# Naval Capabilities Needed.



## Ex-Dragoon (17 May 2007)

Ok over the past few years you might have seen me mention the baseline naval capabilities we  currently have. For a refresher they are AAW (AntiAir Warfare), ASuW(AntiSurface Warfare) and ASW (AntiSubmarine Warfare). I have in the past described it as a triangle and to remain a viable navy, we must maintain a capability in these 3 warfare areas.
   Money is coming in, albeit slowly. JSS, APV, FELEX, (maybe an LPD) and SCSC are all the horizon. The question is where should we go from here? Personally I have been thinking of this and I feel that we should bring back NGS (there is talk the SCSC will have that capability) I also think we should really develop our own UUV knowledge. I think we should as well develop countermeasures against UUVs. I feel that this is a more economical route to go for our Navy, rather then aircraft carriers that some of you forcefully advocate. So what do you think? Where should our Navy go from here?


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## Cdn Blackshirt (17 May 2007)

Well Ex, 

Since no one else seems to want to play with you, I will.   ;D

I think it all depends upon how much you're budgeting for procurement going forward.

Here were my "pulled-out-of-butt" estimates:


..................................2007.......2008.......2009......2010......2011......2012......2013.....2014.....2015

Current Commitments
Arctic Ice Breakers(6)....$50.......$100.......$300......$300......$300......$300......$300.....$300.................
JSS(3)..........................$50........$100.......$200......$200.....$200......$200......$200.....$200.................
Victoria Refits................$25.........$25........$25........$25....................................................................

Recommended Commitments
Additional Cyclones (6)........................................................$100.....$100.......$100......$100...............
FELEX(12).....................$50.........$100......$200......$200......$200.....$200.......$200.....$200......$200=>
BHS(1+).................................................................................$0........$0...........$0........$0.....$ 200=>

Notes:
1) Arctic Ice Hardened Corvettes - Modify design to carry Cyclone.  Cyclone becomes primary weapons delivery system.  Remainder of surveillance and weapons systems are minimal.  Prefer to build in Atlantic Canada as economic stimulus is badly needed.  
2) JSS - I still prefer the idea of separate LPD/AOR's, but I think the reality is the system needs to be combined due to public perception.  Again, Atlantic Canada build would be preferable.  Strategically, I think we should be able to keep at least one shipyard running at all times with smart procurement planning.
3) Victoria Re-Fits - I know many guys keep telling me about how important submarines are, but this purchase still confuses me to no end as the Victoria is not fast enough submerged to escort our surface vessels where enemy submarines could be a threat, which leaves them in the role of ambush killer.  My problem is what are we hunting?  Spanish fishing boats in the Grand Banks?  If you want to monitor fishing violations, use a light patrol aircraft.  To use a 48-crew submarine to do fisheries patrosl is incredibly expensive overkill.  Now, if we're eventually talking about procuring (4) nuclear submarines that can act as battle group escorts as well as having a land-attack capability, then I can see an ROI arguement.
4)  FELEX - Simply put, I think given the age of the CPF's, the cost associated with SCSC at this time is too high given other more urgent needs.  As such, I would move forward with the FELEX project.  As I'm unqualified to speak on details such as hull extensions or radar upgrades, I'll leave that to others to debate.  The one thing I will continue to argue is that the 20mm Phalanx worries the everloving hell out of me (specifically the physics of a 20mm projectile against an evading supersonic target), and would much prefer to see an upgrade to SEA-RAM.  One thought I'd like to throw out there is that IF the current hull is incapable of much upgrading due to weight concerns, perhaps we could split FELEX into (2) batches.  Batch 1 would be the air defence and C&C variant, and would be stripped of its non-essential task-specific gear to focus on new radar and SAM's.  Batch 2 would be the ASW, ASuW variant which would be stripped of Anti-Air Equipment (with the exception of the aforementioned SEA-RAM), and carry Harpoon (including a land attack variant) as well as the UUV's that you mentioned earlier (and totally agree with you, by the way).  In such a fashion you end up with pair of vessels that together provide a great deal more capability that two identical "jack of all trades" frigates.
5)  BHS - Even with JSS, I'd still like to see a dedicated LHD as it would for the first time provide an ability to support troops inland.  Now whether than means AH-1Z or F-35B, I don't know, but I think it's a force multiplier that should be explored.  Note, this construction would dovetail into the same shipyard building the JSS.


Matthew.


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## newfin (18 May 2007)

Dragoon,  CDan you please let me know what NGS means?  I looked for it in the military terms sections and came up empty.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (18 May 2007)

newfin said:
			
		

> Dragoon,  CDan you please let me know what NGS means?  I looked for it in the military terms sections and came up empty.



Naval Gun Support.


Matthew.   

P.S.  If there are more, don't hesitate to ask, because I just reread my post and hadn't realized just how many acronym's I'd used.   ;D


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## Ex-Dragoon (18 May 2007)

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> Naval Gun Support.
> 
> 
> Matthew.
> ...



