equipment and capabilities to send any weapons or deploy a brigade in Europe.






FJAG said:


> They actually are and will be. There's much movement to expand enhanced forward presence southeast and moving closer to borders. The UK has just refocused its defence view towards the Pacific and is in need of a quick rethink. The US has certainly sent large elements forward and my guess is that the Poles are adding to their already forward thinking deployments



The UK has refocused the RN and marines on the Indo-Pacific although it has neglected its North Sea and Baltic commitments basing a Littoral Response Group and a Carrier in the area.   It has also deployed 3 UK Div forwards to Estonia and other troops to the Poland-Belarus border.

They could do more.  But compared to what we are doing they are doing not badly.



FJAG said:


> I try to be weapon neutral in my thinking except in the way of obvious forces. As an example, I've thought for a while that our brigades need a more robust cavalry force which can do more than simply gather information; I think entity structures based on threes (platoons, companies, battalions) just make sense; I think both direct and indirect fire support is critical and that anyone who builds an army around riflemen without adequate ATGMs, mortars, tanks, artillery, air defence and a sustainable logistics system is a simpleton. Basically the combined arms brigade group structure is sound whether its in the light, medium or heavy category. It's not rocket science. Some day we'll have weapon systems that will have us go in a different direction but for the time being that's it.
> 
> The issue for us is to have a doctrine and equip the force in full. The flexibility comes from the RegF/ResF mix. You might need two full rifle companies in a battalion and no artillery for day to day needs but you'd better have trained reservists to fill out that third company and the artillery regiment when the time comes. It's too late when you see the Russians doing a three month exercise at the Latvian border.



It would all help if our organizations were not only weapons neutral but also free of regimental and unit idiosyncrasies.  I really liked the Italian model in that regard.

1x Regimental Commander
1x Cmd and Log Sub Unit with Sigs, Maint, Tpt and QM
1x Unit Commander
1x Support Coy with 4x 120mm mortar, 4x ATGM systems, 12x Recce Vehs

To this point all units, Lt-Med-Hvy Infantry and Tank are identical  

For the Infantry 
3x Rifle Coys with 1x Support Pl with 3x 81mm mortar and 2x ATGM systems and 3x Rifle Pl with 3x Rifle Section.

For the tanks
4x Tank Coys with 14 tanks

Even the cavalry follows the same plot except for replacing the Support Coy with a Heavy Armoured Car subunit..

That means that a Lt Infantry unit can be move up the Lt-Med-Hvy spectrum fairly easily.  And once you have graduated to the Heavy Infantry what is the delta to convert to Cavalry or Tanks?



FJAG said:


> I quite frankly do not want to see any full-timer from the field force Army go at all. My example does two things - one expand the capabilities with existing numbers and the second, more radical, shows how a reduction of full-time field force could leave the same capabilities if properly trained and organized reservists were available and provide sufficient funding to buy the essential material needed. Particularly in a country that seems to profess an aversion for a standing army.
> 
> I do not want to target civilians. We need many of their skills as much as service members. IMHO we have far too many military and civilians in full-time salaried positions that do not advance the effort to deliver defence capabilities. We need to cull the full-time salaried by better, smarter more agile management practices. No one wants that though.
> 
> It reminds me of Leslie's attempt back in 2010/11. The first thing that happened right out the gate is that the DND HQ side of the house refused to take part. After that everyone fought for their turf. The only way to address that is with a top down directed, time limited arbitrary culling of the herd leaving it to sort itself out afterward.
> 
> 🍻



Fair enough.  What can't be done won't be done.


----------



## McG

AmmoTech90 said:


> Hahaha.
> Sgt=Chief Clerk at small unit.
> Very small unit OR that is run by civilians (DRDC, RMC spring to mind) are run by an AS1 or AS2 with AS1, CR3 and 4s working for them, so the civil service equivalent would be 61 to 65k per year.  You get pretty good value for that extra 8k from the Sgt.


RMC is a small unit? I would expect their CClk to be a WO.


----------



## AmmoTech90

McG said:


> RMC is a small unit? I would expect their CClk to be a WO.


Sorry, meant to say- AMS in RMC (clerk there is an AS1 or 2) and sections in DRDC (clerks there are AS1 or 2).  Both look after between 30 and 50 people.


----------



## Underway

dapaterson said:


> Sgt (non-spec, basic IPC) = $73K.
> PS equivalent = CR4.  Max pay = $55K


ENG 4 are paid more than LCdr's so six figures.  Retire as a LCdr, join public service, less responsibility and more pay.  Kids be an engineer!


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Tend to  agree.
> 
> 
> 
> Key element missing there I think.  What portion of the standing force should be put onto foreign battlefields to maintain currency with modern operations?  Related is how much should be spent on innovative structures, doing things differently.


You can’t make a blanket statement about force numbers for foreign operations.  That comes with the specific theatre and what is needed versus what can be sent. 



Kirkhill said:


> The UK has refocused the RN and marines on the Indo-Pacific although it has neglected its North Sea and Baltic commitments basing a Littoral Response Group and a Carrier in the area.   It has also deployed 3 UK Div forwards to Estonia and other troops to the Poland-Belarus border.
> 
> They could do more.  But compared to what we are doing they are doing not badly.
> 
> 
> 
> It would all help if our organizations were not only weapons neutral but also free of regimental and unit idiosyncrasies.  I really liked the Italian model in that regard.


I think the Italians aren’t anything to be emulated.  


Kirkhill said:


> 1x Regimental Commander
> 1x Cmd and Log Sub Unit with Sigs, Maint, Tpt and QM
> 1x Unit Commander
> 1x Support Coy with 4x 120mm mortar, 4x ATGM systems, 12x Recce Vehs
> 
> To this point all units, Lt-Med-Hvy Infantry and Tank are identical
> 
> For the Infantry
> 3x Rifle Coys with 1x Support Pl with 3x 81mm mortar and 2x ATGM systems and 3x Rifle Pl with 3x Rifle Section.


You don’t want a medium Mortar in a Light Infantry Coy, they belong in Combat Supprt in a dedicated Mortar Platoon or Platoons. 
  I don’t see the point to 81’s in Mech Inf as you can put a 120mm in a LAV or IFV and get a significantly more capable system.  


Kirkhill said:


> For the tanks
> 4x Tank Coys with 14 tanks
> 
> Even the cavalry follows the same plot except for replacing the Support Coy with a Heavy Armoured Car subunit..
> 
> That means that a Lt Infantry unit can be move up the Lt-Med-Hvy spectrum fairly easily.  And once you have graduated to the Heavy Infantry what is the delta to convert to Cavalry or Tanks?


Terrible idea. IMHO. 
   Frankly I’m of the mind the LI should be a different MOS/MOSID/MOC whatever than Mech Inf. 
   There are inherently different skill sets for both - the same way I don’t think that Armor should be the same as Cavalry / frankly LAV Inf units are more Calvary than the Armor units.  

Sure you can stick LI in the back as GIB’s as needed, but you need crew that are dedicated to vehicles for Mech Inf (be it heavy or med) as proper vehicle emolument isn’t something you just pick up.  
  The same way a Medium Force needs to fight differently than a Heavy or a Light. - trying to have a generic force just results in something that does nothing well.  


Kirkhill said:


> Fair enough.  What can't be done won't be done.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Or by average do you mean the mean or mode instead of median?



Average and mean are the same thing.  Mode is just a count of a measurement value (most frequently occurring one).

The distinction is important because clusters of measures away from the median can significantly alter the mean without changing the median.  For example, "average/mean" income is often skewed (upward) by the effect of a small number of extremely high incomes.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Underway said:


> ENG 4 are paid more than LCdr's so six figures.  Retire as a LCdr, join public service, less responsibility and more pay.  Kids be an engineer!


I was an EG-6 when I retired, making $88,000, this is the current levels, sigh I should have not retired early.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> You can’t make a blanket statement about force numbers for foreign operations.  That comes with the specific theatre and what is needed versus what can be sent.



I strenuously disagree.  Your statement might be correct for the US Forces but it is certainly not correct for the Canadian Forces.  

Canada's efforts are not going to single-handedly sway any war.  It will be a contribution to someone else's effort.  With that Canada will contribute whatever the Government of the Day sees fit.  That may be 5 Divisions of Infantry with all the trimmings or it may be a platoon of Special Forces. Or maybe it is a frigate standing offshore.

The call is entirely discretionary.

Just as it is for the US when it decides if it is going to fund 10 divisions or 12 and then decides if it is going to use them and where and when they are going to be used.  

The war will be fought with the people and equipment available.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I strenuously disagree.  Your statement might be correct for the US Forces but it is certainly not correct for the Canadian Forces.


I’m missing your point. 
    If the Cdn Gov says the CAF will send 2 Bde then the CAF does. No difference. 

Now the CAF should have been given guidance (I’d say they have with SSE) as to force structures etc.   But that is irrelevant to actual wars - where the Cdn Gov may deploy a lot more than was expected. 



Kirkhill said:


> The war will be fought with the people and equipment available.


Agreed. You do to war with the Military you have, not the military you want. 

Which I why I’ve argued the CAF needs a Brigade all three force constructs Light, Medium and Heavy in order to be able to deliver the most capable and practical for to a theatre.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I’m missing your point.
> If the Cdn Gov says the CAF will send 2 Bde then the CAF does. No difference.



We are talking past each other.  I thought you were suggesting that the situation would define the level of commitment.  I was suggesting that regardless of the situation the Cdn Gov will decide the commitment.

I now believe you to be saying: the Cdn Gov and the CAF will review the situation, make an estimate and despatch a suitable commitment that conforms to the requirement of the theatre.  

I still think you are wrong.  

A more correct statement is: the Cdn Gov will despatch a commitment if it sees political benefit.  



KevinB said:


> Now the CAF should have been given guidance (I’d say they have with SSE) as to force structures etc.   But that is irrelevant to actual wars - where the Cdn Gov may deploy a lot more than was expected.



You expect more from my government than I do.



KevinB said:


> Agreed. You do to war with the Military you have, not the military you want.



100% agreement.



KevinB said:


> Which I why I’ve argued the CAF needs a Brigade all three force constructs Light, Medium and Heavy in order to be able to deliver the most capable and practical for to a theatre.



No disagreement there.  Not necessarily my prescription but a workable one.


----------



## FJAG

IKnowNothing said:


> Ignorant civilian question:
> 
> How impractical is it to look at the CMBG's as purely force generation/ administrative commands, with largely self contained battalions and any actual Bde level deployment being "hand picked" to develop the force needed for a given mission?


Not that ignorant a question at all. If you take a look at our last defence paper _Strong, Secure, Engaged_ you'll see that for the Army, its potential missions are set in the nature of sustained and other deployments in numbers up to 1,500. Effectively that's a battlegroup with attachments and a a national command and support element. That being the case, brigades are basically force generators already.

During Afghanistan we deployed forces of up to around 2,500 which included a battlegroup, a provincial reconstruction team and an command and support element. While brigade headquarters did form the Task Force headquarters, these were far short of a brigade deployment other than a large number of the people came from the brigade augmented by others including a fair number of reservists.

The issue though isn't whether they are already force generators, but are they capable of being force employers - in other words being able to form a brigade headquarters, deploy it into combat with various battalions, regiments under command. While SSE doesn't demand that, the brigades do train for that and are equipped and manned for that.


Kirkhill said:


> It would all help if our organizations were not only weapons neutral but also free of regimental and unit idiosyncrasies. I really liked the Italian model in that regard.
> 
> 1x Regimental Commander
> 1x Cmd and Log Sub Unit with Sigs, Maint, Tpt and QM
> 1x Unit Commander
> 1x Support Coy with 4x 120mm mortar, 4x ATGM systems, 12x Recce Vehs
> 
> To this point all units, Lt-Med-Hvy Infantry and Tank are identical


See my previous comments about the superfluous colonel. Basically all out battalion sized organizations already conform to that. There's a battalion headquarters with all the C2 elements and a CSS company with all the maint and logistics requirement for that specific force. (a heavy armoured battalion, even in Italy, will have a significantly different log sub unit from a light inf battalion. See for example the differing structures for the sic forward support companies that exist within the Brigade Support Battalion in the US Army. 

After that every bn/regt is tailored for its mission. 

This is the standard system used by most western armies with minor variations.



KevinB said:


> Now the CAF should have been given guidance (I’d say they have with SSE) as to force structures etc. But that is irrelevant to actual wars - where the Cdn Gov may deploy a lot more than was expected.


I agree with you in all respects but believe that SSE is very poor guidance.  There used to be a time when our guidance was more realistic by requiring the ability to commit a brigade on, I believe either 90 days or 180 days notice but that was before the turn of the century when the Army was hollowed out and doing back to back tours in Bosnia during the decade of darkness.

The previous White Paper - Canada First Defence Strategy wasn't much better being issued during the Afghanistan engagement and basically living under that construct. All it said was "Maintain combat-capable units at the right level of readiness". In that respect SSE was more instructive but IMHO it set a low bar. Again, IMHO, being involved in a long term conflict like Afghanistan we've learned a bad lesson that concerns itself too much to long term force sustainability and gives too little consideration for having the ability to surge a large force for a limited time like a year or two. Six month rotos as a standard are a killer and mitigate at large force deployments. Our WW2 vets who spent four or five years in Europe are snickering at us. And don't even get me started on HTLA during a combat operation.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> The previous White Paper - Canada First Defence Strategy wasn't much better being issued during the Afghanistan engagement and basically living under that construct. All it said was "Maintain combat-capable units at the right level of readiness". In that respect SSE was more instructive but IMHO it set a low bar. Again, IMHO, being involved in a long term conflict like Afghanistan we've learned a bad lesson that concerns itself too much to long term force sustainability and gives too little consideration for having the ability to surge a large force for a limited time like a year or two. Six month rotos as a standard are a killer and mitigate at large force deployments. Our WW2 vets who spent four or five years in Europe are snickering at us. And don't even get me started on HTLA during a combat operation.
> 
> 🍻



Not just deployments, postings too, the fast moving of our personal ends up creating a force almost constantly in flux from people posting in and out each year. Deployments should be extended, minimum 9 months to a max determined by the mission, within reason. Postings should be limited in my opinion to two scenarios contract resigning, and operational requirement. Make contracts longer, say 6 to 8 years minimum, and your posting is your posting for that entire time. This creates more stability for those with families, and for the member, it will also save money on moves.


----------



## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> Not just deployments, postings too, the fast moving of our personal ends up creating a force almost constantly in flux from people posting in and out each year. Deployments should be extended, minimum 9 months to a max determined by the mission, within reason. Postings should be limited in my opinion to two scenarios contract resigning, and operational requirement. Make contracts longer, say 6 to 8 years minimum, and your posting is your posting for that entire time. This creates more stability for those with families, and for the member, it will also save money on moves.


Agreed. I've never understood the posting turbulence at lower ranks and junior officers. Practically speaking a junior officer should be able to stay in one location until ready for appointment as a company commander. Non-commissioned ranks to CSM appointment. And even there, some could remain in their home unit.

I think the problem is that there are far too many staff positions that need to be filled across the force by Sgt and Captains and up. That usually forces moves when more regimental employment would be better for the individual and the corps. That's a guess.

🍻


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## MilEME09

FJAG said:


> Agreed. I've never understood the posting turbulence at lower ranks and junior officers. Practically speaking a junior officer should be able to stay in one location until ready for appointment as a company commander. Non-commissioned ranks to CSM appointment. And even there, some could remain in their home unit.
> 
> I think the problem is that there are far too many staff positions that need to be filled across the force by Sgt and Captains and up. That usually forces moves when more regimental employment would be better for the individual and the corps. That's a guess.
> 
> 🍻


As an example my friend is a Staff Sgt in the USMC, he has been in about 13 years, and only had two postings, first 8 years with 3 MEF in Okinawa, he resigned his contract and was posted to Ft Sill to teach. That kind of stability would go a long way in the CAF, and might actually force the CAF to improve quality of life in some remote postings.


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## FJAG

MilEME09 said:


> As an example my friend is a Staff Sgt in the USMC, he has been in about 13 years, and only had two postings, first 8 years with 3 MEF in Okinawa, he resigned his contract and was posted to Ft Sill to teach. That kind of stability would go a long way in the CAF, and might actually force the CAF to improve quality of life in some remote postings.


I've been pondering an issue regarding my idea of creating 30/70 battalions which are centred on res units in urban areas. Where do you put the Reg F staffed bn HQ and the one RegF company?

My two thoughts were:

1. acquire some condos in the city (or build them on federal land) and rent them out at reasonable prices as PMQs; and 

2. create a term contract for people who come from the city and have family and housing available and make the contract so that they will not be posted away from the city during the duration of the contract. In time your reservists and regular force folks would all be residents of the city. Great opportunity for spouses to find long term employment in the city , too. 

There are other ways of doing business than our current HR business model.

🍻


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## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> The issue though isn't whether they are already force generators, but are they capable of being force employers - in other words being able to form a brigade headquarters, deploy it into combat with various battalions, regiments under command. While SSE doesn't demand that, the brigades do train for that and are equipped and manned for that.


Sorry, I phrased that a little obliquely.   What I was trying to get at was completely abandoning the idea of CMBG's as force employers (and indeed as functional HQ's) Leave the Divisions as the geographically based command domestic command org in peacetime, and stand up two new HQ's- 1st Canadian Expeditionary Brigade (Mechanized), 2nd Canadian Expeditionary Brigade (Light).   Defeatist approach to get around symmetry, and  equipment/ manpower budgetary constraints.

Assuming there's some budget for weapon system /turret changes:
Drop to one LAV battalion per Regiment (free up ~150 LAV's)

~40 to M-SHORAD (12 x 3 + 4 Spares)
~30 to NEMO ( 4 x 6 + 6 Spares)
~60 to RT60 ATGM  (2x9+ 4x3 + 4x6 + 6 spares)
~15 to LAV UAV ( 2x6)

Use your reserve reform to stretch the Armoured Regiments into two hybrid battalions of 3 squadrons. 1st battalion is heavy with a 14 tank squadron and two 19 LAV Recce squadrons (mix of LRSS, UAV, and RT 60) + a mortar platoon. 2nd Battalion is light cavalry in TAPV's (ideally some of the flat tops with UAV, some of the RWS's upgraded to RS60 with Javelin).

LAV battalion augmented with a mortar platoon, AT platoon, and two ATGM turrets (with 30mm) per company.

Lean on the reserves to stand up the SHORAD batteries and the support required to mobilize two brigades at the same time

War time mobilization  
1 CEB forms around the Armoured Battalion, LAV Battalion, and combat support elements one of the former CMBG's, selects (based on mission and readiness between the remaining 2x Armoured and 2X Lav battalions to round out.
2 CEB does the same with the Light CAV, 2x LIB's, and combat support elements of another, rounds out with either one of the 2 remaining light cav's or LIB's based on mission requirements.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I try to be weapon neutral in my thinking except in the way of obvious forces. As an example, I've thought for a while that our brigades need a more robust cavalry force which can do more than simply gather information; I think entity structures based on threes (platoons, companies, battalions) just make sense; I think both direct and indirect fire support is critical and that anyone who builds an army around riflemen without adequate ATGMs, mortars, tanks, artillery, air defence and a sustainable logistics system is a simpleton. Basically the combined arms brigade group structure is sound whether its in the light, medium or heavy category. It's not rocket science. Some day we'll have weapon systems that will have us go in a different direction but for the time being that's it.
> 
> The issue for us is to have a doctrine and equip the force in full. The flexibility comes from the RegF/ResF mix. You might need two full rifle companies in a battalion and no artillery for day to day needs but you'd better have trained reservists to fill out that third company and the artillery regiment when the time comes. It's too late when you see the Russians doing a three month exercise at the Latvian border.


I'm not questioning the structure of the Brigade (or the need for Brigades), I'm questioning if the traditional Brigade is a suitable/effective Canadian response to an enemy attack on an ally. 

Unless we pre-position a Brigade in Europe (and there is zero indication that there is any political will to do so) then we're likely talking months to get a Brigade prepped, shipped to Europe and ready to fight as a formation (I believe you referenced a past commitment for Canada to provide Brigades in either 90 or 180 days...which you seemed to indicate was at a time when our Army was more prepared than we are currently).  

We're now 50 days into the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  At best we'd expect to be able to have one of our Brigades enter the conflict in another 40 days?  What if the initial Russian assault hadn't been so incompetent?  Would we even have that extra 40 days?  I guess we could penny-packet individual Battalions/Battle Groups in more quickly, or rush over a Light Brigade by air which could possibly be in action more quickly (do we even have the airlift capacity for that?) but do we really want to put relatively immobile light troops up against a mechanized attack?

So, what I guess I'm wondering is that in the absence of forward deployment of a Brigade to Europe if then all the Infantry Brigades (Armoured, Medium or Light) should be Reserve formations rather than Reg Force formations.  If Brigade mobilization is only going to happen in the most extreme circumstances (we haven't deployed a Brigade since Korea) and it will take months to deploy them anyway...too late to be any sort of immediate response to an enemy invasion...then just make them all Reserve mobilization formations.  Make the Reg Force units something else then that CAN be rapidly deployed in case of a conflict.

There are some fairly obvious non-Army forces that could be of immediate use (and quickly deployable) in case of conflict.  Fighters, Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refueling aircraft, ISR aircraft, warships, subs, etc.  For immediately useful Army assets I'd think you'd want to focus on units that can be deployed by air (ideally small enough to deploy by C-130) and have the ability to try and blunt the enemy force's initial attack, giving time for local allies to deploy their forces in response.  I'm thinking things like light SHORAD vehicles to counter enemy aircraft over the front, MRAD and C-RAM systems to protect vital points (logistics centers, mustering locations, transport infrastructure, etc.) from enemy air and missile attacks, EW/ISR/JTAC assets to provide targeting info for allied strike assets, long range precision strike assets (HIMARS?) to hit key enemy targets, etc.

All this just to say that if Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) is to really achieve a meaningful transformation of the Canadian Army I think it needs to do more than just move the existing chess pieces around the board to a different Brigade-based configuration and look at other ways that the Canadian Army can make a meaningful contribution in a future conflict.


----------



## FJAG

IKnowNothing said:


> Sorry, I phrased that a little obliquely.   What I was trying to get at was completely abandoning the idea of CMBG's as force employers (and indeed as functional HQ's) Leave the Divisions as the geographically based command domestic command org in peacetime, and stand up two new HQ's- 1st Canadian Expeditionary Brigade (Mechanized), 2nd Canadian Expeditionary Brigade (Light).   Defeatist approach to get around symmetry, and  equipment/ manpower budgetary constraints.


Sorry, but you won't get me on board for that. IMHO every headquarters between the Army HQ and the individual soldier that is incapable of deploying is a waste of human resources. Yes, we do need a training system and yeas there needs to be a logistics support system but for me that's it. We do not need more administrative elements.

Based on the number of people (both RegF and ResF) that the government authorizes the Army to have we should have enough for two deployable divisions. We have the equipment for one which means we could conceivably deploy one and have one unequipped one in reserve. Realistically we should be able to deploy a two brigade force in the event of a major emergency. To me that means we need deployable brigade headquarters and the ability to field one divisional HQ. 

I tend to be more aggressive in what we should be able to do than others because I think we owe it to the people of Canada who pay all these salaries day-by-day.



IKnowNothing said:


> Assuming there's some budget for weapon system /turret changes:
> Drop to one LAV battalion per Regiment (free up ~150 LAV's)
> 
> ~40 to M-SHORAD (12 x 3 + 4 Spares)
> ~30 to NEMO ( 4 x 6 + 6 Spares)
> ~60 to RT60 ATGM  (2x9+ 4x3 + 4x6 + 6 spares)
> ~15 to LAV UAV ( 2x6)


I'm certainly agreeable to weapon systems like this. I'm not sure we need to sacrifice the LAVs for all of them. It strikes me if you can put an Avenger AD system on a HMVWW then you can put a SHORAD turret on a TAPV and have left over room for reloads. Probably the same with an ATGM turret whatever UCAV systems you might want. Maybe even a mortar system but I'd be more prepared to rebuild whatever Bisons we still have for that. I'm a great believer in making use of what one already has.



IKnowNothing said:


> Use your reserve reform to stretch the Armoured Regiments into two hybrid battalions of 3 squadrons. 1st battalion is heavy with a 14 tank squadron and two 19 LAV Recce squadrons (mix of LRSS, UAV, and RT 60) + a mortar platoon. 2nd Battalion is light cavalry in TAPV's (ideally some of the flat tops with UAV, some of the RWS's upgraded to RS60 with Javelin).


I'm a believer in 14 tank squadrons. I know others insist that the 19 tank squadron is the only way to go but there are enough professional armies using 14 that it's obviously a viable concept and will stretch the resources. That should give us the ability to form 5-6 squadrons (depending on how many you want to set aside for pure training). I prefer organizing those into combined arms battalions. IMHO recce can get by with TAPVs with ATGMs and lots of UAVs and UCAVs supported by long range artillery guns and rockets.



IKnowNothing said:


> LAV battalion augmented with a mortar platoon, AT platoon, and two ATGM turrets (with 30mm) per company.


I'll leave it to current grunts to define the rifle company for me. Mortars definitely and while I used to be a great believer in ATGM platoons, Ukraine is helping to persuade me towards ATGMs everywhere. My thinking right now is something NLAWie in the rifle platoons and something more long range in the cavalry regiment and infantry bn ATGM platoon.



IKnowNothing said:


> Lean on the reserves to stand up the SHORAD batteries and the support required to mobilize two brigades at the same time


Yes, but SHORAD needs a a hybrid structure because some of the systems and processes require some full-timers to operate and maintain.



IKnowNothing said:


> War time mobilization
> 1 CEB forms around the Armoured Battalion, LAV Battalion, and combat support elements one of the former CMBG's, selects (based on mission and readiness between the remaining 2x Armoured and 2X Lav battalions to round out.
> 2 CEB does the same with the Light CAV, 2x LIB's, and combat support elements of another, rounds out with either one of the 2 remaining light cav's or LIB's based on mission requirements.


Not a fan. You've seen my current thoughts already upthread.

The idea is to restructure existing people and equipment into the ability to deploy up to three asymmetric brigades with two brigades of people to round out or reinforce the organization and to build the potential, with extra equipment, to deploy two additional manoeuvre brigades and a solid CS/CSS support structure. I'm not saying that we need to be able to deploy them all at once but I think we need the ability to do so if we have to in an emergency while enhancing our ability to deploy small battlegroups during peacetime.. I'm solidly against any plan that would reduce that capability. 

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> rush over a Light Brigade by air which could possibly be in action more quickly (do we even have the airlift capacity for that?) but do we really want to put relatively immobile light troops up against a mechanized attack?



I don't know.  These immobile light troops have been doing not bad for the last 8 years.  And they seem to be repelling 7 or 8 assaults daily - and killing troops, tanks, IFVs, guns, MRLSs and UASs - even the occasional helicopter and fighter.



Just add MGs, Mortars, Javelins, NLAWs, Stingers and UAS's.  And a good radio connection to Arty and a mobile QRF.


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## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I'm not questioning the structure of the Brigade (or the need for Brigades), I'm questioning if the traditional Brigade is a suitable/effective Canadian response to an enemy attack on an ally.
> 
> Unless we pre-position a Brigade in Europe (and there is zero indication that there is any political will to do so) then we're likely talking months to get a Brigade prepped, shipped to Europe and ready to fight as a formation (I believe you referenced a past commitment for Canada to provide Brigades in either 90 or 180 days...which you seemed to indicate was at a time when our Army was more prepared than we are currently).


After what happened in Ukraine I think there will be a point in time when Canada's government, even this thick one, will understand it will need to contribute more that a half of a battlegroup. A flyover brigade is the most economical and sensible. Even if we do not have one now, the Army should be developing that capability so that when asked it won't stand there with its d!ck hanging out saying "we can't do that".

The point is that an armoured brigade in country, exercised regularly, makes a tremendously more impressive political symbol of commitment than some airy-fairy promise of aircraft and ships which sit somewhere far away and out of view. I'm not questioning their usefulness, just their political impact. On top of that such a brigade makes a credible deterrent to the Orcs on the other side of the border.

With the right kind of planning (including an on-demand contract for civilian airliners) one could deploy a fly-over force in days not weeks or months. 


GR66 said:


> We're now 50 days into the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  At best we'd expect to be able to have one of our Brigades enter the conflict in another 40 days?  What if the initial Russian assault hadn't been so incompetent?  Would we even have that extra 40 days?  I guess we could penny-packet individual Battalions/Battle Groups in more quickly, or rush over a Light Brigade by air which could possibly be in action more quickly (do we even have the airlift capacity for that?) but do we really want to put relatively immobile light troops up against a mechanized attack?


I don't think that committing a light brigade would be as useful as a heavy one, would probably still take too much time if its heavier equipment and ammunition wasn't prepositioned as well and would have a limited political impact or deterrence factor.


GR66 said:


> So, what I guess I'm wondering is that in the absence of forward deployment of a Brigade to Europe if then all the Infantry Brigades (Armoured, Medium or Light) should be Reserve formations rather than Reg Force formations.  If Brigade mobilization is only going to happen in the most extreme circumstances (we haven't deployed a Brigade since Korea) and it will take months to deploy them anyway...too late to be any sort of immediate response to an enemy invasion...then just make them all Reserve mobilization formations.  Make the Reg Force units something else then that CAN be rapidly deployed in case of a conflict.


I'm not against quick reaction light forces. We need them and to be "quick" they need to be full-time forces in being. But mostly for non NATO missions. I see very little value in light reserve forces under Canada's reality other than as a cheap manpower pool that can, with time, be trained for other roles. I think in what do we need day-to day or what is so complex that it needs to be trained day-to-day as the full-timers and reservists as those folks which you only need to call on when things go to hell. When things go to hell you need equipped reservists to call on.



GR66 said:


> There are some fairly obvious non-Army forces that could be of immediate use (and quickly deployable) in case of conflict.  Fighters, Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refueling aircraft, ISR aircraft, warships, subs, etc.  For immediately useful Army assets I'd think you'd want to focus on units that can be deployed by air (ideally small enough to deploy by C-130) and have the ability to try and blunt the enemy force's initial attack, giving time for local allies to deploy their forces in response.  I'm thinking things like light SHORAD vehicles to counter enemy aircraft over the front, MRAD and C-RAM systems to protect vital points (logistics centers, mustering locations, transport infrastructure, etc.) from enemy air and missile attacks, EW/ISR/JTAC assets to provide targeting info for allied strike assets, long range precision strike assets (HIMARS?) to hit key enemy targets, etc.


No criticism there other than visible political impact and the fact that local forces will have been long deployed before we get there. Again, these are assets that should be predeployed and manned by a cadre heavily augmented by flyover troops.


GR66 said:


> All this just to say that if Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) is to really achieve a meaningful transformation of the Canadian Army I think it needs to do more than just move the existing chess pieces around the board to a different Brigade-based configuration and look at other ways that the Canadian Army can make a meaningful contribution in a future conflict.


I do agree in part but force structure should be somewhat disconnected from force use. If one concentrates too much on specific missions and roles one can end up with an unbalanced force. This is what I consider the primary problem with the Hillieresque Advancing with Purpose. It predetermined that Canada would be the sorter out of failed states. It was rebuilding itself for Bosnia type situations and threw everything else under the bus. Then came Afghanistan and the force structure morphed even more to light infantry. This is why today we have an Army largely incapable of being deployed into Europe unless first heavily rearmed. There are concepts (like UCAVs) that are mainstream in third world countries that we do not have. In short, in times of uncertainty, you need a balanced force capable of reacting immediately in any direction (and by that I do not mean solely light quick reaction forces) with trained people and equipment and materiel at hand plus the ability to sustain that force.

Balanced force properly manned by full-time and part-time members in the right roles and properly equipped is the hill I'll die on.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> I don't know.  These immobile light troops have been doing not bad for the last 8 years.  And they seem to be repelling 7 or 8 assaults daily - and killing troops, tanks, IFVs, guns, MRLSs and UASs - even the occasional helicopter and fighter.
> 
> View attachment 70132View attachment 70133View attachment 70134View attachment 70135View attachment 70136View attachment 70138View attachment 70137View attachment 70139
> 
> Just add MGs, Mortars, Javelins, NLAWs, Stingers and UAS's.  And a good radio connection to Arty and a mobile QRF.


No argument that well equipped light troops can be effective in defence, especially in close terrain.  However, keep in mind that Ukraine while a relatively large country is still a fairly narrow front with defined left and right flanks and fairly clear objectives.  It's easier to drop light forces in an environment like this and have them make a meaningful contribution.

Take instead a general Russian attack on NATO and you're looking at a frontage from the Black Sea to the Baltic.  Dropping in a Light Brigade without operational mobility may leave them stuck in an area of the front where they are not required defensively and being light have extremely limited capability of operating offensively.  They may be useful, but I'm suggesting that there are other types of capabilities with similar (or less) logistical requirements which could have a greater military impact.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Another 40 days to raise a brigade?
 To be honest I'd be amazed if we're able the do it under a year. 
May be I'm cynical but quite frankly I'd be amazed if the this government and for that matter the upper echelons of our military really understand the actual concept of a war.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> After what happened in Ukraine I think there will be a point in time when Canada's government, even this thick one, will understand it will need to contribute more that a half of a battlegroup. A flyover brigade is the most economical and sensible. Even if we do not have one now, the Army should be developing that capability so that when asked it won't stand there with its d!ck hanging out saying "we can't do that".


I fear that there are two things that the Canadian Government might take away from the Ukraine conflict, and to be honest which one has the greater influence won't be known until the dust has settled.

1)  As you rightly noted, the West has been put on notice that they can't be complacent and continue to believe that Russia can be "contained" strictly by economic and political pressure.  Military deterrence will be required.

2)  If Russia continues to show as much military incompetence as it has in it's campaign to date, then I fear that the take-away by those NATO states that don't live right on the doorstep of Russia will be that Russia is a paper tiger and will never dare to face NATO directly in a fight.  If Ukraine can fight them to a standstill then they would have no hope against the combined might of NATO.

If this war ends roughly in some type of Russian strategic defeat then I fear #2 will be the dominant take away and in that case I see ZERO chance of a Canadian Government feeling the need to place a Canadian Brigade Group back in Europe (full-time or fly-over).

If Russia manages to turn things around then #1 might be the dominant take-away and a forward deployed Brigade may be possible.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> No argument that well equipped light troops can be effective in defence, especially in close terrain.  However, keep in mind that Ukraine while a relatively large country is still a fairly narrow front with defined left and right flanks and fairly clear objectives.  It's easier to drop light forces in an environment like this and have them make a meaningful contribution.



Not sure I can agree there.  The current front, Kherson-Luhansk-Kharkiv ,  is over 800 km long and neither the Kharkiv nor the Kherson end have strong barriers to anchor the flanks.   



GR66 said:


> Take instead a general Russian attack on NATO and you're looking at a frontage from the Black Sea to the Baltic.  Dropping in a Light Brigade without operational mobility may leave them stuck in an area of the front where they are not required defensively and being light have extremely limited capability of operating offensively.  They may be useful, but I'm suggesting that there are other types of capabilities with similar (or less) logistical requirements which could have a greater military impact.



I agree that operational mobility is good.  However I would be looking towards heliborne/tactical airlift mobility.  Now the Canadian Brigade Gp can be used to put a plug in the dyke anywhere along that Black Sea to Nordkapp line.  Don't forget to order excavators that can be lifted by Chinook.

The helicopters can then be employed across the theater on logistics supplying other formations in the field.

And I don't think that the logistics for a medium or heavy or even a heliborne brigade are much different.  And certainly not more onerous than a light brigade.

Final thought.  I am just back from a drive in southern Alberta.  High prairie.  Dead grass. Empty fields.  Patches of Snow. Flat horizon.  Cut with coulees and hillocks and rivers.  Wide river valleys with coulees and hills.  Few highways.  Fewer river crossings.  Lots of Switchbacks coming out of the bottoms.  Dirt and Gravel roads between the highways.  In short, the same sense that I am getting from Southern Ukraine.

One thing I observed was how easy it was to see a vehicle on the flat lands above the coulees and valleys at 2 to 5 km.
Another thing was how much dead ground there was between here and there.
The final thing I noted was how small a person is when they are 2 km away.

I am not convinced that light infantry in that open terrain, if appropriately armed, is at a disadvantage to a mechanized force.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I fear that there are two things that the Canadian Government might take away from the Ukraine conflict, and to be honest which one has the greater influence won't be known until the dust has settled.
> 
> 1)  As you rightly noted, the West has been put on notice that they can't be complacent and continue to believe that Russia can be "contained" strictly by economic and political pressure.  Military deterrence will be required.
> 
> 2)  If Russia continues to show as much military incompetence as it has in it's campaign to date, then I fear that the take-away by those NATO states that don't live right on the doorstep of Russia will be that Russia is a paper tiger and will never dare to face NATO directly in a fight.  If Ukraine can fight them to a standstill then they would have no hope against the combined might of NATO.
> 
> If this war ends roughly in some type of Russian strategic defeat then I fear #2 will be the dominant take away and in that case I see ZERO chance of a Canadian Government feeling the need to place a Canadian Brigade Group back in Europe (full-time or fly-over).
> 
> If Russia manages to turn things around then #1 might be the dominant take-away and a forward deployed Brigade may be possible.


I do not disagree with you that this is one of the options.

If I was to guess at outcome of this fight, I would guess that Russia throws a heavy effort into the eastern part of Ukraine for a few days until very early May, will get roughed up but makes advances. It will then call a victory followed by a big parade on May 9th for the Moscow public. It will fortify the land it has seized and dare anyone to attack this new part of Russia and will Russianize that territory through its usual depopulation/repopulation programs. As it stands, Russia has already achieved a strategic victory, just not on the scale that Putin had hoped for.

Regardless, there is clearly that element of western society (Canada included) that will conclude that Russia's tactically ineffectual war is proof that it is not a credible threat to NATO. I personally think that's wrong. People like Putin will always gamble to gather in the low hanging fruit through conventional means and then rattle his nuclear sabre against any retaliation against the Motherland. Every time he does that he's gotten away with it. My guess is that collective defence by itself won't be good enough because if he takes a large chunk of the Baltics in the first two days he basically stops and digs in - success. Any counteroffensive would be threatened with and possibly result in a nuke or two thrown out as a signal. Where do we go then?

Our level of deterrence needs to go to that gold standard where he clearly understands that any crossing of the border will instantly bring disaster and defeat to his conventional force right then and there without territorial gains. Any "exercise" buildup on a border will instantly be countered by a deployed defensive force. That requires prepositioned equipment and speedy flyover manning. If anything the current state of the Russian military tends to get me to believe that a more forward defence profile is feasible and we do not have to rely so much on defence in depth.

I can't argue with you that this Canadian government will probably not move to prepare such a force. I merely think the Army should be ready to implement such a plan quickly when the Canadian government (whoever it may be) finally is persuaded that it will gain a significant political benefit by prepositioning such a force.

I actually think it would be easier to do then anyone imagines. The US already has prepositioned equipment there and would probably be tickled pink by being able to "lend" Canada a prepositioned ABCT and the equipment in Canada to train for it. I would assume that the kicker would be that the equipment and organization stay "Americanized" so that if we were to balk at deploying they could send over a ARNG ABCT in our place.

Just guessing here.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Not sure I can agree there.  The current front, Kherson-Luhansk-Kharkiv ,  is over 800 km long and neither the Kharkiv nor the Kherson end have strong barriers to anchor the flanks.


The reality is that the Donbas conflict was essentially static warfare along a defined front line in Donbas (approx. 300km long) with prepared defences and the further Russian attacks were coming from known locations in Russia, Crimea and Belarus (the force concentrations clearly identified by US intel).  The current border region from Russian Occupied Kherson to the Russo-Norwegian border on the Barents sea is around 4,300km long by comparison.



Kirkhill said:


> I agree that operational mobility is good.  However I would be looking towards heliborne/tactical airlift mobility.  Now the Canadian Brigade Gp can be used to put a plug in the dyke anywhere along that Black Sea to Nordkapp line.  Don't forget to order excavators that can be lifted by Chinook.
> 
> The helicopters can then be employed across the theater on logistics supplying other formations in the field.
> 
> And I don't think that the logistics for a medium or heavy or even a heliborne brigade are much different.  And certainly not more onerous than a light brigade.


Where are you expecting to get this heliborne mobility from to move a Light Infantry Brigade?  We simply don't have anywhere near the airlift capacity for even a fraction of that and yes...I'm fairly certain that making a heliborne Brigade would be logistically more onerous than a Light Brigade.


Kirkhill said:


> Final thought.  I am just back from a drive in southern Alberta.  High prairie.  Dead grass. Empty fields.  Patches of Snow. Flat horizon.  Cut with coulees and hillocks and rivers.  Wide river valleys with coulees and hills.  Few highways.  Fewer river crossings.  Lots of Switchbacks coming out of the bottoms.  Dirt and Gravel roads between the highways.  In short, the same sense that I am getting from Southern Ukraine.
> 
> One thing I observed was how easy it was to see a vehicle on the flat lands above the coulees and valleys at 2 to 5 km.
> Another thing was how much dead ground there was between here and there.
> The final thing I noted was how small a person is when they are 2 km away.
> 
> I am not convinced that light infantry in that open terrain, if appropriately armed, is at a disadvantage to a mechanized force.


In open terrain how is that person (presumably with his ATGM) going to be able to hide from enemy ISR if there is no cover?  If I'm not mistaken, someone mentioned in another post (EITS?) that they had tracked a sentry to their position from their IR footprints.  It seems to me that the Light Infantry in such terrain would be very vulnerable to enemy indirect fire to suppress or destroy them.

[Edited for formatting]


----------



## WLSC

McG said:


> RMC is a small unit? I would expect their CClk to be a WO.


I believe the CClk in Saint-Jean is a WO!  So I’m with you on that.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> [snip]
> I actually think it would be easier to do then anyone imagines. The US already has prepositioned equipment there and would probably be tickled pink by being able to "lend" Canada a prepositioned ABCT and the equipment in Canada to train for it. I would assume that the kicker would be that the equipment and organization stay "Americanized" so that if we were to balk at deploying they could send over a ARNG ABCT in our place.
> 
> Just guessing here.
> 
> 🍻


I'm not sure where you get your confidence that the US would be happy to gift us an ABCT's worth of equipment for Europe and another for training in Canada.

From the Congressional Budget Office's US Military's Force Structure: A Primer, 2021 Update document you're talking about the US giving us for frree a total of 2,486 military vehicles (1,243 vehicles per ABCT).  To a country that in the midst of an actual Russian invasion of a NATO partner country agreed to increase its defence budget from 1.37% of GDP to 1.445% of GDP when the agreed upon NATO commitment is to spend 2% of GDP on defence?

And what would the training and support impact of all of this be on the CAF?  Do we divest completely in our existing vehicle fleets so that we only have to supply and maintain the US vehicles?

It's one thing to talk about replacing our Leopard 2s with Abrams or picking a particular US vehicle or piece of kit when we're doing a new procurement anyway, but adopting an entire vehicle set and gear of another military on top of our existing set would likely break the CAF as an organization.


----------



## suffolkowner

GR66 said:


> I'm not sure where you get your confidence that the US would be happy to gift us an ABCT's worth of equipment for Europe and another for training in Canada.
> 
> From the Congressional Budget Office's US Military's Force Structure: A Primer, 2021 Update document you're talking about the US giving us for frree a total of 2,486 military vehicles (1,243 vehicles per ABCT).  To a country that in the midst of an actual Russian invasion of a NATO partner country agreed to increase its defence budget from 1.37% of GDP to 1.445% of GDP when the agreed upon NATO commitment is to spend 2% of GDP on defence?
> 
> And what would the training and support impact of all of this be on the CAF?  Do we divest completely in our existing vehicle fleets so that we only have to supply and maintain the US vehicles?
> 
> It's one thing to talk about replacing our Leopard 2s with Abrams or picking a particular US vehicle or piece of kit when we're doing a new procurement anyway, but adopting an entire vehicle set and gear of another military on top of our existing set would likely break the CAF as an organization.


I'm not sure about FJAG about over the last few decades I've heard reliably from people I know and trust (take that for the paper its not written on) that the US has offered to extensively subsidize our army acquisitions. In point of fact they do so already for quite a few nations. I was told that we variously rejected offers of Abrams, Bradleys, and Humvees for a bunch of BS reasons including sustainability.

On the subject of force structure it seems obvious to me that we dont know what, how or why to structure the Army and so continue in a sort of half ass degraded way thats only that far along because of some decisions made due to Afghanistan. IMHO there is no likelihood of the Army getting and/or using the resouces correctly to assemble or sustain these BCT's concepts.

How many peoply can we actually deploy continuously?
That is what we have to work with and that is what we should structure the brigades and the nature of the brigade around again in my opinion

For example I dont see how 2486 vehicles is enough to sustain an ABCT of 1243. We are going to have two ABCT's and continuously rotate them?


----------



## GR66

suffolkowner said:


> I'm not sure about FJAG about over the last few decades I've heard reliably from people I know and trust (take that for the paper its not written on) that the US has offered to extensively subsidize our army acquisitions. In point of fact they do so already for quite a few nations. I was told that we variously rejected offers of Abrams, Bradleys, and Humvees for a bunch of BS reasons including sustainability.
> 
> On the subject of force structure it seems obvious to me that we dont know what, how or why to structure the Army and so continue in a sort of half ass degraded way thats only that far along because of some decisions made due to Afghanistan. IMHO there is no likelihood of the Army getting and/or using the resouces correctly to assemble or sustain these BCT's concepts.
> 
> How many peoply can we actually deploy continuously?
> That is what we have to work with and that is what we should structure the brigades and the nature of the brigade around again in my opinion
> 
> For example I dont see how 2486 vehicles is enough to sustain an ABCT of 1243. We are going to have two ABCT's and continuously rotate them?


I'll take your word on possible previous offers, but I'm thinking that a) offers of subsidized fleet upgrades are a bit different than wholesale equipping of our Army, and b) with the ongoing shirking of our promised defence commitments combined with all the dollars the US is funneling into Ukraine currently (on top of the massive Covid deficits) that "gifting" equipment to a freeloader at this time is highly unlikely.  Why would you give all this kit to Canada, a G7 nation when you can instead give it to more grateful nations that need it like Poland, the Baltic States, Czechia, etc.?

Edited to add:  You're probably right that 2 ABCT's worth of kit likely isn't enough to sustain the unit in combat.  I'm guessing that 3 would be the minimum?  Even with Reserves could we do that?  Probably why SSE only envisions Battle Group sized deployments...an uncommon lapse of reality in DND planning.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> I'll take your word on possible previous offers, but I'm thinking that a) offers of subsidized fleet upgrades are a bit different than wholesale equipping of our Army, and b) with the ongoing shirking of our promised defence commitments combined with all the dollars the US is funneling into Ukraine currently (on top of the massive Covid deficits) that "gifting" equipment to a freeloader at this time is highly unlikely.  Why would you give all this kit to Canada, a G7 nation when you can instead give it to more grateful nations that need it like Poland, the Baltic States, Czechia, etc.?
> 
> Edited to add:  You're probably right that 2 ABCT's worth of kit likely isn't enough to sustain the unit in combat.  I'm guessing that 3 would be the minimum?  Even with Reserves could we do that?  Probably why SSE only envisions Battle Group sized deployments...an uncommon lapse of reality in DND planning.


The US Army is in process of scrapping 1.5 ABCT’s of personnel.  They equipment however is being retained and more acquired. 

I also think people are reading SSE incorrectly, by picking minimal manning numbers and not looking for the actual flexibility it actually allows DND to equip the CAF.   I think that DND and the CAF aren’t attempting to rationalize acquisitions to SSE very well.


----------



## McG

SSE is almost a choose your own adventure book for the CAF. It says very little about what CAF must be able to do beyond the prescriptive personnel numbers for enduring and time limited missions. So we invest in a whole bunch of shallow, exquisite capabilities and prattle on about smart pledges. We then are not a reliable source of any capability because we will exhaust any commitment in 6 to 12 months.


----------



## IKnowNothing

GR66 said:


> I'll take your word on possible previous offers, but I'm thinking that a) offers of subsidized fleet upgrades are a bit different than wholesale equipping of our Army, and b) with the ongoing shirking of our promised defence commitments combined with all the dollars the US is funneling into Ukraine currently (on top of the massive Covid deficits) that "gifting" equipment to a freeloader at this time is highly unlikely.


I don't know about "gift", but (tieing into the Armoured Recce thread) if we came to them and said, we want to model the RCAC after your armoured cavalry squadrons swapping the scout troop Humvee's for LRSS and TAPV's providing sensors and UAV's, how much for 4 squadrons/regiments worth of M3 Brads, Javelins, and mortar carriers? By the way, the 4th will be added to eFP Latvia for 18 months then left pre-positioned" I don't think that the US would throw up many roadblocks.

Ditto replacing the M777's with Paladins, or adding 1129's and or 1134's to the LAV battalions.


----------



## suffolkowner

GR66 said:


> I'll take your word on possible previous offers, but I'm thinking that a) offers of subsidized fleet upgrades are a bit different than wholesale equipping of our Army, and b) with the ongoing shirking of our promised defence commitments combined with all the dollars the US is funneling into Ukraine currently (on top of the massive Covid deficits) that "gifting" equipment to a freeloader at this time is highly unlikely.  Why would you give all this kit to Canada, a G7 nation when you can instead give it to more grateful nations that need it like Poland, the Baltic States, Czechia, etc.?


I mean it could be an urban legend but I really dont think so. I think the US wants us to be a reliable partner really bad but have probably given up on us by now



GR66 said:


> Edited to add:  You're probably right that 2 ABCT's worth of kit likely isn't enough to sustain the unit in combat.  I'm guessing that 3 would be the minimum?  Even with Reserves could we do that?  Probably why SSE only envisions Battle Group sized deployments...an uncommon lapse of reality in DND planning.



We should probably be able to do more but....

so if we need 3 brigades to sustain one and we cant or wont sustain or provide the people or equipment to do so for a heavy brigade can we do so for a medium brigade or a light one? Can we actually sustain or support different brigade types? Or should we adjust our dreams or visions to that of a sustained battle group a sort of brigade in miniature? The organizational stuff i find confusing but

The active sharp pointy people are somewhere in the range of 4500 for a BCT, correct? So 3 x 4500 = 13,500 plus support/logistics. This would seem to encompass the entire Canadian Army just for one type of brigade not oh lets be able to deploy a heavy brigade and two medium brigades and a light brigade.

There are around 300 strykers in a medium brigade(?) so that seems like Canada should be able to match that (?)we are about to have in the neighbourhood of 976 Lav 6's although we may quibble about the nature of the variants

 but 3 ABCT is going to entail if this is accurate

An ABCT includes 87 Abrams, 152 Bradley IFVs, 18 M109s and 45 armed M113 vehicles. The operational cost for these combat systems is $66,735 per mile. The range of the Abrams limits the brigade to 330 km (205 miles), requiring fuel every 12 hours. The brigade can self-transport 738,100 L (195,000 gallons) of fuel, which is transported by 15 19,000 L (5,000 gal) M969A1 tankers and 48 9,500 L (2,500 gal) M978 tankers.

so 261 tanks, 456 tracked fighting vehicles, 54 tracked sph, and 135 M113 replacements* plus 45 19000L tankers and 144 9500L tankers* 

I also assume that there will need to be equipment set aside for training. I just dont think this is in anyway realistic. What country in Europe pretends to be able to do this or approach these levels of capability? Off the top of my head maybe Ukraine and Poland?


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> After what happened in Ukraine I think there will be a point in time when Canada's government, even this thick one, will understand it will need to contribute more that a half of a battlegroup.



I think that is more of a hope.  One I don't share unfortunately.



FJAG said:


> A flyover brigade is the most economical and sensible. Even if we do not have one now, the Army should be developing that capability so that when asked it won't stand there with its d!ck hanging out saying "we can't do that".



Agreed entirely




FJAG said:


> The point is that an armoured brigade in country, exercised regularly, makes a tremendously more impressive political symbol of commitment than some airy-fairy promise of aircraft and ships which sit somewhere far away and out of view. I'm not questioning their usefulness, just their political impact. On top of that such a brigade makes a credible deterrent to the Orcs on the other side of the border.



Again agreed entirely.   You are describing the difference between 4 CMBG and the CAST Brigade.



FJAG said:


> With the right kind of planning (including an on-demand contract for civilian airliners) one could deploy a fly-over force in days not weeks or months.



Agreed



FJAG said:


> I don't think that committing a light brigade would be as useful as a heavy one, would probably still take too much time if its heavier equipment and ammunition wasn't prepositioned as well and would have a limited political impact or deterrence factor.



Here we come to my first point of contention.  If a light brigade has heavy equipment it is no longer a light brigade.  My solution would be to preposition a heavy/medium brigade of equipment, despatch a light brigade at 72 hr NTM to secure the kit and the form up area then send over the personnel and whatever airportable equipment the HM Brigade has.  The Lt Brigade stays until the HM Brigade gets sorted out and then gets reassigned - either it stays or returns home or moves on to another task.



FJAG said:


> I'm not against quick reaction light forces. We need them and to be "quick" they need to be full-time forces in being. But mostly for non NATO missions.



Generally agreed but I think even NATO has jobs for light forces in securing FOBs, FDLs, Ports, Airfields, Maintenance Areas and Lines of Communications.



FJAG said:


> I see very little value in light reserve forces under Canada's reality other than as a cheap manpower pool that can, with time, be trained for other roles.



I happen to see value in that.  It is the definition of adaptive.  The question is how long can the Regs hold the line to give the Reserves time to adapt.



FJAG said:


> I think in what do we need day-to day or what is so complex that it needs to be trained day-to-day as the full-timers and reservists as those folks which you only need to call on when things go to hell. When things go to hell you need equipped reservists to call on.



That would suggest to me three levels of response.

1  The Active Force of Regulars
2  The Ready Reserve of trained and equipped Reserves
3  The Adaptive Reserve of willing, organized Reserves with basic training in individual skills and up to the level of the Company/Squadron/Battery.



FJAG said:


> No criticism there other than visible political impact and the fact that local forces will have been long deployed before we get there. Again, these are assets that should be predeployed and manned by a cadre heavily augmented by flyover troops.
> 
> I do agree in part but force structure should be somewhat disconnected from force use. If one concentrates too much on specific missions and roles one can end up with an unbalanced force. This is what I consider the primary problem with the Hillieresque Advancing with Purpose. It predetermined that Canada would be the sorter out of failed states. It was rebuilding itself for Bosnia type situations and threw everything else under the bus. Then came Afghanistan and the force structure morphed even more to light infantry. This is why today we have an Army largely incapable of being deployed into Europe unless first heavily rearmed. There are concepts (like UCAVs) that are mainstream in third world countries that we do not have. In short, in times of uncertainty, you need a balanced force capable of reacting immediately in any direction (and by that I do not mean solely light quick reaction forces) with trained people and equipment and materiel at hand plus the ability to sustain that force.
> 
> Balanced force properly manned by full-time and part-time members in the right roles and properly equipped is the hill I'll die on.
> 
> 🍻



Agree.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> The reality is that the Donbas conflict was essentially static warfare along a defined front line in Donbas (approx. 300km long) with prepared defences and the further Russian attacks were coming from known locations in Russia, Crimea and Belarus (the force concentrations clearly identified by US intel).  The current border region from Russian Occupied Kherson to the Russo-Norwegian border on the Barents sea is around 4,300km long by comparison.



And in that 4800 km there is a variety of terrain, climate, enemy capabilities and standing allied capabilities.  Our single brigade is going to make more of a political statement than a tactical one.  The government will get to pick where, when and how it wants the force inserted.  A prepositioned force, somewhere along that 4800 km front is going to be stuck in place for the duration.  That means that decisions made a decade previously are going to limit the choices available in the crisis.




GR66 said:


> Where are you expecting to get this heliborne mobility from to move a Light Infantry Brigade?  We simply don't have anywhere near the airlift capacity for even a fraction of that and yes...I'm fairly certain that making a heliborne Brigade would be logistically more onerous than a Light Brigade.



I know there is a reluctance on the part of many to accept the Griffon as a utility vehicle but I have more faith.  Especially when supplemented by the existing Chinooks and the  rough field, short strip  tactical lift of the Hercules and backed by the C17s.  And I am not of the opinion that because you can't tactically lift a full brigade then the light brigade is of little value.  Frankly, I don't think that if we are only committing a single brigade to the allied effort that we will commit the entire force to a single throw of the dice.  Rather I would expect the entire force to be deployed to the theater in the most advantageous position and then employed tactically in Battlegroups and Combat Teams as circumstances demand while still being retained under national control as a complete force.  

I would also like to see more lift purchased, and proper escorts and incorporation of the RCAF into the force to supply Air Defence, CAS and ISR capabilitites.

In short I like the USMC model.



GR66 said:


> In open terrain how is that person (presumably with his ATGM) going to be able to hide from enemy ISR if there is no cover?  If I'm not mistaken, someone mentioned in another post (EITS?) that they had tracked a sentry to their position from their IR footprints.  It seems to me that the Light Infantry in such terrain would be very vulnerable to enemy indirect fire to suppress or destroy them.
> [Edited for formatting]



EITS and others have also referred to something like a Drinking Straw effect.  Or looking at the world through a telescope or a microcope.  You see a lot of detail by in a very narrow field of view.  Once you know where to look the target becomes obvious and easy to track.  But locating the target is difficult.  If locating the target were easy then there would be no need for Search and Rescue in Canada.  It would strictly be a Rescue force.  But lost people are still hard to find because there is so much space to scan with those telescopes and scanning takes time.

And,  in the military setting, once you have located a trackable target and dedicated assets to tracking that individual then they are not engaged in finding other targets to track or tracking them.   A dispersed force with a large number of very small units, equipped with ultra light vehicles, would be very hard to track.

It would also be very hard to counter since any single artillery strike, or air sortie, would only eliminate a tiny portion of the force.

This is what the US Marines, and the Royal Marines are counting on to allow them to manoeuver within the enemy's ability to respond with fire.  And I believe it is the style of warfare the Ukrainians initially exploited to slow and stop and reverse the Russian incursion in the North.

In the East, as you rightly point out, that 300 km front, is a static front.  Even with Russian reinforcements and continuous effort over the last 7-8 weeks that original line is holding.

But attacks on its flanks at Kherson and Izyum are forcing the Ukrainians over to the offence and they are having to commit organized, well trained and equipped Brigades to the fight.

In short, something I seldom am, I see value in territorial forces, light forces and heavy forces.  Even in a peer on peer conventional war.  I even see value in the conventional war of hybrid warfare, cyber warfare, info warfare and outright propaganda.  World War II employed all of those forces in all theatres globally.  The Russians and Ukrainians are still using them today.

Canada currently has the luxury of deciding how, or if, it is going to wage war.  Unfortunately....


----------



## suffolkowner

I dont see the concept of the brigade holding together in Canada. There is no evidence that we have the desire to equip them and we dont have the people. Sustaining just one medium brigade and one light brigade which is the closest we could approxiamate would require 27000 deployable troops. Thats more than we have right now in the whole army leaving none left over to handle all the day to day boring and necessary stuff. Maybe if we break it down into smaller pieces more similar to a USMC organization or a better fitted out battle group as we used in Afghanistan

Regimental Landing Team (RLT) or Regimental Combat Team (RCT)


Infantry Regiment (w/ 3 Infantry Battalions), Reinforced
48 Amphibious Assault Vehicles, AAV-7A1 and variants (1 Amphibious Assault Vehicle Company (Reinforced))
27 Light Armored Vehicles, LAV-25A1 and variants (1 Light Armored Reconnaissance Company (Reinforced))
14 Main Battle Tank, M1A1, Abrams (1 Tank Company (Reinforced))
2 Armored Recovery Vehicle, M88A2, Hercules (1 Tank Company (Reinforced))
2 Assault Breacher Vehicle, M1, Shredder (Combat Engineer Company)
24 Howitzer, 155 mm, M777A2 (1 Artillery Battalion w/4 firing batteries of 6 guns each)
24 Mortar, 81mm, M252 (4 tubes per section, 2 sections per platoon, of the Mortar Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
27 Lightweight Mortar, 60 mm, M224 LWCMS (3 tubes in the Mortar Section of the Weapons Platoon, Rifle company × 3, Infantry Battalion × 3)
24 Anti-Tank Missile Launcher, BGM-71, TOW (8 launchers in the TOW Section of the Anti-Tank (AT) Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
24 Anti-Tank Missile Launcher, FGM-148, Javelin (8 launchers in the AT Section of the Anti-Tank Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
18 Automatic Grenade Launcher, 40 mm, Mk 19 (6 guns per Heavy Machine Gun Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
18 Browning Machine Gun, Cal. .50, M2, HB, Flexible (6 guns per Heavy Machine Gun Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
54 Machine Gun, 7.62mm, M240 (6 guns in the Machine Gun Section, Weapons Platoon, Rifle Company × 3, Infantry Battalion × 3)
243 Light Machine Gun/Infantry Automatic Rifle, 5.56mm, M249 (9 guns per Rifle Platoon × 3, Rifle Company × 3, Infantry Battalion × 3)


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> SSE is almost a choose your own adventure book for the CAF. It says very little about what CAF must be able to do beyond the prescriptive personnel numbers for enduring and time limited missions. So we invest in a whole bunch of shallow, exquisite capabilities and prattle on about smart pledges. We then are not a reliable source of any capability because we will exhaust any commitment in 6 to 12 months.


That to me is a fault in the CAF not with SSE specifically.   Earlier in this thread and elsewhere @Kirkhill and I spared back and forth with manning levels for SSE. 
   The way I think SSE should be interpreted means the CAF would have a Heavy Bde, Med Bde and Light Bde at min, and a Btl Group from each of those on ready to deploy status, in addition to deployed forces. 

The idea is the CAF is the SME on Military issues in Canada, and should be ready for any reasonable contingency within it’s means. 

Frankly the way the CAF is organized, should be offensive to any Canadian Taxpayer, as you are getting an atrocious ROI for the money put in to DND.


----------



## KevinB

suffolkowner said:


> I dont see the concept of the brigade holding together in Canada. There is no evidence that we have the desire to equip them and we dont have the people. Sustaining just one medium brigade and one light brigade which is the closest we could approxiamate would require 27000 deployable troops. Thats more than we have right now in the whole army leaving none left over to handle all the day to day boring and necessary stuff. Maybe if we break it down into smaller pieces more similar to a USMC organization or a better fitted out battle group as we used in Afghanistan
> 
> Regimental Landing Team (RLT) or Regimental Combat Team (RCT)
> 
> 
> Infantry Regiment (w/ 3 Infantry Battalions), Reinforced
> 48 Amphibious Assault Vehicles, AAV-7A1 and variants (1 Amphibious Assault Vehicle Company (Reinforced))
> 27 Light Armored Vehicles, LAV-25A1 and variants (1 Light Armored Reconnaissance Company (Reinforced))
> 14 Main Battle Tank, M1A1, Abrams (1 Tank Company (Reinforced))
> 2 Armored Recovery Vehicle, M88A2, Hercules (1 Tank Company (Reinforced))
> 2 Assault Breacher Vehicle, M1, Shredder (Combat Engineer Company)
> 24 Howitzer, 155 mm, M777A2 (1 Artillery Battalion w/4 firing batteries of 6 guns each)
> 24 Mortar, 81mm, M252 (4 tubes per section, 2 sections per platoon, of the Mortar Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 27 Lightweight Mortar, 60 mm, M224 LWCMS (3 tubes in the Mortar Section of the Weapons Platoon, Rifle company × 3, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 24 Anti-Tank Missile Launcher, BGM-71, TOW (8 launchers in the TOW Section of the Anti-Tank (AT) Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 24 Anti-Tank Missile Launcher, FGM-148, Javelin (8 launchers in the AT Section of the Anti-Tank Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 18 Automatic Grenade Launcher, 40 mm, Mk 19 (6 guns per Heavy Machine Gun Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 18 Browning Machine Gun, Cal. .50, M2, HB, Flexible (6 guns per Heavy Machine Gun Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 54 Machine Gun, 7.62mm, M240 (6 guns in the Machine Gun Section, Weapons Platoon, Rifle Company × 3, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 243 Light Machine Gun/Infantry Automatic Rifle, 5.56mm, M249 (9 guns per Rifle Platoon × 3, Rifle Company × 3, Infantry Battalion × 3)


Keep in mind that is a Legacy USMC structure. They have divested their tanks and changed their ORBAT considerably.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Not sure I can agree there.  The current front, Kherson-Luhansk-Kharkiv ,  is over 800 km long and neither the Kharkiv nor the Kherson end have strong barriers to anchor the flanks.
> 
> 
> 
> I agree that operational mobility is good.  However I would be looking towards heliborne/tactical airlift mobility.  Now the Canadian Brigade Gp can be used to put a plug in the dyke anywhere along that Black Sea to Nordkapp line.  Don't forget to order excavators that can be lifted by Chinook.
> 
> The helicopters can then be employed across the theater on logistics supplying other formations in the field.
> 
> And I don't think that the logistics for a medium or heavy or even a heliborne brigade are much different.  And certainly not more onerous than a light brigade.
> 
> Final thought.  I am just back from a drive in southern Alberta.  High prairie.  Dead grass. Empty fields.  Patches of Snow. Flat horizon.  Cut with coulees and hillocks and rivers.  Wide river valleys with coulees and hills.  Few highways.  Fewer river crossings.  Lots of Switchbacks coming out of the bottoms.  Dirt and Gravel roads between the highways.  In short, the same sense that I am getting from Southern Ukraine.
> 
> One thing I observed was how easy it was to see a vehicle on the flat lands above the coulees and valleys at 2 to 5 km.
> Another thing was how much dead ground there was between here and there.
> The final thing I noted was how small a person is when they are 2 km away.
> 
> I am not convinced that light infantry in that open terrain, if appropriately armed, is at a disadvantage to a mechanized force.


I train in Alberta extensively, you can see a vehicle on a farm field because it’s not trying to obscure itself. With Optics I can very easily identify dismounted infantry at 5 plus k, and we have tracked light infantry moving to our position hours before they arrive.


----------



## suffolkowner

KevinB said:


> Keep in mind that is a Legacy USMC structure. They have divested their tanks and changed their ORBAT considerably.


Yes but I like tanks so Im keeping them they remind me of my dozers lol

in Canadian terms


tanks14Leo2ARV2Leo2AEV2Leo2LAV675LAV6SPH24Caesar or American winnerSPM24LAV6 with nemo or amos orAnti-Tank24LAV6Anti-Tank24TAPVAnti-Tank24unmounted Javelin,NLAW, GustafShorad??LAV6


also loitering munitions?


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Keep in mind that is a Legacy USMC structure. They have divested their tanks and changed their ORBAT considerably.



Kevin,

I know the USMC has divested tanks, SPGs and helicopters (to an extent) but the have only, to my knowledge, expressed an intention of raising 3 of the novel and controversial Littoral Combat Regiments.  And those have largely been raised from the divested elements and support elements like "MPs" and internal security forces created for the Sandbox Wars, AFAIK.

That still, I think,  leaves the USMC with 3 FMFs, each with a Marine Div capable of raising a MAGTF and MEUs, as well as a Reserve Div and Special Operations Forces.

What do we know about the structure of the Main Body vice the Littoral Combat Regiments.  My sense of them is that, in large part they are recreating the Coastal Defence component of the Marines which were phased out after WW2.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I don't know.  These immobile light troops have been doing not bad for the last 8 years.  And they seem to be repelling 7 or 8 assaults daily - and killing troops, tanks, IFVs, guns, MRLSs and UASs - even the occasional helicopter and fighter.
> 
> View attachment 70132View attachment 70133View attachment 70134View attachment 70135View attachment 70136View attachment 70138View attachment 70137View attachment 70139
> 
> Just add MGs, Mortars, Javelins, NLAWs, Stingers and UAS's.  And a good radio connection to Arty and a mobile QRF.


If you do a quick read up on the Ukrainian army you’ll find they’re actually built around mechanized and motorized Bdes. Without know the units these troops belong to, it’s sort of impossible to tell who they are. I’m assuming your basing your assumption on a lack of vehicles being in these pictures? They’re likely being held back to not expose their run up positions. Or being held for counter move tasks.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Kevin,
> 
> I know the USMC has divested tanks, SPGs and helicopters (to an extent) but the have only, to my knowledge, expressed an intention of raising 3 of the novel and controversial Littoral Combat Regiments.  And those have largely been raised from the divested elements and support elements like "MPs" and internal security forces created for the Sandbox Wars, AFAIK.
> 
> That still, I think,  leaves the USMC with 3 FMFs, each with a Marine Div capable of raising a MAGTF and MEUs, as well as a Reserve Div and Special Operations Forces.
> 
> What do we know about the structure of the Main Body vice the Littoral Combat Regiments.  My sense of them is that, in large part they are recreating the Coastal Defence component of the Marines which were phased out after WW2.


I’ve seen a closed USMC brief so I’m trying to find as much OS info out there to keep me from spouting off stuff that isn’t yet OS. 

I will say that I think you wound be impressed with the plan as it has a lot of stuff you’ve preached for a bit.


----------



## markppcli

suffolkowner said:


> Yes but I like tanks so Im keeping them they remind me of my dozers lol
> 
> in Canadian terms
> 
> 
> tanks14Leo2ARV2Leo2AEV2Leo2LAV675LAV6SPH24Caesar or American winnerSPM24LAV6 with nemo or amos orAnti-Tank24LAV6Anti-Tank24TAPVAnti-Tank24unmounted Javelin,NLAW, GustafShorad??LAV6
> 
> 
> also loitering munitions?
> 
> View attachment 70154


So a battle group? Am I missing something novel here ?


----------



## suffolkowner

markppcli said:


> So a battle group? Am I missing something novel here ?


No you're not missing anything. If a battle group is what we have and a battle group is what we can do then a battle group is what it is


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I train in Alberta extensively, you can see a vehicle on a farm field because it’s not trying to obscure itself. With Optics I can very easily identify dismounted infantry at 5 plus k, and we have tracked light infantry moving to our position hours before they arrive.



Fair enough.

Edit for a quick question though:  How far away can light infantry detect you?  And for how long can they track you?  And do they need to arrive on your position at all to inflict harm?  -  Assuming they are given more than grenades and rifles to tackle your AFVs.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> That would suggest to me three levels of response.
> 
> 1 The Active Force of Regulars
> 2 The Ready Reserve of trained and equipped Reserves
> 3 The Adaptive Reserve of willing, organized Reserves with basic training in individual skills and up to the level of the Company/Squadron/Batter



Preferred models for each level?

1 Whatever the Regulars deem suitable
2 Whatever fits with the Deployment Plan led by the Regulars
3 Something between the Canadian Rangers, the Militia and the European Territorial Defence Volunteers tactically organized after the fashion of the RAF Regiment - large companies geared towards force protection.

I would also suggest seeing the level 3 forces as equivalent to tanglefoot wire - unobtrusive, widespread, hard to cut and designed to slow and impede, not obstruct.  

They would also act as a training base from which individuals could step up to more technically advanced formations.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> I’ve seen a closed USMC brief so I’m trying to find as much OS info out there to keep me from spouting off stuff that isn’t yet OS.
> 
> I will say that I think you wound be impressed with the plan as it has a lot of stuff you’ve preached for a bit.











						Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR)
					

A Marine Littoral Regiment will be a self-deployable, multi-domain force optimized for the contact and blunt layers.  It will persistently operate across the competition continuum to support the Joint



					www.marines.mil
				




That’s the marines article on it. An infantry Bn with an anti ship capability plus an anti air Bn with UAV assets.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> If you do a quick read up on the Ukrainian army you’ll find they’re actually built around mechanized and motorized Bdes. Without know the units these troops belong to, it’s sort of impossible to tell who they are. I’m assuming your basing your assumption on a lack of vehicles being in these pictures? They’re likely being held back to not expose their run up positions. Or being held for counter move tasks.



Mark, I am not arguing against the role of the Armoured Force.  I agree that it is necessary.  I agree that the Ukrainians have armoured brigades and are using them effectively.  No question.

My point is that the well trained and equipped mechanised/armoured force is working in conjunction with light forces.

The light forces have been used to man static positions (yes, probably in conjunction with local Mechanized QRFs and Arty and yes well organized by professional command structures).  They have also been used to impede advances, disrupt lines of communication, hold bridges and defend communities.  They have also been used to re-occupy abandoned communities and clear them and secure blocking positions.

They have also been used, in the form of regular air assault/portable/mobile brigades as Quick Reaction Forces.  Sometimes they deploy by road.  In trucks.  Sometimes in armoured vehicles.  Sometimes with tanks.  

I will stipulate without hesitation that there is a need for the Mechanized Brigade on the battlefield.

Will you stipulate that there is a role for light forces?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> So a battle group? Am I missing something novel here ?


No.  I don't think so.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Preferred models for each level?
> 
> 1 Whatever the Regulars deem suitable
> 2 Whatever fits with the Deployment Plan led by the Regulars
> 3 Something between the Canadian Rangers, the Militia and the European Territorial Defence Volunteers tactically organized after the fashion of the RAF Regiment - large companies geared towards force protection.
> 
> I would also suggest seeing the level 3 forces as equivalent to tanglefoot wire - unobtrusive, widespread, hard to cut and designed to slow and impede, not obstruct.
> 
> They would also act as a training base from which individuals could step up to more technically advanced formations.


I tend to agree. I have often wondered how many potential reservists we loose because their “local unit” is specialized in something unappealing. If we focused the reserves on training for an infantry role (motorized in TAPV) and gave them opportunity to specialize if they want maybe we’d be doing better I think.




Kirkhill said:


> Mark, I am not arguing against the role of the Armoured Force.  I agree that it is necessary.  I agree that the Ukrainians have armoured brigades and are using them effectively.  No question.
> 
> My point is that the well trained and equipped mechanised/armoured force is working in conjunction with light forces.
> 
> The light forces have been used to man static positions (yes, probably in conjunction with local Mechanized QRFs and Arty and yes well organized by professional command structures).  They have also been used to impede advances, disrupt lines of communication, hold bridges and defend communities.  They have also been used to re-occupy abandoned communities and clear them and secure blocking positions.
> 
> They have also been used, in the form of regular air assault/portable/mobile brigades as Quick Reaction Forces.  Sometimes they deploy by road.  In trucks.  Sometimes in armoured vehicles.  Sometimes with tanks.
> 
> I will stipulate without hesitation that there is a need for the Mechanized Brigade on the battlefield.
> 
> Will you stipulate that there is a role for light forces?


Light forces have a purpose, strategic mobility. Very complex terrain I would also agree with.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR)
> 
> 
> A Marine Littoral Regiment will be a self-deployable, multi-domain force optimized for the contact and blunt layers.  It will persistently operate across the competition continuum to support the Joint
> 
> 
> 
> www.marines.mil
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That’s the marines article on it. An infantry Bn with an anti ship capability plus an anti air Bn with UAV assets.




Respectfully Mark that is the "novel and controversial" bit to which I referred.  It is not the Main Body which I was asking about.

The Marines still hold hold something like 9-12 Line Infantry Regiments and 4 Artillery Regiments in their 4 Divisions.  The artillery is switching from shorter range guns to longer range missiles and the Infantry is incorporating more precision and longer ranges all the way down to the Squad level from what I can see.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Fair enough.
> 
> Edit for a quick question though:  How far away can light infantry detect you?  And for how long can they track you?  And do they need to arrive on your position at all to inflict harm?  -  Assuming they are given more than grenades and rifles to tackle your AFVs.


You have to consider the optics imbalance at play. If they’re doing an attack then yes, and even if they were to attack by fire with a hypothetical atgm they’d still need to clear that position out. It’s just in ground like that where a mechanized force will have a huge advantage. If we were in the mountains or somewhere much more densely forested that would shift as our ability to detect early on would be greatly lessened.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> You have to consider the optics imbalance at play. If they’re doing an attack then yes, and even if they were to attack by fire with a hypothetical atgm they’d still need to clear that position out. It’s just in ground like that where a mechanized force will have a huge advantage. If we were in the mountains or somewhere much more densely forested that would shift as our ability to detect early on would be greatly lessened.



I'll agree to that.  But I also think that even on the prairies there a lots of bluffs, scrubby valleys and deep, convoluted coulees that would supply cover and concealment.  Especially if it is night time and the weather is not co-operating.  

On the other hand I would not like to be on the open prairie with a full moon in January.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> So a battle group? Am I missing something novel here ?


That's only the Cavalry/Artillery/Mobility and Weapons Coy's,  still 9x Light/Motorized Rifle companies to factor in.




suffolkowner said:


> Yes but I like tanks so Im keeping them they remind me of my dozers lol
> 
> in Canadian terms
> 
> 
> tanks14Leo2ARV2Leo2AEV2Leo2LAV675LAV6SPH24Caesar or American winnerSPM24LAV6 with nemo or amos orAnti-Tank24LAV6Anti-Tank24TAPVAnti-Tank24unmounted Javelin,NLAW, GustafShorad??LAV6
> 
> 
> also loitering munitions?
> 
> View attachment 70154



I like it a lot.  Went off topic and posted something similar in the Armoured Recce thread. Seems like a realistic way steal a demonstrably viable structure to make use of the fleet we have, add enablers, and still have kit for prepositioned/flyover forces.

Other than LAV conversions the other gap would be enough Bison type vehicles (driven by Reservists?) to motorize the Rifle companies if need be.


----------



## GK .Dundas

suffolkowner said:


> I dont see the concept of the brigade holding together in Canada. There is no evidence that we have the desire to equip them and we dont have the people. Sustaining just one medium brigade and one light brigade which is the closest we could approxiamate would require 27000 deployable troops. Thats more than we have right now in the whole army leaving none left over to handle all the day to day boring and necessary stuff. Maybe if we break it down into smaller pieces more similar to a USMC organization or a better fitted out battle group as we used in Afghanistan
> 
> Regimental Landing Team (RLT) or Regimental Combat Team (RCT)
> 
> 
> Infantry Regiment (w/ 3 Infantry Battalions), Reinforced
> 48 Amphibious Assault Vehicles, AAV-7A1 and variants (1 Amphibious Assault Vehicle Company (Reinforced))
> 27 Light Armored Vehicles, LAV-25A1 and variants (1 Light Armored Reconnaissance Company (Reinforced))
> 14 Main Battle Tank, M1A1, Abrams (1 Tank Company (Reinforced))
> 2 Armored Recovery Vehicle, M88A2, Hercules (1 Tank Company (Reinforced))
> 2 Assault Breacher Vehicle, M1, Shredder (Combat Engineer Company)
> 24 Howitzer, 155 mm, M777A2 (1 Artillery Battalion w/4 firing batteries of 6 guns each)
> 24 Mortar, 81mm, M252 (4 tubes per section, 2 sections per platoon, of the Mortar Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 27 Lightweight Mortar, 60 mm, M224 LWCMS (3 tubes in the Mortar Section of the Weapons Platoon, Rifle company × 3, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 24 Anti-Tank Missile Launcher, BGM-71, TOW (8 launchers in the TOW Section of the Anti-Tank (AT) Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 24 Anti-Tank Missile Launcher, FGM-148, Javelin (8 launchers in the AT Section of the Anti-Tank Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 18 Automatic Grenade Launcher, 40 mm, Mk 19 (6 guns per Heavy Machine Gun Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 18 Browning Machine Gun, Cal. .50, M2, HB, Flexible (6 guns per Heavy Machine Gun Platoon, Weapons Company, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 54 Machine Gun, 7.62mm, M240 (6 guns in the Machine Gun Section, Weapons Platoon, Rifle Company × 3, Infantry Battalion × 3)
> 243 Light Machine Gun/Infantry Automatic Rifle, 5.56mm, M249 (9 guns per Rifle Platoon × 3, Rifle Company × 3, Infantry Battalion × 3)


Is there any sort of discount if I buy six or more?


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> That's only the Cavalry/Artillery/Mobility and Weapons Coy's,  still 9x Light/Motorized Rifle companies to factor in.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I like it a lot.  Went off topic and posted something similar in the Armoured Recce thread. Seems like a realistic way steal a demonstrably viable structure to make use of the fleet we have, add enablers, and still have kit for prepositioned/flyover forces.
> 
> Other than LAV conversions the other gap would be enough Bison type vehicles (driven by Reservists?) to motorize the Rifle companies if need be.


Why have them driven by reservists ? What’s the benefit there.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> That's only the Cavalry/Artillery/Mobility and Weapons Coy's,  still 9x Light/Motorized Rifle companies to factor in.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I like it a lot.  Went off topic and posted something similar in the Armoured Recce thread. Seems like a realistic way steal a demonstrably viable structure to make use of the fleet we have, add enablers, and still have kit for prepositioned/flyover forces.
> 
> Other than LAV conversions the other gap would be enough Bison type vehicles (driven by Reservists?) to motorize the Rifle companies if need be.


Did I miss read a chart? Do we have carrier companies now ?


----------



## PuckChaser

markppcli said:


> Why have them driven by reservists ? What’s the benefit there.


You'd get 92.8% of the way to the objective, then walk from there. Saves on fuel.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Did I miss read a chart? Do we have carrier companies now ?



How about equipping the Transport Platoons of the Rifle Battalions with Bisons?


----------



## Brad Sallows

What's the point?  Off they go in summer to the various schools; come back clapped out and VOR'ed until sometime in Nov/Dec.  I'm trying to picture mounted warfare in Bisons and failing, which leaves battle taxi - training drivers to drive them, and riders to ride in them.


----------



## suffolkowner

By Bisons do we mean just LAV 6 without a turret?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> How about equipping the Transport Platoons of the Rifle Battalions with Bisons?



To do what ?

Did I miss a step here and we’re now talking about reserve units ?


----------



## Kirkhill

suffolkowner said:


> By Bisons do we mean just LAV 6 without a turret?



No.  The original Bison.  An armoured, amphibious truck that fits in a C130 with room and weight to spare.

And I am not thinking mounted warfare Brad.  I am thinking an armoured truck that would go anywhere.   And if they did come back in Nov/Dec they would be just in time for flood and blizzard season.  Get the chains out.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> To do what ?



To supply transport?  To troops that are otherwise footborne?  Instead of TAPVs?


----------



## markppcli

Bn transport doesn’t really use TAPVs to do that. Additionally I don’t know that you’d be able to achieve Tn’s mission without massively expanding it just based on pay load of a bison vs a Mac.


----------



## Kirkhill

Mark, I'm not thinking in terms of the Regular or Expeditionary Force.

I'm back on my domestic hobby horse.  I'm looking at adding a multifunctional transport capability to what is primarily a light force.  I would be thinking of putting the Bison's into the Infantry, Engineers and perhaps some in the Cavalry and Artillery.  

Trucks (MSVS and Higher) would go into the Service Battalion Transport Coys.

I take it as read that you and your brothers and sisters are best placed to define the needs of the Expeditionary Force.

I do think that domestic needs are not being addressed.  Perrin Beatty still presented my preferred solutions.  (Including Nuclear Subs).


----------



## suffolkowner

Kirkhill said:


> Mark, I'm not thinking in terms of the Regular or Expeditionary Force.
> 
> I'm back on my domestic hobby horse.  I'm looking at adding a multifunctional transport capability to what is primarily a light force.  I would be thinking of putting the Bison's into the Infantry, Engineers and perhaps some in the Cavalry and Artillery.
> 
> Trucks (MSVS and Higher) would go into the Service Battalion Transport Coys.
> 
> I take it as read that you and your brothers and sisters are best placed to define the needs of the Expeditionary Force.
> 
> I do think that domestic needs are not being addressed.  Perrin Beatty still presented my preferred solutions.  (Including Nuclear Subs).


Would the LVM-LUVW program maybe not provide a credible solution

I've always liked this ugly duck









						Protolab Misu - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Blackadder1916

Kirkhill said:


> . . .  not thinking in terms of . . . Expeditionary Force.
> 
> I do think that domestic needs are not being addressed.



Domestic movement of pers and light equipment.


----------



## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:


> Domestic movement of pers and light equipment.
> 
> View attachment 70160



Brilliant addition to the Service Battalion.  How does it do when the highway is washed out?


----------



## Kirkhill

suffolkowner said:


> Would the LVM-LUVW program maybe not provide a credible solution
> 
> I've always liked this ugly duck
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Protolab Misu - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org



A contender.  Can you get GDLS or Rheinmetal to build it?  I'm going to guess that the cost and capabilities would be about the same as a Bison.


----------



## suffolkowner

Kirkhill said:


> A contender.  Can you get GDLS or Rheinmetal to build it?  I'm going to guess that the cost and capabilities would be about the same as a Bison.











						Protolab PMPV – Corporal Frisk
					

Posts about Protolab PMPV written by Corporal Frisk




					corporalfrisk.com
				




I mean it should be cheaper since it's supposed to be cheaper than a Patria 6x6


----------



## Kirkhill

Perrin Beatty's Territorial Defence Force​Canadian Airborne Regiment
Special Service Force

Create functional Task Forces by 
Brigading the Militia 
Expanding the Rangers
Adding 90,000 Vital Points Guards
820 Bv206 Northern Terrain Vehicles
199 Bisons





						The Wednesday Report - Issue - TWR48V3
					

TWR48V3 - Issue 48, Volume 3 - The Wednesday Report - Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly - TWR - Editor: Micheal John O'Brien Editorial and news on Canadian aerospace and defence, The Wednesday Report, TWR, Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly, MPRM Group Limited, Micheal John O'Brien...



					thewednesdayreport.com
				




Volume 3, Number 48 November 29,1989



> BV-206 NTV PROJECT GETS PROD FROM ACTION-ORIENTED ALBERTA FIRM​*Lack of activity on Mobile Command's Northern Terrain Vehicle (NTV) *acquisition programme has prompted Hagglunds Foremost Inc. of Calgary, Alberta to issue a discussion paper in the hope of generating political support for the project.* In July 1988, DND approved an acquisition of 820 Swedish BV-206 northern terrain vehicles to be used for territorial defence tasks*. The same fiberglass hulled, rubber tracked over-snow vehicles was successfully used by the Canadian Air Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade.
> 
> *Hagglunds Foremost Inc. (HF) was formed in February 1989 *as a joint venture between Hagglunds Vehicle AB of Sweden, manufacturer of the BV-206, and Canadian Foremost Ltd. of Calgary, Alberta to produce the vehicle in Canada. By early 1989, the firm had actually started converting Swedish technical drawings to Canadian standards and had sent out a number of information packages to potential subcontractors in expectation of a contract award by March 1990. Then came the April 1989 budget cuts. The NTV programme was reduced by half and delayed indefinitely. The company began to cut its staff. Since April the project has remained frozen. An increasingly uncertain HF is awaiting a contract to begin project definition and the NTV Project Management Office (PMO) is waiting for funding to proceed with a Canadianization study to determine which Canadian parts can be used with the BV-206. HF, on its own initiative, issued its paper.
> 
> *According to Shari Pusch of Canadian Foremost Ltd.,* the discussion paper was prepared to update HF's internal management staff, its Board of Directors and any concerned subcontractors. The company also seeks political support. The document reminds its readers that the NTV meets Mobile Command's requirement for a vehicle which can traverse difficult terrain and that the BV-206's low ground pressure minimizes risk of damage to the fragile northern ecology. The paper stresses western industrial diversity for the benefit of any politicians who need to be reminded of this well known political and regional development imperative of the current government.
> 
> *While the company is conducting its private sector briefings,* the NTV PMO is in a continual briefing process of its own, keeping senior DND decision makers informed. An Interdepartmental Senior Review Board (ISRB) is scheduled for today, November 29, at which representatives from DND, DSS and regional development departments will be briefed on project status. There are bright spots to the otherwise irritating situation which are keeping HF guardedly optimistic. DND is experimenting with an air droppable BV prototype which shows promise. Discussions between Hagglunds AB and Canadian Foremost Ltd. may result in HF producing BV-206s in Calgary for the U.S. Army. At present the U.S. buys its BV-206s directly from Hagglunds AB in Sweden. Lastly, the HF paper argues that when an NTV contract is finally awarded, there will be a high degree of Canadian content involved. Svante Andersson, Hagglund's representative in Ottawa, states that as much as 60 percent of the NTV may be made up of Canadian parts.








						Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web
					






					publications.gc.ca


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Perrin Beatty's Territorial Defence Force​Canadian Airborne Regiment
> Special Service Force
> 
> Create functional Task Forces by
> Brigading the Militia
> Expanding the Rangers
> Adding 90,000 Vital Points Guards
> 820 Bv206 Northern Terrain Vehicles
> 199 Bisons
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Wednesday Report - Issue - TWR48V3
> 
> 
> TWR48V3 - Issue 48, Volume 3 - The Wednesday Report - Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly - TWR - Editor: Micheal John O'Brien Editorial and news on Canadian aerospace and defence, The Wednesday Report, TWR, Canada's Aerospace and Defence Weekly, MPRM Group Limited, Micheal John O'Brien...
> 
> 
> 
> thewednesdayreport.com
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 70166
> View attachment 70167
> Volume 3, Number 48 November 29,1989
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> publications.gc.ca


Pretty telling Canada hasn't had much of a common sense DND Policy review since...


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I'm not sure where you get your confidence that the US would be happy to gift us an ABCT's worth of equipment for Europe and another for training in Canada.


I'm an eternal optimist and fully believe in the mantra "If you don't try, you won't succeed!"



GR66 said:


> From the Congressional Budget Office's US Military's Force Structure: A Primer, 2021 Update document you're talking about the US giving us for frree a total of 2,486 military vehicles (1,243 vehicles per ABCT).  To a country that in the midst of an actual Russian invasion of a NATO partner country agreed to increase its defence budget from 1.37% of GDP to 1.445% of GDP when the agreed upon NATO commitment is to spend 2% of GDP on defence?


Sure. Why not?



GR66 said:


> And what would the training and support impact of all of this be on the CAF?  Do we divest completely in our existing vehicle fleets so that we only have to supply and maintain the US vehicles?


We have 15,000 unequipped and undertrained reservists.



GR66 said:


> It's one thing to talk about replacing our Leopard 2s with Abrams or picking a particular US vehicle or piece of kit when we're doing a new procurement anyway, but adopting an entire vehicle set and gear of another military on top of our existing set would likely break the CAF as an organization.


Or force the Army to ramp up the maintenance system to be able to deal with it. 

Look, I appreciate the difficulties with maintaining an army as much as anyone, BUT there are solutions. If we emptied 10% of the chairwarmers out of Ottawa you would have more than enough PYs for maintainers to do the job. 

I don't want to sound flippant but DND seems to spend more time investigating how we can not do things rather than pushing the envelope on what is possible.

How do we know one way or the other until we try?

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I'm an eternal optimist and fully believe in the mantra "If you don't try, you won't succeed!"
> 
> 
> Sure. Why not?
> 
> 
> We have 15,000 unequipped and undertrained reservists.
> 
> 
> Or force the Army to ramp up the maintenance system to be able to deal with it.
> 
> Look, I appreciate the difficulties with maintaining an army as much as anyone, BUT there are solutions. If we emptied 10% of the chairwarmers out of Ottawa you would have more than enough PYs for maintainers to do the job.
> 
> I don't want to sound flippant but DND seems to spend more time investigating how we can not do things rather than pushing the envelope on what is possible.
> 
> How do we know one way or the other until we try?
> 
> 🍻




It's OK, they don't seem to care and it's official 

Why Bureaucrats Don't Seem to Care​

Frontline bureaucrats are often portrayed as unthinking automata, yet they are in fact vested with a substantial margin of discretion. This is where the challenge of implementing policy starts. It is not that rules are absent; on the contrary, they abound. But they are often sufficiently ambiguous that they lend themselves to various plausible interpretations, or so numerous that they conflict with one another. When this is the case, bureaucrats must exert independent judgment to figure out what to do. If they were to stop doing so and adhere religiously to the scripts provided to them, public-service agencies would come to a halt.









						Why Bureaucrats Don't Seem to Care
					

A researcher’s reflection on eight months of observing workers at an anti-poverty agency




					www.theatlantic.com


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> Did I miss read a chart? Do we have carrier companies now ?


The context of the initial discussion was organizing around the ORBAT of a Marine Regimental Combat Team / the Ground Combat Element of an MEB. The chart that you quoted and challenged as being just another battlegroup was not the entirety of the force, it was a summary of the (Canadianized) vehicle fleet required.  What it it excluded from the original post was three battalions of light infantry.  The primary listing of 75 LAV's broke down to ~25 to a Light Armored Reconnaissance Coy,  ~50 as replacement for an Amphibious Assault Company (LAV Mobility Company (not a Battlegroup based around a LAV Battalion).  The rest of the LAV's and TAPV's was assigning vehicles to the 3 Weapon's Coy's.



markppcli said:


> Why have them driven by reservists ? What’s the benefit there.





Brad Sallows said:


> What's the point?  Off they go in summer to the various schools; come back clapped out and VOR'ed until sometime in Nov/Dec.  I'm trying to picture mounted warfare in Bisons and failing, which leaves battle taxi - training drivers to drive them, and riders to ride in them.


The point is that it's not mounted warfare, it's wartime capability to motorize the two remaining LIB's to provide mobility to the Brigade- exactly that, battle taxi's.   The benefit of having them operated by reservists is to make use of the reserves to provide a wartime capability not otherwise needed, stretching RegF PY's to have the three MEB GCE/ RCT Bde's fully manned, the fleet and budget to have all enabler's in place.

And yeah @suffolkowner 's MiSu would do the job.  We'd theoretically have enough kit to have the entire Reg force component of that chart in Latvia, with a single battalion on roto.  Stage 1 flyover man's it in place, Stage 2 flyover /Sea lift motorizes the two remaining LIB's.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> The context of the initial discussion was organizing around the ORBAT of a Marine Regimental Combat Team / the Ground Combat Element of an MEB. The chart that you quoted and challenged as being just another battlegroup was not the entirety of the force, it was a summary of the (Canadianized) vehicle fleet required.  What it it excluded from the original post was three battalions of light infantry.  The primary listing of 75 LAV's broke down to ~25 to a Light Armored Reconnaissance Coy,  ~50 as replacement for an Amphibious Assault Company (LAV Mobility Company (not a Battlegroup based around a LAV Battalion).  The rest of the LAV's and TAPV's was assigning vehicles to the 3 Weapon's Coy's.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The point is that it's not mounted warfare, it's wartime capability to motorize the two remaining LIB's to provide mobility to the Brigade- exactly that, battle taxi's.   The benefit of having them operated by reservists is to make use of the reserves to provide a wartime capability not otherwise needed, stretching RegF PY's to have the three MEB GCE/ RCT Bde's fully manned, the fleet and budget to have all enabler's in place.
> 
> And yeah @suffolkowner 's MiSu would do the job.  We'd theoretically have enough kit to have the entire Reg force component of that chart in Latvia, with a single battalion on roto.  Stage 1 flyover man's it in place, Stage 2 flyover /Sea lift motorizes the two remaining LIB's.


Ah so mobility for the Light Bns. Gotcha.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> I am thinking an armoured truck that would go anywhere.



I'd go with independent transport battalions, or for Res F purpose, independent companies.  Not always needed, so not a permanent part of any unit's establishment.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> Ah so mobility for the Light Bns. Gotcha.


But under this scenario all 9 of the RegF Bns would technically be light. They'd just be trained to and in all likelihood be deployed in "peacetime" with the RegF LAV based mobility company.

9 Btn's that can form the core of a battle group, 3 battalions worth of permanently attached LAV's (plus LAV/TAPV based Weapon's Coy's). Frees up enough hulls to convert/ mount the missing enablers, and preposition 2 Bde's worth of kit.  If it looks like the balloon is going to go up you call up the ResF independent transport companies and attach them to the LIB's to motorize both and have a fully mobile Bde.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> I'd go with independent transport battalions, or for Res F purpose, independent companies.  Not always needed, so not a permanent part of any unit's establishment.



I'd buy that.  In a heartbeat.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I'd buy that.  In a heartbeat.


In my dreams this is what happens to Armoured Reserve units. Essentially dual rolled as cavalry and mobility.


IKnowNothing said:


> But under this scenario all 9 of the RegF Bns would technically be light. They'd just be trained to and in all likelihood be deployed in "peacetime" with the RegF LAV based mobility company.
> 
> 9 Btn's that can form the core of a battle group, 3 battalions worth of permanently attached LAV's (plus LAV/TAPV based Weapon's Coy's). Frees up enough hulls to convert/ mount the missing enablers, and preposition 2 Bde's worth of kit.  If it looks like the balloon is going to go up you call up the ResF independent transport companies and attach them to the LIB's to motorize both and have a fully mobile Bde.


This is what I meant, I don’t see your full plan laid out anywhere. So you would strip all armoured vehicles, minus two companies worth per Bn, and pre position them?  Or am I just missing your point entirely.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> In my dreams this is what happens to Armoured Reserve units. Essentially dual rolled as cavalry and mobility.


I'd also accept that.  Maybe the DAME/Northern Terrain Vehicles go to Service Battalions and the Rangers and the Bisons go to the Armoured Reserve for mobility?


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I'll take your word on possible previous offers, but I'm thinking that a) offers of subsidized fleet upgrades are a bit different than wholesale equipping of our Army, and b) with the ongoing shirking of our promised defence commitments combined with all the dollars the US is funneling into Ukraine currently (on top of the massive Covid deficits) that "gifting" equipment to a freeloader at this time is highly unlikely.  Why would you give all this kit to Canada, a G7 nation when you can instead give it to more grateful nations that need it like Poland, the Baltic States, Czechia, etc.?


Its not really a gift, its more a lend-lease loan. The point though is that the has a catch. The loan requires Canada to commit a flyover brigade to Europe. The second brigade is the tools to train the flyover guys on.

If at the same time Canada argued that it's already heavily in new ships and F35s and will spend new moneys on NORAD, it sweetens the pot considerably and provides a rationale to make the US think favourably.

Regrettably you are right. Our simplemindedness and singlemindedness would prevent us from even making the offer.



GR66 said:


> Edited to add:  You're probably right that 2 ABCT's worth of kit likely isn't enough to sustain the unit in combat.  I'm guessing that 3 would be the minimum?  Even with Reserves could we do that?  Probably why SSE only envisions Battle Group sized deployments...an uncommon lapse of reality in DND planning.


I do not know why we are so fixed on the idea of needed things in three's to sustain them. I know I know its that MRS again, isn't it.

Essentially I proposed two ABCTs. A 70/30 one and a 30/70 one. One deploys, in whole or in part when required and the other trains to augment and replace as required. This is not a full-time continuing deployment and there is no intent to have six month rotations.

During peacetime, both brigades would share the equipment in Canada and deploy regularly to exercise in Europe on the prepositioned equipment.



Kirkhill said:


> Again agreed entirely. You are describing the difference between 4 CMBG and the CAST Brigade.


A bit different actually - 4 CMBG was fully deployed permanently while the bulk of CAST was in Canada and needed to be moved.

I'm thinking more along the line of REFORGER or the flyover augmentation to 4 CMBG.

🍻


----------



## ArmyRick

Dropping the reality bomb. For you ORBAT wizards, what would you do to re-org the Canadian Army AS IT IS TODAY. 

The If we got this, if we got that, is a very moot point. 

Should we even try to hold onto the Brigade or ditch it for battle groups permenantly standing? Ideas? Assume no new kit, because this government and its bureaucrats simply do NOT take defence seriously


----------



## Ostrozac

ArmyRick said:


> Dropping the reality bomb. For you ORBAT wizards, what would you do to re-org the Canadian Army AS IT IS TODAY.
> 
> The If we got this, if we got that, is a very moot point.
> 
> Should we even try to hold onto the Brigade or ditch it for battle groups permenantly standing? Ideas? Assume no new kit, because this government and its bureaucrats simply do NOT take defence seriously



As it is now? Without many of the tools of modern war fighting? That’s not a war fighting force, so you don’t need to think about war. And would be more infantry heavy than today. You do need to be to able to rotate battle groups for COIN/low-intensity conflict. So 3 LAV-equipped battalions and 3 light battalions. Possibly another 3 40/60 (deliberately under strength) battalions with a Bn HQ and a single rifle company, specifically to rotate into Latvia for the tripwire/sacrificial lamb role — as we don’t want to give them the tools to fight in the NATO role, they are strictly symbolic.

The other arms? Just enough to provide a toolbox from which to augment rotational battle groups. One tank regiment, one recce regiment. Two arty regiments - one with towed tube artillery, one with STA. One large combat engineer regiment — two if the infantry battalions lack their own pioneers. If you don’t want to deploy brigades on expeditionary operations, you can probably get away with a single deployable brigade headquarters, optimized for domestic operations (Oka, October Crisis…) that can act as a HICON to exercise the battalions but doesn’t administer them in garrison.

This is the model for a constabulary force, not a war fighting force. Because a war fighting force requires kit we currently don’t hold in the inventory (ATGM, SHORAD, SPA…)


----------



## KevinB

ArmyRick said:


> Dropping the reality bomb. For you ORBAT wizards, what would you do to re-org the Canadian Army AS IT IS TODAY.
> 
> The If we got this, if we got that, is a very moot point.
> 
> Should we even try to hold onto the Brigade or ditch it for battle groups permenantly standing? Ideas? Assume no new kit, because this government and its bureaucrats simply do NOT take defence seriously


With no new kit - I’d shutter the bulk of the Regular Army  to 1 actual Light Bde-ish 
  1 Airborne Btl Group in Pet 
  1 Airborne/Airmobile Btl Group in Edmonton 
  1 Airborne Btl Group in Valcartier 

Sell the Leo’s back to Germany 
  Move the LAV to the reserves.  

Focus everything on the Navy and AirForce and hope they would get new kit.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> In my dreams this is what happens to Armoured Reserve units. Essentially dual rolled as cavalry and mobility.
> 
> This is what I meant, *I don’t see your full plan laid out anywhere*. So you would strip all armoured vehicles, minus two companies worth per Bn, and pre position them?  Or am I just missing your point entirely.


That's fair, I piggy backed off the two posts outlining the RCT and then Canadianizing the fleet.  Full plan:
A. Outfit the 3 Bde's as RCT's,  infantry Btn's default to light, but trained to fight from LAV's and pure carriers as well
B. Take advantage of the lower number of vehicles per Bde to preposition a full Bde worth.

Under the Canadianized RCT there would be the following permanently mounted in the combat arms

Tank Coy
Reinforced LAV Recce/ RSTA Squadron
3x Weapon's Coy's with SPM and ATGM
There also be enough LAV's to mount 3x Rifle Coy's.  (Either as a manned mobility Coy or a vehicle pool).  Enough there to sustain a mounted battlegroup long term, or deploy the Bde with one of the 3 Btn's LAV mobile.

The issue pointed with the original Marine ORBAT is that if we were to deploy as a Bde into a  pear/ near pear conflict the lack of mobility for the remaining 2x LIB would significantly reduce their usefulness, which lead to my solution

C.  Have a stock of lighter weight vehicles to attach in wartime to motorize them, Bisons/ MiSu's, etc.


I think it's a viable option.  
That being said, the easier one (while keeping precious symmetry intact) would be to go to the American's and get everything needed to fill in the gaps to set up the armoured Regiments as US pattern Armoured Cavalry Squadrons, the 6 LAV battalions as Stryker battalions with ATGM platoons, dissolve the LIB's to make sure it's fully manned and stand up one LIB quick reaction force.


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> The point is that it's not mounted warfare, it's wartime capability to motorize the two remaining LIB's to provide mobility to the Brigade- exactly that, battle taxi's.   *The benefit of having them operated by reservists is to make use of the reserves to provide a wartime capability not otherwise needed,* stretching RegF PY's to have the three MEB GCE/ RCT Bde's fully manned, the fleet and budget to have all enabler's in place.



In its current format the CAF Reserves would fail, in a spectacular fashion, at this task.

OTOH, if it was a Reg F led tasking that the Reserves could augment, they might do OK.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Maybe the DAME/Northern Terrain Vehicles go to Service Battalions and the Rangers and the Bisons go to the Armoured Reserve for mobility?



For Res F, all of the vehicles more complicated than a pickup truck should go to the Res F Svc Bns which have proper maintenance facilities.  Might produce a recruitment bump for keeners who want to drive and maintain the beasts.  Armoured units can either go on doing Rat Patrol recce, or voluntarily offer to-role if they want to drive and maintain the beasts.


----------



## Kirkhill

Information archivée dans le Web | Information Archived on the Web
					






					publications.gc.ca
				




Took another look at the 1987 Challenge and Commitment Paper and compared it to current published info.



The Canadian Army in 1987 had Regular Strength of 22,500.  It currently has 23,000 Regs.  ie No Change.

It also had 15,500 Reserves and currently, nominally, 19,000.  I would argue that effectively that also is No Change.

Comms was as separate Branch of 3300 Regs and 1600 Reserves.  I believe that has been largely absorbed into the Army.

On the other hand CANSOFCOM has been stood up with 2550 Regs.

So Comms PYs have been largely swapped for SOF PYs.

Canadian Rangers are similar in strength to what they were.

In short the Army hasn't actually lost that many authorized bodies since 1987.  In fact it has gained Reserve positions.   It just doesn't seem to be able to recruit and retain them.



The RCN had 10,000 Regs and 2,300 Reserves for a total force of 12,300.   

It has 8,500 Regs and 3,700 Reserves for a total force of 12,200. 

The Navy hasn't lost any billets.  It has swapped Regs for the  Reserves.




The big change since 1987 has been in the RCAF.

In 1987 it had 23,050 Regs, or roughly as many Regs as the Army.

Currently it has 12,074 Regs, or roughly 50% of its 1987 strength and 50% of the Army.    

Unlike the RCN the RCAF didn't gain equivalent Reserve billets.  Its Reserve strength rose from 950 to 1,969, or about 1000 positions, but its total strength fell from 24,000 to 14,000.

The RCAF lost 10,000 positions, or the majority of the defence reductions since 1987.





So where did the RCAF lose these positions

Challenge and Commitment described the RCAF as having:

8x Ftr Sqns (CF-18s and CF-5s)
9s Maritime Sqns (CP-140s, Sea Kings and Trackers)
11x TacHel Sqns (Kiowa, Iroquois, Chinook)
6x Transport and Rescue Sqns
4x Transport Sqns
19x Radar Sqns.

The stand out elements are the loss of 

Fighter Sqns (4 Reg)
Tracker Sqns (4? - 3 Reg and 1 Res?)
TacHel Sqns (5? - 3 Reg and 2 Res?))

But the largest loss is the 19 Radar Squadrons.   There are currently 2 Radar Squadrons in service.

The other 17 Squadrons were struck off with the closures of the PineTree and DEW stations and the commissioning of the automated North Warning System.




So, shoulda-woulda-coulda time.

1.  Don't eliminate the Radar PYs - transfer them instead to GBAD Sqns,  Perhaps some of them could be reallocated to Reserve positions in 10/90 or 30/70 Squadrons.

2.  Retain the flying positions but transfer more of them to the Reserves.

3.  Exploit Perrin Beatty's proposed addition of 60,000 new Reserve positions, to bring the total Reserve Force, all Services, up to 90,000 in order to create a useful entry level security force with minimal training for Vital Point (Force Protection).

The Vital Point (Force Protection Force) would number something in the 50,000 to 60,000 range.  Kind of large.  Some transport companies would be useful as well.

The Army would retain its 15-20,000 Reserves but they would be dedicated as a Ready  Force to Reg Force augmentation.  

The RCAF would retain its numbers but would gain a Ground Based force.  That force, dominated by Reservists would supply a domestic and expeditionary GBAD force - reducing pressure on the Army in general and the Artillery in particular - and would also supply a base from which to develop other Ground Based capabilities like Air Space Coordination, UAS-RPAS, Long Range Precision Fires and UCAVs.

Oh.  And the CAR/SSF would be retained as a Light Brigade  QRF to be used in conjunction with CANSOFCOM.

Resurrection of the Comm Squads would also be a useful idea if we are going to fund those additional 60,000 Reservists.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> For Res F, all of the vehicles more complicated than a pickup truck should go to the Res F Svc Bns which have proper maintenance facilities.  Might produce a recruitment bump for keeners who want to drive and maintain the beasts.  Armoured units can either go on doing Rat Patrol recce, or voluntarily offer to-role if they want to drive and maintain the beasts.



OK. Good enough for me.

So long as there is transport available and easily accessible.   Draw from the Svc Bn compound one vehicle with Driver/Mechanic and Vehicle Commander.


----------



## KevinB

Brad Sallows said:


> For Res F, all of the vehicles more complicated than a pickup truck should go to the Res F Svc Bns which have proper maintenance facilities.  Might produce a recruitment bump for keeners who want to drive and maintain the beasts.  Armoured units can either go on doing Rat Patrol recce, or voluntarily offer to-role if they want to drive and maintain the beasts.


I would suggest that perhaps especially for the city based Res units - that one try to make maintenance heavy entities colocated with the maintenance units.
  For the remoter units - the need to have larger integral Maintenance subunits - with Reg Force Maintainer personnel as well.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> I think it's a viable option.
> That being said, the easier one (while keeping precious symmetry intact) would be to go to the American's and get everything needed to fill in the gaps to set up the armoured Regiments as US pattern Armoured Cavalry Squadrons, the 6 LAV battalions as Stryker battalions with ATGM platoons, dissolve the LIB's to make sure it's fully manned and stand up one LIB quick reaction force.


So force 2025 lol, minus the support vehicles (some of those roles will be filled by ACSV). 

I’m generally strongly opposed to the idea of “carrier” units as opposed to organic attachment. That’s simply from having spent some time in NZ and seeing the difficulties QAMR and 1 RNZIR have conducting integrated operations even though they are next door to each other. The problem is really our lack of strategic lift capability but that’s its own problem outside of our general structure.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> So force 2025 lol, minus the support vehicles (some of those roles will be filled by ACSV).


If Force 2025 enabled/directed the Army to do that (complete with Brads in the RCAC, mortar carriers etc) and they weren't already well on the way to implementing it....

Colour me frustrated.


----------



## FJAG

ArmyRick said:


> Dropping the reality bomb. For you ORBAT wizards, what would you do to re-org the Canadian Army AS IT IS TODAY.
> 
> The If we got this, if we got that, is a very moot point.
> 
> Should we even try to hold onto the Brigade or ditch it for battle groups permenantly standing? Ideas? Assume no new kit, because this government and its bureaucrats simply do NOT take defence seriously


Essentially, my 30/70 70/30 structure above is designed to work with today's Army's people and equipment. The two exceptions are HIMARS and AD (albeit it's in project form). The structure is premised on equipment sharing amongst high and low readiness units for training purposes which does limit the size of the total force that can be deployed at any given time to what we can do today. But, the way it is organized, there is an ability to deploy almost twice as many bn(-) organizations (ie a bn HQ and a company(+) sized element like we currently do in Latvia).

🍻


----------



## PuckChaser

Kirkhill said:


> Resurrection of the Comm Squads would also be a useful idea if we are going to fund those additional 60,000 Reservists.


You can't resurrect something that still exists. The Comm Res PYs rolled into the PRes, I think almost all units stayed as is. They reorg'd under Bde Sigs Regts (largest unit in Bde) and the smaller units are now Sqns underneath. RegF is still roughly 3300 Sigs NCM trades, rapidly dropping through 70% PML.

Tons of Sigs PYs in Reg and Res, just no bodies to fill them.


----------



## Kirkhill

PuckChaser said:


> You can't resurrect something that still exists. The Comm Res PYs rolled into the PRes, I think almost all units stayed as is. They reorg'd under Bde Sigs Regts (largest unit in Bde) and the smaller units are now Sqns underneath. RegF is still roughly 3300 Sigs NCM trades, rapidly dropping through 70% PML.
> 
> Tons of Sigs PYs in Reg and Res, just no bodies to fill them.




Thanks for the education.  I thought the positions had all been re-roled from strategic to tactical comms.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> If Force 2025 enabled/directed the Army to do that (complete with Brads in the RCAC, mortar carriers etc) and they weren't already well on the way to implementing it....
> 
> Colour me frustrated.


IFVs shouldn’t be manned by armoured folks. It has follow on complications and even the Americans crew their IFVs with infantrymen. Frankly the Bradley or LAV is a minimal difference, outside of ATGM capability that is.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> IFVs shouldn’t be manned by armoured folks. It has follow on complications and even the Americans crew their IFVs with infantrymen. Frankly the Bradley or LAV is a minimal difference, outside of ATGM capability that is.


I'm not sure how that helps. Just because the vehicle is mechanical and "armoured" doesn't mean it will be better served by an RCAC guy.

Operating the vehicle is something taught on a course to anyone. Operating that vehicle in a specific tactical environment is where experience comes into play. I'd rather have my IFVs operated by folks who have spent time in and know how a infantry platoon/company operates. I can't see having guys whose career stream bounces around between brigade recce and mech infantry and tanks provide added value.

$.02

🍻


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> IFVs shouldn’t be manned by armoured folks. It has follow on complications and even the Americans crew their IFVs with infantrymen. Frankly the Bradley or LAV is a minimal difference, outside of ATGM capability that is.


The post you initially quoted and subsequently claimed was covered in F2025 said to set up the armoured regiments like US ABCT Cavalry squadrons, thats entails scout and javelin teams in M3's


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> The post you initially quoted and subsequently claimed was covered in F2025 said to set up the armoured regiments like US ABCT Cavalry squadrons, thats entails scout and javelin teams in M3's


No I meant the bottom bit about adjustments and cutting light Bns to fill PYs. 


FJAG said:


> I'm not sure how that helps. Just because the vehicle is mechanical and "armoured" doesn't mean it will be better served by an RCAC guy.
> 
> Operating the vehicle is something taught on a course to anyone. Operating that vehicle in a specific tactical environment is where experience comes into play. I'd rather have my IFVs operated by folks who have spent time in and know how a infantry platoon/company operates. I can't see having guys whose career stream bounces around between brigade recce and mech infantry and tanks provide added value.
> 
> $.02
> 
> 🍻


I totally agree and I like having redundancy in crew within my section.


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> I'm not sure how that helps. Just because the vehicle is mechanical and "armoured" doesn't mean it will be better served by an RCAC guy.
> 
> Operating the vehicle is something taught on a course to anyone. Operating that vehicle in a specific tactical environment is where experience comes into play. I'd rather have my IFVs operated by folks who have spent time in and know how a infantry platoon/company operates. I can't see having guys whose career stream bounces around between brigade recce and mech infantry and tanks provide added value.
> 
> $.02
> 
> 🍻


Outsider opinion (assuming symmetry non-negotiable): Shortest route to a credible force is to take what we have, overlay the closest possible "out of the box" proven combat viable structure, gap analysis, fill gaps. The narrower the gaps the simpler to fill.  Beats the hell out of spending years thinking and assessing how to make a uniquely Canadian force structure.  

Armoured Regiment -> ABCT Cav squadron requires   14x M3 Bradleys, 8xMortar Carriers,  mix of LRSS and TAPV replace Humvees
LAV Battalion -> Up gunned SBCT Battalion requires 4 M1134, 10x Mortar Carriers, LAV 6 inplace of Stryker ISC

Not counting spares and training, 42 M3 Bradleys, 84 Mortar Carriers, 24 LAV ATGM, and a bunch of Javelin CLU's.  

Result is 3 Bde's that while admittedly short a Btn are heavier armed and armoured than their US template.  Not an ABCT, but an SBCT+, with a Cavalry squadron that has a role in the heavy fight, and can perform all levels of security tasks in a peer fight.


----------



## ArmyRick

Ostrozac said:


> As it is now? Without many of the tools of modern war fighting? That’s not a war fighting force, so you don’t need to think about war. And would be more infantry heavy than today. You do need to be to able to rotate battle groups for COIN/low-intensity conflict. So 3 LAV-equipped battalions and 3 light battalions. Possibly another 3 40/60 (deliberately under strength) battalions with a Bn HQ and a single rifle company, specifically to rotate into Latvia for the tripwire/sacrificial lamb role — as we don’t want to give them the tools to fight in the NATO role, they are strictly symbolic.
> 
> The other arms? Just enough to provide a toolbox from which to augment rotational battle groups. One tank regiment, one recce regiment. Two arty regiments - one with towed tube artillery, one with STA. One large combat engineer regiment — two if the infantry battalions lack their own pioneers. If you don’t want to deploy brigades on expeditionary operations, you can probably get away with a single deployable brigade headquarters, optimized for domestic operations (Oka, October Crisis…) that can act as a HICON to exercise the battalions but doesn’t administer them in garrison.
> 
> This is the model for a constabulary force, not a war fighting force. Because a war fighting force requires kit we currently don’t hold in the inventory (ATGM, SHORAD, SPA…)


Brutal reality, I am convinced this government will NOT invest didley in the kit needed to be a grown up army.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

We can have credible mechanized infantry battalions/battle groups with the acquisition of Javelin or an equivalent - no need for reorganization. Mortars would be useful as well - I believe that we still have them (not SP but hey) and that would take some organizational work assuming we also wanted to have those battalions/BGs as part of a Bde with artillery.


----------



## Edward Campbell

KevinB said:


> I would suggest that perhaps especially for the city based Res units - that one try to make maintenance heavy entities colocated with the maintenance units.
> For the remoter units - the need to have larger integral Maintenance subunits - with Reg Force Maintainer personnel as well.



In general, IF we want to have a credible, effective reserve, and that's a *Big IF,* then it needs to be properly supported, and that means it needs good Reg Force Maint and Log and Adm people there, in the Res units, as *organic* support, and they need access to tools, test equipment and space parts and money and so on.

That implies that the CF needs more Maint, Log and Adm people, period. That implies that Canada needs a major shift in Army thinking. That implies that we need a new, younger, smarter general staff.


----------



## GR66

TangoTwoBravo said:


> We can have credible mechanized infantry battalions/battle groups with the acquisition of Javelin or an equivalent - no need for reorganization. Mortars would be useful as well - I believe that we still have them (not SP but hey) and that would take some organizational work assuming we also wanted to have those battalions/BGs as part of a Bde with artillery.


I would say that significant mortar support in the Battalions is a key capability that we should focus on.  The prevalence of man-portable ATGMs on the battlefield means that any mounted force will need the internal ability to have high volumes of suppressive indirect fire to protect against dispersed dismounted infantry in complex terrain.  A turreted 120mm mortar on the LAV chassis should be a fairly straight forward acquisition. 

As far as Force 2025 ORBATs go I think the focus really should be on making our three existing Brigade Groups sustainable.  I don't think we have the depth of vehicles, equipment, weapon systems, transport or maintenance support to even consider fielding additional Brigades in sustained combat.  We should instead as a first step ensure that we can field one full Brigade Group and use the other two Brigades and the Reserves to keep it up to strength once deployed.  Additional growth can come after that first step is successful.  

I think the initial premise of 1 x Heavy(ish), 1 x Medium and 1 x Light Brigade is still a solid first step.  Tank Regiment and 3 x LAV Battalions in 1 Brigade, Armoured Recce Regiment and 3 x LAV Battalions in 5 Brigade and Light Armoured Recce and 3 x Light Battalions in 2 Brigade.

If we were to go to a 14-tank Squadron then we could have 3 x Squadrons in LdSH and enough tanks left over to pre-position 2 x 14-tank Squadrons plus a LAV Company in Latvia.  This could be our fly-over Armoured Battalion to work with the eFP Latvia Mechanized Battalion as part of a Canadian led Brigade Group.  Fly over the personnel for the Armoured Battalion at the first sign of a Russian build-up as an additional deterrent force.  If conflict looks imminent then we fly over a Light Battalion to round out the Brigade.  In a defensive battle against a Russian attack a Light Battalion could be effective like the Ukrainians are while the Armoured Battalion and eFP Mech Battalion could provide the mobile elements for local counter attacks.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I would say that significant mortar support in the Battalions is a key capability that we should focus on.  The prevalence of man-portable ATGMs on the battlefield means that any mounted force will need the internal ability to have high volumes of suppressive indirect fire to protect against dispersed dismounted infantry in complex terrain.  A turreted 120mm mortar on the LAV chassis should be a fairly straight forward acquisition.


Couldn't agree more. Even if a turreted 120 is a bit down the road a dismounted 81 is better than nothing in the interim and will allow the training with integral fire support.


GR66 said:


> As far as Force 2025 ORBATs go I think the focus really should be on making our three existing Brigade Groups sustainable.  I don't think we have the depth of vehicles, equipment, weapon systems, transport or maintenance support to even consider fielding additional Brigades in sustained combat.  We should instead as a first step ensure that we can field one full Brigade Group and use the other two Brigades and the Reserves to keep it up to strength once deployed.  Additional growth can come after that first step is successful.


That sounds suspiciously like MRS and whole fleet management. I don't disagree that we might have trouble sustaining a full brigade in sustained combat and will have to dig into the other brigades and reserves to do that. I just think that we should be structured as equipped and organized brigades to start with.

I'm with @TangoTwoBravo in that our infantry battalions are pretty much there.


GR66 said:


> I think the initial premise of 1 x Heavy(ish), 1 x Medium and 1 x Light Brigade is still a solid first step.  Tank Regiment and 3 x LAV Battalions in 1 Brigade, Armoured Recce Regiment and 3 x LAV Battalions in 5 Brigade and Light Armoured Recce and 3 x Light Battalions in 2 Brigade.


Building on the above, the heavy brigade really doesn't need three infantry battalions if it has a full armoured regiment. It already has three manoeuvre battalions to work with. That leaves the armoured regiments recce squadron and a light infantry battalion as the core around which a cavalry regiment can be built.

That leaves four battalions worth of LAVs which can be used to build that three-battalion medium brigade with it's organic armoured recce regiment converting to cavalry. As you suggest, with the third brigade light you now have one battalion of LAVs unallocated and capable of other tasks.


GR66 said:


> If we were to go to a 14-tank Squadron then we could have 3 x Squadrons in LdSH and enough tanks left over to pre-position 2 x 14-tank Squadrons plus a LAV Company in Latvia.  This could be our fly-over Armoured Battalion to work with the eFP Latvia Mechanized Battalion as part of a Canadian led Brigade Group.  Fly over the personnel for the Armoured Battalion at the first sign of a Russian build-up as an additional deterrent force.  If conflict looks imminent then we fly over a Light Battalion to round out the Brigade.  In a defensive battle against a Russian attack a Light Battalion could be effective like the Ukrainians are while the Armoured Battalion and eFP Mech Battalion could provide the mobile elements for local counter attacks.


Okay. Here's a suggestion.

The current eFP battalion led by Canada already has a fair amount of armour in it. To create a full ABCT you would only need to add one armoured battalion and one LAV battalion (plus cavalry, artillery, engineers and CSS).

I've mentioned before that I do not know how the eFP bn fits into any Latvian brigade structures or how Latvians M109s are allocated but for arguments sake if we say that the eFP battalion is assigned to a flyover Canadian brigade then one could preposition an armoured regiment with three squadrons, one additional mech bn of LAVs (remember I said there was a spare one) plus the cavalry regiment and all the requisite CS and CSS gear.

That leaves two tank squadrons in Canada which is sufficient for shared training for the three squadrons (who could also do flyover training).

The tanks and the LAV battalion are actually the easiest part to predeploy. It's the rest of the establishment for a brigade that would put pressure on Canada.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Couldn't agree more. Even if a turreted 120 is a bit down the road a dismounted 81 is better than nothing in the interim and will allow the training with integral fire support.
> 
> That sounds suspiciously like MRS and whole fleet management. I don't disagree that we might have trouble sustaining a full brigade in sustained combat and will have to dig into the other brigades and reserves to do that. I just think that we should be structured as equipped and organized brigades to start with.
> 
> I'm with @TangoTwoBravo in that our infantry battalions are pretty much there.
> 
> Building on the above, the heavy brigade really doesn't need three infantry battalions if it has a full armoured regiment. It already has three manoeuvre battalions to work with. That leaves the armoured regiments recce squadron and a light infantry battalion as the core around which a cavalry regiment can be built.
> 
> That leaves four battalions worth of LAVs which can be used to build that three-battalion medium brigade with it's organic armoured recce regiment converting to cavalry. As you suggest, with the third brigade light you now have one battalion of LAVs unallocated and capable of other tasks.
> 
> Okay. Here's a suggestion.
> 
> The current eFP battalion led by Canada already has a fair amount of armour in it. To create a full ABCT you would only need to add one armoured battalion and one LAV battalion (plus cavalry, artillery, engineers and CSS).
> 
> I've mentioned before that I do not know how the eFP bn fits into any Latvian brigade structures or how Latvians M109s are allocated but for arguments sake if we say that the eFP battalion is assigned to a flyover Canadian brigade then one could preposition an armoured regiment with three squadrons, one additional mech bn of LAVs (remember I said there was a spare one) plus the cavalry regiment and all the requisite CS and CSS gear.
> 
> That leaves two tank squadrons in Canada which is sufficient for shared training for the three squadrons (who could also do flyover training).
> 
> The tanks and the LAV battalion are actually the easiest part to predeploy. It's the rest of the establishment for a brigade that would put pressure on Canada.
> 
> 🍻


eFP actually falls under the Latvian Bde. I assume Estonia and Lithuania have similar arrangements.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> The tanks and the LAV battalion are actually the easiest part to predeploy. It's the rest of the establishment for a brigade that would put pressure on Canada.
> 
> 🍻


Seeing as you actually have Tanks and Lav's -- yes


----------



## CBH99

ArmyRick said:


> Brutal reality, I am convinced this government will NOT invest didley in the kit needed to be a grown up army.


That reinforces my thoughts that once a white paper of sorts is made official - and the government has laid out what it wants to be able to do, how much it is willing to spend, and how they want it to get done… they really need to step aside and let the force equip itself.  

Oversight needed to ensure accountability?  Yes. 

Thick layers of red tape?  No.  


It seems the government forgets that the military is the physical aspect of its foreign policy, and when they cheap out on kit, they are only cheaping out on their own credibility.  

They need to invest more effort into getting out of the f**king way.


----------



## WLSC

White paper…  If I’m not mistaken, the only one that was followed was the one on drastic downsizing ans unification.  As much I believe in what we do, as much I believe GC just don’t care.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> The RCAF lost 10,000 positions, or the majority of the defence reductions since 1987.
> 
> So where did the RCAF lose these positions
> 
> Challenge and Commitment described the RCAF as having:
> 
> 8x Ftr Sqns (CF-18s and CF-5s)
> 9s Maritime Sqns (CP-140s, Sea Kings and Trackers)
> 11x TacHel Sqns (Kiowa, Iroquois, Chinook)
> 6x Transport and Rescue Sqns
> 4x Transport Sqns
> 19x Radar Sqns.
> 
> The stand out elements are the loss of
> 
> Fighter Sqns (4 Reg)
> Tracker Sqns (4? - 3 Reg and 1 Res?)
> TacHel Sqns (5? - 3 Reg and 2 Res?))
> 
> But the largest loss is the 19 Radar Squadrons. There are currently 2 Radar Squadrons in service.
> 
> The other 17 Squadrons were struck off with the closures of the PineTree and DEW stations and the commissioning of the automated North Warning System.
> 
> So, shoulda-woulda-coulda time.
> 
> 1. Don't eliminate the Radar PYs - transfer them instead to GBAD Sqns, Perhaps some of them could be reallocated to Reserve positions in 10/90 or 30/70 Squadrons.




How to make nice with Uncle Sam.

Take advantage of the geopolitical situation revisit Canada's position on Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence now that it is obvious that Russia has gone rogue.

Return the lost 10,000 to the CAF in general and the RCAF in particular.
Reinstate the 19 Radar Squadrons
Redesignate them as GBAD Squadrons

Arm 2 with SM3 Block IIA ABMs  and locate them in Inuvik and Iqaluit.  

RIM-161 Standard Missile 31,500 km alt​2500 km​Mach 18​Mid-Course Intercept25 MCAD

Arm 1 with RPAS 

Arm 4 with SM6 ERAM and locate them in the Lower Mainland, the St Lawrence Valley, the Maritimes, the Prairies.

RIM-174 Standard Missile 6 ERAM34 km alt​370 km​Mach 3.5​Multi-Purpose5 MCAD

Arm the remaining 12 with CAMM-ER and distribute them across the National Airport System (48 Airports and Sea Ports)

CAMM-ER45 km​Mach 4​

Add a ManPADs Troop to every Battery (Reg and Reserve)

Add a GBAD Regiment to the Reg Force.

Add SM3s and 6s to CSC Loadouts.  CAMM-ER already on board.

Add a couple of RRCA Coastal Defence Batteries.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> During peacetime, both brigades would share the equipment in Canada and deploy regularly to exercise in Europe on the prepositioned equipment.





Brad Sallows said:


> For Res F, all of the vehicles more complicated than a pickup truck should go to the Res F Svc Bns which have proper maintenance facilities.  Might produce a recruitment bump for keeners who want to drive and maintain the beasts.



These two comments got me to thinking about how we organize and equip our Reg Force and Reserve units.

Since our Brigade Groups are technically Force Generation units as opposed to Force Deployment units do we need to equip them as if they are to be deployed the same way they are based?

For example, if 1 Brigade were to be set as our "Heavy" Brigade Group with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions all co-located in Edmonton would we need 2 x full Battalions worth of LAVs in Edmonton/Wainwright to train the two Mech Battalions?

Could we instead base 1 x Battalion worth of LAVs in Wainwright for 1 & 2 PPCLI to train on and split the other Battalion worth of LAVs up to have for example 1 x Company co-located in Saskatoon with 38 Service Battalion/North Saskatchewan Regiment, 1 x Company co-located in Richmond with 39 Service Battalion/The Royal Westminster Regiment/The Seaforth Highlanders and 1 x Company co-located in Calgary with 41 Service Battalion/The Calgary Highlanders?

 The Service Battalions could be hybrid staffed with a mix of Reg Force and Reserve maintainers and the Reserve Combat Arms units would have access to the same vehicles/equipment as the Reg Force without having to make any additional vehicle purchases.  

Alternately, perhaps a Reg Force/Reserve Force equipment sharing system could be set up somewhat similar to the Blue Team/Gold Team dual-crew system that the USN uses to man their Ballistic Missile Submarines.  For example, Lord Strathcona's Horse could have their Leapards maintained by their Regimental maintainers but the vehicles have dual-crew Reg Force/Reserve Force manning.

For example the vehicles of one Tank Squadron might have Blue Team manning by A Sqn, LdSH and Gold Team manning by the South Alberta  Light Horse while the vehicles of the next Tank Squadron might have Blue Team manning by B Sqn, LdSH and Gold Team manning by the King's Own Calgary Regiment.

Thoughts?


----------



## McG

GR66 said:


> Could we instead base 1 x Battalion worth of LAVs in Wainwright for 1 & 2 PPCLI to train on and split the other Battalion worth of LAVs up to have for example 1 x Company co-located in Saskatoon with 38 Service Battalion/North Saskatchewan Regiment, 1 x Company co-located in Richmond with 39 Service Battalion/The Royal Westminster Regiment/The Seaforth Highlanders and 1 x Company co-located in Calgary with 41 Service Battalion/The Calgary Highlanders?
> 
> The Service Battalions could be hybrid staffed with a mix of Reg Force and Reserve maintainers and the Reserve Combat Arms units would have access to the same vehicles/equipment as the Reg Force without having to make any additional vehicle purchases.


This is a great way to destroy the vehicle fleet, reduced readiness, and limit training.  Having 1 PPCLI & 2 PPCLI share a vehicle pool means a barrier to concurrent training.  It means there is no sense of vehicle ownership and the resultant level of care and maintenance that crews give when it is their vehicle.  It means every training activity (including collective training and operator courses) requires a deployment away from home.  It means you are posting a lot of maintaners to Wainwright to babysit an equipment pool (which did not work so well when we tried it 18 years ago).  It means you are doubling the wear rate of the vehicles, but probably not halving the time to seeing a replacement fleet.

And down that the PRes units that now have a sprinkling of AFV, the equipment probably starts suffering the faults that come from under-utilization and from not having the proper infrastructure to park and maintain it.  There is limited amounts of STTE and recovery vehicles capable of handling AFV, so you will have trouble keeping things fixed once they are spread much thiner across much broader geography. Your LAV fleet in lower mainland BC will have a hard time finding a training area to support live fire.  The CA cannot even figure out how to fully quallify PRes Veh Techs to look after B fleet, so you are dreaming if thinking PRes techs will support AFV maintenance even with increased Reg F Veh Tech posted to these locations.

If anyone is so emotionally invested in the idea that PRes needs AFV that they cannot consider any other options, then the supporting course of action must consist of Canada buying more AFV with the intent of equiping the PRes.  Not robbing from too-small Reg F vehicle allocations, and not cascading exhausted old Reg F vehicles that are past due for retirement.  You are also going to need to by more STTE so that can be sprinkled to all the places you want to put vehicles, and you are going to need a lot more PYs for CSS to support this larger vehicle fleet.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> This is a great way to destroy the vehicle fleet, reduced readiness, and limit training.  Having 1 PPCLI & 2 PPCLI share a vehicle pool means a barrier to concurrent training.  It means there is no sense of vehicle ownership and the resultant level of care and maintenance that crews give when it is their vehicle.  It means every training activity (including collective training and operator courses) requires a deployment away from home.  It means you are posting a lot of maintaners to Wainwright to babysit an equipment pool (which did not work so well when we tried it 18 years ago).  It means you are doubling the wear rate of the vehicles, but probably not halving the time to seeing a replacement fleet.
> 
> And down that the PRes units that now have a sprinkling of AFV, the equipment probably starts suffering the faults that come from under-utilization and from not having the proper infrastructure to park and maintain it.  There is limited amounts of STTE and recovery vehicles capable of handling AFV, so you will have trouble keeping things fixed once they are spread much thiner across much broader geography. Your LAV fleet in lower mainland BC will have a hard time finding a training area to support live fire.  The CA cannot even figure out how to fully quallify PRes Veh Techs to look after B fleet, so you are dreaming if thinking PRes techs will support AFV maintenance even with increased Reg F Veh Tech posted to these locations.
> 
> If anyone is so emotionally invested in the idea that PRes needs AFV that they cannot consider any other options, then the supporting course of action must consist of Canada buying more AFV with the intent of equiping the PRes.  Not robbing from too-small Reg F vehicle allocations, and not cascading exhausted old Reg F vehicles that are past due for retirement.  You are also going to need to by more STTE so that can be sprinkled to all the places you want to put vehicles, and you are going to need a lot more PYs for CSS to support this larger vehicle fleet.



We had 4 x Grizzlies on Vancouver Island when some genius decided that a gigantic mountainous Island rain forest would be a great place to train for armoured Infantry warfare.

It was a complete waste of time and vehicles, when the vehicles were serviceable (which they were not alot of the time).


----------



## Brad Sallows

I always assumed it had more to do with the fact that a Grizzly battalion (and facilities) was at Work Point.  Otherwise "they" could have co-located those 4 with the Cougars held by the BCD so that the BCD and RM Rang could play together.


----------



## KevinB

National Guard holds their armored vehicles at training centers…
   With full time maintenance teams.

Might be a clue.


----------



## OldSolduer

KevinB said:


> National Guard holds their armored vehicles at training centers…
> With full time maintenance teams.
> 
> Might be a clue.


That costs money!! Money we'd rather spend on a variety of useless programs that basically bribe the Canadian population WITH THEIR OWN MONEY!!


----------



## rmc_wannabe

KevinB said:


> National Guard holds their armored vehicles at training centers…
> With full time maintenance teams.
> 
> Might be a clue.


I used to hate the shit show that was Maple Guardian at CMTC strictly because of the road moves, trail parties, railhead moves, etc.

So many staff hours could have been saved if they had a BG's worth of LAVs and other vehicles sitting in location that could get beat to hell and fixed in loc. But no, we drive, flatbed, and rail car 3 different brigades worth of kit into location because it's "cheaper" than buying and maintaining a Collective Training fleet.


----------



## dapaterson

OldSolduer said:


> That costs money!! Money we'd rather spend on a variety of useless programs that basically bribe the Canadian population WITH THEIR OWN MONEY!!


Also costs full-time personnel, that we'd rather pretend are operationally ready infantry with (checks notes) no integral indirect fire, no vehicles, insufficient range time...

Cash out a Reg F Inf BN and convert them to maintainers and supply and the Reg F and Res F would be significantly more operationally capable.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> We had 4 x Grizzlies on Vancouver Island when some genius decided that a gigantic mountainous Island rain forest would be a great place to train for armoured Infantry warfare.
> 
> It was a complete waste of time and vehicles, when the vehicles were serviceable (which they were not alot of the time).



Armoured Warfare?  Or Urban Riot Control?  
Not much to choose between a Grizzly and a Saracen.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> Cash out a Reg F Bde and make them maintainers


Fixed it for you


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> National Guard holds their armored vehicles at training centers…
> With full time maintenance teams.
> 
> Might be a clue.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Armoured Warfare?  Or Urban Riot Control?
> Not much to choose between a Grizzly and a Saracen.



The 'mean streets' of downtown Victoria hardly require armoured vehicles to tame them.

More like a few dozen bags of free weed....


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The 'mean streets' of downtown Victoria hardly require armoured vehicles to tame them.
> 
> More like a few dozen bags of free weed....



Unfortunately, while you were swanning around Armagh cow paddies our current leader's father was debating alternatives to tanks in the streets. Apparently there was some kind of dust up in Quebec that got his attention just about the time the Paras were getting in some range time in the Bogside.  Grizzlies were going to be just the thing.   So of course every city needed a set of four.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Unfortunately, while you were swanning around Armagh cow paddies our current leader's father was debating alternatives to tanks in the streets. Apparently there was some kind of dust up in Quebec that got his attention just about the time the Paras were getting in some range time in the Bogside.  Grizzlies were going to be just the thing.   So of course every city needed a set of four.



Well, in that case, in our city at least the base maintenance section would be well defended


----------



## KevinB

The biggest fail in all the Reg/Res mixes comes down to the inadequate number of bases available for actual training and support.

The number of base closures to form "Super Bases" in the 90's was significant.  I use quotes around "Super Base" simply because down here, we have Div + bases in abundance - and Bde+ Sized NG Support "Camps" 

Back when 3 VP was in Work Point Barracks Esquimalt, 1 VP was in Currie Barracks Calgary, and 2 VP was in Kapyong Barracks Winnipeg, they offered at least a Bn sized entity and had some minor training areas and ranges, that could have been leverage significantly in a Total Force concept (3 VP briefly had been 10/90 before being shuttered).

The loss of those sites to the Canadian Army significantly reduced any ability to make regional training/support areas for the Res.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> The biggest fail in all the Reg/Res mixes comes down to the inadequate number of bases available for actual training and support.
> 
> The number of base closures to form "Super Bases" in the 90's was significant.  I use quotes around "Super Base" simply because down here, we have Div + bases in abundance - and Bde+ Sized NG Support "Camps"
> 
> Back when 3 VP was in Work Point Barracks Esquimalt, 1 VP was in Currie Barracks Calgary, and 2 VP was in Kapyong Barracks Winnipeg, they offered at least a Bn sized entity and had some minor training areas and ranges, that could have been leverage significantly in a Total Force concept (3 VP briefly had been 10/90 before being shuttered).
> 
> The loss of those sites to the Canadian Army significantly reduced any ability to make regional training/support areas for the Res.



I was in a reserve Infantry unit in Victoria when 3 VP was in town.

We never, ever, connected with them for anything: training, Pro D, social events etc.

As a result, their presence did nothing for us apart from removing every shred of public good will and support for our local training activities when they trashed the Galloping Goose trail (including dumping loads of unwanted ammo and pyro en route) during an infamous battalion death march back from a big exercise they ran in Sooke in the early 90s. 

We were banned from using that trail, usually for our annual 13km BFT, for years after their departure for Edmonton. A wonderful legacy


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> I was in a reserve Infantry unit in Victoria when 3 VP was in town.
> 
> We never, ever, connected with them for anything: training, Pro D, social events etc.
> 
> As a result, their presence did nothing for us apart from removing every shred of public good will and support for our local training activities when they trashed the Galloping Goose trail (including dumping loads of unwanted ammo and pyro en route) during an infamous battalion death march back from a big exercise they ran in Sooke in the early 90s.
> 
> We were banned from using that trail, usually for our annual 13km BFT, for years after their departure for Edmonton. A wonderful legacy



But..... Professionals....


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> But..... Professionals....



To be fair, some members of 3 VP were horrified. Other, more senior folks, didn't seem to GAF


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> I was in a reserve Infantry unit in Victoria when 3 VP was in town.
> 
> We never, ever, connected with them for anything: training, Pro D, social events etc.
> 
> As a result, their presence did nothing for us apart from removing every shred of public good will and support for our local training activities when they trashed the Galloping Goose trail (including dumping loads of unwanted ammo and pyro en route) during an infamous battalion death march back from a big exercise they ran in Sooke in the early 90s.
> 
> We were banned from using that trail, usually for our annual 13km BFT, for years after their departure for Edmonton. A wonderful legacy


Which also goes to prove the fact that the CA really doesn’t give 2 shits about the PRes until they need augmentation…

Which is pretty FUBAR


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Kirkhill said:


> But..... Professionals....


My first Platoon Warrant, who served in Somalia with Mortar Platoon, told me "anyone who tells you the Army of 20-30 years ago was more professional and capable than today..... they are a liar".


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> These two comments got me to thinking about how we organize and equip our Reg Force and Reserve units.
> 
> Since our Brigade Groups are technically Force Generation units as opposed to Force Deployment units do we need to equip them as if they are to be deployed the same way they are based?
> 
> For example, if 1 Brigade were to be set as our "Heavy" Brigade Group with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions all co-located in Edmonton would we need 2 x full Battalions worth of LAVs in Edmonton/Wainwright to train the two Mech Battalions?
> 
> Could we instead base 1 x Battalion worth of LAVs in Wainwright for 1 & 2 PPCLI to train on and split the other Battalion worth of LAVs up to have for example 1 x Company co-located in Saskatoon with 38 Service Battalion/North Saskatchewan Regiment, 1 x Company co-located in Richmond with 39 Service Battalion/The Royal Westminster Regiment/The Seaforth Highlanders and 1 x Company co-located in Calgary with 41 Service Battalion/The Calgary Highlanders?
> 
> The Service Battalions could be hybrid staffed with a mix of Reg Force and Reserve maintainers and the Reserve Combat Arms units would have access to the same vehicles/equipment as the Reg Force without having to make any additional vehicle purchases.
> 
> Alternately, perhaps a Reg Force/Reserve Force equipment sharing system could be set up somewhat similar to the Blue Team/Gold Team dual-crew system that the USN uses to man their Ballistic Missile Submarines.  For example, Lord Strathcona's Horse could have their Leapards maintained by their Regimental maintainers but the vehicles have dual-crew Reg Force/Reserve Force manning.
> 
> For example the vehicles of one Tank Squadron might have Blue Team manning by A Sqn, LdSH and Gold Team manning by the South Alberta  Light Horse while the vehicles of the next Tank Squadron might have Blue Team manning by B Sqn, LdSH and Gold Team manning by the King's Own Calgary Regiment.
> 
> Thoughts?


How do you anticipate gunner grills will be refreshed if 2 VP is 12 hours away from their cars ? Who’s going to teach Gunner / Driver / Crew Commander course that are presently ran in house with the advantage of the Bn being able to run them dependant on the required number of qualifications ?


----------



## WestIsle

KevinB said:


> Which also goes to prove the fact that the CA really doesn’t give 2 shits about the PRes until they need augmentation…
> 
> Which is pretty FUBAR


Which is ironic considering the CA Regular Forces inability to support deployments since WW2.


----------



## markppcli

WestIsle said:


> Which is ironic considering the CA Regular Forces inability to support deployments since WW2.


? Korea, Cyprus, Bosnia. Afghanistan had a mandated 25 percent augmentation but that’s not an inability that’s a policy. Obviously we need reserves for long term operational sustainment but I don’t think that’s really a fair take.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> This is a great way to destroy the vehicle fleet, reduced readiness, and limit training.  Having 1 PPCLI & 2 PPCLI share a vehicle pool means a barrier to concurrent training.


Does one really need concurrent training with two battalions when our SSE dictates we deploy battlegroup sized formations? The answer is no.


McG said:


> It means there is no sense of vehicle ownership and the resultant level of care and maintenance that crews give when it is their vehicle.


It means one set of vehicles are "owned" and maintained by two sets of maintainers combined to keep the vehicles operational.


McG said:


> It means every training activity (including collective training and operator courses) requires a deployment away from home.  It means you are posting a lot of maintaners to Wainwright to babysit an equipment pool (which did not work so well when we tried it 18 years ago).


Not in Pet or Valcartier. The fleet could be kept in Edmonton for routine training and taken out to Wainwright for six weeks for the battalions to train on sequentially.


McG said:


> It means you are doubling the wear rate of the vehicles, but probably not halving the time to seeing a replacement fleet.


The fleet with the reserves would have a lower wear rate and could be rotated to balance the wear.


McG said:


> And down that the PRes units that now have a sprinkling of AFV, the equipment probably starts suffering the faults that come from under-utilization and from not having the proper infrastructure to park and maintain it.


The whole point in sharing equipment is to stop under utilization.


McG said:


> There is limited amounts of STTE and recovery vehicles capable of handling AFV, so you will have trouble keeping things fixed once they are spread much thiner across much broader geography.


Don't spread them around. Concentrate the bulk of them and their maintainers at training centres and distribute a few as local training aides.


McG said:


> Your LAV fleet in lower mainland BC will have a hard time finding a training area to support live fire.


Hold gun camp concentrations at ranges where you can and bus or fly in the troops.


McG said:


> The CA cannot even figure out how to fully quallify PRes Veh Techs to look after B fleet, so you are dreaming if thinking PRes techs will support AFV maintenance even with increased Reg F Veh Tech posted to these locations.


Then a few folks need firing. Who is saying PRes techs support the fleet. Full timers support the fleet. Part timers learn to support the fleet but aren't the primary maintainers. Anyone who tries to maintain a fleet with part-timers is setting themselves up for failure.


McG said:


> If anyone is so emotionally invested in the idea that PRes needs AFV that they cannot consider any other options, then the supporting course of action must consist of Canada buying more AFV with the intent of equiping the PRes.


It's not emotional involvement. It's the practical necessity of exposing people to and letting them train on the equipment they are meant to fight on. The level to which a force should be equipped to is based on the level that they are to be deployed on operationally. If the Op plan says you need to deploy two brigades then you need two brigades worth of equipment plus enough to train with and for battle loss replacements. If you can train two brigades with one set of kit then do so. A possible example would be preposition one brigade set of equipment for operations and have another set of equipment divided between two brigades with the units inside the brigade sharing that half set.


McG said:


> Not robbing from too-small Reg F vehicle allocations, and not cascading exhausted old Reg F vehicles that are past due for retirement.  You are also going to need to by more STTE so that can be sprinkled to all the places you want to put vehicles, and you are going to need a lot more PYs for CSS to support this larger vehicle fleet.


Let's call a spade a spade. What's really going on is that the RegF is glomming on to their equipment while the ResF has none. That's just plain silly when the intent is to train ResF members to a sufficient standard to make them a viable and readily available trained contingent. It leaves half the potential force untrained or undertrained. That has to stop.

I remember that our M109s would spend maybe three months a year actually being used for training (and a third of that is merely driver training and not full field exercising). The other nine months they spent sitting in the gun shed or it's parking lot while the unit did other things. Some of that was maintenance but the bulk was sitting. I'll bet the LAVs are pretty much the same.

One can find a million excuses as to why something shouldn't happen. But when half of your army has little equipment to train on and would use it at best for one or two months a year in the summer, when the RegF doesn't use it then it simply doesn't make sense to not share it. Any given LAV or TAPV or M777 could be trained on by several units and still have sufficient time to be maintained. What it takes is cooperation and planning.

We're smart people; we should be able to figure this out. ... If we really want to.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> ? Korea, Cyprus, Bosnia. Afghanistan had a mandated 25 percent augmentation but that’s not an inability that’s a policy. Obviously we need reserves for long term operational sustainment but I don’t think that’s really a fair take.


Korea was effectively an all reserve thing -- the Special Force raised for Korea was made for it.

Cyprus wasn't a mandated thing, it was mostly Reg force thing until the very end, and that was due to FYR, and Somalia running at the same time.
FYR, again not mandated - just a running out of folks from burning the candle at both ends.

Afghanistan, none of the first Roto's had any significant Res presence - it wasn't until the bucket was being drained that Res where called in.


Let's face it - until their is a dire need, or perception of a dire need, the Regular Army chooses to ignore the P Res.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Let's face it - until their is a dire need, or perception of a dire need, the Regular Army chooses to ignore the P Res.



And, in all truth based on how we were treated when interacting with them, we were generally thankful that they did


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> Does one really need concurrent training with two battalions when our SSE dictates we deploy battlegroup sized formations? The answer is no.


The answer is yes. SSE dictates that we must be able to deploy multiple BG sized organizations concurrently, so those organizations need the ability to prepare and train concurrently.



FJAG said:


> It means one set of vehicles are "owned" and maintained by two sets of maintainers combined to keep the vehicles operational.


Shared fleets don’t engender a sense of ownership in the crews. The vehicles are “rentals” which only need to be suffered until it is time to be put back in the pool.



FJAG said:


> Not in Pet or Valcartier.


So what? I was responding to a proposal that specifically suggested the Reg F units in Edmonton & Shilo should share a fleet that would be in Wainwright. “Not in Pet or Valcartier” does nothing to ameliorate the faults of that proposal. That being said, a shared RCR LAV fleet in Petawawa would compel 2 RCR to do all trainIng (including courses) away from home.



FJAG said:


> Don't spread them around. Concentrate the bulk of them and their maintainers at training centres and distribute a few as local training aides.


Again, I was responding to a proposal that parcelled LAV in little groups about the country. Even coy sized vehicle pools will be problematic because current LAV owning units are not resourced with STTE for divisible A2 & B echelons.



FJAG said:


> It's not emotional involvement. It's the practical necessity of exposing people to and letting them train on the equipment they are meant to fight on.


If it is necessary for PRes to be mechanized then propose it with the proper resources.



FJAG said:


> If you can train two brigades with one set of kit then do so. A possible example would be preposition one brigade set of equipment for operations and have another set of equipment divided between two brigades with the units inside the brigade sharing that half set.


If we look at Ukraine right now, it would appear that equipment (not people) is the critical path for war time for force generation. If we don’t have enough equipment for three brigades, why do we need to figure out how to train six brigades worth of crews?


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Korea was effectively an all reserve thing -- the Special Force raised for Korea was made for it.
> 
> Cyprus wasn't a mandated thing, it was mostly Reg force thing until the very end, and that was due to FYR, and Somalia running at the same time.
> FYR, again not mandated - just a running out of folks from burning the candle at both ends.
> 
> Afghanistan, none of the first Roto's had any significant Res presence - it wasn't until the bucket was being drained that Res where called in.
> 
> 
> Let's face it - until their is a dire need, or perception of a dire need, the Regular Army chooses to ignore the P Res.


Not totally accurate about Korea; the special force was recruited from Active Personnel as much as anything.

In general I agree that the regular force doesn’t care about the reserves.


----------



## OldSolduer

markppcli said:


> ? Korea, Cyprus, Bosnia. Afghanistan had a mandated 25 percent augmentation but that’s not an inability that’s a policy. Obviously we need reserves for long term operational sustainment but I don’t think that’s really a fair take.


Croatia 93 2PPCLI was about 50% PRes folks. In Bosnia 1997 I think the number 45% were PRes. 

When you train as a team and don't dis the B Team then you get results.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Hold gun camp concentrations at ranges where you can and bus or fly in the troops.



Vancouver is third largest metro area in Canada, or thereabouts?  Past time to have a large base within Canadian borders that doesn't require a whole days' drive.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> Vancouver is third largest metro area in Canada, or thereabouts?  Past time to have a large base within Canadian borders that doesn't require a whole days' drive.



The best training area for Lower Mainland based troops is in JBLM - Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and Yakima Firing Centre.

We used to go there a fair bit. Not so much recently.

Beyond that, there's nothing apart from CFB Chilliwack. Mainly because people can't be bothered to get the required clearances done to use Crown Land, or so it seems.


----------



## GR66

McG said:


> So what? I was responding to a proposal that specifically suggested the Reg F units in Edmonton & Shilo should share a fleet that would be in Wainwright. “Not in Pet or Valcartier” does nothing to ameliorate the faults of that proposal. That being said, a shared RCR LAV fleet in Petawawa would compel 2 RCR to do all trainIng (including courses) away from home.


Not to be picky, but I specifically noted in my scenario for discussion that you'd co-locate PPCLI's two LAV battalions in Edmonton so that there would be no travel from Shilo to Wainwright for 2 PPCLI.  Similarly if you were to do this kind of proposal you would logically co-locate both of RCR's LAV Battalions together in Petawawa and R22eR's LAV Battalions in Valcartier.


GR66 said:


> For example, if 1 Brigade were to be set as our "Heavy" Brigade Group with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions all co-located in Edmonton would we need 2 x full Battalions worth of LAVs in Edmonton/Wainwright to train the two Mech Battalions?


I threw that scenario out in response to a couple of comments by others about possible ways to make use of our existing equipment in different ways in order expand our deployment and training options.  McG's and others comments about the potential issues in such a system are welcome and exactly what I was looking for.  Now that we know what some of the key issues with such an idea are, then what would have to be done to solve these issues?  Would those solutions be worth what it would take to implement them?  Are there other ideas which would be easier that would achieve the same goals of better preparing the Reserves to integrate with our Reg Force Mechanized Infantry?  Is that a goal we should even be working toward, or is there a better role that the Reserves should be training for?


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> The answer is yes. SSE dictates that we must be able to deploy multiple BG sized organizations concurrently, so those organizations need the ability to prepare and train concurrently.


SSE calls for "two sustained deployments of 500-1,500 personnel in two different theatres of operation". Effectively that means two distinct battlegroups. Your example was "Having 1 PPCLI & 2 PPCLI share a vehicle pool means a barrier to concurrent training." Canada has six LAV equipped battlegroups. It would still have six sets of equipment even if some of those sets are shared between battalions and with the ResF. Nothing anywhere says that two battalions sharing equipment have to train on it "concurrently". It could be sequentially or battlegroups from different brigades go. 


McG said:


> Shared fleets don’t engender a sense of ownership in the crews. The vehicles are “rentals” which only need to be suffered until it is time to be put back in the pool.


True enough. But if LAV 33C belongs to the third section of the third platoon of the third company of each of 1 and 3 PPCLI in Edmonton then it belongs to two identified sections who share ownership and have a vested interest in its condition. It's not a true pool vehicle per se; just shared.


McG said:


> So what? I was responding to a proposal that specifically suggested the Reg F units in Edmonton & Shilo should share a fleet that would be in Wainwright. “Not in Pet or Valcartier” does nothing to ameliorate the faults of that proposal. That being said, a shared RCR LAV fleet in Petawawa would compel 2 RCR to do all trainIng (including courses) away from home.


2 PPCLI being a LAV battalion is not written in stone. And even if it was, 1 and 3 PPCLI could share one LAV set and both train to be mech. That wouldn't even need a change in infrastructure in Edmonton which already supports one LAV set. That would give 1 CMBG three trained RegF mech battalions using two sets of LAVs. 1 & 3 PPCLI could also share their LAV set with the ResF infantry units in Edmonton and Calgary. 2 PPCLI could share its LAVs with the ResF units in Winnipeg and Regina. That could provide 3 Div with up to 5 additional trained Res F LAV coys.


McG said:


> Again, I was responding to a proposal that parcelled LAV in little groups about the country. Even coy sized vehicle pools will be problematic because current LAV owning units are not resourced with STTE for divisible A2 & B echelons.


That's true and all I'm saying is that "sharing" equipment doesn't need it to be parceled out to small locations that can't support them. There are other ways that can work.


McG said:


> If it is necessary for PRes to be mechanized then propose it with the proper resources.


I'm not sure what you mean by "proper resources". Afghanistan clearly showed ResF infantry working with LAV battalions, artillery reservists with M777 batteries and I presume the tanks in Afghanistan might also have had some reservists with them. The ResF right now has very few roles outside of augmenting the RegF units. It's obvious that the more that ResF personnel are trained on RegF equipment the more proficient they will be at augmenting their RegF counterparts.


McG said:


> If we look at Ukraine right now, it would appear that equipment (not people) is the critical path for war time for force generation. If we don’t have enough equipment for three brigades, why do we need to figure out how to train six brigades worth of crews?


I guess the reciprocal question is if we don't have enough equipment for the three RegF brigades then why don't we simply lay off all those un- and underequipped RegF as well and concentrate into two equipped and manned brigades?

But it is a fair point; equipment is every bit as vital as people and we're woefully short. My own view is that with the overall RegF and ResF strength of the Army we have the numbers to form five manoeuvre brigades (roughly 25,000 folks) and three support brigades (roughly 12,000 folks). There are two ways forward from this: 1) reduce the RegF and ResF strength to man the three existing manoeuvre and one support brigade or 2) increase the equipment holdings to eight brigades. I personally prefer option 2) and in that respect I can clearly see a path to increasing the capability of the ResF through shared equipment until such time as more equipment suitable for a European theatre (or Asian one) is available. 

The one thing that Ukraine is teaching us is that equipment is destroyed in large quantities just as people are. It's meaningless to reinforce a shot up brigade with people if you do not have the equipment to replace the lost equipment. The way it stands, we can replace lost equipment only up to the point of the RegF holdings because we have no reserve equipment holdings. 

If we lose equipment and people at an equivalent rate, at the end of the day we'll have a surplus of 15,000 folks, either RegF or ResF or both. That makes little sense. Having an unequipped ResF only worked only while we lived with the delusion that major ground force combat was a thing of the past, believed in only by us old dinosaurs, and that Canada would keep on doing roto after roto in relatively benign scenarios where we wouldn't have to go "all in".

We seem to have decided that Canada's budget can afford the annual cost of the manpower that it now has so there is no real need to cut numbers. That points to acquiring more equipment. Lets face it, buying the equipment to equip two manoeuvre brigades and two support brigades would be peanuts when you compare it to the cost of the F35s and CSC that are coming onstream.

Clearly there is no equipment coming in the near future and we have some 60 years of neglect to fix with the ResF before we can "trust them" to maintain their equipment. That's why I'm utterly convinced that change is needed now which includes RegF and ResF units becoming integrated and sharing equipment for the time being.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Vancouver is third largest metro area in Canada, or thereabouts?  Past time to have a large base within Canadian borders that doesn't require a whole days' drive.



Strangely enough LAVs are not compatible with the Grouse Grind.  On the other hand you could find lots of great light and heliborne training areas close by.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Strangely enough LAVs are not compatible with the Grouse Grind.  On the other hand you could find lots of great light and heliborne training areas close by.



I can't tell you how many times, over a couple of decades, that I tried to pitch things like that only to fail on the horns of mediocrity.

After awhile I stopped trying as it just wasn't worth the time and effort to fail continuously, especially for a part timer with a busy 'outside the Army' life.


----------



## Infanteer

I would ask those who advocate sharing LAVs, or any A Fleet, if they've ever managed the training on and maintenance of an A Fleet.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> The best training area for Lower Mainland based troops is in JBLM - Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and Yakima Firing Centre.



It is, but absent an agreement for lodging a bunch of stuff and a few people there, it continues to be limited (for the Res F) to what can be moved by advance/rear parties (unemployed people or those able to take extra days off) or loaded up on Fri evening for a long drive by people who probably will have been awake for 18+ hours by the time they reach the biv area.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> I would ask those who advocate sharing LAVs, or any A Fleet, if they've ever managed the training on and maintenance of an A Fleet.


Sharing can work, if they are ‘spare’ vehicles and never expected to be truly operational.   

NG units do it to reduce wear on Op Stock. 
  But the locations it’s done at effectively have a neat depot level refurbishment capability


----------



## Good2Golf

daftandbarmy said:


> The best training area for Lower Mainland based troops is in JBLM - Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and Yakima Firing Centre.
> 
> We used to go there a fair bit. Not so much recently.
> 
> Beyond that, there's nothing apart from CFB Chilliwack. Mainly because people can't be bothered to get the required clearances done to use Crown Land, or so it seems.


JBLM just keeps getting better…new and improved, best shitters in the Army.  

Well played aviators of D-Coy, 2-158th Combat Aviation Brigade, well played!









						These Army pilots poop in luxury at Joint Base Lewis-McChord
					

Army Times exclusively interviewed the former infantry NCO who masterminded the luxury latrine.




					www.armytimes.com


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> JBLM just keeps getting better…new and improved, best shitters in the Army.
> 
> Well played aviators of D-Coy, 2-158th Combat Aviation Brigade, well played!
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> These Army pilots poop in luxury at Joint Base Lewis-McChord
> 
> 
> Army Times exclusively interviewed the former infantry NCO who masterminded the luxury latrine.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.armytimes.com



My abiding memory of the 600m gallery ranges at Yakima was:

1) A porta potty at the right hand edge of each 100m firing point 

2) Bullet holes in all the porta potties from 500m on down


----------



## Brad Sallows

At the other end of the slider, a portable apparently abandoned in the training area for months.  There are no words.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> I can't tell you how many times, over a couple of decades, that I tried to pitch things like that only to fail on the horns of mediocrity.
> 
> After awhile I stopped trying as it just wasn't worth the time and effort to fail continuously, especially for a part timer with a busy 'outside the Army' life.



You would think there are no places in this world where people live in the mountains and forests.


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> I would ask those who advocate sharing LAVs, or any A Fleet, if they've ever managed the training on and maintenance of an A Fleet.


Yes. An M109 battery for three years. And as I've said before, my maint det were my favourite people. In fact our battery had two maintenance dets, one in Shilo looking after our set of 6 x M109s, 6 x M548s, 2 x M577s, 1 x M578, 6 x M113s, and 18 wheeled vehicles and another one in 4 CMBG looking after our duplicate flyover operational set.

IMHO, if you have a core of dedicated maintenance personnel looking after the equipment full-time, provide sufficient time between training cycles for the equipment to be inspected and maintained, and share it between the same operational sets of crews during a year, it should be possible. Again, if two battalions share one set of training vehicles there should be two sets of maintainers to look after them or alternatively it allows for one set of equipment to be shared for training and one set operationally prepositioned and used on flyover exercises with a set of maintainers for each.

It's obviously not the preferred solution (and not just because of the wear and tear on the equipment but because of the limited amount of the force that can deploy operationally at any given time), and I must admit my experience with this was during a period of time when maintenance detachments were fully manned and parts flowed with acceptable rapidity. (I recall one spring exercise where poplar fluff ended up choking air intakes and the regiment blew multiple power packs on the guns in rapid succession before we realized what was going on. They were all replaced during the course of the exercise.)

I've noted comments by many on this forum about the lack of maintainers and parts. I really can't understand how an army that has vast quantities of A Fleets can allow that type of condition to happen much less exist for as long as it has. I've noted several Auditor General reports and CRS reports that comment on what appears to be an ongoing weakness.

I certainly appreciate the point that you are making but most of Canada's operational missions involve the LAV6 and now our handful of M777s and Leopards and TAPVs and only roughly 2/3 of the RegF units have this equipment while the ResF has next to zero. However, one needs to do something to ensure everyone is adequately trained. One won't always have time for three-year (or even two-year) MRS cycles and six months of pre-deployment training.

Like @KevinB points out, it becomes a matter of how organized and coordinated the use and maintenance of equipment sets are handled. A sine qua non is that the Army's maintenance structure needs to be robust and a priority above all else. Among the many lessons that seem to be popping out of the Ukraine is the one that badly maintained equipment and poor logistics result in excessively high vehicle and personnel casualty rates.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

What you've discussed with your experience is the opposite - having two sets of equipment for one group. This could work, with dedicated maintainers, and the US does this with their forward deployed suites.  This is completely out of the CAF's league though, based off our current stocks and organizations.

This discussion of "sharing" fleets on this thread is overly focused on RCEME folks turning wrenches, and is missing out on the details behind unit maintenance plans, "pride of ownership" and maintenance culture, unit training plans, PCF requirements, PM/CM maintenance schedules, and the small windows for collective training activities.  I wouldn't want to be the CQMS with a SNAC verification when some other organization is playing with the stuff I am accountable for.

Not discounting anyone's experience, but folks on here who have managed a modern AFV and the training and maintenance bill that comes with it seem to get the above points.  There seems to be an assumption that a fleet of LAVs is just sitting around, waiting to be jumped in.  In reality, if the vehicle isn't being used for CT, its being used for PCF/IT, or its in maintenance, or its being "ring-fenced" so that it is available.  The idea that a second unit's worth of people could just hop in and achieve the same individual and collective training off a single fleet is trying to "squeeze 10 pounds of s**t into a five pound bag."  Don't believe me if you want, just dial up the Ops O of a battalion and ask what his or her VOR and fleet management plan is.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> What you've discussed with your experience is the opposite - having two sets of equipment for one group. This could work, with dedicated maintainers, and the US does this with their forward deployed suites.  This is completely out of the CAF's league though, based off our current stocks and organizations.
> 
> This discussion of "sharing" fleets on this thread is overly focused on RCEME folks turning wrenches, and is missing out on the details behind unit maintenance plans, "pride of ownership" and maintenance culture, unit training plans, PCF requirements, PM/CM maintenance schedules, and the small windows for collective training activities.  I wouldn't want to be the CQMS with a SNAC verification when some other organization is playing with the stuff I am accountable for.
> 
> Not discounting anyone's experience, but folks on here who have managed a modern AFV and the training and maintenance bill that comes with it seem to get the above points.  There seems to be an assumption that a fleet of LAVs is just sitting around, waiting to be jumped in.  In reality, if the vehicle isn't being used for CT, its being used for PCF/IT, or its in maintenance, or its being "ring-fenced" so that it is available.  The idea that a second unit's worth of people could just hop in and achieve the same individual and collective training off a single fleet is trying to "squeeze 10 pounds of s**t into a five pound bag."  Don't believe me if you want, just dial up the Ops O of a battalion and ask what his or her VOR and fleet management plan is.


As I said before, the only time I see it working is for the PRes - with a full reg force cadre of maintainers, and realistically some OEM Tech Support and Contractors.

 1 Weekend Ex/Training - gets turned in and worked on during the week, rinse and repeat, with a reg force cadre vehicle "owner" who stays with the Reservists in the vehicle  - they have the pride of ownership/responsibility to ensure it is not treated like crap and stuff doesn't walk away.



I don't see it working very well for regular force units -- unless the "use" period was limited and 3-4 days allocated to hand over each time.
  And frankly your Reg Force should have enough equipment they don't need to play musical chairs.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Shared fleets are bad. Bad bad bad. Bad. You can try to do long-terms swaps of equipment when a given unit goes on a long deployment and its gear is left behind, but its a painful shell game. 

The wheel has gone around a few times on this - circa 2005 the army redistributed vehicles to achieve a BG worth at CMTC and a BG worth ready to sail from Montreal. Result - units stripped of vehicles. A few years later the flow was starting to go the other way.

As an OC my troops had their own Coyotes, LUVWs and Bisons. They were always doing something with them. Sometimes the equipment was called away to CTC to support courses - at least that was a controlled handover as part of a somewhat rational plan.


----------



## KevinB

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Shared fleets are bad. Bad bad bad. Bad. You can try to do long-terms swaps of equipment when a given unit goes on a long deployment and its gear is left behind, but its a painful shell game.
> 
> The wheel has gone around a few times on this - circa 2005 the army redistributed vehicles to achieve a BG worth at CMTC and a BG worth ready to sail from Montreal. Result - units stripped of vehicles. A few years later the flow was starting to go the other way.
> 
> As an OC my troops had their own Coyotes, LUVWs and Bisons. They were always doing something with them. Sometimes the equipment was called away to CTC to support courses - at least that was a controlled handover as part of a somewhat rational plan.


Agreed for the Reg Force.

 The only way I see it working in Canada is for Regular Force Bases to have a Pool of extra vehicles to do reserve training on so one can use reserve augmentees as something more than a GIB, or radio watch guy.

And only truly practical if there is a will and desire for the CA to become a Total Force Army and acquire more vehicles so Reserve units can become mobile as well.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Agreed for the Reg Force.
> 
> The only way I see it working in Canada is for Regular Force Bases to have a Pool of extra vehicles to do reserve training on so one can use reserve augmentees as something more than a GIB, or radio watch guy.
> 
> And only truly practical if there is a will and desire for the CA to become a Total Force Army and acquire more vehicles so Reserve units can become mobile as well.



My only problem with that is that if the government bought additional vehicles for the Reserves the Regs would snaffle them so everybody got their own personal LAV.


----------



## Kirkhill

And what's a personal LAV without a bidet?


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> What you've discussed with your experience is the opposite - having two sets of equipment for one group.


True. But your question only addressed the issue of having managed an A Fleet and that was all part of it. The point to the battery in 4 CMBG was that it was used roughly one month a year on a flyover exercise. It could easily have been used by other batteries from other Canadian regiments for several additional exercises each year without creating a serviceability issue.

The same way with our battery in Canada. Basically the guns were used for two to three exercises a year and a driver heavy tracked course. We never did basic gun number training with them - at the time that was an RCAS function - and never used them for training reservists - which we had plenty of time for but never did. Basically they stood idle for in excess of half of the year.


Infanteer said:


> This could work, with dedicated maintainers, and the US does this with their forward deployed suites.  This is completely out of the CAF's league though, based off our current stocks and organizations.
> 
> This discussion of "sharing" fleets on this thread is overly focused on RCEME folks turning wrenches, and is missing out on the details behind unit maintenance plans, "pride of ownership" and maintenance culture, unit training plans, PCF requirements, PM/CM maintenance schedules, and the small windows for collective training activities.  I wouldn't want to be the CQMS with a SNAC verification when some other organization is playing with the stuff I am accountable for.


But effectively the Army did share equipment in Afghanistan where every six months a new battle group did a RIP on the in-theatre gear where it was used harder than any Canadian gear. We're doing it now in Latvia as well in what is basically a training environment. Much of ensuring that equipment is properly maintained by its crew rests with the NCMs and line officers. 


Infanteer said:


> Not discounting anyone's experience, but folks on here who have managed a modern AFV and the training and maintenance bill that comes with it seem to get the above points.  There seems to be an assumption that a fleet of LAVs is just sitting around, waiting to be jumped in.  In reality, if the vehicle isn't being used for CT, its being used for PCF/IT, or its in maintenance, or its being "ring-fenced" so that it is available.  The idea that a second unit's worth of people could just hop in and achieve the same individual and collective training off a single fleet is trying to "squeeze 10 pounds of s**t into a five pound bag."  Don't believe me if you want, just dial up the Ops O of a battalion and ask what his or her VOR and fleet management plan is.


I absolutely believe that it's difficult and can lead to difficulties especially if its done in an unmanaged "jumped in" or "hop in" manner. I don't think anyone here is suggesting that method.

What we're trying to achieve is a way of solving several problems with limited gear. One is how to gather together enough equipment for a pre-positioned flyover force and the other is how to properly train ResF members on the gear they are expected to use. All of that in the absence of a large purchase of new equipment. A managed system of shared equipment is really the only viable option. Except of course the option which we've had for decades where a large part of the Army has had somewhere between limited to very limited equipment to train with.

I'm open to other COAs.

🍻


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> We're doing it now in Latvia as well in what is basically a training environment.


It does not get a lot of attention because it’s less flashy than shooting bullets or blanks but that equipment in Latvia has been rotated out several times because it has been driven hard and gotten worn. 

We rent a ship, swap out the whole A or B fleet in one go, then bring the used stuff home to go through an R&O pipe. It is effective, but it is not an efficient way to run the army in garrison.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Agreed for the Reg Force.
> 
> The only way I see it working in Canada is for Regular Force Bases to have a Pool of extra vehicles to do reserve training on so one can use reserve augmentees as something more than a GIB, or radio watch guy.
> 
> And only truly practical if there is a will and desire for the CA to become a Total Force Army and acquire more vehicles so Reserve units can become mobile as well.



We already excel at deploying to the Assy Area by low flying rental bus, so we're good to go I think


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> What you've discussed with your experience is the opposite - having two sets of equipment for one group. This could work, with dedicated maintainers, and the US does this with their forward deployed suites.  *This is completely out of the CAF's league though, based off our current stocks and organizations.*
> 
> This discussion of "sharing" fleets on this thread is overly focused on RCEME folks turning wrenches, and is missing out on the details behind unit maintenance plans, "pride of ownership" and maintenance culture, unit training plans, PCF requirements, PM/CM maintenance schedules, and the small windows for collective training activities.  I wouldn't want to be the CQMS with a SNAC verification when some other organization is playing with the stuff I am accountable for.
> 
> Not discounting anyone's experience, but folks on here who have managed a modern AFV and the training and maintenance bill that comes with it seem to get the above points.  There seems to be an assumption that a fleet of LAVs is just sitting around, waiting to be jumped in.  In reality, if the vehicle isn't being used for CT, its being used for PCF/IT, or its in maintenance, or its being "ring-fenced" so that it is available.  The idea that a second unit's worth of people could just hop in and achieve the same individual and collective training off a single fleet is trying to "squeeze 10 pounds of s**t into a five pound bag."  Don't believe me if you want, just dial up the Ops O of a battalion and ask what his or her VOR and fleet management plan is.



4x MBT
6x LAV Recce
13x LVTP-7
28x LUV
6x 155mm Towed

4x AH
4x UTTH-Cmd
12x UTTH
4x MHLH

Canadianized.

4x Leo2
6x LAV Recce
13x LAV
28x LAV
6x 155mm Towed

4x CH-146 (Gun-ERSTA)
4x CH-146 (Cmd)
12x CH-146
4x CH-147

I'm sure you recognize it.  And I believe we have the kit to duplicate it.  

It would mean tossing out some standards - like not penny-packeting tanks.

On the other hand 5 suites of Ground Vehicles and 3 suites of Air Vehicles

5x 4 = 20 of 80 Leos 
5x 6 = 30 of 66 LAV-LRSS
5x 41 = 205 of 651 LAV
5x 6 = 30 of 33 M777s  (need to ask nicely to get another 24 and maybe a dozen HIMARs)

3x 20 = 60 of 85 Griffons
3z 4 = 12 of 17 Chinooks

We would win some on the swings and lose some on the roundabouts but with our kit available we could easily produce 5, and maybe 6, equivalent Teams and still have enough left over for a proper Tank Regiment and a Recce Squadron.   Then we just need to kit out the artillery properly.


----------



## KevinB

The Griffon isn’t a AH-1Z nor a UH-60
   So you lose heavily on those.


----------



## GK .Dundas

And.the.Griffon.only resembles a UH 1Y


----------



## GR66

My take-away from 184 pages of discussion on this topic is that there are simply too many issues with the current Canadian Army for Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) to be any sort of truly transformative restructuring of the Army.

We have an Armoured Corps with a worn out fleet of tanks that is too small to support and sustain a true Heavy Brigade and a primary Recce vehicle that current operations in Ukraine are showing may be totally unsuitable for a peer conflict.

Our Infantry Corps is undermanned to fill the 9 x Battalions we have and both the Mechanized and Light Battalions are missing the key enablers which would allow them to survive in a peer conflict (ATGMs, integral DFS, sufficient integral IDF, a SHORAD capability, etc.).  

The Artillery Regiments are woefully lacking in the number of guns they have in addition to not having a self-propelled platform to at least give them a greater chance of survival in a peer conflict.  We have no IDF support beyond the direct support Regiments for the Battalions, no rocket artillery, no loitering munitions, no SHORAD batteries, and no MRAD batteries or C-RAM capabilities to protect our forces or our logistics infrastructure.

Logistics support appears to be ad hoc for overseas deployments with the line between expeditionary support capabilities and garrison support capabilities in the Service Battalions being blurred.  Overall our logistics support infrastructure may turn out to be very vulnerable in a large scale peer/near-peer conflict.  It sound like even peacetime maintenance capabilities are stretched to almost the breaking point.  

Given all of the above I'm beginning to think that rather than Force 2025/202? being a transformation plan it should rather be a consolidation plan.

The global security situation has changed significantly since Force 2025 was first initiated and there are a lot of lessons to be learned from what is happening in Ukraine.  These changes will mean that the Canadian Army has to really take a serious look at what a modern battlefield will really look like from a Canadian perspective and look at what capabilities are missing and if our Doctrine may have to be reviewed/revised in order to be successful and relevant.

Perhaps a first step should be to eliminate the 3rd (Light) Battalions from the Infantry Regiments and feed those PYs back into the schools and the Mechanized Battalions.  Then a focus can be put on re-establishing those support capabilities that we already know are missing in order to make the infantry survivable in a peer conflict (including integral AT, AA and IDF capabilities).  At the same time the Armoured Corps can focus on reviewing our Recce doctrine and determining what the Brigade Recce Squadron needs to look like and at the same time concentrating our tanks in a single Regiment.  The Artillery can focus on bringing in a self-propelled gun system to replace the M777.  The Combat Engineer Regiments and Service Battalions can take the time to review their own units and ensure that they have the equipment and capabilities required to support a deployed Canadian Brigade Group.

While this consolidation and re-building effort is taking place within the Army the CAF leadership should engage with the Government of Canada to push for a new Defence White Paper to clearly define what kind of forces the Government expects to be able to deploy in this new security environment.  This will then allow the Army to look at the larger questions of how many and what type of Brigades are required for the Reg Force and what expectations there are for the contributions will be required from the Reserves to meet our military commitments.  This would define our broader organizational and equipment/training/support requirements.

Not nearly as sexy as the other proposals, but I'm guessing that it would provide a much more solid base to build on going forward.


----------



## McG

GR66 said:


> Perhaps a first step should be to eliminate the 3rd (Light) Battalions from the Infantry Regiments and feed those PYs back into the schools and the Mechanized Battalions.


That was the plan before Putin started his war. Also, there needs to be PY investment in CSS and signals in addition to growing schools, increasing authorized BTL establishment, and growing remaining battalions. I don’t think that supporter investment was planned.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The Griffon isn’t a AH-1Z nor a UH-60
> So you lose heavily on those.



Fine. Agreed. Understood.  You detest the Griffon.  

So don't send them into areas where you feel the risk is too high.   Reserve them for lower risk areas or augment the fleet with a number of additional aircraft that can manage the risk better.   Just like it is necessary to decide whether or not to employ MRZRs, ISVs, Strykers or Bradleys ... or Blackhawks.

But even the lowly Griffon and the LAV have utility in specific circumstances.  Just like the MEU(SOC) has utility in specific circumstances.  And sometimes it is an XVIII Corps job and sometimes it is a III Corps job.

The advantage of a Canadianized MEU(SOC) organization is that it is a Combined Arms Battle Group that we could field right now with our existing kit, and train to as a Combined Arms standard and deploy - either in slow time by sea or by dribbling it in by air over a week or so.

And given the number of tanks we have on hand - we could generate 5 MEU(SOC)-Cda Battle Groups, each with a platoon of 4x Leo2A4M(Can) and still leave a Type 57 regiment of Leo2A4s and Leo2A6M(Can), complete with an Armoured Engr Sqn around which to create another Battle Gp or Bde Gp.


----------



## dapaterson

McG said:


> That was the plan before Putin started his war. Also, there needs to be PY investment in CSS and signals in addition to growing schools, increasing authorized BTL establishment, and growing remaining battalions. I don’t think that supporter investment was planned.


With CAF establishments being a zero sum game of 71.5+30, there need to be hard choices and decisions, not only about what capabilities are inside vs which are sourced from allies, but also about what must be full time, what can be part-time, and where the balance between the two lies.

The continuous refusal to admit that PY limits are a planning factor, or that budgets needs to be considered when looking at capital project options are strong contributors to how the Army has reached its current condition.


----------



## IKnowNothing

What was the plan for the CCV had the project gone forward?  Concentrated in one Bde? One Btn per CMBG? One Coy per LAV Btn?


----------



## dapaterson

From memory: 

Original plan was all in 1 CMBG (none at the infantry school).

Amended plan once the regimental mafias weighed in was dispersed between Gagetown, Valcartier and Edmonton.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> My take-away from 184 pages of discussion on this topic is that there are simply too many issues with the current Canadian Army for Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) to be any sort of truly transformative restructuring of the Army.
> 
> We have an Armoured Corps with a worn out fleet of tanks that is too small to support and sustain a true Heavy Brigade and a primary Recce vehicle that current operations in Ukraine are showing may be totally unsuitable for a peer conflict.
> 
> Our Infantry Corps is undermanned to fill the 9 x Battalions we have and both the Mechanized and Light Battalions are missing the key enablers which would allow them to survive in a peer conflict (ATGMs, integral DFS, sufficient integral IDF, a SHORAD capability, etc.).
> 
> The Artillery Regiments are woefully lacking in the number of guns they have in addition to not having a self-propelled platform to at least give them a greater chance of survival in a peer conflict.  We have no IDF support beyond the direct support Regiments for the Battalions, no rocket artillery, no loitering munitions, no SHORAD batteries, and no MRAD batteries or C-RAM capabilities to protect our forces or our logistics infrastructure.
> 
> Logistics support appears to be ad hoc for overseas deployments with the line between expeditionary support capabilities and garrison support capabilities in the Service Battalions being blurred.  Overall our logistics support infrastructure may turn out to be very vulnerable in a large scale peer/near-peer conflict.  It sound like even peacetime maintenance capabilities are stretched to almost the breaking point.
> 
> Given all of the above I'm beginning to think that rather than Force 2025/202? being a transformation plan it should rather be a consolidation plan.
> 
> The global security situation has changed significantly since Force 2025 was first initiated and there are a lot of lessons to be learned from what is happening in Ukraine.  These changes will mean that the Canadian Army has to really take a serious look at what a modern battlefield will really look like from a Canadian perspective and look at what capabilities are missing and if our Doctrine may have to be reviewed/revised in order to be successful and relevant.
> 
> Perhaps a first step should be to eliminate the 3rd (Light) Battalions from the Infantry Regiments and feed those PYs back into the schools and the Mechanized Battalions.  Then a focus can be put on re-establishing those support capabilities that we already know are missing in order to make the infantry survivable in a peer conflict (including integral AT, AA and IDF capabilities).  At the same time the Armoured Corps can focus on reviewing our Recce doctrine and determining what the Brigade Recce Squadron needs to look like and at the same time concentrating our tanks in a single Regiment.  The Artillery can focus on bringing in a self-propelled gun system to replace the M777.  The Combat Engineer Regiments and Service Battalions can take the time to review their own units and ensure that they have the equipment and capabilities required to support a deployed Canadian Brigade Group.
> 
> While this consolidation and re-building effort is taking place within the Army the CAF leadership should engage with the Government of Canada to push for a new Defence White Paper to clearly define what kind of forces the Government expects to be able to deploy in this new security environment.  This will then allow the Army to look at the larger questions of how many and what type of Brigades are required for the Reg Force and what expectations there are for the contributions will be required from the Reserves to meet our military commitments.  This would define our broader organizational and equipment/training/support requirements.
> 
> Not nearly as sexy as the other proposals, but I'm guessing that it would provide a much more solid base to build on going forward.



I am firmly opposed to eliminating the light battalions.  I agree entirely with working with what is available rather than what is on the wish list.

That starts with the PYs.  And in that regard I would be inclined to keep the 3 Battalions as organizing principles around which additional Light Companies would be created from the Reserves.  And we should be creating lots of those Light Companies so that they supply a pool of Fire Teams from which the Regs can find 5-10% willing volunteers for international augmentation  or 30-70% for domestic crises.

The Light Companies could also be raised by the Cavalry, Gunners and Engineers for domestic duties with dedicated troops forming the specialized Troops of their trades.

The LAV battalions - I would retain their vehicle establishments and fully man the crews (3 people) but reduce the number of Regs in the Rear, perhaps reducing the total per vehicle from 10 (Crew and Pax) to six or seven with a standing augmentation element of 3 or 4.

As to enablers, if you can carry it through a door you can get it inside a LAV, especially if you have fewer pax.  So you have room for 81mm mortars and a mortar team  or a DMR/MG team.

And on the wish list of things that will fit inside and are man-portable are AD and AT systems.

I think a FORCE 2025 Renovation along those lines are entirely doable, including buying additional M777s.

FORCE 2030 can address the Big Ticket items and take advantage of both Lessons Learned from Ukraine and the stabilizing of what is likely to be a significantly revised geopolitical and strategic situation.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> I am firmly opposed to eliminating the light battalions.  I agree entirely with working with what is available rather than what is on the wish list.
> 
> That starts with the PYs.  And in that regard I would be inclined to keep the 3 Battalions as organizing principles around which additional Light Companies would be created from the Reserves.  And we should be creating lots of those Light Companies so that they supply a pool of Fire Teams from which the Regs can find 5-10% willing volunteers for international augmentation  or 30-70% for domestic crises.
> 
> The Light Companies could also be raised by the Cavalry, Gunners and Engineers for domestic duties with dedicated troops forming the specialized Troops of their trades.
> 
> The LAV battalions I would retain there vehicle establishments and fully man the crews (3 people) but reduce the number of Regs in the Rear, perhaps reducing the total per vehicle from 10 (Crew and Pax) to six or seven with a standing augmentation element of 3 or 4.
> 
> As to enablers, if you can carry it through a door you can get it inside a LAV, especially if you have fewer pax.  So you have room for 81mm mortars and a mortar team  or a DMR/MG team.
> 
> And on the wish list of things that will fit inside and are man-portable as AD and AT systems.
> 
> I think a FORCE 2025 Renovation along those lines are entirely doable, including buying additional M777s.
> 
> FORCE 2030 can address the Big Ticket items and take advantage of both Lessons Learned from Ukraine and the stabilizing of what is likely to be a significantly revised geopolitical and strategic situation.


I'm going to disagree with you on the Light Battalions.

The role of true Light Infantry and Mechanized Infantry are quite different.  I'd argue that right now we don't actually have "Light Infantry"...we have Infantry Battalions that don't have armoured vehicles.  Personally I think it's likely beyond the bandwidth of the CAF to simultaneously review and develop doctrine for both Mechanized and Light Infantry at the same time while also working on integrating (re-integrating) key enablers that are required to make each type of infantry survivable on the battlefield.  Maintaining the two types of Infantry Battalions also forces the Army to have two separate CSS structures to support their different needs, while focusing for now on Mechanized infantry only allows for a concentration of effort.

LAVs make up the bulk of our vehicle fleet and they aren't going to go away even if we eventually do purchase a tracked IFV, a HAPC or develop Light Infantry Brigades.  The LAVs aren't going anywhere so whether they remain the main/only Infantry carrier, are concentrated in "Medium" Stryker-like Brigades or are relegated to the Reserves we will need our LAV Battalions to have all the required enablers and a clear doctrine on how to employ them.

In terms of Light Infantry in general, I don't discount their utility and think it is something worthwhile exploring for the CAF.  However, I think there are a couple of factors to keep in mind before we go for some major expansion of our Light forces.  Firstly (and very importantly) is the high level of risk aversion in the Canadian Government.  I am highly doubtful that except in the most desperate of situations that any Canadian Government will be terribly willing to deploy our infantry in anything other then well protected armoured vehicles.  Despite what's going on in Ukraine, the most likely deployments for the Canadian Army in Cold War 2.0 will be into periphery state conflict zones to provide deterrence, monitor conflicts or to engage in counter-insurgency, etc.  Highly unlikely that the Canadian Government would deploy Light forces (outside of CSOR) to these kind of engagements.  Even in a less likely near peer/peer conflict I would imagine a reluctance to deploy light troops (as opposed to mechanized troops operating dismounted).  

Then there is the question of how do we best utilize the Reserves.  Again here I think you're putting the cart before the horse.  Based on the changing global security environment I think it is absolutely vital for the Canadian Government to review our Defence policy and define exactly what expectations we have for the Army going forward.  As much as a reorganization of the Reserves is long overdue, I think it would be unwise to make significant role/equipment decisions until the broader policy is defined and the role that the Reserves would be expected to play in fulfilling that policy determined.

In the meantime I think that a general consolidation of the Reserves along with a review of Reserve Employment policy could be undertaken while that happens.  Required Legislative changes as well as "right sizing" of Reserve Regiments into Companies and possibly consolidation of units as required could be done while the high level policy decisions are made.


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> Given all of the above I'm beginning to think that rather than Force 2025/202? being a transformation plan it should rather be a consolidation plan.


Ding-ding-ding - we have a winner.

You've now arrived where the initiative has been at for the last 5 month.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> And given the number of tanks we have on hand - we could generate 5 MEU(SOC)-Cda Battle Groups, each with a platoon of 4x Leo2A4M(Can) and still leave a Type 57 regiment of Leo2A4s and Leo2A6M(Can), complete with an Armoured Engr Sqn around which to create another Battle Gp or Bde Gp.


Or 6 with a spare plus an ABCT/SBCT Hybrid Cavalry Squadron/Btn (with a spare) and still leave 20 tanks for training overall fleet spares.


----------



## Infanteer

IKnowNothing said:


> What was the plan for the CCV had the project gone forward?  Concentrated in one Bde? One Btn per CMBG? One Coy per LAV Btn?



Original plan to buy enough platforms to equip a battalion.  Two companies were going to go to Edmonton, and one to Shilo.  This was changed mid-stride when silly games started getting played to two companies in Edmonton and one in Gagetown.

The whole plan was a pipedream that would have burdened the CA with a boutique fleet.  We were spared when it was dispatched....


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> I'm going to disagree with you on the Light Battalions.
> 
> The role of true Light Infantry and Mechanized Infantry are quite different.  I'd argue that right now we don't actually have "Light Infantry"...we have Infantry Battalions that don't have armoured vehicles.  Personally I think it's likely beyond the bandwidth of the CAF to simultaneously review and develop doctrine for both Mechanized and Light Infantry at the same time while also working on integrating (re-integrating) key enablers that are required to make each type of infantry survivable on the battlefield.  Maintaining the two types of Infantry Battalions also forces the Army to have two separate CSS structures to support their different needs, while focusing for now on Mechanized infantry only allows for a concentration of effort.
> 
> LAVs make up the bulk of our vehicle fleet and they aren't going to go away even if we eventually do purchase a tracked IFV, a HAPC or develop Light Infantry Brigades.  The LAVs aren't going anywhere so whether they remain the main/only Infantry carrier, are concentrated in "Medium" Stryker-like Brigades or are relegated to the Reserves we will need our LAV Battalions to have all the required enablers and a clear doctrine on how to employ them.
> 
> In terms of Light Infantry in general, I don't discount their utility and think it is something worthwhile exploring for the CAF.  However, I think there are a couple of factors to keep in mind before we go for some major expansion of our Light forces.  Firstly (and very importantly) is the high level of risk aversion in the Canadian Government.  I am highly doubtful that except in the most desperate of situations that any Canadian Government will be terribly willing to deploy our infantry in anything other then well protected armoured vehicles.  Despite what's going on in Ukraine, the most likely deployments for the Canadian Army in Cold War 2.0 will be into periphery state conflict zones to provide deterrence, monitor conflicts or to engage in counter-insurgency, etc.  Highly unlikely that the Canadian Government would deploy Light forces (outside of CSOR) to these kind of engagements.  Even in a less likely near peer/peer conflict I would imagine a reluctance to deploy light troops (as opposed to mechanized troops operating dismounted).
> 
> Then there is the question of how do we best utilize the Reserves.  Again here I think you're putting the cart before the horse.  Based on the changing global security environment I think it is absolutely vital for the Canadian Government to review our Defence policy and define exactly what expectations we have for the Army going forward.  As much as a reorganization of the Reserves is long overdue, I think it would be unwise to make significant role/equipment decisions until the broader policy is defined and the role that the Reserves would be expected to play in fulfilling that policy determined.
> 
> In the meantime I think that a general consolidation of the Reserves along with a review of Reserve Employment policy could be undertaken while that happens.  Required Legislative changes as well as "right sizing" of Reserve Regiments into Companies and possibly consolidation of units as required could be done while the high level policy decisions are made.



I see the Light Infantry as a stepping stone to everything else in the army.  Even a new entry in their first week of training can stand sentry and firewatch (14 year old Sea Cadets did it at Cornwallis).

That is why I emphasize the Light Infantry - not entirely as a tactical capability, although it has its merits there, but for its organizing, training and general utility value.  A useful capability to unload tasks from the Regs, launch military careers in the Reserves and supply a formed body for the Goverhment.  And provide, from the keeners, trainable augmentees for all Corps of the army.


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> I'm going to disagree with you on the Light Battalions.
> 
> The role of true Light Infantry and Mechanized Infantry are quite different.



Not the case.  The role of an infantry battalion, regardless of its transportation, is the same.  An infantry battalion's role is to close with and destroy the enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and to seize and retain ground.  It conducts close engagement tasks in stability operations.



GR66 said:


> I'd argue that right now we don't actually have "Light Infantry"...we have Infantry Battalions that don't have armoured vehicles.  Personally I think it's likely beyond the bandwidth of the CAF to simultaneously review and develop doctrine for both Mechanized and Light Infantry at the same time while also working on integrating (re-integrating) key enablers that are required to make each type of infantry survivable on the battlefield.  Maintaining the two types of Infantry Battalions also forces the Army to have two separate CSS structures to support their different needs, while focusing for now on Mechanized infantry only allows for a concentration of effort.



What is "true light infantry?"


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> Agreed for the Reg Force.
> 
> The only way I see it working in Canada is for Regular Force Bases to have a Pool of extra vehicles to do reserve training on so one can use reserve augmentees as something more than a GIB, or radio watch guy.
> 
> And only truly practical if there is a will and desire for the CA to become a Total Force Army and acquire more vehicles so Reserve units can become mobile as well.


Wasn’t that the idea behind the MSVS truck fleet?  

I thought it was supposed to be used primarily by reserve units and some Reg force units, while another model of medium logistics trucks was also purchased.  


(Did the 2nd fleet ever get purchased?  Am I totally out to lunch on this whole thing?)


----------



## dapaterson

Yes, the MSVS project delivered the MSVS MilCOTS fleet, intended primarily for the Res F, and more recently the MSVS SMP fleet.


----------



## CBH99

Did those vehicles end up getting scooped up by the regular force, leaving the reserve force still lacking that type of vehicle?


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:


> Did those vehicles end up getting scooped up by the regular force, leaving the reserve force still lacking that type of vehicle?



Not that I know of. The MSVS fleet seems to be intact at our local armoury.


----------



## Infanteer

CBH99 said:


> Did those vehicles end up getting scooped up by the regular force, leaving the reserve force still lacking that type of vehicle?



Some Divisions transferred some MSVS MilCot from Res units to Regular units due to the collapse of the LS/ML/HL fleet.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> The LAV battalions - I would retain their vehicle establishments and fully man the crews (3 people) but reduce the number of Regs in the Rear, perhaps reducing the total per vehicle from 10 (Crew and Pax) to six or seven with a standing augmentation element of 3 or 4.



So force 2013 (or was it 2016?). We’re already no authorized our full strength.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> So force 2013 (or was it 2016?). We’re already no authorized our full strength.



It's bad but it is what you've got.


----------



## Infanteer

That is indeed Force 2013, and part of the reason we're in the situation we are in today.  Go with that COA, and you'll have nobody dismounting out the back, so you may as well pack it in.


----------



## markppcli

Exactly, have been bith reservist and regular I’m very confident that you will not get those augmentees for anything that isn’t “sexy,” no one wants to leave their lives for routine training or deployments to Latvia. It’s a total nonstarter to expect their to fill out positions.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> From memory:
> 
> Original plan was all in 1 CMBG (none at the infantry school).
> 
> Amended plan once the regimental mafias weighed in was dispersed between Gagetown, Valcartier and Edmonton.





Infanteer said:


> Original plan to buy enough platforms to equip a battalion.  Two companies were going to go to Edmonton, and one to Shilo.  This was changed mid-stride when silly games started getting played to two companies in Edmonton and one in Gagetown.
> 
> The whole plan was a pipedream that would have burdened the CA with a boutique fleet.  We were spared when it was dispatched....


I had the chance to ask exactly that question of Leslie when I interviewed him.

He confirmed that there were clear and opposing viewpoints but at the end he was persuaded to the distribute them to each brigade for the reason that it was to be a more heavily protected vehicle for deployments (remember this whole thing got its genesis with the Op MEDUSA situation and the LAV3's low protection factor) and if they were to be operationally deployed then every brigade would need some to train on under the Managed Readiness System.

The regimental mafia and equality amongst brothers is a very heavy influencer but the MRS system really is the trump card when it comes to three symmetrical brigades. One first needs to break out of the MRS, as fashioned, if one wants to make any viable arguments for going asymmetrical.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Exactly, have been bith reservist and regular I’m very confident that you will not get those augmentees for anything that isn’t “sexy,” no one wants to leave their lives for routine training or deployments to Latvia. It’s a total nonstarter to expect their to fill out positions.


Latvia is now what I would define as a "standing commitment" in the same sense as Stanavforlant".  So it seems reasonable to me that it should be met by standing forces. Ie Regs.

Are we so reduced and straitened that the Regular Force can't even sustain two companies on their own from three brigades with nominal strengths of something like 4000 each?

Indeed we might as well just pack it in.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I had the chance to ask exactly that question of Leslie when I interviewed him.
> 
> He confirmed that there were clear and opposing viewpoints but at the end he was persuaded to the distribute them to each brigade for the reason that it was to be a more heavily protected vehicle for deployments (remember this whole thing got its genesis with the Op MEDUSA situation and the LAV3's low protection factor) and if they were to be operationally deployed then every brigade would need some to train on under the Managed Readiness System.
> 
> The regimental mafia and equality amongst brothers is a very heavy influencer but the MRS system really is the trump card when it comes to three symmetrical brigades. One first needs to break out of the MRS, as fashioned, if one wants to make any viable arguments for going asymmetrical.
> 
> 🍻


Curiously a platoon of Leo's and a company of CCVs equals a combat team.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Latvia is now what I would define as a "standing commitment" in the same sense as Stanavforlant".  So it seems reasonable to me that it should be met by standing forces. Ie Regs.
> 
> Are we so reduced and straitened that the Regular Force can't even sustain two companies on their own from three brigades with nominal strengths of something like 4000 each?
> 
> Indeed we might as well just pack it in.


No one said it couldn’t be manned.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> What is "true light infantry?"



They're like True Scotsmen.  You'd know them if you saw them.

The chief factor f*cking everything up must be the tendency to keep putting off replacing stuff on time, which necessarily creates an increasingly large bulge of capital spending which no federal government wants to digest (although they do like pocketing the savings from putting stuff off).


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> They're like True Scotsmen.  You'd know them if you saw them.



And if you have to describe them you've never met them.



Brad Sallows said:


> The chief factor f*cking everything up must be the tendency to keep putting off replacing stuff on time, which necessarily creates an increasingly large bulge of capital spending which no federal government wants to digest (although they do like pocketing the savings from putting stuff off).



The only way to address that bow wave is to start feeding the system slowly, over time with lots of small contracts.  Inefficient and no big political splash, or immediate commercial benefit but it solves the forces problems in the short term and lets it sort out its long term needs on a more leisurely basis.

Anand and Freeland need to tell Industry to take a five year hiatus and let the DND lead with Company and Battalion buys.  Industry should be told to keep an eye on what the Forces are buying and figure out how they can contribute in the future.  Maybe they will find something like the LAV that they can sell to the Americans and the Saudis.


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> He confirmed that there were clear and opposing viewpoints but at the end he was persuaded to the distribute them to each brigade for the reason that it was to be a more heavily protected vehicle for deployments (remember this whole thing got its genesis with the Op MEDUSA situation and the LAV3's low protection factor) and if they were to be operationally deployed then every brigade would need some to train on under the Managed Readiness System.
> 
> The regimental mafia and equality amongst brothers is a very heavy influencer but the MRS system really is the trump card when it comes to three symmetrical brigades. One first needs to break out of the MRS, as fashioned, if one wants to make any viable arguments for going asymmetrical.



This was linked to Leslie's crackpot plan that the 9 Infantry Battalions be organized the same.  The original plan being considered was 2 LAV Coys and a Light Coy for each Bn, but this was amended to organizing all battalions with the same structure, and giving the LIBs the TAPV.

It was shortsighted thinking that we'd be fighting Afghanistan again, with a need to punch out cookie cutter battalions, that led to this thinking.  It never went anywhere as the TAPVs went elsewhere and the CCV died on the vine.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Curiously a platoon of Leo's and a company of CCVs equals a combat team.




So here's yet another gameable thought.

2 and 5 CMBGs

2x LAV Bns (build to suit)
2x Heavy Squadrons (1 Troop of Leo2A4Ms and 3 Troops of CV9035s)
2x Recce Squadrons

1 CMBG  

2x LAV Bns
1x Type 57 Leo Regiment with 1x Recce Squadron
2x LAV Bns each with a Heavy Company in CV9035s

And pass the entire Light Force and Domestic Quick Response effort over to the Reserves to be solved within the confines of Class A, B and C troops.

The Reserve Force also to supply trainable bodies for the organized Ready Reserve to augment the Regulars.


----------



## Good2Golf

Infanteer said:


> Not the case.  The *role* of an *infantry battalion,* regardless of its transportation, is the same.  An infantry battalion's role is to *close with and destroy the enemy*, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and to seize and retain ground.  It conducts close engagement tasks in stability operations.
> 
> 
> 
> What is "true light infantry?"


@Infanteer I’m crediting* you with a shot of Johnny Walker Blue, every time you say that…redeemable in person (and transferable to whomever you choose to bring with you) the next time you come to Bytown and elect to RV in my LZ. 🥃 🥃 🥃 🥃…

* _up to a full 750ml bottle_


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> So here's yet another gameable thought.


We don't have CV-90s.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> We don't have CV-90s.



I know.  I erred by allowing myself to fantasize.  Maybe somebody could reopen that discussion?  Maybe settle for some of Kevin's Bradleys?


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> Curiously a platoon of Leo's and a company of CCVs equals a combat team.


Which feeds into tweaking the Canadianized MEU idea   Scrap the extra tank formation, add a platoon/troop to each.
That plus embracing the idea of consolidation..

8x Leo  (2 troops of 4)
8x LAV LRSS  (2x mixed Recce Squadrons)
8x TAPV 
36x LAV 6 ISC (3x Inf Coy)

x7 (all 3 armoured regiments, 1st Btn of the Inf) + 1 spare/ deployed/ prepositioned
=
56 Leo's 
56 LAV LRSS
56 TAPV
252 LAV ISC


Add  8x LAV CP per quickly converted to carry dismount 81mm mortar teams, to be turreted as soon as can be arranged
2nd Btn of the Inf regiments to LIB with TAPV Recce Squadron and 8 tube mortar platoon
3rd battalion dissolved to ensure that everything is manned and supported
Artillery to Achers to free up PY's to man an M-Shorad battery
UOR Javelins


Consolidate the combat arms down to 
6x fully manned and equipped standing combined arms battlegroups,  1x full set of prepositioned/deployable kit
3x LIB


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Curiously a platoon of Leo's and a company of CCVs equals a combat team.


Old Army here. Nothing less than a half squadron, ever.  😁 And that presupposes that somewhere nearby there is a squadron (-) and a regt with all the ech needed to support the half squadron.



Infanteer said:


> This was linked to Leslie's crackpot plan that the 9 Infantry Battalions be organized the same.  The original plan being considered was 2 LAV Coys and a Light Coy for each Bn, but this was amended to organizing all battalions with the same structure, and giving the LIBs the TAPV.


Had never heard of the first plan which IMHO would have been crackpot. Do recall the other. While in Ottawa 2006-9 I had a young crackerjack GGFG sergeant working for me who went RegF officer and was posted to 3 RCR to work on the TAPVization of the battalion. Kept in touch with him for a few years while it slowly crumbled away.



Infanteer said:


> It was shortsighted thinking that we'd be fighting Afghanistan again, with a need to punch out cookie cutter battalions, that led to this thinking.  It never went anywhere as the TAPVs went elsewhere and the CCV died on the vine.


When CCV was initiated it wasn't too far fetched because we had no LAV6.0s and were losing LAV3s to IEDs. Afghanistan and failed states were still on the agenda. Trouble was with the rate of procurement the CCV, as the Army saw it, was made mostly redundant with the LAV6.0 upgrade. I don't think that there was ever a robust plan to form a heavy force for true conventional conflict ... at best it was to form a better protected LAV battlegroup plus tanks for weight. At the same time we were toying seriously with MLRS/HIMARS which was and is a bit of a questionable fit for the force structure we had and were, and still are, all too married to.

I've never been a fan of the symmetric army and MRS. Might get back to my days when we had one heavy brigade and one heavyish brigade each with a purpose and two light brigades with purposes of their own. I can't help but thinking that we need to get back to defining the roles we need to prepare for - and in my view with current policies that includes something heavy for Latvia/NATO; something SOF; and something quickish reaction but still mechanized or mechanizable. One can debate the ratios and the armaments but at the end it should spell the end of symmetry and the MRS as it stands now.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> My take-away from 184 pages of discussion on this topic is that there are simply too many issues with the current Canadian Army for Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) to be any sort of truly transformative restructuring of the Army.


Agreed 


GR66 said:


> We have an Armoured Corps with a worn out fleet of tanks that is too small to support and sustain a true Heavy Brigade and a primary Recce vehicle that current operations in Ukraine are showing may be totally unsuitable for a peer conflict.


Agreed. 


GR66 said:


> Our Infantry Corps is undermanned to fill the 9 x Battalions we have and both the Mechanized and Light Battalions are missing the key enablers which would allow them to survive in a peer conflict (ATGMs, integral DFS, sufficient integral IDF, a SHORAD capability, etc.).


Agreed 


GR66 said:


> The Artillery Regiments are woefully lacking in the number of guns they have in addition to not having a self-propelled platform to at least give them a greater chance of survival in a peer conflict.  We have no IDF support beyond the direct support Regiments for the Battalions, no rocket artillery, no loitering munitions, no SHORAD batteries, and no MRAD batteries or C-RAM capabilities to protect our forces or our logistics infrastructure.


Agreed 


GR66 said:


> Logistics support appears to be ad hoc for overseas deployments with the line between expeditionary support capabilities and garrison support capabilities in the Service Battalions being blurred.  Overall our logistics support infrastructure may turn out to be very vulnerable in a large scale peer/near-peer conflict.  It sound like even peacetime maintenance capabilities are stretched to almost the breaking point.


Agreed 


GR66 said:


> Given all of the above I'm beginning to think that rather than Force 2025/202? being a transformation plan it should rather be a consolidation plan.


Or a Reformation? 



GR66 said:


> The global security situation has changed significantly since Force 2025 was first initiated and there are a lot of lessons to be learned from what is happening in Ukraine.  These changes will mean that the Canadian Army has to really take a serious look at what a modern battlefield will really look like from a Canadian perspective and look at what capabilities are missing and if our Doctrine may have to be reviewed/revised in order to be successful and relevant.


Agreed 



GR66 said:


> Perhaps a first step should be to eliminate the 3rd (Light) Battalions from the Infantry Regiments and feed those PYs back into the schools and the Mechanized Battalions.


I don’t think that is a good idea at all. 
  Light Infantry offer some significant advantages in some terrain that Mechanized Infantry don’t.   The opposite is also true. 
   But I’d collapse a BN of each Regiment if need be - but retain at least 2 BN of Light Infantry - right now I’d say the RCR just do to Pet - and make the RCR the Light Inf (which bothers the crap out of me as a Former PPCLightI guy) 
   But it is what it is - remaining LAV’s would be held in WX and Valcatraz, some in LTPS and a Coy worth for PRes units to learn on for basic courses (Driver, Gunner, Crew Commander) - due to limited CSS ability the need to put some into Long Term Preservative Storage makes sense to me - or gift them to Ukraine. 


GR66 said:


> Then a focus can be put on re-establishing those support capabilities that we already know are missing in order to make the infantry survivable in a peer conflict (including integral AT, AA and IDF capabilities).  At the same time the Armoured Corps can focus on reviewing our Recce doctrine and determining what the Brigade Recce Squadron needs to look like and at the same time concentrating our tanks in a single Regiment.


I’m honestly terribly opposed to the Armored controlling Bde Recce at this point- especially as anyone senior in the RCAC seems to have been fine with some colossally fucked up opinions and acceptance of the suitability of some vehicles and what a Recce asset for a Bde actually is.  

Frankly I’d be focusing the tank the CAF does have in one Reg’t and looking to offload a lot of Armor PY’s into Artillery and Infantry units. 


GR66 said:


> The Artillery can focus on bringing in a self-propelled gun system to replace the M777.


Move all the M777 to Pet - have res units train with 2RCHA so one can field at least 3 6 gun Bty and ideally 8 gun battery.




GR66 said:


> The Combat Engineer Regiments and Service Battalions can take the time to review their own units and ensure that they have the equipment and capabilities required to support a deployed Canadian Brigade Group.





GR66 said:


> While this consolidation and re-building effort is taking place within the Army the CAF leadership should engage with the Government of Canada to push for a new Defence White Paper to clearly define what kind of forces the Government expects to be able to deploy in this new security environment.


Honestly this is a bit of a cop out.  SSE already gave the CAF/DND considerable latitude in force Pre.  The Army has squandered their resources for decades and looked at a lot of things with blinders on.   



GR66 said:


> This will then allow the Army to look at the larger questions of how many and what type of Brigades are required for the Reg Force and what expectations there are for the contributions will be required from the Reserves to meet our military commitments.  This would define our broader organizational and equipment/training/support requirements.


Honestly my faith in the CA to actual learn is low.   As I mentioned above and many times before SSE gave a mandate to prepare for all spectrums of war, and OOW, and no one seemed to play any attention to the idea of a peer/near peer threat 



GR66 said:


> Not nearly as sexy as the other proposals, but I'm guessing that it would provide a much more solid base to build on going forward.



If I was King for a day… 
   My first Force 2025 reorg would be to strike the 2nd and 3rd Regular Force Infantry BN’s 
 I’d use the PY’s to man the 1’st BN’s and make the 2nd and 3rd 30/70 Total Force units. 
    I’d then use the remaining PY to both beef up schools but reintroduce The Black Watch , The Canadian Guards, and create a Canadian Parachute Regiment  
  Not just to dilute the Capbadge Mafia but also to create a backbone of a Total Force Regular Infantry Corps.


----------



## KevinB

A CMBG is allegedly 7,634 ish AR. 
    Which seems a tad bloated, and one can’t wonder why they aren’t all filled when you theoretically try to have 3 and a CSS Bde and…


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Old Army here. Nothing less than a half squadron, ever. 😁 And that presupposes that somewhere nearby there is a squadron (-) and a regt with all the ech needed to support the half squadron.



Come on! Can't I get a little give? I keep being told of the need for compromise ... Jeez. 

Look the Armoured Corps gets a properly resourced Type 57 regiment on the old pattern.
The infantry gets the basis of some real support for their LAV Battalions.
2 LAV Battalions per Brigade each with 4 tanks - That gives the RCAC a half squadron in each Brigade from which to teach the Infantry how to cooperate and which could be combined with 14 LAVs or CV90s if the fairy dust gets sprinkled nicely, to form a permanent Anti-Tank/DFS Squadron to support, protect and co-operate with the LAV Battalions.

The Type 57 Regiment puts the RCAC in the catbird seat for the lead positions in at least one of the Brigades.

And if somebody wants to compromise with Kevin and I on the Light Battalions as well that would be appreciated.  Even if it is just one Lt Battalion and a host of CADTC/SFAB/Cadre Trainers with an bunch of Class A/B Ready Reserve Companies.


----------



## Kirkhill

IKnowNothing said:


> Which feeds into tweaking the Canadianized MEU idea   Scrap the extra tank formation, add a platoon/troop to each.
> That plus embracing the idea of consolidation..
> 
> 8x Leo  (2 troops of 4)
> 8x LAV LRSS  (2x mixed Recce Squadrons)
> 8x TAPV
> 36x LAV 6 ISC (3x Inf Coy)
> 
> x7 (all 3 armoured regiments, 1st Btn of the Inf) + 1 spare/ deployed/ prepositioned
> =
> 56 Leo's
> 56 LAV LRSS
> 56 TAPV
> 252 LAV ISC
> 
> 
> Add  8x LAV CP per quickly converted to carry dismount 81mm mortar teams, to be turreted as soon as can be arranged
> 2nd Btn of the Inf regiments to LIB with TAPV Recce Squadron and 8 tube mortar platoon
> 3rd battalion dissolved to ensure that everything is manned and supported
> Artillery to Achers to free up PY's to man an M-Shorad battery
> UOR Javelins
> 
> 
> Consolidate the combat arms down to
> 6x fully manned and equipped standing combined arms battlegroups,  1x full set of prepositioned/deployable kit
> 3x LIB



The reason I want to keep a central large force of tanks is for training, maintenance and organization.  I could cycle Troops from the centre out the Brigades and keep the remote Troops in reasonable running condition.   In addition it gives me a formed body which can be used in its entirety, as Squadrons, as Half-Squadrons or as more Detached Troops.  Flexibility to react to various situations as the circumstances demand.

The same principle would apply to the Guns, Air Defence and Engineers.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> A CMBG is allegedly 7,634 ish AR.
> Which seems a tad bloated, and one can’t wonder why they aren’t all filled when you theoretically try to have 3 and a CSS Bde and…


Those numbers might be a tad out. The last authorized establishment that I've seen (and that's admittedly not a war establishment) assigned roughly 4,600 PYs to 1 CMBG to which should be added 300 for 1 Fd Amb and whatever 1 MP platoon works out to these days (say 40 or so).

That figure for the brigade is a tad high because 1 Svc Bn has in excess of 900 positions of which a number are undoubtedly base positions and not field positions.

Compare that to an ABCT at 4,040; an SBCT at 4,680 and an IBCT at 4,560 (inclusive of Bde Med Coy)



KevinB said:


> I’m honestly terribly opposed to the Armored controlling Bde Recce at this point- especially as anyone senior in the RCAC seems to have been fine with some colossally fucked up opinions and acceptance of the suitability of some vehicles and what a Recce asset for a Bde actually is.
> 
> Frankly I’d be focusing the tank the CAF does have in one Reg’t and looking to offload a lot of Armor PY’s into Artillery and Infantry units.


I think the RCAC was very badly screwed up in its early '00s scramble to stay relevant what with scraping tanks and fumbling around with ISTAR units and Direct Fire Units and all that. Living in an infantry centric (nay, dare I say rifle company centric army) was rough for zipperheads and gunners. I think the RCAC recce force could do well if properly focused on a role.

A regiment of tanks makes eminent sense. So does a properly organized bde cavalry regiment for each brigade although "sneak and peak" recce (augmented by drones) and surveillance is well within the RCAC's remit. Other things like an infantry element, anti-armour element and close in indirect fire, attack drone elements could come from other branches. But, why bother. Those latter elements are a "in case of fire, break glass" resource and could easily go to the reserves. IMHO Bde cavalry could mostly be a 30/70 organization.

This may sound strange, but for the same "in case of fire, break glass" reason, I don't think the artillery needs more PYs anyway. They can't afford to lose any but I'm not so sure they need more. Much of the artillery could be served by a 30/70 structure as long as the equipment is there.


KevinB said:


> Move all the M777 to Pet - have res units train with 2RCHA so one can field at least 3 6 gun Bty and ideally 8 gun battery.


Every brigade needs a RegF artillery regimental HQ; a full RegF FOO battery and one RegF gun battery (or a 70/30 battery). The other two gun batteries and the STA battery could easily be 30/70 organizations. That reduces the PYs but leaves sufficient structure for the RegF to have a career path and build the requisite doctrinal base while filling out the bulk with low cost reservists.

Gun distribution is problematic because the M777 is the wrong gun except for a light air mobile capable force.

Some 155mm guns must be available at each regiment if for no other purpose then training the FOOs to be proficient with the more complex fire missions. With 37 M777s one could easily deploy a four gun battery to each RegF regiment. That leaves 25 to allocate.

So here's the next question. Do we need or want M777s in Latvia? IMHO, no. We should either work under the Latvian artillery battalions or if we want our own we should lease or buy an SP. Enough for a six-gun battery for Latvia and another for Shilo (plus a tech spare or two). I wouldn't give any to the RCAS as all the training for these could take place in Shilo. If we do something like that then 1 RCHA's for M777s could be used for ResF training or go to the other regiments.

Of the 25 M777s left for distribution, eight could go to each of 2 RCHA and 5 RALC to add to their existing four and thus give them three four-gun batteries each. (I'm not a proponent of a four-gun battery but it's sufficient to adequately equip and train two troops per battery able to be augmented by a 5th and 6th gun when needed). With one RegF battery per regiment that leaves two gun batteries to be manned by ResF pers in each region. That leaves 9 guns which are sufficient for tech and RCAS stock.  

There are other options. But I think the big issue really is will we keep symmetric brigades? And will we be at any point raising the bar to the point where we abandon SSE and get back to a requirement to deploy a full brigade (of whatever weight and structure). Under the SSE battle group construct, aggregate batteries are viable options. Anything bigger then that and you need a fully functioning regiment.

One more issue. We need loitering munitions batteries even more than we need long range precision rockets (and we do need those too.) I see these as a general support battery within the close support regiment. They could also be part of a general support regiment to be allocated to brigades as needed. We're looking at three separate fights here with each needing specialized resources. The close support fight is what our regiments currently focus on with their gun batteries. In addition there is the counterfire role - that's where long range precision rockets come in. We have the acquisition systems in the LCMR and MRR and but no deep strike capability. We're learning from Ukraine, however, that there is also an effective role for an advanced close combat battle involving what used to be a screen and more and more looks like a guard battle fought by lighter forces with new ground and airborne precision anti-armour systems. Three battles - three systems. (Oh yeah. and air defence - let's not lose sight of that one)

Oh hell! One more issue yet. If we are seriously looking at cavalry regiments, we need one additional FSCC and several additional FOOs per brigade. We can currently service three manoeuvre units per brigade. A properly structure cavalry regiment needs a fourth. In the past we always used the reserve battalion's FSCC and FOOs for the screen/guard until they did a passage of lines but that's getting more risky these days.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Oh hell! One more issue yet. If we are seriously looking at cavalry regiments, we need one additional FSCC and several additional FOOs per brigade. We can currently service three manoeuvre units per brigade. A properly structure cavalry regiment needs a fourth. In the past we always used the reserve battalion's FSCC and FOOs for the screen/guard until they did a passage of lines but that's getting more risky these days.
> 
> 🍻


IMHO the amount of FOO Parties never made sense to me.  The old saying a heir and spare comes to mind or 2 is 1, 1 is none.  

   I’m long stale on the Arty organization, as I’d fled to the PPCLI in 94.  
 But the old 2 FOO Parties per Bty and a FCCC/BC’s Party only gave you 9 / Regiment which never seemed to me enough to cover a Bde frontage.  I was told when the FOO parties got stripped from the gun BTY’s they never upped the number.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> IMHO the amount of FOO Parties never made sense to me.  The old saying a heir and spare comes to mind or 2 is 1, 1 is none.
> 
> I’m long stale on the Arty organization, as I’d fled to the PPCLI in 94.
> But the old 2 FOO Parties per Bty and a FCCC/BC’s Party only gave you 9 / Regiment which never seemed to me enough to cover a Bde frontage.  I was told when the FOO parties got stripped from the gun BTY’s they never upped the number.


They actually upped them a lot.

The arty used to have a Bty Comd and tech and a few signalers who augmented the bn Mortar pl commanders CP to form the FSCC. By establishment there were two FOO parties with a wartime establishment of three so that each coy could have one. Back in the seventies and eighties we only had two batteries per regiment supporting a brigade with four manoeuvre battalions (three infantry one armoured/recce). We FOOs were very busy in those days as between artillery gun camps and two sets of battalion exercises. By 2000 the regiments were up to three gun batteries each but still a BC and two FOOs each.

The nice thing in those days was that if the BC and FOOs were pulled away from a battalion to DS another unit then the bn still had its mortars, mor pl CP/FSCC and its MFCs to provide fire support (plus linkage through the brigade net to call for arty support)

When the battalions cast aside their mortar platoons things had to change. 

Under the CLS's Artillery Transformation Directive of Jul 2005, the artillery was tasked to supply three brigade FSCCs, nine full bn FSCCs and increase its FOO holdings from 18 FOO parties to 27 FOO/JTAC teams. The formation of an STA battery in each regiment was also directed. Since the whole thing was to be PY neutral within the artillery the number of gun detachments were reduced from 54 guns to 24 guns (hence two four-gun batteries per regiment rather than three six-gun batteries). Starting with TF1-07, in Afghanistan, the guns provided a battle group FSCC and 4 FOO/JTAC teams and three two-gun troops (plus STA) per roto for a few rotos. (TF 1-07 had three rifle coys, an armoured sqn and a recce sqn)

The FOO batteries actually came after the directive and as a direct cause of it. The process of cranking out more FOOs started immediately and the new FOO batteries really only started to form in 2007. Basically one BC runs the FOO battery and the other two BCs run the two gun batteries so there was really no change in BC strength. STA does its own thing. 

I've said before that its a steep and expensive process to develop a competent FOO/JTAC team. They also have a short time in the job - usually two years - before moving on to other career courses, or regimental or other staff positions. I'm not sure how well it works for the development, career structure and capability of the US FSO and FIST folks since they start with junior people and don't go through the gunline first but nonetheless there is still a world of work to just learn the LAV, LAV turret, LAV OPV systems (or M7 Bradley FSV or M1131 Stryker FSV in the US) and JTACery over and above all the fire control stuff. With no war going on things - like recertifying JTACs - are starting to fall by the wayside. Ammo shortages are going to hurt shooting skills as well (During the 1970s our two battery regiments were each putting about 10,000 rds of 105 mm down range each year. That's certainly not happening anymore. 'course we only had maps and grease pencils so we needed to adjust fire a lot more 😁)

🍻


----------



## Prairie canuck

My observations, for what they're worth, are whichever structure that has been discussed here, and there are many, many, many, unfortunately ignores the need to deploy to an isolated Arctic environment for an extended period of time, no matter the season, be supported,  and all the while under duress. If any of our allies were to inquire about getting some Arctic warfare training Canada could only refer them to Scandanavia.
There's an understandable focus on Europe, the middle east, Asia, etc. but leaving the backdoor wide open because we're focused on the neighbours across the street or down the block is a head scratcher.* 
Probable or not* Canada needs to be able to quickly deploy a mobile force to fight and win in the Arctic (and not just our own area). Leos, LAVs, TAPVs, etc will not be easily transported to nor will they be mobile once, if ever, they get there.  You need "stuff" that can drive across Ellesmere Island. A lack of airfields almost mandates it be something that while in flight can be pushed out the ass end of multiple C17s and/or C130s.
...the defense of Canada... priority #1 right?
Canada should be *the* "experts" in Arctic warfare and I daresay having the rangers lead 50 snowmobiles around every year on a sovereignty ride that covers _maybe_  2% of the arctic isn't very convincing. China and Russia certainly won't be intimidated.
AOPS is a start but that's it, a start. It's got as much firepower as a single LAV.....
It's late and I'm rambling....


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> Not the case.  The role of an infantry battalion, regardless of its transportation, is the same.  An infantry battalion's role is to close with and destroy the enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and to seize and retain ground.  It conducts close engagement tasks in stability operations.
> 
> 
> 
> What is "true light infantry?"


You're right, I shouldn't have thrown out an unofficial definition without context.

When I spoke about "true" light infantry I was couching it in terms similar to what Lt Col Gregory Thiele, USMC describes in his book "4th Generation Warfare Handbook" where he refers back to a more historical distinction between "Line" infantry and "Light" infantry.



> Light Infantry vs. Line Infantry​This is a critical part of 4GW, and one in which the two authors focus much of their time. Line infantry refers to conventional infantry tactics. Lt. Col Thiele uses the word “open space” in reference to it. This is basically uniformed conventional infantry forces fighting other uniformed forces with tanks, air support, and massive amounts of logistics in support.
> 
> Light infantry takes place on a different battlefield that has more complexity and nuance. These units need to be more “self-reliant” and must have a smaller logistical footprint. Furthermore, the use of violence is more selective and calculated. Also, light infantry uses the ambush more than close air support and artillery.



This is a very crude description of the distinction between "Line" and "Light" infantry by Lt Col Thiele in the writings and podcasts I've heard and obviously there is much more to it than that.  

A basic Wikipedia definition of Light Infantry historically (vs the modern interpretation) is:


> Historically, light infantry often fought as scouts, raiders, and skirmishers—soldiers who fight in a loose formation ahead of the main army to harass, delay, disrupt supply lines, and generally "soften up" an enemy before the main battle.


and


> Today the term "light" denotes, in the United States table of organization and equipment, units lacking heavy weapons and armor or with a reduced vehicle footprint. Light infantry units lack the greater firepower, operational mobility and protection of mechanized or armored units, but possess greater tactical mobility and the ability to execute missions in severely restrictive terrain and in areas where weather makes vehicular mobility difficult.



When Kirkhill (and some others) present organizational structures focusing on Light Infantry it seems to me that they are often clearly leaning toward the more historical (and 4th Gen Warfare) definition of "Light" Infantry vs the more contemporary definition.  They are describing small Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field (sometimes behind enemy lines) with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming rather than a traditional Infantry Battalion/IBCT type structure that is designed to "close with and destroy the enemy".

So when I say that the roles of our Mechanized Infantry (or our Light Infantry in a Canadian Light Battalion context) is different than the role of "true" Light Infantry this is the distinction I am referring to.  While there may be a role for "true" Light Infantry in the Canadian Army I think it is important to get the "Line" Infantry role sorted first before we head down that path (outside a CSOR context).

When it comes to the question of concentrating our Light Battalions in the RCR vs. simply dropping the 3rd Battalions from all three Brigades I can see the logic in doing that in order to keep a portion of the force more easily deployable in case of a crisis.  I'd counter that however by a) questioning whether a risk-adverse Canadian Government is likely to choose to deploy a relatively more vulnerable Light Battalion somewhere over a more protected Mechanized Battalion, and b) are there a great many deployment situations where a Light Battalion can be deployed where a Mechanized Battalion cannot be deployed in a Light role without their LAVs?


----------



## Infanteer

So, are you saying a company from a Canadian Army light battalion can't work as "Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field (sometimes behind enemy lines) with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming?"

How is "raiding, skirmishing and swarming" not engaging the enemy in close combat to destroy him?


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> So, are you saying a company from a Canadian Army light battalion can't work as "Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field (sometimes behind enemy lines) with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming?"
> 
> How is "raiding, skirmishing and swarming" not engaging the enemy in close combat to destroy him?


Just a quick question - because I don't know the answer - what is the vehicle establishment of our light battalions right now? Not the whole thing but just roughly what is in use at the rifle company level.


----------



## Infanteer

There are B Vehicles in the echelon, but that's it.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> So, are you saying a company from a Canadian Army light battalion can't work as "Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field (sometimes behind enemy lines) with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming?"
> 
> How is "raiding, skirmishing and swarming" not engaging the enemy in close combat to destroy him?


I'm not saying that they are not capable of doing that but unless I'm reading his intent completely wrong, my understanding is that the Light forces that Kirkhill is proposing as the basis for the infantry would be intended and organized specifically for that type of role as their primary focus as opposed to a traditional Infantry Battalion/Brigade structure capable of splitting of Combat Teams, etc.

And if LAV infantry is the most likely type of unit that the Canadian Government is likely to deploy (even if only to have the vehicles available for protected mobility while the infantry primarily operates dismounted) then why would you choose to have a full 1/3 of your infantry force NOT habitually trained on that platform?

If this issue is rather that we don't have enough LAVs available to support 6 x LAV Battalions then that is another story, but I can't say that I recall that argument being made.


----------



## KevinB

FWIW small team work is SOF territory. Light Infantry isn’t SOF, but generally Infantry who don’t use heavy vehicles and are generally for us on certain niche employment. 
 Rapid Deployment 
Air Assault 
Airborne 
Mountain 
Arctic 

You don’t setup units to fight isolated battles, but your equip your forces so they are effective as possible at the lowest levels that doesn’t adversely affect their mobility.  

Headed to Hockey more to follow.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> I'm not saying that they are not capable of doing that but unless I'm reading his intent completely wrong, my understanding is that the Light forces that Kirkhill is proposing as the basis for the infantry would be intended and organized specifically for that type of role as their primary focus as opposed to a traditional Infantry Battalion/Brigade structure capable of splitting of Combat Teams, etc.
> 
> And if LAV infantry is the most likely type of unit that the Canadian Government is likely to deploy (even if only to have the vehicles available for protected mobility while the infantry primarily operates dismounted) then why would you choose to have a full 1/3 of your infantry force NOT habitually trained on that platform?
> 
> If this issue is rather that we don't have enough LAVs available to support 6 x LAV Battalions then that is another story, but I can't say that I recall that argument being made.


Keeping LAV crews trained… 
  There is only so many training hours and dollars available.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Just a quick question - because I don't know the answer - what is the vehicle establishment of our light battalions right now? Not the whole thing but just roughly what is in use at the rifle company level.



Just a quick question for you.  

Why does it matter?

The whole point of a Light Battalion,  a term I use solely to differentiate it from the various forms of infantry defined by their mounts, is that it is not dependent on its vehicles.

@GR66

I prefer the USMC construct that holds the Infantry's transport as non-organic.  Their Infantry is organized into administrative Regiments of 3 tactical battalions of 3 tactical companies of 3 tactical platoons of 3 tactical squads of 3 tactical teams.  Each level has its own Command and Support Elements, all the way down to the squad.

The Battalion is configured to fight as an integral part of a combined arms Marine Air Ground Task Force or a Marine Expeditionary Brigade or a Marine Expeditionary Unit.  Everything that the Battalion doesn't own, but can be provided by the Corps, is deployed with the Battalion on long term engagements where the entire combined force lives and trains and deploys together.

The Battalion can be fielded as a cohesive full battalion, or split into independent companies, or platoons, or squads.   They can concentrate and  fight as a closed fist on the "conventional" battlefield as they did in Gulf War I.   Or they can disperse and fight as splayed fingers on the ADO battlefield.  They can fight on the shoreline, in the arctic, in the jungles, or on the European battlefield.  They possess weapons to handle enemy personnel, vehicles, AFVs, helicopters and aerial threats.  They can be deployed by ship, boat, amphibs, tracks, wheels and helicopters.  They can be strategically deployed by air (not parachute - just an aircraft landing on any suitable runway anywhere in the world).

And all battalions do all these things - with a basic TO&E and a basic doctrine and training time to permit switching from one specialized role to the next.

Most battalions have their fields of excellence and are customarily deployed in that role but every battalion can switch roles and move from arctic to jungle, from MAGTF to MEU(SOC) to ACP and be expected to perform adequately even if they don't have the luxury of training time.

All battalions are expected to supply "Company-Group sized units capable of independent operation in the field ... with an array of integral weapon systems including AA, AT, Sense/Strike, etc. focused on raiding, skirmishing and swarming?"

The "Behind Enemy Lines" stuff is truly the realm of the Special Forces - even if their tactics and kit are the same as their siblings on the other side of the "Enemy Lines".  That is not a field I would recommend for any Canadian unit outside of CANSOFCOM.


So why do I keep harping on about "Light" Infantry Companies?

In truth I would be happier to refer to them as Infantry as generations have known the term and the USMC still uses the term.  They are "Her Majesty's Odd Job Men".  And that applies to all Infantry regardless of how they get to work.

In truth I would be happier referring to Battalions than Companies as the central organizing principle but our system is so FUBAR between Army and The Rest, Zipperheads and Grunts, Armies of the West and East, Regs and Molitia, Capbadges and Colonels galore .... etc. etc. etc., that I have given up long ago at being able to create workable battalions outside of the Reg Force given the challenge the Reg Force seems to have creating workable battalions for themselves.  And here I do not just refer to the RCIC.  The RCAC and the RRCA are just as FUBAR.


I focus on the Company as that is the largest unit that I have seen on parade on a Molitia Parade Square - 100 to 200 troops.
The Molitia has been able to produce adequate Captains and Warrant Officers.
The Company can train as a combined arms entity if organized on the USMC structure with integral Weapons Platoons and Weapons Squads and well equipped squads and teams.
The Company can train with elements of other Corps to create a combined arms Combat Team.
The Company can be easily plugged into an existing Battalion Structure. Edit: A Battalion can have 2 to 5, 6 at a stretch, Companies working under a central command.* (Actually pre WW1 battalions had 10 Companies under command)*. The 12 manoeuver "Battalions" of the RCIC and the RCAC, and the 4 regular regiments of artillery should be prepared to work with 2 to 6 subunits depending on availability and regardless or parent capbadge.
The Company can be deployed as an independent entity on a brigade or divisional tasking.
The Company is the minimal max-flex organization to which we can aspire.
Should it be 50 troops or 250 troops in size?  I don't care.  I am more concerned about the range of weaponry, competencies and command.


As Infanteer rightly points out, regardless of horse they ride, an Infanteer is an Infanteer.  They close with and destroy.  Sometimes they wait for the enemy to come to them.  Sometimes they take the fight to the enemy.


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> I'm not saying that they are not capable of doing that but unless I'm reading his intent completely wrong, my understanding is that the Light forces that Kirkhill is proposing as the basis for the infantry would be intended and organized specifically for that type of role as their primary focus as opposed to a traditional Infantry Battalion/Brigade structure capable of splitting of Combat Teams, etc.



The problem with the idea of "real light infantry" as is pitched by the 4GW light infantry jaeger crowd is that it is mythical.  It creates a false dichotomy of "mech vs light" infantry that doesn't really exist, but suited the conceptual narrative of the crowd that was pushing that junk theory.

The reality is that infantry forces, regardless of their platform, are all beholden to the same tactical and administrative realities as any other regular, conventional force is.  Any infantry unit can and will disperse and concentrate for tactical and administrative purposes.  But having a force employment concept set permanently to "dispersed" is not in line with the flexibility that an infantry unit provides on the battlefield.

Fighting tactically dispersed is one approach, but I find it is often overhyped.  First off, this sort of operating framework makes forces dreadfully exposed, especially to a mechanized foe, due to lack of mutual support.  I remember a collective exercise where a Light Infantry Company was used as a "long range raiding company."  Following insertion, it was quickly detected, converged upon, and destroyed.  Extraction for a force on foot is difficult when the pursuit is on, and the lines of communication often conceived for these forces are usually vulnerable to any enemy with a modicum of area denial capability.  Call this the "Chindit effect."

The other fact is that concentration of force is a central tenet of modern system land combat for a reason - to achieve decisive results, and to seize and hold ground, a force has to come together to create overwhelming combat power at the critical point.  This is why a Light Infantry Battalion has a robust combat support company - that advantage would be squandered if it operated in a manner that prevented this additional weight.

Any good infantry unit disperses to avoid being vulnerable, and concentrates to achieve decision.  The thinking that this is some sort of tactical deficiency or outmoded way of fighting is why the 4GW theorists are just shoveling clouds.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Historically, light infantry often fought as scouts, raiders, and skirmishers



Maybe a very long time ago.  Historically, going quite far back, anyone on foot scouting and raiding would have been at high risk of being butchered by the enemy's light cavalry.  Skirmishing in front of the line of battle was just a minor part of what was primarily a "line infantry" battle.

Scouting, raiding, anything else requiring extensive movement, is a job for mounted forces.

Light infantry is just dismounted infantry.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> The problem with the idea of "real light infantry" as is pitched by the 4GW light infantry jaeger crowd is that it is mythical.  It creates a false dichotomy of "mech vs light" infantry that doesn't really exist, but suited the conceptual narrative of the crowd that was pushing that junk theory.
> 
> The reality is that infantry forces, regardless of their platform, are all beholden to the same tactical and administrative realities as any other regular, conventional force is.  Any infantry unit can and will disperse and concentrate for tactical and administrative purposes.  But having a force employment concept set permanently to "dispersed" is not in line with the flexibility that an infantry unit provides on the battlefield.
> 
> Fighting tactically dispersed is one approach, but I find it is often overhyped.  First off, this sort of operating framework makes forces dreadfully exposed, especially to a mechanized foe, due to lack of mutual support.  I remember a collective exercise where a Light Infantry Company was used as a "long range raiding company."  Following insertion, it was quickly detected, converged upon, and destroyed.  Extraction for a force on foot is difficult when the pursuit is on, and the lines of communication often conceived for these forces are usually vulnerable to any enemy with a modicum of area denial capability.  Call this the "Chindit effect."
> 
> The other fact is that concentration of force is a central tenet of modern system land combat for a reason - to achieve decisive results, and to seize and hold ground, a force has to come together to create overwhelming combat power at the critical point.  This is why a Light Infantry Battalion has a robust combat support company - that advantage would be squandered if it operated in a manner that prevented this additional weight.
> 
> Any good infantry unit disperses to avoid being vulnerable, and concentrates to achieve decision.  The thinking that this is some sort of tactical deficiency or outmoded way of fighting is why the 4GW theorists are just shoveling clouds.


I guess we're in agreement then.  No SOF-lite like specialized infantry constructs and there is no real substantial difference between Mechanized Infantry and Light Infantry other than how they get to the battle.

The question then is if we are reducing the number of Infantry Battalions from nine to six should we have 6 x LAV Battalions or 4 x LAV Battaltions and 2 x Light Battalions.

Since you agree that the only real difference between the two is that one drives to the battle and the other walks, then wouldn't it give us more flexibility to have 6 x LAV Battalions, any one of which can also deploy dismounted if required?  Deploying the Light Battalions with LAVs on the other hand involves vehicle crewing skills that they are not regularly trained on.


----------



## McG

GR66 said:


> The question then is if we are reducing the number of Infantry Battalions from nine to six should we have 6 x LAV Battalions or 4 x LAV Battaltions and 2 x Light Battalions


My understanding is CA walked back that plan. 9 battalions will stay.


----------



## KevinB

Brad Sallows said:


> .
> 
> Light infantry is just dismounted infantry.


It shouldn’t be.  

Infantry are dismounted fighters by nature. 

   Mechanized Infantry general go in tracks or wheeled APC/IFV  to battle 

   Motorized Infantry use trucks - though this has been co-opted to also explain wheeled APC/IFV Forces. 

Light Infantry isn’t supposed to be just Infantry without mechanization/Motors. 

Light Infantry can have light vehicles for mobility - or helicopters for Air Assault etc. 

Canada has just neglected Light Infantry for years many have forget it’s role - and those who championed LI eventually got pissed off with the refusal to admit that and went SOF and/or got out.  


There are only so many training hours available - you can’t have a Mech Force that is equally good at Light as a dedicated light force that has equal opportunities - simply due to PCF cycles, etc. the isn’t time or money to be stellar at both.  

Unless you ignore the niche roles for Light Infantry as Canada has done…


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> Since you agree that the only real difference between the two is that one drives to the battle and the other walks, then wouldn't it give us more flexibility to have 6 x LAV Battalions, any one of which can also deploy dismounted if required?



It isn't that simple.  What I argued is that their role is the same.

There are differences between the two; largely related to knowledge and skills in planning and sustainment.  As well, their different strengths and weaknesses mean that missions may be different.  Finally, the Infantry does not operate in a vacuum - there are the other arms and services that fight and sustain the battle.  Their ability to support specific missions may mean a degree of specialization or focused training.

These means they are not necessarily inter-changeable for specific missions without some degree of reorientation.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> It isn't that simple.  What I argued is that their role is the same.
> 
> There are differences between the two; largely related to knowledge and skills in planning and sustainment.  As well, their different strengths and weaknesses mean that missions may be different.  Finally, the Infantry does not operate in a vacuum - there are the other arms and services that fight and sustain the battle.  Their ability to support specific missions may mean a degree of specialization or focused training.
> 
> These means they are not necessarily inter-changeable for specific missions without some degree of reorientation.




Would you accept that "What" the Mech and Light Infantry do is the same.

"How" they do it is different.

Both types build competence and excellence within their own particular limitations.


----------



## Fabius

The problem is that with the RCIC period. 

Problem: The Bn’s are hollow and have no personnel stability meaning no expertise developed or ownership of anything. RCIC solution fight tooth and nail to maintain all 9 Bns and the schools as is. 

Problem: Reserve infantry aren’t organized or equipped to do much above provide dismount rifleman (STAR not withstanding). RCIC solution fight tooth and nail against anything that takes away from 9 reg Bns. 

Problem: Light forces. Our 3 Bns are neither IBCT Bns, nor IBCT (Air Assault) Bns, nor IBCT (Airborne) because the problem isn’t with infantry Rifleman who close with and destroy things it’s with the entire combined arms and joint fight to include the Bde level CSS and CS that is absent that makes our 3 Bns unfit for purpose. RCIC solution - tell a 3 Bn CO to come up with a force employment concept for his unit. 

I am sorry but we are doing this to ourselves.


----------



## MilEME09

From what I have been  reading, Ukraine has caused some serious recalculation among the CAF and NATO leadership and F2025 is being changed on the fly to reflect the new reality.


----------



## Infanteer

Fabius said:


> The problem is that with the RCIC period.
> 
> Problem: The Bn’s are hollow and have no personnel stability meaning no expertise developed or ownership of anything. RCIC solution fight tooth and nail to maintain all 9 Bns and the schools as is.
> 
> Problem: Reserve infantry aren’t organized or equipped to do much above provide dismount rifleman (STAR not withstanding). RCIC solution fight tooth and nail against anything that takes away from 9 reg Bns.
> 
> Problem: Light forces. Our 3 Bns are neither IBCT Bns, nor IBCT (Air Assault) Bns, nor IBCT (Airborne) because the problem isn’t with infantry Rifleman who close with and destroy things it’s with the entire combined arms and joint fight to include the Bde level CSS and CS that is absent that makes our 3 Bns unfit for purpose. RCIC solution - tell a 3 Bn CO to come up with a force employment concept for his unit.
> 
> I am sorry but we are doing this to ourselves.



I think you are confusing "RCIC" and "Canadian Army" in a lot of things here.


----------



## McG

Fabius said:


> IBCT


The infantry brigade combat team is American. Instead of coming across as a rational analysis of Canadian requirements, is appears as fetishing US ORBATS when you keep throwing that terminology around where it is not needed.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Would you accept that "What" the Mech and Light Infantry do is the same.
> 
> "How" they do it is different.
> 
> Both types build competence and excellence within their own particular limitations.



"What" is the same. This is defined by the infantry battalion's role - close with and destroy the enemy, repel the enemy’s assault by fire, and to seize and retain ground. It conducts close engagement tasks in stability operations.

"How" is the same as well - application of combined arms tactics in offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

"Where" can be different, based on mission, or it could be the same, depending on mission.  "Where" will impact the method under which "how" occurs.  "Why" and "When" could also introduce a different context, based on the mission, that affects "method."  So "method" is your difference - a subordinate factor of "How."  This may sound like splitting hairs, but I think the nuance is important, and helps conceptually avoid the false dichotomy.

And method is where you build the competence and excellence within limitations.


----------



## MilEME09

Womder how the new Army commander will factor in, from CAF facebook



> Congratulations to LGen Jocelyn Paul’s appointment as the next Commander of the Canadian Army. LGen Paul is a member of the Huron-Wendat First Nation and will be the first Indigenous person to be appointed to lead Canada’s army. LGen Paul began his military career as a Reserve Infantry Officer before joining the Regular Force and is currently serving as NATO’s Deputy Commander Allied Joint Force Command Naples. A change of command between current acting commander MGen Michel-Henri St-Louis and LGen Paul will occur in the summer.
> 
> Congratulations on this achievement Sir, we look forward to serving under your command.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Infantry are dismounted fighters by nature.  Mechanized Infantry general go in tracks or wheeled APC/IFV  to battle.  Motorized Infantry use trucks - though this has been co-opted to also explain wheeled APC/IFV Forces.



What I see as the important distinction is between infantry who expect (and train) to sometimes fight mounted in the vehicles (which must be suited to the purpose), and those who don't.  But I admit it's asking a lot to lump all the rest together - what most people think of as light infantry, and the rest who don't fight mounted but don't spend time working with oddball transport and specialized equipment optimized for portability.


----------



## IKnowNothing

McG said:


> The infantry brigade combat team is American. Instead of coming across as a rational analysis of Canadian requirements, is appears as fetishing US ORBATS when you keep throwing that terminology around where it is not needed.


That's kind of a loaded statement for a dispassionate discussion of the state of the CA and a path forward.  

Is acknowledging the "xBCT" ORBATS (or any foreign/allied ORBAT) as a standard to aspire to/ benchmark against so offensive?


----------



## McG

The US army has different equipment, personnel, and resource constraints than the CA. It also supports a nation with different strategic objectives. Canadian organizations should be built to meet Canadian requirements. Blanket copying any other nation’s model does not set us on the path to success.


----------



## Fabius

All true but what strategic objectives do our infantry forces need to meet? 
Do our current light Bns meet them? Are they enabled by the joint forces and do they enable the joint forces? Letting a unit CO ( or worse telling a unit CO to figure out) force employment concepts is a strategic fail, I don’t see how it can be seen as anything but.


----------



## IKnowNothing

McG said:


> The US army has different equipment, personnel, and resource constraints than the CA. It also supports a nation with different strategic objectives. Canadian organizations should be built to meet Canadian requirements. *Blanket copying any other nation’s model does not set us on the path to success.*


That speaks to number of Bde's and or / BG's, type of Bde's BG's, not the  composition required once those decisions are made.

 What uniquely Canadian requirements call for complete lack of mounted ATGMS, SP Mortars, MANPAD, MANPAT, Direct fire?
Why can't a CMBG be held up against a SBCT and held to account for not delivering?

Bolded, this path to success- it's what we're on now? We've perfected the employment of the medium/light Bde hybrid and no one in the world is set up to do what we want to do better?

(Not disparaging the ability of the personnel in the field),  but I think we can all agree that the answers are:
There aren't any, we're lacking
It can, and it doesn't (deliver)
We're not, we haven't, and there are.

Anything else is pure hubris.


----------



## Fabius

MilEME09 said:


> Womder how the new Army commander will factor in, from CAF facebook


Honestly, if the analysis is sound and the decisions based on good COAs it should not change much, as the institution has not changed in the last week. However that may be an unrealistic perspective. Bottom line great question, time will tell.


----------



## Fabius

Infanteer said:


> I think you are confusing "RCIC" and "Canadian Army" in a lot of things here.


Perhaps, but when Director Infantry on behalf of the RCIC briefs CCA that we need to keep all 9 Bns despite the F2025 plan I will suggest that at minimum it’s both.  Maybe what I am seeing is wrong though I will give you that.


----------



## McG

IKnowNothing said:


> That speaks to number of Bde's and or / BG's, type of Bde's BG's, not the composition required once those decisions are made.


No. The differences between Canada and the US can translate into many differences of size, composition, and capabilities within brigades.



IKnowNothing said:


> What uniquely Canadian requirements call for complete lack of mounted ATGMS, SP Mortars, MANPAD, MANPAT, Direct fire?


Nobody said there were “ Canadian requirements call for complete lack” of anything. Your being hyperbolic and making a strawman.



IKnowNothing said:


> Why can't a CMBG be held up against a SBCT and held to account for not delivering?


Nobody said comparisons can’t be made, but there is no intellectual rigour in defining the requirements for a Canadian battalion entirely in the foundations of what is or is not suitable as for a battalion in a brigade combat team.  

Canada does not have echelons above brigade. The US has echelons above corps. We may need things at the battalion or brigade level that do not exist at the same levels in the US. We may not need capabilities or equipment that the US has because we have other ways of achieving the effect. There may also be things in the US structure that we cannot afford.


----------



## IKnowNothing

McG said:


> No. The differences between Canada and the US can translate into many differences of size, composition, and capabilities within brigades.
> 
> 
> Nobody said there were “ Canadian requirements call for complete lack” of anything. Your being hyperbolic and making a strawman.
> 
> 
> Nobody said comparisons can’t be made, but there is no intellectual rigour in defining the requirements for a Canadian battalion entirely in the foundations of what is or is not suitable as for a battalion in a brigade combat team.
> 
> Canada does not have echelons above brigade. The US has echelons above corps. We may need things at the battalion or brigade level that do not exist at the same levels in the US. We may not need capabilities or equipment that the US has because we have other ways of achieving the effect. There may also be things in the US structure that we cannot afford.


Not to be a dick, but this seems like vague and defensive equivocation.  Call it hyperbolic, but what are these requirements that call for the CMBG as it stands today vs. being a SBCT with chain guns on the carriers (within the combat arms) ?
What are the _specific_ arguments against using SBCT/IBCT battalions as capability benchmarks?
What are some examples of things we have/need at the Bde/Btn level that the US doesn't, and what are some capabilities that we don't have because we (legitimately) have other ways of achieving that effect?
What uniquely Canadian requirements would not be met if we copied the SBCT structure with LAV 6's in place of Strykers?


----------



## McG

Look, go back and look at the post my initial comment was aimed at. That post made the claim that the problem with our battalions is that the were not US brigade combat team patterned battalions. 

The fact that our battalions are different is not, of itself, a problem. There is not a requirement for Canadian units & formations to mirror US, and there are many good reasons for differences.

If you want to take that and stretch it to meaning that there also cannot be similarities, then you are missing the mark.


----------



## Fabius

I was not arguing that Cdn units and formations MUST be the exact same as a US unit or formation. Perhaps unclearly I was lamenting the following:

Each light Bn belongs to a Mechanized Bde the majority of whose resources, training and employment is focused on mech battle. 

Each light Bn is composed of three Coy none of which share the same focus, Jump, Mountain and other.  Meaning it can’t really fight as an Airborne or Mountain Bn. 

Each light Bn has a vehicle scale of issue far below an equivalent US IBCT (or Cdn Mech Bn) meaning that they are not as ground mobile as their peers (this is a perennial issue on international exercises) leading to employment challenges. 

Given those items I don’t see the CA knowing what they want from the light Bns. Are they similar or equivalent to the capability an IBCT offers? Or an IBCT( Airborne) or the Para Bns within 16 Air Assault  Bde(UK) capable of strategic global response type things. Or an air assault element a la an IBCT ( air assault) . 

Bottom line is I don’t think three sub units across three units equals as much  capability as if they were in one unit. Same holds for three units across three Bdes. So what capability do we actually want, and how does that plug into either our joint force or a NATO combined force.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Just a quick question for you.
> 
> Why does it matter?


a. I'm naturally inquisitive 

b. It let's me better understand the capabilities and limitations of our light battalions. I already have a pretty good understanding of the LAV ones.

c. I note that no one has yet actually answered my question.



McG said:


> The US army has different equipment, personnel, and resource constraints than the CA. It also supports a nation with different strategic objectives. Canadian organizations should be built to meet Canadian requirements. Blanket copying any other nation’s model does not set us on the path to success.


Constantly reinventing the wheel when someone else has done all the preliminary research does not set us on a path to success either. Having a good understanding of how similar armies deal with the same fundamental issues of organization is very helpful in mapping out your own. 

The BCT system was set up well after the Americans had our example of how we set up a Mech Brigade Group. Seeing how they refined the example is a very useful piece of information - I completely agree that we should not create a blanket copy but we should certainly examine it as an exemplar and then critically examine those places where we differ significantly to fully understand if we have a critical capability gap.

At the battalion level strategic objectives do not matter unless one of them is "we will never engage in X missions". SSE tells us we need to be ready for the full gamut. Simply put, we have no strategic limitations other then that our current mission requirements do not call for deployments above a battle group albeit in the aggregate they could require the better part of a brigade at any given time.



McG said:


> Canada does not have echelons above brigade. The US has echelons above corps. We may need things at the battalion or brigade level that do not exist at the same levels in the US. We may not need capabilities or equipment that the US has because we have other ways of achieving the effect. There may also be things in the US structure that we cannot afford.


The BCT is designed as a combined arms formation capable of decisive action which can operate under either a division or a task force headquarters. Fundamentally it is no different from a CMBG. Both require some form of theatre support and a guiding headquarters. 

Divisions provide enablers to brigades. Canada does have above brigade enablers by way of the CCSB. You are obviously correct in that there is a substantial difference in the number and type of national above-brigade enablers available to a BCT and a CMBG. I suspect though that when you say that "we may not need capabilities or equipment that the US has because we have ways of achieving the effect" that its more rationalization than fact.

Most of the variations between Canada's CMBG and a US BCT or a UK BCT are driven by other facts most of which can be described by priorities: priorities on where cash gets spent; priorities based on risk assessments of what resources may not be needed in the near future; political direction on equipment acquisitions; and so on.

It's hard to find an offset for Canada's effects capability deficiencies of artillery, air defence, or anti-armour defence. Those are just the most obvious examples. That's just plain resource allocation. My guess is that if the LDsH ever does become a true tank regiment in 1 CMBG, 3 PPCLI will stay as the brigade's light battalion rather than become a cavalry battalion like in an ABCT (which only has three combined arms [tank/mech infantry] battalions in total) because the Army, for whatever reason, prioritizes the continuation of an infantry battalion above the creation of a brigade cavalry battalion. 

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> c. I note that no one has yet actually answered my question.



I gave you the answer right after you asked it.  Only the trucks (4) in the echelon with the CQ and Transport NCO.


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> I gave you the answer right after you asked it.  Only the trucks (4) in the echelon with the CQ and Transport NCO.


Many thanks and my apologies; I completely missed that.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Brad Sallows said:


> What I see as the important distinction is between infantry who expect (and train) to sometimes fight mounted in the vehicles (which must be suited to the purpose), and those who don't.  But I admit it's asking a lot to lump all the rest together - what most people think of as light infantry, and the rest who don't fight mounted but don't spend time working with oddball transport and specialized equipment optimized for portability.


The unfortunate Canadianism due to the lack of equipment. 
  Reserve Infantry Units are not Light Infantry, in fact one may argue they aren’t really equipped even as Infantry units is even more tragic. 

I think we all agree that the LIB’s should  NOT be in the CMBG’s, that tends to reduce their usefulness as well contributes to the outlook that they are just LAVless Mech units. 

In all reality I would argue that they should be amalgamated in a Light Bde - will all sorts of Light enablers.


----------



## IKnowNothing

McG said:


> Look, go back and look at the post my initial comment was aimed at. That post made the claim that the problem with our battalions is that the were not US brigade combat team patterned battalions.
> 
> The fact that our battalions are different is not, of itself, a problem. There is not a requirement for Canadian units & formations to mirror US, and there are many good reasons for differences.
> 
> If you want to take that and stretch it to meaning that there also cannot be similarities, then you are missing the mark.



I didn't reply to that post, I replied to yours- which was thinly veiled gatekeeping.  
That they're different is not a problem.  That they are objectively more poorly equipped and less effective (units, not soldiers) is.  There is not a requirement to mirror, and there are good reasons for differences.  But I'd argue that (within the realm of medium and light- armor is a different story) given the state of the CA it would be far more productive to take that template as a baseline, try to justify divergence ,and rapidly address any gaps that can't be justified,  rather than pretend that the CA is a unicorn with vastly different requirements from medium and light forces and spend years in staff studies coming up with a uniquely Canadian way to meet those requirements.

The questions in post 3749 stand.


----------



## Fabius

Interestingly the Canadian Army seems to now be drifting towards having 2 LIBs reporting to the CCSB with each LIB having different tasks and capabilities (ISR, Arctic Response, Force Protection, CIMIC, IRU).  Also the Infantry Corps in these discussions is musing if 81mm Mortars are too heavy for a Light Force.


----------



## KevinB

Fabius said:


> Interestingly the Canadian Army seems to now be drifting towards having 2 LIBs reporting to the CCSB with each LIB having different tasks and capabilities (ISR, Arctic Response, Force Protection, CIMIC, IRU).


UGH, FP isn't a good LI role, and ISR isn't specific to LI, I cry


Fabius said:


> Also the Infantry Corps in these discussions is musing if 81mm Mortars are too heavy for a Light Force.


They can be for certain operations, and too light for others.

Admittedly nothing the CA does shocks me anymore.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Fabius said:


> Interestingly the Canadian Army seems to now be drifting towards having 2 LIBs reporting to the CCSB with each LIB having different tasks and capabilities (ISR, Arctic Response, Force Protection, CIMIC, IRU).  Also the Infantry Corps in these discussions is musing if* 81mm Mortars are too heavy for a Light Force.*



Our mortar platoon jumped and carried them pretty much everywhere, and we in the rifle companies carried alot of their ammo.

Having said that, there needs to be some light vehicles in the mix somewhere to handle more ammo etc.


----------



## GR66

Fabius said:


> Interestingly the Canadian Army seems to now be drifting towards having 2 LIBs reporting to the CCSB with each LIB having different tasks and capabilities (ISR, Arctic Response, Force Protection, CIMIC, IRU).  Also the Infantry Corps in these discussions is musing if 81mm Mortars are too heavy for a Light Force.


Personally I think that Arctic Response would be a good primary role for the 2 x LIB.  Meets the requirement of defending Canada/North America in addition to strengthening our Sovereignty in the North.  The same arctic mobility vehicle that you'd use for these Arctic Response Battalions would also be useful for NATO (reinforce Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland) or any number of 3rd world deployments.

1 RCR in Petawawa could be a Parachute Battalion (capability could be required for a rapid response in the Canadian Arctic or elsewhere) and 2 RCR in Gagetown could specialize in working with our other Arctic assets (shipboard operations of the AOPS, sea-to-shore helicopter operations, small boat operations, etc.).


----------



## WLSC

McG said:


> No. The differences between Canada and the US can translate into many differences of size, composition, and capabilities within brigades.
> 
> 
> Nobody said there were “ Canadian requirements call for complete lack” of anything. Your being hyperbolic and making a strawman.
> 
> 
> Nobody said comparisons can’t be made, but there is no intellectual rigour in defining the requirements for a Canadian battalion entirely in the foundations of what is or is not suitable as for a battalion in a brigade combat team.
> 
> Canada does not have echelons above brigade. The US has echelons above corps. We may need things at the battalion or brigade level that do not exist at the same levels in the US. We may not need capabilities or equipment that the US has because we have other ways of achieving the effect. There may also be things in the US structure that we cannot afford.


I was going there also.  We should field a CMBG in the middle of a coalition div, right?  Ressources to achieve the mission « need » to be available as much as possible inside that command.  When you can field multiple divisions, you can define your requirements quiet differently.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> We should field a CMBG in the middle of a coalition div, right?



That template works for stuff at the low end of the intensity scale.  I doubt a multinational division composed of brigade groups that can't easily cross-attach stuff works as well as a pure one.  Any fight big enough to merit a brigade group contribution from Canada is probably big enough to attach that formation to an allied corps.


----------



## Kirkhill

WLSC said:


> I was going there also.  We should field a CMBG in the middle of a coalition div, right?  Ressources to achieve the mission « need » to be available as much as possible inside that command.  When you can field multiple divisions, you can define your requirements quiet differently.



I would aim to provide a Canadian Division (minus).

Build the Division with all the enablers but plan on only having one or two brigades that are supplied by Canada with the ability to incorporate 2 or 3 allied brigades from smaller, less rich countries that are able to put up manpower instead.

So  Divisional Arty, Divisional Air Defence, Divisional Heli Support, Divisional Engineers, Divsional Transport, Divisional C4ISR, Divisional Medical at the expense infantry and armoured slots.

Maybe even design the Battle Groups as the spines to which allied companies, or even battalions could attach to create Groups or Brigades.

That model would also work for attaching independent companies from the Canadian Reserves.


----------



## IKnowNothing

WLSC said:


> I was going there also.  We should field a CMBG in the middle of a coalition div, right?  Ressources to achieve the mission « need » to be available as much as possible inside that command.  When you can field multiple divisions, you can define your requirements quiet differently.


This would hold water if  xBCT templates were being used to justify removing capabilities rather than adding them.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I would aim to provide a Canadian Division (minus).
> 
> Build the Division with all the enablers but plan on only having one or two brigades that are supplied by Canada with the ability to incorporate 2 or 3 allied brigades from smaller, less rich countries that are able to put up manpower instead.
> 
> So  Divisional Arty, Divisional Air Defence, Divisional Heli Support, Divisional Engineers, Divsional Transport, Divisional C4ISR, Divisional Medical at the expense infantry and armoured slots.
> 
> Maybe even design the Battle Groups as the spines to which allied companies, or even battalions could attach to create Groups or Brigades.
> 
> That model would also work for attaching independent companies from the Canadian Reserves.


I would categorically disagree.

I think one needs to devise several strategies depending on location and threat level (as well as National Level of Commitment) 

For signifiant Peer/Near Peer Conventional High Intensity Conflicts I would recommend building Bde's that can be attached to capable allied nations Divisional forces(UK or US).
  Canada is missing (and has made ever effort to avoid) certain necessary enablers for formations, or enough of certain items it does have to operate in a Near Peer High Intensity conflict (I'm American, and would argue we don't have a Military Peer therefor I will call things either Near Peer, or Sub Peer, as well as High, Mid, and Low Intensity conflicts.

My experience in dealing with other nations armed forces is basically the only folks you can truly trust to do the job and watch your back are the ABCA countries.



So for that either XVIII Abn Corps - for a Light Brigade (or BattleGroup etc), or III, V etc Corps from the US Army.

Personally I think Canada would get a lot more bang for the buck with XVIII Airborne - as that is our QRF that goes out the door first - until heavier forces can show up.   The Lack of C-17's held by the RCAF would be a limiter, and the Medium CMBG's wouldn't be deployable like the SBCT's in XVIII.

Given the Canadian Army force structure - the easy way to do that is assign the LIB's to a Light Bde - with Light type support (M777 for Arty etc).
  The LAV's would be then in 2 Medium Bde (one could be a Medium with Tank) - that would be assigned to Armored or SBCT based Div's.

For Sub Peer "High Intensity" conflicts - Canada could contribute either a Bde HQ and some units to be made up with other coalition countries, or a Div HQ and a Bde towards the Div.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I would categorically disagree.
> 
> I think one needs to devise several strategies depending on location and threat level (as well as National Level of Commitment)
> 
> For signifiant Peer/Near Peer Conventional High Intensity Conflicts I would recommend building Bde's that can be attached to capable allied nations Divisional forces(UK or US).
> Canada is missing (and has made ever effort to avoid) certain necessary enablers for formations, or enough of certain items it does have to operate in a Near Peer High Intensity conflict (I'm American, and would argue we don't have a Military Peer therefor I will call things either Near Peer, or Sub Peer, as well as High, Mid, and Low Intensity conflicts.
> 
> My experience in dealing with other nations armed forces is basically the only folks you can truly trust to do the job and watch your back are the ABCA countries.
> 
> 
> 
> So for that either XVIII Abn Corps - for a Light Brigade (or BattleGroup etc), or III, V etc Corps from the US Army.
> 
> Personally I think Canada would get a lot more bang for the buck with XVIII Airborne - as that is our QRF that goes out the door first - until heavier forces can show up.   The Lack of C-17's held by the RCAF would be a limiter, and the Medium CMBG's wouldn't be deployable like the SBCT's in XVIII.
> 
> Given the Canadian Army force structure - the easy way to do that is assign the LIB's to a Light Bde - with Light type support (M777 for Arty etc).
> The LAV's would be then in 2 Medium Bde (one could be a Medium with Tank) - that would be assigned to Armored or SBCT based Div's.
> 
> For Sub Peer "High Intensity" conflicts - Canada could contribute either a Bde HQ and some units to be made up with other coalition countries, or a Div HQ and a Bde towards the Div.



How much independence of action does the Canadian government wish to retain?  

As much as I like both the US and the light XVIII Corps model I wouldn't want Canada to continue to be anybody's "Auxilliary" .

We are a gun-shy nation.  We don't like casualties.  We want to help.  We don't want to die.  We are rich.

The answer is to commit as few people as possible to the front lines and make those that we do commit as effective as possible.  Consequently Gunners, FOO/FACs and Air Defenders.  Light/Medium troops for skirmishing and observing and shaping.  Maybe a small (Battle Group) heavy element for counters. 

And lots of Combat Support and Combat Service Support that has utility in high and low intensity conflicts, stabilization and disaster relief efforts, domestically and abroad.

And we put ourselves at the service of ABCANZUS when we choose and of other nations when we find it to our liking.  I would definitely continue to look at ABCANZUS as our key organizing principle, including getting involved with the AUKUS project,  and ensure interoperability in organisations, equipment and standards.


----------



## WLSC

If I’m not mistaken, a CMBG is design to be somewhat independent vs a xBCT because in comes whit a « full package » under one commander.  So it all depends on what Canada would like to do.  Remember that at the start of WW2, the CG wanted to give a Div and attachement (for the army) for the fight in France.  Soon came the 2e Div and after that, the s&it hit the fan.

So even if we supply a Div (-), that would mean what, 2 x CMBG + Div troops.  Again, if I’m not mistaking it’s roughly the same type of units/formations organised differently.

So, if we train as CMBGs and have to fight and organise as a Div, I don’t see a lot of change for the actual manoeuver units/sub-units in their job.  I would be very surprised if we go above a full Div.  That’s in my view the Canadian context.  The CMBG make sense to me for that reason.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Too many names and acronyms.  There are brigades, and there are brigade groups.  Nowadays it seems everyone is seized with variations of the latter.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> As much as I like both the US and the light XVIII Corps model I wouldn't want Canada to continue to be anybody's "Auxilliary" .


Let's be honest.  In any fight against Russia or China (or North Korea or Iran) EVERYONE will be USA's "Auxilliary".


----------



## Kirkhill

WLSC said:


> If I’m not mistaken, a CMBG is design to be somewhat independent vs a xBCT because in comes whit a « full package » under one commander.  So it all depends on what Canada would like to do.  Remember that at the start of WW2, the CG wanted to give a Div and attachement (for the army) for the fight in France.  Soon came the 2e Div and after that, the s&it hit the fan.
> 
> So even if we supply a Div (-), that would mean what, 2 x CMBG + Div troops.  Again, if I’m not mistaking it’s roughly the same type of units/formations organised differently.
> 
> So, if we train as CMBGs and have to fight and organise as a Div, I don’t see a lot of change for the actual manoeuver units/sub-units in their job.  I would be very surprised if we go above a full Div.  That’s in my view the Canadian context.  The CMBG make sense to me for that reason.



If I remember right xBCTs were created to ease rotational pressures in Iraq.  Rather than only having 10-12 divisions to play with they created 30 to 40 BCTs and spread the Divisional Enablers around amongst the BCTs.  This was largely to put more "infantry" into security duties converting tankers, gunners, and MPs into infanteers for the duration of their tours.

Some reduced levels of enablers were retained to support the BCTs in the field.  This has resulted in skill fade and loss of capabilities.

To rectify the situation the BCTs have been reformed into Divisions but have retained many of their own enablers while the Division starts to bring in Corps enablers like MRLS systems.

My sense is that, at all levels, the areas operations, interest and influence are all becoming wider, deeper and more autonomous.

A Canadian Division could have a lot of influence.  A model that could be scaled down is the First Canadian Army in general and the II Canadian Corps in particular.









						First Canadian Army - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Let's be honest.  In any fight against Russia or China (or North Korea or Iran) EVERYONE will be USA's "Auxilliary".



Or Russia's.  Or China's.  Or North Korea's or Iran's.   Currently much of the west, including the US is Ukraine's "Auxilliary".

There are many instances where poorer countries are facing the prospect of lower intensity conflicts and would be happy to have a wealthier "Auxilliary" jump in to assist them.

And some times we might not feel like waiting for Uncle Sam's permission.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Or Russia's.  Or China's.  Or North Korea's or Iran's.   Currently much of the west, including the US is Ukraine's "Auxilliary".
> 
> There are many instances where poorer countries are facing the prospect of lower intensity conflicts and would be happy to have a wealthier "Auxilliary" jump in to assist them.
> 
> And some times we might not feel like waiting for Uncle Sam's permission.


Which I mentioned is fine for low intensity conflict. 
   But you don’t train an army to do low intensity conflict - you train for high intensity.

Low intensity conflicts don’t require the same forces as high, and you can make do without as high a degree of support as Team USA or Team UK offers.

Or else you really need to dig deep into the treasury and fund a significantly better equipped Army and AirForce if you want to Play Expeditionary Force against a more significant opponent.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Which I mentioned is fine for low intensity conflict.
> But you don’t train an army to do low intensity conflict - you train for high intensity.
> 
> Low intensity conflicts don’t require the same forces as high, and you can make do without as high a degree of support as Team USA or Team UK offers.
> 
> Or else you really need to dig deep into the treasury and fund a significantly better equipped Army and AirForce if you want to Play Expeditionary Force against a more significant opponent.



Absolutely agreed.  

The balance is always blood or treasure.  Canadian governments have been reluctant to relinquish either.

The RCAF is by its nature, dependent on treasure more than blood.
The RCN could folllow the RCAF but is still likes its blood stake.
The Canadian Army has neither blood nor treasure to stake but from its organizational bias it seems inclined to spend blood rather than treasure.

Personally, as a taxpaying Canadian father I would sooner we spend treasure.


----------



## IKnowNothing

@Kirkhill so basically flip the script entirely and go from infantry heavy lacking enabler heavy to enablers lacking infantry.

How many decades to plan, pitch, and implement?


----------



## Kirkhill

IKnowNothing said:


> @Kirkhill so basically flip the script entirely and go from infantry heavy lacking enabler heavy to enablers lacking infantry.
> 
> How many decades to plan, pitch, and implement?


Next millenium....

But I live in hope.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> Next millenium....
> 
> But I live in hope.


Honestly though... (and fully slapping my own hand for coming up with a uniquely Canadian solution after my snit last night)

A. Consolidate the "Mech" fleet into symetrical Leo and Lav based armoured regiments,  and one fully loaded up and enabled LAV battalion per CMBG.  Pre-position one of each in Europe.

B. Convert the Artillery to Archers (or ACSV based AGM's) to free up PY's, use said PY's to accomplish any/all of
 have proper sized 155 battery (s)
SHORAD battery
HIMARS Battery

A + B covers peacetime battlegroup sized deployments, and full mobilization gets two host nation infantry Btn's to round out to Bde strength


C. Use TAPV's to turn 1 Battalion per into Light Cavalry/Skirmishers and AD.  Organize in pairs, one escort and one weapons carrier,  3 pairs per platoon, 3 platoons per Coy, 3 Coy's.  One each ATGM's, MANPAD, mortar.  Preposition armour plating and weapons stocks (or a whole set if we want to give Textron more money), heavier and more useful version of a QRF that help in the delaying action of the early days of the conflict and/or provide those enablers to an allied formation.

It would be better if C was done with something easier to airlift, but we have what we have.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Convert the Artillery to Archers (or ACSV based AGM's) to free up PY's



Where is the savings?  Keep in mind that ammunition has to be handled by people at some point, and that people tire.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Brad Sallows said:


> Where is the savings?  Keep in mind that ammunition has to be handled by people at some point, and that people tire.


(For Archer) Gun crew 3-4,  mechanized replenishment vehicle crew 2.  I don't know but would assume palletized reloading of the replenishment vehicle.


----------



## Brad Sallows

There are very few systems that wholly eliminate people from handling the ammunition into the breech.  I'd rather have people involved than more moving parts.


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> Honestly though... (and fully slapping my own hand for coming up with a uniquely Canadian solution after my snit last night)
> 
> A. Consolidate the "Mech" fleet into symetrical Leo and Lav based armoured regiments,  and one fully loaded up and enabled LAV battalion per CMBG.  Pre-position one of each in Europe.


You don't have enough Leo's, and your lacking an ATGM on your IFV - so your only tank killing item is the tank.





IKnowNothing said:


> B. Convert the Artillery to Archers (or ACSV based AGM's) to free up PY's, use said PY's to accomplish any/all of
> have proper sized 155 battery (s)
> SHORAD battery
> HIMARS Battery


Maybe hold a trial for a new SPG?  Determine what is needed for other assets.



IKnowNothing said:


> A + B covers peacetime battlegroup sized deployments, and full mobilization gets two host nation infantry Btn's to round out to Bde strength


It doesn't you just want it to.



IKnowNothing said:


> C. Use TAPV's to turn 1 Battalion per into Light Cavalry/Skirmishers and AD.  Organize in pairs, one escort and one weapons carrier,  3 pairs per platoon, 3 platoons per Coy, 3 Coy's.  One each ATGM's, MANPAD, mortar.  Preposition armour plating and weapons stocks (or a whole set if we want to give Textron more money), heavier and more useful version of a QRF that help in the delaying action of the early days of the conflict and/or provide those enablers to an allied formation.
> 
> It would be better if C was done with something easier to airlift, but we have what we have.


Donate TAPV to Ukraine, or given them to the Service BN and MP's to use for convoy escort.
   Anyone trying to sell it as a Light CAV system really needs their heads examined.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> There are very few systems that wholly eliminate people from handling the ammunition into the breech.  I'd rather have people involved than more moving parts.








As IKN says 3 crew in the cab, nobody on the gun and 2 ammo handlers on the PLS with the container of Ammo and Charges.

There is nobody in the RWS that holds the cannon, nobody at the breech.

10 men on a single M777 or 10 men on 2x Archers with 2x ISOs of ammo on 2x PLS Trucks. - With mechanically assisted ammunition handling.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Handy, if you know exactly what will be needed for the next 21 rounds outgoing.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> As IKN says 3 crew in the cab, nobody on the gun and 2 ammo handlers on the PLS with the container of Ammo and Charges.
> 
> There is nobody in the RWS that holds the cannon, nobody at the breech.
> 
> 10 men on a single M777 or 10 men on 2x Archers with 2x ISOs of ammo on 2x PLS Trucks. - With mechanically assisted ammunition handling.


Which works great until it doesn't work.

It does look promising for a medium weight force - but one will need to understand that it will add a logistics burden, as it is based on a Volvo construction truck 


			https://www.volvoce.com/-/media/volvoce/global/global-site/product-archive/documents/09-articulated-haulers/05-volvo/v-a30d-d10/v-a30d-d10-2216694153-2003-01.pdf?v=SPg5Pw
		

 So another vehicle to the fleet - not insurmountable - but it would have been a little nicer it was based on something already in inventory.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Which works great until it doesn't work.
> 
> It does look promising for a medium weight force - but one will need to understand that it will add a logistics burden, as it is based on a Volvo construction truck
> 
> 
> https://www.volvoce.com/-/media/volvoce/global/global-site/product-archive/documents/09-articulated-haulers/05-volvo/v-a30d-d10/v-a30d-d10-2216694153-2003-01.pdf?v=SPg5Pw
> 
> 
> So another vehicle to the fleet - not insurmountable - but it would have been a little nicer it was based on something already in inventory.




Same system different truck



Bofors cannon in a Kongsberg(?) RWS on a Man truck engineered by BAE.
What truck do you want it on?
And how is the logistics burden anymore than that of an M109A6.
The cannon is an L52 155.







						DSEI 2019: BAE Systems new ARCHER 155mm self-propelled howitzer based on 8x8 MAN truck chassis | DSEI 2019 News Official Show Daily Land Zone | Defence security military exhibition 2019 daily news category
					

BAE Systems unveils new version of its ARCHER 155mm mobile self-propelled howitzer based on a Rheinmetall MAN Military 8x8 truck chassis at DSEI 2019 London UK




					www.armyrecognition.com
				




Now you have a highway legal system good for 90 km/h accompanied by an identical Man with a PLS and a Sea Can for the Ammo.

Still 2x 155s with the Archers, vs 1x 155 with the M777.  And 2x L52s instead of 2x L39 so longer range.  And faster firing and Multi Round Simultaneous Impact.

Yes, suitable for Medium Force but even a light force might be willing to use two or three C17 sorties to add a pair of them to the expedtion.



> The long-range, self-propelled ARCHER brings speed, mobility, and high rates of fire to support ground troops. From the safety of ARCHER’s armored cabin, a three-person crew needs less than 30 seconds to deploy or displace the system, making ARCHER the ultimate shoot-and-scoot artillery system. As the most advanced wheeled 155mm, 52-calibre system in operation today, ARCHER features a 21-round auto-loader and onboard ballistic calculation. The system can fire up to eight rounds per minute at ranges approaching 40 kilometers with conventional 155 mm ammunition and 60 kilometers with precision-guided munitions such as Excalibur.


----------



## Kirkhill

@KevinB 

Further to...

BAE Systems’ 155mm ARCHER successfully completes U.S. Army’s shoot-off evaluation  October 2021.






						BAE Systems’ 155mm ARCHER successfully completes U.S. Army’s shoot-off evaluation
					

BAE Systems’ 155mm ARCHER wheeled howitzer system successfully completed testing during the U.S. Army’s “shoot off” evaluation, as the service evaluates whether to add a wheeled capability to its arsenal. ARCHER is a fully automated mobile weapon system that provides highly responsive and...




					www.baesystems.com
				




Too bad we don't know anybody connected with the US Army and its weaponry.  It would be nice to know how well it was perceived.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Now we're talking... 

United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland told the Ukrainian media outlet European Pravda in an interview on Friday that the US has begun supplying Ukraine with multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).

"We are now working with other NATO allies so that Ukraine will receive more jet systems," stated Nuland adding that the US is trying "to adjust the weapons we send to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine" in accordance with how the conflict is evolving.

Previously, US President Joe Biden confirmed that his administration has authorized additional military support for Ukraine worth $800 million, including heavy artillery, howitzers, drones, and ammunition.









						US supplying Ukraine with multiple launch rocket systems
					

United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland told the Ukrainian media outlet European Pravda in an interview on Friday that the US has begun supplying Ukraine with mult...




					www.teletrader.com


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> @KevinB
> 
> Further to...
> 
> BAE Systems’ 155mm ARCHER successfully completes U.S. Army’s shoot-off evaluation  October 2021.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> BAE Systems’ 155mm ARCHER successfully completes U.S. Army’s shoot-off evaluation
> 
> 
> BAE Systems’ 155mm ARCHER wheeled howitzer system successfully completed testing during the U.S. Army’s “shoot off” evaluation, as the service evaluates whether to add a wheeled capability to its arsenal. ARCHER is a fully automated mobile weapon system that provides highly responsive and...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.baesystems.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Too bad we don't know anybody connected with the US Army and its weaponry.  It would be nice to know how well it was perceived.


I only hang out with SOF and small arms/small team weapons folks.  
  I would assume for here it would be the Oshkosh version of the Man.  

For Light Force I’d want a jumpable gun that is easily air mobile from a Hook.  
   Fairly easy upgrade to put the 52cal barrel on a M777 


Frankly having worked briefly in W Bty 109’s, I’m more comfortable with the M109 for a SPA/SPG role simply due to the manned turret. I’m always worried about technology…


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I only hang out with SOF and small arms/small team weapons folks.
> I would assume for here it would be the Oshkosh version of the Man.
> 
> For Light Force I’d want a jumpable gun that is easily air mobile from a Hook.
> Fairly easy upgrade to put the 52cal barrel on a M777
> 
> 
> Frankly having worked briefly in W Bty 109’s, I’m more comfortable with the M109 for a SPA/SPG role simply due to the manned turret. I’m always worried about technology…



We had artry on call from P Hr + 30 minutes with the 105mm light gun. A wonderful bit of kit for a 'light' organization:


----------



## suffolkowner

Brad Sallows said:


> Handy, if you know exactly what will be needed for the next 21 rounds outgoing.





suffolkowner said:


> I've read that it can select the round but can't change once loaded but others have said it must fire the rounds as loaded?
> 
> Would look good on the Kerax


----------



## Weinie

KevinB said:


> You don't have enough Leo's, and your lacking an ATGM on your IFV -* so your only tank killing item is the tank.*


Sticky bombs. They worked in Saving Private Ryan.                                            

sticky bombs saving private ryan - Bing video


Just sayin.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Weinie said:


> Sticky bombs. They worked in Saving Private Ryan.
> 
> sticky bombs saving private ryan - Bing video
> 
> 
> Just sayin.



Or off route mines:


----------



## IKnowNothing

> You don't have enough Leo's, and your lacking an ATGM on your IFV - so your only tank killing item is the tank.





> It doesn't you just want it to.


Adopt US 14x Coy for the tank squadron.  Don't have an IFV, uparmoured Stryker with a handy chain gun. Fight them as such.  Add Javelins in all right spots for 2 SBCT Cavalry troops (LRSS mounted) and a Stryker battalion.  Use the two now surplus Btn sets of LAV's to convert enough for 10 1129's per LAV battalion and 4 per Armoured regiment, 3 1134's per LAV battalion.   Upgunned and uparmoured Battalion and Cavalry Squadron from an SBCT. 

Filling out a brigade with allied troops is a stretch, but is that non an upgrade on the battlegroup side of things?



> Donate TAPV to Ukraine, or given them to the Service BN and MP's to use for convoy escort.
> Anyone trying to sell it as a Light CAV system really needs their heads examined.


Yeah light CAV was a poor choice of words.  Weapons carriers for crew served weapons that can either be attached to a larger force or used as road mobile skirmishers.   And as I said, TAPV wouldn't be my choice.  But given Canada's location relative to any fight it's going to be in, an easily deployable light but mobile force equipped to bring a disproportionate amount of effect (ATGM's/UAVs/SHORAD) seems more attainable than doing heavy well, and more effective than paying lipservice to going heavy,  so start moving that way now, optimize later.


Heavy well- not happening any time soon
Medium well-  fill gaps for 2x SBCT with Leo's and chain guns, one light Bde equipped as needed (obvious solution, boring to talk about)


----------



## WestIsle

IKnowNothing said:


> Adopt US 14x Coy for the tank squadron.  Don't have an IFV, uparmoured Stryker with a handy chain gun. Fight them as such.  Add Javelins in all right spots for 2 SBCT Cavalry troops (LRSS mounted) and a Stryker battalion.  Use the two now surplus Btn sets of LAV's to convert enough for 10 1129's per LAV battalion and 4 per Armoured regiment, 3 1134's per LAV battalion.   Upgunned and uparmoured Battalion and Cavalry Squadron from an SBCT.
> 
> Filling out a brigade with allied troops is a stretch, but is that non an upgrade on the battlegroup side of things?
> 
> 
> Yeah light CAV was a poor choice of words.  Weapons carriers for crew served weapons that can either be attached to a larger force or used as road mobile skirmishers.   And as I said, TAPV wouldn't be my choice.  But given Canada's location relative to any fight it's going to be in, an easily deployable light but mobile force equipped to bring a disproportionate amount of effect (ATGM's/UAVs/SHORAD) seems more attainable than doing heavy well, and more effective than paying lipservice to going heavy,  so start moving that way now, optimize later.
> 
> 
> Heavy well- not happening any time soon
> Medium well-  fill gaps for 2x SBCT with Leo's and chain guns, one light Bde equipped as needed (obvious solution, boring to talk about)


We need a IFV however. As much as people on here like to dream up the latest death dealing brigade construct NATO has indicated what is needed for a Med or Heavy brigade. Heavy Brigades have 3 IFV battalions and Medium have 1 as well as 3 APC battalions. Canada has been told that we need a division construct with 1 Heavy and 3 Medium Brigades. CA knows that the LAVs wont pass muster for IFVs


----------



## GR66

WestIsle said:


> We need a IFV however. As much as people on here like to dream up the latest death dealing brigade construct NATO has indicated what is needed for a Med or Heavy brigade. Heavy Brigades have 3 IFV battalions and Medium have 1 as well as 3 APC battalions. Canada has been told that we need a division construct with 1 Heavy and 3 Medium Brigades. CA knows that the LAVs wont pass muster for IFVs


Reference?


----------



## Brad Sallows

> the LAVs wont pass muster for IFVs



Why not?  Armoured, carries infantry, can provide DFS.


----------



## Infanteer

LAV is, by definition, and IFV.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> You don't have enough Leo's, and your lacking an ATGM on your IFV - so your only tank killing item is the tank.


Well...if we are able to get that super amazing fire sale deal on free (or nearly free) Abrams that I'm told is available, then we could do something like this:

4 x LAV Infantry Battalions
     1 PPCLI (Edmonton)
     2 PPCLI (Shilo)
     1 R22eR (Valcartier)
     2 R22eR (Quebec)

3 x Light Infantry Battalions
     1 RCR (Petwawa)
     2 RCR (Gagetown)
     3 RCR (Petwawa)

2 x Tank Regiments
     LdSH (Edmonton)
     RCD (move to Edmonton in place of 3 PPCLI)

1 x Armoured Recce Regiment
     12 RBC (Valcartier)

Plus the existing 3 x Artillery, Combat Engineer and Service units.

Gives you the ability to field 2 x Heavy Brigades each with 3 x maneuver units (1 x Tank and 2 x Mech Infantry) and an Infantry Brigade (3 x Light Infantry).  Armoured Recce Regiment provides 3 x Recce Squadrons (one for each Brigade)


----------



## MilEME09

Infanteer said:


> LAV is, by definition, and IFV.


And currently being looked at for further lethality upgrades, both AT and AA


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> LAV is, by definition, and IFV.


Who’s definition? 
    Pretty much since the 80’s that has been protected mobility supported by a cannon and ATGM. 

I’d have much less heartburn with you riding off to battle in them if they had an integral ATGM system in the turret that the gunner and CC could use for Anti-Armor when the M242 isn’t enough.


----------



## Prairie canuck

KevinB said:


> Which works great until it doesn't work.
> 
> It does look promising for a medium weight force - but one will need to understand that it will add a logistics burden, as it is based on a Volvo construction truck
> 
> 
> https://www.volvoce.com/-/media/volvoce/global/global-site/product-archive/documents/09-articulated-haulers/05-volvo/v-a30d-d10/v-a30d-d10-2216694153-2003-01.pdf?v=SPg5Pw
> 
> 
> So another vehicle to the fleet - not insurmountable - but it would have been a little nicer it was based on something already in inventory.


There are 246 heavy equipment dealerships across Canada that deal with Volvo heavy equipment parts. Shouldn't be a problem. Those trucks are a mining staple used all across the country.


----------



## KevinB

Prairie canuck said:


> There are 246 heavy equipment dealerships across Canada that deal with Volvo heavy equipment parts. Shouldn't be a problem. Those trucks are a mining staple used all across the country.


Where are the parts made? 
   If it’s not in Canada or USA you may have a bit of a problem during a larger conflict.


----------



## GR66

MilEME09 said:


> And currently being looked at for further lethality upgrades, both AT and AA


Are they looking at specific options at this point?  RWS in place of turret?


----------



## MilEME09

GR66 said:


> Are they looking at specific options at this point?  RWS in place of turret?


To early but it's about increasing fire power not just swapping


----------



## suffolkowner

KevinB said:


> Where are the parts made?
> If it’s not in Canada or USA you may have a bit of a problem during a larger conflict.


If you can slap it on a Volvo how hard can it be to put it on a Cat or JD? I've been in them all and can't see why it would matter. Just dont expect them to be as good in the mud as the brochure. Better than a 8x8 Mack?



KevinB said:


> Who’s definition?
> Pretty much since the 80’s that has been protected mobility supported by a cannon and ATGM.
> 
> I’d have much less heartburn with you riding off to battle in them if they had an integral ATGM system in the turret that the gunner and CC could use for Anti-Armor when the M242 isn’t enough.


wasn't the differentiating point between an APC and an IFV 20mm at one point with the conventional forces in europe treaty?


----------



## McG

IKnowNothing said:


> I didn't reply to that post, I replied to yours...


Okay. So you deliberately took the post outside of its context. That's a bit disingenuous of a discussion technique ,but whatever.



IKnowNothing said:


> That they're different is not a problem.


Yes.  That is the point I was making ref:


Fabius said:


> Problem: Light forces. Our 3 Bns are neither IBCT Bns, nor IBCT (Air Assault) Bns, nor IBCT (Airborne)


The brigade combat team is a creature of US doctrine. It should not be the template for Canadian organization.  Not even the USMC thought it should copy US Army structures onto itself when it was organizing as the 2nd largest army on the continent.



IKnowNothing said:


> But I'd argue that (within the realm of medium and light- armor is a different story) given the state of the CA it would be far more productive to take that template as a baseline, try to justify divergence ,and rapidly address any gaps that can't be justified, rather than pretend that the CA is a unicorn with vastly different requirements from medium and light forces and spend years in staff studies coming up with a uniquely Canadian way to meet those requirements.


Why when we already have our own baselines that already address many of our requirements? We have doctrine that describes how we want to organize and fight our tanks. We have doctrine that tells us what our brigades should look like, and what our battalions should look like.



IKnowNothing said:


> The questions in post 3749 stand.


Sure:


IKnowNothing said:


> What uniquely Canadian requirements would not be met if we copied the SBCT structure with LAV 6's in place of Strykers?


A US brigade combat team will never be deployed anywhere that is not supported by the US's global military supply chains running through a local(ish) COCOM.  It is unlikely to ever find itself as the sole national element in any theater, and it is unlikely to be asked to form multiple BGs for independent deployments.  

When a Canadian formation deploys, it is going to be the sole national footprint in its theatre. It gets a few attachments from the national sigs regiment, postal unit, and movements control unit. But for the most part that formation has to look after its second and third line support, and it is either providing combat support capabilities itself or depending on an ally. Routinely, the CMBGs are asked to generate and deploy BGs (sometimes simultaneously, typically in immediate succession of each other). When these BGs deploy, they again typically find themselves as the sole national contingent in the theatre and so they need to be reinforced from the brigade with additional CS and CSS. Once again, there will be a few national level attachments but for the most part the sending brigade must generate a support echelon that can span the 2nd and 3rd line functions.

Sending truely independent brigades that is responsible for its national rear link requires more CS and CSS inside the brigade than to send a US brigade combat team that is given a remote AOR within a larger division or corps theater.  Being able to force generate independent BGs also requires more CS and CSS than would a brigade that is typically expected to operate as a whole.

Fortunately, our doctrine calls for all of this.  Our CMBGs are supposed to have more artillery, more engineers, and more CSS.  Unfortunately, our force design has not closely followed our doctrine. We actually have less artillery, much more CSS pers but with much less equipment to enable their job in the field, and slightly more engineers.



WLSC said:


> I was going there also.  We should field a CMBG in the middle of a coalition div, right?  Ressources to achieve the mission « need » to be available as much as possible inside that command.  When you can field multiple divisions, you can define your requirements quiet differently.


Not just that. The US also has access to strategic lift (both air and sea) that is magnitudes greater than Canada even if normalized relative to our respective militaries' sizes.  They also have more tactical air lift (both fixed and rotary wing). They can deploy larger things in greater quantities and faster.



Kirkhill said:


> I would aim to provide a Canadian Division (minus).
> 
> Build the Division with all the enablers but plan on only having one or two brigades that are supplied by Canada with the ability to incorporate 2 or 3 allied brigades from smaller, less rich countries that are able to put up manpower instead.
> 
> So Divisional Arty, Divisional Air Defence, Divisional Heli Support, Divisional Engineers, Divsional Transport, Divisional C4ISR, Divisional Medical at the expense infantry and armoured slots.


If we want to be a lead (or "framework") nation in a NATO construct, then the design of our formations (brigades and maybe even a division) need to go in this direction. We want to provide one manoeuvre element (a BG) under a Canadian HQ, and then we expect others to want to show-up and fill out the rest of the brigade. If a nation is not ready to provide the lion's share of the combat support, then it should not expect other nations to take its aspirations of leadership seriously.


----------



## WestIsle

GR66 said:


> Reference?


ACIMS. Its their as the NATO requirements for brigades. So ironically as much as there is talk about rationalizing brigades there is instead a huge need for growth and sustainment of a much larger army then we have now. This is say nothing about what forces if any we would want to missions outside of NATO like the UN


----------



## markppcli

suffolkowner said:


> wasn't the differentiating point between an APC and an IFV 20mm at one point with the conventional forces in europe treaty?


Yup sure is. The rest is kind of secondary but no one is building autocannon equipped vehicles without some kind of armour preotection to allow movement to contact and intimate support… besides the BTR 82.


----------



## markppcli

Double post but I can’t edit so here’s the quote.

“The term “armoured infantry fighting vehicle” means an armoured combat vehicle which is designed and equipped primarily to transport a combat infantry squad, which normally provides the capability for the troops to deliver fire from inside the vehicle under armoured protection, and which is armed with an integral or organic cannon of at least 20 millimetres calibre and sometimes an antitank missile launcher. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles serve as the principal weapon system of armoured infantry or mechanised infantry or motorised infantry formations and units of ground forces.”

It’s a definition that’s fairly arbitrary but since we can’t seem to come to grasp with what defines one it’s probably useful to just accept the common and legal definition.

On the subject of internal ATGMs… it’s a hit or miss. If it’s not a fire and forget system it’s a very exposed position for something as large as an IFV has to be. As an in extremis yes I agree they’re great. That being said I’ve see the atgm sights on a BMP2 and I’m not too worried.


----------



## Infanteer

An IFV is like porn - its hard to define, but you know it when you see it.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> The brigade combat team is a creature of US doctrine.



And the CMBG is a creature of Canadian doctrine.  And to me they're both brigade groups.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> And the CMBG is a creature of Canadian doctrine.  And to me they're both brigade groups.



Don't we have Regimental Combat Teams?  After all our CMBGs are built around a single Infantry Regiment.






						Regimental combat team - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Infanteer

That's mixing concepts - a Marine Infantry Regiment is a tactical formation with a Commander and a HQ.  A Canadian Infantry Regiment is a uniformed Kiwanis Club.


----------



## WLSC

Canadian regimental system is like a family name, not a cbt org.


----------



## dapaterson

Infanteer said:


> That's mixing concepts - a Marine Infantry Regiment is a tactical formation with a Commander and a HQ.  A Canadian Infantry Regiment is a uniformed Kiwanis Club.


I would never call the dress of two or more members of the PPCLI "uniform".


----------



## IKnowNothing

@McG 


> Okay. So you deliberately took the post outside of its context. *That's a bit disingenuous of a discussion technique ,but whatever.*



And what would you call quoting a question _without_ the modifier that specified the combat arms and providing an answer focusing on CS and CSS?  I appreciate how informative your answer was, but it was almost completely outside of the scope of the question.



> Why when we already have our own baselines that already address many of our requirements? We have doctrine that describes how we want to organize and fight our tanks. We have doctrine that tells us what our brigades should look like, and what our battalions should look like.
> Fortunately, our doctrine calls for all of this.  Our CMBGs are supposed to have more artillery, more engineers, and more CSS.  Unfortunately, our force design has not closely followed our doctrine. We actually have less artillery, much more CSS pers but with much less equipment to enable their job in the field, and slightly more engineers.



This, this is getting somewhere.  I apologize for the ignorance, but what does this baseline look like?  What do the maneuver units + artillery of a CMBG look like when organized and equipped to meet doctrine?


----------



## IKnowNothing

MilEME09 said:


> To early but it's about increasing fire power not just swapping


So LAV UP will (_might_) be finally _start_ to be completed a decade later.

Decent number of off the shelf options that have gone on comparable vehicles, with ATGM's and 30mm or more cannons,
Lance or LanceRC (Montreal connection)
Hitfist
RT60
Cockerill 3030 (went on the Saudi LAV's)

or there's even a Delco 30mm TOW (I don't know if it's been fielded)


----------



## KevinB

US pledges $391 million for Euro allies to buy American to backfill weapons donations to Ukraine
					

Fifteen European allies will get nearly $400 million in new U.S. grants to buy American military hardware to backfill weapons they’ve donated to Ukraine from their own stockpiles, the State Department announced Monday.




					www.defensenews.com
				




I'd donate a lot of CAF kit if I where you 


Leo 2's
Half the LAV fleet, heck maybe 3/4's
all but 24 M777
all the TAPV
anything else you can pry from a depot...


----------



## IKnowNothing

Apologies if I missed it, but I didn't see  this posted in the last two weeks

https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/d...07-000-JD-015_CAJ_19.1_EN_Asymmetric_Army.pdf


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> Apologies if I missed it, but I didn't see  this posted in the last two weeks
> 
> https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/d...07-000-JD-015_CAJ_19.1_EN_Asymmetric_Army.pdf


It has been posted before - it is a great article and my only fault with the good Col's assessment is that he retains the LAV instead of a future tracked HIFV for the Armored Bde.


----------



## IKnowNothing

KevinB said:


> It has been posted before - it is a great article and my only fault with the good Col's assessment is that he retains the LAV instead of a future tracked HIFV for the Armored Bde.


Any word as to how it has been received?


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> Any word as to how it has been received?


It was proposed as a COA from my understanding -  think it was the most viable of all the options.
  Admittedly I really don't understand why the CA is so rectally inverted at times.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I only hang out with SOF and small arms/small team weapons folks.
> I would assume for here it would be the Oshkosh version of the Man.
> 
> For Light Force I’d want a jumpable gun that is easily air mobile from a Hook.
> Fairly easy upgrade to put the 52cal barrel on a M777
> 
> 
> Frankly having worked briefly in W Bty 109’s, I’m more comfortable with the M109 for a SPA/SPG role simply due to the manned turret. I’m always worried about technology…





> The lethality and operational benefits of auto-loaded self-propelled howitzers has been well established in its field use in the German PzH2000, Russian 2S19 “Msta-S”, and Swedish Archer.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ERCA XM1299E1 auto-loading integration on to the M109A7 requires not simply new ammunition handling but also a new breech, gun positioning, and ammunition and fuse selection and setting. Achieving a rate of fire of 7 rounds per minute has been demonstrated in Army evaluations, though these employed a limited capacity loader.











						US Army Demonstrates Auto-loading Artillery - Armada International
					

The US Army’s Picatinny Armaments Center recently highlighted its progress toward developing automated loading for its self-propelled howitzers.




					www.armadainternational.com
				




The 57 tonne solution (C17)






						PzH 2000 - KMW
					

The PzH 2000 in operation




					www.kmweg.com
				




The 48 tonne solution (C17)









						K9 Thunder - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




The 30 tonne solution  (A400M)









						Archer Artillery System - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				





Other autoloaders









						4.5-inch Mark 8 naval gun - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				












						Otobreda 127/64 - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				












						OTO Melara 76 mm - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				












						Bofors 57 mm Naval Automatic Gun L/70 - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				





Autoloaders aren't new technology.   They are heavy but there is transport to solve that problem.

And once you get the light force on the ground and the airlanding secured don't you want to start bringing in the heavier gear as soon as possible?


One other thing that we seem to keep skipping over is that these systems are not used individually.  They are used in multiples.  There is nothing that says that all guns have to have an identical loadout.  The loadout can be mixed and matched.

On the other hand any single gun with it Multi Round Simultaneous Impact capability can duplicate a Battery-1-Round-Fire for Effect shoot and put 6 rounds on target at one time.

3 Archer gunners replicating the work of 60 M777 gunners.


----------



## IKnowNothing

@Kirkhill  I smell an ACSV variant





						Boxer RCH 155 Self-Propelled Howitzer | Military-Today.com
					

The Boxer RCH 155, is a self-propelled artillery system, which utilizes 8x8 chassis of Boxer armored personnel carrier and 155 mm unmanned artillery gun module. This artillery system was introduced in 2014.



					www.military-today.com


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> And once you get the light force on the ground and the airlanding secured don't you want to start bringing in the heavier gear as soon as possible?


Depending on terrain.
  Light Forces need to be configured to work in complex terrain - which doesn't always support vehicles of any size.

I can jump into the mountains  (same with the Arctic, or muskeg, swamp etc.) or  Air Mobile/Air Assault via Helo, and M777's can come with me,  -- but you can't drive out of there (or even get it there in some cases).   

This is why Symmetry does not work, you need to tailor your forces and their equipment for the mission and terrain.
   You can't just stick your head in the sand and wish certain aspects away (well apparently you can in Canada - but we see where that got the CA ...)


Sure if you are seizing and airhead you can jump in - secure it - and then bring heavier forces in -- but at that point it is either a relief in place - and you go off to do other things while the heavier boys stay local - or they push on and you hold the airhead.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Depending on terrain.
> Light Forces need to be configured to work in complex terrain - which doesn't always support vehicles of any size.
> 
> I can jump into the mountains  (same with the Arctic, or muskeg, swamp etc.) or  Air Mobile/Air Assault via Helo, and M777's can come with me,  -- but you can't drive out of there (or even get it there in some cases).
> 
> This is why Symmetry does not work, you need to tailor your forces and their equipment for the mission and terrain.
> You can't just stick your head in the sand and wish certain aspects away (well apparently you can in Canada - but we see where that got the CA ...)
> 
> 
> Sure if you are seizing and airhead you can jump in - secure it - and then bring heavier forces in -- but at that point it is either a relief in place - and you go off to do other things while the heavier boys stay local - or they push on and you hold the airhead.



I understand.  But suppose you can get a 90km cannon on the ground within 70 km of your LZ?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I understand.  But suppose you can get a 90km cannon on the ground within 70 km of your LZ?


Don't get me wrong - I think it is a great potential option for the Medium Force constructs in Canada - and would be a pretty good systems for the PRes Arty too - as everything that really needs to be done on them live, can be mimicked by a simulator - so the actual system could be held at larger bases.   I just wouldn't want to stick them in a Light Bde Arty Reg't -- put then in the CSSB or Div Arty assets that could be chopped toward the Light Bde for certain ops.


----------



## quadrapiper

Would mentally situating the Light Force as operating in an area like Vancouver Island* be a good guideline for kit, structure, and so on?

*Hills, gulleys, mountains, and hills, mostly covered in several generations of temperate rainforest, and with narrow ribbons of not-dirt-roads-through-trees development.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> Would mentally situating the Light Force as operating in an area like Vancouver Island* be a good guideline for kit, structure, and so on?
> 
> *Hills, gulleys, mountains, and hills, mostly covered in several generations of temperate rainforest, and with narrow ribbons of not-dirt-roads-through-trees development.



