# Military use of Gators outside fortified bases



## Teddy Ruxpin (21 Jun 2007)

Fair dealings, blah, blah, blah

http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/227826

Vehicle no match for a roadside bomb
The unarmoured Gator should never have been allowed to travel on roads of Kandahar

June 21, 2007 
Rosie Dimanno
Columnist

It's little more than the military version of a putt-putt buggy and no reason imaginable exists for the go-devil venturing off-base.

The open-top all-terrain vehicle – makes the thing sound far more sophisticated than it is – in which three Canadian soldiers were killed yesterday should never have been on the dangerous roads of Kandahar.

This is a conveyance used by troops for on-site transportation, meaning short excursions inside areas protected by snipers, high-tech sensors, sandbag bunkers and armed sentries.

It is no match for a roadside bomb.

Either someone got tragically careless or standing operational orders are catastrophically out of sync with realities on the ground in southern Afghanistan. Either way, it's difficult to reconcile with the intense security arrangements by which Canadian troops live – and die – in Kandahar.

Resupply convoys that service forward operating bases and power points – often including transport trucks and personnel carriers – don't move an inch outside compounds unless covered by heavily armed escort vehicles. It is staggeringly incomprehensible, a catastrophic lapse in judgment, that the unarmed wagon known as a Gator – little different from a John Deere tractor – was allowed to leave the safety of Sperwan Ghar in order to resupply a checkpoint, if the description of events is correct.

Sperwan Ghar is a strongly fortified satellite west of Kandahar City, just south of the Arghandab River. On the other side is Zhari District, site of fierce fighting last summer between coalition forces and the neo-Taliban but also a region that remains perilous as insurgent cadres move around. 

Earlier yesterday, Canadian and Afghan soldiers battled insurgents in Zhari for four hours. Combat there arose as a result of Operation Season, intended to disrupt the Taliban presence and subdue ambushes against allied forces and Afghan police along Highway 1.

Sperwan Ghar is a stone's throw from that area. It's no place to be out in the open in a vulnerable dune buggy when enemy forces are targeting coalition troops.

This one was allegedly travelling along a track between two Canadian checkpoints when it struck the IED. Sperwan Ghar reaches out in tentacles to power-point studs and police checkpoints – the lonely outposts manned largely by Afghan police and Afghan National Army soldiers. 

Canadian troops routinely patrol highway segments, but always, in this reporter's experience, in at least modest force. Canadian troops, often on foot, regularly check the tarmac and berms for planted devices. Radar and thermal imaging also keeps 24-hour guard for movement within a considerable range.

"A determined enemy clearly was able to penetrate the defences and the observation in the area to plant this device,'' Brig.-Gen. Tim Grant, commander of Canadian forces in Kandahar, told reporters yesterday.

Grant said the vehicle had been struck between two checkpoints a short distance apart, six kilometres west of Sperwan Ghar. He rejected media speculation that the region was an inappropriate venue for the Gator, a vehicle most commonly used for shuttling provisions and equipment up the steep hill at Ghundy Ghar and across the expanse of Sperwan Ghar.

"This vehicle has been used regularly to do resupply missions between some of the checkpoints outside of the forward operating bases,'' said Grant.

Those who've spent time in the region know that this is simply untrue. It is, at minimum, a rarity for the Gator to be used for that purpose. Commanders have more sense than exposing soldiers that way. Sixty Canadian troops have now died in Afghanistan, improvised explosive devices responsible for a third of those casualties.

Yet Grant insisted the Gator was fit for the task, with the terrain – compounds of high mud dwellings amidst poppy fields – unsuitable for larger, armoured vehicles. But Nyalas can manoeuvre almost everywhere, with the exception of narrow village pathways. A review of procedures and equipment used will be conducted, Grant added.

"If we determine that we need to change our tactics, techniques and procedures, we will do that," he said

"But at the current time, we look at this as an unfortunate accident.''

No, it was most decidedly not an accident. It was a blast from the enemy.



I'm somewhat annoyed by this.  The reporter in question has written some decent pieces from theatre and has proven to be a fairly rational and unbiased source, but this is a bit over the top.

The reporter is out of her lane.  She has no idea - zero - of what drove the tactical decision by commanders on the ground to employ the vehicle in question.  She has not been in the exact location where the attack occurred and has no professional credentials - aside from a couple of trips to theatre - to support any of her conclusions.  She is engaging in speculation that will undoubtedly fuel more controversy; indeed, her comments may be designed to do just that.

If mistakes were made, the chain of command will investigate, identify, and address them.  Determining whether a tactical decision was "careless" or "catestrophically out of sync" is hardly a reporter's job and is hardly the role of the media.  Leave the job of soldiering to soldiers, if you please.


