# George Bush is going in-Iraq War



## cameron_highlander (17 Mar 2003)

If anyone has heard the news as of a half hour ago, George Bush has given Saddam 48 hours to leave Iraq with his son's or else war will be declared. This is gonna be one long, bloody war. I just hope the US can stick through it all because they will take alot of casualties. Saddam is one scary mother and he's got to go before he causes some more harm.


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## Michael Dorosh (17 Mar 2003)

It will NOT be a long bloody war; it isn‘t even going to start this week.  With the sandstorms coming, I‘d be surpised to see any ground action in the next 7 days.  Could be up to two months before we see anything but airstrikes.

The 48 hours was the deadline for Saddam, not the US Army.  Note he said "a time of our choosing."

I suspect most Iraqi units will choose to surrender when the balloon goes up - just like last time.


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## nbk (17 Mar 2003)

I doubt this will be a long war. I think the Iraqi soldiers will surrender quick, there is no way they can win, I know some Iraqi-Canadians and they are far from stupid people.

I think this war will be remembered as the buildup to war being much much longer then then the war itself.


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## typhoon85 (18 Mar 2003)

"it isn‘t even going to start this week. With the sandstorms coming, I‘d be surpised to see any ground action in the next 7 days. Could be up to two months before we see anything but airstrikes."

I disagree with Mr. Dorosh, I heard that the U.S Military is runing a "shock and aw" style campaign against Iraq. This means there attacking by land air and sea all at the same time. Not like the last Gulf War were they had air and sea strike‘s first followed by a land invasion.I expect this war to start by the end of this week. Having ground units stay in Kuwait for up to another 2 monthes as you suggested might happen I think would be bad for moral. The sooner the war starts the sooner the soldiers can go back home.


Thats my opinion for what its worth....which probally isn‘t much   :blotto:


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## typhoon85 (18 Mar 2003)

Also about when the war might start.....the war could start before the proposed 48 hours if Saddam is dumb enough to attack the allies first.


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## Michael Dorosh (18 Mar 2003)

I stand corrected - on some other boards as well. 

 Your assessment seems better than mine Sean, on second though.  Either way, I doubt it will be a protracted campaign.  The best case is that the poor *******s surrender in droves, and someone has enough guts to take out Saddam from inside.

Although, one does wonder what Bush meant by "at a time of our choosing".   There was so much talk about not being able to go in the sandstorms, etc., I kind of thought maybe this would make the Americans bide their time.

Will be interesting to say the least.


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## RoyalHighlander (18 Mar 2003)

Best case scenario would be Sadam leaving to exile in some other middle east country, No war,a semblance of stabilty in the region, and every one go back to the hockey games


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## Jarnhamar (18 Mar 2003)

The US already won the war. 

I watched a news clip on TV about american soldiers in kuait. It looked like a little built up town. In the back round there were a bunch of stores like pizza hut, chubby chicken, taco bell. There was a movie theater playing ‘Tears of the Sun‘.  Football field. They mentioned something about american allies (looked like kuait soldiers)enjoying the small luxuries affored to US troops. Even a mini-PX.
Im sure once we take some land in Iraq the same will happen.

Blow up a countries tanks and kill their soldiers and they will  make more. Change their culture more akin to your own and they stop being their own country.

Im sure something like that is in ‘The art of War‘ somewhere    :blotto:


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## onecat (18 Mar 2003)

"Best case scenario would be Sadam leaving to exile in some other middle east country"

Not that I want war, but I don‘t think Saddam deserves exile.  He should only be promised a fair day in court and if convicted a nice warm cell to spend out his days.  If the world is truly changing they exile should taken out the picture.


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## Jungle (18 Mar 2003)

I agree this will be a short war, probably with less casualties then the first one. The Iraqis will surrender faster than the allies can advance, we saw a good example last week. Now if the coalition finds chemical / biological weapons, the UN SC will lose it‘s credibility and countries like France and Germany will look like idiots. The anti-war whiners will find out that the people of Iraq wanted this war.
I am disappointed at the decision of our government not to support, at least politically, the coalition.


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## Michael Dorosh (18 Mar 2003)

But Jungle, we are supporting the coalition.  We have four warships in the Arabian Sea, and 2000 men going to Afghanistan to free up allied soldiers for combat duty in Iraq.  Sending a brigade into combat would be suicide given our current state of equipment.  Can you imagine our MLVWs in the desert?


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## Zoomie (18 Mar 2003)

Michael,

Our four warships will not participate in any action WRT any war in Iraq.  The 2000 men that we are sending to Afghanistan does not really help the Americans in any real way.  They (the US) already have tens of thousands of soldiers on the ground in surrounding nations as I type.  The contingent in Kabul will simply be re-deployed to their staging areas.
I am whole-heartedly disappointed with the Canadian government.  By turning their (and our) backs on the US at the final hour, we are showing that we are a Country of convenience, with no true political back-bone.   I can only see further strains between our two governments and an increase in economic tariffs...


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## Tyler (18 Mar 2003)

> and 2000 men going to Afghanistan to free up allied soldiers for combat duty in Iraq.


Not entirely true. I beleive that we will be relieving the German and Dutch U.N. presence in Kabul. This will be a U.N. mission and there will probably be a few ROTO‘s. I got a call last week from my sect. IC asking me if I was interested in going, so did everyone else in my Coy. I said yes and have been told that more details will come.

Has anyone else in the PRes got a call yet?

Tyler


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## Jungle (18 Mar 2003)

I have seen Armies equipped with worse than MLVWs go into operations. ****, I saw LSVWs in ops, and actually perform well...
I may be wrong, but I don‘t believe there is a strong US commitment to ISAF. The CDN govt agreed to this task to wiggle its way out of fighting in Iraq.
Our ships will defend themselves should they be attacked by Iraqi forces, but... what are the chances of that??? they are deployed for the fight against terrorism, not for ops against Iraq.


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## onecat (18 Mar 2003)

Okay maybe I missed something, but aren‘t your troops being sent to Afghanistan in the summer?  If their going then and its a UN mission how will that help the US out in their war which will be happening very soon????

Also I was thinking the statment made about Iraqi troops, and I think the regular Igaqi troops will surrender, but the SSO troops and Guards have more to lose and I think they might actually put up a fight once US troops close in.  Many of them have committed crimes like torture and mass murder, so any new gov‘t isn‘t likely to treat them well when the war is over.


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## McG (18 Mar 2003)

In 1991, media reports focused on the US Marines that were prepared to conduct an amphibious assault into Kuwait.  The forces which actually defeated the Iraqis were inland and far to the west of the Persian Gulf.

 . . . I suppose the moral is that we can‘t predict how the US will fight the war until after the shooting begins.


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## Gryphon (18 Mar 2003)

> By turning their (and our) backs on the US at the final hour, we are showing that we are a Country of convenience, with no true political back-bone.


I have to disagree. Canadians have always been more involved in peace making and keeping. how are we supposed to keep our roles as peacekeepers if we join the coalition and go to war? **** man, we hardly have the money as it is, but still, i‘d rather go and help some poor soul who‘s life it totally ****ed up by some dictator, and KNOW THAT I‘M ACTUALLY DOING SOME GOOD, rather then go to war with Iraq, and know that all that i‘m doing is helping some Texan mother****er who‘s out for oil and just so that he‘ll have a war.

I‘m sorry, but i thought we evolved a bit from the olden days where the enemy was "evil". If you ask me, it isn‘t Sadaam whose evil, rather it‘s Bush whose evil. He said at the state of the union address that whoever didn‘t climb on board his little "crusade" was decidedly against him, and thus can be considered the enemy. I mean, please, What is this? the Crusades? 

I say if the US decides to put economic sanction onto us, then i say let‘s show the US that we can be *******s as well. Let‘s show them what sanctions are: let‘s cut the gas lines running through the praires that pump gallons of oil into the US. Let‘s turn the power off that powers New England. Let‘s see then how they can cope without us!

True, 80% of our exports go to the US. SO WHAT? they‘re afraid of us. they‘ve taxed our softwood in the interest of "fair trade", they‘ve tried to boycot our wheat, they‘ve stolen our salmon, and i‘ve had enough of their arrogance, audacity, and overall americanisms!
*
I‘m sorry if this offended anybody, but i just had to rant it out!*


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## Bert (18 Mar 2003)

According to and older Stratfor information Services (www.stratfor.com) briefing, a Canadian deployment of 2,000 troops to Afganistan is possible for this summer.  The deployment is susposed to or likely to relieve the remainder of the American 82nd Airborne from airport guard for operations in Iraq.  Considering at least a 3 month Iraqi conflict, the Canadian contribution may yet assist the Americans.  The Canadian destroyer Iroquios and the frigates can easily fit into their own group or groups as part of "war against terrorism", or fit into a carrier battle group as escort and picket duty.  The definition of "war against terrorism" or "attack against or danger too a carrier battle group" can be interrupted in many contexts.  I‘d be surprised if Iroquois and her little sisters didn‘t become somewhat attached to a carrier battle group for awhile during their deployment.


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## Bert (18 Mar 2003)

I read this off of Stratfor‘s www site. Makes interesting reading.  Apologies to Mike Bobbit if this post is too long:

STRATFOR‘S GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
 http://www.stratfor.com 
18 March 2003

War Plan: Consequences

Introduction

All wars have consequences. Some are intended, some are 
unintended. Some wars, such as the Kosovo war, give rise only to 
local consequences. Some wars have global consequences, but only 
for a short time, like the 1956 British-French-Israeli attack on 
Egypt. Other wars reshape the world so profoundly that everything 
that comes after is in some way a consequence of that war; World 
War II is an obvious example. Some wars are really only battles -
- part of a much broader and longer conflict -- and cannot be 
defined in any other way. The Korean War appeared to be a 
freestanding event, but it was really simply an episode in a much 
longer, very complex Cold War.

In our view, Iraq has more in common with Korea than with other 
wars. It is a campaign, not a war. It will be remembered as an 
episode in the global war between the United States and radical 
Islam. That does not mean that the war cannot be consequential, 
but it does mean that the war is embedded in a sequence of events 
and cannot be understood outside of this context.

