# Army Reserve Restructuring



## FJAG (23 May 2020)

I've been giving some thought to next steps since publishing "Unsustainable at Any Price" (sales are doing fairly well, by the way. Thanks to anyone who's bought a copy) and particularly to a small debate Infanteer and I had last year about whether or not restructured reserve infantry battalions and armoured and artillery regiments should have full scale headquarters companies (i.e. the service support elements).

My previous position was that they should be established the same way as a regular force battalion with a complete headquarters coy/bty/sqn. (Remember that my basic premise is that we should have far fewer reserve brigades and units but that all of our current reservists should be organized into full sized, fully equipped and deployable units and formations)

Since then, I've become more tilted towards restructuring ourselves along the line of US Brigade Support Battalions (BSB) and their Forward Support Companies (FSC). Basically, in a US Brigade Combat Team (BCT), none of the manoeuvre, artillery or engineer battalions have what we would call a headquarters company. The BSB has a transport company, a supply company, a maintenance company, a medical company and one FSC for each inf, armor, arty or engr battalion in the BCT. Each FSC is configured specifically for the type of battalion it supports and is generally always assigned to the same battalion. Within the National Guard, the specific FSCs would be located in the same armory or very close to the battalion HQ that it supports.

There are some advantages to this system that I can see:

1. Since the FSCs are a subunit of the BSB, the BSB becomes responsible for the technical training and basic career management of the FSC specialist personnel;
2. During garrison (and even in combat) the BSB can temporarily shuffle resources (especially maintenance) around to where they are most needed;
3. There is a tighter chain of communication/coordination between the battalion's 1st and BCT's 2nd line support since it is within the same battalion;
4; It allows Bn/regt comds (especially reserve ones) to concentrate on the core functions of the bn/regt;

A possible disadvantage is that the FSC Coy Comd is generally a Log/RCEME officer rather than an inf/arty/armoured/engr officer as would be for a HQ Coy/bty/sqn. Is that really a disadvantage though?

Final question: should the Fd Ambulance come under command of the Service Bn (like in a BSB) and, more importantly, should the medical platoons/sections be part of the Fd Amb and forward deployed/attached with their respective bns/regts as per the FSC (i.e. the forward deployed med platoon would be a sub/sub unit of the FSC?

Have at it.

 :stirpot:


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## MilEME09 (23 May 2020)

Where to start with this one, alright I'll break my response down to start from a RCEME perspective, the service battalion perspective, then maybe some of my own thoughts at the end.

First, Organization wise all the elements already exist in RCEME doctrine for the organization of maintenance of RCEME in levels higher then Coy, we just have never needed a maintenance battalion or Brigade on the modern battlefield. We would however have to rework how we do business, currently the service battalion is Second line maintenance, with the F Echelon (the user unit) Admin Coy acting as 1st line support, items are moved between lines of maintenance via BLP's and ECP's. To bring first and second line together would required a restructuring of RCEME,possibly back to being an independent field unit organized much like armoured units are (we used to be formed as technical squadrons until we were amalgamated into service battalions). With a dedicated First line support/close support squadron, a vehicle repair/recovery Squadron, and a Ancillary Squadron. Reserve units already semi operate like this as Pres units do not have full admin coys will maintenance, transport, etc... so the Service battalion provides both first and second line support. First line is usually a request from a unit for us to support them on specific exercises to which we detach the assets required if approved. Second line comes in the form of the full time RSS staff at a service battalion to do the larger tasks.

From a total CSS point of view, again our entire system for how we support units we need to be rewritten from the ground up, especially our supply system.  Given that the CO of a service battalion is in charge of rear area security in our doctrine, having medics, and MP's for example attached to us makes sense, they once were as well until about the 1960's as i recall.


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## daftandbarmy (23 May 2020)

Without more full time support, like an embedded Reg F training team, we're doomed to recreate past mediocrity AFAIC.


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## MilEME09 (23 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Without more full time support, like an embedded Reg F training team, we're doomed to recreate past mediocrity AFAIC.



Yes, and not just NCM'S, Officers too, our current system does not give reserve officers in CSS a lot of chances to be part of a large running support unit, and get practice on say running log ops, or a maintenance control office in the field.


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## daftandbarmy (23 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Yes, and not just NCM'S, Officers too, our current system does not give reserve officers in CSS a lot of chances to be part of a large running support unit, and get practice on say running log ops, or a maintenance control office in the field.



Amen.

IMHO each unit needs a Maj/Capt (Ops/Trg O), a Capt (Adjt/Admin) plus a couple of WO/Sgts, two or three MCpls and 4 or 5 Cpl/Ptes. 

Right now we tend to get a Junior Captain who is broken/ a 'problem child' and/or on his way out, who is used mainly to handle the outrageous amount of administration, and does nothing to mentor/develop the Class A Officers because they just don't have time. 

We also have a WO, who is usually heavily over stretched, trying to manage the myriad of Ops/ Trg requirements, sometimes in partnership with a good Class B RQ (which is rare). We might be lucky enough to snag a MCpl/Sgt/Cpl who is posted locally for some kind of compassionate issue, but that's not guaranteed

Meanwhile we continue to have Op taskings, and other fast ball type requirements piled on us from on high, which the Class A crowd just doesn't have the band width to manage effectively.


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## FJAG (23 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Where to start with this one, alright I'll break my response down to start from a RCEME perspective, the service battalion perspective, then maybe some of my own thoughts at the end.
> 
> First, Organization wise all the elements already exist in RCEME doctrine for the organization of maintenance of RCEME in levels higher then Coy, we just have never needed a maintenance battalion or Brigade on the modern battlefield. We would however have to rework how we do business, currently the service battalion is Second line maintenance, with the F Echelon (the user unit) Admin Coy acting as 1st line support, items are moved between lines of maintenance via BLP's and ECP's. To bring first and second line together would required a restructuring of RCEME,possibly back to being an independent field unit organized much like armoured units are (we used to be formed as technical squadrons until we were amalgamated into service battalions). With a dedicated First line support/close support squadron, a vehicle repair/recovery Squadron, and a Ancillary Squadron. Reserve units already semi operate like this as Pres units do not have full admin coys will maintenance, transport, etc... so the Service battalion provides both first and second line support. First line is usually a request from a unit for us to support them on specific exercises to which we detach the assets required if approved. Second line comes in the form of the full time RSS staff at a service battalion to do the larger tasks.
> 
> From a total CSS point of view, again our entire system for how we support units we need to be rewritten from the ground up, especially our supply system.  Given that the CO of a service battalion is in charge of rear area security in our doctrine, having medics, and MP's for example attached to us makes sense, they once were as well until about the 1960's as i recall.



Thanks for the comment. I'm particularly interested in what the maintainers and logisticians think.

Essentially the US Brigade Support Battalion is very much like our Brigade Service Battalion except for the fact that the various headquarters companies, admin companies etc that now reside within our inf/arty/armour/engr battalions and regiments are concentrated into the BSB as Forward Support Companies and then doled out to the line battalions (there are roughly six FSCs in each BSB depending on the BCT's makeup). The manual for how that is structured is here: https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp4_90.pdf

At the brigade level you are still just dealing with one maintenance, one supply and one distribution company in the BSB but in addition, there is a maintenance platoon, a supply platoon and a distribution (transportation) platoon within each FSC. So 1st line within the FSC and 2nd line within the BSB Maint Coy (in the parlance of what I learned under the old 4 lines of maintenance).

The US Army system for service support above the brigade level is quite modular and task organized. Generally (and I do mean generally) at the Divisional, corps or theatre level there is one (or possibly more) Sustainment Brigade which itself is quite modular as well. The key building blocks inside a Sustainment Brigade is one or more Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) which will have several differing companies supplying whatever support services the CSSB and the brigade is targeted to provide to the division or corps or theatre. One of those companies can be a Support Maintenance Company which is structured to provide a further maintenance support above what is available within the BSB. (Note that the US Army now divides maintenance into what they call Two-Line Maintenance, i.e. "Field Maintenance" and "Sustainment Maintenance")

In the draft Canadian Army structure that I created in my CMJ article and my book I designated that two of the Reserve Force Brigades to be a Combat Sustainment Support Brigade and a Manoeuvre Enhancement Brigade so as to be able to provide the building blocks out of which National Support Elements could be tailored for various expeditionary operations. The draft Combat Sustainment Support Brigade has assigned to it a Combat Sustainment Support Battalion which has the equivalent of a Support Maintenance Company in it (as well as an MP Regiment, an engineer support regiment, a transportation battalion and a special troops battalion (for all the odds and sods)). The Manoeuvre Enhancement Brigade contains another engineer support regiment, a military intelligence regiment, a CBRN regiment, an EW regiment and an Influence Activities Company). Both brigades are hybrid brigades of reg (mostly from existing Canadian Combat Support Brigade) and res force personnel.

Se here for maintenance operations in the US Army: https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19571_ATP%204-33%20C1%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf

I thought that for the time being though I'd concentrate on the service support structure within the brigade and leave higher for some other day.

 :cheers:


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## Colin Parkinson (23 May 2020)

Having had the pleasure of being part of an Ops tasked unit in the 80's, I would say that is the level you want to bring all militia units to. We were able to conduct first line maintenance on vehicles and guns (Is rebuilding an engine for the 3 ton stake truck first line?  ). We had Civilian Doctor and Nurse driving our decently equipped ambulance. A proper kitchen trailer and kitchen in our armoury, making meals in the field and every saturday. A Line laying truck and enough radios (Lacking Nestor though), 2 full OP parties, 2 truck Ammunition party, dedicated QM vehicle, 6 guns and tractors and a primary and secondary CP (with vehicles for survey party.) We had 3 RSS (Captain, WO and M/Bdr) and 3 Class B. 

This gave the ability to be self-sufficient in the field. One of the challenges that we didn't fully comprehend is the amount ammunition and stores required for extended operations, I saw that challenge when we did Black Bear support fire missions and working for 1 Service Battalion in Germany. We really needed to do a brigade level exercise just on logistics with real simulated cargo (weighted ammunition boxes/ fake but properly sized food/water/POL stores). There is a whole subset of skills in packing, loading, cross decking and storing of those stores that people need to experience.


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## MilEME09 (23 May 2020)

Colin P said:
			
		

> This gave the ability to be self-sufficient in the field. One of the challenges that we didn't fully comprehend is the amount ammunition and stores required for extended operations, I saw that challenge when we did Black Bear support fire missions and working for 1 Service Battalion in Germany. We really needed to do a brigade level exercise just on logistics with real simulated cargo (weighted ammunition boxes/ fake but properly sized food/water/POL stores). There is a whole subset of skills in packing, loading, cross decking and storing of those stores that people need to experience.



There's an old saying, "Children study Tactics, men study logistics"


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## FJAG (23 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Without more full time support, like an embedded Reg F training team, we're doomed to recreate past mediocrity AFAIC.



When you run the existing numbers, and you take the 10 current reserve brigades and 138 units, with their existing 18,000 reserve force personnel (plus HSvcs and MPs) and their  current regular support staff and reduce that to two manoeuvre brigades groups, an artillery brigade, a sustainment brigade and a manoeuvre enhancement brigade (five full-sized brigades in total with roughly 34 battalion sized units (3 of which are re-rolled Reg F regts)) then you end up with around 17 RSS staff per battalion plus roughly double the RSS staff at each Bde HQ even before you start considering what to do with the RegF pers from 1 Sig Regt, 4 Gen Support Regt; and 4 Engr Sup Regt.

One area I do see a need for additional RegF (or even ResF Class B) personnel involved (assuming that ResF units receive full TO&E) is more maintainers of all types working full time within the brigade service battalions.

The key here is to get rid of the somewhat useless ... (sorry I previously posted this accidentally before I finished it.) The key here is to get rid of the useless overhead that we have to sustain a career path for LCols and CWOs in 138 fractional battalions. I sympathize with the cap badge loss involved but it makes little sense if the end result is an organization of 18,000 people incapable of fielding even one battalion on their own without massive reorganization and lengthy training. No business organization would allocate even a fraction of the resources to such a thing. We're never going to do mobilization from scratch again anyway and, IF it ever actually became necessary, it would be just as possible to resurrect units from the Supplemental Order of Battle and allocate cadres to them for training and leadership as it would be to bring one of our current reserve battalions up to strength.

While there are clearly equipment acquisition costs involved (and let's face it, if you don't have the equipment you can't go to fight anyway), US Congressional budget estimates make it clear that the annual operating expense of a given National Guard BCT is 1/3 of that of it's Active Army counterpart - anywhere between $162 million (IBCT) to $210 million (ABCT) v $542 million and $601 million.

 :cheers:


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## Kilted (24 May 2020)

This may be slightly off topic, however if we are looking at the reserve a as a whole. One area where I wonder if we can downsize would be the CIC. There are 7500 CIC Officers, which makes up about 20% of the total reserve force. Now, I'm sure the current requirements call for as many as we have. But can we not start amalgamating some Corps and Squadrons?  I understand what the aims of the Cadet program are, but does it need to be as large as it is? Does the CAF get its value back out of the program?  I think that these are some questions that should be asked if we were to start restructuring things.


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## MilEME09 (24 May 2020)

Kilted said:
			
		

> This may be slightly off topic, however if we are looking at the reserve a as a whole. One area where I wonder if we can downsize would be the CIC. There are 7500 CIC Officers, which makes up about 20% of the total reserve force. Now, I'm sure the current requirements call for as many as we have. But can we not start amalgamating some Corps and Squadrons?  I understand what the aims of the Cadet program are, but does it need to be as large as it is? Does the CAF get its value back out of the program?  I think that these are some questions that should be asked if we were to start restructuring things.



CIC is technically a separate entity but at the HQ level reserves and cadets are run as one chunk of the pie. This needs to be separated in my opinion if we want to start to solve our issues.


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## MJP (24 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> From a total CSS point of view, again our entire system for how we support units we need to be rewritten from the ground up, especially our supply system.  Given that the CO of a service battalion is in charge of rear area security in our doctrine, having medics, and MP's for example attached to us makes sense, they once were as well until about the 1960's as i recall.



The ability to do 1st or and 2nd line and even limited 3rd line all within one org has plenty of real world examples (eFP for example has no separation for 1st/2nd line maint work) and practice that it can be done without issue.

I think you need to separate operational/tactical concepts from domestic organization and institutional tasks and needs as the two don't work the same. It is easier to conform to tactical needs IMHO that so any change at the PRes level should focus on the organization/institutional requirement day to day in a domestic setting.



			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Given that the CO of a service battalion is in charge of rear area security in our doctrine, having medics, and MP's for example attached to us makes sense, they once were as well until about the 1960's as i recall.



I will post a few examinations of RAS and the arguments against continuing having RAS being solely a Svc Bn resp.  It might have worked in a different era but it is a dated concept. This isn't to say the the Svc Bn shouldn't do security, it just shouldn't be added onto the mix in addition to their core focus of ensuring a Bde is sustained.  That said like the above the focus shouldn't be on the tactical but rather the institutional.


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## Colin Parkinson (24 May 2020)

Kilted said:
			
		

> This may be slightly off topic, however if we are looking at the reserve a as a whole. One area where I wonder if we can downsize would be the CIC. There are 7500 CIC Officers, which makes up about 20% of the total reserve force. Now, I'm sure the current requirements call for as many as we have. But can we not start amalgamating some Corps and Squadrons?  I understand what the aims of the Cadet program are, but does it need to be as large as it is? Does the CAF get its value back out of the program?  I think that these are some questions that should be asked if we were to start restructuring things.



A quick google shows that for the UK about 25% of the new recruits into the army were cadets, that's not a bad return. I suspect somewhere there are numbers out there for Canadian Cadets. It would be interesting to see how a Cadets performance and record is judged by CF recruiters?

http://natoassociation.ca/cadets-vital-to-canadas-society-and-military/


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## Gunplumber (24 May 2020)

Until the Reserve system is "fixed" its really not worth embedding RCEME guys at a unit, there just isnt enough work. I am a Weapons Tech in a Reserve infantry unit, only because I have been there so long that they had positions when I got out of the Regs and went reserve. I work as a CQMS and fix wpns when needed which isnt to often (partly due to the fact that our MGs are all NS and cant get parts.....). Not keen on Reserve Svc Bns but right now I think it is the best option considering our manpower. It is not often that the Svc Bn ever supports our exercises which I think is a shame.

As to the cadets, I also work with them in my day job. It is a great system and helps out the kids a lot. I would estimate that roughly 20% I talk to want to go military. It also shows the military in a good light to a lot of parents who know nothing about us. There are some extremely dedicated CIC officers I know and they do a good, no make that a great, job. There are also a lot who are not. In my opinion I think that Cadets should be a semi separate entity with CICs being dressed like cadets and not like CAF. They are trained to be CIC and NOT reserve officers. They dont even have to do a FORCE test, but the CDS has mandated that everyone in uniform has to. The Cadets are a good system but should not be part of the Reserve.


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## RocketRichard (24 May 2020)

Gunplumber said:
			
		

> Until the Reserve system is "fixed" its really not worth embedding RCEME guys at a unit, there just isnt enough work. I am a Weapons Tech in a Reserve infantry unit, only because I have been there so long that they had positions when I got out of the Regs and went reserve. I work as a CQMS and fix wpns when needed which isnt to often (partly due to the fact that our MGs are all NS and cant get parts.....). Not keen on Reserve Svc Bns but right now I think it is the best option considering our manpower. It is not often that the Svc Bn ever supports our exercises which I think is a shame.
> 
> As to the cadets, I also work with them in my day job. It is a great system and helps out the kids a lot. I would estimate that roughly 20% I talk to want to go military. It also shows the military in a good light to a lot of parents who know nothing about us. There are some extremely dedicated CIC officers I know and they do a good, no make that a great, job. There are also a lot who are not. In my opinion I think that Cadets should be a semi separate entity with CICs being dressed like cadets and not like CAF. They are trained to be CIC and NOT reserve officers. They dont even have to do a FORCE test, but the CDS has mandated that everyone in uniform has to. The Cadets are a good system but should not be part of the Reserve.


Great post.  Well said about cadets. 


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk


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## FJAG (24 May 2020)

Gunplumber said:
			
		

> Until the Reserve system is "fixed" its really not worth embedding RCEME guys at a unit, there just isnt enough work. I am a Weapons Tech in a Reserve infantry unit, only because I have been there so long that they had positions when I got out of the Regs and went reserve. I work as a CQMS and fix wpns when needed which isnt to often (partly due to the fact that our MGs are all NS and cant get parts.....). Not keen on Reserve Svc Bns but right now I think it is the best option considering our manpower. It is not often that the Svc Bn ever supports our exercises which I think is a shame.



I agree with you. Until Reserve units are "fixed" and equipped and capable of getting collective training, there is little reason to embed full-time RCEME personnel at either the unit or service battalion (and incidentally the parts supply system fixed.



			
				Gunplumber said:
			
		

> As to the cadets, I also work with them in my day job. It is a great system and helps out the kids a lot. I would estimate that roughly 20% I talk to want to go military. It also shows the military in a good light to a lot of parents who know nothing about us. There are some extremely dedicated CIC officers I know and they do a good, no make that a great, job. There are also a lot who are not. In my opinion I think that Cadets should be a semi separate entity with CICs being dressed like cadets and not like CAF. They are trained to be CIC and NOT reserve officers. They dont even have to do a FORCE test, but the CDS has mandated that everyone in uniform has to. The Cadets are a good system but should not be part of the Reserve.



The Reserve Force component created under s 15(3) of the NDA is,  by virtue of a ministerial order at article 2.034 of Queen's Regulations and Orders, divided into subcomponents: a) the primary reserve; b) the supplementary reserve; c) the Cadet Organizations Administration and Training Service; and d) the Canadian Rangers. It could technically be changed by simply having the Minister make a new order. That said, however, the value of having the CIC remain reservists is that they remain subject to the Code of Service Discipline and to the military chain of command in general. What they wear, how they are trained and what administrative requirements that they are subject to (like the FORCE test) are all part of low level orders, directives and instructions and could be easily changed even while they remain as reservists. Being the cynic that I am I presume that they wear the uniform that they do so that we do not have to put one more uniform into the supply chain.

 :cheers:


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## Kilted (24 May 2020)

Gunplumber said:
			
		

> As to the cadets, I also work with them in my day job. It is a great system and helps out the kids a lot. I would estimate that roughly 20% I talk to want to go military. It also shows the military in a good light to a lot of parents who know nothing about us. There are some extremely dedicated CIC officers I know and they do a good, no make that a great, job. There are also a lot who are not. In my opinion I think that Cadets should be a semi separate entity with CICs being dressed like cadets and not like CAF. They are trained to be CIC and NOT reserve officers. They dont even have to do a FORCE test, but the CDS has mandated that everyone in uniform has to. The Cadets are a good system but should not be part of the Reserve.




It's good to hear that that many are interested, but how many actually join, and of this who join, how many of them become CIC? This number may be hard to find because many members are not too willing to admit that they were former cadets. I also know many members who were cadets for less then a year in the 12-14 age range, quit because they didn't like, but still decided to join the Forces later on. 


As far as uniforms go, if the CIC were wearing the same uniform as the cadets, there would not be a need to add a new uniform, maybe a few sizes. I don't see why CIC officers need to be wearing CADPAT, or eventually the new combat uniform. 

I know that the UK has created a separate commission for them. I'm not completely sure of the differences, but it isn't the same thing. They are however still saluted and have mess privileges.


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## dimsum (24 May 2020)

Kilted said:
			
		

> As far as uniforms go, if the CIC were wearing the same uniform as the cadets, there would not be a need to add a new uniform, maybe a few sizes. I don't see why CIC officers need to be wearing CADPAT, or eventually the new combat uniform.
> 
> I know that the UK has created a separate commission for them. I'm not completely sure of the differences, but it isn't the same thing. They are however still saluted and have mess privileges.



Australia has done the same thing, with their CIC instructors (they have officers and NCMs) having "Cadets" or something similar below their rank.  

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Defence_Force_Cadets


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## Good2Golf (24 May 2020)

FJAG, perhaps for clarity, this thread should be renamed “Army Reserve Restructure”?

:2c:

Regards
G2G


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## FJAG (24 May 2020)

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> FJAG, perhaps for clarity, this thread should be renamed “Army Reserve Restructure”?
> 
> :2c:
> 
> ...



Good idea and done!

And incidentally for anyone wanting to look at a precis of my thought process see my article "The Canadian Army needs a Paradigm Shift" in the most recent CMJ here: http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/page19-eng.asp

Just as an aside, in the article I left aside the question of how many "divisions" we actually needed. In my book I answered that question by saying three. 1 Cdn Div (to do the job it does now, i.e. a force employer by commanding deployed forces and forming a deployable headquarters if needed) and two force generating divisions. 3 Canadian Division in Edmonton would command 1, 3 and 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade Gps and the Canadian Sustainment Brigade focused on generating forces for deterrence/employment in Europe and encompassing all forces and facilities from the Ont/Que border west (excepting Petawawa). 2 Cdn Div in Montreal would command 2 Canadian Light Brigade Gp, 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Gp, the Artillery Brigade and the Canadian Manoeuvre Enhancement Brigade focused on generating forces for all operations other than Europe and encompassing all forces and facilities east of the Ont/Que border (and including Petawawa). That's four full brigades per division which is a normal scale of control. I do not see the wide geographic span as an issue considering today's communication capabilities. CANSOFCOM remains unchanged.

Okay. Let's get back to that Service Battalion, Forward Support Company question. And for anyone who wants to have a look at what  US Armored, Stryker and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams look like down to the personnel and vehicle level - look here: https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51535-fsprimerbreakoutchapter2.pdf

 :cheers:


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## Blackadder1916 (24 May 2020)

Where to start?



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> My previous position was that they should be established the same way as a regular force battalion with a complete headquarters coy/bty/sqn. (Remember that my basic premise is that we should have far fewer reserve brigades and units but that all of our current reservists should be organized into full sized, fully equipped and deployable units and formations)
> 
> Since then, I've become more tilted towards restructuring ourselves along the line of US Brigade Support Battalions (BSB) and their Forward Support Companies (FSC). Basically, in a US Brigade Combat Team (BCT), none of the manoeuvre, artillery or engineer battalions have what we would call a headquarters company. The BSB has a transport company, a supply company, a maintenance company, a medical company and one FSC for each inf, armor, arty or engr battalion in the BCT. Each FSC is configured specifically for the type of battalion it supports and is generally always assigned to the same battalion. Within the National Guard, the specific FSCs would be located in the same armory or very close to the battalion HQ that it supports.



If reality didn't poke its ugly nose in, my first thought would be that a reserve formation/unit should be organized the same as a regular formation/unit.  This being Canada, however, there would be significant differences/challenges in manning and equipment but to mangle the first principle of war "selection and maintenance of the aim" shouldn't the aim be to "train as you would fight" (another prime guiding axiom).  If a reserve formation/unit would have to be reorganized if placed on active service (to mirror a reg one that it may replace or partner with in a div/bde) then how is that different than the status quo.  If we are looking at FSCs to assume the 1st line support functions of reserve arms units then why would the same not apply to reg units?



> A possible disadvantage is that the FSC Coy Comd is generally a Log/RCEME officer rather than an inf/arty/armoured/engr officer as would be for a HQ Coy/bty/sqn. Is that really a disadvantage though?



If there was howling (and backstepping) about mortars to the guns and pioneers to the engineers, would there not be a similar reaction to losing control of A and B echelons?



> Final question: should the Fd Ambulance come under command of the Service Bn (like in a BSB) and, more importantly, should the medical platoons/sections be part of the Fd Amb and forward deployed/attached with their respective bns/regts as per the FSC (i.e. the forward deployed med platoon would be a sub/sub unit of the FSC?
> 
> Have at it.



Not just no, but f***  no!  Obviously, this is a much closer personal issue to me.  Of course, current (and future) logisticians are undoubtedly much smarter than those I worked with in decades long past and they will a much better grasp of the principles of providing health support with all its nuances and idiosyncrasies. (_that's sarcasm for those who missed it_)  However on the rare occasions when we tried to incorporate a 2nd line medical element (e.g. an Evac Pl when that was in the Fd Amb org - I'm drawing on experience in 4CMBG ) with a log organization, like an FLG , it didn't work well.

That's not to say I agreed with the establishment of a separate HS organization that included all medical units and pers but nobody asked my opinion back then.  I would have much preferred maintaining medical elements integral to units.  And while you seem to have assumed 1st line medical support in US Army arms units are, like supply and maintenance functions, provided by a FSC that's not the case - or at least not doctrinally.  As example, there is still a medical platoon in the HHC of an infantry bn.  See https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6672_ATP%203-21x20%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf  go to page 28.

And so we don't continue to trip over "lines" and "echelons" and "*roles*" (the current correct doctrine term) when describing HSS an interesting read is this precis at http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/SOH/SOH_Content/CACSC-PUB-HSS%20(2015).docx



			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Given that the CO of a service battalion is in charge of rear area security in our doctrine,* having medics*, and MP's for example attached to us makes sense, they once were as well until about the 1960's as i recall.



While Reserve medical coys/pls may have been incorporated into Militia Svc Bns at one time for ease of administration, fd ambs (or other 2nd/3rd line medical functions) have never been doctrinally included in logistics units.


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## MilEME09 (24 May 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I agree with you. Until Reserve units are "fixed" and equipped and capable of getting collective training, there is little reason to embed full-time RCEME personnel at either the unit or service battalion (and incidentally the parts supply system fixed.
> 
> :cheers:



Agreed, honestly it is hard to justify my own trade in the PRes because of how the system is set up. The way we handle spare parts now makes it difficult to have local stock piles of common parts because many are one for one exchange. At the service battalion I have gotten resistance to supporting other units because of all the silly reasons, it would take away from the number of people coming on our own units exercises. Few unit's actually request support from us, usually it is the armoured recce guy's and they love it when we go support them (nothing makes you feel more appreciated then a Squadron commander telling you to go warm up in a tent when it's -40 because you just fixed half his machine guns to keep his range going).

At unit lines conflicting training priorities means time on turning wrenches is limited, even more limited because of a lack of work space, tools, and spare parts, to compound this the system really works against us. Reg force tech's generally do not trust their PRes counterparts because we lack experience, however the system really doesn't give us the opportunity to get that experience often, on top of that, where in the reg force there are time cards, and means to track work of a tech to a project. No such thing is in the PRes so we have no way to say "I have X hours of experience on piece of kit Y"

If we change the Reserve system though the reg force system will need to change as well to match. Taking out the CSS portions of an admin coy and giving it to the service battalion would make those organizations larger as a whole I believe, not to mention your service battalion would balloon into 6+ companies. You would likely see a split into General and close support battalions, CS acting as the 1st line to the units, and General support working as second line.


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## FJAG (24 May 2020)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> Where to start?
> 
> If reality didn't poke its ugly nose in, my first thought would be that a reserve formation/unit should be organized the same as a regular formation/unit.  This being Canada, however, there would be significant differences/challenges in manning and equipment but to mangle the first principle of war "selection and maintenance of the aim" shouldn't the aim be to "train as you would fight" (another prime guiding axiom).  If a reserve formation/unit would have to be reorganized if placed on active service (to mirror a reg one that it may replace or partner with in a div/bde) then how is that different than the status quo.  If we are looking at FSCs to assume the 1st line support functions of reserve arms units then why would the same not apply to reg units?



That's my bad in the way that I introduced the topic. When Infanteer and I were first on opposite sides of this topic we were discussing a reorganized reserve organization. I agree with you entirely. Whatever organizational structure we take for the Reserve brigade should be the same for the regular ones and vice versa (although I see a difference between light, mechanized and armoured brigades based on function). They should be complete mirrors with eventual identical TO&Es.



			
				Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> If there was howling (and backstepping) about mortars to the guns and pioneers to the engineers, would there not be a similar reaction to losing control of A and B echelons?



The whole problem is that there is howling about just about everything. The Forces are a very much against radical change. The only real question for me is do the pros outweigh the cons. One con I didn't mention above is that while US battalions generally hover around the 400 to 600 pers mark, a BSB runs between 800 to 1,200 depending on the type of BCT involved (There are about 4-500 in the core of the battalion with the rest distributed forward. That's about the same number of support personnel in total for one of our brigades except that we spread them out as to who owns them. I'm just wondering if centralizing all these folks within the BSB chain of command increases sustainment communication and efficiency within the brigade.



			
				Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> Not just no, but f***  no!  Obviously, this is a much closer personal issue to me.  Of course, current (and future) logisticians are undoubtedly much smarter than those I worked with in decades long past and they will a much better grasp of the principles of providing health support with all its nuances and idiosyncrasies. (_that's sarcasm for those who missed it_)  However on the rare occasions when we tried to incorporate a 2nd line medical element (e.g. an Evac Pl when that was in the Fd Amb org - I'm drawing on experience in 4CMBG ) with a log organization, like an FLG , it didn't work well.
> 
> That's not to say I agreed with the establishment of a separate HS organization that included all medical units and pers but nobody asked my opinion back then.  I would have much preferred maintaining medical elements integral to units.  And while you seem to have assumed 1st line medical support in US Army arms units are, like supply and maintenance functions, provided by a FSC that's not the case - or at least not doctrinally.  As example, there is still a medical platoon in the HHC of an infantry bn.  See https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6672_ATP%203-21x20%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf  go to page 28.



Re the US structure you're absolutely right. If you look here https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51535-fsprimerbreakoutchapter2.pdf you'll see a medical company within the BSB; no medical capacity within the FSCs; and medical elements within most supported battalions (usually within the HQ Coy). I was suggesting moving the goal posts a little further. Again, my suggestion is based on grouping technical expertise within a specific type of unit and then decentralizing the resources to supported units within one integrated sub unit.

Re the FLG, I too would have a hard time seeing splitting off a portion of the Field Ambulance to an FLG. It's not really structured for that.

In short the Fd Amb is deployed within the BAA in any event. If we have medical platoons within an infantry battalion why not a field ambulance as part of the service battalion. We should be able to separate the functional aspects of the job from line organizations. (For example the OC Fd Amb could be the medical advisor to the bde commander and have a technical reporting line to the next senior medical headquarters). Honestly I see little difference from the other elements within the Svc Bn as logistics and maintenance are also very different technical disciplines. It merely gives a small entity a bigger umbrella to hang out under.



			
				Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> And so we don't continue to trip over "lines" and "echelons" and "*roles*" (the current correct doctrine term) when describing HSS an interesting read is this precis at http://armyapp.forces.gc.ca/SOH/SOH_Content/CACSC-PUB-HSS%20(2015).



The whole "lines" thing seems to be in a state of flux. Back in the 70s and 80s I thought we had it down so that even we gunners could understand it.



			
				Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> While Reserve medical coys/pls may have been incorporated into Militia Svc Bns at one time for ease of administration, fd ambs (or other 2nd/3rd line medical functions) have never been doctrinally included in logistics units.



I don't see the functional difference between a medical company or a field ambulance. In effect they provide transport for casualties and have a higher level of intermediate treatment capability then available at the battalion aid station/collection point etc. What we're really talking about is an entity that receives casualties within the brigade, treats minor ones and sends more significant ones outside of the brigade for more extensive treatment. Is there any? Ease of administration (and perhaps heightened efficiency) is all I'm thinking about.

If you think the med company in a BSB is troubling, you should look at the issue of the BCT's Millitary Intelligence company, its Signals company, it's anti-armour company (SBCT only) and it's UAV platoon all being inserted in the Brigade Engineer Battalion. Yowza!

 :cheers:


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## Oldgateboatdriver (24 May 2020)

To a large extent, FJAG has put his finger on the primary reason why Reserve restructuring is a difficult, if not impossible, problem to resolve.



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> The whole problem is that there is howling about just about everything. The Forces are a very much against radical change.



There is an entrenchment of historical regiments and units that resist their "disappearance and absorption" into a different organization with the last breath of the last old foggy that is a member of the regimental "Regie" (or Mafia,if Vandoo). This is even more so in the militia regimental system that has long ago lost its purpose of connecting with local populations.