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## Scoobie Newbie (21 Jun 2007)

" zero - of what drove the tactical decision by commanders on the ground to employ the vehicle in question.  She has not been in the exact location where the attack occurred and has no professional credentials"

I think that is relevant to all not just her and that is why I haven't said anything on the subject.  Not many know the area as it is now, nor the atmosphere, or the thinking behind the decision to use the vehicle.


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## regulator12 (21 Jun 2007)

I personally think she makes some good points and would not feel safe travelling in that vehicle and would really protest against it.


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## Reccesoldier (21 Jun 2007)

regulator12 said:
			
		

> I personally think she makes some good points and would not feel safe travelling in that vehicle and would really protest against it.



What are you proposing you would do, call your shop steward? Have a sit in? Tell 'em No? Stamp your feet like you really mean it?

The people who are paid to make these decisions are the ones who get to make them, people like you and I are the ones who get to follow them.  Someone somewhere did a risk analysis on this.  That someone probably walked that road more than once and I'm willing to bet there was more than a moments pause when he/she made the call to use the Gator.  

What do you think the trade offs examined would entail?  Perhaps the choice was a Gator or draw an armoured vehicle like a Coyote or LAV III from active operations to drive the "couple of hundred meters" between checkpoints.  Maybe using anything bigger would have created more of a target. 

We don't know, but I do know what my reaction would be to a "protest"  :rage:


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## cplcaldwell (21 Jun 2007)

One of the things that (I think) is really tragic in this piece is that the reporter in question seems absolutely ignorant of the nature of the conflict and how the enemy is adapting and evolving tactics.

A while ago they were blowing up G-Wagens, then Nyalas, then LAV's. But if one looks at the whole history one begins to see that the enemy never sustains this effort for very long. This may be for _two_ reasons, _first_ they cannot sustain it because the proper intel and subsequent lessons learned are applied, _second_ their main aim, to turn the public against the effort by using media is minimised after a few such (similar) attacks.

In the first case I suspect it's because the troops are savvy enough to anticipate the situations and because the commanders make the proper adjustments to routing, timing, equipment and other tactical considerations. 

In the second case they seem to be succeeding, at least at generating the media reports. I doubt very much that the argument "_Either someone got tragically careless or standing operational orders are catastrophically out of sync with realities on the ground in southern Afghanistan_" could be sustained under any scrutiny; but it sells papers and raises the hackle of the uninitiated. (Take a look at the Globe and Mail blog on this one.. hilarious ( in a sad sort of way)... I thought that it would have been a lot tamer than that as I thought most of that lot would have been at Stonehenge today buying tie-dye t's and chanting.. oh well)

But then again it is the luxury of the press to be able to stand up and wag a finger whenever an improbable event happens; it's like every possible permutation and combination must be foreseen or else someone is incompetent. 

I'll bet that the enemy will find operating procedures are changed, _very soon_. Whether that means getting rid of the gators is someone else's call. (Someone eminently more qualified than me or Ms DiManno).

In any event the enemy will find this kind of 'operation' will be unsuccessful, impossible or very costly in the near future.

I doubt that a 'one off' indicates incompetence, if it becomes a trend, well then maybe some questions should be asked.

This will be/has been the nature of this conflict for a while now and will continue to be so. The end game will be when the ANA and ANP can stand up by themselves and when the people turn against the talibs. The people will inevitably turn against them as they become empowered and as the enemy, unable to strike decisively against NATO, turn to 'soft' civilian targets; they are already hinting at it. 

At that point they will no longer be guerrillas or insurgents, they will be marginalized enough to be seen as the thugs and murderers that they have been, essentially, all along.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (21 Jun 2007)

Lone Wolf Quagmire said:
			
		

> " zero - of what drove the tactical decision by commanders on the ground to employ the vehicle in question.  She has not been in the exact location where the attack occurred and has no professional credentials"
> 
> I think that is relevant to all not just her and that is why I haven't said anything on the subject.  Not many know the area as it is now, nor the atmosphere, or the thinking behind the decision to use the vehicle.



Exactly right, and that's why I won't either.  As I've posted before, it is a very dangerous thing to armchair quarterback and to second-guess tactical decisions made by commanders on the scene - especially when none of us were there and none of us have, by definition, _any_ knowledge of the local situation.  Anything posted or printed by anyone not in theatre right now is pure speculation.

Regulator12:  I assume, based on your remarks, that you're currently attached to the callsign that suffered the casualties and know exactly what happened?  :


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## Bruce Monkhouse (21 Jun 2007)

Not unless he's home on leave. [HTLA?]  _Someday I must remeber all these acronyms._ :-[


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## regulator12 (22 Jun 2007)

No i was and am not in that unit. I simply was saying i would not feel safe in that vehicle. Obviously i can not say what happened because i am not there but we are all entitled to our opinions. So i will obviously keep them to myself as i can see that this will start a verbal war if i express them.