The intended consequences of each side are well understood, from 
our point of view, and we have discussed them extensively in this 
series. The United States has a series of goals that boil down to 
three:

1. Shifting the psychology of the region through a decisive 
victory.
2. Eliminating weapons of mass destruction.
3. Using Iraq as a base for follow-on operations in the region.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein‘s strategic goal is simple:

1. Survival

In our view, the United States is likely to achieve its military 
goals, and Hussein will fail to achieve his. The campaign might 
take longer than hoped, and casualties potentially might be 
higher than desired, but the outcome ought to be a U.S. victory. 
Therefore, the issue is what the consequences -- intended or 
unintended -- will be in the Iraq campaign.

Consequences Within Iraq

The United States and its coalition partners will occupy Iraq. In 
effect, this means occupation by the United States. It is not 
clear, however, that the United States will occupy all of Iraq. 
Events in Turkey have created both a military and a political 
question mark.

The Turkish army has operated in northern Iraq for a long time. 
It has three interests there: securing its frontiers against 
events in Iraq, preventing the formation of a Kurdish state and 
managing Kurdish behavior near its borders, and controlling oil 
fields around Mosul and Kirkuk that represent a critical supply 
for Turkey. One of the reasons for Ankara‘s reluctance to permit 
U.S. troops in the region is that this would limit Turkey‘s own 
ability to act on these three interests directly.

Depending on how the war evolves, Turkish intervention in 
northern Iraq is highly likely. Turkish forces are already in 
Iraqi territory, pursuing Ankara‘s first goal. Turkey, once in 
Iraq, has two interests. First, its forces will seek to take 
control of the Mosul oil fields and, if possible, the oil fields 
in Kirkuk. It is highly likely that the Kurdish forces in the 
northeast also will move on Kirkuk, since that is an old Kurdish 
city as well as an oil center. The likelihood of combat between 
Turkish and Kurdish forces is high. Indeed, Turkey might intend 
to use this conflict to settle matters with the Kurds.

This Turkish action does not challenge any fundamental U.S. 
interests. In executing precursor operations, the Turks will have 
to engage some of the Iraqi formations. In effect, if Turkish 
troops move in, they will be doing some of the heavy lifting that 
the 4th Infantry Division was supposed to do; in terms of 
defeating Iraq, this is more than a satisfactory conclusion. Nor 
will a Turkish occupation of the line from Mosul to Kirkuk pose a 
challenge to U.S. strategic plans. The basic geography of Iraq 
will still permit U.S. power projection throughout the region.

The challenge that the Turkish presence poses is to U.S. postwar 
reconstruction plans. The United States is relying on the sale of 
Iraqi oil to fund those plans in the long run. If it does not 
control the northern oil fields and their output is diverted to 
Turkish uses, the amount of oil available will decline 
substantially. This will pose a challenge to reconstruction. 
Therefore, the United States will have to reach some sort of 
accommodation with Turkey and will have relatively few levers 
with which to do so. It cannot go to war with Turkey, and Turkey 
clearly is not indebted to the United States.

Moreover, a Turkish-Kurdish war is likely to result in disaster 
for the Kurds. The United States has a poor record of keeping its 
promises to the Kurds, and one of the fundamental issues in this 
campaign is U.S. reliability. Countries like Kuwait, Qatar and 
Bahrain are watching this dynamic carefully. From a tactical 
point of view, the fate of the Kurds is a matter of little 
consequence. From a strategic point of view, the treatment of the 
Kurds has substantial significance.

The United States will have to deal with the Turks on their role 
in Iraq. That will be one of the first items on any postwar 
agenda. Accompanying this will be the need to deal with Iran, 
which has been supporting a number of Shiite groups in the north 
and south. Iranian-sponsored forces already have entered Iraqi 
territory in the north, and Iranian operatives are working in the 
south. U.S. relations with Iran are poor, and officials in Tehran 
have said they believe the country is the next target in the 
region. The United States will have to control Iran‘s behavior in 
Iraq. 

Therefore, there is a serious question as to just what parts of 
Iraq the United States will control. It certainly will control 
the bulk of the country, but it may not control all of it 
directly or in practical terms. This means that the United States 
will have to devote substantial forces to the protection of its 
perimeters in Iraq, as well as additional forces for controlling 
Iraq itself.

As in Afghanistan, the United States will create a puppet 
government. If the government actually were to function as 
Washington has advertised -- as a representative of all Iraqi 
ethnic groups -- it would tear itself apart in a week. But since 
no one has elected anyone, and all of these puppets are 
handpicked by the United States, it misses the point that these 
ethnic groups are fragmented along several lines. A genuinely 
function government is a long way away. It does not mean that 
U.S. forces cannot invent and govern through a puppet entity -- 
pretending, as in Afghanistan, that it has legitimacy. Over time, 
it might actually gain some.

The primary burden for reconstructing Iraq will fall on the U.S. 
military, its contractors and that segment of the Iraqi 
technocracy that remains intact. Obviously, British, Australian 
and other coalition partners will be able to participate. The 
extent of destruction will depend on the nature of the war. If 
there is an early collapse of the Iraqi army and no destruction 
of the oil fields, reconstruction should not be the issue. The 
primary issue will be new construction, particularly expanding 
the capacity of the oil fields.

However, it is Hussein‘s intention to conduct a campaign that 
must, as an inevitable side effect, lead to massive destruction. 
The torching of oil fields makes military sense, as we have 
pointed out. The strategy of delay and attrition will lead to 
massive damage to the civilian infrastructure as well as to major 
civilian casualties. Thus, if Hussein is successful in resisting 
to any degree, the requirements of reconstruction can be massive.

The most difficult and immediate problem will be in Baghdad 
itself. Cities the size of Baghdad cannot survive for any period 
of time without water, sanitation, food deliveries and, as the 
basic enabler, electricity. Intense combat in Baghdad will create 
an immediate humanitarian crisis that, if left unmitigated, will 
lead to deaths in a matter of days. Thirst doesn‘t wait, and 
water from unsanitary sources leads rapidly to disease.

The manner in which the United States handles the crisis of 
Baghdad -- if such a crisis occurs -- will condition the entire 
atmosphere of postwar Iraq. One-quarter of Iraq‘s population 
lives inside of Baghdad proper, and perhaps half live in the 
densely populated region south of it. Disaster will come quickly 
here.

The United States has extensive experience in relief efforts in 
non-urban areas; it is much less experienced in emergency relief 
in large metropolitan areas. The ability of individuals to cope 
in cities is much lower than in the countryside. The city is a 
system of systems that does not tolerate failure well. Massive, 
rapid repairs to major facilities will be difficult, particularly 
if intermittent combat continues.

Iraq has massive centrifugal forces. The Hussein regime was not 
an accident: Brutal dictatorship was a political solution for a 
fractious nation. The United States has the ability to impose its 
will on the nation. It has the ability to create a council under 
its authority. It can, if it wishes, pretend that that council 
represents the will of the Iraqi people. Nevertheless, 
withdrawing from Iraq will require either a major evolution in 
Iraqi national identity, a very sophisticated and complex 
arrangement among parties that deeply distrust each other, or a 
new dictator. 

U.S. forces will be in Iraq for a long time. It is not only a 
matter of strategic desirability, it is also a matter of 
necessity. Chaos in Iraq is inconsistent with the psychological 
goals of the campaign. It also would create dangers to U.S. 
deployments there. The United States will, from the moment the 
occupation begins, be forced to assume responsibility for the 
governance of Iraq. Whether it creates an indigenous council or 
tries to hand off control to the United Nations, the United 
States will remain in Iraq for a generation and will be 
responsible for the nation‘s well-being.

Regional Consequences

The primary purpose of the Iraq campaign will, of course, be to 
influence and reshape the region. Al Qaeda has support throughout 
the Middle East, and most governments are either complicit or 
unwilling to incur the political costs of disrupting al Qaeda and 
similar groups at home. The purpose of this campaign is, first 
and foremost, to create a politico-military environment that 
persuades countries in the region to redefine their behavior. To 
put it more brutally and honestly, it is to bring massive 
military forces to bear on countries in the region in order to 
compel them to cooperate, or failing that, carry out future 
military confrontations.

There will be two dimensions to this. The first will be to 
redefine the atmosphere of the Middle East. Washington now 
accepts as a given that it bears the deep animosity of the 
region. Officials do not see any opportunity for a short-term 
solution to this problem, and the problem presented by al Qaeda 
is immediate. If the United States cannot be loved, the second 
best outcome is to be feared. A victory in Iraq would demonstrate 
both American will and power. If it can be coupled with a 
successful and relatively prosperous occupation, fear can be 
coupled with respect. 

The second dimension is politico-military. Following the war, the 
United States not only would be an occupying power but also would 
field a force that is in effect indigenous to the region, at 
least from a military point of view. The presence of a massive, 
mobile force, permanently based in the region, without depending 
on the permission of others, would redefine the region 
dramatically. The United States expects to be able to use that 
force to its ends.

From the U.S. point of view, three countries are particular post-
campaign targets: Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran. In Washington‘s 
eyes, all three are, in different ways and with different 
intentions, facilitators of al Qaeda. Since the United States has 
little confidence in its ability to destroy al Qaeda directly, 
the U.S. focus is on enabling countries -- whether the enablement 
is part of government policy, an unintended consequence of other 
internal problems or the result of fear. 

Once Iraq is occupied, U.S. forces will have two missions. The 
first will be the occupation, pacification and reconstruction of 
Iraq. The second will be to pose a direct military threat two 
these countries. The United States certainly has no intention or 
desire to invade any of these countries. At the same time, the 
United States takes the view that it is only the threat of direct 
military action that will compel them to cooperate in destroying 
al Qaeda. A threat has no meaning if it is not serious. 
Therefore, in order to be effective, the United States will have 
to be prepared to carry out follow-on campaigns.

Each of these countries is in a different position.

* Syria maintains a complex policy of hidden accommodations over 
Lebanon with countries like Israel, and equally hidden support 
for paramilitary groups. As with other countries, its primary 
interest is in regime survival, with a secondary interest in the 
absorption of Lebanon. Following the war in Iraq, the Syrians 
would be completely surrounded by potential enemies: the United 
States, Israel and Turkey. The U.S. 6th Fleet will be offshore in 
the Mediterranean. At that point, Damascus‘ room for maneuver 
will be sharply curtailed. Hussein was an enemy but was not 
particularly interested in the internal affairs of Syria. The 
United States will be in Iraq because it is interested in Syria, 
and that government‘s ability to resist redefinition of its 
policies will be extremely limited.

