# Jessica L ynch's units training



## x westie (20 Sep 2004)

I am new to this forum and i find it very interesting, i would like to hear some input into what went wrong when PFC Lynch's convoy,. was attacked. From following this forum there   are a   large group of professional soldier's in the Canadian Army that contribute to this forum,i would like to hear from you on what you believe went wrong,,and if the Canadian Army is taking steps in training to prevent this from happening to our troops,


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## dutchie (21 Sep 2004)

I will summarize what happened to the esteemed PFC Lynch and ther buddies:

Rear ech troops driving in a war zone, took wrong turn , ran into enemy troops who were not rear ech. 

Enemy troops do their job.

Rear ech troops try to do what SHOULD be their first job. Despite enourmous effort by some, their lack of training in how to destroy the enemy showed very quickly.

Re:what the Canadian Army is doing to prevent this.....

The Canadian Army cannot address the issue of teaching a lot of it's rear ech personel's inability to kill the enemy until they convince them to put the firing pins back in there weapons.


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## D-n-A (21 Sep 2004)

No one here can really comment on the training the 507th Maint Co got, because no one here was in that unit.

And yea, what Caeser said is a paraphrashed version of what happened.


Canada(and I would assume other countries) have learned from this battle and others. 

An example of the training to deal with this type of thing(convoy being attacked) that we're starting to do(I think we may have done this stuff before, but I'm not positive on this)
http://www.army.dnd.ca/lfwa/feature_convoy_training.htm


Caeser, its not fair to crap on all CSS troops, yes some don't take the whole "a soldier first, a tradesmen second" thing serouisly, but there are also a lot that do.


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## gun plumber (21 Sep 2004)

I agree.having been in the reserves for 9 years and the regular force now for 3(just signed my next BE)there is no point in downplaying CSS troops.It's just like any trade or unit:You have the guy who fights in the trenches and then you have the guy who washes pots!


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## dutchie (21 Sep 2004)

re:"its not fair to crap on all CSS troops" 

That's why I said,  "_a lot_ of it's rear ech personel's inability ".....'not all' CSS types do this, but a lot do. 

This is based on my first hand, overseas experience with CSS types. For example, CSS types _disassembling_ their weapons and storing them in the storage bins on the outside of the HL, CSS types removing firing pins so they don't get an ND, CSS types not fully seating the mag on a 9 mil so they don't have to do that whole scary 'put the empty mag in and pull the trigger' clearance drill, the list goes on. I know it was just Bosnia, but holy sheep shiite, your still a bloody soldier. This phenomenon is found _strictly_ in the CSS. An Infantry soldier taking out his firing pin to avoid an ND is like a trucker slashing his tires to avoid driving.

Oh, and it was intended to be humorous.


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## pbi (21 Sep 2004)

I've talked to a few of the US folks here about the Lynch incident. The general consensus is that the US Army, while putting alot of effort into training its combat arms soldiers, had failed to do the same with its CSS types. Now, this would be bad enough in any army going to war, but IMHO the extreme specialization of the US Army CSS types aggravated it further. The comments made by some of the parents pf the soldiers in the 507th Maint Co, such as "my son just joined to be a mechanic....etc" further show that even in the US the role of soldiers as soldiers may not be fully understood. The fact that much of its CSS is in the ARES (not the ARNG) has not helped, as the combat trg levels of that force tend to lie somewhere below our own Army Reserve (anecdotal) Reportedly, the US Army has embarked on a crash program to train its CSS types for combat.



> The Canadian Army cannot address the issue of teaching a lot of it's rear ech personel's inability to kill the enemy until they convince them to put the firing pins back in there weapons



Couldn't agree more. This has been discussed in other threads as evidence of the need to instill an Army-wide "warrior" mentality. IMHO this will only happen when the Army "owns" the CSS MOCs it needs and gets out from under this unified rubbish.



> It's just like any trade or unit:You have the guy who fights in the trenches and then you have the guy who washes pots!