Having a PTSD moment here as I recall trying to explain why, because of everything you've just mentioned, that's the type of training we should be doing (here on Vancouver Island) to fat, stupid, lazy senior ranks who are more interested in training up Infantry who are really good at guarding Port Facilities instead.

FML


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> Having a PTSD moment here as I recall trying to explain why, because of everything you've just mentioned, that's the type of training we should be doing (here on Vancouver Island) to fat, stupid, lazy senior ranks who are more interested in training up Infantry who are really good at guarding Port Facilities instead.
> 
> FML


That sounds monumentally unpleasant, a huge waste, and neglectful of whatever local / civil defence role might be desirable.

Also wonder what it does to retention: not sure of who's joining, but heading off into the bush to train (especially in an area where a good chunk of the population does outdoor "stuff" for fun, and another block already _works there_) sounds like _fun,_ in a strenuous way.

How much of the opposition came from a desire to avoid having to make like a mountain goat on the part of the senior ranks?

(Stepping aside from the Army, it's always struck me as a huge waste that the Army Cadets in BC don't use Strathcona for their expedition summer courses, but instead _make things work_ in Vernon.)


----------



## OldSolduer

Fabius said:


> Also the Infantry Corps in these discussions is musing if 81mm Mortars are too heavy for a Light Force.


That depends on the task and mission. IIRC one of the characteristics of the 81 - which I adore - is it is "man portable for short distances" - and that is because the weight of ammo it fires demands a vehicle resup.  15 rounds/min rapid for four tubes will burn up 60 rounds in a minute.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> That sounds monumentally unpleasant, a huge waste, and neglectful of whatever local / civil defence role might be desirable.
> 
> Also wonder what it does to retention: not sure of who's joining, but heading off into the bush to train (especially in an area where a good chunk of the population does outdoor "stuff" for fun, and another block already _works there_) sounds like _fun,_ in a strenuous way.
> 
> How much of the opposition came from a desire to avoid having to make like a mountain goat on the part of the senior ranks?
> 
> (Stepping aside from the Army, it's always struck me as a huge waste that the Army Cadets in BC don't use Strathcona for their expedition summer courses, but instead _make things work_ in Vernon.)



Like most everything else in the CAF, if it's not mandated from the highest levels the lowest levels won't/ can't make it work. As much as I like to bitch, the bosses are just doing (mainly) what their bosses are telling them to do/ not do and thus the CAF - in general - doesn't 'do' mountain stuff beyond niche capabilities. The fact is that the CAF is an Eastern Canada thing, like most of our federal institutions, so the mountains are largely relegated to postcards of Banff pinned to the odd cubicle wall.

And Strathcona Park Lodge (and I have stayed there before) is both old and tiny, and unsuited to hosting a hundred + cadets or so IMHO.

It's also full of mice/rats too by the way - bring your ear plugs if you want to sleep


----------



## KevinB

OldSolduer said:


> That depends on the task and mission. IIRC one of the characteristics of the 81 - which I adore - is it is "man portable for short distances" - and that is because the weight of ammo it fires demands a vehicle resup.  15 rounds/min rapid for four tubes will burn up 60 rounds in a minute.


I’m a big fan of ATV type vehicles for Light Infantry especially in Support Weapon roles. 
   View it as a Transport Room as it where (for those familiar with the Arms Room concept) a tool in the toolbox to be used when applicable. 

Mules and other pack animals need to be considered too.  The USMC, USASOC and even BSA (Big Stupid Army) down here have sections of Mtn Ops courses dedicated to that aspect.  Because you can’t always pick your AO. 


The Mujahideen man packed a D-30 Howitzer up a mountain to fight the Russians - where there is a need, there is a way…


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I’m a big fan of ATV type vehicles for Light Infantry especially in Support Weapon roles.


And standard Off-the-shelf civilian stuff already comes ruggedized and in cam colours if you want - cheap as borscht, all things considered.

🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> And standard Off-the-shelf civilian stuff already comes ruggedized and in cam colours if you want - cheap as borscht, all things considered.
> 
> 🍻


Nothing that the CAF couldn’t adjust* with a 6-week long ATV operator course…


* sure you can fly an $83M helicopter, but you can’t drive a JD Gator…


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> And standard Off-the-shelf civilian stuff already comes ruggedized and in cam colours if you want - cheap as borscht, all things considered.
> 
> 🍻


It would be nice if Argo had something between the 8x8 and the Sherp.


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> Like most everything else in the CAF, if it's not mandated from the highest levels the lowest levels won't/ can't make it work. As much as I like to bitch, the bosses are just doing (mainly) what their bosses are telling them to do/ not do and thus the CAF - in general - doesn't 'do' mountain stuff beyond niche capabilities. The fact is that the CAF is an Eastern Canada thing, like most of our federal institutions, so the mountains are largely relegated to postcards of Banff pinned to the odd cubicle wall.
> 
> And Strathcona Park Lodge (and I have stayed there before) is both old and tiny, and unsuited to hosting a hundred + cadets or so IMHO.
> 
> It's also full of mice/rats too by the way - bring your ear plugs if you want to sleep


Good to know re: the vermin. I'd understood the lodge was somewhat limited: was thinking of the broader park, especially those areas accessible from Forbidden Plateau and Comox Lake, if one was to work out of Comox. Really looking forward to getting back up there this summer.

Where does "normal" leave off and "mountain" start for the CA?


----------



## dapaterson

Good2Golf said:


> Nothing that the CAF couldn’t adjust* with a 6-week long ATV operator course…
> 
> 
> * sure you can fly an $83M helicopter, but you can’t drive a JD Gator…


I've seen the way most pilots drive...


----------



## Kirkhill

IKnowNothing said:


> It would be nice if Argo had something between the 8x8 and the Sherp.



I think you are into the Polaris and BRP world then aren't you?


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> I think you are into the Polaris and BRP world then aren't you?


Yeah I got locked on Argo level mobility and completely forgot about the Ranger Crew


----------



## OldSolduer

Good2Golf said:


> Nothing that the CAF couldn’t adjust* with a 6-week long ATV operator course…
> 
> 
> * sure you can fly an $83M helicopter, but you can’t drive a JD Gator…


And of course Canadianizing it with all kinds of dumb mods. One thing I'd want though is a wire cutter barrier thing.


----------



## KevinB

Good2Golf said:


> Nothing that the CAF couldn’t adjust* with a 6-week long ATV operator course…
> 
> 
> * sure you can fly an $83M helicopter, but you can’t drive a JD Gator…


I think mine was 2 days in Canada, after I had used them in Afghanistan   
   It probably made me dumber, as it had a road test complete with cones etc -- as opposed to safe operation off-road etc, the way the old (maybe still run) Dispatch Rider Motorcycle course was done.


----------



## Kirkhill

Given some discussion about Canada being asked to supply/lead a "Heavy" Division I took another look at what the British lead "Heavy" Division looked like and asked how close we were to it.

Maybe it isn't so far out of our grasp.   The Brits are building their Brigade out of two "mechanized" brigades with Boxers (WAPCs), Challengers and AJAX/CV90s (depending on what they decide to do with the AJAXs),  and a Deep Strike Recce Bde with Rockets, L52 Cannons and ISR assets including Cavalry.


3 UK Armd DivMI Bn7 Sigs GpSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs Rgt101 Op Sust BdeREME RgtLog RgtLog Rgt25 CS Eng GpClose SptClose SptForce Spt7 AD GpSRADMRAD1 Deep Recce Strike BCTREMEArmd CavLt CavArmd CavClose SptSTAClose SptDeep FiresDeep Fires12 BCT20BCTSpt GpSpt GpLog RgtLog RgtMed RgtMed RgtREME BnREME BnArmd CavArmd CavMech InfMech InfMech InfMech InfMech InfArmdArmd


A preliminary in-fill of the structure with Canadian units


1 Cdn DivMI BnSigs GpSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs Rgt101 Op Sust BdeREME RgtLog RgtLog RgtCS Eng Gp2 CER4 ESR5 CERAD GpSRADMRAD1 DRSB1 Svc Bn1 PPCLILdSH(RC)2 PPCLI2 RCHA4(GS) RCA5 RALC1 RCHA2 CMB5 CMB2 Svc Bn5 Svc BnRCD12 RBC1 RCR2 RCR1 R22R2 R22R

We are long on Infantry (3 RCR, PPCLI and R22R)
We are even on Arty (Need to radically re-equip though)
We are short on Cavalry (Need to re-role 1 and 2 PPCLI at least)
We are very short on Support (Sigs, REME, Med and LOG ) - They deploy battalions where we deploy companies
And Air Defence is Absent 

There is a lot of other capabilities that can be added to that basic structure but we could approximate the basic structure with what we have.
Need to make up some of the deficiencies from all of the light battalions.

Our Mech Bns could become CA Bns by adding a 14 Tank Squadron to each battalion along with a LRATGM Troop for Armoured Defence.

We might just could maybe put together something broadly similar to the Div if we squinted real hard and held our tongue right.


----------



## McG

IKnowNothing said:


> I apologize for the ignorance, but what does this baseline look like? What do the maneuver units + artillery of a CMBG look like when organized and equipped to meet doctrine?


Start here.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Start here.



You should have added "And the best of luck!"

I do love clarity.


----------



## McG

Unfortunately, there is not a concise reference and the building blocks are all described in different books.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Given some discussion about Canada being asked to supply/lead a "Heavy" Division I took another look at what the British lead "Heavy" Division looked like and asked how close we were to it.
> 
> Maybe it isn't so far out of our grasp.   The Brits are building their Brigade out of two "mechanized" brigades with Boxers (WAPCs), Challengers and AJAX/CV90s (depending on what they decide to do with the AJAXs),  and a Deep Strike Recce Bde with Rockets, L52 Cannons and ISR assets including Cavalry.
> 
> 
> 3 UK Armd DivMI Bn7 Sigs GpSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs Rgt101 Op Sust BdeREME RgtLog RgtLog Rgt25 CS Eng GpClose SptClose SptForce Spt7 AD GpSRADMRAD1 Deep Recce Strike BCTREMEArmd CavLt CavArmd CavClose SptSTAClose SptDeep FiresDeep Fires12 BCT20BCTSpt GpSpt GpLog RgtLog RgtMed RgtMed RgtREME BnREME BnArmd CavArmd CavMech InfMech InfMech InfMech InfMech InfArmdArmd
> 
> 
> A preliminary in-fill of the structure with Canadian units
> 
> 
> 1 Cdn DivMI BnSigs GpSigs RgtSigs RgtSigs Rgt101 Op Sust BdeREME RgtLog RgtLog RgtCS Eng Gp2 CER4 ESR5 CERAD GpSRADMRAD1 DRSB1 Svc Bn1 PPCLILdSH(RC)2 PPCLI2 RCHA4(GS) RCA5 RALC1 RCHA2 CMB5 CMB2 Svc Bn5 Svc BnRCD12 RBC1 RCR2 RCR1 R22R2 R22R
> 
> We are long on Infantry (3 RCR, PPCLI and R22R)
> We are even on Arty (Need to radically re-equip though)
> We are short on Cavalry (Need to re-role 1 and 2 PPCLI at least)
> We are very short on Support (Sigs, REME, Med and LOG ) - They deploy battalions where we deploy companies
> And Air Defence is Absent
> 
> There is a lot of other capabilities that can be added to that basic structure but we could approximate the basic structure with what we have.
> Need to make up some of the deficiencies from all of the light battalions.
> 
> Our Mech Bns could become CA Bns by adding a 14 Tank Squadron to each battalion along with a LRATGM Troop for Armoured Defence.
> 
> We might just could maybe put together something broadly similar to the Div if we squinted real hard and held our tongue right.




Should we consider keeping the Regiments but just numbering the Battlegroups as Combined Arms Battlegroups?  Battlegroups 1-9 created from sub-units of different Regiments with particular taskings and with the best qualified Lt Col in command?


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Unfortunately, there is not a concise reference.



Mayhap I sense a problem?


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I think mine was 2 days in Canada, after I had used them in Afghanistan
> It probably made me dumber, as it had a road test complete with cones etc -- as opposed to safe operation off-road etc, the way the old (maybe still run) Dispatch Rider Motorcycle course was done.



This is how I learned to ride a motorcycle... and barely survived 

Notice the 'defaulters' doing pushups in the puddle at 1.29


----------



## WLSC

Kirkhill said:


> Should we consider keeping the Regiments but just numbering the Battlegroups as Combined Arms Battlegroups?  Battlegroups 1-9 created from sub-units of different Regiments with particular taskings and with the best qualified Lt Col in command?


Just to be clear, a BG that include a coy of RCR, Vandoos and PPCLI under a Lcol?  Poor niner !  Regiment are family name that come with their own attitude.  I would like to see that when they'll says ''As per SOP'' 😁


----------



## IKnowNothing

McG said:


> Start here.


Firstly,  thank-you for the great reference source.
Secondly, curse you for the rollercoaster that was having my eyes light up at the menus and headings and then getting crushed by the fun you Kirkhill alluded to.
Thirdly, I apologize for my tone with regard to CA doctrine.  Just scratching the surface, but I've read enough to believe in the (doctrinal) CMBG.
Fourthly, in my defense the CMBG as represent based on the current organization and equipment bares little resemblance to what is called for/allowed.
Fifthly, even just scratching said surface I'm incredibly frustrated at CA leadership for not making the decisions required to follow that.


----------



## KevinB

WLSC said:


> Just to be clear, a BG that include a coy of RCR, Vandoos and PPCLI under a Lcol?  Poor niner !  Regiment are family name that come with their own attitude.  I would like to see that when they'll says ''As per SOP'' 😁


Well the CAR was a microcosm of that..


----------



## daftandbarmy

WLSC said:


> Just to be clear, a BG that include a coy of RCR, Vandoos and PPCLI under a Lcol?  Poor niner !  Regiment are family name that come with their own attitude.  I would like to see that when they'll says ''As per SOP'' 😁



I've led rifle companies formed from troops from up to four different regiments.

It worked fine, as long as we adhered to the 'no cap badges on helmets' philosophy. 

As the commander, at the outset, I found it important to not pay too much attention to my own troops at the expense of the others though, but that tendency went away after a couple of days.


----------



## WLSC

KevinB said:


> Well the CAR was a microcosm of that..


You’re totally right but your reasoning is to adult for the spirit of the post 😁


----------



## WLSC

daftandbarmy said:


> I've led rifle companies formed from troops from up to four different regiments.
> 
> It worked fine, as long as we adhered to the 'no cap badges on helmets' philosophy.
> 
> As the commander, at the outset, I found it important to not pay too much attention to my own troops at the expense of the others though, but that tendency went away after a couple of days.


I know it work, don’t worry.  I’ve done platoons and coy of multi cap badge.  It was really just a light spirited comment.  At the end of the day, we’re all professionals.


----------



## daftandbarmy

WLSC said:


> I know it work, don’t worry.  I’ve done platoons and coy of multi cap badge.  It was really just a light spirited comment.  At the end of the day, we’re all professionals.



Don't bet on it. I've seen alot of 'unprofessionals' in action!


----------



## WLSC

daftandbarmy said:


> Don't bet on it. I've seen alot of 'unprofessionals' in action!


Did you 🫢.    😂🤷🏼‍♂️

We should open a thread on that, it should be fun…maybe not.  Better just say nothing 😂


----------



## daftandbarmy

WLSC said:


> Did you 🫢.    😂🤷🏼‍♂️
> 
> We should open a thread on that, it should be fun…maybe not.  Better just say nothing 😂



I had a CO who referred to our (invaluable) atts and dets as 'those f*cking assh*les' so yes, I have seen that - sadly! 

And yes, the less said the better


----------



## McG

KevinB said:


> Well the CAR was a microcosm of that..


So was a certain R22eR BG in Bosnia, and the whole 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade when it arrived in Germany.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> So was a certain R22eR BG in Bosnia, and the whole 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade when it arrived in Germany.


Or the 27th Commonwealth Brigade at Kapyong?


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Or the 27th Commonwealth Brigade at Kapyong?


I am not tracking that brigade having had a particular military-tribe problem, and its constituent units were generally homogeneous from a regimental perspective.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> I am not tracking that brigade having had a particular military-tribe problem, and its constituent units were generally homogeneous from a regimental perspective.



Seen.  I misunderstood.  I didn't know that the 27th in Germany had "tribal" problems.  Nor the Bosnian BG.
So "tribalism" is that endemic?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

KevinB said:


> I’m a big fan of ATV type vehicles for Light Infantry especially in Support Weapon roles.
> View it as a Transport Room as it where (for those familiar with the Arms Room concept) a tool in the toolbox to be used when applicable.
> 
> Mules and other pack animals need to be considered too.  The USMC, USASOC and even BSA (Big Stupid Army) down here have sections of Mtn Ops courses dedicated to that aspect.  Because you can’t always pick your AO.
> 
> 
> The Mujahideen man packed a D-30 Howitzer up a mountain to fight the Russians - where there is a need, there is a way…


Shades of Dien Bien Phu


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Seen.  I misunderstood.  I didn't know that the 27th in Germany had "tribal" problems.  Nor the Bosnian BG.
> So "tribalism" is that endemic?



Yes, like other parts of the world, everywhere in Europe is essentially 'tribal' to the point of (in some cases) being on the brink of inter-tribal warfare.

For example in Belfast, we used 'Tribal Maps' - that's the actual name of the the type of map - alot:


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes, like other parts of the world, everywhere in Europe is essentially 'tribal' to the point of (in some cases) being on the brink of inter-tribal warfare.
> 
> For example in Belfast, we used 'Tribal Maps' - that's the actual name of the the type of map - alot:
> 
> View attachment 70410


So the green bits are national parks then?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> So the green bits are national parks then?



Yes, of course, inhabited by all kinds of interesting 'wildlife'


----------



## GR66

Here's a possible structure taking into account some previous comments and observations/lessons from the Ukraine conflict.


Infantry Battalions reduced from 9 to 6 to bring up peacetime manning in the remaining Battalions and free up PYs for schools, etc.
1 and 5 Brigade would each have 2 x LAV Battalions while 2 Brigade would have 2 x Light Battalions.
If the opportunity exists to procure M1 Abrams tanks from US stocks at a deeply reduced cost, RCD would co-locate in Edmonton with LdSH and both would be equipped as Tank Regiments.  If not, then our existing Leopards would be concentrated in Edmonton with LdSH and RCD would remain in Petawawa as an Armoured Recce Regiment.
Reserve Regiments re-structured as Company/Squadron-sized units with a mandate to be able to supply a Platoon/Troop sized element of augmentees/replacements for Reg Force units.  This is basically an expansion of the existing STAR Mission Task system but focusing on support to the Combat Arms elements.  
Having Reserve units directly integrated into the existing Reg Force structure eliminates the Reserve Brigades and their HQ overhead and recognizes the reality that Reserve units do not have either the required equipment or the ability to mobilize sufficient numbers per unit to generate new Brigades at this time.
The only "new" capacity in this structure would be 3 x  Reserve HIMARS Batteries under 4 RCHA in the Combat Support Brigade.
A review of how our Armoured Recce Regiments/Squadrons are equipped and organized as well as introduction of additional new equipment capabilities already being planned (or suggested) such as ATGMs (dismounted and vehicle mounted), mortars (ditto), Self-Propelled Artillery for the LAV Brigades, etc. are assumed to move forward.
A new AD capability was NOT included in this structure as the requirement has not yet been defined (SHORAD, MRAD, mobile and/or dismounted, etc.) so the required structure is not yet clear.  Additional PYs will likely be required to stand up this new capability but hopefully some of that can come from the significant HQ reductions from both the Reg Force and Reserves.


----------



## FJAG

Always enjoy seeing a napkin force.

Always enjoy looking at a model that makes the RegF responsible for ResF units in some form of pairing and that eliminates all the div and unnecessary ResF headquarters and puts more RegF staff in the ResF units.

You know me, I'm always pushing for a structure that uses the 15-20,000 ResF personnel to create more deployable brigades, especially CS and CSS ones. 

I'm not so sure we need to throw three battalions under the bus to flesh out the others. Battalions now are established at roughly 590 apiece. I'm not sure of the actual 'war' establishment but I think its around 750 or so with a full CS company. That means one RegF battalion should yield enough PYs to bulk out 4 battalions. Remember that much of the shortfall right now is undermanning which ought to be fixed through recruiting and not redistribution.

For the record, the batteries belonging to the RegF artillery are as follows:
1 RCHA - A, B, C, Z; 
2 RCHA - D, E, F, Y; 
5 RALC - X, Q, R, V; 
4 (GS) RCA - 127, 128, 129

Dormant RCHA regiments are:
3 RCHA - G, H, J, U;
4 RCHA - K, L, M

W Bty is at the RCAS (and in the Sixties belonged to 4 RCHA). RCHA batteries are generally lettered; RCA batteries on the other hand are numbered.

As an aside, which program do you use for making your charts. I use RFFlow which has quite a few functionalities but doesn't come out quite as neat as yours and doesn't provide the diagonal multi-colour.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

A different take on Force 3035


Mission Command and the Entrepreneurial Spirit in the Ranks








						Opinion | The secret to the Ukrainian military’s success
					

Ukraine's conduct is a warning to U.S. leaders that a technically inferior adversary can impose surprisingly sharp costs.




					www.nbcnews.com
				






> The Ukrainian military has also defied expectations. In the  case of the Ukrainian armed forces, they’ve performed well beyond what was anticipated
> 
> The secret to Ukraine’s success rests first of all on its mindset backed up by dynamic military strategies that have exploited the weaknesses of a powerful, overconfident adversary.
> 
> the Ukrainians came into the war with a drastically greater will to fight in defense of their homes and way of life
> 
> Ukrainian units are not panicking and evaporating under intense pressure, instead holding out for weeks in besieged cities like Chernihiv and Mariupol. And when facing setbacks, Kyiv’s troops are aggressively and rapidly counterattacking, often checking or reversing Russian gains.
> 
> bridged long-standing divisions between Ukrainian and Russian speakers within Ukraine, as well as between political rivals, creating a unified, coordinated force for confronting the invaders.
> 
> By 2021, Ukraine’s military had years of combat experience and were demonstrably stronger thanks to new weapons, military aid and tactics,
> 
> Ukraine’s military has arguably managed to blend its inherited Soviet-era legacies — abundant artillery and armored vehicles, greater reliance on ground-based air defenses than fighter aircraft — with selected Western advantages such as the practice of empowering noncommissioned and junior officers on the ground to take initiative, and using intelligence to stage precision attacks. These have killed seven Russian generals, according to Ukraine, and devastated a Russian helicopter base.
> 
> Notably, stealthy teams of Ukrainian infantry have ably used thousands of portable long-distance anti-tank weapons supplied by the West, as well as manufactured by Ukraine itself, to disable hundreds or more Russian armored vehicles and supply trucks in ambushes and hit-and-run raids. There’s often an instinctive desire to use heavy forces to fight heavy forces, when sometimes well-armed soldiers on foot can do the job better because they’re less likely to be spotted. Ukraine showed foresight in focusing on these types of weapons requests from allies.
> 
> 
> Above all, Ukrainian forces have fought asymmetrically: Rather than seeking to stop Russia’s superior might on the border, the Ukrainian leadership has used Ukraine’s sheer geographic expanse as a strength in itself, recognizing that major cities can serve as deadly tar pits for attacking forces. As a result, it’s yielded indefensible open ground while stoutly holding on to densely urbanized areas. Russian troops, therefore, are left with stretched-out and vulnerable lines of supply, with large forces dedicated to surrounding cities they can’t capture to protect these supply lines. To help offset the mismatch further, Ukraine has been highly nimble at distributing imagery of battlefield successes and humanitarian distress to rally Western support.



Ukrainian Feminism








						Ukraine's women fighters reflect a cultural tradition of feminist independence
					

In Ukrainian history and culture, women enjoyed independence and agency. The presence of women fighters in the war now is no surprise.




					theconversation.com
				






Ukraine's New Military Branch








						Ukraine’s new military branch: Citizens protecting their neighborhood
					

A journalist, a data analyst and an improv comedy specialist are just three examples of the everyday people signing up as Russian troops threaten Ukraine.




					www.politico.eu
				






> On January 1, Ukraine passed a law making its Territorial Defense Force a separate military branch.
> 
> Previously, the force — conceived in the early 2000s and first put together in 2014 — answered to the ground forces command and consisted of retired military members divided into units resembling volunteer battalions. Their job was simply to defend the rear.
> 
> But now, with the expectation that Russia may be looking to infiltrate cities mentally and physically in parallel with its massive troop build-up, Ukraine wanted to codify its civilian force.
> 
> The goal is to form a core of 10,000 military professionals by March, Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said at a recent briefing. Initially, that core was expected to lead 130,000 civilian reservists. But on Friday, as the threat of war appeared increasingly imminent, Ukraine’s commander in chief said the force was now seeking 1.5 to 2 million citizens willing to defend their homes, families and country.
> 
> The quickly amassed reservists will be spread out over 25 brigades — one for each of Ukraine’s regions, plus one for the capital city, Kyiv. Those brigades will be split into 150 battalions, buttressed by additional volunteer defenders.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> A different take on Force 3035
> 
> 
> Mission Command and the Entrepreneurial Spirit in the Ranks
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Opinion | The secret to the Ukrainian military’s success
> 
> 
> Ukraine's conduct is a warning to U.S. leaders that a technically inferior adversary can impose surprisingly sharp costs.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.nbcnews.com


Honestly that article is pretty garbage.
   It utterly ignores the fact that NATO's all seeing Eye's (E-8, P-8, GlobalHawk, GeoSpacial Assets etc) are keeping the Ukrainian military abreast of Russian movements, and provided cutting edge equipment and training.




Kirkhill said:


> Ukrainian Feminism
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ukraine's women fighters reflect a cultural tradition of feminist independence
> 
> 
> In Ukrainian history and culture, women enjoyed independence and agency. The presence of women fighters in the war now is no surprise.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> theconversation.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 70475
> 
> Ukraine's New Military Branch
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ukraine’s new military branch: Citizens protecting their neighborhood
> 
> 
> A journalist, a data analyst and an improv comedy specialist are just three examples of the everyday people signing up as Russian troops threaten Ukraine.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.politico.eu


Utterly irrelevant to an Expeditionary Military though...


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Here's a possible structure taking into account some previous comments and observations/lessons from the Ukraine conflict.
> 
> 
> Infantry Battalions reduced from 9 to 6 to bring up peacetime manning in the remaining Battalions and free up PYs for schools, etc.
> 1 and 5 Brigade would each have 2 x LAV Battalions while 2 Brigade would have 2 x Light Battalions.
> If the opportunity exists to procure M1 Abrams tanks from US stocks at a deeply reduced cost, RCD would co-locate in Edmonton with LdSH and both would be equipped as Tank Regiments.  If not, then our existing Leopards would be concentrated in Edmonton with LdSH and RCD would remain in Petawawa as an Armoured Recce Regiment.
> Reserve Regiments re-structured as Company/Squadron-sized units with a mandate to be able to supply a Platoon/Troop sized element of augmentees/replacements for Reg Force units.  This is basically an expansion of the existing STAR Mission Task system but focusing on support to the Combat Arms elements.
> Having Reserve units directly integrated into the existing Reg Force structure eliminates the Reserve Brigades and their HQ overhead and recognizes the reality that Reserve units do not have either the required equipment or the ability to mobilize sufficient numbers per unit to generate new Brigades at this time.
> The only "new" capacity in this structure would be 3 x  Reserve HIMARS Batteries under 4 RCHA in the Combat Support Brigade.
> A review of how our Armoured Recce Regiments/Squadrons are equipped and organized as well as introduction of additional new equipment capabilities already being planned (or suggested) such as ATGMs (dismounted and vehicle mounted), mortars (ditto), Self-Propelled Artillery for the LAV Brigades, etc. are assumed to move forward.
> A new AD capability was NOT included in this structure as the requirement has not yet been defined (SHORAD, MRAD, mobile and/or dismounted, etc.) so the required structure is not yet clear.  Additional PYs will likely be required to stand up this new capability but hopefully some of that can come from the significant HQ reductions from both the Reg Force and Reserves.
> View attachment 70474


FWIW - I would opt for 3 VP and 3 Vandoo to be retained as 10/90 units - or 30/70 if the PY exist.
  Put 2 RCR in Trenton - due to the airhead.

Push the Res "Brigade Recce" units to 6 CCSSB  - honestly I wouldn't have any high priority capabilities in any Res units - as you won't have them available on a short notice deployment - which really is why you have a standing army anyway.

If it wasn't for the capbadge mafia - I would strike one of the Medium Brigades to a 30/70 entity - and have 1 Med and 1 Light Bde at 100% manning, at the very least one Battle Group from Light and Medium forces must be 100% reg that can be on IRU.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> FWIW - I would opt for 3 VP and 3 Vandoo to be retained as 10/90 units - or 30/70 if the PY exist.
> Put 2 RCR in Trenton - due to the airhead.
> 
> Push the Res "Brigade Recce" units to 6 CCSSB  - honestly I wouldn't have any high priority capabilities in any Res units - as you won't have them available on a short notice deployment - which really is why you have a standing army anyway.
> 
> If it wasn't for the capbadge mafia - I would strike one of the Medium Brigades to a 30/70 entity - and have 1 Med and 1 Light Bde at 100% manning, at the very least one Battle Group from Light and Medium forces must be 100% reg that can be on IRU.



Or just mash together the Infantry and Cavalry regiments to create our own 'Panzer Grenadiers'.


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:


> Or just mash together the Infantry and Cavalry regiments to create our own 'Panzer Grenadiers'.


And watch heads explode all across the country.


----------



## MilEME09

GK .Dundas said:


> And watch heads explode all across the country.


Well someone needs to finally take on the regimental mafia's or our system will never advance into the future fully


----------



## daftandbarmy

GK .Dundas said:


> And watch heads explode all across the country.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> FWIW - I would opt for 3 VP and 3 Vandoo to be retained as 10/90 units - or 30/70 if the PY exist.
> Put 2 RCR in Trenton - due to the airhead.


I've become dead set against 10/90 but could see a 30/70 and have part of that 30% be a full para company. With an odd para platoon or two in the 70 bunch.

I'd leave 3 RCR in Pet - after all CSOR is there and TF2's just down the road. There ought to be synergy in that.



KevinB said:


> Push the Res "Brigade Recce" units to 6 CCSSB  - honestly I wouldn't have any high priority capabilities in any Res units - as you won't have them available on a short notice deployment - which really is why you have a standing army anyway.


Fully agree that there should be no high priority (or as I call it - quick reaction) capability in any ResF unit. I'm trying to figure out what the role of 'brigade recce' really is when SSE has no plan for the deployment of a real brigade. Like artillery it seems to be a lost foundling that gets attached to the odd battlegroup in some nebulous beefed up recce platoon role.

Before I contemplate what ResF armoured regiments should be I'd prefer to see what the overall plan for armour should be.



KevinB said:


> If it wasn't for the capbadge mafia - I would strike one of the Medium Brigades to a 30/70 entity - and have 1 Med and 1 Light Bde at 100% manning, at the very least one Battle Group from Light and Medium forces must be 100% reg that can be on IRU.


We seem to be making a habit of economy of effort deployments these days (like Latvia) where we have a battlegroup headquarters, a rifle company and various CS and CSS elements with the bulk of the echelon being allied elements.

If we want to stay with that then we could go a long way with 30/70 entities where the 30% is a 100% RegF bn hq, one 100% RegF rifle company and various RegF CS and CSS elements with the remainder being ResF. If one has several 30/70 brigades to take on those recurring peacetime deployment roles (bulked up with their own ResF volunteers) then one would need only one (maybe 2) 100% RegF formation for ad hoc IRU contingency missions.

Again, splitting existing RegF resources (both in the brigades, Div and CBGHs and RSS) one should easily achieve:

1 X 100/0 RegF light bde (0 LAV coys)

1 X 100/0 RegF med bde (9 LAV cos)

1 x 30/70 RegF/ResF heavy bde (4 type 44 tank sqns, 3 LAV coys)

2 x 30/70 RegF/ResF med bde (3 LAV Coy each)

2-3 CCSBs

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Always enjoy seeing a napkin force.
> 
> Always enjoy looking at a model that makes the RegF responsible for ResF units in some form of pairing and that eliminates all the div and unnecessary ResF headquarters and puts more RegF staff in the ResF units.
> 
> You know me, I'm always pushing for a structure that uses the 15-20,000 ResF personnel to create more deployable brigades, especially CS and CSS ones.
> 
> I'm not so sure we need to throw three battalions under the bus to flesh out the others. Battalions now are established at roughly 590 apiece. I'm not sure of the actual 'war' establishment but I think its around 750 or so with a full CS company. That means one RegF battalion should yield enough PYs to bulk out 4 battalions. Remember that much of the shortfall right now is undermanning which ought to be fixed through recruiting and not redistribution.


Not sure if it's changed, but Force 2013 gives a Mech Battalion Establishment of 833 All Ranks and a Generation Strength of 593 All Ranks (240 difference) so dropping one Battalion per Brigade will allow you to bring the other 2 Battalions up to Establishment strength plus an additional 113 troops per Brigade for instructors at schools, to cover postings outside Battalion positions, personnel on courses, personnel on medical categories, etc.  

Light Battalions on the other hand have an Establishment of 834 and a Generation of only 560, so dropping the 3rd Battalion will allow you to bring the other two up to full establishment but with only 12 extra positions to spare.  So unless more infantry positions are recruited realistically I think we only have enough positions to fully fill 6 Battalions.


FJAG said:


> For the record, the batteries belonging to the RegF artillery are as follows:
> 1 RCHA - A, B, C, Z;
> 2 RCHA - D, E, F, Y;
> 5 RALC - X, Q, R, V;
> 4 (GS) RCA - 127, 128, 129
> 
> Dormant RCHA regiments are:
> 3 RCHA - G, H, J, U;
> 4 RCHA - K, L, M
> 
> W Bty is at the RCAS (and in the Sixties belonged to 4 RCHA). RCHA batteries are generally lettered; RCA batteries on the other hand are numbered.


Thanks for the clarification.


FJAG said:


> As an aside, which program do you use for making your charts. I use RFFlow which has quite a few functionalities but doesn't come out quite as neat as yours and doesn't provide the diagonal multi-colour.
> 
> 🍻


LOL.  I use trusty old MS Paint.  Saved the original Canadian Army ORBAT from Wikipedia as a image file and just move stuff around and make modifications manually.  I'm sure there are much more efficient ways but it works for me.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Before I contemplate what ResF armoured regiments should be I'd prefer to see what the overall plan for armour should be.


I previously expressed my scepticism about the willingness of the US to "gift" us a bunch of M1s, but if it were to be an option I think that Ukraine has shown us that if we ever end up in a real fight against the Russians we're going to need more tanks than what we have currently.

Given the opportunity I'd make all three Reg Force Armoured Regiments  Tank Regiments with 1 x Reg Force Tank Squadron, 2 x Reserve Tank Squadrons and 1 x Reg Force Recce Squadrons.  That would give the ability to generate a "Canada-Heavy" Brigade with a composite Tank Regiment of Regulars to deploy in case of a conflict (in a dream world using a 4th Regiment worth of tanks pre-positioned in Europe).


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Not sure if it's changed, but Force 2013 gives a Mech Battalion Establishment of 833 All Ranks and a Generation Strength of 593 All Ranks (240 difference) so dropping one Battalion per Brigade will allow you to bring the other 2 Battalions up to Establishment strength plus an additional 113 troops per Brigade for instructors at schools, to cover postings outside Battalion positions, personnel on courses, personnel on medical categories, etc.
> 
> Light Battalions on the other hand have an Establishment of 834 and a Generation of only 560, so dropping the 3rd Battalion will allow you to bring the other two up to full establishment but with only 12 extra positions to spare.  So unless more infantry positions are recruited realistically I think we only have enough positions to fully fill 6 Battalions.


You have different (and probably better) source documents than I.


GR66 said:


> LOL.  I use trusty old MS Paint.  Saved the original Canadian Army ORBAT from Wikipedia as a image file and just move stuff around and make modifications manually.  I'm sure there are much more efficient ways but it works for me.


Just played around with that unsuccessfully. Anyway ... you do good work.



GR66 said:


> I previously expressed my scepticism about the willingness of the US to "gift" us a bunch of M1s, but if it were to be an option I think that Ukraine has shown us that if we ever end up in a real fight against the Russians we're going to need more tanks than what we have currently.


I doubt a gift to us as well. We have too much money and are viewed as freeloaders.

OTOH a $1.00 lease if we prepositioned one brigade in Europe under a US div and exercised flyover regularly and agreed to commit it in case of an attack on NATO and we also agreed to built up other capabilities such as for NORAD with our own money ...

🍻


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> I'm not sure of the actual 'war' establishment but I think its around 750


There is no “war establishment.” There once were war time only positions in the establishment, but those were all removed about a decade ago. 



FJAG said:


> I'd leave 3 RCR in Pet - after all CSOR is there and TF2's just down the road. There ought to be synergy in that.


If the belief is that the role of light battalions  is to work with SOF, then do light battalions belong in the army?


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> There is no “war establishment.” There once were war time only positions in the establishment, but those were all removed about a decade ago.
> 
> 
> If the belief is that the role of light battalions  is to work with SOF, then do light battalions belong in the army?


LIB’s have multiple roles.  Support of SOF is just one.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> You know me, I'm always pushing for a structure that uses the 15-20,000 ResF personnel to create more deployable brigades, especially CS and CSS ones.





FJAG said:


> I'm trying to figure out what the role of 'brigade recce' really is when SSE has no plan for the deployment of a real brigade.





FJAG said:


> We seem to be making a habit of economy of effort deployments these days (like Latvia) where we have a battlegroup headquarters, a rifle company and various CS and CSS elements with the bulk of the echelon being allied elements.





McG said:


> If the belief is that the role of light battalions  is to work with SOF, then do light battalions belong in the army?



All of these comments appear to be the signs of an Army desperately looking for a role.

We have "Divisions" and "Brigades" without the enablers to deploy Divisions or Brigades and without even a policy stating that we ever intend to deploy Divisions or Brigades. 

We have significant Reserve units but no plans to deploy them as units, no plans to integrate them into Reg Force units, no real warfighting equipment for them and no extra Reg Force equipment available for them to use.

We have Armoured Regiments that get rid of their tanks then partially bring them back but have no clear plan on how they are to be integrated into the wider Army.  If we're not going to deploy a Brigade do we need them organized as a Regiment?  Should the be penny-packeted into Battle Groups?  Do we really, REALLY need them for the type of Army we have built?

We have Light Battalions but no clear specific role defined for them or how we expect them to operate other than their being "Light" and able to operate where our LAVs can't.  

The Government doesn't seem to be interested in any expanded permanent commitment of forces (or pre-positioned equipment) in Europe beyond what we have now in Latvia which kind of raises some questions about the value of "Heavy" forces that can't quickly be deployed in case of a conflict.  Heck, if an actual Russian invasion of a European country and threats of retaliation against NATO and the Nordic States for our support of Ukraine can't elicit a deterrent force deployment then what would?

And the unspoken question being raised by the Ukrainian conflict is that in light of Russia's conventional forces being significantly weakened by the conflict at the same time as there is a resurgence in European defence spending and capabilities, has the military (not political) need for a Canadian land Army being deployed to Europe actually decreased?

A cynical person would look at the Canadian Army and say:


We have more Infantry and Armour than the Government is willing to deploy.
They are expensive to maintain in peacetime but don't have the tools they need to be effective in a war.
We don't have enough (or the right type of) artillery to be useful in a major conflict.
Our "Heavy" forces are located too far away from where they are likely to be needed in a major conflict to be immediately useful, but the Government is unwilling to station them (or their equipment) closer.
We have light forces which could be rapidly deployed in the case of a conflict but we have no clear plans of what that deployment should look like.
Our domestic logistics overhead is extensive and difficult to maintain but we lack the logistics capacity to deploy and sustain the size of Army we have during a full scale war.
Our Reserves are primarily suited for domestic aid to civil authorities rather than contributing to our warfighting ability in any significant way beyond as a source of (partially) trained individual augmentees for the Reg Force.

Sad that such an important part of our nation is left floundering around in the dark without a flashlight trying to find a role for itself in the absence of any clear guidance (and no I don't think SSE is a clear enough blueprint of what we really expect the Canadian military to be able to do).  In the meantime however we will continue to sink time, effort and treasure into an organization which I believe most people will agree is underachieving.  

/rant


----------



## WLSC

GR66 said:


> All of these comments appear to be the signs of an Army desperately looking for a role.
> 
> We have "Divisions" and "Brigades" without the enablers to deploy Divisions or Brigades and without even a policy stating that we ever intend to deploy Divisions or Brigades.
> 
> We have significant Reserve units but no plans to deploy them as units, no plans to integrate them into Reg Force units, no real warfighting equipment for them and no extra Reg Force equipment available for them to use.
> 
> We have Armoured Regiments that get rid of their tanks then partially bring them back but have no clear plan on how they are to be integrated into the wider Army.  If we're not going to deploy a Brigade do we need them organized as a Regiment?  Should the be penny-packeted into Battle Groups?  Do we really, REALLY need them for the type of Army we have built?
> 
> We have Light Battalions but no clear specific role defined for them or how we expect them to operate other than their being "Light" and able to operate where our LAVs can't.
> 
> The Government doesn't seem to be interested in any expanded permanent commitment of forces (or pre-positioned equipment) in Europe beyond what we have now in Latvia which kind of raises some questions about the value of "Heavy" forces that can't quickly be deployed in case of a conflict.  Heck, if an actual Russian invasion of a European country and threats of retaliation against NATO and the Nordic States for our support of Ukraine can't elicit a deterrent force deployment then what would?
> 
> And the unspoken question being raised by the Ukrainian conflict is that in light of Russia's conventional forces being significantly weakened by the conflict at the same time as there is a resurgence in European defence spending and capabilities, has the military (not political) need for a Canadian land Army being deployed to Europe actually decreased?
> 
> A cynical person would look at the Canadian Army and say:
> 
> 
> We have more Infantry and Armour than the Government is willing to deploy.
> They are expensive to maintain in peacetime but don't have the tools they need to be effective in a war.
> We don't have enough (or the right type of) artillery to be useful in a major conflict.
> Our "Heavy" forces are located too far away from where they are likely to be needed in a major conflict to be immediately useful, but the Government is unwilling to station them (or their equipment) closer.
> We have light forces which could be rapidly deployed in the case of a conflict but we have no clear plans of what that deployment should look like.
> Our domestic logistics overhead is extensive and difficult to maintain but we lack the logistics capacity to deploy and sustain the size of Army we have during a full scale war.
> Our Reserves are primarily suited for domestic aid to civil authorities rather than contributing to our warfighting ability in any significant way beyond as a source of (partially) trained individual augmentees for the Reg Force.
> 
> Sad that such an important part of our nation is left floundering around in the dark without a flashlight trying to find a role for itself in the absence of any clear guidance (and no I don't think SSE is a clear enough blueprint of what we really expect the Canadian military to be able to do).  In the meantime however we will continue to sink time, effort and treasure into an organization which I believe most people will agree is underachieving.
> 
> /rant


Bang on!  I always was on the optimist side, no more since the last budget.  There’s absolutely no will to make us be what we are supposed to.  I have the impression that a lot is done to make us look bad, successfully.


----------



## DBNSG

As a very interested Civilian observer these comments are bang on but I think the Army we have is satisfying exactly what the Folks that live in Ottawa want it too. That is, the Army we have, has just enough capabilities to train the Officers that lead it and all roads lead to Ottawa where the real games and careers are made .A self licking Ice Cream cone that will never be counted on by our Allies because most Canadians are willing to defend Canada down to the very last American. Led by Mr Trudeau are those Canadians wrong? 

 I think they are but I live in one of the biggest targets in N/A ,the Halifax area, and I have studied a little History.


----------



## WestIsle

WLSC said:


> Bang on!  I always was on the optimist side, no more since the last budget.  There’s absolutely no will to make us be what we are supposed to.  I have the impression that a lot is done to make us look bad, successfully.


Look no further then all the latest "reports" and findings. The new MND is quick to throw the CAF under the bus at first light despite the latest report being a whole lot of nothing spanning 20 years of which there has been massive change. All the good will from callouts for domestic support for emergencies and the pandemic have been quickly brushed aside as the government cant have any of that. Trudeau Senior and Junior never thought much about the military and its place in society having largely been more interested in seeing the military or rather not seeing it in their "just society".


----------



## MilEME09

WestIsle said:


> Look no further then all the latest "reports" and findings. The new MND is quick to throw the CAF under the bus at first light despite the latest report being a whole lot of nothing spanning 20 years of which there has been massive change. All the good will from callouts for domestic support for emergencies and the pandemic have been quickly brushed aside as the government cant have any of that. Trudeau Senior and Junior never thought much about the military and its place in society having largely been more interested in seeing the military or rather not seeing it in their "just society".


Catch 22 as well, the CAFs public engagement is definitely lacking, even before covid. If the public actually interacted with the military more, they might care. They do not care because they dint see us, and the loop circles back to us not putting the effort because Canadians do not care. 

Really we need an active PAO program, less passive.


----------



## WLSC

MilEME09 said:


> Catch 22 as well, the CAFs public engagement is definitely lacking, even before covid. If the public actually interacted with the military more, they might care. They do not care because they dint see us, and the loop circles back to us not putting the effort because Canadians do not care.
> 
> Really we need an active PAO program, less passive.


We had an active one. PMO shut it down.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> LIB’s have multiple roles.  Support of SOF is just one.



SOF has multiple roles. Finding targets for the LIB's is just one of them.


----------



## Kirkhill

Ukraine is turning into the Spanish Civil War - a field test of ideas and technologies.

The Royal Marines were playing around with Quadcopters for the CQMS.   Now the Brits are donating dozens of the Malloy T150s the Marines were trialling to the Ukrainians.


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1521723468815151105


			Malloy Aeronautics – Revolutionizing Airborne Logistics
		


I doubt it will make it into Canadian service for Force 2025 but maybe for Force 2030 if the new White Paper rears its head soon.

68KG​MAX PAYLOAD​70+KM​RANGE​30+ M/S  (>108 km/h)​CRUISE SPEED​


----------



## McG

KevinB said:


> LIB’s have multiple roles.  Support of SOF is just one.


I don't disagree but there is a tendency, amongst many, to stop at the support to SOF role when thinking of the development of light infantry. If we are just going to hover on that one aspect of potential employment, then all light infantry may as well be given to SOF. Because if all the other roles are just an after thought, then the Army will never develop a light force that is value added to conventional army tasks.



Kirkhill said:


> SOF has multiple roles. Finding targets for the LIB's is just one of them.


No. That is not one of them. Conventional recce and ISR do that.  If SOF is looking for targets, it is not likely that infantry will to the strike.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> SOF has multiple roles. Finding targets for the LIB's is just one of them.


Probably not.


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> I don't disagree but there is a tendency, amongst many, to stop at the support to SOF role when thinking of the development of light infantry. If we are just going to hover on that one aspect of potential employment, then all light infantry may as well be given to SOF. Because if all the other roles are just an after thought, then the Army will never develop a light force that is value added to conventional army tasks.


Which is one reason that I think pooling the LIB’s into a Light Brigade makes sense.   As well having the Light Brigade working a lot with XVIII Airborne.   

Failing that then I’d chop them CANSOF to be support personnel, like what SOCOM did with the Ranger Battalions 



McG said:


> No. That is not one of them. Conventional recce and ISR do that.  If SOF is looking for targets, it is not likely that infantry will to the strike.


Admittedly SR or Low Vis teams can insert to gain intel that is later used for conventional force  strike - but yeah generally not a specific SOF mission


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Which is one reason that I think pooling the LIB’s into a Light Brigade makes sense.   As well having the Light Brigade working a lot with XVIII Airborne.
> 
> Failing that then I’d chop them CANSOF to be support personnel, like what SOCOM did with the Ranger Battalions
> 
> 
> Admittedly SR or Low Vis teams can insert to gain intel that is later used for conventional force  strike - but yeah generally not a specific SOF mission



The 'LIB' I was with once made an attempt to work with SOF type troops on an operational tour.

We shut it down after the first 'almost' blue on blue, which was largely our fault.

There's a reason why units like CSOR are selected, trained and assigned specifically to work with units like JTF2 as their main task.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> The 'LIB' I was with once made an attempt to work with SOF type troops on an operational tour.
> 
> We shut it down after the first 'almost' blue on blue, which was largely our fault.
> 
> There's a reason why units like CSOR are selected, trained and assigned specifically to work with units like JTF2 as their main task.


SOF always needs to deal with deconflicting with Conventional Forces (CF), as in certain battle spaces you just can black zone areas for no go to CF like one could for Iraq or Afghanistan - and there where still significant incidents at times. 
   Note: don’t assume that CF know what one means by Low Vis Vehicle - because they are going to attempt to put 25mm into the HiLux when you approach…

  There are a lot of support task that are an absolute waste of SOF personnel -such as outer cordon troops - or airfield seizure paratroopers.   

That said I don’t favor cutting the LIB’s to CANSOF as Canada isn’t really a place that does a lot of major NEO or personnel intensive PR’s - so they would  basically gate guard stuff or sweep floors 95% or the time, or do a lot of walking around places looking for something to do —  or — suck a lot of resources up trying to bring them up to a Tier II SOF entity.   

I do think that a Light Bde would of properly resourced and employed have some significant roles to play for both Domestic and Expeditionary missions.   Putting them in Pet would allow for enough cross pollination to CANSOF elements that they could be used as support in some roles if needed — but would also have a well resourced CF Bde to use for actual Light taskings.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I do think that a Light Bde would of properly resourced and employed have some significant roles to play for both Domestic and Expeditionary missions. Putting them in Pet would allow for enough cross pollination to CANSOF elements that they could be used as support in some roles if needed — but would also have a well resourced CF Bde to use for actual Light taskings.


Which raises the next question - does it need to be a three full-time battalion brigade?

If we don't generally have a plan to field a brigade, can one, or should one, get by with a brigade which has one or maybe two full-time battalions and maybe one or two part-time ones plus some enablers?


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Which raises the next question - does it need to be a three full-time battalion brigade?
> 
> If we don't generally have a plan to field a brigade, can one, or should one, get by with a brigade which has one or maybe two full-time battalions and maybe one or two part-time ones plus some enablers?


I don't think so - in all realty it probably only needs to be 1 full time full strength  BN - as the CAF doesn't have enough transport to kick out a Bde in short order.
  1 IRU Coy rotated - monthly - entire unit in high readiness.

 One reconstituting unit (new troops PCF etc) lets call it 70-30, which replaces the sister BN annually as the IRU.
    Raised to full strength in 30 days - and deployable in 60

Then a 30-70 unit which can be raised to full strength inside 60 days, deployable in 90 days.

----- I'd do the same thing with the medium Brigades


----------



## Fabius

When everyone talks about 30/70,70/30 units what are you all envisioning? 
From F2025 development channels I am seeing four options under discussion boiled down as follows:

1. Reserve Class A pers assigned to and working Class A for reg force unit;

2. Reserve Class A pers parade on scheduled basis and deploy on Ex with Reg F unit but belong to and are adminstered by affiliated Res feeder units;

3.  Reserve Class A pers from affiliated Reserve units form a sub unit independent of both Reserve and Reg force units but joins affiliated Reg force unit as needed. Think current ARCG. 

4. Reserve unit has Reg force personnel assigned to a sub unit and said sub unit links up with affiliated Reg force unit as needed.


----------



## dapaterson

One would hope that these options would be run past Legal in advance to determine the implications...


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> One would hope that these options would be run past Legal in advance to determine the implications...


Hey why start now


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> One would hope that these options would be run past Legal in advance to determine the implications...


I've actually been mulling that over and what I would like to see is the MOOs and CFOOs for 4 AD, 1 AD, 18 AD and 6 Fd Regt/58 AD Bty from the 1990s. Someone must have given thought to the establishments and organizational structures of these Total Force units (Funny I never looked them up at the time)



Fabius said:


> When everyone talks about 30/70,70/30 units what are you all envisioning?


Not sure about others but I see the following:

The National Defence Act currently provides that individuals are members of the RegF or ResF (I'm leaving aside the Special Force) based on whether they are on continuing, or other than continuing, full-time service. What the term "full-time service" means is obvious while "continuing" is undefined and not easily parsable. We used to use a rule of thumb that three years would probably do it but @dapaterson would be more up on that as its more policy matter than true legal definition.

Just like people, entities in the military also have a niche they occupy "the reserve force (or the regular force) shall include such units and other elements as are embodied therein". Effectively every military entity is assigned to the appropriate force.

In my mind I essentially see units which are 100% or 70% made up of RegF personnel as being embodied in the RegF while ones that are predominantly made up of reservists are embodied in the ResF units. That, however, is arbitrary.

Generally I see all units, both RegF and ResF as having predominantly RegF personnel in the unit headquarters and then having one or more RegF line companies and mixed CS and CSS companies. A 30/70 battalion would have one full RegF line company and a 70/30 battalion would have two. 

ResF companies would be roughly 90% Class A ResF and 10% RegF for leadership/administration. I'm frankly not sure about how best to describe the status of the Class A members in a RegF unit but do note that NDA s 60(1)(c)(ix) contemplates ResF members "serving with any unit or other element of the regular force..." so its quite doable. We do this all the time with Class Bs. There is obviously a legal consequence to this. S 27 also provides for "attachment" or "secondment" of an individual to another component. It's not legally impossible but a matter of crafting appropriate policies to make it practical.

It's not that easy to describe the relationship as between a RegF unit and ResF sub unit and vice versa, but it strikes me that appropriate MOOs/CFOOs can be crafted for that considering its not just "units" that make up the RegF and ResF but also "other elements" which is a very broad category encompassing any organizational entity. As it stands currently most ResF units are under ResF brigades which are under RegF divisions. I see nothing which would in principle prohibit a RegF battalion having a ResF company or vice versa.

Basically what I do not see are permanent Class B positions. Positions are either RegF or ResF and the ResF are Class As. The only time I would see a Class B is to temporarily fill a RegF position while vacant. IMHO, permanent Class B positions are an improper way of plumping up the number of "full-time" members in the CF in excess of authorized RegF PYs.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Basically what I do not see are permanent Class B positions. Positions are either RegF or ResF and the ResF are Class As. The only time I would see a Class B is to temporarily fill a RegF position while vacant. IMHO, permanent Class B positions are an improper way of plumping up the number of "full-time" members in the CF in excess of authorized RegF PYs.
> 
> 🍻



So what you're saying then is that these units would only be fully up to strength for one weekend a month, and a couple of months in the summertime, when the Class A reservists would be available?


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> So what you're saying then is that these units would only be fully up to strength for one weekend a month, and a couple of months in the summertime, when the Class A reservists would be available?


Both yes and no.

Technically they would not ever be up to strength unless mobilized.

What I see is enough RegF elements within the battalion Hq and the one or two RegF companies so that the RegF members could train and exercise fully throughout the year as they do now (albeit with the ResF companies participating only as a TEWT element involving the RegF leadership).

The reserve companies would conduct mandatory refresher training one weekend per month and a mandatory collective exercise in the summer and participate in voluntary courses in the summer all under their battalion's RegF supervision. 

I generally do not see a full battalion exercise at any time because I do not see that there is a practical way that can be done and, as well, I'm not sure it is necessary so long that the ResF company's RegF leadership does. If the Class A ResF has limited training opportunities then isn't it best if those are focused on the platoon and company level?

All of this presupposes that the basic DP1 training of the ResF recruit and junior officer is conducted at a depot battalion before they join their line battalion and is the same as their RegF counterpart and completed .

I look at the post DP1 training as limited mandatory refresher and collective training and as voluntary 'career' and 'trade' progressive training on both winter and summer courses run by depot battalions and not line battalions.

The concept also allows for the sharing of equipment within the battalion during periods that equipment is limited. Essentially the RegF elements are fully equipped with controlled usage by the ResF elements during their summer exercise. The end state would be to equip all companies fully.

🍻


----------



## quadrapiper

FJAG said:


> Basically what I do not see are permanent Class B positions. Positions are either RegF or ResF and the ResF are Class As. The only time I would see a Class B is to temporarily fill a RegF position while vacant. IMHO, permanent Class B positions are an improper way of plumping up the number of "full-time" members in the CF in excess of authorized RegF PYs.
> 
> 🍻


In that concept, other than as means to avoid opening the NDA, is there a point to retaining both the Class A-C _and _Reg/Res/Special pers structure?

Could see something like A-C+Supp for pers, and some sort of Active (or Ready, or whatever) and Reserve designation for units, but assigning both those labels to personnel seems redundant. Pers could be on the rolls but without obligation (Supp), on day-by-day (A), on a limited-duration contract (B), or hired indefinitely (C).


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I've actually been mulling that over and what I would like to see is the MOOs and CFOOs for 4 AD, 1 AD, 18 AD and 6 Fd Regt/58 AD Bty from the 1990s. Someone must have given thought to the establishments and organizational structures of these Total Force units (Funny I never looked them up at the time)
> 
> 
> Not sure about others but I see the following:
> 
> The National Defence Act currently provides that individuals are members of the RegF or ResF (I'm leaving aside the Special Force) based on whether they are on continuing, or other than continuing, full-time service. What the term "full-time service" means is obvious while "continuing" is undefined and not easily parsable. We used to use a rule of thumb that three years would probably do it but @dapaterson would be more up on that as its more policy matter than true legal definition.
> 
> Just like people, entities in the military also have a niche they occupy "the reserve force (or the regular force) shall include such units and other elements as are embodied therein". Effectively every military entity is assigned to the appropriate force.
> 
> In my mind I essentially see units which are 100% or 70% made up of RegF personnel as being embodied in the RegF while ones that are predominantly made up of reservists are embodied in the ResF units. That, however, is arbitrary.
> 
> Generally I see all units, both RegF and ResF as having predominantly RegF personnel in the unit headquarters and then having one or more RegF line companies and mixed CS and CSS companies. A 30/70 battalion would have one full RegF line company and a 70/30 battalion would have two.
> 
> ResF companies would be roughly 90% Class A ResF and 10% RegF for leadership/administration. I'm frankly not sure about how best to describe the status of the Class A members in a RegF unit but do note that NDA s 60(1)(c)(ix) contemplates ResF members "serving with any unit or other element of the regular force..." so its quite doable. We do this all the time with Class Bs. There is obviously a legal consequence to this. S 27 also provides for "attachment" or "secondment" of an individual to another component. It's not legally impossible but a matter of crafting appropriate policies to make it practical.
> 
> It's not that easy to describe the relationship as between a RegF unit and ResF sub unit and vice versa, but it strikes me that appropriate MOOs/CFOOs can be crafted for that considering its not just "units" that make up the RegF and ResF but also "other elements" which is a very broad category encompassing any organizational entity. As it stands currently most ResF units are under ResF brigades which are under RegF divisions. I see nothing which would in principle prohibit a RegF battalion having a ResF company or vice versa.
> 
> Basically what I do not see are permanent Class B positions. Positions are either RegF or ResF and the ResF are Class As. The only time I would see a Class B is to temporarily fill a RegF position while vacant. IMHO, permanent Class B positions are an improper way of plumping up the number of "full-time" members in the CF in excess of authorized RegF PYs.
> 
> 🍻


Are you seeing these hybrid 70/30 and 30/70 units keeping their Ref Force HQ & Companies at the existing Bases and the Reserve elements coming from those Militia units that are geographically close to those bases?  Or do you envision shifting some Reg Force elements out to new locations to be closer to the Reserve recruiting base?  If so, what existing CF facilities could support or could reasonably be expanded/improved to support such a move?

What model would you proposed for Reserve units that are not near a parent Reg Force facility?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Are you seeing these hybrid 70/30 and 30/70 units keeping their Ref Force HQ & Companies at the existing Bases and the Reserve elements coming from those Militia units that are geographically close to those bases?  Or do you envision shifting some Reg Force elements out to new locations to be closer to the Reserve recruiting base?  If so, what existing CF facilities could support or could reasonably be expanded/improved to support such a move?
> 
> What model would you proposed for Reserve units that are not near a parent Reg Force facility?



IMHO.... the only thing that will work is for the Reserves to be augmented by additional Reg F resources where they parade regularly: the local armoury.

Any attempt to move the reservists out of their usual weekly 'patterns', usually centred around the armoury, their messes, and local training areas, has usually failed in the past.


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> Basically what I do not see are permanent Class B positions. Positions are either RegF or ResF and the ResF are Class As. The only time I would see a Class B is to temporarily fill a RegF position while vacant. IMHO, permanent Class B positions are an improper way of plumping up the number of "full-time" members in the CF in excess of authorized RegF PYs.
> 
> 🍻





quadrapiper said:


> In that concept, other than as means to avoid opening the NDA, is there a point to retaining both the Class A-C _and _Reg/Res/Special pers structure?
> 
> Could see something like A-C+Supp for pers, and some sort of Active (or Ready, or whatever) and Reserve designation for units, but assigning both those labels to personnel seems redundant. Pers could be on the rolls but without obligation (Supp), on day-by-day (A), on a limited-duration contract (B), or hired indefinitely (C).


There is no requirement to amend the NDA to eliminate Class B/A (ie. the "permanent Class B"). There would be a requirement to streamline the transition process between  components. This would conveniently also achieve a goal of The Journey.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> IMHO.... the only thing that will work is for the Reserves to be augmented by additional Reg F resources where they parade regularly: the local armoury.
> 
> Any attempt to move the reservists out of their usual weekly 'patterns', usually centred around the armoury, their messes, and local training areas, has usually failed in the past.



Integrate what used to be the RSS right into the command structure of the Reserve Units perhaps?  Rather than just being a Captain and a Warrant acting as advisors bring add a Sergeant and some Corporal-Instructors to run the training platoon?


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## Underway

Define RSS for us so we understand the definition of the positions.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Integrate what used to be the RSS right into the command structure of the Reserve Units perhaps? Rather than just being a Captain and a Warrant acting as advisors bring add a Sergeant and some Corporal-Instructors to run the training platoon?


It should already be the case that the Captain and WO hold real positions within the unit.  That does not take away the CO's discursion to employ them differently.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Integrate what used to be the RSS right into the command structure of the Reserve Units perhaps?  Rather than just being a Captain and a Warrant acting as advisors bring add a Sergeant and some Corporal-Instructors to run the training platoon?


Pretty much 10/90 was supposed to do.



Underway said:


> Define RSS for us so we understand the definition of the positions.


Regular Support Staff - Regular Force personnel who assist PRes units.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Define RSS for us so we understand the definition of the positions.



Anciently the RSS was Regular Support Staff.  They were regular force personnel, in our unit's case a Capt and a Warrant from the PPCLI, that were assigned to the unit and provided guidance to the Militia and a communications link to the Regular Force to assist in organizing training, courses and resources.

Our unit was organized into the BOR, A Company and B Company.   A and B Companies were both single platoon companies.  A Company was trained soldiers.  B Company was recruits in training.  Instruction was by other Militia soldiers.

The suggestion is that the Cadre (RSS) should be a larger group of qualified regular force instructors capable of training, organizing and fighting their own sections and platoons raised from the troops on the armoury floor.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Pretty much 10/90 was supposed to do.
> 
> 
> Regular Support Staff - Regular Force personnel who assist PRes units.



What he said.


----------



## Underway

I see the issue now.  

Naval Reserve RSS are not the same (not even called that really).  The Admin O (LtN),  Chief Clerk (CPO2 or PO1 rank level), IT Nav Com (MS) and Facilities Manager (PO2) are Reg F.  They do not have anything to do with training unless it was related to their particular skill set.  The TrgO is a Class B position and NAVRES runs all the courses and manages careers like the Reg F with national merit boards, career manager positions etc...


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> I see the issue now.
> 
> Naval Reserve RSS are not the same (not even called that really).  The Admin O (LtN),  Chief Clerk (CPO2 or PO1 rank level), IT Nav Com (MS) and Facilities Manager (PO2) are Reg F.  They do not have anything to do with training unless it was related to their particular skill set.  The TrgO is a Class B position and NAVRES runs all the courses and manages careers like the Reg F with national merit boards, career manager positions etc...


But who manages your kilts and sporrans?


----------



## FJAG

quadrapiper said:


> In that concept, other than as means to avoid opening the NDA, is there a point to retaining both the Class A-C _and _Reg/Res/Special pers structure?
> 
> Could see something like A-C+Supp for pers, and some sort of Active (or Ready, or whatever) and Reserve designation for units, but assigning both those labels to personnel seems redundant. Pers could be on the rolls but without obligation (Supp), on day-by-day (A), on a limited-duration contract (B), or hired indefinitely (C).


I hate throwing out babies with the bath water. I actually see nothing wrong with the Class A and B and C concept except the way we have made the Class Bs an adjunct of the RegF institution. Class B still works well for courses and exercises and even short term backfill for temporarily vacant RegF positions. During the early 00s I provided legal advice for the Reserve Force Employment Project which was trying to redesign that and came up with the ill-fated "limited liability" and "unlimited liability" reserve force service model which I considered pure bull. It's not the service classification model that's the problem; its the way we use it and how the ResF is organized.



GR66 said:


> Are you seeing these hybrid 70/30 and 30/70 units keeping their Ref Force HQ & Companies at the existing Bases and the Reserve elements coming from those Militia units that are geographically close to those bases?  Or do you envision shifting some Reg Force elements out to new locations to be closer to the Reserve recruiting base?  If so, what existing CF facilities could support or could reasonably be expanded/improved to support such a move?
> 
> What model would you proposed for Reserve units that are not near a parent Reg Force facility?


I see a combination of the two. We're actually not as challenged by geography as we think. Many US Army National Guard units are spread over numerous towns and sometimes several states. They benefit by parading in a more limited fashion. It's one thing to drive seventy or a hundred miles to your armoury for one weekend a month than every Tuesday and Thursday night plus a weekend.

I basically see 70/30 units come from existing RegF battalions which would remain at their current bases. Their ResF companies would come from nearby. Ottawa, Quebec and Edmonton/Calgary/Winnipeg and the Maritimes could do that.  

30/70 units are a bit more difficult because of the largest number of units are in expensive urban areas. We would need to address the housing issues (and to a lesser extent, training facilities) for them. I do not see that as impossible - we used to have battalions in Victoria and Winnipeg and Calgary and currently have them in Edmonton.  They did and do quite well. If we could guarantee people more stability on such urban postings so that they could get in on the housing market and spouses could get second jobs we'd be ahead of the game. I sometimes wonder how well we would do in Toronto if we made a contract with a Torontonian recruit that his first ten years would be guaranteed to be with a Toronto based Reg F bn hq, rifle company or support company.



McG said:


> There is no requirement to amend the NDA to eliminate Class B/A (ie. the "permanent Class B"). There would be a requirement to streamline the transition process between  components. This would conveniently also achieve a goal of The Journey.


Reserve Classes of service are not an NDA matter. They are created in QR&O Vol 1 Ch 9 by way of a Governor in Council order. It would need a new GoC order to change them. As I said above, I don't think its necessary. Some minor amendments to give teeth to the "Order to Train" provision in NDA s 33(2)(a) and at QR&O 9.04(2) are necessary



Kirkhill said:


> Anciently the RSS was Regular Support Staff.  They were regular force personnel, in our unit's case a Capt and a Warrant from the PPCLI, that were assigned to the unit and provided guidance to the Militia and a communications link to the Regular Force to assist in organizing training, courses and resources.
> 
> Our unit was organized into the BOR, A Company and B Company.   A and B Companies were both single platoon companies.  A Company was trained soldiers.  B Company was recruits in training.  Instruction was by other Militia soldiers.
> 
> The suggestion is that the Cadre (RSS) should be a larger group of qualified regular force instructors capable of training, organizing and fighting their own sections and platoons raised from the troops on the armoury floor.


I was RSS in 76-78. At the time that was a RegF unit in its own right (RSS Prairie) but with individuals assigned all over the various provinces. I had a staff of four (an arty WO and sergeant, an adm clk sergeant and an arty Bdr storeman). While my title was Adjt and TrgO of the reserve regiment, I was not in its chain of command.

I'm not sure if that has changed or not but my guess it may have. When I look at the establishment charts that are available to me now, I note that every reserve unit has two line items one for RegF pers and one for ResF pers but both accounted against the same UIC.

@dapaterson can probably shed light on the current CoC structure.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Pretty much 10/90 was supposed to do.
> 
> 
> Regular Support Staff - Regular Force personnel who assist PRes units.



Just casting my mind back to one of our RSS Warrants.   A genyouwine peach.  He didn't teach me much but what he taught me stuck with me.  I was asked as a DEO Lt to solve a problem for my OC.  I can't remember the details now.   They don't matter.  In any event, I was direct to the RSS WO to get his advice.

He responded with the immortal phrase inscribed in my memory:

DILLIGAS, Sir!

When I asked for clarification he informed me:

Do I Look Like I Give A Shit, Sir!

Regular Force Support at its finest.


Although, to be fair, we had some good RSS types as well that went out of their way to help.  Captain Fredricksen was one.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I hate throwing out babies with the bath water. I actually see nothing wrong with the Class A and B and C concept except the way we have made the Class Bs an adjunct of the RegF institution. Class B still works well for courses and exercises and even short term backfill for temporarily vacant RegF positions. During the early 00s I provided legal advice for the Reserve Force Employment Project which was trying to redesign that and came up with the ill-fated "limited liability" and "unlimited liability" reserve force service model which I considered pure bull. It's not the service classification model that's the problem; its the way we use it and how the ResF is organized.
> 
> 
> I see a combination of the two. We're actually not as challenged by geography as we think. Many US Army National Guard units are spread over numerous towns and sometimes several states. They benefit by parading in a more limited fashion. It's one thing to drive seventy or a hundred miles to your armoury for one weekend a month than every Tuesday and Thursday night plus a weekend.
> 
> I basically see 70/30 units come from existing RegF battalions which would remain at their current bases. Their ResF companies would come from nearby. Ottawa, Quebec and Edmonton/Calgary/Winnipeg and the Maritimes could do that.
> 
> 30/70 units are a bit more difficult because of the largest number of units are in expensive urban areas. We would need to address the housing issues (and to a lesser extent, training facilities) for them. I do not see that as impossible - we used to have battalions in Victoria and Winnipeg and Calgary and currently have them in Edmonton.  They did and do quite well. If we could guarantee people more stability on such urban postings so that they could get in on the housing market and spouses could get second jobs we'd be ahead of the game. I sometimes wonder how well we would do in Toronto if we made a contract with a Torontonian recruit that his first ten years would be guaranteed to be with a Toronto based Reg F bn hq, rifle company or support company.
> 
> 
> Reserve Classes of service are not an NDA matter. They are created in QR&O Vol 1 Ch 9 by way of a Governor in Council order. It would need a new GoC order to change them. As I said above, I don't think its necessary. Some minor amendments to give teeth to the "Order to Train" provision in NDA s 33(2)(a) and at QR&O 9.04(2) are necessary
> 
> 
> I was RSS in 76-78. At the time that was a RegF unit in its own right (RSS Prairie) but with individuals assigned all over the various provinces. I had a staff of four (an arty WO and sergeant, an adm clk sergeant and an arty Bdr storeman). While my title was Adjt and TrgO of the reserve regiment, I was not in its chain of command.
> 
> I'm not sure if that has changed or not but my guess it may have. When I look at the establishment charts that are available to me now, I note that every reserve unit has two line items one for RegF pers and one for ResF pers but both accounted against the same UIC.
> 
> @dapaterson can probably shed light on the current CoC structure.
> 
> 🍻



I was in from 80 to 84.  Most of my time was with the Calg Highrs but I spent a year with the Johns in Regina.  

Our RSS were outside the CoC.  Or Trg O, Adj and OC B Coy were all Class A Militiamen, as was our CO.  I think we had a couple of Class B clerks in the BOR.

Which brings up the next point.  These days what is the difference in terms of service between a Class C Reservist and a Regular Force soldier doing the same job?


----------



## WLSC

Kirkhill said:


> Integrate what used to be the RSS right into the command structure of the Reserve Units perhaps?  Rather than just being a Captain and a Warrant acting as advisors bring add a Sergeant and some Corporal-Instructors to run the training platoon?


Well, they are posted to the unit and have pre-determined position i.e.: Adjt, Ops WO, Transport sgt, Chief Clk.  They are under the unit CO (which have condition on their employment by CoC.  We still call them RSS but they are not anymore.


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## markppcli

I’ll add that in the Reserve Support Platoons there is a higher percentage of reg force support. For example the LER and NSaskR each took a Sgt, couple MCpls, and a few troops. Would have been nice if those were new PYs but I digress.


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## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I’ll add that in the Reserve Support Platoons there is a higher percentage of reg force support. For example the LER and NSaskR each took a Sgt, couple MCpls, and a few troops. Would have been nice if those were new PYs but I digress.



Roughly, that's the British TA model.

As I recall a Reg F training team (posted in from the Reg F regiment allied to that TA regiment) supports each TA unit, and includes a Reg F CO, a Training Major, and about 10 NCMs who deliver training and other key admin services.


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## FJAG

I'm not sure that the British Reserve system is the way we want to go.

If I understand things right, basic reserve training in the UK is very brief. Basic Training comes in two parts - Part 1A is four weekends and Part 1B is a two week module. That is followed by Initial Trade Training which, for the infantry for example, is a two week Combat Infantry Course.

Officer training is equally brief coming in four modules of two weeks each for basic training to reach 2nd Lt status. and several more for special to arms training. I wasn't able to determine what the Classification training requirements are but I'm thinking a few two week modules as well. All in all it reminds me very much of the old MITCP program to reserve career progression.

Ongoing commitments are from 19 to 26 days per year.

All-in-all it sounds highly basic and far short of our own training requirements. 

Fundamentally I think Canada has two key problems with reserve service which makes our reservists less than optimum.

The first is the 'come-when-you-feel-like-it' model of service. Courses appear adequate but unit training is virtually impossible under this model. Training cannot and does not progress beyond the platoon level. This allows for adequate individual augmentation of RegF units but is totally inadequate as a tool for expanding force capabilities beyond that of RegF establishments.

The second is leadership. ResF leaders are taught the fundamentals of their craft but rarely have the opportunity to put it into practice. Administration requirements are too onerous, take leaders away from actually leading, and above all, the 'come-when-you-feel-like-it' structure of the force is frustrating for leaders, especially RegF RSS staff. Only the most dedicated leaders in ResF units accomplish anything. That isn't good enough. A proper leadership model should make it possible for even average leaders to be successful in their roles.

We can always add more RegF leaders to ResF units (and should do so) but more full-time leaders will not solve the problem until such time that a habit of attendance is created. Very good leaders can accomplish that, but there are too few of them so the sine qua non need is to create a system, reinforced by regulations, that guarantees regular and predictable attendance so that even average leaders can move the goal posts on their units' capabilities.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I'm not sure that the British Reserve system is the way we want to go.
> 
> If I understand things right, basic reserve training in the UK is very brief. Basic Training comes in two parts - Part 1A is four weekends and Part 1B is a two week module. That is followed by Initial Trade Training which, for the infantry for example, is a two week Combat Infantry Course.
> 
> Officer training is equally brief coming in four modules of two weeks each for basic training to reach 2nd Lt status. and several more for special to arms training. I wasn't able to determine what the Classification training requirements are but I'm thinking a few two week modules as well. All in all it reminds me very much of the old MITCP program to reserve career progression.
> 
> Ongoing commitments are from 19 to 26 days per year.
> 
> All-in-all it sounds highly basic and far short of our own training requirements.
> 
> Fundamentally I think Canada has two key problems with reserve service which makes our reservists less than optimum.
> 
> The first is the 'come-when-you-feel-like-it' model of service. Courses appear adequate but unit training is virtually impossible under this model. Training cannot and does not progress beyond the platoon level. This allows for adequate individual augmentation of RegF units but is totally inadequate as a tool for expanding force capabilities beyond that of RegF establishments.
> 
> The second is leadership. ResF leaders are taught the fundamentals of their craft but rarely have the opportunity to put it into practice. Administration requirements are too onerous, take leaders away from actually leading, and above all, the 'come-when-you-feel-like-it' structure of the force is frustrating for leaders, especially RegF RSS staff. Only the most dedicated leaders in ResF units accomplish anything. That isn't good enough. A proper leadership model should make it possible for even average leaders to be successful in their roles.
> 
> We can always add more RegF leaders to ResF units (and should do so) but more full-time leaders will not solve the problem until such time that a habit of attendance is created. Very good leaders can accomplish that, but there are too few of them so the sine qua non need is to create a system, reinforced by regulations, that guarantees regular and predictable attendance so that even average leaders can move the goal posts on their units' capabilities.
> 
> 🍻


The highlighted portion is why in my earlier proposal I focused on having each Reserve unit (Company) focus on generating a single Platoon/Troop to augment their Reg Force parent unit. 

There are lots of roles (especially CS roles) where having a trained Reserve Platoon to plug into a unit would be of great benefit.  In the absence of both the equipment for and a policy calling for expansion of the military through mobilization of the Reserves then effective augmentation capability is good role for the Reserves.

The other benefit of having a bunch of Company-sized Reserve units generating augmentation platoons is that you have a pool of at least partially trained soldiers to draw on if you ever do need to have a more general mobilization.  Each Company (and Regional Training Depot) could continue to train new recruits across the country and generate new Platoons to be pulled together by the CF to man any new units generated for mobilization.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> The highlighted portion is why in my earlier proposal I focused on having each Reserve unit (Company) focus on generating a single Platoon/Troop to augment their Reg Force parent unit.
> 
> There are lots of roles (especially CS roles) where having a trained Reserve Platoon to plug into a unit would be of great benefit.  In the absence of both the equipment for and a policy calling for expansion of the military through mobilization of the Reserves then effective augmentation capability is good role for the Reserves.
> 
> The other benefit of having a bunch of Company-sized Reserve units generating augmentation platoons is that you have a pool of at least partially trained soldiers to draw on if you ever do need to have a more general mobilization.  Each Company (and Regional Training Depot) could continue to train new recruits across the country and generate new Platoons to be pulled together by the CF to man any new units generated for mobilization.


Don't get me wrong, I'm totally behind having ResF CS platoons.

My thought though is that one should push the envelope a bit more to training formed ResF companies, batteries and squadrons albeit with a healthy sprinkling of RegF leadership. The reason I have for that is that it's at the company level that you start to see semi-independent action as well as the integration of all-arms activities. Not so much at the platoon. A company is more of a building block for a battalion than a platoon is of a company. In other words its easier to build a battalion from formed companies then it is to build one from formed platoons.

I'll add to that the fact that currently most ResF battalions or regiments have establishments that roughly equate to company, battery and squadron size as well as having facilities to house them. That tells me that if properly run, they should be able to train and sustain a company-sized sub-unit.

Practically speaking though, I agree with you. Under our current ResF model forming CS platoons is generally doable. Forming full companies is probably a bridge too far at the moment. That's why I think that things need to change rather than fine tuning to the status quo.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Don't get me wrong, I'm totally behind having ResF CS platoons.
> 
> My thought though is that one should push the envelope a bit more to training formed ResF companies, batteries and squadrons albeit with a healthy sprinkling of RegF leadership. The reason I have for that is that it's at the company level that you start to see semi-independent action as well as the integration of all-arms activities. Not so much at the platoon. A company is more of a building block for a battalion than a platoon is of a company. In other words its easier to build a battalion from formed companies then it is to build one from formed platoons.
> 
> I'll add to that the fact that currently most ResF battalions or regiments have establishments that roughly equate to company, battery and squadron size as well as having facilities to house them. That tells me that if properly run, they should be able to train and sustain a company-sized sub-unit.
> 
> Practically speaking though, I agree with you. Under our current ResF model forming CS platoons is generally doable. Forming full companies is probably a bridge too far at the moment. That's why I think that things need to change rather than fine tuning to the status quo.
> 
> 🍻


There is no reason that a Company-sized Reserve unit cannot train as a Company in addition to being able to force generate a Platoon.  In fact, those Reserve Companies should be double-hatted and grouped together to mobilize as part of Territorial Battalions for domestic response in addition to generating an augmentation Platoon for expeditionary service.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> There is no reason that a Company-sized Reserve unit cannot train as a Company in addition to being able to force generate a Platoon.  In fact, those Reserve Companies should be double-hatted and grouped together to mobilize as part of Territorial Battalions for domestic response in addition to generating an augmentation Platoon for expeditionary service.



I agree, and I could have easily done that as an OC in a Reserve Infantry Regiment....

.... if over half the (very) meagre training time allotted wasn't taken up with preparing for the:


Next Change of Command/ Ego Boosting parade, or
Freedom of the City event, or the Soldiers/ Officers Mess/ WO & Sgts Mess Annual Dinner, or
Next SAV visit, or
Hosting of the Bde Comd's Conference/ Annual Bde Dinner, or
Completion of yet another fairly uselss, and boring, annual IBTS cycle (or other mandatory training) when over half the troops don't need to..

Etcetera, etcetera, etcetera


----------



## Kirkhill

Protection of public authorities, local governments, critical facilities and communications.
Deployment at checkpoints.
Combating sabotage and intelligence forces of the enemy, formed by anti-illegal armed formations and looters.
Maintaining safety and security on their respective territories (region, city).
Organization of resistance and (or) guerrilla groups - in case of territory being captured by the enemy.
Emergencies of natural and man-made disasters in peacetime.[_citation needed_]
Tasks of the Ukrainian Territorials


Assist/protect mobilisation of specialised units (Swedish Defence)
Early intelligence
Make use of forward operating forces difficult or impossible
Protect key assets from sabotage and theft by qualified or unqualified actors
Contingency: Free War Doctrine
Tasks of the Swedish Territorials


Support for the Armed Forces includes: Support for civil preparedness includes:*Guarding military installations
Training of Armed Forces soldiers
Marine environment tasks
Guarding of air stations
Airspace monitoring
Sovereignty enforcement at sea .*Assist* the police with tasks at sea
Securing civilian airports
Support TAX at maritime control
Barricade
Traffic regulation
Search*

Tasks of the Danish Territorials

All of these people volunteer their time, generally conduct their training on their own time and do much of their training on-line.   

They don't fill vacancies in the ranks of the regulars.  That is the job of the Reserves and Recruiters.

They perform tasks compatible with their skills and organization so that the Regulars don't have to do them.


Some of them could be available for more comprehensive training that would make them useful to the Regular forces as Augmentees.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> I agree, and I could have easily done that as an OC in a Reserve Infantry Regiment....
> 
> .... if over half the (very) meagre training time allotted wasn't taken up with preparing for the:
> 
> 
> Next Change of Command/ Ego Boosting parade, or
> Freedom of the City event, or the Soldiers/ Officers Mess/ WO & Sgts Mess Annual Dinner, or
> Next SAV visit, or
> Hosting of the Bde Comd's Conference/ Annual Bde Dinner, or
> Completion of yet another fairly uselss, and boring, annual IBTS cycle (or other mandatory training) when over half the troops don't need to..


It's interesting sometimes to see how experiences can vary. When I was at 26th Fd as RSS the regiment's time was spent in running BMQ, basic gun number, arty sig, driver and tech courses and preparing for and conducting four battery level live-fire exercises every year.

There was an annual ball but no training time was spent on it. No parades. No SAVs and no IBTS in those days. Yup. Had to go to Winnipeg for the odd Bde conference but no troops were harmed or annoyed in the course of that.

Things have changed a bit and it now takes two regiments (Regina and Brandon) and an independent battery (Kenora) to field a six-gun artillery brigade tactical group (whatever the hell that's supposed to be). 

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> It's interesting sometimes to see how experiences can vary. When I was at 26th Fd as RSS the regiment's time was spent in running BMQ, basic gun number, arty sig, driver and tech courses and preparing for and conducting four battery level live-fire exercises every year.
> 
> There was an annual ball but no training time was spent on it. No parades. No SAVs and no IBTS in those days. Yup. Had to go to Winnipeg for the odd Bde conference but no troops were harmed or annoyed in the course of that.
> 
> Things have changed a bit and it now takes two regiments (Regina and Brandon) and an independent battery (Kenora) to field a six-gun artillery brigade tactical group (whatever the hell that's supposed to be
> 🍻



The levels of interference, and erosion of training time, in what should be a fairly easy to deliver training program are generally astronomical. 

Experiences differ depending on who's in charge, of course, but also speaks to the deep lack of accountability for COs to train their troops above more than a very basic level of expertise e.g., IBTS and various mandatory online courses. This was all in the name of 'readiness', I guess. 

As a result, we continually had to dumb down training to the lowest common denominator .... in the slivers of time we had available.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> The levels of interference, and erosion of training time, in what should be a fairly easy to deliver training program are generally astronomical.
> 
> Experiences differ depending on who's in charge, of course, but also speaks to the deep lack of accountability for COs to train their troops above more than a very basic level of expertise e.g., IBTS and various mandatory online courses. This was all in the name of 'readiness', I guess.
> 
> As a result, we continually had to dumb down training to the lowest common denominator .... in the slivers of time we had available.


There our experiences are similar. I generally found most ResF COs were disconnected from training. That was usually left with the company/battery commanders - which is generally as it should be although I rarely saw the supervision of training or the field visits which you would expect from  CO.  In that respect I worked with a couple and saw quite a few when I provided legal advice to them as a DJA and DAJAG. The ones I dealt with as RSSO basically left supervision of training up to me.

Mostly my experience was that COs were deeply wrapped up in administration and/or 'association' matters.

I guess the real difference is whether they allowed those matters to interfere with training.

🍻


----------



## MilEME09

GR66 said:


> There is no reason that a Company-sized Reserve unit cannot train as a Company in addition to being able to force generate a Platoon.  In fact, those Reserve Companies should be double-hatted and grouped together to mobilize as part of Territorial Battalions for domestic response in addition to generating an augmentation Platoon for expeditionary service.


In fact STARS says we should be forming platoons. Which in 3 Div, the various platoons would then be bashed together to form a company. What our biggest hindering factor is, our selves. We screamed for purpose, was given it and the first thing I heard was that "its not doable ", no plan to get to the goal, road map, just a nope, to me that's poor leadership.


To solve this I do think the reg force needs to be more involved at the higher levels of Pres leadership, upto and including regular posting of reg force officers as reserve OCs or COs. Many of our leaders need thst mentorship at the senior levels to be more successful in anything but the status quo


----------



## Fabius

It’s been discussed elsewhere about how to effectively get the Reserves to an employable level of training. It’s often been a delta between the Res and the Reg force training and skill levels that has been a problem for integration whether at an individual or unit level.

I wonder if we could alleviate this problem if we worked to change where the reserve personnel come from. Right now we essentially recruit both Reg and Res personnel right off of the street. There is some component transfers back and forth but it’s usually junior reservists going regular and senior retiring regulars going reservist. Most of the junior releases I have seen have declined to join the reserves.

What is we adopted enlistment contracts similar to other countries where in you join up and sign an 8 year contract. First 4 are regular force with the remaining 4 being with a reserve unit (same trade). We would have experienced and fully trained personnel who are qualified LAV Dvr, Gnr, TOW, moving into the reserves able to operate equipment and who would be able to use their reserve mandated trg time to remain proficient vs becoming trained.

I don’t doubt there are some issues to sort out with the concept but it seems to work well elsewhere so I wonder if it would work for us.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Fabius said:


> It’s been discussed elsewhere about how to effectively get the Reserves to an employable level of training. It’s often been a delta between the Res and the Reg force training and skill levels that has been a problem for integration whether at an individual or unit level.
> 
> I wonder if we could alleviate this problem if we worked to change where the reserve personnel come from. Right now we essentially recruit both Reg and Res personnel right off of the street. There is some component transfers back and forth but it’s usually junior reservists going regular and senior retiring regulars going reservist. Most of the junior releases I have seen have declined to join the reserves.
> 
> What is we adopted enlistment contracts similar to other countries where in you join up and sign an 8 year contract. First 4 are regular force with the remaining 4 being with a reserve unit (same trade). We would have experienced and fully trained personnel who are qualified LAV Dvr, Gnr, TOW, moving into the reserves able to operate equipment and who would be able to use their reserve mandated trg time to remain proficient vs becoming trained.
> 
> I don’t doubt there are some issues to sort out with the concept but it seems to work well elsewhere so I wonder if it would work for us.



Given the current state of our Reserve force I assume that, if we did this, the first four years of a soldier's career would be busy and fruitful with the last four years leaving them to dream about self-harming in some way so they can be released before the end of their contracts


----------



## Kirkhill

Ben Wallace - UK Defence Minister via Paul Mason


> Wallace asked can he see way back to a larger army. "If I got new money would i triple the size of the army? No." Talks about boosting UAVs.



Phillips O'Brien


> Second, first lessons to be taken from the Ukraine war for the U.K; this is not a justification for a return to a large land army (lots of tanks). Instead future will be more autonomous aerial platforms.




__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1523637437221978113


----------



## Kirkhill

What is a UAV these days?   

How about anything that can fly a non-ballistic trajectory to a designated location?  Both armed and unarmed?

That very broad definition would encompass everything from Black Hornet nano-drones through Malloy T-150s to the MQ-8C autonomous Jet Ranger.   From 40mm projector launched Drone40s to MLRS launched GLSDBs and Kratos RATO launched Valkyries.  From Shoulder launched missiles to cannon launched Volcano and Excalibur rounds.  Some that fly pre-programmed paths.  Some that incorporate mid-course corrections. Some that have varying degrees of autonomy.

All of which put distance between the target and the killer.

Kevin has long argued against the need for a bayonet lug on his rifle because he would rather eliminate the threat without having to close.  Sending a bullet instead of a man.  UAV-PGM technology makes the operator more effective at removing threats without having to close.

You don't need as many closers.


----------



## McG

If anyone thinks they have found the next new war winning panacea in the lessons of Ukraine, then they are not paying attention or are seeing what they want. 

... or both.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> What is a UAV these days?
> 
> How about anything that can fly a non-ballistic trajectory to a designated location?  Both armed and unarmed?
> 
> That very broad definition would encompass everything from Black Hornet nano-drones through Malloy T-150s to the MQ-8C autonomous Jet Ranger.   From 40mm projector launched Drone40s to MLRS launched GLSDBs and Kratos RATO launched Valkyries.  From Shoulder launched missiles to cannon launched Volcano and Excalibur rounds.  Some that fly pre-programmed paths.  Some that incorporate mid-course corrections. Some that have varying degrees of autonomy.
> 
> All of which put distance between the target and the killer.
> 
> Kevin has long argued against the need for a bayonet lug on his rifle because he would rather eliminate the threat without having to close.  Sending a bullet instead of a man.  UAV-PGM technology makes the operator more effective at removing threats without having to close.
> 
> You don't need as many closers.


Which is fine...until you start running out of the precision, long-range munitions.  Not arguing against getting those systems, but weapon consumption rates in Ukraine show that you'll want to back them up with large volumes of cheap, quick to procure, low-tech systems as well.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Which is fine...until you start running out of the precision, long-range munitions.  Not arguing against getting those systems, but weapon consumption rates in Ukraine show that you'll want to back them up with large volumes of cheap, quick to procure, low-tech systems as well.



In 1915 they were running out of dumb shells.
In 1940 they were running out of Pilots, Planes, Rifles, Trucks, Boots....

The issue is maintaining a supply of the relevant tools of war.

In 1860 the Confederates were running out of cannons.

The thing is there will always be a run on those things that work.  Therefore the need is to be able to produce in bulk that which is being used.

Smart Phones - 


GLOBAL YEARLY SMARTPHONE UNIT SALES TO END USERS 2021
1.43bn
GLOBAL ANNUAL SMARTPHONE UNIT SHIPMENTS
1.29 bn
ANNUAL SMARTPHONE SHIPMENTS WITH THE ANDROID OPERATING SYSTEM
1.32bn










						Topic: Smartphones
					

The smartphone industry is one of the largest product markets in the world, and is poised to recover from the initial effects of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.




					www.statista.com
				




I think there is a lot more capacity available to produce Smart Weapons.


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> If anyone thinks they have found the next new war winning panacea in the lessons of Ukraine, then they are not paying attention or are seeing what they want.
> 
> ... or both.


Superior Equipment, Superior Training, Superior Numbers, and Superior Logistics 
   I win


----------



## ueo

Kirkhill said:


> And with respect to being engaged in a fight - battle taxis, like the M113, do not engage.  They dismount their troops before the fight and go into Zulu harbour.  The troops take their pintle mounted gun with them.  That was one of the problems with the Grizzly.  The guns stayed with the vehicle.  As a result the vehicle was drawn into the fight.


Ummmmm what? Doctrine taught at CAS/RCSof I and employed in Europe for a long while allowed the Z harbor but more often the guy on the ground opted to have the 4 vehs form a hull down fire base to sp his attack. Better ammo supply and the Charlie C/S usually mounted an M2. Ever tried to manpack one of those on a quick or deliberate attack with a bunch of ammo? On completion of the task the Pl 2IC would bring the zulus forward and commence normal battle drills.


----------



## Kirkhill

ueo said:


> Ummmmm what? Doctrine taught at CAS/RCSof I and employed in Europe for a long while allowed the Z harbor but more often the guy on the ground opted to have the 4 vehs form a hull down fire base to sp his attack. Better ammo supply and the Charlie C/S usually mounted an M2. Ever tried to manpack one of those on a quick or deliberate attack with a bunch of ammo? On completion of the task the Pl 2IC would bring the zulus forward and commence normal battle drills.



Lack of clarity on my part.  I was thinking about the defence and being able to dig in.  With the M2s on pintles they could be dismounted and dug in.  With the AVGP system that was a lot more difficult which meant it tended not to happen.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Lack of clarity on my part.  I was thinking about the defence and being able to dig in.  With the M2s on pintles they could be dismounted and dug in.  With the AVGP system that was a lot more difficult which meant it tended not to happen.


Generally RunUp's where used with the Grizzly's but it really wasn't much of a useful addition - as the turret was crap - and the lack of useful optics meant it was pretty useless at night.  It did take a lot of Engineer assets to prep Coy and Bn positions though...


----------



## IKnowNothing

If we were to do away with the infantry battalions and consolidate the RegF infantry regiments down to 4 fully manned line companies and a fully manned CS company, what kind of PY and equipment pool would that create to be played with?


----------



## Kirkhill

IKnowNothing said:


> If we were to do away with the infantry battalions and consolidate the RegF infantry regiments down to 4 fully manned line companies and a fully manned CS company, what kind of PY and equipment pool would that create to be played with?



You would be moving back to 1946


1946​Canadian Army reduced to 15,563 all ranks1946​Canadian Active Force - 3 Infantry Battalions, 2 Armoured Regiments, 1 Artillery Regiment, 1 Engineering Squadron plus Support1946​Active RRCA - 1 RCHA (renamed 71 RCHA at Shilo), 68 Med Bty, 127 AT Bty, 128 HAA Bty, 129 LAA Bty1946​Canadian Reserve Force - after two years mobilization and training by the Active Force - 4 Infantry Divisions and 2 Armoured Divisions1946​Threat appreciation of October - subversion 
and sabotage by internal groups; covert biological and chemical attacks; air attacks against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland and the use of airborne irregular forces ranging throughout the continent.1946​By 1952 planners projected the use ofthe atomic bomb delivered by long range aircraft and the occupation of Newfoundland Alaska and Greenland for the forward basing of Soviet bomber aircraft and airborne forces1946​Canada to provide 1 Airborne or Airtransportable Brigade with necessary airlift1946​Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee designated a Mobile Reserve from the Canadian Active Force but provided no organization or funding


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> You would be moving back to 1946
> 
> 
> 1946​Canadian Army reduced to 15,563 all ranks1946​Canadian Active Force - 3 Infantry Battalions, 2 Armoured Regiments, 1 Artillery Regiment, 1 Engineering Squadron plus Support1946​Active RRCA - 1 RCHA (renamed 71 RCHA at Shilo), 68 Med Bty, 127 AT Bty, 128 HAA Bty, 129 LAA Bty1946​Canadian Reserve Force - after two years mobilization and training by the Active Force - 4 Infantry Divisions and 2 Armoured Divisions1946​Threat appreciation of October - subversion
> and sabotage by internal groups; covert biological and chemical attacks; air attacks against Alaska, Iceland and Greenland and the use of airborne irregular forces ranging throughout the continent.1946​By 1952 planners projected the use ofthe atomic bomb delivered by long range aircraft and the occupation of Newfoundland Alaska and Greenland for the forward basing of Soviet bomber aircraft and airborne forces1946​Canada to provide 1 Airborne or Airtransportable Brigade with necessary airlift1946​Canadian Cabinet Defence Committee designated a Mobile Reserve from the Canadian Active Force but provided no organization or funding


"create to be played with" =/= "eliminated"


----------



## Kirkhill

IKnowNothing said:


> "create to be played with" =/= "eliminated"



Interesting when you think that in 1946 there were 15,563 All Ranks to maintain the institution of the Army, train 6 divisions of "reserves" in two years and deploy a single Brigade Group.

1 Armoured Recce Regiment
1 Tank Regiment
1 Eng Sqn
1 17 pdr AT Bty
1 40mm LAA Bty
3 105mm  CS Bty
1 155mm Med Bty
1 HAA Bty
3 Single Battalion Infantry Regiments each Battalion with 4 Rifle Coys and a Support Coy.

Now we have 7,500 more people, a total of 23,000 regulars, and are trying to staff 4 Brigades with 9 Battalions, 3 Armd Rgts, 4 Artillery Rgts, 4 Engineer Regiments, a bunch of other stuff nobody heard about in 1946 ..... and a SOF Battle Group, a Division HQ and a whole pile of support.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> What is a UAV these days?
> 
> How about anything that can fly a non-ballistic trajectory to a designated location?  Both armed and unarmed?
> 
> That very broad definition would encompass everything from Black Hornet nano-drones through Malloy T-150s to the MQ-8C autonomous Jet Ranger.   From 40mm projector launched Drone40s to MLRS launched GLSDBs and Kratos RATO launched Valkyries.  From Shoulder launched missiles to cannon launched Volcano and Excalibur rounds.  Some that fly pre-programmed paths.  Some that incorporate mid-course corrections. Some that have varying degrees of autonomy.
> 
> All of which put distance between the target and the killer.
> 
> Kevin has long argued against the need for a bayonet lug on his rifle because he would rather eliminate the threat without having to close.  Sending a bullet instead of a man.  UAV-PGM technology makes the operator more effective at removing threats without having to close.
> 
> You don't need as many closers.


The problem with that being the confirmation bias inherent in drone warfare. All we see is the success propaganda because the feeds are already there and it’s easy to post it. Much harder to show the hard fighting in city building blocks where you can’t just hit fortified positions.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> If we were to do away with the infantry battalions and consolidate the RegF infantry regiments down to 4 fully manned line companies and a fully manned CS company, what kind of PY and equipment pool would that create to be played with?



So 2200 total infantry soldiers ? Roughly?


----------



## quadrapiper

markppcli said:


> Much harder to show the hard fighting in city building blocks where you can’t just hit fortified positions.


Waaaay out of my field, but wonder what difference a) cheapo drones (including the practice of dropping explosives from same) and b) every random with a cell phone being able to stream whatever's in front of them will turn out to have made to _that _realm.


----------



## Ostrozac

markppcli said:


> So 2200 total infantry soldiers ? Roughly?


Cutting the infantry to the bone would seem to be attractive because the infantry has a large reserve structure to fall back on and what we are actually in desperate need of is many more full time technical tradesmen — RCEME, RCCS, CIntC… — if we want to take our army into the 21st century.

The counter argument would be that those technical corps are all broken to such an extent that handing them thousands of positions they can’t ever fill would be a complete waste of effort. And would also break the infantry in the process.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> The problem with that being the confirmation bias inherent in drone warfare. All we see is the success propaganda because the feeds are already there and it’s easy to post it. Much harder to show the hard fighting in city building blocks where you can’t just hit fortified positions.



Not wrong.

Just as it is not wrong to say that there is still a place for the tank.

In my mind though, the question is, how much of each is required to win a war and are the ratios changing?

What the UAV is doing now is what the helicopter did, the Bronco did, the Auster did, the SE5A did and the Balloon did.... and the Satellite does.
But now instead of being scarce and expensive and only available to the few at HQ they are now universally available making it difficult not to be seen and tracked.  And positions readily communicated.

I think it is right to say that this war will be a bad predictor of wars to come.  But that is only because every war is a poor predictor of the next one.


----------



## markppcli

Ostrozac said:


> Cutting the infantry to the bone would seem to be attractive because the infantry has a large reserve structure to fall back on and what we are actually in desperate need of is many more full time technical tradesmen — RCEME, RCCS, CIntC… — if we want to take our army into the 21st century.
> 
> The counter argument would be that those technical corps are all broken to such an extent that handing them thousands of positions they can’t ever fill would be a complete waste of effort. And would also break the infantry in the process.


The problem being that reservist support is unreliable and not capable or handling the equipment in a regular Bn.


----------



## Weinie

Kirkhill said:


> Not wrong.
> 
> Just as it is not wrong to say that there is still a place for the tank.
> 
> In my mind though, the question is, how much of each is required to win a war and are the ratios changing?
> 
> What the UAV is doing now is what the helicopter did, the Bronco did, the Auster did, the SE5A did and the Balloon did.... and the Satellite does.
> But now instead of being scarce and expensive and only available to the few at HQ they are now universally available making it difficult not to be seen and tracked.  And positions readily communicated.
> 
> I think it is right to say that this war will be a bad predictor of wars to come. * But that is only because every war is a poor predictor of the next one.*


This.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> The problem being that reservist support is unreliable and not capable or handling the equipment in a regular Bn.


In any credible organization which has goals to achieve, if its subordinate departments were unreliable or not capable of handling the equipment it needs to operate with, a program of corrective actions would be initiated or its chief operations officer and all his staff would be fired and replaced by capable managers.

We've had over a half a century of failure. How many more decades of failure will be tolerated?


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> In any credible organization which has goals to achieve, if its subordinate departments were unreliable or not capable of handling the equipment it needs to operate with, a program of corrective actions would be initiated or its chief operations officer and all his staff would be fired and replaced by capable managers.
> 
> We've had over a half a century of failure. How many more decades of failure will be tolerated?


Well I’d argue that cutting 1/2 your maneuver elements PYs probably isn’t the solution to our problems. 

But yes I generally agree the reserve system needs a massive overhaul.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> So 2200 total infantry soldiers ? Roughly?


Is that what comes from 12 line Coy's and 3 CS fully manned, with an 3 HQ's that can split when a tank squadron is attached to fight as two combined arms battalion (-)

If so yes.  But with the amendment to "2200 total infantry soldiers organized and equipped to fight as mechanized infantry in fully manned 100% RegF Units, roughly"

With x vehicles and y PY's freed up to be assigned to other tasks, free of regimental mafia interference etc.  Possibilities
-consolidated and separate light infantry unit (PY's)
-transferred to artillery to bring additional capabilities online (PY's and vehicles)
-transferred to CSS (PY's)
-to provide trainer/maintainer platoons so that the PRes can train on LAV's (PY's and vehicles)
-to pre-position vehicles and maintainers in Europe (PY's and vehicles)
-to convert hulls to fill capability gaps (vehicles)
-to stand up an independent CS btn


Lots of ideas, not enough no how to understand how many resources would be available.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> Is that what comes from 12 line Coy's and 3 CS fully manned, with an 3 HQ's that can split when a tank squadron is attached to fight as two combined arms battalion (-)
> 
> If so yes.  But with the amendment to "2200 total infantry soldiers organized and equipped to fight as mechanized infantry in fully manned 100% RegF Units, roughly"
> 
> With x vehicles and y PY's freed up to be assigned to other tasks, free of regimental mafia interference etc.  Possibilities
> -consolidated and separate light infantry unit (PY's)
> -transferred to artillery to bring additional capabilities online (PY's and vehicles)
> -transferred to CSS (PY's)
> -to provide trainer/maintainer platoons so that the PRes can train on LAV's (PY's and vehicles)
> -to pre-position vehicles and maintainers in Europe (PY's and vehicles)
> -to convert hulls to fill capability gaps (vehicles)
> -to stand up an independent CS btn
> 
> 
> Lots of ideas, not enough no how to understand how many resources would be available.


Well roughly 140-150 in a rifle company so 600 in 4 companies add a bit more and multiply by three.

What is an independent CS Bn?

How does this organize ?

What regimental mafia issues are fixed if they’re still regiments ?

If your building a new Light Bn then add that in to 4.

What vehicles do the infantry have that will be extra capability to the artillery? Do they need a couple dozen LAVs? What for?

We actually have the PYs available for 80 % manned Bns. We just can’t retain the people. 3 v 4 companies is what ever, we’ve spent a great deal more time going 2 up 1 back with CS as support than we ever did with 4 coys.


----------



## dapaterson

How do you get 80 manned Bns?  Or are you wishing away support completely?


EDIT: Seen.


----------



## markppcli

dapaterson said:


> How do you get 80 manned Bns?  Or are you wishing away support completely?


Typo, should have read 80 % manned


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Well I’d argue that cutting 1/2 your maneuver elements PYs probably isn’t the solution to our problems.


Fully agree. Whenever I look at the possibilities I use as a starting point that fact that the government has already approved to fund X number of  Army PYs and Y number of ResF Army positions. I then look at all the PYs that are all already supporting the ResF and try to figure out what can be done with that to improve things and then look elsewhere.


markppcli said:


> But yes I generally agree the reserve system needs a massive overhaul.


A fine distinction is that it's not just the reserve system that needs a massive overhaul. Its the entire Army that needs a massive overhaul if one wants to create a system that optimizes what each of the RegF and ResF brings to the table. In very simple terms, the RegF brings expertise and a quick reaction capability while the ResF brings cost efficiency and an ability to create a larger force than the RegF alone can generate. It really is a Total Force issue that needs to be addressed.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> A fine distinction is that it's not just the reserve system that needs a massive overhaul. Its the entire Army that needs a massive overhaul if one wants to create a system that optimizes what each of the RegF and ResF brings to the table. In very simple terms,* the RegF brings expertise and a quick reaction capability while the ResF brings cost efficiency and an ability to create a larger force than the RegF alone can generate*. It really is a Total Force issue that needs to be addressed.
> 
> 🍻



Adm point: based on what we saw during the recent floods in BC's Lower Mainland, the Reserves could be considered 'quick response' if we can shorten the time it takes to load willing soldiers onto Class C contracts in less than 2 or 3 weeks


----------



## WLSC

markppcli said:


> The problem being that reservist support is unreliable and not capable or handling the equipment in a regular Bn.


The problem is that no one really care about the reserve.


----------



## IKnowNothing

@markppcli



> What is an independent CS Bn?


Looney toon idea to stash several Coy size sub-units of CS type enablers separate from the CMBG's, capable of deploying in support of any of them, or allies.  If we don't have the resources to do something right at a brigade level three times over and are forced to choose between being stretched too thin or not doing it at all, choose the 3rd option and pool it, do it right once and attach when needed.


> How does this organize ?


Haven't gotten that far, wanted an answer to the "what's left question" before filling that out



> What regimental mafia issues are fixed if they’re still regiments ?


The 3 RegF infantry regiments are kept and kept equal, reducedd by 2 LAV battalions and a LIB that didn't fit.  They're the mechanized core of the army, no one of them is slighted.
The leftover PY's are assigned and organized in whatever manner the army sees fit, outside of that pre-existing framework to deliver the capabilities needed.



> What vehicles do the infantry have that will be extra capability to the artillery? Do they need a couple dozen LAVs? What for?


Mounting M-Shorad turrets.  Denel 105mm. UAV launchers.  Things that the artillery should have but don't that make sense LAV mounted.  But maybe that's not the priority, maybe the Trainer Platoons and/or pre-positioned fleet is.  Would the extra LAV's be enough to do all 3?

The whole point is too consider what could be done, and would the overall result be better.

Is 18 80% manned RegF Lav coy's the best use of men and materiel? 
Could 12 100% manned deliver the required ready force?
Could 3 Coy's worth of LAV's each with a platoon of trainers/maintainers allow the reserves to provide platoon or even company strength augments for sustainment? 
Could 3 Coy's worth of LAV's help bring GBAD or UAV capability online faster and within budget? 
If freed from symmetry, are 3 pure LIB's needed / the best approach?
If not, how many PY's are needed in a pure light infantry role?
What's the best way to employ the leftovers? CSS? CS with greater strategic mobility? More support to bring the reserves up to a usable state?





I


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Adm point: based on what we saw during the recent floods in BC's Lower Mainland, the Reserves could be considered 'quick response' if we can shorten the time it takes to load willing soldiers onto Class C contracts in less than 2 or 3 weeks


You see, that's the thing that really frosts my gourd. I can think of a dozen ways to speed that up including a policy that delegates issuing the contract to a Bde HQ (or even the unit) once a named operation is stood up. What could be easier then a message saying "39 Bde is tasked to Op XYZ. 50 Class C positions authorized for the period *__ to __* inclusive. Fin Code 123...". Then let the subordinates do their job.



WLSC said:


> The problem is that no one really care about the reserve.


I'm not so sure I agree with that. I tend to think that the problem is that most senior leadership gets so wrapped up in the day-to-day challenges of the job that they do not invest the time to look at the details of what needs to be done to create a more efficient ResF. To an extent too senior ResF leadership has its own rice bowls to worry about and tend to not be on board with some of the cures needed (like getting rid of most of the senior ResF leadership and amalgamating units).

Let's just say that there are too many vested interests at play which both the RegF and the ResF do not want to see disturbed through creating a more effective force.

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Mostly my experience was that COs were deeply wrapped up in administration and/or 'association' matters.



Which is probably what every unit needs - not a "command team", but a "liaison team" (a handful of blarney mechanics), whose job is to soak up all the extra sh!t without delegating/tasking anything away.


----------



## WLSC

FJAG said:


> You see, that's the thing that really frosts my gourd. I can think of a dozen ways to speed that up including a policy that delegates issuing the contract to a Bde HQ (or even the unit) once a named operation is stood up. What could be easier then a message saying "39 Bde is tasked to Op XYZ. 50 Class C positions authorized for the period *__ to __* inclusive. Fin Code 123...". The let the subordinates do their job.
> 
> 
> I'm not so sure I agree with that. I tend to think that the problem is that most senior leadership gets so wrapped up in the day-to-day challenges of the job that they do not invest the time to look at the details of what needs to be done to create a more efficient ResF. To an extent too senior ResF leadership has its own rice bowls to worry about and tend to not be on board with some of the cures needed (like getting rid of most of the senior ResF leadership and amalgamating units).
> 
> Let's just say that there are too many vested interests at play which both the RegF and the ResF do not want to see disturbed through creating a more effective force.
> 
> 🍻


This is the point, exactly.  When CBG are told that finishing supplemental part of infantry  DP 1 is a waist of time and resources.  When the decision is made each time there a « ARes review » not to make decision, when you remove unit ressource to a point that unit can’t even deploy a platoon, when you have 4 x C6 that can go on a range in a CBG and I can go on, I would say that no one really care.  The CG make their show in Ottawa, so PRes is good.

At one point,I’ve seen troops buying Dora the Explorer hand held CB to go on exercice because there were no 522 for us.  Yes, they could have bought better CB but they were aiming to make a point 🤷🏼‍♂️

Even with all the problems of our sclerosis system, somethings can be done.  No decision are taken in a positive way.

Right now, we see an army fighting and transitioning on new equipment in weeks and here, ARes are deem not able to maintain or train on modern kit.  I do not see the day it will change.  To many time hope was burn.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> @markppcli
> 
> 
> Looney toon idea to stash several Coy size sub-units of CS type enablers separate from the CMBG's, capable of deploying in support of any of them, or allies.  If we don't have the resources to do something right at a brigade level three times over and are forced to choose between being stretched too thin or not doing it at all, choose the 3rd option and pool it, do it right once and attach when needed.



Yes but what does CS enablers mean in this case ?




IKnowNothing said:


> Haven't gotten that far, wanted an answer to the "what's left question" before filling that out
> 
> 
> The 3 RegF infantry regiments are kept and kept equal, reducedd by 2 LAV battalions and a LIB that didn't fit.  They're the mechanized core of the army, no one of them is slighted.



That would mean they no longer exist ? Or did you mistype there ? I assume you meant 1 mechanized and 1 light infantry Bn?


IKnowNothing said:


> The leftover PY's are assigned and organized in whatever manner the army sees fit, outside of that pre-existing framework to deliver the capabilities needed.



I don’t think the army functions better with fewer deployable maneuver elements.



IKnowNothing said:


> Mounting M-Shorad turrets.  Denel 105mm. UAV launchers.  Things that the artillery should have but don't that make sense LAV mounted.  But maybe that's not the priority, maybe the Trainer Platoons and/or pre-positioned fleet is.  Would the extra LAV's be enough to do all 3?



Well you’ve said above that you’ve scrapped all six LAV Bns. You tell me ? Largely though if you actually mean reduce to 3 LAV Bn of four companies you probably have an excess. But I seriously doubt it’s cheaper to retrofit a a LAV to carry a Denel 105 than it is to simply procure an SPG.



IKnowNothing said:


> The whole point is too consider what could be done, and would the overall result be better.
> 
> Is 18 80% manned RegF Lav coy's the best use of men and materiel?



It would be better if they were 100 % manned with full support coys, as per force 2025.


IKnowNothing said:


> Could 12 100% manned deliver the required ready force?



The last time we were in a combat operation it took just about every able bodied infantry soldier to get the task force going, so likely not no.


IKnowNothing said:


> Could 3 Coy's worth of LAV's each with a platoon of trainers/maintainers allow the reserves to provide platoon or even company strength augments for sustainment?



LAV Gunner/CC and Driver are both over 20 training days with very little “fluff.” That would probably tap out most reserve units for training time, and mean they’d do nothing but generate crewmen. Which I’m not opposed to but seems a waste of 2/3rd our infantry.



IKnowNothing said:


> Could 3 Coy's worth of LAV's help bring GBAD or UAV capability online faster and within budget?



No, we have units dedicated to those roles, they have the PYs.



IKnowNothing said:


> If freed from symmetry, are 3 pure LIB's needed / the best approach?



Probably not. They can fill up the other Bns and our schools so we aren’t sending every MCpl and Sgt in Bn on 180 plus days of TD a year. ( not that isn’t hyperbole).



IKnowNothing said:


> If not, how many PY's are needed in a pure light infantry role?



700 odd per Bn



IKnowNothing said:


> What's the best way to employ the leftovers? CSS? CS with greater strategic mobility?



See two above



IKnowNothing said:


> More support to bring the reserves up to a usable state?



Is that the real purpose of the army? I’m all for reserve integration and making them a viable part of a total force, but if we organize firstly as a means to make the reserves relevant it’s putting the cart before the horse. We should firstly have a capability, the. Figure out how best to manage that.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> Yes but what does CS enablers mean in this case ?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That would mean they no longer exist ? Or did you mistype there ? I assume you meant 1 mechanized and 1 light infantry Bn?


I don't know, what would be most useful? But I see it starting with an AT and an AD Coy/Battery, ideally road mobile but light enough to deploy quickly by air to support in the early days of a conflict.  

I mistyped.  Reducing by two mechanized companies, one LIB.  Going from 18 to 12, as clarified later in the post.



markppcli said:


> LAV Gunner/CC and Driver are both over 20 training days with very little “fluff.” That would probably tap out most reserve units for training time, and mean they’d do nothing but generate crewmen. Which I’m not opposed to but seems a waste of 2/3rd our infantry.



18 x .8 = 14.4 Coy's worth of infantry, spread across 18
12 x 1 = 12 left in 100% RegF Lav Coy's.
Closer to 1/6 than 2/3 (of the LAV force) and not all of them tasked to reserve integration

And surely to god if we were going to assign a company worth of PY's and 3 of Lav's with the intent of generating platoon and coy level augments we wouldn't do it in a vacuum and that kind of barrier would be addressed with broader reserve reform.


----------



## markppcli

Your actually going from 27 rifle companies to 12. Your forgetting about cutting the light Bns. I suspect fyi didn’t know what the mandated manning levels were before, so it’s not exactly honest to start introducing it now.

AD / AT support coys? Bit bizarre. What are they intended to do in a vacuum of maneuver elements ? Do you see us rapidly deploying this somewhere without the assets to protect them ?


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> Your actually going from 27 rifle companies to 12. Your forgetting about cutting the light Bns. I suspect fyi didn’t know what the mandated manning levels were before, *so it’s not exactly honest* to start introducing it now.
> 
> AD / AT support coys? Bit bizarre. What are they intended to do in a vacuum of maneuver elements ? Do you see us rapidly deploying this somewhere without the assets to protect them ?


Not forgetting. They went into the pool, with the whatever amount pulled back out of the pool to generate the proper and necessary light force (whatever that is) in a sensible manner outside of the CMBG structure.  And I didn't know the exact number, (hence the initial post on this line of discussion being a question explicitly asking what would be left over), but I knew it was a material difference.

Who said anything about a vacuum? If shit hit the fan might eFP Latvia like those assets?  Our allies? The light force? 
And like I said, AT/AD was a hypothetical starting point, I asked what would be useful.  HIMARS? UCAV? an additional 155 battery outside of the CMBG's? 


You say this as if I'm defending a tightly knit thesis rather than trying to have an exploratory discussion.  But I get it. The status quo is awesome.


----------



## Kirkhill

IKN - Your CS Battalion used to be known as a Machine Gun Battalion and was held at the Brigade.  Division.



> On 15 Dec 1936, as part of sweeping reorganizations within the Militia, the Canadian Machine Gun Corps was disbanded. The companies were absorbed by infantry and cavalry regiments, and a new type of Infantry Battalion - the "infantry battalion (Machine Gun)" was created. Official designations of many regiments were then suffixed with (MG) (or (Mit) in French, short for Mitraiulleuses).​
> Second World War​The mobilization of two divisions in 1939 brought with it the mobilization of six Machine Gun Battalions, assigned to the divisions on a scale of one per brigade. This was scaled back in January 1941 to one per division. Three such battalions eventually saw action with the Canadian Army in Europe. Some regiments changed to or from a machine gun role during the existence of Machine Gun Battalions.​





> Organization​Each battalion was initially organized around four companies of Vickers machine guns. Each company had twelve Vickers Guns, in three platoons of four guns.
> 
> In the summer and fall of 1942, the future of the machine gun battalions was in doubt, and a feeling that the heavy Vickers Guns were obsolete gave way to thoughts that the MG battalions might be better employed in other roles. The idea of using them in beachhead administration during amphibious assaults was investigated, until reports from North Africa praising the work of MG battalions there brought such efforts to a halt.
> 
> While new emphasis was placed on the value of the Medium Machine Gun, a new organization was announced in the spring of 1943, and the three Machine Gun Battalions were redesignated "Support Battalions" and reorganized and re-equipped.​
> Support Battalions​On 1 May 1943, the former Machine Gun battalions
> 
> 
> Saskatoon Light Infantry (Machine Gun)
> Toronto Scottish Regiment (Machine Gun)
> Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (Machine Gun)
> were redesignated
> 
> 
> 1st Canadian Division Support Battalion (Saskatoon Light Infantry)
> 2nd Canadian Division Support Battalion (Toronto Scottish Regiment)
> 3rd Canadian Division Support Battalion (Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa)​





> Each Support Battalion consisted of an enlarged headquarters to administer the Division's Administration Area and three Brigade Support Groups, each under the operational control of a brigade when on operations. The new establishment included 20mm anti-aircraft guns as well as 4.2" mortars.





> Machine Gun Battalions​The new changes were short-lived, and the establishment was changed from a three group, nine company Support Battalion back to a four company Machine Gun Battalion; three companies of machineguns and one company of mortars, each with four platoons. The anti-aircraft elements were disbanded, and the old designation of Toronto Scottish Regiment (MG) was resumed. A full slate of T-16 carriers was issued for the mortar crews and Universal Carriers for the machinegun platoons, with special mountings for the Vickers Guns.​
> The establishment did not change again for the rest of the war. It called for a total of 36 officers and 711 Other Ranks.
> 
> 
> Battalion Headquarters
> Headquarters Company
> Light Aid Detachment, RCEME (attached)
> Signals Platoon
> 
> Medium Machine Gun Company
> Machine Gun Platoon - 4 x Vickers Gun
> Machine Gun Platoon
> Machine Gun Platoon
> 
> Medium Machine Gun Company
> (as above)
> 
> Medium Machine Gun Company
> (as above)
> 
> Mortar Company
> Mortar Platoon - 4 x 4.2" Mortar
> Mortar Platoon (as above)
> Mortar Platoon (as above)
> Mortar Platoon (as above)







__





						www.canadiansoldiers.com
					

www.canadiansoldiers.com



					www.canadiansoldiers.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile, an update on the USMC's Force 2030 drive









						Fewer Marines, More Sensors Part of Berger’s Latest Force Design Revision - USNI News
					

THE PENTAGON – Reducing the Marines to 175,000 and adding more sensor capability to smaller units are part of a wide swath of adjustments the Marine Corps is pursuing in the latest iteration of its modernization drive. Released on Monday, the Force Design 2030 annual report is the Marines’...




					news.usni.org
				



The link to the Force 2030 Update is embedded in the USNI article

Highlights

IndoPacific

MEF III will continue to take the lead on the MLR (Marine Littoral Regiment) concept while generating and maintaining an MEU
MEF I will continue as the largest USMC Force and maintain its ability to generate a MAGTF and sustain MEUs while operating out of Darwin, Australia

Global Response

MEF II will focus on developing a 3-Star Joint Task Force HQ in addition to its MAGTFs.  JTF  procedures to borrow heavily from the USMC Air element.
Marine Reserves to be closely aligned with MEF II


MLRs likely to be realigned with Artillery or Recce instead of the Infantry

LAR Bns likely to be moved away from the LAV to a more platform independent, sensor heavy structure but still based on small teams.

Infantry Bns to continue with small, dispersed, sensor rich teams that are independent of means of mobility.   Augmentation with Precision Weapons.  Carl Gustav to feature as a key element emphasising it Multi-Functional suite of munitions.    Switchblade/Hero type munitions to feature.  60mm mortars to be retained in the arms locker for the Platoon Commander to access on a mission needs basis.  81mm mortars to be retained at the rate of 2 per company.  They could be held at battalion or at company.  TBD.

Still emphasising Long Range Fires and littoral movements.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to USMC mobility challenges.   

The USMC continues to experiment with existing vessels available to them until they get approval to build their preferred Light Amphibious Warships.









						The light amphibious warship is delayed, but the Marine Corps has a temporary solution
					

U.S. Marines want to move quickly and discreetly, but the crowded shipbuilding budget is in the way.




					www.defensenews.com


----------



## Kirkhill

And for those interested here is a link to the US Army's Catalog - Army Weapons Systems Handbook 2020-2021



			https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2020-2021_Weapon_Systems_Handbook.pdf


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> And for those interested here is a link to the US Army's Catalog - Army Weapons Systems Handbook 2020-2021
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2020-2021_Weapon_Systems_Handbook.pdf


Good links this - and the USMC ones. Clears up a few things.

🍻


----------



## GR66

I think a key to coming up with an improved force structure is to stop using the existing structure as the assumed base that we are starting from.  A better approach would be to identify what capabilities we need and what structure will fulfill those needs.  

Then you use your existing personnel/equipment to fill out that structure and inform your equipment/vehicle procurement needs.  Same with the Reserves.  What capabilities are required to support/augment/expand the Reg Force Army you've designed and what structure/equipment/training/support are required to meet that requirement.


----------



## Kirkhill

More on the Marines

Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC)









						Raytheon, Rafale Test US Marine Medium-Range Interceptor Capability
					

Raytheon and Rafale have live-tested the Medium Range Interceptor Capability to examine the integration of its key components.




					www.thedefensepost.com
				






> The MRIC is a modified Israeli Iron Dome interceptor integrated with the US Marine Corps’ AN/TPS-80 Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar and Common Aviation Command and Control System.
> 
> The trailer-mounted system has been developed for expeditionary operations. It detects, tracks, identifies, and defeats cruise missiles, manned, and unmanned aircraft.












						Medium Range Interceptor Capability proves effective in US Marine Corps advanced cruise missile defense test - EDR Magazine
					

Tucson, Ariz., (May 6, 2022) — Raytheon Missiles & Defense, a Raytheon Technologies business, and RAFAEL Advanced Defense Systems Ltd., an



					www.edrmagazine.eu


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> Not forgetting. They went into the pool, with the whatever amount pulled back out of the pool to generate the proper and necessary light force (whatever that is) in a sensible manner outside of the CMBG structure.  And I didn't know the exact number, (hence the initial post on this line of discussion being a question explicitly asking what would be left over), but I knew it was a material difference.



So force 2025’s existing plan ? You still discounted them in your estimate.



IKnowNothing said:


> Who said anything about a vacuum? If shit hit the fan might eFP Latvia like those assets?  Our allies? The light force?



A properly manned Bn would have its support Pls. Combat Support (CS) and a Combat Support companies are very different things.



IKnowNothing said:


> And like I said, AT/AD was a hypothetical starting point, I asked what would be useful.  HIMARS? UCAV? an additional 155 battery outside of the CMBG's?



Are we still talking about force 2025 or are we just creating shopping lists now?a single 155 battery outside of it’s parent regiment would be without OPs or STA assets, so no a terrible place.



IKnowNothing said:


> You say this as if I'm defending a tightly knit thesis rather than trying to have an exploratory discussion.  But I get it. The status quo is awesome.



Don’t be petulant when you, self admittedly, throwing mud at a wall and being told it doesn’t stick.

If you want to see what happens when you throw lots of enablers with small about of infantry into a fight, take a look at Russia in Ukraine.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> I think a key to coming up with an improved force structure is to stop using the existing structure as the assumed base that we are starting from.  A better approach would be to identify what capabilities we need and what structure will fulfill those needs.
> 
> Then you use your existing personnel/equipment to fill out that structure and inform your equipment/vehicle procurement needs.  Same with the Reserves.  What capabilities are required to support/augment/expand the Reg Force Army you've designed and what structure/equipment/training/support are required to meet that requirement.


Do we not already have that though? In terms of Secure and Engaged out lining deployable capabilities we require ? 

Fully agree the structure needs to be built for the goal not vice versa; that’s probably it’s glaring within the reserves.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Do we not already have that though? In terms of Secure and Engaged out lining deployable capabilities we require ?
> 
> Fully agree the structure needs to be built for the goal not vice versa; that’s probably it’s glaring within the reserves.


I'd argue that the strategic environment is radically different than when SSE was drafted and is no longer fit for purpose.  And frankly I strongly suspect that the deployment capabilities in SSE were based more on what the existing structure was/is capable of generating rather than an actual strategic assessment of what is required to meet the military/political objectives of the Government of Canada.

A new set of capability objectives based on a coherent strategic plan I think is required.


----------



## markppcli

I think the requirements of a battle group size deployment long term or meeting our nato 1 Heavy Bde commitment short term on x days notice is probably the reasonable goal. 

That requires the refinement of a battle groups is / means ( I want to say SSE says 1500 person deployment?). It also requires we define a heavy Bde, to incline its structure and its capabilities, and man it. We then need to determine if that Bde will have to be rotated off readiness and how that effects of Bde / forces. Or do we just have “the heavy Bde” that units float in and out of ?


----------



## McG

markppcli said:


> Do we not already have that though? In terms of Secure and Engaged out lining deployable capabilities we require?


SSE does not actually spell out the deployable capabilities that the CAF must have. If does list a few mostly new capabilities, but it primarily lays out requirements in terms of numbers of people and durations of effort. When you link that with a vision that sees the strategic objective as being achieved just by showing up, you end up with the situation where a frigate and a square combat team are interchangeable. It is hardly comprehensive guidance for force development, but it is great for an L1s’ choose your own adventure menue.


----------



## Prairie canuck

Gentlemen, this is strictly from the outside looking in. Some thoughts on the presence of all manner of UAVs which are becoming a larger consideration as seen even today in Ukraine. There is a variety of these assisting in what seems as mainly the offensive part of the battle so I imagine there's someone already developing systems to counter UAVs (have seen a few of these too). As these establish themselves as part of "the battle plan" do you not have to dedicate more soldiers to manning these systems and would this growth not lend itself to "for lack of a better label - UAV teams" much like there are mortar teams etc.? Should the larger numbers of these personnel not be identified and noted when building your battle groups? I see this becoming much more a prominent force in the years to come so why not acknowledge it now and build your future accordingly?
As I mentioned, it's from the outside looking in and full disclosure I am well out of my lane....


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> SSE does not actually spell out the deployable capabilities that the CAF must have. If does list a few mostly new capabilities, but it primarily lays out requirements in terms of numbers of people and durations of effort. When you link that with a vision that sees the strategic objective as being achieved just by showing up, you end up with the situation where a frigate and a square combat team are interchangeable. It is hardly comprehensive guidance for force development, but it is great for an L1s’ choose your own adventure menue.


Arguably it theoretically allowed for the CAF to create a lot of different capabilities to allow for a robust response in any domain. 

Of course the NATO Heavy Bde commitment was spelled out and the CAF hasn’t had a Heavy Bde since 4 CMBG in Germany…
   The CA just likes to pretend that todays CMBG is heavy, as opposed to medium with some tanks and towed Arty, no GBAD, no anti armor capability (outside the tanks) etc. 

I suspect SSE 2.0 will have a much less open interpretation as it’s clear the CAF can’t be trusted to act like an adult and actually plan for spelled out requirements let alone for open ended options.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Arguably it theoretically allowed for the CAF to create a lot of different capabilities to allow for a robust response in any domain.
> 
> Of course the NATO Heavy Bde commitment was spelled out and the CAF hasn’t had a Heavy Bde since 4 CMBG in Germany…
> The CA just likes to pretend that todays CMBG is heavy, as opposed to medium with some tanks and towed Arty, no GBAD, no anti armor capability (outside the tanks) etc.
> 
> I suspect SSE 2.0 will have a much less open interpretation as it’s clear the CAF can’t be trusted to act like an adult and actually plan for spelled out requirements let alone for open ended options.



Where are you finding these adults to write a prescriptive text for the CAF to follow?  Or is the Permanent Joint Board on Defence weighing in on this?









						U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense Discusses Defense Priorities, NORAD Moderniza
					

The Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Dr. Mara Karlin, hosted the 239th meeting of the U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense.



					www.defense.gov
				









						Organization Profile - Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence
					

Organization Profile - Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence




					federal-organizations.canada.ca


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I'd argue that the strategic environment is radically different than when SSE was drafted and is no longer fit for purpose.  And frankly I strongly suspect that the deployment capabilities in SSE were based more on what the existing structure was/is capable of generating rather than an actual strategic assessment of what is required to meet the military/political objectives of the Government of Canada.
> 
> A new set of capability objectives based on a coherent strategic plan I think is required.



I don't think things have changed at all. This was part of SSE:


> _Recent years have witnessed several challenges. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea is an example that has carried grave consequences. _


and:


> _The re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canada and its allies of the importance of deterrence. ... A credible military deterrence serves as a diplomatic tool to prevent conflict and should be accompanied by dialogue. NATO allies ... have been re-examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer.”_


I think that the strategic overview was there. Other than our commitments to Latvia and Ukraine, it, and the department's response, failed to address the bigger picture.



markppcli said:


> I think the requirements of a battle group size deployment long term or meeting our nato 1 Heavy Bde commitment short term on x days notice is probably the reasonable goal.
> 
> That requires the refinement of a battle groups is / means ( I want to say SSE says 1500 person deployment?). It also requires we define a heavy Bde, to incline its structure and its capabilities, and man it. We then need to determine if that Bde will have to be rotated off readiness and how that effects of Bde / forces. Or do we just have “the heavy Bde” that units float in and out of ?


Yes to both. Latvia is a good international statement. A prepositioned heavy brigade is an achievable "credible military deterrence" act.



McG said:


> SSE does not actually spell out the deployable capabilities that the CAF must have. If does list a few mostly new capabilities, but it primarily lays out requirements in terms of numbers of people and durations of effort. When you link that with a vision that sees the strategic objective as being achieved just by showing up, you end up with the situation where a frigate and a square combat team are interchangeable. It is hardly comprehensive guidance for force development, but it is great for an L1s’ choose your own adventure menue.


In any functioning organizational entity a broad statement of vision which leaves the details to the staff is the right way to go. That presupposes that you have a staff that is aligned with the visionary and the vision is adequately communicated.

Ever since we went to Kabul (maybe even Bosnia), we seem to be more focused on the number of deployed troops we can generate and sustain and we try to squeeze the capabilities into each roto envelope. Kandahar initially saw some envelope and capability growth but that came as the result of reactions to circumstances met on the ground rather than by proactive forward planning.

Writing a defence paper is obviously a cooperative act which not only is done in consultation with the various stakeholders within DND but also other agencies and the PMO. I can only assume that the structure of the SSE is because that's what everyone agreed to or, if they didn't, its the content that the shot caller on the final draft wanted.



KevinB said:


> ...   The CA just likes to pretend that todays CMBG is heavy, as opposed to medium with some tanks and towed Arty, no GBAD, no anti armor capability (outside the tanks) etc.
> 
> I suspect SSE 2.0 will have a much less open interpretation as it’s clear the CAF can’t be trusted to act like an adult and actually plan for spelled out requirements let alone for open ended options.


It's not a pretense. Advancing with Purpose states:


> The Canadian Army is an increasingly network-enabled, medium land force augmented by light and heavy forces. Its composition optimizes versatility across the spectrum of missions and unique environments. The medium force allows the Canadian Army to provide task-tailored forces ready to respond broadly to many conflict types.


So it's a medium weight force that can suck and blow light and heavy at the same time.

😁


----------



## KevinB

I ‘like’ the fact it didn’t even commit to being a fully network enabled forces - just increasingly - so getting an extra digital network radio a year could meet that goal…. 

It like they took ‘aim small, miss small’ to a level of ‘don’t aim, so you can’t miss…’


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I ‘like’ the fact it didn’t even commit to being a fully network enabled forces - just increasingly - so getting an extra digital network radio a year could meet that goal….
> 
> It like they took ‘aim small, miss small’ to a level of ‘don’t aim, so you can’t miss…’


Note that it also says "many conflict types" but not "all" nor specifying which.

😁


----------



## MilEME09

KevinB said:


> I ‘like’ the fact it didn’t even commit to being a fully network enabled forces - just increasingly - so getting an extra digital network radio a year could meet that goal….
> 
> It like they took ‘aim small, miss small’ to a level of ‘don’t aim, so you can’t miss…’


You can't fail if you never try?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Prairie canuck said:


> Gentlemen, this is strictly from the outside looking in. Some thoughts on the presence of all manner of UAVs which are becoming a larger consideration as seen even today in Ukraine. There is a variety of these assisting in what seems as mainly the offensive part of the battle so I imagine there's someone already developing systems to counter UAVs (have seen a few of these too). As these establish themselves as part of "the battle plan" do you not have to dedicate more soldiers to manning these systems and would this growth not lend itself to "for lack of a better label - UAV teams" much like there are mortar teams etc.? Should the larger numbers of these personnel not be identified and noted when building your battle groups? I see this becoming much more a prominent force in the years to come so why not acknowledge it now and build your future accordingly?
> As I mentioned, it's from the outside looking in and full disclosure I am well out of my lane....



If only we had UAVs....


----------



## CBH99

Prairie canuck said:


> Gentlemen, this is strictly from the outside looking in. Some thoughts on the presence of all manner of UAVs which are becoming a larger consideration as seen even today in Ukraine. There is a variety of these assisting in what seems as mainly the offensive part of the battle so I imagine there's someone already developing systems to counter UAVs (have seen a few of these too). As these establish themselves as part of "the battle plan" do you not have to dedicate more soldiers to manning these systems and would this growth not lend itself to "for lack of a better label - UAV teams" much like there are mortar teams etc.? Should the larger numbers of these personnel not be identified and noted when building your battle groups? I see this becoming much more a prominent force in the years to come so why not acknowledge it now and build your future accordingly?
> As I mentioned, it's from the outside looking in and full disclosure I am well out of my lane....


I agree.  

Conflicts between Russia & Ukraine, or Armenia & Azerbaijani, both demonstrate how small UAVs have become weaponized into controllable, loitering munitions.  

In both conflicts, they’ve played a decisive role & inflicted far more than their fair share of damage.  

While the conflicts mentioned above involved purpose built UAVs, with military level performance & warhead size, rebel factions in Yemen have demonstrated how easy it is to convert civilian ‘toy drones’ into flying remote controlled bombs.


This highlights the need for advanced sensors (to detect them, since they are small) and advanced enough weapons to be able to shoot them down. 

The problem will be economics.  As things are currently, it’ll cost western forces significantly more money to shoot down the drones than the drones themselves.


----------



## markppcli

CBH99 said:


> I agree.
> 
> Conflicts between Russia & Ukraine, or Armenia & Azerbaijani, both demonstrate how small UAVs have become weaponized into controllable, loitering munitions.
> 
> In both conflicts, they’ve played a decisive role & inflicted far more than their fair share of damage.
> 
> While the conflicts mentioned above involved purpose built UAVs, with military level performance & warhead size, rebel factions in Yemen have demonstrated how easy it is to convert civilian ‘toy drones’ into flying remote controlled bombs.
> 
> 
> This highlights the need for advanced sensors (to detect them, since they are small) and advanced enough weapons to be able to shoot them down.
> 
> The problem will be economics.  As things are currently, it’ll cost western forces significantly more money to shoot down the drones than the drones themselves.


What small UAVs have been weaponized in Ukraine ? Or in Azerbaijan ? TB2s are anything but. We run the risk of assuming drone = quad copter. It doesn’t, they’re cheaper than a jet but still in the millions of dollars.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> What small UAVs have been weaponized in Ukraine ? Or in Azerbaijan ? TB2s are anything but. We run the risk of assuming drone = quad copter. It doesn’t, they’re cheaper than a jet but still in the millions of dollars.



It happens.




__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/fosscad/comments/t7pk2r









						Ukraine’s $10,000 Drones Are Dropping Tiny Bombs On Russian Troops
					

Aerorozvidka, a volunteer drone squad, has begun dropping tiny bombs from its off-the-shelf helicopter drones.




					www.forbes.com


----------



## suffolkowner

CBH99 said:


> I agree.
> 
> Conflicts between Russia & Ukraine, or Armenia & Azerbaijani, both demonstrate how small UAVs have become weaponized into controllable, loitering munitions.
> 
> In both conflicts, they’ve played a decisive role & inflicted far more than their fair share of damage.
> 
> While the conflicts mentioned above involved purpose built UAVs, with military level performance & warhead size, rebel factions in Yemen have demonstrated how easy it is to convert civilian ‘toy drones’ into flying remote controlled bombs.
> 
> 
> This highlights the need for advanced sensors (to detect them, since they are small) and advanced enough weapons to be able to shoot them down.
> 
> The problem will be economics.  As things are currently, it’ll cost western forces significantly more money to shoot down the drones than the drones themselves.





markppcli said:


> What small UAVs have been weaponized in Ukraine ? Or in Azerbaijan ? TB2s are anything but. We run the risk of assuming drone = quad copter. It doesn’t, they’re cheaper than a jet but still in the millions of dollars.



I'm pretty sure there was some decent use of Harop in Azerbaijan. Doesn't seem like there's been a lot of coverage of loitering munitions in Ukraine though not sure if thats from lack of use or not. Maybe US deliveries of Switchblade?

The cost of a Tamir missile and a Harop are roughly the same I think


----------



## GR66

Not all loitering munitions/UAVs should be viewed the same and each type will be integrated into the force differently.


Micro-UAVs and small quadcopters treated as an extended range sensor for a Section/Platoon
Slightly larger units (Switchblade 300?) that are employed in a similar way as mortars or other support weapons in a CS company (or as longer range sensors for a Recce Troop/Squadron).
Larger (vehicle mounted?  Switchblade 600?) units fulfilling a Direct Support artillery type role in support of a Brigade Group and/or recce.
Fixed wing UAVs using runways from the Bayraktar TB2 up to large units like the Reaper or Predator would be Air Force units and would fulfill roles ranging from ISR, targeting for long range precision fires, tactical air support, deep strike against high value targets, etc.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Not all loitering munitions/UAVs should be viewed the same and each type will be integrated into the force differently.
> 
> 
> Micro-UAVs and small quadcopters treated as an extended range sensor for a Section/Platoon
> Slightly larger units (Switchblade 300?) that are employed in a similar way as mortars or other support weapons in a CS company (or as longer range sensors for a Recce Troop/Squadron).



I would insert the Quad-Copter / Recoverable IED at about this level - It is kind of a poor man's Switchblade 300 but with the additional benefit that it can be recovered and re-armed.

As I understand it, in Ukrainian service, the Quad-Copters were popularized in the Territorials and Volunteers when locals talked to locals who had Quad-Copters and asked them to bring them out to the field to help them observe and target the Russians.  From there the use of the Quads spread and then somebody started sticking old 1950s era hand thrown HEAT grenades on them.  Accuracy was improved by local 3D printing of fins that could screw on to the grenade in place of the original throwing stick and parachute.

DIY warfare.



GR66 said:


> Larger (vehicle mounted?  Switchblade 600?) units fulfilling a Direct Support artillery type role in support of a Brigade Group and/or recce.
> Fixed wing UAVs using runways from the Bayraktar TB2 up to large units like the Reaper or Predator would be Air Force units and would fulfill roles ranging from ISR, targeting for long range precision fires, tactical air support, deep strike against high value targets, etc.


----------



## IKnowNothing

If there was going to be any public movement on/towards the Asymmetric Army proposal, when would that start showing up, and where would one watch for it?


----------



## markppcli

The Force 2025 structure is on ACIMs or do you mean for those without acims access?


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Not all loitering munitions/UAVs should be viewed the same and each type will be integrated into the force differently.
> 
> 
> Micro-UAVs and small quadcopters treated as an extended range sensor for a Section/Platoon
> Slightly larger units (Switchblade 300?) that are employed in a similar way as mortars or other support weapons in a CS company (or as longer range sensors for a Recce Troop/Squadron).
> Larger (vehicle mounted?  Switchblade 600?) units fulfilling a Direct Support artillery type role in support of a Brigade Group and/or recce.
> Fixed wing UAVs using runways from the Bayraktar TB2 up to large units like the Reaper or Predator would be Air Force units and would fulfill roles ranging from ISR, targeting for long range precision fires, tactical air support, deep strike against high value targets, etc.


Honestly below the runway launched UAV I really see their major benefit as sensor extenders. I’m not sure I’d want one as a section commander frankly. I have this worry about giving guys at the pointy end too much information leads to a bit of  overload. Similar to what happens if a JTAC gives the company commander access to VDL, all of a sudden it’s screen watching not leading troops.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Honestly below the runway launched UAV I really see their major benefit as sensor extenders. I’m not sure I’d want one as a section commander frankly. I have this worry about giving guys at the pointy end too much information leads to a bit of  overload. Similar to what happens if a JTAC gives the company commander access to VDL, all of a sudden it’s screen watching not leading troops.


Who knows how far down the chain they will go.  Could be extremely useful in urban combat for seeing what's behind the fence, in the next compound or even down the hall.  Agreed though that at the lower levels their utility will be as sensors not weapons.

From the CS aspect I'm surprised that an automatic mortar launched loitering munition round hasn't been developed.  Something like a Patria Nemo turreted 120mm mortar that can select a Loitering Munition as one of the "ammo" types available to the crew....HE, Smoke, Illumination, PGMM, Loitering Munition...whatever round gives the needed effect.


----------



## Kirkhill

Raytheon and Chemring unite to develop anti-surface naval weapon system
					

Raytheon Missile Systems and Chemring have signed an agreement to jointly develop an affordable anti-surface missile system to enhance protection of naval platforms against surface targets.




					www.naval-technology.com
				











						Navy's Next Missile Launcher Spins Like a Revolver Barrel
					

The Navy may have a new line of defense against a changing threat environment after the successful missile firing from a new multi-role launcher in development. In a recent round of tests announced Tuesday, Chemring Countermeasures and Raytheon Missile Systems say they have successfully fired a...




					www.wired.com
				






Mix of Pyro, Decoys and Javelins for the Navy.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

markppcli said:


> Honestly below the runway launched UAV I really see their major benefit as sensor extenders. I’m not sure I’d want one as a section commander frankly. I have this worry about giving guys at the pointy end too much information leads to a bit of  overload. Similar to what happens if a JTAC gives the company commander access to VDL, all of a sudden it’s screen watching not leading troops.


Sensor overload is a real thing, not only for the Section commander, but also on the back-end hassles it creates in a C5ISR scenario. 

Where does the feed link into? How is that feed routed? Is it secure/encrypted? Who wants the info (Section, Pl, Coy, Bn, etc.) ? How much bandwidth will it eat up? How much battery does it eat up? How much weight does it all add to the poor fucker humping it onto the objective?

I remember seeing the initial trials for the ISSP at GDLS in Calgary and I brought up these questions without solid answers from anyone involved. 

New tech is awesome, but how much is to much?


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Who knows how far down the chain they will go.  Could be extremely useful in urban combat for seeing what's behind the fence, in the next compound or even down the hall.  Agreed though that at the lower levels their utility will be as sensors not weapons.
> 
> From the CS aspect I'm surprised that an automatic mortar launched loitering munition round hasn't been developed.  Something like a Patria Nemo turreted 120mm mortar that can select a Loitering Munition as one of the "ammo" types available to the crew....HE, Smoke, Illumination, PGMM, Loitering Munition...whatever round gives the needed effect.


I think the ISSP evaluations had sections commanders saying they found it to be to much for them to handle, in terms of cognitive overload. I can’t imagine a section level drone is going to help. This is rapidly going outside of force 2025 though.


----------



## MilEME09

markppcli said:


> I think the ISSP evaluations had sections commanders saying they found it to be to much for them to handle, in terms of cognitive overload. I can’t imagine a section level drone is going to help. This is rapidly going outside of force 2025 though.


only way I could see it working is part of the weapons det or HQ element having a man portable UAV. If we put to many toys and kit into the sections, we will load them down too much, and potentially take away training from war fighting basics.


----------



## GR66

rmc_wannabe said:


> Sensor overload is a real thing, not only for the Section commander, but also on the back-end hassles it creates in a C5ISR scenario.
> 
> Where does the feed link into? How is that feed routed? Is it secure/encrypted? Who wants the info (Section, Pl, Coy, Bn, etc.) ? How much bandwidth will it eat up? How much battery does it eat up? How much weight does it all add to the poor fucker humping it onto the objective?
> 
> I remember seeing the initial trials for the ISSP at GDLS in Calgary and I brought up these questions without solid answers from anyone involved.
> 
> New tech is awesome, but how much is to much?


Maybe part of the problem is thinking that all intel must pass up the chain to higher levels.  Maybe sometimes the people on the scene need a tool to see something with other than the Mk I eyeball.  Just like like night vision devices were once a rare, specialist device they have now become a common tool for general use.  

Just like what you see in your night vision goggles or your rifle scope isn't transmitted up the chain, you don't necessarily need every other vision enhancement device becoming a unit ISR node.  A micro UAV doesn't have to be treated differently than any other vision enhancement device like a flashlight, binoculars or a mirror for looking around a corner.



markppcli said:


> I think the ISSP evaluations had sections commanders saying they found it to be to much for them to handle, in terms of cognitive overload. I can’t imagine a section level drone is going to help. This is rapidly going outside of force 2025 though.


Agreed though that this is a thread derail.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I think the ISSP evaluations had sections commanders saying they found it to be to much for them to handle, in terms of cognitive overload. I can’t imagine a section level drone is going to help. This is rapidly going outside of force 2025 though.



Mark, both you and rmc might find this article interesting if you haven't already seen it.  It addresses the USMC squad reorg and specifically mentions adding positions to handle information.

The traditional Squad Leader just had to look to the front, and keep his three team leaders in line.  The new Squad Leader gets an Assistant Squad Leader as well as a Systems Operator.




> *A dedicated assistant squad leader* ensures the fire teams all have adequate leadership without tacking a second job onto any of their responsibilities.
> 
> At the same time, the assistant squad leader can accomplish mission-critical tasks that could take away from the squad leader’s ability to control his squad in combat. Specifically, the assistant squad leader can now manage comms with command and manage and coordinate fires, leaving the squad leader to focus on the fight. Coordinating fires means communicating to relay target information and friendly positions for artillery, mortar, and air strikes, among others. These tasks are essential in a fight, but can take away from a squad leader’s situational awareness, and as a result, their ability to lead their squad.
> 
> ...The assistant squad leader can now manage these tasks and others on the squad leader’s behalf. If I was a squad leader, my assistant would be helping to complete a variety of combat and logistical tasks like medical evacs, tactical sight exploitation, and POW handling. At the same time, the assistant squad leader will be receiving valuable training for a future role as a squad leader themselves.





> The *newly created position of Marine Systems Operator* replaces the position of radio Marine. While the System operator will be tasked with carrying the squad’s radio, they will expand into other systems as well.
> 
> This includes the use of quadcopter-based reconnaissance devices. These small ‘drones’ allow a Marine squad to enhance their situational awareness with discretion. It promises to be the new eyes of the squad leader and enhance their capabilities in urban warfare by providing an overhead view of the battlespace that wasn’t previously available at the squad level. This stealthy tool can spot threats ahead of time and provide general recon without risking members of the Marine rifle squad.











						The future Marine Rifle Squad as explained by a machine gunner
					

The Marine Corps does a lot of things well. One of those things is to do more with less, and as you'd expect as a result, another is to innovate. However,




					www.sandboxx.us
				




Obviously this results in a larger squad/section (15 total, 16 when you include the medic) that won't fit into a LAV - They would fit into 3 LAVs though.  So maybe we are talking about replicating the Marine Squad organization but with the Platoon?

Three six-man teams and then the existing Pl HQ with a UAV with the Pl Cmd det or the Weapons det?

Any how.  

Cheers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Mark, both you and rmc might find this article interesting if you haven't already seen it.  It addresses the USMC squad reorg and specifically mentions adding positions to handle information.
> 
> The traditional Squad Leader just had to look to the front, and keep his three team leaders in line.  The new Squad Leader gets an Assistant Squad Leader as well as a Systems Operator.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The future Marine Rifle Squad as explained by a machine gunner
> 
> 
> The Marine Corps does a lot of things well. One of those things is to do more with less, and as you'd expect as a result, another is to innovate. However,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.sandboxx.us
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Obviously this results in a larger squad/section (15 total, 16 when you include the medic) that won't fit into a LAV - They would fit into 3 LAVs though.  So maybe we are talking about replicating the Marine Squad organization but with the Platoon?
> 
> Three six-man teams and then the existing Pl HQ with a UAV with the Pl Cmd det or the Weapons det?
> 
> Any how.
> 
> Cheers.



FWIW....

We tried deploying multiples of 3 x 6 man teams, trying to defeat a specific RCIED threat, in a rural environment.

Even with experienced troops it was rather unwieldy.... a Jug F8ck, actually. 

So we just went back to 3 x 4 man teams and 'good fieldcraft'


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> FWIW....
> 
> We tried deploying multiples of 3 x 6 man teams, trying to defeat a specific RCIED threat, in a rural environment.
> 
> Even with experienced troops it was rather unwieldy.... a Jug F8ck, actually.
> 
> So we just went back to 3 x 4 man teams and 'good fieldcraft'


So what would you think about three LAVs with crews and the modernized USMC Squad?

9+16 = 25 in 30 Seats.


----------



## FJAG

I don't want to stop a good debate about the infantry section (albeit it should be in the infantry thread), but isn't the size of the Canadian mechanized infantry section pretty much settled by the fact that we have a herd of hundreds of LAV 6.0s and they have a crew of 3 and room for 7 dismounts.

We keep debating what the section size should be or how we can make it fit but essentially the vehicle dictates what the section is and to a certain extent how it fights. We should stop fighting the problem and simply accept the reality and move on to the real question: What should the platoon look like?

With four vehicles you can carry some 28 dismounts, regardless of how you organize the sections and the platoon hq. If more dismounts are needed then maybe a platoon should go to five vehicles providing 35 dismounts. Within that envelope - 4 or 5 vehicles, with 12 to 15 dedicated vehicle crews and from 28 to 35 dismounts you can start organizing how to arm the vehicles and men and how to fight as teams. There are enough people to offer many options including sufficient people to handle specialty tasks and crew served weapons.

With a section of seven dismounts you have numerous options: a leader and two three-man fire teams; a leader and three two-man fire teams; a leader and a four-man fire team and a two-man weapons team; etc etc. It shouldn't be that hard to find an optimum combo within that.

While the LAV settles the size of the section for mech units, nothing says that a LIB section has to be the same although one can still start with the same ten men and allocate the three "crewmen" as a weapons det while the seven "dismounts" operate the same way as for a mech LAV section.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I don't want to stop a good debate about the infantry section (albeit it should be in the infantry thread), but isn't the size of the Canadian mechanized infantry section pretty much settled by the fact that we have a herd of hundreds of LAV 6.0s and they have a crew of 3 and room for 7 dismounts.
> 
> We keep debating what the section size should be or how we can make it fit but essentially the vehicle dictates what the section is and to a certain extent how it fights. We should stop fighting the problem and simply accept the reality and move on to the real question: What should the platoon look like?
> 
> With four vehicles you can carry some 28 dismounts, regardless of how you organize the sections and the platoon hq. If more dismounts are needed then maybe a platoon should go to five vehicles providing 35 dismounts. Within that envelope - 4 or 5 vehicles, with 12 to 15 dedicated vehicle crews and from 28 to 35 dismounts you can start organizing how to arm the vehicles and men and how to fight as teams. There are enough people to offer many options including sufficient people to handle specialty tasks and crew served weapons.
> 
> With a section of seven dismounts you have numerous options: a leader and two three-man fire teams; a leader and three two-man fire teams; a leader and a four-man fire team and a two-man weapons team; etc etc. It shouldn't be that hard to find an optimum combo within that.
> 
> While the LAV settles the size of the section for mech units, nothing says that a LIB section has to be the same although one can still start with the same ten men and allocate the three "crewmen" as a weapons det while the seven "dismounts" operate the same way as for a mech LAV section.
> 
> 🍻



Why do we restrict the organization to 1 section per LAV?
It requires 2 TAPVs to carry a section.
Recce Tps have long used 2 vehicles as a base element and up to 8 vehicles in a Troop.
And why do we have to fill the vehicles?
And, wrt the unwieldiness of the 6 man section vs the 4 man team, the Danes and Swedes are happy enough with the 6 man section and the Swedes are working with 3x 6 + 1 Grd Leader = 19 dismounts carried in 3 vehicles.  Again, for reference, the USMC Squad is 15 marines and a corpsman.

So why do we do things the way we do them?  And are there alternatives?

WRT discussing the Size and Capabilities and Needs of the Infantry Section and Platoon, and by inference the Company and Battalion is a thread about Force  Structure - everything is connected to everything.  What capabilities can the Infantry bring to the fight on their own? And what capabilities are better supplied by other arms and branches?  And what duplications and redundancies are necessary?

WRT to the latter - if the Ukrainian situation is showing anything it seems to be showing that the answer is not 60mm mortar or 40mm GMG it is both and anything else that will get the job done because you never know what you are actually going to have in your hands to fight once the enemy gets a vote.

There is a school solution - but neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians have their school resources.  They are fighting with whatever, and whoever, they can get their hands on.


----------



## markppcli

The


Kirkhill said:


> Why do we restrict the organization to 1 section per LAV?
> It requires 2 TAPVs to carry a section.
> Recce Tps have long used 2 vehicles as a base element and up to 8 vehicles in a Troop.
> And why do we have to fill the vehicles?
> And, wrt the unwieldiness of the 6 man section vs the 4 man team, the Danes and Swedes are happy enough with the 6 man section and the Swedes are working with 3x 6 + 1 Grd Leader = 19 dismounts carried in 3 vehicles.  Again, for reference, the USMC Squad is 15 marines and a corpsman.



So your taking around your multi vehicle answer. A section commander is in charge of his vehicle and both his groups. We try to limit commanders to 3 maneuver elements, as that’s approximately the cognitive limit.


----------



## Kirkhill

So the USMC solution is one Squad HQ and 3 Fire teams
The Recce solution is 2 vehicles and a dismount team
The Swedish solultion is a Platoon Ldr (mounted) with 3 vehicles carrying a  Ground Leader and 3 small sections of 6.

The 3 Swedish Sections + Ground Leader = 19
The 3 USMC Fireteams + HQ = 16


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> So the USMC solution is one Squad HQ and 3 Fire teams
> The Recce solution is 2 vehicles and a dismount team
> The Swedish solultion is a Platoon Ldr (mounted) with 3 vehicles carrying a  Ground Leader and 3 small sections of 6.
> 
> The 3 Swedish Sections + Ground Leader = 19
> The 3 USMC Fireteams + HQ = 16



I'm starting to lose the plot here. On the one hand you are talking a large USMC section on the other a small Swedish platoon. I really can't see where a two-car recce patrol has anything to do with the thing.

To get back to your question "why do we restrict the organization to 1 section per LAV?" It's because its what one person can conveniently and optimally manage. It frankly doesn't matter what we call things; its how they are used. 

Tanks and recce vehicles work in groupings of pairs to provide a cover element while the other moves. We aggregate those pairs into teams of pairs and so on.

Infantry need to be slightly more flexible because not every man carries the same weapon but still, they essentially work in pairs (or fire teams) and groupings of such pairs into assault groups or bricks or whatever. The basic concept at that level, a firebase to cover a manoeuvre element holds true throughout whether we talk a WW2 Brit ten-man section with its Bren gun team or a German nine-man gruppe with an MG34/42 team or a US twelve-man squad with its BAR team.

One thing that came out of WW2 was the mechanization of German Infantrie into Panzergrenadiere. The primary halftrack in use, the Sd.Kfz 251 could carry ten and the gruppe was divided into two MG34/42 teams (one of five (including the gruppen Fuehrer) the other of four men). Two machine guns provided a more symmetric approach as teams traded back and forth between manoeuvre and fire support.

At a certain point, once there is a force large enough to require a reserve or depth, we switch from the pair concept to threes.

I think basically there are some constants built into this. Firstly a section is whatever size can fit into one vehicle and be easily commanded by one leader; second the section internally builds up in pairs to provide internal fire and manoeuvre capabilities regardless of what weapons it has and how many there are in the section; and third, at some level, usually immediately above the section, you introduce a concept of threes to form a reserve/depth which, at each progressive level, is a grouping easily manageable by one leader.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

I’d argue that the Mechanized Section makes more sense in two vehicles.  
  1) The loss of one vehicle doesn’t eliminate the Section or it’s mobility 
  2) It allows for Section movement to do bouncing over watch.  
 3) For dispersed positions it provides vehicle redundancy. 
 4) In terms of the LAV 6.0 it allows for a 12 (2x6 or 3 x4 teams ) soldier dismounted section , plus a local language specialist and medic at the section level.  For a total of 14 dismounted personnel.  
5) At the PL HQ level is allows for a second LAV to be a CCP / Emergency Recovery vehicle - and/or an ATGM system if you don’t give every LAV an ATGM UA turret.  

Sure it doubles the hulls required and increases the logistics and maintenance burden - but it vastly increases the fire power and sustainability of the section, platoon and company in the fight.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> I’d argue that the Mechanized Section makes more sense in two vehicles.
> 1) The loss of one vehicle doesn’t eliminate the Section or it’s mobility
> 2) It allows for Section movement to do bouncing over watch.
> 3) For dispersed positions it provides vehicle redundancy.
> 4) In terms of the LAV 6.0 it allows for a 12 (2x6 or 3 x4 teams ) soldier dismounted section , plus a local language specialist and medic at the section level.  For a total of 14 dismounted personnel.
> 5) At the PL HQ level is allows for a second LAV to be a CCP / Emergency Recovery vehicle - and/or an ATGM system if you don’t give every LAV an ATGM UA turret.
> 
> Sure it doubles the hulls required and increases the logistics and maintenance burden - but it vastly increases the fire power and sustainability of the section, platoon and company in the fight.


You’re talking about an 8 car platoon. 60 persons. That’s enormous, and it’s dispersion would be almost a kilometre across. Too much for a Pl frankly. Yes we can loose a section from a LAV going down, but six people is six people no matter how you look at it. Besides we have depth to fill that gap.

A section is a single entity, with we group then together they will get used as two independent entities and we might call them teams but for all intent and purposes they’ll function as a section. Show me an 8 car platoon and I’ll show you two “Demi platoons” do exactly what we expect platoons to do.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> You’re talking about an 8 car platoon. 60 persons. That’s enormous, and it’s dispersion would be almost a kilometre across. Too much for a Pl frankly. Yes we can loose a section from a LAV going down, but six people is six people no matter how you look at it. Besides we have depth to fill that gap.


It’s big yes, but the concept isn’t separating the section by much - no the standard gap between section LAV.  If you are still concerned perhaps drop a section from the platoon / 6 vehicles 48 Pers, which isn’t crazy for a platoon.  


markppcli said:


> A section is a single entity, with we group then together they will get used as two independent entities and we might call them teams but for all intent and purposes they’ll function as a section. Show me an 8 car platoon and I’ll show you two “Demi platoons” do exactly what we expect platoons to do.


6 dismounts is pretty light on the ground especially in any complex terrain.  I’d rather opt for more vehicles to give the section more bodies on the ground to act like a section not a glorified fireteam.


----------



## Kirkhill

@FJAG 

You're not losing the plot.  Nor have I.

My point is largely what you have stated. Different armies do things differently with different names for different purposes.

Yet they still manage to fight effectively.  And the better ones continue to fight effectively even when the parade strength sold to the accountants no longer applies.

You ask why I include the Recce Patrol.   You then cite the Panzergrenadiers as a model.  But ....

In the Recce Patrol the vehicles are integral to the team.  They define how the job is done.  In the absence of the vehicles the job changes.  Likewise for the Panzergrenadiers, a highly specialized corps of infanteers created to work with the Panzers and supplied with vehicles to allow them, and their kit, to keep up.  Did the Panzergrenadier vehicle decide the size of the section or did the section decide the vehicle? 

And in Canada's case, where we apparently want a general purpose infantry that can fight effectively with or without its LAVs are the Panzergrenadiers, , a suitable model?  Or should we be looking at the Fallschirmjaeger?  Or how about  bog standard infantry?


When we go back the origins of the modern platoon we find that it was an organization of indeterminate size, subject to reorganization, created to conform to the needs of the moment in the trenches of 1917 and influenced by the lack of trained soldiers and junior leaders, both commissioned and non-commissioned.

We also find the admonition "* It is not possible to lay down a correct line of action for all situations which may arise on the battle field.*"  It was a guide, to assist inexperienced commanders in making decisions.

From there we some how have ended up with setting organizations in stone.


I don't know what the right answer is.  Largely that is because I don't believe there is a right answer. There is only the answer that meets the needs of the situation.








INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE TRAINING OF PLATOONS FOR 
OFFENSIVE ACTION , 1917 . 


The instructions herewith are in extenso of those contained in Section IV, paragraph 5 of S. S. 135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, and must be read in conjunction therewith.

In the last-mentioned document* it is laid down, as a result of recent experience, that the platoon is the unit in the assault*.
*The organization of a platoon has been decided* in G. H. Q. letter O. B./1919, dated February 7, 1917. The guiding principles of this organization are that *the platoon shall consist of a combination of all the weapons with which the Infantry are now armed,* and that *specialist commanders for Infantry are undesirable*.

*The adoption of a normal formation for the attack has been necessitated* partly *by the shortness of the time which is available for training*, and partly *by the lack of experience among subordinate commanders*.

This pamphlet has been drawn up with a view to assisting platoon commanders in training and fighting their platoons.* It is not possible to lay down a correct line of action for all situations which may arise on the battle field,* but it is hoped that a careful study of the instructions herein contained may assist subordinate commanders to act correctly in any situation


PART I. - ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS . 
1. ORGANIZATION OF A PLATOON . 

The platoon is the smallest unit in the field which comprises all the weapons with which the Infantry soldier is armed . It has a minimum strength , exclusive of its headquarters , of 28 O. R. and a maximum of 44 O. R. If the strength falls below the minimum , the platoon ceases to be workable , and the necessary numbers will be obtained by the temporary almalgamation of companies , platoons , or sections under battalion arrangements . 

Taking an average strength in the sections of 36 0. R. , a suitable organization would be as follows : 

Headquarters — 1 officer and 4 0. R ....... 4 
1 section bombers - 1 N. C. O. and 8 0. R. ( includes 2 bayonet  men and 2 throwers ) .    9  (7-11)
1 section Lewis gunners - 1 N. C. O. and 8 O. R. ( includes Nos . 1 and 2 ) .......  9 (7-11)
1 section riflemen - 1 N. C. O. and 8 0. R. ( picked shots , scouts , picked bayonet fighters ) ..  9 (7-11)
1 section rifle bombers — 1 N. C. O. and 8 0. R. ( includes 4 bomb firers ) . 9 (7-11)


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> It’s big yes, but the concept isn’t separating the section by much - no the standard gap between section LAV.  If you are still concerned perhaps drop a section from the platoon / 6 vehicles 48 Pers, which isn’t crazy for a platoon.



Interestingly enough 48 is the number of a 1917 British Platoon at full strength (4x 11 + 4 in the HQ).
The 13 man USMC Squad fitted into a 43 man platoon.
The new 15 man Squad will be part of a 49 man platoon, 53 with corpsmen.

Conversely,  50 men has also been a Company organized under a Captain.  Or 64 in a Squadron. Or a Troop in some armies.



KevinB said:


> 6 dismounts is pretty light on the ground especially in any complex terrain.  I’d rather opt for more vehicles to give the section more bodies on the ground to act like a section not a glorified fireteam.


----------



## Brad Sallows

3 x 7 of rifle, LMG, over-and-unders; no additional crew weapons.
1 x 7 of crew weapons (3 teams of whatever is mission appropriate).
No additional people or vehicles.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> 3 x 7 of rifle, LMG, over-and-unders; no additional crew weapons.
> 1 x 7 of crew weapons (3 teams of whatever is mission appropriate).
> No additional people or vehicles.


Cmd element separate?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> 3 x 7 of rifle, LMG, over-and-unders; no additional crew weapons.
> 1 x 7 of crew weapons (3 teams of whatever is mission appropriate).
> No additional people or vehicles.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Yeah, that's the obvious oversight.  Pl comd, Pl WO, pl signaller, pl medic.  Maybe no easy solution without a fifth ride.

[Add: but also be practical and assume 3 or 4 LoBs.]

[Add: and this is old ground.  Deja vu.  I recall hearing at the 39 CBG "PD" (CMX/CAX) weekends over 20 years ago, comments from Reg F inf officers recently posted in (to Res F units or HQ) who had been working with the then-new LAVs.  The same old questions/discussions: how big should the dismount element be?  Which of the I/C and 2I/C remains with the vehicle, and which dismounts?  Etc.  I suppose they must've known what they were doing.  My answer: continue to provide enough training money for the companies to exercise a lot of different scenarios, every year, so that all of the "it depends" variations are worked through, using the as-is equipment and people.]


----------



## IKnowNothing

Reading around more, I found a much better communicated vision of what I was trying to get at with the Lav infantry consolidation:



GR66 said:


> My personal opinion is that deploying a Division or even a full Brigade Group to Europe would be a poor use of Canadian defence dollars.  To my mind that money would be better spent on things like:
> .........
> 
> Invest in building a well-equipped, high-readiness rapid reaction light force that could quickly deploy to Europe in case of an invasion or heightened tensions.  Needs to include lots of AT and AA capability within the force.  Objective would be to rapidly increase deterrence once a build-up is detected or to blunt/slow the initial attack if it occurs in order give time for heavier forces to be deployed.
> Alternately heavily invest in SHORAD, MRAD and Long Range Precision Fires (HIMARS) capabilities which can be rapidly air deployed to Europe in support of allied ground troops in case of conflict.


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile - how to train and where?



> Col. James Kidd, director of range training programs for the service’s Training and Education Command, said when it comes to using emerging technologies such as long-range precision fires, loitering munitions and unmanned systems, “even at our most expansive range complexes, we're quickly outrunning what we can do in those training areas.”








						Project Tripoli to ‘Radically’ Change Marine Corps Training
					

Project Tripoli to ‘Radically’ Change Marine Corps Training




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Meanwhile, an update on the USMC's Force 2030 drive
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Fewer Marines, More Sensors Part of Berger’s Latest Force Design Revision - USNI News
> 
> 
> THE PENTAGON – Reducing the Marines to 175,000 and adding more sensor capability to smaller units are part of a wide swath of adjustments the Marine Corps is pursuing in the latest iteration of its modernization drive. Released on Monday, the Force Design 2030 annual report is the Marines’...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> news.usni.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The link to the Force 2030 Update is embedded in the USNI article
> 
> Highlights
> 
> IndoPacific
> 
> MEF III will continue to take the lead on the MLR (Marine Littoral Regiment) concept while generating and maintaining an MEU
> MEF I will continue as the largest USMC Force and maintain its ability to generate a MAGTF and sustain MEUs while operating out of Darwin, Australia
> 
> Global Response
> 
> MEF II will focus on developing a 3-Star Joint Task Force HQ in addition to its MAGTFs.  JTF  procedures to borrow heavily from the USMC Air element.
> Marine Reserves to be closely aligned with MEF II
> 
> 
> MLRs likely to be realigned with Artillery or Recce instead of the Infantry
> 
> LAR Bns likely to be moved away from the LAV to a more platform independent, sensor heavy structure but still based on small teams.
> 
> Infantry Bns to continue with small, dispersed, sensor rich teams that are independent of means of mobility.   Augmentation with Precision Weapons.  Carl Gustav to feature as a key element emphasising it Multi-Functional suite of munitions.    Switchblade/Hero type munitions to feature.  60mm mortars to be retained in the arms locker for the Platoon Commander to access on a mission needs basis.  81mm mortars to be retained at the rate of 2 per company.  They could be held at battalion or at company.  TBD.
> 
> Still emphasising Long Range Fires and littoral movements.




More on the Marine Littoral Regiment - still in development but first and foremost it is a rapidly deployable strategic asset




> A key goal of the littoral regiments is to build a unit that can strategically deploy to where it is needed quickly, shifting away from the traditional deployment cycle where marines spend six months preparing, six months deployed and six months of rest.









						Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine –  Can the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Survive?   | Small Wars Journal
					

The world woke up on February 24, 2022, to the news of Russian military forces moving into Ukraine under the guise of protecting dual Russian-Ukrainian nationalist interest. This left the rest of the world, most notably former nuclear weapons states (NWS) and those that fall under the security...




					smallwarsjournal.com


----------



## markppcli

Brad Sallows said:


> 3 x 7 of rifle, LMG, over-and-unders; no additional crew weapons.
> 1 x 7 of crew weapons (3 teams of whatever is mission appropriate).
> No additional people or vehicles.


I think in a mechanized context you can shorten up that weapons section given that you have much greater organic direct fire. Which, annoyingly, is exactly what’s detailed in Infantry Platoon in battle.

7 man sections gives you a leader, with two three man groups to get his job done. Add in the vehicle and we’re still within that golden rule of three. 

@KevinB I don’t envy the section commander who has to wrangle 2 LAVs, and I presume 4 fire teams of 3 ? I suppose he could have a 2 IC handle 2 of them while he handles 2. But then we’ve just arrived at two sections grouped together. I don’t generally disagree that 6 man sections are light on the ground, I just feel that the section should be seen as the smallest indivisible grouping of infantry. What you’ve described is actually very similar to what the Brazilians do where the platoon operates in two “sections” each of two “groups.” Those groups are equivalent to what we would call a section. 









						Brazilian Army Mechanized Rifle Platoon (2017)
					

The layout of the Brazilian Army's new mechanized infantry platoons.




					www.battleorder.org


----------



## Infanteer

What is the "rule of three?"


----------



## Brad Sallows

> What is the "rule of three?"



When asking how many sexual partners someone has had, divide a man's answer by 3 and multiply a woman's answer by 3.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> What is the "rule of three?"


I’m trying to find a source for where I got that phrase in my head. It’s essentially saying that a leader or commander shouldn’t be in charge of more than 3 elements at any given time. Obviously that’s hazy and blurry at times.


----------



## Brad Sallows

It sounds like an attempt to fix the optimum value of the guideline that span of control should fall between 2 and 5, inclusive.


----------



## Infanteer

Underway said:


> There is a growing rumble among the analyst community that Ukraine is just playing for a stalemate right now.  There will be no offensive until they are either forced into one or they are ready.  The Ukrainian gov't has stated that it will take at least till June to digest, train, and equip units with NATO equipment.
> 
> Using the info @KevinB has gotten the first large amount of US equipment that isn't artillery or defensive weapons is in Poland and being handed over soon. In my mind, we're about three to four weeks out before those formations are properly ready to hit the battle line.
> 
> Kharkiv's significance may be related to this...  I don't know who this dude is but its an interesting point.  If this is correct Ukraine by trying to sit astride the Russian's LOC's to Izium from the north, limiting their ability to sustain operations there.  We have stated that this modern war seems to be one of artillery after all.
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1523740677632565249
> 
> They are amateurs compared to the Afghans.





markppcli said:


> I’m trying to find a source for where I got that phrase in my head. It’s essentially saying that a leader or commander shouldn’t be in charge of more than 3 elements at any given time. Obviously that’s hazy and blurry at times.


Ahh...got it.  Span of control.  It's written write into our command doctrine that 2-5 is ideal.  There is a foundation behind this.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I’m trying to find a source for where I got that phrase in my head. It’s essentially saying that a leader or commander shouldn’t be in charge of more than 3 elements at any given time. Obviously that’s hazy and blurry at times.



It was an article in Inc. magazine:

The U.S. Marine Corps Uses the Rule of 3 to Organize Almost Everything. Here's How Learning It 21 Years Ago Changed My Life









						The U.S. Marine Corps Uses the Rule of 3 to Organize Almost Everything. Here's How Learning It 21 Years Ago Changed My Life
					

It all started with a copy of Inc. magazine that my dad handed to me back in 1998.




					www.inc.com


----------



## Brad Sallows

Oh, and I had forgotten the iconoclast solution:
4 x 3 in vehicle crews and 4 x 5 in dismount groups
2 spaces in each vehicle for extras (I/C, 2I/C, signaller, medic, videographer, DJ, etc)


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> My answer: continue to provide enough training money for the companies to exercise a lot of different scenarios, every year, so that all of the "it depends" variations are worked through, using the as-is equipment and people.]


My answer is create a trials and evaluation organization, work it out and then publish it as doctrine and implement it through training so that people do not have to reinvent the wheel continuously.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I think in a mechanized context you can shorten up that weapons section given that you have much greater organic direct fire. Which, annoyingly, is exactly what’s detailed in Infantry Platoon in battle.
> 
> 7 man sections gives you a leader, with two three man groups to get his job done. Add in the vehicle and we’re still within that golden rule of three.
> 
> @KevinB I don’t envy the section commander who has to wrangle 2 LAVs, and I presume 4 fire teams of 3 ? I suppose he could have a 2 IC handle 2 of them while he handles 2. But then we’ve just arrived at two sections grouped together. I don’t generally disagree that 6 man sections are light on the ground, I just feel that the section should be seen as the smallest indivisible grouping of infantry. What you’ve described is actually very similar to what the Brazilians do where the platoon operates in two “sections” each of two “groups.” Those groups are equivalent to what we would call a section.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Brazilian Army Mechanized Rifle Platoon (2017)
> 
> 
> The layout of the Brazilian Army's new mechanized infantry platoons.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.battleorder.org


Brazilians also drop grenades from Helicopters in internal Police actions  



My theory with the big section was you have now 2 M/Cpl’s in the section too - so if you have 3 groups (which would be split in the vehicles (I’m aware ain’t ideal) where the SGT has 1 team and 2 M/Cpl as team leaders to - or you have the SGT and support guy somewhat separate and two M/Cpl lead teams that take direction from the SGT.  
  It also creates a casualty backup - and a large pool to select SGT’s from. 

My main issue rests with the issue that any urban/subterranean or other more complex terrain is significantly manpower intensive- and you can’t use the LAV for it, and casualties quickly make a small section stuck without significant assets to support.


----------



## Mountie

Brad Sallows said:


> 3 x 7 of rifle, LMG, over-and-unders; no additional crew weapons.
> 1 x 7 of crew weapons (3 teams of whatever is mission appropriate).
> No additional people or vehicles.


This means a company of 3 platoons with a total of 9 rifle sections and 3 weapons sections. 

How about a company of 4 platoons with a total of 8 rifle sections and 4 weapons sections?  This would require a fourth platoon headquarters and one additional LAV-6.0, but would give the company four manoeuvre elements and would swap a rifle section for an additional weapons section giving it 33% more crew-served weapons.

Platoon Headquarters (9+1 Attached)

1 x 3-member Command Group (Platoon Commander, Platoon Warrant & Platoon Signaller)
1 x 3-member Assault Pioneer Group (M3 CG)
1 x 3-member LAV Group
Medical Technician* (Attached)

2 x Rifle Section (10)

Section Commander
2 x 3-member Assault Group
1 x 3-member LAV Group

1 x Support Section (10)

Section Commander
2 x 3-member Support Group (GMPG & DMR per group)
1 x 3-member LAV Group


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Brazilians also drop grenades from Helicopters in internal Police actions
> 
> 
> 
> My theory with the big section was you have now 2 M/Cpl’s in the section too - so if you have 3 groups (which would be split in the vehicles (I’m aware ain’t ideal) where the SGT has 1 team and 2 M/Cpl as team leaders to - or you have the SGT and support guy somewhat separate and two M/Cpl lead teams that take direction from the SGT.
> It also creates a casualty backup - and a large pool to select SGT’s from.
> 
> My main issue rests with the issue that any urban/subterranean or other more complex terrain is significantly manpower intensive- and you can’t use the LAV for it, and casualties quickly make a small section stuck without significant assets to support.


So you have 1 MCpl crew commander, 1 as a 2 IC. If we have two LAVs I’m assuming you’re adding a third to command that other LAV? Or do we have two crew commanders and two team leads? That’s where get to to are these “teams” not just those same small sections?

I think the manpower issue just means you need to commit more platoons or sections to that task. Mechanized troops get their faster but have less foot print. For the record reports from Ukrainian urban fighting cite heavy use of 30mm to support that infantry. So it’s not as though it always doesn’t matter but get your point that 4 “stacks” for the platoon isn’t ideal.

Either way we’re probably better to move this to the infantry paper napkin thread.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Mountie said:


> This means a company of 3 platoons with a total of 9 rifle sections and 3 weapons sections.
> 
> How about a company of 4 platoons with a total of 8 rifle sections and 4 weapons sections?  This would require a fourth platoon headquarters and one additional LAV-6.0, but would give the company four manoeuvre elements and would swap a rifle section for an additional weapons section giving it 33% more crew-served weapons.
> 
> Platoon Headquarters (9+1 Attached)
> 
> 1 x 3-member Command Group (Platoon Commander, Platoon Warrant & Platoon Signaller)
> 1 x 3-member Assault Pioneer Group (M3 CG)
> 1 x 3-member LAV Group
> Medical Technician* (Attached)
> 
> 2 x Rifle Section (10)
> 
> Section Commander
> 2 x 3-member Assault Group
> 1 x 3-member LAV Group
> 
> 1 x Support Section (10)
> 
> Section Commander
> 2 x 3-member Support Group (GMPG & DMR per group)
> 1 x 3-member LAV Group



That would be an insane amount of bodies and equipment to try and control for one platoon.

A platoon has to be like a starving Rottweiler: lean and mean and ready to fight to the death at close quarters on a moment's notice. 

A Platoon Commander needs to be able to, literally, point in one direction and know that every fanatic under his/ her command will ferociously swarm the enemy, instantly and expertly, as required. 

If they fail, the OC should be confident that at least our glorious teenaged Infantry dead have piled up in front of the enemy's MGs in such a way as to provide defilade for the rest of the Company to safely manoevre to complete a victorious slaughter, and exact their revenge on the enemy.

We need to shake the GWOT-itis out of our Shemaghs and get our War Faces on. Turning the Rifle Platoon Commander into a Mini-Field Marshall is diametrically opposed to that goal and pure folly, especially in General War.

Oops... is it H-Hr already? Sorry, gotta jet


----------



## McG

Here are some new thoughts drawing on comparisons to allied structures: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/24/192/Tremaine.pdf


----------



## Mountie

daftandbarmy said:


> That would be an insane amount of bodies and equipment to try and control for one platoon.
> 
> A platoon has to be like a starving Rottweiler: lean and mean and ready to fight to the death at close quarters on a moment's notice.


Huh???

It's he exactly the same size as the current rifle platoon.  It's just exchanging a rifle section for a weapons section.  The company would have 8 rifle sections and 4 weapons sections, not the platoon.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> Here are some new thoughts drawing on comparisons to allied structures: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/24/192/Tremaine.pdf


Oh my.

I do have some issues with the end product of a RegF and a ResF division even though I greatly applaud his conclusion that the divisional and ResF headquarters should be reduced and consolidated. Even eliminating CMTC is on my bucket list.

My problem is that this is a very simplistic staff paper for the CFC. It really doesn't deal with the major issue (which at the beginning is the manpower shortages). It's discussion portion is virtually non existent barely touching on two examples from the US and Australia. Finally it jumps into conclusions and recommendations that seem to have been pulled out of a hat (or somewhere else).

Folks - we've had better and more carefully researched and articulated solutions in this forum from multiple folks.

Is this the best that CFC can turn out these days? Sorry if I sound too critical ... but.


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> My problem is that this is a very simplistic staff paper for the CFC.


Well, it is a service paper, which are the smallest of the different sorts papers that CFC publishes each year. It has to stay more focused on a single aspect of a problem, as opposed to the analysis that goes into the course project papers.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> Well, it is a service paper, which are the smallest of the different sorts papers that CFC publishes each year. It has to stay more focused on a single aspect of a problem, as opposed to the analysis that goes into the course project papers.


Yeah. I felt a bit overly critical but it's such an important issue ...


----------



## Brad Sallows

Another opportunity to plug for renaming the Res F formations as "districts" as an encouragement for function to follow form.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> Another opportunity to plug for renaming the Res F formations as "districts" as an encouragement for function to follow form.


Not in my view.

We need to do everything we can to integrate the ResF into a Total Force. Creating different entities simply highlights the status quo of a second class organization.

Renaming them "districts" is a simple solution that produces nothing of value. Even if they are just reformed into two or three light brigades and a CS and CSS brigade with light scales of equipment, you are ahead of the game. Consolidating them into fewer brigade and unit headquarters but with fully-authorized numbers would be a good start.

I agree that function should follow form. But that can cut in two directions. One builds up our defence capabilities; the other merely perpetuates a broken system.

🍻


----------



## GR66

McG said:


> Here are some new thoughts drawing on comparisons to allied structures: https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/24/192/Tremaine.pdf


Other than eliminating some HQs (a good thing) I'm not sure what benefit there is of moving Reserve units from a Reg Force Division to an all Reserve Division.

Unless there is a fundamental change to the way our Reserves are organized, trained and equipped they will remain "units" that are incapable of being deployed as combat capable units.  Imaginary Battalions in a Reserve Division are just as pretend as those same imaginary Battalions in a Reg Force Division.


----------



## McG

GR66 said:


> Other than eliminating some HQs (a good thing) I'm not sure what benefit there is of moving Reserve units from a Reg Force Division to an all Reserve Division.


Fixing the unit structures is not incompatible with streamline formation HQ. The author had to keep the scope focused, but you could take the idea to the next step by figuring out how you streamline the structure below the proposed consolidated PRes Bde HQs.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Other than eliminating some HQs (a good thing) I'm not sure what benefit there is of moving Reserve units from a Reg Force Division to an all Reserve Division.
> 
> Unless there is a fundamental change to the way our Reserves are organized, trained and equipped they will remain "units" that are incapable of being deployed as combat capable units.  Imaginary Battalions in a Reserve Division are just as pretend as those same imaginary Battalions in a Reg Force Division.


Exactly. We need, at most, one divisional headquarters capable of deploying a forward element while leaving a rear at home. I can't see any reason why the majority of the staff functions needed to run the "field force" can't be done by the staff of one divisional headquarters (if it learns to not over centralize). 

When we mentioned "districts" above, a G9 cell in a division with small regional LO cells in provinces would do.

IMHO our problem is that we have allowed administrative processes to grow unchecked and thus needed to add more and more staff and more and more staff levels. We need to curtail the processes and staff layers in order to shrink the headquarters.



McG said:


> but you could take the idea to the next step by figuring out how you streamline the structure below the proposed consolidated PRes Bde HQs.


Absolutely. I'm still hanging in with the 30/70 70/30 concept as the most viable.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Not in my view.
> 
> We need to do everything we can to integrate the ResF into a Total Force. Creating different entities simply highlights the status quo of a second class organization.
> 
> Renaming them "districts" is a simple solution that produces nothing of value. Even if they are just reformed into two or three light brigades and a CS and CSS brigade with light scales of equipment, you are ahead of the game. Consolidating them into fewer brigade and unit headquarters but with fully-authorized numbers would be a good start.
> 
> I agree that function should follow form. But that can cut in two directions. One builds up our defence capabilities; the other merely perpetuates a broken system.
> 
> 🍻



As usual I will voice my disagreement.

I would prefer that the Regional body of troops be first and foremost a Regional body of troops - with a common command structure and trained to known standards, if not a common standard.

To pretend that an amorphous body of bodies, no matter how willing, is a Division, or a Brigade, or even a Territorial Battalion Group is ludicrous.  The best that will happen is that a poor cousin of a regular capability will be created.

On the other hand to give a Regional commander with the responsibility to manage and train the volunteers within her district the opportunity to raise a TBG or two from the standard platoons or companies in her Region seems to make more sense.  Those platoons and companies (batteries, squadrons) can then be attached to the inventory of troops available to the Regular Forces or to the TBGs.

Organizing from the Parade Strength and not from the Tactical Formation.  Parade Strength reflects Inventory,  and can be organized to reflect trained Inventory.  Tactical Formations should be Ad Hoc Formations - tailored to the needs of the moment.  The advantage of a regular force should be that they are practiced in many contingencies.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> As usual I will voice my disagreement.


It's too bad that you live so far away. We should really sit down over a beer (or ten) some time.

😁


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill said:


> Organizing from the Parade Strength and not from the Tactical Formation. Parade Strength reflects Inventory, and can be organized to reflect trained Inventory. Tactical Formations should be Ad Hoc Formations - tailored to the needs of the moment. The advantage of a regular force should be that they are practiced in many contingencies.


I think you are grossly overvaluing the sea the net was cast into, and equally grossly undervaluing the knowledge of how to fish…which includes how to work with other fishers.


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:


> I think you are grossly overvaluing the sea the net was cast into, and equally grossly undervaluing the knowledge of how to fish…which includes how to work with other fishers.



But for there to be good fishers and bad fishers first of all there must be fish.  We can sort the good fish from the bad fish and we can make better fishers out of poor fishers but we can't do either if we don't have fish to start with.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> It's too bad that you live so far away. We should really sit down over a beer (or ten) some time.
> 
> 😁



It's our version of  The Song That Never Ends.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Calling whatever hodgepodge of units happen to be available in a region a "brigade" just encourages people to pursue aims beyond their capabilities.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Mountie said:


> Huh???
> 
> It's he exactly the same size as the current rifle platoon.  It's just exchanging a rifle section for a weapons section.  The company would have 8 rifle sections and 4 weapons sections, not the platoon.



In my defence, your Honour, I was mainly looking for an excuse to use a 'Full Metal Jacket' meme


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> In my defence, your Honour, I was mainly looking for an excuse to use a 'Full Metal Jacket' meme


Mountie - he has never seen a "full" platoon in his career.

He's either been carried by a short-staffed bunch of wiry, chain-smoking supermen or else a similarly short-staffed bunch of Canadian militiamen.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Mountie - he has never seen a "full" platoon in his career.
> 
> He's either been carried by a short-staffed bunch of wiry, chain-smoking supermen or else a similarly short-staffed bunch of Canadian militiamen.



You're not wrong... half the complement with all the support weapons and ammo


----------



## McG

McG said:


> Stumbled across my old Army Reserve Force structure proposal.  A little less adventurous that the Force 2025 plan but, at the same time, it's a nice start point for building new total force units.


Did some thinking about how to smash together F2025 ideas with my old PRes structures.  I think that RFL2 sub-units in Reg F units is just a way of hiding the rust & holes, but RFL2 in PRes formations could be a path to greater PRes capability. So this is probably a bit backward from how most staffs are approaching the problem, but here is my take on a potential 2 Div structure:


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> Did some thinking about how to smash together F2025 ideas with my old PRes structures.  I think that RFL2 sub-units in Reg F units is just a way of hiding the rust & holes, but RFL2 in PRes formations could be a path to greater PRes capability. So this is probably a bit backward from how most staffs are approaching the problem, but here is my take on a potential 2 Div structure:
> View attachment 70762


I don’t see that a method hiding rust and or holes in one system won’t do it in the other.   

IMHO there needs to be an effective way to cut out rust and holes - and that needs to be firmly in place before any structural changes. 

I also don’t see the need/want for a 2nd DIV 

Canada can’t field 2Div, so why bother with a DIV HQ and DIV assets for a second DIV, when the CA doesn’t even have enough for 1 DIV? 

I don’t buy the ‘mobilization’ argument either - as it’s better to organically grow than make believe that a 2nd DIV that never doesn’t anything will have any useful skills.   

I’d argue that making 6 Bde (including the CSB) under 1 DIV would be a better way of providing for the future.  

1 Heavy 
2 Med 
2 Light 
1 CSB


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I don’t see that a method hiding rust and or holes in one system won’t do it in the other.
> 
> IMHO there needs to be an effective way to cut out rust and holes - and that needs to be firmly in place before any structural changes.
> 
> I also don’t see the need/want for a 2nd DIV
> 
> Canada can’t field 2Div, so why bother with a DIV HQ and DIV assets for a second DIV, when the CA doesn’t even have enough for 1 DIV?
> 
> I don’t buy the ‘mobilization’ argument either - as it’s better to organically grow than make believe that a 2nd DIV that never doesn’t anything will have any useful skills.
> 
> I’d argue that making 6 Bde (including the CSB) under 1 DIV would be a better way of providing for the future.
> 
> 1 Heavy
> 2 Med
> 2 Light
> 1 CSB


Agreed right up to the brigade numbers.

As between the RegF and ResF there are enough authorized personnel at present to grow five manoeuvre brigades and three support brigades.

If one uses just the equipment we have as a 'come as you are affair' then the manoeuvre brigades could be: 

1 heavy, 
1 medium, 
1 mixed medium and light and 
2 light. 

If one plans to build it to what ought to be based on reasonably predictable defence tasks (Europe, peacekeeping, quick reaction) then it ought to be:

1 each RegF and ResF heavy, 
1 each RegF and ResF medium and 
1 RegF light.

In either case the three support brigades should be hybrid RegF/ResF: 

1 artillery, 
1 manoeuvre enhancement and 
1 sustainment.

$.02

🍻


----------



## McG

KevinB said:


> I don’t see that a method hiding rust and or holes in one system won’t do it in the other.


In one case (RFL2 in Reg F units) the system hides deficiencies in full time capability with Class A positions. This hides rust & holes as we declare capabilities based on a number of hollow battalions.

In the other case (RFL2 in PRes formations), full time positions increase the planning, training, and CSS capacities of part time organizations. This actually strengthens the PRes.


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> In one case (RFL2 in Reg F units) the system hides deficiencies in full time capability with Class A positions. This hides rust & holes as we declare capabilities based on a number of hollow battalions.
> 
> In the other case (RFL2 in PRes formations), full time positions increase the planning, training, and CSS capacities of part time organizations. This actually strengthens the PRes.


Okay I see that outlook - but realistically the outcome is the same.  
   There are still the same number of bodies.  

If the Res system was more like down here - those numbers wouldn’t be hollow.  
The system needs to be fixed for any meaningful change to occur.  




FJAG said:


> Agreed right up to the brigade numbers.
> 
> As between the RegF and ResF there are enough authorized personnel at present to grow five manoeuvre brigades and three support brigades.
> 
> If one uses just the equipment we have as a 'come as you are affair' then the manoeuvre brigades could be:
> 
> 1 heavy,
> 1 medium,
> 1 mixed medium and light and
> 2 light.
> 
> If one plans to build it to what ought to be based on reasonably predictable defence tasks (Europe, peacekeeping, quick reaction) then it ought to be:
> 
> 1 each RegF and ResF heavy,
> 1 each RegF and ResF medium and
> 1 RegF light.
> 
> In either case the three support brigades should be hybrid RegF/ResF:
> 
> 1 artillery,
> 1 manoeuvre enhancement and
> 1 sustainment.
> 
> $.02
> 
> 🍻


I figured Heavy is fully tracked - I don’t consider the current LAV, M777 and some Leo’s heavy.  

I do think you could field 2 medium Bde with a wheeled SPA and some other missing enablers.  

A heavy Bde needs a blank slate and to be created from scratch - either retaining and augmenting the existing Leo2 or adopting a new MBT, a heavy IFV, a tracked SPA and all the other necessities.  

I’m not sure you need two heavy Bde, and not sure Canada can afford the bill


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I figured Heavy is fully tracked - I don’t consider the current LAV, M777 and some Leo’s heavy.


I'll agree to call the heavy brigade in the "using what equipment we have" scenario an "ersatz heavy" brigade more designed to be able to teach and practice the skills and deploy with known risks and deficiencies. My two "if I were king" heavy brigades are tracked and more heavily armoured.


KevinB said:


> I do think you could field 2 medium Bde with a wheeled SPA and some other missing enablers.


Yup


KevinB said:


> A heavy Bde needs a blank slate and to be created from scratch - either retaining and augmenting the existing Leo2 or adopting a new MBT, a heavy IFV, a tracked SPA and all the other necessities.


Yup


KevinB said:


> I’m not sure you need two heavy Bde, and not sure Canada can afford the bill


I think the only way that Canada will ever commit to a true heavy brigade is if it commits to prepositioned flyover one in Europe. That means needing equipment back in Canada to train on. That essentially translates into two equipment sets. So one might as well have two sets of trained personnel (ResF heavy in my books).

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Good point. But if you have 1/3rd to 1/2 of the Bde predeployed -and all it’s equipment  you could do fly over Bde ex’s and rotate the permanent personnel every 2 years or so - so you could cheap out back home and only have a battle group or so of kit in Canada.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Good point. But if you have 1/3rd to 1/2 of the Bde predeployed -and all it’s equipment  you could do fly over Bde ex’s and rotate the permanent personnel every 2 years or so - so you could cheap out back home and only have a battle group or so of kit in Canada.


I think so too but I do take the issues raised by @Infanteer and several others re sharing equipment to heart.

I always look at things with recurring costs v a one time capital cost (albeit with recurring annual expenses) which is why I would want the minimum number of personnel forward deployed (some leaders, admin and a whole lot of maintainers) as a posting, while the rest flies over for rotational exercises only. If one converted to a more robust eFP then that might change to a combined arms type of battle group but quite frankly I'd want to stay away from deploying too much of the force forward - a cornerstone battalion headquarters and rifle company maybe.

Since I consider the heavy brigade an "in case of fire, break glass" type of force and not a real "QRF" I would want as much of it to be hybrid as practicable and therefore save recurring annual costs through reservists allowing more funds to go towards equipment purchases. This also has the benefit of having an equipped "follow-on" force available.

So, bottom line, if I'm going to cheap out anywhere its in forward deployed full-time troops costs. I'd funnel every nickel I've got into equipment.

When you think about it, we already have much of the expensive gear that we need for two medium brigades and a light brigade (if we really need a full light brigade) so most of the new equipment costs can go towards heavy. In many ways we're well positioned in that, based on Ukraine, we're not invested in too much heavy gear that needs replacing upgrading and we can basically design a heavy force based on some of the most relevant new lessons learned. Plus, I think we have a few years to work it out now.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I think so too but I do take the issues raised by @Infanteer and several others re sharing equipment to heart.


Ack, I don't like time share concepts - but I also am very skeptical of Cdn Gov willingness to actually equip a forward force if it doesn't have troops -- I see it being a paper Army 


FJAG said:


> When you think about it, we already have much of the expensive gear that we need for two medium brigades and a light brigade (if we really need a full light brigade) so most of the new equipment costs can go towards heavy.


I'd argue that one has about half of 2 Medium Bde worth - the LAV's, and that is really it.
  As far as the Light goes, you have a bunch of M777, and that is about it.

I don't think the CA really has a true Bde worth of equipment, but more parts of 3 or 4 Bde worth of equipment, deploying a "Battlegroup" (or pieces of it) has been the cheap way of paying face value to commitments.


FJAG said:


> In many ways we're well positioned in that, based on Ukraine, we're not invested in too much heavy gear that needs replacing upgrading and we can basically design a heavy force based on some of the most relevant new lessons learned. Plus, I think we have a few years to work it out now.
> 
> 🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

USMC thoughts on ISTAR, Recce and LAVs for their Force 2030

USNI 









						Marines Look Beyond LAVs as Recon Roles Expand - USNI News
					

Marines are rethinking how the service does reconnaissance beyond its traditional light armored vehicles as part of the ongoing Force Design 2030 effort, officials said last week. With more unmanned systems on the market and the Pentagon continuing a shift toward potential operations in the...




					news.usni.org
				


​


> Marines Look Beyond LAVs as Recon Roles Expand​By: Mallory Shelbourne
> May 20, 2022 5:24 PM
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Sgt. David Seeley, a squad leader with Battalion Landing Team 3/4, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and a native of Dunwoody, Georgia, walks past a light armored vehicle (LAV) at Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan on Feb. 8, 2021. Marine Corps Photo
> 
> 
> *Marines are rethinking how the service does reconnaissance beyond its traditional light armored vehicles* as part of the ongoing Force Design 2030 effort, officials said last week.
> 
> *With more unmanned systems on the market and the Pentagon continuing a shift toward potential operations in the Indo-Pacific*, the Marine Corps in the next year plans to experiment with *ways to perform reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance in a sea environmen*t, according to the service’s most recent Force Design 2030 update.
> 
> But the service says* it cannot depend on ground vehicles alone* to perform the reconnaissance mission.
> 
> *“Our light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalions must transition from their current ground vehicle-centric approach to an all-domain mobile reconnaissance approach. Sole reliance on armored ground vehicles for reconnaissance is too limiting*, especially in complex littoral environments,” reads the Marine Corps’ latest Force Design update, released earlier this month. *“Attributes such as reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting beyond the line of sight, littoral mobility, and equipment that integrates with special operations and joint forces are needed.”*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A U.S. Marine LAV-25 light armored vehicle attached to Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), engages a target with an M242 25mm chain gun during exercise Alexander the Great 2019 in Volos, Greece, Jan. 8. Exercise Alexander the Great 2019 is combined training exercise between U.S. and Hellenic armed forces. US Marine Corps photo
> 
> During a roundtable with reporters last week, Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, acknowledged that* Marines will perform reconnaissance differently, depending on the region and operating environment*.
> 
> “[Light armored reconnaissance] in the Indo-Pacific with III [Marine Expeditionary Unit] is most likely going to look different than light armored reconnaissance in II MEF,” Heckl said at the annual Modern Day Marine conference.
> 
> Heckl’s comments reflect how Marine Corps officials have recently described the service’s ongoing Force Design 2030 effort, which is aimed at preparing the Marines for conflict in the coming decade. The Marine Corps has said* III MEF, based in Okinawa, Japan, will look different than I and II MEFs because III MEF is operating as the so-called “stand-in-force” in the range of Chinese weapons.*
> 
> Marine Corps Systems Command, which is the service’s acquisition arm, has been working on the* prototyping effort to replace the Light Armored Reconnaissance vehicle.* That initiative includes evaluating a variant of BAE Systems’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle for the reconnaissance mission.
> 
> *“My opinion is none of that works in the Indo-Pacific,” Heckl said of the vehicles. “I think LAR would look something more like a lot of unmanned in multiple domains.”*
> 
> After several years of struggling to replace the aging LAVs, the Marine Corps embarked on a prototyping effort in 2020 that continued throughout last year.
> 
> “We are doing some demos and prototyping right now so we can get ahead and maintain decision space for the commandant as we flesh out what that recon capability’s going to be in the future,” *Col. David Walsh, the acting program executive officer for land systems,* told reporters. “We’ve now got a head start on *if there’s a vehicle that needs to be fielded* and bought to support that vision, we’ve now got a couple years head start. We’ve done some competitive prototyping and *that vehicle won’t be 5 years out. It’ll be a couple years out from being fielded.”*
> 
> 
> 
> 
> U.S. Marines with Echo Company, Battalion Landing Team 2/6, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, utilize a laser rangefinder during a transit through the Strait of Gibraltar aboard San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD-24), April 26, 2022. US Navy Photo
> 
> The Force Design 2030 initiative has included the Marine Corps shedding some of its heavier equipment, like tanks, and investing in capabilities like anti-ship missiles, which *the Marines want to fire from expeditionary nodes that smaller units set up on islands and shorelines.
> 
> 
> With a heavy focus on reconnaissance,* the Marine Corps’ recent Force Design update said the* reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance experimentation will influence how the service pursues ground vehicles *in the future.
> 
> “*Choices made in the maritime mobility discussion above will also affect the [Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle Strategy], as will its integration with our uncrewed systems roadmap*. We must continually refine this strategy to ensure it is operationally suitable and logistically supportable,” the document reads.
> 
> As the Marine Corps assesses how it will operate in the Indo-Pacific,* the service needs to figure out how it will perform the reconnaissance mission across a vast region that mostly includes water*.
> 
> “What do our organizations already recognize? They recognize that in terms of where the commandant has pointed us, then our focus is on how we operate in and affect battlespace that includes more than land,” said Maj. Gen. Ben Watson, the commanding general of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.
> 
> “So* if we’re going to own battlespace that includes water space, but we can only operate in wheeled vehicles and by walking around, then we are probably incapable of controlling that battlespace and maximizing our influence within it.* So we’ve got to diversify the means with which we get ground.”
> 
> In addition to the maritime domain, *the Marines need a strategy that factors in cyber and other non-kinetic elements*, Watson said. Heckl said the* MEF Information Groups would likely play a key role in performing reconnaissance missions when it comes to cyber-warfare.*
> 
> “The biggest eye-opener for me as a new MEF commander was this new thing called *MEF information group and the stuff – the scope, scale, breadth of what they were doing was eyewatering*,” Heckl said. “But *they’re short, we’re dramatically short in all [Military Occupational Safety]’s*. They are low-density, high-demand. But I think that kind of highlights for you how much *the MEFs are going to have to play into whatever this thing ends up looking like*.”
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Marines prepare to recover an RQ-21A Blackjack unmanned aerial vehicle after a training flight during exercise Black Shadow at Fort Stewart, Georgia, Jan. 19, 2021. US Marine Corps Photo
> 
> Getting after this will also* likely include manned-unmanned teaming,* which is how the Navy and Marine Corps now describe their unmanned systems strategy. It would pair manned and unmanned platforms together to conduct various missions.
> 
> “So how do we leverage manned and unmanned teaming and the characteristics of unmanned systems to enhance the survivability and effectiveness of our more limited manned systems. Because* that also speaks to the logistics challenge, right, demand reduction. Nothing consumes more than humans,”* Watson said.
> 
> “They are problems that are actively being wrestled with and that we are trying to help shape as well as support from headquarters to get after what the commandant’s looking for.”
> 
> In its recent Force Design update,* the Marine Corps said it will release “an updated and refined” strategy for ground vehicles that take into account how the Marines will get after the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance mission.*
> 
> The update also calls for the Marines to *start shifting their light armored reconnaissance battalions “to mobile reconnaissance battalions,”* beginning with the 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion.
> 
> The Marines have been told to use the work done by Task Force 61 Naval Amphibious Forces Europe/2nd Marine Division, recently created by U.S. 6th Fleet, as a springboard.
> 
> 
> 
> *“Mobile reconnaissance battalions do not have to be mirror-imaged,”* the update reads.






> 01 April 2022
> 
> U.S. Sixth Fleet Establishes Naval Amphibious Forces Europe Supporting Fully Integrated Navy-Marine Operations and Experimentation​
> U.S. Sixth Fleet stood up Task Force 61 Naval Amphibious Forces Europe/ 2d Marine Division (TF-61/2) to synchronize command and control of deployed Navy and Marine Corps amphibious forces and advance the integrated Marine Corps capability in the Sixth Fleet area of operations (AOO) on March 16,











						U.S. Sixth Fleet Establishes Naval Amphibious Forces Europe Supporting Fully Integrated Na
					

U.S. Sixth Fleet stood up Task Force 61 Naval Amphibious Forces Europe/ 2d Marine Division (TF-61/2) to synchronize command and control of deployed Navy and Marine Corps amphibious forces and advance



					www.navy.mil
				






> 16 May 2022
> 
> U.S., Estonia Kick Off Exercise Hedgehog 22​
> TALLINN, Estonia - Members of Task Force 61 Naval Amphibious Forces Europe/2d Marine Division (TF-61/2), operating under U.S. Sixth Fleet, joined their Estonian counterparts to kick off exercise Siil 22, also known in English as Exercise Hedgehog, in Tallinn, Estonia, May 16.











						U.S., Estonia Kick Off Exercise Hedgehog 22
					

TALLINN, Estonia - Members of Task Force 61 Naval Amphibious Forces Europe/2d Marine Division (TF-61/2), operating under U.S. Sixth Fleet, joined their Estonian counterparts to kick off exercise Siil



					www.navy.mil


----------



## Kirkhill

The Marine Littoral Strategy  for the Indo-Pacificl is predicated on working in an Archipelago of Islands.  The LAV  has limited utility in that environment.

Task Force 61 conducted Operation Hedgehog in the Baltic.  The Baltic is a shallow sea dominated by rocky archipelagoes of islands.  The preferred vehicles for that environment are CB90s.



These are backed by small boat navies equipped with shallow draft, high speed missile boats and small corvettes




Most of Canada's territory is also incompatible with the LAV, our primary vehicle.  We face the same ISTAR-Info-Cyber-EW challenges as the rest of the world.

And our coasts are dominated by Archipelagos 

The Straits of Juan de Fuca
The Inside Passage 
The Belcher Islands of Hudson Bay
The 1000 Islands of the St Lawrence
The Magdalene Islands of the Gulf of St Lawrence
And most importantly our Arctic Archipelago.

In addition we have massive estuaries, long navigable rivers and many systems of interconnected very large lakes.

We have a land mass of which 70% is not accessible by road.

In addition we have the same seasonality problem as the Swedes and the Finns. - for much of the year our waters freeze


Which raises the subject of Canadian People Movers

Kirkhill's list

CB90s
RHIBs
LCVPs

Argos
Sherps
Bv206s 
(I understand the Bv206s won't handle the deepest snow but much of the High North is actually a windswept desert - and they float when the ice breaks)

VTOLs
UTTHs (Griffins)
MLH (Cormorants/Cyclones)
MHLHs (Chinooks)
(Future - Tilt Rotors)

STOL 
Twin Otters
Buffalo
Hercs
CC-177s

Airport to Airport
Challenger
Polaris
Civvy Charters.


Fire Support  is a  separate issue. 

Curiously enough the big question, in terms of Recce/ISTAR/Info/Cyber/EW is:

How many people do you need to move?

With the related question:

How many people are needed to deal with whatever is discovered?










						Swedish Navy - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						Finnish Navy - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						Estonian Navy - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						Latvian Naval Forces - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						Lithuanian Naval Force - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						Polish Navy - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				





Denmark and Norway have a more Blue Water orientation in keeping with their geopolitical positioning.  Norway guards the approaches to the Baltic from the Arctic and the Atlantic.  Denmark controls the chokepoint at the entrance to the Baltic.   Denmark has recently switched from a small boat, local defence navy to a Blue Water ASW/AAW navy.  Together with the Norwegians and the Brits they aim to dominate the GIUK Gap and protect the approaches to the Baltic and the Atlantic.


----------



## Kirkhill

Autonomous operations in Archipelagos (with civilian traffic) is already here.






This relates directly to 









						The USN's Blue Water Navy - The LCS as A-10
					

Blue Water, Green Water, Brown Water Fighting Ships, Support Ships Big Ships, Little Ships Surface, Subsurface Manned, Unmanned Full-time, Part-time, Civilian.  https://cimsec.org/let-the-navy-retire-lcs-and-build-a-u-s-maritime-constabulary-instead/  The discussion is not unique to the USN, or...




					www.army.ca


----------



## Kirkhill

One other aspect of operations in the Baltic is the number of  small submarines in service

Poland - 1x Kilo
Sweden - 5x AIP subs (1500 tonne)
Norway -  6x Diesel Electric subs (1000 tonne)

These are supplemented by the Dutch - 4x Diesel Electric subs (2500 tonne)


The UK backstops these with


6x Nuclear Fleet subs (4000-8000 tonne)
4x Nuclear Ballistic subs (16,000 tonne)

That represents a fleet of 16 conventional subs - very quiet with 5 Air Independent vessels backed by 6 nuclear attack subs and 4 nuclear ballistic missile subs.

To secure the Baltic and Scandinavia.


----------



## Kirkhill

And more autonomy 
And yes I know this is an Army thread....

One word - 

Joint.


----------



## GR66

Just going to throw this out there for the sake of discussion...

What if we dropped our love affair with the LAV and went all Light Infantry Battalions.  That would theoretically allow us to deploy a full Light Infantry Division with the existing three Brigades.  

Drop the number of Reg Force Batteries in the Artillery Regiments from two to one and make up the 2nd and 3rd Batteries of each Regiment from Reserve Artillery Units.

4th Artillery Regiment could provide the HQ and STA elements for the Divisional Artillery with three Divisional Artillery Regiments (1 x Gun, 1 x AD and 1 x HIMARS) each made up of one Reg Force Battery and two Reserve Batteries.

The Tac Hel units are combined together into the Divisional Aviation Brigade.

The Canadian Combat Support Brigade becomes the Divisional Sustainment Brigade and is augmented by the Engineer, Signal and Service Battalion elements from the 10 x existing Reserve Brigades.

Reserve Infantry/Armour/Artillery units are re-organized as Company-sized units each tasked to Force Generate a single Infantry or CS Platoon/Troop/Gun Detachment as per the existing STAR system.  These Companies would be grouped together into Reserve Battalions under the three Reg Force Brigades.

These Reserve elements augmenting the Reg Force units would allow a deployed Brigade (or even Division) to be sustained with personnel.

The training and equipment delta between the Reg Force and Reserve Force would be eliminated.  

Light forces are better suited to Defence of North America roles than LAV-based units and a Canadian Light Infantry Division would be an excellent compliment to the US Army's new 11th Airborne Division in Alaska.  In a NATO role, a Light Infantry Division would be an excellent option for deploying forces to the new Nordic members (Finland/Sweden/Norway) as well as the Baltics in case of Russian attack and could be more quickly deployed than Medium/Heavy forces from Canada.

The LAVs (and Leopards) could be retained for war stocks and the Army could continue to run courses for their use/maintenance so that they can be used by the Battalions as required (for Latvia, Peace Keeping deployments, etc.).


----------



## IKnowNothing

@GR66 I like the idea.  But given that we have the Leo's, the LRSS, and the LAV's, it brings me back to working off the legacy MEB GCT structure to make use of the heavier equipment (with pre-positioned stocks in Europe, maybe Australia if we want to strengthen those ties)


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Just going to throw this out there for the sake of discussion...
> 
> What if we dropped our love affair with the LAV and went all Light Infantry Battalions.  That would theoretically allow us to deploy a full Light Infantry Division with the existing three Brigades.
> 
> Drop the number of Reg Force Batteries in the Artillery Regiments from two to one and make up the 2nd and 3rd Batteries of each Regiment from Reserve Artillery Units.
> 
> 4th Artillery Regiment could provide the HQ and STA elements for the Divisional Artillery with three Divisional Artillery Regiments (1 x Gun, 1 x AD and 1 x HIMARS) each made up of one Reg Force Battery and two Reserve Batteries.
> 
> The Tac Hel units are combined together into the Divisional Aviation Brigade.
> 
> The Canadian Combat Support Brigade becomes the Divisional Sustainment Brigade and is augmented by the Engineer, Signal and Service Battalion elements from the 10 x existing Reserve Brigades.
> 
> Reserve Infantry/Armour/Artillery units are re-organized as Company-sized units each tasked to Force Generate a single Infantry or CS Platoon/Troop/Gun Detachment as per the existing STAR system.  These Companies would be grouped together into Reserve Battalions under the three Reg Force Brigades.
> 
> These Reserve elements augmenting the Reg Force units would allow a deployed Brigade (or even Division) to be sustained with personnel.
> 
> The training and equipment delta between the Reg Force and Reserve Force would be eliminated.
> 
> Light forces are better suited to Defence of North America roles than LAV-based units and a Canadian Light Infantry Division would be an excellent compliment to the US Army's new 11th Airborne Division in Alaska.  In a NATO role, a Light Infantry Division would be an excellent option for deploying forces to the new Nordic members (Finland/Sweden/Norway) as well as the Baltics in case of Russian attack and could be more quickly deployed than Medium/Heavy forces from Canada.
> 
> The LAVs (and Leopards) could be retained for war stocks and the Army could continue to run courses for their use/maintenance so that they can be used by the Battalions as required (for Latvia, Peace Keeping deployments, etc.).



I've always been a 'light infantry guy but the extra capabilities of the LAV in communications, protection, firepower and mobility are a huge advantage, IMHO.


----------



## IKnowNothing

daftandbarmy said:


> I've always been a 'light infantry guy but the extra capabilities of the LAV in communications, protection, firepower and mobility are a huge advantage, IMHO.


Granted, but if we don't have/ can't get them in theatre in sufficient quantities in a timely manner that huge advantage does NATO no good and amounts to vanity spending.


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> Granted, but if we don't have/ can't get them in theatre in sufficient quantities in a timely manner that huge advantage does NATO no good and amounts to vanity spending.



I'm sure the NATO in place' Divisions will rely on our mighty Battle Group to be there before they cross the LD for the big counter-stroke


----------



## IKnowNothing

daftandbarmy said:


> I'm sure the NATO in place' Divisions will rely on our mighty Battle Group to be there before they cross the LD for the big counter-stroke


Tongue in cheek I know, but they want their Bde, and if we have any intention of actually providing it it should either be
-stationed there
-prepositioned for REFORGER style flyover
-light enough to deploy by air

otherwise it's just lip service with no real prospect of being deployed, and therefore arguably a waste of defense dollars.

Heretical solution, go with Light/Medium/Heavy,  call a spade a spade and acknowledge that if the 28 tonne LAV 6 is our Heavy vehicle it's not a medium vehicle, give all the infantry and armour LAV chassis' and Leo's  to 1CMBG, pre position a full Bde set in Latvia.  Give 5CMBG all the TAPV's and tell them to figure it out.  They're by no means ideal, but they're heavier than Lav 3's, and the RWS loadout shouldn't be set in stone.  Deal with the shortcomings of our Heavy IFV being wheeled with a 25mm and no ATGM and our medium weight vehicle needing to be two to a section, do better with fleet selection in 10 years.


----------



## Kirkhill

Polish prime minister calls for permanent bases in NATO’s east​


> *Poland is prepared to construct new bases to host more NATO forces and other countries along the alliance’s eastern flank ought to follow suit, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki told security leaders gathered in Warsaw.
> 
> “Permanent bases of allies should be established in NATO’s eastern flank countries,” Morawiecki said Thursday at the Strategic Ark think tank forum. “*Poland is ready to build such bases (to include) light infantry units on a permanent basis.*”*



Somebody likes the Light Infantry for the Eastern Front.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Just going to throw this out there for the sake of discussion...


I don't agree with everything you're suggesting but assuming that you are right in wanting to accomplish what you do, then you can do all that and still retain the LAVs.

You can always take the infantryman out of the LAV and let him deploy as light infantry but once you park the LAVs for any length of time its difficult to get them and their crews back up to snuff.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I don't agree with everything you're suggesting but assuming that you are right in wanting to accomplish what you do, then you can do all that and still retain the LAVs.
> 
> You can always take the infantryman out of the LAV and let him deploy as light infantry but once you park the LAVs for any length of time its difficult to get them and their crews back up to snuff.
> 
> 🍻



If you can do that then you can create Independent LAV Sub-Units and Sub-Sub-Units  which can carry Lt Infantry.

You've already decided that there needs to be a Standard Section and Standard Platoon for both LAV and Lt Infantry  and the Standard Section will be based on the number of soldiers in the back of the LAV.  You also want to be able to get the whole platoon and their kit in the back of a Chinook.  From that you ended up with a Standard Section of 7 and a Standard Platoon of 30 (28 would make more sense but...)

The consequence of those decisions, in my opinion, is that the Platoon's LAVs are an addition to the Platoon.  Therefore the LAV Capt's LAVs are an addition to the Coy.  And the Bn's LAVs are an addition to the Bn....

The proportion of cap-badges, trades or components can all be debated.

The Falklands only saw a couple of troops of  Lt AFVs engaged to support two brigades of Lt Infantry.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> If you can do that then you can create Independent LAV Sub-Units and Sub-Sub-Units  which can carry Lt Infantry.
> 
> You've already decided that there needs to be a Standard Section and Standard Platoon for both LAV and Lt Infantry  and the Standard Section will be based on the number of soldiers in the back of the LAV.  You also want to be able to get the whole platoon and their kit in the back of a Chinook.  From that you ended up with a Standard Section of 7 and a Standard Platoon of 30 (28 would make more sense but...)


You're confusing me slightly with @Infanteer here but yes and yes - 28 dismounts for the platoon.


Kirkhill said:


> The consequence of those decisions, in my opinion, is that the Platoon's LAVs are an addition to the Platoon.  Therefore the LAV Capt's LAVs are an addition to the Coy.  And the Bn's LAVs are an addition to the Bn....


You can argue that but I'd disagree - the same way that I'd disagree that the LAV crew or the ISV driver are "in addition" to the platoon. They are part of it. I suggested that specialty vehicles (such as BVs) should come with their own drivers and maintainers because they are a brigade resource and can be parcelled out to varying units and require special skills to operate and maintain.


Kirkhill said:


> The proportion of cap-badges, trades or components can all be debated.


Sure they can but IMHO its an unnecessary debate. One only changes things when there is a clear advantage. I don't even see a minor advantage.


Kirkhill said:


> The Falklands only saw a couple of troops of  Lt AFVs engaged to support two brigades of Lt Infantry.


Not sure what a war with logistics limitations and poor terrain has to do with anything. Falklands was a unique situation and an interesting case study but not a pro forma example for general force (even light force) structures. 

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Those light AFVs were also specifically picked out for their effectiveness in the Falklands. I’d imagine the Brits would have preferred more not less, the Arggies too. 

A question for @Kirkill what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of a separate carrier unit vice organic? I’m interested primarily because I can only think of two military organizations that have “carrier” units, and both have a very specific mission set.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> You're confusing me slightly with @Infanteer here but yes and yes - 28 dismounts for the platoon.



The collective "you".



FJAG said:


> You can argue that but I'd disagree - the same way that I'd disagree that the LAV crew or the ISV driver are "in addition" to the platoon. They are part of it. I suggested that specialty vehicles (such as BVs) should come with their own drivers and maintainers because they are a brigade resource and can be parcelled out to varying units and require special skills to operate and maintain.



If you expect the GIBS that have spent 2 years working with their own transport and heavy supporting fire to suddenly become Light Infantry, working without that LAV and its fire power and needing to learn how to work with different support then you had better train them to operate with and without the LAVs.  And while they are operating without the LAVs, what are the LAV crews doing?  Are they suddenly converted to the skills necessary to man the weapons of a Support Company?

If you can subtract the LAVs from the GIBs then shouldn't you be able to add new GIBs to the LAVs?



FJAG said:


> Sure they can but IMHO its an unnecessary debate. One only changes things when there is a clear advantage. I don't even see a minor advantage.



I agree it is an unnecessary debate.  So why is it reprised so often?



FJAG said:


> Not sure what a war with logistics limitations and poor terrain has to do with anything. Falklands was a unique situation and an interesting case study but not a pro forma example for general force (even light force) structures.
> 
> 🍻



Many wars have logistics limitations and poor terrain.  The combatants then have to fight with what they managed to get to the fight with them.

Maybe the LAV Battalion can only manage to get its GIBs and a half company of LAVs to the fight.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> If you expect the GIBS that have spent 2 years working with their own transport and heavy supporting fire to suddenly become Light Infantry, working without that LAV and its fire power and needing to learn how to work with different support then you had better train them to operate with and without the LAVs.  And while they are operating without the LAVs, what are the LAV crews doing?  Are they suddenly converted to the skills necessary to man the weapons of a Support Company?



Mechanized Bns have Support Companies, and are trained in the same weapons as it stands now. They also qualify as light infantry and it is very normal for us to conduct light exercises. The crews, being infantry, are just a nice addition to us. Besides they’re only in that role for a period of time, not unlike being the C6 gunner or Pl Sig.  


Kirkhill said:


> If you can subtract the LAVs from the GIBs then shouldn't you be able to add new GIBs to the LAVs?



Not as easy, those GIBs are also the back up gunners and drivers who have intimate knowledge of their ride. They have conducted and trained on RRPs, can be expected to pull turret watch, are used to assisting in driver maintenance. There’s a reason why 3 vp leaves work 2 hours before 1 vp.



Kirkhill said:


> I agree it is an unnecessary debate.  So why is it reprised so often?



Why indeed.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Those light AFVs were also specifically picked out for their effectiveness in the Falklands. I’d imagine the Brits would have preferred more not less, the Arggies too.
> 
> A question for @Kirkill what do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of a separate carrier unit vice organic? I’m interested primarily because I can only think of two military organizations that have “carrier” units, and both have a very specific mission set.



I think that Organic LAVs result in a highly efficient force optimized to work as a team.  If the team can be deployed as a team with all its equipment then that is the optimum solution. The unit will do as well as any unit can.

My comment was specifically in reference to GR66's comments about a Light Infantry Division and FJAG's expressed concerns about maintaining LAV crew skills.  In that context I was suggesting that the LAV unit could be a non-organic asset that was available to work with the Light Infantry.  It might not be as proficient a combination as the Organic team.  But perhaps, even in small doses, such as the troop of Scorpions and Scimitars, it is enough to swing a battle.

The Household Cavalry Regiment supplied those Lt Tanks.   And yes all parties would probably have been happier to have more of them.  Just like they would have been happier to have more Harriers, more Lt Guns, more mortars, transport and Chinooks.  But they didn't have them.  They had to work with what they had.  Britain had more Lt Tanks, more Chinooks and it had MBTs.  But it couldn't get them to the fight.

Integral LAVs build proficiency in those skills.  I would go farther and suggest that if the Square Combat Team is your standard operational element them the Square Combat Team might as well become a permanent structure. It too would gain proficiency from constant practice.



On the other hand, in the context of a light battalion, there might be a 70% solution available by adding a Reserve Force or RCAC or RCIC Carrier Squadron to change the capabilities of a unit that is proficient in the skills of working independently of LAVs.



As to my interest in smaller vehicles - that is simple.  Smaller vehicles are easier to pack and thus easier to get into the field than big vehicles.  Also, their primary value is they can bring heavier fire support to the fight than a dismounted force.   If they can move people that is a bonus.  


To sum up.  I like the Organic LAV Unit.  I would like it better if we had better transport available to deploy it overseas where it can be useful.  It has, in my opinion, little utility domestically.

Domestically, for a variety of reasons, I thing the air transportable light infantry unit is the better solution.  How to support them when they are on the surface becomes the next issue - and that will require some form of air transportable vehicle and there are a bunch of them to choose from.  But the LAV isn't one of them.  Nor is the CV90 or the Bradley.  In some instances the Scorpion and Scimitar might be useful but if the Bv206 is bogging down in central Canada then they probably will as well.

The Light Infantry has to stay vehicle independent because we can't afford to have specialist infantry for every environment and season.  But maybe we can afford to keep an array of useful vehicles on hand with knowledgeable crews to be able to boost the variety of missions the light force can undertake.

In addition to having a committed, deployable, expeditionary medium - or heavy - force.


----------



## Kirkhill

Separately 

Philips P O'Brien in the Telegraph.



> Ukraine is showing the future of modern warfare​Ben Wallace should pay close attention to events that may be a turning point in how we win wars
> PHILLIPS O'BRIEN22 May 2022 • 12:00pm
> 
> In an address to the National Army Museum earlier this month, the Defence Secretary Ben Wallace gave a fascinating view of the present state, and possible future, of military power. Though he focused on Ukraine, he also gave some tantalising hints about where the UK might be moving next.
> 
> Wallace painted a picture of a Russian army that was “rotten” from top to bottom; with demoralised rank-and-file troops and a class of “failing” generals, whose planning, if that word could even be used, left their men helpless against fierce Ukrainian resistance. Corruption and inefficiency were ubiquitous, from soldiers selling their vehicles’ fuel for extra cash, to expensive and vital logistics vehicles being poorly maintained. All of this contributed to an enormous strategic failure at the Battle of Kyiv.
> 
> Such basic lessons should hopefully be irrelevant to UK armed forces, but the Defence Secretary also discussed weapons and technology, and it is here that things get interesting. He spoke of the Russian army as a fighting force rooted in heavy, almost unthinking, firepower. Instead of using the high-tech weaponry many anticipated, Russia revealed itself to be a Second World War force - and a primitive one at that. Unable to deploy their heavy armour and artillery properly, they resorted to “indiscriminate barrages” that failed to convert their greater numbers into a victorious situation.
> 
> Wallace’s praise for the Ukrainians was also noteworthy. Alongside their moral superiority, he singled out their success in using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to observe and attack the unprepared Russians. The Defence Secretary also seemed to reiterate this preference for UAVs and against traditional heavy forces at another conference this month. Asked whether the UK should use the lessons of Ukraine to rebuild a large British land army (ours has suffered major reductions in personnel, equipment and funding over the last decade) he demurred. When asked what he would do with the promised greater defence funding he exclaimed: “Would I triple the size of the Army? No.” Instead he reiterated the value of UAVs.
> 
> The Defence Secretary’s instincts not to recreate a large land army may prove controversial, but they are eminently reasonable in light of recent events. Many initially believed that the Ukraine war had reinforced the tank’s value on the battlefield, severe Russian heavy vehicle losses have undermined this assumption. Instead, we are seeing the value of range attack. As the Russians, with their heavy but ultimately short-range force, have shown, it is very difficult to move forward into the face of a modern army with a system of different ranged defences at its disposal.
> 
> All of this means that if the UK military does receive significant new funding, focusing on soldier numbers and heavy land vehicles could be the riskier, retrograde choice. It would be far better to take some time to try and understand what has happened in Ukraine before investing. Poor spending choices will merely entrench the vested interests defending armed forces that Britain no longer needs, which will ultimately make her a less influential Nato and European partner.
> 
> Other militaries, including the Chinese government, are thought to be setting time aside to learn the lessons of this war to evaluate their own strategy. Events in Ukraine might well be a turning point in modern warfare, the moment it became clear just how difficult it is for all but the most dominant military powers to suppress defensive firepower. Taking stock might be a risky political move for Ben Wallace, but in the long run it would be far more shrewd.


----------



## OldSolduer

Great article.

Maintenance of your vehicles isn't "sexy" so it got the shitty end of the stick.


----------



## daftandbarmy

OldSolduer said:


> Great article.
> 
> Maintenance of your vehicles isn't "sexy" so it got the shitty end of the stick.



Like logistics and all the other unglamourous stuff


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Domestically, for a variety of reasons, I thing the air transportable light infantry unit is the better solution. How to support them when they are on the surface becomes the next issue - and that will require some form of air transportable vehicle and there are a bunch of them to choose from. But the LAV isn't one of them. Nor is the CV90 or the Bradley. In some instances the Scorpion and Scimitar might be useful but if the Bv206 is bogging down in central Canada then they probably will as well.


Let me just address the issue of domestic use of the LAV. The thing is ground deployable and at 70kms in the hour, a LAV element, driving in shifts can cover 1,500 kms in a 24 hour period. With LAV units in Gagetown, Valcartier, Petawawa, Shilo and Edmonton, there is no place in Southern Canada that can't be reached by a LAV element within 24 hours. It's not the travel time that's the issue, its the readiness and mounting time that's the issue. Preparing for and conducting an air move in Southern Canada would probably take far longer then simply driving there. Air v ground deployment is not an overriding factor in the South and we do not need an air component capability to move large LAV formations domestically. The LAV will do just fine here.

The north is a different situation entirely. Not only are we challenged by a road network to the north but also by a lack of airfields and a road network once there. Much of the North is heavily forested and/or boggy and/or frozen. But then, not every square metre of the North needs to be protected either. I think we are lacking a good analysis of just what the real potential threats are and what elements of a joint force is needed there. My guess is its heavily weighed towards air and naval forces with a better trained, organized and equipped Ranger component and small airborne strike components all supported by some hardened support bases and probably by ground based very-long range cruise or hypersonic missile batteries and anti-air and anti-ship defences. It's a whole different deal than defending the North with company sized airborne teams although they may have a small role to play within a more sophisticated defence scheme.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Let me just address the issue of domestic use of the LAV. The thing is ground deployable and at 70kms in the hour, a LAV element, driving in shifts can cover 1,500 kms in a 24 hour period. With LAV units in Gagetown, Valcartier, Petawawa, Shilo and Edmonton, there is no place in Southern Canada that can't be reached by a LAV element within 24 hours. It's not the travel time that's the issue, its the readiness and mounting time that's the issue. Preparing for and conducting an air move in Southern Canada would probably take far longer then simply driving there. Air v ground deployment is not an overriding factor in the South and we do not need an air component capability to move large LAV formations domestically. The LAV will do just fine here.
> 
> The north is a different situation entirely. Not only are we challenged by a road network to the north but also by a lack of airfields and a road network once there. Much of the North is heavily forested and/or boggy and/or frozen. But then, not every square metre of the North needs to be protected either. I think we are lacking a good analysis of just what the real potential threats are and what elements of a joint force is needed there. My guess is its heavily weighed towards air and naval forces with a better trained, organized and equipped Ranger component and small airborne strike components all supported by some hardened support bases and probably by ground based very-long range cruise or hypersonic missile batteries and anti-air and anti-ship defences. It's a whole different deal than defending the North with company sized airborne teams although they may have a small role to play within a more sophisticated defence scheme.
> 
> 🍻



Heavy industry seems to operate large vehicles all across Canada quite successfully, including the Arctic, year round.

With the right planning/ preparation there shouldn't be an issue.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Heavy industry seems to operate large vehicles all across Canada quite successfully, including the Arctic, year round.
> 
> With the right planning/ preparation there shouldn't be an issue.


You've never watched "Ice Road Truckers" have you? There's an issue in every episode.

😁


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> You've never watched "Ice Road Truckers" do you? There's an issue in every episode.
> 
> 😁



Especially if Liam Neeson's involved


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Especially if Liam Neeson's involved


Different show and I never hear of the Neeson one.

What fun - a new silly movie to watch on Netlix 

😁


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Let me just address the issue of domestic use of the LAV. The thing is ground deployable and at 70kms in the hour, a LAV element, driving in shifts can cover 1,500 kms in a 24 hour period. With LAV units in Gagetown, Valcartier, Petawawa, Shilo and Edmonton, there is no place in Southern Canada that can't be reached by a LAV element within 24 hours. It's not the travel time that's the issue, its the readiness and mounting time that's the issue. Preparing for and conducting an air move in Southern Canada would probably take far longer then simply driving there. Air v ground deployment is not an overriding factor in the South and we do not need an air component capability to move large LAV formations domestically. The LAV will do just fine here.
> 
> The north is a different situation entirely. Not only are we challenged by a road network to the north but also by a lack of airfields and a road network once there. Much of the North is heavily forested and/or boggy and/or frozen. But then, not every square metre of the North needs to be protected either. I think we are lacking a good analysis of just what the real potential threats are and what elements of a joint force is needed there. My guess is its heavily weighed towards air and naval forces with a better trained, organized and equipped Ranger component and small airborne strike components all supported by some hardened support bases and probably by ground based very-long range cruise or hypersonic missile batteries and anti-air and anti-ship defences. It's a whole different deal than defending the North with company sized airborne teams although they may have a small role to play within a more sophisticated defence scheme.
> 
> 🍻



We are in 100% agreement.

Just see my comments about what a LIGHT Armoured Vehicle should be and who should be driving it.


----------



## Kirkhill

Delete


----------



## Kirkhill

@FJAG

How about this?

Would you go for

1 Panzer Brigade equipped with 2 Brigades worth of Vehicles (CV90s/Leos and SPHs) - one forward deployed in Europe

4 Light Brigades

3 of those Light Brigades with one Regular LAV 6.0 Battalion and 3  Reg/Res Infantry Battalions (Light/Rifle/General Duties)
1 of those Light Brigades with one Regular Airborne Battalion and 3  Reg/Res Infantry Battalions (Light/Rifle/General Duties)
All equipped wtih a well supplied Transport Battalion each - like the Artillery that too could be a Reserve heavy unit.




Kirkhill said:


> I too like the MRZR and the Dagor - but only as an alternative to the LAV II - Bv206 - Argo - Sherp equipment. And i would add some RHIBs to the transport mix as well. CB90s is a step too far. Maybe we could talk the Navy into manning them.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> @FJAG
> 
> How about this?
> 
> Would you go for
> 
> 1 Panzer Brigade equipped with 2 Brigades worth of Vehicles (CV90s/Leos and SPHs) - one forward deployed in Europe


I would go with a heavy brigade's worth of equipment in Europe with a maintainer and admin element.

A 70/30 heavy brigade and a 30/70 heavy brigade in Canada with the RegF components having in sum total a brigade's worth of equipment and with the RegF folks doing a fly-over brigade exercise in Europe in the late winter and the ResF folks doing a flyover exercise in Europe in the summer. While the RegF equipment in the summer is used for training the next generation of RegF and ResF folks.

That way you end up with two trained brigades of people to man two brigade's worth of equipment.

I like CV90s but insist that it comes with an ATGM system. The CV9035 NL MLU might fit the bill as long as it maintains 7-8 dismounts.


Kirkhill said:


> 4 Light Brigades
> 
> 3 of those Light Brigades with one Regular LAV 6.0 Battalion and 3  Reg/Res Infantry Battalions (Light/Rifle/General Duties)
> 1 of those Light Brigades with one Regular Airborne Battalion and 3  Reg/Res Infantry Battalions (Light/Rifle/General Duties)
> All equipped wtih a well supplied Transport Battalion each - like the Artillery that too could be a Reserve heavy unit.


You know me by now. I don't like mixing capabilities within brigades it complicates life (mostly maintenance and training) unnecessarily and negatively impacts their employability as a complete formation. We have enough LAVs for six battalions which equates to two full brigades. I see that as one 70/30 brigade and one 30/70 brigade with current manpower levels.

If we could generate more people, I would expand that to an additional 30/70 brigade without adding any equipment.

In many ways, in that second scenario, my idea of a 30/70 brigade is similar to your idea of a "light brigade" with a RegF LAV battalion and 2 or more ResF light battalions except for the fact that I have each battalion identical with a RegF HQ and one RegF, fully equipped LAV company and two ResF underequipped but fully trained LAV companies.

I'd have just the one light brigade but with three RegF light battalions (and sure, make one airborne). I prefer organic battalion transport and the artillery can be 30/70.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

@FJAG

We're getting there.

But you seem to be hung up on Order.  One might almost suggest a Germanic influence in your background.  Although that might be unfair to the non-Prussian Germans.    

I don't think we can prepare a plan for every situation.  I am quite comfortable knowing I have a variety of options available to me.  

I can see your Heavy solution but I prefer my Light/Medium solution.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Moved


----------



## KevinB

*i&*


daftandbarmy said:


> If you scroll down to near the bottom of this online book selection, by Mark Adkins, you'll see a description of how 2 PARA was organized during the Falklands War, as were other Infantry units at the time.
> 
> 2 x GPMGs per section was the norm, in 2 x 4 man teams. Those, the 66mm/M72 and No. 80 WP grenades are credited as the main battle winners...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Goose Green
> 
> 
> Reissued for the 40th anniversary of the Falklands conflictThe most in-depth and powerful account yet published of the first crucial clash of the Falklands war - told from both sides.'Thorough and exhaustive' Daily Telegraph'An excellent and fast paced narrative' Michael McCarthy, historical...
> 
> 
> 
> books.google.ca


One aspect to note was Argentinian forces on the island(s) when Britain attached to recapture then where light troops from the subtropical areas, and mostly conscripts. 
  No armor (save 12x 90mm cannon armed Panhard armored cars)  and due to border issues with Chile, keep the vast majority of their regular forces on that border. 

If the Argentinians had had the bulk of their Marines and Mountain troops available there there would been more vehicles and troops ready for the terrain. 
   Which would have vastly changed the British lessons learned.


----------



## Underway

FJAG said:


> I like CV90s but insist that it comes with an ATGM system. The CV9035 NL MLU might fit the bill as long as it maintains 7-8 dismounts.


CV90's aren't heavy.  They prioritized mobility well above armour with those vehicles.  They have equivalent armour protection to a LAV 6 and less vs mines.  They are small and incorporate a lot of other survivability traits (smoke, multispectral gas, low signature, hard kill active protection).  I would think they would be a really good cavalry or recce unit type.  Also for dismounts you're likely looking at 6 for the CV90 maybe 7.

If you want heavy then Lynx is probably the biggest standout.  Though unless you are going with an HAPC then nothing currently exists that can survive over 30mm autocannons right now.


----------



## KevinB

The CV90 MkIV upper glacis plate on level ground can deflect or absorb pretty much most non dedicated Anti-Tank impacts, allegedly past 25mm and 30mm APFSDSDU rounds (call me a skeptic as the DU generally can front pen a T-72).
  At 37 tonnes is it still very agile, I would however put it in the Heavy Category, but not like the 60t Namer which is basically a Merkava MBT without Gun (mind you they have an IFV version now with turret with what appears to be a 25mm M242 Bushmaster cannon).

Honestly I'm curious to the engine replacement/repair time with the Namer and Merkava, as with the amount of armor on the front glacis plate - it can't be easy to unlock and move.

The CV90 MkIV has claimed room for 8 dismounts - a little more cubic area than the LAV, and lower - so the troop area seems to have about an extra 1.5 feet, so I suspect you actually could get 8 troops with armor etc fairly decently.
  Next AUSA I need to bring my tape measure


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> CV90's aren't heavy.  They prioritized mobility well above armour with those vehicles.  They have equivalent armour protection to a LAV 6 and less vs mines.  They are small and incorporate a lot of other survivability traits (smoke, multispectral gas, low signature, hard kill active protection).  I would think they would be a really good cavalry or recce unit type.  Also for dismounts you're likely looking at 6 for the CV90 maybe 7.
> 
> If you want heavy then Lynx is probably the biggest standout.  Though unless you are going with an HAPC then nothing currently exists that can survive over 30mm autocannons right now.



To paraphrase Crocodile Dundee.  Those ain't heavy!  Now the Namer is HEAVY!





__





						Namer Heavy Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com
					

The Namer heavy armored personnel carrier is based on Merkava Mk.4 MBT chassis. Currently it is one of the most protected APCs in the world.



					www.military-today.com
				




CV-90  is in the 23 to 37 tonne range.
Lynx is in the 34 to 50 tonne range
Namer is in the 60 tonne range.

And the Namer doesn't waste any of the weight allowance on offensive armaments.  It all goes to protecting as many infantry passengers as possible (10) with a separate crew (2).

To my mind it looks like just the thing if you need to thicken up an assault force by dropping a large number of infantry onto the objective.  And with that ability then the IFVs that would normally accompany the tanks would have less need for a large number of assaulters on-board.

One MBT Squadron
Two IFV Companies
One Heavy APC Transport Company/Squadron to move an attached Light Infantry Battalion when required.


----------



## quadrapiper

Kirkhill said:


> To my mind it looks like just the thing if you need to thicken up an assault force by dropping a large number of infantry onto the objective.  And with that ability then the IFVs that would normally accompany the tanks would have less need for a large number of assaulters on-board.


Looking at the acreage on top, seems like, in your concept, it might also be able to carry (semi-)automated defences that the other two classes might not have space for.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> To paraphrase Crocodile Dundee.  Those ain't heavy!  Now the Namer is HEAVY!
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Namer Heavy Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com
> 
> 
> The Namer heavy armored personnel carrier is based on Merkava Mk.4 MBT chassis. Currently it is one of the most protected APCs in the world.
> 
> 
> 
> www.military-today.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> CV-90  is in the 23 to 37 tonne range.
> Lynx is in the 34 to 50 tonne range
> Namer is in the 60 tonne range.
> 
> And the Namer doesn't waste any of the weight allowance on offensive armaments.  It all goes to protecting as many infantry passengers as possible (10) with a separate crew (2).


The Namer has actually getting more and more armaments as it progresses.
  It started bare - went to a RWS, and now a full turret.

I don't think a bare system works as folks ID it easily and smack it - and it has no defensive systems.
 I don't think the Namer makes sense for a non Merkava armed country -- you might be able to get a front engine Leo2 variant - it won't work with the Abrams turbine - but they would require a great deal of re-engineering, which would probably end up with a heavier system that the original MBT it was based off - simply as the engineer replacement method doesn't allow for a solid front Glacis like most tanks have.
   Thus you need to have sealable removable armor plate there.


Kirkhill said:


> To my mind it looks like just the thing if you need to thicken up an assault force by dropping a large number of infantry onto the objective.  And with that ability then the IFVs that would normally accompany the tanks would have less need for a large number of assaulters on-board.
> 
> One MBT Squadron
> Two IFV Companies
> One Heavy APC Transport Company/Squadron to move an attached Light Infantry Battalion when required.




You need to view the battlefield holistically - it isn't just a paper beats rock, that beats scissors, as there are a lot of hands throwing different things.

For a Heavy Force - you need protection from Indirect Fire, as well as direct fires, mines, and other obstacles, plus the ability to suppress the direct fire systems and enemy infantry.

Any holdings of a Heavy APC - would be a higher than Bde asset I would assume, because I don't see wasting assets to plan for the attachment of Light Forces to a Heavy Brigade would be part of the Heavy Brigade.
  At that point you are better off just having more troops in the heavy Bde.


----------



## OldSolduer

Kirkhill said:


> To paraphrase Crocodile Dundee.  Those ain't heavy!  Now the Namer is HEAVY!
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Namer Heavy Armored Personnel Carrier | Military-Today.com
> 
> 
> The Namer heavy armored personnel carrier is based on Merkava Mk.4 MBT chassis. Currently it is one of the most protected APCs in the world.
> 
> 
> 
> www.military-today.com


Yah but does it come in Electric only mode? Joking - somewhat


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The Namer has actually getting more and more armaments as it progresses.
> It started bare - went to a RWS, and now a full turret.
> 
> I don't think a bare system works as folks ID it easily and smack it - and it has no defensive systems.
> I don't think the Namer makes sense for a non Merkava armed country -- you might be able to get a front engine Leo2 variant - it won't work with the Abrams turbine - but they would require a great deal of re-engineering, which would probably end up with a heavier system that the original MBT it was based off - simply as the engineer replacement method doesn't allow for a solid front Glacis like most tanks have.
> Thus you need to have sealable removable armor plate there.
> 
> 
> 
> You need to view the battlefield holistically - it isn't just a paper beats rock, that beats scissors, as there are a lot of hands throwing different things.
> 
> For a Heavy Force - you need protection from Indirect Fire, as well as direct fires, mines, and other obstacles, plus the ability to suppress the direct fire systems and enemy infantry.
> 
> Any holdings of a Heavy APC - would be a higher than Bde asset I would assume, because I don't see wasting assets to plan for the attachment of Light Forces to a Heavy Brigade would be part of the Heavy Brigade.
> At that point you are better off just having more troops in the heavy Bde.




The last mob that looked at any unit holistically came up with this

74 LAV-25
20 LAV-AT
19 LAV-L
10 LAV-M
9 LAV-C2
7 LAV-R
139

I bring your attention to  the LAV-L variant (which was also the Bison, the LAV-M, the LAV-C2 and the LAV-R).

LAV-L or LAV-Log or LAV-Logistics is essentially a 2.5 tonne TCV, armoured to the same level as the force it is supporting and with equivalent mobility so it can keep up.  If the vehicle is emptied of ammunition, spares, and such if becomes a Bison APC.

In other words the LAV-Log, just like the Deuce and a Half TCV can do double duty in the battalion as a troop carrier and as a supply vehicle.

The Russians are having great difficulty because their lines of communications are vulnerable.  Their vehicles are soft.

The closer they get to the front lines the harder their supply vehicles need to be.  Those same vehicles could be used to move troops and supplies.


I'm suggesting that if you are going to create a Heavy Force then create a Heavy Force and follow the USMC philosophy of making all elements of the Force capable of operating in identical environments.  With that as a given then an additional Heavy APC subunit at Brigade for moving supplies and troops forwards, and casualties to the rear, under fire, to my mind seems a reasonable allocation of resources.

As to that "acreage" on top - fine, put weapons and sensors on top if you like.  Put an air defence battery on top if you like - just so long as it doesn't impact the number of troops that can be carried inside, it doesn't take up any internal volume, add any weight or make the vehicle top heavy and more inclined to roll.


----------



## KevinB

I agree on whole heartedly on the identical force structures.

 Using a Leo 2 Heavy Bde 
Leo 2A6/7 MBT
CV90 MkIV IFV
Kodiak CEV (Leo2 body Combat Engineering Vehicle)
Biber bridge-laying tank (Leo2 Body)
Keiler Mine Clearing Vehicle (Leo 2 Body) 
CV90 120 Mortar Carrier
CV90 Ambulance
CV90 APC
CV90 Recovery Vehicle 
CV90 CP
CV90 Logistics Vehicle
CV90 LR ATGM vehicle 
Büffel 3 Armored Recovery Vehicle (Leo 2 body)
PzH 2000 SPA (Leo 2 chasis) 

I have not seen a dedicated CV90 MkIV Air Defense system - but I am sure one could get both missile and gun versions, and you wouldn't really have any Bde Gaps - beyond the Heavy Tactical Truck - which I am still partial to the HEMTT A4.
2 main types of A vehicles, and one heavy (and somewhat armored) Logistical vehicle - which would reduce the different types of spares and allow ones supply and maintainers to have a lot of familiarity.


----------



## FJAG

You need some CV90 OPV and a CV90 CP/FSCC if not already included with your other CPs.

😉


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> You need some CV90 OPV and a CV90 CP/FSCC if not already included with your other CPs.
> 
> 😉



You're reliable.....


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> You need some CV90 OPV and a CV90 CP/FSCC if not already included with your other CPs.
> 
> 😉


I actually would suggest a Leo 2 OPV as well.  
  It’s robust enough the FOO doesn’t have to  sit back if attached to the Armored. 
I don’t care if it’s not using the 120mm 99% of the time.  

I have not seen any of the CV90 MkIV CP’s, but I’d assume they could do FSCC work, I mean we used to do it in the back of an Iltis with trailer…


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I actually would suggest a Leo 2 OPV as well.
> It’s robust enough the FOO doesn’t have to  sit back if attached to the Armored.
> I don’t care if it’s not using the 120mm 99% of the time.
> 
> I have not seen any of the CV90 MkIV CP’s, but I’d assume they could do FSCC work, I mean we used to do it in the back of an Iltis with trailer…


There is a CV90 OPV in use in the Netherlands. I don't think that it's as sophisticated as our LAV OPV but don't know for sure.

I did one Black Bear battle run as a FOO in a Leo 1 and one in a Marder. The rest were all in the M113. Black Bear is fun but not very challenging from a gunner's point of view (It ain't no BATUS). I found both the Leo and the Marder hard to work out of because of the turret configuration and how hard it was to work with your tech and sig. FOOing is a team sport. If I remember in WW2 we used some Shermans with the guns removed and replaced by a wooden dummy leaving the turret mostly empty.

Our FOO parties had gone to six people in Afghanistan which includes a FOO/FAC, an OP Det comd/FAC sgt, two technicians/LAV gunners and two driver signallers. This facilitates doing simultaneous fire missions and combat air controls as well as dismounted operations with a vehicle anchor.

That size of crew rules out the Leo. I really can't see reducing the crew below five and the driver on mounted operations really can't perform any function other than driving. My guess though is that if it can be done from a LAV it can be done from a CV90 just as well assuming it gets the same equipment the LAV OPV now has.

One other thing is that we rarely have a tank squadron without LAVs while we frequently have infantry companies without tanks. A FOO in a tank would be limited in being moved around to anything other than a tank squadron and would somewhat stand out in a rifle company with no other tanks around him.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

@FJAG I was thinking of CV90 for Inf based FOO teams and Leo for Tank based. 
   Just to help blend in.


----------



## Kirkhill

The Swedes have CV9040s for their FOOs.

Swedish Pansar Battalion

Setting aside the Command and Staff -

4x CV9040 - Recce Platoon = 4
2x 4x CV90120 - Mjolnir Mortar Platoons = 8
4x CV9040 - Air Defence Platoon (Radar Directed) = 4
3x CV90 + 1x AVLB - Pioneer Platoon = 3+1

Tank Companies

2x 11x Leo2 = 22
2x 1x ARV = 2
2x 3x Bv410 - Log/Amb = 6
2x 1x CV9040 - MRT = 2
2x 1x CV9040 - FOO = 2
2x 1x CV9040 - CP = 2

IFV Companies

2x 9x CV9040 - IFV = 18
2x 1x CV90 - MRV = 2
2x 3x Bv410 - Log/Amb = 6
2x 1x CV9040 - MRT = 2
2x 1x CV9040 - FOO = 2
2x 3x CV9040 - CP= 6
2x 3x19x Ground Combat Infantry = 114






Another way to look at it?  The Combined Arms Battalion includes one Light Infantry Company dispersed.


----------



## Kirkhill

And the Ukrainians have their hands on the French Caesar.  Crew of 9.  
Good going over dry fields.


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/uxf63g


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> To paraphrase Crocodile Dundee.  Those ain't heavy!  Now the Namer is HEAVY!



It's important to note that the Israeli's key goal is to avoid heavy casualties to 18 year old conscripts, or the government will fall.

The Merkava is another example of protection being emphasized over everything else.

I'm not sure if we'd be in the same head space though.


----------



## markppcli

Given our inability to keep troops in the Artillery trade, can’t imagine why Shilo isn’t appealing to our young increasingly urban recruits but I digress, I think Archer or Caesar is the obvious solution.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Swedish Pansar Battalion


Thanks for the video. I watched the Canadian one as well. That one was interesting for how much the three regiments seem to organize things based on unit SOPs or quiffs.

The Swedish one actually interested me quite a bit and almost has me at the point where maybe my view that the three (heavy, medium, light) battalions' should fundamentally have the same dismounted organization TTPs etc.

I do favour the combined arms battalion concept and the Swede's have a lighter, more flexible organization than that found in the ABCT. (Incidentally I see very little purpose in the "regimental" structure other than as a base and training structure that remains in situ after the battalions are assigned to one or the other of the two brigades. I can think of about a dozen better ways of doing that.

It made me think that with roughly 22 tanks and roughly 30-35 IFVs per battalion we could reorganize 1 CMBG to consist of three Swedish style combined arms battalions and have gear left over to give to the reserves 😉 .

I'm ambivalent as to whether or not our tankless mechanized battalions should also change to a lighter structure that puts more emphasis on fighting the vehicle rather than the dismounted battle. Cutting 2 and 5 CMBG's 12 x LAV companies to11  LAVs each could generate enough extra LAVs to mechanize the two remaining light battalions' six companies.

It feels a bit like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic - but maybe with a purpose. But then there's the Russian BTGs.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

When did Sweden last fight a war…
    I like the concept of the Combined Arms Bn, but I think the Brigade Combat Team is honestly the smallest deployable reasonable entity, and combinations should be based on flexibility from that.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> When did Sweden last fight a war…
> I like the concept of the Combined Arms Bn, but I think the Brigade Combat Team is honestly the smallest deployable reasonable entity, and combinations should be based on flexibility from that.


Agreed. And I really don't think much of the Swede's concept of having their battalions in "Regiments" in peacetime but in "brigade groups" during wartime. It's an unnecessary organizational change in structure.

The real question, though, isn't at the brigade level where the wo structures are very similar. The issue is within the combined arms battalion itself.

The US combined arms battalion used to have four companies (two tank [14 tanks each ] and two mech infantry [14 IFVs each] for a total of 56 fighting vehicles). They dropped that to three companies (two battalions with 2 tank 1 infantry [28 +14 = 42] and 1 battalion with 1 tank and 2 infantry [14 + 28 = 42]) or a total of 70 tanks and 56 IFV (total 126 fighting vehicles) in the brigade. (leaving aside command, recce/cavalry and support elements).

The Swedish combined arms battalion on the other hand has slightly smaller companies ( based on three vehicles rather than four per platoon) but more companies (four vice three). (three battalions with 2 tank 2 infantry each [22 + 22 = 44] or 66 tanks and 66 IFV (total 132 fighting vehicles) in the brigade.

Long story short, a Swedish combined arms battalion commander commands slightly more fighting vehicles (11 x 4 = 44) (For a total of 12 manoeuvre companies per brigade) than an American one (14 x 3 = 42) (For a total of 9 manoeuvre companies per brigade) 

So the question is which is preferable? An American battalion/brigade that has more flexibility within the company level by having more vehicles, and therefore stronger platoons and companies but only 75% of the manoeuvre companies? Or a battalion/brigade that has more flexibility at the battalion/brigade level by having 33% more but smaller manoeuvre companies?

I'm dismissing what's coming out of the Ukraine for the time being. While Russian companies are smaller like the Swedish ones, I think that there are entirely too many other factors at play which influence their failures to allow any conclusion as to the effect that platoon and company size have.


----------



## GR66

I like to dream as much as the next person, but in the absence of any actual plans to acquire tracked IFVs, more tanks, re-establish a Brigade (or pre-positioned equipment for one) in Europe, equip the Reserves with combat vehicles or fundamentally restructure the way the Reserves are trained and organized, we need to look at what instead is possible with what we do have.

We have the elements required for a Heavy(ish) Brigade with a Tank Regiment and two LAV Battalions.  We also have the light Battalions which could be grouped together in a Light Infantry Brigade as a quicker to deploy option to the Heavy Brigade.  

Realistically the only time I can see Canada deploying anything as large as a full Brigade Group would be in a peer/near-peer fight against a handful of opponents (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, etc.).  No other threats are likely important enough politically to Canada to justify a military deployment so large.  

Since a Medium Brigade (i.e. LAVs without tanks) would be of limited use in a peer fight then do we need a full Medium Brigade Group?  Could we instead perhaps have three Medium Battle Groups (say 2 x LAV Companies and 1 x Armoured Recce Squadron each) for Peacekeeping/Stability operations?

With 6 x LAV Companies in the Heavy Brigade and 6 x LAV Companies in the Stability Ops Battle Groups (plus the 9 x Light Infantry Companies in the Light Brigade) that would leave 6 x Companies worth of Reg Force infantry available to build a framework around which you could plan Reserve Force mobilization.  

With the lack of dedicated heavy equipment available for the Reserves and the difficulty for the Reserve to train to operate and maintain that equipment, it would make sense to me that any mobilization plan would be based on Light Infantry.

With the above structure we would have 3 x Reg Force Light Infantry Battalions plus 6 x additional Reg Force Infantry Companies.  We also have the Artillery, Engineers and Service Battalions for three Reg Force Brigades.

On mobilization each Brigade could have 1 x Reg Force Light Infantry Battalion and 2 x Hybrid Light Infantry Battalions each with 1 x Reg Force Company and 2 x Reserve Companies.  If we use the existing STAR system of having each Reserve unit generate a single Platoon then we'd need 36 x Reserve Infantry units to fill out the Hybrid Companies.  We currently have 51 x Reserve Infantry Units.  The 15 x additional Infantry units plus the Reserve Armoured units (Recce Platoons), Signal Regiments (Sig Platoons) and CER Regiments (Pioneer Platoons) could be used to fill out the CS Companies for the Hybrid Battalions.  The 19 x Reserve Artillery Regiments and 10 x Reserve Service Battalions should be enough (along with Reg Force units) to fill out a Divisional Artillery and a Sustainment Brigade.

This would give us the capability to force generate a full Light Infantry Division if force expansion were required.


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> Since a Medium Brigade (i.e. LAVs without tanks) would be of limited use in a peer fight then do we need a full Medium Brigade Group?  Could we instead perhaps have three Medium Battle Groups (say 2 x LAV Companies and 1 x Armoured Recce Squadron each) for Peacekeeping/Stability operations?



(1) What does a Armd Recce Sqn give you that a Infantry Company doesn't?  How is an Armd Recce Sqn, with fewer people, more suitable for peacekeeping/stability operations?

(2) How is "three medium battle groups" not a "Medium Brigade?"


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Thanks for the video. I watched the Canadian one as well. That one was interesting for how much the three regiments seem to organize things based on unit SOPs or quiffs.
> 
> The Swedish one actually interested me quite a bit and almost has me at the point where maybe my view that the three (heavy, medium, light) battalions' should fundamentally have the same dismounted organization TTPs etc.
> 
> I do favour the combined arms battalion concept and the Swede's have a lighter, more flexible organization than that found in the ABCT. (Incidentally I see very little purpose in the "regimental" structure other than as a base and training structure that remains in situ after the battalions are assigned to one or the other of the two brigades. I can think of about a dozen better ways of doing that.
> 
> It made me think that with roughly 22 tanks and roughly 30-35 IFVs per battalion we could reorganize 1 CMBG to consist of three Swedish style combined arms battalions and have gear left over to give to the reserves 😉 .
> 
> I'm ambivalent as to whether or not our tankless mechanized battalions should also change to a lighter structure that puts more emphasis on fighting the vehicle rather than the dismounted battle. Cutting 2 and 5 CMBG's 12 x LAV companies to11  LAVs each could generate enough extra LAVs to mechanize the two remaining light battalions' six companies.
> 
> It feels a bit like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic - but maybe with a purpose. *But then there's the Russian BTGs.*
> 
> 🍻



Maybe the Russian BTG is a demonstration of how not to do things.

First the Russian BTG doesn't just organize the Close Combat elements.  It also distributes the Fire Support elements to the BTG.   The Russians can compensate for that with their Arty Brigades so that isn't as much of a hindrance as it might be for us.  We're probably better concentrating the Artillery and Engineers at the Brigade and Division levels.

Second the Russian employment of the BTG:  there seemed to be little evidence of co-ordination in thie war.  From the beginning the emphasis seemed to be to disperse the BTGs, and even their Companies, as broadly as possible.

Armies were assigned sectors. Brigades sent in their BTGs along the width of that sector.  BTGs progressed as far and fast as they could until they ran out of gas or they hit resistance.  If they hit resistance then they held with the engaged company and sent the other companies out looking for parallel routes to employ.   They created a front, metaphorically, a mile wide and an inch deep.  They lacked focus and concentration of forces.  They were not economical in their effort.  There was no mutual support across BTGs, Brigades or Armies or even across the entire invasion force.  And they struggled with administration.  

Although they got their offensive action the only people they surprised were their own (and the rest of the world outside of  Ukraine). They may have selected an aim but they failed to let their troops know about it and the force at large couldn't maintain it.  As a result they also failed to maintain the morale of their troops.

And there seems to have been a lack of unity in command.

They invited defeat in detail.

So the BTG may be more a case of a fair to middling idea, if implemented within the context of the Brigade Group, executed abysmally in practice.

The Combined Arms Battle Group, I think, has much to commend it.

In the Canadian Context that Swedish Battle Group might be compared to a Square Combat Team

22 Leos vs 20 Leos (including the spare)
24 CV9040s vs 15 LAV 6.0s
114 Rifles vs 105 Rifles (Each LAV holds 10 of which 3 stay with the vehicle leaving 7 dismounts from each of 15 LAVs = 105)

So we are not a mile away from fielding 3 such Teams

We can even find healthy Recce Platoons to add to the Team and make a fair fist of a Pioneer Platoon although we lack the AVLBs
The biggest issues are

 the lack of any AD capability, much less a platoon for every Square Combat Team, and

the lack of 8 Self Propelled 120mm Mortars for each Square Combat Team., and

the lack of an AT system for the dismounts.


I you put all of that together then, to replicate the Swedes within our current scheme you would combine the Strathconas and 1 PPCLI at Wainwright.

You would form three Square Combat Teams of one Tank Squadron and one LAV Company with a total of 60 tanks and 45 LAVs and 315 dismounts.

You would form a Recce Coy of 3 Platoons, for each Combat Team.

You would form an Armd Engineer Squadron with 9 AEVs and 3 AVLBs

You would form an RRCA SHORAD Battery with 12 MSHORADs

You would form an RRCA Battery with 24 Self Propelled Mortars (I prefer the AMOS to the Mjolnir) and 12 FOOs.


That would create a deployable Heavyish Medium Force that would need a separate SPH Regiment or 24 guns in support and a MRAD battery, with an additional Force Recce/ISR element (large Sqn or a Bn), a Brigade level Armd Engineer Squadron with AEVs and Bridging Gear.

Then start piling on the logistics support , the meds and the sigs.


The one area the Swedes are deficient is in Medium to Long Range ATGMs.  Bolting on some Javelins to the LAVs would solve that.  Adding some LAMs to the inventory would also be useful.

And now you have, within our means, if not our grasp, one deployable heavy brigade.



And the RCAC has 2 full time regiments left.
The RCIC has 7 full time battalion HQs left
The RRCA has 3 full time regiments with 9 batteries left
The RCE has 3 full time regiments left.

Plus access to the Primary Reserve System


And an insufficiency of transport, logistics, meds and sigs.


Edit:   In this context that CCV project looks to have been another own goal.  An opportunity missed.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> (1) What does a Armd Recce Sqn give you that a Infantry Company doesn't?  How is an Armd Recce Sqn, with fewer people, more suitable for peacekeeping/stability operations?


In a post-Afghanistan world I imagine future peacekeeping/stability operations will be less about direct combat operations by our forces and more about support for indigenous partner forces.  That would include providing area surveillance, etc. including aerial observation (UAVs) which I am assuming will be a near future evolution in our Armoured Recce Squadrons. 

Partly this shift will be due to lessons learned (foreign forces have limited ability to influence local political factors without local forces taking the lead in operations) and a general reluctance to take casualties (and inflict civilian casualties).   


Infanteer said:


> (2) How is "three medium battle groups" not a "Medium Brigade?"


As I don't see Canada ever deploying a full Brigade Group for Stability operations the Battle Groups could be organized to have integral support elements directly at the Battle Group level rather than ad hoc attachments per deployment.  Special capabilities (armour, artillery, etc.) that may only be required for specific missions could still be attached when required, but forward support, engineering/CIED support, Psy-Ops, Comms, etc. which would typically be required on virtually any peacekeeping/stability operation could be integral so that they habitually train together.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> And the RCAC has 2 full time regiments left.
> The RCIC has 7 full time battalion HQs left (Edit - Error - 8  full time battalions left)
> The RRCA has 3 full time regiments with 9 batteries left
> The RCE has 3 full time regiments left.
> 
> Plus access to the Primary Reserve System
> 
> 
> And an insufficiency of transport, logistics, meds and sigs.



And I forgot to add the 2 full time Brigade HQs.

Put that lot together with 1 Cdn Div HQ

and you end up with 

1 Canadian (Armoured) Brigade Group with 3x Combined Arms Battle Groups and a SP Artillery Regiment (Alll Corps)

2 Infantry Brigades with 4 Infantry Battalions each (sort out light, medium,, para, reg, reserve at leisure) (RCIC)
1 Artillery Brigade (RRCA)
1 Divisional Recce/ISR Regiment (RCAC)
1 Divisional Anti Tank Regiment. (RCAC)


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> In a post-Afghanistan world I imagine future peacekeeping/stability operations will be less about direct combat operations by our forces and more about support for indigenous partner forces.  That would include providing area surveillance, etc. including aerial observation (UAVs) which I am assuming will be a near future evolution in our Armoured Recce Squadrons.


Armoured Recce Squadron in Canada is simply a way to keep Armor PY's 
   The fact that people still talk about them like they'd be viable is actually quite humorous at this point.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> In the Canadian Context that Swedish Battle Group might be compared to a Square Combat Team


I don't want to run away from the main theme here, but this and some of the other threads got me thinking. 

For example your discussions about the Marines and their "large" platoons got me wondering if these aren't in reality more like small companies which is what you see with the Swedes.

In the same way, we've discussed the suitability of the LAV 6.0 as to it's usefulness as an IFV. Some here see it on a level of parity. That, and the fact that the two sides fighting right now are not fielding the pinnacle of the state of the art equipment. That makes me say that we shouldn't hesitate to field a battalion made up of Leo 2 A4s and LAV 6.0s. Sure we should strive for better but we shouldn't write off the usefulness of what we have.

Basically we do have enough tanks and enough LAV6s in 1 CMBG to form three Swedish style combined arms battalions. Yup our mortars and TOWs aren't under armour and we don't have a proper cavalry regiment but do have recce. And yes, we do need to use M777s for the guns but basically it's doable.

We could put together a mechanized brigade based on combined arms battalions. If the will was there.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I don't want to run away from the main theme here, but this and some of the other threads got me thinking.
> 
> For example your discussions about the Marines and their "large" platoons got me wondering if these aren't in reality more like small companies which is what you see with the Swedes.
> 
> In the same way, we've discussed the suitability of the LAV 6.0 as to it's usefulness as an IFV. Some here see it on a level of parity. That, and the fact that the two sides fighting right now are not fielding the pinnacle of the state of the art equipment. That makes me say that we shouldn't hesitate to field a battalion made up of Leo 2 A4s and LAV 6.0s. Sure we should strive for better but we shouldn't write off the usefulness of what we have.
> 
> Basically we do have enough tanks and enough LAV6s in 1 CMBG to form three Swedish style combined arms battalions. Yup our mortars and TOWs aren't under armour and we don't have a proper cavalry regiment but do have recce. And yes, we do need to use M777s for the guns but basically it's doable.
> 
> We could put together a mechanized brigade based on combined arms battalions. If the will was there.
> 
> 🍻



Pretty much like every other army, depending on what we decided to field, the commander would just have to do his appreciation and choose his battles accordingly.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I don't want to run away from the main theme here, but this and some of the other threads got me thinking.
> 
> For example your discussions about the Marines and their "large" platoons got me wondering if these aren't in reality more like small companies which is what you see with the Swedes.



Re: Large Platoons... Army Commandos in WW2 contained six 'Troops' of 65 all ranks each.

This specific number was connected to the capacity of the landing craft they raided from, so some similarities with the rationale for the size of the modern armoured Infantry section:


*ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF BRITISH COMMANDOS*
Origin.

During the winter of 1939-1940, and prior to the Norway campaign, twelve independent volunteer companies, one from each of twelve British divisions were formed. These companies were trained to perform especially hazardous tasks in support of divisional operations. Upon conclusion of the Norway campaign, and in June 1940, these twelve companies were formed into six independent battalions. In February 1941, these were regrouped into eleven commandos which now comprise the Special Service (SS) Brigade. Conversation with several officers indicated that while it was believed that this S.S. Brigade originally should have been comprised of Marines, this was not possible at the time as the Royal Marines were unable to furnish the required personnel.

Missions.

The primary mission of the S.S. Brigade is to carry out raids. Raiding parties may vary in size from a small reconnaissance group to a complete commando or even a larger force. Secondary missions are:

(1) To act as an elite or shock assault brigade to seize and hold a bridgehead to cover a landing in force.
(2) To provide especially trained covering forces for any operation.

Organization.

The S.S. Brigade functions under the Advisor for Combined Operations (A.C.O.). The A.C.O. acts in an advisory capacity to, and executes the orders of, the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Imperial Defence Council. The staff of the A.C.O. consists of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Royal Marines. The S.S. Brigade is commanded by a Brigadier who has both an operational and an administrative staff. The Brigade, however, does not train, nor does it function normally as a Brigade, but as separate commandos which are stationed in various parts of the British Isles and abroad. The S.S. Brigade is entirely serviced by the Army.

*The commando consists of approximately 25 officers and 450 enlisted men, all of whom are volunteers. The unit is organized into a commando headquarters and six troops. The former consists of seven officers and 77 enlisted men organized into Administrative, Intelligence, Signal, and Transport Sections. In addition there are attached: one surgeon, seven Royal Army Medical Corps personnel and two Royal Army Ordnance Corps men.

Each troop consists of three officers and 62 enlisted men, organized into a Troop HQS. and two sections. Troop HQS. consists of a Captain (C.O.), a troop sergeant major and an orderly (runner and batman). Each section (1 officer and 30 enlisted men) is commanded by a Lieutenant. The section is composed of two or more subsections (squads of six to eight men each. Subsections are commanded by sergeants. It will be noted that the section is exactly suitable for boating in one Assault Landing Craft (A.L.L.).*



			Organization and Training of British Commandos, WWII Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 1, June 18, 1942 (Lone Sentry)


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I don't want to run away from the main theme here, but this and some of the other threads got me thinking.
> 
> For example your discussions about the Marines and their "large" platoons got me wondering if these aren't in reality more like small companies which is what you see with the Swedes.
> 
> In the same way, we've discussed the suitability of the LAV 6.0 as to it's usefulness as an IFV. Some here see it on a level of parity. That, and the fact that the two sides fighting right now are not fielding the pinnacle of the state of the art equipment. That makes me say that we shouldn't hesitate to field a battalion made up of Leo 2 A4s and LAV 6.0s. Sure we should strive for better but we shouldn't write off the usefulness of what we have.
> 
> Basically we do have enough tanks and enough LAV6s in 1 CMBG to form three Swedish style combined arms battalions. Yup our mortars and TOWs aren't under armour and we don't have a proper cavalry regiment but do have recce. And yes, we do need to use M777s for the guns but basically it's doable.
> 
> We could put together a mechanized brigade based on combined arms battalions. If the will was there.
> 
> 🍻


Do you not risk diminishing the value of your tanks by tying them intimately to a vehicle that has less mobility than they do?  Penny packets of tanks somewhat reminiscent of the Jock Columns of WWII.  A traditional Heavy(-ish) Brigade Group with a Tank Regiment and two LAV Battalions would allow the Tanks to concentrate their power when required but could break into Battle Groups/Company Groups when appropriate.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Do you not risk diminishing the value of your tanks by tying them intimately to a vehicle that has less mobility than they do?


Which is why I think a CV90 type vehicle is the best ISV/IFV for tank equipped Bde and Battle Groups.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Do you not risk diminishing the value of your tanks by tying them intimately to a vehicle that has less mobility than they do?  Penny packets of tanks somewhat reminiscent of the Jock Columns of WWII.  A traditional Heavy(-ish) Brigade Group with a Tank Regiment and two LAV Battalions would allow the Tanks to concentrate their power when required but could break into Battle Groups/Company Groups when appropriate.


I don't think that we have very many potential areas of operations where you can have grand sweeping tank assaults. Most are close terrain dotted with woods and villages, towns and cities where combined arms operations are the norm. US Combined Arms battalions are of two types, two armour heavy and one infantry heavy. Further, ABCT doctrine incorporates attaching companies from one combined arms battalion to the other and as such they could easily generate a pure tank battalion or pure mechanized infantry battalion if appropriate.

I too believe that the LAV is less manoeuvrable than its tracked equivalents but its what we have. I've long been a believer in the Rumsfeldian philosophy of 'going to war with the army you have' so you might as well develop phase 1 of your doctrine to match what you have in hand. That's not to say that you shouldn't have a coherent plan to get you to a phase 2 doctrine which lets you build the army that you need.

One should never forget that the blitzkrieg tactics that are still at the heart of our armoured warfare today, started off with Panzers I and II which basically mounted medium machine guns and a 20mm gun respectively. (and two years later, phase 2 brought Mark III and IVs and shortly after that Phase 3 brought Panthers and Tigers)

🍻


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Do you not risk diminishing the value of your tanks by tying them intimately to a vehicle that has less mobility than they do?  Penny packets of tanks somewhat reminiscent of the Jock Columns of WWII.  A traditional Heavy(-ish) Brigade Group with a Tank Regiment and two LAV Battalions would allow the Tanks to concentrate their power when required but could break into Battle Groups/Company Groups when appropriate.



Ehhh the mobility stuff… the way we move in a combat team, which is really just about ensuring the Tanks and Infantry are in place to mutually support each other for a given operation and have the required support, mitigates a fair bit of the disparity.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Operational mobility was the important characteristic of the early WWII armoured/mechanized/motorized forces.  Size of gun and thickness of armour occasionally tactically important, but the real impact was wheels (and some tracks).


----------



## Skysix

Tangentially, Northern focus? Not seeing it yet just promises, or am I just not looking in the right places? China might be more of a concern than Russia as far as Arctic access and resource exploitation but....









						Corporal Frisk
					

Finnish blogger in reserve, defence and national security.




					corporalfrisk.com


----------



## GK .Dundas

According to all the Canadian experts (Well those that matter anyway) the tank is obsolete in the Canadian context.
The above btw is a quote in a position paper done for the Canadian government in the early 70s .
This is how we almost ended up with Scorpion and we did end up with the Cougar.
We are still feeling the effects and dealing with that paper almost 50 or so  years later. 
Well that we're pretty much an infantry-centric army have been since pre confederation.
The struggle for tactical and strategic mobility is one that we seem to know well. Coming up with working answers seems to be the problem.


----------



## KevinB

Anyone saying the tank is obsolete, probably should be ignored.  
  Of course the tank isn’t a stand alone system, and needs a proper IFV to work effectively, as well as proper Engineering vehicles etc.


----------



## GK .Dundas

KevinB said:


> Anyone saying the tank is obsolete, probably should be ignored.
> Of course the tank isn’t a stand alone system, and needs a proper IFV to work effectively, as well as proper Engineering vehicles etc.


When he happens to be the chief foreign affairs and national security adviser to the Prime Minister, ignoring him is a bit problematic.
Google Ivan Head.


----------



## Ostrozac

KevinB said:


> I like the concept of the Combined Arms Bn, but I think the Brigade Combat Team is honestly the smallest deployable reasonable entity, and combinations should be based on flexibility from that.


On paper, everyone agrees with you on the importance of the brigade. Even policy. From SSE: “The Army trains to fight at the brigade group-level.” We sent a brigade to West Germany and we sent a brigade to Korea. We’ve known this for a while.

But in practice, building brigades is hard work. And building combat teams and battle groups is comparatively easy and fun! And due to internal army politics, some of the most important enablers in modern warfare are being neglected because they are tied to cap badges that lack influence — Signals, EME, Intelligence.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Sometimes I honestly believe I could improve army efficiency by a good 75-80 percent.
The trick is to get the various regimental associations into the same room and make it look like an accident.
And some days I am only partially joking......it doesn't have to look like an accident..
We really are our own worst enemy.


----------



## Kirkhill

GK .Dundas said:


> Sometimes I honestly believe I could improve army efficiency by a good 75-80 percent.
> The trick is to get the various regimental associations into the same room and make it look like an accident.
> And some days I am only partially joking......it doesn't have to look like an accident..
> We really are our own worst enemy.



Reorganization by hand-grenade.  Call the meeting.  Step out.  Toss in hand grenade. Close door.  Wait 10 secs.  Open door.  Reorg whatever is left over.

I went through that with a Swedish manager parachuted into a Danish company.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Ostrozac said:


> On paper, everyone agrees with you on the importance of the brigade. Even policy. From SSE: “The Army trains to fight at the brigade group-level.” We sent a brigade to West Germany and we sent a brigade to Korea. We’ve known this for a while.
> 
> *But in practice, building brigades is hard work. And building combat teams and battle groups is comparatively easy and fun! And due to internal army politics, some of the most important enablers in modern warfare are being neglected because they are tied to cap badges that lack influence — Signals, EME, Intelligence.*


This.

We have gutted capabilities in CS and CSS, in favor of bolstering the pointy end.

As the Russian folly in Ukraine shows, doesn't matter how awesome your combat capabilities are, they need to be able to get to the objective, with proper int, and with an ability to pass the message back when things are entirely fucked.

The fact is most of our B Fleet is completely rusting out (MSVS SMP excluded... but with some problems). It's all well and good to have LAV6 and ACSV coming online, but those beasts need a lot to keep moving.

If you can't move parts, fuel, ammunition, or food to service those crews in the 2nd or 3rd Line of Support... then you're hooped. If you can't communicate effectively throughout the battle space, because your Comms suites are junk, you're hooped. If you lack the ability to paint an adequate threat picture within the AO, you're hooped.


----------



## FJAG

GK .Dundas said:


> According to all the Canadian experts (Well those that matter anyway) the tank is obsolete in the Canadian context.


This seems to be the overall defence strategy that Canadian leadership follows which is "defence by being inconspicuous". The hope that if you don't threaten anyone, they will leave you alone. That policy becomes more and more difficult as the natural resources of the North (which during the age of various dinosaurs was a lovely temperate sea absolutely perfect for laying down hydrocarbon resources) become ever more accessible through modern technology.

Tanks matter in a European and NATO context. By not being there to deter aggression against NATO, we invite our allies asking "what have you done for us lately, Canada?" when Russian or Chinese research vessels start explorations in what we claim as our domain.

To say that tanks do not matter in a Canadian context is simplistic but seems to be perfectly matched to our present simplistic foreign policy.

🍻


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Tanks are good at moving firepower and support close to the fight, and rather quickly. 

ATGM crews have maneuverability in the urban environment, but getting fire and support cross country requires wheels/rotors to get them to the fight. If your Anti-Armour option is moving those ATGM crews by truck ot helicopter, you have firepower moving in soft targets.

Tanks are great in large, vast, open areas.... like ...you know... most of the country outside of the coastal areas and urban areas. Much of Eastern/South Western Ontario is on par with Ukraine for farmland and open space. Prairies moreover. To think Canada doesn't need Tanks is to think we can defend our country from its capital.


----------



## Infanteer

rmc_wannabe said:


> Tanks are great in large, vast, open areas.... like ...you know... most of the country outside of the coastal areas and urban areas. Much of Eastern/South Western Ontario is on par with Ukraine for farmland and open space. Prairies moreover. To think Canada doesn't need Tanks is to think we can defend our country from its capital.



Tanks are also great in urban areas and close terrain.  Data indicates that friendly force casualties decline significantly when operating in urban terrain with tanks.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Infanteer said:


> Tanks are also great in urban areas and close terrain.  Data indicates that friendly force casualties decline significantly when operating in urban terrain with tanks.


That too. True combined arms operations are a beautiful situation. 

Whatever the hell it is the Russians are doing.... not so much


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Tanks are also great in urban areas and close terrain.  Data indicates that friendly force casualties decline significantly when operating in urban terrain with tanks.


Everyone shoots at tanks.  It keeps them from shooting at me - which is good.  

Based on my own experiences people often shoot a lot of utterly useless systems at tanks - but heck if that MG is shooting at a tank - it’s not shooting at folks with less armor.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Part of the problem is we are a infantry-centric army. And we've developed a rather bizarre attitude towards armour 
 Strangely enough it strikes me that attitude is the same as the  Israeli armoured force during the early part of the 73' war.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GK .Dundas said:


> Part of the problem is we are a infantry-centric *cost shy* army. And we've developed a rather bizarre attitude towards armour
> Strangely enough it strikes me that attitude is the same as the  Israeli armoured force during the early part of the 73' war.



I _think _I FTFY.

Infantry is cheaper than tanks, GBAD, MLRS, modern logistics vehicles and a host of other 'important to the survival of a modern Army' things, so it's easier to argue for keeping them around.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> I _think _I FTFY.
> 
> Infantry is cheaper than tanks, GBAD, MLRS, modern logistics vehicles and a host of other 'important to the survival of a modern Army' things, so it's easier to argue for keeping them around.


Interesting thought.

I would think that the cost of producing a given armoured vehicle (whether tank or IFV or MLRS, or SP) ought not to vary very much albeit that development costs and production costs etc would - based on the scale of production. Of course in reality they do but still a battalion of tanks do not cost significantly more than a battalion of IFVs (look at AJAX for example). On the other hand there are costs for annual upkeep which have to be factored in as well and here, personnel numbers play a role. Tanks generally have lower manning than infantry. The Congressional Budget Office has a handy tool for comparing costs of different establishments (which are all-in costs).

What's really interesting to note is that first of all an ABCT (at 4,040) has less people in it than an SBCT  (4,680) and an IBCT  (4,560) meaning there is almost a full battalion's worth of annual salaries that do not need paying in an ABCT. There are more annual costs in other fields though (maintenance, fuel, ammunition) because at the end of the day, the overall annual all-in costs for an ABCT, SBCT and IBCT are virtually identical ($3.5 billion, $3.4 billion and $3.2 billion - remember these are all-up O&M costs including share of HQs, infrastructure, civilian workforce etc, etc). What's key here is that an ABCT costs about the same every year as an SBCT or IBCT.

There is obviously a difference for an up front capital cost as between the three (especially the IBCT which is very equipment light) but its really the continuing annual costs which show that once acquired it doesn't matter what type of brigade you have cost wise.

It's also very interesting to note that National Guard brigades of each type have annual recurring costs of $1.0; $0.9; and $0.9 billion respectively. Less than a third of that of their Active Army counterparts.

The overall conclusion that I take away from all this is that cost, especially annual recurring costs, should never be a factor in deciding force structure. First and foremost should be the national defence strategy. What purpose is the force to fulfill in peacetime and the various potential wartime roles? This will determine whether you need an infantry-centric, mech infantry-centric or armour centric-force. 

Further it should dictate what portion of the force you should allocate to a full-time and a part-time force. For me the logical conclusion is that in peacetime we need a light, rapidly deployable infantry centric force with some mech infantry while for wartime we should concentrate on a heavy force with all the necessary enablers much of which should be a properly organized, trained and equipped part-time force.

But I've said that before. The above numbers merely explain why.

🍻


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:


> I _think _I FTFY.
> 
> Infantry is cheaper than tanks, GBAD, MLRS, modern logistics vehicles and a host of other 'important to the survival of a modern Army' things, so it's easier to argue for keeping them around.


Well that too. 😉


----------



## Kirkhill

US Army has released the TOET for the M-SHORAD battalions.

40x Stryker M-SHORAD
20x Stryker (or MRAP)  ISC & AMB (total)
100x JLTV (or HMMWV)
75x Support Vehicles and Trailers
550x Gunners

4 Battalions to be fielded



> Training will also require installations to have protected airspace, to a minimum of 25,000-30,000 feet above ground level, according to the assessment. Live fire training will include Stinger and Longbow Hellfire missiles shooting down unmanned aerial vehicles.
> 
> Each battalion will require approximately 19.6 acres worth of dedicated facilities, including headquarters, maintenance facilities, parking, housing and dining, according to the assessment.







__





						Army releases fielding requirements for M-SHORAD battalions | InsideDefense.com
					

Each battalion of the Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense will include 40 M-SHORAD vehicles, along with roughly 270 additional ground vehicles and trailers, according to a programmatic environmental assessment for M-SHORAD fielding.




					insidedefense.com
				






> Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) is an Air Defense Artillery capability which moves and maneuvers in direct support of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to destroy, neutralize or deter low altitude aerial threats, including *Group 3 UAS*, rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft.








						Maneuver Short Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) | Leonardo DRS
					

With the M-SHORAD Mission Equipment Package (MEP) on a purpose-built Stryker, Warfighters maneuver with tactical units to detect, identify, track and defeat air threats.



					www.leonardodrs.com
				




That still leaves the ground elements vulnerable to attack by swarms of Group 2 and 1 UAS.


UAS GroupMaximum weight
(lb) (MGTOW)Nominal operating
altitude (ft)Speed (kn)Representative UASGroup 10–20< 1,200 AGL100RQ-11 Raven, WASP, Puma, Drone40, Switchblade 300, Coyote, Hero-120,Group 221–55< 3,500 AGL< 250ScanEagle, Flexrotor, SIC5, Switchblade 600, Spike N-LOSGroup 3< 1,320< FL 18,000V-BAT, RQ-7B Shadow, RQ-21 Blackjack, Navmar RQ-23 Tigershark, Arcturus-UAV Jump 20, Arcturus T-20, SIC25, Resolute ISR Resolute Eagle, Vanilla,Group 4> 1,320Any airspeedMQ-8B Fire Scout, MQ-1A/B Predator, MQ-1C Gray EagleGroup 5> FL 18,000MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-4C Triton


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> US Army has released the TOET for the M-SHORAD battalions.


Interesting. Thanks for that.

I should note that so far only the 5-4 AD has converted from Avenger to SHORAD. All the other Active Army AD Battalions with Avenger (there are 5 of them) are mixed Avenger and Patriot or C-RAM battalions. There are also 7 ARNG pure Avenger battalions.

If the Army is going to convert three more battalions it will be interesting to see which ones it will be. Like us, new toys frequently end up in Active Army hands whether they really need to be there or not.

😁


----------



## Kirkhill

Another piece of the air defence puzzle?



> This Footage Of Jet-Powered Coyote Drones Obliterating Other Drones Is Incredible
















						This Footage Of Jet-Powered Coyote Drones Obliterating Other Drones Is Incredible
					

Coyote doesn't play around when it comes to blowing other drones to bits. The explosions alone make the video worth watching.




					www.thedrive.com


----------



## Underway

GK .Dundas said:


> Sometimes I honestly believe I could improve army efficiency by a good 75-80 percent.
> The trick is to get the various regimental associations into the same room and make it look like an accident.
> And some days I am only partially joking......it doesn't have to look like an accident..
> We really are our own worst enemy.


You wouldn't have to make it look like an accident.  Just tell them they get to decide which one of the Regiments are being disbanded or combined.  Walk away.



rmc_wannabe said:


> To think Canada doesn't need Tanks is to think we can defend our country from its capital.


Army combat operations are _for the away game only _(baring a few specific capabilities that happen to fall under the army).  The defense of Canada is a cyber, space, air and naval war.  This means any discussion of army reorganization and equipment should focus entirely on that reality.  In this case, we need tanks because the away game needs tanks to be relevant.

How to work better with and integrate into a US/NATO division, as well as bringing all the self-sufficient capabilities to a Brigade so we are self-reliant/plug and play, should be the focus.  It's within our grasp, is basically our doctrine, and aligns with the US doctrine (more or less) as well.


----------



## KevinB

Underway said:


> How to work better with and integrate into a US/NATO division, as well as bringing all the self-sufficient capabilities to a Brigade so we are self-reliant/plug and play, should be the focus.  It's within our grasp, is basically our doctrine, and aligns with the US doctrine (more or less) as well.



I’m of the opinion that 1 CMBG should be changed into an ABCT - and ‘twinned’ to a US Corps ( III or V) playing with them as much as possible. 

2 CMBG should become a Light Bde and work with XVIII Airborne Corps.  

5 ideally would become a SBCT or probably more practically setup along a USMC Organization (that would require a significant RCAF and RCN buy in however).


----------



## Underway

KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion that 1 CMBG should be changed into an ABCT - and ‘twinned’ to a US Corps ( III or V) playing with them as much as possible.
> 
> 2 CMBG should become a Light Bde and work with XVIII Airborne Corps.


We still need our own independent military as our own agent.  There's nothing wrong with exercises etc... but you can only go so far before US planners will just start assuming our unit will deploy with theirs, or that we become to reliant on each other instead of ourselves.  Teamwork is good but we need to do our own thing for our own soverignty.



KevinB said:


> 5 ideally would become a SBCT or probably more practically setup along a USMC Organization (that would require a significant RCAF and RCN buy in however).



It's not RCN buy-in that's needed.  It's CA buy-in.  The death of the Big Honking Ship was because of the army.  The RCN floated the idea and was fully on board (puns intended) but the army was never really interested.  The only way this happens is if there is either a strong strategic imperative (there isn't), political pressure (nothing there) or that the Navy is allowed to create and fund their own Marine Commando (which they won't).  Only SOF cares and JSS/ CSC/ AOPS has already been designed to accommodate them to an extent.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion that 1 CMBG should be changed into an ABCT - and ‘twinned’ to a US Corps ( III or V) playing with them as much as possible.
> 
> 2 CMBG should become a Light Bde and work with XVIII Airborne Corps.
> 
> 5 ideally would become a SBCT or probably more practically setup along a USMC Organization (that would require a significant RCAF and RCN buy in however).




Or, you could form 1 CMBG into an ABCT-ish Brigade of Combined Arms Battalions with the kit available, and 5 CMBG become a SBCT-ish Brigade of Motorized Infantry equipped with the LAV 6.0s.   And combine them to create an Armoured Division of the the 1944 pattern.


By Noclador - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, File:Great Britain World War II Armoured Division Structure 1944.png - Wikimedia Commons

That employs 8 of the 12 RCAC and RCIC regular force units.  That still leaves  4 units for the 2 CMBG Light force  with a Defence of North America focus but robust enough to accept foreign deployments as a QRF.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Or, you could form 1 CMBG into an ABCT-ish Brigade of Combined Arms Battalions with the kit available, and 5 CMBG become a SBCT-ish Brigade of Motorized Infantry equipped with the LAV 6.0s.   And combine them to create an Armoured Division of the the 1944 pattern.
> 
> View attachment 71220
> By Noclador - Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, File:Great Britain World War II Armoured Division Structure 1944.png - Wikimedia Commons
> 
> That employs 8 of the 12 RCAC and RCIC regular force units.  That still leaves  4 units for the 2 CMBG Light force  with a Defence of North America focus but robust enough to accept foreign deployments as a QRF.



1 CMBG - RCD, LdSH(RC), 12RBC, 1 PPCLI
5 CMBG - 1,2,3 R22eR
Div Recce and MG Coy - 2 PPCLI
DAG - 1 RCHA, 5 RALC, 4GS RCA

2 CMBG - 1,2,3 RCR,  3 PPCLI,  2 RCHA.

The Division focuses on Europe and working with JEF in NATO

2 CMBG focuses on North America and working with the RCAF, CJOC, the Joint Task Forces, NORAD and Northcom in conjunction with 11th Abn Div in Alaska.


NB:  And I only include the nameplates to demonstrate that we have an adequate number of HQs.  I don't really care which regiment, battalion, squadron or company goes where or what their detailed role or organization is.


----------



## Kirkhill

With respect to Force 2025 Artillery.

The Ukrainians have apparently adopted a regiment of 18 Caesar L52 155mms, trained crews in two weeks and started employing the first battery of 6 guns on Counter-Battery operations.   They seem to be operating in troops of 3 and engaging in shoot-and-scoot activities.


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/v60t1s


----------



## daftandbarmy

FWIW...

Based on videos like this I'm thinking that ATGM systems like TOW are still relevant:


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Further it should dictate what portion of the force you should allocate to a full-time and a part-time force. For me the logical conclusion is that in peacetime we need a light, rapidly deployable infantry centric force with some mech infantry while for wartime we should concentrate on a heavy force with all the necessary enablers much of which should be a properly organized, trained and equipped part-time force.


And here's the dilemma in which the Canadian Army finds itself:

Logical Structure:

Full-time, rapidly deployable Light Forces
Largely Part-time, wartime deployable Heavy Forces

Current Structure:

Full-time Heavy AND Light Forces.
Part-time force that lacks the equipment, technical support, training structure/capability, geographic concentration of training areas and support bases to generate wartime Heavy forces without major fundamental changes to the Reserve (and Reg Force) systems, but can potentially generate Light forces (with less radical changes) but don't have the ability to rapidly deploy by their nature of being Part-time.

I don't think that there are really any easy solutions to the situation unfortunately.  A couple possible courses of action are:

Status Quo.  Tinker with the Reg Force structure (asymmetric Brigades) to make them more efficient.  Reserves remain primarily a source of individual augmentees and troops for domestic aid to civil powers efforts.
Undertake a fundamental restructuring of the Reserve system to create a part-time force that is capable of generating Heavy forces and enablers during wartime.  Would have to include legislative and structural changes, equipment investment, possibly new training areas and Reg Force support facilities closer to Reserve unit concentrations, etc.
Maintain a full-time Heavy Brigade capability and focus the Reserves on expansion of our Light forces from a Brigade perhaps to a Division during wartime.  May require less dramatic structural changes and equipment purchases than restructuring for a Heavy force focused Reserves but would still require significant work to make it happen (including dealing with training/support facility issues).
Do a complete rethink on what kind of forces we can offer to our allies during a major conflict.  Does our contribution have to be a Heavy/Medium/Light Brigade Group?  Could we instead focus on generating more specialized units (Artillery or SHORAD Brigades, etc.) instead which may possibly be easier to generate with our current Reserve structure?

Anything other than Option 1 (status quo with tinkering) will require much more imagination, effort and money than the Army is likely willing to spend.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion that 1 CMBG should be changed into an ABCT - and ‘twinned’ to a US Corps ( III or V) playing with them as much as possible.
> 
> 2 CMBG should become a Light Bde and work with XVIII Airborne Corps.
> 
> 5 ideally would become a SBCT or probably more practically setup along a USMC Organization (that would require a significant RCAF and RCN buy in however).


That's my thought in essence but I think it falls into what I call the "Canadian Trap" in that it doesn't call for a plan to grow the Army.

I'm a firm follower of this:



> Even more important, Canada’s military has neither a real plan nor an ability to expand its standing forces into something larger in a crisis. As J.L Granatstein and LGen (ret’d) Charles Belzile stated when discussing mobilization (or “activation”) of the reserves in their ten year review of the Special Commission of the Restructuring of the Reserves 1995:
> 
> _... Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war.
> 
> This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.
> 
> The Canadian Forces needs a plan.*[1]*_
> 
> 
> [1] J.L. Granatstein and LGen (retd) Charles Belzile, _The Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later _Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Calgary, 2005  p. 12
> https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.n...cturing_The_Reserves_-_English.pdf?1413661138



There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that we need to form heavy, medium and light forces, preferably at the brigade group level. Canada should make a plan which concentrates on a peacetime light to medium force and a wartime heavy force with the former being dominated by the full-time Army and the later by a hybrid full/part-time Army. What could be reduced to one or two full-time brigades should be complemented by an additional four to six hybrid full/part-time brigades (enabler formations included) which could be mobilized for major emergencies including war.

IMHO, those who believe that there will never be a need for a large fighting force are still drinking the 2000-2005 Kool-Aid of the all singing and dancing medium force and have not learned the lessons of how true deterrence operates in a modern world.

Once the decision is made to have a core full-time element and an expandable hybrid full/part-time force then all the decisions respecting infrastructure, organization, equipment, terms of service, training, career paths, etc etc can fall into place.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> And here's the dilemma in which the Canadian Army finds itself:
> 
> Logical Structure:
> 
> Full-time, rapidly deployable Light Forces
> Largely Part-time, wartime deployable Heavy Forces
> 
> Current Structure:
> 
> Full-time Heavy AND Light Forces.
> Part-time force that lacks the *HIGH QUALITY LEADERSHIP *equipment, technical support, training structure/capability, geographic concentration of training areas and support bases to generate wartime Heavy forces without major fundamental changes to the Reserve (and Reg Force) systems, but can potentially generate Light forces (with less radical changes) but don't have the ability to rapidly deploy by their nature of being Part-time.



I think you accidentally left one out....

... I believe that if we fix this issue first, which is pretty much fully within our control right now, many others might be addressed in due course as a result.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> That's my thought in essence but I think it falls into what I call the "Canadian Trap" in that it doesn't call for a plan to grow the Army.
> 
> I'm a firm follower of this:
> 
> 
> 
> There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that we need to form heavy, medium and light forces, preferably at the brigade group level. Canada should make a plan which concentrates on a peacetime light to medium force and a wartime heavy force with the former being dominated by the full-time Army and the later by a hybrid full/part-time Army. What could be reduced to one or two full-time brigades should be complemented by an additional four to six hybrid full/part-time brigades (enabler formations included) which could be mobilized for major emergencies including war.
> 
> IMHO, those who believe that there will never be a need for a large fighting force are still drinking the 2000-2005 Kool-Aid of the all singing and dancing medium force and have not learned the lessons of how true deterrence operates in a modern world.
> 
> Once the decision is made to have a core full-time element and an expandable hybrid full/part-time force then all the decisions respecting infrastructure, organization, equipment, terms of service, training, career paths, etc etc can fall into place.
> 
> 🍻


I would mirror the Bdes with the PRes.
  Ideally some would be total force and future force able to generate DIV’s of Light, Shmedium, and Heavy.
 I’d start by rolling the non US ABCT equipment to the reserve Heavy Force - and backfill as new items come on line.

I’m of the opinion Canada needs to change its employment model - and ensure that Reg force personnel can be recalled for 10years after (and PRes at least 5) as well as some mandatory training annually for those SRR type personnel.

The US Mil does this, and it makes this NG and Res system a lot more robust.


----------



## McG

KevinB said:


> SRR


The Sup Ready Res no longer exists.  Both halves of the Sup Res were fused into a single thing about 17 years ago.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I don't think that there are really any easy solutions to the situation unfortunately. A couple possible courses of action are:
> 
> Status Quo. Tinker with the Reg Force structure (asymmetric Brigades) to make them more efficient. Reserves remain primarily a source of individual augmentees and troops for domestic aid to civil powers efforts.


This option hasn't worked for over a half of a century. It needs to be utterly abandoned.


GR66 said:


> Undertake a fundamental restructuring of the Reserve system to create a part-time force that is capable of generating Heavy forces and enablers during wartime. Would have to include legislative and structural changes, equipment investment, possibly new training areas and Reg Force support facilities closer to Reserve unit concentrations, etc.


That's key. Equipment investment would have to come in stages as capabilities grow. Easily phased.


GR66 said:


> Maintain a full-time Heavy Brigade capability and focus the Reserves on expansion of our Light forces from a Brigade perhaps to a Division during wartime. May require less dramatic structural changes and equipment purchases than restructuring for a Heavy force focused Reserves but would still require significant work to make it happen (including dealing with training/support facility issues).


Maintaining a full-time heavy brigade is counter-productive to putting full-time forces into places that are used day-to-day in peacetime. There definitely have to be enough full-time personnel involved to become subject matter experts, trainers and leaders, maintainers, and be able to generate an small quick reaction element to support peace-time deployments (if any). The main intend of having reserves in a heavy force is to leverage the cost benefit (roughly 1/3) of annual recurring costs of the brigade due to the fact that it is the least likely force to be deployed during peacetime.


GR66 said:


> Do a complete rethink on what kind of forces we can offer to our allies during a major conflict. Does our contribution have to be a Heavy/Medium/Light Brigade Group? Could we instead focus on generating more specialized units (Artillery or SHORAD Brigades, etc.) instead which may possibly be easier to generate with our current Reserve structure?


That is a possibility and open to debate. My view is that in order to fully understand army operations you need the ability to both study and practice the principles and processes. There is also a political angle which is to be seen by others to be contributing. A Canadian flag representing a Canadian heavy brigade in an American armoured division has much more political impact then several small markers for an artillery or a SHORAD battalion. That's an impact for both our allies and our potential enemies in a deterrence structure. It's for this reason as well that I favour a flyover brigade commitment.


GR66 said:


> Anything other than Option 1 (status quo with tinkering) will require much more imagination, effort and money than the Army is likely willing to spend.


I'm not so sure money is an issue. One can phase this initially so that only existing forces and equipment is involved. (Call that riding with training wheels). As the organization matures (and supposing you used the time) you can move to phase 2 where new equipment comes on board. Basically we have the heavy equipment already for two relatively fully equipped medium brigade groups. We can use it to form the core of a heavy brigade and a medium brigade in phase 1. As we acquire equipment for a heavy brigade its existing medium equipment transitions to form a second medium brigade for phase 2. We also already have much of the equipment for a light brigade whether we need another light brigade or not needs to be examined. If yes, its relatively inexpensive. We can probably repurpose much existing equipment to create CSS units but would need some additional CS equipment. The main point is that if there is a logical plan then the equipment acquisition can flow from it over time.

Imagination and effort is definitely needed. I'll add something else. A Champion with a vision. The last one of those we had , IMHO, destroyed the Army and made it what it is today because he was too narrow in interpreting the challenges facing the world.

🍻


KevinB said:


> I would mirror the Bdes with the PRes.
> Ideally some would be total force and future force able to generate DIV’s of Light, Shmedium, and Heavy.


I'd make them all total force with day-to-day peacetime elements being 70-100% Reg F and war-time deterrent forces being roughly 30% Reg F.

As to divisions; I'd focus on one deployable divisional HQ targeted on Europe and heavy forces and being the core of a multinational division. It should have one Canadian heavy brigade, an option for a Canadian medium brigade and other nation's brigades as available (preferably a heavy one). We should also provide the requisite divisional enablers by way of a CS and a CSS brigade. I do not see a need or opportunity to deploy any additional divisional headquarters.



KevinB said:


> I’d start by rolling the non US ABCT equipment to the reserve Heavy Force - and backfill as new items come on line.


That's my thought. If one starts with one Leo armoured regiment, a cavalry/reconnaissance regiment, and two LAV battalions then that's good enough for a starter for manoeuvre forces. Once we backfill with proper IFVs (which for me is priority 2; proper arty and AD is priority 1 and replacing Leos is far down the list until other kit is in place), the LAVs can move to a second medium brigade.



KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion Canada needs to change its employment model - and ensure that Reg force personnel can be recalled for 10years after (and PRes at least 5) as well as some mandatory training annually for those SRR type personnel.