I'll always remember when, in the late 90's, the equipment, simulators and other class room requirements associated with manning the MCDV's and the Harbour Defence Org clearly exceeded the capacity for upgrading the unit at HMCS DONNACONA (which was old, decrepit, maxed out on power availability and a fire trap). We started the process to get a new, modern building with BFC Montreal.

One night, at the beginning of the process, we got a visit form the Base Commander, the Base Admin O. and the BCEO. They squarely asked us if, after they would have spent five years on the project or more and they were about to put shovel to dirt, they would get interference from our Regie to "save the historical home" and blah! blah! blah!

They were quite surprised (and happy) when we responded that "We were Navy, not Army, and that s ship was a crest, a motto to live by and a ship's company. That when the hull is getting old and beaten up, we just move to a new one and send the old one to the breakers."

Apparently, we were one of  BFC Montreal's fastest project from beginning to actual delivery of a new unit (6 years) as a result.

Anyhow. Until that regimental mafia mentality is defeated, I don't believe the militia can be saved and transformed into a useful Army component - which doesn't prevent some militia personnel from being useful in augmentation.


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## FJAG (24 May 2020)

This is why I've adamantly not been a fan of Reserves 2000 which was formed to halt amalgamations and has traditionally fought for a cap badge retention and significant expansion of the reserve numbers instead. I note more recently their objectives have changed to "fund, train, equip and expand."

IMHO we have enough positions (as I said above, for five full-strength brigades) which is as many as I think Canada could make use of at this time and nearly doubles the Army's combat strength. The objective should be "fund, reorganize, train and equip". Expansion could be a further downstream goal if the first four objectives are achieved and the situation merits expanding the force.

In the words of LGen Leslie in the Transformation Report of 2011:



> ... and it became apparent that the tendency was to argue for the preservation of the status quo within any one particular organization, which is perfectly natural. Though grimly amusing, these interactions proved that consensus has not and will probably never be achieved on any significant change as we are large and complicated, and the different organizations that make up the whole do different things, each of which is believed to be very important by those who are in them



In respect of the Report and in words of David Bercuson:



> "Militaries are inherently conservative bureaucracies and they don't like change,” ... Bercuson said such cuts will need a strong minister, who isn't afraid to “stand on the necks” of officials and force staffing cuts through.
> ...
> “Historically speaking, this kind of significant change I think this report is calling for, if that's not driven by the civilian sector, it’s just not going to happen,” Bercuson said. “To introduce a sweeping program of reform, as opposed to one or two changes, you need a very, very, very highly placed political figure to take ownership of it.”



 :cheers:


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## daftandbarmy (24 May 2020)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Anyhow. Until that regimental mafia mentality is defeated, I don't believe the militia can be saved and transformed into a useful Army component - which doesn't prevent some militia personnel from being useful in augmentation.



On the other hand, this strong identity and sense of purpose might also be leveraged to grow the Reserves. 

However, it's probably a growth model that looks more like 'here's an embedded OMLT' approach versus the current 'here's an email telling you what to do without any resources' approach.


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## MilEME09 (24 May 2020)

Let's be honest here, it isn't just the Reserves who are protecting their empires and do not want change. We are likely about to get hit by serious budget constraints, and if we want to survive and be useful and relevant, then empires must fall, we do not need 5 divisions, Ontario doesn't need two reserve brigades, they can become one. We need a minister with balls to break down the establishment and reform our forces to a more effective force.


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## daftandbarmy (24 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Let's be honest here, it isn't just the Reserves who are protecting their empires and do not want change. We are likely about to get hit by serious budget constraints, and if we want to survive and be useful and relevant, then empires must fall, we do not need 5 divisions, Ontario doesn't need two reserve brigades, they can become one. We need a minister with balls to break down the establishment and reform our forces to a more effective force.



And, I'm sure, now that we have a Defense Minister who is a former Reservist, that will definitely happen  :sarcasm:


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## MilEME09 (24 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> And, I'm sure, now that we have a Defense Minister who is a former Reservist, that will definitely happen  :sarcasm:



I doubt it will ever happen


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## FJAG (24 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Let's be honest here, it isn't just the Reserves who are protecting their empires and do not want change. We are likely about to get hit by serious budget constraints, and if we want to survive and be useful and relevant, then empires must fall, we do not need 5 divisions, Ontario doesn't need two reserve brigades, they can become one. We need a minister with balls to break down the establishment and reform our forces to a more effective force.



When I started this look at the Army Reserve last year, I worked through not only what type of structure would be useful for Canada's Army but what the Reserves could generate. There are several unknowns such as how paid ceilings limits and attrition leaves us from year to year, but I think I got a fairly decent handle on what could be done. In short, this is what I found:

It took all three of 38, 39 and 41 Bdes (plus their local MP, Int and Health Services pers) to fill the staffing for one full armoured brigade group plus a depot training battalion;

Ontario could generate two brigades, one a full armoured brigade the other a smaller sustainment brigade plus two depot battalions and two additional reinforcement infantry battalions (one heavy and one light);

Quebec could generate an artillery brigade plus a depot battalion and two additional light infantry reinforcement battalions and one light reinforcement reconnaissance regiment; and

The Maritimes (together with the Canadian Combat Support Brigade) could generate one manoeuvre enhancement brigade plus a depot battalion and two light reinforcement infantry battalions (albeit that 21 EW Regt and CA Int Regt are mostly in Ontario)

(You should note that the "reinforcement" battalions are designed to provide augmentation for other regular or reserve formations and units or combat replacements - while one could argue these could have formed another light brigade (by the time that you convert several of those battalions to engineers and service support units, I thought a pool of battalions that could provide rear area security, domestic defence and augmentation/reinforcement/replacement functions would be more useful and they could easily fit into the 5 existing brigades for administration)

Anyway, the point is Ontario can generate the numbers to form two brigades (out of a population base of some 14 million); Quebec a brigade and a bit (out of a population base of near 8.5 million) and the Maritimes a brigade (out of a population base of 2.3 million). The West is particularly weak being barely able to form a brigade (out of a population base of close to 11.9 million)

I sometimes wonder where people get the idea that we can expand to 30,000 without seriously changing the concept of how we do business. Without equipment and a stable training system and a number of other changes I don't see how we can be attractive enough to attract the numbers needed and subsequently retain them.

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (25 May 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> When I started this look at the Army Reserve last year, I worked through not only what type of structure would be useful for Canada's Army but what the Reserves could generate. There are several unknowns such as how paid ceilings limits and attrition leaves us from year to year, but I think I got a fairly decent handle on what could be done. In short, this is what I found:
> 
> It took all three of 38, 39 and 41 Bdes (plus their local MP, Int and Health Services pers) to fill the staffing for one full armoured brigade group plus a depot training battalion;
> 
> ...



The one problem, and I use the the word problem loosely, is Geography, the west and the Arctic is massive. So creating one Armoured Brigade from 3 division's PRes units would likely fail unless significant logistical support was created including moving Armouries closer to rail heads, and investing more in our heavy transport capabilities. As an example years ago I was on EX with the South Dakota National Guard and their BSB, all their vehicles came up on flatbed tractor trailers, that they had (none of it was contracted). This included two FAR's, multiple transport trucks, Contact Trucks (their version of a MRT) and other vehicles. Our units couldn't do a move like that, heck I do not think our reg force has the transportation fleet to do that either unless we massed everything in one area.

One Idea I have had in the past is to create Mini bases in larger cities that can house multiple reserve units. These CFRB's would contain all vehicles in one compound, maintenance facilities, clothing stores, SAT range, potentially even an indoor 100m or 200m range. Be close to a rail head or invest in building one right on the base to the nearest main line. You then move all the unit's within said city to the base, and remove all other armouries from the equation. Historic armouries could be retained and converted into regimental museums, would many resist this kind of a change? heck yes but from a cost perspective it may be better then having multiple units spread out over and across say all of Toronto for example, if they were all in one place you would save time and money.


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## FJAG (25 May 2020)

I've been thinking unoccupied shopping centres and manufacturing plants as long as we don't turn it into a Carling Campus project.

 ;D


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## Kilted (25 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Let's be honest here, it isn't just the Reserves who are protecting their empires and do not want change. We are likely about to get hit by serious budget constraints, and if we want to survive and be useful and relevant, then empires must fall, we do not need 5 divisions, Ontario doesn't need two reserve brigades, they can become one. We need a minister with balls to break down the establishment and reform our forces to a more effective force.



Ontario has three reserve brigades and part of 38 CBG, which is part of 3 Div. They are already significantly spaced out, for some things it would actually be easier if we had more. You have to think about how large Ontario is. There is already significant distance between some units and their brigade HQ. Which makes a number of things difficult, kit exchange, medicals, etc. While I am aware that some of the things are Divisional level, but even when they are close to you they are only open during normal business hours when most people are working. 

We cannot expect the reserve brigades to have the same format as reg force brigades. Canada is too big.  We need the number of brigades we have. Some of them are already spread across multiple Provinces.


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## daftandbarmy (25 May 2020)

Kilted said:
			
		

> Ontario has three reserve brigades and part of 38 CBG, which is part of 3 Div. They are already significantly spaced out, for some things it would actually be easier if we had more. You have to think about how large Ontario is. There is already significant distance between some units and their brigade HQ. Which makes a number of things difficult, kit exchange, medicals, etc. While I am aware that some of the things are Divisional level, but even when they are close to you they are only open during normal business hours when most people are working.
> 
> We cannot expect the reserve brigades to have the same format as reg force brigades. Canada is too big.  We need the number of brigades we have. Some of them are already spread across multiple Provinces.



Technically, we don't need troops based in every city/town/hamlet. We need the ability to _project _troops to every part of Canada, for Domops and other reasons, which is a very different thing. No ivilian actually cares who is in those big, quaint, brick buildings dotted across the country in the 19 teens, and they stopped being a meaningful part of municipal life sometime around the 1960s I would guess.

The argument that we need to maintain a broad, physically present militia footprint across Canada is an industrial age concept based on the obsolete concept of rapid mobilization through providing a crenelated tower encrusted edifice to accept thousands of willing recruits, in long lines, to be sent to the front. We can be present, virtually & social media wise, in a much more effective fashion but probably lack the innovative technology, policy, manning and leadership/ thought processes to enable this effectively. 

A good example of the challenges we face in this regard is reflected in an organization that still centers it's key pay & HR management processes around physically signing a paper pay sheet, and zedding off the unfilled rows with a ruler.


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## MilEME09 (25 May 2020)

I didn't include thunder bay as Ontario because 38 CBG is mainly in the prairies. 32 and 33CBG are all in Ontario. If 38 can command units across 2.5 province's, then we should be able to merge 32 and 33 no problem. Along with about half of its units, The GTA doesn't need 6 Infantry units all sitting at company strength, reduce 4 to null strength, rebadge every one into the remaining two. Now you have two regiments with 3 full companies and a HQ. Same for other units, distance is not a problem if you are willing to find solutions.

Of course people won't want to loose their regiment but it happens, just ask 2 RCR, they were the Black watch until rebadged in the 50s.


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## Kilted (25 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I didn't include thunder bay as Ontario because 38 CBG is mainly in the prairies. 32 and 33CBG are all in Ontario. If 38 can command units across 2.5 province's, then we should be able to merge 32 and 33 no problem. Along with about half of its units, The GTA doesn't need 6 Infantry units all sitting at company strength, reduce 4 to null strength, rebadge every one into the remaining two. Now you have two regiments with 3 full companies and a HQ. Same for other units, distance is not a problem if you are willing to find solutions.
> 
> Of course people won't want to loose their regiment but it happens, just ask 2 RCR, they were the Black watch until rebadged in the 50s.



You're completely forgetting 31 CBG. One of the major reasons for having locations spread across the Province is recruiting. You start cutting locations we are going to see a decrease in recruiting as large areas of the Province would no longer have a presence. Sure, you'll find some people willing to drive  two or three hours once a week, we already have that in some cases. The reality of the situation is that the reserves is now more than a one night a week, one weekend a month commitment. You add in extra tasks units are given, public affairs, add in Battle School commitments (some units contribute more than others), exercises with the reg force, which seems to happen three or four times a year at least. Over all it's not uncommon for a number of troops to have 10 to 15 Class A days a month. Some people live of Class A September to January and then off Class B with Battle School the rest of the year. We would end up losing many of these people if they had to commute 4 to 6 hours every single day.


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## MilEME09 (25 May 2020)

Kilted said:
			
		

> You're completely forgetting 31 CBG. One of the major reasons for having locations spread across the Province is recruiting. You start cutting locations we are going to see a decrease in recruiting as large areas of the Province would no longer have a presence. Sure, you'll find some people willing to drive  two or three hours once a week, we already have that in some cases. The reality of the situation is that the reserves is now more than a one night a week, one weekend a month commitment. You add in extra tasks units are given, public affairs, add in Battle School commitments (some units contribute more than others), exercises with the reg force, which seems to happen three or four times a year at least. Over all it's not uncommon for a number of troops to have 10 to 15 Class A days a month. Some people live of Class A September to January and then off Class B with Battle School the rest of the year. We would end up losing many of these people if they had to commute 4 to 6 hours every single day.



I am not saying we cut locations, just HQ's, amalgamating the remaining into 1 brigade for both Ontario and Quebec. Unit's get merged as well, you'll have spread out platoons and companies, but one higher headquarters.


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## FJAG (25 May 2020)

Kilted said:
			
		

> Ontario has three reserve brigades and part of 38 CBG, which is part of 3 Div. They are already significantly spaced out, for some things it would actually be easier if we had more. You have to think about how large Ontario is. There is already significant distance between some units and their brigade HQ. Which makes a number of things difficult, kit exchange, medicals, etc. While I am aware that some of the things are Divisional level, but even when they are close to you they are only open during normal business hours when most people are working.
> 
> We cannot expect the reserve brigades to have the same format as reg force brigades. Canada is too big.  We need the number of brigades we have. Some of them are already spread across multiple Provinces.



The problem is our structure and systems and not the distances. The US National Guard has similar issues. Look at the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat Team (a heavy armor brigade). Its headquarters, one combined arms battalion, its artillery battalion and engineer battalion are spread all across Idaho, another combined arms battalion comes from Oregon, its third combined arms battalion comes from Montana. Its Brigade Support Battalion is centered in Oregon but has FSCs spread throughout Oregon and spread across all four states to support each of the other battalions. Their situation is even more complicated than ours because each states National Guard contingent has a separate state line of command and the brigade is only linked through its secondary federal role. It's format and equipment is identical to an Active Duty Armored BCT.

Here are a couple of photos of them training:

















Just because you don't parade in the same armoury doesn't mean that you can't create, train, administer, and deploy as a formation. This brigade has deployed to Iraq twice AS A BRIGADE on operational tours.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/116th_Cavalry_Brigade_Combat_Team

The problems we have are entirely of our own making and not because of our regional layout.

 :cheers:


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## daftandbarmy (25 May 2020)

Kilted said:
			
		

> You're completely forgetting 31 CBG. One of the major reasons for having locations spread across the Province is recruiting. You start cutting locations we are going to see a decrease in recruiting as large areas of the Province would no longer have a presence.



In the future, maybe we only have reserve units in major urban centers, where it's easier to recruit larger numbers of people....

Struggling to keep numbers up in all the 'Forts, Ports and Rivers' is a huge waste of scarce resources.


----------



## FJAG (25 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Technically, we don't need troops based in every city/town/hamlet. We need the ability to _project _troops to every part of Canada, for Domops and other reasons, which is a very different thing. No ivilian actually cares who is in those big, quaint, brick buildings dotted across the country in the 19 teens, and they stopped being a meaningful part of municipal life sometime around the 1960s I would guess.
> 
> The argument that we need to maintain a broad, physically present militia footprint across Canada is an industrial age concept based on the obsolete concept of rapid mobilization through providing a crenelated tower encrusted edifice to accept thousands of willing recruits, in long lines, to be sent to the front. We can be present, virtually & social media wise, in a much more effective fashion but probably lack the innovative technology, policy, manning and leadership/ thought processes to enable this effectively.
> 
> A good example of the challenges we face in this regard is reflected in an organization that still centers it's key pay & HR management processes around physically signing a paper pay sheet, and zedding off the unfilled rows with a ruler.



I tend to mostly agree with you that our footprint comes out of an era that is no longer valid. I'm of the view, however, that there is some value in keeping a wide footprint not because we need it for recruiting but because we should want to make military service available for everyone (especially in rural areas) as much as possible.

The National Guard and Army Reserve has many, many of its units dispersed throughout each state in smaller company size armouries on the edges of small towns and cities in industrial parks where there is room for their equipment. Larger armories or reserve centres do exist in larger urban areas but even there dispersion is still in play. For example the 1st Bn, 124th Infantry has its headquarters in Miami together with one company but its other two rifle companies, its weapons company and its FSC are spread in individual company sized armories along a hundred mile stretch of the southwest Florida coast. In total the FLNG has some 12,000 personnel in 128 units/subunits in 55 (mostly company sized) facilities across a state of some 21 million people.

In my ideal world, all individual training is done at the Brigade Depots (with local satellite companies and platoons) and the units only do collective training at the rate of ten 2.5 day weekends per year and a three week ex in August all of which are mandatory. That means out-of-towners would only need to drive in to the armory a limited number of times in the year and the unit/subunit would pay mileage and provide sleeping and ablution facilities to allow them to overnight. A small town armory could probably mange a 150 km catchment radius.

I like the smaller suburban armouries over the large central ones as they provide room for equipment (and lets face it most old big city armouries have close to zero room for that) and, in the long run are probably easier to maintain than the old hulks (London turned its old armoury into a lovely hotel-the sale of prime downtown realty would probably fund the construction of new smaller facilities)

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (25 May 2020)

We have downsized the reserves before, in the 50s alberta, Ft McCloud, Caroline, and other small towns had detatched platoons and they were removed from the ORBAT.


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## FJAG (25 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> We have downsized the reserves before, in the 50s alberta, Ft McCloud, Caroline, and other small towns had detatched platoons and they were removed from the ORBAT.



That I agree with. IMHO, a company is the smallest viable element that can be properly trained and administered if you aim for collective employment capabilities within the overall unit.

When I was RSS in Manitoba we had a battery in Portage La Prairie. It usually was unable to provide more than a gun det and a recce det on exercises. It had a large populous catchment area but just didn't thrive. Small elements like troops or platoons generally depend on one or two really interested people to keep them alive. Without those they go into a death spiral.

 :cheers:


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## daftandbarmy (25 May 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Small elements like troops or platoons generally depend on one or two really interested people to keep them alive. Without those they go into a death spiral.
> 
> :cheers:



This is not just the case with 'small elements', especially in the Class A world. I would argue that one of the reasons why our Class B, and the B stands for 'Bloat', has been necessary is to help risk manage performance where Class A inconsistency occurs.


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## Gunplumber (25 May 2020)

Why not look at something like the British London Regt? It has had 4 or 5 Companies in its recent existence from the 90s and before that it was huge. They all have different cap badges but I am assuming one CO? Im pretty sure most reserve units could be run by a Captain given the numbers.


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## quadrapiper (25 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> This is not just the case with 'small elements', especially in the Class A world. I would argue that one of the reasons why our Class B, and the B stands for 'Bloat', has been necessary is to help risk manage performance where Class A inconsistency occurs.


Jumping on the Cadets tangent, on that note: that program has endured the same sort of HQ growth afflicting the rest of the CAF, with (and I'm not sure if the dynamic's the same on the Militia side) a slow increase in Class B mostly CIC positions, often filled by "career B" people, who seem to carry on more or less undisturbed by the 3-5 year rotation of national and regional Regular commanders.

On the should-the-CIC-be-CAF front? Yes, out of convenience on the administrative and disciplinary side, and because a commission and the Queen's uniform is a very meaningful but ultimately affordable way to reward service (25 days/year, 35/year for corps/squadron COs doesn't cover any half-decent officer's time expended). As far as training and requirements; FORCE test, etc.; there have been various rumours, initiatives, announcements, etc. over the years regarding both, which never seem to come to anything. Where, at the national level, there's a roadblock to ensuring a fitter CIC I've no idea, but there doesn't seem to be much appetite to push that side of things (though there's been a requirement for several years to have a current FORCE test, though not a pass, to qualify for B contracts, and integration of FORCE testing into what are the "bookend" courses for CIC).

What CIC shouldn't be is in long-term employment in policy-making roles at regional or national headquarters, nor in firmly-managed careers: the only long-term CIC pers should be those SMEs whose value increases with experience, and personnel in non-policy roles where familiarity with the program is of significant value. We should be the default within the program, as in default option when something better can't be found.

Value for money probably depends on what the CAF and the Minister actually hope to get out of running the program. As far as the stated program aim, without getting overly child-soldiery, there's certainly much more that could be done to "encourage an interest in the CAF," while the "promote physical fitness" part is also generally ill-served. Encouraging good citizenship and leadership are both broadly well-delivered, though the framework in which the latter is both delivered and applied varies significantly between the three elements and between corps/squadrons.

On that last note rests what the CIC "should" be, beyond my earlier comments: whether the desire is 50-70k youth well-informed about and interested in the CAF and related matters; a strong PR and recruiting pipeline; a federal youth program that happens to be CAF-run; some combination of all of those, or something else. In many ways, we're in a situation similar to the militia: there isn't a clearly defined and communicated goal.


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## Gunplumber (25 May 2020)

Disciplinary? Where I work, the CICs dont give a damn about TI cards or even following the rules and nothing ever happens about it. Even leaving rifles, bolts and ammo in a cube van over night with no one around. It makes me sick. If things like that happend in the Reserves there would be charges.

If you are wearing a CAF uniform then you should do a FORCE test. Period. Its not up to National to make that decision, it is a CAF requirement.

I agree with you that there should not be a lot of Class B in the CIC, but there should be some, but a lot of what they are hiring is reminiscent of NDHQ. It needs to be cleaned up.


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## FJAG (25 May 2020)

Gunplumber said:
			
		

> Disciplinary? Where I work, the CICs dont give a damn about TI cards or even following the rules and nothing ever happens about it. Even leaving rifles, bolts and ammo in a cube van over night with no one around. It makes me sick. If things like that happend in the Reserves there would be charges.
> 
> If you are wearing a CAF uniform then you should do a FORCE test. Period. Its not up to National to make that decision, it is a CAF requirement.
> 
> I agree with you that there should not be a lot of Class B in the CIC, but there should be some, but a lot of what they are hiring is reminiscent of NDHQ. It needs to be cleaned up.



From time-to-time the system cares:

https://decisia.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/jmc-cmj/cm/en/item/99211/index.do?q=cadet+instructor

https://decisia.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/jmc-cmj/cm/en/item/99031/index.do?q=cadet+instructor

https://decisia.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/jmc-cmj/cm/en/item/98723/index.do?q=cadet+instructor

 :cheers:


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## Brad Sallows (26 May 2020)

Ambitious plans and ideas shouldn't prevent doing small things that can be done immediately at negligible cost.

Stop promoting to LCol and CWO at the unit level, and reduce promotions to Maj and MWO accordingly.


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## daftandbarmy (26 May 2020)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Ambitious plans and ideas shouldn't prevent doing small things that can be done immediately at negligible cost.
> 
> Stop promoting to LCol and CWO at the unit level, and reduce promotions to Maj and MWO accordingly.



Big holes in succession plans are already accomplishing this goal, to a certain extent.


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## dapaterson (26 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Big holes in succession plans are already accomplishing this goal, to a certain extent.



Recycling COs for second and third command tours in units where they lack specialist knowledge, and extending them for four or five years is also considered a viable COA.


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## daftandbarmy (26 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Recycling COs for second and third command tours in units where they lack specialist knowledge, and extending them for four or five years is also considered a viable COA.



OMG: The 'Professional part-time CO/RSM'. Frequently the cause of much attrition, and not at the enemy end of the bayonet.


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## dapaterson (26 May 2020)

"Why would I collaborate with other artillery units to provide collective training when I can partner with my old infantry unit instead?  That way we can train these gunners in proper infantry tactics."


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## MilEME09 (26 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> "Why would I collaborate with other artillery units to provide collective training when I can partner with my old infantry unit instead?  That way we can train these gunners in proper infantry tactics."



Sounds like when I hear combat units in the reserves say they don't need CSS. To be fair though,  on a weekend Ex, they don't, due to the way our system works. Another part of our problem as a reserve force.


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## dapaterson (26 May 2020)

Our systems are designed to have company-sized organizations able to operate independently for a period of 72 hours, self sufficient in beans, bullets and benzene.  Feature, not bug.

But, the C2 and CQs of those organizations need to be trained and practice the full replenishment cycle in collaboration with their HQs and supporting sustainment units.  Or you can plan a week long exercise and nobody think about food until day 3.

But there does need to be institutional discipline.  Forget to bring it?  That's a 48 wait for it to show up - not a "do a quick run up to the base, grab it, come back".  Cheating on planning and cheating on sustainment means the weekend succeeded - but the training reinforced behaviours that lead to catastrophic failure in real life.


The time constraints of a 30 practical hours for training model (like we have in the Res F) dictate the types of training which can be effectively delivered, and thus the capabilities and levels of proficiency we can reasonably expect.  To my mind, that's proficient company-sized organizations which, when called upon, can be combined into battalion sized groups and deployed.

American NG and Res units go through significant ramp-up training prior to deployments.  Nothing wrong with building deployable units from employable companies as needed.


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## TCM621 (26 May 2020)

> This brigade has deployed to Iraq twice AS A BRIGADE on operational tours.



I think this has a lot to do with reserve problems. Our reserve units are not operational units, merely administrative and training units. For every person who plans to deploy you have 1 guy who likes playing army on the weekends, 1 guy who shows up on parade nights so he can hang out in the mess after and another who only shows up enough to not get kicked out. Only one of those guys is actually training with reality in mind. Then we have the problem that officers rarely deploy in leadership positions.

Both problems are a result of using the reserves as a farm system to call up people you need. Sure the Reg Force Capt for life isn't a fantastic leader and maybe the reserve Capt is better but the CO knows the first Capt while the reservist is an unknown. If I'm about to take a unit into battle, I don't want any more unknowns than I already have. It happens in the ranks as well but not as often and normally only at the higher leadership levels.

I think they had the right idea with the Combined Reserve Infranty Company in 2000 or when ever it was but it didn't work so they dismissed the only idea. But if we called up a unit, like the Americans do, people may be more willing to do the things needed to ensure success. This goes for leadership and the unit. Leadership has to provide the unit with the resources it needs to train for a combat role and the unit has to train to fight as a unit.


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## FJAG (26 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Sounds like when I hear combat units in the reserves say they don't need CSS. To be fair though,  on a weekend Ex, they don't, due to the way our system works. Another part of our problem as a reserve force.



The CAF needs CSS. AND, it really needs CSS in the reserves. In the US there are 31 Active and 27 ARNG manoeuvre brigades (total 58) and 75 Active and 137 ARNG and USAR support brigades (total 212 both CS and CSS of which 64.6% are ARNG or USAR). 

Looking at CSS, of its 17 divisional sustainment brigades, 7 are ARNG; of its additional 14 sustainment brigades, 12 are either ARNG or USAR. Accordingly of its deployable CSS capabilities, 61.3% is either ARNG or USAR. 

The question which Ottawa seems to miss is that while we may not need CSS on a weekend ex, where will we find it if we ever do need to deploy in a serious fashion ... or maybe we'll just choose not to go and write off that 20 billion we've been spending every year.

 :stirpot:


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## MilEME09 (26 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> But there does need to be institutional discipline.  Forget to bring it?  That's a 48 wait for it to show up - not a "do a quick run up to the base, grab it, come back".  Cheating on planning and cheating on sustainment means the weekend succeeded - but the training reinforced behaviours that lead to catastrophic failure in real life.
> 
> 
> The time constraints of a 30 practical hours for training model (like we have in the Res F) dictate the types of training which can be effectively delivered, and thus the capabilities and levels of proficiency we can reasonably expect.  To my mind, that's proficient company-sized organizations which, when called upon, can be combined into battalion sized groups and deployed.



A normal resupply request comes in 24H prior to resupply, usually when the DP or CP happens the reciever unit gives the demands for the next day. There are processes for an emergency DP as well for the oh shit moments, we can make our system work if we want it to. Suggestion I put up a long time ago is CSS holds all the stores for all units for the weekend, we pretend it's hour 48, friday night they send a request for saturday. Never actually happened though.




> The CAF needs CSS. AND, it really needs CSS in the reserves. In the US there are 31 Active and 27 ARNG manoeuvre brigades (total 58) and 75 Active and 137 ARNG and USAR support brigades (total 212 both CS and CSS of which 64.6% are ARNG or USAR).
> 
> Looking at CSS, of its 17 divisional sustainment brigades, 7 are ARNG; of its additional 14 sustainment brigades, 12 are either ARNG or USAR. Accordingly of its deployable CSS capabilities, 61.3% is either ARNG or USAR.
> 
> The question which Ottawa seems to miss is that while we may not need CSS on a weekend ex, where will we find it if we ever do need to deploy in a serious fashion ... or maybe we'll just choose not to go and write off that 20 billion we've been spending every year.



I agree, however our system doesn't allow for it right now, unfortunately we have beaten this dead horse to a pulp.


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## dapaterson (26 May 2020)

Many support trades are intensive and training and in time required to maintain skills.  Those more logically vest in a full-time component where there is greater RoI and greater ability to maintain those skills.

Res F =/= Reg F and should not attempt to; the differences must be understood when developing missions and roles to assign in various proportions to both components.

That concept, of course, shatters iron ricebowls in both components.


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## FJAG (26 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> American NG and Res units go through significant ramp-up training prior to deployments.  Nothing wrong with building deployable units from employable companies as needed.



That concept is changing under ARNG 4.0. 

https://www.nationalguard.mil/Resources/ARNG-Readiness/Fact-Sheets/FileId/172141/

https://www.ausa.org/articles/army-national-guard-evolutionary-leap-citizen-soldiers

The key to such as system is to a) reduce administrative load on any given unit by adding sufficient full-timers to look after it day to day; b) remove individual training from the unit's responsibility and have that done by a separate yet local/regional training unit; c) spend all of the unit's allocated time during the winter training cycle and summer exercise on collective training; d) sequence activities so that individual training and collective training do not conflict. 

At 10 mandatory 2.5-day weekends and a mandatory 23 day summer exercise that means the unit will complete 48 days of refresher/collective training annually or effectively 6 months worth of collective training in a four-year cycle. ARNG 4.0 is based on a system similar to this.

The issue is focusing on doable tasks and breaking them down amongst the right people/agencies so that they can be accomplished.

 :cheers:


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## FJAG (26 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Many support trades are intensive and training and in time required to maintain skills.  Those more logically vest in a full-time component where there is greater RoI and greater ability to maintain those skills.
> 
> Res F =/= Reg F and should not attempt to; the differences must be understood when developing missions and roles to assign in various proportions to both components.
> 
> That concept, of course, shatters iron ricebowls in both components.



I agree with this issue. My areas of particular concern are in the field of maintainers and health care providers. There should be a properly sized full-time for this (and by full-time I mean RegF not perpetual Class Bs). 

I think, however, we can leverage recruiting for these trades by paying for tuitions at community colleges for diesel mechanics, heavy truckers, food service workers, heavy equipment operators, health care workers together with summer employment by way of military "conversion" training in exchange for periods of obligatory service with the Reserves. If we bulk up the numbers we'll 1) help to train trades people for the nation; b) maybe have a goodly number transfer to the Reg F; and c) have a pool of adequately trained folks in an emergency.

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (26 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Many support trades are intensive and training and in time required to maintain skills.  Those more logically vest in a full-time component where there is greater RoI and greater ability to maintain those skills.
> 
> Res F =/= Reg F and should not attempt to; the differences must be understood when developing missions and roles to assign in various proportions to both components.
> 
> That concept, of course, shatters iron ricebowls in both components.



There honestly isn't enough time in a reserve training cycle for technical trades. My unit schedules one trades training day a month (long time ago we didn't even have that), thankfully some of our vehicle techs are also mechanics civi side, but for everyone else, the skill fade is an issue. 

I honestly think PRes CSS, possibly even the reserves as a whole need to double our weekly training to two nights a week, one night can be for all the usual IBTS, and other mandatory briefs etc.... the other night just for turning wrenches and practicing our trades. Doesn't seem like much but it means 120 hours of training to atleast keep up a minimum of skill proficiency. combine that we say a two week summer concentration of some kind and perhaps we can bring up the skill level of our reserves, and help address retention. A lot of CSS types leave because they spend a lot of time on very long courses to come back to the unit and never touch their trade again.


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## dapaterson (26 May 2020)

There is finite time available for individuals to be a part-time reservist.  Adding more training days is not necessarily the panacea some see it to be.

MGen Tabbernor, as the senior Army reservist, compared the part-time Reserve life to a stool with three legs: Work, Home, Reserves.  If any one leg gets too long, the whole thing gets out of balance, tips over, and is useless.

Certainly, as a Pte/Cpl or a 2Lt/Lt, I had time.  But I also required supervision; and it's those supervisors (both junior and senior) who we start layering additional demands of time upon, thus upsetting the balance and resulting in senior people leaving, or the wrong people being selected because they are available (not because they are they best or the ones needed).  As a Commanding Officer I was working 80+class A days per year - that's the equivalent of four months full time every year - on top of a demanding full time job, and occasionally seeing a woman in my house who, rumour has it, I was married to.  That's not a viable or sustainable model.

The concept of "one night a week, one weekend a month and a week every summer" was never built around an OSMER type workload review, but rather defining a semi-realistic, reasonable time demand model that could be sustainable in the long term.

Unfortunately, various senior leaders of both the part and full time variety seem to think having a pool of chronically unemployed / unemployable part-time reservists scrambling for occasional short-term full-time employment is a viable and morally defensible organizational choice.