Actually its Naval _Gunfire_ Support


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## Ex-Dragoon (18 May 2007)

Matthew,
  Considering the Cyclone is an Air Force asset as much as the Navy would like to think we own it, then it really does not belong in your list. I don 't want to discuss economics as its way above my pay grade.
1) Considering how hard the Arctic environment is for Helos, making them your primary weapons carrier might be a mistake. UAVs might be a better option.
2) JSS is more AOR anyways with sealift capability, its not even the same class as an LPD.
3) I am not sure what else I can say to you regarding subs so I am not.
4) FELEX is going ahead irregardless. It is needed and very much overdue. I have no concerns about the Block 1B series of CIWS, and as a sailor I think having confidence in the kit we use should count for something. Not that I would mind having RAM onboard as well, anything added to help keep me alive is a good thing. Dividing the FELEX into 2 batches would only add to the cost and make it more unswallowable to Cabinet. Not a good idea. Its having the jack of all trades frigates that make a Halifax class frigate a much desired asset with our allies.
5) Agreed, although again adopting fixed winged air craft for the Navy would sky rocket the cost. If anything stick with gunships.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (18 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Actually its Naval _Gunfire_ Support



Well you misspelled "it's".....  ;D


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## Ex-Dragoon (18 May 2007)

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> Well you misspelled "it's".....  ;D



I'm an east coaster


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## Ex-Dragoon (19 May 2007)

Another area that we should investigate and develop a capability for is small boats ops. Well armed FIACs that could be used to help support boarding ops, escort merchant traffic in littoral areas would be a god send to naval commanders in areas like the Arabian gulf.


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## cameron (19 May 2007)

As someone with a strong interest in anything naval i've been following this thread, too bad more army.ca members aren't taking part in this discussion.  Anyway a couple of thoughts, first I support ExDragoon 100% on developing small boat capabilities (this is something i've been thinking about for awhile myself).  I think Canada should seriously pursue creating a small boat capability similar to the US Navy's Special Boat Squadrons which support SEAL operations.  I propose a squadron each for the Atlantic and Pacific fleets.  As ExDragoon pointed out they could be used to support boarding operations and escort merchant shipping in littoral waters, taking some of the burden off the destroyers and frigates.

Like the aforementioned US Navy squadrons, they could be used to support CANSOFCOM, providing seaborne insertion and extraction, including while under hostile fire, which would be difficult for submarines to do.  Such a capability is timely given events on the global maritime stage, such as the increase in piracy on Africa coasts and in the Pacific.

I know from previous discussions that the Victoria class boats are a touchy subject for many here.  While among patrol subs the Vics may have unique capabilities, that in some ways make them similar to nuclear powered hunter-killers, what sense is there in having these unique capabilities if one cannot use them fully.  The Vics have yet to return value for the money spent on them.  There are other designs out there, that while they may not have some of the Vics capabilities, they WORK.  One example is the Franco-Spanish Scorpene class.  Canada should seriously consider purchasing these, or one of the other excellent diesel boat types available out there.  One question, from what I understand plans to purchase or build an amphibious ship have been axed.  So does the Navy still plan to lease the USS Gunston, and what about SCTF, is this still in the works, and what timeframe are we looking at?


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## aesop081 (19 May 2007)

cameron said:
			
		

> So does the Navy still plan to lease the USS Gunston,



No.  The Gunston Hall was used for the ITEE and thats it.



> and what about SCTF, is this still in the works, and what timeframe are we looking at?



The SCF has been put on long-term hold.......


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## Kirkhill (19 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Another area that we should investigate and develop a capability for is small boats ops. Well armed FIACs that could be used to help support boarding ops, escort merchant traffic in littoral areas would be a god send to naval commanders in areas like the Arabian gulf.



Dockstavarvet's CB-90 - for APVs, for FELEX/SCSC, for Naval Reserve DOMOPS.  And yes I am a fan.... ;D
http://www.dockstavarvet.se/index2.php?content=products&subpage=combat_boat_cb_90_h
http://www.cat.com/cda/files/254901/7/Patrol%20Boats%20%E2%80%A6Dockstavarvet.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combat_Boat_90


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## Kirkhill (19 May 2007)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yOHFgDIGvOA

Here's a Swedish video on the CB-90 on YouTube.


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## CrazyCanuck (19 May 2007)

Downsides to using small boats: Can't handle ice and can't handle big waves.

Personally I'd say go for small multi-role Corvettes to defend the east and west coast like they plan to do for the arctic, they're cheaper(than frigates or destroyers) and will free up our frigates for international exercises. Find one small ship design that's cheap, easy to build, and operate and allows for many to be built, don't go over the top, just build what you need and allow for additional add-ons later. Yes big fancy frigates are nice but if you don't have a lot of them, you're kinda screwed, especially with a coastline like ours.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (19 May 2007)

Boater said:
			
		

> Downsides to using small boats: Can't handle ice and can't handle big waves.
> 
> Personally I'd say go for small multi-role Corvettes to defend the east and west coast like they plan to do for the arctic, they're cheaper(than frigates or destroyers) and will free up our frigates for international exercises. Find one small ship design that's cheap, easy to build, and operate and allows for many to be built, don't go over the top, just build what you need and allow for additional add-ons later. Yes big fancy frigates are nice but if you don't have a lot of them, you're kinda screwed, especially with a coastline like ours.