Agreed on changing the employment model. I also think that the SRR concept is needed considering we always seem to be short people. Not so sure about the 5 and 10 year and mandatory training elements. First there is skill fade - especially as new equipment comes on line - and second, if one doesn't have equipment for them to man then they are useless. (I'm assuming personnel casualties and equipment casualties will run at roughly the same rate) I would need to see some actual numbers run in order to determine how large the SRR needs to be, how long service should be and if there is a need for refresher training. My gut tells me that if we had a three-year SRR period with no training requirement then we would probably fill our needs adequately with no additional costs other than keeping the pers info current.



KevinB said:


> The US Mil does this, and it makes this NG and Res system a lot more robust.


I didn't think that the various ready reserve categories had any training requirement. I do think there is a lot to be said for some of the requirements and benefits of the various ready reserve components that Canada should look at. Our problem is that we have had very, very little use out of the SupRes and as a result no one considers it even worth the paperwork involved. I personally think that a graduated career that lets a person transition easily between RegF, PRes and SupRes and all subject to one overarching personnel management system that takes Gunner Bloggins from recruiting through DP1 training to eventual retirement is the only way to go.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I didn't think that the various ready reserve categories had any training requirement.


They do, I'm not 100% on all of it, but I know several who ETS'd and had to do Active segments in the Reserves.
   Some where very weird - as a buddy of mine ended up as USMC SSG Infantryman in an Armored Unit due to location and ended up becoming a Qualified Crew Commander.
   It seems to have something to do with Active Time in Service, as to what ones commitment to Reserve active dates are required after regular service, pensionable time as it where.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I would mirror the Bdes with the PRes.
> Ideally some would be total force and future force able to generate DIV’s of Light, Shmedium, and Heavy.
> I’d start by rolling the non US ABCT equipment to the reserve Heavy Force - and backfill as new items come on line.
> 
> I’m of the opinion Canada needs to change its employment model - and ensure that Reg force personnel can be recalled for 10years after (and PRes at least 5) as well as some mandatory training annually for those SRR type personnel.
> 
> The US Mil does this, and it makes this NG and Res system a lot more robust.



British Army Reforms at the time they buggered off back to Blighty and left John A's mob to figure it out on their own.



> The Act of 1870 allowed a soldier to choose to spend time in the reserves rather than the regulars and be paid fourpence a day, in return for a short period of training each year and an obligation to serve when called up. Men now enlisted for a maximum term of twelve years. The minimum length of actual service required varied according to branch: six years for infantry,[15][16][17] eight years for line cavalry and artillery, twelve years for the Household Cavalry, three years for the Army Service Corps.[18][19] On discharge, a soldier in any corps would now remain with the reserves for the remainder of his twelve-year term, under the umbrella of the First Class Army Reserve. (In subsequent years, soldiers entering the reserve to serve the remainder of their time would be classified as either Section A or Section B Army Reserve.[20]) As to the proportion of time spent on active service with the colours versus the balance in the reserve, this was to be laid down from time to time by the Secretary of State for War.[15][21][22] In 1881, short service for the infantry was increased to seven years with the colours, and five with the reserve, of the twelve-year enlistment period.[23][24][25]
> 
> There was opposition to short-term enlistment both in Parliament and among the Army's senior officers. The Queen is said to have signed the Act into Law "most reluctantly",[26] but the system worked, producing an immediate increase in the army's strength. While a number of long-service NCOs still chose to remain with the colours for the maximum service permitted of twenty-one years, the great majority of soldiers passed into the reserve at the end of their initial enlistments. By 1900 the reservists numbered about 80,000 trained men, still relatively young and available to be recalled to their units at short notice in the event of general mobilisation.[27]











						Cardwell Reforms - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






> *Before 1825 a regiment consisted of eight Companies, of which one skeleton Company was left at home during war, to recruit men and furnish reliefs. In that year, Palmerston raised the number of Companies to ten, to be treated as one battalion at home, but during war, six were to go abroad as a service battalion, and four to remain at home as a Depot. Thus Cardwell's reform was nearly anticipated....*
> 
> *....Now the Infantry Private's pay was still 1/- a day, apart from 1d. beer money, from this was deducted the actual cost of the ration up to 6d. (the ration was fixed in 1813 at 1lb. of bread and 12 oz. of(meat). But as the actual cost was always in excess of 6d, the deduction remained stable at 6d. A further 3½d. was deducted to cover a miscellany of items - washing, barrack damages, and the renewal of jacket, cap, shirts, brushes, soap, sponge, haversack, razor and mittens. The balance of 2½d. was paid daily. There was not much left here for suppers and coffee or tobacco or spirits. Yet in 1834 William Cobbett actually advocated the reduction of the soldier's pay from which fate he was saved by the Poor Law Commission reporting that the soldier was worse paid than any other class, and comparing his standard of comfort unfavourably with that of both paupers and convicts.*





> *Twenty years later the terms of service were altered with the idea of building up a Reserve. Though service had been unlimited in theory, it was found that the great majority of soldiers took their discharge after 15 years, one fourth of them every year buying their discharge, one fourth retiring on pension, and one half deserting or otherwise getting away. It was sensibly decided to face these facts; and the period of service in the infantry was limited to 10 years and in the cavalry to 12, after which, with the C.O's approval, the soldier could re-enlist for a further 11 or 12 respectively.*
> 
> 
> *The attempt was made to tack on to this a scheme by which men who retired after, the first period should, if they enrolled for 22 years, and do 12 days training annual1y, get a deferred pension of 6d. a day; *





> *In 1867 a Royal Commission on Recruiting made many recommendations, some of which were adopted. Thus enlistment was to be for general service and not for special Regiments. The rate of pay was increased by 2d. a day (in lieu of the recommendation to issue a supply of necessaries free and to increase the meat ration). Re-engagement was to give an extra 1d. a day, but the first period of service was lengthened from 10 to 12 years. The Commission considered the enlistment of men for 12 years, of which part would be with the Colours and part with the Reserve, but rejected it on the grounds that soldiers would not easily find employment after, say, seven years with the Colours, and, thereafter, would not readily be found if called up . It was left for Cardwell to adopt this in 1870, whereby the question of a Reserve was solved.*








						Notes on Army Pay 4
					






					rapc-association.org.uk
				






> The Act of 1870 allowed a soldier to choose to spend time in the reserves rather than the regulars and be paid fourpence a day, in return for a short period of training each year and an obligation to serve when called up.



The problem isn't new.  The solution was found in Britain as well as Kevin's America.

In Britain the soldiers weren't paid off on release.  They were, effectively treated like officers who had traditionally been kept available to the Crown by putting them on Half-Pay.  Other ranks being other ranks were retained on One Third Pay for the remainder of their 12 year combined Regular and Reserve engagement.

In Canadian Service a First Class Reserve Soldier would be a fully trained and experienced soldier with 5 to 7 years more service to the Crown drawing an annual pay of $23,412 assuming quitting the colours as a Standard 5B Corporal Pay Increment 4.  For that $23,412 the Corporal was required to show up for a short period of training each year and an obligation to serve when called up,  at which point he would revert to full pay for the duration.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Maintaining a full-time heavy brigade is counter-productive to putting full-time forces into places that are used day-to-day in peacetime. There definitely have to be enough full-time personnel involved to become subject matter experts, trainers and leaders, maintainers, and be able to generate an small quick reaction element to support peace-time deployments (if any). The main intend of having reserves in a heavy force is to leverage the cost benefit (roughly 1/3) of annual recurring costs of the brigade due to the fact that it is the least likely force to be deployed during peacetime.





FJAG said:


> I'm not so sure money is an issue. One can phase this initially so that only existing forces and equipment is involved. (Call that riding with training wheels). As the organization matures (and supposing you used the time) you can move to phase 2 where new equipment comes on board. Basically we have the heavy equipment already for two relatively fully equipped medium brigade groups. We can use it to form the core of a heavy brigade and a medium brigade in phase 1. As we acquire equipment for a heavy brigade its existing medium equipment transitions to form a second medium brigade for phase 2. We also already have much of the equipment for a light brigade whether we need another light brigade or not needs to be examined. If yes, its relatively inexpensive. We can probably repurpose much existing equipment to create CSS units but would need some additional CS equipment. The main point is that if there is a logical plan then the equipment acquisition can flow from it over time.


I'm going to push back a little on these.  What you are saying makes sense if you make the assumption that we are going to use the Reserves to expand our Heavy forces during wartime.  While I agree with the goal I am simply not convinced that the very substantial changes required to the Army, the Reserves and the equipment budget will be there to make it a reality.  There are so many other major military procurement items (ships, fighters, MPA's, NORAD upgrades, SP Artillery, SHORAD, ATGMs, etc.) pending that will take priority over new money for IFVs, a forward deployed Brigade (or prepositioned equipment) in Europe or the major structural changes that would be required to make the Army/Reserves match your vision that I simply don't see it happening.  If the CF leadership is giving no indication that such a change is in the cards, then what is the point of acting like it's going to happen?  

That being said, if for example expanding the number of tank Regiments beyond one is not in the cards, what is the minimum Reg Force cadre that you need to maintain to sustain the capability?  I bet it's likely not much less than a full Regiment.  Could you sustain expertise in tank operations with a single Reg Force Squadron?  With two Squadrons?  Do you need a full Regiment in order to maintain the Brigade-level combined arms expertise as well as the required leadership skills progression?  

As for the LAV-based Mechanized infantry component of a Canadianized Heavy(ish) Brigade, I'd argue that in fact they are probably the MOST likely type of unit that we would be likely to deploy during peacetime.  Risk aversion would likely limit the willingness of the government to deploy Light infantry on a peacekeeping or counter-insurgency operation due to the potentially greater risk of casualties to a force in unarmoured vehicles.

We're in agreement however that there is a role for a Reg Force Light Brigade as a rapid reaction force.  In fact, the reactivation of the 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as well as the addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO I think are perfect opportunities for Canada to establish a clear role for a Light Brigade.  I think that expansion of a Light Brigade (possibly even up to Division size) could be within the capability of the Army Reserves more or less as already structured.

Keeping in mind that our existing Brigades are force generators as opposed to force employers, you could potentially have:

Mechanized Forces:

12 RBC as a Armoured Recce Regiment
LdSH as a Tank Regiment (with SALH, KOCR & Sask D providing Reserve Squadrons if additional tanks available)
1 PPCLI & 3 PPCLI (Edmonton), 2 PPCLI (Shilo), 1 R22eR (Valcartier) and 2 RCR (Gagetown) as LAV Battalions
1 RCHA (Shilo) and 5e RALC (Valcartier) as SP Artillery
1 CER (Edmonton) and 5 CER (Valcartier)
1 Svc (Edmonton) and 5 Svc (Valcartier)
These units would be able to force generate either a Heavy(ish) ABCT or a Medium SBCT equivalent.

Light Forces:

RCD (Petawawa) as a Light Recce (Air Mobile) Regiment
1 RCR & 3 RCR (Petawawa) and 3 R22eR (Quebec) as Light Battalions
2 RCHA (Petawawa) as towed/light vehicle SP Artillery
2 CER (Petawawa)
2 Svc (Petawawa)
3 x Infantry Companies from 2 R22eR would be used (1 x Company Each) as basis for 3 x 30/70 Reserve Light Battalions
3 x 10/90 Reserve Light Battalions
These units could force generate our Rapid Response Brigade.

This structure would give us a total of 15 x maneuver units.  6 x Mechanized units (1 x Tank and 5 x LAV) and 9 x Light units (3 x Reg Force, 3 x 30/70 Reserve and 3 x 10/90 Reserve).  Together with 3 each Reg Force Artillery Regiments, Combat Engineer Regiments, Service Battalions plus the Canadian Combat Support Brigade and Reserve Artillery units, this should give us the ability to force generate a Division.


----------



## KevinB

@GR66 while I think it is interesting that you have found some manners of ways to employ various units if you look abjectly at that force layout you are still missing some major pieces - and have a number of questionable entities.

1) Armored Recce - It really is a fools errand for a LAV based entity -- it is neither very mobile off road, nor does it have firepower to conduct any sort of screening.   I don't get how the RCAC thinks they can continue that shell game, look at how a US ABCT is organized - and you see how badly that Canada is equipped in that respect.
2) Tanks, unless you are getting more, and a whole lot more - reserve incorporation in the Armored makes zero sense.  
3) Artillery - right now you don't have SP Arty -- so you need to have a program for that.
4) Light Recce is an Infantry task -- simply disband the RCD - as that role is better filled by Light Infantryman 
5) Lack of Anti-Tank (in any meaningful way) and lack of Air defense means the Army is out for any high intensity conflict for some time without just attaching a BG to a US/UK Coalition.

Right now Canada has an Army that is neither fish nor fowl - it isn't Heavy - it isn't Light, and quite frankly, I am not sure what it wants to be when it grows up.
  It isn't even truly Medium, as it is missing an awful lot of Medium assets.

The best thing Force 2025 could probably do is chop 1 Regular Force Infantry BN from each Reg, and one of the "Armoured" units.
  One needs to harvest those PY for GBAD and rebuilding the Air Defense Trade in Canada, and burn down a few HQ's too.
Several other trades on the back end are hurting for bodies -- in this day and age your Army functions digitally or doesn't function, which means the Sig's trade is in huge demand - in additional to the the massive gaps in Logistics, Maintenance and Supply Support that need to be filled.

I think Force 2040 would be a more realistic look for significant changes in Canada's Army - simply because I don't see Canada interested in major capital programs for more Tanks, a true tracked HIFV, Proper Armored Engineer Assets, Tracked SPA, etc.


What you can do now is simply create 1 Medish Bed with Tanks and Towed Arty, and 1 Light Bde, plus the CSSB, give up any hope of a 3rd Bde outside the Reserves.
   Without having the willpower to deal with the Regimental System all one is doing at this point is rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic while it is sinking --


----------



## GR66

I made mention in the Ukraine thread about a War on the Rocks podcast featuring Michael Kofman which discussed the implications of Russian force structure decisions and in particular peacetime manning levels on their performance in that conflict.

I see now that War on the Rocks has a related article on the subject which I think is worth a read in relation to our own force design instructions.  Obviously we don't have the same issues as the Russian in relation to conscript service personnel, but it does raise important questions about partial peacetime manning of units.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> @GR66 while I think it is interesting that you have found some manners of ways to employ various units if you look abjectly at that force layout you are still missing some major pieces - and have a number of questionable entities.
> 
> 1) Armored Recce - It really is a fools errand for a LAV based entity -- it is neither very mobile off road, nor does it have firepower to conduct any sort of screening.   I don't get how the RCAC thinks they can continue that shell game, look at how a US ABCT is organized - and you see how badly that Canada is equipped in that respect.


Canadian Armoured Recce Regiments as currently configured may not be fit for task, but every US BCT has a Cavalry Squadron.  There is a role to be filled.  While I don't expect to see additional tanks (or even Mobile Protected Firepower vehicles) procured by Canada I believe there are things within our grasp that could make our Armoured Recce Regiments much more effective.  For example, you could evolve to a structure something like:

1 x Surveillance Troop (LAV LRSS)
1 x UAV Troop (LAV w/tube-launched UAV launcher)
1 x Ground Recce Troop (LAV designed to carry/deploy/operate a Recce UGV and equipped with a RWS (quad Hellfire?) to strike targets illuminated by the UGV or the UAVs?  Maybe even a pair of electric motorcycles for a dismounted Recce team?



KevinB said:


> 2) Tanks, unless you are getting more, and a whole lot more - reserve incorporation in the Armored makes zero sense.


Agreed.  As I suggested IF additional tanks were to become available we could establish Reserve Squadrons.


KevinB said:


> 3) Artillery - right now you don't have SP Arty -- so you need to have a program for that.


Advancing with Purpose has an "Indirect Fire Modernization" program.  Hopefully that will result in us getting a SP Artillery platform.


KevinB said:


> 4) Light Recce is an Infantry task -- simply disband the RCD - as that role is better filled by Light Infantryman


The US IBCT still has a Cavalry Squadron (2 x Mounted Troops and 1 x Dismounted Troop).  Regardless of the colour of the beret, there is a role to fill.  Figuring out the structure and equipment for that role is something that can be debated.


KevinB said:


> 5) Lack of Anti-Tank (in any meaningful way) and lack of Air defense means the Army is out for any high intensity conflict for some time without just attaching a BG to a US/UK Coalition.


Advancing with Purpose also has a "Ground Based Air Defence" and an "Anti-Tank Guided Missile" program, so again presumably these deficiencies will (eventually) be resolved.


KevinB said:


> Right now Canada has an Army that is neither fish nor fowl - it isn't Heavy - it isn't Light, and quite frankly, I am not sure what it wants to be when it grows up.
> It isn't even truly Medium, as it is missing an awful lot of Medium assets.
> 
> The best thing Force 2025 could probably do is chop 1 Regular Force Infantry BN from each Reg, and one of the "Armoured" units.
> One needs to harvest those PY for GBAD and rebuilding the Air Defense Trade in Canada, and burn down a few HQ's too.
> Several other trades on the back end are hurting for bodies -- in this day and age your Army functions digitally or doesn't function, which means the Sig's trade is in huge demand - in additional to the the massive gaps in Logistics, Maintenance and Supply Support that need to be filled.
> 
> I think Force 2040 would be a more realistic look for significant changes in Canada's Army - simply because I don't see Canada interested in major capital programs for more Tanks, a true tracked HIFV, Proper Armored Engineer Assets, Tracked SPA, etc.
> 
> 
> What you can do now is simply create 1 Medish Bed with Tanks and Towed Arty, and 1 Light Bde, plus the CSSB, give up any hope of a 3rd Bde outside the Reserves.
> Without having the willpower to deal with the Regimental System all one is doing at this point is rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic while it is sinking --


I agree that probably the best course of action would be to cut units and HQ in order to properly man the units remaining and fill out the missing capability.

An alternative solution would be 1 x Heavy(ish) Brigade with a Tank Regiment, and two LAV Battalions out West.  1 x Medium Brigade with three LAV Battalions (Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown).  And a single Light Battalion (Petawawa) as the Rapid Response force and the anchor for a Reserve Light Infantry Brigade.

Makes the most use of the LAVs we already have (and are probably the type of unit we are most likely to deploy in peacetime).  Maintains a Light RRF but still frees up PYs for the capabilities we need to add.  Artillery, CER and Service Battalions can focus their PYs on providing support to two instead of three Brigades (but be able to provide a Reg Force core for the Reserve Brigade supporting units).


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Canadian Armoured Recce Regiments as currently configured may not be fit for task, but every US BCT has a Cavalry Squadron.  There is a role to be filled.  While I don't expect to see additional tanks (or even Mobile Protected Firepower vehicles) procured by Canada I believe there are things within our grasp that could make our Armoured Recce Regiments much more effective.  For example, you could evolve to a structure something like:
> 
> 1 x Surveillance Troop (LAV LRSS)
> 1 x UAV Troop (LAV w/tube-launched UAV launcher)
> 1 x Ground Recce Troop (LAV designed to carry/deploy/operate a Recce UGV and equipped with a RWS (quad Hellfire?) to strike targets illuminated by the UGV or the UAVs?  Maybe even a pair of electric motorcycles for a dismounted Recce team?


Look at our CAV Squadrons - they have these wonderful things called TOW and Javelin - as well as a plethora of support enablers.





						The Cavalry Squadron of 2025
					






					www.benning.army.mil
				



From the Screen Line: Cavalry Scouts in the Army of 2020

I think that honestly the Armored Recce Squadron needs to be a combined Arms formation - there are roles needed to be filled by a lot more than Armor -- probably should be called the Brigade Recce Squadron IMHO




GR66 said:


> Agreed.  As I suggested IF additional tanks were to become available we could establish Reserve Squadrons.
> 
> Advancing with Purpose has an "Indirect Fire Modernization" program.  Hopefully that will result in us getting a SP Artillery platform.


 Agreed - but I would suggest that the Heavy Force needs a heavier tracked IFV, and the CA needs to come to grips with that.



GR66 said:


> The US IBCT still has a Cavalry Squadron (2 x Mounted Troops and 1 x Dismounted Troop).  Regardless of the colour of the beret, there is a role to fill.  Figuring out the structure and equipment for that role is something that can be debated.


IBCT's are a weird one - as they vastly differ on the CAV side if it is an Airborne, Airmobile or Light IBCT.


GR66 said:


> Advancing with Purpose also has a "Ground Based Air Defence" and an "Anti-Tank Guided Missile" program, so again presumably these deficiencies will (eventually) be resolved.
> 
> I agree that probably the best course of action would be to cut units and HQ in order to properly man the units remaining and fill out the missing capability.
> 
> An alternative solution would be 1 x Heavy(ish) Brigade with a Tank Regiment, and two LAV Battalions out West.  1 x Medium Brigade with three LAV Battalions (Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown).  And a single Light Battalion (Petawawa) as the Rapid Response force and the anchor for a Reserve Light Infantry Brigade.
> 
> Makes the most use of the LAVs we already have (and are probably the type of unit we are most likely to deploy in peacetime).  Maintains a Light RRF but still frees up PYs for the capabilities we need to add.  Artillery, CER and Service Battalions can focus their PYs on providing support to two instead of three Brigades (but be able to provide a Reg Force core for the Reserve Brigade supporting units).


The issue I keep coming back to is the CAF has no way of deploying anything other than a Light Bde in any reasonable time frame.
  So you probably have your IRU as a Reg Light Bde - and you can run 30-70 units for the others.
    30-70 units will allow BG Deployments of Medish with Tank as fast as the ship can get material overseas - and for longer duration missions allows for heavier reserve integration.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> The issue I keep coming back to is the CAF has no way of deploying anything other than a Light Bde in any reasonable time frame.
> So you probably have your IRU as a Reg Light Bde - and you can run 30-70 units for the others.
> 30-70 units will allow BG Deployments of Medish with Tank as fast as the ship can get material overseas - and for longer duration missions allows for heavier reserve integration.



I wonder if anyone's 'done the math' on what we can fit into our strategic movement fleet, and what we can send to Europe on Day 1-30ish?


----------



## dapaterson

Is GTS Katie available?


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Look at our CAV Squadrons - they have these wonderful things called TOW and Javelin - as well as a plethora of support enablers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Cavalry Squadron of 2025
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.benning.army.mil
> 
> 
> 
> 
> From the Screen Line: Cavalry Scouts in the Army of 2020
> 
> I think that honestly the Armored Recce Squadron needs to be a combined Arms formation - there are roles needed to be filled by a lot more than Armor -- probably should be called the Brigade Recce Squadron IMHO


I think that Ukraine has shown that the entire concept of Recce on the modern battlefield has to be reviewed.  Surveillance, UAVs, UGVs, TOW/Javelin/Hellfire, Loitering Munitions, Direct Fire, whatever are all likely on the table.  In a Canadian context there are programs which address most of these capabilities but I highly doubt that any short/medium term solution will involve an entirely new vehicle platform.  Until that changes the logical thing is to see what can be done using the platforms we do have.


KevinB said:


> Agreed - but I would suggest that the Heavy Force needs a heavier tracked IFV, and the CA needs to come to grips with that.


See my comment above.  If we're not going to get a tracked IFV then we need to make the best of what we do have.


KevinB said:


> IBCT's are a weird one - as they vastly differ on the CAV side if it is an Airborne, Airmobile or Light IBCT.


Agreed.  We'll have to figure out what it should look like once we determine the concept of operations for our Light forces.


KevinB said:


> The issue I keep coming back to is the CAF has no way of deploying anything other than a Light Bde in any reasonable time frame.
> So you probably have your IRU as a Reg Light Bde - and you can run 30-70 units for the others.
> 30-70 units will allow BG Deployments of Medish with Tank as fast as the ship can get material overseas - and for longer duration missions allows for heavier reserve integration.


Two problems.  Firstly, do we have enough airlift capability to deploy and sustain a full Light Brigade in a reasonable time frame?  Keep in mind that if we go to war deploying and supplying an Army Brigade won't be the only demand made of our air transport assets.  Secondly, our Reserve system isn't currently capable of generating units that can support a Medium/Heavy force structure.  Do you honestly believe that the cost and effort to transform the Reserve system into a system similar the the US National Guard will get the required support to make it happen in the near term in the face of competing priorities like new equipment/capabilities, the F-35, the CSC and NORAD modernization?  Better in my mind to start down the path based on a Light Infantry structure which is within our capabilities as a first step then transition to a Medium/Heavy structure once the cash/will is there in the future.

As to the question of maintaining a Light Brigade vs a Medium Brigade I'd argue that just like during the Cold War, smaller regional conflicts are going to be the most likely scenario we'll have to face rather than a direct invasion of NATO.  Medium forces will be more in demand for those types of operations.  The option of course exists if necessary to deploy our Medium Battalions without their vehicles if necessary.  The opposite isn't necessarily true.


----------



## Kirkhill

Can we resolve these issues by lumping the 12 Combat Arms Units into a single, common combined arms Corps?

Canadian Corps (The Royal Canadians)
Canadian Corps (Lord Strathcona's)
Canadian Corps (Princess Patricia's)
Canadian Corps (Royal 22nd)
Canadian Corps (Le 12e)

The Royal Canadians would encompass both the RCRs and the RCDs
Number of Units and Subunits to be determined.
Nomenclature according to regimental quiffs.
Role designators such as Dragoons, Horse, Light Infantry, Armoured would all be eliminated.

Tank
Light Armoured

Cavalry
Dragoons
Armoured Infantry
Mechanized Infantry
Motorized Infantry
Light Infantry

Heliborne Infantry
Airborne Infantry
Marine Infantry

Assault
Defence
Patrols
Recce
ISTAR
QRF

All cap badges would be eligible for all taskings  (long term taskings - not tasked minute by minute but according to a 5 to 10 year schedule and the national threat assessment)

The RRCA, RCE, RCCS etc would all continue undisturbed


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The issue I keep coming back to is the CAF has no way of deploying anything other than a Light Bde in any reasonable time frame.
> So you probably have your IRU as a Reg Light Bde - and you can run 30-70 units for the others.
> 30-70 units will allow BG Deployments of Medish with Tank as fast as the ship can get material overseas - and for longer duration missions allows for heavier reserve integration.



You mean a Light Bn in a week and the rest of the Brigade in a month or so?

The rest? Whatever, whenever.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> I think that Ukraine has shown that the entire concept of Recce on the modern battlefield has to be reviewed.  Surveillance, UAVs, UGVs, TOW/Javelin/Hellfire, Loitering Munitions, Direct Fire, whatever are all likely on the table.  In a Canadian context there are programs which address most of these capabilities but I highly doubt that any short/medium term solution will involve an entirely new vehicle platform.  Until that changes the logical thing is to see what can be done using the platforms we do have.


I understand your point - but I feel remiss if I don't constantly ring the alarm bell on heavier assets for high intensity conflict.



GR66 said:


> See my comment above.  If we're not going to get a tracked IFV then we need to make the best of what we do have.


 See mine 



GR66 said:


> Agreed.  We'll have to figure out what it should look like once we determine the concept of operations for our Light forces.
> 
> Two problems.  Firstly, do we have enough airlift capability to deploy and sustain a full Light Brigade in a reasonable time frame?


  5 C-17 and 20 odd Herc's
    I would say yes.


GR66 said:


> Keep in mind that if we go to war deploying and supplying an Army Brigade won't be the only demand made of our air transport assets.


 There would need to be a lot of sealift as well -- which would probably also be bringing heavier forces.



GR66 said:


> Secondly, our Reserve system isn't currently capable of generating units that can support a Medium/Heavy force structure.  Do you honestly believe that the cost and effort to transform the Reserve system into a system similar the the US National Guard will get the required support to make it happen in the near term in the face of competing priorities like new equipment/capabilities, the F-35, the CSC and NORAD modernization?  Better in my mind to start down the path based on a Light Infantry structure which is within our capabilities as a first step then transition to a Medium/Heavy structure once the cash/will is there in the future.


 The Res system needs to change regardless -- 
     As @FJAG has pointed out the cost of units is fairly similar.
 My point is IF one is an Expeditionary Army, then one needs equipment - or just cashier the PRes if you aren't going equip them.



GR66 said:


> As to the question of maintaining a Light Brigade vs a Medium Brigade I'd argue that just like during the Cold War, smaller regional conflicts are going to be the most likely scenario we'll have to face rather than a direct invasion of NATO.  Medium forces will be more in demand for those types of operations.  The option of course exists if necessary to deploy our Medium Battalions without their vehicles if necessary.  The opposite isn't necessarily true.


Medium means too Heavy to Move easy - to Light to Fight 
   Properly Equipped Light Forces can do a lot - especially in the beginning stages - but when use comes to shove you need a true heavy force -- the Medium "gap" really is a Peace Enforcement Low Intensity role IMHO.
  If you are going to those -- you can put LI folks in the back of Armor Driven LAV if you need more troops.


When you look at the response to the Ukrainian Invasion -- we (USA) moved XVIII Airborne into theatre first - then V (Heavy) Corps.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> You mean a Light Bn in a week and the rest of the Brigade in a month or so?
> 
> The rest? Whatever, whenever.


The CAF is more than capable of delivering a Light Bde anywhere in the world inside 72hrs based on their current capability.
   Faster if we help


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The CAF is more than capable of delivering a Light Bde anywhere in the world inside 72hrs based on their current capability.



You're probably right - given the lack of need to pack ATGMs and SAMs or 120mm mortars or light utility vehicles.  What would they be doing again?  Once they got there?



KevinB said:


> Faster if we help


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Is GTS Katie available?



I had to search that as it sounded familiar... as in 'familiar levels of national shame' 



			https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/g-t-s-katie-standoff-ends-1.232542


----------



## Kirkhill

More fun with numbers

Drawn from the Army and Air Defence lists of the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.  Numbers were amalgamated and adjusted to Canada by population and roughly rounded.

For a sense of the numbers, ratios and capabilities and a starting point for play time.

A modernized Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery


Patriot36HIMARS108NASAMS-ESSM36Archer/K972GBAD-CAMM24M77736MSHORAD60AMOS36ManPAD480Mortar 120216


----------



## Brad Sallows

> Can we resolve these issues by lumping the 12 Combat Arms Units into a single, common combined arms Corps?



Just make them numbered battalions of one regiment, the Large Amalgamated Canadian Key Enablers Yeomanry.


----------



## TacticalTea

Very interesting talk in here! I do have one question:

How does the US army manage and integrate air defence with its BCTs? As an example, shouldn't there be a Stryker MSHORAD troop or squadron in an SBCT? Avengers in an IBCT?

@KevinB probably best placed to answer.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> Just make them numbered battalions of one regiment, the Large Amalgamated Canadian Key Enablers Yeomanry.


Took a second.


----------



## Blackadder1916

KevinB said:


> The CAF is more than capable of delivering a Light Bde anywhere in the world inside 72hrs based on their current capability.
> * Faster if we help*



With a wink and a nod, say no more!  As if it would be something out of the ordinary.  Actually, there is an already existing agreement between our two countries that can provide for that situation.

Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Relating to the Establishment of Integrated Lines of Communications to Ensure Logistic Support for the Canadian Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of the United States of America

While day to day operation of the ILOC is more mundane than a worst case scenario of US military sealift assets being used to transport a Canadian ground force's equipment, it's likely been considered and there's probably a contingency plan sitting in a dusty filing cabinet somewhere along with the equally dusty plan for the large scale air medical evacuation of patients using integrated assets.

A couple of articles (from 2002) about ILOC.

Canadian troops deploy to Dover to move cargo


> . . .
> This activation, which took place by mutual consent Dec. 5, 2001, was the first one since the Canada - United States Integrated Lines of Communication Agreement was signed in 1979.
> 
> "The agreement was somewhat used during the Gulf War and Kosovo, however (before Operation Enduring Freedom) it's never been formally activated," said Canadian army Maj. Serge Pelletier, assigned to Military Traffic Management Command headquarters. "When activated, (Canadian and U.S.) transportation resources and infrastructure blend into one."
> . . .



MTMC assignment up front: Canadian officer spurs shipments to his mates in Afghanistan


> . . .
> Originally designed to support a NATO conflict in Europe, the agreement's mandate was widened after the Gulf War to cover any operation in which both countries participate anywhere in the world.
> 
> "The agreement is unique," said Lt. Col. Jean-Pierre Pichette, Canada's senior representative to the agreement, serving at U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. "*It is a bilateral agreement between two partner nations which, when activated, blends the entire North American transportation infrastructure and resources into a single system*."
> 
> This is also Pichette's second tour as a Canada-United States Integrated Lines of Communication Agreement officer. He worked with the agreement in the mid-1980s while assigned in Ramstein, Germany, with the U.S. Air Force Europe.
> 
> "*It is activated by mutual consent*," said Pichette. "It was activated for the very first time on December 5, 2001. We are now reaping the benefits of the more than 20 years we have invested in the agreement moving a steady flow of cargo to support our troops half way around the world. We are making logistics history and are setting the way for the future."
> 
> There is a key difference between the agreement and the Cooperative Airlift Agreement, said Maj. Sylvain Turbide, a Canadian officer assigned to the Air Mobility Command.
> 
> "Under the Canada-United States Integrated Lines of Communication Agreement, Canada can ship cargo on American planes according to its priority," said Turbide. "The cargo moves according to its priority, so the highest priority cargo leaves on the next plane?the country of ownership of the cargo and the aircraft does not come into play whatsoever."
> 
> The Cooperative Airlift Agreement only allows shipment on a space available basis.
> 
> The Canada-United States Integrated Lines of Communication Agreement enables Canada to take advantage of the vast American transportation resources to better support our troops deployed on operations, said Pichette.
> 
> The agreement is not only for the movement of freight, said Maj. Phyllis O'Grady, a Canadian officer assigned to the Command Surgeon's Office at U.S. Transportation Command.
> 
> "There is a health care side to it," said O'Grady. "It can also be used to transport our sick or injured troops from the area of operation back to North America." . . .


----------



## KevinB

TacticalTea said:


> Very interesting talk in here! I do have one question:
> 
> How does the US army manage and integrate air defence with its BCTs? As an example, shouldn't there be a Stryker MSHORAD troop or squadron in an SBCT? Avengers in an IBCT?
> 
> @KevinB probably best placed to answer.


I really don't hang out with the conventional forces.
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31339-FM_3-01-000-WEB-1.pdf
All you need to know and a heck of a lot more on US Army Air Defense from Stinger to THAAD.

The ADAM (Air Defense Airspace Management) Cell exits in all of the BCT's as it is a Bde resource.
  However the M-SHORAD or SHORAD Battalion is a Div resource, and distributed through the DIV AO as needed.  The only Bde and below level assets are the Stinger's that work in two man teams - which is non an ADA specific course.   
More on the intent to get more M-SHORAD https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46463/2


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> I understand your point - but I feel remiss if I don't constantly ring the alarm bell on heavier assets for high intensity conflict.


Keep ringing the alarm.  Maybe it will eventually wake someone up and we'll get those IFVs.  Until then we'll have to use what we have.


KevinB said:


> See mine
> 
> 
> 5 C-17 and 20 odd Herc's
> I would say yes.
> 
> There would need to be a lot of sealift as well -- which would probably also be bringing heavier forces.


I've got no objection to a Light Brigade.  In fact I think it's actually a good match for Canada.  Working with 11th Airborne as an Arctic force for domestic defence would be a great synergy.  Such a unit would also be ideal for reinforcement of the Nordic front (Finland, Sweden, Norway) in case of a conflict with Russia and Light forces would be more useful in the Pacific if ever required there as well.

I do however maintain that Medium forces are still quite useful in the less-than-war/Small War scenarios which are likely to be the more common conflicts during this new period of competition with China and Russia.  At the very least I'd give the Heavy(ish) Brigade 3 x LAV Battalions along with the Tank Regiment in order to be able to have one Battle Group deployed and still have 3 x maneuver units available for a Brigade deployment if required.


KevinB said:


> The Res system needs to change regardless --
> As @FJAG has pointed out the cost of units is fairly similar.
> My point is IF one is an Expeditionary Army, then one needs equipment - or just cashier the PRes if you aren't going equip them.


I think everyone agrees that the Reserve system needs to change.  Just no one is willing to actually make the change.

That being said, if we did free up 3 x Battalions worth of LAVs for the Reserves by reducing the Reg Force to two Brigades (1 x Heavy-ish and 1 x Light) then the only way I see making use of them for the Reserves would be to place them where there is already support available and where there is a large enough concentration of Reservists to make use of them.  

You could perhaps have 3 x 30/70 Battalions (1 x Reg Force Company and 2 x Reserve Companies):

1 x Battalion in Valcartier co-located with 5 Svc for support and drawing Reservists from Montreal/Quebec City
1 x Battalion in Petawawa co-located with 2 Svc for support and drawing Reservists from Eastern Ontario/Eastern GTA
1 x Battalion in Borden/Meaford co-located with RCEME (with support from 31 & 32 Svc) drawing Reservists from the GTA



KevinB said:


> Medium means too Heavy to Move easy - to Light to Fight
> Properly Equipped Light Forces can do a lot - especially in the beginning stages - but when use comes to shove you need a true heavy force -- the Medium "gap" really is a Peace Enforcement Low Intensity role IMHO.
> If you are going to those -- you can put LI folks in the back of Armor Driven LAV if you need more troops.
> 
> 
> When you look at the response to the Ukrainian Invasion -- we (USA) moved XVIII Airborne into theatre first - then V (Heavy) Corps.


----------



## Kirkhill

This is from the Dutch Ministry of Defence.  The dog and pony version of their kit.  Layered GBAD.



Patriot
NASAMs - ESSM
Fennek - Stinger
Manpads - Stinger



> The *Joint Ground-based Air Defence Command* (Dutch: _*Defensie Grondgebonden Luchtverdedigingscommando, DGLC*_) is a joint command of the Royal Netherlands Army, formed in 2012 after amalgamation of the _Commando Luchtdoelartillerie_ (Anti-aircraft Artillery Command) of the Royal Netherlands Army and the _Groep Geleide Wapens_ (Group Guided Weapons) of the Royal Netherlands Air Force. The command is responsible for all ground-based air defence tasks and consists of both army and air force personnel.[2] The DGLC employs an integrated layered air-defence approach featuring FIM-92 Stinger, NASAMS II and MIM-104 Patriot systems.



Applying this to the whole of the North Sea - Baltic Region I ended up with this for Ready To Launch Missiles

336x Patriot
492x NASAMS - ESSM


> 284x Iris/Crotale/CAMM


444x Vehicle Mounted ManPADs - Stinger/RBS70/Grom/Piorun


> 1000 ManPADs Launchers.



This land based assemblage is backed by, potentially

96x SM3 ABMs on Danish Ships
128x SM2 SAMs on Danish and Dutch Ships
364x ESSMs across the region
384x CAMMs on the recently ordered Polish Type 31s

This assumes all ships at sea and fully loaded

None of this includes missiles warehoused in inventory.



This Ground and Sea Based Air Defence System results in some 2500 Ready To Launch Air Defence Missiles - not including the handheld MANPADs.  It covers everything from Large UAVs, Helicopters, Aircraft and Cruise Missiles to Ballistic Missiles.

In addition 221x F35 Lightning IIs will be flown by 5 nations with the Swedes flying 71 Gripens.

The airspace defended is  20 to 40% of Canada's.


----------



## KevinB

I could burn through an additional 50B USD just in Capital Acquisition and there still would be holes in the CAF.


----------



## Kirkhill

To round out the artillery effort

Anti-Ship Missiles, fired from coastal batteries, missile boats and ships at sea in the Ready To Launch mode

North Sea (Danish Approaches) - Netherlands, Denmark, Norway - Harpoons and NSMs - 208
Baltic Sea (Kaliningrad Approaches) - Sweden, Poland and Lithuania - RBS15 and NSMs - 164
Gulf of Finland (St Petersburg Approaches) - Finland, Estonia and Latvia - Blue Spear - 40

For a total of more than 412 surface targets on the water or ashore.

Again, the NSMs can be carried by the F35s meaning they are both an Air Defence and a Coastal Defence asset.


----------



## KevinB

If any of you read the Congressional Report I linked above -- one chapter is...
  Should there be a Legislative Provision on Future Divestment of SHOARD Capability?

Canada wasn't the only player to dump needed capabilities during GWOT


----------



## markppcli

An argument in favour of reservist tankers. The British operate a “crew replacement” regiment in their Royal Yeomanry. Training extra bodies to replace shortages / losses isn’t the worst idea and the SALH are actually ideally suited to the task being in Edmonton and able to make use of simulators on a weekend or join in on exercises when able.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> That being said, if we did free up 3 x Battalions worth of LAVs for the Reserves by reducing the Reg Force to two Brigades (1 x Heavy-ish and 1 x Light) then the only way I see making use of them for the Reserves would be to place them where there is already support available and where there is a large enough concentration of Reservists to make use of them.



There are two things that need defending:  Spaces and Places.

Spaces are where the people aren't.
Places are where the people are.

There are two things from which spaces and places need defending:  Things and People.

The job of defending the Spaces from Things and People is a full time job but with limited consequences in the event of failure.  Permanent Surveillance, occasional patrols and scaleable QRFs that can deploy rapidly over long distances are the order of the day. 

Joining up with the 11th Airborne Div sounds just the ticket.

The job of defending Places from Things is also a full time job but this one has grave consequences in the event of failure. 24/7 surveillance and instantaneous reaction with destructive force is the requirement.  Especially given the risk of collateral damage in a high population and traffic area.  Fortunately for Canada there aren't that many Places in Canada.  Most people congregate in a very small number of Places.  So the number of dedicated systems is low.   Equally the greatest risk to the operators is death by boredom.  The greatest risk to the population is death as a result of failure by bored operators.  There is no great need for a large number of missiles, or launchers, to be permanently manned at any given Place.

Extending the NORAD system to the local level via either the RCAF or the RRCA, and RCN pickets would require a small number of professionals on permanent duty locally, with good sensors and command and control, great maintenance and a small number of missiles that are more likely to be unloaded that launched.

Something like 30 to 40 systems for Places would cover more than 90% of the People.

The final job, that of defending Places from People, that is a full time job as well.  But the threat is generally managed by the civil agencies.  The Army is required occasionally when the civil agencies are overwhelmed - by circumstances, the environment, the unruly or, very occasionally, the organized lethal force.

Those circumstances are rare and it is hard to justify a standing army for them.  Especially when most of them don't require a standing army to deal with them.  The problem, of course, is that when an army is necessary you can't just conjure it out of the ether.

In my view the ideal solution for defending the people in the places is to use the people in the places when they need defending.  That means locally recruiting, organizing, equipping and training local people for local defence.  It also means keeping the enrolled population at various levels of readiness.  It also means maintaining a well trained, highly proficient, professional cadre locally to do two things - to react to ACP callouts instantly and to ensure there is a trained force on hand to assist them when they need additional assistance.

Where do these trained professionals come from?  From field time defending the Spaces from Things and People,  and defending other peoples' places and spaces.


So, domestically,  we need - 

A light force dedicated to the defence of Spaces - similar to the 11th Airborne Division
An Air Defence force employing Air, Sea and Ground assets to defend the Places from incoming Things
A large force of people in the Places trained and equipped by solid cadres of willing professionals - and in this sense I am thinking of the way the Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre relates/ed to the Royal Marines.  They are both a leading edge operational element and a training element.  One complements the other.

Do we need an expeditionary force?

Yes.  If for no other reason than to train our professionals in the latest state of the art.

Building relations and helping out friends is a good thing too.  But it isn't the first thing.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> I wonder if anyone's 'done the math' on what we can fit into our strategic movement fleet, and what we can send to Europe on Day 1-30ish?


The answer is yes.

I was UEO for 2 RCHA back in 72-76 and responsible for managing the various movement tables needed to move the AMF(L) battery as well as the regiment (including its phantom F Battery at the time). Long story short - we couldn't move the regiment much less the brigade.

CAST was another story.

I presume that there are still various staff officers in units, brigades and divisions that do these jobs. It's always a saw off between "I need this" and "Yeah. But all you're getting is this."



Kirkhill said:


> Can we resolve these issues by lumping the 12 Combat Arms Units into a single, common combined arms Corps?



No.  🙂



KevinB said:


> The CAF is more than capable of delivering a Light Bde anywhere in the world inside 72hrs based on their current capability.
> Faster if we help


Not if you figure in aircraft down time, distance travelled, crew rest/limitations. I no longer have any idea how long it would take but I think 72 hours is very optimistic even if one were to take as a given that the brigade is ready and configured to move.



TacticalTea said:


> How does the US army manage and integrate air defence with its BCTs? As an example, shouldn't there be a Stryker MSHORAD troop or squadron in an SBCT? Avengers in an IBCT?


US Army air defence is undergoing a bit of a revival after several decades of neglect (not as bad as ours but neglect nonetheless) ADA battalions are held within ADA brigades (ADAB) which reside in Army Air and Missile Defence Commands (AADMC). Many ADA units were deactivated and almost all Avenger battalions relegated to the ARNG. Patriot, C-RAM and THAAD stayed with the Active Army.

Essentially there are no ADA units organic to either BCTs or divisions or corps. ADA resources are assigned to a specific theatre of operations and then reallocated as required.

Essentially an AADMC is allocated to a theatre to command and control all air defence resources. There is no hard and fast rule as to allocation of ADA resources below the AADMC as much depends on the size and structure of the force deployed but essentially you could anticipate an ADAB to support a division or possibly corps and ADA battalions or tailored ADA Task Forces to support a BCT with ADA batteries and platoons to be distributed throughout the BCT's AO. Remember that ADA is basically an area weapon deployed to protect high vulnerability sectors based on priority and therefore some manoeuvre units may see more and some less coverage based on the air threat.

Currently 10 AADMC covers Europe and has no ADAB assigned to it although it does have two ADA battalions, a Patriot battalion (5-7 ADAR) and an Avenger/M-SHORAD battalion (5-4 ADAR). One of the key forces is 32 AADMC which is subordinate to US Forces Command and stationed at Fort Hood and which has four ADABs with 13 ADA battalions and an additional seven THAAD batteries all of which can be reallocated to other theatres when required. There is an additional AADMC in Hawaii for the Pacific theatre and an ARNG AADMC in South Carolina.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> An argument in favour of reservist tankers. The British operate a “crew replacement” regiment in their Royal Yeomanry. Training extra bodies to replace shortages / losses isn’t the worst idea and the SALH are actually ideally suited to the task being in Edmonton and able to make use of simulators on a weekend or join in on exercises when able.


There are 5 ABCTs and 2 SBCTs in the US ARNG.

While replacement crews are a good start, more can be done when there is a will. Canada sadly lacks will.

Lets look at this from a pure cost point of view. Canada hasn't sent tanks to war in 11 years. We haven't even deployed them to Latvia. Our armoured force is at this point a stand-by force and a training vehicle. (Both of which in my mind are a necessity). We have enough tanks for a full armoured regiment but are strained on PYs. One could convert an Alberta armoured unit to a pure 2A4+/2A4M tank regiment on a 30/70 basis and still have enough RegF personnel to man the HQ and one tank squadron to stay proficient in the skills needed and to provide training support to the mech inf battalions that need to practice combined arms operations for Latvia. The other two squadrons could be manned by a small (10%) RegF element and by a large (90%) ResF members training in the summers.

That brings down the recurring annual costs of the armoured regiment to less than half as well as reduce the wear and tear on the equipment.

That could free up roughly 200 PYs to bulk out a properly organized 70/30 cavalry regiment including a squadron of 2A6Ms, one LAV Surv squadron and two recce squadrons (one RegF and one ResF). Just for the hell of it lets call the tank regiment the KOCR and the cavalry regt the LdSH.

🍻


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> There are 5 ABCTs and 2 SBCTs in the US ARNG.
> 
> While replacement crews are a good start, more can be done when there is a will. Canada sadly lacks will.
> 
> Lets look at this from a pure cost point of view. Canada hasn't sent tanks to war in 11 years. We haven't even deployed them to Latvia. Our armoured force is at this point a stand-by force and a training vehicle. (Both of which in my mind are a necessity). We have enough tanks for a full armoured regiment but are strained on PYs. One could convert an Alberta armoured unit to a pure 2A4+/2A4M tank regiment on a 30/70 basis and still have enough RegF personnel to man the HQ and one tank squadron to stay proficient in the skills needed and to provide training support to the mech inf battalions that need to practice combined arms operations for Latvia. The other two squadrons could be manned by a small (10%) RegF element and by a large (90%) ResF members training in the summers.
> 
> That brings down the recurring annual costs of the armoured regiment to less than half as well as reduce the wear and tear on the equipment.
> 
> That could free up roughly 200 PYs to bulk out a properly organized 70/30 cavalry regiment including a squadron of 2A6Ms, one LAV Surv squadron and two recce squadrons (one RegF and one ResF). Just for the hell of it lets call the tank regiment the KOCR and the cavalry regt the LdSH.


It seems like (along with reserve reform) the big key to pulling this off is pulling the 40 A4+ out of a pooled training fleet and assigning them to Squadrons. Is that only made possible by having them all co-sited or could it be viewed general possibility?

If so, I've been thinking that the distinction between Heavy-ish (medium with tanks) and Medium during the LAV 6 bound training wheels stage is kind of needless.

Assumptions
ATGM /DF project leads to section / platoon / Mounted AT Platoon / Armoured Recce all having the proper weapons and vehicles in the proper numbers
2 CMBG becomes 2CLBG
NATO squeezes us to up presence in Latvia, preposition said properly organized cavalry regiment and Lav battalion of kit
3 PPCLI and 3 R22 dissolved to round out 1 and 2,

So of our 80 tanks, 20 in Europe, 30 each with LdSH and 12e.  One fully equipped Reg squadron, 10 tanks for pool training for a 10/90 reserve squadron, so each regiment has 1x Reg Tank, 1x Reg Surv, 1x Reg Recce, 1x ResF Tank, 1x ResF Recce

NATO commitment
Stage 1- eFP Latvia roto remains the same, but pre-positioned equipment for: 
Stage 2- Reforger style flyover to man Cavalry regiment and LAV battalion as core of multi-national brigade
Stage 3- Reserve component (with A Squadron's tanks) join the 2nd LAV battalion and reinforce as soon as ships can be loaded to round out the CMBG

Leaving the other CMBG for domestic use and maintaining commitments to smaller deployments, 10 tanks, one Recce Squadron, and one Lav battalion worth of kit left behind from the NATO Brigade for sustainment


----------



## TacticalTea

KevinB said:


> If any of you read the Congressional Report I linked above -- one chapter is...
> Should there be a Legislative Provision on Future Divestment of SHOARD Capability?
> 
> Canada wasn't the only player to dump needed capabilities during GWOT


Those two documents were an awesome read and precisely what I was looking for!

I leave this great scifi-to-reality illustration from the congressional report as a token of gratitude:


----------



## Kirkhill

Some thoughts on items on the menu.

US Divs, Brigades and Battalions.

Looks to me as if we could furnish an ABCT type brigade based on a LAV Bn and the RCAC - the 3rd Regiment would be the "Cavalry Squadron" dedicated to ISR.

We could also look at supplying a Division on the lines of the 11th (5x LIBs in 2x BCTs), the 25th (4x LIBs in 2x BCTs) or even the 7th (6x LAVs)

Or even a Division with an ABCT and an SBCT (LAV) and an independent Light Brigade on the lines of the 173rd Separate.

1x Armd Div (Cdn 1945 Pattern)
ABCT (RCAC - 2x Armd, 1x ISR, RCIC - 1x LAV/CCV)
SBCT (RCIC - 3x LAV)
CCSB

1x Separate Light Bde
IBCT (RCIC - 2x LIB, 1x ISR)




1st Cav1 ABCT3 Cav Sqn4x Div11x ABCT33x CAB1st Cav2 ABCT3 Cav Sqn1st Cav3 ABCT3 Cav Sqn1st Armd1 ABCT2 Armd1 Inf1st Armd2 ABCT2 Armd1 Inf1st Armd3 ABCT2 Armd1 Inf1st Inf1 ABCT2 Armd1 Inf1st Inf2 ABCT2 Armd1 Inf3rd Inf1 ABCT2 Armd1 Inf3rd Inf2 ABCT2 Armd1 Inf4th Inf3 ABCT2 Armd1 Inf4th Inf1 SBCT3 Bn3x Div6x SBCT18x MIB4th Inf2 SBCT3 Bn2nd Inf1 SBCT3 Bn2nd Inf2 SBCT3 Bn7th Inf1-2 Stryker3 Bn7th Inf2-2 Stryker3 Bn10th Inf1 IBCT3 Bn3x Div10x IBCT (a)30x LIB10th Inf2 IBCT3 Bn10th Inf3 IBCT3 Bn82nd Inf1 IBCT3 Bn82nd Inf2 IBCT3 Bn82nd Inf3 IBCT3 Bn101st Inf1 IBCT3 Bn101st Inf2 IBCT3 Bn101st Inf3 IBCT3 Bn11th Inf1 IBCT3 Bn11th Inf2 IBCT2 Bn2x Div4x IBCT (b)8x LIB25th Inf2 IBCT2 Bn25th Inf3 IBCT2 Bn173rd Inf1 IBCT2 Bn


----------



## KevinB

“The U.S. Marine Corps has divested in their tanks” Well, what does that mean? - Naval News
					

General David H. Berger, Commandant of the U.S.M.C. explains where the Corps’ M1A1 tanks will go at Modern Day Marine 2020




					www.navalnews.com
				




Something Canada may want to ponder.


----------



## dapaterson

KevinB said:


> “The U.S. Marine Corps has divested in their tanks” Well, what does that mean? - Naval News
> 
> 
> General David H. Berger, Commandant of the U.S.M.C. explains where the Corps’ M1A1 tanks will go at Modern Day Marine 2020
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.navalnews.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Something Canada may want to ponder.



:stirpot:

#MGS


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> :stirpot:
> 
> #MGS


Was more thinking something like this -- the tracked Boxer is significantly lower to the ground than the wheeled version -- plus had better off road capability...


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1536308619347632134
It isn't really a tank - but it gives Medium Forces some firepower.
   It appears to be a decent Light Armored Recce type vehicle addition.


----------



## Spencer100

KevinB said:


> Was more thinking something like this -- the tracked Boxer is significantly lower to the ground than the wheeled version -- plus had better off road capability...
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1536308619347632134
> It isn't really a tank - but it gives Medium Forces some firepower.
> It appears to be a decent Light Armored Recce type vehicle addition.


Here it is the Tracked LAV.  I'm sure GD would build you one in London.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Was more thinking something like this -- the tracked Boxer is significantly lower to the ground than the wheeled version -- plus had better off road capability...
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1536308619347632134
> It isn't really a tank - but it gives Medium Forces some firepower.
> It appears to be a decent Light Armored Recce type vehicle addition.


But it's not made by GDLS!

Maybe the Griffin II (with the original 120mm Griffin I turret) and Griffin III IFV would be an option that could be built by GDLS in Canada?

Advantage of the Griffin would be commonality with the US using the Griffin II in their Mobile Protected Firepower program.

@Spencer100 beat me to the tracked Stryker option.

Edited to add:  Problem with the Griffin III IFV though is that it only carries 6 x Dismounts which opens up a whole new debate in other threads!


----------



## FJAG

Boxer and its modular system has suddenly become interesting. If the mission modules are interchangeable as between the two vehicles then it provides a great deal of training and employment commonality as between medium and heavy troops.

Leaves me with the question as to whether the powerpack is different and whether it can carry the additional armour to bring the Boxer more into an IFV category. The tracks certainly help with the cross country mobility issue.

Stryker/Tracked Stryker doesn't have the module feature but I expect it could be configured identically inside. I don't think much of modularity from the point of view of switching modules back and forth after acquisition (although there is some advantage to that for particulalry uncommon special purpose modules with a broken chassis) but I think it really helps in the manufacturing process if basic chassis and specialized modules could be worked on independently and then just mated as required.

🍻


----------



## TacticalTea

Rheinmetall pitches Panther battle tank as heir to the Leopard
					

The proposal at the Eurosatory defense exhibition in Paris adds a new angle to the discussion in Europe about a next-generation tank for the continent.




					www.defensenews.com


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> But it's not made by GDLS!
> 
> Maybe the Griffin II (with the original 120mm Griffin I turret) and Griffin III IFV would be an option that could be built by GDLS in Canada?
> 
> Advantage of the Griffin would be commonality with the US using the Griffin II in their Mobile Protected Firepower program.
> 
> @Spencer100 beat me to the tracked Stryker option.
> 
> Edited to add:  Problem with the Griffin III IFV though is that it only carries 6 x Dismounts which opens up a whole new debate in other threads!


I would solve the 6 dismount aspect by adding another vehicle or two to the Platoon 
   The other question I am wrestling with is does a Mixed Platoon work? A portion APC with RWS - and a portion with a 2 man turret (assuming common chassis).

But in all reality - I see those tracked systems more as a Tank substitute for Medium Forces - and a partial option for Armored Recon.


----------



## Kirkhill

It must be that time of the year.









						Eurosatory 2022
					






					www.baesystems.com


----------



## Kirkhill

The CV90


----------



## Kirkhill

Time to start signing contracts and shipping existing gear to Ukraine.


----------



## Kirkhill

And wouldn't mind these on wheels or tracks 


ModelOriginTypeQuantityImageDetailsKRHPSAJON XA-361-AMOS



Finland



SwedenSelf-propelled gun-mortar18[5]

120mm twin-barrel Patria AMOS mortar on a Patria AMV platform.

The Swedes have 8 simpler double barreled mortars in each Combined Arms Battalion.


Grkpbv 90



SwedenSelf-propelled mortar40[9]

A Swedish 120 mm double-barrel mortar version of the CV90. Another 20 on order to be delivered 2023-2024.


----------



## suffolkowner

Spencer100 said:


> Here it is the Tracked LAV.  I'm sure GD would build you one in London.
> 
> View attachment 71355


I've mentioned it before but have we tried mounting these to a LAV?






						Mattracks | Agriculture & Commercial Tracks
					

Rubber Tracks for 4x4 Tractors, Trenchers, Commercial Vehicles




					mattracks.co


----------



## McG

Spencer100 said:


> Here it is the Tracked LAV.  I'm sure GD would build you one in London.
> 
> View attachment 71355


Those tracks look super narrow.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Since we're talking about transformation, here's some information about what works and what doesn't:



Losing from day one: Why even successful transformations fall short​
*After 15 years of original* McKinsey research on organizational transformations,1 the results from our latest McKinsey Global Survey confirm an enduring truth: the more transformation actions a company takes, the greater its chances for success.2 Yet success remains the exception, not the rule. While we’ve known for years that a comprehensive approach to organizational transformation is more conducive to lasting change, the average success rate has remained persistently low. Less than one-third of respondents—all of whom had been part of a transformation in the past five years—say their companies’ transformations have been successful at both improving organizational performance and sustaining those improvements over time.

But even companies with successful transformations don’t always capture the full financial benefits of these efforts. So we took a closer look at the different stages of a transformation’s life cycle to understand where value is lost and what companies can do to preserve it. According to our analysis, three core actions of a transformation are especially predictive of value capture—and the companies with successful transformations are more likely than the rest to pursue the specific tactics that support them.

Looking ahead​In response to some of the challenges that the survey results revealed, here are a few steps that companies can take to support the success of their transformations:


_Show—don’t tell—progress to the front line._ When large companies embark on a transformation, there is a risk that frontline employees will see only the individual pain and not the aggregate gain. Communicating clearly and creatively in a way that stimulates dialogue around the transformation’s ambition and progress further increases the chances of success. Techniques such as regular surveys taking the organization’s cultural pulse, and progress parties celebrating a transformation’s milestones, can help create a foundation for real dialogue between senior leaders and the front line on the transformation and the potential changes to be made.
_Involve HR as a strategic partner._ Transformations have a significant impact on employees and therefore require active involvement from human resources. Yet respondents tend to perceive their HR leaders as less critical than other senior roles to the transformation’s outcome. For this view to change, the HR leader must set up his or her function to position itself strategically at the center of the transformation, rather than playing a transactional role. This will allow HR to make full use of its expertise and contribute to the transformation in important ways, such as moving people around the organization—in moderation. One way for HR to add value in a transformation is by taking a clean-sheet approach to the organization’s new, posttransformation design, then using strategic workforce-planning tactics (such as recruitment, talent development, and dismissal) to achieve that vision.
_Engage employees through new channels._ The survey results suggest that reaching the front line is a greater-than-average challenge at larger companies. But companies of all sizes can benefit from creative, more digital approaches to engaging employees in a transformation. The use of social media, change-management apps or games, and live-feedback tools should support and complement the movement of information from the top to the rest of the organization, rather than replace traditional methods. Such approaches can do so by making communication more tailored and personal to individual employees (for example, sending personalized push notifications if a milestone has been reached) and by providing more regular updates on the state of the transformation. Employees can also use these tools to explore and engage with the changes being made, on their own terms and with the ability to provide feedback. More advanced communication tools will be especially helpful in large companies that struggle to engage the front line and in companies with many different sites or locations.









						Losing from day one: Why even successful transformations fall short
					

The newest research from McKinsey confirms that successful organizational transformations still rely on a holistic approach--and still remain elusive.




					www.mckinsey.com


----------



## dapaterson

McKinsey are bullshit artists of the highest order; they even make KPMG look good.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> McKinsey are bullshit artists of the highest order; they even make KPMG look good.



My ideal future job


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:


> McKinsey are bullshit artists of the highest order; they even make KPMG look good.


Wasn’t it their proposals to streamline British defence organizations that contributed to a plane falling out of the Afghan skies?


----------



## Spencer100

Opps


----------



## Spencer100

suffolkowner said:


> I've mentioned it before but have we tried mounting these to a LAV?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Mattracks | Agriculture & Commercial Tracks
> 
> 
> Rubber Tracks for 4x4 Tractors, Trenchers, Commercial Vehicles
> 
> 
> 
> 
> mattracks.co



Hammond tried it! Didn't work lol


----------



## KevinB

Spencer100 said:


> Hammond tried it! Didn't work lol


The USMC used them in Hummers at the MWTC for a bit.  
 They where not adopted after the trial…


----------



## GR66

Question.  Most of the discussions around force structure have revolved around the types and quantities of Brigades we should have (Light/Medium/Heavy) and how those Brigades should be equipped.  

I think it's generally agreed that there are important roles to be played by both Light and Heavy Brigades (the suitability of Medium forces in a peer conflict is in question).  If realistically we only have the capability to deploy and maintain a single Brigade in a full-scale peer conflict (possibly along with a Divisional HQ to lead a multi-national Division) then we're left with a choice of which Brigade type to deploy - Light or Heavy.  

However, if a key political objective in any major force deployment is to maintain at least a certain amount of autonomy for our national forces, and since both Light and Heavy forces have important roles to play even in the same battle space, then should we maybe consider deploying hybrid Brigades rather then pure Light or Heavy Brigades?

Maybe we've already got the basic structure right for Canada with one Light Battalion and two Mech Battalions per Brigade.  The Light Battalion can evolve into the type of dispersed screening force to cover the open terrain and the Mech Battalions evolve into Heavy Combined Arms Battalions with tanks and tracked IFVs for the fight in the urban spaces.


----------



## Kirkhill

Robotic Wingman Test Fires 30mm Cannon
					

Robotic Wingman Test Fires 30mm Cannon




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				














						Army Tests Uncrewed M113 Armed With Laser-Guided Rocket Launcher
					

Outfitting surplus M113s with autonomous brains and weapons could be a cost-effective route to fielding robotic combat vehicles.




					www.thedrive.com
				




Here's a question.

Given the state of play and current technology are these vehicles ready for the manoeuvre arms or are they artillery pieces?

I can easily see these vehicles trailing in convoy without drivers.  Carrying explosive payloads.

I can also easily see them moving into battery for firing and withdrawing from battery for relocating and/or reloading.

I can also easily see them being connected, by tether or freespace, to a central FDC, after the fashion of the NASAMs Air Defence and Coastal Defence systems.

With those capabilities I can easily see them as valuable artillery assets, fire support assets, to be employed en masse in support of sub-units, units and formations.  They could mount anything from 30mm cannon to PrSMs and CAMMs.  They certainly can be ammunition limbers and refuellers.

I could also see them as engineering assets, with different systems on board, useful for breaching operations.  Dozers and Hoes and IED-C kit.

I am not sure I see them as ready to act independently as tanks.  As "wingmen" proper.


----------



## McG

There are roles and requirements for both mech and light forces, but mech and light forces are not complementary capabilities when shoe-horned into a single minor formation.


----------



## Infanteer

GR66 said:


> Maybe we've already got the basic structure right for Canada with one Light Battalion and two Mech Battalions per Brigade.  The Light Battalion can evolve into the type of dispersed screening force to cover the open terrain and the Mech Battalions evolve into Heavy Combined Arms Battalions with tanks and tracked IFVs for the fight in the urban spaces.



I'll just echo the comment above.

We need to be careful about the lessons we infer from Ukraine, because we are seeing a distorted picture through curated twitter releases.  The image of the plucky little tank hunting team stopping the Russians short of Kyiv was more a product of a flawed Russian operational concept than of the staying power of light elements in the face of a mechanized one.  What's more, it ignores the fact that the biggest killer was artillery.

I have little faith in a Light Battalion acting as a "dispersed screening force to cover" much of anything.  Dispersion detracts from the ability of forces to really fight, and the lack of any form of protected mobility would make withdrawal under pressure a difficult proposition.  As well, the Light Infantry possession of an anti-systems weapon like an ATGM does not give it the ability to fight mobile nor conduct any of the three security tasks (screen, guard, cover) against a mechanized adversary.

Generally, when a CMBG fights a simulated battle with a Light Battalion, it gets put in a sector that is "out of the way" (and, in one instance I saw, that out of the way sector was targeted by the enemy and the Bn run over) or gets put in the rear.  An Army would be far better off to consolidate this capability in its own brigade to focus on its own distinct missions and tasks.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Question.  Most of the discussions around force structure have revolved around the types and quantities of Brigades we should have (Light/Medium/Heavy) and how those Brigades should be equipped.
> 
> I think it's generally agreed that there are important roles to be played by both Light and Heavy Brigades (the suitability of Medium forces in a peer conflict is in question).  If realistically we only have the capability to deploy and maintain a single Brigade in a full-scale peer conflict (possibly along with a Divisional HQ to lead a multi-national Division) then we're left with a choice of which Brigade type to deploy - Light or Heavy.
> 
> However, if a key political objective in any major force deployment is to maintain at least a certain amount of autonomy for our national forces, and since both Light and Heavy forces have important roles to play even in the same battle space, then should we maybe consider deploying hybrid Brigades rather then pure Light or Heavy Brigades?
> 
> Maybe we've already got the basic structure right for Canada with one Light Battalion and two Mech Battalions per Brigade.  The Light Battalion can evolve into the type of dispersed screening force to cover the open terrain and the Mech Battalions evolve into Heavy Combined Arms Battalions with tanks and tracked IFVs for the fight in the urban spaces.



You mean NDHQ might have known what they were doing all along?  

If we accept your theory - radical though it is - what do we really have?  If we deployed a Division HQ with support and a single Field Brigade Group.

A Divisional HQ?
A Support Element?
A General Support Aviation Element?

A Brigade HQ?
A Service Support Element?
An Engineering Support Element?
A Fire Support Element?

4x Manoeuver Unit HQs

2x LRSS Sub Units
1x MBT Sub Unit
6x LAV Sub Units
3x Lt Inf Sub Units
1x Lt Inf CS Sub Unit.

Can the problems be resolved by some discrete, well targeted, equipment programmes?  

If we started by equipping the existing elements with new kit to expand their scope of capabilities - Anti-Tank, Air Defence, Engineering, Comms and UAS, without adding numbers or HQs, how far down the road would that get the Army?

Then look at upgrading kit (Towed to SP eg) and adding new capabilities (Brigade/Div GBAD, UAS and new Vertical Lift).


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> There are roles and requirements for both mech and light forces, but mech and light forces are not complementary capabilities when shoe-horned into a single minor formation.





Infanteer said:


> I'll just echo the comment above.
> 
> We need to be careful about the lessons we infer from Ukraine, because we are seeing a distorted picture through curated twitter releases.  The image of the plucky little tank hunting team stopping the Russians short of Kyiv was more a product of a flawed Russian operational concept than of the staying power of light elements in the face of a mechanized one.  What's more, it ignores the fact that the biggest killer was artillery.
> 
> I have little faith in a Light Battalion acting as a "dispersed screening force to cover" much of anything.  Dispersion detracts from the ability of forces to really fight, and the lack of any form of protected mobility would make withdrawal under pressure a difficult proposition.  As well, the Light Infantry possession of an anti-systems weapon like an ATGM does not give it the ability to fight mobile nor conduct any of the three security tasks (screen, guard, cover) against a mechanized adversary.
> 
> Generally, when a CMBG fights a simulated battle with a Light Battalion, it gets put in a sector that is "out of the way" (and, in one instance I saw, that out of the way sector was targeted by the enemy and the Bn run over) or gets put in the rear.  An Army would be far better off to consolidate this capability in its own brigade to focus on its own distinct missions and tasks.




But...

Could it be the right configuration for a flexible response brigade?

Not a brigade prepped for a particular fight (Ukraine Today) but a brigade prepped for a transitional, exploratory fight (Ukraine Feb 24th).  One that is not yet sure of the enemy, the enemy's intents or capabilities, one that is trying to survive and figure out the enemy.  One that can lead new troops into the field once the enemy is sussed.

Consider deploying the Bde HQ and the Lt Bn up front in a hurry, along with GBAD and Lt Artillery Assets and a strong ISTAR capability in the first 72 hours.

Start drawing in the heavier forces to be completed in 7 days.

Once the battlespace is clarified then it can be decided if this is a light or a heavy battle and the Brigade can be reshaped with reinforcements from Canada to suit the need.

It could end up being a grouping of all three 3rd battalions or a grouping of all three Armoured Regiments.  The LAV Coys in Canada with the other two Brigades could end up deployed overseas in an Armd Bde, even an Armd Div (1 Armd Bde of 3 CA Battalions and a LAV Bde), or they could find themselves converted to Light Bns for deployment.

How do you build that level of flexibility into the system?  Can you?


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Could it be the right configuration for a flexible response brigade?


No. Because we don't resource the CS and CSS to support light and mech, and we cannot afford to resource the CS and CSS to support light and mech in every brigade.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> No. Because we don't resource the CS and CSS to support light and mech, and we cannot afford to resource the CS and CSS to support light and mech in every brigade.


Understood.

What would it take to make it right?


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Can the problems be resolved by some discrete, well targeted, equipment programmes?
> 
> If we started by equipping the existing elements with new kit to expand their scope of capabilities - Anti-Tank, Air Defence, Engineering, Comms and UAS, without adding numbers or HQs, how far down the road would that get the Army?
> 
> Then look at upgrading kit (Towed to SP eg) and adding new capabilities (Brigade/Div GBAD, UAS and new Vertical Lift).


I know you're throwing this out for discussion purposes, but a mere equipment program doesn't solve the fundamental problem.

1 CMBG is already trending heavyish and assuming it ever does have a proper tank regiment and two mech battalions it's already a long way to being there. A brigade can function quite adequately with three manoeuvre units. It doesn't matter so much if they are organized as combined arms battalions or in "pure" battalions capable of regrouping on the fly.

The problem it has (aside from all the CS and CSS stuff) is that it has a light battalion that has minimal use and it does not have what we've been describing as a cavalry regiment capable of doing the screen, guard, cover functions that @Infanteer describes. In the past that has always been extracted from the main body (usually assigned to the battlegroup that would eventually form the reserve)

In order to "bring balance to the force" (TM), what is really necessary is to re-equip and reorganize and retrain the light battalion as whatever we want a cavalry regiment to be. I tend to think that a properly constructed cavalry regiment (or battalion) would provide more utility and versatility for a brigade, both in high intensity combat and for the numerous lessor roles it might be required for, than a pure light infantry battalion as currently configured or even re-equipped.

🍻


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Understood.
> 
> What would it take to make it right?


The answer is already given.



Infanteer said:


> An Army would be far better off to consolidate this capability in its own brigade to focus on its own distinct missions and tasks.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> But...
> 
> Could it be the right configuration for a flexible response brigade?
> 
> Not a brigade prepped for a particular fight (Ukraine Today) but a brigade prepped for a transitional, exploratory fight (Ukraine Feb 24th).  One that is not yet sure of the enemy, the enemy's intents or capabilities, one that is trying to survive and figure out the enemy.  One that can lead new troops into the field once the enemy is sussed.
> 
> Consider deploying the Bde HQ and the Lt Bn up front in a hurry, along with GBAD and Lt Artillery Assets and a strong ISTAR capability in the first 72 hours.



What is a "flexible response brigade" and what does it do when "exploratory" transitions to "the close fight" in an instant?

February 24th wasn't an exploratory fight, it was a poorly executed conventional invasion.  It is highly likely that if the plan wouldn't have rested on faulty Russian assumptions, that it could have resulted a lot differently for the Ukrainians.

The problem with what your speaking to is that units do not fight in isolation, especially when it comes to CS and CSS.  There is a second line backbone that requires different capabilities and capacities in terms of planning and sustainment.  Establishing a comms backbone and a sustainment footprint for a rapid reaction element and a mechanized element committed to decisive operations are two different things, along with the formation HQ capacity to coordinate the affair.  It's difficult to ask the formation units charged with those duties to be able to do both - they'll try, but probably not do them well.

The brigade, in my view, is where all-arms integration rubber meets the road because it is the brigade where proficiency in combined arms manoeuvre is mixed with second line combat support (signals, intelligence, fires, engineering) and combat service support (maintenance, supply, and personnel/medical support).  Trying to pile multiple mission sets and tasks onto a brigade means you water down its capability.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I know you're throwing this out for discussion purposes, but a mere equipment program doesn't solve the fundamental problem.
> 
> 1 CMBG is already trending heavyish and assuming it ever does have a proper tank regiment and two mech battalions it's already a long way to being there. A brigade can function quite adequately with three manoeuvre units. It doesn't matter so much if they are organized as combined arms battalions or in "pure" battalions capable of regrouping on the fly.
> 
> The problem it has (aside from all the CS and CSS stuff) is that it has a light battalion that has minimal use and it does not have what we've been describing as a cavalry regiment capable of doing the screen, guard, cover functions that @Infanteer describes. In the past that has always been extracted from the main body (usually assigned to the battlegroup that would eventually form the reserve)
> 
> In order to "bring balance to the force" (TM), what is really necessary is to re-equip and reorganize and retrain the light battalion as whatever we want a cavalry regiment to be. I tend to think that a properly constructed cavalry regiment (or battalion) would provide more utility and versatility for a brigade, both in high intensity combat and for the numerous lessor roles it might be required for, than a pure light infantry battalion as currently configured or even re-equipped.
> 
> 🍻



If I remember the evolution of 4 CMBG it started with the Recce "Sqn" being separately established from the Armd "Rgt".  The Sqn was a Brigade asset, not a regimental one.  It was only latterly that the same regiment was tasked with finding both the Armd squadrons and the Recce squadron.

We have a sense of what an Armoured or Tank squadron looks like, and is supposed to do.
Equally we have a sense of what an Infantry company (abn, lt, motor, mech or armd) looks like and is supposed to do.
We have a sense of the Artillery battery, the Engineer squadron and the Transport company.

The bits we seem to be struggling with are covered by the wonderful confabulation C5ISTAR (I think I got that right - or is there a Q++ at the end?).

It we were to take the Swedish Combined Arms Battalion and multiply it by three before dividing it into its components we would end up with

3 manoeuvre unit HQs  - Avaialable
3 manoeuvre unit service support sub-units - Available
14 manoeuvre sub-unit HQs - Available

3 Recce platoons with 12 IFVs - Available
3 Air Defence platoons with 12 AD variants of the IFVs
6 120mm Mortar platoons with 24 double barreled mortar variants of the IFVs
12 FOO variants of the IFVs - Available
3 Pioneer platoons with 9 IFVs and 3 AVBLs - IFVs, or Alternately AEVs, Available 

18 Infantry platoons with 54 IFVs plus 15 more for the Inf Coy HQs and 6 more for the Tank Coy HQs for a total of 75 IFVs - Avaialable
18 Tank platoons with 54 MBTs plus 12 more for the Coy HQs for a total of 66 MBTs - Available

18 Ground Combat Elements with 19 soldiers each in 3 sections of 6  for a total of 342 infantry. - Available

I have checked off what we have available 

What is missing is 

3 Air Defence platoons with 12 AD variants of the IFVs
6 120mm Mortar platoons with 24 double barreled mortar variants of the IFVs
3 AVBLs

We can find and convert, or even add, 36 IFVs with minimal effort.

Beyond that the IFVs need ATGMs (or the Platoons or Coys or Bns or all of the above do)
And the 364 infantry need ATGMs, ASMs and SAMs, all man-portable.  


We can create the core of one Heavy Brigade with minimal effort.
We can even add a reasonable Armoured Engineer element to the mix

The places we get hung up are

C5ISTAR
Army-Air Co-Operation
GBAD
Arty

In my opinion on of the biggest questions concerns the Recce Platoons, Troops, Squadrons and Regiments.

Are they primarily intelligence gathering assets?
Or are they primarily tactical assets for screening and guarding?
Should they be armed and protected for fighting with intelligence assets for developing their own situational awareness - and just reporting their situation.
Or should they equipped with all the high tech gear necessary for the Brigade to fully understand their Area of Interest? The Area of Operations?

Or could screening and guarding be better accomplished by adding a fourth manoeuvre element to the Swedish developed Combined Arms model above?

That would then leave the Recce Squadron/ISTAR Bn/UAS Bty-Coy-Sqn/Int/Cyber complex as a separate standalone SA entity.

Similar questions revolve around all other tactical units once they are equipped with UAS systems.

I think if we took the Swedish model as a base but added a LAV Battalion to the 3 CA Battalions to create  a 4 Unit Brigade, and also added an All Arms C5ISTAR unit (an enlarged HQ and Sigs Sqn/Rgt?) we wouldn't be far off a working model for the heavy force.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> If I remember the evolution of 4 CMBG it started with the Recce "Sqn" being separately established from the Armd "Rgt".  The Sqn was a Brigade asset, not a regimental one.  It was only latterly that the same regiment was tasked with finding both the Armd squadrons and the Recce squadron.
> 
> We have a sense of what an Armoured or Tank squadron looks like, and is supposed to do.
> Equally we have a sense of what an Infantry company (abn, lt, motor, mech or armd) looks like and is supposed to do.
> We have a sense of the Artillery battery, the Engineer squadron and the Transport company.
> 
> The bits we seem to be struggling with are covered by the wonderful confabulation C5ISTAR (I think I got that right - or is there a Q++ at the end?).
> 
> It we were to take the Swedish Combined Arms Battalion and multiply it by three before dividing it into its components we would end up with
> 
> 3 manoeuvre unit HQs  - Avaialable
> 3 manoeuvre unit service support sub-units - Available
> 14 manoeuvre sub-unit HQs - Available
> 
> 3 Recce platoons with 12 IFVs - Available
> 3 Air Defence platoons with 12 AD variants of the IFVs
> 6 120mm Mortar platoons with 24 double barreled mortar variants of the IFVs
> 12 FOO variants of the IFVs - Available
> 3 Pioneer platoons with 9 IFVs and 3 AVBLs - IFVs, or Alternately AEVs, Available
> 
> 18 Infantry platoons with 54 IFVs plus 15 more for the Inf Coy HQs and 6 more for the Tank Coy HQs for a total of 75 IFVs - Avaialable
> 18 Tank platoons with 54 MBTs plus 12 more for the Coy HQs for a total of 66 MBTs - Available
> 
> 18 Ground Combat Elements with 19 soldiers each in 3 sections of 6  for a total of 342 infantry. - Available
> 
> I have checked off what we have available
> 
> What is missing is
> 
> 3 Air Defence platoons with 12 AD variants of the IFVs
> 6 120mm Mortar platoons with 24 double barreled mortar variants of the IFVs
> 3 AVBLs
> 
> We can find and convert, or even add, 36 IFVs with minimal effort.
> 
> Beyond that the IFVs need ATGMs (or the Platoons or Coys or Bns or all of the above do)
> And the 364 infantry need ATGMs, ASMs and SAMs, all man-portable.
> 
> 
> We can create the core of one Heavy Brigade with minimal effort.
> We can even add a reasonable Armoured Engineer element to the mix
> 
> The places we get hung up are
> 
> C5ISTAR
> Army-Air Co-Operation
> GBAD
> Arty
> 
> In my opinion on of the biggest questions concerns the Recce Platoons, Troops, Squadrons and Regiments.
> 
> Are they primarily intelligence gathering assets?
> Or are they primarily tactical assets for screening and guarding?
> Should they be armed and protected for fighting with intelligence assets for developing their own situational awareness - and just reporting their situation.
> Or should they equipped with all the high tech gear necessary for the Brigade to fully understand their Area of Interest? The Area of Operations?
> 
> Or could screening and guarding be better accomplished by adding a fourth manoeuvre element to the Swedish developed Combined Arms model above?
> 
> That would then leave the Recce Squadron/ISTAR Bn/UAS Bty-Coy-Sqn/Int/Cyber complex as a separate standalone SA entity.
> 
> Similar questions revolve around all other tactical units once they are equipped with UAS systems.
> 
> I think if we took the Swedish model as a base but added a LAV Battalion to the 3 CA Battalions to create  a 4 Unit Brigade, and also added an All Arms C5ISTAR unit (an enlarged HQ and Sigs Sqn/Rgt?) we wouldn't be far off a working model for the heavy force.



The Bde Recce Sqn, since at least the 70s, been housed by the Armoured Regiment in the CMBG but operates directly for the Bde Comd on operations/ in the field. It has its own callsign on the Bde Net, the OC attends the Bde O Gp and its A2 echelon is serviced by the Svc Bn or by whatever BG is closest/makes the most sense. 

Our ground manouevre reconnaissance (GMR) doctrine provides guidance on the employment of infantry and armoured recce. Recce platoons that belong to infantry battalions perform close reconnaissance. Brigade Recce Sqns perform medium reconnaissance. Many things can contribute to the ISTAR process without being part of an ISTAR unit. I say this having been in ISTAR Company in Kabul. There is also a difference between the screening performed by ground manouevre reconnaissance and those assets that do not have their own battlespace or troops directly in contact. 

We are experimenting with a Combat Support Group for the various other ISTAR assets that are not organic to manouevre units (EW, SUAS, Hostile Weapon Locating/ etc).  I won't go too much into it here, but work is proceeding based on two iterations with a third upcoming. 

While I do look at other nation's armies I do not worry about matching with what the Swedes have. We have theoretical structures. We even exercise them.


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## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> What is a "flexible response brigade" and what does it do when "exploratory" transitions to "the close fight" in an instant?
> 
> February 24th wasn't an exploratory fight, it was a poorly executed conventional invasion.  It is highly likely that if the plan wouldn't have rested on faulty Russian assumptions, that it could have resulted a lot differently for the Ukrainians.
> 
> The problem with what your speaking to is that units do not fight in isolation, especially when it comes to CS and CSS.  There is a second line backbone that requires different capabilities and capacities in terms of planning and sustainment.  Establishing a comms backbone and a sustainment footprint for a rapid reaction element and a mechanized element committed to decisive operations are two different things, along with the formation HQ capacity to coordinate the affair.  It's difficult to ask the formation units charged with those duties to be able to do both - they'll try, but probably not do them well.
> 
> The brigade, in my view, is where all-arms integration rubber meets the road because it is the brigade where proficiency in combined arms manoeuvre is mixed with second line combat support (signals, intelligence, fires, engineering) and combat service support (maintenance, supply, and personnel/medical support).  Trying to pile multiple mission sets and tasks onto a brigade means you water down its capability.



Discussion demands that I look at entities in isolation.  I have to describe organizations in isolation.  I can't describe all the combinations and permutations possible with whatever elements are available, or might be available.  That is, apparently, the job of this site and the career of NDHQ.  It is especially true after contact has been made.

I take it as a given that after the enemy has voted the force in the field will have to adapt and employ whatever resources the enemy has left the force to work with.  It will then have to adapt its tactics and plans accordingly.

I don't think we can operate on the assumption that conventional planning assumptions would have worked if only the Russians hadn't screwed up.  Equally I can agree that we can't assume that the Ukrainians were military geniuses in the early going.  Are the Russians now geniuses and the Ukrainians dolts because circumstances are changing?

I love my fencing analogy.  The fencer has to stay light on the feet, with the weight centred, ready to advance or retire, lunge or parry, instantaneously.   And that is all done with one tool - one skinny pointy stick.

I accept that anybody that practices one series of movements with one set of tools will become expert in that employment.  I also accept that trying to do everything results in a jack of all trades and master of none.

Can we afford to field a force that excels on one field of battle?  Or do we need to accept that we need a force that is good enough on many fields?


I think we are close to a working structure right now.  The only major difference I would suggest is that if we are going to stick with three symmetrical Brigade Groups then we commit to them and equip all three equally.

That would mean spreading the tanks uniformly and creating a Wainwright for each Brigade.  Among other things.

It would mean two LAV Battalions, a Swedish Combined Arms Battalion (SCABs) and a Light Infantry Battalion.

It would also mean training the LIBs to operate under one command on a regular basis.  Similarly with the SCABs.

We already play mix and match.  You just don't seem to get the opportunity to practice it often enough to make it habitual.

Same problem with incorporating Artillery and Air Support.

Lack of practice resulting from lack of dollars.


Owning Canada costs money - lots of money.


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## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The Bde Recce Sqn, since at least the 70s, been housed by the Armoured Regiment in the CMBG but operates directly for the Bde Comd on operations/ in the field. It has its own callsign on the Bde Net, the OC attends the Bde O Gp and its A2 echelon is serviced by the Svc Bn or by whatever BG is closest/makes the most sense.
> 
> Our ground manouevre reconnaissance (GMR) doctrine provides guidance on the employment of infantry and armoured recce. Recce platoons that belong to infantry battalions perform close reconnaissance. Brigade Recce Sqns perform medium reconnaissance. Many things can contribute to the ISTAR process without being part of an ISTAR unit. I say this having been in ISTAR Company in Kabul. There is also a difference between the screening performed by ground manouevre reconnaissance and those assets that do not have their own battlespace or troops directly in contact.
> 
> We are experimenting with a Combat Support Group for the various other ISTAR assets that are not organic to manouevre units (EW, SUAS, Hostile Weapon Locating/ etc).  I won't go too much into it here, but work is proceeding based on two iterations with a third upcoming.
> 
> While I do look at other nation's armies I do not worry about matching with what the Swedes have. We have theoretical structures. We even exercise them.



Thanks for that.

I look at other nations' organizations for bench-marking, for a sense of what is possible and what is realistic.  I am sure that many other solutions are possible.  I just have to look at our own, and other nations' standards and how forces were deployed and employed on operations.

Every operation seems to be an opportunity to rewrite the book, or at least submit and addendum.


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## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> If I remember the evolution of 4 CMBG it started with the Recce "Sqn" being separately established from the Armd "Rgt". The Sqn was a Brigade asset, not a regimental one. It was only latterly that the same regiment was tasked with finding both the Armd squadrons and the Recce squadron.


Digging back into the dark ages, I think that you were quite correct. Doctrinally there was a brigade recce squadron which consisted of three seven car recce troops and one support troop with five M113s. In addition to that, the armoured regiment had a recce troop which provided recce functions for the regiment.

I never actually saw the doctrinal model because in my time the recce resources were incorporated into a single squadron in the armoured regiment which provided the dual function but primarily brigade recce because by then we were routinely penny-packeting tanks out into combat teams where close recce came primarily from the infantry battalions.



Kirkhill said:


> In my opinion on of the biggest questions concerns the Recce Platoons, Troops, Squadrons and Regiments.
> 
> Are they primarily intelligence gathering assets?
> Or are they primarily tactical assets for screening and guarding?
> Should they be armed and protected for fighting with intelligence assets for developing their own situational awareness - and just reporting their situation.
> Or should they equipped with all the high tech gear necessary for the Brigade to fully understand their Area of Interest? The Area of Operations?



I think the key to your question may be in better defining what is recce and surveillance and what is providing recce and security. When you take a look at ATP 3-20.96 Cavalry Squadron, you'll see quite a bit of discussion about that in Ch 3 Reconnaissance Task and Ch 4 Security Tasks with respect to the three different BCTs.

I think that this, however, is just scratching the surface of the issue as we go further along in analysing the change being brought to the engagements forward of the main line of defence by the proliferation of new, but relatively mature, weapon systems. 

I think that since 2014 it should have been an exciting time to study and redefine the roles of the various arms in high intensity conflict. It's now gone beyond exciting to absolutely vital.

Let me close by saying that we do not have the equipment to create three symmetrical brigades that have any coherent establishment. With basically the equipment of one tank regiment, six mechanized battalions, three light battalions and the aggregate of an artillery regiment+ you are either forced into a light, medium and heavy brigade at most or concede that the brigades are merely organizations used solely to generate a variety of battlegroups as opposed to a functional fighting formation. Just as importantly, I think that there are mission sets that the Army will be expected to meet over the next five to ten years that would be best met by brigades that are oriented at specialty niches rather than being generalists.

🍻


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## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks for that.
> 
> I look at other nations' organizations for bench-marking, for a sense of what is possible and what is realistic.  I am sure that many other solutions are possible.  I just have to look at our own, and other nations' standards and how forces were deployed and employed on operations.
> 
> Every operation seems to be an opportunity to rewrite the book, or at least submit and addendum.


The most important thing to do when looking at other Military forces is what is their role - and how does their nation envision their employment.  

Local Ground Armies (Israel, Sweden etc) are vastly different than Expeditionary Armies.  

Things that locally operating forces have inorganically often need to be organic for Expedition Forces.    

Israel is often touted by many - but when you look at the AoR they have - you can see how some of their choices make sense for them - but are terrible for an Army that is expected to operate thousands of miles from its shores.


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## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> Let me close by saying that we do not have the equipment to create three symmetrical brigades that have any coherent establishment. With basically the equipment of one tank regiment, six mechanized battalions, three light battalions and the aggregate of an artillery regiment+


Not to make light of re-turreting, but if there was will and money to put these on LAV's into Infantry AT platoons and the armoured regiments (2:1 with LRSS) how far off would we be from having one tank regiment, three cavalry regiments, six mechanized battalions, three light battalions, and the aggregate of an artillery regiment+?  Could it be done with the existing LAV fleet (hulls)?

If so, we'd have the basis of 3 symmetrical Medium+ Brigades (each with 2x Mech Battalion+ Cavalry Regiment) and a Light Brigade.  Could a pooled total force tank regiment be used as needed, whether that be penny packeted with half squadrons added to battlegroups or the whole regiment added to any of the three brigades to turn it heavy(ish)? Could the artillery (guns) be similarly pooled?


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## Underway

Infanteer said:


> I have little faith in a Light Battalion acting as a "dispersed screening force to cover" much of anything. Dispersion detracts from the ability of forces to really fight, and the lack of any form of protected mobility would make withdrawal under pressure a difficult proposition. As well, the Light Infantry possession of an anti-systems weapon like an ATGM does not give it the ability to fight mobile nor conduct any of the three security tasks (screen, guard, cover) against a mechanized adversary.
> 
> Generally, when a CMBG fights a simulated battle with a Light Battalion, it gets put in a sector that is "out of the way" (and, in one instance I saw, that out of the way sector was targeted by the enemy and the Bn run over) or gets put in the rear. An Army would be far better off to consolidate this capability in its own brigade to focus on its own distinct missions and tasks.


So what's the point of a Light Battalion then?  

Seems like it just needs to be jettisoned or combined into a light brigade with air mobility to make it useful for specific tasks that only a light brigade can do.  Or should we give all the light brigades new jobs and make them fully mechanized across the board?  If you want to jump out of planes then join CSOR.



FJAG said:


> In order to "bring balance to the force" (TM), what is really necessary is to re-equip and reorganize and retrain the light battalion as whatever we want a cavalry regiment to be. I tend to think that a properly constructed cavalry regiment (or battalion) would provide more utility and versatility for a brigade, both in high intensity combat and for the numerous lessor roles it might be required for, than a pure light infantry battalion as currently configured or even re-equipped.


Why use the light battalion for this?  This means you are losing an infantry battalion.  Cavalry Squadrons are at their core Armoured Recce Squadrons and we have those existing already.

Or is this a case of we don't have enough Recce to go around and also have an Armoured Squadron (I think we use Regiment for this size of armoured formation?) formation attached to make up the CMBG.  Are you using the ABCT as your template with only 2x Mech Companies and 2x Armor Companies per Combined Arms Battalion?


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## Infanteer

Underway said:


> So what's the point of a Light Battalion then?
> 
> Seems like it just needs to be jettisoned or combined into a light brigade with air mobility to make it useful for specific tasks that only a light brigade can do.  Or should we give all the light brigades new jobs and make them fully mechanized across the board?  If you want to jump out of planes then join CSOR.



Let's go back to the definition of Light Forces in B-GL-300-001.

_Light forces are defined as military forces rapidly deployable at all levels of command and optimized for terrain and conditions not suited to mechanized forces. They have significant strategic mobility, as they can be transported to any theatre by aircraft. They may be the only forces that can operate in complex environments characterized by close terrain._

So, same role (infantry - close with and destroy the enemy) but for different missions and tasks.  The Light Battalion should be able to rapidly deploy, and should.  There are plenty of examples of missions and tasks that suited light forces for a variety of reasons: UK in the Falklands, French in Mali, numerous smaller scale interventions (I'm thinking UK in Sierra Leone), specific missions within a larger conflict (101st in OIF), counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (RC-East), NEO in Kabul, etc, etc.

Again, a light battalion can't do this on its own, and needs a level of second line support external to the unit to be fully enabled (no different than any other type of unit).


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## Prairie canuck

I am well out of my lane regarding force structure but my general view from all that is written here is I do not see anything that would enable Canada to be active in the Pacific.  The US is restructuring the USMC to do exactly that. 
Adding amphibious capabilities to Canada's expeditionary forces is a must if we are to stay linked to and support our Pacific Allies is it not? Naval surface and subsurface assets to support amphibious operations are also lacking so it will be a huge undertaking but the US see China as the "next" threat, Europe and Russia not so much.


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## Underway

Infanteer said:


> Let's go back to the definition of Light Forces in B-GL-300-001.
> 
> _Light forces are defined as military forces rapidly deployable at all levels of command and optimized for terrain and conditions not suited to mechanized forces. They have significant strategic mobility, as they can be transported to any theatre by aircraft. They may be the only forces that can operate in complex environments characterized by close terrain._
> 
> So, same role (infantry - close with and destroy the enemy) but for different missions and tasks.  The Light Battalion should be able to rapidly deploy, and should.  There are plenty of examples of missions and tasks that suited light forces for a variety of reasons: UK in the Falklands, French in Mali, numerous smaller scale interventions (I'm thinking UK in Sierra Leone), specific missions within a larger conflict (101st in OIF), counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (RC-East), NEO in Kabul, etc, etc.
> 
> Again, a light battalion can't do this on its own, and needs a level of second line support external to the unit to be fully enabled (no different than any other type of unit).


I appreciate the time you're putting in to educate me here.

I perhaps should have been more specific in my question.  What's the point of a Light Battalion in a Mech Medium Brigade force construct?  If as you say they are often not able to be effective in a mechanized conflict and provide a weak point in the CMBG should they not be able to do their B-GL-300-001 defined tasks with their own dedicated Brigade or another sort of formation instead?

It just seems like they are tacked on as an afterthought (I am aware of the history of their creation).


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> So what's the point of a Light Battalion then?
> 
> Seems like it just needs to be jettisoned or combined into a light brigade with air mobility to make it useful for specific tasks that only a light brigade can do.  Or should we give all the light brigades new jobs and make them fully mechanized across the board?  If you want to jump out of planes then join CSOR.
> 
> 
> Why use the light battalion for this?  This means you are losing an infantry battalion.  Cavalry Squadrons are at their core Armoured Recce Squadrons and we have those existing already.
> 
> Or is this a case of we don't have enough Recce to go around and also have an Armoured Squadron (I think we use Regiment for this size of armoured formation?) formation attached to make up the CMBG.  Are you using the ABCT as your template with only 2x Mech Companies and 2x Armor Companies per Combined Arms Battalion?




If you only have heavy forces then the enemy will go where the heavy forces can't.

America won the conventional war in Kuwait in 1991 and Iraq in 2003.  So the opposition fought differently in different places.

Israel fights with heavy forces because they don't have far to travel and they are backed by a well developed network of highways.

Sweden and Finland fight with light forces and lots of artillery backed by local armoured manoeuvre forces because much of their countryside is covered in trees and bogs.  And because the forces are local, and locally organized they have little need for airlift of any kind.  A strategy based on dispersed light forces armed with mortars and ATGMs plays to their strengths.  They also have strong GBAD networks and Air Defence Fighter forces.

Sweden has 

1000x Unarmoured Bandvagns - locally designed and built
246x Armoured Bandvagns - locally designed and built
354x CV9040 IFV(Tracked) - locally designed and built
316x WAPC - designed and built in Finland
165x Combat Boats  - locally designed and built for use by the marines

These are backed by

121x MBTs - German 

215x 81mm mortars - designed and built in Finland
84x 120mm mortars - designed and built in Finland
60x 120mm Mjolner self propelled mortars - locally designed and built
72x 155mm Archers self propelled howitzers - locally designed and built


Air Defence consists of 

27x CV9040 AD variants to defend the manoeuvre forces - locally designed and built
70x RBS-70 MANPADS - locally designed and built
12x Patriot launchers - US systems
71x Gripens - locally designed and built


All that to defend a population and area equivalent to Alberta with a terrain and climate not dissimilar


Finland has

426x Bandvagns - designed and built in Sweden 
102x CV9030  IFV(Tracked) - designed and built in Sweden 
628x WAPC - locally designed and built

These are backed by

200x MBTs - German

550x 81mm mortars - locally designed and built
698x 120mm mortars - locally designed and built
167x 155mm towed howitzers - locally designed and built

18x 120mm AMOS self propelled mortars - locally designed and built in cooperation with Sweden
48x 155mm K9 self propelled howitzers - Korean
40x MRLS M270 - US


Air Defence consists of a complex mix of autocannons and missiles from the USSR, the US, the UK, France, Germany, Switzerland and Norway together with 55 F18s which are being replaced by 64 F35s


Finland also maintains a Warsaw Pact era inventory.

110x BMD-2  IFV(Tracked) - designed and built in the Soviet Union
389x TAPC - MTLB - designed and built in the Soviet Union
471x 122mm towed howitzers - designed and built in the Soviet Union
24x 152mm towed field guns - designed and built in the Soviet Union
74x 122mm self propelled howitzers - designed and built in the Soviet Union
34x 122mm MRLS - Czech


That defends the population of BC in the area of Newfoundland and Labrador with terrain and climate similar to Labrador or Northern Ontario,


----------



## Underway

Full disclosure, I don't read all your data. I read your first para and last para and ignore skim the rest. 

Sure, but now you're running into the jack of all trades master of none trap.  Let's just bolt on everything to a CMBG just in case.  How about a CLBG construct instead.  I know around the buoy with the same argument.

I'm trying to drill down here.  Is a CMBG better or worse off with a Light Infantry Battalion as integral to the formation? It seems like (from what others here have mentioned) they inhibit the operations of the rest of the CMBG more than they enable them, and that the Mech Inf Battalions can provide a lot of what the Light can if they leave their rides behind.


----------



## FJAG

IKnowNothing said:


> Not to make light of re-turreting, but if there was will and money to put these on LAV's into Infantry AT platoons and the armoured regiments (2:1 with LRSS) how far off would we be from having one tank regiment, three cavalry regiments, six mechanized battalions, three light battalions, and the aggregate of an artillery regiment+?  Could it be done with the existing LAV fleet (hulls)?
> 
> If so, we'd have the basis of 3 symmetrical Medium+ Brigades (each with 2x Mech Battalion+ Cavalry Regiment) and a Light Brigade.  Could a pooled total force tank regiment be used as needed, whether that be penny packeted with half squadrons added to battlegroups or the whole regiment added to any of the three brigades to turn it heavy(ish)? Could the artillery (guns) be similarly pooled?


I see it a bit different.

My suggestion to turn a light battalion into a cavalry regiment applies to only to 1 CMBG - the heavy brigade - so that it has one armoured regiment and two mech battalions as its manoeuvre units plus a new cavalry unit.

2 and 5 CMBG already have an armoured regiment that could be modified into a cavalry regiment. As well each has three infantry battalions. If one battalion's worth of LAVs were passed over from 2 CMBG to 5 CMBG then 5 CMBG would have all the makings of a medium brigade while 2 CMBG turns primarily into a light brigade. IMHO, the way I see a cavalry regiment (regardless if light, medium or heavy) it does not come up to the standard as a manoeuvre unit. You still need either three infantry, tank or combined battalions as the manoeuvre element plus a cavalry regiment. (and again I throw in my caveat that CS and CSS needs work as well)



Underway said:


> Why use the light battalion for this? This means you are losing an infantry battalion. Cavalry Squadrons are at their core Armoured Recce Squadrons and we have those existing already.
> 
> Or is this a case of we don't have enough Recce to go around and also have an Armoured Squadron (I think we use Regiment for this size of armoured formation?) formation attached to make up the CMBG.


See my comments above.

I do this solely on a reorganization of the RegF and staying PY neutral. Effectively, if you want a heavy brigade and you want a cavalry regiment with each brigade then you will need four armoured units (one tank, three cavalry) and only need eight infantry battalions (5 mech, 3 light). It's the simplest, math based shuffle available.

In truth, I think that we should make much more use of the reserves which would relieve some of the strain on the RegF because I characterize a tank regiment (like artillery) a force that could and should be served largely by reservists because they are the least likely to be needed for day to day peacetime operations. If reservists filled in some of these lower priority jobs, then such a reclassification would not be necessary.



Underway said:


> Are you using the ABCT as your template with only 2x Mech Companies and 2x Armor Companies per Combined Arms Battalion?


Actually no.

Firstly, combined arms battalions have not been a 2 + 2 structure for some time. They gave up a tank company to the cavalry squadron and are now organized with three companies per combined arms battalion - two battalions are tank heavy (2 tank + 1 inf) and one is infantry heavy (1 tank + 2 inf)

While I would like to go in that direction (in fact I'd prefer three (2 + 1) battalions), Canada doesn't have enough tanks for that. I think Canada could squeeze a 14-tank squadron of 2A6Ms out for the cavalry regiment and three 14-tank squadrons of 2A4/2A4Ms out for the armoured regiment. That obviously falls short of the tank power of an ABCT (and not just because of the number of tanks but for a bunch of reasons), but does create a fairly robust organization which can reform into mixed battlegroups as required and provides a suitable organization for training in combined arms tactics.

If the Blue Fairey could grant me a wish I'd be looking at enough tanks and IFVs to create two proper ABCTs (mostly reservist - with one brigade's worth of equipment prepositioned overseas), take all of our LAVs and aggregate them into two medium brigades (one mostly RegF and one mostly ResF) and keep one light brigade (which is mostly RegF) all done using our current RegF and ResF strength (again plus revamp CS and CSS).

🍻


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## Infanteer

Underway said:


> It just seems like they are tacked on as an afterthought.



You've answered the question.


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## KevinB

Underway said:


> I appreciate the time you're putting in to educate me here.
> 
> I perhaps should have been more specific in my question.  What's the point of a Light Battalion in a Mech Medium Brigade force construct?  If as you say they are often not able to be effective in a mechanized conflict and provide a weak point in the CMBG should they not be able to do their B-GL-300-001 defined tasks with their own dedicated Brigade or another sort of formation instead?
> 
> It just seems like they are tacked on as an afterthought (I am aware of the history of their creation).


cap badge mafia…

No one in their right mind can defend the layout of the CA — it’s simply because the 3 regular force Infantry units prefer to bicker like children and share everything equally - especially failure.


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## FJAG

Underway said:


> I'm trying to drill down here. Is a CMBG better or worse off with a Light Infantry Battalion as integral to the formation? It seems like (from what others here have mentioned) they inhibit the operations of the rest of the CMBG more than they enable them, and that the Mech Inf Battalions can provide a lot of what the Light can if they leave their rides behind.


The issue though is that in the early 2000s, the Army turned its focus on force generating battlegroups based around infantry battalions rather than force generating brigades that fight as an entity.

The Army also ended up with an imbalance on equipment (due to limited purchasing power) and a need to have a flexible, configurable force.

Add onto that a managed readiness plan that needs to turn out a similarly structured ready force in three-year cycles and what you end up with is three symmetrical brigades that turn out two mech battalions, a light battalion, a recce regiment and wimpy artillery regiment, an engineer regiment and a conflicted service battalion organized as much for base support as field support. What's more, during Afghanistan, each brigade had to turn out a roto for six month deployment often while preparing another simultaneously. Even more complicated was the fact that some of the force was mechanized while other elements like the PRT and even one of the three rifle companies were "light".

The system was stressed during Afghanistan and required significant ResF augmentation.

During this period, however, the need to organize and fight as a brigade took a back seat. If you take a close look at SSE you'll see that there is no task for the Army to deploy a full combat brigade. The numbers set out are basically varying sizes of battle groups. We've limped along for years like this, and it looks like we will for a few more yet.

🍻


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## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> Even more complicated was the fact that some of the force was mechanized while other elements like the PRT and even one of the three rifle companies were "light".



Only for Roto 0.  By Roto 1, all elements were starting to mechanize.  Roto 2 had a motorized company, but after that, they were pretty much all mechanized.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> The issue though is that in the early 2000s, the Army turned its focus on force generating battlegroups based around infantry battalions rather than force generating brigades that fight as an entity.
> 
> The Army also ended up with an imbalance on equipment (due to limited purchasing power) and a need to have a flexible, configurable force.
> 
> Add onto that a managed readiness plan that needs to turn out a similarly structured ready force in three-year cycles and what you end up with is three symmetrical brigades that turn out two mech battalions, a light battalion, a recce regiment and wimpy artillery regiment, an engineer regiment and a conflicted service battalion organized as much for base support as field support. What's more, during Afghanistan, each brigade had to turn out a roto for six month deployment often while preparing another simultaneously. Even more complicated was the fact that some of the force was mechanized while other elements like the PRT and even one of the three rifle companies were "light".
> 
> The system was stressed during Afghanistan and required significant ResF augmentation.
> 
> During this period, however, the need to organize and fight as a brigade took a back seat. If you take a close look at SSE you'll see that there is no task for the Army to deploy a full combat brigade. The numbers set out are basically varying sizes of battle groups. We've limped along for years like this, and it looks like we will for a few more yet.
> 
> 🍻


I think you are giving the CA too much credit. 
@Infanteer points out that realistically only the Roto 0 for Op Apollo was Light. 

At the end of the day Canada could have moved all the Light Infantry BN’s to one Bde should they wanted to years ago. 
  Remember just before 9/11 the LIB’s and Para Coy’s where going to be chopped. The CMBG’s don’t need a LIB and have been trying to sink them since the end of the CAR. 

I’d argue that the CA has been derelict WRT that - the farce of managed readiness and   has not conducted an honest review of the needs of the CA in decades


----------



## Underway

In a Canadian construct would this be a Battle Group?



Because in the US construct that's a proposed Cavalry Squadron.


----------



## Infanteer

Underway said:


> In a Canadian construct would this be a Battle Group?
> 
> Because in the US construct that's a proposed Cavalry Squadron.



Again, I'll refer to doctrine.  Land Ops states that a battle group (BG) is _a combined arms tactical organization task tailored for operations based upon a unit  headquarters (usually an armour, mounted recce, or infantry unit), consisting of manoeuvre subunits with integral cbt sp and CSS, a cbt sp subunit and an integral CSS subunit, organized to complete a specific mission or task_. 

The key is that its task tailored for a specific mission or task.  Its a temporary organization.  For example, a Bde is conduct an assault water crossing, and forms two battle groups from its elements to act as a Bridgehead Force and a Breakout Force, while using an infantry battalion as the In Place Force.  Following this task, the bde could simply revert to standard unit organizations, or reorganize into different battle groups for a different mission.

In the case of your diagram, I would offer that it is not a battle group if it is permanently organized that way.  It is simply a battalion/squadron/regiment/etc.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Infanteer said:


> Again, I'll refer to doctrine.  Land Ops states that a battle group (BG) is _a combined arms tactical organization task tailored for operations based upon a unit  headquarters (usually an armour, mounted recce, or infantry unit), consisting of manoeuvre subunits with integral cbt sp and CSS, a cbt sp subunit and an integral CSS subunit, organized to complete a specific mission or task_.
> 
> The key is that its task tailored for a specific mission or task.  Its a temporary organization.  For example, a Bde is conduct an assault water crossing, and forms two battle groups from its elements to act as a Bridgehead Force and a Breakout Force, while using an infantry battalion as the In Place Force.  Following this task, the bde could simply revert to standard unit organizations, or reorganize into different battle groups for a different mission.
> 
> In the case of your diagram, I would offer that it is not a battle group if it is permanently organized that way.  It is simply a battalion/squadron/regiment/etc.


Because making it a permanent organization would break too many rice bowls. You would have just about every Corps Mafia family screaming bloody murder. 
Strangely enough I think the RCAC would be the loudest in objecting.


----------



## Infanteer

That depends.  There is a balance to be struck between combined arms interoperability and the efficiency of managing and training for a capability.  In many cases, it is easier to break down into smaller, temporary combined arms teams than it is to build up larger groups.

In some cases, you wouldn't even want to push specific functions down too low.  There is a reason we don't push artillery batteries down to units.


----------



## KevinB

GK .Dundas said:


> Because making it a permanent organization would break too many rice bowls. You would have just about every Corps Mafia family screaming bloody murder.
> Strangely enough I think the RCAC would be the loudest in objecting.


The RCAC feels entitled to own Cav.  
  I never really understood that, as a CAV Sqn is really a fantastic combined arms unit. 

I also think part of the issue is the refusal of the CA to split certain trades 
 Armour - for tanks 
 CAV - for LAV or other Armoured not tank vehicles. 
  Part of that is no doubt self preservation due to the tanks on, tanks off nature of the CA…

But in the same vein that I don’t think Mech Inf should really be the same MOSID either as Light.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Underway said:


> In a Canadian construct would this be a Battle Group?
> 
> View attachment 71397
> 
> Because in the US construct that's a proposed Cavalry Squadron.


I'll  take ummm... four please , don't bother to wrap them up to go.
Oh! And could I get some attack helos for scouting and what not on side ?
Please and thank you !


----------



## Underway

GK .Dundas said:


> Because making it a permanent organization would break too many rice bowls. You would have just about every Corps Mafia family screaming bloody murder.
> Strangely enough I think the RCAC would be the loudest in objecting.





KevinB said:


> also think part of the issue is the refusal of the CA to split certain trades
> Armour - for tanks
> CAV - for LAV or other Armoured not tank vehicles.
> Part of that is no doubt self preservation due to the tanks on, tanks off nature of the CA…


That's sort of what I was getting at.  It's mainly armour units but the 6x36 could easily be an infantry cap badge, sniper infantry, 120mm artillery, UAS artillery etc...

Conversely, there is no reason you can't train armoured soldiers on a mortar system, or do dismounted work in the 6x36 scout platoon.  The snipers are specialized and should be attached, as the UAS and the various support elements like med etc...


----------



## KevinB

Underway said:


> That's sort of what I was getting at.  It's mainly armour units but the 6x36 could easily be an infantry cap badge, sniper infantry, 120mm artillery, UAS artillery etc...
> 
> Conversely, there is no reason you can't train armoured soldiers on a mortar system, or do dismounted work in the 6x36 scout platoon.  The snipers are specialized and should be attached, as the UAS and the various support elements like med etc...


I think for CAV the Black hats drive and the green hats sit in back works best.  
    It’s not a Inf Bn or a Tank Sqn - it’s a mix and needs a bunch of different skillsets IMHO.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> I think for CAV the Black hats drive and the green hats sit in back works best.
> It’s not a Inf Bn or a Tank Sqn - it’s a mix and needs a bunch of different skillsets IMHO.


Or they could all just take off their coloured hats and wear helmets instead.  One Army...many Trades.


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> Only for Roto 0.  By Roto 1, all elements were starting to mechanize.  Roto 2 had a motorized company, but after that, they were pretty much all mechanized.


I'm still stuck in 2007. TF 1-07 with 2 RCR had two LAV companies H and I and had C Coy 3 PPCLI attached which was mounted in RG 31s which is mechanized of a sort. Task Force 3-07 reorganized themselves with A Company (1 R22eR) giving up a platoon each to B Coy (2 R22eR) and C Coy (3 R22eR) and then forming a new coy with its remaining platoon and the ANA which I think was basically Ranger mounted and maybe some RG 31s. (Just starting into 3-07s story this week so not too sure yet)

🍻


----------



## Underway

KevinB said:


> I think for CAV the Black hats drive and the green hats sit in back works best.
> It’s not a Inf Bn or a Tank Sqn - it’s a mix and needs a bunch of different skillsets IMHO.


I can't help but think that would be a disaster.  An RCR platoon just plunked into the RCD lines to do dismounted ops.  Recce sqns already do (or did) dismounted ops for their tasks.   The platoon-sized unit is there to provide OP's, and internal manpower for other tasks like that.

The CA just seems allergic to permanent mixed trade formations like this.  Actually my mistake, it's not mixed trade it's mixed regiment! I mean look at our new "Cavalry Sqns"  They are square with 19 LAV or 19 TAPV.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Full disclosure, I don't read all your data. I read your first para and last para and ignore skim the rest.
> 
> Sure, but now you're running into the jack of all trades master of none trap.  Let's just bolt on everything to a CMBG just in case.  How about a CLBG construct instead.  I know around the buoy with the same argument.
> 
> I'm trying to drill down here.  Is a CMBG better or worse off with a Light Infantry Battalion as integral to the formation? It seems like (from what others here have mentioned) they inhibit the operations of the rest of the CMBG more than they enable them, and that the Mech Inf Battalions can provide a lot of what the Light can if they leave their rides behind.



No problem with the skimming.  I do a lot of that myself.

On the other hand I like to think some folks,  those that read footnotes, might occasionally find something of interest there.  If nothing else it makes me feel better that I have done my homework and that I have left my data available for challenge.

With respect to the jack of all trades master of none trap I don't perceive the trap.

The only reason we can afford the luxury of focusing on two or three scenarios is because we have the luxury of picking our battles.  Our forces aren't really for National Defence.  They are for National Interests.  Most of the stuff Canadians want the CAF to do could be done by the RCMP, the Coast Guard and the local Emergency Services.  They see no reason to shoot anyone ever.  They don't like soldiers doing it, police doing it or their fellow citizens doing it.  Loud noises are scary.  

That really is the reason that @FJAG's proposals, or mine for that matter, that would provide for the ability to raise a citizen army of jacks of all trades capable of taking on any eventuality, never gets off the ground.

The most useful, in my opinion, element of the CAF, is the one that most Canadians have likely never heard of - The Canadian Rangers.   And their greatest utility, I think, is likely to be finding lost neighbours for the RCMP and just keeping their eyes open.

The Army, Navy and Air Force will only get used when Global Affairs thinks it is a good idea.

And that makes it very difficult to decide what type of force structure works.  As I've noted in the past the Navy and the Air Force have day jobs. They perform tasks that the government, Canadians at large and the neighbours value.  Even CANSOFCOM justifies itself through discretion.

The Army is uniquely challenged.  And the Militia (Primary Reserve) even moreso.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Is a CMBG better or worse off with a Light Infantry Battalion as integral to the formation? It seems like (from what others here have mentioned) they inhibit the operations of the rest of the CMBG more than they enable them, and that the Mech Inf Battalions can provide a lot of what the Light can if they leave their rides behind.



My response is:  Are we talking administratively or operationally?

A LIB may not be a useful addition to a Mechanized Brigade.  It may inhibit planning if it is limited to black caddy's and trucks.

On the other hand I have noticed that deployed British Divisions and Brigades tend to add Infantry Battalions and Companies for Defence and Duties, base security, line of communication security and PW management.  They are assigned whatever vehicles work in the environment.  Often they are paired with helicopters for Quick Reaction Companies and Blocking Companies.

They are also often independently tasked internationally in multiple roles across the spectrum of conflict - starting with training the locals and conducting anti-poaching patrols.

Personally I find the idea of having a light infantry and a mechanized infantry capability in one brigade a useful concept for readiness management.  It should be easy to say that 1,2 or 5 Brigade is on High Readiness and regardless of the crisis  that Brigade will deploy the requisite force.  Combat Team, Battle Group or Brigade Group.  Light or Heavy.  Temporary or Sustained.  Light, Medium or Heavy.  Airmobile or Heliportable.

We are quite capable of finding the bodies and command structure for a Lt Combat Tm, or even a Battle Group.  Or a Medium Cbt Tm or Btl Gp.  Or even a Hvy Cbt Tm.  We can air lift Heliportable Lt Cbt Tms.  Now if only we had better kit.

The one thing we can't do effectively is deploy a Bde Gp, light, medium or heavy.

We might be able to manage a Division, if everybody else supplied all the necessary bodies and bits and pieces.

As to "Mech Inf Battalions can provide a lot of what the Light can if they leave their rides behind"

I could as easily re-write it as "Light Inf Battalions can provide a lot of what the Mech can if they are paired with suitable rides".

Canadian Jacks have to learn at least two trades.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Only for Roto 0.  By Roto 1, all elements were starting to mechanize.  Roto 2 had a motorized company, but after that, they were pretty much all mechanized.



Which, surely is the whole point about the value of the Light Force.  The Mech/Motor element, especially in a land-locked environment, took time to establish.


Roto 0August 2003– February 20043rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion GroupRoto 1February 2004– August 20043rd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment Battalion GroupRoto 2August 2004– February 20051st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battalion GroupRoto 3February 2005– July 20051st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion Group

The first 12 months were conducted by LIBs.  Transport, especially in Roto 0, was characterized by John Deere Gators, the Iltis, the Bv206 and the Chinook.  I can't speak to the make up Roto 1 except to note that it was a Light Bn.  If there were any mechanized/medium/heavy/motorized elements they were added to a Light Infantry Bn core.

From Roto 2, 12 months later, the Canadian Army started deploying full time Mechanized Battalions with reinforcements.

I would say that the Light - Medium mix worked pretty much as it would be expected to.   Although taking a year to get a full LAV Battle Group in country might seem a bit excessive to some.  Tanks arrived in 2006.  Combat Ops ended in 2011 and Withdrawal occurred in 2014.

I agree that the Medium Force made the better force for the long term deployment.  But it was the Light Force that established the theatre.  And there seems to have been an awful lot of infantry flying around in helicopters as well.  Even if they had to park their LAVs.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Roto 0August 2003– February 20043rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion GroupRoto 1February 2004– August 20043rd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment Battalion GroupRoto 2August 2004– February 20051st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battalion GroupRoto 3February 2005– July 20051st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion Group


Your table is Kabul. That is not even the same mission that eventually got the tanks you speak of.


----------



## KevinB

Underway said:


> I can't help but think that would be a disaster.  An RCR platoon just plunked into the RCD lines to do dismounted ops.


Yet we do it here with no issues...
   It wouldn't be RCR Platoon in RCD lines - it would be soldiers in a Cav Sqn. - Heck we can give them a florescent yellow beret and a new capbage if it helps.
    New building - new CO etc.



Underway said:


> Recce sqns already do (or did) dismounted ops for their tasks.   The platoon-sized unit is there to provide OP's, and internal manpower for other tasks like that.
> 
> The CA just seems allergic to permanent mixed trade formations like this.  Actually my mistake, it's not mixed trade it's mixed regiment! I mean look at our new "Cavalry Sqns"  They are square with 19 LAV or 19 TAPV.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Your table is Kabul. That is not even the same mission that eventually got the tanks you speak of.



Thanks.  As I said previously I include data to keep me honest.






						Operation ATHENA - Canada.ca
					

Canada’s contribution of peace-support and combat forces to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from July 17, 2003, to December 1, 2011.




					www.canada.ca


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Which, surely is the whole point about the value of the Light Force.  The Mech/Motor element, especially in a land-locked environment, took time to establish.
> 
> 
> Roto 0August 2003– February 20043rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion GroupRoto 1February 2004– August 20043rd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment Battalion GroupRoto 2August 2004– February 20051st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battalion GroupRoto 3February 2005– July 20051st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion Group
> 
> The first 12 months were conducted by LIBs.  Transport, especially in Roto 0, was characterized by John Deere Gators, the Iltis, the Bv206 and the Chinook.  I can't speak to the make up Roto 1 except to note that it was a Light Bn.  If there were any mechanized/medium/heavy/motorized elements they were added to a Light Infantry Bn core.
> 
> From Roto 2, 12 months later, the Canadian Army started deploying full time Mechanized Battalions with reinforcements.
> 
> I would say that the Light - Medium mix worked pretty much as it would be expected to.   Although taking a year to get a full LAV Battle Group in country might seem a bit excessive to some.  Tanks arrived in 2006.  Combat Ops ended in 2011 and Withdrawal occurred in 2014.
> 
> I agree that the Medium Force made the better force for the long term deployment.  But it was the Light Force that established the theatre.  And there seems to have been an awful lot of infantry flying around in helicopters as well.  Even if they had to park their LAVs.


That's not quite correct.

Rotos 0 and 1 of Op Athena 1 were large rotos with a brigade headquarters and a battlegroup with one company of infantry (Mike "Para") in Iltis and another in LAV/Bison (mostly from 1 RCR). On top of that the recce sqn had Coyotes. Our gunners had a troop of guns four FOO parties, 3 in LAV one in Iltis. Patrolling tasks varied based on whether the terrain was urban or rural and if rural if mountains needed climbing.

For Rotos 2 and 3 the battlegroup was greatly downsized. The brigade headquarters and the artillery went home and the infantry component was reduced to one company of two platoons - one as camp security and the second as a mounted QRF while the long and slow process of sending kit home or preparing it for Kandahar took place.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I think you are giving the CA too much credit.


I'm not sure I've ever been accused of that before.  😉 


KevinB said:


> @Infanteer points out that realistically only the Roto 0 for Op Apollo was Light.


True. My point was that there were numerous positions within within TFK where light infantry was useful. From OMLTs to the PRT to CLP escorts where they had a variety of vehicles, some armoured, but not necessarily LAVs working as mech infantry. With a six month predeployment training cycle and with horse trading trained crews from other battalions, things got done. Not an advocate of this system but I can see it.



KevinB said:


> At the end of the day Canada could have moved all the Light Infantry BN’s to one Bde should they wanted to years ago.


I think the 108 CCVs would have gone a long way in closing the mechanized gap. Unfortunately I do know that the ultimate plan was to penny packet those across the three brigades as well. Sigh.



KevinB said:


> Remember just before 9/11 the LIB’s and Para Coy’s where going to be chopped. The CMBG’s don’t need a LIB and have been trying to sink them since the end of the CAR.


Let's not forget that the infantry resuscitated LIBs from the 10/90 experiment which I think put them into an eventual PY bind.

I completely agree that the LIBs should be in a light force. Whether in a light brigade or a light regiment depends entirely upon whether we ever have any intention of deploying a light brigade or just light battalions.

I think the fundamental problem with the LIBs is that there simply aren't enough infantry PYs to properly staff 9 infantry battalions. There is enough mechanized equipment to support six battalions which could all use more people than 600 some odd all ranks. I can see a use for one LIB. But would think there would be an advantage in breaking up the other two for different, more necessary purposes.



KevinB said:


> I’d argue that the CA has been derelict WRT that - the farce of managed readiness and   has not conducted an honest review of the needs of the CA in decades


You won't find me disagreeing with either of those. Add to that the fact that even when some decent reviews of the reserves have been done, the implementation has been bungled. We work too much by rice bowl committees and not enough by enlightened, decisive fiat.


🍻


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> I'm still stuck in 2007. TF 1-07 with 2 RCR had two LAV companies H and I and had C Coy 3 PPCLI attached which was mounted in RG 31s which is mechanized of a sort. Task Force 3-07 reorganized themselves with A Company (1 R22eR) giving up a platoon each to B Coy (2 R22eR) and C Coy (3 R22eR) and then forming a new coy with its remaining platoon and the ANA which I think was basically Ranger mounted and maybe some RG 31s. (Just starting into 3-07s story this week so not too sure yet)



RG-31 - Motorized.

3-07 began BG transition to 2x big coys (4 Pls) which continued to 1-08 (2 PPCLI) and 3-08 (3 RCR).  1-09 (2 R22eR) shifted back to three companies.  I think 1-10 (1 RCR) saw the BG absorb the PRT company too.



Kirkhill said:


> Which, surely is the whole point about the value of the Light Force.  The Mech/Motor element, especially in a land-locked environment, took time to establish.
> 
> 
> Roto 0August 2003– February 20043rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion GroupRoto 1February 2004– August 20043rd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment Battalion GroupRoto 2August 2004– February 20051st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battalion GroupRoto 3February 2005– July 20051st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battalion Group
> 
> The first 12 months were conducted by LIBs.  Transport, especially in Roto 0, was characterized by John Deere Gators, the Iltis, the Bv206 and the Chinook.  I can't speak to the make up Roto 1 except to note that it was a Light Bn.  If there were any mechanized/medium/heavy/motorized elements they were added to a Light Infantry Bn core.
> 
> From Roto 2, 12 months later, the Canadian Army started deploying full time Mechanized Battalions with reinforcements.



You've completely mixed missions.  Those Rotos were force protection missions for the big peace support operations in Kabul (no Bv206/Chinook).  They really were "infantry - any" missions.

The Roto 0 combat mission in Kandahar was the 1 PPCLI BG with 2 Coys from that Bn and a Coy from 2 PPCLI that was jeep mounted.  It did not "take longer" to get mechanized forces in theatre - Afghanistan saw four different theatres, and each mission consisted of conscious force structure decisions based on mission specific tasks.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Much to respond to.

I was on Roto 0 of Kabul. While 3 RCR was tapped as the BG, a LAV company from 2 RCR was on the ground first with the Theatre Activation Team. Once 3 RCR was there they had two infantry companies in Iltis and an infantry company from 1 RCR in LAVs. The ISTAR Coy, with Coyotes, MEWTs, initially Arthur Radars, then Sperwer was a Bde asset. The idea, though, was that Iltis would be a non-intrusive way to patrol the city. In Jan 04 after two suicide bombs only armoured vehicles were allowed off camp. We can argue the decision, but there it is. My point is that there were plenty of LAVs in theatre. 

I was also on the Feb to Aug 06 rotation into Kandahar. There were LUVWs in B Coy, but they also had LAVs. Anyhoo.

I was also in the 2 RCR Optimized Battle Group as the OC of the Recce Sqn. There were bumps along the way, but it worked. The Human Dimension of Operations surveys revealed by the end of the experiment that the Dragoons identified more with 2 RCR BG than the riflemen in the companies did. Weird eh? A lot of hard work went into that below the waterline. So permanently mixed BGs can work, but I think this was more a feature of geography and a perfect storm of personalities (that clicked together). 

I have worked in a mixed CMBG at MAPLE RESOLVE (so real troops on real ground) and UNIFIED RESOLVE.  A light battalion with no integral A vehs is not a good fit in a mechanized brigade. It is a solution desperately looking for a problem. Give them Bisons or TAPVs (but many) and at least they can keep up and do something. 

Finally, when I was working with them the US Army Cavalry Squadrons did not have infantryman (except for the mortar dudes). The Scout Platoons in the Cavalry Troops  were not manned by infantrymen.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Yet we do it here with no issues...
> It wouldn't be RCR Platoon in RCD lines - it would be soldiers in a Cav Sqn. - Heck we can give them a florescent yellow beret and a new capbage if it helps.
> New building - new CO etc.


Sorry but that’s not true anymore is it? Bradley’s and Strikers are crewed by 11Bs no?


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> Sorry but that’s not true anymore is it? Bradley’s and Strikers are crewed by 11Bs no?


And by 19D’s (CAV Scout) - depends on the formation.  https://www.cool.osd.mil/army/enlisted/19d.htm

The 19K MOS is the ‘hard armor’ M1 Crewmen.


My point being for Canada that a CAV Sqn would have Armored Recce trade, Infantry trade and some other trades in it to achieve a optimal force.  I don’t see the point in training Armor troops to do a bunch of dismount stuff (much in the same way I don’t think Infantry for armored vehicles) 


Down here 19D’s no longer go through Sniper School, that has been a on the bus, off the Bus routine down here - so Infantry again fill the sniper role in the Cav formation, as well as Mortar platoon. 
  There has been a lot of discussion as to how to optimize the ORBAT for the CAV with MoS’s - a friend of mine just did a paper at C&GSC on a more mixed system I really like it - if it gets beyond FOUO I’ll share.


----------



## Underway

Infanteer said:


> I think 1-10 (1 RCR) saw the BG absorb the PRT company too.


I was 3-09 PRT and did the turnover to 1-10.  STAB Coy A (Charlie 2VP) , and STAB Coy B (I think 3VP but may be wrong) were merged under STAB A at CNS.  It really gave us a Coy+ (five platoons 4 mech, one light) if memory serves as two of our original 2VP platoons were outside of CNS.

When I left India Coy 2 RCR (STAB A's replacement) was being transferred to the BG and moved out of CNS.  Not sure who replaced STAB B, but I think they arrived and directly joined the BG.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks.  As I said previously I include data to keep me honest.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Operation ATHENA - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> Canada’s contribution of peace-support and combat forces to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from July 17, 2003, to December 1, 2011.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.canada.ca



During the period 2003 to 2014 Canada committed a Battlegroup to Afghanistan.  Over that period the mission of the force changed.  It morphed constantly in my opinion, as I would expect.  Combat operations ended in 2011.

As the situation evolved the commitment evolved and the force structure evolved.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Sorry but that’s not true anymore is it? Bradley’s and Strikers are crewed by 11Bs no?


There used to be a 11M for fighting vehicle infantry but they consolidated that into 11B. They also did that with 11H- anti-armor. All that's left as a separate MOS is 11C - Indirect fire infantryman (mortars)

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle









						Army details 'highest level,' but 'not final' OMFV requirements for next phases - Breaking Defense
					

As the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle enters phases three and four, a senior Army official details some requirements but says the service is flexible.




					breakingdefense.com
				







> *the vehicle includes a two-person crew with six dismounted infantry*
> 
> Dean said the vehicle includes a two-person crew with six dismounted infantry in the back, down from a three-person crew in the Bradley. Dean said that decision will come with some cultural adjustments for soldiers, who will say they need a third crewman, but highlights the need to implement tools on the OMFV that will reduce the cognitive burden on soldiers. While fighter jets have evolved to give pilots more situational awareness and fly-by-wire capabilities that ease the burden on soldiers, combat vehicles have not, he said.
> 
> “We haven’t evolved,” Dean said. So that’s the opportunity for the future because without that evolution, again in the future space, as we’re seeing in Ukraine, is very complex.
> 
> To address the change, the OMFV will maintain a third crew station to ease the transition from a three soldier crew to two.
> 
> “That’s how we’re going to balance in the transition toward the application of greater autonomy on the platform,” Dean said. “Two crew is challenging today. I don’t have all the apps I need loaded to handle my data.”





> the vehicle have a medium caliber cannon, with a minimum .30 caliber cannon, though the acquisition objective is .50 caliber cannon. The service is also weighing anti-tank guide missile systems for the platforms, though “we haven’t specified which missile,” Dean said.



I assume .30 caliber and .50 caliber are supposed to be 30 and 50 mm cannons


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> I assume .30 caliber and .50 caliber are supposed to be 30 and 50 mm cannons


Yes.  50mm supershot and standard 30mm.


----------



## KevinB

Report to Congress on Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle - USNI News
					

The following is the Dec. 28, 2021, Congressional Research Service report The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) Program: Background and Issues for Congress. From the report In June 2018, in part due to congressional concerns, the Army announced a new modernization strategy and...




					news.usni.org


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> I see it a bit different.
> 
> My suggestion to turn a light battalion into a cavalry regiment applies to only to 1 CMBG - the heavy brigade - so that it has one armoured regiment and two mech battalions as its manoeuvre units plus a new cavalry unit.
> 
> 2 and 5 CMBG already have an armoured regiment that could be modified into a cavalry regiment. As well each has three infantry battalions. If one battalion's worth of LAVs were passed over from 2 CMBG to 5 CMBG then 5 CMBG would have all the makings of a medium brigade while 2 CMBG turns primarily into a light brigade. IMHO, the way I see a cavalry regiment (regardless if light, medium or heavy) it does not come up to the standard as a manoeuvre unit. You still need either three infantry, tank or combined battalions as the manoeuvre element plus a cavalry regiment. (and again I throw in my caveat that CS and CSS needs work as well)
> 
> See my comments above.
> 
> *I do this solely on a reorganization of the RegF and staying PY neutral. Effectively, if you want a heavy brigade and you want a cavalry regiment with each brigade then you will need four armoured units (one tank, three cavalry) and only need eight infantry battalions (5 mech, 3 light). It's the simplest, math based shuffle available.*


Fair enough, I was going off the basis of the 2 non continental US BCT's running with 2 infantry battalions as precedent for "enough"

Challenge, does the Light Brigade need a standing cav unit, or is it's primary purpose to force generate QRF battalions and potentially light based battlegroups?  If it does need a Cav capability, wouldn't it make more sense for the LIB -> Cav conversion to happen within the light force? Good geographic location to play with your reserve ideas in PRes rich Ontario, strip a company each from 1,2,3 RCR to form the new RegF Cav, 3RCR becomes a 10/90 reserve LIB.

If so, the math changes to 3 armoured (1 tank and 2 cav) 6 mech. Two symmetrical medium Bde's,  one independent/floating tank regiment that can turn either "heavyish" as needed.  Or, if we got wild, two 70/30 tank regiments where the 30 trains on the 70's tanks to end up with two heavy-ish Bde's.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I think for CAV the Black hats drive and the green hats sit in back works best.
> It’s not a Inf Bn or a Tank Sqn - it’s a mix and needs a bunch of different skillsets IMHO.



FJAG has been promoting fractional units.  10:90, 30:70, 50:50 etc.

What if the same concept were applied to the Infantry / Armoured debate?

What if we focused the RCAC on manoeuvre warfare and the RCIC on positional warfare?

And then developed a 3:1 standard.  Four Subunits to the Unit.

RCAC - 3 parts manoeuvre to 1 part position (3 Sabre to 1 Support)
RCIC - 3 parts position to 1 part manoeuvre (3 Rifle to 1 Support)

RCIC Sabre is all about mounted weapons and the Support is infantry for clearance and to take and hold briefly.
RCAC Rifle is all about light troops and emplaced man-portable weapons and Support is heavy weapons on wheels or tracks to screen and manoeuvre.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG has been promoting fractional units.  10:90, 30:70, 50:50 etc.
> 
> What if the same concept were applied to the Infantry / Armoured debate?
> 
> What if we focused the RCAC on manoeuvre warfare and the RCIC on positional warfare?
> 
> And then developed a 3:1 standard.  Four Subunits to the Unit.
> 
> RCAC - 3 parts manoeuvre to 1 part position (3 Sabre to 1 Support)
> RCIC - 3 parts position to 1 part manoeuvre (3 Rifle to 1 Support)
> 
> RCIC Sabre is all about mounted weapons and the Support is infantry for clearance and to take and hold briefly.
> RCAC Rifle is all about light troops and emplaced man-portable weapons and Support is heavy weapons on wheels or tracks to screen and manoeuvre.


I think there is a culture and a training (*or should have) difference between Infantry - Armor - and Cav

I think the Inf / Armor Combat Teams as fixed entities can work in large armies that do a great amount of training - and have the resources to support -- some here (Infanteer for one) have mentioned that a mixed unit has a tough time of doing training etc.
   So I will concede that the Cbt Tm can be built as required.

Both Inf and Armored are required for static and maneuver warfare -

The Cav role, I see as an entity that has troops from a bunch of branches posted in for a 2-3 years and spends it times doing collective training - and some common individual training (and perhaps sending troops to their parent trade units/schools for PCF).

 Looking at a CAV unit - you need Armored- Recce (as opposed to Armored - Tank)  crew - I don't see a point in trying to make Armored troops Infantryman in that role - so you post in Infantry for the roles applicable.  You also have Cbt Engineers, etc.
   CAV becomes the Bde Recce asset, as if you look at how the US Army sets it up, it has a lot of what Canada would want in that role.

I think 10/90 isn't enough based on my own 10/90 experiences in the early 90's - I think the 70/30 and 30/70 makes a good deal of sense for some formations -- but again that rolls back to Canada needs to change the PRes to make it a viable entity beyond minor augmentation.
   Until that occurs, I tend to dismiss any PRes incorporation


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I think there is a culture and a training (*or should have) difference between Infantry - Armor - and Cav
> 
> I think the Inf / Armor Combat Teams as fixed entities can work in large armies that do a great amount of training - and have the resources to support -- some here (Infanteer for one) have mentioned that a mixed unit has a tough time of doing training etc.
> So I will concede that the Cbt Tm can be built as required.
> 
> Both Inf and Armored are required for static and maneuver warfare -
> 
> The Cav role, I see as an entity that has troops from a bunch of branches posted in for a 2-3 years and spends it times doing collective training - and some common individual training (and perhaps sending troops to their parent trade units/schools for PCF).
> 
> Looking at a CAV unit - you need Armored- Recce (as opposed to Armored - Tank)  crew - I don't see a point in trying to make Armored troops Infantryman in that role - so you post in Infantry for the roles applicable.  You also have Cbt Engineers, etc.
> CAV becomes the Bde Recce asset, as if you look at how the US Army sets it up, it has a lot of what Canada would want in that role.
> 
> I think 10/90 isn't enough based on my own 10/90 experiences in the early 90's - I think the 70/30 and 30/70 makes a good deal of sense for some formations -- but again that rolls back to Canada needs to change the PRes to make it a viable entity beyond minor augmentation.
> Until that occurs, I tend to dismiss any PRes incorporation





> 3rd (United Kingdom) Division exists as the United Kingdom’s strategic land warfare asset.
> 
> As such the Division is able to bring to bear the considerable firepower of the British Army and concentrate the force which includes: Reconnaissance, Armoured Cavalry; Armoured and Mechanised Infantry, Aviation, Artillery, Engineers and Logistics; in what is referred to as “the full spectrum” of warfighting capability.
> 
> 'The Iron Division' is made up of 1st Armoured Infantry Brigade, 12th Armoured Brigade Combat Team, 20th Armoured Brigade Combat Team, 1st Artillery Brigade, 11 Signals Brigade and 101st Operational Sustainment Brigade, 7th Air Defence Group and 25 (Close Support) Engineer Group, 4 Military Intelligence Battalion and 7 Military Intelligence Battalion.



I'm trying not to get tied up in vocabulary.  The vocabulary is less and less representative of the roles in the field.

Let me back up a bit then.

Manoeuvre units (flexible with a manoeuvre focus but a positional capability)
Positional units  (flexible with a positional focus but a manoeuvre capability)
ISTAR units (observation and info-gathering with a self-defence capability drawing on the sneak and peek tradition rather than the fight for info tradition)
Fire Support units (fire support of all sorts with a ISTAR capability)

The dedicated one unit, one weapon system, seems to me as out dated a notion as the infanteer being identified as a rifle operator rather than the rifle just being one tool of many for the infanteer.


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## TangoTwoBravo

While I was training with the US Army the Bradleys in the US Cavalry Troops were not crewed by Infantry. They were Scouts. While those Scouts Troops had dismounted scouts, they were not intended to be used as infantrymen.

If we are trying to do close combat then we have combat team structures, training and equipment. The Armoured Corps is exploring Cavalry, but that is really about having a single individual training steam and organizational (if not equipment) structure in the field units. We'll see how that develops. 

Canadian armour crewmen can absolutely conduct dismounted recce work. If we are looking for an element to recce/mark/secure in support of infantry companies in a battalion dismounted attack then a Recce Platoon from an infantry battalion would indeed be the preferred element. Having said that, Recce Tps, even those equipped with Coyotes, have not been completely tied to their vehicles. They dismount as appropriate to execute their recce tasks.


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## KevinB

TangoTwoBravo said:


> While I was training with the US Army the Bradleys in the US Cavalry Troops were not crewed by Infantry. They were Scouts. While those Scouts Troops had dismounted scouts, they were not intended to be used as infantrymen.


Agreed - given the CA doesn't have a 19D type trade, I was suggesting the role can be filled by mixing Inf and Arm forces.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> If we are trying to do close combat then we have combat team structures, training and equipment. The Armoured Corps is exploring Cavalry, but that is really about having a single individual training steam and organizational (if not equipment) structure in the field units. We'll see how that develops.
> 
> Canadian armour crewmen can absolutely conduct dismounted recce work. If we are looking for an element to recce/mark/secure in support of infantry companies in a battalion dismounted attack then a Recce Platoon from an infantry battalion would indeed be the preferred element. Having said that, Recce Tps, even those equipped with Coyotes, have not been completely tied to their vehicles. They dismount as appropriate to execute their recce tasks.


  Frankly this is a rice bowl issue -- I've never been significantly impressed by 19D's or CA Armored Recce trying to dismount work -- the same way I never understood why an Inf BN would get Coyote's for Recce.
   In an Army as small as Canada, it doesn't make sense to attempt to duplicate capabilities and half ass it.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

KevinB said:


> Agreed - given the CA doesn't have a 19D type trade, I was suggesting the role can be filled by mixing Inf and Arm forces.
> 
> Frankly this is a rice bowl issue -- I've never been significantly impressed by 19D's or CA Armored Recce trying to dismount work -- the same way I never understood why an Inf BN would get Coyote's for Recce.
> In an Army as small as Canada, it doesn't make sense to attempt to duplicate capabilities and half ass it.


We have RCAC folks that spend a whole career conducting recce. They do what the US Scout platoons do (although there are absolutely differences in the TTPs).


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## FJAG

IKnowNothing said:


> Fair enough, I was going off the basis of the 2 non continental US BCT's running with 2 infantry battalions as precedent for "enough"
> 
> Challenge, does the Light Brigade need a standing cav unit, or is it's primary purpose to force generate QRF battalions and potentially light based battlegroups?  If it does need a Cav capability, wouldn't it make more sense for the LIB -> Cav conversion to happen within the light force? Good geographic location to play with your reserve ideas in PRes rich Ontario, strip a company each from 1,2,3 RCR to form the new RegF Cav, 3RCR becomes a 10/90 reserve LIB.
> 
> If so, the math changes to 3 armoured (1 tank and 2 cav) 6 mech. Two symmetrical medium Bde's,  one independent/floating tank regiment that can turn either "heavyish" as needed.  Or, if we got wild, two 70/30 tank regiments where the 30 trains on the 70's tanks to end up with two heavy-ish Bde's.


I think what matters most about the structure, is what you intend the final structure's capability to be. With a Canadian Army hovering around 20,000 regulars and 15,000 reservists (those are very rough rounded off numbers you might be able to generate for a field force) the most you could ever deploy and marginally sustain would be a single division (say 20 - 23,000 all told). It would be more practical to generate and deploy a brigade (say 5,000) and the SSE, as is written, is for the deployment of battlegroups (1,5 - 2,500). In each of those structures, it doesn't matter how many are regular or reservists as long as you develop a proper training and mobilization structure to complement it. Obviously the more regulars a force has the more rapidly it can be mobilized and the more effective it will be at the time of mobilization albeit that with time effectiveness will reach a level of parity.

If one looks solely at the SSE then brigade and division structures do not matter. What matters is that a core for the battlegroup exists. That equates to at least a trained battalion headquarters. If you want that battlegroup to be able of deploying rapidly then the more of its sub-components (such as rifle companies, CS and CSS) should be organic. If there is time for pre-deployment training and organization before deployment then those sub-components can come from elsewhere. Essentially this is how we did things during Afghanistan. With roughly a years notice and six months of predeployment training we were able to literally cobble together 2 - 2,500 man battlegroups on a continuing basis using both regular and reserve forces (roughly 10-20%) for each roto. For that type of conveyor system of force generation our brigade structures, our reserve structures and our managed readiness and equipment management systems were adequate and still remain adequate.

The problem comes when you want to up the game and send a brigade all at once. None of our brigades are configured or manned to a level where it could be mobilized without very heavy augmentation in both personnel and equipment from the other two brigades and the reserve force. To go one step further, depending on what level of hostilities they are going into, we would need to procure several crucial weapons systems not currently in our inventory and need the time to train their operators. Lastly, we would need to build a CSS structure to be able to support the force. In addition we would need to build a system that generates replacements for casualties of both personnel and equipment and perhaps a rotational system.

The problem with brigades is that we will never send one as currently configured. The LIB is an issue as is the paucity of artillery and the nonexistence of a variety of enabling weapons such as AD and ATGMs. Time is the big factor. The brigade will need to be "rounded-out" from other brigades and reservists and trained and this will take significantly more time to do than a mere battlegroup.

Building and deploying a division confronts us with the same issues but at a significantly greater magnitude to the point where its nigh on impossible to do.

Personally I think that a structure of the size of Canada's current Army, that aims to deploy only battlegroups is aiming far too low.

I think that if all you are planning on sending is a battlegroup, then an Army which actually has enough effectives (both regular and reservists combined) to man that battlegroup is enough for one roto. If more rotos are envisioned then you need some additional cadres to form additional battle groups while filling the ranks with new recruits. A mechanized battalion has roughly 600 all ranks of which roughly 360 are cpls/ptes. Lets up those numbers to a more realistic level of 800 and 500 respectively and set roto lengths as one year. In a year of intensive training the core of 300 should be able to bring 500 new recruits to a level where the battalion is effective. While our risk averse hierarchy might disagree with that, most armies are quite capable of doing it. So effectively, an Army that plans to deploy only battlegroups needs only multiple sets of equipment and personnel to put out a Roto 0 and maybe two sets of cadres to form Rotos 1 and 2 and subsequent ones. If there is a pool of DP1 level trained reservists already available - lets say enough for Roto 1 - then the job becomes even easier. And if the deployments are basically peacetime ones such as the one to Latvia, a newly raised and trained battlegroup has even more time in theatre to hone its skills to a much higher level.

Obviously if we upscale our requirement for deployment to a brigade, then the problem becomes much more complex. Unlike a battlegroup whose equipment and CSS support is relatively modest, a brigade's are increased by a factor of 5-6 at a minimum. Equipping and training a brigade from scratch easily takes more than a year even if you start with a trained cadre as you need to take the first year to get the battalions organized and trained and then take significantly more time to train them to operate as combined arms.

My point with the above is not to urge us to reduce the army to one Roto 0 and several cadres but to say that its critical to understand and fully tailor your army to meet its expected objectives well before the fact. Know how large a force you want to deploy and in what theatre and organize the structure (equipment and personnel) well ahead of the fact. If cost is a consideration (and when isn't it?) then make a part of the force a properly trained reserve force. If time is not a consideration (and in the peacetime past it hasn't been) then include in the plan the recruiting and training of civilians. But. Make sure that you have a solid doctrine and a structure to support that doctrine and to stay with it. We _ad hoc_ things entirely too much.

What's clear to me is that, having committed to Latvia, we need to sustain a battlegroup in theatre. It's effectively an open ended standing commitment. Under the SSE we need a structure only sufficient in personnel and equipment to sustain it. We do not need a brigade for that. Three, maybe four, battalion cores (1,500 total max) rotating on one year periods could do it. That's significantly less expensive than a whole RegF brigade. If, however, we think that at some point we need to, or want the option to, send a full brigade, then we better have a properly equipped and organized heavy brigade with a proper doctrine available for that. Since that's a contingency, and not a standing commitment, much of it can be a reserve element. If we think that will become a major operation then we better have an additional reserve heavy brigade in the hopper as well.

Over and above Latvia, we need to do that analysis for each and every commitment, whether standing or contingent. Do we want to do security force training? - configure a force for that. Do we want to do UN peacekeeping? - configure a force for that. Do we want an army presence in the Arctic and on our coasts? - configure a force for that. Some of those will be standing commitments requiring a full-time force; others will be contingencies which can get by with a core, reservists and civilians.

In effect this is why I favour restructuring into light, medium and heavy forces - each targeted on a particular class of missions (quick reaction and the North; peacekeeping; and Europe respectively), each equipped and trained to meet those commitments.

I think that our knee jerk response to missions (standing and contingent) in trying to be jacks of all trades are what is burning out the Army as people are shoved around from pillar to post and what is tying us to a large and expensive standing regular force which undermines our ability to obtain proper equipment.

All that to say my whole concept of 30/70 forces comes from the idea of having more full-time "cores" available to build battlegroups or brigades around in sufficient numbers to meet standing commitments and reasonably foreseeable contingencies.

That to say as well, why I'm not in favour of having forces designed to meet a variety of tasks such as a tank regiment that could work with either this brigade or that one or a brigade formed with two battalions and a cavalry regiment. Nor do I know for sure whether the light force needs a cavalry regiment (I suspect it does if it needs to be able to deploy as a brigade as opposed to just light battlegroups).

I certainly am with you on the fact that we need to leverage PRes heavy areas. In fact I think much of the future of the army as a viable and credible force depends on it. I find it regrettable that the Army's leadership hasn't recognized that yet.

🍻


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## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> What's clear to me is that, having committed to Latvia, we need to sustain a battlegroup in theatre. It's effectively an open ended standing commitment. Under the SSE we need a structure only sufficient in personnel and equipment to sustain it. We do not need a brigade for that. Three, maybe four, battalion cores (1,500 total max) rotating on one year periods could do it. That's significantly less expensive than a whole RegF brigade. If, however, we think that at some point we need to, or want the option to, send a full brigade, then we better have a properly equipped and organized heavy brigade with a proper doctrine available for that. Since that's a contingency, and not a standing commitment, much of it can be a reserve element. If we think that will become a major operation then we better have an additional reserve heavy brigade in the hopper as well.
> 
> 
> 🍻



Knowing as little as I do now I would add a 5 or 6 Battery Artillery Regiment to the Battlegroup Commitment.

3x M777 or SPH Batteries
1x SPH or HIMARS Battery
1x STA/FOO/FAC/TUAS Element
1x MRAD/SHORAD/ManPADs Battery

Or something of such sort.

And no cannons with less than L52 barrels.


----------



## KevinB

TangoTwoBravo said:


> We have RCAC folks that spend a whole career conducting recce. They do what the US Scout platoons do (although there are absolutely differences in the TTPs).


Again to me that is a rice bowl issue, if we talk about making a CAV type Squadron.

I think it make a lot sense to have dismounted Inf Recce types and Engineer Recce types do the dismount portion, and have the Armor do the vehicle and UAS/Surveillance aspects, especially in an Army Canada's size.

I don't see the viability of the current CA Armored Recce Squadron with its current ORBAT.


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## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Knowing as little as I do now I would add a 5 or 6 Battery Artillery Regiment to the Battlegroup Commitment.
> 
> 3x M777 or SPH Batteries
> 1x SPH or HIMARS Battery
> 1x STA/FOO/FAC/TUAS Element
> 1x MRAD/SHORAD/ManPADs Battery
> 
> Or something of such sort.
> 
> And no cannons with less than L52 barrels.


I think the entire idea of a self deployed battle group is incredibly bad.  For years the Bde had been viewed as the minimum deployable formation and I’d say for a lot of reasons.  

If you start pushing more and more assets to a BattleGroup it’s a Bde- at that point, and you’ve had to deploy the majority of the command staff and Bde enablers that make the Bde unable to relief itself anyway.  

  I think that the years in Cyprus as a BN tasking and then the piecemeal BattleGroups for FYR really played havoc with the CA.   Then Afghanistan just continued the shell game.   

Either the Cdn Gov needs to accept their asks are bigger than the ability of the CAF and scale it up to meet the needs - or they need to scale back the operations to short term commitments of a Bde.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Knowing as little as I do now I would add a 5 or 6 Battery Artillery Regiment to the Battlegroup Commitment.
> 
> 3x M777 or SPH Batteries
> 1x SPH or HIMARS Battery
> 1x STA/FOO/FAC/TUAS Element
> 1x MRAD/SHORAD/ManPADs Battery
> 
> Or something of such sort.
> 
> And no cannons with less than L52 barrels.


I take the same view with respect to artillery, or any other branch. You need to know what you want for a final outcome. If what we are talking about is battlegroups, then all you need is one composite regiment with a battery of guns for every concurrent battlegroup deployment augmented by an STA battery capable of spinning off troops and maybe a troop's worth of HIMARS. All that backed up by a sufficient stock of equipment, additional full-timers, reservists, recruits etc to create additional rotos from and to support training and rotations and doctrine and trade progression

Again, if the objective is a brigade, then you need multiple regiments with one each for each deployable brigade with an additional force training. As artillery is generally not a major peace-time requirement, they can be tilted considerably to part-time personnel. The amount and nature of equipment is clearly predicated on what expectation there is for the force to deploy concurrently. If we contemplate two simultaneous brigade deployments then we need to be able to form two Roto 0 regiments plus etc etc.

When the big decisions are made, the other ones all fall into place.

Our problem, our very expensive problem, is that we have a force structure with very little purpose. While we had 4 CMBG there was a clear purpose for the troops in Canada to be organized and trained as brigades to rotate through. There was even a long standing commitment for an additional brigade and battlegroup which again gave a focus for organization equipment and training. Under _SSE_ we no longer have a real purpose for a brigade except in the way of a contingency, which is unspoken in _SSE, _or as a training framework for battlegroups and to spin off NCEs from time-to-time. Neither of those needs a fully formed or equipped brigade.

If one strictly looked at the rotational battlegroup missions as set out in _SSE _one does not need a full brigade framework or a brigade's equipment holdings. One could easily have a colonel or one star training headquarters that three or four or more battlegroups in training could report to and be supported by. That would be the economical way of doing things.

I'm personally very much in favour of having at least one fully formed brigade properly equipped and trained for our most demanding contingency (which currently is northern Europe) and, because it is a contingency, it could be largely reservist. I think that, at a minimum we need one other brigade to be equipped and trained for defence of Canada operations and other contingencies such as UN missions. My preference, however, is to have a multi brigade structure as set out in my Force 2027 30/70 structure which gives Canada the ability to "grow a host". It's not that I think that they will necessarily be employed, but I'm a firm believer that being able to build a "host" is a very important factor for deterrence and credibility amongst our allies. We've spent decades deluding ourselves that the individual capability of our soldier (which even with 4 CMBG was largely delusional towards the end) buys us credibility. It didn't then and it certainly doesn't now.



KevinB said:


> I think the entire idea of a self deployed battle group is incredibly bad.  For years the Bde had been viewed as the minimum deployable formation and I’d say for a lot of reasons.
> 
> If you start pushing more and more assets to a BattleGroup it’s a Bde- at that point, and you’ve had to deploy the majority of the command staff and Bde enablers that make the Bde unable to relief itself anyway.
> 
> I think that the years in Cyprus as a BN tasking and then the piecemeal BattleGroups for FYR really played havoc with the CA.   Then Afghanistan just continued the shell game.
> 
> Either the Cdn Gov needs to accept their asks are bigger than the ability of the CAF and scale it up to meet the needs - or they need to scale back the operations to short term commitments of a Bde.



Very much agree.

Mike Jeffery, the CLS, at the turn of the century was very concerned that with Bosnia ongoing he was unable to meet the then standing defence requirements of the 1994 Defence White Paper of a light battalion in 10 days, a mech battlegroup in 21 and a brigade in three months. He estimated he could do the first but need three months for the mech battlegroup and "might" be able to generate a brigade in six months. At his retirement, just before we sent battlegroups to Kabul, he opined that two six-month rotations of 1,800 in Afghanistan together with our then Bosnia commitment meant that 1/3 of the deployable strength of the army was tied up in international deployments which concerned him for the army's future.

In essence we were officially admitting point blank that deploying and sustaining a brigade was not realistically feasible as at that time we had only two battlegroups deployed at any given time while preparing another two which even in the aggregate is less than a brigade. While our force strength has gone up since then, much of that growth has been absorbed into administrative HQ functions rather than the field force.

Honestly, I think scaling back commitments would not be the answer. That results in an annual expenditure of $26 Billion for very little. If 68,000 full-time military folks and some 20-25,000 reservists can't meet our rather modest current commitments (the CAF website says we have 2,000 deployed on 20 ops) then the government has to take a damn close look at what's going on here. Every business looks closely as to the % of resources expended on overhead and administration as opposed to that on operations or production. Our ratio is so far out of kilter that it should be sending off giant alarm bells. What's needed is a massive reset of the entire structure.







🍻


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## Kirkhill

FJAG, I would be content to see Canada act as the spine for an Allied Brigade Group with an HQ, a Battle Group and the Support elements, in particular Fire Support.

For  a Brigade Group of Allies I might expect to see four "manoeuvre" elements, on supplying Situational Awareness (Recce, ISTAR, whatever you want to call it) and three Combat Arms (Infantry, Tank, Armour, whatever).

That would mean:

one large battery in support of each of the three Combat Arms elements (M777 or SPH)
one depth battery in support of the SA/Recce/ISTAR whatever (SPH if M777s or HIMARS if SPHs)
one Situational Awareness battery (STA/FOO/FAC/UAS)
one GBAD battery capable of covering the Brigade Area of Operations / Area of Interest.

I might expect to find Latvian, Swedish and Danish elements under command.


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## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> FJAG, I would be content to see Canada act as the spine for an Allied Brigade Group with an HQ, a Battle Group and the Support elements, in particular Fire Support.
> 
> For  a Brigade Group of Allies I might expect to see four "manoeuvre" elements, on supplying Situational Awareness (Recce, ISTAR, whatever you want to call it) and three Combat Arms (Infantry, Tank, Armour, whatever).
> 
> That would mean:
> 
> one large battery in support of each of the three Combat Arms elements (M777 or SPH)
> one depth battery in support of the SA/Recce/ISTAR whatever (SPH if M777s or HIMARS if SPHs)
> one Situational Awareness battery (STA/FOO/FAC/UAS)
> one GBAD battery capable of covering the Brigade Area of Operations / Area of Interest.
> 
> I might expect to find Latvian, Swedish and Danish elements under command.


I like the concept but with only three brigade headquarters it would be unsustainable vis a vis the bde HQ for more than three rotations unless you go to a one year cycle or make it a fourth bde HQ and post families there for two to three years. (again this is why I go to my 30/70 construct in order to create a total of five deployable brigade HQ cores which could support shorter rotations (say 9 months)).)

You'd need someone to supply an artillery battalion (which IMHO should in future have a loitering munitions battery) with its own observers and FSCCs as well. One can cobble together a multinational arty battalion but I wouldn't recommend it.

Since there already is a Multinational division there, an AD bn, an STA battery and a HIMARS bn would best be part of the div. If not made available we'd need those resources for the brigade.

Honestly, I think the fundamental concept of a UK-like Strike brigade with highly upgraded recce regiments, teamed with long range artillery regiments is a very valid concept. I'm just not sure if it needs to be concentrated in a single brigade or whether it should be based on each line brigade's cavalry regiment and the divisional artillery. The former makes it a divisional fight and the later a brigade one. I tend to favour the later in large part for simpler logistics and greater flexibility.

Incidentally, and since I'm not a purist, I think we should adopt the term Brigade Combat Team since both the US and Brits use it. I think I'll do that in my future napkin forces.

😁


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## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Honestly, I think the fundamental concept of a UK-like Strike brigade with highly upgraded recce regiments, teamed with long range artillery regiments is a very valid concept. I'm just not sure if it needs to be concentrated in a single brigade or whether it should be based on each line brigade's cavalry regiment and the divisional artillery. The former makes it a divisional fight and the later a brigade one. I tend to favour the later in large part for simpler logistics and greater flexibility.
> 
> Incidentally, and since I'm not a purist, I think we should adopt the term Brigade Combat Team since both the US and Brits use it. I think I'll do that in my future napkin forces.
> 
> 😁



Light-brigades make countries look like light-weights. It sends a political statement.

Canada was a 'heavy' hitter in two World Wars, and it got us a seat at the Big Boys' tables. 

If we want to continue to measure up, we should invest in heavy metal.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Light-brigades make countries look like light-weights. It sends a political statement.
> 
> Canada was a 'heavy' hitter in two World Wars, and it got us a seat at the Big Boys' tables.
> 
> If we want to continue to measure up, we should invest in heavy metal.


... and put a bigger presence into Europe. It's the place to be to be seen to be "relevant".

I find it disconcerting that such an obvious "political" decision hasn't yet been made by our touchy-feely government. I guess I just answered my own question.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> Light-brigades make countries look like light-weights. It sends a political statement.
> 
> Canada was a 'heavy' hitter in two World Wars, and it got us a seat at the Big Boys' tables.
> 
> If we want to continue to measure up, we should invest in heavy metal.


To paraphrase something or other, it's not how heavy it is, it's how you use it.

You are correct.  Divesting Heavy Brigades sitting in Canada and replacing with Light Brigades sitting in Canada would make us look like light-weights.

A more proper question is how could we use both Light and Heavy forces?  I'm going to make an assumption here that Canada (despite FJAG and others strong wishes) will not be increasing our permanent European presence beyond the existing eFP Latvia commitment (I have seen absolutely no indications that it is even being considered). 

Right now we have mixed Medium and Light forces in Canada.  We can possibly deploy a Light Battalion fairly quickly in response to an emergency, but as FJAG noted above, deploying a Brigade will take considerable time.  Enough time that it might be quite possible to have many of it's positions filled by Reservists.  

We could for example have a force structure that was designed to rapidly deploy a Light Battle Group with capabilities something like an Airborne Battalion and/or Marine Littoral Regiment (and regularly exercise this capability with our Allies) followed up in a contingency situation (war) with a Heavy 30/70 Brigade which can be sustained with replacement equipment from a Reserve 10/90 Brigade (the 10 being mixed Reg/Reserve HQ and specialist positions) and further follow-on replacement equipment for a mobilization-only Brigade.  

Would a clear, explicitly organized, funded and structured plan which moves most of our Heavy capabilities into the Reserves and makes our Regular forces more Light (but more responsive) make us look "light-weight" to our Allies or would it be seen as an improvement over what we have now?


----------



## McG

Heavy forces in North America can be relevant if you own all the right resources.









						Bay-class landing ship - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## GR66

McG said:


> Heavy forces in North America can be relevant if you own all the right resources.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Bay-class landing ship - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


So...holds up to 24 x Challenger tanks (just over a single Canadian tank Squadron).  How many to transport a CMBG?  There are four in existence, so the combined fleet of them can transport the RCD.  How many LSDs does the RCN have?  How many on the books?


----------



## McG

We have nothing. If we want it, we must build it.


----------



## KevinB

I’m of the opinion that Canada should be able to field a real 3 DIV force for the Army. 
  1 Light (1 Reg Bde, 1 70:30 Mostly Reg and 1 mostly PRes 30:70) 
  1 Heavy (1 70:30 mostly Reg Bde ) and 2 30:70 Mostly Res Bde’s) 
  1 Med (mostly PRes 10:90) 

DIV assets and Staff would be 30:70 Reg/PRes 

I don’t see that as a bridge to far for Canada with its population and GDP.  

I’m also of the opinion that the RCN needs to about triple and the RCAF double.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion that Canada should be able to field a real 3 DIV force for the Army.
> 1 Light (1 Reg Bde, 1 70:30 Mostly Reg and 1 mostly PRes 30:70)
> 1 Heavy (1 70:30 mostly Reg Bde ) and 2 30:70 Mostly Res Bde’s)
> 1 Med (mostly PRes 10:90)
> 
> DIV assets and Staff would be 30:70 Reg/PRes
> 
> *I don’t see that as a bridge to far for Canada with its population and GDP. *
> 
> I’m also of the opinion that the RCN needs to about triple and the RCAF double.



The GDP of Russia ranks #12 in the world, and we now have a good idea of how much 'heavy metal' they can bring to the party while concurrently maintaining a thriving economy.

Canada is #9.









						Economy Rankings: Largest countries by GDP, 2022 - CEOWORLD magazine
					

What are the largest economies in the world? The five largest economies in the world as measured by nominal GDP are the U.S., China, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Just top 5 countries—the U.S., China, Japan, Germany, and the U.K.—make up over half of the world’s economic output by...




					ceoworld.biz


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion that Canada should be able to field a real 3 DIV force for the Army.
> 1 Light (1 Reg Bde, 1 70:30 Mostly Reg and 1 mostly PRes 30:70)
> 1 Heavy (1 70:30 mostly Reg Bde ) and 2 30:70 Mostly Res Bde’s)
> 1 Med (mostly PRes 10:90)
> 
> DIV assets and Staff would be 30:70 Reg/PRes
> 
> I don’t see that as a bridge to far for Canada with its population and GDP.
> 
> I’m also of the opinion that the RCN needs to about triple and the RCAF double.


Let's put it this way @KevinB, in WW2 with a population of 12 million we fielded 1.1 million in the military. The Army raised 8 divisions and 4 brigades of which  5 divisions and 2 brigades went overseas to fight in Europe. Today we have a population of 38 million which, notwithstanding obesity amongst our youth, means that we could easily sustain a force of that size if there was the same public fervor to participate.

The conscription crisis in WW2 made it clear that the vast bulk of those in favour of fighting overseas were individuals who identified with the British Empire at a time when England was perceived to be under a direct threat. We have no such allegiance anymore to anything. I'd go so far as to say that there is a general apathy as to a cause that would be considered worth fighting for by even a minority of Canadians.

A 3 division force (together with a headquarters, training and logistics capability - I'll assume that no corps headquarters or corps troops are fielded) would come in at around 70-80,000 soldiers (add the corps and let's say 100,000).

I think that's doable assuming the right incentives for recruiting and retention are available. Those incentives need to predominate in the field of self-interest (education, cash and interesting fellowship) rather than patriotism.

A GDP ratio increase from 1.4% to 2% should put an additional $10 to $11 billion into the defence budget. Let's unreasonably assume that it doesn't all get eaten up by the bureaucracy. Then the math kind of goes like this:

1. We already have the equivalent of one div of Reg F personnel in the current budget;

2. We already have the equivalent of almost one division of ResF personnel in the budget;

3. We already have ship and new fighter replacements included in our current budget projections;

4. We already have much of the equipment for a div worth of LBCTs (LAV BCT)  (two for sure, three if we become a bit less lavish with the gear);

5. The CBO cost calculator indicates the following annual costs for an ABCT - $1 billion for an ARNG ABCT and $3.5 billion for an Active Army ABCT;

6. Accordingly a ResF armoured div would cost approximately $3 - 4 Billion more per year to maintain;

7. Then there is the cost for the new equipment to build the new ABCT and to bring the LBCTs (LAV BCT) and the IBCTs up to snuff. Lets allocate $3 billion per year until done;

8. That totals roughly $6-7 billion out of a budget increase of $10 - $11 billion annually; and

9. That leaves roughly $4 billion annually to dedicate to NORAD projects and a submarine project.

So it's very roughly mathematically doable but that leaves the question of why would we? We should probably spend more on NOAD and subs than $4 billion annually. We could probably form two divisions (1 ABCT, 1 LBCT) for roughly $4 billion per year ($1 billion for personnel, $3 billion for equipment). Maybe once the ABCT equipment is bought and paid for a good slice of those costs could go towards developing several IBCTs as well. But at the moment I fail to see the need for the Inf Division. The LBCT can perform mounted and dismounted (including QRF alongside our existing SOF capability) roles during peacetime as required as well as numerous other contingency missions for wartime. The Armoured Division, NORAD and submarines are our big draws for a making friends and influencing people with respect to our allies and enemies (especially if a large portion is prepositioned in and dedicated to Europe and continental defence).

Just some musings.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Let's put it this way @KevinB, in WW2 with a population of 12 million we fielded 1.1 million in the military. The Army raised 8 divisions and 4 brigades of which  5 divisions and 2 brigades went overseas to fight in Europe. Today we have a population of 38 million which, notwithstanding obesity amongst our youth, means that we could easily sustain a force of that size if there was the same public fervor to participate.
> 
> The conscription crisis in WW2 made it clear that the vast bulk of those in favour of fighting overseas were individuals who identified with the British Empire at a time when England was perceived to be under a direct threat. We have no such allegiance anymore to anything. I'd go so far as to say that there is a general apathy as to a cause that would be considered worth fighting for by even a minority of Canadians.
> 
> A 3 division force (together with a headquarters, training and logistics capability - I'll assume that no corps headquarters or corps troops are fielded) would come in at around 70-80,000 soldiers (add the corps and let's say 100,000).
> 
> I think that's doable assuming the right incentives for recruiting and retention are available. Those incentives need to predominate in the field of self-interest (education, cash and interesting fellowship) rather than patriotism.
> 
> A GDP ratio increase from 1.4% to 2% should put an additional $10 to $11 billion into the defence budget. Let's unreasonably assume that it doesn't all get eaten up by the bureaucracy. Then the math kind of goes like this:
> 
> 1. We already have the equivalent of one div of Reg F personnel in the current budget;
> 
> 2. We already have the equivalent of almost one division of ResF personnel in the budget;
> 
> 3. We already have ship and new fighter replacements included in our current budget projections;
> 
> 4. We already have much of the equipment for a div worth of LBCTs (LAV BCT)  (two for sure, three if we become a bit less lavish with the gear);
> 
> 5. The CBO cost calculator indicates the following annual costs for an ABCT - $1 billion for an ARNG ABCT and $3.5 billion for an Active Army ABCT;
> 
> 6. Accordingly a ResF armoured div would cost approximately $3 - 4 Billion more per year to maintain;
> 
> 7. Then there is the cost for the new equipment to build the new ABCT and to bring the LBCTs (LAV BCT) and the IBCTs up to snuff. Lets allocate $3 billion per year until done;
> 
> 8. That totals roughly $6-7 billion out of a budget increase of $10 - $11 billion annually; and
> 
> 9. That leaves roughly $4 billion annually to dedicate to NORAD projects and a submarine project.
> 
> So it's very roughly mathematically doable but that leaves the question of why would we? We should probably spend more on NOAD and subs than $4 billion annually. We could probably form two divisions (1 ABCT, 1 LBCT) for roughly $4 billion per year ($1 billion for personnel, $3 billion for equipment). Maybe once the ABCT equipment is bought and paid for a good slice of those costs could go towards developing several IBCTs as well. But at the moment I fail to see the need for the Inf Division. The LBCT can perform mounted and dismounted (including QRF alongside our existing SOF capability) roles during peacetime as required as well as numerous other contingency missions for wartime. The Armoured Division, NORAD and submarines are our big draws for a making friends and influencing people with respect to our allies and enemies (especially if a large portion is prepositioned in and dedicated to Europe and continental defence).
> 
> Just some musings.
> 
> 🍻


Are we stuck in a WWII/Cold War mindset when it comes to our Army requirements?  Firstly I don't think you can compare the size of WWII forces to current force structures.  The differences in costs to man and equip forces is exponentially higher than it was then and no country has the size of military to population ratio anywhere near what they had in WWII.  It's like comparing apples to socket wrenches.  Also remember that the original Canadian land force commitment (the Canadian Active Service Force - CASF) was only a single Division for overseas deployment and a 2nd Division to be raised and kept in Canada only to be used "as necessary".  Only after the fall of France in May 1940 did Canada authorize the raising of the 3rd and 4th Divisions and with the exception of Hong Kong and Dieppe it was three years before the units were deployed in combat.  

Secondly, the population & GDP (NATO vs Russia)/Military Spending/Size of Military Forces differences between NATO and Russia are huge and greatly favour NATO in any war with Russia.  While in a surprise attack Russia could potentially do great damage to NATO forces and win some battles ultimately NATO simply has the population, economic and military strength to beat Russia in any full-scale war.  Those balances are tipping even further in NATO's favour with the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO and the heavy losses that Russia is facing in Ukraine.  

So the question is whether it really makes sense for Canada to focus it's military force structure on preparing to deploy Divisions worth of Heavy forces to Europe?  Do we really believe Russia is going to launch a conventional attack against NATO?  I think we're doing the right thing by putting multinational tripwire forces in the bordering nations in order to basically guarantee an Article 5 joint NATO response if Russia were to attack one of the more vulnerable, smaller neighbours, but do we really need to forward position more heavy forces there to further demonstrate our military overmatch? 

I also totally agree that we can't assume that situations won't change and that we will never need Heavy forces and also that due to the length of time it takes to procure modern military hardware that we need to have it now...not only start to get it when things turn hot.  But shouldn't those forces be primarily rested in the Reserves where the annual cost to maintain them is significantly less?  

We are very fortunate that as a nation we face very little direct military threat of invasion.  We're basically a distant island conveniently sitting on top of the most powerful military power on the planet.  We're a trading nation and probably the most ethnically diverse nation on the planet.  We should be looking outward to the entire world and not just focusing on a single military threat.  

As an "island" nation our primary military focus should be on the RCN and RCAF to both protect our approaches and to project our power.  To my mind that means that our day-to-day Army focus should be to support and enhance those capabilities.  That means forces that can deploy by air and from our ships at sea.  Our Heavy forces should be our mobilization forces with a core of Reg Force personnel but primarily Reserves.  But it also means we have to make the commitment to properly train and equip those mobilization forces...not leave them to wither like we are doing now.

$.02


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The GDP of Russia ranks #12 in the world, and we now have a good idea of how much 'heavy metal' they can bring to the party while concurrently maintaining a thriving economy.
> 
> Canada is #9.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Economy Rankings: Largest countries by GDP, 2022 - CEOWORLD magazine
> 
> 
> What are the largest economies in the world? The five largest economies in the world as measured by nominal GDP are the U.S., China, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Just top 5 countries—the U.S., China, Japan, Germany, and the U.K.—make up over half of the world’s economic output by...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ceoworld.biz








On February 2022 Russia managed to field a force of something like 100,000 to 200,000 troops

This is from a population of 144.1 Million
Canada has a population of 38 Million or roughly 25%

Following the same model should we expect Canada to field

250,000 bodies comprising

55,000 Officers
106,500 Contractees (Most of whom are in the RCN, the RCAF, the Space Element, the CSE and in the Log and Support elements)
88,750 Conscripts

Of that mob we should expect to launch an army of 25,000 to 50,000 organized into 40 BTGs or so with 600 to 1200 troops per BTG.  
40 BTGs = 400 Leos and 1200 LAVs plus a bunch of other stuff we don't have 
1200 LAVs with 6 Dismounts each = an infantry/airborne force of 7200 rifles and the vast majority of them conscripts or pressed conscripts operating under forced contracts.

With our current model we field a comparably sized Infantry force.


As to weaponry for the RCAC, RRCA, RCE, RCAF and RCN

What I see in Russia is very slow production rates of everything,  very little new technology introduced and a lot of remanufactured existing stock or replenishment of very old designs.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Are we stuck in a WWII/Cold War mindset when it comes to our Army requirements?


Set aside the preconceptions about what you think I said, re-read @KevinB's posts and then my post and you might glean from that that neither of us is talking about a WW2 and Cold War mindset per se but instead we are talking about what would return some political clout and an attitude that we are pulling our weight to both our North American and Western society allies while equally projecting a credible deterrence force against what this century has turned into an avaricious expansionist. They are not even being subtle about it. My reference to WW2 goes no further than to point out the numbers involved and the changed social circumstances.

But since the subject of the Cold War has been brought up. The issue is not whether NATO can beat Russia in a war. No one can "beat" Russia. Anyone who has nuclear weapons cannot be beaten. They might be held in check but not beaten.

If you really do not think that the Baltic states and other former Warsaw Pact countries that have a sizeable ethnic Russian population in them are not vulnerable to Russian pressure then you haven't been paying attention to either history (and yes that means WW2 and the Cold War) or the noises coming out of Russia. This Russian regime, which has in effect solidified Putin's reign into perpetuity, has long ago stopped looking at détente.

No. I do not expect to see a massive sweep of tank armies heading for the Fulda Gap. But I do see many bite and hold "special operations" like we've seen in Georgia and Ukraine occurring in the Baltics, and Moldova and the continued suppression of opposition in Belarus (a la Hungary and Czechoslovakia) as well as influence operations in almost all the former Warsaw Pact countries not to mention in Western democracies.

How much Russian Shyte do individual NATO countries need to eat before it becomes a problem? 

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Light Brigades have capabilities that medium don’t. 
  Look at XVIII Abn Corps and I’d like a Abn Bde and an Airmobile Bde - I might accept a LAV Bde as the third Bde in that Div.  

There needs to be a credible Rapid Reaction Force than can get places if needed.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> How much Russian Shyte do individual NATO countries need to eat before it becomes a problem?
> 
> 🍻



I recall when General Howlett, CinC AFNORTH, visited us north of Narvik in the winter of 1986 and explained that the great NATO fear was for Russia to 'scootch' over the border with Norway, following a 'friendship making' campaign with the people in North Norway.

This is not a new thing for Russia. NATO has just been asleep at the switch since the Wall came down.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Are we stuck in a WWII/Cold War mindset when it comes to our Army requirements?  Firstly I don't think you can compare the size of WWII forces to current force structures.  The differences in costs to man and equip forces is exponentially higher than it was then and no country has the size of military to population ratio anywhere near what they had in WWII.  It's like comparing apples to socket wrenches.  Also remember that the original Canadian land force commitment (the Canadian Active Service Force - CASF) was only a single Division for overseas deployment and a 2nd Division to be raised and kept in Canada only to be used "as necessary".  Only after the fall of France in May 1940 did Canada authorize the raising of the 3rd and 4th Divisions and with the exception of Hong Kong and Dieppe it was three years before the units were deployed in combat.


The model I proposed above is a heavy Reserve based system.   I am looking at history for the fact that the perception of weakness drives aggression from rogue/authoritarian regimes.

1 Regular Force Light Bde (like the old SSF) with an Airborne/Airmobile capability -- with a goal of being able to push that Bde anywhere in the world inside 72hrs.
   The critical time period before competition turns to conflict and allows forces in place to help deter aggression - while heavier forces (if appropriate) can be moved into theatre.
   The 2nd Bde would then be "mobilized" and ready to conducted the RDF/IRU mission, support the 1st Bde, or if necessary rotate in to relieve the 1st if that mission becomes longer than a 9 month deployment.





GR66 said:


> Secondly, the population & GDP (NATO vs Russia)/Military Spending/Size of Military Forces differences between NATO and Russia are huge and greatly favour NATO in any war with Russia.  While in a surprise attack Russia could potentially do great damage to NATO forces and win some battles ultimately NATO simply has the population, economic and military strength to beat Russia in any full-scale war.  Those balances are tipping even further in NATO's favour with the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO and the heavy losses that Russia is facing in Ukraine.
> 
> So the question is whether it really makes sense for Canada to focus it's military force structure on preparing to deploy Divisions worth of Heavy forces to Europe?  Do we really believe Russia is going to launch a conventional attack against NATO?  I think we're doing the right thing by putting multinational tripwire forces in the bordering nations in order to basically guarantee an Article 5 joint NATO response if Russia were to attack one of the more vulnerable, smaller neighbours, but do we really need to forward position more heavy forces there to further demonstrate our military overmatch?


What does a tripwire really do?   We have seen that Russia fully believes that NATO Tripwires will be pulled back, and Article 5 will most likely only be invoked if certain countries in NATO are attacked.

Furthermore - Europe is 1 continent, it doesn't have the monopoly on World Crisis, as we have constantly seen crisis across the Globe in the last 100 years.
   It is much easier for a Rogue state to start brush fires across the Globe than create a massive confrontation -- Russia has a lot of support worldwide in other authoritarian regimes, and those also seek to grow -- there is force need to contain those entities, and provided stability to regions that they would seek to disrupt.



GR66 said:


> I also totally agree that we can't assume that situations won't change and that we will never need Heavy forces and also that due to the length of time it takes to procure modern military hardware that we need to have it now...not only start to get it when things turn hot.  But shouldn't those forces be primarily rested in the Reserves where the annual cost to maintain them is significantly less?


  I agree that the majority of Heavy Forces should be PRes, (which also gets into my you need to totally restructure the PRes to more a ARNG model) 



GR66 said:


> We are very fortunate that as a nation we face very little direct military threat of invasion.  We're basically a distant island conveniently sitting on top of the most powerful military power on the planet.  We're a trading nation and probably the most ethnically diverse nation on the planet.  We should be looking outward to the entire world and not just focusing on a single military threat.


Agreed


GR66 said:


> As an "island" nation our primary military focus should be on the RCN and RCAF to both protect our approaches and to project our power.  To my mind that means that our day-to-day Army focus should be to support and enhance those capabilities.


You still need ground forces to control/defend territory.



GR66 said:


> That means forces that can deploy by air and from our ships at sea.  Our Heavy forces should be our mobilization forces with a core of Reg Force personnel but primarily Reserves.  But it also means we have to make the commitment to properly train and equip those mobilization forces...not leave them to wither like we are doing now.
> 
> $.02


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Set aside the preconceptions about what you think I said, re-read @KevinB's posts and then my post and you might glean from that that neither of us is talking about a WW2 and Cold War mindset per se but instead we are talking about what would return some political clout and an attitude that we are pulling our weight to both our North American and Western society allies while equally projecting a credible deterrence force against what this century has turned into an avaricious expansionist. They are not even being subtle about it. My reference to WW2 goes no further than to point out the numbers involved and the changed social circumstances.


I did read (and re-read) both of your posts and there are two elements of the WWII/Cold War mindset that I was referring to.  The first is what I perceive as a misconception of the size of Army that is likely "doable" for Canada.  @KevinB's post proposed three deployable, asymmetric Divisions (1 x Light, 1 x Medium and 1 x Heavy) plus a tripling in size of the RCN and a doubling in size of the RCAF.  You noted in your follow-up post that in WWII that with a population of 12 million we raised 8 Divisions and suggested that by comparison fielding three Divisions today should be doable.  

Firstly I'd note that saying that Canada raised 8 Divisions in WWII is somewhat of an exaggeration.  6th, 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions were all short-lived entities with Brigades moving in-and out and with the exception of 6th Division's 13th Brigade being deployed to Kiska, Alaska (where it had no contact with the enemy) were not deployed overseas.  7th and 8th Infantry Divisions were raised in 1942 and disbanded in 1943 and 6th Division HQ was disbanded in January 1945 after most of it's constituent units had already been transferred out in 1944.  So reality in WWII we had 5 x deployable Divisions and this is in a time of full national mobilization and (eventually) conscription.  The (temporary) existence of the 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions goes to show how much depth of manpower (and equipment) is required to keep those deployed Divisions at effective strength in the field and despite this we were still experiencing serious manpower shortages in the combat arms by the end of the war.

So how large does your actual Army need to be to support three Divisions in the field?  Not just the manpower, but the replacement vehicles, equipment and war stocks of ammo, and consumables to keep them operational?  Take a look at current estimates of artillery ammunition usage rates in Ukraine.  Either we need to establish a massive defence industry to supply our greatly expanded Army (and maintain the capacity to rapidly ramp up production in time of war) or we have to rely on the US to keep us supplied during a major war.  And if they are our primary source of supply that means we will be limited to using their equipment.  Is that a politically acceptable option?

I'd also note that the United States, with almost ten times our population (and over double our % GDP defence expenditure) currently has only 12 x Active Army, 8 x Army National Guard and 4 x Marine Divisions for a total of 24 Divisions.  I defy you to identify a political party that would be able to justify to the Canadian public the level of defence spending that would be required to maintain a peacetime Army that is proportionally larger than that of the United States.  




FJAG said:


> But since the subject of the Cold War has been brought up. The issue is not whether NATO can beat Russia in a war. No one can "beat" Russia. Anyone who has nuclear weapons cannot be beaten. They might be held in check but not beaten.
> 
> If you really do not think that the Baltic states and other former Warsaw Pact countries that have a sizeable ethnic Russian population in them are not vulnerable to Russian pressure then you haven't been paying attention to either history (and yes that means WW2 and the Cold War) or the noises coming out of Russia. This Russian regime, which has in effect solidified Putin's reign into perpetuity, has long ago stopped looking at détente.
> 
> No. I do not expect to see a massive sweep of tank armies heading for the Fulda Gap. But I do see many bite and hold "special operations" like we've seen in Georgia and Ukraine occurring in the Baltics, and Moldova and the continued suppression of opposition in Belarus (a la Hungary and Czechoslovakia) as well as influence operations in almost all the former Warsaw Pact countries not to mention in Western democracies.
> 
> How much Russian Shyte do individual NATO countries need to eat before it becomes a problem?
> 
> 🍻


And this speaks to my 2nd element of WWII/Cold War mindset to which I was referring.  The assumption that despite the fact that you "do not expect to see a massive sweep of tank armies headed for the Fulda Gap", the default form of deterrence we tend to fall back on is more ABCT's facing off against the Russians along their border.

There are already NATO forces in the Baltic and I'm not sure what additional forces there would do to assist with asymmetric operations by the Russians in relation to their Russian minorities.  If you're suggesting that a Russian military incursion against a NATO member in order to seize a limited piece of territory wouldn't illicit an Article 5 response then really that's a question of NATO's political will rather than a question of force ratios.  Whether we have a multi-national Brigade or a multi-national Corps in country is irrelevant if the NATO alliance chooses not to honour its treaty obligations.

With respect to Belarus and other non-NATO countries facing pressure and threats from Russia I guess we already have our answer to that question in Ukraine.  We are not willing to risk full-scale war with Russia for a non-alliance state.  Until that political reality changes the number of troops we have deployed on the ground on NATO's Eastern frontier is irrelevant.  Cash and increased stocks of weapons and ammo available to supply the defending nation would be the better investment if we're unwilling to fight Russia ourselves.  

Don't get me wrong.  I totally agree that we have to up our military capabilities in the face of Russian (and potentially Chinese and other's) aggression.  I just don't view massive expansion of our heavy land forces as being the only, or necessarily the best option available.


----------



## KevinB

I’m talking about the equivalent of a DIV of regulars. 
   But having equipment and a trained reserve to mobilize in terms of crisis.  

I don’t see that as a tough demand from Canada as it works to around 30k regular force personnel in the Army and close to 70k for the PRes.  

Increasing the Regular Force portion of the RCN from ~ 8,300 to 25,000 and NavRes from 3,400 to 10k shouldn’t be impossible either.  

The RCAF from 12k to 25k and Res from 1,600 to 6k shouldn’t be a burden either.  

That’s around 80k regular force personnel, up really only 12k from current authorized strength. 
  The major changes would be in the reserves as it would grow from approx 36k to 86k. 


It would take years of training, major legislation for the PRes, and years of acquisition to support it, but at the end of the day Freedom isn’t Free.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> So how large does your actual Army need to be to support three Divisions in the field?


I never took @KevinB to say he wants to create an army that will deploy and support three divisions in the field. I took him to say he wants to create an army of three divisions including both RegF and ResF. My pointing out the number of divisions we raised in WW2 with the population that we had then should result in Canada having no problems in finding the people and resources to man three divisions today (hell - most people think we already have 5 divisions 😉). By my figures that's an army of no more than 70-80,000 the majority of whom will be reservists.

If you recall all my posts you'll remember that I'm advocating for an Army of approximately the same size as we have now of five manoeuvre and three support brigades with only one divisional headquarters located within CJOC to command any actual deployed force bigger than a brigade. So yes, I do have an appreciation for the fact that there need to be layers to support a deployed division. IMHO the size of force I suggest is a sustainable peacetime force possible with our current manning and budget and capable of generating up to a division for deployment.



GR66 said:


> I'd also note that the United States, with almost ten times our population (and over double our % GDP defence expenditure) currently has only 12 x Active Army, 8 x Army National Guard and 4 x Marine Divisions for a total of 24 Divisions. I defy you to identify a political party that would be able to justify to the Canadian public the level of defence spending that would be required to maintain a peacetime Army that is proportionally larger than that of the United States.


Actually, those figures lean more towards proving that my figures are easily doable and @KevinB are also within parameters. The US Army has 485k Active, 336k ARNG and 189k ARes for a total of  1,000,000 uniformed members. 1/10th of that is a Canadian Army of 100k made up of 48k RegF and 52K ResF. Both @KevinB and I call for less than those numbers.

More importantly though is a count of brigades. Each division generally has three manoeuvre brigades and three support brigades (artillery, aviation, sustainment) so 24 divisions contain roughly 70 manoeuvre brigades and 70 support brigades. Over and above that, there are 50 brigade-sized formations outside the divisions including air defence, intelligence, artillery, engineer, aviation, cavalry and special forces for a grand total of 190 brigades. My proposal is for 8 (9 if you add 1 Wing) which is around 4 - 4.7% of the US. @KevinB suggests something in the nature of 15 brigades (16 with 1 Wing) which is 7.9 to 8.4% of the US Army/Marines.

All told my suggestion falls within the current RegF and ResF pay envelop but certainly requires more equipment. @KevinB's generally requires a larger personnel structure than the current one but if I understand his proposals he aims that the vast majority of that as being ResF members. He too requires more equipment. Quite frankly it ought to be a national scandal that the Army provides virtually no equipment to the ResF.

As to defying to name a political party - I'll start with the CPC whose policy platform is to spend 2% of GDP on the military. The CLP, post Russian invasion, has also promised an uptick in spending although they plan to run through a new study first. But I'll truck out my old basic argument that we could afford considerably more defence outputs even with the current budget if we cleaned up our administrative overhead and acquisition processes and reformed and assigned more roles to the ResF.



GR66 said:


> And this speaks to my 2nd element of WWII/Cold War mindset to which I was referring. ..., the default form of deterrence we tend to fall back on is more ABCT's facing off against the Russians along their border.
> 
> There are already NATO forces in the Baltic and I'm not sure what additional forces there would do to assist with asymmetric operations by the Russians in relation to their Russian minorities. If you're suggesting that a Russian military incursion against a NATO member in order to seize a limited piece of territory wouldn't illicit an Article 5 response then really that's a question of NATO's political will rather than a question of force ratios. Whether we have a multi-national Brigade or a multi-national Corps in country is irrelevant if the NATO alliance chooses not to honour its treaty obligations.


RAND wargaming studies indicate NATO needs at least seven brigades on the ground in the Baltics three of which need to be heavy. Latvia has one mech brigade, Lithuania has one mech and two light brigades, Estonia has one mech and one light battalion. The total RegF strength of the three countries is the equivalent of three brigades while the rest are reservists. There are additional home guard troops. None of these units are "heavy" or ABCTs.

NATOs Enhanced Forward presence bolsters this force with three battlegroups which are basically mechanized with some tanks and could in some ways be considered combined arms battalions. They are weak in artillery and, most importantly, are scattered around the region and could therefore not be operated as a single heavy brigade.

In short, while there are roughly seven brigades in the Baltics, they lack the necessary three heavy brigades which are vital for counterattacking and stabilizing faltering positions. 

An Article 5 response would be of no value in defending these countries. RAND calls for these forces to be on the ground or preposition for rapid mobilization. Once the Russians cross the border is too late.



GR66 said:


> With respect to Belarus and other non-NATO countries facing pressure and threats from Russia I guess we already have our answer to that question in Ukraine. We are not willing to risk full-scale war with Russia for a non-alliance state. Until that political reality changes the number of troops we have deployed on the ground on NATO's Eastern frontier is irrelevant. Cash and increased stocks of weapons and ammo available to supply the defending nation would be the better investment if we're unwilling to fight Russia ourselves.


I disagree with that. I fully agree with cash and stocks of weapons but considering Canada's pitiful response so far I presume this is one of those "Let Joe do it" suggestions. It's far more meaningful and probably cheaper to have our own prepositioned force there to augment and expand the eFP battlegroup. I don't want to for a minute minimize the political ineptitude of our current government when it comes to international commitments but I prefer to remain optimistic and at least believe that we won't be morons forever.



GR66 said:


> Don't get me wrong. I totally agree that we have to up our military capabilities in the face of Russian (and potentially Chinese and other's) aggression. I just don't view massive expansion of our heavy land forces as being the only, or necessarily the best option available.


I won't pretend that I'm not a product of the Cold War Army. I also never drank the Hillier Kool-Aid as to the all singing all dancing Lego Block medium force that can be light one day and heavy the next if you add or subtract the right blocks. We took a wrong turn with Advancing with Purpose as we advanced ourselves into a force structure that has a very limited capabilities to engage in high intensity warfare. Like @KevinB I think Canada has a need for each of light, medium and heavy forces. We already have the light and the medium (mostly but with critical shortfalls). What we need to build, almost from scratch, is a heavy capability. We can fake it a bit with the Leos and LAVs that we've got but we owe it to our soldiers to properly equip them for the fight. 

Don't fool yourself; our commitment to the eFP in Latvia means that Canada has already made the political decision that we need to be there. The only other decision to be made is how best to we fulfill the commitment we have made and provide a proper deterrence. I'm comfortable with a commitment of the current eFP battlegroup stationed in country on a rotational basis and the remainder of a heavy brigade (a HQ, an armoured regiment, an additional mech infantry battalion, an artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, a service battalion and a field ambulance) prepositioned and exercised in Latvia on a twice yearly fly-over basis. Incidentally I don't ant this to be a 4 CMBG knock-off. There are new concepts and new weapon systems required and which need to be acquired, but at its heart, a heavy brigade needs a solid core of tanks, armoured infantry and SP artillery. 

🍻


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> So how large does your actual Army need to be to support three Divisions in the field?  Not just the manpower, but the replacement vehicles, equipment and war stocks of ammo, and consumables to keep them operational?  Take a look at current estimates of artillery ammunition usage rates in Ukraine.  Either we need to establish a massive defence industry to supply our greatly expanded Army (and maintain the capacity to rapidly ramp up production in time of war) or we have to rely on the US to keep us supplied during a major war.  And if they are our primary source of supply that means we will be limited to using their equipment.  Is that a politically acceptable option?


The CAF I proposed would only field 3 Divisions in the event of a major worldwide conflict - that would have Canada mobilizing anyway, and the economy moved into wartime production etc.
@FJAG pointed that aspect out already.

When one looks at the PRes, from my understanding around 3k Regular Force members release each year.
   If one was to change the pension and educational benefit system to make those members have an incentive to join the PRes for 10 years, you can add nearly 30k members to the PRes (All services).

 The system down here does that, as well as having VA Loans for home buying etc -- a much more supportive system to encourage service beyond ones active time.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The CAF I proposed would only field 3 Divisions in the event of a major worldwide conflict - that would have Canada mobilizing anyway, and the economy moved into wartime production etc.
> @FJAG pointed that aspect out already.
> 
> When one looks at the PRes, from my understanding around 3k Regular Force members release each year.
> If one was to change the pension and educational benefit system to make those members have an incentive to join the PRes for 10 years, you can add nearly 30k members to the PRes (All services).
> 
> The system down here does that, as well as having VA Loans for home buying etc -- a much more supportive system to encourage service beyond ones active time.





> Divisions[edit]​See also: Divisions of the United States Army
> Regular Army Divisions
> 
> 
> 1st Armored Division
> 1st Cavalry Division
> 1st Infantry Division
> 2nd Infantry Division
> 3rd Infantry Division
> 4th Infantry Division
> 7th Infantry Division (Headquarters Only)
> 10th Mountain Division
> 11th Airborne Division
> 25th Infantry Division
> 82nd Airborne Division
> 101st Airborne Division
> Army National Guard Divisions
> 
> 
> 28th Infantry Division
> 29th Infantry Division
> 34th Infantry Division
> 35th Infantry Division
> 36th Infantry Division
> 38th Infantry Division
> 40th Infantry Division
> 42nd Infantry Division



The US is ponying up 12 Regular Divisions (11 if you eliminate the HQ Only 7th - and 2 or the 11 are 2 Brigade Division (the 11th and the 25th)
Lets call it 10 Regular Divs. 

US Population 330,000,000
Canada Population 38,000,000 = 11.5% of US Population
Army is people heavy so comparing Divs to People is reasonable.

So 11.5% of 10 Divs is a bit over 1 Div.

So if Canada had available one Div it would be matching the US regular commitment.


The US also has 8 National Guard Divs

11.5% of 8 is a bit under 1 Div

So if Canada had available on Div it would be matching the US National Guard commitment.


Our actual commitment of Bodies and Units are already in line with the US commitment.

Now if only we could get our act together internally and decide how we were going to task, organize and equip the soldiers we have been authorized to recruit and sustain.

The US maintains 3 Brigade Types

Lt (IBCTs)
Med (SBCTs)
Hy (ABCTs)

Each Brigade has a strength of about 4500 PYs

The Regular Force has 

15 IBCTs
6 SBCTs
10 ABCTs
31 BCTs total

The National Guard has 

20 IBCTs
2 SBCTs
5 ABCTs
27 BCTs total

Canadianized

1 Division of 
3 Regular BCTs Total of 4500 each
1.5 IBCTs
0.5 SBCTs
1.0 ABCT

1 Division of 
3 Militia BCTs total of 4500 each
2.0 IBCTs 
0.2 SBCTs
0.5 ABCTs

I would note that the SBCT is actually an IBCT with integral transport.

On that basis

The US maintains 3 Brigade Types

Lt (IBCTs)
Med (SBCTs)
Hy (ABCTs)

Each Brigade has a strength of about 4500 PYs

The Regular Force has 

15 IBCTs
6 SBCTs
21 Light

10 ABCTs
10 Heavy

The National Guard has 

20 IBCTs
2 SBCTs
22 Lt

5 ABCTs
5 Hy

Canadianized

1 Division of 
3 Regular BCTs Total of 4500 each
1.5 IBCTs
0.5 SBCTs
2 Lt

1.0 ABCT
1 Hy

1 Division of 
3 Militia BCTs total of 4500 each
2.0 IBCTs 
0.2 SBCTs
2 Lt

0.5 ABCTs
0.5 Hy


Summary paragraph

US, with 10x the population and a comparable per capita GDP fields a predominantly Light Force.   Of 58 BCTs, split among 19 to 20 Divisions,  35 are Infantry BCTs and 8 of them are Mounted Infantry BCTs (Light Infantry in Strykers).  15 are Heavy Armoured BCTs.

If Canadianized we should expect to supply 2 Divisions of Troops with a total of 6 BCTs, 1 Regular Division with 3 BCTs and 1 Militia Division with 3 BCTs.

The 6 BCTs would 1 ABCT (Regular), 3 IBCT (1 Regular, 2 Militia) 2 Medium, Composite or LAV BCTs (1 Regular 1 Militia) 

We are not far from where we should be.

2 Divisions are within our grasp.

We have the Regular Division framework already established - 1 Cdn Div, CCSB, 1/2/5 CBGs,  it needs, dare I say it, Regimenting?  A bit of discipline?

The Militia continues to be a mess.  But we have 10 TBGs, or the bases for 3 or 4 Militia Brigades that could be organized under 1 Division command.

One thing that I think we get wrong is the emphasis on the Heavy Force.  If we were to look at our 6 Brigades as 3 Lt Brigades, 2 LAV Brigades and 1 Heavy Brigade, and consider the LAVs not as poor man's IFVs but instead as really good WAPCs then I think the force structure would rationalize itself quickly.

Particularly if it were noted that in the US, in both the Stryker and Bradley Units, the crews are managed separately from the infantry.

Stryker crews carry full 9 man squads in the back.
The Bradley crews are moving towards carrying a fire team in the back of each vehicle with two vehicles carrying a section of infantry.  The Bradley company is moving towards a Bradley Platoon of 14 crews, two Infantry platoons, and a Mortar/Indirect Fire section.

That would mean that we would be looking at 5 infantry brigades, two of them with LAV transport and a Heavy Brigade equipped with a better IFV but incorporating the same infantry platoon as employed in the other 5 brigades.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I never took @KevinB to say he wants to create an army that will deploy and support three divisions in the field.





KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion that Canada should be able to field a real 3 DIV force for the Army.
> 1 Light (1 Reg Bde, 1 70:30 Mostly Reg and 1 mostly PRes 30:70)
> 1 Heavy (1 70:30 mostly Reg Bde ) and 2 30:70 Mostly Res Bde’s)
> 1 Med (mostly PRes 10:90)
> 
> DIV assets and Staff would be 30:70 Reg/PRes
> 
> I don’t see that as a bridge to far for Canada with its population and GDP.
> 
> I’m also of the opinion that the RCN needs to about triple and the RCAF double.





FJAG said:


> A 3 division force (together with a headquarters, training and logistics capability - I'll assume that no corps headquarters or corps troops are fielded) would come in at around 70-80,000 soldiers (add the corps and let's say 100,000).
> 
> I think that's doable assuming the right incentives for recruiting and retention are available. Those incentives need to predominate in the field of self-interest (education, cash and interesting fellowship) rather than patriotism.


From the above two comments I think you can excuse me for getting the impression that you were both envisioning Canada being able to field (and presumably support in the field) a 3 Division Force.

I'll just say that in light of the current economic situation and with major defence spending like the just announced NORAD upgrades, the shipbuilding program, F-35's and basic critical equipment needs highlighted by the events in Ukraine on the books, that in my humble opinion any CDS or MND that walked in to the PMO and suggested that we go from an Army that has no plans to even deploy a single Brigade Group to any army that wants to be able to deploy a 3 Division force (regardless of the ratio of Reg Force to Reserves) would be laughed out of the office. 



FJAG said:


> I took him to say he wants to create an army of three divisions including both RegF and ResF. My pointing out the number of divisions we raised in WW2 with the population that we had then should result in Canada having no problems in finding the people and resources to man three divisions today (hell - most people think we already have 5 divisions 😉). By my figures that's an army of no more than 70-80,000 the majority of whom will be reservists.
> 
> If you recall all my posts you'll remember that I'm advocating for an Army of approximately the same size as we have now of five manoeuvre and three support brigades with only one divisional headquarters located within CJOC to command any actual deployed force bigger than a brigade. So yes, I do have an appreciation for the fact that there need to be layers to support a deployed division. IMHO the size of force I suggest is a sustainable peacetime force possible with our current manning and budget and capable of generating up to a division for deployment.
> 
> 
> Actually, those figures lean more towards proving that my figures are easily doable and @KevinB are also within parameters. The US Army has 485k Active, 336k ARNG and 189k ARes for a total of  1,000,000 uniformed members. 1/10th of that is a Canadian Army of 100k made up of 48k RegF and 52K ResF. Both @KevinB and I call for less than those numbers.
> 
> More importantly though is a count of brigades. Each division generally has three manoeuvre brigades and three support brigades (artillery, aviation, sustainment) so 24 divisions contain roughly 70 manoeuvre brigades and 70 support brigades. Over and above that, there are 50 brigade-sized formations outside the divisions including air defence, intelligence, artillery, engineer, aviation, cavalry and special forces for a grand total of 190 brigades. My proposal is for 8 (9 if you add 1 Wing) which is around 4 - 4.7% of the US. @KevinB suggests something in the nature of 15 brigades (16 with 1 Wing) which is 7.9 to 8.4% of the US Army/Marines.
> 
> All told my suggestion falls within the current RegF and ResF pay envelop but certainly requires more equipment. @KevinB's generally requires a larger personnel structure than the current one but if I understand his proposals he aims that the vast majority of that as being ResF members. He too requires more equipment. Quite frankly it ought to be a national scandal that the Army provides virtually no equipment to the ResF.


If you are suggesting that we have an Army that is the equivalent of 3 Divisions with the objective of being able to deploy, support and maintain a single Division in the field then I will agree with you that this is an objective that a country the size and wealth of Canada should be able to achieve.  I will however suggest that this is an aspirational goal that falls (very) far outside any discussions of a Force 2025/2030/2035 timeframe.

There are already a lot of major defence programs in process which will eat up much of the effort and funding available to the CAF that will have to work their way through the system before the absolutely transformative changes that would be required to achieve a Division-sized field force can become a reality.  Retention issues, basing issues, equipment issues, training issues, Reserve TOS issues, legislative issues, doctrinal issues, etc. all together will likely be a decades long battle in order to lay the foundation for what you are proposing.  That's not to say that we shouldn't start down that road now, but it does to my mind mean that we need a more achievable interim plan.


FJAG said:


> As to defying to name a political party - I'll start with the CPC whose policy platform is to spend 2% of GDP on the military. The CLP, post Russian invasion, has also promised an uptick in spending although they plan to run through a new study first. But I'll truck out my old basic argument that we could afford considerably more defence outputs even with the current budget if we cleaned up our administrative overhead and acquisition processes and reformed and assigned more roles to the ResF.


2% GDP and major administrative reform are an excellent start but I'd argue that probably at least a decade of that level of funding will be required just to fix what we have (and complete our current projects) before it can start to be directed into major transformation programs.


FJAG said:


> RAND wargaming studies indicate NATO needs at least seven brigades on the ground in the Baltics three of which need to be heavy. Latvia has one mech brigade, Lithuania has one mech and two light brigades, Estonia has one mech and one light battalion. The total RegF strength of the three countries is the equivalent of three brigades while the rest are reservists. There are additional home guard troops. None of these units are "heavy" or ABCTs.
> 
> NATOs Enhanced Forward presence bolsters this force with three battlegroups which are basically mechanized with some tanks and could in some ways be considered combined arms battalions. They are weak in artillery and, most importantly, are scattered around the region and could therefore not be operated as a single heavy brigade.
> 
> In short, while there are roughly seven brigades in the Baltics, they lack the necessary three heavy brigades which are vital for counterattacking and stabilizing faltering positions.
> 
> An Article 5 response would be of no value in defending these countries. RAND calls for these forces to be on the ground or preposition for rapid mobilization. Once the Russians cross the border is too late.


I'd make a couple of comments about the RAND report.  Firstly, their wargaming pits the entire forces of the Russian Western Military District and their forces in Kaliningrad (which runs from Ukraine in the South to the coast of Norway in the North) against the in-place NATO forces in the Baltic States.  So, are we to seriously expect that Russia would leave the rest of their entire Western frontier undefended while they focus all of their military forces against a single point on the NATO front?  Of course not.  

In order to invade the Baltic States Russia would have to move and concentrate their forces for the attack as well as move up reinforcements from other military districts to cover the rest of their front against the likely counter-attacks by NATO.  These movements and preparations for war would certainly be noticed by NATO.  

NATO first noticed an increase in Russian forces massing near Ukraine and conducting increased tempo of training exercises in the Spring of 2021.  By November 2021 the US publicly released commercial satellite images showing the continuing build-up of Russian forces (they certainly would have been aware of this well before the information was released publicly).  January 24th NATO put their forces on standby and began reinforcing Europe with additional ships and aircraft.  In February the US deployed additional troops to Poland and Romania and warned Russia of impending economic sanctions should they invade.

I don't think that there is any reason to believe that the signs of a Russian build-up in preparation for an invasion of NATO would not also be detected in advance.  Especially in light of what has happened in Ukraine I'd suggest that both NATO will be extra vigilant in watching for any future signs of Russian military preparations and that Russia will not want to risk the manpower issues that it faced in Ukraine by not ordering a general mobilization of Reserves in advance of a war against NATO.

This should trigger a build-up of NATO forces from both Europe and North America.  Yes I think that deploying a Brigade is something that Canada should have as a policy, maintain the capability to do and regularly practice.  I've also stated before that I'm not opposed to Canada pre-deploying some equipment for a fly-over force in Europe although I've seen no signs that any Canadian political party is in favour of doing that.

As to your comment that Article 5 is irrelevant to the Baltic States because "Once the Russians cross the border it's too late" I simply disagree with that.  Setting aside the fact that a reinforced NATO presence in the Baltics resulting from detection of signs of the Russian build up may firstly deter Russia from going through with the attack or that the beefed up defending forces may stop or significantly slow any Russian attack, an invasion by Russia would cause the death of not only Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian NATO personnel, it would also result in the deaths of  American, British, Danish, French, Canadian, Albanian, Czech, Italian, Montenegran, Polish, Slovakian, Slovenian, Spanish, Belgian, Icelandic, Luxembourgian, Dutch, German, Norwegian, Croatian and Romanian NATO troops.  

I don't believe that NATO in the face of that kind of aggression and loss of life would simply allow Russia a fait accompli with whatever gains they made.


FJAG said:


> I disagree with that. I fully agree with cash and stocks of weapons but considering Canada's pitiful response so far I presume this is one of those "Let Joe do it" suggestions. It's far more meaningful and probably cheaper to have our own prepositioned force there to augment and expand the eFP battlegroup. I don't want to for a minute minimize the political ineptitude of our current government when it comes to international commitments but I prefer to remain optimistic and at least believe that we won't be morons forever.


The comment about supplying arms and cash was in relation to Russian aggression against non-NATO members.  It is related to the (obvious) fact that so far NATO is unwilling to directly intervene in the defence of non-alliance members.  Augmenting our eFP Battlegroup in Latvia will have ZERO deterrent effect on Russia's actions in Ukraine (or any other non-NATO country they choose to invade) unless the policy of NATO changes and direct military intervention is approved.  This isn't just a case of Canadian political ineptitude, it's a pan-NATO policy decision.


FJAG said:


> I won't pretend that I'm not a product of the Cold War Army. I also never drank the Hillier Kool-Aid as to the all singing all dancing Lego Block medium force that can be light one day and heavy the next if you add or subtract the right blocks. We took a wrong turn with Advancing with Purpose as we advanced ourselves into a force structure that has a very limited capabilities to engage in high intensity warfare. Like @KevinB I think Canada has a need for each of light, medium and heavy forces. We already have the light and the medium (mostly but with critical shortfalls). What we need to build, almost from scratch, is a heavy capability. We can fake it a bit with the Leos and LAVs that we've got but we owe it to our soldiers to properly equip them for the fight.


What makes our "Medium" forces "Medium"?  The LAV 6.0 is 28,636kg.  The Bradley M2A2 is 27,220kg.  We're certainly not "Medium" in terms of deployability.  We're "Medium" I guess in that we're missing a bunch of the puzzle pieces that allow us to engage in a peer "Heavy" conflict, but is there some type of "Medium" role that a 28,636kg LAV can perform that a 27,220kg Bradley can't perform?

It's probably time to take the term "Medium" out of our vocabulary.  Realistically the only time we'd ever deploy a full Brigade on operations (or a full Division in our wet dreams) would be for a major peer/near-peer conflict.  And for that we either need Light forces (because we need to respond more quickly than we are able to deploy our Heavy forces) or we need Heavy forces.  

If we simply bought some more tanks we'd have what we need for 3 x Heavy Brigades each with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions.  That would be enough Heavy forces to deploy and maintain through rotation 1 x Heavy Brigade in the field.  That also leaves us with 3 x Light Battalions which could be grouped together into a single Light Brigade with a single Battlegroup available on rotation as a Rapid Response force.

If we're lucky, GDLS will be selected as the winner of the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle competition for the US Army and we can begin replacing the LAVs in our Reg Force Battalions with domestically produced Griffin III IFVs.  By that time (if we're lucky) we'll have some of our Reserve structure/training/legislation issues worked out and we can start devolving the LAVs down to the Reserves and begin building up the Divisional structure you and @KevinB have been proposing.


FJAG said:


> Don't fool yourself; our commitment to the eFP in Latvia means that Canada has already made the political decision that we need to be there. The only other decision to be made is how best to we fulfill the commitment we have made and provide a proper deterrence. I'm comfortable with a commitment of the current eFP battlegroup stationed in country on a rotational basis and the remainder of a heavy brigade (a HQ, an armoured regiment, an additional mech infantry battalion, an artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, a service battalion and a field ambulance) prepositioned and exercised in Latvia on a twice yearly fly-over basis. Incidentally I don't ant this to be a 4 CMBG knock-off. There are new concepts and new weapon systems required and which need to be acquired, but at its heart, a heavy brigade needs a solid core of tanks, armoured infantry and SP artillery.
> 
> 🍻


I won't argue that this is one possible contribution to NATO that we can make, but it really is focused primarily on a single threat (Russian invasion of NATO) which for several reasons I don't feel is likely (not impossible, but in my opinion highly unlikely).

For example, Light forces equipped with AD and ASuW missiles could be deployed along the Norwegian coast or in the Baltic Islands or on Svalbard, etc. to block Russian naval/amphibious forces from deploying in support of a land invasion.  These same types of forces would also be useful in the Pacific theater, the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden or elsewhere in the World.

Replacing our Aurora's with an equal number (or even greater number) of P-8s would also be useful not just against Russian naval threats but Worldwide against all types of military and non-state threats.

Building small combatants like Corvette's to replace our Kingston-class would allow us to better contribute to naval conflicts, enforce sanctions/blockades, anti-piracy and contraband smuggling, etc.

Bigger stretch here, but what if we were to actually get the mythical "Big Honking Ship"?  What kind of capabilities for example would a Canadian Juan Carlos-class LPD give Canada?  Carries 913 troops and up to 46 MBTs.  In a pure combat role it can carry 25 x F-35Bs or in a pure transport role can carry 25 x NH90 class helicopters (or FVL?).

Any of these capabilities combined with a continued eFP Latvia rotation, a Rapid Deployment Light Battlegroup and a single ABCT available to be sustainably deployed when required might be just as valuable to NATO as a single fly-over Division and be much more flexible for Canada in contributing to allied military operations around the World and not just in a single theatre.


----------



## GK .Dundas

GR66 said:


> From the above two comments I think you can excuse me for getting the impression that you were both envisioning Canada being able to field (and presumably support in the field) a 3 Division Force.
> 
> I'll just say that in light of the current economic situation and with major defence spending like the just announced NORAD upgrades, the shipbuilding program, F-35's and basic critical equipment needs highlighted by the events in Ukraine on the books, that in my humble opinion any CDS or MND that walked in to the PMO and suggested that we go from an Army that has no plans to even deploy a single Brigade Group to any army that wants to be able to deploy a 3 Division force (regardless of the ratio of Reg Force to Reserves) would be laughed out of the office.
> 
> 
> If you are suggesting that we have an Army that is the equivalent of 3 Divisions with the objective of being able to deploy, support and maintain a single Division in the field then I will agree with you that this is an objective that a country the size and wealth of Canada should be able to achieve.  I will however suggest that this is an aspirational goal that falls (very) far outside any discussions of a Force 2025/2030/2035 timeframe.
> 
> There are already a lot of major defence programs in process which will eat up much of the effort and funding available to the CAF that will have to work their way through the system before the absolutely transformative changes that would be required to achieve a Division-sized field force can become a reality.  Retention issues, basing issues, equipment issues, training issues, Reserve TOS issues, legislative issues, doctrinal issues, etc. all together will likely be a decades long battle in order to lay the foundation for what you are proposing.  That's not to say that we shouldn't start down that road now, but it does to my mind mean that we need a more achievable interim plan.
> 
> 2% GDP and major administrative reform are an excellent start but I'd argue that probably at least a decade of that level of funding will be required just to fix what we have (and complete our current projects) before it can start to be directed into major transformation programs.
> 
> I'd make a couple of comments about the RAND report.  Firstly, their wargaming pits the entire forces of the Russian Western Military District and their forces in Kaliningrad (which runs from Ukraine in the South to the coast of Norway in the North) against the in-place NATO forces in the Baltic States.  So, are we to seriously expect that Russia would leave the rest of their entire Western frontier undefended while they focus all of their military forces against a single point on the NATO front?  Of course not.
> 
> In order to invade the Baltic States Russia would have to move and concentrate their forces for the attack as well as move up reinforcements from other military districts to cover the rest of their front against the likely counter-attacks by NATO.  These movements and preparations for war would certainly be noticed by NATO.
> 
> NATO first noticed an increase in Russian forces massing near Ukraine and conducting increased tempo of training exercises in the Spring of 2021.  By November 2021 the US publicly released commercial satellite images showing the continuing build-up of Russian forces (they certainly would have been aware of this well before the information was released publicly).  January 24th NATO put their forces on standby and began reinforcing Europe with additional ships and aircraft.  In February the US deployed additional troops to Poland and Romania and warned Russia of impending economic sanctions should they invade.
> 
> I don't think that there is any reason to believe that the signs of a Russian build-up in preparation for an invasion of NATO would not also be detected in advance.  Especially in light of what has happened in Ukraine I'd suggest that both NATO will be extra vigilant in watching for any future signs of Russian military preparations and that Russia will not want to risk the manpower issues that it faced in Ukraine by not ordering a general mobilization of Reserves in advance of a war against NATO.
> 
> This should trigger a build-up of NATO forces from both Europe and North America.  Yes I think that deploying a Brigade is something that Canada should have as a policy, maintain the capability to do and regularly practice.  I've also stated before that I'm not opposed to Canada pre-deploying some equipment for a fly-over force in Europe although I've seen no signs that any Canadian political party is in favour of doing that.
> 
> As to your comment that Article 5 is irrelevant to the Baltic States because "Once the Russians cross the border it's too late" I simply disagree with that.  Setting aside the fact that a reinforced NATO presence in the Baltics resulting from detection of signs of the Russian build up may firstly deter Russia from going through with the attack or that the beefed up defending forces may stop or significantly slow any Russian attack, an invasion by Russia would cause the death of not only Latvian, Estonian and Lithuanian NATO personnel, it would also result in the deaths of  American, British, Danish, French, Canadian, Albanian, Czech, Italian, Montenegran, Polish, Slovakian, Slovenian, Spanish, Belgian, Icelandic, Luxembourgian, Dutch, German, Norwegian, Croatian and Romanian NATO troops.
> 
> I don't believe that NATO in the face of that kind of aggression and loss of life would simply allow Russia a fait accompli with whatever gains they made.
> 
> The comment about supplying arms and cash was in relation to Russian aggression against non-NATO members.  It is related to the (obvious) fact that so far NATO is unwilling to directly intervene in the defence of non-alliance members.  Augmenting our eFP Battlegroup in Latvia will have ZERO deterrent effect on Russia's actions in Ukraine (or any other non-NATO country they choose to invade) unless the policy of NATO changes and direct military intervention is approved.  This isn't just a case of Canadian political ineptitude, it's a pan-NATO policy decision.
> 
> What makes our "Medium" forces "Medium"?  The LAV 6.0 is 28,636kg.  The Bradley M2A2 is 27,220kg.  We're certainly not "Medium" in terms of deployability.  We're "Medium" I guess in that we're missing a bunch of the puzzle pieces that allow us to engage in a peer "Heavy" conflict, but is there some type of "Medium" role that a 28,636kg LAV can perform that a 27,220kg Bradley can't perform?
> 
> It's probably time to take the term "Medium" out of our vocabulary.  Realistically the only time we'd ever deploy a full Brigade on operations (or a full Division in our wet dreams) would be for a major peer/near-peer conflict.  And for that we either need Light forces (because we need to respond more quickly than we are able to deploy our Heavy forces) or we need Heavy forces.
> 
> If we simply bought some more tanks we'd have what we need for 3 x Heavy Brigades each with 1 x Tank Regiment and 2 x LAV Battalions.  That would be enough Heavy forces to deploy and maintain through rotation 1 x Heavy Brigade in the field.  That also leaves us with 3 x Light Battalions which could be grouped together into a single Light Brigade with a single Battlegroup available on rotation as a Rapid Response force.
> 
> If we're lucky, GDLS will be selected as the winner of the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle competition for the US Army and we can begin replacing the LAVs in our Reg Force Battalions with domestically produced Griffin III IFVs.  By that time (if we're lucky) we'll have some of our Reserve structure/training/legislation issues worked out and we can start devolving the LAVs down to the Reserves and begin building up the Divisional structure you and @KevinB have been proposing.
> 
> I won't argue that this is one possible contribution to NATO that we can make, but it really is focused primarily on a single threat (Russian invasion of NATO) which for several reasons I don't feel is likely (not impossible, but in my opinion highly unlikely).
> 
> For example, Light forces equipped with AD and ASuW missiles could be deployed along the Norwegian coast or in the Baltic Islands or on Svalbard, etc. to block Russian naval/amphibious forces from deploying in support of a land invasion.  These same types of forces would also be useful in the Pacific theater, the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Aden or elsewhere in the World.
> 
> Replacing our Aurora's with an equal number (or even greater number) of P-8s would also be useful not just against Russian naval threats but Worldwide against all types of military and non-state threats.
> 
> Building small combatants like Corvette's to replace our Kingston-class would allow us to better contribute to naval conflicts, enforce sanctions/blockades, anti-piracy and contraband smuggling, etc.
> 
> Bigger stretch here, but what if we were to actually get the mythical "Big Honking Ship"?  What kind of capabilities for example would a Canadian Juan Carlos-class LPD give Canada?  Carries 913 troops and up to 46 MBTs.  In a pure combat role it can carry 25 x F-35Bs or in a pure transport role can carry 25 x NH90 class helicopters (or FVL?).
> 
> Any of these capabilities combined with a continued eFP Latvia rotation, a Rapid Deployment Light Battlegroup and a single ABCT available to be sustainably deployed when required might be just as valuable to NATO as a single fly-over Division and be much more flexible for Canada in contributing to allied military operations around the World and not just in a single theatre.


Small problem, you would have to get the following groups to actually take this seriously.
Canadian politicians who are too busy fighting the next election . The only reason they even travel abroad aside from vacations is to win votes locally.
War doesn't win votes talking about it seriously even might even lose you votes. Better to avoid the issue entirely
The Canadian Military at the moment is in disarray trying to fight far too many internals battles to be able to focus on fighting a war.
And the average Canadian is deluged with problems from having to choose between having sufficient food to eat for their entire family and having enough gas in their car in order to get to work in able to earn enough money for the above.
And then we have the spectre of inflation and recession.,.....
And the beat goes on.
I wish I knew what the answer was I really do.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> From the above two comments I think you can excuse me for getting the impression that you were both envisioning Canada being able to field (and presumably support in the field) a 3 Division Force.


Except that for over a year now we've both argued that we need more deployable units than we have but neither one of us has ever said that we should internationally deploy 3 divisions at one time. Most of the time we debate whether we are even capable of deploying one division. 



GR66 said:


> If you are suggesting that we have an Army that is the equivalent of 3 Divisions with the objective of being able to deploy, support and maintain a single Division in the field then I will agree with you that this is an objective that a country the size and wealth of Canada should be able to achieve.


My position is simply that we should create an eight brigade (5 manoeuvre, 3 support) peacetime army with one battlegroup forward deployed, the remainder of one heavy brigade prepositioned for flyover. In addition we should provide healthy staff augmentation to the Multinational Division North headquarters and have contingency plans to deploy an additional heavy brigade, an additional mech or light brigade and divisional support enablers. And I'll repeat that I think that is achievable within the current budgeting and manning levels save and except there is the capital cost of two heavy brigades' and some support equipment. It's also within the Force 2025 timeframe with the exception of the equipment acquisition which means that we form one heavy brigade from our existing Leo and LAV stocks. Not optimal by any stretch of the imagination but a viable first step.



GR66 said:


> I'd make a couple of comments about the RAND report. Firstly, their wargaming pits the entire forces of the Russian Western Military District and their forces in Kaliningrad (which runs from Ukraine in the South to the coast of Norway in the North) against the in-place NATO forces in the Baltic States. So, are we to seriously expect that Russia would leave the rest of their entire Western frontier undefended while they focus all of their military forces against a single point on the NATO front? Of course not.


I don't think the report says that. It wargamed 25 BTGs plus supporting another 21 supporting artillery and aviation battalions "from WMD". WMD has some 300,000 troops. 25 BTGs is a portion of WMD, not it's entirety. 



GR66 said:


> What makes our "Medium" forces "Medium"?


We've discussed this ad nauseam throughout these threads. Let's just rest on this quote from Advancing with Purpose.



> Today, Canada’s Land Force is often described as a strategically relevant, tactically decisive, knowledge-based, medium-weight force.





GR66 said:


> I won't argue that this is one possible contribution to NATO that we can make, but it really is focused primarily on a single threat (Russian invasion of NATO) which for several reasons I don't feel is likely (not impossible, but in my opinion highly unlikely).


It's not merely possible but we're already fully committed as a part of Latvia's defence. That's a fait accompli. But it's an inadequate deterrent. That's why I argue for more. Italy and especially Spain could also commit more to eFP Latvia - maybe an armoured battlegroup each.



GR66 said:


> Bigger stretch here, but what if we were to actually get the mythical "Big Honking Ship"?


I have absolutely no objections for other missions and roles. That's why we have a Navy, and Airforce and two medium brigades and a light brigade and a Special Forces Command still in the inventory. 



> Today, Canada’s Land Force is often described as a strategically relevant, tactically decisive, knowledge-based, medium-weight force.


Not a big fan anymore of big honking ships in the Navy. I prefer press-ganging/contingency leasing ocean going ferries and civilian ROROs an having mixed regular and reserve crews trained on how to operate them. I find it a hard peacetime resource to commit to. If we did we should lease it out to civilian customers during peacetime and let it earn its maintenance costs.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Not a big fan anymore of big honking ships in the Navy. I prefer press-ganging/contingency leasing ocean going ferries and civilian ROROs an having mixed regular and reserve crews trained on how to operate them. *I find it a hard peacetime resource to commit to. If we did we should lease it out to civilian customers during peacetime and let it earn its maintenance costs.*
> 
> 🍻



Tax break to shipping companies and airlines to buy and maintain milstd cargo assets in excess of their actual needs.  Reserve crews to fly them in time of need.  Government to insure when flying into a warzone.  Bob's your uncle.  The extra craft might even be useful in supplying communications with remote communities.

As to the size of the force, based on  my exercise above I am now going to start punting for a 6 Brigade Army plus Brigade sized CANSOFCOM. 2 Divisions plus CANSOFCOM

6 Brigades of 12 Regular BTGs and 10 Reserve BTGs.  1 Heavy, 5 Light - 1 Light mounted in LAVs,  4 Lights with a LAV BTG in each.

1 Hvy
1 Lt (LAV)
4 Lt

Reg, Reserve Mix and deployments to be determined.

The Poles seem interested in hosting Lt Infantry - they will even supply the bases.



> *Poland ready to build permanent NATO bases*​
> Post dateMay 19, 2022
> No Commentson Poland ready to build permanent NATO bases
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *The installations would accommodate? Light infantry units? in the bloc, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has said*
> *Warsaw is ready to build permanent military installations to house “light infantry units” from the US-led NATO bloc, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said on Thursday. The Prime Minister called for further military build-up of NATO in Eastern Europe in the midst of the ongoing Russian offensive in Ukraine.
> 
> “Permanent Allied bases should be built in the countries of the eastern flank of NATO. Poland is ready to build such bases as would be provided for the permanent deployment of light infantry units,” he told the Strategic Ark Forum in Warsaw.*
> Continuing NATO’s military build-up is the only way to “deter” Russia, the prime minister said, demanding that military aid be extended to Ukraine as well. Warsaw has been one of the most active suppliers to Kyiv in the ongoing conflict, sending old Soviet-made tanks and other hardware to Ukrainian troops.
> “Russia can only be deterred by our unity and military capabilities and harsh sanctions; not by telephone calls and talks with Putin but by military aid to Ukraine and the strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank,” Morawiecki stressed.
> 
> The Polish Prime Minister also promised to provide military support to Sweden and Finland should they be attacked during their NATO alignment process.
> “I would like to make it clear that in the event of an attack on Sweden or Finland during their accession process to NATO, Poland will help them,” Morawiecki said.
> Morawiecki’s rhetoric echoed with comments made earlier this month by his British counterpart, Boris Johnson, who promised to also come and help the new potential NATO members. “What we emphatically say is that in the event of a disaster or in the event of an attack on Sweden, then Britain would come to Sweden’s aid with whatever Sweden requested,” Johnson said.
> 
> The two Nordic nations submitted a formal membership offer on Wednesday, but they have already met strong opposition from Ankara. Turkey, which is a large NATO country, claims that Sweden and Finland both house people they consider to be terrorists, namely members of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has branded the countries a “guest house” for terrorists.
> NATO’s expansion and alliance building in Eastern Europe were revived by the Russian offensive in Ukraine, which began in late February. *In addition to Poland, other easternmost members of the bloc are also seeking an increased military presence of the US-led bloc. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are said to be pushing to create a division-size force of about 20,000 soldiers. The force would be on standby and ready for deployment in any of the nations should any threat arise.*
> 
> Russia attacked the neighboring state after Ukraine’s failure to implement the terms of the Minsk agreements, which were first signed in 2014, and Moscow’s final recognition of the Donbass republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. The German- and French-mediated Minsk Protocol was designed to give the breakaway regions a special status within the Ukrainian state.
> The Kremlin has since demanded that Ukraine officially declare itself a neutral country that will never join the US-led NATO military bloc. Kyiv insists that the Russian offensive was completely unprovoked and has denied claims that it planned to retake the two republics by force.


----------



## KevinB

The Poles see multiple benefits. 
   Increased defense and deterrence, plus financial benefits. 

Plus they know the enemies in play.


----------



## KevinB

I hate the term BTG 
   Brigades exist for a reason.


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## Infanteer

Bde or Bde Gp.
BTG is a Russian specific term that we would call a Battle Group (BG)


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## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I hate the term BTG
> Brigades exist for a reason.


I'm with you there.

The first time I heard the term "tactical group" used in earnest was in relation to 38 CBG Artillery Tactical Group. It's a stupid name and simply stood for the fact that 10 Fd Regt, 26 Fd Regt and 116 Ind Fd Bty had sunk so low that they could barely field a battery between them and were now going to share one commanding officer. In total they number 5 batteries: 18 (Regina), 64 (Yorkton), 13 (Portage La Prairie), 71 (Brandon) and 116 (Kenora) spread over 750 kilometres (albeit centred on Shilo). 

Why do we keep playing these silly games?

😖


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> Artillery Tactical Group


The Artillery Tactical Group is the only occurrence of “tactical group” in the Canadian defence terminology bank. It is not a conglomeration of different artillery units; it is the C2, observers, and fire coordination bits that actually plug into a battlegroup.


----------



## dapaterson

FJAG said:


> I'm with you there.
> 
> The first time I heard the term "tactical group" used in earnest was in relation to 38 CBG Artillery Tactical Group. It's a stupid name and simply stood for the fact that 10 Fd Regt, 26 Fd Regt and 116 Ind Fd Bty had sunk so low that they could barely field a battery between them and were now going to share one commanding officer. In total they number 5 batteries: 18 (Regina), 64 (Yorkton), 13 (Portage La Prairie), 71 (Brandon) and 116 (Kenora) spread over 750 kilometres (albeit centred on Shilo).
> 
> Why do we keep playing these silly games?
> 
> 😖


Because of the perception in the Army HQ that it's not worth the effort to formally amalgamate the units, and this provides the pretence that perhaps someday in the future each unit may again have a CO and RSM.

The authorized size of the Army Reserve, cannot sustain all the CO and RSM positions of the post WWII legacy units, but god forbid anyone suggest that the Buckshot Fusiliers of Flin Flon Manitoba, all 57 of them (on paper) should have less than a LCol!


----------



## McG

The unit in Flin Flon killed itself by being corrupt.


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> The unit in Flin Flon killed itself by being corrupt.


So it learned from the CoC you say…


----------



## Ostrozac

dapaterson said:


> The authorized size of the Army Reserve, cannot sustain all the CO and RSM positions of the post WWII legacy units,


Oddly enough, the last major culling of reserve regiments was done in the 1960’s — a period when not only were the majority of WWII veterans still very much alive and with us, but many were still serving. Didn’t stop regiments with service in Hong Kong, Normandy and Italy from getting the chop and placed on the Supplementary list.  Something has organizationally paralyzed a good portion of the Canadian army reserves for the last 60 years or so — I can’t put my finger on exactly what, but it isn’t the Second World War.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> The Artillery Tactical Group is the only occurrence of “tactical group” in the Canadian defence terminology bank. It is not a conglomeration of different artillery units; it is the C2, observers, and fire coordination bits that actually plug into a battlegroup.


We're talking apples and oranges here.

We too have adopted "tactical group" here (and I saw the term as early as the 2005-2006 artillery reorganization), the same as the British Artillery who now have "Tactical Group Batteries" which describes what we've been calling an "OP Battery" (Actually the term "Artillery Tactical Group" preceded our formation of OP batteries). Either way those are made up of "artillery tactical groups" which include the observers, BC and FSCC and related staff.

38 CBG Artillery Tactical Group is a different kettle of fish and describes the mash up of the three reserve units.



dapaterson said:


> Because of the perception in the Army HQ that it's not worth the effort to formally amalgamate the units, and this provides the pretence that perhaps someday in the future each unit may again have a CO and RSM.
> 
> The authorized size of the Army Reserve, cannot sustain all the CO and RSM positions of the post WWII legacy units, but god forbid anyone suggest that the Buckshot Fusiliers of Flin Flon Manitoba, all 57 of them (on paper) should have less than a LCol!











Ostrozac said:


> Oddly enough, the last major culling of reserve regiments was done in the 1960’s — a period when not only were the majority of WWII veterans still very much alive and with us, but many were still serving. Didn’t stop regiments with service in Hong Kong, Normandy and Italy from getting the chop and placed on the Supplementary list.  Something has organizationally paralyzed a good portion of the Canadian army reserves for the last 60 years or so — I can’t put my finger on exactly what, but it isn’t the Second World War.


I joined up within a year of the "culling". We had four guns in the gun park and a regiment's worth of 24 detachment commanders in the Sergeant's Mess. Unfortunately the "unit culling" was accompanied by the Snakes and Ladders fiasco which meant that most of the people who were amalgamated went on to "cull" themselves fairly rapidly. The Shyte show that was the interim Richmond Street Armories hastened that process.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

McG said:


> The unit in Flin Flon killed itself by being corrupt.


I was engaging in artistic license; back in the day, they were an Engr Sqn commanded by a Maj (with a profitable side gig doing excavation, as the story goes...)


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> I think what matters most about the structure, is what you intend the final structure's capability to be. With a Canadian Army hovering around 20,000 regulars and 15,000 reservists (those are very rough rounded off numbers you might be able to generate for a field force) the most you could ever deploy and marginally sustain would be a single division (say 20 - 23,000 all told). It would be more practical to generate and deploy a brigade (say 5,000) and the SSE, as is written, is for the deployment of battlegroups (1,5 - 2,500).


King IKnowNothing's intensions for the CA:
1. Expand eFP Latvia and sustain in perpetuity- Bde HQ for a multi-national Bde, fully manned and equipped LAV battalion, tank squadron, Cav squadron (1 & 5 tasking)
2. Be prepared to send a full Medium+Tank Bde to Europe in time of war (1&5 tasking)
3. Be prepared to send one LIB sized QRF anywhere as needed (2 tasking)
4. Be prepared to send and sustain a light - light mobility protected BG for non-near peer conflict  (2 tasking)

Assumptions- ATGM, GBAD, SPG needs are met

2 CMBG-2 CLBG
Loses it's LAV's and the RCD.  Pulls some sub-units from RCR to stand up a either a new light cav regiment or a new LIB (if light cav regiment is not deemed necessary). Pilots reserve reform to expand the Bde with PRes subunits in 70/30 battalions and a 10/90 4 or 5RCR.  Receives the majority of CA TAPV's.  Maintains the flexibility to provide all of leg/airborne/airmobile/ mobility protected wheeled.  Has all the M777's in blend of Reg and PRes.  Takes responsibility for all non NATO/peer fight taskings.

1 and 5 CMBG
Each with 3 Mech Battalions, 1 Cav Regiment, engineers,  artillery attachments but no organic guns.  Tanks pooled into one 85/15 (3 Reg squadrons, 1 PRes) total force tank regiment, SPG batteries and GBAD similarly pooled.  Make use of reserves for individual augments and sub/sub unit gap filling of war-time type capabilities.

Each Lav Bn and Cav squadron falls into a 1 in 6 deployment rotation, Tanks 1 in 3 (half the duration?). The deployed tank squadron leaves one worth of tanks in Canada for the PRes to train on.  For a war-time deployment the full tank regiment and all the guns are attached to the full (non eFP Latvia) CMBG remaining in Canada and shipped to deploy as a full intact Bde.

Multi-national Bde HQ becomes a semi-permanent separate entity.


----------



## McG

IKnowNothing said:


> Expand eFP Latvia and sustain in perpetuity- Bde HQ for a multi-national Bde, fully manned and equipped LAV battalion, tank squadron, Cav squadron (1 & 5 tasking)


You are proposing that Canada should have the privilege of commanding a MN bde while only contributing a battlegroup? If Canada wants to be lead nation or framework nation, then Canada needs to provide the plurality of the combat support & common combat service support.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> You are proposing that Canada should have the privilege of commanding a MN bde while only contributing a battlegroup? If Canada wants to be lead nation or framework nation, then Canada needs to provide the plurality of the combat support & common combat service support.


A valid point but right now we command a battlegroup while only supplying one of its five manoeuvre companies. My guess is that countries will always be prepared to sit back and let someone else, willing to step up, do it. My guess is that it would be easier for Canada to receive international approval to assume the role of a brigade headquarters with only one battlegroup, than to get international commitments to fill out the remaining battlegroups and components.

🍻


----------



## McG

The CS and CSS for a BG are a much simpler beast than for a whole bde, and Canada does provide an on/off artillery battery to the battlegroup.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> The CS and CSS for a BG are a much simpler beast than for a whole bde, and Canada does provide an on/off artillery battery to the battlegroup.


I would think that the CS and CSS for a battlegroup made up from eight different countries is anything but simple. 

😁


----------



## Ostrozac

IKnowNothing said:


> Takes responsibility for all non NATO/peer fight taskings.


And this becomes the field upon which the regimental system fights its battles. Everybody wants a piece of everything, so if one of the brigades becomes the only place where you can potentially get six month rotations to Cyprus/Bosnia/Haiti/Eritrea, and similarly, if that brigade is cut out of the “real action” in NATO/North Korea, then it won’t be left to a single regiment. So you have to move 3PPCLI and 3R22eR to Petawawa, where they will feel like orphans in their regimental families — and we basically organizationally reinvent the Airborne Regiment, but not in a good way.

It’s pretty clear that we missed an opportunity in the late 1960’s when the infantry was downsized by going with ‘big’ 3 battalion regiments instead of single battalion regiments (which is essentially what the armoured corps went with), because the system we ended up with gives too much power to each regiment and therefore has to be divisible by three.

I mean, the infantry is eventually going to have to confront the ‘rule of three’, isn’t it? The Francophone population of Canada is at about 23% and dropping — at some point we won’t be able to sustain 33% of the battalions being R22eR. But that’s maybe a sacred cow to barbecue another day.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Ostrozac said:


> And this becomes the field upon which the regimental system fights its battles. Everybody wants a piece of everything, so if one of the brigades becomes the only place where you can potentially get six month rotations to Cyprus/Bosnia/Haiti/Eritrea, and similarly, if that brigade is cut out of the “real action” in NATO/North Korea, then it won’t be left to a single regiment. So you have to move 3PPCLI and 3R22eR to Petawawa, where they will feel like orphans in their regimental families — and we basically organizationally reinvent the Airborne Regiment, but not in a good way.
> 
> It’s pretty clear that we missed an opportunity in the late 1960’s when the infantry was downsized by going with ‘big’ 3 battalion regiments instead of single battalion regiments (which is essentially what the armoured corps went with), because the system we ended up with gives too much power to each regiment and therefore has to be divisible by three.
> 
> I mean, the infantry is eventually going to have to confront the ‘rule of three’, isn’t it? The Francophone population of Canada is at about 23% and dropping — at some point we won’t be able to sustain 33% of the battalions being R22eR. But that’s maybe a sacred cow to barbecue another day.



The Canadian Army always did it's best work, in both world wars for example, when divisions and brigades were filled with regiments and other units drawn from across the country. In diversity there is strength, in more ways than one.

For example, I recall when the infamous Quebec Referendum of 1995 was evolving into a national crisis my Dad, a 3 Div Gunner from WW2 who supported the The Régiment de la Chaudière (amongst others) through many tough battles, called the regimental orderly room directly and said that he wished they would stay in Canada and the Canadian Army. The guy was almost in tears. And this from a kid who grew up in Victoria.

Having done pretty much the opposite of that since then, we seem to have unintentionally recreated - at an Army level - what continues to divide us as a nation with all the attendant in-fighting, ass covering, petty jealousies and regional exceptionalism.

The term 'Army of the West', for example, is not helpful when trying to build a stronger team IMHO.


----------



## markppcli

.


McG said:


> The CS and CSS for a BG are a much simpler beast than for a whole bde, and Canada does provide an on/off artillery battery to the battlegroup.


And the Spanish provide a tank platoon, and the majority of the engineer support, full time.


----------



## IKnowNothing

McG said:


> You are proposing that Canada should have the privilege of commanding a MN bde while only contributing a battlegroup? If Canada wants to be lead nation or framework nation, then Canada needs to provide the plurality of the combat support & common combat service support.


Thanks, like FJAG pointed out I was working off the current BG ratio, but scaled up.

If it won't fly then axe the MN Bde. Canada provides the full BG for eFP Latvia, NATO  finds another lead nation to either keep 2 in Latvia or uses those commitments to man one of the 4 new ones.



Ostrozac said:


> And this becomes the field upon which the regimental system fights its battles. *Everybody wants a piece of everything,* so if one of the brigades becomes the only place where you can potentially get six month rotations to Cyprus/Bosnia/Haiti/Eritrea, and similarly, if that brigade is cut out of the “real action” in NATO/North Korea, then it won’t be left to a single regiment.


This BS should not be allowed to stand in the way of organizing the Army as effectively as possible .Not that I'm claiming my proposal is that, but whether it's mine or that of someone far more informed the theme of "that won't work, the Army can't get out of it's own way" is far too pervasive.


----------



## KevinB

Should not be hard to run Latvia ( if they wish) like 4 CMBG.

Rotate units every 3-4 years.   

Put a CMBG Hq there - and 50% of the personnel for the Bde (and all equipment) and task some units as flyover.


----------



## Kirkhill

Communicating during Dispersed Operations.



> Offensively, small units dispersed widely... could scatter a range of sensors throughout, allowing the larger joint force a look inside. They could also ferry weapons closer to an adversary and act on targeting data faster or in more innovative ways — immobilizing an enemy... instead of (destroying) it, for example.
> 
> Defensively, small and scattered units blend in easier with local ... traffic and topography, making it harder for an enemy to find, target and hit them.











						Viasat to test 5G networking for Marine Corps operations
					

The U.S. Marine Corps plans to conduct expeditionary advanced base operations in the near future, both for offensive and defensive reasons. But command and control remains a big barrier.




					www.defensenews.com
				




One thing about relying on Cyber, Electronic and Directed Energy Warfare it allows for a more aggressive posture.   With less risk of killing people it allows for a more aggressive form of non-lethal commercial warfare.  Although in a world where wars have started over the loss of an ear eight years prior, sometimes it is difficult to predict what will cause a conflict to flashover.










						War of Jenkins' Ear - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Skysix

There well may be some other things we should change in how things are done ..









						This Army officer's epic rant about company command is a work of art
					

This hilarious ode to company command pulls no punches in letting us know about all the bullshit your commander deals with.




					taskandpurpose.com


----------



## daftandbarmy

Skysix said:


> There well may be some other things we should change in how things are done ..
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This Army officer's epic rant about company command is a work of art
> 
> 
> This hilarious ode to company command pulls no punches in letting us know about all the bullshit your commander deals with.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> taskandpurpose.com



This, times 1000 

"If I hear one more reference to that fucking loser who wrote _On Killing_ from a Fivehead Transportation Commander who failed CCC three times, I am going to drag each and every one of you with me down to hell."


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:


> This, times 1000
> 
> "If I hear one more reference to that fucking loser who wrote _On Killing_ from a Fivehead Transportation Commander who failed CCC three times, I am going to drag each and every one of you with me down to hell."


So Captain aside from that, how was your day ?


----------



## DBNSG

Skysix said:


> There well may be some other things we should change in how things are done ..
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This Army officer's epic rant about company command is a work of art
> 
> 
> This hilarious ode to company command pulls no punches in letting us know about all the bullshit your commander deals with.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> taskandpurpose.com


My God that was funny, I am sending it to my Dad who used to run the Land Transportation garage at CFB Halifax.


----------



## Good2Golf

Jaded for sure, but probably not too far off, with this…


> This is some sort of lovecraftian paradox where doing something as simple as pretending to help unload a connex for 10 minutes, or just not being fat, earns you Dick Winters levels of praise, but two years spent trying to improve and fix systems for the betterment of your people and the mission is met with utter indifference and, usually, failure.


----------



## Skysix

Never mind the incredibly high attrition rate of irreplaceable (during a war) high end assets like ships  fighters and tanks, Force Projection will now require adequate Force Protection as those needs now will include commercial shipping, rail, and air supply from Canada to wherever, or even within Canada, as well as at-home armed protection (not an uparmed rent-a-cop but counter-SF level operators and emplaced air defense batteries) of critical manufacturing plants (artillery shells and UAS for example)

"A determined adversary might find that it is both easier and more effective to render U.S. Army units inoperable by destroying these vital logistics pipelines instead of targeting fighting units directly.

The future transparency of this expansive web of support should be nothing short of terrifying to U.S. military planners. The ability to achieve surprise, to protect one’s logistics, and to conceal the force from persistent detection is evaporating. These factors have staggering implications for future Army doctrine, organizations, and
platforms"








						The Other Big Lessons That the U.S. Army Should Learn from Ukraine - War on the Rocks
					

The war in Ukraine is the first major land war between two modern militaries equipped with advanced conventional weapons in decades. Its emerging lessons



					warontherocks.com
				




THEY should  WE likely won't. Prove me wrong. Please.

(Time to upgrade and expand the Rangers into a real Territorial Defense Force?)


----------



## KevinB

Skysix said:


> Never mind the incredibly high attrition rate of irreplaceable (during a war) high end assets like ships  fighters and tanks, Force Projection will now require adequate Force Protection as those needs now will include commercial shipping, rail, and air supply from Canada to wherever, or even within Canada, as well as at-home armed protection (not an uparmed rent-a-cop but counter-SF level operators and emplaced air defense batteries) of critical manufacturing plants (artillery shells and UAS for example)
> 
> "A determined adversary might find that it is both easier and more effective to render U.S. Army units inoperable by destroying these vital logistics pipelines instead of targeting fighting units directly.
> 
> The future transparency of this expansive web of support should be nothing short of terrifying to U.S. military planners. The ability to achieve surprise, to protect one’s logistics, and to conceal the force from persistent detection is evaporating. These factors have staggering implications for future Army doctrine, organizations, and
> platforms"
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Other Big Lessons That the U.S. Army Should Learn from Ukraine - War on the Rocks
> 
> 
> The war in Ukraine is the first major land war between two modern militaries equipped with advanced conventional weapons in decades. Its emerging lessons
> 
> 
> 
> warontherocks.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> THEY should  WE likely won't. Prove me wrong. Please.
> 
> (Time to upgrade and expand the Rangers into a real Territorial Defense Force?)


That is part of the current MDO doctrine and DHS mandate down here.


----------



## Skysix

KevinB said:


> That is part of the current MDO doctrine and DHS mandate down here.


Don't get me started on DHS over-reach and actual vs intended vs desired vs needed capabilities.

They don't make rabbit holes that deep! 🤓😂


----------



## Kirkhill

We appear to have a developing standard

Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and now Slovakia.  Switzerland is already a member of the club.


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1541713001862021121


----------



## daftandbarmy

Skysix said:


> Never mind the incredibly high attrition rate of irreplaceable (during a war) high end assets like ships  fighters and tanks, Force Projection will now require adequate Force Protection as those needs now will include commercial shipping, rail, and air supply from Canada to wherever, or even within Canada, as well as at-home armed protection (not an uparmed rent-a-cop but counter-SF level operators and emplaced air defense batteries) of critical manufacturing plants (artillery shells and UAS for example)



Good old fashioned Infantry, alot of Infantry, is the best solution of course. 

But the chances of standing up another 10 or 12 battalions - chump change in the great scheme of things - are ridiculously small I'm thinking.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Good old fashioned Infantry, alot of Infantry, is the best solution of course.
> 
> But the chances of standing up another 10 or 12 battalions - chump change in the great scheme of things - are ridiculously small I'm thinking.



I agree on the capital cost of the 10 or 12 battalions.  But that represents a major opportunity cost in terms of lost manpower and a massive political cost.

Better to pay those 10 or 12 battalions to build smart motors.


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> We appear to have a developing standard
> 
> Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia and now Slovakia.  Switzerland is already a member of the club.
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1541713001862021121


That's a different turret then the CV90 normally has.  I wonder if its the Block IV version turret or something different.  The competition results were relatively open source.  CV90 actually failed an obstacle height test but did better than the Lynx on the shooting (mainly due to the Lynx not being able to rotate the turret unless the engine was on). I'll try to find the link and post it in Future Armour or something.


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> CV90 actually failed an obstacle height test but did better than the Lynx on the shooting (mainly due to the Lynx not being able to rotate the turret unless the engine was on).



The Sherman was sub-optimal in many areas.  But it was made to work regardless.  And it is apparently still in service today.









						WWII Sherman Tanks: Back in Action in 2016
					

One country is putting WWII-era M3 Stuarts and M4 Shermans into service today.




					nationalinterest.org


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> The Sherman was sub-optimal in many areas.  But it was made to work regardless.  And it is apparently still in service today.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> WWII Sherman Tanks: Back in Action in 2016
> 
> 
> One country is putting WWII-era M3 Stuarts and M4 Shermans into service today.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> nationalinterest.org


Apparently there are still T-34s in service. 

🍻


----------



## KevinB

MkIV turret below  

It appears to me to be a modified turret for the Slovakian Military.  It’s missing a few functions from the MkIV IFV standard turret.


----------



## markppcli

I mean I’ve ridden in a Slovakian BVP2, anything would be an upgrade.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I mean I’ve ridden in a Slovakian BVP2, anything would be an upgrade.


True - but I also noticed they said ‘illustration’ on the press release, and mentioned MkIV, so perhaps the article didn’t have access to MkIV images and dropped that in as a reasonable facsimile.


----------



## markppcli

Interesting given thst they had spent money upgraded some BVP2s, I think mostly for recce ?  How extensive it was I’m unsure.


----------



## Kirkhill

The Alternative to the IFV strategy.  

Boxers and Wiesels






The Boxer, as used by the Germans, is an armoured bus, a troop transporter for the dismount infantry.  Its main armament is an RWS with either a 12.7mm HMG or a 40mm GMG.  These are for close protection of the vehicle only.  

The Battalion's heavy weapons are carried separately in the Wiesel.  Many on this site have commented on the Wiesel before, a light, air and helitransportable tracked vehicle that carries a variety of weapons.  The principal weapons pairing is a Wiesel with an ATGM (currently the venerable TOW) and another Wiesel with a dual feed 20 mm autocannon.  The Wiesel is also used for a mounted 120mm mortar system, a light anti-aircraft system and assorted FOVs, CPs and sensors.   These can accompany the troops on deployment by air even when their Boxers can't.

The 20mm/ATGM pairing deserves some further consideration.

The Javelin/NLAW ATGMs have been getting lots of good press in Ukraine but as the war drags on stocks are under stress.  That has prompted the Ukrainians to build a 14.5 mm Anti-Materiel Rifle with a 2 km range to take the load off the ATGMs.  In much the same way I fancy the 20mm takes the load off of the TOWs in the German Wiesels. 






Given that NLAW weighs 12.5 kg, the Javelin weighs 22.3 kg and the Alligator AMR weighs 25 kg  I can only think that those weapons would benefit from having weapons carriers to transport them.   In which case why not the Wiesel?

Especially given that Rheinmetall has a  new optionally manned version






This is based on the same technology as Rheinmetall's other autonomous systems.






						Rheinmetall Canada – Mission Master unmanned ground vehicle A-UGV
					

Rheinmetall Mission Master is a unique family of Autonomous Unmanned Ground Vehicles to support military troops in dangerous missions with difficult conditions.




					www.rheinmetall.ca
				







Leave the IFVs to the RCAC and the Panzergrenadiers.

Buy ACSV TCVs for infantry transport and put the battalion weapons companies on board something that can be lifted by air in the same helicopters and aircraft as the rifles.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> The Alternative to the IFV strategy.
> 
> Boxers and Wiesels
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Boxer, as used by the Germans, is an armoured bus, a troop transporter for the dismount infantry.  Its main armament is an RWS with either a 12.7mm HMG or a 40mm GMG.  These are for close protection of the vehicle only.
> 
> The Battalion's heavy weapons are carried separately in the Wiesel.  Many on this site have commented on the Wiesel before, a light, air and helitransportable tracked vehicle that carries a variety of weapons.  The principal weapons pairing is a Wiesel with an ATGM (currently the venerable TOW) and another Wiesel with a dual feed 20 mm autocannon.  The Wiesel is also used for a mounted 120mm mortar system, a light anti-aircraft system and assorted FOVs, CPs and sensors.   These can accompany the troops on deployment by air even when their Boxers can't.
> 
> The 20mm/ATGM pairing deserves some further consideration.
> 
> The Javelin/NLAW ATGMs have been getting lots of good press in Ukraine but as the war drags on stocks are under stress.  That has prompted the Ukrainians to build a 14.5 mm Anti-Materiel Rifle with a 2 km range to take the load off the ATGMs.  In much the same way I fancy the 20mm takes the load off of the TOWs in the German Wiesels.



In case of a real war, break glass 








__





						Boys 0.55in
					

Page details technical specifications, development, and operational history of the Boys 0.55in including pictures.



					www.militaryfactory.com


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> In case of a real war, break glass
> 
> View attachment 71849
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Boys 0.55in
> 
> 
> Page details technical specifications, development, and operational history of the Boys 0.55in including pictures.
> 
> 
> 
> www.militaryfactory.com



Just make sure the NHS is fully paid up to deal with all the broken shoulders.


----------



## Kirkhill

Barrett 50 - 15 kJ
Boys .55 - 17 kJ
Alligator 14.5 - 32 kJ
Lahti 20 - 47 kJ
Rh202 20 - 81 kJ
M242 25 - 110 kJ


----------



## Kirkhill

More on the OMFV competition and reiteration of the vehicle troop loading



> Each OMFV is designed to have a two-person crew and carry six soldiers in the back. Under current plans, according to Coffman, there will be six OMFVs per platoon, to carry a minimum of 30 soldiers total, or five each, meaning another seat will be available to transport an additional soldier, such as a medic or interpreter, or other equipment.



I read that as 6 fire teams of 4 in 3 squads with 12 seats for command and ancillaries.  And a total of 12 crew.









						For next OMFV phase, new competitors could join contest to replace Bradley - Breaking Defense
					

The Army released the RFP for the next two phases of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle on July 1, which could see some new entrants from abroad.




					breakingdefense.com


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> More on the OMFV competition and reiteration of the vehicle troop loading
> 
> 
> 
> I read that as 6 fire teams of 4 in 3 squads with 12 seats for command and ancillaries.  And a total of 12 crew.


Right now the Platoon down here in the US Army seems to be being reimagined.
   30 man dismount platoon (29+1) +6 (Medic, Terp, HumInt, SOF etc folks) +12 crew.
  Some are suggesting 3 x 10 man Squads for the dismount +atts, while others are pushing for 4 x 6 man Squad/Dets with a 5+1 Pl HQ + atts   

Right now the Bradley Platoon is broken into 2 mounted Sections - Alpha and Bravo each with two Bradleys  - OMFV would add Charlie Section with 2 vehicles - they are playing with the currently with 6 Bradley / Platoon to try to see what works best.

   Bradley Dismounts from the 4 Bradley Platoon  are broken up into 3 x 9 man Squads +1 the Platoon Leader (across the vehicles - the load plan is on the web, but basically A1 has 7 from 1st Squad, A2 has two pers from 1st Squad, the Platoon Leader, and 4 from 2nd Squad, B1 has 5 from 2nd Squad and 2 from 3rd Squad, B2 has 7 from 3rd Squad.  The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sgt dismounts - and the Platoon Master Gunner takes the Platoon Leaders spot running the Bradleys (like the LAV Sgt) - and the Gunner takes over vehicle CC for the Platoon Sgt, and the A/Gunner moves to the Gunner spot 
  - it's a worse musical chair scenario than the LAV dismount...


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Right now the Platoon down here in the US Army seems to be being reimagined.
> 30 man dismount platoon (29+1) +6 (Medic, Terp, HumInt, SOF etc folks) +12 crew.
> Some are suggesting 3 x 10 man Squads for the dismount +atts, while others are pushing for 4 x 6 man Squad/Dets with a 5+1 Pl HQ + atts
> 
> Right now the Bradley Platoon is broken into 2 mounted Sections - Alpha and Bravo each with two Bradleys  - OMFV would add Charlie Section with 2 vehicles - they are playing with the currently with 6 Bradley / Platoon to try to see what works best.
> 
> Bradley Dismounts from the 4 Bradley Platoon  are broken up into 3 x 9 man Squads +1 the Platoon Leader (across the vehicles - the load plan is on the web, but basically A1 has 7 from 1st Squad, A2 has two pers from 1st Squad, the Platoon Leader, and 4 from 2nd Squad, B1 has 5 from 2nd Squad and 2 from 3rd Squad, B2 has 7 from 3rd Squad.  The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sgt dismounts - and the Platoon Master Gunner takes the Platoon Leaders spot running the Bradleys (like the LAV Sgt) - and the Gunner takes over vehicle CC for the Platoon Sgt, and the A/Gunner moves to the Gunner spot
> - it's a worse musical chair scenario than the LAV dismount...



A couple of good drivers and gunners could probably run the ZULU show .... just sayin'


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Right now the Platoon down here in the US Army seems to be being reimagined.
> 30 man dismount platoon (29+1) +6 (Medic, Terp, HumInt, SOF etc folks) +12 crew.
> Some are suggesting 3 x 10 man Squads for the dismount +atts, while others are pushing for 4 x 6 man Squad/Dets with a 5+1 Pl HQ + atts
> 
> Right now the Bradley Platoon is broken into 2 mounted Sections - Alpha and Bravo each with two Bradleys  - OMFV would add Charlie Section with 2 vehicles - they are playing with the currently with 6 Bradley / Platoon to try to see what works best.
> 
> Bradley Dismounts from the 4 Bradley Platoon  are broken up into 3 x 9 man Squads +1 the Platoon Leader (across the vehicles - the load plan is on the web, but basically A1 has 7 from 1st Squad, A2 has two pers from 1st Squad, the Platoon Leader, and 4 from 2nd Squad, B1 has 5 from 2nd Squad and 2 from 3rd Squad, B2 has 7 from 3rd Squad.  The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sgt dismounts - and the Platoon Master Gunner takes the Platoon Leaders spot running the Bradleys (like the LAV Sgt) - and the Gunner takes over vehicle CC for the Platoon Sgt, and the A/Gunner moves to the Gunner spot
> - it's a worse musical chair scenario than the LAV dismount...



Are they optimizing to crash onto the objective or to dismount, form up and fight their way onto the objective?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Are they optimizing to crash onto the objective or to dismount, form up and fight their way onto the objective?


I try to stay far away from Mech people - but it seems ti depends on terrain and threat.


----------



## Good2Golf

daftandbarmy said:


> A couple of good drivers and gunners could probably run the ZULU show .... just sayin'


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> A couple of good drivers and gunners could probably run the ZULU show .... just sayin'



Sigh, not this again.



Kirkhill said:


> Are they optimizing to crash onto the objective or to dismount, form up and fight their way onto the objective?



In my conversations with an officer from a Bradley unit; it depends on situation. Much like us the quick attack vs deliberate vs breach with tanks all require different SOPs. I can’t imagine a Bradley seating change flows well if it’s a close dismount though. Happily now, in regards to @KevinB ’s comment about musical chairs, we let people keep the seats they fight from for just that reason. One day the school will also get on board.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> The Alternative to the IFV strategy.
> 
> Boxers and Wiesels
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Boxer, as used by the Germans, is an armoured bus, a troop transporter for the dismount infantry.  Its main armament is an RWS with either a 12.7mm HMG or a 40mm GMG.  These are for close protection of the vehicle only.
> 
> The Battalion's heavy weapons are carried separately in the Wiesel.  Many on this site have commented on the Wiesel before, a light, air and helitransportable tracked vehicle that carries a variety of weapons.  The principal weapons pairing is a Wiesel with an ATGM (currently the venerable TOW) and another Wiesel with a dual feed 20 mm autocannon.  The Wiesel is also used for a mounted 120mm mortar system, a light anti-aircraft system and assorted FOVs, CPs and sensors.   These can accompany the troops on deployment by air even when their Boxers can't.
> 
> The 20mm/ATGM pairing deserves some further consideration.
> 
> The Javelin/NLAW ATGMs have been getting lots of good press in Ukraine but as the war drags on stocks are under stress.  That has prompted the Ukrainians to build a 14.5 mm Anti-Materiel Rifle with a 2 km range to take the load off the ATGMs.  In much the same way I fancy the 20mm takes the load off of the TOWs in the German Wiesels.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Given that NLAW weighs 12.5 kg, the Javelin weighs 22.3 kg and the Alligator AMR weighs 25 kg  I can only think that those weapons would benefit from having weapons carriers to transport them.   In which case why not the Wiesel?
> 
> Especially given that Rheinmetall has a  new optionally manned version
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is based on the same technology as Rheinmetall's other autonomous systems.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Rheinmetall Canada – Mission Master unmanned ground vehicle A-UGV
> 
> 
> Rheinmetall Mission Master is a unique family of Autonomous Unmanned Ground Vehicles to support military troops in dangerous missions with difficult conditions.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.rheinmetall.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 71848
> 
> 
> Leave the IFVs to the RCAC and the Panzergrenadiers.
> 
> Buy ACSV TCVs for infantry transport and put the battalion weapons companies on board something that can be lifted by air in the same helicopters and aircraft as the rifles.


Out of curiosity do you have a link for the German boxer unit ttps or the make up of their Wiesel company / platoons ? 

Worth noting is that the life extension upgrades to the weisle will see them replaced in Boxer equipped units by… boxer. Heeres-Planung: Boxer-‚Radschützenpanzer‘ soll Wiesel ablösen – Augen geradeaus!


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Sigh, not this again.



Not to worry Mark.  Sooner or later you will get it right.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Out of curiosity do you have a link for the German boxer unit ttps or the make up of their Wiesel company / platoons ?


I've done a quick search of the Wikipedia.de site and have found the following re the current Boxer equipped Jägerbataillon 292 - with a translation that follows:


> Das Jägerbataillon 292 gliedert sich in eine Versorgungs- und Unterstützungskompanie, drei Jägerkompanien und eine Schwere Jägerkompanie.
> 
> Die Kampfkompanien setzen sich aus insgesamt vier Zügen sowie der Kompanieführungsgruppe, einem Kompaniefeldwebeltrupp, einem Versorgungstrupp und dem Technischen Trupp zusammen. Der erste bis dritte Zug sind Infanteriezüge aus jeweils drei Gruppen (zwei Unteroffiziere mit Portepee und acht Soldaten) sowie einem Zugtrupp. Der vierte, (schwere) Infanteriezug ist mit schweren Infanteriewaffen wie Granatmaschinenwaffe und Panzerabwehrwaffe MILAN ausgestattet. Ihm ist die Scharfschützengruppe der Kompanie unterstellt. Diese unterstützt die Jägerzüge im Gefecht.
> 
> In der fünften (bis 2006 sechsten) (Schweren) Kompanie befinden sich die 120-mm-Mörser (acht Rohre Panzermörser M 113), der Panzerabwehrzug (sechs Wiesel mit TOW), der Maschinenkanonenzug (sechs Wiesel mit MK 20), der Aufklärungszug (sechs Wiesel und zwei Geländefahrzeug gl Wolf) sowie der Feuerunterstützungszug mit dem Joint Fire Support Coordination Team (JFSCT) und vier Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST). Die ehemalige sechste (bis 2006 fünfte) Kompanie war die Einsatz- und Unterstützungskompanie des Bataillons, die den Hauptauftrag der Grundausbildung wahrnahm. Diese wurde in drei Zügen durchgeführt. Sie stellte weiterhin den Sicherungs- und Unterstützungszug, dessen Gliederung und Auftrag im Wesentlichen dem der leichten Infanteriezüge in den Kampfkompanien entsprach. Innerhalb des Stationierungskonzeptes 2011 wurde die sechste Kompanie Ende 2012 aufgelöst.[1]





> The 292nd Jägerbataillon is divided into a supply and support company, three infantry companies and one heavy infantry company.
> 
> The combat companies consist of a total of four platoons as well as the company command group, a company sergeant squad, a supply squad and the technical squad. The first to third platoons are infantry platoons each consisting of three groups [i.e. sections] (two senior non-commissioned officers and eight soldiers) and a platoon squad. The fourth (heavy) infantry platoon is equipped with heavy infantry weapons such as automatic grenade launchers and MILAN anti-tank weapons. The company's sniper squad reports to him. This supports the infantry platoons in battle.
> 
> The fifth (until 2006 sixth) (heavy) company includes the 120 mm mortar (eight barrels of M 113 tank mortars), the anti-tank platoon (six Wiesel with TOW), the machine gun platoon (six Wiesel with MK 20), the reconnaissance platoon ( six Weasels and two all-terrain vehicles gl Wolf) as well as the fire support platoon with the Joint Fire Support Coordination Team (JFSCT) and four Joint Fire Support Teams (JFST). The former sixth (until 2006 fifth) company was the battalion's operational and support company, performing the main mission of basic training. This was done in three moves. They continued to provide the security and support platoon, whose structure and mission essentially corresponded to that of the light infantry platoons in the combat companies. Within the stationing concept of 2011, the sixth company was dissolved at the end of 2012.[1]



There's an image for a rifle platoon from a prior organization circa 1985. I doubt if it has changed much other than the vehicles which would have changed from five wheeled vehicles to four Boxers. Note that the section has gone from one senior NCO to two - presumably one vehicle commander and one dismount commander. Most of the terms are self explanatory but if you need any translated just let me know.







Just as an aside, this relates to a PanzerGrenadierbataillon:



> The PzGrenBtl 371 currently uses the Marder infantry fighting vehicle (44 pieces, 14 of which per Panzergrenadier company and two in the supply and support company). According to the Federal Ministry of Defence, the introduction of the SPz Puma will be delayed until 2025 at the latest.



Note the absence of any "weapons company". The "Supply and Support Company" would translate better as a HQ and HQ Coy as it also contains the battalion HQ personnel and signals platoon.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

@FJAG 

Vielen dank'


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Not to worry Mark.  Sooner or later you will get it right.



I’ll wait for you to explain ho the gunner is supposed to look to the right of the vehicle but I suppose actual knowledge of a platform is secondary to shaking one’s fist at the sky. 

On that note thanks for the information @FJAG, I wasn’t sure if those 20mm Weisles were fire support or recce tasked. Either way turreted Puma variants as supposed to be replacing them outside of the air borne.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I’ll wait for you to explain ho the gunner is supposed to look to the right of the vehicle but I suppose actual knowledge of a platform is secondary to shaking one’s fist at the sky.


I would assume the gunner would move over to the CC spot - so he couldn't see out of the left


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I’ll wait for you to explain ho the gunner is supposed to look to the right of the vehicle but I suppose actual knowledge of a platform is secondary to shaking one’s fist at the sky.
> 
> On that note thanks for the information @FJAG, I wasn’t sure if those 20mm Weisles were fire support or recce tasked. Either way turreted Puma variants as supposed to be replacing them outside of the air borne.



Turreted Pumas with tracks are to be mixed with wheeled Boxers?  Still retaining a heavy weapons company construction but with Pumas instead of Wiesels?  Or are we looking at turreted Boxers?

As to fields of view - aren't the vehicles working in teams covering each other's arcs?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Turreted Pumas with tracks are to be mixed with wheeled Boxers?  Still retaining a heavy weapons company construction but with Pumas instead of Wiesels?  Or are we looking at turreted Boxers?
> 
> As to fields of view - aren't the vehicles working in teams covering each other's arcs?


Typo, turreted Boxers.  

I don’t think I need to explain to you why being able to see the side of a vehicle is important when you're conducting a fire base. Yet again I mean.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> I would assume the gunner would move over to the CC spot - so he couldn't see out of the left


An that nice quick, hatches down swap. It’s the reason we should all do Yoga.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> I would assume the gunner would move over to the CC spot - so he couldn't see out of the left



You mean, like, use his initiative and stuff right?


----------



## Kirkhill

To inform the debate.


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/vtkhg7


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> You mean, like, use his initiative and stuff right?


No left


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> An that nice quick, hatches down swap. It’s the reason we should all do Yoga.


I think we can agree it is a two man turret for a reason.

If you get a 1 man turret - then things will change, but the LAV and Bradley turrets are not conducive to being operated by a solo Gunner/CC.
   It's an Admin Move only sort of thing when one can hang out the hatches to get SA.


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:


> I think we can agree it is a two man turret for a reason.
> 
> If you get a 1 man turret - then things will change, but the LAV and Bradley turrets are not conducive to being operated by a solo Gunner/CC.
> It's an Admin Move only sort of thing when one can hang out the hatches to get SA.


I thought that was established 219 pages ago?


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> I thought that was established 219 pages ago?



So which is cheaper - pop the existing turrets and put new one man / RWS systems in their place or rewire the existing turrets so that one person can operate them?


----------



## Kirkhill

Force 2025 Long Range Precision Fires - and why wheels not tracks









						Ukrainian army shows combat use of HIMARS in Zaporizhzhia region
					

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have begun to use HIMARS multiple rocket launcher systems in the Zaporizhzhia region. — Ukrinform.




					www.ukrinform.net
				












						Russians abandon military warehouses fearing HIMARS
					

Russian fear of HIMARS multiple launcher rocket systems forces the occupiers to abandon their military equipment warehouses en masse, Zaporizhzhya regional military administration reported on July 7.




					news.yahoo.com


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> So which is cheaper - pop the existing turrets and put new one man / RWS systems in their place or rewire the existing turrets so that one person can operate them?


Neither ?  If you expect the vehicle to do any kind of fire and movement you need some one to coordinate that. As we discussed a 100 pages ago. I truly an baffled by where you see the issue here, but more so by your consistent disregard of the experience of the end user. A mere page ago you discussed your admiration for an autocannon taking the stress of AT weapons, while simultaneously you go on about the merits of not having them on armoured vehicles. But mostly it is that you simply refuse to understand that when a vehicle is jockeying on a position you need to have some one telling the driver when to turn and they can’t do it with their face in a sight.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Neither ?  If you expect the vehicle to do any kind of fire and movement you need some one to coordinate that. As we discussed a 100 pages ago. I truly an baffled by where you see the issue here, but more so by your consistent disregard of the experience of the end user. A mere page ago you discussed your admiration for an autocannon taking the stress of AT weapons, while simultaneously you go on about the merits of not having them on armoured vehicles. But mostly it is that you simply refuse to understand that when a vehicle is jockeying on a position you need to have some one telling the driver when to turn and they can’t do it with their face in a sight.


And yet some armies do it (strykers) and others are contemplating it.  All in a world where it is getting harder to recruit people to fill those seats.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> I thought that was established 219 pages ago?


Oh we did… and again 100 pages ago.


----------



## Kirkhill

Wiesel AWC - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




20mm Wiesel - 2 man crew, one man turret.


CrewDriver, gunner/commander or driver, gunner and commander depending on variant.


----------



## markppcli

Read the second half of that. If your going to try and be smug, you ought to read the full comment.

All of that aside that is a design choice to make the size work, but I’m sick and tired of this conversation. Your lack of knowledge of armoured fighting vehicle employment, the LAV specifically, I can understand. The refusal to take in the knowledge and experience coming from others is a different matter entirely.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Wiesel AWC - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 20mm Wiesel - 2 man crew, one man turret.
> 
> 
> CrewDriver, gunner/commander or driver, gunner and commander depending on variant.


Is that cannon stabilized? Does that turret have 360 degrees of rotation? If the answer to both questions is not yes, then does the system represent something that we should aspire to emulate?


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Is that cannon stabilized? Does that turret have 360 degrees of rotation? If the answer to both questions is not yes, then does the system represent something that we should aspire to emulate?



It is an infantry support vehicle.  It carries a heavy "machine gun" to the infantry fight and allows it to be rapidly relocated from one firing position to another.


----------



## Kirkhill

Wiesel 1 Airportable Armored Vehicle | Military-Today.com
					

The Wiesel 1 airportable armored vehicle was developed by Porsche at the end of 1970s. It entered service with German airborne units in 1982. Over 300 of these vehicles were built.



					www.military-today.com
				




And here is the proposed replacement with a 27mm RWS - and a two man crew.






						LuWa Airborne Armored Vehicle | Military-Today.com
					

In 2021 demonstrator of a new airmobile tracked armored vehicle was revealed in Germany. It was designed as a replacement for the Wiesel. This armored vehicle is carried inside military helicopters and supports airborne troops.



					www.military-today.com
				









						Valhalla turrets
					






					www.valhalla-turrets.com
				




In my view these are vehicles designed to accompany infantry.  The LAV is a vehicle for infantry to accompany vehicles.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> And yet some armies do it (strykers) and others are contemplating it.  All in a world where it is getting harder to recruit people to fill those seats.


One man or unmanned turrets are different.  

It’s both a space issue, and an SA issue.  
Personally having dealt with both types of turrets - I prefer the two man system for an IFV.  I don’t believe that one can get enough SA from a RWS to jockey and direct support Infantry on the ground.
  I’m also going to say that vehicles are inherently dangerous to dismounted personnel.   A good friend of mine who retired as the CDD SGM from the Army SMU down here likes to point out the most dangerous thing in combat to the 11B was the M1A2 Abrams tank - because even a two man turret  on a AFV jockeying and fighting the vehicle isn’t able to keep track of dismounts. 
   Crew tend to call dismounts crunchies for a reason.   

The Styker is IMHO an APC, the 25mm on the LAV makes it more than a simple APC and it is expected to support the fight - the same with the Bradley. 

OMFV will have a lot more sensors and ability to provide SA to the driver and Gunner/Commander - I’m still leery of a 1 man turret for that role however as target selection, vehicle commanding and target engagements are a lot do expect from one person in combat, while ensuring you don’t drive over your troops.


----------



## IKnowNothing

KevinB said:


> The Styker is IMHO an APC, the 25mm on the LAV makes it more than a simple APC and it is expected to support the fight - the same with the Bradley.


Hypothetically speaking,   
4x Lav 6.0 with 25mm, 7 dismounts per
vs
3x Lav6.0 with .50/40mm RWS, 8 dismounts per + 1x Lav 6.0 upgunned ATGM equipped turret / RWS, 6 dismounts


----------



## OldSolduer

KevinB said:


> I’m also going to say that vehicles are inherently dangerous to dismounted personnel.   A good friend of mine who retired as the CDD SGM from the Army SMU down here likes to point out the most dangerous thing in combat to the 11B was the M1A2 Abrams tank - because even a two man turret  on a AFV jockeying and fighting the vehicle isn’t able to keep track of dismounts.
> Crew tend to call dismounts crunchies for a reason.


The highlighted part - its a critical safety requirement for dismounts to be well aware of the AFVs in the area. The AFVs lines of sight are terrible and are full of blind spots.


----------



## Kirkhill

OldSolduer said:


> The highlighted part - its a critical safety requirement for dismounts to be well aware of the AFVs in the area. The AFVs lines of sight are terrible and are full of blind spots.



Navy rules.  Little boats give way to big boats.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Navy rules.  Little boats give way to big boats.


The problem is - boats just can’t randomly back up Immediately… 

You can be minding your own business getting your kill on, and then some guy from the enemy team fires a missile - and every AFV on Blue all of a sudden decides to act like a elephant that has seen a mouse - that house you where busy in - all of a sudden has an Abrams drive into it…


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> Navy rules.  Little boats give way to big boats.


That's not the rules.  Power driven vessels give way to sailing vessels, or vessels that are fishing, or vessels that are restricted in their ability to maneuver, or not under command or....  So many rules.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Underway said:


> That's not the rules.  Power driven vessels give way to sailing vessels, or vessels that are fishing, or vessels that are restricted in their ability to maneuver, or not under command or....  So many rules.



In my kayak, I'm officially at the bottom of the food chain so should be able to insist that the biggest ships yield to my awesomeness.

However, unlike some cyclists, I know that physics is not on my side so am somewhat more circumspect


----------



## Underway

daftandbarmy said:


> In my kayak, I'm officially at the bottom of the food chain so should be able to insist that the biggest ships yield to my awesomeness.
> 
> However, unlike some cyclists, I know that physics is not on my side so am somewhat more circumspect


There are the rules and then there is common sense self preservation.  Those big ships couldn't avoid you even if they saw you depending on where you are paddling. 
Army Reorg.

Seems the the Cavalry squadrons are a go.  But they seem to be square (aka all the exact same vehicle). Is that a good idea?  Do they have attachements?  Why is Canada allergic to mixing vehicle types into a squadron organization (like say a command vehicle into the squadron)?  Or are there mixed vehicles and I just don't know it?  Or perhaps its early days still and the mix may come as the squadrons shake out.


----------



## Kirkhill

Wiesel video.  I still like it.  It is more like a Bren Carrier than a tank.






Edit to add a full length video on the Wiesel and its variants - unfortunately it is in German with no sub-titles.


----------



## markppcli

Underway said:


> There are the rules and then there is common sense self preservation.  Those big ships couldn't avoid you even if they saw you depending on where you are paddling.
> Army Reorg.
> 
> Seems the the Cavalry squadrons are a go.  But they seem to be square (aka all the exact same vehicle). Is that a good idea?  Do they have attachements?  Why is Canada allergic to mixing vehicle types into a squadron organization (like say a command vehicle into the squadron)?  Or are there mixed vehicles and I just don't know it?  Or perhaps its early days still and the mix may come as the squadrons shake out.



Typically when we say “square” in terms of structure we mean 4 sub components, or symmetry in elements. A square Bn is one with 4 companies, a square combat team is a full Sqn and a full rifle company. Sorry to be a pedant.

In terms of your actually question about mixing vehicle types, it adds some logistical and planning complexity for not a lot of gain. Additionally it makes the enemies job easier in terms of targeting.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> In terms of your actually question about mixing vehicle types, it adds some logistical and planning complexity for not a lot of gain.


Depends on the mix.  



markppcli said:


> Additionally it makes the enemies job easier in terms of targeting.


Arguable unless your command vehicles are the only outliers.  

The US Army Cav Squadron maneuver Troops in an ABCT have 4 different vehicles.  M1A2 SepV, M2A3 Bradley (or call it a M3A2 but they are identical at this point) M1069 120mm Mortar Carriers (M113 variant), and Hummer/JLTV.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Wiesel video.  I still like it.  It is more like a Bren Carrier than a tank.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Edit to add a full length video on the Wiesel and its variants - unfortunately it is in German with no sub-titles.


Just adding this, previously posted, to bring the entire Wiesel story into one place.  






Yes.  I'm a fanboi.


----------



## KevinB

KevinB said:


> Depends on the mix.
> 
> 
> Arguable unless your command vehicles are the only outliers.
> 
> The US Army Cav Squadron maneuver Troops in an ABCT have 4 different vehicles.  M1A2 SepV, M2A3 Bradley (or call it a M3A2 but they are identical at this point) M1069 120mm Mortar Carriers (M113 variant), and Hummer/JLTV.


 To quote myself 

Looking at a Canadian attempt to configure a Cav Squadron 

You would need 
Leo 2 Troop 
LAV 6.0 Recce 
LAV - ATGM - which Canada doesn’t have 
LAV - Mortar - which Canada doesn’t have 

The Cav down here have also pointed out that even the 39x M3A2 14x M1A2 and 6x Mortar systems in the maneuver troops would need to draw assets from the Combined Arms BN’s of the ABCT to fulfill most of the missions for the Bde. 

So I don’t really see how a CAV unit in Canada is practical at this point.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> To quote myself
> 
> Looking at a Canadian attempt to configure a Cav Squadron
> 
> You would need
> Leo 2 Troop
> LAV 6.0 Recce
> LAV - ATGM - which Canada doesn’t have
> LAV - Mortar - which Canada doesn’t have
> 
> The Cav down here have also pointed out that even the 39x M3A2 14x M1A2 and 6x Mortar systems in the maneuver troops would need to draw assets from the Combined Arms BN’s of the ABCT to fulfill most of the missions for the Bde.
> 
> So I don’t really see how a CAV unit in Canada is practical at this point.


I'm not sold on a fully mixed squadron. I'd rather see three "recce" squadrons each with predominantly recce vehicles and some mortars and some ATGMs. I'd keep the tanks in their own squadron and an additional platoon of mortars and another of ATGMs in the regimental headquarters. It's easier to attach central assets down to a squadron to bolster it, if required, than to reconfigure your manoeuvre squadrons by cross attaching assets from one to the other. I like my tanks concentrated and only penny packeted when absolutely necessary.

One other thing. Practically and financially speaking. We have 500 bloody TAPVs. They could make an adequate interim scout car (yes, I know they're bloody huge), and ATGM and even mortar carrier with "relatively minor" modification. I sometimes wonder whether or not the surveillance package on the LAV 6.0 LRSS could be fitted to a TAPV. I know - heresy.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I'm not sold on a fully mixed squadron. I'd rather see three "recce" squadrons each with predominantly recce vehicles and some mortars and some ATGMs. I'd keep the tanks in their own squadron and an additional platoon of mortars and another of ATGMs in the regimental headquarters.


Down here we have (I believe correctly) identified that an Armored Cavalry (Recce) Squadron cannot do it’s primary task without tanks. 

Tanks are also part of the Combined Arms Battalions - either Infantry or Tank Heavy.  




FJAG said:


> It's easier to attach central assets down to a squadron to bolster it, if required, than to reconfigure your manoeuvre squadrons by cross attaching assets from one to the other. I like my tanks concentrated and only penny packeted when absolutely necessary.


An ABCT already has more tanks than Canada has - so it’s not penny packing. 




FJAG said:


> One other thing. Practically and financially speaking. We have 500 bloody TAPVs. They could make an adequate interim scout car (yes, I know they're bloody huge), and ATGM and even mortar carrier with "relatively minor" modification. I sometimes wonder whether or not the surveillance package on the LAV 6.0 LRSS could be fitted to a TAPV. I know - heresy.
> 
> 🍻


I’m still unsure what sort of idiot wrote that requirement in DLR, and who thought 500 was a reasonable number for Canada, and then who funded it.    
    It took at least three idiots to get there.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I'm not sold on a fully mixed squadron. I'd rather see three "recce" squadrons each with predominantly recce vehicles and some mortars and some ATGMs. I'd keep the tanks in their own squadron and an additional platoon of mortars and another of ATGMs in the regimental headquarters. It's easier to attach central assets down to a squadron to bolster it, if required, than to reconfigure your manoeuvre squadrons by cross attaching assets from one to the other. I like my tanks concentrated and only penny packeted when absolutely necessary.
> 
> One other thing. Practically and financially speaking. We have 500 bloody TAPVs. They could make an adequate interim scout car (yes, I know they're bloody huge), and ATGM and even mortar carrier with "relatively minor" modification. I sometimes wonder whether or not the surveillance package on the LAV 6.0 LRSS could be fitted to a TAPV. I know - heresy.
> 
> 🍻



@FJAG 

We don't have the numbers to justify single function regiments, or even squadrons.  We're not raising and training 5 infantry divisions and 2 armoured divisions.

Our 4500 infanteers and 1500 armoured/tankers/cavalry/blackhats/zipperheads are Speshul just by dint of there being so few of them.  And having so much time on their hands in garrison.  And we only have a pennorth of tanks in any case.

As to the TAPVs - I agree.  They could be utilized as buses.  But if you want to optimize them for transport then you need to minimize the crew.  And you don't need to modify them for carrying mortars - you just need a place where the mortars and their ammunition can be carried on board for easy mount and dismount.  As to the ATGMs - the ones we don't have - they could be put into the same locker the mortar might be carried in.  Or the Stingers. Or the LAMs.  All man portable and to be deployed from the ground.

And two TAPVs carrying two teams of 4 with a third team of 4 driving the vehicles - humour me and pretend they aren't fighting vehicles.


----------



## Kirkhill

WRT TAPV

Can somebody explain what this is for?  Is it stowage?  A maintenance corridor?  Alternate exit? Wasted space?






Positioned as it is behind the seat for "the rear sentry" - who is inside and facing forwards - it appears much like the closet under my grandma's stairs.  Small, cramped, oddly shaped, inaccessible and not much use for anything.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Down here we have (I believe correctly) identified that an Armored Cavalry (Recce) Squadron cannot do it’s primary task without tanks.
> 
> Tanks are also part of the Combined Arms Battalions - either Infantry or Tank Heavy.


You misunderstood me. We were talking about the Canadian cavalry regiment which would be made up of several squadrons. My comment was addressed to concentrating the tanks in that regiment in one squadron the same way that the tanks are concentrated in one armoured company within the ABCT Cavalry squadron. (I bloody well wish we could all standardize on the term battalion when talking about a battalion-sized organization - referring to them as battalions in one scenario, regiments in another and squadron in a third just leads to confusion across borders)



KevinB said:


> I’m still unsure what sort of idiot wrote that requirement in DLR, and who thought 500 was a reasonable number for Canada, and then who funded it.
> It took at least three idiots to get there.


Couldn't agree with you more although conceptually they were more along the line of an RG-31 replacement, I think. My point rests on the "we've got the damn things, lets make use of them until we can replace them" concept.



Kirkhill said:


> We don't have the numbers to justify single function regiments, or even squadrons. We're not raising and training 5 infantry divisions and 2 armoured divisions.


See my comments to @KevinB above. You're reading far more into what I said than was intended.



Kirkhill said:


> As to the TAPVs - I agree. They could be utilized as buses. But if you want to optimize them for transport then you need to minimize the crew. And you don't need to modify them for carrying mortars - you just need a place where the mortars and their ammunition can be carried on board for easy mount and dismount. As to the ATGMs - the ones we don't have - they could be put into the same locker the mortar might be carried in. Or the Stingers. Or the LAMs. All man portable and to be deployed from the ground.


Re the TAPV mortars, agreed but also I think that there is enough space in the vehicle so that with the right floor reinforcement and a better hatch you could actually mount an 81mm (and maybe even a 120mm) internally and convert walls to ammo storage racks. A mortar can get by with a crew of four inside the vehicle with more ammo numbers in additional ammo vehicles. The driver has a function on the mortar det as there is no need to keep him separate. For them trailers for extra ammo is an option.

Re the TAPV ATGM, agreed again but also an ATGM remote turret could be fitted with a three man crew (driver, gunner, commander) and maybe a fourth ammo reloader. Again, there is sufficient space to store extra missiles in racks. (Maybe even some remotely piloted loitering ATk munitions)

At a minimum you could make it happen by fitting the appropriate storage racks and at a maximum, convert the vehicles to allow them to operate under armour.

It's not rocket science.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Agreed its not rocket science.



Any one of these systems could be adapted to that TAPV,  unless there is some overwhelming need for a maintenance corridor in the beast.

But I fear you are asking for more than we can afford to give at this time.

In the meantime we do have 81mm mortars, we have purchased some NLAWs and M72s and even some Spikes.  We have the CG84s - I think - unless we sent them all to Ukraine.   And we might even be able to scrounge some Stingers, Starstreaks or Mistrales without breaking the bank.


----------



## suffolkowner

send half the TAPV's to Ukraine


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Agreed its not rocket science.
> 
> View attachment 71933View attachment 71934View attachment 71935
> 
> Any one of these systems could be adapted to that TAPV,  unless there is some overwhelming need for a maintenance corridor in the beast.
> 
> But I fear you are asking for more than we can afford to give at this time.
> 
> In the meantime we do have 81mm mortars, we have purchased some NLAWs and M72s and even some Spikes.  We have the CG84s - I think - unless we sent them all to Ukraine.   And we might even be able to scrounge some Stingers, Starstreaks or Mistrales without breaking the bank.


Those are all interesting solutions and expensive ones. But I was thinking of something which is probably within your own realm of experience. DND tends to think of arms manufacturers and very pricey solutions to every problem. There are other solutions.

I did twenty years of my business supporting a lot of clients in the rural farm economy, like you do. Amongst my clientele were Hutterites and farm machinery manufacturers with small to medium scale machine shops. If you gave any of them a TAPV and a 120mm mortar, a couple of sample drill rounds, a supply of angle iron and a description of the problem, within a month they'd have a working prototype for you and within another month would have a limited assembly line that could probably turn out one vehicle every week or so. Hell, the Army probably has machine shops just as talented.

DND routinely overthinks the problem. Unfortunately it is really limited in finding practical solutions because the government has hamstrung itself so efficiently with its own red tape.

🍻


----------



## GR66

The problem with interim solutions in the CAF is that once implemented they become the permanent solution.

Probably the best solution is to pick the desired end state and devote the money to achieving that rather then diverting a bunch of it to meet temporary solutions.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> The problem with interim solutions in the CAF is that once implemented they become the permanent solution.
> 
> Probably the best solution is to pick the desired end state and devote the money to achieving that rather then diverting a bunch of it to meet temporary solutions.



But that sets us on the path of describing the perfect solution.  You will then spend 10 years, 5 project managers, 3 ministers and two deployments discussing the validity of your original proposal.  And in the meantime the technology will have changed.


----------



## markppcli

suffolkowner said:


> send half the TAPV's to Ukraine



Jesus, we’re trying to support them aren’t we ? 




Kirkhill said:


> WRT TAPV
> 
> Can somebody explain what this is for?  Is it stowage?  A maintenance corridor?  Alternate exit? Wasted space?
> 
> View attachment 71931
> 
> 
> View attachment 71932
> 
> Positioned as it is behind the seat for "the rear sentry" - who is inside and facing forwards - it appears much like the closet under my grandma's stairs.  Small, cramped, oddly shaped, inaccessible and not much use for anything.


It’s a maintenance corridor that gets used for storage since there’s fuck all space in the TAPV.  The inside of the TAPV, as a side effect being rear engined, really makes it’s a sup optimal weapons carrier. Mind you it’s also a sub optimal APC, Recce vehicle, SUV, frankly I’m not really sure what it’s optimal for beyond rolling over and lighting on fire.


----------



## KevinB

IMHO the TAPV should be given to the MP’s 
   It’s a airfield security vehicle that can double as a convoy escort vehicle.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

KevinB said:


> IMHO the TAPV should be given to the MP’s
> It’s a airfield security vehicle that can double as a convoy escort vehicle.


You really don’t like MPs?


----------



## Underway

markppcli said:


> Typically when we say “square” in terms of structure we mean 4 sub components, or symmetry in elements. A square Bn is one with 4 companies, a square combat team is a full Sqn and a full rifle company. Sorry to be a pedant.


Oh no, be pendant!  I'm exactly the same way.  Which is why I put my understanding of what square was into the brackets of my comment.  We're all learning from each other.

TAPV was for counter-insurgency and peace support operations.  It was a vehicle purchased for IED/mine protection and NSE convoy's.  I have yet to speak to an actual non-PRes operator about its performance in the Recce task, so will withhold judgment on that portion.

Honestly, the main flaw of the TAPV IMHO is the lack of internal space.  If it had more space to put stuff (whatever that stuff may be), then it would easily find more roles.

Can it tow things?  Like a water trailer?  That opens up some more use for it.



SeaKingTacco said:


> You really don’t like MPs?


The US MP's that I spoke to when the TAPV was announced loved the source vehicle (M1117 Armoured Security Vehicle), but that was for driving down roads, convoy escort, and doing MP stuff.  How far theTAPV has moved from the M1117 may have changed it to much.


----------



## KevinB

Underway said:


> Oh no, be pendant!  I'm exactly the same way.  Which is why I put my understanding of what square was into the brackets of my comment.  We're all learning from each other.
> 
> TAPV was for counter-insurgency and peace support operations.  It was a vehicle purchased for IED/mine protection and NSE convoy's.  I have yet to speak to an actual non-PRes operator about its performance in the Recce task, so will withhold judgment on that portion.
> 
> Honestly, the main flaw of the TAPV IMHO is the lack of internal space.  If it had more space to put stuff (whatever that stuff may be), then it would easily find more roles.
> 
> Can it tow things?  Like a water trailer?  That opens up some more use for it.
> 
> 
> The US MP's that I spoke to when the TAPV was announced loved the source vehicle (M1117 Armoured Security Vehicle), but that was for driving down roads, convoy escort, and doing MP stuff.  How far theTAPV has moved from the M1117 may have changed it to much.


It has the standard SMP pintel clamp hitch system - so I would assume it can tow any medium SMP Trailer - to include a Water Buffalo.
  Looks like it should be able to tow:
2 1/2 ton M1082 Trailer 
5 ton M1095 MTV Trailer
5 ton M1095 RST Trailer (which all I can see the difference if from the MTV is the swing down sides to allow HIMARS Rocket pods to be loaded easily)
LHS Trailer - which apparently 300 are in CAF service 








						MSVS Trailer
					

The MSVS Trailer brings unique mission capabilities to logistic support operations. Capable of hauling 22,000 lbs., the trailer is extremely versatile and can be used to haul 20ft cargo containers, mobile workshops, or communications center. The military grade trailer has been in service with the…




					www.linkmfg.com
				





Also for those looking to nerd out there is a RAND study/tech report on US Army Wheeled Vehicles from 2011 that I found pretty neat.


			https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR890.pdf


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> Honestly, the main flaw of the TAPV IMHO is the lack of internal space.  If it had more space to put stuff (whatever that stuff may be), then it would easily find more roles.





I don't think the TAPV lacks interior space.  What it does suffer from is one of the world's worst/laziest design teams.

Maintenance Corridor - vacant space 
Control Panel on Gunner's left shoulder  protruding into cabin space - panels stacked on top of each other
Why isn't that panel tucked into the Maintenance Corridor space. It could still be accessible from the interior.

Despite the Maintenance Corridor the spare is carried on the roof.
Why isn't the spare, perhaps even with a retractable jib, integrated into the maintenance corridor?

The Driver and CC are jammed into the front shoulder to shoulder while the gunner is three miles to the rear hogging the available floor area in what is actually a quite roomy space.

If the Dutch get a crew of three into a Fennek but pushing the driver up front at the apex of the crew triangle while the gunner/cc and the radio operator/obs sit side by side to the rear of the driver.

That Triangle would leave the space to the rear of the crew fully open and well delineated for use as a cargo/pax/auxilliary system area.    And the control panel that I suggested could go into the maintenance corridor, could have an alternate home in the centre of the Crew Triangle.

IMHO - somebody just got slack and idle and decided they had a massive space for a small crew and decided that it didn't matter about space utilization and, as I said, allowed the gunner to hog the whole space.  

With more thought I think that vehicle could easily be a 3+6 vehicle and with lower profile and centre of mass.

But it would require a ridiculously expensive redesign.


----------



## Kirkhill

An alternative thought for what might have been.


----------



## markppcli

Maintenance corridor isn’t accessible from the inside. I get you mean a redesign but they intended to keep the chassis realistically unchanged


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> Maintenance corridor isn’t accessible from the inside. I get you mean a redesign but they intended to keep the chassis realistically unchanged


Which meant it wasn’t suitable for the role the CAF envisioned for it - check.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Which meant it wasn’t suitable for the role the CAF envisioned for it - check.


Yup, trust me I’m no great defender of the thing. I’ve posted before about the only real uses I see for it; which is essentially providing a protected mobility element to the reserves. Ideall as a third maneuver Bn in each Bde; but I digress.


----------



## McG

KevinB said:


> It has the standard SMP pintel clamp hitch system - so I would assume it can tow any medium SMP Trailer - to include a Water Buffalo.


If only life could be so simple. If you have the right pintel at the wrong height then the vehicle & trailer are still incompatible.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Maintenance corridor isn’t accessible from the inside. I get you mean a redesign but they intended to keep the chassis realistically unchanged



I'm willing to bet that there is ample space for those panels, or at least the components within them, in the wings and centre of the crew triangle/compartment.  A lot of dead space up there as well.

But you're right.  A bad idea executed poorly.

A better suite of options, IMO - Panhard VBLs, Fennecs, LAV-LRSS and ACSVs. - and maybe some Heavy Armoured Cars.


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> If only life could be so simple. If you have the right pintel at the wrong height then the vehicle & trailer are still incompatible.


You can get height adaptors for both though.   I'm a bigger fan of the eye loop height adjustment on the trailer - but sometimes that isn't viable.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> I'm willing to bet that there is ample space for those panels, or at least the components within them, in the wings and centre of the crew triangle/compartment.  A lot of dead space up there as well.
> 
> But you're right.  A bad idea executed poorly.
> 
> A better suite of options, IMO - Panhard VBLs, Fennecs, LAV-LRSS and ACSVs. - and maybe some Heavy Armoured Cars.


Maybe all you need is space in the TAPV for a control panel plus a trailer carrying either a multi-canister UAV launcher or a load of UGV recce vehicles to be directed from the "mothership"?   Use your tanks when you need to recce in direct contact with the enemy.


----------



## Kirkhill

And before I go... why isn't the height of the suspension adjustable?

It might make the beast a little less tippy on the highways.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Maybe all you need is space in the TAPV for a control panel plus a trailer carrying either a multi-canister UAV launcher or a load of UGV recce vehicles to be directed from the "mothership"?   Use your tanks when you need to recce in direct contact with the enemy.


Like that one.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Maybe all you need is space in the TAPV for a control panel plus a trailer carrying either a multi-canister UAV launcher or a load of UGV recce vehicles to be directed from the "mothership"?   Use your tanks when you need to recce in direct contact with the enemy.



This kind of thing?


----------



## Skysix

FJAG said:


> Those are all interesting solutions and expensive ones. But I was thinking of something which is probably within your own realm of experience. DND tends to think of arms manufacturers and very pricey solutions to every problem. There are other solutions.
> 
> I did twenty years of my business supporting a lot of clients in the rural farm economy, like you do. Amongst my clientele were Hutterites and farm machinery manufacturers with small to medium scale machine shops. If you gave any of them a TAPV and a 120mm mortar, a couple of sample drill rounds, a supply of angle iron and a description of the problem, within a month they'd have a working prototype for you and within another month would have a limited assembly line that could probably turn out one vehicle every week or so. Hell, the Army probably has machine shops just as talented.
> 
> DND routinely overthinks the problem. Unfortunately it is really limited in finding practical solutions because the government has hamstrung itself so efficiently with its own red tape.
> 
> 🍻


Precisely what is happening in Ukraine. Improvise, adapt and overcome.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> And before I go... why isn't the height of the suspension adjustable?
> 
> It might make the beast a little less tippy on the highways.



Well, you don't want kids trying to climb into the thing do you?


----------



## GR66

This OpEd titled "What NATO's New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong" from Westpoint's Modern Warfare Institute website suggests that "small countries should develop defensive approaches geared less toward fielding a small hyperconventional, NATO-interoperable force—which would likely be significantly degraded in the initial stages of a Russian invasion—and more toward fielding formations customized to their unique operating environments, rationalized for budgetary and manpower considerations, and sustainable with or without the alliance’s conventional might."

While Canada may not meet the technical definition of a "small country" given our population and GDP, a similar argument could possibly be made for our military due to the difficulty of projecting a large conventional military force from Canada to Europe.  

If one were to follow this line of thinking what might a "Canadianized" Canadian Army look like?


----------



## ArmyRick

The CAF getting the TAPV for its role in the army is to me as logical as purchasing a cement truck to bale my hay instead of a hay baler.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> This OpEd titled "What NATO's New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong" from Westpoint's Modern Warfare Institute website suggests that "small countries should develop defensive approaches geared less toward fielding a small hyperconventional, NATO-interoperable force—which would likely be significantly degraded in the initial stages of a Russian invasion—and more toward fielding formations customized to their unique operating environments, rationalized for budgetary and manpower considerations, and sustainable with or without the alliance’s conventional might."
> 
> While Canada may not meet the technical definition of a "small country" given our population and GDP, a similar argument could possibly be made for our military due to the difficulty of projecting a large conventional military force from Canada to Europe.
> 
> If one were to follow this line of thinking what might a "Canadianized" Canadian Army look like?


The article made me shudder considerably.
   Look at the authors background -- He's indirectly advocating for a SOF led guerilla specific force to be a porcupine.

_They must develop asymmetric approaches based on systems that are small, numerous, smart, stealthy, fast, mobile, low-cost, survivable, effective, easy to develop, maintain and preserve, and difficult to detect and counter._

He is asking for the unlikely and more likely impossible.  It's got a lot of buzzwords, but...

_Simply put, small NATO members must develop technology-enabled, resistance-based porcupine strategies.
_ Wait - he wanted low cost right?  

_This approach cannot be ad hoc or haphazard, based on loosely defined amateur homeland defense forces. It demands state-owned, purpose-built, professional military organizations and tailored hardware to succeed. _
  Again - how is this low cost, or survivable, let alone easy to develop?

_Just like prior paradigms, this transformation requires military formations, rank systems, career paths, training and education pipelines, and weapon systems built for a specific type of war. While some foundations will survive, most solutions should radically depart from current approaches. Universally accepted principles that have long shaped conventional militaries should be fundamentally reimagined, if not abandoned entirely. Previously sacred elements of modern military culture should become relics.

Small members could employ more affordable, independently sustainable defense approaches, strategies that would enable their success even if left to fight alone. At the same time, instead of having weak, conventional tripwires along its eastern flank, NATO would have multiple layers of credible, independently capable porcupines supported by the conventional might of larger NATO states. A collective resistance-grounded defense concept would present a stronger deterrent, significantly raising the costs of aggression compared to a resurrected Cold War deterrence paradigm._

 I think it's absolute folly, and I am a big fan of SOF applications -- but I fail too see how this would slow Russia at all.  
_independently sustainable defense approaches : _what does this really mean in actuality on the ground?   
 All Russia is going to see is a weak state - and if noting more it will boost their aggression.