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## daftandbarmy (22 Jun 2007)

It's pretty clear that the media, and others, have been sucked into thinking that more armour = greater safety. Safety lies in concluding the fighting as soon as possible and rebuilding the nation. As a wise CSM once told me "The safest place on the battlefield is the objective". RIP troops.


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## MikeM (22 Jun 2007)

Regulator, you've made a wise decision to clam up, comment on what you have experienced and know.


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## 1feral1 (22 Jun 2007)

regulator12 said:
			
		

> I simply was saying i would not feel safe in that vehicle.



During my time in Iraq, I never felt safe in any vehicle. I often used to ride in US Gators going from their part of the FOB to ours, often on the scrounge for each other.

Even around the IZ in an uparmoured F-250 or SUV, same thing, never safe, and in a LAV, out in the RZ, the word safe is the last word on my mind. Staying focused for snipers, complex attacks with SA and RPGs, frags, and the worst thing which haunts me still is the IED/VBIED/SVBIED threat, and even worse is the EFP threat. All very real, and we simply were lucky. Yes it was luck, good INT on where not to go, but luck/fate and chance is what saved us.

Going on 3 months home, and I will not drive over coke cans, and I see 'sus' things on or along the road all the time, and thats the 1st thing that comes to mind, 'sus'.

I, like others all over the Free West have a very heavy heart about the loss of more soldiers. Many may ask how did the bad guys get inside the wire, why were they not noticed? These questions may never be answered, but what can we do to help prevent it from happening again.

Was this IED command detonated? Victim detonated or a PIR sensor used perhaps? Thats may indeed come out, and some type of countermeasure may end up in new TTPs. Mourn for their loss, yes, but let us learn from their unnecessary and untimely deaths.

The media will continue to sensationalise a story, milk it for what its worth for shock value and ratings, warping and manipulating the truth to suit them, well forgetting that those men had familes, and they were more than just another guy in green.  

I always avoided the media like a plague, and dreaded every time they showed up in our locality. We all did.

MINI RANT ON:

As for REGULATOR12's comment in an earlier post on 'protesting', thats just plain piss weak. Its a war, and people die on both sides. Risks are everywhere, even while in/on the toilet. I remember those 122mm Katyusha rockets very well, landing willy-nilly anywhere at random at any time. 

An attitude like that will get you ostracised by your own men, and you'll end up getting sent home with your tail between your legs. Protest! If I heard one of my guys say that there, I'd ask him if he wanted to see the Padre. I think of the shyte that I (and we) had to endure there, and then I hear a yellow comment like that on here. Well, that sends me. Shake your head REG12 and sort yourself out. 

You may indeed be in the wrong profession. Don't think that at times we were not scared, or that I never questioned (in my mind) the at times unrealistic orders of a Jr Offr. I did what i was told without question, was professional, and got the job done as best we could. A few words of advice, go hard or simply, go home. Perhaps a job less stressful is in order.

MINI RANT OFF.

Regards from a cold winter night in the tropics,


Wes


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## GAP (22 Jun 2007)

*Military suspends use of Gators outside bases*  
Updated Fri. Jun. 22 2007 10:47 AM ET Canadian Press
Article Link

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan -- The Canadian military has suspended the use of Gator all-terrain vehicles outside secure compounds in Afghanistan after a roadside bomb killed three soldiers. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Rob Walker says the roadside bomb attack shows the Panjwaii district west of Kandahar isn't as safe as the military believed. 

Sergeant Christos Karigiannis, Corporal Stephen Bouzane and Private Joel Wiebe were killed Wednesday when the bomb blasted the Gator vehicle they were riding between checkpoints. 

The army had said the open-top vehicles with no armour were the only option in the area to transfer supplies because of the rocky terrain. 

Soldiers on foot patrol were replaced with the Gators because the military believed the district was secure from insurgent attack after months of combat operations and reconstruction work. 

Walker, who commands Canada's battle groups in Afghanistan, says the question now is whether the attack signals a move by insurgents to target Canadian forces more directly. 
More on link


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## Colin Parkinson (22 Jun 2007)

I suspect these ATV's have less ground pressure than the human foot, correct?


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## Armymedic (22 Jun 2007)

Of course they did.

whats that called when someone taps your knee with a rubber hammer....Reflexive Jerk

So now the boys wil have to walk again...and it was only +45 in the shade today in the Kandahar area


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## safeboy43 (22 Jun 2007)

Agreed that this is a complete reflex by the CF. Infantry are just as open to attack as any vehicle (aside from being slightly more quiet and camouflaged). They are also just as likely to trip a mine set by insurgents if they are on foot. What the CF has done here won't do much more than burn the poor guys out in 50+ degree weather.