* Saudi Arabia‘s internal politics are far too complex to deal 
with here. Suffice it to say that there are elements in Saudi 
Arabia that have supported al Qaeda, at least according to the 
United States, and that the Saudis have lacked the ability or the 
will to dismantle that apparatus. Saudi Arabia is a country with 
deep internal divisions and serious financial problems. From 
Iraq, the United States would be able to manipulate these 
internal contradictions directly. Moreover, it would have a 
tremendous lever over Saudi policy. If the United States controls 
Iraq‘s oil, it will be in a position to put severe pressure on 
oil prices. Riyadh needs a relatively high price of oil, despite 
the kingdom‘s low production costs; its debts need to be serviced 
through the cash flow that oil produces. Between the manipulation 
of Saudi Arabia‘s internal political system, the potential 
ability to manipulate oil prices and the presence of U.S. forces 
on its borders, the United States is assuming that it can force 
Riyadh to reshape its behavior.

* Iran represents the most serious regional challenge for the 
United States. Unlike Saudi Arabia and Syria, Iran is a 
substantial national entity which, though deeply divided, might 
well present a united front against the United States. The 
correlation of forces between the United States and Syria or 
Saudi Arabia vastly favors the United States. The correlation of 
forces with Iran is not nearly so favorable, however, and 
therefore the U.S. military threat is not nearly so credible. At 
the same time, U.S. leaders have noted that Iran has a 
substantial nuclear weapons program that in many ways is more 
sophisticated than Iraq‘s. Iran also has maintained complex and 
murky relationships with al Qaeda since January 2002. Even though 
the United States technically poses a two-front threat to Iran 
(Iraq and Afghanistan), Washington does not have a deep appetite 
for war with Iran. At the same time, it must, in some way, reach 
accommodation with Iran or force Tehran to change its behavior.

We expect Iran to be the next major confrontation in the region. 
The Saudis already are adjusting their position, allowing U.S. 
forces into the kingdom. The Syrians have little room for 
maneuver. The Iranians -- who already claim that they are the 
next target of the United States -- are by far the most 
formidable challengers to U.S. regional hegemony. So long as Iran 
keeps its distance from al Qaeda and related groups, Washington 
is prepared to avoid confrontation. However, the extraordinarily 
complex internal political struggle between reformers and 
conservatives creates situations in which challenging the United 
States and aligning with al Qaeda benefits some groups. The 
central government is divided and therefore will become an arena 
in which confrontation will be generated. We expect emerging 
issues between the United States and Iran in the wake of the Iraq 
campaign.

Global Consequences

The fundamental threat to the United States from al Qaeda will 
not be reduced by the campaign in Iraq. But it is our view that a 
successful campaign will cause the threat to lessen more than if 
the United States had not gone to war. One of al Qaeda‘s 
recruiting arguments has been that the United States intends to 
make war on all Islamic countries; the other has been that the 
struggle against the United States is not hopeless because the 
superpower is weak and corrupt -- unable to wage war and 
therefore vulnerable to dedicated paramilitary groups. Since one 
of the foundations of revolutionary groups is hope -- the belief 
that sacrifice can lead to victory -- any action that undermines 
that hope limits recruiting. Now, this in no way implies that the 
threat declines. Al Qaeda will carry out attacks as intensely as 
it can over time. But in the long run, destroying its 
infrastructure in host countries and undermining the sense of 
hope might have some limiting effect. At any rate, we believe the 
Iraqi campaign will not increase the total quantity of attacks on 
the United States, but it might move the distribution of attacks 
forward, increasing the tempo of operations at the present time.

There is also a fundamental shift in the global alignment. It is 
noteworthy that France and the United States treated each other 
as enemies during the U.N. diplomatic process. That is to say 
that France did not simply express its objection to U.S. aims -- 
rather, Paris used its resources aggressively to block American 
ambitions. 

France‘s motives in this were two-fold:

* It saw the Iraqi issue as an opportunity to generate momentum 
in Europe for a unified foreign policy designed to balance U.S. 
power. French leaders understood that the nation, by itself, 
could not hope to counterbalance U.S. power. Therefore, they saw 
Europe, coalesced around a Franco-German axis, as the 
counterbalance; they saw France as the dominant power in this 
European entity.

* France has long had ambitions to be a major player in the 
Middle East. It has historical roots there and current interests 
in a range of commercial entities. France has long felt hindered 
by U.S. policies and presence in the region. Paris sought to 
supplant the United States by establishing closer relations with 
Arab countries than the United States did. It sought to use its 
defense of Iraq as a trigger for greater regional influence.

French hopes have been shattered on both fronts. In Europe, the 
reaction to a French-designed European foreign policy has been 
overwhelmingly negative. Apart from Germany, only Sweden, Belgium 
and Luxembourg have signed on to the French program. Paris‘ 
influence, particularly in the east, has suffered severe blows. 
In the Middle East, France has been shown to be incapable of 
controlling the United States and therefore to be an unreliable 
ally.

The Franco-American confrontation has generated precisely the 
opposite effect than what Paris had intended. Out of fear of 
France, much of Europe aligned with the United States. Out of 
appearance of weakness, France has lost tremendous credibility in 
the Middle East. The United States will press home this 
advantage. Washington in essence has demonstrated that it cannot 
be blocked and that it will not allow international institutions 
to control its actions. This, of course, has bred great 
resentment. It also has created a situation in which European 
powers, including Russia and potentially Germany, will have to 
re-evaluate their behavior toward the United States.

If the Iraq war goes well -- if it ends quickly, with relatively 
few casualties and with an effective and benign occupation -- the 
United States will emerge from the war with substantially 
enhanced power globally. The issue for the United States is not 
whether it is liked; the issue is whether the cost of resistance 
to U.S. policies is high enough that challengers will be 
deterred.

It follows that the United States will not reconcile with France. 
Rather, Washington will seek to make an example of the 
consequences of active attempts to thwart American policies. 
Russia and Germany opposed but did not devote nearly the 
resources that France did to defeating U.S. ambitions. Opposing 
and working actively to block U.S. policies is the distinction -- 
and from the U.S. point of view, France crossed the line. 
Washington will have one policy for the rest of Europe, another 
policy for Germany and Russia and a third policy especially for 
France. U.S. policy in the Middle East and in Europe will be 
constructed around this, not simply out of anger at France -- 
although this should not be dismissed -- but as an exercise in 
power and a lesson in consequences.

Conclusion

The Iraq campaign will not transform the world, but it will be 
far from a trivial event. It obviously will change life 
dramatically in Iraq -- with the proviso that in this very 
ancient land, the more things change, the more things stay the 
same. Another conqueror always changes things, but life goes on. 
On a global scale, if the war is successful from Washington‘s 
viewpoint and the United States is able to reconstruct Iraq 
rapidly, U.S. power will simply grow. Public opinion is volatile. 
Rome was never loved; it was admired. 

It will be on the regional level that things will change the 
most. We will make a bold assertion: The region bordering Iraq 
will see the most dramatic changes since the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire and the Sykes-Picot Agreements that created the modern 
Middle East. The insertion of American power into the middle of 
this region will redefine the behavior of the entire region. It 
is crucial, however, to understand that the Iraq war is no more a 
war than Guadalcanal was a war. It is a campaign that will be 
followed by other campaigns. 

All of this depends on the course of the war. Four outcomes now 
possible: Hussein‘s abdication and a peaceful U.S. entrance; a 
rapid U.S. victory; a more difficult victory; an inconclusive war 
ending in an inconclusive cease-fire. It would appear to us that 
the likely outcome rests somewhere between the second and third 
choices.


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## typhoon85 (19 Mar 2003)

"i‘d rather go and help some poor soul who‘s life it totally ****ed up by some dictator, and KNOW THAT I‘M ACTUALLY DOING SOME GOOD, rather then go to war with Iraq,"-gryphon664

This statement confused me. Last time I checked Saddam was a evil and brutal dictator to. Gryphon664 don‘t u think that the result of this war will bring some good to the Iraqie people? I certainly do.

"If you ask me, it isn‘t Sadaam whose evil, rather it‘s Bush whose evil"-gryphon664

I must say i don‘t agree with some issues with President Bush but to say that Saddam is not evil and that President Bush is.....is just stupid and flat out ignorant on your part.

"I say if the US decides to put economic sanction onto us, then i say let‘s show the US that we can be *******s as well. Let‘s show them what sanctions are: let‘s cut the gas lines running through the praires that pump gallons of oil into the US. Let‘s turn the power off that powers New England. Let‘s see then how they can cope without us!"-gryphon664

I be extremely surprized and shocked if the U.S. put economic sanctions on us simply because we won‘t support a war unless it gets a 2nd resolution.Second of all you say we should cut the gas lines running through the praires that pump gallons of oil into the U.S. and that we should turn off the power that powers NE wouldn‘t be to smart cuz that would cut off the flow of cash we get for these services.......yes we don‘t do this for free.

"SO WHAT? they‘re afraid of us"-gryphon664

What are they afraid of?


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## Jarnhamar (19 Mar 2003)

Saddam puts a gun to his peoples heads and says ‘If you don‘t join me i‘ll kill you‘
Bush address the world and says ‘If you don‘t join me your against me‘ (read between the lines)

One is a thief dirty and dressed like  a thug, like a gang leader in the hood. The other a well dressed buisness man making deals and fast talking. Both use violence to get what they want. The difference is that one is simple and straight forward while the other tries to come across as something else. Whos better? I would say neigher.

I think part of the reason i personally am against sending troops to iraq (besides the moral reasons of joining a slaughter) is embarassment.  I hate the idea of the world seeing the state that our military is in.  I‘d wonder how long it would be before one of our ships have to be brought into port because the anchor fell off or a frontline unit goes home because of alligations of sexual harassment/assault.  Watch the money in the buget cease to exist because all the higher ups want to fly to iraq first class and have all the nice accomodations just so they can say "they were in iraq".
I think my post is a little negitive, no wonder i never excelled while working as a recruiter


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## humint (19 Mar 2003)

I don‘t think that Bush and Hussien are evil. I just think that they are crazy old farts that need a good kick in the @ss!   :evil:  

We shouldn‘t be surprised that Bush is going in -- the whole thing was inevitable! Ever heard of the irresistable force? Well, that‘s US foreign policy and the will to war.