----------



## Prairie canuck

GR66 said:


> This OpEd titled "What NATO's New Strategic Concept Gets Wrong" from Westpoint's Modern Warfare Institute website suggests that "small countries should develop defensive approaches geared less toward fielding a small hyperconventional, NATO-interoperable force—which would likely be significantly degraded in the initial stages of a Russian invasion—and more toward fielding formations customized to their unique operating environments, rationalized for budgetary and manpower considerations, and sustainable with or without the alliance’s conventional might."
> 
> While Canada may not meet the technical definition of a "small country" given our population and GDP, a similar argument could possibly be made for our military due to the difficulty of projecting a large conventional military force from Canada to Europe.
> 
> If one were to follow this line of thinking what might a "Canadianized" Canadian Army look like?


Maybe the question could be - What would the CAF be equipped for if the U.S. wasn't an ally?


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> While Canada may not meet the technical definition of a "small country" given our population and GDP, a similar argument could possibly be made for our military due to the difficulty of projecting a large conventional military force from Canada to Europe.


Canada is essentially a country that needs expeditionary forces. Our defence is, fortunately, based on strengthening the deterrence capabilities of other countries.

Our last real domestic war was 1814 with scares in 1867 and 1870/71 and some internal bothers in 1837/8, 1869/70 and 1885.

The difficulty in "projecting a large conventional force from Canada to Europe" has been solved very well three times (WW1, WW2, and the Cold War). It is merely a problem looking for the right solution.

The real question is: if we're not prepared to project a large force, why do we even bother keeping one? Let's face it, the country is right now paying good dollars for a force that, in payroll numbers, is the size of one average full-time division and one average part-time division. ... And yet it is capability poor to the point where deploying a properly equipped battlegroup is a challenge. Does any of that make sense?

😖


----------



## SeaKingTacco

ArmyRick said:


> The CAF getting the TAPV for its role in the army is to me as logical as purchasing a cement truck to bale my hay instead of a hay baler.


I would pay good money to see a cement truck bale hay…


----------



## rmc_wannabe

FJAG said:


> Canada is essentially a country that needs expeditionary forces. Our defence is, fortunately, based on strengthening the deterrence capabilities of other countries.
> 
> Our last real domestic war was 1814 with scares in 1867 and 1870/71 and some internal bothers in 1837/8, 1869/70 and 1885.
> 
> The difficulty in "projecting a large conventional force from Canada to Europe" has been solved very well three times (WW1, WW2, and the Cold War). It is merely a problem looking for the right solution.
> 
> The real question is: if we're not prepared to project a large force, why do we even bother keeping one? Let's face it, the country is right now paying good dollars for a force that, in payroll numbers, is the size of one average full-time division and one average part-time division. ... And yet it is capability poor to the point where deploying a properly equipped battlegroup is a challenge. Does any of that make sense?
> 
> 😖


The problem is that we have relied on that "we can always mobilize a large conventional force...we did it before, right?" as a valid COA. 

It's not. 

In all 3 of our last big mobilizations, we showed up poorly equipped, poorly trained, and ready to fight the wars of tomorrow with yesterday's tech and tactics. Same can be said about Afghanistan. 

We fiddle, dawdle, and piss away time, money, and effort in peace time and wonder why we are caught with our pants down the next time we are told "Gentlemen, Orders..." 

It's gotten worse as warfare has become more technologically driven. Weapons systems are far more expensive, harder to produce, and need more time Instructing than generations prior. 

Whatever happens in Force 2025, unless we're actively at War within a NATO context, we're  still going to be chasing our tail.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Canada is essentially a country that needs expeditionary forces. Our defence is, fortunately, based on strengthening the deterrence capabilities of other countries.
> 
> Our last real domestic war was 1814 with scares in 1867 and 1870/71 and some internal bothers in 1837/8, 1869/70 and 1885.
> 
> The difficulty in "projecting a large conventional force from Canada to Europe" has been solved very well three times (WW1, WW2, and the Cold War). It is merely a problem looking for the right solution.
> 
> The real question is: if we're not prepared to project a large force, why do we even bother keeping one? Let's face it, the country is right now paying good dollars for a force that, in payroll numbers, is the size of one average full-time division and one average part-time division. ... And yet it is capability poor to the point where deploying a properly equipped battlegroup is a challenge. Does any of that make sense?
> 
> 😖


Our regular army needs to deploy over expeditionary distances.  Agreed.

Our internal distances are similar to the distances we have to cover to support our closest geographical allies.

We have allies that require support that inhabit lands at our latitudes, with our seasons, our environment and our terrain.

Kit that works there, tactics and procedures that work there will work here.

Our problem is that we are stuck in Flanders when we should be focusing on Finnmark.

AMFL and CAST Bde and not 4 CMBG.
101st Division and not 1st Cav.
Gage, Moore and de Rottenberg and not Dundas and Frederick


----------



## daftandbarmy

rmc_wannabe said:


> The problem is that we have relied on that "we can always mobilize a large conventional force...we did it before, right?" as a valid COA.
> 
> It's not.
> 
> In all 3 of our last big mobilizations, we showed up poorly equipped, poorly trained, and ready to fight the wars of tomorrow with yesterday's tech and tactics. Same can be said about Afghanistan.
> 
> We fiddle, dawdle, and piss away time, money, and effort in peace time and wonder why we are caught with our pants down the next time we are told "Gentlemen, Orders..."
> 
> It's gotten worse as warfare has become more technologically driven. Weapons systems are far more expensive, harder to produce, and need more time Instructing than generations prior.
> 
> Whatever happens in Force 2025, unless we're actively at War within a NATO context, we're  still going to be chasing our tail.



To be fair, except for the Dictatorships, just about every First World Nation has been in the same position since WW2. And before.


----------



## Kirkhill

> General Money describes the Battle of Bunker Hill between “undisciplined peasantry… and the best… regiments in the British service, the raw peasants of the country… killed and wounded, out of 2000, no less than 1054 British  officers and soldiers.” Money in effect highlighted the limitations of rigid formations when facing free moving, irregular troops.



We have been here before.   The Regular vs the Irregular.   The same battle the Russians are facing.




> A Brief History of British Light Infantry until 1800​
> By Adam Barnes
> 
> The 18th Century saw massive steps forward in the tactics of warfare, with a shift from hand to hand combat in a meat grinder of pikes, supported by muskets, to lines of infantry, armed with muskets firing volleys at each other. Within the British Army, these developments grew further, with a more organised restructuring of the Regimental System and the increasing importance of the two flank companies, consisting of one company of Grenadiers and another of Light Infantry, within the Battalion’s line.
> 
> It wasn’t until 1758, during the Seven Years War, that all British infantry battalions were ordered to train up one company as designated Light Infantry companies. Many units went further with this, adapting uniform and equipment to allow greater speed and freedom of movement across the battlefield. However, the life of the Light Infantryman was short lived as, with the end of the Seven Years War, the need for Light Infantry diminished and these light troops returned back into the line as regular infantry.
> 
> It was not until the American War of Independence where the need for Light Infantry would rear it’s head once again, for example ,General Money describes the Battle of Bunker Hill between “undisciplined peasantry… and the best… regiments in the British service, the raw peasants of the country… killed and wounded, out of 2000, no less than 1054 British  officers and soldiers.” Money in effect highlighted the limitations of rigid formations when facing free moving, irregular troops.
> 
> These limitations were answered in part by the formation of two “Legions” of Light Infantry, Simcoe’s ‘Queens Rangers’ and Tarleton’s ‘British Legion’, who were able to fight their own petit guerres against rebel forces. Alongside these, other light infantry units were also raised; such as ‘Ferguson’s Sharpshooters’ in 1776, who were armed with rifles, one of the first instances of a regular Army unit employing rifles. By 1779, Ferguson’s Sharpshooters had effectively been destroyed, and the rifle had mostly been removed from service.





> Simcoe's Queen's Rangers
> 
> 
> With the cessation of hostilities in America another decline in the need for Light Infantry occurred, and by the 1790s, very few units retained the skills and training necessary for Light Infantry to carry out their duties effectively. Across Britain, there remained very little support for Light Infantry, with players such as Sir David Dundas claiming that large scale introduction of Light Infantry would be of the most fatal consequence. However there was another train of support towards the introduction of a permanent Light Infantry corps from General Money and General Sir John Moore.
> 
> 1799 saw a huge turning point, after a disastrous campaign to Flanders. Plans were quickly drawn up to devise a programme for the creation of the first permanent regiments of Light Infantry in the British Army. This coincided with an appeal to the government from Colonel Coote Maningham and Lieutenant Colonel William Stewart, pointing out the potential importance of a corps of infantry armed with rifles. Thus, on January 17th 1800, the Experimental Corps of Riflemen with its manpower coming from ‘volunteers’ from fourteen regiments under the instruction of Colonel Coote Manningham and Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. William Stewart was formed.



Light troops have utility on many battlefields, especially our domestic ones and the flanks of our NATO allies.  They also have utility in all the brushfire wars and peacekeeping missions.

We should be buying helicopters and not tanks.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

daftandbarmy said:


> To be fair, except for the Dictatorships, just about every First World Nation has been in the same position since WW2. And before.


Fair indeed. I'm not advocating a military industrial overhaul to see "Canada rise to glory again.." I just worry that we are the grasshopper and not the ants. 

We divest capabilities faster than we replenish them. At a rate faster than most of our allies. It's going to come back and bite us in a way "convening" can't salvage.


----------



## ArmyRick

SeaKingTacco said:


> I would pay good money to see a cement truck bale hay…


I used 400 liter recycling bins one year.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> We should be buying helicopters and not tanks.


But in true CAF fashion you have too few of both...


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> But in true CAF fashion you have too few of both...



Note the use of the word SHOULD.   I would ditch the tanks and start building Combat Aviation Brigades - at least 2 of them preferably 3, maybe 4 if there was a strong reserve component.

I like Alaska and Washington as Guard models.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> We should be buying helicopters and not tanks.



Yes. Of course.

If, for the first time since WW1, we want to be considered, literally, lightweights with no say in how things play out globally.

Realpolitik is about national survival, and global influence, and it's expensive.

"The Pope... How many Divisions has he got?"

_Josef Stalin to French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval on May 13, 1935_


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> Note the use of the word SHOULD.   I would ditch the tanks and start building Combat Aviation Brigades - at least 2 of them preferably 3, maybe 4 if there was a strong reserve component.
> 
> I like Alaska and Washington as Guard models.


Oregon too. G-1/189 Medevac is often at Maple Resolve.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> And before I go... why isn't the height of the suspension adjustable?
> 
> It might make the beast a little less tippy on the highways.



Couldn’t care less about its highway performance; I care about it rolling every time it’s in a training area. That being said, height management systems rely on sensors that are generally external and are very easily damaged when driving cross country.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes. Of course.
> 
> If, for the first time since WW1, we want to be considered, literally, lightweights with no say in how things play out globally.
> 
> Realpolitik is about national survival, and global influence, and it's expensive.
> 
> "The Pope... How many Divisions has he got?"
> 
> _Josef Stalin to French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval on May 13, 1935_


How many divisions does Canada operate within the Arctic Circle?

How many can it get to Alaska or Finnmark?

Or Hans Island?

The Front has changed.  We were facing West and contemplating an About Turn to the East.  Now we are being expected to change front and reform on the left flank with the Americans on our new left and JEF on our new right. 

We are being asked to hold fast in the centre, our home turf.

Our flanks are all heavily invested in anti missile defences and Northern mobility.  And yes there are some tanks on the right flank, in position, but ATVs and air and sea mobility are more prevalent on both flanks.

How seriously will we be taken if we can't hold the centre?


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> The article made me shudder considerably.
> Look at the authors background -- He's indirectly advocating for a SOF led guerilla specific force to be a porcupine.
> 
> _They must develop asymmetric approaches based on systems that are small, numerous, smart, stealthy, fast, mobile, low-cost, survivable, effective, easy to develop, maintain and preserve, and difficult to detect and counter._
> 
> He is asking for the unlikely and more likely impossible.  It's got a lot of buzzwords, but...
> 
> _Simply put, small NATO members must develop technology-enabled, resistance-based porcupine strategies._
> Wait - he wanted low cost right?
> 
> _This approach cannot be ad hoc or haphazard, based on loosely defined amateur homeland defense forces. It demands state-owned, purpose-built, professional military organizations and tailored hardware to succeed. _
> Again - how is this low cost, or survivable, let alone easy to develop?
> 
> _Just like prior paradigms, this transformation requires military formations, rank systems, career paths, training and education pipelines, and weapon systems built for a specific type of war. While some foundations will survive, most solutions should radically depart from current approaches. Universally accepted principles that have long shaped conventional militaries should be fundamentally reimagined, if not abandoned entirely. Previously sacred elements of modern military culture should become relics.
> 
> Small members could employ more affordable, independently sustainable defense approaches, strategies that would enable their success even if left to fight alone. At the same time, instead of having weak, conventional tripwires along its eastern flank, NATO would have multiple layers of credible, independently capable porcupines supported by the conventional might of larger NATO states. A collective resistance-grounded defense concept would present a stronger deterrent, significantly raising the costs of aggression compared to a resurrected Cold War deterrence paradigm._
> 
> I think it's absolute folly, and I am a big fan of SOF applications -- but I fail too see how this would slow Russia at all.
> _independently sustainable defense approaches : _what does this really mean in actuality on the ground?
> All Russia is going to see is a weak state - and if noting more it will boost their aggression.


The more meaningful takeaway that I got from the article was the idea that it doesn't necessarily make sense for every NATO member to try and emulate US military capabilities in miniature.  Each nation could/should look at their own particular defence requirements and capabilities to try and come up with a force structure (and suite of equipment) which is both effective and sustainable for their own defence and can also be an effective contribution to the larger strategic defence goals of the alliance.

Any specific suggestions made by the author of the article to my mind undermine his general argument as obviously the defence requirements for each NATO member nation will be unique and therefor require unique solutions.  Obviously the defence needs and alliance contributions that make sense for Estonia will be different than those of Montenegro.  

For example, for Canada I think that commonality of equipment with the US makes total sense due to our physical proximity and the massive defence industry output of the US compared to our own.  Is that the case for Romania?  Does it make more sense for them to align their structure and equipment more in line with their near neighbours like Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland?

I'm simply saying that the author may have a point in suggesting that each member nation when looking at their defence capabilities should examine whether the the best option is _augmenting _the military capabilities of the US by generating forces which plug into the American model or if they can better contribute by providing capabilities that can _complement _US military capabilities.  

Obviously these decisions shouldn't be made in isolation but rather in consultation with the alliance as a whole so that you don't just have nations saying "here's what we have...what can you do with it" but rather a logical examination of what each nation's strengths and weaknesses are and how those strengths can be leveraged and the weaknesses compensated for.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> The more meaningful takeaway that I got from the article was the idea that it doesn't necessarily make sense for every NATO member to try and emulate US military capabilities in miniature.  Each nation could/should look at their own particular defence requirements and capabilities to try and come up with a force structure (and suite of equipment) which is both effective and sustainable for their own defence and can also be an effective contribution to the larger strategic defence goals of the alliance.


I agree with that in principle, however the author veered from that and advocated no real conventional force structure.  



GR66 said:


> Any specific suggestions made by the author of the article to my mind undermine his general argument as obviously the defence requirements for each NATO member nation will be unique and therefor require unique solutions.  Obviously the defence needs and alliance contributions that make sense for Estonia will be different than those of Montenegro.


Agreed, and I don’t think that anyone is suggesting that everyone have a symmetrical force scaled per means as other countries.  


GR66 said:


> For example, for Canada I think that commonality of equipment with the US makes total sense due to our physical proximity and the massive defence industry output of the US compared to our own.  Is that the case for Romania?  Does it make more sense for them to align their structure and equipment more in line with their near neighbours like Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland?


All of the former WP NATO members are conducting an ongoing divestment of their WP equipment.  Most of that was given to Ukraine for very favorable exchange with US kit.  


GR66 said:


> I'm simply saying that the author may have a point in suggesting that each member nation when looking at their defence capabilities should examine whether the the best option is _augmenting _the military capabilities of the US by generating forces which plug into the American model or if they can better contribute by providing capabilities that can _complement _US military capabilities.


Agreed, however we have STANAG for a reason. There needs to be a degree of commonality in terms of ammunition etc.    if Ukraine has taught anything it should be the US DoD is the only country in NATO that truly has ‘break in case of war’ stockpiles of equipment and ammunition.   
 Most NATO countries have empty cupboards in that respect, and are not self sufficient when tapped beyond annual training.  



GR66 said:


> Obviously these decisions shouldn't be made in isolation but rather in consultation with the alliance as a whole so that you don't just have nations saying "here's what we have...what can you do with it" but rather a logical examination of what each nation's strengths and weaknesses are and how those strengths can be leveraged and the weaknesses compensated for.


Agreed.  
   However down here we have a large force that has a number of different capabilities.  

Not everyone needs to have an Abrams/Bradley based ABCT’s and DIV that  link with V Corps in Poland.  
  Perhaps XVIII Airborne is a better fit, or the USMC or…


----------



## Skysix

markppcli said:


> height management systems rely on sensors that are generally external and are very easily damaged when driving cross country.


That seems dumb. What is wrong with simple multi position switch and presets? Say differential to road height in inches plus 0, 3, 6, 9, 12 (or whatever the maximum travel is)

Or the metric equivalent thereof😜


----------



## KevinB

Skysix said:


> That seems dumb. What is wrong with simple multi position switch and presets? Say differential to road height in inches plus 0, 3, 6, 9, 12 (or whatever the maximum travel is)
> 
> Or the metric equivalent thereof😜


Even automated systems are subject to damage.  Most rely on simple hydraulic adjustments and not mechanical locks, which result in great strain on the hydraulic with significant impacts.   Those that ohave a hydraulic adjustment from different  Mech lock systems still rely on a generally exposed hydraulic cable that can be torn or otherwise damaged leaving the vehicle in one mode of travel.  
   The only way to have a significantly robust system is a manual adjustment that is fairly awkward to do quickly in the field.


----------



## Weinie

KevinB said:


> Even automated systems are subject to damage.  Most rely on simple hydraulic adjustments and not mechanical locks, which result in great strain on the hydraulic with significant impacts.   Those that ohave a hydraulic adjustment from different  Mech lock systems still rely on a generally exposed hydraulic cable that can be torn or otherwise damaged leaving the vehicle in one mode of travel.
> The only way to have a significantly robust system is a manual adjustment that is fairly awkward to do quickly in the field.


Or we could have built a fit for purpose vehicle in the first place, making moot of this TAPV derail.


----------



## KevinB

Weinie said:


> Or we could have built a fit for purpose vehicle in the first place, making moot of this TAPV derail.


Common sense isn’t…


----------



## markppcli

Skysix said:


> That seems dumb. What is wrong with simple multi position switch and presets? Say differential to road height in inches plus 0, 3, 6, 9, 12 (or whatever the maximum travel is)
> 
> Or the metric equivalent thereof😜


It does that. But the pressure sensors and vale’s have parts on the outside. Very annoying


----------



## markppcli

Weinie said:


> Or we could have built a fit for purpose vehicle in the first place, making moot of this TAPV derail.


I don’t know that the possible tasks and failings of our largest military vehicle purchase in decades is that much of a derail in a discussion on army restructure. What a TAPV can and can’t do is a concept that has to be central to that surely?


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I don’t know that the possible tasks and failings of our largest military vehicle purchase in decades is that much of a derail in a discussion on army restructure. What a TAPV can and can’t do is a concept that has to be central to that surely?


Well it sort of sums up a lot of the CA restructuring.


----------



## Underway

markppcli said:


> I don’t know that the possible tasks and failings of our largest military vehicle purchase in decades is that much of a derail in a discussion on army restructure. What a TAPV can and can’t do is a concept that has to be central to that surely?


Agreed.  Its not like Army Reorg doesn't derail all the other threads around here.  Take that Reorg Thread you get sidetracked too!

So I'm thinking that simple might be best for a "reorg".  Get rid of the light battalions and use the pers freed up to make the mech one's whole.


----------



## Infanteer

Underway said:


> So I'm thinking that simple might be best for a "reorg".  Get rid of the light battalions and use the pers freed up to make the mech one's whole.



The year 2001 just entered the chat.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> The year 2001 just entered the chat.


It’s not as though that wasn’t a stated COA for Force 2025.


----------



## GR66

Let's be honest...a decision...ANY decision that is matched with the resources to properly apply the change would be a great improvement over what we have now.

A LAV/Leopard-based Armoured Brigade with programs established to provide the missing CS and CSS capabilities (ATGMs, SHORAD, SP Howitzers, etc.)? An improvement.

A Light Brigade Air Mobile/Arctic Response Brigade with light vehicles and air-transportable CS/CSS enablers and expanded vertical/strategic lift capabilities?  An improvement.

A LAV-based Security Force Assistance Brigade plus a properly manned and equipped Artillery Brigade and Mobility Enhancement Brigade?  An improvement.

There are a multitude of useful roles that a well trained, organized and equipped military can fulfil that are useful both in peacetime and in wartime.  The key is having them well trained, organized and equipped to fulfil their stated purpose (and I'd include in that properly integrated to work with our allied nations).  

Just make a decision and make it work.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Let's be honest...a decision...ANY decision that is matched with the resources to properly apply the change would be a great improvement over what we have now.
> 
> A LAV/Leopard-based Armoured Brigade with programs established to provide the missing CS and CSS capabilities (ATGMs, SHORAD, SP Howitzers, etc.)? An improvement.
> 
> A Light Brigade Air Mobile/Arctic Response Brigade with light vehicles and air-transportable CS/CSS enablers and expanded vertical/strategic lift capabilities?  An improvement.
> 
> A LAV-based Security Force Assistance Brigade plus a properly manned and equipped Artillery Brigade and Mobility Enhancement Brigade?  An improvement.
> 
> There are a multitude of useful roles that a well trained, organized and equipped military can fulfil that are useful both in peacetime and in wartime.  The key is having them well trained, organized and equipped to fulfil their stated purpose (and I'd include in that properly integrated to work with our allied nations).
> 
> Just make a decision and make it work.



The problem seems to be that no matter what decision is made it will pissoff somebody who will scream and turn blue.


----------



## Kirkhill

I am regularly accused of derailing.  I plead guilty.  

In large part I find this is because a small change in technology can have a big impact on structure.

In the same way that I find Saab's dual purpose Anti Tank Anti Air sight for cannons to be worthy of exploration I am intrigued by a new sight offering for SAAB products.  Something that would seem to be applicable to the Canadian environment and needs.











						Sights on the future
					

While we normally supply the Carl-Gustaf M4 with a choice of either integrated metal sights (iron sights) or a red-dot sight, some users require even higher levels of control, accuracy and flexibility. To enable this, Saab collaborates with a limited number of leading manufacturers who produce...




					www.saab.com


----------



## markppcli

Been trialled, no idea where it went. Per the report 3 RCR was getting 1st round hits at 1000m. Which effectively doubles its range.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Been trialled, no idea where it went. Per the report 3 RCR was getting 1st round hits at 1000m. Which effectively doubles its range.


From the description, that it "clips on" to the AT4 as well, and seems to follow the same targeting as the NLAW it strikes me as a useful piece of kit for the section.  Was it any use as a standalone observation device?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> From the description, that it "clips on" to the AT4 as well, and seems to follow the same targeting as the NLAW it strikes me as a useful piece of kit for the section.  Was it any use as a standalone observation device?



Not really the same. It just gives you an aim point from my understanding. 

We already have thermals down to section level, so I don’t know what extra used it’d see as a stano option.


----------



## Infanteer

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1547260588530728962
I'm just going to leave this here....


----------



## FJAG

Infanteer said:


> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1547260588530728962
> I'm just going to leave this here....


I must admit I never cared much for the Boxer or its modular concept. While there is a potential to swap out modules, how often would that happen in practice? Possibly a few times if a high value module has a chassis damaged but I expect at that point the module will have deformities that would prevent a simple in-the-field swap out. Manufacture of separate chassis and modules is no simpler than a complete LAV and probably more expensive and the module structure most probably robs the interior of valuable space. IMHO its a toss up between the Boxer and the LAV series for the medium role while the Lynx better fit the ABCT IFV slot.

But with a choice between a wheeled and a tracked chassis with interchangeable modules the game has changed substantially. The tracked chassis can be better configured for the heavier armoured and heavier powertrain role for an IFV while the wheeled chassis remains a lighter more air transportable version. The commonality of the modules from one fleet to the other presents a great advantage in training and maintenance. 

General Dynamics leaves me a little confused between the ASCOD, the AJAX series and now the tracked Stryker. I think they are missing the boat if they aren't looking at a future series of modules that are interchangeable as between a tracked or wheeled chassis.

Just a thought.

🍻


----------



## McG

All those variants have been fielded or prototyped on LAV.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> All those variants have been fielded or prototyped on LAV.


But not as modules, to the best of my knowledge.

Imagine for example an air defence module, or an ATGM module, or a radar module, or a gun module which could be set up at a school without a chassis and used as a training aid for crews regardless of whether they go to a heavy or medium brigade.

🍻


----------



## Underway

FJAG said:


> I must admit I never cared much for the Boxer or its modular concept. While there is a potential to swap out modules, how often would that happen in practice? Possibly a few times if a high value module has a chassis damaged but I expect at that point the module will have deformities that would prevent a simple in-the-field swap out. Manufacture of separate chassis and modules is no simpler than a complete LAV and probably more expensive and the module structure most probably robs the interior of valuable space.


I agree with your modular concept criticism.  There is a place for specialized vehicles and a place for modular vehicles.  And there is a place for a specialized vehicle to have "modules" on it to swap out equipment.



FJAG said:


> IMHO its a toss up between the Boxer and the LAV series for the medium role while the Lynx better fit the ABCT IFV slot.


LAV 6 and Boxer are in the same weight class.  I think the LAV protection/firepower/mobility triangle is better balanced than Boxer which leans more on the armor side of the house but loses out in mobility.



FJAG said:


> But with a choice between a wheeled and a tracked chassis with interchangeable modules the game has changed substantially. The tracked chassis can be better configured for the heavier armoured and heavier powertrain role for an IFV while the wheeled chassis remains a lighter more air transportable version. The commonality of the modules from one fleet to the other presents a great advantage in training and maintenance.
> 
> General Dynamics leaves me a little confused between the ASCOD, the AJAX series and now the tracked Stryker. I think they are missing the boat if they aren't looking at a future series of modules that are interchangeable as between a tracked or wheeled chassis.
> 
> Just a thought.
> 
> 🍻


The ASCOD and AJAX are basically the same family.  You can put the tracked Stryker in a different grouping though.  It makes sense though.  Tracked Stryker was designed to replace the M113.  ASCOD is a tracked IFV.


----------



## Skysix

Underway said:


> LAV 6 and Boxer are in the same weight class.  I think the LAV protection/firepower/mobility triangle is better balanced than Boxer which leans more on the armor side of the house but loses out on mobility


I think we need now to re-evaluate armor. What level vs mobility is needed for what.

Protection against arty shrapnel, 12.7/.50 and IEDs is one level. Against 30mm another. HEAT from tanks and roadside mines yet another. Protection against top attack and NLAW etc not very practicle any more. Drones and  SMART artillery are game changers.

What is the purpose of the protection? Absolute so an invulnerable chassis can get its payload to 'x'? Or limited so it can withstand random battlefield dangers.

The protection-mobility tradeoff has shifted substantially over the past decade to the point where unarmored dune buggies are proving effective at one end of the spectrum yet top of the line tanks are vulnerable to a squaddie with a man portable missile at a distance beyond the normal protection circle of dismounts.

Or maybe I am just reading too much into what the Ukraine battlefield is showing us.


----------



## Underway

Skysix said:


> I think we need now to re-evaluate armor. What level vs mobility is needed for what.
> 
> Protection against arty shrapnel, 12.7/.50 and IEDs is one level. Against 30mm another. HEAT from tanks and roadside mines yet another. Protection against top attack and NLAW etc not very practicle any more. Drones and  SMART artillery are game changers.
> 
> What is the purpose of the protection? Absolute so an invulnerable chassis can get its payload to 'x'? Or limited so it can withstand random battlefield dangers.
> 
> The protection-mobility tradeoff has shifted substantially over the past decade to the point where unarmored dune buggies are proving effective at one end of the spectrum yet top of the line tanks are vulnerable to a squaddie with a man portable missile at a distance beyond the normal protection circle of dismounts.
> 
> Or maybe I am just reading too much into what the Ukraine battlefield is showing us.


We have to be careful with the media's narrow focus of what Ukraine is showing us.  If we took the data at the start of the war we would have thought that ATGM was king.  But now we see that artillery likely still is.

There are minefields all over Ukraine now.  I've seen videos of four tanks in a row hitting mines.  With train tracks being damaged all over the place just driving the troops to the defensive line on roads while being protected from shell fragments in the process is a useful capability.

Also, a vehicle destroyed by whatever weapon doesn't invalidate the capability that the vehicle provides.  LAVs were never designed to deal with AT systems, only small arms, fragments and mines.


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> The ASCOD and AJAX are basically the same family. You can put the tracked Stryker in a different grouping though. It makes sense though. Tracked Stryker was designed to replace the M113. ASCOD is a tracked IFV.


It's an interesting question as to whether a given manufacturer needs separate vehicles which all function around the same weight class (give or take a few tonnes here or there) or whether it should turn its production into a common line. I'm starting to like the idea of common modules (maybe with some bolt on armour upgrade capability) which can be "slid into" either a single universal heavy tracked chassis or a single universal medium wheeled chassis. The trouble for GD is that they already have different legacy vehicles in fairly wide usage and turning back the clock will be difficult. They may need to leap a generation.



Skysix said:


> I think we need now to re-evaluate armor. What level vs mobility is needed for what.


The holy trinity of protection, mobility and firepower have been in a constant tension and been reevaluated continuously since Little Willie was unveiled in 1915. It always has been and will be a trade off that will draw some people one way and others another. I think @Underway has it right - before we jump we need to be cautious and wait to see if the empirical data supports the Twitter analyses.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Underway said:


> We have to be careful with the media's narrow focus of what Ukraine is showing us.  If we took the data at the start of the war we would have thought that ATGM was king.  But now we see that artillery likely still is.



But what is artillery?  Is it the Russians pounding cities and empty fields with tonnes of hand-bombed HE?

Or is it the Ukrainians observing and correcting every round and using all the precision guided munitions they can lay their hands on?

I could argue that the Ukranians have swapped man-portable PGMs for artillery launched PGMs.



Underway said:


> There are minefields all over Ukraine now.  I've seen videos of four tanks in a row hitting mines.  With train tracks being damaged all over the place just driving the troops to the defensive line on roads while being protected from shell fragments in the process is a useful capability.
> 
> Also, a vehicle destroyed by whatever weapon doesn't invalidate the capability that the vehicle provides.  LAVs were never designed to deal with AT systems, only small arms, fragments and mines.


----------



## Kirkhill

Curiously the only ones that have been ordered are the armoured boxes.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> But what is artillery?  Is it the Russians pounding cities and empty fields with tonnes of hand-bombed HE?
> 
> Or is it the Ukrainians observing and correcting every round and using all the precision guided munitions they can lay their hands on?
> 
> I could argue that the Ukranians have swapped man-portable PGMs for artillery launched PGMs.


For every precision artillery round they are firing they are firing a hundred dumb projectiles.

The answer is artillery is both. Remember that there is a difference between 'destruction' missions and 'neutralization' missions. The difference is still relevant and the cost and limited number of precision projectiles still makes it impossible to destroy everything. 

Cost is one of the reasons I tend to favour guided or autonomous loitering munitions to cannon launched precision rounds. If the cost eventually balances out I might change my mind but even then, a radar isn't about to pick up and hone in on the launching point of certain loitering munitions as easily as it will on a cannon or mortar launched round.

There's a big balancing act that needs to be done here.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> For every precision artillery round they are firing they are firing a hundred dumb projectiles.
> 
> The answer is artillery is both. Remember that there is a difference between 'destruction' missions and 'neutralization' missions. The difference is still relevant and the cost and limited number of precision projectiles still makes it impossible to destroy everything.
> 
> Cost is one of the reasons I tend to favour guided or autonomous loitering munitions to cannon launched precision rounds. If the cost eventually balances out I might change my mind but even then, a radar isn't about to pick up and hone in on the launching point of certain loitering munitions as easily as it will on a cannon or mortar launched round.
> 
> There's a big balancing act that needs to be done here.
> 
> 🍻



They may be firing dumb projectiles but they are observing and correcting their fall. They are reducing their usage of even their dumb rounds.  The Russians seem to be in spray and pray mode.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> They may be firing dumb projectiles but they are observing and correcting their fall. They are reducing their usage of even their dumb rounds.  The Russians seem to be in spray and pray mode.


Who says the Ukrainians aren't also using "spray and pray" fire?  Just because they're only showing the precision strikes doesn't mean those are the only type of strikes they are making.

I'm definitely pro-precision fires...but backed up by crap-loads of non-precision for when you need it.


----------



## Kirkhill

> The HIMARS appears to have been used in a massive strike against a warehouse in the town of Nova Kakhovka in the Kherson region on Monday night. The strike set off secondary explosions and caused widespread damage, according to satellite imagery reviewed by CNN. The imagery showed how precise the attack had been, leaving just one small crater.











						Ukraine's new US rockets are causing fresh problems for Russia
					

There's a new and potentially very significant factor in the Ukrainian conflict: the Ukrainians' ability to use recently supplied Western systems to hit Russian command posts, logistical hubs and ammunition dumps a long way beyond the front lines.




					www.cnn.com


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Who says the Ukrainians aren't also using "spray and pray" fire?  Just because they're only showing the precision strikes doesn't mean those are the only type of strikes they are making.
> 
> I'm definitely pro-precision fires...but backed up by crap-loads of non-precision for when you need it.



Do the Ukrainians have the supply lines to support a spray and pray programme?  I don't believe so from the reports.


----------



## Kirkhill

Incoming


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/vyylu0

Outgoing  (single gun!)


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/vyx7zw


----------



## Kirkhill

In amongst the propaganda...


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/vyo42w


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/vyfkz7


----------



## markppcli

Skysix said:


> Or maybe I am just reading too much into what the Ukraine battlefield is showing us.


More the Ukrainian memefield


----------



## McG

Kirkhill, did you intend to put those posts on Putin’s invasion in another thread?

… or is there a point on Canadian force structures that you are hoping we will devine?


----------



## FJAG

So, I'm a little bored and do some surfing of the Canadian Army Website about the "Army of Today".

Apparently under the tab for "Organization" and that of the "Regular Force" it says we have an air defence regiment. 



> As well, there is an engineer support regiment, air defence regiment, and electronic warfare squadron.



Who knew?

😖


----------



## GK .Dundas

I suspect that the  Air Defence Regiment currently is based in somewhere in
somebody's desk drawer.in NDHQ.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Kirkhill, did you intend to put those posts on Putin’s invasion in another thread?
> 
> … or is there a point on Canadian force structures that you are hoping we will devine




Sorry - got carried away on the artillery point.  The discussion moved into the precision vs mass field and I found myself cherry picking some anecdotes from Ukraine about the quality of the Russian fire support vice the Ukrainians.  If we can believe published "intercepts" then it appears that the Russians are none too impressed with their own guns and technology (missing the target by a grid square and arriving a day late). Meanwhile the Ukrainians, reportedly, are able to accurately engage with a mortar and a drone.


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> Sorry - got carried away on the artillery point.  The discussion moved into the precision vs mass field and I found myself cherry picking some anecdotes from Ukraine about the quality of the Russian fire support vice the Ukrainians.  If we can believe published "intercepts" then it appears that the Russians are none too impressed with their own guns and technology (missing the target by a grid square and arriving a day late). Meanwhile the Ukrainians, reportedly, are able to accurately engage with a mortar and a drone.


@Kirkhill  have you seen this analysis?


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Apparently under the tab for "Organization" and that of the "Regular Force" it says we have an air defence regiment.



Dress for the job you want ?


----------



## Kirkhill

Skysix said:


> @Kirkhill  have you seen this analysis?


Thanks for the reference


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Dress for the job you want ?


My guess is that no one who really knows what the force structure is has looked at that web page since 2014 when 4 AD changed its name and function to 4 RCA(GS). 

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

And note that a change of name of a parent formation means that all subordinate units must have their MOOs and CFOOs amended as well to reflect that change.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> And note that a change of name of a parent formation means that all subordinate units must have their MOOs and CFOOs amended as well to reflect that change.


Which brings up another point. 4 RCA(GS) is a renaming/rebranding of 4 AD, which if I'm not mistaken was actually organized as a ResF regiment and as part of the ResF when it was re-established in 1995 notwithstanding its high RegF manning and subsequent ash-canning of its ResF members. I'm not sure if that was ever changed or enshrined in its CFOOs/MOOs.

Have we found the Army's equivalent of the Navy's unenshrined rank name changes?

😁


----------



## dapaterson

4 AD was Reg F; 1 AD (L&R Scots), the unit in Quebec, and the unit in AB were all Res F.

4 GS is Reg F.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> Sorry - got carried away on the artillery point.  The discussion moved into the precision vs mass field and I found myself cherry picking some anecdotes from Ukraine about the quality of the Russian fire support vice the Ukrainians.  If we can believe published "intercepts" then it appears that the Russians are none too impressed with their own guns and technology (missing the target by a grid square and arriving a day late). Meanwhile the Ukrainians, reportedly, are able to accurately engage with a mortar and a drone.


You are indeed cherry picking.  No single round sniping here.


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1548043185795895296


----------



## Kirkhill

> *The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps will be modernized and centralized in a single formation based in Alberta.*








						Force 2025 - Canada.ca
					

Force 2025 is the Canadian Army (CA)’s initiative to review all its components and seek to optimize and modernize its structures to meet current and projected operational requirements as well as support SSE initiatives.




					www.canada.ca
				






> Force 2025​Situation​Force 2025 (F2025) is the Canadian Army (CA)’s initiative to review all its components to optimize and modernize its structures to meet current and projected operational requirements as well as support SSE initiatives.
> Recognizing that the CA’s effectiveness is adversely affected by a shortfall of 8000 people, an extensive analysis was carried out in December 2021. As a result, a new structure was adopted and is now being implemented.
> This new, ‘One Army’ structure will see the integration of the Primary Reserves, Canadian Rangers, civilians, and the Regular Force into a single, integrated team.
> Increased integration enhances command and control relationships and training opportunities, and clarifies assigned tasks and integration points, ensuring the CA is prepared to carry out assigned tasks and support concurrent operations.
> The One Army model also supports digital transformation initiatives. It is sufficiently agile to respond to modern threats such cyber and space and enable the CA to address capability gaps in areas such as Ground-Based Air Defence, long-range heavy indirect fire support, Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED), and Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN) expertise.
> F2025 also includes initiatives to refine attraction, recruiting, and retention. In line with Canadian Armed Forces Reconstitution efforts, the CA is implementing policies to enable the operational capability of Reserve personnel, while ensuring that administration is streamlined, and the continued development and integration of Reserve Mission Tasks to build capacity and depth.
> F2025 has six key components:
> 
> Changes to the training model - Reinforcing training centres with instructors from units to reduce pressure on individual units to design, plan and carry out training;
> Staffing realignment - Prioritizing the staffing levels of units, including reallocation of vacant positions for both Regular Force and Reserve units;
> Modernization of structure - While units will see a decrease in total positions, the force generation output is expected to remain largely unchanged through tailored Reserve Mission Tasks and reciprocal integration of Regular Force soldiers into Reserve units;
> Realignment of responsibilities and authorities - Pushing these functions to newly-created entities or to existing structures where they may be more suitable. Analysis to seek efficiencies is ongoing;
> Ready Force Levels - Integration of Regular and Reserve components through tailored and tiered Readiness structures that will identify tasks to a unit based on personnel and equipment allocation; and
> Maintaining a strategic Reserve Force that can be mobilized quickly.
> Action​
> A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022, and the proposed final structure plan is being tested in war games before it is approved;
> In line with the current international context, the CA is exploring the concept of a global response task force that would provide forces offering a wide range of options to the federal government for emerging crises around the world and at home;;
> The CA is improving coordination with Canadian Joint Operations Command and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command to better align force generation with force employment and ensure proper force design;;
> *The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps will be modernized and centralized in a single formation based in Alberta.* Additional trials will be conducted to inform tasks, mission tasks and structures in order to reduce national procurement and increase its integration into a digitally networked CA;
> The CA is Experimenting with Second and Third Line logistics through the reorganization of Combat Service Support between 2 Service Battalion and 4th Canadian Division Support Group in support of Ex MAPLE RESOVE. What we learn will be adjusted and applied.



Should the RCAC reference be taken to mean that the RCDs and 12 RBC will join the LdSH(RC) in Alberta in a separate Brigade?

Because if so then that opens up the possibility of 2 or 3 of these Brigades.



> *2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne)* "Spartans" located at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska
> Headquarters and Headquarters Company
> 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment "Denali"
> 1st Battalion 501st Infantry Regiment
> 3rd Battalion 509th Infantry Regiment
> 2nd Battalion 377th Field Artillery Regiment
> 6th Brigade Engineer Battalion "Oak"
> 725th Brigade Support Battalion "Centurion"



Eg

1 HQ and Sigs Sqn
3 PPCLI (RSTA)
2 PPCLI
1 PPCLI
1 RCHA
1 CER
1 Svc Bn

Add 1 Wing and you are heading in the direction of



> *11th Airborne Division* "Arctic Angels"
> *Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion*
> 
> 
> Headquarters and Headquarters Company
> Signal, Intelligence, and Sustainment Company
> 9th Army Band
> SFC Brevard NCO Academy
> Northern Warfare Training Center
> *1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team* "Arctic Wolves" located at Fort Wainwright, Alaska
> Headquarters and Headquarters Company "Dire Wolves"
> 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) "Blackhawk"
> 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment "Bobcat"
> 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment "Gimlet"
> 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment "Legion"
> 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment "Automatic"
> 70th Brigade Engineer Battalion "Kodiak"
> 25th Brigade Support Battalion "Opahey"
> 
> *2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne)* "Spartans" located at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska
> Headquarters and Headquarters Company
> 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment "Denali"
> 1st Battalion 501st Infantry Regiment
> 3rd Battalion 509th Infantry Regiment
> 2nd Battalion 377th Field Artillery Regiment
> 6th Brigade Engineer Battalion "Oak"
> 725th Brigade Support Battalion "Centurion"
> 
> *11th Airborne Division Artillery*
> Headquarters and Headquarter Battery
> 
> *Combat Aviation Brigade, 11th Airborne Division*
> Headquarters and Headquarters Company
> 1st Battalion, 52nd Aviation Regiment (General Support)
> 1st Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment (Attack Reconnaissance)
> Company D, 25th Aviation Regiment (MQ-1C)
> 
> *11th Airborne Division Sustainment Brigade*
> Headquarters and Headquarters Company
> Special Troops Battalion
> 17th Combat Support Sustainment Battalion


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> You are indeed cherry picking.  No single round sniping here.
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1548043185795895296



Sounds like about 24 impacts.  2x Uragan or Smerch?  You pick your cherries and I will pick mine.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> 4 AD was Reg F; 1 AD (L&R Scots), the unit in Quebec, and the unit in AB were all Res F.
> 
> 4 GS is Reg F.


The link to DHist says 4 AD started as RegF, was reduced to nil strength in 1992 and when it was reformed in 1995 was reformed as a ResF unit as part of the ResF. I can only go by what I can find. This is why I was looking for the MOO and CFOO for 4 AD and 4 RCA(GS) some time ago.

🤷‍♂️


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Should the RCAC reference be taken to mean that the RCDs and 12 RBC will join the LdSH(RC) in Alberta in a separate Brigade?


Your source says it was last updated in January. A lot has changed since then (war in Europe, new Army commander). Are you sure it is reliable?


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> The link to DHist says 4 AD started as RegF, was reduced to nil strength in 1992 and when it was reformed in 1995 was reformed as a ResF unit as part of the ResF. I can only go by what I can find. This is why I was looking for the MOO and CFOO for 4 AD and 4 RCA(GS) some time ago.
> 
> 🤷‍♂️


I understood that AD behaved as a total force demi-formation with 4 AD containing a single battery and providing the RHQ to all AD units across Canada.


----------



## dapaterson

Legally speaking, there's no such thing as a Total Force unit.  Units are embodied in the Reg F or Res F.

And woe betide the Res F person in a unit embodied in the Reg F; their liability under the NDA is materially increased


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> I understood that AD behaved as a total force demi-formation with 4 AD containing a single battery and providing the RHQ to all AD units across Canada.


There were actually three batteries in 4 AD around the turn of the century. 119 and 128  AD batteries with ADATS, Oerlikon 35mm and Javelin as well as 210 Workshop which was a battery strength maintenance facility for all things AD. These were primarily RegF. 

On the ResF side 1 AD Regt in Pembroke, 18 AD Regt in Red Deer and 6 Fd Regt all together had 5 ResF AD batteries between them with a goodly number of RegF included and manning Javelin missiles. The standing task for the five ResF batteries was to provide Airspace Coordination Centres to each of the three Brigade Groups and a total of three Javelin troops to augment 4 AD. In grand total the establishment was for 475 RegF members and 430 ResF ones. That's a fairly realistic number of air defenders needed to support Canada's Army.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Your source says it was last updated in January. A lot has changed since then (war in Europe, new Army commander). Are you sure it is reliable?


No idea.  It was on a government/dnd/army site.  So,  as accurate as any other government information?



> *A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022*, and the proposed final structure plan is being tested in war games before it is approved;



Current time 15 July
Warning order WAS issued in March 2022
So Action plan prepared in the last three months?  Post Feb 24 and Ukraine and NORAD announcements?


----------



## Underway

Kirkhill said:


> Should the RCAC reference be taken to mean that the RCDs and 12 RBC will join the LdSH(RC) in Alberta in a separate Brigade?


Seems like it.  It makes sense to a certain extent.  If the RCAC want to go with a cavalry model then they need to be able to mix and match with their various vehicles to see what works.


----------



## Ostrozac

McG said:


> Your source says it was last updated in January. A lot has changed since then (war in Europe, new Army commander). Are you sure it is reliable?


It is certainly odd that a document that states “Date modified: 2022-01-18” contains the line “A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022,” — clearly somebody isn’t telling the entire accurate truth. Or is using time travel.

Whats the situation with Francophone schools in Edmonton these days? As I understand it, lack of facilities for unilingual French-speaking dependants was a driving force behind 1 Commando being stood up in Valcartier when the Canadian Airborne Regiment was being established in Edmonton. I wonder if the same issues would be faced by 12eRBC.

Of course, how we had the resources to educate soldiers’ children in French when their battalions were in Germany, but somehow lacked those same resources in Alberta, that’s another issue.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> There were actually three batteries in 4 AD around the turn of the century. 119 and 128  AD batteries with ADATS, Oerlikon 35mm and Javelin as well as 210 Workshop which was a battery strength maintenance facility for all things AD. These were primarily RegF.
> 
> On the ResF side 1 AD Regt in Pembroke, 18 AD Regt in Red Deer and 6 Fd Regt all together had 5 ResF AD batteries between them with a goodly number of RegF included and manning Javelin missiles. The standing task for the five ResF batteries was to provide Airspace Coordination Centres to each of the three Brigade Groups and a total of three Javelin troops to augment 4 AD. In grand total the establishment was for 475 RegF members and 430 ResF ones. That's a fairly realistic number of air defenders needed to support Canada's Army.
> 
> 🍻


20th Independent Battery in Lethbridge was the AD battery.

20th Field Regiment is in Red Deer.

While it may be a realistic number to support the Army is it a realistic number to defend Canada, or even Canada's cities?


----------



## Kirkhill

Ostrozac said:


> It is certainly odd that a document that states “Date modified: 2022-01-18” contains the line “A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022,” — clearly somebody isn’t telling the entire accurate truth. Or is using time travel.
> 
> Whats the situation with Francophone schools in Edmonton these days? As I understand it, lack of facilities for unilingual French-speaking dependants was a driving force behind 1 Commando being stood up in Valcartier when the Canadian Airborne Regiment was being established in Edmonton. I wonder if the same issues would be faced by 12eRBC.
> 
> Of course, how we had the resources to educate soldiers’ children in French when their battalions were in Germany, but somehow lacked those same resources in Alberta, that’s another issue.












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And the Catholic system.






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----------



## Kirkhill

At one time there were about 50,000 Quebecers commuting to the oil sands.









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----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> 20th Independent Battery in Lethbridge was the AD battery.
> 
> 20th Field Regiment is in Red Deer.


You're part right. 

18AD Regt was in Lethbridge, not Red Deer (brain fart on my part) but it wasn't 20th Ind Fd Bty per se that was the AD unit. 20th Ind Fd Bty was reorganized as a regiment and named 18 AD Regt on 10 Nov 1992. 18 AD Regt was allocated two batteries: 20 AD Bty and 39 AD Bty (The artillery distinguishes between Fd, AD and ATk batteries - they run separate lineages). It lost its air defence role in 2005 and reverted to field artillery but it wasn't officially reverted back to a single battery size and name changed back to 20 Ind Fd Bty until 13 Jul 2011 which was around the time period that 4 AD converted over from AD to its new role as 4 RCA (GS).



Kirkhill said:


> While it may be a realistic number to support the Army is it a realistic number to defend Canada, or even Canada's cities?


You're mixing apples and oranges here. 

On the one hand is air defence for a field army's deployed force which is what the 1992 to 2005 structure was designed to be (that included 4 CMBG and our European air fields). 

On the other hand is strategic air defence which has generally been an air force role and which has shrunk considerably from a large and varied force in the 1950s growing with things through Bomarcs and Voodoos until shrinking down to what is now a handful of F18 squadrons.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> You're part right.
> 
> 18AD Regt was in Lethbridge, not Red Deer (brain fart on my part) but it wasn't 20th Ind Fd Bty per se that was the AD unit. 20th Ind Fd Bty was reorganized as a regiment and named 18 AD Regt on 10 Nov 1992. 18 AD Regt was allocated two batteries: 20 AD Bty and 39 AD Bty (The artillery distinguishes between Fd, AD and ATk batteries - they run separate lineages). It lost its air defence role in 2005 and reverted to field artillery but it wasn't officially reverted back to a single battery size and name changed back to 20 Ind Fd Bty until 13 Jul 2011 which was around the time period that 4 AD converted over from AD to its new role as 4 RCA (GS).
> 
> 
> You're mixing apples and oranges here.
> 
> On the one hand is air defence for a field army's deployed force which is what the 1992 to 2005 structure was designed to be (that included 4 CMBG and our European air fields).
> 
> On the other hand is strategic air defence which has generally been an air force role and which has shrunk considerably from a large and varied force in the 1950s growing with things through Bomarcs and Voodoos until shrinking down to what is now a handful of F18 squadrons.
> 
> 🍻



So we have some clarification then .... despite the deployment of Army Air Defence assets to protect civil infrastructure as at Kananaskis.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> So we have some clarification then .... despite the deployment of Army Air Defence assets to protect civil infrastructure as at Kananaskis.


That was not about infrastructure; it was about an activity that contained many very high value targets (world leaders).  It’s easy to allocate point defence assets when you need to protect the head of a pin for a finite time window.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

This thread is indeed a wild ride as the train derails down multiple rabbit holes. 

The three Reg F Armoured Regiments are not moving to Edmonton. The tanks being consolidated in Edmonton, though, is now wrapped up in F2025 discussions. The tank squadron in Gagetown is under the RCD but is comprised of soldiers from the RCD and 12 RBC. When the dust settles we may see that sqn in Edmonton.

Some folks have been decrying the state of the CA. There is plenty to complain about, but lets look at what can be generated.

The CA could field an absolutely world-class Cavalry Regiment/Cavalry Battlegroup to attach to multi-national formation in high-intensity operations. Whether it had pure squadrons of tanks and recce or scrambled ones could be worked out, but the tools and people are there to perform that mission set. 

The CA could field a very good infantry Battlegroup with infantry, tanks and engineers for high-intensity operations, but we really need ALAWS in addition to the existing dismounted TOW to be ready for prime-time. There is work being done on this. I might trade M777s for mortars for fire support.  If its down to PYs I might even trade Recce Platoon for Mortars. 

The CA could field a mechanized brigade for high-intensity operations, but our towed artillery would be a major issue. Ground Based Air Defence is another gap, but there is also work being done on this. We do have some excellent enablers found in a variety of formations to include 6 CCSB to support a mechanized brigade as well.

What the CA can really do well is force generate outstanding battlegroups along with HQs and support for COIN/stability operations on a permanent, enduring basis. The army we have today was the result of rotational BG operations of this type from 1992 until 2011. At the risk of opening the TAPV can again, that program was borne out of the Kandahar experience. If we had a BG in a place like Mali it makes a certain amount of sense to have a bunch of TAPV. If the Taliban had operated masses of tanks and aircraft then we would probably have lots of anti-tank missiles and GBAD. Instead, they used IEDs and we developed, at great human cost, capabilities to counter that threat. We were fortunate to get the arguably best tank in service out that conflict. That conflict also saved our tube artillery from oblivion, but while we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is?  

So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Infanteer said:


> You are indeed cherry picking.  No single round sniping here.
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1548043185795895296


I am not sure that I would be standing up filming incoming artillery rounds. I have been on the receiving of artillery fire exactly once and do not want to be, ever again.


----------



## GR66

TangoTwoBravo said:


> This thread is indeed a wild ride as the train derails down multiple rabbit holes.
> 
> The three Reg F Armoured Regiments are not moving to Edmonton. The tanks being consolidated in Edmonton, though, is now wrapped up in F2025 discussions. The tank squadron in Gagetown is under the RCD but is comprised of soldiers from the RCD and 12 RBC. When the dust settles we may see that sqn in Edmonton.
> 
> Some folks have been decrying the state of the CA. There is plenty to complain about, but lets look at what can be generated.
> 
> The CA could field an absolutely world-class Cavalry Regiment/Cavalry Battlegroup to attach to multi-national formation in high-intensity operations. Whether it had pure squadrons of tanks and recce or scrambled ones could be worked out, but the tools and people are there to perform that mission set.
> 
> The CA could field a very good infantry Battlegroup with infantry, tanks and engineers for high-intensity operations, but we really need ALAWS in addition to the existing dismounted TOW to be ready for prime-time. There is work being done on this. I might trade M777s for mortars for fire support.  If its down to PYs I might even trade Recce Platoon for Mortars.
> 
> The CA could field a mechanized brigade for high-intensity operations, but our towed artillery would be a major issue. Ground Based Air Defence is another gap, but there is also work being done on this. We do have some excellent enablers found in a variety of formations to include 6 CCSB to support a mechanized brigade as well.
> 
> What the CA can really do well is force generate outstanding battlegroups along with HQs and support for COIN/stability operations on a permanent, enduring basis. The army we have today was the result of rotational BG operations of this type from 1992 until 2011. At the risk of opening the TAPV can again, that program was borne out of the Kandahar experience. If we had a BG in a place like Mali it makes a certain amount of sense to have a bunch of TAPV. If the Taliban had operated masses of tanks and aircraft then we would probably have lots of anti-tank missiles and GBAD. Instead, they used IEDs and we developed, at great human cost, capabilities to counter that threat. We were fortunate to get the arguably best tank in service out that conflict. That conflict also saved our tube artillery from oblivion, but while we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is?
> 
> So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.


I'll agree that there are a bunch of good building blocks to work with and that a number of the capability gaps in terms of equipment are already been looked at, or in light of what's happening in Ukraine are likely to be addressed in the near future.

My take is that while the LAV may have shortcomings in comparison to tracked IFVs with integral AT weapons, we are not likely to see them being dropped any time soon as our primary vehicle.  Too much money in tight economic times and too many other major defence purchases already in the pipeline (NORAD upgrades, CSCs, F-35's, etc.).

Secondly, while I agree that we need to maintain a "heavy" capability for both military and political purposes, I think that realistically a direct military conflict between Russia and NATO in the near to medium term is low.  Russia is too busy in Ukraine and has been too weakened to contemplate directly taking on NATO in Poland/the Baltic States any time soon and NATO won't risk initiating a conflict with Russia both for lack of political will and for fear of nuclear retaliation/escalation by Russia if they fear they risk losing.  Any conflict/deterrence requirements will likely be along the peripheries where NATO's heavy forces are not already concentrated.  This could include along the Northern NATO flank (including the Arctic) where reduction in ice cover will make competition for valuable resources and trade routes much more viable.

Lastly, during periods of great power competition there is likely to be quite a few brushfire and proxy wars as each of the competing powers vies for greater influence and control of strategic terrain and resources around the world.  Our LAV-based forces are well equipped to provide support for our allies in these types of conflicts.

My proposal would be to maintain enough LAV-based mechanized forces to be able to maintain our eFP Latvia deterrence force, sustain a Battle Group sized deployment to foreign stability operations as they come up and be able to force generate (and sustain) a Mechanized Brigade Group for an allied Division in case of a major conflict (NATO's Multinational Division - North or an American/British/Commonwealth Division).  That force could look something like this:


Lord Strathconas Horse (Tank) - Edmonton
Reserve Armoured Regiment (Tank) - Western Canada
12e Regiment Blinde Canada (Cavalry) - Valcartier
Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Quebec
1 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
2 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Western Canada
1 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
2 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Quebec
1 RCHA (SPG Artillery) - Shilo
Reserve Artillery Regiment (SPG) - Western Canada
5e RALC (SHORAD) - Valcartier
Reserve Artillery Regiment (SHORAD) - Quebec
1 CER - Edmonton
5 CER - Valcartier
1 Service Battalion - Edmonton
5 Service Battalion - Valcartier

I'd also have a Light (Arctic/Air Mobile) Brigade both for defence of the Canadian Arctic and for use as a Rapid Reaction Force for deployment worldwide in times of Crisis.  This Brigade could be tasked to become the 3rd maneuver Brigade in the US Army's 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as part of an Allied defence of North America force or if required in a major conflict be used as the core to expand to a full Light Infantry Division with integration with Reserve units.  This force could look something like this:


Royal Canadian Dragoons (Cavalry) - Petawawa
1 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
2 RCR (Light Infantry) - Gagetown
3 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
2 RCHA (M777 Artillery) - Petawawa
2 CER - Petawawa
2 Service Battalion - Petawawa


Reserve Light Infantry Brigade (East)
3 R22eR (Light Infantry) - Quebec
Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Atlantic Canada
Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Quebec
Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Atlantic Canada
Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Atlantic Canada
Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Atlantic Canada/Quebec
Reserve Service Battalion - Atlantic Canada/Quebec


Reseve Infantry Battalion (Central)
3 PPCLI (Light Infantry) - Shilo
Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Ontario
Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Ontario
Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Ontario
Reserve Service Battalion - Ontario
Total Reserve Requirements (by Region) to fill out this force would be:

Atlantic Canada
1 x Light Infantry Battalion
1 x Cavalry Regiment
1 x Artillery Regiment
1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
1/2 x Service Battalion

Quebec
1 x Cavalry Regiment
1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
1 x Light Infantry Battalion
1 x SHORAD Battalion
1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
1/2 x Service Battalion

Ontario
2 x Light Infantry Battalions
1 x Cavalry Regiment
1 x Artillery Regiment
1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
1 x Service Battalion

Western Canada
1 x Tank Regiment
1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
1 x Artillery Regiment

Any remaining Reserve Regiments that are not required to fill out the above requirements would be used to augment 6 CSSB capabilities or to generate Divisional-level forces for the Light Division (SHORAD and MRAD, HIMARS, etc.).


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> This thread is indeed a wild ride as the train derails down multiple rabbit holes.
> 
> The three Reg F Armoured Regiments are not moving to Edmonton. The tanks being consolidated in Edmonton, though, is now wrapped up in F2025 discussions. The tank squadron in Gagetown is under the RCD but is comprised of soldiers from the RCD and 12 RBC. When the dust settles we may see that sqn in Edmonton.
> 
> Some folks have been decrying the state of the CA. There is plenty to complain about, but lets look at what can be generated.
> 
> The CA could field an absolutely world-class Cavalry Regiment/Cavalry Battlegroup to attach to multi-national formation in high-intensity operations. Whether it had pure squadrons of tanks and recce or scrambled ones could be worked out, but the tools and people are there to perform that mission set.
> 
> The CA could field a very good infantry Battlegroup with infantry, tanks and engineers for high-intensity operations, but we really need ALAWS in addition to the existing dismounted TOW to be ready for prime-time. There is work being done on this. I might trade M777s for mortars for fire support.  If its down to PYs I might even trade Recce Platoon for Mortars.
> 
> The CA could field a mechanized brigade for high-intensity operations, but our towed artillery would be a major issue. Ground Based Air Defence is another gap, but there is also work being done on this. We do have some excellent enablers found in a variety of formations to include 6 CCSB to support a mechanized brigade as well.
> 
> What the CA can really do well is force generate outstanding battlegroups along with HQs and support for COIN/stability operations on a permanent, enduring basis. The army we have today was the result of rotational BG operations of this type from 1992 until 2011. At the risk of opening the TAPV can again, that program was borne out of the Kandahar experience. If we had a BG in a place like Mali it makes a certain amount of sense to have a bunch of TAPV. If the Taliban had operated masses of tanks and aircraft then we would probably have lots of anti-tank missiles and GBAD. Instead, they used IEDs and we developed, at great human cost, capabilities to counter that threat. We were fortunate to get the arguably best tank in service out that conflict. That conflict also saved our tube artillery from oblivion, but while we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is?
> 
> So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.



In fairness/defence the latest rabbit hole came as a result of yet another "official" proclamation.  Something to do with "narrative".






						Force 2025 - Canada.ca
					

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> Action​
> *A F2025 Warning Order was issued in March 2022*, and the proposed final structure plan is being tested in war games before it is approved;
> In line with the current international context, *the CA is exploring the concept of a global response task force* that would provide forces offering a wide range of options to the federal government for emerging crises around the world and at home;;
> The CA is* improving coordination with Canadian Joint Operations Command and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command *to better align force generation with force employment and ensure proper force design;;
> *The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps will be modernized and centralized in a single formation based in Alberta*. Additional trials will be conducted to inform tasks, mission tasks and structures in order to reduce national procurement and increase its integration into a digitally networked CA;
> The CA is *Experimenting with Second and Third Line logistics through the reorganization of Combat Service Support between 2 Service Battalion and 4th Canadian Division Support Group in support of Ex MAPLE RESOVE*. What we learn will be adjusted and applied.



So if the Army wants to prevent speculation it may want to try and resolve its own issues expeditiously and communicate them forthrightly.


As to the wild ride... 



TangoTwoBravo said:


> This thread is indeed a wild ride as the train derails down multiple rabbit holes.
> 
> The three Reg F Armoured Regiments are not moving to Edmonton.* The tanks being consolidated in Edmonton, though, is now wrapped up in F2025 discussions.* The tank squadron in Gagetown is under the RCD but is comprised of soldiers from the RCD and 12 RBC. *When the dust settles we may see that sqn in Edmonton.*
> 
> Some folks have been decrying the state of the CA. There is plenty to complain about, but lets look at what can be generated.
> 
> The CA could field an absolutely world-class Cavalry Regiment/Cavalry Battlegroup to attach to multi-national formation in high-intensity operations. *Whether it had pure squadrons of tanks and recce or scrambled ones could be worked out,* but the tools and people are there to perform that mission set.
> 
> *The CA could field a very good infantry Battlegroup* with infantry, tanks and engineers for high-intensity operations, *but we really need ALAWS in addition to the existing dismounted TOW to be ready for prime-time*. There is work being done on this. I *might trade M777s for mortars* for fire support.  If its down to PYs I* might even trade Recce Platoon for Mortars*.
> 
> The CA* could field a mechanized brigade* for high-intensity operations, but our* towed artillery would be a major issue*. *Ground Based Air Defence is another gap, but there is also work being done on this*. We do have some excellent enablers found in a variety of formations to include 6 CCSB to support a mechanized brigade as well.
> 
> What the CA can really do well is force generate outstanding battlegroups along with HQs and support for COIN/stability operations on a permanent, enduring basis. The army we have today was the result of rotational BG operations of this type from 1992 until 2011. At the risk of opening the TAPV can again, that program was borne out of the Kandahar experience. If we had a BG in a place like Mali it makes a certain amount of sense to have a bunch of TAPV. If the Taliban had operated masses of tanks and aircraft then we would probably have lots of anti-tank missiles and GBAD. Instead, they used IEDs and we developed, at great human cost, capabilities to counter that threat. We were fortunate to get the arguably best tank in service out that conflict. That conflict also saved our tube artillery from oblivion, but while *we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is? *
> 
> So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.



I highlighted all the points of consideration and debate that are up for resolution.  I think there is both ample opportunity, and need, for speculation.  Pondering the imponderables and considering all the questions that are presented by stakeholders in the outcome leads to consideration of ancillary issues like the availability of French language schools for the kids and jobs for the spouses.

I agree that this discussion, and the Ukrainian ones, and all the other force design and reserve design ones, wander all over the map.  But that is a feature, not a bug.  It is a demonstration of how inter-connected all the issues under consideration are.  It is not possible to consider elements in isolation.  In fact the only reason for looking at any particular element is to consider how it might be employed and the effects on own forces, atts, dets and the enemy.

So yes, a wild ride, and I would not expect the wild ride to ever really end... even after battlefield decisions enter into the discussion.

I really like this line - 



> *we got something that was outstanding for that type of conflict it is not necessarily what would be needed for mobile mechanized operations against a conventional enemy. Or maybe it is? *



Ukraine has rotated my kaleidoscope and applied new filters for the time being.  As a result that "maybe it is" resonates with me.  The first question the Ukrainians have had to ask themselves is "how effective can we be with what we have?"  Or putting it another way "what tactics and stratagems work for us?"  They are not working to a standardized doctrine that accommodates the expectations of allies.  They are developing doctrine that meets the current needs of their situation.

Upthread, or on another thread, there was discussion about an article that suggested that rather than NATO pushing for standardized brigades and divisions that it permit each nation to first of all focus on getting its own defence in order using the doctrines, strategies and tactics that work best for them.  Let the Swedes and the Finns continue to be Swedes and Finns and encourage others to be more like them.  The more the locals can look after themselves the less the likelihood that III Corps will have to move or ICBMs will have to be discussed.

We in Canada still have a lot of wild rides ahead of us as all of this has yet to be discussed let alone resolved.


----------



## MilEME09

My understanding about the centralization in AB, is it is the tanks that are centralizing not the entire corp. The other units are becoming Cavalry formations, which directly leads into why the CF is watching the new American light tank program, we know we do not have enough tanks.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> I'll agree that there are a bunch of good building blocks to work with and that a number of the capability gaps in terms of equipment are already been looked at, or in light of what's happening in Ukraine are likely to be addressed in the near future.
> 
> My take is that while the LAV may have shortcomings in comparison to tracked IFVs with integral AT weapons, we are not likely to see them being dropped any time soon as our primary vehicle.  Too much money in tight economic times and too many other major defence purchases already in the pipeline (NORAD upgrades, CSCs, F-35's, etc.).
> 
> Secondly, while I agree that we need to maintain a "heavy" capability for both military and political purposes, I think that realistically a direct military conflict between Russia and NATO in the near to medium term is low.  Russia is too busy in Ukraine and has been too weakened to contemplate directly taking on NATO in Poland/the Baltic States any time soon and NATO won't risk initiating a conflict with Russia both for lack of political will and for fear of nuclear retaliation/escalation by Russia if they fear they risk losing.  Any conflict/deterrence requirements will likely be along the peripheries where NATO's heavy forces are not already concentrated.  This could include along the Northern NATO flank (including the Arctic) where reduction in ice cover will make competition for valuable resources and trade routes much more viable.
> 
> Lastly, during periods of great power competition there is likely to be quite a few brushfire and proxy wars as each of the competing powers vies for greater influence and control of strategic terrain and resources around the world.  Our LAV-based forces are well equipped to provide support for our allies in these types of conflicts.
> 
> My proposal would be to maintain enough LAV-based mechanized forces to be able to maintain our eFP Latvia deterrence force, sustain a Battle Group sized deployment to foreign stability operations as they come up and be able to force generate (and sustain) a Mechanized Brigade Group for an allied Division in case of a major conflict (NATO's Multinational Division - North or an American/British/Commonwealth Division).  That force could look something like this:
> 
> 
> Lord Strathconas Horse (Tank) - Edmonton
> Reserve Armoured Regiment (Tank) - Western Canada
> 12e Regiment Blinde Canada (Cavalry) - Valcartier
> Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Quebec
> 1 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
> 2 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Western Canada
> 1 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
> 2 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Quebec
> 1 RCHA (SPG Artillery) - Shilo
> Reserve Artillery Regiment (SPG) - Western Canada
> 5e RALC (SHORAD) - Valcartier
> Reserve Artillery Regiment (SHORAD) - Quebec
> 1 CER - Edmonton
> 5 CER - Valcartier
> 1 Service Battalion - Edmonton
> 5 Service Battalion - Valcartier
> 
> I'd also have a Light (Arctic/Air Mobile) Brigade both for defence of the Canadian Arctic and for use as a Rapid Reaction Force for deployment worldwide in times of Crisis.  This Brigade could be tasked to become the 3rd maneuver Brigade in the US Army's 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as part of an Allied defence of North America force or if required in a major conflict be used as the core to expand to a full Light Infantry Division with integration with Reserve units.  This force could look something like this:
> 
> 
> Royal Canadian Dragoons (Cavalry) - Petawawa
> 1 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
> 2 RCR (Light Infantry) - Gagetown
> 3 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
> 2 RCHA (M777 Artillery) - Petawawa
> 2 CER - Petawawa
> 2 Service Battalion - Petawawa
> 
> 
> Reserve Light Infantry Brigade (East)
> 3 R22eR (Light Infantry) - Quebec
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Atlantic Canada
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Quebec
> Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Atlantic Canada
> Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Atlantic Canada
> Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Atlantic Canada/Quebec
> Reserve Service Battalion - Atlantic Canada/Quebec
> 
> 
> Reseve Infantry Battalion (Central)
> 3 PPCLI (Light Infantry) - Shilo
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
> Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Ontario
> Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Ontario
> Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Ontario
> Reserve Service Battalion - Ontario
> Total Reserve Requirements (by Region) to fill out this force would be:
> 
> Atlantic Canada
> 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
> 1 x Cavalry Regiment
> 1 x Artillery Regiment
> 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1/2 x Service Battalion
> 
> Quebec
> 1 x Cavalry Regiment
> 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
> 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
> 1 x SHORAD Battalion
> 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1/2 x Service Battalion
> 
> Ontario
> 2 x Light Infantry Battalions
> 1 x Cavalry Regiment
> 1 x Artillery Regiment
> 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1 x Service Battalion
> 
> Western Canada
> 1 x Tank Regiment
> 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
> 1 x Artillery Regiment
> 
> Any remaining Reserve Regiments that are not required to fill out the above requirements would be used to augment 6 CSSB capabilities or to generate Divisional-level forces for the Light Division (SHORAD and MRAD, HIMARS, etc.).




I'm going to take the opportunity ....

3x SSFs
1x Pansar Brigade
1x CCSB

Looking at the Abn Infantry Brigade of the 11th Abn Div  I realized that it looked a lot like the old Special Service Force before it became 2 CMBG.

So -

HQ & Sigs Sqn
Svc Bn
Eng Sqn/Regt
Arty Regt (Fd & AD)
Recce/RSTA Unit  (Previously the RCD - proposed 2nd Bn RCR)
Lt (Abn) Unit based on permanent combat teams with their own, internal, man-portable, heavy weapons (Previously the CAR - proposed 3rd Bn RCR)
LAV Unit (Previously and proposed 1st Bn RCR)

Two more similar brigades based on the PPCLI and the Vandoos and the existing Brigade Groups.
Minimal disruption.

The Pansar Brigade

RCD/LdSH(RC)/12eRBC

Each Pansar Battalion is based on a large Canadian Squadron (22 Swedish tanks vs 19-20 Canadians) operating in two Half-Squadrons and accompanied by 40 to 48 IFVs (12 IFVs per company, 4 IFVs for a recce platoon, 4 AD variants for. an AD platoon and 8 mortar variants for two mortar platoons).

We have the kit to produce three such units and still leave kit, and bodies, for enablers.

CCSB to continue as planned minus the armoured and infantry elements

The key element is to focus on the kit we have and not on the bodies we would like.

Oh ... and the Army needs to stand up its own DIV HQ separate from CJOC.


----------



## Kirkhill

And why do I keep forgetting to add 1 Wing to the Army's ORBAT -  the light battalions don't work without integrated rotary wing lift.


----------



## Kirkhill

An alternative would be the Pansar Brigade based on 1 CMBG with 2 SSF Brigades where the RSTA units are based on Cavalry Squadrons.


----------



## Kirkhill

MilEME09 said:


> My understanding about the centralization in AB, is it is the tanks that are centralizing not the entire corp. The other units are becoming Cavalry formations, which directly leads into why the CF is watching the new American light tank program, we know we do not have enough tanks.



I think we do have enough tanks.  Could we use more tanks?  Sure.  Maybe.  Could we use lighter tanks?  Sure.  Maybe.  Could we use tracked IFVs?  Sure.  Maybe.

But what can we do with what we have first?


----------



## Kirkhill

On the arty front

SSF Regiments  2x M777s, 1x HIMARS, 1x AD
Pansar Regiment 2x SPH, 2x LRPF, 1x AD
IRSTA and FSCC to suit.


----------



## Skysix

GR66 said:


> I'll agree that there are a bunch of good building blocks to work with and that a number of the capability gaps in terms of equipment are already been looked at, or in light of what's happening in Ukraine are likely to be addressed in the near future.
> 
> My take is that while the LAV may have shortcomings in comparison to tracked IFVs with integral AT weapons, we are not likely to see them being dropped any time soon as our primary vehicle.  Too much money in tight economic times and too many other major defence purchases already in the pipeline (NORAD upgrades, CSCs, F-35's, etc.).
> 
> Secondly, while I agree that we need to maintain a "heavy" capability for both military and political purposes, I think that realistically a direct military conflict between Russia and NATO in the near to medium term is low.  Russia is too busy in Ukraine and has been too weakened to contemplate directly taking on NATO in Poland/the Baltic States any time soon and NATO won't risk initiating a conflict with Russia both for lack of political will and for fear of nuclear retaliation/escalation by Russia if they fear they risk losing.  Any conflict/deterrence requirements will likely be along the peripheries where NATO's heavy forces are not already concentrated.  This could include along the Northern NATO flank (including the Arctic) where reduction in ice cover will make competition for valuable resources and trade routes much more viable.
> 
> Lastly, during periods of great power competition there is likely to be quite a few brushfire and proxy wars as each of the competing powers vies for greater influence and control of strategic terrain and resources around the world.  Our LAV-based forces are well equipped to provide support for our allies in these types of conflicts.
> 
> My proposal would be to maintain enough LAV-based mechanized forces to be able to maintain our eFP Latvia deterrence force, sustain a Battle Group sized deployment to foreign stability operations as they come up and be able to force generate (and sustain) a Mechanized Brigade Group for an allied Division in case of a major conflict (NATO's Multinational Division - North or an American/British/Commonwealth Division).  That force could look something like this:
> 
> 
> Lord Strathconas Horse (Tank) - Edmonton
> Reserve Armoured Regiment (Tank) - Western Canada
> 12e Regiment Blinde Canada (Cavalry) - Valcartier
> Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Quebec
> 1 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
> 2 PPCLI (LAV Infantry) - Edmonton
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Western Canada
> 1 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
> 2 R22eR (LAV Infantry) - Valcartier
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (LAV Infantry) - Quebec
> 1 RCHA (SPG Artillery) - Shilo
> Reserve Artillery Regiment (SPG) - Western Canada
> 5e RALC (SHORAD) - Valcartier
> Reserve Artillery Regiment (SHORAD) - Quebec
> 1 CER - Edmonton
> 5 CER - Valcartier
> 1 Service Battalion - Edmonton
> 5 Service Battalion - Valcartier
> 
> I'd also have a Light (Arctic/Air Mobile) Brigade both for defence of the Canadian Arctic and for use as a Rapid Reaction Force for deployment worldwide in times of Crisis.  This Brigade could be tasked to become the 3rd maneuver Brigade in the US Army's 11th Airborne Division in Alaska as part of an Allied defence of North America force or if required in a major conflict be used as the core to expand to a full Light Infantry Division with integration with Reserve units.  This force could look something like this:
> 
> 
> Royal Canadian Dragoons (Cavalry) - Petawawa
> 1 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
> 2 RCR (Light Infantry) - Gagetown
> 3 RCR (Light Infantry) - Petawawa
> 2 RCHA (M777 Artillery) - Petawawa
> 2 CER - Petawawa
> 2 Service Battalion - Petawawa
> 
> 
> Reserve Light Infantry Brigade (East)
> 3 R22eR (Light Infantry) - Quebec
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Atlantic Canada
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Quebec
> Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Atlantic Canada
> Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Atlantic Canada
> Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Atlantic Canada/Quebec
> Reserve Service Battalion - Atlantic Canada/Quebec
> 
> 
> Reseve Infantry Battalion (Central)
> 3 PPCLI (Light Infantry) - Shilo
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
> Reserve Infantry Battalion (Light Infantry) - Ontario
> Reserve Armoured Regiment (Cavalry) - Ontario
> Reserve Artillery Regiment (Towed/Light Wheeled Howitzer) - Ontario
> Reserve Combat Engineer Regiment - Ontario
> Reserve Service Battalion - Ontario
> Total Reserve Requirements (by Region) to fill out this force would be:
> 
> Atlantic Canada
> 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
> 1 x Cavalry Regiment
> 1 x Artillery Regiment
> 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1/2 x Service Battalion
> 
> Quebec
> 1 x Cavalry Regiment
> 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
> 1 x Light Infantry Battalion
> 1 x SHORAD Battalion
> 1/2 x Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1/2 x Service Battalion
> 
> Ontario
> 2 x Light Infantry Battalions
> 1 x Cavalry Regiment
> 1 x Artillery Regiment
> 1 x Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1 x Service Battalion
> 
> Western Canada
> 1 x Tank Regiment
> 1 x LAV Infantry Battalion
> 1 x Artillery Regiment
> 
> Any remaining Reserve Regiments that are not required to fill out the above requirements would be used to augment 6 CSSB capabilities or to generate Divisional-level forces for the Light Division (SHORAD and MRAD, HIMARS, etc.).


Glad to see we won't be taking any casualties so won't need CSH/Medevac/medical units  beyond the medics integral to the units. Or logistics to supply all the shooters and guns.


----------



## GR66

Skysix said:


> Glad to see we won't be taking any casualties so won't need CSH/Medevac/medical units  beyond the medics integral to the units. Or logistics to supply all the shooters and guns.


Medical services fall under the Canadian Forces Health Services Group and are responsible for the Field Ambulance units which support the Brigades.  They are not integral to the Brigade Groups.  Also each Reg Force Brigade is supported by a Reg Force Service Battalion (actually in my structure the Heavy Brigade Group has two Service Battalions for support - 1st and 5th) and each Reserve Brigade has a Reserve Service Battalion so not sure what your point is.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Medical services fall under the Canadian Forces Health Services Group and are responsible for the Field Ambulance units which support the Brigades.  They are not integral to the Brigade Groups.  Also each Reg Force Brigade is supported by a Reg Force Service Battalion (actually in my structure the Heavy Brigade Group has two Service Battalions for support - 1st and 5th) and each Reserve Brigade has a Reserve Service Battalion so not sure what your point is.



Perhaps the point is there is not enough of them and they are NOT integral?  Garrison and Field Medics - are they the same thing?  

Keeping the force healthy in garrison is one job.  Patching it up in the field is another.  
Similar situation for Maintenance and Supply. 
At least in my opinion.


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> Perhaps the point is there is not enough of them and they are NOT integral?  Garrison and Field Medics - are they the same thing?
> 
> Keeping the force healthy in garrison is one job.  Patching it up in the field is another.
> Similar situation for Maintenance and Supply.
> At least in my opinion.


Issue with supply and maintenance is the line between institutional support and field support has become blured. We are also having field units robbing the institutional support constantly in order to support even reg force exercises. Reserve augmentation is limited because in the words of one warrant I talked to "we don't trust you", not because we are reservists but because the system is broken and we lack actual experience to be independent and have that knowledge. 

Force 2025 unfortunately doesn't address this but it hopefully stops robbing Peter to pay Paul in the long term.


----------



## Ostrozac

MilEME09 said:


> Issue with supply and maintenance is the line between institutional support and field support has become blured. We are also having field units robbing the institutional support constantly in order to support even reg force exercises. Reserve augmentation is limited because in the words of one warrant I talked to "we don't trust you", not because we are reservists but because the system is broken and we lack actual experience to be independent and have that knowledge.
> 
> Force 2025 unfortunately doesn't address this but it hopefully stops robbing Peter to pay Paul in the long term.


All of the support functions are the most important bit. It really doesn’t matter what the mix of manoeuvre units are if the medical, signals, intelligence and EME communities are all deeply, deeply broken in the regular force and lack a credible reserve component to lean on for augmentation.

If Force 2025 is to be a success — it will have to fix the support end. At least some of it.


----------



## MilEME09

Ostrozac said:


> All of the support functions are the most important bit. It really doesn’t matter what the mix of manoeuvre units are if the medical, signals, intelligence and EME communities are all deeply, deeply broken in the regular force and lack a credible reserve component to lean on for augmentation.
> 
> If Force 2025 is to be a success — it will have to fix the support end. At least some of it.


Part of it is just simple communication, we have gotten requests before with 1 week notice of requests for augmentation for multi week exercises. No reservist can take weeks off on a week notice, and if they do, I bet they won't have a job to come back to.


----------



## Kirkhill

Skysix said:


> Glad to see we won't be taking any casualties so won't need CSH/Medevac/medical units  beyond the medics integral to the units. Or logistics to supply all the shooters and guns.



We seem to know how - if only the government would focus.






						Exercise STRIKING BAT 21 hit it out of the park - News Article  - Royal Canadian Air Force - Canada.ca
					

Exercise STRIKING BAT 21 recently concluded at United States Marine Corps (USMC) Air Ground Combat Centre Twentynine Palms, California. “These exercises are crucial to ensure we maintain the skills of our world-class aircrews and ground staff,” said LCol Richard Harris, Exercise Director and...




					www.canada.ca


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> So now we pivot again, faced with tough decisions about what to retain, what to acquire and what to divest to attain that acquisition of new capabilities.


I agreed fully with everything you said. I wish, though, that those three highlighted words weren't part of the reality of how the Army does things. IMHO, all the gear we have at present is useful and necessary (even the much maligned TAPV a vehicle I really have no issue with and which I believe could be put to better use than we do and the M777 which definitely has uses).

We basically have half the Army unequipped as part of a deliberate policy. We need to change that policy. Our policy should be that as a first priority we acquire the equipment needed to provide the capabilities we are missing: ATGMs (some under armour), better artillery, AD, a more robust maintenance system, you name it, without replacing anything. As a second priority we replace older equipment before it is clapped out so that rather than being divested, it can continue to provide service at a reduced usage rate (such as with the reserves or as war stocks). As a third priority should be the purchasing of new equipment capabilities which only have a reserve role function to support a mobilized force.

The overarching policy should be to create an equipment holding that allows for the expansion of the Army beyond its current 3 + 1 brigade limit to its full authorized manpower potential. That obviously requires a new approach to equipment maintenance and usage including a reallocation of funds and people to keeping it serviceable.

Quite frankly, while I love playing with napkin forces to see what can be done within the current manpower allotments for the Army, I really have no idea of what direction the current Army should go (a failing which government and the military seem to share with me). One could reduce the size of the RegF Army dramatically so that the combined RegF and ResF that's left over would fit the current equipment holdings, or one could keep the current manpower footprint and expand the equipment holdings, or do something in between. All of that depends on what the objective for Canada's Army actually is both for day-to-day tasks during peacetime and in the case of an eventual conflict.

I know that for at least 25 years, divestment for replacement has been the economical and necessary solution. In many cases it formed the justification for new equipment purchases (eg MGS to replace tanks). In other cases it had no sense of reality at all (divesting M109s without replacement on the theory we just didn't need anything and they were costly to maintain). IMHO that's a fundamental flaw in thinking which is woven, in part, into our long term belief that the reserves are good for nothing but augmentation after a lengthy predeployment training period (you could probably recruit and train people off the street in that length of time). It protects a broken status quo while failing to look for more practical and more effective solutions.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I agreed fully with everything you said. I wish, though, that those three highlighted words weren't part of the reality of how the Army does things. IMHO, all the gear we have at present is useful and necessary (even the much maligned TAPV a vehicle I really have no issue with and which I believe could be put to better use than we do and the M777 which definitely has uses).
> 
> We basically have half the Army unequipped as part of a deliberate policy. We need to change that policy. Our policy should be that as a first priority we acquire the equipment needed to provide the capabilities we are missing: ATGMs (some under armour), better artillery, AD, a more robust maintenance system, you name it, without replacing anything. As a second priority we replace older equipment before it is clapped out so that rather than being divested, it can continue to provide service at a reduced usage rate (such as with the reserves or as war stocks). As a third priority should be the purchasing of new equipment capabilities which only have a reserve role function to support a mobilized force.
> 
> The overarching policy should be to create an equipment holding that allows for the expansion of the Army beyond its current 3 + 1 brigade limit to its full authorized manpower potential. That obviously requires a new approach to equipment maintenance and usage including a reallocation of funds and people to keeping it serviceable.
> 
> Quite frankly, while I love playing with napkin forces to see what can be done within the current manpower allotments for the Army, I really have no idea of what direction the current Army should go (a failing which government and the military seem to share with me). One could reduce the size of the RegF Army dramatically so that the combined RegF and ResF that's left over would fit the current equipment holdings, or one could keep the current manpower footprint and expand the equipment holdings, or do something in between. All of that depends on what the objective for Canada's Army actually is both for day-to-day tasks during peacetime and in the case of an eventual conflict.
> 
> I know that for at least 25 years, divestment for replacement has been the economical and necessary solution. In many cases it formed the justification for new equipment purchases (eg MGS to replace tanks). In other cases it had no sense of reality at all (divesting M109s without replacement on the theory we just didn't need anything and they were costly to maintain). IMHO that's a fundamental flaw in thinking which is woven, in part, into our long term belief that the reserves are good for nothing but augmentation after a lengthy predeployment training period (you could probably recruit and train people off the street in that length of time). It protects a broken status quo while failing to look for more practical and more effective solutions.
> 
> 🍻



Based on observations of the current situation this takes on some interesting overtones



> Our policy should be that as a first priority we acquire the equipment needed to provide the capabilities we are missing: ATGMs (some under armour), better artillery, AD, a more robust maintenance system, you name it, without replacing anything.



According to our allies we are short some 5 to 10 BCAD annually in dues.  A problem shared by a number of them granted.

One thing that the current kerfuffle is demonstrating is the value of goods in storage.  Any goods.  If Canada is not comfortable offering blood then it must offer treasure or else quit its alliance.

The solution then becomes stocking the larder with 5 to 10 BCAD of hardware and consumables annually and then rotating the stock regularly.  Part of that rotation programme can be selling it / donating it as foreign aid to allies on an ongoing basis.  Become a sugar daddy.

Incidentally, whatever small number of troops Canada has on strength would have a modern arsenal and the Just In Case Militia would have something to draw on.


----------



## McG

The problem with all CAF sustainment is that we made it lean & efficient for peacetime and to support static operations wherein the strategic lines of communication delivered everything to a MOB that the fighting unit’s integral echelon could reach right into. To compound the problem, we started civilianizing tactical level positions that held deployable “support operators” (while simultaneously bloating a few civilian institutional functions with military personnel.

A lean force is fragile; a highly efficient force is brittle. Even before COVID & a war in Europe, our country uniformed sustainment personnel were operating at a peak tempo. There is not enough to sustain a war fighting force and all the domestic institutional demand.


----------



## Underway

MilEME09 said:


> The other units are becoming Cavalry formations, which directly leads into why the CF is watching the new American light tank program, we know we do not have enough tanks.


Really?  Instead of light tanks perhaps we should just get more MBTs.  Adding another vehicle line for something as specialized as light tanks just makes me cringe.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Ostrozac said:


> All of the support functions are the most important bit. It really doesn’t matter what the mix of manoeuvre units are if the medical, signals, intelligence and EME communities are all deeply, deeply broken in the regular force and lack a credible reserve component to lean on for augmentation.
> 
> If Force 2025 is to be a success — it will have to fix the support end. At least some of it.


“Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.”
– Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC (Commandant, US Marine Corps) (1980)


----------



## quadrapiper

Underway said:


> Really?  Instead of light tanks perhaps we should just get more MBTs.  Adding another vehicle line for something as specialized as light tanks just makes me cringe.


How much of an improvement does a light "pure" tank offer in comparison to the punchier sorts of IFV? Is it akin to a battlecruiser; all the punch of the heavier sibling, but with other aspects significantly downgraded; or is it more balanced in its capability-drop?

Wondering whether, if you're looking at a need for something to go where a MBT cannot go/be sustained/etc., if you'd be just as well served by buying additional units of a class of vehicles with broader utility (one of the turreted IFVs, e.g.) and just not filing the back with infantry.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> Based on observations of the current situation this takes on some interesting overtones
> 
> 
> 
> According to our allies we are short some 5 to 10 BCAD annually in dues.  A problem shared by a number of them granted.
> 
> One thing that the current kerfuffle is demonstrating is the value of goods in storage.  Any goods.  If Canada is not comfortable offering blood then it must offer treasure or else quit its alliance.
> 
> The solution then becomes stocking the larder with 5 to 10 BCAD of hardware and consumables annually and then rotating the stock regularly.  Part of that rotation programme can be selling it / donating it as foreign aid to allies on an ongoing basis.  Become a sugar daddy.
> 
> Incidentally, whatever small number of troops Canada has on strength would have a modern arsenal and the Just In Case Militia would have something to draw on.


The 2% pledge is just that - a pledge. 

Canada absolutely meets direct funding obligations for NATO programs. Canada contributes roughly 6% of the NATO direct funding budget - that amount is based on Gross National Income (we are allocated a share to pay based on GNI - adjustments are made). The US contributes 16% of the overall budget while Denmark contributes 1%. 

NATO membership is also voluntary. The benefits accrued can vary and are likely unequal. European members are quite happy to have their trans-Atlantic allies contribute to their collective security. Our contributions of forces to NATO certainly increase European collective security - NATO gains nothing by losing Canada.  

Don't get me wrong - happy to get more funding. Happy to have the full suite of brigade combat, command support, combat support and combat service support. Larger war stocks are great, but I am not sure we need stockpiles of equipment that need to be maintained beyond our means.


----------



## KevinB

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The 2% pledge is just that - a pledge.
> 
> Canada absolutely meets direct funding obligations for NATO programs. Canada contributes roughly 6% of the NATO direct funding budget - that amount is based on Gross National Income (we are allocated a share to pay based on GNI - adjustments are made). The US contributes 16% of the overall budget while Denmark contributes 1%.
> 
> NATO membership is also voluntary. The benefits accrued can vary and are likely unequal. European members are quite happy to have their trans-Atlantic allies contribute to their collective security. Our contributions of forces to NATO certainly increase European collective security - NATO gains nothing by losing Canada.
> 
> Don't get me wrong - happy to get more funding. Happy to have the full suite of brigade combat, command support, combat support and combat service support. Larger war stocks are great, but I am not sure we need stockpiles of equipment that need to be maintained beyond our means.


Canada has the means though. 
   Just not the will.


----------



## Skysix

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The 2% pledge is just that - a pledge.
> 
> Canada absolutely meets direct funding obligations for NATO programs. Canada contributes roughly 6% of the NATO direct funding budget - that amount is based on Gross National Income (we are allocated a share to pay based on GNI - adjustments are made). The US contributes 16% of the overall budget while Denmark contributes 1%.
> 
> NATO membership is also voluntary. The benefits accrued can vary and are likely unequal. European members are quite happy to have their trans-Atlantic allies contribute to their collective security. Our contributions of forces to NATO certainly increase European collective security - NATO gains nothing by losing Canada.
> 
> Don't get me wrong - happy to get more funding. Happy to have the full suite of brigade combat, command support, combat support and combat service support. Larger war stocks are great, but I am not sure we need stockpiles of equipment that need to be maintained beyond our means.


Ummmm. Prove me wrong, but there is also a 2% GDP "pledge" of actual funding of the Canadian Forces. The 6% you refer to, and seem far more informed on than most, is general funding of NATO as an organisation. Totally different concept and comittment.


----------



## FJAG

Skysix said:


> Ummmm. Prove me wrong, but there is also a 2% GDP "pledge" of actual funding of the Canadian Forces. The 6% you refer to, and seem far more informed on than most, is general funding of NATO as an organisation. Totally different concept and comittment.


The wording of the 2014 Wales Declaration re GDP is as follows:



> 4.We will therefore strengthen the military capabilities the Alliance needs. After two decades of intensive operations, Allies now have the most experienced, capable and interoperable forces in NATO's history. We will continue to invest in modern and deployable armed forces that can operate effectively together and at a high level of readiness to fulfil NATO's tasks, in full accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.





> 5. We recognise that these steps will take the necessary effort and funding. In light of this, we agree to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows; we will direct our defence budgets as efficiently and effectively as possible; we will aim to move towards the existing NATO guideline of spending 2% of GDP on defence within a decade, with a view to fulfilling NATO capability priorities. We will display the political will to provide required capabilities and deploy forces when they are needed.



Note that "defence budget" does not mean spending on just the CAF. It's considerably broader including many other defence related matters.

You should also note that allies committed themselves to spend 20% of their defence budgets on equipment.

Note that these goals are to be met within a decade which technically means prior to 2024 there is no actual guideline.

🍻


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Skysix said:


> Ummmm. Prove me wrong, but there is also a 2% GDP "pledge" of actual funding of the Canadian Forces. The 6% you refer to, and seem far more informed on than most, is general funding of NATO as an organisation. Totally different concept and comittment.


That’s what my post said. I even said pledge.

A previous poster said we were not paying our dues. We do indeed pay our dues - our agreed upon share of NATO direct funding.


----------



## Gorgo

Given the recent moves by the government to honour No. 2 Construction Battalion CEF with it being linked in perpetuation to 4 Engineer Support Regiment, wouldn't it be a smart idea to have a somewhat like-named unit formed under 5th Division/6 Canadian Combat Support Brigade as a reserve-only mirror to 4 ESR recruiting from the area.  Say call it 2 Engineer Support Regiment?

Or have it be a direct element of the Canadian Joint Support Group as a reserve-only element of 1 Engineer Support Unit in Kingston?  Call this one 2 Engineer Support Unit and have it be a joint Army/Air Force formation which could augment 14 CES and 4 ESR?

Just my 2 🪙


----------



## KevinB

TangoTwoBravo said:


> That’s what my post said. I even said pledge.
> 
> A previous poster said we were not paying our dues. We do indeed pay our dues - our agreed upon share of NATO direct funding.


Semantics…

 Besides not honoring a pledge isn’t exactly better than not paying dues.


----------



## McG

Gorgo said:


> Given the recent moves by the government to honour No. 2 Construction Battalion CEF with it being linked in perpetuation to 4 Engineer Support Regiment, wouldn't it be a smart idea to have a somewhat like-named unit formed under 5th Division/6 Canadian Combat Support Brigade as a reserve-only mirror to 4 ESR recruiting from the area.  Say call it 2 Engineer Support Regiment?
> 
> Or have it be a direct element of the Canadian Joint Support Group as a reserve-only element of 1 Engineer Support Unit in Kingston?  Call this one 2 Engineer Support Unit and have it be a joint Army/Air Force formation which could augment 14 CES and 4 ESR?
> 
> Just my 2 🪙


The start point to initiate any consideration of creating any new unit, formation, or command should always be a military requirement and not nostalgia or a heritage moment.


----------



## Kirkhill

Once upon a time it would have been said we welched on our word and scotched the deal.


----------



## Underway

McG said:


> The start point to initiate any consideration of creating any new unit, formation, or command should always be a military requirement and not nostalgia or a heritage moment.


Instead of using nostalgia or heritage to keep existing units going well past their usefulness for military requirements.  That's SOP.


----------



## Kirkhill

Re: the Budget/2% debate.  I offer Stoltenberg.

I agree with every word.


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/w1i3p8


----------



## Infanteer

McG said:


> The start point to initiate any consideration of creating any new unit, formation, or command should always be a military requirement and not nostalgia or a heritage moment.


The Halifax Rifles have entered the chat.


----------



## Skysix

TangoTwoBravo said:


> That’s what my post said. I even said pledge.
> 
> A previous poster said we were not paying our dues. We do indeed pay our dues - our agreed upon share of NATO direct funding.


I  still unclear on how paying 6% of NATO's operating budget relates to the 'pledge' to spend 2% of GDP on our OWN defense (of which 20% should be hardware etc)

I don't think the intent, or understanding by other NATO members, was that the 80% of our 2% 'pledge' could be given to NATO for its administration and operation and simultaneously serve double duty as part of our own internal defense expenditures.

So not sure what that 6%  figure really is 6% of, or why it matters in the context of what Canada spends on our OWN defense hardware research and acquisition / operations and maintenance / wages and benefits etc. when we are nowhere near the 2% of GDP target of defense related spending. Feels like smoke and mirrors.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Infanteer said:


> The Halifax Rifles have entered the chat.


There are so many Reserve Regiments, Battalions, Companies, Platoons, Sections that need to be consolidated and reorganized for operational and administrative reasons. 

They're dancing the last waltz really, but somehow no one wants to be the person to pull the trigger.


----------



## daftandbarmy

rmc_wannabe said:


> There are so many Reserve Regiments, Battalions, Companies, Platoons, Sections that need to be consolidated and reorganized for operational and administrative reasons.
> 
> They're dancing the last waltz really, but somehow no one wants to be the person to pull the trigger.



And, over the past couple of decades the Reserves have added dozens of LCol/Col/GOFO positions to the roster, largely trading on the reputation built by noteworthy contributions made to operations in FRY & AG by (mainly) thousands of NCMs.

As a result any type of consolidation/ rationalization will become even more difficult, if not impossible, to manage.


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> Instead of using nostalgia or heritage to keep existing units going well past their usefulness for military requirements.  That's SOP.


Funny point that. While I don't for a minute consider my Napkin Army to be an official military requirement, in virtually every one that I have created in order to firm up logical roles for the reserves to properly round out the Canadian Army, I have consolidated 36 and 37 Combat Engineer Regiments in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick into a single Engineer Support Regiment for the following reasons:

1) Each of the three RegF brigade groups already have a CER and the ResF CERs near them make the logical choice for their support and training;

2) The sole RegF Army engineers unit in the Maritimes is 4 ESR yet 36 and 37 are CERs. It would make much more sense to have ResF ESR elements in the Maritimes to support and train with their RegF counterparts in 4 ESR. 

3) ESRs are useful elements in general and providing 4 ESR with more depth by way of the ResF would be useful.

I'll admit that I called my Napkin Forse Maritime ResF ESR 3 ESR primarily because the number is vacant (1, 2 and 5 CERs and 4 ESR) but there really is no reason why there couldn't be a 2 CER and a 2 ESR. But that's beside the point, the real issue being as to whether a ResF ESR is a good idea from the military requirements point of view. Personally, the answer is Yup and the CAF would probably think so too if it ever put some serious thought into improving the ResF.

Over to you @TangoTwoBravo.

🍻


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> in virtually every one that I have created in order to firm up logical roles for the reserves to properly round out the Canadian Army, I have consolidated 36 and 37 Combat Engineer Regiments in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick into a single Engineer Support Regiment for the following reasons:
> 
> …
> 
> the real issue being as to whether a ResF ESR is a good idea from the military requirements point of view.


What do you envision a PRes ESR doing?  There already is a PRes construction engineering unit primarily in Nova Scotia. It’s RCAF, but I don’t know that the region can support two such units on top of each other (especially considering how nearly impossible it is to train PRes construction tradespersons). Maybe the squadron in Fredericton could take-over an EROC suite, but the vehicle maintenance would still fall back to being a 4 ESR problem.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> What do you envision a PRes ESR doing?  There already is a PRes construction engineering unit primarily in Nova Scotia. It’s RCAF, but I don’t know that the region can support two such units on top of each other (especially considering how nearly impossible it is to train PRes construction tradespersons). Maybe the squadron in Fredericton could take-over an EROC suite, but the vehicle maintenance would still fall back to being a 4 ESR problem.



Maybe the key is not to train tradespeople but to engage tradespeople and train them how to be soldiers.  Bring those skilled bodies into the ranks.


----------



## dapaterson

"Hey, you!  Want to work more hours and not get overtime?"


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Maybe the key is not to train tradespeople but to engage tradespeople and train them how to be soldiers.  Bring those skilled bodies into the ranks.


Reserve infantry achieves that.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Reserve infantry achieves that.



That's true.  

But how do we dig those civvy skills out from the ranks of the infantry and organize them into useable teams?


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> "Hey, you!  Want to work more hours and not get overtime?"



Hey you! Want to get away on the weekend?  Drive back country trails?  Shoot on the government's dime?  Make loud noises?  Learn how to communicate over long distances?  And get your beer paid for?    And maybe put your skills to the use of a community in need?


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Hey you! Want to get away on the weekend?  Drive back country trails?  Shoot on the government's dime?  Make loud noises?  Learn how to communicate over long distances?  And get your beer paid for?    And maybe put your skills to the use of a community in need?



Additional thought -

When called out why not look at paying tradespeople at union scale?  How badly do you want them?


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> That's true.
> 
> But how do we dig those civvy skills out from the ranks of the infantry and organize them into useable teams?


Allow PRes to register a civilian trade as a secondary MOS?


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Allow PRes to register a civilian trade as a secondary MOS?


Be good that.

Does the CF accept civilian trades quals?


----------



## MilEME09

Kirkhill said:


> Be good that.
> 
> Does the CF accept civilian trades quals?


Some yes, example cooks, mechanics, but our PLAR system is frankly slower then dirt. I have a mechanic who has to go on his DP1 cause his PLAR isn't expected to be completed for a year. So we the army are sending him on a course on how to properly use hand tools, even though he is a ticketed mechanic because of how slow our system is.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> What do you envision a PRes ESR doing?  There already is a PRes construction engineering unit primarily in Nova Scotia. It’s RCAF, but I don’t know that the region can support two such units on top of each other (especially considering how nearly impossible it is to train PRes construction tradespersons). Maybe the squadron in Fredericton could take-over an EROC suite, but the vehicle maintenance would still fall back to being a 4 ESR problem.


I'll try to contain my disappointment with this question, but let me just throw this out there.

The US Army National Guard has 9 ARNG Engineer Brigades with roughly two battalions apiece across the country while the US Army Reserve has two Engineer Theatre Commands with a total of four engineer brigades which themselves have a total of 18 Engineer battalions. My guess is that they can find something for them to do.

But lets just get real. In times of national disasters engineer battalions, especially heavy equipment ones are invaluable. On operations, even ones as small as Canada's has a use for theatre level (NCE, NSE level) engineering resources for camp construction, vertical and horizontal facilities construction and maintenance and thus leaving the combat engineers free to concentrate on direct manoeuvre unit/formation support.

Can the region support two such units - sure it can. They can share equipment for training and if required on operations, domestic or expeditionary can rent equipment. Sure 4 ESR would look after the military equipment since we're too damn cheap to buy more or to set up a proper equipment maintenance strategy for the ResF.

Training - nothing simpler - use community colleges trade courses for plumbers, carpenters, electricians and heavy equipment operators, etc. You can pay their tuition and get an obligatory service commitment. Then run a small conversion course onto military equipment.

Let me put it this way; support engineers are probably the easiest to train if one puts ones mind to it and will be a highly valuable asset.

Regretfully, people seem to see difficulties where there aren't any and don't bother to look for the solutions or the benefits. The Canadian Army continues to be an institution that thinks small and plans for very little when it comes to how to expand the force beyond its RegF footprint.

Let's be honest. The Canadian Army's basic structure and methodology was set in the 1950s with its Korea and NATO expansion and a flip to the RegF forces-in-being concept. Ever since then the Army's primary objective has been to retain as much of that RegF structure as budgets allow. Even while its numbers have dropped dramatically, its only gone down from four brigades to three plus a significant special forces element and a plethora of headquarters. The point here is that the Army is trying to hold on to the past so much by fine tuning that it has not made much effort in trying to redefine itself in a meaningful way for the future. The greatest sign of that is that while clinging to every PY it has gone cheap on equipment, dropping critical capabilities and leaving its ResF component unequipped and undertrained.

Creating a ResF ESR in the Maritimes is basically a no-brainer. Yes, there are challenges but they are far from insurmountable and the result would pay dividends.

🍻


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> Be good that.
> 
> Does the CF accept civilian trades quals?


Some. Not medics though.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Does the CF accept civilian trades quals?


It’s complicated, but not without solutions.

The CAF generally does not directly mirror civilian trades, even where it looks like we do.  We tend to take two or three trades, strip out the bits that we don’t need, and then smash those together into a single thing. Other times, we may take the core of a civilian trade and bolt-on a bunch of additional skills.

For the peacetime and on small missions, it lets us  send one military tradesperson to do a job that requires three civi trades. This does not led itself well to accepting civilian trade qualifications without additional training to cover the skill/knowledge delta.

But, our current trades are designed for the relatively small missions we’ve know for the past decades. Until very recently, we maintained a whole separate set of occupations defined for the special force (or rather, these were sub-occupations of the Reg F chimera trades). The practice has fallen out of vogue (probably because we would never see another major war against a peer, right) and these special force occupations are being removed as occ specs are being updated.

But if we were to bring them back, they would provide an ideal framework for PRes “secondary MOS” with more direct equivalencies to civilian trades. In the event of a big war necessitating the special force, the super-polyvalent RegF tradesperson no longer provides efficiency because you still need as many people to get all the work done. But efficiency can be had from specialization. So all the civi trades that got mashed into one RegF occupation were often found pulled apart in the special force sub-occupations.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> It’s complicated, but not without solutions.
> 
> The CAF generally does not directly mirror civilian trades, even where it looks like we do.  We tend to take two or three trades, strip out the bits that we don’t need, and then smash those together into a single thing. Other times, we may take the core of a civilian trade and bolt-on a bunch of additional skills.
> 
> For the peacetime and on small missions, it lets us  send one military tradesperson to do a job that requires three civi trades. This does not led itself well to accepting civilian trade qualifications without additional training to cover the skill/knowledge delta.
> 
> But, our current trades are designed for the relatively small missions we’ve know for the past decades. Until very recently, we maintained a whole separate set of occupations defined for the special force (or rather, these were sub-occupations of the Reg F chimera trades). The practice has fallen out of vogue (probably because we would never see another major war against a peer, right) and these special force occupations are being removed as occ specs are being updated.
> 
> But if we were to bring them back, they would provide an ideal framework for PRes “secondary MOS” with more direct equivalencies to civilian trades. In the event of a big war necessitating the special force, the super-polyvalent RegF tradesperson no longer provides efficiency because you still need as many people to get all the work done. But efficiency can be had from specialization. So all the civi trades that got mashed into one RegF occupation were often found pulled apart in the special force sub-occupations.



How much could be accomplished by having a single general mechanic or artificer trade with their file endorsed for particular skills?


----------



## McG

A single anything will not do much of any help. Value comes when you have a few hundred across the country.


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> A single anything will not do much of any help. Value comes when you have a few hundred across the country.


To make a forest you first need to plant the trees


----------



## Underway

Skysix said:


> Some. Not medics though.


I thought medics were different, in that to be a PRes Medic you had to be paramedic qualified on your own.  If you were not paramedic qualified then you were some different category of the medical trades.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Underway said:


> I thought medics were different, in that to be a PRes Medic you had to be paramedic qualified on your own.  If you were not paramedic qualified then you were some different category of the medical trades.



Yes. Medics are different....


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes. Medics are different....
> 
> View attachment 72098


All in all , I'd say she took.the break up / dumping rather well.
 Don't you ?


----------



## Halifax Tar

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes. Medics are different....
> 
> View attachment 72098



They say "Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned"


----------



## rmc_wannabe

MilEME09 said:


> Some yes, example cooks, mechanics, but our PLAR system is frankly slower then dirt. I have a mechanic who has to go on his DP1 cause his PLAR isn't expected to be completed for a year. So we the army are sending him on a course on how to properly use hand tools, even though he is a ticketed mechanic because of how slow our system is.


I have 2 troops doing their IS Tech OJE in one of my sections:

-1st dude has a Bachelor's of IT from NAIT, with 4 years working as an enterprise server admin for Suncor

-2nd dude did 15 years with CSIS as a network engineer with more certifications than half my staff.

I have initiated PLARs for both these troops, who honestly should be working at a mich higher pay rate than what we currently are giving them.

As much as I would harp on CTC G7 for taking forever and a day to process a PLAR, I also will point the finger at CFRG for not initiating it upon enrollment, as well as on my Corps writ large for adding in just enough "Armyism" to the JBS/QSTP that a direct Skilled Entry isn't a thing for our trades... even though we are spending out the ass to train folks, as well as bleeding qualified people from the middle.


----------



## FJAG

rmc_wannabe said:


> as well as on my Corps writ large for adding in just enough "Armyism" to the JBS/QSTP that a direct Skilled Entry isn't a thing for our trades... even though we are spending out the ass to train folks, as well as bleeding qualified people from the middle.


Therein lies the problem for most of many of our skilled trades.

If the specs were written and given in two modules--the first with the basic civilian trade skills as would be used in getting a ticket punched in the civilian industry; and the second as an add-on conversion package to teach the peculiar military skills needed to function in that trade--it would go a long way especially if the second module was also available independently after the first one. A recruit off the street would get both modules with the CAF (preferably also getting his civilian ticket stamped at the same time) and a skilled candidate who already has the civilian qualification would just take the second module.

🍻


----------



## Skysix

rmc_wannabe said:


> I have 2 troops doing their IS Tech OJE in one of my sections:
> 
> -1st dude has a Bachelor's of IT from NAIT, with 4 years working as an enterprise server admin for Suncor
> 
> -2nd dude did 15 years with CSIS as a network engineer with more certifications than half my staff.
> 
> I have initiated PLARs for both these troops, who honestly should be working at a mich higher pay rate than what we currently are giving them.
> 
> As much as I would harp on CTC G7 for taking forever and a day to process a PLAR, I also will point the finger at CFRG for not initiating it upon enrollment, as well as on my Corps writ large for adding in just enough "Armyism" to the JBS/QSTP that a direct Skilled Entry isn't a thing for our trades... even though we are spending out the ass to train folks, as well as bleeding qualified people from the middle.


And for not running a once yearly "bridging course" that covers only the mil specific content, a well as a better way of ranking up (after the appropriate leadership training) to the rank level their skill level would normally be.

As an example if a Critical Care Paramedic with flight experience and a decade of leading small teams and incident command gets sucessfully recruited as a medic. After basic he is looking at being unable to use those skills for 6+ years as he takes the various military medical courses often taught by those with less real world experience or breadth of knowledge and waits his turn to get the leadership courses to promote to Sgt. 

Wanna bet what the retention rate to that point is?


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Skysix said:


> And for not running a once yearly "bridging course" that covers only the mil specific content, a well as a better way of ranking up (after the appropriate leadership training) to the rank level their skill level would normally be.
> 
> As an example if a Critical Care Paramedic with flight experience and a decade of leading small teams and incident command gets sucessfully recruited as a medic. After basic he is looking at being unable to use those skills for 6+ years as he takes the various military medical courses often taught by those with less real world experience or breadth of knowledge and waits his turn to get the leadership courses to promote to Sgt.
> 
> Wanna bet what the retention rate to that point is?


The RCMS and RCCS have a similar problem in the sense that we both want to recruit and employ professionally trained talent; but not at the going market rate and with a belief that "our way is best way."

I tried to get buy in to see if we could get our curriculum recognized by CIPS (Canada's IT Professional Association), but that initiative fell on deaf ears. 

"If we get them certifications, no one will stay!" 

On the contrary, nothing is getting folks to stay, so let's try something different for once.


----------



## Kirkhill

rmc_wannabe said:


> The RCMS and RCCS have a similar problem in the sense that we both want to recruit and employ professionally trained talent; but not at the going market rate and with a belief that "our way is best way."
> 
> I tried to get buy in to see if we could get our curriculum recognized by CIPS (Canada's IT Professional Association), but that initiative fell on deaf ears.
> 
> "If we get them certifications, no one will stay!"
> 
> On the contrary, nothing is getting folks to stay, so let's try something different for once.



Another reason not to pitch the CAF as a training establishment.  Hired trained personnel.  

And here's another question:  is the trade expected to perform under enemy fire?  If not does that person need to be on uniformed strength?  

I suggest that there are many professionals who would be willing to offer their services on a part time basis if they could continue with their primary career as well.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

KevinB said:


> To make a forest you first need to plant the trees


or take over someone else forest.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> And here's another question: is the trade expected to perform under enemy fire? If not does that person need to be on uniformed strength?


Some artillery can reach hundreds on km; there is no safe distance from the front in a peer conflict. In Afghanistan, even the super MOBs suffered incursions, with one flight line in Helmand seeing office workers & aircraft mechanics fight to secure it. There is no going into any future theatre and not potentially having to fight or otherwise perform under fire.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> Some artillery can reach hundreds on km; there is no safe distance from the front in a peer conflict. In Afghanistan, even the super MOBs suffered incursions, with one flight line in Helmand seeing office workers & aircraft mechanics fight to secure it. There is no going into any future theatre and not potentially having to fight or otherwise perform under fire.



One could argue that there are no safe civilians either.   Even in Ottawa.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> And here's another question: is the trade expected to perform under enemy fire? If not does that person need to be on uniformed strength?


In most cases, yes. "Uniformed" is not the issue. The person, however, needs to be constrained in a system where he can be given orders, needs to show up when required, not be free to quit his job at the drop of the hat, can be moved around to wherever his skills are needed and be subject to a system of consequences when he steps out of line.  A military cannot function when people can simply walk away from their commitments. In short, a military must be able to coerce people into doing things that they do not want to do. Currently that means "uniformed" but doesn't necessarily have to.

One can always set up a tiered structure which allows varying rights and responsibilities during peacetime. I like a concept where recruit with specialist skills could choose to serve in a given location and not be posted during the term of his contract. In exchange for that he would give up leadership courses and his promotability to a leadership position would be limited. This could help recruit highly technical skills to specialist units in larger urban centres. In a way we do that something akin to that with Class B's right now. We need a system that makes it easier for people to serve where they want to live rather than moving them around willy nilly from pillar to post.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> In most cases, yes. "Uniformed" is not the issue. The person, however, needs to be constrained in a system where he can be given orders, needs to show up when required, not be free to quit his job at the drop of the hat, can be moved around to wherever his skills are needed and be subject to a system of consequences when he steps out of line.  A military cannot function when people can simply walk away from their commitments. In short, a military must be able to coerce people into doing things that they do not want to do. Currently that means "uniformed" but doesn't necessarily have to.
> 
> One can always set up a tiered structure which allows varying rights and responsibilities during peacetime. I like a concept where recruit with specialist skills could choose to serve in a given location and not be posted during the term of his contract. In exchange for that he would give up leadership courses and his promotability to a leadership position would be limited. This could help recruit highly technical skills to specialist units in larger urban centres. In a way we do that something akin to that with Class B's right now. We need a system that makes it easier for people to serve where they want to live rather than moving them around willy nilly from pillar to post.
> 
> 🍻



The military exists in a civilian world.  All of its supply lines originate in the civilian world.  Its comms.  Its weapons.  Its vehicles.  Even its soldiers.  And its orders.  

Even if the day comes that martial law is declared that is not going to change.  The percentage of civilians in uniform will rise but new civilians will be making and repairing comms, weapons and vehicles.  Those civilians are targets and are just as likely to be killed.  Even when they don't wear a uniform.  And setting up a martial society is a long term project.

The Forces need to work with the civilians.  That process begins in peace time.  Warehousing and transportation, maintenance, in peace time with a garrison army are all tasks that can be handled by civilians.  They do the jobs for other civilians on a daily basis.  The skill sets used to do the jobs for the Forces are no different.  In war time they can continue doing the same jobs without interruption.   Similarly for Engineers.  In peaceful environments civilian contractors can do horizontal and vertical construction.

The dividing line, in my view, has to be "when the guns begin to shoot".  I agree that "guns" can shoot a long way these days.  In fact there isn't anywhere they can't reach.  So any facility considered of strategic value, whether manned by civilian or military personnel is at risk.

I think the difference between the environment in which the civilian and the soldier operates has to be seen as one of degree and not of kind.   The difference is that the closer you get to the Front the greater the intensity of the fire you will face.  Not everybody is willing to face that danger.

Some civilians are.  They are willing, as civilians, to drive trucks or build runways in the face of an enemy.  They will weigh dollars against risk and decide which risks they are willing to take.  They can be relied on to do some of the work that needs to be done but, like the Waggonneers of old, and the dockyard workers of WW2, they may choose to absent themselves for a while.

Under those circumstances it is useful to have on hand a body of people with those skills willing to accept a harsher contractual obligation.  Or even better yet, volunteers.

It is those types of people that I would look to the Reserves to find.  Much of the supply to the peacetime garrison, and the wartime distribution hubs can be managed by civilians overseen by soldiers.  Distribution forward from the hubs is the job of soldiers.  In peace that demand is small.  In war that demand is great. 

We have a limited peacetime authorization of "soldiers" from the Treasury, both full time and part time. Doesn't it make sense to make the best use of the authorization possible and reserve those soldiers for the jobs where you absolutely must have soldiers and use civilians, and civilian systems to keep the beast fed?

One thing the current unpleasantness is showing is that it doesn't take much time to train a willing civilian how to soldier.  That isn't the same as turning her into a soldier but teaching her enough to help the cause.  Do we need to spend a lot of effort on keeping trained rifles on parade strength in the reserves?  Or are we better to accept a high turnover and use the reserves to teach a pool of civilians how to assist when necessary and then register them as useful.  For future reference.

The regular force should be configured to manage the diplomatic tasks of the government in peacetime, and manage those tasks from within its own strength.  Neither the regs nor the reserves are committed to the peace time use of the reserves in any event, at least not in Canada.


----------



## Skysix

FJAG said:


> In most cases, yes. "Uniformed" is not the issue. The person, however, needs to be constrained in a system where he can be given orders, needs to show up when required, not be free to quit his job at the drop of the hat, can be moved around to wherever his skills are needed and be subject to a system of consequences when he steps out of line.  A military cannot function when people can simply walk away from their commitments. In short, a military must be able to coerce people into doing things that they do not want to do. Currently that means "uniformed" but doesn't necessarily have to.
> 
> One can always set up a tiered structure which allows varying rights and responsibilities during peacetime. I like a concept where recruit with specialist skills could choose to serve in a given location and not be posted during the term of his contract. In exchange for that he would give up leadership courses and his promotability to a leadership position would be limited. This could help recruit highly technical skills to specialist units in larger urban centres. In a way we do that something akin to that with Class B's right now. We need a system that makes it easier for people to serve where they want to live rather than moving them around willy nilly from pillar to post.
> 
> 🍻


Hmmm. Sounds like the CWO's in the US....  SME with their own promotion and rank system.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> The military exists in a civilian world.  All of its supply lines originate in the civilian world.  Its comms.  Its weapons.  Its vehicles.  Even its soldiers.  And its orders.


Always has; always will.


Kirkhill said:


> Even if the day comes that martial law is declared that is not going to change.  The percentage of civilians in uniform will rise but new civilians will be making and repairing comms, weapons and vehicles.  Those civilians are targets and are just as likely to be killed.  Even when they don't wear a uniform.  And setting up a martial society is a long term project.


Who was talking about a martial society? Your initial question was:



Kirkhill said:


> And here's another question: is the trade expected to perform under enemy fire? If not does that person need to be on uniformed strength?


And the answer simply was that "uniformed" is not the issue but for a number of reasons it needs to be someone who is in the nature of a soldier and subject to a hierarchy, discipline and terms of service.

You seem to be heading off on a different tangent at this point and I really can't see what your desired end-state is here.



Kirkhill said:


> The Forces need to work with the civilians.  That process begins in peace time.  Warehousing and transportation, maintenance, in peace time with a garrison army are all tasks that can be handled by civilians.  They do the jobs for other civilians on a daily basis.  The skill sets used to do the jobs for the Forces are no different.  In war time they can continue doing the same jobs without interruption.   Similarly for Engineers.  In peaceful environments civilian contractors can do horizontal and vertical construction.


That's mostly true but it ignores the simple situation that the skill set may need to be used in the field during wartime so there is a period of training required for the individual who deploys. Simply put I can teach both a soldier and a civilian to do construction of a house on a base. BUT, if I need that construction to be done in Upper Podunk in the bush in Africa, I can't force the civilian to go there.



Kirkhill said:


> The dividing line, in my view, has to be "when the guns begin to shoot".  I agree that "guns" can shoot a long way these days.  In fact there isn't anywhere they can't reach.  So any facility considered of strategic value, whether manned by civilian or military personnel is at risk.


Civilians have been at risk since the first cavemen decided to raid their neighbours hunting grounds. "Guns" are not the issue. The issue is: can I foce a "civilian" to do what he doesn't want to like I can a soldier.



Kirkhill said:


> I think the difference between the environment in which the civilian and the soldier operates has to be seen as one of degree and not of kind.   The difference is that the closer you get to the Front the greater the intensity of the fire you will face.  Not everybody is willing to face that danger.
> 
> Some civilians are.  They are willing, as civilians, to drive trucks or build runways in the face of an enemy.  They will weigh dollars against risk and decide which risks they are willing to take.  They can be relied on to do some of the work that needs to be done but, like the Waggonneers of old, and the dockyard workers of WW2, they may choose to absent themselves for a while.


It's both degree and kind but it's also irrelevant to the issue. The latter point, however, is the relevant point. When the need arises is not the time to find out which of your workforce are prepared to carry on and which will down tools and bugger off. We're not just talking about plumbers' helpers here. Were talking about a wide variety of specialized trade and technical folk who need training and integration into the force well before it needs to deploy.



Kirkhill said:


> Under those circumstances it is useful to have on hand a body of people with those skills willing to accept a harsher contractual obligation.  Or even better yet, volunteers.


That's too broad and too vague a classification.



Kirkhill said:


> It is those types of people that I would look to the Reserves to find.


Okay. Me too.



Kirkhill said:


> Much of the supply to the peacetime garrison, and the wartime distribution hubs can be managed by civilians overseen by soldiers.


We've fallen into a rut because our civilian workforce currently provides a measure of stability which is sometimes lacking with military personnel who may need to go on lengthier courses for both skill and leadership development and who fall into posting cycles. Civilians, however, provide little depth to the force if there is a need to call more personnel forward.



Kirkhill said:


> Distribution forward from the hubs is the job of soldiers.  In peace that demand is small.  In war that demand is great.


That's obvious. 



Kirkhill said:


> We have a limited peacetime authorization of "soldiers" from the Treasury, both full time and part time. Doesn't it make sense to make the best use of the authorization possible and reserve those soldiers for the jobs where you absolutely must have soldiers and use civilians, and civilian systems to keep the beast fed?


The premise is false. Both the soldier and civilian cost money. Authorizations are between soldiers and civilians are arbitrary unless there is a clear cost saving involved that trumps the fact that a trained soldier in the job provides more depth and flexibility to the system. Your premise only works if we can't find enough people who want to be soldiers. At that point we have to prioritize. Actually, if we reach that point we need to revert to conscription.



Kirkhill said:


> One thing the current unpleasantness is showing is that it doesn't take much time to train a willing civilian how to soldier.


Well, more than the one month the Russians seem to be using right now, but I tend to agree. Canada overtrains its RegF soldiers (with good reason) and uses training schedules that are more suited to accommodate the instructors than challenge the trainees. We need to return to a system of peacetime training standards and an accelerated one for war-time mobilization. One problem with a small army going all-in is that there is very little cadre staff left behind to train and lead the follow-on forces.



Kirkhill said:


> That isn't the same as turning her into a soldier but teaching her enough to help the cause.  Do we need to spend a lot of effort on keeping trained rifles on parade strength in the reserves?  Or are we better to accept a high turnover and use the reserves to teach a pool of civilians how to assist when necessary and then register them as useful.  For future reference.


I think that's the wrong question. The question starts with what is the threat and how best do we organize to meet it? There may be a role for a home guard type of force but it needs more than keeping an accurate list of names and contact information. It also needs equipment and an organization that it can fall onto. 

Do we still need to keep trained rifles on parade in the reserves? Absolutely, and much more than that. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't also have a well organized and managed supplementary reserve with a plan on how to use it. One can, and should have both.



Kirkhill said:


> The regular force should be configured to manage the diplomatic tasks of the government in peacetime, and manage those tasks from within its own strength.


I wouldn't go that far. Firstly those tasks are elastic. They grow and shrink, sometimes quickly. One wouldn't want to keep growing and shrinking the RegF to manage that. One also wouldn't want to man a new task from the RegF if that manning resulted in an inability to continue normal recruiting, training and career development. The ResF provides excellent flexibility to meet operational taskings while also providing a training and experience opportunity not typically available to a reservist.



Kirkhill said:


> Neither the regs nor the reserves are committed to the peace time use of the reserves in any event, at least not in Canada.


Judging by the number of Class Bs and Cs employed at any given time I think that statement is clearly wrong. I think too many of them are used wrongly, though, and IMHO, we're missing the boat on how to use the various subcomponents of the ResF to their best advantage.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Always has; always will.
> 
> Who was talking about a martial society? Your initial question was:
> 
> 
> And the answer simply was that "uniformed" is not the issue but for a number of reasons it needs to be someone who is in the nature of a soldier and subject to a hierarchy, discipline and terms of service.
> 
> You seem to be heading off on a different tangent at this point and I really can't see what your desired end-state is here.
> 
> 
> That's mostly true but it ignores the simple situation that the skill set may need to be used in the field during wartime so there is a period of training required for the individual who deploys. Simply put I can teach both a soldier and a civilian to do construction of a house on a base. BUT, if I need that construction to be done in Upper Podunk in the bush in Africa, I can't force the civilian to go there.
> 
> 
> Civilians have been at risk since the first cavemen decided to raid their neighbours hunting grounds. "Guns" are not the issue. The issue is: can I foce a "civilian" to do what he doesn't want to like I can a soldier.
> 
> 
> It's both degree and kind but it's also irrelevant to the issue. The latter point, however, is the relevant point. When the need arises is not the time to find out which of your workforce are prepared to carry on and which will down tools and bugger off. We're not just talking about plumbers' helpers here. Were talking about a wide variety of specialized trade and technical folk who need training and integration into the force well before it needs to deploy.
> 
> 
> That's too broad and too vague a classification.
> 
> 
> Okay. Me too.
> 
> 
> We've fallen into a rut because our civilian workforce currently provides a measure of stability which is sometimes lacking with military personnel who may need to go on lengthier courses for both skill and leadership development and who fall into posting cycles. Civilians, however, provide little depth to the force if there is a need to call more personnel forward.
> 
> 
> That's obvious.
> 
> 
> The premise is false. Both the soldier and civilian cost money. Authorizations are between soldiers and civilians are arbitrary unless there is a clear cost saving involved that trumps the fact that a trained soldier in the job provides more depth and flexibility to the system. Your premise only works if we can't find enough people who want to be soldiers. At that point we have to prioritize. Actually, if we reach that point we need to revert to conscription.
> 
> 
> Well, more than the one month the Russians seem to be using right now, but I tend to agree. Canada overtrains its RegF soldiers (with good reason) and uses training schedules that are more suited to accommodate the instructors than challenge the trainees. We need to return to a system of peacetime training standards and an accelerated one for war-time mobilization. One problem with a small army going all-in is that there is very little cadre staff left behind to train and lead the follow-on forces.
> 
> 
> I think that's the wrong question. The question starts with what is the threat and how best do we organize to meet it? There may be a role for a home guard type of force but it needs more than keeping an accurate list of names and contact information. It also needs equipment and an organization that it can fall onto.
> 
> Do we still need to keep trained rifles on parade in the reserves? Absolutely, and much more than that. But that doesn't mean that we shouldn't also have a well organized and managed supplementary reserve with a plan on how to use it. One can, and should have both.
> 
> 
> I wouldn't go that far. Firstly those tasks are elastic. They grow and shrink, sometimes quickly. One wouldn't want to keep growing and shrinking the RegF to manage that. One also wouldn't want to man a new task from the RegF if that manning resulted in an inability to continue normal recruiting, training and career development. The ResF provides excellent flexibility to meet operational taskings while also providing a training and experience opportunity not typically available to a reservist.
> 
> 
> Judging by the number of Class Bs and Cs employed at any given time I think that statement is clearly wrong. I think too many of them are used wrongly, though, and IMHO, we're missing the boat on how to use the various subcomponents of the ResF to their best advantage.
> 
> 🍻



I find myself compelled to respond to your response.

My eye is drawn to



> if I need that construction to be done in Upper Podunk in the bush in Africa,* I can't force the civilian to go there*.



So the value of the uniform is that permits compulsion. 

Except that the wearer of the uniform volunteered to put it on, volunteered to accept the terms of a contract, volunteered to accept a pay scale, to accept a level of risk, and volunteered to accept terms under which the contract could be quit or severed.  In fact, the ultimate sanction for a soldier who refuses compulsion is to be stripped of the uniform.  In which case the ability to compel ends.

In what way is the Private's contract any different than that of any other civil contract?  In fact Pvt as an abbreviation can either refer to a Private soldier, a contracted individual or, in some commonwealth jurisdictions, a Private company.

Command, compel, coerce.
Lead, encourage, buy.

In Canada, and most of the West it is difficult to compel and coerce, even if an individual has volunteered to put on a uniform.  Dragging heels, misinterpretation, communications difficulties, failure to comprehend, outright mutiny, even fragging.  Every person with responsibility has to be cognizant of the limitations of their authority.  This is particularly true for the Forces in peacetime where the Forces serve the diplomatic whims of the government of the day.

If construction is necessary in the bush of Africa, you may not be able to compel a particular civilian to do that but it would be a very strange situation if you weren't able to find some civilian willing to take on the task for the right fee and conditions. 

Those companies, those people exist and operate in the field daily.  There are even companies that will supply armed security for such sites.

So if Global Affairs Canada absolutely has to have an airfield built in Upper Podunk does it need to send uniformed engineers to do the job?  Or can it employ civilian trades?

Why do the Forces need to train engineers, mechanics, electricians, carpenters, welders, heavy equipment operators?  There are lots of them out there.  Surely some portion of them could be convinced to work for the Crown?  Perhaps the contracts that are being offered, not just the monetary reward but the terms, are not attractive? 

If you absolutely want the Upper Podunk job done by people in uniform then perhaps you hire the people for the duration, give them a one month orientation and issue them uniforms.  After the contract ends you keep them on file for the next contract.

World War I is still imprinted on our organizations despite the changes in technology.

In WWI even city kids could harness a horse or kick clay in tunnels.  They had no clue about cars, internal combustion, radios or even machine guns.  They had to be taught the basics of technologies that were brand new because the Forces needed them and there weren't enough of them to go around.  WWI army and navy trade schools, together with all the surplus kit left over after the war really set the stage for the democratization of technology in the 20th century.

But now?

2 year olds learn how to push buttons on computers to access their favourite games and cartoons when the parents aren't watching.  The forces are explicitly using gaming technology to operate weapons systems.  There is little to choose between a simulator and a game.  And meanwhile technologies and ideas advance faster than the Forces can figure out how to use them - but not faster than billions of other people can figure out ways they can be used, often to the detriment of existing technologies operated by the Forces.

Cicero is still right.  The sinews of war is infinite money.

And no amount of compulsion will overcome that.

If the army, or more properly the government, needs a good, or a service, then it should first go shopping and buy it. 

What can it not buy?


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> I find myself compelled to respond to your response.
> 
> My eye is drawn to
> 
> 
> 
> So the value of the uniform is that permits compulsion.
> 
> Except that the wearer of the uniform volunteered to put it on, volunteered to accept the terms of a contract, volunteered to accept a pay scale, to accept a level of risk, and volunteered to accept terms under which the contract could be quit or severed.  In fact, the ultimate sanction for a soldier who refuses compulsion is to be stripped of the uniform.  In which case the ability to compel ends.
> 
> In what way is the Private's contract any different than that of any other civil contract?  In fact Pvt as an abbreviation can either refer to a Private soldier, a contracted individual or, in some commonwealth jurisdictions, a Private company.
> 
> Command, compel, coerce.
> Lead, encourage, buy.
> 
> In Canada, and most of the West it is difficult to compel and coerce, even if an individual has volunteered to put on a uniform.  Dragging heels, misinterpretation, communications difficulties, failure to comprehend, outright mutiny, even fragging.  Every person with responsibility has to be cognizant of the limitations of their authority.  This is particularly true for the Forces in peacetime where the Forces serve the diplomatic whims of the government of the day.
> 
> If construction is necessary in the bush of Africa, you may not be able to compel a particular civilian to do that but it would be a very strange situation if you weren't able to find some civilian willing to take on the task for the right fee and conditions.
> 
> Those companies, those people exist and operate in the field daily.  There are even companies that will supply armed security for such sites.
> 
> So if Global Affairs Canada absolutely has to have an airfield built in Upper Podunk does it need to send uniformed engineers to do the job?  Or can it employ civilian trades?
> 
> Why do the Forces need to train engineers, mechanics, electricians, carpenters, welders, heavy equipment operators?  There are lots of them out there.  Surely some portion of them could be convinced to work for the Crown?  Perhaps the contracts that are being offered, not just the monetary reward but the terms, are not attractive?
> 
> If you absolutely want the Upper Podunk job done by people in uniform then perhaps you hire the people for the duration, give them a one month orientation and issue them uniforms.  After the contract ends you keep them on file for the next contract.
> 
> World War I is still imprinted on our organizations despite the changes in technology.
> 
> In WWI even city kids could harness a horse or kick clay in tunnels.  They had no clue about cars, internal combustion, radios or even machine guns.  They had to be taught the basics of technologies that were brand new because the Forces needed them and there weren't enough of them to go around.  WWI army and navy trade schools, together with all the surplus kit left over after the war really set the stage for the democratization of technology in the 20th century.
> 
> But now?
> 
> 2 year olds learn how to push buttons on computers to access their favourite games and cartoons when the parents aren't watching.  The forces are explicitly using gaming technology to operate weapons systems.  There is little to choose between a simulator and a game.  And meanwhile technologies and ideas advance faster than the Forces can figure out how to use them - but not faster than billions of other people can figure out ways they can be used, often to the detriment of existing technologies operated by the Forces.
> 
> Cicero is still right.  The sinews of war is infinite money.
> 
> And no amount of compulsion will overcome that.
> 
> If the army, or more properly the government, needs a good, or a service, then it should first go shopping and buy it.
> 
> What can it not buy?


Are you really suggesting turning loose the CF procurement system on the test of Canada?😜


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I find myself compelled to respond to your response.


I knew you would. We both suffer from the same affliction.  😉 


Kirkhill said:


> So the value of the uniform is that permits compulsion.
> 
> Except that the wearer of the uniform volunteered to put it on, volunteered to accept the terms of a contract, volunteered to accept a pay scale, to accept a level of risk, and volunteered to accept terms under which the contract could be quit or severed.  In fact, the ultimate sanction for a soldier who refuses compulsion is to be stripped of the uniform.  In which case the ability to compel ends.


I said twice above that the uniform is irrelevant. It's the terms of service that the uniform is representative of. A contract alone is not enough. Terms of service arise from the enlistment papers and a set of legislation and regulation that creates a tiered hierarchy and a complex administrative and legal system. Civilian contractors are only subject to the CSD when accompanying forces overseas but even that doesn't equate to the entire breadth of the liabilities that attach with military service.

There is nothing that prevents one from creating a system that would mirror the military service for a new civilian service but why would you bother? If you want to establish a new type of force to work with the military it is much simpler to add or amend categories within the current RegF and various ResF components.



Kirkhill said:


> In what way is the Private's contract any different than that of any other civil contract?  In fact Pvt as an abbreviation can either refer to a Private soldier, a contracted individual or, in some commonwealth jurisdictions, a Private company.
> 
> Command, compel, coerce.
> Lead, encourage, buy.


You're stretching here.



Kirkhill said:


> In Canada, and most of the West it is difficult to compel and coerce, even if an individual has volunteered to put on a uniform.  Dragging heels, misinterpretation, communications difficulties, failure to comprehend, outright mutiny, even fragging.  Every person with responsibility has to be cognizant of the limitations of their authority.  This is particularly true for the Forces in peacetime where the Forces serve the diplomatic whims of the government of the day.
> 
> If construction is necessary in the bush of Africa, you may not be able to compel a particular civilian to do that but it would be a very strange situation if you weren't able to find some civilian willing to take on the task for the right fee and conditions.
> 
> Those companies, those people exist and operate in the field daily.  There are even companies that will supply armed security for such sites.
> 
> So if Global Affairs Canada absolutely has to have an airfield built in Upper Podunk does it need to send uniformed engineers to do the job?  Or can it employ civilian trades?
> 
> Why do the Forces need to train engineers, mechanics, electricians, carpenters, welders, heavy equipment operators?  There are lots of them out there.  Surely some portion of them could be convinced to work for the Crown?  Perhaps the contracts that are being offered, not just the monetary reward but the terms, are not attractive?
> 
> If you absolutely want the Upper Podunk job done by people in uniform then perhaps you hire the people for the duration, give them a one month orientation and issue them uniforms.  After the contract ends you keep them on file for the next contract.
> 
> World War I is still imprinted on our organizations despite the changes in technology.
> 
> In WWI even city kids could harness a horse or kick clay in tunnels.  They had no clue about cars, internal combustion, radios or even machine guns.  They had to be taught the basics of technologies that were brand new because the Forces needed them and there weren't enough of them to go around.  WWI army and navy trade schools, together with all the surplus kit left over after the war really set the stage for the democratization of technology in the 20th century.
> 
> But now?
> 
> 2 year olds learn how to push buttons on computers to access their favourite games and cartoons when the parents aren't watching.  The forces are explicitly using gaming technology to operate weapons systems.  There is little to choose between a simulator and a game.  And meanwhile technologies and ideas advance faster than the Forces can figure out how to use them - but not faster than billions of other people can figure out ways they can be used, often to the detriment of existing technologies operated by the Forces.


It's not just WW2. The history of mankind is replete with military structures that came and went yet the fundamental underlying system of a military force to guard the nation's security remains in every nation except a tiny handful. 



Kirkhill said:


> Cicero is still right.  The sinews of war is infinite money.


I've always thought of Cicero as an opinionated old charlatan who created more problems by his intractability than he solved. He did, though, write very many self serving pieces of text (saviour of his country, for one) that have been handed down through the ages. Rome's way of obtaining "infinite money" was through military occupation and administrative oppression through tax farming. The reason that the mafia's home is Italy is not without reason



Kirkhill said:


> And no amount of compulsion will overcome that.
> 
> If the army, or more properly the government, needs a good, or a service, then it should first go shopping and buy it.
> 
> What can it not buy?


The logical conclusion to your argument, however, is that Canada disband its military and hire mercenary forces of whatever stripe is necessary at that moment in time to look after its national security. In Western society there is still a veneer, at least, of citizens serving their country in uniform to protect hearth and home. Contract forces are infamous for seeking higher rewards with bigger spenders when the chips are down. I guess we could always hire SNC-Lavalin ... and Wagner.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

To answer my own question, and your point,  you can't buy loyalty.

How many loyal soldiers and officers do you need?  

That is a different question to how many contractors do you need?


----------



## Skysix

Never mind just contractors. Any sort of real conflict will rapidly exhaust stocks and hardware that take years to make. And relying on Uncle Sam to save our bacon is a fools wish as they will also be tapped out quickly  









						The fundamental flaw in US plans to defend Taiwan from a Chinese assault
					

If the U.S. can't deter China from attacking Taiwan in the South China Sea, it will be because lawmakers didn't pay the bill.




					taskandpurpose.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Skysix said:


> Never mind just contractors. Any sort of real conflict will rapidly exhaust stocks and hardware that take years to make. And relying on Uncle Sam to save our bacon is a fools wish as they will also be tapped out quickly
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The fundamental flaw in US plans to defend Taiwan from a Chinese assault
> 
> 
> If the U.S. can't deter China from attacking Taiwan in the South China Sea, it will be because lawmakers didn't pay the bill.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> taskandpurpose.com



And all the loyal soldiers in the world won't do you any good if they don't have the tools to work with.  And all of that costs money.  Back to Cicero and back to the civilian supply system.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> The logical conclusion to your argument, however, is that *Canada disband its military and hire mercenary forces* of whatever stripe is necessary at that moment in time to look after its national security. In Western society there is still a veneer, at least, of citizens serving their country in uniform to protect hearth and home. Contract forces are infamous for seeking higher rewards with bigger spenders when the chips are down. I guess we could always hire SNC-Lavalin ... and Wagner.
> 
> 🍻



The 'Militia Mercenary' enters the chat


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> So if Global Affairs Canada absolutely has to have an airfield built in Upper Podunk does it need to send uniformed engineers to do the job?


We don't send military engineers to build airfields for GAC. Military engineers support the military in achieving military missions.



Kirkhill said:


> If the army, or more properly the government, needs a good, or a service, then it should first go shopping and buy it.
> 
> What can it not buy?


The A echelon for a rifle company that must deploy tonight.
A horizontal construction company that will leave with three days notice to repair/reactivate a runway.
A large ship that will embark a mechanized battlegroup in five days from now.

There were a lot of services that we told ourselves we could get on-time through contract when the need arose, and that assumption has been demonstrated false in the last half year.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> The A echelon for a rifle company that must deploy tonight.
> A horizontal construction company that will leave with three days notice to repair/reactivate a runway.
> A large ship that will embark a mechanized battlegroup in five days from now.
> 
> There were a lot of services that we told ourselves we could get on-time through contract when the need arose, and that assumption has been demonstrated false in the last half year.



Inclined to agree with all of that, especially the A Echelon.

I'm a bit equivocal on the construction company and the ship though.  It seems to me that both of those could be supplied from the civilian world if the government were willing to pay the long term contract necessary to keep a ship at 5 days NTM or a horizontal construction company at 3 days NTM.  

I agree you can't just go and buy off the civvy market with no planning.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Inclined to agree with all of that, especially the A Echelon.
> 
> I'm a bit equivocal on the construction company and the ship though.  It seems to me that both of those could be supplied from the civilian world if the government were willing to pay the long term contract necessary to keep a ship at 5 days NTM or a horizontal construction company at 3 days NTM.
> 
> I agree you can't just go and buy off the civvy market with no planning.


Planning -- what's that?

The issue that comes up with CAF/GoC wanting to hire things, is quite often they won't look for those assets until someone else is already using them...

   Certain items need to be held within the CAF to simply ensure their availability to be used if needed.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Inclined to agree with all of that, especially the A Echelon.
> 
> I'm a bit equivocal on the construction company and the ship though.  It seems to me that both of those could be supplied from the civilian world if the government were willing to pay the long term contract necessary to keep a ship at 5 days NTM or a horizontal construction company at 3 days NTM.
> 
> I agree you can't just go and buy off the civvy market with no planning.


You might be able to pull a construction company off another job, but having a cargo vessel on five days NTM when its somewhere between Rangoon and Mandalay is not feasible regardless of how the contract is written.

Quite frankly very few construction companies would be able to meet a 3 day NTM or agree to such a contract - their bread and butter is working for people who need them every day and commit to big contracts. You might bet Bob and his brother Dave under such a contract but not Dufferin Construction. They'd need time to gather staff and equipment and it wouldn't be their A Team.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> You might be able to pull a construction company off another job, but having a cargo vessel on five days NTM when its somewhere between Rangoon and Mandalay is not feasible regardless of how the contract is written.
> 
> Quite frankly very few construction companies would be able to meet a 3 day NTM or agree to such a contract - their bread and butter is working for people who need them every day and commit to big contracts. You might bet Bob and his brother Dave under such a contract but not Dufferin Construction. They'd need time to gather staff and equipment and it wouldn't be their A Team.
> 
> 🍻


As my old man used to say

"Anything is possible ... if cash"

It comes under the cheap-good-fast discussion.  Two out of three.

If you want it fast and good it isn't going to be cheap.

And therein lies the CAF's problem.

On the other hand having people waiting around for the never-never isn't cheap either.  Nor are they getting much in the way of practical experience to hone their skills.

Better to have some current civilians being paid by their employer to take some time off active jobs to go on standby for a while.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> As my old man used to say
> 
> "Anything is possible ... if cash"
> 
> It comes under the cheap-good-fast discussion.  Two out of three.
> 
> If you want it fast and good it isn't going to be cheap.
> 
> And therein lies the CAF's problem.
> 
> On the other hand having people waiting around for the never-never isn't cheap either.  Nor are they getting much in the way of practical experience to hone their skills.
> 
> Better to have some current civilians being paid by their employer to take some time off active jobs to go on standby for a while.


The issue isn’t that your idea is bad, it is simply that the GOC has zero interest.  

To make it work there would need to be a national merchant marine, financially incentivized by the GOC to acquire certain ships, and a major change to the CAF PRes. 
   Neither the PRes nor the Regular Army appears to be interested in changes to the PRes, and the GOC hasn’t called anyone on the carpet for that.   

There are hundreds of other things the GOC could (should) do WRT Canadian Defense, and they don’t, and there are many missed opportunities that would be exceptionally valuable to Canada (Northern Infrastructure and Transportation for one).


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> The issue isn’t that your idea is bad, it is simply that the GOC has zero interest.
> 
> To make it work there would need to be a national merchant marine, financially incentivized by the GOC to acquire certain ships, and a major change to the CAF PRes.
> Neither the PRes nor the Regular Army appears to be interested in changes to the PRes, and the GOC hasn’t called anyone on the carpet for that.
> 
> There are hundreds of other things the GOC could (should) do WRT Canadian Defense, and they don’t, and there are many missed opportunities that would be exceptionally valuable to Canada (Northern Infrastructure and Transportation for one).



You mean this landmark 'amphibious invasion' exercise wasn't a warning to Putin? Geez...


Army, navy storm Comox beach in joint training operation

Canadian Armed Forces personnel combined forces the morning of May 11 to storm a beach in Comox.

The littoral, or shore, assault was part of Exercise Cougar Gauntlet in the area as of March 6 for a one-week period.

More than 300 reserve members, primarily army reserve from 39 Canadian Brigade, but with assistance from navy members stationed in a few vessels off Air Force Beach, took part.









						Army, navy storm Comox beach in joint training operation - Comox Valley Record
					

Exercise Cougar Gauntlet provides week of training for military reservists




					www.comoxvalleyrecord.com


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> You mean this landmark 'amphibious invasion' exercise wasn't a warning to Putin? Geez...
> 
> 
> Army, navy storm Comox beach in joint training operation
> 
> Canadian Armed Forces personnel combined forces the morning of May 11 to storm a beach in Comox.
> 
> The littoral, or shore, assault was part of Exercise Cougar Gauntlet in the area as of March 6 for a one-week period.
> 
> More than 300 reserve members, primarily army reserve from 39 Canadian Brigade, but with assistance from navy members stationed in a few vessels off Air Force Beach, took part.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Army, navy storm Comox beach in joint training operation - Comox Valley Record
> 
> 
> Exercise Cougar Gauntlet provides week of training for military reservists
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.comoxvalleyrecord.com


The Halifax class anchored off the beach was a bit of a hint this was an administrative event in everything but name.
  I had honestly expected a massive train wreck - due to the lack of familiarity with OTB (Over the Beach) Operations the CAF has outside of CANSOF - I am glad that it was conducted without a loss of life.
   But I don't think there was any actual training value gained from this - other than one needs more assets to make something like this viable.

Now, do I think that both coasts should have some sort of OTB ability - totally - but that requires buy in from all the services to be able to acquire the needed tools, and train together to make amphibious and littoral operations viable.
   Missing are:
1) Doctrine to support
2) Large Naval Assets (think a Tarawa type LHA) 
3) MH/TacHel Assets in enough quantity to be able to move troops in quantities inland
4) Real Surf Zone small transports (an Assault Raft is not a practical surf zone setup)
5) Some sort of Amphibious Armored Transport 
6) Landing Craft for large vehicles (Light Tanks, LAV, Artillery and logistics vehicles).


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> The Halifax class anchored off the beach was a bit of a hint this was an administrative event in everything but name.
> I had honestly expected a massive train wreck - due to the lack of familiarity with OTB (Over the Beach) Operations the CAF has outside of CANSOF - I am glad that it was conducted without a loss of life.
> But I don't think there was any actual training value gained from this - other than one needs more assets to make something like this viable.
> 
> Now, do I think that both coasts should have some sort of OTB ability - totally - but that requires buy in from all the services to be able to acquire the needed tools, and train together to make amphibious and littoral operations viable.
> Missing are:
> 1) Doctrine to support
> 2) Large Naval Assets (think a Tarawa type LHA)
> 3) MH/TacHel Assets in enough quantity to be able to move troops in quantities inland
> 4) Real Surf Zone small transports (an Assault Raft is not a practical surf zone setup)
> 5) Some sort of Amphibious Armored Transport
> 6) Landing Craft for large vehicles (Light Tanks, LAV, Artillery and logistics vehicles).



Trained leadership is probably a good start point. I'm guessing we'd need a 'few good Coles' on the job


----------



## Colin Parkinson

KevinB said:


> The Halifax class anchored off the beach was a bit of a hint this was an administrative event in everything but name.
> I had honestly expected a massive train wreck - due to the lack of familiarity with OTB (Over the Beach) Operations the CAF has outside of CANSOF - I am glad that it was conducted without a loss of life.
> But I don't think there was any actual training value gained from this - other than one needs more assets to make something like this viable.
> 
> Now, do I think that both coasts should have some sort of OTB ability - totally - but that requires buy in from all the services to be able to acquire the needed tools, and train together to make amphibious and littoral operations viable.
> Missing are:
> 1) Doctrine to support
> 2) Large Naval Assets (think a Tarawa type LHA)
> 3) MH/TacHel Assets in enough quantity to be able to move troops in quantities inland
> 4) Real Surf Zone small transports (an Assault Raft is not a practical surf zone setup)
> 5) Some sort of Amphibious Armored Transport
> 6) Landing Craft for large vehicles (Light Tanks, LAV, Artillery and logistics vehicles).


This is more akin to the classic RM landings of the 19th Century to capture high ground over a fort to compel surrender, just missing the Sailors dragging some artillery ashore. 

Canada could certainly use a couple of these. Crew is around 18-25


			https://i.pinimg.com/originals/68/2e/a6/682ea64b678142e6f8a3dc93cbeccd4d.jpg


----------



## GR66

Colin Parkinson said:


> This is more akin to the classic RM landings of the 19th Century to capture high ground over a fort to compel surrender, just missing the Sailors dragging some artillery ashore.
> 
> Canada could certainly use a couple of these. Crew is around 18-25
> 
> 
> https://i.pinimg.com/originals/68/2e/a6/682ea64b678142e6f8a3dc93cbeccd4d.jpg


For a small Army like Canada's, rather than having a limited niche capability that a few Landing Ship carrying vessels would provide (near shore to shore transport only), wouldn't we be better off with longer range aviation assets like the Chinook or the FVL program winner?

Aircraft let you deploy from further off shore and land your troops beyond the shoreline.  Vertical lift aircraft can potentially deploy from a range of bases...including both land-based FOBs as well as a range of our own (or allies) naval vessels that have the appropriately sized landing deck.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> For a small Army like Canada's, rather than having a limited niche capability that a few Landing Ship carrying vessels would provide (near shore to shore transport only), wouldn't we be better off with longer range aviation assets like the Chinook or the FVL program winner?
> 
> Aircraft let you deploy from further off shore and land your troops beyond the shoreline.  Vertical lift aircraft can potentially deploy from a range of bases...including both land-based FOBs as well as a range of our own (or allies) naval vessels that have the appropriately sized landing deck.



Absalon.  Absalon.  Absalon.





__





						Absalon class Frigate Command Support Ship Royal Danish Navy
					

absalon class frigate command support ship royal danish navy hdms esbern snare stanflex essm missile harpoon



					www.seaforces.org
				




It wouldn't take much to configure a Type 25 from the current design to the Command & Support configuration - and the navy gets to keep most of the utility of a frigate with the added utility of a mothership.  The army gains a transport and the air force gains a FARP.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Absalon.  Absalon.  Absalon.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Absalon class Frigate Command Support Ship Royal Danish Navy
> 
> 
> absalon class frigate command support ship royal danish navy hdms esbern snare stanflex essm missile harpoon
> 
> 
> 
> www.seaforces.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It wouldn't take much to configure a Type 25 from the current design to the Command & Support configuration - and the navy gets to keep most of the utility of a frigate with the added utility of a mothership.  The army gains a transport and the air force gains a FARP.


Wouldn't the JSS fit the same role?


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Wouldn't the JSS fit the same role?



Dutch JSS or Canadian JSS?  The RCN wanted, and needed AORs.  The Army saw a big ship and said "take me" so a bunch of stuff was grafted on to it.  The Dutch built their JSS/LPD fleet as dedicated vessels for their Marine Corps - the Corps from which the Royals and the USMC descended.

The Danish Navy built a ship that could defend itself, transport a company combat team and hunt subs.  In the Canadian context, and with the notion that something is better than nothing, combined with the rising costs of the CSC programme I like the idea of converting some of the CSC build, perhaps a flight, to the C&S model.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

GR66 said:


> For a small Army like Canada's, rather than having a limited niche capability that a few Landing Ship carrying vessels would provide (near shore to shore transport only), wouldn't we be better off with longer range aviation assets like the Chinook or the FVL program winner?
> 
> Aircraft let you deploy from further off shore and land your troops beyond the shoreline.  Vertical lift aircraft can potentially deploy from a range of bases...including both land-based FOBs as well as a range of our own (or allies) naval vessels that have the appropriately sized landing deck.


The landing ship lets you deploy the LAV's and other equipment which seems to be what our infantry is built around. Plus the larger ones can self deploy. They would do well in the Arctic exercises and fulfil the needs for domestic emergence and responding to disasters overseas, which our current government loves to talk about. Not to mention supporting our allies in various ops around the world. The base crew is around MCDV levels or even less. I know there is a lot of other stuff we need to fix first, but I think in the long run it's a capability we should have.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> The landing ship lets you deploy the LAV's and other equipment which seems to be what our infantry is built around. Plus the larger ones can self deploy. They would do well in the Arctic exercises and fulfil the needs for domestic emergence and responding to disasters overseas, which our current government loves to talk about. Not to mention supporting our allies in various ops around the world. The base crew is around MCDV levels or even less. I know there is a lot of other stuff we need to fix first, but I think in the long run it's a capability we should have.



Canada used to be pretty good at operating these things when we were known as 'The Water Rats':






						LVT-4 Water Buffalo (1943)
					

The Landing, Vehicle, Tracked Mark 4 was used on all front from 1944



					tanks-encyclopedia.com


----------



## GR66

Colin Parkinson said:


> The landing ship lets you deploy the LAV's and other equipment which seems to be what our infantry is built around. Plus the larger ones can self deploy. They would do well in the Arctic exercises and fulfil the needs for domestic emergence and responding to disasters overseas, which our current government loves to talk about. Not to mention supporting our allies in various ops around the world. The base crew is around MCDV levels or even less. I know there is a lot of other stuff we need to fix first, but I think in the long run it's a capability we should have.


Not arguing that something like that wouldn't be a nice to have capability...but there are lots of "nice to haves" on the list.  Not sure that this one would make it into my top 10 though.

I don't see Canada getting into the opposed amphibious landing business any time soon, so what we're really looking at is littoral deployment capabilities into permissive environments.  JSS can support deployment by Chinooks.  AOPS and CSC's can support deployments by medium-lift helicopters.  All of the above have small craft for over the beach deployments.  If LAVs are needed we can deploy them by C-17 or JSS if required.  

For emergency response along our own coasts one look at the map will tell you that wherever you place your handful of amphibious ships they are likely to be quite far away from where they are needed.  Airborne deployments will certainly be your quicker response option so if I had to choose where to invest my limited dollars I'd pick additional aircraft over the amphibious capability.  Aircraft also have the advantage of being able go places other than the shoreline.

Again, not discounting amphibs as an excellent capability to have, but in the absence of having the funds available to fully and properly develop the capability as @KevinB outlined above, then to my mind improving our air transport capability is the smarter way to go.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Even these are not for opposed landing, in fact I don't see anyone doing opposed landings anymore, unless it's a bunch of tribesman armed with AK's opposing. If we went for stuff like this they could be manned by Canadian RFA types. It does allow you to quickly bring heavy equipment, trucks and AFV's to shore without any available infrastructure.


----------



## Kirkhill

I think we have a working skeleton on which to build.









						Marine Atlantic - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




Depending on how you look at the map the Arctic Coast of Canada is an extension of the Atlantic Coast.



> *Marine Atlantic Inc.* (French: _Marine Atlantique_) is an independent Canadian federal Crown corporation which is mandated to operate ferry services between the provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia.



Extend the mandate and vary the composition of the fleet.


----------



## Kirkhill

Bay Ferries - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






> *Bay Ferries Limited*, or simply, *Bay Ferries*, is a ferry company operating in eastern Canada and is headquartered in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Canada. It is a subsidiary of Northumberland Ferries Limited and a sister company to the defunct Bay Ferries Great Lakes Limited.
> 
> Bay Ferries began operations in 1997 upon being awarded the operating licenses for ferry routes in the Bay of Fundy and Gulf of Maine which were being discontinued by federal Crown corporation Marine Atlantic as part of cost-cutting measures.



And that type of cost cutting is exactly what the government should not be doing.  Would you destroy a bridge or highway as a cost-cutting measure?

Ferries, Ports and Airports are critical to the development of Canada.  Especially north of 55.


----------



## KevinB

The CAF needs to figure out what it really wants to be.   Right now IMHO the taxpayer gets a pretty terrible return on investment due to lack of strategic planning and inter service (and inter regimental) rivalries.

I think there needs to be a massive increase in the TacHel to properly support domestic response - as well as overseas.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The CAF needs to figure out what it really wants to be.   Right now IMHO the taxpayer gets a pretty terrible return on investment due to lack of strategic planning and inter service (and inter regimental) rivalries.
> 
> I think there needs to be a massive increase in the TacHel to properly support domestic response - as well as overseas.



An easy way to start, if they wanted to go that route, would be to buy another 24 CH-47s and split them between 408 and 438 while adding more CH-146/Bell 412 qualified civvies into the Reserve ranks and/or reallocate the Combat Support "Squadrons" at Cold Lake and Bagotville.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> An easy way to start, if they wanted to go that route, would be to buy another 24 CH-47s and split them between 408 and 438 while adding more CH-146/Bell 412 qualified civvies into the Reserve ranks and/or reallocate the Combat Support "Squadrons" at Cold Lake and Bagotville.


I cannot support the Griffon, I'd gladly take the Hook's - but the Griffon really isn't a useful UH, unless 4 troops and a Toboggan is your idea of a valid UH...
    Upgrade them to the UH-1Y, and I will shut my mouth - but I think the better option is get more Hooks now and look at FVL for the winner...


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I cannot support the Griffon, I'd gladly take the Hook's - but the Griffon really isn't a useful UH, unless 4 troops and a Toboggan is your idea of a valid UH...
> Upgrade them to the UH-1Y, and I will shut my mouth - but I think the better option is get more Hooks now and look at FVL for the winner...



Limited bucks - First things first.  I would spend money on the Hooks before Vipers, Venoms or Hawks.  The need for, and utility of, the Hooks is greater.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> The CAF needs to figure out what it really wants to be.   Right now IMHO the taxpayer gets a pretty terrible return on investment due to lack of strategic planning and inter service (and inter regimental) rivalries.
> 
> I think there needs to be a massive increase in the TacHel to properly support domestic response - as well as overseas.


The highlighted part really is (always has been) the key missing piece.  The CAF has a tendency to half-ass EVERYTHING rather than focusing on properly and fully investing in key capabilities even if it might potentially mean that other capabilities may suffer.  

We tend to blame the government for this, but in reality I think most of the blame goes to the CAF itself.  Strong, Secure, Engaged (along with literally every previous defence policy document put out by governments of both federal parties) calls for Canada's military to be: 


*Strong at home*, its sovereignty well-defended by a Canadian Armed Forces also ready to assist in times of natural disaster, other emergencies, and search and rescue.
Secure in North Am*erica*, active in a renewed defence partnership in NORAD and with the United States.
*Engaged in the world*, with the Canadian Armed Forces doing its part in Canada's contributions to a more stable, peaceful world, including through peace support operations and peacekeeping.
The first two objectives are very closely related in the capabilities required and due to the huge size of our country those same capabilities are essentially expeditionary in nature and can be used to meet the third requirement.

Military threats to Canada primarily come from the Sea and Air.  Detecting those threats is the first priority, so NORAD modernization, Satellites, OPVs, MPA's, UAVs, etc. are required.  Then we need to be able to respond to those threats so Fighters, surface combatants, submarines and AD systems are required.  

Then we need to be able to respond to any ground and non-kinetic threats, so a rapidly deployable (light) force that can get quickly to any point in Canada is required along with the ability to counter cyber threats and non-conventional threats that are beyond the capabilities of law enforcement to handle.  

All of the above require robust logistics capabilities.  Lots of air transport.  Air-to-Air Refueling.  Ships capable of carrying supplies.  

Meet those domestic requirements with a properly equipped force and you will automatically be able to fulfill the requirements to be engaged elsewhere in the World.  Fighters, naval forces, AAR and transport aircraft, AD systems, Light Rapid Response forces, robust logistics support.  I think all of our allies would be quite happy if we could provide those things even if it means we don't have an Armoured Division to add to the mix.


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> An easy way to start, if they wanted to go that route, would be to buy another 24 CH-47s and split them between 408 and 438 while adding more CH-146/Bell 412 qualified civvies into the Reserve ranks and/or reallocate the Combat Support "Squadrons" at Cold Lake and Bagotville.


Close, but....

Get out of the 412 platform for tac hel (move them into domestic only use for dispersed SAR etc (like 417 SQN) or RW initial flight training and get a fleet of S70i plus a few MH6 for CanSOFCom


----------



## Prairie canuck

GR66 said:


> Not arguing that something like that wouldn't be a nice to have capability...but there are lots of "nice to haves" on the list.  Not sure that this one would make it into my top 10 though.
> 
> I don't see Canada getting into the opposed amphibious landing business any time soon, so what we're really looking at is littoral deployment capabilities into permissive environments.  JSS can support deployment by Chinooks.  AOPS and CSC's can support deployments by medium-lift helicopters.  All of the above have small craft for over the beach deployments.  If LAVs are needed we can deploy them by C-17 or JSS if required.
> 
> For emergency response along our own coasts one look at the map will tell you that wherever you place your handful of amphibious ships they are likely to be quite far away from where they are needed.  Airborne deployments will certainly be your quicker response option so if I had to choose where to invest my limited dollars I'd pick additional aircraft over the amphibious capability.  Aircraft also have the advantage of being able go places other than the shoreline.
> 
> Again, not discounting amphibs as an excellent capability to have, but in the absence of having the funds available to fully and properly develop the capability as @KevinB outlined above, then to my mind improving our air transport capability is the smarter way to go.


I know I've posted this in another thread and it's conceptual but Davie's G-LAM does answer many needs along with supplementing the 2 new AORs with some limited RAS capabilty. Large flight deck and hanger etc.


----------



## KevinB

Skysix said:


> Close, but....
> 
> Get out of the 412 platform for tac hel (move them into domestic only use for dispersed SAR etc (like 417 SQN) or RW initial flight training and get a fleet of S70i plus a few MH6 for CanSOFCom


I love the Hawk, but for now I think it’s better to wait and see with FVL.   No point in TacHel getting 60R’s unless one can get a screaming deal at this point.


----------



## Skysix

KevinB said:


> I love the Hawk, but for now I think it’s better to wait and see with FVL.   No point in TacHel getting 60R’s unless one can get a screaming deal at this point.


Several counterpoints (in no particular order as my squirrel brain spits them out)

FVL is still very much a developmental tech and is probably 10-12 years away from mature and widespread implementation

The 41EP-SAR (Griffon) will be nearing end of their cost effective operational and parts supported utility long before the Canadian purchasing system sees deliveries of FVL

The 60R might satisfy our Naval needs but there are other varients more suited to Army and Air Force needs.

The US does not sell export UH60'x', they are all S70's. They will gift old 60's to second and third world armies and airforces however (for example Afghanistan).

FVL will be a quantum increase in cost over the 412 with a lot less built in Canada spinoffs (assuming you consider Bell in Quebec as being in Canada😜) so there will not only be an inflation driven fleet size reduction  but also a larger platform cost driven fleet size reduction

The 'Hawk series with the newest generation of avionics will be a viable and supported platform for 15-20 years and is in widespread use by NATO and other allies - FVL will be a tightly held tech for a while.

The V22 took over 20 years to become a reliable transport. With a lot of fatalities along the way. We do not have the depth of experience or fleet size to support that sort of incremental safety improvement upgrade.


----------



## Kirkhill

The upper photo is of the LPD HMS Albion swaying out a pair of LCVPs from her davits.
The lower photo is of Marine Atlantic's RoPax ferry Highlanders (previously Stena Traveller).

I believe I could make a commercial case for an ice strengthened version of the Highlanders with the addition of the LCVP davits to launch LCVPs as freight lighters to remote communities along the coast.  Buy 3 more ships than the commercial service justifies but keep them in service at a low rate of use.


----------



## Skysix

Speaking of Reserve vs Active culture/conflict...









						South Korea Needs a Wake-Up Call On Its Reservist Crisis - War on the Rocks
					

As the war in Ukraine unfolds, some countries have started to take a closer look at the readiness of their military reserve forces, and what they are



					warontherocks.com


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> The upper photo is of the LPD HMS Albion swaying out a pair of LCVPs from her davits.
> The lower photo is of Marine Atlantic's RoPax ferry Highlanders (previously Stena Traveller).
> 
> I believe I could make a commercial case for an ice strengthened version of the Highlanders with the addition of the LCVP davits to launch LCVPs as freight lighters to remote communities along the coast.  Buy 3 more ships than the commercial service justifies but keep them in service at a low rate of use.
> 
> View attachment 72212
> View attachment 72213











						You Go to War with the Watercraft You Have - War on the Rocks
					

The U.S military is at risk of repeating Russia’s logistics failures in Ukraine during a war in the Indo-Pacific. One of the enduring images from Russia’s



					warontherocks.com
				




And people...no lessons learned here









						Marine unit involved in high-surf amphibious vehicle rollover same as one involved in 2020 sinking
					

The Marine unit operating in high surf off Camp Pendleton when two of its amphibious troop carriers floundered in the waves last week is the




					americanmilitarynews.com


----------



## Dale Denton

Kirkhill said:


> The upper photo is of the LPD HMS Albion swaying out a pair of LCVPs from her davits.
> The lower photo is of Marine Atlantic's RoPax ferry Highlanders (previously Stena Traveller).
> 
> I believe I could make a commercial case for an ice strengthened version of the Highlanders with the addition of the LCVP davits to launch LCVPs as freight lighters to remote communities along the coast.  Buy 3 more ships than the commercial service justifies but keep them in service at a low rate of use.



Agreed, we should augment the tiny fleet of AORs with plenty of cheap options in lieu of more Protecteurs.

The oldest ship in the Royal Naval Service to become the new Littoral Strike Ship

A closer look at the Littoral Strike Ship concept

Converting the Bay-class auxiliaries into littoral strike ships


----------



## daftandbarmy

Skysix said:


> Speaking of Reserve vs Active culture/conflict...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> South Korea Needs a Wake-Up Call On Its Reservist Crisis - War on the Rocks
> 
> 
> As the war in Ukraine unfolds, some countries have started to take a closer look at the readiness of their military reserve forces, and what they are
> 
> 
> 
> warontherocks.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> This is more akin to the classic RM landings of the 19th Century to capture high ground over a fort to compel surrender, just missing the Sailors dragging some artillery ashore.
> 
> Canada could certainly use a couple of these. Crew is around 18-25
> 
> 
> https://i.pinimg.com/originals/68/2e/a6/682ea64b678142e6f8a3dc93cbeccd4d.jpg





Kirkhill said:


> Absalon.  Absalon.  Absalon.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Absalon class Frigate Command Support Ship Royal Danish Navy
> 
> 
> absalon class frigate command support ship royal danish navy hdms esbern snare stanflex essm missile harpoon
> 
> 
> 
> www.seaforces.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It wouldn't take much to configure a Type 25 from the current design to the Command & Support configuration - and the navy gets to keep most of the utility of a frigate with the added utility of a mothership.  The army gains a transport and the air force gains a FARP.





GR66 said:


> Wouldn't the JSS fit the same role?



The RN's Type 31 descends from the Iver Huitfeldts which in turn descend from the Absalon.  The Huitfeldts are characterized by a AAW suite.
The Absalons are characterized by a large open space - a Flex Deck.



> The *Type 31 frigate* or *Inspiration class*, and formerly known as the *Type 31e frigate* or *General Purpose Frigate* (GPF), is a planned class of frigate intended to enter service with the United Kingdom's Royal Navy in the 2020s alongside the submarine-hunting Type 26 frigate.[11] Designed by Babcock International, it is also marketed under the name *Arrowhead 140* and was based on the hull of the _Iver Huitfeldt_-class frigate.[12]



The Type 32s descend from the Type 31s meaning they descend ultimately from the Absalons.  Both the Absalon and the Type 32s are characterized by their Flex Decks.  Absalon was designed to host a Company Combat Team but has been used to host ASW and Anti-Piracy teams as well as doing Standing Patrols.  The Type 32s are designed "with a focus on hosting and operating autonomous onboard systems" and " to support the Royal Navy's new Littoral Response Groups (LRGs)."

What is more autonomous than a Company Combat Team?

The RN is planning to sail 8 Type 26s, 5 Type 31s (Iver Huitfeldt variants) and 5 Type 32s (Absalon variants).



> _Defence in a Competitive Age_, elaborated further on the Type 32 frigate stating that it would be designed to protect territorial waters, to provide persistent presence and to support the Royal Navy's new Littoral Response Groups (LRGs). The document also stated that, along with the Type 31, the frigates would be more flexible than their predecessors, featuring a modular design, and equipped with advanced sensors and weapons.[6] According to the document, the ships are likely to be built at Scottish shipyards, like the Type 26 and Type 31.[6]
> 
> During the DSEI exhibition in September 2021, Babcock International revealed it was pitching its Arrowhead 140 design, used by the Type 31 frigate, as the base design for the Type 32. The company's Chief Corporate Affairs Officer John Howie stated that the design was well suited to the Royal Navy's requirements for the Type 32, with a flexible mission bay capable of operating subsurface and airborne autonomous systems.[7]
> 
> In November 2021, Royal Navy First Sea Lord Tony Radakin announced that the ship had entered its concept phase. He added that it was too early to define its characteristics but being a "Type 31 Batch 2" frigate could be an option. Radakin also reiterated the intent of the programme to provide "additional volume" to the fleet and embrace emerging technology.[8] The revised National Shipbuilding Strategy, released in March 2022, suggested that the Type 32 frigates were likely to be "the first of a new generation of warships with a focus on hosting and operating autonomous onboard systems".[9] Earlier comments by the UK's Minister for Defense Procurement, Jeremy Quin, also suggested that the new Type 32 frigate will be a platform for autonomous systems, adding to the Royal Navy's capabilities for missions such as anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures.[10]








						Type 32 frigate - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				











						Future of the Royal Navy - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Colin Parkinson

What you really need is a ocean crossing capable vessel that can self land heavy equipment on unprepared beaches, either by coming ashore (LST type) or a flooding deck to load landing craft that it carries. Also a helipad and if not a LST then a hanger as well. Note I am not suggesting vessels that can do opposed landings.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> What you really need is a ocean crossing capable vessel that can self land heavy equipment on unprepared beaches, either by coming ashore (LST type) or a flooding deck to load landing craft that it carries. Also a helipad and if not a LST then a hanger as well. Note I am not suggesting vessels that can do opposed landings.



Fearful and Insipid enter the chat 



			Fearless class Landing Platform Dock Amphibious - Royal Navy


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> The CAF needs to figure out what it really wants to be.   Right now IMHO the taxpayer gets a pretty terrible return on investment due to lack of strategic planning and inter service (and inter regimental) rivalries.
> 
> I think there needs to be a massive increase in the TacHel to properly support domestic response - as well as overseas.


Part of the problem with the highlighted portion is related to equipment and another part is political.  

On the equipment side we don't have enough tanks to make all of our Brigades "Heavy".  On the other hand we don't have enough LAVs to make all three of our Brigades fully "Medium" either.  You could make all three Brigades "Light" but then what do you do with the LAVs and tanks you do have?  You could give them to the Reserves, but there's a 193 page discussion of why that's not going to happen any time soon.  

So what are your options?  You can either have Brigades that are a mix of unit types that don't really work together (like we have now), or you can have asymmetrical Brigades (1 x Heavy, 1 x Medium and 1 x Light).  This is where we run into the political problems.

Firstly you have the language issue.  If you create asymmetrical Brigades what does that do for career planning?  If all the tanks for example are in Edmonton then what do you do with the Francophone tankers (or recruits that want to become tankers)?  

Secondly you have the Regimental mafias.  Which Regiment gets to be Heavy/Medium/Light?  What if the bulk of deployments to places/missions that are considered "favourable" go disproportionately to one Brigade due to them having the most appropriate force type while more of the "less favourable" deployments fall to another Brigade?  Same thing goes with deployment splits between the Anglo and Franco Brigades.

The Regimental issue could at least partially be helped by splitting up the existing 3 x Regiments into 9 x individually named Battalions (or alternately make them all Battalions of a single Regiment (like in Australia), but the geographical/linguistic issue would still remain.

Personally I think the best route would be to have all three Brigades configured the same so that you'd have the makings for a full Division but going Heavy or Medium would require significant new vehicle purchases while going Light would be politically difficult with all the money that's recently gone into the LAV fleet.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Our current problem is easily summed up with this allegory:

-The Government wants us to have $2.00 with the least amount of coinage possible
- We currently have about $1.25 if we're being generous. It's all in nickels.
-we can switch out our nickels for any other size of coinage we want.
-Everyone will have their own opinion on what configuration of coins they want to have BUT:

-At the end of the day, we're 75 cents short and until we get that $0.75 from the Government that sets the $2.00 target, we will still just be switching $1.25 around trying to make it 2 bucks.


----------



## IKnowNothing

@GR66 what about expanding the option set?

We have the symmetrical status quo,  the proposed asymmetrical 1+1+1,  why not asymmetrical 2+1, with 1 and 5 remaining CMBG's with all of the LAV's and tanks split between them, 2 goes light?


----------



## GR66

rmc_wannabe said:


> Our current problem is easily summed up with this allegory:
> 
> -The Government wants us to have $2.00 with the least amount of coinage possible
> - We currently have about $1.25 if we're being generous. It's all in nickels.
> -we can switch out our nickels for any other size of coinage we want.
> -Everyone will have their own opinion on what configuration of coins they want to have BUT:
> 
> -At the end of the day, we're 75 cents short and until we get that $0.75 from the Government that sets the $2.00 target, we will still just be switching $1.25 around trying to make it 2 bucks.


True, but also remember that even if the government coughs up the extra $0.75 it might not go to you.  You have two brothers you have to share the $2.00 with and they have things they want to buy as well.  Either way you can spend the $1.25 wisely and at least have something you can use or you can spend it unwisely.


----------



## McG

IKnowNothing said:


> @GR66 what about expanding the option set?
> 
> We have the symmetrical status quo,  the proposed asymmetrical 1+1+1,  why not asymmetrical 2+1, with 1 and 5 remaining CMBG's with all of the LAV's and tanks split between them, 2 goes light?


Valcartier does not have the infrastructure to support or employ modern tanks. Neither does Petawawa.
Even if all the tanks are in Edmonton, we will not have an armoured brigade. 2 mech brigades and one light brigade is a reasonable structure for our army if we feel that we need to keep a light battalion for every infantry cap badge.


----------



## GR66

IKnowNothing said:


> @GR66 what about expanding the option set?
> 
> We have the symmetrical status quo,  the proposed asymmetrical 1+1+1,  why not asymmetrical 2+1, with 1 and 5 remaining CMBG's with all of the LAV's and tanks split between them, 2 goes light?


I guess asymmetrical is still asymmetrical.  Similar potential problems.  I guess if the perfect solution existed then it would have been done.  Whatever the Army ends up doing it will likely solve some problems, leave some existing problems unresolved and create some new problems.


----------



## IKnowNothing

McG said:


> Valcartier does not have the infrastructure to support or employ modern tanks. Neither does Petawawa.
> Even if all the tanks are in Edmonton, we will not have an armoured brigade. 2 mech brigades and one light brigade is a reasonable structure for our army if we feel that we need to keep a light battalion for every infantry cap badge.


Could the tanks stay at Gagetown with 12 RBC filling the whole squadron?


----------



## McG

IKnowNothing said:


> Could the tanks stay at Gagetown with 12 RBC filling the whole squadron?


The infrastructure exists, but you will end up with an infantry battalion and a tank squadron that are co-located but don’t optimize their collaborative training because each is being directed by a different Bde HQ.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> On the equipment side we don't have enough tanks to make all of our Brigades "Heavy". On the other hand we don't have enough LAVs to make all three of our Brigades fully "Medium" either. You could make all three Brigades "Light" but then what do you do with the LAVs and tanks you do have? You could give them to the Reserves, but there's a 193 page discussion of why that's not going to happen any time soon.


 
But we might be able to make one Swedish Pattern Combined Arms Brigade with what we have.

Major acquisitions  would be 24 AMOS 120mm Mortar Systems, and 12 MSHORAD type AA systems

CV90 type CCVs would be nice but we could cheap out initially with LAV 6.0s


RCAC BdeLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MISTAR SqnLdSH(RC)RCD12 RBCLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MCCVCCVCCVCCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-AACCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-RCCV-PnrCCV-PnrCCV-PnrCCV-PnrCCV-PnrCCV-PnrCCV-PnrCCV-PnrCCV-PnrAVLBAVLBAVLBLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MLeo 2A6MAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSAMOSLeo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4Leo 2A4CCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-EMECCV-EMECCV-EMECCV-EMECCV-EMECCV-EMEARVARVARVARVARVARVBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-AmbBVs-AmbBVs-AmbBVs-AmbBVs-AmbBVs-AmbLeo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4MLeo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4Leo 2A4CCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-FOCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-CPCCV-MainCCV-MainCCV-MainCCV-MainCCV-MainCCV-MainARVARVARVARVARVARVBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-LogBVs-AmbBVs-AmbBVs-AmbBVs-AmbBVs-AmbBVs-AmbCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCVCCV


----------



## Kirkhill

As for the rest of the Regular Army - 3 Light Brigades modeled on the SSF (+), the CCSB and a Canadian Artillery Group.


1 CBG2 CBG5 CBGLight Recce Strike BnLight Recce Strike BnLight Recce Strike BnLAV Inf BnLAV Inf BnLAV Inf BnLt Inf BnLt Inf BnLt Inf BnEng SqnEng SqnEng SqnHelo SqnHelo SqnHelo SqnHQ&SigsHQ&SigsHQ&SigsSvcSvcSvcCCSBCAG1 RCHA2 RCHA5 RALC4 RCA


----------



## Kirkhill

For the Reserves, keep the Divisions and Territorial Brigade (Groups) as adminstrative centres focused on HQ&Sigs, Svc and Engineering.

Redesignate the infantry according to precedence in the RCIC with its current title as an honourific in the same way the Brits have handled the Rifles and the Royal Regiment of Scotland.  The GGFG for example would become 1 RCIC (GGFG).  Likewise the RCAC would reorganize.  The RRCA is already in position to easily reorganize.

So.

I propose the RCIC focus on generating 51 Light Infantry Company Combat Teams, complete with AD, AT, Pnr, DFS and Mor/PF elements, while the RCAC focus on generating 18 Light Recce Strike / ISTAR / Cav Squadrons.  The RRCA, with its 40 Batteries under it various Regiments could perhaps manage 30 Field Batteries and 10 Missile Batteries (NASAMS type launchers for SHORAD as well as Pods for HIMARS/NSM type missiles).

Once the Sub-Unit level is sorted out and working adequately then we might be able to start thinking about Reserve battalions, brigades and divisions.


2 Cdn Div3 Cdn Div4 Cdn Div5 Cdn Div34 TBG35 TBG38 TBG39 TBG41 TBG31 TBG32 TBG33 TBG36 TBG37 TBGRRCA (Reserves)Btys1 RRCA5 RRCA9 RRCA13 RRCA17 RRCA21 RRCA25 RRCA29 RRCA33 RRCA37 RRCA2 RRCA6 RRCA10 RRCA14 RRCA18 RRCA22 RRCA26 RRCA30 RRCA34 RRCA38 RRCA3 RRCA7 RRCA11 RRCA15 RRCA19 RRCA23 RRCA27 RRCA31 RRCA35 RRCA39 RRCA4 RRCA8 RRCA12 RRCA16 RRCA20 RRCA24 RRCA28 RRCA32 RRCA36 RRCA40 RRCARCAC (Reserves)LRS Sqns1 RCAC (GGHG)3 RCAC (8CH)5 RCAC (QYR)7 RCAC (12RBC)8 RCAC (1H)10 RCAC (RCH)12 RCAC (SALH)13 RCAC (SD)15 RCAC (BCD)17 RCAC (RdH)2 RCAC (HR)4 RCAC (OR)6 RCAC (SH)9 RCAC (PEIR)11 RCAC (BCR)14 rCAC (KOCR)16 RCAC (FGH)18 RCAC (WR)RCIC (Reserve)Light Inf CCTs1 RCIC (GGFG)6 RCIC (RRC)11 RCIC (4RCR)16 RCIC (SDGH)21 RCIC (FMR)51 RCIC (2 RNR)26 RCIC (NNSH)31 RCIC (48HC)36 RCIC (LSSR)41 RCIC (QOCHC)46 RCIC (CSR)2 RCIC (CG)7 RCIC (RHLI)12 RCIC (RHFC)17 RCIC (FdSL)22 RCIC (PLF)27 RCIC (RdM)32 RCIC (RdS)37 RCIC (NSR)42 RCIC (RWR)47 RCIC (RMR)3 RCIC (QORC)8 RCIC (PWOR)13 RCIC (GSF)18 RCIC (RdlC)23 RCIC (1RNBR)28 RCIC (CHO)33 RCIC (CBH)38 RCIC (RRR)43 RCIC (CH)48 RCIC (2RIRC)4 RCIC (RHRC)9 RCIC (HPER)14 RCIC (LS)19 RCIC (4R22R)24 RCIC (WNSR)29 RCIC (RWR)34 RCIC (AR)39 RCIC (RMR)44 RCIC (FdS)49 RCIC (TSR)5 RCIC (VG)10 RCIC (LWR)15 RCIC (BR)20 RCIC (6R22R)25 RCIC (NSNBR)30 RCIC (EKS)35 RCIC (ASHC)40 RCIC (LER)45 RCIC (SHC)50 RCIC (1RNR)


----------



## Kirkhill

Standard Infantry Coy for Reserves and Regs

A LAV Coy is a Standard Coy with LAVs and crews added on top.

Numbers are intentionally left out, as are the number of Regular coys


ADSensorsEffectorsIFSFO/FSCMorPFDFSSniperMGGMGCannonMissileRifleRifleRifleRiflePnrSvcCmd


----------



## Skysix

This could be Canada's best CAS option, and a reserve SQN or two fron the prairies could easiy be stood up.









						Modified Crop Duster Chosen For Special Ops Armed Overwatch Mission
					

The AT-802U Sky Warden is Special Operations Command’s pick for its new precision strike and armed surveillance aircraft.




					www.thedrive.com
				




On a related note, I wonder if this will be flown by USAF pilots or if it will become an Army program. I doubt all the fastair jocks/wannabees that already hate the A10 will love on it


----------



## Ostrozac

Skysix said:


> On a related note, I wonder if this will be flown by USAF pilots or if it will become an Army program. I doubt all the fastair jocks/wannabees that already hate the A10 will love on it


Crews will be USAF. Previous media reporting on the subject quoted the commander of Air Force Special Operations Command, Lieutenant Genreal James Slife, who has a background as a helicopter pilot (MH-53 Pave Low). There’s more to the USAF than fighter pilots.









						These five firms could build a new armed overwatch plane for US Air Force special operators
					

A replacement for the U-28 Draco could be chosen as early as 2022.




					www.defensenews.com


----------



## Skysix

Ostrozac said:


> Crews will be USAF. Previous media reporting on the subject quoted the commander of Air Force Special Operations Command, Lieutenant Genreal James Slife, who has a background as a helicopter pilot (MH-53 Pave Low). There’s more to the USAF than fighter pilots.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> These five firms could build a new armed overwatch plane for US Air Force special operators
> 
> 
> A replacement for the U-28 Draco could be chosen as early as 2022.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defensenews.com


In general, yes. The MH-53 was retired almost 15 years ago (yet the USAF still flies Hueys!) and was replaced by the HH60W. But institutionally and at the General Officer levels they have been trying to ditch the A10 and the CAS mission for years preferring to use F16 etc and GPS bombs over gun runs at 30' in the A10. Let alone the even more austere locations and risky operations this aircraft would be doing. It makes more sense for the Army to fly it.

Not to mention the long standing interservice agreement that the Army would stay out of jets in return for being the helicopter operator. An agreement stretched by the HH60W, UH1N and MH139 on one side and the C20, UC35 and C37 on the other.


----------



## markppcli

Skysix said:


> This could be Canada's best CAS option, and a reserve SQN or two fron the prairies could easiy be stood up.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Modified Crop Duster Chosen For Special Ops Armed Overwatch Mission
> 
> 
> The AT-802U Sky Warden is Special Operations Command’s pick for its new precision strike and armed surveillance aircraft.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.thedrive.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On a related note, I wonder if this will be flown by USAF pilots or if it will become an Army program. I doubt all the fastair jocks/wannabees that already hate the A10 will love on it


Alternatively give the training Hawks a secondary light attack role, I think the Brits had them armed for a while.


----------



## GR66

Maybe we should get a primary combat aircraft before we even consider looking at a second platform...


----------



## Colin Parkinson

At the rate we are going, just contract out to the Commemorative Air Force, the planes are roughly the same vintage and they are used to working on old stuff.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Maybe we should get a primary combat aircraft before we even consider looking at a second platform...



Well F35s are selected, apparently. I’m a little biased based on what I’m doing now, but we would benefit from have some Canadian pilots who could do CAS instead of relying of contracted air craft when the CF18s are more focused, quite rightly, on their primary task of defending Canadian Airspace. But we’re wildly off topic now I think.


----------



## GR66

GR66 said:


> Part of the problem with the highlighted portion is related to equipment and another part is political.
> 
> On the equipment side we don't have enough tanks to make all of our Brigades "Heavy".  On the other hand we don't have enough LAVs to make all three of our Brigades fully "Medium" either.  You could make all three Brigades "Light" but then what do you do with the LAVs and tanks you do have?  You could give them to the Reserves, but there's a 193 page discussion of why that's not going to happen any time soon.
> 
> So what are your options?  You can either have Brigades that are a mix of unit types that don't really work together (like we have now), or you can have asymmetrical Brigades (1 x Heavy, 1 x Medium and 1 x Light).  This is where we run into the political problems.
> 
> Firstly you have the language issue.  If you create asymmetrical Brigades what does that do for career planning?  If all the tanks for example are in Edmonton then what do you do with the Francophone tankers (or recruits that want to become tankers)?
> 
> Secondly you have the Regimental mafias.  Which Regiment gets to be Heavy/Medium/Light?  What if the bulk of deployments to places/missions that are considered "favourable" go disproportionately to one Brigade due to them having the most appropriate force type while more of the "less favourable" deployments fall to another Brigade?  Same thing goes with deployment splits between the Anglo and Franco Brigades.
> 
> The Regimental issue could at least partially be helped by splitting up the existing 3 x Regiments into 9 x individually named Battalions (or alternately make them all Battalions of a single Regiment (like in Australia), but the geographical/linguistic issue would still remain.
> 
> Personally I think the best route would be to have all three Brigades configured the same so that you'd have the makings for a full Division but going Heavy or Medium would require significant new vehicle purchases while going Light would be politically difficult with all the money that's recently gone into the LAV fleet.


Replying to myself with a possible solution.

We have enough equipment for a fly-over Mechanized Brigade in Latvia (upgrade our existing eFP Latvia commitment to a full Brigade Group).

1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
Lord Strathcona's Horse (Edmonton)
1 PPCLI (Edmonton)
1 RCR (Petawawa)
1 R22eR (Valcartier)
1 RCHA (Shilo)
1 CER (Edmonton)
1 Svc (Edmonton)

LdSH would have 3 x Squadrons of tanks in Latvia and 1 x Training Squadron in Edmonton/Wainwright.  LdSH squadrons rotate deployments (1 deployed to Latvia, 1 in work-up training, 1 in refit).
Each infantry Battalion has one vehicle set in Latvia and one at their home base.  Battalions rotate forward deployments.
1 RCHA gets new SP gun system with 3 x Batteries in Latvia and a Training Battery in Shilo.  Batteries rotate deployments.
1 CER and 1 Svc rotate Squadrons/Companies to Latvia.  Additional vehicles/equipment may be required for training in Canada.

The remaining 6 x Regular Battalions would be formed into two Light Brigade Groups.  Each of these Light Battalions could take on an individual Regimental name from the list of existing Regiments (The Queen's Own Rifles, The Black Watch, etc.) or they could all be numbered Battalions from a Regiment from the Supplementary Order of Battle (for example 1 Royal Rifles of Canada, 2 Royal Rifles of Canada, 3 Royal Rifles of Canada, etc.) similar to the Royal Australian Regiment.

2 Canadian Light Brigade Group
Royal Canadian Dragoons (Petawawa)
1 Royal Rifles of Canada (Edmonton)
2 Royal Rifles of Canada (Shilo)
3 Royal Rifles of Canada (Petawawa)
2 RCHA (Petawawa)
2 CER (Petawawa)
2 Svc (Petawawa)


5 Canadian Light Brigade Group
12 RBC (Valcartier)
4 Royal Rifles of Canada (Quebec)
5 Royal Rifles of Canada (Valcartier)
6 Royal Rifles of Canada (Gagetown)
5 RAL (Valcartier)
5 CER (Valcartier)
5 Svc (Valcartier)


Each of the Reserve Brigade Groups could each be amalgamated into additional Light Battalions.  If the two Maritimes Brigades (the region with the lowest population to draw from) were amalgamated then you'd be able to have a complete Reserve Light Infantry Division to draw on:

3 Canadian Light Brigade Group (Reserve)
Armoured Regiment (Amalgamated 38/39/41 Bde Regiments)
7 Royal Rifles of Canada (Vancouver - Amalgamated 39 Bde Regiments)
8 Royal Rifles of Canada (Calgary - Amalgamated 41 Bde Regiments)
9 Royal Rifles of Canada (Winnipeg - Amalgamated 38 Bde Regiments)
Artillery Regiment (Amalgamated 38/39/41 Bde Regiments)
Combat Engineer Regiment (Amalgamated 38/39/41 Bde Regiments)
Service Battalion (Amalgamated 38/39/41 Bde Battalions)


4 Canadian Light Brigade Group (Reserve)
Armoured Regiment (Amalgamated 31/32/33 Bde Regiments)
10 Royal Rifles of Canada (London- Amalgamated 31 Bde Regiments)
11 Royal Rifles of Canada (Toronto- Amalgamated 32 Bde Regiments)
12 Royal Rifles of Canada (Ottawa- Amalgamated 33 Bde Regiments)
Artillery Regiment (Amalgamated 31/32/33 Bde Regiments)
Combat Engineer Regiment (Amalgamated 31/32/33 Bde Regiments)
Service Battalion (Amalgamated 31/32/33 Bde Battalions)


6 Canadian Light Brigade Group (Reserve)
Armoured Regiment (Amalgamated 34/35/36/37 Bde Regiments)
13 Royal Rifles of Canada (Montreal- Amalgamated 34 Bde Regiments)
14 Royal Rifles of Canada (Quebec- Amalgamated 35 Bde Regiments)
15 Royal Rifles of Canada (Halifax- Amalgamated 36/37 Bde Regiments)
Artillery Regiment (Amalgamated 34/35/36/37 Bde Regiments)
Combat Engineer Regiment (Amalgamated 34/35/36/37 Bde Regiments)
Service Battalion (Amalgamated 34/35/36/37 Bde Battalions)


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Replying to myself with a possible solution.
> 
> We have enough equipment for a fly-over Mechanized Brigade in Latvia (upgrade our existing eFP Latvia commitment to a full Brigade Group).
> 
> 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
> Lord Strathcona's Horse (Edmonton)
> 1 PPCLI (Edmonton)
> 1 RCR (Petawawa)
> 1 R22eR (Valcartier)
> 1 RCHA (Shilo)
> 1 CER (Edmonton)
> 1 Svc (Edmonton)
> 
> LdSH would have 3 x Squadrons of tanks in Latvia and 1 x Training Squadron in Edmonton/Wainwright.  LdSH squadrons rotate deployments (1 deployed to Latvia, 1 in work-up training, 1 in refit).
> Each infantry Battalion has one vehicle set in Latvia and one at their home base.  Battalions rotate forward deployments.
> 1 RCHA gets new SP gun system with 3 x Batteries in Latvia and a Training Battery in Shilo.  Batteries rotate deployments.
> 1 CER and 1 Svc rotate Squadrons/Companies to Latvia.  Additional vehicles/equipment may be required for training in Canada.
> 
> The remaining 6 x Regular Battalions would be formed into two Light Brigade Groups.  Each of these Light Battalions could take on an individual Regimental name from the list of existing Regiments (The Queen's Own Rifles, The Black Watch, etc.) or they could all be numbered Battalions from a Regiment from the Supplementary Order of Battle (for example 1 Royal Rifles of Canada, 2 Royal Rifles of Canada, 3 Royal Rifles of Canada, etc.) similar to the Royal Australian Regiment.
> 
> 2 Canadian Light Brigade Group
> Royal Canadian Dragoons (Petawawa)
> 1 Royal Rifles of Canada (Edmonton)
> 2 Royal Rifles of Canada (Shilo)
> 3 Royal Rifles of Canada (Petawawa)
> 2 RCHA (Petawawa)
> 2 CER (Petawawa)
> 2 Svc (Petawawa)
> 
> 5 Canadian Light Brigade Group
> 12 RBC (Valcartier)
> 4 Royal Rifles of Canada (Quebec)
> 5 Royal Rifles of Canada (Valcartier)
> 6 Royal Rifles of Canada (Gagetown)
> 5 RAL (Valcartier)
> 5 CER (Valcartier)
> 5 Svc (Valcartier)
> 
> 
> Each of the Reserve Brigade Groups could each be amalgamated into additional Light Battalions.  If the two Maritimes Brigades (the region with the lowest population to draw from) were amalgamated then you'd be able to have a complete Reserve Light Infantry Division to draw on:
> 
> 3 Canadian Light Brigade Group (Reserve)
> Armoured Regiment (Amalgamated 38/39/41 Bde Regiments)
> 7 Royal Rifles of Canada (Vancouver - Amalgamated 39 Bde Regiments)
> 8 Royal Rifles of Canada (Calgary - Amalgamated 41 Bde Regiments)
> 9 Royal Rifles of Canada (Winnipeg - Amalgamated 38 Bde Regiments)
> Artillery Regiment (Amalgamated 38/39/41 Bde Regiments)
> Combat Engineer Regiment (Amalgamated 38/39/41 Bde Regiments)
> Service Battalion (Amalgamated 38/39/41 Bde Battalions)
> 
> 4 Canadian Light Brigade Group (Reserve)
> Armoured Regiment (Amalgamated 31/32/33 Bde Regiments)
> 10 Royal Rifles of Canada (London- Amalgamated 31 Bde Regiments)
> 11 Royal Rifles of Canada (Toronto- Amalgamated 32 Bde Regiments)
> 12 Royal Rifles of Canada (Ottawa- Amalgamated 33 Bde Regiments)
> Artillery Regiment (Amalgamated 31/32/33 Bde Regiments)
> Combat Engineer Regiment (Amalgamated 31/32/33 Bde Regiments)
> Service Battalion (Amalgamated 31/32/33 Bde Battalions)
> 
> 6 Canadian Light Brigade Group (Reserve)
> Armoured Regiment (Amalgamated 34/35/36/37 Bde Regiments)
> 13 Royal Rifles of Canada (Montreal- Amalgamated 34 Bde Regiments)
> 14 Royal Rifles of Canada (Quebec- Amalgamated 35 Bde Regiments)
> 15 Royal Rifles of Canada (Halifax- Amalgamated 36/37 Bde Regiments)
> Artillery Regiment (Amalgamated 34/35/36/37 Bde Regiments)
> Combat Engineer Regiment (Amalgamated 34/35/36/37 Bde Regiments)
> Service Battalion (Amalgamated 34/35/36/37 Bde Battalions)



Isn't that kind of what we did for WW1 and Korea e.g., abandon the organization we have now as impossible to deal with, and create a new one from scratch, to avoid having to deal with all the petty politics and in fighting?


----------



## Brad Sallows

Prep for Korea was made easier by the fact everyone had just gone through an extended master class in warfare and knew the difference between that and whatever it is the forces revert to in peacetime.


----------



## Old Sweat

Brad Sallows said:


> Prep for Korea was made easier by the fact everyone had just gone through an extended master class in warfare and knew the difference between that and whatever it is the forces revert to in peacetime.


The 1950-1953 time frame must have been interesting. On one hand we had a population of veterans snd adolescents who grew up watching the war. We also had field army's worth of kit.

But we were faced with two theaters emerge more or less simultaneously. Somehow we went from three infantry battalions training for an airborne role to defend North America to 15 infantry battalions (three AB) with a brigade in Germany and another fighting in Korea. Try that today


----------



## Ostrozac

Brad Sallows said:


> Prep for Korea was made easier by the fact everyone had just gone through an extended master class in warfare and knew the difference between that and whatever it is the forces revert to in peacetime.


There is a strong argument that the Commonwealth’s regimental system is designed and suitable for peacetime service, to give garrison soldiers in places like India and Hong Kong something to organize their cricket leagues around. The British Army, who invented the thing, certainly seem quick to abandon it once shots are fired, only to re-embrace it in extended peacetime. The Canadian Army, on the other hand, seems uncritically fascinated by this system.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> Isn't that kind of what we did for WW1 and Korea e.g., abandon the organization we have now as impossible to deal with, and create a new one from scratch, to avoid having to deal with all the petty politics and in fighting?


I'm not sure we really abandoned the existing organizations in WW1 or Korea.  More we simply ignored them and got on with the business of fighting the war.  When the wars were over we slid back into what existed before and never really solved the problems.


----------



## Kirkhill

The porcupine is a Canadian animal.









						Being a porcupine like Ukraine could help Taiwan fight off China
					

Kyiv’s use of relatively cheap Western weapons against Russia offers a glimpse of how the island nation might defend itself




					www.telegraph.co.uk


----------



## Skysix

Is it too much to think that the PTB might actually read and learn from this?









						The Intricacies Of F-35 Operations Over The Frigid Alaskan Frontier
					

Now with 54 F-35s on hand, Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska is fine-tuning how it operates its fleet and how it projects power abroad.




					www.thedrive.com


----------



## GR66

Here's another opinion piece from the Wavell Room in the APC vs IFV debate.


----------



## GR66

And this piece, also from the Wavell Room, I think describes quite well the circles we end up talking about in this and similar threads.

Canada by virtue of it's location clearly needs our forces to have "Reach".  So which of "Scale" and "Capability" do we sacrifice?


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Here's another opinion piece from the Wavell Room in the APC vs IFV debate.


Read this a week ago when it came out and wrote it off as nonsense. An poorly researched, superficial opinion piece with no persuasive facts. 



GR66 said:


> And this piece, also from the Wavell Room, I think describes quite well the circles we end up talking about in this and similar threads.
> 
> Canada by virtue of it's location clearly needs our forces to have "Reach".  So which of "Scale" and "Capability" do we sacrifice?


This on the other hand is a good piece that looks at three fundamental trade-offs that lie at the behind all force structure considerations.

I tend to think that "reach" is not what we should be aiming for. Remember that the way Tusa defines it is as "Global reach is as it looks: it would be the ability to deploy _and sustain_ forces near-indefinitely (almost) anywhere in the World."

I don't support the concept of Canada having "global reach". 

I think that our reach should be much more limited. The concept, for example, of having a fly-over brigade in Latvia would be more in the nature of "scale" than "global reach". If that was in the nature of having a quick reaction brigade for deployment anywhere in the world then yes, it would be an element of "global reach". Similarly, a navy structured for Canada's coastal defence with a North Atlantic capability is not "global reach" but rather a limited reach more in the nature of scale.

From the above you can conclude that I'm a scale and capability type of guy.

😉


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Been trialled, no idea where it went. Per the report 3 RCR was getting 1st round hits at 1000m. Which effectively doubles its range.



Further to the possibilities






						FCS13RE - Demo Videos - Aimpoint Global
					

The FCS13-RE provides a very high probability of first-shot hit on both stationary and moving targets at extended ranges and utilizes a very intuitive user control interface.




					www.aimpoint.com
				




I kind of think that with the right sight and airburst ammunition the replacement of the 60mm mortar with the 40mm C16 GMG might have made sense.

That one sight system would apply to the C6, M2, M3, C16, AT4, CG84 and possibly something the size of the NLAW. - Anything with a picatinny rail?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Further to the possibilities
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> FCS13RE - Demo Videos - Aimpoint Global
> 
> 
> The FCS13-RE provides a very high probability of first-shot hit on both stationary and moving targets at extended ranges and utilizes a very intuitive user control interface.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.aimpoint.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I kind of think that with the right sight and airburst ammunition the replacement of the 60mm mortar with the 40mm C16 GMG might have made sense.
> 
> That one sight system would apply to the C6, M2, M3, C16, AT4, CG84 and possibly something the size of the NLAW. - Anything with a picatinny rail?


Keep in mind that zeroing the optic is still a thing. 

The AT4 1913 rail gives a neat ability - but your left with just a rough ‘bore sighting’ so it’s not going to be great further out - I view it as really effective for a thermal sight to be used inside 300m 

IMHO you don’t want the same sight for a number of those items. 
  The C-16 GMG and M2 sure because the ranges are similar and justify the higher end FCS.   
  But a good FCS for the GMG is something like this Rheinmetall Defence - Fire Control Units





						American Rheinmetall Systems: Soldier lethality I Situational awareness
					

American Rheinmetall Systems, LLC, in Maine, is a leader in the integration of next-generation intelligent systems for ground vehicles and ISR platforms.




					www.rheinmetall-defence.com
				




Complete overkill for the other systems.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Keep in mind that zeroing the optic is still a thing.
> 
> The AT4 1913 rail gives a neat ability - but your left with just a rough ‘bore sighting’ so it’s not going to be great further out - I view it as really effective for a thermal sight to be used inside 300m
> 
> IMHO you don’t want the same sight for a number of those items.
> The C-16 GMG and M2 sure because the ranges are similar and justify the higher end FCS.
> But a good FCS for the GMG is something like this Rheinmetall Defence - Fire Control Units
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> American Rheinmetall Systems: Soldier lethality I Situational awareness
> 
> 
> American Rheinmetall Systems, LLC, in Maine, is a leader in the integration of next-generation intelligent systems for ground vehicles and ISR platforms.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.rheinmetall-defence.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Complete overkill for the others



C6A1 sight was common to both MGs and Mortars  allowing common training and fire control.  Presumably a lesson learned from the old Brigade MG Companies with their  Vickers and 4.2s.

The Aimpoint is a Predictive Line Of Sight system.  The same type of system supplied as part of the disposable NLAW.

Being able to hit the target with the first round  regardless of the weapon, is no bad thing.


----------



## FJAG

This thread has slowly lost its way.

Does anyone have any updates to share as to what is actually developing on the Force 2025 front?

Are there any hints of a vision as to what the structure will bring to the table for either the RegF or the ResF?

Or has this initiative died a lingering death?


----------



## Kirkhill

Two years to 2025.

A war that is rewriting the environment if not the rules.

A larder that has been emptied.

A new, new, defence review manana.

Why would you think the thread might have wandered a bit?


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Or has this initiative died a lingering death *like all similar, previous initiatives*?



There, FTFY


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Read this a week ago when it came out and wrote it off as nonsense. An poorly researched, superficial opinion piece with no persuasive facts.
> 
> 
> This on the other hand is a good piece that looks at three fundamental trade-offs that lie at the behind all force structure considerations.
> 
> I tend to think that "reach" is not what we should be aiming for. Remember that the way Tusa defines it is as "Global reach is as it looks: it would be the ability to deploy _and sustain_ forces near-indefinitely (almost) anywhere in the World."
> 
> I don't support the concept of Canada having "global reach".
> 
> I think that our reach should be much more limited. The concept, for example, of having a fly-over brigade in Latvia would be more in the nature of "scale" than "global reach". If that was in the nature of having a quick reaction brigade for deployment anywhere in the world then yes, it would be an element of "global reach". Similarly, a navy structured for Canada's coastal defence with a North Atlantic capability is not "global reach" but rather a limited reach more in the nature of scale.
> 
> From the above you can conclude that I'm a scale and capability type of guy.
> 
> 😉


First off I'd note that the article talks in terms of trade-offs between Reach, Scale and Capability but of course they are all on a sliding scale.  It's not like you pick two from the list and don't get the other, it's just that the more money you spend on for example capability, the less money you have available for Reach and Scale.  

So not so much of a Reach ✅, Scale ❌, Capability ✅ but more of a Reach = 40%, Scale = 20%, Capability = 40%.

I'd still contend that for the Regular Army anyway that simply due to our physical location in the World compared to where we expect our Army to operate that the "Reach" (strategic transport, logistics support, etc.) portion of our spending will necessarily be a larger piece of our pie than it would be for a country like Poland for example where the expectation is that they will be operating much closer to home.  As a result, proportionally we will have less of the pie available to spend on "Scale" or "Capability".  

Of course you are correct that focusing our "Reach" on Eastern Europe specifically as opposed to a more "Global Reach" capability comes at a lower opportunity cost to our "Scale" and "Capability".

I'd also suggest that how we balance these three elements might be different for the Regular Army vs the Reserve Army (or even specific elements of the Army).  You might for example want your Regular (quick reaction forces) to skew towards Reach and Capability while your Reserves (who are likely only to be mobilized in the most dire of situations) may skew towards Scale with slightly less Capability (stocks of the highest tech munitions for example may be largely depleted by the time the Reserves are mobilized and deployed so they might focus on larger quantities of "dumb" munitions).

For some portions of the Reserves that are meant to augment the Reg Force, or to provide specific capabilities which may only be required in a high-end peer conflict (air defence, long range precision strike, etc.) the primary focus might be on the Capability.

Of course there is no magic formula that is "correct" but I just felt it provides an interesting lens through which to examine the proposals and ideas that are put forward here and also to act as a reminder that with every "great idea" that is put forward that there will have to be some kind of trade-off elsewhere in the plan in order to pay for the capability.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> First off I'd note that the article talks in terms of trade-offs between Reach, Scale and Capability but of course they are all on a sliding scale.  It's not like you pick two from the list and don't get the other, it's just that the more money you spend on for example capability, the less money you have available for Reach and Scale.
> 
> So not so much of a Reach ✅, Scale ❌, Capability ✅ but more of a Reach = 40%, Scale = 20%, Capability = 40%.


I like that way of looking at it. How one assigns those percentages is very much the issue.



GR66 said:


> I'd still contend that for the Regular Army anyway that simply due to our physical location in the World compared to where we expect our Army to operate that the "Reach" (strategic transport, logistics support, etc.) portion of our spending will necessarily be a larger piece of our pie than it would be for a country like Poland for example where the expectation is that they will be operating much closer to home.  As a result, proportionally we will have less of the pie available to spend on "Scale" or "Capability".
> 
> Of course you are correct that focusing our "Reach" on Eastern Europe specifically as opposed to a more "Global Reach" capability comes at a lower opportunity cost to our "Scale" and "Capability".


Exactly. It's the question of how much effort and treasure we put into being able to "reach" anywhere in the world at any time rather than one discrete location far away. It's not a lot further from Gagetown to 5 Fd Regt in Victoria than it is to the BG in Latvia. This is why I say that supporting a fixed unit in Latvia is more a question of scale (something like positioning and supporting CA units in Gagetown, Quebec, Petawawa, Edmonton and Victoria) rather than one of reach.



GR66 said:


> I'd also suggest that how we balance these three elements might be different for the Regular Army vs the Reserve Army (or even specific elements of the Army).  You might for example want your Regular (quick reaction forces) to skew towards Reach and Capability while your Reserves (who are likely only to be mobilized in the most dire of situations) may skew towards Scale with slightly less Capability (stocks of the highest tech munitions for example may be largely depleted by the time the Reserves are mobilized and deployed so they might focus on larger quantities of "dumb" munitions).
> 
> For some portions of the Reserves that are meant to augment the Reg Force, or to provide specific capabilities which may only be required in a high-end peer conflict (air defence, long range precision strike, etc.) the primary focus might be on the Capability.


Absolutely. When it comes to capability you might find a particular one unique to the standing force vs the mobilized force. It always goes back to what do you use day-to-day or need to bring into play overnight vs those that can wait a week or a even a month.



GR66 said:


> Of course there is no magic formula that is "correct" but I just felt it provides an interesting lens through which to examine the proposals and ideas that are put forward here and also to act as a reminder that with every "great idea" that is put forward that there will have to be some kind of trade-off elsewhere in the plan in order to pay for the capability.


Yup.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Interesting discussion on vehicles as it related to force structure


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1560642195727601665


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Interesting discussion on vehicles as it related to force structure
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1560642195727601665


Two comments from the tweet that could be relevant to Force 2025 discussions:



> I like the duality of heavy tracked armour and wheeled medium armour. Wheeled medium forces deploy quickly but lack resilience. Heavy tracked forces deploy slowly but have staying power. Regardless of vehicle weight, the trick is to avoid mixing wheels + tracks in same formation.





> You'll need light wheeled vehicles (Panther, JLTV etc) and light tracked (BVS10, Wiesel) as well. This gives you heavy tracked, medium wheeled, light wheeled, and light tracked, or four core combat vehicle types.


----------



## GR66

The Corporal Frisk blog is noting that Poland is divesting all of its 140 x Leopard 2A4s and 105 x Leopard 2A5s in favour of their new purchase Abrams M1A2 SEP 3 and Korean K2 Black Panther tanks.

What would be the possibilities with at least some of those available?  Combined with our existing fleet that would give us 20 x Leopard 2A6M, 105 x Leopard 2A5 and 202 x Leopard 2A4/2A4M.

With that you could put together something like:

3 x Symmetrical Mechanized Brigades each with three Combined Arms Battalions consisting of:

1 x Tank Squadron (Leopard 2A4 for close support) - Total of 171 x Leopard 2A4 required for 9 x Squadrons
2 x LAV 6.0 Infantry Companies - Total of 18 x LAV 6.0 Companies required (existing)
1 x Tank Regiment

4 x Tank Squadrons (Leopard 2A6) - Total of 78 x Leopard 2A6 (20 x existing plus 58 x upgraded Leopard 2A5's)
1 x Armoured Recce Regiment

1 x Tank Squadron (Leopard 2A4) - Total of 19 x Leopard 2A4
3 x LAV Recce Squadrons (existing)
1 x SHORAD Regiment (converted LAVs from 3rd Armoured Regiment)


----------



## Ostrozac

Leaning heavily into becoming a tank-heavy force runs into a logistical issue — most of our bases aren’t suited infrastructure-wise to tanks anymore (if they ever really were, Petawawa, Valcartier, I’m talking to you). Bridges are an issue, and we’ve ripped up most of the rail infrastructure.

Turning Suffield into a major base and the home of the tanks might be the best way to do this — the British Army seems increasingly lukewarm on BATUS.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> The Corporal Frisk blog is noting that Poland is divesting all of its 140 x Leopard 2A4s and 105 x Leopard 2A5s in favour of their new purchase Abrams M1A2 SEP 3 and Korean K2 Black Panther tanks.
> 
> What would be the possibilities with at least some of those available?  Combined with our existing fleet that would give us 20 x Leopard 2A6M, 105 x Leopard 2A5 and 202 x Leopard 2A4/2A4M.
> 
> With that you could put together something like:
> 
> 3 x Symmetrical Mechanized Brigades each with three Combined Arms Battalions consisting of:
> 
> 1 x Tank Squadron (Leopard 2A4 for close support) - Total of 171 x Leopard 2A4 required for 9 x Squadrons
> 2 x LAV 6.0 Infantry Companies - Total of 18 x LAV 6.0 Companies required (existing)
> 1 x Tank Regiment
> 
> 4 x Tank Squadrons (Leopard 2A6) - Total of 78 x Leopard 2A6 (20 x existing plus 58 x upgraded Leopard 2A5's)
> 1 x Armoured Recce Regiment
> 
> 1 x Tank Squadron (Leopard 2A4) - Total of 19 x Leopard 2A4
> 3 x LAV Recce Squadrons (existing)
> 1 x SHORAD Regiment (converted LAVs from 3rd Armoured Regiment)


Why on earth would you want symmetrical? 
    Even ignoring @Ostrozac ’s comment about the base structure.  Symmetrical CMBG’s may be easy - but it doesn’t begin to cover the needs of the CAF or the threats out there. 

It does ensure the CAF is too heavy to go anywhere and can just sit back and watch its equipment rust 

Make an Armd Bde sure.  
  Maybe make 2 - on the Prairie's, but you need Light Forces to get places rapidly - and the Medium LAV force can do things too. 

We also have a lot of reasons why you don’t combine wheels and tracks in the same Bde.


----------



## IKnowNothing

GR66 said:


> The Corporal Frisk blog is noting that Poland is divesting all of its 140 x Leopard 2A4s and 105 x Leopard 2A5s in favour of their new purchase Abrams M1A2 SEP 3 and Korean K2 Black Panther tanks.
> 
> What would be the possibilities with at least some of those available?  Combined with our existing fleet that would give us 20 x Leopard 2A6M, 105 x Leopard 2A5 and 202 x Leopard 2A4/2A4M.


Going a little less audacious, assuming no major reforms and that the 40 A4 training tanks are untouchable/ needed where they are:

Buy 105x A5, 20x A4,  upgraded to A6M CAN and A4M CAN respectively

the new A4M's and the existing go to Gagetown, each of RCD and 12 RBC have a full squadron so that 2 and 5 CMBG have their own close support capability for battlegroup generation.

65 A6M's go to Latvia, 60 out West.  LdSH goes 1x Recce, 3x Tank.  1 Squadron tank Roto in Latvia at all times, the rest of the regiment fly over. The 3rd squadron in Canada used to maintain at least 2 deployable squadrons of PRes.  LdSH tasked to a multi-national Bde, one PRes squadron acts as a reserve for LdSH, one provides organic tanks to 1CMBG


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> 65 A6M's go to Latvia, 60 out West.  LdSH goes 1x Recce, 3x Tank.  1 Squadron tank Roto in Latvia at all times, the rest of the regiment fly over. The 3rd squadron in Canada used to maintain at least 2 deployable squadrons of PRes.  LdSH tasked to a multi-national Bde, *one PRes squadron acts as a reserve for LdSH*, one provides organic tanks to 1CMBG



Not the way that the Reserves are currently set up they won't...


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Why on earth would you want symmetrical?


Exactly. The only reason would be to placate the regimental mafias so that no one feels slighted. 



IKnowNothing said:


> Going a little less audacious, assuming no major reforms and that the 40 A4 training tanks are untouchable/ needed where they are:
> 
> Buy 105x A5, 20x A4,  upgraded to A6M CAN and A4M CAN respectively
> 
> the new A4M's and the existing go to Gagetown, each of RCD and 12 RBC have a full squadron so that 2 and 5 CMBG have their own close support capability for battlegroup generation.


I'm not sure if you mean for actual deployments or as a training aid. I can see a squadron of tanks at the school for training basic armoured officers (all other ranks should be trained at Wainwright).

Personally I think 2 CMBG should become light and the RCD a light cavalry regiment while 5 CMBG becomes fully medium and 12 RBC equipped with a suitable wheeled vehicle for the medium cavalry role. I can see many roles for a medium force with a medium direct fire system. Having them train with heavy armour but them deploying them on, lets say a UN mission, without it just doesn't make much sense.



IKnowNothing said:


> 65 A6M's go to Latvia, 60 out West.  LdSH goes 1x Recce, 3x Tank.  1 Squadron tank Roto in Latvia at all times, the rest of the regiment fly over. The 3rd squadron in Canada used to maintain at least 2 deployable squadrons of PRes.  LdSH tasked to a multi-national Bde, one PRes squadron acts as a reserve for LdSH, one provides organic tanks to 1CMBG


I can see having prepositioned regiment of tanks in Latvia and having the equivalent of a reserve force armoured regiment to back up a RegF armoured regiment in Edmonton. In fact I'm a strong advocate for that and implement it in my 30/70 concept.

One thing that such a forward deployment does, is that it makes it possible for 5 CMBG, if its considered desirable to do so, to flyover a battalion now and then to train on tank and infantry cooperation. Personally, I'd prefer to put my effort into finding that medium, wheeled direct fire support system for 5 CMBG and leave the tanks for 1 CMBG and its reserve shadow brigade(s).



daftandbarmy said:


> Not the way that the Reserves are currently set up they won't...


That's why it needs to change. 

🍻


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Why on earth would you want symmetrical?
> Even ignoring @Ostrozac ’s comment about the base structure.  Symmetrical CMBG’s may be easy - but it doesn’t begin to cover the needs of the CAF or the threats out there.
> 
> It does ensure the CAF is too heavy to go anywhere and can just sit back and watch its equipment rust
> 
> Make an Armd Bde sure.
> Maybe make 2 - on the Prairie's, but you need Light Forces to get places rapidly - and the Medium LAV force can do things too.
> 
> We also have a lot of reasons why you don’t combine wheels and tracks in the same Bde.


It wasn't so much of a "this is what we should do" as a "look at what you could do with what another country is throwing away"


----------



## daftandbarmy

A good reminder for the CAF in this arena:


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> I'm not sure if you mean for actual deployments or as a training aid. I can see a squadron of tanks at the school for training basic armoured officers (all other ranks should be trained at Wainwright).
> 
> Personally I think 2 CMBG should become light and the RCD a light cavalry regiment while 5 CMBG becomes fully medium and 12 RBC equipped with a suitable wheeled vehicle for the medium cavalry role. I can see many roles for a medium force with a medium direct fire system. Having them train with heavy armour but them deploying them on, lets say a UN mission, without it just doesn't make much sense.
> 
> 
> I can see having prepositioned regiment of tanks in Latvia and having the equivalent of a reserve force armoured regiment to back up a RegF armoured regiment in Edmonton. In fact I'm a strong advocate for that and implement it in my 30/70 concept.
> 
> One thing that such a forward deployment does, is that it makes it possible for 5 CMBG, if its considered desirable to do so, to flyover a battalion now and then to train on tank and infantry cooperation. Personally, I'd prefer to put my effort into finding that medium, wheeled direct fire support system for 5 CMBG and leave the tanks for 1 CMBG and its reserve shadow brigade(s).


I meant for actual deployments. 
I agree with the "should" section,  but I tried to constrain my thinking to a straight tank purchase rather than a sweeping restructure.  The Polish divestment _could_ present a somewhat non-dreaming opportunity for a snap decision, but it doesn't let us go back in time to :
-have CCV go through and equip 1 CABG with Leo's and CV9035
-which leads to LAV UP taking a more Stryker/British Boxer approach to equip 5CMBG with RWS armed ISC's and a proper suite of variants
-somehow prevent TAPV from happening and instead spend that money on a mix of license built Finnish MiSu's, Ocelots, and Fennek's


----------



## Kirkhill

What if every sub-unit of the Infantry and the Cavalry had its own Indirect Fire sub-sub-unit?

Eg 

Light Infantry Company has a 81mm mortar platoon
Light Cavalry Squadron has a 70mm rocket troop
Medium Infantry/Cavalry Company/Squadron has a mounted 120mm mortar platoon/troop (Mjolnir)
Tank Squadron loses 5 of its 19 Leos and is pared down to a 14 tank American Squadron but adds 4x AMOS 120mm mortars and a FSCC vehicle.


----------



## GR66

Back to the Polish Leos...too bad that we're no longer a country that takes initiative.  We could upgrade our 2A6M's and the Polish 2A5's to 2A7 standard for the RCD (and couple of Reserve Squadrons) and use their and our 2A4's to convert into HAPCs for the PPCLI to give us a true Heavy Brigade.


----------



## Prairie canuck

GR66 said:


> Back to the Polish Leos...too bad that we're no longer a country that takes initiative.  We could upgrade our 2A6M's and the Polish 2A5's to 2A7 standard for the RCD (and couple of Reserve Squadrons) and use their and our 2A4's to convert into HAPCs for the PPCLI to give us a true Heavy Brigade.


IMHO taking the initiative would be to do as Poland is doing and divesting Canada of its Leos and adopting the M1A2. The 3 Baltic states would likely find a way to make use of the Leos. Donate a few more LAVs and replace them with Bradleys and their variants. Again, just my opinion.


----------



## Dale Denton

Prairie canuck said:


> IMHO taking the initiative would be to do as Poland is doing and divesting Canada of its Leos and adopting the M1A2. The 3 Baltic states would likely find a way to make use of the Leos. Donate a few more LAVs and replace them with Bradleys and their variants. Again, just my opinion.


I agree, it just makes more sense at the end of the day to  just acknowledge that we're tied to the USA.

This new Abrams being teased by GDLS at AUSA 2022 would be a big and quick win for GDLS with another Abrams nation. Buy into the US Abrams maintenance program for a big new facility/employer in Canada. It buys us ties to the US defence industry and its influence within the US govt through. Would get them off our backs on defence spending too. And oh ya, gives us a cutting edge yet proven tank with better Canadian industrial benefits. Give Poland (and later Ukraine) our Leos.

They're announcing a new STRYKER vehicle too, probably has a lot in common with LAV 6.0 I assume. Rebuild the vehicle fleet with new variants and be able to justify sustaining the capability financially long term.

An Army NSS.


----------



## FJAG

IKnowNothing said:


> I meant for actual deployments.
> I agree with the "should" section,  but I tried to constrain my thinking to a straight tank purchase rather than a sweeping restructure.  The Polish divestment _could_ present a somewhat non-dreaming opportunity for a snap decision, but it doesn't let us go back in time to :
> -have CCV go through and equip 1 CABG with Leo's and CV9035
> -which leads to LAV UP taking a more Stryker/British Boxer approach to equip 5CMBG with RWS armed ISC's and a proper suite of variants
> -somehow prevent TAPV from happening and instead spend that money on a mix of license built Finnish MiSu's, Ocelots, and Fennek's


I think we have the people and facilities to build two armoured brigades - one RegF heavy, one ResF heavy - within the western part of the country. At first that could be done through a shared equipment structure of one brigade's worth of equipment and eventually developed to a prepositioned brigade's worth of equipment in Europe and one back in Canada.

If you accept the LAV as the infantry carrier then we wouldn't even need much additional gear initially. Eventually they should be equipped with a better generation of tanks and IFVs.

All that said, its probably a bridge too far and too ambitious for the Army to even attempt.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Prairie canuck said:


> IMHO taking the initiative would be to do as Poland is doing and divesting Canada of its Leos and adopting the M1A2. The 3 Baltic states would likely find a way to make use of the Leos. Donate a few more LAVs and replace them with Bradleys and their variants. Again, just my opinion.


No issue with getting M1's for our Heavy Brigade...I've said previously that we should strive for commonality of equipment with the US as much as possible for the simple reason that if we ever go to war we can make use of their massive logistics capabilities.

That being said, there is clearly a reluctance in many of our elected politicians to be seen as getting too close to the United States and that shows in our military procurement.  Instead of first looking at what the US is using and determining if there is a valid reason why we can't use the same we tend to want to try and reinvent the wheel to meet our "unique Canadian requirements".  Those "requirements" unfortunately often seem to be more political than military.


----------



## IKnowNothing

I think 


FJAG said:


> I think we have the people and facilities to build two armoured brigades - one RegF heavy, one ResF heavy - within the western part of the country. At first that could be done through a shared equipment structure of one brigade's worth of equipment and eventually developed to a prepositioned brigade's worth of equipment in Europe and one back in Canada.
> 
> If you accept the LAV as the infantry carrier then we wouldn't even need much additional gear initially. Eventually they should be equipped with a better generation of tanks and IFVs.
> 
> All that said, its probably a bridge too far and too ambitious for the Army to even attempt.
> 
> 🍻


I think Ontario is the key to unlocking your 70/30, 30/70.

Its just such a perfect fit geographically and with respect to the reserve CBG's. 70/30  2 CLBGin Petawawa(Light Protected Mobility) in TAPV's( ideally JLTV or Ocelot) and MiSu's/ modernized Bisons,  30/70 3 CLBG (Light Motorized) in commercial side by sides and/ or ISV.

After that I wonder if the 30/70 reserve brigade is the best use the PY's.  Use the Alberta PRes to make 1 CABG a 70/30, but then re-role and spread the Regulars around as necessary to add  capabilities. BC gets a 30/70 coastal defence battlegroup (battery of surface to surface, battery of shorad, a couple companies of mountain infantry to defend them) Sask/Man provides expanded artillery with HIMARS,  loitering munitions, Shorad, etc.


----------



## Kirkhill

IKnowNothing said:


> I think
> 
> I think Ontario is the key to unlocking your 70/30, 30/70.
> 
> Its just such a perfect fit geographically and with respect to the reserve CBG's. 70/30  2 CLBGin Petawawa(Light Protected Mobility) in TAPV's( ideally JLTV or Ocelot) and MiSu's/ modernized Bisons,  30/70 3 CLBG (Light Motorized) in commercial side by sides and/ or ISV.
> 
> After that I wonder if the 30/70 reserve brigade is the best use the PY's.  Use the Alberta PRes to make 1 CABG a 70/30, but then re-role and spread the Regulars around as necessary to add  capabilities. BC gets a 30/70 coastal defence battlegroup (battery of surface to surface, battery of shorad, a couple companies of mountain infantry to defend them) Sask/Man provides expanded artillery with HIMARS,  loitering munitions, Shorad, etc.



Here is your biggest challenge in Ontario in particular and urban Canada in general.



> The 2016 Census enumerated over 7.5 million foreign-born individuals in Canada, accounting for *21.9%* of the total population. In Ontario, 3,852,145 foreign-born residents represented 29.1% of total population, the highest proportion among provinces.





> Toronto's foreign-born population accounted for *46.1%* of its total population in 2016, up slightly from 2011 (46.0%) and still the highest share among CMAs in Canada. Vancouver came in second at 40.8%.



The pool of recruits is not your traditional recruit pool.  Many of the potentials are averse to military service and/or service to the Crown.  And many of the rest are disinclined and/or incapable of meeting the traditional standards and expectations.

The switch dated from 1972.  Britain left the Commonwealth for the EU.  Canada left Britain.


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> I think
> 
> I think Ontario is the key to unlocking your 70/30, 30/70.
> 
> Its just such a perfect fit geographically and with respect to the reserve CBG's. 70/30  2 CLBGin Petawawa(Light Protected Mobility) in TAPV's( ideally JLTV or Ocelot) and MiSu's/ modernized Bisons,  30/70 3 CLBG (Light Motorized) in commercial side by sides and/ or ISV.
> 
> After that I wonder if the 30/70 reserve brigade is the best use the PY's.  Use the Alberta PRes to make 1 CABG a 70/30, but then re-role and spread the Regulars around as necessary to add  capabilities. BC gets a 30/70 coastal defence battlegroup (battery of surface to surface, battery of shorad, a couple companies of mountain infantry to defend them) Sask/Man provides expanded artillery with HIMARS,  loitering munitions, Shorad, etc.



Except thst all the senior leaders in BC ignore the mountains because you only get noticed in the CAF if you pretend you’re better at Armoured operations than your peers. Funny thing though, when the CO forces you to pretend you’re doing combat team attacks amongst one of the earth‘s most extensive mountainous coastal rainforest/ Montaigne, things may not work out as intended.


----------



## FJAG

IKnowNothing said:


> I think
> 
> I think Ontario is the key to unlocking your 70/30, 30/70.


Ontario is very important due to numbers in and around Toronto but has the difficulty of very limited training infrastructure in Meaford. Quebec is actually a bit better positioned because of the proximity of both Montreal and Quebec City to Valcartier. The West and even the Maritimes are challenged by distance and limited populations (and BC by limited training infrastructure). All but Quebec require unique compromises.


IKnowNothing said:


> Its just such a perfect fit geographically and with respect to the reserve CBG's. 70/30  2 CLBGin Petawawa(Light Protected Mobility) in TAPV's( ideally JLTV or Ocelot) and MiSu's/ modernized Bisons,  30/70 3 CLBG (Light Motorized) in commercial side by sides and/ or ISV.


While it is far easier to create a ResF light brigade than an armoured or mech one, I tend to view that Canada's need for light forces is more one that requires high readiness which points to a primarily RegF structure. Forces that we do not need day-to-day in a peacetime force but do need in an emergency are mech and armoured forces. While it is better to have the bulk of those personnel on a reserve stand-by basis they do have the issue of the difficulty of training and maintaining ResF. Recognizing the difficulties my preference remains for 100/0 or 70/30 for light forces and 30/70 for mech and heavy.


IKnowNothing said:


> After that I wonder if the 30/70 reserve brigade is the best use the PY's.  Use the Alberta PRes to make 1 CABG a 70/30, but then re-role and spread the Regulars around as necessary to add  capabilities. BC gets a 30/70 coastal defence battlegroup (battery of surface to surface, battery of shorad, a couple companies of mountain infantry to defend them) Sask/Man provides expanded artillery with HIMARS,  loitering munitions, Shorad, etc.


30/70 is not the best use if you scatter the 30 around the whole battalion. If the headquarters is mixed 30/70 and one subunit is 100/0 (while the rest are 5/95 or 10/90) then you have the core of a battalion headquarters capable of deploying and one full company capable of full training and deploying. With our building block system of tailoring task forces for a mission, a 30/70 battalion headquarters as well as the 100/0 company are fully viable and fully trained full-time building blocks.



Kirkhill said:


> The pool of recruits is not your traditional recruit pool. Many of the potentials are averse to military service and/or service to the Crown. And many of the rest are disinclined and/or incapable of meeting the traditional standards and expectations.









Finding 5 - 10,000 reservists, regardless of ethnicity, in a Southern Ontario population pool of 12 million would not be a challenge if we offered them something meaningful and not half-assed. Even as challenged as the ResF is, SO generates over 4,000 folks many of whom have Asian and Caribbean/African heritage. BC does the same.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Finding 5 - 10,000 reservists, regardless of ethnicity, in a Southern Ontario population pool of 12 million would not be a challenge if we offered them something meaningful and not half-assed. Even as challenged as the ResF is, SO generates over 4,000 folks many of whom have Asian and Caribbean/African heritage. BC does the same, *mostly in Vancouver and the Fraser Valley.*
> 
> 🍻



There, FTFY.

Outside of that region 39 CBG looks alot like a White Pride revival meeting.


----------



## dimsum

FJAG said:


> Finding 5 - 10,000 reservists, regardless of ethnicity, in a Southern Ontario population pool of 12 million would not be a challenge if we offered them something meaningful and not half-assed. Even as challenged as the ResF is, SO generates over 4,000 folks many of whom have Asian and Caribbean/African heritage. BC does the same.
> 
> 🍻


I'm not sure what I was expecting when I saw a Sikh Highlander in turban and kilt front and centre, but it works.


----------



## FJAG

dimsum said:


> I'm not sure what I was expecting when I saw a Sikh Highlander in turban and kilt front and centre, but it works.


Toronto Scottish I believe based on the tartan.

🍻


----------



## rmc_wannabe

FJAG said:


> Toronto Scottish I believe based on the tartan.
> 
> 🍻


Correct. This is a combination of 31/32 CBG troops.


----------



## Kirkhill

dimsum said:


> I'm not sure what I was expecting when I saw a Sikh Highlander in turban and kilt front and centre, but it works.



It worked in 1990 as well when the Calgary Highlanders were presented new Queen's Colours by Her Majesty.  One of the colour party, wearing Government Tartan was a Sikh Captain with turban and Calgary Highlanders cap badge.  Unfortunately I can't remember his name.  He had more active service than anyone else on parade that day.

He shared the parade ground with Piper General John de Chastelain.


----------



## GR66

I'm going to suggest that maybe due to our unique geographical location and the expeditionary nature of our military that the way we structure our Reg Force and Reserves might be different than in the past and different than many other nations.

Realistically if we're in a conflict with a lesser power like North Korea or Iran, etc. it's likely to be a Reg Force (with augmentation) show and not a situation where we're going to mobilize the Reserves.  A war against China is going to be an Air Force and Navy conflict.  A war against a nuclear armed Russia would be a matter of stopping and reversing a Russian attack rather than an invasion of Russian territory.  European NATO and the US realistically have enough manpower available to retake allied territory...it's not the same as having to occupy enemy territory.

So perhaps instead of designing an Army that can expand the number of Brigades we have in time of war we can instead focus on a) providing the Reserve forces required to MAINTAIN (as opposed to expand) our Reg Force formations and b) generate the supporting forces required to support our forces.

Does that mean we should focus our Reserve forces on Artillery, AD and Logistics/CSS forces rather than additional Armoured Regiments and Infantry Battalions?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> I'm going to suggest that maybe due to our unique geographical location and the expeditionary nature of our military that the way we structure our Reg Force and Reserves might be different than in the past and different than many other nations.
> 
> Realistically if we're in a conflict with *a lesser power like North Korea or Iran, etc. i*t's likely to be a Reg Force (with augmentation) show and not a situation where we're going to mobilize the Reserves.  A war against China is going to be an Air Force and Navy conflict.  A war against a nuclear armed Russia would be a matter of stopping and reversing a Russian attack rather than an invasion of Russian territory.  European NATO and the US realistically have enough manpower available to retake allied territory...it's not the same as having to occupy enemy territory.



Lesser powers? Are you kidding? We are now the 'third world' military... e.g.,

North Korea: 

The Korean People's Army operates a very large amount of equipment, including 4,100 tanks, 2,100 APCs, 8,500 field artillery pieces, 5,100 multiple rocket launchers,[49] 11,000 air defence guns and some 10,000 MANPADS and anti-tank guided missiles[62] in the Ground force; about 500 vessels in the Navy[49] and 730 combat aircraft in the Air Force,[49] of which 478 are fighters and 180 are bombers.[63] North Korea also has the largest special forces in the world, as well as the largest submarine fleet.[64] The equipment is a mixture of World War II vintage vehicles and small arms, widely proliferated Cold War technology, and more modern Soviet or locally produced weapons.

North Korea possesses a vast array of long range artillery in shelters just north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone. It has been a long-standing cause for concern that a preemptive strike or retaliatory strike on Seoul using this arsenal of artillery north of the Demilitarized Zone would lead to a massive loss of life in Seoul. Estimates on how many people would die in an attack on Seoul vary. When the Clinton administration mobilised forces over the reactor at Yongbyon in 1994, planners concluded that retaliation by North Korea against Seoul could kill 40,000 people.[65] Other estimates projects hundreds of thousands or possibly millions of fatalities if North Korea uses chemical or nuclear munitions.[66] RAND Corporation conducted an extensive study in 2020 on a range of potential artillery bombardment scenarios and concluded that a strike on Seoul alone could result in over 100,000 casualties in the first hour of bombardment.[67]









						Korean People's Army - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Weinie

daftandbarmy said:


> Lesser powers? Are you kidding? We are now the 'third world' military... e.g.,
> 
> North Korea:
> 
> The Korean People's Army operates a very large amount of equipment, including 4,100 tanks, 2,100 APCs, 8,500 field artillery pieces, 5,100 multiple rocket launchers,[49] 11,000 air defence guns and some 10,000 MANPADS and anti-tank guided missiles[62] in the Ground force; about 500 vessels in the Navy[49] and 730 combat aircraft in the Air Force,[49] of which 478 are fighters and 180 are bombers.[63] North Korea also has the largest special forces in the world, as well as the largest submarine fleet.[64] The equipment is a mixture of World War II vintage vehicles and small arms, widely proliferated Cold War technology, and more modern Soviet or locally produced weapons.
> 
> North Korea possesses a vast array of long range artillery in shelters just north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone. It has been a long-standing cause for concern that a preemptive strike or retaliatory strike on Seoul using this arsenal of artillery north of the Demilitarized Zone would lead to a massive loss of life in Seoul. Estimates on how many people would die in an attack on Seoul vary. When the Clinton administration mobilised forces over the reactor at Yongbyon in 1994, planners concluded that retaliation by North Korea against Seoul could kill 40,000 people.[65] Other estimates projects hundreds of thousands or possibly millions of fatalities if North Korea uses chemical or nuclear munitions.[66] RAND Corporation conducted an extensive study in 2020 on a range of potential artillery bombardment scenarios and concluded that a strike on Seoul alone could result in over 100,000 casualties in the first hour of bombardment.[67]
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Korean People's Army - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


And North Korea would, _IMO,_ cease to exist about a day after that attack.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

GR66 said:


> I'm going to suggest that maybe due to our unique geographical location and the expeditionary nature of our military that the way we structure our Reg Force and Reserves might be different than in the past and different than many other nations.


Geography isn't a defense strategy in the age of hypersonic missiles and melting Arctic ice. I agree we do need to restructure, but mainly a consolidation vice a total reorg.



GR66 said:


> Realistically if we're in a conflict with a lesser power like North Korea or Iran, etc. it's likely to be a Reg Force (with augmentation) show and not a situation where we're going to mobilize the Reserves.


Our entire Reg Force would be wiped out within 6 hours of convention war with either of those countries. "Lesser Power" for us is South Sudan or Lesotho  at this point. Like @daftandbarmy illustrates, they have personnel and equipment in spades. Doesn't matter if it's Cold War vintage; the still fire very real munitions and dead is dead. 

Having the belief we can have a CMBG come in and rule the day is a fallacy. 



GR66 said:


> A war against China is going to be an Air Force and Navy conflict.


Until it isn't. China has made far more strides in amphibious warfare than we give them credit for. They know they need a way to get that million man army around if it's going to be effective. 


GR66 said:


> A war against a nuclear armed Russia would be a matter of stopping and reversing a Russian attack rather than an invasion of Russian territory.  European NATO and the US realistically have enough manpower available to retake allied territory...it's not the same as having to occupy enemy territory.


See how well Ukraine is doing pushing back the Russian advance? I commend the UA for being able to halt the Russians, but there has not been a push back or breakthrough of scale because the Russians have had more depth of forces (for now, the cupboard is pretty bare).



GR66 said:


> We can instead focus on a) providing the Reserve forces required to MAINTAIN (as opposed to expand) our Reg Force formations


Our Reg Force formations are anemic as they are. We would drain those Reserve Bdes in a matter of months if that were their role in this scheme. Better to have the Command Struture in place to expand out, rather than have a Reservist's sole purpose being to plug holes in a Reg F Bde structure.



GR66 said:


> and b) generate the supporting forces required to support our forces.


Supporting forces are specialized forces. It takes time and experience to have that maintainer or technician be capable of fixing the thing. It's why we have such varied success with Reserve Svc Bns and Sig Regts; those that have the time and ambition are awesome techs and can mesh into a Reg Force support role with little to no issue. Others don't have the experience or training. Add in the transitory nature of the Reserves and ita not a viable option.



GR66 said:


> Does that mean we should focus our Reserve forces on Artillery, AD and Logistics/CSS forces rather than additional Armoured Regiments and Infantry Battalions?


What we need to do is consolidate our formations and cut down on HQs. We need to ensure every PY in the CAF is devoted to an operationalnor strategic output. Anything else needs to be looked at really hard with an objective eye.


----------



## Kirkhill

If we filled every authorized PY and consolidated we would still only be talking about deploying the equivalent of a NATO division ... once ... for a very short time ... with no kit ... and no way to deploy it.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> If we filled every authorized PY and consolidated we would still only be talking about deploying the equivalent of a NATO division ... once ... for a very short time ... with no kit ... and no way to deploy it.


Regular Force and PRes numbers could give 2 Div plus a training cadre. 

But not enough equipment for even 1 Bde properly outfitted.


----------



## GR66

rmc_wannabe said:


> Geography isn't a defense strategy in the age of hypersonic missiles and melting Arctic ice. I agree we do need to restructure, but mainly a consolidation vice a total reorg.


Correct.  However Infantry Brigades (Light, Medium or Heavy) are no use against missiles directed at North America, hypersonic or not.


rmc_wannabe said:


> Our entire Reg Force would be wiped out within 6 hours of convention war with either of those countries. "Lesser Power" for us is South Sudan or Lesotho  at this point. Like @daftandbarmy illustrates, they have personnel and equipment in spades. Doesn't matter if it's Cold War vintage; the still fire very real munitions and dead is dead.


Firstly my catagorization of Iran or North Korea as "Lesser Powers" is in relation to the two major world powers China and Russia, not in terms of their military strength relative to Canada.  Also there is no point in making an argument of how Canada's Army would fare on its own against either of those countries as we would never be in that situation.  It would obviously be a war where we are part of a coalition of allied forces.


rmc_wannabe said:


> Having the belief we can have a CMBG come in and rule the day is a fallacy.


Of course a CMBG will never come in and rule the day but as noted above it won't be expected to.  Even during the Korean War (which of course involved China in addition to North Korea) our land contribution to the conflict was a single Infantry Brigade as part of the 1st Commonwealth Division.  I don't expect that during a 2nd Korean War that Canada would choose to mobilize the nation in order to deploy a force larger than that.  I don't believe that any Canadian Government will likely see such a war as important enough to our national interest to expend that much blood or treasure.  You may disagree with the appropriateness of that thinking but you'd be hard pressed to convince me that our Government would feel otherwise.


rmc_wannabe said:


> Until it isn't. China has made far more strides in amphibious warfare than we give them credit for. They know they need a way to get that million man army around if it's going to be effective.


No argument that they are really pushing their amphibious capability with the obvious objective of being able to take Taiwan if they so choose.  The two points that I'd make about that are firstly, that the best way to counter an amphibious invasion is to strike the ships carrying the troops before they have the chance to land rather than trying to insert your own ground forces to counter the invasion after it takes place.  I'd contend that investment in our naval and air forces would be the better choice than increasing our land forces.  Secondly I have my doubts whether Canada would be willing to deploy ground forces to Taiwan in the case of a Chinese invasion.  The status of Taiwan is politically unique in that both Taiwan and the PRC contend that Taiwan is Chinese territory.  They however disagree as to which of them is the legitimate party to lead all of China.  I don't see a Canadian Government being likely to deploy our Army to take sides in what is essentially the continuation of an unresolved Chinese Civil War.  Again, people on this site might have strong feelings about whether Canada SHOULD come to the military defence of Taiwan should China invade, but you'd be hard pressed to convince me that any Canadian Government will make the decision to do so.

In terms of the Chinese military threat to our other Allies in the Pacific like Japan or the Philippines again I'd argue that air and sea power to prevent any invasion happening place in the first place would be the better investment over land forces.


rmc_wannabe said:


> See how well Ukraine is doing pushing back the Russian advance? I commend the UA for being able to halt the Russians, but there has not been a push back or breakthrough of scale because the Russians have had more depth of forces (for now, the cupboard is pretty bare).


I don't believe that what we're seeing in Ukraine is likely what we'd see in a potential Russia/NATO conflict.  Firstly, I've stated in the past that I think that any direct invasion of NATO territory by Russia is unlikely for basically the same reason that we're not seeing direct NATO intervention in Ukraine.  Both sides are nuclear powers and any war between NATO and Russia will almost certainly turn nuclear the moment that once side or the other feels at risk of decisively losing.  

For that reason I believe that Russia is both unlikely to conduct a direct military attack on any NATO nation which would risk an Article 5 response.  NATO has seen the recklessness of Putin's Russia and it's members (especially those bordering Russia and its allies) are improving their capabilities and readiness to face any such attack.  And as I have noted previously, unlike in Ukraine where Russia has the advantage in terms of military power, economic power and total population, those advantages are reversed when you compare Russian military/economic/demographic strength to that of the NATO alliance.  The weaknesses of the Russian military forces in Ukraine (and the corresponding increase in the strength of NATO forces in response) I think has made the idea of a Russian invasion of NATO even less likely.

What the Ukraine war I think has shown is that high-tech weapons do have the capability to seriously affect the capability of an army to conduct fast paced, deep penetrating offensive operations as ISR capabilities are able to identify large formations on the move and precision weapons have the capability to strike them before they can concentrate on their objectives.  When that happens there is a move toward dispersion of forces and increased reliance on fires.  

It seems telling to me that the main items that the West are supplying to Ukraine (and that Ukraine is asking for) are weapons to defeat Russian air power (including UAVs), precision anti-armour weapons, UAVs/Loitering Munitions, and indirect fire weapons.  I'm suggesting that in a Russia/NATO conflict (or in a West/Iran, West/North Korea, etc. conflict) that the same systems will again be in demand.  

I'll contend that since European NATO (plus the US military) have a military manpower advantage over Russia already and that any additional ground forces that Canada can generate (short of national mobilization) would not make a major quantitative difference to the overall balance, that focusing our Reserve "surge" capabilities on those areas noted above would have a greater military contribution to a conflict than any increase in the number of Brigades we are able to generate.


rmc_wannabe said:


> Our Reg Force formations are anemic as they are. We would drain those Reserve Bdes in a matter of months if that were their role in this scheme. Better to have the Command Struture in place to expand out, rather than have a Reservist's sole purpose being to plug holes in a Reg F Bde structure.


Our Reg Force formations ARE anemic and I think that one thing the Russian experience has shown us is that deploying forces at less than full strength is a huge mistake.  I think our Battalions should be brought up to full strength and additional Reserve Battalions (10/90 and/or 30/70) should be integrated directly into the Regiments to provide sustainment manpower (and equipment).


rmc_wannabe said:


> Supporting forces are specialized forces. It takes time and experience to have that maintainer or technician be capable of fixing the thing. It's why we have such varied success with Reserve Svc Bns and Sig Regts; those that have the time and ambition are awesome techs and can mesh into a Reg Force support role with little to no issue. Others don't have the experience or training. Add in the transitory nature of the Reserves and ita not a viable option.


The NLOS and Joint Force Arsenal threads are examples of some of the capabilities (along with conventional tube and missile artillery) that I think would be well suited for the Reserves and could in a conflict potentially have more impact than expanding the number of Infantry Brigades we are able to field.

Of course during a major conflict both our Reg Force Brigades and our Reserve capabilities will need technical and logistical support beyond what the peacetime Reg Force is likely able to provide.  It's often contended that those technical capabilities are beyond what the Reserves are able to generate, however there are examples South of the border of Reserve forces that are able to exactly that.  Yes, achieving that will require a fundamental change to the way the Reserves are structured, trained, organized, equipped and legislated, but if we want an Army capable of warfighting then that is what will have to happen.  


rmc_wannabe said:


> What we need to do is consolidate our formations and cut down on HQs. We need to ensure every PY in the CAF is devoted to an operationalnor strategic output. Anything else needs to be looked at really hard with an objective eye.


Agreed.  When the leadership (both military and civilian) no longer views the ultimate purpose of the military to fight and win at war then that is when you get organizational drift that leads to the situation where we find ourselves now.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Regular Force and PRes numbers could give 2 Div plus a training cadre.
> 
> But not enough equipment for even 1 Bde properly outfitted.



But 2 Divisions are a Corps 

Do you think there is enough to supply a Division plus the support that Division needs to make it to the field?  Let alone a Corps?

We can field one tactical division - on a light scale - maybe.

82nd Airborne - 3 light brigades with a single DFS/MPF battalion held at Division to be penny-packeted out to the Brigades for use in the MGS/StuG/Assault Gun role.  I was going to say Infantry Tank but the original Infantry Tanks traded mobility and speed for protection.  They were the most heavily protected vehicles.  The 82nd also has XVIII Corps to support them along with the entirety of the USAF cargo fleet and escorting fighters.

In the words of that wise old farmer.... you can't get there from here.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> But 2 Divisions are a Corps



2 Division are just 2 Divisions.  A Corps requires the Command, Combat Support, and Sustainment elements to build around 2 or more Divisions.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> 2 Division are just 2 Divisions.  A Corps requires the Command, Combat Support, and Sustainment elements to build around 2 or more Divisions.


I agree.  If we are talking about administrative divisions.  Or  for that matter, administrative Corps, like the RCAC, RCIC or the RCCS.

But our discussions always seem to end up prioritizing the tactical over the administrative.

I have no problem with two administrative divisions.

I think one tactical division is a stretch for us.

And two is an impossibility with our current 1% of GDP force.

If pushed these days I would lean towards a Reserve heavy CJOC/JTF Joint structure based around our National Defence / NORAD obligations. 

I would have the Regular Army focus on 1 Can Div and being able to rapidly deplo a small Brigade.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> Here is your biggest challenge in Ontario in particular and urban Canada in general.
> 
> The pool of recruits is not your traditional recruit pool.  Many of the potentials are averse to military service and/or service to the Crown.  And many of the rest are disinclined and/or incapable of meeting the traditional standards and expectations.
> 
> The switch dated from 1972.  Britain left the Commonwealth for the EU.  Canada left Britain.


Reposting from the recruitment thread:

"Falling into the trap of associating Southern Ontario and the GTA. Yes the GTA/Golden Horseshoe has the majority of the population, but that overshadows that the non-GH part of Southwestern Ontario is more than 2.5 million. Higher than Manitoba and Saskatchewan combined, a lot of it Belleville type small towns, actual small towns, and rural, a lot of it skewing conservative.

Narrowing the view somewhat here to look at Meaford/Borden. There's ~400k people living in rural Grey/Dufferin/Simcoe/Wellington.

Looking away from raw demographics to inplace infrastructure, 31 CBG claims 8 combat arms regiments. Grey Simcoe Highlanders claim one line platoon plus one training.  Assume with a little tweaking you could count on 1.5 platoons/troops per reserve regiment.  3 light cavalry troops, 9 light infantry platoons.  It it such a stretch to assume that 32 CBG with 4x the population to draw on could do the same, regardless of demographics?



FJAG said:


> 30/70 is not the best use if you scatter the 30 around the whole battalion. If the headquarters is mixed 30/70 and one subunit is 100/0 (while the rest are 5/95 or 10/90) then you have the core of a battalion headquarters capable of deploying and one full company capable of full training and deploying. With our building block system of tailoring task forces for a mission, a 30/70 battalion headquarters as well as the 100/0 company are fully viable and fully trained full-time building blocks.
> 
> 🍻


Regarding the 30/70 best use- I think we have to be willing to drop the "building block" system for some aspects of the force to get the most out of the reserves.  For Bde attached reserve battalions that makes sense- to be able to plug and play, have viable units and sub units, but does that hold true if the objective a given reserve unit is to provide an army level capability that requires more "Reg" presence than a pure PRes could deliver?

If we overcome the hurdle of symmetry, why stop at re-roling the Regular Bde's?

2CMBG splits and absorbs 33 CBG to form a "traditional" 70/30 light Bde,  roles - COIN, UN, domestic, Arctic, QRF
5CMBG absorbs 35, single "traditional" 70/30 Medium Bde,  roles COIN, UN, domestic, ANZAC
1CMBG absorbs 41, Single "traditional 70/30 Heavy Bde, role- NATO

Unallocated- 
Reg
"30" each from 1/2/5 CMBG
PRes
31/32/34/36+37/38/39

At the cost of losing plug and play sub-units, is there not a collection of 3-6  worth while taskings for 6x 15/85 task oriented battlegroups
36+37 and 39 -> Littoral Combat / Coastal Defense  
34 and 38 -> Air Defense
31 and 32 -> Strike (NLOS / HIMARS / Loitering Munitions


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I agree.  If we are talking about administrative divisions.  Or  for that matter, administrative Corps, like the RCAC, RCIC or the RCCS.
> 
> But our discussions always seem to end up prioritizing the tactical operational over the administrative.


Prioritizing the administrative over the operational has got us to where we are today.


Kirkhill said:


> I have no problem with two administrative divisions.
> 
> I think one tactical operational division is a stretch for us.


It really isn't. We have the people and much of the equipment to form one, albeit with some capabilities deficiencies which need rectifying. It's more an attitude and organizational challenge than a practical one. The real issue is post-deployment sustainment.


Kirkhill said:


> And two is an impossibility with our current 1% of GDP force.


Don't think of it as 1% - Think of it as $26 billion. Now try to think of one divisional headquarters with a peacetime administrative and war-time operational role and another with a peacetime administrative and war-time administrative force-generating/sustainment role. And while we should strive to be capable of putting a whole division in the field there is nothing to say we couldn't deploy a divisional headquarters, and a brigade and have other NATO brigades plug in. There are numerous possibilities but none of them will work as long as you do not form a deployable divisional headquarters and its basic sustainment elements. That works for $26 billion.


Kirkhill said:


> If pushed these days I would lean towards a Reserve heavy CJOC/JTF Joint structure based around our National Defence / NORAD obligations.


This is where we always part the ways. I believe the issue with respect to the defence of Canada is not whether we need to do it but rather when we will need to do it. As northern resources become more exploitable, competition will arise. We do not have the resources to make an effective solitary northern defence. We will always need allied help. The way to get allied help is to contribute to allied defence efforts. We need to be seen as a valued partner and not as a freeloader. To be seen as a valued partner we need to have a presence in our allies forward defence initiatives which, for the time being, are in Europe. Having a credible force deployed in or prepositioned in Europe will firstly help deter aggression there and secondly help us to be seen as a valued partner. Don't think that just because we are sharing a border with the US that they will come and help us for free. They will probably come, but it won't be for free. They'll be looking for or taking payback.


Kirkhill said:


> I would have the Regular Army focus on 1 Can Div and being able to rapidly deplo a small Brigade.


I said credible above and I meant credible. In the old days we kept a large brigade there because, quite literally, we wanted be a large enough force where we showed up with a national symbol on all the planning maps. We did the same in taking on Kandahar as a place where our contribution would be noticed by our allies rather than lost in some backwater part of Afghanistan. How much does anyone know about the Italians in Herat other than the Italians? The rule in these games is "go big or go home". We've been staying home for far too long. And, you can't go big just using the RegF - that's exactly where your 1% problem comes in. To go big, at least big enough to be noticed, you need the ResF and, quite frankly looking at Russian preparations for the Ukraine, it won't need to deploy all that rapidly. Mounting onto prepositioned equipment will be fast enough as long as the logistics are all in place and our personnel adequately trained and prepared for the role.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

The Army doesn't get 26 BCAD.  It gets something in the 5 BCAD range?

And I did not say anything about prioritizing.  I am simply of the opinion that there I'd nothing wrong with cataloging resources administratively.

Creating operational/tactical solutions from  that catalogue I consider a separate task.


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> The way to get allied help is to contribute to allied defence efforts. We need to be seen as a valued partner and not as a freeloader. To be seen as a valued partner we need to have a presence in our allies forward defence initiatives which, for the time being, are in Europe. Having a credible force deployed in or prepositioned in Europe will firstly help deter aggression there and secondly help us to be seen as a valued partner. Don't think that just because we are sharing a border with the US that they will come and help us for free. They will probably come, but it won't be for free. They'll be looking for or taking payback.
> 
> I said credible above and I meant credible. In the old days we kept a large brigade there because, quite literally, we wanted be a large enough force where we showed up with a national symbol on all the planning maps.


Is the only way to accomplish that with a full Bde and heavy metal?
If we were to 
-take on eFP Latvia with a permanent combined arms battlegroup
-pre-position equipment etc.  for a Response Force commitment of a flyover HQ/CS/CSS to lead a multi-national Bde 
-add a Response for commitment of a nordic trained Light Bde to Finland/ Sweden, conduct annual BG size exercises 
would that not be credible?

Or, assuming Finland/Sweden get in, would it make sense for us to pull out of Latvia entirely to focus on an expanded and permanent Nordic role?


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Correct.  However Infantry Brigades (Light, Medium or Heavy) are no use against missiles directed at North America, hypersonic or not.


Agree



GR66 said:


> Firstly my catagorization of Iran or North Korea as "Lesser Powers" is in relation to the two major world powers China and Russia, not in terms of their military strength relative to Canada.  Also there is no point in making an argument of how Canada's Army would fare on its own against either of those countries as we would never be in that situation.  It would obviously be a war where we are part of a coalition of allied forces.


Agree



GR66 said:


> Of course a CMBG will never come in and rule the day but as noted above it won't be expected to.  Even during the Korean War (which of course involved China in addition to North Korea) our land contribution to the conflict was a single Infantry Brigade as part of the 1st Commonwealth Division.  I don't expect that during a 2nd Korean War that Canada would choose to mobilize the nation in order to deploy a force larger than that.  I don't believe that any Canadian Government will likely see such a war as important enough to our national interest to expend that much blood or treasure.  You may disagree with the appropriateness of that thinking but you'd be hard pressed to convince me that our Government would feel otherwise.


Agree on blood expenditures.  Not so sure about the expenditure of treasure.  Remember that we print our own money.



GR66 said:


> No argument that they are really pushing their amphibious capability with the obvious objective of being able to take Taiwan if they so choose.  The two points that I'd make about that are firstly, that the best way to counter an amphibious invasion is to strike the ships carrying the troops before they have the chance to land rather than trying to insert your own ground forces to counter the invasion after it takes place.  I'd contend that investment in our naval and air forces would be the better choice than increasing our land forces.  Secondly I have my doubts whether Canada would be willing to deploy ground forces to Taiwan in the case of a Chinese invasion.  The status of Taiwan is politically unique in that both Taiwan and the PRC contend that Taiwan is Chinese territory.  They however disagree as to which of them is the legitimate party to lead all of China.  I don't see a Canadian Government being likely to deploy our Army to take sides in what is essentially the continuation of an unresolved Chinese Civil War.  Again, people on this site might have strong feelings about whether Canada SHOULD come to the military defence of Taiwan should China invade, but you'd be hard pressed to convince me that any Canadian Government will make the decision to do so.


I can't see the GoC deploying troops to Taiwan or even aircraft.  The aircraft would have to be based on the island itself and thus they and their troops would be hostage to events.

I could see, at some distant point in the future, VLS equipped CSCs deploying to the rear of Taiwan to supply a missile umbrella over the island (both SAM and SSMs).



GR66 said:


> In terms of the Chinese military threat to our other Allies in the Pacific like Japan or the Philippines again I'd argue that air and sea power to prevent any invasion happening place in the first place would be the better investment over land forces.


Agree



GR66 said:


> I don't believe that what we're seeing in Ukraine is likely what we'd see in a potential Russia/NATO conflict.  Firstly, I've stated in the past that I think that any direct invasion of NATO territory by Russia is unlikely for basically the same reason that we're not seeing direct NATO intervention in Ukraine.  Both sides are nuclear powers and any war between NATO and Russia will almost certainly turn nuclear the moment that once side or the other feels at risk of decisively losing.


That theory might be tested in the near future.



GR66 said:


> For that reason I believe that Russia is both unlikely to conduct a direct military attack on any NATO nation which would risk an Article 5 response.  NATO has seen the recklessness of Putin's Russia and it's members (especially those bordering Russia and its allies) are improving their capabilities and readiness to face any such attack.  And as I have noted previously, unlike in Ukraine where Russia has the advantage in terms of military power, economic power and total population, those advantages are reversed when you compare Russian military/economic/demographic strength to that of the NATO alliance.  The weaknesses of the Russian military forces in Ukraine (and the corresponding increase in the strength of NATO forces in response) I think has made the idea of a Russian invasion of NATO even less likely.


General agreement on the weakness issue. I am not convinced Article 5 is a substantive issue at all.



GR66 said:


> What the Ukraine war I think has shown is that high-tech weapons do have the capability to seriously affect the capability of an army to conduct fast paced, deep penetrating offensive operations as ISR capabilities are able to identify large formations on the move and precision weapons have the capability to strike them before they can concentrate on their objectives.  When that happens there is a move toward dispersion of forces and increased reliance on fires.


Agree



GR66 said:


> It seems telling to me that the main items that the West are supplying to Ukraine (and that Ukraine is asking for) are weapons to defeat Russian air power (including UAVs), precision anti-armour weapons, UAVs/Loitering Munitions, and indirect fire weapons.  I'm suggesting that in a Russia/NATO conflict (or in a West/Iran, West/North Korea, etc. conflict) that the same systems will again be in demand.


Agree



GR66 said:


> I'll contend that since European NATO (plus the US military) have a military manpower advantage over Russia already and that any additional ground forces that Canada can generate (short of national mobilization) would not make a major quantitative difference to the overall balance, that focusing our Reserve "surge" capabilities on those areas noted above would have a greater military contribution to a conflict than any increase in the number of Brigades we are able to generate.


Agree



GR66 said:


> Our Reg Force formations ARE anemic and I think that one thing the Russian experience has shown us is that deploying forces at less than full strength is a huge mistake.  I think our Battalions should be brought up to full strength and additional Reserve Battalions (10/90 and/or 30/70) should be integrated directly into the Regiments to provide sustainment manpower (and equipment).


Agree



GR66 said:


> The NLOS and Joint Force Arsenal threads are examples of some of the capabilities (along with conventional tube and missile artillery) that I think would be well suited for the Reserves and could in a conflict potentially have more impact than expanding the number of Infantry Brigades we are able to field.


Self serving agreement here.  

I would add that domestic missile forces would have application in both the NORAD and NATO roles.  If we built lots of missiles we might only have to ever use a few domestically but they would be welcomed by any allies to bolster their own defences.  That is what I was thinking about when I suggested that a GoC might be willing to spend treasure in support of an alliance.



GR66 said:


> Of course during a major conflict both our Reg Force Brigades and our Reserve capabilities will need technical and logistical support beyond what the peacetime Reg Force is likely able to provide.  It's often contended that those technical capabilities are beyond what the Reserves are able to generate, however there are examples South of the border of Reserve forces that are able to exactly that.  Yes, achieving that will require a fundamental change to the way the Reserves are structured, trained, organized, equipped and legislated, but if we want an Army capable of warfighting then that is what will have to happen.


The Reserves may be short of mechanics, electricians and logisticians but the civilian market isn't.  If we are not sending brigades overseas to bleed,  if we are sending, instead, sensors and missiles, from the North American citadel, then we need factories, warehouses, trucks, planes and ships.  And a Navy and Air Force.



GR66 said:


> Agreed.  When the leadership (both military and civilian) no longer views the ultimate purpose of the military to fight and win at war then that is when you get organizational drift that leads to the situation where we find ourselves now.


Agree.


----------



## FJAG

IKnowNothing said:


> Is the only way to accomplish that with a full Bde and heavy metal?


There are numerous options


IKnowNothing said:


> If we were to
> -take on eFP Latvia with a permanent combined arms battlegroup


I don't see a need to change that commitment upwards. The multinational nature has an impact and at the same time requires a moderate, sustainable manpower commitment. If one goes to "permanent ... battlegroup" you are starting to up the commitment to Afghanistan levels with the concomitant stress back in Canada to keep generating them. I'm not so sure that you want to get into a trhee-year posting scenario for such a force.


IKnowNothing said:


> -pre-position equipment etc.  for a Response Force commitment of a flyover HQ/CS/CSS to lead a multi-national Bde
> -add a Response for commitment of a nordic trained Light Bde to Finland/ Sweden, conduct annual BG size exercises
> would that not be credible?


Now you're getting to the levels that I'm talking about but with a subtle difference. 

Your suggestion is for a MNB headquarters plus CS and CSS and a disassociated flyover battalion for the Nordic front.

My suggestion has all of those flyover commitments teamed up with the current eFP battlegroup into a recognizable CA Bde in Latvia. That's easier to manage logistics wise and has that all-important "Canadian Symbol" on all the NATO maps. This would be even more strengthened with Canadian divisional staff at Multinational Division North. Essentially MND-N is a two country (Latvia and Estonia) AO. A large Canadian flyover presence there would have a big impact.


IKnowNothing said:


> Or, assuming Finland/Sweden get in, would it make sense for us to pull out of Latvia entirely to focus on an expanded and permanent Nordic role?


Not in my view. We did that already with the CAST. It had too little impact and it was difficult logistically. All the attention was focused on 4 CMBG. Furthermore, IMHO, Norway, Finland and Sweden are a backwater front. When the Soviet Army existed it had sufficient troops to commit there. Much of that Soviet army is now part of NATO and what's left in Russia will not be able to operate on that wide a scope. The Baltic States, on the other hand, are still a strategic nexus for Russia to protect and consolidate its western flank. The need for a strong NATO presence is in the Baltics. Leave Norway, Finland and Sweden to US and UK Marines and the navy and air force.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> The Baltic States, on the other hand, are still a strategic nexus for Russia to protect and consolidate its western flank. The need for a strong NATO presence is in the Baltics. Leave Norway, Finland and Sweden to US and UK Marines and the navy and air force.
> 
> 🍻



And, you know, Norway, Finland and Sweden's Armed Forces


----------



## Brad Sallows

The difference between population and military in almost every region is so pronounced that worrying about potential to recruit enough reservists is a diversion.

What lacks is the political will to create/update/maintain training areas sufficient to whatever requirements are given to Res F units, close to where the units are; to properly resource those requirements; and to grip the leaders from above to ensure they are competent for the task of meeting those requirements and that they do so.

Add: the whole army doesn't need to be committed to a selected 2025 COA all at once.  Where is the best mix of: Reg F presence, a couple/handful of healthy Res F units, and suitable training area(s)?  Risk a proof-of-concept.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> My suggestion has all of those flyover commitments teamed up with the current eFP battlegroup into a recognizable CA Bde in Latvia. That's easier to manage logistics wise and has that all-important "Canadian Symbol" on all the NATO maps. This would be even more strengthened with Canadian divisional staff at Multinational Division North. Essentially MND-N is a two country (Latvia and Estonia) AO. A large Canadian flyover presence there would have a big impact.






FJAG said:


> Not in my view. We did that already with the CAST. It had too little impact and it was difficult logistically. All the attention was focused on 4 CMBG.


We did not do that with CAST.  It was difficult logistically because all the attention was focused on 4 CMBG.  The effort expended on 4 CMBG could have been expended on CAST.  And CAST was an important tasking because Norway protected the flank of the GIUK Gap and also dominated the exit to the Arctic from Murmansk and the Kola Inlet. 




FJAG said:


> Furthermore, IMHO, Norway, Finland and Sweden are a backwater front. When the Soviet Army existed it had sufficient troops to commit there. Much of that Soviet army is now part of NATO and what's left in Russia will not be able to operate on that wide a scope. The Baltic States, on the other hand, are still a strategic nexus for Russia to protect and consolidate its western flank. The need for a strong NATO presence is in the Baltics. Leave Norway, Finland and Sweden to US and UK Marines and the navy and air force.
> 
> 🍻



As to Norway, Sweden and Finland being backwaters, you might have had a better argument when Sweden and Finland were neutral but now that they are actively tied into both NATO and JEF, and Finland and Estonia (one of the countries you would support) have aligned their coastal defence systems so as to blockade St Petersburg - their historical role, they are both central to any Baltic actions.  And Finland, Sweden and Norway still are fundamental to containing the Northern Fleet in the Kola.

Scandinavia is not a backwater.  It is a key element.  It blocks both the Kola and St Petersburg.  And it neutralizes Kaliningrad.  It is especially critical with a depleted Russia.  Russia can't afford a run up the middle.  Especially with allies like Belarus in its rear.  It could take as swing at the Kola Peninsula and Karelia.  And we can get there with supporting air power.



> “We can really, in a single fighter sortie, range to just about any AOR in the Northern Hemisphere pretty easily,”



That's US Air Force Col. David “Ajax” Berkland, commander of the 354th Fighter Wing, speaking during an Air & Space Forces Association virtual conversation - commanding 54 F35As at Eielson AFB in Alaska.









						The Intricacies Of F-35 Operations Over The Frigid Alaskan Frontier
					

Now with 54 F-35s on hand, Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska is fine-tuning how it operates its fleet and how it projects power abroad.




					www.thedrive.com
				




Are we any less well positioned to offer deployable support across the Northern Hemisphere pretty easily?

And again - deployable forces are both an international and a domestic asset.  One that will fly the flag in the headlines when issues are hot.  How many foreigners were even aware that Canada had 4 CMBG in Germany?


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> Add: the whole army doesn't need to be committed to a selected 2025 COA all at once. Where is the best mix of: Reg F presence, a couple/handful of healthy Res F units, and suitable training area(s)? Risk a proof-of-concept.


There are actually two somewhat countervailing components of business transformation.

One is that one should transform in manageable steps with pilot programs so that one can assess and adjust the process for the full roll-out.

The other one is that one needs to quickly get to a state with the transformation so that the foot-draggers can't easily switch back to the old dysfunctional system.

I sometimes think that with the foot dragging that has gone on with respect to any meaningful transformation of the Army and in particular the ResF, the second needs to be given prominence even if that means a wholesale, externally dictated, all-encompassing event.

In the words of my new favourite saying:



> One reason people insist that you use the proper channels to change things is because they have control of the proper channels and they’re confident it won’t work - Jon Stone - Writer Sesame Street



The people who have control over the proper change agenda have been screwing it up for so long that they should no longer have control.

Let chaos reign! Burn it down and let a phoenix rise!

😁


----------



## daftandbarmy

Russia regards its northern approaches to the North Sea as pretty important, and will continue to flex its muscles in response to perceived access threats from NATO.

We ignore that at our peril as their Northern Fleet is huge - from last March:

Russian Navy announces firing west of NATO Arctic exercise​








						Russian Navy announces firing west of NATO Arctic exercise
					

Russia’s biggest warship, the nuclear-powered battle cruiser “Pyotr Veliky” and the destroyer “Severomorsk” are sailing towards the activated warning zone halfway between northern Norway and Iceland.




					thebarentsobserver.com


----------



## GR66

Brad Sallows said:


> The difference between population and military in almost every region is so pronounced that worrying about potential to recruit enough reservists is a diversion.
> 
> What lacks is the political will to create/update/maintain training areas sufficient to whatever requirements are given to Res F units, close to where the units are; to properly resource those requirements; and to grip the leaders from above to ensure they are competent for the task of meeting those requirements and that they do so.
> 
> Add: the whole army doesn't need to be committed to a selected 2025 COA all at once.  Where is the best mix of: Reg F presence, a couple/handful of healthy Res F units, and suitable training area(s)?  Risk a proof-of-concept.


These two points in particular I believe represent very good first steps toward modernizing the Army and will almost certainly be required regardless of what Force 2025/30/35 eventually ends up looking like.

The Reserves will never be able to transform into a deployable force unless it has the facilities to be able to train properly.  And the Reserves will never be able to effectively force generate units as long as its members are split up into a series of independent Company-sized packets.

Step 1 - Take all the Reserve units that are within a reasonable travel distance from the existing Reg Force training areas and group them together into whatever size unit their actual combined strength represents.  Ideally these units could be integrated as Reserve elements of a parent Reg Force Regiment .

Step 2 - For all the Reserve units that were not amalgamated in Step 1, identify potential training area locations that would be within reasonable travel distance of as many Reserve units as possible and begin the establishment of new training areas.  Yes this will be expensive, but as infrastructure investment it will also have positive impacts on the local economy (and will count toward our 2% Defence spending commitment).  Once the training areas are established the units surrounding these new facilities can be amalgamated as well.

Step 3 - For any Reserve units that are still too isolated from a training area then you could look at relocating these units to an under served community that IS within the catchment area of a training base or re-role the unit to a type that doesn't require a large training facility.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> There are actually two somewhat countervailing components of business transformation.



It's not a business that can allow itself to risk failure.


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> There are numerous options
> 
> I don't see a need to change that commitment upwards. The multinational nature has an impact and at the same time requires a moderate, sustainable manpower commitment. If one goes to "permanent ... battlegroup" you are starting to up the commitment to Afghanistan levels with the concomitant stress back in Canada to keep generating them. I'm not so sure that you want to get into a trhee-year posting scenario for such a force.
> 
> Now you're getting to the levels that I'm talking about but with a subtle difference.
> 
> Your suggestion is for a MNB headquarters plus CS and CSS and a disassociated flyover battalion for the Nordic front.
> 
> My suggestion has all of those flyover commitments teamed up with the current eFP battlegroup into a recognizable CA Bde in Latvia. That's easier to manage logistics wise and has that all-important "Canadian Symbol" on all the NATO maps. This would be even more strengthened with Canadian divisional staff at Multinational Division North. Essentially MND-N is a two country (Latvia and Estonia) AO. A large Canadian flyover presence there would have a big impact.


I may be completely out to lunch, but I question the ease with which a multinational battlegroup can be surged to a Bde.  Does that BG maintain integrity as one of the component battalions, with 2-3 of the contributing nations sending an additional, or is it broken apart with each component company mated to fly over parent unit? 

Slight difference, I'm calling for a whole disassociate flyover Bde for the Nordic front.  1CMBG tasked to Latvia, 2 CIBG tasked to Finland.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> It's not a business that can allow itself to risk failure.


I agree with you 100%. But ... that's exactly where it is.


IKnowNothing said:


> I may be completely out to lunch, but I question the ease with which a multinational battlegroup can be surged to a Bde.  Does that BG maintain integrity as one of the component battalions, with 2-3 of the contributing nations sending an additional, or is it broken apart with each component company mated to fly over parent unit?


I would think the BG would stay as a multinational force and additional, predesignated elements will in the rest of the Bde.


IKnowNothing said:


> Slight difference, I'm calling for a whole disassociate flyover Bde for the Nordic front.  1CMBG tasked to Latvia, 2 CIBG tasked to Finland.


Fine, as long as one Bde (at least) is trained for and remains in Canada to deal with multiple territorial incursions.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Ignoring the specifics of how the various Units and Sub-Units are structured I'd think that a reasonable goal for a country the size and wealth of Canada would be to be for our Army to be able to lead a Multi-National Division with a Canadian Divisional HQ and supporting elements plus a single Brigade with the other two Brigades being supplied by allied forces.  

On mobilization we should be able to field and sustain a fully Canadian Division.  We can debate what types of Brigades, how they are equipped, where they are deployed, whether elements are pre-positioned in various locations, etc., but overall in my opinion the above should be an achievable goal around which the other discussions should take place.


----------



## FJAG

Just came across this article in Canadian Army Today:



> Time for a new tank killer | Canadian Army Today
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> canadianarmytoday.com



This line caught my eye:



> The ATGMR project is still in the identification phase, but Gendron hopes that with some push a request for proposals could be released around 2025, after more urgent projects such as the Canadian Modular Assault Rifle are near implementation. Until then, the BGM-71 remains serviceable, albeit on its final legs.



🤦‍♂️


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Just came across this article in Canadian Army Today:
> 
> 
> 
> This line caught my eye:
> 
> 
> 
> 🤦‍♂️



Nice to see that the 'micro' takes precedence over the 'macro' ...


----------



## GR66

What are people's thoughts on the US pulling their Close Support Artillery Battalions from the Brigades and concentrating them in an Artillery Brigade?

For Canada I don't see any advantage in doing that as it would have to be an Artillery Brigade with its component Regiments geographically separated otherwise we'd lose the ability to do combined arms training with the other Branches.  Organizationally would there be any advantage to a dispersed Artillery Brigade over Close Support Regiments directly within the Maneuver Brigades?


----------



## ueo

IKnowNothing said:


> I think
> 
> I think Ontario is the key to unlocking your 70/30, 30/70.
> 
> Its just such a perfect fit geographically and with respect to the reserve CBG's. 70/30  2 CLBGin Petawawa(Light Protected Mobility) in TAPV's( ideally JLTV or Ocelot) and MiSu's/ modernized Bisons,  30/70 3 CLBG (Light Motorized) in commercial side by sides and/ or ISV.
> 
> After that I wonder if the 30/70 reserve brigade is the best use the PY's.  Use the Alberta PRes to make 1 CABG a 70/30, but then re-role and spread the Regulars around as necessary to add  capabilities. BC gets a 30/70 coastal defence battlegroup (battery of surface to surface, battery of shorad, a couple companies of mountain infantry to defend them) Sask/Man provides expanded artillery with HIMARS,  loitering munitions, Shorad, etc.


Did we not do this waltz some years back with a 70/30 Bn group in Borden?


----------



## ueo

Infanteer said:


> 2 Division are just 2 Divisions.  A Corps requires the Command, Combat Support, and Sustainment elements to build around 2 or more Divisions.


Dont think we could provide an "adequately supported" (read necessary indirect fire, engr and adm resources, etc) battalion or a Brigade today.


----------



## KevinB

ueo said:


> Did we not do this waltz some years back with a 70/30 Bn group in Borden?


No It was 10/90 and for the Infantry was just the 3rd Bn’s 
Then 3 RCR was still in London. 
3VP Work Point in BC 
3 VanDoo in Valcatraz


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

KevinB said:


> No It was 10/90 and for the Infantry was just the 3rd Bn’s
> Then 3 RCR was still in London.
> 3VP Work Point in BC
> 3 VanDoo in Valcatraz


Not quite.

The 90/10s were partially an attempt to retain Reg F units as 4 CMBG was struck from the order of battle at the end of the Cold War. It was a confusing time organizationally. 4 CMBG permanently had 1R22eR on its order of battle. The 4 CMBG anglo infantry battalion, though, rotated between the 2 PPCLI and 3 RCR. The battalion of either Regiment would be in Winnipeg when they were not in Germany. 1 RCR was in London and 2 RCR were in Gagetown. 3 RCR was in Germany as 4 CMBG was cut. I am not sure when the 1 CMBG move from Calgary to Edmonton occurred but it was likely decided upon at that time as well, adding to the swirl. As part of the early 90s cuts/reorganizations 1 RCR was moved to Petawawa circa 1992. 

I believe that 3 R22eR in Valcartier simply (?) renumbered to 1 R22eR as 4 CMBG was struck.  The 3rd Battalions were then turned into 10/90s (I am not sure where the 3VP HQ was at this time, but the Work Point closure was part of this). With the RCR the battalion numbering made it easy - turn 3 RCR into 10/90 and find a logical home. Borden was selected, which made a certain amount of sense given the geographical disposition of the militia units. London would have also made sense but perhaps that would have salted the wounds for all involved including the planners who had "closed" the base. The Reg F 8CH from 4 CMBG landed in Gagetown/Moncton as a Total Force Armoured Regiment that took in C Sqn RCD (with attendant rebadges) so the mix with 8CH(M) was closer to 50/50. This lasted until 1997 when they were removed from the Reg F order of battle and the Reg F 8CH members badged to one of the other three Reg F armoured regiments. It was a bewildering time. 

The 10/90 Infantry battalions trained and functioned until it was realized that the rotational peacekeeping of the mid-90s needed a larger force. So the 3rd Battalions were reinstated with some attendant recruiting increases and CTs but without kit - the so-called Mechanized Infantry battalions on light scales. That's another thread. I worked alongside the 3 RCR 10/90 for a couple of things as I was an armoured reservist in London at the time. My memory was that the reservist soldiers/junior officers in the sub-units were happy enough to have well organized training and a larger cadre of NCOs available to teach QL4 courses and develop some expertise.


----------



## ArmyRick

3 VP was at Work Point barracks until '93 or '94. They then converted to 10/90 and I think they spread around BC. In 2VP we got a whole bunch of 3VP posted in during APS 94. Then after Airborne disbandment, I remember Patricia Jump Coy was sent to Edmonton, and about that time they announced the standing up again of the 3rd battalions. PPCLI jump coy was basically the first of the 're-born" 3VP.


----------



## FJAG

TangoTwoBravo said:


> I am not sure when the 1 CMBG move from Calgary to Edmonton occurred but it was likely decided upon at that time as well, adding to the swirl.



The move of 1 CMBG from Calgary to Edmonton happened in 1997. My understanding at the time was that decision for the move happened much earlier under the Conservative government when Don Mazankowski (MP from Vegrevile just east of Edmonton) was the Deputy Prime Minister. Several other Fed departments ended up having offices or elements move to Edmonton during this time.

4 AD also made the move from Germany during this time eventually ending up in Moncton.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The 10/90 Infantry battalions trained and functioned until it was realized that the rotational peacekeeping of the mid-90s needed a larger force. So the 3rd Battalions were reinstated with some attendant recruiting increases and CTs but without kit - the so-called Mechanized Infantry battalions on light scales. That's another thread. I worked alongside the 3 RCR 10/90 for a couple of things as I was an armoured reservist in London at the time. My memory was that the reservist soldiers/junior officers in the sub-units were happy enough to have well organized training and a larger cadre of NCOs available to teach QL4 courses and develop some expertise.



It worked OK, right up until the Reg F reconstituted their 3rd battalions (after the wolf wandered away from the door) and they took all our soldiers with them in a massive CT scam.

My reserve unit was left a hollow shell, and it took several years to recover. So mission accomlished I guess


----------



## KevinB

@TangoTwoBravo roger I forgot it was 1RCR that first moved to Pet (from London)

For some reason I forgot that and thought 3RCR did 10/90 in London.


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> Just came across this article in Canadian Army Today:
> 
> 
> 
> This line caught my eye:
> 
> 
> 
> 🤦‍♂️


I read this and was enraged. 

Actually the last three or four articles they’ve produced have been attempts to defend the procurement process. While I appreciate that they’re doing a job, it’s been a bad look. The defence of the ISSP article was literally just a chat with a Thales representative put to paper.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I read this and was enraged.
> 
> Actually the last three or four articles they’ve produced have been attempts to defend the procurement process. While I appreciate that they’re doing a job, it’s been a bad look. The defence of the ISSP article was literally just a chat with a Thales representative put to paper.



I guess I must have missed how TOW is semi-automatic. 


Not a lot of accuracy in that article.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I guess I must have missed how TOW is semi-automatic.
> 
> 
> Not a lot of accuracy in that article.


But he's the guy at DLR - so ...


----------



## Kirkhill

SACLOS?






						Semi-automatic command to line of sight - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Kirkhill said:


> SACLOS?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Semi-automatic command to line of sight - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


Yup- TOW is a fairly classic SACLOS system. Not my favourite, because the time of flight is horrific…


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> SACLOS?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Semi-automatic command to line of sight - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


I realy hate that term, as it’s inaccurate.

  There is absolutely nothing semi-automatic about it.
   It’s a manually guided wire controlled system.   It’s not semi-automatic as it uses active input by the launcher seeker to align the missile (using the rocket engine as a reference) onto the target selected by the users crosshair. 

Even the earlier beam rider missiles where not semi-automatic, I might accept semi-active, as the eye was taking/took  ‘snap shot pictures’ and aligned to the target from the beam that way.


----------



## AmmoTech90

KevinB said:


> I realy hate that term, as it’s inaccurate.
> 
> There is absolutely nothing semi-automatic about it.
> It’s a manually guided wire controlled system.   It’s not semi-automatic as it uses active input by the launcher seeker to align the missile (using the rocket engine as a reference) onto the target selected by the users crosshair.
> 
> Even the earlier beam rider missiles where not semi-automatic, I might accept semi-active, as the eye was taking/took  ‘snap shot pictures’ and aligned to the target from the beam that way.


Sure it's semi automatic.  Not in the sense of small arms but in terms of control.

Manual means you keep the sight on the target and fly the missile to the target.

Automatic means you launch the missile and ignore it.

Semi-automatic means one of the aspects (sight picture or control) is automatic.  For all SACLOS I know about, the control is automatic and sight picture is manual.  So it could be semi-manual or semi-automatic and automatic was chosen.

The motor is not used for tracking as it normally burns out partway through flight, thermal or optical beacon is tracked by the firing post.  TOW's flight motor burns for less than 2 seconds and it coasts the rest of the way to the target.


----------



## Good2Golf

KevinB said:


> I realy hate that term, as it’s inaccurate.
> 
> There is absolutely nothing semi-automatic about it.
> It’s a manually guided wire controlled system.   It’s not semi-automatic as it uses active input by the launcher seeker to align the missile (using the rocket engine as a reference) onto the target selected by the users crosshair.
> 
> Even the earlier beam rider missiles where not semi-automatic, I might accept semi-active, as the eye was taking/took  ‘snap shot pictures’ and aligned to the target from the beam that way.


I get what you’re saying, KevinB, but the difference between semi-automatic and semi-active is the location of the steer-signal.  TOW with wire or RBS70 with laser, still has command signal sent from the CLU to the missile.  

Semi-active has to my knowledge always represented a system where the missile itself is generating steer cues from RF or laser energy painted onto and reflected from the target, like say an AIM-7 Sparrow or RIM-162 ESSM missile (RF) or an AGM-114K or M Hellfire (STANAG 3733 laser designated).


----------



## KevinB

Okay, I still think Semi-Auto is a poor term.

Anyone with a Time Machine - I recommend going back to suggest:
Direct Input Corrected Guidance, Line of Sight - or DICGLOS


----------



## Kirkhill




----------



## Weinie

KevinB said:


> Okay, I still think Semi-Auto is a poor term.
> 
> Anyone with a Time Machine - I recommend going back to suggest:
> Direct Input Corrected Guidance, Line of Sight - or DICGLOS


I recall a movie where DICGLOS was prominent. Skin Deep.


----------



## Brad Sallows

> What are people's thoughts on the US pulling their Close Support Artillery Battalions from the Brigades and concentrating them in an Artillery Brigade?



A fine and proper thing.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Anyone with a Time Machine - I recommend going back to suggest:
> Direct Input Corrected Guidance, Line of Sight - or DICGLOS


At the risk of being constantly pedantic, it’s semi automatic in that the inputs are automated. Point of aim is chosen, but the adjustment of the missile into that point is automated.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> At the risk of being constantly pedantic, it’s semi automatic in that the inputs are automated. Point of aim is chosen, but the adjustment of the missile into that point is automated.


So Manual Aim, Automated Correction ? 
  My overly pedantic point is simply there is no reason to say semi-automatic.    

I still like DICGLOS


----------



## IKnowNothing

Assuming that at least some of the CBG's are  staffed such that each Regiment could provide a full troop/platoon, and assuming we could chart the course from here to there (and execute), would there be any value in  having 2-4  quasi-deployable "welterweight"  (Modernized Bisons, Patria Pasi etc) motorized, territorial/militia battalions?  Looking at 31 it seems to map over fairly well.  6x Inf gives 2 coy's,  the artillery for a mortar platoon, the two armoured go one each Recce and DF/AT.

Would it fill a gap? Free up the Regs for other tasks? Complete waste?


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> Assuming that at least some of the CBG's are  staffed such that each Regiment could provide a full troop/platoon, and assuming we could chart the course from here to there (and execute), would there be any value in  having 2-4  quasi-deployable "welterweight"  (Modernized Bisons, Patria Pasi etc) motorized, territorial/militia battalions?  Looking at 31 it seems to map over fairly well.  6x Inf gives 2 coy's,  the artillery for a mortar platoon, the two armoured go one each Recce and DF/AT.
> 
> Would it fill a gap? Free up the Regs for other tasks? Complete waste?


1) I would never use Arty for a Mortar Platoon - there are needs for Artillery AND needs for Mortars.
2) The PRes issue needs to be solved - I am not sure which is the Chicken and which is the Egg WRT to Future Force initiatives and the Regular and Reserve mix.

I'd argue the LAV is already the Mid weight - and going lighter without going Light is another fools errand in the believe of some sort of role for forces between Heavy and Light.


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> Assuming that at least some of the CBG's are  staffed such that each Regiment could provide a full troop/platoon, and assuming we could chart the course from here to there (and execute), would there be any value in  having 2-4  quasi-deployable "welterweight"  (Modernized Bisons, Patria Pasi etc) motorized, territorial/militia battalions?  Looking at 31 it seems to map over fairly well.  6x Inf gives 2 coy's,  the artillery for a mortar platoon, the two armoured go one each Recce and DF/AT.
> 
> Would it fill a gap? Free up the Regs for other tasks? Complete waste?



I am enjoying your optimism with respect to militia capabilities, and the capacity of the CAF to support them effectively in that role.

The only realistic role for the militia is to augment the Reg F, as much as it is able, with individuals as and when required. Apart from that we can be trusted to mess around in our own little worlds, as we normally do, with occasional spots of fire/flood fighting to keep us relvant to the locals.

The thought that there would be from 2 to 4 'Militia Battalions' is horrifyingly risky, unnecessary, and unprecedented, ever, even during the World Wars. 

To realize such a goal would probably require a 5-10 year ramp up, a heavy investment in Class B/C, and a militia rank ceiling of around Maj/MWO. Even then, you might think of them as 'vapour ware' as they'd probably dissassemble completely without a huge fire hose of recruits.

But keep up the good work. The militia ego needs dreams like that to keep the motivation up!


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> Assuming that at least some of the CBG's are  staffed such that each Regiment could provide a full troop/platoon, and assuming we could chart the course from here to there (and execute), would there be any value in  having 2-4  quasi-deployable "welterweight"  (Modernized Bisons, Patria Pasi etc) motorized, territorial/militia battalions?  Looking at 31 it seems to map over fairly well.  6x Inf gives 2 coy's,  the artillery for a mortar platoon, the two armoured go one each Recce and DF/AT.
> 
> Would it fill a gap? Free up the Regs for other tasks? Complete waste?


I’ve posted before about the idea of organizing the reserve Infantry and Cavalry regiments into Bns with attached Cavalry / mobility Sqns, at roughly a rate of 1 per Bde. Given limited training time having armour crew vehicles makes sense, and we have a vehicle that could fill that role in the TAPV. It’s not ideal but we have them, and they aren’t going anywhere.


----------



## IKnowNothing

daftandbarmy said:


> I am enjoying your optimism with respect to militia capabilities, and the capacity of the CAF to support them effectively in that role.
> 
> The only realistic role for the militia is to augment the Reg F, as much as it is able, with individuals as and when required. Apart from that we can be trusted to mess around in our own little worlds, as we normally do, with occasional spots of fire/flood fighting to keep us relvant to the locals.


So this (admittedly uncited Wiki excerpt) is whimsical fancy?
"
Traditionally the militia has been subdivided into district garrisons, and this system is still used as units are grouped along geographic lines into brigades for the purposes of administration, training and operations. The deployable sub unit from each regiment are often operationally tasked and grouped together by the brigade to form a composite all-arms battle group of battalion strength known as Territorial Battalion Groups for combined arms training or defence of Canada tasks in the brigade area of operations.

The battle group is usually commanded by a lieutenant-colonel selected on a rotational basis from one of the brigade units. The order of battle will vary depending on the task and the available manpower but generally includes an artillery battery with 105 mm C3 Close Support Guns, several companies of truck-mounted light infantry with support weapons, an armoured reconnaissance squadron with G-Wagons equipped with GPMGs/LAW, and a combat engineer troop."

It was the basis of my thinking.  But with that unit given equipment such that it can actually fill a role. 
If that's insurmountable, why can other countries do what we can't? 

 I get we don't  have near as compelling of use case for organized reserves as many allies and other comparators, but not doing it should be based on choice, not because it's impossible.


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> So this (admittedly uncited Wiki excerpt) is whimsical fancy?
> "
> Traditionally the militia has been subdivided into district garrisons, and this system is still used as units are grouped along geographic lines into brigades for the purposes of administration, training and operations. *The deployable sub unit from each regiment are often operationally tasked and grouped together by the brigade to form a composite all-arms battle group of battalion strength known as Territorial Battalion Groups for combined arms training or defence of Canada tasks in the brigade area of operations.*
> 
> The battle group is usually commanded by a lieutenant-colonel selected on a rotational basis from one of the brigade units. The order of battle will vary depending on the task and the available manpower but generally includes an artillery battery with 105 mm C3 Close Support Guns, several companies of truck-mounted light infantry with support weapons, an armoured reconnaissance squadron with G-Wagons equipped with GPMGs/LAW, and a combat engineer troop."
> 
> It was the basis of my thinking.  But with that unit given equipment such that it can actually fill a role.
> If that's insurmountable, why can other countries do what we can't?
> 
> I get we don't  have near as compelling of use case for organized reserves as many allies and other comparators, but not doing it should be based on choice, not because it's impossible.



As I recall the TDBGs were a fantasy organization, developed a few years ago, to recognize the inability of a very heavily staffed CBG HQ to organize and lead anything meaningful by way of training. The Bde Comd merely delegates and disappears. I'm sure there was a sugar coated purpose of some kind floated on high, but that's how it appeared to me at the 'parapet level'.

There is nothing operationally or 'territorially defensive' about it, apart from guarding one's own turf of course.

At best, they can try to get everyone to the same location to do the same thing, or at least something by way of training in the same geographical area. There is never any attempt to act like a real brigade, with a commander, and an aim and shared resources aligned with a common plan. In any case just the 'getting together' part has rarely occurred as intended, if ever, AFAIK.

At worst indecision, arguing, infighting, confusion, and a lack of resourcing and adequate battle procedure causes the chaos and collapse of various aspirational plans.

That's been my experience of it at any rate, and others might differ of course


----------



## IKnowNothing

daftandbarmy said:


> As I recall the TDBGs were a fantasy organization, developed a few years ago, to recognize the inability of a very heavily staffed CBG HQ to organize and lead anything meaningful by way of training. The Bde Comd merely delegates and disappears. I'm sure there was a sugar coated purpose of some kind floated on high, but that's how it appeared to me at the 'parapet level'.


So assuming the TBG's were a reality, and we had a functioning reserve system with driven leadership delivering bang for the buck- what's the right weight/equipment level for them to be given and role for them to be tasked with?
Stryker type to plug and play into COIN?
Bison/Pasi for domestic deployment, plug and play into Chapter 6?
Pure light/ truck motorized/ vehicle agnostic?
LAV 6's with a cadre of RegF maintenance support?


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> So assuming the TBG's were a reality, and we had *a functioning reserve system with driven leadership delivering bang for the buck*- what's the right weight/equipment level for them to be given and role for them to be tasked with?
> Stryker type to plug and play into COIN?
> Bison/Pasi for domestic deployment, plug and play into Chapter 6?
> Pure light/ truck motorized/ vehicle agnostic?
> LAV 6's with a cadre of RegF maintenance support?



IMHO....

I would disband the Reserve CBGs, cap rank levels at Major/MWO, and have units report directly to a 'Force Generation Officer'/desk, probably run by the 3 shop, at Div HQ. Perhaps have a (smaller, nimbler, more effective) regionally based 'coordination cell' that replaces the Bde HQ. I don't really know what I'm talking about here but just spit ballin'...

Reserve units would receive takings to 'FG a sub-unit by NLT XYZ date to accomplish ABC tasks' in the summer, and receive the Reg F/ FT training support to achieve those tasks during the training year (September to May). This would mean a Reg F/ FT training team for each Sub-Unit (Coy/Sqn etc) who would train the troops, *and the Officers and NCOs* who currrently get zero training, to successfully fulfill their roles during a summer exercise of some kind, the nature of which would be clearly rticulated in advance using the time tested orders/BP process. Find the money for this support from all the FT positions you booted out of the Reserve CBG HQs, maybe.

These sub-units would be given performance gateways to achieve throughout the training year in line with the Mission. In the summer, the sub-units would muster at a central training location, such as Wainwright, where they would marry up with Reg F CBGs and participate in FTXs designed to build up their capabilities in a reasonable, step by step fashion.

Over the course of three or four years you would likely see the capabilities of the reserve sub-units gradually increase to the point where you might see people emerge at the leadership level who could be qualified to command at a BGp level as opposed to, right now, the 'last man/woman standing', or the 'ambitious but dangerously unqualified'. Unit level admin/maintenance/logitics capabilities would also increase concurrently.

At that point, you could revisit the structure and perhaps stand up full units with well qualified leadership - and infrastructure - who could participate in increasingly complex summer FTXs...

...and then think about issuing out all the fancy schmancy kit/vehicles etc., and telling the Reserves 'you're on your own from here buddy'....

IMHO...


----------



## IKnowNothing

Thank-you very much @daftandbarmy


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> Thank-you very much @daftandbarmy



Avec plaisir!


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> IMHO....
> 
> I would disband the Reserve CBGs, cap rank levels at Major/MWO, and have units report directly to a 'Force Generation Officer'/desk, probably run by the 3 shop, at Div HQ. Perhaps have a (smaller, nimbler, more effective) regionally based 'coordination cell' that replaces the Bde HQ. I don't really know what I'm talking about here but just spit ballin'...
> 
> Reserve units would receive takings to 'FG a sub-unit by NLT XYZ date to accomplish ABC tasks' in the summer, and receive the Reg F/ FT training support to achieve those tasks during the training year (September to May). This would mean a Reg F/ FT training team for each Sub-Unit (Coy/Sqn etc) who would train the troops, *and the Officers and NCOs* who currrently get zero training, to successfully fulfill their roles during a summer exercise of some kind, the nature of which would be clearly rticulated in advance using the time tested orders/BP process. Find the money for this support from all the FT positions you booted out of the Reserve CBG HQs, maybe.
> 
> These sub-units would be given performance gateways to achieve throughout the training year in line with the Mission. In the summer, the sub-units would muster at a central training location, such as Wainwright, where they would marry up with Reg F CBGs and participate in FTXs designed to build up their capabilities in a reasonable, step by step fashion.
> 
> Over the course of three or four years you would likely see the capabilities of the reserve sub-units gradually increase to the point where you might see people emerge at the leadership level who could be qualified to command at a BGp level as opposed to, right now, the 'last man/woman standing', or the 'ambitious but dangerously unqualified'. Unit level admin/maintenance/logitics capabilities would also increase concurrently.
> 
> At that point, you could revisit the structure and perhaps stand up full units with well qualified leadership - and infrastructure - who could participate in increasingly complex summer FTXs...
> 
> ...and then think about issuing out all the fancy schmancy kit/vehicles etc., and telling the Reserves 'you're on your own from here buddy'....
> 
> IMHO...





I’d even go so far as to say the reserves in the one situation where I think there’s actually an argument for NCM service before a commission. Not because I think it “grounds them” or makes them better leaders, but simply because you then “hire” your potential officers as positions open as opposed to having an ill defined pool of officer cadets / LTs / captains searching for purpose.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> The only realistic role for the militia is to augment the Reg F, as much as it is able, with individuals as and when required.


As thing currently stand.


daftandbarmy said:


> To realize such a goal would probably require a 5-10 year ramp up


Every journey starts with a single step... but I wouldn't go down a full Militia battalion either - hence the 30/70 battalions. The ResF can provide low cost manpower at the lower ranks if structured and trained correctly under RegF senior leadership in a system tailored to RegF capabilities.


daftandbarmy said:


> I would disband the Reserve CBGs, cap rank levels at Major/MWO, and have units report directly to a 'Force Generation Officer'/desk, probably run by the 3 shop, at Div HQ


Disband the CBGs - yes. Report to an administrative structure - no. Form them into known, doctrinal tactical entities so that they can train fully.


daftandbarmy said:


> This would mean a Reg F/ FT training team for each Sub-Unit (Coy/Sqn etc) who would train the troops, *and the Officers and NCOs* who currrently get zero training, to successfully fulfill their roles during a summer exercise of some kind


RegF/FT training team  - no. RegF command, administration and training element - yes. Like you I do not believe that there is added value in ResF officers above the rank of major or NCMs above WO unless they have had the proper training AND experience for MWO and LCol and above rank which is highly unlikely for the vast majority of them. One might as well put ResF units under proper leadership from square one.


daftandbarmy said:


> In the summer, the sub-units would muster at a central training location, such as Wainwright, where they would marry up with Reg F CBGs


Marry up with - no. Belong to and deploy on exercises with a RegF commanded and administered CBG - yes. Believe it or not, I actually think we need more brigade headquarters than the three that we have. The 10 existing CBGs are brigade headquarters in name only. Those ten should be reduced and amalgamated into maybe two manoeuvre brigades and three to four support brigades which also follow a 30/70 mix with the 30% RegF being the leaders, and administrators for the entire brigade.

The biggest problem with the ResF, at this time, has less to do with structure and much more to do with the "come play when you feel like it" model of reserve service. That's a neck that needs thorough wringing if we are ever to expect reservists to develop decent individual skills and units that include reservists to have decent collective skills. That's merely a regulatory change with a very minor NDA amendment but is a very large leap in how we structure individual training courses for reservists (which IMHO should parallel RegF courses at the DP1 and 2 level) and how we structure annual training for the ResF units so that it is "attendable", interesting and valuable.