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## Armymedic (22 Jun 2007)

Colin P said:
			
		

> I suspect these ATV's have less ground pressure than the human foot, correct?



That is a good question.

But I believe it would not have made a difference as the most common non remote detonated type of IED in the area is a Pressure Plate (PPIED). Most are made with old metal saw blades separated by about 1 cm. Any weight on the top will make the connection and set off the mine (which is what they are).

If we are playing the second guessing game....what happened to the good old armoured Gwagons for this kind of movement? I don't know of anyone who would willingly walk 2 km when there is a veh, any veh, avail to drive them.


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## GAP (22 Jun 2007)

Could we send wagons over in the Care Packages?


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## PO2FinClk (22 Jun 2007)

Aside from assessing the safety issue to the troops, this knee jerk reaction is common when faced with media based pressures. Had they not the media would be in the process of crucifying them.


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## safeboy43 (22 Jun 2007)

St. Micheals Medical Team said:
			
		

> I don't know of anyone who would willingly walk 2 km when there is a veh, any veh, avail to drive them.


I might be a bit out of my lane on this one as I have never been to A-Stan but putting myself in the deployed troop's shoes, it would be easy to say "I'll be fine just this once. It's only 2km." 

Then again, if a human foot can set it off just as easily, it wouldn't have mattered.  

RIP Troops


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## MJP (22 Jun 2007)

St. Micheals Medical Team said:
			
		

> If we are playing the second guessing game....what happened to the good old armoured Gwagons for this kind of movement? I don't know of anyone who would willingly walk 2 km when there is a veh, any veh, avail to drive them.



Remember in another knee jerk reaction we forbid those vehicles from leaving the wire as well?  (insert sarcastic voice) Pretty soon we'll all be stuck in the wire waiting for choppers to takes us in as NO vehicle will be allowed outside the wire due to the extreme IED threat


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## daftandbarmy (22 Jun 2007)

This is exactly what happend in the border areas in NI. The IRA became so effective at blowing us up with great big IEDs that all patrol movement was conducted either on foot or by chopper. Would this be acceptable in A-Stan? Not likely, given the distances and conditions there.


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## Babbling Brooks (22 Jun 2007)

I'm with Teddy on this, and delved into not only DiManno's piece, but also coverage from CTV, the Sun, and the Globe & Mail on this issue <a href="http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2007/06/welcome-to-feeding-frenzy.html">at my own site</a>.

The <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20070621.AFGHANBASE21/TPStory/">one notable exception</a> to the media feeding frenzy on this came from Graeme Smith yesterday, in an article entitled "Guards felt comfortable with Gators" that reinforces some of the points made here.  What a novel idea: talking directly to soldiers about how they do their jobs.  I'll quote at length:



> Soldiers preparing for their guard shift at Sperwan Ghar were very unhappy one day last month when their Gator broke down. The small all-terrain vehicle, manufactured by John Deere in Welland, Ont., looked out of place among the hulking military equipment arrayed on the steep hillside where Canadians and their allies have carved out a strategic base in Panjwai district. One of the nearby Leopard tanks could probably have crushed the little six-wheeled ATV if it got in the way.
> 
> But for the young men who make the tiresome trips back and forth between their bunkers on the hill and the guard posts below, it was essential to keep the Gator chugging.
> 
> ...


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## Bob Terwilliger (22 Jun 2007)

The gist of her article, while a tad shrill, I believe is essentially correct. If one examines the overall number of IED fatalities amongst Canadian troops, its clear that IEDs present by far the largest threat. There is no reason why resupply between OPs should be done with what is essentially a lawn tractor with a coat of OD paint. There is no protection whatsoever for the occupants of that vehicle, and its use should be stopped.


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## Colin Parkinson (22 Jun 2007)

Then what?

You will have to build a road to get the LAV's, Nyala, G-wagons there. Which means more equipment needs to be moved in, which means more fuel, more time, more food, more security, which then means more equipment, more food, more fuel, more, etc,etc

There is no perfect answer. Perhaps the main issue was the lack of alternative routes that allowed the enemy to see a pattern, but even then, sometimes life is like that and you can't have the perfect tactical scenario. Perhaps the lesson is that when geography requires the continued use of a route, sniper teams and ambush teams need to watch likely ambush places and perhaps can be used to lure the enemy to such areas to be engaged. 

All those that think getting rid of the gator should first put on full military gear, plus armour, weapon, food & water, then strap on 60-80lbs of supplies and slow jog in a dry sauna for 8 hours, while throwing talcum powder in their faces every 10 minutes.