I was guessing that:
1) The Svalbard-equivalents in concert with the MCDV's are going to be tasked exactly as you describe primarily with Coastal Defence and Surveillance while freeing up the CPF's to be tasked primarily for foreign deployments.
2)  The 280's will be retired without AAD replacement with a majority of crew transferred to the Svalbard-equivalents (2nd in command become captains of Svalbards) whilst captains probably go to JSS hulls due to the C&C role of the new vessels.


Matthew.


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## CrazyCanuck (19 May 2007)

http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/visby/   

These Swedish ones are nice, though I'm not to sure how they would handle ice being made of 'plastic' and all.

But: They are fast 35K
       Small Crew 43
       And fairly well armed though lacking a viable air defence system but I belive that they are designed so that one may be added on at a later date
       And they look really cool


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## Ex-Dragoon (19 May 2007)

Executive Officers of 280s are only Lieutenant Commanders, they would not get a major war vessel command and the C&C role of the JSS is more geared towards the troops ashore vice a naval warfare role.


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## Ex-Dragoon (19 May 2007)

For a FIAC I think this would be a better option:
http://www.defense-update.com/directory/shaldag-II.htm


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## CrazyCanuck (19 May 2007)

Good for near the Coast Ex-Dragoon, not good if you have to reach out and touch somebody over the horizon, though they could be useful in a layered coastal defensive system: Big ships (frigates/Destroyers) far out to sea to protect against naval or cargo ship bourne threats, Corvettes in the middle for patrol and intercept, and small boats up close to shore for intercept and harbour defense.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (19 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Executive Officers of 280s are only Lieutenant Commanders, they would not get a major war vessel command and the C&C role of the JSS is more geared towards the troops ashore vice a naval warfare role.



Thanks for the correction Ex....


Matthew.


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## Kirkhill (20 May 2007)

So first question: What do we want this small boat to do?

My suggestion of the CB-90 was essentially an RHIB replacement that could operate from large vessels in littoral waters and operate in riverine environments environments both domestically and overseas.  In addition to working from the APV (when the ice is out) or any other large vessel it could also operate in harbours, on the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, the West Coast Islands (which are ice-free) and be available for operation in any flood environment or inland waterway because of the shallow draft and waterjet propulsion.

Ex-Dragoon's selection looks like a solution for the West Coast, or the Great Lakes and Seaway, or foreign litorals (but might be a bit of a problem to transport to theatre).

Blackshirt moves up into the Corvette class. The Visby would be great on the West Coast and Georges Bank but would have to self deploy for expeditionary work in foreign littorals.

Boater seems to be thinking along the lines of a larger Offshore Patrol Vessel (A Frigate without the weapons or an APV without the ice capability)


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## Ex-Dragoon (20 May 2007)

I think we are focusing a little bit much on the inshore a bit


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## NavyShooter (21 May 2007)

I think the question being asked is which capabilities do we need to maintain, and how?

The individual platforms that would fill the roles that we choose to maintain will likely need to be made in Canada, or at least, licensed copies that can be built in Canadian Shipyards (if we have any left).

So.

Looking at our existing capabilities:

*ASW: *  Maintain the CPF's keep this role.  New platform not needed.  

*ASuW:*  Maintain CPF's, keep this role.  Improve it with newer versions of Harpoon, adding better land attack capability.

*AAW (LR):  * Retire the 280s, finish installing the ESSM's on CPF's, improve their point defence capabilities to a larger area defence capability, and get the 4 missile cells to increase loadout (from 16 single missile cells to 16x4 missile cells for 64 missiles per CPF) Not an ideal solution, but the 280's are well past their prime, and maintaining more than one class of major warship is damn expensive. 

There's the 3 basic core capabilities of the Canadian Navy.  The CPF's can maintain most of them until we get a new class of ship. 

Other capabilities and issues with them:

*Command Ship.*  CPF's have previously been configured as command ship.  This has been a jury-rig, but it's worked.  We can maintain a minimal level of this support on CPF's.  

*Shipboard Helos:*  The upgrade to the new Cyclones will be a welcomed change, but the size of the helo means that there is a significant amount of work to be done to a ship in order to fly them.

*Naval Boarding Party: *  No change.

*Naval Gunner Support:*  No ships currently well suited for this role, (though 280's are better off than CPF's due to larger gun) but no current ability (except Harpoon) to direct Precision Attacks.

*Littoral Capability:*  MCDV's are not a fast or capable platfrom for Littoral missions.  They lack firepower, speed and survivability.  CPF's are too large and valuable to be put inshore.  New platform needed.  If the platform is capable of performing NGS missions, and operating NBP's we gain a HUGE set of capabilities, and free the CPF's for offshore work.

So, whereto from here?

1.  Buy some mid-size corvettes and retire the MCDV's.  Simlar crew-size, greater capabilities.

2.  Retire the 280s, and get some small littoral ships such as the CB-90.  These ships have NGS ability with the 120mm AMOS turret.

3.  Get the JSS's on stream ASAP, but add the ability to have them carry two or more CB-90's, so that they can bring some extra hardware along when going into battle.  

Just my thoughts.  I was writing more, but it got confusing to me (up with the sick kids last night, zero sleep.)

NavyShooter


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## Ex-Dragoon (21 May 2007)

Would you keep the Block1B or would you move to the RAM?