Any and all restructuring of the ResF is the equivalent of building on shifting sands until we first address the fundamental foundation of ResF service. We continue to use a model that reaches back to the 1800s when an army was a collection of guys who could march together and generally shoot straight and could be relatively easily mobilized. Times have changed.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> As thing currently stand.
> 
> Every journey starts with a single step... but I wouldn't go down a full Militia battalion either - hence the 30/70 battalions. The ResF can provide low cost manpower at the lower ranks if structured and trained correctly under RegF senior leadership in a system tailored to RegF capabilities.
> 
> Disband the CBGs - yes. Report to an administrative structure - no. Form them into known, doctrinal tactical entities so that they can train fully.
> 
> RegF/FT training team  - no. RegF command, administration and training element - yes. Like you I do not believe that there is added value in ResF officers above the rank of major or NCMs above WO unless they have had the proper training AND experience for MWO and LCol and above rank which is highly unlikely for the vast majority of them. One might as well put ResF units under proper leadership from square one.
> 
> Marry up with - no. Belong to and deploy on exercises with a RegF commanded and administered CBG - yes. Believe it or not, I actually think we need more brigade headquarters than the three that we have. The 10 existing CBGs are brigade headquarters in name only. Those ten should be reduced and amalgamated into maybe two manoeuvre brigades and three to four support brigades which also follow a 30/70 mix with the 30% RegF being the leaders, and administrators for the entire brigade.
> 
> The biggest problem with the ResF, at this time, has less to do with structure and much more to do with the "come play when you feel like it" model of reserve service. That's a neck that needs thorough wringing if we are ever to expect reservists to develop decent individual skills and units that include reservists to have decent collective skills. That's merely a regulatory change with a very minor NDA amendment but is a very large leap in how we structure individual training courses for reservists (which IMHO should parallel RegF courses at the DP1 and 2 level) and how we structure annual training for the ResF units so that it is "attendable", interesting and valuable.
> 
> Any and all restructuring of the ResF is the equivalent of building on shifting sands until we first address the fundamental foundation of ResF service. We continue to use a model that reaches back to the 1800s when an army was a collection of guys who could march together and generally shoot straight and could be relatively easily mobilized. Times have changed.
> 
> 🍻


I actually think the new standards do go a long way in addressing that; IBTS covers a fair bit and can actually be manipulated a lot.


----------



## GR66

Part of the problem with any of these Force 2025 ideas is that we simply don't have enough positions being filled in the units we already have.

I think one key lesson we can take from the Russian experience in Ukraine is that it's suicide to deploy your forces at less than full establishment.  They deployed BTG's at 70/30  readiness which resulted in fully crewed vehicles with almost no dismounts to support them.  All the destroyed Russian tanks and IFVs from the first weeks of the war are proof of that peril.  

These numbers are old (Force 2013 I think?) but I don't imagine they are radically different today:

Mechanized Infantry Battalion = 833 Establishment/593 Generation (x6 = 4998 Establishment/3558 Generation)
Light Infantry Battalion = 834 Establishment/560 Generation (x3 = 2502 Establishment/1680 Generation)
Total = 7500 Establishment/5238 Generation (i.e. 70/30)

In a conflict we may need to rapidly deploy our Reg Force without time to augment with Reserves.

Say for example we were to concentrate all of our LAVs/Tanks into a single Heavy(ish) 1st Mechanized Brigade with a full vehicle set in Edmonton and a full fly-over set in Latvia.  We'd want to man this Brigade at 100% strength because due to their experience in Ukraine if Russia were to decide to attack NATO they would want to do it with strategic surprise so we don't have time to build up our forces.

We could then organize the balance of our forces around a total force three Brigade Light Division with each Brigade having one Battalion at 100% (giving us the ability to rotate a high-readiness Battle Group as a Rapid Response Force), one Battalion at 70/30 Reg/Reserve and a third Battalion at 30/70 Reg/Reserve.

For the Infantry that would require:
3 x 100% Strength Mech Battalions @ 833 = 2,499
3 x 100% Strength Light Battalions @ 834 = 2,502
3 x 70/30 Light Battalions @ 584 = 1,752
3 x 30/70 Light Battalions @ 250 = 750

Total Infantry Reg Force Requirements = 7,503

That's basically identical to our existing Establishment numbers but since our Generation numbers are only 5,238 that leaves us 2,265 Reg Force Infantry positions short of what we really should have in order to have a force that can reasonably be expected to deploy to a combat mission in a fast evolving crisis situation.

These numbers are just for the Infantry.  I'm sure they are the same (or worse?) for the other trades as well.

So to my mind unless we look at increasing our manning levels we shouldn't be looking at growing the number of units in the Army because they will just be even more hollow than they are now.  Without more numbers we might even be better off reducing the number of units to ensure that the ones we have are effective.


----------



## FJAG

Your points are all very valid. 

I diverge on the idea of having 3 x Mech and 3 x Light battalions at 100% strength for one reason and only one reason. 

The way I see 70/30 battalions and 30/70 battalions being employed is by way of loosely twinned brigades - one brigade predominantly RegF the other predominantly ResF. In each brigade the battalions have either two companies (for the 70/30) or one company (for the 30/70) that are at 100% RegF strength. The remaining one and two companies are at 5% RegF / 95% ResF. The purpose of this is to be able to create a force of roughly twice the size of the three current RegF brigades and which are all fully under RegF leadership. In other words the structures purpose is to enable the ResF to rise up in capability by having RegF leadership and equipment available throughout all their training. Effectively one CO is responsible for collective training of his RegF personnel during Sept to April and of his ResF members during a weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. Depot battalions would be responsible for the bulk of individual training for both RegF and ResF. Having 6 battalions at 100% Reg F strength severely reduces that capability to the point of impossibility.

IMHO, we rarely deploy battalions at 100% strength anyway. The BG in Latvia has one company and CS and CSS. Essentially any 30/70 or 70/30 battalion could do the current eFP Latvia task with minor augmentation from its ResF elements. The same with our training mission in Ukraine.

In the rare eventuality where a 100% battalion-sized rapid force is required then a 70/30 battalion could deploy with its two 100% RegF companies and one additional 100% RegF company (with its equipment) from another battalion (like we frequently did for Afghanistan). In the same way, the battalion HQ and CS and CSS would be rounded out by predesignated RegF pers from another 70/30 or 30/70 battalion. Quite clearly a rapid reaction standby force would need predesignating so that a rapid assembly becomes possible.

With time, once the ResF components become viable, it would be easier to have a list of stand-by volunteer ResF members to round out or even be "activated" for a rapid deployment.

My suggestion is not the only one. Other ways of doing this are possible, but to truly bring about lasting change we need a system whereby ResF personnel receive the benefit of proper leadership and training within the framework of of a proper part-time system. In short we need to make them a properly trained and led part-time reserve, not merely a lesser semi-qualified alternate force.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

I’d strongly recommend that at least 1 Light Bn be 100% strength. 
   If it deploys then one of the 70/30 units goes to 100% with Class C augmented forces.  

If Canada had the means to quickly project a Mech Force I’d suggest that one of those be 100% too, but by the time Canada was able to deploy a Mech Bn, to any OA outside of North America, they could have augmented to 300% strength anyway...


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I’d strongly recommend that at least 1 Light Bn be 100% strength.
> If it deploys then one of the 70/30 units goes to 100% with Class C augmented forces.
> 
> If Canada had the means to quickly project a Mech Force I’d suggest that one of those be 100% too, but by the time Canada was able to deploy a Mech Bn, to any OA outside of North America, they could have augmented to 300% strength anyway...


I think that I actually did that with my last napkin 2 Div.



In fact two of them - 2 RCR (stationed in Edmonton) in 39 Light Bde (West coast rapid reaction) and 1 RCR (stationed in Petawawa) in 2 Light Bde (East coast rapid reaction)

The US found out it couldn't rapid reaction the Stryker Brigades with all the air lift that they have. I sincerely doubt that we can do a mech battalion but we might be able to augment a light battalion with the better part of a LAV company (of which there are six in 2 Div. 

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

The kind of battlefield the Res F is going to step onto in the event of mobilization will be a very dangerous one.  At this point, militia capability has degraded so much that it would be a pointless waste of life to put mobilized reservists into anything other than a Reg F framework.


----------



## FJAG

Brad Sallows said:


> The kind of battlefield the Res F is going to step onto in the event of mobilization will be a very dangerous one.  At this point, militia capability has degraded so much that it would be a pointless waste of life to put mobilized reservists into anything other than a Reg F framework.


I think the first thing that one has to realize is that the mass of forces fighting in Ukraine right now, on both sides, are troops with considerably less training and less capable equipment than the US or Brit RegF and to a large extent our RegF. ResFs there are holding the line. In Afghanistan our ResF made up from 15 to 25% of the units' strength. So let's not dismiss ResFs out of hand based on what we currently have.

Step 1 is to stop and reverse the decline. To do that Canada needs to train reservists to the same individual standards at DP1 and 2 as the RegF. That's doable with the full summer employment model.

To properly create and maintain that individual standard as well as to create and maintain a collective training capability the ResF must absolutely be put into a RegF framework but for peacetime training as well as operational deployment.

The problem with a pure ResF augmentation to the RegF model is that it does not provide adequate individual training for reservists nor a viable framework for growing the total force beyond the three existing RegF brigades without massively deconstructing those brigades and reassembling them in a time of crisis. We need a peacetime total force framework that provides and meets Canada's current peacetime army needs as well as a mobilizable structure for reasonably contemplated emergencies.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I think that I actually did that with my last napkin 2 Div.
> 
> View attachment 72866
> 
> In fact two of them - 2 RCR (stationed in Edmonton) in 39 Light Bde (West coast rapid reaction) and 1 RCR (stationed in Petawawa) in 2 Light Bde (East coast rapid reaction)
> 
> The US found out it couldn't rapid reaction the Stryker Brigades with all the air lift that they have. I sincerely doubt that we can do a mech battalion but we might be able to augment a light battalion with the better part of a LAV company (of which there are six in 2 Div.
> 
> 🍻


I'm assuming that you're only showing two Infantry Battalions in each Brigade simply because we don't have the density of Reserve units to provide enough Reserve Infantry Companies in most of Canada (Ontario being the possible exemption)?


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I think the first thing that one has to realize is that the mass of forces fighting in Ukraine right now, on both sides, are troops with considerably less training and less capable equipment than the US or Brit RegF and to a large extent our RegF. ResFs there are holding the line. In Afghanistan our ResF made up from 15 to 25% of the units' strength. So let's not dismiss ResFs out of hand based on what we currently have.
> 
> Step 1 is to stop and reverse the decline. To do that Canada needs to train reservists to the same individual standards at DP1 and 2 as the RegF. That's doable with the full summer employment model.
> 
> To properly create and maintain that individual standard as well as to create and maintain a collective training capability the ResF must absolutely be put into a RegF framework but for peacetime training as well as operational deployment.
> 
> The problem with a pure ResF augmentation to the RegF model is that it does not provide adequate individual training for reservists nor a viable framework for growing the total force beyond the three existing RegF brigades without massively deconstructing those brigades and reassembling them in a time of crisis. We need a peacetime total force framework that provides and meets Canada's current peacetime army needs as well as a mobilizable structure for reasonably contemplated emergencies.
> 
> 🍻



Where is this vast reserve army going to be employed?

I am regularly told there is no foreseeable domestic requirement.

So am I to assume we are going to enroll every fighting age man and woman to go to the defence of Latvia?  Or Taiwan?

The forward defence notion doesn't work if the population of Canada is sacrificed defending another country.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Where is this vast reserve army going to be employed?
> 
> I am regularly told there is no foreseeable domestic requirement.
> 
> So am I to assume we are going to enroll every fighting age man and woman to go to the defence of Latvia?  Or Taiwan?
> 
> The forward defence notion doesn't work if the population of Canada is sacrificed defending another country.


WW I and WW II enter the chat


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> WW I and WW II enter the chat


And in WWI most of the Canadians were Brit emigres.

In WWII it was their sons.

The WWI tribe had relatives in the lines.  They were citizens of the Empire.

More Canadians these days are philosophically aligned with the Quebecers of those wars.

They have no skin in the game and are disinclined to offer theirs up.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I think the first thing that one has to realize is that the mass of forces fighting in Ukraine right now, on both sides, are troops with considerably less training and less capable equipment than the US or Brit RegF and to a large extent our RegF. ResFs there are holding the line. In Afghanistan our ResF made up from 15 to 25% of the units' strength. So let's not dismiss ResFs out of hand based on what we currently have.
> 
> Step 1 is to stop and reverse the decline. To do that Canada needs to train reservists to the same individual standards at DP1 and 2 as the RegF. That's doable with the full summer employment model.
> 
> To properly create and maintain that individual standard as well as to create and maintain a collective training capability the ResF must absolutely be put into a RegF framework but for peacetime training as well as operational deployment.
> 
> The problem with a pure ResF augmentation to the RegF model is that it does not provide adequate individual training for reservists nor a viable framework for growing the total force beyond the three existing RegF brigades without massively deconstructing those brigades and reassembling them in a time of crisis. We need a peacetime total force framework that provides and meets Canada's current peacetime army needs as well as a mobilizable structure for reasonably contemplated emergencies.
> 
> 🍻



So.... as the purpose of the Reserves....

Will it be door #1, 2 or 3? I think we were 1 until about FRY and AFG kicked off, then it got (even more) confusing:

The Canadian Forces Reserves face a number of important challenges, including pay, equipment, infrastructure, recruiting, and veterans’ benefits. However, in addition to these everyday issues it is important to consider the fundamental strategic question: what is the purpose of the Reserves within the Forces? Contemporary debate reveals that there are in fact three distinct answers to this question: 1) full mobilization, 2) augmenting the Forces, and 3) complementing the skills of the Regular Force.










						The Purpose of the Reserve: Mobilization, Augmentation, or Integration?
					

Misha Boutilier argues that Reserves need not serve as a base for mass mobilization, they should instead continue in their role of augmenting the Regular Force, while also expanding their ability to complement Regular Force skills.




					natoassociation.ca


----------



## IKnowNothing

GR66 said:


> Part of the problem with any of these Force 2025 ideas is that we simply don't have enough positions being filled in the units we already have.
> 
> I think one key lesson we can take from the Russian experience in Ukraine is that it's suicide to deploy your forces at less than full establishment.  They deployed BTG's at 70/30  readiness which resulted in fully crewed vehicles with almost no dismounts to support them.  All the destroyed Russian tanks and IFVs from the first weeks of the war are proof of that peril.
> 
> These numbers are old (Force 2013 I think?) but I don't imagine they are radically different today:
> 
> Mechanized Infantry Battalion = 833 Establishment/593 Generation (x6 = 4998 Establishment/3558 Generation)
> Light Infantry Battalion = 834 Establishment/560 Generation (x3 = 2502 Establishment/1680 Generation)
> Total = 7500 Establishment/5238 Generation (i.e. 70/30)
> 
> In a conflict we may need to rapidly deploy our Reg Force without time to augment with Reserves.
> 
> Say for example we were to concentrate all of our LAVs/Tanks into a single Heavy(ish) 1st Mechanized Brigade with a full vehicle set in Edmonton and a full fly-over set in Latvia.  We'd want to man this Brigade at 100% strength because due to their experience in Ukraine if Russia were to decide to attack NATO they would want to do it with strategic surprise so we don't have time to build up our forces.
> 
> We could then organize the balance of our forces around a total force three Brigade Light Division with each Brigade having one Battalion at 100% (giving us the ability to rotate a high-readiness Battle Group as a Rapid Response Force), one Battalion at 70/30 Reg/Reserve and a third Battalion at 30/70 Reg/Reserve.
> 
> For the Infantry that would require:
> 3 x 100% Strength Mech Battalions @ 833 = 2,499
> 3 x 100% Strength Light Battalions @ 834 = 2,502
> 3 x 70/30 Light Battalions @ 584 = 1,752
> 3 x 30/70 Light Battalions @ 250 = 750
> 
> Total Infantry Reg Force Requirements = 7,503
> 
> That's basically identical to our existing Establishment numbers but since our Generation numbers are only 5,238 that leaves us 2,265 Reg Force Infantry positions short of what we really should have in order to have a force that can reasonably be expected to deploy to a combat mission in a fast evolving crisis situation.
> 
> These numbers are just for the Infantry.  I'm sure they are the same (or worse?) for the other trades as well.
> 
> So to my mind unless we look at increasing our manning levels we shouldn't be looking at growing the number of units in the Army because they will just be even more hollow than they are now.  *Without more numbers we might even be better off reducing the number of units to ensure that the ones we have are effective.*


Unless I'm missing something, that math is damn close if we stuck with 2 Light Bde's, and move the 3rd light to a 10/90
3x 100% Mech = 2499
2x 100% Light = 1668
2x 70/30 Light = 1168
2x 10/90 Light = 166
=5501

It's thin on the readiness front, but if you included the 70/30's in the rotation they'd have two down cycles to recruit/select/onboard a companies worth of Class C, one to train to readiness, one on standby (presuming the budget is there to accommodate- from a co-located reserve pool of a short battalion.


----------



## Kirkhill

IKnowNothing said:


> Unless I'm missing something, that math is damn close if we stuck with 2 Light Bde's, and move the 3rd light to a 10/90
> 3x 100% Mech = 2499
> 2x 100% Light = 1668
> 2x 70/30 Light = 1168
> 2x 10/90 Light = 166
> =5501
> 
> It's thin on the readiness front, but if you included the 70/30's in the rotation they'd have two down cycles to recruit/select/onboard a companies worth of Class C, one to train to readiness, one on standby (presuming the budget is there to accommodate- from a co-located reserve pool of a short battalion.



In other countries 5500 isn't an army its a Special Forces Brigade.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I'm assuming that you're only showing two Infantry Battalions in each Brigade simply because we don't have the density of Reserve units to provide enough Reserve Infantry Companies in most of Canada (Ontario being the possible exemption)?


My main reasons were as follows:

1) in general, I limited myself to the currently existing RegF and ResF strengths. 

2) I upped the infantry battalions to a full strength of 848 all ranks (essentially 720 plus a 128 man fourth ResF rifle company) rather than the current 560 for a RegF light battalion and 594 for a RegF mech battalion. The extra 250 - 280 all ranks per battalion essentially required that the RegF battalions be reduced from 9 to 6 before being divided into 2 X 100/0 RFL1 battalions, 4 X 70/30 RFL1.1 battalions, and 7 X 30/70 RFL2 battalions. The increase to full strength of each battalion by roughly 30% means that the number of 100% RegF rifle companies was reduced from 27 partial strength ones to 21 full strength ones.

3) in 1 Div - the heavy brigades only need two infantry battalions as the armoured regiment makes the third manoeuvre battalion giving three manoeuvre units to the brigade.

4) In the case of 2 Div there are 9 infantry battalions so the choice was to give three brigades 3 battalions each or to form 4 brigades and give three 2 battalions and one 3 battalions. I ended up drifting to the latter because the more that I thought about it a light brigade for each coast made more sense than one light brigade covering the whole country. Concurrently there was the limitation that there were only 6 battalion's or 18 rifle companies worth of LAVs in total. 1 Div has 12 of those (6 in Canada and 6 prepositioned in Europe) which meant only 2 X 70/30 and 2 X 30/70 mech battalions (or 6 mech rifle companies) for 2 Div. (Incidentally I see 2 Div also deploying for flyover exercises to Europe and using the prepositioned equipment there as in my perfect world CMTC shuts down and moves to Europe rather than railing gear to Wainwright)

5) As mentioned above, each 30/70 and 70/30 infantry battalion has a fourth ResF rifle company for a total of 11 such companies. There is another rifle company as a div HQ force protection company in 33 Sigs Regt. Finally I have decided to add an infantry based combat support company to each of the 3 Bde Recce Regiments. Those could all have been amalgamated to form a third battalion in three of the 2 Div brigades. I didn't do that because:

there wasn't enough RegF depth to form three more 30/70 battalions unless I went back to reducing the size of all battalions;
I think there is value in a recce regt having a CS company; 
I think there is value in having the additional ResF personnel as the 4th company in each battalion; and
I see 2 Div being the "peacetime army" which provides battle group sized task forces for deployments (other than Latvia) rather than a full brigade deployment. If a full light or mech brigade is ever needed a third battalion can be attached from another brigade.
6) With the rough count of ResF members available across the country, 13 X 848-man infantry battalions (roughly 5,500 each RegF and ResF infantry) seemed doable.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Where is this vast reserve army going to be employed?


See my 30/70 napkin force as one example.


Kirkhill said:


> I am regularly told there is no foreseeable domestic requirement.


That's what you choose to hear. Many of us are saying that there is a domestic role as well as a NATO role.


Kirkhill said:


> So am I to assume we are going to enroll every fighting age man and woman to go to the defence of Latvia?  Or Taiwan?


You can assume that, but you'd be assuming wrong.


Kirkhill said:


> The forward defence notion doesn't work if the population of Canada is sacrificed defending another country.


Forward defence's primary _raison d'être_ is deterrence so that no one needs to be sacrificed. A brigade predeployed for forward defence commits 1/6th of the total army. Assuming another 1/6th as sustainment/reinforcement that leaves 2/3rd to be employed otherwise. 

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> In other countries 5500 isn't an army its a Special Forces Brigade.


Or a small portion.  
Just USASOC (Army Special Operations) has 65,000 personnel.  
    Now not all are shooters, but it would suggest that Canada should be able to have a 6,500 personnel sized CANSOF.  
  And a 100k Regular Army…


----------



## ueo

KevinB said:


> @TangoTwoBravo roger I forgot it was 1RCR that first moved to Pet (from London)
> 
> For some reason I forgot that and thought 3RCR did 10/90 in London.





Kirkhill said:


> In other countries 5500 isn't an army its a Special Forces Brigade.


Maybe a Bn?


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Or a small portion.
> Just USASOC (Army Special Operations) has 65,000 personnel.
> Now not all are shooters, but it would suggest that Canada should be able to have a 6,500 personnel sized CANSOF.
> And a 100k Regular Army…



And a 200k Reserve...


----------



## Kirkhill

An info rich article on what the USMC is doing with their Indo-Pacific changes - Marine Littoral Regiment and MAGTF integration, tactics, vehicles, comms... and much much more.









						Marine Hone Future Concepts with Dune Buggies, Liaison Officers, and Many Radios
					

The giant RIMPAC exercise helped the Corps test their newest type of agile unit within a multinational force.




					www.defenseone.com


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> So.... as the purpose of the Reserves....
> 
> Will it be door #1, 2 or 3? I think we were 1 until about FRY and AFG kicked off, then it got (even more) confusing:
> 
> The Canadian Forces Reserves face a number of important challenges, including pay, equipment, infrastructure, recruiting, and veterans’ benefits. However, in addition to these everyday issues it is important to consider the fundamental strategic question: what is the purpose of the Reserves within the Forces? Contemporary debate reveals that there are in fact three distinct answers to this question: 1) full mobilization, 2) augmenting the Forces, and 3) complementing the skills of the Regular Force.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Purpose of the Reserve: Mobilization, Augmentation, or Integration?
> 
> 
> Misha Boutilier argues that Reserves need not serve as a base for mass mobilization, they should instead continue in their role of augmenting the Regular Force, while also expanding their ability to complement Regular Force skills.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> natoassociation.ca


This of course is a very important foundational question.  How Force 20xx looks very much depends on how you answer it.

I question whether we were anywhere near #1 before/during/after Yugoslavia and Afghanistan unless by full mobilization you mean the Reserves providing a pool of partially trained personnel to recruit from if the Army needed to expand.  Reserve Regiments were/are in no way capable of actually deploying as formed combat units in case of war.

Personally I would pick a bit of Door #2 (Augmentation) and a bit of Door #3 (Complementary Capabilities).

With the cost of military hardware (vehicles, weapon systems, munitions, etc.) being so much higher today than in the lower-tech past I simply don't see Canada having the ability to significantly expand the size of the Army in time of war.  In a serious peer conflict we will much more likely struggle to maintain the strength of our existing forces once deployed rather than be able to expand the Army.  

The Reg Force provides the structure for the deployed Army and the high-readiness forces required for the initial deployment.  The Reserves would provide "Augmentation" for those capabilities that are not required at full scale during peacetime operations (Artillery Batteries for example) as well as those "Complementary Capabilities" which are typically only required during wartime.

What those specific capabilities are depends on what you expect your Reg Force Army to do in both peacetime and when deployed for war.


----------



## GR66

I'd argue that Canada needs the capability to rapidly respond with at least a Battle Group/Battalion sized force when required.  

That to me suggests a fully-manned Light Brigade with the three Battalions rotating readiness (2,502 personnel or roughly half of the current 5,238 Reg Force Infantry positions assigned to the existing Battalions).  

How the rest of the positions are allocated depends on what you want the rest of the Army to be able to do.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> I'd argue that Canada needs the capability to rapidly respond with at least a Battle Group/Battalion sized force when required.
> 
> That to me suggests a fully-manned Light Brigade with the three Battalions rotating readiness (2,502 personnel or roughly half of the current 5,238 Reg Force Infantry positions assigned to the existing Battalions).
> 
> How the rest of the positions are allocated depends on what you want the rest of the Army to be able to do.


Depending on how you rotate readiness - I’d argue you probably don’t need the entire Brigade of Regular troops. 
  If you ran a Coy on 12 Hrs NTM and the rest of the Bn at 48hrs, you could run 6 month IRU rotations.  Which would allow for at least one of those non IRU Bn’s to be a 70/30 reg/PRes formation.  

Your Heavier formation could be on a 30 day and 90 Day NTM (respectively) and the readier portion could be 70/30 while the 90 day portion could be 50/50 or even 30/70.  

Right now salaries for personnel take an enormous chunk out of the CAF budget - and in order to equip the Force for modern operations, something needs to give — I think the only reasonable option given the GoC seems loathe to make a meaningful increase in the budget that the size of the regular army needs to decline.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Depending on how you rotate readiness - I’d argue you probably don’t need the entire Brigade of Regular troops.
> If you ran a Coy on 12 Hrs NTM and the rest of the Bn at 48hrs, you could run 6 month IRU rotations.  Which would allow for at least one of those non IRU Bn’s to be a 70/30 reg/PRes formation.
> 
> Your Heavier formation could be on a 30 day and 90 Day NTM (respectively) and the readier portion could be 70/30 while the 90 day portion could be 50/50 or even 30/70.
> 
> Right now salaries for personnel take an enormous chunk out of the CAF budget - and in order to equip the Force for modern operations, something needs to give — I think the only reasonable option given the GoC seems loathe to make a meaningful increase in the budget that the size of the regular army needs to decline.


Something like this?

Battalion #1
Current IRU Battalion
100% Reg Force manning
1 Coy at 12hrs NTM and 2 Coy at 48hrs NTM

Battalion #2 
Next in line as IRU Battalion.  Work-up training.
100% Reg Force manning

Battalion #2
Just off IRU.  Refit
70% manning (30% of personnel away on individual training, school assignments, etc.)
Reserves to provide 30% augmentation if unit is required to deploy.

So unlike a unit which has an actual 70/30 habitual establishment (like you might do in the heavier "break glass in case of fire" units) the Battalions in the IRU rotation would at times be at 100% manning and when in refit stage would have reduced manning with Reserve augmentation if required?


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> *With the cost of military hardware (vehicles, weapon systems, munitions, etc.) being so much higher today than in the lower-tech past *I simply don't see Canada having the ability to significantly expand the size of the Army in time of war.  In a serious peer conflict we will much more likely struggle to maintain the strength of our existing forces once deployed rather than be able to expand the Army.



Is that a valid assumption?

My sense is that while the cost of bullets and targets is increasing the net tendency seems to favour the defence over the offence.  In other words the cost of the defence, and the ability to supply the defence, is greater than the cost of the offence and the ability to supply the offence.

The heavy weaponry necessary to conduct an effective offence is being supplied, on both sides,  from inventory.  New systems are not being produced as fast as they are being destroyed.

The same is also true of the missiles being used in the defence but I am inclined to believe that those 30 year old production lines that produced the NLAWs  and Stingers, and that are producing the Javelins and Starstreaks, can be cranked up faster than the production lines for vehicles and guns.  Missiles can be built from 3-D printed parts of plastic and aluminum and fitted with Cell Phone quality optics and logic.  That is what is happening to the Stinger replacement.

1 Selection and maintenance of the aim;
2 maintenance of morale;
3 offensive action;
4 surprise;
5 security;
6 concentration of force;
7 economy of effort;
8 flexibility;
9 co-operation;
10 and administration.

Most of those principles are still paramount, especially numbers 1 and 2, but numbers 3, 4 and 6 are being seriously challenged and inhibited.

Offensive action is difficult.  That is in large part because surprise is difficult.  It is also difficult to concentrate force.  And the overarching difficulty afflicting all of them is the difficulty of manoeuvering that result from constant observation and secure communications. 

Another contributing factor is the increasing ability of small entities to operate effectively with higher degrees of autonomy.  The area of interest and the area of influence of even a single vehicle are massive now with 5 km Javelins and 15 km UAS.   And critically the ability of the individual element to place themselves in the field and communicate their position has moved the discussion well past the elbow dressing of Victoria's armies or even the 5 yard spacing and visual alignment of WW2 battle drills.

I am strongly convinced that a defensive army, armed with mass produced ATGMs and VSHORAD missiles, both  man portable and light vehicle mounted, together with UAVs and good comms, as well as the WW1 vintage Emma Gees and mortars, would blunt any enemy offensive. 

The key element in any defensive programme would be denying the enemy surprise.  That means that in times of peace the most important part of defence is forward observation and constant vigilance so as to permit the time necessary for the forming of an effective defence.

Each country should be able to supply local defence to its own borders, lands, cities and citizens.  If there is no immediate threat then those defensive assets that are surplus to the immediate requirement can be shared forwards with allies under threat, as is happening in Ukraine.

Those are the key elements of a local reserve.  It is recruited locally, trained and equipped locally to act locally.  It is not an expeditionary force. 

Local defence forces are necessities.  Expeditionary forces are discretionary.


Now, just because offence is difficult doesn't mean that offensive action can be ignored.  It means that offensive troops need to be better trained and equipped.   They need to be professionals.  But because the offence has become more difficult it may mean a significant change in tactics.  Less of the direct frontal assault and more of the corps envelopment, rapid movement to flanks, exploiting weaknesses and creating threats that the enemy must counter.  Creating opportunities to fight defensive battles on preferred ground.

Canada has the skeleton of a professional expeditionary division.  My preference is that that division be fully fleshed out so that it can be deployed domestically as a division should the need arise, but is also capable of sustaining, on a rotating basis one Brigade Group and also, on a rotating basis, take command of a Multi National Division while supplying the necessary support.

Canada's local defence should not depend on its professional expeditionary force.  That expeditionary force should be freely deployable.  It should also be a sponge.  It should suck up information and expertise and pass the lessons it learns back to the National Defence Force.


Finally,

I think there is room for an additional, 11th, principle of war: the exploitation of technology.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Is that a valid assumption?
> 
> My sense is that while the cost of bullets and targets is increasing the net tendency seems to favour the defence over the offence.  In other words the cost of the defence, and the ability to supply the defence, is greater than the cost of the offence and the ability to supply the offence.


Offence and Defence are different sides of the same coin.  Unless your defence is so strong that you can prevent the enemy from taking any of your territory whatsoever you will require offensive capability to retake that territory.  

The attacker has the choice of where to attack and the ability to concentrate their forces while the defender must either cover all possible parts of the front or accept that they may lose some territory at the start of the conflict and have offensive forces available to retake the lost territory or take the fight to the enemy's territory.  


Kirkhill said:


> The heavy weaponry necessary to conduct an effective offence is being supplied, on both sides,  from inventory.  New systems are not being produced as fast as they are being destroyed.


Agreed.  You need stocks of these items on hand at the start of a conflict to replenish losses or your force will degrade in capability as the conflict progresses.  That means either greater peacetime spending to increase the number of platforms in stock or tailoring the size of your force to match the equipment levels you have based on your expected rates of loss.


Kirkhill said:


> The same is also true of the missiles being used in the defence but I am inclined to believe that those 30 year old production lines that produced the NLAWs  and Stingers, and that are producing the Javelins and Starstreaks, can be cranked up faster than the production lines for vehicles and guns.  Missiles can be built from 3-D printed parts of plastic and aluminum and fitted with Cell Phone quality optics and logic.  That is what is happening to the Stinger replacement.


Agreed to a point.  These are still far from being mass-produced items and should be supplemented by large volumes of less advanced "dumb" munitions.


Kirkhill said:


> 1 Selection and maintenance of the aim;
> 2 maintenance of morale;
> 3 offensive action;
> 4 surprise;
> 5 security;
> 6 concentration of force;
> 7 economy of effort;
> 8 flexibility;
> 9 co-operation;
> 10 and administration.
> 
> Most of those principles are still paramount, especially numbers 1 and 2, but numbers 3, 4 and 6 are being seriously challenged and inhibited.
> 
> Offensive action is difficult.  That is in large part because surprise is difficult.  It is also difficult to concentrate force.  And the overarching difficulty afflicting all of them is the difficulty of manoeuvering that result from constant observation and secure communications.


Agreed.  The forces required for offensive action are expensive too which is why today's armies are smaller than during the World Wars and the Cold War.  Today's armies are simply too small to take and occupy large areas of enemy territory.  As a result (and also because of nuclear deterrence) I believe most military actions by major nations will fit into one of the following catagories:

Attacks with limited military objectives where they feel they can fairly quickly obtain their goal and either avoid an enemy response or be able to quickly shift to the defence so the enemy is forced to take the more costly offensive action.
Attack against an enemy that they feel is militarily inferior and can be defeated in battle by the forces available and expansion of the conflict to include other nations is unlikely and/or where they have reason to believe the local population may be at least somewhat supportive of the military action (Ukraine)
Situations where a nation feels an attack is a political imperative despite the cost that will have to be paid (Taiwan)
Brushfire wars and Insurgencies/Counter Insurgencies.  Either supporting an allied government against insurgent forces or supporting insurgent forces against an opposing state.



Kirkhill said:


> Another contributing factor is the increasing ability of small entities to operate effectively with higher degrees of autonomy.  The area of interest and the area of influence of even a single vehicle are massive now with 5 km Javelins and 15 km UAS.   And critically the ability of the individual element to place themselves in the field and communicate their position has moved the discussion well past the elbow dressing of Victoria's armies or even the 5 yard spacing and visual alignment of WW2 battle drills.
> 
> I am strongly convinced that a defensive army, armed with mass produced ATGMs and VSHORAD missiles, both  man portable and light vehicle mounted, together with UAVs and good comms, as well as the WW1 vintage Emma Gees and mortars, would blunt any enemy offensive.
> 
> The key element in any defensive programme would be denying the enemy surprise.  That means that in times of peace the most important part of defence is forward observation and constant vigilance so as to permit the time necessary for the forming of an effective defence.


Again agreed.  I'm very much in favour of expanding ISR capabilities as part of deterrence as well has Light forces that can rapidly be deployed for defence.


Kirkhill said:


> Each country should be able to supply local defence to its own borders, lands, cities and citizens.  If there is no immediate threat then those defensive assets that are surplus to the immediate requirement can be shared forwards with allies under threat, as is happening in Ukraine.
> 
> Those are the key elements of a local reserve.  It is recruited locally, trained and equipped locally to act locally.  It is not an expeditionary force.
> 
> Local defence forces are necessities.  Expeditionary forces are discretionary.


This is where we disagree when it comes to Canada.  Beyond non-military disaster response, etc. I don't see where training and equipping the Grey & Simcoe Foresters in Owen Sound for the local defence of Owen Sound is the military necessity.  

The military threats to Canada are external to our borders.  No enemy nation has the military capability to invade and occupy us so our primary home defence requirements can typically be met by NORAD, the RCN, the RCAF and land based AD capabilities.  Any need for land-based military forces will not likely be in the location they are based so will have to be effectively "expeditionary" in nature rather than "local".


Kirkhill said:


> Now, just because offence is difficult doesn't mean that offensive action can be ignored.  It means that offensive troops need to be better trained and equipped.   They need to be professionals.  But because the offence has become more difficult it may mean a significant change in tactics.  Less of the direct frontal assault and more of the corps envelopment, rapid movement to flanks, exploiting weaknesses and creating threats that the enemy must counter.  Creating opportunities to fight defensive battles on preferred ground.


As the world is becoming more urbanized and many political goals are increasingly population-based as opposed to territorial-based we are likely to see more and more fighting in built up areas.  That will require heavy forces.


Kirkhill said:


> Canada has the skeleton of a professional expeditionary division.  My preference is that that division be fully fleshed out so that it can be deployed domestically as a division should the need arise, but is also capable of sustaining, on a rotating basis one Brigade Group and also, on a rotating basis, take command of a Multi National Division while supplying the necessary support.
> 
> Canada's local defence should not depend on its professional expeditionary force.  That expeditionary force should be freely deployable.  It should also be a sponge.  It should suck up information and expertise and pass the lessons it learns back to the National Defence Force.
> 
> 
> Finally,
> 
> I think there is room for an additional, 11th, principle of war: the exploitation of technology.


I question whether Canada really does have the capability for a sustainable Division currently.  I think some tough choices need to be made as to what we want our military to actually be able to do in case of a major conflict...not just have a skeleton force that looks like a real Army.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Offence and Defence are different sides of the same coin.  Unless your defence is so strong that you can prevent the enemy from taking any of your territory whatsoever you will require offensive capability to retake that territory.
> 
> The attacker has the choice of where to attack and the ability to concentrate their forces while the defender must either cover all possible parts of the front or accept that they may lose some territory at the start of the conflict and have offensive forces available to retake the lost territory or take the fight to the enemy's territory.
> 
> Agreed.  You need stocks of these items on hand at the start of a conflict to replenish losses or your force will degrade in capability as the conflict progresses.  That means either greater peacetime spending to increase the number of platforms in stock or tailoring the size of your force to match the equipment levels you have based on your expected rates of loss.
> 
> Agreed to a point.  These are still far from being mass-produced items and should be supplemented by large volumes of less advanced "dumb" munitions.
> 
> Agreed.  The forces required for offensive action are expensive too which is why today's armies are smaller than during the World Wars and the Cold War.  Today's armies are simply too small to take and occupy large areas of enemy territory.  As a result (and also because of nuclear deterrence) I believe most military actions by major nations will fit into one of the following catagories:
> 
> Attacks with limited military objectives where they feel they can fairly quickly obtain their goal and either avoid an enemy response or be able to quickly shift to the defence so the enemy is forced to take the more costly offensive action.
> Attack against an enemy that they feel is militarily inferior and can be defeated in battle by the forces available and expansion of the conflict to include other nations is unlikely and/or where they have reason to believe the local population may be at least somewhat supportive of the military action (Ukraine)
> Situations where a nation feels an attack is a political imperative despite the cost that will have to be paid (Taiwan)
> Brushfire wars and Insurgencies/Counter Insurgencies.  Either supporting an allied government against insurgent forces or supporting insurgent forces against an opposing state.
> 
> Again agreed.  I'm very much in favour of expanding ISR capabilities as part of deterrence as well has Light forces that can rapidly be deployed for defence.


We'll skip the points of agreement.



GR66 said:


> This is where we disagree when it comes to Canada.  Beyond non-military disaster response, etc. I don't see where training and equipping the Grey & Simcoe Foresters in Owen Sound for the local defence of Owen Sound is the military necessity.


I would argue that the reserve function is to provide defence when there is a military necessity.  If you wait until the necessity is obvious it is too late.

As to managing threats -

there are threats.

Those threats include civil and military threats and can include assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot.

The Foresters are needed, not just to support the Army in particular, or even the CAF in general, they are needed to support the police and other government departments when manpower is required.  The question is what capabilities can they cheaply supply with minimal training.  My sense is that security should be their primary focus.  That means small arms, light vehicles and comms.  It also could mean the provision of a significant arsenal of single shot wooden rounds.  Machine Guns and Mortars are also relatively cheap. 

My overarching need is for missile defence - everything from CRAM with strong EW and Directed Energy devices like lasers backed by kinetic weapons (guns) up through VSHORAD, SHORAD and MRAD to ABM defences.   All of those could be mixed regular/reserve formations.  With the Foresters providing security for the deployed systems.





GR66 said:


> The military threats to Canada are external to our borders.  No enemy nation has the military capability to invade and occupy us so our primary home defence requirements can typically be met by NORAD, the RCN, the RCAF and land based AD capabilities.  Any need for land-based military forces will not likely be in the location they are based so will have to be effectively "expeditionary" in nature rather than "local".



The "military" threats, in the sense of state actors in uniform, may be external to our borders but internally we present opportunities that external actors can exploit and exploit effectively by supplying hardware that would make our local malcontents a capable threat.  At very least they could deny the government and commerce access to broad swathes of the country.

Oka on a large scale.

Managing that would be a police matter but we don't keep enough police on strength to manage those issues under all circumstances.



GR66 said:


> As the world is becoming more urbanized and many political goals are increasingly population-based as opposed to territorial-based we are likely to see more and more fighting in built up areas.



Yes.



GR66 said:


> That will require heavy forces.



No.  Only if you plan on demolishing the cities.  If you want to minimize the damage and focus on the insurgents then there is ample cover and concealment to permit light forces to operate effectively in the urban environment.

It's nice to have a tank to mousehole an apartment block but wouldn't a Carl Gustaf with the right warhead (or even an AT4) be just as effective, and more manoeuverable?



GR66 said:


> I question whether Canada really does have the capability for a sustainable Division currently.  I think some tough choices need to be made as to what we want our military to actually be able to do in case of a major conflict...not just have a skeleton force that looks like a real Army.



I don't question the capability of Canada.  It doesn't have a sustainable Division currently.  

I think it has the skeleton of a Division.   And I think that a Division, in conjunction with a well organized local reserve, is a reasonable scale of investment for Canada's national defence.  I'm not particularly bothered about the nature of the expeditionary  Division.   I do like your Light Brigade structure but I am inclined to have that, like the SSF, as a National Defence entity.  It may be better to separate that from Expeditionary Division and form it separately in the same way the Brits have formed their 16th Air Assault Brigade as a Global Response Force.


And the Institutional Army, the CADTC, they need to spend more effort figuring out how to turn civilians into a local defence force that can be filed for future reference.


----------



## Kirkhill

No comment offered.



> Moreover – and what is often not readily recognized – is that the National Guard is able to perform its domestic support functions as expertly and as effectively as it does _because_ it is a military service with combat training and technologies. The real secret to the National Guard’s effectiveness is that it brings a military mindset, focus, organizational approach, and specialized equipment to solve problems that may not be solely military in nature, but where a military solution can address those problems more swiftly and effectively.





			https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/09/02/the_real_secret_to_the_national_guards_domestic_effectiveness_851473.html


----------



## GR66

GR66 said:


> Something like this?
> 
> Battalion #1
> Current IRU Battalion
> 100% Reg Force manning
> 1 Coy at 12hrs NTM and 2 Coy at 48hrs NTM
> 
> Battalion #2
> Next in line as IRU Battalion.  Work-up training.
> 100% Reg Force manning
> 
> Battalion #3
> Just off IRU.  Refit
> 70% manning (30% of personnel away on individual training, school assignments, etc.)
> Reserves to provide 30% augmentation if unit is required to deploy.
> 
> So unlike a unit which has an actual 70/30 habitual establishment (like you might do in the heavier "break glass in case of fire" units) the Battalions in the IRU rotation would at times be at 100% manning and when in refit stage would have reduced manning with Reserve augmentation if required?


@KevinB - You gave a "thumbs up" to my understanding of how you envisioned IRU Battalion manning.  I'm assuming that means what I posted is roughly in line with your thinking.  Minor point - While Battalion #3 (just off IRU) is only at 70% Reg Force manning at this stage of the rotation, the other 30% Reg Force positions still exist on the books but those Pers are just not available for deployment with the unit at that time and would require Reserve augmentation in order for the unit to deploy.  All three Battalions would still technically have to be manned at 100% of Establishment by Reg Force positions.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> @KevinB - You gave a "thumbs up" to my understanding of how you envisioned IRU Battalion manning.  I'm assuming that means what I posted is roughly in line with your thinking.  Minor point - While Battalion #3 (just off IRU) is only at 70% Reg Force manning at this stage of the rotation, the other 30% Reg Force positions still exist on the books but those Pers are just not available for deployment with the unit at that time and would require Reserve augmentation in order for the unit to deploy.  All three Battalions would still technically have to be manned at 100% of Establishment by Reg Force positions.


The thumbs up was for ‘that could work’.  

I don’t necessarily think though that those positions need to be 100% RegF.  

With a rotation system one could have Class C positions coming into those units from PRes units tasked to them.   In theory all of the units could be 70/30 and the IRU unit is plussed up prior to rotation to 100% Manning with Class C augmented PRes personnel.

That way the IRU Bn is at 100% the oncoming IRU is starting to fill to 100% and the outgoing IRU Bn is starting to scale down. 
   It would generally cause issues with APS. 
Perhaps a 4th LIB in rotation would make more sense for my method - as then annual posting wouldn’t occur in two of those BN’s 
 The current IRU and the incoming wouldn’t be affected that way - while the other two could have more flexibility for postings, long term courses etc.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> The thumbs up was for ‘that could work’.
> 
> I don’t necessarily think though that those positions need to be 100% RegF.
> 
> With a rotation system one could have Class C positions coming into those units from PRes units tasked to them.   In theory all of the units could be 70/30 and the IRU unit is plussed up prior to rotation to 100% Manning with Class C augmented PRes personnel.
> 
> That way the IRU Bn is at 100% the oncoming IRU is starting to fill to 100% and the outgoing IRU Bn is starting to scale down.
> It would generally cause issues with APS.
> Perhaps a 4th LIB in rotation would make more sense for my method - as then annual posting wouldn’t occur in two of those BN’s
> The current IRU and the incoming wouldn’t be affected that way - while the other two could have more flexibility for postings, long term courses etc.


So for each IRU Battalion say you had two 100% Reg Force Companies and the 3rd Company having the Coy HQ Reg Force and the 3 x Platoons coming from Class C Reservists (or maybe more likely 1 x Platoon from each Company being Class C) and these Reserve positions are only filled for the current IRU Battalion and the oncoming IRU Battalion.

How large a Reserve catchment area would you need to be able to fill those positions?  You're looking at 3 x Platoons for each of the two Battalions to be augmented, so around 120 x Class C positions each Battalion for 1 year postings (6 month work-up and 6 month IRU).  Assuming you geographically spread the IRU Battalions so they are not drawing from the same Reserve recruiting base, would a single Reserve Infantry Brigade be able to reliably fill those positions?


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> The thumbs up was for ‘that could work’.
> 
> I don’t necessarily think though that those positions need to be 100% RegF.
> 
> With a rotation system one could have Class C positions coming into those units from PRes units tasked to them.   In theory all of the units could be 70/30 and the IRU unit is plussed up prior to rotation to 100% Manning with Class C augmented PRes personnel.
> 
> That way the IRU Bn is at 100% the oncoming IRU is starting to fill to 100% and the outgoing IRU Bn is starting to scale down.
> It would generally cause issues with APS.
> Perhaps a 4th LIB in rotation would make more sense for my method - as then annual posting wouldn’t occur in two of those BN’s
> The current IRU and the incoming wouldn’t be affected that way - while the other two could have more flexibility for postings, long term courses etc.



Be careful about Class C vs. Reg F. 

Equivalent levels of Quality Control isn't necessarily a thing


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> We'll skip the points of agreement.
> 
> 
> I would argue that the reserve function is to provide defence when there is a military necessity.  If you wait until the necessity is obvious it is too late.
> 
> As to managing threats -
> 
> there are threats.
> 
> Those threats include civil and military threats and can include assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot.
> 
> The Foresters are needed, not just to support the Army in particular, or even the CAF in general, they are needed to support the police and other government departments when manpower is required.  The question is what capabilities can they cheaply supply with minimal training.  My sense is that security should be their primary focus.  That means small arms, light vehicles and comms.  It also could mean the provision of a significant arsenal of single shot wooden rounds.  Machine Guns and Mortars are also relatively cheap.


I don't agree that the primary focus of the Reserves should be local security.  "Assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot." should be the responsibility of law enforcement.  The military's "primary focus" should not be defending the government against its own population or enforcing the law except in the most extreme circumstances where law enforcement simply doesn't have the capability to deal with the threat.  And if it ever becomes the case where these "extreme circumstances" become common then I'd rather we expand the capabilities of our law enforcement agencies rather than use our Reserves as a para-military police force.



Kirkhill said:


> My overarching need is for missile defence - everything from CRAM with strong EW and Directed Energy devices like lasers backed by kinetic weapons (guns) up through VSHORAD, SHORAD and MRAD to ABM defences.   All of those could be mixed regular/reserve formations.  With the Foresters providing security for the deployed systems.


I agree that a range of missile defence capabilities should be a priority for Canada, both for domestic defence as well as for protection of our deployed expeditionary forces.  High level threats against the nation (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, etc.) need to be available at least at some level 24/7 and would include the RCAF and RCN plus whatever new capabilities we get.  These could be augmented by additional Reserve capabilities at times of heightened tensions or during major events (Olympics, G7 gatherings, etc.).

As for 24/7 local SHORAD/VSHORAD coverage all across Canada?  Is there a demonstrated need for something like that?  What would be the cost (and opportunity cost) of trying to implement that?  So we have a SHORAD battery in Owen Sound protected by the G&SF.  Is the AD battery active 24/7?  Does it require a security force 24/7?


Kirkhill said:


> The "military" threats, in the sense of state actors in uniform, may be external to our borders but internally we present opportunities that external actors can exploit and exploit effectively by supplying hardware that would make our local malcontents a capable threat.  At very least they could deny the government and commerce access to broad swathes of the country.
> 
> Oka on a large scale.
> 
> Managing that would be a police matter but we don't keep enough police on strength to manage those issues under all circumstances.


As I noted above, if these uncommon occurrences where law enforcement in not sufficient become regular events then we should increase our law enforcement capabilities rather then throw the military at the problem.


Kirkhill said:


> No.  Only if you plan on demolishing the cities.  If you want to minimize the damage and focus on the insurgents then there is ample cover and concealment to permit light forces to operate effectively in the urban environment.
> 
> It's nice to have a tank to mousehole an apartment block but wouldn't a Carl Gustaf with the right warhead (or even an AT4) be just as effective, and more manoeuverable?


Lots of historical and recent examples of urban combat show the importance of protected mobility.  There are open spaces to be crossed between the areas of cover and concealment.


Kirkhill said:


> I don't question the capability of Canada.  It doesn't have a sustainable Division currently.
> 
> I think it has the skeleton of a Division.   And I think that a Division, in conjunction with a well organized local reserve, is a reasonable scale of investment for Canada's national defence.  I'm not particularly bothered about the nature of the expeditionary  Division.   I do like your Light Brigade structure but I am inclined to have that, like the SSF, as a National Defence entity.  It may be better to separate that from Expeditionary Division and form it separately in the same way the Brits have formed their 16th Air Assault Brigade as a Global Response Force.
> 
> 
> And the Institutional Army, the CADTC, they need to spend more effort figuring out how to turn civilians into a local defence force that can be filed for future reference.


Again, I think our differences come down to a fundamental disagreement over the best way to defend Canada and its interests.  I believe the battles to protect what we value are more likely to take happen in places like Riga or the South China Sea rather than in Owen Sound, ON or Yorkton, SK.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> So for each IRU Battalion say you had two 100% Reg Force Companies and the 3rd Company having the Coy HQ Reg Force and the 3 x Platoons coming from Class C Reservists (or maybe more likely 1 x Platoon from each Company being Class C) and these Reserve positions are only filled for the current IRU Battalion and the oncoming IRU Battalion.
> 
> How large a Reserve catchment area would you need to be able to fill those positions?  You're looking at 3 x Platoons for each of the two Battalions to be augmented, so around 120 x Class C positions each Battalion for 1 year postings (6 month work-up and 6 month IRU).  Assuming you geographically spread the IRU Battalions so they are not drawing from the same Reserve recruiting base, would a single Reserve Infantry Brigade be able to reliably fill those positions?


If I was King, I’d had two LI Bde’s 
  One East and one West 
  2 Bn from each 70/30 and one 30/70 
 It would spread the geography, and Run East -West-East etc for IRU. 
   It would leave troops for Internal deployment as well 



daftandbarmy said:


> Be careful about Class C vs. Reg F.
> 
> Equivalent levels of Quality Control isn't necessarily a thing


 I think with a decent training program and a decent work schedule the Augmentation forces would be competitive 

Initially most SNCO and Capt+ positions would be Reg.  Then if you kept getting the same folks and they where usable for higher positions - you could end up with a fairly capable PRes as well that is getting regular higher end training and deployment.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> Be careful about Class C vs. Reg F.
> 
> Equivalent levels of Quality Control isn't necessarily a thing


True, but with regularly scheduled annual Class C deployments would that delta possibly decrease over time?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> True, but with regularly scheduled annual Class C deployments would that delta possibly decrease over time?



I doubt it. 

Right now, IMHO, Class C is code for 'gravy train'. The bigger hogs will always tend to force their way to the front


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> If I was King, I’d had two LI Bde’s
> One East and one West
> 2 Bn from each 70/30 and one 30/70
> It would spread the geography, and Run East -West-East etc for IRU.
> It would leave troops for Internal deployment as well
> 
> 
> I think with a decent training program and a decent work schedule the Augmentation forces would be competitive
> 
> Initially most SNCO and Capt+ positions would be Reg.  Then if you kept getting the same folks and they where usable for higher positions - you could end up with a fairly capable PRes as well that is getting regular higher end training and deployment.



A nail has been hit on the head.   Time is a key issue.

It will be difficult to change the PRes and the Regs.   That will take time.  There will be no flipping of switches.  You are looking at something that will likely take a generation and adherence to a plan over that time.  This is not a job for a 2 year GOFO.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> I don't agree that the primary focus of the Reserves should be local security.  "Assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot." should be the responsibility of law enforcement.  The military's "primary focus" should not be defending the government against its own population or enforcing the law except in the most extreme circumstances where law enforcement simply doesn't have the capability to deal with the threat.  And if it ever becomes the case where these "extreme circumstances" become common then I'd rather we expand the capabilities of our law enforcement agencies rather than use our Reserves as a para-military police force.



In my view that Reserves are like Taxpayers.  There is only one of them.  In fact the Taxpayers and the Reserves are the same person.  The Reserve offers his labour in exchange for taxes.  She is a citizen that comes to the aid of the government.  She doesn't belong to the Army.  Or the Navy or the Air Force.  Nor should she belong to the RCMP.

The purpose of a Reserve is to allow the Government to deal effectively with infrequent catastrophes.

And that is why I like the US National Guard and Danish Home Guard models. 

These are citizens organized in military fashion, with military training and a military culture.  Within those groups of citizens there are those that are predisposed to supply support and those that are predisposed to supply security.  And there are those that are predisposed to fight with guns and tanks, fly jets and helicopters and sail boats.  The government is offered an array of opportunities to exploit in a crisis.  And one of those crises can be a war overseas that threatens domestic interests.

But those are not the only crises government faces.  And government needs manpower for them all.

The Army is not the only draw on labour.

And an expeditionary army is not a particularly popular concept in Canada.

I would sooner have a body of willing citizens adapted to military culture that can be drawn on when the need for an expeditionary army is obvious to them.

Security is an easy sell.  Fighting foreign wars is a hard sell.



GR66 said:


> I agree that a range of missile defence capabilities should be a priority for Canada, both for domestic defence as well as for protection of our deployed expeditionary forces.  High level threats against the nation (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, etc.) need to be available at least at some level 24/7 and would include the RCAF and RCN plus whatever new capabilities we get.  These could be augmented by additional Reserve capabilities at times of heightened tensions or during major events (Olympics, G7 gatherings, etc.).


Agreement.



GR66 said:


> As for 24/7 local SHORAD/VSHORAD coverage all across Canada?  Is there a demonstrated need for something like that?  What would be the cost (and opportunity cost) of trying to implement that?  So we have a SHORAD battery in Owen Sound protected by the G&SF.  Is the AD battery active 24/7?  Does it require a security force 24/7?


No.  It doesn't require the entirety of the Foresters 24/7.  It may require a detachment on an ongoing basis to secure the gear.

As to the need for local Air Defence.

We're accustomed to thinking of guns targeting planes, or missiles targeting missiles.  Now we are looking at targeting drones which we liken to military planes.

But on the civil side of things drones fall into the same category as birds.  Nuisances.  And nuisances are dealt with as quietly and unobtrusively as possible so as to not frighten the locals as they go about their affairs.

Rheinmetall is already promoting their air defence systems to civilian ports for managing all threats - from birds, drones and intruders to MIRVs.

The sensor and command and control packages are similar if not identical.  The choice of effectors varies.

The basic system could include acoustics to startle, or directed energy systems (lasers, microwaves and RF) to fry silently.

Those systems would be entirely civilian controlled and maintained.

But suppose the threat moved up the spectrum to the "military"  and there was a need for adding guns and missiles to the array of effectors?

Rheinmetall high level peace time effector



Rheinmetall low level war time effector.



And they would or could be augmented by NASAMS launchers



  Once those effectors were deployed, and even while they were in storage in the armouries, they will need guarding.







GR66 said:


> As I noted above, if these uncommon occurrences where law enforcement in not sufficient become regular events then we should increase our law enforcement capabilities rather then throw the military at the problem.



On this we both agree.  Or we should change government.



GR66 said:


> Lots of historical and recent examples of urban combat show the importance of protected mobility.  There are open spaces to be crossed between the areas of cover and concealment.



Also agreed.  But how much protected mobility?  Everybody armoured?  Or a Brigade per Division?  A Battalion?   A Transport Company?



GR66 said:


> Again, I think our differences come down to a fundamental disagreement over the best way to defend Canada and its interests.  I believe the battles to protect what we value are more likely to take happen in places like Riga or the South China Sea rather than in Owen Sound, ON or Yorkton, SK.



And my concern is engaging Canada's citizens so that they will respond to crises in both Owen Sound and the South China Sea  when and as required.

I am not interested in keeping 4 CMBG happy in the Bierhalls.  I am interested in raising Sam Hughes's CEF when necessary.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> If I was King, I’d had two LI Bde’s
> One East and one West
> 2 Bn from each 70/30 and one 30/70
> It would spread the geography, and Run East -West-East etc for IRU.
> It would leave troops for Internal deployment as well
> 
> 
> I think with a decent training program and a decent work schedule the Augmentation forces would be competitive
> 
> Initially most SNCO and Capt+ positions would be Reg.  Then if you kept getting the same folks and they where usable for higher positions - you could end up with a fairly capable PRes as well that is getting regular higher end training and deployment.


In this scenario would you only have the four 70/30 Battalions (two per Brigade) rotate the IRU tasking?  Or how would you propose fitting a 30/70 Battalion into high readiness rotation?

You could possibly do two Light Brigades each with three 70/30 Battalions with the Western Brigade having Battalions in Edmonton (41 Bde and possibly central BC units from 39 Bde as the Reserve components), Shilo (with 38 Bde as the Reserve components) and Petawawa (33 Bde).  The Eastern Brigade would have Battalions in Quebec (34 Bde), Valcartier (35 Bde) and Gagetown (37 Bde). 

IRU could then be split between 6 units rather than 3 (or 4) somewhat easing the burden on each.  IRU rotation could be Edmonton-Quebec-Shilo-Valcartier-Petawawa-Gagetown...repeat.

Reg Force manning for these two Light Brigades (6 x 70/30 Battalions) would be about 3,500 positions leaving 1,735 Reg Force Infantry positions left over for Mech forces.  This could be 2 x 100% Battalions or 3 x Battalions at current (70%) manning levels.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Reg Force manning for these two Light Brigades (6 x 70/30 Battalions) would be about 3,500 positions leaving 1,735 Reg Force Infantry positions left over for Mech forces.  This could be 2 x 100% Battalions or 3 x Battalions at current (70%) manning levels.


Honestly I would have 1 x 70/30 Bn and 5 30/70 Bn of Mech forces.  

That would provide 4-5 potential Bde of Infantry for the CA.  

But all of that requires a significant change in the CA and specific the PRes from an employment standpoint - and a dedication to equipment and training that right now, I don’t see on any side (GoC, CA or PRes structures).


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> In my view that Reserves are like Taxpayers.  There is only one of them.  In fact the Taxpayers and the Reserves are the same person.  The Reserve offers his labour in exchange for taxes.  She is a citizen that comes to the aid of the government.  She doesn't belong to the Army.  Or the Navy or the Air Force.  Nor should she belong to the RCMP.
> 
> The purpose of a Reserve is to allow the Government to deal effectively with infrequent catastrophes.
> 
> And that is why I like the US National Guard and Danish Home Guard models.
> 
> These are citizens organized in military fashion, with military training and a military culture.  Within those groups of citizens there are those that are predisposed to supply support and those that are predisposed to supply security.  And there are those that are predisposed to fight with guns and tanks, fly jets and helicopters and sail boats.  The government is offered an array of opportunities to exploit in a crisis.  And one of those crises can be a war overseas that threatens domestic interests.
> 
> But those are not the only crises government faces.  And government needs manpower for them all.
> 
> The Army is not the only draw on labour.
> 
> And an expeditionary army is not a particularly popular concept in Canada.
> 
> I would sooner have a body of willing citizens adapted to military culture that can be drawn on when the need for an expeditionary army is obvious to them.
> 
> Security is an easy sell.  Fighting foreign wars is a hard sell.
> 
> 
> Agreement.
> 
> 
> No.  It doesn't require the entirety of the Foresters 24/7.  It may require a detachment on an ongoing basis to secure the gear.
> 
> As to the need for local Air Defence.
> 
> We're accustomed to thinking of guns targeting planes, or missiles targeting missiles.  Now we are looking at targeting drones which we liken to military planes.
> 
> But on the civil side of things drones fall into the same category as birds.  Nuisances.  And nuisances are dealt with as quietly and unobtrusively as possible so as to not frighten the locals as they go about their affairs.
> 
> Rheinmetall is already promoting their air defence systems to civilian ports for managing all threats - from birds, drones and intruders to MIRVs.
> 
> The sensor and command and control packages are similar if not identical.  The choice of effectors varies.
> 
> The basic system could include acoustics to startle, or directed energy systems (lasers, microwaves and RF) to fry silently.
> 
> Those systems would be entirely civilian controlled and maintained.
> 
> But suppose the threat moved up the spectrum to the "military"  and there was a need for adding guns and missiles to the array of effectors?
> 
> Rheinmetall high level peace time effector
> 
> View attachment 73317
> 
> Rheinmetall low level war time effector.
> 
> View attachment 73318
> 
> And they would or could be augmented by NASAMS launchers
> 
> View attachment 73319
> 
> Once those effectors were deployed, and even while they were in storage in the armouries, they will need guarding.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On this we both agree.  Or we should change government.
> 
> 
> 
> Also agreed.  But how much protected mobility?  Everybody armoured?  Or a Brigade per Division?  A Battalion?   A Transport Company?
> 
> 
> 
> And my concern is engaging Canada's citizens so that they will respond to crises in both Owen Sound and the South China Sea  when and as required.
> 
> I am not interested in keeping 4 CMBG happy in the Bierhalls.  I am interested in raising Sam Hughes's CEF when necessary.




Further to my comments about the civil/military cross over on air defence.  Rheinmetall graphic.


----------



## GR66

Further to the 2 x 70/30 Light Brigade Concept it could possibly look something like this:


Integrates Reserve Regiments directly into the Reg Force structure and "right sizes" them to Company establishment strength with generation requirements of roughly a Platoon (-) of Class C augmentees on a predictable rotating basis.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> We'll skip the points of agreement.
> 
> 
> I would argue that the reserve function is to provide defence when there is a military necessity.  If you wait until the necessity is obvious it is too late.
> 
> As to managing threats -
> 
> there are threats.
> 
> Those threats include civil and military threats and can include assaults by mobs, occupations and blockades, emplacement of bombs and other deadly devices and the launching of missiles from near and far - to include taking control civil aircraft while on autopilot.
> 
> The Foresters are needed, not just to support the Army in particular, or even the CAF in general, they are needed to support the police and other government departments when manpower is required.  The question is what capabilities can they cheaply supply with minimal training.  My sense is that security should be their primary focus.  That means small arms, light vehicles and comms.  It also could mean the provision of a significant arsenal of single shot wooden rounds.  Machine Guns and Mortars are also relatively cheap.
> 
> My overarching need is for missile defence - everything from CRAM with strong EW and Directed Energy devices like lasers backed by kinetic weapons (guns) up through VSHORAD, SHORAD and MRAD to ABM defences.   All of those could be mixed regular/reserve formations.  With the Foresters providing security for the deployed systems.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The "military" threats, in the sense of state actors in uniform, may be external to our borders but internally we present opportunities that external actors can exploit and exploit effectively by supplying hardware that would make our local malcontents a capable threat.  At very least they could deny the government and commerce access to broad swathes of the country.
> 
> Oka on a large scale.
> 
> Managing that would be a police matter but we don't keep enough police on strength to manage those issues under all circumstances.
> 
> 
> 
> Yes.
> 
> 
> 
> No.  Only if you plan on demolishing the cities.  If you want to minimize the damage and focus on the insurgents then there is ample cover and concealment to permit light forces to operate effectively in the urban environment.
> 
> It's nice to have a tank to mousehole an apartment block but wouldn't a Carl Gustaf with the right warhead (or even an AT4) be just as effective, and more manoeuverable?
> 
> 
> 
> I don't question the capability of Canada.  It doesn't have a sustainable Division currently.
> 
> I think it has the skeleton of a Division.   And I think that a Division, in conjunction with a well organized local reserve, is a reasonable scale of investment for Canada's national defence.  I'm not particularly bothered about the nature of the expeditionary  Division.   I do like your Light Brigade structure but I am inclined to have that, like the SSF, as a National Defence entity.  It may be better to separate that from Expeditionary Division and form it separately in the same way the Brits have formed their 16th Air Assault Brigade as a Global Response Force.
> 
> 
> And the Institutional Army, the CADTC, they need to spend more effort figuring out how to turn civilians into a local defence force that can be filed for future reference.


What threats are you perceiving to cause you to want to focus on ground-based air defence of Canadian cities by our Army Reserve and fielding a local defence force with machineguns and mortars? 

There needs to be a credible threat to make investments and changes on the scale that you demand (and that you are in no position to do so BTW). In learned in several International Relations courses as part of my Poli Sci degree some decades ago that the threat a nation perceives of another can be made into a formula: threat = capability x intention. So if either is assessed as zero then there is no threat. 

For example, the US absolutely has the capability to harm Canada, but has no intention. Therefore, it would be silly to base our defence policy to counter a threat from the US. Does Russia have the capability and intention to harm Canada? Perhaps. But it would be with weapons for which we have NORAD and the threat of immediate US retaliation. What other threats are driving your strident demands?

Having said that, Defence of Canada and then North America are indeed our priorities in that order ahead of international operations. Its just that those two roles can be covered with other assets (NORAD fighters, ships, CANSOF) against the credible assessment of threats. Army Reserve units do absolutely have the task of domestic operations. Keep in mind that assistance to law enforcement is only one potential task whereas disaster assistance is much more likely. There are Territorial Battle Groups that can and have executed that role. Out in 5XX, for example, we had TBGs as IRU during one storm season. Folks here, many of whom have very limited awareness of the situation, love to hate on the CAF, CA and the Reserves. Good things are also happening. 

The Grey and Simcoe Foresters, by the way, have very realistic mission task of providing an Arctic Response Company Group to deploy to the North and conduct domestic operations. Converting them to air defence of Owen Sound and Barrie doesn't make sense.


----------



## ArmyRick

TangoTwoBravo said:


> What threats are you perceiving to cause you to want to focus on ground-based air defence of Canadian cities by our Army Reserve and fielding a local defence force with machineguns and mortars?
> 
> There needs to be a credible threat to make investments and changes on the scale that you demand (and that you are in no position to do so BTW). In learned in several International Relations courses as part of my Poli Sci degree some decades ago that the threat a nation perceives of another can be made into a formula: threat = capability x intention. So if either is assessed as zero then there is no threat.
> 
> For example, the US absolutely has the capability to harm Canada, but has no intention. Therefore, it would be silly to base our defence policy to counter a threat from the US. Does Russia have the capability and intention to harm Canada? Perhaps. But it would be with weapons for which we have NORAD and the threat of immediate US retaliation. What other threats are driving your strident demands?
> 
> Having said that, Defence of Canada and then North America are indeed our priorities in that order ahead of international operations. Its just that those two roles can be covered with other assets (NORAD fighters, ships, CANSOF) against the credible assessment of threats. Army Reserve units do absolutely have the task of domestic operations. Keep in mind that assistance to law enforcement is only one potential task whereas disaster assistance is much more likely. There are Territorial Battle Groups that can and have executed that role. Out in 5XX, for example, we had TBGs as IRU during one storm season. Folks here, many of whom have very limited awareness of the situation, love to hate on the CAF, CA and the Reserves. Good things are also happening.
> 
> The Grey and Simcoe Foresters, by the way, have very realistic mission task of providing an Arctic Response Company Group to deploy to the North and conduct domestic operations. Converting them to air defence of Owen Sound and Barrie doesn't make sense.


As a former Forester, BIG no thanks to the air defence role. Big no.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> There needs to be a credible threat to make investments and changes on the scale that you demand (and that you are in no position to do so BTW). In learned in several International Relations courses as part of my Poli Sci degree some decades ago that the threat a nation perceives of another can be made into a formula: threat = capability x intention. So if either is assessed as zero then there is no threat.



Heh. There's a chuckle.  You and my wife.  Between the pair of you I'm well aware that I am no position to demand anything. 

What I want and what I expect are worlds apart.  So I learned a minute ago not to demand anything.

I'll propose a modification to your formula.

Threat at time = t is a function of capability at time = t and intention at time = t.

Capability, intention and time are all variables.  Therefore the threat will vary over time.  As will capability and intention.

What will the nature of the threat be at time = t?  When will it arise?  How fast will it appear?

How long does it take to prepare for a revised threat?

Should you prepare for the perceived immediate threat?  Or should you prepare for the generic threat?



TangoTwoBravo said:


> What threats are you perceiving to cause you to want to focus on ground-based air defence of Canadian cities by our Army Reserve and fielding a local defence force with machineguns and mortars?



As I noted Canadian ports face aerial nuisances that require constant surveillance of the skies and recourse to a variety of effectors.  Most nuisance threats don't require effectors that will kill people.  But because the scale of response is less it doesn't mean that the sense or command requirement is any less.  Civil airports surveilling their grounds and skies to track everything from birds and runway intruders to windshear events so that they are in a position to react.  Even if the reaction is just a broadcast warning.  On occasion they might want a more lively response.  A klaxon, a popper, an acoustic beam, a microwave or even, potentially a laser to discretely knock down some kid's quadcopter that has strayed onto the airfield.   Nuisance management.

That does not require a military response.  But conveniently the architecture for nuisance management is not a million miles away from managing a military response.

Most of the system I am envisaging is under civilian control, NAVCan control and/or NORAD control.  What I am proposing is that the military provide the means to plug military effectors into civilian controlled system when the threat warrants, and if necessary, NORAD or other military command takes control.

Not necessarily when, but perhaps if.

They might come in handy some day.

In the meantime those effectors, if not required at home might be welcome in places like Taipei, Riga, Lviv or Bucharest.  Or even Svalbard or Attu.

The military air defence then might find itself carrying a version of the civil system into the field with its own sensors and command system - but using the same effectors.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> For example, the US absolutely has the capability to harm Canada,


Agreed.  Today.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> but has no intention.


Agreed.  Today.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Therefore, it would be silly to base our defence policy to counter a threat from the US.


Is that still true in 40 years?  Even 20?



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Does Russia have the capability and intention to harm Canada? Perhaps.


Agreed.  Today.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> But it would be with weapons for which we have NORAD and the threat of immediate US retaliation.


Agreed.  Today.   Although I understand we are pretty much on our own if Russia decided to launch on Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal.  Not sure why they would do that but forever is a long time.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> What other threats are driving your strident demands?


Am I making demands?  Stridently? 
I thought I was making an argument.  Strenuously.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Having said that, Defence of Canada and then North America are indeed our priorities in that order ahead of international operations. Its just that those two roles can be covered with other assets (NORAD fighters, ships, CANSOF) against the credible assessment of threats.


I accept that you are managing the current threat level adequately.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Army Reserve units do absolutely have the task of domestic operations.


Thank you for confirming my understanding.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Keep in mind that assistance to law enforcement is only one potential task whereas disaster assistance is much more likely.


Agreed.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> There are Territorial Battle Groups that can and have executed that role. Out in 5XX, for example, we had TBGs as IRU during one storm season.


And that is a good thing as far as I am concerned.  Although I sense that a number of people on this site are not thrilled at effort spent in that regard.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Folks here, many of whom have very limited awareness of the situation,


That would include me.


TangoTwoBravo said:


> love to hate on the CAF, CA and the Reserves.


That would not include me.  I don't hate any of the organizations.  I have distinct reservations about the way they are manned, equipped, trained and organized. 



TangoTwoBravo said:


> Good things are also happening.


I'm glad.

My primary concern, gleaned from this site, is that there is a distinct lack of manpower and a shallow recruiting pool.  My belief is that by focusing on the expeditionary army the army in particular and the CAF in general is not moving in sync with the general population and that is making it harder to find recruits.   To put it another way, I am suggesting that the CAF open itself up to recruiting more Zombies.  And perhaps, out of that herd of Zombies you might find those willing and able to take on a more aggressive posture with the expeditionary forces.

Why machine guns and mortars?  Beyond the fact that they are useful in a variety of scenarios, they, along with rifles, grenades and M72s supply a suite of weapons useful in all levels of warfare and provide a training base for section, platoon and company training.



TangoTwoBravo said:


> The Grey and Simcoe Foresters, by the way, have very realistic mission task of providing an Arctic Response Company Group to deploy to the North and conduct domestic operations. Converting them to air defence of Owen Sound and Barrie doesn't make sense.



I'm glad the Foresters are gainfully employed but you misunderstand me if you think I meant that they should be turned into anti-aircraft gunners.  I was suggesting that they be prepared to provide security to anti-aircraft gunners.

Anti-aircraft gunners that could be employed tying their guns into Owen Sound, or North Bay, or Toronto, Vancouver, Darlington, Halifax or Alert..... of Riga.  In all of those places I would expect that an infantry company would be attached to a deployed air defence troop, or battery, to supply local security.

Those security troops could be adjuncts to the Manoeuver Brigade.  They might even supply recruits for the Brigade.  They would certainly count towards NATO tripwire forces and solidarity... and they might even contribute to protecting the tripwire.


----------



## Kirkhill

PS

What domestic threats do you expect to counter with Leos and M777s? 

I'll stipulate that the LAVs, ACSVs and TAPVs have domestic utility in support of the RCMP.


----------



## McG

The CAF does not want PRes crewed LAV doing anything ALEA. It doesn’t even want to see LAV doing anything ALEA with Reg F crews.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> Heh. There's a chuckle.  You and my wife.  Between the pair of you I'm well aware that I am no position to demand anything.
> 
> What I want and what I expect are worlds apart.  So I learned a minute ago not to demand anything.
> 
> I'll propose a modification to your formula.
> 
> Threat at time = t is a function of capability at time = t and intention at time = t.
> 
> Capability, intention and time are all variables.  Therefore the threat will vary over time.  As will capability and intention.
> 
> What will the nature of the threat be at time = t?  When will it arise?  How fast will it appear?
> 
> How long does it take to prepare for a revised threat?
> 
> Should you prepare for the perceived immediate threat?  Or should you prepare for the generic threat?
> 
> 
> 
> As I noted Canadian ports face aerial nuisances that require constant surveillance of the skies and recourse to a variety of effectors.  Most nuisance threats don't require effectors that will kill people.  But because the scale of response is less it doesn't mean that the sense or command requirement is any less.  Civil airports surveilling their grounds and skies to track everything from birds and runway intruders to windshear events so that they are in a position to react.  Even if the reaction is just a broadcast warning.  On occasion they might want a more lively response.  A klaxon, a popper, an acoustic beam, a microwave or even, potentially a laser to discretely knock down some kid's quadcopter that has strayed onto the airfield.   Nuisance management.
> 
> That does not require a military response.  But conveniently the architecture for nuisance management is not a million miles away from managing a military response.
> 
> Most of the system I am envisaging is under civilian control, NAVCan control and/or NORAD control.  What I am proposing is that the military provide the means to plug military effectors into civilian controlled system when the threat warrants, and if necessary, NORAD or other military command takes control.
> 
> Not necessarily when, but perhaps if.
> 
> They might come in handy some day.
> 
> In the meantime those effectors, if not required at home might be welcome in places like Taipei, Riga, Lviv or Bucharest.  Or even Svalbard or Attu.
> 
> The military air defence then might find itself carrying a version of the civil system into the field with its own sensors and command system - but using the same effectors.
> 
> 
> Agreed.  Today.
> 
> 
> Agreed.  Today.
> 
> 
> Is that still true in 40 years?  Even 20?
> 
> 
> Agreed.  Today.
> 
> 
> Agreed.  Today.   Although I understand we are pretty much on our own if Russia decided to launch on Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver or Montreal.  Not sure why they would do that but forever is a long time.
> 
> 
> Am I making demands?  Stridently?
> I thought I was making an argument.  Strenuously.
> 
> 
> I accept that you are managing the current threat level adequately.
> 
> 
> Thank you for confirming my understanding.
> 
> 
> Agreed.
> 
> 
> And that is a good thing as far as I am concerned.  Although I sense that a number of people on this site are not thrilled at effort spent in that regard.
> 
> 
> That would include me.
> 
> That would not include me.  I don't hate any of the organizations.  I have distinct reservations about the way they are manned, equipped, trained and organized.
> 
> 
> I'm glad.
> 
> My primary concern, gleaned from this site, is that there is a distinct lack of manpower and a shallow recruiting pool.  My belief is that by focusing on the expeditionary army the army in particular and the CAF in general is not moving in sync with the general population and that is making it harder to find recruits.   To put it another way, I am suggesting that the CAF open itself up to recruiting more Zombies.  And perhaps, out of that herd of Zombies you might find those willing and able to take on a more aggressive posture with the expeditionary forces.
> 
> Why machine guns and mortars?  Beyond the fact that they are useful in a variety of scenarios, they, along with rifles, grenades and M72s supply a suite of weapons useful in all levels of warfare and provide a training base for section, platoon and company training.
> 
> 
> 
> I'm glad the Foresters are gainfully employed but you misunderstand me if you think I meant that they should be turned into anti-aircraft gunners.  I was suggesting that they be prepared to provide security to anti-aircraft gunners.
> 
> Anti-aircraft gunners that could be employed tying their guns into Owen Sound, or North Bay, or Toronto, Vancouver, Darlington, Halifax or Alert..... of Riga.  In all of those places I would expect that an infantry company would be attached to a deployed air defence troop, or battery, to supply local security.
> 
> Those security troops could be adjuncts to the Manoeuver Brigade.  They might even supply recruits for the Brigade.  They would certainly count towards NATO tripwire forces and solidarity... and they might even contribute to protecting the tripwire.


You'll have to forgive me for not engaging in a line by line post-dissection fest with you. 

I will say, though, that domestic operations are not the only task of the Reserves and I apologize if my post gave that impression. All components of the CAF have the task of domestic operations. We have immediate response units across the country that may have been on expeditionary operations the year before. 

Our expenditure on defence must be to counter credible threats and to prepare to engage in likely operations.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> You'll have to forgive me for not engaging in a line by line post-dissection fest with you.
> 
> I will say, though, that domestic operations are not the only task of the Reserves and I apologize if my post gave that impression. All components of the CAF have the task of domestic operations. We have immediate response units across the country that may have been on expeditionary operations the year before.
> 
> Our expenditure on defence must be to counter credible threats and to prepare to engage in likely operations.


Cheers.


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> The CAF does not want PRes crewed LAV doing anything ALEA. It doesn’t even want to see LAV doing anything ALEA with Reg F crews.



I understand that.  I am saying that despite that I personally find the LAV and TAPV vehicles well suited to operating in the Canadian urban and rural environment.  That does not include the bush, muskeg, the tundra, mountains or high arctic.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Kirkhill said:


> I understand that.  I am saying that despite that I personally find the LAV and TAPV vehicles well suited to operating in the Canadian urban and rural environment.  That does not include the bush, muskeg, the tundra, mountains or high arctic.
> [/QUITE]
> In other words the other 75% of the country.
> Ah well in the entire history of warfare no one has ever fought in such terrain so I suspect we're pretty safe.


----------



## Kirkhill

Canada's Priorities.




Total uniformed employees - ~230,000

The governments of Canada hire as many police officers as they do military personnel.  And they hire a similar number of firefighters and paramedics combined.






						DND/CAF Footprint - Canada.ca
					

March 2020 - Essential information to familiarize the Minister with the Department.




					www.canada.ca
				









						Supporting Canada’s Public Safety Personnel: An Action Plan on Post-Traumatic Stress Injuries
					

Supporting Canada’s Public Safety Personnel: An Action Plan on Post-Traumatic Stress Injuries




					www.publicsafety.gc.ca
				












						Canadian Coast Guard - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				







80,000 firefighter volunteers
18,000 SAR volunteers
30,000 Reserves.

128,000 Civilian Volunteers.

3 to 4 times as many Canadians willing to put themselves at risk to help other Canadians for free as are willing to join the Reserves for pay.

What the CAF and the Reserves are selling, Canadians are not buying.


----------



## GR66

Taking the reorganization of the Reserves a step further the balance of the Reserve Regiments work pretty well for creating 2 x 10/90 Reserve Light Brigades with 4 x Territorial Battalions each.  This could be your mobilization force if ever required, doubling the size of the light forces to a four Brigade Light Division worth of Infantry.

For non-mobilization situations these Territorial Battalions can be used for any variety of domestic operations required.  Coincidentally, it just happened to work out to be the case that for each of the groupings of 3 x Companies (Reserve Regiments) in the proposed Territorial Battalions just one of the three units have an existing StAR "Mission Task" assigned.  This same Mission Task could be extended to the other two Regiments in each Territorial Battalion giving each the ability to force generate a full Company-sized specialty unit.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to the task of finding Reserves to organize.



> In 2018, over 24 million people volunteered, accounting for 79% of Canadians aged 15 and older.
> Volunteers dedicated approximately 5 billion hours to their volunteer activities, a number of hours equivalent to over 2.5 million full-time year-round jobs.








						Volunteering counts: Formal and informal contributions of Canadians in 2018
					

Using data from the 2018 General Social Survey on Giving, Volunteering and Participating (GSS GVP), this article presents information on the volunteer activities of Canadians, including volunteer rates and number of volunteer hours, the types of volunteering activities and the organizations...




					www150.statcan.gc.ca
				




That suggests that the majority of Canadians are heavily invested in their communities and want to help/assist/serve. 
They are willing to spend, on average 200 hours of their own time, beyond the typical 2000 hours of the typical work year in that service.

200 hours is
50 4 hour Wednesday nights, or
25 8 hour shifts (12 weekend days) or
5 48 hour weekend exercises or
5 40 hour work weeks or
8 24 hour days.

Ukrainians are being trained in 3 to 5 weeks - 500 to 800 hours.

The Danes training opportunities (it is in English)






						Kurser
					






					vistillerop.dk
				






Curiously although 24,000,000 Canadians volunteer domestically every year on 65,000 youngsters have volunteered for overseas assignments in the past 60 years since the era of Lotta Hitschmanova.



> Since the 1960s, over 65,000 young Canadians have participated in volunteer abroad
> programs; this number continues to expand each year as young people travel to
> developing countries for a variety of reasons that range from self-discovery and
> adventure to the desire to make a difference (Tiessen, 2008).





			https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1020596.pdf
		



Another indication, perhaps, that emphasising foreign service deployments is not attracting young Canadians to the Forces?


----------



## Kirkhill

Danish Home Guard Training

Basic



> As a new volunteer, you must complete  our * statutory basic training of a minimum of 250 hours ,* unless you have previously been conscripted .  It is a basic military training  with *four modules that you must complete  within the first three years* .  (See figure below).
> 
> During the course  you will learn , among other things, on weapons, first aid, combat and tactics as well as guard duty.* Each module lasts 4-9 days*, but y*ou can also choose to complete the entire course over three weeks at the Home Guard's bootcamp.*
> 
> The training is divided into three different tracks: the Marine Home Guard, the Air Force Home Guard and the Army Home Guard (including the Police and Business Home Guard).  For all three tracks, it is possible to complete modules 1 and 4 in  all the  Home Guard's local subdivisions .








						Uddannelse
					






					vistillerop.dk
				




Specialised



> When you have completed the basic training, or if you have previously been conscripted, you have the opportunity to continue your development with our specialized training and courses. We have many different ones, so there are good chances that you can build on your training and education with something that matches both your interests and your level of ambition .
> 
> For example, you can train as :
> 
> 
> Shipmaster
> Navigator
> Security guard specialist
> Dog handler
> Medical assistant
> IT commander
> Press and recruitment officer



Leadership



> If you would like to continue your development further, you can take one of our leadership courses, which give you a deeper understanding of the dynamics of group collaboration . The goal is to develop your leadership skills through a focus on stronger group cooperation and relationship building .
> 
> 
> The result of the training is a number of tools that are useful in the Home Guard , but which are also of great value in the business world.
> 
> On our management courses, you learn about:
> 
> 
> Decision-making processes
> Systematic problem solving
> The conditions of man
> See, listen and understand
> Influence and co-determination
> Assumption about people
> Communication options
> Communication problems


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Another indication, perhaps, that emphasizing foreign service deployments is not attracting young Canadians to the Forces?


I think you are missing the likelihood that maybe it’s just the CAF in general that doesn’t appeal to those demographics.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I think you are missing the likelihood that maybe it’s just the CAF in general that doesn’t appeal to those demographics.



That's possible.  But why?

There are apparently a lot of people, including young people, that are willing to volunteer (for free) their time in service of the community.  A couple of hundred hours a year.  That corresponds to a Danish Homeguard Basic Training Course of 3 weeks and an Anglo Ukrainian Basic Defence Course of 3 weeks.

What is wrong with the CAF's terms of service that youngsters would rather volunteer for SAR or Firefighting or a multitude of other activities?

And I don't think it is just about tattoos, piercings, hair-colour or gender issues.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> That's possible.  But why?
> 
> There are apparently a lot of people, including young people, that are willing to volunteer (for free) their time in service of the community.  A couple of hundred hours a year.  That corresponds to a Danish Homeguard Basic Training Course of 3 weeks and an Anglo Ukrainian Basic Defence Course of 3 weeks.
> 
> What is wrong with the CAF's terms of service that youngsters would rather volunteer for SAR or Firefighting or a multitude of other activities?
> 
> And I don't think it is just about tattoos, piercings, hair-colour or gender issues.


Military, weapons, and war…


----------



## Kirkhill

There should still be a quarter to half of the population available as a recruiting pool.

Or 6 to 12 million volunteers.



> Canadians are split, however, on whether they would go to war with Russia over Ukraine. Thirty-two per cent of respondents oppose entering the conflict, and 13 per cent somewhat oppose joining the fray. Twenty-one per cent would support fighting Russia over Ukraine, and another 26 per cent would somewhat support this course of action.
> 
> But support for war rises if Moscow were to invade another country, the poll found. Two-thirds of Canadians would support or somewhat support war with Russia in that scenario, with 41 per cent supportive and 25 per cent somewhat supportive. Sixteen per cent of Canadians would still oppose war, and 11 per cent would somewhat oppose it.
> 
> The Nanos poll found significant differences between older and younger adults on this question. Only 31 per cent of Canadians 18 to 34 would support war with Russia under this scenario, with another 25 per cent somewhat supporting it.











						Canadians support further sanctions but are hesitant to go to war with Russia: Nanos poll
					

Polling also found Canadians support the idea of accepting Ukrainian refugees, including a majority that back using tax dollars to airlift Ukrainian refugees to Canada




					www.theglobeandmail.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Miracle Cure for the LAVs....









						Nordic Traction
					






					www.army-technology.com


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Miracle Cure for the LAVs....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Nordic Traction
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.army-technology.com


Not sure if I’d go that far.  
  Doesn’t help with ground pressure - so deep snow will still high center them.


----------



## GR66

Assuming no increase in Reg Force Infantry PYs the proposed structure for the Light Brigades uses around 3502 of the 5238 PYs currently allocated.  That would leave 1736 PYs for the Mech Forces.

With that you could do something like the following to create a single Mechanized Brigade with 3 x Combined Arms Battalions (at 100% Reg Force manning).

These 3 x Battalions would rotate readiness to provide the eFP Latvia Mechanized Company.  The reduced overall number of LAV Battalions would allow you to pre-position the tank Squadron and the additional LAV Company to allow us to fly-over the balance of the high-readiness Battalion to increase our Latvia deployment to a full combined arms Battalion.

We could also have a LAV Training Company at each of Shilo, Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown to allow the Light Infantry troops stationed there to cross-train on the LAVs to provide additional mechanized troops if required.

Lastly, there would be enough LAVs left over to allow a Battalion's worth to be re-configured to provide a SHORAD Regiment and another Battalion's worth to be converted to specialty vehicles (120mm Mortars, ATGMs, UAV/Loitering Munition launchers, etc.) to equip the Weapon Detachments/CS Company for the Mechanized Brigade.


----------



## dapaterson

Never start with an assumption that all PYs in current functions should remain.  That way lies stasis.


----------



## GR66

dapaterson said:


> Never start with an assumption that all PYs in current functions should remain.  That way lies stasis.


Ahh...you're suggesting that the government will be increasing the current PYs?


----------



## dapaterson

Nope.  I'm suggesting that there may be more important capabilities to vest in the full time military than infantry.


----------



## GR66

dapaterson said:


> Nope.  I'm suggesting that there may be more important capabilities to vest in the full time military than infantry.


No disagreement.  However I'd suggest that 5200 Infantry positions is probably the bare minimum that an Army can probably get by with and still claim to have a combat capable Army.  That's likely just barely enough to field and sustain a single Brigade.  Any deployable capability less than a Brigade realistically makes you an auxiliary element of someone else's Army.


----------



## dapaterson

The Canadian Army has not deployed anything close to a brigade in the lifetime of any serving member.


----------



## GR66

dapaterson said:


> The Canadian Army has not deployed anything close to a brigade in the lifetime of any serving member.


So we don't prepare to be able to deploy a nationally independent force if required?  The nature of war in 2022 isn't what it was in 1914.  We can't quickly build an Army from scratch when required.  The technology cost and lead times don't allow for that.


----------



## dapaterson

Infantry training can be managed and maintained in shorter timeframes, and thus can be more heavily weighted to other than full-time service.

CSS activities are those that ensure readiness (available and serviceable equipment and materiel) and thus should be weighted more heavily within the full-time component.

The GoC has given the CAF, all in, caps of 71,500 Reg F and 30,000 P Res personnel.  This includes training lists, medical holding lists, and, well, everything.  Therefore, there will have to be tradeoffs to remain within those limitations.  And deliberate choices about what must be full time, what is good to have as full time, what can be part time, and what is best to have as part time.

The Canadian Army, on the other hand, begins by situating the estimate and declaring without valid rationale or proof, that there Must Be Nine Reg F Inf Bns.  From there, with that initial framing assumption demonstrably false, all the other crud and crap gets added.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> The Canadian Army, on the other hand, begins by situating the estimate and declaring without valid rationale or proof, that there Must Be Nine Reg F Inf Bns.  From there, with that initial framing assumption demonstrably false, all the other crud and crap gets added.


Well I mean Regimental Mafias feel that is rational...


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Well I mean Regimental Mafias feel that is rational...



I believe it's more of a political statement than anything else e.g., West, Central and French Canada each get a regiment with three battalions.

To make any changes will probably be as difficult as changing the articles of Confederation I assume


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:


> I believe it's more of a political statement than anything else e.g., West, Central and French Canada each get a regiment with three battalions.
> 
> To make any changes will probably be as difficult as changing the articles of Confederation I assume


Probably even harder.


----------



## dapaterson

A truly transformational Army Commander would host a dinner with their senior generals to discuss long term transformation with a goat stew and horse tartare.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> The reduced overall number of LAV Battalions would allow you to pre-position the tank Squadron and the additional LAV Company to allow us to fly-over the balance of the high-readiness Battalion to increase our Latvia deployment to a full combined arms Battalion.


The eFP battle group already has sufficient mech infantry and tanks from other countries so that it does not need a flyover component. In fact a flyover component would be counterproductive as it would require the existing eFP battle group to be broken up.



daftandbarmy said:


> I believe it's more of a political statement than anything else e.g., West, Central and French Canada each get a regiment with three battalions.


You could make an equally strong "political" statement with a brigade in each region with a full-sized 100/0, a 70/30 and a 30/70 battalion. Keeping three small sized 100/0 RegF battalions in each region is more "military politics" than "civilian politics". I fully believe the following from @dapaterson is absolutely true:



dapaterson said:


> The Canadian Army, on the other hand, begins by situating the estimate and declaring without valid rationale or proof, that there Must Be Nine Reg F Inf Bns. From there, with that initial framing assumption demonstrably false, all the other crud and crap gets added.


In part, the managed readiness concept continues to be used to falsely justify the math long after its need to generate rotations for Afghanistan expired. It always makes me wonder how we made it through the Cold War without managed readiness.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> In part, the managed readiness concept continues to be used to falsely justify the math long after its need to generate rotations for Afghanistan expired. It always makes me wonder how we made it through the Cold War without managed readiness.
> 
> 🍻



Apparently nobody expected more than one track change...  Three weeks and done.



> Rusi’s Taylor says that *during the Cold War, Nato countries’ militaries held about three weeks’ worth of ammunition*. With nuclear armageddon expected to occur before those three weeks were up, the defence supply chains of many countries, including the UK, were trimmed to suit.



How the West is racing to stop Ukraine's guns falling silent


----------



## McG

dapaterson said:


> The Canadian Army has not deployed anything close to a brigade in the lifetime of any serving member.


4 CMBG existed during my lifetime, and it was deployed for the whole of its lifetime.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> 4 CMBG existed during my lifetime, and it was deployed for the whole of its lifetime.


Mine too but I failed on the "serving" part of the statement.

I look back on the presentations Mike Jeffery, the then CCA, made before various government committees around the turn of the century which all involved the standing commitments of the Army including the deployment of a mech brigade. He consistently said we could, but not within the time frames contemplated in the standing directives. It wasn't until after Mike left that we started turning towards a posture where key units within brigades were told to stop being force employers and only generators of subunits intended for the deployment of battle groups. Once you tell an artillery or engineer regiment that they are only force generators, you seriously degrade the ability to generate a real brigade group.

So while there has been no full brigade group deployment during the service of current members, the capability still existed ... at least for a while. Quite frankly, counting the people available and the equipment available we should still be able to generate and deploy a brigade group and maybe even two. The questions are: for what purpose and for how long? There are clear capability gaps that limit what we can do beyond simply generating the force.

🍻


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> That's possible.  But why?
> 
> There are apparently a lot of people, including young people, that are willing to volunteer (for free) their time in service of the community.  A couple of hundred hours a year.  That corresponds to a Danish Homeguard Basic Training Course of 3 weeks and an Anglo Ukrainian Basic Defence Course of 3 weeks.
> 
> What is wrong with the CAF's terms of service that youngsters would rather volunteer for SAR or Firefighting or a multitude of other activities?
> 
> And I don't think it is just about tattoos, piercings, hair-colour or gender issues.


Lack of trust in the chain of command
Despise careerism
Do not belive that vet's are properly looked after medically/psychologically after service
Minimal employer protection/support
Sexual shenannigans in the chain of command
Percieved lack of appropriate and timely discipline of E7/O3 and up
Slow or no recognition of outstanding effort or performance
Pay issues
Poor transferability of skills back and forth fo civilian side

Some of these are issues only discovered after enlistment that cause early release  but word if mouth is an equally powerfull in discouraging recruiter as it is in encouraging them.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Skysix said:


> Lack of trust in the chain of command
> Despise careerism
> Do not belive that vet's are properly looked after medically/psychologically after service
> Minimal employer protection/support
> Sexual shenannigans in the chain of command
> Percieved lack of appropriate and timely discipline of E7/O3 and up
> Slow or no recognition of outstanding effort or performance
> 
> Some of these are issues only discovered after enlistment that cause early release  but word if mouth is an equally powerfull in discouraging recruiter as it is in encouraging them.



I've bumped into a fair number of young folks over the past couple of years, (men and women) who are positively ecstatic about their decision to head to the recruiting centre and 'sign their lives away'. I've even coached a couple through the process.

I think the CAF looks really good to young folks, from the outside...


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> Miracle Cure for the LAVs....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Nordic Traction
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.army-technology.com


Nothing new. That style of chain has been around for 30 years. For ice, mud less than frame deep, packed snow they are great. Sand they dig in too much.

For light/fresh snow, sand or deep mud you need flotation as well as traction. And proper use of throttle, gears and momentum. As well as appropriate loading and about a 55-60%/45-40% ground pressure ratio rear/front


----------



## GR66

dapaterson said:


> Infantry training can be managed and maintained in shorter timeframes, and thus can be more heavily weighted to other than full-time service.
> 
> CSS activities are those that ensure readiness (available and serviceable equipment and materiel) and thus should be weighted more heavily within the full-time component.
> 
> The GoC has given the CAF, all in, caps of 71,500 Reg F and 30,000 P Res personnel.  This includes training lists, medical holding lists, and, well, everything.  Therefore, there will have to be tradeoffs to remain within those limitations.  And deliberate choices about what must be full time, what is good to have as full time, what can be part time, and what is best to have as part time.
> 
> The Canadian Army, on the other hand, begins by situating the estimate and declaring without valid rationale or proof, that there Must Be Nine Reg F Inf Bns.  From there, with that initial framing assumption demonstrably false, all the other crud and crap gets added.


In a strict sense you of course are correct, but the number of Infantry Battalions is not really out of line from what the Government says it expects from the Army.  Strong, Secure, Engaged states that:

THE BRIGADE GROUP The Army trains to fight at the brigade group-level. This is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns while integrating various components, be they from another service, government department, non-governmental organization, or coalition partner

If you expect the Brigade to consist of 3 x Infantry Battalions and you expect to be able to deploy your Brigade within a reasonable time frame in a crisis (i.e. keeping a portion of your force at heightened readiness) and if you expect to have enough depth in the Army to sustain that Brigade in combat then an Army consisting of 3 x Brigades (9 x Infantry Battalions) is not out of line for that expectation.

Of course you can adjust the structure of the Brigade which will affect the number of component units you'd need and you can adjust the portion of the Brigade you expect to be available at high readiness for deployment and how quickly you expect to be able to put together the balance of the Brigade (as well as how long you plan to be able to sustain it in combat) which will all affect what portion of the Brigade should be Reg Force and what portion should be Reserves, but overall the basic current structure of the Army broadly reflects the structure you'd need in order to be able to fight a Brigade.


----------



## KevinB

A detail breakdown of the Brigade Combat Team down here
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3-96-000-WEB-1.pdf

The IBCT's and SBCT's each have 3 Inf Battalions -- the ABCT does not - as it has 3 Combined Arms Battalions, 1 Inf Heavy and 2 Armor Heavy.

When you start to dig into the constructs, once can see that Canada's Army is significantly Infantry heavy compared to the US Army.
  - each Bde has 3 x 6 gun close support batteries, the gap widens from there.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> A detail breakdown of the Brigade Combat Team down here
> https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3-96-000-WEB-1.pdf
> 
> The IBCT's and SBCT's each have 3 Inf Battalions -- the ABCT does not - as it has 3 Combined Arms Battalions, 1 Inf Heavy and 2 Armor Heavy.
> 
> When you start to dig into the constructs, once can see that Canada's Army is significantly Infantry heavy compared to the US Army.
> - each Bde has 3 x 6 gun close support batteries, the gap widens from there.


You could equally say that Canada's Army is significantly armour/artillery light compared to the US Army.

I'm certainly not saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option that Canada COULD go with, but I guess I'm saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option Canada CAN go with based on the equipment we have currently.  And I don't see any programs on the books to increase the number of tanks we have, so....


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> You could equally say that Canada's Army is significantly armour/artillery light compared to the US Army.
> 
> I'm certainly not saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option that Canada COULD go with, but I guess I'm saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option Canada CAN go with based on the equipment we have currently.  And I don't see any programs on the books to increase the number of tanks we have, so....



I remember that movie!


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> You could equally say that Canada's Army is significantly armour/artillery light compared to the US Army.


No Armor exists in the SBCT or IBCT's currently (thought the Light Tank Program will most likely change that).



GR66 said:


> I'm certainly not saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option that Canada COULD go with, but I guess I'm saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option Canada CAN go with based on the equipment we have currently.  And I don't see any programs on the books to increase the number of tanks we have, so....


The CA has continually screwed itself in the drive for Symmetry, and divesting PY's for a variety of rather bizarre reasons.


----------



## KevinB

The ABCT to my count has 84 Abrams tanks.
 6 Companies of them @ 14 / Coy (4 / Platoon and 2 in HQ) 
 1 Company in the Inf Heavy Bn, 2 Coy each in the Armor Heavy Bn, and 1 in the Cav Squadron.

So unless my count is off (and it very well could be) - Canada does have enough tanks to create an Armoured Brigade out of 1 CMBG.

But the wheels fall off is one is honestly looking at the requirement of a fully kitted out BCT, I don't think Canada could field more than 1, and then would have some significant gaps.

For reasons I don't pretend to understand Canada seems to beat to it's own drum and prefers to make believe that it has multiple Brigades that are capable of operations....


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> The ABCT to my count has 84 Abrams tanks.
> 6 Companies of them @ 14 / Coy (4 / Platoon and 2 in HQ)
> 1 Company in the Inf Heavy Bn, 2 Coy each in the Armor Heavy Bn, and 1 in the Cav Squadron.
> 
> So unless my count is off (and it very well could be) - Canada does have enough tanks to create an Armoured Brigade out of 1 CMBG.
> 
> But the wheels fall off is one is honestly looking at the requirement of a fully kitted out BCT, I don't think Canada could field more than 1, and then would have some significant gaps.
> 
> For reasons I don't pretend to understand Canada seems to beat to it's own drum and prefers to make believe that it has multiple Brigades that are capable of operations....


By my count 2 tanks short for an ABCT (20 x 2A6M's, 20 x 2A4M's and 42 x 2A4's retained for training purposes according to Wikipedia) and that assumes that all are serviceable, none for the schools, etc., the doctrinal squadron size reduced from 19 to 14 and even that only gets you at the start line on Day 1.  

No spares to cover combat/mechanical losses, so your one ABCT is unsustainable so would begin degrading in combat ability immediately.  Pretty soon you'd end up with exactly what is being complained about...and Infantry Brigade (but now an understrength one compared to a CMBG).


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> No Armor exists in the SBCT or IBCT's currently (thought the Light Tank Program will most likely change that).



You mean the new SturmGeschutz? The tracked MGS?  The Infantry Support Tank?

At the scale of 1 battalion per division?









						How America's NEW Light Tank Units Will Work
					

New video on the new American MPF light tank, its doctrinal purpose, what units get it, and its unit organization.




					www.battleorder.org
				




These will not be turning the Light and Airborne Divisions into Shock and Awe assets.  Not with a Battalion per Division designed to be penny-packeted out to the Brigades at the rate of 1 Company per Brigade.   A Company which will require a minimum of 7 C17s to land and unload the MPFs at the rated of two per aircraft.

Interesting also that early adopters will be the National Guard.



KevinB said:


> The CA has continually screwed itself in the drive for Symmetry, and divesting PY's for a variety of rather bizarre reasons.



For sure.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> In a strict sense you of course are correct, but the number of Infantry Battalions is not really out of line from what the Government says it expects from the Army.  Strong, Secure, Engaged states that:
> 
> THE BRIGADE GROUP The Army trains to fight at the brigade group-level. This is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns while integrating various components, be they from another service, government department, non-governmental organization, or coalition partner


I find it a contradiction when SSE, in a sidebar, recognizes that a brigade group "is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns" and then sets task that do not go above BG levels - I guess technically they aren't all that joint ... but still.



GR66 said:


> If you expect the Brigade to consist of 3 x Infantry Battalions and you expect to be able to deploy your Brigade within a reasonable time frame in a crisis (i.e. keeping a portion of your force at heightened readiness) and if you expect to have enough depth in the Army to sustain that Brigade in combat then an Army consisting of 3 x Brigades (9 x Infantry Battalions) is not out of line for that expectation.


I think what @KevinB is pointing out is that a brigade doesn't call for three infantry battalions but three manoeuvre units. That's eventually how 4 CMBG ended up with one tank regiment and two infantry battalions. 

I'm really not so sure that you need 3 brigades (9 battalions) to deploy 1 brigade. What you really need is one full brigade group to deploy and then a force generation structure behind that to generate rotos, replacements and lost equipment to keep it up to strength. You do not need a two supporting one structure nor a managed readiness cycle.

If you recall, 1st Canadian Army in Europe had three infantry divisions, 2 armoured divisions, two armoured brigades and a hockey sock of Army and Corps troops in Europe but back in Canada there were only three other divisions and an armoured brigade but there was a force generation structure to replace losses.

I think that the Army has lost the plot. It settled on a RegF army structure several decades ago and have fought ever since to maintain its status quo by finding roles and processes to justify its existence and every PY. We would never have been able to deploy 4 CMBG to Europe if we had sent them on 6 month rotos with a managed readiness program. It would have required 6 brigades to do that. As it stands each corps fights tooth and nail for every PY and every capability in order to maintain its relevance. It needs a review and reality check.



GR66 said:


> Of course you can adjust the structure of the Brigade which will affect the number of component units you'd need and you can adjust the portion of the Brigade you expect to be available at high readiness for deployment and how quickly you expect to be able to put together the balance of the Brigade (as well as how long you plan to be able to sustain it in combat) which will all affect what portion of the Brigade should be Reg Force and what portion should be Reserves, but overall the basic current structure of the Army broadly reflects the structure you'd need in order to be able to fight a Brigade.


In very broad and general terms I agree with that. The problem is that the devil is in the details - artillery batteries are at 4 guns because M777s require a crew of 10 vice 7 and because each battery had to shift extra people into an expanded FSCC and extra FOO parties. There are now 2 gun batteries in a regiment vice 3 because the Army recognized that Surveillance and Target Acquisition was important. BUT - it wouldn't give one additional PYs to the artillery for those FSCCs or FOOs or STA or gun det members  - hence we have a 8 gun regiments rather than an 18 gun one. The Army is trying to squeeze ten pounds of s**t into five pound bags. It will pay for that one day.



GR66 said:


> You could equally say that Canada's Army is significantly armour/artillery light compared to the US Army.


Interestingly a Canadian brigade seems to be established at 4,800 (as per SSE - I actually think its lighter at around 4,400 established positions but don't have access to the actual numbers these days) and that's considering shortfalls in critical areas that need ResF augmentation. In the US, on the other hand, an ABCT is fully manned at 4,200; an SBCT at 4,440 and an IBCT at 4,230. And they do have 18 gun artillery battalions. So we're already equal to, if not heavier, than a BCT as far as personnel are concerned. Surprisingly though, an SBCT rifle battalion is larger than ours at 780 (inclusive of its Forward Support Company) while Canada's RegF battalions are allocated roughly 600 PYs.



GR66 said:


> I'm certainly not saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option that Canada COULD go with, but I guess I'm saying that an Infantry-heavy Brigade is the only option Canada CAN go with based on the equipment we have currently.  And I don't see any programs on the books to increase the number of tanks we have, so....


I think the fallacy is that we look at equipment as the big ticket item when what really cost the big cash is the annual paycheck for the folks manning it. An M777 and a LAV has 10 folks running it. A tank has 4. An ABCT tank company has an establishment of 62 while a rifle company has 135. That's less than half on the recurring paychecks albeit gas is more expensive. Not sure about ammo considering infantry now shoot pretty pricey missiles in training too.

If you go to an SP gun that has a crew of 5 including ammo handlers then you cut the annual recurring personnel costs in half. Even better if 50% of those are properly trained ResF members on a standby status until needed. 

There are many places where one can cut personnel costs. Infantry dismounts within a battalion isn't one of those. But does Canada really need nine RegF battalions of infantry and a SOR when our current recurring deployed needs are a half battalion for Latvia and another half battalion of smaller taskings? Or can Canada do it with three or four such battalions and force generate rotations for peacetime missions as required from less expensive ResF or short term contracts soldiers on an as required basis?

Would we be better served by one RegF brigade group which is fully organized, trained and equipped as a deployable combat entity for NATO backed up by two to four primarily ResF brigades (but RegF led) and a second RegF brigade whose role is simply to hold a varying number of unit HQs and RegF personnel whose role is to force generate contingents for specific "peacetime" missions by way of recruiting and ResF mobilization?


----------



## Brad Sallows

> 5200 Infantry positions ... barely enough to field and sustain a single Brigade.



I could get a division out of that.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I find it a contradiction when SSE, in a sidebar, recognizes that a brigade group "is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns" and then sets task that do not go above BG levels - I guess technically they aren't all that joint ... but still.
> 
> 
> I think what @KevinB is pointing out is that a brigade doesn't call for three infantry battalions but three manoeuvre units. That's eventually how 4 CMBG ended up with one tank regiment and two infantry battalions.


Agreed.  As I mentioned you could absolutely do that but as noted we currently have barely enough tanks to do that with no replacements.  With no plans on the books to purchase more tanks it really doesn't make any sense to go that route.


FJAG said:


> I'm really not so sure that you need 3 brigades (9 battalions) to deploy 1 brigade. What you really need is one full brigade group to deploy and then a force generation structure behind that to generate rotos, replacements and lost equipment to keep it up to strength. You do not need a two supporting one structure nor a managed readiness cycle.
> 
> If you recall, 1st Canadian Army in Europe had three infantry divisions, 2 armoured divisions, two armoured brigades and a hockey sock of Army and Corps troops in Europe but back in Canada there were only three other divisions and an armoured brigade but there was a force generation structure to replace losses.
> 
> I think that the Army has lost the plot. It settled on a RegF army structure several decades ago and have fought ever since to maintain its status quo by finding roles and processes to justify its existence and every PY. We would never have been able to deploy 4 CMBG to Europe if we had sent them on 6 month rotos with a managed readiness program. It would have required 6 brigades to do that. As it stands each corps fights tooth and nail for every PY and every capability in order to maintain its relevance. It needs a review and reality check.


Again I'll come back to the situation we find ourselves in now.  We're talking Force 2025 (or whatever it is now) not "if I were king for a day".  Many members here have made it abundantly clear that the Reserves as they are currently structured simply do not have the capability to force generate mechanized units.  They could possibly force generate light infantry units but many members more knowledgeable than I question even that.  

We can talk about how the whole Reserve system could be changed top to bottom but unfortunately I've heard zero mention of that kind planning in the Force 2025 discussions.  I've seen things about moving LAVs around between Battalions and giving the RCAC a Cavalry role, but no mention of additional PY's, moving PY's between the various branches or frankly anything related to the Reserve system overall.  

Frankly all the Army is looking at with Force 20xx is how to move the deck chairs around, not how to build a modern and effective Army.  Anything we suggest here that goes beyond cosmetic changes is unfortunately more the realm of fantasy than anything that might realistically be implemented by this initiative.  Sad but true.  


FJAG said:


> In very broad and general terms I agree with that. The problem is that the devil is in the details - artillery batteries are at 4 guns because M777s require a crew of 10 vice 7 and because each battery had to shift extra people into an expanded FSCC and extra FOO parties. There are now 2 gun batteries in a regiment vice 3 because the Army recognized that Surveillance and Target Acquisition was important. BUT - it wouldn't give one additional PYs to the artillery for those FSCCs or FOOs or STA or gun det members  - hence we have a 8 gun regiments rather than an 18 gun one. The Army is trying to squeeze ten pounds of s**t into five pound bags. It will pay for that one day.


Makes a good argument for pulling all of the Artillery Regiments (both Reg Force and Reserve) out of the Brigade Groups and concentrating them in an Artillery Brigade so they can focus on adequate augmentation of the Reg Force Regiments with additional Reserve Batteries.


FJAG said:


> Interestingly a Canadian brigade seems to be established at 4,800 (as per SSE - I actually think its lighter at around 4,400 established positions but don't have access to the actual numbers these days) and that's considering shortfalls in critical areas that need ResF augmentation. In the US, on the other hand, an ABCT is fully manned at 4,200; an SBCT at 4,440 and an IBCT at 4,230. And they do have 18 gun artillery battalions. So we're already equal to, if not heavier, than a BCT as far as personnel are concerned. Surprisingly though, an SBCT rifle battalion is larger than ours at 780 (inclusive of its Forward Support Company) while Canada's RegF battalions are allocated roughly 600 PYs.


The latest numbers I saw (from Force 2013) give an establishment strength of a Canadian Infantry Battalion of 833 (834 for a Light Battalion) with a Generation strength of 593 (560 for Light Battalions).  That could very well have changed.


FJAG said:


> I think the fallacy is that we look at equipment as the big ticket item when what really cost the big cash is the annual paycheck for the folks manning it. An M777 and a LAV has 10 folks running it. A tank has 4. An ABCT tank company has an establishment of 62 while a rifle company has 135. That's less than half on the recurring paychecks albeit gas is more expensive. Not sure about ammo considering infantry now shoot pretty pricey missiles in training too.
> 
> If you go to an SP gun that has a crew of 5 including ammo handlers then you cut the annual recurring personnel costs in half. Even better if 50% of those are properly trained ResF members on a standby status until needed.


100% agreed.  Unfortunately we need to see programs to purchase that equipment though before we can realize any PY savings.  Not to mention changes to the Reserve system to give them the support they need to manage that equipment.


FJAG said:


> There are many places where one can cut personnel costs. Infantry dismounts within a battalion isn't one of those. But does Canada really need nine RegF battalions of infantry and a SOR when our current recurring deployed needs are a half battalion for Latvia and another half battalion of smaller taskings? Or can Canada do it with three or four such battalions and force generate rotations for peacetime missions as required from less expensive ResF or short term contracts soldiers on an as required basis?
> 
> Would we be better served by one RegF brigade group which is fully organized, trained and equipped as a deployable combat entity for NATO backed up by two to four primarily ResF brigades (but RegF led) and a second RegF brigade whose role is simply to hold a varying number of unit HQs and RegF personnel whose role is to force generate contingents for specific "peacetime" missions by way of recruiting and ResF mobilization?


I'm sure there are multiple ways to achieve a more efficient Army.  Unfortunately Force 20xx isn't really looking at that.


----------



## markppcli

That’s because a stated constraint of Force 2025 was no increase to PYs… all this discussion exists within that confine. We aren’t going to be magically authorized an increase to 100 000, nor are we getting billions in additional funding. The CAF needs to adjust the CA into a more lethal force within the confines of what it has.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> ... We're talking Force 2025 (or whatever it is now) not "if I were king for a day".


Yup. And it really wasn't Force 2025 I was addressing. IMHO, Force 2025 has died a septic death and we really don't need to concern ourselves more about it. What did peak my interest was the fact that we still have 3 RegF brigades and 9 RegF infantry battalions and I asked myself: why? So I engaged in a bit of devil's advocacy to test the waters.



GR66 said:


> Frankly all the Army is looking at with Force 20xx is how to move the deck chairs around, not how to build a modern and effective Army.


Exactly. And it will be that way until the CAF gets the idea out of its head that we need a full-time standing army. The money the Army is getting from the government is going to be finite for quite a few years. As long as the Army's fight is to protect PYs, it's budget will be consumed by personnel costs and will prevent it acquiring the equipment and munitions needed to be a credible force. It will forever be like Blanche DuBois and will be 'relying on the kindness of strangers' to provide what Canada won't. I know that the fear is that once you cut back on PYs you'll bever see them again but that's alright as long as the equipment plan stays funded and you develop a better yet effective way to man it.



GR66 said:


> The latest numbers I saw (from Force 2013) give an establishment strength of a Canadian Infantry Battalion of 833 (834 for a Light Battalion) with a Generation strength of 593 (560 for Light Battalions).  That could very well have changed.


Those are the numbers I'm still working off as well 



GR66 said:


> 100% agreed.  Unfortunately we need to see programs to purchase that equipment though before we can realize any PY savings.  Not to mention changes to the Reserve system to give them the support they need to manage that equipment.
> 
> I'm sure there are multiple ways to achieve a more efficient Army.  Unfortunately Force 20xx isn't really looking at that.


Check, and check.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Multiple armies?

Armies of the demos? The infantry and the cavalry? The cavalry, historically, is the army of the rich demos.  They are the armies of the Adjutant-General and the Militia.  Sandhurst.  Scarlets.

Armies of the ordnance?  The commissariat, engineers, artillery, air force and navy? Fortifications and communications?  They are the armies of the Master-General of Ordnance and the Arsenal.  Woolwich. Blues.

The Scarlets rely on the taxpayers.  The Blues rely on the taxes.

Even under the current conditions the Brits are still de-emphasising the Scarlets to emphasise the Blues.

Ukraine is demonstrating that the Arsenal takes longer to replenish than the Militia.  It used to be that it took longer to train the Ordnance than the Militia but technology (smart-technology, plug-and-play, user-friendly) and a better qualified demos (cell phone and computer operators, gamers, drivers) is narrowing that gap.

But technology, the Ordnance, is still about taxes.  Fighting is still about taxpayers and the MIlitia.

How many taxpayers, how much of the Militia, should be kept on strength permanently?  

The more of the Militia on strength the fewer taxpayers there are to pay taxes and keep the Ordnance supplied.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> That’s because a stated constraint of Force 2025 was no increase to PYs… all this discussion exists within that confine. We aren’t going to be magically authorized an increase to 100 000, nor are we getting billions in additional funding. *The CAF needs to adjust *the CA into a more lethal force within the confines of what it has.



You mean 'we have to agree amongst ourselves', which is the hardest thing imaginable to do but spectacular to watch


----------



## GR66

Are you guys suggesting that the real purpose of the Army isn't to have and maintain the Army?  What other possible purpose could there be???


----------



## GK .Dundas

GR66 said:


> Are you guys suggesting that the real purpose of the Army isn't to have and maintain the Army?  What other possible purpose could there be???


Wait ,there's a purpose to all this....wow .....


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Are you guys suggesting that the real purpose of the Army isn't to have and maintain the Army?  What other possible purpose could there be???


For the last ten years I’d argue we force generate  PER points more than anything else.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Are you guys suggesting that the real purpose of the Army isn't to have and maintain the Army?  What other possible purpose could there be???



Simple....


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Simple....
> 
> View attachment 73405


One reason the shrubs on bases look like crap


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> One reason the shrubs on bases look like crap


Would you prefer this?


----------



## GR66

So let's assume the Army does the easiest deck chair shuffle and makes 1 Bde all LAV with all the tanks concentrated in the Strathconas as a "Heavy" Brigade, 2 Bde becomes all "Light" and 5 Bde gets LAVs and a Cavalry Regiment in the 12 RBC.

How many Reg Force Battalions (and at what manning level) should be in each?


----------



## GR66

Before we think about ditching our armour in favour of the Rat Patrol with Javelins, we should consider this War on the Rocks opinion piece on the continuing importance of the tank (and AD and Artillery).


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Before we think about ditching our armour in favour of the Rat Patrol with Javelins, we should consider this War on the Rocks opinion piece on the continuing importance of the tank (and AD and Artillery).


IMHO, anyone who still thinks that tanks and artillery are obsolete should join Hillier in retirement.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Before we think about ditching our armour in favour of the Rat Patrol with Javelins, we should consider this War on the Rocks opinion piece on the continuing importance of the tank (and AD and Artillery).


Let's be honest you don't have that much armor anyway 



FJAG said:


> IMHO, anyone who still thinks that tanks and artillery are obsolete should join Hillier in retirement.


The CA is generally its own biggest enemy.


----------



## GR66

If we're realistically looking at moderate, incremental change for Force 2025 (or whatever is replacing it) then maybe at least we can take a couple of steps in the right direction to move us toward where we eventually want to be.

1) Consolidate our Heavy/Medium/Light forces.
2) "Right-Size" our Reserve units and group them together under a Reg Force umbrella.
3) Reduce the HQ Overhead.

Maybe something like this:


A first step only.  Lot's of loose ends/adjustments still required like changes to how the Reserves work (legistlation/TOS/training structure, etc.), consolidation/redistribution/elimination of units, unit manning levels, tons of equipment issues, etc.  But it's like eating an elephant as they say...just take one bite at a time.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Maybe something like this:


I'll look at this in more detail later but the points that pop out to me are:

I'm a great fan of reducing and streamlining administrative headquarters but operational ones not so much. We tend to use brigade headquarters and their staff on deployments as national command elements even if the deployed force is primarily a battle group. Therefore I see nothing wrong with having a few more brigade headquarters in the mix so long as they are primarily staffed with RegF and are designated to take their place in rotations.
I'm also a fan of an operational CSS capability. I see the need for a primarily ResF CSS brigade.
🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I'll look at this in more detail later but the points that pop out to me are:
> 
> I'm a great fan of reducing and streamlining administrative headquarters but operational ones not so much. We tend to use brigade headquarters and their staff on deployments as national command elements even if the deployed force is primarily a battle group. Therefore I see nothing wrong with having a few more brigade headquarters in the mix so long as they are primarily staffed with RegF and are designated to take their place in rotations.
> I'm also a fan of an operational CSS capability. I see the need for a primarily ResF CSS brigade.
> 🍻


Are the CGB HQ's really Operational HQ's?  Remember that this is proposed as a Step 1 in an ongoing process.  My thoughts were that it would be better to have Reserve Regiments falling under a Reg Force Brigade Group HQ so that at the very least training schedules and augmentation opportunities can be coordinated with the associated Reg Force units.

Once a reorganisation of the Reserves is implemented which would allow them to provide at least sub-unit level augmentation, or even better full Battalion-level deployments then the appropriate Operational HQ's could be stood up to support the units.  

Same argument for Reserve CSS units.  My feeling is that the Reg Force CSS units are under strength at the moment.  Better to use the Reserve elements that we have to bring them up to strength first. 

As I mentioned previously, I see this is a first step toward a long term reorganization.  Ultimately we may look at reducing the number of Reg Force Battalions, adjusting the Reg Force/Reserve Force balance in some units and even re-badging units to create a CSS Battalion, etc.  The short-term goal though is to take a first step toward a deployable, expandable, integrated force.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Are the CGB HQ's really Operational HQ's?  Remember that this is proposed as a Step 1 in an ongoing process.  My thoughts were that it would be better to have Reserve Regiments falling under a Reg Force Brigade Group HQ so that at the very least training schedules and augmentation opportunities can be coordinated with the associated Reg Force units.



I assume you mean CBGs here. Yes for the regular force ones, no for the reserve brigades.


GR66 said:


> Once a reorganisation of the Reserves is implemented which would allow them to provide at least sub-unit level augmentation, or even better full Battalion-level deployments then the appropriate Operational HQ's could be stood up to support the units.



Why would a deployable reserve Bn, in the current CF operational model be a desirable thing ? We’ve already deployed Reserve sub units on operations in the current model so it’s hardly an aspirational goal. Your asking a LOT of a brigade HQ to both be an operational HQ and to manage all the reserve units across its area and responsibly integrate their training. 


GR66 said:


> Same argument for Reserve CSS units.  My feeling is that the Reg Force CSS units are under strength at the moment.  Better to use the Reserve elements that we have to bring them up to strength first.
> 
> As I mentioned previously, I see this is a first step toward a long term reorganization.  Ultimately we may look at reducing the number of Reg Force Battalions, adjusting the Reg Force/Reserve Force balance in some units and even re-badging units to create a CSS Battalion, etc.  The short-term goal though is to take a first step toward a deployable, expandable, integrated force.


Define CSS in this context please


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Are the CGB HQ's really Operational HQ's?


Good God, no! But there is no reason why 2 to 4 of them couldn't be especially if one were to create blended units and formations.


GR66 said:


> Remember that this is proposed as a Step 1 in an ongoing process.  My thoughts were that it would be better to have Reserve Regiments falling under a Reg Force Brigade Group HQ so that at the very least training schedules and augmentation opportunities can be coordinated with the associated Reg Force units.


I absolutely agree that ResF subunits should fall under Ref units and brigades. I don't think that one brigade could manage 11 battalions especially if some are RegF and some are ResF. A span of control comes in around 5, give or take. Based on the total number of folks in the Army's field force I think somewhere in the nature of 5 to 6 manoeuvre brigade headquarters and 4 support brigades is achievable and desirable.


GR66 said:


> Once a reorganisation of the Reserves is implemented which would allow them to provide at least sub-unit level augmentation, or even better full Battalion-level deployments then the appropriate Operational HQ's could be stood up to support the units.


I can't see ResF battalions deploying without serious RegF leadership these days. I'm pretty settled on 30/70 - 70/30 units and brigades.


GR66 said:


> Same argument for Reserve CSS units.  My feeling is that the Reg Force CSS units are under strength at the moment.  Better to use the Reserve elements that we have to bring them up to strength first.


ResF integration will not bolster day-to-day RegF manning shortfalls. ResF augmentation should only be of those RegF unit positions that are not needed day-to-day but only in the event of mobilization.


GR66 said:


> As I mentioned previously, I see this is a first step toward a long term reorganization.  Ultimately we may look at reducing the number of Reg Force Battalions, adjusting the Reg Force/Reserve Force balance in some units and even re-badging units to create a CSS Battalion, etc.  The short-term goal though is to take a first step toward a deployable, expandable, integrated force.


We agree on the objective but not so much on the methodology.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Are the CGB HQ's really Operational HQ's?  Remember that this is proposed as a Step 1 in an ongoing process.  My thoughts were that it would be better to have Reserve Regiments falling under a Reg Force Brigade Group HQ so that at the very least training schedules and augmentation opportunities can be coordinated with the associated Reg Force units.
> 
> Once a reorganisation of the Reserves is implemented which would allow them to provide at least sub-unit level augmentation, or even better full Battalion-level deployments then the appropriate Operational HQ's could be stood up to support the units.
> 
> Same argument for Reserve CSS units.  My feeling is that the Reg Force CSS units are under strength at the moment.  Better to use the Reserve elements that we have to bring them up to strength first.
> 
> As I mentioned previously, I see this is a first step toward a long term reorganization.  Ultimately we may look at reducing the number of Reg Force Battalions, adjusting the Reg Force/Reserve Force balance in some units and even re-badging units to create a CSS Battalion, etc.  The short-term goal though is to take a first step toward a deployable, expandable, integrated force.



AFAIK, right now the CAF is investing something like $20 million per year in a Reserve CBG: HQ and units. In BC at any rate. That's about 2000 all ranks I think. No idea how many are 'effecives' but I'd guess at less than 50%.

Are the CAF getting the return on investment that they're expecting? 

If yes, then leave the CBGs alone. If not, then it's time for a change.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> AFAIK, right now the CAF is investing something like $20 million per year in a Reserve CBG: HQ and units. In BC at any rate. That's about 2000 all ranks I think. No idea how many are 'effecives' but I'd guess at less than 50%.
> 
> Are the CAF getting the return on investment that they're expecting?


That opens up a can of worms. One not only needs to define what a return on investment actually is in this particular scenario but also determine if this is the maximum return on investment available.

No insurance policy provides a return on investment unless and until it is actually triggered. Then and only then will you be able to determine if the investment in it was worth it.

However, my gut tells me that the Army is far short of maximizing its return on investment.


daftandbarmy said:


> If yes, then leave the CBGs alone. If not, then it's time for a change.


Again, just by simply glancing across the border I can tell that a change is long past due.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

I may be behind other folks on this but I just noticed the Canadian Army Journal Vol 19.3 is out.

It has a number of pertinent articles including two on cavalry.



> https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/army-armee/migration/assets/army_internet/docs/en/canadian-army-journal/caj-19-3-en.pdf



This paragraph from the first article scares me:



> The cavalry concept, however, is an acknowledgement of the size of our Corps and the requirement to generate and maintain combat-capable, multi-purpose land forces—which inherently means accepting some risks in order to remain relevant and sustainable.



It's wording like that that bladed the artillery 17 years ago.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I may be behind other folks on this but I just noticed the Canadian Army Journal Vol 19.3 is out.
> 
> It has a number of pertinent articles including two on cavalry.
> 
> 
> 
> This paragraph from the first article scares me:
> 
> 
> 
> It's wording like that that bladed the artillery 17 years ago.
> 
> 🍻



Too bad he quotes Trevor Cadieu... probably a career limiting move in today's Woke-Land


----------



## FJAG

I highly recommend the article by Captain Bryce Simpson: A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future at pg 8. It is thought provoking and seems to fly in the face of where the RCAC may be heading based on reading the tea leaves coming from Colonel Dove's editorial at p. 6 (which is the one that scared me).

Simpson gets things back to first principles and one can leave lots of room as to how one equips and mans the various elements (dismounts, anti-armour, indirect fire) that support the basic recce and security elements of the cavalry squadron/regiment but the fact that these elements are all essential appears glaringly obvious. New technologies can easily find their way into all the key elements.



daftandbarmy said:


> Too bad he quotes Trevor Cadieu... probably a career limiting move in today's Woke-Land


I expect this was written in the production mill well before the allegations surfaced. That said, one should not disregard valid ideas just because there is a veil of allegations (and as yet unproved) out there.

🍻


----------



## WestIsle

I think its extremely telling that the infantry battalions prioritize having sniper and recce platoons over mortar. Ironic to have recce platoons as we are creating brigades that are built to produce battlegroups each of which are to have a recce squadron.


----------



## CBH99

FJAG said:


> I highly recommend the article by Captain Bryce Simpson: A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future at pg 8. It is thought provoking and seems to fly in the face of where the RCAC may be heading based on reading the tea leaves coming from Colonel Dove's editorial at p. 6 (which is the one that scared me).
> 
> Simpson gets things back to first principles and one can leave lots of room as to how one equips and mans the various elements (dismounts, anti-armour, indirect fire) that support the basic recce and security elements of the cavalry squadron/regiment but the fact that these elements are all essential appears glaringly obvious. New technologies can easily find their way into all the key elements.
> 
> 
> I expect this was written in the production mill well before the allegations surfaced. That said, one should not disregard valid ideas just because there is a veil of allegations (and as yet unproved) out there.
> 
> 🍻


I am extremely familiar with Trevor, as we worked together every day & lived together overseas for 7 months.

Those allegations came directly (well rather indirectly) from the PM's office because of Trevor's differing stance on woke culture BS.  We have proof of this, which is why the media hasn't focused on it at all since it was first reported, and the PMO went silent on the matter also.

Solid guy, great boss, and able to get things done.


----------



## daftandbarmy

WestIsle said:


> I think its extremely telling that the infantry battalions prioritize having sniper and recce platoons over mortar. Ironic to have recce platoons as we are creating brigades that are built to produce battlegroups each of which are to have a recce squadron.



Did you notice that you didn't even mention Anti-Tanks?

Not a criticism, just an apt reflection of our current (navel gazing) approach


----------



## IRepoCans

daftandbarmy said:


> Did you notice that you didn't even mention Anti-Tanks?
> 
> Not a criticism, just an apt reflection of our current (navel gazing) approach


Best thing about it is this: the best ISTAR asset the light battalions have right now is the DFS platoon (which have been inviting over a lot of Aussie and British DFS instructors to observe the courseware and doctrine in Gagetown).


----------



## Kirkhill

I think that all of the following should be read together:

Colonel Dove's editorial
Captain Bryce Simpson: A Perspective on Cavalry: Re-examining the Mounted Arm for the Future
Colonel Christopher W. Hunt: Defining Cavalry within the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps
Jean-François Gravel and Lieutenant-Colonel François Laroche: Maximizing Survivability of Canadian Army combat platforms
Major John Keess, CD, Ph.D. (ABD), RMC, plsc: Freed by Limits: The strategic realities of the Canadian Army, Close Engagement,
and the potential for a new way of thinking about Canadian land power

As a companion piece I like tihis (recommended by a friend)







The video describes, among many other useful things, the composition of the Ukrainian Forces in Kherson and Kharkiv.

The Kherson Force is backed by US HIMARS and Polish Krabs (UK AS90 turrets with L52 cannons on Polish hulls)
The Armoured element comprised westernised T72s and  BMPs
Special emphasis was made of the use of Technicals (Pickup trucks with weapons in the rear) as a Light Cavalry force

The Kherkiv Force is backed by UK/Nor/German MLRS and German PzH2000s (also with L52 cannons)
The Armoured element comprised more westernized T72s but these were paired with US M113s
Again special emphasis was given to the use of a wheeled Light Cavalry force but this time typified by the Australian Bushmaster - a lightly armoured 4x4 section carrier.

Interesting that the Ukrainians are making their 3 man T72s work for them, despite the inherent Jack in the Box design.  I have also seen reference to Ukrainians expressing concern about the wasteful 4 man crew of NATO tanks. (Leopards, Challengers and Abrams).  The Poles, also familiar with the 3 man system  have selected the 3 man Korean K2 as their future battle tank despite having access to Leopards, Abrams and Challengers

Edited to  the Maximizing Survivability reference.


----------



## Kirkhill

This is from Maximizing Survivability.

The one thing that I notice is that the survival gear competes with space (and likely dollars) for ATGMs and Air Defence Missiles.




If the future standard of the RCAC is the 4 car troop then perhaps we need to stop drawing individual vehicles but instead drawing 4 vehicles in a group and considering the suite of kit available to the Troop Leader.    More like a single ship with four compartments rather than 4 individuals.

Perhaps then we look at 3 Sabre vehicles with the TL forward and a Support Vehicle in the hands of the Troop 2iC.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> This is from Maximizing Survivability.
> 
> The one thing that I notice is that the survival gear competes with space (and likely dollars) for ATGMs and Air Defence Missiles.



In my opinion a small exceptional equipped Army is better than a larger ill equipped one - at least as far as an Expeditionary Force goes.    That at least forms a backbone of capabilities than can be expanded on



Kirkhill said:


> If the future standard of the RCAC is the 4 car troop then perhaps we need to stop drawing individual vehicles but instead drawing 4 vehicles in a group and considering the suite of kit available to the Troop Leader.    More like a single ship with four compartments rather than 4 individuals.





Kirkhill said:


> Perhaps then we look at 3 Sabre vehicles with the TL forward and a Support Vehicle in the hands of the Troop 2iC.


Or look at what other countries add to capabilities to their Recce/Cav  elements.


----------



## ArmyRick

IRepoCans said:


> Best thing about it is this: the best ISTAR asset the light battalions have right now is the DFS platoon (which have been inviting over a lot of Aussie and British DFS instructors to observe the courseware and doctrine in Gagetown).


Ohhh. Tell us more. You have peaked my curiousity.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Or look at what other countries add to capabilities to their Recce/Cav  elements.



If you are relying on hundreds of horse power to haul your gear rather than 1/3 of a horse (a man) you can afford to haul a bunch of Gucci kit.  So long as you aren't toting tonnes of steel plate along with you.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Realistically, could TAPV's with retrofitted weapon systems (the RS6 for example) provide the basis of mixed vehicle medium CAV troops (1x LRSS, 3x TAPV with assortment of scout teams, tank hunter teams, and varied RWS mounts) even as a stop gap for the next decade? Or are they complete duds.


----------



## Kirkhill

IKnowNothing said:


> Realistically, could TAPV's with retrofitted weapon systems (the RS6 for example) provide the basis of mixed vehicle medium CAV troops (1x LRSS, 3x TAPV with assortment of scout teams, tank hunter teams, and varied RWS mounts) even as a stop gap for the next decade? Or are they complete duds.



What is its tendency to Turtle?

I don't like the TAPV.


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> Realistically, could TAPV's with retrofitted weapon systems (the RS6 for example) provide the basis of mixed vehicle medium CAV troops (1x LRSS, 3x TAPV with assortment of scout teams, tank hunter teams, and varied RWS mounts) even as a stop gap for the next decade? Or are they complete duds.


IMHO they belong in the Service BN’s to provide security for convoys - or the Bde HQ’s for local security.  





Kirkhill said:


> If you are relying on hundreds of horse power to haul your gear rather than 1/3 of a horse (a man) you can afford to haul a bunch of Gucci kit.  So long as you aren't toting tonnes of steel plate along with you.



I’m a fan of Armor in the Armoured Reconnaissance role.  For Armored formations it only makes sense to me. 

I’m of the opinion that the Medium Force is a constabulary force, at best.   

So for Canada that would 1 ABCT type Brigade of 70/30 and 1 of 30/70  (ideally 2 of the 30/70 but…), however there are only enough tanks to barely make 1.  

I will continue my broken record that I think the Tanks need a tracked IFV with them (and tracked Engineer, Arty etc).  

As well I think true ISTAR is beyond Div level, so it would be nice to consider the ISR aspect to the Recce Squadron (and the subsequent follow one from that - MI, HUMINT
   Basically follow the concept of the Recce Squadron from down here.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> I don't like the TAPV.





KevinB said:


> IMHO they belong in the Service BN’s to provide security for convoys - or the Bde HQ’s for local security.



No one likes the TAPV.

But they're what we have. But 40 gun tanks and 66 LRSS doesn't exactly make for 3 armoured regiments.  Wholesale re-assignment and replacement of the TAPV seems... unlikely.  So what I'm asking is if (with some tweaking) could they be used to make operational sub-units that fall in line with the concepts in the above articles, or is the RCAC going to be 2 squadrons of tanks and 2.3 regiments of placeholders for the foreseeable future?


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> No one likes the TAPV.
> 
> But they're what we have. But 40 gun tanks and 66 LRSS doesn't exactly make for 3 armoured regiments.  Wholesale re-assignment and replacement of the TAPV seems... unlikely.


So maybe scrap a Reg’t or 2… 



IKnowNothing said:


> So what I'm asking is if (with some tweaking) could they be used to make operational sub-units that fall in line with the concepts in the above articles, or is the RCAC going to be 2 squadrons of tanks and 2.3 regiments of placeholders for the foreseeable future?


IMHO the CF should split the Armoured Trade to hard Armour and hard Scout trades. 

That doesn’t fix the TAPV issue, but it may make the Scout/Recce role get a lot more thought to doctrine and subsequently equipment.  

One doesn’t need all LRSS variants in a Cav Squadron, some Infantry variant versions could be used, as well as then looking at an ATGM version and other more relevant variants (120mm Mortar carrier anyone?). 

The TAPV is the poster child for when one buys into niche COIN vehicles for a small Conventional Army, the quickly the CA acknowledges it’s a turd and flushes it, the better.


----------



## Kirkhill

IKnowNothing said:


> No one likes the TAPV.


Right


IKnowNothing said:


> But they're what we have.


Again right


IKnowNothing said:


> But 40 gun tanks and 66 LRSS doesn't exactly make for 3 armoured regiments.


And again


IKnowNothing said:


> Wholesale re-assignment and replacement of the TAPV seems... unlikely.


Read between the lines of the RCAC presentations in the CAJ 19.3 referenced above and I think you could consider a different conclusion.



IKnowNothing said:


> So what I'm asking is if (with some tweaking) could they be used to make operational sub-units that fall in line with the concepts in the above articles, or is the RCAC going to be 2 squadrons of tanks and 2.3 regiments of placeholders for the foreseeable future?


As long as the operational units only plan to operate on paved roads below 80 km/h, moving from OP to OP.



KevinB said:


> IMHO they belong in the Service BN’s to provide security for convoys - or the Bde HQ’s for local security.


I'll take your word for it



KevinB said:


> I’m a fan of Armor in the Armoured Reconnaissance role.  For Armored formations it only makes sense to me.


Armour for armoured recce.  OK
But does recce, over even cavalry have to be armoured?



KevinB said:


> I’m of the opinion that the Medium Force is a constabulary force, at best.


And yet the Ukrainians are using lighter vehicles than LAVs in the cavalry role.  Successfully.



KevinB said:


> So for Canada that would 1 ABCT type Brigade of 70/30 and 1 of 30/70  (ideally 2 of the 30/70 but…), however there are only enough tanks to barely make 1.
> I will continue my broken record that I think the Tanks need a tracked IFV with them (and tracked Engineer, Arty etc).



Yeah, yeah.  And I skrawk back... How do you get them there?  
See Major Keess in CAJ 19.3 - Freed by Limits.



KevinB said:


> As well I think true ISTAR is beyond Div level, so it would be nice to consider the ISR aspect to the Recce Squadron (and the subsequent follow one from that - MI, HUMINT


And a True Scotsman responds.
Everybody needs Situational Awareness - especially true in a dispersed battlefield - ISTAR is nothing but SA.



KevinB said:


> Basically follow the concept of the Recce Squadron from down here.


You really want a Canadian Auxilliary for the US Army, doncha?    You that short of bodies down there?

Again, referencing CAJ 19.3 (many thanks @FJAG ) Colonel Hunt's suggestion, in his "Defining Cavalry", is that as usual, given three choices you only get to achieve 2 out of 3.  Usually the choices are fast, cheap and good.  In his case the choices are firepower, protection, mobility.  He suggests, and I agree with him, that the key elements for a mounted force are mobility and firepower.

I'll go one step further, the key element for any mobile force is how many horses can you bring into the field?  Or more exactly, how much horsepower is available to move you people and kit?

Another reference list.


HPMan0.35​Horse1​VTUASVBAT 12813​MotorcycleKLR 65036​Argo 8x8Conquest Pro 95040​Argo 4x4Sherp44​VTUASSkeldar V20055​JeepIltis74​Polaris QuadMV85078​SnowmobilePolaris S4100​LSVWIveco115​Polaris UTVMRZR Alpha118​MOSVBv206132​MLVWBombardier165​ISVGM Defense186​APCM113A1215​APCM113A3275​LAVCougar275​LAVCoyote275​MOSVBeowulf285​LUVGWagon296​MSVS-MILCOTSNavistar 7000300​LUHJet Ranger317​JLTVOshkosh340​LAVLAV III350​TAPVOshkosh365​LUVMilverado365​VTUASFirescout MQ8B420​LAVLAV 6.0450​MSVS-SMPMack Renault460​IFVCV90550​IFVBradley600​LAVLAV 700711​DFSVCentauro 2720​DFSVMPF1000​UTTHGriffon1250​MBTLeopard1479​MBTAbrams1500​UTTHVenom3600​UTTHBlackhawk3780​MLHCyclone6000​MLHCormorant6300​MHLHChinook9554​VTOLOsprey12300​HHStallion13140​


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> IMHO they belong in the Service BN’s to provide security for convoys - or the Bde HQ’s for local security.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I’m a fan of Armor in the Armoured Reconnaissance role.  For Armored formations it only makes sense to me.
> 
> I’m of the opinion that the Medium Force is a constabulary force, at best.
> 
> So for Canada that would 1 ABCT type Brigade of 70/30 and 1 of 30/70  (ideally 2 of the 30/70 but…), however there are only enough tanks to barely make 1.
> 
> I will continue my broken record that I think the Tanks need a tracked IFV with them (and tracked Engineer, Arty etc).
> 
> As well I think true ISTAR is beyond Div level, so it would be nice to consider the ISR aspect to the Recce Squadron (and the subsequent follow one from that - MI, HUMINT
> Basically follow the concept of the Recce Squadron from down here.



Only if your reservist component is fully Class C... just sayin'


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> IMHO the CF should split the Armoured Trade to hard Armour and hard Scout trades.


Fully agree. The artillery is finding the same dilemma in that amongst some 2,000 troops you need to run a gun branch, an STA branch and pretty soon an AD branch again. It makes it tricky to run careers especially when they get to the MWO / major rank. 

Neither the RCA nor the RCAC seem to be giving serious consideration in splitting the heavy wartime trades off primarily to the reserves. It's not a panacea but it would help.

I guess realistically though, if the RegF were to download a serious capability to the reserves to handle, rather than setting the conditions for success, it would merely be the first step to total divestiture of that capability. Even Total Force units seem to get the Deathwatch Beetles taping (4 Air Defence Regiment - we're talking about you)

🍻


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> Read between the lines of the RCAC presentations in the CAJ 19.3 referenced above and I think you could consider a different conclusion


Wanted and likely (in a timely manner) are very different.

If they could it seems like the RCAC would love to pull the trigger and have a regiment of Leo's, a regiment of Jaguars, and Regiment of JLTV Heavy Guns carriers, all playing from the same book.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Fully agree. The artillery is finding the same dilemma in that amongst some 2,000 troops you need to run a gun branch, an STA branch and pretty soon an AD branch again. It makes it tricky to run careers especially when they get to the MWO / major rank.



But as pointed out above in the CAJ articles the RCAC is too small.  And frankly its name hamstrings it as well.  ARMOURED is as defined by its platform as the Machine Gun Corps was.  And it is of the same vintage.



FJAG said:


> Neither the RCA nor the RCAC seem to be giving serious consideration in splitting the heavy wartime trades off primarily to the reserves. It's not a panacea but it would help.
> 
> I guess realistically though, if the RegF were to download a serious capability to the reserves to handle, rather than setting the conditions for success, it would merely be the first step to total divestiture of that capability. Even Total Force units seem to get the Deathwatch Beetles taping (4 Air Defence Regiment - we're talking about you)
> 
> 🍻



So here's another thought - Convert the RCAC to tracks entirely - and give it its own guns and dragoons (panzer grenadiers).  US Heavy Cavalry Regiment ca 1980.

At the same time convert the Infantry to Mounted Rifles and put all the vehicles into the Support Company.  The Rifle Coys are foot mobile and platform independent - they use what they can hump and each coy has its own humpable support platoon.  Brigade gets a UTTH Squadron to improve cross country mobility.

Meanwhile the Artillery takes on GS Roles and AD Roles.

EW and STA merge with Int.

And everybody gets drones...


----------



## Kirkhill

@FJAG 

Re the Deathwatch Beetles.

What happened to the Shermans?


----------



## Kirkhill

Ukrainians are asking for more Bushmasters as well as Hawkeis

30 Bushmasters equals a Ukrainian Battalion apparently.  They are being employed as expedient IFVs for want of anything better.

Ukraine calls for more Bushmasters, Hawkeis as war with Russia rages on​ABC Central Victoria
 / By Tyrone Dalton
Posted 15h ago15 hours ago





Ukraine is asking for more Bushmasters.(Supplied: Department of Defence)
Help keep family & friends informed by sharing this article
abc.net.au/news/ukranian-ambassador-calls-for-more-bushmasters/101442472
COPY LINKSHARE
The Ukrainian ambassador to Australia says his country's forces are getting creative in how they use Australian-made Bushmasters as its Bendigo-based manufacturer, Thales, says it is working hard to secure export orders for both Bushmaster and Hawkei protected vehicles.
Key points:​
Ukrainian ambassador Vasyl Myroshnychenko is asking for 30 more Bushmasters
Ukraine says it can road test the Hawkei, a lighter armoured vehicle, during combat
The request for Hawkeis follows the conclusion of a contract to build them in Bendigo

Vasyl Myroshnychenko has made representations to Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles requesting another 30 Bushmaster vehicles to bring the total to 90, 200 days after the war started between Ukraine and Russia.
"Ninety would be three different battalions, in battalions of 30," he told ABC Victoria's Statewide Drive presenter Nicole Chvastek.
Since 2007, the Australian arm of French defence contractor Thales has secured exports of more than 200 Bushmaster vehicles.
"The Bushmaster is currently in service with eight countries including Australia, the Netherlands, Fiji, Japan, Jamaica, Indonesia, the United Kingdom and Ukraine," a spokesperson said.
But the defence contractor is nearing the completion of its New Zealand contract, which is scheduled to be met by the end of this year.




Vasyl Myroshnychenko toured the factory at Bendigo where Thales makes the Bushmaster and Hawkei vehicles.(ABC Central Victoria: Sarah Lawrence)
Waiting for more​Since April this year, Australia has delivered 40 of the 60 Bushmasters requested by Ukraine.
Space to play or pause, M to mute, left and right arrows to seek, up and down arrows for volume.
LISTEN
Duration: 6 minutes 36 seconds6m





Hundreds of Hawkeis are sitting out the front of Thales — why?
Speaking to ABC Statewide Drive on Monday, Mr Myroshnychenko said Ukraine's armed forces were using the Bushmaster to drive back Russian forces from the Kharkiv region in north-eastern Ukraine.
"A lot of them are actually being used almost as infantry fighting vehicles – though they are not that – because we don't have anything else," he said.
Mr Myroshnychenko said Ukraine and its allies had to ensure a steady supply of weapons and ammunition.
"The only way how we can achieve peace is actually when we get rid of the Russians in Ukraine and then come to some sort of arrangement," he said.




The Hawkei armoured vehicles are set to replace the ADF's Land Rovers.(Supplied: Department of Defence)
Shift to lighter vehicles?​The ambassador is also asking for 30 Hawkeis, also made by Thales, weeks after 29 jobs were cut at the Bendigo factory after a contract to build more than 1,000 of the vehicles ended.
The Hawkei is a light, armoured four-wheel drive weighing in at seven tonnes.
The Bushmaster weighs 12.5 tonnes.
The Hawkeis are in testing mode and can often be seen on the streets of Bendigo, but Mr Myroshnychenko says he would like to see how they perform in the field.
"I believe it will really test them in Ukraine, provide valuable feedback and just make them better so that they can serve the Australian Defence Forces much more efficiently," Mr Myroshnychenko said.
The Australian government is spending $1.3 billion on 1,100 Hawkeis from Thales to replace the army's Land Rovers, but the rollout has been delayed because of brake issues.
The future of the Bushmaster, meanwhile, could be secured after the Australian Army unveiled its prototype of an electric variant in Adelaide last month.
Thales says the final Hawkei will come off the production line in June this year.









						Ukraine calls for 30 more Bushmasters, offers to pressure-test new Hawkeis
					

Ukraine's ambassador to Australia says troops are getting creative in the way they're using Bendigo-made Bushmasters in the war with Russia.




					www.abc.net.au


----------



## Kirkhill

The Germans are contributing 50 Dingos to the cause -  8 to 12 Tonners









						Bundeswehr liefert 50 gepanzerte Dingo-Fahrzeuge und zwei Raketenwerfer an die Ukraine
					

Zuletzt hatte sich auf Deutschland der Druck erhöht, weitere Waffen in die Ukraine zu schicken. Nun soll ein weiteres Paket mit Waffen geschnürt werden.




					www.businessinsider.de


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Ukrainians are asking for more Bushmasters as well as Hawkeis
> 
> 30 Bushmasters equals a Ukrainian Battalion apparently.  They are being employed as expedient IFVs for want of anything better.
> 
> Ukraine calls for more Bushmasters, Hawkeis as war with Russia rages on​ABC Central Victoria
> / By Tyrone Dalton
> Posted 15h ago15 hours ago
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ukraine is asking for more Bushmasters.(Supplied: Department of Defence)
> Help keep family & friends informed by sharing this article
> abc.net.au/news/ukranian-ambassador-calls-for-more-bushmasters/101442472
> COPY LINKSHARE
> The Ukrainian ambassador to Australia says his country's forces are getting creative in how they use Australian-made Bushmasters as its Bendigo-based manufacturer, Thales, says it is working hard to secure export orders for both Bushmaster and Hawkei protected vehicles.
> Key points:​
> Ukrainian ambassador Vasyl Myroshnychenko is asking for 30 more Bushmasters
> Ukraine says it can road test the Hawkei, a lighter armoured vehicle, during combat
> The request for Hawkeis follows the conclusion of a contract to build them in Bendigo
> 
> Vasyl Myroshnychenko has made representations to Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles requesting another 30 Bushmaster vehicles to bring the total to 90, 200 days after the war started between Ukraine and Russia.
> "Ninety would be three different battalions, in battalions of 30," he told ABC Victoria's Statewide Drive presenter Nicole Chvastek.
> Since 2007, the Australian arm of French defence contractor Thales has secured exports of more than 200 Bushmaster vehicles.
> "The Bushmaster is currently in service with eight countries including Australia, the Netherlands, Fiji, Japan, Jamaica, Indonesia, the United Kingdom and Ukraine," a spokesperson said.
> But the defence contractor is nearing the completion of its New Zealand contract, which is scheduled to be met by the end of this year.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Vasyl Myroshnychenko toured the factory at Bendigo where Thales makes the Bushmaster and Hawkei vehicles.(ABC Central Victoria: Sarah Lawrence)
> Waiting for more​Since April this year, Australia has delivered 40 of the 60 Bushmasters requested by Ukraine.
> Space to play or pause, M to mute, left and right arrows to seek, up and down arrows for volume.
> LISTEN
> Duration: 6 minutes 36 seconds6m
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Hundreds of Hawkeis are sitting out the front of Thales — why?
> Speaking to ABC Statewide Drive on Monday, Mr Myroshnychenko said Ukraine's armed forces were using the Bushmaster to drive back Russian forces from the Kharkiv region in north-eastern Ukraine.
> "A lot of them are actually being used almost as infantry fighting vehicles – though they are not that – because we don't have anything else," he said.
> Mr Myroshnychenko said Ukraine and its allies had to ensure a steady supply of weapons and ammunition.
> "The only way how we can achieve peace is actually when we get rid of the Russians in Ukraine and then come to some sort of arrangement," he said.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Hawkei armoured vehicles are set to replace the ADF's Land Rovers.(Supplied: Department of Defence)
> Shift to lighter vehicles?​The ambassador is also asking for 30 Hawkeis, also made by Thales, weeks after 29 jobs were cut at the Bendigo factory after a contract to build more than 1,000 of the vehicles ended.
> The Hawkei is a light, armoured four-wheel drive weighing in at seven tonnes.
> The Bushmaster weighs 12.5 tonnes.
> The Hawkeis are in testing mode and can often be seen on the streets of Bendigo, but Mr Myroshnychenko says he would like to see how they perform in the field.
> "I believe it will really test them in Ukraine, provide valuable feedback and just make them better so that they can serve the Australian Defence Forces much more efficiently," Mr Myroshnychenko said.
> The Australian government is spending $1.3 billion on 1,100 Hawkeis from Thales to replace the army's Land Rovers, but the rollout has been delayed because of brake issues.
> The future of the Bushmaster, meanwhile, could be secured after the Australian Army unveiled its prototype of an electric variant in Adelaide last month.
> Thales says the final Hawkei will come off the production line in June this year.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ukraine calls for 30 more Bushmasters, offers to pressure-test new Hawkeis
> 
> 
> Ukraine's ambassador to Australia says troops are getting creative in the way they're using Bendigo-made Bushmasters in the war with Russia.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.abc.net.au


Keep in mind training is a big issue for Ukraine at this point. 
   A LAV or Bradley would be vastly preferred if they had time to train up crews 

Canada has time and space to setup whatever force they want. 
 I would posit that a Light Bde of Regulars (or mostly reg) as an IRU and a Heavy Bde as mostly PRes would fill 90% of Canada’s Global Expedition needs, and two Bde of Medium Constabulary forces would round it out.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> But as pointed out above in the CAJ articles the RCAC is too small.


I don't think it's much smaller than the artillery but size is an issue as long as you insist everyone gets a meaningful career up to and including CWO and LCol. This is one reason (but certainly not the most important reason) I tend to favour the 70/30 // 30/70 concept. It allows for more full-time leadership with a large part-time bulk to create more and larger units to expand into. It also creates more posting stability if you allow it to.

The problem is that if you amend your training and career streams to cater to a small force problem at the expense of tactical/doctrinal common sense then what are you really accomplishing in the way of a viable defence outputs. We were there before in the pretend combat teams we had with Cougar and Grizzley. It was fun to have them but we all knew they were a joke.



Kirkhill said:


> And frankly its name hamstrings it as well.  ARMOURED is as defined by its platform as the Machine Gun Corps was.  And it is of the same vintage.


"Armoured" is no worse than "cavalry". It would make sense though to call one version a tank regiment and the other ... well whatever. I have always liked the German term "_Aufklärer Batallion". _It translates as "reconnaissance battalion" but "_Aufklärer" _carries a stronger connotation in the manner of "clearing an area" and can easily encompass the concept of fighting for information as well as sneak and peak work.

Cavalry works for me because it is more "vague" than "reconnaissance" and you can add tasks beyond the basic scouting function without doing an injustice to the term.



Kirkhill said:


> So here's another thought - Convert the RCAC to tracks entirely - and give it its own guns and dragoons (panzer grenadiers).  US Heavy Cavalry Regiment ca 1980.


I've bought into the idea that cavalry needs vehicle crews, dismounts, and direct and indirect fire support as organic elements. Whether they are tracked or not is more a function of whether they work with a heavy tracked brigade or a wheeled light or medium brigade. Their functions and weapon systems should generally be the same but the mobility chassis should match the supported formation.



Kirkhill said:


> At the same time convert the Infantry to Mounted Rifles and put all the vehicles into the Support Company.  The Rifle Coys are foot mobile and platform independent - they use what they can hump and each coy has its own humpable support platoon.  Brigade gets a UTTH Squadron to improve cross country mobility.


Again, I see a distinct between infantry operating in a combined arms scenario with tanks where dismounting is incidental and infantry in a light or medium role where dismounting is primary. The former need organic dedicated vehicles to team with full-time, the others (especially light infantry) can get by  with generic pooled transport.



Kirkhill said:


> Meanwhile the Artillery takes on GS Roles and AD Roles.


Watch out. Your throwing out babies with bathwater here. The fact that battalions have organic mortars and even UCAVs doesn't mean the brigade doesn't need artillery. Centrally controlled CS matters. It matters a lot.


Kirkhill said:


> EW and STA merge with Int.


Not an ISTAR fan. Yes, we need to break down int silos but - for CB, a direct and fast responding STA sensor to shooter link is vital. I see nothing wrong with STA acquisition and shooting data being fed into an ISTAR system. I do see problems every time some additional headquarters gets involved in authorizing an Act response. It's even worse for AD where Sense and Act are matters of split seconds.


Kirkhill said:


> And everybody gets drones...


Yup.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I don't think it's much smaller than the artillery but size is an issue as long as you insist everyone gets a meaningful career up to and including CWO and LCol. This is one reason (but certainly not the most important reason) I tend to favour the 70/30 // 30/70 concept. It allows for more full-time leadership with a large part-time bulk to create more and larger units to expand into. It also creates more posting stability if you allow it to.
> 
> The problem is that if you amend your training and career streams to cater to a small force problem at the expense of tactical/doctrinal common sense then what are you really accomplishing in the way of a viable defence outputs. We were there before in the pretend combat teams we had with Cougar and Grizzley. It was fun to have them but we all knew they were a joke.
> 
> 
> "Armoured" is no worse than "cavalry". It would make sense though to call one version a tank regiment and the other ... well whatever. I have always liked the German term "_Aufklärer Batallion". _It translates as "reconnaissance battalion" but "_Aufklärer" _carries a stronger connotation in the manner of "clearing an area" and can easily encompass the concept of fighting for information as well as sneak and peak work.
> 
> Cavalry works for me because it is more "vague" than "reconnaissance" and you can add tasks beyond the basic scouting function without doing an injustice to the term.
> 
> 
> I've bought into the idea that cavalry needs vehicle crews, dismounts, and direct and indirect fire support as organic elements. Whether they are tracked or not is more a function of whether they work with a heavy tracked brigade or a wheeled light or medium brigade. Their functions and weapon systems should generally be the same but the mobility chassis should match the supported formation.
> 
> 
> Again, I see a distinct between infantry operating in a combined arms scenario with tanks where dismounting is incidental and infantry in a light or medium role where dismounting is primary. The former need organic dedicated vehicles to team with full-time, the others (especially light infantry) can get by  with generic pooled transport.
> 
> 
> Watch out. Your throwing out babies with bathwater here. The fact that battalions have organic mortars and even UCAVs doesn't mean the brigade doesn't need artillery. Centrally controlled CS matters. It matters a lot.
> 
> Not an ISTAR fan. Yes, we need to break down int silos but - for CB, a direct and fast responding STA sensor to shooter link is vital. I see nothing wrong with STA acquisition and shooting data being fed into an ISTAR system. I do see problems every time some additional headquarters gets involved in authorizing an Act response. It's even worse for AD where Sense and Act are matters of split seconds.
> 
> Yup.
> 
> 🍻



Frankly I don't really care which cap badge gets allocated what function.

I am starting from the premise that the Regular Force - the number of bodies the government should be able to count on as being able to generate a useful force at a moments notice - consists of, approximately,

4500 in the RCIC
1500 in the RCAC
1500 in the RRCA

Plus some indeterminate numbers of engineers, truckdrivers, medics and chaplains.

I would be fine if the chaplains were tasked with Intelligence.


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> I've bought into the idea that cavalry needs vehicle crews, dismounts, and direct and indirect fire support as organic elements. Whether they are tracked or not is more a function of whether they work with a heavy tracked brigade or a wheeled light or medium brigade. Their functions and weapon systems should generally be the same but the mobility chassis should match the supported formation.


This sounds like a call to lift and modernize the TO&E for an 80's/90's US Armored Cavalry Troop (9x Tank, 13x CFV, 2x Mortar Carrier) and install it on our Squadrons- same structure, various weights.

Edit- with current equipment
Heavy
3x Leo+ LRSS Troops   (Javelin added to turret)
1x 14x Pres Tank Coy
=41 gun tanks, 66 LRSS
Medium
3x TAPV + TAPV troops  ("gun" TAPV's get RS6 30mm with javelin, scout unmodified
Light
G-Wagons?


----------



## daftandbarmy

IKnowNothing said:


> This sounds like a call to lift and modernize the TO&E for an 80's/90's US Armored Cavalry Troop (9x Tank, 13x CFV, 2x Mortar Carrier) and install it on our Squadrons- same structure, various weights.



Huzzah!


----------



## WestIsle

daftandbarmy said:


> Did you notice that you didn't even mention Anti-Tanks?
> 
> Not a criticism, just an apt reflection of our current (navel gazing) approach


In my defense mortars have been an instrumental part of the infantry battalion for over 100 years now and the CAF can always handwave the lack of anti-tank at every level by pointing to the Carl G and M72s being employed in platoons. Ya know real tank killers/s


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to @IKnowNothing and the question of what to do with the TAPVs

The Ukrainians were gifted the UK's surplus Saxon.  Like the TAPV it is a 4x4 armoured box that nobody wanted.  But the Ukrainians have found homes for them.









						Saxon APCs in Ukraine
					

The fighting in Ukraine has frequently drawn comparisons with the Cold War and while plenty of Eastern Cold War vehicles have been seen in use one of the interesting Western Cold War warriors seen …




					armourersbench.com
				




This is what the Saxon was intended for.  To deliver a section and their kit from Britain to the German front over highways that were at risk of shell fire and bomb blast.



This is how the Ukrainians have been using them



> While arguably obsolete the Ukrainians themselves reportedly felt they were fairly decent vehicles with the armour providing the expected level of protection. Ukrainian National Guard testing in February 2015 showed tha*t the armour could withstand B-32 7.62x54mmR API*. There was a well reported accident involving a pair of Saxons with on overturning and another hitting the central barrier on a motorway in March 2015. Its clear that *the Ukrainians thought at the time they were cost-effective, capable vehicles which they wisely didn’t push into close combat roles.*





> The majority, however appear to have been *rerolled as command or MEDEVAC vehicles *and were reportedly initially *assigned to 25th Airborne Brigade, 79th, 81st and 95th Airmobile and 36th Naval Infantry Brigades.* Though it is unclear if or when they were reassigned from these units. They saw action in Donbas for the first time in June 2015.





> a member of the 81st airmobile brigade said: “it’s a really beautiful vehicle and* the armour is good. for evacuating personnel* the APC is great.”




Related vehicles that the Ukraine is receiving and asking for are the German Dingo, the Australian Bushmaster and the British Foxhound/Ocelot





> The role of the Bushmaster is to provide protected mobility transport (or protected troop lift capability), with infantry dismounting from the vehicle before going into action.





Looking at that picture, and comparing it to the relatable vehicles it strikes me that the TAPV suffers from the same problem as this.





> Ask any legitimate off-roader about common mistakes people make with their trucks, and right at the top of the list is big body and suspension lifts. It ruins handling, it moves the vehicle center of gravity dangerously high, it overstresses driveline components, and frankly, it gives the impression that the driver is, shall we say, overcompensating for something? Ferrari owners know what I’m talking about here.











						5 Stupid Pickup Truck Modifications
					

The only thing more ‘Murican than pickup trucks are custom pickup trucks. There’s nothing wrong with making a vehicle decidedly your own, but these accessorising trends need to go away




					www.carthrottle.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to - The TAPV might want to get rid of all the top-hamper as well.

Move the Spare Tire and ditch the Crane.
Remove the RWS or at least find a lighter one

Rework the interior so that the (IMO surplus to requirement) gunner doesn't occupy the entire space. 

If it is just a transport vehicle the VC could operate the RWS from his seat beside the driver.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Further to - The TAPV might want to get rid of all the top-hamper as well.
> 
> Move the Spare Tire and ditch the Crane.
> Remove the RWS or at least find a lighter one
> 
> Rework the interior so that the (IMO surplus to requirement) gunner doesn't occupy the entire space.
> 
> If it is just a transport vehicle the VC could operate the RWS from his seat beside the driver.


All of that is exactly what I was thinking when I read your post above. I'd put the gunner up front as well and who says the vehicle commander has to sit up front. He could do the job from a smaller tighter seat close to the two front seats leaving more room in the space in the back for extra folks or gear and would allow him better control of the dismounts in the rear and provide him with an easier exit with them.

Kind of makes you wonder why the folks at Textron didn't come up with all of that in the first place when they were designing the details of this thing.

I'm a firm believer in making the most of what you have. A little kit bashing can pay big dividends.

🍻


----------



## GK .Dundas

The biggest problems with the TAPV all seems to stem from the COC's obsession with defeating IEDs into as near as one can tell,  the megaton range.
The reason a lot of P.res people seem to be still thrilled with them is that ,one : they're brand new and  two: they're honest to god armoured vehicles. And they don't see much of either...even less so then the regulars.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Further to @IKnowNothing and the question of what to do with the TAPVs
> 
> The Ukrainians were gifted the UK's surplus Saxon.  Like the TAPV it is a 4x4 armoured box that nobody wanted.  But the Ukrainians have found homes for them.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Saxon APCs in Ukraine
> 
> 
> The fighting in Ukraine has frequently drawn comparisons with the Cold War and while plenty of Eastern Cold War vehicles have been seen in use one of the interesting Western Cold War warriors seen …
> 
> 
> 
> 
> armourersbench.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is what the Saxon was intended for.  To deliver a section and their kit from Britain to the German front over highways that were at risk of shell fire and bomb blast.
> 
> View attachment 73575



Saxon was designed for the Territorial Army 'follow on reinforcement' of BAOR, after the Russkis crossed the border and the Reserves were officially mobilized.

See? The British give their Reserves cheap POS kit too!


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> All of that is exactly what I was thinking when I read your post above. I'd put the gunner up front as well and who says the vehicle commander has to sit up front. He could do the job from a smaller tighter seat close to the two front seats leaving more room in the space in the back for extra folks or gear and would allow him better control of the dismounts in the rear and provide him with an easier exit with them.
> 
> Kind of makes you wonder why the folks at Textron didn't come up with all of that in the first place when they were designing the details of this thing.
> 
> I'm a firm believer in making the most of what you have. A little kit bashing can pay big dividends.
> 
> 🍻




Agree entirely with repositioning the VC/Gnr/Dr.

As to blaming Textron - you might want to consider the OFSVs and OOSVs that had to be redesigned after Coast Guard committee got done with adding labs and staterooms.  Textron got some help from Rheinmetall.

The Canadian Horse


----------



## GK .Dundas

daftandbarmy said:


> Saxon was designed for the Territorial Army 'follow on reinforcement' of BAOR, after the Russkis crossed the border and the Reserves were officially mobilized.
> 
> See? The British give their Reserves cheap POS kit too!


Bite your tongue !
These are expensive POS  kit .


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> All of that is exactly what I was thinking when I read your post above. I'd put the gunner up front as well and who says the vehicle commander has to sit up front. He could do the job from a smaller tighter seat close to the two front seats leaving more room in the space in the back for extra folks or gear and would allow him better control of the dismounts in the rear and provide him with an easier exit with them.
> 
> Kind of makes you wonder why the folks at Textron didn't come up with all of that in the first place when they were designing the details of this thing.
> 
> I'm a firm believer in making the most of what you have. A little kit bashing can pay big dividends.
> 
> 🍻




Move the Gunner's seat forwards between the front wheels.  Have, as you suggest, the gunner and the VC swap places.  Remove the RWS controls to the wasted space beside the engine and move the spare into that same space., Or park it on the outside of the rear. Or even on the front face.


----------



## KevinB

Like the Bison the TAPV spare tire should be front mounted. That shifts that weight from a problem to a helper.  Plus it is less likely to get shrapnel from Arty there, and as mentioned that crane can go away because as I understand it’s simply there for the idiot tire placement. 

But yes, best spot for the TAPV is Ukraine, maybe they can sink them in a river as a field expedient bridge.


----------



## Blackadder1916

FJAG said:


> All of that is exactly what I was thinking when I read your post above. I'd put the gunner up front as well and *who says the vehicle commander has to sit up front*. He could do the job from a smaller tighter seat close to the two front seats leaving more room in the space in the back for extra folks or gear and would allow him better control of the dismounts in the rear and provide him with an easier exit with them.
> 
> Kind of makes you wonder why the folks at Textron didn't come up with all of that in the first place when they were designing the details of this thing.
> 
> I'm a firm believer in making the most of what you have. A little kit bashing can pay big dividends.
> 
> 🍻



I don't often comment about current pieces of kit, especially AFVs, since the last time I clanked about as either a driver or crew comd was over forty years ago.  However, having on occasion in the intervening years made the error of letting someone else (junior) ride "shotgun" while I rode "bitch*" or back seat, I would posit there is probably both a tactical and hierarchical reason for the comd being there.  Though I haven't been in a TAPV, from photos I've viewed it seems that the up front seats have greater field of view than any other position (even if only slightly rear of them).  If one were to assign priority to situational awareness, the vehicle commander would likely win out over the gunner.  Also by having the comd next to the driver, he is better able to direct him not only by verbal orders but also by gesture (much like the use of the pick handle back those 40 years ago when we traveled with heads out the hatch).


_edited to add_

*My apologies for the use of this vulgar term, however it may serve to illustrate the "hierarchical" aspect of seating arrangement


----------



## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:


> I don't often comment about current pieces of kit, especially AFVs, since the last time I clanked about as either a driver or crew comd was over forty years ago.  However, having on occasion in the intervening years made the error of letting someone else (junior) ride "shotgun" while I rode "bitch" or back seat, I would posit there is probably both a tactical and hierarchical reason for the comd being there.  Though I haven't been in a TAPV, from photos I've viewed it seems that the up front seats have greater field of view than any other position (even if only slightly rear of them).  If one were to assign priority to situational awareness, the vehicle commander would likely win out over the gunner.  Also by having the comd next to the driver, he is better able to direct him not only by verbal orders but also by gesture (much like the use of the pick handle back those 40 years ago when we traveled with heads out the hatch).



All of that problem goes away if the TAPV loses its role as a "Patrol" Vehicle and becomes a Transport Vehicle.

The second seat is filled with the co-driver and the co-driver gets the RWS controls for a simple,, lightweight RWS for local defence.  Move the Rheinmetall-Kongsberg RWS to a more suitable vehicle - like, perhaps, the ACSVs?


----------



## Kirkhill

And on the technology front - The Electric Bushmaster









						Electric combat vehicle of the future comes from country Victoria
					

The electric Bushmaster runs cooler and is quieter than its combustion engine counterparts meaning it can hide more effectively from the enemy.




					www.abc.net.au
				






> The electric Protected Mobility Vehicle, or ePMV, is quieter than its combustion engine counterparts and it is hoped it can drive for 1000 kilometres before needing to be recharged.





> He said the electric version can accelerate faster, generate more torque, is simpler to maintain because it has fewer mechanical moving parts and can export power so the army can run a headquarters or a workshop from the vehicle on the battlefield.
> 
> "Electric vehicles tend to have a different heat signature on the battlefield so they wouldn't be quite so hot, because you don't have an engine creating a thermal signature," Colonel Smith said.




BUT....



> how does the army charge the vehicles on the battlefield?
> 
> "That's part of the journey already," Colonel Smith said.
> 
> "We will need to charge the vehicle in the field. Hence, phase two takes us to a self-charging electric vehicle, which gets us around having to provide the electric charging point in the field."



So an electric vehicle with a genny.  

Some people might call that a hybrid.


----------



## Weinie

Kirkhill said:


> And on the technology front - The Electric Bushmaster
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Electric combat vehicle of the future comes from country Victoria
> 
> 
> The electric Bushmaster runs cooler and is quieter than its combustion engine counterparts meaning it can hide more effectively from the enemy.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.abc.net.au
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> BUT....
> 
> 
> 
> So an electric vehicle with a genny.
> 
> *Some people might call that a hybrid.*


Some people might call that "Terminator"


----------



## Kirkhill

Blackadder1916 said:


> I don't often comment about current pieces of kit, especially AFVs, since the last time I clanked about as either a driver or crew comd was over forty years ago.  However, having on occasion in the intervening years made the error of letting someone else (junior) ride "shotgun" while I rode "bitch*" or back seat, I would posit there is probably both a tactical and hierarchical reason for the comd being there.  Though I haven't been in a TAPV, from photos I've viewed it seems that the up front seats have greater field of view than any other position (even if only slightly rear of them).  If one were to assign priority to situational awareness, the vehicle commander would likely win out over the gunner.  Also by having the comd next to the driver, he is better able to direct him not only by verbal orders but also by gesture (much like the use of the pick handle back those 40 years ago when we traveled with heads out the hatch).
> 
> 
> _edited to add_
> 
> *My apologies for the use of this vulgar term, however it may serve to illustrate the "hierarchical" aspect of seating arrangement



Your intervention kept me thinking .... and brought me to this.  The universal, over head pivot arm.  Replace the light with the CLU or whatever the HMI is called and place it behind and between the front two seats with the third seat.  Then the crew can figure out who sits where and does what job.  If the vehicle were stationary then the driver could man the gun and cover the other two while they are dismounted.


----------



## Kirkhill

Or better yet something like this HMI that could be passed around from Gnr to VC to Driver.  Or maybe you could afford to buy two for each vehicle. One for the VC/Gnr and one for the Gnr/Pax.











						HMI-Human Machine Interface  | Allen-Bradley
					

Visualization and HMI solutions help you address your productivity, innovation, and globalization needs.




					www.rockwellautomation.com


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> Realistically, could TAPV's with retrofitted weapon systems (the RS6 for example) provide the basis of mixed vehicle medium CAV troops (1x LRSS, 3x TAPV with assortment of scout teams, tank hunter teams, and varied RWS mounts) even as a stop gap for the next decade? Or are they complete duds.


Duds, honestly you can manipulate and exchange systems, swap seats, what ever but your changing the deck chairs in the Titanic. Why that project isn’t used to highlight our procurement failure I don’t know.

That being said they aren’t going anywhere so a role needs to be found for them.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> That being said they aren’t going anywhere so a role needs to be found for them.


I keep coming back to the Ukrainian expedient bridge…


----------



## dapaterson

TAPV is not a procurement failure.  It's a requirements failure.


----------



## Good2Golf

dapaterson said:


> TAPV is not a procurement failure.  It's a requirements failure.


Or perhaps a misplaced sympathy trying to be magnanimous and failing hard?  (RegF brain trust thinking a new non-hand me down to the PRes would ingratiate them)…


----------



## McG

Good2Golf said:


> Or perhaps a misplaced sympathy trying to be magnanimous and failing hard?  (RegF brain trust thinking a new non-hand me down to the PRes would ingratiate them)…


That fact that PRes have TAPV is a symptom of how wrong the defined requirements were. When TAPV was conceived, the then CLS was quite adamant  that the army would never waste a dollar buying an A vehicle for the PRes. But when the contract was awarded years later, the vehicle was so useless for purpose that cascading it to the PRes was a way to save face.


----------



## markppcli

dapaterson said:


> TAPV is not a procurement failure.  It's a requirements failure.


So the requirements out lined in the procurement process? I’ll wrap all that up in a single “procurement” bubble honestly.


@KevinB personally I think the targetry in our training areas could be updated.



Good2Golf said:


> Or perhaps a misplaced sympathy trying to be magnanimous and failing hard?  (RegF brain trust thinking a new non-hand me down to the PRes would ingratiate them)…



Trying to show horn two wildly different vehicles into one.


----------



## Good2Golf

McG said:


> That fact that PRes have TAPV is a symptom of how wrong the defined requirements were. When TAPV was conceived, the then CLS was quite adamant  that the army would never waste a dollar buying an A vehicle for the PRes. But when the contract was awarded years later, the vehicle was so useless for purpose that cascading it to the PRes was a way to save face.


So DLR incompetence Maskirovka?


----------



## McG

I don’t know. To some extent, DLR definitely played a role. But I don’t know who generated the impetus that army would buy a vehicle to institutionalize the RG-31 role. It may have been spawned from the same meeting where ADM(Mat) held LAV Up and LRPR hostage to force army to pursue CCV.


----------



## dapaterson

Retired RCA ADM Mat and serving RCA CLS/CCA butted heads, as I recall.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> Or perhaps a misplaced sympathy trying to be magnanimous and failing hard?  (RegF brain trust thinking a new non-hand me down to the PRes would ingratiate them)…



.... because one of the things that keeps the Reg F up at night is thinking up ways to ingratiate themselves to the Reserves ...


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Retired RCA ADM Mat and serving RCA CLS/CCA butted heads, as I recall.


If I recall, TAPV, LAV(UP) and CCV were all part of the same $5.2 billion package to solve the problem of the vulnerability of our then fleet of LAVIII and RG31 in Afghanistan and the wearing out of the Coyotes. I'm not sure how much CLS and ADM(Mat) at the time were at loggerheads on the issue because they both wanted better protection and manoeuverability. While we were already slated to leave Afghanistan, the failed-state type of mission was still on our agenda. I know both favoured CCV. I don't know where they stood on TAPV or who defined the requirements.

TAPV went into the planning in 2009, the CLS left the job in 2010 and it wasn't until 2012 that Textron won the contract for TAPV.

I'm not sure how much you can lay the actual Textron version of the TAPV on the then CLS's feet. He would have been gone shortly after the broad need was established and, I think, before the detailed requirements were laid down.


----------



## dapaterson

Next time you're in Ottawa we can meet and talk about things...


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Next time you're in Ottawa we can meet and talk about things...


I would very much like that unfortunately (or fortunately) I haven't been back for a while. If your ever down London way and are looking for a place to stay and a friendly beer, give me a call. (I can show you the railroad 🚂😁)

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> That fact that PRes have TAPV is a symptom of how wrong the defined requirements were. *When TAPV was conceived, the then CLS was quite adamant  that the army would never waste a dollar buying an A vehicle for the PRes. But when the contract was awarded years later, the vehicle was so useless for purpose that cascading it to the PRes was a way to save face.*



It's hard to say that there is one thing wrong with the procurement system but the highlighted sentence seems to be right up there.

The power of the short termers on the General Staff breeds discontinuity. 

The TAPV's competitors



Armoured Transports offered for Recce.....

vs an Armoured Security Vehicle designed for Convoy Escort and Base Patrol Vehicle offered for the same task.

When acquired, as noted, the CLS declared no armour for the Reserves.
That then became 25 vehicles for each Reserve Division to be communally held.
That then seems to have become give them all to the Reserves because we don't have any use for them.

I'm surprised the Regs aren't casting around to see if the Reserves have hidden any more Bisons they can grab.


I'm a fan of armoured transports but it seems to me that those programmes should by part of the LVM programme.

As far as the TAPV is concerned let it revert back to its original configuration and role as an ASV.  And leave it with the Reserves and the Service Battalions as a Rear Echelon and LOC vehicle.

The Bigger Problem though 

Institutionalizing requirements to guarantee continuity -


----------



## Kirkhill

Strip the TAPV back to this.


----------



## Kirkhill

The functionally similar, if not identical, Dutch Fennek.



Lower ride.  lower and lighter top hamper.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> The functionally similar, if not identical, Dutch Fennek.
> 
> View attachment 73651
> 
> Lower ride.  lower and lighter top hamper.


Can't we just go back in time, get an appropriate number of Fennek's, uncancel CCV, select the CV90, and exercise the option?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

FJAG said:


> If I recall, TAPV, LAV(UP) and CCV were all part of the same $5.2 billion package to solve the problem of the vulnerability of our then fleet of LAVIII and RG31 in Afghanistan and the wearing out of the Coyotes. I'm not sure how much CLS and ADM(Mat) at the time were at loggerheads on the issue because they both wanted better protection and manoeuverability. While we were already slated to leave Afghanistan, the failed-state type of mission was still on our agenda. I know both favoured CCV. I don't know where they stood on TAPV or who defined the requirements.
> 
> TAPV went into the planning in 2009, the CLS left the job in 2010 and it wasn't until 2012 that Textron won the contract for TAPV.
> 
> I'm not sure how much you can lay the actual Textron version of the TAPV on the then CLS's feet. He would have been gone shortly after the broad need was established and, I think, before the detailed requirements were laid down.


The TAPV project was absolutely rolling in 2008. I was part of an RCAC Working Group that was convened in Oct 2008 when the scope of the project was expanded to replace the Coyote instead of just the LUVW and RG31. The TAPV was conceived in the darkest days of Kandahar - a response to the IED threat. There were six vehicles on the PowerPoints, but one was conceptual and one was not for sale. 

The infantry were also supposed to get the TAPV, but they applied the five Ds and ignored it. Should they find themselves in a place like Mali, though, it would quite useful for them in its intended role.

Anyhoo.


----------



## Kirkhill

Recently in from the BattleOrder

Force 2030 -  7x MEUs from MEF I and MEF II with 3x MLRs from MEF III



Graphic: Marine Expeditionary Unit in 2030

Notional future Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) composition under the tentative Force Design 2030/EABO plan. MEUs are inherently flexible organizations so even if this idea persists, it will vary in practice most likely.

The MEU will still consist of a command element (permanently under the I MEF or II MEF), a ground combat element (battalion landing team with units sourced from either 1st Marine Div for I MEF or 2nd Marine Div for II MEF), aviation combat element (a composite aviation squadron sourced from the MEFs' respective Marine Air Wings), and a logistics combat element (a task organized combat logistics battalion).

I MEF and II MEF will be focused on generating 7 MEUs while III MEF forward deployed to the Pacific will have 3 new Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) instead.

As usual a very robust Air Combat Element based on Ospreys but supported by  Sea Stallions, Vipers and Venoms as well as MQ-9B SkyGuardians, Hercs and F35-Bs.

The Ground Combat Element (poetic licence here) includes an SOF Coy and 3 Rifle Coys as well as an LAR Coy.  Ground transport is by a platoon of the wheeled ACVs which would be compatible with the LAVs of the LAR Coy.

The novel addition is a Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel Platoon.   Vessels and Platoons are not two words you commonly see linked.

The other bit of note - Ground Combat Fire Support comes in the form of a single HIMARS battery operating in support of the battalion.  Presumably the unit will rely on the F35Bs and the Vipers and Venoms for additional support.   And organic loitering munitions?











						The first weapon system for the USMC's new LRUSV: Hero-120 - Naval Post- Naval News and Information
					

he first weapon system for the United States Marine Corps’ new Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel (LRUSV) has been confirmed. The UVision Air Ltd. Hero-120 Organic Precision Fires (OPF) smart loitering munition system




					navalpost.com
				






Crew of 3 + 13









						Amphibious Combat Vehicle
					

Mission: Ship-to-shore troop transport




					www.military.com


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> The Ground Combat Element (poetic licence here) includes an SOF Coy and 3 Rifle Coys as well as an LAR Coy.



Note that the SOF Coy and the SOLE are under the CE and not the GCE.  The distinction is important.


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The TAPV project was absolutely rolling in 2008. I was part of an RCAC Working Group that was convened in Oct 2008 when the scope of the project was expanded to replace the Coyote instead of just the LUVW and RG31. The TAPV was conceived in the darkest days of Kandahar - a response to the IED threat. There were six vehicles on the PowerPoints, but one was conceptual and one was not for sale.
> 
> The infantry were also supposed to get the TAPV, but they applied *the five Ds *and ignored it. Should they find themselves in a place like Mali, though, it would quite useful for them in its intended role.
> 
> Anyhoo.



5 Ds? Please enlighten us


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Note that the SOF Coy and the SOLE are under the CE and not the GCE.  The distinction is important.


Understood.  Although I did allow myself a bit of poetic license, as I said.  

I assume that the SOF component would be separately tasked and the GCE/ACE just as likely to be acting in support/relief of the SOF component.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> 5 Ds? Please enlighten us



Diddle - Diddle - Diddle - Diddle - Dee.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> 5 Ds? Please enlighten us


----------



## McG




----------



## TangoTwoBravo

markppcli said:


>


You get me


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Note that the SOF Coy and the SOLE are under the CE and not the GCE.  The distinction is important.


I’m curious what they are calling the SOF Coy. 
 MARSOC’s 3 Bn’s aren’t direct support for the MEF’s.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> I’m curious what they are calling the SOF Coy.
> MARSOC’s 3 Bn’s aren’t direct support for the MEF’s.


They come out of the force reconnaissance companies with atts.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> They come out of the force reconnaissance companies with atts.


Pedantic point would be, like the MEU-SOC, being Special Operations Capable, not a SOF specific force. 

With reality being a small c for capable, as MARSOC MSOB’s stole a lot of the humint, languages and other capabilities out of those.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I’m curious what they are calling the SOF Coy.
> MARSOC’s 3 Bn’s aren’t direct support for the MEF’s.





markppcli said:


> They come out of the force reconnaissance companies with atts.



Battle Order does define it as "Maritime Raid Force".  That suggests to me something that is closer to the conventional end of the spectrum than the special -

And look what Google turned up (I'm trying to catch up....)









						Marine Raider Regiment - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




The *Marine Raider Regiment*, formerly known as the *Marine Special Operations Regiment* (*MSOR*), is a special operations force of the United States Marine Corps, part of Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC). Renamed for its predecessor, the World War II Marine Raiders,[4][5] this unit is the principal combat component of MARSOC, which is the Marine Corps' contribution to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

Types of missions[edit]​
Direct action
Special reconnaissance
Counter-terrorism
Foreign internal defense
Unconventional warfare
Security force assistance
Preparation of the environment
Counter-insurgency
Maritime Interdiction Operations
Special/Clandestine operations
Counter-drug operations


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Battle Order does define it as "Maritime Raid Force".  That suggests to me something that is closer to the conventional end of the spectrum than the special -
> 
> And look what Google turned up
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Marine Raider Regiment - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


The Marine Special Operations Battalions trace their lineage to the Raiders. They evicted the Recon from the line when they stood up.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> The Marine Special Operations Battalions trace their lineage to the Raiders. They evicted the Recon from the line when they stood up.


Still working on my first cup of coffee.

Thanks. I guess that only puts me 7 years or so behind the times.


----------



## Kirkhill

Types of missions[edit]​
Excuses to be on the ground

Foreign internal defense
Security force assistance
Counter-insurgency
Counter-drug operations
Counter-terrorism
Primary missions

Preparation of the environment
Unconventional warfare
Special/Clandestine operations
Special reconnaissance
Maritime Interdiction Operations
Direct action
Does that look like a recognizable breakdown?


----------



## KevinB

Admittedly I always liked the MEU formation, and thought it was a good model for Canada to emulate.  

With USMC divesting tanks, I don’t think that will work anymore.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Admittedly I always liked the MEU formation, and thought it was a good model for Canada to emulate.
> 
> With USMC divesting tanks, I don’t think that will work anymore.



We would need ships and helicopters....


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> We would need ships and helicopters....


Yes.   
   Which frankly as an Expeditionary Army are major missing assets. 

I’ve been tinkering with my Napkin Army - and parsed it down.  
    Pushing more PY to RCN and RCAF, and only 4 large Bde’s for the CA, 2 Light, 1 Heavy, and 1 Med.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> We would need ships and helicopters....



More importantly you would need a doctrine - and trained leadership - supporting combined operations and, I believe, we are light years away from that.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> More importantly you would need a doctrine - and trained leadership - supporting combined operations and, I believe, we are light years away from that.


Oh I think the CAF had a Doctrine for that.  Didn’t you see the PRes rendition of RimPac this summer


----------



## Colin Parkinson

KevinB said:


> Oh I think the CAF had a Doctrine for that.  Didn’t you see the PRes rendition of RimPac this summer


_Leading Change_

As a country with a history of expeditionary adventures, longest coastline in the world (or 2nd longest) it's shocking we have no amphibious capability. I wish Harper had been able to snag those two Mistral's. It would have forced the 3 services to work together. The odd thing is that they are really useful for the soft power approach and humanitarian stuff. You think the governments would happily go for it. I don't expect us to do opposed landings, but being able to put forces almost anywhere coastal makes a big difference and would allow us to provide support to many international missions.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Oh I think the CAF had a Doctrine for that.  Didn’t you see the PRes rendition of RimPac this summer



No battleships = buzz kill 

Glass half full: at least they gave it a shot. With a longer term focus, and some dedicated cross functional leadership at the higher levels, you could build a nice little capability, I'm thinking.

Sadly, it's hard to maintain a long term focus on much these days it seems.


----------



## KevinB

Colin Parkinson said:


> _Leading Change_
> 
> As a country with a history of expeditionary adventures, longest coastline in the world (or 2nd longest) it's shocking we have no amphibious capability. I wish Harper had been able to snag those two Mistral's. It would have forced the 3 services to work together. The odd thing is that they are really useful for the soft power approach and humanitarian stuff. You think the governments would happily go for it. I don't expect us to do opposed landings, but being able to put forces almost anywhere coastal makes a big difference and would allow us to provide support to many international missions.


Yup, there needs to be something to push the Services together -- plus Amphibs as you mention work for C&C, and logistics support of Operations near water -- so Caribbean hurricane belt etc -- for the most part I think opposed Amphibious landing have gone the way of the Dodo, but that doesn't mean they cannot take troops from A to B, and disembark them.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

daftandbarmy said:


> No battleships = buzz kill
> 
> Glass half full: at least they gave it a shot. With a longer term focus, and some dedicated cross functional leadership at the higher levels, you could build a nice little capability, I'm thinking.
> 
> Sadly, it's hard to maintain a long term focus on much these days it seems.


You would think that Coastal based Reserve infantry units would get a secondary tasking of ship to shore ops as part of their mandate and interior ones perhaps Arctic warfare. Sigh I can remember Reserve infantry units with functioning AT platoons, mortar platoons and heavy weapon platoons, not to mention 6 gun batteries with two CP's.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> You would think that Coastal based Reserve infantry units would get a secondary tasking of ship to shore ops as part of their mandate and interior ones perhaps Arctic warfare. Sigh I can remember Reserve infantry units with functioning AT platoons, mortar platoons and heavy weapon platoons, not to mention 6 gun batteries with two CP's.



You would think....

I believe the main issue is one of consistency. 

There was a time when these capabilities were assigned and maintained over a long period. These things tend to come and go like the wind, like the latest 'fad', these days which doesn't bode well for the long term commitment to a single purpose or mission of some kind.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

With the advent of the AOP's the ability to move people ashore has increased by a factor of 2. They now can safely bring ATV's and similar ashore with their landing craft. Hire a CCG helicopter to sling equipment ashore as well. We are almost where the USMC was back in the 1920-30's.


----------



## KevinB

Colin Parkinson said:


> With the advent of the AOP's the ability to move people ashore has increased by a factor of 2. They now can safely bring ATV's and similar ashore with their landing craft. Hire a CCG helicopter to sling equipment ashore as well. We are almost where the USMC was back in the 1920-30's.


Better yet get a real helicopter - it appear the HH-60 would fit on the AOPS no issue


----------



## Kirkhill

Colin Parkinson said:


> You would think that Coastal based Reserve infantry units would get a secondary tasking of ship to shore ops as part of their mandate and interior ones perhaps Arctic warfare. Sigh I can remember Reserve infantry units with functioning AT platoons, mortar platoons and heavy weapon platoons, not to mention 6 gun batteries with two CP's.



For the record - Sweden's CB90 force, and their Coastal Commandos, are part of the Navy.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Better yet get a real helicopter - it appear the HH-60 would fit on the AOPS no issue



Nothing wrong with any of the Cormorant, Cyclone or Chinook for moving light vehicles from ship to shore.   Especially when they don't actually have to be based on the ship.  They can lift off from Resolute, Iqaluit, Rankin or Inuvik, fly out to the ship, refuel, pickup cargo and deposit it on some other island, another ship or on the ice, then return to primary with a refuelling stop on the AOPS along the way.

We have the kit.  We even have the bodies.  We don't seem to have a plan or the inclination.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Nothing wrong with any of the Cormorant, Cyclone or Chinook for moving light vehicles from ship to shore.


Uhm how many of those do you have?



Kirkhill said:


> Especially when they don't actually have to be based on the ship.  They can lift off from Resolute, Iqaluit, Rankin or Inuvik, fly out to the ship, refuel, pickup cargo and deposit it on some other island, another ship or on the ice, then return to primary with a refuelling stop on the AOPS along the way.


I would suggest that an integral HH-60 would be of vastly more effective.



Kirkhill said:


> We have some kit.  We even have some bodies.  We don't seem to have a plan or the inclination.


FIFY.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Uhm how many of those do you have?



Light vehicles or helicopters?

23/28 x CH148 Cyclones, 13 x CH149 Cormorants, 15x CH147F Chinooks

The Cyclones and Cormorants are 5 tonne payload and the Chinook is 10 tonne payload.  The Cyclones would have to roll all that roller mounted ASW gear out of the rear ramp first.

But that is a fleet of up to 51 transport helicopters.  We should be able to find an available squadron some where.



KevinB said:


> I would suggest that an integral HH-60 would be of vastly more effective.



Possibly.  But we don't have them.  We do have other stuff.  And I am not sure that it would be vastly more effective for inshore work.  It strikes me that shore based maintenance is likely to be better than that provided by a det at sea.

Not to mention you could sustain more RCAF crews ashore,  and they could stay in hotels, and be much better rested.

  Katimivik Suites - Rankin Inlet


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Light vehicles or helicopters?
> 
> 23/28 x CH148 Cyclones, 13 x CH149 Cormorants, 15x CH147F Chinooks
> 
> The Cyclones and Cormorants are 5 tonne payload and the Chinook is 10 tonne payload.  The Cyclones would have to roll all that roller mounted ASW gear out of the rear ramp first.
> 
> But that is a fleet of up to 51 transport helicopters.  We should be able to find an available squadron some where.


Cyclones are dedicated ASW - the conversion time and issues mean that unless there is an extreme need, those are off the books.
  The 13 Cormorants - that's SAR, so don't expect them outside of a 1-2 bird flight.
 The 15 Hooks - I am pretty sure CANSOF has several of those dedicated...

  So you may get 2-3 Hooks and 1-2 Corms.



Kirkhill said:


> Possibly.  But we don't have them.  We do have other stuff.  And I am not sure that it would be vastly more effective for inshore work.  It strikes me that shore based maintenance is likely to be better than that provided by a det at sea.
> 
> Not to mention you could sustain more RCAF crews ashore,  and they could stay in hotels, and be much better rested.
> 
> View attachment 73708  Katimivik Suites - Rankin Inlet


Fixed sites are not nearly as flexible -- I don't disagree that shore based maintenance is better - but if you had spare birds you could rotate then out...

  You won't ever sell me on the CAF has enough vertical lift at this point.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Cyclones are dedicated ASW - the conversion time and issues mean that unless there is an extreme need, those are off the books.
> The 13 Cormorants - that's SAR, so don't expect them outside of a 1-2 bird flight.
> The 15 Hooks - I am pretty sure CANSOF has several of those dedicated...
> 
> So you may get 2-3 Hooks and 1-2 Corms.
> 
> 
> Fixed sites are not nearly as flexible -- I don't disagree that shore based maintenance is better - but if you had spare birds you could rotate then out...
> 
> You won't ever sell me on the CAF has enough vertical lift at this point.



No.  The CAF doesn't have enough vertical lift. 

But.  It has vertical lift that can be reassigned in extremis.  And there should be a plan for that.

Just because SOPs declare it shouldn't make it immutable.


----------



## Kirkhill

The Army wants to poach on the Marine's Turf?  Coastal Artillery used to be an Army thing in any case.



> This article argues that *the U.S. Army*, rather than the traditional maritime Services, has an emergent opportunity to increase relevancy by *exercising sea control to guarantee American access to global markets* in competitive spaces in the twenty-first century. In a strategic environment where adversaries are developing sophisticated defenses in-depth to negate American power projection, the institution has a unique capability *to create forward positions* of advantage *with reimagined operational fires* commands at scale—as the nucleus of Joint, interagency, and multinational teams—to protect economic prosperity and preserve coalition unity in Central Europe and Southeast Asia in particular, and across the world in general. Advocating for *a shift in operational approach that subordinates tactical maneuver in support of operational fires,*





> The U.S. Army faces a daunting task in the emerging strategic environment





> the land power institution must argue for credible relevancy, and therefore sufficient funding





> the Army has struggled to define success in a succession of Middle Eastern interventions during the past two decades, where it has found difficulties translating tactical success into lasting strategic gains





			The Army and Sea Control
		


Or putting it another way?  The US Army is facing the same question as the Canadian Army.  What is the Army for?

The Army is already poaching on USAF turf with UAVs, Tilt Rotors and 1000 km missiles.

Now it seems that the Army kind of likes the USMCs Marine Littoral Regiments.   Great idea.  Place Artillery Forts with LRPFs all over the world and us the Manouever Army for active defence patrols....

It's a thought.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

You could increase the vertical lift available to the RCN by doing what the CCG does. Lease helicopters and crews from TC. TC buys helicopters from Canada, hires the crews and leases them to the Navy with a gray paint job. Maybe it's the 75% solution, but it will be significantly less than trying to stand up another Squadron of CAF helicopters and get them manned. Nothing stopping you from doing both. The leased birds do a lot of the mundane stuff, freeing up the military birds for the military stuff. This is what both the USN and RN does.


----------



## dapaterson

I thought the lack of crews for the FFHs balanced out the lack of aircrew for the MHs


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> I thought the lack of crews for the FFHs balanced out the lack of aircrew for the MHs


Some might recommend scrapping an Inf BN or two to harvest the PY’s to the Navy and RCAF…


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> Nothing wrong with any of the Cormorant, Cyclone or Chinook for moving light vehicles from ship to shore.   Especially when they don't actually have to be based on the ship.  They can lift off from Resolute, Iqaluit, Rankin or Inuvik, fly out to the ship, refuel, pickup cargo and deposit it on some other island, another ship or on the ice, then return to primary with a refuelling stop on the AOPS along the way.
> 
> We have the kit.  We even have the bodies.  We don't seem to have a plan or the inclination.


UH60M yes, HH60M has less available lift thanks to the medevac floor and stretcher lift system. And no 'gunners windows'


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Pedantic point would be, like the MEU-SOC, being Special Operations Capable, not a SOF specific force.
> 
> With reality being a small c for capable, as MARSOC MSOB’s stole a lot of the humint, languages and other capabilities out of those.


Yeah my understanding is they have a recce / DA element plus some humint / dog int and other stuff going on. Very hard to find the actual orbat, and I imagine it’s more fluid and and task built maybe. But my understand is the platoons come from the existing Force Recon Coys while MARSOC does it’s own, non MEU thing. But I’m likely not correct so w/e.


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:


> Some might recommend scrapping an Inf BN or two to harvest the PY’s to the Navy and RCAF…


Could make sense until you realize they can't fill the ones they've already got.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Could make sense until you realize they can't fill the ones they've already got.


Make the 2nd and 3rd Bn’s 30/70 
   No it’s not ideal, but if the CA feels a Battle Group is all it’s deployed then 9 Inf reg Bn are not needed


----------



## Infanteer

I was talking about the Navy and the Air Force.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> I was talking about the Navy and the Air Force.


Ack. 
   Seems hollow is a defining trait across the board, the CA no longer has a monopoly.


----------



## Kirkhill

The state of military recruitment and retention: Shortages are everywhere - ToTalent
					

The US Army recently boosted military recruitment sign-on bonuses to a maximum of $50,000 to compete for talent on a ‘tight’ labour market. But what is the state of military recruitment in Europe?




					totalent.eu
				











						With Few Able and Fewer Willing, U.S. Military Can’t Find Recruits
					

Fighting headwinds from the pandemic, the tight labor market and demographic shifts, the armed forces may fall further short of enlistment quotas this year than they have in decades.




					www.nytimes.com
				








						Military dealing with more than 10,000 unfilled positions amid growing pressures
					

OTTAWA — New figures show the Canadian Armed Forces are struggling with a growing shortage of personnel even as the military faces more and more demands at…




					nationalpost.com
				






> According to a _Bloomberg report_, a staggering 71% of people ages 17 to 24 are unable to join the military due to a variety of reasons. Those reasons include obesity, a lack of high school diploma or a criminal record_. _“That means the remaining age cohort is the prime attraction for all recruiting from not just the military, but also colleges and employers”



It seems that Ukraine may be one of the few forces that has no trouble recruiting.  Ukraine and the Eastern Europeans.

Uncrewed, Optionally Crewed and Reduced Crew vehicles, regardless of  domain, together with Artificial Intelligence, seem likely to be the future for most militaries.  Physically fit specimens suitable for infantry and Special Ops are likely to be as scarce as Olympic athletes.


----------



## Kirkhill

Looking a bit closer at @KevinB 's latest Napkin proposal.

2x Lt
1x Hvy
1x Med/LAV

If we adopt the 2nd BCT - 11th Abn Div structure then we need 12 Infantry Coys (2x2x3)
If we adopt the ABCT structure then we need 4 more Infantry Coys (2x1 +1x2)
That is 16 Coys out of the nominal 27 Coys of the RCIC (3x3x3)

27-16=11 Coys to equip the LAV Brigade, or 2 more than currently.

Also, if we adopted the ABCT structure of 5 tank "Coys", each with 14 tanks for a total of 70, then we have enough tanks and crews (assuming full manning) to provide adequate RCAC resources.

It's a good starting point.


----------



## KevinB

@Kirkhill you need to add the tank Coy  for the Cav Sqn in the ABCT too.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> @Kirkhill you need to add the tank Coy  for the Cav Sqn in the ABCT too.



We'd have to Canadianize that Squadron - we only have enough tanks for the 5 Tank Coys with 10 tanks in Reserve.

Of course we could go the Swedish route and swap 4 gun tanks in each company for 4 AMOS mortar tanks by buying those instead of additional gun tanks.  We would need 32 of them to marry up with our 80 gun tanks.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> We'd have to Canadianize that Squadron - we only have enough tanks for the 5 Tank Coys with 10 tanks in Reserve.
> 
> Of course we could go the Swedish route and swap 4 gun tanks in each company for 4 AMOS mortar tanks by buying those instead of additional gun tanks.  We would need 32 of them to marry up with our 80 gun tanks.


Get more tanks. 
    But again so many missing assets anyway that it’s not as simple as that.


----------



## GK .Dundas

KevinB said:


> Get more tanks.
> But again so many missing assets anyway that it’s not as simple as that.


Oh I can simplify that quite easily...we need... basically everything.


----------



## Kirkhill

Found a really interesting quote in an article on the Hellfire replacement, the JAGM.



> *Winning a fight between developed industrial nations will really come down to the efficient use of available systems*. *That means fielding updated and upgraded low-cost weapons and finding new and creative ways to leverage existing systems is just as important as developing and fielding next-generation tech.*





> While hypersonic missiles and AI-powered drones may draw the majority of attention when it comes to new defense developments, systems like the AGM-179 JAGM offer a glimpse into the economically efficient near-future of warfare. A large-scale conflict with a near-peer like China is often seen as “_the big game_” of sorts for exquisite and supremely expensive systems like $100 million boost-glide weapons and sleek next-generation stealth fighters.
> 
> The truth is, these technologies really _do_ matter, but their cutting-edge nature means their use in such a fight would be limited. In 2021, for instance, the U.S. Air Force had approximately 272 F-35As in service — more stealth fighters than any other country has in total — but the _vast _majority of America’s fighter fleets remain older 4th generation jets. Flying alongside those 272 F-35As were more than 450 F-15s of various sorts and _nearly a thousand_ F-16s. Likewise, China’s 1,800 fighters include just 150 or fewer stealth jets — with 800 or so 4th generation fighters and the rest coming from _even older_ stock.











						AGM-179 JAGM: Replacing the legendary Hellfire missile
					

Lockheed Martin's new AGM-179 JAGM will replace two different versions of the legendary Hellfire missile that's been in service for 40 years.




					www.sandboxx.us
				




The Ukrainians are demonstrating this philosophy every day.

Or as Donald Rumsfeld would have it: "You go to war with the Army you have -- not the Army you might wish you have"

So,  working within the framework of the tanks, guns and helicopters we have, might be a useful starting point.  Figuring out what else can be done with them might also be useful.


----------



## Kirkhill

Best example of the above, in my opinion.

Converting obsolete rifle anti-tank grenades to be compatible with hobby drones by means of 3D printers.









						Drones the new snipers of Ukraine war as 3D tech turns Soviet grenades into airborne tank killers
					

Modified grenades are now highly accurate at destroying Russian tanks by attacking the relatively less-protected top of the turret




					www.telegraph.co.uk


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Or as Donald Rumsfeld would have it: "You go to war with the Army you have -- not the Army you might wish you have"
> 
> So,  working within the framework of the tanks, guns and helicopters we have, might be a useful starting point.  Figuring out what else can be done with them might also be useful.


I don’t disagree, but given that Canada isn’t in a shooting war currently, there is some ability to acquire items that are needed deficiencies.   The world isn’t exactly a stable place, I would suggest that given the massive gaps that are in the CAF that a pressing need to fill those gaps exist.  

Canada needs a modernized Defence White Paper to make a goal to work forward too. 

The last holistic look at Defence in Canada was Perrin Beatty’s 1987 WP 








						A defence plan for Canada | Maclean's | JUNE 15, 1987
					






					archive.macleans.ca
				




Until that is done, it’s just rearranging deck chairs.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I don’t disagree, but given that Canada isn’t in a shooting war currently, there is some ability to acquire items that are needed deficiencies.   The world isn’t exactly a stable place, I would suggest that given the massive gaps that are in the CAF that a pressing need to fill those gaps exist.
> 
> Canada needs a modernized Defence White Paper to make a goal to work forward too.
> 
> The last holistic look at Defence in Canada was Perrin Beatty’s 1987 WP
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A defence plan for Canada | Maclean's | JUNE 15, 1987
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> archive.macleans.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Until that is done, it’s just rearranging deck chairs.



I can't disagree entirely but ...

Perhaps the whole problem begins with the lack of a sense of urgency.  Canada, and I will include citizens, politicians and soldiers, has no sense of impending doom.  Lacking that sense of urgency time is spent thinking in stead of doing.

People never get around to testing out all their hypotheses for fear that it is going to cost money and that their hypothesis will fail.  And with it their careers.  The safe thing to do is to do what has been done.  There is little obvious effort to keep pushing the limits and expanding envelopes.

Those failed experiments are critical to development.  They demonstrate the limits of what is available, what critical gaps exist and how current technologies might fill those gaps.

Canada's most fortunate and secure position should be resulting in the world's most experimental force.  Not the most conservative force.

And to achieve that, with the world's most uninterested government, that has to mean using the available kit in the most outrageous manners possible while incremental additions are made.  Increments from internal workshops, civilian market (non milspec) and freebies from vendors.  And whatever government grants can be scrounged.  

In other words, act like every other shoe-string start up with a bright idea.    You need one department that throws out the rule book and plays.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> I can't disagree entirely but ...
> 
> Perhaps the whole problem begins with the lack of a sense of urgency.  Canada, and I will include citizens, politicians and soldiers, has no sense of impending doom.  Lacking that sense of urgency time is spent thinking in stead of doing.
> 
> People never get around to testing out all their hypotheses for fear that it is going to cost money and that their hypothesis will fail.  And with it their careers.  The safe thing to do is to do what has been done.  There is little obvious effort to keep pushing the limits and expanding envelopes.
> 
> Those failed experiments are critical to development.  They demonstrate the limits of what is available, what critical gaps exist and how current technologies might fill those gaps.
> 
> Canada's most fortunate and secure position should be resulting in the world's most experimental force.  Not the most conservative force.
> 
> And to achieve that, with the world's most uninterested government, that has to mean using the available kit in the most outrageous manners possible while incremental additions are made.  Increments from internal workshops, civilian market (non milspec) and freebies from vendors.  And whatever government grants can be scrounged.
> 
> In other words, act like every other shoe-string start up with a bright idea.    You need one department that throws out the rule book and plays.



Come to that... doesn't that department already exist?  How does it integrate with F Echelon and the Operational Units?






						Future Force Design - Canada.ca
					

As Minister of National Defence, it is my privilege to present the 2020-21 Departmental Results Report for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).




					www.canada.ca
				




2020-2021 - 2223 people (FTE) with 881,591,666 CAD to spend

Money being spent on cyber, comms and Transport Canada projects rather than buying half a dozen Javelins to bolt on to LAVs and deploy on foot.  Leasing 4 M109s for Maple Resolve.   Or at least sending some gunners down to the US to train on them in a unit and invite the Yanks to bring their guns to Maple Resolve.  Experimental purchases of the full range of CG-84 ammunition to play with on exercise.

Chopping and channeling a couple of TAPVs to see what has to be done to make them acceptable rides......

I could go on but there are other much better qualified to rant than me.   HIMARS, NASAMS-GBAD-CSC overlaps....


----------



## Weinie

KevinB said:


> I don’t disagree, but given that Canada isn’t in a shooting war currently, there is some ability to acquire items that are needed deficiencies.   The world isn’t exactly a stable place, I would suggest that given the massive gaps that are in the CAF that a pressing need to fill those gaps exist.
> 
> Canada needs a modernized Defence White Paper to make a goal to work forward too.
> 
> The last holistic look at Defence in Canada was Perrin Beatty’s 1987 WP
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A defence plan for Canada | Maclean's | JUNE 15, 1987
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> archive.macleans.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *Until that is done, it’s just rearranging deck chairs.*


Nailed it. SSE was a tick in the box, instead of a way forward. Promises made were not met, future capabilities were not capitalized, and the PY promises/initiatives were re-allocated or cut. It is/was a shit-show, yet people keep trotting it out (because we have nothing else/in the absence of anything else).


----------



## Kirkhill

Place to start....

TAPVs - generally agreed to be surplus to requirement.

Hand 24 of them over to DRDC, 6 with RWS and 18 clean utility.   Have them evaluate the beasts.  Enumerate the faults.  Find fixes.  And then use them as platforms to find out what capabilities they can realistically support once they are fixed as much as they can be.

But make sure there are some field soldiers holding the engineers' hands.  And bring the trial units into the field on exercises like Maple Resolve for evaluation.

Some of those capabilities might be tranferrable to LAVs, LUVs or even CCVs.






						Defence Research and Development Canada research centres - Canada.ca
					

DRDC operates eight research centres across Canada, each with a unique combination of expertise and facilities to carry out world-class science and technology research.




					www.canada.ca


----------



## GK .Dundas

Please tell me the almost 1200 various types of M113s haven't all been converted to hubcaps or something?


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Or at least sending some gunners down to the US to train on them in a unit and invite the Yanks to bring their guns to Maple Resolve.


The 12 M109A6 Paladins of the two batteries of the 1st Bn of the 148th FAR of the Idaho National Guard enter the chat. Or the two batteries of HIMARS of the 2nd Bn of the 300th FAR of the Wyoming National Guard enter the chat.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The 12 M109A6 Paladins of the two batteries of the 1st Bn of the 148th FAR of the Idaho National Guard enter the chat. Or the two batteries of HIMARS of the 2nd Bn of the 300th FAR of the Wyoming National Guard enter the chat.
> 
> 🍻


Calgary Highlanders have (or had) an annual cross-border social event with the Washington State National Guard in Spokane.   There are exploitable links all along the border.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Come to that... doesn't that department already exist?  How does it integrate with F Echelon and the Operational Units?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Future Force Design - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> As Minister of National Defence, it is my privilege to present the 2020-21 Departmental Results Report for the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.canada.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 2020-2021 - 2223 people (FTE) with 881,591,666 CAD to spend
> 
> Money being spent on cyber, comms and Transport Canada projects rather than buying half a dozen Javelins to bolt on to LAVs and deploy on foot.  Leasing 4 M109s for Maple Resolve.   Or at least sending some gunners down to the US to train on them in a unit and invite the Yanks to bring their guns to Maple Resolve.  Experimental purchases of the full range of CG-84 ammunition to play with on exercise.
> 
> Chopping and channeling a couple of TAPVs to see what has to be done to make them acceptable rides......
> 
> I could go on but there are other much better qualified to rant than me.   HIMARS, NASAMS-GBAD-CSC overlaps....




The more I think about this the more annoyed I become.

0.9 BCAD is not chump change.  It is about 4% of the Defence Budget.  

I see the Navy and the Air Force seem to be fully exploiting the opportunities with big budget, long term projects.  The Government certainly is exploiting the budget with crossovers into Transport Canada, DFO, Energy, Arctic, Environment, Pollution, Security, Disaster Management and Emergency Preparedness....

Is the Army doing all it can to exploit the opportunity with near term combat arms experimentation - new systems, modifications, tactics, techniques and procedures?


----------



## Kirkhill

A bunch of students, 1.5 MUSD and 18 months








						Students Teach Army About Rapid Prototyping
					

Students Teach Army About Rapid Prototyping




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org


----------



## IKnowNothing

Moreso on the topic of making the best of what we have. Given the things a TAPV can do vs. the things a TAPV can't do, the RCAC's desire to go Cavalry, and the potential to have 2 Bde's tasked primarily with COIN/peacekeeping/QRF, it seems to me that the question becomes whether or not LAV mounted mech battalions outside of 1 CMBG make sense, and I think the answer is no.  

Whether it's 3 combined arms battalions or 1 tank regiment + 2 mech Bn's, the maneuver units of 1CMBG will eat up ~2 battalion sets of LAV's.  Three more sets + LRSS has all three armoured regiments mounted as LAV based cavalry (strap on ATGM's and UAV's as needed, dismount scout and tank hunter teams).  6th set pre-positioned to Europe with a squadron worth of tanks to have a flyover combined arms BG.  RCR and 22 go light with TAPV's assigned for COIN/convoy escort/ protected mobility as needed for non-peer fight taskings .


----------



## Kirkhill

ACSV for the infantry.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> ACSV for the infantry.


ACSV line is already going to be stretched thin with gap filling, 20-30 hulls to each of AGM, RiWP, and Spike N-Los makes a dent


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> A bunch of students, 1.5 MUSD and 18 months
> 
> View attachment 73765
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Students Teach Army About Rapid Prototyping
> 
> 
> Students Teach Army About Rapid Prototyping
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.nationaldefensemagazine.org


Oh. the stories I could tell about students and rapid prototyping projects for people...
   Sadly all Classified


----------



## AmmoTech90

Kirkhill said:


> Hand 24 of them over to DRDC, 6 with RWS and 18 clean utility. Have them evaluate the beasts. Enumerate the faults. Find fixes.


Do not do this.  It is not DRDCs job.  R&D is.  They get stuck doing shit like this and produce long, off target reports too late.
Use LETE for this.  Oh wait.  Army grown ups don't care enough about technical stuff to do anything serious about fixing short comings in a fast and good manner.  They were given the opportunity to take two out of three options and chose cheap.


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> Moreso on the topic of making the best of what we have. Given the things a TAPV can do vs. the things a TAPV can't do, the RCAC's desire to go Cavalry, and the potential to have 2 Bde's tasked primarily with COIN/peacekeeping/QRF, it seems to me that the question becomes whether or not LAV mounted mech battalions outside of 1 CMBG make sense, and I think the answer is no.
> 
> Whether it's 3 combined arms battalions or 1 tank regiment + 2 mech Bn's, the maneuver units of 1CMBG will eat up ~2 battalion sets of LAV's.  Three more sets + LRSS has all three armoured regiments mounted as LAV based cavalry (strap on ATGM's and UAV's as needed, dismount scout and tank hunter teams).  6th set pre-positioned to Europe with a squadron worth of tanks to have a flyover combined arms BG.  RCR and 22 go light with TAPV's assigned for COIN/convoy escort/ protected mobility as needed for non-peer fight taskings .


Again I wonder who's crack pipe thinks that Wheeled vehicles for the Infantry are a good match for Tracked Tanks...


----------



## dangerboy

AmmoTech90 said:


> Do not do this.  It is not DRDCs job.  R&D is.  They get stuck doing shit like this and produce long, off target reports too late.
> Use LETE for this.  Oh wait.  Army grown ups don't care enough about technical stuff to do anything serious about fixing short comings in a fast and good manner.  They were given the opportunity to take two out of three options and chose cheap.


Unfortunately LETE was closed down, I think the mid-1990s. We have CATEU (Canadian Army Trials and Evaluation Unit) now but I don't know if they have the same capabilities as LETE (I am not knowledgable on LETE). But I agree it should not be given to DRDC, they are best used for future capabilities research.


----------



## AmmoTech90

Yeah, I missed the sarcasm emoji for the LETE comment.  The Trial and Error unit could probably do a good job but they are not equipped for automotive and electromech testing like LETE was.
QETE might be able do some work, again not set up for automotive work.


----------



## McG

dangerboy said:


> Unfortunately LETE was closed down, I think the mid-1990s. We have CATEU (Canadian Army Trials and Evaluation Unit) now but I don't know if they have the same capabilities as LETE (I am not knowledgable on LETE). But I agree it should not be given to DRDC, they are best used for future capabilities research.


I think LESC is marketing themselves as being capable of doing some of this design improvement and technical evaluation stuff, but don’t think they are anywhere near the resources that LETE had.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Again I wonder who's crack pipe thinks that Wheeled vehicles for the Infantry are a good match for Tracked Tanks...



The Department of ‘Meh.. Good Enough’?


----------



## GK .Dundas

KevinB said:


> Again I wonder who's crack pipe thinks that Wheeled vehicles for the Infantry are a good match for Tracked Tanks...


That was just one of the reasons I even brought up the  M 113 .


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Again I wonder who's crack pipe thinks that Wheeled vehicles for the Infantry are a good match for Tracked Tanks...


When they were bought the C2 Leopard tanks were heading to the scrap pile. Tanks became an Afghanistan imperative. At that point it became a matter of do the best you can with what you have.

I think that you and I are in the minority on this forum (and probably in the Canadian Army) that think that tracked tanks are best supported by tracked IFVs.

I'll accept LAVs working with tanks only so long as is necessary to define a project looking for a tracked IFV.



GK .Dundas said:


> That was just one of the reasons I even brought up the  M 113 .


Sometimes when I ponder the good use that was made of the TLAVs a decade and a half ago, I wonder if there is still life left in them.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> When they were bought the C2 Leopard tanks were heading to the scrap pile. Tanks became an Afghanistan imperative. At that point it became a matter of do the best you can with what you have.
> 
> I think that you and I are in the minority on this forum (and probably in the Canadian Army) that think that tracked tanks are best supported by tracked IFVs.
> 
> I'll accept LAVs working with tanks only so long as is necessary to define a project looking for a tracked IFV.
> 
> 
> Sometimes when I ponder the good use that was made of the TLAVs a decade and a half ago, I wonder if there is still life left in them.
> 
> 🍻



For the record I am fine with tracks supporting tracks.  If tanks are going to support wheels then the crews need their own tank transporters to keep up with the wheels on the highways.

Leos and CV90s and even M109s sound right if you are having a proper Heavy Brigade - but if that then you better get a really fast Big Honking Ship.

The same ship can haul the LAV brigade as well - complete with wheeled SPHs, LRPFs and GBAD.

As to the light battalions/battle groups/brigades ...  I've run out of puff.


----------



## Kirkhill

For sh*ts and grins I compared the TAPV to the M1117 ASV


TAPVASVLengthm6.81​6​Widthm2.75​2.6​Height-Hullm2.39​2.215​Height - OAm3.21​2.6​Height - Turretm0.82​0.385​Clearancem0.635​0.46​Weightkg18,500​13,400​Tires16.00 R20 XZL14.00 R20XZLRWS/TurretOff Centre Right FrontDead Centre5 Tonnes heavierSitting 6 inches higherStanding 2 feet tallerTurret off center right front instead of Dead CenterTires rated for 55 mph (89 km/h) not 110 km/h


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile.... the Brits



> The Defence Secretary would not “speculate” on the parts of the Armed Forces that would grow as a result of the uplift, saying “we need to look at the lessons” of Ukraine.
> 
> He added: “It’s highly likely we will grow the Army but it might not be the places that your armchair generals want you to, because* what we desperately need is to, for example, invest in our ISR [Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] capability*.
> 
> “People will always talk about the regiments – ‘will you bring back the Rifles’, or whatever it is. *We are more likely to be bringing about artillery batteries and more signals intelligence and more electric warfare, and certainly counter-UAV capabilities*. If we can’t bring down those little drones, we are very vulnerable, no matter who you are.”





> In his first interview since Ms Truss entered Downing Street earlier this month, Mr Wallace disclosed that the Prime Minister had made clear that enacting her campaign pledge to increase defence spending to 3 per cent of GDP would be a priority for the Government.
> 
> “She said from day one, ‘be under no illusion, I mean it,’” Mr Wallace said. “It’s one of her clear priorities as a Prime Minister that we are going to invest and spend the money.” He said the pledge amounted to an annual defence budget of about £100 billion by 2030 - an increase of £52 billion on the current sum.











						Armed Forces to grow thanks to £52bn spending boost
					

Ben Wallace tells The Telegraph that after decades of cuts, the military will increase in size as Liz Truss responds to Russian aggression




					www.telegraph.co.uk


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Meanwhile.... the Brits
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Armed Forces to grow thanks to £52bn spending boost
> 
> 
> Ben Wallace tells The Telegraph that after decades of cuts, the military will increase in size as Liz Truss responds to Russian aggression
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.telegraph.co.uk



And, of course, the first new unit is a Guards Battalion dedicated to ceremonial duties.









						Second Battalion Irish Guards reactivated after 75 years
					

The battalion, which was disbanded in 1947, will see new soldiers hone their "discipline and skills" by performing ceremonial duties.




					www.forces.net


----------



## Brad Sallows

"Discipline and skills"...just give them the time and address of the monthly Dungeon Night meeting and they will learn discipline, and some skills.


----------



## Kirkhill

New videos from Battle Order  - Infantry Support Future and HIMARS 









						Future Weapons for U.S. Army Infantry?
					

New video on platforms being looked at by the army. 1. An "enhanced 81mm" with the range of a 120mm mounted on an Infantry Squad Vehicle for airborne/air assault 2. An XM25 type thing with dialable direct fire airburst grenades (the Precision Grenadier System or PGS) 3. And a combined...




					www.battleorder.org
				












						Organization of U.S. Missile Arty Batteries (HIMARS + MLRS)
					

A new detailed look at the organization and equipment of U.S. Army and Marine Missile Artillery Batteries, with details on both M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS units.




					www.battleorder.org
				












						Tactical Guide to HIMARS/MLRS Missile Artillery
					

New video on HIMARS and MLRS, including a platform overview; the capabilities and types of munitions; how they're employed organizationally in the US Army, US Marine Corps, British Army, and Japanese GSDF; notes on Ukraine; tactics on the ground; and limitations.




					www.battleorder.org
				




Keep in mind the USMC MEU, dealing with long ranges, is swapping its cannons for HIMARs.


----------



## McG

Kirkhill said:


> Keep in mind the USMC MEU, dealing with long ranges, is swapping its cannons for HIMARs.


They are also planning to fight a war across island chains, which is a substantially different problem set that fighting across any continent.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> They are also planning to fight a war across island chains, which is a substantially different problem set that fighting across any continent.



For 'Islands' think 'Unsinkable aircraft carriers'....


US Scrambling to Check Growing Chinese Influence in Pacific Islands​*
Maintaining Strong Ties with Pacific Islands*

The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)—collectively known as the Freely Associated States (FAS)—entered a Compact in the late 1980s with the US, promising to provide security and defense in exchange of freely accessing the surrounding waters of these sovereign states. Throughout the next decade, these agreements didn’t only involve transactional relationships but also weaved both societal and cultural ties that bolstered “economic, education, and interpersonal linkages,” which eventually became the heart of the Compact. However, the agreement is set to expire in 2023 and 2024, and if not renegotiated, the report warned that FAS could look to China for funding and support.










						US Scrambling to Check Growing Chinese Influence in Pacific Islands
					

Experts warn Washington about China's geopolitical expansion into the Pacific Islands, saying it could pose a challenge to US interests.




					sofrep.com


----------



## Kirkhill

McG said:


> They are also planning to fight a war across island chains, which is a substantially different problem set that fighting across any continent.



But is it different to fighting across 7000 km of a continent with widely dispersed settlements poorly connected by roads?


----------



## WestIsle

daftandbarmy said:


> And, of course, the first new unit is a Guards Battalion dedicated to ceremonial duties.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Second Battalion Irish Guards reactivated after 75 years
> 
> 
> The battalion, which was disbanded in 1947, will see new soldiers hone their "discipline and skills" by performing ceremonial duties.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.forces.net


It would appear that this is more so the incremental companies associating with 2nd battalion despite it not being a full establishment. This is due to the 1st battalion being a SFA unit which requires far fewer troops then a regular battalion.


----------



## daftandbarmy

WestIsle said:


> It would appear that this is more so the incremental companies associating with 2nd battalion despite it not being a full establishment. This is due to the 1st battalion being a SFA unit which requires far fewer troops then a regular battalion.



Guards breed like rabitts... it's best to keep a jaundiced eye on them, especially since the Queen's Funeral


----------



## Kirkhill

> Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – drones – have made the tank obsolete, we are told. We are on the brink of nuclear weapons being used in Europe. And information and cyber warfare have fundamentally changed the nature of conflict. All of these assertions have elements of truth in them, which is why they get repeated.
> 
> But they are far from the whole story.





> The reality is that all of these things – and more – are changes of degree. They are changes of mode in the manner of prosecution of war. But they are not changes to the substance of warfare. The nature of war has not changed since man fought as bands of hunter-gatherers on the African savannah. It is still – primarily and fundamentally – a deeply psychological phenomenon. It is still a contest between evolved human brains.
> 
> The same dynamics of advance, retreat, feint, ruse, confidence and fear decide the outcomes of battles, and of wars. The physicality of war - the bombs, bullets and bayonets - are merely there to affect your enemy's state of mind, as was illustrated so clearly two weeks ago when Ukraine’s recapture of Russian-occupied territory prompted many frightened Russian soldiers to surrender or flee their positions.
> 
> This fundamental psychological truth about warfare tells us some other things as well. It tells us that strategy – how you change your enemy’s psychology and make them do what you want – is supreme. It also tells us that logistics – your resources or tools for the job – are of crucial importance. And it tells us that morale – that ancient intangible of camaraderie and esprit de corps – is a battle winner.
> 
> The side that has these three things right – strategy, logistics and morale – will win the war. And this was as true in the Neolithic Period as it is in the new millennium.





> Strategy, logistics and morale: Why the fundamentals of war haven’t changed​The way to destroy an enemy hasn't altered since we fought as bands of hunter-gatherers on the African savannah – and Ukraine proves it
> 
> ByMike Martin 25 September 2022 • 7:00am











						Strategy, logistics and morale: Why the fundamentals of war haven’t changed
					

The way to destroy an enemy hasn't altered since we fought as bands of hunter-gatherers on the African savannah – and Ukraine proves it




					www.telegraph.co.uk
				




So what force structure can we sustain that will have the greatest impact on an enemy's morale?


----------



## GK .Dundas

As near as I can tell we've been debating the organizational set of a light armour/ cavalry regiment / squadron for damned near 50-60 years. 
That has to a record in indecisiveness even for us.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The Department of ‘Meh.. Good Enough’?



Seems to work for the USAF....






						Air Force Clears Tanker for Refueling Mission with Work Arounds
					

Air Force Clears Tanker for Refueling Mission with Work Arounds




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				




And other departments.  Sounds as if there is an increasing emphasis on working in the near term with what is available, despite unsettling the accountants.






						Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve Launching Despite Funding Uncertainty
					

Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve Launching Despite Funding Uncertainty




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				








						Army Taking Incremental Approach to Fielding New Missile
					

Army Taking Incremental Approach to Fielding New Missile




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				








						Uncrewed Aircraft Can Offset Declining Fighter Squadron Capacity, Air Force Official Says
					

Uncrewed Aircraft Can Offset Declining Fighter Squadron Capacity, Air Force Official Says




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				








						B-21 Bomber to Make Public Debut in December
					

B-21 Bomber to Make Public Debut in December




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				








						AFA NEWS: Tests Show Converting C-130s into Amphibious Aircraft ‘Viable’
					

AFA NEWS: Tests Show Converting C-130s into Amphibious Aircraft ‘Viable’




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				




I blame the Ukrainians.  They have reintroduced the concept of "suck it and see".

Let the battlefield be the proving ground.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Actually now that I have had a chance to dig through some my books . 
I was wrong......it wasn't 50-60 years,it was longer turns out we've looking at light armour units since roughly 1946.


----------



## McG

With less than 2.5 years to deliver before posting season 2025, there will be nothing substantial in anything delivered by Force 2025.  There is not enough time to implement any major equipment projects (in fact, we will still be waiting for delivery of things that were promised in SSE) and no major infrastructure projects.  So, we will not have new fleets of currently forecasted vehicles, we will not have substantial relocations of major units (unless units are swapping locations), and there will not be substantial re-allocation of major vehicle fleets to locations that do not currently support lots of vehicles. So the Army's F2025 needs to be the low level changes that set a foundation for the CAF's Objective Force 2030 which will follow.

At the extreme end of ambitious, we might fix PRes, CSS, army training, and light forces structures ... but even this would be a challenge within existing PYs and remaining time.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> At the extreme end of ambitious, we might fix PRes, CSS, army training, and light forces structures ... but even this would be a challenge within existing PYs and remaining time.


Some interesting ideas here but my question is - Is the ARes structure here an end state in and of itself based on an augmentation concept or is it a Phase 1 to a future more rounded total force structure with a mobilization capability?


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Some interesting ideas here but my question is - Is the ARes structure here an end state in and of itself based on an augmentation concept or is it a Phase 1 to a future more rounded total force structure with a mobilization capability?



All things are possible assuming: money


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> All things are possible assuming: money


True enough. But sometimes a plan has many steps before one gets to the desired end state and some of the early teps can be done very, very cheaply.

I'm all in for phased plans that lead to a desired end-state.

🍻


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> Is the ARes structure here an end state in and of itself based on an augmentation concept or is it a Phase 1 to a future more rounded total force structure with a mobilization capability?


I think that would depend on the government’s interest in resourcing the PRes to do more. If no, then this organization is still a stable structure to continue the individual augmentation & domestic response that have dominated the use of PRes through recent decades. If yes, then this organization is a solid foundation from which to build something more.


----------



## GR66

There's an interesting article on pg. 62 of the Canadian Army Journal titled "Freed by Limits" (page 62).

The author (Maj John Kees) looks at some ways of working within the existing equipment and funding restraints to create an Army that isn't bound by a fixed Brigade Group structure and is instead designed for flexible response and adaptation.

I think he has some interesting ideas.  For example, tailoring at least a portion of the force structure to match the reality of our current logistics capabilities and finding novel ways of maintaining capabilities even in the absence of new equipment.

Where I think he's off the mark is the fact that the long lead time for equipment procurement means that you don't realistically have the time to build the force you need to suit a particular situation from too limited an equipment base.  Personnel can be trained more quickly than complex equipment can be built.  We may be able to "borrow" some items from the great Tickle Trunk to the South, but is that really a good strategy for a supposedly  independent nation?

As far as the Army Reserves go, in the absence of a commitment to procure (and maintain, upgrade and replace over time) the huge range of vehicles and equipment required to be the basis for a major expansion of the Army in a conflict then I think augmentation, domestic response, maintenance of certain capabilities that the Reg Force doesn't need on a daily basis and possibly a single Light Brigade Group are likely the best option for the Reserves.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> I think that would depend on the government’s interest in resourcing the PRes to do more. If no, then this organization is still a stable structure to continue the individual augmentation & domestic response that have dominated the use of PRes through recent decades. If yes, then this organization is a solid foundation from which to build something more.


I've probably said this all too often, but governments do not have any interest in the details. They think macro and don't have the knowledge to think micro without input from the military. They leave details to the experts until a political crisis (sexual misconduct I'm looking at you) draws their attention to a micro point.

The CA needs to take on the role of salesmen. It needs to develop a good workable plan that maximizes resources, needs to work out the macro and micro issues in detail, and then needs to sell the politicians on the plan. There are very few people, politicians included, who would not be prepared to agree to a plan that doubles the size of the "effective" Army within the existing manpower and payroll envelope.

The problem is the Army can't come up with a viable plan except to do what its done all along with a few minor tune-ups from time-to-time. The last one we had to turn the CAF from a Cold War Army to a "modern" OOTW medium force was the most short-sighted disaster ever foisted on an organization or government. The capabilities divestments that followed essentially turned a small credible force into a smaller force of limited capabilities. As it stands, the CA is of limited use yet draws significant national resources.

There is quite frankly no need to resource the ARes more. There is a very clear need to resource the Army more but that's irrespective of whether we make the ARes more efficient. IMHO by increasing the capability of the ARes we can probably reduce personnel costs within the Army. (Just as an example, a US Army Stryker brigade combat team [the nearest equivalent of our CMBG] cost $3 billion in direct, indirect and overhead costs each year while an identically equipped ARNG one costs $0.85 billion - less than a third)  Equipment, on the other hand, is what will cost money and appropriate equipment is essential for the CA.  If the CA is not properly equipped then you might as well pack in the whole organization and save the country $6 or 7 billion a year.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Some interesting ideas here but my question is - Is the ARes structure here an end state in and of itself based on an augmentation concept or is it a Phase 1 to a future more rounded total force structure with a mobilization capability?



Sometimes all you can hope for is establishing a firm base for the next step..... whatever that might be.    Some people get confused with complex plans.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Sometimes all you can hope for is establishing a firm base for the next step..... whatever that might be.    Some people get confused with complex plans.


Except the CA is attempting to place a foundation on quicksand…


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Sometimes all you can hope for is establishing a firm base for the next step..... whatever that might be.    Some people get confused with complex plans.


True enough. But the firm base needs to have a second step, or options for several 2nd steps.

Anyone who gets confused by complex plans shouldn't be in a position of leadership either military or political.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> True enough. But the firm base needs to have a second step, or options for several 2nd steps.
> 
> Anyone who gets confused by complex plans shouldn't be in a position of leadership either military or political.
> 
> 🍻


All true...


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Except the CA is attempting to place a foundation on quicksand…



Which hasn't been helped by the hurricane in the maritimes, the war in Ukraine, or internal dithering ...


As the East Coast picks up the pieces post-Fiona, MPs ask themselves what an army is for​Vaccine management, disaster response — can the Canadian Armed Forces do it all? Should it?​
With a major war raging in Ukraine that threatens to get more dangerous, coupled with devastating climate-driven disasters, the Liberal government — as Prevost noted — is labouring behind closed doors to revise its defence policy. 

Unlike the last policy vision, released in 2017, the latest review is being done mostly in-house, without a great deal of public consultation.

The question seems to be whether it will be able to reconcile all of the competing visions that were on display Tuesday.



			https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fiona-canadian-armed-forces-hurricane-atlantic-canada-1.6598003?cmp=newsletter_Morning%20Headlines%20from%20CBC%20News_1613_706097


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Which hasn't been helped by the hurricane in the maritimes, the war in Ukraine, or internal dithering ...
> 
> 
> As the East Coast picks up the pieces post-Fiona, MPs ask themselves what an army is for​​Vaccine management, disaster response — can the Canadian Armed Forces do it all? Should it?​
> With a major war raging in Ukraine that threatens to get more dangerous, coupled with devastating climate-driven disasters, the Liberal government — as Prevost noted — is labouring behind closed doors to revise its defence policy.
> 
> Unlike the last policy vision, released in 2017, the latest review is being done mostly in-house, without a great deal of public consultation.
> 
> The question seems to be whether it will be able to reconcile all of the competing visions that were on display Tuesday.
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/fiona-canadian-armed-forces-hurricane-atlantic-canada-1.6598003?cmp=newsletter_Morning%20Headlines%20from%20CBC%20News_1613_706097



Strangely I find myself in agreement with both the NDP and Cheryl Gallant.




> New Democrat MP Lindsay Mathyssen seemed to suggest that some kind of Rubicon had been crossed in terms of the expectations set for the military — that the military was being called upon to do what both federal and provincial governments should be doing for themselves.





> Using soldiers to bail out provincial health care systems and respond to disasters seemed anathema to Conservative MP Cheryl Gallant.
> 
> "What would the impact [be on] our army's future ability to do its job in a future conflict if the reserve army were to become a climate change defence force, which is what some of our members are suggesting?" Gallant asked.



But is there a common thread with the CAF's problems?   Logistics?  

Government's ability to create cross-party policy and procurement and supply.   Trucks, Vaccines, Doctors, Gas, Fighters, Ships, Guns.

Sewers and Street Lights.

Is it any wonder the Army ends up as a slush fund?


----------



## Halifax Tar

Kirkhill said:


> Strangely I find myself in agreement with both the NDP and Cheryl Gallant.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> But is there a common thread with the CAF's problems?   Logistics?
> 
> Government's ability to create cross-party policy and procurement and supply.   Trucks, Vaccines, Doctors, Gas, Fighters, Ships, Guns.
> 
> Sewers and Street Lights.
> 
> Is it any wonder the Army ends up as a slush fund?



Also from the article:



> "We saw this during the pandemic. The military was called on to do warehouse management, supply chain management," she said, before asking Prevost to reconcile the ordinary tasks the military is asked to perform "with the significant underfunding" of public services.


----------



## FJAG

I don't know if it's just Brewster's style of writing or whether our two attending CAF witnesses were just being cagey or clueless but this shouldn't be much of a debate for the CAF. The CAF is given a piss-pot full of money every year to have a 100,000 folks available at all times to do all of the above as required by the government from time-to-time.

If the CAF needs to be mealy-mouthed in front of a Parliamentary committee then it looks like the CAF does not have clear plans.

To suggest underfunding as an issue when there is a shortfall of 10,000 folks from government authorized personnel levels seems disingenuous.

😖


----------



## GK .Dundas

Let's be honest when you have NDHQ  and Ottawa, do you really need Russia or China, earthquakes, Hurricanes et al ?


----------



## GR66

I'm going to make a couple of assumptions here:

The minimum aspiration for the CA should be to have the capability to deploy and sustain a Brigade Group.  It's the smallest size unit that will allow for a reasonable level of national autonomy in a major military deployment.
Any major combat deployment for the CA will be expeditionary in nature (that includes the Canadian Arctic)
We are unlikely to engage in any major Brigade Group level combat deployment outside a coalition.
The most likely leader and major contributor to any combat coalition we join is the United States.
Given the above I'd argue that it would make sense to establish a close working relationship with the US forces we would be most likely to deploy with and also as much as possible align our future equipment acquisitions to match what those partners are using so as to take advantage of an integrated logistical pipeline.

Looking at the US Army Reg Force Divisions that are geographically closest to us (and therefore easiest to train with) we have:

11th Airborne Division (Arctic Warfare) in Alaska

1st IBCT
2nd IBCT (Airborne)

7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington

1st SBCT
2nd SBCT
81st SBCT (WA NG)

10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York

1st IBCT
2nd IBCT
3rd IBCT

That's two Light Infantry Divisions and a Stryker Division.

Would it then make sense for the CA to align itself with those Divisions as follows:

2nd Canadian Division (aligned with 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY)
     5 Light Infantry Brigade in Valcartier
     51 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 34/35/36/37 Brigades

3rd Canadian Division (aligned with 7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, WA)
     1 Mechanized Brigade in Edmonton
     11 Mechanized Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 38/39/41 Brigades

4th Canadian Division (aligned with 11th Airborne Division in Alaska)
     2 Light Infantry Brigade (Arctic Warfare) in Petawawa
     21 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 31/32/33 Brigades

Tank proficiency could be maintained by having a single Reg Force Tank Squadron in Edmonton (with Abrams tanks replacing our Leopards) and the personnel for two additional Squadrons serving on exchange service with US ABCT units (one squadron worth on exchange and one squadron worth manning schools/on individual training/leave/etc.).  If in time of war we need to field tanks we can acquire the balance of the Squadrons from the US and have trained personnel to man them.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> I'm going to make a couple of assumptions here:
> 
> The minimum aspiration for the CA should be to have the capability to deploy and sustain a Brigade Group.  It's the smallest size unit that will allow for a reasonable level of national autonomy in a major military deployment.
> Any major combat deployment for the CA will be expeditionary in nature (that includes the Canadian Arctic)
> We are unlikely to engage in any major Brigade Group level combat deployment outside a coalition.
> The most likely leader and major contributor to any combat coalition we join is the United States.
> Given the above I'd argue that it would make sense to establish a close working relationship with the US forces we would be most likely to deploy with and also as much as possible align our future equipment acquisitions to match what those partners are using so as to take advantage of an integrated logistical pipeline.
> 
> Looking at the US Army Reg Force Divisions that are geographically closest to us (and therefore easiest to train with) we have:
> 
> 11th Airborne Division (Arctic Warfare) in Alaska
> 
> 1st IBCT
> 2nd IBCT (Airborne)
> 
> 7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington
> 
> 1st SBCT
> 2nd SBCT
> 81st SBCT (WA NG)
> 
> 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York
> 
> 1st IBCT
> 2nd IBCT
> 3rd IBCT
> 
> That's two Light Infantry Divisions and a Stryker Division.
> 
> Would it then make sense for the CA to align itself with those Divisions as follows:
> 
> 2nd Canadian Division (aligned with 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY)
> 5 Light Infantry Brigade in Valcartier
> 51 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 34/35/36/37 Brigades
> 
> 3rd Canadian Division (aligned with 7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, WA)
> 1 Mechanized Brigade in Edmonton
> 11 Mechanized Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 38/39/41 Brigades
> 
> 4th Canadian Division (aligned with 11th Airborne Division in Alaska)
> 2 Light Infantry Brigade (Arctic Warfare) in Petawawa
> 21 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 31/32/33 Brigades
> 
> Tank proficiency could be maintained by having a single Reg Force Tank Squadron in Edmonton (with Abrams tanks replacing our Leopards) and the personnel for two additional Squadrons serving on exchange service with US ABCT units (one squadron worth on exchange and one squadron worth manning schools/on individual training/leave/etc.).  If in time of war we need to field tanks we can acquire the balance of the Squadrons from the US and have trained personnel to man them.


Look at Corps level down here, not Div.
   XVIII Airborne, and III Corps are probably the ones to tie into.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Look at Corps level down here, not Div.
> XVIII Airborne, and III Corps are probably the ones to tie into.


10th Mountain is in XVIII Airborne Corps

The problem with III Armored Corps is that all its component Divisions are in the South so more difficult to train with.  Also, well it's an Armored Division and that's one area of equipment we're sorely lacking in.  There's only two SBCTs in the whole Corps so not only would logistics not tie in well together but frankly we'd have difficulty keeping up with the rest of the Corps.

I Corps (with 7th ID and 11th Airborne) is both closer and composed with a mix of Stryker and Light Brigades which suit our current vehicle set.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Given the above I'd argue that it would make sense to establish a close working relationship with the US forces we would be most likely to deploy with and also as much as possible align our future equipment acquisitions to match what those partners are using so as to take advantage of an integrated logistical pipeline.


I've always been a proponent of such alignment and think it is both desirable and critical.

I'll add two additional organization:

1) the 34th ID (ARNG) headquartered in Arden Hills, Minnesota. It encompasses and coordinates the training of the following including two ABCTs centred on Minnesota and Idaho, two IBCTs centred on Indiana and Wisconsin and an Aviation Brigade centred on Minnesota.







2) The 42nd ID (ARNG) headquartered in Troy, NY with IBCTs centred on New York State, New Jersey and Vermont and an aviation brigade in New York.






There's actually a lot of synergy that could be generated (and is already being generated informally) between CA ARes units and the ARNG. A lot more could be done on a wider basis if we reformed our own system first.

🍻


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## rmc_wannabe

FJAG said:


> There's actually a lot of synergy that could be generated (and is already being generated informally) between CA ARes units and the ARNG. A lot more could be done on a wider basis if we reformed our own system first.
> 
> 🍻


Hey whoa.... the Pictou Fusiliers stormed the beaches of Normandy in 1944 and the section+ they parade twice a month takes great pride in that.

How dare you suggest trampling on that proud heritage in the pursuit of a more functional ORBAT


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I've always been a proponent of such alignment and think it is both desirable and critical.
> 
> I'll add two additional organization:
> 
> 1) the 34th ID (ARNG) headquartered in Arden Hills, Minnesota. It encompasses and coordinates the training of the following including two ABCTs centred on Minnesota and Idaho, two IBCTs centred on Indiana and Wisconsin and an Aviation Brigade centred on Minnesota.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 2) The 42nd ID (ARNG) headquartered in Troy, NY with IBCTs centred on New York State, New Jersey and Vermont and an aviation brigade in New York.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There's actually a lot of synergy that could be generated (and is already being generated informally) between CA ARes units and the ARNG. A lot more could be done on a wider basis if we reformed our own system first.
> 
> 🍻


100% agree.  I actually looked at those before I posted because there would be good synergy.  Especially with the ABCT in 34th ID.  

I see some advantages in keeping the Reserve Brigade from each Division keeping the same association as their Reg Force counterpart so that they have a more unified sense of direction.  However I also see the advantage of having Canadian Reserve units associated with US Reserve units as they may have many more practical lessons to share about managing part time soldiering than a Reg Force unit would.


----------



## FJAG

rmc_wannabe said:


> Hey whoa.... the Pictou Fusiliers stormed the beaches of Normandy in 1944 and the section+ they parade twice a month takes great pride in that.
> 
> How dare you suggest trampling on that proud heritage in the pursuit of a more functional ORBAT


I know that comes with a healthy dose of sarcasm but in reading "Relentless Struggle" and Reserves 2000's website and material one realizes the tremendous counterproductive gap that exists between the RegF view of the ARes and the politicized ex-leadership of the ARes. One needs to find a happy medium between the dismal reality of the ARes and its realizeable potential.

The trouble is that both sides have some good points but also some stupid ideas which neither will let go of.

I've been puzzling through this as I look at my napkin force from time-to-time. There frankly are no courses of action which will please both sides. In typical lawyer fashion one has to reach a settlement which leaves both sides equally dissatisfied.

I'm someone who doesn't want to throw out the baby with the bathwater by creating a whole new set of numbered battalions or newly named regional units. I believe in keeping alive traditions that are already established as much as possible. I've got a lot of flexibility here but think one could reach a balance with 30/70 / 70/30 units with the following:

1. reduce each of the three RegF infantry regiments to a single 70/30 PPCLI bn, a single 100/0 RCR bn and a single 100/0 R22eR bn;

2. designate 12 - 15 of the strongest ARes battalions across the country as either a 70/30 or a 30/70 battalion;

3. designate 4 additional ARes battalions across the country as depot battalions;

4. designate the GGFG as a public duties battalion;

5. each of items 2, 3 and 4 will be assigned a RegF CO and a large RegF Regt'l HQ staff;

6. all remaining RegF rifle companies not part of serial 1. will be assigned to serials 2 and 3 at the rate of one per 30/70 bn and two per 70/30 bn;

7. all RegF CS and CSS companies will be distributed across the infantry battalions in platoons of appropriate ratios;

8. all remaining ARes bns are reduced to coy strength and assigned to one or another of the 30/70 and 70/30 bns

Similar reallocation will occur for armed, arty, engineer and CSS battalions

I've been toying with a continued affiliation system so that, as an example, the RHLI becomes a 30/70 battalion with a rifle company plus a CS platoon and a CSS platoon from let's say 3 RCR (but moved into the Hamilton area on long tour postings - and probably rebadged as RHLI) as its fully equipped RegF "30" components; an ARes rifle company from the original RHLI in Hamilton; an ARes rifle company from the L&WRegt from St Catherines/Welland and maybe the A&SHighrs as the ARes portion of two CS platoons and two CSS platoons as the "70". Let the RHLI have an honourary colonel and each of the other three ARes "companies" have an honourary LCol and maybe even let them keep their dress uniforms and volunteer bands.

It's not the neatest solution but it preserves important regimental ties and affiliations and the regional connection with the communities while creating a viable battalion with a solid RegF core. It might make the whole program less unpalatable to both sides. I'm way open to other suggestions as to how to make something like this work. 

🍻


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## Kirkhill

7th Infantry Division organization 2021



10th Mountain Div


Both Divs incorporate a National Guard Brigade.


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## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Both Divs incorporate a National Guard Brigade.


Only when Federalized. 
    The workings of our Regular Army  and ARNG are not as easy to put on paper as it appears.  The ARNG belongs to the state, not the Fed Gov, unless activated by the Fed Gov   

Litany of domestic reasons.  

However as Posse Comitatus doesn’t have a similar relative in Canada, you won’t need to worry about the legal hurdles and web of issues that come with the separation of the Regular Army from domestic usage.


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## daftandbarmy

rmc_wannabe said:


> Hey whoa.... the Pictou Fusiliers stormed the beaches of Normandy in 1944 and the section+ they parade twice a month takes great pride in that.
> 
> How dare you suggest trampling on that proud heritage in the pursuit of a more functional ORBAT



There are ARes Colonels and Generals who owe their meteoric rise to the hard work of 30 or so random all ranks in their home regiments ... with boot prints on their backs


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## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Only when Federalized.
> The workings of our Regular Army  and ARNG are not as easy to put on paper as it appears.  The ARNG belongs to the state, not the Fed Gov, unless activated by the Fed Gov
> 
> Litany of domestic reasons.
> 
> However as Posse Comitatus doesn’t have a similar relative in Canada, you won’t need to worry about the legal hurdles and web of issues that come with the separation of the Regular Army from domestic usage.



Got that.  On the other hand the Guard train with the same kit and to the same standards are expected to work with the Regulars when federalized.  No?

As a mobilization model, is there a reason it wouldn't work for FJAG, GR66 and McG?


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## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Got that.  On the other hand the Guard train with the same kit and to the same standards are expected to work with the Regulars when federalized.  No?
> 
> As a mobilization model, is there a reason it wouldn't work for FJAG, GR66 and McG?


There is no reason why it wouldn't work from a Canadian legislative framework point of view.

The ARes's problem's arise out of the "attend when you feel like it" concept of reserve service. There are fixes for most everything through organizational and regulatory changes which are within the control of DND/CAF. Equipment for mobilization is a challenge; equipment for training is doable through reorganization. Employer/employee legislation needs a big fix but is not a deal breaker, it's a speed bump to retaining well trained middle tier leaders.

Yes. The ARNG could be a mobilization model. I think, however, in adopting it outright, with continuing senior ARes leadership, we might retain many of the current weaknesses. I think that a 30/70-based system would make supressing those weaknesses easier. One needs to make career soldiers responsible and accountable for their blended units within a framework that enables proper training activities suitable for ARes members.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> There is no reason why it wouldn't work from a Canadian legislative framework point of view.
> 
> The ARes's problem's arise out of the "attend when you feel like it" concept of reserve service. There are fixes for most everything through organizational and regulatory changes which are within the control of DND/CAF. Equipment for mobilization is a challenge; equipment for training is doable through reorganization. Employer/employee legislation needs a big fix but is not a deal breaker, it's a speed bump to retaining well trained middle tier leaders.
> 
> Yes. The ARNG could be a mobilization model. I think, however, in adopting it outright, with continuing senior ARes leadership, we might retain many of the current weaknesses. I think that a 30/70-based system would make supressing those weaknesses easier. One needs to make career soldiers responsible and accountable for their blended units within a framework that enables proper training activities suitable for ARes members.
> 
> 🍻



The ARes' main issue is not 'attend when you feel like it' as much as it is 'serve under really bad leaders, both Reserve and Reg F, because there's no one else available'.

You can pour millions into it, and fix all the legislation you want, but when the leadership competence ceiling for ARes is about Major/MWO (and that's a big stretch in many cases), and the Reg F continues to use the ARes as a dumping ground for misfits, you'll be throwing good money/effort after bad.


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## Rifleman62

daftandbarmy said:


> The ARes' main issue is not 'attend when you feel like it' as much as it is 'serve under really bad leaders, both Reserve and Reg F, because there's no one else available'.
> 
> You can pour millions into it, and fix all the legislation you want, but when the leadership competence ceiling for ARes is about Major/MWO (and that's a big stretch in many cases), and the Reg F continues to use the ARes as a dumping ground for misfits, you'll be throwing good money/effort after bad.


You hit the nail on the head. Dumping ground.



> There are ARes Colonels and Generals who owe their meteoric rise to the hard work of 30 or so random all ranks in their home regiments ... with boot prints on their back.


Personally served with them. Stopped counting at five.


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## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> The ARes' main issue is not 'attend when you feel like it' as much as it is 'serve under really bad leaders, both Reserve and Reg F, because there's no one else available'.
> 
> You can pour millions into it, and fix all the legislation you want, but when the leadership competence ceiling for ARes is about Major/MWO (and that's a big stretch in many cases), and the Reg F continues to use the ARes as a dumping ground for misfits, you'll be throwing good money/effort after bad.


Does that not lend itself to the idea that there should not be separate Reg Force units and Reserve Force units but rather just Army units with varying percentages of Full-time and Part-time members?


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Does that not lend itself to the idea that there should not be separate Reg Force units and Reserve Force units but rather just Army units with varying percentages of Full-time and Part-time members?



I'm guessing it should be something like that.

Right now - IMHO - we have created the equivalent of a third world country in the Canadian Army, and people are wandering around congratulating themselves as if they've actually accomplished something meaningful, you know, kind of like the US military did with the ARVNs just before the Tet Offensive .


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## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> I'm guessing it should be something like that.
> 
> Right now - IMHO - we have created the equivalent of a third world country in the Canadian Army, and people are wandering around congratulating themselves as if they've actually accomplished something meaningful, you know, kind of like the US military did with the ARVNs just before the Tet Offensive .


We have indeed. 

At the best of times, the lack of proper training and experience in both the ARes's officer corps and senior NCO corps as you get above lieutenant and sergeant level generally ensures poor leadership in garrison and definitely in combat. One can always find the exception to the rule and discover an exceptional individual but in general the system leaves even them lacking the proper foundation to develop their excellence.

This is why the ARNG model is not the best either because even there you have a 'last man standing' factor which still leads to promotion to the most senior levels. Training may be more uniform as between the Active Army and the ARNG but experience can be lacking. The mass of rotations through Iraq and Afghanistan by the ARNG (and for that matter many ARes officers and NCOs have helped with experience.

My belief is that by blending the 30/70 70/30 units under RegF leadership the RegF can't simply dump its less capable officers and NCOs with the reserves. Leaders at all levels above, say, sergeant and Capt, will have had both RegF training and experience as RegF personnel and will be evaluated for their future careers by RegF personnel in competition with their peers as they lead and develop both their RegF and ARes subunits and personnel.

There is still some room for exceptional ARes officers and NCOs to rise to higher ranks but essentially they will be limited to the ones who have had the requisite training and experience along the way. 

It's by no means a perfect solution but it is a viable one that has a chance of succeeding while any ones that retain pure ARes units will always result in there being second class status associated with them.

As an aside, while leadership is very important, the development of the personnel and units themselves depends entirely on the training given them. We need to first create a common training standard at the DP1 level to ensure that every soldier, RegF and ARes, comes to their unit with a common level of training. That's where I see depot battalions that provide a mandatory common training standard for all DP1 (and later voluntary DP2 trainees) 

Thereafter, to ensure that the units can function as units there has to be an adequate minimum level of collective training at the sub unit level within a unit framework. That means that units need for to be relieved of responsibilities for individual training (by the depot battalions) to concentrate on collective training only. That also means that we establish a mandatory training regime/cycle for the ARes members and elements of each unit that allows meeting the minimum standard but in a rigorously consistent way that facilitates attendance by ARes members. I see that through ten months of a single 2.5 day weekend per month and a a single summer exercise of 16.5 days (Friday evening to Sunday evening) for a total of 41.5 mandatory days per year. All other events, additional training, ceremonial occasions social gatherings etc would be purely voluntary.

I'll add one other component. Service contracts need to be for fixed terms to allow the CA to recapture service for the investment made in DP1 training. We already use that concept for education provided with obligatory service contracts. That concept needs expanding so that when we spend time and money on training any soldier to a DP1 level in any trade or classification we get a certain number of years of service as either a RegF or ARes soldier out of them. We can't simply have a soldier walk away with six months notice or by stopping parading. An enrolling soldier must commit themselves to a reasonable fixed term contract before enlistment and be held to the terms of that contract or face consequences if he/she fails to follow through.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

The 7th, 10th and 11th Divisions may offer interesting comparisons for Reg/Res cooperation for the CAF, but looking at the ORBATs shown, something else stood out:  the organization of the artillery.

In the 7th there is an artillery brigade but the battalions stay with their supported brigades - reinforcing the notion of the BCT as the primary combat element and capable of independent action.

In the 10th the artillery is brigaded at the divisional level with the exception of the ARNG BCT that brings its own artillery battalion along with it when it joins the division.  Presumably that battalion then falls under the artillery brigade's command and control.  Does the 10th feel that freeing the light brigade commanders from the artillery enhances their speed of response and flexibility perhaps?

The 11th is still sorting itself out.

The all-singing all-dancing BCT, on the other hand, seems to work well for the ARNG as a plug and play entity when transferred from State to Federal control.

And both the 7th and the 10th could be described as 70/30 Divisions.




Kirkhill said:


> 7th Infantry Division organization 2021
> 
> View attachment 73913
> 
> 10th Mountain Div
> 
> 
> Both Divs incorporate a National Guard Brigade.




As to levels of competence - other armies have retained the traditional difference between the local Captain, his Lieutenants and Sergeants and the Government's officers - the Generals, Colonels, Lt Cols and Majors and the Warrant Officers - all those that wear the Crown in the Canadian system.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Thereafter, to ensure that the units can function as units there has to be an adequate minimum level of collective training at the sub unit level within a unit framework. That means that units need for to be relieved of responsibilities for individual training (by the depot battalions) to concentrate on collective training only. That also means that we establish a mandatory training regime/cycle for the ARes members and elements of each unit that allows meeting the minimum standard but in a rigorously consistent way that facilitates attendance by ARes members. I see that through ten months of a single 2.5 day weekend per month and a a single summer exercise of 16.5 days (Friday evening to Sunday evening) for a total of 41.5 mandatory days per year. All other events, additional training, ceremonial occasions social gatherings etc would be purely voluntary.



For individual training could more emphasis be placed on self-learning through on-line study with one night a week being set aside for supervised TOETs and tutoring?


----------



## foresterab

Been following this for a while and please ignore any errors made through my ignorance.  I'm a civilian, haven't served, but have an interest in ensuring that the Armed Forces of Canada are effective within the constraints imposed by the government.  

I've also only focused on the infantry units because frankly I don't know enough about the service/support units and my understanding of the Armour units was initially wrong.  

Infantry:


Currently 11 primary units (9 infantry battalions) + JTF2 + Governor General Guards for ceremonial purposes
Shift to 11 different units:
Governor General’s Foot Guards – Ceremonial Unit only manned primarily by longer term (6-12 month contract positions) reserve forces
JTF2 – expand to 2 units. The folks that do lots of things only told over beers and outside of media. 100% Reg. force manning
9 separate infantry battalions

Only 1 cap badge per battalion. Intent is to eliminate the regimental godfather blessing and focus on role more.


CFB Edmonton/CFB Wainwright
Princess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry
80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)

Rocky Mountain Rangers (Former PPCLI)
manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)

CFB Shilo
Canadian Grenadier Guards (former PPCLI)
manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)

CFB Petawawa
Royal Canadian Regiment
80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)

CFB Gagetown
The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada (former RCR unit)
manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)

CFB Valcartier
Royal 22nd Regiment
80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)

Fusiliers de St. Laurant (former 22nd regiment)
manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)

Royal Rifles of Canada (former 22nd regiment)
manned up from supplemental order of battle but chosen due to non-specific town/province
80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)



Wikipedia lists 49 units in the reserves some of which have multiple battalions and does not address those with separate Companies.
At approximately 5 units/ regular force unit that means that to fill the missing company each reserve unit would be required to man 2 sections for deployment in the event of ROTO tour.

Training to focus upon 3 major events per year
Fall training dominated by Reg force units
One exercise at a battalion command level, one at brigade.
Rotating exercise locations. Troops move to location and focus (i.e. Yellowknife, Shilo, Chilliwack…)

Late winter training dominated by Reg force units
One exercise at a battalion command level, one at brigade.
Rotating exercise locations. Troops move to location and focus (i.e. Yellowknife, Shilo, Chilliwack…)

Summer training session, not to exceed 2 weeks, for Reserve units.
Full company deployment x5 units + 1x unit from regular force
Should align with all new recruit battle school completed prior to event.

Published schedule 2 years in advance.

Army wide:


Increased number of units to help break the cap badge mafia within Reg Force and promote a wider range of thinking. Tradition is important but there needs to be more than 3 ways of thinking.
Training to be based upon a mix of battalion and brigade level exercises.
Promotion must show competence in leadership at multiple exercises.
Reserve unit performance directly tied performance of battalion commanders.
Battalion and higher rank requires full time Reg Force roles.
Reserve units
ALL UNITS, unless mobilized above, will be rebadged
Rebadging of units will occur based upon provincial name similar to the approach taken by the British Army where this is now the Royal Regiment of Scotland
Each company/troop of units, as associated with the historical unit, will be allowed to retain tartan/hackle/badge within the assembly of each unit.
Unit name also will require endorsement from province or territory.

Mission Focus
Company based unit designed to develop and deploy at primarily section level (basic role) with annual company training (reg force battalion command, reserve force company command)
Performance of Reserve units directly tied to success of regular force units and performance. And vice versa…
Long term taskings (OP REASSURANCE) will be completed with minimum 1 year notice to associated units and reserve units mobilizing 2 sections minimum per unit for deployment. Formal activation of subunit or entire unit if appropriate.
Summer training will be known minimum 2 years in advance state of emergency declared and will be full unit deployment under command of 2 i/c Captain.

Secondary focus:
All armouries will be updated to work as a local state of emergency center. Command and Control centers to allow for use by local civilian agencies to deal with a state of emergency.
Updates depending upon local hazard needs. Not the supply depot but an overlapping command center (if needed) and/or mobilization point.
Supply depots to be keep separate from armoury/unit tasking’s
Includes basic ICS training with specialized knowledge added depending on location (wildfire/flood/earthquake etc..)



It is impossible to figure out exactly what the next major conflict will require but there are aspects to which Canada can train for and become known for:
Small unit leadership. From section to company command we are more and more relying upon effective small unit leaders and even when dealing with the mess of the Ukraine it is the difference in small unit leadership that is most obvious
Heavy emphasis upon night fighting. We were known the for trench raids of WW1 and it’s time to bring that back. Lets utilize a high level of training and ensure that we can punch when the opponent may be weak
Winter training. Winter isn’t going away so we should be not only training in these conditions but a leader within NATO in operating in the cold.
Less training on the static and more both mobility training (i.e. shoot and scoot) and urban training. Conflicts will be where the people are and we don’t train much in urban fighting settings.
No unit is completely manned. This is on purpose as it forces a discussion on a) how to man it up completely and b) forces a unit to rely upon communication with others. Note that it’s a flip/flop between battalion led exercises on who provides the manpower depending upon time of year
Increase emphasis upon plugging and playing units. Complete a brigade exercise at CFB Suffield with BATUS/Strathconas and the PPCLI. A winter training exercise in Norway with a unit from there. RCR’s go to meet with the Marine Corp in Florida….well maybe not that one…

If Canada politically will not fund a full force then we must be as adaptable as possible to be useful, in a meaningful way, to those other resources.
Promotion to general field rank requires:
Proven experience in small unit leadership.
Proven leadership through battalion leadership integrating multiple units into battle plan
May involve 3rd party feedback from allied nations
Planning and supporting a major field exercise
Note this can be either plans or logistics roles for supply folks.
Proven leadership through brigade/fleet exercise.
This will be judged in part through 3rd party observers from allied nations commenting on responses.


----------



## KevinB

foresterab said:


> Been following this for a while and please ignore any errors made through my ignorance.  I'm a civilian, haven't served, but have an interest in ensuring that the Armed Forces of Canada are effective within the constraints imposed by the government.
> 
> I've also only focused on the infantry units because frankly I don't know enough about the service/support units and my understanding of the Armour units was initially wrong.
> 
> Infantry:
> 
> 
> Currently 11 primary units (9 infantry battalions) + JTF2 + Governor General Guards for ceremonial purposes
> Shift to 11 different units:
> Governor General’s Foot Guards – Ceremonial Unit only manned primarily by longer term (6-12 month contract positions) reserve forces
> JTF2 – expand to 2 units. The folks that do lots of things only told over beers and outside of media. 100% Reg. force manning
> 9 separate infantry battalions
> 
> Only 1 cap badge per battalion. Intent is to eliminate the regimental godfather blessing and focus on role more.
> 
> 
> CFB Edmonton/CFB Wainwright
> Princess Patricias Canadian Light Infantry
> 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
> 
> Rocky Mountain Rangers (Former PPCLI)
> manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
> 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
> 
> CFB Shilo
> Canadian Grenadier Guards (former PPCLI)
> manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
> 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
> 
> CFB Petawawa
> Royal Canadian Regiment
> 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
> 
> CFB Gagetown
> The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada (former RCR unit)
> manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
> 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
> 
> CFB Valcartier
> Royal 22nd Regiment
> 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
> 
> Fusiliers de St. Laurant (former 22nd regiment)
> manned up from reserve but chosen due to non-specific town/province
> 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
> 
> Royal Rifles of Canada (former 22nd regiment)
> manned up from supplemental order of battle but chosen due to non-specific town/province
> 80% manning (4 Coy) + 1 Coy (when deploying Reserve) + HQ Coy (Reg force)
> 
> 
> 
> Wikipedia lists 49 units in the reserves some of which have multiple battalions and does not address those with separate Companies.
> At approximately 5 units/ regular force unit that means that to fill the missing company each reserve unit would be required to man 2 sections for deployment in the event of ROTO tour.
> 
> Training to focus upon 3 major events per year
> Fall training dominated by Reg force units
> One exercise at a battalion command level, one at brigade.
> Rotating exercise locations. Troops move to location and focus (i.e. Yellowknife, Shilo, Chilliwack…)
> 
> Late winter training dominated by Reg force units
> One exercise at a battalion command level, one at brigade.
> Rotating exercise locations. Troops move to location and focus (i.e. Yellowknife, Shilo, Chilliwack…)
> 
> Summer training session, not to exceed 2 weeks, for Reserve units.
> Full company deployment x5 units + 1x unit from regular force
> Should align with all new recruit battle school completed prior to event.
> 
> Published schedule 2 years in advance.
> 
> Army wide:
> 
> 
> Increased number of units to help break the cap badge mafia within Reg Force and promote a wider range of thinking. Tradition is important but there needs to be more than 3 ways of thinking.
> Training to be based upon a mix of battalion and brigade level exercises.
> Promotion must show competence in leadership at multiple exercises.
> Reserve unit performance directly tied performance of battalion commanders.
> Battalion and higher rank requires full time Reg Force roles.
> Reserve units
> ALL UNITS, unless mobilized above, will be rebadged
> Rebadging of units will occur based upon provincial name similar to the approach taken by the British Army where this is now the Royal Regiment of Scotland
> Each company/troop of units, as associated with the historical unit, will be allowed to retain tartan/hackle/badge within the assembly of each unit.
> Unit name also will require endorsement from province or territory.
> 
> Mission Focus
> Company based unit designed to develop and deploy at primarily section level (basic role) with annual company training (reg force battalion command, reserve force company command)
> Performance of Reserve units directly tied to success of regular force units and performance. And vice versa…
> Long term taskings (OP REASSURANCE) will be completed with minimum 1 year notice to associated units and reserve units mobilizing 2 sections minimum per unit for deployment. Formal activation of subunit or entire unit if appropriate.
> Summer training will be known minimum 2 years in advance state of emergency declared and will be full unit deployment under command of 2 i/c Captain.
> 
> Secondary focus:
> All armouries will be updated to work as a local state of emergency center. Command and Control centers to allow for use by local civilian agencies to deal with a state of emergency.
> Updates depending upon local hazard needs. Not the supply depot but an overlapping command center (if needed) and/or mobilization point.
> Supply depots to be keep separate from armoury/unit tasking’s
> Includes basic ICS training with specialized knowledge added depending on location (wildfire/flood/earthquake etc..)
> 
> 
> 
> It is impossible to figure out exactly what the next major conflict will require but there are aspects to which Canada can train for and become known for:
> Small unit leadership. From section to company command we are more and more relying upon effective small unit leaders and even when dealing with the mess of the Ukraine it is the difference in small unit leadership that is most obvious
> Heavy emphasis upon night fighting. We were known the for trench raids of WW1 and it’s time to bring that back. Lets utilize a high level of training and ensure that we can punch when the opponent may be weak
> Winter training. Winter isn’t going away so we should be not only training in these conditions but a leader within NATO in operating in the cold.
> Less training on the static and more both mobility training (i.e. shoot and scoot) and urban training. Conflicts will be where the people are and we don’t train much in urban fighting settings.
> No unit is completely manned. This is on purpose as it forces a discussion on a) how to man it up completely and b) forces a unit to rely upon communication with others. Note that it’s a flip/flop between battalion led exercises on who provides the manpower depending upon time of year
> Increase emphasis upon plugging and playing units. Complete a brigade exercise at CFB Suffield with BATUS/Strathconas and the PPCLI. A winter training exercise in Norway with a unit from there. RCR’s go to meet with the Marine Corp in Florida….well maybe not that one…
> 
> If Canada politically will not fund a full force then we must be as adaptable as possible to be useful, in a meaningful way, to those other resources.
> Promotion to general field rank requires:
> Proven experience in small unit leadership.
> Proven leadership through battalion leadership integrating multiple units into battle plan
> May involve 3rd party feedback from allied nations
> Planning and supporting a major field exercise
> Note this can be either plans or logistics roles for supply folks.
> Proven leadership through brigade/fleet exercise.
> This will be judged in part through 3rd party observers from allied nations commenting on responses.


Ignore JTF-2 for this. They are part of CANSOF, as is CSOR. 

The better question is does Canada need 9 Reg Force Infantry Bn’s. 
 To answer that, one needs to know what the Defence policy is, which is still under re-write.


----------



## McG

foresterab said:


> Currently 11 primary units (9 infantry battalions) + JTF2 + Governor General Guards for ceremonial purposes


JTF 2 is not infantry. The Ceremonial Guard is a tiny planning staff that takes on a surge of PRes to execute ceremonial duties in the summer months. The 9 battalions are the only “primary units” of infantry.



foresterab said:


> Only 1 cap badge per battalion. Intent is to eliminate the regimental godfather blessing and focus on role more.


You might find that this actually exacerbates the “godfather” influence within regiments while increases tribalism between regiments.



foresterab said:


> Wikipedia lists 49 units in the reserves some of which have multiple battalions


If it contains multiple battalions, then it is multiple units.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> For individual training could more emphasis be placed on self-learning through on-line study with one night a week being set aside for supervised TOETs and tutoring?



No. Never. Not a chance.

As with most trades the only way to learn your craft properly is through on the job experience, augmented with good, practical in-person course type training. 

Platoon Commanders learn by commanding platoons, Company Commanders companies etc etc. It is reasonable to assume that this could be accomplished within range of the normal mix of currently available courses and training time during the week and weekends. There is alot of work to do to reinforce and improve this training and on the job learning, believe me, but the basics are probably already there within the range of the training year, courses and available RSS support.

However, with few exceptions, anyone at the rank of LCol and CWO - and above - in the militia is probably seriously under trained, has never been tested, selected or performance managed within a competitive process for senior leaders and are, at worst, figureheads. Some of them, because of the 'last man standing' principle, are dangerously incompetent and almost wholly unaccountable for their actions unless they screw up on a large scale.

For example, unlike during my full time service, in over 30 years of militia service I never once saw a militia CO issue orders for anything or really lead anything personally, especially a field exercise of some sort or even during a CAX/CPX. Unless it was a ceremonial parade or social event of some sort, there were no orders given from on high, which isn't any good for the units or the professional development of our most senior leaders. Not all their fault, of course, it's just the way things are run in the nuthouse...

Militia Bde Comds, Generals and their CWO sidekicks? These absurdly outsized roles are seemingly political appointments so the Reg F can claim they are 'listening' to the needs of the militia, as well as being 'fair' to those who want to pursue some kind of upwards part-time career progression. They appear to be mainly 'bag holders' for their Reg F counterparts AFAIC, otherwise there wouldn't still be so many probelms in the militia world writ large.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> In the 10th the artillery is brigaded at the divisional level with the exception of the ARNG BCT that brings its own artillery battalion along with it when it joins the division. Presumably that battalion then falls under the artillery brigade's command and control. Does the 10th feel that freeing the light brigade commanders from the artillery enhances their speed of response and flexibility perhaps?


I'm not sure how far the lessons can go as to the different establishments. Divisionalization is an ongoing process and current structure does not necessarily reflect the future end state.

7th Div is a special case. It's purpose is as a feeder of rotational BCTs to Korea and not the deployment as a division in its own right. Notice the absence of the critical Div Sustainment Brigade/Command. Note that 2 Div in Korea already has both a complete rocket artillery brigade and sustainment brigade but only a single rotational BCT. Currently rotating BCTs come with their organic close support arty bns which plug into the div arty bde.



Kirkhill said:


> The 11th is still sorting itself out.
> 
> The all-singing all-dancing BCT, on the other hand, seems to work well for the ARNG as a plug and play entity when transferred from State to Federal control.


The issue here is whether or not these units are in a pretransitional phase or already at end state. We'll know in due course.

In any organizational changes of artillery there are three key factors to consider: 1. who supplies the fire support coordination cells and forward observers that must accompany the manoeuvre brigades and battalions? 2. who commands the fire units? 3. who provides the logistics support for the fire units?

For ARNG units there are also questions of state control and the line of peacetime administrative & training responsibility. To a certain extent, ARNG firing units are plug and play building blocks that can easily be shuffled around. FSOs and FOs should be training with the manoeuvre bdes and bns with which they are most likely to deploy. Logistics support should either be organic to the division with which the firing units are most likely to deploy with or be developed into a plug and play component that can be easily transferred from the BCT's Brigade Support Battalion to the receiving division. Accordingly we may eventually end up with varying structures for ARNG battalions reflecting those assigned to a combat division (like 10 Mtn) and those kept in a more general pool to be assigned as needed.



Kirkhill said:


> And both the 7th and the 10th could be described as 70/30 Divisions.


They certainly could. For the reasons described in my previous post, I prefer the 70/30 split to be at a lower level, mainly starting at the battalion level. I certainly do like the idea that the the ARNG BCTs in the 7th and the 10th are equipped, manned and organized as a viable fighting formation rather than the administrative situation we have within Canada's CBGs and Divs. The key to a proper 70/30 structure is that the ARes component can be mobilized. In my view the first phase of that is the organizational and training changes followed in due course by the equipment changes needed.


Kirkhill said:


> For individual training could more emphasis be placed on self-learning through on-line study with one night a week being set aside for supervised TOETs and tutoring?


Yes - but I wouldn't say emphasis. Much of the DP1 and 2 level training involves hands-on experience followed by confirmatory exercising to bring the education component into focus and to develop and advance skills and knowledge. We're discussing things in broad and general terms here and I haven't mapped out a comprehensive training scheme but I certainly see all existing education and training tools having a role. What's important, I think, is a uniformity of training at the DP1 and 2 level as between RegF and PRes so as to make individual soldiers equally schooled if not exercised. I see the mass of the ARes being at the DP1 and 2 level with fewer at the DP3 and above where most of the roles will be filled by RegF who have not only had the training but the experience needed. All training, including RegF training should be heavily reviewed and revised to ensure that delivery of all the essential skills are deliverable to ARes trainees as well as RegF ones. That might require having some of it as distance learning or even shortening courses to concentrate on the "must knows" of the position.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> No. Never. Not a chance.
> 
> As with most trades the only way to learn your craft properly is through on the job experience, augmented with good, practical in-person course type training.
> 
> Platoon Commanders learn by commanding platoons, Company Commanders companies etc etc. It is reasonable to assume that this could be accomplished within range of the normal mix of currently available courses and training time during the week and weekends. There is alot of work to do to reinforce and improve this training and on the job learning, believe me, but the basics are probably already there within the range of the training year, courses and available RSS support.
> 
> However, with few exceptions, anyone at the rank of LCol and CWO - and above - in the militia is probably seriously under trained, has never been tested, selected or performance managed within a competitive process for senior leaders and are, at worst, figureheads. Some of them, because of the 'last man standing' principle, are dangerously incompetent and almost wholly unaccountable for their actions unless they screw up on a large scale.
> 
> For example, unlike during my full time service, in over 30 years of militia service I never once saw a militia CO issue orders for anything or really lead anything personally, especially a field exercise of some sort or even during a CAX/CPX. Unless it was a ceremonial parade or social event of some sort, there were no orders given from on high, which isn't any good for the units or the professional development of our most senior leaders. Not all their fault, of course, it's just the way things are run in the nuthouse...
> 
> Militia Bde Comds, Generals and their CWO sidekicks? These absurdly outsized roles are seemingly political appointments so the Reg F can claim they are 'listening' to the needs of the militia, as well as being 'fair' to those who want to pursue some kind of upwards part-time career progression. They appear to be mainly 'bag holders' for their Reg F counterparts AFAIC, otherwise there wouldn't still be so many probelms in the militia world writ large.



I seem to recall a whole bunch of mindless bumf that had to be digested that took up valuable scarce hours on Wednesdays and Weekends.  Dental hygiene springs immediately to  mind.  Lessons on ORBATs.  Where to find QR&Os.  The role of the BOR.  Yadda Yadda.

Even the role, weight and characteristics of the FNC1A1 shoulder fired semi automatic rifle.  I don't know many youngsters that aren't keen and capable of reading up on weapons, vehicles, radios and radars.  

Let them learn on their own time.  Test them in the armouries.   Trial them in the field.  And put them on salary/stipend.

As for leaders and commanders - of course they need to learn on the job.   Their learning is made easier if they have access to information AND troops they don't have to spend time training from scratch.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Yes - but I wouldn't say emphasis. Much of the DP1 and 2 level training involves hands-on experience followed by confirmatory exercising to bring the education component into focus and to develop and advance skills and knowledge.



WRT my previous to D&B.   

For example - soldier shows up on Wednesday night.  Gets a 5 minute confirmatory test to determine if the weapon and safety drills are well understood and spends the next hour and a half with the weapon on a range or simulator and half an hour stripping, cleaning and assembling the weapon and returning it to stores.  Half an hour on adm and prep work for the upcoming monthly weekend exercise.



FJAG said:


> We're discussing things in broad and general terms here and I haven't mapped out a comprehensive training scheme but I certainly see all existing education and training tools having a role. What's important, I think, is a uniformity of training at the DP1 and 2 level as between RegF and PRes so as to make individual soldiers equally schooled if not exercised. I see the mass of the ARes being at the DP1 and 2 level with fewer at the DP3 and above where most of the roles will be filled by RegF who have not only had the training but the experience needed. All training, including RegF training should be heavily reviewed and revised to ensure that delivery of all the essential skills are deliverable to ARes trainees as well as RegF ones. That might require having some of it as distance learning or even shortening courses to concentrate on the "must knows" of the position.
> 
> 🍻



Violent agreement.


----------



## KevinB

IMHO the CA needs to make important distinction between our (US) Orbat and the Canadian. 
   While we are returning to the Div as generally the basic maneuver element, Canada cannot do that simply due to size.  
  If you want to x3 the CA then that would make sense.  
    Canada to me needs to have the Bde as the basic element, for it cannot field a homogeneous Div.  


@FJAG I don’t see the ARNG changing from the BCT  simply as it allows then to train as a combined arms formation outside the Regular Army.  If there where to break up towards a supported Div, the collective training model would suffer (IMHO).


----------



## Kirkhill

New video from Battle Order on the USMC Littoral Squad

Current thinking 

Staff Sgt Squad Leader
Sgt Asst Squad Leader

2x Teams of 6 led by a Sgt each.

Squads to be armed with a common rifle.
MGs, CG84s and Switchblades to be held at Platoon or Company and drawn when necessary.

Key element - The Asst Squad Leader is actually a Joint Fires Observer.

The basic unit of action is the reinforced platoon.


----------



## GR66

McG said:


> You might find that this actually exacerbates the “godfather” influence within regiments while increases tribalism between regiments.


I say we go ahead and make everyone's head explode and just have a Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry.  1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion.....12th Battalion, etc.

One common capbadge across the board.  Historic linkages can be maintained through Battalion "nicknames" like those used by units in the US Army.


*1st Infantry Brigade Combat Team* "Arctic Wolves" located at Fort Wainwright, Alaska
Headquarters and Headquarters Company "Dire Wolves"


 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) "Blackhawk"


 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment "Bobcat"


 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment "Gimlet"


 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment "Legion"


 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment "Automatic"


 70th Brigade Engineer Battalion "Kodiak"


 25th Brigade Support Battalion "Opahey"


----------



## FJAG

foresterab said:


> Been following this for a while


Good for you and a good effort to get into the discussion. I'll just concentrate on a couple of points


foresterab said:


> Only 1 cap badge per battalion. Intent is to eliminate the regimental godfather blessing and focus on role more.


I agree with this. The problem here comes in the multiple ways we use the term "regiment" and "unit". In days of yore, regiments were "units" led by a colonel and which, for tactical reasons could be formed into battalions as required. That went on to be developed into standalone battalions (generally led by a Lieutenant-Colonel) where several battalions could be organized into a "regiment" or a brigade. Currently a "unit" is a battalion sized entity (roughly 4-800 folks) which in the infantry and some services is called a battalion while in others, the armoured corps, and artillery, is called a regiment. To complicate matters further the nine RegF infantry battalions are grouped administratively (not tactically) into three regiments (RCR, PPCLI and R22eR) of three battalions each. A very few ResF infantry regiments are also grouped this way.

What really matters though is that the three infantry "regiments" carry an unequal weight in the Army when it comes to numerous matters that effect everyone as they can quickly form a united front to push their issues. Like you, I believe that this power base needs to be disrupted.


foresterab said:


> Wikipedia lists 49 units in the reserves some of which have multiple battalions and does not address those with separate Companies.
> 
> At approximately 5 units/ regular force unit that means that to fill the missing company each reserve unit would be required to man 2 sections for deployment in the event of ROTO tour.


I'm a little unsure of what you mean by this but let me give you my thoughts. Rifle companies, artillery gun batteries and tank and recce squadrons should be made up of either all RegF soldiers or a very large proportion of ARes soldiers with a small RegF cadre. The reason for this is that the collective fighting skills there need to be taught as a group and because of the time commitments of ARes soldiers it is virtually impossible to integrate them in day-to-day peacetime training. 

RegF soldiers are available for training mostly in the fall to spring with commitments got postings, leave etc during the summer when their kids are out od school. ARes soldiers are mostly involved in school or their work during the fall to spring with a little bit of time available on weekends or evenings but are more open for longer training during summer vacation months. It's simply impossible to do integrated training for a mixed RegF ARes company. The exception is in combat support and combat service support companies where one has to go to the individual platoon level as, for example, mortar platoons, recce platoons and even anti-armour platoons can train independently. Its similar, but not identical for artillery and armour and engineers and service support.

The key then is to find the right level that one can allow a RegF entity and a ARes entity to train separately without compromising the collective training. For the most part that's at the company. Companies should be a single homogeneous entity and not made up of two sections from here or there. One has more flexibility at the battalion level where you can bring together companies from separate groups.


foresterab said:


> Increased number of units to help break the cap badge mafia within Reg Force and promote a wider range of thinking. Tradition is important but there needs to be more than 3 ways of thinking.


I've got no problem with tradition. I think its worth saving but not in such a way that it gets in the way of efficiency. Mafias get in the way of efficiency.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I seem to recall a whole bunch of mindless bumf that had to be digested that took up valuable scarce hours on Wednesdays and Weekends.


I too recall disorganized training there. I think I went through the introduction to the FNC1 lecture three times because of instructor changes and new students dropping in who hadn't had the lecture before.


Kirkhill said:


> For example - soldier shows up on Wednesday night.  Gets a 5 minute confirmatory test to determine if the weapon and safety drills are well understood and spends the next hour and a half with the weapon on a range or simulator and half an hour stripping, cleaning and assembling the weapon and returning it to stores.  Half an hour on adm and prep work for the upcoming monthly weekend exercise.


The problem is when Gunner Bloggins shows up and hasn't done the reading. You suddenly have a split class where someone has to take Bloggins aside and clue him in and hopefully get that done in time for him still to get to the aim of today's lesson.



KevinB said:


> IMHO the CA needs to make important distinction between our (US) Orbat and the Canadian.
> While we are returning to the Div as generally the basic maneuver element, Canada cannot do that simply due to size.
> If you want to x3 the CA then that would make sense.
> Canada to me needs to have the Bde as the basic element, for it cannot field a homogeneous Div.


I kind of agree but ...  😁 I think you need to consider the following:

1. What is the largest entity you think Canada may need to generate at the worst state and build that. Personally with 40,000 plus soldiers we should aim to a field a division as our worst case entity. 

2. Even if all we deploy is a brigade in a worst case scenario it will undoubtably be employed within the framework of an allied division (If anyone will even take us on and not stuff us into a Corps reserve role again). 

3. The worst case entity should be capable of deploying smaller entities for lower end missions or day-to-day peacetime missions. 

Staying with the artillery example you could have:

a. a divisional artillery brigade organized and trained to hive off a CS regiment together with its logistic support train to an independently deployed manoeuvre brigade; or

b. organic BCT artillery battalions and the BSBs support element which can be aggregated into a Canadian or allied pre-existing divisional artillery brigade headquarters.

The key is to be able to have doctrine and a methodology to transform easily, one way or the other, as the mission scales up or down.


KevinB said:


> @FJAG I don’t see the ARNG changing from the BCT  simply as it allows then to train as a combined arms formation outside the Regular Army.  If there where to break up towards a supported Div, the collective training model would suffer (IMHO).


I disagree to the extent that manoeuvre units rarely train in peacetime with their fires delivery elements or CSS. They do need train constantly with their FSO/FSCC and FO/FOO elements. In my 16 years with the guns I can count on the fingers of one hand the number of times guns fired live on exercise in support of a battalion (aside from fire power demonstrations). BCs and FOOs on the other hand were with their battalions often as well as training at other times with the guns in live fire. So far my interviews for the Afghanistan books confirms that even in predeployment training in the early years for Kandahar there were few opportunities taken to integrate live artillery fire into routine manoeuvre training. 

Canada needs to conceptually, maybe even organizationally, separate the FSO/FSCCand FO/FOO dets from the fires delivery elements and their logistics trains. In any event, there needs to be a functional Div Arty headquarters and divisional support element where guns and CSS can be plugged into.

In a perfect world we would use live fires and CSS on all bn and bde exercises but we really don't other than as exceptions rather than the rule. 

All that to say I have no problem with keeping the CS regiment (whether RegF or ARes) with the BCT as long as there is a mechanism to group the guns and the CSS into a pre-existing division and divisional arty HQ and sustainment system. Those BCT artillery battalions need to be technically "managed" by the arty bde HQ and should exercise frequently as divisional fire support. Regardless of how we deploy for major conflict, as either a Canadian brigade or a Canadian division, a Canadian artillery battalion will need to slot into either a Canadian or coalition divisional framework. That doesn't happen overnight. Our data communications systems, our staff systems and our logistics systems right now are not optimized for that. That takes time and practice to get right.



GR66 said:


> I say we go ahead and make everyone's head explode and just have a Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry. 1st Battalion, 2nd Battalion.....12th Battalion, etc.


No! Hell, No! I do not want to see another screwed up unification/integration boondoggle! Head has exploded.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> No! Hell, No! I do not want to see another screwed up unification/integration boondoggle! Head has exploded.
> 
> 🍻


Let each Battalion wear their historical headdress/kilts with their ceremonial dress.  Let each maintain an honourary Lt Col to maintain ties to their community.  Let each Battalion have their own Colours with their Battle Honours.  Have their historical Regimental Name on their shoulder flash...or historical cap badge collar dogs, etc.  (or their own unique ascot if you wish ).

I don't see this as the same thing as Hellyer's unification/integration.  It's not like you're taking sailors and air crew and putting them in Army-like uniforms.  They're all Army already.  They're all the same trade already even.  The UK doesn't seem to have great difficulty changing regiments around over time and somehow the US has managed to scrape through a couple of conflicts with numbered Regiments and Battalions.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I too recall disorganized training there. I think I went through the introduction to the FNC1 lecture three times because of instructor changes and new students dropping in who hadn't had the lecture before.
> 
> The problem is when Gunner Bloggins shows up and hasn't done the reading. You suddenly have a split class where someone has to take Bloggins aside and clue him in and hopefully get that done in time for him still to get to the aim of today's lesson.


Send him home with no pay…



FJAG said:


> I kind of agree but ...  😁 I think you need to consider the following:
> 
> 1. What is the largest entity you think Canada may need to generate at the worst state and build that. Personally with 40,000 plus soldiers we should aim to a field a division as our worst case entity.


I don’t disagree with you, but it needs to be a homogeneous Div, not a Heavy Bde, a Light Bde and a Med Bde.  
   Frankly I think at least Canada should be able to field 3 real Divisions - but as the GoC won’t even equip 1 properly, I’ve given up hoping for sanity.  



FJAG said:


> 2. Even if all we deploy is a brigade in a worst case scenario it will undoubtably be employed within the framework of an allied division (If anyone will even take us on and not stuff us into a Corps reserve role again).
> 
> 3. The worst case entity should be capable of deploying smaller entities for lower end missions or day-to-day peacetime missions.
> 
> Staying with the artillery example you could have:
> 
> a. a divisional artillery brigade organized and trained to hive off a CS regiment together with its logistic support train to an independently deployed manoeuvre brigade; or
> 
> b. organic BCT artillery battalions and the BSBs support element which can be aggregated into a Canadian or allied pre-existing divisional artillery brigade headquarters.
> 
> The key is to be able to have doctrine and a methodology to transform easily, one way or the other, as the mission scales up or down.


I don’t disagree there.  My issue is the Div system doesn’t work well when so many assets are missing. 


FJAG said:


> I disagree to the extent that manoeuvre units rarely train in peacetime with their fires delivery elements or CSS. They do need train constantly with their FSO/FSCC and FO/FOO elements. In my 16 years with the guns I can count on the fingers of one hand the number of times guns fired live on exercise in support of a battalion (aside from fire power demonstrations). BCs and FOOs on the other hand were with their battalions often as well as training at other times with the guns in live fire. So far my interviews for the Afghanistan books confirms that even in predeployment training in the early years for Kandahar there were few opportunities taken to integrate live artillery fire into routine manoeuvre training.


I guess I lived in the boom times. We had 4 Ottawa Militia District live fires when I was in 30RCA, did 2 with 2 RCHA and had two in 1VP. 


FJAG said:


> Canada needs to conceptually, maybe even organizationally, separate the FSO/FSCCand FO/FOO dets from the fires delivery elements and their logistics trains. In any event, there needs to be a functional Div Arty headquarters and divisional support element where guns and CSS can be plugged into.
> 
> In a perfect world we would use live fires and CSS on all bn and bde exercises but we really don't other than as exceptions rather than the rule.


Agree there.    I would think at least 1 Bde a year should be doing a full Bde live fire and ideally all Bde’s more than 2x a year 


FJAG said:


> All that to say I have no problem with keeping the CS regiment (whether RegF or ARes) with the BCT as long as there is a mechanism to group the guns and the CSS into a pre-existing division and divisional arty HQ and sustainment system. Those BCT artillery battalions need to be technically "managed" by the arty bde HQ and should exercise frequently as divisional fire support. Regardless of how we deploy for major conflict, as either a Canadian brigade or a Canadian division, a Canadian artillery battalion will need to slot into either a Canadian or coalition divisional framework. That doesn't happen overnight. Our data communications systems, our staff systems and our logistics systems right now are not optimized for that. That takes time and practice to get right.


I’d argue that if the Bde is resourced properly to do that, the Bde Arty cell could join with the Div/Corp as needed.  
   Of course when you only have 12 guns across the country - does it matter . 


FJAG said:


> No! Hell, No! I do not want to see another screwed up unification/integration boondoggle! Head has exploded.
> 
> 🍻


Retain the units as it, but instead of Regimental’ism post the officers around between all three and make them wear whatever cap badge of the unit they are in.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> The UK doesn't seem to have great difficulty changing regiments around over time and somehow the US has managed to scrape through a couple of conflicts with numbered Regiments and Battalions.


The Brits continue to gripe about these things. The American's started out with numbered regiments from square one. 

I actually like the way the Americans do it. It makes postings really easy with just a change of the odd enamelled badge and maybe a shoulder flash. If I was starting from square one I'd adopt some of that. They even redesignate battalions e.g. from infantry to armour. We did that during WW2 as well as the need arose.

Unfortunately the current system is deeply engrained and I believe in causing as little trauma as possible even when things need to change radically. My motto is "don't sweat the little stuff". We need to reorganize into effective units with effective training. We do not need to willy nilly throw out a 2 1/2 centuries of history.

😁


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Let each Battalion wear their historical headdress/kilts with their ceremonial dress.  Let each maintain an honourary Lt Col to maintain ties to their community.  Let each Battalion have their own Colours with their Battle Honours.  Have their historical Regimental Name on their shoulder flash...or historical cap badge collar dogs, etc.  (or their own unique ascot if you wish ).
> 
> I don't see this as the same thing as Hellyer's unification/integration.  It's not like you're taking sailors and air crew and putting them in Army-like uniforms.  They're all Army already.  They're all the same trade already even.  The UK doesn't seem to have great difficulty changing regiments around over time and somehow the US has managed to scrape through a couple of conflicts with numbered Regiments and Battalions.



I have a strong recollection of showing up at Gagetown with all my kit, as issued from Base and Regimental stores, and the course Warrant, calling out the items on the list.  Those that were short were required to call out their deficiencies.  I wore out my tonsils that day.

Instead of pants, black socks, tunic, beret and forage cap - I was reporting kilt, sporrans, hose, hose tops, spats, Glengarry and Balmoral.

As proud as I was of my Regiment I think everyone should be issued common DEUs.  Keep the Ceremonials for appropriate regimental functions.

I would have worn my Calg Highrs badge on a beret in DEUs and still thought of myself as a Highlander.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Send him home with no pay…



Yup! 

Or if the troops are getting a salary or stipend, with the expectation that they will be doing their homework on their own time, dock him on his next pay cheque for disrupting training.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The Brits continue to gripe about these things. The American's started out with numbered regiments from square one.



For a good chunk of their history many of Britains storied Regiments were hard pressed to field more than 4 or 5 companies of 40 to 50 men.

Yellow fever and dysentery will do that to you.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Send him home with no pay…


Regardless, Distance learning works okay if its on an academic topic that's a stand alone and doesn't lead in to other skills that need to be taught and practiced manually.


KevinB said:


> I don’t disagree with you, but it needs to be a homogeneous Div, not a Heavy Bde, a Light Bde and a Med Bde.
> Frankly I think at least Canada should be able to field 3 real Divisions - but as the GoC won’t even equip 1 properly, I’ve given up hoping for sanity.


We violently agree. You know my model. A division of heavy brigades made up of primarily reservists to do the "in case of fire break glass" work in extreme cases and a second division of light and medium brigades weighed towards full-timers designed to spin off battlegroups or even companies for quick reaction and day-to-day peacetime work.


KevinB said:


> I don’t disagree there.  My issue is the Div system doesn’t work well when so many assets are missing.


That to me is a given. Based on the timeline to generate equipment, one has to stage changes which first work with what we have and then buy the equipment to round it out. There is little to be gained by waiting for equipment before reorganize because you'll just slip back into the status quo.


KevinB said:


> I guess I lived in the boom times. We had 4 Ottawa Militia District live fires when I was in 30RCA, did 2 with 2 RCHA and had two in 1VP.


I expect the 30 Fd ones were more in the nature of staged firepower events rather than unscripted fire and manoeuvre. Even the few actual live fire and manoeuvre exercises we did used normal safety distances. Quite frankly the 13 live fire battle runs I did with the Germans in Shilo with their draft army at the time were more realistic than anything I ever did with the Canadians but nowhere near as realistic as the Brits at BATUS.


KevinB said:


> Agree there.    I would think at least 1 Bde a year should be doing a full Bde live fire and ideally all Bde’s more than 2x a year


I've never been on a Maple Resolve and have no real personal idea how complex they get. In my day the higher the level of the exercise was, the less value it brought at the company level. Based on my experience I think the best trade-off of value that you get is at a battlegroup exercise where everyone gets challenged. I might be wrong, brigade exercises might be better now and they might work well at the simulated level but I still have my doubts about live fire.


KevinB said:


> I’d argue that if the Bde is resourced properly to do that, the Bde Arty cell could join with the Div/Corp as needed.
> Of course when you only have 12 guns across the country - does it matter .


As I said above, I ignore resources because I think it is so vital to shift the paradigm that we need to start while waiting for the resources. Also the two can be done in tandem. When you know the force that needs to be built to meet your defence objectives then it is much easier to define the resources needed to get there. 


KevinB said:


> Retain the units as it, but instead of Regimental’ism post the officers around between all three and make them wear whatever cap badge of the unit they are in.


That I'm fully in favour of. Frankly, in my mind, I see the CA wearing CADPAT (or whatever is in vogue) for 99.9% of the time. They might have a distinctive shoulder badge and hat badge. Hell, I like to see ceremonial parades in fighting order and not S3s. Save those for weddings and funerals. But you are right, if a RegF officer is appointed CO of the RHLI he wears RHLI identifiers and not whatever RegF battalion he served in 10 years ago. Staff officers maybe their last battalion's. We need to separate career management from a regimental title. Maybe all infantry officers in 1 Div are managed as a block. When you only have one PPCLI battalion to staff in the west but seven other battalions then one can expect to change hat badges from time to time. Maybe not sweat what colour stripe is on one's mess dress trousers.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Regardless, Distance learning works okay if its on an academic topic that's a stand alone and doesn't lead in to other skills that need to be taught and practiced manually.
> 
> We violently agree. You know my model. A division of heavy brigades made up of primarily reservists to do the "in case of fire break glass" work in extreme cases and a second division of light and medium brigades weighed towards full-timers designed to spin off battlegroups or even companies for quick reaction and day-to-day peacetime work.
> 
> That to me is a given. Based on the timeline to generate equipment, one has to stage changes which first work with what we have and then buy the equipment to round it out. There is little to be gained by waiting for equipment before reorganize because you'll just slip back into the status quo.


I don't disagree - I think a viable White Paper needs to come first - to give clear guidance to the CA as to what is expected.  The RCAF and RCN seem to have decent vision as to their requirements (albeit I think they are a little myopic on the land support side), but my concern in building anything before a new WP arrives and you will see the Canadian TAPV Bde get kitted out before anything else, and of course more LAV's because everyone needs a personal LAV...



FJAG said:


> I expect the 30 Fd ones were more in the nature of staged firepower events rather than unscripted fire and manoeuvre. Even the few actual live fire and manoeuvre exercises we did used normal safety distances. Quite frankly the 13 live fire battle runs I did with the Germans in Shilo with their draft army at the time were more realistic than anything I ever did with the Canadians but nowhere near as realistic as the Brits at BATUS.


Two of the OMD ones I did in the OP, the problem with scripted means you have to have a competent force...
2 Gun line ones where simply Defensive LF's = so really just pounding rounds down range on both ends.
   But yes in general principle I agree with you -- nearly all the stuff was attempted to be very scripted.
Oh I forgot a W Bty one - but that was basically a FP Ex.
 Suffied is a real training area, one can do a lot within it...



FJAG said:


> I've never been on a Maple Resolve and have no real personal idea how complex they get. In my day the higher the level of the exercise was, the less value it brought at the company level. Based on my experience I think the best trade-off of value that you get is at a battlegroup exercise where everyone gets challenged. I might be wrong, brigade exercises might be better now and they might work well at the simulated level but I still have my doubts about live fire.


As an Infantryman Life Fire Bde Ex's are Boring AF - unless its a live fire defensive with fast air and arty.  MR was after my time, and my only RV was in Div Arty CP with 2 Horse.





FJAG said:


> As I said above, I ignore resources because I think it is so vital to shift the paradigm that we need to start while waiting for the resources. Also the two can be done in tandem. When you know the force that needs to be built to meet your defence objectives then it is much easier to define the resources needed to get there.


Agreed - I'm just jaded on the lack of a clear CAF Defence Policy that seems to allow a lot of random and odd projects to sputter along, with some major gaps being unrealized.


FJAG said:


> That I'm fully in favour of. Frankly, in my mind, I see the CA wearing CADPAT (or whatever is in vogue) for 99.9% of the time. They might have a distinctive shoulder badge and hat badge. Hell, I like to see ceremonial parades in fighting order and not S3s. Save those for weddings and funerals. But you are right, if a RegF officer is appointed CO of the RHLI he wears RHLI identifiers and not whatever RegF battalion he served in 10 years ago. Staff officers maybe their last battalion's. We need to separate career management from a regimental title. Maybe all infantry officers in 1 Div are managed as a block. When you only have one PPCLI battalion to staff in the west but seven other battalions then one can expect to change hat badges from time to time. Maybe not sweat what colour stripe is on one's mess dress trousers.
> 
> 🍻


Staff Officers can wear the RCIC Cap Badge, or even a General Service one - so everyone in those spots are the same.