It was never about WMD, but rather regime change -- plain and simple. And, Cretien has stood firm on that point: Canada does not support regime change through the use of force. WMD, saving the people of Iraq, etc, etc, blah blah blah: it was all just rhetoric to justify George Bush‘s frat-party prank of shaving off Saddam‘s moustache! Alpha Beta Sigma Phi! Man, those were good days.

It really annoys me to hear people complain that we are not supporting the US in their fight against terrorism. It was decided long ago that, unless the UN sanctioned it, Canada would not directly support the use of force against Iraq. 

Personally, I think this was a wise decision. Whether people like it or not, unilateral decisions for the use of force is not legitimate foreign policy. Certainly, not under the current circumstances.

And, Canada still supports the war on terrorism by sending rotos of Afghanistan and ships to the Gulf as well as other exchanges, etc. We are still in the game. 

The idea that we left the US high-and-dry is a farce. 

To be honest. The US created this Middle-East mess ages ago when they supported Saddam and gave him chemical and biological agents to fight Iran. Where were they when Kurds and Shi Muslim were getting gassed? Well, now‘s the time the US can have thier cake and eat it too! They made the mess, now they can go an clean it up!

And then, after the dust settles and Iraq is a wasteland, Canada can go in there and help rebuild it and keep the peace.


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## Pugil (19 Mar 2003)

They said they want to topple Saddam because he has WMD, then it was because of the link to AL-Qaida, they found also that it would be a good cause to liberate Iraq from a tyrant( that they supported not long ago), not long ago they said that only an exile from Saddam would avert war but they changed their mind saying that even with the exile of the dictator, the US will invade Iraq. SO can somebody tell me whats the real aim of the US in this whole idea of invading Iraq????!!


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## Infanteer (19 Mar 2003)

Wow, there is a lot of posts up here that resort to nothing but spouting Anti-US rhetoric in the form of ad hominem attacks against George Bush.  How about forming some real arguments on this issue.  Alot of you seem to be letting some preconceived notions or idealss get in the way of what is really going on.  If you feel I‘m wrong, lets hear a good rebutal.



> _gryphon said_
> I say if the US decides to put economic sanction onto us, then i say let‘s show the US that we can be *******s as well. Let‘s show them what sanctions are: let‘s cut the gas lines running through the praires that pump gallons of oil into the US. Let‘s turn the power off that powers New England. Let‘s see then how they can cope without us!
> True, 80% of our exports go to the US. SO WHAT? they‘re afraid of us. they‘ve taxed our softwood in the interest of "fair trade", they‘ve tried to boycot our wheat, they‘ve stolen our salmon, and i‘ve had enough of their arrogance, audacity, and overall americanisms!


This is just plain silly.  Remember, there is an asymmetric relationship in the US-Canadian economic game.  We need them more than they need us.  I don‘t think a pissing match to prove we don‘t need americans is worth waking up next day with a severely crippled economy and a lowered standard of living.



> _ghost said_One is a thief dirty and dressed like a thug, like a gang leader in the hood. The other a well dressed buisness man making deals and fast talking. Both use violence to get what they want. The difference is that one is simple and straight forward while the other tries to come across as something else. Whos better? I would say neigher.


Come on.  Condeming American foreign policy by comparing Bush to Saddam.  There are many issues surrounding this soon-to-be-war, and this silly statement gets to the core of none of them.  Can you honestly expect anyone to believe that we should have trouble differentiating between one of the oldest democracy‘s in the world and and a authoritarian regime that has used WMD on its neighbours and its on citizens.



> _humint said_Personally, I think this was a wise decision. Whether people like it or not, unilateral decisions for the use of force is not legitimate foreign policy. Certainly, not under the current circumstances.


This is wishful thinking at best, and dangerous dreaming at worst.  I think history (including the last week) prove this statement to be false.



> To be honest. The US created this Middle-East mess ages ago when they supported Saddam and gave him chemical and biological agents to fight Iran. Where were they when Kurds and Shi Muslim were getting gassed? Well, now‘s the time the US can have thier cake and eat it too! They made the mess, now they can go an clean it up!


I don‘t know about that.  This mess was set in place long before Saddam came to power.  IMHO, it all started with failure to deal with rising Arab fanatical nationalism that started with Nasser in the 50‘s.  What we are seeing is merely a continuation of post-Cold War mish-mash, not necessarily the fault of Americans alone.


Well, I refuse to let some "inferiority complex" against the US affect my view on this subject.  (It seems this way when Canadian soldiers talk about their US counterparts as well.)  America is merely looking after the interests of American citizens (what else should it do?).  
Why are the Americans in this region?  They refuse to allow a tin-pot dictatorship hold it for ransom by cornering a critical resource (vital to the standard of living to ALL Western nations) through either direct conquest or regional destabilization.  They refuse to allow a geo-political area to continue to support terrorist groups that continue to wage an asymmetric war against the West.  And they refuse to have their hands tied by some piss-ant countries in a defunct organization that have no real interest in the matter because they can barely hold themselves togeather.
  And as much as we hate to admit it, for the most part American interests are our interests.  Look at an average Canadian and an average American, and you couldn‘t find two more similar beings.
  As far as I can tell, Canada‘s refusal to support not one but both of our nations historic allies makes no sense as it serves no interests to us and makes us really look like "A Country of Convenience."  Look at Austrailia, it has much more to lose regionally (Indonesia) but still recognises that when the chips fall, they will be on the right side.  It is something I fail to see why Canada did not pick up on (spoiled due to geography is my best guess).  Yes we have tokens elsewhere, and yes we were in Afgahnistan, but like I have said before, abroad Canada has taken one step forward and two steps back.  
To sum up, I agree with those who are truly ashamed of our actions to those we have considered the closest of friends.
And for what?  As to date, I have seen no realistic alternatives to the actions America has undertaken.  Submit to the UN, where the are assured a veto by a has-been power?  Give Iraq more time...we‘ve given him 12 years.  America has tried to play the multilateral game, and many other countries have turned their backs on them (maybe forgetting what the States has done for them in the past, directly or indirectly).  So, all the power to the United States of America, and I hope they know that not all Canadians see them as our Government does.

If anyone has a differnet idea, please offer a counter-argument.  This is a forum for an exchange of ideas.  But don‘t tell me this entire event has come from a poor, Texas upbringing.


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## Jarnhamar (19 Mar 2003)

"Come on. Condeming American foreign policy by comparing Bush to Saddam. There are many issues surrounding this soon-to-be-war, and this silly statement gets to the core of none of them. Can you honestly expect anyone to believe that we should have trouble differentiating between one of the oldest democracy‘s in the world and and a autoritarian regime that has used WMD on its neighbours and its on citizens."


I think bush and hussain are simular. Both use fear to get what they want. One uses fear of death, the other uses fear of withdrawing support. Taking away aid such as food or whatever is just as effective as shooting someone.
The us HAS used and tested WMD on its own people and others during a time of war.

The more i think of it however i‘m starting to think the war is a good idea if only to prove how utterly useless the UN has been.   It‘s an excellent point that the UN has been in iraq for 12 years with nothing to show for. The US just pushing them out of the way like a yipping dog might serve to change how the UN works. Having countrie with vito power who makes their decisions not for the good of the world but for the good of their own economy should stop.

In the end i think a lot of attention should be paid to the point that was mentioned here. The US is responsible for this. First for supplying them weapons and technology to fight iran (Whats the difference between the US supplying iraq with weapons and money and iraq supplying terrorists with weapons and money?) and second for not finishing what they started in 91.


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## Pugil (19 Mar 2003)

_________________________________________
"As far as I can tell, Canada‘s refusal to support not one but both of our nations historic allies makes no sense as it serves no interests to us and makes us really look like "A Country of Convenience." Look at Austrailia, it has much more to lose regionally (Indonesia) but still recognises that when the chips fall, they will be on the right side"
_________________________________________

As far as im concerned a vast majority of the canadian population doesnt support the war, and the government is doing what their voters want by not supporting an unilateral attack on Iraq.

_________________________________________
Give Iraq more time...we‘ve given him 12 years. America has tried to play the multilateral game, and many other countries have turned their backs on them (maybe forgetting what the States has done for them in the past, directly or indirectly)
_________________________________________

Hanx Blix only asked for 3 months to disarm Iraq, WHAT hurt can Iraq do in 3 months when in the 12 years it hasnt threaten any of his neighbour? Israel  has been bashing all the UN resolutions against it for more than 35 years and even have WMD. If this is not double standard can somebody tell what it is?

__________________________________________
I think bush and hussain are simular. Both use fear to get what they want. One uses fear of death, the other uses fear of withdrawing support
__________________________________________

Bush is using the 9-11 fear to get what he wants


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## Infanteer (19 Mar 2003)

I am sure we are all eagerly glued to news sources as this unfolds.  The more I read in the news, the more confused I get.  Canada promises more to the ultimate effort than alot of countries who have backed the US, yet we sit on the fence.  Again, I see nothing for us on our present course and am unable to decipher the goals of our Government.  Even if we could not support the war militarily, we should at least offer political support.



> The more i think of it however i‘m starting to think the war is a good idea if only to prove how utterly useless the UN has been. It‘s an excellent point that the UN has been in iraq for 12 years with nothing to show for. The US just pushing them out of the way like a yipping dog might serve to change how the UN works. Having countrie with vito power who makes their decisions not for the good of the world but for the good of their own economy should stop


I agree with you here.  For seperate reasons, but I don‘t agree with the general principles of many of the functions of the UN, especially the Security Council.



> In the end i think a lot of attention should be paid to the point that was mentioned here. The US is responsible for this. First for supplying them weapons and technology to fight iran (Whats the difference between the US supplying iraq with weapons and money and iraq supplying terrorists with weapons and money?) and second for not finishing what they started in 91.


First Point
Who was the bigger threat back than.  Iran.  It was an attempt to overthrow an totalitarian, fundamentalist regime by supporting an authoritarian regime.  Put yourself in their position at that time and decide for yourself who was the biggest threat.  The world is not cut and dry, black and white, and sometimes we are forced to choose the lesser of two evils.  Saddam has evolved into something different, and now we have arrived at a point where these two states have juxtaposed positions.  So America is dealing with it, anyway it can, due to overarching security concerns stemming from the region.
Second Point
They didn‘t finish the War in ‘91 because they were playing the multilateral game.
1.  They didn‘t have the UN mandate to go into Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein
2.  They were attempting to hold togeather a coalition that was extremely apprehensive against the invasion of Iraq for stability reasons.
3.  They sustained a deep-seated fear of overcommitment and heavy casulties stemming from Vietnam (hence the beutiful propaganda campaign)

As you can see, this decision has come back to haunt them and the Iraqi people (12 years of debilitating sanctions).  Today presents a different set of circumstances both in the US and throughout the world due to Sept.11.  It is obvious that they won‘t fall into this trap again, and are taking a different approach to settle this problem once and for all.