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## MilEME09 (26 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Unfortunately, various senior leaders of both the part and full time variety seem to think having a pool of chronically unemployed / unemployable part-time reservists scrambling for occasional short-term full-time employment is a viable and morally defensible organizational choice.



It's not unfortunately, and talking with my wifes grandfather who was a reservist in the late 50's, he did exactly what I suggested, two nights a week, plus two weekends a month. Now it was a different time, and the system has changed a bit since 1957 however given the increasing complexity of military equipment I feel we do need to go back to the table and ask hard questions about the trades we have in the reserve Force, the resources we give them, and how much time they actually need to accomplish everything we are giving them.

At one point years ago my unit was swarmed with enough taskings that we had troops deployed on EX's, teaching courses, and other taskings that for several months we had about half or more of our commit able resources out on every weekend, and some weekdays. A great accomplishment for a Reserve unit but we burnt everyone out getting it done. The model we use is broken, if we can't train our reservists to a standard that we can actually plug and play easily into the reg force for augmentation then we as a force fail.


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## daftandbarmy (26 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> It's not unfortunately, and talking with my wifes grandfather who was a reservist in the late 50's, he did exactly what I suggested, two nights a week, plus two weekends a month. Now it was a different time, and the system has changed a bit since 1957 however given the increasing complexity of military equipment I feel we do need to go back to the table and ask hard questions about the trades we have in the reserve Force, the resources we give them, and how much time they actually need to accomplish everything we are giving them.
> 
> At one point years ago my unit was swarmed with enough taskings that we had troops deployed on EX's, teaching courses, and other taskings that for several months we had about half or more of our commit able resources out on every weekend, and some weekdays. A great accomplishment for a Reserve unit _*but we burnt everyone out getting it done*_. The model we use is broken, if we can't train our reservists to a standard that we can actually plug and play easily into the reg force for augmentation then we as a force fail.



Now you've done it... the ugly specter of 'part time careerism' rears it's ugly head


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## FJAG (26 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> There is finite time available for individuals to be a part-time reservist.  Adding more training days is not necessarily the panacea some see it to be.
> 
> MGen Tabbernor, as the senior Army reservist, compared the part-time Reserve life to a stool with three legs: Work, Home, Reserves.  If any one leg gets too long, the whole thing gets out of balance, tips over, and is useless.
> 
> ...



You know it wasn't always like that. Back in the sixties (yeah, those sixties) my battery paraded every Saturday morning for 1/2 day (other batteries paraded either Tuesday or Thursday evening--but not both--for 1/2 day); we went out on live fire exercises to Meaford about two to three times a year and spent a week long concentration in Petawawa in the summer. There were summer course training opportunities in Pet for those who wanted them and they were rarely longer than two weeks each.

I don't know exactly when the changeover came but by the time I went to RSS in 1976 pretty much all of Manitoba District was doing the two nights (Tue -admin; Thurs--trg) and every second weekend.

Personally I'm from the less is more camp. I see one mandatory 2.5 day weekend per month with July off and then a mandatory three-week exercise in August for the simple reason that this balances the three legs. You leave three weekends a month and the whole month of July for family and employer. The three week exercise is a rough issue as it would need Federal statutory support so that individuals could attend military training and still have several weeks vacation in July. What we really need is a covenant as between the military, the individual and the employer so that everyone knows at least a year in advance as to what the military's mandatory demands are going to be. 

As I said above though, we need to change the focus of who does day-to-day admin; who looks after individual training and when (not the unit) and what BTS will be covered on each specific day of unit training (non of this make it up as you go along thing). The aim should be to not just train the individual but to get the unit itself up to a standard where it can be put out the door on a deployment.

 :cheers:


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## dapaterson (26 May 2020)

When a Bde HQ issues an annual op plan that delegates to certain units the right to choose their own BTS for the year... again...

"The role of the full-time personnel is to enable the part-time personnel" is a concept rarely understood and even more rarely implemented.


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## FJAG (26 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> When a Bde HQ issues an annual op plan that delegates to certain units the right to choose their own BTS for the year... again...
> 
> "The role of the full-time personnel is to enable the part-time personnel" is a concept rarely understood and even more rarely implemented.



IMHO we will probably never switch to doing anything beyond what we're doing now because: cynic.

However, if the aim for the reserves was ever to turn to creating and maintaining deployable Army Reserve formations and units then the annual training plans and supporting material would need to come out of CADTC in a tightly controlled program.

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (27 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> When a Bde HQ issues an annual op plan that delegates to certain units the right to choose their own BTS for the year... again...
> 
> "The role of the full-time personnel is to enable the part-time personnel" is a concept rarely understood and even more rarely implemented.



I think this could be solved by actually giving the reserves a defined mission to achieve, and give them the resources to do it. As you have pointed out, we need RSS to be not just supporters, but enablers, training and instructors, passing on their wealth of knowledge to the PRes when and where possible. I can honestly say I have only seen a small percentage of our RSS staff on exercises, and a even smaller percentage helping instruct on courses. This needs to change I feel if we want the reserves to succeed.


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## daftandbarmy (27 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I think this could be solved by actually giving the reserves a defined mission to achieve, and give them the resources to do it. As you have pointed out, we need RSS to be not just supporters, but enablers, training and instructors, passing on their wealth of knowledge to the PRes when and where possible. I can honestly say I have only seen a small percentage of our RSS staff on exercises, and a even smaller percentage helping instruct on courses. This needs to change I feel if we want the reserves to succeed.



I can count on the fingers of one sawmiller's hand the number of times I've seen the RSS on exercise with us in 'participation' mode from H-Hr to Endex. I could also say the same about many (Class A) COs and their Class A and B hench-peeeps. 

Often, slogging up the road in the rain late on a Friday night, after getting off work and rushing to the armoury to jump in a truck/bus and deploy with my company, I wondered if the 'Chateau Bn HQ Dwellers' were - at that exact moment - enjoying their first Friday night beer in front of the game on TV. Occasionally, one or two would turn up on Saturday afternoon in a rented (always white, for some reason) SUV, survey the great unwashed, complain about 'they're not wearing respirators', or something, then jumping back in the air conditioned mobile cocoon and head off to coach their kid's basketball game, or something like that.

The participation levels seem to vary involved once you move above the Coy/ Sqn level, RSS or not.


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## tomahawk6 (27 May 2020)

My hat is off to reservists who have a desire to serve their country and juggling a civie career with their military career. I know it isn't easy but their service is important.


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## MilEME09 (27 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The participation levels seem to vary involved once you move above the Coy/ Sqn level, RSS or not.



And I thought the White SUV was our thing  I agree though, sometimes the ones who say something is mandatory/highly encouraged are the ones who also do not show up. which of course leads to troops grumbling, and a break down in trust of leadership over time.


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## TCM621 (27 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I can count on the fingers of one sawmiller's hand the number of times I've seen the RSS on exercise with us in 'participation' mode from H-Hr to Endex. I could also say the same about many (Class A) COs and their Class A and B hench-peeeps.
> 
> Often, slogging up the road in the rain late on a Friday night, after getting off work and rushing to the armoury to jump in a truck/bus and deploy with my company, I wondered if the 'Chateau Bn HQ Dwellers' were - at that exact moment - enjoying their first Friday night beer in front of the game on TV. Occasionally, one or two would turn up on Saturday afternoon in a rented (always white, for some reason) SUV, survey the great unwashed, complain about 'they're not wearing respirators', or something, then jumping back in the air conditioned mobile cocoon and head off to coach their kid's basketball game, or something like that.
> 
> The participation levels seem to vary involved once you move above the Coy/ Sqn level, RSS or not.



When I was RSS staff, I was always in the field as was the other full-time staff with the exception of the orderly pers outside of IBTS training exercises. However, our sister regiment was the exact opposite. I think part of the problem with RSS staff is that it is primarily seen as a retirement posting or sick, lame, lazy posting rather than a promotion posting. People who are counting down the days aren't as likely put in any more work than they absolutely have to or in some cases they just can't because of their injuries. It's a common problem in the military, if it involves our future we love to post people who are at the end of their careers or whose careers have stalled. We never rarely post people with upward career trajectories.


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## FJAG (27 May 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I can count on the fingers of one sawmiller's hand the number of times I've seen the RSS on exercise with us in 'participation' mode from H-Hr to Endex. I could also say the same about many (Class A) COs and their Class A and B hench-peeeps.
> 
> Often, slogging up the road in the rain late on a Friday night, after getting off work and rushing to the armoury to jump in a truck/bus and deploy with my company, I wondered if the 'Chateau Bn HQ Dwellers' were - at that exact moment - enjoying their first Friday night beer in front of the game on TV. Occasionally, one or two would turn up on Saturday afternoon in a rented (always white, for some reason) SUV, survey the great unwashed, complain about 'they're not wearing respirators', or something, then jumping back in the air conditioned mobile cocoon and head off to coach their kid's basketball game, or something like that.
> 
> The participation levels seem to vary involved once you move above the Coy/ Sqn level, RSS or not.



When I was posted into an RSS position back in '76 my Dist SO3 boss gave me a very simple terms of reference: "If there's a reservist who can do the job and is willing to do it, let him do it; if there's a reservist who doesn't know how to do the job but is willing to do it, teach him how and let him do it; if there's no one capable or willing to do the job then do it yourself." Going into the field was never a question. My WO and I were the poor man's equivalent of the regiment's instructor and assistant instructor in gunnery and oversaw and critiqued everything, him on the gun line, me up forward. We were there for every exercise while the QM bombardier and chief clerk stayed back at the armoury during the exercise. If this is not happening these days then there has emerged a very distinct failure within the RSS chain of command.

Our reserve CO at the time was pretty much of the equivalent that D&B encountered other than I never saw him in the field-ever-white car or not. He was much more concerned about the band fund and regimental ball than anything having to do with training. On the other hand, that suited me fine at the time as it kept him out of my hair and that of the troops.

 :arid rifleman: (we need an artillery emoji)


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## quadrapiper (28 May 2020)

Gunplumber said:
			
		

> Disciplinary? Where I work, the CICs dont give a damn about TI cards or even following the rules and nothing ever happens about it. Even leaving rifles, bolts and ammo in a cube van over night with no one around. It makes me sick. If things like that happend in the Reserves there would be charges.
> 
> If you are wearing a CAF uniform then you should do a FORCE test. Period. Its not up to National to make that decision, it is a CAF requirement.
> 
> I agree with you that there should not be a lot of Class B in the CIC, but there should be some, but a lot of what they are hiring is reminiscent of NDHQ. It needs to be cleaned up.


No idea what your particular situation is: as described, certainly needs squaring away.

Agreed that FORCE tests should be universal. No idea what pressures are driving the current policy, but CIC doing the test _at all_ was a major improvement: the previous test wasn't a requirement, barring IIRC long Class B pers.

There's still a better toolkit available for managing/disciplining/directing Reservists, whether or not any of the applicable layers of command use it, than for e.g. civil service or volunteers.


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## daftandbarmy (28 May 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> When I was posted into an RSS position back in '76 my Dist SO3 boss gave me a very simple terms of reference: "If there's a reservist who can do the job and is willing to do it, let him do it; if there's a reservist who doesn't know how to do the job but is willing to do it, teach him how and let him do it; if there's no one capable or willing to do the job then do it yourself." Going into the field was never a question. My WO and I were the poor man's equivalent of the regiment's instructor and assistant instructor in gunnery and oversaw and critiqued everything, him on the gun line, me up forward. We were there for every exercise while the QM bombardier and chief clerk stayed back at the armoury during the exercise. If this is not happening these days then there has emerged a very distinct failure within the RSS chain of command.
> 
> Our reserve CO at the time was pretty much of the equivalent that D&B encountered other than I never saw him in the field-ever-white car or not. He was much more concerned about the band fund and regimental ball than anything having to do with training. On the other hand, that suited me fine at the time as it kept him out of my hair and that of the troops.
> 
> :arid rifleman: (we need an artillery emoji)



I'm not saying good leadership, such as you have described above, is completely absent everywhere. Just in about 70% of the cases (gut feel) 
I've observed over more than 20 years. If not for the keen professionalism of most of my troops in the various rifle companies I have led in the mo', I would have packed it in ages ago.

And I agree: we SHOULD get that Sheldrake Emoji, right AFTER the Pegasus emoji


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## Colin Parkinson (29 May 2020)

Back in the day when the Reserves ran tanks
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mEyg1OfVZ7g&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=IwAR2xR3DygGQtC3GmXpnPSr5NDU24KsdhYWCO_n2Rkq6LpQxIyYNraKxNfPc


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## dimsum (29 May 2020)

And the RCN Reserve had aircraft.

https://torontoaviationhistory.com/toronto-military-aviation/vc920-rcn-reserve-squadron/


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## Colin Parkinson (29 May 2020)

With the advent of computers, all the combat kit went away, more guns, less computers!!!!


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## MilEME09 (30 May 2020)

Colin P said:
			
		

> With the advent of computers, all the combat kit went away, more guns, less computers!!!!



Maybe we just need newer computers? VAC's Ombudsman's systems run on DOS, how expensive is it to keep that going these days? We all know kit is getting more complicated, and more costly to build and maintain, I do not think the defense industry has struck a balance between the high tech and the low tech when it comes to military hardware. At the end of the day 1000 cheap, easy to maintain but effective tanks will eventually win out against 100 super high tech tanks with all the bells and whistles


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## daftandbarmy (30 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> At the end of the day 1000 cheap, easy to maintain but effective tanks will eventually win out against 100 super high tech tanks with all the bells and whistles



That isn't quite how it panned out for the Iraqis in 2003.


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## Halifax Tar (30 May 2020)

The RCN and RCAF seem to be able to have complimentary Reg and Res forces.  

What is stopping the Army ?

Rice bowls and capbages ?


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## Remius (30 May 2020)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> What is stopping the Army ?



The Army.


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## dapaterson (30 May 2020)

RCN has the MCDVs vs the rest of NavRes, and RCAF reserve is a pack of double dipping retirees.  Very different.


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## FSTO (30 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> RCN has the MCDVs vs the rest of NavRes, and RCAF reserve is a pack of double dipping retirees.  Very different.



Well actually NAVRES pers now have opportunities to sail in all platforms (even subs if a reservist could get qualified) in the RCN.
The original concept of the MCDV's (reserve only ships) damn near destroyed the NRD's. They are still recovering from that decision and some units may never fully recover.


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## PuckChaser (30 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Maybe we just need newer computers? VAC's Ombudsman's systems run on DOS, how expensive is it to keep that going these days? We all know kit is getting more complicated, and more costly to build and maintain, I do not think the defense industry has struck a balance between the high tech and the low tech when it comes to military hardware. At the end of the day 1000 cheap, easy to maintain but effective tanks will eventually win out against 100 super high tech tanks with all the bells and whistles


Its not expensive, that's the point. Why pay millions for new software to be designed when you can use stuff we finished paying for in 1988?


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## GR66 (30 May 2020)

The idea of fully deployable Reserve Brigades (or Battle Groups at the least) I think makes sense for many of the reasons that FJAG and others have mentioned.  A smaller, ready Regular Force for the types of deployments you see on a more regular basis and a larger, cheaper to maintain, Reserve Force for times when you have to face the rarer, larger military threats.  The US ANG is one model that shows this could be done.

However, I think we're a very long way from the current structure of a multitude of individual Reserve Regiments and a focus on individual augmentation of the Regular Force to the kind of Reserve Force being suggested.  Add in the fact that in the current economic situation there is no way I see an influx of new equipment and support for the Reserves in the near future and I think it would be best to focus on incremental steps toward the final goal.

One possible first step would be to officially recognize that Reserve "Regiments" are actually Company/Squadron/Battery-sized sub-units and structure and group them together as such.  This would create the basic framework to build upon for fully deployable units and each Company/Squadron/Battery-sized sub-unit could have an objective of being able to immediately force generate a complete Platoon/Troop/Gun-sized sub-sub-unit to either augment the Regular Force or be grouped together with other units within their Reserve Brigade for form Companies/Squadrons or even complete Battle Groups.  On full mobilization they should eventually be able to form the Brigades originally envisioned.

I've attached images of the existing Reserve Force structure and one possible model for how it could be re-organized.  This is obviously just a rough idea of how an initial re-organization could take place and there are obviously many different variations/modifications or evolutions that could work as well or better.  The basic idea though is to start by building the organizational framework for an effective Army Reserve and then begin adding in the other required elements (changes to training, new equipment, CS and CSS elements, etc.) as they become feasible.


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## Halifax Tar (30 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> RCN has the MCDVs vs the rest of NavRes, and RCAF reserve is a pack of double dipping retirees.  Very different.



As stated the MCDVs are Reg Force staffed and always had a couple of Reg Force onboard even when the majority were reserve.  NRDs are what they are, administrative units that are there to provide augmentation to the Regular and full time resserve Navy.  

Even when the MCDVs were totally reserve I never wittnessed this kind of sly look at one another.  In fact in the Reg Force we had allot of respect for the MCDV crews as the did more sea time than most of the heavies (CPFs, 280s and Tanker) crews. 

The RCAF Res seems to be able to function and meld with their Reg Force counter parts seamlessly.  Not sure I would knock that method.  

Perhaps the Big Army should step down off its stool and see if there isnt some concepts that the RCN and RCAF have that they could implement.  I know that might seem to run counter to how we do things; but the big green machine doesnt look all that effiencent or capable the way you guys go on about its components. 

Again it just seems to be about rice bowls and capbages.


----------



## daftandbarmy (30 May 2020)

GR66 said:
			
		

> The idea of fully deployable Reserve Brigades (or Battle Groups at the least) I think makes sense for many of the reasons that FJAG and others have mentioned.  A smaller, ready Regular Force for the types of deployments you see on a more regular basis and a larger, cheaper to maintain, Reserve Force for times when you have to face the rarer, larger military threats.  The US ANG is one model that shows this could be done.
> 
> However, I think we're a very long way from the current structure of a multitude of individual Reserve Regiments and a focus on individual augmentation of the Regular Force to the kind of Reserve Force being suggested.  Add in the fact that in the current economic situation there is no way I see an influx of new equipment and support for the Reserves in the near future and I think it would be best to focus on incremental steps toward the final goal.
> 
> ...



FWIW, the 'Reserve Force Mobilization' mechanism we have in place right now seems to work pretty well, and we've been using it effectively over the course of some of the worst situations we've ever faced in a DOMPOPS scenario over the past 10 years or more e.g., record setting fire, flood, ice storm and, now, pandemic events.

If anything, a major area of improvement might be to increase the numbers of troops who can 'DAG Green' at the start of such events, which is an excellent measure of readiness. This would lead us down the path of making sure everyone is medical/dental/Pers Adm ready, and there are alot of areas for improvement we could make there, as well as the usual physical fitness and trade/specialty soldier qualifications requirements. And Regiments, Brigades and Divisions need to make sure this all is happening consistently and successfully during the training year. Of course there are a few other administrative process improvements that could be implemented e.g., it took 4 months to get me paid for my meagre 2 week hitch on OP LENTUS a couple of years ago. I was well finished my commitment by the time I got the money in the bank and no doubt others were in the same boat.

Of all the qualifications, PLQ is the most important IMHO as it prepares more junior leaders to operate effectively with small teams in less certain scenarios. If we were to increase our investment anywhere in an area of training designed to prepare more leaders, to a higher standard of readiness for both peace and war time requirements, it would be ....... leadership.

However, overall, the basic process seems to be serving us well. Let's not chuck it out.


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## dapaterson (30 May 2020)

The intent of a Reserve Force is not a "Reg F on the cheap" - lower cost full time permanent augmentation.  It is an "in case of emergency, break glass" type thing.

NavRes as noted above was nearly completely broken by the MCDVs, and resulted in major clefts between the full-time and part-time elements of the force.

RCAF Res is already running full tilt with little ability to surge, and does virtually no ab initio entry (partly because the RCAF has mismanaged its individual training system for at least three decades).

If you look at my posting history, I have been an advocate for fundamental restructure of the Army Reserve.  There are valid lessons to learn from the RCN , RCAF and from other international partners.  But to claim the RCN and RCAF are free from problems (some foundational) in their generation and maintenance of their forces, both Reg and Res, is to wear terrible, wilful blinders.


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## daftandbarmy (30 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The intent of a Reserve Force is not a "Reg F on the cheap" - lower cost full time permanent augmentation.  It is an "in case of emergency, break glass" type thing.



Nailed it. 

Now if we can just instill this vision statement into the minds of our most senior leadership, both political and military, we'll be OK


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## FJAG (30 May 2020)

GR66 said:
			
		

> The idea of fully deployable Reserve Brigades (or Battle Groups at the least) I think makes sense for many of the reasons that FJAG and others have mentioned.  A smaller, ready Regular Force for the types of deployments you see on a more regular basis and a larger, cheaper to maintain, Reserve Force for times when you have to face the rarer, larger military threats.  The US ANG is one model that shows this could be done.
> 
> However, I think we're a very long way from the current structure of a multitude of individual Reserve Regiments and a focus on individual augmentation of the Regular Force to the kind of Reserve Force being suggested.  Add in the fact that in the current economic situation there is no way I see an influx of new equipment and support for the Reserves in the near future and I think it would be best to focus on incremental steps toward the final goal.
> 
> ...



You're on point. The amalgamation is the only real option for us based on the size of the force we have. 4 to 6 brigades is all that one could reasonably construct out of an establishment of under 25,000.

I only have one issue with what you propose. We desperately need support brigades more than extra manoeuvre brigades which is what drew me to create an establishment of two reserve heavy manoeuvre brigades, one artillery brigade, one sustainment brigade and one manoeuvre enhancement brigade. 

I'll concede that your establishment would be easier to find acceptance within the reserve communities because there are fewer requirements to convert existing "combat" units into "sustainment" or "manoeuvre enhancement" units. (the artillery brigade is easily do-able). At some point, however, we need to face the question of: what should the Army have to be more lethal and credible rather than how do we maintain every cap badge, band and regimental museum that we have now. If we do have the need and opportunity to "mobilize" in the traditional sense, we can always bring units back from the Supp Order of Battle.

I actually ran the exercise of doing just that and it was a gut wrenching task to strike out famous regiments willy nilly just on paper. It's going to take a cold hearted bugger to do what actually needs to be done in real life.



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> The intent of a Reserve Force is not a "Reg F on the cheap" - lower cost full time permanent augmentation.  It is an "in case of emergency, break glass" type thing.



Bingo!



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> NavRes as noted above was nearly completely broken by the MCDVs, and resulted in major clefts between the full-time and part-time elements of the force.
> 
> RCAF Res is already running full tilt with little ability to surge, and does virtually no ab initio entry (partly because the RCAF has mismanaged its individual training system for at least three decades).
> 
> If you look at my posting history, I have been an advocate for fundamental restructure of the Army Reserve.  There are valid lessons to learn from the RCN , RCAF and from other international partners.  But to claim the RCN and RCAF are free from problems (some foundational) in their generation and maintenance of their forces, both Reg and Res, is to wear terrible, wilful blinders.



Bingo again!

With the "break glass" analogy my thoughts have been along this line: If a significant portion of the Army reserve is oriented towards the extreme but more hostile European theatre then:

a) the Navy reserve should be oriented to the "break glass" possibility of moving and sustaining large armoured forces by sea to Europe, the maintenance of sea lanes and counter area denial strategies, and

b) the Air Force reserve should be oriented towards the more "break glass" needs such as  medical evacuation, armed UAVs, attack helicopter, and forming a deployable air wing headquarters with air field engineering and defence and an aviation maintenance squadron. (many of those in hybrid Reg/Res elements and I tend to think of it as a deployable aviation brigade that can be tailored with additional helicopter transportation squadrons if and as needed)

A man can dream.  8)

 :cheers:


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## blacktriangle (30 May 2020)

Are any PRes regiments actually authorized to be larger than Coy/Sqn/Bty size?


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## FJAG (30 May 2020)

One additional point.

Consider creating a depot battalion in each region. The only job of the depot battalion is to provide individual training at the DP 1 and DP 2 level for both Reg F and Res F ORs and DP 1 for Reg F and Res F officers of all trades in the region. The purpose for doing this is to:

a) leave the units within the brigades free to organize and concentrate on solely collective training; and

b) in the event of "total" mobilization, the depot battalions stay behind and continue to train DP1 and 2 reinforcements/ replacements for the field force and (in really extreme circumstances) for additional battalions to augment the field force.

Incidentally, with three Reg F brigades and around five Res F brigades you can run the force with three division headquarters: 1 Div as the force employer holding no units or formations until assigned for employment and 2 Div in the East and 3 Div in the West which are the force generators.

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (30 May 2020)

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> Are any PRes regiments actually authorized to be larger than Coy/Sqn/Bty size?



Taking the average for a coy is between 80 to 150 pers, my unit is about 2 coy's plus a bit extra in authorized strength. The new reserve recruitment system shifts numbers a fair bit, units not recruiting get reduced intake and the positions/ funding goes to units that are.


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## blacktriangle (30 May 2020)

Interesting, thanks. Out of curiousity, what is the actual strength in contrast to what is authorized?


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## MilEME09 (30 May 2020)

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> Interesting, thanks. Out of curiousity, what is the actual strength in contrast to what is authorized?



Last I checked (about a year ago) 240+ and growing fast. The issue facing the reserves is the new recruitment system opening the flood gates so to speak. The Training system can't keep up,we have 2 platoon pluses of PAT. Though there is a plan and a way to deal with it thanks to this pandemic.


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## Halifax Tar (30 May 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The intent of a Reserve Force is not a "Reg F on the cheap" - lower cost full time permanent augmentation.  It is an "in case of emergency, break glass" type thing.



I am not sayin it is.  What the RCN and RCAF have done though is made sure their Reg and Res folks are as counter trained as possible.  Hence the reason my Ops room has a bunch reserve NCIOPs right now.  And the Deck Dept has 5 reserve boatswains.  The RCAF has a ready reserve of people who are capable of being the brake-glass force, same with the RCN.  Are we perfect ?  Nope but compared to what guys spout off about WRT the Army Res we are worlds ahead of you. 



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> NavRes as noted above was nearly completely broken by the MCDVs, and resulted in major clefts between the full-time and part-time elements of the force.


I dont buy it.  I was in NavRes we've always have big NRDs and little ones.  They really are just recruiting depots and public affairs concentrations.  They do their job well.  These units were never expected too and never will deploy as a unit.  They are people suppliers. 



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> RCAF Res is already running full tilt with little ability to surge, and does virtually no ab initio entry (partly because the RCAF has mismanaged its individual training system for at least three decades).


Maybe but their reserve Sqns sure seem able interoperate the same magical dust flying thingys.  



			
				dapaterson said:
			
		

> If you look at my posting history, I have been an advocate for fundamental restructure of the Army Reserve.  There are valid lessons to learn from the RCN , RCAF and from other international partners.  But to claim the RCN and RCAF are free from problems (some foundational) in their generation and maintenance of their forces, both Reg and Res, is to wear terrible, wilful blinders.



Telling the Army they are imperfect and we (RCN) may have a couple things to learn from does not mean we perfect.  I sure could pick apart the RCN, no problem; you should see the TM we just released on writting Theatre PDRs.  It boggles the mind.  Try not to be so defensive.  We might have a trick or two you could use.


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## blacktriangle (30 May 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Last I checked (about a year ago) 240+ and growing fast. The issue facing the reserves is the new recruitment system opening the flood gates so to speak. The Training system can't keep up,we have 2 platoon pluses of PAT. Though there is a plan and a way to deal with it thanks to this pandemic.



Wow, that's not so bad. Hope getting them all trained works out ok. I suppose my perspective on the PRes is very skewed as it is only based on a short time during the Afg years. Lots of people were out on long-term Class Bs and rarely seen, or on pre-deployment/deployment. So things felt pretty thin on the ground...and many of us that were there either had CTs in the works or were trying to jump on an upcoming roto. 

Did the Class B cuts years back have any impact (positive or negative) on the Class A parade numbers?


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## FJAG (30 May 2020)

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I am not sayin it is.  What the RCN and RCAF have done though is made sure their Reg and Res folks are as counter trained as possible.  Hence the reason my Ops room has a bunch reserve NCIOPs right now.  And the Deck Dept has 5 reserve boatswains.  The RCAF has a ready reserve of people who are capable of being the brake-glass force, same with the RCN.  Are we perfect ?  Nope but compared to what guys spout off about WRT the Army Res we are worlds ahead of you. ...
> I dont buy it.  I was in NavRes we've always have big NRDs and little ones.  They really are just recruiting depots and public affairs concentrations.  They do their job well.  These units were never expected too and never will deploy as a unit.  They are people suppliers. ...
> Maybe but their reserve Sqns sure seem able interoperate the same magical dust flying thingys.
> ...
> Telling the Army they are imperfect and we (RCN) may have a couple things to learn from does not mean we perfect.  I sure could pick apart the RCN, no problem; you should see the TM we just released on writting Theatre PDRs.  It boggles the mind.  Try not to be so defensive.  We might have a trick or two you could use.



The problem in a general sense, the way that I see it, is that the Navy, the Air Force and the national and other headquarters are using reservists as office overload to fill full-time positions that are not authorized under the government's Regular Force manning limitations. In some cases they are filling temporarily vacant positions but in many cases (especially the Air Force) it's just permanent full-time extra positions that have accreted over time recruited primarily from retired Reg F members. 

The definition of a reservist is "enrolled for other than continuing, full-time service". CAF has been stretching the meaning of "other than continuing ..." for quite some time now. That's where the idea of "in case of emergency, break glass" comes into play. It should be a force made up of individuals, units and formations that are trained and equipped to be available for call-out in cases of emergencies from domops to war and not for continuous augmentation of routine duties.

 :cheers:


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## tomahawk6 (30 May 2020)

Not all reservists need to be in a unit they can be managed by a central command and doled out as individual augmentee's.


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## Brad Sallows (30 May 2020)

If you're already working full-time somewhere to keep the lights on, you're not really in "reserve".


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## MilEME09 (30 May 2020)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> If you're already working full-time somewhere to keep the lights on, you're not really in "reserve".



Are you suggesting we scrap the reserves?


----------



## FJAG (30 May 2020)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Not all reservists need to be in a unit they can be managed by a central command and doled out as individual augmentee's.



I can see that for what we call the Supplementary Reserve which is basically people who have been in either the Reg F or Primary Res F and have volunteered for call back but have no training requirements year to year. We tend not to use it very much.

It's kind of like your Retired Reserve but its a bit different from your Individual Ready Reserve where individuals are still able to be promoted and take training and Active Duty opportunities. 

In a way we have a group of what we call Class B reservists (i.e. part of the Primary Reserve) but who have been away from their home unit on lengthy full-time service with some Reg F headquarters or other. There are also such things as Primary Reserve Lists which contain both part time and full time reservists (usually with JAG or at NDHQ (and in the past with the medical branch) whose training and service requirements are usually a bit different from those of the typical Army, Navy and Air Force reservists. They're not the equivalent of the IRR but some of them do have some of the features.

I could see an IRR concept being useful for personnel who have moved from where their unit was to an area where a USAR or ARNG unit is not available and they wish to stay on strength and available for training or deployment. Their administration is a bit tricky but there would be value in keeping them engaged. 

I prefer individual augmentees to come from units where their fitness and training standard can be kept current.



			
				Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> If you're already working full-time somewhere to keep the lights on, you're not really in "reserve".



That's where NDA ss 15(2) and (3) come in and how one defines "continuing full-time service" and "other than continuing full-time service". It's expected that reservists will be on "full-time service" at some point but not on a "continuing" basis. The question is: how long does the service need to be before it becomes "continuing full-time service"? That's up for debate.

 :cheers:


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## blacktriangle (30 May 2020)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Not all reservists need to be in a unit they can be managed by a central command and doled out as individual augmentee's.



We already have the Primary Reserve List (PRL) concept, don't we? I seem to remember there being one for CANSOFCOM, and a few others maybe?

Edit: FJAG already beat me to it...


----------



## FSTO (30 May 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> The problem in a general sense, the way that I see it, is that the Navy, the Air Force and the national and other headquarters are using reservists as office overload to fill full-time positions that are not authorized under the government's Regular Force manning limitations. In some cases they are filling temporarily vacant positions but in many cases (especially the Air Force) it's just permanent full-time extra positions that have accredited over time recruited primarily from retired Reg F members.
> 
> The definition of a reservist is "enrolled for other than continuing, full-time service". CAF has been stretching the meaning of "other than continuing ..." for quite some time now. That's where the idea of "in case of emergency, break glass" comes into play. It should be a force made up of individuals, units and formations that are trained and equipped to be available for call-out in cases of emergencies from domops to war and not for continuous augmentation of routine duties.
> 
> :cheers:



The Navy doesn't work that way at all. It takes time to build a ship and get people trained to be able to fight that ship effectively and that is why the "Fleet in Being" has always been the goal of the RCN. When I said the MCDV's "Broke" the NRD's, I meant those ships took the Naval Knowledge soul of the NRD's, the P2's and the qualified Lt(N) who were capable of conducting effective in house training at the NRD's and to sail the old pig boats and do some augmentation of the Frigates, Destroyers, and AOR's as required. Those people then left to sail MCDV's or CT to the Reg force and now many NRD's are populated with a lot of Subbies and Killicks with a smattering of long in the tooth C2 and LCdr's.

But the NRD's are effective recruiting centres for the Regular RCN and are now providing an increasing number of augmenties for the  entire fleet. An individual NRD are only capable of operating an ORCA Class PCT on their own.


----------



## MilEME09 (30 May 2020)

On the subject of the reserves as a whole, I can't find much about the air res, I know they are connected to operational squadrons.

Should we potentially expand the air res? Limit it to major cities only, and utilize tech schools for training.