----------



## foresterab

FJAG said:


> I kind of agree but ...  😁 I think you need to consider the following:
> 
> 1. What is the largest entity you think Canada may need to generate at the worst state and build that. Personally with 40,000 plus soldiers we should aim to a field a division as our worst case entity.
> 
> 2. Even if all we deploy is a brigade in a worst case scenario it will undoubtably be employed within the framework of an allied division (If anyone will even take us on and not stuff us into a Corps reserve role again).
> 
> 3. The worst case entity should be capable of deploying smaller entities for lower end missions or day-to-day peacetime missions.
> 
> Staying with the artillery example you could have:
> 
> a. a divisional artillery brigade organized and trained to hive off a CS regiment together with its logistic support train to an independently deployed manoeuvre brigade; or
> 
> b. organic BCT artillery battalions and the BSBs support element which can be aggregated into a Canadian or allied pre-existing divisional artillery brigade headquarters.
> 
> 🍻


So to follow the 3 key questions being asked here...
1.  Short of a major war declaration (WW2 level) the largest short notice deployment I can see is being a combat brigade (I don't think I have terminology correct here) based upon two regiments and associated support detachments.  This would be paired most likely with a local brigade to flesh out the numbers needed.   A good precedent is the Canadian Army units sent in WW1 which deployed as part of the British Army until such numbers were recruited, mobilized, "trained", and formed into the eventual Canadian Divisions and then years into the conflict the Canadian Corp. 

2. If we are assuming that in the case of large scale conflict we would be in a multinational brigade situation I would hope the defending nation (Latvia? Singapore? Jordan?) would be filling in the gaps.  This is more like the Canadian Army in WW2 with the addition of British and Polish troops under the Canadian Army.   However the capacity that force brings to the brigade is the difference in leadership...if it's just troops and rifles you have much less say than a LAV mobile unit complete with Air Defence, Artillery Support and Field Hospitals.   It is the basis of providing the 2/3rd complete (and 100% complete backup often not mentioned logistics and support forces) that allows the Canadian Force to form the Skelton of an international brigade vs. a Korea like situations where we are just a force of many contributing to the Commonwealth Division.   (Full disclosure I don't know as much about Korea so definitely not trying to downplay Canadian efforts there...it's just my initial impression).

3. This is where I think, under the current manning and taskings there may be a better direction provided.   We have a collection of units that range from section to company to regimental size but try to treat as equals regardless of mission and resourcing provided.   Instead I view it as a collection of administrative units that provide formed section/platoon (Reserves) that fit into a pre-determined Company contained within a parent Reg. Force Unit.   The advantage of Echo Company remaining "unmanned" is that should emergency deployment be required then Bravo Company of Reg Force X can be assigned the mission, as a formed sub unit, until additional mobilization can fill needs.   This is more similar to the later Yugoslavia missions where reserve units were providing a much higher percentage of forces (Roto specific) than Reg Force as I understand and in a much more formed structure than what happened with Afghanistan.   

The other aspect of ensuring as high of caliber smaller unit leadership is looking at what's happening now on the East Coast.  300, now 700 members are deployed to assist in clean up.   But any time I've heard of the military showing up it's common to have them split into subunits (company/platoon/section) for taskings with only CO and others remaining at a central point to coordinate with civilian authorities.   It's not normally 800 troops of a regiment working on the same street or even neighborhood although it has happened in the past.


----------



## KevinB

foresterab said:


> So to follow the 3 key questions being asked here...
> 1.  Short of a major war declaration (WW2 level) the largest short notice deployment I can see is being a combat brigade (I don't think I have terminology correct here) based upon two regiments and associated support detachments.  This would be paired most likely with a local brigade to flesh out the numbers needed.   A good precedent is the Canadian Army units sent in WW1 which deployed as part of the British Army until such numbers were recruited, mobilized, "trained", and formed into the eventual Canadian Divisions and then years into the conflict the Canadian Corp.


A Brigade (Bde) regardless of type (Light, Mech, Armor etc) is generally 3 Maneuver elements (Battalion sized) with Engineers, etc.

Generally a Bde is considered the smallest maneuver element than can be self sufficient (and that is a misnomer anyway - but).
   However Canada tends to avoid sending Bde's anywhere these days (likes to ignore it's own doctrine  ) 



foresterab said:


> 2. If we are assuming that in the case of large scale conflict we would be in a multinational brigade situation I would hope the defending nation (Latvia? Singapore? Jordan?) would be filling in the gaps.  This is more like the Canadian Army in WW2 with the addition of British and Polish troops under the Canadian Army.   However the capacity that force brings to the brigade is the difference in leadership...if it's just troops and rifles you have much less say than a LAV mobile unit complete with Air Defence, Artillery Support and Field Hospitals.   It is the basis of providing the 2/3rd complete (and 100% complete backup often not mentioned logistics and support forces) that allows the Canadian Force to form the Skelton of an international brigade vs. a Korea like situations where we are just a force of many contributing to the Commonwealth Division.   (Full disclosure I don't know as much about Korea so definitely not trying to downplay Canadian efforts there...it's just my initial impression).


The problem with expecting others to fill in the gaps - is a lot of those host nations don't have any enablers to fill gaps -- 
  Ideally one would field a Bde- that is only deficient in Infantry - as everyone has those guys...


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> I don’t disagree with you, but it needs to be a homogeneous Div, not a Heavy Bde, a Light Bde and a Med Bde.


Since we don't even really have a single Heavy Brigade and not enough LAVs for a full Medium Division I could possibly see some usefulness in a mixed Division of 2 x Light Brigades and 1 x Medium LAV Brigade.  

The LAV Brigade (equipped with the proper ATGM, Mortar, DFS, SHORAD, etc. variants) could provide some "stiffening" to a defending Light Brigade being attacked by heavier enemy units.  It could also provide the opportunity to exploit an opening should an enemy attack get badly mauled against entrenched Light Brigade defenders, or alternately provide a mobile blocking force to counter enemy mounted units attempting to flank a Light Brigade with limited mobility.


----------



## FJAG

foresterab said:


> So to follow the 3 key questions being asked here...
> 1.  Short of a major war declaration (WW2 level) the largest short notice deployment I can see is being a combat brigade (I don't think I have terminology correct here) based upon two regiments and associated support detachments.  This would be paired most likely with a local brigade to flesh out the numbers needed.   A good precedent is the Canadian Army units sent in WW1 which deployed as part of the British Army until such numbers were recruited, mobilized, "trained", and formed into the eventual Canadian Divisions and then years into the conflict the Canadian Corp.


Yup, you are off on terminology. To simplify things ignore the term regiment. A Brigade group has roughly 5,000 folks and consists of a headquarters, three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion and a service battalion  of around 600 each. We have three such full-time RegF brigade groups albeit they are understrength.

If you take an infantry battalion and add a reconnaissance squadron (company-sized), an engineer squadron and an artillery battery you end up with what we call a battle group. In Afghanistan we essentially deployed a single battle groups in rotation after rotation under a single brigade headquarters.

Neither WW1 nor WW2 are good examples because at the start of each of those we had very few full-time soldiers but a fairly large number of part-time ones who needed training. These days we have three brigades that are capable of much more rapid deployment.


foresterab said:


> 2. If we are assuming that in the case of large scale conflict we would be in a multinational brigade situation I would hope the defending nation (Latvia? Singapore? Jordan?) would be filling in the gaps.  This is more like the Canadian Army in WW2 with the addition of British and Polish troops under the Canadian Army.   However the capacity that force brings to the brigade is the difference in leadership...if it's just troops and rifles you have much less say than a LAV mobile unit complete with Air Defence, Artillery Support and Field Hospitals.   It is the basis of providing the 2/3rd complete (and 100% complete backup often not mentioned logistics and support forces) that allows the Canadian Force to form the Skelton of an international brigade vs. a Korea like situations where we are just a force of many contributing to the Commonwealth Division.   (Full disclosure I don't know as much about Korea so definitely not trying to downplay Canadian efforts there...it's just my initial impression).


We currently have a battlegroup headquarters plus a rifle company and an artillery battery and other elements on Latvia. The battle group is fully staffed and equipped by companies from Spain, Italy and Poland as well as several smaller nations. The battle group operates within a multi national NATO structure.

Realistically I think Canada has the ability to deploy one more brigade group and sustain it for a few years or, alternatively, surge a larger force for a shorter term. That is hard to do under the current structure but possible within the number of RegF and ARes positions currently authorized by the Canadian government.

Personally, from a personal point of view we should form a multinational division headquarters with several Canadian brigades and some allied ones in order to make the political statement within NATO that a country of our wealth should be capable of making.



foresterab said:


> 3. This is where I think, under the current manning and taskings there may be a better direction provided.   We have a collection of units that range from section to company to regimental size but try to treat as equals regardless of mission and resourcing provided.   Instead I view it as a collection of administrative units that provide formed section/platoon (Reserves) that fit into a pre-determined Company contained within a parent Reg. Force Unit.   The advantage of Echo Company remaining "unmanned" is that should emergency deployment be required then Bravo Company of Reg Force X can be assigned the mission, as a formed sub unit, until additional mobilization can fill needs.   This is more similar to the later Yugoslavia missions where reserve units were providing a much higher percentage of forces (Roto specific) than Reg Force as I understand and in a much more formed structure than what happened with Afghanistan.


Plug and play doesn't work that well at this level. Augmentation by individual soldiers and small teams like a section only works when there is sufficient time to train as a formed element which IMHO is at a minimum the company of roughly 130 people. For Afghanistan we generally took four to six months of predeployment training to get an augmented unit up to snuff for any given roto. If companies have trained together they can be slotted into a battalion more easily.

As you say, if a two company battalion needs a third company in a hurry then this has to come from some other battalion to fill in. But even here, it still takes time to train-up for a mission.

Bosnia was a more permissive environment than Afghanistan and more risks could be taken. The problem with our ARes structure for some time now is that there are no real formed units that have trained together significantly in anything above platoon level at best. This is why we need to change.



foresterab said:


> The other aspect of ensuring as high of caliber smaller unit leadership is looking at what's happening now on the East Coast.  300, now 700 members are deployed to assist in clean up.   But any time I've heard of the military showing up it's common to have them split into subunits (company/platoon/section) for taskings with only CO and others remaining at a central point to coordinate with civilian authorities.   It's not normally 800 troops of a regiment working on the same street or even neighborhood although it has happened in the past.


That's the nature of domestic operations. The unit still operates as a unit under centralized leadership but can be widely dispersed on taskings.

🍻


----------



## Skysix

GR66 said:


> I'm going to make a couple of assumptions here:
> 
> The minimum aspiration for the CA should be to have the capability to deploy and sustain a Brigade Group.  It's the smallest size unit that will allow for a reasonable level of national autonomy in a major military deployment.
> Any major combat deployment for the CA will be expeditionary in nature (that includes the Canadian Arctic)
> We are unlikely to engage in any major Brigade Group level combat deployment outside a coalition.
> The most likely leader and major contributor to any combat coalition we join is the United States.
> Given the above I'd argue that it would make sense to establish a close working relationship with the US forces we would be most likely to deploy with and also as much as possible align our future equipment acquisitions to match what those partners are using so as to take advantage of an integrated logistical pipeline.
> 
> Looking at the US Army Reg Force Divisions that are geographically closest to us (and therefore easiest to train with) we have:
> 
> 11th Airborne Division (Arctic Warfare) in Alaska
> 
> 1st IBCT
> 2nd IBCT (Airborne)
> 
> 7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington
> 
> 1st SBCT
> 2nd SBCT
> 81st SBCT (WA NG)
> 
> 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York
> 
> 1st IBCT
> 2nd IBCT
> 3rd IBCT
> 
> That's two Light Infantry Divisions and a Stryker Division.
> 
> Would it then make sense for the CA to align itself with those Divisions as follows:
> 
> 2nd Canadian Division (aligned with 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY)
> 5 Light Infantry Brigade in Valcartier
> 51 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 34/35/36/37 Brigades
> 
> 3rd Canadian Division (aligned with 7th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, WA)
> 1 Mechanized Brigade in Edmonton
> 11 Mechanized Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 38/39/41 Brigades
> 
> 4th Canadian Division (aligned with 11th Airborne Division in Alaska)
> 2 Light Infantry Brigade (Arctic Warfare) in Petawawa
> 21 Light Infantry Brigade (Reserve) amalgamated from 31/32/33 Brigades
> 
> Tank proficiency could be maintained by having a single Reg Force Tank Squadron in Edmonton (with Abrams tanks replacing our Leopards) and the personnel for two additional Squadrons serving on exchange service with US ABCT units (one squadron worth on exchange and one squadron worth manning schools/on individual training/leave/etc.).  If in time of war we need to field tanks we can acquire the balance of the Squadrons from the US and have trained personnel to man them.


I'd argue that specialising in Arctic and Mountain ops (with the 86th IBCT, reserve/guard actual mountain ops vs 10th Mountain which is now mostly light infantry feeding the 75th) would be our best contribution to continental defense  and an area we USED to excell at.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

It may surprise some to learn that the Canadian Army does indeed train with US units. We validate a Light Battalion from the Div in the Build year as part of a US Brigade at JRTC (Ft Polk). They integrate into that Brigade for the lead-up and execution of the exercise. We also send an infantry company (para last year and this upcoming roto) and an ARCG to JPMRC Alaska who work with a Bde from 11th Airborne during their validation exercise.  

We also need to remain flexible and retain our ability to deploy on such operations as we are sent with the partners from those operations. Latvia, for instance, sees us working very closely with a host of NATO allies.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Skysix said:


> I'd argue that specialising in Arctic and Mountain ops (with the 86th IBCT, reserve/guard actual mountain ops vs mostly light infantry feeding the 75th) would be our best contribution to continental defense  and an area we USED to excell at.



And it's also in our national interest, big time....


----------



## ArmyRick

daftandbarmy said:


> And it's also in our national interest, big time....


I know before I jumped my ship, my old unit (Foresters) was big into the ARCG role (arctic response company group). I was in the process of switching to COATS for the last 2 years of my career (thats another jumble of sh*t story for a different thread) so I was kind of distancing myself.

The troops and the NCOs though were getting good at snow mobiling and all that (nick named the snow mobile club).

My one concern I had back in 2015 or so. The Foresters were so focused on arctic stuff October to April that I saw troops and NCOs eroding their basic skills. 
A MCPL failed an 84mm handling test on starting his Small Arms course and was sent home (He was excellent at packing a super tobaggan and the all the ARCG stuff though). I didn't blame him as our unit seem to "over focus" on ARCG prep, to the point that regular skill maintenance exercises and training was getting binned to do more ARCG prep. 
Several soldiers were getting rusty on patrolling and hasty attacks but had all the ARCG stuff down to a science. 

Basically I have concerns with the limited time the PRes has to train what extra gucci stuff they try to tackle. I think having cadres of troops in these units who have the time to extra training and qualifications is a good idea (They do their regular soldier skills BEYOND check list IBTS and then dedicate extra time to arctic, mountain, amphibious, whatever).


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:


> I know before I jumped my ship, my old unit (Foresters) was big into the ARCG role (arctic response company group). I was in the process of switching to COATS for the last 2 years of my career (thats another jumble of sh*t story for a different thread) so I was kind of distancing myself.
> 
> The troops and the NCOs though were getting good at snow mobiling and all that (nick named the snow mobile club).
> 
> My one concern I had back in 2015 or so. The Foresters were so focused on arctic stuff October to April that I saw troops and NCOs eroding their basic skills.
> A MCPL failed an 84mm handling test on starting his Small Arms course and was sent home (He was excellent at packing a super tobaggan and the all the ARCG stuff though). I didn't blame him as our unit seem to "over focus" on ARCG prep, to the point that regular skill maintenance exercises and training was getting binned to do more ARCG prep.
> Several soldiers were getting rusty on patrolling and hasty attacks but had all the ARCG stuff down to a science.
> 
> Basically I have concerns with the limited time the PRes has to train what extra gucci stuff they try to tackle. I think having cadres of troops in these units who have the time to extra training and qualifications is a good idea (They do their regular soldier skills BEYOND check list IBTS and then dedicate extra time to arctic, mountain, amphibious, whatever).



You've nicely described the challenges of giving a part time organization a 'full time' operational role.


----------



## IRepoCans

TangoTwoBravo said:


> It may surprise some to learn that the Canadian Army does indeed train with US units. We validate a Light Battalion from the Div in the Build year as part of a US Brigade at JRTC (Ft Polk). They integrate into that Brigade for the lead-up and execution of the exercise. We also send an infantry company (para last year and this upcoming roto) and an ARCG to JPMRC Alaska who work with a Bde from 11th Airborne during their validation exercise.
> 
> We also need to remain flexible and retain our ability to deploy on such operations as we are sent with the partners from those operations. Latvia, for instance, sees us working very closely with a host of NATO allies.


You say validated light infantry, I say we identified a lot of short falls in training, equipment and logistics... the 3RCR AAR was _interesting_ and the TLDR of it was this: if SFAB wasn't there we wouldn't have even been as marginally useful as we were to the BCT getting validated.

Side note: as it stands, there are five (that I am aware of!) different builds for light inf/light forces employment being put into practice right now so it's kind of hard to validate anything we haven't actually made into a hard doctrinal piece that delineates X, Y and Z.


----------



## daftandbarmy

IRepoCans said:


> You say validated light infantry, I say we identified a lot of short falls in training, equipment and logistics... the 3RCR AAR was _interesting_ and the TLDR of it was this: if SFAB wasn't there we wouldn't have even been as marginally useful as we were to the BCT getting validated.
> 
> Side note: as it stands,* there are five (that I am aware of!) different builds for light inf/light forces employment being put into practice right now* so it's kind of hard to validate anything we haven't actually made into a hard doctrinal piece that delineates X, Y and Z.



Thought bubble: "Good thing they've discovered only five ways that light infantry will be employed in battle"


----------



## markppcli

IRepoCans said:


> You say validated light infantry, I say we identified a lot of short falls in training, equipment and logistics... the 3RCR AAR was _interesting_ and the TLDR of it was this: if SFAB wasn't there we wouldn't have even been as marginally useful as we were to the BCT getting validated.
> 
> Side note: as it stands, there are five (that I am aware of!) different builds for light inf/light forces employment being put into practice right now so it's kind of hard to validate anything we haven't actually made into a hard doctrinal piece that delineates X, Y and Z.


That AAR might be the single most honest thing I’ve read about the CAF.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

IRepoCans said:


> You say validated light infantry, I say we identified a lot of short falls in training, equipment and logistics... the 3RCR AAR was _interesting_ and the TLDR of it was this: if SFAB wasn't there we wouldn't have even been as marginally useful as we were to the BCT getting validated.
> 
> Side note: as it stands, there are five (that I am aware of!) different builds for light inf/light forces employment being put into practice right now so it's kind of hard to validate anything we haven't actually made into a hard doctrinal piece that delineates X, Y and Z.


I said we validate a light infantry battalion each year at JRTC. This refers to the Foundation CAO where validation is how well the organization meets the operational standard (as expressed in Battle Task Standards which in turn are linked with doctrine). You don't fail a unit at validation of its training because it lacks a capability. Divisions in the Build year of the MRP have their battalions and brigade HQ validated against those BTS. The three JRTC rotations thus far have absolutely Validated those light infantry battalions  - they go through a grueling exercise where they are not supposed to win. The house (TF Geronimo) always wins at JRTC - the question is how hard they have to push against the training audience to beat them. If you were on one of those rotations I tip my hat to you! The alternative validation venue would be an exercise in Canada. Validating at JRTC has been a huge step forward in that we have access to a training centre _designed_ for light forces in large scale combat operations, never mind the interoperability benefits of integrating into a US infantry brigade for the lead-up to and execution of the exercise. 

You are absolutely correct that there are shortfalls in capabilities. A benefit of going to JRTC is that we have another mechanism to highlight those shortfalls and document how they affect the ability of the light battalions (and perhaps light forces writ large). There is no hiding problems at JRTC. This can help feed the force development process. 

Ideally we get some bespoke light infantry/light forces doctrine in the coming years. Exercises like JRTC and JPMRC provide a mechanism to explore that space while also validating the training standard of the units. 

Maybe I'm just a glass half full kind of guy.


----------



## foresterab

FJAG said:


> Yup, you are off on terminology. To simplify things ignore the term regiment. A Brigade group has roughly 5,000 folks and consists of a headquarters, three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion and a service battalion  of around 600 each. We have three such full-time RegF brigade groups albeit they are understrength.
> 
> If you take an infantry battalion and add a reconnaissance squadron (company-sized), an engineer squadron and an artillery battery you end up with what we call a battle group. In Afghanistan we essentially deployed a single battle groups in rotation after rotation under a single brigade headquarters.
> 
> Neither WW1 nor WW2 are good examples because at the start of each of those we had very few full-time soldiers but a fairly large number of part-time ones who needed training. These days we have three brigades that are capable of much more rapid deployment.
> 
> We currently have a battlegroup headquarters plus a rifle company and an artillery battery and other elements on Latvia. The battle group is fully staffed and equipped by companies from Spain, Italy and Poland as well as several smaller nations. The battle group operates within a multi national NATO structure.
> 
> Realistically I think Canada has the ability to deploy one more brigade group and sustain it for a few years or, alternatively, surge a larger force for a shorter term. That is hard to do under the current structure but possible within the number of RegF and ARes positions currently authorized by the Canadian government.
> 
> Personally, from a personal point of view we should form a multinational division headquarters with several Canadian brigades and some allied ones in order to make the political statement within NATO that a country of our wealth should be capable of making.
> 
> 🍻


Thanks for the update on the terminology.  I wanted to call it a Combat Team but did not think that was the right term as being too small but Brigade -> Division makes more sense now that I think about it.   I was definitely under allocating resources mentally to the Recce/Arty etc support roles thinking troops but battalions make much more logical sense.    I do think that a two battalion based infantry unit combined with a complete set of artillery/engineers and support should be the immediate surge (think 2 week deployment timeline) force goal but anything longer I view in terms of months/years due to shortages in the ranks currently. 



FJAG said:


> Plug and play doesn't work that well at this level. Augmentation by individual soldiers and small teams like a section only works when there is sufficient time to train as a formed element which IMHO is at a minimum the company of roughly 130 people. For Afghanistan we generally took four to six months of predeployment training to get an augmented unit up to snuff for any given roto. If companies have trained together they can be slotted into a battalion more easily.
> 
> As you say, if a two company battalion needs a third company in a hurry then this has to come from some other battalion to fill in. But even here, it still takes time to train-up for a mission.
> 
> Bosnia was a more permissive environment than Afghanistan and more risks could be taken. The problem with our ARes structure for some time now is that there are no real formed units that have trained together significantly in anything above platoon level at best. This is why we need to change.
> 
> 
> That's the nature of domestic operations. The unit still operates as a unit under centralized leadership but can be widely dispersed on taskings.
> 
> 🍻


My background is more wildfire operations so on those operations it's much more common to plug/play different crews into the role.  Is there a capacity and skills difference between Mexico vs. the NWT crews? South Africa vs. USFS vs. NFLD?  yes...but the basic duties are understood and we occasionally have to train on differences (muskeg vs. mountains are very different fire environments) during operations.   I know I am greatly over simplifying the role of a regular force infantry company but also view it that it should be a goal to have complete sub units, well trained that could be plugged in as needed in surge situations.   I do struggle with the reserve units due to the limited manning levels (base company sized? ) and while I'd love to mobilize the whole unit similar to the US NG units I just don't see it politically.   So then it's a case of can a formed section or platoon being sourced, times X units, to create needed missing company while hopefully cutting down the pre-deployment training delta as it's now about how small teams, used to working together, learn to work in the bigger unit at battalion + deployments. 

This is also why I think of Reserve units at no higher than a Captain (preferred) /Major rank (politics might dictate) with the higher ranks being Regular Force members who have the time to a) gain the experience in the larger formation leadership and b) gain the range of experience needed rather than leading a singular common sub-unit.    My biggest concern is how to you surge forces, in a high intensity conflict, in numbers and I don't think the current status quo did that well for Afghanistan let alone a Ukraine type invasion scenario.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Yup, you are off on terminology. To simplify things ignore the term regiment. A Brigade group has roughly 5,000 folks and consists of a headquarters, three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion and a service battalion  of around 600 each. We have three such full-time RegF brigade groups albeit they are understrength.


Pedantic point, you don't need 3 Inf Bn - just 3 Maneuver Bn, so it could be 2 Inf and 1 Armor, or 2 Armor and 1 Inf, (or Combined Arms BN of Inf and Armor like we do down here)  plus your Cav/Recon, Arty, Engineer and other supporting assets.
   Canada has for a while had 3 Inf + 1 "Armour" (to which I haven't fully ever understood)


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Pedantic point, you don't need 3 Inf Bn - just 3 Maneuver Bn, so it could be 2 Inf and 1 Armor, or 2 Armor and 1 Inf, (or Combined Arms BN of Inf and Armor like we do down here)  plus your Cav/Recon, Arty, *Engineer *and other supporting assets.
> Canada has for a while had 3 Inf + 1 "Armour" (to which I haven't fully ever understood)



I think they're rediscovering why 'manoeuvre' is synonymous with 'lots of Engineering resources' in the Ukraine these days.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> I think they're rediscovering why 'manoeuvre' is synonymous with 'lots of Engineering resources' in the Ukraine these days.



So is the static defence.   One needs bridges.  The other needs diggers.  Both need lots of trucks.


----------



## daftandbarmy

I'm not an Armd Recce type, but it seems that this encounter is what an Armd Recce vehicle (the Ukrainian one) should be able to do... and the TAPV can't:



__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1576673479469895680


----------



## GR66

What about something like this for a pragmatic, doable in the short term plan that lays some groundwork for future force enhancements:

1 Brigade becomes our "Heavy" Brigade with all the tanks concentrated in LdSH and two PPCLI LAV Battalions making up the three maneuver units.  1 RCHA would transition from the M777 to a new SP 155mm when that program eventually happens.

2 Brigade (RCR) goes all 3 x Light Battalions and acts as our Rapid Deployment/Arctic Response Brigade.  RCD is roled as a light (motorized) Cavalry/Recce element to support the Light Brigade.  2 RCHA would keep the M777.

Realistically we're probably already really stretching to be able to deploy and sustain a single Canadian Brigade Group and don't have the required enablers to deploy a Canadian Division.  Therefore we don't really need to have 5 Brigade as a fully deployable Brigade Group.  5 Bde HQ would be maintained for future expansion.  1 & 2 R22eR would be maintained as LAV Battalions.  They would be used along with 1 & 2 PPCLI for deployment as part of 1 Bde to provide depth/replacements and to help fulfill other Battle Group sized deployments which may come up.

Since 5 Bde is not a deployable Brigade then it will not require Artillery, Engineer or Service support elements.  One gun battery from 5 RAL would go to each of 1 & 2 RCHA to bring them up to full 3 x Battery Regiments.  The HQ and remaining elements of 5 RAL would be re-roled into a SHORAD Regiment as part of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB).  5 CER and 5 Service would also be integrated into the CCSB to make it a fully deployable Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.

The PYs from the two Light Battalions which are being eliminated (3 PPCLI and 3 R22eR) would be fed back into the remaining Infantry Battalions to being up their strength (and in particular rebuilding missing CS capabilities).  The 2 x Battalions worth of LAVs that are made available by 1 & 2 RCR going Light would be used to provide vehicles for the future SHORAD Regiment (5 RAL) and to be modified into CS variants for use by the remaining four LAV Battalions (ATGM, Mortar, DFS, etc.)

The Reg Force Brigades could be amalgamated into a single Reg Force Division (1 Mech Bde, 2 Lt Bde, 5 Bde and CCSB).  

Similarly all of the Reserve units could be combined under a single Reserve Division with the existing Reserve Brigades being amalgamated into three Light Infantry Brigades (38/39/41 Brigade, 31/32/33 Brigade and 34/35/36/37 Brigade).


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Similarly all of the Reserve units could be combined under a single Reserve Division with the existing Reserve Brigades being amalgamated into three Light Infantry Brigades (38/39/41 Brigade, 31/32/33 Brigade and 34/35/36/37 Brigade).



And you'd spend a couple of wasted years figuring out who was going to be the next (deeply unqualified) Reservist to command the Division 

I like the idea of Reserve units feeding into Reg F formations e.g., 'will provide 1 x dismounted rifle company' etc. 

Relying on the Reserves to sustain a stand alone division is probably a big mistake.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> And you'd spend a couple of wasted years figuring out who was going to be the next (deeply unqualified) Reservist to command the Division
> 
> I like the idea of Reserve units feeding into Reg F formations e.g., 'will provide 1 x dismounted rifle company' etc.
> 
> Relying on the Reserves to sustain a stand alone division is probably a big mistake.


Sorry for the lack of clarity.  We currently have 4 x Divisional HQs in the Canadian Army (#s 2-5).  All three Reg Force combat Brigades plus CCSB would be grouped together under 2 Division while all the Reserve Brigades would be grouped under 3 Division.  

3 Div HQ would be Reg Force and the majority of the 3 x Reserve Brigade HQs would be Reg Force as well (using the PYs gained from eliminating 2 x Divisional HQs and 7 x Reserve Brigade HQs). 

Based on the current capabilities of the Reserves, 3 Division would not be a deployable Division (or even deployable Brigade Groups within the Division).  The Reg Force manned Divisional and Brigade HQs would be deployable HQs to give depth of trained personnel beyond the 2 Division HQs.

The Reserve units making up 3 Division would continue to generate individual augmentees as well as STAR assigned sub-units to the Reg Force Units until such time as more substantial changes are made to the Reserves which would allow them to take on an expanded mobilization role.

This should be viewed as a first step towards an eventual goal of creating a deployable Canadian Division (2 x Reg Force Brigades plus 1 x Reserve Brigade).


----------



## Ostrozac

GR66 said:


> All three Reg Force combat Brigades plus CCSB would be grouped together under 2 Division while all the Reserve Brigades would be grouped under 3 Division.


You had me at the fighting brigades reporting to a staff-heavy headquarters in Montreal. The Canadian Army goes full circle back to where it was when I joined — albeit out of Long Point, since we’ve divested most of Saint Hubert.


----------



## McG

GR66 said:


> 1 Brigade becomes our "Heavy" Brigade


Even with all the tanks, it will not be heavy.



GR66 said:


> Since 5 Bde is not a deployable Brigade then it will not require Artillery, Engineer or Service support elements. One gun battery from 5 RAL would go to each of 1 & 2 RCHA to bring them up to full 3 x Battery Regiments. The HQ and remaining elements of 5 RAL would be re-roled into a SHORAD Regiment as part of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB). 5 CER and 5 Service would also be integrated into the CCSB to make it a fully deployable Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.


Dissolving the Francophone brigade may do more to alienate a quarter of the potential recruiting pool than any organizational efficiency such a move may offer.  You would also be shutting down a brigade HQ that can at least deploy to the field while keeping another that cannot.


----------



## KevinB

If anything the Ukraine conflict has shown that Canada doesn’t have enough of an Army as it is.  
    Instead of striking Reg Force formations off the books, one would be better served IMHO at trying to make a Total Force Army work.  
  That means making the PRes work under Reg Force units and fixing the equipment and personnel shortfalls that exist in significant amounts.


----------



## GR66

McG said:


> Even with all the tanks, it will not be heavy.


Hence the quotation marks around "Heavy"


McG said:


> Dissolving the Francophone brigade may do more to alienate a quarter of the potential recruiting pool than any organizational efficiency such a move may offer.  You would also be shutting down a brigade HQ that can at least deploy to the field while keeping another that cannot.


5 Bde would not be dissolved.  5 Bde HQ would remain (and remain as a deployable HQ).  3 R22eR would be eliminated but those francophone PYs would be fed back into 1 & 2 R22eR.  All other units from 5 Brigade would remain intact but shift to CCSB.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> If anything the Ukraine conflict has shown that Canada doesn’t have enough of an Army as it is.
> Instead of striking Reg Force formations off the books, one would be better served IMHO at trying to make a Total Force Army work.
> That means making the PRes work under Reg Force units and fixing the equipment and personnel shortfalls that exist in significant amounts.


This would be a first step.  Bring two Brigade Groups closer to full manning by filling in missing CS capabilities to make them more combat effective.

Deploying a single Brigade right now would likely be a stretch so why pretend by having three understrength Brigades?  1 & 2 Brigades would give us Light and Heavy(ish) deployment options that are potentially doable with additional Reg Force troops in 5 Brigade to sustain them.

Making CCSB a deployable Brigade would bring us closer to the capability of being able to deploy a Canadian led multi-national Division with a Divisional HQ, 1 x Maneuver Brigade and 1 x Support Brigade (and we could fold in our Tac Hel Squadrons into an Aviation Brigade as well).

Edit to add:  Eventual goal would be to have the Reserves able to provide the unit-level augmentation to 5 Brigade to make them fully deployable as well.


----------



## Ostrozac

McG said:


> Dissolving the Francophone brigade may do more to alienate a quarter of the potential recruiting pool than any organizational efficiency such a move may offer.


Canada’s Francophone proportion of population is shrinking — Statscan forecasts 17-18% by the mid-2030’s, and the population of Quebec tracks older than the national average. A breakdown of Canada’s fighting age population may show even worse numbers.

Valcartier has absolutely been a success story — but the recruiting pool of small-town Quebecois may be starting to dry up — albeit a few years after demographic patterns in the Maritimes/Newfoundland did something similar. Demographics of Canada drives our source of people, and we can’t ignore the facts because of outdated models or sacred cows.

Valcartier is affordable, and we’ve had English language units there in the past (3rd Bn Canadian Guards) — is the solution to our housing crisis right outside Quebec City? If a city becomes unaffordable for troops — start to pack up units and send them to Val!


----------



## KevinB

Well you are better off folding the RCR or PPCLI Brigades than the French, given there are two English ones and 1 French, folding the Vandoos would go over like a fart in church.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Well you are better off folding the RCR or PPCLI Brigades than the French, given there are two English ones and 1 French, folding the Vandoos would go over like a fart in church.


But you're not folding the Vandoos.  A deployed Brigade would basically have 5 x maneuver units to pick from for a deployment.  LdSH, 1 & 2 PPCLI and 1 & 2 R22eR.  You could do a Heavy(ish) deployment with LdSH and any two of the four LAV Battalions or a Medium deployment of 3 x LAV Battalions which would still leave 1 x LAV Battalion in reserve or available for a separate Battle Group deployment.

Remember our Brigades are not fixed field formations.  A deployment could quite possibly be:

5 Brigade HQ
1 R22eR
2 R22eR
LdSH
2 RCHA
5 CER
1 Service


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> If anything the Ukraine conflict has shown that Canada doesn’t have enough of an Army as it is.
> Instead of striking Reg Force formations off the books, one would be better served IMHO at trying to make a Total Force Army work.
> That means making the PRes work under Reg Force units and fixing the equipment and personnel shortfalls that exist in significant amounts.



Actually, the Reserve structure is very effective at standing up a mass Army quickly. That's what it was designed for, and it did it's job very well in both World Wars and, to a lesser extent, conflicts in FRY and AFG.

If you want to leverage that strength, then use the Reserves as a massive Force Generator for the Reg F. Attract, recruit, deliver basic preliminary training/ acclimatization, send off to Depot, done...

If you could only get CFRC out of the way....


----------



## IKnowNothing

GR66 said:


> But you're not folding the Vandoos.  A deployed Brigade would basically have 5 x maneuver units to pick from for a deployment.  LdSH, 1 & 2 PPCLI and 1 & 2 R22eR.  You could do a Heavy(ish) deployment with LdSH and any two of the four LAV Battalions or a Medium deployment of 3 x LAV Battalions which would still leave 1 x LAV Battalion in reserve or available for a separate Battle Group deployment.
> 
> Remember our Brigades are not fixed field formations.  A deployment could quite possibly be:
> 
> 5 Brigade HQ
> 1 R22eR
> 2 R22eR
> LdSH
> 2 RCHA
> 5 CER
> 1 Service


What about:

leave 5 Bde intact, 
leave LdSH and 12 BdC as Cavalry
dissolve 3 PPCLI and 3 R22eR to round out 1&2
Pull a half squadron of regulars from each of RCD, 12, and LdSH to stand up a 50/50 tank regiment
20 tanks to Val for subunit/ combat team training (flyover from Edmonton)
1 and 5 CMBG, both capable of being our "heavyish" Bde with the tanks attached, both capable of generating mech BG's.  Still the 2x Bn sets from RCR to round out CS and Cav


----------



## KevinB

At the end of the day the current equipment is lacking.  

I’d prefer to get 1 Bde (being a number not specifically 1 CMBG) setup correctly. 
   Sit down and decide what is needed for Bde’s to actually be Bde’s. 

Unfortunately until an actual Defence plan is unveiled, it’s really just pissing in the wind.  

I suspect 2030 will have rolled by and this will be still up for debate.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> At the end of the day the current equipment is lacking.
> 
> I’d prefer to get 1 Bde (being a number not specifically 1 CMBG) setup correctly.
> Sit down and decide what is needed for Bde’s to actually be Bde’s.
> 
> Unfortunately until an actual Defence plan is unveiled, it’s really just pissing in the wind.
> 
> I suspect 2030 will have rolled by and this will be still up for debate.



Does anybody have any idea on what that magical date is for the release of the "renewed" defence policy?  The one that, back in May, was promised would be speedily produced?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Does anybody have any idea on what that magical date is for the release of the "renewed" defence policy?  The one that, back in May, was promised would be speedily produced?


Sometime after the Crisis had ended.
    Which crisis you ask, well whatever is the current one…


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> What about something like this for a pragmatic, doable in the short term plan that lays some groundwork for future force enhancements:
> 
> 1 Brigade becomes our "Heavy" Brigade with all the tanks concentrated in LdSH and two PPCLI LAV Battalions making up the three maneuver units.  1 RCHA would transition from the M777 to a new SP 155mm when that program eventually happens.
> 
> 2 Brigade (RCR) goes all 3 x Light Battalions and acts as our Rapid Deployment/Arctic Response Brigade.  RCD is roled as a light (motorized) Cavalry/Recce element to support the Light Brigade.  2 RCHA would keep the M777.


So far generally I'm along



GR66 said:


> Realistically we're probably already really stretching to be able to deploy and sustain a single Canadian Brigade Group and don't have the required enablers to deploy a Canadian Division.  Therefore we don't really need to have 5 Brigade as a fully deployable Brigade Group.  5 Bde HQ would be maintained for future expansion.  1 & 2 R22eR would be maintained as LAV Battalions.  They would be used along with 1 & 2 PPCLI for deployment as part of 1 Bde to provide depth/replacements and to help fulfill other Battle Group sized deployments which may come up.


I take a different path here. I see 1 bde and 2 bde's roles are in extremis - use when the balloon goes up - roles. 5 bde would be useful for all the peacetime missions such as peacekeeping, foreign training etc. that do not require a full brigade.
Fix the reserves and use them for depth/replacements



GR66 said:


> Since 5 Bde is not a deployable Brigade then it will not require Artillery, Engineer or Service support elements.  One gun battery from 5 RAL would go to each of 1 & 2 RCHA to bring them up to full 3 x Battery Regiments.  The HQ and remaining elements of 5 RAL would be re-roled into a SHORAD Regiment as part of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB).  5 CER and 5 Service would also be integrated into the CCSB to make it a fully deployable Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.


4 RCA(GS) is good enough for the SHORAD role. We don't have enough gun regiments as it is. fragmenting one, won't help things. Disperse some of the PYs to bulk up other places but keep the core as a 30/70 regiment. We also need an LRPR system that will need a home.


GR66 said:


> The PYs from the two Light Battalions which are being eliminated (3 PPCLI and 3 R22eR) would be fed back into the remaining Infantry Battalions to being up their strength (and in particular rebuilding missing CS capabilities).  The 2 x Battalions worth of LAVs that are made available by 1 & 2 RCR going Light would be used to provide vehicles for the future SHORAD Regiment (5 RAL) and to be modified into CS variants for use by the remaining four LAV Battalions (ATGM, Mortar, DFS, etc.)


Converting a perfectly useable LAV into a SHORAD carrier is a waste of capability. We can easily build basic LAV hulls for specialist roles just as cheaply as converting old ones.


GR66 said:


> The Reg Force Brigades could be amalgamated into a single Reg Force Division (1 Mech Bde, 2 Lt Bde, 5 Bde and CCSB).


I don't go for this. We need to spread our RegF PYs across two forces - an extremis for war force and an everyday force. Concentrating them merely continues the two solitudes between the Reg Army and the decrepit reserves.


GR66 said:


> Similarly all of the Reserve units could be combined under a single Reserve Division with the existing Reserve Brigades being amalgamated into three Light Infantry Brigades (38/39/41 Brigade, 31/32/33 Brigade and 34/35/36/37 Brigade).


See above. 

🍻


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Actually, the Reserve structure is very effective at standing up a mass Army quickly. That's what it was designed for, and it did it's job very well in both World Wars and, to a lesser extent, conflicts in FRY and AFG.
> 
> If you want to leverage that strength, then use the Reserves as a massive Force Generator for the Reg F. Attract, recruit, deliver basic preliminary training/ acclimatization, send off to Depot, done...
> 
> If you could only get CFRC out of the way....


I see a need for a beefed up training establishment (which I usually express as 4 x Depot battalions across the country) to conduct DP1 and 2 training for all branches during peacetime. My view of mobilization is to augment them to increase throughput. Since I see most Reservists already assigned to deployable units, new units would need to be called up from the supplementary order of battle. Equipment is the bugbear. 

🍻


----------



## IKnowNothing

KevinB said:


> Sit down and decide what is needed for Bde’s to actually be Bde’s.
> 
> Unfortunately until an actual Defence plan is unveiled, it’s really just pissing in the wind.


I think that's a cop out.  While maybe not perfect, CA has (acceptable?) doctrinal ORBATs.  CA has the full and part-time personnel to fill them.  CA has spent the money and bought enough hulls/chassis to fill them.  

Senior leadership doesn't get the prerogative of throwing shit uphill unless they've made the best use of what they have, and executed to the limits of what they're allowed to.   I think we can all agree that's not the case.


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> I think that's a cop out.  While maybe not perfect, CA has (acceptable?) doctrinal ORBATs.  CA has the full and part-time personnel to fill them.  CA has spent the money and bought enough hulls/chassis to fill them.


Not sure if the book value doctrine ORBAT has changed in the years, but there used to be a lot of theoretical items included.  

I’d argue Senior CA leadership have made a mess of this for ages.  


the symmetrically useless ‘medium’ Brigades enters the chat.
divesting M109, ADATS, TUA, TLAV/M113 and the list continues without a replacement…
getting a tank and calling it a day without a tracked IFV, SPA etc.
divesting Cbt Spt Coy’s from Infantry BN’s to focus on riflemen (probably the easiest filled job in NATO)

Senior leadership doesn't get the prerogative of throwing shit uphill unless they've made the best use of what they have, and executed to the limits of what they're allowed to.   I think we can all agree that's not the case.

I don’t disagree with you there. My point is simply that without a fundamental shift in the CA, that it’s really just rearranging deck chairs.

How many Light working groups have their been?  I got out in 2005, and there was yet another one going then…

 I don’t think it takes a rocket scientist to know divesting your Air Defense role isn’t exactly the smartest thing to do for any Army…

The CA is generally the CA’s biggest enemy, the second biggest enemy is the GoC…


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> At the end of the day the current equipment is lacking.
> 
> I’d prefer to get 1 Bde (being a number not specifically 1 CMBG) setup correctly.
> Sit down and decide what is needed for Bde’s to actually be Bde’s.
> 
> Unfortunately until an actual Defence plan is unveiled, it’s really just pissing in the wind.
> 
> I suspect 2030 will have rolled by and this will be still up for debate.


Agree and disagree.  Current equipment is lacking and both updated Foreign and Defence policies are needed.

However, there is broadly laid out in SSE the general range of operations that are expected to be performed by the CF.  
That document specifically states that "The Army trains to fight at the Brigade-group level." and that it should be prepared to operate across "the spectrum of conflict" which would include peer/near-peer combat.  A new Foreign or Defence policy paper is not likely to significantly change what basic capabilities are required to field a battle-worthy Brigade Group. 

If the CA leadership doesn't know what capabilities are required to fight a Brigade in a peer conflict then they shouldn't be the CA leadership.
We have certain equipment.  Some of it is not ideal for every role but is still useable.  There are other required capabilities that we do not have.  Everyone knows what they are.  The CA should begin re-building the Brigades with what they have and provide the GoC a list of the additional capabilities required in order of priority in order to achieve the required combat capability.  No need to wait for new White Papers to start that process.


FJAG said:


> I take a different path here. I see 1 bde and 2 bde's roles are in extremis - use when the balloon goes up - roles. 5 bde would be useful for all the peacetime missions such as peacekeeping, foreign training etc. that do not require a full brigade.
> Fix the reserves and use them for depth/replacements
> Agreed.  Our Heavy(ish) Brigade is for in extremis but in the absence of a Reserve system that is ready to RAPIDLY expand our Mechanized capability in a crisis then for the short-to-medium term I believe we will have to rely on primarily Reg Force personnel with limited Reserve augmentation (remember that all of our existing "Reg Force" units are actually already 70/30 units based on Establishment vs Force Generation numbers).  The Light Brigade is our Rapid Deployment capability and at least a portion needs to be Reg Force personnel on heightened readiness.  The combination of LAV infantry between 1 & 5 Brigades gives the ability to deploy a mechanized Battle Group on OOTW missions while still having enough forces available for a crisis deployment.  Definitely fix the Reserves so that we can move beyond these initial bandaid fixes to a proper "Total Force" structure.
> 
> 4 RCA(GS) is good enough for the SHORAD role. We don't have enough gun regiments as it is. fragmenting one, won't help things. Disperse some of the PYs to bulk up other places but keep the core as a 30/70 regiment. We also need an LRPR system that will need a home.
> Are there enough PYs for 4 RCA(GS) to fulfill their current role as well as take on the SHORAD role?  Should the two capabilities be combined within the same unit?  Agreed that probably one of the easiest Total Force changes would be for Reserve Artillery units to take on the manning of the guns in the 2nd & 3rd Batteries in each of the CS Regiments.  If the PYs from the two 5 RAC Batteries are then maintained within that Regiment then where are they best put to use?  As a 3rd CS Regiment supporting your "Medium" Battalions (which are focused on OOTW), or for manning new capabilities like SHORAD and HIMARS?
> Converting a perfectly useable LAV into a SHORAD carrier is a waste of capability. We can easily build basic LAV hulls for specialist roles just as cheaply as converting old ones.
> SHORAD is actually one program that is listed in SSE so perhaps there will be money for the required vehicles made available by the GoC.  I don't hold great confidence however in light of pending NORAD upgrades, the F-35s and new ships for the RCN that there will be much funding left available for things like ATGM and Mortar LAVs, etc.  Ideally the RCR LAVs would be issued to the Reserves to be used for force expansion/sustainment in a conflict but if the only way we can afford to get key missing CS capabilities met for our Reg Force Battalions is to re-purpose existing hulls then I'd do so.
> I don't go for this. We need to spread our RegF PYs across two forces - an extremis for war force and an everyday force. Concentrating them merely continues the two solitudes between the Reg Army and the decrepit reserves.
> Agreed as the desired end state.  However I don't believe that the Reserves are currently in a position to be able to act in the "extremis for war" force in terms of equipment, organization, leadership or training.  Creating two Divisions with structures that roughly mirror each other (3 x maneuver Brigades and ideally a deployable CSS Brigade) is a first step.  Once that is in place and you start filling in the gaps in organization, training and equipment then you can start shifting your Reg Force/Reserve Force PYs between the units to create the balance you need.  Start with 2 x Reg Force Divisional HQs and 6 x Reg Force deployable Brigade Group HQs as the first step.  For Phase II you work on the consolidation of all the individual Reserve Regiments into 3 x coherent Brigade Groups plus a CSS Brigade).  Then you have the common foundation upon which you can start shifting the weight between Reg Force and Reserve Force PYs between the various component units.
> See above.


----------



## Skysix

Wonder if there would be a role for any of these in Canada. 30mm autocannon, 7.62 remote machinegun and an automatic grenade launcher.

As a mobile fire support base or recce vehicle in a mechanised unit? Too light for an armored unit.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Skysix said:


> Wonder if there would be a role for any of these in Canada. 30mm autocannon, 7.62 remote machineView attachment 74011gun and an automatic grenade launcher. As a mobile fire support base or recce vehicle in a mechanised unit? Too light for an armored unit.



You could have one on standby at NDHQ to bust through some red tape as required


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> However, there is broadly laid out in SSE the general range of operations that are expected to be performed by the CF.
> That document specifically states that "The Army trains to fight at the Brigade-group level." and that it should be prepared to operate across "the spectrum of conflict" which would include peer/near-peer combat.  A new Foreign or Defence policy paper is not likely to significantly change what basic capabilities are required to field a battle-worthy Brigade Group.


I basically agree with this but I do tend to be a stickler for parsing language. 'trains to fight at the Brigade-group level" does not equate to "deploying and sustaining a brigade". When you take a look at the mission sets enumerated in SSE you'll see that none of them approach the numbers needed for a full brigade group deployment. Prior defence policies made deployment of a brigade a task.



> Are there enough PYs for 4 RCA(GS) to fulfill their current role as well as take on the SHORAD role? Should the two capabilities be combined within the same unit?


I understand that there are additional PYs assigned to the GBAD project which strike me as enough for a full battery. 4 RCA(GS) already has the MRR radars and ASCC which would ordinarily be part of an AD regiment. The whole thing revolves around how many systems are being contemplated as part of the purchase. If the answer is 9 to 16 then there will be enough PYs to build a regiment with one firing battery. If we can get 18 to 32 systems and MANPADs then we could build two or more batteries which would involve transferring 4 RCA(GS)s Blackjacks to some other unit and adding in ResF positions but my guess is we would still be able to generated within the existing and contemplated PY ceiling.



> However I don't believe that the Reserves are currently in a position to be able to act in the "extremis for war" force in terms of equipment, organization, leadership or training.


All my napkin forces are based on the presumption that someone will grab the CAF leadership by the short and curlies and demand meaningful reform. It also presupposes a phased transition from our current state to the desired end state.



> Agreed as the desired end state. However I don't believe that the Reserves are currently in a position to be able to act in the "extremis for war" force in terms of equipment, organization, leadership or training. Creating two Divisions with structures that roughly mirror each other (3 x maneuver Brigades and ideally a deployable CSS Brigade) is a first step. Once that is in place and you start filling in the gaps in organization, training and equipment then you can start shifting your Reg Force/Reserve Force PYs between the units to create the balance you need. Start with 2 x Reg Force Divisional HQs and 6 x Reg Force deployable Brigade Group HQs as the first step. For Phase II you work on the consolidation of all the individual Reserve Regiments into 3 x coherent Brigade Groups plus a CSS Brigade). Then you have the common foundation upon which you can start shifting the weight between Reg Force and Reserve Force PYs between the various component units


I agree totally that you start with forming the two divisional headquarters and the appropriate brigade headquarters. I disagree with the idea that they be "mirrored" when their end state is to be asymmetrical. Each division and brigade from the start should be formed in a way that reflects the end state. For example, in my design, 1 Div in the west should be developed in contemplation that it might need to be deployable while 2 Div in the east won't be. While the brigade headquarters might well be full RegF, the brigade's support structures in the west will be designed in contemplation of a predominant end state of being ResF while the east is more tilted towards a larger RegF day to day component. We're talking a subtle difference here.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

One rule of thumb I have found from looking at both US and UK force constructs for the Army in that there is generally a 35-36% of the force in Combat Units.
   46-47% in Support Units - and the remaining ~2% in overhead (admin units)
No granted down here we do put more Support in the Reserve (not ARNG, but USAR) 

Down here we are pretty transparent - so for your reading pleasure (has nice graphics too)...


			https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-05/57088-Force-Structure-Primer.pdf
		


Plus this lovely little tidbit on P.29:
However, DoD currently describes scenarios involving Russia and China as its most challenging potential con- flicts, and the particular strengths of Stryker BCTs would not be especially useful in those scenarios. Armored BCTs would probably be preferred for responding to Russian aggression against the Baltic states, and infantry BCTs would probably be preferred for responding to Chinese military action against Taiwan or other states on the South China Sea.

Also what I found relevant to Canada is the "Special Topic" on P.38 
Integration of the Army’s Active and Reserve Components

In short given the size of the CA, I think the 4 Regular Bde (3 "CMBG" and 1 CSSB) is a little overly ambitious, without PRes integration - given the Support needs of an Expeditionary Army...

If the PRes can be effectively leveraged - then I think that the CA could actually field two functioning DIV.
   BUT that would require massive capital investiture - something I strongly doubt that the GoC would support.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> One rule of thumb I have found from looking at both US and UK force constructs for the Army in that there is generally a 35-36% of the force in Combat Units.
> 46-47% in Support Units - and the remaining ~2% in overhead (admin units)
> No granted down here we do put more Support in the Reserve (not ARNG, but USAR)
> 
> Down here we are pretty transparent - so for your reading pleasure (has nice graphics too)...
> 
> 
> https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-05/57088-Force-Structure-Primer.pdf


One of my primary reference sources. CBO also has a good interactive page for "what iffing" the costs of adding, subtracting or changing BCTs.



> CBO’s Interactive Force Structure Tool | Congressional Budget Office
> 
> 
> This tool allows the user to see the effects on the Department of Defense’s total operation and support costs and on the size of the military of adding or subtracting tanks, ships, aircraft, and other units.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.cbo.gov





KevinB said:


> Plus this lovely little tidbit on P.29:
> However, DoD currently describes scenarios involving Russia and China as its most challenging potential con- flicts, and the particular strengths of Stryker BCTs would not be especially useful in those scenarios. Armored BCTs would probably be preferred for responding to Russian aggression against the Baltic states, and infantry BCTs would probably be preferred for responding to Chinese military action against Taiwan or other states on the South China Sea.


I think the important lesson here is that when the SBCT was initially conceptualized (roughly concurrently with our LAV based all singing and dancing force) the intent was to create a rapidly deployable force (96 hours worldwide) that could make and hold a bridgehead until heavy forces arrived. Studies done in 2003 found that the airlift for such a reaction time simply wasn't available.



> https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-03-801.pdf


When you now consider the heavier LAV 6.0 and the restricted Canadian airlift, the concept of a quick reaction mechanized force simply becomes impossible. Medium weight forces have always been a compromise right from the get go with the BTR 60s. A medium weight vehicle has its uses; a medium weight force, on the other hand, is a solution looking for a problem.



KevinB said:


> Also what I found relevant to Canada is the "Special Topic" on P.38
> Integration of the Army’s Active and Reserve Components


This is very critical for a force that routinely deploys in strength or has an objective to deploy at some time in massive strength and wants to have all the necessary enablers available at a low standby costs.

It's less of a requirement for an Army that deals in small scale missions day to day and has no plan for large scale missions. For those purposes a small full-time support structure is adequate and a reserve force can be mostly ignored.

The Army is a product of its own folly and limited vision.



KevinB said:


> In short given the size of the CA, I think the 4 Regular Bde (3 "CMBG" and 1 CSSB) is a little overly ambitious, without PRes integration - given the Support needs of an Expeditionary Army...


Canada's army is solely expeditionary. Even defence of our own territories is primarily an expeditionary operation and in short, we are poorly established for the role. A massive rebalancing is necessary.



KevinB said:


> If the PRes can be effectively leveraged - then I think that the CA could actually field two functioning DIV.
> BUT that would require massive capital investiture - something I strongly doubt that the GoC would support.


Numbers-wise you are absolutely correct. We have the people authorized to field two divisions as it stands - one for day-to day operations at small scale and one training for deployment on divisional scale. With current numbers (and assuming we cure our training deficiencies) we could not deploy and sustain more than the one division. Based on the equipment available to us we could not deploy and sustain more than one brigade. All of that assumes that we do not use a six month rotation scheme but go "all in" and that we rapidly overcome some critical capability deficiencies by UOR. To go beyond deploying more than one brigade requires a substantial procurement program.

🍻


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> When you now consider the heavier LAV 6.0 and the restricted Canadian airlift, the concept of a quick reaction mechanized force simply becomes impossible. Medium weight forces have always been a compromise right from the get go with the BTR 60s. A medium weight vehicle has its uses; a medium weight force, on the other hand, is a solution looking for a problem.
> 🍻


If doctrine were followed, units were equipped to a modern standard, and LAV UP and TAPV didn't shit the bed, is a CMBG riding a 26tonne, 30mm & ATGM equipped IFV, supported with organic turreted mortars, suitable Bn level AT assets, and a tank regiment still a medium force?


----------



## Ostrozac

IKnowNothing said:


> If doctrine were followed, units were equipped to a modern standard, and LAV UP and TAPV didn't shit the bed, is a CMBG riding a 26tonne, 30mm & ATGM equipped IFV, supported with organic turreted mortars, suitable Bn level AT assets, and a tank regiment still a medium force?


Yes — because you‘d be missing self propelled artillery. Mortars are critical, but they supplement, not replace, proper tube and rocket artillery.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Ostrozac said:


> Yes — because you‘d be missing self propelled artillery. Mortars are critical, but they supplement, not replace, proper tube and rocket artillery.


Sorry, was focusing on the maneuver elements.  Add your preference of Archer/Ceasar/ LAV 6 AGM,  same answer?


----------



## KevinB

TBH looking at what is available, the Regular Force @ around 22k gives slightly less than 2 Bde’s if one follows the 36% Cbt Formation construct.

I’d argue that is the CA isn’t going to vastly reform the PRes, then creating 1 CABG and 2 CLBG out of the Regs with modern equipment and to cascade the LAV to the PRes… 
   That involves also giving up and ideas on CSSB and Div assets and working from within Brit and US Div’s.  I’m not sure the GoC would like that - but…


----------



## Ostrozac

IKnowNothing said:


> Sorry, was focusing on the maneuver elements.  Add your preference of Archer/Ceasar/ LAV 6 ACSV,  same answer?


You’d be getting there. You’d have more firepower than a comparable British armoured brigade, but less protection, so you’d probably get the job done with higher casualties.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> I think that's a cop out.  While maybe not perfect, CA has (acceptable?) doctrinal ORBATs.  CA has the full and part-time personnel to fill them.  CA has spent the money and bought enough hulls/chassis to fill them.
> 
> Senior leadership doesn't get the prerogative of throwing shit uphill unless they've made the best use of what they have, and executed to the limits of what they're allowed to.   I think we can all agree that's not the case.


Respectfully we have doctrine that has no grounding in our reality. I challa ge anyone to tell me the last time a Canadian infantry Bn had 4 companies and an Anti Tank company, I suspect it’s only in the fevered dreams of some people in a Kingston basement. Similarly our existing equipment does not let us equip our forces to the doctrinal Orbats; the notional 4 CMBG tank regiment has more tanks in it the entire CAF and I don’t know that I’ve ever seen a Javelin company in a Canadian Bde.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> Respectfully we have doctrine that has no grounding in our reality. I challa ge anyone to tell me the last time a Canadian infantry Bn had 4 companies and an Anti Tank company, I suspect it’s only in the fevered dreams of some people in a Kingston basement. Similarly our existing equipment does not let us equip our forces to the doctrinal Orbats; the notional 4 CMBG tank regiment has more tanks in it the entire CAF and I don’t know that I’ve ever seen a Javelin company in a Canadian Bde.


Interesting this.

Going back to the 70s and early into 1980s the battalions here in Canada had three rifle companies and a combat support company from my recollection. I believe 4 CMBG's battalions may have had four (but I can't swear to it)

During my Army Command and Staff Course we were already playing around with concepts that would mature into Corps 86 (which had many deltas between real world and doctrine over and above the four-company battalion) but the unanswered question was always: "how do we get to the "doctrinal" establishment from the real establishment both as to people and equipment. There was a defining silence as to that. 

The closest to a plan that I ever encountered was the designation of G Bty 3 RCHA as a flyover battery to 1 RCHA where we would form its fourth gun battery - Z Bty - on prepositioned M109s. We successfully exercised that plan several times.

I see nothing wrong with having a restricted peacetime organization and a doctrinal wartime one as long as there is a coherent mobilization plan to get from A to B and one exercises it regularly to work out the kinks. 

The problem is that after the Cold War shut down, the word "mobilization" became a dirty word. Instead the Army has gone to extremes to build a flexible force that gets cobbled together to suit specific missions with never ending ad hocery. It's really just a bit of a shell game to hide the Army's many deficiencies albeit many might call it "working with what you have" or "managing to stay relevant". I've never been on a MAPLE RESOLVE but considering the nature and scope of our organizations and the way that managed readiness works, I think it falls far short of mobilizing in a way that let's the Army exercises and evaluates doctrinal organizations properly. 

Personally I've given up on Canadian Army doctrine. Our need to go our own way seems both unnecessary and arrogant. More and more I find myself drifting to doctrine built around three-company battalions and 14-tank squadrons because those have been war gamed and proven in combat recently rather than being WW2 artifacts. Sure, the extra gear and people are useful, but is it more useful to have four three-company battalions in your army rather than three four-company ones? Is it better to have one Type 56 tank regiment and a fragment rather than two Type 44 regiments?

Whatever doctrine we either adopt or make for ourselves needs to be supported by a clear equipment procurement program and mobilization plan that achieves the doctrinal end state. Ad hocery built around capability deficiencies has to end. If the Army doesn't have a clear doctrinal structure, how can it ever convince politicians to pay for the equipment required? The Army will forever be sucked into making do with whatever inadequate quantities allocated funds will buy.

🍻


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> Respectfully we have doctrine that has no grounding in our reality. I challa ge anyone to tell me the last time a Canadian infantry Bn had 4 companies and an Anti Tank company, I suspect it’s only in the fevered dreams of some people in a Kingston basement. Similarly our existing equipment does not let us equip our forces to the doctrinal Orbats; the notional 4 CMBG tank regiment has more tanks in it the entire CAF and I don’t know that I’ve ever seen a Javelin company in a Canadian Bde.


Truthfully, the link I used to use to get to Battalion in Battle,  Infantry Section/Platoon is defunct so I'm going off memory (stupid for not downloading), but as I recall the much more recent Infantry Section/Platoon describes a 3 coy Bn with an AT/Direct Fire Platoon, not Coy, and Bn in battle allowed for those expansions but didn't necessarily prescribe them. When faced with contradictory bureaucratic information I go with the most recent.   I also might be completely imagining that, but suffice to say when I was referring to a doctrinal mech Bn it's 3 line Coy, AT platoon, recce platoon, mortar platoon, assault pioneer platoon,  a doctrinal tank regiment as a type 56/7.

That being said, respectfully, you're hammering home my point.  We have enough tanks for a type 56, we just decided not to follow doctrine and didn't upgrade enough to combat standard.  We have enough LAV hulls to mount x number of doctrinal mech Bn's, but we didn't equip the necessary weapons systems/ variants, and are spreading them too thin.

I challenge that when viewed from a long term perspective it's not that doctrine has no grounding in reality, it's that CA senior leadership has done a pisspoor job organizing and equipping the army to follow it.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Interesting this.
> 
> Going back to the 70s and early into 1980s the battalions here in Canada had three rifle companies and a combat support company from my recollection. I believe 4 CMBG's battalions may have had four (but I can't swear to it)
> 
> During my Army Command and Staff Course we were already playing around with concepts that would mature into Corps 86 (which had many deltas between real world and doctrine over and above the four-company battalion) but the unanswered question was always: "how do we get to the "doctrinal" establishment from the real establishment both as to people and equipment. There was a defining silence as to that.
> 
> The closest to a plan that I ever encountered was the designation of G Bty 3 RCHA as a flyover battery to 1 RCHA where we would form its fourth gun battery - Z Bty - on prepositioned M109s. We successfully exercised that plan several times.
> 
> I see nothing wrong with having a restricted peacetime organization and a doctrinal wartime one as long as there is a coherent mobilization plan to get from A to B and one exercises it regularly to work out the kinks.
> 
> The problem is that after the Cold War shut down, the word "mobilization" became a dirty word. Instead the Army has gone to extremes to build a flexible force that gets cobbled together to suit specific missions with never ending ad hocery. It's really just a bit of a shell game to hide the Army's many deficiencies albeit many might call it "working with what you have" or "managing to stay relevant". I've never been on a MAPLE RESOLVE but considering the nature and scope of our organizations and the way that managed readiness works, I think it falls far short of mobilizing in a way that let's the Army exercises and evaluates doctrinal organizations properly.
> 
> Personally I've given up on Canadian Army doctrine. Our need to go our own way seems both unnecessary and arrogant. More and more I find myself drifting to doctrine built around three-company battalions and 14-tank squadrons because those have been war gamed and proven in combat recently rather than being WW2 artifacts. Sure, the extra gear and people are useful, but is it more useful to have four three-company battalions in your army rather than three four-company ones? Is it better to have one Type 56 tank regiment and a fragment rather than two Type 44 regiments?
> 
> Whatever doctrine we either adopt or make for ourselves needs to be supported by a clear equipment procurement program and mobilization plan that achieves the doctrinal end state. Ad hocery built around capability deficiencies has to end. If the Army doesn't have a clear doctrinal structure, how can it ever convince politicians to pay for the equipment required? The Army will forever be sucked into making do with whatever inadequate quantities allocated funds will buy.
> 
> 🍻


Several have said it here previously.  If we deploy (especially for major combat operations) it will with certainty be alongside the US military.  

In our organization and equipment purchases we should strive for as much commonality and interoperability with the US as possible.  We should be able to more or less seamlessly plug a Canadian BCT (lets even start using their terminology to avoid confusion) into a US Division.  If we ever get our act together enough to deploy a Canadian-led Division we should also be able to more or less seamlessly plug an American BCT into our formation.

No need to constantly try to re-invent the wheel.  Is the US system/equipment perfect?  No, but nobody has the perfect system/equipment.  Their overall package though is clearly superior to ours.  Take advantage of the economy of scale in joint/common equipment purchases.  If we do that consistently we might even lure some defence production North of the border.

Some would say that copying the Americans would be surrendering some of our sovereignty, but I'd suggest that if the US government sees us an actually useful contributor to our collective defence it will rather increase the say we have at the political table.

$.02


----------



## KevinB

Which is where IMHO it’s better to have 2 properly resourced Regular Bde’s than 4 that seem to strive for inadequacy.  Or 4 Total Force Bde’s that are properly organized and equipped than the ~11 that exist on paper. 

Honestly with 22k regulars, and 17k PRes that’s 39k troops All Ranks. 

Using the 36% Cbt Formation that works out to 14k for Bde’s, and at 4,500 per Bde (ish) that works out to 3.1 
   Given the CAF doesn’t have the seem churn as the US Army, I don’t think the Admin and Support #’s need to be as high as down here, so I think that 4 Bde is very doable. 
  It also provided for robust support and schools to allow for mobilization. 

1 Armoured 
2 Light (Airborne, Air Mobile, with Arctic and Mountain sub specialties 
1 Med (and honestly I’d burn the Med Bde if the CAF didn’t have a zillion LAV) 
    Put remaining LAV in storage for mobilization needs or protected mobility for Light units on Peace Support Ops. 

Those should be setup to plug and play with the US Army - but I’d accept 1 of the Light Bde’s setup for work with the USMC too).


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Which is where IMHO it’s better to have 2 properly resourced Regular Bde’s than 4 that seem to strive for inadequacy.  Or 4 Total Force Bde’s that are properly organized and equipped than the ~11 that exist on paper.
> 
> Honestly with 22k regulars, and 17k PRes that’s 39k troops All Ranks.
> 
> Using the 36% Cbt Formation that works out to 14k for Bde’s, and at 4,500 per Bde (ish) that works out to 3.1
> Given the CAF doesn’t have the seem churn as the US Army, I don’t think the Admin and Support #’s need to be as high as down here, so I think that 4 Bde is very doable.
> It also provided for robust support and schools to allow for mobilization.
> 
> 1 Armoured
> 2 Light (Airborne, Air Mobile, with Arctic and Mountain sub specialties
> 1 Med (and honestly I’d burn the Med Bde if the CAF didn’t have a zillion LAV)
> Put remaining LAV in storage for mobilization needs or protected mobility for Light units on Peace Support Ops.
> 
> Those should be setup to plug and play with the US Army - but I’d accept 1 of the Light Bde’s setup for work with the USMC too).


Under your proposal I could possibly see something like this as an evolution:

1 x ABCT
We don't currently have the equipment required for one and personally I'd wait until the winner of the Bradley replacement program (Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle) is determined before we look at acquiring the required equipment.  No point starting out with kit that is already on its way out the door in the US.
Logically our Heavy "break glass in case of fire" force should be a 30/70 formation.  The Reserves are not yet at a point where they can provide that 70% contribution.
So to me it would make sense to "put a pin" in this one for now.  Do what we need to do to maintain our tank skills (and ideally start shifting from the Leopard to the Abrams) and our mounted infantry skills while we work on making the changes required to the Reserves to allow them to fulfill the required role and while we wait for procurement programs to provide the required equipment.

2 x IBCT
Should not be terribly difficult to begin aligning our structure to match the American model and also the unit type that lends itself best currently to Reserve augmentation.  
Technically our Brigades are already at 70% manning so we could begin formalizing the augmentation between the Reserves and the Reg Force elements.
Eventually we may want to shift some of the Battalions to a 30/70 Reg/Reserve ratio once the Reserve system is overhauled.

1 x SBCT
LAVs are already there.  Manning is at 70% already but some work will be required to get the Reserves to fulfill 30%, especially in the more technical elements.  
Being a single BCT we could focus on a single geographic region for upgrading the Reserve technical capabilities.  To start we could look at filling 30% as primarily dismounts.  Eventually you might want to shift at least one of the Battalions to a 30/70 ratio.

I'm assuming your 4 x Brigade proposal excludes any plans for Divisional-level assets or plans for Canadian Divisional HQ deployments?  Current CSSB elements would be distributed into the BCT structures?  Or could you maybe replace one of the IBCTs with a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade?


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Which is where IMHO it’s better to have 2 properly resourced Regular Bde’s than 4 that seem to strive for inadequacy.  Or 4 Total Force Bde’s that are properly organized and equipped than the ~11 that exist on paper.
> 
> *Honestly with 22k regulars, and 17k PRes that’s 39k troops All Ranks.*



No. 

That's 22k regulars with a mish mash of full time and part time reservists that, because of prevailing CAF policies and leadership postures, might be described as, at best, unreliable and, at worst, a dangerous liability.


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> During my Army Command and Staff Course we were already playing around with concepts that would mature into Corps 86 (which had many deltas between real world and doctrine over and above the four-company battalion) but the unanswered question was always: "how do we get to the "doctrinal" establishment from the real establishment both as to people and equipment. There was a defining silence as to that.


It strikes that said silence would exist regardless.   Old Canadian doctrine, new canadian doctrine, SBCT, IBCT, ABCT, Deep Strike... 
Seems like regardless of what was written the decisions made over the last 20 years would have similarly ignored it and the same gaps would exist.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> No.
> 
> That's 22k regulars with a mish mash of full time and part time reservists that, because of prevailing CAF policies and leadership postures, might be described as, at best, unreliable and, at worst, a dangerous liability.


I don’t make a lot of expectations out of the current PRes structure. 
     The only way for Canada to realistically be able to field more than two actual Combat ready Bde’s is to totally rework the PRes system.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Some micro complaints about the Res F:
1. Spends too much time prepping/loading/unloading/cleaning/storing eqpt relative to training time; and attendance isn't mandatory.
2. Consequently doesn't execute enough pl/coy battle tasks in the course of a year.
3. Consequently has decreasingly skilled people relative to increasing rank, which affects the quality of the little bit of actual training at (1).

That wheel must be broken.

Regarding the general mobilization scenario, many (most) Res F officers will not be capable in command roles.  Most will be capable in staff roles.  The Res F could better prepare by participating in more long staff exercises (under canvas, not in barracks or armouries).  I doubt the Res F is capable of adequately training itself in this regard (at least, not yet).

Someone is going to have to try mixed units at some point.  If they work, reinforce success and start withdrawing resources from failures.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> Some micro complaints about the Res F:
> 1. Spends too much time prepping/loading/unloading/cleaning/storing eqpt relative to training time; and attendance isn't mandatory.
> 2. Consequently doesn't execute enough pl/coy battle tasks in the course of a year.
> 3. Consequently has decreasingly skilled people relative to increasing rank, which affects the quality of the little bit of actual training at (1).
> 
> That wheel must be broken.
> 
> Regarding the general mobilization scenario, many (most) Res F officers will not be capable in command roles.  Most will be capable in staff roles.  The Res F could better prepare by participating in more long staff exercises (under canvas, not in barracks or armouries).  I doubt the Res F is capable of adequately training itself in this regard (at least, not yet).
> 
> Someone is going to have to try mixed units at some point.  If they work, reinforce success and start withdrawing resources from failures.



The people in the Reserves are/ have the potential to be generally excellent.

The biggest issue is no clear vision/mission/goals.

As a result, every direction people try to lead the reserves is the right one because: these 8 things, especially #3 









						Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail
					

In the past decade, the author has watched more than 100 companies try to remake themselves into better competitors. Their efforts have gone under many banners: total quality management, reengineering, right sizing, restructuring, cultural change, and turnarounds. In almost every case, the goal...




					hbr.org
				






.


----------



## foresterab

Brad Sallows said:


> Some micro complaints about the Res F:
> 1. Spends too much time prepping/loading/unloading/cleaning/storing eqpt relative to training time; and attendance isn't mandatory.
> 2. Consequently doesn't execute enough pl/coy battle tasks in the course of a year.
> 3. Consequently has decreasingly skilled people relative to increasing rank, which affects the quality of the little bit of actual training at (1).
> 
> That wheel must be broken.
> 
> Regarding the general mobilization scenario, many (most) Res F officers will not be capable in command roles.  Most will be capable in staff roles.  The Res F could better prepare by participating in more long staff exercises (under canvas, not in barracks or armouries).  I doubt the Res F is capable of adequately training itself in this regard (at least, not yet).
> 
> Someone is going to have to try mixed units at some point.  If they work, reinforce success and start withdrawing resources from failures.


This is one of the reasons I think of reserve units being overhauled almost completely with equipment.   In my mind the basic vehicle for any reserve unit is a 3/4 ton long box truck that can be serviced via local garage/dealership and allows for 4 passengers per/vehicle. 

Why go this route for infantry units?
1. All LAV/Bison/field wrecker units for infantry based units are stored at central, Division maintained, training facilities where assembly of units will occur for annual training.
2. A simplified fleet allows for easier local maintenance but also allows for cheaper sourcing of vehicles via bulk order and logistics support. 
3. Truck canopy add-ons allow for mobile treatment centers for limited medical support.  These are not ambulances but advanced first aid level care until experts show up. 
4. simplified training for basic recruits.   Yes training should occur before a person hops from a pickup to a Leopard or LAV but at least you can use all recruits, with minimum training, for basic exercises.
5. Cheap means of planning assembly and road movement exercise.   Assemble the unit on a training night and try to go through Montreal as a formed unit while section commanders try to track 3x trucks enroute.   
6. You don't need a LAV to show to the public you're the Canadian Army.   Uniforms, common trucks with armed forces logo on side, and frankly showing up is what what people want to know.    
7. Law enforcement has gun locking mounts for the cab if needed for transport of firearms in the cab.  

For field support/Artillery/armour units?
1. Medical units should have some ambulance type units (sorry I'm totally ignorant on what they currently have) under direct care so they can be operate immediately as effective medical support
2. Logistics units should have some tractor trailer rigs and a limited number of flatdeck/lowboy trailers to allow for movement.  The trucks are more important than the trailers as you can hook onto civilian sourced trailers. 
3. Artillery and armour units.   You have heavy expensive loads that need a bigger truck at times.   Need competency on how to move and retrieve stuck vehicles but also think this is often better learned during field exercises than paved parking lots. 

Reality says that if reserve forces are going to be deployed it's going to be a multiple step process.  1) Movement order, 2) local assembly, 3) assembly at a common brigade/division assembly point, 4) mission order.    By simplifying things to basic pick ups you are aligning with 3) assembly at a common brigade/division assembly point where the movement from local armoury to this location may be road transport (so pick up is fine) or air (in which case ground transport is irrelevant).  

Again the emphasis here is based upon all reserve units working jointly with regular forces towards annual mobilization and common training.   I want the reserves to know at least the annual mission and to be able to train within the limits of their limited personel at each local unit to allow for a larger, more effective formation to be created when joined with regular force units.


----------



## dapaterson

Prepping / cleaning / user maintenance of equipment isn't something to be ignored or offloaded to others.


----------



## Brad Sallows

It's more efficient to load/unload for a 4 day exercise than a 36 hour exercise.

[Add: I get the reluctance to have a situation in which the troops-to-be-trained fall in on their eqpt and drop it off for someone else to finish up with, but at some point the hours available for a part-timer are going to crash into the minimum training hours needed to maintain some given level of expertise, and solutions involving "housekeepers" may have to be considered.]


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Prepping / cleaning / user maintenance of equipment isn't something to be ignored or offloaded to others.



It's actually an important part of professional development... for everyone.

Where leaders, at all levels, don't do their job re: maintenance we're all hooped, of course.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> It's actually an important part of professional development... for everyone.
> 
> Where leaders, at all levels, don't do their job re: maintenance we're all hooped, of course.


The issue is most of the time in my experience cleaning and maintenance are done to foolishness, and often actually damages the items instead…


----------



## foresterab

daftandbarmy said:


> It's actually an important part of professional development... for everyone.
> 
> Where leaders, at all levels, don't do their job re: maintenance we're all hooped, of course.


Fully agree that there is a level of development gained for personally responsible.  Your own webbing, boots, field gear...yes.    

As a unit that is however going to be a) attached to a larger permanent force if mobilized fully and b) often limited on numbers it can mobilize under the current system of P Reserve attendance/training and c) often mobilized as single resources to fill out gaps in other unit and/or conglomerated units mis-mashed together (domestic ops)....then why have the responsibility of training and preparation on equipment that doesn't always align and instead simplify the mission training day to day so that field exercises can be true focused learned. 

Again I'm biased from my wildfire experience where we mobilize manpower, send it with basic gear, and then draw additional resources upon arrival depending on what's needed (pumps/hoses/saws etc.)   There is enough common equipment to allow national or international resources to grab a pump and deploy on incident even if we have variations in boots/coverals/radios.   Most importantly though the incoming resources are known and have a mission pre-deployment (you're a plans chief, you're a helicopter coordinator, your a crew leader of a 20 man unit) that can be slotted into the bigger operational picture and rotated as needed.


----------



## dapaterson

Combat Arms soldiers in the Res F already mistreat CSS soldiers enough, and expect them to do basic tasks that are not CSS.

Cheating on exercises by offloading your responsibilities to someone else (before, during or after) builds bad muscle memory, and means soldiers are not being properly prepared and trained.

Mission focus means understanding your roles from end to end and practicing them.

Signed, CBT A to CSS, from back row third rank to front of the parade retired Res F guy.


----------



## dapaterson

Let me add: there is ample time to prepare for Res F units, they just piss away most of it.

A normal month should be something like:

Evening one: four periods of lectures and rehearsals for the upcoming exercise.

Evening two: one period of rehearsals, three periods of prep of equipment etc in advance of the coming weekend.

Weekend exercise

Evening three: cleanup, repair, put away eqpt.

Evening four: various mandatory training and lectures.

Lather, rinse, repeat.  It's not rocket surgery.


----------



## KevinB

1) Pooled vehicles / equipment don’t work. 
   They get driven like stolen and treated with zero responsibility.  
2) Basic vehicle maintenance is a driver / crew function — however that doesn’t mean there doesn’t need to be robust support functions.  
   The CAF should never need to simply take their Chevy  etc down to the local dealership, as they should have enough personnel in support side to keep the entire fleet moving. 
3) Contractor maintenance makes folks lazy, irresponsible and odds are those contractors won’t come and fix your vehicle in a war zone. 

Post Ex drills aren’t rocket science as @dapaterson pointed out. 
   Personal kit is an individual task 
   Section/platoon (DET etc) items are a collective one. 
For the PRes - some items may need a quick job till the next admin night or full parade night as long as they are not muddy, etc. 

One problem is secure storage - few PRes Armories have cages etc to hang things etc.


----------



## KevinB

That last comment drives home a point. 
  The Reg Force units have Platoon/Det etc cages - so tents can be hung to dry and not go missing.  Other items can be left to dry or soaking in oil etc whatever. 

Very very few PRes units have significant controlled storage space to allow for things like toboggan groups to be left to air dry.  

Res Armories need to be construct with the same concept of Ops as Reg Force buildings (those are generally the bare minimum as well).


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> 1) Pooled vehicles / equipment don’t work.
> They get driven like stolen and treated with zero responsibility.


For several years in 2 RCHA, F Bty used militia equipment with the understanding the militia could use it on weekends and summer concentrations and save having to drive their own to Petawawa.

On a training weekend we would line the battery up on the parade square with kit laid out. The training militia unit would arrive by bus on a Friday night, sign for their kit and deploy to the field with each det or crew having an F Bty DS supervisor to supervise training. On Sunday afternoon the battery would return to the parade square for maintenance under the supervision of their officers and NCOs. Each piece of kit was signed back and inspected by the DS for cleanliness and completeness. No bus left until every piece of kit was clean and accounted for.

It can be done.



KevinB said:


> 2) Basic vehicle maintenance is a driver / crew function — however that doesn’t mean there doesn’t need to be robust support functions.
> The CAF should never need to simply take their Chevy  etc down to the local dealership, as they should have enough personnel in support side to keep the entire fleet moving.


Absolutely agree. 



KevinB said:


> 3) Contractor maintenance makes folks lazy, irresponsible and odds are those contractors won’t come and fix your vehicle in a war zone
> Post Ex drills aren’t rocket science as @dapaterson pointed out.
> Personal kit is an individual task
> Section/platoon (DET etc) items are a collective one.
> For the PRes - some items may need a quick job till the next admin night or full parade night as long as they are not muddy, etc.


Absolutely agree, again. It's a vital part of training. If done poorly in training it will be done poorly when it counts.



KevinB said:


> One problem is secure storage - few PRes Armories have cages etc to hang things etc.


That should be fixable on a case-by-case basis with minor and inexpensive budgets. RSMs hate to give up space on a parade square for things as "messy" as caged lockers.  😁 

🍻


----------



## Brad Sallows

My concern is the ratio of "pre/post" to "exercise".

Each of the following requires some amount of time:

pers admin - nearly inelastic, can't be evaded
mandatory non-BTS training - completely inelastic, can't be evaded
BTS - somewhat elastic depending on how activities are planned and due to fact not everything can realistically be done each year, so BTS must be selected and therefore time required can be tweaked
pre/post activities for practicing and measuring BTS - nearly inelastic unless people aren't moving with purpose

Add up the time required.  If it exceeds 37.5 days (or whatever the number of days is "per soldier"), less the amount of overhead skimmed by various "work parties" (advance, rear, prep for SAV, etc) and other miscellaneous activities, it is unrealistic and fated to fail; failure rests at the feet of the people not matching resources to requirements.

Shortening the time spent on BTS is an option, but is self-defeating if the aim is to increase Res F competence.

So that leaves shortening the time spent on pre/post activities (increasing the "BTS time" : "pre/post time" ratio).  Either find other people to do some of the pre/post stuff (which is what advance and rear parties do some of), or plan longer exercise periods and stop wasting 2.5 paid days per soldier on 30 to 36 hour exercises.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> For several years in 2 RCHA, F Bty used militia equipment with the understanding the militia could use it on weekends and summer concentrations and save having to drive their own to Petawawa.


F Troop  



FJAG said:


> On a training weekend we would line the battery up on the parade square with kit laid out. The training militia unit would arrive by bus on a Friday night, sign for their kit and deploy to the field with each det or crew having an F Bty DS supervisor to supervise training. On Sunday afternoon the battery would return to the parade square for maintenance under the supervision of their officers and NCOs. Each piece of kit was signed back and inspected by the DS for cleanliness and completeness. No bus left until every piece of kit was clean and accounted for.
> 
> It can be done.


A C1 Bty cleanup isn’t nearly as intensive as a LAV Coy in my experience. Also IIRC it was really just 49FD and 56FD using it.  30FD always brought it own gear and I was pretty sure did 7Tor.   

It wasn’t getting used every weekend and left. 
  The Militia AVGP pool enters the chat.  

Can it be done, yes, but will it, and most importantly it shouldn’t need to.  

I’m fine with extra gear that a cadre holds at a Trg Area - but it should be extra for TRG only.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> F Troop
> 
> 
> A C1 Bty cleanup isn’t nearly as intensive as a LAV Coy in my experience. Also IIRC it was really just 49FD and 56FD using it.  30FD always brought it own gear and I was pretty sure did 7Tor.


Nope. 7 Tor, 11 Fd, 30 Fd, 49 Fd and 56 Fd all came up by buses in those years. The gear was basically theirs to start with. Each regiment was "taxed" one or two guns and several 1/4, 3/4 and 2 1/2 tons each. Generally each regiment came for two shoots in the spring and one in the fall as well as a summer concentration. In the summer they had to bring extra gear because they generally formed two batteries. This is one of the reasons that when I transferred to the reserves in 1981 I had 180 days accumulated leave which saw me pretty well through first year law.  😁 


KevinB said:


> It wasn’t getting used every weekend and left.


Around 15 weekends per year, the summer concentration and three live fire 2 RCHA exercises every year. The regiment ran at 15,000 rounds each year so the battery would have put roughly 7,500 downrange of our own and the Militia added roughly another 3,000 (about 600 per regiment). 


KevinB said:


> The Militia AVGP pool enters the chat.
> 
> Can it be done, yes, but will it, and most importantly it shouldn’t need to.


I don't disagree. If one had operational guns, you'd need to rotate them if nothing else to keep the EFCs under control.


KevinB said:


> I’m fine with extra gear that a cadre holds at a Trg Area - but it should be extra for TRG only.


I'm actually on the side of depot battalions having their own vehicles and heavy weapons if only for the reason that if the operational battalions go off to war the depots need to keep churning out trainees. I'm also not a fan of concentrating units' gear into an NRQS/ARTS (or whatever its called) or Milcon pool in the summer. That does guarantee clapped out gear coming back.

In my perfect world, the heavy brigades would do their exercises with prepositioned gear in Europe. RegF during the fall to spring and ResF during the summer.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FWIW...

The military can't be the first line of defence in domestic disasters, MPs told​





						The military can't be the first line of defence in domestic disasters, MPs told
					






					www-cbc-ca.cdn.ampproject.org


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Nope. 7 Tor, 11 Fd, 30 Fd, 49 Fd and 56 Fd all came up by buses in those years. The gear was basically theirs to start with. Each regiment was "taxed" one or two guns and several 1/4, 3/4 and 2 1/2 tons each. Generally each regiment came for two shoots in the spring and one in the fall as well as a summer concentration. In the summer they had to bring extra gear because they generally formed two batteries. This is one of the reasons that when I transferred to the reserves in 1981 I had 180 days accumulated leave which saw me pretty well through first year law.  😁


Ah.  Several years before me.  
  I know it was tried again in the early 90’s with less than stellar results 


FJAG said:


> Around 15 weekends per year, the summer concentration and three live fire 2 RCHA exercises every year. The regiment ran at 15,000 rounds each year so the battery would have put roughly 7,500 downrange of our own and the Militia added roughly another 3,000 (about 600 per regiment).
> 
> I don't disagree. If one had operational guns, you'd need to rotate them if nothing else to keep the EFCs under control.
> 
> I'm actually on the side of depot battalions having their own vehicles and heavy weapons if only for the reason that if the operational battalions go off to war the depots need to keep churning out trainees. I'm also not a fan of concentrating units' gear into an NRQS/ARTS (or whatever its called) or Milcon pool in the summer. That does guarantee clapped out gear coming back.
> 
> In my perfect world, the heavy brigades would do their exercises with prepositioned gear in Europe. RegF during the fall to spring and ResF during the summer.
> 
> 🍻


Agreed. 
   I don’t like the idea of operational gear for training either.


----------



## AmmoTech90

dapaterson said:


> Let me add: there is ample time to prepare for Res F units, they just piss away most of it.
> 
> A normal month should be something like:
> 
> Evening one: four periods of lectures and rehearsals for the upcoming exercise.
> 
> Evening two: one period of rehearsals, three periods of prep of equipment etc in advance of the coming weekend.
> 
> Weekend exercise
> 
> Evening three: cleanup, repair, put away eqpt.
> 
> Evening four: various mandatory training and lectures.
> 
> Lather, rinse, repeat.  It's not rocket surgery.


I just dug out the regimental schedule for 763 (Ottawa) Comm Regt for Feb 1988.
All Wednesdays were Admin Parades.  MCpl+ and others by appointment.  Sometimes the .22 indoor range would be booked.
1st Friday- CO's parade followed by Sqn Training.
1st Saturday- Regimental Trg
2nd Friday- Officer's have a mess dinner.  RSM's parade followed by Sqn Training
2nd Sunday- Regimental skiing
3rd Friday- Squadron Trg/Packup/depart for squadron level exercises
3rd Sat/Sun- Squadron level exercises (Radio or Teletype)
4th Weekend- No training (not sure why).
In December, right after school broke we had run a 7 day Winter Indoc.
In January, the training was similar but we did a ground search and rescue exercise where the Radio squadron established comms and support and Teletype got to practice their winter indoc stuff.
In March there was SIT course, driver training, ranges and a Comm Gp level exercise.

We didn't always work on our own, often one or two rad dets would be tasked to support another unit's exercise.  Of course MILCON was a thing in the the summer, and the Ottawa Militia District seemed to like having a mini-MILCON in September where all the Rad Dets would get to do what they did during MILCON again.  

All of this was organized with O-gps, a semi-regular unit newsletter, and a big white board outside the OR.  Not rocket science.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> FWIW...
> 
> The military can't be the first line of defence in domestic disasters, MPs told​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The military can't be the first line of defence in domestic disasters, MPs told
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www-cbc-ca.cdn.ampproject.org




We can but hope.....


----------



## Kirkhill

@KevinB 

US National Guard.

When the Guard is assigned a Federal Task - eg supplying a Stryker Brigade Combat Team - is the entire Guard assigned to the task?   Are there volunteers for the duty?  How does it work?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> @KevinB
> 
> US National Guard.
> 
> When the Guard is assigned a Federal Task - eg supplying a Stryker Brigade Combat Team - is the entire Guard assigned to the task?   Are there volunteers for the duty?  How does it work?


If the Guard unit is Federalized - it’s the entire unit that mobilizes.  So everyone but those sick or otherwise excused (generally very few excused).  
   Unless it’s a limited personnel tasking.  

Even on their drill periods it’s mandatory, employers need to give them effectively Leave (and most do leave with pay). 

The ARNG and USAR are a pretty good model these days.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> If the Guard unit is Federalized - it’s the entire unit that mobilizes.  So everyone but those sick or otherwise excused (generally very few excused).
> Unless it’s a limited personnel tasking.
> 
> Even on their drill periods it’s mandatory, employers need to give them effectively Leave (and most do leave with pay).
> 
> The ARNG and USAR are a pretty good model these days.



What I was getting at was Guardsmen surplus to the numbers necessary to field the BCT for Federal Service.  

Would the entire Pennsylvania Guard be federalized or just the SBCT?  And how is the SBCT populated?  Are they volunteered?  Do they volunteer?  How long are they tasked prior to deployment?  Etc.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Which is where IMHO it’s better to have 2 properly resourced Regular Bde’s than 4 that seem to strive for inadequacy.  Or 4 Total Force Bde’s that are properly organized and equipped than the ~11 that exist on paper.
> 
> Honestly with 22k regulars, and 17k PRes that’s 39k troops All Ranks.
> 
> Using the 36% Cbt Formation that works out to 14k for Bde’s, and at 4,500 per Bde (ish) that works out to 3.1
> Given the CAF doesn’t have the seem churn as the US Army, I don’t think the Admin and Support #’s need to be as high as down here, so I think that 4 Bde is very doable.
> It also provided for robust support and schools to allow for mobilization.
> 
> 1 Armoured
> 2 Light (Airborne, Air Mobile, with Arctic and Mountain sub specialties
> 1 Med (and honestly I’d burn the Med Bde if the CAF didn’t have a zillion LAV)
> Put remaining LAV in storage for mobilization needs or protected mobility for Light units on Peace Support Ops.
> 
> Those should be setup to plug and play with the US Army - but I’d accept 1 of the Light Bde’s setup for work with the USMC too).


A couple of thoughts on the types of Brigades we may want/need.


I think an Armoured Brigade (ideally Reserve-heavy if we can ever fix that mess) should be part of the mix because if anything major does go down in Europe/Iran/North Korea/etc. you're going to want a Heavy "break glass in case of fire" capability.
A Light Brigade makes sense for Canada as both a Rapid Reaction Force that can be deployed worldwide in a crisis and can also respond to any threats to the Canadian Arctic.
While I think it's important to have the types of forces available to fight a peer conflict if required, I do also continue to believe (especially after the beating Russia has taken in Ukraine) that like during the Cold War, the most common types of future deployments will be in support of proxy brush wars rather than direct conflict with Russia/China.  Would it then make sense to have 1 or more Security Force Assistance Brigades?  LAVs and TAPVs would be suitable vehicles for such missions and being Officer and NCM heavy units they would provide a good leadership base for expansion if mobilization is ever required.  They also use up less PYs than a maneuver Brigade.
Ukraine has proven (yet again) that Artillery is the "King of Battle".  Perhaps a Fires Brigade (or two) would be a more impactful contribution to our coalition partners than another maneuver Brigade.  Also potentially less manpower intensive (and well suited for the Reserves).


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> What I was getting at was Guardsmen surplus to the numbers necessary to field the BCT for Federal Service.
> 
> Would the entire Pennsylvania Guard be federalized or just the SBCT?  And how is the SBCT populated?  Are they volunteered?  Do they volunteer?  How long are they tasked prior to deployment?  Etc.


The ARNG and USAR can be mobilized as individuals, subunits, units or formations.

During Afghanistan's Op Phoenix, the training of the ANA was rotated between various ARNG brigades. Generally the entire brigade would deploy with the exception of rear parties and a few individuals exempted for various reasons. The brigades were generally understaffed and as such volunteers from other brigades would round out the establishment.

The US Army's Command and General Staff College's Combined Arms Research Library has a large collection of interviews of various individuals who deployed during the Global War on Terror many of whom are Guard and Reservist. They are very informative and can be found here:



> CONTENTdm
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org



🍻


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> What I was getting at was Guardsmen surplus to the numbers necessary to field the BCT for Federal Service.
> 
> Would the entire Pennsylvania Guard be federalized or just the SBCT?  And how is the SBCT populated?  Are they volunteered?  Do they volunteer?  How long are they tasked prior to deployment?  Etc.


Okay wasn’t tracking that. 
   As far as scope goes it depends on what needed.  For augmentation whole units are generally brought up. 
As @FJAG pointed out it can be individual deployments too - but those taskings are generally voluntary calls for personnel outside the mobilized unit, but still inside that state (but not always). 

The Army down here identified a lot of issues during deployments and has made changes to the employment model over time. 

As far as predeployment training, that depends on the mission.  I don’t know a lot of folks in the Guard outside of folks who retired into 19th and 20th Group.  Their pre deployment has been generally a month.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The ARNG and USAR can be mobilized as individuals, subunits, units or formations.
> 
> During Afghanistan's Op Phoenix, the training of the ANA was rotated between various ARNG brigades. Generally the entire brigade would deploy with the exception of rear parties and a few individuals exempted for various reasons. The brigades were generally understaffed and as such volunteers from other brigades would round out the establishment.
> 
> The US Army's Command and General Staff College's Combined Arms Research Library has a large collection of interviews of various individuals who deployed during the Global War on Terror many of whom are Guard and Reservist. They are very informative and can be found here:
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻


Thanks for that FJAG.


----------



## WLSC

dapaterson said:


> Let me add: there is ample time to prepare for Res F units, they just piss away most of it.
> 
> A normal month should be something like:
> 
> Evening one: four periods of lectures and rehearsals for the upcoming exercise.
> 
> Evening two: one period of rehearsals, three periods of prep of equipment etc in advance of the coming weekend.
> 
> Weekend exercise
> 
> Evening three: cleanup, repair, put away eqpt.
> 
> Evening four: various mandatory training and lectures.
> 
> Lather, rinse, repeat.  It's not rocket surgery.


I would suggest that it’s about a normal month in the ARes I know.


----------



## WLSC

KevinB said:


> That last comment drives home a point.
> The Reg Force units have Platoon/Det etc cages - so tents can be hung to dry and not go missing.  Other items can be left to dry or soaking in oil etc whatever.
> 
> Very very few PRes units have significant controlled storage space to allow for things like toboggan groups to be left to air dry.
> 
> Res Armories need to be construct with the same concept of Ops as Reg Force buildings (those are generally the bare minimum as well).


I would say that in 34 CBG, most unit have a setup that kinda look like that, according to the space they have, of course.


----------



## KevinB

WLSC said:


> I would say that in 34 CBG, most unit have a setup that kinda look like that, according to the space they have, of course.


Interesting, for an Infantry Platoon, it needs at least a 20x20ft cage, ideally with sub areas for sections.
   In the ideal world a Section would have their own 30x20 vehicle bay and secure storage - but...


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> My concern is the ratio of "pre/post" to "exercise".
> 
> Each of the following requires some amount of time:
> 
> pers admin - nearly inelastic, can't be evaded
> mandatory non-BTS training - completely inelastic, can't be evaded
> BTS - somewhat elastic depending on how activities are planned and due to fact not everything can realistically be done each year, so BTS must be selected and therefore time required can be tweaked
> pre/post activities for practicing and measuring BTS - nearly inelastic unless people aren't moving with purpose
> 
> Add up the time required.  If it exceeds *37.5 days* (or whatever the number of days is "per soldier"), less the amount of overhead skimmed by various "work parties" (advance, rear, prep for SAV, etc) and other miscellaneous activities, it is unrealistic and fated to fail; failure rests at the feet of the people not matching resources to requirements.
> 
> Shortening the time spent on BTS is an option, but is self-defeating if the aim is to increase Res F competence.
> 
> So that leaves shortening the time spent on pre/post activities (increasing the "BTS time" : "pre/post time" ratio).  Either find other people to do some of the pre/post stuff (which is what advance and rear parties do some of), or plan longer exercise periods and stop wasting 2.5 paid days per soldier on 30 to 36 hour exercises.



Edit - sorry to have disrupted the flow but that 37.5 number niggled 

37.5 parade days a year.

And the Ukrainians were planning to send their guys to war with 21 days of training by the Brits (for defensive roles).  With 35 days they were qualified for offensive roles.

And a lot of the February Volunteers got a lot less training than that.


----------



## Brad Sallows

That 37.5 has to cover collective training up to platoon if not company and, theoretically, validation of BTS.  Is the 21 (or 35) individual training?


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> That 37.5 has to cover collective training up to platoon if not company and, theoretically, validation of BTS.  Is the 21 (or 35) individual training?



What did the Ukrainians manage to accomplish in their 21/35 days?

And that would just be the Year 1 troops who walk in the gates.
Years 2,3 and 4 would be on a separate training plan presumably.
By Year 5 most of Year 1 is out.

Why not make the local armouries and naval divisions principal recruiting centres?  Civilian walks in.  Gets the once over.  Is attested.  Joins the herd.  See if they survive the first year while they are going through career management.  Find out if they are suited and they may learn something useful.   In the meantime they are being supported and militarized.


----------



## McG

Under an MND who “understood” that PRes hiring was being held back by the incapable CFRCs, the army reserve units were given control over their recruiting and they managed to do nothing to improve their situation.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> What did the Ukrainians manage to accomplish in their 21/35 days?
> 
> And that would just be the Year 1 troops who walk in the gates.
> Years 2,3 and 4 would be on a separate training plan presumably.
> By Year 5 most of Year 1 is out.
> 
> Why not make the local armouries and naval divisions principal recruiting centres?  Civilian walks in.  Gets the once over.  Is attested.  Joins the herd.  See if they survive the first year while they are going through career management.  Find out if they are suited and they may learn something useful.   In the meantime they are being supported and militarized.


They also don’t need to waste time with endless Harassment and Safety  etc briefs


----------



## dapaterson

McG said:


> Under an MND who “understood” that PRes hiring was being held back by the incapable CFRCs, the army reserve units were given control over their recruiting and they managed to do nothing to improve their situation.


Hey!  That full-time recruiter keeps the museum up to date, runs the backend for messes during the day, is working on that special project using donations from the honoraries to redo some offices, fills a role as a platoon warrant...  Do you expect them to recruit as well?

Next you'll make the heretical suggestion that recruiting plans need to be aligned with training capacity.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Hey!  That full-time recruiter keeps the museum up to date, runs the backend for messes during the day, is working on that special project using donations from the honoraries to redo some offices, fills a role as a platoon warrant...  Do you expect them to recruit as well?
> 
> Next you'll make the heretical suggestion that recruiting plans need to be aligned with training capacity, _and the mind boggling delays and frustrations related to being forced to work with CFRC._



There, FTFY


----------



## dapaterson

Funny thing - if you remain in contact, notify them of missing docs, and shepherd them through the process, you can actually do well.

Or sit, wait, and ignore applications and wonder why you can't bring anyone in.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> Funny thing - if you remain in contact, notify them of missing docs, and shepherd them through the process, you can actually do well.
> 
> Or sit, wait, and ignore applications and wonder why you can't bring anyone in.


Kind of like procurement too


----------



## Kirkhill

dapaterson said:


> Funny thing - if you remain in contact, notify them of missing docs, and shepherd them through the process, you can actually do well.
> 
> Or sit, wait, and ignore applications and wonder why you can't bring anyone in.



So what you are saying is you have to make yourself an expert to ride herd on the experts that are there to expedite affairs.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> So what you are saying is you have to make yourself an expert to ride herd on the experts that are there to expedite affairs.



And keep a log of every single conversation.... with name, time and date attached


----------



## WLSC

KevinB said:


> Interesting, for an Infantry Platoon, it needs at least a 20x20ft cage, ideally with sub areas for sections.
> In the ideal world a Section would have their own 30x20 vehicle bay and secure storage - but...


I know for a fact that some unit have about the same setup than the LIB for a coy even if we can’t field more than a platoon.  We are footborne a inclose in old building.  We do what we can.  The point is that there good will to make thing move forward dispite all the red tape and the « bâtons dans les roues » of the system.


----------



## dapaterson

Kirkhill said:


> So what you are saying is you have to make yourself an expert to ride herd on the experts that are there to expedite affairs.


No.  I'm saying that someone whose role is to enroll people should be engaged and not a bloated passive disengaged do nothing.


----------



## childs56

McG said:


> Under an MND who “understood” that PRes hiring was being held back by the incapable CFRCs, the army reserve units were given control over their recruiting and they managed to do nothing to improve their situation.


That is not the full truth over that. Background checks, medical approvals and testing still had to be approved by CFRCs/ departments when I was Unit Recruiting. 
I know we went from parading 14 Troops a Day to over 90 regular with 140ish total when we started our own recruiting. 
The problem was still slow processing from CFRC, but more so the lack of budget for Courses, equipment and then pay. 
people were taking the time off work to attend courses but the course was cancelled. We even had employers asking why things were so bad. 
We had the numbers. we had the attrition gap filled. We did not have the commitment from higher. It was made even worse when they cut training days back, ammo allotments and no money to fix broken guns. 
The system is entirely broken with no single fix other then the old school bosses need to go, the old school mentality needs to go and common sense needs to be used.


----------



## daftandbarmy

childs56 said:


> That is not the full truth over that. Background checks, medical approvals and testing still had to be approved by CFRCs/ departments when I was Unit Recruiting.
> I know we went from parading 14 Troops a Day to over 90 regular with 140ish total when we started our own recruiting.
> The problem was still slow processing from CFRC, but more so the lack of budget for Courses, equipment and then pay.
> people were taking the time off work to attend courses but the course was cancelled. We even had employers asking why things were so bad.
> We had the numbers. we had the attrition gap filled. We did not have the commitment from higher. It was made even worse when they cut training days back, ammo allotments and no money to fix broken guns.
> The system is entirely broken with no single fix other then the old school bosses need to go, the old school mentality needs to go and common sense needs to be used.



So you found a doctor who could do the medicals? 

What kind of wizard are you?


----------



## ueo

KevinB said:


> Except the CA is attempting to place a foundation on quicksand…


Been known to happen, remember the new hospital in Lahr?


----------



## Brad Sallows

For the most part the Res F recruiting surges I observed, with additional money thrown at unit recruiters, was OK.  But recruiting is just the entry to a training pipeline, and someone has to have a firm grip on the training pipeline to get the recruits from mufti to private-one-hook.  "You recruited X people.  Well done.  Now you must provide Y of your (very few qualified and suitable) people as instructors for a year."  Some units can't do "train recruits" and "meet BTS" at the same time because they lack the people (depth).  So, failure.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Brad Sallows said:


> For the most part the Res F recruiting surges I observed, with additional money thrown at unit recruiters, was OK.  But recruiting is just the entry to a training pipeline, and someone has to have a firm grip on the training pipeline to get the recruits from mufti to private-one-hook.  "You recruited X people.  Well done.  Now you must provide Y of your (very few qualified and suitable) people as instructors for a year."  Some units can't do "train recruits" and "meet BTS" at the same time because they lack the people (depth).  So, failure.



Regular Force units don't have to worry about expending time and resources in attracting, enrolling and training recruits (NCMs and Officers), or carrying untrained people on their books for months and months, or years in some cases.. 

Why should Reserve units (with much less resource breadth and depth) have to worry about that?


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:


> Regular Force units don't have to worry about expending time and resources in attracting, enrolling and training recruits (NCMs and Officers), or carrying untrained people on their books for months and months, or years in some cases..
> 
> Why should Reserve units (with much less resource breadth and depth) have to worry about that?


Because they whine and demand additional responsibilities without understanding them.

Besides, it pads unit numbers to have all those Pte (R) on the books.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Regular Force units don't have to worry about expending time and resources in attracting, enrolling and training recruits (NCMs and Officers)


I’ll remember this next time I’m teaching a DP 1 lol. Part of STARS was that the Reserves would be responsible for training their own soldiers. That has never happened, with summer DP1s in training centres still being mass augmented from field units, much like every other DP1. Infact I’ve never not been short troops / peers because they were away supporting some course somewhere.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I’ll remember this next time I’m teaching a DP 1 lol. Part of STARS was that the Reserves would be responsible for training their own soldiers. That has never happened, with summer DP1s in training centres still being mass augmented from field units, much like every other DP1. Infact I’ve never not been short troops / peers because they were away supporting some course somewhere.


I know from 1987 to 2005 I never knew of a summer without RegF augmentation (any sometimes total control) of PRes Training.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I’ll remember this next time I’m teaching a DP 1 lol. Part of STARS was that the Reserves would be responsible for training their own soldiers. That has never happened, with summer DP1s in training centres still being mass augmented from field units, much like every other DP1. Infact I’ve never not been short troops / peers because they were away supporting some course somewhere.



Every reserve unit has a Recruit Pl of untrained soldiers, as well as OCdts, who parade during the training year and work separately from the trained soldiers. Sometimes they don’t pass/ attend summer courses and stay around ‘forever’.

It’s a PITA that the Regs just don’t need to deal with, and probably not doing the untrained a big favour either.


----------



## childs56

daftandbarmy said:


> So you found a doctor who could do the medicals?
> 
> What kind of wizard are you?


Actually no wizardry, We had an approved local  Dr to do the medicals. They still had to be reviewed by Ottawa. But it worked pretty good. It took a bit of work for all involved. Many times we assisted our local CFRC with recruiting and initial paper work. 
Things can work, you just need to have the right people in the correct place. Many times it is the wrong person for the wrong job in the Military.  

Thinking outside the box and getting things done worked well back then and could work well now. Except the issues lack of courses, Pat Platoon being to long and recruits being subjected to poor conditions prior to training is one factor that unless the higher ups change, is not going to positively work out. 

For example send them to Basic training then send  to civie school to be a heavy duty mechanic. Then a local course specific to armoured or what ever they are needing.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Every reserve unit has a Recruit Pl of untrained soldiers, as well as OCdts, who parade during the training year and work separately from the trained soldiers. Sometimes they don’t pass/ attend summer courses and stay around ‘forever’.
> 
> It’s a PITA that the Regs just don’t need to deal with, and probably not doing the untrained a big favour either.


Well 1 RCR is actually trialling that exact thing right now with this OJT Dp1 fiasco. But I suppose if you don’t count BTL / PAT platoons than that’s true for the time being. Those platoons do actually take up NCO postings btw.

I’ll ask you this question though, what would you do with untrained / awaiting training given the reserves can’t send all its persons awaiting training to PAT / BTL?


----------



## childs56

markppcli said:


> Well 1 RCR is actually trialling that exact thing right now with this OJT Dp1 fiasco. But I suppose if you don’t count BTL / PAT platoons than that’s true for the time being. Those platoons do actually take up NCO postings btw.
> 
> I’ll ask you this question though, what would you do with untrained / awaiting training given the reserves can’t send all its persons awaiting training to PAT / BTL?


We incorporated them into our regular training. We also ran classes for them to learn the basics such as rank, how to maintain a uniform, look after their gear things like that.


----------



## Kirkhill

Well, as a PITA MITCP intake I can tell you what was done.

Join the all ranks recruit platoon taking the same classes as the OR recruits.  Extra classes from the officers on legalities, organization, culture, QR&Os.  RSM and Adjt taking a personal interest.  Being hauled out of class to be informed my parchment had arrived.  Returned to class with the ORs to get my first salute.  Upstairs to the mess to go broke buying rounds.

Training continued with the ORs.   OJT with supervised taskings - investigation of tent fire on winter warfare ex comes to mind.  Shadowing Pl Ldrs on exercisees.   2 weeks MITCP at Orangeville - Hockley Valley.

Year 2 - Recruiting Officer - Grizzly and troops to malls and schools. - Recruited my own platoon.  Placed under tight supervision of an OC, 2iC, CSM, very experienced Platoon 2ic and 3 long service Master Corporals.  More OJT.   More independent study.  Duty officer when the JRs was open.  Excuses to the Commissionaire when one of the JRs decided he needed the keys to a Grizzly to take his girlfriend for the night for a ride - the Commissionaire held the keys.  Info'd the Commissionaire the Corporal was suffering the after effects of paint fumes. 

Excused summer training because I was signed up for Phase 2 at Gagetown in January.  More OJT, shadowing A Coy Pl Ldr in the field.   Organizing a range at Wainwright.  Shit jobs like setting up tents for a Boy Scout Jamboree.  Dealing with the fallout from a Winter Ex - overheated soldier passed out in the traces of a toboggan on a way up a mountain.  Locating a lost breech block carrier in snow drift.  The drift won.  Unditching a Deuce and a Half that skated down the mountain into another drift.  Without the assistance of the only winch in the packet because the OC had taken it back to the armouries to get help because he had more important things to do than make sure his Coy, with attached cadets, got back safely to the armouries.

I know there were manuals and lesson plans - I don't remember much in the way of dedicated instructors.

And then I was in Gagetown until my father croaked and was released.  Transferred to the Johns for a while.  Pretty much more of the same.

In short - I learned much the same way I learned any civvy job - with a lot of help from my friends.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Well 1 RCR is actually trialling that exact thing right now with this OJT Dp1 fiasco. But I suppose if you don’t count BTL / PAT platoons than that’s true for the time being. Those platoons do actually take up NCO postings btw.
> 
> I’ll ask you this question though, what would you do with untrained / awaiting training given the reserves can’t send all its persons awaiting training to PAT / BTL?



Have the Reserve CBG HQs do what they should to do, run a depot to produce trained soldiers/ Officers for the units instead of planning more golf weekends for all their Class B floppers


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Have the Reserve CBG HQs do what they should to do, run a depot to produce trained soldiers/ Officers for the units instead of planning more golf weekends for all their Class B floppers


ManMilDist (38 CBG) did that in the 1980s. It didn't work well for the units not located in Winnipeg. Units in Winnipeg were taxed for instructors. Theoretically it should have worked but most units were not happy with the idea as during the winter months they lost the use of both the instructors and the recruits. Go figure.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> ManMilDist (38 CBG) did that in the 1980s. It didn't work well for the units not located in Winnipeg. Units in Winnipeg were taxed for instructors. Theoretically it should have worked but most units were not happy with the idea as during the winter months they lost the use of both the instructors and the recruits. Go figure.
> 
> 🍻



Centralized solutions can not work in Canada.  And they most definitely will not work in a Militia scattered over 100 to 150 locations.  Nor do they work for the 150 or so Ranger Patrols.

You're going to have to do something different.  

The Cornwallis model is a viable option.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> The Cornwallis model


What exactly is that?


----------



## markppcli

childs56 said:


> We incorporated them into our regular training. We also ran classes for them to learn the basics such as rank, how to maintain a uniform, look after their gear things like that.


That was my experience in the reserves as well. 



daftandbarmy said:


> Have the Reserve CBG HQs do what they should to do, run a depot to produce trained soldiers/ Officers for the units instead of planning more golf weekends for all their Class B floppers



Okay so sure, let’s look at that from the 39 CBG context. How does that look for new recruits in Trail and Prince George ? Do they report to their units or are the sent class B to this depot ?


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> That was my experience in the reserves as well.
> 
> 
> 
> Okay so sure, let’s look at that from the 39 CBG context. How does that look for new recruits in Trail and Prince George ? Do they report to their units or are the sent class B to this depot ?



Most of our soldiers live near two major urban centres. 

It would be easy to bus them all to a depot location, like Chilliwack, on weekends for training. In fact, we used to do that with the training facility in Nanaimo, I believe. Troops in remote locations could be serviced by a smaller detachment based in Vernon or Kamloops, or wherever makes sense.

The 50+ (very expensive and under-utlized) full time positions - with Class A augmentation as required - that currently inhabit the Bde HQs would then re-configure into a mainly recruiting and training role. The 'Class B Commandos' would then also have the huge culture shock of working weekends like the other reservists, which they do not do now.

In any case, the principle would be to ensure that only trained soldiers and Officers arrive at units, like the Reg F. Then the limited resources at the units could focus all their time and attention on readiness for whatever task they finally figure out for us.

And the full timers can scrap with the full timers at CFRG etc over the vagaries of the often mysterious recruiting systems.


----------



## childs56

Ultimately units and Brigades need to put the priority and  emphasis on recruiting and training. If you do not then you can not grow it is that simple. You can point the fingers all you want. The CTCs were and I assume still haveing a hard time providing instructors and courses. 
if Brigade HQ gave a few of their Class B jobs to hire instructors then things might look a little better. 
I think back to early 2000s when the Navy in Esquimalt put together their own Basic training Cadre and trained their own recruits. It was a expensive solution for them but it worked to get people through the door and trained. 

The Reserves need to put priority where it needs to go. 
The Regular force well they are in a tough spot. But they can run indepent BMQs themselves and certain courses. Themselves as needed, again they need to prioritize their needs. If training is not a priority then they will fail.
The entire military needs a few people who realize what they need, not what they want.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> What exactly is that?



Anciently all recruits from all over Canada were sent to CFB Cornwallis for training.  It had started off as the RCN's central training facility.

My point is that what works for regs doesn't work for the militia and rangers.  And I continue to draw the distinction between the militia and the reserves.  Reserves should be superannuated Regs.


----------



## KevinB

Active Guard members down here (similar to class B) participant in their Unit exercises.     Of course they don’t have the same sort of boondoggle class Bn’s as Canada, as their higher formations are deployable.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Most of our soldiers live near two major urban centres.
> 
> It would be easy to bus them all to a depot location, like Chilliwack, on weekends for training. In fact, we used to do that with the training facility in Nanaimo, I believe. Troops in remote locations could be serviced by a smaller detachment based in Vernon or Kamloops, or wherever makes sense.
> 
> The 50+ (very expensive and under-utlized) full time positions - with Class A augmentation as required - that currently inhabit the Bde HQs would then re-configure into a mainly recruiting and training role. The 'Class B Commandos' would then also have the huge culture shock of working weekends like the other reservists, which they do not do now.
> 
> In any case, the principle would be to ensure that only trained soldiers and Officers arrive at units, like the Reg F. Then the limited resources at the units could focus all their time and attention on readiness for whatever task they finally figure out for us.
> 
> And the full timers can scrap with the full timers at CFRG etc over the vagaries of the often mysterious recruiting systems.


So you’re going to have the recruits work every weekend or are they going to be on BMQ? Does that BMQ start date coincide with their joining the CAF? What do they do in the mean time, what do they do in the time between BMQ and heir trade training, still at the depot ? Those depot dets in more remote locations ( PG, Trail) are manned by whom? Presumably the units themselves right? When it comes to trades training how do you ensure they meet the requirement for course loads and instructor ratios?


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> So you’re going to have the recruits work every weekend or are they going to be on BMQ? Does that BMQ start date coincide with their joining the CAF? What do they do in the mean time, what do they do in the time between BMQ and heir trade training, still at the depot ? Those depot dets in more remote locations ( PG, Trail) are manned by whom? Presumably the units themselves right? When it comes to trades training how do you ensure they meet the requirement for course loads and instructor ratios?



These are all very good questions, of course.

However, all I know is that the Reg F only have to focus on readiness, and working with fully trained soldiers who are supplied by their recuriting and depot supply chain.

Individual Reserve units are also responsible for managing the full supply chain for their recruit soldiers and Officers, and this draws down on scarce resources like MCpls, Sgts and Lt/Capts that could be better employed in readiness focused training. I can only imagine that dozens of Reserve units independently contacting CFRC must be a PITA at their end too, and introduces a huge number of inconsistencies in a process that should be streamlined and seamless.

There are few things more depressing than having an untrained OCdt waiting around for their courses for months, unable to be employed for anything apart from Mess duties, secondary duties or other menial tasks. Or even worse, put in charge of a 'Recruit Platoon' of half trained troops who themselves can't be 'officially' employed for anything but menial tasks, or deploy to the field, until they're fully trained.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> These are all very good questions, of course.
> 
> However, all I know is that the Reg F only have to focus on readiness, and working with fully trained soldiers who are supplied by their recuriting and depot supply chain.



I mean beyond having to Augment the schools constantly, year round, yes that is currently true. That’s changing with our new model however; how we’re supposed to be high readiness while also conducting OJT Dp1 is a question to the Army Sgt Major couldn’t answer for me but I digress.



daftandbarmy said:


> Individual Reserve units are also responsible for managing the full supply chain for their recruit soldiers and Officers, and this draws down on scarce resources like MCpls, Sgts and Lt/Capts that could be better employed in readiness focused training. I can only imagine that dozens of Reserve units independently contacting CFRC must be a PITA at their end too, and introduces a huge number of inconsistencies in a process that should be streamlined and seamless.



This is where I see the problem, either we have dispersed reserve units or we don’t, we simply don’t have the man power to maintain section sized Depots for Flinflon, Trail, and Sydney. Those bodies have to be managed somewhere and I don’t see a practical solution beyond the units being responsible. 



daftandbarmy said:


> There are few things more depressing than having an untrained OCdt waiting around for their courses for months, unable to be employed for anything apart from Mess duties, secondary duties or other menial tasks. Or even worse, put in charge of a 'Recruit Platoon' of half trained troops who themselves can't be 'officially' employed for anything but menial tasks, or deploy to the field, until they're fully trained.



Being in charge of the recruits seems like an ideal junior leadership task to be honest. I never remember not being allowed in the field for the year I spend between BMQ and SQ / BIQ infact I was just part of a section doing the same thing everyone else was. Maybe that wasn’t the way it was supposed to be done but who knows. 

Earlier you mentioned the problem of OCdt hanging around never going on course. Surely that would merit a career review board?


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Earlier you mentioned the problem of OCdt hanging around never going on course. Surely that would merit a career review board?



I applaud your belief that such a laudable HR management process would be reliably implemented in a consistent manner by hundreds of part time organizations that pride themselves on being, in their own way, 'special'


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Anciently all recruits from all over Canada were sent to CFB Cornwallis for training.  It had started off as the RCN's central training facility.
> 
> My point is that what works for regs doesn't work for the militia and rangers.  And I continue to draw the distinction between the militia and the reserves.  Reserves should be superannuated Regs.


Oh, that old thing! They basically what St Jean does now in better buildings.

I agree with you. That's a waste of money for the ResF. You can do about 75-80% of DP1 training at local armouries year round which saves you the cost of 2/3 of the rations and all of the quarters by letting people live at home. You then do the last 20-25% in the field at a regional training centre (depot) and, again save on quarters. It obviously varies by trade. It also means most of the training staff do not have to go on TD away from home.

People living in small communities that can't put a full DP1 platoon together obviously need a separate solution by being taken to one of several regional training centres.

I don't even like the idea of the Cornwallis/St Jean system even for the RegF. I lean towards the US One Station Training System that combines recruit and DP1 trade training into one base with the two course running sequentially. Maybe I'm just reverting back to my preunification experience but it strikes me that the BMQ portion of DP1 is too long and requires an unnecessary posting. It should be reduced and tailored for each of the three environments (the purples can be dealt with separately as a "fourth service") and be part of the specific DP1 trade course.

One doesn't have to revert to names like Militia: Primary Reserve and Supplementary Reserve are hard wired into our current legislation - PRes and SupRes will do just fine and everyone understands what it is. One just need to administer the SupRes better.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> There are few things more depressing than having an untrained OCdt waiting around for their courses for months or years, unable to be employed for anything apart from Mess duties, secondary duties or other menial tasks.


FTFY


----------



## childs56

markppcli said:


> So you’re going to have the recruits work every weekend or are they going to be on BMQ? Does that BMQ start date coincide with their joining the CAF? What do they do in the mean time, what do they do in the time between BMQ and heir trade training, still at the depot ? Those depot dets in more remote locations ( PG, Trail) are manned by whom? Presumably the units themselves right? When it comes to trades training how do you ensure they meet the requirement for course loads and instructor ratios?





Kirkhill said:


> Anciently all recruits from all over Canada were sent to CFB Cornwallis for training.  It had started off as the RCN's central training facility.
> 
> My point is that what works for regs doesn't work for the militia and rangers.  And I continue to draw the distinction between the militia and the reserves.  Reserves should be superannuated Regs.


Honestly If more course offerings were done for the Reserves and the mandate to make them work instead of being cancelled then central training can and will work. The problem is the lack of staffing from all levels, and the lack of commitment from all levels. Being a instructor is one of the harder things I did, often working 16 plus hours a day, while my friends and co-workers were having a steak and beer close to the parade square. I can say the Regular Force Staff I worked with were awesome. They were impressed with my performance as I was theirs. We trained a lot of QL3 Artillerymen/ SQ Field when that came in. 
At my Unit level the local BMQs were run pretty smooth. The worse part is not having shacks for them to live in and have locker setups for inspection. But you can overcome that for the most part.  
Going home after a long day of training is tougher in some respects then staying in the shacks.  

There are workable solutions, but to many people are stuck in the not my job, or it wont work so we wont do it. So far they have failed in their current training ways and will continue to fail unless they put some real thought into it. 

For for the love of soldiers stop cancelling courses.


----------



## FJAG

markppcli said:


> I mean beyond having to Augment the schools constantly, year round, yes that is currently true. That’s changing with our new model however; how we’re supposed to be high readiness while also conducting OJT Dp1 is a question to the Army Sgt Major couldn’t answer for me but I digress.


We'll never get rid of augmentation. It's a way of life because we're simply not large enough in either students or instructors to run a year-round balanced course load.

I do agree with @daftandbarmy though that ResF units will never be able to concentrate on any level of collective training unless relieved of the administrative and training responsibility of individual training. I think we can solve much of the problem with regional training depots who own the BTLs of both the RegF and ResF running with their own core staff in a training cycle balanced to cater to the needs of both. I think that these depots should also own Army recruiting so that the entire process from civilian applicant to trained DP1 soldier is owned by one organization. Same-same for the RCN and RCAF.

If I were King I'd break the training year into two cycles: 1 Sep to 30 April for collective training and 1 May to 31 Aug for DP1 and 2 Individual training (including a major collective training exercise for ResF units in August). That would leave the RegF free in the 1 May to 31 Aug time frame to do equipment maintenance, summer leave, APS AND providing augmentation for regional depots. The four summer months should be the Army's primary individual training period because of the high school and summer breaks. Courses schedules should commence as soon as high schools let out at the end of June and universities and colleges at the end of April or so. 



markppcli said:


> This is where I see the problem, either we have dispersed reserve units or we don’t, we simply don’t have the man power to maintain section sized Depots for Flinflon, Trail, and Sydney. Those bodies have to be managed somewhere and I don’t see a practical solution beyond the units being responsible.


I'm a great fan of the presence in the local community concept but there is a point of diminished returns where tiny units need to be rolled into nearby larger units (even if a different type of unit) or, in some cases, shut down.

For smaller units not capable of recruiting let's say twenty recruits for a course, the individual recruits should be sent off for summer training at a regional depot. We can't go on making small bespoke courses for a half dozen candidates at a small armory.



markppcli said:


> Being in charge of the recruits seems like an ideal junior leadership task to be honest. I never remember not being allowed in the field for the year I spend between BMQ and SQ / BIQ in fact I was just part of a section doing the same thing everyone else was. Maybe that wasn’t the way it was supposed to be done but who knows.


I think that this is more realistic than syphoning off a small group of instructors to keep a tiny handful of recruits amused during the winter (albeit involving a level of risk the Army tends to frown on). That's how my first two years as a gunner went. Since I was thick as a post in school Grade 11 and had to go to summer school instead of my initial recruit course, I spent one winter on a basic gun number's course and the next on a driver wheeled and arty communicator course and did a half dozen live fire exercises (as both a #3 and once as a #1 on a 105mm C1) before ever taking my recruit course. That kept me interested and involved.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> FTFY



I know, right? It's infuriating...


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> I applaud your belief that such a laudable HR management process would be reliably implemented in a consistent manner by hundreds of part time organizations that pride themselves on being, in their own way, 'special'





FJAG said:


> FTFY


See career review board, it’s actually not that much work honestly. We sent a candidate on one after he refused to listen to female course seniors and failed off BMOQA.

Generally though the model the reserves functions of off, week night training in local areas, doesn’t allow for a depot system. I’m not against regional training centres but that would require a larger overhaul.

But hey, I’m still trying to figure out how we’re going to correct Meaford’s failure and get some new Pte’s to shoot an 84 so they won’t be listed as Pte (R) anymore, never mind their CQCB. Good thing I get fully qualified soldiers from the training system right ? My suggestion that we bill Meaford for the rounds, fuel, and rations was met with mirth and not action sadly.


----------



## Ostrozac

FJAG said:


> I don't even like the idea of the Cornwallis/St Jean system even for the RegF. I lean towards the US One Station Training System that combines recruit and DP1 trade training into one base with the two course running sequentially. Maybe I'm just reverting back to my preunification experience but it strikes me that the BMQ portion of DP1 is too long and requires an unnecessary posting. It should be reduced and tailored for each of the three environments (the purples can be dealt with separately as a "fourth service") and be part of the specific DP1 trade course.


I fully agree about the value of one station training. As it stands now, a soldier needs 2 or 3 courses to become DP1 qualified and sent to their first job — and the various army and joint training authorities seem to lack the ability to synchronize that training, leading to our most valuable resources — people — sitting around the country waiting for courses. Often being treated like garbage at the same time — because neglecting PATs has become a habit.

Enrolling a potential R22eR soldier and sending him straight to Valcartier, without any contact with CFLRS, just makes good sense to me. And the infantry knows this — they’ve been experimenting with ‘trial’ combined BMQ/DP1 Infantryman serials since the 1990’s. I don’t know what’s stopping this — but I suspect it’s CMP gatekeeping and trying to defend the value of St Jean. A value I question.


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:


> I suspect it’s CMP gatekeeping and trying to defend the value of St Jean. A value I question.


I'm sure one could use St Jean for an alternate purpose. Same as one could repurpose RMC.

Never sell real estate!

🍻


----------



## Ostrozac

FJAG said:


> I'm sure one could use St Jean for an alternate purpose. Same as one could repurpose RMC.
> 
> Never sell real estate!
> 
> 🍻


I’m on board with that — it’s the current incarnation of CFLRS that I have issues with. Once we have sent all the recruits out to their trade schools, and all the officer cadets over to a new CFOCS on the current grounds of RMC Kingston, I think that the Mega would be a fine home for Joint ISR. It lacks fresh air and natural light (both known enemies of the intelligence community) and looks retro-futuristic in a Jetson’s/Tom Swift sort of way. And it’s affordable to live near there.

Instead, we’re pushing ahead with making the NCR the home of JISR. And in 15 years people will be wondering how come we built an expensive modern facility that will sit empty and we can’t staff because the troops that are supposed to be working there can’t afford to live in Ottawa.


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:


> I’m on board with that — it’s the current incarnation of CFLRS that I have issues with. Once we have sent all the recruits out to their trade schools, and all the officer cadets over to a new CFOCS on the current grounds of RMC Kingston, I think that the Mega would be a fine home for Joint ISR. It lacks fresh air and natural light (both known enemies of the intelligence community) and looks retro-futuristic in a Jetson’s/Tom Swift sort of way. And it’s affordable to live near there.
> 
> Instead, we’re pushing ahead with making the NCR the home of JISR. And in 15 years people will be wondering how come we built an expensive modern facility that will sit empty and we can’t staff because the troops that are supposed to be working there can’t afford to live in Ottawa.


All on board - but re the live in Ottawa thing. I firmly believe that we need less people in Ottawa but that said, we need more people in the big cities. I think that's where the future of our reserve force is (of which we need more) and we need a large number of RegF as their leaders, trainers,  administrators and logisticians. That means we need affordable housing for them and a career path that doesn't shuffle them around from pillar to post.

We need a housing authority that buys or builds suitable urban condos, townhouses and even single residences that will support that at a reasonable price. It may have been fine in the 1950s to build bases in the wilds of Canada where they and their stay at home wives and kids lived; the world doesn't work that way anymore.

🍻


----------



## Underway

US Army Reorg into Divisions

I'll just leave this here as it seems topical and I really want to see this thread get to 340 pages in the next two months.


----------



## Blackadder1916

ueo said:


> KevinB said:
> 
> 
> 
> Except the CA is attempting to place a foundation on quicksand…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Been known to happen, remember the new hospital in Lahr?
Click to expand...


The new hospital was not put over "quicksand"; the soil problem was contamination from the tannery that had previously occupied the site.  Even then, it did not affect the entire site.  With minimal (and expected) remediation, the foundation went in pretty much on schedule.  The remaining problem we had was development of the area in back of the hospital and even that delay had more to do with negotiation with the host nation as to financial responsibility for the cleanup.  The contingency factor in our budget accommodated the limited soil remediation (we had to go back to TB for an increase but that was more to do with the rise in the Deutsche Mark rather that unforeseen requirements).


----------



## KevinB

Underway said:


> US Army Reorg into Divisions
> 
> I'll just leave this here as it seems topical and I really want to see this thread get to 340 pages in the next two months.


The main issue for Canada is the size of the Army and the fact that Div generally are homogenous type formations and Canada can’t (won’t) field enough equipment and troops for a real Division (arguments can be made the same is true for a real Brigade).


----------



## Kirkhill

The Ukraine war proves the US Army is right to focus on high-tech long-range weapons and old-school high-intensity training, Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville tells Breaking Defense.​








						Firepower & people: Army chief on keys to future war (EXCLUSIVE) - Breaking Defense
					

The Ukraine war proves the US Army is right to focus on high-tech long-range weapons and old-school high-intensity training, Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville tells Breaking Defense.




					breakingdefense.com
				







> WASHINGTON — As Ukraine’s underdog army pushes back the Russian invaders, *what lessons should the American military take to heart*?
> 
> The US Army’s top officer doesn’t hesitate: “*We’re seeing the impact of long-range precision fires*,” Gen. James McConville said at once. “The *HIMARS** has been a game changer *for the Ukrainians.”
> 
> “The battle has shifted,” said McConville, the Army Chief of Staff, in a late September interview with Breaking Defense.
> 
> _*RELATED: How we fight: Army issues all-new handbook for multi-domain war*_
> 
> *The first phase of the fight,* a desperate defense against onrushing Russian armor, *put a premium on man-portable anti-tank missiles like the US Javelin and British NLAW. The defenders also needed shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, like the venerable Stinger, *to take out Russian helicopters and ground-attack aircraft.
> 
> But as Ukraine stabilized the front and then went on the offensive, both sides shifted emphasis to artillery, seeking to disrupt enemy advances and soften up sectors for attack. *Ukrainian forces urgently needed the ability to strike deeply and accurately at Russian supply depots, transport hubs, and other critical targets* far behind the front lines. So the West began supplying long-range artillery systems, like the American HIMARS missile launcher.
> 
> “The Ukrainians initially had a lot of success with what I would call short-range weapons systems, like the Javelin, like the Stinger,” McConville said. But over time, “they found that having artillery – [like] the triple-7s [i.e. the M777 155 mm howitzer] — gave them much more capability. And now with HIMARS, [they have] the ability to engage across the depth of the battlefield.”
> 
> *Long-Range, High-Tech, High Lethality*
> 
> Such “Long-Range Precision Fires” – from GPS-guided howitzer shells to hypersonic missiles – have been the US Army’s No. 1 priority for research, development, and acquisition since 2017.
> 
> That’s when then-Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark Milley, now chairman of the Joint Chiefs, used the annual Association of the US Army conference as a platform to set the service on a bold new course, refocusing from grueling guerilla warfare in the Middle East to high-tech conflict with China and Russia. McConville, who was Milley’s deputy, succeeded him as chief in 2019 and is now shepherding several programs the two men started into production.
> 
> “Those capabilities will be coming into the force starting next year,” McConville said. “That will fundamentally change how we do business.”
> 
> In 2023, the Army will get its first combat-ready prototypes for three new Long-Range Precision Fires systems:
> 
> 
> the hypersonic Dark Eagle missile, whose classified range is estimated at over 1,700 miles;
> the Mid-Range Capability (MRC), aka Typhon, which repurposes Navy SM-6s and Tomahawks for strikes at ranges of about 1,000 miles; and
> the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), an all-new weapon designed to fit in existing HIMARS launchers and hit targets over 300 miles away.
> By comparison, the farthest-striking missile currently available to the Army is the HIMARS-launched ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System), with a maximum range of under 200 miles. And the US hasn’t actually given any ATACMS to Ukraine, just the 40-mile GMRLS rockets. That range is adequate for most targets in eastern Ukraine, but not for the vast distances of the western Pacific.
> 
> “We are developing systems that help us deal with the ranges and the speeds that are required in an environment that is much larger,” McConville said.
> 
> What’s more, the Army aims to upgrade these new weapons with sophisticated seekers that let them strike moving targets, including ships at sea. That makes them much more useful in the Pacific, historically a Navy-dominated theater, where the Army seeks a new role supporting the fleet with land-based anti-ship strikes.
> 
> *“Long range precision fires gives you the ability to penetrate integrated air and missile defenses,”* McConville said. “*It gives you the ability to sink ships* – which, again, can be very helpful if someone’s considering some type of amphibious operation.” (While McConville doesn’t offer examples, the most-discussed amphibious scenario is a Chinese attempt to land troops on Taiwan).
> 
> Of course, the US isn’t the only one developing such long-range precision-guided weapons. So is Russia – although it has resorted increasingly to indiscriminate strikes against civilians in Ukraine – and China. That puts *a premium on missile defenses*, McConville said, another of the Army’s six modernization priorities. But it also *requires US forces to stay on the move and spread out*, so they don’t provide big, static targets, like the Russian ammo dumps and air bases repeatedly ravaged by Ukrainian strikes.
> 
> *Dispersion and mobility are tactics the Army must relearn *after a generation in Afghanistan and Iraq, where US forces built up an extensive, static infrastructure of big bases, supply dumps, and well-appointed command posts.
> 
> “*Commanders… will no longer be able to have the large command posts* that they had in Afghanistan or Iraq… with stadium-type seats and a lot of big screens,” McConville said. “In the future, the battlefield will be so lethal, and there’ll be the ability to gather [targeting] information on where our command posts are, so *we’re going to have to move them very, very quickly, and they’ll have to be dispersed and smaller*.”
> 
> The new approach will *require a change in mindset and doctrine *– which leads to what McConville considers the most crucial weapons system: the human brain.
> 
> *The Human Factor: Training & Doctrine*
> 
> Western weapons have made a major difference in Ukraine, McConville told Breaking Defense. But weapons are nothing without soldiers to wield them. So, he said, *what’s most important in this war – and every war – is the human factor: the Ukrainian soldiers’ will and skill*.
> 
> Both have grown with eight years of combat experience and Western training since Russia’s initial, more limited invasion in 2014, when Ukraine ceded Crimea without a shot and then suffered heavy losses in the Donbas.
> 
> “This is not the Ukrainian army of 2014,” McConville emphasized. Today, he said, “*the Ukrainian army is very competent and very committed*. With the training that’s going on, that NATO is conducting for the Ukrainians, they pick up these [new] capabilities very quickly.”
> 
> Admittedly, much of Ukraine’s success is due to Russian incompetence. But McConville warns against understating either the Russian threat or the Ukrainian accomplishment in repelling it.
> 
> “*We should not underestimate what the Ukrainians are doing*,” he said. “They’ve done a lot of training, they have learned, they’re a learning organization, and they are performing very, very well on the battlefield.”
> 
> The US, likewise, has changed its training in recent years to emphasize high-intensity combat against a well-armed nation-state.
> 
> “If you go out to our national training centers, now, it’s large scale combat operations, where, over the last 20 years, we’d been focused on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, irregular warfare,” McConville said. “*If you have command posts, you have to move them often, or they’re going to be targeted…. Your command posts are going to be jammed, your computers are going to be taken away from you.”*
> 
> That’s down to what the Army calls “long-range effects.” Those include not only Long-Range Precision Firepower, like HIMARS and hypersonics, but non-lethal tools like hacking and radio jamming to disable the command, control, and communications systems on which all modern militaries depend. The Army’s new Multi-Domain Task Forces are meant to combine firepower, electronic attack, and cyber warfare to cripple an enemy military’s digital nervous system — and potential enemies aim to do the same to US units.
> 
> That means *commanders can’t count on live drone feeds* from the battlespace or constant communications with frontline forces. It means *junior officers must learn to fight in the dark*, without detailed intelligence or instructions from higher headquarters.
> 
> *“You will have to develop organizations that are trained, disciplined and fit,” McConvile said, “to the level that they can operate off of truly off mission command.”*
> 
> That’s *the doctrine whereby commanders tell subordinates what they must accomplish – “commander’s intent” – without micromanaging how they accomplish those missions*. Planning, coordination, and orders still matter, but *the emphasis is increasingly on adaptability, improvisation, and initiative.*
> 
> “How we do command and control will change,” McConville said. “It’ll be much more focused on mission command. You’ll give orders that are more based on the commander’s intent, because you may not have the ability, in this very lethal and complex environment, to continue to give orders to your subordinate units. They may be dispersed, they may have to operate on intent, you may not be able to contact them.”
> 
> In such chaotic high-tech conflicts, drones, robots, and networks all play a useful role, McConville said, but such AI systems are also vulnerable to disruption and deception. Just as armies have long used camouflage to trick the human eye, he said, today they’re finding ways to “confuse the algorithm.” So while artificial intelligence can support human soldiers, McConville believes that it can’t replace them.
> 
> “You’re going to see our ground forces enabled by robotic combat vehicles and unmanned aerial systems,” he said. “We’re going to have autonomous vehicles, we’re going to have autonomous aircraft — but at the end of the day, I still think there’s a place for soldiers in the decision making loop, and you want them in a position where they can see the battlefield, because when you’re looking through cameras and drones, you can’t get the full picture.”
> 
> “At the end of the day, people are your greatest strength,” McConville emphasized. “They’re the most important weapons system.”
> 
> *“We equip our soldiers with the best gear, but having soldiers that are willing to fight and defend their country in a very lethal battlefield is extremely important,” he said. “That’s what we’re seeing in Ukraine.”
> 
> “What makes the difference is the will to fight. All conflicts are a battle of wills.”*


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> The Ukraine war proves the US Army is right to focus on high-tech long-range weapons and old-school high-intensity training, Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville tells Breaking Defense.​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Firepower & people: Army chief on keys to future war (EXCLUSIVE) - Breaking Defense
> 
> 
> The Ukraine war proves the US Army is right to focus on high-tech long-range weapons and old-school high-intensity training, Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville tells Breaking Defense.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> breakingdefense.com




Adaptive Dispersed Operations and Mission Command always brings to my mind the June 6th drops in Normandy of the 6th, 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions.  They were effective despite (or because of) their wide dispersion but with everybody knowing what their commander's intent was.


----------



## GR66

Is there somewhat of a disconnect between the renewed focus being on dispersed operations and mission command vs. the shift from the BCT being the primary unit of action back to the Division?  The new "Heavy" and "Penetration" Division structures seem to me to lean toward a concentration of heavy forces which might attract the exact type of precision fires that are meant to be avoided by dispersion.

Is there something to learn from the way the Ukrainian campaign has rolled out (accidental or not)?

The initial enemy attack is blunted by dispersed, light forces using handheld AT/AD weapons which are difficult to detect by a force on the move and less easily targeted by the attacker's artillery.
Once the initial attack is stopped long range precision fires are used to degrade the enemy's logistics, AD assets and troop concentrations forcing them to disperse.
Once the attacking force is isolated into smaller pockets, mobile units achieving local superiority conduct counter-attacks where weaknesses are detected.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Is there somewhat of a disconnect between the renewed focus being on dispersed operations and mission command vs. the shift from the BCT being the primary unit of action back to the Division?  The new "Heavy" and "Penetration" Division structures seem to me to lean toward a concentration of heavy forces which might attract the exact type of precision fires that are meant to be avoided by dispersion.


MDO doesn't solely mean Dispersed operations - it just means Multi-Domain.

One still disperses for safety and concentrates for attack or defense.

The Bde is not large enough to hold all the assets ones needs for Maneuver Operations - so the Division is going back to the 'primary' Maneuver Unit - so Artillery and other assets can be concentrated.


GR66 said:


> Is there something to learn from the way the Ukrainian campaign has rolled out (accidental or not)?
> 
> The initial enemy attack is blunted by dispersed, light forces using handheld AT/AD weapons which are difficult to detect by a force on the move and less easily targeted by the attacker's artillery.


WRT to Ukraine - one needs to understand the initial Russian push was blunted by both Mech/Armor and Light Forces - pretty much only due to both an overwhelming Information advantage - and the Russia Thunder Run method.
  If Russia had used either their overwhelming fire advantage at the beginning, or a precision Air Campaign favored by NATO, then the UKR units would have been rolled hard and fast.
  You can't emplace a strategy based on assuming enemy mistakes.



GR66 said:


> Once the initial attack is stopped long range precision fires are used to degrade the enemy's logistics, AD assets and troop concentrations forcing them to disperse.


That is general doctrine - but not just LRPF - but all CS and GS Arty as well as Air etc.


GR66 said:


> Once the attacking force is isolated into smaller pockets, mobile units achieving local superiority conduct counter-attacks where weaknesses are detected.



I think everyone know I am not a huge fan of the LAV series - but I would point out a lot of the Hummer based assaults that have been done by UKR would be better suited to a mobile force -- UKR is both being extremely advantaged by knowing RuAF positions and strengths allowing the Hummers to work, and fairly lucky RU issues have hampered their responses that could really have chewed up those Light vehicles.
  I believe a LAV based medium force could have done a lot more slicing than the Hummers - due to similar mobility (the Hummer is great, but the Up Armors are not exactly significantly mobile) and then better protection and firepower.

Keep in mind as UKR is getting more APC and IFV, they are converting a lot of there Light Inf to those -- keeping Air Assault, Airborne and the Marine Light Inf as Infantry - but the bone stock Leg Inf are transitioning where possible.

All I am seeing out of Ukraine is the validation of effective combines arms operations - and the need for both Air and Intelligence Superiority...


----------



## Underway

KevinB said:


> The main issue for Canada is the size of the Army and the fact that Div generally are homogenous type formations and Canada can’t (won’t) field enough equipment and troops for a real Division (arguments can be made the same is true for a real Brigade).



True but there is some interesting stuff in how those Brigades are being organized inside the Division.  Combining Strykers, Bradleys and Tanks into one Brigade to get the advantages of the each for example echo's a bit of the CMBG.  The internal security components (see TAPV) required for the Division are spelled out relatively clearly as well.  Some ideas for sure.

The second thought is that realizing we won't ever be fighting on our own.  The RCN actualizes this reality by being fulling ineroperable with the US and NATO.  Creating a CMBG structure that could plug into the US Division structure might be an idea.  Not as a Penetration Brigade but a Heavy Brigade could be done relatively easily.  



KevinB said:


> I think everyone know I am not a huge fan of the LAV series - but I would point out a lot of the Hummer based assaults that have been done by UKR would be better suited to a mobile force -- UKR is both being extremely advantaged by knowing RuAF positions and strengths allowing the Hummers to work, and fairly lucky RU issues have hampered their responses that could really have chewed up those Light vehicles.
> I believe a LAV based medium force could have done a lot more slicing than the Hummers - due to similar mobility (the Hummer is great, but the Up Armors are not exactly significantly mobile) and then better protection and firepower.



Stragtegic mobility is one of those things we've forgotten about because the nature of the wars the West has been fighting in the last few years. In this case it was critical.


----------



## KevinB

Underway said:


> True but there is some interesting stuff in how those Brigades are being organized inside the Division.  Combining Strykers, Bradleys and Tanks into one Brigade to get the advantages of the each for example echo's a bit of the CMBG.  The internal security components (see TAPV) required for the Division are spelled out relatively clearly as well.  Some ideas for sure.


Honestly, the Strykers days are probably numbered down here, there have been plans to reduce them once the Bradley replacement comes on line (retaining some Bradley Bde's in favor of cutting Stryker formations).   The more interesting thing I saw was moving some Stryker formations into Light Div's to give some protected mobility.


Underway said:


> The second thought is that realizing we won't ever be fighting on our own.  The RCN actualizes this reality by being fulling ineroperable with the US and NATO.  Creating a CMBG structure that could plug into the US Division structure might be an idea.  Not as a Penetration Brigade but a Heavy Brigade could be done relatively easily.


If I was Canada I would look at fitting into both Heavy and Light Div's - and restructuring Bde's to do that -- but that is just me.



Underway said:


> Stragtegic mobility is one of those things we've forgotten about because the nature of the wars the West has been fighting in the last few years. In this case it was critical.


  Define we


----------



## Underway

KevinB said:


> Honestly, the Strykers days are probably numbered down here, there have been plans to reduce them once the Bradley replacement comes on line (retaining some Bradley Bde's in favor of cutting Stryker formations).   The more interesting thing I saw was moving some Stryker formations into Light Div's to give some protected mobility.


I'll believe that when I see it.  I don't think I'll see it. They are adding Strykers to the Penetration Brigades because of the higher number of infantry they can move under armour, and the Bradleys (and replacement) can't carry enough bodies.


----------



## WestIsle

Ostrozac said:


> I fully agree about the value of one station training. As it stands now, a soldier needs 2 or 3 courses to become DP1 qualified and sent to their first job — and the various army and joint training authorities seem to lack the ability to synchronize that training, leading to our most valuable resources — people — sitting around the country waiting for courses. Often being treated like garbage at the same time — because neglecting PATs has become a habit.
> 
> Enrolling a potential R22eR soldier and sending him straight to Valcartier, without any contact with CFLRS, just makes good sense to me. And the infantry knows this — they’ve been experimenting with ‘trial’ combined BMQ/DP1 Infantryman serials since the 1990’s. I don’t know what’s stopping this — but I suspect it’s CMP gatekeeping and trying to defend the value of St Jean. A value I question.


The quality of troops trained at St.Jean has become a huge issue. They freely admit to training troops as purple trades so many are not ready to complete training on a combat arms DP1


----------



## WLSC

FJAG said:


> We'll never get rid of augmentation. It's a way of life because we're simply not large enough in either students or instructors to run a year-round balanced course load.
> 
> I do agree with @daftandbarmy though that ResF units will never be able to concentrate on any level of collective training unless relieved of the administrative and training responsibility of individual training. I think we can solve much of the problem with regional training depots who own the BTLs of both the RegF and ResF running with their own core staff in a training cycle balanced to cater to the needs of both. I think that these depots should also own Army recruiting so that the entire process from civilian applicant to trained DP1 soldier is owned by one organization. Same-same for the RCN and RCAF.
> 
> If I were King I'd break the training year into two cycles: 1 Sep to 30 April for collective training and 1 May to 31 Aug for DP1 and 2 Individual training (including a major collective training exercise for ResF units in August). That would leave the RegF free in the 1 May to 31 Aug time frame to do equipment maintenance, summer leave, APS AND providing augmentation for regional depots. The four summer months should be the Army's primary individual training period because of the high school and summer breaks. Courses schedules should commence as soon as high schools let out at the end of June and universities and colleges at the end of April or so.
> 
> 
> I'm a great fan of the presence in the local community concept but there is a point of diminished returns where tiny units need to be rolled into nearby larger units (even if a different type of unit) or, in some cases, shut down.
> 
> For smaller units not capable of recruiting let's say twenty recruits for a course, the individual recruits should be sent off for summer training at a regional depot. We can't go on making small bespoke courses for a half dozen candidates at a small armory.
> 
> 
> I think that this is more realistic than syphoning off a small group of instructors to keep a tiny handful of recruits amused during the winter (albeit involving a level of risk the Army tends to frown on). That's how my first two years as a gunner went. Since I was thick as a post in school Grade 11 and had to go to summer school instead of my initial recruit course, I spent one winter on a basic gun number's course and the next on a driver wheeled and arty communicator course and did a half dozen live fire exercises (as both a #3 and once as a #1 on a 105mm C1) before ever taking my recruit course. That kept me interested and involved.
> 
> 🍻


I lived thru a very centralised recruiting process and « collective depot ».  I agree with you that it’s very beneficial and useful.  What morphed/stopped it was that different trade/units had different requirements from other trades and some units realised that their recruits where going voluntarily to other units with their buddy or for simply better units.

Attraction should be kept at unit level but the admin centralised with a view to reward performance in attraction and retention.  Not to switch and level the numbers or recruits for the least performing unit.  I agree the not all units can pull the necessary personal to accomplish that but that something that can an exception.  The training depot should be à keep at 100%.  It was magic.  It morphed because it was a local initiative.  If it was a national directive, it would stop the least performing units to cry to loud.


----------



## KevinB

Underway said:


> I'll believe that when I see it.  I don't think I'll see it. They are adding Strykers to the Penetration Brigades because of the higher number of infantry they can move under armour, and the Bradleys (and replacement) can't carry enough bodies.


We have gone to more Bradley's / Platoon - the Stryker has a lot of issues, I'll leave it at that.


----------



## FJAG

Underway said:


> rue but there is some interesting stuff in how those Brigades are being organized inside the Division. Combining Strykers, Bradleys and Tanks into one Brigade to get the advantages of the each for example echo's a bit of the CMBG. The internal security components (see TAPV) required for the Division are spelled out relatively clearly as well. Some ideas for sure.
> 
> The second thought is that realizing we won't ever be fighting on our own. The RCN actualizes this reality by being fulling ineroperable with the US and NATO. Creating a CMBG structure that could plug into the US Division structure might be an idea. Not as a Penetration Brigade but a Heavy Brigade could be done relatively easily.


I'm a bit of a cynic on this. I think the fact that an SBCT is part of the Heavy Division has more to do with the fact that there aren't enough ABCTs to create the number of Heavy Divisions that the Americans want than that they think an SBCT fills the role well. I'm pretty sure the Americans would prefer one of their own SBCT rather than a CMBG which is short of ATGMs, mortars, MGS, and SPGs (once they convert).



KevinB said:


> Honestly, the Strykers days are probably numbered down here, there have been plans to reduce them once the Bradley replacement comes on line (retaining some Bradley Bde's in favor of cutting Stryker formations). The more interesting thing I saw was moving some Stryker formations into Light Div's to give some protected mobility.


You know me. Waste not, want not. Most of the Active Army IBCTs are there because there is a role for a light force. Most of the ARNG IBCTs are there because even the Americans can't afford to equip everyone with mechanized equipment. The Strykers have life left in them. My guess is that they'll try to pony up the money to equip app the current Active ABCTs and SBCTs and ARNG ABCTs with Bradley replacements and then cascade the Strykers down to selected elements of both Active and ARNG IBCTs

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> We have gone to more Bradley's / Platoon - the Stryker has a lot of issues, I'll leave it at that.


And fewer platoons per company.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> And fewer platoons per company.


Not on the most recent ORBAT.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Not on the most recent ORBAT.


Kay.

The last one I saw (open source) created 2 6-car platoons from 3 4-car platoons.


----------



## ArmyRick

KevinB said:


> Not on the most recent ORBAT.


Are you able to put up a link?


----------



## KevinB

ArmyRick said:


> Are you able to put up a link?


I’ll check today, as @Kirkhill just worried me that it’s not OS.  


Kirkhill said:


> Kay.
> 
> The last one I saw (open source) created 2 6-car platoons from 3 4-car platoons.


----------



## Infanteer

Just saw a note that its not called a penetration division anymore, its now a reinforced heavy division or something like that.  Saw that one coming a mile out.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Just saw a note that its not called a penetration division anymore, its now a reinforced heavy division or something like that.  Saw that one coming a mile out.


I will say it was very humorous to watch the MCOE CG brief it in Benning as it got a lot of snickers when he said it.
   I suspect it dawned on folks then that it probably wasn't suitable *shocking I know...


----------



## quadrapiper

Infanteer said:


> Just saw a note that its not called a penetration division anymore, its now a reinforced heavy division or something like that.  Saw that one coming a mile out.


Can't imagine the flood of memes, morale patches, etc. if "penetration division" was retained.


----------



## Kirkhill

The way these conversations have evolved this could have gone into this thread, the Ukrainian one, the GBAD one or the C3 Replacement one.  Lots of overlap.

L3 Harris Vampire - a modular C-UAV system based on an EO/IR sensor, a EW jammer and a 70mm missile pod (APKWS)
It can be mounted in a variety of vehicles.  And possibly ground mounted?











						VAMPIRE™
					

L3Harris’ Vehicle-Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment (VAMPIRE) is a portable kit that can be installed on most vehicles with a cargo bed for launching of the advanced precision kill weapons system (APKWS) or other laser-guided munitions




					www.l3harris.com
				













						Here Is the Counterdrone Kit the US Is Sending Ukraine
					

Made by L3Harris Technologies, the system can be quickly installed on different types of vehicles.




					www.defenseone.com


----------



## Kirkhill

And in the same overlapped tendency

US response to the changing security situation in the Arctic (The true north strong and free?)









						China, Russia Quietly Expanding Arctic Partnership, Says Panel - USNI News
					

China is subtly installing a larger presence in the Arctic through an extensive partnership with Russia in areas ranging from multi-use ports and airfields to energy extraction, Arctic security experts said Tuesday. The partnership also includes scientific research and sharing intelligence...




					news.usni.org
				












						Biden releases Arctic strategy with emphasis on competition with China and Russia
					

The 15-page document is intended to guide U.S. policy in the Arctic for the next 10 years.




					www.adn.com
				






			https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf
		


Thin gruel.


----------



## FJAG

The new FM 3-0 Operations is out! The new FM 3-0 Operations is out!



It's right here.

😁


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> The new FM 3-0 Operations is out! The new FM 3-0 Operations is out!
> 
> 
> 
> It's right here.
> 
> 😁


DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.



I really want to ask who thinks that wording makes any sense?
  Why bother having the Distro Restriction if it is APR unlimited?


----------



## quadrapiper

KevinB said:


> DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
> 
> 
> 
> I really want to ask who thinks that wording makes any sense?
> Why bother having the Distro Restriction if it is APR unlimited?


To avoid ambiguity and prevent restrictions being imposed/assumed by lower levels.


----------



## dapaterson

Common look and feel is important in any bureaucratic organization.

Consistency is underrated.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> *Common look and feel* is important in any bureaucratic organization.
> 
> Consistency is underrated.



Just wondering: did you actually mean to say 'Synchronized Organization Projection'?


----------



## KevinB

quadrapiper said:


> To avoid ambiguity and prevent restrictions being imposed/assumed by lower levels.


How about using less ink and saying None, or  just Public Release.


----------



## dapaterson

Repeatability of a function means those involved know their roles, rather than having commanders inserting random changes on every iteration.

Make it easy to do the routine parts of the job, so energy and effort can be committed to the unusual things.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> Repeatability of a function means those involved know their roles, rather than having commanders inserting random changes on every iteration.
> 
> Make it easy to do the routine parts of the job, so energy and effort can be committed to the unusual things.


Like redefining terminology from other documents.


----------



## dapaterson

That'd be a big "No" from me.


----------



## Kirkhill

The best argument for higher levels of command - span of control​*“The large-scale combat [operations] against a peer threat, the amount of complexity, speed, violence, chaos, leads us to the conclusion that our great brigade combat team commanders are going to be wholly consumed winning the fight they're in,”*​
*But is span of control a function of boots on the ground or the number of separate combat functions being orchestrated?*
​​










						Divisions, Corps to Replace Brigades As Army’s Wartime Formation Of Choice
					

Brigades that operated largely independently in Iraq and Afghanistan will fight as part of larger units in future conflicts, officials said.




					www.defenseone.com
				



​​Divisions, Corps to Replace Brigades As Army’s Wartime Formation Of Choice​Brigades that operated largely independently in Iraq and Afghanistan will fight as part of larger units in future conflicts, officials said.​




BY CAITLIN M. KENNEY
STAFF REPORTER, DEFENSE ONE
OCTOBER 10, 2022

ARMY
UKRAINE

The Army’s brigade combat teams may have been the signature units of recent wars, but service leaders believe future conflicts will be dominated by divisions and even corps, officials said Monday.
“The large-scale combat [operations] against a peer threat, the amount of complexity, speed, violence, chaos, leads us to the conclusion that our great brigade combat team commanders are going to be wholly consumed winning the fight they're in,” said Gen. James Rainey, the new chief of Army Futures Command, at the Association of the United States Army’s conference in Washington, D.C.
Operations during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were largely planned by brigade combat teams—some 4,000 troops led by a colonel—and executed by their battalions and companies. Rainey said these BCTs were built in a way that had them hold and operate in an area for a year but were not a “maneuver formation.”
The war in Ukraine has shown what the Army could face in a large-scale conflict, said James Greer, an associate professor at the U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies, who spoke on a future-of-warfare  panel with Rainey. Ukraine has committed the equivalent of two full corps of troops and is fighting across a vast area, about 150 times larger than the Army’s National Training Center in California, Greer said. A single U.S. Army corps can be comprised of two to five divisions with up to 45,000 soldiers, commanded by a lieutenant general.  
“So: very large formations, very large spaces, and of course, everyone's familiar with the lethality, the destruction, the consumption of materiel, ammunition, etc., on a scale that we haven't really thought through in a long time,” Greer said.
Focusing the Army on these larger formations will mean they will be able to work closer with the other services as well as allies and partners, Secretary Christine Wormuth in her Monday keynote.


“Our study and analysis of recent conflicts, exercises, simulation, and training, tells us that brigade commanders must focus fully on winning the close fight. To allow frontline leaders to concentrate on the close fight, division and corps commanders will have the responsibility and capability to visualize the larger picture,” Wormuth said. “To ensure they can do this, our theater armies, corps, and divisions will gain the personnel, organizations, and equipment they need to disrupt and defeat peer adversaries on the future battlefield.”
That means bringing artillery, engineers, and intelligence together at the division level, she said. 
Rainey said division commanders will be able to provide these capabilities to the brigades when they need it.
The secretary said this focus on larger formations would be part of the Army’s upcoming doctrine on multi-domain operations, Wormuth said. 
“To realize this vision and build the Army of 2030, we are transforming our force structure and evolving how we fight. We must do this to prepare for the challenge of large-scale combat operations, strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and to be ready if deterrence fails,” she said.
Rainey pushed back on any would-be critics who say the Army is “going backwards” by going to a division. “And that is absolutely not the case. First of all, everything we're doing is threat-informed.”
The brigades will also have to get smaller in order to survive and move, he said—but did not say how much smaller or what kind of weapons and gear would have to be shed.
The larger formations will also help keep brigades in the fight longer—for weeks and months—and give them “endurance,” which they are seeing as a requirement from what they are learning about the war in Ukraine, Greer said.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> The best argument for higher levels of command - span of control​*“The large-scale combat [operations] against a peer threat, the amount of complexity, speed, violence, chaos, leads us to the conclusion that our great brigade combat team commanders are going to be wholly consumed winning the fight they're in,”*​
> *But is span of control a function of boots on the ground or the number of separate combat functions being orchestrated?*
> ​​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Divisions, Corps to Replace Brigades As Army’s Wartime Formation Of Choice
> 
> 
> Brigades that operated largely independently in Iraq and Afghanistan will fight as part of larger units in future conflicts, officials said.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defenseone.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ​​Divisions, Corps to Replace Brigades As Army’s Wartime Formation Of Choice​Brigades that operated largely independently in Iraq and Afghanistan will fight as part of larger units in future conflicts, officials said.​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> BY CAITLIN M. KENNEY
> STAFF REPORTER, DEFENSE ONE
> OCTOBER 10, 2022
> 
> ARMY
> UKRAINE
> 
> The Army’s brigade combat teams may have been the signature units of recent wars, but service leaders believe future conflicts will be dominated by divisions and even corps, officials said Monday.
> “The large-scale combat [operations] against a peer threat, the amount of complexity, speed, violence, chaos, leads us to the conclusion that our great brigade combat team commanders are going to be wholly consumed winning the fight they're in,” said Gen. James Rainey, the new chief of Army Futures Command, at the Association of the United States Army’s conference in Washington, D.C.
> Operations during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were largely planned by brigade combat teams—some 4,000 troops led by a colonel—and executed by their battalions and companies. Rainey said these BCTs were built in a way that had them hold and operate in an area for a year but were not a “maneuver formation.”
> The war in Ukraine has shown what the Army could face in a large-scale conflict, said James Greer, an associate professor at the U.S. Army School for Advanced Military Studies, who spoke on a future-of-warfare  panel with Rainey. Ukraine has committed the equivalent of two full corps of troops and is fighting across a vast area, about 150 times larger than the Army’s National Training Center in California, Greer said. A single U.S. Army corps can be comprised of two to five divisions with up to 45,000 soldiers, commanded by a lieutenant general.
> “So: very large formations, very large spaces, and of course, everyone's familiar with the lethality, the destruction, the consumption of materiel, ammunition, etc., on a scale that we haven't really thought through in a long time,” Greer said.
> Focusing the Army on these larger formations will mean they will be able to work closer with the other services as well as allies and partners, Secretary Christine Wormuth in her Monday keynote.
> 
> 
> “Our study and analysis of recent conflicts, exercises, simulation, and training, tells us that brigade commanders must focus fully on winning the close fight. To allow frontline leaders to concentrate on the close fight, division and corps commanders will have the responsibility and capability to visualize the larger picture,” Wormuth said. “To ensure they can do this, our theater armies, corps, and divisions will gain the personnel, organizations, and equipment they need to disrupt and defeat peer adversaries on the future battlefield.”
> That means bringing artillery, engineers, and intelligence together at the division level, she said.
> Rainey said division commanders will be able to provide these capabilities to the brigades when they need it.
> The secretary said this focus on larger formations would be part of the Army’s upcoming doctrine on multi-domain operations, Wormuth said.
> “To realize this vision and build the Army of 2030, we are transforming our force structure and evolving how we fight. We must do this to prepare for the challenge of large-scale combat operations, strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and to be ready if deterrence fails,” she said.
> Rainey pushed back on any would-be critics who say the Army is “going backwards” by going to a division. “And that is absolutely not the case. First of all, everything we're doing is threat-informed.”
> The brigades will also have to get smaller in order to survive and move, he said—but did not say how much smaller or what kind of weapons and gear would have to be shed.
> The larger formations will also help keep brigades in the fight longer—for weeks and months—and give them “endurance,” which they are seeing as a requirement from what they are learning about the war in Ukraine, Greer said.




So does that argue for a proper division with 2 or 3 small brigades or 3 large brigade groups that can slot into someone else's division/corps?

Based on this info, and latest perceptions, I could be persuaded of the benefit of a division with a heavy-medium support brigade and 2 small light-medium brigades.  Focus on the Ordnance Corps and the enablers.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> So does that argue for a proper division with 2 or 3 small brigades or 3 large brigade groups that can slot into someone else's division/corps?
> 
> Based on this info, and latest perceptions, I could be persuaded of the benefit of a division with a heavy-medium support brigade and 2 small light-medium brigades.  Focus on the Ordnance Corps and the enablers.


I think that until Canada really changes it’s force structure that the only reasonable approach is 3-5 separate robust Brigades that are tailored to link into US/UK Div.   

Divisions are ideally homogeneous entities. 
Armored or Light 
I’m not even sure a rational exists for a Medium Div.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I think that until Canada really changes it’s force structure that the only reasonable approach is 3-5 separate robust Brigades that are tailored to link into US/UK Div.
> 
> Divisions are ideally homogeneous entities.
> Armored or Light
> I’m not even sure a rational exists for a Medium Div.



Kevin, as much as you and I find many points of agreement, and as much as I am a fan of Americans, especially the red state ones I have spent a career working with, I cannot bring myself to relegating the CAF to auxiliary spear-chuckers for the US Government.

Canada does have a dysfunctional defence establishment.  It has a dysfunctional system of governance.  For me though, the solution is not to merge into the US by stealth.  The solution is to create functional systems in a sovereign society.

I have no problem with buying yankee kit.   Some of it is pretty good and there is lots of it.  But I remain unconvinced that Heavy Forces are a priority requirement for Canadian defence needs.  Are they a diplomatic necessity?  That is a separate question.  They serve good relations with our neighbour and provide a useful international diplomatic tool.  But are they more useful than the supporting enablers necessary to field a useful division.   I don't believe so. 

Should some heavy tools be part of the package of enablers?  Absolutely.  But, counter to North German Plain orthodoxy,  I am entirely convinced that the future will look kindly on dispersed small units with penny-packets of heavy gear when appropriate.

And as for the relevance of the LAV..... If Hummers can be found to be useful, if BTRs can be found to be useful, then LAVs have their place.  Even if they are just carriers for ATGM, MANPAD and 81mm mortar teams.



Definition - Medium-Heavy - Mix of 2 or 3 LAV battalions and a Tank Regiment
Definition - Medium-Light - Mix of 2 Light battalions and a LAV Regiment
Definition - Divisional Troops and Enablers - TBD.


Edit:  Besides I think the yanks would be happier if we first committed to the integrated anti-missile defence and established the continental defence force we have been promising since 1947.


----------



## FJAG

I think that the debate about whether we are going back to Cold War divisions and corps or not are a red herring.

To start with we never really lost the concept of divisions or corps in the first place. The terminology changed a bit with the use of the term "task force" but essentially, divisional and corps headquarters continued to function during the GWOT albeit in slightly modified forms.

The real point of contention is the brigade structure.

Cold War brigades were designed and intended to function within a tightly deployed division so that supporting CS and CSS elements such as artillery, engineers, reconnaissance and sustainment could be centrally controlled and shifted to support efforts that were concentrated on one  or two of the three or more manoeuvre brigades of the division.

The turn of the century reorganization of the US Army, like ours, assumed that large scale combat like last seen in Iraq 1 would not occur again (I really could never understand how that conclusion was justified). The assumption was that combat would be widely distributed and divisions would not have the ability to properly control CS and CSS over distance. It was done with the assumption that it would be much more likely that brigades in the future ought to be large enough force to deploy as an independent force. Accordingly the divisional support elements were broken up amongst the various brigades to form self sufficient BCTs which mirrored the brigade groups that Canada had already had for decades. Divisional headquarters still remained but, notwithstanding that the classical arty, engineer, recce and sustainment elements were still there, the ability to gather them together into single entities had atrophied. 

The structure worked reasonably well during Iraq 2 and Afghanistan.

Quite frankly, it doesn't matter that much as to whether you have brigades and CS and CSS centralized at division or BCTs with decentralized CS and CSS. What matters in a peacetime army is whether you have the ability to change from one model to the other rapidly when the need arises. A centralized division should have the ability to spin off a manoeuvre brigade as a BCT when needed for independent operations. A decentralized division ought to have the staff structure to rapidly absorb the decentralized CS and CSS when required to deploy as a concentrated formation. My own preference is for the former it just strikes me as easier to organize, train and exercise. It also mentally prepares the force for large scale operations which the BCT model doesn't do well.

So. As to the debate between @KevinB and @Kirkhill my view is quite simply that we should have a deployable division which has the ability to spin off brigades and Cs and CSS elements as required.

I say this because I think we do need the mindset and the ability to deploy a division if circumstances require it. It's always easier to deploy something smaller than the whole rather than to build something bigger that you don't already have. A division is not necessarily a bigger force then you already have. We already have the manoeuvre brigades, artillery, engineer and recce regiments, sustainment units, signals unit and much of the needed for a division. It's just scattered around and not organized as an entity. Yes, there are capability deficiencies that need to be worked on and a proper sustainment system that needs to be organized, but the manpower and basic elements are already there.

It would be extremely short sighted if we did not organize and train in a way that would allow us to plug a battalion, brigade or even a division into a US or UK force. Yes, there are NATO multinational corps and divisions but the most likely ones we would operate with use US/UK staff structures anyway. Our biggest challenge is to tie our logistics system into a multinational structure. Let's get back to the two, simple overriding factors, though. We share a continent with the US and will probably never deploy on a major operation where the US is not a dominant player. The principle of "Keep It Simple, Stupid" makes it abundantly clear that we should be organized and equipped to operate as seamlessly as possible with a higher US HQ. Unfortunately our nationalistic bravado makes us reject in the heart that which our brain tells us is logical. 

There is nothing whatsoever to prevent us having a doctrine that organizes and equips us to be part of a bilateral US/CA force but also have one of tactics and procedures to enable us to operate in the dispersed penny packet system @Kirkhill envisions. Light forces are ideal for that. So are medium forces to an extent. As I said before, its easier to decentralize than to recentralize (if that's a word). 

🍻


----------



## KevinB

@FJAG and @Kirkhill I’d be tickled pink if the CAF would reorganize and be able to field a DIV or 2.  
  However I don’t see the will collectively.  

Harken back to the ratio of tooth to tail. 
  You have ~22k Reg Army and ~17 PRes. 
Even at a 1:2 ratio (significantly greater than any of the credible western armies) that leaves you with 11k Cbt Force troops. 

The fact that the CAF logistics and support systems are so thin already has me doubting that one could actually support 2 Bde’s at this point in time on a continuing basis.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> @FJAG and @Kirkhill I’d be tickled pink if the CAF would reorganize and be able to field a DIV or 2.
> However I don’t see the will collectively.
> 
> Harken back to the ratio of tooth to tail.
> You have ~22k Reg Army and ~17 PRes.
> Even at a 1:2 ratio (significantly greater than any of the credible western armies) that leaves you with 11k Cbt Force troops.
> 
> The fact that the CAF logistics and support systems are so thin already has me doubting that one could actually support 2 Bde’s at this point in time on a continuing basis.


That's the dilemma for anyone trying to figure out how to organize the Army isn't it?  Do you believe the Army will remain roughly the size it is now with roughly the same challenges (but hopefully with some new equipment), or do you think the situation will change enough that serious efforts will be made to correct the many issues underlying the force and expansion is possible?

If you're a "glass half full" type then it makes sense to begin putting in place the changes to build toward a deployable (and sustainable) Division even if we don't yet have all of the pieces required to make it a reality today.  

If on the other hand you're a "glass half empty" type then maybe it instead makes sense to see how to best reorganize our existing assets in order to make the most effective use of them.

Unfortunately, successive Governments barely seem to realize we even have a glass or what they heck to do with it.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> @FJAG and @Kirkhill I’d be tickled pink if the CAF would reorganize and be able to field a DIV or 2.
> However I don’t see the will collectively.
> 
> Harken back to the ratio of tooth to tail.
> You have ~22k Reg Army and ~17 PRes.
> Even at a 1:2 ratio (significantly greater than any of the credible western armies) that leaves you with 11k Cbt Force troops.
> 
> The fact that the CAF logistics and support systems are so thin already has me doubting that one could actually support 2 Bde’s at this point in time on a continuing basis.



Not disagreeing at all.  Except to say that change is necessary.

My difference with @Furniture and @FJAG is that I don't expect to see more bodies in the ranks any time soon.

On the other hand I see 550 LAV 6.0s in the system, 66 LAV LRSS in the pipeline for 2023 and 350 LAV ACSV in the pipeline for 2024.

I would start from there and assign 3 crew members to each of the 966 vehicles (2888 troops)  and then figure out what you can do with them.

We have 3200 trucks in the 7 to 10 tonne range - 3200 drivers (can't afford assistant drivers - don't have them and can't recruit them).

So just to man our LAVs and MSVS fleet we need 6000 bodies.

We have a few tanks - 100 including MBTs, ARVs and AEVs so allow for another 400 bodies.

We also have Engineers but they need new bridges, bulldozers and front end loaders, and some Bobcats, to be useful.

Signallers need radios and radio relay systems.

We have to exploit what we have, and not worry about the things we don't have.

If all we have is a highly mobile light cavalry force then let us embrace that.  And ditch all the other pretensions.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> @FJAG and @Kirkhill I’d be tickled pink if the CAF would reorganize and be able to field a DIV or 2.
> However I don’t see the will collectively.
> 
> Harken back to the ratio of tooth to tail.
> You have ~22k Reg Army and ~17 PRes.
> Even at a 1:2 ratio (significantly greater than any of the credible western armies) that leaves you with 11k Cbt Force troops.
> 
> The fact that the CAF logistics and support systems are so thin already has me doubting that one could actually support 2 Bde’s at this point in time on a continuing basis.


I like those odds. Based on three existing manoeuvre brigades of 4,000 each (12,000 total) that leaves 27,000. Dedicate 7,000 to administrative overhead and core training establishments and you have 20,000 left over. That's enough for a divisional headquarters and 5 to 6 other brigades.

There's also the fact that the ARes is established at some 30,000 but only paid to roughly 16-18,000 leaving some room for adjustment if one cut back on the RegF and exchanged the PYs for ARes at a 1:3 to 1:6 ratio.

I'm waiting to see how the new US divisional structure works out numbers wise by the time is all said and done but let's look at a heavy division as an example. 

Two ABCTs are 4,040 each and an SBCT is 4,680 for a total of 12,760. 
The division adds a headquarters but the artillery brigade comes out of the hides of the manoeuvre brigades and is basically a wash. 
The Aviation brigade is also a wash because it comes out of the RCAF. 
That leaves the headquarters itself, a two battalion Sustainment Brigade and a Protection Brigade which are well within the 5-6 brigades available.
That leaves up to 2 to 4 brigades over and above the division requirements.

One thing to remember in the overall structure is that there is no need to cater for a corps support structure - that will have to come from a multinational organization although it would not be unreasonable to suppose that we will need a national theatre sustainment element as part of that (let's say one brigade equivalent)

Let's be real though. The crux of whatever argument is the phrase "at this point in time". 

Can we currently support two deployed brigades on a continuing basis? If we're talking two fully staffed and deployed brigades each on a six month rotational basis then the answer is no; of course not.

Can we staff and deploy two brigades? Yes we can, assuming we can cure the obvious equipment deficiencies. The problem is duration and rotation. It's a one shot affair.

Can we staff and deploy one brigade? Yes we can, for a short duration and maybe even a rotation or two.

We certainly can't staff and deploy three brigades or a division out of the way that we are currently configured even if it wasn't for more than a one time deployment. There are just too many capability shortfalls starting with the lack of a trained and equipped deployable divisional headquarters much less the logistics system needed to support that size of a force.

For me that's the fundamental need for a "Force 20xx" program. The numbers say we should be able to deploy and sustain more. From within the present manpower envelope authorized by the government, we should be able to deploy and sustain one rotational brigade indefinitely or do a one time deployment of a full division (which can't be rotated but could be sustained for losses).

I keep saying: If the Canadian Army were to receive a report card from a high school teacher it would read "Not performing up to his potential".

We need to be aspirational. Honestly, we can be aspirational while remaining realistic with a little bit of vision and an willingness for reform.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

11th Airborne Division

12,000 troops

2 IBCT

2 Cavalry Squadrons
2 Engineer Battalions
5 Infantry Battalions

1 Atk Recce Avn Battalion
2 Artillery Regiments

2 Support Battalions
1 Sustainment Battalion
1 GS Avn Battalion










						Army re-activates historic airborne unit, reaffirms commitment to Arctic Strategy
					

FORT WAINWRIGHT, Alaska – Several hundred Soldiers gathered in formation within the Alaskan Interior on a bright June morning to take part in the activa...




					www.army.mil


----------



## KevinB

@FJAG any actual increase to TacHel needs to come at the expense of Army PY’s, as the RCAF won’t alter it themselves.  


@Kirkhill the 11th isn’t fully filled out yet. 
  It’s still missing an Inf Bde. 

The 82nd is a better example of an Airborne Div.  
  - this is a 2021 chart, I have not found a more updated one.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Canada sent a Para company and elements of an ARCG to JPMRC Alaska in March 2022 to train with 11th Airborne Division as part of their Brigade validation and will be doing so again in March 2023.


----------



## KevinB

TangoTwoBravo said:


> Canada sent a Para company and elements of an ARCG to JPMRC Alaska in March 2022 to train with 11th Airborne Division as part of their Brigade validation and will be doing so again in March 2023.


Would be nice if it was actually at least a Para Bn.  
    Conventional Force deployment of a Para Coy is pretty pointless (I’d argue a Bde is the minimum capability but…)


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:


> @Kirkhill the 11th isn’t fully filled out yet.
> It’s still missing an Inf Bde.
> 
> The 82nd is a better example of an Airborne Div.
> - this is a 2021 chart, I have not found a more updated one.



Nothing says a Division needs three brigades.  11 Abn Div isn't the only US Div with 2x Bdes.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> @FJAG any actual increase to TacHel needs to come at the expense of Army PY’s, as the RCAF won’t alter it themselves.


I'd give up a recce squadron and a gun battery of RegF PYs for an attack helicopter squadron or a decent UCAV squadron.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> @FJAG any actual increase to TacHel needs to come at the expense of Army PY’s, as the RCAF won’t alter it themselves.
> 
> 
> @Kirkhill the 11th isn’t fully filled out yet.
> It’s still missing an Inf Bde.
> 
> The 82nd is a better example of an Airborne Div.
> - this is a 2021 chart, I have not found a more updated one.
> View attachment 74287



Kevin, you have had small divisions and separate brigades for a long time.

As Infanteer noted - (sorry. I react as I read).


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Nothing says a Division needs three brigades.  11 Abn Div isn't the only US Div with 2x Bdes.





Kirkhill said:


> Kevin, you have had small divisions and separate brigades for a long time.
> 
> As Infanteer noted - (sorry. I react as I read).


I don't disagree - but if you are only having 1 Div , I'd opt for 3 Bde in it. -- unless you want to dedicate a Abn Bde to 11th ABN.



FJAG said:


> I'd give up a recce squadron and a gun battery of RegF PYs for an attack helicopter squadron or a decent UCAV squadron.
> 
> 🍻


You really should not need to though.


----------



## Kirkhill

A Canadian 2 Brigade Division​​4th Canadian (Armoured) Division[edit]​The *4th Canadian (Armoured) Division* was created during World War II by the conversion of the 4th Canadian Infantry Division at the beginning of 1942 in Canada. The division proceeded overseas in 1942, with its two main convoys reaching the United Kingdom in August and October.

The division spent almost two years training in the United Kingdom before crossing to Normandy in July 1944. In the United Kingdom, it participated in war games together with the Polish 1st Armoured Division, and later fought in France, the Low Countries, and Germany; both divisions followed very close paths. The division participated in the later stages of the Battle of Normandy at the Falaise Pocket, the advance from Normandy and spent almost two months engaged at the Breskens Pocket as well as Operation Pheasant. It wintered in the Netherlands and took part in the final advance across northern Germany.

Formation[edit]​1944–1945

4th Canadian Armoured Brigade

21st Armoured Regiment (The Governor General's Foot Guards)
22nd Armoured Regiment (The Canadian Grenadier Guards)
28th Armoured Regiment (The British Columbia Regiment (Duke of Connaught's Own))
The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor)



Formation sign used to identify vehicles of the 4th Canadian (Armoured) Division.
10th Canadian Infantry Brigade

10th Independent Machine Gun Company (The New Brunswick Rangers)[7] [8] [9]
The Lincoln and Welland Regiment
The Algonquin Regiment
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's)
10 Canadian Infantry Brigade Ground Defence Platoon (Lorne Scots)
Other units

29th Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (The South Alberta Regiment)
"D" Squadron, 25th Armoured Delivery Regiment (The Elgin Regiment), Canadian Armoured Corps
15th Field Regiment, RCA
23rd Field Regiment, RCA
5th Anti-tank Regiment, RCA
8th Light Anti-aircraft Regiment, RCA
4th Canadian Armoured Division Engineers
8th Field Squadron, RCE
9th Field Squadron, RCE
6th Field Park Squadron, RCE
4th Canadian Armoured Division Bridge Troop, RCE
No. 46 Light Aid Detachment, RCEME

4th Canadian Armoured Divisional Signals, R.C. Sigs
No. 4 Defence and Employment Platoon (Lorne Scots)
12 Light Field Ambulance, RCAMC[10]
No. 8 Provost Company, Canadian Provost Corps



> In 1939, the armoured division comprised 9,442 men all ranks, this increased to 14,964 men all ranks by 1944;[45] however, of this latter figure, the division had a combat strength of around 7,000 men with only 3,400 of these men being in the division's nine rifle companies



Wiki math appears to be a bit off - by my calcs there were 12 motor rifle companies in the division  with about 2100 rifles. 



			The Canadian Motor Battalion 1943-1945


----------



## KevinB

Armored formations are always lighter in troops than Infantry ones due to the manning of tanks versus rifles.
   While I agree a Div can hold 2 Maneuver Bde's, I still like ones with 3 to give more depth, and a reserve.


----------



## Infanteer

I've read documents and reports that indicate two is easier to control, and actually more effective.  A Division doesn't need an entire brigade for reserve, it needs a Bn max, if not a Cbt Tm.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> I've read documents and reports that indicate two is easier to control, and actually more effective.  A Division doesn't need an entire brigade for reserve, it needs a Bn max, if not a Cbt Tm.



That Canadian Armoured Div organization seems to me to be the exemplar of Bite and Hold tactics.

The Tank Brigade Bites with its own motor rifles and the Armoured Delivery Squadron in support, together with the Div Arty.  The Infantry Brigade Holds together with the Machine Gun Company, the Anti-Tank and Anti-Air Regiments.   Div Recce on screen.

It is also interesting that the Infantry Battalions swapped out a Rifle Coy for additional anti-tank and machine gun platoons.



> Support Company (7 Officers, 190 men), comprised of;
> 
> Company HQ (2 Officers, 23 men) * increased by 1 man, October 1944
> 
> Three Anti-tank Platoons, _each _(1 Officer, 37 men)
> 
> Two Machine Gun Platoons, _each _(1 Officer, 28 men)
> 
> Three Motors Companies (7 Officers, 168 men), _each _comprised of;
> 
> Company HQ (2 Officers, 37 men)
> 
> Scout Platoon (2 Officers, 41 men)
> 
> Three Motor Platoons, _each _comprised of;
> 
> Platoon HQ (1 Officer, 6 men)
> 
> Three Motor Sections, _each _comprised of 8 men





> Machine Gun Platoon - the Motor Battalion enjoyed a luxury denied the Infantry in that they carried their own Vickers medium machine guns.  Each platoon required eight Universal Carriers to transport the four weapons and the Vickers could be fired from the carrier itself.  A PIAT was provided for anti-tank defence.
> 
> Anti-tank Platoon – was a slimmed down version of the Infantry unit.  The platoon served four 6-pdr guns, each with two T16 Carriers plus a Bren and 2-inch mortar.  Platoon HQ added a Universal Carrier, trucks and motorcycles.



Interesting that each rifle company had its own large Scout Platoon.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> That Canadian Armoured Div organization seems to me to be the exemplar of Bite and Hold tactics.



Not quite, as far as I understand it.

Infantry Divisions breach, and Armoured Divisions would go through to exploit.  So, Inf Div bites, Armd Bde pushes through, and Armd Bde Inf holds once limit of exploitation reached.  Corps Bite and Hold.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Not quite, as far as I understand it.
> 
> Infantry Divisions breach, and Armoured Divisions would go through to exploit.  So, Inf Div bites, Armd Bde pushes through, and Armd Bde Inf holds once limit of exploitation reached.  Corps Bite and Hold.



OK.  I stand corrected.  Thanks.


----------



## FJAG

If I remember correctly there were significant differences in American armored and infantry divisions in WW2.

Infantry divisions held three infantry regiments of three battalions each plus a divisional artillery of four battalions.

An armored division was divided into three combat commands - CC A held three tank battalions, CC B held three mechanized infantry battalions and CC R held three self propelled arty battalions.

There were of course other elements in each but those were the core components.

🍻


----------



## Infanteer

FJAG said:


> An armored division was divided into three combat commands - CC A held three tank battalions, CC B held three mechanized infantry battalions and CC R held three self propelled arty battalions.



Those CCs held neither.  It was really CC A and B that mixed and matched the battalions.  CC R was usually just a holding formation.

Another example of a two-"bde" Div that was a successful design.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> If I remember correctly there were significant differences in American armored and infantry divisions in WW2.
> 
> Infantry divisions held three infantry regiments of three battalions each plus a divisional artillery of four battalions.
> 
> An armored division was divided into three combat commands - CC A held three tank battalions, CC B held three mechanized infantry battalions and CC R held three self propelled arty battalions.
> 
> There were of course other elements in each but those were the core components.
> 
> 🍻



That sounds a lot like the British-Canadian Division - only the Combat Commands were called Brigades.


----------



## Infanteer

Kirkhill said:


> That sounds a lot like the British-Canadian Division - only the Combat Commands were called Brigades.



...and a late war Panzer Division generally fought two Kampfgruppe built off its Panzer Regiment and its Infantry Regiment.  You seeing a trend here?


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> ...and a late war Panzer Division generally fought two Kampfgruppe built off its Panzer Regiment and its Infantry Regiment.  You seeing a trend here?


Mebbe so....


----------



## FJAG

So all we need to do is turn 80 some odd tanks into three battalions. 

How do people feel about Russian style 10-tank companies?

😖


----------



## Kirkhill

So does that mean that we could contemplate a Functional Canadian Division with three small brigades (2 battalions and cavalry unit), together with Divisional Support Troops, capable of detaching a battle group, or even an independent brigade, and still leave a working 2 Brigade Division?

And keep it within the existing pay packet of the CAF?


----------



## GR66

So an updated version that also tries to standardize with US force structures would be an ABCT (Leopards & LAVs for now), a SBCT (LAVs) and an Artillery Brigade.

That could leave you with either a Light IBCT that could possibly plug into the 11th Airborne Division as it's 3rd Maneuver Brigade or could act as a base for a Reserve Light Infantry Division (with 1 x Reg Force Battalion per IBCT).


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> So all we need to do is turn 80 some odd tanks into three battalions.
> 
> How do people feel about Russian style 10-tank companies?
> 
> 😖



Pourquoi pas?  Or Swedish Pansar Coys in Swedish Pansar Battalions?

1 Battalion - 2x 11 MBT = 22,  34x IFV, 4x AA, 8x Mor.

There are enough tanks for 3 Swedish style CA Battalions - with LAVs standing in for IFVs.

Or, effectively, a large MBT squadron with 2x LAV companies.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Pourquoi pas?  Or Swedish Pansar Coys in Swedish Pansar Battalions?
> 
> 1 Battalion - 2x 11 MBT = 22,  34x IFV, 4x AA, 8x Mor.
> 
> There are enough tanks for 3 Swedish style CA Battalions - with LAVs standing in for IFVs.
> 
> Or, effectively, a large MBT squadron with 2x LAV companies.


There are 73 x tanks in the three maneuver Battalions of a US ABCT.  We technically have enough for that but would have to do a "Canadianized" (bastardized) Cavalry Squadron until such time as we get more tanks.


----------



## Kirkhill

Does interoperable have to mean identical?  Given the diversity of options within NATO, SEATO and ABCANZUS it seems to me there is room for a degree of flexibility.


----------



## FJAG

But you need two sets of those for an armoured division at minimum.

Anyway. Nice dreams.

🍻


----------



## IKnowNothing

So if a 2Bde+ Division with 2Bn Bde's is an acceptable target

Current 3rd Division Area
Div HQ
1x Cav/Armoured Recce Regiment
1x Square Combined Arms Battalion (Cad pattern tank squadrons)
Div Artillery
Div AD
Div Engineers

Current 4th Division Area (Based at Pet)
1x Cav/Recce Squadron
2x Mech Battalion
(Edit) 1x Reinforced Mech Coy (AT and Mortar Platoon added)
Bde CS Arty
Bde Engineers

Current 2nd Division Area (Based at Val)
Same


That uses 7/9 Armoured Squadrons,  15/27 Inf Coy's, 1/3 Armoured HQ's, 4/9 Inf HQ's,  half of the tanks, ~5/6s of the LAV's (4/6 Bn + 1 Coy +some to have the Cav fully Lav mounted.   Enough Artillery to look after CS for the Bde's (albeit towed), Div artillery is entirely imaginary, as is AD.

Put the colocated CBG's directly under area command to round out (both individual augment platoon level)

Put Light Bn's with Bde HQ's at Borden and Montreal,  commence building out Hybrid 30/70 light Bde's


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> So if a 2Bde+ Division with 2Bn Bde's is an acceptable target
> 
> Current 3rd Division Area
> Div HQ
> 1x Cav/Armoured Recce Regiment
> 1x Square Combined Arms Battalion (Cad pattern tank squadrons)
> Div Artillery
> Div AD
> Div Engineers
> 
> Current 4th Division Area (Based at Pet)
> 1x Cav/Recce Squadron
> 2x Mech Battalion
> Bde CS Arty
> Bde Engineers
> 
> Current 2nd Division Area (Based at Val)
> Same
> 
> 
> That uses 7/9 Armoured Squadrons,  14/27 Inf Coy's, 1/3 Armoured HQ's, 4/9 Inf HQ's,  half of the tanks, ~3/4's of the LAV's (4/6 + some to have the Cav fully Lav mounted.   Enough Artillery to look after CS for the Bde's (albeit towed), Div artillery is entirely imaginary, as is AD.
> 
> Put the colocated CBG's directly under area command to round out (both individual augment platoon level)
> 
> Put Light Bn's with Bde HQ's at Borden and Montreal,  commence building out Hybrid 30/70 light Bde's


If you got to 2 Bde+ Div’s you need 3 Maneuver Bn Bde’s (I’d argue you need those anyway even if you go to 3 Bde+ Div’s 
  I’d argue the Cav Sqn isn’t a Maneuver entity in these terms generally those are Tank or Inf entities. 

I’m also of the opinion that if you are going to have Light, Med and Heavy(ish) Bde’s the heavier forces are better ones to run at 30/70 and your Light ones are more suited for 70/30 as you can deploy them a lot quicker.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Infanteer said:


> I've read documents and reports that indicate two is easier to control, and actually more effective.  A Division doesn't need an entire brigade for reserve, it needs a Bn max, if not a Cbt Tm.


Would this hold true at a smaller scale- Bde doesn't need an entire Bn for reserve, but a reinforced Coy instead?


----------



## Infanteer

Yes.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Yes.


But I would suggest it clearly does reduce one’s ability to push a counter attack.


----------



## Kirkhill

In which case

11 Div Pattern +

2x Lt Inf Brigades 
with 2x Lt Inf Battalions and 2x LAV based Cavalry Regiments and 1x Lt CS Arty Regiment

1x Combined Arms Brigade with 3x LAV/Leo CA Units  and 1x SP Arty Regiment

= 6x Infantry Battalions, 3x MBT Squadrons in 1 Armoured Regiment and 2x Cavalry Regiments 

With 3 Bde HQs one Lt HQ can be detached with a Battle Group while the other battalion and cavalry regiment (-) could be attached to the second Brigade leaving the following 

1 Battle Gp as the core of a multinational Canadian Brigade Gp or adjunct to an Northam element

1 deployable 2 Brigade div with 3 Combined Arms Units and 3 Infantry Units with adequate numbers for support and enablers.


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:


> But I would suggest it clearly does reduce one’s ability to push a counter attack.



Launching a company into a counterattack vs a battalion has the advantage of timeliness.  It's far easier to get a sub-unit moving on an objective in a chaotic situation than it is a full unit. When timeliness is of the essence, a smaller element now is better than a larger element too late.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> If you got to 2 Bde+ Div’s you need 3 Maneuver Bn Bde’s (I’d argue you need those anyway even if you go to 3 Bde+ Div’s
> I’d argue the Cav Sqn isn’t a Maneuver entity in these terms generally those are Tank or Inf entities.
> 
> I’m also of the opinion that if you are going to have Light, Med and Heavy(ish) Bde’s the heavier forces are better ones to run at 30/70 and your Light ones are more suited for 70/30 as you can deploy them a lot quicker.



Kevin you seem to be thinking entirely in Heavy terms.   I would argue that in a dispersed field even a light cavalry squadron/troop can disrupt and exploit.  Or a LAV infantry company with a troop/platoon of tanks in support.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Kevin you seem to be thinking entirely in Heavy terms.   I would argue that in a dispersed field even a light cavalry squadron/troop can disrupt and exploit.  Or a LAV infantry company with a troop/platoon of tanks in support.


Situational dependent yes.  
   I’m not a medium force fan, especially for Canada as it’s medium forces miss a slew of needed enablers to fight against an armor equipped foe.  

A US Cav Sqn be it either Heavy, Stryker or Light has an enormous amount of firepower compared to a CAF one.  
   But only the Armored Cav units can effectively screen and fight a withdrawal against an armor threat.   

I’m very leery of using OS Ukraine information in force structures, as they don’t truly reflect the actual situation on the ground and UKR has been fantastic at keeping battlefield OPSEC.   

I think Light Forces and Medium forces can do fantastic things against certain situations, but not everything, and for that one needs a mix of Heavy Armor, that can hold and fix, and more agile forces than can flex as needed.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Situational dependent yes.
> I’m not a medium force fan, especially for Canada as it’s medium forces miss a slew of needed enablers to fight against an armor equipped foe.
> 
> A US Cav Sqn be it either Heavy, Stryker or Light has an enormous amount of firepower compared to a CAF one.
> But only the Armored Cav units can effectively screen and fight a withdrawal against an armor threat.
> 
> I’m very leery of using OS Ukraine information in force structures, as they don’t truly reflect the actual situation on the ground and UKR has been fantastic at keeping battlefield OPSEC.
> 
> I think Light Forces and Medium forces can do fantastic things against certain situations, but not everything, and for that one needs a mix of Heavy Armor, that can hold and fix, and more agile forces than can flex as needed.



Canada will never be able to act in all situations.  And that is equally true, if not more so, if it had a Heavy Army.  The cost of enablers would escalate as would the logistical costs.

Light and Medium forces will find a home on any battlefield.  They probably won't be crushing trenches.  But they might be dominating the countryside around those trenches.  Or securing the LOCs.  Or supplying more bodies to secure towns.  Or operating where the tanks can't go.

We're going to choose our fights - and if the time permits - adjust our organization to suit the situation.


----------



## IKnowNothing

KevinB said:


> I’m not a medium force fan, especially for Canada as it’s medium forces miss a slew of needed enablers to fight against an armor equipped foe.
> 
> A US Cav Sqn be it either Heavy, Stryker or Light has an enormous amount of firepower compared to a CAF one.


Should  (operative word) be a straighter and shorter path to change the accuracy of those statements than to throw everything out and rebuild heavy.  A properly equipped LAV6 based CAV would/should material outgun it's Stryker equivalent (though that gap will close once 50/50 Dragoon/CROWS-J is rolled out.



KevinB said:


> I’m also of the opinion that if you are going to have Light, Med and Heavy(ish) Bde’s the heavier forces are better ones to run at 30/70 and your Light ones are more suited for 70/30 as you can deploy them a lot quicker.


Granted it would be better, but again- shorter and straighter path to expanded force.  Tanks have to be out west. EC based mech has to be Pet/Val/Gagetown.   But light forces based in Southern Ontario/ Greater Montreal have much great access to a substantial reserve pool (current & future), don't have the same training footprint, and can deploy to the larger training areas far more easily.


----------



## KevinB

Tanks don’t HAVE to be out West. 
  Tanks and artillery simply require larger training areas. Western Canada has actual mountains unlike the eastern and central parts. 

   The fact the CAF doesn’t have any bases suited to Armored/Mech warfare training is telling enough.  
  Before anyone says Wainwright, it’s still very limited for any real live fire maneuver with 25mm. Wx was great for the Grizzly - with the .50 not the LAV with the 25mm.    Suffield is pretty good, if you didn’t effectively give control to the Brits and DRES.  

The CAF needs to do a realistic assessment of their basing options and create some actual true training centers for modern warfare.


----------



## ArmyRick

Its very interesting watching the ideas for what Canada could/should/would do. I love reading the input, ideas and comparisons to our allies. 

What I find very tough to add anything useful lately. I know, I know, I am part of the napkin field marshall crowd.  Main reason I have difficulty is that our current government has ZERO desire to take defence seriously. At all. 

I had a glimmer of hope when the Soviet Union, er..ops I mean Putin's Russia invaded the Ukraine and basically escalated things very badly. BUT NOPE. Trudeau, Freeland and crew are more concerned with fighting "climate change" (or using that excuse for cash grab), stopping "hate" (or people who disagree with anything Liberal) or paying attention to 2SLBQTIGVABTEUNGGG++++ (Fook, who can keep up with all the letters these days? Even my friends that are gay can't tell me what they mean)

I think first step is acknowledging there will be NO new equipment purchased (thats not already on the books) and no new personnel added or new units. Not going to happen. Nope. Nada. Nopers.

So with our current equipment and troops, would it be better to keep 3 brigades in the regular army with reduced infantry battalions or 2 brigades with more units? Curious on your thoughts?


----------



## KevinB

IMHO given the option of 3 or 2 Reg BDE

With a clean sheet of paper I’d opt for an ABCT with all the bells and whistles ( maybe even more) and an Airborne/Air Assault IBCT. 

But again that requires effort and I don’t see that occurring.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Tanks don’t HAVE to be out West.
> Tanks and artillery simply require larger training areas. Western Canada has actual mountains unlike the eastern and central parts.
> 
> The fact the CAF doesn’t have any bases suited to Armored/Mech warfare training is telling enough.


We did have. In it's day Borden and Meaford were into tanks, but the tanks outgrew the facilities.

Gagetown played a role after that and even Shilo served the Germans well for many years.

It's really only Petawawa and Valcartier that are a bit anemic and that's mostly because so much of the ranges are unsuitable for wide ranging open manoeuvre.


KevinB said:


> Before anyone says Wainwright, it’s still very limited for any real live fire maneuver with 25mm. Wx was great for the Grizzly - with the .50 not the LAV with the 25mm.    Suffield is pretty good, if you didn’t effectively give control to the Brits and DRES.
> 
> The CAF needs to do a realistic assessment of their basing options and create some actual true training centers for modern warfare.


I sometimes think that we're not doing enough with simulated munitions for our large calibre weapons or in using civilian terrain like we did in Germany. There's shooting and then there's realistic battalion level tactical manoeuvre. The two do not need to be combined in the same exercise. 4 CMBG shot on very restrictive ranges but manoeuvred in the most realistic terrain possible.

Don't get me wrong. I see the benefits of a facility like NTC that can run a BCT at a time ... and even CMTC ... but quite frankly restrained in both equipment and money and ranges as we are, I think that the biggest bang for the buck we get is at the battalion/battle group level for integrated live fire and manoeuvre while brigade level is best kept to simulated exercises. If we turn out good battle groups (heavy, medium and light) capable of working within a sim-trained brigade framework then we've done well.



ArmyRick said:


> I think first step is acknowledging there will be NO new equipment purchased (thats not already on the books) and no new personnel added or new units. Not going to happen. Nope. Nada. Nopers.


You're probably right.



ArmyRick said:


> So with our current equipment and troops, would it be better to keep 3 brigades in the regular army with reduced infantry battalions or 2 brigades with more units? Curious on your thoughts?


My thoughts, as expected, run more in the nature of more deployable brigade and battalion headquarters than we have but with (please don't yell at me) fewer RegF troops. Do that through more ResF integration in things like 30/70 brigades and battalions.

We are constantly deploying contingents with the equivalents of a battle group headquarters overseen by rump TF/NCE headquarters which are akin to a small brigade headquarters. We need to continue to have enough of those so that we can do the rotations to suit the deployment requirements set out in the SSE. In addition we need trained and knowledgeable headquarters if we are ever going to expand in an emergency. 

My gut math tells me we can reduce the 5 div HQs to 2 and the 3+1+10 brigades to probably 6 manoeuvre and 4 support using existing manning levels. We convert the around 30 major RegF units and the 130+ ResF units into around 50 hybrid units plus a half dozen training units. All done without any equipment changes other than what's already on the books.

I've put this diagram up before and I'm in the process of revising it but it's shows one way to do that. (Note that the Readiness FL 4 category is for a prepositioned armoured brigade's equipment in Latvia with minimal full time manning, and in large measure concurrently replacing the functions of CMTC as a training and certification venue.



🍻


----------



## quadrapiper

FJAG said:


> If we turn out good battle groups (heavy, medium and light) capable of working within a sim-trained brigade framework then we've done well.


How much of a difference would there be for sim trainees from a "real" brigade exercise, assuming there's enough "noise" being input into their world to mirror real-world, real-time flukery?


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> We did have. In it's day Borden and Meaford were into tanks, but the tanks outgrew the facilities.


Lot of things have outgrown the facilities. 

Arty, would be one, but for the fact one doesn’t need to practice loading super charge etc. 
  If the CAF gets into rockets though that will require a lot more room, just for safety templates.  

Also a 1 dimensional target doesn’t do a good job for LAV or Tank crews, in the same way a Fig 11 doesn’t do a good job for the rifleperson in fire and maneuver (other than ensuring a strict script is adhered to and no deviation of firing lines… 
So I’d argue its isn’t just the ranges that have been outgrown.  




FJAG said:


> Gagetown played a role after that and even Shilo served the Germans well for many years.


Both within very strict repetitive traces. 
   I mean I haven’t been in Gagetown since 1988 but I probably could do a template for Lawfield Corridor by memory… 



FJAG said:


> It's really only Petawawa and Valcartier that are a bit anemic and that's mostly because so much of the ranges are unsuitable for wide ranging open manoeuvre.


Pet is pretty jammed up with CSOR and the SOAS one one side - but across the road there are a lot of areas that could be reconfigured - it would mean merging a lot of impact areas and clearance though. 

I haven’t been to Valcatraz other than a brief stop over - so I can’t really comment on that, but looking at a map I’d agree with your assessment.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Launching a company into a counterattack vs a battalion has the advantage of timeliness.  It's far easier to get a sub-unit moving on an objective in a chaotic situation than it is a full unit. When timeliness is of the essence, a smaller element now is better than a larger element too late.



Wasn't that Rommel's take on the counter-attack?  Was he the chap that advocated keeping 10% of his force in his pocket just for the counter-attack?


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Both within very strict repetitive traces.


Yup. I can still do a BLACK BEAR battle group battle run in my sleep. But that was for nine-month conscripts. It doesn't have to be that restrictive.

😁


----------



## WestIsle

KevinB said:


> I haven’t been to Valcatraz other than a brief stop over - so I can’t really comment on that, but looking at a map I’d agree with your assessment.


I also haven't but everyone I have worked with has indicated that the area is not at all suitable to anything but dismounted operations. What usually happens is the LAVs act as battle taxis with the rest being left up to the troops as I'm told. Additionally, as much as everyone including myself rags on them it seems like they are the best run brigade these days or at least when it comes to retention and getting people trained.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> We did have. In it's day Borden and Meaford were into tanks, but the tanks outgrew the facilities.
> 
> Gagetown played a role after that and even Shilo served the Germans well for many years.
> 
> It's really only Petawawa and Valcartier that are a bit anemic and that's mostly because so much of the ranges are unsuitable for wide ranging open manoeuvre.
> 
> I sometimes think that we're not doing enough with simulated munitions for our large calibre weapons or in using civilian terrain like we did in Germany. There's shooting and then there's realistic battalion level tactical manoeuvre. The two do not need to be combined in the same exercise. 4 CMBG shot on very restrictive ranges but manoeuvred in the most realistic terrain possible.
> 
> Don't get me wrong. I see the benefits of a facility like NTC that can run a BCT at a time ... and even CMTC ... but quite frankly restrained in both equipment and money and ranges as we are, I think that the biggest bang for the buck we get is at the battalion/battle group level for integrated live fire and manoeuvre while brigade level is best kept to simulated exercises. If we turn out good battle groups (heavy, medium and light) capable of working within a sim-trained brigade framework then we've done well.
> 
> 
> You're probably right.
> 
> 
> My thoughts, as expected, run more in the nature of more deployable brigade and battalion headquarters than we have but with (please don't yell at me) fewer RegF troops. Do that through more ResF integration in things like 30/70 brigades and battalions.
> 
> We are constantly deploying contingents with the equivalents of a battle group headquarters overseen by rump TF/NCE headquarters which are akin to a small brigade headquarters. We need to continue to have enough of those so that we can do the rotations to suit the deployment requirements set out in the SSE. In addition we need trained and knowledgeable headquarters if we are ever going to expand in an emergency.
> 
> My gut math tells me we can reduce the 5 div HQs to 2 and the 3+1+10 brigades to probably 6 manoeuvre and 4 support using existing manning levels. We convert the around 30 major RegF units and the 130+ ResF units into around 50 hybrid units plus a half dozen training units. All done without any equipment changes other than what's already on the books.
> 
> I've put this diagram up before and I'm in the process of revising it but it's shows one way to do that. (Note that the Readiness FL 4 category is for a prepositioned armoured brigade's equipment in Latvia with minimal full time manning, and in large measure concurrently replacing the functions of CMTC as a training and certification venue.
> 
> View attachment 74309
> 
> 🍻


My issue with your plan (looking forward to your revision) is that you seem to be assuming equipment expansion (3 x Tank Regiments vs our current 1 and 10 x Mech Battalions vs our current 6) and also the basic issue of Reserve participation in Tank Regiments/Mechanized Battalions.

It would be hard to convince me with the major spending already pending for the CAF (NORAD upgrades, the shipbuilding program, F-35's, and new AD & AT capabilities that a major expansion of our AFV fleet is also a real possibility.

The general consensus on the site seems to suggest that achieving 30% properly trained and ready to deploy Reserve augmentation for Mechanized Infantry and Armoured units is not realistic and that 70% manning for those units is likely pure fantasy.  Can we get to the point where that is actually a possibility?  Maybe, but there seems to be no effort being made at present to even move toward that goal so wishing it into existence is maybe not realistic.

I had considered that possibly "Reservists" (as opposed to part-time Militia members) ...fully trained Reg Force members shifting to Reserve units on release with a core of Reg Force leadership and located close to existing CAF bases for technical support might be a way to expand Total Force units for mobilization, but realistically how many Reg Force members leaving full-time service are choosing to remain close to existing CFB's?  Or are they moving back to places like Metro Toronto and Metro Montreal, etc. where they grew up? 

There are MANY steps that need to be taken to revive the CA to become a more effective and efficient force.  What you're suggesting might be a possible end goal, but I fear we are far from being able to even consider that as the next step.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> My issue with your play (looking forward to your revision) is that you seem to be assuming equipment expansion (3 x Tank Regiments vs our current 1 and 10 x Mech Battalions vs our current 6) and also the basic issue of Reserve participation in Tank Regiments/Mechanized Battalions.


Actually not. The details is in the fine print. In a 30/70 battalion for example, only the RFL 1 100/0 RegF company is fully equipped (mech or otherwise). The two 10/90 RFL 3 ResF companies are not but take their training on the equipment and do annual summer concentrations on the prepositioned flyover equipment in Europe. The numbers are generally within the current equipment holdings although there are a few unequipped placeholder units such as the GBAD and HIMARS.



GR66 said:


> The general consensus on the site seems to suggest that achieving 30% properly trained and ready to deploy Reserve augmentation for Mechanized Infantry and Armoured units is not realistic and that 70% manning for those units is likely pure fantasy.  Can we get to the point where that is actually a possibility?  Maybe, but there seems to be no effort being made at present to even move toward that goal so wishing it into existence is maybe not realistic.


I agree with you that there is currently no effort being made in that direction but you are only skimming the surface of the idea. The concept is significantly more complex. I've discussed in many past posts the preconditions necessary to put such a system in place.



GR66 said:


> I had considered that possibly "Reservists" (as opposed to part-time Militia members) ...fully trained Reg Force members shifting to Reserve units on release with a core of Reg Force leadership and located close to existing CAF bases for technical support might be a way to expand Total Force units for mobilization, but realistically how many Reg Force members leaving full-time service are choosing to remain close to existing CFB's?  Or are they moving back to places like Metro Toronto and Metro Montreal, etc. where they grew up?


We do have a supplementary reserve on the books but it has zero training requirement. It's merely a pool that can be placed on active service by the GiC. We also have a number of releasing members who choose to join reserve units (probably less now with the education benefit). IWhile lots of former soldiers settle down near bases, I don't think that you'd ever get a large pool but they would be valuable.



GR66 said:


> There are MANY steps that need to be taken to revive the CA to become a more effective and efficient force.  What you're suggesting might be a possible end goal, but I fear we are far from being able to even consider that as the next step.


I'm quite aware that there are MANY steps needed to do this. I've set many of them out in a short book called "Unsustainable at any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis." (Note that I wrote this a few years ago and I'm in the process of doing a major revision - especially to include the 30/70 concept and several other things that have popped up in the last few years.)

I should point out though that what I've put forward isn't a next step. It is an end goal vision. I hate to be catty (well maybe not) but one of the key problems within DND is that people are so wrapped up in day to day issues that grand visions are neither developed nor worked on. DND putters along by increments going from one crisis to another.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

DND putters along by increments going from one crisis to another.

@FJAG 
  Would you accept a change to: DND gradually sinker deeper into a hole, by going from one crisis of their own creation to another…


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> DND putters along by increments going from one crisis to another.
> 
> @FJAG
> Would you accept a change to: DND gradually sinker deeper into a hole, by going from one crisis of their own creation to another…


I think so. I've held for years that the current model of DND isn't sustainable due to the ever rising cost of full-time personnel which, coupled with dropping or stagnant or moderately rising budgets, guarantees a reduction in force size or capabilities over time. This progresses to a point where the force might have some residual capability but is essentially irrelevant.

One might reasonably argue as to whether we've already reached that point or not, and one might reasonably argue as to whether or not the crises being dealt with are self inflicted or generated by outside forces. IMHO, while government action and inaction has a lot to do with that, there is also a systemic failure within DND's civilian and military leadership in properly charting a sustainable path to regaining combat capabilities and credibility.

There's always a lot of 20/20 hindsight in these things but who hasn't been aware for decades of the fact that our recruiting and training system, for example, has been dysfunctional? Or, if you read Leslie's 2011 report on transformation, that our personnel priorities are skewed? Or the last several audits and CRS reviews that our materiel support and procurement system is dysfunctional? And don't get me started on reserves.

It's always a hard thing to lay the blame on individuals because we all know that there are a lot of capable and dedicated people there but the system as a whole has difficulty coping and, at the end of the day, the system is nothing more than the sum of its individuals and processes.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

I tend to see the PRes as a poor value for the money at this time, due to equipment issues and lack of structure (both in terms of legislation and actual units).   

The Army Regular Force probably needs a drastic change in structure and equipment as well.  
   I think for the budget the Army is incredibly wasteful, again the 1 million LAV army rears it head, as with Tanks and 777’s it’s really not Medium, but a Poorly structured mess of Heavy, Medium and Light, with no sound basis for its genesis.   

I think starting from scratch might be the only way forward.  

If one could fix the Res issues - 30/70 and 70/30 units would be created as below. 

1 CABG in an expanded base in Shilo with railhead and airfield for C17.  (30/70) 
   1/3rd Equipment Predeployed to Europe 

2 CLBG (Airborne/Airmobile) in Petawawa 70/30
3 CLBG (Airborne/Mountain) Edmonton 70/30
 Reactivating airfield 
4 CMBG (LAV ) Gagetown 30/70
5 CMBG (LAV) Valcartier 70/30
6 CLBG (Amphibious) new base Vancouver Island or coastal mainland. 30/70 

1 CND Mechanized DIV - Shilo (1, 4,5 Bde) 
2 CND Light Div - somewhere in BC. With 2,3,6 Bde 
  Each Div would also have a CSSB 

Each base would be setup for OST (One station training). 

Yes it requires new kit (about 15B, of which around 11B is required anyway) but is fairly PY neutral (large decrease in PRes senior leaders and some HQ positions)


----------



## FJAG

I'll keep this in mind for my own rewrite.

Off the top of my head:

1) Southern Ontario is left out as a bde and is a major ResF manpower pool (and has little role in 2 CLBG whose 30% could probably come from Ottawa and vicinity alone)

2) The two div HQs are in the west but the bulk of the Army is in the east

3) no amphib capability on east coast

Just as a quick adjustment I'd consider:

1) moving 4 CMBG and 1 Div HQ to Toronto or London with 4 CMBG staying under 1 Cdn Div

2) adding an arty bde to 1 Cdn Div headquartered in Shilo; 

3) moving 5 CBG to be under 2 Div 

4) putting the BC Coastal Amphib contingent (which will probably be just battle group size) under 3 CLBG and canning 6 CLBG

5) creating a light Coastal Amphib battle group in the Maritimes and putting it under 5 CMBG

That leaves 1 Div (with 2 manoeuvre and 2 support bdes total) generally western with a med to heavy mix and NATO focus and 2 Div (with 3 manoeuvre and 1 support bde [I'd consider leaving their artillery as part of the manoeuvre bde gps]) generally eastern and coastal with a light to medium mix and multipurpose QRF focus.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

Also while I hate to sound all doom and gloom, if one cannot fix the PRes issue 


FJAG said:


> I'll keep this in mind for my own rewrite.
> 
> Off the top of my head:
> 
> 1) Southern Ontario is left out as a bde and is a major ResF manpower pool (and has little role in 2 CLBG whose 30% could probably come from Ottawa and vicinity alone)


Agreed -- I was just doing a terrain assessment - and while Souther Ontario offers some good Mech terrain - there doesn't appear to be anywhere to stick a Bde with a training area (I'm pretty much dead set those are a requirement).


FJAG said:


> 2) The two div HQs are in the west but the bulk of the Army is in the east


Realistically Manitoba is pretty much central Canada - (albeit Shilo is on the western side) because I opted for an expanded Shilo base - I figured it was worth it to stick the Div HQ there, as one could conduct larger than Bde training there (granted the GoC would need to buy up the land) - 
  Suffield would have been my ideal location for 1 CABG and 1 Div, as its decently close to Medicine Hat, and the training area is great already -- but since the Brits still have use of it, I crossed it off.



FJAG said:


> 3) no amphib capability on east coast


I see the Pacific as the major Amphib AO, and the Pacific Fleet being the POC on that - so left the Eastern side without.



FJAG said:


> Just as a quick adjustment I'd consider:
> 
> 1) moving 4 CMBG and 1 Div HQ to Toronto or London with 4 CMBG staying under 1 Cdn Div


Again, without a real training area, I don't see the viability of those bases.
 One basically need to push towards the Bruce Peninsula to find open land - without significant expropriation costs)  The population density is significant though - and I see potential for a 30/70 Bn to be based at Meaford - and have that area with offshoot Platoons 


FJAG said:


> 2) adding an arty bde to 1 Cdn Div headquartered in Shilo;


Yes I meant to write Div with enablers - I should have been clearer.



FJAG said:


> 3) moving 5 CBG to be under 2 Div


In my ideal world - the 1 CABG would have an extra Bde worth of Pre-Deployed Equipment - and 5 CMBG or 4 CMBG would potentially move into the domestic equipment if there was a need for another Armored Bde -- given my 1 CABG has a tracked IFV (lets pencil in the CV90 MkIV for now) that leaves 2 Bde worth of LAV's - and Vacartier while not ideal for 25mm Bn Battle runs, has a decent enough training area for exercises, and PCF's on the LAV.


FJAG said:


> 4) putting the BC Coastal Amphib contingent (which will probably be just battle group size) under 3 CLBG and canning 6 CLBG


I like 3 Bde Div's, mainly as it allows for 1 Bde to be entirely rotated out of the line as needed for R&R&R.


FJAG said:


> 5) creating a light Coastal Amphib battle group in the Maritimes and putting it under 5 CMBG


Don't go symetrical on me   I don't see a real use for Amphib in the East - short of Hurricane support work, and so I would prefer to keep a Bde sized force out West to work with the Pacific Fleet and the USMC.



FJAG said:


> That leaves 1 Div (with 2 manoeuvre and 2 support bdes total) generally western with a med to heavy mix and NATO focus and 2 Div (with 3 manoeuvre and 1 support bde [I'd consider leaving their artillery as part of the manoeuvre bde gps]) generally eastern and coastal with a light to medium mix and multipurpose QRF focus.
> 
> 🍻


Roger.

I figured that if push comes to shove - the 2 Light Bde's can jump off to anywhere as needed, and can rotate readiness (not fake readiness - but actually a Bn on 6hrs NTM, and the Bde on 24) I don't see a major use for the Armor (tracks or LAV) in the Pacific (channelling my inner MacArthur as best I can with not wanting to get involved in a ground war in Asia) - but the Light and Amphib units can support that theatre as needed - and the heavier forces with a European focus.


If the Army was larger, I would have regionally specific Divisions - and support language and culture courses in their specific AOR's.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Agreed -- I was just doing a terrain assessment - and while Souther Ontario offers some good Mech terrain - there doesn't appear to be anywhere to stick a Bde with a training area (I'm pretty much dead set those are a requirement).


I worry less about training ranges in Canada because with 30/70 heavy units, I would move much of the major exercising off shore to the prepositioned equipment so as to 1) reduce the need for ranges in Canada and build familiarity with the likely AO; 2) exercise the air move capability/plans for the RCAF regularly; and 3) create interest and excitement for both the RegF and ResF members to entice recruitment and retention



KevinB said:


> Realistically Manitoba is pretty much central Canada - (albeit Shilo is on the western side) because I opted for an expanded Shilo base - I figured it was worth it to stick the Div HQ there, as one could conduct larger than Bde training there (granted the GoC would need to buy up the land) -


As above ranges for bde level exercises is a minor issue because of Europe. I have no real issues with 1 CABG in Shilo (albeit infrastructure is an issue) and could easily see 1 Div HQ in any of Shilo, Winnipeg, London or Toronto.



KevinB said:


> I see the Pacific as the major Amphib AO, and the Pacific Fleet being the POC on that - so left the Eastern side without.


I agree on the Pacific issue but see below



KevinB said:


> Again, without a real training area, I don't see the viability of those bases.
> One basically need to push towards the Bruce Peninsula to find open land - without significant expropriation costs)  The population density is significant though - and I see potential for a 30/70 Bn to be based at Meaford - and have that area with offshoot Platoons


I don't see land purchases for training anywhere - the Special Ops base in Trenton is a sad lesson that will forestall any GoC support for that.


KevinB said:


> In my ideal world - the 1 CABG would have an extra Bde worth of Pre-Deployed Equipment - and 5 CMBG or 4 CMBG would potentially move into the domestic equipment if there was a need for another Armored Bde -- given my 1 CABG has a tracked IFV (lets pencil in the CV90 MkIV for now) that leaves 2 Bde worth of LAV's - and Vacartier while not ideal for 25mm Bn Battle runs, has a decent enough training area for exercises, and PCF's on the LAV.


Working on my basis of using what we have I can only see one fully equipped brigade as the prepositioned one in Europe were all bde level exercises are conducted. Units in Canada will be equipped fully only to the extent of their RegF component and partially at training unit. 


KevinB said:


> I like 3 Bde Div's, mainly as it allows for 1 Bde to be entirely rotated out of the line as needed for R&R&R.


That's generally my thought although I tend to think in the current LAV model and as such 2 Div's 5 CMBG can be used for that role as well. If anyone is ever prepared to address the CV 90 issue again then the structure may need to be revisited.


KevinB said:


> Don't go symetrical on me   I don't see a real use for Amphib in the East - short of Hurricane support work, and so I would prefer to keep a Bde sized force out West to work with the Pacific Fleet and the USMC.


Two coasts (more like three actually) require some symmetry. 2 Div USMC is on the east coast as is all of the UK's Marine force all with roles for the northern Atlantic of which we could and should be a part.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I worry less about training ranges in Canada because with 30/70 heavy units, I would move much of the major exercising off shore to the prepositioned equipment so as to 1) reduce the need for ranges in Canada and build familiarity with the likely AO; 2) exercise the air move capability/plans for the RCAF regularly; and 3) create interest and excitement for both the RegF and ResF members to entice recruitment and retention


My sole aspect to Trg Area = Bases is for OST, it makes it so much easier to train people in situ, at least to their initial trade qual.



FJAG said:


> As above ranges for bde level exercises is a minor issue because of Europe. I have no real issues with 1 CABG in Shilo (albeit infrastructure is an issue) and could easily see 1 Div HQ in any of Shilo, Winnipeg, London or Toronto.


While I like the idea of a Reforger/CAST/AMF(L) type activity - I do think there needs to be some local ability to conduct larger exercises.



FJAG said:


> I don't see land purchases for training anywhere - the Special Ops base in Trenton is a sad lesson that will forestall any GoC support for that.


The unfortunate aspect of that reality means that Canada is stuck with no real area to play effectively.



FJAG said:


> Working on my basis of using what we have I can only see one fully equipped brigade as the prepositioned one in Europe were all bde level exercises are conducted. Units in Canada will be equipped fully only to the extent of their RegF component and partially at training unit.


I think due to the small size of Canada Army a realistic and responsible Government would have a heir and a spare for equipment...



FJAG said:


> That's generally my thought although I tend to think in the current LAV model and as such 2 Div's 5 CMBG can be used for that role as well. If anyone is ever prepared to address the CV 90 issue again then the structure may need to be revisited.


Ack I just do not see Tank and LAV working as symbiotically as some folks in Canada do, so I keep preaching IFV-T 


FJAG said:


> Two coasts (more like three actually) require some symmetry. 2 Div USMC is on the east coast as is all of the UK's Marine force all with roles for the northern Atlantic of which we could and should be a part.
> 
> 🍻


I tend to think a Bde is the smallest entity one should look at deploying, hence my dislike of penny packing those as Btl Gps to each coast.
- again with a larger Military one could do a lot more.


----------



## IKnowNothing

A lot of crossover between this and the reserves thread.  Going to try and walk the line between aspirational and incremental change, and avoid major capital purchases other than those already on the books (GBAD/ Arty/ ATGM)

1 CABG - current 1 CMBG + 38&39 CBG
Move all combat arms LAV's out west, adopt 14 tank squadron, shift LdSH to a LAV/LRSS based Cav regiment, go to combined arms mech battalions
5x combined arms battalions = 70/80 tanks, 10/18 Lav Coy sets.  (Cav regiment eats another 3 (1.5 per, 2nd set in Europe))
3x PPCLI Bns
1x Bn set for 38 and 39 to split time on with Reg force leadership
1x Bn set pre-positioned in Europe
1x Reg set pre-positioned in Europe

With appropriate purchase of SP 155's and GBAD, pre-position of that and other CS/CSS equipment, NATO commitment of leading the flyover surge of eFP Latvia to a MN Bde.
Edit- could also drop a PPCLI Bn to free up PY's, and have 2 full Bn set's in Europe.

2 Canadian Light Division
2 CLBG - RCD ,1&2 RCR (100/0)+ 33CBG (10/90) -
4CLBG - 32, 33, 34, 41, 36/37 (all 10/90) 
5 CLBG - 12 RBC, 1&2 R22R, (100/0) + 35CBG (10/90)


2&5 provide a pool of 4 100/0 Bn's for QRF, and each have a pool of ACSV Troop variants attached to provide protected mobility for UN/COIN taskings.

4CLBG is an administrative command tasked with ensuring that all 5 subordinate CBG's are capable of delivering self contained light battlegroups for Arctic Response, Domestic Defense etc.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I think due to the small size of Canada Army a realistic and responsible Government would have a heir and a spare for equipment...


I think that I found the flaw in your argument.


----------



## quadrapiper

FJAG said:


> I don't see land purchases for training anywhere - the Special Ops base in Trenton is a sad lesson that will forestall any GoC support for that.
> 
> 
> 🍻


If you're looking at a travel-to-train model _anyway_, would that open up a much more transitory approach to e.g. using Crown/Indigenous land in the less populous reaches of the country? Don't need anything like the footprint, especially if the dynamic changed to bringing everything you needed for each ex (I think I saw someone posting recently about the value of giving the support elements a full airing).

Bet a brigade could happily occupy itself on the northern end of Vancouver Island, let alone further north in the province.


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> If you're looking at a travel-to-train model _anyway_, would that open up a much more transitory approach to e.g. using Crown/Indigenous land in the less populous reaches of the country? Don't need anything like the footprint, especially if the dynamic changed to bringing everything you needed for each ex (I think I saw someone posting recently about the value of giving the support elements a full airing).
> 
> *Bet a brigade could happily occupy itself on the northern end of Vancouver Island, let alone further north in the province.*


 
If the Brigade didn't get booted out by the loggers who own all the private land (IIRC that most of the North Island is private land) and access roads, or the first nations, or hounded by the insane environmentalists chainingthemsleves to the vehicles.

Oh, and then there's the inaccessible rain forest covering most of the area that might just drown/ kill people because of the prevailing geography and weather


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> If the Brigade didn't get booted out by the loggers who own all the private land (IIRC that most of the North Island is private land) and access roads, or the first nations, or hounded by the insane environmentalists chaining themsleves to the vehicles.
> 
> Oh, and then there's the inaccessible rain forest covering most of the area that might just drown/ kill people because of the prevailing geography and weather


Couldn't remember how much of the north island was properly private, and how much was leased/licensed/etc., and using the island for training anyone not already based here is probably a logistical nonstarter regardless. Just thinking of how much Not Really Lived In landscape is kicking around, not too far from nominal civilization.

DND/CAF need to start selling their actually really good current environmental custodial practices more enthusiastically: see if the purely green crowd can be convinced that Defence land is often quite environmentally friendly.

Mentioned first nations land initially, as I could see the right nation being quite amenable to some sort of rental/lease agreement.

As for your last line, aren't there a number of countries who have to leave their borders to train in terrain like that (granted, I think those are all much warmer iterations of rain forest...), or who've identified a patch of The Worst Land in the Country for training trades who walk to work? (Did ground SAR for a number of years: yeah, lots of good ways to mess yourself up in the cold and wet around here)

On an island note, I wonder what the Strathcona charter has to say about military use?


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> 1 CABG in an expanded base in Shilo with railhead and airfield for C17.  (30/70)
> 1/3rd Equipment Predeployed to Europe


If some sort of agreement with the UK to share Suffield could be made would it make sense to keep 1 CABG in Edmonton?  Continue to use Wainwright as the regular training base but annually provide a Battle Group to act as the BATUS OPFOR for at least a portion of the UK's summer training cycle.  It would give both nations the opportunity to exercise against someone other than their own troops.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> I've read documents and reports that indicate two is easier to control, and actually more effective.  A Division doesn't need an entire brigade for reserve, it needs a Bn max, if not a Cbt Tm.


Any OS info you're able to share on this?

If you were to have a 2 Brigade Division with a single Battalion for reserve where would the reserve Battalion fall in the ORBAT?  As part of the Support Brigade?  Directly under the Division HQ?


----------



## markppcli

WestIsle said:


> I also haven't but everyone I have worked with has indicated that the area is not at all suitable to anything but dismounted operations. What usually happens is the LAVs act as battle taxis with the rest being left up to the troops as I'm told. Additionally, as much as everyone including myself rags on them it seems like they are the best run brigade these days or at least when it comes to retention and getting people trained.


Their retention has for a long time been an economic factor less than a Bde leadership thing. Also consider that a Vandoo or 12 RBC soldier will likely complete his career with at most 1 ere posting, and when they go back to the regiment it’s in Valcartier which is conveniently 30 minutes from Quebec City, infact they have shacks and a JRs in Quebec City. 

I don’t know what you mean by “getting people trained”?


----------



## markppcli

quadrapiper said:


> If you're looking at a travel-to-train model _anyway_, would that open up a much more transitory approach to e.g. using Crown/Indigenous land in the less populous reaches of the country? Don't need anything like the footprint, especially if the dynamic changed to bringing everything you needed for each ex (I think I saw someone posting recently about the value of giving the support elements a full airing).
> 
> Bet a brigade could happily occupy itself on the northern end of Vancouver Island, let alone further north in the province.


There’s a training area in the Chilcotin just sayin


----------



## WestIsle

markppcli said:


> I don’t know what you mean by “getting people trained”?


5 Brigade usually runs trial courses for troops going on courses such as ARP and UO. This leads to a much better ratio of troops getting qualified compared to 1 CBMG or more specifically PPCLI which treats every course like selection, has half the troops fail at least, and then throws their hands up and say "don't worry we will show you how to do this back in battalion". I mean just look at BRP which is just a pricey version of CSOR selection for a recce platoon in a battalion which in itself is superfluous in a battlegroup that will have an armored recce squadron with actual sensors. But as I have said before thank God every battalion will have a sniper and recce platoon instead of anti-tank or mortars..../s


----------



## markppcli

WestIsle said:


> 5 Brigade usually runs trial courses for troops going on courses such as ARP and UO. This leads to a much better ratio of troops getting qualified compared to 1 CBMG or more specifically PPCLI which treats every course like selection, has half the troops fail at least, and then throws their hands up and say "don't worry we will show you how to do this back in battalion". I mean just look at BRP which is just a pricey version of CSOR selection for a recce platoon in a battalion which in itself is superfluous in a battlegroup that will have an armored recce squadron with actual sensors. But as I have said before thank God every battalion will have a sniper and recce platoon instead of anti-tank or mortars..../s


I’ve never met a guy who failed UOI lol, or didn’t make ARP if they got picked up for it. Frankly I don’t know that I’ve seen a lot that says 5 Bde is inherently better at sending people of courses. What I can say is that when you have a section of people getting taught at a much lower instructor student ratio they will naturally do better that the aggregate for the course all things being equal.

If you don’t get the difference between what an infantry recce platoon does vs a Bde recce Sqn there’s some books I could suggest to cover that off. Rodger on the BRP having gotten a bit nuts, it’s really not a course so much as it’s a try out for the platoon. And hey, we got mortars back…. Just some are held by reservists.


----------



## Kirkhill

Light Infantry Anti-Tank. - Hellfire and Brimstone repurposed from coastal defence targets to land targets.









						Ukraine Now Using Donated Shore Defense Missiles Against Land Targets
					

It would seem that Ukrainian Forces are using Sweden’s RBS-17 missile system designed to fend off amphibious landings against ground targets.




					www.thedrive.com
				




We have been talking a lot about NLAWs (800m), Javelins (5km), Spike NLOS (32km), Switchblade 600 (40 km), and Hero-120 (60km), 

NLAW is an M72 upgrade and replacement.
Javelin is a Milan upgrade and replacement
Spike, Switchblade and Hero are all new systems that add a new capability.

TOW needs a separate replacement.  The original replacement was the Hellfire.  That has gone through a number of mods over the years and has generated Longbow, Brimstones, SPEARS and SeaSPEARS.


 




Hellfire 7 to 9 km
Brimstone 8 to 60 km (platform and variant dependent)
SPEAR 140 km (in development)
SPEAR-EW (in development)

6 to 10 kg warhead depending on variant.


Not an anti-armour missile - a multipurpose missile that could be added to army, navy and air force inventories and always be guaranteed to be available in support.

It could be ubiquitous.


----------



## GR66

Infanteer said:


> I've read documents and reports that indicate two is easier to control, and actually more effective.  A Division doesn't need an entire brigade for reserve, it needs a Bn max, if not a Cbt Tm.


Going to a two Brigade Division opens some interesting possibilities for the CA.

Here's something we could roughly put together using existing units to create a Canadianized two Brigade Mechanized Division roughly mirroring the US Army's Waypoint 2028 Heavy Division and leaving a Light Infantry Brigade as foundation for a three Brigade Light Division.



Going to a US-style 14 tank Squadron would even allow us to have both a full Tank Regiment in our Combined Arms Brigade plus a tank Squadron in each of the Cavalry Regiments in our Mechanized Division.

The Canadian Combat Support Brigade is already roughly similar to the US Army's proposed Protection Brigades so with some adjustment could fill that role.

The Division Sustainment Brigade is something that we currently don't have an equivalent of in our Divisional structure so that is something we'd have to create out of our existing CSS structures.

Obviously there are key pieces of kit missing, but a number of them are potentially in the works.

The Light Infantry Brigade, in addition to being the core of a Light Division going forward could also be a Canadian IBCT contribution to an American Light Division (11th Airborne for example)

There are a lot of issues to be worked out in order to make the Reserves an effective mobilization force so I've only laid out an aspirational structure to aim for for now.  Existing Reserve units can begin to be plugged into the new structure, but I'd suggest that the first priority should be to get the Reg Force straightened out, then we can begin to make Reg/Reserve manning adjustments as they begin to make sense on a unit-by-unit (and trade-by-trade) basis.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Going to a two Brigade Division opens some interesting possibilities for the CA.
> 
> Here's something we could roughly put together using existing units to create a Canadianized two Brigade Mechanized Division roughly mirroring the US Army's Waypoint 2028 Heavy Division and leaving a Light Infantry Brigade as foundation for a three Brigade Light Division.
> 
> View attachment 74403
> 
> Going to a US-style 14 tank Squadron would even allow us to have both a full Tank Regiment in our Combined Arms Brigade plus a tank Squadron in each of the Cavalry Regiments in our Mechanized Division.
> 
> The Canadian Combat Support Brigade is already roughly similar to the US Army's proposed Protection Brigades so with some adjustment could fill that role.
> 
> The Division Sustainment Brigade is something that we currently don't have an equivalent of in our Divisional structure so that is something we'd have to create out of our existing CSS structures.
> 
> Obviously there are key pieces of kit missing, but a number of them are potentially in the works.
> 
> The Light Infantry Brigade, in addition to being the core of a Light Division going forward could also be a Canadian IBCT contribution to an American Light Division (11th Airborne for example)
> 
> There are a lot of issues to be worked out in order to make the Reserves an effective mobilization force so I've only laid out an aspirational structure to aim for for now.  Existing Reserve units can begin to be plugged into the new structure, but I'd suggest that the first priority should be to get the Reg Force straightened out, then we can begin to make Reg/Reserve manning adjustments as they begin to make sense on a unit-by-unit (and trade-by-trade) basis.



I like that a lot.   You have a functional force staffed entirely within the existing envelope, one that can be modified to suit operations (eg swapping the armoured brigade for the light brigade if necessary), and it leaves the Reserve Force with a guiding element and an opportunity to sort itself out.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:


> Light Infantry Anti-Tank. - Hellfire and Brimstone repurposed from coastal defence targets to land targets.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ukraine Now Using Donated Shore Defense Missiles Against Land Targets
> 
> 
> It would seem that Ukrainian Forces are using Sweden’s RBS-17 missile system designed to fend off amphibious landings against ground targets.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.thedrive.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> We have been talking a lot about NLAWs (800m), Javelins (5km), Spike NLOS (32km), Switchblade 600 (40 km), and Hero-120 (60km),
> 
> NLAW is an M72 upgrade and replacement.
> Javelin is a Milan upgrade and replacement
> Spike, Switchblade and Hero are all new systems that add a new capability.
> 
> TOW needs a separate replacement.  The original replacement was the Hellfire.  That has gone through a number of mods over the years and has generated Longbow, Brimstones, SPEARS and SeaSPEARS.
> 
> View attachment 74385View attachment 74386View attachment 74387
> View attachment 74388 View attachment 74389
> View attachment 74390View attachment 74391View attachment 74392
> View attachment 74393View attachment 74394
> 
> 
> Hellfire 7 to 9 km
> Brimstone 8 to 60 km (platform and variant dependent)
> SPEAR 140 km (in development)
> SPEAR-EW (in development)
> 
> 6 to 10 kg warhead depending on variant.
> 
> 
> Not an anti-armour missile - a multipurpose missile that could be added to army, navy and air force inventories and always be guaranteed to be available in support.
> 
> It could be ubiquitous.




Forgot entirely about









						AGM-179 JAGM - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				






> Lockheed Martin was awarded a $66 million engineering and manufacturing contract to combine its laser and millimeter wave seekers into the Hellfire Romeo missile body. Raytheon chose not to compete but retains its tri-mode seeker should the Army request it.[16]
> 
> The designation AGM-179 was assigned to the JAGM program.[17] A Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract for JAGM was approved in 2018.[18] The AGM-179A achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with USMC AH-1Z helicopters in early 2022, clearing the weapon for operational deployment.[19]
> 
> On 30 August 2022, the JAGM was declared ready for full-rate production. 1,000 missiles had been produced by February 2022, manufacturing at the minimum sustainment rate under low-rate production. Improvements to the JAGM are being developed, such as a medium-range variant with a range of 16 km (9.9 mi) without changing the missile's dimensions.[20]


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Going to a two Brigade Division opens some interesting possibilities for the CA.
> 
> Here's something we could roughly put together using existing units to create a Canadianized two Brigade Mechanized Division roughly mirroring the US Army's Waypoint 2028 Heavy Division and leaving a Light Infantry Brigade as foundation for a three Brigade Light Division.
> 
> View attachment 74403
> 
> Going to a US-style 14 tank Squadron would even allow us to have both a full Tank Regiment in our Combined Arms Brigade plus a tank Squadron in each of the Cavalry Regiments in our Mechanized Division.
> 
> The Canadian Combat Support Brigade is already roughly similar to the US Army's proposed Protection Brigades so with some adjustment could fill that role.
> 
> The Division Sustainment Brigade is something that we currently don't have an equivalent of in our Divisional structure so that is something we'd have to create out of our existing CSS structures.
> 
> Obviously there are key pieces of kit missing, but a number of them are potentially in the works.
> 
> The Light Infantry Brigade, in addition to being the core of a Light Division going forward could also be a Canadian IBCT contribution to an American Light Division (11th Airborne for example)
> 
> There are a lot of issues to be worked out in order to make the Reserves an effective mobilization force so I've only laid out an aspirational structure to aim for for now.  Existing Reserve units can begin to be plugged into the new structure, but I'd suggest that the first priority should be to get the Reg Force straightened out, then we can begin to make Reg/Reserve manning adjustments as they begin to make sense on a unit-by-unit (and trade-by-trade) basis.



In terms of adding heft to this force my priorities would be:

GBAD for the Artillery - suite of capabilities TBD (C-RAM, C-UAS, M-SHORAD, VSHORAD, SHORAD, MRAD, ManPADs)
LRPF for the Artillery - HIMARS and NSMs
AMOS mortars for the Tank Squadrons (4 each) and for the LAV Battalions (8 each)
JLTV/ISV/UGV/BvS10 (TBD) mounted 120mm mortars for the Light Battalions (8 each)
WSPH 155 batteries to support the Mech Division - M777s relegated to the Light Division.

Anti-Tank Capabilities.

70mm APKWS for Light battalions
Javelins for the Light and LAV Battalions (both mounted and dismounted CLUs)
Tank Squadrons and LAV Battalions to be supported by Artillery Anti-Tank Batteries
Anti-tank batteries - suite of capabilities TBD (Hellfire, Brimstone, SPEAR, JAGM, Switchblade 600, Hero-120, Spike N-LOS etc)


Light Division to be equipped with 

Milverados
ISVs
JLTVs
BvS10s 
UGVs
MSVS-MilCOTS


Helicopters and UAVs TBD.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Agreed -- I was just doing a terrain assessment - and while Souther Ontario offers some good Mech terrain - there doesn't appear to be anywhere to stick a Bde with a training area (I'm pretty much dead set those are a requirement).
> 
> 
> Again, without a real training area, I don't see the viability of those bases.
> One basically need to push towards the Bruce Peninsula to find open land - without significant expropriation costs)  The population density is significant though - and I see potential for a 30/70 Bn to be based at Meaford - and have that area with offshoot Platoons


Perhaps Borden could be set up as an Urban Warfare Training Centre?  Doesn't take up as much geography as a mechanized training area so could possibly be established without any additional land appropriation required.

Lots of Reserve units in the GTA within 2 hours of Borden and Meaford isn't much farther.  Meaford can be used as the "traditional" training area for a GTA Reserve IBCT with Borden having the Urban Warfare Centre.  CFSEME is at Borden so if there are vehicles required for the facility they can be maintained by Reg Force techs (facilities are there...dedicated staff added to cover the workload).


----------



## Kirkhill

We seem to worry about Torontonians being able to make it to training areas in Southern Ontario.

Those same Torontonians seem to have no problems, in the middle of February, making it to Collingwood to go skiing.  Or to Wasaga Beach in the Summer.








						Map of Ontario Resort Locations | SkiCentral.com
					

Ontario ski resort map, location, directions and distances to nearby Ontario resorts.



					www.skicentral.com
				





(1) Adanac Ski Hill
(2) Antoine Mountain
(3) Batawa Ski Hill
(4) Beaver Valley Ski Club
(5) Blue Mountain
(6) Boler Mountain (London Ski Club)
(7) Brimacombre
(8) Calabogie Peaks
(9) Caledon
(10) Chicopee
(11) Craigleith Ski Club
(12) Dagmar
(13) Devil's Glen Country Club
(14) Glen Eden
(15) Hidden Valley Highlands
(16) Hockley Valley
(17) Horseshoe Resort
(18) Larder Lake Ski Club
(19) Laurentian Ski Hill
(20) Lively Ski Hill
(21) Loch Lomond
(22) Mansfield Ski Club
(23) Mount Chinguacousy
(24) Mount Dufour
(25) Mount Jamieson Resort
(26) Mount Pakenham
(27) Mount St. Louis Moonstone
(28) Osler Bluff Ski Club
(29) Remi Ski Club
(30) Searchmont
(31) Sir Sam's Ski Area
(32) Ski Lakeridge
(33) Ski Snow Valley
(34) Trestle Ridge Ski Slopes
(35) Uplands Ski Centre


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Going to a two Brigade Division opens some interesting possibilities for the CA.
> 
> Here's something we could roughly put together using existing units to create a Canadianized two Brigade Mechanized Division roughly mirroring the US Army's Waypoint 2028 Heavy Division and leaving a Light Infantry Brigade as foundation for a three Brigade Light Division.
> 
> View attachment 74403
> 
> Going to a US-style 14 tank Squadron would even allow us to have both a full Tank Regiment in our Combined Arms Brigade plus a tank Squadron in each of the Cavalry Regiments in our Mechanized Division.
> 
> The Canadian Combat Support Brigade is already roughly similar to the US Army's proposed Protection Brigades so with some adjustment could fill that role.
> 
> The Division Sustainment Brigade is something that we currently don't have an equivalent of in our Divisional structure so that is something we'd have to create out of our existing CSS structures.
> 
> Obviously there are key pieces of kit missing, but a number of them are potentially in the works.
> 
> The Light Infantry Brigade, in addition to being the core of a Light Division going forward could also be a Canadian IBCT contribution to an American Light Division (11th Airborne for example)
> 
> There are a lot of issues to be worked out in order to make the Reserves an effective mobilization force so I've only laid out an aspirational structure to aim for for now.  Existing Reserve units can begin to be plugged into the new structure, but I'd suggest that the first priority should be to get the Reg Force straightened out, then we can begin to make Reg/Reserve manning adjustments as they begin to make sense on a unit-by-unit (and trade-by-trade) basis.


I like the concept model. The weapon allocation thing doesn't matter as for any kind of napkin force one needs to stay weapon agnostic while providing for entities in the establishment that can go in any direction on weapon systems as long as the primary doctrinal fundamentals are maintained.

It's an easy model to switch to from our current one.

My real divergence from this is that the heavy force is principally full-time while the light force is principally part-time. That's acceptable (perhaps even necessary) with the current state of our RegF and ResF. The goal, IMHO however, is that it should be a transitional model that sets the conditions for the ResF being the one which is less likely to be required day to day, while the RegF is the one that is required to be used day to day. Essentially that means that heavy forces will be ResF and light to medium and complex and specialized units be RegF.

Such a model needs more than a mere reshuffle of existing resources, but also a built in method to transition the Army to be capable of operating and deploying a heavy force which is predominantly ResF.

Just an add on. I can see the heavy division requiring the support brigades to facilitate deploying as a division. Will the light division, however, deploy as a division? My guess is not which means that it needs a different support structure than that of a deployable division. It needs a structure that facilitates the deployment of smaller elements and, perhaps, several concurrently.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I like the concept model. The weapon allocation thing doesn't matter as for any kind of napkin force one needs to stay weapon agnostic while providing for entities in the establishment that can go in any direction on weapon systems as long as the primary doctrinal fundamentals are maintained.
> 
> It's an easy model to switch to from our current one.
> 
> My real divergence from this is that the heavy force is principally full-time while the light force is principally part-time. That's acceptable (perhaps even necessary) with the current state of our RegF and ResF. The goal, IMHO however, is that it should be a transitional model that sets the conditions for the ResF being the one which is less likely to be required day to day, while the RegF is the one that is required to be used day to day. Essentially that means that heavy forces will be ResF and light to medium and complex and specialized units be RegF.
> 
> Such a model needs more than a mere reshuffle of existing resources, but also a built in method to transition the Army to be capable of operating and deploying a heavy force which is predominantly ResF.


We're in agreement that what I presented is a possible 1st step, not the final destination with regard to Reg Force/Reserve Force manning.  The ultimate goal is like you say to reverse the existing Reg Force - Heavy, Reserve Force - Light capabilities, but we need to start from where we already are.

In addition to changes to the way the Reserves operate and train there may also be changes to where units are located (both Reg Force and Reserve) to make sure that units have the required technical support available nearby and also that units have a large enough pool of Reservists to draw from to fill their required part-time positions.  Once we have the basic force structure in place we can look as I said unit-by-unit, trade-by-trade to begin making the changes required to achieve the end goal.



FJAG said:


> Just an add on. I can see the heavy division requiring the support brigades to facilitate deploying as a division. Will the light division, however, deploy as a division? My guess is not which means that it needs a different support structure than that of a deployable division. It needs a structure that facilitates the deployment of smaller elements and, perhaps, several concurrently.
> 
> 🍻


Good point.  But while the Light Division might not be expected to be deployable you will likely want the support structure to at lease mirror as much as possible the Heavy Division support structure in order to provide for augmentation/loss replacement for the deployed Division.


----------



## daftandbarmy

childs56 said:


> Ultimately units and Brigades need to put the priority and  emphasis on recruiting and training. If you do not then you can not grow it is that simple. You can point the fingers all you want.



Even moreso based on these statistics IMHO


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1584429045105643520


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Even moreso based on these statistics IMHO
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1584429045105643520


Admittedly that is taken from a Global Study - when you see a lot of Second and Third World countries Militaries - I'm surprised it is that high...


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Admittedly that is taken from a Global Study - when you see a lot of Second and Third World countries Militaries - I'm surprised it is that high...



Or talking to the parents at my kids' school


----------



## Kirkhill

Canada's Army ???

Subject to revision - my current estimate of the existing situation.

Let me know of my errors (as if I need to ask...)

5 LAV Battalions of 3 Companies = 15 Companies - My understanding is that we are just short of 6 Battalions of LAVs, the 6th Battalion was supposed to be the CCVs

3 MBT Squadrons of 20 Leos

6 Batteries of 6 M777s

24 FOO/FAC teams





ISTAR Assets?

5 Infantry Recce Platoons of 10x TAPV

5 Armoured Recce Squadrons of 3 Troops with 5x TAPV, 3x LRSS and 1x MUAV Ground Control Station with 3 Ravens

5 Artillery HALO Tps

5 Artillery LCMR Tps

1 Artillery SUAV Battery with 2 Ground Control Stations and 5 Blackjack SUAV


----------



## WestIsle

Kirkhill said:


> 3 MBT Squadrons of 20 Leos
> 
> 5 Armoured Recce Squadrons of 3 Troops with 5x TAPV, 3x LRSS and 1x MUAV Ground Control Station with 3 Ravens



Keep in mind there are currently 82 MBTs and those are all in play moving forward. 
A big thing that people don't seem to be mentioning here is that the housing and infrastructure for these vehicles is a big deal. We only have realistically space for 4 squadrons atm and that's split evenly between Edm/Wx and GT.
Additionally, I believe that plan is to supplement the LRSS LAVs with infantry carriers so you actually only have about 4 battalions to play with.


----------



## FJAG

Just a quick update but note my info is based on 2010 data which I do not think has changed dramatically except for 4 RCA (GS) below. 

1) There are three field regiments (1 and 2 RCHA and 5 RALC) each of which has:

a) 1 x Bde level FSCC with 1 x LAV + 3 x CP (M777 or Bison or  other) (for a total of 3 teams for the CA)

b) 3 x Battle group FSCCs with 1 x LAV + 1 x LAV OPV each (for a total of 9 teams for the CA)

c) 9 x FOO/JTAC teams  with 1 X LAV OPV each (for a total of 27 for the CA)

d) 2 x M777 gun batteries of 4 guns each  (for a total of 8 per regiment and 24 for the CA)

e) 1 x STA Bty with

e.1) 1 x Surveillance and Target Acquisition Control centre (for a total of three for the CA)

e.1) 1 x Weapon Locating troop with 3 x LCMR and 1 x AWLS (for a total of 9 x LCMR + 3 x AWLS for the CA)

e.2) 2 x MUAV troops with 3 x drone detachments each (for a total of 6 per regiment and 18 for the CA)

Note - LCMR = Light Counter Mortar Radar; AWLS=Acoustic Weapon Locating System

Note  - equipment holdings are for within units , additional holding for some equip exists at the school and as spares.

2) There is one General Support Regiment (4 RCS(GS)) which has:

f) the ability to provide above brigade level FSCC, DADC and STACC capabilities

g) 3 x Batteries - which  can deploy various mix and matched elements but as of 2021 have areas of focus as follows:

g.1) 127 Bty -  Air Defence and Tactical Data Links + Airspace Coordination Centres (for a total of three for the CA)

g.2) 128 Bty - 10 x Medium range radars

g.3) 129 Bty - SUAV10 x Medium Range Radar 2 control centres and 10 x SUAV Blackjack including ISTARCC and STACC capabilities

I'm not 100% up on the current status of all the above and stand to be corrected.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Just a quick update but note my info is based on 2010 data which I do not think has changed dramatically except for 4 RCA (GS) below.
> 
> 1) There are three field regiments (1 and 2 RCHA and 5 RALC) each of which has:
> 
> a) 1 x Bde level FSCC with 1 x LAV + 3 x CP (M777 or Bison or  other) (for a total of 3 teams for the CA)
> 
> b) 3 x Battle group FSCCs with 1 x LAV + 1 x LAV OPV each (for a total of 9 teams for the CA)
> 
> c) 9 x FOO/JTAC teams  with 1 X LAV OPV each (for a total of 27 for the CA)
> 
> d) 2 x M777 gun batteries of 4 guns each  (for a total of 8 per regiment and 24 for the CA)
> 
> e) 1 x STA Bty with
> 
> e.1) 1 x Surveillance and Target Acquisition Control centre (for a total of three for the CA)
> 
> e.1) 1 x Weapon Locating troop with 3 x LCMR and 1 x AWLS (for a total of 9 x LCMR + 3 x AWLS for the CA)
> 
> e.2) 2 x MUAV troops with 3 x drone detachments each (for a total of 6 per regiment and 18 for the CA)
> 
> Note - LCMR = Light Counter Mortar Radar; AWLS=Acoustic Weapon Locating System
> 
> Note  - equipment holdings are for within units , additional holding for some equip exists at the school and as spares.
> 
> 2) There is one General Support Regiment (4 RCS(GS)) which has:
> 
> f) the ability to provide above brigade level FSCC, DADC and STACC capabilities
> 
> g) 3 x Batteries - which  can deploy various mix and matched elements but as of 2021 have areas of focus as follows:
> 
> g.1) 127 Bty -  Air Defence and Tactical Data Links + Airspace Coordination Centres (for a total of three for the CA)
> 
> g.2) 128 Bty - 10 x Medium range radars
> 
> g.3) 129 Bty - SUAV10 x Medium Range Radar 2 control centres and 10 x SUAV Blackjack including ISTARCC and STACC capabilities
> 
> I'm not 100% up on the current status of all the above and stand to be corrected.
> 
> 🍻



The incredible shrinking field force....

Thanks FJAG.


----------



## Kirkhill

Canada's Army - next attempt

1st Revision

Again, let me know of my errors 

6 LAV Battalions of 2 Companies and a Recce Platoon = 12 Companies + 6 Platoons

3 MBT Squadrons of 20 Leos

6 Batteries of 4 M777s





ISTAR Assets?

5 Armoured Recce Squadrons of 3 Troops with 5x LAV, 3x LRSS and 1x MUAV Ground Control Station with 3 Ravens

27 Artillery FOO/FAC Teams in LAV-OPVs - 9 per Regiment

3 Weapons Locating Troops with 3x LCMR and 1x AWLS each - 1 Troop per Regiment

6 MUAV Troops with 3 UAV each - 2 Troops per Regiment

1 Artillery MRR Radar Battery with 10 Radar Systems - General Support

1 Artillery SUAV Battery with 2 Ground Control Stations and 5 Blackjack SUAV - General Support




The purpose of the exercise is to try and get all the primary assets "on parade" if you will.    Engineers, EW and CSS to follow.  Intentionally leaving C2 nodes to the side.  They can continue promenading for a while yet.


----------



## WestIsle

Like I said it would appear that even though there has been consideration of a squadron of tanks for training as well as about 100 LAVs set aside as well bit no2 it would appear that all equipment is on the table to be pushed out to the field force with in house training going on at the unit level in order to try to meet NATO remits. Or at least for the more limited pieces such as the AEV, ARV, M777, and MBTs.

An idea for the recon squadrons might be to adopt a larger US style formation with 2 (6 Car LSRR) platoons, 2 (4 Crew Carrier) platoons with dismounts, and a dismounted recce platoon like you would find in an infantry battalion. We actually only need a squadron for each infantry battalion per doctrine and so would need 6 squadrons.


----------



## FJAG

Okay. Another cut at the Army's Future Force Structure. I call this one Force 2026 to be different.

Notes:

All brigades and units are still based on existing CA personnel counts (RegF and ResF) and equipment holdings (except a HIMARS and AD Arty regiment which are aspirational as far as equipment is concerned and will continue to be equipped with 105mm C3 until new equipment procured)
1 (CA) Div has one job and one job only - NATO commitment to Europe during Phase 1 (current equipment holdings) with a flyover armoured brigade and during Phase 2 (new equipment procured) up to a mech division.
2 (CA) Div is responsible for defence of Canada and being the lead on all other missions at up to battle group strength.
Rather than classifying units by readiness levels, they are classified by manning and equipment holdings. e.g. a Type 30/70 unit or subunit has a 30% RegF manning and 70% ResF manning and holds 30% of that unit's equipment. Typically a 30/70 Bn would have 1 x 100/0 fully equipped and RegF manned company and 2 x 10/90 partially equipped companies with a 70/30 Bn HQ, and 30/70 CS Coy and CSS Coy.
From it's own resources, 1 (CA) Div can immediately man 1 complete fully equipped Armd brigade in Canada as well as 1 complete fully equipped prepositioned Armd brigade in Europe.
2 (CA) Div forms all Canadian JTF headquarters based on 39 Bde Victoria (JTF West - BC, AB, SK & NT), 2 Bde Petawawa (JTF West Central - MB, ON & NU), 5 Bde Valcartier (JTF East Central - QC) and 36 Bde Halifax (JTF East - NS, NB, PE, & NL), Cdn RGR groups are placed under command of these four Bde/JTF headquarters.
2 (CA) Div no longer has any Mech bns, however each Type 100/0 or 30/70 recce regt or inf bn has an integral ground mobility platoon/troop or company/squadron with varying types of vehicles (including up to TAPV and LAV6) depending on role and therefore has some limited mech capabilities (appx 6 companies and 3-4 squadrons worth in total).
A small Depot Bn has been added to Vancouver


🍻


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Anti-Tank Capabilities.
> 
> 70mm APKWS for Light battalions



You want the Light Bns to run around with LTDs for precision rockets ?


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Okay. Another cut at the Army's Future Force Structure. I call this one Force 2026 to be different.
> 
> Notes:
> 
> All brigades and units are still based on existing CA personnel counts (RegF and ResF) and equipment holdings (except a HIMARS and AD Arty regiment which are aspirational as far as equipment is concerned and will continue to be equipped with 105mm C3 until new equipment procured)
> 1 (CA) Div has one job and one job only - NATO commitment to Europe during Phase 1 (current equipment holdings) with a flyover armoured brigade and during Phase 2 (new equipment procured) up to a mech division.
> 2 (CA) Div is responsible for defence of Canada and being the lead on all other missions at up to battle group strength.
> Rather than classifying units by readiness levels, they are classified by manning and equipment holdings. e.g. a Type 30/70 unit or subunit has a 30% RegF manning and 70% ResF manning and holds 30% of that unit's equipment. Typically a 30/70 Bn would have 1 x 100/0 fully equipped and RegF manned company and 2 x 10/90 partially equipped companies with a 70/30 Bn HQ, and 30/70 CS Coy and CSS Coy.
> From it's own resources, 1 (CA) Div can immediately man 1 complete fully equipped Armd brigade in Canada as well as 1 complete fully equipped prepositioned Armd brigade in Europe.
> 2 (CA) Div forms all Canadian JTF headquarters based on 39 Bde Victoria (JTF West - BC, AB, SK & NT), 2 Bde Petawawa (JTF West Central - MB, ON & NU), 5 Bde Valcartier (JTF East Central - QC) and 36 Bde Halifax (JTF East - NS, NB, PE, & NL), Cdn RGR groups are placed under command of these four Bde/JTF headquarters.
> 2 (CA) Div no longer has any Mech bns, however each Type 100/0 or 30/70 recce regt or inf bn has an integral ground mobility platoon/troop or company/squadron with varying types of vehicles (including up to TAPV and LAV6) depending on role and therefore has some limited mech capabilities (appx 6 companies and 3-4 squadrons worth in total).
> A small Depot Bn has been added to Vancouver
> View attachment 74541
> 
> 🍻



Victoria? Who's she?

Metro Vancouver projected to add more than 1 million residents by 2050, according to planners​




__





						Loading...
					





					www.cbc.ca


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## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Victoria? Who's she?
> 
> Metro Vancouver projected to add more than 1 million residents by 2050, according to planners​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Loading...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.cbc.ca


Bde HQ in Victoria because: Esquimalt and jointness. Most troops, including depot bn in Vancouver because: people.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Bde HQ in Victoria because: Esquimalt and jointness. Most troops, including depot bn in Vancouver because: people.



Oh man, you just dropped a big turd in the political pond of BC military leadership


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> You want the Light Bns to run around with LTDs for precision rockets ?



If you mean these then absolutely.   At the platoon or company level certainly.



The US-made An/PEQ-1 SOF Laser Marker (SOFLAM) is a hand-held LTD in use with UKSF.

Just as I expect them to be running around with these at the section and platoon levels for Javelins and Stingers.



40mm Pike



70mm APKWS



84mm Guided Mulitpurpose Munition (CG-84 and AT4)



And that is just coy/battalion systems that could be targeted.   Forget what the RCAC, the RRCA, the RCAF and the RCN could deliver in support of the Light Company.

The rifleman and machine gunner are the protection detail for the targeter.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Oh man, you just dropped a big turd in the political pond of BC military leadership


It shouldn't. In my perfect world all the senior leadership in 39 Bde will become RegF anyway. 100% of all ResF LCols and above positions will become redundant.


----------



## Kirkhill

Forgot one

Also expect them to be running around with these 

40mm Quadcopter UAS by DefendTek - hand launched or launched from an M203, armed or purely recce.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> It shouldn't. In my perfect world all the senior leadership in 39 Bde will become RegF anyway. 100% of all ResF LCols and above positions will *become redundant.*



Because they aren't already?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> If you mean these then absolutely.   At the platoon or company level certainly.
> 
> View attachment 74543
> 
> The US-made An/PEQ-1 SOF Laser Marker (SOFLAM) is a hand-held LTD in use with UKSF.
> 
> Just as I expect them to be running around with these at the section and platoon levels for Javelins and Stingers.
> 
> View attachment 74546
> 
> 40mm Pike
> 
> View attachment 74547
> 
> 70mm APKWS
> 
> View attachment 74549
> 
> 84mm Guided Mulitpurpose Munition (CG-84 and AT4)
> 
> View attachment 74550
> 
> And that is just coy/battalion systems that could be targeted.   Forget what the RCAC, the RRCA, the RCAF and the RCN could deliver in support of the Light Company.
> 
> The rifleman and machine gunner are the protection detail for the targeter.


That’s what I mean yes. I cannot imagine that going well at all if every platoon is trying to set up an LTD and using it. I know what APKWS is and what it does, it’s realllllly not meant to do what you’re suggesting it could be used for.

I realized how clipped my response probably sounded. Suffice it to say there are limitations to laser designation and guidance that make it sub optimal for employment by elements that should be engaged in the close fight. Particularly under spill and the inability to ensure weapon deployment at correct angles to avoid acquisition of the emitter vs the tgt.

Last bit “hand held” is a misnomer, those are employed off a tripod, or should be.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> That’s what I mean yes. I cannot imagine that going well at all if every platoon is trying to set up an LTD and using it. I know what APKWS is and what it does, it’s realllllly not meant to do what you’re suggesting it could be used for.







> The Assistant Squad Leader​The old Marine Rifle Squad often used an assistant squad leader in the form of the first fire team leader, who is traditionally the most experienced and trusted among the fire team heads. A dedicated assistant squad leader ensures the fire teams all have adequate leadership without tacking a second job onto any of their responsibilities.
> 
> At the same time, the assistant squad leader can accomplish mission-critical tasks that could take away from the squad leader’s ability to control his squad in combat. Specifically, *the assistant squad leader can now manage comms with command and manage and coordinate fires,* leaving the squad leader to focus on the fight. *Coordinating fires means communicating to relay target information and friendly positions for artillery, mortar, and air strikes, among others.* These tasks are essential in a fight, but can take away from a squad leader’s situational awareness, and as a result, their ability to lead their squad.
> 
> I remember that in the midst of a rather intense firefight, our command was constantly wanting an update from our squad leader. They called over and over as he worked to manage covering fire and maneuver elements against an emplaced enemy. I can’t remember his exact words to higher, but it was something like, “_I’m shooting people right now. I’ll call you back later._”
> 
> The assistant squad leader can now manage these tasks and others on the squad leader’s behalf. If I was a squad leader, my assistant would be helping to complete a variety of combat and logistical tasks like medical evacs, tactical sight exploitation, and POW handling. At the same time, the assistant squad leader will be receiving valuable training for a future role as a squad leader themselves.
> 
> The Marine Systems Operator​As we step into modern warfare, we are seeing the implementation of modern electronic systems that can greatly benefit the guys on the ground. The newly created position of *Marine Systems Operator replaces the position of radio Marine. While the System operator will be tasked with carrying the squad’s radio, they will expand into other systems as well.*
> 
> This includes the use of quadcopter-based reconnaissance devices. These small ‘drones’ allow a Marine squad to enhance their situational awareness with discretion. It promises to be the new eyes of the squad leader and enhance their capabilities in urban warfare by providing an overhead view of the battlespace that wasn’t previously available at the squad level. This stealthy tool can spot threats ahead of time and provide general recon without risking members of the Marine rifle squad.



It seems to me in that envisioned environment adding an LTD to the Asst Squad Leader's bag of tricks would have a significant effect on fire support.

How many LTDs are found in armoured units?  One per Squadron, Troop or vehicle?  Of is it only the FOOs that have them?  But the Asst Squad Leader is now, effectively and explicitly a Forward Observer.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 74554
> 
> 
> 
> It seems to me in that envisioned environment adding an LTD to the Asst Squad Leader's bag of tricks would have a significant effect on fire support.
> 
> How many LTDs are found in armoured units?  One per Squadron, Troop or vehicle?  Of is it only the FOOs that have them?  But the Asst Squad Leader is now, effectively and explicitly a Forward Observer.


LTDs are used by the JTACs at combat team level. I’d be curious to know the JFO trained Asst Squad Leaders will be expect to actually do and what they’ll be carrying.  I’m not sure how much laser guided ordnance is being deployed from a ship or marine artillery since HIMARS and the like are gps guided.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to my previous.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Further to my previous.


Yeah Brandon’s great and everything buts he’s a graphic design grad in Australia not a defence expert. So large grains of salt are to be had with his stuff, especially with the how’s and why’s of modern stuff.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Okay. Another cut at the Army's Future Force Structure. I call this one Force 2026 to be different.
> 
> Notes:
> 
> All brigades and units are still based on existing CA personnel counts (RegF and ResF) and equipment holdings (except a HIMARS and AD Arty regiment which are aspirational as far as equipment is concerned and will continue to be equipped with 105mm C3 until new equipment procured)
> 1 (CA) Div has one job and one job only - NATO commitment to Europe during Phase 1 (current equipment holdings) with a flyover armoured brigade and during Phase 2 (new equipment procured) up to a mech division.
> 2 (CA) Div is responsible for defence of Canada and being the lead on all other missions at up to battle group strength.
> Rather than classifying units by readiness levels, they are classified by manning and equipment holdings. e.g. a Type 30/70 unit or subunit has a 30% RegF manning and 70% ResF manning and holds 30% of that unit's equipment. Typically a 30/70 Bn would have 1 x 100/0 fully equipped and RegF manned company and 2 x 10/90 partially equipped companies with a 70/30 Bn HQ, and 30/70 CS Coy and CSS Coy.
> From it's own resources, 1 (CA) Div can immediately man 1 complete fully equipped Armd brigade in Canada as well as 1 complete fully equipped prepositioned Armd brigade in Europe.
> 2 (CA) Div forms all Canadian JTF headquarters based on 39 Bde Victoria (JTF West - BC, AB, SK & NT), 2 Bde Petawawa (JTF West Central - MB, ON & NU), 5 Bde Valcartier (JTF East Central - QC) and 36 Bde Halifax (JTF East - NS, NB, PE, & NL), Cdn RGR groups are placed under command of these four Bde/JTF headquarters.
> 2 (CA) Div no longer has any Mech bns, however each Type 100/0 or 30/70 recce regt or inf bn has an integral ground mobility platoon/troop or company/squadron with varying types of vehicles (including up to TAPV and LAV6) depending on role and therefore has some limited mech capabilities (appx 6 companies and 3-4 squadrons worth in total).
> A small Depot Bn has been added to Vancouver
> View attachment 74541
> 
> 🍻


Where I struggle with most attempts at integrated force structures is Geography vs Population.

You have a 30/70 Armoured Brigade in Edmonton.  With 1 x 100% Reg Force Company/Squadron per Battalion/Regiment that leaves 4 x Mech Companies and 2 x Tank Squadrons to be manned 90% by Reservists (plus 2 x CS and 3 x CSS Companies to be 70% Reservists).  41 Brigade in Alberta only has 2 x Infantry and 2 x Armoured Reserve units.  Even drawing in the Saskatchewan Reserve units you're only adding 1 x Armoured and 2 x Infantry units but the travel distances required to train with their parent units in Edmonton are impractical.  

Your Toronto and Montreal Armoured Brigades have the opposite problems.  There are plenty of Reservists available in these large metro areas, but what training facilities are there that can handle a Mechanized Brigade?  

By moving our training areas away from our population centres we've created a situation where it is very difficult to achieve your objective Heavy forces being largely manned by Reservists.  I totally understand the goal, but not sure I see a doable path toward it at this point in time.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Where I struggle with most attempts at integrated force structures is Geography vs Population.
> 
> You have a 30/70 Armoured Brigade in Edmonton.  With 1 x 100% Reg Force Company/Squadron per Battalion/Regiment that leaves 4 x Mech Companies and 2 x Tank Squadrons to be manned 90% by Reservists (plus 2 x CS and 3 x CSS Companies to be 70% Reservists).  41 Brigade in Alberta only has 2 x Infantry and 2 x Armoured Reserve units.  Even drawing in the Saskatchewan Reserve units you're only adding 1 x Armoured and 2 x Infantry units but the travel distances required to train with their parent units in Edmonton are impractical.
> 
> Your Toronto and Montreal Armoured Brigades have the opposite problems.  There are plenty of Reservists available in these large metro areas, but what training facilities are there that can handle a Mechanized Brigade?
> 
> By moving our training areas away from our population centres we've created a situation where it is very difficult to achieve your objective Heavy forces being largely manned by Reservists.  I totally understand the goal, but not sure I see a doable path toward it at this point in time.


Let’s not draw to much from how many reserve units are in a given province. Alberta might just have the most sensible distribution of reserve units in the country. Number of reserve *units* is not the same thing as number of *reservists*. See Winnipeg vs Edmonton.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Let’s not draw to much from how many reserve units are in a given province. Alberta might just have the most sensible distribution of reserve units in the country. Number of reserve *units* is not the same thing as number of *reservists*. See Winnipeg vs Edmonton.


But the question is are there enough combat arms reservists in Alberta to generate 4 x 90% Mech Companies, 2 x 90% Tank Squadrons, 2 x 90% 
Armoured Recce Squadrons, 2 x 70% CS Companies (4 if the Tank and Armoured Recce Regiments are to have CS Squadrons) and 4 x 70% CSS Companies?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Yeah Brandon’s great and everything buts he’s a graphic design grad in Australia not a defence expert. So large grains of salt are to be had with his stuff, especially with the how’s and why’s of modern stuff.



The thing is - that is not the only source I have seen describe the Asst Sqd Ldr as a Forward Observer.

As to munitions?

Stuff carried by F35s (Small Diameter Bombs and Paveway).
Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs launched by HIMARS.
Joint Air Ground Munitions replacing TOWs, Hellfires, Brimstones and Longbows
70mm APKWS
Vulcano 155mm, 127mm and 76mm artillery rounds
With experimental work being done with 40mm, 82mm and 120mm rounds.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> The thing is - that is not the only source I have seen describe the Asst Sqd Ldr as a Forward Observer.
> 
> As to munitions?
> 
> Stuff carried by F35s (Small Diameter Bombs and Paveway).
> Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs launched by HIMARS.
> Joint Air Ground Munitions replacing TOWs, Hellfires, Brimstones and Longbows
> 70mm APKWS
> Vulcano 155mm, 127mm and 76mm artillery rounds
> With experimental work being done with 40mm, 82mm and 120mm rounds.


That’s fine, it’s also not what I was talking about. JFO does not mean in and of itself your carrying an LTD.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Okay. Another cut at the Army's Future Force Structure. I call this one Force 2026 to be different.
> 
> Notes:
> 
> All brigades and units are still based on existing CA personnel counts (RegF and ResF) and equipment holdings (except a HIMARS and AD Arty regiment which are aspirational as far as equipment is concerned and will continue to be equipped with 105mm C3 until new equipment procured)
> 1 (CA) Div has one job and one job only - NATO commitment to Europe during Phase 1 (current equipment holdings) with a flyover armoured brigade and during Phase 2 (new equipment procured) up to a mech division.
> 2 (CA) Div is responsible for defence of Canada and being the lead on all other missions at up to battle group strength.
> Rather than classifying units by readiness levels, they are classified by manning and equipment holdings. e.g. a Type 30/70 unit or subunit has a 30% RegF manning and 70% ResF manning and holds 30% of that unit's equipment. Typically a 30/70 Bn would have 1 x 100/0 fully equipped and RegF manned company and 2 x 10/90 partially equipped companies with a 70/30 Bn HQ, and 30/70 CS Coy and CSS Coy.
> From it's own resources, 1 (CA) Div can immediately man 1 complete fully equipped Armd brigade in Canada as well as 1 complete fully equipped prepositioned Armd brigade in Europe.
> 2 (CA) Div forms all Canadian JTF headquarters based on 39 Bde Victoria (JTF West - BC, AB, SK & NT), 2 Bde Petawawa (JTF West Central - MB, ON & NU), 5 Bde Valcartier (JTF East Central - QC) and 36 Bde Halifax (JTF East - NS, NB, PE, & NL), Cdn RGR groups are placed under command of these four Bde/JTF headquarters.
> 2 (CA) Div no longer has any Mech bns, however each Type 100/0 or 30/70 recce regt or inf bn has an integral ground mobility platoon/troop or company/squadron with varying types of vehicles (including up to TAPV and LAV6) depending on role and therefore has some limited mech capabilities (appx 6 companies and 3-4 squadrons worth in total).
> A small Depot Bn has been added to Vancouver
> View attachment 74541
> 
> 🍻



I've got to say I am still struggling with the notion of Mixed Units.  90/10-70/30-50/50-30/70-10/90.  I just think that terms of service and geography both work against the concept.  

I think I prefer a small, ready, deployable full-time force and a 10/90 reserve with a Reg Force Cadre responsible for ensuring that the Reserves can supply competent sub-units.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> That’s fine, it’s also not what I was talking about. JFO does not mean in and of itself your carrying an LTD.



OK.  I look forwards to being educated.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> OK.  I look forwards to being educated.


JFO is a designation that includes training on terminal guidance. TGO is 100 percent inside their wheel house, but does that mean every marine squad is going to be carrying an LTD? I have my doubts given their bulk, weight, and fragility.  Similarly the use of an LTD, especially if your going to be having 1 per squad / section, has some complexities to it in terms of angles (between the emitter and the weapon being released) and coding that would require a hefty bit of coordination.


Kirkhill said:


> The thing is - that is not the only source I have seen describe the Asst Sqd Ldr as a Forward Observer.
> 
> As to munitions?
> 
> Stuff carried by F35s (Small Diameter Bombs and Paveway).



I mentioned that I was curious about Sea and Land, since any air attack will be handled by a JTAC or FAC (A).


Kirkhill said:


> Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs launched by HIMARS.



Laser guided for a deep strike weapon would be odd.


Kirkhill said:


> Joint Air Ground Munitions replacing TOWs, Hellfires, Brimstones and Longbows



See above


Kirkhill said:


> 70mm APKWS



Air launched or ground ?


Kirkhill said:


> Vulcano 155mm, 127mm and 76mm artillery rounds
> With experimental work being done with 40mm, 82mm and 120mm rounds.


Laser guided artillery is a weird one for me. You’re expecting the supported arm to be exposed to fire and it’s going to need to designate each round, seems sun optimal to me personally.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> But the question is are there enough combat arms reservists in Alberta to generate 4 x 90% Mech Companies, 2 x 90% Tank Squadrons, 2 x 90%
> Armoured Recce Squadrons, 2 x 70% CS Companies (4 if the Tank and Armoured Recce Regiments are to have CS Squadrons) and 4 x 70% CSS Companies?


No, I also don’t think we’ll ever see much of an increase in reserve CSS without heavy education incentives, or targeted contracts to ensure released members have reserve obligations.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> JFO is a designation that includes training on terminal guidance. TGO is 100 percent inside their wheel house, but does that mean every marine squad is going to be carrying an LTD? I have my doubts given their bulk, weight, and fragility.  Similarly the use of an LTD, especially if your going to be having 1 per squad / section, has some complexities to it in terms of angles (between the emitter and the weapon being released) and coding that would require a hefty bit of coordination.
> 
> 
> I mentioned that I was curious about Sea and Land, since any air attack will be handled by a JTAC or FAC (A).
> 
> 
> Laser guided for a deep strike weapon would be odd.
> 
> 
> See above
> 
> 
> Air launched or ground ?
> 
> Laser guided artillery is a weird one for me. You’re expecting the supported arm to be exposed to fire and it’s going to need to designate each round, seems sun optimal to me personally.



Thanks for the education.

I think a major part of the discussion revolves around the whole concept of dispersion.

In Ukraine we are looking at a 2000 km frontline and a couple of hundred kilometers of depth with maybe 20 or so brigades operating on each side?   The I am not seeing fields of tanks or even black masses of troops moving on the surface.  I am seeing independent sections and platoons operating out of sight of mutual support.

In the marines case we are looking at 3 Regiments with one infantry battalion each with 3 companies with 3 platoons supported by 30 or so light amphibious vessels and 3 missile regiments.  So 27 to 30 independent platoons operating over 5410 km from Tokyo to Darwin (as the crow flies) and thousands of islands.

That battle plan doesn't really seem to fit with Wainwright and Gagetown exercises - or even Suffield Battle Groups.

It feels to me as if the Marines are planning for, and the Ukrainians are opting for, something that is more akin to the way Special Forces have operated.   A lot more self sufficiency, more autonomy and a lot less mutual support - more open flanks.

Edit - I think the key difference is going to be in the definition of what close means - especially when it applies to close combat.    Range, stand-off, I would expect, would be your friend whenever possible.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> But the question is are there enough combat arms reservists in Alberta to generate 4 x 90% Mech Companies, 2 x 90% Tank Squadrons, 2 x 90%
> Armoured Recce Squadrons, 2 x 70% CS Companies (4 if the Tank and Armoured Recce Regiments are to have CS Squadrons) and 4 x 70% CSS Companies?



IIRC that there are over a million people in Alberta in the right age ranges to join the Reserves. If we can't recruit a few thousand, we really, really suck....



By 2046, Alberta's population is expected to reach almost 6.4 million people, an increase of roughly 1.9 million people from 2020, as arrivals from other countries account for about 54% of the expected growth over the projection period. The population become more concentrated in urban centres, especially along the Edmonton-Calgary Corridor, 80% of Albertans are expected to live in this region by 2046.

As per 2016 census, Below is the population by Age and sex. Population of Alberta as per 2016 census is 4,067,175, increase of 412,918 people from the last 2011 census of Population with 3,645,257. By 2016 census the Population from 0 to 14 years are 779,155, 15 to 64 years are 2,787,805, 65 years and over are 500,215, 85 years and over are 63,385. Alberta population in 2021 is to be 4.43 million(estimated).


Age GroupTotalMaleFemale0 to 4 years266,515136,520129,9955 to 9 years270,715138,990131,72510 to 14 years241,920124,060117,86015 to 19 years240,035123,625116,41020 to 24 years261,830133,990127,84025 to 29 years310,940156,715154,22530 to 34 years333,175167,555165,62035 to 39 years305,505153,655151,85040 to 44 years281,205142,545138,66045 to 49 years269,030135,855133,18050 to 54 years284,310142,205142,10055 to 59 years275,540138,565136,97060 to 64 years226,230113,440112,79065 to 69 years173,68085,50088,18070 to 74 years117,03556,43060,61075 to 79 years83,95539,10544,84580 to 84 years62,16527,59034,57585 to 89 years39,96516,05023,91590 to 94 years18,0255,75512,27595 to 99 years4,7351,1453,595100 years and over650115535





__





						Alberta Population 2022
					





					www.populationu.com


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Thanks for the education.
> 
> I think a major part of the discussion revolves around the whole concept of dispersion.
> 
> In Ukraine we are looking at a 2000 km frontline and a couple of hundred kilometers of depth with maybe 20 or so brigades operating on each side?   The I am not seeing fields of tanks or even black masses of troops moving on the surface.  I am seeing independent sections and platoons operating out of sight of mutual support.
> 
> In the marines case we are looking at 3 Regiments with one infantry battalion each with 3 companies with 3 platoons supported by 30 or so light amphibious vessels and 3 missile regiments.  So 27 to 30 independent platoons operating over 5410 km from Tokyo to Darwin (as the crow flies) and thousands of islands.
> 
> That battle plan doesn't really seem to fit with Wainwright and Gagetown exercises - or even Suffield Battle Groups.
> 
> It feels to me as if the Marines are planning for, and the Ukrainians are opting for, something that is more akin to the way Special Forces have operated.   A lot more self sufficiency, more autonomy and a lot less mutual support - more open flanks.
> 
> Edit - I think the key difference is going to be in the definition of what close means - especially when it applies to close combat.    Range, stand-off, I would expect, would be your friend whenever possible.


We literally just saw the Ukrainians launch an offensive with light mechanized Bdes, yes plural, across a narrow front to isolate1 st Guards Tank Army. What comes out in videos is not the whole picture.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> IIRC that there are over a million people in Alberta in the right age ranges to join the Reserves. If we can't recruit a few thousand, we really, really suck....
> 
> 
> 
> By 2046, Alberta's population is expected to reach almost 6.4 million people, an increase of roughly 1.9 million people from 2020, as arrivals from other countries account for about 54% of the expected growth over the projection period. The population become more concentrated in urban centres, especially along the Edmonton-Calgary Corridor, 80% of Albertans are expected to live in this region by 2046.
> 
> As per 2016 census, Below is the population by Age and sex. Population of Alberta as per 2016 census is 4,067,175, increase of 412,918 people from the last 2011 census of Population with 3,645,257. By 2016 census the Population from 0 to 14 years are 779,155, 15 to 64 years are 2,787,805, 65 years and over are 500,215, 85 years and over are 63,385. Alberta population in 2021 is to be 4.43 million(estimated).
> 
> 
> Age GroupTotalMaleFemale0 to 4 years266,515136,520129,9955 to 9 years270,715138,990131,72510 to 14 years241,920124,060117,86015 to 19 years240,035123,625116,41020 to 24 years261,830133,990127,84025 to 29 years310,940156,715154,22530 to 34 years333,175167,555165,62035 to 39 years305,505153,655151,85040 to 44 years281,205142,545138,66045 to 49 years269,030135,855133,18050 to 54 years284,310142,205142,10055 to 59 years275,540138,565136,97060 to 64 years226,230113,440112,79065 to 69 years173,68085,50088,18070 to 74 years117,03556,43060,61075 to 79 years83,95539,10544,84580 to 84 years62,16527,59034,57585 to 89 years39,96516,05023,91590 to 94 years18,0255,75512,27595 to 99 years4,7351,1453,595100 years and over650115535
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Alberta Population 2022
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.populationu.com


Maybe we do really, really suck.  I have no idea how many Reservists are in the South Alberta Light Horse, King's Own Calgary Regiment, Loyal Edmonton Regiment and Calgary Highlanders but I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest it's not enough to fill all the positions that FJAG's proposed plan would require.  

So to my mind either the plan needs to change, or something needs to be done to significantly increase the number of Albertans that are willing to join the Reserves.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> We literally just saw the Ukrainians launch an offensive with light mechanized Bdes, yes plural, across a narrow front to isolate1 st Guards Tank Army. What comes out in videos is not the whole picture.



Fair comment


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Where I struggle with most attempts at integrated force structures is Geography vs Population.
> 
> You have a 30/70 Armoured Brigade in Edmonton.  With 1 x 100% Reg Force Company/Squadron per Battalion/Regiment that leaves 4 x Mech Companies and 2 x Tank Squadrons to be manned 90% by Reservists (plus 2 x CS and 3 x CSS Companies to be 70% Reservists).  41 Brigade in Alberta only has 2 x Infantry and 2 x Armoured Reserve units.  Even drawing in the Saskatchewan Reserve units you're only adding 1 x Armoured and 2 x Infantry units but the travel distances required to train with their parent units in Edmonton are impractical.
> 
> Your Toronto and Montreal Armoured Brigades have the opposite problems.  There are plenty of Reservists available in these large metro areas, but what training facilities are there that can handle a Mechanized Brigade?
> 
> By moving our training areas away from our population centres we've created a situation where it is very difficult to achieve your objective Heavy forces being largely manned by Reservists.  I totally understand the goal, but not sure I see a doable path toward it at this point in time.


The 1 Bde HQ is in Edmonton but draws its units from across all three Prairie Provinces with equipment stationed in Edmonton/Wainwright and Shilo.

The Prairies can support around 2,500 reservists. Deduct roughly 400 for the Prairie-based artillery regiment and lets say 300 total for a Prairie-based Div engineer squadron and Div recce squadron and that leaves roughly 1,800 for the rest of 1 Bde which is roughly what is needed to round out the brigade. If you recall from some previous calculations, these brigades come out at roughly 3,000 all ranks as they do not have integral recce, arty or engineers which are all a divisional resource and only about a third of those come from the Prairies.

Remember too that these are not fully equipped brigades. Essentially a full brigade's worth of equipment is distributed between the three 30/70 brigades. In Toronto and Montreal you are looking at basic dry training at the DP 1 level. Live firing for all three brigades can be done in Wainwright and Europe. I see collective manoeuvre exercises taking place on flyover to 3 Bde's equipment in Europe on a summer basis for ResF companies/squadrons and during the winter for the RegF companies/squadrons. Not only does that familiarize the troops with their operational environment but also practices the RCAF in flyover ops and as a bonus provides a recruiting incentive to help build numbers.

It's not just the organization that is changing but also the training and some basic concepts of how the organizations are operated.

Sorry that wasn't clear here. Previous versions of this structure included drill-down locations to the company level for each of 1 and 2 Div. I'm still working on those for the new version.

I should point out that I still have three RegF rifle companies unallocated and am pondering where best to allocate them (there are 27 and I have allocated 24) (There are 18 companies worth of LAVs available for distribution and 12 allocated to 1 Div [6 in Europe and 6 in Canada] leaving 6 for 2 Div)

As @daftandbarmy points out, population numbers are rising and, given the right incentives, numbers can climb. In all my calculations I use PYs as currently assigned to the Army establishments across the country and several sources to establish how many reservists paraded in each province several years ago (rather than authorized positions) Those numbers may have changed a bit but are nonetheless realistic "as-is" figures.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I've got to say I am still struggling with the notion of Mixed Units.  90/10-70/30-50/50-30/70-10/90.  I just think that terms of service and geography both work against the concept.
> 
> I think I prefer a small, ready, deployable full-time force and a 10/90 reserve with a Reg Force Cadre responsible for ensuring that the Reserves can supply competent sub-units.


The "ready deployable force" is in 2 Div where there are four infantry battalions and 2 recce squadrons that are 100/0.  In addition in 2 Div there are 6 battalions each of which has a RegF Bn HQ and 1 x 100/0 rifle company. In other words 2 Div can deploy 10 battalion HQs and 18 x 100/0 rifle companies.

1 Div has a different concept. It has the ability to deploy 3 x RegF tank regt HQs and 6 x Reg F Inf Bn HQ with 3 x 100/0 tank squadrons and 6 x 100/0 LAV companies (plus CS and CSS). Essentially there are enough RegF elements to do 6 to 9 RegF Latvia style rotations or even deploy a full RegF armoured brigade in the aggregate (with two additional brigades of ResF personnel and 1 bde of equipment back in Canada). Plus three 100/0 rifle companies as yet unallocated. Essentially both brigades have sufficient 100/0 RegF elements for rapid deployments as well as significant ResF and equipment depth. 

There is no reduction in the number of RegF 100/0 tank squadrons, recce squadrons and rifle and CS companies. There are more deployable battalion HQs and bde HQs to help look after less than full battalion level rotations such as training missions to the Ukraine and operational ones to Latvia (from 12 manoeuvre bn HQs to 20 and from 3 manoeuvre bde HQs to 8 (including 36 and 39 Regt which are "bde HQs Lite")).

CS and CSS functions in the same way.

For me, the benefit of the hybrid structure is that every ResF company, squadron or battery comes under the command of a RegF leadership structure which is accountable for managing its training and has sufficient personnel and equipment available to train itself and it's reserve component on. That is essentially not available in a 10/90 battalion as it stands with the current RegF RSS cadre. Tweaking that alone won't help.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> The "ready deployable force" is in 2 Div where there are four infantry battalions and 2 recce squadrons that are 100/0.  In addition in 2 Div there are 6 battalions each of which has a RegF Bn HQ and 1 x 100/0 rifle company. In other words 2 Div can deploy 10 battalion HQs and 18 x 100/0 rifle companies.
> 
> 1 Div has a different concept. It has the ability to deploy 3 x RegF tank regt HQs and 6 x Reg F Inf Bn HQ with 3 x 100/0 tank squadrons and 6 x 100/0 LAV companies (plus CS and CSS). Essentially there are enough RegF elements to do 6 to 9 RegF Latvia style rotations or even deploy a full RegF armoured brigade in the aggregate (with two additional brigades of ResF personnel and 1 bde of equipment back in Canada). Plus three 100/0 rifle companies as yet unallocated. Essentially both brigades have sufficient 100/0 RegF elements for rapid deployments as well as significant ResF and equipment depth.
> 
> There is no reduction in the number of RegF 100/0 tank squadrons, recce squadrons and rifle and CS companies. There are more deployable battalion HQs and bde HQs to help look after less than full battalion level rotations such as training missions to the Ukraine and operational ones to Latvia (from 12 manoeuvre bn HQs to 20 and from 3 manoeuvre bde HQs to 8 (including 36 and 39 Regt which are "bde HQs Lite")).
> 
> CS and CSS functions in the same way.
> 
> For me, the benefit of the hybrid structure is that every ResF company, squadron or battery comes under the command of a RegF leadership structure which is accountable for managing its training and has sufficient personnel and equipment available to train itself and it's reserve component on. That is essentially not available in a 10/90 battalion as it stands with the current RegF RSS cadre. Tweaking that alone won't help.


OK - I'm tracking now.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> We literally just saw the Ukrainians launch an offensive with light mechanized Bdes, yes plural, across a narrow front to isolate1 st Guards Tank Army. What comes out in videos is not the whole picture.



Just for clarification - I am not arguing against Corps-Division-Brigade-Battalion-Company-Platoon coordination.  The Ukrainians are obviously co-ordinating at all those levels.  My belief is that the platoons of the Battalion are operating over much wider frontages and penetrating much deeper when they get the opportunity.  They are still under higher control but are operating with a greater degree of local autonomy.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Just for clarification - I am not arguing against Corps-Division-Brigade-Battalion-Company-Platoon coordination.  The Ukrainians are obviously co-ordinating at all those levels.  My belief is that the platoons of the Battalion are operating over much wider frontages and penetrating much deeper when they get the opportunity.  They are still under higher control but are operating with a greater degree of local autonomy.


... and a greater degree of risk during periods when they operate beyond mutual support of other elements of the force.

There's always a balance to these things.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> ... and a greater degree of risk during periods when they operate beyond mutual support of other elements of the force.
> 
> There's always a balance to these things.
> 
> 🍻



Absolutely there is a balance - there is always a risk.

The Ukrainians seem to be a lot less risk averse, at all levels of society, than Canadians generally or the CAF in particular.


----------



## markppcli

I think you’re seeing a nation having to make due by virtue of extreme circumstances rather than any kind of coherent plan to make high risk choices.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I think you’re seeing a nation having to make due by virtue of extreme circumstances rather than any kind of coherent plan to make high risk choices.



That is true.  Conversely Canada, and the CAF have little motivation to make any choices.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Maybe we do really, really suck.  I have no idea how many Reservists are in the South Alberta Light Horse, King's Own Calgary Regiment, Loyal Edmonton Regiment and Calgary Highlanders but I'm going to go out on a limb and suggest it's not enough to fill all the positions that FJAG's proposed plan would require.
> 
> So to my mind either the plan needs to change, or something needs to be done to significantly increase the number of Albertans that are willing to join the Reserves.



Why don't we do what other 'crazy outside the box innovation leaders' do and just ask them?

For example, I regularly travel through various airports and other high volume transportation nodes and see lots of ads for jobs in alot of different organizations. 

The CAF? Not so much.

CFRG seems to be a gatekeeper, not a gate opener, sadly.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

daftandbarmy said:


> I regularly travel through various airports and other high volume transportation nodes and see lots of ads for jobs in alot of different organizations.
> 
> The CAF? Not so much.
> 
> * CFRG seems to be a gatekeeper, not a gate opener, sadly. *


CFRG still labours under the delusion that we're an employer of choice and we can be extremely picky about who we take on even as a potential candidate. 

Couple that with social engineering policies from on high, you're left with a hiring body that has more metrics stating "this is the exact kind of candidate we're looking for" instead of "can we work with this? Do we see potential?" 

I honestly would love to see recruiting be taken over by a private industry HR firm for a year, just solely to see if it's the CFRCs that are the problem or if we end up shooting ourselves in the foot with our own policies.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Why don't we do what other 'crazy outside the box innovation leaders' do and just ask them?
> 
> For example, I regularly travel through various airports and other high volume transportation nodes and see lots of ads for jobs in alot of different organizations.
> 
> The CAF? Not so much.
> 
> CFRG seems to be a gatekeeper, not a gate opener, sadly.



Related - I don't know the current state of play but both the Highlanders and the Eddies sought permission to establish remote companies and platoons in communities that expressed interest in hosting them.   They were turned down.


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Kirkhill said:


> Related - I don't know the current state of play but both the Highlanders and the Eddies sought permission to establish remote companies and platoons in communities that expressed interest in hosting them.   They were turned down.


I know the QORof C tried something similar about 20 years ago with moving Buff's Coy out to Scarborough. Like most things, it was a great I initiative that would have seen great promise with 10 to 15 years of buy in.

Instead, there was no immediate payoff and the project was scrapped. So to this day, a sizeable portion of your recruitable force is living in Suburbia/Durham County... your only options east of the downtown core are Oshawa, Cobourg, or Peterborough for Reserve Force employment before you hit Belleville. 

Does not make any sense to me.


----------



## daftandbarmy

rmc_wannabe said:


> I know the QORof C tried something similar about 20 years ago with moving Buff's Coy out to Scarborough. Like most things, it was a great I initiative that would have seen great promise with 10 to 15 years of buy in.
> 
> Instead, there was no immediate payoff and the project was scrapped. So to this day, a sizeable portion of your recruitable force is living in Suburbia/Durham County... your only options east of the downtown core are Oshawa, Cobourg, or Peterborough for Reserve Force employment before you hit Belleville.
> 
> Does not make any sense to me.



The Bert Hoffmeister armoury in Vancouver enters the chat...

Good thing they had the Cadets on parade to make up numbers or it would have looked pretty anemic because no one in downtown Vancouver wants anything to do with the Army these days 









						PHOTOS: Seaforth Highlanders march back to new and improved armoury
					

There were many different levels of celebration for Rod Hoffmeister during Saturday’s return of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada to their armoury, and they all had one common thread — pride.




					www.vancouverisawesome.com


----------



## Kirkhill

A couple of interesting submissions from Battle Order

1 - the structure of the Platoon in the Swiss Territorial Division (5 Battalions per Division)



> Swiss Infantry Platoon (2019-Present)​
> Military Organization > Switzerland > Swiss Infantry Platoon (2019-Present)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> *Part of:* Infantry Company of the Infantry Battalion (Territorial Division)
> 
> *Type:* Motorized Infantry
> 
> *Time Frame: *2019-Present (Modern)
> 
> *Personnel:* 1-2 Officers, 42-43 Other Ranks
> 
> 
> 
> The following is the organization of the Swiss Army Infantry Platoon as it applies to its Territorial Division Infantry Battalions. These are motorized infantry, mounted in either a variant of the MOWAG Piranha IIC (APC-93) or the MOWAG Duro IIIP (GMTF 11 Pl/2t 6x6 gl). The vehicles are more or less interchangeable with the same personnel and equipment for both types of vehicles, but vary in application depending on environment.
> 
> 
> 
> Generally, each Infantry Company has four Infantry Platoons (this), while each Infantry Battalion has a Staff Company, three Infantry Companies, and a Combat Support Company with 81mm mortars and snipers. This information broadly applies to units in Infantry Battalions, Mountain Battalions (Gebirgsinfanterie and Gebirgsschützen), and the Carbiniers Battalion. Territorial Divisions generally have four to five of such battalions, in addition to a Divisional Staff Battalion, Engineer Battalion, and Search & Rescue Battalion. This makes the regionally-based Territorial Divisions the size of large brigades or very small divisions.
> 
> 
> 
> ↓ Organization​
> *Vehicle One (APC-93 or GMTF 11 Pl/2t 6x6 gl)
> 
> Vehicle Crew
> 
> 1× Platoon Leader,* Leutnant or Oberleutnant, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *1× Vehicle Machine Gunner*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *1× Driver*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with a 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *Troop Bravo (of Infantry Group)
> 
> 1× Group Leader*, Wachtmeister, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle (optionally with Kern Aarau 4x24 scope)
> 
> *1× Machine Gunner*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with 1 LMg 05 Light Machine Gun
> 
> *1× Anti-Tank Rifleman,* Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle (with GwA 97 Grenade Launcher) and Panzerfaust 3 or MATADOR
> 
> *1× Rifleman*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *Troop Alpha (of Infantry Group)
> 
> 1× Troop Leader*, Wachtmeister, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle (optionally with Kern Aarau 4x24 scope)
> 
> *1× Machine Gunner*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with 1 LMg 05 Light Machine Gun
> 
> *1× Anti-Tank Rifleman,* Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle (with GwA 97 Grenade Launcher) and Panzerfaust 3 or MATADOR
> 
> *1× Rifleman/Breacher*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> 
> 
> *Vehicle Three (APC-93 or GMTF 11 Pl/2t 6x6 gl)
> 
> Vehicle Crew
> 
> 1× Deputy Platoon Leader,* Oberwachtmeister/Leutnant, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *1× Vehicle Machine Gunner*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *1× Driver*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with a 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *(same Dismounted Group as Vehicle One)
> 
> 
> 
> Vehicle Two & Four (APC-93 or GMTF 11 Pl/2t 6x6 gl)
> 
> Vehicle Crew
> 
> 1× Vehicle Commander,* Wachtmeister, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *1× Vehicle Machine Gunner*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *1× Driver*, Soldat/Gefreiter, armed with a 1 Stgw 90 Rifle
> 
> *(same Dismounted Group as Vehicle One)*
> 
> 
> 
> ↓ Discussion​
> The *Swiss Army Infantry Platoon* is a motorized infantry formation and one of the fundamental close combat elements of Switzerland's Territorial Infantry Battalions. These battalions are part of one of four Territorial Divisions, which are tied to Territorial Regions for the purposes of regional defense and coordinating civilian-military operations in a given area. These divisions are in addition to the Army (Heer), which consists of three Mechanized Brigades composed principally of Panzer and Mechanized Battalions (each with two Panzer Companies with Leopard 2A4s and two Panzergrenadier Companies with CV9030s) and Reconnaissance Battalions (with three Recce Companies mounted in MOWAG Eagles).
> 
> The platoon itself consists of four vehicles and four dismounted Infantry Groups (_Infanterie Gruppe_ in German and _Groupe de combat d’Infanterie_ in French). These may be a mix of APC-93s (a variant of the MOWAG Piranha IIC 8x8 armored personnel carrier) or the GMTF 11 Pl/2t 6x6 gl (a variant of the MOWAG DURO IIIP 6x6). Both are armed with M2HB 12.7mm heavy machine guns (designated Mg 64 in Swiss service) and vehicle crews are trained to operate both. Generally speaking, the Piranha seems to be preferred for operations in the countryside while the DURO is preferred for urban operations, although this may not be entirely prescriptive. These vehicles are split into two sections, whose structure is mirrored on the dismount. The first section is led by the Platoon Leader, who is typically a Oberleutnant (1st Lieutenant) or Leutnant (2nd Lieutenant) while the second section is led by the Deputy Platoon Leader, typically an Oberwachtmeister (Sergeant First Class) or Leutnant. Both act as vehicle commanders. When the platoon dismounts, either could remain mounted to command the vehicles depending on the orders of the Platoon Leader. However, if both dismount, command of the mounted element passes over to the senior-most Vehicle Commander. Vehicle Commanders are equivalent in rank and status to Group Leaders, both being Wachtmeister (Sergeant). As such, neither is superior to the other, although when mounted the Vehicle Commanders are the ones taking orders from platoon leadership. Further, on the dismount, the vehicles generally act as a separate entity from the dismounts under platoon orders rather than group orders. The vehicles are further crewed by a Machine Gunner (who mans the remote machine gun on both vehicles) and a Driver.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Each *dismount Infantry Group* meanwhile consists of eight personnel. They are split into two troops or teams (_équipe_ in French and _trupp_ in German) each under a leader. There appears to be some variation in how things are organized and who is equipped with what as several Swiss servicemembers have given conflicting reports of what their units do, so we are reporting what seems to be the most generally true. Troop Bravo is under the command of the Group Leader, who typically ranks Wachtmeister. He is the only non-commissioned officer in the group. Troop Alpha is under the Troop Leader, who is typically a Gefreiter (junior enlisted with some time in service). The troops are designated as such because typically the Troop Leader's takes the lead position in movements and when breaching buildings, while the Group Leader's troop follows and supports. However, in some units, the naming convention may be reversed, with the Group Leader in Alpha and the Troop Leader in Bravo. Either way, each troop further consists of a Light Machine Gunner, Anti-Tank Rifleman, and Rifleman.
> 
> The Group Leader and Troop Leader are armed with Stgw 90 rifles. Generally speaking, these two (or at least the Troop Leader depending on the unit) will also be equipped as designated marksmen with a Kern Aarau 4x24 optic. While there are practical advantages to giving leaders optics over other soldiers (enhancing their target acquisition capabilities), this change was mainly to cope with the limited time the Swiss Army has to train conscripts. Swiss DMR doctrine places an emphasis on rapid target acquisition with carefully aimed first shots and rapid follow-on shots to increase hit probability if a mistake was made or at least suppress the target in a very short period of time. Given the Troop Leader and Group Leader are generally the most experienced soldiers in the group (or at least the most competent) logic follows that they can make the most out of the added capability. However, as stated previously, there is variation as to who actually gets the DMR(s), so in some circumstances the Group and Troop Leader won't be the ones with it. In some instances, it could just be the soldier in the group who is most skilled at marksmanship.
> 
> The Machine Gunners meanwhile are equipped with the LMg 05, a short-barreled variant of the FN Minimi belt-fed light achine gun chambered in 5.56x45mm. They appear to usually be equipped with EOTech Holographic sights as well. Next up, the Anti-Tank Riflemen may be armed with a variety of weapon systems. Since 2019, they have been at least armed with Stgw 90 rifles and GwA 97 under-barrel grenade launchers (these used to be issued to the Riflemen). However—again with unit variation—sometimes a grenade launcher goes to a Rifleman instead. AT Riflemen may further be equipped with either a Panzerfaust 3 or MATADOR in the future. The MATADOR may provide specificity for operations in urban environments with its HESH/HEAT rounds, but we are unsure if they will be replacing the Pzf 3 eventually in the motorized infantry. Each AT Rifleman carries only one munition.
> 
> Rounding out the dismount groups are two Riflemen, one per troop. Both are armed with Stgw 90 rifles, but may be assigned other specialty functions. For example, there is usually one breacher/demolitions specialists in the group who is responsible for explosives and operating breaching kits. Another Rifleman could operate a 60mm mortar for signalling at night as well.