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## NavyShooter (21 May 2007)

Not being 100% in the know as to all the capability differences between the two, I'd say stick with the 1B, and maybe put the RAM onto the corvette sized ships.  

NS


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## newfin (22 May 2007)

I like the size of vessel that the Coast Guard is going to fill it's MSPV (mid-shore patrol vessel) role with.  I think the design is scheduled to be finalised this summer.  Here's presentation on the MSPV project.  Ignore the date on the first page - it automatically inserts today's date so I am not sure when this presentation dates from.

I think that all of the projects that are currently on the go should be completed.  An OPV is the most important big ticket capability that we need to add.  As for getting rid of the Kingston's, seems like they are widely unloved but what about their mine sweeping capability?  Shouldn't that be retained?  Side scan sonar?  I realise there have been recent problems with one.

And why can't we find three suitable, available vessels to fill in the role of the 280's while we are waiting for SCSC.  By available I mean previously loved.  Used.  We only need 10 years of life out of them.  The AAW and C&C functions of the 280's are requirements that the Navy finds useful and do not want to give up on.  I don't think we should either but it does not matter much what I think.

...and the role of the Sea King/Cyclone is/will be so important to the function of the ship that it has to be included.  These a/c exist only because of what they offer the ship.  Their ownership does not matter.  If they were flown by Navy pilots and owned by the Navy the capabilities that they bring to the ship would not change.


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## newfin (22 May 2007)

link: 
http://www.uscg.mil/d9/wwm/marinesafety/blomshield/MSPV.ppt


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## cameron (22 May 2007)

Just getting to check replies, the usual problem of accessing the site.  Thanks for the info CDN Aviator, too bad SCTF has been put on hold.  While I support the mission in Astan 200%, and realize that we need to commit a lot of resources including financial there, I fear the powers that be may be getting tunnel vision.  We need to prepare our military to face not only current but future contingencies.  The next threat may very well not come from a landlocked nation.  Yes the army certainly needs extra resources at this time, let's just make sure we don't sacrifice the Navy too much in the process


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## Good2Golf (22 May 2007)

What happened to CADRE?  Did it get rolled into SCSC or FELIX?


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## IN HOC SIGNO (22 May 2007)

cameron said:
			
		

> Just getting to check replies, the usual problem of accessing the site.  Thanks for the info CDN Aviator, too bad SCTF has been put on hold.  While I support the mission in Astan 200%, and realize that we need to commit a lot of resources including financial there, I fear the powers that be may be getting tunnel vision.  We need to prepare our military to face not only current but future contingencies.  The next threat may very well not come from a landlocked nation.  Yes the army certainly needs extra resources at this time, let's just make sure we don't sacrifice the Navy too much in the process



I agree Cameron. I have no doubt that there is a lot of tunnel vision right now on the needs of the mission and the Army at the expense of the capability of the other two services. I too support the mission unequivocally and believe the purchases we are making to support (C17s, Chinooks, Tanks etc)are worthy and will serve for other theatres at a later date also. I do wonder though if we are going to have as capable a Navy and Air Force...not just for things that help the troops get to where they need to go. We need to be capable in ASW....there are lots of subs in the world (check out China and Russia)...and AAW. We need a fast air capability and adequate maritime patrol....etc etc
I think that a country as rich as ours should never have to wonder if we can afford to do long range planning and investing for our defence needs. If we can waste billions in scandals in the HRDC and the adscam and the gun registry (to mention only a few places we have squandered billions) we have billions to invest in proper equipment for our protection.


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## cameron (22 May 2007)

+1 IN HOC SIGNO, there was a recent article in a publication by that naval studies think tank at Dalhousie University.  Unfortunately I can't remember the name of the publication or the think tank, that's why I didn't mention it in my previous post.  However, the gist of the article, which I agree with, is that Britain, a small country with a small population, became a military giant due to its naval power, which it used to secure and consolidate its empire against countries like France which have always (up to today) had bigger armies.  While I have great respect for the RAF (I think its probably the world's most incredible air force), many people forget how mortally afraid Hitler was of the Royal Navy, remember how the Tirpitz was kept hidden in a Scandinavian fjord for much of its service life?  And one of the reasons why Sweden was the only Scandinavian country not attacked by Hitler was his healthy respect for the Swedish Navy.

I am overjoyed to see the Canadian Army getting long overdue respect as warfighters, respect it hasn't gotten since WWII and Korea.  A country with a small population like Canada's however, needs to realize that a flexible navy that is always kept at the cutting edge in terms of ships and equipment, is not only indispensable for defending the world's largest coastline, but also for defending Canada's interests abroad and projecting Canadian military might, both as a credible deterrent and a credible response.  Like the above mentioned article stated Canada can learn a lot from the historical lessons of British naval power.  I'll try to find the article and provide a link as soon as possible.


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## cameron (22 May 2007)

Ok guys i've found it, the journal is the Canadian Naval Review published by Dalhousie University.  We all know of my previous miserable attempts to post links so i'll not try it  this time ;D.  But if you go to Dalhousie U's website in the search bar type the name 'canadian naval review', open the link and click on archive, some back issues will be displayed.  The article which is entitled "Sinking the Navy in Afghanistan" is in the Winter 2007 article, pp 25-27.  Excellent article, check it out.