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## FJAG (30 May 2020)

FSTO said:
			
		

> The Navy doesn't work that way at all. It takes time to build a ship and get people trained to be able to fight that ship effectively and that is why the "Fleet in Being" has always been the goal of the RCN. When I said the MCDV's "Broke" the NRD's, I meant those ships took the Naval Knowledge soul of the NRD's, the P2's and the qualified Lt(N) who were capable of conducting effective in house training at the NRD's and to sail the old pig boats and do some augmentation of the Frigates, Destroyers, and AOR's as required. Those people then left to sail MCDV's or CT to the Reg force and now many NRD's are populated with a lot of Subbies and Killicks with a smattering of long in the tooth C2 and LCdr's.
> 
> But the NRD's are effective recruiting centres for the Regular RCN and are now providing an increasing number of augmenties for the  entire fleet. An individual NRD are only capable of operating an ORCA Class PCT on their own.



I actually took it the way that you meant it. (and to a large extent it's the same problem in the Army where some of the more knowledgeable personnel have been taken away from the units to fill Class B positions elsewhere.)

I expect that a certain part of the training for any sailor involves being on a ship of some type for OJT in their trade or at a fleet school for a course, but what I understand has been happening in the Navy is that they can't man their ships with the Reg F positions assigned to it so they too have been filling their vacancies in ships and at naval and national headquarters with experienced reservists thus depriving the NRDs of those experienced personnel. This is different from ResF personnel being on a ship for a cruise of some duration in order to fulfil the requirements of a specific trade qualification.

I know little about the inner workings of the way that the Navy reserve is supposed to work. i.e. what is its end state to be if the system is working right. I assume that like the current Army, the basic concept is to create a large enough pool of individuals so that when the balloon goes up, every ship in the fleet can be fully manned with a Reg F complement augmented by reservists.

The concept of a finite number of ships and their slow construction time is not unknown in the Army where major equipment holdings currently limit the size of force we can actively deploy. In case of a major conflict, the Army would also have serious problems in expanding the force size as we don't have a high manufacturing capability and most of our equipment comes from foreign sources who might not be able to deliver in a time of crisis. That's the main reason I keep arguing that the Army Res should be equipped and trained in peacetime so that it has the capability to expand the Army in war time.

I would think with the Navy the same is true. We might need x ships for peace time training and patrolling but x + 7 ships for wartime duties. In that case we should have a total of x + 7 ships in inventory; enough Reg F personnel to keep x ships operating in peacetime and enough trained reservists to immediately be able to man 7 extra ships in wartime. That gives us the ships we need but keeps peacetime annual Reg F full-time salaries to the minimum required for peacetime and still give us the ability to expand the force in an emergency.

Like the Army, the Navy does not understand the true opportunity cost savings that a reserve force could deliver annually IF IT WAS FULLY TRAINED AND HAD THE ASSIGNED EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE. Under what I consider a false interpretation of the "Forces in being" concept our military is focused on maintaining maximum Reg F PYs (regardless of how costly they are) at the expense of necessary equipment acquisition and adequate O&M funding. What the Reg F has now is all we have. There is no real reserve, just a pool of hole fillers. What's worse is that the holes which the Reg F currently has in its battalions and ships and squadrons are as a result of sucking more and more PYs into administrative headquarters positions (not to mention recruiting and training capacity problems).

There. I've ranted again.

 :cheers:


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## Colin Parkinson (30 May 2020)

If we were smart, we would build slightly more hulls than we can man, with high modulelarity so they can be updated. A couple of hulls are always in warm layup, a few ships always in refit, others in work up and others operational. Every ship rotates through these slots, after several long patrols, ship goes into a slow refit and upgrade, the ship that was in refit moves to warm layup, the vessel in layup, moves into workup, and so on. If things go pear shape, it means you push Reservists on to them and spread the expertise around. Ships in warmup can also host remedial training courses to keep reservists up to date. 
Not sure how well missiles stay in storage, can we store enough missiles to arm all of the ships at the same time and resupply them again? In which case ensuring there are adequate gun systems to make up the shortfalls of missile inventory.


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## MilEME09 (30 May 2020)

Colin P said:
			
		

> If we were smart, we would build slightly more hulls than we can man, with high modulelarity so they can be updated. A couple of hulls are always in warm layup, a few ships always in refit, others in work up and others operational. Every ship rotates through these slots, after several long patrols, ship goes into a slow refit and upgrade, the ship that was in refit moves to warm layup, the vessel in layup, moves into workup, and so on. If things go pear shape, it means you push Reservists on to them and spread the expertise around. Ships in warmup can also host remedial training courses to keep reservists up to date.
> Not sure how well missiles stay in storage, can we store enough missiles to arm all of the ships at the same time and resupply them again? In which case ensuring there are adequate gun systems to make up the shortfalls of missile inventory.



Why not also put guns in mountings on shore to train gunnery? mind you simulators could probably do the same thing.

Back on topic, Should the reserves utilize civilian trade schools more to put less strain on our IT system? For example subsidize trade schools to teach Cooks, V-techs, Computer programing (or what ever Cyber warfare needs), medical assistants, nursing. Members then stay local reducing R&Q cost, then send them to their respective schools after for any Army specific training.


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## Brad Sallows (31 May 2020)

>Are you suggesting we scrap the reserves?

No, just that I'd prefer full-time positions to be filled by regulars, irrespective of which component the positions belong to.

Augmentation, backfill, and CT are a drain on Res F units which few units can sustain because few have sufficient critical mass.  Units struggle to build a company because they are perpetually rebuilding platoons.


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## FJAG (31 May 2020)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> >Are you suggesting we scrap the reserves?
> 
> No, just that I'd prefer full-time positions to be filled by regulars, irrespective of which component the positions belong to.
> 
> Augmentation, backfill, and CT are a drain on Res F units which few units can sustain because few have sufficient critical mass.  Units struggle to build a company because they are perpetually rebuilding platoons.



 :nod:   :cdnsalute:


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## GR66 (31 May 2020)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> >Are you suggesting we scrap the reserves?
> 
> No, just that I'd prefer full-time positions to be filled by regulars, irrespective of which component the positions belong to.
> 
> Augmentation, backfill, and CT are a drain on Res F units which few units can sustain because few have sufficient critical mass.  Units struggle to build a company because they are perpetually rebuilding platoons.



Maybe the Reg F is suffering from the same disease as the Res F.  Regiments trying to maintain 3 x battalions with authorized staffing only for two.  The Reg F can't fulfill its role as the immediate ready force because it has to steal troops from elsewhere to get up to deployment strength and the Reserves can't train and organize as the "break glass in case of emergency" force because they are always having to augment the Reg F instead of preparing to deploy as formed units.

You can't fix one without fixing the other.


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## FJAG (31 May 2020)

GR66 said:
			
		

> Maybe the Reg F is suffering from the same disease as the Res F.  Regiments trying to maintain 3 x battalions with authorized staffing only for two.  The Reg F can't fulfill its role as the immediate ready force because it has to steal troops from elsewhere to get up to deployment strength and the Reserves can't train and organize as the "break glass in case of emergency" force because they are always having to augment the Reg F instead of preparing to deploy as formed units.
> 
> You can't fix one without fixing the other.



Bingo!

 :cheers:


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## BDTyre (1 Jun 2020)

reverse_engineer said:
			
		

> Interesting, thanks. Out of curiousity, what is the actual strength in contrast to what is authorized?



Not sure what my regiment is authorized for, but on paper we are in excess of 200 people. Last number I heard was about 220.


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## dapaterson (1 Jun 2020)

Never trust a unit's count of their own personnel.  They will not differentiate between trained and untrained; effective and non-effective; has conducted any military training in the past 4 years vs is the mess secretary full stop...

And if the Army HQ defines a method to report, it will be six months or less before one of the Divisions (with excess full-time staff, Reg and Res) invents a new way to count which, oddly enough, shows their formations in a better light than the HHQ method.


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## daftandbarmy (1 Jun 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Never trust a unit's count of their own personnel.  They will not differentiate between trained and untrained; effective and non-effective; has conducted any military training in the past 4 years vs is the mess secretary full stop...
> 
> And if the Army HQ defines a method to report, it will be six months or less before one of the Divisions (with excess full-time staff, Reg and Res) invents a new way to count which, oddly enough, shows their formations in a better light than the HHQ method.



Having seen this 'counting' process in action it is one of the most frustrating experiences I've ever experienced. 

In the Reg F you fall in the Company on Monday, count heads, account for those not present, report, salute, and off you go.

In the Reserves you almost never can have everyone on parade at the same time, so it becomes a nightmare of figuring out who has paraded/ signed a pay sheet at least once in the past month (the criteria for being 'effective'), and a host of other complex guessing games, paper pay sheet checking, suppositions, emails, phone calls, and other shamanism. The majority of this work falls on the shoulders of SNCOs, who should really be doing more value added work during their limited Class A time.

Of course, if we had a simple card swipe system for paying the troops, or something similar, we could have all the data uploaded real time and ready for managing fast.


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## MilEME09 (1 Jun 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Having seen this 'counting' process in action it is one of the most frustrating experiences I've ever experienced.
> 
> In the Reg F you fall in the Company on Monday, count heads, account for those not present, report, salute, and off you go.
> 
> ...



My unit went old fashioned, rolls call every parade night, parade state delivered to the CSM by 2000. I do agree we need a better system then pay sheets though.

I have worked at restaurants that required a biometric scan of your eye or thumb to clock in and out. How can we not do something that secure to say enter our buildings, and have it tied to reserve pay?


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## Old Sweat (1 Jun 2020)

D&B, you just jogged my memory. I was a spectator, and only got one side of the story, but here goes. Circa 1988-1989 the then MND ordered the forces to fix the reserve pay system so that personnel could be paid in a timely, and accurate, manner. Well, the system wrapped itself in the Financial Administration Act and a horde of like directives, proving that the forces could not introduce a more efficient and effective system, as to do so would go against government direction. They managed to outlast the MND, who eventually departed in a shuffle. Need I say more?


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## daftandbarmy (1 Jun 2020)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> D&B, you just jogged my memory. I was a spectator, and only got one side of the story, but here goes. Circa 1988-1989 the then MND ordered the forces to fix the reserve pay system so that personnel could be paid in a timely, and accurate, manner. Well, the system wrapped itself in the Financial Administration Act and a horde of like directives, proving that the forces could not introduce a more efficient and effective system, as to do so would go against government direction. They managed to outlast the MND, who eventually departed in a shuffle. Need I say more?



We have a pay process that is well suited to the 1940s, made more complicated by various random additions made necessary by the digital age. 

It is a very ugly hybrid, which returns the investment we've made in it.


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## MilEME09 (1 Jun 2020)

D&B I am quoting you from the navy thread



> That's a great idea. We should do the same in the Army where, for example, the 'Fort Rupert Light Horse' is aligned with the Strathconas and is required to augment them on exercises and operations. One of the benefits might be to attract retirees from the Reg F unit into the Reserve unit, doing both a favour through their continued service.
> 
> It kind of worked that way when we had an Op Tasked Airborne Platoon required to support 2 Cdo, but the ties between units were pretty weak at the best of times. Regardless, we'd deploy 15 - 20 troops on various exercises with them, and it usually worked out OK.



This should absolutely be a thing, not just unit's trying to form partnerships but have it part of how we operate. My unit has worked hard to have some head way with operating with 1 SVC. That said many of the challenges of the reserves show their ugly heads when it comes to sending people on reg force EX's, especially time off, as example they asked people going on Maple resolve last year to also go on the lead up exercises as well. As much as a reservist may want to do it, unless you are out of a job, good luck getting 4 months off to go do army stuff.

There are more then enough reserve units in each div that if they had a parent reg force unit, it could make training easier for the reserves, and force generation easier for the reg force with better coordination.


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## dapaterson (2 Jun 2020)

When I was in the Army HQ, the official metric was "paraded at least once within a month".

An Area HQ (nameless, but with a HQ east of Quebec) decided to redefine that (for their reports to higher) as once within the past three months.


The problems with pay (both in reporting and producing) are driven by ignorant combat arms types trying to inflict their preferred solutions (which may or may not be illegal) rather than defining problems and working with experts to find solutions.

This is an example of the CAF's lack of human resources  professionals, and the continual problem of arms officers inflicting their lack of knowledge on the '1 side...


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## FJAG (2 Jun 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> When I was in the Army HQ, the official metric was "paraded at least once within a month".
> 
> An Area HQ (nameless, but with a HQ east of Quebec) decided to redefine that (for their reports to higher) as once within the past three months.
> 
> ...



The first issue that you describe sounds to me like the difference between the activities we expect a soldier to show up to do and the NES requirements i.e. if you do any less than this and we'll turf you out.

LegOs at the Bde level frequently deal with NES issues and it certainly struck me that many people (and not just privates) were looking at NES as the guideline as to how little they could get away with before being hauled up by the short and cur----. 

That's not what NES was designed for. QR&O  9.04(2) (ordered to train max of 15 days Class B 60 days Class A per year) was that guidance coupled with whatever budgetary restrictions might apply. Units create their own training plans and therefore should set their own attendance requirements, however, NES provisions, whatever they might be,  should never be the "standard".

 :cheers:


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## CountDC (3 Jun 2020)

Colin P said:
			
		

> If we were smart, we would build slightly more hulls than we can man, with high modulelarity so they can be updated.



With current numbers we have done that, we have more hulls than we can man.  We just hide it by rapid rotation from ship to ship to make it look better.  Worse case I saw when trying to calculate a members points for a deployment was

Posted ship 1 - refit
Attach Posted ship 2 - along side 
Loaned ship 3 - workups 
Loaned Ship 4 - 2 week fishpat.
Loaned Ship 5 - Deployed.

This was all in the same time period quickly leaping from one to the other in less than 2 months.

None of it was published in peoplesoft.  After talking to the member I had to search through his pers file to find any documents I could to support his claim of the deployment that increased his points. Luckily it was there so he got the credit.

Despite the  "reorgs" over the last 30 years with the last in 2012 the army does need one and I like the suggestions here.  The reserves also need to let go of the "we need this" for historical connections mentality.  When an armouries has little to no training rooms with a crap load of messes because every unit in the place needs their own that is a problem.  In one case the unit has JRs, Sgts&WOs, Officers and Band mess.  4 Messes for one reserve unit training one night a week doesn't make sense while they are crying there are not enough classrooms (1) in the buliding. With that kind of mentality it will take someone strong to push the reorg.


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## FJAG (20 Jun 2020)

So my initial question on this thread was whether or not we would be interested in considering a Forward Support Company concept like within the US Army Brigade Support Battalion. I glean a general consensus that the answer is no - stay with the support structure currently existing within each battalion/regiment's headquarters company.

New questions. Make the following assumptions:

1. reserve battalions and regiments will fully manned and equipped to war establishments;

2. reserve battalions and regiments will have no responsibility for individual training, only collective training to the extent of ten monthly 2.5-day mandatory training weekends and one mandatory three-week collective training exercise in the summer;

3. all training preparation, and all administrative, logistic and maintenance tasks  for the battalion will be conducted by a full-time cadre; and

4. some companies/batteries/squadrons may be located at armories separate from the bn/regt HQ;

Question 1 what should be the standard establishment of the full-time cadre for an infantry battalion?

Question 2 what changes from the standard establishment (if any) should there be for an armoured regiment, artillery regiment, engineer regiment and service battalion?

Question 3 should vehicles be held a) distributed at local armories (assume space will be available for it) or b) held at a centralized regional training centre?

 :cheers:


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## Colin Parkinson (20 Jun 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> When I was in the Army HQ, the official metric was "paraded at least once within a month".
> 
> An Area HQ (nameless, but with a HQ east of Quebec) decided to redefine that (for their reports to higher) as once within the past three months.
> 
> ...



I have found human resources professionals vary wildly in competence and suitability for the job. A good one is worth their weight in gold, but likley they won't be around long as they are very transitory as they move quickly up the ladder. To find a competent one that is happy where they are is another rare beast. The rest vary from the ok, disinterested, lazy, learning, absolute wastes of skin.


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## Eaglelord17 (20 Jun 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Question 2 what changes from the standard establishment (if any) should there be for an armoured regiment, artillery regiment, engineer regiment and service battalion?
> 
> Question 3 should vehicles be held a) distributed at local armories (assume space will be available for it) or b) held at a centralized regional training centre?



For #2 if you decide to go the route of the mandatory days you would have to make sure there is protection for the Reservists for their civilian jobs or else your going to have less than you started with. For example if that became mandatory today I would have to quit as I cannot sustain that with my current employer and there wouldn't be the protections needed for me to choose the military. To me one of the biggest advantages the Reserves bring in is the fact you have people who can be very skilled civvy side, especially on skills not currently found in the military. You would lose that very quickly if you didn't have the protections needed for their jobs.


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## FJAG (20 Jun 2020)

Eaglelord17 said:
			
		

> For #2 if you decide to go the route of the mandatory days you would have to make sure there is protection for the Reservists for their civilian jobs or else your going to have less than you started with. For example if that became mandatory today I would have to quit as I cannot sustain that with my current employer and there wouldn't be the protections needed for me to choose the military. To me one of the biggest advantages the Reserves bring in is the fact you have people who can be very skilled civvy side, especially on skills not currently found in the military. You would lose that very quickly if you didn't have the protections needed for their jobs.



I didn't want to mention every assumption as I've said in the past that a new regime of federally mandated employer/employee legislative protection is essential to restructuring the reserves. They key to creating a lethal and capable reserve force is a set amount of mandatory collective training that achieves a doable balance of the amount of time demanded of the soldier, his family and employer with the amount of time needed to achieve the required battle standards.

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (20 Jun 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I didn't want to mention every assumption as I've said in the past that a new regime of federally mandated employer/employee legislative protection is essential to restructuring the reserves. They key to creating a lethal and capable reserve force is a set amount of mandatory collective training that achieves a doable balance of the amount of time demanded of the soldier, his family and employer with the amount of time needed to achieve the required battle standards.
> 
> :cheers:



Exactly, wanna know why we had so many (including my self) sign class C contracts? We had no employer to tell us no you can't or if you do you won't have a job to come back to. I recently put a question about time off to the conservative defense critic. To sum up the answer, he personally was working with DND and Canada company to grow an official group of sorts of supportive employers for reservists but cut short of saying federal legislative changes. Which is unfortunate.


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## Kilted (21 Jun 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I didn't want to mention every assumption as I've said in the past that a new regime of federally mandated employer/employee legislative protection is essential to restructuring the reserves. They key to creating a lethal and capable reserve force is a set amount of mandatory collective training that achieves a doable balance of the amount of time demanded of the soldier, his family and employer with the amount of time needed to achieve the required battle standards.
> 
> :cheers:




One of the problems with this is that you may find that employers would be less willing to hire reservists. Which I could then see some people leaving it off their resumes, which would hinder some people. I'm sure that there would be a few employers who wouldn't be happy with new hires on the first day saying: "O, by the way...". If we really wanted compete job protection you would need to see reservists added as a protected group in the various human rights code, but that's all a whole other conversation. 

As a reservist there are already a number of barriers to employment. For example evening and night shift are completely out depending on what time they start/finish. Jobs that require you to work weekends get hairy pretty fast. 

Let's not forget the Pandora's box of having your C-of-C mad at you because you can't get work off and  your job mad at you for the time you do get off. And then the times when your C-of-C gets mad at you cause you can't get 10 days off in February for an ex, and tells you that you are a sub-par soldier and should VR because you didn't fill one of the eight spots that your regiment needs to fill for the ex. That hasn't happened to me, but I've seen similar things happen. 

Then there are conflicts with family, especially for the younger guys. We had one soldier who had to sneak out of his house for an ex one weekend because his father told him that he couldn't go cause he wanted him home with the family. This individual was in his early 20's.


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## mariomike (21 Jun 2020)

Kilted said:
			
		

> As a reservist there are already a number of barriers to employment. For example evening and night shift are completely out depending on what time they start/finish. Jobs that require you to work weekends get hairy pretty fast.



I was a reservist, and a shift worker. Pretty simple. The full-time job comes first. It's your career. Not your hobby.



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> They key to creating a lethal and capable reserve force is a set amount of mandatory collective training that achieves a doable balance of the amount of time demanded of the soldier, his family and employer with the amount of time needed to achieve the required battle standards.



My employer gave me two weeks Leave with Pay ( LWP ) each and every summer for PRes training. 

Which was, I think, pretty generous. They had to pay me 80 hours at regular time, and my replacement another 80 hours at time and a half.


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## Kilted (21 Jun 2020)

Not everyone looking for work has a career. I've even had my chain of command say that those with actual careers would be given more slack. But those who were working whatever they could find, due to school or whatever circumstances would be expected to still be there.


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## FJAG (21 Jun 2020)

Re the employer/employee issue, I'm firmly on the side of having legislation and a system that makes a certain amount of training mandatory  whether the employer likes it or not. The vital ground in this argument is that you cannot create formed, trained and capable reserve units on a come-when-you-feel-like-it basis. Does that mean there will be some employer/employee issues as described above? Most probably. That's why there needs to be a legislative system and enforcement system to protect soldiers and why there needs to be a very clear covenant between the Army, the soldier, his family and his employer about the limits of "mandatory" training and a lengthy advance notice as to when it takes place (by which I mean a year in advance) so that everyone can adjust their lives accordingly.

Not trying to derail the employer/employee issue, my latest question has to do with the size of the full-time cadre required for a fully staffed Class A reserve battalion. I asked this question because when I did my estimates for consolidating the existing 128 reserve units into approximately 37 reserve units and you pooled all the RSS etc staff dedicated to the reserves now, you end up with approximately 17 full-timers per battalion. My question is: Is that adequate?

 :cheers:


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## dapaterson (21 Jun 2020)

The problems with employers I encountered were almost universally due to the CAF's stubborn refusal to properly plan ahead.  Soldiers should be able to plan months ahead.  Higher HQs should issue timely orders to units to enable them to plan.

Employers, given timely notice, are great supporters.  Employers, given little to no notice for routine training, become remarkably skeptical about the Army.


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## Blackadder1916 (21 Jun 2020)

Kilted said:
			
		

> One of the problems with this is . . .
> 
> Let's not forget the Pandora's box of . . .
> 
> Then there are conflicts with family  . . .



If one buys into a proposal of "Reserve Restructuring" then one also has to stop thinking of the myriad, niggling, little problems that interfere with reserve participation "as it stands now" and change thinking to how things will (hopefully) be done in a restructured force.  The most common comparison usually made is between the CAF Primary Reserve and the various Reserve and Guard elements of the US military.  While they have much more robust federal job protection legislation than we do, they are also not without problems in having some employers accept workplace absences due to military reserve service.  What probably makes it easier south of the border is that, besides the legal protections, Reserve and Guard units have (in many cases) actual missions and have been deployed as formed sub-units/units on a continuing and highly visible basis for most of the last 30 years (i.e., since Desert Shield/Storm).  Before then, yes, US reserve military units deployed in formed bodies, but that was mostly (post WW2) in training/exercise scenarios.

However one of the benefits of the US government taking their reserves seriously (and to be honest the adults do not really take the CF reserves seriously) is that along with real world missions comes the budgeting that makes it possible to plan training in advance (months and years in advance) and hold to those timings.  Those "39 days a year" have been the standard for over a hundred years and it is the exception, rather than the rule as in the case of the CF, that the funding for that minimum unit training will be clawed back to pay for something Regular.


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## MilEME09 (21 Jun 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> The problems with employers I encountered were almost universally due to the CAF's stubborn refusal to properly plan ahead.  Soldiers should be able to plan months ahead.  Higher HQs should issue timely orders to units to enable them to plan.
> 
> Employers, given timely notice, are great supporters.  Employers, given little to no notice for routine training, become remarkably skeptical about the Army.



I agree, I have lost support from employers before because of last minute course cancellations, etc... When a employer potentially reworks schedules for you, adds over time, or even hires additional staff, and your at the 11th hour say by the way its not happening any more. People tend to get pissed off at that for sure.


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## daftandbarmy (5 Jul 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I agree, I have lost support from employers before because of last minute course cancellations, etc... When a employer potentially reworks schedules for you, adds over time, or even hires additional staff, and your at the 11th hour say by the way its not happening any more. People tend to get pissed off at that for sure.



I have spoken to employers, some of them former military members, who refuse to hire reservists mainly for that reason. 

It's not the soldier who is the problem, it's the vagaries of the system they work within.


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## Kilted (5 Jul 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I have spoken to employers, some of them former military members, who refuse to hire reservists mainly for that reason.
> 
> It's not the soldier who is the problem, it's the vagaries of the system they work within.



I suppose that there is no legal requirement to tell a potential employer that you are a reservist.  However, good luck getting the time off after doing that.  Although if someone was hard enough up for money, you never know.


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## FJAG (5 Jul 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I have spoken to employers, some of them former military members, who refuse to hire reservists mainly for that reason.
> 
> It's not the soldier who is the problem, it's the vagaries of the system they work within.



My suggested solution to that is three-fold:

1.  Separate responsibility for DP1 trg from the unit and concentrate it with Depot units who target primarily young students who have summer time available and who need guaranteed and lengthy summer employment. An individual does not join his unit until DP1 qualified.

2.  Have units only responsible for collective training with mandatory training taking place on one 2.5-day weekend per month (10 per year for 25 days) and three weeks (23 days) in the summer (total 48 days annually) with trg dates set and fixed at least one year in advance. 

3.  Improved employment legislation that supports soldiers for mandatory trg attendance and which provides incentives to employers to ease the burden of loosing individuals for those three weeks in the summer (over and above statutory annual vacation times).

All other trg beyond DP1 is voluntary with much of DP2 going on at Depot units during summer vacation periods (again targeting the young). Terms of service should be set so that an individual is recruited and signs on for a fixed term contract that covers both his anticipated DP1 trg cycle and at least two annual trg cycles with his unit. No voluntary release prior to the end of the contract and reenlistment would be encouraged through modest re-enlistment bonuses.

The intent here is to make recruitment attractive to young people while they have the time in the summers to train by way of Depot units that can adjust staff to meet recruiting fluctuation so that course can be set well in advance and never be cancelled. 

Collective training at the units must be very predictable (ie set in stone) with minimal trg events so as to make it more attractive to older individuals who have more family and civilian employment commitments to deal with. I would foresee that unit collective trg be rigorously and centrally set through BTSs required to be completed by a given unit annually so that there is very little opportunity to run things "on the fly".

The big issue is to make the Class A system rigorously predictable so that everyone (members, family and employers) knows exactly what they are getting into from square one. There would still be room for individuals to volunteer for Class B/C opportunities but that is an altogether separate issue.

Will that be a system that fits everyone. Hardly. But it should fit enough people that units become effective over time.

 :cheers:


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## dapaterson (24 Jul 2020)

It's a US context, but this hits too close to home...

https://twitter.com/oneminutecall/status/1286569408274534401/photo/1


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## stellarpanther (24 Jul 2020)

With all the stuff going on with COVID and other legislation that has probably slowed or stopped for now, restructuring the reserves is probably not even on their radar.  Some of what you mentioned would also cost money that they don't have to spend.  We're going to see huge cuts in the next couple of budgets and DND/CAF isn't about to start spending more money for the reserves when money to the Reg force is going to shrink.  As well, you mentioned that people shouldn't even join their units until they are DP1 qualified.  Unless they really change which I doubt will happen, it could be a couple of years to get that course.  The way things seem to be at least in a couple of unit's I'm familiar with, as soon as they get DP1, they get promoted at the same time.  By the sounds of it being a Cpl in the Reserves doesn't mean you have any real experience in your job.


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## daftandbarmy (24 Jul 2020)

Like other 'irregular forces', I would argue that the Reserves are more change resilient than the Regulars in many ways.

I mean, if the Reserves did not cave in as a result of all the neglect, chaos and other good ideas and fastballs thrown around over the past few decades, they're not likely to in the near future either


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## Ostrozac (24 Jul 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Like other 'irregular forces', I would argue that the Reserves are more change resilient than the Regulars in many ways.
> 
> I mean, if the Reserves did not cave in as a result of all the neglect, chaos and other good ideas and fastballs thrown around over the past few decades, they're not likely to in the near future either



Agreed; “organizational culture eats strategy for breakfast” applies here. And big Army doesn’t have a lot of tools to change the Army Reserve — there are no huge pots of resources to use as a carrot, and how could you use a stick when the reserves have already been neglected for so long? The Army Reserve we have today is going to look very similar to the Army Reserve we will have 20 years from now. Change, if it happens, will have to be gradual and sustained. And no, flash-in-the-pan good idea fairies don’t count (I see you there, 10/90!).


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## FJAG (24 Jul 2020)

stellarpanther said:
			
		

> With all the stuff going on with COVID and other legislation that has probably slowed or stopped for now, restructuring the reserves is probably not even on their radar.  Some of what you mentioned would also cost money that they don't have to spend.  We're going to see huge cuts in the next couple of budgets and DND/CAF isn't about to start spending more money for the reserves when money to the Reg force is going to shrink.  As well, you mentioned that people shouldn't even join their units until they are DP1 qualified.  Unless they really change which I doubt will happen, it could be a couple of years to get that course.  The way things seem to be at least in a couple of unit's I'm familiar with, as soon as they get DP1, they get promoted at the same time.  By the sounds of it being a Cpl in the Reserves doesn't mean you have any real experience in your job.



There's nothing new about Covid when it comes to DND/CAF ignoring the reserves. They've done that for over half a century as it is.

The key that people seem to forget when it comes to budgeting is that reservists are cheaper in the long run. A typical Class A costs one sixth of the pay and allowances that a Reg F member does which means that you could hire two class As for the cost of one Reg F member and still save two thirds of the costs. Give that a thought for a second: double the manpower for less than half the price.

The problem isn't that individual reservists aren't capable. They're the same raw material as our Reg F members. The problem is that our reserve force system, from top to bottom, isn't fit for purpose. Individual training could be better, collective training is practically non-existent and as far as our terms of service and employer support are concerned ... well you couldn't make a more destructive system if you went out to design one.

The issue about not joining the unit until after DP1 is quite simply to allow units to concentrate on collective training. You could just as easily have a platoon within a battalion do DP1 training but IMHO if you create a separate structure (which I call Depot battalions that would have companies and platoons in all the local areas and be responsible for recruiting and managing training until the individual is DP1 qualified and capable of participating fully in the unit's collective training) then you have two purpose built entities that can concentrate completely in their own missions. We do that now for Reg F personnel. Why not reservists? Why do we ad hoc the reserve training system?

The question of how long it will take to train a reservist to DP1 varies from trade to trade and while we can shorten some training courses by being more efficient on what we teach, how we teach it (for example there are many trades [medical, mechanics, truck drivers, cooks etc] where we could assist the individuals in taking civilian community college programs in the winter to learn the essentials and then augment that by much shorter military specific courses in the summer] and how we utilize every spare minute of a students summer breaks, some things will just take time. The whole idea behind the "depot" system is to create efficiencies so that delays for training and courses are eliminated and a young recruit is trained expeditiously and made ready to participate in his/her unit's collective training.

Long story short; it's exactly at this time that we could restructure the system to change over from a large and expensive (over half our budget goes for pay and benefits) full-time force (by which I include Class Bs which are being used to surreptitiously expand the size of the "full-time" force beyond government limits) to an annually less expensive and better equipped and trained part-time force.

Don't get hung up on little crap like "promotion" to corporal. I was there when they created the whole Hellyer corporal system. We all understood then (and despised the fact) that what we were doing was simply saying that corporals were, in effect, trained journeymen and not junior leaders. That was the whole point behind creating master corporals--i.e. to reintroduce a junior NCO rank. 

I do agree with you that they do not have much experience in their jobs. They never will. Even if you count the amount of down-time in the Reg F when people aren't "doing their job" a Reg F member will probably spend at least three (and quite possibly four or five) times as much time in a given year, doing "his job". That's inherent in the two systems. But. We can't have a reserve system whereby a private would have to spend ten to twelve years of part-time service to get the equivalent of three to four years full-time equivalent experience before promotion to corporal. Career progression would stop. The amount of experience needed for promotion to corporal is a very subjective thing and at best is somewhat arbitrary. There was a time, long ago, in the combat arms where we coursed individuals to trade level 3 but to complete TL4 was an on job training program where supervisors had to check off an individual's experience progress. It was a tremendous pain in the butt and I sympathise with any trade that still has to use an OJT system.

 :cheers:


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## daftandbarmy (24 Jul 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> There's nothing new about Covid when it comes to DND/CAF ignoring the reserves. They've done that for over half a century as it is.
> 
> The key that people seem to forget when it comes to budgeting is that reservists are cheaper in the long run. A typical Class A costs one sixth of the pay and allowances that a Reg F member does which means that you could hire two class As for the cost of one Reg F member and still save two thirds of the costs. Give that a thought for a second: double the manpower for less than half the price.



If the Reg F were to run all their major exercises May to August, they could easily save a ton of cash by running on lower numbers of full timers through the fall/winter months, and then 'calling up' reservists to fill up the units for 'exercise season'. 

Of course, the reservists would be mainly filling in the lower end jobs at the start, but over the course of a few years you would likely see the reservists being able to take on the more complex tasks.

And then reservist training through the fall/winter months could focus on upskilling people for the next 'exercise season'.


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## FJAG (24 Jul 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> If the Reg F were to run all their major exercises May to August, they could easily save a ton of cash by running on lower numbers of full timers through the fall/winter months, and then 'calling up' reservists to fill up the units for 'exercise season'.
> 
> Of course, the reservists would be mainly filling in the lower end jobs at the start, but over the course of a few years you would likely see the reservists being able to take on the more complex tasks.
> 
> And then reservist training through the fall/winter months could focus on upskilling people for the next 'exercise season'.



We disagree slightly (I prefer seeing the Regs do their training and exercises Sep to April and then using the May to August period to do their annual leave, APS, and support to the reserves so that the reserves can use the Reg equipment in August for their annual exercise with minimal Reg F supervision and support. 

Either way though I see the period Sep to Aug as training time for the reserves to build to the annual August exercise which should be the centre point of their training cycle.