						Swiss Infantry Platoon (2019-Present)
					

The organization and equipment of Switzerland's modern motorized infantry platoon.




					www.battleorder.org
				




The APC93, or Piranha IIC, is effectively a Bison or Coyote with an RWS on top, leaving room for 3 crew and 8 Pax.

The alternate transport is an armoured truck with an RWS on top with the same loading

MOWAG Duro IIIP (GMTF 11 Pl/2t 6x6 gl).


----------



## Kirkhill

The second presentation is a video on the playing around the French have been doing with their Armoured Regiments.

Effectively they pair VBLs and MBTs in their Tank Squadrons - one for one.  They also mix Tank and VBL Squadrons within the Regiment.

The VBLs in the Tank Squadrons conduct local recce.  There are three Squadrons to the Regiment.

The VBL Squadrons, 1 or 2 of them for each regiment, both conducting Divisional Recce and Anti-Tank Operations.

It seems like one of the VBL Squadrons is going to be converted to UAS/EW operations while one or two new Reserve Force VBL squadrons will be added.  This is apparently a result of the French take on lessons learned in Ukraine.









						Evolution of French Tank Regiments (1989-2022+)
					

A brief overview of the French Army Tank Regiment (régiment de chars) from the late 1980s to 2022.




					www.battleorder.org


----------



## FJAG

I think that the recce/anti-armour combo symbol in the Div Scouting Squadron is my new favourite.

🍻


----------



## McG

This one?


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> This one?


Yup.

It took me a second to figure it out and then it just struck me as brilliant - both as a symbol and as a tactical function.

I've been playing with notions for a modern cavalry force that merged recce with anti-armour with UAVs and UCAVs all linked in with long range artillery a la Deep Strike BCT on steroids. Add a track or wheeled modifier and maybe a UAV gull-wing modifier and you're there.

This will show up in my next napkin force iteration - TAPV based.


----------



## McG

Don’t make your symbols too busy.


----------



## GK .Dundas

Kirkhill said:


> The Alternative to the IFV strategy.
> 
> Boxers and Wiesels
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The Boxer, as used by the Germans, is an armoured bus, a troop transporter for the dismount infantry.  Its main armament is an RWS with either a 12.7mm HMG or a 40mm GMG.  These are for close protection of the vehicle only.
> 
> The Battalion's heavy weapons are carried separately in the Wiesel.  Many on this site have commented on the Wiesel before, a light, air and helitransportable tracked vehicle that carries a variety of weapons.  The principal weapons pairing is a Wiesel with an ATGM (currently the venerable TOW) and another Wiesel with a dual feed 20 mm autocannon.  The Wiesel is also used for a mounted 120mm mortar system, a light anti-aircraft system and assorted FOVs, CPs and sensors.   These can accompany the troops on deployment by air even when their Boxers can't.
> 
> The 20mm/ATGM pairing deserves some further consideration.
> 
> The Javelin/NLAW ATGMs have been getting lots of good press in Ukraine but as the war drags on stocks are under stress.  That has prompted the Ukrainians to build a 14.5 mm Anti-Materiel Rifle with a 2 km range to take the load off the ATGMs.  In much the same way I fancy the 20mm takes the load off of the TOWs in the German Wiesels.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Given that NLAW weighs 12.5 kg, the Javelin weighs 22.3 kg and the Alligator AMR weighs 25 kg  I can only think that those weapons would benefit from having weapons carriers to transport them.   In which case why not the Wiesel?
> 
> Especially given that Rheinmetall has a  new optionally manned version
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is based on the same technology as Rheinmetall's other autonomous systems.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Rheinmetall Canada – Mission Master unmanned ground vehicle A-UGV
> 
> 
> Rheinmetall Mission Master is a unique family of Autonomous Unmanned Ground Vehicles to support military troops in dangerous missions with difficult conditions.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.rheinmetall.ca
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> View attachment 71848
> 
> 
> Leave the IFVs to the RCAC and the Panzergrenadiers.
> 
> Buy ACSV TCVs for infantry transport and put the battalion weapons companies on board something that can be lifted by air in the same helicopters and aircraft as the rifles.





FJAG said:


> Yup.
> 
> It took me a second to figure it out and then it just struck me as brilliant - both as a symbol and as a tactical function.
> 
> I've been playing with notions for a modern cavalry force that merged recce with anti-armour with UAVs and UCAVs all linked in with long range artillery a la Deep Strike BCT on steroids. Add a track or wheeled modifier and maybe a UAV gull-wing modifier and you're there.
> 
> This will show up in my next napkin force iteration - TAPV based.
> 
> View attachment 74623


You know if you acted quickly enough , you could sell that for a fair chunk of change in one of the New York art galleries.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> Don’t make your symbols too busy.




Although the NATO symbol system is designed to add a fair number of modifiers and thus get busy. 




It becomes a question of how much you need to hang on when the prime users understand what the equipment mix of a particular force is.

I think the recce and anti-armour symbol are necessary to show the dual function. The UAV symbol isn't necessary but the armoured/wheeled is useful.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Although the NATO symbol system is designed to add a fair number of modifiers and thus get busy.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It becomes a question of how much you need to hang on when the prime users understand what the equipment mix of a particular force is.


I’d suggest it is necessary the further up the allied structure you go for understanding, at a Div and below level it should be understood (ah then those Mukti National Bde’s get complicated) 
  That said, it’s easier just to show them a Div icon and leave it at that - and if really necessary tell them to google what’s in a Div…



FJAG said:


> I think the recce and anti-armour symbol are necessary to show the dual function. The UAV symbol isn't necessary but the armoured/wheeled is useful.
> 
> 🍻


UAV symbols are only necessarily (IMHO) for higher level UAS (non Bde organic).


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> UAV symbols are only necessarily (IMHO) for higher level UAS (non Bde organic).


Yeah. It's the difference between a UAV being part of the equipment of a unit with a different function and a unit or subunit whose primary function is operating UAVs.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> A couple of interesting submissions from Battle Order
> 
> 1 - the structure of the Platoon in the Swiss Territorial Division (5 Battalions per Division)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Swiss Infantry Platoon (2019-Present)
> 
> 
> The organization and equipment of Switzerland's modern motorized infantry platoon.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.battleorder.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The APC93, or Piranha IIC, is effectively a Bison or Coyote with an RWS on top, leaving room for 3 crew and 8 Pax.
> 
> The alternate transport is an armoured truck with an RWS on top with the same loading
> 
> MOWAG Duro IIIP (GMTF 11 Pl/2t 6x6 gl).
> 
> View attachment 74610
> 
> View attachment 74611


Context being these light Bns, that’s what they are, light Bns with APCs. Are supplemental to the higher readiness armoured formations, which have infantry in the IFVs.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Context being these light Bns, that’s what they are, light Bns with APCs. Are supplemental to the higher readiness armoured formations, which have infantry in the IFVs.


Context accepted.  That was what our M113 army used to was.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Context accepted.  That was what our M113 army used to was.


The 113 was a pre IFV era battle taxi. 
   The only 113 formations we really had was 4CMBG which at the time was our heaviest entity. 
  The units inside Canada had AVGP’s and tracks only for TOW (outside the CAR who had them on Jeeps then Iltis)


----------



## KevinB

One of the issues I have with looking at continental European armies is they are; 1) setup primary for Home Defense and/or 2) Haven't fought a significant combat action in ages against any sort of organized foe.

Switzerland prides itself on it's neutrality, and solely has forces for Border integrity, as well as the whole not fighting a war in centuries.

France is well France - short of African excursions, it really hasn't done a lot since it's departure from French Indo-China.

Due to Canada's location- it is faced with little geographic threats, and thus needs an Expeditionary Army - of which the US and UK have the most modern and experienced forces of NATO allies.

Those Militaries are thus best suited to both emulate - and to tailor ones force to work with.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> The 113 was a pre IFV era battle taxi.
> The only 113 formations we really had was 4CMBG which at the time was our heaviest entity.
> The units inside Canada had AVGP’s and tracks only for TOW (outside the CAR who had them on Jeeps then Iltis)


It varied over the years. 3 CIBG out of Gagetown was also heavily tracked and after its demise, the Ace Mobile Force and CAST Combat Group were heavily tracked. - Sigh. There were those days in D Battery where we dragged our L5 pack howitzers around with and in M548s.

Me about to go FOOing.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> of the issues I have with looking at continental European armies is they are; 1) setup primary for Home Defense and/or 2) Haven't fought a significant combat action in ages against any sort of organized foe.
> 
> Switzerland prides itself on it's neutrality, and solely has forces for Border integrity, as well as the whole not fighting a war in centuries.



Agreed, when we need to relearn pike and shot tactics, the Swiss will be my first port of call. Until then I’ll note them fire developing rubber rifle sticks to let you shoot AT Rifle Grenades and red camouflage.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> One of the issues I have with looking at continental European armies is they are; 1) setup primary for Home Defense and/or 2) Haven't fought a significant combat action in ages against any sort of organized foe.
> 
> Switzerland prides itself on it's neutrality, and solely has forces for Border integrity, as well as the whole not fighting a war in centuries.
> 
> France is well France - short of African excursions, it really hasn't done a lot since it's departure from French Indo-China.
> 
> Due to Canada's location- it is faced with little geographic threats, and thus needs an Expeditionary Army - of which the US and UK have the most modern and experienced forces of NATO allies.
> 
> Those Militaries are thus best suited to both emulate - and to tailor ones force to work with.



Lessons learned:

You can be an Army that hasn't fought a battle in 50 years, and win against a more experienced Army, as long as you modernize your technology, train for war, and have an efficient and professional General Staff.... or something like that....


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Lessons learned:
> 
> You can be an Army that hasn't fought a battle in 50 years, and win against a more experienced Army, as long as you modernize your technology, train for war, and have an efficient and professional General Staff.... or something like that....


Helps if your fighting a collapsing empire beset with internal strife and a operationally crippling language policy.


----------



## daftandbarmy

How about a UAV Battalion per Bde Gp? 

With capabilities like these, we're nuts/ dead if we ignore the potential...


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588139903099047938


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> I think the recce and anti-armour symbol are necessary to show the dual function. The UAV symbol isn't necessary but the armoured/wheeled is useful.


If you like greater specificity in your symbols, you might like the one the French tended to use for regimental recce (as opposed to the more traditional symbol that they reserved for higher assets).


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> How about a UAV Battalion per Bde Gp?
> 
> With capabilities like these, we're nuts/ dead if we ignore the potential...
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588139903099047938


We hold them in a few places already, I don’t know that they shouldn’t be held by existent units. Frankly I’d be tempted to hold any loitering munitions under 4 GS where they have air space control centres organic.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> We hold them in a few places already, I don’t know that they shouldn’t be held by existent units. Frankly I’d be tempted to hold any loitering munitions under 4 GS where they have air space control centres organic.



If I was getting blasted by Russian arty, I'd like to be able to look up and see a sky 'dark with armed UAVs' heading their way, followed by a horizon dancing with flame as they pound the shit out of them for us.

However that pans out Org Chart wise I could care less, of course


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> If I was getting blasted by Russian arty, I'd like to be able to look up and see a sky 'dark with armed UAVs' heading their way, followed by a horizon dancing with flame as they pound the shit out of them for us.
> 
> However that pans out Org Chart wise I could care less, of course


Well, there’s good sources out now about how the Ukranian UAVs were in a period of ineffectiveness because they were simply to slow to effect strikes, that’s been solved by using HIMARS to erode Russian AD. I’d rather here some F35’s telling me “no factor” as I brief threats and we begin dropping GBU 49s with impunity. 

But I get your point. I’d just read up on the joint force arsenal thread and I think peopl on here, well some anyways, don’t really get that airspace requires coordination so everything doesn’t run into each other. Skies dark with UAVs is great until they all smash into each other.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Well, there’s good sources out now about how the Ukranian UAVs were in a period of ineffectiveness because they were simply to slow to effect strikes, that’s been solved by using HIMARS to erode Russian AD. I’d rather here some F35’s telling me “no factor” as I brief threats and we begin dropping GBU 49s with impunity.
> 
> But I get your point. I’d just read up on the joint force arsenal thread and I think peopl on here, well some anyways, don’t really get that airspace requires coordination so everything doesn’t run into each other. Skies dark with UAVs is great *until they all smash into each other.*



Which would be awesome!


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Which would be awesome!


Somewhere a tacp just had an aneurism


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Okay. Another cut at the Army's Future Force Structure. I call this one Force 2026 to be different.
> 
> Notes:
> 
> All brigades and units are still based on existing CA personnel counts (RegF and ResF) and equipment holdings (except a HIMARS and AD Arty regiment which are aspirational as far as equipment is concerned and will continue to be equipped with 105mm C3 until new equipment procured)
> 1 (CA) Div has one job and one job only - NATO commitment to Europe during Phase 1 (current equipment holdings) with a flyover armoured brigade and during Phase 2 (new equipment procured) up to a mech division.
> 2 (CA) Div is responsible for defence of Canada and being the lead on all other missions at up to battle group strength.
> Rather than classifying units by readiness levels, they are classified by manning and equipment holdings. e.g. a Type 30/70 unit or subunit has a 30% RegF manning and 70% ResF manning and holds 30% of that unit's equipment. Typically a 30/70 Bn would have 1 x 100/0 fully equipped and RegF manned company and 2 x 10/90 partially equipped companies with a 70/30 Bn HQ, and 30/70 CS Coy and CSS Coy.
> From it's own resources, 1 (CA) Div can immediately man 1 complete fully equipped Armd brigade in Canada as well as 1 complete fully equipped prepositioned Armd brigade in Europe.
> 2 (CA) Div forms all Canadian JTF headquarters based on 39 Bde Victoria (JTF West - BC, AB, SK & NT), 2 Bde Petawawa (JTF West Central - MB, ON & NU), 5 Bde Valcartier (JTF East Central - QC) and 36 Bde Halifax (JTF East - NS, NB, PE, & NL), Cdn RGR groups are placed under command of these four Bde/JTF headquarters.
> 2 (CA) Div no longer has any Mech bns, however each Type 100/0 or 30/70 recce regt or inf bn has an integral ground mobility platoon/troop or company/squadron with varying types of vehicles (including up to TAPV and LAV6) depending on role and therefore has some limited mech capabilities (appx 6 companies and 3-4 squadrons worth in total).
> A small Depot Bn has been added to Vancouver
> View attachment 74541
> 
> 🍻


Curious as to your thoughts on how the 30/70 and 70/30 Service Battalions will be organized.  Currently I believe each has an Admin, Supply, Transport and Maintenance Company.  Would each Company be manned at the split levels, or would for example the Maintenance Companies be manned 100/0 and the Supply and Transport Companies at 30/70?


----------



## Ostrozac

markppcli said:


> Somewhere a tacp just had an aneurism


Wait until self-propelled anti-aircraft guns make their big comeback in the counter-UAS role. They’ll be throwing up ordnance all over the sky at drones, helicopters, geese, unusual looking clouds…


----------



## markppcli

Ostrozac said:


> Wait until self-propelled anti-aircraft guns make their big comeback in the counter-UAS role. They’ll be throwing up ordnance all over the sky at drones, helicopters, geese, unusual looking clouds…


Happily you can drop a bomb through fire, it’s the UAVs and loitering munitions I worry about


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> How about a UAV Battalion per Bde Gp?
> 
> With capabilities like these, we're nuts/ dead if we ignore the potential...
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588139903099047938


That's gonna be hard to buff out.

My preference is to use existing resources that already perform the basic functions.

I see UAVs with both brigade recce and artillery forward observers and infantry recce and mortar MFCs.

I see the armed UAVs, or loitering munitions get launched by mortar platoons or by specialized artillery batteries depending on their size and range.

There's already a very robust command and control structure to integrate them into.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Curious as to your thoughts on how the 30/70 and 70/30 Service Battalions will be organized.  Currently I believe each has an Admin, Supply, Transport and Maintenance Company.  Would each Company be manned at the split levels, or would for example the Maintenance Companies be manned 100/0 and the Supply and Transport Companies at 30/70?


You're right. The split probably needs to be different. I start with the first principle that a 30/70 brigade and it's 30/70 battalions have a primary purpose which is to be a training and mobilization base but with a secondary day-to-day role to provide rotations to such things as the Latvia eFP BG.

For starters, under the initial phase, where equipment holdings are based on existing holdings, each battalion etc will hold only roughly 1/3 of the equipment of a full brigade. In that respect the CSS support does not need to be 100% even for maintenance although I do think maintenance requires a higher full-timer ratio. In my day, the supply and transport function was conducted by one company. That's basically the organization within a US BCT's brigade support battalion which has a distribution company, a field maintenance company and a headquarters company (I'll leave aside the forward support companies which are their equivalent of our unit A Echs). They also put the brigade medical company under the BSB.

Effectively the BSB is my model (albeit I've boosted the numbers from roughly 400 to 530) which I see with the following numbers PYs/Class A :

HQ &HQ Coy - roughly 60/80;

Maintenance Coy - roughly 70/70 - 90/50 depending on types of equipment held by the particular brigade;

S&T Coy - 40/120

Field Ambulance - 25/65

Totals: 195-215 / 335-315   That's roughly 37 - 40% RegF PYs.

Note A - the numbers are for the deployable field force and do not include static support base functions

Note B - the numbers contemplate that there is a divisional sustainment brigade with a maintenance battalion, two transport battalions and a logistics/special troops battalion and that there is a field hospital all of which deploy either in whole or in part for theatre support.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> That's gonna be hard to buff out.
> 
> My preference is to use existing resources that already perform the basic functions.
> 
> I see UAVs with both brigade recce and artillery forward observers and infantry recce and mortar MFCs.


Everyone is going to get UAS down to the section level eventually.  
   It’s happening down here, and so far the exercises are going well.   There needs to be fantastic A-G Coordination when using Helicopters and Fast Air, but so far even experimenting with drone swarm integration is going well.   


FJAG said:


> I see the armed UAVs, or loitering munitions get launched by mortar platoons or by specialized artillery batteries depending on their size and range.


Again I think that depends on scale - a micro copter section level drone dropping a grenade can work in some situations.  The heavier duty large UAS that launch missiles, rockets etc need to be controlled at higher / I don’t think a Mortar Platoon is the right place - but I also may be a little old fashioned there.  
 I tend to like the idea of A/UAS for the AirForce and Artillery.  Someone on a direct Brigade net.  


FJAG said:


> There's already a very robust command and control structure to integrate them into.
> 
> 🍻


I don’t see the CA Mortar Platoons being that anymore.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> A couple of interesting submissions from Battle Order
> 
> 1 - the structure of the Platoon in the Swiss Territorial Division (5 Battalions per Division)
> 
> The APC93, or Piranha IIC, is effectively a Bison or Coyote with an RWS on top, leaving room for 3 crew and 8 Pax.
> 
> The alternate transport is an armoured truck with an RWS on top with the same loading
> 
> MOWAG Duro IIIP (GMTF 11 Pl/2t 6x6 gl).


Maybe I'm wrong, but it seems like the "Territorial" nature of this suggestion was missed.   There's nothing particularly novel about their RegF mech formations (other than maybe using wheeled Eagles to screen totally tracked mech bde's).  What's interesting to me is they've explicitly addressed the limitations of their reservists (discussion about giving the DMR's to the senior NCM's in sections because they're more likely to be able to make good use of them), kitted them out accordingly (cheaper and less complex weapons and vehicles requiring less maintenance, less cost to acquire, maintain, and operate) and turned out 17 battalions of infantry that can get from A to B under armour and are loaded with (albiet short range) MBT level anti-armour capability.   

Ukraine has shown us the potential of a peer fight of any length to force combatants to dig deep into reserves-  of people/ vehicle stocks/ munitions. 

We're never going to match the per capita (or even absolute) size that the Finn's and Swiss generate via conscription, but  there might be something to be learned from their employment and surge capability, that there's a middle ground to be found with deployable reserves without US expenditure levels, and without massive leaps required to get the reserves trained on using and maintaining the best and most complicated kit.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I don’t see the CA Mortar Platoons being that anymore.


They're tied directly into the bn/BG FSCC which is all you need. 

I think that the bn mor pl concept is tactically and organizationally still valid. I do wonder whether a mortar platoon should be manned by "uptrained riflemen" or whether they shouldn't be a specialty in their own right like in the US. One could have a trade called indirect fire support that covers everything from tube to UCAVs ... maybe even heavy anti-armour ... etc. Basically keep all weapon systems used within the rifle company as your standard infantryman qualification and career stream and everything from bn support weapons and create a separate stream.



IKnowNothing said:


> We're never going to match the per capita (or even absolute) size that the Finn's and Swiss generate via conscription, but there might be something to be learned from their employment and surge capability, that there's a middle ground to be found with deployable reserves without US expenditure levels, and without massive leaps required to get the reserves trained on using and maintaining the best and most complicated kit.


That makes me think a bit cart before the horse. It works on the proposition that we have a reserve and a cheap government so let's see what we can do with it without first looking to see if we need a cheap, moderately trained force. 

Where and how will we use these territorial units? Will it be for home defence? That presupposes an attack on Canada. And where do we need them, our main harbour areas? the north? Will we send it overseas as part of a NATO force? They already have such forces. Do they need or want more? Or do they want armoured or mech or artillery brigades? Will we use it on missions outside the country such as UN or training support missions? That's not a ResF job per se under our political/military construct - that's a full-timer job.

I keep pivoting the ResF towards a mech force in Europe. Why? 1) Europe needs more armoured and mech forces as a deterrent to the Putins in life and it fits our current NATO obligations, 2) such forces do not need to be forces in being - flyovers exercising regularly in Europe add deterrent value at a fraction of the cost of a full-time force and can be mobilized and deployed as threat levels go up 3) we already have the bulk of the equipment we need to equip such a force to a brigade level and to train and sustain it, 4) our RegF should pivot to being a) a leadership/training/support cadre for a mobilizable force, and b) light quick reaction forces and specialized units that are needed on a day-to-day, full-time basis and/or need constant training to hone their skills.

Our main impediment to restructuring the force in that way is that the RegF does not want to give up their toys to part-timers. The mantra that the ResF can't maintain them is ridiculous. The fact is that the ResF can't maintain this equipment under the current system. In any organization worth its salt if there is a capability gap then you redesign the system to close the gap. We have ignored doing that for decades. We continue to fine tune a broken concept.

We need to stop looking for a role for an inadequate ResF and restructure the force to make it affordable and capable for real defence needs.

The first step should always be - what are our day-to-day defence needs and what is the force we might need to generate for an extreme event.  I do not see a Ukrainian style territorial force as falling under either category in the foreseeable future. That might have been the case in the period before the Boer War but not now.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> They're tied directly into the bn/BG FSCC which is all you need.


Theoretically, but given the CA seems intent on constantly divesting the Reg Force Mortar Platoons, and have PRes set to form them - I tend to view that as suboptimal.



FJAG said:


> I think that the bn mor pl concept is tactically and organizationally still valid. I do wonder whether a mortar platoon should be manned by "uptrained riflemen" or whether they shouldn't be a specialty in their own right like in the US. One could have a trade called indirect fire support that covers everything from tube to UCAVs ... maybe even heavy anti-armour ... etc. Basically keep all weapon systems used within the rifle company as your standard infantryman qualification and career stream and everything from bn support weapons and create a separate stream.


Now admittedly I was an Artilleryman and Foo Tech prior to my Infantry Mortar experiences, but I believe that Cbt Spt positions a great places for senior Cpl's and 3rd year Pte's, it gives some time away from Rifle Platoon work - and gives experience from that to the Cbt Spt Platoons.
  Mortar, Recce/Sniper, Pioneer and Armor Defense Platoon aren't places for brand new troops.

I don't see the ability in Canada to break the trade further given the small Army - and limited positions for that.


FJAG said:


> That makes me think a bit cart before the horse. It works on the proposition that we have a reserve and a cheap government so let's see what we can do with it without first looking to see if we need a cheap, moderately trained force.
> 
> Where and how will we use these territorial units? Will it be for home defence? That presupposes an attack on Canada. And where do we need them, our main harbour areas? the north? Will we send it overseas as part of a NATO force? They already have such forces. Do they need or want more? Or do they want armoured or mech or artillery brigades? Will we use it on missions outside the country such as UN or training support missions? That's not a ResF job per se under our political/military construct - that's a full-timer job.
> 
> I keep pivoting the ResF towards a mech force in Europe. Why? 1) Europe needs more armoured and mech forces as a deterrent to the Putins in life and it fits our current NATO obligations, 2) such forces do not need to be forces in being - flyovers exercising regularly in Europe add deterrent value at a fraction of the cost of a full-time force and can be mobilized and deployed as threat levels go up 3) we already have the bulk of the equipment we need to equip such a force to a brigade level and to train and sustain it, 4) our RegF should pivot to being a) a leadership/training/support cadre for a mobilizable force, and b) light quick reaction forces and specialized units that are needed on a day-to-day, full-time basis and/or need constant training to hone their skills.


110% agreed with the above.


FJAG said:


> Our main impediment to restructuring the force in that way is that the RegF does not want to give up their toys to part-timers. The mantra that the ResF can't maintain them is ridiculous. The fact is that the ResF can't maintain this equipment under the current system. In any organization worth its salt if there is a capability gap then you redesign the system to close the gap. We have ignored doing that for decades. We continue to fine tune a broken concept.
> 
> We need to stop looking for a role for an inadequate ResF and restructure the force to make it affordable and capable for real defence needs.
> 
> The first step should always be - what are our day-to-day defence needs and what is the force we might need to generate for an extreme event.  I do not see a Ukrainian style territorial force as falling under either category in the foreseeable future. That might have been the case in the period before the Boer War but not now.
> 
> 🍻


 think we both agree that a European leaning Heavier force should be PRes Focused 30/70 type construct - the fact the ARNG has heavy armor (and real capabilities) means there is no reasonable argument that the PRes cannot do it.

Both the Reg Force and PRes in Canada seem to be enjoying the status quo of their rush to the bottom...


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> That makes me think a bit cart before the horse. It works on the proposition that we have a reserve and a cheap government so let's see what we can do with it without first looking to see if we need a cheap, moderately trained force.
> 
> Where and how will we use these territorial units? Will it be for home defence? That presupposes an attack on Canada. And where do we need them, our main harbour areas? the north? Will we send it overseas as part of a NATO force? They already have such forces. Do they need or want more? Or do they want armoured or mech or artillery brigades? Will we use it on missions outside the country such as UN or training support missions? That's not a ResF job per se under our political/military construct - that's a full-timer job.
> 
> I keep pivoting the ResF towards a mech force in Europe. Why? 1) Europe needs more armoured and mech forces as a deterrent to the Putins in life and it fits our current NATO obligations, 2) such forces do not need to be forces in being - flyovers exercising regularly in Europe add deterrent value at a fraction of the cost of a full-time force and can be mobilized and deployed as threat levels go up *3) we already have the bulk of the equipment we need to equip such a force to a brigade level and to train and sustain it, 4) our RegF should pivot to being a) a leadership/training/support cadre for a mobilizable force, and b) light quick reaction forces and specialized units that are needed on a day-to-day, full-time basis and/or need constant training to hone their skills.*


I don't see it as in conflict with the heavy aspect of your plans, but as proof of concept as to how it could be extended, particularly 4a.

Hypothetically, you get your way. Full Bde kit in Europe  2x 30/70 Bde's trained and organized to man it.  In this future this formation is fully kitted to modern standards, tracked IFV's, SP155's etc. etc.

Is it not reasonable to assume that

a.the Heavy tasking will require the commitment of  essentially all of the Grade A mechanized kit we acquire? (and currently all of what we have now)
b. that the combat arms reserves can/should deliver more than 8 (2per Bn x 4 30/70 Mech Bn's) Inf Coy's? and 4x tank + 4x recce squadrons

It seems like with some small tweaks and some RegF integration (HQ and CS Coy) the Swiss/Finnish template could yield formed battalions, maybe even a bde (with RegF help on CS/CSS) that aren't so much adhoc Ukrainian territorials as they are budget Stryker battalions, significantly increasing the size and deterrent effect of our flyover capability at a fraction of the cost.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> I don't see it as in conflict with the heavy aspect of your plans, but as proof of concept as to how it could be extended, particularly 4a.
> 
> Hypothetically, you get your way. Full Bde kit in Europe  2x 30/70 Bde's trained and organized to man it.  In this future this formation is fully kitted to modern standards, tracked IFV's, SP155's etc. etc.
> 
> Is it not reasonable to assume that
> 
> a.the Heavy tasking will require the commitment of  essentially all of the Grade A mechanized kit we acquire? (and currently all of what we have now)
> b. that the combat arms reserves can/should deliver more than 8 (2per Bn x 4 30/70 Mech Bn's) Inf Coy's? and 4x tank + 4x recce squadrons
> 
> It seems like with some small tweaks and some RegF integration (HQ and CS Coy) the Swiss/Finnish template could yield formed battalions, maybe even a bde (with RegF help on CS/CSS) that aren't so much adhoc Ukrainian territorials as they are budget Stryker battalions, significantly increasing the size and deterrent effect of our flyover capability at a fraction of the cost.


The Swiss and Finns have that template because they know exactly how many draftees they’ll get every year.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> The Swiss and Finns have that template because they know exactly how many draftees they’ll get every year.



So would we if we had any control over our supply chain of people, which any good organization should be able to figure out assuming a proactive recruitment processes...


Proactive recruitment is focused on sourcing, engaging, and attracting candidates ahead of hiring demand. With the ever-increasing time to hire and cost per hire, it makes sense for recruiters to engage their candidates proactively and stay ahead of the hiring demands.

Unlike reactive recruiting, proactive recruiting doesn’t depend on candidates applying for a position after it’s open. Instead, proactive recruitment focuses on identifying talent before its demand, establishing contact, nurturing relationships, and ultimately making the candidate interested in an open opportunity.

Proactive recruiters are much more like marketers and/or salespeople and tend to treat their candidates as customers. Candidates once sourced enter into your sales funnel or rather a series of stages ultimately resulting in the candidate working for your company.









						What is Proactive Recruitment?
					

Proactive recruitment involves finding, engaging, and recruiting candidates ahead of hiring needs. Learn more about its methodology & phases.




					recruiterflow.com


----------



## OldSolduer

Ostrozac said:


> Wait until self-propelled anti-aircraft guns make their big comeback in the counter-UAS role. They’ll be throwing up ordnance all over the sky at drones, helicopters, geese, unusual looking clouds…


Don't forget "very small rocks"


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Okay. Another cut at the Army's Future Force Structure. I call this one Force 2026 to be different.
> 
> Notes:
> 
> All brigades and units are still based on existing CA personnel counts (RegF and ResF) and equipment holdings (except a HIMARS and AD Arty regiment which are aspirational as far as equipment is concerned and will continue to be equipped with 105mm C3 until new equipment procured)
> 1 (CA) Div has one job and one job only - NATO commitment to Europe during Phase 1 (current equipment holdings) with a flyover armoured brigade and during Phase 2 (new equipment procured) up to a mech division.
> 2 (CA) Div is responsible for defence of Canada and being the lead on all other missions at up to battle group strength.
> Rather than classifying units by readiness levels, they are classified by manning and equipment holdings. e.g. a Type 30/70 unit or subunit has a 30% RegF manning and 70% ResF manning and holds 30% of that unit's equipment. Typically a 30/70 Bn would have 1 x 100/0 fully equipped and RegF manned company and 2 x 10/90 partially equipped companies with a 70/30 Bn HQ, and 30/70 CS Coy and CSS Coy.
> From it's own resources, 1 (CA) Div can immediately man 1 complete fully equipped Armd brigade in Canada as well as 1 complete fully equipped prepositioned Armd brigade in Europe.
> 2 (CA) Div forms all Canadian JTF headquarters based on 39 Bde Victoria (JTF West - BC, AB, SK & NT), 2 Bde Petawawa (JTF West Central - MB, ON & NU), 5 Bde Valcartier (JTF East Central - QC) and 36 Bde Halifax (JTF East - NS, NB, PE, & NL), Cdn RGR groups are placed under command of these four Bde/JTF headquarters.
> 2 (CA) Div no longer has any Mech bns, however each Type 100/0 or 30/70 recce regt or inf bn has an integral ground mobility platoon/troop or company/squadron with varying types of vehicles (including up to TAPV and LAV6) depending on role and therefore has some limited mech capabilities (appx 6 companies and 3-4 squadrons worth in total).
> A small Depot Bn has been added to Vancouver
> View attachment 74541
> 
> 🍻


Couple of questions about your proposed 3 Mechanized Brigade in Latvia.

Would this replace our eFP Latvia commitment or would it be in addition to that?  If 3 Brigade is in addition to eFP Latvia then presumably each force would require their own, separate equipment and support structures in theater.  

You show 3 Brigade as being 10/0 manning.  I assume that means that the Canadian-based Brigades would only fly over for annual exercises rather than provide rotating limited manning of the Brigade?  The Brigade HQ and the Maintenance Coy might possibly be at higher manning levels to coordinate with Allied units/service the pre-positioned equipment I'm thinking.

Do you see 3 Brigade as an actual separate Brigade HQ and unit structure or would on activation one of the three Canada-based Brigades just basically take over the equipment with the other two Brigades filling out the missing sub-units (until such time as the 10/90 sub-units can be worked up and rotated in)?


----------



## GK .Dundas

OldSolduer said:


> Don't forget "very small rocks"


The occasional hill.


----------



## GR66

And what about AD for your 1 Division/Latvia Brigade?  

You have equipment for a single Artillery Regiment in the pre-positioned Brigade.  Does each Artillery Regiment have an AD Battery integrated (2 x 6 gun batteries and an AD Battery?).  Or are you assuming that whatever Division we're under will provide AD?  

Your Artillery Brigade shows three Gun Regiments and a HIMARS Regiment.  If we're realistically only looking at supporting a single Mechanized Brigade rather than deploying a full Division then maybe an AD Regiment would be more useful than a HIMARS Regiment?


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Couple of questions about your proposed 3 Mechanized Brigade in Latvia.
> 
> Would this replace our eFP Latvia commitment or would it be in addition to that?  If 3 Brigade is in addition to eFP Latvia then presumably each force would require their own, separate equipment and support structures in theater.


My thought is that it would be separate. eFP Latvia has a key role and is part of an allied infrastructure and therefore committed to a specific task.

My thought on 3 Bde would be as a separate force separate from eFP Latvia. Where it would actually be located is a question in my mind for the moment. I'm thinking more in Poland as part of the US V Corps because there are better training areas and facilities there, much of V Corps is flyover, it would let us tie into the US sustainment chain and earn us particular brownie points with the US.


GR66 said:


> You show 3 Brigade as being 10/0 manning.  I assume that means that the Canadian-based Brigades would only fly over for annual exercises rather than provide rotating limited manning of the Brigade?  The Brigade HQ and the Maintenance Coy might possibly be at higher manning levels to coordinate with Allied units/service the pre-positioned equipment I'm thinking.


Exactly. The 10% is primarily in the headquarters to allow all the requisite liaison and planning and the maintenance organizations to keep the equipment serviceable year-round. The maintenance teams would be spread throughout the brigade service battalion and battalion A Echs. We had something similar with Z Bty 1 RCHA. G Bty 3 RCHA was designated as the flyover battery. Z Bty itself had a Battery Captain (Bty 2i/c) and an entire maintenance and Bty QM there (roughly 15-20 people) as well as a full battery's worth of equipment. G Bty's BK (me at the time) and my maintenance and Bty QM det were designated as stay behind and would reform our M109 battery based on redistribution and augmentation on our existing equipment. (I snuck over as a FOO though)

My thought is that 3 Bde's role (besides its obvious war time role) is the peace time role of replacing CMTC as the primary formation training organization for the CAF (particulalry 1 Div) where the aggregated Reg F components would fly over at least once per year (let's say Apr or May - maybe also late Oct/November) for the culmination of their collective training phases and training year and the aggregated ResF components in maybe two serials in late July and early Aug for their annual concentrations.


GR66 said:


> Do you see 3 Brigade as an actual separate Brigade HQ and unit structure or would on activation one of the three Canada-based Brigades just basically take over the equipment with the other two Brigades filling out the missing sub-units (until such time as the 10/90 sub-units can be worked up and rotated in)?


Not a complete HQ. The bulk of the brigade headquarters comes from the three Canadian based brigades. There would, however, be enough planning staff to allow year-round liaison with the next higher US headquarters (probably a divisional headquarters), participation in their CPXs/CAXs, planning and preparation for flyover components, coordination of year-round sustainment of equipment, maintenance of in theatre war stocks

Effectively on mobilization one or the other (or a combination) of the Canadian based brigades would fill out probably 95% of 3 Bde's establishment adding on to half of the 3 Bde's personnel while the other half of 3 Bde's personnel would form part of the theatre's Canadian command and support elements. How the latter would function is obviously an issue as to the depth of the arrangement with V Corps. It might require additional flyover forces for theatre level Canadian sustainment and support elements (which would come from 1 Div's 31 Sustainment Brigade and 2 Div's 6 Combat Support Brigade.). I haven't gone too deeply into that because its too nebulous. I have provided mobilizable elements to form that structure, however.



GR66 said:


> And what about AD for your 1 Division/Latvia Brigade?


An AD regiment is contained in 36 Arty Bde. It's purpose is to provide AD for any deployed force that needs it including to 3 Bde, however, the need for AD in 3 Bde would be part and parcel to the overall AD structure in V Corps and what commitment Canada makes to that.

As far as the eFP force is concerned, AD resources there depend on the overall structure of the NATO Multinational Div North that the eFP Latvia belongs to.



GR66 said:


> You have equipment for a single Artillery Regiment in the pre-positioned Brigade.  Does each Artillery Regiment have an AD Battery integrated (2 x 6 gun batteries and an AD Battery?).  Or are you assuming that whatever Division we're under will provide AD?


Each of my field regiments consist of three six-gun batteries, a UCAV battery and an STA troop. Guns are either M777s, C3s or G1s depending on the unit. UCAV equipment is as yet undefined. There is no AD allocated to any of the field regiments.

I've allocated the force two artillery brigades. 38 Arty bde in Shilo commands three field regiments organized as above, a General Support Regiment (notionally for HIMARS) and the divisional reconnaissance regiment (in a structure to work like the UK Deep Strike BCT) all focused on 1 CA Div's role. 36 Arty Bde in Quebec has 3 x Fd Regts and an Air Defence Regiment. The Fd regiments support 2 Div while the AD Regt is general support for both divs. Note the artillery structure with 36 Bde is a significant departure from previous iterations of my force structure.

As to 3 Bde's artillery regiment, I see it having 3 x M777 batteries, a UCAV battery, a recce squadron, and possibly a HIMARS battery and possibly an AD battery (depending on the arrangements with V Corps)


GR66 said:


> Your Artillery Brigade shows three Gun Regiments and a HIMARS Regiment.  If we're realistically only looking at supporting a single Mechanized Brigade rather than deploying a full Division then maybe an AD Regiment would be more useful than a HIMARS Regiment?


There is an additional notional HIMARS regiment within 38 Arty Bde and in previous iterations I allotted one of its batteries to augment 3 Bde's artillery regiment. I will probably do so again if for nothing else for flyover training purposes because the regiment is primarily a ResF regiment. Obviously the deployment of any such battery is dependent on the Army actually having a project to field such a system.

I've always included a plan for an "AD Regiment" in the structure based on the existing GBAD project. The size of that Regt will vary depending on the number of systems that will be procured under GBAD. My plan is for a three battery regiment in Canada with one RegF battery, fully equipped and two ResF batteries without equipment and training on the RegF equipment. Assuming that there is enough equipment purchased for a second battery then I would position it with 3 Bde to permit flyover training on it.

I think that both a HIMARS and an AD regiment are necessary for Canada. My question is where to place it? In earlier iterations I have placed HIMARS in a General Support Arty Bde together with a GS field regiment (guns only, no observers), and an AD Regt in order to provide general support as required by either brigade. More recently I have decided that it might be more efficient to target the HIMARS system to Europe and couple it with a Deep Strike Recce element (either brigade or Divisional capable). The Ukrainian model has influenced me greatly that Deep Strike is a viable concept that should be exploited by coupling recce and arty (rockets and UCAVs in particular but also guns with ever increasing ranges).

That left me pondering artillery support in 2 Div.

1 Div is built with the idea of prepositioning one brigade in Europe with existing equipment and being able to form a second brigade out of aggregating existing equipment in Canada that could be deployed into a two-brigade division in Europe in an extreme situation and where time to deploy is available.

2 Div on the other hand is designed specifically for deploying lighter battle groups on a variety of missions that might or might not be in NATO Europe. Their brigade HQs would be deploying more in the nature of an NCE than a fighting brigade HQ. I'd originally left the bulk of 2 Div's artillery as part of each brigade but have changed my mind and also created an arty brigade for 2 Div to aggregate their guns which means that this arty brigade is less of a general support bde but more of a close support one with administrative control over the AD Regiment which I see located in Gagetown and the Maritimes (but tasked for AD support for the Army as a whole). I've moved this arty brigade's HQ from Halifax to Quebec City to be more centrally located to the arty regiments that are its components - 2 RCHA, 5 RALC, 4 RCA(GS), 42 Fd, 30 Fd, 2 Fd, 6 Fd, 62 Fd, 1 Fd, 3 Fd, 84 Bty What will now be 37 Arty Bde will have four key operational bases: Petawawa (formed around 2 RCHA), Valcartier (formed around 2 Fd and 5 RALC), and Gagetown (formed around 4 RCA (GS) renamed back to 4 AD)

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> My thought is that it would be separate. eFP Latvia has a key role and is part of an allied infrastructure and therefore committed to a specific task.
> 
> My thought on 3 Bde would be as a separate force separate from eFP Latvia. Where it would actually be located is a question in my mind for the moment. I'm thinking more in Poland as part of the US V Corps because there are better training areas and facilities there, much of V Corps is flyover, it would let us tie into the US sustainment chain and earn us particular brownie points with the US.


One concern with your proposed force structure and keeping eFP Latvia separate is that you have a total of 6 x 100/0 LAV Companies in Canada presumably with these providing the eFP Company on a rotational basis.  If something kicks off rapidly vs Russia that leaves you 1 x LAV company short for your flyover 3 Brigade force.  This can eventually be made up as a Reserve Company is brought together, but still leaves your rapid deployment force less than fully manned.


FJAG said:


> Exactly. The 10% is primarily in the headquarters to allow all the requisite liaison and planning and the maintenance organizations to keep the equipment serviceable year-round. The maintenance teams would be spread throughout the brigade service battalion and battalion A Echs. We had something similar with Z Bty 1 RCHA. G Bty 3 RCHA was designated as the flyover battery. Z Bty itself had a Battery Captain (Bty 2i/c) and an entire maintenance and Bty QM there (roughly 15-20 people) as well as a full battery's worth of equipment. G Bty's BK (me at the time) and my maintenance and Bty QM det were designated as stay behind and would reform our M109 battery based on redistribution and augmentation on our existing equipment. (I snuck over as a FOO though)
> 
> My thought is that 3 Bde's role (besides its obvious war time role) is the peace time role of replacing CMTC as the primary formation training organization for the CAF (particulalry 1 Div) where the aggregated Reg F components would fly over at least once per year (let's say Apr or May - maybe also late Oct/November) for the culmination of their collective training phases and training year and the aggregated ResF components in maybe two serials in late July and early Aug for their annual concentrations.
> 
> Not a complete HQ. The bulk of the brigade headquarters comes from the three Canadian based brigades. There would, however, be enough planning staff to allow year-round liaison with the next higher US headquarters (probably a divisional headquarters), participation in their CPXs/CAXs, planning and preparation for flyover components, coordination of year-round sustainment of equipment, maintenance of in theatre war stocks
> 
> Effectively on mobilization one or the other (or a combination) of the Canadian based brigades would fill out probably 95% of 3 Bde's establishment adding on to half of the 3 Bde's personnel while the other half of 3 Bde's personnel would form part of the theatre's Canadian command and support elements. How the latter would function is obviously an issue as to the depth of the arrangement with V Corps. It might require additional flyover forces for theatre level Canadian sustainment and support elements (which would come from 1 Div's 31 Sustainment Brigade and 2 Div's 6 Combat Support Brigade.). I haven't gone too deeply into that because its too nebulous. I have provided mobilizable elements to form that structure, however.





FJAG said:


> An AD regiment is contained in 36 Arty Bde. It's purpose is to provide AD for any deployed force that needs it including to 3 Bde, however, the need for AD in 3 Bde would be part and parcel to the overall AD structure in V Corps and what commitment Canada makes to that.
> 
> As far as the eFP force is concerned, AD resources there depend on the overall structure of the NATO Multinational Div North that the eFP Latvia belongs to.


I guess a lot depends on how you envision 3 Brigade being employed.  If you're envisioning a Brigade that for political reasons you wish to have some operational autonomy it might serve a role similar to the later "mobile reserve" role of 4 CMBG.  In that case you might want to push down more key enablers (AD, EW, Recce, etc.) down to the Brigade Group level.

It could also expand the existing eFP commitment in Latvia to that of a Canadian-led multi-national Brigade in place of the existing multi-National Battle Group.  Currently the Division is organized as the Estonian 1st Infantry Brigade with eFP Estonia attached and the Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade with eFP Latvia attached.  Canada could provide the basis of a 3rd Maneuver Brigade for the Division.

In that case you may only need one fly-over Mech Battalion and the Tank Regiment in addition to the Mech Company in the multi-national Battalion.  You could also look at organizing our units as Combined Arms Battalions rather than a separate Tank Regiment and LAV Battalion to more closely match the way the eFP Battle Group is currently configured.  As you say above, the AD and other enablers in this case would depend on how NATO Multi-national Division North is supporting elements are structured.  

If instead 3 Brigade is to be embedded as one of the maneuver elements of an American Division then presumably we don't require our own integrated enablers like AD (or even Artillery) if we're going to follow their general BCT organizational structure.  This might be a bit of a tougher sell politically as our forces would be seen as working directly under US command in a way that would not be so obvious if we were an "independent" Brigade or part of a multi-national Division (which would both in reality still be operating under overall US command of course!).

This last option would actually be the easiest for us to fulfill in the long term if we were to move to US vehicles and equipment as our existing gear needs to be replaced so that we could fully integrate into the US support structures.


FJAG said:


> Each of my field regiments consist of three six-gun batteries, a UCAV battery and an STA troop. Guns are either M777s, C3s or G1s depending on the unit. UCAV equipment is as yet undefined. There is no AD allocated to any of the field regiments.
> 
> I've allocated the force two artillery brigades. 38 Arty bde in Shilo commands three field regiments organized as above, a General Support Regiment (notionally for HIMARS) and the divisional reconnaissance regiment (in a structure to work like the UK Deep Strike BCT) all focused on 1 CA Div's role. 36 Arty Bde in Quebec has 3 x Fd Regts and an Air Defence Regiment. The Fd regiments support 2 Div while the AD Regt is general support for both divs. Note the artillery structure with 36 Bde is a significant departure from previous iterations of my force structure.
> 
> As to 3 Bde's artillery regiment, I see it having 3 x M777 batteries, a UCAV battery, a recce squadron, and possibly a HIMARS battery and possibly an AD battery (depending on the arrangements with V Corps)
> 
> There is an additional notional HIMARS regiment within 38 Arty Bde and in previous iterations I allotted one of its batteries to augment 3 Bde's artillery regiment. I will probably do so again if for nothing else for flyover training purposes because the regiment is primarily a ResF regiment. Obviously the deployment of any such battery is dependent on the Army actually having a project to field such a system.
> 
> I've always included a plan for an "AD Regiment" in the structure based on the existing GBAD project. The size of that Regt will vary depending on the number of systems that will be procured under GBAD. My plan is for a three battery regiment in Canada with one RegF battery, fully equipped and two ResF batteries without equipment and training on the RegF equipment. Assuming that there is enough equipment purchased for a second battery then I would position it with 3 Bde to permit flyover training on it.
> 
> I think that both a HIMARS and an AD regiment are necessary for Canada. My question is where to place it? In earlier iterations I have placed HIMARS in a General Support Arty Bde together with a GS field regiment (guns only, no observers), and an AD Regt in order to provide general support as required by either brigade. More recently I have decided that it might be more efficient to target the HIMARS system to Europe and couple it with a Deep Strike Recce element (either brigade or Divisional capable). The Ukrainian model has influenced me greatly that Deep Strike is a viable concept that should be exploited by coupling recce and arty (rockets and UCAVs in particular but also guns with ever increasing ranges).


As noted above I think that the correct structure for our Artillery forces is highly dependent on how we plan to employ our Mechanized forces and integrate them into our allied force structures.


FJAG said:


> That left me pondering artillery support in 2 Div.
> 
> 1 Div is built with the idea of prepositioning one brigade in Europe with existing equipment and being able to form a second brigade out of aggregating existing equipment in Canada that could be deployed into a two-brigade division in Europe in an extreme situation and where time to deploy is available.
> 
> 2 Div on the other hand is designed specifically for deploying lighter battle groups on a variety of missions that might or might not be in NATO Europe. Their brigade HQs would be deploying more in the nature of an NCE than a fighting brigade HQ. I'd originally left the bulk of 2 Div's artillery as part of each brigade but have changed my mind and also created an arty brigade for 2 Div to aggregate their guns which means that this arty brigade is less of a general support bde but more of a close support one with administrative control over the AD Regiment which I see located in Gagetown and the Maritimes (but tasked for AD support for the Army as a whole). I've moved this arty brigade's HQ from Halifax to Quebec City to be more centrally located to the arty regiments that are its components - 2 RCHA, 5 RALC, 4 RCA(GS), 42 Fd, 30 Fd, 2 Fd, 6 Fd, 62 Fd, 1 Fd, 3 Fd, 84 Bty What will now be 37 Arty Bde will have four key operational bases: Petawawa (formed around 2 RCHA), Valcartier (formed around 2 Fd and 5 RALC), and Gagetown (formed around 4 RCA (GS) renamed back to 4 AD)
> 
> 🍻


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> One concern with your proposed force structure and keeping eFP Latvia separate is that you have a total of 6 x 100/0 LAV Companies in Canada presumably with these providing the eFP Company on a rotational basis.  If something kicks off rapidly vs Russia that leaves you 1 x LAV company short for your flyover 3 Brigade force.  This can eventually be made up as a Reserve Company is brought together, but still leaves your rapid deployment force less than fully manned.


The whole idea behind 30/70 forces is to increase the ability of the ResF units to, in time, be capable of running LAVs so that they will routinely take on Latvia rotos and be on higher states of readiness than they are now. 

Across 1 Div there are nine battle group headquarters capable of forming a combined arms battle group headquarters for Latvia with some augmentation (six infantry and three armoured). There are six RegF rifle companies and 12 ResF ones and the objective would be that any given Latvia mech company rotation would take a core of RegF personnel and be rounded out by ResF volunteers. I wouldn't expect more that one battle group headquarters and no more than a half a RegF company to go on any rotation.

The key point, however, is that the whole structure is to be a mobilizable force. If the situation gets desperate enough to require the whole brigade to deploy then it will go with with activated reservists and one would expect that, like the Ukraine. there will be precursors and time available to deploy a rapid vanguard followed by the main body. If necessary pulling GiBs from 2 Div. My guess is that we can assemble people faster than the aircraft to get them over.



GR66 said:


> I guess a lot depends on how you envision 3 Brigade being employed.  If you're envisioning a Brigade that for political reasons you wish to have some operational autonomy it might serve a role similar to the later "mobile reserve" role of 4 CMBG.  In that case you might want to push down more key enablers (AD, EW, Recce, etc.) down to the Brigade Group level.
> 
> It could also expand the existing eFP commitment in Latvia to that of a Canadian-led multi-national Brigade in place of the existing multi-National Battle Group.  Currently the Division is organized as the Estonian 1st Infantry Brigade with eFP Estonia attached and the Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade with eFP Latvia attached.  Canada could provide the basis of a 3rd Maneuver Brigade for the Division.
> 
> In that case you may only need one fly-over Mech Battalion and the Tank Regiment in addition to the Mech Company in the multi-national Battalion.  You could also look at organizing our units as Combined Arms Battalions rather than a separate Tank Regiment and LAV Battalion to more closely match the way the eFP Battle Group is currently configured.  As you say above, the AD and other enablers in this case would depend on how NATO Multi-national Division North is supporting elements are structured.
> 
> If instead 3 Brigade is to be embedded as one of the maneuver elements of an American Division then presumably we don't require our own integrated enablers like AD (or even Artillery) if we're going to follow their general BCT organizational structure.  This might be a bit of a tougher sell politically as our forces would be seen as working directly under US command in a way that would not be so obvious if we were an "independent" Brigade or part of a multi-national Division (which would both in reality still be operating under overall US command of course!).
> 
> This last option would actually be the easiest for us to fulfill in the long term if we were to move to US vehicles and equipment as our existing gear needs to be replaced so that we could fully integrate into the US support structures.
> 
> As noted above I think that the correct structure for our Artillery forces is highly dependent on how we plan to employ our Mechanized forces and integrate them into our allied force structures.


For me the issue isn't necessarily how I see it employed but more as one of providing capabilities that will give the government options when they have an issue that needs addressing.

In many ways the formation of 1 (CA) Div is an economy of effort structure that allows the government to meet its commitment for a force in Europe (essentially both an eFP battle group framework and a mechanized brigade out of existing holdings. (with the usual bugbear about anti-armour systems and air defence). Only one third of the RegF is committed to this role which simplifies the readiness issues for the Army as a whole.

The bulk of the force is contained in 2 (CA) Div, which has four 100/0 light infantry battalions and another eight 30/70 light battalions to mobilize none of which are tied down to Europe and can be used for a myriad of missions and which is highly flexible. Once again the aim is a core of ready forces and an ability to generate longer lasting rotos from both the 100/0 and 30/70 units with voluntary augmentees or activation if needed.

I've actually just fleshed out the structure of these divisions to the company level and will post them tomorrow evening for comments.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Well I said I was going to inflict another Napkin Force on everyone so here it is:




Note that rather than using readiness levels, the colour code is now based on 'types of units' based on their RegF to ResF ratios.

As before the ratio of RegF ratio also determines the extent to which the unit is equipped (except for the prepositioned 3 Bde which is fully equipped).

As before, the philosophy behind the structure is that 1 (CA) div is an economy of effort force based on large numbers of properly trained reservists to be used to mobilize a force as large as two mechanized brigades (one in Europe and one in Canada and the personnel for a third one. 2 (CA) Div on the other hand is the day-to-day force to cater to all other missions and is a light force capable of rapid reaction deployments. It's heaviest equipment is in the nature of TAPVs and some LAV 6 Surveillance systems. 2 (CA) Div can reinforce 1 (CA) Div with both personnel and with specialist equipment and skills contained in 6 Support Brigade. Similalry 1 (CA) Div can reinforce 2 (CA) Div with heavy equipment and extra logistics support from 31 Sustainment Bde.

As before, one of the objectives remain to provide more deployable entities (both headquarters, subunits and logistics elements) to facilitate creating tailormade task forces for missions so that units do not burn out. In part this is achieved by reducing the administrative headquarters (3 divisional headquarters, 10 CBG headquarters and over a hundred RSS teams) and placing them into deployable entities that command both RegF and ResF personnel and equipment. 

Major changes from the last one:

1) The ratio of 100/0 units is increased with four full battalions (two in 2 Bde and two in 5 Bde) Both Bde's are 70/30 structures to have its own source of reservists;

2) all artillery is removed from the manoeuvre brigades to be "pooled" in two artillery brigades. M777s are concentrated in 1 (CA) Div while 2 (CA) Div makes do with light guns. There are designated units to receive UCAVs, GBAD and HIMARS type systems;

3) engineer resources have also been 'divisonalized' into three engineer regiments, one to support each division and one ESR unit.

4) 1 (CA) Div has no coordinating domestic ops functions which are the responsibility of 2 (CA) Div and its two brigades and two infantry Regiments. This goes so far as to put a Cdn Ranger group under each of the four formations and to expand the rangers role along the entire coastline as well as inland. 1 (CA) Div may be tasked to augment 2 (CA) Div on domestic operations with both personnel and equipment.

5) There are now 7 Manoeuvre headquarters capable of deploying as major task force headquarters (plus the two artillery ones which can also be used in a pinch) and 25 battle group level headquarters (armour, infantry, cavalry) which can be assigned to TF rotations as required.

6) All LAVs are assigned to 1 (CA) Div (13 out of 18 companies in total. I would see three companies worth being reserved for use in depot battalions for training in Ontario and on the Prairies. The last two I would reserve for additional TF deployments as necessary. In addition I  contemplate that the six LAV companies and three tank squadrons prepositioned in Europe will be used regularly by 1 (CA) Div RegF and ResF units in flyover collective annual training exercises.

7) Reconnaissance units have been changed to a form of cavalry indicated by the blend of the recce and anti-armour symbols. Note that one such cavalry regiment has been assigned to 38 Arty brigade as the divisional deep strike recce unit.

8) Note that 2 (CA) Div has two "coastal" regiments (36 Cdn Inf Regt out of Halifax and 39 Cdn Inf Regt out of Victoria). Each regiment has one of its two battalion designated as amphibious. This is not full scale amphibious operations (a la Marines) but to be capable of joint operations with their respective Naval forces on each coast. Similarly each of 2 and 5 Bde have one of their two 100/0 battalions designated as airborne. This in not an attempt to reform the CAR but more designed to keep an airborne option up their sleeves that the Army can offer the government for both domestic and foreign quick reaction operations and to create a feeder stream for CSOR/JTF2

Finally note that I've assigned names to the various battalions and companies more as gut level staff check on the ability to round out the establishments with existing RegF and ResF strengths and geographic ability to function together.

Enjoy.

🍻


----------



## McG

I don’t think you will find success in a model that sees field units having their sub-units spread from Victoria to Halifax.


----------



## FJAG

McG said:


> I don’t think you will find success in a model that sees field units having their sub-units spread from Victoria to Halifax.


Understood, but there are agencies, like intelligence, CIMIC and the MPs now who are spread out like that. The US Army Reserve and Army National Guard also function with widely distributed sub units such as engineering companies, special force companies etc.

Intercommunication systems make these types of structures more possible than ever.

I think that one of the ResF greatest contributions to the country is its reach into the local communities which the RegF has completely abandoned by virtue of their concentration into a small handful of super (by our standards) bases. 

Wherever possible the units and their subunits have been grouped geographically but there are some situations where it can't be helped. Artillery on the Pacific coasts is a perfect example. There are two regiments but their numbers are basically a battery and a troop. There are two main solutions - have them under command of the coastal regiment/ brigade which takes them out of the artillery chain and leaves them no further ahead than now or assign them to an artillery organization that shares and controls their mission set. That in fact is the purpose behind 1 Fd Regt - to manage and control two units that provide support to two light infantry coastal regiments. One could also have them part of the 1 (CA) Div but "over the mountains" relationships are just as tenuous as across the country ones.

I think that you'll find, when you try to parse the best possible solution, that there just isn't always an optimum one available.

🍻


----------



## WLSC

FJAG said:


> Finally note that I've assigned names to the various battalions and companies more as gut level staff check on the ability to round out the establishments with existing RegF and ResF strengths and geographic ability to function together.



I like your guts assessment on the 34 AB in Mtl on the 2nd inf bn😎.


----------



## WLSC

FJAG said:


> Understood, but there are agencies, like intelligence, CIMIC and the MPs now who are spread out like that. The US Army Reserve and Army National Guard also function with widely distributed sub units such as engineering companies, special force companies etc.
> 
> Intercommunication systems make these types of structures more possible than ever.
> 
> I think that one of the ResF greatest contributions to the country is its reach into the local communities which the RegF has completely abandoned by virtue of their concentration into a small handful of super (by our standards) bases.
> 
> Wherever possible the units and their subunits have been grouped geographically but there are some situations where it can't be helped. Artillery on the Pacific coasts is a perfect example. There are two regiments but their numbers are basically a battery and a troop. There are two main solutions - have them under command of the coastal regiment/ brigade which takes them out of the artillery chain and leaves them no further ahead than now or assign them to an artillery organization that shares and controls their mission set. That in fact is the purpose behind 1 Fd Regt - to manage and control two units that provide support to two light infantry coastal regiments. One could also have them part of the 1 (CA) Div but "over the mountains" relationships are just as tenuous as across the country ones.
> 
> I think that you'll find, when you try to parse the best possible solution, that there just isn't always an optimum one available.
> 
> 🍻



It can work as long as units are expected to coordinate/level standards and best practices.  Those sub-units should be almost « independent ».


----------



## WestIsle

McG said:


> I don’t think you will find success in a model that sees field units having their sub-units spread from Victoria to Halifax.


Seems like a possible easy fix by focusing on having sub units for CS and CSS units drawn from their end of the country even if you cant do most armored engineer roles in Vancouver for example.


----------



## WestIsle

FJAG said:


> Well I said I was going to inflict another Napkin Force on everyone so here it is:
> View attachment 74707


This is completely unacceptable and unworkable as the Royal Westminster Regiment won't be given the jump tasking and as you may know the regiment was a jump regiment not so long ago....../s

All jokes aside I myself was thinking much the same thing with an attempt at a heavy and light division on each side of the country as we have a lot of manpower tied up in the 5 division construct atm. I would probably suggest trying to keep subunits on one side of the country. But as I have said before so much of the location and size of units is going to be dictated by the infrastructure which this does a good job of keeping to.


----------



## FJAG

WestIsle said:


> This is completely unacceptable and unworkable as the Royal Westminster Regiment won't be given the jump tasking and as you may know the regiment was a jump regiment not so long ago....../s


Funny that you should mention that as I thought there was another jump status ResF unit other than the QOR and was surprised to learn QOR was the only one these days. I'm perhaps overdoing the jump capability as I did add another one with the Voltigers to give 5 Bde a little depth and besides I think its a great draw to bring in keen young ResF soldiers if there's an opportunity for them.



WestIsle said:


> All jokes aside I myself was thinking much the same thing with an attempt at a heavy and light division on each side of the country as we have a lot of manpower tied up in the 5 division construct atm. I would probably suggest trying to keep subunits on one side of the country. But as I have said before so much of the location and size of units is going to be dictated by the infrastructure which this does a good job of keeping to.


That's exactly right. 

The fact is that working with existing infrastructure and unit type distribution across the country makes it difficult to keep things grouped as tightly as one wants. It's not a big problem as long as you have independent 140 man battalions grouped under an administrative headquarters but the moment you convert those to a 140 man companies that report to an operational battalion headquarters then the exercise becomes difficult except in the biggest urban centres. As I mentioned above, that shouldn't be the big issue most of us here in Canada think as the Guard in the US exists mostly in company sized armouries spread all around urban and rural areas. 

Here's a quick view of Florida NG and USAR units the vast majority of which are company or detachment sized  entities. 





You can see how widely they are distributed throughout the state in company sized armories. About half of these units belong to Florida's 53 IBCT out of Tampa but just as many belong to higher units and formations outside the state such as A Co of the 3 Bn of the 20th Special Forces Group in Ocala. The Bn is headquartered at Ft Blanding has another company in North Carolina and reports to its group headquarters in Birmingham Alabama.

If you discount BC, there's a pretty good dividing line for the Army based on the Ottawa valley and the Quebec Ont border north of that. The Reg F has a brigade on either side of that and one right on the border. Similarly numbers of ResF units balance out very roughly as between the east and the west with (based on some old figures) with roughly 2,400 on the Prairies, 5,200 in Ont, 4,200 in Que and 3,000 in the Maritimes. The question then is what do you do with BC's 1,500? It's very hard to put them into a mechanized force but they are quite well suited for light infantry and associated roles.

If you accept that the the west is the best place for mech training (Wainwrights and Shilo) then you are stuck with the fact that a 30/70 structure requires 1/3rd of 1 CMBG and all of the ResF in the Prairies to make one bde which pushes the other two bdes and their sustainment infrastructure into the population centres of Ont. Concurrently the weigh the light force towards a 70/30 or so establishment you need to add 2 Bde to the eastern divide (make the boundary Hwy 17 rather than the river) and you end up assigning much of 33 Bde to be the ResF roundout to 2 Bde. On top of that 33 Bde is the weakest of Ontario's three brigades and wouldn't be able to form the core of a good mech bde which slides you over to Montreal for the 3rd mech bde. It is well suited for it.

BC will always be a problem for RegF/ResF organizational structures. It's less of a problem where the demands on the ResF units isn't high and ResF leadership is left to their own devices on the other side of the mountains. BC will always be an outlier regardless of what criteria you use for the organization. A simple geographic grouping with the "Army of the West" might be seductive but is impractical once you add a functional break with a Europe-focused division. I prefer 39 Bde to have a coastal focus which functionally puts it into the "Light" Division.

Functional command trumps geographic in my books.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> The fact is that working with existing infrastructure and unit type distribution across the country makes it difficult to keep things grouped as tightly as one wants. It's not a big problem as long as you have independent 140 man battalions grouped under an administrative headquarters but the moment you convert those to a 140 man companies that report to an operational battalion headquarters then the exercise becomes difficult except in the biggest urban centres. As I mentioned above, that shouldn't be the big issue most of us here in Canada think as the Guard in the US exists mostly in company sized armouries spread all around urban and rural areas.
> 
> Here's a quick view of Florida NG and USAR units the vast majority of which are company or detachment sized  entities.
> 
> You can see how widely they are distributed throughout the state in company sized armories. About half of these units belong to Florida's 53 IBCT out of Tampa but just as many belong to higher units and formations outside the state such as A Co of the 3 Bn of the 20th Special Forces Group in Ocala. The Bn is headquartered at Ft Blanding has another company in North Carolina and reports to its group headquarters in Birmingham Alabama.


Not arguing the fact that there are ways to overcome the geography issues but just noting that Florida is 16% the size of Manitoba but has a population that's almost 60% of the total population of Canada.  

The US also has a much higher rate of military participation than Canada.  Approx. 7% of Americans have prior military service while only 1.5% of Canadians are veterans.  I'm assuming that translates into a much higher percentage of USNG/AR members having previously been in Active Service (and therefore have a higher baseline level of training and experience) than Canadian Reservists.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Not arguing the fact that there are ways to overcome the geography issues but just noting that Florida is 16% the size of Manitoba but has a population that's almost 60% of the total population of Canada.


That's not a fair comparison. Florida is occupied from one end to the other except for that little swamp in the south while 90% of Manitoba's population lives in a strip of land some 200 kms long and maybe 50 wide. The "populous" area of Florida exceeds that of Manitoba's several fold. 

The 116th Cavalry BCT of Idaho, an armoured BCT complete with M1s, M2 and M109s has battalions in Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Nevada. It is part of the 34th Infantry Division which is headquartered in Minnesota and which has additional BCTs in North and South Dakota, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Indian and Illinois and a few elements as far south as Kentucky and Georgia. Effectively it stretches along the northern states from the Pacific to Chicago and mostly in small company-sized armouries in rural areas as well as urban centres.



> 34th Infantry Division (United States) - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


It's not geography that defeats us; its lack of imagination.



GR66 said:


> The US also has a much higher rate of military participation than Canada.  Approx. 7% of Americans have prior military service while only 1.5% of Canadians are veterans.  I'm assuming that translates into a much higher percentage of USNG/AR members having previously been in Active Service (and therefore have a higher baseline level of training and experience) than Canadian Reservists.


The US currently has some 1,350,000 active and 800,000 reserve military personnel for a population of 332 million. Canada purportedly 68,000 regular and 27,000 reserves (which must include Rangers and a lot of NES). Essentially we have 11% of the US population and 4.4% of their military establishment (on a good day). It's no wonder they have a higher previous service rate.

I think that there are a lot of factors that translate into why more ARNG and USAR members have active service experience but I think it essentially boils down to a large world power like theirs needs a large military and they understand the financial and deterrence side of putting much of their personnel costs into a less expensive but equipped reserve. We don't have such imperatives and therefore both the government and the military leadership downplay the benefits of a proper reserve. 

I'm not so sure I agree about the quality of individual training. Up until recently it took only some 14 weeks to turn a recruit, Active or Guard, into a qualified infantryman (BCT and AIT combined). Its now 22. Our ResF basic training time wasn't far off with roughly 20 days each of BMQ, SQ and BIT which works out to roughly 12 weeks. Their officer training was also model on something similar to our old MITCIP blocks as their lowest denominator. I think that they have equipment (did I mention that the 34th ID has an ARNG Combat Aviation Brigade with attack helicopters, Black Hawks and Chinooks spread throughout Minnesota, Wisconsin, Idaho, Colorado, Michigan and the Dakotas? It's org chart puts it at 1,870 people and 159 aircraft). That's what makes all the difference.

Despite everything we had a lot of reservists in Afghanistan too. While they gained a lot of experience, many of them didn't bring it back to the units. Reserve COs that I've talked to said they would come back and be bored out of their gourds and many went to join the RegF or took other Class B contracts or left.

Playing with org charts is fun. I treat it something like doing a Sudoku puzzle. We can jig the org charts all we want. We can fix training. All of that helps in small increments. What's hard to do is to fix the quality of ResF service. Through no fault of the individual reservists, the quality of that service as the Army delivers it is systemically substandard and has been for over sixty years. I like the 30/70 - 70/30 constructs because they depart radically from how we do business and should help within the general framework of current manning, equipment holdings and budget. We need to do something before every WO and MWO we have all leave to join the railroad.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Despite everything we had a lot of reservists in Afghanistan too. While they gained a lot of experience, many of them didn't bring it back to the units. Reserve COs that I've talked to said they would come back and be bored out of their gourds and many went to join the RegF or took other Class B contracts or left.



My observation was that alot of them left because they were treated like shit, despite anything that people like me could do to correct those problems.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> My observation was that alot of them left because they were treated like shit, despite anything that people like me could do to correct those problems.


Very sad as those Reservists with significant overseas operational experience could have been an excellent foundation on which to build a new culture in the Reserves.

This kind of goes to my point above that we can't just take a model from another country (National Guard, Nordic country conscripts or Ukrainian "volunteers") and try to replicate them in Canada.  Our culture, geography, facilities, capabilities and political realities are different.  

Again, doesn't mean that our unique problems can't be resolved, just that we need to adapt any model to our own realities for it to work.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Very sad as those Reservists with significant overseas operational experience could have been an excellent foundation on which to build a new culture in the Reserves.
> 
> This kind of goes to my point above that we can't just take a model from another country (National Guard, Nordic country conscripts or Ukrainian "volunteers") and try to replicate them in Canada.  Our culture, geography, facilities, capabilities and political realities are different.
> 
> Again, doesn't mean that our unique problems can't be resolved, just that we need to adapt any model to our own realities for it to work.


You can, if you look at the US ARNG prior to 9/11 it had a lot of problems.  It had even more problems pre GW1.  
    The issue is one needs to critically and honestly conduct a review and make an actual effort into making changes.   

There is nothing stopping the CA from doing these changes other than themselves.


----------



## dapaterson

daftandbarmy said:


> My observation was that alot of them left because they were treated like shit, despite anything that people like me could do to correct those problems.


Depends.  I have a group shot of seven of my troops on deployment, over a decade ago (with names & ranks on the back, plus the names and ranks of three more at deployed at the same time).

Of those ten: one released in anger and frustration shortly after returning, one released after getting a new job about two years later, one released seven years later as his family and civ job got busier, one joined the Reg F and got court martialed and released.  The others are all still serving.  So unit culture makes a big difference as well.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Funny that you should mention that as I thought there was another jump status ResF unit other than the QOR and was surprised to learn QOR was the only one these days. I'm perhaps overdoing the jump capability as I did add another one with the Voltigers to give 5 Bde a little depth and besides I think its a great draw to bring in keen young ResF soldiers if there's an opportunity for them.
> 
> 
> That's exactly right.
> 
> The fact is that working with existing infrastructure and unit type distribution across the country makes it difficult to keep things grouped as tightly as one wants. It's not a big problem as long as you have independent 140 man battalions grouped under an administrative headquarters but the moment you convert those to a 140 man companies that report to an operational battalion headquarters then the exercise becomes difficult except in the biggest urban centres. As I mentioned above, that shouldn't be the big issue most of us here in Canada think as the Guard in the US exists mostly in company sized armouries spread all around urban and rural areas.
> 
> Here's a quick view of Florida NG and USAR units the vast majority of which are company or detachment sized  entities.
> 
> View attachment 74717
> 
> 
> View attachment 74716
> You can see how widely they are distributed throughout the state in company sized armories. About half of these units belong to Florida's 53 IBCT out of Tampa but just as many belong to higher units and formations outside the state such as A Co of the 3 Bn of the 20th Special Forces Group in Ocala. The Bn is headquartered at Ft Blanding has another company in North Carolina and reports to its group headquarters in Birmingham Alabama.
> 
> If you discount BC, there's a pretty good dividing line for the Army based on the Ottawa valley and the Quebec Ont border north of that. The Reg F has a brigade on either side of that and one right on the border. Similarly numbers of ResF units balance out very roughly as between the east and the west with (based on some old figures) with roughly 2,400 on the Prairies, 5,200 in Ont, 4,200 in Que and 3,000 in the Maritimes. The question then is what do you do with BC's 1,500? It's very hard to put them into a mechanized force but they are quite well suited for light infantry and associated roles.
> 
> If you accept that the the west is the best place for mech training (Wainwrights and Shilo) then you are stuck with the fact that a 30/70 structure requires 1/3rd of 1 CMBG and all of the ResF in the Prairies to make one bde which pushes the other two bdes and their sustainment infrastructure into the population centres of Ont. Concurrently the weigh the light force towards a 70/30 or so establishment you need to add 2 Bde to the eastern divide (make the boundary Hwy 17 rather than the river) and you end up assigning much of 33 Bde to be the ResF roundout to 2 Bde. On top of that 33 Bde is the weakest of Ontario's three brigades and wouldn't be able to form the core of a good mech bde which slides you over to Montreal for the 3rd mech bde. It is well suited for it.
> 
> BC will always be a problem for RegF/ResF organizational structures. It's less of a problem where the demands on the ResF units isn't high and ResF leadership is left to their own devices on the other side of the mountains. BC will always be an outlier regardless of what criteria you use for the organization. A simple geographic grouping with the "Army of the West" might be seductive but is impractical once you add a functional break with a Europe-focused division. I prefer 39 Bde to have a coastal focus which functionally puts it into the "Light" Division.
> 
> Functional command trumps geographic in my books.
> 
> 🍻



39 CBG's only real constraint is the availability of suitable training areas which, with a little good staff work, might be addressed through securing suitable Crown Land for both ranges and dry training areas. It's absurd that Force Design decisions should be artificially skewed by the lack of a few hectares of dirt to train on part time.

Trying to 'squeak by' with the current, very limited and barely adequate, training facilities and areas on a ginormous land base (bigger than the entire UK) is probably just acute laziness or inadequate staff expertise, on the part of Army HQ on down, or a combination of both.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Funny that you should mention that as I thought there was another jump status ResF unit other than the QOR and was surprised to learn QOR was the only one these days. I'm perhaps overdoing the jump capability as I did add another one with the Voltigers to give 5 Bde a little depth and besides I think its a great draw to bring in keen young ResF soldiers if there's an opportunity for them.
> 
> 
> That's exactly right.
> 
> The fact is that working with existing infrastructure and unit type distribution across the country makes it difficult to keep things grouped as tightly as one wants. It's not a big problem as long as you have independent 140 man battalions grouped under an administrative headquarters but the moment you convert those to a 140 man companies that report to an operational battalion headquarters then the exercise becomes difficult except in the biggest urban centres. As I mentioned above, that shouldn't be the big issue most of us here in Canada think as the Guard in the US exists mostly in company sized armouries spread all around urban and rural areas.
> 
> Here's a quick view of Florida NG and USAR units the vast majority of which are company or detachment sized  entities.
> 
> View attachment 74717
> 
> 
> View attachment 74716
> You can see how widely they are distributed throughout the state in company sized armories. About half of these units belong to Florida's 53 IBCT out of Tampa but just as many belong to higher units and formations outside the state such as A Co of the 3 Bn of the 20th Special Forces Group in Ocala. The Bn is headquartered at Ft Blanding has another company in North Carolina and reports to its group headquarters in Birmingham Alabama.
> 
> If you discount BC, there's a pretty good dividing line for the Army based on the Ottawa valley and the Quebec Ont border north of that. The Reg F has a brigade on either side of that and one right on the border. Similarly numbers of ResF units balance out very roughly as between the east and the west with (based on some old figures) with roughly 2,400 on the Prairies, 5,200 in Ont, 4,200 in Que and 3,000 in the Maritimes. The question then is what do you do with BC's 1,500? It's very hard to put them into a mechanized force but they are quite well suited for light infantry and associated roles.
> 
> If you accept that the the west is the best place for mech training (Wainwrights and Shilo) then you are stuck with the fact that a 30/70 structure requires 1/3rd of 1 CMBG and all of the ResF in the Prairies to make one bde which pushes the other two bdes and their sustainment infrastructure into the population centres of Ont. Concurrently the weigh the light force towards a 70/30 or so establishment you need to add 2 Bde to the eastern divide (make the boundary Hwy 17 rather than the river) and you end up assigning much of 33 Bde to be the ResF roundout to 2 Bde. On top of that 33 Bde is the weakest of Ontario's three brigades and wouldn't be able to form the core of a good mech bde which slides you over to Montreal for the 3rd mech bde. It is well suited for it.
> 
> BC will always be a problem for RegF/ResF organizational structures. It's less of a problem where the demands on the ResF units isn't high and ResF leadership is left to their own devices on the other side of the mountains. BC will always be an outlier regardless of what criteria you use for the organization. A simple geographic grouping with the "Army of the West" might be seductive but is impractical once you add a functional break with a Europe-focused division. I prefer 39 Bde to have a coastal focus which functionally puts it into the "Light" Division.
> 
> Functional command trumps geographic in my books.
> 
> 🍻


Don't forget all those National Guard Armories, with their HMMVWs and trucks are also emergency response centres.  The Feds may value their warfighting capabilities but the States value them for their local Civil roles.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> 39 CBG's only real constraint is the availability of suitable training areas which, with a little good staff work, might be addressed through securing suitable Crown Land for both ranges and dry training areas. It's absurd that Force Design decisions should be artificially skewed by the lack of a few hectares of dirt to train on part time.
> 
> Trying to 'squeak by' with the current, very limited and barely adequate, training facilities and areas on a ginormous land base (bigger than the entire UK) is probably just acute laziness or inadequate staff expertise, on the part of Army HQ on down, or a combination of both.


Let me guess - no one kept any portion of Chilliwack's range facilities for 39 Bde.

I've been wracking my brains since I went through CFOCS Venture in Esquimalt for my BOTC - I'm sure we qualified on a range somewhere - William's Head, or Albert Head, or Royal Roads maybe?

I know when I was with 3 RCHA I went out to Yakima as a safety officer for 5 Fd Bty (as it then was and should be again) and 15 Fd Regt.

Sigh.

🍻


----------



## dapaterson

Volkes and Slesse were the two ranges around Chilliwack, as I recall.


----------



## markppcli

Cooked and the training area in Chilcotin?


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Let me guess - no one kept any portion of Chilliwack's range facilities for 39 Bde.
> 
> I've been wracking my brains since I went through CFOCS Venture in Esquimalt for my BOTC - I'm sure we qualified on a range somewhere - William's Head, or Albert Head, or Royal Roads maybe?
> 
> I know when I was with 3 RCHA I went out to Yakima as a safety officer for 5 Fd Bty (as it then was and should be again) and 15 Fd Regt.
> 
> Sigh.
> 
> 🍻


According to Wikipedia ASU Chilliwack is responsible for the following training areas:

Training Areas[edit]​ASU Chilliwack has responsibility over several military training areas. These areas are often used by Regular Force units from 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Reserve Force units from Mainland British Columbia, some units training for deployment to Afghanistan, and as well as Cadets.

ASU Chilliwack maintains ranges and training areas for use by it dependencies, as well as visiting units.


Vokes Range
Slesse Creek Demolition Training Areas
Columbia Valley Training Area
Trail Rifle Range
Stone Creek Training Area
Vernon Military Camp
OPSEE Training Area
Chilcotin Training Area
Vedder Mountain Training Area
Richmond – Armoury and transmitter site


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> Let me guess - no one kept any portion of Chilliwack's range facilities for 39 Bde.
> 
> I've been wracking my brains since I went through CFOCS Venture in Esquimalt for my BOTC - I'm sure we qualified on a range somewhere - William's Head, or Albert Head, or Royal Roads maybe?
> 
> I know when I was with 3 RCHA I went out to Yakima as a safety officer for 5 Fd Bty (as it then was and should be again) and 15 Fd Regt.
> 
> Sigh.
> 
> 🍻



The Vokes Range has a restricted template now that they discovered it was laid out incorrectly from inception, infringing on FN land. I'm not sure if they can fire 7.62mm on it yet, and it was constrained to 5.56mm for quite awhile. There's Heals Range in Victoria, and the range in Nanaimo, but: Vancouver Island.

Regardless, there's no range facilities available in BC to do any type of field firing, from pairs F&M on up, and no dry training area with even a tiny portion of what's available at Joint Base Lewis-McChord/ Yakima in Washington State, or Wainwright. 

Also, the US training facilities are pretty much impossible to access easily, for whatever reason, and are not a reliable option for training plans that need to have a high degree of certainty.

The Chilcotin is too far to be useful except in the summer months, when the militia don't need it, and is continually under pressure from FN land claims.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Chilliwack also used to have a SMG Jungle lane with pop up targets.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Colin Parkinson said:


> Chilliwack also used to have a SMG Jungle lane with pop up targets.



And a 3.5 in Rocket range. But no more.

The grenade range is still there, I think, and Slesse Creek Dems range is still in use.


----------



## OldSolduer

daftandbarmy said:


> The Vokes Range has a restricted template now that they discovered it was laid out incorrectly from inception, infringing on FN land. I'm not sure if they can fire 7.62mm on it yet, and it was constrained to 5.56mm for quite awhile. There's Heals Range in Victoria, and the range in Nanaimo, but: Vancouver Island.
> 
> Regardless, there's no range facilities available in BC to do any type of field firing, from pairs F&M on up, and no dry training area with even a tiny portion of what's available at Joint Base Lewis-McChord/ Yakima in Washington State, or Wainwright.
> 
> Also, the US training facilities are pretty much impossible to access easily, for whatever reason, and are not a reliable option for training plans that need to have a high degree of certainty.
> 
> The Chilcotin is too far to be useful except in the summer months, when the militia don't need it, and is continually under pressure from FN land claims.


So just to be clear there is no area in BC where the PRes can safely live fire infantry weapons? Or indirect fire?


----------



## daftandbarmy

OldSolduer said:


> So just to be clear there is no area in BC where the PRes can safely live fire infantry weapons? Or indirect fire?



Nope. Just the Chilcotin, which is an 8 hour drive from Vancouver and not usable for much of the training year due to weather etc.









						Chilcotin Training Area
					

Chilcotin Training Area is a military base in British Columbia and has an elevation of 1,100 metres. Mapcarta, the open map.




					mapcarta.com


----------



## KevinB

OldSolduer said:


> So just to be clear there is no area in BC where the PRes can safely live fire infantry weapons? Or indirect fire?


According to the CAF...

Volkes could be upgraded due to the terrain to allow for small arms fire fielding, they where on a restricted template in 2000, and it took me about 15min to figure out how to fix that one, it really isn't rocket science to push up some berms and reorient a range - or to put "jungle lane" type activities in a low area with ridges around it.
   It has a Mountain as a back stop - so shifting the orientation of the range and the location of the firing points could give a lot more usable range - and you could have a 1400m UKD/Field firing range on the side of the reoriented KD (with a large enough berm you could run both without issue).


----------



## dapaterson

Chilcotin: Plus the occasional brush fire when the fire index is extremely high, but 39 CBG fires tracer regardless.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> The Vokes Range has a restricted template now that they discovered it was laid out incorrectly from inception, infringing on FN land. I'm not sure if they can fire 7.62mm on it yet, and it was constrained to 5.56mm for quite awhile. There's Heals Range in Victoria, and the range in Nanaimo, but: Vancouver Island.
> 
> Regardless, there's no range facilities available in BC to do any type of field firing, from pairs F&M on up, and no dry training area with even a tiny portion of what's available at Joint Base Lewis-McChord/ Yakima in Washington State, or Wainwright.
> 
> Also, the US training facilities are pretty much impossible to access easily, for whatever reason, and are not a reliable option for training plans that need to have a high degree of certainty.
> 
> The Chilcotin is too far to be useful except in the summer months, when the militia don't need it, and is continually under pressure from FN land claims.


I’ve done a line fire woods clearing in Chilcotin, we also shit 84 and C6 SF there. Want to say it was February / March? Had a very motivated RSS team that made it happen. Will and a way.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I’ve done a line fire woods clearing in Chilcotin, we also shit 84 and C6 SF there. Want to say it was February / March? Had a *very motivated RSS team *that made it happen. Will and a way.



It's a wonderful thing when that happens.

However, Chilcotin's still not a viable option in the same way that Wainwright, for example, might be for nearby units.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> It's a wonderful thing when that happens.
> 
> However, Chilcotin's still not a viable option in the same way that Wainwright, for example, might be for nearby units.


Maybe in absence of a viable local wilderness training area the lower mainland would be an ideal spot to develop an urban warfare centre?


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Maybe in absence of a viable local wilderness training area the lower mainland would be an ideal spot to develop an urban warfare centre?


The fact that there is a slew of Crown land that could be used easily for non live (and live with a lot more prep) right there just shows me that a lot of Units are just lazy.  

Urban sites take a ton of land and facilities to make worthwhile, as well as a slew of experience to design and operate safely.   
   *Not in the PRes lane at all.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> The fact that there is a slew of Crown land that could be used easily for non live (and live with a lot more prep) right there just shows me that a lot of Units are just lazy.
> 
> Urban sites take a ton of land and facilities to make worthwhile, as well as a slew of experience to design and operate safely.
> *Not in the PRes lane at all.


Of course you could probably achieve 90 percent of your fire and movement goals with simunition and massively reduce the template but that’s probably too outside the box for the CAF.



daftandbarmy said:


> It's a wonderful thing when that happens.
> 
> However, Chilcotin's still not a viable option in the same way that Wainwright, for example, might be for nearby units.




Viable for a week long even, it’s a day long trip. For a weekend exercise I agree but you’re probably not going live on those anyways.


----------



## daftandbarmy

dapaterson said:


> Chilcotin: Plus the occasional brush fire when the fire index is extremely high, but 39 CBG fires tracer regardless.



I once had the pleasure of working with a client, who knew I was in the Reserves, that pointed out we had 'made the Provincial wildfire report' one May when my unit's machine gun course burned down the Chilcotin.

We're Number One! 

Because of the increasing, perennial, fire danger in that neck of the woods, I'm sure the Chilcotin will become unusuable in the not too distant future.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> I once had the pleasure of working with a client, who knew I was in the Reserves, that pointed out we had 'made the Provincial wildfire report' one May when my unit's machine gun course burned down the Chilcotin.
> 
> We're Number One!
> 
> Because of the increasing, perennial, fire danger in that neck of the woods, I'm sure the Chilcotin will become unusuable in the not too distant future.


There is 7.62 (as well as 5.56mm and .50) belted available without tracer, you know for things like fire index issues. 

It makes it a lot easier than having troops delink the tracer from the belts (though it does deprive you from linking up 100% tracer belts for ‘laser’ shows later.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> The fact that there is a slew of Crown land that could be used easily for non live (and live with a lot more prep) right there just shows me that a lot of Units are just lazy.
> 
> Urban sites take a ton of land and facilities to make worthwhile, as well as a slew of experience to design and operate safely.
> *Not in the PRes lane at all.


Not saying it has to be a PRes run thing...although the 40th ID of the California National Guard is taking the lead in creating the first Urban Warfare Planners course in the US.  

We may have a long way to go to get there, but it shows what is possible.

And while it's still very important to learn and train for this:


I think there's a very great likelihood that we're going to be more likely to have to be prepared for this in the future:


----------



## quadrapiper

FJAG said:


> Let me guess - no one kept any portion of Chilliwack's range facilities for 39 Bde.
> 
> I've been wracking my brains since I went through CFOCS Venture in Esquimalt for my BOTC - I'm sure we qualified on a range somewhere - William's Head, or Albert Head, or Royal Roads maybe?
> 
> I know when I was with 3 RCHA I went out to Yakima as a safety officer for 5 Fd Bty (as it then was and should be again) and 15 Fd Regt.
> 
> Sigh.
> 
> 🍻


If BC Ferries wasn't involved, probably Heals up in Saanich, though RRMC had some small range facilities. (maybe pistol only?)  

Not sure if Albert Head ever had a rifle range; there's currently a grenade range (on what is admittedly a somewhat rifle range-shaped bit of cleared land, though I can't imagine anyone being happy with its orientation if that _was _what it was used for in the dawn of time). Williams Head is home to a jail. Off Rocky Point, just to complete the tour of ranges, is Bentinck Island with a demolition range. Mary Hill, behind William Head, IIRC has (had?) a healthy supply of UXO, so someone was chucking something around there at some point.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Not saying it has to be a PRes run thing...although the 40th ID of the California National Guard is taking the lead in creating the first Urban Warfare Planners course in the US.
> 
> We may have a long way to go to get there, but it shows what is possible.
> 
> And while it's still very important to learn and train for this:
> View attachment 74747
> 
> I think there's a very great likelihood that we're going to be more likely to have to be prepared for this in the future:
> View attachment 74748


Irrelevant, doesn’t validate combat team commanders


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> If BC Ferries wasn't involved, probably Heals up in Saanich, though RRMC had some small range facilities. (maybe pistol only?)
> 
> Not sure if Albert Head ever had a rifle range; there's currently a grenade range (on what is admittedly a somewhat rifle range-shaped bit of cleared land, though I can't imagine anyone being happy with its orientation if that _was _what it was used for in the dawn of time). Williams Head is home to a jail. Off Rocky Point, just to complete the tour of ranges, is Bentinck Island with a demolition range. Mary Hill, behind William Head, IIRC has (had?) a healthy supply of UXO, so someone was chucking something around there at some point.



RRU is now a civilian university and the ranges are out of use and over grown.

There are also very few pieces of CAF owned terrain to shake out a dismounted unit, larger than a couple of sections or so, anywhere close to Vancouver/Lower Mainland, or on Vancouver Island, where most of the troops are. Rocky Point is very limited, for example, as are the various Chilliwack dry training areas. 

It's a real PITA when you're trying to develop skills above section level in anything other than patrolling.


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> RRU is now a civilian university and the ranges are out of use and over grown.
> 
> There are also very few pieces of CAF owned terrain to shake out a dismounted unit, larger than a couple of sections or so, anywhere close to Vancouver/Lower Mainland, or on Vancouver Island, where most of the troops are. Rocky Point is very limited, for example, as are the various Chilliwack dry training areas.
> 
> It's a real PITA when you're trying to develop skills above section level in anything other than patrolling.


Absolutely: was just trying to guess at where FJAG might have qual'd some indeterminate number of years ago. Quite like how the CAF has divested to various degrees all sorts of useful space in the Esquimalt area: Fort Rodd and Hatley Park (RRMC, now RRU). Probably not big enough to be any more useful than Rocky for army training, but might come in handy for other purposes.

I'm enjoying the notion of sending units up to Chilcotin: enjoy the ad hoc winter survival ex on the side of the road.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Irrelevant, doesn’t validate combat team commanders


Not sure what point you're making.  

My reference to the 40th ID initiative was to point out that a properly run, organized and equipped Reserve organization is capable of taking on pretty complex initiatives.  As Kevin B stated setting up and running something like an Urban Warfare Centre is simply outside the capabilities of CA Reserves at the present time, but that's not to say that we shouldn't strive toward these types of capabilites.

My Wainwright/Mariupol references simply suggest that the Army seems to spend a disproportionate amount of time training for one type of warfare when it's highly likely that urban warfare could be the more probably type of terrain we'll end up fighting in.  Are you suggesting that urban warfare training doesn't lend itself to training combat team commanders?


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> Not sure what point you're making.
> 
> My reference to the 40th ID initiative was to point out that a properly run, organized and equipped Reserve organization is capable of taking on pretty complex initiatives.  As Kevin B stated setting up and running something like an Urban Warfare Centre is simply outside the capabilities of CA Reserves at the present time, but that's not to say that we shouldn't strive toward these types of capabilites.
> 
> My Wainwright/Mariupol references simply suggest that the Army seems to spend a disproportionate amount of time training for one type of warfare when it's highly likely that urban warfare could be the more probably type of terrain we'll end up fighting in.  Are you suggesting that urban warfare training doesn't lend itself to training combat team commanders?


I think there was some humor in his sarcastic point.

1) Urban Ops a messy - and very few Commanders want to get validated in one, as it would probably be a disaster - and a career impediment.
2) The CA is not a very agile or forward thinking entity - they will be training for Cbt Team + Validation when other Armies a using teleportation, and death rays.


----------



## dapaterson

quadrapiper said:


> Absolutely: was just trying to guess at where FJAG might have qual'd some indeterminate number of years ago.


----------



## childs56

More then likely Heals range was used in Victoria.  

As for a dry fire training Area. The Forestry Companies around Nanaimo were very lenient to us dry training on their land. They allowed Smoke, T flashes , Arty sims and blanks to be used. Along with providing some very detailed maps of their land. I think we used their land twice during my time. Doing Cresting drills alongside a mountain was interesting. They also were at the time willing to let us do live fire rifle and MG if we gave them the notice so they could ensure the area was safe (we never did pursue this)  They stated the military used to have Artillery/ Mortar range in the area.


----------



## daftandbarmy

childs56 said:


> More then likely Heals range was used in Victoria.
> 
> As for a dry fire training Area. *The Forestry Companies around Nanaimo *were very lenient to us dry training on their land. They allowed Smoke, T flashes , Arty sims and blanks to be used. Along with providing some very detailed maps of their land. I think we used their land twice during my time. Doing Cresting drills alongside a mountain was interesting. They also were at the time willing to let us do live fire rifle and MG if we gave them the notice so they could ensure the area was safe (we never did pursue this)  They stated the military used to have Artillery/ Mortar range in the area.



No longer. Mosaic (the current forest company that owns most of the private land on VI) is very risk averse, as they should be.

The need for a reasonable, reliably available, well equipped field training facility (live firing and dry firing) in BC close to the major population centres is starkly evident, and long ignored, unfortuantely.

Relying on random and happy accidents, like the occasional forest company letting us use their land, is no way to run a railroad... or to train soldiers for battle.


----------



## childs56

daftandbarmy said:


> No longer. Mosaic (the current forest company that owns most of the private land on VI) is very risk averse, as they should be.


We use to deal with TimberWest and Macblo, They were pretty good to deal with. What I liked was nav exercises were in the woods.  Dry gun deployments were in not pre approved flattish locations. 


daftandbarmy said:


> The need for a reasonable, reliably available, well equipped field training facility (live firing and dry firing) in BC close to the major population centres is starkly evident, and long ignored, unfortuantely.


We always said Vancouver Island could use a good multi use range. Lots of land that could be utilized as a impact area. But to many protesters. 


daftandbarmy said:


> Relying on random and happy accidents, like the occasional forest company letting us use their land, is no way to run a railroad... or to train soldiers for battle.


Land use with them use to be based on mutual respect. I Know Mosaic limits many users dues to being responsible for the third parties damage to the land and infrastructure as indicated by the Gov of BC. The lands from Comox lake into the mountains use to be freely open to public access. After a few car collisions into the lake, some road damage from idiots. The gov going after the land owner/ leaser they locked the gates. I am not sure now but they had them locked most of the time. Which sucked because getting into some of the small lakes back in there was more difficult.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Not sure what point you're making.
> 
> My reference to the 40th ID initiative was to point out that a properly run, organized and equipped Reserve organization is capable of taking on pretty complex initiatives.  As Kevin B stated setting up and running something like an Urban Warfare Centre is simply outside the capabilities of CA Reserves at the present time, but that's not to say that we shouldn't strive toward these types of capabilites.
> 
> My Wainwright/Mariupol references simply suggest that the Army seems to spend a disproportionate amount of time training for one type of warfare when it's highly likely that urban warfare could be the more probably type of terrain we'll end up fighting in.  Are you suggesting that urban warfare training doesn't lend itself to training combat team commanders?


My point, I’ve probably made it a couple times, was to point out that the CAF has no real interest in Pershing urban operations, our training cycles are built to culminate in combat team attack ranges to validate their commanders. There is no requirement for a company commander to take an urban objective with their company, which is absurd but is probably digressing.

BC needs to either have a range / training area with better access inside it, or have a formal agreement to access and use something south of the border.


----------



## Infanteer

Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing.  It is not a "different type" of warfare either.

Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.


----------



## CBH99

Infanteer said:


> Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing.  It is not a "different type" of warfare either.
> 
> Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.


Combat footage from Falluja (either 1st or 2nd time driving insurgent forces out en-mass) shows just this.  All arms in.  

Plenty of infantry going block by block, building by building.  Tanks & IFV’s providing a solid punch from the street where called for, helping the infantry in clearing some well fortified positions, while infantry kept the immediately area around the vehicles clear of insurgents.  

One hell of a bloody battle, both times.  

Without the armour, it would have been a lot worse


----------



## daftandbarmy

childs56 said:


> We use to deal with TimberWest and Macblo, They were pretty good to deal with. What I liked was nav exercises were in the woods.  Dry gun deployments were in not pre approved flattish locations.
> 
> We always said Vancouver Island could use a good multi use range. Lots of land that could be utilized as a impact area. But to many protesters.
> 
> Land use with them use to be based on mutual respect. I Know Mosaic limits many users dues to being responsible for the third parties damage to the land and infrastructure as indicated by the Gov of BC. The lands from Comox lake into the mountains use to be freely open to public access. After a few car collisions into the lake, some road damage from idiots. The gov going after the land owner/ leaser they locked the gates. I am not sure now but they had them locked most of the time. Which sucked because getting into some of the small lakes back in there was more difficult.



Coincidentally, it looks like the local SAR community has out-thought/ manoeuvred the military. If the military was smart enough to begin seeking a similar agreement at all, of course 

Mosaic Forest Management opens land to search and rescue training​ 
Mosaic Forest Management, which manages private timberlands and public forest tenures on Vancouver Island, has signed a deal with seven Island search and rescue groups giving them land access

Mosaic Forest Management, which manages private timberlands and public forest tenures on Vancouver Island, has signed a deal with seven Island search and rescue groups giving them land access for training purposes.

The agreements also offer data-sharing opportunities and support for the groups.

“We’re very proud to support the dedicated volunteers of these search and rescue organizations,” said Domenico Iannidinardo, Mosaic’s chief forester. “They play a critical role in public safety, providing a vital lifeline to those who are lost or injured in the Vancouver Island wilderness.”










						Mosaic Forest Management opens land to search and rescue training
					

Mosaic Forest Management, which manages private timberlands and public forest tenures on Vancouver Island, has signed a deal with seven Island search and rescue groups giving them land access




					www.timescolonist.com


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing.  It is not a "different type" of warfare either.


Precision Urban Combat is however.
   I would argue that most NATO countries populations wouldn't be exceptionally thrilled for a Grozny/Mariupol type event.



Infanteer said:


> Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.


Again it depends on context of the Operation - and the Enemy forces.
  Light Forces can succeed in many ways where heavier combined forces will not (unless you consider destruction of the city to be a valid COA).

If you are only facing fairly lightly armed fighter, you are going to be better off (in the long run) using precision and targeted killings to effect change -- using SOF, with rapid precision strikes from both Low Vis mobility and Rotary Wing, and having a Armored QRF.

If you are facing a determined conventional opponent - then yes I agree that Combined Arms operations are the only way to go - unless you can just isolate the city and starve them out.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing.  It is not a "different type" of warfare either.
> 
> Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.


I don’t disagree with anything you said.

The problem is we do not train in any kind of complex terrain. We do not do woods clearings, we do not clear trench lines, we do not clear urban areas in culminating exercises. Certainly not beyond section or, very rarely, platoon level.


----------



## Kirkhill

Infanteer said:


> Urban warfare is not black magic, despite some figures trying to turn it into such a thing.  It is not a "different type" of warfare either.
> 
> Success in an urban engagement is achieved through the same tactics as in other forms of complex terrain. And it does not favor "light forces" - historically the most successful urban operations have been those that incorporate all arms; urban operations with tanks see a significant decline in friendly casualties.



Tanks were conceived of as siege engines and work well in that role.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Tanks were conceived of as siege engines and work well in that role.


In the Urban environment Tanks however work poorly alone - they require DISMOUNTED Infantry to provide security and screening - while they provide the Infantry a Rolling Firebase.
   At the individual level between tank and infantry it requires a great deal of communication and experience to work decently together (tank not squishing infantry, and infantry not leaving tank alone to it's demise).

A good friend of mine once called the M1 Abrams the most dangerous thing to the American Infantryman - in the terms of battles in Iraq - he was not wrong...


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I don’t disagree with anything you said.
> 
> The problem is we do not train in any kind of complex terrain. We do not do woods clearings, we do not clear trench lines, we do not clear urban areas in culminating exercises. Certainly not beyond section or, very rarely, platoon level.



FWIW, our soldiers can do that stuff very well in my experience. 

Many of our leaders are so risk averse though, they shudder at the thought of anyone leaving the pavement or 'rolling plains'.


----------



## Kirkhill

Other urban combat facilitator


markppcli said:


> I don’t disagree with anything you said.
> 
> The problem is we do not train in any kind of complex terrain. We do not do woods clearings, we do not clear trench lines, we do not clear urban areas in culminating exercises. Certainly not beyond section or, very rarely, platoon level.



Mark, I'm going to put this carefully, as an honest question - not trying to stir the pot.

But

Do you need the LAV team to conduct that form of training in complex terrain?  I know this comes back to the same point I keep pounding on but a lot of that training may benefit from different ratios of foot to mounted troops.

For example, a platoon of LAVs and a company of dismounts may be a better configuration, or a battalion of dismounts and troop of tanks, than a force with one LAV per section.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Other urban combat facilitator
> 
> 
> Mark, I'm going to put this carefully, as an honest question - not trying to stir the pot.
> 
> But
> 
> Do you need the LAV team to conduct that form of training in complex terrain?  I know this comes back to the same point I keep pounding on but a lot of that training may benefit from different ratios of foot to mounted troops.
> 
> For example, a platoon of LAVs and a company of dismounts may be a better configuration, or a battalion of dismounts and troop of tanks, than a force with one LAV per section.


There are going to be time, a Section/Squad and 1 tank make sense - there will be times (in the CA context) a Company of LAV's and a Squadron of Tanks makes sense -- the issue is it will come down to both the terrain, and the enemy force disposition.
   For a lot of things a 25mm (ideally larger) cannon on a HAPC would be a nice tool too.

Based on my experiences, tracks are better in rubble, but wheels are better for mobility when the city isn't debris strewn - however tank and 25mm casings will tear up some LAV tires when on concrete and pavement at inopportune times.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> FWIW, our soldiers can do that stuff very well in my experience.
> 
> Many of our leaders are so risk averse though, they shudder at the thought of anyone leaving the pavement or 'rolling plains'.


My issues come down to the fact that we don’t plan to deal with that complex terrain because we don’t include it in those larger muscle movements. I posed the question to an OC of mine about you would make entry to a trench system after the obstacle breach, as an example,  and we talked a fair bit about how it’s something no one in the room, CSM included, had ever seen done. It should be assumed that the positions behind an obstacle will be intact trenches. We should expect to deal with those as a matter of course. We also routinely ignore defile drills / woods clearing as a time consideration.




Kirkhill said:


> Other urban combat facilitator
> 
> 
> Mark, I'm going to put this carefully, as an honest question - not trying to stir the pot.
> 
> But
> 
> Do you need the LAV team to conduct that form of training in complex terrain?  I know this comes back to the same point I keep pounding on but a lot of that training may benefit from different ratios of foot to mounted troops.



In terms of actually kick doors ? Not really no. The crew will probably be training their dismount skills if it’s low level. But there needs to be training done to include those vehicles so everyone is in the same page. See defile drills, or gaining lodgement, a motorized raid. Ect. 


Kirkhill said:


> For example, a platoon of LAVs and a company of dismounts may be a better configuration, or a battalion of dismounts and troop of tanks, than a force with one LAV per section.



Maybe? It’s sort of a ground will dictate. What we have are mechanized Bns so in that context the whole team needs to be working together.


----------



## Infanteer

KevinB said:


> Precision Urban Combat is however.



What is "precision urban combat?"



markppcli said:


> I don’t disagree with anything you said.
> 
> The problem is we do not train in any kind of complex terrain. We do not do woods clearings, we do not clear trench lines, we do not clear urban areas in culminating exercises. Certainly not beyond section or, very rarely, platoon level.



That's a shame.  I've done all of them, and they can be done in places like Wainwright with a little extra work. What you are speaking to is a failure in imagination, not in CA training objectives or design.


----------



## KevinB

Infanteer said:


> What is "precision urban combat?"


Let's call it non high intensity combined arms usage.
   Perhaps COIN in Urban areas may be a better term - but when you have significant civilian population interspersed with hostility combatants, you cannot wade through the city like the Russians do, and your combined arms options are very limited...



Infanteer said:


> That's a shame.  I've done all of them, and they can be done in places like Wainwright with a little extra work. What you are speaking to is a failure in imagination, not in CA training objectives or design.


The CA lost any real ability to have an Urban Facility when Griesbach Barracks was shuttered, there was an Urban Ex there prior to closing.
  It's not just imagination - it is also a lack of facilities.


----------



## markppcli

Infanteer said:


> What is "precision urban combat?"
> 
> 
> 
> That's a shame.  I've done all of them, and they can be done in places like Wainwright with a little extra work. What you are speaking to is a failure in imagination, not in CA training objectives or design.



I’d argue that the lack of complex terrain being a requirement in validation is a failure of objectives and design. We don’t need to do any of it to hit IBTS, or for TMST. It’s not a part of combat team commander, so it’s up to the units to find time to do it. The last time 1 VP cleared a trench system was… 2014. In fact to my knowledge none of our courses, beyond the urban ops instructor / operator, have hard assessed portions that require leadership in complex terrain.

To @KevinB ’s point, we built a great facility with Rocky Ford in Wainwright, then some one decided to fence it so vehicles could only approach by road for some reason.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I’d argue that the lack of complex training being a requirement in validation is a failure of objectives and design. In fact to my knowledge none of our courses, beyond the urban ops instructor / operator, have hard assessed portions that require leadership in complex terrain.



Memories of ripping out what was left of my hair trying to explain to a CO (retired RegF Maj commanding an ARes unit as an over promoted LCol) why it was a waste of time doing frontals - as if the troops were dismounting from imaginary APCs - all weekend on a playing field instead of using the excellent and complex infantry terrain God had gifted to us - inlcuding hiils, bush, streams etc - to train them properly.


----------



## Kirkhill

When the enemy is armed with 4 km precision guided munitions shouldn't this be treated as complex terrain?   I'm willing to be the guy with the javelin will see the LAV before the LAV sees him.  No?


----------



## Kirkhill

Even ground like this yields dead ground for the infantry.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 74760
> 
> Even ground like this yields dead ground for the infantry.


But not for the UAS


----------



## Ostrozac

KevinB said:


> But not for the UAS


Try to look unimportant, the Hunter/Killer Drones might be low on ammo!


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 74760
> 
> Even ground like this yields dead ground for the infantry.


With the swarms of UAVs, Loitering Munitions, Indirect Fire units, etc. that you're a fan of this is more likely to be "Dead" ground for the Infantry.
☠️


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Memories of ripping out what was left of my hair trying to explain to a CO (retired RegF Maj commanding an ARes unit as an over promoted LCol) why it was a waste of time doing frontals - as if the troops were dismounting from imaginary APCs - all weekend on a playing field instead of using the excellent and complex infantry terrain God had gifted to us - inlcuding hiils, bush, streams etc - to train them properly.


Eh, there’s a value to doing section frontals. Even if you do flank them, the actual fire and movement is a frontal. My time in the reserves in BC was spent on innumerable patrolling exercises. While I’d love to assume there was some great plan behind it I suspect that cost was more a factor.




Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 74759
> 
> When the enemy is armed with 4 km precision guided munitions shouldn't this be treated as complex terrain?   I'm willing to be the guy with the javelin will see the LAV before the LAV sees him.  No?


Oh that’s nice LAV country, gently rolling hills I get roll behind and get hull down? Yes please. I’m not familiar enough with Javelin optics but as a rule anything man portable will be inferior to the heavy, more power hungry vehicle optics.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> With the swarms of UAVs, Loitering Munitions, Indirect Fire units, etc. that you're a fan of this is more likely to be "Dead" ground for the Infantry.
> ☠️


Fair comment.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> Eh, there’s a value to doing section frontals. Even if you do flank them, the actual fire and movement is a frontal. My time in the reserves in BC was spent on innumerable patrolling exercises. While I’d love to assume there was some great plan behind it I suspect that cost was more a factor.
> 
> 
> 
> Oh that’s nice LAV country, gently rolling hills I get roll behind and get hull down? Yes please. I’m not familiar enough with Javelin optics but as a rule anything man portable will be inferior to the heavy, more power hungry vehicle optics.


Javelin LWCLU will see a LAV over 5km away if it is just hulldown. 
  The LAV is extremely unlikely to see the Javelin team until at least half that range.


----------



## Kirkhill

So infantry sections/platoons likely to be less effective than dispersed anti-tank teams and forward observers?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> So infantry sections/platoons likely to be less effective than dispersed anti-tank teams and forward observers?


It’s not an either or.  You don’t leave two guys out on an OP for days on end.  
   You can’t attack or advance as a super dispersed entity either.  

Plus that one AT team can deal with 1 AFV…


----------



## ArmyRick

KevinB said:


> It’s not an either or.  You don’t leave two guys out on an OP for days on end.
> You can’t attack or advance as a super dispersed entity either.
> 
> Plus that one AT team can deal with 1 AFV…


We used to get a hoot when teaching reg f DP1 infantry course and one of the EOs was participating in a "tank hunting team". 

We would treat it as a go get 'er done quick thing so we could check the box. Using an LSVW to act as a tank and doing the task. What MBT or BMP or BTR is out just bumbling around all by itself on the battlefield. WE fought several times to get rid of this stupid PO/EO. 

I use to be in a TOW platoon (or anti-armour platoon for proper terminology), when we did more realistic tactics with TUAs on defeating armour.


----------



## MJP

ArmyRick said:


> We would treat it as a go get 'er done quick thing so we could check the box. Using an LSVW to act as a tank and doing the task. What MBT or BMP or BTR is out just bumbling around all by itself on the battlefield.


Well according to Ukraine - Russian War all of them just bumble around the battlefield! Maybe the TP writers knew how bad the Russians were!


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:


> We used to get a hoot when teaching reg f DP1 infantry course and one of the EOs was participating in a "tank hunting team".
> 
> We would treat it as a go get 'er done quick thing so we could check the box. Using an LSVW to act as a tank and doing the task. What MBT or BMP or BTR is out just bumbling around all by itself on the battlefield. WE fought several times to get rid of this stupid PO/EO.
> 
> I use to be in a TOW platoon (or anti-armour platoon for proper terminology), when we did more realistic tactics with TUAs on defeating armour.



Nothing like trying to chase an armoured vehicle at night through the woods with an 84mm, not being able to fire it at anything in the end


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> It’s not an either or.  You don’t leave two guys out on an OP for days on end.
> You can’t attack or advance as a super dispersed entity either.
> 
> Plus that one AT team can deal with 1 AFV…




Understood - I guess what I am picking up from what the Russians and Ukrainians are laying down is that the basic wiring diagrams of teams, sections, platoons, companies, battalions, brigades, divisions, corps are all still valid.  

But.

The degree of dispersion has increased putting more reliance on small units, strategic corporals, mission command and wide dispersion.  All of those have been necessitated by the wide distribution of novel technologies and forced older technologies to be reapplied.

Kyiv
Kharkiv
Kherson

(This war writes its own chapters)

Kyiv 

The Russians concentrated their forces in BTGs and Brigades, marching in columns following their best practice.  And got their butts handed to them as the columns were destroyed en masse by light infantry, artillery and engineers (flooding) taking advantage of terrain.

Kharkiv

Russians disperse their forces and the Ukrainians exploit with a mixture of heavy forces for breaching at a couple of key points and exploitation with light "cavalry" forces manoeuvering among the spaces left by the widely dispersed small units of the Russians - many of them recently mobilized

Kherson 

Waiting to see - it has been at least a 3 month battle over a wide area, 9 months if we include the defence of Mykolaiv.

Donbas

An 8 year long static defence.


The other interesting bit as far as I'm concerned is the role of the roving "intelligence" teams in their civvy vehicles handing out flags and making propaganda videos.  Intelligence, Influence Activities and PsyOps.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Understood - I guess what I am picking up from what the Russians and Ukrainians are laying down is that the basic wiring diagrams of teams, sections, platoons, companies, battalions, brigades, divisions, corps are all still valid.
> 
> But.
> 
> The degree of dispersion has increased putting more reliance on small units, strategic corporals, mission command and wide dispersion.  All of those have been necessitated by the wide distribution of novel technologies and forced older technologies to be reapplied.


Don’t forget casualties.  Both sides have taken horrific losses.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Don’t forget casualties.  Both sides have taken horrific losses.



Which tends to both necessitate and motivate dispersion.


----------



## ueo

markppcli said:


> Irrelevant, doesn’t validate combat team commanders


So who on the west coast has a real Cbt Team? Just wondering,


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Well I said I was going to inflict another Napkin Force on everyone so here it is:


Fairly minor difference of opinion about your proposed flyover 3 Brigade deployment to Poland.

Currently NATO Multinational Division North (HQ in Adiza) consists of 2 x Brigades:

Estonian 1st Infantry Brigade
NATO eFP Battlegroup Estonia (w/UK as Lead Nation - attached)

Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade
NATO eFP Battlegroup Latvia (w/Canada as Lead Nation - attached)

The UK is already looking at expanding it's Estonian presence to a full Brigade by committing additional flyover forces to it's current eFP Estonia deployment.  Canada could do the same by expanding our eFP contribution to a full Brigade.  The resulting NATO Multinational Division North would then look something like:


NATO Multinational Division North HQ (Adiza, Latvia)
Estonian 1st Infantry Brigade
UK Brigade (flyover elements + eFP Estonia)
Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade
Canadian 3 Brigade
3 Brigade HQ (100/0)
Tank Regiment (10/0 - Flyover)
LAV Battalion (10/0 - Flyover)
eFP Latvia Battlegroup (100/0)
Artillery Regiment (10/0 - Flyover)
Service Battalion (30/0 - Flyover)


This would give a couple of advantages over a full flyover Brigade deployment to Poland.

Probably a much easier sell politically to increase our current Latvian commitment (and mostly with flyover troops rather than significant additional physically deployed troops) than establishing a completely new Brigade-size commitment to Europe.
Having eFP Latvia replacing a 3rd maneuver flyover unit would provide for both greater depth for our mechanized forces to replace potential battle losses as well as possibly freeing up additional Canadian-based LAV forces for non-NATO deployments without adding personnel stress to our NATO commitment.
Would ensure that our Canadian-led eFP Latvia forces would fall under Canadian Brigade command in any conflict.
Having our eFP Latvia rotations and our flyover 3 Brigade training rotations both in the same location would provide greater ability for our troops to become familiar with the area in which they'd be likely to operate.  Flyover troops that have already taken part in an eFP Latvia rotation would already know the area.
Since eFP is permanently manned it would in effect mean we have a 30/70 Brigade in place for Day 1 of a conflict rather than a 10/90 Brigade.  It would also give our 3 Brigade HQ an actual 100% manned maneuver unit to train with rather than just annual flyover units (and tabletop exercises).
A Brigade-level commitment to Latvia should give us some seats in the NATO Multinational Division North HQ which would be co-located in Adiza with both our eFP Latvia deployment and our 3 Brigade HQ.  
Our logistics system would be able to focus on supplying our troops in a single geographic location.


----------



## Kirkhill

> “*One of the big problems* we identified in this particular scenario is going to be *we have too much data*, and we haven't been able to correlate it in the way that we want to provide it to the warfighter,” McKean said. “*A few years ago, we wouldn't have had that problem because we weren't even talking to each other, and our machines certainly wouldn't be talking to each other. And so that's a huge step forward, the fact that we are all sharing data. … We have the capability right now to take multiple communication pathways. Some of those are very military-specific. Some of those are actually quite commercial. And we can use those in multiple ways, so if one is denied, we switch to another one.”*











						Array Of Sensors, Unmanned Systems Creating Data Headaches For Army Commanders
					

Battlefield data is vital, and lots of it is great, but Army leaders are concerned they are burdened with an embarrassment of riches.




					www.thedrive.com
				




Here's the Fort Irwin exercise from a British perspective - focusing on the Rangers - not so much a Special Force as, perhaps, a new Experimental Corps of Riflemen.









						Ranger Regiment troops trial new cutting-edge battlefield kit on first deployment with US Special Forces
					

Allies from the UK, US and Australia have been testing 300 new technologies to demonstrate their future fighting capabilities.




					www.forces.net


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Fairly minor difference of opinion about your proposed flyover 3 Brigade deployment to Poland.
> 
> Currently NATO Multinational Division North (HQ in Adiza) consists of 2 x Brigades:
> 
> Estonian 1st Infantry Brigade
> NATO eFP Battlegroup Estonia (w/UK as Lead Nation - attached)
> 
> Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade
> NATO eFP Battlegroup Latvia (w/Canada as Lead Nation - attached)
> 
> The UK is already looking at expanding it's Estonian presence to a full Brigade by committing additional flyover forces to it's current eFP Estonia deployment.  Canada could do the same by expanding our eFP contribution to a full Brigade.  The resulting NATO Multinational Division North would then look something like:
> 
> 
> NATO Multinational Division North HQ (Adiza, Latvia)
> Estonian 1st Infantry Brigade
> UK Brigade (flyover elements + eFP Estonia)
> Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade
> Canadian 3 Brigade
> 3 Brigade HQ (100/0)
> Tank Regiment (10/0 - Flyover)
> LAV Battalion (10/0 - Flyover)
> eFP Latvia Battlegroup (100/0)
> Artillery Regiment (10/0 - Flyover)
> Service Battalion (30/0 - Flyover)
> 
> 
> This would give a couple of advantages over a full flyover Brigade deployment to Poland.
> 
> Probably a much easier sell politically to increase our current Latvian commitment (and mostly with flyover troops rather than significant additional physically deployed troops) than establishing a completely new Brigade-size commitment to Europe.
> Having eFP Latvia replacing a 3rd maneuver flyover unit would provide for both greater depth for our mechanized forces to replace potential battle losses as well as possibly freeing up additional Canadian-based LAV forces for non-NATO deployments without adding personnel stress to our NATO commitment.
> Would ensure that our Canadian-led eFP Latvia forces would fall under Canadian Brigade command in any conflict.
> Having our eFP Latvia rotations and our flyover 3 Brigade training rotations both in the same location would provide greater ability for our troops to become familiar with the area in which they'd be likely to operate.  Flyover troops that have already taken part in an eFP Latvia rotation would already know the area.
> Since eFP is permanently manned it would in effect mean we have a 30/70 Brigade in place for Day 1 of a conflict rather than a 10/90 Brigade.  It would also give our 3 Brigade HQ an actual 100% manned maneuver unit to train with rather than just annual flyover units (and tabletop exercises).
> A Brigade-level commitment to Latvia should give us some seats in the NATO Multinational Division North HQ which would be co-located in Adiza with both our eFP Latvia deployment and our 3 Brigade HQ.
> Our logistics system would be able to focus on supplying our troops in a single geographic location.


I actually like that idea with some minor modifications.

Firstly, my placing 3 Bde into Poland as predicated on two things: 1) better training facilities than Latvia (one of the primary purposes of 3 Bde is as a replacement of CMTC in Wainwright and thereby converting those PYs and the function to 3 Bde) and 2) additional strategic depth for secure airheads for a flyover deployment and sustainment in case of emergency. There's also the connection with the US V Corps but that's secondary.

Adazi is quite limited and can provide, at best, very limited live fire for larger calibre weapons. There is a possibility of a larger facility in the area of Selija/Salonia which could be up to three times the size of Adazi and thus slightly more useful for live fire. I tend to see dry manoeuvre out in the "wild" as we did in Germany (and probably less destructive vis a vis manoeuvre damage because of the greatly reduced tracked component of the brigade).  

That leaves strategic depth for flyovers and deployment. The Options are 1) based in Latvia with risk of having access to the equipment cut off or 2) based in Poland with access to equipment more assured but requiring an approach march from the Polish base through the Sulwaki Gap to Latvia. Either way there is a risk that needs to be mitigated.

I'm not sure how I feel about the eFP being 100/0 and part of 3 Bde. Firstly, right now the eFP is more in the nature of a 30/70 with the 70 coming from other NATO countries. I definitely prefer that it should stay that way so as to ensure other NATO nations stay "at risk" in Latvia and create a united deterrent. 

That leaves the question of whether the eFP BG should be part of 3 Bde or remain under the Latvian Mechanized Brigade. If the latter than we need to have a second 10/0 LAV battalion as part of 3 Bde (as previously contemplated); if the former, we can save ourselves a battalion's worth of gear to keep back in Canada but will not be able to exercise a whole fly-over bde in one shot. I guess one could keep a second 10/0 LAV battalion there in any event and have 3 Bde with four manoeuvre battalions. Personally I think I'd rather have a clean and full flyover bde and leave the eFP BG with the Latvian Mech Bde as a signal of commitment. Our government/Army leadership would probably prefer the eFP integrated into 3 Bde to minimize the scale of our commitment.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> But not for the UAS



The Shirley Road exercise - Ukrainian Style 

Section attack on an isolated position.


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/yswsjn


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Our government/Army leadership would probably prefer the eFP integrated into 3 Bde to minimize the scale of our commitment whole Ukraine thing would go away so they can focus on "more important" things.


FTFY


----------



## markppcli

ueo said:


> So who on the west coast has a real Cbt Team? Just wondering,


Well a combat team is just a combined arms team built around a company or squadron. Surely 39 CBG can put together one of those ?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> The Shirley Road exercise - Ukrainian Style
> 
> Section attack on an isolated position.
> 
> 
> __
> https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/yswsjn


Watching Ukrainian success videos is always going to give you skewed results since you see what a) was a success and b) will get more views.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Watching Ukrainian success videos is always going to give you skewed results since you see what a) was a success and b) will get more views.



All true Mark.  But success videos do tend to re-establish the bar as to what is possible.   

Even that attack was only partly successful as 3 or so Russians managed to escape.  But 7 didn't.  And the Ukrainians appear to have suffered no causalties.  Enhanced Situational Awareness?


----------



## McG

markppcli said:


> Well a combat team is just a combined arms team built around a company or squadron.


That was the case, but the definition has been updated (probably more for reasons of Canadian Army identity than for doctrine) to require there be tanks in a combat team.


----------



## GR66

McG said:


> That was the case, but the definition has been updated (probably more for reasons of Canadian Army identity than for doctrine) to require there be tanks in a combat team.


Mo-litia Tanks...

RCAC Reservist in his G-Wagon saying "tankety-tank, tankety-tank, tankety-tank"


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> All true Mark.  But success videos do tend to re-establish the bar as to what is possible.
> 
> Even that attack was only partly successful as 3 or so Russians managed to escape.  But 7 didn't.  And the Ukrainians appear to have suffered no causalties.  Enhanced Situational Awareness?



It's a good idea to let a couple survive so they can spread the word about what's coming to the rest


----------



## Good2Golf

daftandbarmy said:


> It's a good idea to let a couple survive so they can spread the word about what's coming to the rest


Dr. William Brydon concurs…


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> Dr. William Brydon concurs…



And his horse, if it was able to be reached for comment


----------



## ueo

markppcli said:


> Well a combat team is just a combined arms team built around a company or squadron. Surely 39 CBG can put together one of those ?


Ok. I'll bite. based on what and where?


----------



## markppcli

ueo said:


> Ok. I'll bite. based on what and where?


1500 odd reservists can’t manage to mass in one place ?


----------



## markppcli

McG said:


> That was the case, but the definition has been updated (probably more for reasons of Canadian Army identity than for doctrine) to require there be tanks in a combat team.


I stand corrected


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> 1500 odd reservists can’t manage to mass in one place ?



Yes. And 39 CBG has enough 'odd' ones to fulfill the requirement 

The primary barrier to concentrating for annual summer exercises, as I understand it, is usually leadership (lack of joint RegF/ARes), planning skills (coordination of summer courses with FTX needs) and money.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes. And 39 CBG has enough 'odd' ones to fulfill the requirement
> 
> The primary barrier to concentrating for annual summer exercises, as I understand it, is usually leadership (lack of joint RegF/ARes), planning skills (coordination of summer courses with FTX needs) and money.


We used to solve this by having Cougar Salvo over March break no ?


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> We used to solve this by having Cougar Salvo over March break no ?



Yes, which worked really well, but it's been hit and miss over the past decade or so.

I'm not up to speed as to exactly why, but my pet theory is that the 10 years of being 'rent-a-troop' to the Reg F during AFG, and then multiple big fire years, and now COVID, has thrown us out of whack and lost us alot of 'muscle memory' in how to do this.

I think they sent a few troops to Wainwright last Spring though, although it was only something like a platoon I think, and the rest invaded Comox 



__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1525870319378083840


----------



## WestIsle

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes, which worked really well, but it's been hit and miss over the past decade or so.
> 
> I'm not up to speed as to exactly why, but my pet theory is that the 10 years of being 'rent-a-troop' to the Reg F during AFG, and then multiple big fire years, and now COVID, has thrown us out of whack and lost us alot of 'muscle memory' in how to do this.
> 
> I think they sent a few troops to Wainwright last Spring though, although it was only something like a platoon I think, and the rest invaded Comox
> 
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1525870319378083840


From what I heard at the time that Spring ex was spun up with a week or two notice for troops so Im surprised anyone showed up.


----------



## ueo

markppcli said:


> 1500 odd reservists can’t manage to mass in one place ?


No answer, politics but no hard data!


----------



## daftandbarmy

WestIsle said:


> From what I heard at the time that Spring ex was spun up with a week or two notice for troops so Im surprised anyone showed up.



Gawd Bless 'Em... the troops will always respond in some way, given the chance, even with crappy leadership


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Yes. And 39 CBG has enough 'odd' ones to fulfill the requirement
> 
> The primary barrier to concentrating for annual summer exercises, as I understand it, is usually leadership (lack of joint RegF/ARes), planning skills (coordination of summer courses with FTX needs) and money.



There are already the Arctic Response Company Groups.  How are they provided, selected and manned?  Do they exist even when not training in the North?

Shouldn't every Regional Brigade be able to produce at short notice a Regional Company Group?   Even in 1866 the lowly Militia was able to field Flank Companies of willing Militiamen.

What would happen if, as a first step, an OC was assigned and volunteers were requested to sign up on a fan out sheet?  Then establish sites like this one for each of the Regional Company Groups where the volunteers could communicate with each other and assist in their organization.   Aim for a flatter organization.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> There are already the Arctic Response Company Groups.  How are they provided, selected and manned?  Do they exist even when not training in the North?
> 
> Shouldn't every Regional Brigade be able to produce at short notice a Regional Company Group?   Even in 1866 the lowly Militia was able to field Flank Companies of willing Militiamen.
> 
> What would happen if, as a first step, an OC was assigned and volunteers were requested to sign up on a fan out sheet?  Then establish sites like this one for each of the Regional Company Groups where the volunteers could communicate with each other and assist in their organization.   Aim for a flatter organization.



The ARCGs are operating in other Divisions, AFAIK, but have a limited mandate, scope and training regimen. Why try and fly reservists to the Arctic, with all the attendant hassle of training, equipping, finding time off at the right time etc etc etc, when you've got dozens of Reg F combat arms coy/sqn groups you can pick from?

In reality, anything 'Op Tasking' like that, layered on top of what limited militia resources are already responsible for, is an expensive distraction at best and a political 'the Reserves can do anything the Reg F can do' smoke and mirrors program at worst.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The ARCGs are operating in other Divisions, AFAIK, but have a limited mandate, scope and training regimen. Why try and fly reservists to the Arctic, with all the attendant hassle of training, equipping, finding time off at the right time etc etc etc, when you've got dozens of Reg F combat arms coy/sqn groups you can pick from?
> 
> In reality, anything 'Op Tasking' like that, layered on top of what limited militia resources are already responsible for, is an expensive distraction at best and a political 'the Reserves can do anything the Reg F can do' smoke and mirrors program at worst.



Fair.

But if the Divisions can raise Company Groups for a particular tasking then why not start the reworking of the Militia (Army Reserves) by raising 10 Company Groups, one from each Division, which is willing and able to deploy nationally at short notice?  The should be able to organize a Company Group training event within the territory of each Regional Brigade.  Except of course in Newfoundland where it is half an hour later and your Island, permanently wreathed in trees and cannabis.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Fair.
> 
> But if the Divisions can raise Company Groups for a particular tasking then why not start the reworking of the Militia (Army Reserves) by raising 10 Company Groups, one from each Division, which is willing and able to deploy nationally at short notice?  The should be able to organize a Company Group training event within the territory of each Regional Brigade.  Except of course in Newfoundland where it is half an hour later and your Island, permanently wreathed in trees and cannabis.



There is no need for an ARes Coy Gp to 'deploy nationally' IMHO.

But if you want to build good company groups the tried and true way is to, months in advance (e.g., September), declare that there will be an annual concentration at a suitable training area (e.g., Wainwright, August the following year) with a training aim (e.g., Defensive/Offensive Operations), and prepare for it throughout the training year. Include a 'Gun Camp' during the Spring Break to qualify on your crew served weapons, and do other types of preparatory field firing (e.g., PWT4)

For some reason, this pattern has eroded over time with the effect that all training seems disjointed, last minute, poorly supported, and without any clear final aim, goal or purpose.

But that's just the view from my sanger window...


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Fair.
> 
> But if the Divisions can raise Company Groups for a particular tasking then why not start the reworking of the Militia (Army Reserves) by raising 10 Company Groups, one from each Division, which is willing and able to deploy nationally at short notice?  The should be able to organize a Company Group training event within the territory of each Regional Brigade.  Except of course in Newfoundland where it is half an hour later and your Island, permanently wreathed in trees and cannabis.


I think the better question is: why bother?

What you're doing is finding a job for the reserves (particularly one the RegF would rather ignore for themselves). In some ways its a way of trying to stay relevant but it fails to address the overarching issue of what is the purpose of the RegF and what is the purpose of the ResF?

Anything with the modifiers "quick reaction" or "short notice" is for all intents and purposes, RegF.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> There is no need for an ARes Coy Gp to 'deploy nationally' IMHO.
> 
> But if you want to build good company groups the tried and true way is to, months in advance (e.g., September), declare that there will be an annual concentration at a suitable training area (e.g., Wainwright, August the following year) with a training aim (e.g., Defensive/Offensive Operations), and prepare for it throughout the training year. Include a 'Gun Camp' during the Spring Break to qualify on your crew served weapons, and do other types of preparatory field firing (e.g., PWT4)
> 
> For some reason, this pattern has eroded over time with the effect that all training seems disjointed, last minute, poorly supported, and without any clear final aim, goal or purpose.
> 
> But that's just the view from my sanger window...





FJAG said:


> I think the better question is: why bother?
> 
> What you're doing is finding a job for the reserves (particularly one the RegF would rather ignore for themselves). In some ways its a way of trying to stay relevant but it fails to address the overarching issue of what is the purpose of the RegF and what is the purpose of the ResF?
> 
> Anything with the modifiers "quick reaction" or "short notice" is for all intents and purposes, RegF.
> 
> 🍻



Good enuff.  I'll put them back on the dusty empty shelves from which they came.


----------



## Kirkhill

I was trying to figure out where to post this

But given the responses above I decided to post it here.



> Training and operating the Army Reserve costs about $724 million annually, based on figures from the 2013–14 fiscal year.


 
Would $714 MCAD be better employed maintaining dusty empty shelves in broken down armouries or in fielding drones for the regular army regiments and corps?







						Revolution in Military Affairs vs Military Revolution: The Emergence of Drones and Robotics as a driver in Societal Change | Small Wars Journal
					

The war in Ukraine has proven one explicable truth, the convergence of commercial off-the-shelf drone technology with the military-industrial complex (MIC) drone platform is here to stay and possibly the first military revolution we’ve seen since the advent of the nuclear age.




					smallwarsjournal.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Your Company Pioneer.  One for every company and battery.   And changes the dynamics of the Armoured Engineer.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Would $714 MCAD be better employed maintaining dusty empty shelves in broken down armouries or in fielding drones for the regular army regiments and corps?


You and I both know that's a silly question because you know the value and cost efficiency that a properly run reserve force can bring.

Empty shelves in broken down armouries are priority choices made by a variety RegF managers along the way. There are dozens of ways to correct that and get better value for money than we are now. 

The RegF could easily afford drones for everyone if they fired half of its senior staff and reduced its central headquarters by 25%. 

There is more defence output value in a broken down armoury, even as poorly run as it is, than in large swaths of Ottawa.

🍻


----------



## Rifleman62

Where there is a will ...............


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:


> There are already the Arctic Response Company Groups.  How are they provided, selected and manned?  Do they exist even when not training in the North?
> 
> Shouldn't every Regional Brigade be able to produce at short notice a Regional Company Group?   Even in 1866 the lowly Militia was able to field Flank Companies of willing Militiamen.
> 
> What would happen if, as a first step, an OC was assigned and volunteers were requested to sign up on a fan out sheet?  Then establish sites like this one for each of the Regional Company Groups where the volunteers could communicate with each other and assist in their organization.   Aim for a flatter organization.


There are Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCGs) and also Territorial Battle Groups (TBGs). The members lead a bit of a dual life - they belong to their home unit but are identified as being part of one of those organizations. The ARCGs have lead CBGs and units that organize their training. The ARCGs conduct specialized training and have equipment for their role. The ARCGs are a success story, providing an excellent real-world capability.

The TBGs have successfully conducted DOMOPs and conduct training for their role - the recent storm out east is an example. Doesn't completely relieve the Reg F of IRU (Immediate Response Unit) duties but I think it's an improvement from past practices. At a minimum, it provides a structure for the orderly relief in place of an IRU on a DOMOP.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> You and I both know that's a silly question because you know the value and cost efficiency that a properly run reserve force can bring.
> 
> Empty shelves in broken down armouries are priority choices made by a variety RegF managers along the way. There are dozens of ways to correct that and get better value for money than we are now.
> 
> The RegF could easily afford drones for everyone if they fired half of its senior staff and reduced its central headquarters by 25%.
> 
> There is more defence output value in a broken down armoury, even as poorly run as it is, than in large swaths of Ottawa.
> 
> 🍻



I do know that.

And I agree with all of your statements.

Including, and importantly, the priority choices being made (by whomever).



However my comment was the result of the comments that I took to suggest that it is inappropriate to find jobs for the Reserves.  I know your feelings towards the need for a "Break Glass In Time Of War" force.  But real people don't survive behind glass.  They need to live and breathe - and they need to want to offer themselves up for the benefit of others.

Likewise with D&B's comment about National Deployment.  I want to see BC Militiamen removing trees on PEI and Ontarians helping out with landslides in BC.   They see the country.  Meet their counterparts,  Learn to work under other management. Learn how to deploy rapidly and adapt to a variety of situations.  And create a nucleus of troops in each of the Brigades with tales to tell.  The tales they will tell will depend on how well they are treated and how much they enjoyed their experience.

And as your boss, and a past CSIS boss I believe, your limited number of Reg Force brethren are getting nowhere near enough time practicing tactical skills


----------



## quadrapiper

daftandbarmy said:


> The ARCGs are operating in other Divisions, AFAIK, but have a limited mandate, scope and training regimen. Why try and fly reservists to the Arctic, with all the attendant hassle of training, equipping, finding time off at the right time etc etc etc, when you've got dozens of Reg F combat arms coy/sqn groups you can pick from?
> 
> In reality, anything 'Op Tasking' like that, layered on top of what limited militia resources are already responsible for, is an expensive distraction at best and a political 'the Reserves can do anything the Reg F can do' smoke and mirrors program at worst.


Would some sort of opportunity for Reserve augmentation to those tasks be worthwhile as bait?


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> There are Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCGs) and also Territorial Battle Groups (TBGs). The members lead a bit of a dual life - they belong to their home unit but are identified as being part of one of those organizations. The ARCGs have lead CBGs and units that organize their training. The ARCGs conduct specialized training and have equipment for their role. The ARCGs are a success story, providing an excellent real-world capability.
> 
> The TBGs have successfully conducted DOMOPs and conduct training for their role - the recent storm out east is an example. Doesn't completely relieve the Reg F of IRU (Immediate Response Unit) duties but I think it's an improvement from past practices. At a minimum, it provides a structure for the orderly relief in place of an IRU on a DOMOP.


And I find I am covering ground well covered by T2B above.


----------



## AvroArrow92

Going off what others have been posting, would this orbat make any sense? Equipment holdings would largely remain the same outside of additional ATGM, GBAD, and precision fires program which are already in the pipeline. The only thing I would consider purchasing additional numbers of is the LAV 6.0 Recce so we could actually have armoured calavary regiments at the regular force level at least. 

Canadian Army, Land Force 2025

-1 active armour brigade group (Adazi) 10-90
-2 active mechanized brigade groups (Edmonton, &Valcartier) 70-30
-1 active light brigade group (Petawawa) 90-10

-1 active-reserve ranger patrol brigade (Yellowknife) 30-70
-1 active-reserve combat support brigade (Gagetown) 70-30
-1 active-reserve combat support services brigade (Montreal) 70-30

-3 reserve infantry brigades (Calgary, Toronto, &Montreal) 30-70

-1 nondeployable divisional headquarters (Winnipeg)
-1 deployable divisional headquarters (Kingston)
-1 training doctrine center (Kingston)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1st Canadian Division (Kingston)

-1 active armour brigade group (Adazi) 10-90
-2 active mechanized brigade group (Edmonton, &Valcartier) 70-30
-1 active-reserve combat support brigade (Gagetown) 70-30
-1 active-reserve combat support services brigade (Montreal) 70-30

The 1st Canadian Division is designed to fulfil any expeditionary land force needs of the Canadian government, with a particular focus on supporting NATO on the Baltic Front. The 4th CABG is a fly over force, with only one mechanized infantry battalion, a css battalion, and a headquarters staff being full staffed. This unit also doubles as the Canada contribution tp the enhanced battlegroup in Lativa. In the event of a conflict a combined personal from the 1st &5th CMBG will immediately fly over to fully staff the brigade. In the event of a prolonged conflict the CMBG and other assets of the 1st Canadian Division would deploy in mass to Europe as one cohesive divisional formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3rd Canadian Division (Winnipeg)

-1 active light brigade group (Petawawa) 90-10
-1 active-reserve ranger patrol brigade (Yellowknife) 30-70
-3 reserve infantry brigade groups (Calgary, Toronto, &Montreal) 30-70

The 3rd Canadian Division is designed to fulfil any domestic land force needs of the Canadian government, with a particular focus on supporting the continental defence of North America. The 2nd CLBG is the rapid deployment force of the Canadian Army, able to deploy in a battlegroup anywhere in Canada within seventy-two hours; with the remainder of the brigade within seven days. The ranger patrol brigade has three ranger patrol groups; each of the reserve infantry brigades can mobilize one arctic response company (ARC) to surge to the ranger patrol brigade. Each brigade can mobilize three territorial defence companies (TDC)  for domestic land force needs or one territorial battle group say in seven days (still not sure of that one).


----------



## daftandbarmy

quadrapiper said:


> Would some sort of opportunity for Reserve augmentation to those tasks be worthwhile as bait?



No.... my guess it would just pull scarce resources away from any other main effort, and cause that to fail in some way.

Having said that, most reserve units, including those in the West where winter is too mild for proper arctic type training, have at least one winter ex every year.

You could use the Xmas break period to concentrate a fair number of reservists somewhere really cold for up to about 10 days of winter warfare training annually, I would guess.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> No.... my guess it would just pull scarce resources away from any other main effort, and cause that to fail in some way.
> 
> *Having said that, most reserve units, including those in the West where winter is too mild for proper arctic type training, have at least one winter ex every year.*
> 
> You could use the Xmas break period to concentrate a fair number of reservists somewhere really cold for up to about 10 days of winter warfare training annually, I would guess.



And that continues the argument for separation of Vancouver Island and the Lower Mainland as a separate entity. East of Port Mann you can swap elevation for arctic conditions starting in Manning Park


Coquihalla Pass -  1244 m
Yellowhead Pass - 1131 m
Rogers Pass - 1330 m
Crowsnest Pass - 1310 m
Kickinghorse Pass - 1627 m
Spray Lakes Reservoir 1701 m

Kelowna - 344 m
Revelstoke - 480 m
Golden - 800 m
Banff - 1400 m
Canmore - 1375 m
Calgary - 1045 m
Lethbridge - 910 m
Edmonton - 645 m
Saskatoon - 482 m
Regina - 577 m
Winnipeg - 239 m
Kenora - 410 m
Thunder Bay - 199 m

The rest of us in The West find little difficulty finding suitable arctic/winter warfare training venues.

Vancouver really should become a Navy show.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

daftandbarmy said:


> No.... my guess it would just pull scarce resources away from any other main effort, and cause that to fail in some way.
> 
> Having said that, most reserve units, including those in the West where winter is too mild for proper arctic type training, have at least one winter ex every year.
> 
> You could use the Xmas break period to concentrate a fair number of reservists somewhere really cold for up to about 10 days of winter warfare training annually, I would guess.


The 2XX ARCG contributed a platoon to the 3R22eR company that went to JPMRC Alaska in March 22 and impressed the heck out of 11 ABN. 2XX will have their ARCG at the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Centre RESOLUTE BAY this coming February. 5XX's ARCG will be at Goose Bay this winter as well. 3XX's ARCG will work with 3 PPLCI's company that will be at JPMRC Alaska. 4XX's ARCG are part of Op NANOOK this year (there are several sub-activities). 

As such, the ARCGs do plenty of training and operations in the Arctic/Northern Canada. There is also the preparatory training that occurs leading up to that. All that to say they are a success story. Lots of hard work and obstacles, to be sure, but a success nonetheless!


----------



## daftandbarmy

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The 2XX ARCG contributed a platoon to the 3R22eR company that went to JPMRC Alaska in March 22 and impressed the heck out of 11 ABN. 2XX will have their ARCG at the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Centre RESOLUTE BAY this coming February. 5XX's ARCG will be at Goose Bay this winter as well. 3XX's ARCG will work with 3 PPLCI's company that will be at JPMRC Alaska. 4XX's ARCG are part of Op NANOOK this year (there are several sub-activities).
> 
> As such, the ARCGs do plenty of training and operations in the Arctic/Northern Canada. There is also the preparatory training that occurs leading up to that. All that to say they are a success story. Lots of hard work and obstacles, to be sure, but a success nonetheless!



Well, that's awesome to hear!


----------



## KevinB

Areas of BC have significantly different types of cold than the arctic or even Northern AB, SK, MB, ON, etc.  
   Wet cold requires different kit and approaches to things than dry cold.  

Wet Cold will kill you easier than Dry Cold all else being equal.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> And that continues the argument for separation of Vancouver Island and the Lower Mainland as a separate entity. East of Port Mann you can swap elevation for arctic conditions starting in Manning Park
> 
> The rest of us in The West find little difficulty finding suitable arctic/winter warfare training venues.
> 
> Vancouver really should become a Navy show.



The issue with 'elevation' on the coast is access: one dump of snow can either stop you from getting in, or out, of 99% of suitable winter training locations. OTOH, sometimes there's no snow at all so you're dragging loaded toboggans over sketchy pieces of soggy ice on the logging road in a downpour 

If the ARCG concept is working, as indicated by T2B, that's probably the best way for the ARes to add value to our Arctic commitments in a consistent, high quality fashion.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Areas of BC have significantly different types of cold than the arctic or even Northern AB, SK, MB, ON, etc.
> Wet cold requires different kit and approaches to things than dry cold.
> 
> Wet Cold will kill you easier than Dry Cold all else being equal.



All our puffy, fluffy stuff had little utility even in Gagetown.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> The issue with 'elevation' on the coast is access: one dump of snow can either stop you from getting in, or out, of 99% of suitable winter training locations.


Sounds like an equipment issue.  
   For which a requirement should be raised. 


daftandbarmy said:


> OTOH, sometimes there's no snow at all so you're dragging loaded toboggans over sketchy pieces of soggy ice on the logging road in a downpour
> 
> If the ARCG concept is working, as indicated by T2B, that's probably the best way for the ARes to add value to our Arctic commitments in a consistent, high quality fashion.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> All our puffy, fluffy stuff had little utility even in Gagetown.


I’ve never been there in the Winter, but I suspect the Maritimes has Wet Cold issues as well, and some of which is a much colder Wet Cold than the Pacific areas for the most part.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Sounds like an equipment issue.
> For which a requirement should be raised.



You know, our regular issued 'CQMS-Tex' stuff if actually pretty good in the cold-wet coast. It's a bit heavier and clunkier than similarly available items on the civilian market, but a huge improvement over 1990 kit.

The big issue is boots, snowshoes/skis, tents and stoves.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> The issue with 'elevation' on the coast is access: one dump of snow can either stop you from getting in, or out, of 99% of suitable winter training locations. OTOH, sometimes there's no snow at all so you're dragging loaded toboggans over sketchy pieces of soggy ice on the logging road in a downpour



Which I why I suggest making the Coast a Navy show - one where the army moves by water.



daftandbarmy said:


> If the ARCG concept is working, as indicated by T2B, that's probably the best way for the ARes to add value to our Arctic commitments in a consistent, high quality fashion.



Agreed.

But if the ARCG concept is working, and is a sustainable organizational structure, then why can't we consider raising similar Company Groups for other specific tasks - such as, for example, a Maritime Response Company Group.  Or have I just discovered the Choir's Hymnal?


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> You know, our regular issued 'CQMS-Tex' stuff if actually pretty good in the cold-wet coast. It's a bit heavier and clunkier than similarly available items on the civilian market, but a huge improvement over 1990 kit.
> 
> The big issue is boots, snowshoes/skis, tents and stoves.


I was more thinking like BV206 and Snowmobiles, and Construction/Snow Removal Equipment  etc.


----------



## KevinB

KevinB said:


> I was more thinking like BV206 and Snowmobiles, and Construction/Snow Removal Equipment  etc.


I.E. Terrain and Climate relevant equipment.


----------



## KevinB

KevinB said:


> I.E. Terrain and Climate relevant equipment.


Which to me is @Kirkhill ’s dual use items to a T.   They can be used for regional issues (be it military training or DOMOPS support) or as needed overseas in relevant theaters.


----------



## Kirkhill

TangoTwoBravo said:


> The 2XX ARCG contributed a platoon to the 3R22eR company that went to JPMRC Alaska in March 22 and impressed the heck out of 11 ABN. 2XX will have their ARCG at the Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Training Centre RESOLUTE BAY this coming February. 5XX's ARCG will be at Goose Bay this winter as well. 3XX's ARCG will work with 3 PPLCI's company that will be at JPMRC Alaska. 4XX's ARCG are part of Op NANOOK this year (there are several sub-activities).
> 
> As such, the ARCGs do plenty of training and operations in the Arctic/Northern Canada. There is also the preparatory training that occurs leading up to that. All that to say they are a success story. Lots of hard work and obstacles, to be sure, but a success nonetheless!



@TangoTwoBravo 

Have you had an opportunity to consider how you might grow the ARCG concept from one CG per Div to one CG per Bde?

As I noted just above perhaps some of those could be Maritime Response Company Groups - Vancouver Island, the Great Lakes and the Gulf of St Lawrence for example.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Which to me is @Kirkhill ’s dual use items to a T.   They can be used for regional issues (be it military training or DOMOPS support) or as needed overseas in relevant theaters.



If you can't get in there for training how are you going to get in there for operations?


----------



## quadrapiper

Kirkhill said:


> If you can't get in there for training how are you going to get in there for operations?


At least some of the weather issues wouldn't be operationally dreadful (another day's travel in, or a longer stay, e.g.) but would be unacceptable for limited-duration training evolutions.


----------



## KevinB

quadrapiper said:


> At least some of the weather issues wouldn't be operationally dreadful (another day's travel in, or a longer stay, e.g.) but would be unacceptable for limited-duration training evolutions.


Uhm - I would not consider weather issues to be an acceptable operational impediment.
  Training, well whatever, it sucks, but it isn't a actual operational issue where lives are most likely on the line...


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> If you can't get in there for training how are you going to get in there for operations?


They aren’t. Access to high altitude areas of BC is a pretty unlikely task for the reserves and in an emergency they’d probably end up contracting heavy machinery to get in.

The Brigade should have a store of LOSVs for issue though, in a perfect world.



Kirkhill said:


> such as, for example, a Maritime Response Company Group.  Or have I just discovered the Choir's Hymnal?


 
What does this Maritime Respnnse Company mean ? What does it look like, what is it’s possible role?


----------



## RangerRay

daftandbarmy said:


> The issue with 'elevation' on the coast is access: one dump of snow can either stop you from getting in, or out, of 99% of suitable winter training locations. OTOH, sometimes there's no snow at all so you're dragging loaded toboggans over sketchy pieces of soggy ice on the logging road in a downpour
> 
> If the ARCG concept is working, as indicated by T2B, that's probably the best way for the ARes to add value to our Arctic commitments in a consistent, high quality fashion.


In BC, you might be somewhere with lots of snow but it’s only -5C, or somewhere where it’s-20C but only have half an inch of snow. Not great “Arctic” training!


----------



## daftandbarmy

RangerRay said:


> In BC, you might be somewhere with lots of snow but it’s only -5C, or somewhere where it’s-20C but only have half an inch of snow. Not great “Arctic” training!



OTOH, pukka mountain troops are ski mountaineers, and this is perfect terrain for that kind of training.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> They aren’t. Access to high altitude areas of BC is a pretty unlikely task for the reserves and in an emergency they’d probably end up contracting heavy machinery to get in.



Sfunny.  The High Altitude areas of BC begin at about 1000 m.  Pretty much the altitude of Mean Ground Level in Alberta. 

BC Drives Uphill to Rogers Pass.  Alberta starts going Downhill there.




markppcli said:


> The Brigade should have a store of LOSVs for issue though, in a perfect world.



And Quads, and MOSVs/Bv206s/BVS10s, and RHIBs.



markppcli said:


> What does this Maritime Respnnse Company mean ? What does it look like, what is it’s possible role?



It replicates the capabilities of the Arctic Response Company Group in the Southern Canadian Littorals when supported by the RCN as well as the RCAF.

It replaces Over Snow Vehicles with boats and BVS10s.

And yeah,  it will take dollars away from LAVs, Leos and SPHs.


----------



## Blackadder1916

daftandbarmy said:


> OTOH, pukka mountain troops are ski mountaineers, and this is perfect terrain for that kind of training.



Mountains, who needs mountains?









						Canada's first ski school for training soldiers in the type of winter warfare waged so successfully by the Finns against the Russians has just opened (...)
					






					digitalarchive.tpl.ca
				






> Original Toronto Star caption: Canada's first ski school for training soldiers in the type of winter warfare waged so successfully by the Finns against the Russians has just opened on the dominion experiemental farm at Ottawa. Here is Lieut. Thomas P. Gilday; chief instructor; giving his class an introductory lesson to their three-week course.











						With the mercury well be, the students who will train ski troops across Canada this winter refused a lift up by day to get in some extra travel actoss(...)
					






					digitalarchive.tpl.ca
				






> Original Toronto Star caption: With the mercury well be; the students who will train ski troops across Canada this winter refused a lift up by day to get in some extra travel actoss the rolling bush country at the Dominion experimental farm. For fighting on skis; cross-country and bush skiers are preferred to jumpers


----------



## FJAG

AvroArrow92 said:


> Going off what others have been posting, would this orbat make any sense?


It makes sense to me.



daftandbarmy said:


> The issue with 'elevation' on the coast is access: one dump of snow can either stop you from getting in, or out, of 99% of suitable winter training locations.


Just an observation. I spent two winters doing avalanche control in Rogers Pass. The Trans Canada was accessible 99% of the time but if you went off the road by a hundred metres you were in up to five to ten feet of snow and terrain easily useable for winter training (hell, the place gets over 400 inches per year). I'm not saying one needs to go to Rogers Pass as there are numerous accessible roads and areas further west with good dependable winter training conditions close at hand. Winter/Arctic training  generally doesn't need much space nor a live fire range to be useful. In an area as large as the BC mountains, 1% is plenty of room.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> It makes sense to me.
> 
> 
> Just an observation. I spent two winters doing avalanche control in Rogers Pass. The Trans Canada was accessible 99% of the time but if you went off the road by a hundred metres you were in up to five to ten feet of snow and terrain easily useable for winter training (hell, the place gets over 400 inches per year). I'm not saying one needs to go to Rogers Pass as there are numerous accessible roads and areas further west with good dependable winter training conditions close at hand. Winter/Arctic training  generally doesn't need much space nor a live fire range to be useful. In an area as large as the BC mountains, 1% is plenty of room.
> 
> 🍻



Sadly, many of those who would lead such activities have no idea what they are doing in this regard. This can be fatal on the West Coast in winter, where avalanches reign supreme.

A few years ago I had a hell of a time convincing a not to be named unit from running a winter ex in a dangerous avalanche zone. They kept pushing back until I sent them the avvie conditions website, which was open source (they just had no idea where to look).

I knew some Alpine Club folks who went into the same area, the same weekend, and they described a gigantic avalanche that closed the logging road this unit would have been using for their proposed exercise.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Sfunny.  The High Altitude areas of BC begin at about 1000 m.  Pretty much the altitude of Mean Ground Level in Alberta.
> 
> BC Drives Uphill to Rogers Pass.  Alberta starts going Downhill there.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And Quads, and MOSVs/Bv206s/BVS10s, and RHIBs.



So the boats already held by CERs check, quads held in units, their utility is… eh. 


Kirkhill said:


> It replicates the capabilities of the Arctic Response Company Group in the Southern Canadian Littorals when supported by the RCN as well as the RCAF.



To achieve what? Based out of where ?  How are they going to deploy from ship to shore ? 



Kirkhill said:


> It replaces Over Snow Vehicles with boats and BVS10s.



My concern is more that your adding a great deal more complexity to doctrine and skills we don’t have. To achieve something you have articulated. 


Kirkhill said:


> And yeah,  it will take dollars away from LAVs, Leos and SPHs.


Don’t be petulant, it’s beneath you.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Sadly, many of those who would lead such activities have no idea what they are doing in this regard. This can be fatal on the West Coast in winter, where avalanches reign supreme.
> 
> A few years ago I had a hell of a time convincing a not to be named unit from running a winter ex in a dangerous avalanche zone. They kept pushing back until I sent them the avvie conditions website, which was open source (they just had no idea where to look).
> 
> I knew some Alpine Club folks who went into the same area, the same weekend, and they described a gigantic avalanche that closed the logging road this unit would have been using for their proposed exercise.


I was lucky enough to do a “winter mobility” course in prep for Op Podium. It pains me deeply to see what all of that equipment is left to rot and the skills learned have been allowed to perish. I came out a firm believer in the superiority of skis, and understood how to get into high country and assess a snow pack. Lost skills now.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I was lucky enough to do a “winter mobility” course in prep for Op Podium. It pains me deeply to see what all of that equipment is left to rot and the skills learned have been allowed to perish. I came out a firm believer in the superiority of skis, and understood how to get into high country and assess a snow pack. Lost skills now.



I tried to secure some of those OP PODIUM skis for winter training, but failed miserably...


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> I tried to secure some of those OP PODIUM skis for winter training, but failed miserably...


Last time I saw them they were in CMBG and issued out for adventure training. If it were up to me they’d be issued 1 per man to each infantry unit in the Army… probably need a bit of white spray paint to be fair.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Sadly, many of those who would lead such activities have no idea what they are doing in this regard. This can be fatal on the West Coast in winter, where avalanches reign supreme.
> 
> A few years ago I had a hell of a time convincing a not to be named unit from running a winter ex in a dangerous avalanche zone. They kept pushing back until I sent them the avvie conditions website, which was open source (they just had no idea where to look).
> 
> I knew some Alpine Club folks who went into the same area, the same weekend, and they described a gigantic avalanche that closed the logging road this unit would have been using for their proposed exercise.


Yup. 

Hence "Avalanche Control Det" and the "Snow Research and Avalanche Warning Section" at Rogers. There are experts who can help with these things if one but asks.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> So the boats already held by CERs check, quads held in units, their utility is… eh.



Presence of boats.  Great.
Quads - agree - not for unit holding.  Held at Division for distribution along with the MOSVs - perhaps held in a transport company/platoon of one of the Service Battalions?



markppcli said:


> To achieve what? Based out of where ?  How are they going to deploy from ship to shore ?



To be able to deploy where Canadians are in a timely fashion to help them manage situations they can't manage with their own resources.  Similar rationale to the presence of the AOPS and the ARCGs.  A rallying point.  An action team.

As to TTPs - all to play for.



markppcli said:


> My concern is more that your adding a great deal more complexity to doctrine and skills we don’t have. To achieve something you have articulated.



In a sense you are correct.  In part that is because I continue to chase my tail arguing the cause for effective DOMOPs capabilities that will both free up the Reg Force for targeted capabilities that Ottawa can decide to deploy if the politics warrant and also make the CAF and the Reserves more pertinent to the General Public.  I believe in the value of the SAR fleet of Yellowbirds. I believe in the value of a General Purpose Light Force, well supported with service support, logistics and comms that can be applied to any situation including combat.




markppcli said:


> Don’t be petulant, it’s beneath you.



Thanks for the get out jail free card.  Appreciated.  Sometimes my snark switch slips.

Lets just say that I recognize that the capability will require reallocation of funds.  My belief is that the dividends paid from proving relevance to Canadians will result in more support for defence budgets generally.  It may not work.  But ... what else has worked.


----------



## markppcli

Without the ability to go ship to shore, and some very detailed planning, that’s wasted effort. Those are, I assume, skills and drills you don’t want to be assigning 2 days of training to a year.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Without the ability to go ship to shore, and some very detailed planning, that’s wasted effort. Those are, I assume, skills and drills you don’t want to be assigning 2 days of training to a year.



Absolutely.  Perhaps cross-training with the Naval Reserve could diminish the hump?


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Without the ability to go ship to shore, and some very detailed planning, that’s wasted effort. Those are, I assume, skills and drills you don’t want to be assigning 2 days of training to a year.



You mean like this?









						Army, Navy Reserves team up for beach assault exercise around 19 Wing Comox
					

Hundreds of Canadian Forces Reservists from across Canada take part in a joint exercise to improve operational readiness.




					www.cheknews.ca


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> You mean like this?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Army, Navy Reserves team up for beach assault exercise around 19 Wing Comox
> 
> 
> Hundreds of Canadian Forces Reservists from across Canada take part in a joint exercise to improve operational readiness.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.cheknews.ca




__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/yvjiw7

Funny that the equipment sets employed in the Canadian Reserve Exercise and the real life Ukrainian Insertion Operation don't look radically different to this unschooled civilian.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Absolutely.  Perhaps cross-training with the Naval Reserve could diminish the hump?


Why would they deploy from Kingston class ships or a pool in Regina ? 

Good for 39 Brigade for doing that, that’s awesome skill development. I maintain that to be able to do it as a “response” probably means higher flash to bang but good on them.


----------



## Kirkhill

Well, perhaps, rather than each Brigade being tasked to supply one Company Response Group the tasking could still be a Divisional Tasking

For example

3 Div to supply 2x ARCGs and 1x Maritime RCG (Pacific)
4 Div to supply 2x ARCGs and 1x Maritime RCG (Great Lakes)
2 Div to supply 1x ARCG and 1x Maritime RCG (St Lawrence)
5 Div to supply 1x ARCG and 1x Maritime RCG (Atlantic)

Troops drawn from across the division to create an embryonic capability that can be permitted to grow.   Flash to Bang will shorten with practice.


----------



## Skysix

"[The Finnish] Army is sporting roughly 3,500 full-time personnel, while the wartime mobilised strength is approximately 160,000, i.e. less than 2.5 % of the mobilised force would be professionals. Take that ratio, and in a 300-strong company you are looking at less than eight professional officers and NCOs."









						Corporal Frisk
					

Finnish blogger in reserve, defence and national security.




					corporalfrisk.com
				




Interestingly, conscript trades and leadership candidates are chosen by cadre during their first 12 weeks of service


----------



## KevinB

Skysix said:


> "[The Finnish] Army is sporting roughly 3,500 full-time personnel, while the wartime mobilised strength is approximately 160,000, i.e. less than 2.5 % of the mobilised force would be professionals. Take that ratio, and in a 300-strong company you are looking at less than eight professional officers and NCOs."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Corporal Frisk
> 
> 
> Finnish blogger in reserve, defence and national security.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> corporalfrisk.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Interestingly, conscript trades and leadership candidates are chosen by cadre during their first 12 weeks of service



But they intake 18,400 conscripts annually, and another 18,400 reservists are mobilized annually for refresher training.  

So they have in addition to the cadre, over 36k personnel in active service. 

They have an interesting system, but I don’t think it would work for Canada.


----------



## ueo

Kirkhill said:


> Sfunny.  The High Altitude areas of BC begin at about 1000 m.  Pretty much the altitude of Mean Ground Level in Alberta.
> 
> BC Drives Uphill to Rogers Pass.  Alberta starts going Downhill there.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> And Quads, and MOSVs/Bv206s/BVS10s, and RHIBs.
> 
> 
> 
> It replicates the capabilities of the Arctic Response Company Group in the Southern Canadian Littorals when supported by the RCN as well as the RCAF.
> 
> It replaces Over Snow Vehicles with boats and BVS10s.
> 
> And yeah,  it will take dollars away from LAVs, Leos and SPHs.


Southern littorials- does this include the great lakes. Mackenzie delta and other areas?


----------



## Kirkhill

ueo said:


> Southern littorials- does this include the great lakes. Mackenzie delta and other areas?



Great question.  When does the Arctic become a Marine environment?    And when is an Arctic Lake an Inland Sea?

The Pacific, in Canada, is almost unique in that it is Ice Free - except when Alpine Glaciers come down to the Sea.

Much of the rest of the Arctic has a Maritime aspect to it.   The Great Lakes, although heavily populated experience enough ice to block navigation.  The Gulf of St Lawrence freezes and supports haulouts for harp seals. Our entire northern shore line freezes for much of the year.

So what are the best tools for operating in that part of Canada where Pick Up trucks, LAVs and Leos can't go?

The Ski Doo, the Quad, the Argo, the Sherp, solve some problems.  MOSVs solve some problems, Helicopters and planes solve some problems.  RHIBs solve some problems. Jet boats solve some problems.  CB90 type boats solve some problems.   

I think the AOPS, Patrol Centres and Armouries can also solve some problems.  

Comms are essential.   Navigation is essential.  Small arms are adequate.  ISTAR assets are essential.  Air Defence would be the first big ticket weapons priority now - available on very short notice and broadly distributed.


----------



## RangerRay

Kirkhill said:


> Great question.  When does the Arctic become a Marine environment?    And when is an Arctic Lake an Inland Sea?
> 
> The Pacific, in Canada, is almost unique in that it is Ice Free - except when Alpine Glaciers come down to the Sea.
> 
> Much of the rest of the Arctic has a Maritime aspect to it.   The Great Lakes, although heavily populated experience enough ice to block navigation.  The Gulf of St Lawrence freezes and supports haulouts for harp seals. Our entire northern shore line freezes for much of the year.
> 
> So what are the best tools for operating in that part of Canada where Pick Up trucks, LAVs and Leos can't go?
> 
> The Ski Doo, the Quad, the Argo, the Sherp, solve some problems.  MOSVs solve some problems, Helicopters and planes solve some problems.  RHIBs solve some problems. Jet boats solve some problems.  CB90 type boats solve some problems.
> 
> I think the AOPS, Patrol Centres and Armouries can also solve some problems.
> 
> Comms are essential.   Navigation is essential.  Small arms are adequate.  ISTAR assets are essential.  Air Defence would be the first big ticket weapons priority now - available on very short notice and broadly distributed.


Airmobile may be the way to go. Expensive but that’s how BC Wildfire Service gets into inaccessible areas of the province. 






						Initial Attack crews
					

Learn about BC Wildfire Service Initial Attack crews. Initial Attack crews are small, quick-response teams designed to suppress new wildfires before they grow.



					www2.gov.bc.ca


----------



## Kirkhill

RangerRay said:


> Airmobile may be the way to go. Expensive but that’s how BC Wildfire Service gets into inaccessible areas of the province.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Initial Attack crews
> 
> 
> Learn about BC Wildfire Service Initial Attack crews. Initial Attack crews are small, quick-response teams designed to suppress new wildfires before they grow.
> 
> 
> 
> www2.gov.bc.ca



It may be the highest cost per attack but how does it compare in terms of maintaining a standing attack capability?  For example, suppose there were no air attack capability, only ground attack by truck, boat and permanently emplaced assets.  How much would fire defence cost under those circumstances?


----------



## KevinB

RangerRay said:


> Airmobile may be the way to go. Expensive but that’s how BC Wildfire Service gets into inaccessible areas of the province.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Initial Attack crews
> 
> 
> Learn about BC Wildfire Service Initial Attack crews. Initial Attack crews are small, quick-response teams designed to suppress new wildfires before they grow.
> 
> 
> 
> www2.gov.bc.ca


Biggest issue the CAF has is the fact it doesn’t have significant rotary wing assets, and most they have aren’t an ideal platform (cough Griffon cough).


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> It may be the highest cost per attack but how does it compare in terms of maintaining a standing attack capability?  For example, suppose there were no air attack capability, only ground attack by truck, boat and permanently emplaced assets.  How much would fire defence cost under those circumstances?


One also needs to factor in the significantly larger losses due to lack of early response.  

Some of the terrain is impossible to reach via other means - and you can’t build fire fighting bunkers all over the mountains as cool as it would be


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Biggest issue the CAF has is the fact it doesn’t have significant rotary wing assets, and most they have aren’t an ideal platform (cough Griffon cough).



Yah, yah.   It could be better.

I will still take something over nothing and short legs over no legs.   

Are the procedures for supporting a ground force by air at 300 km significantly different than supporting the same ground force by air at 1000 km?

Even with the Griffons and the small force of Chinooks, Twotters, Hercs and C17s we are not without means to act at some levels.   Just like we do have some small boat assets, inflatables, ribs, rhibs, jet boats, small landing craft and pontoons.

We can build capabilities and TTPs based on the equipment we have - regardless of what you think of the equipment.

Wooden tanks were a thing.  The formed the bases for a number of the world's tank armies.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Last time I saw them they were in CMBG and issued out for adventure training. If it were up to me they’d be issued 1 per man to each infantry unit in the Army… probably need a bit of white spray paint to be fair.



That's what I spent several winters doing in Arctic Norway. You can move a battalion on skis about 5X as fast as on snowshoes, or on foot....


----------



## foresterab

Kirkhill said:


> It may be the highest cost per attack but how does it compare in terms of maintaining a standing attack capability?  For example, suppose there were no air attack capability, only ground attack by truck, boat and permanently emplaced assets.  How much would fire defence cost under those circumstances?


This is a common discussion with IA resources and frankly...truck attack is more normal than helicopter based attack for budget if nothing else.    Specialized skills such as helicopter based rappel and para-jumpers are even rarer due to a) changes in helicopter capacity/lift from the 1970/1980's  b) increased road development and c) triage of value reporting.   

The trade off of not having these assets is basically a balancing act between spending lots of money to hit fires small vs. waiting for the fire to come to a value at risk and then fighting it.   The northern areas of YT/NWT/SK/MB/ON/PQ and Parks Canada often allow fires to burn due to a lack of values to protect and the fire is assumed to be a natural cycle.  This tends to be very low cost fire fighting which might results in a fire that might only be monitored by a daily patrol mapping the perimeter growth and/or more recently satellite tools like MODIS.    The downside is that if you don't hit that fire and it starts to come towards your value at risk....now you've got a major problem in an area with limited response.   Think of it like a beach defense scenario....if you can pick the landing craft off in the water it's way easier than allowing an army to land, establish a bridgehead and then try to repulse them.   The downside is now you need a means of monitoring all the beaches...

The other big challenge is we're dealing with a somewhat accepted issue with wildfires that "belongs" for lack of a better term.  But when we're talking the CAF who are tasked with ensuring the sovereignty of the Nation you are not in a position to accept that we've allowed Red Force X to occupy Baffin Island (for example) while we decide if it's worth mobilizing or not and then trying to figure out how to get there.   You need that ready, full time force, there ready for the unknown while having a plan to add resources to support the initial response.


----------



## Kirkhill

foresterab said:


> This is a common discussion with IA resources and frankly...truck attack is more normal than helicopter based attack for budget if nothing else.    Specialized skills such as helicopter based rappel and para-jumpers are even rarer due to a) changes in helicopter capacity/lift from the 1970/1980's  b) increased road development and c) triage of value reporting.
> 
> The trade off of not having these assets is basically a balancing act between spending lots of money to hit fires small vs. waiting for the fire to come to a value at risk and then fighting it.   The northern areas of YT/NWT/SK/MB/ON/PQ and Parks Canada often allow fires to burn due to a lack of values to protect and the fire is assumed to be a natural cycle.  This tends to be very low cost fire fighting which might results in a fire that might only be monitored by a daily patrol mapping the perimeter growth and/or more recently satellite tools like MODIS.    The downside is that if you don't hit that fire and it starts to come towards your value at risk....now you've got a major problem in an area with limited response.   Think of it like a beach defense scenario....if you can pick the landing craft off in the water it's way easier than allowing an army to land, establish a bridgehead and then try to repulse them.   The downside is now you need a means of monitoring all the beaches...
> 
> The other big challenge is we're dealing with a somewhat accepted issue with wildfires that "belongs" for lack of a better term.  But when we're talking the CAF who are tasked with ensuring the sovereignty of the Nation you are not in a position to accept that we've allowed Red Force X to occupy Baffin Island (for example) while we decide if it's worth mobilizing or not and then trying to figure out how to get there.   You need that ready, full time force, there ready for the unknown while having a plan to add resources to support the initial response.



Fires in places and fires in spaces?

Fires where people are are fires in places.  The people and their property need to be defended.  But there are roads there.   The roads bring in trucks to defeat the fires.  But.  The roads also brought in the people who started the fires and the people who have the property that necessitates a defence.

Fires where people are not are fires in spaces.  There are no people, and very little property, to be defended.  There are no roads to bring in trucks to defeat the fires.  But.  There are no roads to bring in people who start fires and most high value property seems likely to have its own fire defences.


----------



## RangerRay

Kirkhill said:


> It may be the highest cost per attack but how does it compare in terms of maintaining a standing attack capability?  For example, suppose there were no air attack capability, only ground attack by truck, boat and permanently emplaced assets.  How much would fire defence cost under those circumstances?


No idea, but in terms of getting into places with no road or trail access quickly, nothing beats heli-attack and rap-attack (although rap-attack’s safety protocols don’t make them much faster than heli-attack doing a hover exit.

I suppose that if the fire crews didn’t have helicopters, the cost of fighting the same fire when it got close to a road or a beach would be a lot more than if a 3 person airmobile initial attack crew got to the fire when it was small and low intensity.  A big factor in using helicopters over vehicle is speed, as well as accessibility.  By the time that fire got close enough to a road, it would probably be a project fire requiring unit crews, camps, command structures, heavy equipment and the logistical tail that would require.

In terms of military applications, I was throwing airmobile out there as a suggestion since much of the province is accessible only by mountain goat. I know the Army likes to think troops are pack mules, but you are going to break a lot of them humping 200 lbs of kit up and down heavily forested mountains to set up OP’s.

My $0.02.


----------



## daftandbarmy

RangerRay said:


> In terms of military applications, I was throwing airmobile out there as a suggestion since much of the province is accessible only by mountain goat.* I know the Army likes to think troops are pack mules, but you are going to break a lot of them humping 200 lbs of kit up and down heavily forested mountains to set up OP’s.*
> 
> My $0.02.



The other part of it is to select and train (hard) your troops so they can cover long distances through rough terrain with heavy loads and not even think twice about it.

If you let people think they can be effective in their roles even though they can't operate away from the pavement, or carry a ruck further than from the bus stop to the armoury, then you're not doing anyone a service.

Again, the troops will always be up for these kind of efforts and this is mainly a leadership challenge. 

Fat, risk averse, unskilled, smug and chateau-borne leaders will always get what they lead


----------



## RangerRay

daftandbarmy said:


> The other part of it is to select and train (hard) your troops so they can cover long distances through rough terrain with heavy loads and not even think twice about it.
> 
> If you let people think they can be effective in their roles even though they can't operate away from the pavement, or carry a ruck further than from the bus stop to the armoury, then you're not doing anyone a service.
> 
> Again, the troops will always be up for these kind of efforts and this is mainly a leadership challenge.
> 
> Fat, risk averse, unskilled, smug and chateau-borne leaders will always get what they lead


But you have to agree…there’s a difference between training to make tough, resilient soldiers, and treating them literally like rented mules…


----------



## daftandbarmy

RangerRay said:


> But you have to agree…there’s a difference between training to make tough, resilient soldiers, and treating them literally like rented mules…



Fully paid and pension earning mules, of course 









						"Marius' mules" « IMPERIUM ROMANUM
					

The Roman army has evolved many times over the course of history. The equipment (except armour) of Roman soldiers was originally, as was the case in all armies of the then world, on carts or mules/donkeys. Gradually, however, there was a need to improve military mobility, shorten the entire...




					imperiumromanum.pl


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> The other part of it is to select and train (hard) your troops so they can cover long distances through rough terrain with heavy loads and not even think twice about it.
> 
> If you let people think they can be effective in their roles even though they can't operate away from the pavement, or carry a ruck further than from the bus stop to the armoury, then you're not doing anyone a service.
> 
> Again, the troops will always be up for these kind of efforts and this is mainly a leadership challenge.
> 
> Fat, risk averse, unskilled, smug and chateau-borne leaders will always get what they lead


GWOT also taught us that it’s makes no sense to clap out folks carrying unreasonable loads when resupply can be done via Aviation assets (helicopter or GPS directed bundles).


----------



## foresterab

Kirkhill said:


> Fires in places and fires in spaces?
> 
> Fires where people are are fires in places.  The people and their property need to be defended.  But there are roads there.   The roads bring in trucks to defeat the fires.  But.  The roads also brought in the people who started the fires and the people who have the property that necessitates a defence.
> 
> Fires where people are not are fires in spaces.  There are no people, and very little property, to be defended.  There are no roads to bring in trucks to defeat the fires.  But.  There are no roads to bring in people who start fires and most high value property seems likely to have its own fire defences.


I really like your statement there "Fires in Place and Fires in Spaces".

Small fires in bad places can have terrible impacts but unfortunately large fires in isolated areas get low attention.    Then folks wonder why bad things happen when what is normal everywhere else hits them in turn...

For much of the southern portions of provinces and even middle portions it's a great way to sum up the situation.   Unfortunately then you get to the north...small, isolated communities, limited infrastructure, and lower cost impact (by sheer numbers) but high cultural/societal impacts for any event.    This where the RCAF has been called in many times to evacuate communities in part due to lift capacity but also due to the ability to fly off of instruments/no vis conditions and deal with issues such as smoke. 

Unfortunately regardless of where it is located high value property is rarely protected in my opinion and often is only found out about due to a critical emergency.     A topic worth a few beers...


----------



## foresterab

RangerRay said:


> No idea, but in terms of getting into places with no road or trail access quickly, nothing beats heli-attack and rap-attack (although rap-attack’s safety protocols don’t make them much faster than heli-attack doing a hover exit.
> 
> I suppose that if the fire crews didn’t have helicopters, the cost of fighting the same fire when it got close to a road or a beach would be a lot more than if a 3 person airmobile initial attack crew got to the fire when it was small and low intensity.  A big factor in using helicopters over vehicle is speed, as well as accessibility.  By the time that fire got close enough to a road, it would probably be a project fire requiring unit crews, camps, command structures, heavy equipment and the logistical tail that would require.
> 
> In terms of military applications, I was throwing airmobile out there as a suggestion since much of the province is accessible only by mountain goat. I know the Army likes to think troops are pack mules, but you are going to break a lot of them humping 200 lbs of kit up and down heavily forested mountains to set up OP’s.
> 
> My $0.02.


There are two issues that air attack can greatly assist with though I should have mentioned.   
1) An aerial perspective can be critical for observation of not just what the fire is doing but also other values.   This initial assessment is the basis of all triage decisions and tactic development.    Also can be critical for post fire investigation on causes etc.   Does not have to be helicopter but eyes in the sky help you realize that you're about to burn into a change on conditions and don't hit the left flank that will become the new head. 

2) Safety.   Even though I have 80% cell coverage in my district it's still common to need helicopters to work as repeaters for handheld radio comms back to HQ, especially in mountain conditions.    It's also a set of eyes in the sky than can be critical on tense working condition days to get timely evacuation notices.   Lastly...it really sucks to hear the command "All machines, punch buckets now and evac at helipad X".  But it can and does happen and more than a few tight situations were saved by air evac that trucks would not allow.

Trucks on the other hand allow for much greater flexibility in gear and cargo transport.   Need to carry a jerry can + hose + Crew + +++++ it can go in the bed of the truck and away you go at a much lower cost/easier logistical chain.  But trucks don't like swamps, or mountains, or sharp rock and often a longer walk is a smarter call than a stuck vehicle with no alternatives.     

To put this in Army terms it's very similar issues to airborne units (low supply, light arms, high training needs) vs. main force (full supply, heavy arms, can be lower training needs for basic function).  Time and place for each capacity but no silver bullet that says this the right tool everywhere.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> GWOT also taught us that it’s makes no sense to clap out folks carrying unreasonable loads when resupply can be done via Aviation assets (helicopter or GPS directed bundles).



Travel light, freeze at night, win the fight


----------



## RangerRay

foresterab said:


> There are two issues that air attack can greatly assist with though I should have mentioned.
> 1) An aerial perspective can be critical for observation of not just what the fire is doing but also other values.   This initial assessment is the basis of all triage decisions and tactic development.    Also can be critical for post fire investigation on causes etc.   Does not have to be helicopter but eyes in the sky help you realize that you're about to burn into a change on conditions and don't hit the left flank that will become the new head.
> 
> 2) Safety.   Even though I have 80% cell coverage in my district it's still common to need helicopters to work as repeaters for handheld radio comms back to HQ, especially in mountain conditions.    It's also a set of eyes in the sky than can be critical on tense working condition days to get timely evacuation notices.   Lastly...it really sucks to hear the command "All machines, punch buckets now and evac at helipad X".  But it can and does happen and more than a few tight situations were saved by air evac that trucks would not allow.
> 
> Trucks on the other hand allow for much greater flexibility in gear and cargo transport.   Need to carry a jerry can + hose + Crew + +++++ it can go in the bed of the truck and away you go at a much lower cost/easier logistical chain.  But trucks don't like swamps, or mountains, or sharp rock and often a longer walk is a smarter call than a stuck vehicle with no alternatives.
> 
> To put this in Army terms it's very similar issues to airborne units (low supply, light arms, high training needs) vs. main force (full supply, heavy arms, can be lower training needs for basic function).  Time and place for each capacity but no silver bullet that says this the right tool everywhere.


I defer to your far greater experience in fire suppression. I have always been involved in the periphery. 

I missed your earlier reply before I replied. Much better stated than mine!


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> Air Defense would be the first big ticket weapons priority now - available on very short notice and broadly distributed.


This weapon system and an ASEA plus thermal sensor system mounted on various platforms (BVS10, littoral boats, even containerised on trucks) might be a start









						This Is China's Beastly New Chinese Air Defense Vehicle
					

Short-range air defenses are now top of mind, and China is moving fast in this space as highlighted by its new Type 625E system.




					www.thedrive.com


----------



## Skysix

Double post deleted


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> It may be the highest cost per attack but how does it compare in terms of maintaining a standing attack capability?  For example, suppose there were no air attack capability, only ground attack by truck, boat and permanently emplaced assets.  How much would fire defence cost under those circumstances?


Airmobile is very weather dependant. Weather in the North is as much  or more so, of an opponent as the enemy. I wouldn't want to jump a Javelin or Stinger and rely on the tent group supplies landing anywhere near me in much if the winter weather north if tbe Arctic Circle. Pretty sure you can't LAPSE or airdrop through the clouds and snow squalls effectively.


----------



## RangerRay

Skysix said:


> Airmobile is very weather dependant. Weather in the North is as much  or more so, of an opponent as the enemy. I wouldn't want to jump a Javelin or Stinger and rely on the tent group supplies landing anywhere near me in much if the winter weather north if tbe Arctic Circle. Pretty sure you can't LAPSE or airdrop through the clouds and snow squalls effectively.


Weather would be a limiting factor to airmobile operations in British Columbia as well, especially along the wet Coast and in the Interior in winter (at least until you get above the inversion layer in the valley bottoms).


----------



## Skysix

KevinB said:


> Biggest issue the CAF has is the fact it doesn’t have significant rotary wing assets, and most they have aren’t an ideal platform (cough Griffon cough).


100%

They need another set of CH-47F and 2 squadrons of UH-60M plus 6 or so HH-60M


----------



## Skysix

foresterab said:


> But when we're talking the CAF who are tasked with ensuring the sovereignty of the Nation you are not in a position to accept that we've allowed Red Force X to occupy Baffin Island (for example) while we decide if it's worth mobilizing or not and then trying to figure out how to get there.   You need that ready, full time force, there ready for the unknown while having a plan to add resources to support the initial response.


Greenland/Denmark enter the chat


----------



## daftandbarmy

Skysix said:


> 100%
> 
> They need another set of CH-47F and 2 squadrons of UH-60M plus 6 or so HH-60M



That would assume the CAF has first identified its purpose and subsequent main effort/CoG, and sticks to it for longer than a Hummingbird's Heartbeat


----------



## Kirkhill

Skysix said:


> Airmobile is very weather dependant. Weather in the North is as much  or more so, of an opponent as the enemy. I wouldn't want to jump a Javelin or Stinger and rely on the tent group supplies landing anywhere near me in much if the winter weather north if tbe Arctic Circle. Pretty sure you can't LAPSE or airdrop through the clouds and snow squalls effectively.



So airmobile forces need to carry a sufficient amount of supplies to weather the weather and also needs ground transport to be able to relocate.
The unit needs to be right sized so that the personnel, their tools, their supplies and their vehicles can all be deposited in a single lift.  The air lift has to be organized along the same lines so that complete elements with their vehicle(s) and supplies are delivered in single air frames.


----------



## Kirkhill

RangerRay said:


> Weather would be a limiting factor to airmobile operations in British Columbia as well, especially along the wet Coast and in the Interior in winter (at least until you get above the inversion layer in the valley bottoms).



Weather is a limiting factor in all operations.  It can instantly change the Terrain and make all your vehicles useless, or at least degrade them.  It can also degrade your Situational Awareness.  Back to the need for autonomy.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> So airmobile forces need to carry a sufficient amount of supplies to weather the weather and also needs ground transport to be able to relocate.
> The unit needs to be right sized so that the personnel, their tools, their supplies and their vehicles can all be deposited in a single lift.  The air lift has to be organized along the same lines so that complete elements with their vehicle(s) and supplies are delivered in single air frames.



And it presupposes air superiority.... which alot of people tend to forget.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> And it presupposes air superiority.... which alot of people tend to forget.



Fair comment but does air superiority mean what we though it meant?

Perhaps air superiority begins with a CLU and a Stinger for every infantry section.


----------



## Skysix

Kirkhill said:


> Fair comment but does air superiority mean what we though it meant?
> 
> Perhaps air superiority begins with a CLU and a Stinger for every infantry section.


Thought I read somewhere that CLU can launch some AA missiles as well. If not, a CLU compatible fire and forget radar or IR guided AA missile would be a good idea. 

But now the section loadout 'starts' getting heavy with 2x SAW, CLU and 2 or 3 of each missile type (threat dependant)


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Fair comment but does air superiority mean what we though it meant?
> 
> Perhaps air superiority begins with a CLU and a Stinger for every infantry section.



Um, no.

It starts with overwhelming superiority in the aero-space realm, then adds bells and whistles after that.

Or at least that's what I was told


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> Um, no.
> 
> It starts with overwhelming superiority in the aero-space realm, then adds bells and whistles after that.
> 
> Or at least that's what I was told



That was prior to Feb 24th 2022.


----------



## Kirkhill

Skysix said:


> Thought I read somewhere that CLU can launch some AA missiles as well. If not, a CLU compatible fire and forget radar or IR guided AA missile would be a good idea.
> 
> But now the section loadout 'starts' getting heavy with 2x SAW, CLU and 2 or 3 of each missile type (threat dependant)











						The Army Is Now Firing Stinger Missiles From A Javelin Launcher
					

Firing Stingers from a Javelin launcher could be especially useful for engaging aircraft, drones, and missiles at night and in bad weather.




					www.thedrive.com
				




Every section gets a CLU to add to Situational Awareness in all environments.  Add missiles according to the threat environment.

Edit:  The section doesn't carry any missiles at all unless the Coy OC makes the call.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> That was prior to Feb 24th 2022.


There's a lot more to Ukrainian air defence than a few Stingers.



> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Armed_Forces_of_Ukraine#Air_defense_systems



Has anyone mentioned lately that we have none of the above nor their NATO brethren except what's on our frigates?

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> There's a lot more to Ukrainian air defence than a few Stingers.
> 
> 
> 
> Has anyone mentioned lately that we have none of the above nor their NATO brethren except what's on our frigates?
> 
> 🍻


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


>








😖


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> 😖


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


>


Yer too late


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> There's a lot more to Ukrainian air defence than a few Stingers.



From the previously cited article

The LWCLU is not just a missile launcher.  It is a node in the battlefield network.  One of the Stryker's early advantages was that it netted in the section/squad.  The LWCLU does the same for the section/squad when it is dismounted. 



> The same launcher can also be networked, including under FAAD C2, allowing the operator to receive data-linked targeting information from a host of off-board sensors, including those operated by different branches of the military. While it’s unclear exactly which third-party sources would generally be available to an LWCLU/Stinger combination, the fact that this is even available as an option is a significant advance over the basic Stinger. Even without additional targeting input, the LWCLU targeting system is far more advanced, including a digital compass and a datalink to a soldier’s tactical radio.





> The March 2021 testing milestone took place at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and involved soldiers from the Mississippi National Guard. The test also made use of a simulated Lockheed Martin AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel battlefield radar, while the UAV target was tracked using Northrop Grumman’s Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control, or FAAD C2, architecture. FAAD C2 is designed to integrate short-range air defense (SHORAD), counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM), and counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) systems, from initial detection of a threat through to interception.





FJAG said:


> Has anyone mentioned lately that we have none of the above nor their NATO brethren except what's on our frigates?
> 
> 🍻



Has anyone noted that the stuff we fire from frigates and aircraft can be netted in and launched from trucks ashore using the networks the navy currently employs?



			Navy Unveils Truck-Mounted SM-6 Missile Launcher In European Test
		


Finally, has anyone noticed how exquisite guns keep breaking down faster than the enemy can put them out of action.  And that missiles can stand in for both guns and aircraft









						Daily Kos: The Ukraine updates
					

<big>This is the full listing of the major articles/updates by kos, Mark Sumner, Barbara Morrill, and Hunter on the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Daily Kos evening summary diaries are not included in this compilation.  <br><br> The introductory Diary for this group is <strong>The Ukraine...




					www.dailykos.com


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Fair comment but does air superiority mean what we though it meant?
> 
> Perhaps air superiority begins with a CLU and a Stinger for every infantry section.


Not for being permissive to air mobile operations it doesn’t. 



Kirkhill said:


> That was prior to Feb 24th 2022.



What changed wrt to air superiority there ? What air mobile operations have been successful in an air parity environment ?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Not for being permissive to air mobile operations it doesn’t.



Does it not depend on scale and distance as well as risk appreciation?  Is the objective worth the risk?  For example resupplying and evacuating Azovstal or Khe San.  Are we moving a section or a battle group?  Is it a short hop in a brigade's area or is it a corps effort?



markppcli said:


> What changed wrt to air superiority there ?


The definition of air superiority and the number of tasks that previously were considered to require air superiority to let our aircraft fly.  Now there are many tasks (both SA and Strike) that are being handled in the air domain by uninhabited craft - and here I will include smart shells, missiles and loitering munitions.   The demands on manned aircraft have been reduced but the jobs still get done.

Concurrently the opposing force has found it expedient to keep its craft on the ground due to the high threat environment resulting from the wide dispersion of ground based anti-air assets.  Although the demand is for more even the limited numbers available have had effect across the full spectrum - Bombers, fighters, helicopters, uas as well as cruise missiles.  Even the occasional ballistic missile has been reported as intercepted.



markppcli said:


> What air mobile operations have been successful in an air parity environment ?



Mariupol resupply is one that has been publicly described that I would consider an air mobility operation.
The ability of helicopters, notably cargo carrying, to continue to conduct operations, suggest the possibility of moving and supporting sections and platoons, maybe even companies, from location to location.

I haven't seen anything to suggest Crete, or Arnhem or Ia Drang.  But operations on the scale of Bruneval seem not unlikely.


----------



## Furniture

The CAF lacks the Met support to operate helos in remote places efficiently/effectively. If the CAF wants to emphasize helo ops in the BC mountains, they need to invest in support. 

Helos and UAVs are awesome, but without good forecasts they are significantly less effective.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Does it not depend on scale and distance as well as risk appreciation?  Is the objective worth the risk?  For example resupplying and evacuating Azovstal or Khe San.  Are we moving a section or a battle group?  Is it a short hop in a brigade's area or is it a corps effort?



Having a Sam in the ground doesn’t protect your helicopter pushing forward if there’s air parity. You’re obviously right that risk and reward must be weighed by that’s a massive generalist and doesn’t do much to support your point.



Kirkhill said:


> The definition of air superiority and the number of tasks that previously were considered to require air superiority to let our aircraft fly.  Now there are many tasks (both SA and Strike) that are being handled in the air domain by uninhabited craft - and here I will include smart shells, missiles and loitering munitions.   The demands on manned aircraft have been reduced but the jobs still get done.



Which tasks, considered by whom, what does that have to do with your question about man pads equally air superiority? 



Kirkhill said:


> Concurrently the opposing force has found it expedient to keep its craft on the ground due to the high threat environment resulting from the wide dispersion of ground based anti-air assets.  Although the demand is for more even the limited numbers available have had effect across the full spectrum - Bombers, fighters, helicopters, uas as well as cruise missiles.  Even the occasional ballistic missile has been reported as intercepted.



That’s one possible interpretation. But the threat is a series of different tools, not “a man pad in a section.” 



Kirkhill said:


> Mariupol resupply is one that has been publicly described that I would consider an air mobility operation.
> The ability of helicopters, notably cargo carrying, to continue to conduct operations, suggest the possibility of moving and supporting sections and platoons, maybe even companies, from location to location.



They launched seven “runs” and had two helicopters shot down. Super high risk and conducted by their equivalent of CANSOF, not what I’d call a major shift.


Kirkhill said:


> I haven't seen anything to suggest Crete, or Arnhem or Ia Drang.  But operations on the scale of Bruneval seem not unlikely.



Ask the Russians how that went in Air Parity.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Having a Sam in the ground doesn’t protect your helicopter pushing forward if there’s air parity. You’re obviously right that risk and reward must be weighed by that’s a massive generalist and doesn’t do much to support your point.
> 
> 
> 
> Which tasks, considered by whom, what does that have to do with your question about man pads equally air superiority?
> 
> 
> 
> That’s one possible interpretation. But the threat is a series of different tools, not “a man pad in a section.”
> 
> 
> 
> They launched seven “runs” and had two helicopters shot down. Super high risk and conducted by their equivalent of CANSOF, not what I’d call a major shift.
> 
> 
> Ask the Russians how that went in Air Parity.



I guess I see movement in the balance.  A sway that makes some things more likely than they were.  I agree that there has been no clicking of a switch, nor any sign of a magic bullet.  I do see signs that, to me, indicate that things are not as they were.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I guess I see movement in the balance.  A sway that makes some things more likely than they were.  I agree that there has been no clicking of a switch, nor any sign of a magic bullet.  I do see signs that, to me, indicate that things are not as they were.


You can’t have things both ways; if a section with a CLU and Stingers can adequately defend the air space, we have to presume the enemy’s manpads are able to do the same. So if anything that kind of operation will become less possible. But no one pushes manpads down to section level because that’s massive over mill and you’d completely erode the ability of the section to do its job. But I digress.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> You can’t have things both ways; if a section with a CLU and Stingers can adequately defend the air space, we have to presume the enemy’s manpads are able to do the same. So if anything that kind of operation will become less possible. But no one pushes manpads down to section level because that’s massive over mill and you’d completely erode the ability of the section to do its job. But I digress.



But supposing the OC were to task one section in his company to carry a ManPAD?

And is that section defending the airspace or is it supplying a point defence for the company?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> But supposing the OC were to task one section in his company to carry a ManPAD?
> 
> And is that section defending the airspace or is it supplying a point defence for the company?


Neither; unless they’re being vectored as part of a network they providing pretty minimal value.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Furniture said:


> The CAF lacks the Met support to operate helos in remote places efficiently/effectively. If the CAF wants to emphasize helo ops in the BC mountains, they need to invest in support.
> 
> Helos and UAVs are awesome, but without good forecasts they are significantly less effective.



Like Airborne Armies (OP Market Garden enters the chat)


----------



## KevinB

Skysix said:


> Airmobile is very weather dependant. Weather in the North is as much  or more so, of an opponent as the enemy. I wouldn't want to jump a Javelin or Stinger and rely on the tent group supplies landing anywhere near me in much if the winter weather north if tbe Arctic Circle. Pretty sure you can't LAPSE or airdrop through the clouds and snow squalls effectively.


Airmobile isn’t as weather dependent as people perceive.   It’s mostly equipment and risk dependent as one can fly in a lot of conditions that some militaries (or elements thereof) won’t fly.  

Also there are GPS guided steerable cargo delivery systems that can be HAHO’s in almost any situation, that will land within 5m of your desired spot in significantly challenging weather conditions.  

Back in the 80’s and earliest of the 90’s (probably earlier too) the CAR would jump in with ‘old school’ CT-1 chutes and tent groups into the Arctic — and delivery methods are exponentially better now.  

FWIW I’ve never seen anyone (even on the JSOC side) jump a Stinger or Javelin on their person - generally the Mk48, M240 and Mk22 are about the largest items jumped individually either on a free fall or static line rig. Heavier items are cargo, jumped on pallets or bundles.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> You can’t have things both ways; if a section with a CLU and Stingers can adequately defend the air space, we have to presume the enemy’s manpads are able to do the same. So if anything that kind of operation will become less possible. But no one pushes manpads down to section level because that’s massive over mill and you’d completely erode the ability of the section to do its job. But I digress.


Actually there are Stinger Dets at the Platoon level in the US Army — they have gone through an AD class, and are networked with the Brigade ADAM Cell.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Also there are GPS guided steerable cargo delivery systems that can be HAHO’s in almost any situation, that will land within 5m of your desired spot in significantly challenging weather conditions.


I've heard a few stories during my interviews on Afghanistan which indicate that such delivery was far from 100% efficient and that was in a very permissive air defence environment. 

JPADS does have a standoff capability but the distance of the standoff is determined by the release altitude AGL which makes it very susceptible to a proper AD layered defence.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Airmobile isn’t as weather dependent as people perceive.



If the RNAS is doing the flying, you're probably OK. 

RAF? Make sure you bring spare socks


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I've heard a few stories during my interviews on Afghanistan which indicate that such delivery was far from 100% efficient and that was in a very permissive air defence environment.


It’s gotten a lot better, Afghanistan was the beta test area  



FJAG said:


> JPADS does have a standoff capability but the distance of the standoff is determined by the release altitude AGL which makes it very susceptible to a proper AD layered defence.
> 
> 🍻


They can be released by Unmanned vehicles 
   But yes, the assumption is that most Airborne, Airmobile operations including supplying of same that friendly Air has air supremacy and SEAD missions have degraded enemy AD assets.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> They can be released by Unmanned vehicles


That raises an interesting point.

While using an unmanned vehicle eliminates the risk of losing a valuable crew, it nonetheless does not change the vulnerability to interception statistic and loses a valuable, probably hard to replace asset. There is a point where the expenditure of "smart" systems and equipment becomes a factor - usually prewar where high cost $ to stockpile such assets in sufficient numbers to sustain operations takes away from other acquisitions.

Reducing aircrew numbers, however, is a very worthwhile endeavour as they constitute a very high recurring peacetime cost.

In the long run, every weapon system--including trained personnel--becomes part of a cost-benefit analysis. Canada's military is a prime example of what operational capabilities sometimes get thrown under the bus for other operational, and even worse, non operational day to day imperatives.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Actually there are Stinger Dets at the Platoon level in the US Army — they have gone through an AD class, and are networked with the Brigade ADAM Cell.


My understanding was that it’s less a set Stinger det and more some guys in some units are qualified on the stinger. As a stop gap while they build up their ad assets. 

But if you go read what I said it was that randomly assigning a section a stinger is not air superiority in anyway shape or form, and is limited air defence to the point of not being air defence. Networked, integrated, overlapping systems are air defence just like any other defence. And lastly that giving sections a stinger means they aren’t going to be able to do their primary job, which probably means the platoon now can’t do their job as 30 percent of their man power is doing AD.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> My understanding was that it’s less a set Stinger det and more some guys in some units are qualified on the stinger. As a stop gap while they build up their ad assets.


 True - they also have dedicated comms etc to be plugged into the ADAM. 
    But from what was briefed earlier this year, there is no intent to have MANPADS be operated by AD, just controlled by AD, ADA personnel are better used in ‘real’ AD platforms.   



markppcli said:


> But if you go read what I said it was that randomly assigning a section a stinger is not air superiority in anyway shape or form, and is limited air defence to the point of not being air defence. Networked, integrated, overlapping systems are air defence just like any other defence. And lastly that giving sections a stinger means they aren’t going to be able to do their primary job, which probably means the platoon now can’t do their job as 30 percent of their man power is doing AD.



The goal of the Infantry, Cavalry, Armor and Engineers having the ability to employ MANPADS is just part of the layered AD plan. 
   The ADA Battalions and Brigades will control the AD fight in conjunction with the Air Force, but MANPADS provide point air defense - and better 20% of the Section/Squad be able to conduct that PAD Role than the entire entity be potentially helpless, and degraded or destroyed without consequence.   Honestly it’s much closer to 2-4 guys in a Platoon, and so can be kept at the Pl HQ/Wpn DET level.  

It’s designed to be part of the Arms Room concept - that items are used as needed, and if not, then they aren’t used.  

I’m always a fan of its better to have and not need, than need and not have.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> True - they also have dedicated comms etc to be plugged into the ADAM.
> But from what was briefed earlier this year, there is no intent to have MANPADS be operated by AD, just controlled by AD, ADA personnel are better used in ‘real’ AD platforms.
> 
> 
> 
> The goal of the Infantry, Cavalry, Armor and Engineers having the ability to employ MANPADS is just part of the layered AD plan.
> The ADA Battalions and Brigades will control the AD fight in conjunction with the Air Force, but MANPADS provide point air defense - and better 20% of the Section/Squad be able to conduct that PAD Role than the entire entity be potentially helpless, and degraded or destroyed without consequence.   Honestly it’s much closer to 2-4 guys in a Platoon, and so can be kept at the Pl HQ/Wpn DET level.



I’d rather see those 2 guys per platoon in a dedicated platoon with its own logistic supports. 



KevinB said:


> It’s designed to be part of the Arms Room concept - that items are used as needed, and if not, then they aren’t used.
> 
> I’m always a fan of its better to have and not need, than need and not have.


Have and not need vs need and not have is great when your doing DA or limited duration missions out of a fob. It’s much harder to sustain when your in a conventional setting and all those “haves” are taking up space in your logistical train.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I’d rather see those 2 guys per platoon in a dedicated platoon with its own logistic supports.
> 
> 
> Have and not need vs need and not have is great when your doing DA or limited duration missions out of a fob. It’s much harder to sustain when your in a conventional setting and all those “haves” are taking up space in your logistical train.



I'd rather know there was something in the Canadian system that was available to knock some of the stuff out of the skies some of the time.


----------



## Kirkhill

AEROSPACE & DEFENSE
The Ukrainian Army’s Helicopters Sat Out The Last Campaign. They Sure Aren’t Sitting Out This One.​David Axe
Forbes Staff
I write about ships, planes, tanks, drones, missiles and satellites.

Nov 19, 2022,08:00am EST





Ukrainian army Mil Mi-8s.
UKRAINIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY PHOTO
It was an open question, as Russian forces massed along Ukraine’s borders in late 2021 and early 2022, whether the Ukrainian army’s helicopter pilots would play any meaningful role in the coming wider war.



There was good reason to believe they wouldn’t. The army’s four helicopter brigades—one each in the north, west, south and east—suffered such heavy casualties in fighting over eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014 that, in 2015, commanders pulled them off the front line.

But as the wider war grinds into its nine months, the aviation brigades not only are playing a huge role in the Ukrainian campaign, they actually are stronger now than they were back in February when Russian battalions rolled across the border.

Ukraine’s four aviation brigades are similar in structure, with each on paper operating around 16 Mil Mi-8 transports and 10 Mil Mi-24 gunships. In practice, the distribution of airframes is uneven. And there are a few Mil Mi-2 training helicopters and Mil Mi-26 heavy transports sprinkled across the brigades.

It’s not a huge rotary-wing force—especially not compared to Russia’s own rotary arsenal, which includes around 400 gunships and some 600 transports.
And it’s vulnerable. The air-defense environment over the Ukrainian front is one of the most dangerous in the world. In 2014 and 2015, the Russians and their separatist allies shot down or badly damaged at least 17 Ukrainian helicopters, killing most of the crews and reducing by nearly a fifth Ukraine’s rotary fleet.

As the war widened in February, it was reasonable to expect the Ukrainian aviation brigades to keep away from the front and instead stick to auxiliary roles safe inside friendly territory. Moving people and supplies between rear bases.

That’s not what happened. Ukraine’s helicopter brigades have been in the fight since the beginning, even as at least one of them—the 11th Separate Army Aviation Brigade—had to evacuate its base in the southern city of Kherson as Russian troops closed in. The brigades have suffered heavy losses. But they’ve inducted enough new equipment to make good their losses.

The Mi-8s have flown resupply and medical-evacuation missions. The Mi-24s have joined the Mi-8s on distinctive bombardment missions, approaching low then angling up to lob rockets at Russian troops from miles away.
The Mi-8 force’s finest hours were this spring, when crews flew daring daylight sorties into Russian-occupied Mariupol on the Black Sea coast in order to bring in supplies and bring out the most grievously wounded members of the tiny garrison holding out in the city’s iconic steel plant. The sorties ended after the Russians shot down three of the Mi-8s, killing many crew and passengers.
In all, the Russians have shot down 19 Ukrainian helicopters that independent analysts can confirm: 16 Mi-8s and variants plus three Mi-24s. But the surviving crews have endured, flying so low to avoid Russian air-defenses that their helicopters’ wheels nearly graze the tops of cars on the roads they follow for navigation.

Nineteen write-offs is a lot for a rotary force that, before the war, probably had no more than 100 airframes. But Ukraine’s foreign allies have stepped up. The United States, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Latvia between them have sent to Ukraine, or soon are sending, 40 Mil Mi-17s and at least two Mi-24s. The Mi-17 is a variant of the Mi-8.
With these new airframes, the Ukrainians actually will have more helicopters than they had in February. And having honed their low-flying tactics and weathered the Mariupol crisis, they’ve brought down the loss-rate to a level that should be sustainable for years.
All that is to say, it was wrong to assume the Ukrainian army’s helicopter brigades would sit out the wider war. They’ve been fighting hard since day one.










						The Ukrainian Army’s Helicopters Sat Out The Last Campaign. They Sure Aren’t Sitting Out This One.
					

With donated airframes, the Ukrainians soon will have more helicopters than they had in February.




					www.forbes.com


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> I'd rather know there was something in the Canadian system that was available to knock some of the stuff out of the skies some of the time.


I mean obviously yes, but that’s not what we were talking about


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I’d rather see those 2 guys per platoon in a dedicated platoon with its own logistic supports.


Who’s supporting them?  A dispersed AD Platoon that is made up of two man Dets attached to a Platoon/Troop… 



markppcli said:


> Have and not need vs need and not have is great when your doing DA or limited duration missions out of a fob. It’s much harder to sustain when your in a conventional setting and all those “haves” are taking up space in your logistical train.


 They are going to take up space regardless. 
  Regardless of who’s truck/track/helicopter etc it is in.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> Who’s supporting them?  A dispersed AD Platoon that is made up of two man Dets attached to a Platoon/Troop…



Well I’d imagine you work it like a mortar or atgm platoons with some internal logistics.



KevinB said:


> They are going to take up space regardless.
> Regardless of who’s truck/track/helicopter etc it is in.



I mean I guess, but an AD regiment has its own logistics. An arms room for every section eats the Bns logistics uo.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Who’s supporting them?  A dispersed AD Platoon that is made up of two man Dets attached to a Platoon/Troop…
> 
> 
> They are going to take up space regardless.
> Regardless of who’s truck/track/helicopter etc it is in.


You know my view that they be part of an AD troop. Back in the 70's, the Blowpipe dets each had their own 5/4 ton and comms gear and I presume the same was true for the later Javelin dets.

That said, I have no big issue with each rifle platoon having its own Stinger det - hell it saves the arty PYs for bigger systems. But I still want to see those infantry or armour dets with either a radio or digital device that's on an AD command and control net and which gives out early warning and fire control status data.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> You know my view that they be part of an AD troop. Back in the 70's, the Blowpipe dets each had their own 5/4 ton and comms gear and I presume the same was true for the later Javelin dets.
> 
> That said, I have no big issue with each rifle platoon having its own Stinger det - hell it saves the arty PYs for bigger systems. But I still want to see those infantry or armour dets with either a radio or digital device that's on an AD command and control net and which gives out early warning and fire control status data.
> 
> 🍻





> We now have our initial look at a demonstration of a Stinger short-range heat-seeking surface-to-air missile fired from a portable launcher originally designed for the Javelin anti-tank missile. In tests,* the combination of Javelin launcher and Stinger missile has been used to destroy an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) target, although, ultimately, the system will be able to take on a range of air and ground threats,* providing improved engagement capabilities for the Stinger.
> 
> The March 2021 testing milestone took place at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and involved soldiers from the Mississippi National Guard. *The test also made use of a simulated Lockheed Martin AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel battlefield radar, while the UAV target was tracked using Northrop Grumman’s Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control, or FAAD C2, architecture. FAAD C2 is designed to integrate short-range air defense (SHORAD), counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM), and counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) systems, from initial detection of a threat through to interception. *
> 
> According to Raytheon, compared with the original Javelin launcher, *the LWCLU can acquire targets at twice the sight range at night and three times the range during the day, *regardless of weather conditions.
> 
> Furthermore, since the launcher can be *used against targets in the air and on the ground*, it removes the requirement for troops to carry separate Stinger and Javelin launchers, at least in some scenarios:
> *“Because LWCLU can defeat both land and aerial threats, it’s easier for soldiers to use in complex environment*s,” said Tom Laliberty, vice president of Land Warfare & Air Defense, a business area of Raytheon Missiles & Defense, in a company statement last year. “It reduces the burden of carrying additional gear.”





> The *LWCLU, in contrast, offers an infrared optic as standard, providing superior capabilities in terms of spotting and then tracking targets at increased range* and at night.
> As for the infrared optics, this is something that has been noted as badly lacking from the majority of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) initially used by Ukraine against Russian airpower. According to a recent report from the  Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank, the Russian Aerospace Forces switched to night attacks in March this year at least partly in response to Ukrainian MANPADS operators lacking night-vision goggles or other optics.
> 
> *The same launcher can also be networked, including under FAAD C2, allowing the operator to receive data-linked targeting information from a host of off-board sensors, including those operated by different branches of the military.* While it’s unclear exactly which third-party sources would generally be available to an LWCLU/Stinger combination, the fact that this is even available as an option is a significant advance over the basic Stinger. Even without additional targeting input,* the LWCLU targeting system is far more advanced, including a digital compass and a datalink to a soldier’s tactical radio.*











						The Army Is Now Firing Stinger Missiles From A Javelin Launcher
					

Firing Stingers from a Javelin launcher could be especially useful for engaging aircraft, drones, and missiles at night and in bad weather.




					www.thedrive.com
				




So, to be clear one black box, the Javelin LWCLU, can let the owner see farther, by day and night, calculate a bearing, transmit it to the net, receive cueing data via FAAD C2 from various military branches, and with the right Ukrainian app, from civilian phones, locate and track the target at long range and then engage the target with either a Javelin variant or a Stinger variant.

If you issue the LWCLUs like the Yanks,  one per section, then the threat environment will determine how many Stingers and how many Javelins will be carried by the CQ.

You will a have a fully netted Man Portable ADATs (Air Defence Anti-Tank) system.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> The Army Is Now Firing Stinger Missiles From A Javelin Launcher
> 
> 
> Firing Stingers from a Javelin launcher could be especially useful for engaging aircraft, drones, and missiles at night and in bad weather.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.thedrive.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> So, to be clear one black box, the Javelin LWCLU, can let the owner see farther, by day and night, calculate a bearing, transmit it to the net, receive cueing data via FAAD C2 from various military branches, and with the right Ukrainian app, from civilian phones, locate and track the target at long range and then engage the target with either a Javelin variant or a Stinger variant.
> 
> If you issue the LWCLUs like the Yanks,  one per section, then the threat environment will determine how many Stingers and how many Javelins will be carried by the CQ.
> 
> You will a have a fully netted Man Portable ADATs (Air Defence Anti-Tank) system.


Just to be clear only the AD DET are on the ADAM down here, and only they get Stingers. 
   Everyone else with a Javelin LWCLU gets Javelins — that way the air weapons release state is controlled by ADAM (for that Bde’s AD Dets) and not every one can be blasting MANPADS.  

The Ukrainian solutions work for their limited Air efforts.   They wouldn’t work for a NATO Air situation, as that Det being required to be point AD is viewed as in extremis, not the day to day routine.


----------



## ueo

daftandbarmy said:


> And it presupposes air superiority.... which alot of people tend to forget.


How about landing strips etc to  sp the air element. I know no reqt for abn ops but follow on forces must go/land some where reasonably close.


----------



## ueo

KevinB said:


> Airmobile isn’t as weather dependent as people perceive.   It’s mostly equipment and risk dependent as one can fly in a lot of conditions that some militaries (or elements thereof) won’t fly.
> 
> Also there are GPS guided steerable cargo delivery systems that can be HAHO’s in almost any situation, that will land within 5m of your desired spot in significantly challenging weather conditions.
> 
> Back in the 80’s and earliest of the 90’s (probably earlier too) the CAR would jump in with ‘old school’ CT-1 chutes and tent groups into the Arctic — and delivery methods are exponentially better now.
> 
> FWIW I’ve never seen anyone (even on the JSOC side) jump a Stinger or Javelin on their person - generally the Mk48, M240 and Mk22 are about the largest items jumped individually either on a free fall or static line rig. Heavier items are cargo, jumped on pallets or bundles.


Ask about the "Round Lake Masacure",  just for interest  and context.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Well, the US has the ability to "buy it and try it" instead of just talking about what might work best.


----------



## KevinB

ueo said:


> Ask about the "Round Lake Masacure",  just for interest  and context.


I have a cottage on Round Lake, I am familiar…


----------



## Kirkhill

> Dubbed “Streetfighter” and “Megatron”, the upgraded Challenger 2 will feel more like a computer simulation for the drivers, with 360-degree views and X-ray vision.
> 
> Both will be fitted with anti-tank Brimstone missile systems, and crews will be able to maintain full visibility even with hatches closed, thanks to special helmets kitted out with Israeli-made IronVision See-Through' Head-Mounted Display technology.
> 
> In order for this system to work, an array of electro-optical and infrared cameras are positioned around the hull of each tank.





> In addition, an iPad -type tablet will be mounted on the rear to allow infantry to communicate with the tank’s crew if radio communications fail.





> Justin Crump, of Sibylline strategic risk group, who is also a reservist tank commander, said: “It’s important to note that none of this is Challenger 3 - this is simply a Challenger 2 upgrade.
> 
> “We don’t know what the mix will be, but it is likely that the Streetfighter is being prepared for somewhere like Estonia, while the Megatron will be held back for operations in other theatres. The point is we just don't know what will be asked of us.”
> 
> He added: “On paper, these are good developments if they work efficiently. The addition of Brimstone would allow tanks to fire over the ridge of a hill, for instance.
> 
> “I do worry about information overload inside the turret, however, and whether one platform is being asked to perform too many tasks. - but we do trials for a reason.”





> Army unveils two deadly new tanks with X-Ray vision
> 
> 
> War gamers would feel at home in the Army's latest hi-tech tanks.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.express.co.uk






So, better to put the Brimstones on the Tanks (RCAC owners)?

Or on the AFVs carrying the infantry following in trail of the tanks (RCIC owners)?






Or on a separate stand-alone vehicle (RRCA owners)?











						RBSL unveils Brimstone-equipped Boxer vehicle | DefenceToday.com
					

Brimstone, leveraging significant investments by UK MOD into this state-of-the-art anti-armour weapon system, offers ‘one missile, multi-platform’ versatility




					www.defencetoday.com


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> So, better to put the Brimstones on the Tanks (RCAC owners)?
> 
> Or on the AFVs carrying the infantry following in trail of the tanks (RCIC owners)?
> 
> 
> 
> Or on a separate stand-alone vehicle (RRCA owners)?


How about option 4:  standalone vehicle, RCAC and RCIC owners,  Cav Regiment/Inf Battalion AT Platoon


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 75037
> 
> 
> So, better to put the Brimstones on the Tanks (RCAC owners)?
> 
> Or on the AFVs carrying the infantry following in trail of the tanks (RCIC owners)?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Or on a separate stand-alone vehicle (RRCA owners)?
> 
> View attachment 75039
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> RBSL unveils Brimstone-equipped Boxer vehicle | DefenceToday.com
> 
> 
> Brimstone, leveraging significant investments by UK MOD into this state-of-the-art anti-armour weapon system, offers ‘one missile, multi-platform’ versatility
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defencetoday.com


I like stand alone and RCIC, I worry about adding systems in systems on systems for crews to deal with. Everyone has a given amou t of cognitive load they can handle and when they are responsible for continuous multi tasking you begin ti stress that. 

Stand alone vehicles: Great can take on that anti tank role, cover gaps, flank security, awesome. Carry a shit tone of reloads and be small.

IFV / APC : in extremis coverage, provide AT fire if required. Ideally same system as the dismounts are carrying for commonality, but bearing mind reloads eat internal space and exterior carriage is sub optimal.

Tanks: your taking away from their primary purpose / ammo carriage, with questionable return.


----------



## KevinB

markppcli said:


> I like stand alone and RCIC, I worry about adding systems in systems on systems for crews to deal with. Everyone has a given amou t of cognitive load they can handle and when they are responsible for continuous multi tasking you begin ti stress that.
> 
> Stand alone vehicles: Great can take on that anti tank role, cover gaps, flank security, awesome. Carry a shit tone of reloads and be small.
> 
> IFV / APC : in extremis coverage, provide AT fire if required. Ideally same system as the dismounts are carrying for commonality, but bearing mind reloads eat internal space and exterior carriage is sub optimal.
> 
> Tanks: your taking away from their primary purpose / ammo carriage, with questionable return.


The Bradley concept is a good example I think of what can be both a Cav, Inf, and stand alone AT system.  

Replace the TOW with Javelin or JAGM, and you have a stand off Anti Armor (and anti structure) System, and update the cannon to a 30-50mm system and it has anti-person/light vehicle capabilities too.


----------



## IKnowNothing

KevinB said:


> Replace the TOW with Javelin or JAGM, and you have a stand off Anti Armor (and anti structure) System, and update the cannon to a 30-50mm system and it has anti-person/light vehicle capabilities too.


That's one thing that's been niggling at me, why is the A4 still 25mm/twin TOW? No appetite to re-turret? weight/size limitations?

Edit- with a blank cheque (no need to free load off the US) what's the case for the A4 over the CV9035NL MLU?


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I like stand alone and RCIC, I worry about adding systems in systems on systems for crews to deal with. Everyone has a given amou t of cognitive load they can handle and when they are responsible for continuous multi tasking you begin ti stress that.
> 
> Stand alone vehicles: Great can take on that anti tank role, cover gaps, flank security, awesome. Carry a shit tone of reloads and be small.
> 
> IFV / APC : in extremis coverage, provide AT fire if required. Ideally same system as the dismounts are carrying for commonality, but bearing mind reloads eat internal space and exterior carriage is sub optimal.
> 
> Tanks: your taking away from their primary purpose / ammo carriage, with questionable return.



So the tank continues as a gun carrier - rapid fire, close combat, line of sight

The infantry gets an infantry carrier - carrying troops with infantry weapons to fight the close combat battle on foot

The infantry carrier can also be used to carry dismountable support weapons to fight the stand off battle

The artillery gets an armoured pickup truck optimized to carry a range of stand off weapons systems.

All vehicles get a light calibre, high angle, rapid slew, RWS with lots of rounds for local defence against personnel and aerial threeats (uavs and missiles)

Something along those lines?

Is the 25mm manned turret still the optimal solution or does the production emphasis need to swing to accommodate a couple more vehicle types in the Platoon/Coy?


----------



## KevinB

IKnowNothing said:


> That's one thing that's been niggling at me, why is the A4 still 25mm/twin TOW? No appetite to re-turret? weight/size limitations?


A4 is just an improvement on the theme - more power for network requirements.
   Javelin and Hellfire models have been made, but as I understand it, the hope had been that OMFV would come on line sooner than later - and no major platform upgrades to the Bradley will be required.
   Based on OMFV timeline, I expect an A5 Bradley with a 40-50mm gun and JAGM will come on line in the FY24.


IKnowNothing said:


> Edit- with a blank cheque (no need to free load off the US) what's the case for the A4 over the CV9035NL MLU?


Blank Check I think the CV90 MkIV platform would be the way to roll




Kirkhill said:


> So the tank continues as a gun carrier - rapid fire, close combat, line of sight
> 
> The infantry gets an infantry carrier - carrying troops with infantry weapons to fight the close combat battle on foot
> 
> The infantry carrier can also be used to carry dismountable support weapons to fight the stand off battle


Tracking


Kirkhill said:


> The artillery gets an armoured pickup truck optimized to carry a range of stand off weapons systems.


Lost me totally, as I see HIMARS and M1299/M109A7 being the logical CMBG Arty assets.



Kirkhill said:


> All vehicles get a light calibre, high angle, rapid slew, RWS with lots of rounds for local defence against personnel and aerial threeats (uavs and missiles)


Losing me again.
   I do see RWS needs, but I don't see them on all vehicles - and I still believe the ADA needs to control the Anti Air State - and responses.
 So I would have some vehicles setup for AAD, as part of the Bde+ Air Plan and networked with the Canadian equivalent of the ADAM Cell (sorry I've been a long time and I flushed most of my CA organization knowledge) 


Kirkhill said:


> Something along those lines?
> 
> Is the 25mm manned turret still the optimal solution or does the production emphasis need to swing to accommodate a couple more vehicle types in the Platoon/Coy?


The 25mm is definitely no longer the optimal solution, I think 35-50mm is the way most NATO countries are going for an IFV, with a NLOS ATGM.    Keep in mind the ATGM can also be used for anti-structure/fortification usage (even if an expensive option - it's cheaper than wasted lives).


----------



## ArmyRick

KevinB said:


> A4 is just an improvement on the theme - more power for network requirements.
> Javelin and Hellfire models have been made, but as I understand it, the hope had been that OMFV would come on line sooner than later - and no major platform upgrades to the Bradley will be required.
> Based on OMFV timeline, I expect an A5 Bradley with a 40-50mm gun and JAGM will come on line in the FY24.
> 
> Blank Check I think the CV90 MkIV platform would be the way to roll
> 
> 
> 
> Tracking
> 
> Lost me totally, as I see HIMARS and M1299/M109A7 being the logical CMBG Arty assets.
> 
> 
> Losing me again.
> I do see RWS needs, but I don't see them on all vehicles - and I still believe the ADA needs to control the Anti Air State - and responses.
> So I would have some vehicles setup for AAD, as part of the Bde+ Air Plan and networked with the Canadian equivalent of the ADAM Cell (sorry I've been a long time and I flushed most of my CA organization knowledge)
> 
> The 25mm is definitely no longer the optimal solution, I think 35-50mm is the way most NATO countries are going for an IFV, with a NLOS ATGM.    Keep in mind the ATGM can also be used for anti-structure/fortification usage (even if an expensive option - it's cheaper than wasted lives).


Do you ever get the feeling the Yanks go too much for "dream machine" in their technology development? In the pursuit of near pefection, they see one project after another being cancelled (IMO). 
Look at FCS Manned ground vehicles, then the IFV bradley replacement that got tossed after that. Then the first what was supposed to be the selection for I believe OMFV a year ago was down to the KF41 and it was cancelled. 

I know its funny hearing a Canadian telling the yanks "to accept the 70% good enough solution" and stop pursuing the 99% perfection idea. 

I think if they purchase an excellent system that has multiple future upgrade options is the way to go for OMFV.


----------



## daftandbarmy

ArmyRick said:


> Do you ever get the feeling the Yanks go too much for "dream machine" in their technology development? In the pursuit of near pefection, they see one project after another being cancelled (IMO).
> Look at FCS Manned ground vehicles, then the IFV bradley replacement that got tossed after that. Then the first what was supposed to be the selection for I believe OMFV a year ago was down to the KF41 and it was cancelled.
> 
> I know its funny hearing a Canadian telling the yanks "to accept the 70% good enough solution" and stop pursuing the 99% perfection idea.
> 
> I think if they purchase an excellent system that has multiple future upgrade options is the way to go for OMFV.



That's how innovation really works.... 80% of the ideas never make it to fruition. And it's expensive.


----------



## KevinB

ArmyRick said:


> Do you ever get the feeling the Yanks go too much for "dream machine" in their technology development? In the pursuit of near pefection, they see one project after another being cancelled (IMO).
> Look at FCS Manned ground vehicles, then the IFV bradley replacement that got tossed after that. Then the first what was supposed to be the selection for I believe OMFV a year ago was down to the KF41 and it was cancelled.


There are multifold issues at work;
Part of it is a willingness of the Project Offices, plus HASC and SASC to scrap programs when the result clearly isn't worth it, or has been overtaken by events, I wish more programs down here actually got the axe at times (NGSW and NGAR for example).
Part of it is HASC and SASC oversight calling the Army (etc) to be accountable when attempting to field giant POS's.

But culturally, there is a desire to remain at the bleeding edge of technology - and with that one needs to accept that some visions won't pan out.



ArmyRick said:


> I know its funny hearing a Canadian telling the yanks "to accept the 70% good enough solution" and stop pursuing the 99% perfection idea.
> 
> I think if they purchase an excellent system that has multiple future upgrade options is the way to go for OMFV.


Personally I think OMFV has been a bridge too far, and that realistically certain aspect of that should have been ironed out prior to embarking on a Bradley replacement -- as a result I think we are probably going to see 10-15 more years of Bradly service at least.
  I think a better investment would have been in an Autonomous Combat Vehicle as a Remote Combat Scout/Support Vehicle for formation to work with the Bradleys - and Bradley upgrades to  turret, etc  that when and if the Autonomous Combat Vehicle is prime time, that then a big brother can be looked at.



daftandbarmy said:


> That's how innovation really works.... 80% of the ideas never make it to fruition. And it's expensive.


Yeah lots of R&D Efforts never result in a specific product/program, but the results and innovation from those programs can be used in the future.
  I also include learning from the really bad ideas that one shouldn't do that again (like the M14)


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> That's how innovation really works.... 80% of the ideas never make it to fruition. And it's expensive.


Yup new systems from failed machines upgrade existing fleets.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> A4 is just an improvement on the theme - more power for network requirements.
> Javelin and Hellfire models have been made, but as I understand it, the hope had been that OMFV would come on line sooner than later - and no major platform upgrades to the Bradley will be required.
> Based on OMFV timeline, I expect an A5 Bradley with a 40-50mm gun and JAGM will come on line in the FY24.
> 
> Blank Check I think the CV90 MkIV platform would be the way to roll
> 
> 
> 
> Tracking
> 
> Lost me totally, as I see HIMARS and M1299/M109A7 being the logical CMBG Arty assets.



Although I like pickup trucks as GP vehicles in this instance I am using them as a concept for a GP vehicle, regardless of tonnage, that can launch a variety of missiles.  HIMARS is one way to go.  Boxer/LAV-ACSV/Stryker  is another.


KevinB said:


> Losing me again.
> I do see RWS needs, but I don't see them on all vehicles - and I still believe the ADA needs to control the Anti Air State - and responses.
> So I would have some vehicles setup for AAD, as part of the Bde+ Air Plan and networked with the Canadian equivalent of the ADAM Cell (sorry I've been a long time and I flushed most of my CA organization knowledge)


I am thinking in terms of an upgraded Trophy APS system for point defence that can also provide APers defence when manually overridden

I am sold on separate AD and AT organizations.  Equally though I am sold on technological commonality where possible.

Common launcher for Brimstone, APKWS, Stinger, CAMM, ASPIDE, AIM9, AMRAAM, ESSM, MRLS, GMRLS, GMRLS-ER, GLSDB, PrSM, ATACMS.



KevinB said:


> The 25mm is definitely no longer the optimal solution, I think 35-50mm is the way most NATO countries are going for an IFV, with a NLOS ATGM.    Keep in mind the ATGM can also be used for anti-structure/fortification usage (even if an expensive option - it's cheaper than wasted lives).


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Although I like pickup trucks as GP vehicles in this instance I am using them as a concept for a GP vehicle, regardless of tonnage, that can launch a variety of missiles.  HIMARS is one way to go.  Boxer/LAV-ACSV/Stryker  is another.


Okay I am tracking now.



Kirkhill said:


> I am thinking in terms of an upgraded Trophy APS system for point defence that can also provide APers defence when manually overridden


Sort of like the reverse of the Abrams X 30mm, primary it is for AP and Light Vehicle engagement - but can be used with Proximity fuzed munitions for CUAS, but it has a separate APS for incoming Missiles.



Kirkhill said:


> I am sold on separate AD and AT organizations.  Equally though I am sold on technological commonality where possible.
> 
> Common launcher for Brimstone, APKWS, Stinger, CAMM, ASPIDE, AIM9, AMRAAM, ESSM, MRLS, GMRLS, GMRLS-ER, GLSDB, PrSM, ATACMS.


I'm not sure what you mean by common launcher - as several of those missiles/rockets need different launchers, due to the size/guidance requirement of the systems.
   For example  MRLS, GMRLS, GMRLS-ER, GLSDB, PrSM, ATACMS all use the MRLS/HIMARS Boxes - they have no targeting requirements on their own - and just need target data links to be fed firing solutions.
   With Stinger and AIM9 those are IR trackers - and need seeker lock - they can go on pretty much anything though.
 The Radar etc Air to Air systems - those require much more specialized launch system - and to be linked into detection systems.

I don't see a common system for those different aspects - other than a vehicle platform, for the more fixed AD system you could palletize them so any PLS system could mount them - or just to move them around though.


----------



## Brad Sallows

KevinB said:


> But culturally, there is a desire to remain at the bleeding edge of technology - and with that one needs to accept that some visions won't pan out.


Strategy of technology.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Okay I am tracking now.
> 
> 
> Sort of like the reverse of the Abrams X 30mm, primary it is for AP and Light Vehicle engagement - but can be used with Proximity fuzed munitions for CUAS, but it has a separate APS for incoming Missiles.
> 
> 
> I'm not sure what you mean by common launcher - as several of those missiles/rockets need different launchers, due to the size/guidance requirement of the systems.
> For example  MRLS, GMRLS, GMRLS-ER, GLSDB, PrSM, ATACMS all use the MRLS/HIMARS Boxes - they have no targeting requirements on their own - and just need target data links to be fed firing solutions.
> With Stinger and AIM9 those are IR trackers - and need seeker lock - they can go on pretty much anything though.
> The Radar etc Air to Air systems - those require much more specialized launch system - and to be linked into detection systems.
> 
> I don't see a common system for those different aspects - other than a vehicle platform, for the more fixed AD system you could palletize them so any PLS system could mount them - or just to move them around though.




My models are:

VLS Mk 41
NASAMS
HIMARS
AH-64/MH-60
Anything the Airforce Flies that uses any of their BRU rails.





You are putting the targeter on the same platform as the launcher.   I see the launcher separately.

HIMARS truck with Traverse and Elevation could be used launch all the missiles I described along with 

Hellfire, JAGM, NSMs and ARMs.

Most missiles have a separate TEL removed from the sensor vehicle(s) and the Command Node vehicle(s).







The Launcher Team is becoming more part of the Ammo Train than it is the Command Group.

If one vehicle system can deliver multiple ready to fire ammunition sets to various command groups I would consider that a logistical win.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> My models are:
> 
> VLS Mk 41
> NASAMS
> HIMARS
> AH-64/MH-60
> Anything the Airforce Flies that uses any of their BRU rails.
> 
> 
> View attachment 75051
> 
> 
> You are putting the targeter on the same platform as the launcher.   I see the launcher separately.
> 
> HIMARS truck with Traverse and Elevation could be used launch all the missiles I described along with
> 
> Hellfire, JAGM, NSMs and ARMs.
> 
> Most missiles have a separate TEL removed from the sensor vehicle(s) and the Command Node vehicle(s).
> 
> View attachment 75052
> 
> View attachment 75053
> 
> View attachment 75054
> 
> The Launcher Team is becoming more part of the Ammo Train than it is the Command Group.
> 
> If one vehicle system can deliver multiple ready to fire ammunition sets to various command groups I would consider that a logistical win.


I’d suggest the smaller Missiles etc would better fit on something like a JLTV as a launch platform.  Using a Heavy Logistics vehicle for small systems is a bit of a waste.  

I’m in full agreement that larger systems make sense for common haulers.  

But as far as organizing, the launchers aren’t (and can’t be) considered part of the ammo train - one needs to allocate them in terms of their respective capabilities.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Hellfire, JAGM, NSMs and ARMs.
> 
> Most missiles have a separate TEL removed from the sensor vehicle(s) and the Command Node vehicle(s).



I think Kevin is pointing out that the nature of laser guided munitions makes depth deployments sub optimal at best. Hellfires can be LOAL or LOBL, depends on the model and varient for example. APKWS has a seeker head, but it needs to be fired “online” to actually acquire energy and be guided to target.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> I think Kevin is pointing out that the nature of laser guided munitions makes depth deployments sub optimal at best. Hellfires can be LOAL or LOBL, depends on the model and varient for example. APKWS has a seeker head, but it needs to be fired “online” to actually acquire energy and be guided to target.


Fair.

But can the VLS and HIMARS pods be more comprehensively exploited so to simplify logistics?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Fair.
> 
> But can the VLS and HIMARS pods be more comprehensively exploited so to simplify logistics?


Possible? I just see ground launched APKWS as a solution to a problem that doesn’t exist frankly. That’s where I stepped in. Hell fire for sure, but I’m leary if anything that is built on wireless links.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Possible? I just see ground launched APKWS as a solution to a problem that doesn’t exist frankly. That’s where I stepped in. Hell fire for sure, but I’m leary if anything that is built on wireless links.


I freely admit to a fantasist streak.  My net tendency is to eliminate the impossible ten start playing with the improbable.


----------



## IKnowNothing

markppcli said:


> Possible? I just see ground launched APKWS as a solution to a problem that doesn’t exist frankly.


Based on the situation today I agree.  Canada needs a true modern ATGM that can kill MBT's at standoff ranges, no substitutions.

That being said, it's almost inexcusably Canadian that we don't have/haven't had an APKWS equivalent in inventory for years.  Looking back to the 06-> forward time period when Magellan rolled out the CRV-7PG it's hard to reconcile Canada not getting behind the program and leading the way.  When leadership thinks that the peer heavy metal fight is no longer a threat and you have 80k rockets in stock how can you justify _not _investing in a _domestic_ program to give the army a very cheap precision system to deal with bunkers, T-62's and all manner of failed state threats that don't need a Leo/Javelin.


----------



## markppcli

IKnowNothing said:


> Based on the situation today I agree.  Canada needs a true modern ATGM that can kill MBT's at standoff ranges, no substitutions.



Spike or Javeline, I care not which. 



IKnowNothing said:


> That being said, it's almost inexcusably Canadian that we don't have/haven't had an APKWS equivalent in inventory for years.  Looking back to the 06-> forward time period when Magellan rolled out the CRV-7PG it's hard to reconcile Canada not getting behind the program and leading the way.  When leadership thinks that the peer heavy metal fight is no longer a threat and you have 80k rockets in stock how can you justify _not _investing in a _domestic_ program to give the army a very cheap precision system to deal with bunkers, T-62's and all manner of failed state threats that don't need a Leo/Javelin.


Probably has something to do with CF18s seeing CAS as at best a distasteful afterthought.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Spike or Javeline, I care not which.
> 
> 
> Probably has something to do with CF18s seeing CAS as at best a distasteful afterthought.



And the other common platform for the 70mm/APKWS being rotary wing..... and complementary to the Hellfire.


----------



## Brad Sallows

All this 2025 and Future Structure dreaming is kind of pointless in view of the current financial situation.

What we need to do is get ahead of the cycle by leaping two or thread or four bounds down the road - Force 2100.

Assume future staff and bureaucrats and politicians will have the same motivated reasoning (estimate situating) skills as current and previous generations.  Extrapolate the trends - eg. fewer capabilities since they'll be assumed away, less than 1-for-1 equipment replacement, increasing HQ staffs.

A possible vision for Army 2100 - tanks and artillery dropped, so no real need for infantry, so no real need for any other combat enablers.  Instead, a Public Order Battalion (eg. mostly MPs) and a Public Welfare Brigade (comms, supply, transport, medical, construction engineering); the latter would be deployable for peace support abroad.  Increased staffs so we have an Army Group HQ staff in each Area in case of general mobilization.  Militia entirely reworked to support the Public Welfare Brigade as Labour Companies (pick & shovel) (if motorized, they can be Labour Squadrons) - no more fighting over roles and tasks and hat badges, no need for ranks above Lt or WO, much reduced training burden, equipment in line with what they can be trusted to master, matches customary contemporary employment.

Naval and air forces could undergo similar evolutions.   Say, four minesweepers/gunboats on each coast, a SAR wing, and a transport wing.

Should be affordable.


----------



## FJAG

And entirely liable to be wiped off the face of the Earth by the average drug cartel.

🍻


----------



## markppcli

Force 2025 is by all accounts dead so sort of pointless to talk about it I suppose.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Force 2025 is by all accounts dead so sort of pointless to talk about it I suppose.



Can 'Reconstitution' be far behind?


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> All this 2025 and Future Structure dreaming is kind of pointless in view of the current financial situation.
> 
> What we need to do is get ahead of the cycle by leaping two or thread or four bounds down the road - Force 2100.
> 
> Assume future staff and bureaucrats and politicians will have the same motivated reasoning (estimate situating) skills as current and previous generations.  Extrapolate the trends - eg. fewer capabilities since they'll be assumed away, less than 1-for-1 equipment replacement, increasing HQ staffs.
> 
> A possible vision for Army 2100 - tanks and artillery dropped, so no real need for infantry, so no real need for any other combat enablers.  Instead, a Public Order Battalion (eg. mostly MPs) and a Public Welfare Brigade (comms, supply, transport, medical, construction engineering); the latter would be deployable for peace support abroad.  Increased staffs so we have an Army Group HQ staff in each Area in case of general mobilization.  Militia entirely reworked to support the Public Welfare Brigade as Labour Companies (pick & shovel) (if motorized, they can be Labour Squadrons) - no more fighting over roles and tasks and hat badges, no need for ranks above Lt or WO, much reduced training burden, equipment in line with what they can be trusted to master, matches customary contemporary employment.
> 
> Naval and air forces could undergo similar evolutions.   Say, four minesweepers/gunboats on each coast, a SAR wing, and a transport wing.
> 
> Should be affordable.


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Can 'Reconstitution' be far behind?


That’s just an order that’s been treated as a suggestion and casually ignored. Using the same logic people did during the height of the pandemic to justify putting troops in the field.


----------



## Kirkhill

Helicopters, helicopters and more helicopters...









						How Can the Marines Learn From the Falklands War? - War on the Rocks
					

How does one stop a revisionist autocracy from invading its island neighbor? If the invasion lands on this nation’s shores, how does one force the



					warontherocks.com


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Helicopters, helicopters and more helicopters...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How Can the Marines Learn From the Falklands War? - War on the Rocks
> 
> 
> How does one stop a revisionist autocracy from invading its island neighbor? If the invasion lands on this nation’s shores, how does one force the
> 
> 
> 
> warontherocks.com



What the British can learn from the USMC re: the Falklands would be more important.

One measly USMC MEU has more resources than a British Bde AFAIK.









						Marine expeditionary unit - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Kirkhill

So this image accompanied an article about a unit being stood up with 40 Pickups and 40 UAVs.   The inclusion of the two helicopters stood out for me.




Shortly after the US authorized the transfer of 40 armoured riverine/littoral patrol boats to the Ukraine (concurrent with reports of Kinburn activity) the UK announced a donation of 3 Sea Kings (Junglies?) to the Ukraine.

In the article on the Falklands 



> The ground-based Rapier air defense system was intended to mitigate the risk of air attack in the absence of air superiority. The terrain best suited for the Rapier to perform this function was inaccessible by ground vehicles and the system itself was too heavy to be hand-carried. As a result, the commander of the amphibious battle group, Michael Clapp, was compelled to dedicate limited assets *“to supply the Rapiers with one Sea King on permanent call for the delivery of stores and petrol for their generators.”*





> it took 82 Sea King sorties to transport a single battery of six 105-millimeter howitzers and its required ammunition.





I would note that in the Falklands the Brits only had a couple of Bv202s (early variants of the 206s) and no ATVs/Quads as well as inadequate vertical lift assets.  Nor did they have air drops or JPADS landing systems.   

They most certainly did not have lots of trucks.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> So this image accompanied an article about a unit being stood up with 40 Pickups and 40 UAVs.   The inclusion of the two helicopters stood out for me.
> 
> 
> View attachment 75154
> 
> Shortly after the US authorized the transfer of 40 armoured riverine/littoral patrol boats to the Ukraine (concurrent with reports of Kinburn activity) the UK announced a donation of 3 Sea Kings (Junglies?) to the Ukraine.
> 
> In the article on the Falklands
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I would note that in the Falklands the Brits only had a couple of Bv202s (early variants of the 206s) and no ATVs/Quads as well as inadequate vertical lift assets.  Nor did they have air drops or JPADS landing systems.
> 
> They most certainly did not have lots of trucks.



Flew with the Junglies alot in 3 CDO BDE. 

First class crews and craft. Crew members had to pass the Commando Course.









						845 Naval Air Squadron - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




You had to be organized... they'd rarely wait for you to get your shit together and leave you to walk if required, and quite rightly so too


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> Force 2025 is by all accounts dead so sort of pointless to talk about it I suppose.


Also difficult to discuss future force structure when we don't know yet what the eFP Latvia Brigade will look like and what our contribution will be.

Assuming we have at least a Battalion-level contribution would it make sense for Latvia to be a Posting as opposed to a rotational tour?


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> What the British can learn from the USMC re: the Falklands would be more important.
> 
> One measly USMC MEU has more resources than a British Bde AFAIK.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Marine expeditionary unit - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org


When you look at the UK force structure it's pretty clear that the Brit's are like us - trying to do more with less.



> It is worth reminding ourselves why a Defence Review is underway as the Integrated Review, written 1 SofS Defence, 3 Prime Ministers, and 4 Chancellors ago (e.g. last year) is now looking already out of date. The significant changes to the global security environment driven by the invasion of Ukraine, the reinvigoration of NATO against a dangerous Russian threat, the challenges raised by ‘grey zone’ operations as well as the increasingly fraught relationship between the USA and China means that assumptions need to be revisited.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Tootle Pip?
> 
> 
> A blog about UK defence issues which tries to put a positive and fresh look at many current matters impacting UK and wider defence.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com



It'll be interesting to see where this latest review will go. I betcha it ain't gonna be a good thing regardless of everything old being new again.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> ...
> it took 82 Sea King sorties to transport a single battery of six 105-millimeter howitzers and its required ammunition.


I'd just like to put that in perspective. 

The Sea King HC4 could lift appx 6,000 lbs internally and 5,000 underslung 

The L118 is roughly 4,100 lbs 

Back in the day the airlift planning figure for a fully equipped soldier was 250 lbs (that's light by today's standards)

A light airmobile battery would have roughly 6 detachments of 7 men each (42 total), and a CP and forward deployed tail of roughly 20-25 men so let's say 65. (FOOs and BC deploy with the battalion - rear tail stays at the base)

Depending on how you do the lift (gun slung and det inside / sortie; gun and ammo slung/ sortie, men separate; gun, ammo, men all separate sorties) It would take at a minimum 7 sorties to move 6 guns and personnel every time the battery has to move. 

3 Commando Brigade had 29 Commando Regt RA deploying 3 x 6-gun batteries; 5 Bde deployed 97 Bty RA with 6 guns.

Ammo weighs roughly 50lbs per round (depending on in boxes or "deboxed" so every sortie could lift roughly a maximum of 100 rds underslung.

Now those figures are best case scenario as per aircraft capability. Those figures can change drastically based on conditions. Note the second reference below which states that it would take 45 sorties to move a battery (including it's basic load of ammo) and that in some cases it would take 1.25 hours to fly one sortie with 36 rounds across the island.

So to get to it - that 82 sortie quote is a bit vague. If we're talking one battery times one move then we're talking 7 sorties for the battery and 75 for ammunition which equates to 7,500 rounds per position. But that would have been restricted for distance and there would have been several moves based on the size of the island. I don't know how often the batteries had to move but based on the size of the island, they would have to leapfrog their way across. I do know that the commander dedicated 85% of all helicopter sorties to moving guns and ammo leaving the infantry to mostly walk.

Fire support was not used well on occasion and I know at the end for the final push the Brits corrected their mistakes and fired 17,500 rounds in the last offensive. That alone is 175 sorties (at best and based on the above point re 36 rounds per sortie is more like 400 or more sorties.

The best info that I have on this campaign is here:



> https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA401278.pdf



and here:



> https://tradocfcoeccafcoepfwprod.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/fires-bulletin-archive/1986/MAY_JUN_1986/MAY_JUN_1986_FULL_EDITION.pdf



at pp 14-21.

Interesting loggie issue at page 20 in that they had transported 16,000 proximity (i.e. air burst) fuzes with the fleet but couldn't find many of them at the end.

A final thought. If you think the ammo issue was a nightmare, think of all the fuel needed by the helicopters to get it there.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Brits training in Oman - planning on rotating 2 light battlegroups annually through the training area.

Ukrainian lessons learned and applied?  Apparently?

Small batteries to enhance mobility.
3 and a half minutes to get rounds on target and be off position.
Navigation in protected vehicles and pickup trucks over large featureless areas.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> Brits training in Oman - planning on rotating 2 light battlegroups annually through the training area.
> 
> Ukrainian lessons learned and applied?  Apparently?
> 
> Small batteries to enhance mobility.
> 3 and a half minutes to get rounds on target and be off position.
> Navigation in protected vehicles and pickup trucks over large featureless areas.



Oman is an awesome training area... mainly because you can do live firing just about anywhere you want to.

I was out in the desert with my platoon, tooled up for a week of live firing, and asked the Omani LO what we needed to do to make sure the range area was clear. 

He said "Just fire a few rounds in the direction you want to go, then wait a bit for the Bedouin to clear out."


----------



## rmc_wannabe

daftandbarmy said:


> Oman is an awesome training area... mainly because you can do live firing just about anywhere you want to.
> 
> I was out in the desert with my platoon, tooled up for a week of live firing, and asked the Omani LO what we needed to do to make sure the range area was clear.
> 
> He said "Just fire a few rounds in the direction you want to go, then wait a bit for the Bedouin to clear out."


Reminds me of Romania and the shepherds tending their flock. 2 rounds into the tree line and the next thing you saw was 200 to 300 sheep booking it; usually with a German Shepherd Dog trailing and a herder yelling at us he's moving as fast as he could....


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Oman is an awesome training area... mainly because you can do live firing just about anywhere you want to.
> 
> I was out in the desert with my platoon, tooled up for a week of live firing, and asked the Omani LO what we needed to do to make sure the range area was clear.
> 
> He said "Just fire a few rounds in the direction you want to go, then wait a bit for the Bedouin to clear out."


Lots of ranges like that outside of NA and Western Europe.  
    We have such funny concepts about range safety compared to the rest of the world…


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Lots of ranges like that outside of NA and Western Europe.
> We have such funny anal concepts about range safety compared to the rest of the world…



There, FTFY


----------



## Kirkhill

I am a fan of the Aussies, like a lot of other folks.

This article caught my attention.

"It ultimately comes down to the ultimate question that we're not really good at answering in this country— what are we really trying do with our military?"​








						Australia delays largest program, IFV, as Strategic Defense Review grapples with 'hard choices' - Breaking Defense
					

Will the SDR make big decisions and refocus Australia's strategy? "It ultimately comes down to the ultimate question that we're not really good at answering in this country— what are we really trying do with our military?" Marcus Hellyer of ASPI said.




					breakingdefense.com
				







> “We do have limited resources — and there will be hard choices to be made about priorities"....pointed to *command and control systems*, *precision strike capabilities* and the need for *robust logistics systems* as key lessons learned from Ukraine.
> 
> “Australia needs to be able to preserve our freedom of action and to discourage and deter those seeking to disrupt the international rules-based order — especially through force, or the threat of force. We see the need for capabilities to deter conflict — and in a worst case scenario, defend against aggression. The war against Ukraine has highlighted this, in stark terms.”
> 
> *Among those programs that could see changes is the Infantry Fighting Vehicle program*, Australia’s largest. The current plan, strongly supported by the new Army chief, is to buy 450 IFVs from either South Korea’s Hanwha or Germany’s Rheinmetall. But reports have been circulating for months that the number is now likely to be closer to 300.
> 
> One of the top defense procurement experts here, Marcus Hellyer of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), said even *those like himself who want to see “a lighter, more deployable army,” agree they need armor. But how much armor the island nation should have and how heavy it should be are key questions he expects the SDR to consider.*
> 
> “I don’t know *how the force structure the army is now building can be moved to the fight and, more importantly, get it home,”* he said. There are signs the Royal Australian Army may not get as much armor as it wants. Greg Sheridan, the well-connected foreign editor of The Australian, penned a mid-October op-ed sharply critiquing the army’s plan to buy 72 Abrams tanks and the fighting vehicles.
> 
> “This is an insane program. We have not deployed a tank outside of Australia or anywhere near combat in more than 50 years,” he wrote. *“We are planning to acquire 450 of the heaviest combat vehicles in the world. We cannot transport them effectively inside Australia as it is. We are acquiring infantry vehicles twice as heavy as those of the South Koreans. Our ships can carry only tiny quantities of them.”*
> 
> In an interview with Sheridan on Nov. 4, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said *Australia would instead focus on missiles, missile defense capabilities and drones, including armed drones.*





> *Breaking the iron budget triangle, where each service gets almost exactly as much as the others, will be bureaucratically and politically perilous.*
> 
> In his talk, Moriarity said that* the government is already focused on building resilient supply chains, along with acquiring stockpiles of high-end consumables, including weapons.  Resources — in other words money — will need to be found for this. *Every existing program already has a sizeable constituency ready to defend it and a long-established precedent that no single service gets much more than the others.





Couple of related points

The Ukrainians have been effectively employing the Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle (11 to 16 tonnes) as well as the ancient M113s (12 tonnes) - both of which have been donated by Australia and has prompted to Australia to look at re-opening its Bushmaster production line.

The Australians are tightly associated with the USMC and are a hinge, a lynch pin, for the island hopping strategy.

Australia has a lot better shipping arrangements available to it than Canada.

Australia has a much better developed defence industry infrastructure than Canada.

Report on the contenders   - The Rheinmetall Lynx (34 to 50 tonnes) and the Hanwha Redback (42 tonnes)



			https://www.aspi.org.au/report/deciding-future


----------



## Kirkhill

Bushmasters 'saving lives' but Ukraine needs more, ambassador says
					

During a visit to Bendigo's Thales factory Vasyl Myroshnychenko thanked Australia for its donations, but said his country was at risk of succumbing to the Russians without more aid.




					www.abc.net.au


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> I am a fan of the Aussies, like a lot of other folks.
> 
> This article caught my attention.
> 
> "It ultimately comes down to the ultimate question that we're not really good at answering in this country— what are we really trying do with our military?"​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Australia delays largest program, IFV, as Strategic Defense Review grapples with 'hard choices' - Breaking Defense
> 
> 
> Will the SDR make big decisions and refocus Australia's strategy? "It ultimately comes down to the ultimate question that we're not really good at answering in this country— what are we really trying do with our military?" Marcus Hellyer of ASPI said.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> breakingdefense.com


Hmmm...any of the debates in that article sound familiar?


----------



## Kirkhill

Ben Hodges on Lessons Learnt









						Ukraine war: Five lessons learned from the conflict so far
					

"I don't think anybody who is currently in service has experienced anything like that," said Lt Gen Ben Hodges.




					www.forces.net
				




*Lesson 1: Modern warfare is still about the troops in the fight*​


> "The importance of training, of leaders having the experience and ability and confidence to make decisions without perfect information.
> 
> "The stuff that we already know from our training and doctrine now is being reinforced even in modern warfare you have to have the human factors,"



*Lesson 2: Strategic planning is critical*​


> the amount of ammunition that has been used in this war has been "staggering".
> 
> "The defence industry in none of our countries right now is operating at a level to sustain that."



*Lesson 3: The requirement for air and missile defence has increased*​


> During his time as commander of the US Army in Europe, the lieutenant general says he was worried about not having enough air and missile defences.
> 
> At that time, he said the thinking was about the need to protect airfields, seaports and critical infrastructure.
> 
> The Russian military has been targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine as well, firing multi-million dollar cruise missiles at apartment buildings and power stations.
> 
> Lt Gen Hodges said this means the requirement for air missile defence is now "significantly higher".



*Lesson 4: Hybrid warfare remains relevant*​


> hybrid warfare in Europe is at its worst since the Second World War.
> 
> It can take the form of disinformation campaigns and fake news, meddling in foreign elections or deploying special forces on covert (secret) operations.



*Lesson 5: Accurate intelligence is key to success*​


> "I was so wrong about Russian capabilities.
> 
> "I really thought the Russians would do better.
> 
> "I think many of us overestimated what they would be able to do.
> 
> "How did we get that so wrong?" Lt Gen Hodges asked.



This line stands out for me....

*The Russian military has been targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine as well, firing multi-million dollar cruise missiles at apartment buildings and power stations.*

The Russians are committing war crimes - and they don't care.  Their entire construct is based on terrifying the civilian population.  

What does this mean for our planning assumptions?
For Air Defence requirements?
For the employment of Autonomous systems if the enemy doesn't givadam about rules of engagement and near misses?
We hold back technology in search of the perfect surgical strike.  The enemy employs technology when it is good enough to cause an effect on our planning.


----------



## Kirkhill

British Army on Lessons Learnt in Mali - Operating dispersed.









						'Lessons to be learnt' from Army's role in world's most dangerous peacekeeping mission in Mali
					

British troops have been pulled from the UN peacekeeping mission in the country due to political instability.




					www.forces.net
				






> Lt Col Will Meddings, former Commander, Long Range Reconnaissance Group, told Forces News: "Down at a tactical level, there were a whole load of lessons that we took away, and I don't just mean things about how to operate and live in those temperatures at such long distances and so far away from resupply.
> 
> "But I think about how we could disperse ourselves across a wide area, act as a reconnaissance force."
> 
> He added: "The integration of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) and, I think, the operating over a dispersed area are the real tactical lessons that we'll be taking back."


----------



## Kirkhill

Brit Army - New Binoculars - 2.2 kg - links to cell phone.









						Jim Compact Sniper Sight: Take a look at the Army's new binoculars
					

The binoculars can spot targets from more than 5km away, have both thermal and low-level light capabilities and can take HD pictures.




					www.forces.net


----------



## Kirkhill

Brimstone 2 as supplied to Ukraine - air and surface launched, autonomous, anti-"swarm", acts against masses of boats and tanks.









						Brimstone 2: The laser-guided missile system UK is providing to Ukraine
					

The UK first provided Ukraine with Brimstone missiles about six months ago.




					www.forces.net


----------



## Kirkhill

This is an Air Force article but I think it applies across all services - especially in the "Joint" Canadian context and in a world where finding suitable labour is difficult.  Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy are both being exploited by competitors and enemies without the same concern for the niceties that we show.



> US Air Force must ‘automate more’ to maintain advantage, CIO says​By Colin Demarest
> Nov 30, 01:24 PM
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A U-2 Dragon Lady prepares to land at Beale Air Force Base, California, in 2020. The flight marked a major leap forward, as artificial intelligence took flight aboard a military aircraft. (Airman 1st Class Luis A. Ruiz-Vazquez/U.S. Air Force)
> 
> WASHINGTON — *The U.S. Air Force must embrace artificial intelligence to remain dominant in a world where militaries increasingly employ advanced computing and make decisions at a quicker clip, according to the service’s top IT official.
> 
> “We have to automate more. That’s kind of a first step,”* Chief Information Officer Lauren Knausenberger said Nov. 30 at a livestreamed event hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. *“If we tried to do everything today manually, leveraging the same processes that we always have, we’re not going to have the speed that we need for any of our kill chains.”*
> 
> The Air Force already uses AI for predictive maintenance, education, imagery analysis and more. The technology is also a pillar of the Advanced Battle Management System, the service’s contribution to Joint All-Domain Command and Control, an attempt to seamlessly link forces across land, air, sea, space and cyber.
> 
> *The speed and flexibility afforded by AI and machine learning, U.S. defense officials say, are needed to maintain an edge over technologically savvy competitors including China and Russia.* The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence similarly concluded the U.S. must take AI seriously, as it will “reorganize the world.” The Pentagon has followed suit, launching the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office, which subsumed the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center and other older entities.
> 
> Knausenberger on Wednesday said the Air Force is “doing some very interesting things” with AI, “some just in the lab, some on the battlefield, some embedded in things that we are building today.”
> 
> *The service in 2020 deployed AI as a pilot’s sidekick, allowing it to control sensing and navigation *aboard a U-2 Dragon Lady surveillance plane. Leaders at the time hailed it a watershed moment.
> 
> More recently, AFWERX, an Air Force office in charge of finding new and innovative ways to use technology, established a program called Autonomy Prime to learn about autonomous kit the private sector is developing and how the military can appropriate it, Defense News reported.
> 
> The Pentagon’s public spending on AI, including autonomy, ballooned to $2.5 billion last year from a little more than $600 million in fiscal 2016.
> 
> *More than **600 AI projects* — including several related to major weapons systems, *such as the MQ-9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle* — were underway as of April 2021. *More than 230 are traced back to the Army*, according to an analysis conducted by the Government Accountability Office. The *Air and Space forces together are handling more than 80 AI projects*.
> 
> “Our secretary has said a few times that in the future, *we expect AI to just be a part of all of our weapons platforms*,” Knausenberger said. “That is definitely notable, in that as we build out capabilities of the future, it’ll be in the statement of work, that we have this capability.”











						US Air Force must ‘automate more’ to maintain advantage, CIO says
					

More than 600 AI projects, including several related to major weapons systems, were underway at the Department of Defense as of April 2021.




					www.defensenews.com
				





A battery of 6 AI JLTVs with a total of 12 gunners?




Swap all those manned vehicles for optionally manned JLTVs and MTVRs?


----------



## Kirkhill

US Army and Loitering Munitions.



> “The Army will need a mixture of capabilities that suit light/SOF and mounted (Stryker/mechanized) formations from the squad to, potentially, the brigade level,” the RFI said.











						Army conducting market research for kamikaze drones
					

The Army is conducting market research with an eye on loitering munitions and other unmanned aerial system technology that could make squads and other units more lethal.




					defensescoop.com


----------



## Kirkhill

And on the C-UAS side...






						Army Purchases Fire Control System to Counter Small Drones
					

Army Purchases Fire Control System to Counter Small Drones




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				









> a contract to purchase Israeli-based Smart Shooter’s SMASH 2000L fire control system, a company executive confirmed.
> 
> The 2000L is a rifle-mounted, “next generation fire control optic” and uses artificial intelligence, computer vision and advanced algorithms to locate and engage targets, Scott Thompson, the company’s vice president of U.S. operations, said at the Association of the United States Army’s annual conference in Washington, D.C.
> 
> “Once you engage the system, it does the ballistic calculation to the target — whether it’s a ground target or an aerial target — and it will not release the round until it has [a] 100 percent solution on that target,” Thompson said. “It’s really easy, very user-friendly.”








						Home - smart-shooter
					

Smart Shooter develops state-of-the-art Fire Control Systems for small arms that significantly increase weapon accuracy




					www.smart-shooter.com
				






			Smart Shooter’s SMASH 2000L - Google Search
		


I get the sense that the system is something like the NLAW system or the AIMPOINT FCS-13 used on the CG-84, the Mk19 and various machine guns.

A ballistic computer for calculating the lead.











						Aimpoint to provide controls for the Carl Gustaf
					

Aimpoint has been contracted to supply fire control systems for the new lightweight M3-E1 Carl Gustaf.




					www.militarytimes.com


----------



## Kirkhill

And more fun at the Armouries on Wednesday night.






						Special Operators Want Multi-Player, Combined Simulations
					

Special Operators Want Multi-Player, Combined Simulations




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org


----------



## Kirkhill

Mindset and training....



> In spring 2015, Ukrainian soldiers began attending the Yavoriv Training Center. Since the initial National Guard deployments in 2015, there have been five additional rotations in support of converting Ukraine from a Soviet mindset to Western standards.
> 
> These efforts resulted in the training of more than 10,000 officers every year since 2015. The Ukrainians created a non-commissioned officer corps and began *the empowerment of lower levels of the force, especially special operations, to take the fight to the enemy without the heavy burden of bureaucracy.*
> 
> Today, the Ukrainians are engaging in somewhat of an insurgent fight much like the Mujahideen did against the Russians in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russian doctrine has not changed.
> 
> So, what can we learn from this turnaround story? The current conflict highlights not only the need for cutting-edge technology that is easy to use, but more importantly in my view, a fighting force confident in their leadership and trained to fight for its country and that is educated enough to assimilate technology quickly and smart enough to employ to maximum effect. Why are the SEALs so good? Why are Top Gun pilots the best? Education, training and a common cause are the keys to winning.








						NDIA Perspective: Ukraine Serves as Lesson in the Value of Training
					

NDIA Perspective: Ukraine Serves as Lesson in the Value of Training




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org


----------



## Kirkhill

ANALYSIS: Ukraine War Proves Big Guns Are Back
					

ANALYSIS: Ukraine War Proves Big Guns Are Back




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org
				






> All of which suggests that the future of artillery will include armored and wheeled guns as well as towed weapons for austere theaters or for armies needing simpler weapons.
> 
> “There is going to be a mix of artillery,” Johnson said. “What really matters is how you employ them.”


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> ANALYSIS: Ukraine War Proves Big Guns Are Back
> 
> 
> ANALYSIS: Ukraine War Proves Big Guns Are Back
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.nationaldefensemagazine.org



“It is with artillery that war is made"

Napoleon Bonaparte


----------



## Kirkhill

It is with Technicals that war is made -

The 14.5mm ZPU-2 is being resurrected as a Portee on the back of a pickup.   Modified in Czechia for Ukraine - 115 vehicles supplied

Factory also repairing tanks, SPHs and other systems.


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1598769075659821056
I wonder if they are incorporating those AIMPOINT FCS type ballistic computers into the mounts.



> *Breaking Defense: What is the conflict in Ukraine teaching us about modern drone warfare?
> 
> Lee:* One thing we’re clearly seeing is that, unlike the past 20 years of counterinsurgency and conventional warfare, *the life of a drone is nasty, brutish, and short. I’ve seen estimates as low as nine days* [due to] electromagnetic spectrum competition and the measures/countermeasures fight going on [as well as] a kinetic fight for these drones. It’s a highly contested environment



For UAS to operate in contested airspace, autonomy is key - Breaking Defense 

If I remember correctly a nine day life expectancy for a drone compares favourably with the life expectancy of a Canadian Recce Troop Leader on the Scheldt in WW2, according to George Blackburn.


----------



## Kirkhill

More on the UAS / C-UAS fight



> So, for example, *the average life expectancy of a fixed-wing UAV on the battlefield is about six flights, a regular quadcopter "lives" only three flights*.
> 
> Another conclusion is that* drones play a vital role primarily for reconnaissance, not for strike missions.* So, if units without drones take 30 minutes or more from detection to destruction of targets, the presence of a drone reduces the time to 3-5 minutes.











						Survivability of UAVs On the Battlefield In Ukraine | Defense Express
					

In order to be able to actively conduct reconnaissance, armies need a significant number of drones, which end up being "expendables" on the battlefield




					en.defence-ua.com


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Kirkhill said:


> More on the UAS / C-UAS fight
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Survivability of UAVs On the Battlefield In Ukraine | Defense Express
> 
> 
> In order to be able to actively conduct reconnaissance, armies need a significant number of drones, which end up being "expendables" on the battlefield
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.defence-ua.com



Fundamentals of COA comparison really. This is economy and flexibility trumping survivability. If you're using a 300 dollar drone to help take out a 200K tank, money well spent. If you're using 300k drone and it ends up in a fireball before it can take out a target.... well you get the picture. 

Sometimes the best combat effect is the simplest and cheapest. Expensive toys make us risk adverse to use them. 30 years of playing this game with the Taliban should have taught us this lesson.


----------



## Furniture

rmc_wannabe said:


> Fundamentals of COA comparison really. This is economy and flexibility trumping survivability. If you're using a 300 dollar drone to help take out a 200K tank, money well spent. If you're using 300k drone and it ends up in a fireball before it can take out a target.... well you get the picture.
> 
> Sometimes the best combat effect isbthe simplest and cheapest. Expensive toys make us risk adverse to use them. 30 years of playing this game with the Taliban should have taught us this lesson.


Before it was kit, it was soldiers... 


> _A scrimmage in a Border Station—
> A canter down some dark defile—
> Two thousand pounds of education
> Drops to a ten-rupee jezail—
> The Crammer’s boast, the Squadron’s pride,
> Shot like a rabbit in a ride!
> 
> No proposition Euclid wrote,
> No formulae the text-books know,
> Will turn the bullet from your coat,
> Or ward the tulwar’s downward blow
> Strike hard who cares—shoot straight who can—
> The odds are on the cheaper man._


----------



## Kirkhill

And the value of the UAS in the local fight - Russian section (10 men) held by Ukrainian OP (2 men)









						Fierce Battles near Bakhmut: Ukrainian Soldiers Defended an Observation Post Against Five Times as Many Wagner Mercenaries (Video) | Defense Express
					

Once again about the importance of UAVs on the battlefield




					en.defence-ua.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Use of COTS comms?

Ukraine has utilized Starlink and its civvy cell network effectively - it seems.

New Zealand has been following something of the same path.  Learning opportunities for Canada?









						New Zealand’s half-billion dollar bet on COTS to network its army - Breaking Defense
					

The end goal of NEA is to create the NZ Army’s future network environment, known as the Land Tactical Information Network.




					breakingdefense.com


----------



## Kirkhill

And back to the C-UAS fight









						US approves potential $1 billion counter-drone tech sale to Qatar - Breaking Defense
					

The US says the sale would support American national security interests by "helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East."




					breakingdefense.com
				




Qatar wants a fixed C-UAS system rather than  a JLTV mounted one.  But what happens if you mount the C-UAS turrets and sensors on autonomous ROGUE Fires type JLTVs for roaming fixed sites?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Use of COTS comms?
> 
> Ukraine has utilized Starlink and its civvy cell network effectively - it seems.
> 
> New Zealand has been following something of the same path.  Learning opportunities for Canada?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> New Zealand’s half-billion dollar bet on COTS to network its army - Breaking Defense
> 
> 
> The end goal of NEA is to create the NZ Army’s future network environment, known as the Land Tactical Information Network.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> breakingdefense.com


I’d argue NZ is pretty much a MOTS (Military Off the Shelf) solution.  
  The only Commercial aspect is the Satellite provider - but all the other systems are ‘standard’ Mil items from industry.  





Kirkhill said:


> And back to the C-UAS fight
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> US approves potential $1 billion counter-drone tech sale to Qatar - Breaking Defense
> 
> 
> The US says the sale would support American national security interests by "helping to improve the security of a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> breakingdefense.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Qatar wants a fixed C-UAS system rather than  a JLTV mounted one.  But what happens if you mount the C-UAS turrets and sensors on autonomous ROGUE Fires type JLTVs for roaming fixed sites?


I have no idea what you mean by roaming fixed sites,  as roaming does not equal fixed.

Qatar is a small nation, and like Israel can get by with fixed installations for many items.  

As far as automation of GBAD/CUAS, very few Militaries are willing to allow remote work on a remote platform, as they want a human to be able to ensure Weapon Hold at some piece of the kill chain.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I’d argue NZ is pretty much a MOTS (Military Off the Shelf) solution.
> The only Commercial aspect is the Satellite provider - but all the other systems are ‘standard’ Mil items from industry.



Seen.



KevinB said:


> I have no idea what you mean by roaming fixed sites,  as roaming does not equal fixed.
> 
> Qatar is a small nation, and like Israel can get by with fixed installations for many items.
> 
> As far as automation of GBAD/CUAS, very few Militaries are willing to allow remote work on a remote platform, as they want a human to be able to ensure Weapon Hold at some piece of the kill chain.



Relocatable?

Most GBAD systems for static positions are based on systems like this.

 

ROGUE Fires basically seems to mean an unmanned vehicle from which weapons can be launched and the vehicle relocated for administration, reloading or moving to a new firing position.

 



> The Qatari government is interested in the fixed-site version of the Mobile Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Integrated Defeat System shown here during a US infantry training exercise on Oct. 24, 2022. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Spc. Everett Sharp)



So rather than the launcher being fixed to a particular site the battery operators can make the picture more complex by relocating the launchers.



> The NASAMS is equipped with three multi-missile launchers (LCHR), each carrying up to six ready-to-fire missiles inside the protective canisters. The purpose of the NASAMS Multi-Missile Launcher is to transport, aim and fire missiles with different characteristics, all mounted on the same launch rail inside the protective canisters. *The NASAMS launcher carries up to six AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles and is connected to the FDC (Fire Distribution Center) command post via radio and/or field wire. The mobile launcher can be deployed and remotely controlled up to 25 km away from the FDC. *The launcher can fire the six AMRAAMs in seconds against six different targets enabling multiple simultaneous engagements. Up to 12 launchers with 72 missiles can be netted and all missiles are ready to fire. In the firing position, the platform with the launcher is lowered to the ground and four hydraulic jacks can be deployed to stabilize the launch pad during the firing. In a battalion configuration comprising of up to 12 launchers and up to 72 missiles loaded, all missiles can be fired against individual targets in less than 15 seconds.



You can still have "man-in-the-loop" control with remote launchers 25 km away.   

Or an ocean away.


----------



## KevinB

I’m quibbling on autonomous doesn’t equal uncrewed


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I’m quibbling on autonomous doesn’t equal uncrewed



True but there is now a spectra of autonomy,  habitation and crewing.

You can have autonomous crews inhabiting vehicles.  Or you can have uninhabited vehicles with autonomous crews.  Or you can have inhabited vehicles with crews with no autonomy....

Or you can call me Ray....


----------



## KevinB

Imagine buying something…









						Estonia buys HIMARS, as eastern allies boost artillery arsenals
					

Lockheed Martin is booking orders from a growing number of countries, as U.S. Army officials promote joint operational concepts for artillery in Europe.




					www.defensenews.com


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Imagine buying something…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Estonia buys HIMARS, as eastern allies boost artillery arsenals
> 
> 
> Lockheed Martin is booking orders from a growing number of countries, as U.S. Army officials promote joint operational concepts for artillery in Europe.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defensenews.com



*“Nothing concentrates one’s mind so much as the realization that one is going to be hanged in the morning!”*

— Samuel Johnson


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Imagine buying something…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Estonia buys HIMARS, as eastern allies boost artillery arsenals
> 
> 
> Lockheed Martin is booking orders from a growing number of countries, as U.S. Army officials promote joint operational concepts for artillery in Europe.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defensenews.com


At the rate that these small Baltic states are buying the key combat enablers, the longer Canada can weasel out of buying its own.

🤬


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> At the rate that these small Baltic states are buying the key combat enablers, the longer Canada can weasel out of buying its own.
> 
> 🤬


Well Foot Infantry is cheap right...


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Well Foot Infantry is cheap right...


Not if they're Canadian Regular Force.


----------



## dapaterson

FJAG said:


> Not if they're Canadian Regular Force.


You ever try to get an infanteer to pick up a bar tab?


----------



## McG

FJAG said:


> That's mixing apples and oranges. We have three manoeuvre brigades and one combat support brigade. 6 CCSB is not a deployable entity in its own right. On top of that you've moved most of its units out to other formations and repurposed some in a way that you will still be short PYs. 4 Fd(GS) is now an AD regiment in another brigade so there is no arty regt to convert to 3 RCHA. You've moved out 21 EW as well and the IA. Your missing an engineer support regiment for the Army because you've converted it to combat engineers. There is no service battalion to assign to the 6th and there is no HQ and signals squadron to assign to the 6th. While you've moved the RCD from the 2nd to the 6th, there is no longer a brigade recce/cavalry capability in the 2nd which limits its employability.
> 
> Long story short, you are compromising a very important combat support function in favour of creating four manoeuvre brigades which have no more actual combat power than the three that already exist.
> 
> 🍻


The CA has no viable CS nor CSS for its light forces, and it never will so long as they live in different houses.  Consolidating them allows for establishment of efficient CS and CSS structures.  The CA lacks CSS across the board and it is leaning towards plans for a mitosis of the existing service battalions.  New PYs are being sought for AD, so that doesn't need to be arty the unit in Gagetown.  4 ESR is set-up well to re-fight the Afghan IED threat, but otherwise it is established like a CER that is missing a field squadron. A four brigade structure allows rebalancing responsibilities for all four Reg F Engr regiments to better focus on both close support and general support capabilities.


----------



## KevinB

3 or 4 Bde's are rather irrelevant discussions at this point in time, given the fact there isn't even a fully compliment of war fighting  equipment for 1...


----------



## KevinB

meanwhile great strides made in convening...

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1599878776170553344


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> 3 or 4 Bde's are rather irrelevant discussions at this point in time, given the fact there isn't even a fully compliment of war fighting  equipment for 1...


Sadly, reconstitution and re-equipping will have to come before any expansion.


----------



## dapaterson

KevinB said:


> meanwhile great strides made in convening...
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1599878776170553344


Addressing issues related to interprovincial friction are not sexy, but are significant quality of life issues for CAF members as they get moved around Canada during their careers.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> Addressing issues related to interprovincial friction are not sexy, but are significant quality of life issues for CAF members as they get moved around Canada during their careers.


I don’t disagree.  I had a perfectly good cottage near Petawawa until in 1994 the GoC decided that Patricia’s needed to be out west…
*and I’d like to thank the RCR BSL for sending me to teach in Mudford prior.  


   But, I found it interesting to see on a day Estonia was getting HIMARS, the major news for the CAF was dealing with internal geographical postings.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> But, I found it interesting to see on a day Estonia was getting HIMARS, the major news for the CAF was dealing with internal geographical postings.




"I have only to appear and sing to have peace once more in Gaul"

_Nero_


----------



## rmc_wannabe

KevinB said:


> But, I found it interesting to see on a day Estonia was getting HIMARS, the major news for the CAF was dealing with internal geographical postings.



One costs significantly less money than the other? 

Also, I imagine Estonia is the Ant while we're the Grasshopper; we have "time and space" to push off rearmament, while the Baltics realize all to well the costs of complacency. 

There is very recent memories of the effects the Soviet horde brought upon former satellite states, while Canada hasn't been invaded by a foreign country of any real strength since 1814. That invading force is now our largest and most consistent partner in defence, trade, and culture. 

Priorities are skewed for sure, but it's hard to change a narrative 200 years in the making...


----------



## KevinB

rmc_wannabe said:


> Canada hasn't been invaded by a foreign country of any real strength since 1814. That invading force is now our largest and most consistent partner in defence, trade, and culture.


Just watch me  

I’ll pop up on the Thousand Island Bridge and annex you in the name of progress. 




rmc_wannabe said:


> Priorities are skewed for sure, but it's hard to change a narrative 200 years in the making...


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Imagine buying something…
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Estonia buys HIMARS, as eastern allies boost artillery arsenals
> 
> 
> Lockheed Martin is booking orders from a growing number of countries, as U.S. Army officials promote joint operational concepts for artillery in Europe.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.defensenews.com



And Finland is buying 400 GMLRS missiles for 538 MUSD as well as 380 MUSD worth of Stingers.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Kirkhill said:


> And Finland is buying 400 GMLRS missiles for 538 MUSD as well as 380 MUSD worth of Stingers.


----------



## KevinB

Well it appears that nothing has official occurred since 2018 in the CAF...






						Land defence procurement projects - Canada.ca
					

Purchases and upgrades of ground transport, wheeled combat vehicles, main battles tanks, tactical command and control system, and light armoured vehicles.




					www.canada.ca


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> Well it appears that nothing has official occurred since 2018 in the CAF...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Land defence procurement projects - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> Purchases and upgrades of ground transport, wheeled combat vehicles, main battles tanks, tactical command and control system, and light armoured vehicles.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.canada.ca


Well, to be fair nothing in the security environment has significantly changed since 2018...right?  Right?  RIGHT?????


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> Well it appears that nothing has official occurred since 2018 in the CAF...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Land defence procurement projects - Canada.ca
> 
> 
> Purchases and upgrades of ground transport, wheeled combat vehicles, main battles tanks, tactical command and control system, and light armoured vehicles.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.canada.ca



Or they just haven't updated their website, which is more likely.


----------



## KevinB

daftandbarmy said:


> Or they just haven't updated their website, which is more likely.


And/or programs? 
  One of the issues I have with the CAF is the entirely non transparent way that procurement is conducted (or perhaps not conducted)    

People seem to wonder why the CAF has a number of issues finding bidders or industry partners


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> And/or programs?
> One of the issues I have with the CAF is the entirely non transparent way that procurement is conducted (or perhaps not conducted)
> 
> People seem to wonder why the CAF has a number of issues finding bidders or industry partners



The Federal Government gets exactly what it leads by way of suppliers, hence some of the recommendations in the Auditor General's report 






						Minister of National Defence’s statement in response to the Auditor General of Canada’s report on supplying the Canadian Armed Forces - Canada.ca
					

Following the tabling of the Auditor General of Canada’s report on supplying the Canadian Armed Forces, the Minister of National Defence, Harjit S. Sajjan, issued the following statement.




					www.canada.ca


----------



## dapaterson

Every Government website is someone's good idea that their successors forget about and let wither on the vine until the next good idea.


----------



## KevinB

dapaterson said:


> Every Government website is someone's good idea that their successors forget about and let wither on the vine until the next good idea.





			https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/mil_fy2023.pdf
		




			PEO Soldier | Home
		


Or not


----------



## GR66

Here's another napkin to toss on the floor...

More of a consolidation and building a foundation for future growth based on the current poor condition of the CA.

Consolidation and concentration of Ref Force units to help ease the current personnel issues while a focus can be put on modernization of equipment and capabilities.  Same for the Reserves - "right sizing" the units and consolidating them under Reg Force command structure.  Short term focus will still have to be augmentation, but once all the required elements are in place (training, structure, equipment and legislation) the units can shift toward being deployable.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Here's another napkin to toss on the floor...
> 
> More of a consolidation and building a foundation for future growth based on the current poor condition of the CA.
> 
> Consolidation and concentration of Ref Force units to help ease the current personnel issues while a focus can be put on modernization of equipment and capabilities.  Same for the Reserves - "right sizing" the units and consolidating them under Reg Force command structure.  Short term focus will still have to be augmentation, but once all the required elements are in place (training, structure, equipment and legislation) the units can shift toward being deployable.
> 
> View attachment 75380



Funny thing about the Reserves...


The soldiers are always more 'deployment ready' than the Officers and SNCOs, mainly due to them being (mainly) students with few family and work obligations.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Kirkhill said:


> I am a fan of the Aussies, like a lot of other folks.
> 
> This article caught my attention.
> 
> "It ultimately comes down to the ultimate question that we're not really good at answering in this country— what are we really trying do with our military?"​
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Australia delays largest program, IFV, as Strategic Defense Review grapples with 'hard choices' - Breaking Defense
> 
> 
> Will the SDR make big decisions and refocus Australia's strategy? "It ultimately comes down to the ultimate question that we're not really good at answering in this country— what are we really trying do with our military?" Marcus Hellyer of ASPI said.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> breakingdefense.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Couple of related points
> 
> The Ukrainians have been effectively employing the Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle (11 to 16 tonnes) as well as the ancient M113s (12 tonnes) - both of which have been donated by Australia and has prompted to Australia to look at re-opening its Bushmaster production line.
> 
> The Australians are tightly associated with the USMC and are a hinge, a lynch pin, for the island hopping strategy.
> 
> Australia has a lot better shipping arrangements available to it than Canada.
> 
> Australia has a much better developed defence industry infrastructure than Canada.
> 
> Report on the contenders   - The Rheinmetall Lynx (34 to 50 tonnes) and the Hanwha Redback (42 tonnes)
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.aspi.org.au/report/deciding-future


This article got me thinking, and thinking has lead me down a likely ignorant and unrealistic (and certainly unpopular path.

Assumption- Canada has two reasons to maintain heavy capability
A- to support NATO
B- to maintain the capability should there be need to expand it if geopolitical realities change to create more reasons than A

Challenge- accomplish the above with as few PY's as possible

What do we really need to do that well? Depends on the NATO commitment.   Lets say it's
Lead a tracked combined arms eFP Latvia Battlegroup, contributing the HQ, CS, CSS, and one combat arms coy
Lead a flyover tracked mechanized eFP Latvia Bde, Contributing HQ, CS, CSS, one combined arms Bn, that absorbs the eFP BG
A follow up Combined Arms BN for depth (needs to be shipped over)

Focusing on the combat arms, would we not be able to accomplish that our with existing tanks (all training tanks upgraded to 2A4+ CAN standard 3x 14 tank coy's domestic, 2x + 8 spares Latvia), 2x regimental sets of CFV's (one domestic, one Latvia),  4 Bn CS coy sets of mortars etc (two domestic, two Latvia) and 5 Inf Coy sets of IFV's plus spares, (3 domestic, 2 Latvia)

Domestic Organization would be thus
1x RegF Cavalry Regiment (Fully Equipped)
1x RegF Square Combined Arms BN (Fully Equipped)
2x PRes Square Combat teams (50% Equipped - one shared set)

Readiness cycle 1/5 with the Cav regiment providing half squadrons to the BG, the combined arms Bn providing full coy's.  eFP BG has prescribed foreign contribution of 1 tank Coy and one Inf Coy.  When we're on a tank roto it's the Bde armoured Bn, and our fly over is a mech, when we're on an Inf roto it's reversed.  To maintain the operational pace when we're on an Inf roto a formed coy from a LAV bn is seconded, completes crossover training and works up.


With the NATO commitment addressed, reorganize the rest of the CA with light and LAV equipment to better fulfill the non heavy fight


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> Funny thing about the Reserves...
> 
> 
> The soldiers are always more 'deployment ready' than the Officers and SNCOs, mainly due to them being (mainly) students with few family and work obligations.


One of the reasons that I'm suggesting the the Reserve Brigade HQs be 100% Reg force and the Battalion HQ Companies be 70% Reg/30% Res.


----------



## Kirkhill

Here is what is necessary for modern war....

2,250,000 155mm MACS charges
864,000 155mm shells - Base Bleed, Rocket Assist and Conventional - all compatible with the PGM-K precision kit
12,050 155mm Excalibur PGMs

106,000 GMRLS Missiles
1,700 MGM-140 ATACMS Missiles
700 M142 HIMARS Trucks

28,300 Javelin Missiles
12,000 Joint Air to Ground Missiles (Hellfire and TOW replacements)
3,100 Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles
950 Long Range Air to Surface Missile
2,600 Harpoon Missiles
1,250 Naval Strike Missiles

5,600 Stinger Missiles - MANPADs
5,100 Sidewinder Missiles - NASAMS
5,100 AMRAAM Missiles- NASAMS
3,850 Patriot Missiles
1.500 SM-6 Missiles (Dual Function GBAD and IRBM)

An awful lot of precision, a lot of stand-off range and a lot of GBAD there.

An awful lot of arrows.  The horses should be worried.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Here is what is necessary for modern war....
> 
> 2,250,000 155mm MACS charges
> 864,000 155mm shells - Base Bleed, Rocket Assist and Conventional - all compatible with the PGM-K precision kit
> 12,050 155mm Excalibur PGMs
> 
> 106,000 GMRLS Missiles
> 1,700 MGM-140 ATACMS Missiles
> 700 M142 HIMARS Trucks
> 
> 28,300 Javelin Missiles
> 12,000 Joint Air to Ground Missiles (Hellfire and TOW replacements)
> 3,100 Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles
> 950 Long Range Air to Surface Missile
> 2,600 Harpoon Missiles
> 1,250 Naval Strike Missiles
> 
> 5,600 Stinger Missiles - MANPADs
> 5,100 Sidewinder Missiles - NASAMS
> 5,100 AMRAAM Missiles- NASAMS
> 3,850 Patriot Missiles
> 1.500 SM-6 Missiles (Dual Function GBAD and IRBM)
> 
> An awful lot of precision, a lot of stand-off range and a lot of GBAD there.


I think you’re on a very low end at best.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I think you’re on a very low end at best.



I wouldn't doubt that in the slightest.  But even at that it demonstrates a direction of travel considerably at variance with my understanding of Canada's travel plans.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> I think you’re on a very low end at best.



Source info.


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1600473574245945344


----------



## Kirkhill

Do these things tie together under the Future Army banner?  A more flexible approach to systems development?

Open systems architecture









						Open systems architecture can unlock 'limitless potential:' Army Undersecretary - Breaking Defense
					

Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo said he was particularly impressed by the service’s adoption of the C5ISR Modular Suite of Standards program, a platform that will allow soldiers to plug in cards embedded with networking and EW capabilities




					breakingdefense.com
				




The development of Kropiva



Kirkhill said:


> Kropiva Battle Management
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/zhyr5o
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1575972921612193792
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Precision artillery guidance using cheap tablets – how Ukrainian high-tech for effective projectile targeting works - Technology Org
> 
> 
> Several days ago, the Armed Forces of Ukraine announced an artillery long-strike record achieved with an old soviet-era tank T-64. The target was destroyed
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.technology.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How Ukraine turns cheap tablets into lethal weapons
> 
> 
> Army SOS, an activist-led NGO, converts Android-based tablets into smart units with automated precision guidance.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.aljazeera.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> They do things differently.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Not sure if this has been posted before (couldn't find it in the search). 

Joe Paul on the future...



From Ukraine with urgency: How the lessons of conflict are shaping the Army agenda​ 

*What direction did you put on the table during Army Council?*

I’ve made it clear that, first of all, we will be implementing the Canadian Army Modernization Strategy. I told them that I was not planning on doing version 2 and 3. The time of writing is done. Now it’s time for action. We will be making some adjustments based on the lessons learned from the Ukraine conflict, but CAMS is the way ahead. 

There are three buckets of decisions that have to be made. We will be tackling the first before Christmas.* There are a few items in that bucket, but one we’ll be paying attention to is the mission tasks of the divisions. The Reserve mission task is a great concept. But four years in, we need to take stock, assess, and adjust.* How has it been delivered? What has been effective? What are areas for improvement? And are there areas where Canada, the CAF and the Army would benefit from other types of mission tasks? One of the lessons of Ukraine (for example), has been their [effort] to go after the logistical tail of Russia. What do we need to do to strengthen and reinforce force protection for the logistical tail of the Canadian Army? In the second bucket, we’ll look at Army structure (Force 2025). Everything is on the table.                     

*Does the conflict reprioritize any of your capability requirements? Is what you’re seeing in Ukraine creating more urgency?*

Yes. There are constraints, obviously. Some processes I do not own. But regarding everything that is under my purview and within my authority, absolutely, we’re trying to move as fast as possible. The Army programs are competing for space with programs from the Navy and the Air Force. But I must say, the fact that the government has accepted to have a leadership role of the eFP Battle Group in Latvia has certainly been acknowledged by everybody in this department. And there’s recognition of the fact that we could end up having to speed up some of these projects. 

The most urgent ones have to do with air defence, counter UAS systems, and anti-tank systems. These are in the machinery and moving as quickly as they can. But these are the basic entry points. I keep reminding everybody that it’s not because you have a point air defence system on your shoulder that you have air defence – it’s just one of the many moving parts. You need to have radars, mid- and long-range fires. An M-SHORAD (Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense) system like the one we’re looking at right now is like a band aid, it’s a quick fix. What we are after is a totally integrated, much larger type of capability. But that program is going to take a while before it can deliver. 

The number one thing on which I’m focused right now is C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance). Everything that has to do with command and sense. We have multiple projects that are trying to address current deficiencies. You need to be able to optimize your sensors and your shooters, [and for that] you need to draw data, convey data and analyze data. You need to provide commanders the decision-making tools they need to make the right decisions quickly. And you need to secure these networks. 

But as we move toward being more digitalized, we still need to be able to do HF, VHF radio, we need to maintain the capability of laying lines. It wouldn’t take much to shut down the GPS constellation. So, just as you train to navigate with your compass, you need to be able to operate your command-and-control system with lines. I believe there’s still a place for runners in our organization, with a motocross bike or an ATV. You need to have a multi-layered system that gives you redundancy. 

_*Is there anything that needs to be brought forward now?*_

Everything that has to do with the aFP brigade. If it does not contribute to deterring an authoritarian regime, I’m not interested right now.

_





						From Ukraine with urgency: How the lessons of conflict are shaping the Army agenda | Canadian Army Today
					






					canadianarmytoday.com
				



_


----------



## Kirkhill

I love this paragraph 



> There is an ongoing defence policy update that will be presented to the government.* We’ll see then how much treasure the government is willing to give us.* Because, as I like to say,* a vision without the resources is just a hallucination. If I don’t have the money, if I don’t have the people, if I don’t have the kit, it’s not going to happen.* Until I know how much resources I’m allocated, it’s kind of difficult to reorganize.


----------



## Rifleman62

Pipe dream.


----------



## dapaterson

Ok, my napkin Army.

First, move all bases / base support functions under a single BGen in Ottawa (Level 2 in NDHQ speak).

Second, the Army Individual Training Authority can be a second BGen (also a L2).

Third, the Army Futures position should be a MGen, and tagged for bigger and better.

Fourth, keep a BGen COS Ops.

Fifth, divest the RJOC functions.  Let CJOC run them with LCol caretakers.

Sixth, organize the field force, fixed Reg and Res, into a single division of six brigades.  Not brigade groups.  Brigade groups should be temporary formations, not standing.

The six brigades:

One Armored Bde, with two Armd and one Inf Bns.  Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.

Two Infantry Bdes, each with two inf and one armd Bns. Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.

One fires Bde, for all Artillery and enablers.

One Engr Bde, with combat and construction units.

One CSS Bde, with Maint, Tn, Sup, Food Svcs and pers support / replacement Bns.


----------



## ArmyRick

dapaterson said:


> Ok, my napkin Army.
> 
> First, move all bases / base support functions under a single BGen in Ottawa (Level 2 in NDHQ speak).
> 
> Second, the Army Individual Training Authority can be a second BGen (also a L2).
> 
> Third, the Army Futures position should be a MGen, and tagged for bigger and better.
> 
> Fourth, keep a BGen COS Ops.
> 
> Fifth, divest the RJOC functions.  Let CJOC run them with LCol caretakers.
> 
> Sixth, organize the field force, fixed Reg and Res, into a single division of six brigades.  Not brigade groups.  Brigade groups should be temporary formations, not standing.
> 
> The six brigades:
> 
> One Armored Bde, with two Armd and one Inf Bns.  Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.
> 
> Two Infantry Bdes, each with two inf and one armd Bns. Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.
> 
> One fires Bde, for all Artillery and enablers.
> 
> One Engr Bde, with combat and construction units.
> 
> One CSS Bde, with Maint, Tn, Sup, Food Svcs and pers support / replacement Bns.


Interesting. Your background in Logistics? Its sometimes overlooked by ground apes like me to remember nothing happens with no ammo, food, water or fuel.


----------



## dapaterson

Whoops - I forgot the Sigs Bde!

But yes, a dedicated CSS Bde would be an improvement over the continual desire to do CSS on the cheap.


----------



## FJAG

dapaterson said:


> Ok, my napkin Army.
> 
> First, move all bases / base support functions under a single BGen in Ottawa (Level 2 in NDHQ speak).
> 
> Second, the Army Individual Training Authority can be a second BGen (also a L2).
> 
> Third, the Army Futures position should be a MGen, and tagged for bigger and better.
> 
> Fourth, keep a BGen COS Ops.
> 
> Fifth, divest the RJOC functions.  Let CJOC run them with LCol caretakers.
> 
> Sixth, organize the field force, fixed Reg and Res, into a single division of six brigades.  Not brigade groups.  Brigade groups should be temporary formations, not standing.
> 
> The six brigades:
> 
> One Armored Bde, with two Armd and one Inf Bns.  Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.
> 
> Two Infantry Bdes, each with two inf and one armd Bns. Plus a small HQ/SIGs and small CSS footprint.
> 
> One fires Bde, for all Artillery and enablers.
> 
> One Engr Bde, with combat and construction units.
> 
> One CSS Bde, with Maint, Tn, Sup, Food Svcs and pers support / replacement Bns.


Not arguing with the basic structure (especially bdes v Bde Gps - albeit what constitutes a "small CSS footprint" may need some negotiating) but just doing meatball math, that can all be done within the authorized strength of the existing RegF with several battalions worth of RegF left over even if you fluff up the remaining battalions.

I would consider adding a CS brigade for enablers such as EW, MI, Sigs Bn, Special Troops Bn, CBRN Bn; MP Bn. Div Recce and the like.

What are your guestimates as to tiered readiness and ResF percentages?

🍻


----------



## KevinB

IMHO Bde Groups make sense if you don’t plan on deploying larger forces, as you can allocate additional HQ assets to coordinate the Group Enablers. 

Honestly for Canada, I’ve always thought the Group makes more sense, as the odds of sending a Div are snowballs chance in hell (not enough gear, and it would take years to move them with the CAF movement assets). 


I still think Canada should have Div Assets and ideally 2 Deployable Divisions (one Heavy and one Light) accepting that some of those Bde’s would be ‘Total Force’ mixtures.  

The Heavy Div would consist of 2 Armored Bde’s and 1 Mech Bde plus CS and CSS Bde’s and be primarily tracked (I’m willing to accept HIMARS for the GS Regiment though) 
  1 Prepositioned Armored Bde and Div HQ, remaining Div equipment prepositioned in Europe with 30/70 troops for flyover). 

The Light Div would have 2 Light Bde’s and 1 Cav Bde plus related CS and CSS, primarily wheeled.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> IMHO Bde Groups make sense if you don’t plan on deploying larger forces, as you can allocate additional HQ assets to coordinate the Group Enablers.
> 
> Honestly for Canada, I’ve always thought the Group makes more sense, as the odds of sending a Div are snowballs chance in hell (not enough gear, and it would take years to move them with the CAF movement assets).
> 
> 
> I still think Canada should have Div Assets and ideally 2 Deployable Divisions (one Heavy and one Light) accepting that some of those Bde’s would be ‘Total Force’ mixtures.
> 
> The Heavy Div would consist of 2 Armored Bde’s and 1 Mech Bde plus CS and CSS Bde’s and be primarily tracked (I’m willing to accept HIMARS for the GS Regiment though)
> 1 Prepositioned Armored Bde and Div HQ, remaining Div equipment prepositioned in Europe with 30/70 troops for flyover).
> 
> The Light Div would have 2 Light Bde’s and 1 Cav Bde plus related CS and CSS, primarily wheeled.


I'm going to take the contrarian position that two deployable Divisions (and all the equipment and support that is required to field and sustain them) is not the best use of limited Canadian defence dollars - even if we increase our spending to the 2% of GDP target.


Canada is essentially an island nation and therefore the RCN and RCAF should be the primary focus of our spending.  Expanding and properly equipping the Army to two deployable Divisions would divert money and manpower that would be better spent on increasing our naval and air capabilities.
China is the most urgent threat that Canada and the collective "West" need to prepare to face.  That threat, like continental defence, requires mainly air and sea power.  That's where we should concentrate our efforts.
While I 100% agree that we should not discount the threat posed by Russia just because of the beating they are currently taking in Ukraine, I do still maintain that Canadian military contributions to NATO collective defence are mainly a political rather than a military necessity.  European NATO has a vastly larger population and economy than Russia and even leaving nuclear deterrence aside, that means that in the long run Russia is not really in a position to defeat NATO.  Frankly, even if the US didn't deploy a single soldier to Europe but instead once again acted as the "Arsenal of Democracy" and simply fed Europe a steady supply of equipment and ammunition to keep them in the fight they would eventually defeat Russia just due to the imbalance of power between them.  Canada should find the right balance between what's politically required and what's militarily required to support NATO.  I'm not convinced that a full Canadian Division earmarked for deployment to Europe is required for that.
I'd suggest that a properly equipped, Canadian-led Brigade Group in Latvia (either multi-national in composition with a significant Canadian contribution or a fully Canadian flyover Brigade Group with a significant forward deployed element) meets the political contribution requirement to deter Russia from a potential (but highly unlikely) attack against NATO.

That likely means we'd need two Reg Force Mechanized/Armoured Brigades (one Anglo and one French) with at least two properly equipped Reserve Brigades (again one Anglo and one French) to sustain the NATO Brigade in any potential conflict.  

We'd also likely want at least a Battle Group sized force available as a Rapid Deployment Force to respond to quickly developing situations.  That would suggest a Reg Force Light Brigade Group.

A (largely) Reg Force Fires Brigade with 1 x Towed Howitzer Regiment, 2 x SP Howitzer Regiments, 1 x AD Regiment and 1 x LRPF (HIMARS?) Regiment would be required to support the maneuver Brigades.  You'd also want the Canadian Combat Support Brigade to provide the extra enablers for your deployed force as well as a (mostly) Reg Force Sustainment Brigade to keep them in the field.

The current Reg Force Army could likely work out for this structure in terms of manning once it's properly equipped if we strip out unnecessary HQ's, etc.  The question is how to best use the Reserve Forces that are not yet fully utilized.  I'd argue that rather than adding more Mechanized/Light Infantry Battalions/Brigades we'd be better off adding more Fires (both guns and rocket), AD, EW and Sustainment units.  These would allow our deployed Brigades to maintain effectiveness during a conflict.  

Basically I'm arguing that Europe has the manpower required to ultimately defeat Russia in a war and that a Brigade-sized contribution from Canada is enough deterrent to meet our political contribution.  In my opinion our ability to surge key (and in short supply) high-end enablers to support NATO should a war begin (again Fires, AD, EW, logistics, etc. from the Army as well as RCAF and RCN contributions) would have a greater military impact on the conflict than the ability to send additional maneuver Brigades.

$0.02


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> I'm going to take the contrarian position that two deployable Divisions (and all the equipment and support that is required to field and sustain them) is not the best use of limited Canadian defence dollars - even if we increase our spending to the 2% of GDP target.
> 
> 
> Canada is essentially an island nation and therefore the RCN and RCAF should be the primary focus of our spending.  Expanding and properly equipping the Army to two deployable Divisions would divert money and manpower that would be better spent on increasing our naval and air capabilities.
> China is the most urgent threat that Canada and the collective "West" need to prepare to face.  That threat, like continental defence, requires mainly air and sea power.  That's where we should concentrate our efforts.
> While I 100% agree that we should not discount the threat posed by Russia just because of the beating they are currently taking in Ukraine, I do still maintain that Canadian military contributions to NATO collective defence are mainly a political rather than a military necessity.  European NATO has a vastly larger population and economy than Russia and even leaving nuclear deterrence aside, that means that in the long run Russia is not really in a position to defeat NATO.  Frankly, even if the US didn't deploy a single soldier to Europe but instead once again acted as the "Arsenal of Democracy" and simply fed Europe a steady supply of equipment and ammunition to keep them in the fight they would eventually defeat Russia just due to the imbalance of power between them.  Canada should find the right balance between what's politically required and what's militarily required to support NATO.  I'm not convinced that a full Canadian Division earmarked for deployment to Europe is required for that.
> I'd suggest that a properly equipped, Canadian-led Brigade Group in Latvia (either multi-national in composition with a significant Canadian contribution or a fully Canadian flyover Brigade Group with a significant forward deployed element) meets the political contribution requirement to deter Russia from a potential (but highly unlikely) attack against NATO.
> 
> That likely means we'd need two Reg Force Mechanized/Armoured Brigades (one Anglo and one French) with at least two properly equipped Reserve Brigades (again one Anglo and one French) to sustain the NATO Brigade in any potential conflict.
> 
> We'd also likely want at least a Battle Group sized force available as a Rapid Deployment Force to respond to quickly developing situations.  That would suggest a Reg Force Light Brigade Group.
> 
> A (largely) Reg Force Fires Brigade with 1 x Towed Howitzer Regiment, 2 x SP Howitzer Regiments, 1 x AD Regiment and 1 x LRPF (HIMARS?) Regiment would be required to support the maneuver Brigades.  You'd also want the Canadian Combat Support Brigade to provide the extra enablers for your deployed force as well as a (mostly) Reg Force Sustainment Brigade to keep them in the field.
> 
> The current Reg Force Army could likely work out for this structure in terms of manning once it's properly equipped if we strip out unnecessary HQ's, etc.  The question is how to best use the Reserve Forces that are not yet fully utilized.  I'd argue that rather than adding more Mechanized/Light Infantry Battalions/Brigades we'd be better off adding more Fires (both guns and rocket), AD, EW and Sustainment units.  These would allow our deployed Brigades to maintain effectiveness during a conflict.
> 
> Basically I'm arguing that Europe has the manpower required to ultimately defeat Russia in a war and that a Brigade-sized contribution from Canada is enough deterrent to meet our political contribution.  In my opinion our ability to surge key (and in short supply) high-end enablers to support NATO should a war begin (again Fires, AD, EW, logistics, etc. from the Army as well as RCAF and RCN contributions) would have a greater military impact on the conflict than the ability to send additional maneuver Brigades.
> 
> $0.02


At the end of the Day, boots on the ground is a true show of support.  You can sail around or fly around to your hearts content - but nothing says I am here to help and will fight with you like troops in defensive positions do.  