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## NavyShooter (22 May 2007)

http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive/public/vol2num4art6.pdf


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## Good2Golf (22 May 2007)

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> http://naval.review.cfps.dal.ca/archive/public/vol2num4art6.pdf



That's a good piece.  Since many of the world's hot spots are within reach of the littoral, I'd say it would be wise not to forsake the Navy which, pardon the metaphor (not meant as a slight to a subordinate service), is the maritime version of "boots on the ground".

G2G


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## NavyShooter (23 May 2007)

Some 90% of the world's population lives within Harpoon missile range of a shoreline.

Foresaking the ability to influence these areas?  What a loss for our country, with how many thousands of km's of shoreline ourselves?

Don't forget the GTS Katie....who had to save the army's kit from being "hijacked" for more money?  (Kidnapped?)  

NS


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## NavyShooter (23 May 2007)

Or is that....tank-napped?


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## George Wallace (23 May 2007)

NavyShooter said:
			
		

> Don't forget the GTS Katie....who had to save the army's kit from being "hijacked" for more money?  (Kidnapped?)





			
				NavyShooter said:
			
		

> Or is that....tank-napped?



So does this put you "FOR" or "Against"?


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## CrazyCanuck (23 May 2007)

At this point in time the only way the Canadian Navy is going to be rejuvenated is if a) major public opinion supports it or b) sadly if people start dying which in turn will lead to public opinion demanding it.


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## a_majoor (23 May 2007)

Canada has a particular problem with naval capabilities.

We have the longest shoreline in the world, and 1/3 is icebound for most of the year. We should have platforms capable of patroling and controlling these areas.

If we are doing force projection, we need to cross oceans, which means large, capable ships which can commence operations once they reach the AoR.

On the other hand, inside the AoR, the trend seems to be for smaller ships that can operate in Littorals, and conduct small boat operations such as landing SOF teams.

We also have a relatively small industrial base and disinterested population when it comes to getting resources to address these problems.

You will live in interesting times........


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## Cdn Blackshirt (23 May 2007)

No offence to the Navy personnel here, but I totally disagree with the author on a number of his statements, the most glaring being:



> "Most particularly, it is important for the Canadian Government to recognize the cost-effectiveness of a modern and capable navy, and how a flexible, multi-role fleet gives Canada the most effective and nationally-acceptable means to meet is alliance responsibilites and the many other challenges that will arise."



Specifically:
1)  I find the above statement re: "national acceptability" to be somewhat cowardly and very much reminiscent of the Liberals intentional rust out of armed forces so that foreign policy options were limited by intentional reduction in physical capability.  We may have a large number of anti-war advocates as citizens who would claim non-intervention in places like Afghanistan, however that in no way means they are right.  To pander a procurement model based on the idealistic naivete of our population is disgraceful.
2)  I think the above statement regarding cost-effectiveness is misleading as it makes it sound as if naval procurement is relatively inexpensive.  My recollection is the latest costing for the new Australian AAD's is pushing $2 billion per ship, excluding Life Cycle Costs.  That means for a fleet of (4) replacement AAD's the cost would be close to $8 billion excluding the helicopters.   To say there are a lot of alternative ways to spend that $8 billion, would be an understatement and I think his absolute aversion to presenting a tangible procurement plan necessitates the fact he knows those numbers will undermine his own argument.
3)  I think the author is somewhat too attached to the British Navy as a model.  He forgets that the nostalgic British Navy he describes existed in an era of nation-states where destroying another nation's harbours, merchant navy, and as such its ability to trade, in essence destroyed the circulation system of that state at which point the leadership bowed and succumbed to British dominance.  As we transition into the 21st century, killing civilians, even when caught in a crossfire, is no longer deemed acceptable, much less launching a battleship barrage onto a town or city to assert national dominance.  In short, the model he cites in support of his statements ceased to exist long ago.

In a world in which failed state insurgencies are going to be the greatest demand (Taliban in Afghanistan, Janjaweed in Darfur, Hezbollah or Al Qaeda in Lebanon), we have to measure the prudency of procuring redundant naval assets that our allies already own that we know will be on-station because it is politically expedient as described above especially for our European allies (frigates and destroyers), versus investing primarily in Land Forces (with requisite air support like C-17 and naval support like JSS) that our allies are politically unwilling to deploy and whether those contributed forces are the tipping point between action and inaction in a theatre such as the former Rwanda. 

Candidly, I think the CDS is on exactly the right track in terms of balance and only hope he continues along the path he has started to walk....


Matthew.


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## Ex-Dragoon (23 May 2007)

And when we start to go back and possibly engage nations with real blue water capability then what then Matthew? Naval capabilities and equipment takes years to gain and maintain, its something that cannot come back overnight at all and when the day comes where we will need it I have no doubts casualties will be high and awful.


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## cameron (23 May 2007)

+1 Ex-Dragoon, there was a time not that long ago when the British and many others thought that retaining certain naval capabilities was an anachronism.  No one expected the Royal Navy to sail halfway around the world to fight a Latin American power.  The possibility of a war with the Warsaw Pact was the most plausible reality in the late 70's early 80's.  But history shows that in war new realities have a way of popping up (sometimes these realities are not all that new but we're often so preoccupied with present realities that we fail to see the big picture and miss other evolving threats).  