Again, either way, Reg and Res training cycles need to be synchronized.

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (16 Aug 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> We disagree slightly (I prefer seeing the Regs do their training and exercises Sep to April and then using the May to August period to do their annual leave, APS, and support to the reserves so that the reserves can use the Reg equipment in August for their annual exercise with minimal Reg F supervision and support.
> 
> Either way though I see the period Sep to Aug as training time for the reserves to build to the annual August exercise which should be the centre point of their training cycle.
> 
> ...



We used to have a 10 day summer EX, that was one of the first things cut. Now the focus is individual not collective training. I think as time goes on we need to reevaluate what trades are actually reserve. For example some of the construction engineering side of things like electrical, plumbing, carpentry, refrigeration techs could be brought reserve side, easily due to applicable civilian trades. You can't contract out everything after all. In fact I argue we have contracted out too much.


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## FJAG (16 Aug 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> We used to have a 10 day summer EX, that was one of the first things cut. Now the focus is individual not collective training. I think as time goes on we need to reevaluate what trades are actually reserve. For example some of the construction engineering side of things like electrical, plumbing, carpentry, refrigeration techs could be brought reserve side, easily due to applicable civilian trades. You can't contract out everything after all. In fact I argue we have contracted out too much.



Agree that we need to look at trades to determine which should be regular and which could or should be reserve.

My criteria is that any trade in great demand on a day to day basis (like technicians maintaining equipment) or which need to exercise their skills continuously (like special forces) should be regular force; those only needed in time of crisis (such as gunners, tankers) should be largely (but never completely) reservists. I can certainly see things such as horizontal and vertical engineers being reservists. What I don't want to see is reserve force trades (even refrigeration techs, or carpenters) that spend an entire career on Class B service with Base CE.

 :cheers:


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## dapaterson (16 Aug 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> What I don't want to see is reserve force trades (even refrigeration techs, or carpenters) that spend an entire career on Class B service with Base CE.



Exactly.



We need them doing their entire career on class B doing a second rate job replacing clerks.


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## FJAG (16 Aug 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Exactly.
> 
> We need them doing their entire career on class B doing a second rate job replacing clerks.



If you cut the number of GOFOs and colonels at NDHQ/CAFHQ in half, you wouldn't need any Class B clerks.

 ;D


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## dapaterson (17 Aug 2020)

Interesting quick read on US Reserve readiness: https://www.gao.gov/mobile/products/GAO-15-626


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## McG (17 Aug 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Agree that we need to look at trades to determine which should be regular and which could or should be reserve.
> 
> My criteria is that any trade in great demand on a day to day basis (like technicians maintaining equipment) or which need to exercise their skills continuously (like special forces) should be regular force; those only needed in time of crisis (such as gunners, tankers) should be largely (but never completely) reservists. I can certainly see things such as horizontal and vertical engineers being reservists. What I don't want to see is reserve force trades (even refrigeration techs, or carpenters) that spend an entire career on Class B service with Base CE.


"The Journey" provides a path to correcting the miss-use of PRes to fill permanent full-time requirements.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> So, here is a crazy idea to some of the underlying problems (as I see them) of unrestrained Class B bloat.  As I see it we need a system that:
> 
> prevents just anyone with a budget from using money for empire building
> ensures full time personnel growth has oversight & control at the appropriate levels
> ...





			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Somewhere on these boards, I have suggested something similar to elements of this Journey.  Instead of looking at it from a Reg F career flexibility perspective, I was looking more at the RegF/PRes boundary.
> 
> Currently, all Reg F positions have an Operational Baseline Type and I would either build on this or create a separate designation to differentiate between positions that can accept a limited liability occupant and positions require an unlimited liability occupant.  All Class B/A positions would become Reg F positions with a limited liability occupant acceptable designation (PRes incumbents would remain until end of current TOS, then be given the option to CT or vacate the position).
> 
> ...


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## FJAG (17 Aug 2020)

MCG said:
			
		

> "The Journey" provides a path to correcting the miss-use of PRes to fill permanent full-time requirements.



I like some of your concepts and not too thrilled with others. I'll only make two comments though.

1. I absolutely detest the concept of "limited liability service" and "unlimited liability service" because they are dead wrong terminology. Every member of the CAF, once enrolled is subject to "unlimited liability" insofar as even reservists can be involuntarily placed on active duty and at that point can be sent into harm's way (or anywhere else) on the government's whim. This whole limited/unlimited liability thing harkens back to the Reserve Force Employment Project (RFEP from around the turn of the century) where we told them that it was an improper concept. I know what you are trying to do -- create a hybrid soldier -- but it needs new classes of service and terminology (possibly requiring NDA amendments) although much of it can be done through admin instructions. I'm not sure it's worth it though. The existing Class of reserve service system works very well for what the reserve force was designed for. It's perceived shortcomings are only because the leadership is trying to make it an ad hoc full-time labour pool for headquarters administration jobs to circumvent the PY limitations imposed by the government; and

2. One of my fundamental arguments in just about everything is that our military is significantly handicapped because such a large component of our budget goes to the pay of full-time members and civilians. If we ever want to have a military that can keep up to date and be effective then we need to cut money from the full-time pay budget and direct it to the equipment and the operations and maintenance budgets. To me that means reducing full-time PYs by rigorously getting rid of large numbers of people who are working primarily in administration at the headquarters level (many of whom to me are working on self licking ice cream cone jobs -- and that includes cutting out programs, regulations, directives etc that create these positions which are needed to administer them). We have entirely too much bureaucracy for the size of force that we are. Once the numbers of PYs are down to an acceptable level, then we need to rigorously enforce that number by ensuring that there are no additional full-timers brought in through the backdoor regardless if they are full timers or whatever class of reservists. It's the full-time pay envelope that we need to control. A reservist filling in on Class B in a vacant PY because the incumbent retired or died or has been put on an ATL etc, is fine with me. Anything that creates even one full-timer above the established PYs - absolutely not.

 :cheers:


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## quadrapiper (17 Aug 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Agree that we need to look at trades to determine which should be regular and which could or should be reserve.
> 
> My criteria is that any trade in great demand on a day to day basis (like technicians maintaining equipment) or which need to exercise their skills continuously (like special forces) should be regular force; those only needed in time of crisis (such as gunners, tankers) should be largely (but never completely) reservists. I can certainly see things such as horizontal and vertical engineers being reservists. What I don't want to see is reserve force trades (even refrigeration techs, or carpenters) that spend an entire career on Class B service with Base CE.
> 
> :cheers:


Depending on the need for deployable tradesmen, would Base CE (or a "reserve district" CE section) actually be a good home? X a month days of A service working at the base/armouries within a given footprint, or Y a year B, with the member filling in with civvy contracts, assuming CAF and civvy certs are 1:1?

Build things so, should there be a need to deploy Bloggins, you just boost the hours or days/month of others in that trade on site.

Just tossing ideas around.


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## FJAG (17 Aug 2020)

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> Depending on the need for deployable tradesmen, would Base CE (or a "reserve district" CE section) actually be a good home? X a month days of A service working at the base/armouries within a given footprint, or Y a year B, with the member filling in with civvy contracts, assuming CAF and civvy certs are 1:1?
> 
> Build things so, should there be a need to deploy Bloggins, you just boost the hours or days/month of others in that trade on site.
> 
> Just tossing ideas around.



I've kind of had some thoughts along that line for reserve recruiting of specialist trades (think construction engineers, vehicle maintenance technicians, diesel mechanics, medical staff, truckers, cooks, computer technicians/programmers, heavy equipment operators etc).

Essentially you recruit them, train them military in the summer with pay, send them to community college in the winter where the Army pays their tuition and fees but not wages, then after they finish their certificate and DP1 training, you offer them employment locally within trade for a year or two to gain experience at the end of which they have to fulfill a period of years of obligatory Reserve Class A service (same as we do now for RMC graduates, pilots and pharmacists etc). In the end you get a trained and experienced tradesmen, their education is paid for and they have a number of years' experience to make them more attractive for a civilian job. Everybody is happy.

 :cheers:


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## jeffb (17 Aug 2020)

This is not dissimilar to the "Minuteman" program several states use with their National Guard. I worked with a Lt from the Florida National Guard who had his full university paid for. His return was 7 years in the National Guard with with one period of active service on 270 day orders. Seems like a pretty good deal given the price of US post-secondary education.


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## FJAG (18 Aug 2020)

jeffb said:
			
		

> This is not dissimilar to the "Minuteman" program several states use with their National Guard. I worked with a Lt from the Florida National Guard who had his full university paid for. His return was 7 years in the National Guard with with one period of active service on 270 day orders. Seems like a pretty good deal given the price of US post-secondary education.



And it meets two valid objectives: a trained soldier and a trained and employable citizen. What more could you want. Win! Win!

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (18 Aug 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> And it meets two valid objectives: a trained soldier and a trained and employable citizen. What more could you want. Win! Win!
> 
> :cheers:



Equipment to train them with, a rationally sized HQ, a useful reserve force,..... I can go on if you would like.


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## GR66 (22 Aug 2020)

I'm going to throw this in here, but it really touches on Reg Force Restructuring as much as the Reserves, but realistically can/should one be done without the other?

Nicholas Drummond has an article on the Wavell Room website (https://wavellroom.com/2019/08/29/the-universal-battalion-possible-future-infantry-unit-structures/) in which he proposes that the British Army adopt a standardized Infantry Battalion structure across all of their existing Infantry Battalion types (Armoured, Mechanized, Air Assault, Light and Specialized)

In the article he suggests:


> At one end of the spectrum, Armoured Infantry battalions are well-resourced with 732 soldiers, while Specialised Infantry battalions have just 267, but this is for training and mentoring roles, rather than high-intensity combat. The disparity in numbers across different battalion types makes it difficult to monitor shortfalls in manpower and to fill gaps quickly. When it becomes necessary to re-role a battalion at short notice, there is a risk of not being able to deploy it with the required number soldiers it needs to complete the mission. Six different battalion types means that ORBATs are constantly in a state of flux, which makes human resource planning more complex than it needs to be. Many battalions of all types are currently operating below their headcount caps, with very few, if any, operating with the same number of personnel. Ultimately, having multiple battalion types is inefficient and an unmilitary approach to resource allocation and management. It makes the planning and implementation of sub-unit tasks more difficult and detracts from the infantry’s ability to perform its most important role: dominating ground.



Would there be a benefit to implementing something like this for the Canadian Army as part of a larger re-organization of both the Regular Force and Reserve Force?  Perhaps something along these lines:

Re-structure the infantry along the lines proposed in the article.  Reduce the number of Regular Force Infantry Battalions from 9 to 6 which should allow each of the Battalions to be fully manned including Combat Support Companies (Recce, Sniper, Assault Pioneer, Mortar and AT Platoons).  All six Regular Force Battalions and all  Reserve Infantry Battalions would be identically organized as light infantry.

I'd suggest a 10-man Infantry Section which could allow for 3 x 3-man Fire Teams plus the Section Commander or 2 x 4-man Fire Teams plus the Section Commander and one other (runner, designated marksman, Carl-G gunner, UAV operator, etc.).

This would be the bigger change.  The LAVs from the six existing Regular Force Mechanized Battalions would be transferred to the three Armoured Regiments which would be re-roled as Cavalry Regiments.   Each Cavalry Troop in the Cavalry Squadrons would have 7 or 8 LAVs which would allow each Troop to embark an Infantry Platoon.  Depending on how the Infantry Sections are organized, each LAV would have 5-6 dismounts which would also leave room for attachments to the Infantry (JTAC, Medics, etc.).  Each Armoured Regiment would have their own Combat Support Squadron with their own LAV-mounted Mortar Troop, AT Troop, etc. 

All three existing tank Squadrons would be grouped together in a single Tank Regiment which could be partially shifted to the Reserves, with one Tank Squadron and the bulk of the maintenance elements being Regular Force and the other two Tank Squadrons being manned by Reserves.

Existing Reserve Infantry Regiments would be grouped together to form the new Standardized Infantry Battalions with the same equipment and training standards as the Reg Force Light Battalions.  Some Reserve Regiments could be tasked to provide the Recce, Pioneer, Mortar and AT Platoons for the Reserve Battalions.

Savings from a reduced number of Divisions/Brigades and full-time vs part-time Battalions could be directed toward new equipment.

While the government is not likely to invest in new, tracked IFVs, they could possibly be convinced to go with all-terrain carriers such as the Bronco 3 ()http://www.military-today.com/apc/bronco_new_gen.htm or BvS 10 (http://www.military-today.com/apc/bvs10_viking.htm).  These vehicles could be issued to Reserve "Mobility Battalions".  They have room to accommodate the new standardized 10-man Infantry Sections and in addition to being able to provide cross-country and amphibious mobility to the infantry (with protection up to STANAG 4 available) they can be equipped with remote weapon stations, be used as mortar carriers, ambulances, recovery vehicles, are air transportable by C-130 and Chinook and could be used in the Arctic or for flood and forest fire response.

A system like this would allow for all Infantry units to be identically organized and equipped, give greater strength for dismounted operations (due to the larger Infantry Sections), and allow any Infantry Battalion to be used in Light (dismounted), Medium (mounted in ATTC's or LAVs), or Heavy roles (mounted in ATTC's or LAVs with a Tank Regiment attached)


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## FJAG (22 Aug 2020)

I read the article and I think Drummond is trying to solve a problem that isn't really there.

Most of the disparities in numbers are based on: 1) different types of vehicles have different crewing requirements (usually two or three) and differing dismount capacities (eg Warrior seven, Boxer eight); 2) different types of vehicles have different types of roles which can change the numbers of combat support personnel required/desired; and 3) different types of vehicle fleets and their manner of usage may have higher maintenance and/or supply requirements (i.e. additional vehicles and personnel) You should ignore the "specialized infantry battalions" as their roles is completely different from the other ones (they're more like US special forces or training cadres)

Everything starts with the dismounted rifle section which ideally should be nine (based on US squads and the Drummond model) however, that doesn't fit in either the Warrior or Boxer or LAV or Bradley. We immediately need to change the dismounted section to fit the vehicle or find a way to redistribute them. That's a problem I leave to guys like Infanteer to work out because while I understand the nuances involved I have nowhere near the expertise to argue it one way or the other.

Note that the last real-world Canadian establishment that I looked at (end of 2017) set the PYs allocated to a Reg F infantry battalion at 594 for a mech bn and 561 for a lt bn (that may have gone up with the return of mortars and pioneers - I'm not sure). Res F battalions were set at around 170-320 depending on the particular battalion (that's not to say they actually had the paid strength to fill that establishment). IMHO based on some papers I exchanged with Infanteer about a year ago, the "war establishment" for a battalion should be around 750-760 which is close to the UK mech battalion. Note that there was little change between a light and a mech battalion. Each rifle company came in at around 128 it's just that the mech company might have fewer dismounts and no weapons dets in exchange for crewing the LAVs. The point here is, I think, that you can arbitrarily assign a common number of pers to these establishments, but their equipment holdings and tactical employment will dictate who does what where.

I wouldn't reduce 9 bns to 6 just to bulk them out. If total PYs are an issue (and they are) I would designate certain components within the bn that isn't needed day-to-day as a reserve job but rather than having a res bn fill the positions I would have the RegF bn have a reserve company that is part of the unit's war establishment (wearing the same cap badge and under command of the Reg F CO - for example mortars, anti-tank gunners, some recce, some pioneers, medics, some truckers etc) 

I'm a firm believer that reserve inf bns (and other units) should be "brigaded" into single, full-war establishment units and equipped. That reduces the overall number of units and the command structure but creates trainable/deployable units. That, however, takes some changes in the terms of service and other administrative matters and would be heavily resisted by senior reserve leadership (and Reserves 2000). Regardless of the resistance change is necessary.

I'm not in favour of transferring the LAVs to the armoured corps. The Aussies used to assign their M113s to the armoured branch as carrier companies which could then be assigned to whatever infantry battalion needed a mechanized lift. That was fine in the battlefield taxi days but the LAVs are a more integral part of the tactics of a mech company and need people running them who are well schooled in basic infantry tactics first and who can be switched out for a rifleman when needed.

IMHO there's a distinct role separation between cavalry and tanks and mounted infantry. To me, cavalry is recce with the ability to be aggressive. I know that the UK Strike brigades have a bit of a mounted/dismounted mix to them and I do see cavalry that's a mix between electronic sensors, UAVs and anti-armour (maybe mortars) but I wouldn't go in the direction that you are.

I think that tanks should be grouped as you suggest with a core of Reg F but mostly reservists on the basis that armor is not one of those things we need day-to-day but only in emergencies. Same for artillery, air defence and cavalry. Just as importantly we need to brigade and assign tasks and formations to our combat service support elements. 

Yup. Reorganization could and should lessen the command structure (by my estimate using the available PYs and reserve numbers, three division headquarters - one operational, two force generating; 5 manoeuvre brigades (three Reg, 2 Res); three support brigades; and about 2/5th of the unit headquarters)

 :cheers:


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## GR66 (24 Aug 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I read the article and I think Drummond is trying to solve a problem that isn't really there.
> 
> Most of the disparities in numbers are based on: 1) different types of vehicles have different crewing requirements (usually two or three) and differing dismount capacities (eg Warrior seven, Boxer eight); 2) different types of vehicles have different types of roles which can change the numbers of combat support personnel required/desired; and 3) different types of vehicle fleets and their manner of usage may have higher maintenance and/or supply requirements (i.e. additional vehicles and personnel) You should ignore the "specialized infantry battalions" as their roles is completely different from the other ones (they're more like US special forces or training cadres)
> 
> ...



I'm not qualified to judge whether the current Infantry manning model works or not.  The numbers I see (from Force 2013) show Mech Battalions with an Establishment of 833 All Ranks and Generation Strength of 593 All Ranks.  Light Battalions have an Establishment of 834 All Ranks and a Generation Strength of 560 All Ranks.  That means that the Infantry Battalions are currently manned at roughly 70% of their authorized Establishment Strength.

News reports and anecdotal comments here and on other sites say that Afghanistan nearly "broke" the Army.  Did below Establishment manning contribute to that?  Even with 15% - 25% Reserve augmentation per rotation (http://natoassociation.ca/canadian-reserves-in-afghanistan-an-expanding-legacy/) did manning issues result in a lack of available instructors, training difficulties in non-deployed Battalions, multiple deployments for key personnel, etc.?  Would concentrating the limited Reg Force Infantry PYs into fewer, fully-manned Battalions help with these issues?  I'd be interested in hearing the thoughts of Infantry folks on this.

I have absolutely no issue with having certain components of Reg Force units being Reserve positions like you suggest to bring the units up to wartime strength.  We just need to make sure that the training, equipment, organization and legislation required to quickly integrate these elements into their parent units when the balloon goes up are in place.  

I guess the same goes for the Reg Force Battalions.  If as you suggest elsewhere that we need to pre-deploy the equipment for a Battle Group in Europe because we may not have time to deploy our forces from Canada in case of a rapid Russian invasion, then how does having 70% manning for our Battalions affect their ability to rapidly deploy in wartime?  Maybe the big brains could come up with a way to bring at least the high readiness Battalions to Establishment Strength in case there's the need for rapid deployment?

As far as the reduction in the number of LAV Battalions from 6 to 3 that is meant to address the question of Infantry Section size which as you said, everything starts there.  The thing that interested me about the article was the standardization of units across types.  We currently have variances between our light and mechanized infantry.  Both have 10-man sections but in reality the Mechanized infantry only have 7-man sections because three troops are tied to the vehicles.  

To me it would seem that 10-man sections would be better across the board.  More firepower, more flexibility in organization and more ability to absorb casualties.  As you suggested you can swap out the vehicle crews for more riflemen, but that degrades the capabilities of the LAV to provide support.  There's also a training price as your Infantry now have to learn additional skill sets (vehicle driving, maintenance, turret operations, mounted tactics, etc.) which takes time away from their primary skills of closing with and defeating the enemy.  

The halving of the number of LAV Battalions was to provide enough LAVs to accommodate 10-man sections (5 dismounts per LAV plus room for attached personnel).  As to what colour beret drive the LAVs I guess that's really not that important.  I think the real benefit (other than larger dismounted section size) is that the dismounts can train and concentrate on dismounted infantry skills while the LAV crews can concentrate on vehicle-related skills.  I know this kind of split has been brought up more than once in various threads and I guess you can tell where I stand on the question.

You brought up the Australian M113 carrier company experience.  You suggest that model was OK in the "battle taxi" days but it's not suitable for the LAV.  I'd argue that the general consensus on these forums is that the LAV is more of an up-gunned battle taxi rather than a true IFV.  They can provide valuable fire support in an Afghanistan-type scenario, but would you want to expose them to an enemy with AT capabilities?  If in a peer/near-peer scenario we're going to keep the LAVs out of the line of direct enemy fire and deploy our infantry in dismounted attack/defence, then wouldn't it make sense to have larger dismounted sections?


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## ArmyRick (25 Aug 2020)

following thread. Interesting article but agreed with FJAG, its not a big issue exact size and manning per battalion.


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## GR66 (29 Aug 2020)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> following thread. Interesting article but agreed with FJAG, its not a big issue exact size and manning per battalion.



So if we stick with the current 70% manning of Reg Force Infantry Battalions, then what do our Reserves have to look like?

I think it's pretty fair to say that in the current financial situation we can't expect anything in the way of new APCs/IFVs in the near future, and assuming there's no interest in reducing the number of Reg Force Infantry Battalions, then what should our expectations be?

Let's say we re-group our existing Reg Force Battalions into two LAV Brigades and one Light Brigade with the individual Battalions cycling through readiness levels.

Let's assume that one LAV Brigade is responsible for supplying it's high readiness Battalion to man the Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia. 

The 2nd LAV Brigade would presumably be training to be available to deploy their high readiness Battalion as the 2nd of the "sustained deployments of ~500-1500 personnel" outlined in Strong Secure Engaged.  

I'm thinking that the 3rd (Light) Brigade's high readiness Infantry Battalion, due to the comparative ease of deploying them and their light equipment more quickly by air, would be the "stand-by" Battalion available to rapidly respond to an evolving situation. 

What does that make our Reserve augmentation requirements.

Latvia isn't a full Infantry Battalion deployment.  Is a 70% manned Regular Force Infantry Battalion enough to fulfill that deployment without any augmentation?

Presumably if the balloon goes up in Europe or somewhere else, then the high readiness Light Battalion I think would be the logical unit to deploy as a rapid response.  They could fill out the EFP Latvia Battalion, or make the initial deployment to another trouble spot.  Would we deploy an under-manned Battalion in this situation, or would we need a high readiness Reserve unit to quickly fill out the Reg Force Battalion?  Is a rapid response Reserve force even practical under our current model, or are we better off drawing the required troops from other Reg Force Battalions (which are themselves already under manned)?

In the case of a European conflict or a 2nd Battle Group sized deployment elsewhere, it would then fall to the 2nd high readiness LAV Battalion (possibly in relief of the Light Battalion's initial deployment).  How many Reserve Infantry units would be required to fill out this Battalion and how many other units would be required to cycle through readiness to support this as a sustained deployment?

All of this of course ignores the Armour, Artillery, Engineer and Logistics elements of supporting these deployments and completely sets aside the idea of being able to deploy a complete Brigade Group any time in the near future.  But should figuring out this part not be the first step in restructuring?


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## FJAG (29 Aug 2020)

GR66 said:
			
		

> Latvia isn't a full Infantry Battalion deployment.  Is a 70% manned Regular Force Infantry Battalion enough to fulfill that deployment without any augmentation?



Yes and no. If we stay on a six month rotation then any given infantry company would go every eighteen months which is difficult to sustain. If we go to a one year deployment then every three years which is more doable but a bit tough on families although American line (not SOF) units in Iraq and Afghanistan generally stayed for more than a year. An additional problem is that we also furnish a battalion HQ which would mean it would have to stay there permanently. On the other hand if all of 1 CMBG is responsible for the rotations, then it's quite doable.



> Presumably if the balloon goes up in Europe or somewhere else, then the high readiness Light Battalion I think would be the logical unit to deploy as a rapid response.  They could fill out the EFP Latvia Battalion, or make the initial deployment to another trouble spot.  Would we deploy an under-manned Battalion in this situation, or would we need a high readiness Reserve unit to quickly fill out the Reg Force Battalion?  Is a rapid response Reserve force even practical under our current model, or are we better off drawing the required troops from other Reg Force Battalions (which are themselves already under manned)?



The Latvia battalion doesn't need rounding out as the rest of the battalion is already filled by companies from each of  Italy, Spain, Slovakia, Poland and several other countries.

What additional rapid deployment force we would send needs to be well planned out ahead of time. Even a light battalion in a near-peer conflict needs equipment.

I'm a great fan of using fully formed reserve units (if our system of reserve service was changed to make that possible) but rapid response is not one of those.  My guess would be a reserve unit or formation during it's "ready" cycle could deploy onto prepositioned equipment if a minimum of seven days is available. Obviously significantly more if they are at any stage other than "ready".



> In the case of a European conflict or a 2nd Battle Group sized deployment elsewhere, it would then fall to the 2nd high readiness LAV Battalion (possibly in relief of the Light Battalion's initial deployment).  How many Reserve Infantry units would be required to fill out this Battalion and how many other units would be required to cycle through readiness to support this as a sustained deployment?



That's a difficult question to answer under our current system. This is why I believe it is imperative to restructure the entire system from the ground up. Right now we think in the way of Reg F and Res F units. As long as we stay with the 70% solution we will always need to cobble together Reg F units in order to field a deployable high readiness force at 100% strength. If we change the system to filling the remaining 30% with designated reservists in a hybrid unit then we need a completely new paradigm for how those 30% are generated for a deployably ready, high readiness situation.



> All of this of course ignores the Armour, Artillery, Engineer and Logistics elements of supporting these deployments and completely sets aside the idea of being able to deploy a complete Brigade Group any time in the near future.  But should figuring out this part not be the first step in restructuring?



It absolutely is and is a topic I address with my view of how we can get there in my little book. This is why I'm so critical of our leadership because, in the words of General Belzile from 2005:



> Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war.
> This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.
> The Canadian Forces needs a plan.



Considering the fact that we have a Reg F Army of some 23,000 folks in three manoeuvre brigades and one support brigade and another 20,000 reservists, we should have plans that would allow us to efficiently deploy something much greater than a battle group. We have enough people to man two divisions even though we only have enough equipment for perhaps 3/4 to one division if we scrape it all together (with some very serious capability gaps) What we don't have is a plan to grow the force in an emergency and, even worse, we don't have a plan towards equipping and organizing the force over time so that in an emergency in the future we can be "a great host". We have set very low goals for ourselves by way of SSE (and seem to have troubles meeting those goals)

 :cheers:


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## daftandbarmy (31 Aug 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Considering the fact that we have a Reg F Army of some 23,000 folks in three manoeuvre brigades and one support brigade and another 20,000 reservists, we should have plans that would allow us to efficiently deploy something much greater than a battle group. We have enough people to man two divisions even though we only have enough equipment for perhaps 3/4 to one division if we scrape it all together (with some very serious capability gaps) What we don't have is a plan to grow the force in an emergency and, even worse, we don't have a plan towards equipping and organizing the force over time so that in an emergency in the future we can be "a great host". We have set very low goals for ourselves by way of SSE (and seem to have troubles meeting those goals)
> 
> :cheers:



Ironically, we send OMLTs to build the armies of other countries when we could use them here to build the Reserves to the point where they could seamlessly integrate with the Reg F, in large numbers, as required.

And I’m guessing that you wouldn’t even need to change the terms of service, assuming they receive high quality training and a ‘good go’ overseas every once in awhile.


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## GR66 (6 Sep 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> ...
> Considering the fact that we have a Reg F Army of some 23,000 folks in three manoeuvre brigades and one support brigade and another 20,000 reservists, we should have plans that would allow us to efficiently deploy something much greater than a battle group. We have enough people to man two divisions even though we only have enough equipment for perhaps 3/4 to one division if we scrape it all together (with some very serious capability gaps) What we don't have is a plan to grow the force in an emergency and, even worse, we don't have a plan towards equipping and organizing the force over time so that in an emergency in the future we can be "a great host". We have set very low goals for ourselves by way of SSE (and seem to have troubles meeting those goals)
> 
> :cheers:



I guess this section is the crux of the problem.  We have quite a few expensive full-time troops without enough equipment to field and maintain them in any significant type of conflict.  We have a pool of less expensive part-time troops with no combat worthy equipment at all and an organizational structure that doesn't lend itself to anything other than individual augmentation of the Reg Force.  

We're completely missing, or seriously lacking in some key supporting capabilities.  By virtue of our geography we're by definition an expeditionary Army, but have virtually no capability to project our forces in anything like a timely manner.  There is no real political will to increase the size of the Army and there is minimal political will to expand the size of DND's budget in these difficult times.  On top of that much of any money that is/will be available will go the CSC and CF-188 replacement projects, not the Army.  

So I guess the question isn't really what we dream or wish the Army could look like, but rather given the current limitations, what is something achievable in the short term that would at least make the Army (Reg Force and Reserves) relevant, capable and deployable?  This could at least provide a solid base which it could grow from once the political and economic situation changes.

 My assumptions would be:
- The size of the Reg Force Army will not grow.  It could be re-structured but I don't see any additional PY's being added.
- The Reserves could potentially grow, but I think any increase in size would be moderate and the cost of any increase in size would likely have to be offset by cost savings elsewhere.
- I don't believe there will be any increase in the size of our armoured vehicle fleet.  It may be possible that we could see some additional support vehicles/weapons (AT, Artillery, GBAD, etc.) which could potentially be LAV-based, but I don't see any IFV's/APC's to equip Reserve Battalions any time soon.  I think we should assume for the short-term at least that Reserve Battalions will be light, or will augment Reg Force units with Reg Force equipment.

Given this, what could realistically be done to restructure, or do we just throw up our hands and muddle along with what we have in place now and hope that nothing bad happens?


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## MilEME09 (6 Sep 2020)

GR66 said:
			
		

> Given this, what could realistically be done to restructure, or do we just throw up our hands and muddle along with what we have in place now and hope that nothing bad happens?



First: Full reorg of the PRes, tactically group smaller units under one command team. They can retain any traditions at the company/platoom level.

Second: create a force similar to a OMLT the goes and mentors the command staff, and NCOs of the PRes.

Third: Give the OMLT a 5 year goal to prepare reserve units for deployment. 

Fourth: Reserve units are required to deploy at minimum a platoon every deployment cycle after the 5 year build up. In theory each division except 5 Div would be able to field a small reserve battle group with two companies of infantry as the back bone and a full CSS element if everyone supplied a platoon.

Fifth: cut out mess dinners(except Christmas), paid hockey teams, and any non training events that take budget away from training.

Just my 2 cents but it may be doable but I don't address equipment issues, only the training aspect.


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## CBH99 (6 Sep 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> First: Full reorg of the PRes, tactically group smaller units under one command team. They can retain any traditions at the company/platoom level.
> 
> Second: create a force similar to a OMLT the goes and mentors the command staff, and NCOs of the PRes.
> 
> ...





Would you mind expanding on your Point # 3, re: a 5 year goal of preparing a unit to deploy?

That just seems like an awfully long time to prepare a unit for deployment?


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## FJAG (6 Sep 2020)

GR66 said:
			
		

> I guess this section is the crux of the problem.  We have quite a few expensive full-time troops without enough equipment to field and maintain them in any significant type of conflict.  We have a pool of less expensive part-time troops with no combat worthy equipment at all and an organizational structure that doesn't lend itself to anything other than individual augmentation of the Reg Force.
> 
> We're completely missing, or seriously lacking in some key supporting capabilities.  By virtue of our geography we're by definition an expeditionary Army, but have virtually no capability to project our forces in anything like a timely manner.  There is no real political will to increase the size of the Army and there is minimal political will to expand the size of DND's budget in these difficult times.  On top of that much of any money that is/will be available will go the CSC and CF-188 replacement projects, not the Army.
> 
> ...



Let me jump off my wish list (which essentially is cut 10,000 full time positions from NDHQ/CFHQ and take the annual $1 billion per year savings, reorg the army reserve system to two manoeuvre and three support brigades and equip the army reserve slowly) and take a look at what can be done realistically within the existing budget framework. Incidentally I agree with the highlited points above.

1. We should still cut headquarters positions to both save money to reallocate to equipment and O&M and improve efficiency within DNDHQ/CFHQ 
- our current authorized CF establishment is for 61,250/47,300 (RegF/ResF). NDHQ has another 24,000 employees.
- the Army is established for 21,706/30,486 (although we are provided pay for only around 20,000 PRes); Navy at 8,125/5,720; Air Force at 12,723/3,416; CJOC at 2,061/215; CANSOFCOM at 1,135/288 which leaves 15,500/7,175 in other positions (including Health Svc and the MPs) (and once again there are actually about 10,000 less Army PRes folks then indicated here based on paid ceilings. And lets not forget that many of the PRes are on full time contracts and that there are also a herd of contractors filling basically full-time jobs (Note my figures were accurate as of 2017 and I don't have the charts to update them but they haven't changed that much)
- over half of our DND's budget goes to pay and benefits so roughly for every 10,000 full-time positions Canada spends roughly $1 billion.