If/when Russia crumbles, those troops in Europe will be needed for stability operations while Marshall 2.0 goes into effect.   As well as a counter to Chinese ambitions on Russian territory.  

Two Cdn Divisions should be what Canada can field currently with its numbers, and properly utilizing the Reserves.  
   Even at Canada’s current 1.3’ish Defense Budget, a properly structured 2Div Army shouldn’t mean that the RCN and RCAF suck hind tit.   

I agree that a Pacific tilt is occurring/needs to occur, but see 1 Light Div would be a credible CAF contender in that AO provided the RCN and RCAF have assets in that area as well.  

On the Fires aspect - even every other Service Support/Combat Support entity - they need to be tailored to the force they support.  Having Light Infantry trying to be supported by Tracked systems makes no sense, in the same way that Light support cannot effective support a heavy tracked entity.  
   An ISV doesn’t need an ARV to recover it, and similarly a MBT isn’t getting recovered at all or supplied well by a light utility truck or medium logistics vehicle.


----------



## Halifax Tar

GR66 said:


> I'm going to take the contrarian position that two deployable Divisions (and all the equipment and support that is required to field and sustain them) is not the best use of limited Canadian defence dollars - even if we increase our spending to the 2% of GDP target.
> 
> 
> Canada is essentially an island nation and therefore the RCN and RCAF should be the primary focus of our spending.  Expanding and properly equipping the Army to two deployable Divisions would divert money and manpower that would be better spent on increasing our naval and air capabilities.
> China is the most urgent threat that Canada and the collective "West" need to prepare to face.  That threat, like continental defence, requires mainly air and sea power.  That's where we should concentrate our efforts.
> While I 100% agree that we should not discount the threat posed by Russia just because of the beating they are currently taking in Ukraine, I do still maintain that Canadian military contributions to NATO collective defence are mainly a political rather than a military necessity.  European NATO has a vastly larger population and economy than Russia and even leaving nuclear deterrence aside, that means that in the long run Russia is not really in a position to defeat NATO.  Frankly, even if the US didn't deploy a single soldier to Europe but instead once again acted as the "Arsenal of Democracy" and simply fed Europe a steady supply of equipment and ammunition to keep them in the fight they would eventually defeat Russia just due to the imbalance of power between them.  Canada should find the right balance between what's politically required and what's militarily required to support NATO.  I'm not convinced that a full Canadian Division earmarked for deployment to Europe is required for that.
> I'd suggest that a properly equipped, Canadian-led Brigade Group in Latvia (either multi-national in composition with a significant Canadian contribution or a fully Canadian flyover Brigade Group with a significant forward deployed element) meets the political contribution requirement to deter Russia from a potential (but highly unlikely) attack against NATO.
> 
> That likely means we'd need two Reg Force Mechanized/Armoured Brigades (one Anglo and one French) with at least two properly equipped Reserve Brigades (again one Anglo and one French) to sustain the NATO Brigade in any potential conflict.
> 
> We'd also likely want at least a Battle Group sized force available as a Rapid Deployment Force to respond to quickly developing situations.  That would suggest a Reg Force Light Brigade Group.
> 
> A (largely) Reg Force Fires Brigade with 1 x Towed Howitzer Regiment, 2 x SP Howitzer Regiments, 1 x AD Regiment and 1 x LRPF (HIMARS?) Regiment would be required to support the maneuver Brigades.  You'd also want the Canadian Combat Support Brigade to provide the extra enablers for your deployed force as well as a (mostly) Reg Force Sustainment Brigade to keep them in the field.
> 
> The current Reg Force Army could likely work out for this structure in terms of manning once it's properly equipped if we strip out unnecessary HQ's, etc.  The question is how to best use the Reserve Forces that are not yet fully utilized.  I'd argue that rather than adding more Mechanized/Light Infantry Battalions/Brigades we'd be better off adding more Fires (both guns and rocket), AD, EW and Sustainment units.  These would allow our deployed Brigades to maintain effectiveness during a conflict.
> 
> Basically I'm arguing that Europe has the manpower required to ultimately defeat Russia in a war and that a Brigade-sized contribution from Canada is enough deterrent to meet our political contribution.  In my opinion our ability to surge key (and in short supply) high-end enablers to support NATO should a war begin (again Fires, AD, EW, logistics, etc. from the Army as well as RCAF and RCN contributions) would have a greater military impact on the conflict than the ability to send additional maneuver Brigades.
> 
> $0.02



I've argued this before here lol It doesn't go well lol


----------



## Halifax Tar

KevinB said:


> At the end of the Day, boots on the ground is a true show of support.  You can sail around or fly around to your hearts content - but nothing says I am here to help and will fight with you like troops in defensive positions do.



With the deepest respect, I think that's a very narrow view and very Army centric view.  The most important campaign/battle/theatre for the ETO during WW2 was the BOA. Regardless of the opinions of the riflemen in the field.  A sharp sword is of no value if its shattered beyond the point.


----------



## KevinB

Halifax Tar said:


> I've argued this before here lol It doesn't go well lol


No one is saying that a credible Navy and Air Force aren’t needed.  

I personally thing a 30 warship force and 12 SSN fleet would be a reasonable number for Canada’s Navy.   

Don’t even get me started on the RCAF.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Basically I'm arguing that Europe has the manpower required to ultimately defeat Russia in a war and that a Brigade-sized contribution from Canada is enough deterrent to meet our political contribution.  In my opinion our ability to surge key (and in short supply) high-end enablers to support NATO should a war begin (again Fires, AD, EW, logistics, etc. from the Army as well as RCAF and RCN contributions) would have a greater military impact on the conflict than the ability to send additional maneuver Brigades.
> 
> $0.02



The planning problem everyone is making, though, is that the US will always be there to back stop us. This makes it easy for other governments to spend more on their 'socialist paradises' at the expense of defence commitments.

This is a dangerous, misguided, selfish and deeply disturbing pattern.


----------



## KevinB

Halifax Tar said:


> With the deepest respect, I think that's a very narrow view and very Army centric view.  The most important campaign/battle/theatre for the ETO during WW2 was the BOA. Regardless of the opinions of the riflemen in the field.  A sharp sword is of no value if it’s shattered beyond the point.


You mistaking my comment.  

I’m saying as a deterrent force, Army forces in position make a much more defined statement. 
   I’m totally in agreement that the RCN and RCAF need more, and come an actual conflict the Navy will be required in significant numbers (way beyond Canada’s planned CSC acquisition).   

My sole point was that given its current situation, the Army with its numbers should be able to field 2 Div.  

I think a 45b Cdn Defense Budget is a more realistic number for Canada, especially given the salaries that eat into it so heavily.


----------



## GR66

Halifax Tar said:


> With the deepest respect, I think that's a very narrow view and very Army centric view.  The most important campaign/battle/theatre for the ETO during WW2 was the BOA. Regardless of the opinions of the riflemen in the field.  A sharp sword is of no value if its shattered beyond the point.


I'm with Halifax Tar on this one.  Our ships and aircraft would be as much on the front lines of a NATO/Russia conflict as the grunts in the trenches.  

Both Russia and China know that in order to defeat the West (i.e. the USA) they need to prevent the US from being able to deploy its military power.  Anything Canada can do to ensure that US forces/equipment safely get to where they need to go will be ultimately more valuable than any meagre land forces we're able to contribute ourselves.

Of course that doesn't mean that we ignore our Army contributions...just that we understand where they war is most likely to be won/lost and tailor our overall military to best support that.


----------



## Halifax Tar

KevinB said:


> You mistaking my comment.
> 
> I’m saying as a deterrent force, Army forces in position make a much more defined statement.
> I’m totally in agreement that the RCN and RCAF need more, and come an actual conflict the Navy will be required in significant numbers (way beyond Canada’s planned CSC acquisition).
> 
> My sole point was that given its current situation, the Army with its numbers should be able to field 2 Div.
> 
> I think a 45b Cdn Defense Budget is a more realistic number for Canada, especially given the salaries that eat into it so heavily.





GR66 said:


> I'm with Halifax Tar on this one.  Our ships and aircraft would be as much on the front lines of a NATO/Russia conflict as the grunts in the trenches.
> 
> Both Russia and China know that in order to defeat the West (i.e. the USA) they need to prevent the US from being able to deploy its military power.  Anything Canada can do to ensure that US forces/equipment safely get to where they need to go will be ultimately more valuable than any meagre land forces we're able to contribute ourselves.
> 
> Of course that doesn't mean that we ignore our Army contributions...just that we understand where they war is most likely to be won/lost and tailor our overall military to best support that.



As I have argued, I don't think we need expeditionary Land forces, beyond a small, mobile well equipped and trained SOF component.  You can maybe include some sort of airfield/port security unit as well; maybe. 

I think our Land forces would be best used in a facet like the Rangers, in much bolstered roll, in the North and continental and coastal defense and observation elsewhere.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> And/or programs?
> One of the issues I have with the CAF is the entirely non transparent way that procurement is conducted (or perhaps not conducted)
> 
> People seem to wonder why the CAF has a number of issues finding bidders or industry partners


Hey now, it isn't entirely non-transparent.

Its just a confusing web of multiple government departments that need to communicate and approve of each other's things while signing off on each other's excessive paperwork, so that it can get to the next stage of the same thing.  

Add bidders into the mix, and lawyer's from all parties needing to adjust/review/communicate with each other, etc 

And finally, after the Tasmanian Devil has done his work & something is ready for announcement, they announce it in a way that emphasizes being vague and confusing...

_This project is valued at X dollars.  It includes the platforms, training materials, initial spare parts, and comprehensive support for the next 10 years to be done by 'this Canadian company._

_This project is valued at Y dollars.  It doesn't include s**t, and any work required will be done by a company that probably won't exist by the time this press conference is finished_


...We're just misunderstood, okay?


----------



## KevinB

Halifax Tar said:


> As I have argued, I don't think we need expeditionary Land forces, beyond a small, mobile well equipped and trained SOF component.  You can maybe include some sort of airfield/port security unit as well; maybe.
> 
> I think our Land forces would be best used in a facet like the Rangers, in much bolstered roll, in the North and continental and coastal defense and observation elsewhere.


As far as actual capabilities, you probably aren’t wrong.  
   But from a geopolitical aspect, conventional troops on the ground show support, support that can’t leave very easily…

Plus you can’t build SOF without some foundation.  Also SOF is an expensive investment in training time and $, so you don’t want them wasted doing non SOF stuff that could be done by conventional forces

If you want to penny pinch on the Army then go to two Div with 2 maneuver Bde / Div’s.


----------



## GR66

Halifax Tar said:


> As I have argued, I don't think we need expeditionary Land forces, beyond a small, mobile well equipped and trained SOF component.  You can maybe include some sort of airfield/port security unit as well; maybe.
> 
> I think our Land forces would be best used in a facet like the Rangers, in much bolstered roll, in the North and continental and coastal defense and observation elsewhere.


I'll disagree with you on this one though.  While I think that air and sea should be the priority you can't ignore the land.  Ultimately you can't control territory without "boots on the ground".  For that you need conventional land forces.

Where @KevinB and I disagree is over how many of what type of forces are appropriate for Canada.  I argue for a Brigade Group minimum (plus additional enablers) as anything smaller than that is not only politically insignificant but also really impossible to operate with any degree of autonomy in a major conflict.  You'd be putting our troops under someone else's direct command.  [realistically ANY sized force Canada deploys in a major war will ultimately under US/Allied command, but anything smaller than a Brigade would have to be under direct tactical command]

Others argue that based on the size of Canada we should be able to deploy at least a Division.  Anything less isn't enough to show our Allies we are really taking on our share of the burden in the fight by putting our own sons & daughters lives on the line beside our partners.

I disagree with that in so far as I think that our sailors and aircrews will equally be in the line of fire doing the vital task of preventing our enemies from disrupting the flow of troops and equipment from the USA to the conflict zone.  Every American ship or aircraft that we ensure arrives safely will have profoundly more impact on the conflict than additional Canadian boots on the ground in my opinion so I'll gladly trade the two extra Brigades required to deploy a full Division for additional RCN and RCAF assets.    

I'd also suggest that if we are to deploy anything beyond a Brigade Group it would be more impactful (based on observations of recent conflicts including Ukraine) to deploy additional units such as artillery, long range precision fires, air defence, ISR, EW, etc. over more infantry/armour.  It may be less people deployed overall...and less perhaps directly on the front lines, but I think it would likely be more impactful militarily.


----------



## Halifax Tar

GR66 said:


> I'll disagree with you on this one though.  While I think that air and sea should be the priority you can't ignore the land.  Ultimately you can't control territory without "boots on the ground".  For that you need conventional land forces.
> 
> Where @KevinB and I disagree is over how many of what type of forces are appropriate for Canada.  I argue for a Brigade Group minimum (plus additional enablers) as anything smaller than that is not only politically insignificant but also really impossible to operate with any degree of autonomy in a major conflict.  You'd be putting our troops under someone else's direct command.  [realistically ANY sized force Canada deploys in a major war will ultimately under US/Allied command, but anything smaller than a Brigade would have to be under direct tactical command]
> 
> Others argue that based on the size of Canada we should be able to deploy at least a Division.  Anything less isn't enough to show our Allies we are really taking on our share of the burden in the fight by putting our own sons & daughters lives on the line beside our partners.
> 
> I disagree with that in so far as I think that our sailors and aircrews will equally be in the line of fire doing the vital task of preventing our enemies from disrupting the flow of troops and equipment from the USA to the conflict zone.  Every American ship or aircraft that we ensure arrives safely will have profoundly more impact on the conflict than additional Canadian boots on the ground in my opinion so I'll gladly trade the two extra Brigades required to deploy a full Division for additional RCN and RCAF assets.
> 
> I'd also suggest that if we are to deploy anything beyond a Brigade Group it would be more impactful (based on observations of recent conflicts including Ukraine) to deploy additional units such as artillery, long range precision fires, air defence, ISR, EW, etc. over more infantry/armour.  It may be less people deployed overall...and less perhaps directly on the front lines, but I think it would likely be more impactful militarily.



I would argue Canada as a Nation has no desire to take and hold ground; right or wrong.  But I think the country is ok with the Army doing domestic/coastal defense.


----------



## GR66

Halifax Tar said:


> I would argue Canada as a Nation has no desire to take and hold ground; right or wrong.  But I think the country is ok with the Army doing domestic/coastal defense.


I'll agree that Canadians generally have no desire to "take and hold ground" that belongs to other people (although arguably that's basically what peacekeeping is), however I'd say we have a proven willingness to sacrifice our blood and treasure to help our friends and allies keep/retake their own ground from an invader.


----------



## Halifax Tar

GR66 said:


> I'll agree that Canadians generally have no desire to "take and hold ground" that belongs to other people (although arguably that's basically what peacekeeping is), however I'd say we have a proven willingness to sacrifice our blood and treasure to help our friends and allies keep/retake their own ground from an invader.



Have we ?  Maybe in the past.  Recently it only took 158 KIAs to have us pull out of AFG.

Not trying to be crass, but I don't think we have the stomach for conflict.


----------



## KevinB

Halifax Tar said:


> Have we ?  Maybe in the past.  Recently it only took 158 KIAs to have us pull out of AFG.
> 
> Not trying to be crass, but I don't think we have the stomach for conflict.


Depends where it is.

Also if you stick a Bde in Singapore or on the Asian landmass itself, they are there for the duration, as you aren't evacuating anyone during a conflict regardless of public wishes - Canada doesn't have the logistics or force projection means to do it...


----------



## Halifax Tar

KevinB said:


> Depends where it is.
> 
> Also if you stick a Bde in Singapore or on the Asian landmass itself, they are there for the duration, as you aren't evacuating anyone during a conflict regardless of public wishes - Canada doesn't have the logistics or force projection means to do it...



I don't think Canada is interested in a Hong Kong part deux.   That didn't go well, despite the valiant fight our soldiers put up.


----------



## quadrapiper

Halifax Tar said:


> Have we ?  Maybe in the past.  Recently it only took 158 KIAs to have us pull out of AFG.
> 
> Not trying to be crass, but I don't think we have the stomach for conflict.


Which was a multi-layered, multi-headed mess, however gallantly fought and, in individual locations or certain areas, briefly promising of peace and progress. Without getting into whether or not it would actually be a good idea, I expect a direct CAF role in e.g. Ukraine would be a _much _easier sell than a continuation of the neverending fight in Afghanistan. Clear situation (Armed Russians in someone else's country), clear solution (skilful application of overwhelming violence to those Russians), readily identifiable endpoint (a country now without an armed Russian problem).


----------



## Halifax Tar

quadrapiper said:


> Which was a multi-layered, multi-headed mess, however gallantly fought and, in individual locations or certain areas, briefly promising of peace and progress. Without getting into whether or not it would actually be a good idea, I expect a direct CAF role in e.g. Ukraine would be a _much _easier sell than a continuation of the neverending fight in Afghanistan. Clear situation (Armed Russians in someone else's country), clear solution (skilful application of overwhelming violence to those Russians), readily identifiable endpoint (a country now without an armed Russian problem).



Everything is an easy sell to an emotionally irrational pubic who wants to pretend they are a world player.  Its when the butchers bill comes in that things get real and opinions change.


----------



## GR66

Halifax Tar said:


> Have we ?  Maybe in the past.  Recently it only took 158 KIAs to have us pull out of AFG.
> 
> Not trying to be crass, but I don't think we have the stomach for conflict.


Not trying to be crass myself and nothing against the poor, long suffering Afghan population, but I'm not sure I'd classify Afghanistan as our "friends or allies" in anything beyond the collective humanity sense.

I do think that a great many Canadian however would have much more of a stomach for conflict that involves our traditional friends and allies that have cultures and values broadly similar to ours and with which we have fairly deep and ongoing cultural and economic ties.


----------



## FJAG

Halifax Tar said:


> I would argue Canada as a Nation has no desire to take and hold ground; right or wrong. But I think the country is ok with the Army doing domestic/coastal defense.


Do we really wish to have a defence structure and policy based on what the "herd" wants or expects. Military structure is a capital "P" political issue. Where does our country wish to have influence for all the selfish reasons that each and every country has: influence, trading partners, defence allies etc.

Our influence has waned and trading structure has become one-dimensional and vulnerable to disruption because we have pushed out heads up into our internal social policies butt. Our manufacturing capabilities continue to wane because of internal weaknesses.

I'm not saying that a robust defence posture will fix that but its part of a bigger revolution that has to take place and that will never take place until we stop kowtowing to small but vocal special interest groups that can not see beyond their pet issues.

Laurier said in 1904



> “The 19th century has been the century of United States’ development… Let me tell you, my fellow countrymen, that all the signs point this way, that the 20th century shall be the century of Canada and of Canadian development. For the next 70 years, nay for the next 100 years, Canada shall be the star towards which all men who love progress and freedom shall come."



That was on track during the early part of the century and then was frittered away by numerous government programs that were closer to a "bread and circuses" policy that one of strengthening and growing the nation.

Defence policies in Canada do not need to listen to the people because the people, as a mass, have no idea what it is and what the military is doing. We could have massive reforms which would never be noticed. Budgets do get noticed but, if handled properly and with the proper spin, are publicly manageable. 

I'm entirely with @KevinB on this. If you want to make an impact amongst Europeans and Americans that we are doing our part then you need Canadian tanks rolling through their streets occasionally to let them know we stand with them and care. A ship offshore or a fighter at 10,000 feet, no matter how useful, has zero impact. It's the Canadian foot soldier in the street buying a pack of cigarettes at the local tobacconist who has the impact.

We need to regain some clout internationally and an army, even a flyover army, is one of the necessary tools to provide that.

Joe Lunchbucket understands that better than your average university career academic. It's time to stop listening to the wrong advocacy groups.

Here's the bottom line.



> The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression



There will always be a**holes in the world but, if you do deterrence right there will not ever be a "butcher's bill". If you do it wrong by huddling in a corner then the eventual butcher's bill will be enormous.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> I'm entirely with @KevinB on this. If you want to make an impact amongst Europeans and Americans that we are doing our part then you need Canadian tanks rolling through their streets occasionally to let them know we stand with them and care. A ship offshore or a fighter at 10,000 feet, no matter how useful, has zero impact. It's the Canadian foot soldier in the street buying a pack of cigarettes at the local tobacconist who has the impact.



Memories of being with another Army on the NATO AMF (L) exercise in Arctic Norway when it was announced that Canada's CAST Brigade wouldn't be deploying that year, or probably ever.

Although it wasn't a 'thing' back then, our response equated to making an 'L' on our foreheads.


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Memories of being with another Army on the NATO AMF (L) exercise in Arctic Norway when it was announced that Canada's CAST Brigade wouldn't be deploying that year, or probably ever.
> 
> Although it wasn't a 'thing' back then, our response equated to making an 'L' on our foreheads.


I was with 2RCHA when D Bty had the AMF(L) role. It was good to have a purpose. I can't recall ever practicing with 5CMBG a situation where both AMF(L) and CAST deployed. I presume there were plans for that but they never got down to us guys at the coal face.

They tried exercising the CAST on Ex BRAVE LION back in the 1980s. It was a roaring success if you listen to the folks at Public Affairs but in reality was a dismal failure that showed clearly that the emperor had no clothes. It was either fix it or let it die a lingering death. In true Canadian fashion we chose the latter.

🍻


----------



## Halifax Tar

FJAG said:


> Do we really wish to have a defence structure and policy based on what the "herd" wants or expects. Military structure is a capital "P" political issue. Where does our country wish to have influence for all the selfish reasons that each and every country has: influence, trading partners, defence allies etc.



I'm simply playing the field that exists.  We can dream and play with paper napkin forces all day.  Or we can grasp reality and make the best of it. 

I would love to see Canada have real powerful expeditionary forces.  Unfortunately I think Canadians only want that until we start sending hearses down the highway of heroes again. 

I also think mixing our "herds" climate and geographic location make Naval and Air assets and forces the perfect spot for us to project and play a role.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> IMHO Bde Groups make sense if you don’t plan on deploying larger forces, as you can allocate additional HQ assets to coordinate the Group Enablers.
> 
> Honestly for Canada, I’ve always thought the Group makes more sense, as the odds of sending a Div are snowballs chance in hell (not enough gear, and it would take years to move them with the CAF movement assets).
> 
> 
> I still think Canada should have Div Assets and ideally 2 Deployable Divisions (one Heavy and one Light) accepting that some of those Bde’s would be ‘Total Force’ mixtures.
> 
> The Heavy Div would consist of 2 Armored Bde’s and 1 Mech Bde plus CS and CSS Bde’s and be primarily tracked (I’m willing to accept HIMARS for the GS Regiment though)
> 1 Prepositioned Armored Bde and Div HQ, remaining Div equipment prepositioned in Europe with 30/70 troops for flyover).
> 
> The Light Div would have 2 Light Bde’s and 1 Cav Bde plus related CS and CSS, primarily wheeled.



But part of the reason, I believe, we don't have "enablers" is that they are all considered Div or Corps assets and we have no mechanism for co-ordinating the tasks of the Brigades or of deciding how scarce resources are allocated for a mission.

Take the tanks for example - we have 4 squadrons of 3 different models.   We try to divide that among 3 Brigades and end up with gaggles of pennypackets.  On the other hand if they were in the hands of the Div Commander she could allocate them to a brigade according to task or keep them as in independent tactical manoeuver unit.  Keeping them as a tactical unit would have encouraged the Div Commander to agitate for more AT systems for her Brigades.

Similarly on the artillery and the air defence.  With a Divisional Model then there is a structure to justify the purchase of a single AD Bty rather than three independent Troops.

Aren't you lot always harping on about mission command and unity of command?


----------



## CBH99

I see what you’re saying Kirkhill, and I agree that scarce resources _should_ all be put together & deployed under one command, if for no other reason than both the command and the assets are both better off.

(For anybody with recent experience with our tanks - are the 3 models really that different from a maintenance perspective?  The engines, tracks, mechanical stuff is mostly the same, no?)



Was it Exercise Trident Juncture we practiced deploying to Europe in the case of an Article 5, (a few years back now…I couldn’t wait to leave once CJOC showed up!)

I was surprised (in a good way) at how quickly we were able to deploy, and at how many Canadian vehicles and troops I came across.  Something like 16 CF-18’s too?

I was surprised (in a bad way) of how institutional stupidity quickly turned things into a bit of a mess.  (CJOC that is 100% on you!)


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> But part of the reason, I believe, we don't have "enablers" is that they are all considered Div or Corps assets and we have no mechanism for co-ordinating the tasks of the Brigades or of deciding how scarce resources are allocated for a mission.
> 
> Take the tanks for example - we have 4 squadrons of 3 different models.   We try to divide that among 3 Brigades and end up with gaggles of pennypackets.  On the other hand if they were in the hands of the Div Commander she could allocate them to a brigade according to task or keep them as in independent tactical manoeuver unit.  Keeping them as a tactical unit would have encouraged the Div Commander to agitate for more AT systems for her Brigades.
> 
> Similarly on the artillery and the air defence.  With a Divisional Model then there is a structure to justify the purchase of a single AD Bty rather than three independent Troops.
> 
> Aren't you lot always harping on about mission command and unity of command?


If Canada was in the business of deploying Divisions I’d agree to a point.  
  I don’t like removing the CS Arty Reg’t from a Bde anyway.  You need to view those guns like the Battalion Commander views their mortars.  GS Regiments belong at higher.  

Every Bde needs some sort of generic AD, and an Air Defense/Air Management cell, especially now given the current increase in UAS.   

I can agree that the Engineers could be parsed down to a Squadron or two compared to an entire Reg’t in the current CMBG’s.  

WRT the Tanks, Canada doesn’t have enough for 1 Full Bde anyway, I would gift the Leo2’s to Ukraine and try to get a 2:1 replacement deal off us down here.  That would at least allow for a true Armored Bde to be formed. 

The main issue I have with the idea of Support or Fire’s Bde’s is those items vary depending on the formation they belong. 

A M777 Reg’t isn’t a good choice for an Armored or Mech Bde, and M109’s aren’t great for Light Bde’s — so why try to jam them all together somewhere. 


The same goes for other assets.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> If Canada was in the business of deploying Divisions I’d agree to a point.
> I don’t like removing the CS Arty Reg’t from a Bde anyway.  You need to view those guns like the Battalion Commander views their mortars.  GS Regiments belong at higher.
> 
> Every Bde needs some sort of generic AD, and an Air Defense/Air Management cell, especially now given the current increase in UAS.
> 
> I can agree that the Engineers could be parsed down to a Squadron or two compared to an entire Reg’t in the current CMBG’s.
> 
> WRT the Tanks, Canada doesn’t have enough for 1 Full Bde anyway, I would gift the Leo2’s to Ukraine and try to get a 2:1 replacement deal off us down here.  That would at least allow for a true Armored Bde to be formed.
> 
> The main issue I have with the idea of Support or Fire’s Bde’s is those items vary depending on the formation they belong.
> 
> A M777 Reg’t isn’t a good choice for an Armored or Mech Bde, and M109’s aren’t great for Light Bde’s — so why try to jam them all together somewhere.
> 
> 
> The same goes for other assets.



You are talking about an army that can afford specialized formations.

I am thinking about an army that has to work with the kit they have while taking on an assortment of tasks.

We should be keeping the cutlery in the drawer and practice taking it out as needed.  We shouldn't be hung up on particular structures.

And I agree we will never deploy a division.  However our one active division may end up deploying a Brigade Gp here, a Battle Gp there and an couple of Coy Cbt Tms with each of them having particular enablers assigned from Division.


----------



## Kirkhill

We've been nattering away on the Ukraine thread about COTS and IT stuff that are going to impact the future structure of all forces.

Accordingly I am posting this article here to drag the conversation into a more appropriate thread.









						Open systems architecture can unlock 'limitless potential:' Army Undersecretary - Breaking Defense
					

Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo said he was particularly impressed by the service’s adoption of the C5ISR Modular Suite of Standards program, a platform that will allow soldiers to plug in cards embedded with networking and EW capabilities




					breakingdefense.com
				






> Open systems architecture can unlock ‘limitless potential:’ Army Undersecretary​Army Undersecretary Gabe Camarillo said he was particularly impressed by the service’s adoption of the C5ISR Modular Suite of Standards program, a platform that will allow soldiers to plug in cards embedded with networking and EW capabilities​



This goes hand in glove with rapid incorporation of COTS solutions and with rapid coding.  Do we need more uniformed riflemen or do we need more tubby coders in shorts?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> You are talking about an army that can afford specialized formations.
> 
> I am thinking about an army that has to work with the kit they have while taking on an assortment of tasks.
> 
> We should be keeping the cutlery in the drawer and practice taking it out as needed.  We shouldn't be hung up on particular structures.
> 
> And I agree we will never deploy a division.  However our one active division may end up deploying a Brigade Gp here, a Battle Gp there and an couple of Coy Cbt Tms with each of them having particular enablers assigned from Division.


You are a G7 Nation - with a sub G20 Military.

Right now the Army, Navy and RCAF are in dire straights - they can't legitimately go anywhere or do anything. without a bucket brigade bailing the leaks.

Militaries need structures to train on, one needs to make hard decisions with the Tax Payer Monies on how one will create a Force -- right now that can has been kicked so far down the road, I am not even sure it is visible.

Canada has been locked with Europe since it was founded -- that fact isn't going to change.
  Armored Forces are generally better for most of Europe in both an offensive and defensive capability -- BUT they are slow to deploy.
  Light Forces are generally easier to move anywhere - and for places like the Asian Rim - have more flexibility for deployment.

 Canada's Army needs a mix of Forces - including a plethora of capabilities it doesn't currently have.
   But that mix is much like oil and water, as Heavy and Light while they can be complimentary, aren't interchangeable, and need their own specific enablers.

At least the Army has a general concept that War Fighting (and deterrence of the same) is it's mission.
  The RCN, and RCAF seem to often wonder what their actual purpose it - as the RCN for such a small Navy doesn't seem to understand that in a small Navy that every ship needs to be a potential warship.  The RCAF seems to constantly be focused on Fighters - the MRTT seems more to be an effort to keep Fighters in the air, than actual concern about movements - and the RCAF tends to ignore TacHel are Maritime Helicopters as best as they can.

My Napkin Army split a few things off, each under a MGen, with a 3* as CDS (life sucks GO/FO's wear a helmet)

CSOC - Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM, with more but with a shorter name  )

RCN - 17 CSC, 5 AOR, 10 AOPS (which better weapons platforms), and 10 SSN

Canadian Army - 1 "Div" of 5 Brigade Groups (1 Armor, 1 Para, 1 Light/Airmobile, and 2 Medium LAV/CAV) - including the Reserves.

RCAF - 156 F-35, 45 C-130J, 34 P-8, 18 MRTT, 12 C17 (yes I know the line is stale)

TSAG (Tactical Support Aviation Group) - I moved TacHel and MH out of the RCAF, as well as all the UAS, I loaded up on CH-47's (144)  HH-60's (also doing MH) for 306, and AH-1Z's (for Bell to a tune of 306 ) and a 306 UAS split of 50/50 MQ-1D's and RQ-4D Phoenix (which can also do the S of SAR), but TacHel, MH, and UAS are OPCOM to the CA and RCN.

Yes I knocked down the Army - mainly as I think to make a robust force, the logistics and service support aspects are more important, I grew the other services - as I think Bde tasks are about all Canada will consider for the Army beyond a Global War...


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> You are a G7 Nation - with a sub G20 Military.



There's a great problem statement.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> You are a G7 Nation - with a sub G20 Military.



And?

So what?


----------



## TacticalTea

Kirkhill said:


> And?
> 
> So what?


So it's absolutely embarrassing to be in the G7 and yet yield so little influence, in matters military but others also.


----------



## Kirkhill

TacticalTea said:


> So it's absolutely embarrassing to be in the G7 and yet yield so little influence, in matters military but others also.



I would suggest that our current governors aren't of a like mind.  Hand over last year's parka and throw a fiver in the kettle and they're good.


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> If Canada was in the business of deploying Divisions I’d agree to a point.
> I don’t like removing the CS Arty Reg’t from a Bde anyway.  You need to view those guns like the Battalion Commander views their mortars.  GS Regiments belong at higher.
> 
> Every Bde needs some sort of generic AD, and an Air Defense/Air Management cell, especially now given the current increase in UAS.
> 
> I can agree that the Engineers could be parsed down to a Squadron or two compared to an entire Reg’t in the current CMBG’s.
> 
> WRT the Tanks, Canada doesn’t have enough for 1 Full Bde anyway, I would gift the Leo2’s to Ukraine and try to get a 2:1 replacement deal off us down here.  That would at least allow for a true Armored Bde to be formed.
> 
> The main issue I have with the idea of Support or Fire’s Bde’s is those items vary depending on the formation they belong.
> 
> A M777 Reg’t isn’t a good choice for an Armored or Mech Bde, and M109’s aren’t great for Light Bde’s — so why try to jam them all together somewhere.
> 
> 
> The same goes for other assets.


Agreed on all points.  

I wouldn’t try to jam M109’s and M777’s together - I was referring more to our tanks, and how many could actually be deployed in such a scenario.  

(Gifting Ukraine our Leopard 2’s, and arranging a 2:1 replacement with Abrams makes a ton of sense.  From a training, maintenance, spare parts perspective - and from a deployment perspective.  All in all sounds like good sense.)


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> You are a G7 Nation - with a sub G20 Military.


And as a result sub G20 influence in the World


KevinB said:


> Right now the Army, Navy and RCAF are in dire straights - they can't legitimately go anywhere or do anything. without a bucket brigade bailing the leaks.


Agreed.  And much more than some duct tape, baling wire and a couple of band-aids will be required to fix them.  It will be a LONG process.


KevinB said:


> Militaries need structures to train on, one needs to make hard decisions with the Tax Payer Monies on how one will create a Force -- right now that can has been kicked so far down the road, I am not even sure it is visible.


Agreed.  Funny though that you've stated previously that we should as a nation be able to field two Divisions but then you focus on Brigade Groups in your Napkin Army.  I on the other hand have argued that Brigade Groups are likely the most appropriate size for us to deploy (currently and in the near future) but think that the eventual goal should be for Divisional-level capabilities. 

For that reason I think we should maintain a Divisional structure even if we don't have all the elements to make a Division at this time.  I'd propose that we start with Brigades that are highly interoperable with US forces and could be plugged into a US Division as part of a multi-national deployment.  Over time we keep adding the missing building blocks until such time as we can field our own Division.


KevinB said:


> Canada has been locked with Europe since it was founded -- that fact isn't going to change.
> Armored Forces are generally better for most of Europe in both an offensive and defensive capability -- BUT they are slow to deploy.


Agreed.  We were wrong to ever abandon our heavy capabilities as an Army.  A heavy force can always fight lighter but a light force can't fight heavier.


KevinB said:


> Light Forces are generally easier to move anywhere - and for places like the Asian Rim - have more flexibility for deployment.


Agreed. 


KevinB said:


> Canada's Army needs a mix of Forces - including a plethora of capabilities it doesn't currently have.
> But that mix is much like oil and water, as Heavy and Light while they can be complimentary, aren't interchangeable, and need their own specific enablers.


Again in total agreement.


KevinB said:


> At least the Army has a general concept that War Fighting (and deterrence of the same) is it's mission.


Based on some of our divestment decisions in the past I'd argue that many in the Army leadership have lost that concept.


KevinB said:


> The RCN, and RCAF seem to often wonder what their actual purpose it - as the RCN for such a small Navy doesn't seem to understand that in a small Navy that every ship needs to be a potential warship.


There are lots of very important non-combat roles that are typically undertaken by a nation's navy.  However, as I stated previously there are times when the storm clouds are gathering when the Navy has to prepare for war and let other national agencies bear much of those non-combat tasks.


KevinB said:


> The RCAF seems to constantly be focused on Fighters - the MRTT seems more to be an effort to keep Fighters in the air, than actual concern about movements - and the RCAF tends to ignore TacHel are Maritime Helicopters as best as they can.


For a country as large as ours and with virtually any military deployment (even within Canada) essentially being "expeditionary" we have a pathetically limited airlift capacity.


KevinB said:


> My Napkin Army split a few things off, each under a MGen, with a 3* as CDS (life sucks GO/FO's wear a helmet)
> 
> CSOC - Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM, with more but with a shorter name  )





KevinB said:


> RCN - 17 CSC, 5 AOR, 10 AOPS (which better weapons platforms), and 10 SSN


I can't see the CSC build exceeding the planned 15 ships due to the cost and the manning requirements.  To be honest I wouldn't be shocked if the final count was reduced to 12.

Taking an option for a 3rd JSS would be smart in my mind and you could supplement with a pair of contracted (or Reserve) oilers.

The AOPS (even with better weapons) are simply not warships.  I'd use the AOPS that are already planned now to train and expand our Navy manning but as the CSCs come online I'd transfer them to other government agencies (CCG, DFO, RCMP) for constabulary work.  Instead of expanding the AOPS buy I'd instead look at a small combatant replacement for the MCDVs to supplement the CSC fleet.

10 x SSNs I can't see happening.  Both politically and logistically.  Between US, British and Australian build schedules I just don't see the capacity to get ten SSNs anytime in the near future.  I think we'd be better to aim for 8 x AIP SSKs.  Much easier to sell politically and much more likely to actually be available in the timelines we'd need to replace the Victorias. 


KevinB said:


> Canadian Army - 1 "Div" of 5 Brigade Groups (1 Armor, 1 Para, 1 Light/Airmobile, and 2 Medium LAV/CAV) - including the Reserves.


As noted above I'd opt for 1 x Heavy and 1 x Light Division even if we're missing key elements and work toward filling in those gaps over time.


KevinB said:


> RCAF - 156 F-35, 45 C-130J, 34 P-8, 18 MRTT, 12 C17 (yes I know the line is stale)
> 
> TSAG (Tactical Support Aviation Group) - I moved TacHel and MH out of the RCAF, as well as all the UAS, I loaded up on CH-47's (144)  HH-60's (also doing MH) for 306, and AH-1Z's (for Bell to a tune of 306 ) and a 306 UAS split of 50/50 MQ-1D's and RQ-4D Phoenix (which can also do the S of SAR), but TacHel, MH, and UAS are OPCOM to the CA and RCN.


This is where I think you're taking a bit of a leap from wishful thinking to fantasy.  Training and keeping pilots is already a major problem for the RCAF (as well as the USAF and other Air Forces around the World) but you're massively increasing the number of aircraft. 

I doubt you'll see an increase in the F-35 buy due to cost.  Perhaps in time a Loyal Wingman option will be available to supplement the fighter fleet.

Increasing airlift capacity would be a definite plus.  It would be nice to see a new heavy lift aircraft become available by the time our C-177s need to be replaced.  As you suggested we could increase our C-130J and MRTT fleets but I just can't see the numbers your suggesting being possible.  For P-8's I'm guessing the Government will likely try to just replace the 14 x CP-140M's being modernized but if I were king I'd push to get at least 18 to 24 due to their literally daily utility in protecting our sovereignty. 

As far a rotary wing it would definitely be nice to have more Chinooks and a common medium-lift airframe to replace the Griffins, Cyclones and Cormorants would be ideal (with more of each) but again I just can't see anything close to the numbers you're proposing being a possibility.


KevinB said:


> Yes I knocked down the Army - mainly as I think to make a robust force, the logistics and service support aspects are more important, I grew the other services - as I think Bde tasks are about all Canada will consider for the Army beyond a Global War...


Totally agree with the logistics and support services.  I'd rather be able to deploy a single Brigade that is well equipped and supported than a Division that's trying to operate on a shoestring.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I don’t like removing the CS Arty Reg’t from a Bde anyway. You need to view those guns like the Battalion Commander views their mortars. GS Regiments belong at higher.
> 
> Every Bde needs some sort of generic AD, and an Air Defense/Air Management cell, especially now given the current increase in UAS.


I'm still mulling this over but more and more I'm thinking artillery regiments could use bifurcation.

On the one hand there are the sense functions. BCs/FOOs or FSOs/FISTs - whatever - but other than training and personnel management, they really have no need to be affiliated with any particular regiment. We have most of them in one battery now within each CS regiment and the Brits go even further with having them in what they call Tactical Group Batteries. Each one has a BC, and FSCC, a number of observer/JTAC parties and a Joint Fires cell with roughly 40 pers. They're enough for basically one battalion. A regiment can therefore have none or one or more tactical group batteries. There can also be independent tactical group batteries not attached to any gun batteries.

Similarly, STA batteries do not need to be affiliated with any particular regiment. 

The other elements are the act elements: guns, rockets, armed UAVs, you name it.

I'm thinking that the more that you get away from the concept of a CS regiment within the brigade, to one of a divisional artillery brigade which holds the resources, the more flexibility you have in assigning a right mix of sense and act elements to a particular battle group or brigade as required.

In addition bifurcation makes organizing reserve regiments/batteries simpler. A designated battery in a given location can be a tactical group battery, an STA battery, a gun, rocket or UAV battery depending on size, need, proximity to ranges etc etc.

That wouldn't stop peacetime affiliations where a given Regt Hq and 9, 10, 26, 42, 81, and 99 batteries all being affiliated for training to 1 CMBG.

Just a thought.

I'm a two divisions guy. One capable of actual deployment (whether with one or four brigades) and the second as the organization to build and control the follow up force on. I think we need a real functioning and not admin HQ for the primary reason of keeping the skill levels needed for that alive. If you do not have a real division HQ, trained or equipped, you will never be able to create one in a reasonable time. The Army, as it stands, is large enough for two divisions (not 5) regardless how the brigades are organized.

I also think that deployable divisional headquarters needs a NATO role on a flyover basis. If for no other reason to show a Canadian Flag on NATO map boards. We are entirely too humble (and currently we have a lot to be humble about) We need to take on more and very definitely need to be seen to take on more in dramatic fashion.

🍻


----------



## daftandbarmy

FJAG said:


> *I'm a two divisions guy. One capable of actual deployment (whether with one or four brigades) and the second as the organization to build and control the follow up force on. *



Why do you need a second Division to do that? I assume an Army HQ could manage the FG requirements just fine...


----------



## FJAG

daftandbarmy said:


> Why do you need a second Division to do that? I assume an Army HQ could manage the FG requirements just fine...


IMHO, Army HQ should be looking at the bigger more strategic picture and stop micromanaging day-to-day admin and training.

There's also the idea that one division focuses on Europe and the other on everything else.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> I'm still mulling this over but more and more I'm thinking artillery regiments could use bifurcation.
> 
> On the one hand there are the sense functions. BCs/FOOs or FSOs/FISTs - whatever - but other than training and personnel management, they really have no need to be affiliated with any particular regiment. We have most of them in one battery now within each CS regiment and the Brits go even further with having them in what they call Tactical Group Batteries. Each one has a BC, and FSCC, a number of observer/JTAC parties and a Joint Fires cell with roughly 40 pers. They're enough for basically one battalion. A regiment can therefore have none or one or more tactical group batteries. There can also be independent tactical group batteries not attached to any gun batteries.
> 
> Similarly, STA batteries do not need to be affiliated with any particular regiment.
> 
> The other elements are the act elements: guns, rockets, armed UAVs, you name it.
> 
> I'm thinking that the more that you get away from the concept of a CS regiment within the brigade, to one of a divisional artillery brigade which holds the resources, the more flexibility you have in assigning a right mix of sense and act elements to a particular battle group or brigade as required.
> 
> In addition bifurcation makes organizing reserve regiments/batteries simpler. A designated battery in a given location can be a tactical group battery, an STA battery, a gun, rocket or UAV battery depending on size, need, proximity to ranges etc etc.
> 
> That wouldn't stop peacetime affiliations where a given Regt Hq and 9, 10, 26, 42, 81, and 99 batteries all being affiliated for training to 1 CMBG.


I like structure 
  To me sticking a CS Reg't in a Bde givens them 3 x 8 tube gun batteries, and FOO's etc.

The STA/UAS, I would make part of the Bde ISR Squadron.

Higher Formations get GS Reg'ts of Missiles and Rockets 



FJAG said:


> Just a thought.
> 
> I'm a two divisions guy. One capable of actual deployment (whether with one or four brigades) and the second as the organization to build and control the follow up force on. I think we need a real functioning and not admin HQ for the primary reason of keeping the skill levels needed for that alive. If you do not have a real division HQ, trained or equipped, you will never be able to create one in a reasonable time. The Army, as it stands, is large enough for two divisions (not 5) regardless how the brigades are organized.
> 
> I also think that deployable divisional headquarters needs a NATO role on a flyover basis. If for no other reason to show a Canadian Flag on NATO map boards. We are entirely too humble (and currently we have a lot to be humble about) We need to take on more and very definitely need to be seen to take on more in dramatic fashion.
> 
> 🍻





GR66 said:


> Agreed.  Funny though that you've stated previously that we should as a nation be able to field two Divisions but then you focus on Brigade Groups in your Napkin Army.  I on the other hand have argued that Brigade Groups are likely the most appropriate size for us to deploy (currently and in the near future) but think that the eventual goal should be for Divisional-level capabilities.


I think Canada should be able to field two Div - but I didn't prioritize it in my Napkin Army as I think there are higher priorities.



GR66 said:


> For that reason I think we should maintain a Divisional structure even if we don't have all the elements to make a Division at this time.  I'd propose that we start with Brigades that are highly interoperable with US forces and could be plugged into a US Division as part of a multi-national deployment.  Over time we keep adding the missing building blocks until such time as we can field our own Division.


One might argue you don't have all the necessary items to make a real Bde at this point...
   I have argued Bde's to play into US Div systems before, other than you, it didn't get a lot of traction.



GR66 said:


> I can't see the CSC build exceeding the planned 15 ships due to the cost and the manning requirements.  To be honest I wouldn't be shocked if the final count was reduced to 12.


  2 is 1, 1 is none, IMHO 12 CSC isn't enough to do the missions.





GR66 said:


> Taking an option for a 3rd JSS would be smart in my mind and you could supplement with a pair of contracted (or Reserve) oilers.
> 
> The AOPS (even with better weapons) are simply not warships.  I'd use the AOPS that are already planned now to train and expand our Navy manning but as the CSCs come online I'd transfer them to other government agencies (CCG, DFO, RCMP) for constabulary work.  Instead of expanding the AOPS buy I'd instead look at a small combatant replacement for the MCDVs to supplement the CSC fleet.


Not true warships - but they can mount a lot of pod based systems - and work up North, which from a. strictly Canadian sovereignty issue is a win.



GR66 said:


> 10 x SSNs I can't see happening.  Both politically and logistically.  Between US, British and Australian build schedules I just don't see the capacity to get ten SSNs anytime in the near future.  I think we'd be better to aim for 8 x AIP SSKs.  Much easier to sell politically and much more likely to actually be available in the timelines we'd need to replace the Victorias.


   I don't see it happening either, but AIP SSK's won't fill the role that Canada needs both from a Patrol Range/Speed for the Pacific, and the Under Ice operations up north.



GR66 said:


> As noted above I'd opt for 1 x Heavy and 1 x Light Division even if we're missing key elements and work toward filling in those gaps over time.
> 
> This is where I think you're taking a bit of a leap from wishful thinking to fantasy.  Training and keeping pilots is already a major problem for the RCAF (as well as the USAF and other Air Forces around the World) but you're massively increasing the number of aircraft.
> 
> I doubt you'll see an increase in the F-35 buy due to cost.  Perhaps in time a Loyal Wingman option will be available to supplement the fighter fleet.


Again, I looked at a what does Canada need to conduct both Domestic Patrol, and Expeditionary work - and arrived at the number that way.
   I would probably look at the F-15 to supplement the F-35's and conduct strike roles to leave the F-35 for AS.



GR66 said:


> Increasing airlift capacity would be a definite plus.  It would be nice to see a new heavy lift aircraft become available by the time our C-177s need to be replaced.  As you suggested we could increase our C-130J and MRTT fleets but I just can't see the numbers you're suggesting being possible.  For P-8's I'm guessing the Government will likely try to just replace the 14 x CP-140M's being modernized but if I were king I'd push to get at least 18 to 24 due to their literally daily utility in protecting our sovereignty.


You're getting P-8's, we've told your dear Leader very clearly 

  Everything is possible, and those numbers are not even crazy when you look at the cube and mass required to move a Bde and support it in an expeditionary setting.



GR66 said:


> As far a rotary wing it would definitely be nice to have more Chinooks and a common medium-lift airframe to replace the Griffins, Cyclones and Cormorants would be ideal (with more of each) but again I just can't see anything close to the numbers you're proposing being a possibility.


To run MH, and support TacHel for each Bde, as well as a fully Airmobile Bde, that is the numbers you are looking at, when you look at the actual platform costing - it would be doable over a period of 10 years with a 2% Defense Budget commitment.




GR66 said:


> Totally agree with the logistics and support services.  I'd rather be able to deploy a single Brigade that is well equipped and supported than a Division that's trying to operate on a shoestring.


That's where I went with the Brigade Group concepts.   I viewed my Napkin Army as a restructuring base - with the goal of striving for more.


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> I like structure
> To me sticking a CS Reg't in a Bde givens them 3 x 8 tube gun batteries, and FOO's etc.
> 
> The STA/UAS, I would make part of the Bde ISR Squadron.
> 
> Higher Formations get GS Reg'ts of Missiles and Rockets


I'll leave discussions on artillery organization to the Gunners...just so long as we get a lot more of them.


KevinB said:


> I think Canada should be able to field two Div - but I didn't prioritize it in my Napkin Army as I think there are higher priorities.
> 
> 
> One might argue you don't have all the necessary items to make a real Bde at this point...
> I have argued Bde's to play into US Div systems before, other than you, it didn't get a lot of traction.


We as a nation need to get over our reflexive anti-Americanism when it comes to practical military issues.  The fact is we need to be as interoperable as possible to be effective and frankly being interoperable will in the long run be cheaper than trying to re-invent the wheel every time in order to be uniquely Canadian.


KevinB said:


> 2 is 1, 1 is none, IMHO 12 CSC isn't enough to do the missions.
> 
> Not true warships - but they can mount a lot of pod based systems - and work up North, which from a. strictly Canadian sovereignty issue is a win.
> 
> I don't see it happening either, but AIP SSK's won't fill the role that Canada needs both from a Patrol Range/Speed for the Pacific, and the Under Ice operations up north.
> 
> Again, I looked at a what does Canada need to conduct both Domestic Patrol, and Expeditionary work - and arrived at the number that way.
> I would probably look at the F-15 to supplement the F-35's and conduct strike roles to leave the F-35 for AS.
> 
> You're getting P-8's, we've told your dear Leader very clearly
> 
> Everything is possible, and those numbers are not even crazy when you look at the cube and mass required to move a Bde and support it in an expeditionary setting.
> 
> To run MH, and support TacHel for each Bde, as well as a fully Airmobile Bde, that is the numbers you are looking at, when you look at the actual platform costing - it would be doable over a period of 10 years with a 2% Defense Budget commitment.


All of these issues are related and are probably the single most important thing that we need to address when talking about the Army's (and Navy/Air Force's) future structure.  You're absolutely right that with some political backbone and a solid budget we can likely afford most of the equipment that you're talking about.  The major elephant in the room though (and again this is not unique to Canada) is manning that equipment.  Even if we magically fix our training and retention issues the fact is that people in the West are increasingly less and less interested in joining the military.  We need to face that fact and find ways to work around it, otherwise we're likely to end up with a bunch of equipment that we don't have the people to maintain and deploy.

FJAG's been screaming into the wind on this forever, but we need to find ways to effectively make use of Reservists.  Not only to fill out the bulk of our combat arms units in case of war, but also for those higher-skilled trades (techs of all sorts, pilots, Reserve-manned ships, etc.).

We also need to very seriously start looking to unmanned platforms to make the most use of our limited manpower - UAVs, "Loyal Wingman"-type aircraft, Satellites, USVs and UUVs, UGVs for both combat and logistics, etc.  


KevinB said:


> That's where I went with the Brigade Group concepts.   I viewed my Napkin Army as a restructuring base - with the goal of striving for more.


The sad thing is that at some point institutionally the CAF lost the goal of "striving for more".  Military leadership for years has just tried to plod along without change in face of Government neglect rather than pushing to find ways of doing better even if with less.


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> I'll leave discussions on artillery organization to the Gunners...just so long as we get a lot more of them.


Never trust a Gunner  
  But seriously all components need input into force structures - to ensure that a logical and usable system is created, and no one goes off empire building on their own





GR66 said:


> We as a nation need to get over our reflexive anti-Americanism when it comes to practical military issues.  The fact is we need to be as interoperable as possible to be effective and frankly being interoperable will in the long run be cheaper than trying to re-invent the wheel every time in order to be uniquely Canadian.


Totally agreed.  


GR66 said:


> All of these issues are related and are probably the single most important thing that we need to address when talking about the Army's (and Navy/Air Force's) future structure.  You're absolutely right that with some political backbone and a solid budget we can likely afford most of the equipment that you're talking about.  The major elephant in the room though (and again this is not unique to Canada) is manning that equipment.  Even if we magically fix our training and retention issues the fact is that people in the West are increasingly less and less interested in joining the military.  We need to face that fact and find ways to work around it, otherwise we're likely to end up with a bunch of equipment that we don't have the people to maintain and deploy.
> 
> FJAG's been screaming into the wind on this forever, but we need to find ways to effectively make use of Reservists.  Not only to fill out the bulk of our combat arms units in case of war, but also for those higher-skilled trades (techs of all sorts, pilots, Reserve-manned ships, etc.).



In my mind with equipment a lot of the retention and recruitment issues go away.  

1) New equipment is sexy, people tend to care more for new and capable equipment. It also generates confidence.  Capability deficiencies are corrosive to cohesion and moral.   

2) Newer Items generally don’t need the same amount of maintenance to keep running and for the most part are safer. Which reduced concerns on individual safety and crew burnouts (which also enhances safety).  All of which increase career satisfaction.  

3) With modern equipment more missions can be conducted. People who join the Military generally like doing the job, so deployments tend to attract more recruits, and retain experienced personnel as with growth and experience there is mobility upwards.  

4) I totally agree a future force needs to be a Total Force - which means Reg/Res integration.  




GR66 said:


> We also need to very seriously start looking to unmanned platforms to make the most use of our limited manpower - UAVs, "Loyal Wingman"-type aircraft, Satellites, USVs and UUVs, UGVs for both combat and logistics, etc.
> 
> The sad thing is that at some point institutionally the CAF lost the goal of "striving for more".  Military leadership for years has just tried to plod along without change in face of Government neglect rather than pushing to find ways of doing better even if with less.


Agreed.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I like structure
> To me sticking a CS Reg't in a Bde givens them 3 x 8 tube gun batteries, and FOO's etc.
> 
> The STA/UAS, I would make part of the Bde ISR Squadron.
> 
> Higher Formations get GS Reg'ts of Missiles and Rockets


Hey! It's your napkin army. You can do whatever looks good.

I must admit, bifurcation is already partially there because of the current gun bty/OP structure except we still have a BC and his FSCC crew in the gun battery in garrison because - majors and PYs - and we can't trust captains to run company-sized sub-units. Which never made sense to me. In days of yore when deployed to the field the gun-line portion of the battery belonged to the Battery Captain who was - ta da - a captain. Now we have captains as troop commanders when their equivalents in the past were lieutenants.

There's a real problem in properly setting up a career stream to ensure that officers and NCOs go through postings that they need to get the right type of experience for their next level of leadership. The artillery is getting too small and is spread across too many career fields what with guns and STA and soon AD. Fire support coordination, JTACing etc is also becoming complex to the point that it could almost be a separate career field but that then really starts screwing people up at the WO and Maj and above levels as they will only have seen one facet of the much wider field. What happens when a guy who has gone through a dozen years as a FOO/FSCC tech and JTAC then gets promoted to be the BSM of a gun or missile or STA battery?

It's a conundrum. If you go in silos then you have senior leaders without the right breadth of experience and if you pop people around through all the different lanes then you get folks who are jacks of all trades and masters of none. 

There's a lot more to think about than what symbol should go inside the rectangle of a line diagram.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Hey! It's your napkin army. You can do whatever looks good.
> 
> I must admit, bifurcation is already partially there because of the current gun bty/OP structure except we still have a BC and his FSCC crew in the gun battery in garrison because - majors and PYs - and we can't trust captains to run company-sized sub-units. Which never made sense to me. In days of yore when deployed to the field the gun-line portion of the battery belonged to the Battery Captain who was - ta da - a captain. Now we have captains as troop commanders when their equivalents in the past were lieutenants.
> 
> There's a real problem in properly setting up a career stream to ensure that officers and NCOs go through postings that they need to get the right type of experience for their next level of leadership. The artillery is getting too small and is spread across too many career fields what with guns and STA and soon AD. Fire support coordination, JTACing etc is also becoming complex to the point that it could almost be a separate career field but that then really starts screwing people up at the WO and Maj and above levels as they will only have seen one facet of the much wider field. What happens when a guy who has gone through a dozen years as a FOO/FSCC tech and JTAC then gets promoted to be the BSM of a gun or missile or STA battery?
> 
> It's a conundrum. If you go in silos then you have senior leaders without the right breadth of experience and if you pop people around through all the different lanes then you get folks who are jacks of all trades and masters of none.
> 
> There's a lot more to think about than what symbol should go inside the rectangle of a line diagram.
> 
> 🍻


Admittedly I don’t have all the answers.  
  Some aspect though I think need to split the trade, which admittedly is an issue when you end up with a small trade in a small Army. 

WRT to the FOO/JTAC at the NCO and O levels, having post Reg’t positions at Bde, Div and Schools can help, but it won’t be the be all and end all.  

ADA needs to be a different trade, perhaps the Officer stream could be linked with STA/UAS.  

But it also goes beyond the Artillery, as I think the Amoured Corps is going to have issues with transitioning from Tanks into LAV and TLAV and back and forth


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Admittedly I don’t have all the answers.
> Some aspect though I think need to split the trade, which admittedly is an issue when you end up with a small trade in a small Army.
> 
> WRT to the FOO/JTAC at the NCO and O levels, having post Reg’t positions at Bde, Div and Schools can help, but it won’t be the be all and end all.
> 
> ADA needs to be a different trade, perhaps the Officer stream could be linked with STA/UAS.  ...


ADA was a problem when we had over 900 gunners out of 4,000 (RegF and ResF) doing AD. It's going to be even worse when we go back to 2-300.

I think the numbers are so small that this is one of those times where a little fine tuning to the present system is about the best that one can do.

😖


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> But it also goes beyond the Artillery, as I think the Amoured Corps is going to have issues with transitioning from Tanks into LAV and TLAV and back and forth


Well we could always go with the M1 Abrams for the heavy Brigades and the MPF for the Light and Medium Brigades.

According to this article from Task & Purpose:



> The vehicles are so similar that Abrams tank crew members can be trained to learn how to operate an MPF vehicle very quickly, said Army Lt. Col. Peter George, product manager for Mobile Protected Firepower.
> 
> “One of the benefits of this platform is it’s incredibly common with the Abrams,” said George, who also spoke to Task & Purpose at Saturday’s Army-Navy Game. “You take a 19K tank crewman; you train them on an Abrams, you get them set on an Abrams, and then you do a short transition where they can pick this vehicle up, move into the formation, and then work that teaming with infantry soldiers. “
> 
> Right now, the Army’s plan is that soldiers who operate MPF vehicles will attend the U.S. Army Armor School at Fort Benning Georgia to train in the same Military Occupational Specialty as M1 Abrams crews, George told Task & Purpose in a follow-up email.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Well we could always go with the M1 Abrams for the heavy Brigades and the MPF for the Light and Medium Brigades.
> 
> According to this article from Task & Purpose:



One problem... no room at the back for Infantry to ride into the assault


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> One problem... no room at the back for Infantry to ride into the assault


Of course we're talking for the Armoured folks here.  Infantry would have to slum it in LAVs or the Griffin III (IFV on the same chassis as the MPF).


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> Agreed. Funny though that you've stated previously that we should as a nation be able to field two Divisions but then you focus on Brigade Groups in your Napkin Army. I on the other hand have argued that Brigade Groups are likely the most appropriate size for us to deploy (currently and in the near future) but think that the eventual goal should be for Divisional-level capabilities.
> 
> For that reason I think we should maintain a Divisional structure even if we don't have all the elements to make a Division at this time. I'd propose that we start with Brigades that are highly interoperable with US forces and could be plugged into a US Division as part of a multi-national deployment. Over time we keep adding the missing building blocks until such time as we can field our own Division.



I can't agree more.

If we created the regular army as a single National Defence Division that focused on growing and maintaining a multi-brigade structure, with brigades that could be detached from the Division and OpCon to the US and other Allied Formations then we would have the best of all worlds.  We would have a functional, deployable army positioned to grow and develop new capabilities.

Under one command


----------



## TacticalTea

FJAG said:


> I'm a two divisions guy. One capable of actual deployment (whether with one or four brigades) and the second as the organization to build and control the follow up force on. I think we need a real functioning and not admin HQ for the primary reason of keeping the skill levels needed for that alive. If you do not have a real division HQ, trained or equipped, you will never be able to create one in a reasonable time. The Army, as it stands, is large enough for two divisions (not 5) regardless how the brigades are organized.
> 
> 
> 🍻


Would your first, "ready" division be mostly RegF and the second be mostly ResF? Or try to strike a balance? 

I'm also curious about geographic disposition of your napkin brigades, both you and @KevinB


----------



## Kirkhill

Considering what the Ukrainians have been doing with HMMWVs and Hit and Run raids.

How about a 200 km/h light armoured recce vehicle?  160 km/h on desert tracks.  3500 kg GVW including the 650 kg turret/rws.









						Cockerill i-X Integrated Combat Vehicle, Belgium
					

The Cockerill i-X integrated combat vehicle developed by John Cockerill Defense is claimed to be the first-ever ground interceptor.




					www.army-technology.com
				













> transported by air, sea, and land through platforms such as fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter, truck and train. It can also be air-dropped using a parachute.





> The Cockerill i-X vehicle is powered by either a 750hp thermal engine or an 800hp hybrid thermal-electric engine. The drive train enables the vehicle to achieve high speeds on-road and off-road.
> 
> The vehicle can achieve a maximum road speed of 200km/h and a desert track speed of 160km/h. It has a range of 600km, while the range in full electric mode is expected to be 30km.
> 
> It can accelerate from 0km/h to 100km/h within six seconds. It has a braking distance of 40m at 100km/h.





> Level 2 STANAG 4569 protection against ballistic threats and Level 3 STANAG 4569 protection against mines.





> a crew of two, including a gunner and a driver.





> The Cockerill® Smart Helmet worn by the operator enables human-machine interaction. The interface features an intelligent multimodal engine that will reduce the cognitive load of the operator.
> 
> equipped with high-performance sensors to collect data and provide 360° situational awareness. The artificial intelligence (AI)-based embedded algorithms can process data to detect, identify, locate and assess threats.





> The Cockerill i-X provides enhanced stealth capabilities to offer advantage in the battleground.
> Its turrets are modular and retractable to provide stealth capabilities during missions. Adaptive camouflage can be used to manage the appearance, while infrared (IR) and acoustic signature can be modified to further increase the vehicle’s stealth.





> The weapon station atop the vehicle can be fitted with a 25mm dual feeder automatic cannon or a 30x113mm automatic cannon, with 120 ready-to-fire rounds each, and a secondary 7.62mm machine gun with between 400 and 600 ready rounds.
> Another option is to equip the weapon system with two to four ready anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and a 12.7mm machine gun. The vehicle can also be integrated with a rocket launcher with provision for up to seven launch tubes.
> The turret can be raised from an elevation of -10° to 60°.











						Cockerill® i-X - John Cockerill
					

John Cockerill Defense presents , for the first time in the world, its new product called Cockerill® i-X (“i” for “interceptor” and “X” for “modular multi-weapons system). It’s the first ever ground interceptor and is a breakthrough combat system for territorial defense interception: engage and...




					johncockerill.com
				












						Cockerill i-X: a ground interceptor with Paris-Dakar DNA - EDR Magazine
					

Although well hidden under the vehicle armour, the chassis of the Cockerill® i-X, the vehicle unveiled by John Cockerill Defense




					www.edrmagazine.eu


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Well we could always go with the M1 Abrams for the heavy Brigades and the MPF for the Light and Medium Brigades.
> 
> According to this article from Task & Purpose:


The text makes it clear this thing is in the nature of an assault gun. Makes one wonder why they didn't put a bigger gun into the hull and forget about the turret and give all the extra space over to more ammunition.

These things look like a Tank Mini-me. That became a problem with the Stryker MGS as well as COs of Stryker bns ran them as tanks at NTC and kept being blown away.

Never Bring a Stryker to a Tank Fight - Modern War Institute

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> ADA was a problem when we had over 900 gunners out of 4,000 (RegF and ResF) doing AD. It's going to be even worse when we go back to 2-300.
> 
> I think the numbers are so small that this is one of those times where a little fine tuning to the present system is about the best that one can do.
> 
> 😖


I thought the 250 number was just to start ADA back up, not a final trade cap. 

I don’t think 250 is enough to do what is required by 1-2 Maneuver Bde’s  let alone more.



FJAG said:


> The text makes it clear this thing is in the nature of an assault gun. Makes one wonder why they didn't put a bigger gun into the hull and forget about the turret and give all the extra space over to more ammunition.
> 
> These things look like a Tank Mini-me. That became a problem with the Stryker MGS as well as COs of Stryker bns ran them as tanks at NTC and kept being blown away.
> 
> Never Bring a Stryker to a Tank Fight - Modern War Institute
> 
> 🍻


Tankers are going to tank regardless of platform, and Commanders are going to use anything with a gun as a tank until they get educated/corrected about employment of a DFS asset. 

The Abrams allows for some relatively sloppy employment due to the Armor/Mobility/Firepower.  Things that non MBT’s tend to lack.

It’s one reason why I like to split trades so dangerous activities aren’t promoted in certain platforms.


----------



## Kirkhill

Direct Fire Support Vehicles.










						How America's NEW Light Tank Units Will Work
					

New video on the new American MPF light tank, its doctrinal purpose, what units get it, and its unit organization.




					www.battleorder.org
				




Some observations made by the video.

Stryker MGS originally allocated as a platoon in every Stryker rifle company.  Retired concentrated in the Brigade Cavalry Squadron - the main problems were maintenance (readiness) and gunnery.

USMC LAV25s in 82nd Airborne - the LAV Coy took up 25% of the Bde XOs time despite being only one of 40 coys in the Brigade - training and maintenance

WW2 and Korea vintage Tank Coys in Regimental Combat Teams less effective than comparable coys in Tank units - maintenance and training

Each MPF Coy would have 62 troops in 14 AFVs.  Hard to maintain currency.  Decision made to centralize the MPFs in a Divisional Battalion manned by the Armo(u)red Corps.

Concerns expressed that the MPF will be misused and treated by its crews and its command as a Tank.


French employment of Tanks and Jeeps (VBLs)

How to effectively mix Lt and Heavy assets at the sub-sub-unit level in an expeditionary army for both Anti-Tank, Recce and Scouting operations as well as Direct Fire Support.









						Why France Mixes Jeeps and Tanks
					

New video on the role of French Leclerc tank and AMX-10RC wheeled cavalry regiments, with a particular focus on the history of light vehicles providing close security and reconnaissance capabilities to those formations.




					www.battleorder.org
				












						Evolution of French Tank Regiments (1989-2022+)
					

A brief overview of the French Army Tank Regiment (régiment de chars) from the late 1980s to 2022.




					www.battleorder.org
				






So where to go from here?


1 Canadian Division (100% Regular)

1 Cdn Div HQ & Sigs Sqn

8 Bde (Svc - Theater Activation)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng

7 Bde (Svc - Operations)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng

9 Bde (Svc - Div Spt)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng


6 Bde (Combat Spt) 
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
Int
Influence Activities


4 Bde (Artillery)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR
EW
AD 
AT
IDF
LRPF

3 Bde (Cavalry)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Rgt
ISR Rgt
Spt Rgt

1 Bde (Inf)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Bn
Rfl Bn
Rfl Bn

2 Bde (Inf)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Bn
Rfl Bn
Rfl Bn

5 Bde (Inf)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Bn
Rfl Bn
Rfl Bn

10 Bde (Avn)
HQ/Sigs/Svc/Eng
ISR Sqn
UTTH Sqn
UTTH Sqn
MHLH Sqn
Long Range Sqn



RCAF

7 Wing (Space)
14 Wing (ISR)
22 Wing (NORAD)
3 Wing (NORAD)
4 Wing (NORAD)

2 Wing (Expedition)
8 Wing (Mobility)

Additional wings raised to manage local and theater air defence as well as coastal missile artillery.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I thought the 250 number was just to start ADA back up, not a final trade cap.
> 
> I don’t think 250 is enough to do what is required by 1-2 Maneuver Bde’s let alone more.


True enough. There are more folks available, however.

4 RCA (GS) already contains several ASCCs and a bunch of MRR assets which will add in the AD role. Note that the MRR has both a weapon locating capability as well as an air surveillance capability. I don't have any particular insight or background info on this but my guess would be that 4 RCA(GS) will be broadening its current role to add in AD to its existing STA role. There are currently in excess of 400 PYs in it. Essentially much of the C2 and logistics elements are already there.

250 is probably enough for up two AD batteries and a small workshop battery. There is always the possibility too of bringing ResF regiments back into the role of Manpack VLLAD which they did to the tune of 5 troops in the 1990s.

The real question is how much gear will the allocated project funds buy? My guess is that there will be enough to properly cover at least 1 manoeuvre brigade plus have enough for a training and tech spare reserve depending on what gear is bought.

Back to the numbers for a trade of their own - I really don't know. It all depends on how one looks at the gun, STA and AD mix. If 4 RCA (GS) goes multi-purpose AD/STA and one adds in the STA batteries in the Fd Regts, you might be able to swing it.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

I think STA belongs in the Recce/ISR Squadron - I'd kick to that role to MI folks


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I think STA belongs in the Recce/ISR Squadron - I'd kick to that role to MI folks


They tried running arty STA through an ISTAR system in Afghanistan - first an ISTAR company then a recce squadron. It didn't work. There are issues respecting enemy  artillery tactics and sensor shooter links amongst others. It's basically the separation between the deep battle and the close battle. 

The brigade recce squadron is and should be focused on the close battle.

There is a place where I see a better meld of recce and artillery STA and that's for something like the Brit's Deep Strike Brigade and to an extent what used to be the US Army's Cavalry Regiments where the role is to look and engage deeper. That doesn't mean the resources go to the recce elements but that you make Arty STA resources available as part of its organic structure.

🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> They tried running arty STA through an ISTAR system in Afghanistan - first an ISTAR company then a recce squadron. It didn't work. There are issues respecting enemy  artillery tactics and sensor shooter links amongst others. It's basically the separation between the deep battle and the close battle.
> 
> The brigade recce squadron is and should be focused on the close battle.
> 
> There is a place where I see a better meld of recce and artillery STA and that's for something like the Brit's Deep Strike Brigade and to an extent what used to be the US Army's Cavalry Regiments where the role is to look and engage deeper. That doesn't mean the resources go to the recce elements but that you make Arty STA resources available as part of its organic structure.
> 
> 🍻


I’m having issues with that breakdown. 

Mainly because I think STA in terms of Higher level for GS Arty/Deep Strike isn’t really best run with UAS that wouldn’t be an RCAF asset. 

Basically you will need a Brigade level (and lower) ISTAR ability, which will help Close/Direct Support missions but ‘true’ STA for Div plus target packages, to me is going to fall into HALE and MALE (and GeoSpacial) territories.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I’m having issues with that breakdown.
> 
> Mainly because I think STA in terms of Higher level for GS Arty/Deep Strike isn’t really best run with UAS that wouldn’t be an RCAF asset.
> 
> Basically you will need a Brigade level (and lower) ISTAR ability, which will help Close/Direct Support missions but ‘true’ STA for Div plus target packages, to me is going to fall into HALE and MALE (and GeoSpacial) territories.


Agree to a point. Our radars, even the LCMR are clearly counterfire assets and should stay STA.

On the other hand our UAVs have been problematic starting with the Sperwer and the Skylark which were more often used in what I would call a recce role rather than an air observation post role although both were used for that as well. I think the real reason the artillery got into the UAV business was because the RCAF had canned the light observation helicopters, wasn't even interested in tactical UAVs (much less mini UAVs) and because the artillery was in the right place and time to champion their use.

Add to that the fact that for much of the shooting part of Afghanistan we downloaded air support and airspace coordination onto the battlegroup during a counterinsurgency war, and so we somewhat lost the plot on the proper divisions of UAVs as between recce and artillery and the proper roles of battle groups, brigades and divisions in the fight. I guess "losing the plot' isn't the right term. We never developed a proper plot beyond counterinsurgency is the better way to look at it.

Our suite of UAVs has gotten better but I think we are still multipurposing them in a way that blurs the line between recce and STA use. Much of that has to do with the fact that we are still dabbling with what we have rather than what we should have. To the best of my knowledge we don't even have a project looking at armed UAVs and loitering munitions except JUSTAS which has taken us twenty years to work out. Don't even get me started on 120mm mortars and C3s.

For me the division comes with those UAVs sent out to gather information quickly and across large areas to develop the tactical picture, and those that are sent out linked to a shooter system that goes out and has the dwell time to sit over found targets and conduct an engagement to completion. The former can and should run from the company level and the battalion and yes, when in close, should include engagement through organic weapon systems such as mortars and loitering munitions. The latter hunt deeper finding headquarters, staging and assembly areas, artillery positions, choke points and the like and engage with heavier guns and long range loitering systems and even air power - if it's flying.

I see an issue too as between MALE and HALE and deep strike. The former is quite clearly have their role in that fight but they are not guaranteed assets being subject to air and anti air countermeasures. That's acceptable if you do not have ground assets committed in the deep. Deep strike organizations are designed to penetrate into gaps and exploit seams and weaknesses. They need appropriate ground support which is why the 1 DRSBCT comes with an arty STA regt, 2 x SP regiments and 2 x MLRS regiments to support its 4 x armoured and light cavalry regiments and why there are 2 x Arty UAV regiments in general support with the UK's Field Army Troops (Div).

In the same way, US Army Fires Brigades each have an organic TA battery and an organic UAV battery to support their counterfires missions. Even US close support battalions have 2 x organic TA radars. I'm not sure that the US Army has really developed their program because of the success of their Predator program and the wealth of Attack Helicopters available to them. Those both need a rethink in light of Ukraine (not abandonment by any stretch of the imagination - just a rethink)

🍻


----------



## KevinB

I guess my issue is if we take HALE and MALE UAS out of the picture - the question comes down to if one will accept that STA for Deep Strike is predominantly an Int function, and once targets are acquired that the Artillery and Air Force come in to align the lists and prosecute the targets.  

At lower levels (Bde and lower) the most of the UAS are more individual consumable systems. 

Something like this however is where I see a Bde Recce/ISTAR asset 









						Home - Alpha
					

Alpha Unmanned Systems, SL is a world leader in the design and manufacture of advanced tactical UAV helicopters.




					alphaunmannedsystems.com
				





Down here there is a lot of talk of moving most of the Group 2 UAS under Cav units and their MI cells.


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> I guess my issue is if we take HALE and MALE UAS out of the picture - the question comes down to if one will accept that STA for Deep Strike is predominantly an Int function, and once targets are acquired that the Artillery and Air Force come in to align the lists and prosecute the targets.


That would work in a world where Int wasn't the circuit breaker that it is in taking raw data and turning it into actionable info. I keep harping on the sensor-shooter link for a reason It's to take action on a target as soon as practical after acquisition before it changes posture or location. The formal motto for the artillery is "Ubique". Its unofficial one is "24/7 Sense of Urgency"


KevinB said:


> At lower levels (Bde and lower) the most of the UAS are more individual consumable systems.


100% agree which is why I like loitering munitions. Find a target; kill a target; set out another drone.


KevinB said:


> Something like this however is where I see a Bde Recce/ISTAR asset
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Home - Alpha
> 
> 
> Alpha Unmanned Systems, SL is a world leader in the design and manufacture of advanced tactical UAV helicopters.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> alphaunmannedsystems.com


There are lots of products out there. Our current system is the RQ-21 Blackjack flown by 4 RCA(GS) and which (at least according to the brochures) has a longer range and significantly longer endurance than the Alpha. The system isn't so much the issue as its tactical employment.


KevinB said:


> Down here there is a lot of talk of moving most of the Group 2 UAS under Cav units and their MI cells.


That was the theory up here in the early 2000s. I believe in tiered systems based on tactical employment and functionality. Group 2 is the ScanEagle class. We occupy Gp 1 with Raven and Gp3 with Blackjack. We rented ScanEagles in Afghanistan and ran them in conjunction with the bigger Sperwers and then Herons. 

You comment raises an interesting gap in my knowledge of US Army use of UAVs within the BCT. I know they've been running Gp 1 Ravens and smaller drones although not as part of the regular TOE of any unit within the BCT. Again, I think Predator was used quite a bit for surveillance as well as attack in Afghanistan so there was no urgency for Gp2 or Gp3 although the Gp 3 Shadow logged a lot of time in Iraq and Afghanistan but I never knew for certain what organization operated them (I think, but am not sure, they came out of the Div Aviation Brigade's UAV company - which incidentally remains under the new div structures). 

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

I had an informal discussion with an architect once.  I was all about layouts and dimensions and furniture.

He was all about bubbles.

What did I want to do?
How many bubbles did I need or want?
What stuff did I need in them?
How big did the bubbles need to be?

In military terms he was asking what effects did I want.

The organization came next along with the iterative processes of material and budget.

Until we are ready to move out of our Edwardian Mansion and build a new structure fit for this present era most of the questions posed here will go unanswered.  Nobody wants their bedroom turned into mum's sewing room to become a sauna.


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> That would work in a world where Int wasn't the circuit breaker that it is in taking raw data and turning it into actionable info. I keep harping on the sensor-shooter link for a reason It's to take action on a target as soon as practical after acquisition before it changes posture or location. The formal motto for the artillery is "Ubique". Its unofficial one is "24/7 Sense of Urgency"


There has to be both. As uneducated folks looking at data aren’t going to give a good picture of the ground.   
   Most of that beyond Bde range data will be collected by H/M ALE systems that aren’t and Arty asset.  




FJAG said:


> There are lots of products out there. Our current system is the RQ-21 Blackjack flown by 4 RCA(GS) and which (at least according to the brochures) has a longer range and significantly longer endurance than the Alpha. The system isn't so much the issue as its tactical employment.


I grabbed Alpha simply as they had a decent PDF and was capable of carrying/dropping munitions. 

That’s the segment that is see the biggest problem with deconflicting - ones that have a payload.  




FJAG said:


> That was the theory up here in the early 2000s. I believe in tiered systems based on tactical employment and functionality. Group 2 is the ScanEagle class. We occupy Gp 1 with Raven and Gp3 with Blackjack. We rented ScanEagles in Afghanistan and ran them in conjunction with the bigger Sperwers and then Herons.
> 
> You comment raises an interesting gap in my knowledge of US Army use of UAVs within the BCT. I know they've been running Gp 1 Ravens and smaller drones although not as part of the regular TOE of any unit within the BCT.


We have even smaller stuff than Raven now at Squad level.   Honestly every time I visit someone there is a new system being played with. 
Even Wiki can’t keep up.  





						U.S. military UAS groups - Wikipedia
					






					en.m.wikipedia.org
				






FJAG said:


> Again, I think Predator was used quite a bit for surveillance as well as attack in Afghanistan so there was no urgency for Gp2 or Gp3 although the Gp 3 Shadow logged a lot of time in Iraq and Afghanistan but I never knew for certain what organization operated them (I think, but am not sure, they came out of the Div Aviation Brigade's UAV company - which incidentally remains under the new div structures).
> 
> 🍻


We returned Armed UAS to the Intelligence community.  Right now there are supposed to be no Predator/Reaper/Avenger ER systems in the USAF, but I’m not sure that has been fully implemented, and I don’t think it will continue based on what has occurred in Ukraine.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> It’s gotten a lot better, Afghanistan was the beta test area
> 
> 
> They can be released by Unmanned vehicles
> But yes, the assumption is that most Airborne, Airmobile operations including supplying of same that friendly Air has air supremacy and SEAD missions have degraded enemy AD assets.




More on the JPADs topic -  Contested logistics



> Army Experiments With Next-Gen Aerial Resupply​*12/21/2022*
> By Mikayla Easley
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Defense Dept. photo
> 
> *FORT IRWIN, California — To improve the Army’s ability to move supplies into future battlefields, the service is experimenting with new technologies for its contested logistics strategy*.
> 
> *The Army recently tested how the Joint Precision Aerial Delivery System, or JPADS, could deliver critical supplies directly to soldiers in austere environments where they may be unable to use GPS to locate supply packages. The system was one of two dozen logistics technologies tested *during the service’s annual Project Convergence 2022 experiment in late fall, said Col. Marchant Callis, the Army’s sustainment capabilities development and integration director.
> 
> The experiment is helping bring the service’s sustainment efforts into the 21st century by conducting missions “over increasingly dispersed footprints and across contested, degraded or denied environments,” Callis said during a demonstration at Project Convergence.
> 
> *The services already use JPADS in operations today. The system comes in two variants — one able to carry 2,000 pounds of supplies and a 10,000-pound version — that are typically launched from a C-130 aircraft from altitudes up to 24,500 feet and around 15 miles from the target destination, Callis said.*
> 
> Once dropped, an onboard computer uses GPS-designated coordinates to autonomously steer a parachute that delivers the palletized load. Multiple JPADS can be launched simultaneously and sent to different waypoints on a battlefield, Callis noted.
> 
> “This is key in that it reduces the aircraft’s loitering time, which by extension reduces its exposure to enemy air defense systems,” he said.
> 
> At Project Convergence, *the Army used JPADS to conduct an aerial resupply mission through congested airspace to a GPS-jammed battlefield. Despite friendly and enemy aircraft crowding the skies, the system delivered 4,000 pounds of supplies so accurately that soldiers didn’t need GPS on the ground to locate it, Callis said.*
> 
> The experiment reflects an operating environment Army leaders said they believe will be common in the future: one with multiple manned and unmanned systems, as well as cyber and electronic warfare technologies.
> 
> *The service is evaluating different ways an adversary can contest logistics and how autonomous capabilities could give them an advantage, *Lt. Gen. Charles Hamilton, deputy chief of staff for Army logistics, told reporters.
> 
> *“We’ve gone uncontested in the last 20-plus years now in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Hamilton said. “We know that will not be the case in the next large-scale combat operation.”*









						Army Experiments With Next-Gen Aerial Resupply
					

Army Experiments With Next-Gen Aerial Resupply




					www.nationaldefensemagazine.org


----------



## FJAG

"I will keep Stalingrad supplied!" Herman Goering, 1942

🍻


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> As someone who has made a career working with industry marketing materials I am well aware of their limitations.
> 
> Having said that I am happy to work in the universe of the possible even if I am only getting a 70% solution.  We'll work on it once it is delivered.





Kirkhill said:


> You mean like relying on 7.62 and 25mm as your lethal solutions?  Absent SAMs, ATGMs, Mines, Shells, AGM/ASMs, Attack Helicopters....
> 
> We have nothing but suboptimal solutions.
> 
> We can't afford American solutions.


The above quotes were from the Ukraine - Superthread but I think my response is better suited here.

I wonder if he highlighted comments indicate a flaw in our basic thinking with regard to our defence strategy (such as it is).

I think most people will agree that due to our physical location that our Army is really for expeditionary purposes rather than homeland defence and therefore in many ways fulfills political purposes as much as strictly military purposes.  

The question is, who are we needing to impress politically?  In reality does impressing the Germans, Danes, Norwegians, Poles or Latvians give us any significant political benefit?  If we deployed a full Armoured Division to Latvia would these countries suddenly become less Eurocentric and seek out greater economic, cultural and political ties with Canada?  Would they open up their defence industries to Canadian companies and begin producing here?  Would they start seeking out out input on political matters affecting them and invite us into new decision-making organizations?  I seriously doubt it.  I'd argue that the people we really get political benefit from impressing are the Americans.  So the question is, how do we best impress the Americans?

I've always argued that the #1 way we can impress the Americans is to take continental defence seriously which to me means a primary focus on NORAD modernization (including participation in BMD), fighters, Air-to-Air Refueling, MPAs and ASW (both ships and subs) which are all primarily RCAF and RCN responsibilities.  What does that mean then for Army priorities?

We could continue on the path we have been on for the past 50 years or so and have an American Army "Light" so to speak.  Just get "good enough" (the above mentioned "70% solution") kit to keep us in the game.  Enough capability to be able to show up when required.  Give the political benefit of being another coalition flag to demonstrate united Western resolve.  It's enough to give us a seat at the table, but not enough for us to actually have any say.  It's basically the minimum that is expected of us.  It's also the same that's expected of every other NATO ally of the US, so it in no way distinguishes our contribution from anyone else's contribution.  We're all just the kid brothers tagging along.  

The US knows that it will bear the primary burden in any conflict.  It will make the key decisions and it will use its own forces to fulfill the key tasks and use the less capable partner forces to support its efforts.  

In my opinion the only way to stand out to the Americans is to field a force that is equally capable as their own forces.  A force that they can trust to perform as well as their own units.  The goal should not to be to have forces that are interoperable with US forces, but rather forces that are in effect interchangeable with US forces.  That's when the US political leadership will start taking Canada seriously as a partner.

Kirkhill suggested "We can't afford American solutions".  I'd suggest that isn't technically true.  We CAN afford American solutions...we just can't afford them at American scale.  I'd suggest however that matching American capability at a smaller scale gives us more political clout with the US than providing lesser capability at a larger scale.  

In my opinion this is the approach we should take when deciding what the future Canadian Army should look like.  Create the largest force we can afford that matches the top level US capabilities rather than a larger "70% Solution" force.  

$0.02


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> The above quotes were from the Ukraine - Superthread but I think my response is better suited here.
> 
> I wonder if he highlighted comments indicate a flaw in our basic thinking with regard to our defence strategy (such as it is).
> 
> I think most people will agree that due to our physical location that our Army is really for expeditionary purposes rather than homeland defence and therefore in many ways fulfills political purposes as much as strictly military purposes.
> 
> The question is, who are we needing to impress politically?  In reality does impressing the Germans, Danes, Norwegians, Poles or Latvians give us any significant political benefit?  If we deployed a full Armoured Division to Latvia would these countries suddenly become less Eurocentric and seek out greater economic, cultural and political ties with Canada?  Would they open up their defence industries to Canadian companies and begin producing here?  Would they start seeking out out input on political matters affecting them and invite us into new decision-making organizations?  I seriously doubt it.  I'd argue that the people we really get political benefit from impressing are the Americans.  So the question is, how do we best impress the Americans?
> 
> I've always argued that the #1 way we can impress the Americans is to take continental defence seriously which to me means a primary focus on NORAD modernization (including participation in BMD), fighters, Air-to-Air Refueling, MPAs and ASW (both ships and subs) which are all primarily RCAF and RCN responsibilities.  What does that mean then for Army priorities?



Up to here I am in 100% agreement.



GR66 said:


> We could continue on the path we have been on for the past 50 years or so and have an American Army "Light" so to speak.  Just get "good enough" (the above mentioned "70% solution") kit to keep us in the game.  Enough capability to be able to show up when required.  Give the political benefit of being another coalition flag to demonstrate united Western resolve.  It's enough to give us a seat at the table, but not enough for us to actually have any say.  It's basically the minimum that is expected of us.  It's also the same that's expected of every other NATO ally of the US, so it in no way distinguishes our contribution from anyone else's contribution.  We're all just the kid brothers tagging along.



Agreed



GR66 said:


> The US knows that it will bear the primary burden in any conflict.  It will make the key decisions and it will use its own forces to fulfill the key tasks and use the less capable partner forces to support its efforts.



Agreed




GR66 said:


> In my opinion the only way to stand out to the Americans is to field a force that is equally capable as their own forces.  A force that they can trust to perform as well as their own units.  The goal should not to be to have forces that are interoperable with US forces, but rather forces that are in effect interchangeable with US forces.  That's when the US political leadership will start taking Canada seriously as a partner.



Here is where things get tougher - 




GR66 said:


> Kirkhill suggested "We can't afford American solutions".  I'd suggest that isn't technically true.  We CAN afford American solutions...we just can't afford them at American scale.  I'd suggest however that matching American capability at a smaller scale gives us more political clout with the US than providing lesser capability at a larger scale.



Which capabilities do we want to field?  All of the American capabilities but at 1/10th scale?

They have 10 divisions. We have 1 division.
They field a specialist division. We field a specialist battalion.
They field a battalion.  We field a platoon.
Etc.

That becomes a very expensive force to train, equip and maintain - not to mention the costs of transporting any heavy elements.

It becomes more challenging when we look at this

11th Abn Div - 2x IBCT with 5 Battalions
82nd Abn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
101st Abn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
10th Mtn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
25th Inf Div - 2x IBCT with 6 Battalions
173rd Sep Bde - 1x IBCT with 2 Battalions

1st Armd Div - 3x ABCT with 9 Combined Arms Units
1st Cav Div - 3x ABCT with 9 Combined Arms Units
1st Inf Div - 2x ABCT with 6 Combined Arms Units
3rd Inf Div - 2x ABCT with 6 Combined Arms Units

2nd/7th Inf Div - 2x SBCT with 6 Battalions
4th Inf Div - 2x SBCT with 6 Battalions and 1x ABCT with 3 Combined Arms Units

Looking at those choices we can build 2 battalion and 3 battalion brigades, separate brigades, 2 and 3 brigade divisions, airborne, heliborne, leg, Lt Armd, and Armd units, brigades and divisions.

The US also has a bunch of National Guard elements of various types.

From that it seems to me that the US is quite comfortable with integrating a large variety of elements in its force structure.  

My sense is that whatever we decide to do, as long as we do it well, all assistance will be gratefully received.  If we look at the various organizations of the US Allies (NATO, SEATO, Japan, ABCANZUS... USMC) there seems to be very little call to make our army look like their army.

The other thing that bothers me is that I don't want to blow the budget on a Division that is going to be eaten up in a near peer battle in 72 hours.    I want that budget to supply an Army which will be available to defend my country 100 years from now.  Something that will bend and flex with the times.

$0.02   



GR66 said:


> In my opinion this is the approach we should take when deciding what the future Canadian Army should look like.  Create the largest force we can afford that matches the top level US capabilities rather than a larger "70% Solution" force.
> 
> $0.02


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> The other thing that bothers me is that I don't want to blow the budget on a Division that is going to be eaten up in a near peer battle in 72 hours. I want that budget to supply an Army which will be available to defend my country 100 years from now. Something that will bend and flex with the times.



I'm not so sure about this part.

A division being eaten up in a peer battle has nothing to do with having one but how we utilize it and where and how we commit it.

I appreciate that the need to deploy a Canadian division is not likely but it's not a non-zero possibility. More importantly, the size of Canada's current army is well within the range of the size of a division, maybe even two, but certainly not five divisional and fourteen brigade headquarters.

More importantly a division is required as a framework of training and career progression of both the brigade staffs as well as divisional staff. This allows Canadian staff capable of integrating seamlessly into allied formations. We do some of that already using exchange postings but we have the numbers to do more domestically.

Last, but by no means least, every once in a while you need to do something on the scale of an RV exercise to point out the systemic issues of your doctrine, your structure and with operating in or running of or being part of a large formation. It does it in a way that a CAX simply won't do, particulalry in the field of logistics. IMHO a real divisional/brigade structure is critical for the Cdn Army, but not in the form of the administrative organizations that we currently have.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I'm not so sure about this part.
> 
> A division being eaten up in a peer battle has nothing to do with having one but how we utilize it and where and how we commit it.
> 
> I appreciate that the need to deploy a Canadian division is not likely but it's not a non-zero possibility. More importantly, the size of Canada's current army is well within the range of the size of a division, maybe even two, but certainly not five divisional and fourteen brigade headquarters.
> 
> More importantly a division is required as a framework of training and career progression of both the brigade staffs as well as divisional staff. This allows Canadian staff capable of integrating seamlessly into allied formations. We do some of that already using exchange postings but we have the numbers to do more domestically.
> 
> Last, but by no means least, every once in a while you need to do something on the scale of an RV exercise to point out the systemic issues of your doctrine, your structure and with operating in or running of or being part of a large formation. It does it in a way that a CAX simply won't do, particulalry in the field of logistics. IMHO a real divisional/brigade structure is critical for the Cdn Army, but not in the form of the administrative organizations that we currently have.
> 
> 🍻



Back to the perennial problem of the tactical div and the administrative div.

I am close to you and GR66 on Div structure.

But.

I would opt for two light brigades of two battalions and an ISR unit each,  a 3 battalion LAV brigade with an ISR unit and a Tank unit and a separate Arty Brigade.

Reserves organized primarily as single function subunits allied to the regs but administered by a separate div hq. 

So a two div army.  One at notice to move. One dedicated to training and sustainment.

The Reg div has to be able to deploy elements in cooperation with friends and allies.

And we need transport and warehouses.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Back to the perennial problem of the tactical div and the administrative div.
> 
> I am close to you and GR66 on Div structure.
> 
> But.
> 
> I would opt for two light brigades of two battalions and an ISR unit each,  a 3 battalion LAV brigade with an ISR unit and a Tank unit and a separate Arty Brigade.


I'm not wedded to any particular brigade structure as I tend to have bought into the building block system. That was the 2000s transformation paradigm, forces built on combinations of companies and headquarters which were routinely used to build task forces. This is why I feel 30/70 structures are viable. That said, there needs to be a doctrinal battalion, brigade and even division structure to build up to and all the appropriate building blocks need to be there. That structure also serves as a peacetime administrative and training organization.

I grew up on the "two up and one in reserve" manoeuvre force structure. I'd need to see a good tactical benefit to change from that. One ISR and two battalions doesn't show me that.



Kirkhill said:


> Reserves organized primarily as single function subunits allied to the regs but administered by a separate div hq.


Single function sub-units is where my head is at. Organized separate from the RegF has been the ResF problem over the years.


Kirkhill said:


> So a two div army.  One at notice to move. One dedicated to training and sustainment.


Two div army yes. One day-to-day quick reaction, the other expansion and sustainment.



Kirkhill said:


> The Reg div has to be able to deploy elements in cooperation with friends and allies.


Both need to.



Kirkhill said:


> And we need transport and warehouses.


And manufacturing arsenals.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I'm not wedded to any particular brigade structure as I tend to have bought into the building block system. That was the 2000s transformation paradigm, forces built on combinations of companies and headquarters which were routinely used to build task forces. This is why I feel 30/70 structures are viable. That said, there needs to be a doctrinal battalion, brigade and even division structure to build up to and all the appropriate building blocks need to be there. That structure also serves as a peacetime administrative and training organization.
> 
> I grew up on the "two up and one in reserve" manoeuvre force structure. I'd need to see a good tactical benefit to change from that. One ISR and two battalions doesn't show me that.
> 
> 
> Single function sub-units is where my head is at. Organized separate from the RegF has been the ResF problem over the years.
> 
> Two div army yes. One day-to-day quick reaction, the other expansion and sustainment.
> 
> 
> Both need to.
> 
> 
> And manufacturing arsenals.
> 
> 🍻


I sense a mutual approach in the offing.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Which capabilities do we want to field?  All of the American capabilities but at 1/10th scale?
> 
> They have 10 divisions. We have 1 division.
> They field a specialist division. We field a specialist battalion.
> They field a battalion.  We field a platoon.
> Etc.
> 
> That becomes a very expensive force to train, equip and maintain - not to mention the costs of transporting any heavy elements.
> 
> It becomes more challenging when we look at this
> 
> 11th Abn Div - 2x IBCT with 5 Battalions
> 82nd Abn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
> 101st Abn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
> 10th Mtn Div - 3x IBCT with 9 Battalions
> 25th Inf Div - 2x IBCT with 6 Battalions
> 173rd Sep Bde - 1x IBCT with 2 Battalions
> 
> 1st Armd Div - 3x ABCT with 9 Combined Arms Units
> 1st Cav Div - 3x ABCT with 9 Combined Arms Units
> 1st Inf Div - 2x ABCT with 6 Combined Arms Units
> 3rd Inf Div - 2x ABCT with 6 Combined Arms Units
> 
> 2nd/7th Inf Div - 2x SBCT with 6 Battalions
> 4th Inf Div - 2x SBCT with 6 Battalions and 1x ABCT with 3 Combined Arms Units
> 
> Looking at those choices we can build 2 battalion and 3 battalion brigades, separate brigades, 2 and 3 brigade divisions, airborne, heliborne, leg, Lt Armd, and Armd units, brigades and divisions.
> 
> The US also has a bunch of National Guard elements of various types.
> 
> From that it seems to me that the US is quite comfortable with integrating a large variety of elements in its force structure.
> 
> My sense is that whatever we decide to do, as long as we do it well, all assistance will be gratefully received.  If we look at the various organizations of the US Allies (NATO, SEATO, Japan, ABCANZUS... USMC) there seems to be very little call to make our army look like their army.
> 
> The other thing that bothers me is that I don't want to blow the budget on a Division that is going to be eaten up in a near peer battle in 72 hours.    I want that budget to supply an Army which will be available to defend my country 100 years from now.  Something that will bend and flex with the times.
> 
> $0.02


To me the goal isn't to recreate the span of the US military in miniature.  It is to select what elements make sense for us but to make sure that those elements are able to operate together with and at the same level as the US military.  Not a peer at everything, but in effect a peer in those areas that we choose to field.

I'm open minded as to what those capabilities and structures might be.


----------



## KevinB

Look to put a Bde into a few US Corps
  That would give you a pretty good idea on what is needed. 

Canadian Army Exchange Officers often go to III Corps, when I’d argue XVIII Airborne would be more appropriate. 






						III Armored Corps :: U.S Army Fort Hood
					

Learn about III Armored Corps, a corps of the United States Army headquartered at Fort Hood, Texas.



					home.army.mil
				









						XVIII Airborne Corps :: Fort Bragg
					

The XVIII Airborne Corps maintains a strategic response force capability to deploy on short notice anywhere in the world by land, air, or sea, to conduct full-spectrum operations as an Army, joint, or combined headquarters. If required, conducts joint forcible entry operations and provides...



					home.army.mil
				




If III (or V) Corps is a desired teammate, then Canada needs to restructure a Bde (or more)


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I grew up on the "two up and one in reserve" manoeuvre force structure. I'd need to see a good tactical benefit to change from that. One ISR and two battalions doesn't show me that.



The structure I am looking at gives you 3 Brigade HQs, two of which can deploy a Battle Gp each at short notice and one of which can deploy a two up - one back Brigade Gp.  All three Brigades can shuffle battalions and all three can be reinforced from the other brigades or the arty brigade.


----------



## IKnowNothing

GR66 said:


> To me the goal isn't to recreate the span of the US military in miniature.  It is to select what elements make sense for us but to make sure that those elements are able to operate together with and at the same level as the US military.  Not a peer at everything, but in effect a peer in those areas that we choose to field.
> 
> I'm open minded as to what those capabilities and structures might be.


When you combine the divisions defined in Waypoint 2028 with our current state, political will, and senior leadership ability I'd argue that a meaningful heavy force comes off the board and our option set to accomplish "peer" contributions is limited to

2x SBCT, 1x IBCT, 1x Arty Bde, reserves as augments,  all but one SBCT promised to round out US Divisions
or
1x SBCT (organic CS, CSS, 4th battalion from reserves) (Quebec) PLUS
1x Light Division (everything else)

In both cases CSOR chopped backed to the Army as a Bn+ Forcible Entry Regiment


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> On the other hand our UAVs have been problematic starting with the Sperwer and the Skylark which were more often used in what I would call a recce role rather than an air observation post role although both were used for that as well. I think the real reason the artillery got into the UAV business was because the RCAF *Army* had canned the light observation helicopters, wasn't even interested in tactical UAVs (much less mini UAVs) and because the artillery was in the right place and time to champion their use.


Not to be too much of a 💩’y pedant…but…St-Hubert…


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Look to put a Bde into a few US Corps
> That would give you a pretty good idea on what is needed.
> 
> Canadian Army Exchange Officers often go to III Corps, when I’d argue XVIII Airborne would be more appropriate.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> III Armored Corps :: U.S Army Fort Hood
> 
> 
> Learn about III Armored Corps, a corps of the United States Army headquartered at Fort Hood, Texas.
> 
> 
> 
> home.army.mil
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> XVIII Airborne Corps :: Fort Bragg
> 
> 
> The XVIII Airborne Corps maintains a strategic response force capability to deploy on short notice anywhere in the world by land, air, or sea, to conduct full-spectrum operations as an Army, joint, or combined headquarters. If required, conducts joint forcible entry operations and provides...
> 
> 
> 
> home.army.mil
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If III (or V) Corps is a desired teammate, then Canada needs to restructure a Bde (or more)


I think III Corps was part of our NATO heritage concept. V Corps was only recently re-established and would be a more logical choice.

XVIII Airborne Corps is a waste of time for us. We'd be much better off with I Corps with its 7th Division (three Stryker Brigades) or 11th Airborne Division in Alaska. I was thinking the Marine Expeditionary force for Norway but I think "Marine" is a bit out of our wheelhouse while Norway would be useful.



Kirkhill said:


> The structure I am looking at gives you 3 Brigade HQs, two of which can deploy a Battle Gp each at short notice and one of which can deploy a two up - one back Brigade Gp.  All three Brigades can shuffle battalions and all three can be reinforced from the other brigades or the arty brigade.



And that's where I'd like to push the capability. By eliminating three division headquarters and five ResF brigade headquarters you can form 5 manoeuvre brigade headquarters (with a total of  26 battle group headquarters) two artillery brigades, a CS brigade and a CSS brigade headquarters.

The manoeuvre brigades can still generate up to 14 RegF battle groups but also up to 26 mixed RegF and ResF battlegroups with each commanded by RegF leadership.

Effectively you create a force structure capable of generating more brigade and battlegroup headquarters for peacetime rotations (basically giving headquarters a longer time within which to reconstitute) and also have a mobilization structure to build on in the event a larger force is needed.



IKnowNothing said:


> When you combine the divisions defined in Waypoint 2028 with our current state, political will, and senior leadership ability I'd argue that a meaningful heavy force comes off the board and our option set to accomplish "peer" contributions is limited to
> 
> 2x SBCT, 1x IBCT, 1x Arty Bde, reserves as augments,  all but one SBCT promised to round out US Divisions
> or
> 1x SBCT (organic CS, CSS, 4th battalion from reserves) (Quebec) PLUS
> 1x Light Division (everything else)
> 
> In both cases CSOR chopped backed to the Army as a Bn+ Forcible Entry Regiment


I don't think we need to throw a heavy capability under the bus. We just need to accept using LAV 6.0s with tanks.

You can form three mechanized 30/70 brigades (1 tk regt & 2 mech bns each) and a fourth flyover prepositioned 10/0 brigade using the eqpt resources of all our tanks and five mech infantry battalions and the personnel from 1 RegF armoured regiment and three RegF mech battalions. In effect that is the Army's low readiness division for high intensity warfare and holds the equipment to form two full brigades.

You can concurrently form two light 70/30 brigades (one 70/30 light recce regt, two 100/0 light Inf bns and two 30/70 light infantry bns each) and two light infantry regiments (one 30/70 light recce regt and two 30/70 light inf battalions each) from the remaining 2 RegF armoured recce regiments and six  RegF infantry battalions. That's your high readiness light force for day to day multipurpose use.

The two artillery brigades, CS brigade and CSS brigade are essentially 30/70 organizations.

I'll show the sketch again:






Good2Golf said:


> Not to be too much of a 💩’y pedant…but…St-Hubert…


I'll concede to change that to DND and CAF because there is clearly enough blame to spread around.

🍻


----------



## IKnowNothing

FJAG said:


> I don't think we need to throw a heavy capability under the bus. We just need to accept using LAV 6.0s with tanks.


We could do so with the will, and that being the objective. But I'd argue that doing so would fly in the face of @GR66 's concept of selecting capabilities and delivering them to American standards.

I'd also argue (admittedly ignorantly) that if we followed the American Light Division structure and tasked RCD and LdSH each with providing a tank bn(-) (Leo or Griffin/MPF (I prefer the latter)) + cavalry troop/squadron that from a long term institutional capability perspective we would not being throwing the heavy capability under the bus, we'd just cease pretending in the short term.


----------



## FJAG

I think much of what we're discussing here is heavily dependent on what signal Canada's government wants to show to NATO. 

If we are seriously looking at a brigade for North Europe, whether a headquarters and one or more battlegroups, then eventually we will need to think heavy mechanized built around Leo 2s (or M1s) and something tracked IFV. That's pretty much what most others have and its for a reason. Northern and central Europe are generally the same or wetter than Ukraine and you can see what havoc the terrain there can play at certain times of the year. 

Honestly its not that much of a cost. Hell, one ship could pay for the better part of a full brigade. I'm not saying we need to cut ships, but we need to use some perspective.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I think much of what we're discussing here is heavily dependent on what signal Canada's government wants to show to NATO.
> 
> If we are seriously looking at a brigade for North Europe, whether a headquarters and one or more battlegroups, then eventually we will need to think heavy mechanized built around Leo 2s (or M1s) and something tracked IFV. That's pretty much what most others have and its for a reason. Northern and central Europe are generally the same or wetter than Ukraine and you can see what havoc the terrain there can play at certain times of the year.
> 
> Honestly its not that much of a cost. Hell, one ship could pay for the better part of a full brigade. I'm not saying we need to cut ships, but we need to use some perspective.
> 
> 🍻



Absolutely - the answer to the wet terrain is a heavy force....


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/spx8xr

Come on FJAG.

The Mud stopped the Russians.  It stopped the Ukrainians.  It stopped the original Panzergrenadiers.


----------



## Kirkhill

Here's your all terrain, all season mobility solution


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Absolutely - the answer to the wet terrain is a heavy force....
> 
> 
> __
> https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/spx8xr
> 
> Come on FJAG.
> 
> The Mud stopped the Russians.  It stopped the Ukrainians.  It stopped the original Panzergrenadiers.


Come on, Kirkhill  It stops them a lot less than it stops wheeled vehicles.

Simple physics based on ground pressure exerted by a tracked vehicle (low) over that of a wheeled (high). The BVs do really well because of lighter vehicle with wide tracks.

BVs do not do well in a straight up tank fight in open fields. Or for that matter in a BV v IFV fight.

We're not talking boreal forests but these kind of conditions:







🍻


----------



## KevinB

FJAG said:


> Come on, Kirkhill  It stops them a lot less than it stops wheeled vehicles.
> 
> Simple physics based on ground pressure exerted by a tracked vehicle (low) over that of a wheeled (high). The BVs do really well because of lighter vehicle with wide tracks.
> 
> BVs do not do well in a straight up tank fight in open fields. Or for that matter in a BV v IFV fight.
> 
> We're not talking boreal forests but these kind of conditions:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻


The only think moving well in that terrain is Aviation.  

Which of course depends on the air situation.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Look to put a Bde into a few US Corps
> That would give you a pretty good idea on what is needed.
> 
> Canadian Army Exchange Officers often go to III Corps, when I’d argue XVIII Airborne would be more appropriate.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> III Armored Corps :: U.S Army Fort Hood
> 
> 
> Learn about III Armored Corps, a corps of the United States Army headquartered at Fort Hood, Texas.
> 
> 
> 
> home.army.mil
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> XVIII Airborne Corps :: Fort Bragg
> 
> 
> The XVIII Airborne Corps maintains a strategic response force capability to deploy on short notice anywhere in the world by land, air, or sea, to conduct full-spectrum operations as an Army, joint, or combined headquarters. If required, conducts joint forcible entry operations and provides...
> 
> 
> 
> home.army.mil
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> If III (or V) Corps is a desired teammate, then Canada needs to restructure a Bde (or more)





FJAG said:


> I think III Corps was part of our NATO heritage concept. V Corps was only recently re-established and would be a more logical choice.
> 
> *XVIII Airborne Corps is a waste of time for us*. We'd be much better off with I Corps with its 7th Division (three Stryker Brigades) or 11th Airborne Division in Alaska. I was thinking the Marine Expeditionary force for Norway but I think "Marine" is a bit out of our wheelhouse while Norway would be useful.



@FJAG - Brother do we disagree.
I'd sooner XVIII over III/V.  But I'd be willing to compromise on I.  Particularly the 11th Airborne Div ....

BUT

Retain the Stryker Brigade with our attached Leo Regiment to supply Mobile Protected Firepower to the Div when the circumstances permit (than means penny-packeting in infantry support)

Form two of the 2 battalion Light Brigades - heliportable, air portable, Bandvagon portable.

Add a solid Div Arty Brigade with CS, LRPFs and GBAD.


I am coming to think the LAV with its 25mm/7.62mm coax is not such a bad combo for a battle taxi these days.   The gun would make a great system for swatting all these mini UAVs dropping handgrenades. Could it also be tasked alongside something like the Trophy system to tackle ATGMs in flight?


PropertyValueSpecifications:Depression (degree)-7​Elevation (degree)59​Slew rates in Elevation (deg/sec)36​Slew rates in Azimuth (deg/sec)45​Traverse arc (degree)360​Auxiliary gun calibre (mm)240​Ammunition of the auxiliary gun400​Grenade launcher calibre (mm)76​Number of smoke grenade launchers8​Auxiliary gun calibre (mm)7.62​Crew2​Main weapon caliber (mm)25​


Rate of fire• Cyclic: 200rpm with 1hp or 500rpm with 8hpMuzzle velocity1,100 metres per second (3,600 ft/s)Effective firing range3,000 metres (9,800 ft)Maximum firing range6,800 metres (22,300 ft)

Does it need a more effective anti-aircraft round?

Given that drones/UAVs are being engaged by M2s, 14.5s, and 23s, the 25 can't be much less effective.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Come on, Kirkhill  It stops them a lot less than it stops wheeled vehicles.
> 
> Simple physics based on ground pressure exerted by a tracked vehicle (low) over that of a wheeled (high). The BVs do really well because of lighter vehicle with wide tracks.
> 
> BVs do not do well in a straight up tank fight in open fields. Or for that matter in a BV v IFV fight.
> 
> We're not talking boreal forests but these kind of conditions:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻



Why would you want to go Marquis of Queensbury with the other guy's tanks?

Neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians are heading for the open fields, even when the going is good.  They are moving round the edges, keeping to the valleys, the marshes, the treelines and the hedgerows.

And I fully agree Aviation is the answer -  

But helicopters and jets aren't the only answers.  One way UAVs or even the 9 day variety are more than just supplements.


----------



## Kirkhill

Tires - 25 to 50 psi?
Tanks - 11 to 16 psi
Bandvagons - 2 psi
Foot 2 to 4 psi


T-72 Main Battle Tank Gary's Combat Vehicle Reference Guide

GENERAL DATAGround Pressure*11.81 psi (0.83 kg/cm²)*12.8 psi (0.90 kg/cm²

Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank Gary's Combat Vehicle Reference Guide

GENERAL DATAGround Pressure*11.8 psi* (0.83 kg/cm²)


M1 / IPM1M1A2SpecificationsWidth143.8 inches144 inchesGround Clearance19 inchesGround Pressure*13.1 PSI*15.4 PSI

Bv 206 Specific ground pressure Front/Rear car 11.6/13.6 kPa (1.68/1.97 PSI)

BvS10 VIKING - Army Guide​
The tracks are 620mm wide moulded rubber with chord. The mean maximum _ground pressure_ is about the same as that of the Bv206 vehicle, which is 4t lighter.


----------



## Kirkhill

MT-LB Light Armored Multi-purpose Vehicle Gary's Combat Vehicle Reference Guide

GENERAL DATAGround Pressure*6.54 psi (0.46 kg/cm²)* standard track. 3.98 psi (0.28 kg/cm²) wide track


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/zlp0p2

One third to one half of load of a T72 but 2 to 3 times the load of a Bv.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Why would you want to go Marquis of Queensbury with the other guy's tanks?
> 
> Neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians are heading for the open fields, even when the going is good.  They are moving round the edges, keeping to the valleys, the marshes, the treelines and the hedgerows.
> 
> And I fully agree Aviation is the answer -
> 
> But helicopters and jets aren't the only answers.  One way UAVs or even the 9 day variety are more than just supplements.


That’s interesting because the Ukranians most effective offensive wa s through open ground. And their defensive lines on both sides extend through open fields. This isn’t a war fought in the “valleys, hedge rows and marshes” it’s a war fought everywhere with best use of terrain where possible.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> That’s interesting because the Ukranians most effective offensive wa s through open ground. And their defensive lines on both sides extend through open fields. This isn’t a war fought in the “valleys, hedge rows and marshes” it’s a war fought everywhere with best use of terrain where possible.



And there's this new 'high ground' on the battlefield, which is emerging as the newest and most important dimension to master:



__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1607120005958881280


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:


> And there's this new 'high ground' on the battlefield, which is emerging as the newest and most important dimension to master:
> 
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1607120005958881280



But that high ground is another variant of "air superiority" - and a version managed at the section level -

It tends to keep people out of open spaces and in places where you can dig holes without the holes being obvious 

So firing positions and trenches are built where disturbed ground is less obvious - in tree lines and hedgerows.

Those Russian anti-tank ditches that can be seen from the moon only serve to tell the Ukrainians where the Russians are.


And I agree that the advances in Kharkiv were done with mad dashes over open ground - but open ground that was firm enough to permit light wheeled vehicles to move rapidly along roads as well as across open fields.

Tanks seem to be retained for the slug fests in places like Chernihiv, Balaklaia and Bakhmut.  And both Chernihiv and Bakhmut were, and are defensive battles that write down heavy armour at a steady rate - a rate faster than the vehicles can be replaced.   Even the Kharkiv offensive resulted in a large bag of Russian armour.

I'll continue to say that tanks have their place but that place is diminishing on the dispersed battlefield.  I will also continue to argue for a light Canadian force.

Dundas and Howe?  Prussians and Americans?


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> But that high ground is another variant of "air superiority" - and a version managed at the section level -
> 
> It tends to keep people out of open spaces and in places where you can dig holes without the holes being obvious
> 
> So firing positions and trenches are built where disturbed ground is less obvious - in tree lines and hedgerows.
> 
> Those Russian anti-tank ditches that can be seen from the moon only serve to tell the Ukrainians where the Russians are.
> 
> 
> And I agree that the advances in Kharkiv were done with mad dashes over open ground - but open ground that was firm enough to permit light wheeled vehicles to move rapidly along roads as well as across open fields.
> 
> Tanks seem to be retained for the slug fests in places like Chernihiv, Balaklaia and Bakhmut.  And both Chernihiv and Bakhmut were, and are defensive battles that write down heavy armour at a steady rate - a rate faster than the vehicles can be replaced.   Even the Kharkiv offensive resulted in a large bag of Russian armour.
> 
> I'll continue to say that tanks have their place but that place is diminishing on the dispersed battlefield.  I will also continue to argue for a light Canadian force.
> 
> Dundas and Howe?  Prussians and Americans?


Kharkiv was fought with vehicles , but spearheaded by tanks.  If they had IFVs they’d have chosen them, they just don’t have enough. This is a critical factor that gets ignored by certain posters here. The Ukrainians  are making due, but what they’re using is far from what they actually want to be using.

Kherson was fought with mechnized forces.
Bahkmut has largely been fought by light infantry. In trench lines crossing all sorts of terrain. They don’t hide the trenches, they just choose when the occupy them.

The “end of the tank” and the “dimished tank” is such an incredibly poor take from this conflict it can only be the result of looking for confirmation instead of drawing conclusions from evidence.


----------



## ArmyRick

markppcli said:


> Kharkiv was fought with vehicles , but spearheaded by tanks.  If they had IFVs they’d have chosen them, they just don’t have enough. This is a critical factor that gets ignored by certain posters here. The Ukrainians  are making due, but what they’re using is far from what they actually want to be using.
> 
> Kherson was fought with mechnized forces.
> Bahkmut has largely been fought by light infantry. In trench lines crossing all sorts of terrain. They don’t hide the trenches, they just choose when the occupy them.
> 
> The “end of the tank” and the “dimished tank” is such an incredibly poor take from this conflict it can only be the result of looking for confirmation instead of drawing conclusions from evidence.


Maybe not the end of the tank, but most certainly an eye opening and forced modernization to tank technology and possibly tank tactics? 

Something as simple as a Switchblade 600 kind of shakes things up.


----------



## markppcli

ArmyRick said:


> Maybe not the end of the tank, but most certainly an eye opening and forced modernization to tank technology and possibly tank tactics?
> 
> Something as simple as a Switchblade 600 kind of shakes things up.



You mean like adapting to operations in a diserpersed way? If only there was some kind of publication that touched in that…

I don’t think I’d call any of the loitering munitions “simple” myself; and we were talking about the “demise of the tank” several years ago when Armenia and Azerbaijan were squaring off. There are more tools but that’s just it, more tool. Is AD being show to have been something we in the west have ignored too long ? Absolutely. But Ukrainians and Russians and still relying on and armoured fist to lead their advances. Early losses by Russia being more about operational ineptitude than some revolution in military tactics.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I think much of what we're discussing here is heavily dependent on what signal Canada's government wants to show to NATO.
> 
> If we are seriously looking at a brigade for North Europe, whether a headquarters and one or more battlegroups, then eventually we will need to think heavy mechanized built around Leo 2s (or M1s) and something tracked IFV. That's pretty much what most others have and its for a reason. Northern and central Europe are generally the same or wetter than Ukraine and you can see what havoc the terrain there can play at certain times of the year.


I totally get the constant focus on NATO and heavy forces for the Canadian Army.  It's in many ways our military heritage as a nation.  WWI, WWII, the Cold War, even FRY.  Ukraine of course is a modern reminder of that whole way of thinking about the Russian threats to our collective security and Canada's role in our alliances.

I do however think that it would really be worthwhile to step back and think hard about how our military can best serve our political interests as well as how to best contribute to our allies militarily.  

Firstly, despite the war in Ukraine I think the likelihood of an actual Russian attack on NATO territory is quite low.  Not just because of the generally poor performance of the Russian military, but simply because the balance of military, economic and demographic power has shifted so substantially against Russia and in favour of NATO.  

Compare the split in European alliances at the start of World War I, World War II and the Cold War:


The European powers were fairly evenly split during all of those conflicts and as a result our Allies in Europe needed very significant support from Canada (and of course the United States and various colonial/former colonial powers) to tip the balance in our favour.

Compare that to the current split in Europe between NATO and Russia:


With modern armies being smaller in size than in the past due to the high cost of modern military equipment, so long as NATO remains politically united and maintains a reasonable level of military preparedness then realistically there is no way that Russia can defeat NATO in a conventional conflict.  The numbers in terms of personnel, equipment and money simply aren't there for them.

I'm in no way suggesting complacency in NATO's European defence planning.  The vast majority of non-American NATO nations (especially Canada) allowed their military forces to seriously atrophy since the end of the Cold War.  Hopefully the renewed urgency resulting from the Ukraine war will stick and members will actually work to meet their 2% of GDP spending promises and work to make their Armies combat effective.  

I honestly believe that if the above can be achieved (and I think it's important politically for Canada to lead by example on this if we wish to continue to have any influence within NATO) then European NATO with some limited, but important American and Canadian forward deployed support (and the ability of the US to massively surge additional forces) is enough for NATO to deter any Russian conventional aggression against NATO territory.

I'd go as far to say that i don't believe the United States really fears a Russian attack on NATO so much as it fears Russia tying down US forces during a conflict with China.  My guess is that the push for beefing up NATO is in hopes of making European NATO strong enough to contain Russia in order to free up US military power against China.  The request for Canada in increase it's NATO permanent presence I believe is largely political (to show the trans-Atlantic solidarity of the Alliance) but also party simply because Canada has nothing useful militarily to really contribute to a potential conflict against China.  

In my opinion if Canada had forces that were better suited for conflict in the Pacific theatre you'd see much less push from the Americans for us to increase our NATO contribution and much more for us to work with them in the Pacific.  That's where they see the greatest military threat. 

So the question in my mind as we look at restructuring the Canadian Army for the future is how do we balance between looking Eastward toward Russia and what I believe may ultimately be the "secondary" theatre in any potential future conflict and looking to the West and figuring out what kind of forces we need to effectively contribute there?  

Almost certainly we'll need a little of "Column A" and a little of "Column B", but often I get the impression that we're overly fixated on "Column A" and not thinking at all about "Column B".


----------



## FJAG

Not arguing with your rationale at all albeit that your balance of power chart is off as it does not take into consideration that a large part of the NATO power is not in Europe but in North America and that Russia has a military structure that is heavily tilted to a reserve (both personnel and equipment) that does not exist in NATO. True, that reserve looks particulalry poorly organized and maintained, but if there is one thing that I believe its that Russia will learn from its mistakes. Given time they will fix their problems.

I'm not so much worried that Russia will make another thrust across the German plains; its will it try to gather low hanging fruit by "rescuing" the ethnic Russians living in the Baltic States, the Balkans, Poland and elsewhere. Russia espouses a need to secure its borders from NATO through buffer states but it's definition of a buffer state is one that is wholly within Russia's sphere of influence. Russia will continue to nibble on the edges of NATO's smaller states and in the process keep trying to create little Donbases and Luhansks and Georgias and Chechnyas wherever it can (even if it destroys them in the doing) on the supposition that NATO will not risk full-out nuclear war over these tiny slivers. Its a policy of death by a thousand cuts.

I'm a firm believer that "_The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression."_

For the time being that requires boots and gear on the ground. Maybe some day we'll be able to build an automated high tech Maginot line that secures our collective borders but until then we need a balanced force of conventional and nuclear capabilities. Those conventional forces include heavy armour and artillery and air defence and anti-armour etc.

IMHO, those forces need to be combat capable but also affordable. Affordability in a military like ours must first address personnel costs. Despite views inside the military we pay well compared to many other nations. Personnel costs consume half of our budget severely restricting capital and operations and maintenance expenditures. We need to change that by minimizing the number of people dedicated to simply administering the CAF and NDHQ. That requires changing those policies and require administration (regardless if they are internal or external to DND) and in reducing the number of full-time personnel down to the lowest number to ensure that all necessary day-to-day functions required for combat capabilities are carried out.

Canada desperately needs a revised system of part-time service which is designed to build a viable structure that is significantly less expensive during peacetime but has the capability of rapid mobilization for wartime needs. All heavy equipment, whether army tanks or IFVs or artillery, or ships or fighter aircraft are primarily a wartime resource. Certain amounts of it need to be manned day to day in peacetime for such things as training and routine career development and as quick reaction elements but most of it can be held in stand-by mode as long as an efficient training and mobilization system exists. That saves money which can be transferred to building and maintaining that equipment and war supplies.

My fear about the lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that western military leadership will draw the conclusion that Russia's failure to maintain and mobilize its reserves is directly transferable to them and will rely less on their own reserves in favour of seeking yet more full-time positions and their exorbitant year-to-year recurring costs. They'll gloss over the fact that much of the Ukraine's defence was built on a reserve force structure that had moderately trained people operating masses of moderately maintained equipment eventually bolstered by a hodge-podge of mostly modern NATO gear. 

Back in the early 2000s we were writing off our heavy gear because it wasn't "transportable" or maintainable both of which are pure bull if you contemplate a proper system of prepositioning and reserve status. It kind of reminds e of Kennedy's "Moon speech".



> “_We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things (accomplishments and aspirations), not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win.”_



There comes a time when you need to do something which appears hard (and to some curmudgeons "impossible") because they have to be done to win.

The CAF desperately needs a paradigm shift that balances day-to-day full-timers with part-timers in an intelligent way and that demands that much of the heavy equipment that remains necessary for wartime use be put into the hands of a mobilizable, less expensive, part-time force. If our current RegF/ResF system can't provide that then it needs to be thrown under the bus and rebuilt from scratch.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Not arguing with your rationale at all albeit that your balance of power chart is off as it does not take into consideration that a large part of the NATO power is not in Europe but in North America and that Russia has a military structure that is heavily tilted to a reserve (both personnel and equipment) that does not exist in NATO. True, that reserve looks particulalry poorly organized and maintained, but if there is one thing that I believe its that Russia will learn from its mistakes. Given time they will fix their problems.
> 
> I'm not so much worried that Russia will make another thrust across the German plains; its will it try to gather low hanging fruit by "rescuing" the ethnic Russians living in the Baltic States, the Balkans, Poland and elsewhere. Russia espouses a need to secure its borders from NATO through buffer states but it's definition of a buffer state is one that is wholly within Russia's sphere of influence. Russia will continue to nibble on the edges of NATO's smaller states and in the process keep trying to create little Donbases and Luhansks and Georgias and Chechnyas wherever it can (even if it destroys them in the doing) on the supposition that NATO will not risk full-out nuclear war over these tiny slivers. Its a policy of death by a thousand cuts.
> 
> I'm a firm believer that "_The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression."_
> 
> For the time being that requires boots and gear on the ground. Maybe some day we'll be able to build an automated high tech Maginot line that secures our collective borders but until then we need a balanced force of conventional and nuclear capabilities. Those conventional forces include heavy armour and artillery and air defence and anti-armour etc.
> 
> IMHO, those forces need to be combat capable but also affordable. Affordability in a military like ours must first address personnel costs. Despite views inside the military we pay well compared to many other nations. Personnel costs consume half of our budget severely restricting capital and operations and maintenance expenditures. We need to change that by minimizing the number of people dedicated to simply administering the CAF and NDHQ. That requires changing those policies and require administration (regardless if they are internal or external to DND) and in reducing the number of full-time personnel down to the lowest number to ensure that all necessary day-to-day functions required for combat capabilities are carried out.
> 
> Canada desperately needs a revised system of part-time service which is designed to build a viable structure that is significantly less expensive during peacetime but has the capability of rapid mobilization for wartime needs. All heavy equipment, whether army tanks or IFVs or artillery, or ships or fighter aircraft are primarily a wartime resource. Certain amounts of it need to be manned day to day in peacetime for such things as training and routine career development and as quick reaction elements but most of it can be held in stand-by mode as long as an efficient training and mobilization system exists. That saves money which can be transferred to building and maintaining that equipment and war supplies.
> 
> My fear about the lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is that western military leadership will draw the conclusion that Russia's failure to maintain and mobilize its reserves is directly transferable to them and will rely less on their own reserves in favour of seeking yet more full-time positions and their exorbitant year-to-year recurring costs. They'll gloss over the fact that much of the Ukraine's defence was built on a reserve force structure that had moderately trained people operating masses of moderately maintained equipment eventually bolstered by a hodge-podge of mostly modern NATO gear.
> 
> Back in the early 2000s we were writing off our heavy gear because it wasn't "transportable" or maintainable both of which are pure bull if you contemplate a proper system of prepositioning and reserve status. It kind of reminds e of Kennedy's "Moon speech".
> 
> 
> 
> There comes a time when you need to do something which appears hard (and to some curmudgeons "impossible") because they have to be done to win.
> 
> The CAF desperately needs a paradigm shift that balances day-to-day full-timers with part-timers in an intelligent way and that demands that much of the heavy equipment that remains necessary for wartime use be put into the hands of a mobilizable, less expensive, part-time force. If our current RegF/ResF system can't provide that then it needs to be thrown under the bus and rebuilt from scratch.
> 
> 🍻


Anything is possible.....if cash.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I'm a firm believer that "_The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression."_


I'll leave out the rest of your response because basically I agree with it 100% other than you have essentially proven my point by framing it in a completely Eurocentric framework.  

Does not that "gold standard of deterrence" also apply to China?  Which of China and Russia are likely the greatest long term threat to our Western way of life and thinking?  A declining Russia with a population of around 146 million and a GDP of around $1,710 Billion USD or China with a population of 1.426 billion and a GDP of around $18,266 Billion USD?

What is the Canadian Army bringing to the table to help confront China "with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression"?  Of course a Pacific War will be primarily fought in the air and sea domains, but at least the USMC is looking at how it can do its part in the conflict.  And of course our tiny Army will only have a small impact on any overall conflict against China but frankly the same is true for any potential conflict with Russia.  

Again, as I mentioned at the end of my posting we'll likely need to look to both the East and the West in how we decide to restructure our Army but almost everything I see proposed completely ignores the challenge of China and only looks at the challenge of Russia and I think that is fundamentally wrong.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Anything is possible.....if cash.


Repurpose full-time pay cash.



GR66 said:


> Does not that "gold standard of deterrence" also apply to China?


Yes it does. Absolutely.



GR66 said:


> What is the Canadian Army bringing to the table to help confront China "with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression"?


At the moment, nothing of consequence.

It is a problem that needs confronting. Currently we have an active need in Europe and an alliance to work with that was initially built for that purpose.

I see nothing to build on re China at this time. There is no military alliance of consequence to work with and much political effort is needed before we even get to the question of what role Canada will play. We're not even a member of the dysfunctional SEATO. I note with some interest Australia which is much closer to the problem but has no forward looking policy (except maybe training grounds for the Indonesians and Americans). I note with more interest Japan's recent decision to ramp up. And then there is India. And of course the US. 

It's a conundrum. My military solution is to work on what you can and need to and let the politicians work out what approach we need to what's on the other side of the Pacific and the internal security apparatus deal with incursions in our homeland.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> Repurpose full-time pay cash.
> 
> 
> Yes it does. Absolutely.
> 
> 
> At the moment, nothing of consequence.
> 
> It is a problem that needs confronting. Currently we have an active need in Europe and an alliance to work with that was initially built for that purpose.
> 
> I see nothing to build on re China at this time. There is no military alliance of consequence to work with and much political effort is needed before we even get to the question of what role Canada will play. We're not even a member of the dysfunctional SEATO. I note with some interest Australia which is much closer to the problem but has no forward looking policy (except maybe training grounds for the Indonesians and Americans). I note with more interest Japan's recent decision to ramp up. And then there is India. And of course the US.
> 
> It's a conundrum. My military solution is to work on what you can and need to and let the politicians work out what approach we need to what's on the other side of the Pacific and the internal security apparatus deal with incursions in our homeland.
> 
> 🍻


The US is there and it's a given that whatever alliances develop in the Indo-Pacific that it will be primarily American led (just as NATO is).  We start with working with them.

We know that any Chinese aggression will have to cross water so that means anti-air and anti-ship capabilities will be required.  AD systems like NASAMS and Land Ceptor (CAMM) are already in service and have proven capability.  HIMARS and similar systems are already being looked at for launching Naval Strike Missiles in addition to their existing land attack missiles.  We could prioritize a Regiment of each.  Both these capabilities would be equally effective against Russia (and for homeland defence) but for some reason there seems to be an insistence that our NATO contribution MUST be in the form of heavy armour formations...no other type of contribution is seen as being acceptable.  

This is the Eurocentric and Cold War focused mindset that I simply don't understand.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Kharkiv was fought with vehicles , but spearheaded by tanks.  If they had IFVs they’d have chosen them, they just don’t have enough. This is a critical factor that gets ignored by certain posters here. The Ukrainians  are making due, but what they’re using is far from what they actually want to be using.
> 
> Kherson was fought with mechnized forces.
> Bahkmut has largely been fought by light infantry. In trench lines crossing all sorts of terrain. They don’t hide the trenches, they just choose when the occupy them.
> 
> The “end of the tank” and the “dimished tank” is such an incredibly poor take from this conflict it can only be the result of looking for confirmation instead of drawing conclusions from evidence.



I admit to bias.

A couple of points:

"The Ukrainians are making due" 
"looking for confirmation instead of drawing conclusions from evidence."

Every war is a matter of making do with what you have.
It is partly the corollary to the Rumsfeld observation that you go to war with the army you have and not the army you want.

It is partly the result of the enemy gets a vote.
They may choose to bypass your strengths and go for your weaknesses. They may develop a successful technique that neutralizes your strengths.

So the question then becomes:  Do you give up and quit the field?  Or do you do the other thing?  And nobody knows what the other thing is until it is tried and found to be successful.  

The USMC has it right:  Adapt, Improvise and Overcome.

It is true that the Ukrainians don't have as many tanks and IFVs as they want.  It is also true that Russians, through bad planning, bad luck or the actions of the Ukrainians, also find themselves short of tanks and IFVs.   And both sides are short of shells and the guns to shoot them, missiles and planes, and ships and subs.   Ukraine is short of the support it was guaranteed when it handed over its nuclear arsenal to Moscow.  Both sides are challenged to Adapt, Improvise and Overcome.   Every war ends with the tools available.  Often the tools available at the end of the war are not the tools that were available at its start.

I flippantly responded to @FJAG that anything is possible if cash. - Cicero's sinews.

As in Cicero's day, in the days of Howe and Dundas, in Ukraine and Russia, Canada suffers from a lack of infinite money.  So the money available has to be allocated.  Bets must be placed.  And the wheel spun....

My sense is that the biggest failing of NDHQ is not the inability to lobby effectively to for more money to buy the tools it thinks necessary to fight, it is the inability to successfully manage the funds they have to create an effective fighting force - one which can Adapt, Improvise and Overcome.  

War is not about process.  War is about outcome.   And only winning matters.

FJAG points to Russia's militarized society as a strength in that it replaces cash with people.  I am not convinced that a coerced people make for an effective army.  Especially one that lacks effective weaponry.

Ukraine had an effective army that had held off the Russians for 8 years but even they had not fully embraced a military society until January of this year.

Canada is not a militarized society.  There obviously are elements in society that are in sympathy with need for a military.  Some of those are in uniform.  Some just want to help anyway they can.  Part of the failing, as far as I am concerned is the lack of outreach to those willing helpers and figure out how to best employ them

Strangely enough, me that is no fan of accountants, find myself in sympathy with the accountants.  If NDHQ can't manage a budget in peacetime, can't adapt, improvise and overcome in peacetime, to create a useful force for the politicians to employ, then what evidence is there that their skills will magically improve on the day war breaks out?  

Is it a matter of hope in NDHQ that they limp along until that day when the taps will open and all their problems will be solved?

One characteristic of that day throughout history is that all the crystal balls are broken.  And you live with results of the roulette wheel's spin.



On the subject of confirmation bias.


I search the available evidence.  I find evidence that suits my developing hypothesis.  It convinces me.
You are free to search the available evidence to find that which suits your hypothesis.  No doubt it convinces you.  You argue well.

I don't know if I am right or wrong in my beliefs but as of this time I am not convinced of the general utility of a very expensive, heavily armoured force in the Canadian context.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> My sense is that the biggest failing of NDHQ is not the inability to lobby effectively to for more money to buy the tools it thinks necessary to fight, it is the inability to successfully manage the funds they have to create an effective fighting force - one which can Adapt, Improvise and Overcome.
> 
> ...
> 
> Strangely enough, me that is no fan of accountants, find myself in sympathy with the accountants.  If NDHQ can't manage a budget in peacetime, can't adapt, improvise and overcome in peacetime, to create a useful force for the politicians to employ, then what evidence is there that their skills will magically improve on the day war breaks out?
> 
> Is it a matter of hope in NDHQ that they limp along until that day when the taps will open and all their problems will be solved?


These points here.  1,000%


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> The US is there and it's a given that whatever alliances develop in the Indo-Pacific that it will be primarily American led (just as NATO is).  We start with working with them.


I'll be the first to admit that I don't think enough about the China issue but for starters I would think that Canada's interest is minor in the Indo-Pacific and much more focused on the NW passage. Incidentally while my above discussion about Russia focuses on the ResF in a heavy role in Europe my focus for the RegF is primarily on the defence of Canada through quick and highly trained people air, land and sea, capable of securing our shores, including the North.


GR66 said:


> We know that any Chinese aggression will have to cross water so that means anti-air and anti-ship capabilities will be required.  AD systems like NASAMS and Land Ceptor (CAMM) are already in service and have proven capability.


This is why we have an air force and navy. The army's role is secondary.


GR66 said:


> HIMARS and similar systems are already being looked at for launching Naval Strike Missiles in addition to their existing land attack missiles.  We could prioritize a Regiment of each.  Both these capabilities would be equally effective against Russia (and for homeland defence) but for some reason there seems to be an insistence that our NATO contribution MUST be in the form of heavy armour formations...no other type of contribution is seen as being acceptable.


Why is it that when you hear us talking about heavy forces you think that we only talk about tanks and IFVs. Heavy forces, like any other, need a variety of support systems from HIMARS to EW to UCAVs etc etc. I keep using the words "balanced force". That includes everything from unarmed int pers to light infantry, to .... at the far end nuclear strike. And while we won't use nuclear weapons ourselves anymore, we need to be allied with people who can and will as a proper deterrent. 

Heavy is a category that has a place in a balanced inventory and should be prepositioned in a place where it is needed and be highly visible as part of our deterrence policy. If deterrence is done right it may never be needed (see the whole damn Cold War as a prime example). This is why IMHO it is a classic ResF task. There is absolutely zero value of having a heavy force within Canada manned by expensive full-timers with no ability to transport it anywhere in time of emergency. (You do need sufficient RegF pers to lead and train the ResF flyover users and to develop and upgrade the skill set)



GR66 said:


> This is the Eurocentric and Cold War focused mindset that I simply don't understand.


Yes it is. The problem facing us in the face is Europe. And I simply do not understand anyone who doesn't recognize that we are in fact in the middle of a Cold War that has warmed up considerably since 2014.

What you need to understand that what I'm defending is the need to keep an eye on Europe but not at the expense of other issues. We need a balanced force which includes a component that looks and is capable of mechanized warfare because for the time being, it still matters. That's why I continuously say to make Europe a primarily ResF responsibility (to sa 🍻 ve costs) and target the majority of the RegF on those other issues that require very high skills or quick reaction. Equipment is a red herring. A properly trained and organized ResF with the right RegF leadership and support structure can handle heavy equipment including all those HIMARS and air defence systems you mention.

Our problem is that the RegF refuses to create a ResF capable of using heavy equipment and hoards the "good toys" for themselves. It unnecessarily increase the cost of defence and ties up too many full-time people in what is basically a very necessary but improperly manned stand-by deterrence force.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> My sense is that the biggest failing of NDHQ is not the inability to lobby effectively to for more money to buy the tools it thinks necessary to fight, it is the inability to successfully manage the funds they have to create an effective fighting force - one which can Adapt, Improvise and Overcome.


We agree on that


Kirkhill said:


> War is not about process. War is about outcome. And only winning matters.


And that requires capabilities. We measure $ inputs when we should be measuring defence capability outputs. Currently the latter do not equate to the former. 


Kirkhill said:


> FJAG points to Russia's militarized society as a strength in that it replaces cash with people. I am not convinced that a coerced people make for an effective army. Especially one that lacks effective weaponry.


I don't think I ever said that, because I don't believe it. I agree that the Russians replace cash with people. I don't believe that this is a strength if the people are poorly trained and equipped.

I have the same reservations about the Canadian Army which has half of its field strength in an under-trained and under-equipped ResF. It's a wasted resource the way it is structured.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I don't think I ever said that, because I don't believe it. I agree that the Russians replace cash with people. I don't believe that this is a strength if the people are poorly trained and equipped.
> 
> 🍻



I apologize for the misinterpretation.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> And that requires capabilities. We measure $ inputs when we should be measuring defence capability outputs. Currently the latter do not equate to the former.



And that is where we disagree.  Which capabilities do we require?   Which should we acquire?  

You want to bet on Black (Heavy).  I want to bet on Red (Light).

In truth none of us are that adamant.  Almost everybody wants to hedge their bets.  The argument fundamentally becomes how much to you put on Black and how much on Red.

Me, I'm 70/30 Red (Light) to Black (Heavy).

And that is just the professional regulars.  Augmented by released professionals as a reserve sounds right to me.

The bigger area of disagreement is over how much money should be spent on organizing, training and equipping unpaid volunteers anxious and willing to assist.


----------



## Kirkhill

From Forbes
Something for everyone here
Even a couple of "gimmes" for @markppcli and @FJAG 




> AEROSPACE & DEFENSE
> The Ukrainian Army’s Jaeger Brigades Are Its Middleweight Forest Troops​David Axe
> Forbes Staff
> I write about ships, planes, tanks, drones, missiles and satellites.
> Follow
> 3
> Dec 26, 2022,11:31pm EST
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 71st Jaeger Brigade troopers.
> UKRAINIAN ARMY PHOTO
> The Ukrainian army grew fast in the months before, and after, a 200,000-man Russian army rolled into northern, eastern and southern Ukraine, widening a grinding war that had been raging for eight years.
> 
> *With a huge influx of new volunteers and returning ex-soldiers, the army—which before the war had around 200,000 people on its payroll—grew by tens of thousands.
> 
> The fresh manpower allowed the army to form a couple dozen light territorial brigades plus several new heavy mechanized brigades, as well as to enlarge the existing 20 or so active mechanized and tank brigades.*
> 
> Perhaps the most obscure units are the* three jaeger brigades, each with around 2,000 troops.* _Jaeger_ is German for “hunters.” The 61st, 68th and 71st Jaeger Brigades honor a long European tradition—and fit *somewhere in the middle of the army’s force-structure. Neither heavy nor light.*
> 
> The first jaegers were what the word implies. Hunters and woodsmen who formed specialized skirmishing units in Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia. Today the German, Austrian, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish armies still have jaeger units, and generally consider them special operations forces.
> *In Ukraine, jaeger brigades are middleweight infantry—neither as light as territorial brigades, which generally lack tracked vehicles, nor as heavy as tank or mechanized brigades with their hundreds of tanks and fighting vehicles.
> 
> The 61st was the first jaeger brigade. It formed in 2015 *as part of the Ukrainian army’s initial expansion in response to the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region.
> 
> The 61st Jaeger Brigade is *based in Zhytomyr Oblast in northerwestern Ukraine. The brigade with its BRDM wheeled vehicles and trucks fitted with ZSU-23 auto-cannons was suited to operations in the marshes and forests* (presumably they don't go off track) of northern Ukraine’s border region.
> And since the 61st Jaeger Brigade’s home oblast overlapped with the radioactive Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, the plan was for the brigade also to have a radiological reconnaissance unit.
> It’s not clear that the radiological unit ever formed, however—the 61st has spent much of the current war in southern Ukraine which, while wet in places, generally isn’t radioactive. _Yet._
> 
> 
> *The 68th and 71st Jaeger Brigades formed this year.* Both benefitted from a consignment of new* pickup trucks**, some of which the brigades modified with bed-mounted rocket-launchers. Jaegers also have been spotted in U.S.-supplied MaxxPro wheeled armored vehicles.*
> 
> *The 71st technically belongs to the airborne corps, even though its troopers aren’t qualified as parachutists or heliborne assault troops. Instead, the 71st Jaeger Brigade supports the lighter, airborne-qualified formations in the same corps.*
> The 71st lately has been fighting around Opytne, one of the settlements anchoring the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut in the east.
> 
> The 68th, it seems, is somewhere in the south around Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
> 
> *The war has untethered the jaeger brigades from the geography that originally justified their formation*. Which is not to say the brigades aren’t useful.* Jaeger brigades in theory can move more quickly than heavy brigades can do, and hit harder than territorial brigades can do.*
> 
> But *the sheer violence of the Russian-Ukraine war motivates troops to harden*. So don’t be shocked if, *over time, the jaeger brigades evolve in the same way most Ukrainian formations are evolving: by adding armor and firepower and slowly becoming heavy brigades* ... regardless of their name.
> 
> 
> Adding armour and firepower assumes that armour and firepower is available to be added.



To which


			https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/27/ukraine-russia-tanks-military-vehicles/
		




> Captured Russian tanks and equipment are coveted trophies — and a headache​Ukrainian forces have seized hundreds of tanks and other military vehicles, but many are languishing as they wait for repairs and spare parts​By Samantha Schmidt
> ,
> Isabelle Khurshudyan
> and
> Serhii Korolchuk
> 
> Updated December 27, 2022 at 10:07 a.m. EST|Published December 27, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EST
> 
> 
> KHARKIV REGION, Ukraine — When Ukrainian forces came across the abandoned Russian fighting vehicle on the battlefield, they knew they had found a rare prize.
> The BMP-3, armed with a 100mm main gun and a 30mm autocannon, was one of the few of its kind that the Ukrainian military had seized from the Russians since the start of the invasion. But about a month ago, after weeks of being operated by Ukrainian soldiers, its engine and fueling system began to fail
> 
> Ever since, the Russian fighting vehicle has been out of commission, stuck at a repair site in Ukraine’s northeastern Kharkiv region.
> Ukrainian forces have seized hundreds of what they call “trophies” — Russian tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles — since the start of the war. They’ve become valuable assets for Kyiv. The brigade working at this repair site jokingly referred to them as “lend-lease” tanks, referring to the World World II program under which the United States supplied Britain, the Soviet Union and other Allied nations with humanitarian aid and military equipment.
> 
> 
> But many of these tanks and other vehicles are stuck in hangars like the one at this repair site as brigades struggle to find the parts needed to repair them. The unit here, a maintenance battalion for the 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade, has been unable to find the parts it needs for the BMP-3.
> “It’s obvious it should be fighting the enemy and not sitting in a hangar,” said Ruslan, the 47-year-old commander of the maintenance battalion, who spoke on the condition that his last name not be used.
> 
> A member of the maintenance battalion for Ukraine's 14th Separate Mechanized Brigade works on the engine of a battlefield vehicle. (Heidi Levine for The Washington Post)
> To find parts to fix the vehicle, the battalion would need to first find an identical match. Unlike earlier models of this type of fighting vehicle, the BMP-3 cannot be repaired using parts from similar Ukrainian vehicles.
> 
> It’s possible another brigade might have a vehicle that is a match, Ruslan said, but there is no system for locating the parts. He suggested that the armed forces could benefit from a program or database tracking compatible parts across brigades. “It would save time,” he said. “It would save a lot of resources.”
> 
> A press officer for the 14th Brigade, the only brigade that has fought on all major front lines in the country since the start of Russia’s invasion, joked that it’s in the Ukrainian nature to collect and hoard prized possessions. It’s not always as easy as merely asking another brigade for its identical trophy tank or vehicle.
> 
> 
> In the Donetsk region, Vadym Ustymenko, a member of a tank unit in Ukraine’s 25th Airborne Assault Brigade, said he has changed tanks “six or seven times” in the past seven months because they often need repair. He’s now fighting in a T-80 tank — among the best models in Ukraine’s arsenal.
> 
> The 25th Brigade was the first unit into the city of Izyum* after Russian forces hastily retreated from the Kharkiv region in Septembe*r, leaving behind an extraordinary amount of tanks and armored personnel carriers.
> 
> 
> 
> “*Speaking about just the tanks, there were indeed a lot of them, but very few were operational*,” Ustymenko said. “Those that you could just start up or only needed *a few minutes of work, you could count on one hand*. Those that *needed some repair *but would eventually run was *another 30 percen*t probably. And *the last 50 percent was junk* that requires a whole lot of work.”
> 
> For the tanks that were in bad condition, some could be “donors” of needed parts, said another soldier in Ustymenko’s unit. Because Ukraine’s weapons largely date to the Soviet Union, a tank that’s more than 30 years old could be improved with a spare part from a seized Russian model that’s just five years old.
> 
> 
> The soldiers in Ustymenko’s unit said they occasionally communicate with other brigades about spare parts. One soldier in the tank unit mentioned that they asked for some ammunition for their tank from a brigade in the area and were refused.
> 
> 
> *While Ukraine can often repair its own equipment on or near the front lines with available spare parts, a breakdown of Western-provided equipment typically means it needs to be towed back to a NATO facility in Poland. That could mean removing a vital weapon from the battlefield for weeks.   *
> “The weapons that are coming from the U.S., they are mostly coming from stockpiles, so they are not new,” said Daria Kaleniuk, executive director of the Anti-Corruption Action Center in Ukraine. She has been meeting with Western politicians to push for Ukraine to receive modern fighter jets and battle tanks.* Sending damaged weapons to Poland “is a huge delay and a big frustration for the Ukrainian military,” Kaleniuk said.  (Still want to donate our Leos?)*
> At the field repair site in the Kharkiv region, members of the maintenance battalion worked to fix two Russian tanks and several armored personnel carriers, repairing engines, steering systems and machine-gun turrets. One of the first things the unit does when repairing a trophy is repaint it, removing the “Z” symbol of its former Russian owner.
> 
> *Often, the most challenging part of repairing a Russian vehicle is simply identifying the problem*, Ruslan said. Many tanks were seized in the area around Kupiansk during Ukraine’s Kharkiv counteroffensive.
> 
> 
> Each brigade has a* technical reconnaissance (scavenger) unit* dedicated to searching fields for abandoned vehicles and equipment, then transporting them to repair sites. *The tanks and vehicles have become easier to find since the leaves fell off the trees, improving visibility.
> 
> But the winter months also create harsher conditions for tanks and equipment, causing more wear and tear.  *
> Constant *power outages create an additional obstacle*. The* near-daily blackouts at this repair site delay the team’s work*. Even a generator isn’t enough to power all of the tools they need to fix the equipment. This is part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s goal, Ruslan said.
> “The Russians are doing this for a reason,” he said.
> 
> CORRECTION
> An earlier version of this story said a Russian BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle was armed with a 100mm machine gun. Some versions of the vehicle have a 100mm main gun. This story has been updated.


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> I'll be the first to admit that I don't think enough about the China issue but for starters I would think that Canada's interest is minor in the Indo-Pacific and much more focused on the NW passage. Incidentally while my above discussion about Russia focuses on the ResF in a heavy role in Europe my focus for the RegF is primarily on the defence of Canada through quick and highly trained people air, land and sea, capable of securing our shores, including the North.


Our interest in the Indo-Pacific is in keeping a rule based World order where nations can freely trade goods, services, ideas and people.  That is what is at risk with the expansion of China.  It is a fundamental threat to the basic structure to our society in a way that Russia is not.  For that very reason I would NOT think that "Canada's interest is minor".  


FJAG said:


> This is why we have an air force and navy. The army's role is secondary.


And I said as much in my post.  The Army's role is _secondary_...but right now our Army's role is non-existent.  


FJAG said:


> Why is it that when you hear us talking about heavy forces you think that we only talk about tanks and IFVs. Heavy forces, like any other, need a variety of support systems from HIMARS to EW to UCAVs etc etc. I keep using the words "balanced force". That includes everything from unarmed int pers to light infantry, to .... at the far end nuclear strike. And while we won't use nuclear weapons ourselves anymore, we need to be allied with people who can and will as a proper deterrent.
> 
> Heavy is a category that has a place in a balanced inventory and should be prepositioned in a place where it is needed and be highly visible as part of our deterrence policy. If deterrence is done right it may never be needed (see the whole damn Cold War as a prime example). This is why IMHO it is a classic ResF task. There is absolutely zero value of having a heavy force within Canada manned by expensive full-timers with no ability to transport it anywhere in time of emergency. (You do need sufficient RegF pers to lead and train the ResF flyover users and to develop and upgrade the skill set)


The reason I think about tanks and IFVs when you talk about heavy forces is that you consistently, specifically talk about Armoured Brigade Groups and Armoured Divisions pre-deployed to Europe.  I'm not in any way suggesting that "balanced forces" are not required in a potential conflict against either Russia or China (or any other potential foe).  What I am suggesting is simply questioning whether our Canadian contribution to the "balanced" NATO forces needs to be "balanced" (i.e. Armoured Brigade/Division) itself.  Are there possibly other types of contributions to the overall balanced NATO forces that Canada could make?

NATO has both national and multi-national Brigades, Divisions and even Corps.  Is the only feasible and useful Canadian contribution to that "balanced force" an Armoured Brigade or Division?  



FJAG said:


> Yes it is. The problem facing us in the face is Europe. And I simply do not understand anyone who doesn't recognize that we are in fact in the middle of a Cold War that has warmed up considerably since 2014.


And yesterday China carried out a "strike drill" with 47 aircraft across the Taiwan Strait in a further increase in pressure and tension that has also been escalating over the past decade plus. That's on top of the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong, cultural genocide in Tibet and actual concentration camps in Xinjiang. I equally simply do not understand anyone who doesn't recognize that we are in fact in the middle of a Cold War that has warmed up considerably there as well.  


FJAG said:


> What you need to understand that what I'm defending is the need to keep an eye on Europe but not at the expense of other issues. We need a balanced force which includes a component that looks and is capable of mechanized warfare because for the time being, it still matters.


But in essence you are keeping an eye on Europe at the expense of other issues: 


FJAG said:


> I see nothing to build on re China at this time. There is no military alliance of consequence to work with and much political effort is needed before we even get to the question of what role Canada will play.


My point is that we already have NATO in place to face Russia and there are many other countries that are also contributing to that collective defence/deterrence.  They do have balanced forces that are capable of mechanized warfare.  I'm not in any way saying that we abandon NATO and focus only on China but as you note above it's vs China that there is much more work to be done in creating an effective defensive alliance vs an even more powerful military than anything Russia can muster.  Are there force structures we could put in place that would both be something to build upon in a conflict with China and at the same time contribute to the balanced NATO deterrent against Russia?  

And that certainly doesn't preclude the possibility of for example having a fly-over Armoured Brigade in Europe both as a useful military contribution but also as an important political contribution and signal of support.  



FJAG said:


> That's why I continuously say to make Europe a primarily ResF responsibility (to sa 🍻 ve costs) and target the majority of the RegF on those other issues that require very high skills or quick reaction. Equipment is a red herring. A properly trained and organized ResF with the right RegF leadership and support structure can handle heavy equipment including all those HIMARS and air defence systems you mention.
> 
> Our problem is that the RegF refuses to create a ResF capable of using heavy equipment and hoards the "good toys" for themselves. It unnecessarily increase the cost of defence and ties up too many full-time people in what is basically a very necessary but improperly manned stand-by deterrence force.
> 
> 🍻


This is true whether we're talking about Russia or China.  Personnel are a huge chunk of our defence budget and anything we can do to make sure we have enough of the right equipment and a pool of well trained, part time personnel to man it when required will go a long way to making us a more efficient (and effective) military.


----------



## Kirkhill

And anudder great article from Forbes









						Ukraine Converts $21.9 Billion In U.S. Military Surplus Into Fearsome Force
					

Doubters want you to believe $21.9 billion dollars in military aid is a lot, when, in fact, it's mostly cast-off gear that the U.S. was already sending to the scrapyard.




					www.forbes.com
				





Making do with military surplus - and still beating your enemy.  


What is just as fascinating to me is that 21.9 BUSD is broadly equivalent to DND's budge for a year.  Even if you just looked at the capital budget you are looking at 4 to 5 years of the capital budget.



> Ukraine Converts $21.9 Billion In U.S. Military Surplus Into Fearsome Force​Craig Hooper
> Senior Contributor
> I evaluate national security threats and propose solutions.
> Follow
> 12
> New! Click on the conversation bubble to join the conversation  Got it!
> Dec 26, 2022,03:27pm EST
> https://policies.google.com/privacy
> 
> Listen to article10 minutes
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Few nations have put U.S. military aid to better use than Ukraine
> AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
> The list of American security assistance to Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s “unprovoked and brutal invasion” is impressive. What is more impressive is that $21.9 billion in U.S. military aid has been dominated by largely second-string gear, comprised of unpopular or lower-tech systems that were, in many cases, on the way to the scrapyard.
> 
> 
> As Congress gears up to constrain the Biden Administration’s relative largesse, it is worth emphasizing that the aid, to date, is neither excessive nor threatening to U.S. national security.
> 
> In fact, U.S. military support to Ukraine has cost less than what Congress is paying to procure two _Gerald R. Ford_ (CVN 78) class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. In total, taxpayers will put some $26 billion into the USS _Gerald R. Ford_ (CVN 78) and the USS _John F. Kennedy_ (CVN 79). In comparison to these troubled flattops, the $21.9 billion for Ukraine appears to be a far more effective return on investment.
> 
> Aid to Ukraine has, in effect, shattered the Russian military, exposing it as little more than a paper tiger. The war has helped destroy Russia’s once-burgeoning arms bazaar, ruining Russian efforts to destabilize strategic regions. Enabling the fight has bolstered Ukraine’s commitment to their nation, critical for advancing society-building and anti-corruption efforts there. Facilitating Ukraine’s resistance may even end the kleptocratic reign of Vladimir Putin, paving the way for a more just—if not more democratic—society in Russia itself.
> 
> The war served a good proving ground for modern conflict, forcing the U.S. to recognize old “big war” conflict models it had eschewed for decades. The war has also reinforced the value of basic, boring old consumables, items the U.S. often ignores in the constant pursuit of the newest and shiniest technology—like the pricey _Ford_Class carrier.
> In all, the $21.9 billion has been very well spent. Had America held back the support, and just let Russia roll over Ukraine, America would have spent far more in keeping Russia from suborning the rest of Europe.
> MORE FOR YOU
> 
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> Helping Ukraine stand against overt aggression has already offered a great return on investment. America has frittered away far more for far less strategic benefit. The second Iraq War of 2003 cost the United States over a trillion dollars. Afghanistan cost another trillion in 2022 dollars. Those two conflicts—which offered little strategic advantage the U.S.— make the $21 billion in Ukraine security aid look like chump change.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Surplus International MaxxPro Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) fighting vehicles return from ... [+]
> © 2012 BLOOMBERG FINANCE LP
> Second-String U.S. Gear Has Rarely Been Used So Effectively​While the numbers and lists of gear are impressive, America hasn’t given very much that might impact America’s security in any substantial way. We’ve handed over a lot of former Russian or otherwise obsolete equipment, including 45 Russian-built T-72B main battle tanks and 20 Mi-17 helicopters. Much of the gear sent to Ukraine was headed for either the scrapheap or to other allies.
> To a general audience, armored personnel carriers sound impressive. The fact that America gave Ukraine some 200 M113 Armored Personnel Carriers sounds like a big deal. But military experts know that America stopped building these tracked utility vehicles about 25 years ago and is busy stripping them from the U.S. force.
> Other surplus gear has gone to Ukraine. During America’s counterinsurgency conflicts, the Army procured lots of M1117 Armored Security Vehicles—a wheeled armored car—between 1999 and 2014. More appropriate for military constabulary duties than full-scale conflict, the U.S. has already been drawing down the vehicle inventory, so the 250 sent to Ukraine won’t be missed. To give an idea of where Ukraine sits in terms of donations, the U.S. gave 200 of these vehicles to Columbia in 2020. Over 700 were produced for the Afghanistan Army and 400 went to the Iraqi armed forces. At least, in Ukraine, these vehicles are directly supporting U.S. goals.
> Some fancy militarized-sounding gifts have centered around mobility. A grant of almost 300-400 “Tactical Vehicles” may impress a general audience, but they’re all just military trucks built to carry between 2.5 or 5 tons.
> American taxpayers gave Ukraine 477 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs). Built for a grinding counterinsurgency, the U.S. military has been so eager to shed the heavy, hard-to-maintain vehicles it has handed them out to police departments all over the United States.
> America also provided some 1,200 “High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles.” Better known as Humvees, the U.S. is busy replacing this modern retake of the old military jeep with a newer version called the “Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.”
> Even the newly popular tube artillery systems—when donated, the future of much of the 142 155mm and 36 105mm howitzers, the 10 120mm, 10 82 mm and 10 60mm mortar systems donated to Ukraine were in doubt. The Marine Corps was aiming to cut their M777 howitzer batteries from 21 to five, but the importance of artillery on the Ukraine battlefield may have changed a few opinions.
> In air defense, all the focus has been on the yet-to-be-delivered Patriot air defense battery and the eight National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NSAMS). But the bigger story is in the old HAWK missiles the U.S. is supplying. The U.S. hasn’t used HAWK missiles since 2002, and, given that we made thousands of them, it would be very interesting to know more about how these old missiles are doing in the field.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A civilian at an interactive exhibition "Weapons of Victory," where visitors have the opportunity to ... [+]
> ANADOLU AGENCY VIA GETTY IMAGES
> Amid The Dross, Ukraine Has Gotten Some “Good Stuff”​This isn’t to say that the U.S. hasn’t supplied “good stuff”—complex, front-line weapons, coupled with always in-demand consumables. But, while the new gear gets a lot of headlines, the truly modern systems are few and far between, dwarfed the array of nearly-obsolete U.S. weaponry.
> The modern gear gets headlines. But then again, those modern, front-line systems in Ukraine are very few and far between, reflecting a jaundiced assessment of Ukrainian strategies, technical capabilities, and training. That’s why a modern Patriot air defense system may take time to be fielded in Ukraine. In a few years, eight batteries of National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NSAAMS) will arrive. New operators need a lot of training to fully exploit America’s high-tech gear.
> Ukraine supporters, when agitating for more and better weaponry point toward Ukraine’s quick exploitation of the 38 U.S. supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS. But these front-line assets are largely “fire-and-forget” platforms, and, as export items, their effectiveness depends more on the end-user’s prowess in finding, reporting and targeting relevant enemy assets.
> That is why the U.S. has put a lot of emphasis upon modern command and control assistance. Command post vehicles, including well over 80 different radars of various types, jamming gear, tactical communications systems, SATCOM terminals and surveillance equipment helped Ukraine plug critical capability gaps. And yet, while these tactical tools are high-demand and are, in many cases, considered relatively modern equipment, the U.S. has plenty to offer.
> Some high-tech, relatively “experimental” gear has also gone to Ukraine. The U.S. has fed 700 Switchblade kamikaze drones, 1,800 Phoenix Ghost unmanned aerial systems, unmanned costal defense vessels and other interesting trinkets into the war zone. These new high-tech “experiments” do cost money, but, for the U.S., getting an understanding of how these platforms perform on a modern battlefield is invaluable.
> Use rates of relatively modern man-portable or other small defensive anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems—1,600 Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, 8,500 Javelin anti-armor missiles, 46,000 other anti-armor systems, as well as 1,500 TOW anti-tank missiles, and 13,000 grenade launchers—have likely outstripped America’s ability to produce the munitions. But, again, this largesse has only made a small dent in America’s supplies—over the years America produced tens of thousands of Stingers and almost 50,000 Javelins.
> Another worry is Ukraine’s consumption of modern artillery shells. But this “revelation” is, again, worth an enormous amount to the U.S. military. For years, only a lonely team logisticians and other defense experts worried about America’s habit of underfunding munitions production and weapons sustainment.
> Until now, their concerns went unheard by a military more interested in funding shiny new weapons than in refreshing the grubby, dirty, and dangerous industrial base devoted to making munitions. Discovering that the critics were right, and identifying this manufacturing shortfall as a major constraint, enables the U.S. to do something about it now, when U.S. national security is not directly threatened on the battlefield.
> While, in total, the amount of military funding sent to Ukraine seems large, in real terms, much of the military aid sent to Ukraine—outside of ammunition—is comprised of systems that the Pentagon has already written off. That is worth remembering when demagogues try to sew public doubts about America’s support of Ukraine.
> 
> Follow me on Twitter or LinkedIn. Check out my website.


----------



## Kirkhill

@FJAG 

Needless to say I lean heavily towards @GR66 's arguments.

If I wanted an army that could function globally, ie across Canada, the Indo-Pacific, the High Arctic and Europe, regardless of alliances, I would give it wings and the ability to land on ships.

It may not do all jobs in every theater  but it would be available to work in every theater across the full spectrum of conflict.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> And that is where we disagree.  Which capabilities do we require?   Which should we acquire?
> 
> You want to bet on Black (Heavy).  I want to bet on Red (Light).
> 
> In truth none of us are that adamant.  Almost everybody wants to hedge their bets.  The argument fundamentally becomes how much to you put on Black and how much on Red.
> 
> Me, I'm 70/30 Red (Light) to Black (Heavy).
> 
> And that is just the professional regulars.  Augmented by released professionals as a reserve sounds right to me.
> 
> The bigger area of disagreement is over how much money should be spent on organizing, training and equipping unpaid volunteers anxious and willing to assist.


You see that's where I think you and @GR66 and I are talking at cross purposes because, like the two of you I think that 2/3rds of our full-time Army should be light and mobile and be supported by almost all of the Navy and Air Force in the defence of Canada and discrete and minor international missions.

You hear me arguing for heavy army components solely because I strongly believe heavy army components need to be maintained for a European deterrence theatre, a theatre which others here seem to be ready to throw under the bus. 

I too put 70% of the army's RegF into the Red category. Add to that mission most of the RCAF and the RCN and fully 90% of the RegF is committed to the Red (ie other than Europe heavy) side of the balance sheet.

By my meatball math, less than 5% of DND's capital and O&M budgets would go to European oriented heavy fly-over forces and with the predominant use of ResF troops less than 8% of DND's annual payroll. (i.e. roughly 5,000 out of 100,000 full-time salaries and roughly 12,000 out of roughly 27,000 authorized paid part-time positions.) would be Europe ie NATO focused. And remember we are talking focused not fully committed as most of these people are still in Canada and available for other missions while they train and are on stand-by.

We always seem to forget that one new aircraft could buy almost a subunit of tanks or IFVs or SP guns and that one ship easily a battalion or two's worth. And that battalion, prepositioned in Latvia buys a lot more goodwill and credibility than a ship at sea or an aircraft in Cold Lake.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> You see that's where I think you and @GR66 and I are talking at cross purposes because, like the two of you I think that 2/3rds of our full-time Army should be light and mobile and be supported by almost all of the Navy and Air Force in the defence of Canada and discrete and minor international missions.
> 
> You hear me arguing for heavy army components solely because I strongly believe heavy army components need to be maintained for a European deterrence theatre, a theatre which others here seem to be ready to throw under the bus.
> 
> I too put 70% of the army's RegF into the Red category. Add to that mission most of the RCAF and the RCN and fully 90% of the RegF is committed to the Red (ie other than Europe heavy) side of the balance sheet.
> 
> By my meatball math, less than 5% of DND's capital and O&M budgets would go to European oriented heavy fly-over forces and with the predominant use of ResF troops less than 8% of DND's annual payroll. (i.e. roughly 5,000 out of 100,000 full-time salaries and roughly 12,000 out of roughly 27,000 authorized paid part-time positions.) would be Europe ie NATO focused. And remember we are talking focused not fully committed as most of these people are still in Canada and available for other missions while they train and are on stand-by.
> 
> We always seem to forget that one new aircraft could buy almost a subunit of tanks or IFVs or SP guns and that one ship easily a battalion or two's worth. And that battalion, prepositioned in Latvia buys a lot more goodwill and credibility than a ship at sea or an aircraft in Cold Lake.
> 
> 🍻



Why on earth didn't you say so in the beginning?  

Strangely enough I can support that.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Why on earth didn't you say so in the beginning?
> 
> Strangely enough I can support that.


Take a look at my Army 2026 organization charts up in several threads well over a month ago.

1 Div (the heavy one) is a 30/70 force. All of 1 Div's battalions are 30/70.

2 Div (the all others jobs one) is a 70/30 force. In 2 Div 4 battalions are light 100/0 pure RegF (2 of which are para capable) supported by a CS brigade with battalions of 70/30 signals, EW, AD, Engrs (x2) and 30/70 MI and MP and 8 x light 30/70 battalions and three 30/70 Fd artillery regiments. Two of the 30/70 Inf battalions (one on each coast) is amphibious and one (on the west coast) is mountain.

Long story short, 2 of the RegF infantry battalions (six rifle companies) are in the heavy 1 Div. The remaining 7 RegF battalions (21 rifle companies) are made light and in 2 Div. Equipment wise, the LAVs from 12 companies are in 1 Div (6 prepositioned and six in Canada for training) 4 companies worth are unallocated.

Just as a reminder here's what I put out- the divisions are roughly the same size; the key is in the colour coding of the RegF to ResF ratios. Note too that 2 Div spans the whole country and owns all the Cdn Rangers which are spread further around the country than just the coastal areas and, which in my mind ought to be the core around which a home guard organization can be built:



🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

Based on the above level of concordance (agreement maybe too much to hope for yet)

Howzabout?

We have 12 professional regular manoeuvre groups and 4 professional regular fire groups plus a burgeoning array of other useful and interesting stuff.

I'm going to set the array aside and focus on the traditional units.


Therefore - 6 manoeuvre groups formed into 3 Special Service type Brigades.

From Wiki

The following units were serving in the SSF on disbandment in 1995:



> Special Service Force Headquarters and Signals Squadron
> 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
> Royal Canadian Dragoons
> 2 Combat Engineer Regiment
> 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment
> Canadian Airborne Regiment (now disbanded)
> 2 Field Ambulance
> 2 Military Police Platoon
> 2 Service Battalion
> 2 Intelligence Platoon
> 427 Tactical Helicopter Squadron



That takes care of 9 out of the 12 manoeuvre units and 3 of the fire support units.

My variations would be to lighten up the Cavalry and the Artillery (reduce the number of regular squadrons), have the Cavalry and the Artillery co-operate on ISTAR, reduce the number of CS batteries but thicken up the AD troop to become a full battery.   One of the infantry battalions would be platform independent light.  The other would be primarily National Defence LAV but capable of leaving their LAVs behind if necessary.

With three Light Brigades of that sort then an HQ and Sigs Sqn of any brigade could be fielded with various atts and dets from other brigades to meet particular circumstances.

All of those elements should be 100% Reg,


What is left over?  1 fire support unit and 3 manoeuvre units plus additional bodies from the lightened (and dare I suggest) automated cavalry and artillery.

You could do worse than 4 CMBG as a model

An armd recce sqn
2 infantry battalions
1 armd regiment
1 large artillery regiment (3x 8-Gun Batteries, 1x LR Battery, 2x AD Batteries)

That could both be adequately manned to supply immediate support to the deployed Light Brigades AND allied with part-timers (militia, volunteers, reservists, whatever) to both permit the deployment of the heavy brigade independently and its sustainment over the long haul.

Generally speaking I would be reducing the size of sections and platoons, emphasizing vehicles (appropriate to the means of deployment and the theatre) as well as team served systems, and multiplying the means of communication - radios, dispatch riders and lasers.

As for the reserves

Light First.

Every reserve unit is formed up as a Rifle Coy in terms of numbers and rank structure.  Without exception.  Everybody trains with batons and rifles.

Some units focus on assault operations, some on defence, some on mobile ops, some on air defence, some on close fire support, some on intelligence gathering, some on transport and supply.



One other thing I have thinking about since watching the Ukrainian efforts, and this moves into the array of interesting stuff,  I am starting to think there needs to be a very close alignment between the Artillery (especially the GBAD elements but also the Class II and III types) AND the EW squadron - not so much its intelligence are as its active measures arm.


Edit - after seeing @FJAG's reiteration of his position I see that his first Division and mine don't look dissimilar.  My primary issues are the 30/70 split (I would be aiming for 0/100 res to regs) and too many LAV battalions.  As well as too many armoured regiments.

Make your three brigade armoured regiments into Light Armour (no tanks) and make one of the LAV battalions a light battalion.

All the rest of the tanks and LAVs then get amalgamated in the Heavy Brigade -  either 3 permanent Combined Arms Units or 1 Armd and 2 Mech Inf (if you want to adhere to tradition) is fine with me.  Some of those will be manned by part-timers.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> Based on the above level of concordance (agreement maybe too much to hope for yet)


I'll give you my reasons for why I prefer my organization below


Kirkhill said:


> Howzabout?
> 
> We have 12 professional regular manoeuvre groups and 4 professional regular fire groups plus a burgeoning array of other useful and interesting stuff.
> 
> I'm going to set the array aside and focus on the traditional units.
> 
> 
> Therefore - 6 manoeuvre groups formed into 3 Special Service type Brigades.
> 
> From Wiki
> 
> The following units were serving in the SSF on disbandment in 1995:


I'm not a fan of the SSF. It was a mashed together organization designed primarily to remove a formation (at the time we had four brigades/combat groups and an airborne regiment.) We ended up with three brigades/combat groups and an SSF (which was bigger than an airborne regiment but smaller than a brigade)

Essentially in 1976 the RCR had three battalions, one each in London, Petawawa and Gagetown. 2RCR in Gagetown had nothing really to do with 2 Combat Group (just like E Bty 2RCHA and the VIII Hussars outfit in Gagetown had nothing to do with 2 Cbt Gp in Pet - I was in Pet from 72-76 and trained many times with 1 and 3 RCR but never with 2 RCR. I'm not sure who they belonged to either before or after the SSF formation). In 1976 they moved the Airborne Regt to Pet and moved 3 RCR to Germany) Effectively 2 Combat Group went from 2 bns to one mech bn and the Airborne. Everything stayed more or less the same for the rest of the combat group except the elements lightened up a bit and got a para capability grafted in. It never made sense to me albeit its stated purpose was to have a rapid reaction light force with a more general purpose follow up force. 



Kirkhill said:


> That takes care of 9 out of the 12 manoeuvre units and 3 of the fire support units.
> 
> My variations would be to lighten up the Cavalry and the Artillery (reduce the number of regular squadrons), have the Cavalry and the Artillery co-operate on ISTAR, reduce the number of CS batteries but thicken up the AD troop to become a full battery.   One of the infantry battalions would be platform independent light.  The other would be primarily National Defence LAV but capable of leaving their LAVs behind if necessary.


I'm way out of date on ISTAR subsequent to Afghanistan. Cavalry to artillery cooperation comes in the brigade ops centre where ops in general is grafted at the hip to the FSCC and STACC. You can link in recce with dedicated FOO/JTACs and, maybe, an FSCC. You do not need an ISTAR cell per se for that. To me the bulk of sensor-shooter responses do not need the analysis that an ISTAR organization or All-source intelligence cell gives, and if anything, it can slow down the response. Don't get me wrong, I'm not against ISTAR. It depends on the processes and how things function. I'm from the old school brigade staff structure where the Bde IntO, the ArtyOps O and the brigade major could all talk to each other from the back doors of their cheek-to-jowl CP vehicles.

One thing about air defence. The SSF was unique in having an AD troop. All the other two Canadian brigades had a battery at the time and 4 CMBG a battery plus a bunch. The doctrine I learned under was an AD regiment supported a division and an AD battery a brigade. 


Kirkhill said:


> With three Light Brigades of that sort then an HQ and Sigs Sqn of any brigade could be fielded with various atts and dets from other brigades to meet particular circumstances.


I've slowly bought into the building block system. manpower shortages have always made that a necessity for my whole career and it became embedded in our basic force generation/force employment structure at the sub-unit level in the early 00s transformation.


Kirkhill said:


> All of those elements should be 100% Reg,


This I do not buy and I'll explain below.


Kirkhill said:


> What is left over?  1 fire support unit and 3 manoeuvre units plus additional bodies from the lightened (and dare I suggest) automated cavalry and artillery.
> 
> You could do worse than 4 CMBG as a model
> 
> An armd recce sqn
> 2 infantry battalions
> 1 armd regiment
> 1 large artillery regiment (3x 8-Gun Batteries, 1x LR Battery, 2x AD Batteries)


That varies depending on whether you aim to fight as a separate brigade or as part of a division. I agree totally that 1 armd regt and two mech battalions form the core. Recce and artillery and service support can be downloaded from a divisional asset. Just as a point, you don't want two AD batteries in a brigade because you only want one AD control centre - if there aren't enough sensor and fire units then make the battery bigger. 


Kirkhill said:


> That could both be adequately manned to supply immediate support to the deployed Light Brigades AND allied with part-timers (militia, volunteers, reservists, whatever) to both permit the deployment of the heavy brigade independently and its sustainment over the long haul.
> 
> Generally speaking I would be reducing the size of sections and platoons, emphasizing vehicles (appropriate to the means of deployment and the theatre) as well as team served systems, and multiplying the means of communication - radios, dispatch riders and lasers.


I don't go into that level of detail. There are far too many options and which option is appropriate is both theatre dependent and highly subjective.


Kirkhill said:


> As for the reserves
> 
> Light First.
> 
> Every reserve unit is formed up as a Rifle Coy in terms of numbers and rank structure.  Without exception.  Everybody trains with batons and rifles.
> 
> Some units focus on assault operations, some on defence, some on mobile ops, some on air defence, some on close fire support, some on intelligence gathering.


Totally disagree with minor exceptions. 

I'm on the side of the reserves as an active partner in meeting basic defence requirements. For me that starts with a reserve predominant heavy force because it's affordable and you only need it in very narrow circumstances. It does need enough RegF leadership to provide structure and training and even, in an emergency, a small rapid deployable capability. Equipment usage, wear and tear and ammunition expenditures are reduced over a full-time force but at the same time you do have the capability available when needed.

There must also be a capability to augment light forces with reservists. In my structure 1/3 of the RegF is heavy and 2/3 is light while the ResF is roughly 60/40.

There clearly is a need for some 100/0 RegF units for rapid reaction work. The number of such units is debateable and one has to look both historically at how we've been doing deployments and how we want to do them in the future as well as how we want to manage readiness. 

I have the same view about light ResF units needing RegF leadership but possibly a slightly smaller support structure. They need it to relieve part-timers of administrative burdens that get in the way of training; to organize and supervise and run such training; to keep equipment ready; and to create a core around which others are mobilized.

Essentially my 30/70 model is created by taking the PYs of a single RegF battalion and out of them creating 3 battalion cores. Each core has one complete rifle company and a roughly 1/3 slice of headquarters, combat support and combat service support and a very small core for two more rifle companies. The remaining positions are filled out using some RegF (ie RSS staff) and the reservists from two or more reserve battalions.

The result is that for every RegF battalion that existed, you can create three 30/70 battalions. That creates more battalions that can be deployed than we presently can based on the fact that there is already a professional core there to build up. In addition one can increase the interval between when a given battalion needs to redeploy. Our current deployment missions are generally less than a single battalion augmented to a battle group in certain circumstances. In many case a single battalion core and a single rifle company is sufficient to deploy. In others, where speed is an issue, that core can be augmented by the RegF personnel from other battalions (the way we do now) or, where speed is not an issue it can be augmented by ResF personnel from within its own battalion, its own brigade or the army in general. 

The aim here is to create both a more professional ResF capable of deployment through better leadership and training and also a larger deployable force through making better use of the full-time leadership, that is currently too concentrated in RegF units/formations, and filling out the deploying unit numbers with less skilled reservists.

There is no magic in having 100% RegF battalions when they are constantly undermanned and we have been constantly deploying less than battalions and/or augmenting battalions with sub-units from other battalions. This was routine in Afghanistan where for example TF 3-07 had one company from each of the three R22eR battalions. Aggregating sub-units into a purpose based task force is the paradigm that was created with Advancing with Purpose. 

The same is even more true for armoured and combat support and service support elements which may or may not be needed for any given mission.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> I'll give you my reasons for why I prefer my organization below
> 
> I'm not a fan of the SSF. It was a mashed together organization designed primarily to remove a formation (at the time we had four brigades/combat groups and an airborne regiment.) We ended up with three brigades/combat groups and an SSF (which was bigger than an airborne regiment but smaller than a brigade)
> 
> Essentially in 1976 the RCR had three battalions, one each in London, Petawawa and Gagetown. 2RCR in Gagetown had nothing really to do with 2 Combat Group (just like E Bty 2RCHA and the VIII Hussars outfit in Gagetown had nothing to do with 2 Cbt Gp in Pet - I was in Pet from 72-76 and trained many times with 1 and 3 RCR but never with 2 RCR. I'm not sure who they belonged to either before or after the SSF formation). In 1976 they moved the Airborne Regt to Pet and moved 3 RCR to Germany) Effectively 2 Combat Group went from 2 bns to one mech bn and the Airborne. Everything stayed more or less the same for the rest of the combat group except the elements lightened up a bit and got a para capability grafted in. It never made sense to me albeit its stated purpose was to have a rapid reaction light force with a more general purpose follow up force.
> 
> 
> I'm way out of date on ISTAR subsequent to Afghanistan. Cavalry to artillery cooperation comes in the brigade ops centre where ops in general is grafted at the hip to the FSCC and STACC. You can link in recce with dedicated FOO/JTACs and, maybe, an FSCC. You do not need an ISTAR cell per se for that. To me the bulk of sensor-shooter responses do not need the analysis that an ISTAR organization or All-source intelligence cell gives, and if anything, it can slow down the response. Don't get me wrong, I'm not against ISTAR. It depends on the processes and how things function. I'm from the old school brigade staff structure where the Bde IntO, the ArtyOps O and the brigade major could all talk to each other from the back doors of their cheek-to-jowl CP vehicles.
> 
> One thing about air defence. The SSF was unique in having an AD troop. All the other two Canadian brigades had a battery at the time and 4 CMBG a battery plus a bunch. The doctrine I learned under was an AD regiment supported a division and an AD battery a brigade.
> 
> I've slowly bought into the building block system. manpower shortages have always made that a necessity for my whole career and it became embedded in our basic force generation/force employment structure at the sub-unit level in the early 00s transformation.
> 
> This I do not buy and I'll explain below.
> 
> That varies depending on whether you aim to fight as a separate brigade or as part of a division. I agree totally that 1 armd regt and two mech battalions form the core. Recce and artillery and service support can be downloaded from a divisional asset. Just as a point, you don't want two AD batteries in a brigade because you only want one AD control centre - if there aren't enough sensor and fire units then make the battery bigger.
> 
> I don't go into that level of detail. There are far too many options and which option is appropriate is both theatre dependent and highly subjective.
> 
> Totally disagree with minor exceptions.
> 
> I'm on the side of the reserves as an active partner in meeting basic defence requirements. For me that starts with a reserve predominant heavy force because it's affordable and you only need it in very narrow circumstances. It does need enough RegF leadership to provide structure and training and even, in an emergency, a small rapid deployable capability. Equipment usage, wear and tear and ammunition expenditures are reduced over a full-time force but at the same time you do have the capability available when needed.
> 
> There must also be a capability to augment light forces with reservists. In my structure 1/3 of the RegF is heavy and 2/3 is light while the ResF is roughly 60/40.
> 
> There clearly is a need for some 100/0 RegF units for rapid reaction work. The number of such units is debateable and one has to look both historically at how we've been doing deployments and how we want to do them in the future as well as how we want to manage readiness.
> 
> I have the same view about light ResF units needing RegF leadership but possibly a slightly smaller support structure. They need it to relieve part-timers of administrative burdens that get in the way of training; to organize and supervise and run such training; to keep equipment ready; and to create a core around which others are mobilized.
> 
> Essentially my 30/70 model is created by taking the PYs of a single RegF battalion and out of them creating 3 battalion cores. Each core has one complete rifle company and a roughly 1/3 slice of headquarters, combat support and combat service support and a very small core for two more rifle companies. The remaining positions are filled out using some RegF (ie RSS staff) and the reservists from two or more reserve battalions.
> 
> The result is that for every RegF battalion that existed, you can create three 30/70 battalions. That creates more battalions that can be deployed than we presently can based on the fact that there is already a professional core there to build up. In addition one can increase the interval between when a given battalion needs to redeploy. Our current deployment missions are generally less than a single battalion augmented to a battle group in certain circumstances. In many case a single battalion core and a single rifle company is sufficient to deploy. In others, where speed is an issue, that core can be augmented by the RegF personnel from other battalions (the way we do now) or, where speed is not an issue it can be augmented by ResF personnel from within its own battalion, its own brigade or the army in general.
> 
> The aim here is to create both a more professional ResF capable of deployment through better leadership and training and also a larger deployable force through making better use of the full-time leadership, that is currently too concentrated in RegF units/formations, and filling out the deploying unit numbers with less skilled reservists.
> 
> There is no magic in having 100% RegF battalions when they are constantly undermanned and we have been constantly deploying less than battalions and/or augmenting battalions with sub-units from other battalions. This was routine in Afghanistan where for example TF 3-07 had one company from each of the three R22eR battalions. Aggregating sub-units into a purpose based task force is the paradigm that was created with Advancing with Purpose.
> 
> The same is even more true for armoured and combat support and service support elements which may or may not be needed for any given mission.
> 
> 🍻



And I thought we were doing so well!   

I'll be back to you.

Just for thoughts I would ask you to compare these formations

173rd Abn Brigade (Separate) - I am inclined to discount the role of the ARNG battalion


 Headquarters and Headquarters Company
4th Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment[5][7]
1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment[5]
54th Brigade Engineer Battalion[10]
1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment[5]
2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment[5]
1st Battalion, 143rd Infantry Regiment, associated unit (Texas and Rhode Island Army National Guard)[8][9]
173rd Support Battalion[11]

*2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne)* "Spartans" located at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska

Headquarters and Headquarters Company
2nd Battalion 377th Field Artillery Regiment
1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment "Denali"
6th Brigade Engineer Battalion "Oak"
1st Battalion 501st Infantry Regiment
3rd Battalion 509th Infantry Regiment
725th Brigade Support Battalion "Centurion"
Special Service Force

Special Service Force Headquarters and Signals Squadron
2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
Royal Canadian Dragoons
2 Combat Engineer Regiment
1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (LAV-AVGP)
Canadian Airborne Regiment (now disbanded) (Lt-Abn)
2 Service Battalion
2 Field Ambulance
2 Military Police Platoon
2 Intelligence Platoon


427 Tactical Helicopter Squadron


----------



## FJAG

There really is no comparison. US Airborne brigades are based on the IBCT structure. ie 1 x cav sqn, 3 x Inf bns, 1 x arty bn, 1 x engineer bn and 1 x bde support battalion and are comparable in structure to our CMBGs (other than the LAVs). SBCTs have the same structure but different equipment. ABCTs are the same but have 3 x Combined arms battalions.

The fact that 173 IBCT and 2 Bde 11 Ab Div only have two para battalions has less to do with structure but more to do with not deploying a full IBCT to Italy or Alaska or investing in an additional two airborne IBCTs. The 101 Abn has three IBCTs with three airmobile bns each and the 82 has three IBCTs with 3 airborne bns each. In other words 

At its heart, the SSF was the same as 2 Cbt Gp but with one of its two infantry battalions removed to make room for the Airborne Regiment. At this time the Airborne Regiment lost a number of its enablers which became part of the 2 CG/SSF units. For example the airborne battery dissapeared and the para role went to E Bty (para). E Bty had for a long time been the divorced child of 2 RCHA which had been sent to be part of the CTC when the schools all consolidated in Gagetown in the 1970. E Bty title had returned to Pet before the Airborne came and had joined D and T Bty (T was the air defence battery but had also bee equipped with L5s. Gagetown's gunners stayed there and were renamed as W Bty. The same happened to its sigs, engineer and logistics elements which were absorbed in the SSF's sigs squadron, engineer regiment and service battalion leaving behind only enough support elements as a more or less regular line battalion would have.

With the SSF in place, D Bty retook the AMF(L) role (which had for a few years moved to Shilo) in support of 1 RCR and E Bty the para role in support of the CAR. T Bty was deactivated and converted into an AD troop. SSF was looked at as a domestic and international quick reaction fire brigade. Remember that this was all before that managed readiness nonsense.

Meanwhile 1 Combat Group and 5 Combat group were getting heavier as their artillery gave their L5s away for M109s to support the M113s and AVGPs of the infantry. We were an asynchronous army with a small light SSF, two middlin' combat groups and one heavy mechanized brigade group.

If you really want to have a laugh about the stupid things that went on then consider this. In the 1970 reorganization ( this was when the RCR and PPCLI went from 2 to 3 battalions each and the last of the Cdn Guards, Black Watch and QOR disappeared along with 4 RCHA, the FGH and 3 CMBG) 2 PPCLI in Germany was renamed the 3rd Mechanized Commando (mostly a mishmash of RCR and Patricia troops - 2 PPCLI's name went home to Winnipeg to take over 3 RCHA's barracks as the 3rd moved to join me in Shilo) 3 Mech Cdo was fully mechanized but wore the Airborne cap badge and maroon beret (which pissed off all the jumpers). It continued on in Germany for seven years drawing soldiers from Canada from wherever it could. In 1977 it went to the supplementary order of battle and was replaced by the3 RCR title which came from 2 Combat Group.

🍻


----------



## GR66

I'm going to continue to push back a bit here.


FJAG said:


> You see that's where I think you and @GR66 and I are talking at cross purposes because, like the two of you I think that 2/3rds of our full-time Army should be light and mobile and be supported by almost all of the Navy and Air Force in the defence of Canada and discrete and minor international missions.
> 
> You hear me arguing for heavy army components solely because I strongly believe heavy army components need to be maintained for a European deterrence theatre, a theatre which others here seem to be ready to throw under the bus.


I don't have an issue with the whole 100/0, 70/30, 30/70 concept at all.  I agree that the only way we're really going to get value out of the Reserves is to integrate them into a larger overall "Total Force" structure under Reg Force leadership. 

I also agree that it makes sense for those "Light" forces that are easier to transport quickly by air to have a higher Reg to Reserve ratio than the "Heavier" forces which will require transport by sea so that you can have a "Light" Rapid Deployment capability.

Where I do have the issue is with your basic overall force structure still focusing exclusively on unit types that are primarily suited for a European theatre of operations.  You have one Mechanized Division consisting of 4 x Canadianized SBCTs (one forward deployed to Latvia) and a Light Infantry Division of 4 x Canadianized IBCTs.  There is nothing here that is really suitable for the Indo-Pacific Theatre. 

Again I'm not arguing that air and naval forces won't be the primary contributions to a conflict against China.  However, unlike in Europe where the overall balance of military/economic/demographic strength massively favours NATO over Russia in any potential European conflict, the situation is NOT the same in the Indo-Pacific.  That to my mind makes it even more important for us to find ways for the Army to contribute in any way it can to support the RCN and RCAF in a conflict with China. 

Let's take a look at likely scenarios for a NATO-Russia conflict in Europe.  You have fully 1/2 of your proposed force structure (1 Mechanized Division) optimized for deterring Russia and fighting them if required.  I think we both agree that the threat from Russia is highly unlikely that they will launch a conventional attack on NATO that realistically they have no real chance of winning:


FJAG said:


> I'm not so much worried that Russia will make another thrust across the German plains; its will it try to gather low hanging fruit by "rescuing" the ethnic Russians living in the Baltic States, the Balkans, Poland and elsewhere. Russia espouses a need to secure its borders from NATO through buffer states but it's definition of a buffer state is one that is wholly within Russia's sphere of influence. Russia will continue to nibble on the edges of NATO's smaller states and in the process keep trying to create little Donbases and Luhansks and Georgias and Chechnyas wherever it can (even if it destroys them in the doing) on the supposition that NATO will not risk full-out nuclear war over these tiny slivers. Its a policy of death by a thousand cuts.


So let's say that we have our Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Latvia as a deterrent to Russia with the rest of 1 Division back in Canada to sustain/augment them if Russia actually does invade.

I think I can safely say that we are both in agreement that Russia is not going to "make another thrust across the German plains" in some kind of attempt to defeat the whole of NATO.  They simply don't have the military capability.  So I think we can also agree that any territorial ambitions that Russia has would be in either non-NATO nations or possibly in regions within NATO countries that have significant ethnic Russian minorities that they could exploit in order to expand their influence.

Ukraine has shown that Russian military involvement in non-NATO countries is highly unlikely to illicit a direct military response by NATO.  Other than Ukraine, what are the other non-NATO states in Europe that Russia might invade?  Moldova is the most likely, but Russian forces would have to cross Ukraine to get there.  How likely is that?  Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo?  Russian forces would have to fly over NATO territory to get to any of these.  The Caucuses (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan)?  We've already shown an unwillingness to have any direct military involvement there in the face of Russian military attacks.  So that really leaves Russian influence in ethnic Russian areas of NATO countries.

Is Russia going to simply launch a military invasion of Latvia in order to seize the portions of Latvia that have significant ethnic Russian minorities?  Certainly that would trigger an Article 5 response by NATO.  Do you have any doubt that NATO would be able to mobilize and retake that territory?  Do you think that Russia would risk nuclear annihilation by using nukes to defend such seized territory?  I don't think so.  Any Russian attempts to expand their influence/territory into these ethnically Russian areas would have to be much more in the "Grey Zone".

So let's look at a possible alternate scenario for Russian activities against Latvia:

ethnic Russians begin street protests demanding language rights and certain areas of self-determination within Latvia
strikes and protests by ethnic Russians become increasingly violent with street fights, molotov cocktails being thrown, etc.
the Latvian government cracks down on protesters with arrests, raids, curfews, detentions, etc.
ethnic Russian attacks against government forces escalate with protesters (aided by "little green men" from Russia and military type weapons crossing the border) including bombings of police stations, RPG attacks on police vehicles, sniper attacks, etc.
the Latvian government moves military forces in to deal with protesters and declares martial law in the restive regions of the country
pro-Russian Latvian forces seize key government buildings and declare an independent Republic
At what point along this continuum do we authorize our Mechanized Brigade Group to engage against the Latvian separatist forces?
At what point along this continuum does Russian regular military forces crossing the border into Latvian territory NOT trigger an Article 5 NATO military response?

My guess is that we would not use Canadian forces at all against Latvians and that movement of Russian forces directly into Latvian territory (disputed or not) would definitely trigger an Article 5 NATO response.

So we have fully 1/2 of our force structure tailored for a series of scenarios where it is highly unlikely to actually be used while at the same time it's looking increasingly likely that there may be some kind of conflict in the Indo-Pacific for which we have 0% of our force structure designed to face.

I'll say again though that I'm not proposing that we abandon NATO and "throw it under the bus" as has been suggested.  Let's face it even under @FJAG proposed structure Canada is still a pretty minor proportion of the total NATO deterrence against Russia.  Adjusting our force structure to also take into account a potential conflict with China is not going to make the difference between a strong and stable NATO and a renewed Warsaw Pact with all the Baltics, Ukraine and Eastern Poland all speaking Russian behind a new Iron Curtain.  

I'm not going to put a Napkin Army here because I'm not sure yet what it might look like but I'd suggest that it could still include a Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Latvia (with the bulk of it being flyover forces) because I agree we need to keep a "Heavy" capability.  

We also certainly need to keep a segment of our force that can be quickly transported by air in case of a crisis (either within Canada or elsewhere) but perhaps we need to examine what those forces might look like.  Does that need to be a dedicated Light Infantry Brigade?  Can dismounted LAV-based forces be deployed as an infantry component?  Could CSOR fill that role?  Are there other air-deployable types of forces that would be as useful/more useful than light infantry?  AD, EW, Rocket Artillery?

All I'm saying is that our current thinking on force structures seems to be firmly locked in a Cold War box.  We need mechanized forces to deter/fight the Russians and some Light Infantry to fill the gap in an emergency.  We already have those basic building blocks and we just argue about how to shuffle them around (and put back in the enablers that have been lost to budget cuts over the years) rather than starting from first principles and asking what are our military challenges/objectives and what types of forces do we need to meet those.


----------



## KevinB

I think for Europe you are missing post Ukraine conflict stabilization operations.  

Assuming that NATO will move into Ukraine to stabilize the border.  

Also when/IF Russia becomes a failed state - and needs a Marshall 2.0 and Constabulary Forces.  

I’m a big fan of Balanced Forces
  I think the Light Forces should be modeled on XVIII Airborne- specifically the 82nd and 101st, and ideally 2 Airborne Bde’s and 2 Airmobile. 
  I’d be willing to accept a 1 and 1 Bde (as opposed to 2 each) if both have 3 Inf Bn’s in them.  But would prefer 2 and 2 in a 60/40 organization.  
   Where at least 1Bde of each are 100 Reg. 

Then 1 Heavy Bde (the equivalent of 3 Combined Arms Bn’s, with 2 Tank Heavy and 1 Tracked IFV Inf heavy Bn’s) 
 Then 1 Mech Bde with 1 Tank Heavy and 2 LAV heavy Inf Bn) 

The Heavier forces being primarily Res as 30/70 organizations.  

  But neither the Light ‘Global QRF’ or the Heavy formations do anyone any good if there isn’t a robust supply and support system in place - and RCAF and RCN support to get them into theaters and support them once there.


----------



## ArmyRick

FJAG said:


> There really is no comparison. US Airborne brigades are based on the IBCT structure. ie 1 x cav sqn, 3 x Inf bns, 1 x arty bn, 1 x engineer bn and 1 x bde support battalion and are comparable in structure to our CMBGs (other than the LAVs). SBCTs have the same structure but different equipment. ABCTs are the same but have 3 x Combined arms battalions.
> 
> The fact that 173 IBCT and 2 Bde 11 Ab Div only have two para battalions has less to do with structure but more to do with not deploying a full IBCT to Italy or Alaska or investing in an additional two airborne IBCTs. The 101 Abn has three IBCTs with three airmobile bns each and the 82 has three IBCTs with 3 airborne bns each. In other words
> 
> At its heart, the SSF was the same as 2 Cbt Gp but with one of its two infantry battalions removed to make room for the Airborne Regiment. At this time the Airborne Regiment lost a number of its enablers which became part of the 2 CG/SSF units. For example the airborne battery dissapeared and the para role went to E Bty (para). E Bty had for a long time been the divorced child of 2 RCHA which had been sent to be part of the CTC when the schools all consolidated in Gagetown in the 1970. E Bty title had returned to Pet before the Airborne came and had joined D and T Bty (T was the air defence battery but had also bee equipped with L5s. Gagetown's gunners stayed there and were renamed as W Bty. The same happened to its sigs, engineer and logistics elements which were absorbed in the SSF's sigs squadron, engineer regiment and service battalion leaving behind only enough support elements as a more or less regular line battalion would have.
> 
> With the SSF in place, D Bty retook the AMF(L) role (which had for a few years moved to Shilo) in support of 1 RCR and E Bty the para role in support of the CAR. T Bty was deactivated and converted into an AD troop. SSF was looked at as a domestic and international quick reaction fire brigade. Remember that this was all before that managed readiness nonsense.
> 
> Meanwhile 1 Combat Group and 5 Combat group were getting heavier as their artillery gave their L5s away for M109s to support the M113s and AVGPs of the infantry. We were an asynchronous army with a small light SSF, two middlin' combat groups and one heavy mechanized brigade group.
> 
> If you really want to have a laugh about the stupid things that went on then consider this. In the 1970 reorganization ( this was when the RCR and PPCLI went from 2 to 3 battalions each and the last of the Cdn Guards, Black Watch and QOR disappeared along with 4 RCHA, the FGH and 3 CMBG) 2 PPCLI in Germany was renamed the 3rd Mechanized Commando (mostly a mishmash of RCR and Patricia troops - 2 PPCLI's name went home to Winnipeg to take over 3 RCHA's barracks as the 3rd moved to join me in Shilo) 3 Mech Cdo was fully mechanized but wore the Airborne cap badge and maroon beret (which pissed off all the jumpers). It continued on in Germany for seven years drawing soldiers from Canada from wherever it could. In 1977 it went to the supplementary order of battle and was replaced by the3 RCR title which came from 2 Combat Group.
> 
> 🍻


Just a quick history question, so 3RCR was part of 2 combat group until the SSF stood up in '77 and then went overseas to take over 3 Mech (not really) CDO?


----------



## Kirkhill

For the record, and pushing back against the three battalion model

In addition to the two battalion brigades that I cited here is the 4 CMBG model ca 1989








Headquarters – Lahr





8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) – armoured (59 Leopard C-1, 24 Lynx, 3 Leopard ARV (Taurus?), 23 M113)





1st Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment – mechanized





3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment – mechanized





1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery – self-propelled artillery and light anti-aircraft (24 M109A2, 15 Blowpipe SAM)





4th Air Defence Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery – motorized anti-aircraft artillery (with Oerlikon 35mm)





4 Combat Engineer Regiment – mechanized engineers[9](3 Biber, 19 M113, 3 Lynx)





444 Helicopter Squadron – light helicopter squadron (12 CH136 Kiowa (OH58))

6 battalions and 3 armoured regiments, together with 4 arty regiments buys you 2x SSF and 1x 4 CMBG.

You could always do as the 173rd Abn does and add an ARNG/PrRes battalion to each brigade - maybe thicken up the arty and the cav.   But in the mean time you have three functional brigades at notice to move.


----------



## daftandbarmy

KevinB said:


> But neither the Light ‘Global QRF’ or the Heavy formations do anyone any good if there isn’t a robust supply and support system in place - and RCAF and RCN support to get them into theaters and support them once there.



This is the key, of course. 

Strategic reach, and sustainment during heavy fighting, requires a whole of nation effort which Canada might just not be ready for.


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:


> This is the key, of course.
> 
> Strategic reach, and sustainment during heavy fighting, requires a whole of nation effort which Canada might just not be ready for.


Totally agree and hopefully the Army isn't looking at its future force structure in isolation and is sitting down with the RCN and RCAF and figuring out what kind of force can actually be sustained.

Sadly I don't know whether to put [/sarcasm] after this comment or not.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> Totally agree and hopefully the Army isn't looking at its future force structure in isolation and is sitting down with the RCN and RCAF and figuring out what kind of force can actually be sustained.
> 
> Sadly I don't know whether to put [/sarcasm] after this comment or not.



I can see it now


----------



## GR66

KevinB said:


> I think for Europe you are missing post Ukraine conflict stabilization operations.
> 
> Assuming that NATO will move into Ukraine to stabilize the border.
> 
> Also when/IF Russia becomes a failed state - and needs a Marshall 2.0 and Constabulary Forces.


I can think of no better way than moving NATO forces into Ukraine after the conflict to strengthen the radical elements in Russia.  You'd basically be confirming their pre-war propaganda about NATO's attempts to encircle Russia.  Surveillance overflights and a security guarantee are more likely (and less provocative) than NATO forces or NATO membership at least until a post-Putin Russia sorts itself out.

Similarly, moving NATO forces into Russia that is breaking apart would be an invitation to Russian radical nationalists to use their nuclear weapons in the "final defence" of their country.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> Where I do have the issue is with your basic overall force structure still focusing exclusively on unit types that are primarily suited for a European theatre of operations.  You have one Mechanized Division consisting of 4 x Canadianized SBCTs (one forward deployed to Latvia) and a Light Infantry Division of 4 x Canadianized IBCTs.  There is nothing here that is really suitable for the Indo-Pacific Theatre.


IMHO, its not that great for Europe either. My prime criteria for this establishment is to use the people and equipment we presently have. In effect we have no SBCTs nor ABCTs. We have three brigades structured on the BCT model with a tank regiment and two LAV infantry battalions as the manoeuvre elements. Plus inadequate artillery and cavalry. It's a mash up and basically there is only the equipment for two such brigades. One brigades worth forward deployed and one in Canada which are shared by three brigades worth of people (remember that the prepositioned brigade is equipment with some maintainers and a command staff only - its meant to be manned by the three Canadian brigades). The numbers are designed to ensure that they are sustainable (both in peace and war) and there is a hope that at some point in the future proper equipment will follow. Effectively as designed it is capable of sustaining one single deployed mechanized brigade which admittedly is targeted at Europe where our current military threat is.

I'm generally equipment agnostic as to future equipment for both divisions for the time being. It's a given that we need better anti-armour and anti-air resources. I generally do not see the armoured regiment or infantry battalions needing to change much in number or structure - just the equipment they may end up with. I do see major possibilities for new types of cavalry and artillery based on new weapons development. I basically look at mortar platoons and arty battalions as having a future that will probably be a mixture of tubes, rockets, loitering things etc. I also see that with longer ranges and new systems, that cavalry units and artillery will be more connected at the hip to extend the fight forward of and in between the gaps of the traditional manoeuvre units.


GR66 said:


> Again I'm not arguing that air and naval forces won't be the primary contributions to a conflict against China.  However, unlike in Europe where the overall balance of military/economic/demographic strength massively favours NATO over Russia in any potential European conflict, the situation is NOT the same in the Indo-Pacific.  That to my mind makes it even more important for us to find ways for the Army to contribute in any way it can to support the RCN and RCAF in a conflict with China.


I'm not ignoring China. I just don't feel confident enough to know or pontificate on where we fit in yet. I like the theory of a Multi-Domain Task Force. The US only has two targeted on the Indo-Pacific and I see a use for more. It's a high price for equipment and skills, however. Maybe beyond our Chevy budget.

As far as combat forces are concerned, that's where 2 Div's light battalions fit in for me. 


GR66 said:


> Let's take a look at likely scenarios for a NATO-Russia conflict in Europe.  You have fully 1/2 of your proposed force structure (1 Mechanized Division) optimized for deterring Russia and fighting them if required.  I think we both agree that the threat from Russia is highly unlikely that they will launch a conventional attack on NATO that realistically they have no real chance of winning:


It's a non-zero possibility.


GR66 said:


> So let's say that we have our Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Latvia as a deterrent to Russia with the rest of 1 Division back in Canada to sustain/augment them if Russia actually does invade.
> 
> I think I can safely say that we are both in agreement that Russia is not going to "make another thrust across the German plains" in some kind of attempt to defeat the whole of NATO.  They simply don't have the military capability.  So I think we can also agree that any territorial ambitions that Russia has would be in either non-NATO nations or possibly in regions within NATO countries that have significant ethnic Russian minorities that they could exploit in order to expand their influence.


The reason they won't make the thrust is if there is adequate deterrence there. The possibility of a land grab "a la Ukraine" is there for the former Western pact countries if deterrence is too weak.


GR66 said:


> Ukraine has shown that Russian military involvement in non-NATO countries is highly unlikely to illicit a direct military response by NATO.  Other than Ukraine, what are the other non-NATO states in Europe that Russia might invade?  Moldova is the most likely, but Russian forces would have to cross Ukraine to get there.  How likely is that?  Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo?  Russian forces would have to fly over NATO territory to get to any of these.  The Caucuses (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan)?  We've already shown an unwillingness to have any direct military involvement there in the face of Russian military attacks.  So that really leaves Russian influence in ethnic Russian areas of NATO countries.


The Baltic states and parts of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria are possibilities depending on the Ukraine outcome. Don't think tomorrow. Think in a decade after the Russians have rebuilt and seeded the ground. 


GR66 said:


> Is Russia going to simply launch a military invasion of Latvia in order to seize the portions of Latvia that have significant ethnic Russian minorities?  Certainly that would trigger an Article 5 response by NATO.  Do you have any doubt that NATO would be able to mobilize and retake that territory?  Do you think that Russia would risk nuclear annihilation by using nukes to defend such seized territory?  I don't think so.  Any Russian attempts to expand their influence/territory into these ethnically Russian areas would have to be much more in the "Grey Zone".


I I think that your optimism (which NATO shared for a couple of decades) is dangerous. It's why Russia keeps nibbling away at the borders of neighbouring countries that no longer tow the Moscow line. Boots on the ground do more than deter Russia. They bolster the confidence of these little states that are at risk. I was in the room back in the early 00s when a Russian diplomat told us quite bluntly that if the Baltic States joined NATO "the tanks will roll". I believed him then and I do now. Russians have a different world view than we do. Moscow has control of the states security forces and media and make Trump look like a tyro when it comes to bald-faced lies.


GR66 said:


> So let's look at a possible alternate scenario for Russian activities against Latvia:
> 
> ethnic Russians begin street protests demanding language rights and certain areas of self-determination within Latvia
> strikes and protests by ethnic Russians become increasingly violent with street fights, molotov cocktails being thrown, etc.
> the Latvian government cracks down on protesters with arrests, raids, curfews, detentions, etc.
> ethnic Russian attacks against government forces escalate with protesters (aided by "little green men" from Russia and military type weapons crossing the border) including bombings of police stations, RPG attacks on police vehicles, sniper attacks, etc.
> the Latvian government moves military forces in to deal with protesters and declares martial law in the restive regions of the country
> pro-Russian Latvian forces seize key government buildings and declare an independent Republic
> At what point along this continuum do we authorize our Mechanized Brigade Group to engage against the Latvian separatist forces?
> At what point along this continuum does Russian regular military forces crossing the border into Latvian territory NOT trigger an Article 5 NATO military response?
> 
> My guess is that we would not use Canadian forces at all against Latvians and that movement of Russian forces directly into Latvian territory (disputed or not) would definitely trigger an Article 5 NATO response.
> 
> So we have fully 1/2 of our force structure tailored for a series of scenarios where it is highly unlikely to actually be used while at the same time it's looking increasingly likely that there may be some kind of conflict in the Indo-Pacific for which we have 0% of our force structure designed to face.


Lets get real and pretend the Russians aren't a threat. Let's say we have a brigades worth of equipment sitting in Latvia and the tanks never role but other things happen. We then still have one brigade's worth of equipment and three brigade's of people in Canada to use as we see fit. If you leave one on standing watch for an opportunistic European deployment that leaves 1 brigade of equipment (and hopefully by then another brigades worth and two brigades worth of people able to man it. (over and above all the light forces in 2 Div) Nothing whatsoever stops you from targeting them on the Pacific. There are places where heavy forces are highly useful - Korea, Taiwan, Japan, even Australia. There utility isn't wasted but again gives the government the option to deploy a heavy brigade to the west, if it chooses to do so. 


GR66 said:


> I'll say again though that I'm not proposing that we abandon NATO and "throw it under the bus" as has been suggested.  Let's face it even under @FJAG proposed structure Canada is still a pretty minor proportion of the total NATO deterrence against Russia.  Adjusting our force structure to also take into account a potential conflict with China is not going to make the difference between a strong and stable NATO and a renewed Warsaw Pact with all the Baltics, Ukraine and Eastern Poland all speaking Russian behind a new Iron Curtain.
> 
> I'm not going to put a Napkin Army here because I'm not sure yet what it might look like but I'd suggest that it could still include a Canadian Mechanized Brigade in Latvia (with the bulk of it being flyover forces) because I agree we need to keep a "Heavy" capability.


That's the point though. At some point the CAF needs to put up a napkin force that makes sense. I never was a fan of managed readiness but admit its utility in Afghanistan when we were committing the better part of a brigade every six months out of a force that had been ravaged the decade before. Our force is ravaged again and the only solution that I see is better training and integration of part-time forces which, because of the limited training time available, requires a more focused regime then the all-singing and dancing thing that we have now. Russia isn't just a operational focus; its a means to an end to establish an organizational and training regime that brings the CAF to a higher level of capability within the current limitations.


GR66 said:


> We also certainly need to keep a segment of our force that can be quickly transported by air in case of a crisis (either within Canada or elsewhere) but perhaps we need to examine what those forces might look like.  Does that need to be a dedicated Light Infantry Brigade?  Can dismounted LAV-based forces be deployed as an infantry component?  Could CSOR fill that role?  Are there other air-deployable types of forces that would be as useful/more useful than light infantry?  AD, EW, Rocket Artillery?
> 
> All I'm saying is that our current thinking on force structures seems to be firmly locked in a Cold War box.  We need mechanized forces to deter/fight the Russians and some Light Infantry to fill the gap in an emergency.  We already have those basic building blocks and we just argue about how to shuffle them around (and put back in the enablers that have been lost to budget cuts over the years) rather than starting from first principles and asking what are our military challenges/objectives and what types of forces do we need to meet those.


Let me assure you that Canada is not locked into a Cold War box. That was what Transformation and Advancing with Purpose was all about. To take the Army out of the Cold War box. It created two religious tribes in the Army - The Hillierians who basically disassembled our Cold War capability in an attempt to create an agile, mobile OOTW force that had to adapt as Afghanistan went along and those who said "hold on a minute; let's not throw out the baby with the bath water". I was firmly in the latter camp and watched in disgust as one capability after another was thrown under the bus. The fact that we still have some tanks is a minor miracle of circumstances and has nothing to do with a rationale plan. 

Canada isn't even close to being in a Cold War box. Let me just say this. The first principle when of designing a force when you do not know what the challenge is that it has to face is to ensure that your force is balanced adequately to be able to meet (or at least participate) in every part of the conflict spectrum. For me that includes an overriding factor - we'll never be large enough to go on our own and we'll never go without the US so we might as well follow their lead to ensure that we fit as seamlessly as possible into their force structure. To me that means a Delta like SF, a Ranger-like special force, and at least one each (preferably two) of an ABCT, SBCT, IBCT, an artillery brigade, an aviation brigade, a sustainment brigade and what they now call a protection brigade with sufficient reserve force depth and at least one deployable division headquarters. That gives you the ability to go in any direction regardless of what you focus them on in peacetime. We currently have the manning to achieve that (RegF and ResF combined) and a good start on the equipment needed.

Basically you need to start the reorganization while you figure out the equipment you need. You can always fine tune the organization to serve the equipment once its decided on.

I really need to bow out of this thread for a while and get some work done. 

🍻


----------



## FJAG

ArmyRick said:


> Just a quick history question, so 3RCR was part of 2 combat group until the SSF stood up in '77 and then went overseas to take over 3 Mech (not really) CDO?


Yup. To the best of my recollection the 3rd was recreated around 1970 from elements of the Cdn Guards in Pet (it had previously been created for and disbanded after Korea). 1st Bn was down in London. When I got to Pet in 72, 2 RCR was in Gagetown having come back from Germany around 1970 and merged with what was left of the Black Watch. 2 RCR was never really a part of 2 Combat Group - just 1 and 3 RCR - while I was there until 1976. The SSF moved in just after I left and when the 3rd went to Germany.

At some point, I don't remember when, 1 RCR moved up from London to Pet as well. It might have been around the time of the disbandment of 4 CMBG and the CAR.

🍻


----------



## GR66

FJAG said:


> IMHO, its not that great for Europe either. My prime criteria for this establishment is to use the people and equipment we presently have. In effect we have no SBCTs nor ABCTs. We have three brigades structured on the BCT model with a tank regiment and two LAV infantry battalions as the manoeuvre elements. Plus inadequate artillery and cavalry. It's a mash up and basically there is only the equipment for two such brigades. One brigades worth forward deployed and one in Canada which are shared by three brigades worth of people (remember that the prepositioned brigade is equipment with some maintainers and a command staff only - its meant to be manned by the three Canadian brigades). The numbers are designed to ensure that they are sustainable (both in peace and war) and there is a hope that at some point in the future proper equipment will follow. Effectively as designed it is capable of sustaining one single deployed mechanized brigade which admittedly is targeted at Europe where our current military threat is.
> 
> I'm generally equipment agnostic as to future equipment for both divisions for the time being. It's a given that we need better anti-armour and anti-air resources. I generally do not see the armoured regiment or infantry battalions needing to change much in number or structure - just the equipment they may end up with. I do see major possibilities for new types of cavalry and artillery based on new weapons development. I basically look at mortar platoons and arty battalions as having a future that will probably be a mixture of tubes, rockets, loitering things etc. I also see that with longer ranges and new systems, that cavalry units and artillery will be more connected at the hip to extend the fight forward of and in between the gaps of the traditional manoeuvre units.


I'd point to this as an example of where there is a determination to stick with what is basically a WWII structure in the combined arms Brigade without examining if there are any different constructs that might be more appropriate based on the technology of the 2020s and beyond.  The exact same building blocks as 1945 just with us looking to upgrade our equipment/vehicles to a more modern standard.  

Now I realize it's very risky to just go and change from a formula that worked in the past but I'd put this down to yet another failure of past and present Canadian Army leadership.  There have been no serious efforts made for decades to examine our way of war or to experiment with new ideas.  Rather we've just stuck to the same formula and dropped capabilities in order to maintain the basic structures until we've stripped so much away capability that the structures we're left with are unable to perform their original tasks.  We've sacrificed function for form.


FJAG said:


> I'm not ignoring China. I just don't feel confident enough to know or pontificate on where we fit in yet. I like the theory of a Multi-Domain Task Force. The US only has two targeted on the Indo-Pacific and I see a use for more. It's a high price for equipment and skills, however. Maybe beyond our Chevy budget.
> 
> As far as combat forces are concerned, that's where 2 Div's light battalions fit in for me.


We do more trade with China (our #2 trade partner) that with the entire EU and that doesn't include trade with Japan (#4), South Korea (#7), Hong Kong (#11) and India (#14).  It really is crazy that we as a nation and our military in particular have such a blind eye to the Indo-Pacific and its importance to our own prosperity.

2 Division's Light Battalions are really just an afterthought.  I can't remember which forum member it was that said that we don't have Light Infantry because we don't have any doctrine for their use.  What we really have is extra Infantry Battalions that we're too cheap to buy vehicles for.  Sending our Light Battalions to the Indo-Pacific would be the modern equivalent of Hong Kong in 1941.


FJAG said:


> It's a non-zero possibility. [added context: meaning a Russian invasion of NATO]
> 
> The reason they won't make the thrust is if there is adequate deterrence there. The possibility of a land grab "a la Ukraine" is there for the former Western pact countries if deterrence is too weak.
> 
> The Baltic states and parts of Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria are possibilities depending on the Ukraine outcome. Don't think tomorrow. Think in a decade after the Russians have rebuilt and seeded the ground.
> 
> I I think that your optimism (which NATO shared for a couple of decades) is dangerous. It's why Russia keeps nibbling away at the borders of neighbouring countries that no longer tow the Moscow line. Boots on the ground do more than deter Russia. They bolster the confidence of these little states that are at risk. I was in the room back in the early 00s when a Russian diplomat told us quite bluntly that if the Baltic States joined NATO "the tanks will roll". I believed him then and I do now. Russians have a different world view than we do. Moscow has control of the states security forces and media and make Trump look like a tyro when it comes to bald-faced lies.
> 
> Lets get real and pretend the Russians aren't a threat. Let's say we have a brigades worth of equipment sitting in Latvia and the tanks never role but other things happen. We then still have one brigade's worth of equipment and three brigade's of people in Canada to use as we see fit. If you leave one on standing watch for an opportunistic European deployment that leaves 1 brigade of equipment (and hopefully by then another brigades worth and two brigades worth of people able to man it. (over and above all the light forces in 2 Div) Nothing whatsoever stops you from targeting them on the Pacific. There are places where heavy forces are highly useful - Korea, Taiwan, Japan, even Australia. There utility isn't wasted but again gives the government the option to deploy a heavy brigade to the west, if it chooses to do so.


Not many things are "a non-zero possibility" but some things are more likely than others.  I personally would rank Russia launching a near suicidal attack on NATO fairly low on the risk of possibilities.

How high in comparison would you rank the possibility of China invading Taiwan and coming in conflict with US forces?  And if that happens, how high would you rank the possibility of North Korean forces becoming involved in the conflict?  Personally I'd rate both of these possibilities as considerably higher than Russia invading a NATO country.  Are China and North Korea any less belligerent in their rhetoric about their neighbours than Russia?  In fact the military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific puts the risk of the West losing a conflict there much higher than against Russia.  But I don't see any suggestions that instead of putting a pre-positioned Mechanized Brigade in Latvia we put one in South Korea where the risk of direct conflict is potentially much greater than in Europe.  It's for reasons like this that I suggest that some of the proposed thinking around our future force structure are stuck in Eurocentric thinking.


FJAG said:


> That's the point though. At some point the CAF needs to put up a napkin force that makes sense. I never was a fan of managed readiness but admit its utility in Afghanistan when we were committing the better part of a brigade every six months out of a force that had been ravaged the decade before. Our force is ravaged again and the only solution that I see is better training and integration of part-time forces which, because of the limited training time available, requires a more focused regime then the all-singing and dancing thing that we have now. Russia isn't just a operational focus; its a means to an end to establish an organizational and training regime that brings the CAF to a higher level of capability within the current limitations.


Yes, at some point somebody has to put up a napkin force that makes sense.  Most of what we're doing right now though is just shuffling around our existing units on the page making slight variations to our existing structure.  We're not really looking at anything new or different like the UK's "Deep Recce Strike Brigade", the US Army's "Multi Domain Task Force" or the USMC's "Littoral Regiment".  Again, it seems like a task beyond the capabilities of our military leadership.


FJAG said:


> Let me assure you that Canada is not locked into a Cold War box. That was what Transformation and Advancing with Purpose was all about. To take the Army out of the Cold War box. It created two religious tribes in the Army - The Hillierians who basically disassembled our Cold War capability in an attempt to create an agile, mobile OOTW force that had to adapt as Afghanistan went along and those who said "hold on a minute; let's not throw out the baby with the bath water". I was firmly in the latter camp and watched in disgust as one capability after another was thrown under the bus. The fact that we still have some tanks is a minor miracle of circumstances and has nothing to do with a rationale plan.


I'll agree that the current Canadian Army isn't locked into a Cold War box.  They are stuck in a cubicle in NDHQ.  What you're describing above is not really a battle between two concepts of war fighting within the Army it was more a battle between those who bought into "The End of History" and believed that we wouldn't have to fight another major war again and  those who didn't.  


FJAG said:


> Canada isn't even close to being in a Cold War box. Let me just say this. The first principle when of designing a force when you do not know what the challenge is that it has to face is to ensure that your force is balanced adequately to be able to meet (or at least participate) in every part of the conflict spectrum. For me that includes an overriding factor - we'll never be large enough to go on our own and we'll never go without the US so we might as well follow their lead to ensure that we fit as seamlessly as possible into their force structure. To me that means a Delta like SF, a Ranger-like special force, and at least one each (preferably two) of an ABCT, SBCT, IBCT, an artillery brigade, an aviation brigade, a sustainment brigade and what they now call a protection brigade with sufficient reserve force depth and at least one deployable division headquarters. That gives you the ability to go in any direction regardless of what you focus them on in peacetime. We currently have the manning to achieve that (RegF and ResF combined) and a good start on the equipment needed.
> 
> Basically you need to start the reorganization while you figure out the equipment you need. You can always fine tune the organization to serve the equipment once its decided on.


The Cold War box isn't where the Army is but rather where the thinking is on where the Army should go.  The US Army structures you want us to re-create in miniature are the same basic units designed to fight Russia.  Why not an ABCT and two Littoral Regiments?  Or a SBCT with tanks an Artillery Brigade and an AD Brigade?  A Deep Recce Strike Brigade and Airborne Brigade and an ABCT?  

I'll I'm suggesting is that there may be fights coming where the same traditional Brigades that we've developed to fight in Europe against the Russians might not be well suited to fight.  And these conflicts may actually be more likely than a renewed one against Russia.  And also that all of the force types your describing already exist in NATO and the same non-traditional types of units that might be better suited for an Indo-Pacific conflict might also be very effective in a conflict against Russia alongside our allies.  

I can't help but think that now...when we're basically starting from scratch is an ideal time to start seriously thinking about these things.


FJAG said:


> I really need to bow out of this thread for a while and get some work done.
> 
> 🍻


----------



## FJAG

I got some work done.


GR66 said:


> I'd point to this as an example of where there is a determination to stick with what is basically a WWII structure in the combined arms Brigade without examining if there are any different constructs that might be more appropriate based on the technology of the 2020s and beyond.  The exact same building blocks as 1945 just with us looking to upgrade our equipment/vehicles to a more modern standard.
> 
> Now I realize it's very risky to just go and change from a formula that worked in the past but I'd put this down to yet another failure of past and present Canadian Army leadership.  There have been no serious efforts made for decades to examine our way of war or to experiment with new ideas.  Rather we've just stuck to the same formula and dropped capabilities in order to maintain the basic structures until we've stripped so much away capability that the structures we're left with are unable to perform their original tasks.  We've sacrificed function for form.


I'm one of the bigger cynics on this site and I wouldn't go that far.

There's a considerable industry out there in organizations that do exactly what you suggest - wargame the possibilities of how to incorporate and optimize new weapon systems as they come online. There are folks in the Army, some of them here on this forum, who are quite smart and progressive but like any organization there are the curmudgeons who drag their feet. I spoke with Mike Jeffery about the Advancing with Purpose Transformation process and he described that one of the hardest things was to build unity - to get consensus on the way ahead. You might recall he moved us into a progressive program for a lighter more agile force but at the same time kept a heavy component in his pocket. Hillier blew that away on the eve of Afghanistan. Coming out of Afghanistan it was clear that even fighting the Taliban that a heavy component was needed (as they were blowing our lighter crap away) but the move to do that faltered after Leslie left in 2011.

The subtle point here is that every time the shooting starts, we find a need to dust off some of the Cold War gear and thinking.


GR66 said:


> We do more trade with China (our #2 trade partner) that with the entire EU and that doesn't include trade with Japan (#4), South Korea (#7), Hong Kong (#11) and India (#14).  It really is crazy that we as a nation and our military in particular have such a blind eye to the Indo-Pacific and its importance to our own prosperity.


Our trade figures aren't that simple. Our biggest trading partner by far is the US - roughly 75% and, more importantly its a pretty healthy trade surplus for us., China comes in at 10% of our imports and 5% of our exports which leaves us in a constant trade imbalance with them. The EU numbers are slightly ahead of Chinas but again a trade imbalance. When you add the UK our European trade exceeds that with China and with the UK at least we have a trade surplus. If it wasn't for rare earth metals we could probably kiss China good-bye.



> International merchandise trade for all countries and by Principal Trading Partners, monthly
> 
> 
> International merchandise trade data grouped by Principal Trading Partners (PTP). Users have the option of selecting Imports, Exports, or Trade Balance. Data are unadjusted and seasonally adjusted, and are on a Customs and Balance of Payments basis.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www150.statcan.gc.ca





GR66 said:


> 2 Division's Light Battalions are really just an afterthought.  I can't remember which forum member it was that said that we don't have Light Infantry because we don't have any doctrine for their use.  What we really have is extra Infantry Battalions that we're too cheap to buy vehicles for.  Sending our Light Battalions to the Indo-Pacific would be the modern equivalent of Hong Kong in 1941.


No they aren't. Otherwise I wouldn't have held back 2 battalions of LAVs in reserve. They're specifically light because I envision them used in places and scenarios where light is needed or quick reaction is needed. Why the light battalions still don't have proper light transport is beyond me although I'll take a guess. I had a crackerjack GGFG sergeant working for me in Ottawa on Class B for three years. He went RegF as an officer and was posted to 3 RCR and for two years was involved in determining how the battalion would transform to TAPV. Since TAPV was bought as a type of Nyala replacement my guess is that the plan was for the three light battalions to go largely TAPV and that didn't work out so well as hoped. That's, like I said is a guess. Some of the more knowledgeable infantry folks on this forum might want to pick up on that.


GR66 said:


> Not many things are "a non-zero possibility" but some things are more likely than others.  I personally would rank Russia launching a near suicidal attack on NATO fairly low on the risk of possibilities.


I don't share your optimism.


GR66 said:


> How high in comparison would you rank the possibility of China invading Taiwan and coming in conflict with US forces?  And if that happens, how high would you rank the possibility of North Korean forces becoming involved in the conflict?  Personally I'd rate both of these possibilities as considerably higher than Russia invading a NATO country.  Are China and North Korea any less belligerent in their rhetoric about their neighbours than Russia?  In fact the military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific puts the risk of the West losing a conflict there much higher than against Russia.  But I don't see any suggestions that instead of putting a pre-positioned Mechanized Brigade in Latvia we put one in South Korea where the risk of direct conflict is potentially much greater than in Europe.  It's for reasons like this that I suggest that some of the proposed thinking around our future force structure are stuck in Eurocentric thinking.


The US is in Korea. They don't need us. Taiwan has allied status with the US and don't need us. Major aside here - both the ROK and the ROC's ground forces are very heavily weighed towards armoured brigades.


GR66 said:


> Yes, at some point somebody has to put up a napkin force that makes sense.  Most of what we're doing right now though is just shuffling around our existing units on the page making slight variations to our existing structure.  We're not really looking at anything new or different like the UK's "Deep Recce Strike Brigade", the US Army's "Multi Domain Task Force" or the USMC's "Littoral Regiment".  Again, it seems like a task beyond the capabilities of our military leadership.


I've seen far too many initiatives stillborn so I really can't argue this. My take, through second hand info, is that the Army gets too small a piece of the defence pie post Afghanistan (both the Navy and Air Force are saying its our turn) and of what it gets, there is no unity amongst the competing Army senior actors for a way forward. 


GR66 said:


> I'll agree that the current Canadian Army isn't locked into a Cold War box.  They are stuck in a cubicle in NDHQ.  What you're describing above is not really a battle between two concepts of war fighting within the Army it was more a battle between those who bought into "The End of History" and believed that we wouldn't have to fight another major war again and  those who didn't.


My problem with the abandoning heavy concept is that there are failed states scenarios where various warlords could give us a shit kicking right now with T62 tanks and drones which exist in abundance. You basically need a heavy force with air defence and other systems to deal with a third power country much less a peer.


GR66 said:


> The Cold War box isn't where the Army is but rather where the thinking is on where the Army should go.  The US Army structures you want us to re-create in miniature are the same basic units designed to fight Russia.  Why not an ABCT and two Littoral Regiments?  Or a SBCT with tanks an Artillery Brigade and an AD Brigade?  A Deep Recce Strike Brigade and Airborne Brigade and an ABCT?


Your problem with looking at my structures is that you do not see the weapon systems. You just see rectangle placeholders which are equipped with what we currently hold. I want to change the organization and methodology of how we train so that we can lift up the ResF to be a power multiplier and not a mere augmentee force when we have six months to train them. But take a closer look at the organizations. The three(4) mech brigades are in fact melds of an ABCT and an SBCT by virtue of there being tanks and LAVs. 38 Arty brigade has a deep strike component to it because it combines the divisional cavalry regiment (combined recce and anti-armour) with artillery regiments and (too be acquired) rocket regiment.

Take a look at 2 Div. There are two coastal regiments each of which is a meld of cavalry, an amphibious battalion a light (or in the west, mountain) battalion and a Canadian ranger battalion. The two light battalions each include a para battalion and a Canadian ranger battalion. There are two artillery brigades which are undefined right now but would need to be combinations of our current system which are highly inadequate. Personally my purchase program would include 1 x HIMARS battalion and 2 (preferably 3) 155mm SP regiments. I would leave all the M777s with 2 Div alongside the LG1s (basically 1 regt of each) and make the third regiment dedicated to a variety of UCAVs or other loitering munitions.

Note that all my recce regts also bear an anti-armour symbol (which means very little under our current equipment holdings) These are meant to have a heavy role in finding and attriting the enemy far forward in combination with long range tube artillery, rockets, UCAVs and air strikes.

One thing I'd like to see, but never will, is an aviation brigade. We had one once in 10 TAG, but the Army, in its wisdom, and funding crisis, gave that up.


GR66 said:


> I'll I'm suggesting is that there may be fights coming where the same traditional Brigades that we've developed to fight in Europe against the Russians might not be well suited to fight.  And these conflicts may actually be more likely than a renewed one against Russia.  And also that all of the force types your describing already exist in NATO and the same non-traditional types of units that might be better suited for an Indo-Pacific conflict might also be very effective in a conflict against Russia alongside our allies.


I'm not sure where "non traditional" leads us. I still see the main combat functions of Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain as valid regardless of the foe. As long as an organization is established to fundamentally cater to those either organically or through available enablers then you've got a good start. As long as you have the ability to train in those fundamentals then adapting to new weapon systems are possible. Just as an example, in 2003 Canadian artillery deployed to Kabul with LG1s (which it had) and a new UAV (Sperwer) and a rented counter mortar radar (ARTHUR) It took a while to get a handle on that but in 2005 we transformed the artillery to cater to UAVs and CMRs and when we went to Kandahar we quickly adapted to M777s, Skylark UAVs and LCMRs all of which were bought on rapid purchase UORs. It wasn't as easy as all that but because we had the basic TTPs from our earlier tour it was relatively easy to integrate the new gear.

That's basically what a balanced force will give you. The ability to develop skills at all ends of the conflict spectrum so that once the politicians make their choice, then you have either something ready to go or to adapt to the particular mission. Once you give up a particular skill set, regardless of how minor in importance it looks and once the gear is gone and the officers and NCOs who ran it are gone then it becomes a major undertaking to get it back. Air defence is the primary bad example of stupidity. Heavy is another. Combined arms tactical skills don't come easy particulalry if you are missing half of the weapon sets. Tanks and IFVs are only a part of a proper combined arms team. They miss a lot of sense and shield and we don't seem to be too good on the sustain either. We've been trying to improve command for twenty years and still aren't there.

If we have a decent light and a decent heavy capability we can do something for the Indo-Pacific as soon as someone figures out what it is. Don't get sucked in by the Marine rhetoric. Their solution is to fix the problem that they see to suit their role. That is only a part of that theatre. There's clearly an army role as well and as you can see by ROC and ROK, that includes lots of heavy armour.

🍻


----------



## FJAG

Oh Yeah! And then there's this.



> Canadian Army shrank by 1,200 soldiers in 2022 as Latvia mission set to expand in June
> 
> 
> But the Canadian Army cannot sustain a significantly larger deployment to Latvia over the long term, says its commander Lt.-Gen. Joe Paul
> 
> 
> 
> 
> windsorstar.com



😖


----------



## KevinB

GR66 said:


> I can think of no better way than moving NATO forces into Ukraine after the conflict to strengthen the radical elements in Russia.  You'd basically be confirming their pre-war propaganda about NATO's attempts to encircle Russia.  Surveillance overflights and a security guarantee are more likely (and less provocative) than NATO forces or NATO membership at least until a post-Putin Russia sorts itself out.


My point was a contingency if Russia became a failed state, and wanted/needed security support. 
  Not an invasion of Russia.
Also if Putin was to go, depending on who boosted him, they may want NATO’s support for a Marshall 2.0 to rebuild and resist China (and Hard Line Russian Nationalists).

Light Forces are great to get somewhere fast. 
  They can be extremely agile in some cases with enablers, but they aren’t a replacement for Heavy Forces when the slugging starts.


----------



## IKnowNothing

Is there a path forward that does both?

I'm probably missing something, but looking at @FJAG 's F2026 it seems like that with a couple tweaks it leaves room for @GR66 's "something else" (my words).

The tweaks
- instead of functional divisions with separate CS/CSS Bde's maintain the self-contained and deployable brigade group
-reduce 1 Div by a bde

reduce 2 Div by 2 bdes
form 3 Div with 3 bdes

The result
1 Div - 2x  30/70 mech bde's tasked for the NATO heavy fight (Edmonton and Quebec)
2 Div 2x 70/30 Light* bdes for all other "conventional" tasks (Petawawa and Quebec
3 Div 3x 30/70 xyz** bdes for xyz, (BC, SW Ontario, Maritimes)

*Flex Weight vehicle agnostic, anything and everything thats not the mechaniz fight, from leg QRF to Mrap COIN

** My preference being a "Coastal Defense Bde", based on the shooty bits of a multi domain taskforce
Strike Bn with NSM and brimstone/ Spike NLos batteries
Security / Motorized Inf Bn
AD Bn - layered batteries, patriot or atleast NASAMS 3 with MADIS

Missions- Arctic and Coastal Sovereignty, Indopacific contribution, focussing on area denial


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> My point was a contingency if Russia became a failed state, and wanted/needed security support.
> Not an invasion of Russia.
> Also if Putin was to go, depending on who boosted him, they may want NATO’s support for a Marshall 2.0 to rebuild and resist China (and Hard Line Russian Nationalists).
> 
> Light Forces are great to get somewhere fast.
> They can be extremely agile in some cases with enablers, but they aren’t a replacement for Heavy Forces when the slugging starts.



I'll ask this question:   How much slugging can you afford?
Second question:  When should you commit to a slugfest?

I can see there being a key point that needs to be held at all costs.  But is that the same as  a key point that needs to be taken at all costs?   Or does that vital point just need to be destroyed, suppressed, neutralized or even just evacuated?   Or can it be bypassed and cut off?

When do you need to go toe to toe with a matched force?  Should you?

A lot of wars have been fought without heavy cavalry.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> I'll ask this question:   How much slugging can you afford?
> Second question:  When should you commit to a slugfest?



Based on the last forty years of history, you commit to slugging when the politicians can no longer afford to be seen by the public or their major allies to be doing nothing. And then as little as possible.



Kirkhill said:


> I can see there being a key point that needs to be held at all costs.  But is that the same as  a key point that needs to be taken at all costs?   Or does that vital point just need to be destroyed, suppressed, neutralized or even just evacuated?   Or can it be bypassed and cut off?
> 
> When do you need to go toe to toe with a matched force?  Should you?



🤷‍♂️


Kirkhill said:


> A lot of wars have been fought without heavy cavalry.



That's because you needed light cavalry to define the enemy picture and there were plenty of heavy manoeuvre forces to do the heavy cavalry work when needed. Nowadays there are more and better reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities so that the need for light cavalry is lessened, while the costs of manoeuvre forces is high and the wider spaces between them and in front of them need to be filled by something more capable of fighting.

IMHO, the move to heavier cavalry combined with UAVs, satellite and other surveillance and longer range guns and newer airborne weapon systems is a maturing of the recce/cavalry capability that needs development and exploiting, if nothing else, than as an economy of force measure.

🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> Based on the last forty years of history, you commit to slugging when the politicians can no longer afford to be seen by the public or their major allies to be doing nothing. And then as little as possible.



40 years is not history.  That is yesterday's news.



FJAG said:


> That's because you needed light cavalry to define the enemy picture and there were plenty of heavy manoeuvre forces to do the heavy cavalry work when needed. Nowadays there are more and better reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities so that the need for light cavalry is lessened, while the costs of manoeuvre forces is high and the wider spaces between them and in front of them need to be filled by something more capable of fighting.
> 
> IMHO, the move to heavier cavalry combined with UAVs, satellite and other surveillance and longer range guns and newer airborne weapon systems is a maturing of the recce/cavalry capability that needs development and exploiting, if nothing else, than as an economy of force measure.
> 
> 🍻



So you are saying that there is a need to develop situational awareness and to shape the battle to your advantage?  No disagreement there then.

My point is that striking power has moved from a cavalry function (the kinetic charge) to an artillery function (rifles, tank cannons, machine guns, howitzers, bombers and missiles).  Artillery has become ever more dominant once they figured out how to actually hit their targets.

Armour plate has gone in and out of fashion over the millenia.   Wars can be fought without armour plate.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> 40 years is not history.  That is yesterday's news.


Not to Canadians.  


Kirkhill said:


> So you are saying that there is a need to develop situational awareness and to shape the battle to your advantage?  No disagreement there then.
> 
> My point is that striking power has moved from a cavalry function (the kinetic charge) to an artillery function (rifles, tank cannons, machine guns, howitzers, bombers and missiles).  Artillery has become ever more dominant once they figured out how to actually hit their targets.
> 
> Armour plate has gone in and out of fashion over the millenia.   Wars can be fought without armour plate.


I was merely addressing the traditional distinction between light and heavy cavalry. The former for scouting the latter for shock action. As late as the Crimean War (the 1853-6 one) that distinction existed with a British cavalry force that came in heavy and light brigades. It took the better part of a half a century and the arrival of the machine gun to put paid to the horse-based shock action concept and the arming of cavalry with carbines to create a dragoon/mounted infantry that acted as both scouts and mobile reserves.

Lightly armed and armoured Canadian reconnaissance has been more or less de rigour since the interval between the first two wars when the cavalry branch divided itself into recce and tank with recce filling the reconnaissance and surveillance role and tanks the shock action role. Effectively after almost a half century of dragoons we went right back to light and heavy cavalry.

There has been much bantering back and forth within the armoured/cavalry community as to what constitutes "true cavalry". In the US in the latter part of the Cold War "armored cavalry" was truly heavy, armed with M1 tanks, and tasked to "fight for information" while the other armoured battalions were designed more for working in combined arms formations with varying percentages of infantry.

So back to the point. I disagree with the concept that "striking power" has moved from cavalry to artillery based on the simple premise that artillery cannot take or hold ground. "Striking power" is a flexible term that does not relate to combat functions and in particular, it washes over striking through manoeuvre and striking through firepower. Firepower will always be an enabler to a manoeuvre strike or shock function. At the end of the day you need a heavy mechanized force to deliver that punch.

In my mind the distinction between light and heavy cavalry and armoured forces depends on how far you go on the continuum of the combat scale where at the low end is a pure "sense" capability (i.e light cavalry) and at the high end an "act" capability through shock action (tanks in combined arms battle groups). Somewhere in the middle is something that can do a bit of both but really adds value to the "shield" capability of the force while being able to properly "sense" and, to an extent, "act" when required. That latter capability, which has the ability to sense, shield and act as required, in my mind, is what I term heavy cavalry. All three of these are enabled through firepower.

I should add as well that the light cavalry function is done by way of a suite of sensors which range from satellites to light recce vehicles on the ground. I'll add one more item. I see nothing wrong with a cavalry organization, as small as a battalion, that has both a light component and a heavy component and even enablers such as some infantry and some form of organic fire support. ABCT cavalry squadrons are an example of this. Finding the right balance of equipment is the trick. There may not be a single, universal TOE.

🍻


----------



## Good2Golf

FJAG said:


> I'm not so much worried that Russia will make another thrust across the German plains; its will it try to gather low hanging fruit by "rescuing" the ethnic Russians living in the Baltic States, the Balkans, *Poland* and elsewhere.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:


> View attachment 75667



Geography may repeat itself:

NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor​
MARCH 3, 2022, 3:45 PM

As the Biden administration monitors Moscow’s reaction to dramatic U.S. and allied increases in assistance to Ukraine as well as the punishing Western economic and financial sanctions on Russia, it should turn its focus to a relatively small corner of northeastern Europe that is familiar to military strategists but often overlooked by most policymakers and the general public.

The Suwalki corridor (also known as the Suwalki Gap) separates the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea from Belarus, now host to thousands of Russian troops and soon home to permanently stationed Russian forces, including advanced fighter jets and nuclear weapons. It is also the only way to get by road or rail from Poland and Central Europe to the Baltic states—arguably NATO’s most exposed members.

A Russian move to seize control of the corridor may seem far-fetched, as it would explicitly involve an attack on NATO territory, triggering a U.S. military response. Nonetheless, if Moscow’s reinvasion of Ukraine has any central lesson to offer at this point, it’s that U.S. and allied officials must prepare now for worst-case scenarios by focusing on actual Russian military capabilities in the region, rather than the Kremlin’s announced intent, considered estimates of Russia’s strategic logic, or intelligence assessments of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s outlook.

Forty miles wide as the crow flies, the Suwalki corridor isn’t much of a corridor, at least in terms of natural boundaries such as rivers, coastlines, or mountains. Driving through the area last October while on a research trip to NATO units, I found it a wide-open rural region, predominantly characterized by rolling farmland interspersed with forests and small villages. Much of it is ideal terrain for tracked vehicles like tanks, given the very limited roadways and the gentle hills.

Two highways—one with two lanes each way, the other with just a single lane each way—plus a rail line, are all the ground-based transportation infrastructure that connect Poland with the Baltic states. Since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, in 2014, Western government officials, military leaders, and think tank experts have paid extra attention to this relatively narrow passageway between allies, primarily because of the chokepoint it represents should Russia seek to cut off the Baltics.










						NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor
					

On the Polish-Lithuanian border, the West must respond to Russia’s actual capabilities rather than making assumptions about its intent.




					foreignpolicy.com


----------



## rmc_wannabe

Good2Golf said:


> View attachment 75667



It's like hearing a recruit talk about going to CANSOFCOM when they haven't even hit the field yet. 

"Alright there buds. Focus on passing your TOETs first"


----------



## Good2Golf

daftandbarmy said:


> Geography may repeat itself:
> 
> NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor​
> MARCH 3, 2022, 3:45 PM
> 
> As the Biden administration monitors Moscow’s reaction to dramatic U.S. and allied increases in assistance to Ukraine as well as the punishing Western economic and financial sanctions on Russia, it should turn its focus to a relatively small corner of northeastern Europe that is familiar to military strategists but often overlooked by most policymakers and the general public.
> 
> The Suwalki corridor (also known as the Suwalki Gap) separates the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea from Belarus, now host to thousands of Russian troops and soon home to permanently stationed Russian forces, including advanced fighter jets and nuclear weapons. It is also the only way to get by road or rail from Poland and Central Europe to the Baltic states—arguably NATO’s most exposed members.
> 
> A Russian move to seize control of the corridor may seem far-fetched, as it would explicitly involve an attack on NATO territory, triggering a U.S. military response. Nonetheless, if Moscow’s reinvasion of Ukraine has any central lesson to offer at this point, it’s that U.S. and allied officials must prepare now for worst-case scenarios by focusing on actual Russian military capabilities in the region, rather than the Kremlin’s announced intent, considered estimates of Russia’s strategic logic, or intelligence assessments of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s outlook.
> 
> Forty miles wide as the crow flies, the Suwalki corridor isn’t much of a corridor, at least in terms of natural boundaries such as rivers, coastlines, or mountains. Driving through the area last October while on a research trip to NATO units, I found it a wide-open rural region, predominantly characterized by rolling farmland interspersed with forests and small villages. Much of it is ideal terrain for tracked vehicles like tanks, given the very limited roadways and the gentle hills.
> 
> Two highways—one with two lanes each way, the other with just a single lane each way—plus a rail line, are all the ground-based transportation infrastructure that connect Poland with the Baltic states. Since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, in 2014, Western government officials, military leaders, and think tank experts have paid extra attention to this relatively narrow passageway between allies, primarily because of the chokepoint it represents should Russia seek to cut off the Baltics.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point—the Suwalki Corridor
> 
> 
> On the Polish-Lithuanian border, the West must respond to Russia’s actual capabilities rather than making assumptions about its intent.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> foreignpolicy.com


If that’s a thinly veiled recce by Russian apologists to make the case that “it’s only 40km” it’s pretty naive to believe that the Poles wouldn’t unleash a fury of their own, even if NATO decided to ignore Art.5 and excuse itself to the washroom while Russia linked up with Kaliningrad…


----------



## Kirkhill

Meanwhile the USN and the USMC - Steel Knight 23 (1 MEF, 1 MarDiv, 3 MEW) - in the Indo Pacific

Highlighted weapons

Link 16

MV22 - rapid deployment of Marines and ASW (Grumman Tracker Replacements - sonobuoys, torpedoes and onboard processing)
P8s






Lots of opportunities in Canada for VSTOL aircraft (MV-22s and V-280s) to deploy in this fashion.

F35s and longservice F18Cs as bombtrucks with Harpoons and NSMs

AH-1Zs, UH-1Ys, MH-60Rs, MQ-8Cs and LCSs in anti ship roles. (LCS armed with NSMs)










						How Marines Went To War Off California To Prepare For A Big Pacific Fight
					

F-35Cs striking over huge distances, Cobra and Huey helicopters attacking ships, and Ospreys hunting subs were all elements of Steel Knight.




					www.thedrive.com
				




Add in other exotics like KC-130s delivering HIMARS/PrSMs/ATACMs  or rolling cruise missiles over the tailgate that the Rogue Fires systems.

And many, many more.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Meanwhile the USN and the USMC - Steel Knight 23 (1 MEF, 1 MarDiv, 3 MEW) - in the Indo Pacific
> 
> Highlighted weapons
> 
> Link 16
> 
> MV22 - rapid deployment of Marines and ASW (Grumman Tracker Replacements - sonobuoys, torpedoes and onboard processing)
> P8s
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Lots of opportunities in Canada for VSTOL aircraft (MV-22s and V-280s) to deploy in this fashion.
> 
> F35s and longservice F18Cs as bombtrucks with Harpoons and NSMs
> 
> AH-1Zs, UH-1Ys, MH-60Rs, MQ-8Cs and LCSs in anti ship roles. (LCS armed with NSMs)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How Marines Went To War Off California To Prepare For A Big Pacific Fight
> 
> 
> F-35Cs striking over huge distances, Cobra and Huey helicopters attacking ships, and Ospreys hunting subs were all elements of Steel Knight.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.thedrive.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Add in other exotics like KC-130s delivering HIMARS/PrSMs/ATACMs  or rolling cruise missiles over the tailgate that the Rogue Fires systems.
> 
> And many, many more.


But the USMC can be the USMC because of the USN, USAF, and US Army also exist.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> But the USMC can be the USMC because of the USN, USAF, and US Army also exist.



And the CAF can only exist because the USN, USAF and US Army (and the USMC and Space Force and US SOCOM) also exist.

We can't begin to replicate.  We can be complementary while focusing on our national, and domestic needs.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> And the CAF can only exist because the USN, USAF and US Army (and the USMC and Space Force and US SOCOM) also exist.
> 
> We can't begin to replicate.  We can be complementary while focusing on our national, and domestic needs.


Complimentary in this case means interoperable with a willing partner.
   Which means putting Troops on the ground in harms way.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Complimentary in this case means interoperable with a willing partner.
> Which means putting Troops on the ground in harms way.



Do we have to put them on the ground with the III/V?   Can't we work alongside I, XVIII or even the USMC?

The USMC is still planning on flying its F18s until 2030 as bombtrucks and WSO carriers.  Be interesting to see the benefits of a WSO in an mixed optionally manned formation working with F35s.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Do we have to put them on the ground with the III/V?   Can't we work alongside I, XVIII or even the USMC?
> 
> The USMC is still planning on flying its F18s until 2030 as bombtrucks and WSO carriers.  Be interesting to see the benefits of a WSO in an mixed optionally manned formation working with F35s.


Some need to go to III/V, some should go to XVIII, and probably the USMC too.

With a small Military, Canada needs to be adaptable - but also have certain tailor made formations to mesh with allies.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Some need to go to III/V, some should go to XVIII, and probably the USMC too.
> 
> With a small Military, Canada needs to be adaptable - but also have certain tailor made formations to mesh with allies.



Sounds a lot like something that Sir John French or Lord Gort might have said during their tenures as Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff.

The very thing that Canadian politicians and soldiers rebelled against in both wars.  It is not just tankers that don't want to be penny-packeted into a fight.


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Sounds a lot like something that Sir John French or Lord Gort might have said during their tenures as Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff.
> 
> The very thing that Canadian politicians and soldiers rebelled against in both wars.  It is not just tankers that don't want to be penny-packeted into a fight.


I think the reality is that we're unfortunately living in a time where there is the potential for two very different types of wars taking place.  We need to be ready for either should they take place.  This isn't 1914 or 1939 where you have years to build up an army that you ignored during the build up to conflict.  The complexity of modern military equipment doesn't allow for that.

All I've been trying to argue here is that we are prepared for neither currently and our current discussions on trying to become prepared are focusing almost exclusively on how we can fight one of those two wars.  To my mind we definitely need a little of Column A and a little of Column B.  I don't think that's really penny-packeting.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:


> I think the reality is that we're unfortunately living in a time where there is the potential for two very different types of wars taking place.  We need to be ready for either should they take place.  This isn't 1914 or 1939 where you have years to build up an army that you ignored during the build up to conflict.  The complexity of modern military equipment doesn't allow for that.
> 
> All I've been trying to argue here is that we are prepared for neither currently and our current discussions on trying to become prepared are focusing almost exclusively on how we can fight one of those two wars.  To my mind we definitely need a little of Column A and a little of Column B.  I don't think that's really penny-packeting.



I agree with your overall position.  

My contention is that all wars occur in multiple environments, over a variety of seasons, in various phases.  As a result I believe that an adaptive, generalist force that can be fielded broadly in a timely fashion will always find work, regardless of the theatre.   

At the other end of the spectrum, a specialist force that is tied to a particular threat in a particular location, that is hard to maintain, hard to modernize, inclined to "keep up with the Joneses", and hard to deploy or re-deploy from their primary deployment, is at risk of being sidelined.   And if it is sidelined then all the capital, all the training, all the manpower, all the careers invested are wasted.

The USMC is not the US Army's armored force.  They do very different things.  But which get used more often across the full spectrum of conflict? Regardless of how they are equipped, in peace or war, the Pentagon seems to find things for the Marines to do.

That is the type of generalist force I want the CAF to aspire to be.  One that integrates and leverages all its investments in one cohesive, focused capability of general utility.


----------



## FJAG

GR66 said:


> I think the reality is that we're unfortunately living in a time where there is the potential for two very different types of wars taking place.  We need to be ready for either should they take place.  This isn't 1914 or 1939 where you have years to build up an army that you ignored during the build up to conflict.  The complexity of modern military equipment doesn't allow for that.


There are two thoughts here and I'm not sure I agree with either.

The proxy war with Russia has been running for almost a decade albeit that while we've been involved in the preparation for the fight, the West has done little in arming for it. It's not that there hasn't been an opportunity for it, it's just that we never took it. I'm concerned that Russia's performance to date may very well lull the West into a false sense of security , or, at least, a lack of a sense of urgency about preparing further.

The question about China is much more complex. Yes, we see it as a competitor and even a foe. What we don't see is the nature of the conflict. It has two key components: Taiwan - a conventional war in the old style - (which may or may not be accompanied by North Korea attacking south) and the artificial islands in the South China Sea. I'll leave aside the economic and cyber war that accompanies that.

China's actions are belligerent and part of a long game to dominate the area economically. That domination requires a stable but compliant world and not a war but there is little doubt that circumstances could arise where they take action - probably against Taiwan. The South China Sea islands importance is in simply being there. Tactically they may add a surveillance screen but are too small and too fixed to become major bases of operations. In a conflict they would be easy to neutralize. It's not like the Japanese occupying the western Pacific region with millions of men in hundreds of locations supported by large fleets.

In WW2, the Marines were the US's amphibious assault forces, but once a position was taken it was occupied by army and army air corps forces for consolidation. This island hopping campaign was necessary because of the limited range of weapon systems which couldn't reach Japan's mainland until a firm corridor was established. The navy cruised and cleared the waters in between the hops.

The Marines objectives for Force 2030 include "Force Design 2030 is our latest effort to adapt, remain relevant, and out maneuver our adversaries." I think that means "not just be a small US Army". There is much debate within the Marines as to whether Force 2030 is the right move. Effectively they are designing a system of smaller forces that can seize and hold hard-points that the Navy can manoeuvre around and which the Army can subsequently occupy, if necessary, as the Marines move forward. The problem is numbers of men and ships. The region is vast, crowded and complex (for both us and the Chinese). Neither party has the depth to run a Japanese style Pacific War. Notwithstanding that, the war with China will be a long one. They have the initiative. It will probably unfold much like the war with Japan with initial loses that need to be retaken.

That leaves me with the question. How do you see such a conflict unfolding and what role do you see Canada needing to prepare for that our current (or my napkin force) structure doesn't cater for? And don't tell me bags of cyber battalions and hundreds of long range tactical missiles. We both know we don't have the political will for that and besides we will be part of an alliance. So what does Canada realistically bring to the table that the Aussies and Indonesians and Philippines and Brits and Americans don't already have, or need more of that isn't already catered for?



GR66 said:


> All I've been trying to argue here is that we are prepared for neither currently and our current discussions on trying to become prepared are focusing almost exclusively on how we can fight one of those two wars.  To my mind we definitely need a little of Column A and a little of Column B.  I don't think that's really penny-packeting.



Which gets me back to the point that creating a mix of a light force (2 Div) and a heavy force (1 Div) constitutes exactly that, a Column A and a Column B to choose from. Organizing into those groups and enabling the ResF to be a mobilization base is the start of reform. The next, and costlier, phase is to purchase the right weapon systems to grow the capability. But you have to start somewhere and for us that's in organization and initially fixing the blatant capability deficiencies.

🍻


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> I agree with your overall position.
> 
> My contention is that all wars occur in multiple environments, over a variety of seasons, in various phases.  As a result I believe that an adaptive, generalist force that can be fielded broadly in a timely fashion will always find work, regardless of the theatre.
> 
> At the other end of the spectrum, a specialist force that is tied to a particular threat in a particular location, that is hard to maintain, hard to modernize, inclined to "keep up with the Joneses", and hard to deploy or re-deploy from their primary deployment, is at risk of being sidelined.   And if it is sidelined then all the capital, all the training, all the manpower, all the careers invested are wasted.
> 
> The USMC is not the US Army's armored force.  They do very different things.  But which get used more often across the full spectrum of conflict? Regardless of how they are equipped, in peace or war, the Pentagon seems to find things for the Marines to do.
> 
> That is the type of generalist force I want the CAF to aspire to be.  One that integrates and leverages all its investments in one cohesive, focused capability of general utility.


To be fair you're really comparing what the USMC is _moving toward_ to the US Army rather than what the USMC _was _until very recently.  The Marines have been for quite a long time essentially a "mini Army" and have been employed by the US Government almost interchangeably with the Army in recent conflicts.  General Berger's re-structuring is an attempt to change that.

You're right that the USMC doesn't have to be the heavy, door-knocking force for the United States because they have the US Army to fulfill that role.  By that definition though I'd disagree with you that the "new" USMC will be used "across the full spectrum of conflict" in that they need the US Army to fulfill that extreme, heavy end of the spectrum.

That being said, I'll agree that it _could _be an option for the Canadian Army to look at force design in the same manner...i.e. taking into account what our Allies are bringing to the table and filling in the gaps with what you describe as "generalist" forces (and from your descriptions from previous posts I'm assuming by that you mean forces more in line with what the _future _USMC is striving toward).  

However, I do have to agree with members like @FJAG and @KevinB that there is also a political dimension to take into account.  The Heavy forces are the ones that will be required to do the "dirty work" (and take the bulk of the casualties).  Yes, systems like artillery, missiles, AD and ASuW might have a disproportionate impact on a conflict in the strategic sense, but if you're not also willing to do your share of the "dirty work" along with your Allies then one might question how good an Ally you really are.  That's why I say we need a little of both Column A and Column B rather than just a whole bunch of Column B.


----------



## Kirkhill

FJAG said:


> There are two thoughts here and I'm not sure I agree with either.
> 
> The proxy war with Russia has been running for almost a decade albeit that while we've been involved in the preparation for the fight, the West has done little in arming for it. It's not that there hasn't been an opportunity for it, it's just that we never took it. I'm concerned that Russia's performance to date may very well lull the West into a false sense of security , or, at least, a lack of a sense of urgency about preparing further.
> 
> The question about China is much more complex. Yes, we see it as a competitor and even a foe. What we don't see is the nature of the conflict. It has two key components: Taiwan - a conventional war in the old style - (which may or may not be accompanied by North Korea attacking south) and the artificial islands in the South China Sea. I'll leave aside the economic and cyber war that accompanies that.
> 
> China's actions are belligerent and part of a long game to dominate the area economically. That domination requires a stable but compliant world and not a war but there is little doubt that circumstances could arise where they take action - probably against Taiwan. The South China Sea islands importance is in simply being there. Tactically they may add a surveillance screen but are too small and too fixed to become major bases of operations. In a conflict they would be easy to neutralize. It's not like the Japanese occupying the western Pacific region with millions of men in hundreds of locations supported by large fleets.
> 
> In WW2, the Marines were the US's amphibious assault forces, but once a position was taken it was occupied by army and army air corps forces for consolidation. This island hopping campaign was necessary because of the limited range of weapon systems which couldn't reach Japan's mainland until a firm corridor was established. The navy cruised and cleared the waters in between the hops.
> 
> The Marines objectives for Force 2030 include "Force Design 2030 is our latest effort to adapt, remain relevant, and out maneuver our adversaries." I think that means "not just be a small US Army". There is much debate within the Marines as to whether Force 2030 is the right move. Effectively they are designing a system of smaller forces that can seize and hold hard-points that the Navy can manoeuvre around and which the Army can subsequently occupy, if necessary, as the Marines move forward. The problem is numbers of men and ships. The region is vast, crowded and complex (for both us and the Chinese). Neither party has the depth to run a Japanese style Pacific War. Notwithstanding that, the war with China will be a long one. They have the initiative. It will probably unfold much like the war with Japan with initial loses that need to be retaken.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Which gets me back to the point that creating a mix of a light force (2 Div) and a heavy force (1 Div) constitutes exactly that, a Column A and a Column B to choose from. Organizing into those groups and enabling the ResF to be a mobilization base is the start of reform. The next, and costlier, phase is to purchase the right weapon systems to grow the capability. But you have to start somewhere and for us that's in organization and initially fixing the blatant capability deficiencies.
> 
> 🍻



In broad strokes I agree with FJAG's 2 Div structure - we clash over details.  I want his 1st div to look more like the USMC - and I do not think constantly looking for relevance is a bad thing.  Especially if that is the only force available to the government and the force is more likely to be employed in "peace"  than in "war".  It needs to constantly be re-evaluating where it might be helpful and how so.

My bigger concern is with the 2nd Div.   I favour a clearer distinction between the "Regular" 1st Div and the "Reserve" 2nd Div.    I also struggle with the Heavy Force Focus - I am more inclined to invest in enablers and defensive elements first and then offensive element second.



> That leaves me with the question. How do you see such a conflict unfolding and what role do you see Canada needing to prepare for that our current (or my napkin force) structure doesn't cater for? And don't tell me bags of cyber battalions and hundreds of long range tactical missiles. We both know we don't have the political will for that and besides we will be part of an alliance. *So what does Canada realistically bring to the table that the Ukrainians, Poles, Balts, Scandinavians  and Brits and Americans don't already have, or need more of that isn't already catered for?*



The short form, in my view, is that, contrary to government messaging, the world doesn't NEED more Canada.  It can get by without whatever pittance we are willing to put in the collection plate.  

It's entirely up to us to decide if we want the rest of the congregation to notice our contribution.


----------



## FJAG

Kirkhill said:


> In broad strokes I agree with FJAG's 2 Div structure - we clash over details.  I want his 1st div to look more like the USMC - and I do not think constantly looking for relevance is a bad thing.  Especially if that is the only force available to the government and the force is more likely to be employed in "peace"  than in "war".  It needs to constantly be re-evaluating where it might be helpful and how so.
> 
> My bigger concern is with the 2nd Div.   I favour a clearer distinction between the "Regular" 1st Div and the "Reserve" 2nd Div.    I also struggle with the Heavy Force Focus - I am more inclined to invest in enablers and defensive elements first and then offensive element second.


That's because, I believe, that you are looking at it wrong.

1 Div is primarily a Reserve organization designed to mobilize a large force in an emergency with heavy capabilities but on a day-to-day basis consume few resources while still being able to generate a small rapid reaction heavy element. It's prime focus is to generate and sustain a mechanized brigade group and, in extreme circumstances a second mechanized brigade group and a division headquarters with enablers based on current resources.

2 Div is the Regular division with the highest state of readiness and day-to-day capability with a smaller reserve component to give depth, an augmentation capability and sustainability. It's prime focus is to generate and sustain multiple battle groups on a rapid and tiered reaction basis for routine operations as required by the GoC from time-to-time. This is why each of 2 and 5 bdes have two 100/0 battalions, several 70/30 enablers and a number of 30/70 battalions. The four 100/0 battalions provide quick reaction while the division's eight 30/70 battalions provide augmentation and sustainability.

I think that there is a very large misconception as to my proposed structure which arises from the attitude which currently permeates the Army. We tie the Regular (i.e. the valuable) force to major equipment while we tie the Reserve (i.e. the inconsequential) force to the absence of any equipment. My concept turns that on its head based on the type of force we need day-to-day and that needed when we have no choice but to enter a major conflict. 1 Div is an economy of effort force. It provides prepositioned equipment as a political statement of support to NATO while manning it primarily with low cost reservists. (But make no mistake they need to be better organized, better trained and better led reservists). In the meantime our heaviest investment in annual recurring full-time personnel costs is in 2 Div. The fact that these are light forces does not mean that they are unequipped. It's just that the equipment needs to be commensurate with their missions so that they can remain capable of rapid deployment both within Canada and internationally and to have the ability to be agile and flexible in their capabilities.

If one wants to make a broad analogy then 2 Div is our RegF with ResF augmentation and 1 Div is our ResF with RegF augmentation and leadership.



Kirkhill said:


> The short form, in my view, is that, contrary to government messaging, the world doesn't NEED more Canada.  It can get by without whatever pittance we are willing to put in the collection plate.
> 
> It's entirely up to us to decide if we want the rest of the congregation to notice our contribution.


100%

🍻


----------



## GR66

Question to any members "in the know" regarding the following line item from the "Action" section on the Army's Force 2025 webpage:



> The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps will be modernized and centralized in a single formation based in Alberta. Additional trials will be conducted to inform tasks, mission tasks and structures in order to reduce national procurement and increase its integration into a digitally networked CA;


By a "single formation" does this mean a single Regiment?  It seems to suggest that when they talk about the objective being "to reduce national procurement".

Also, there has been lots of talk on this site about some of the trials, etc. being done to develop a Cavalry-like capability involving a mix of LAVs and TAPVs.  Does that suggest they they are again looking at divesting the tanks and going to strictly Cavalry role for the RCAC?  Or possibly reducing the number of tanks and integrating them into a mixed Cavalry Regiment?

Edited to add:

May have answered my own question.  The most recent issue of the Canadian Army Journal has an article on Page 7 entitled "Armoured Corps Modernization:  An Overview of the Cavalry Concept".  It talks about an integration of the Tank and Recce streams in Armoured training and of Cavalry Regiments consisting of "Heavy Armoured Cav" Squadrons using the Leopard and "Light Armoured Cav" Squadrons using the LAV (or sub-optimally the TAPV).  

So I'm wondering if for the Reg Force RCAC they're maybe looking at a single Cavalry Regiment with perhaps 2 x LAV Squadrons and 2 x Leopard Squadrons?  That would certainly appear to take the "Heavy" (ABCT) role off the table for the Army going forward if so.


----------



## Ostrozac

GR66 said:


> By a "single formation" does this mean a single Regiment?  It seems to suggest that when they talk about the objective being "to reduce national procurement".


A single large regiment with two squadrons of tank and two squadrons of LRSS is certainly an option — two small regiments might be more likely. Those two regiments (units) could still be in the same brigade (formation) — probably 1 brigade, although there is an argument that scarce resources belong in the combat support brigade instead.

The RCAC still hasn’t quite come to terms with what the long term impact is of acquiring an armoured vehicle that nobody needs or wants. And we acquired 500 TAPV. These were also supposed to go the light infantry battalions, but the infantry’s solution — that they would rather walk than use TAPV — isn’t really feasible for the RCAC. The Canadian Army has procured more TAPV than we did AVGP —the impact of that procurement will be widespread, and will last for decades,


----------



## daftandbarmy

Ostrozac said:


> A single large regiment with two squadrons of tank and two squadrons of LRSS is certainly an option — two small regiments might be more likely. Those two regiments (units) could still be in the same brigade (formation) — probably 1 brigade, although there is an argument that scarce resources belong in the combat support brigade instead.
> 
> The RCAC still hasn’t quite come to terms with what the long term impact is of acquiring an armoured vehicle that nobody needs or wants. And we acquired 500 TAPV. These were also supposed to go the light infantry battalions, but the infantry’s solution — that they would rather walk than use TAPV — isn’t really feasible for the RCAC. The Canadian Army has procured more TAPV than we did AVGP —the impact of that procurement will be widespread, and will last for decades,


----------



## FJAG

Ostrozac said:


> The RCAC still hasn’t quite come to terms with what the long term impact is of acquiring an armoured vehicle that nobody needs or wants. And we acquired 500 TAPV. These were also supposed to go the light infantry battalions, but the infantry’s solution — that they would rather walk than use TAPV — isn’t really feasible for the RCAC. The Canadian Army has procured more TAPV than we did AVGP —the impact of that procurement will be widespread, and will last for decades,


The artillery could use a whole bunch of them as gun detachment vehicles, recce vehicles, STA vehicles (the way they used TLAVs in Afghanistan) even as second-tier FOO vehicles for the Militia.  Mind you I haven't asked anyone if they actually "want" them.


----------



## KevinB

I still think the TAPV should be quickly donated to Ukraine. 
   Then say sorry.


----------



## RangerRay

Might be out of my lane but I always liked the idea that armoured regiments would consist of one recce squadron and the remaining squadrons being tank squadrons.


----------



## Fabius

The RCAC and the Army don’t really know where they are going with a Cav concept or if they are going there. 
The consolidation of tanks in Alberta was in theory approved but seems to have been walked back due to pending decisions on NATO commitments. 
Ironically it was a semi serious discussion of if the Army could afford MBTs something that seems to have been settled with the decisions on 4th line industrial support to be set up in Canada.


----------



## markppcli

KevinB said:


> I still think the TAPV should be quickly donated to Ukraine.
> Then say sorry.


Who’s side are you on?


----------



## markppcli

FJAG said:


> The artillery could use a whole bunch of them as gun detachment vehicles, recce vehicles, STA vehicles (the way they used TLAVs in Afghanistan) even as second-tier FOO vehicles for the Militia.  Mind you I haven't asked anyone if they actually "want" them.


Can’t fit a gun det ina TAPV so that’s a non starter. There’s a role for them; but not in the CAF. The procurement of the TAPV should be a national scandal quite frankly. The fact that we’d rather talk about the jets we may or may not buy instead of the albatross we’ve tethered to the Army’s neck is deeply frustrating.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Can’t fit a gun det ina TAPV so that’s a non starter. There’s a role for them; but not in the CAF. The procurement of the TAPV should be a national scandal quite frankly. The fact that we’d rather talk about the jets we may or may not buy instead of the albatross we’ve tethered to the Army’s neck is deeply frustrating.



Given that it's designed as a MP's 'armoured squad car', it fits perfectly into the Peacekeeping narrative espoused by the current Liberal government.

An ambitious General, with an eye on promotion, might point that out and reconfigure the CAF accordingly


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> Given that it's designed as a MP's 'armoured squad car', it fits perfectly into the Peacekeeping narrative espoused by the current Liberal government.
> 
> An ambitious General, with an eye on promotion, might point that out and reconfigure the CAF accordingly



I haven’t heard much “peace keeping narrative” from Trudeau since he realized “Canada’s back” would mean harms way in Africa.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> I haven’t heard much “peace keeping narrative” from Trudeau since he realized “Canada’s back” would mean harms way in Africa.



I'm holding out hope for Haiti!


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> I'm holding out hope for Haiti!


If you want our retention issues solved in the Army a mission that doesn’t involved BFAs would go a long way. Overall likelihood of success not withstanding.


----------



## Brad Sallows

I have a difficult time envisioning Canada making a useful contribution to the "land war in Asia" part of a war against China.  I also have difficulty envisioning the air/naval part of the war going deeply into the Pacific, from China's PoV, except as a convoy war.

The Ukraine war reminds me that - in crude terms - if our "come as you are" priors produce a force that can sustain operations for N months and it takes us M months to usefully mobilize where N < M, then a prospective foe just needs to design a force that can sustain operations for P months where N < P < M.


----------



## GR66

Brad Sallows said:


> I have a difficult time envisioning Canada making a useful contribution to the "land war in Asia" part of a war against China.  I also have difficulty envisioning the air/naval part of the war going deeply into the Pacific, from China's PoV, except as a convoy war.


You could potentially have something similar to an air-transportable version of the USMC Littoral Regiment:

_The MLR will employ three subordinate elements:

• a Littoral Combat Team

• a Littoral Anti-Air Battalion

• a Combat Logistics Battalion

The LCT will be task organized around an infantry battalion along with an anti-ship missile battery. It is designed to provide the basis for employing multiple platoon-reinforced-size expeditionary advanced base sites that can host and enable a variety of missions such as long-range anti-ship fires, forward arming and refueling of aircraft, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of key maritime terrain, and air-defense and early warning.

The Littoral Anti-Air Battalion is designed to provide air defense, air surveillance and early warning, air control, and forward rearming and refueling capabilities.

The Combat Logistics Battalion provides tactical logistics support to the MLR by resupplying expeditionary advanced base sites, managing cache sites, and connecting to higher-level logistics providers. It provides expanded purchasing authorities, limited Role II medical forces, distribution of ammunition and fuel, and field level maintenance._

If China wants to take Taiwan it will likely also have to hit the military facilities from which Allied forces are attempting to counter the invasion.  You could place a version of Littoral Regiment along the likely strike routes taken by Chinese forces which would allow the AA Battalion to detect and shoot down incoming missiles/aircraft and the Anti-Ship battery would counter any surface strike attempts.  The Infantry would provide local security to the missile units and the Logistics element would keep them supplied.


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> I have a difficult time envisioning Canada making a useful contribution to the "land war in Asia" part of a war against China.  I also have difficulty envisioning the air/naval part of the war going deeply into the Pacific, from China's PoV, except as a convoy war.
> 
> The Ukraine war reminds me that - in crude terms - if our "come as you are" priors produce a force that can sustain operations for N months and it takes us M months to usefully mobilize where N < M, then a prospective foe just needs to design a force that can sustain operations for P months where N < P < M.



One "advantage" the Ukrainians have "gained" from being the recipients of our weapons rather than our army is that they didn't import the TTPs for the systems.  They were free to experiment and use the equipment in the manner that best suited their needs and circumstances.  They experimented.   That was also made easier because they were more willing to take chances as they focused less on winning and more on not losing.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> One "advantage" the Ukrainians have "gained" from being the recipients of our weapons rather than our army is that they didn't import the TTPs for the systems.  They were free to experiment and use the equipment in the manner that best suited their needs and circumstances.  They experimented.   That was also made easier because they were more willing to take chances as they focused less on winning and more on not losing.



Oh interesting; can you point out some different TTPs they’ve developed ?


----------



## Brad Sallows

GR66 said:


> You could place a version of Littoral Regiment along the likely strike routes taken by Chinese forces which would allow the AA Battalion to detect and shoot down incoming missiles/aircraft and the Anti-Ship battery would counter any surface strike attempts.  The Infantry would provide local security to the missile units and the Logistics element would keep them supplied.


I'd prefer to have the flexibility of air- and ship-based platforms over something that can only be deployed where there happens to be land and which can't easily depart its location if threatened.


----------



## GR66

Brad Sallows said:


> I'd prefer to have the flexibility of air- and ship-based platforms over something that can only be deployed where there happens to be land and which can't easily depart its location if threatened.


Main issue being we don't have any "big honkin ships" to move a large land force...but of course we don't have any AD or Anti-Ship systems either so the whole thing is highly hypothetical.  Just trying to give examples of how the Canadian Army could potentially make a useful contribution in a conflict with China.  The same type of unit could of course be used in any conflict if the missile systems are capable of land attack as well as anti-ship (the Naval Strike Missile that the USMC has tested on JLTV platforms is dual capable).


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Main issue being we don't have any "big honkin ships" to move a large land force...but of course we don't have any AD or Anti-Ship systems either so the whole thing is highly hypothetical.  Just trying to give examples of how the Canadian Army could potentially make a useful contribution in a conflict with China.  The same type of unit could of course be used in any conflict if the missile systems are capable of land attack as well as anti-ship (the Naval Strike Missile that the USMC has tested on JLTV platforms is dual capable).



I think in a world where we don’t know what the next conflict will look like, general combat capability vs niche roles is the wise course of action.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> I think in a world where we don’t know what the next conflict will look like, general combat capability vs niche roles is the wise course of action.


What is "general combat capability" these days though?  Eastern Europe and the South China Seas are very different environments.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Oh interesting; can you point out some different TTPs they’ve developed ?



Nope.  I say they have the opportunity to use things differently.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:


> What is "general combat capability" these days though?  Eastern Europe and the South China Seas are very different environments.



Up to the Bde level it's pretty much the same job, IMHO.

General War vs. Limited War/COIN is where most of the differences lie.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> What is "general combat capability" these days though?  Eastern Europe and the South China Seas are very different environments.


I honestly don’t see it as being that different. The USMC Littoral Regiments are built ground up to seize and then defend island air strips. That’s a boutique unit with a neiche task. The USMC can afford to operate something like that because the have two other marine divisions to do the rest of it. 

When I say “general combat capability” I mean a force that is capable of operating across the operational spectrum. You say we offer nothing tailore to the pacific, I’d argue that Japan operates mechanized Divisons based on wheeled IFV / APCs, they operate in the pacific no?


----------



## Kirkhill

Brad Sallows said:


> I'd prefer to have the flexibility of air- and ship-based platforms over something that can only be deployed where there happens to be land and which can't easily depart its location if threatened.



Armies can unass when appropriate.  But not all defendable targets can be unassed.  Sometimes it is necessary just to stay and slug it out.


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1609618982398578688


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> I honestly don’t see it as being that different. The USMC Littoral Regiments are built ground up to seize and then defend island air strips. That’s a boutique unit with a neiche task. The USMC can afford to operate something like that because the have two other marine divisions to do the rest of it.
> 
> When I say “general combat capability” I mean a force that is capable of operating across the operational spectrum. You say we offer nothing tailore to the pacific, I’d argue that Japan operates mechanized Divisons based on wheeled IFV / APCs, they operate in the pacific no?


Agreed...but the difference is that they are there...and we are not.  It's no good having a capability if you don't also have the capability to deploy it and support it once it's deployed.


----------



## Kirkhill

Back to the Future in Air Defence


__
		https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraine/comments/100qmry


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> Agreed...but the difference is that they are there...and we are not.  It's no good having a capability if you don't also have the capability to deploy it and support it once it's deployed.


 
We have deployed mechanized forces though? Or is it just not fast enough now? Agreed that we need more strategic lift regardless.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> We have deployed mechanized forces though? Or is it just not fast enough now? Agreed that we need more strategic lift regardless.


I don't think you can compare Afghanistan to a peer conflict in the Pacific.

But 1000% agree that there isn't much point in restructuring the combat arms into a structure that we can't actually deploy to theatre and support once there and taking combat losses.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> I don't think you can compare Afghanistan to a peer conflict in the Pacific.
> 
> But 1000% agree that there isn't much point in restructuring the combat arms into a structure that we can't actually deploy to theatre and support once there and taking combat losses.


It’s be like any other conflict; we’ll piggy back of the US. I don’t disagree about the ability to deploying being different; but we’ve also send under equipped forces to Asia in the name of expediency in our past and we should learn from that mistake.

I don’t see much threat of Chinese military expansion, but that’s just me.


----------



## GR66

markppcli said:


> It’s be like any other conflict; we’ll piggy back of the US.


That's fine until there is a major conflict and the US is maxed out supporting their own forces.  Then we're just a drain rather than a help.


markppcli said:


> I don’t see much threat of Chinese military expansion, but that’s just me.


The US and their "Pivot to the Pacific" suggests that others might feel otherwise.

That being said, frankly I'd be thrilled with an Army that is manned and equipped to fulfil ANY high end combat deployment in any theatre.


----------



## markppcli

GR66 said:


> That's fine until there is a major conflict and the US is maxed out supporting their own forces.  Then we're just a drain rather than a help.
> 
> The US and their "Pivot to the Pacific" suggests that others might feel otherwise.
> 
> That being said, frankly I'd be thrilled with an Army that is manned and equipped to fulfil ANY high end combat deployment in any theatre.


Give us 40 more Leo 2s, 48 K9s, and 24 MSHORAD and we’re about there. Who’s going to man that is a whole other kettle of fish


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Give us 40 more Leo 2s, 48 K9s, and 24 MSHORAD and we’re about there. Who’s going to man that is a whole other kettle of fish


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


>


Who calls people hipsters anymore ? Dating yourself mate


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> Who calls people hipsters anymore ? Dating yourself mate



Still loads around in this neck of the woods e.g., 






						The 15 Best Hipster Places in Vancouver
					

We did the research so that you don't have to. 33 Acres Brewing Company and Biltmore Cabaret are on the list. See what other places made the cut.




					foursquare.com


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Oh interesting; can you point out some different TTPs they’ve developed ?



Does this qualify?



> In the trenches, fields and streets around the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, Ukrainian tanks are delivering brutal strikes on Russian troops, but not in direct face-to-face combat. Instead, the* old T-64 tanks are being used as indirect artillery*, with targeting handled by drones or combat helicopters.
> 
> Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty filmed some of the tank crews utilizing their armor to bolster Ukrainian artillery.  It’s a combined arms tactic that is netting successful strikes, even as both sides fail to break through the other’s lines. If Russians try to target the tanks, they move to a different position and resume barrages.











						Ukraine is using its old tanks as artillery amid trench warfare in Bakhmut
					

“It gives you an extra nudge. You see what you’ve done, that you have helped the infantry, and you just want to keep on going."




					taskandpurpose.com
				




 How about citizens that engaged the Russians with 3 days of "training"?  Did they have time to absorb ANY TTPs?

Sections equipped with an assortment of Javelins, NLAWs, Panzerfaust 3s, Matadors, AT4s, CG84s, M72s, RPG7s, RPG22s, Stingers, Starstreaks, Martlets, Milans, etc.   Using whatever they can get ahold of to kill whatever is in front of them.

60mm mortar crews using DJIA drones to launch artillery raids.  Was that in a pam somewhere?  Printing plastic fins to screw onto anti-tank grenades that were jerry-rigged to drop from DJIA drones into trenches, chimneys and hatches.   

SU-27s launching HARM missiles.  Brimstones launched from trucks.   Pickup trucks with HMGs, Autocannons and 70 to 120mm rockets and missiles.

Artillery raids rather than barrages.  Small units of guns, employed with precision and short bursts of fire.

Naval drones.

Some of this is no doubt in some manual somewhere but we can't deny that the Ukrainians have shown an extraordinary propensity for innovation and little tendency to be bound by rule books.


----------



## markppcli

Kirkhill said:


> Does this qualify?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Ukraine is using its old tanks as artillery amid trench warfare in Bakhmut
> 
> 
> “It gives you an extra nudge. You see what you’ve done, that you have helped the infantry, and you just want to keep on going."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> taskandpurpose.com



Tanks have been firing indirect since WW2, aerial spotters have existed since the advent of military aviation. Even our Tac Hel pilots train to adjust fires. 


Kirkhill said:


> How about citizens that engaged the Russians with 3 days of "training"?  Did they have time to absorb ANY TTPs?



Are we resorting to this for a three day old post ? Obviously armed civilians raised as temporary militias are going to be operating differently. My understanding is they were being led by active soldiers ? 



Kirkhill said:


> Sections equipped with an assortment of Javelins, NLAWs, Panzerfaust 3s, Matadors, AT4s, CG84s, M72s, RPG7s, RPG22s, Stingers, Starstreaks, Martlets, Milans, etc.   Using whatever they can get ahold of to kill whatever is in front of them.



We’re they equipped at section level ? Do you assume there was no control of the issue of those weapons and it was just a max scramble to push stuff out ? Probably in February / March but certainly less so now.



Kirkhill said:


> 60mm mortar crews using DJIA drones to launch artillery raids.  Was that in a pam somewhere?  Printing plastic fins to screw onto anti-tank grenades that were jerry-rigged to drop from DJIA drones into trenches, chimneys and hatches.



Are you honestly asking if using UAVs to sport for artillery is something no one else has done ? 

For the record ISIS was doing the home made grenade thing nearly a decade ago.



Kirkhill said:


> SU-27s launching HARM missiles.  Brimstones launched from trucks.   Pickup trucks with HMGs, Autocannons and 70 to 120mm rockets and missiles.
> 
> Artillery raids rather than barrages.  Small units of guns, employed with precision and short bursts of fire.
> 
> Naval drones.
> 
> Some of this is no doubt in some manual somewhere but we can't deny that the Ukrainians have shown an extraordinary propensity for innovation and little tendency to be bound by rule books.



I think assuming they aren’t operating with some kind of TTP, or structure, is frankly absurd. They’re creating some improvised equipment to cover gaps from losses, the system remains unchanged. Of course TTPs are going to adapt in a conflict; but those improvised vehicles and weapons get a disproportionate amount of attention because the people reporting want clicks.


----------



## Kirkhill

markppcli said:


> Tanks have been firing indirect since WW2, aerial spotters have existed since the advent of military aviation. Even our Tac Hel pilots train to adjust fires.
> 
> 
> Are we resorting to this for a three day old post ? Obviously armed civilians raised as temporary militias are going to be operating differently. My understanding is they were being led by active soldiers ?
> 
> 
> 
> We’re they equipped at section level ? Do you assume there was no control of the issue of those weapons and it was just a max scramble to push stuff out ? Probably in February / March but certainly less so now.
> 
> 
> 
> Are you honestly asking if using UAVs to sport for artillery is something no one else has done ?
> 
> For the record ISIS was doing the home made grenade thing nearly a decade ago.
> 
> 
> 
> I think assuming they aren’t operating with some kind of TTP, or structure, is frankly absurd. They’re creating some improvised equipment to cover gaps from losses, the system remains unchanged. Of course TTPs are going to adapt in a conflict; but those improvised vehicles and weapons get a disproportionate amount of attention because the people reporting want clicks.



Never mind.  Slainte.


----------



## Eaglelord17

markppcli said:


> It’s be like any other conflict; we’ll piggy back of the US. I don’t disagree about the ability to deploying being different; but we’ve also send under equipped forces to Asia in the name of expediency in our past and we should learn from that mistake.
> 
> I don’t see much threat of Chinese military expansion, but that’s just me.


China is the largest threat to our nation likely since the US decided they wanted us to be part of them. 

Easiest example being Taiwan, if we lose their semi-conductor manufacturing capabilities we go back to the 90s technologically with no real effective way of being ourselves back to the present. 

Also our steadily increasing reliance on Chinese goods and manufacturing coupled with our steadily decreased capabilities for both manufacturing and maintaining equipment is putting us more and more into their hands. 

They don’t necessarily need to invade Canada to do a ton of damage to us. Whether or not we are their directly intended target or not doesn’t mean it won’t have a serious effect on us.


----------



## Kirkhill

Video of Aussie DFSW Platoon

Sustained Fire Systems - MAG 58 - 7.62, M2 - 12.7, M47 - 40,  all mounting C2 sights for direct and indirect fire.
Anti-Armour systems - CG-84 M3/4 with AT,HE and Ill rounds as well as Javelin


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## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Video of Aussie DFSW Platoon
> 
> Sustained Fire Systems - MAG 58 - 7.62, M2 - 12.7, M47 - 40,  all mounting C2 sights for direct and indirect fire.
> Anti-Armour systems - CG-84 M3/4 with AT,HE and Ill rounds as well as Javelin


There are some pretty decent FCS out there now that allow for direct and indirect fire without the need for the C2 sight - and the issues of teaching folks how to lay the system and record aiming marks etc.
   I'm a big fan of knowing the analog systems - but being able to do it in the dark in seconds without any pre-registering is a nice add that the new stuff allows.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> There are some pretty decent FCS out there now that allow for direct and indirect fire without the need for the C2 sight - and the issues of teaching folks how to lay the system and record aiming marks etc.
> I'm a big fan of knowing the analog systems - but being able to do it in the dark in seconds without any pre-registering is a nice add that the new stuff allows.



Like the types of things Saab has been hanging from their CG84s that can also be employed on MGs and rifles?






						Aimpoint® FCS (Fire Control System) Series - Aimpoint Global
					

The Aimpoint FCS is a multi-weapon sight for use on crew served support weapons and vehicle mounted machine guns. Units using Aimpoint FCS are less lethal and increase their endurance.




					www.aimpoint.com


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Like the types of things Saab has been hanging from their CG84s that can also be employed on MGs and rifles?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Aimpoint® FCS (Fire Control System) Series - Aimpoint Global
> 
> 
> The Aimpoint FCS is a multi-weapon sight for use on crew served support weapons and vehicle mounted machine guns. Units using Aimpoint FCS are less lethal and increase their endurance.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.aimpoint.com


Sort of, there are some much more expensive and advanced systems though -- and just like the Aimpoint FCS you wouldn't want to put them on rifles or MG's though - the nature of those means bulky beast.


----------



## Kirkhill

KevinB said:


> Sort of, there are some much more expensive and advanced systems though -- and just like the Aimpoint FCS you wouldn't want to put them on rifles or MG's though - the nature of those means bulky beast.



Is that as major problem for a Support Platoon Weapon, firing from fixed positions, as it is for assaulters?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> Is that as major problem for a Support Platoon Weapon, firing from fixed positions, as it is for assaulters?


It is if you want to change belts or barrels easily...


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## Kirkhill

FCS13RE - Demo Videos - Aimpoint Global
					

The FCS13-RE provides a very high probability of first-shot hit on both stationary and moving targets at extended ranges and utilizes a very intuitive user control interface.




					www.aimpoint.com
				




It seems to me that it would cover the entire range of weapons of the DFSW Platoon, minus the Javelin but potentially including Anti-Materiel Rifles such as the Barrett and the Alligator that the Ukrainians seem to like.









						Size Matters: The Snipex Alligator Is Ukraine’s Anti-Everything Rifle
					

This absolute unit of a rifle is being used by Ukrainian soldiers and makes a .50-cal look like a paintball gun.




					www.coffeeordie.com


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## Kirkhill

FCS 12 Aimpoint on Carl Gustaf






FCS 12 on 40mm AGL






FCS 12 on M2HB






The FCS 12 is the earlier generation of the FCS 13 RE.









						10th MTN Soldiers learn how to use new ITWS on M3 Carl Gustaf
					

FORT BELVOIR, Virginia -- Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) had first-hand experience in August using the latest aiming technology innovation that makes the Army's recoilless rifle even deadlier.New Equipment Trainers of Proje.....




					www.army.mil
				




Seems that a little bit of bulk is tolerable if it improves effects.


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## Ostrozac

KevinB said:


> There are some pretty decent FCS out there now that allow for direct and indirect fire without the need for the C2 sight - and the issues of teaching folks how to lay the system and record aiming marks etc.
> I'm a big fan of knowing the analog systems - but being able to do it in the dark in seconds without any pre-registering is a nice add that the new stuff allows.


On that topic, did we ever get the FCS on the C16 CASW Automatic Grenade Launcher to work? When I left the field force it was still incapable of registering targets — a bracket for a C2 sight would have been an upgrade.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> FCS 12 Aimpoint on Carl Gustaf
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> FCS 12 on 40mm AGL
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> FCS 12 on M2HB
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The FCS 12 is the earlier generation of the FCS 13 RE.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 10th MTN Soldiers learn how to use new ITWS on M3 Carl Gustaf
> 
> 
> FORT BELVOIR, Virginia -- Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) had first-hand experience in August using the latest aiming technology innovation that makes the Army's recoilless rifle even deadlier.New Equipment Trainers of Proje.....
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.army.mil
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Seems that a little bit of bulk is tolerable if it improves effects.


Not for a 240/C6 or smaller.


----------



## KevinB

Ostrozac said:


> On that topic, did we ever get the FCS on the C16 CASW Automatic Grenade Launcher to work? When I left the field force it was still incapable of registering targets — a bracket for a C2 sight would have been an upgrade.


No idea.  Which one did the CAF get?  
   Some of the RM designs are pretty slick. Those are the only ones I’ve seen on the GMG that actually have worked for that.


----------



## markppcli

Ostrozac said:


> On that topic, did we ever get the FCS on the C16 CASW Automatic Grenade Launcher to work? When I left the field force it was still incapable of registering targets — a bracket for a C2 sight would have been an upgrade.


It works ish it’s just a really shit system in that it doesn’t give you like a pip to put the cross hairs on. Given the weight and bulk of that FCS it doesn’t come out on ex much. Mind you neither does the C16.


----------



## daftandbarmy

markppcli said:


> It works ish it’s just a really shit system in that it doesn’t give you like a pip to put the cross hairs on. Given the weight and bulk of that FCS it doesn’t come out on ex much.* Mind you neither does the C16.*



So at least it is following the example set by the 60mm MOR it replaced as an 'Armoury Queen'


----------



## markppcli

daftandbarmy said:


> So at least it is following the example set by the 60mm MOR it replaced as an 'Armoury Queen'


Nah we use to always take out the 60mm. Took up no room in a LAV, weighed piss all. Polar opposite of the C16.


----------



## IKnowNothing

GR66 said:


> Question to any members "in the know" regarding the following line item from the "Action" section on the Army's Force 2025 webpage:
> 
> 
> By a "single formation" does this mean a single Regiment?  It seems to suggest that when they talk about the objective being "to reduce national procurement".
> 
> Also, there has been lots of talk on this site about some of the trials, etc. being done to develop a Cavalry-like capability involving a mix of LAVs and TAPVs.  Does that suggest they they are again looking at divesting the tanks and going to strictly Cavalry role for the RCAC?  Or possibly reducing the number of tanks and integrating them into a mixed Cavalry Regiment?
> 
> Edited to add:
> 
> May have answered my own question.  The most recent issue of the Canadian Army Journal has an article on Page 7 entitled "Armoured Corps Modernization:  An Overview of the Cavalry Concept".  It talks about an integration of the Tank and Recce streams in Armoured training and of Cavalry Regiments consisting of "Heavy Armoured Cav" Squadrons using the Leopard and "Light Armoured Cav" Squadrons using the LAV (or sub-optimally the TAPV).
> 
> So I'm wondering if for the Reg Force RCAC they're maybe looking at a single Cavalry Regiment with perhaps 2 x LAV Squadrons and 2 x Leopard Squadrons?  That would certainly appear to take the "Heavy" (ABCT) role off the table for the Army going forward if so.


Isn't "formation" actually a technical term denoting Bde (X) Div (XX) or Corps (XXX), so the "Single Formation" would be the RCAC consolidated into a single co-located Bde consisting of y number of Armoured Regiments rather than having the regiments parcelled out across the CMBG's?


Reading further through that Issue the article by Col. Hunt spells out the RCAC's dissatisfaction with the current vehicle suite pretty clearly.  For the medium cav he/they want either/both of a LAV 6.0 class vehicle with a 105mm or 30/35mm and integral ATGM,  for the light atleast a RWS upgrade on the TAPV, but ideally something like the JLTV with Javelin equipped RS6 30mm


----------



## ueo

daftandbarmy said:


> Given that it's designed as a MP's 'armoured squad car', it fits perfectly into the Peacekeeping narrative espoused by the current Liberal government.
> 
> An ambitious General, with an eye on promotion, might point that out and reconfigure the CAF accordingly


Until the protection level is tested by someone with RPGs, Semtex and other goodies arising in so called third/fourth nations.


----------



## daftandbarmy

ueo said:


> Until the protection level is tested by someone with RPGs, Semtex and other goodies arising in so called third/fourth nations.



Good point... better not issue them to 5 DIV troops then, or the government might fall


----------



## FJAG

Not sure if this has been posted elsewhere but ... it was up briefly on CBC this morning and then slid to the back page.


> More than a decade ago, the army had a plan to rebuild. It went nowhere​Canada is still standing in line for equipment it planned to buy 12 years ago
> 
> Murray Brewster · CBC News · Posted: Jan 07, 2023





> https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-armed-forces-equipment-procurement-ukraine-latvia-1.6706444



🍻


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## ArmyRick

FJAG said:


> Not sure if this has been posted elsewhere but ... it was up briefly on CBC this morning and then slid to the back page.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 🍻


Glad to see Gen (Ret'd) Leslie calling out the non-sense of the Canadian procurement and government bureaucracy that fucks around on procurement and equipping the forces. 

Tom Lawson, I say this, shame on you.


----------



## Kirkhill

Under the Long Range Precision Fires / NASAM head

NSM missiles deployed in a Kongsberg NASAMS type fire control architecture.









						Romania Buys Naval Strike Missile Coastal Batteries in $217M Deal - USNI News
					

Raytheon was awarded a $208 million contract to arm Black Sea state and NATO member Romania with mobile coastal anti-ship missile batteries, the Pentagon announced in a Thursday contract statement. Working with the Norwegian company Kongsberg, Raytheon will provide Romania an unspecified number...




					news.usni.org
				






> According to a 2021 report from Norwegian engineering magazine _Teknisk Ukeblad_, the deal would pay for two coastal defense systems that would amount to four mobile launchers and two command and control nodes for the batteries.
> 
> The NSM was developed initially for the Royal Norwegian Navy as a modern anti-ship missile with a range of more than 100 nautical miles for its surface fleet. The ground-based launcher was developed by Kongsberg in part for export sales paired with a command and control system.





> Raytheon was awarded a $208 million contract to arm Black Sea state and NATO member Romania with mobile coastal anti-ship missile batteries, the Pentagon announced in a Thursday contract statement.
> 
> Working with the Norwegian company Kongsberg, Raytheon will provide Romania an unspecified number of Naval Strike Missile Coastal Defense Systems as part of the deal that could be worth up to $217 million after all the options are exercised, according to the announcement. The bulk of the work will be done in Norway and at Raytheon’s facility in Tucson, Ariz., reads the statement.


----------



## Kirkhill

More on Long Range Precision Fires and the Deep Strike Recce Brigade.

The UK is not buying any HIMARS systems.  What it is doing is keeping and upgrading all of its M270 MLRS launchers.

The Launchers will form  the base of the Deep Fires Rocket System



> The late 2022 DSTL magazine, *The Science Inside*, also described their work on the Deep Fires Rocket System.
> 
> Deep Fires Rocket Systems: A single platform with multiple effectors, capable of independent precision targeting of threats out to 150km. Dstl is working with industry to develop a missile to engage high value, time sensitive moving targets (Land Precision Strike) and a dispensing rocket payload that provides target acquisition, kinetic and non-kinetic effect against multiple dispersed targets (long range area effect).
> 
> Further details on Land Precision Strike missile was provided in a *separate document *sent to the Defence Select Committee;
> 
> The Land Precision Strike (LPS) Project is developing momentum fast; it will be fired from the upgraded MLRS to leverage investment in that platform, achieve efficiencies, and deliver the vision of ‘One Launcher, Many Payloads’. This will be a transformational capability from 2028 to counter mobile, fleeting, armoured, and high value threats out to at least 80km.





> The In-Service *Guided/Multiple Launch Rocket System (G/MLRS)* upgrade programmes will consist of…
> 
> 
> Upgrades to 44 M270B1 launch vehicles, including a new armoured cab, composite rubber tracks, and upgraded automotive and launch mechanism components,
> A new Fire Control System will be developed collaboratively with the US, UK, Italy, and Finland,
> An ability to fire the Guided MLRS Extended Range (GMLRS-ER), providing a 150km capability,
> An ability to fire the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), providing a 499km capability.



Noteworthy is a new missile compatible with the MLRS 

It is essentially a ground launched Brimstone with an 80 km fire and forget capability against moving targets (tanks and missile launchers for example).



> Why Land Precision Strike?​*GMLRS and ER-GMLRS *are no doubt extremely effective munitions, with the former well proven in multiple conflicts. The IM-compliant M31A1 GMLRS rocket is 3.94m long, 227mm in diameter and weighs 302kg. Of that 302kg, 90kg is the single blast fragmentation warhead.
> 
> This single warhead is excellent against buildings or other fixed infrastructure, and clusters of vehicles, but its area effects are limited. The Alternative Warhead provides these area effects by using 160,000 preformed tungsten fragments. A version using larger tungsten balls is also under development for the US Army.
> 
> Even though GMLRS has been called the 70km sniper, it is a blunt weapon.
> 
> GMLRS cannot be used against moving targets because it only has a GPS/INS guidance system, and in some scenarios, the minimum range of 15km might also be a problem.
> 
> GMLRS cannot be easily fired from naval vessels (although it has been demonstrated) and is limited against reverse slope targets.
> 
> The large warhead might also be limiting in many situations.
> 
> Perhaps an easy way to understand the requirement is to visualise an 80km Brimstone.
> 
> Land Precision Strike (and GMLRS/ER-GMLRS) are fundamental components of the British Army’s new *Deep Reconnaissance Strike Brigade Combat Team*.
> 
> *Future Soldier* describes DRS as;
> 
> 1st Deep Recce Strike BCT will focus on the Army’s deep fight, combining deep fires with reconnaissance and the ability to integrate non-lethal effects. Deep Recce Strike BCT combines the Ajax’s formidable sensors with enhanced fires systems to provide long-range persistent surveillance for the coordination of deep fires.
> It is fair to say that DRS is still a work in progress, but the building blocks are beginning to form, and the Land Precision Strike missile will be fundamental part of its development.


----------



## Kirkhill




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## Kirkhill




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## Kirkhill




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## Kirkhill




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## Kirkhill




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## KevinB

@Kirkhill that seems to be a 1st Quarter 2022 paper (or early 2nd) the UK MoD has changed a few directions since then FWIW.


----------



## Kirkhill

The previous posts came from a document referred to under the Think Defence Deep Fires post above.

The give a good idea of the direction of travel of the British Arrmy and the Royal Artillery.


KevinB said:


> @Kirkhill that seems to be a 1st Quarter 2022 paper (or early 2nd) the UK MoD has changed a few directions since then FWIW.



That's interesting - yes it was a May 22 doc.   Anything OS more current?


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> View attachment 75803
> 
> The previous posts came from a document referred to under the Think Defence Deep Fires post above.
> 
> The give a good idea of the direction of travel of the British Arrmy and the Royal Artillery.
> 
> 
> That's interesting - yes it was a May 22 doc.   Anything OS more current?


Not sure about fully OS, last Nov a Brit Col was doing a FOUO Unclass brief in Ft Benning, I didn’t find it that exciting and didn’t stay past the first 10 min, but it was a Sept dated brief.   My guess is that will migrate to OS soon if not already - I just don’t generally surf UK MoD stuff.  

The Uk however views the Challenger 3 upgrade as in interim armor and will be joining the EU (Franco-German) next gen Tank program this year (I don’t recall its moniker).


----------



## FJAG

KevinB said:


> Not sure about fully OS, last Nov a Brit Col was doing a FOUO Unclass brief in Ft Benning, I didn’t find it that exciting and didn’t stay past the first 10 min, but it was a Sept dated brief.   My guess is that will migrate to OS soon if not already - I just don’t generally surf UK MoD stuff.
> 
> The Uk however views the Challenger 3 upgrade as in interim armor and will be joining the EU (Franco-German) next gen Tank program this year (I don’t recall its moniker).


This one



> Main Ground Combat System - Wikipedia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> en.wikipedia.org





> MGCS – The Smart Tank is Rolling in | HENSOLDT
> 
> 
> MGCS (Main Ground Combat System) is a project by France and Germany for a new state-of-the-art tank. HENSOLDT strives to develop the game-changing networked sensor solution for MGCS. The goal: Offering the crew an automated situation analysis in real time with the support of AI.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.hensoldt.net



🍻


----------



## Kirkhill

I was kind of taken by the breadth of the British effort.  Not the benefits of a particular system but the number of systems, their modifications and their overlaps.

And a sense that 80 km is the new 8 km.


----------



## KevinB

Kirkhill said:


> I was kind of taken by the breadth of the British effort.  Not the benefits of a particular system but the number of systems, their modifications and their overlaps.
> 
> And a sense that 80 km is the new 8 km.


Nearly every other Army has the same overlap because no one system can do it all. 

Queue the ‘all singing and dancing’ LAV trying to juggle a lot of stuff in the air and no one seems to notice everything that was dropped.


----------