> As far as im concerned a vast majority of the canadian population doesnt support the war, and the government is doing what their voters want by not supporting an unilateral attack on Iraq.


I think the wide ranging views on this board show that it is not quite a vast majority of the public that opposes the war.  This event is proven to be controversial, look at the news covering the decisions of the Government.  The protests have received much publicity, but, as in past cases, they have proven to be a very vocal minority capable of garnering attention.


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## Jarnhamar (19 Mar 2003)

I‘m at a disadvantage. I do see things as black and white. I wouldnt side with the lesser of two evils.
"The lesser of two evils is evil none the less".
I see it akin to someone saying "Its okay to side with guy A because he only killed 3 innocent people and guy B killed 15. Mr A is the lesser of two evils.
I think the whole US culture is built around war. Watching Tv its crazy. War this war that. It makes me a little sad that right now on TV the most important topic isn‘t about all the innocent lives that will be lost but wether of not the oscars will be canceled and which hollywood actor will attend or not. All the TV programs that because of the evil saddam might have their times changed.

Canada should support taking away weapons of mass destruction from psychos like Hussain. Sure i agree with that. But if we want to do it in the name of good and morality then we should do the same against North Korea and Isreal.  I wonder how long it will be before Isreal is tired of the US and the world telling them to calm down and relax and just decides to eradicate palistine in the name of self protection.  I think the term self protection has been used to explain the motives behind some of the most bloody fighting in history.


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## muskrat89 (19 Mar 2003)

I agree with every single point that Infanteer has made. Logic, not emotion. Reason, not teenage recitals/attempts of rebellion....


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## Gryphon (19 Mar 2003)

I have to agree. I do realize that I sound like a hippocrite right now, but i just had to rant somewhere sorry. I‘ll delete it if you guys want


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## Bert (19 Mar 2003)

This post is made up of two articles from www.stratfor.com .  I find them particularily interesting since there is so much confusion surrounding the operations against Iraq.  If article posts are not accepted here, let me know.  I apologise in advance.


THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
19 March 2003

by Dr. George Friedman

Beyond the Iraq Campaign

Summary

If the Iraq campaign ends as most expect, in a U.S. victory, the 
most critical questions will be: What will be the next American 
campaign in the war, and when will it happen? There are deep 
pressures on the United States to call an extended halt to 
operations while it regroups. However, events may not permit 
this, and the place to be most concerned about is Iran.

Analysis

There are wars. There are campaigns. There are battles. Winning 
battles is the key to winning campaigns. Winning campaigns is the 
key to winning wars. Knowing which you are fighting is the key to 
making sense of the situation and planning strategy. If you 
confuse winning a battle with winning a war, that could lead to 
disaster. So too, confusing a victory in a campaign with a 
victory in a war could lead to defeat in the war. Clarity is 
indispensable.

The United States is in a war with al Qaeda. The war began on 
Sept. 11, 2001. It will conclude when the ability of al Qaeda or 
related or follow-on forces, to attack the United States has been 
sufficiently diminished that the United States has returned to a 
state of relative security -- relative, since absolute security 
does not exist in this world. The Iraq campaign is not that war. 
It is a campaign within that war. It follows a previous campaign 
-- Afghanistan -- and it will be followed by other campaigns.

In other words, Iraq is a means toward an end. It is not an end 
in itself. It achieves nothing definitive by itself. Its purpose 
is to enable the United States to achieve other ends later, ends 
that will bring the nation closer to winning the war -- or so 
Washington hopes. It is useful to think of Iraq in terms of the 
New Guinea campaign of World War II: U.S. and Australian troops 
fought there not because of any intrinsic value in New Guinea, 
but because of its geographic and strategic value. The New Guinea 
campaign helped block a Japanese invasion of Australia and served 
as a springboard for later offensives. New Guinea‘s value was in 
what it made possible later on, not in its intrinsic value. It 
was not a war, just a campaign within a war.

Iraq, too, is a campaign within a war. It will not, by itself, 
settle anything. Readers of Stratfor know it is our view that the 
primary purpose of the Iraq war is to set the stage for 
undermining the foundations of al Qaeda in particular and of 
radical Islam as an effective paramilitary force in general. The 
United States has found it enormously difficult to attack al 
Qaeda directly. Mapping out the al Qaeda network -- a sparse 
global system of operatives -- is intrinsically difficult. Taking 
effective action against it on a global, retail level has proven 
even harder.

The United States has tried to find the center of gravity of al 
Qaeda -- the one spot which, if struck, would cause the system 
itself to collapse. Al Qaeda is structured to deny an attacker 
the luxury of a center of gravity. The closest the United States 
could get to one would be the support systems upon which al Qaeda 
depends -- financial support and distribution, recruitment, 
command and control centers, training centers. Al Qaeda doesn‘t 
float on air. It is connected to the earth through its support 
systems. Those support systems, in turn, have locations. If the 
United States can cause the host countries to attack these 
operations, then al Qaeda‘s ability to operate will be severely 
curtailed. Victory in the war will become possible.

Al Qaeda shrewdly has distributed these operations in several 
countries. Instead of depending on state support, they have 
simply relied upon non-governmental entities to cooperate with 
them in providing facilities. These non-governmental entities are 
not necessarily supported by local governments, but they normally 
consist of individuals with sufficient standing and influence 
that acting against them would cause political instability. 
Therefore, the host countries have chosen not to act, fearing 
instability resulting from suppression more than they have feared 
the United States.

These countries -- Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and so 
forth -- cannot simply be said to be working with al Qaeda. Quite 
the contrary, some, like Pakistan, have taken at least some steps 
against al Qaeda. But they share this in common: Whether 
unwilling or unable, they have not taken definitive steps to 
render al Qaeda‘s support systems inoperative within their 
territory. Moreover, in the case of Iran, for example, the danger 
that Iranian weapons of mass destruction will be transferred by 
some means to al Qaeda remains substantial.

The occupation of Iraq will provide the United States with a base 
of operations from which to influence -- and coerce -- regional 
powers into attacking internal sources of support for al Qaeda. 
It also will help to deter state support. Therefore, the real 
question now is what will happen at the close of the Iraq 
campaign and where United States‘ war on al Qaeda will lead it 
next.

The politico-military logic of the situation argues for a very 
rapid exploitation of the Iraq campaign, and a rapid evolution to 
new confrontation in the region. There are a number of reasons we 
think this won‘t happen.

1. The United States is exhausted by the Iraq campaign at all 
levels. The American public has been dealing with this issue for 
months. The Bush administration has gone through intense internal 
and external struggles that will require a period of reevaluation 
and possibly reorganization and personnel changes. U.S. troops 
are exhausted. The military reserve system has been stretched to 
the limits. It needs radical surgery if it is to sustain the 
United States through the rest of the war.

2. It is important for the lessons of the Iraq campaign to sink 
into countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran. If the campaign 
goes well, two points will sink in: First, that the international 
system, alliances and institutions cannot contain American power; 
there is no protection there. And second, that the American 
ability to exercise warfare at extreme distances is overwhelming. 
Therefore, resistance to the United States is less rational than 
accommodating the United States. Since Washington seeks a change 
of behavior -- and war is merely a means toward that end -- time 
must be taken to allow the lessons of Iraq to be absorbed.

3. The United States has issues outside of the Iraq region. The 
North Korean affair is orders of magnitude less serious than the 
war against al Qaeda, but it must be attended to. Of far greater 
importance is Pakistan, which remains the critical center of al 
Qaeda operations. Each time the Musharraf government appears to 
collaborate with the United States, it becomes a bit less stable. 
There are forces in Pakistan that would like, for a range of 
reasons, to overthrow Musharraf. Some are simply ambitious, 
others want to reshape Pakistan in a secular mode. The most 
important of these forces are radical Islamists who want to halt 
Pakistani cooperation with the United States. Washington has a 
vested interest in the Musharraf government. It has no desire to 
see another ambitious general in charge, and it has no belief 
that a secular government would produce anything beyond a civil 
war that would make attacks on al Qaeda even more difficult. It 
does not want to see an Islamist government. Washington has 
interests to manage in Pakistan. It has issues in the Philippines 
and Indonesia. Time is needed to tend to these.

4. There are tremendous opportunities for the United States in 
Europe. The Franco-German bloc has maneuvered itself right up 
against a brick wall. Washington has opportunities to consolidate 
its relationships in Europe in the wake of successful war -- 
particularly one in which proof of Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction would be available. Pushing Europe into another 
campaign prematurely would undermine that process. Waiting could 
well create broad European support for the war. The dynamics are 
there in Europe, but it will take time to bring them to fruition.

The problem that the United States faces right now is that, while 
a pause in operations makes both operational and political sense, 
enemy actions dictate whether this option will be available. 
Syria and Saudi Arabia are not really concerns. The Syrians, who 
shortly will be surrounded on all sides, are nothing if not 
practical. They understand reality. Saudi leaders already have 
capitulated to the war, allowing U.S. forces to be based within 
the kingdom. The Saudis will go through a very painful time, but 
in the end the royal family consists of realists -- and whatever 
dreams some of the younger members might have had, U.S. divisions 
on Saudi Arabia‘s northern border will breed moderation. The 
regime will cooperate more avidly than before.

But Iran is the basic issue. U.S. officials said last week that 
they are concerned about Iran‘s nuclear weapons program. That was 
not a casual statement. The Iranians said they knew that they 
were next on Washington‘s target list. That wasn‘t a casual 
statement either. One might think the logical move would be for 
Tehran to reassure Washington about both its nuclear program‘s 
security and its ability to control al Qaeda -- but that isn‘t 
all that easy to do either.

The United States is not concerned with the current intentions of 
the Iranian state. Washington is concerned about what those 
intentions will be in the future. It is concerned about who will 
constitute the Iranian state in the future. It is concerned about 
the internal political processes in Tehran and whether the state 
apparatus can control quasi-state and non-state processes. In 
other words, the United States must, by the logic of the campaign 
in Iraq, be deeply concerned not only about the intentions of the 
Iranian government, but also the intentions of a host of non-
governmental actors. Iran is inherently unpredictable. It is also 
a complex, sophisticated and -- on many levels -- competent 
country. 