2. Realistically we will not be able to cut the NDHQ/CFHQ sides by more than 10,000 full-time positions without impacting capabilities (I think all the unimportant functions will go with the first 10,000). So if we wish to reallocate even more pay and benefits to equip and O&M then we will have to start cutting into the Army, Navy and Air Force establishments (CJOC and CANSOFCOM look fairly lean for the capabilities they manage)

3. 1 part-time reservist costs us between 1/3 of a full-time position during the first few training years and around 1/6th of a full-time position in the later steady state period. So in theory, for every full-time brigade that we cut, we should be able to generate the personnel costs for three to six reserve brigades (but adjusting for O&M we are realistically probably looking at three to four) If we do cut a full-time brigade, it's equipment would still be in play for the new part-time brigades, however, if we wish to grow the force overall capability we would need to fund the equipment acquisition for the additional reserve brigades created. (I won't get into terms of service, RSS roles, etc at this time as the only way the whole thing becomes an effective force is if we change the basic ground rules)

4. Expeditionary is a key point. In essence that's a Navy and Air Force issue. Both need to change to build in that capability. Back in the early 1970s, I was the Unit Emplaning Officer for 2 RCHA. My job was to create and keep current the air and sea cargo manifests for moving my regiment to Europe (in part with the ACE Mobile Force and in part with the CAST Brigade Group) CAST deployment depended on leased air and sea transport and was only ever exercised once on Ex BRAVE LION which was pretty much a logistical disaster. You are absolutely right that we are "expeditionary" in every thing the Army does which means quite clearly that all three services MUST have a plan and the equipment for expeditionary operations (IMHO in up to brigade scale) and exercise them on a regular (IMHO annually) basis. If we preposition equipment in Europe, we need a transport element with the Air Force (including rapidly available charters) to fly us onto the equipment. In addition we need sea lift (and it's escorts) to reinforce and sustain any deployed force.

5. Note following statement in SSE at page 36:



> THE BRIGADE GROUP
> The Army trains to fight at the brigade group-level. This is the minimum level at which it is possible to execute joint campaigns while integrating various components, be they from another service, government department, non-governmental organization, or coalition partner. The brigade group consists of approximately 4,800 soldiers, organized in eight major units generally including Artillery, Armour, Infantry, Engineer, and Combat Service Support organizations. Combinations of these units operate together in “battle groups” to provide the joint force with the requisite firepower, mobility, protection, sustainment, and command and control functions to effectively coordinate their employment.


I defy you to show me anywhere in the SSE that requires DND/CAF to have the capability to project and sustain a brigade group expeditionary force.

6. Some random thoughts.
- The Air Force has 2,913/801 officers and 391 operational aircraft (there is roughly one RCAF LCol and above for every aircraft); The CF as a whole has 13,497/8,088 officers and 47,503/38,325 other ranks; there are 531/215 CWOs. Our rank pyramid looks more like a cylinder.

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (6 Sep 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Would you mind expanding on your Point # 3, re: a 5 year goal of preparing a unit to deploy?
> 
> That just seems like an awfully long time to prepare a unit for deployment?



I picked  5 years for two reasons, one given the max  90 days per year the PRes train per year (if lucky) and the fact that PRes has not deployed more then individual augmenting to the reg force since probably Korea. We lack the ability to properly manage company, Regiment,  and battle group level coordination, it will have to built from scratch properly.

I do not call what I see PRes units pass off as level 3 and 4 exercises as actially that.


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## blacktriangle (6 Sep 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> PRes has not deployed more then individual augmenting to the reg force since probably Korea.



Are you sure about that?


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## MilEME09 (6 Sep 2020)

reveng said:
			
		

> Are you sure about that?



41 CBG recently sent a motor platoon over, but even that took a lot of work, and two infantry Regiments to pull off a platoon. If you have an example of anything platoon or larger from a single unit, i am happy to be enlightened.


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## CBH99 (6 Sep 2020)

The Calgary Highlanders deployed a platoon of roughly 50 personnel sub-unit to Afghanistan, I believe in 2 separate occasions.  (I'm not sure if it was 2 consecutive rotations.)

The sub-unit remained as a sub-unit on deployment.


18 AD also deployed I _believe_ a 12 person sub-unit (for that unit's size, from a small city, it was actually really well done) to Afghanistan also.  Upon deployment, I believe half went to augment M777 dets, while the others were rolled as helicopter loadmasters.


(I know helicopter loadmaster isn't a trade.  However I am 100% certain this is what they were rolled as, as I had several friends in that unit who deployed as such.)


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## MilEME09 (6 Sep 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> The Calgary Highlanders deployed a platoon of roughly 50 personnel sub-unit to Afghanistan, I believe in 2 separate occasions.  (I'm not sure if it was 2 consecutive rotations.)
> 
> The sub-unit remained as a sub-unit on deployment.
> 
> ...



I'll consider my self educated, I knew the cak highs had multiple large deployments, didn't know they stayed togetherness.


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## dapaterson (6 Sep 2020)

A sub-unit is a company; fifty soldiers does not a company make.  In the late 90s or early 2000s there was a Composite Reserve Infantry Company (CRIC) deployed to the former Yugoslavia; its success (from selection through training through deployment) was never fully assessed (and and such assessment would be subjective, at best).


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## Ostrozac (6 Sep 2020)

The line from SSE Para 36 about the importance of the brigade bears examining. On its face, its a motherhood statement saying the patently obvious -- you need to bring at least a brigade to a ground war if you want to have actual effect or influence. We knew that when we sent brigades to Korea and to West Germany. But we, as an Army, have mostly neglected the brigade level as "too hard, too expensive" since the end of the Cold War and the shut down of 4 Brigade in West Germany. We have been trying, and mostly failing, to make the Battle Group level work as a cheap substitute, but a full look at the structure of the Army, Regular and Reserve, needs an honest look at our brigades.

Regular brigades need to be symmetrical, so that they can replace each other in a sustained operation. We can't have a light brigade, a LAV brigade and a tank brigade and then expect them all to deploy in succession in a LAV role over three rotos. A LAV brigade that has the ability to also deploy in a lightish (truck mounted, not airborne/airmobile) role is probably a suitable compromise. The brigades need to be able to replace each other over the course of an extended war. Are we married to the 6 month deployment, or are we ready to commit to 12 months? Given that it's taking 12 months to train units, and probably 12 months for a unit to recover from war, 3 brigades would just barely be sustainable with 12 month deployment cycles. With 6 month tours, we need 5 brigades. So deployment length isn't just a whim of CJOC commander the day the Op Order is written -- it drives force structure.

Centralized control of scarce resources. The Combat Support Brigade is, in my opinion, long overdue. For too long, we've had a strange habit of concentrating national level resources, allocating them to low level regional or tactical headquarters, and then wondering why those HQs didn't have the ability or influence to manage them properly. I'm thinking Electronic Warfare, tanks and the short-lived TOW company. I do wonder about putting the Combat Support Brigade under one of the divisions though, I would have it as a direct report to Army HQ. And I don't think that the concept went far enough -- if we don't have enough to share, tanks belong in the Combat Support Brigade. That doesn't mean they don't belong in Edmonton and Gagetown -- it means that I think they need central stewardship. If we insist on having minimal indirect fire, there's a argument to pulling the M777 up under central control, too.

Role of the reserves? Throughout. I'd have the high readiness brigade at full strength, all units topped up with Class C reservists for the duration of road to high readiness and high readiness. Whether 6 or 12 month tours, maybe instead of Class C we have them enrol in the Regular Force or the Special Force for a 18-24 month engagement for the entire road to high readiness and the deployment/high readiness period. Could this augmentation go behind individuals, and include entire platoons or companies or even a battalion of reservists, giving reservists the ability to command on operations? Of course, but probably on a lesser rotation cycle than the regulars. If there are 3 regular brigades, we might need 6 or 9 reserve battalion equivalents, plus reserve augmentation for the Combat Support functions -- but certainly not a structure of 10 reserve brigades.

Anything on top of that is an extra bill. Making the Latvia battalion a permanent non-rotational posting adds a battalion to the force structure, but removes that task from the brigades. If it stays rotational, that's another brigade on the force structure. A standing light NEO battalion, that's probably another brigade. You can easily get to a 5 to 7 brigade structure. Which is what we might need to be a credible army with influence and effect -- but then we get back to where we started at the end of the Cold War: "too hard, too expensive". None of this would be easy and cheap -- if was, we would have done it by now.


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## MilEME09 (6 Sep 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> A sub-unit is a company; fifty soldiers does not a company make.  In the late 90s or early 2000s there was a Composite Reserve Infantry Company (CRIC) deployed to the former Yugoslavia; its success (from selection through training through deployment) was never fully assessed (and and such assessment would be subjective, at best).



If the army was serious about the StAR's initiative, then ever unit would be pushing to have platoon sized elements ready to deploy. Since the StARs tasks were announced, I have heard little on its execution, planning or if units are actually attempting to reach their assigned tasks. 

If StARs is failing to produce deployable platoons, in my opinion its because leadership wanted it to fail, not because it was a bad plan.


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## FJAG (7 Sep 2020)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> The line from SSE Para 36 about the importance of the brigade bears examining. On its face, its a motherhood statement saying the patently obvious -- you need to bring at least a brigade to a ground war if you want to have actual effect or influence. We knew that when we sent brigades to Korea and to West Germany. But we, as an Army, have mostly neglected the brigade level as "too hard, too expensive" since the end of the Cold War and the shut down of 4 Brigade in West Germany. We have been trying, and mostly failing, to make the Battle Group level work as a cheap substitute, but a full look at the structure of the Army, Regular and Reserve, needs an honest look at our brigades.



You make some very good points in your post. Let me make a few comments to add to the discussion.



> Regular brigades need to be symmetrical, so that they can replace each other in a sustained operation. We can't have a light brigade, a LAV brigade and a tank brigade and then expect them all to deploy in succession in a LAV role over three rotos. A LAV brigade that has the ability to also deploy in a lightish (truck mounted, not airborne/airmobile) role is probably a suitable compromise. The brigades need to be able to replace each other over the course of an extended war. Are we married to the 6 month deployment, or are we ready to commit to 12 months? Given that it's taking 12 months to train units, and probably 12 months for a unit to recover from war, 3 brigades would just barely be sustainable with 12 month deployment cycles. With 6 month tours, we need 5 brigades. So deployment length isn't just a whim of CJOC commander the day the Op Order is written -- it drives force structure.



I don't agree with this although your arguments are sound if we had a role to actually deploy a full brigade. On the other hand if the SSE roles remain limited to battlegroups or less than one can (and IMHO, should) have asynchronous brigades with each brigade having a specialty and the responsibility to generate battlegroups to specific missions e.g. 1 CMBG (armoured) constantly looks after only the Baltics eFP battlegroup; 2 CMBG (light) constantly looks after the Ukraine mission and a quick reaction force; 5 CMBG (mech) looks after UN missions and follow-on to the quick reaction force. - This develops expertise within the brigade for its prime mission. Personally I would go to a one year deployment. I'm also personally of the view that if a given brigade has a single mission focus then you would not need to train the "ready" component for a year predeployment anywhere near as long as we do now. The problem with being a Jack of all trades is that you are never a master of one and will constantly be training for something different.



> Centralized control of scarce resources. The Combat Support Brigade is, in my opinion, long overdue. For too long, we've had a strange habit of concentrating national level resources, allocating them to low level regional or tactical headquarters, and then wondering why those HQs didn't have the ability or influence to manage them properly. I'm thinking Electronic Warfare, tanks and the short-lived TOW company. I do wonder about putting the Combat Support Brigade under one of the divisions though, I would have it as a direct report to Army HQ. And I don't think that the concept went far enough -- if we don't have enough to share, tanks belong in the Combat Support Brigade. That doesn't mean they don't belong in Edmonton and Gagetown -- it means that I think they need central stewardship. If we insist on having minimal indirect fire, there's a argument to pulling the M777 up under central control, too.



Completely agree. IMHO the weakness of the CCSB is that it's headquarters is not a deployable entity, just a force generating headquarters. More importantly, Canada also needs a sustainment brigade (CSB) which commands, controls and generates the forces necessary to form the NSEs that accompany our deployed contingents. Both the CCSB and the CSB should also have substantial ResF personnel and units. I don't agree that they need to be directly under Army headquarters. Our Divisions (except 1 Cdn Div) are simply non-deployable administrative headquarters that force generate (including everything that entails) and as such they remove much responsibility for training, direct supervision etc of the brigades and their units from the senior Army headquarters. Basically the CCSB and the CSB, under Div supervision, would generate the forces necessary to round out, support and sustain deployed maneouvre brigade elements as directed by CJOC and commanded by 1 Cdn Div. (Quite frankly I don't think that we need four force generating divisions; practically speaking - again looking at personnel numbers (both Reg F and Res F) two force generating Div HQs are sufficient.



> Role of the reserves? Throughout. I'd have the high readiness brigade at full strength, all units topped up with Class C reservists for the duration of road to high readiness and high readiness. Whether 6 or 12 month tours, maybe instead of Class C we have them enrol in the Regular Force or the Special Force for a 18-24 month engagement for the entire road to high readiness and the deployment/high readiness period. Could this augmentation go behind individuals, and include entire platoons or companies or even a battalion of reservists, giving reservists the ability to command on operations? Of course, but probably on a lesser rotation cycle than the regulars. If there are 3 regular brigades, we might need 6 or 9 reserve battalion equivalents, plus reserve augmentation for the Combat Support functions -- but certainly not a structure of 10 reserve brigades.



I think if you have asymmetric brigades targeted on battlegroup or smaller missions then the entire brigade's resources could be used to top up the "deploying contingent" to full strength, whether by other Reg F personnel from within the brigade or by Class Cs. I also agree reservists could and should be used for such deployments but in order to do so we need to again get away from symmetry. Reservists cannot be agile, multi-purpose forces as the Army imagines itself to be. If specific reserve units in specific reserve brigades are also asynchronous and paired with a specific Reg F brigade then the training, organizational and mission specific skill focus is narrowed and much more achievable. I agree with you as to needing fewer reserve brigades. Based on the numbers of reservists we have (some 20,000) we can comfortably man five reserve brigades and their trg system. If we increase the size of the Army reserve (and are capable of generating and retaining such numbers) we could form an additional brigade or two.



> Anything on top of that is an extra bill. Making the Latvia battalion a permanent non-rotational posting adds a battalion to the force structure, but removes that task from the brigades. If it stays rotational, that's another brigade on the force structure. A standing light NEO battalion, that's probably another brigade. You can easily get to a 5 to 7 brigade structure. Which is what we might need to be a credible army with influence and effect -- but then we get back to where we started at the end of the Cold War: "too hard, too expensive". None of this would be easy and cheap -- if was, we would have done it by now.



I thought about that but if that organization becomes non-rotational it will inevitably lead to requiring accommodation for families with all the complexity that comes with it.  As stated above, if we changed the rotation to one year then the four manoeuvre units in 1 CMBG (3 Inf bns, 1 armd regt) would rotate it's HQ and a support and rifle company there every 4th year. More importantly, the entire brigade would be experienced in that mission and be capable of rapidly reinforcing the ePF Latvia if required (and assuming we could get the equipment there). Same for the other brigades and their missions.

I agree fully that in order to be a credible deterrent we need to have a credible force. We have the numbers to justify an eight brigade force ( 5 manoeuvre and 3 support) We only have equipment for roughly 1 armoured brigade, 1 mechanised brigade, 1 light brigade and 1 combat support brigade (but with critical capability gaps) It's a long shopping list. The Canadian Army has seriously starved itself of mission essential equipment for far too many years.

 :cheers:


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## Ostrozac (7 Sep 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I don't agree with this although your arguments are sound if we had a role to actually deploy a full brigade.



If we don't want to actually deploy a full brigade, then my arguments are completely unsound. But if we view the brigade as an administrative headquarters, not a tactical one that fights, then we need to say so instead of dancing around the subject. Revitalize the old Optimized Battle Group (the OBGYN project, for those that remember) and stop wasting time and money with half-assed brigade exercises and concentrate on the battalion level. But recognize that it will be symbolic -- a Canadian battalion will not be a credible contribution to fighting in the next Korean War.



			
				FJAG said:
			
		

> On the other hand if the SSE roles remain limited to battlegroups or less than one can (and IMHO, should) have asynchronous brigades with each brigade having a specialty and the responsibility to generate battlegroups to specific missions e.g. 1 CMBG (armoured) constantly looks after only the Baltics eFP battlegroup; 2 CMBG (light) constantly looks after the Ukraine mission and a quick reaction force; 5 CMBG (mech) looks after UN missions and follow-on to the quick reaction force. - This develops expertise within the brigade for its prime mission.



I discussed my argument for symmetrical tactical brigades, but even if the brigades are purely administrative headquarters that only force generate battalions/battle groups, I'd still prefer them to be symmetrical. One disadvantage I see of asymmetrical administrative brigades is that you don't assign your risk evenly. In your above example, if we commit to 3 small missions -- Latvia for 1 CMBG, Ukraine for 2 CMBG and 5GBMC to a Mali-equivalent quagmire, then 1 and 2 Brigade are bored and 5 Brigade suffers disproportionate casualties.


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## Old Sweat (7 Sep 2020)

Let me play devil's advocate for a few minutes here. There is no way any Canadian government would commit a major formation drawn mainly from one region of the country to battle. Our force structure, especially our regular infantry regimental structure, combined with geography, and plain old political sensibilities rule against it. No matter how logically and how compelling is our argument, the reaction of the voting public and the politicians rule against it. I'm sorry, but that's how it has been for over a century, in fact since the Boer War, and that's how it is going to continue to work. During my time as an officer, covering the sixties and ending in the mid-nineties, I don't know how many times I have heard well researched and compelling logical presentations for just the sort of structure being debated here. I also don't know how many times they have been shot down in flames as being non-starters politically.

A battle group maybe, as long as the next battle group in line is from another region, with another cap badge, but a brigade group drawn purely from one of our existing formations would not fly. Maybe it is militarily dodgy, but ramp ceremonies and convoys of hearses on the Highway of Heroes has logic all of its own. Does that create really difficult, maybe insurmountable, challenges for the army? You bet your butt it does, but it is a fact of life in Canada.


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## daftandbarmy (7 Sep 2020)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Let me play devil's advocate for a few minutes here. There is no way any Canadian government would commit a major formation drawn mainly from one region of the country to battle. Our force structure, especially our regular infantry regimental structure, combined with geography, and plain old political sensibilities rule against it. No matter how logically and how compelling is our argument, the reaction of the voting public and the politicians rule against it. I'm sorry, but that's how it has been for over a century, in fact since the Boer War, and that's how it is going to continue to work. During my time as an officer, covering the sixties and ending in the mid-nineties, I don't know how many times I have heard well researched and compelling logical presentations for just the sort of structure being debated here. I also don't know how many times they have been shot down in flames as being non-starters politically.
> 
> A battle group maybe, as long as the next battle group in line is from another region, with another cap badge, but a brigade group drawn purely from one of our existing formations would not fly. Maybe it is militarily dodgy, but ramp ceremonies and convoys of hearses on the Highway of Heroes has logic all of its own. Does that create really difficult, maybe insurmountable, challenges for the army? You bet your butt it does, but it is a fact of life in Canada.



Our extended commitment to Afghanistan showed the way forward AFAIC. There are alot of ways to make it better, but I'd rather build on that than re-create an unrealistic wheel.


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## FJAG (7 Sep 2020)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> If we don't want to actually deploy a full brigade, then my arguments are completely unsound. But if we view the brigade as an administrative headquarters, not a tactical one that fights, then we need to say so instead of dancing around the subject. Revitalize the old Optimized Battle Group (the OBGYN project, for those that remember) and stop wasting time and money with half-assed brigade exercises and concentrate on the battalion level. But recognize that it will be symbolic -- a Canadian battalion will not be a credible contribution to fighting in the next Korean War.



Don't get me wrong. In my view we should be fully capable of deploying a brigade and in fact in my view we should plan for and have the ability to deploy a division. Right now, the Reg F does have three deployable brigade headquarters (and IMHO, the reserves should have several more) It's the SSE that limits our missions to forces of a size that equate to a battle group. My argument is that the SSE should require the Army to have a contingency to deploy more than that.



			
				Ostrozac said:
			
		

> I discussed my argument for symmetrical tactical brigades, but even if the brigades are purely administrative headquarters that only force generate battalions/battle groups, I'd still prefer them to be symmetrical. One disadvantage I see of asymmetrical administrative brigades is that you don't assign your risk evenly. In your above example, if we commit to 3 small missions -- Latvia for 1 CMBG, Ukraine for 2 CMBG and 5GBMC to a Mali-equivalent quagmire, then 1 and 2 Brigade are bored and 5 Brigade suffers disproportionate casualties.





			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Let me play devil's advocate for a few minutes here. There is no way any Canadian government would commit a major formation drawn mainly from one region of the country to battle. Our force structure, especially our regular infantry regimental structure, combined with geography, and plain old political sensibilities rule against it. No matter how logically and how compelling is our argument, the reaction of the voting public and the politicians rule against it. I'm sorry, but that's how it has been for over a century, in fact since the Boer War, and that's how it is going to continue to work. During my time as an officer, covering the sixties and ending in the mid-nineties, I don't know how many times I have heard well researched and compelling logical presentations for just the sort of structure being debated here. I also don't know how many times they have been shot down in flames as being non-starters politically.
> 
> A battle group maybe, as long as the next battle group in line is from another region, with another cap badge, but a brigade group drawn purely from one of our existing formations would not fly. Maybe it is militarily dodgy, but ramp ceremonies and convoys of hearses on the Highway of Heroes has logic all of its own. Does that create really difficult, maybe insurmountable, challenges for the army? You bet your butt it does, but it is a fact of life in Canada.



Brian. I know that you are the historical expert amongst us and arguing with you will probably prove me to be wrong but there are several factors to take into consideration.

First, the rule is not hard and fast. For example in WW2 we had several brigades that were regionally homogeneous (for example 1st and 4th Inf Bde's battalions were all southern Ontario; the 7th Inf were western Canada; the 15th were from Quebec) But I take your point. I sometimes wonder whether or not the organization came from an overt plan to mix casualties or as a result of grouping units into new formations as they finished their training which would come in waves across the country;

Secondly, Our Reg F brigades may be stationed regionally, but their troops are willy-nilly from across the country without any special segregation (except perhaps by language). When we add reservists into deploying formations, they are similarly scattered about. I see absolutely nothing that would prevent us from deploying a given Reg F brigade with it's organic units.

As an example, in the suggest revised asymmetric structure that I have previously proposed, an armoured/mech force for Europe would have it's brigade's units come from central and western Canada while it's support components come primarily from Quebec and the Maritimes. A UN peacekeeping force would it's manoeuvre units come primarily from Quebec and the Maritimes with support elements from the Maritimes and central Canada. (at the same time, ResF infantry trained on LAVs from western and central Canada could volunteer as augmentees to 5 Bde.)

While I think that the burden of casualties could very well be an excuse to restrict any move to an asymmetrical force, the true and real reason is RegF Regimental hideboundness (I claim a copyright on that word). I honestly believe that it's not so much what the politicians think but what the military leadership thinks that the politicians are thinking or what they might want. When's the last time a military leader resigned when he disagreed with a stupid political thought (and Norman doesn't count for this)

The problem with our way of thinking is that we believe we'll have forever to cobble together and train an ad hoc force. We did it in South Africa, two world wars, Korea and Afghanistan. For 4 CMBG we just posted it there in total for several decades. Firstly we won't post any major elements outside the country for the foreseeable future and secondly we shouldn't be spending $23 billion per year maintaining a full-time force that's so fragile that it needs a year to train to deploy. Lord at that rate we could have a cadre of 75 trained people and recruit and train the rest of  the battalion off the streets when we need them. (I'm obviously exaggerating but not by much)

 :cheers:


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## FJAG (24 Oct 2020)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I have been mulling over FJAG's plan, and think there are a number of very good points to it, but I think it may founder on the principle of forces in being that has been the backbone of our defence policy since about 1950. Being one known to have dabbled in military history, I can state with some confidence it is much easier to predict the past than it is to do the same for guess the future.
> 
> The CAF would have to convince the Federal bureaucracy that we had an achievable solution, after we had convinced ourselves, and then would have to do the same to our allies and to our Parliamentarians and academics, and, probably above all else, the HCols cabal. There are a number of aspects that would have to be addressed, and solved economically and effectively, or we will be bogged down like a Centurion in the Lawfield Corridor. (OK, a flash from the past, but a number of you will get my drift.)
> 
> Mods, I suggest this could be a stand along discussion separate from the C3 replacement.



Have moved my response to you here.

Brian I know full well that everything you say are real points of contention although I really hesitate to call them valid points.

The "forces in being" concept; the Reg F attitude towards the Class A reserve system; the honouraries and Reserves 2000 are all barriers to transforming the reserves. I seriously doubt that anything concrete will ever be done from within the system to move things forward. One only has to read "Relentless Struggle" once (I've now read it three times) to get a feel for where things have gone awry over the last half century or more.

The problem is that the "forces in being" concept is exactly what has gotten us into the fix of a very pricy full-time force that gobbles up our budget and leaves the force starved of equipment procurement and O&M funds. The "forces in being" concept needs major modification (i.e a significant reduction in full-timers to free up funds) if we ever want to develop our capabilities.

We can't reduce full-timers unless and until we have a credible reserve force (or at least a road to a credible reserve force) that can fill the bill for the "break glass in case of fire" scenarios. That means a serious compromise on the part of the "honouraries" as well as the Reg F to the creation of a whole new force structure that makes use of a reduced size high-capability full time element (It's utterly stupid to have 17,400 people working in Ottawa - that's almost 20% of all DND employees) and a better trained and fully equipped reserve force (which really does not need to expand in size, just reorganization into properly trained and equipped units capable of meeting major emergencies)

I'm not fooling myself, Brian. I know the cabal of honouraries and reserve leadership don't want to give up the current number of units and brigades (and their commensurate high profile positions) but insist on more funds for more people and gear. I know the full-time leadership resists change like the plague. It will need an outsider from the defence establishment (a strong prime minister or minister) with tremendous cohones to impose his/her will on the bureaucracy that infests Ottawa right now.  I know it won't be the current minster; he's the weakest I've seen and I've seen a few in my days (It's too bad actually. I had high hopes for him even with Trudeau in charge. He could have been the one but ... . I actually sent him a copy of my book over a month ago and haven't even gotten a letter back from some staff wienie saying "thanks for the book, dumbass, but we've got better things to do."

All that said. One has to keep pushing for reform. Otherwise we'll have another half century of missed opportunity and potential.

 :brickwall:


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## Weinie (24 Oct 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Have moved my response to you here.
> 
> Brian I know full well that everything you say are real points of contention although I really hesitate to call them valid points.
> 
> ...



Wolf,

Your passion and aspirations for the Reserves are both laudable and commendable.....and likely unattainable/undesirable from a political perspective

To support what you have posited, we would need a major rebalance in the Reg F vs Res F structure. Though you see it positively, it would mean a major re-distribution of resources, including shutting down many bases where government spending is the key to the local economy, and votes. Any major reshuffle that resulted in a loss of support at the voting box would be anathema.

Although Defence is clearly (and constitutionally)  a federal responsibility, it is not a federal priority.


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## FJAG (24 Oct 2020)

Weinie said:
			
		

> Wolf,
> 
> Your passion and aspirations for the Reserves are both laudable and commendable.....and likely unattainable/undesirable from a political perspective
> 
> ...



Actually that's the beauty of my plan, Weinie. It requires virtually no shut down of any bases or local economy and if anything increases local economies because it redistributes a billion or two annually from Ottawa to regions and industries outside of Ottawa.

The re-distribution is relatively minor in that the cuts to the Reg F that I propose would be internal to NDHQ/CFHQ where I see major cuts. All Reg F brigades, SOF organizations, dockyards and air bases remain the same. All reserve force armouries remain the same. Besides the cuts within NDHQ/CFHQ I propose cutting two divisional headquarters and five of the reserve force brigade headquarters but redistribute their people to the remaining 2nd and 3rd Division and the five remaining reserve or hybrid brigades. All the divisional support bases and training establishments remain in place. All Res F personnel remain the same and remain at their local armouries although small units would become subunits integrated with other units. Yup that means roughly 6/10ths of the reserve LCols and RSMs are cut but roughly the same number of majors and MWOs and all other ranks remain in place. For all I care local companies/batteries/squadrons could keep their prior honouraries - they cost very little.

Most of the ResF budgeting is already in place albeit the Class B budgets being eaten up in Ottawa would go to the field units' Class A budgets and O&M.

My basic position is that Ottawa has become a cash sinkhole and can and should be forced to drastically reduce it's own consumption of defence funds so that they can be rediverted to a slow and gradual buildup of Res F equipment and capabilities. DND/CAF spends entirely too much administrating itself (note I consider administration at NDHQ/CFHQ separate and apart from the vital logistics/sustainment support). We need more, not less, field force and less office overhead. We could easily run this organization with half the GOFOs and EXs and their staffs if we put our minds to it. The problem is Ottawa keeps inventing more and more processes and creates more and more staff to deal with them. That's what needs to be reversed. It's not so much that my ideas ought to be politically objectionable   - they're really not if fully examined - because they're primarily targeted at reducing the bureaucracy in favour of expanding defence capabilities which ought to be a federal priority and because it ought to put more money into the local economies. 

I get back to Leslie's study. The numbers re HQ bloat were clear; the organizational friction was clearly exposed; the savings were demonstrated and in the end, the bureaucracy protected itself and did very little to implement the recommendations (CJOC accepted). It's the bureaucracy that runs the organization that will scuttle any plan for reform which threatens the bureaucracy itself. 

 :'(


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## MilEME09 (25 Oct 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> .
> 
> I get back to Leslie's study. The numbers re HQ bloat were clear; the organizational friction was clearly exposed; the savings were demonstrated and in the end, the bureaucracy protected itself and did very little to implement the recommendations (CJOC accepted). It's the bureaucracy that runs the organization that will scuttle any plan for reform which threatens the bureaucracy itself.
> 
> :'(



Kinda like how the bureaucracy scuttled then MND Jason Kenny's attempt to buy the French Mistrals before they were sold to Egypt? I more and more feel the ministers have as much power over their departments as the Governor general has over parliament and the military.


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## dapaterson (25 Oct 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Kinda like how the bureaucracy scuttled then MND Jason Kenny's attempt to buy the French Mistrals before they were sold to Egypt? I more and more feel the ministers have as much power over their departments as the Governor general has over parliament and the military.



"Scuttled"?  Were you present?  Did you hear what was said?  What was written?  What direction was given / advice given?

"Ok, Mr Minister, if we spend $2B right now on the ships it means we will not be buying X, Y and Z until later unless government gives us additional funding.  Oh, and there will be costs of $XXXM to convert their systems to be compatible with those we have in service, and the Government of France insists that we do such work in their shipyards.  That additional cost means A, B and C will also be delayed."

I was not present for any of those discussions, but I imagine they unfolded per above.  First, impacts of ministerial considerations are brought forward so they are able to understand the impact.  Second, any purchase woudl not be an MND decision.  It would go to the full cabinet for consideration, through an instrument known as a Memorandum to Cabinet.  On major issues / major expenditures, cabinet decides, not the MND.

Ministers, senior commanders (Div and above) and senior execs in the PS are not day-to-day folks.  Their decisions and actions will generally take months to years to bear fruit. For example, a new armoury for the seventh Battalion, Royal Mukluk Regiment of Canada (Archduke Ferdinand's Own) in Mistatim SK announced today (after years of prioritization against other needs/wants) would see a year or two of detailed planning and approvals (What do you mean the municipal sewer system runs directly under the site we're planning to excavate to 20'?) followed by construction of 18 months or so.  Good senior leaders understand their roles as custodians of the institution and make plans for the long future.  Poor ones fixate on today.


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## MilEME09 (25 Oct 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> "Scuttled"?  Were you present?  Did you hear what was said?  What was written?  What direction was given / advice given?
> 
> "Ok, Mr Minister, if we spend $2B right now on the ships it means we will not be buying X, Y and Z until later unless government gives us additional funding.  Oh, and there will be costs of $XXXM to convert their systems to be compatible with those we have in service, and the Government of France insists that we do such work in their shipyards.  That additional cost means A, B and C will also be delayed."
> 
> ...



I'll have to dig up the source but it was his statement during an interview after leaving federal politics.


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## dapaterson (25 Oct 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> I'll have to dig up the source but it was his statement during an interview after leaving federal politics.



The story is at: https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2016/04/25/bureaucrats-blocked-former-tory-government-s-desire-to-buy-navy-landing-ships_n_9773532.html

If the then-MND was serious, he would have ordered a Memorandum to Cabinet be drafted.  If he never directed the necessary work be done, he has no right to complain that things never happened.


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## Haggis (25 Oct 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> A sub-unit is a company; fifty soldiers does not a company make.  In the late 90s or early 2000s there was a Composite Reserve Infantry Company (CRIC) deployed to the former Yugoslavia; its success (from selection through training through deployment) was never fully assessed (and and such assessment would be subjective, at best).


There were at least two of these beasts deployed in 2002-2004.  The first was a Composite Reserve Company (CRC, eventually C Coy, 2PPCLI BG) comprised of Cbt A soldiers from across Canada and had a Reg F Coy 2IC, CQMS and CSM. So, not a true "Reserve" sub-unit.  The second was a Composite Reserve Infantry Company (CRIC - eventually C Coy, RCD BG) drawn from across the three Reserve CBGs of 4XX, in which the entire command structure was P Res with some individual Reg F augmentation (Medics, Cooks and Maintainers in the camp).  One platoon was OPCON to MNB(NW) as D&S Pl for the MNB(NW) HQ, one was OPCON to A Sqn RCD BG and the remainder of the Coy conducted it's own ops in NW BiH until the drawdown and camp closures  began in early 2004.

The general opinion above the BG level was that this coy leadership was staffed with P Res "ringers", e.g. P Res soldiers with a Reg F background or an extraordinary amount of experience and training.

Notwithstanding that the CRIC leadership underwent a fairly arduous selection process at the Div level and the Coy declared OPREADY by Comd 2 CMBG, the Army wanted to replace the OC, 2IC ad CSM with Reg F members a week prior to deployment.  In the end, the entire P Res command team was deployed.

As this was the last Roto in the FRY to deploy a BG sized element, there was neither an objective or subjective assessment of the the success or failure of the CRC or CRIC.   In short, both were "one -off" P Res Army sub-unit deployments which were not attempted internationally again.