Just because Canada's greatest national security threat presently comes from a country or countries which does not require us to respond with naval assets, does not mean out future threats will be of the same nature.  Many third world countries are improving their navies and not all of them are necessarily friendly to the west, and even if they seem friendly now, their future plans are suspect, eg. China.  Cdn Blackshirt, it would be unwise to handicap our navy, when we obviously can never tell what what lies over future horizons.  Mark my word, if Canada does not take immediate steps to halt the decline of its blue water naval capability, and take concrete steps to bring new capabilities on board to meet future threats, it will only be a matter of when not if, we pay the catastrophic consequences.


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## cameron (23 May 2007)

Hey guys the current (spring) issue of the Canadian Naval Review also has an excellent editorial on this topic, I just read it.  The editorial is available online.


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## Ex-Dragoon (23 May 2007)

cameron said:
			
		

> +1 Ex-Dragoon, there was a time not that long ago when the British and many others thought that retaining certain naval capabilities was an anachronism.  No one expected the Royal Navy to sail halfway around the world to fight a Latin American power.  The possibility of a war with the Warsaw Pact was the most plausible reality in the late 70's early 80's.  But history shows that in war new realities have a way of popping up (sometimes these realities are not all that new but we're often so preoccupied with present realities that we fail to see the big picture and miss other evolving threats).
> 
> Just because Canada's greatest national security threat presently comes from a country or countries which does not require us to respond with naval assets, does not mean out future threats will be of the same nature.  Many third world countries are improving their navies and not all of them are necessarily friendly to the west, and even if they seem friendly now, their future plans are suspect, eg. China.  Cdn Blackshirt, it would be unwise to handicap our navy, when we obviously can never tell what what lies over future horizons.  Mark my word, if Canada does not take immediate steps to halt the decline of its blue water naval capability, and take concrete steps to bring new capabilities on board to meet future threats, it will only be a matter of when not if, we pay the catastrophic consequences.


+1 to you as well cameron. The Falklands were the exact example I was thinking of. Not to mention the LIO and MIO Ops done during Op Apollo is another case and point on why a decent blue water capability must not be maintained, if we don't stop the decline now we might as well start allowing the USN to start basing ships in Halifax and Esquilmalt to do what the Canadian should be doing.


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## dapaterson (23 May 2007)

However, here's a question:  Do we need to retain at great expense a ship design and ship building capability within Canada?  Do we need teams of naval architects to design and build the small fleets Canada will buy?  Or should we simply buy "Military Off The Shelf" (MOTS) from other nations?

We already buy aircraft from other nations (though the Air Force's insatiable desire for AERE officers (more AERE than airframes nowdays) does concern me); why can't we use foreign deisnged and foreign built ships?  (Anyone arguing quality control will be sentenced to a career on one of the frigates built in Quebec).


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## Cdn Blackshirt (23 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> And when we start to go back and possibly engage nations with real blue water capability then what then Matthew? Naval capabilities and equipment takes years to gain and maintain, its something that cannot come back overnight at all and when the day comes where we will need it I have no doubts casualties will be high and awful.



Then we provide the capabilities we have within a combined fleet dominated by our allies.

I guess the situation as I see it is;
100% probability of additional COIN operations in the next decade.
5%-10% probability of engagement with blue water navy of another nation state within the next decade.  And in that environment, less than a 1% chance that engagement will occur without allied support including AAD destroyers and most likely a carrier group.



Matthew.


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## Good2Golf (23 May 2007)

Not to come across as being unfair, but the reality is that the recent surge of Naval Seppuku hasn't helped.  The Navy is more disadvantaged than say a couple of years ago.

G2G


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## Ex-Dragoon (23 May 2007)

The thing is Matthew you _cannot_ guarantee we won't be involved in a major conflict, no one can, so tossing out random numbers is not really condusive to the discussion.

As for buying foreign built ships, personally I feel its the route we should go.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (23 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> The thing is Matthew you _cannot_ guarantee we won't be involved in a major conflict, no one can, so tossing out random numbers is not really condusive to the discussion.



No offence Ex, but I disagree.  In a resource scarce environment, we are forced to prioritize and the only efficient way to prioritize is by examining the probabilities of various events.  In short, you may disagree with my estimates, but using weighted probabilities in concert with the impact of said probability occurring, is the only way to make the best possible decision given our limited funds.


Matthew.


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## Ex-Dragoon (23 May 2007)

But where do you get your numbers? Throwing probabilities of 5%, 1% and 10% are pretty big certainties, one has a better chance of being struck by lightning. Then again it was said we would never use the tank again and look its back in vogue....


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## Cdn Blackshirt (24 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> But where do you get your numbers? Throwing probabilities of 5%, 1% and 10% are pretty big certainties, one has a better chance of being struck by lightning. Then again it was said we would never use the tank again and look its back in vogue....



Personally, I produced my probabilities using tried & true PANOOMA methodology (Pulled A Number Out Of My A....).   ;D

In all seriousness, I made quick calculations based on what I see as the current and developing world environment.  My point isn't that I should be responsible for developing those probabilities.  There are others who are specialists who are much more qualifed.  That being said, I think the preponderance of evidence would indicate that we're far more likely to deal with a number of issues other than blue water navy confrontations alone due to the low number of potential enemies.