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## Pencil Tech (22 Jun 2007)

Look, I don't think it's surprising that the public, or Rosie di Manno for that matter, don't understand why the troops were in a Gator. People see it as a vehicle, and they see a LAV or a Nyala as a vehicle, and can't understand why they weren't in a vehicle that offered some protection vice one that offers none. In one TV report last night, LCol Eyre actually explained pretty effectively that the Gator was being used in a situation where the troops would normally be marching and carrying a large amount of kit on their backs and the Gator basically makes that kind of task easier. Obviously they'd be just as vulnerable if they were humping on foot (and I think the public know that soldiers do that), but the public naturally sees this as a flashback to the Iltis, and so on. Unfortunately the department as a whole is doing what it so often does: banning the vehicle instead of giving a comprehensible explanation of why the Gator is useful and appreciated by the troops who use it.


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## Scoobie Newbie (22 Jun 2007)

Gents unless your serving in the unit that is on the ground how about we cease speculation on this particular subject.  It serves nothing but add fodder to those that would have us vacate Afghanistan and seems to be pitting us against each other.  There .are so many variables that if those that have been there in the past can't give much more to the converstation then those that have never been


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## Babbling Brooks (22 Jun 2007)

Bruce Rolston at Flit <a href="http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2007_06_22.html#006209">weighs in</a>:



> The M-Gator, used by the Canadian, U.S. and other militaries, has a ground pressure when fully loaded of 8 psi. Human-foot ground pressure is 9-12 psi. So assuming the IED that destroyed the Gator was detonated by a pressure plate or other independent trigger, it likely would have been tripped by personnel walking from point A to B as well. And if it was command-detonated (ie, someone pressed a button to blow it up) it would also have been equally effective against three dismounted troops.
> 
> The general in charge has said the vehicle in question was used in part because of the narrowness of the local laneways, which would seem to rule out the use of any larger, better protected vehicle, regardless of their availability. So there may not have been a lot of good choices here, and given those ground pressure figures it at least seems unlikely the personnel would have been any safer walking that day.


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## Bob Terwilliger (22 Jun 2007)

Colin, I think we should find a safe alternative to a lawn tractor. Don't get me wrong, I think Gators are fine utility vehicles, so long as they are used in areas that uber are secure ie airfileds, bases etc.  There is no reason why Nyalas could not have been used. None.


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## Scoobie Newbie (22 Jun 2007)

Bob Terwilliger said:
			
		

> There is no reason why Nyalas could not have been used. None.



Unless of course the roads were too steep or narrow.


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## Colin Parkinson (22 Jun 2007)

Well we could go back to Mules and horses, but then I am sure we would be hearing from PETA in no time at all.


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## Scoobie Newbie (22 Jun 2007)

Actually on my tour the engineers bought a mule.  don't know  how much they used it.


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## George Wallace (22 Jun 2007)

I think this puts an end to the speculation and the need for further discussion.  It happened in an Operational Theatre, a war zone.  It could have happened anywhere in theatre.  It happened here.  



			
				Babbling Brooks said:
			
		

> Bruce Rolston at Flit <a href="http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2007_06_22.html#006209">weighs in</a>:
> 
> 
> > The M-Gator, used by the Canadian, U.S. and other militaries, has a ground pressure when fully loaded of 8 psi. Human-foot ground pressure is 9-12 psi. So assuming the IED that destroyed the Gator was detonated by a pressure plate or other independent trigger, it likely would have been tripped by personnel walking from point A to B as well. And if it was command-detonated (ie, someone pressed a button to blow it up) it would also have been equally effective against three dismounted troops.
> ...


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## seamus (22 Jun 2007)

Bob Terwilliger said:
			
		

> Colin, I think we should find a safe alternative to a lawn tractor. Don't get me wrong, I think Gators are fine utility vehicles, so long as they are used in areas that uber are secure ie airfields, bases etc. There is no reason why Nyalas could not have been used. None.


 I have seen the gator used in combat situations, when the area is narrow especially in urban areas and the temperature is above 50, you need the support. You cannot carry enough water with mission essential to do your job. The press is looking for headlines and trying to dictate doctrine. We have lost more LAVIII's than gators is the same period of time and no one is trying to keep them locked in KAF. If the IED had been set while they were respplying on foot I doubt the headline would have been to up armour the mark 3.


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## MJP (22 Jun 2007)

Bob Terwilliger said:
			
		

> There is no reason why Nyalas could not have been used. None.



I assume you are operating in that particular region right now and know the current disposition of all the vehicles assigned to both the FOB/Operating base at the time of the incident.  As well considering the narrowness of the lanes as cited by the general in charge, I assume you know the width, turning radius and capabilities of the Nyala?  If not mayhaps I might suggest your out of your lane as are most people speculating on the incident.  

The decision was made by the commanders on the ground at the time to use the vehicles.  Sometimes and I know it's hard to believe some people forget that we are fighting a war.  Casualties and deaths happen and we should not and can not second guess and arm-chair general the soldiers on the ground making the decisions.