Competence and unpredictability are the things that most endanger 
the United States in the Islamic world. Therefore, if the United 
States has its way, months, perhaps a year, will elapse before it 
chooses to confront Iran. However, Washington may not have this 
luxury, depending on the pace of Iranian weapons programs and the 
degree of control that President Mohammed Khatami‘s government 
has over them. The ideal evolution for the United States would be 
to reach a stable understanding with the Khatami regime over 
Iran‘s weapons programs and its relations with al Qaeda. However, 
as in other cases, it is not clear that the president of Iran has 
the ability to deal authoritatively with the United States.

Therefore, depending on how rapidly events evolve in Iran, the 
United States might find itself embroiled in a crisis there. The 
U.S. military is certainly not ready for another campaign against 
a country the size of Iran at this time. It is capable of 
attacking known weapons of mass destruction facilities in Iran -- 
so long as they are known. Which brings us back to where we came 
in -- next door, in Iraq.

It would appear to us that the United States will try to spend 
the next year reconstructing Iraq, building military facilities 
there and probing the responses of neighboring countries. It will 
use the time to exploit the French miscalculation in Europe and 
to deal with peripheral issues in places like North Korea or the 
Philippines. Pakistan must now be a focus. The United States 
certainly will want time to regroup and reorganize its forces. At 
the same time, the probes can result in rebuffs. Campaigns are 
not always planned. 

It appears to us that, sooner or later, the settlement of the 
Iraq issue must lead to Iran, whatever the detours might be.


The American Empire 

Al Qaedaâ€™s goal always has been to unify the Islamic world under an Islamic governmentâ€”to create, in effect, an Islamic empire that is ready to both protect the interests of the Islamic world and to expand Islamic influence. It is doubtful that al Qaeda will achieve this goal. Indeed, it is Stratforâ€™s view that al Qaedaâ€™s actions will, contrary to its intentions or expectations, generate the exact opposite effect -- the creation of an American empire. 

In a sense, the American empire already was created by the nearly simultaneous fall of the Soviet Union and the Japanese economy. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only power capable of projecting military force globally. With the crash of Japanâ€™s economy and the extraordinary expansion of the American economy in the 1990s, the United States also became the dominant global economic power, the primary source of capital and innovation. These two forces combined to give the United States overwhelming political power and with that came the ability to shape the international order as it wished. 

American power did not match the American appetite for power. The U.S. did not perceive itself as having major global interests and its economy was less dependent on either imports or exports than were those of other major powers. Nevertheless, the United States had an interest in maintaining the stability of the international economic order. In general, this meant maintaining and expanding market capitalism in other countries and developing an international free trade regime with the inevitable protectionist aspects that domestic American politics had come to require. 

On another level, the United States, no longer riveted by any serious threats to its national security, had the luxury to focus on the moral character of regimes. It intervened in Somalia to end appalling hunger; in Haiti to put a stop to a brutal and repressive regime; in Bosnia and Kosovo to limit Serbian excesses. All of these were elective operations. The United States did not undertake these missions because it had any overriding interests at stake, but because it had a massive surplus in politico-military power and could afford to indulge. When Somalia proved more complex and painful than the United States was prepared to endure, it withdrew. When the Haitian operation failed to provide the promised blessings, the government changed its focus. 

The central reality of the 1990s was this: while the United States had the ability to impose a global order, it clearly did not need one and the cost of imposing one outstripped any benefit that the United States might derive from it. Although the U.S. was clearly the worldâ€™s leader in every sense, and even thought of itself as the leader, it did not wish to take on the disciplines of leadership or assume the cost of forming a global order. Leadership includes developing coherent principles for governing the international system, deploying the power to impose that system and the willingness to create appropriate institutions with which to govern. 

The lack of American appetite for power in the 1990s resulted in a subsequent lack of any predictable, coherent behavior in the international system. Instead, Washington‘s principles were vague, its political and military power was diffuse and the institutions it chose to operate through (namely the United Nations and NATO) were both relics of the Cold War and were fundamentally unsuited to the tasks at hand. 

Nothing is more dangerous than power without appetite or fear. Appetite and fear focus power, make it predictable and make it possible for other nations to craft policies that accommodate, avoid or resist that power. Where there is neither appetite nor fear, power is unfocused and therefore inherently unpredictable. That unpredictability was the mark of U.S. policy between the fall of the Berlin Wall and Sept. 11. 

For most of the rest of the world, the 1990s was like living with a huge gorilla whose intentions were generally good if somewhat addled. It was impossible to predict what the gorilla might become interested in next, what it might do and the consequences of its actions. For other nations, the United States potentially could be the solution to their problems, but, if unfocused, also could be dangerous. 

Other countries therefore had two predominant goals. One was to try to take advantage of a relationship with the United States. The other was to try to form coalitions large enough to focus the U.S. or at least render it predictable to some degree. The latter was difficult. Working with the United States was more profitable than resisting it. Thus every time a coalition started to form, the U.S. government would shift its policy slightly, perhaps seducing one of the potential coalition members, and the effort would collapse. 

The rest of the world did not find this situation amusing. U.S. power and indifference posed a threat to their national interest. The problem did not derive from any defect in the American character, but from geography and power. The United States was physically secure from the rest of the world and so powerful and prosperous that it needed little from that world. American self-sufficiency and the power to secure what little it needed collided with the very different experience of the rest of the world. 

Nowhere was this clearer than in Somalia. The United States, under former President George Bush, intervened for humanitarian reasons, stayed to try to build a nation, then pulled out when the nationals resisted. From the American point of view, this was a humanitarian mission that just didnâ€™t work out. 

From the standpoint of the Islamic world -- and particularly that of al Qaedaâ€™s founders -- this was an example of the random and unpredictable nature of U.S. foreign policy, coupled with a lack of moral fiber. Washingtonâ€™s actions may have been well intended, but were perceived as an unwarranted, imperial intervention. Worse, the intervention was perceived as an imperial move by a nation with no appetite for empire. 

Somalia led directly to Sept. 11. Al Qaeda was part of the international community that found U.S. behavior erratic, unpredictable and ultimately weak. Al Qaedaâ€™s goal -- building an Islamic empire -- required that it challenge the U.S. and demonstrate that the United States was both inherently weak due to moral corruption and that it would be incapable of destroying al Qaeda. For al Qaeda, challenging the United States would change the psychology of the Islamic world, thereby undermining the perceived power of the United States. 

Sept. 11 redefined the world for the United States. It turned the world from a vaguely irrelevant, generally harmless place in which there were economic opportunities and the chance to do good deeds into one that was deadly. It also created a focus for U.S. power that changed the dynamic of the entire international system. Prior to Sept. 11, the United States had only a vague interest in the international system; after the attacks this international system -- and the destruction of al Qaeda, to be precise -- became an obsession. 

The problem for the United States, however, is that destroying al Qaeda is not a straightforward action. The group has dispersed itself globally, which forces the United States to follow suit. Prior to Sept. 11, the United States completely dominated the worldâ€™s oceans and space. This allowed it to go anywhere and see everything, but its ground forces were deployed fairly randomly. For example, thousands of troops were still deployed in Germany, more from habit than from need. The U.S. presence in Eurasia was essentially without a mission and not particularly deep. 

Over the past 10 months, the United States has not only dispersed its forces throughout Eurasia and the surrounding islands, but also has moved deeply into the governments, intelligence agencies and security apparatus of many of these countries. U.S. forces have been deployed, in small numbers, to areas ranging from Europe and Georgia to the "stans" and the Philippines. More important, in many of these countries small numbers of U.S. forces are "advising" (i.e. commanding) native forces while U.S. advisors monitor and influence decisions from the these countriesâ€™ Ministries. 

Sept. 11 created an unintended momentum in U.S. foreign policy that has led directly to empire-building. Empires are not created by salivating monsters seeking power. Such empires usually fail. The Romans did not intend to build an empire, but each step they took logically led to the next and in due course they had an empire. In turn, being an empire profoundly changed their institutions and their self-definition. Aside from a deep belief in their own virtue, becoming an empire was not an intention but an outcome. 

The United States does not intend to become an empire. Its birth was the first great anti-imperial exercise. It certainly has little economic need for empire because, like the British, it can trade for what it needs. But the logic of empire does not consist of avarice nearly as much as fear. The Romansâ€™ first impulse to empire was defensive. So, too, the American impulse is entirely defensive. The United States is not trying to build an empire: It simply wants to stop al Qaeda. However, to do so is to follow the classic imperial process. 

Driven by the need to defeat al Qaeda, American forces are deploying to scores of countries around the world -- sometimes overtly, sometimes secretly; sometimes in uniform and sometimes as secret agents. In all of these countries, the United States is engaged in reshaping domestic policies. Al Qaeda cannot be rooted out unless the social fabric of these countries can be managed. 

Few will dare resist. The United States is enormously powerful and has been transformed from a vaguely disinterested gorilla into a brutally focused and deadly viper, ready to strike anywhere. Given U.S. power and the American mood, few nations are prepared to risk U.S. displeasure by refusing to cooperate in the fight against al Qaeda. Indeed, many see it as a chance to profit from collaboration with Washington. 

In practice this means that, in the course of defeating al Qaeda the United States is becoming an integral part of the domestic policy process and implementation in virtually all countries around the globe. Those that resist are potential targets for American attack. This was an inevitable -- but unintended â€“ consequence of the attacks of Sept. 11. 

The intention is to defeat al Qaeda; the means to do so is a global war against them. This requires the United States to be present in a majority of countries, overseeing processes that are part of a sovereign nationâ€™s purview, therefore, in effect, usurping its sovereignty. Since the war itself requires reconstructing social orders, the American presence will have to intrude deeply into these societies. Since the war against al Qaeda could take a generation, the U.S. will be there for a long time. 

Most American policymakers would deny that this is their intention. All would be sincere, but the unintended consequence is the nature of politics. In this case, the unintended consequence is empire. U.S. power, having met an obsessive need, is moving throughout the world. Where it meets resistance, it has no choice but to plan war. The United States can neither decline combat with al Qaeda nor avoid the consequences of such combat. 