China.
Iran.
Russia?
Venezuela?

On the other side of the equation, the number of likely hotspots for failed states or islamic insurgencies is dramatic.

Afghanistan
Pakistan.
Actually...all of the 'stans.
Lebanon.
Indonesia.
The Philippines.
Algeria.
Actually....almost the entire continent of Africa.

Do you agree or disagree with my lists?  Actually, perhaps more helpful to me to understand your position, I'm sure you're thinking of a hypothetical where my model doesn't work.  Give me that hypothetical and I'll do my best to play catch-up....


Matthew.


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## Ex-Dragoon (24 May 2007)

Oh your list is fine but my problem is when people advocate getting rid of certain capabilities (C&C ,AAD,etc)we tend to be less self sufficent and rely more on our allies. While it is likely we will operate in a multinational task force there are no guarantees. When we lose something its very hard to get it back, when we lose something people die in a worst case scenario.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (24 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Oh your list is fine but my problem is when people advocate getting rid of certain capabilities (C&C ,AAD,etc)we tend to be less self sufficent and rely more on our allies. While it is likely we will operate in a multinational task force there are no guarantees. When we lose something its very hard to get it back, when we lose something people die in a worst case scenario.



Agreed....and I would not advocate such a position unless it was a sacrifice absolutely necessary to add a new capability that otherwise we would be unable to afford that fits into that probability matrix mentioned above.

Example:  If the choice is to fund MRAP's, Improved Armed Tactical UAV's, Heavy Lift Helicopters, C-17 Strategic Airlifters and additional infantry with upgraded body armour vs funding the replacement of the 280's, I would argue the sacrifice is necessary IF we don't have the budget to do both.


Matthew.


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## Good2Golf (24 May 2007)

The problem is the contemporary operating environment can change so much more rapidly than the systems and infrastructures and personal training can.  You have to weigh things and hedge your bets against the "less probable, but no less important" capabilities out there.

Kudos to the Navy for trying to make SCTF/SCF work...sadly the amount of energy directed into that effort was not returned in kind to the Navy as an institution within the CF.  On the flip side, one could say that the Navy is now the waning service, just as it waxed in the 80's and early 90's with CPF while the Army was pretty much languishing in Cyprus.

I think it's fair to say that there needs to be a little more balance IMO, we shouldn't be taking a "well you had more support in the past, it's our turn now" sort of attitude.

G2G


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## Ex-Dragoon (24 May 2007)

Agreed G2G


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## ChrisG (27 May 2007)

Age entitles one to a certain perspective and I have seen the cycle turn over two or three times in my adult life.  Sometimes, too,  being outside the administration gives one a different perpective.  (Now I am a  school trustee and almost every day I see trustees with educational backgrounds misapprehend a problem because they can only see it from inside the box so forgive me please if as an inexperienced outsider wishing to add to the discussion I make some basic boo-boos.)

One thing is for sure,  whatever threat you equip for today,  a new, unexpected threat will be the one you must face tomorrow.  For instance,  maybe 15 British sailors would not have been screwed (metaphorically)  if they had the support of a shallowdraft, water jet type patrol boat that could have hung around longer than a helicopter.  After years of believing that 'policing' required only light vehicles we suddenly find that heavy armour is indispensible.  What next?

There is no way Canadian Naval forces, however well they fight, can defend us against a major navy such as Russia or China,  sheer numbers say it   Maybe then we should have submarines. How can  we persuade them that the price would not be worth the candle?  Should we be attempting to 'project' naval power knowing that the loss of a couple of ships in foreign waters to a new or unexpected form of attack would cripple our naval defence literally for years.  Do we have the depth to sustain the loss of the assets we risk?  Maybe we should  only risk light patrol craft for policing actions.

Why do we not appear to understand  the concept  and need for instant and  powerful air support?  The proof has been around since before the Germans invented blitzkrieg but we still have to rely on US air forces to give support 'when they can.'  Seems strange in a force where we no longer define personnel as Army, Navy, or Air Force but as serving  'the CF' in 'an environment.'

This week my No 3 son signed up for RMC as a future MARS officer. ( No 1 son is just finishing up SLT as a future pilot.) Will we see him having the right equipment for all the jobs the Navy will be asked to do and  co-ordinated support from the other 'evironments' or will he too be struggling to make do?  

Apart from our new military connection I do, reluctantly, believe we must build a force capable of operating economically in all circumstances,  and that means having offshore capability and litoral capability,  heavier ships  and the fastest lightest boats too, and the skill to make them work together.  It is a great idea,  but it means giving up the traditional prejudices.


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## IN HOC SIGNO (27 May 2007)

The concern of a father is always a good motivator. I remember when I was sailing on the West Coast and the EH 101 helicopter was cancelled. Not long after that there was a Sea King crash in which pers were killed. Some parents of Sea King crew members on mty ship wrote to the PM of the day wondering why their children were not entitled to work with safe equipment that wasn't older than them.