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## Bob Terwilliger (22 Jun 2007)

Nope. I took my release some time ago. But if you are going to present a case for  Gator v. EID, I will gladly stick around and listen. It's  a vehicle designed for sportsmen and hauling yard waste.


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## MJP (22 Jun 2007)

Sigh....Perhaps it is time to yet again reiterate that the vehicle used doesn't matter.  Bigger/better protected vehicle just results in a bigger and better IED.  In the whole wide world of the military there doesn't exist a vehicle that can't be taken out.


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## Colin Parkinson (22 Jun 2007)

Militaries have used similar vehicles for years, remember the “Mule” here is the DAF version.

http://jalopnik.com/cars/daf/daf-vs-faf-froggy-mehari-gets-whooped-by-daf-pony-military-vehicle-221056.php

The difference is the cost of the gator is much less and parts easier to get thanks to the large amount of civiy sales.

Perhaps in a few years we can have remote controlled ones running supplies, but still the enemy will adapt. They are fighting a media war, destroying a gator or supplies has little meaning for them, they know they must create causalities and get those into our media to have any hope of beating us.


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## seamus (22 Jun 2007)

MJP said:
			
		

> Sigh....Perhaps it is time to yet again reiterate that the vehicle used doesn't matter.  Bigger/better protected vehicle just results in a bigger and better IED.  In the whole wide world of the military there doesn't exist a vehicle that can't be taken out.


 So you might as well use the one that adapts best to the tactical situation at hand, to augment your ability to complete the mission.


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## Bob Terwilliger (22 Jun 2007)

Colin, armies have to adapt to the threat at hand. When I was in, the threat was a massive Soviet invasion of Europe. Thats what we trained to deal with. Our training had no focus whatsoever on counter insurgency operations, EIDs or anything like that. I don't expect troops today train to deal with 3rd Shock Army rolling through the Fulda gap. If the largest single threat to soldiers deployed today comes from roadside EIDS, then why the %&#*%& are they driving around in unarmoured, open topped lawn tractors that do not even have a bloody roll cage????


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## 48 highlander (22 Jun 2007)

because it lets you do your job quickly and efficently


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## seamus (22 Jun 2007)

Bob Terwilliger said:
			
		

> Colin, armies have to adapt to the threat at hand. When I was in, the threat was a massive Soviet invasion of Europe. That's what we trained to deal with. Our training had no focus whatsoever on counter insurgency operations, EIDs or anything like that. I don't expect troops today train to deal with 3rd Shock Army rolling through the Fulda gap. If the largest single threat to soldiers deployed today comes from roadside EIDS, then why the %&#*%& are they driving around in unarmoured, open topped lawn tractors that do not even have a bloody roll cage????


 To tell the truth, it could carry more water than a quad. Quads are used by many forces outside the wire, but don't have the same capacity to carry suplies. Unless you hall a trailer but then your limiting the mobility which brings us back to why the gator's are being used in the first place.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (22 Jun 2007)

Funny how the comments telling those who don't have any background to STFU are coming from guys with time in theatre, while comments questioning tactics come from those with little or no experience... Just sayin'...  :

Again, as a couple of posters have stated - no one writing here knows anything about this particular incident, let alone details of the force protection measures involved, the nature of the specific terrain, the perceived threat, the type of IED (if it was indeed an IED), the precise nature of the task the vehicle was performing, the weather... nothing.  The guys that have BTDT know the drill - it's too bad the lesson hasn't been absorbed by the media and by some posting here.


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## Bob Terwilliger (22 Jun 2007)

Well, Teddy, it seems the Gator has been withdrawn to secure areas, so I guess I was right. You can spin it any way you want, but it does not take a tour there to understand that lawn tractors have no place in harms way. The real decision makers made that call.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (22 Jun 2007)

Sure Bob, you were right...

_or_

As MJP pointed out, it is a politically-motivated decision based on press-inspired hyperventilating...

_or_

It's a decision taken by the chain of command to mitigate risk until the true facts of the attack are known...

Take your pick.  I don't know and neither do you.


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## muskrat89 (22 Jun 2007)

OK, this is silly. 

Speculating and back-seat driving ends in this thread now. If people want to do that, they can go to www.Imanarmchairexpert.com or www.letsguesswhathappened.com

Any more tit-for-tat and the thread gets locked down.

It's friggin presumptious beyond all comprehension to second guess what people who are there are saying.

Army.ca Staff


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## GAP (22 Jun 2007)

Basically, I find this thread exactly as TR described it, and I personally think it has come to its' righteous expiration date....there really is not anything more to add, just more idle speculation, which is doing nobody any favors.