The United States has been a democratic republic, an anti-imperial power. Now it is an imperial power, not in the simplistic Leninist sense of seeking markets, but in the classical sense of being unable to secure its safety without controlling others. The paradox is that al Qaeda -- ultimately a very minor power -- is driving the world‘s greatest nation toward this end. 

The problem, of course, is that all of this is visible tactically to Americans. They see the deployments into each country. They see the acceptance of advisors into ministries. They have come to expect cooperation by police in Yemen, bases in Kyrgyzstan, information from Egypt and accommodation from Germans or Russians. They expect it, but have not yet constructed a coherent picture or named what they are getting into: empire. Empires begin not with rabid manifestoes, but with short-term solutions leading only one way. 

The dispersal we see today will last at least as long as the Cold War dispersals, and will be even harder to abandon. There will be resistance to an American empire, from great powers as well as small. There will be burdens to be borne in holding this empire that cannot be abandoned. The American dilemma is that it is better at winning an empire than explaining it or even admitting what has happened. 

The United States is taking control of countries throughout the world, bringing benefits and making threats. But the United States has no theory of empire. How can a democratic republic and an empire coincide? Once, this was an interesting theoretical question. Now it is the burning -- but undiscussed -- question in American politics. 

The issue is not whether this should happen. It is happening. The real issue, apart from how all this plays out, is what effect it will have on the United States as a whole. A global empire whose center is unsure of its identity, its purposes and its moral justification is an empire with a center that might not hold. As the obvious becomes apparent, this will become the focus of a pressing debate in the United States.


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## typhoon85 (19 Mar 2003)

Next time Bert can you just summarize the article and give us a link to the article like u have been doing....they are a bit long


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## Bert (20 Mar 2003)

Roger that.  They are kinda long.  Couldn‘t link the articles because the links would temporary and a password is needed for access.


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## Gunnar (20 Mar 2003)

Problem with that is that Stratfor is subscription only, so if he posts the link, it won‘t work for those of us who don‘t subscribe.


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## humint (20 Mar 2003)

I really enjoy watching people condemn offers for their views, especially since the views are either rants (personal expressions of frustration) or offered as tongue-in-cheek fodder. 

Certainly, in this discussion, as with most, there are no absolutes. You can debate the political realm all you want, but what it really comes down to is either realpolitik or the fanciful. The political, as with most things in life (because it is an extension of human existence), is a matter of interpretation and is inherently subjective and malleable; which ultimately means that it can be manipulated according to one’s ideological standpoint or weltanschuuang.  

This is especially true with the concept of political sovereignty. What it really comes down to is the theorist(s) you want to use to prove a certain point; and, rest assured, you can prove any point you wan to make!  

For example, a previous post indicates that the US has every right to defend itself in the face of aggression. But, what is aggression? How do we quantify or qualify it? 

For theorists such as Carl Schmitt, who was a Nazi jurist and ideologue, politics is the struggle between enemies aiming at acquiring power in the framework of the state. For Schmitt, the political struggle consists of distinguishing friends from enemies, and that each nation-state has the absolute authority (because it is sovereign) to act as it wishes in a state of absolute crisis/peril. For Schmitt, the survival of the nation-state rises above all other aspects, even human life itself.

For Transformationalists, the political is inherently different. This theory, which is postmaterialism and post-modernism, places a high value on self-actualisation and the search for meaning and purpose. Transformational politics recognises society as organic, and strives for a politics of transcendence that unites spiritual and material being. For Transformationalists, the nation-state has not brought community into being; but rather destroys it by placing emphasis on national existence versus human life. This theory recognises the nation-state as a falsehood, a desperate attempt to create a fortress in a seemingly hostile world; and ultimately doomed to failure because it fails to recognise the needs of society. 

There are also fundamenatalist or reformist political movements. When fused with xenophobia and religion, these are inherently anti-modern and nativist, and urge a strong nation-state by emphasising a mystical union of a specific cultural, ethnic, or racial group with the nation and the divine. They also tend to see political elites as sovereign entities, and see the world in a totalistic and manchicean manner: meaning that you can justify war as the defence of the nation, the people, and God from its perceived enemies.   

So yes, we can talk theory and history and whatever until we are blue in the face, but the fun starts when people play devil’s advocate or goes off on an emotional rant. 

++++++++
quote: 

"humint saidPersonally, I think this was a wise decision. Whether people like it or not, unilateral decisions for the use of force is not legitimate foreign policy. Certainly, not under the current circumstances." 

This is wishful thinking at best, and dangerous dreaming at worst. I think history (including the last week) prove this statement to be false.
+++++++++++++

So, when you say (but for rhetoric‘s sake, I‘ll turn it into a question) that this is wishful thinking or dreaming, I have to admit: yes, it’s true. I have a different view of the political, and I believe that we should be striving for something better than what we have; which, in my mind, is a failure of diplomacy and the regression into human conflict.

Call me an idealist, call me a romantic, call me what you want. 
 

edited because typos will be the death of me!


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## Greeny (20 Mar 2003)

I love those stratfor articles


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## Jarnhamar (20 Mar 2003)

Id like to hear more about the republican guard and the more sinister elite republican guard. 
They sound like a real top notch deadly unit   

I actually think more american and british soldiers have died during the work up and eairly stages of this war then iraq soldiers. (all the helicopter crashes)

If they really want the war to end fast they should place a bunch of water buffilos across the country and come back a few days later and collect all the iraq soldiers that have surrendered to them.


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## RoyalHighlander (21 Mar 2003)

I think what Bush has done will have major repercussions in the future... He walked into Iraq with out Un sanction... well what‘s going to happen now? Will mainland China attack Taiwan now?? Will India go after Pakistan too using the same logic as GWB?? Will N Korea use Bush‘s reasons to invade the South again?? Now folks will say "Hey We were doing like Bush did" "we are protecting our interests"..... I think what has happened has changed the face of world politics for ever.. and has done in The UN security council for good.


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## humint (21 Mar 2003)

Yes, I agree. Now anyone can claim WMD or the right to self-defence to start a conflict -- just like Uncle Sam. 

It‘s not like the old days when you really had to plan really hard to trick the world‘s media and governments into thinking that that you were actually provoked into a war. 

Man, totally gone are the good old days of destroying your own radio station and killing prisoners in Polish uniforms (as proof of an invasion) or shooting at your own boat in the Bay of Tonkin. Or how about the time the US had to trick the Russians into missing a Security Council vote so they could get the UN troops to South Korea. Did that actually happen or is that just urban myth? Either way, the days of snake-oil and card tricks are over.


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## muskrat89 (21 Mar 2003)

As much as it pains me to poke holes in your rhetoric     , there have been 160+ wars, since the UN was formed. Only 2 have had UN backing. The Korean conflict, and the first Gulf War. Most would agree that neither of those was resolved appropriately, in spite of the UN‘s guidance, which you two seem to hold in such high esteem. Regardless of your position on the war, this is not anything new.


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## Jarnhamar (21 Mar 2003)

Personally im getting pretty sick over the stupid protesters. The americans are bending over backwards (probably out of nessesity though) to make sure as few civilians are hurt as possible.  Saddam surrounds military targets with women and children. On top of that he just launches missles ‘where ever‘ and hopes they kill as many people as possible. Yet protesters are trying to paint the guy like a victim. The more i watch the news the more pro-war/bush im becomming. Too bad i couldnt see the world through rose coloured lenses like all the peacenuts.  It‘s easy for them to sit in safty and comdem people. When the twin towers were bombed the whole country freaked out. Compard to whats going on in the rest of the world that was a drop int he ocean yet they act the world was comming to an end.

I wonder what the iraq soldiers who are tripping over themselves trying to surrender first so they can actually eat think about all the protesters who want to stop the americans from liberating them. I guess it‘s easy for protesters to scream morality on a full stomach. I‘m willing to bet most protesters don‘t care much for Iraq, their not anti war they are anti-american.

The UN is like russia threatening war. All talk no ball$

And while im ranting, morons who bring kids to protests should be kicked in the head.


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## onecat (21 Mar 2003)

"Where were the peace protestors when saddam gassed the kurds and attack kuwait?"

Actually if your in highschool right now then you won‘t remmber, but their a lot of a protectors after the gasing of kurds in 1988; and their was a lot of protest to teh after that US ( under regan at the) was going to give money.  He was still a trusted ally at the time. With Iran/contra it sometimes gets missed.... there‘s a another a group support with us tax dollars.

I think your view of protestors is somewhat short sited; people protest what they beleive they can chnage and they had no way of changing soviet nuke policy.  But they could change US policy which during the early 80‘s had many people believing war ( and that with nukes )was the only out come.  Again if your high school now you would have no way of know that. I was and believe me it was a real feeling  and reason why thousands took to street.


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## onecat (21 Mar 2003)

"The UN is like russia threatening war. All talk no ball$"

I can understand your feeling about protestors and this war.  After its over and saddam is gone Iraq will be a better place for the Iraqi.  Will it make the world safer, I doubt it will there be democrary in Iraq maybe.  The US track record on that part isn‘t great after all weren‘t they being democrary to kuwait?  And what happened woman still can‘t drive and still can‘t vote.  But removing Saddam is enough for me.

But I just had to comment on your UN position.  The UN does balls and could be more effective, but the members of UN SC decide what UN does. They say no that is not the fault of UN but the member nations who voted no, Take Rawanda, the US voted no to troops and only changed its mind after that fact.  That‘s not teh only the nation which has done this all five have, so don‘t take this a anti american its not.  I just pointing out the UN is only as good as member allow it too be.


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## Jarnhamar (21 Mar 2003)

I think the UN has too many chiefs, period.  It takes forever to get anything done. Over 300‘000 people in rawanda lost their lives because of that. Thats a heck of a lot more people killed then 911. And in a very much more gruesoem manner.
It‘s a good idea but it doesn‘t work.

I have to disagree that ‘most people know what they are protesting about and feel emotional over it‘.  Maybe they feel emotional but i think they are just acting on herd behavior.  Only an "evil" person would support war, were not evil, stop the war!
Watch late night with jay leno and watch "Jay walking". Jay Leno stops random americans and holds pictures of george w bush up and saddam hussain or bin laddin and 80% of the time the americans think that its a) colonel sanders, b) the faunz or 3)a hockey team coach.
Simply clueless. I see this then i see them protesting the war and i just have to think to myself they dont know both sides.