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## dapaterson (25 Oct 2020)

They were not Army Res sub-unit deployments; they were composite sub-unit deployments.  A significant difference.


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## Infanteer (25 Oct 2020)

Haggis said:
			
		

> There were at least two of these beasts deployed in 2002-2004.  The first was a Composite Reserve Company (CRC, eventually C Coy, 2PPCLI BG) comprised of Cbt A soldiers from across Canada and had a Reg F Coy 2IC, CQMS and CSM. So, not a true "Reserve" sub-unit.  The second was a Composite Reserve Infantry Company (CRIC - eventually C Coy, RCD BG) drawn from across the three Reserve CBGs of 4XX, in which the entire command structure was P Res with some individual Reg F augmentation (Medics, Cooks and Maintainers in the camp).  One platoon was OPCON to MNB(NW) as D&S Pl for the MNB(NW) HQ, one was OPCON to A Sqn RCD BG and the remainder of the Coy conducted it's own ops in NW BiH until the drawdown and camp closures  began in early 2004.



The first was a "CRIC" that preceded the 2 PPCLI CRC.  It was formed as D Coy, 1 PPCLI for deployment to Bosnia in 2002.  It was composed of Infantry reservists from across LFWA (the precursor to 3 Div, for you young uns) and initially only featured a Reg Force WO as CQMS, although the Reserve CSM was replaced with a Reg Force MWO prior to deployment.

There was a selection process, with some reservists being sent to other parts of the battlegroup as individual augmentees and a portion being sent home due to "services not required."

The 2 PPCLI CRC was the second reserve sub-unit, and from my understanding was constructed as all-arms as the first CRIC had denuded LFWA of its infantry reservists available for an operational  deployment - this is my recollection on the reasoning, and I'm not sure if this is fact or not.  If it was true, the fact that an entire Land Force Area ("Division") composed of 11 Reserve infantry units from across Western Canada could not generate two-consecutive 120-soldier infantry sub-units for operations in a year is a sign of how inefficient the reserve system is functionally structured.


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## Infanteer (25 Oct 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Kinda like how the bureaucracy scuttled then MND Jason Kenny's attempt to buy the French Mistrals before they were sold to Egypt? I more and more feel the ministers have as much power over their departments as the Governor general has over parliament and the military.



When you read of how government functioned in the 1940s and 50s, the executive decision making flowed through consultative processes in Cabinet.  The Official History of the Second World War makes frequent reference of PM King referring problems and decisions to Cabinet to resolve.

This is not how it works anymore.  Read Donald Savoie's _Governing From the Centre_, which is probably the authoritative textbook on how the machinery of government works.  Cabinet government, with ministers hold significant power within their department, has essentially withered away since Pierre Trudeau reformed "the centre" in the 1960s.  The PMO and PCO now set the agenda and dictate to cabinet how the agenda of government will unfold.  If I read Savoie's analysis right, Cabinet has almost become a bit of a rubber-stamp shorn of true executive function - a prestige and pay boost for those MPs who will be the face of the centre's agenda.


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## Old Sweat (25 Oct 2020)

It all comes down to the unpleasant truth that personnel costs consume lots of money that should go for operational equipment and training. After all, that is what drove Mister Hellyer and his 1964 White Paper that kicked off integration, unification, and everything that came later. I believe Hellyer wanted to be able to devote 30% of the defence budget to equipment, but in the long run, he ad his successors came nowhere close.

What are some ways to get a grip on personnel costs? Well, major force cuts, although the high priced help in Ottawa seem immune, and the results over the years did not live up to expectations; a rebalancing of regular and reserves could work, but it would require some logical and adult thought and compromise that seems far beyond us; and something else, I know not what. Gosh, I can only hope and pray that the next CDS can bring an open mind to the table, and has a strong resistance to being fed bs by the bureaucracy. Even then, his/her term is likely to be too short to accomplish any lasting effect.

In my lifetime - almost 81 years and counting - we fought a major war; then in peace planned for a six division army to fight in Europe, while defending Canada with an airborne brigade group; then under NATO promised a division, with a brigade group in Germany (and a brigade group in Korea for four years); then the CAST brigade for Norway and a smaller brigade group in Germany; then along with the force in Germany, we entered the peace keeping and total force era; and finally we deployied a series of battle groups (+) followed by a rotational commitment to the Baltic. In all this time, we never were able to maintain a full strength force, relying instead on flyover, augmentation, hole plugging, and the like. What now is the question? 

I invite your criticism and comments.


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## Jarnhamar (25 Oct 2020)

[quote author=Infanteer]If it was true, the fact that an entire Land Force Area ("Division") composed of 11 Reserve infantry units from across Western Canada could not generate two-consecutive 120-soldier infantry sub-units for operations in a year is a sign of how inefficient the reserve system is functionally structured.
[/quote]

Similar experience seeing armored reserves in all of LFCA not being able to put together a platoon for a deployment.

I think part of the CIRC's problems, at least in my experience, was the amount of time they wanted part time soldiers to devote to training. 
6 months worth of pre-deployment before the 6 month tour but also pre-pre deployment training and pre-pre-pre deployment training as random weekends of must attend training. Which was must attend for some and waived for others. It felt like a 1.5 - 2 year commitment for a 6 month tour.


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## daftandbarmy (25 Oct 2020)

Jarnhamar said:
			
		

> Similar experience seeing armored reserves in all of LFCA not being able to put together a platoon for a deployment.
> 
> I think part of the CIRC's problems, at least in my experience, was the amount of time they wanted part time soldiers to devote to training.
> 6 months worth of pre-deployment before the 6 month tour but also pre-pre deployment training and pre-pre-pre deployment training as random weekends of must attend training. Which was must attend for some and waived for others. It felt like a 1.5 - 2 year commitment for a 6 month tour.



IMHO the other problem, of course, is that some senior reservists with career/ political ambitions are overselling what the Class A Army is actually capable of achieving on a consistent basis, and their Reg F counterparts aren't calling BS on that because 'hey, they're only reservists, if they want to stick their necks out....'


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## MilEME09 (25 Oct 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> IMHO the other problem, of course, is that some senior reservists with career/ political ambitions are overselling what the Class A Army is actually capable of achieving on a consistent basis, and their Reg F counterparts aren't calling BS on that because 'hey, they're only reservists, if they want to stick their necks out....'



And it is sometimes those same RegF bodies that say we arent allowed to do our jobs. Had a reg force Cpl trying to tell a Reserve Sgt (with 35+ years, and multiple tours) that his ET said she wasn't somehow qualified to do an annual inspection on a truck. Its situations like this that boil my blood, and prevent the PRes from becoming better.


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## FJAG (25 Oct 2020)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ... If it was true, the fact that an entire Land Force Area ("Division") composed of 11 Reserve infantry units from across Western Canada could not generate two-consecutive 120-soldier infantry sub-units for operations in a year is a sign of how inefficient the reserve system is functionally structured.



As must be clear from my missives over the years, I fully agree with the highlighted statement but not exactly as stated and not for the reason that you seem to be alluding to. More importantly I think that the proper statement should be "... how inefficient the whole system is functionally structured."

Systemically you cannot expect anything more from an organization that is allowed to run on a "come train when you feel like it and leave whenever you want" basis. The fault for that does not lie at the unit but at the feet of CAF's full-time leadership and it's constant retreat from the necessary reforms.

But let's look further than the reserves. At it's post Korea height the Canadian Army had four fully equipped and mostly fully manned full-time brigades and for a brief time an airborne regiment. At the time they were equipped to peer standards and perpetually kept one brigade operationally deployed to Europe and one battalion perpetually rotating through Cyprus. Today we still have three full-time brigades as well as a regimental sized special operations force but we seem to be hard pressed to keep the equivalent of one battle group operationally deployed. SSE doesn't even contemplate a requirement to deploy a full brigade group. Perhaps (and in my own mind, definitely) the problem is that the size of our national defence headquarters is larger than the Army's full-time deployable field force thus robbing the entire system of vital defence dollars. In addition there is an imbalance as to which defence capabilities need to be full-time and which can be relegated to less expensive part-time forces.

Further though, not only do we have reserve force personnel that need extensive pre-deployment training (in fact training so long as to make it nearly impossible for any reservist to volunteer to deploy unless they are unemployed or undergoing schooling that lets them take over a year off) but even regular force units go through a managed readiness program that literally requires two years of reconstitution and rebuilding before the unit or formation is considered ready to deploy. The result is that only one third of the full-time field force is ever considered "ready" for operational deployment. I don't doubt that in an extreme pinch we would be able to generate a second brigade but I also don't doubt that we'd be unable to efficiently project that force overseas and to sustain those two brigades in the field for anything beyond a very short interval. Even then it would probably require compulsory activation of reservists, something we haven't planned or practiced in many decades.

I won't even get into the dismal state of equipment maintenance and readiness and numerous capability gaps existing within the regular force organizations that create a high risk for the force if employment in combat unless such gaps are filled by our allies.

We've become a complacent-peace time force that, based on the priorities we put on our defence spending, is more concerned about administrating itself and sustaining its bureaucracy than creating and maintaining a credible, deployable field force on a day-to-day basis and than developing the ability to grow that force in times of a major emergency by way of a trained and equipped low-cost reserve.

We need to review the whole DND/CAF structure from the ground up. That review must include a ruthless review of the resources DBD/CAF has locked into administrative costs that contribute very little to the creation and maintenance of defence outputs. Those costs must be cut through reduction of full-time positions within Ottawa and the funds reassigned to concrete defence outputs.

Within the Army there needs to be a very clear review of 1) what capabilities are considered necessary on a day-to-day full-time basis during peace time to either react quickly to an event or because their skill set is of such complexity that it needs to be honed daily (special forces is a prime example) and 2) what capabilities are ones which can properly be maintained in an on-call part-time force that can be called into active service in less likely but more extreme circumstances where the full-time force is inadequate by itself. Obviously such a force requires a fundamental restructuring of all aspects of the defence portfolio from legislation, through terms of service, doctrine, equipping and training etc on up. We already have tens of thousands of good full and part-timers in the system. What they both need is a better structure that allows them to fully develop their potential.

The time to fine tune the system is long gone. The current structure is systemically, fundamentally flawed. It consumes tens of billions of dollars annually to provide lifetime careers to it's participants (both civilian and military, full-timers and Class Bs) while delivering very limited actual defence outputs. These costs will continue to rise every year simply to maintain the rising PY costs of the department's full-time personnel (especially the high ranking, high priced headquarters ones) while capabilities will continue to shrink because we can't afford the more complex, more efficient, yet more costly equipment required by a modern force. 

It is no longer a question of can this be sold to the politicians. If the politicians truly understood the waste of money that DND/CAF has become and the spiral DND.CAF is on they would ask: why weren't we told years ago? This absolutely needs doing and it needs doing regardless of the bureaucratic friction that will undoubtedly erupt.

 :cheers:


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## FormerHorseGuard (25 Oct 2020)

I have been out many years. Biggest problem I see in the Reserves is the Reserves themselves.  A duty, a job, or a tasking comes up and no one is able to do it because of outside of the armouries life or no one wants to do it.  I will give examples from when I served and the taskings were super hard to fill. D Day  plus 50 parade in Europe.  Instead of picking a soldier who was earned the chance to attend and worked hard every parade night, and weekend, the powers to be picked a soldier who just so happened to wander in the doors to pick up her pay cheque. The CC asked if she was available, she was sent to D Day Parades. No chain of command, just tasking came in, soldier walked in at the same second , tasking filled. 

Tasking for a driver to pick up orders and messages during the first gulf war at LFCA HQ, they had to call a unit from Hamilton because of none of the local units could find a soldier on short notice.  Job got done but it took longer to get the soldier to come in from Hamilton then it would of taken a Toronto unit to fill the Class A position for a few weeks. The driver did not know her way  around Toronto  but oh well it got done.

Units looking for drivers for a weekend,  Cpl, Pte positions, had to be filled by  Sgts and Mcpls, because no private wanted to drive VIPs around for a parade because the hosting Regiment wanted their soldiers on the parade. 

Reserve unit in the Ottawa area, had a shift in taskings from Inf to Arty,  could not even manage to put a platoon in to CAC because no one was available to be boots on the ground, courses for the new trade took a lot of man power away, real jobs took away bodies.  CO and DCO were listed as Platoon officers because no JR officer was available or willing to come work as a soldier for those 2 weeks.  Pay  clerk was the platoon radio operator. CSM future RSM was the Platoon SGT, because the Sgt was the section commander, no Mcpls available.

Some units need to be folded and taken into other units to make a unit operational. Lack of equipment, lack of man power, lack of real training directions are all issues that  really need to be dealt with in real time and politics have to be forgotten.

Units should be training together,  I have always thought that 2 Inf type Reserve Regiments should train together, one operate as the enemy  force,  have a real force to do recces on,  use what  is actually seen as to plan the attack,  the defence etc. Pool the training staff so the troops get  real training, and learn from the mistakes of the enemy force, and the enemy  force learn for the other side how to defend, etc. 
Change the forces every  training weekend so both Regiments get the required training. Instead of just having the attacks done HQ sections of the Regiments. 

Armoured Regiments this is harder because of lack of equipment, but have them doing the recce of enemy  forces etc, there forces could be another Res Inf Regiment, doing field training, etc. Having the Armoured Recce actually looking and reporting back what  they  see and not being seen is good training. 

Inter unit co operation has to be improved and some one in power has to decide what role the reserve units are going to take on and actually  give the power to make it happen. Job protection, like they have in the States, equal training on courses, and time of courses, if it has to be weekend, so be it, but make it so the Res soldier can fill in or be quickly trained to step and do the job within the Reg Force standard.  A gunner who cannot step up do the job in the real world is of little value. The 105mm in the CF stocks has very  little value on the battle field of today. Basic skills are there, but up train them to be able to do the job on the 155mm M777 guns.  Train the EME guys to be able to actually fix what  is broken, instead of  just tagging  it and ship off to be fixed. Not everything can be done in a weekend of training but some of the jobs could be done.

I hope those who read this get the idea of what I am trying to explain, or think,  hard for me to express in sentences here. Improvements are needed, and they are needed now.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (25 Oct 2020)

But FHG, wouldn't what FJAG proposes fix that problem?

And just as a follow up: Is what FGH describes a generally valid reality or just an unusual circumstances?

I ask because I know that, for instance, in the Naval Rreserve we didn't seem to have that problem (at least generally). When the Army needed naval support for the Oka crisis, HMCS DONNACONA provided patrol boat and crews without any difficulty, and yes many of us (me included) took time off civilian work to do so without any problems. Same for the Winnipeg flood: Reserve units were asked to provide their Rhib's and Zodiacs and if possible crews. At DONNACONA, again, we had a total of four of those large boats and were able to put nine crews together for deployment in four hours of phone calls. I understand it was pretty representative of what was achieved at all reserve units.

Isn't the same happening at Armouries?


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## daftandbarmy (25 Oct 2020)

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> But FHG, wouldn't what FJAG proposes fix that problem?
> 
> And just as a follow up: Is what FGH describes a generally valid reality or just an unusual circumstances?
> 
> ...



No. Not at all.

What's happening at the armoury floor level, based on my understanding, is that the Army is paralyzed by COVID to the extent that conscientious COs and unit level Officers and SNCOs are dreaming up training to keep the troops interested and progressing while those many levels above their pay grade are still extracting their craniums to get their heads around what the regular training year should look like.

In the meantime, exercise wise, we're pretty much doing what we've always done: range ex for PWT 3, FTX to practise various field skils and drills, all within the context of some vague higher level plan that may, or may not, result in some kind of culminating exercise. All Mess Dinners and other collective social events are cancelled.

We're also still on 'OP LASER', officially, whatever that means to us right now. Glass half full, apparently we had quite alot of people deploy on courses during the summer and they got alot of good, longer term training/ employment experience while on Class B, which they would not have been able to do outside of the COVID experience.

'Slightly Adrift' might be an apt description of the whole experience right now.


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## FJAG (25 Oct 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ..
> What's happening at the armoury floor level, based on my understanding, is that the Army is paralyzed by COVID to the extent that conscientious COs and unit level Officers and SNCOs are dreaming up training to keep the troops interested and progressing while those many levels above their pay grade are still extracting their craniums to get their heads around what the regular training year should look like.
> 
> In the meantime, exercise wise, we're pretty much doing what we've always done: range ex for PWT 3, FTX to practise various field skils and drills, all within the context of some vague higher level plan that may, or may not, result in some kind of culminating exercise. All Mess Dinners and other collective social events are cancelled.
> ...



While I didn't mention it in a recent post, D&B, my thought on reserve restructure involves a completely different training/exercise system from the current one. There is a mandatory collective training scheme which includes 10 x 2 and 1/2 day weekends (one per month except July and August and a three week exercise in August) all of which have centrally mandated individual and collective operational training BTS modules to be completed throughout the year: e.g. PWTs, CBRN refresher, LUSAR, crew served weapons trg, etc and various tasks/exercises commensurate with the unit's type and role. Effectively units will have a four-year cycle to go through which brings them to a competent, deployable status and which will clearly indicate how much additional training the unit requires if it is required to deploy prior to completing the whole cycle. Units are not responsible for any individual advancement training at all but concentrate solely on the collective.

IMHO the Army P Res currently waste precious time and resources (ie pay) by providing only a few mandated requirements and leaving the rest of the training schedule to be ad hoc'd through the year usually with insufficient guidance, supervision and resources. I'm at heart a firm believer that a CO should be given a mission, resources and then be left to train his unit, however, experience has shown that most reserve units simply aren't able to do that both because of external and internal factors. We need more top down rigour. Units and their members should know the entire training plan a year in advance so that both family and employer/school commitments can be properly met. 

op:


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## daftandbarmy (25 Oct 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> While I didn't mention it in a recent post, D&B, my thought on reserve restructure involves a completely different training/exercise system from the current one. There is a mandatory collective training scheme which includes 10 x 2 and 1/2 day weekends (one per month except July and August and a three week exercise in August) all of which have centrally mandated individual and collective operational training BTS modules to be completed throughout the year: e.g. PWTs, CBRN refresher, LUSAR, crew served weapons trg, etc and various tasks/exercises commensurate with the unit's type and role. Effectively units will have a four-year cycle to go through which brings them to a competent, deployable status and which will clearly indicate how much additional training the unit requires if it is required to deploy prior to completing the whole cycle. Units are not responsible for any individual advancement training at all but concentrate solely on the collective.
> 
> IMHO the Army P Res currently waste precious time and resources (ie pay) by providing only a few mandated requirements and leaving the rest of the training schedule to be ad hoc'd through the year usually with insufficient guidance, supervision and resources. I'm at heart a firm believer that a CO should be given a mission, resources and then be left to train his unit, however, experience has shown that most reserve units simply aren't able to do that both because of external and internal factors. We need more top down rigour. Units and their members should know the entire training plan a year in advance so that both family and employer/school commitments can be properly met.
> 
> op:



We are all mission oriented. Without a goal to train for we will always ‘wander’ away from the things we need to do on the armoury floor.

The most important thing the Army can give us is a mission, and hold us accountable for being prepared to be tested at least a couple of times per year.

Ideally, that should be preparing for, and participating in, progressively larger and more complex FTX and field firing ranges etc. With or without an obvious connection to Reg F exercises. The last time I can remember that happening is in the 90s.

The only progression we can be certain of these days is my waistline


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## FJAG (26 Oct 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We are all mission oriented. Without a goal to train for we will always ‘wander’ away from the things we need to do on the armoury floor.
> 
> The most important thing the Army can give us is a mission, and hold us accountable for being prepared to be tested at least a couple of times per year.
> 
> ...



Even with all that kayaking and mountaineering?

 ;D


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## quadrapiper (26 Oct 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Even with all that kayaking and mountaineering?
> 
> ;D


If D&B's where I think he is, the variety and excellence of outdoor activities is matched only by the number and output of local breweries and kitchens.


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## daftandbarmy (26 Oct 2020)

quadrapiper said:
			
		

> If D&B's where I think he is, the variety and excellence of outdoor activities is matched only by the number and output of local breweries and kitchens.



You nailed it buddy.

There’s a real skill in trying to find ‘balance’ around here


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## MilEME09 (26 Oct 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We are all mission oriented. Without a goal to train for we will always ‘wander’ away from the things we need to do on the armoury floor.
> 
> The most important thing the Army can give us is a mission, and hold us accountable for being prepared to be tested at least a couple of times per year.
> 
> ...



The STARS initiative is attempting to give us purpose, and a mission/ task. I havent seen anything in the way of follow up, or critical mile stones towards said tasks.


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## daftandbarmy (26 Oct 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The STARS initiative is attempting to give us purpose, and a mission/ task. I havent seen anything in the way of follow up, or critical mile stones towards said tasks.



I understand that results vary. My unit? 

Based on some who have left, I think we've actually gone backwards since we were assigned our Op Task.


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## dapaterson (26 Oct 2020)

"We need op tasks" say units that fail to maintain even basic proficiency in their core mandate.


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## MilEME09 (26 Oct 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> "We need op tasks" say units that fail to maintain even basic proficiency in their core mandate.



Personally I think unit's need to get a fire lit under their asses, followed by following up if they are not making progress as to why they aren't meeting the stated objective.


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## daftandbarmy (26 Oct 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Personally I think unit's need to get a fire lit under their asses, followed by following up if they are not making progress as to why they aren't meeting the stated objective.



Well, if other units are anything like ours, you could burn us like a witch all year and we still wouldn't be any further ahead unless you can post in an Advanced Recce qualified lead and a training team who can run some courses for us. It would take us three or four years, and rare course vacancies, to qualify our own Adv Recce NCOs/Officers. Once upon a time we had one person of this type but, no surprise, they CT'd.

Of secondary importance, of course, is all the fancy gear you need to run a recce pl like, you know, dip  

And then, of course, are the collective training events (all part of the bigger strategic plan to progressively develop a currently non-existent capability, right?) that we will be preparing for where we will be able to deploy all our awesome new skills and gear, and further develop platoon integrity, confidence and leadership. This doesn't seem to exist either.

Meanwhile, we'll continue to run basic contact drills on the parade square using chairs as 'cover'.


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## FJAG (26 Oct 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> ...
> Meanwhile, we'll continue to run basic contact drills on the parade square using chairs as 'cover'.



Dude, you really know how to bring up long repressed memories, don't you?

Immediately after I left the artillery to go to law school and had taken over my Camerons rifle company (harump - platoon) I had them on exercise at Shilo to find them all turning up in all types of strange uniforms and webbing and proceeded to watch them play silly-bugger in the woods. After the exercise wash-up, I directed my CSM (harump - platoon warrant) that the next Tuesday night they'd all be in proper Canadian gear and running through battle drills on the parade square as a little refresher on the Canadian Army. They did - "doing basic contact drills on the parade square using chairs as 'cover':  ;D. One guess as to who wasn't the most popular ex-regular force officer company commander in the armories that night and for a few weeks after.  ;D

That was 39 years ago. It's very depressing to think that with everything that's happened in the interval that we still haven't made things one iota better for the lads.  :'(

 :worms:


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## MilEME09 (26 Oct 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Meanwhile, we'll continue to run basic contact drills on the parade square using chairs as 'cover'.



Ever done convoy ops on a parade square using lumps of people as vehicles? Unfortunately sometimes the basics are lost simply because of all the extra stuff forced on us. Like upcoming hateful conduct training. The more mandatory stuff the force on us, the less real training we can do, they expect more but aren't giving us more time to do it.


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## Brad Sallows (26 Oct 2020)

Does it take more or fewer days of training to adequately prepare a [insert trade here] now, compared to [insert year of decades past here]?

What fraction of time is consumed by things that didn't need to be learned in [insert year of decades past here]?

If "rifleman, 1960" could be done and "rifleman, 2020" cannot (with the same time and money)...


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## daftandbarmy (26 Oct 2020)

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Does it take more or fewer days of training to adequately prepare a [insert trade here] now, compared to [insert year of decades past here]?
> 
> What fraction of time is consumed by things that didn't need to be learned in [insert year of decades past here]?
> 
> If "rifleman, 1960" could be done and "rifleman, 2020" cannot (with the same time and money)...



IMHO the kids we have today are much smarter, more savvy, and generally in better shape than we were when I was their age so, given 'status quo', I'm betting they'd be much faster learners...


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## Brad Sallows (26 Oct 2020)

If that were true we'd see it in the schools and universities.


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## McG (26 Oct 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> "We need op tasks" say units that fail to maintain even basic proficiency in their core mandate.


If the requirement were legitimate, it probably would have been resourced.
If the capability requirement were legitimate, we would probably ask Reg F battalions to generate the soldiers who were both rifleman & specialist.
It suggests we are okay with capability failure by our asking the full-time Reg F to just generate the rifleman and the part-time PRes to generate the rifleman-specialist.
The real reason for mission tasks probably has more to do with "train to excite" and/or appeasing the MND's PRes roots.


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## dapaterson (26 Oct 2020)

MCG said:
			
		

> If the requirement were legitimate, it probably would have been resourced.
> If the capability requirement were legitimate, we would probably ask Reg F battalions to generate the soldiers who were both rifleman & specialist.
> It suggests we are okay with capability failure by our asking the full-time Reg F to just generate the rifleman and the part-time PRes to generate the rifleman-specialist.
> The real reason for mission tasks probably has more to do with "train to excite" and/or appeasing the MND's PRes roots.



I always read "Train to excite" as a polite way of saying "I have no idea how to motivate troops".


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## MilEME09 (26 Oct 2020)

MCG said:
			
		

> If the requirement were legitimate, it probably would have been resourced.
> If the capability requirement were legitimate, we would probably ask Reg F battalions to generate the soldiers who were both rifleman & specialist.
> It suggests we are okay with capability failure by our asking the full-time Reg F to just generate the rifleman and the part-time PRes to generate the rifleman-specialist.
> The real reason for mission tasks probably has more to do with "train to excite" and/or appeasing the MND's PRes roots.



STARS started around 2013/14, so previous MND.


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## FJAG (26 Oct 2020)

IMHO, the fundamental flaw with StAR is that reservists generally don't have the ability to attend the Reg F exercises during the typical Reg F training year, and the Reg F  has no ability to conduct their exercises in the summer when the reservists are available. It's pretty much preordained that the Reg F battalions and their StAR augmentees will rarely be able to train together as proper teams. 

With LUSAR that's not a big deal and maybe even not so much with mortars but pioneers and direct fire support (and at least mortar simulation) should be integrated into every major Reg F exercise.

Stalemate.

 :2c:


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## BDTyre (27 Oct 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> With LUSAR that's not a big deal and maybe even not so much with mortars but pioneers and direct fire support (and at least mortar simulation) should be integrated into every major Reg F exercise.
> 
> Stalemate.
> 
> :2c:



When our unit first started sending guys on the very first Pioneer courses run out of Gagetown there was some talk around Pioneer platoon members/people who wanted the course needing to be available for three weeks for Maple Resolve (I believe) as the idea was to provide a Pioneer section to augment the reg force on exercise. I believe we were able to send sufficient guys for the first go and the feedback was not good - on both sides. The reg force had the idea we wouldn't know what we were doing and therefore didn't utilize the guys we sent in the role they were supposed to be fulfilling. From our side, the complaint was that the reg force didn't take us seriously and didn't provide any way for the guys to use their skills resulting in our Pioneers being under utilized and poorly employed. I think after that the "requirement" of being available for three weeks (if it even was a requirement) was dropped and opportunities to go on Maple Resolve were provided but not encouraged. 

That and concerns over low numbers for the course because not everyone can commit to the three weeks, so they just wouldn't bother with the course, and the topic of our Pioneers augmenting the reg force hasn't come up for awhile.


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## MilEME09 (27 Oct 2020)

CanadianTire said:
			
		

> When our unit first started sending guys on the very first Pioneer courses run out of Gagetown there was some talk around Pioneer platoon members/people who wanted the course needing to be available for three weeks for Maple Resolve (I believe) as the idea was to provide a Pioneer section to augment the reg force on exercise. I believe we were able to send sufficient guys for the first go and the feedback was not good - on both sides. The reg force had the idea we wouldn't know what we were doing and therefore didn't utilize the guys we sent in the role they were supposed to be fulfilling. From our side, the complaint was that the reg force didn't take us seriously and didn't provide any way for the guys to use their skills resulting in our Pioneers being under utilized and poorly employed. I think after that the "requirement" of being available for three weeks (if it even was a requirement) was dropped and opportunities to go on Maple Resolve were provided but not encouraged.
> 
> That and concerns over low numbers for the course because not everyone can commit to the three weeks, so they just wouldn't bother with the course, and the topic of our Pioneers augmenting the reg force hasn't come up for awhile.



We see this in service battalion all the time, especially on the tech side, We show up, Reg Force doesn't trust our technical ability due to lack of experience so they find more "suitable" roles for the people we send. Members then come back complaining, it got so bad at one point that our CoC authorized that since it was our unit paying for us to go, if we were not being employed in the promised/stated role, we could pack up, clear out and leave. We paying for people to be employed in trade, not as GD or other non trade related tasks for an entire exercise.


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## FJAG (27 Oct 2020)

I started in this business in 1965. As both a reserve gunner and a Reg F officer I saw that the whole individual augmentee concept didn't work because our training cycles were out of sync and because reservists, who did join us on exercises, weren't put into the jobs that they'd signed up for and were frequently given GD roles. That's sixty years ago and we still haven't figured it out how to fix the issue.

Things work much better on op deployments where the teams are built up together over time and people have time to get used to each other and trust each other (although not always)

The idea of reservists fulfilling these roles during the training year simply doesn't work. We need a better idea.

 :cheers:


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## MJP (27 Oct 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> We see this in service battalion all the time, especially on the tech side, We show up, Reg Force doesn't trust our technical ability due to lack of experience so they find more "suitable" roles for the people we send. Members then come back complaining, it got so bad at one point that our CoC authorized that since it was our unit paying for us to go, if we were not being employed in the promised/stated role, we could pack up, clear out and leave. We paying for people to be employed in trade, not as GD or other non trade related tasks for an entire exercise.




You are passionate and I get that you care but your assertive posts are pretty far from truth. It is ok you don't see much of the background stuff and can really only comment with a ground floor perspective.

Been around 1 Svc for quite some time in recent history in various roles but have not seen many pers from your Svc Bn on Ex. I do know there is an effort (I won't say a good one) to get more Pres Svc Bn folks out but both sides have been pretty lack-luster in making it work. It is a two way street and I agree if they are not being gainfully employed than it behooves the 41 Svc CoC to engage 1 Svc CoC rather than throwing their teddy bear in the corner and stomping off as you allege. That is how professionals solve issues and my interactions (albeit limited) indicate to me that 41 Svc CoC are eminently professional.


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## MilEME09 (27 Oct 2020)

MJP said:
			
		

> You are passionate and I get that you care but your assertive posts are pretty far from truth. It is ok you don't see much of the background stuff and can really only comment with a ground floor perspective.
> 
> Been around 1 Svc for quite some time in recent history in various roles but have not seen many pers from your Svc Bn on Ex. I do know there is an effort (I won't say a good one) to get more Pres Svc Bn folks out but both sides have been pretty lack-luster in making it work. It is a two way street and I agree if they are not being gainfully employed than it behooves the 41 Svc CoC to engage 1 Svc CoC rather than throwing their teddy bear in the corner and stomping off as you allege. That is how professionals solve issues and my interactions (albeit limited) indicate to me that 41 Svc CoC are eminently professional.



I should clarify that my previous post was a situation years ago. We have had positive interactions with 1 SVC the past few years MJP, the issue is trained man power when it comes to augmentation. Vast majority of our organization is DP1 or less, and maintenance is pretty black and white right now either fully trained (very few) or untrained. We lost a lot of trained people between 2012 and 2015 to CT or OT and retirement. Many would love to help out more but sometimes it is a matter of time off work, which is not always easy.

I am okay with being wrong or off the mark, I can't see everything after all, I should never take the experiences of even my self let alone others at face value as there are always other circumstances, that said I do my best to post based on what I know without speculating.


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## FJAG (27 Oct 2020)

MJP said:
			
		

> ... Been around 1 Svc for quite some time in recent history in various roles but have not seen many pers from your Svc Bn on Ex. I do know there is an effort (I won't say a good one) to get more Pres Svc Bn folks out but both sides have been pretty lack-luster in making it work. It is a two way street and I agree if they are not being gainfully employed than it behooves the 41 Svc CoC to engage 1 Svc CoC rather than throwing their teddy bear in the corner and stomping off as you allege. ...



You are clearly identifying the problem - the lack of participation despite efforts. I don't thing the solution will work because systemically the reserve force is not designed for nor populated by individuals who can routinely go off on Reg F exercises which typically take place during the active school year or typical civilian business cycles.

I would expect that if Reg F brigades and their reserve counterparts ran a joint exercise in July or August, the resulting success would be heartwarming. The problem is that, of course, Reg F units can't practically do that because of APS and annual leave requirements etc, etc. Maybe with some planning and foresight it could be made to work, but I'm certainly not holding my breath for that.

Realistically though, if one wants to talk about Reg F units which have an establishment that is designed to encompass reservists, then I really only see one practical solution (albeit it could have modifications). In effect reserve units are restructured to be sub-units or sub-sub-units of Reg F battalions that are not routinely needed for the day-to-day functioning of the Reg F unit but still are under the units control.

As an example a Reg F artillery regiment could have one or two Reg F batteries which would routinely train during the year as they do now and fulfill operational requirements as needed while one or two reserve artillery batteries carry on their training throughout the year as they do now but under the direction and supervision of the Reg F staff. A summer exercise would involve just the one or two batteries and a minimum regimental HQ to control and supervise while the remaining Reg F regiment is doing it's leave, maintenance, APS etc. In a major emergency the reserve batteries are called up to round out the regiment.