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## MarkOttawa (22 Jun 2007)

Just noticed this was already fully discussed at this topic, but I'll leave it up:
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/63484/post-581545.html#msg581545

A post by Bruce Rolston at_ Flit_:

About the M-Gator tragedy
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2007_06_22.html#006209



> One point worth making about the tragic loss of 3 CF personnel in Afghanistan this week, not yet made by those opposed to the media coverage of it:
> 
> The M-Gator, used by the Canadian, U.S. and other militaries, has a ground pressure when fully loaded of 8 psi. Human-foot ground pressure is 9-12 psi. So assuming the IED that destroyed the Gator was detonated by a pressure plate or other independent trigger, it likely would have been tripped by personnel walking from point A to B as well. And if it was command-detonated (ie, someone pressed a button to blow it up) it would also have been equally effective against three dismounted troops.
> 
> The general in charge has said the vehicle in question was used in part because of the narrowness of the local laneways, which would seem to rule out the use of any larger, better protected vehicle, regardless of their availability. So there may not have been a lot of good choices here, and given those ground pressure figures it at least seems unlikely the personnel would have been any safer walking that day.



Mark
Ottawa


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## Greymatters (22 Jun 2007)

Mark, +1, totally invalidates the removal of Gators from patrols.


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## kenneyb210 (22 Jun 2007)

O/T  sorry .. I am in Edmonton and would like to pay respect to fallen CF. Is there information as to which airport and flight time. I read about folks lining the overpasses between Trenton and Toronto and would like to do something  here. There is the city center Municipal aiport or the International outside of the city.  

John W


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## regulator12 (22 Jun 2007)

so why then the last tour A coy 2vp none of the guys used gators outside the wire...and because i say i would protest does not mean i am in the wrong job. protesting to ride in that vehicle does not make me a pussy or a wimp. If you  where to never question what is asked of you and take a step back and say hey does this make sense do i have better assets on hand can this be done another way then that makes you a robot and not a thinking soldier. Not everything that higher up tells us to do is correct. Everyone on here always has to defend the decisions made by higher, you know sometimes mistakes are made....I am not a robot and can think for myself thank god i work in an organization that thinks the same way.


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## daftandbarmy (22 Jun 2007)

The man has a point! Atta boy Reg 12.


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## cplcaldwell (22 Jun 2007)

The 'Official' place to look is on dnd.ca  kenneyb, look at the Media Advisories page.

There is nothing there yet.

Perhaps PPCLI has something coming, 1st Bn PPCLI.


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## George Wallace (22 Jun 2007)

Bob Terwilliger said:
			
		

> Colin, armies have to adapt to the threat at hand. When I was in, the threat was a massive Soviet invasion of Europe. Thats what we trained to deal with. Our training had no focus whatsoever on counter insurgency operations, EIDs or anything like that. I don't expect troops today train to deal with 3rd Shock Army rolling through the Fulda gap. If the largest single threat to soldiers deployed today comes from roadside EIDS, then why the %&#*%& are they driving around in unarmoured, open topped lawn tractors that do not even have a bloody roll cage????



I'll have to call you on that.

We used a large number of unarmoured vehicles both in the Fighting and B Echelons.  We had 106 Recoiless Rifles and later TOW mounted on jeeps.  No Armour there.  We had absolutely no armour on any of the B Vehicles we used.   Recce was conducted in both Lynx and jeeps.   Airborne troops of various nations used many types of unarmoured 'mules' to transport their equipment on the battlefield.  None of those vehicles, jeeps through M113 Family would fare well in Afghanistan.  

IEDs are new.  Mines are not.  No one knew in the Cold War when they would run into a minefield or ambush with mines, booby traps and Claymore style mines.  Times have changed and many things are different, but not all that different.


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## CrazyCanuck (22 Jun 2007)

If it was detonated by a cellphone or other handheld device, I wouldn't think that either walking or Gator's would make much of a difference.

This is an assumption please correct me if I'm wrong, the Gator having no armour would have a lower psi then other vehicles, more armour = more psi, so it's a trade off.


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## kenneyb210 (22 Jun 2007)

Thank you cplcaldwell.

John W.


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## George Wallace (22 Jun 2007)

Boater

Please refer back to Reply #5


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## KevinB (22 Jun 2007)

MarkOttawa -- a very logical and key point - lost in a sea of kneejerking media hype.


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## cplcaldwell (22 Jun 2007)

regulator12 Posted on: Today at 17:26:36 said:
			
		

> Not everything that higher up tells us to do is correct.



Ummm, Actually it is. It's called a Lawful Command.