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## Jungle (21 Mar 2003)

Pugil wrote:   





> As far as im concerned a vast majority of the canadian population doesnt support the war, and the government is doing what their voters want by not supporting an unilateral attack on Iraq.


Last numbers I saw, (this week) was 51% against, 46% in favor... not quite so overwhelming.


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## Bert (21 Mar 2003)

Heres another article from www.stratfor.com.  This one put a wee smile on my face.

20 March 2003

Oil-for-Food Plan Strikes at French, Russian Interests

Summary

The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations soon will propose 
changes to the oil-for-food program that disburses aid to Iraq. 
The changes would not only streamline the aid disbursement 
process but also cut French and Russian firms out of the loop.

Analysis

The first of many punishments appears to be under way for states 
that lined up against the United States in the runup to the Iraq 
war. On March 19, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John 
Negroponte said Washington soon would propose changes to the U.N. 
oil-for-food program that would streamline aid distribution. 
Negroponte said the United States would formally unveil the plan 
shortly after the beginning of the war.

The plan reportedly would shift control over the escrow account 
of the oil-for-food program -- control that currently is shared 
between Baghdad, which requests purchases, and a committee 
controlled by the U.N. Security Council, which approves them. 
Iraqi officials select venders to import the goods or complete 
the approved work -- such as humanitarian projects, 
infrastructure repairs and the like.

Under the new system, any entity operating in Iraq could make 
submissions directly to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who 
would approve and oversee aid disbursements. Such entities could 
do the work if they were equipped to do so, or subcontract it out 
to others as they saw fit. The process would greatly speed up the 
aid disbursement process and cut out the middlemen who profit 
from the contractual go-betweens.

Under the existing system, those middlemen have been almost 
exclusively French and Russian companies, and French and Russian 
banks usually have channeled the funds to the appropriate places. 
The reason for this is simple: The contracts were bribes to Paris 
and Moscow to secure French and Russian support for Iraq within 
the United Nations.

Under the new system, it would fall first to allied forces in 
Iraq to submit most of the requests for aid disbursements, and 
later to a coalition-backed government. This would almost 
completely eradicate the French and Russian business presence in 
both Iraq and the oil-for-food program writ large.

Aside from accelerating the disbursement process -- and helping 
to satisfy any desires for political vengeance against France and 
Russia that may be brewing in Washington -- the new plan serves 
another, very practical purpose. Since any Security Council 
member could block an aid disbursement, oil monies have built up 
in the escrow account -- to the tune of some $40 billion, 
according to March 19 statements from the United Nations. That‘s 
more than Iraq normally makes from oil sales in two years. If 
confirmed, it would be a significant coup for Washington to be 
able to pull such a large sum directly away from French and 
Russian contractors. But it also would be enough to fund the 
short-term reconstruction of Iraq under all but the most onerous 
postwar damage scenarios.

Paris and Moscow doubtless will attempt to impede the American 
proposal initially, but they will have to capitulate shortly. The 
proposed changes are logical ways to speed the distribution of 
aid to the Iraqi people. Recent French and Russian foreign policy 
has been based upon Paris and Moscow claims to the moral high 
ground -- and arguing to keep a cumbersome aid disbursement 
process for the sole purpose of protecting income to their own 
companies would sweep that shiny moral aura away.


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## Paul Gagnon (22 Mar 2003)

Honestly I don‘t agree with the reasons that the US says they are in Iraq. Frankly I think they are being purposely deceptive. 

However, I do believe that the reason they are really there is because they hope to change the dynamic of US-Arab relations. By going into Iraq and creating a prosperous democratic nation they hope to change the current Islamic view of the USA from one of an imperialist infidel to one of a benevolent ally. I believe that they hope one success will breed political change within other countries in the region without(major) conflict. This type of change in the region would diffuse the current hatred of the USA by Arab nations and should, if successful, prevent or reduce the threat of terrorist attacks on US soil. Taken this way(and given that the same plan has been innefective in Afghanistan) I can see how they can justify the attack on Iraq even though I don‘t necessarily come to the same conclusions. 

Regardless of all that lets hope that this war is short and there are as few casualties as possible.


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## RoyalHighlander (22 Mar 2003)

> As much as it pains me to poke holes in your rhetoric  , there have been 160+ wars, since the UN was formed. Only 2 have had UN backing. The Korean conflict, and the first Gulf War. Most would agree that neither of those was resolved appropriately, in spite of the UN‘s guidance, which you two seem to hold in such high esteem. Regardless of your position on the war, this is not anything new.


I you were refering to me about loving the UN I dont. Look what happened with Dallaire in Rwanda
Speaking of which who here has seen "The last just man"?


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## humint (22 Mar 2003)

Yes, I think that, immediately following the attacks, there was a spontaneous reaction on behalf of the civ population to support the war effort. 

And, I‘m perplexed as to why the about-face. 

Is it because we never heard from this section of the population prior to the war? Is it because we hate being left out of something? Or is it because people started to fear that Canada would be economically punished by the US. Certainly, all the corporate busibodies on Bay Street started to scream that the US will financially lock Canada out and some conservative politicians, like Ralph Klein, scrammbled to protect his province‘s economic relationship with the US. 

Where were these pro-war people before the big day?  If they are only supporting the war effort out of fear for economic reprisal, than they are sad-sad people with no moral fortitude.

And, by the way, I think the NDP leader Jack Layton is out to lunch! "Bring everyone back blah blah blah." Is this guy on crack?


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## Jungle (22 Mar 2003)

Humint, I think the reason we did not hear from these people is that if someone shows support for war, they are seen as "right wing war-mongers", or "Bush-loving ignorants". So they would rather keep a low profile, not like the anti-war protesters who seem to think they make a difference when they have never done ANYTHING to help peace. Many people on this board have put their lives on the line, sometimes in high danger areas, to help restore peace and freedom. You cannot evaluate the value of Freedom when you have always enjoyed it... The Iraqis wish to be liberated, and the coalition will do exactly that.  I wonder if Canada was under a totalitarian dictatorship, the peaceniks would not agree to military action... I‘m sure they would be the first to demand it, and accuse any country opposing it of encouraging the regime.


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## Pugil (22 Mar 2003)

________________________________________
 So they would rather keep a low profile, not like the anti-war protesters who seem to think they make a difference when they have never done ANYTHING to help peace
_________________________________________

What about Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Gandhi and many others great leaders of this century who won what they believed in without a single blood spilled. Im not a pacifist nor an anti-american but I believed that the war on Iraq could be avoided through diplomacy. The inspectors asked for only for 3 months to disarm Iraq and in the same time avoid war. WHAT hurt it is to wait 3 months?? Since the end of the gulf war, Iraq has never threaten any of his neighbours, and therefore does not constitute an imminent threat. His military had been reduce to half of his strenght after the gulf war. Ill support war if someone can give me proof that Iraq is an imminent threat, so far im unconvinced like the majority of the World population.


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## Jungle (22 Mar 2003)

> What about Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, Gandhi and many others great leaders of this century who won what they believed in without a single blood spilled.


Bad comparison: these outstanding people were working for human rights issues in their own countries. No comparison possible with the PROTESTERS. They seem to base their opinion on emotions rather than logic. How many of them understand how the UN and it‘s SC function ? How many of them remember the ineffective way the int‘l community was, through the UN, in preventing the slaughter of 1/2 million Rwandans, or the massacre of thousands in Srebrenica, of preventing the violence in East Timor ? How many of them know UNPROFOR was so ineffective it had to be replaced by a NATO force to implement the Dayton accord ? The UN need some renovations, this war will hopefully serve to provoke this process.
A lot of the protesters would change their minds if they were properly informed.


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## Jarnhamar (22 Mar 2003)

"but I believed that the war on Iraq could be avoided through diplomacy"
A tiger does not change his stripes. Saddam is a killer and mass murderer.  The only time someone like that uses diplomacy is when it suits their needs. Give him an extra 3 months and thats 3 months longer he has to hide wmd or do any of the other manovelent things he does.
Saddam has practically no army yet hes talking about killing all invaders infidels etc.. Can you imagine what he WOULD do if he actually did have a professional army. Loyal troops, new tanks and fighter aircraft?  I don‘t think he would use diplomacy i think he would just start a war, like he did last time.


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## typhoon85 (22 Mar 2003)

"Watch late night with jay leno and watch "Jay walking". Jay Leno stops random americans and holds pictures of george w bush up and saddam hussain or bin laddin and 80% of the time the americans think that its a) colonel sanders, b) the faunz or 3)a hockey team coach.
Simply clueless. I see this then i see them protesting the war and i just have to think to myself they dont know both sides."-ghost778

I know that if i had a camera and went up to Canadian citizens and asked them questions about the country, I could make Canadians look just as stupid as Americans look on Jay Leno and that 1 time show "Talking To Americans" (CBC) . What Im trying to say is it doesn‘t prove that the majority of them are clueless....there just taking the idiots that got it wrong and showing them instead of the vast majority of the people that got it right. Its Still funny to see people not even know who there president is though    

Just On a side note i just want to say that im embarressed that the people at a Montreal Canadians hockey game just recently boo‘d the Star Spangled Banner while it was being sung. I know this has happened in the U.S. (Americans booing are National Anthem)but i think we should show more class then them and show respect for it(just keeping silent while it plays instead of booing would be the best way i think).


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## Gryphon (22 Mar 2003)

i gotta agree with you saying that it is ebarrassing, especially for me, as a montrealer,

But however, i think that happened like a few months back, didn‘t it? or did it happen again recently?


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## Michael Dorosh (22 Mar 2003)

Sean‘s comments two posts above are all particularly good.

There has been some serious discussion elsewhere about the motivation of some protesters and in particular human shields.  An observation has been made that it is easier for them to protest in other countries, when the other country consists of an ethnic group different than the protestor themself, and who have a conflict with the ethnic group from which the protestor comes.

For example, we see caucasian North Americans going to, say, Iraq to protest against American imperialism.   They find it easy to picture the dark skinned arabic people of Iraq as oppressed, and apparently feel some degree of shame or guilt at being caucasian.

The point being that you rarely see caucasian college students from Canada or the US going to other countries to protest the actions of arabs, negros or asians.

Don‘t know if it means anything, and I am sure you can find isolated examples proving that there are exceptions to this, but it did get me thinking when I read about it.

The American national anthem is on Hockey Night in Canada right now....no booing for it, or the Canadian.....whew.....


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