The same could be done by having, for example a Reg F service battalion with a designated transport platoon, or a field ambulance with a designated reserve evac platoon, or even an infantry company, etc.

What works within the battalions can also be adapted to brigades. For example, do we really need a full-time brigade recce regiment, tank regiment or, for that matter, an MP platoon (base MP det sure, but a brigade MP platoon?) when we haven't deployed a proper brigade since Korea (or Germany if you consider 4 CMBG a deployment) Or can these be units that exist only as reservists (with a core of regulars) to be mobilized if and when the brigade actually deploys on operations.

The problem isn't the will to train together. The problem is that their training cycles are, and always will be, out of whack except for the rare unemployed individual.

If we cater to that by having the reservists provide sub units and sub sub units that are not essential for the Reg F battalion's/brigade's own annual training so that they can train within their own cycle but yet with their Reg F counterparts supervision then there may be a chance for success. (concurrent with that notion is that if required in a "major" emergency, the reservists will be called up to round out their deploying unit - for ordinary peace time deployments the volunteer augmentation ought to continue)

We've really got to stop trying to put band-aids on a system that's fundamentally flawed.

 :2c:


----------



## quadrapiper (27 Oct 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> You nailed it buddy.
> 
> There’s a real skill in trying to find ‘balance’ around here


Between pint and plate?


----------



## BDTyre (27 Oct 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> If we cater to that by having the reservists provide sub units and sub sub units that are not essential for the Reg F battalion's/brigade's own annual training so that they can train within their own cycle but yet with their Reg F counterparts supervision then there may be a chance for success. (concurrent with that notion is that if required in a "major" emergency, the reservists will be called up to round out their deploying unit - for ordinary peace time deployments the volunteer augmentation ought to continue)
> :2c:



We started doing this approach (partially) with our in-house Pioneer course. The first one we ran was staffed entirely by reg force staff assigned to our unit for the purposes of being part of our Pioneer platoon. The second in-house course we ran was about 50/50 reg force and our own leadership types that came off the previous course. Our course O was reserve, or WO reg force but both had adv. pioneer. 

COVID mixed things up a bit and our reg force staff are now on courses and so the resurrected pioneer course is staffed in-house with the except of our engineer SME.


----------



## FJAG (10 Nov 2020)

A series of discussions a few weeks ago in the C3 replacement thread got me to rework a blog post on how to restructure the Army so that there is a minimal effect on personnel movements/remustering and in ensuring that all facilities, both regular and reserve are kept as they are.

You can find the post at  Restructuring the Canadian Army - A Sustainable Option

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09 (10 Nov 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> A series of discussions a few weeks ago in the C3 replacement thread got me to rework a blog post on how to restructure the Army so that there is a minimal effect on personnel movements/remustering and in ensuring that all facilities, both regular and reserve are kept as they are.
> 
> You can find the post at  Restructuring the Canadian Army - A Sustainable Option
> 
> :cheers:



Facility wise, and I know I will get burned at the steak for this. We should consolidate Reserve Forces into modern mini bases. Historical armouries could be preserved as heritage sites by the department or as HQ facilities. Each mini base let's call Canadian Forces Stations or Reserve bases, and have all facilities needed to be self sufficient locally. Including a 200m indoor rifle range, SAT, sleeping areas, parade square, class rooms, vehicle storage and maintenance facilities. These facilities would be 2 to 5 buildings with sufficient parking space to accommodate the hundreds of personal training at the facility.

This way as much as possible can be done locally, saving travel costs, and time.


----------



## daftandbarmy (10 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Facility wise, and I know I will get burned at the steak for this. We should consolidate Reserve Forces into modern mini bases. Historical armouries could be preserved as heritage sites by the department or as HQ facilities. Each mini base let's call Canadian Forces Stations or Reserve bases, and have all facilities needed to be self sufficient locally. Including a 200m indoor rifle range, SAT, sleeping areas, parade square, class rooms, vehicle storage and maintenance facilities. These facilities would be 2 to 5 buildings with sufficient parking space to accommodate the hundreds of personal training at the facility.
> 
> This way as much as possible can be done locally, saving travel costs, and time.



There is one flaw in your cunning plan that will most certainly see it dashed on the rocks of despair: you have not considered, in your estimate, the critical need for three separate mess spaces per unit. 

The tradition, which must be maintained at all costs, is that approximately 30% of the available space in any militia armoury be occupied by the Officers', WOs and Sgts, and JR's messes.

And then there's the Band, Cadets, Museum and Associations etc etc.


----------



## MilEME09 (10 Nov 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> There is one flaw in your cunning plan that will most certainly see it dashed on the rocks of despair: you have not considered, in your estimate, the critical need for three separate mess spaces per unit.
> 
> The tradition, which must be maintained at all costs, is that approximately 30% of the available space in any militia armoury be occupied by the Officers', WOs and Sgts, and JR's messes.
> 
> And then there's the Band, Cadets, Museum and Associations etc etc.



Combined messes are already the normal so that's not much of a problem, and other groups could be planned in, including a limited space for Cadets to keep them away from operations areas.


----------



## FJAG (10 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Facility wise, and I know I will get burned at the steak for this. We should consolidate Reserve Forces into modern mini bases. Historical armouries could be preserved as heritage sites by the department or as HQ facilities. Each mini base let's call Canadian Forces Stations or Reserve bases, and have all facilities needed to be self sufficient locally. Including a 200m indoor rifle range, SAT, sleeping areas, parade square, class rooms, vehicle storage and maintenance facilities. These facilities would be 2 to 5 buildings with sufficient parking space to accommodate the hundreds of personal training at the facility.
> 
> This way as much as possible can be done locally, saving travel costs, and time.



I tend to favour local battalion or company size armouries that stay in the local communities and are easily accessible. It reduces travel time (although as a reservist a half century ago it took me an hour to go from Scarborough to downtown Toronto using a bus, a streetcar, a subway, another subway and another streetcar) and keeps a tie in with smaller cities towns and communities. As an example, the armouries in Brandon can comfortably handle a battery and even though only some 25 kilometers from Shilo, it would be preferable to stay in the centre of the city (especially in the winter)

I have nothing against mini training centres like Aldershot or Meaford but the more you concentrate in those, the more inconvenient it becomes to the young soldiers and the thinner your ties to the community become. Pretty soon they'll become as irrelevant to society as the regular force in their little gated country club communities.

On top of that change can be traumatic. You need to pick what hill you want to die on. Mine is amalgamation of units and equipment. Without those, nothing will change. Amalgamation of facilities is a complication.

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09 (11 Nov 2020)

In some larger cities it may not be possible due to land prices but even in say calgary, some commercial and industrial land is fairly wide open still with easy access to major road ways. Flip side of so many businesses closing is land is cheap right now, if DND wanted to build new facilities for the PRes, now would be the time to get the land, then build after.


----------



## FJAG (11 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> In some larger cities it may not be possible due to land prices but even in say calgary, some commercial and industrial land is fairly wide open still with easy access to major road ways. Flip side of so many businesses closing is land is cheap right now, if DND wanted to build new facilities for the PRes, now would be the time to get the land, then build after.



I always thought that abandon shopping centres would make terrific armouries what with their big parking lots, food court facilities, adequate washroom facilities, large anchor store facilities as parade squares, small stores as office space. If you're lucky it'll have a Walmart or Canadian tire automotive centre for the RCEME guys.

 ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy (11 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> In some larger cities it may not be possible due to land prices but even in say calgary, some commercial and industrial land is fairly wide open still with easy access to major road ways. Flip side of so many businesses closing is land is cheap right now, if DND wanted to build new facilities for the PRes, now would be the time to get the land, then build after.



Excellent news. That means we can finally move the Army away from the Western Coast of Canada and consign it to 'fly over country', where it belongs 

 :sarcasm:


----------



## brihard (11 Nov 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I always thought that abandon shopping centres would make terrific armouries what with their big parking lots, food court facilities, adequate washroom facilities, large anchor store facilities as parade squares, small stores as office space. If you're lucky it'll have a Walmart or Canadian tire automotive centre for the RCEME guys.
> 
> ;D



*breathes heavily in urban ops*


----------



## MilEME09 (11 Nov 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I always thought that abandon shopping centres would make terrific armouries what with their big parking lots, food court facilities, adequate washroom facilities, large anchor store facilities as parade squares, small stores as office space. If you're lucky it'll have a Walmart or Canadian tire automotive centre for the RCEME guys.
> 
> ;D



Movie theaters would make great SAT ranges! 


In all seriousness though, a mall would have the right foot print, however would require significant remodeling to work.

The key for Reserve facilities is central location and ease of access to major transportation routes. More so roads but access to a railhead may be useful in the future.

Bridge classifications, etc all have to be considered in the local area, plus enough space to anticipate future growth.


----------



## Blackadder1916 (11 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> In all seriousness though, a mall would have the right foot print, however would require significant remodeling to work.
> 
> The key for Reserve facilities is central location and ease of access to major transportation routes. More so roads but access to a railhead may be useful in the future.
> 
> Bridge classifications, etc all have to be considered in the local area, plus enough space to anticipate future growth.



All very good points for an ideal facility if cost was no object.  Since an underlying premise of FJAG's restructuring of the reserves is to free up monies (primarily person dollars) that would be used to re-equip an effective reserve element, perhaps some reality injection is needed.  How much does infrastructure cost us?  Since I've not found online a breakdown of facility O&M costs, I'll just have to use some general figures.  According to the latest NATO defense expenditures report, 3.7% of our $30.8 billion (estimated) 2020 defence budget is spent on "infrastructure" - or a little less than $1.14 billion.  Obviously, only a small portion of that is spent on the Reserves, but if, in conjunction with reserve restructuring, additional infrastructure was acquired (_I can just see the visions of castles dancing in the heads of empire builders_) then a significant portion of that "savings" would be gobbled up by "footprint"

DND is the top federal organization in terms of number of buildings and square footage; it's only third in land area - Parks Canada and Environment Canada have them beat.  But still, the military is not a slouch when it comes to real estate holdings.





> Your query has found 721 parcels of land on 628 properties, with a total land area of 2,201,412 ha. This includes 13865 buildings with a total floor area of 8,885,816 m2.



Granted most of that is used in support of full-time activities, but what about some of the expenses such as payment in lieu of taxation (PILT) for facilities used primarily in support of "part-time soldering".  I suppose I could have gone property by property to figure out DND's share of the $562,157,133.62 that the Canadian government shelled out in 2019 for PILT.  However, I'll limit myself to a few examples, such as here in Calgary where the 2019 PILT expense for Mewata Armoury was $312,928.36,  HMCS Tecumsah was $158,115.81, and the remaining Currie Barracks footprint comes in at $227,433.73; I don't know if the armoury in the NE is still being used but the City of Calgary received $147,765.61 from DND's budget in 2019.

It would be nice to have the wide open space of a re-purposed mall or similar commercial/industrial structure (I think that was the background of the armoury in NE Calgary) but how much of it would actually be "efficiently" utilized for one evening a week and one or two weekends a month for nine or ten months a year.  There's a not insignificant cost to that footprint.


----------



## MilEME09 (11 Nov 2020)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> All very good points for an ideal facility if cost was no object.  Since an underlying premise of FJAG's restructuring of the reserves is to free up monies (primarily person dollars) that would be used to re-equip an effective reserve element, perhaps some reality injection is needed.  How much does infrastructure cost us?  Since I've not found online a breakdown of facility O&M costs, I'll just have to use some general figures.  According to the latest NATO defense expenditures report, 3.7% of our $30.8 billion (estimated) 2020 defence budget is spent on "infrastructure" - or a little less than $1.14 billion.  Obviously, only a small portion of that is spent on the Reserves, but if, in conjunction with reserve restructuring, additional infrastructure was acquired (_I can just see the visions of castles dancing in the heads of empire builders_) then a significant portion of that "savings" would be gobbled up by "footprint"
> 
> DND is the top federal organization in terms of number of buildings and square footage; it's only third in land area - Parks Canada and Environment Canada have them beat.  But still, the military is not a slouch when it comes to real estate holdings.
> Granted most of that is used in support of full-time activities, but what about some of the expenses such as payment in lieu of taxation (PILT) for facilities used primarily in support of "part-time soldering".  I suppose I could have gone property by property to figure out DND's share of the $562,157,133.62 that the Canadian government shelled out in 2019 for PILT.  However, I'll limit myself to a few examples, such as here in Calgary where the 2019 PILT expense for Mewata Armoury was $312,928.36,  HMCS Tecumsah was $158,115.81, and the remaining Currie Barracks footprint comes in at $227,433.73; I don't know if the armoury in the NE is still being used but the City of Calgary received $147,765.61 from DND's budget in 2019.
> ...



Last I heard the NE armoury is still DND property but not used. It has been a few years though since I last heard about it. Also how much DND spends for maintaining Cadet camps like the Rocky mountain cadet camp? That place is almost a small base on its own but only used in summer due to age and lack of winterizing.


----------



## Blackadder1916 (11 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Last I heard the NE armoury is still DND property but not used. It has been a few years though since I last heard about it. Also how much DND spends for maintaining Cadet camps like the Rocky mountain cadet camp? That place is almost a small base on its own but only used in summer due to age and lack of winterizing.




$88,920.41 in PILT to Bighorn, Municipal District #8.  Money spent by DND to operate and maintain the facility is another amount.


----------



## MilEME09 (11 Nov 2020)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> $88,920.41 in PILT to Bighorn, Municipal District #8.  Money spent by DND to operate and maintain the facility is another amount.



Even that seems like a lot for a facility used mostly in the summer only


----------



## CBH99 (11 Nov 2020)

Blackadder1916 said:
			
		

> DND is the top federal organization in terms of number of buildings and square footage; it's only third in land area - Parks Canada and Environment Canada have them beat.  But still, the military is not a slouch when it comes to real estate holdings.
> Granted most of that is used in support of full-time activities, but what about some of the expenses such as payment in lieu of taxation (PILT) for facilities used primarily in support of "part-time soldering".  I suppose I could have gone property by property to figure out DND's share of the $562,157,133.62 that the Canadian government shelled out in 2019 for PILT.  However, I'll limit myself to a few examples, such as here in Calgary where the 2019 PILT expense for Mewata Armoury was $312,928.36,  HMCS Tecumsah was $158,115.81, and the remaining Currie Barracks footprint comes in at $227,433.73; I don't know if the armoury in the NE is still being used but the City of Calgary received $147,765.61 from DND's budget in 2019.
> 
> It would be nice to have the wide open space of a re-purposed mall or similar commercial/industrial structure (I think that was the background of the armoury in NE Calgary) but how much of it would actually be "efficiently" utilized for one evening a week and one or two weekends a month for nine or ten months a year.  There's a not insignificant cost to that footprint.




Can someone explain just in brief terms why DND is paying various municipalities and such, these payments?

Aren't the buildings already bought/paid for out of DND budget?


----------



## dapaterson (11 Nov 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Can someone explain just in brief terms why DND is paying various municipalities and such, these payments?
> 
> Aren't the buildings already bought/paid for out of DND budget?



"Normal" buildings would pay property taxes to support municipal infrastructure and services.  Federal government properties do not; they make "payments in lieu of taxes" or PILT instead.


----------



## FJAG (11 Nov 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> "Normal" buildings would pay property taxes to support municipal infrastructure and services.  Federal government properties do not; they make "payments in lieu of taxes" or PILT instead.



I've known that for decades but what I never knew was why we do. I can't see a constitutional requirement, and in fact s 125 basically exempts the Feds from taxes levied by the municipalities and provinces. 

I know that there is a Fed Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act which makes it discretionary for the Minister of PWGS to make such payments but have no idea why we enacted it in the first place. The US has a similar program.

I presume this is one of those things we started doing after a lot of lobbying by provincial governments. I guess that's what happens when you're not spending your own money's, but the taxpayors. You become pretty free passing it around. All that said with the full realization that if the local authority didn't receive PILT from the Feds, they'd make up for the shortfall with a direct taxation on the local taxpayors. Just strikes me as a shell game though.

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09 (11 Nov 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I've known that for decades but what I never knew was why we do. I can't see a constitutional requirement, and in fact s 125 basically exempts the Feds from taxes levied by the municipalities and provinces.
> 
> I know that there is a Fed Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act which makes it discretionary for the Minister of PWGS to make such payments but have no idea why we enacted it in the first place. The US has a similar program.
> 
> ...



Sounds like a line item the department could easily cut to out money to more important things.


----------



## dapaterson (11 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Sounds like a line item the department could easily cut to out money to more important things.


And relationships with communities would suffer.

Defence infra expenditures are more tied to construction than maintenance or PILT.  Savings would be minor to result in major disruptions (not only DND/CAF, but also other departments).


----------



## MJP (11 Nov 2020)

Dapa beat me 



			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Sounds like a line item the department could easily cut to out money to more important things.



Like move it directly into re-building the municipal infrastructure that currently services DND land and buildings once we are cut off from provided municipal services?

Some bases have limited autonomy from local services but most are beholden to utilize the same infrastructure that the rest of the surrounding community uses. Those things aren't free and municipalities would take a hard line if the Feds stopped paying their share. It can be as FJAG points out a bit of a shell game as it is lots of federal dollars that likely created that infra, but O&M still costs a pretty penny. PILT is our contribution to that.


----------



## daftandbarmy (11 Nov 2020)

dapaterson said:
			
		

> And relationships with communities would suffer.
> 
> Defence infra expenditures are more tied to construction than maintenance or PILT.  Savings would be minor to result in major disruptions (not only DND/CAF, but also other departments).



And, as the Irish Fusiliers of Canada discovered after their armoury in Vancouver burned down, there's a strong connection between 'Militia Regiment Survival' and 'Having a Home Armoury'.

"By the end of World War I the building had been adapted for military use and became known as The Stanley Park Armouries, later the home of the Vancouver Regiment of the Irish Fusiliers of Canada.

The Armouries remained in use as a regimental headquarters and mixed-use venue through the Second World War and the 1950s — until March 18, 1960 when disaster struck.

March 17 was, of course, St. Patrick’s Day, and the officers and men of the Irish Fusiliers held their weekly parade in the building and lingered into the evening to celebrate Ireland’s great holiday. Sometime early in the morning of March 18 a fire broke out, destroying the wooden structure within an hour. Firefighters were able to prevent the fire from spreading to surrounding buildings, but the regimental museum’s entire collection of badges, swords, headgear, trophies, flags, and band instruments was lost."

https://www.thewestendjournal.ca/blog/2016/8/13/then-now


----------



## MilEME09 (28 Nov 2020)

https://canadianarmytoday.com/ready-for-adaptive-dispersed-operations-the-armys-modernization-strategy/

Relevant to this conversation is the armys new 5 year strategy. One part stood out to me under restructuring and the PRes

"Over the past five years, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has seen a 1,000 percent increase in Operation Lentus taskings. One option under consideration is bringing the Reserves onto full-time service for specific periods each year. The Army is also seeing how it can make the best use of full-time summer employment. “We are still exploring that space,” said Eyre."


Bring a reserve unit as a whole to full time service would require a monumental legislative change, one the next CDS would have to really push for if they want to go down that path.


----------



## brihard (28 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Bring a reserve unit as a whole to full time service would require a monumental legislative change, one the next CDS would have to really push for if they want to go down that path.



I'll bite. Why? Is there anything required that cannot already be proclaimed via Order in Council?

I mean, second order effects like job protection and such, sure. But calling up reservists to do military stuff is already provided for in legislation, no?


----------



## MilEME09 (28 Nov 2020)

Brihard said:
			
		

> I'll bite. Why? Is there anything required that cannot already be proclaimed via Order in Council?
> 
> I mean, second order effects like job protection and such, sure. But calling up reservists to do military stuff is already provided for in legislation, no?



If they want to do it regularly then the most efficient means would be to allow it without an OIC, outside a OIC the PRes is only authorized 60 Class A and 10 Class B days per year. Plus secondary job protect which I would hope would be at the federal level and cover all of Canada, instead of the patchwork Canada currently has.


----------



## FJAG (28 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> "Over the past five years, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has seen a 1,000 percent increase in Operation Lentus taskings. One option under consideration is bringing the Reserves onto full-time service for specific periods each year. The Army is also seeing how it can make the best use of full-time summer employment. “We are still exploring that space,” said Eyre."
> 
> 
> Bring a reserve unit as a whole to full time service would require a monumental legislative change, one the next CDS would have to really push for if they want to go down that path.



With respect, I think that you are misinterpreting what the article said.

In this respect I'll also mirror what Brihard said. The legislative provisions are already there if the GiC chooses to exercise their power for call-out under s 33(2)(B) of the NDA. To facilitate such a call-out, the government could pass a regulation to delegate such powers to the MND in the case of certain situations much like it did with QR&O article 9.04(3) for emergencies (Note emergencies are defined in the legislation as:  "war, invasion, riot or insurrection, real or apprehended" and not natural disasters etc.)

I think all that is being put forward here is a planned request for volunteers to be available for or to be put on Class B for employment in the case of what are becoming seasonally predictable disasters (such as flooding along the Ottawa and St Lawrence) rather then waiting for the event and then cobbling together a force.



			
				MilEME09 said:
			
		

> If they want to do it regularly then the most efficient means would be to allow it without an OIC, outside a OIC the PRes is only authorized 60 Class A and 10 Class B days per year. Plus secondary job protect which I would hope would be at the federal level and cover all of Canada, instead of the patchwork Canada currently has.



The 60 days Class A and 15 days Class B service are only with respect to being "ordered to train" pursuant to QR&O 9.04(2). It does not apply to voluntary attendance of any type and it does not apply to any call out on service under an OiC.

 :cheers:


----------



## MilEME09 (28 Nov 2020)

You are right i probably am, without additional detail you are probably correct and this would be a class B/C similar to what we saw with OP laser this past year, a short term stand by force.


----------



## BDTyre (30 Nov 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> outside a OIC the PRes is only authorized 60 Class A days...per year.



I'm sure I've exceeded that some years.


----------



## FJAG (30 Nov 2020)

CanadianTire said:
			
		

> I'm sure I've exceeded that some years.



There is no problem exceeding 60 days per year as long as it's voluntary and has been authorized by the CoC. See above.

 :cheers:


----------



## BDTyre (1 Dec 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> There is no problem exceeding 60 days per year as long as it's voluntary and has been authorized by the CoC. See above.
> 
> :cheers:



My point exactly. 

Oh...does voluntold count?


----------



## MilEME09 (13 Dec 2020)

Open question: With the pandemic causing reservists to be called up more, on top of OP lentus tasks, Reservists are becoming more important and in the spot light more. As a result I wonder if this will create a push for reorg or create legislative changes.


----------



## daftandbarmy (13 Dec 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Open question: With the pandemic causing reservists to be called up more, on top of OP lentus tasks, Reservists are becoming more important and in the spot light more. As a result I wonder if this will create a push for reorg or create legislative changes.



No.

IMHO, if 10 years of AFG and the insanely busy fire fighting years (2017-18) haven't done that already, it will never happen.


----------



## MilEME09 (13 Dec 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> No.
> 
> IMHO, if 10 years of AFG and the insanely busy fire fighting years (2017-18) haven't done that already, it will never happen.



AFG wasn't in their own backyards though. Peoples mind sets tend to change when your response to a crisis can effect your reelection.


----------



## MJP (13 Dec 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> AFG wasn't in their own backyards though. Peoples mind sets tend to change when your response to a crisis can effect your reelection.



Meh, the CAF and PRes have no hold on public conscious beyond the headlines of today. Any serious PRes restructuring will have to come from within the CAF itself in line with current legislation. There is no upswell to to force the government to intervene and create new legislation.


----------



## brihard (13 Dec 2020)

People only see the troops deploying to work. They neither known or care about the bureaucratic machinations that got them there. The dysfunction is not visible or apparent outside of the institution. It commands no concern or attention.


----------



## FJAG (13 Dec 2020)

Regretfully, I'd take a guess that the majority of the public do not distinguish between the regular force and the reserve force when thinking "military" much less having any understanding of how those elements function, how many there are, the administrative details behind them or the problems which plague them. The CAF is one large amorphous mass that gets mentioned in the press occasionally but is mostly out of sight or mind.

Nope. If we are hoping for some crystallizing event to get a public movement for reform going, then we will be forever waiting in vain. We need either a strong minister or CDS with vision and the balls to turn the horse before it careens over the cliff's edge.

 :worms:


----------



## CBH99 (13 Dec 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Regretfully, I'd take a guess that the majority of the public do not distinguish between the regular force and the reserve force when thinking "military" much less having any understanding of how those elements function, how many there are, the administrative details behind them or the problems which plague them. The CAF is one large amorphous mass that gets mentioned in the press occasionally but is mostly out of sight or mind.
> 
> Nope. If we are hoping for some crystallizing event to get a public movement for reform going, then we will be forever waiting in vain. We need either a strong minister or CDS with vision and the balls to turn the horse before it careens over the cliff's edge.
> 
> :worms:




Between our current CDS and our current MND, I thought any effective change to the PRes would have been coming during their tensure.

Vance had a solid reputation for good leadership during the Afghan war days, and I think was a good choice for CDS.  And our MND had a lot of experience as a reservist, and is well aware of the changes that are needed to make it a more effective organization.  

Yet on the issue of Reserve Restruction - zip, from both.


The crystalizing moment, if there is one, will be during the next serious armed conflict we find ourselves in, when the Army goes back to having a focus & the mindset changes back to a 'warfighting' mentality.    :2c:


----------



## FJAG (13 Dec 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Between our current CDS and our current MND, I thought any effective change to the PRes would have been coming during their tenure.



So did I. Sigh. So did I.

 :facepalm:


----------



## daftandbarmy (13 Dec 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Between our current CDS and our current MND, I thought any effective change to the PRes would have been coming during their tensure.
> 
> Vance had a solid reputation for good leadership during the Afghan war days, and I think was a good choice for CDS.  And our MND had a lot of experience as a reservist, and is well aware of the changes that are needed to make it a more effective organization.
> 
> ...



You mean like the time I suggested that me and my rifle company would walk to and from the training area, and then they accused me of 'abusing the troops'. 

Or when my training plan was turned down because we would be practising section attacks and recce/fighting patrols, through something a little more 'cluttered' than bald a$$ prairie, and I was told that we would 'unnecessarily injure' too many troops, so they made me change it.

Or when I suggested that we would do the BFT, then carry on and do a FTX as per normal and.... well, you can guess the rest..

Or, or, or.... 

We've done an excellent job of inculcating an 'Office mindset' in our most Senior Officers


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## Haggis (13 Dec 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Between our current CDS and our current MND, I thought any effective change to the PRes would have been coming during their tenure.



Not a chance with a Trudeau calling the shots. Remember, his first move was to give Daesh a pass from bombing. Then he spent years looking for a feelgood UN mission to deploy an all-female contingent on.

No, I never held out any hope for substantial/any improvements to the CAF under this government.


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## FSTO (14 Dec 2020)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> We've done an excellent job of inculcating an 'Office mindset' in our most Senior Officers



That's a little harsh. Those chairborne warriors are wearing combats in 101 and Carling don't you know!


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## FSTO (14 Dec 2020)

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Between our current CDS and our current MND, I thought any effective change to the PRes would have been coming during their tenure.



The MND is a placeholder and nothing else. All decisions come out the cabal that runs the PMO office and all they want from DND is don't spend more than what we give you and don't cause us trouble. Seems we do a pretty good job of failing at both of those tasks.

The last pro-active MND who executed a vision for the CAF was Hellyer.   :boke:


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## FJAG (14 Dec 2020)

FSTO said:
			
		

> ...
> The last pro-active MND who executed a vision for the CAF was Hellyer.   :boke:



Regretfully, that's probably true.

Your comment, however, made me also reflect on the Chiefs of Defence Staff we've had since unification to see who stood out for his vision and leadership. 

There were a number who immediately popped to mind for the utter failures they were but none stood out as head and shoulders above the rest. Others who were clearly strong leaders but who, to the best of my knowledge, have left no lasting mark.

I briefly pondered Hillier but my feelings for him were quite mixed. Charisma is one thing and his relationship with government was notable as was the initial effort in shaping the force for Afghanistan. Unfortunately, IMHO, I think he botched being all-in on a medium weight Army and accelerated a spiralling growth in the bureaucracy in Ottawa which, again IMHO, is principally responsible for much of the sad state of the current field forces.

I think that, all-in-all, whatever talents each of them had were consumed by the day to day dealing with resource allocation and bureaucratic humdrum of their headquarters to left them with little to invest into any effort in the development of a vision that would revolutionize and evolve the force for the future. Fine tuning some issues, yes; "advancing with a purpose", no.

Interested in hearing opposing views.

 :cheers:


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## Dale Denton (14 Dec 2020)

You could as what is the _real _ purpose of a CDS or MND? Its clear that reorganisation and innovation is a part of the job only on paper/its public face and not the main focus, or else we'd see more noticable change every few years. 

They really just seem like senior-management positions and not executives when you look at the public-facing decisions they can make on their own. Seems more like they are tasked with ensuring the dept doesn't implode or embarrass the "Board" while X gov't is in power. The "Board" doesn't want an Elon Musk/wildcard/Hillier that'll reshape the company (for the better you could argue), they want a quiet beaurocrat that'll keep this dept out of the news. 

How do you realistically fix it?

Unionize the reserves, bring the issues to the public eye, embarrass the gov't into action is the only way to make change. Auditor General reports don't force change, the reserves aren't in the public eye enough. The legacy of the current MND is a risk to cabinet, either opposition can paint him as an ineffective change-manager or a silenced innovator. A union representing his former reservists could target him as easy as the next guy.


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## FSTO (14 Dec 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Regretfully, that's probably true.
> 
> Your comment, however, made me also reflect on the Chiefs of Defence Staff we've had since unification to see who stood out for his vision and leadership.
> 
> ...



The Hillier experiment by the Martin government is a blueprint for future governments on what sort of CDS they don't want! They want a grey man, a nobody and person who will implement the stupid stuff the government comes up with (Aussie F18) without a fuss. 
Correction, they want 2 grey men (MND/CDS)!


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## brihard (14 Dec 2020)

LoboCanada said:
			
		

> How do you realistically fix it?
> 
> Unionize the reserves, bring the issues to the public eye, embarrass the gov't into action is the only way to make change. Auditor General reports don't force change, the reserves aren't in the public eye enough. The legacy of the current MND is a risk to cabinet, either opposition can paint him as an ineffective change-manager or a silenced innovator. A union representing his former reservists could target him as easy as the next guy.



No. Unions donMt get to trample on operational decisions. “Management has the right to manage”, and that doesn’t mean that have to be good at it. Unions can hold the employer accountable to law, regulation, policy, and the collective agreement. They cannot dictate things like how a unit is tasked, which jobs are deemed operationally necessary, etc. They can advocate and take legally enforceable action to make sure things are done with proper regards to health and safety, that work is properly compensated, etc.

The RCMP is grappling with this right now- their union has been up and running for about a year, but they mostly deal with individual or collective personnel, health, and safety issues. They don’t get to take the reins on how the force is deployed or the mission accomplished. They don’t get to lean out a too heavy chain of command, or excessively burdensome bureaucracy. A unionized portion of the military would be no different in these regards. All the operational problems, all the issues with force generation and force employment would still be unaddressed. Those are exclusively executive decisions.


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## daftandbarmy (14 Dec 2020)

Brihard said:
			
		

> No. Unions donMt get to trample on operational decisions. “Management has the right to manage”, and that doesn’t mean that have to be good at it. Unions can hold the employer accountable to law, regulation, policy, and the collective agreement. They cannot dictate things like how a unit is tasked, which jobs are deemed operationally necessary, etc. They can advocate and take legally enforceable action to make sure things are done with proper regards to health and safety, that work is properly compensated, etc.
> 
> The RCMP is grappling with this right now- their union has been up and running for about a year, but they mostly deal with individual or collective personnel, health, and safety issues. They don’t get to take the reins on how the force is deployed or the mission accomplished. They don’t get to lean out a too heavy chain of command, or excessively burdensome bureaucracy. A unionized portion of the military would be no different in these regards. All the operational problems, all the issues with force generation and force employment would still be unaddressed. Those are exclusively executive decisions.



Based on some of the whining that always impedes unity, progress and performance, a Unionized Reserve Force might be a relief.

The only way to 'fix' the Reserves is to give us a proper mission. And then support us & hold us accountable properly to achieve that mission e.g., "5 3/4 Bde will Destroy Enfor in KZ ABC NLT 0600hrs.....". 

'Train to excite' is not a mission, it's a leadership cop out at the highest levels. Dishing out trinkets like 'Mission Taskings' that never get properly supported, or tested in integration with the Reg F units we are supposed to support, is even worse in many ways.


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## FJAG (14 Dec 2020)

I've said it before and I'll say it again:



> Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war. This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little. The Canadian Forces needs a plan. General Belzile 2005



The regular force is those people we need for day-to-day operations in a peacetime or semi-stable world. The reserves should be the plan for a "major war". This means organization, equipment and training. Take away any of those and it becomes an entity that falls far short of its potential and will fail the country in a crisis.

The only way to "fix" the reserves? - This is one way that won't break the bank. (Shameless plug)

 :cheers:


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## MilEME09 (15 Dec 2020)

FJAG said:
			
		

> I've said it before and I'll say it again:
> 
> The regular force is those people we need for day-to-day operations in a peacetime or semi-stable world. The reserves should be the plan for a "major war". This means organization, equipment and training. Take away any of those and it becomes an entity that falls far short of its potential and will fail the country in a crisis.
> 
> ...



For that though we would also need a robust and slightly more aggressive foreign policy that actually utilizes the military as a tool in the box, not just something to toss at issues when our allies come knocking for our keep.


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## FJAG (15 Dec 2020)

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> For that though we would also need a robust and slightly more aggressive foreign policy that actually utilizes the military as a tool in the box, not just something to toss at issues when our allies come knocking for our keep.



Oh no. You're not getting me to go down that old rabbit hole again. No, sir.

 ;D


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