*But*  I do have to agree with you, you are not a wimp if you say "I think that is too dangerous ..." _when it does not interfere with the objective._ You are allowed to say that, and the next guy up the food chain is allowed to 

*a)* Say_ 'Tough snot, get on with it'_. (Your decision at that point would be to do it or start practising the hatless dance.)
*b)* Say _' You know, Bloggins, good point, go get the old man's LAV... he won't mind.'_ (At which point you thank providence for a chance to do some baja-ing in kit you never signed for.)



Mr Wallace's point is correct, recce was done in Iltis, tarps off, windshields down, door chains stowed and a lot of the time with the crew commander sitting on top of the radio trays for a better vantage. Couldn't get closer to the 'bad guys' than Bde Recce. _Why?_ those safety 'faux pas' were required in order to achieve the mission. 

The question of armour and it's protection has to be balanced against speed and stealth, both equally as good methods of protection as armour. I think that's as applicable whether in the Fulda Gap or ferrying jerries between the FOB and the OP. 

Heck, the Infantry doesn't call tanks (and other heavy track) 'bullet magnets' for nothing.

Once again, I think if we look at the task that was needed to be done, the intrep, the considerations of armour vs. speed vs. stealth the man on the ground was the man to make the decision. 

Given this incident they'll revisit it, I'm pretty sure that does not represent back peddling or incompetence in the first instance (although the press will try to spin it that way) but rather an adaptation of an initially sound plan to changing circumstances.

I'm pretty sure the grown ups will make the right call, they _usually _ do.


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## 1feral1 (22 Jun 2007)

regulator12 said:
			
		

> so why then the last tour A coy 2vp none of the guys used gators outside the wire...and because i say i would protest does not mean i am in the wrong job. protesting to ride in that vehicle does not make me a pussy or a wimp. If you  where to never question what is asked of you and take a step back and say hey does this make sense do i have better assets on hand can this be done another way then that makes you a robot and not a thinking soldier. Not everything that higher up tells us to do is correct. Everyone on here always has to defend the decisions made by higher, you know sometimes mistakes are made....I am not a robot and can think for myself thank god i work in an organization that thinks the same way.



I would have got inot that gator without question. Read my post, I've used them many times in theatre with SAF, and IDF ( do you know what these terms even are?) going off in the distance, and no it was not a range. I am far from a robot, and as a TP SGT (PL WO), I look after 31 men daily and make many decisions at time well beyond my rank. As for you, you make your comments based on what? As i thought, your profile is EMPTY. So before you go questioning me, why not tell us who you are and what your experience is. 

I don't question direct commands and orders. I act on them or delegate. As much as safety and force protection is paramount, necessary risks to perform your job have been assessed by others before hand. Would you protest when you came under fire, refusing to listen to your SECT COMD because you felt unsafe? Or would the EN shooting at you make you want to rethink your situation. When you are told to move you do, others lives depend on your QUICK actions, and if you continue to 'question' things you will fail as a team player. No individuals in the army. Individuals get people killed including themselves, so don't 'come the raw prawn' with me mate! Been there, done it, and have many faded t-shirts.


Wes


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## devil39 (22 Jun 2007)

How about we leave the platforms and tactics to the tactical commanders.  None of us can ever second guess the decisions of a tactical commander.  

Only those who are present at the decision, or have previously articulated their concerns, and make their concerns apparent have the right to second guess.

Full stop.


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## devil39 (23 Jun 2007)

I will make the same point I have made in an other thread....

_How about we leave the platforms and tactics to the tactical commanders.  None of us can ever second guess the decisions of a tactical commander. 

Only those who are present at the decision, or have previously articulated their concerns, and make their concerns apparent have the right to second guess.

Full stop._

Tactical commanders are making tactical decisions every day.  Most of us have no concept of their reality... 

If you haven't been inside the tactical commander's head at the Bn, Coy, Sect, Gp level, perhaps you think twice before criticizing...

Carry on the good work all of you who are leading the way for us


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## muskrat89 (23 Jun 2007)

and on that fine post by devil39, I think we'll call this thread a "wrap". If someone has something useful to add, PM a Moderator.

Army.ca Staff


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## McG (23 Jun 2007)

Different needs require different tools and at the same time certain circumstances preclude certain tools.

I cannot speak for this specific incident (and I suspect that nobody here can currently do so either).  However, my observations, from the time of a previous battle group in the same AO, were that there are times that the gator is the best available tool to meet the needs given the constraints.

To the fine retired gentlemen who have chosen to inform us that no un-armoured vehicle should ever be used, I suggest you have become out of touch with what it means to be a soldier.  Next you will be lining up to tell us that soldiers should never dismount because that might expose them to the danger of being outside the hull.

As a final thought, nothing saps away moral quicker than a deployed soldier visiting this site to see his unit’s tactical judgement being picked apart by folks that don’t know the details . . . and there are details that we will never see in print and which those deployed will not be permitted to discuss with us.  Let’s give them a break & stop the second guessing.


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