I think you are right in many ways Chris that it is impossible to plan as a small player for major threats, however, we have to be a player, in conjunction with our allies, that makes a contribution other than sitting on the sidelines and trying to claim moral superiority. In the cold war era our Navy was training to do the ASW piece and given the budget cuts of the 70s we didn't do too bad a job at it. the Army was deployed in Europe and despite the fact that our equipment was old and obsolete we still won soldiering competitions such as tank gunnery competitions etc. Our Air Force laboured with aging aircraft but still managed to hold their heads up high too.

I think we need an overall plan like the Aussies came up with that is resistant to changing Governments and their whims. Get a ten year plan for general defence requirements....factor in where we will fit in with Allies in a big fight and get some all party assent to move toward the goal. We are a very rich country and we can afford it...we just need political will to push it forward. As more and more families discover that the interests of their loved ones...be it sons or cousins or whatever...are at stake, maybe it's not too far fetched to believe that we can do it.


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## ChrisG (27 May 2007)

Maybe supporting our allies in their endeavors,  to the extent that we can,  is what we pay for the greater protection of their blue water navy. Maybe, without giving up the capability we ave,  we could also specialise in, say, inshore patrol etc in return.  It  needs skill and imagination but it might be done.

You make an excellent point on the planning front,  if you are starting a lobby  count me in.


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## cameron (27 May 2007)

Same here on the planning front IN HOC SIGNO :cdnsalute:


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## Ex-Dragoon (27 May 2007)

Unfortunately when we become a niche navy we lose capability and interest. I for one  as well as many others would pronbably leave if all we did was inshore. We want to retain and add to what we can do not remove anything from the pot so to speak.


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## Kirkhill (27 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Unfortunately when we become a niche navy we lose capability and interest. I for one  as well as many others would pronbably leave if all we did was inshore. ....



That seems like a reasonable position - so what portion of your career would you reckon should be allocated to domestic duties and what portion to expeditionary duties?

6 months on, 6 months off?  3 Years domestic, 1 Year Expeditionary?  3 Years Expeditionary, 1 Year domestic?  How much time would you be willing to invest in training and supporting the Naval Reserve?

Jus' bein' cheeky as usual


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## Ex-Dragoon (27 May 2007)

Well I am lazy so I am not going to do the math...what it boils down to is the mission required at the time. I do guarantee though, if we structure our Navy on inshore OPS you will have some politico it Ottawa figure that if we are not doing blue water then why do we need frigates and destroyers when OPVs and corvettes will do the trick, if we don't have frigates and destroyers then we really do not need AORs (JSS) or that matter an LHA/LPD. We could ask the USN to take over escort of a LPD but sometimes their own national interests would come first. See where I am  going?


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## cameron (28 May 2007)

I for one, am also totally against turning what is still (for now) one of the world's best blue water navies into a brown water patrol force.


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## Cdn Blackshirt (28 May 2007)

cameron said:
			
		

> I for one, am also totally against turning what is still (for now) one of the world's best blue water navies into a brown water patrol force.



I don't think anyone here has advocated that....


Matthew.   ???


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## Ex-Dragoon (28 May 2007)

Reply#57 Matthew, comes close to advocating otherwise Matthew


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## Kirkhill (28 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Well I am lazy so I am not going to do the math...what it boils down to is the mission required at the time. I do guarantee though, if we structure our Navy on inshore OPS you will have some politico it Ottawa figure that if we are not doing blue water then why do we need frigates and destroyers when OPVs and corvettes will do the trick, if we don't have frigates and destroyers then we really do not need AORs (JSS) or that matter an LHA/LPD. We could ask the USN to take over escort of a LPD but sometimes their own national interests would come first. See where I am  going?



I do see where you are going but like Matthew said "I don't think anyone here has advocated" cameron's brown water patrol force as a replacement for the blue water navy.  The thing is we HAVE inshore waters to patrol, we HAVE a lot of internal brown waters and our enemies operate in inshore and brown waters overseas.  

The army is having to adjust to the threat in uncomfortable fashions (even though they are keeping the tanks they won't be used in the same fashion that they were, nor in the numbers anticipated).

Do you see any possibility that the Navy would find acceptable conducting inshore and brown water operations, both domestically and overseas, if it meant reducing (not eliminating) blue water operations?


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## Ex-Dragoon (28 May 2007)

Its still a lot of capability just to give up like that...in the time where the O Boats were decommissioned til the Victorias started to sail we _lost_so much in training. Both surface and subsurface, and we are still feeling the effects as we have not got back what we lost. I would rather add a brown/green water capoability on then go through the crap we are going through now again. Its no half measures, it will either be an inshore constabulary navy(coast guard) or a true blue water navy with inshore assets. Walk a mile in my shoes and you would see that.
Kirkhill we cannot reduce much more, we are at the bare minimum as it is!


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## Cdn Blackshirt (28 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Reply#57 Matthew, comes close to advocating otherwise Matthew



I stand corrected....


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## Kirkhill (28 May 2007)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> Walk a mile in my shoes and you would see that.
> Kirkhill we cannot reduce much more, we are at the bare minimum as it is!



Heard Ex-D. Going silent -- until the next time.


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## cameron (28 May 2007)

I think Ex-Dragoon's second option is the best way to go.  A true blue water navy with inshore assets.  The navy needs to be properly balanced to credibly meet threats in whatever form they come.


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