Yes, you do. And you need them to be alive to do their jobs. The enemy doesn't check MOCs before he pulls the trigger, and he knows the Achilles heel of any Western force is its CSS. The last thing we should do is "downplay" CSS. I blame us Cbt A types to a certain extent for this, but I still lay the great bulk of the blame at the feet   of the unified trg system. Cheers.


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## dutchie (21 Sep 2004)

Re:"The enemy doesn't check MOCs before he pulls the trigger"   - couldn't have said it better myself. 

Further, all soldiers (but particularly CSS) should remember that the enemy trains to kill us as hard as our Combat Arms troops train to kill the enemy. If you think the Combat Arms types are too hard on you for your lack of discipline when it comes to war training, wait till you see how hard the enemy will be on you when YOU make that wrong turn. 

PBI: How would you address the issue of training? Would you increase the war fighting training of CSS pers over their trades training? Make each man/woman a qualified Infantry soldier prior to commencing any trades qual courses? If so, how would you address the maintenance of the quality of their war fighting ability? I have my own ideas, but am anxious to here things from your perspective.


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## x westie (21 Sep 2004)

It seems that history is repeating itself, during WW2, i have read reports of the   Brit. RAF ground crew in both the Battle for Singapore and Crete unable to defend their airbases with   the issued .303 rifles & Bren LMG because they were not interested in learning a military skill or the higher up types felt there no need,this also happened in the Canadian Army in WW2,   in late 1944 due to heavy casualties after Normandy,many Service Corps people stationed in the U.K. were sent to man the infantry battalions, these people also did not know basic weapons handling and had to be trained at the front,aperantly some had been in the Army for several years but again either not interested or higher up types not making sure they were trained.


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## the 48th regulator (21 Sep 2004)

it was an ambush folks,

Can someone please, regardles of what trade, elaborate how they would handle such a situation?  I know I have had to go through one so I would like to hear the opinion of how front line troops would have handled themselves any better. 

And please spare me the finite details of what one has learned in training.

Shit happens and you react... remember an abush is meant to surprise you, and unless you train on a constant basis for ambush drills, trust me, it aint easy for anyone.  Who would train on a regular basis for this type of attack?  Units that have been posted in an A.O  for long periods of time where you are able to learn local tactics of yer enemy, his favoured method of ambush, his favourite attakc routes (ie of his enemy, your ally).   Until that time happens, guess what? You get hit, and you get hit hard.  Period.  That's why you try to take it to them before the enemy can get a chance to plan on you. 

that's how you beat an ambush.  Does the trade have an effect, sure combat arms will have the faster reaction time, cuz that's what we are trained for. Does it always work?  Think about it, all actions are really different types of ambush, woudl you not say?  You try to draw an emeny into a well defended position.  So in the end ya we may be able as "front line troops" know how to handle our selves, but given the chance anyone of us will jump if someone cam up behind us and tapped us on the head in th middle of the night.  Now try patollign in enemy territory when all eyes are on you.....big difference.

oh well time for bed, so keep the eyes on the back of yer heads open...

Tess


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## pbi (21 Sep 2004)

the 48th regulator said:
			
		

> it was an ambush folks,
> 
> Can someone please, regardles of what trade, elaborate how they would handle such a situation?   I know I have had to go through one so I would like to hear the opinion of how front line troops would have handled themselves any better.
> 
> ...



Just out of interest, where were you ambushed and how did you survive?

I believe that the facts of   the 507th ambush are much worse than what you are suggesting. I have heard from US types here that the members of the coy did not have magazines in their weapons and in some cases were not able to operate weapons such as the SAWS (=our C9). These sad facts, as well as high level of concern about the low combat skill levels of their CSS types (esecially ARES CSS) has led the US Army to go into the crash combat training program I referred to above. Perhaps you may not feel that such training will make much difference, but evidently the US Army, who have all the facts of the 507 incident, do feel that it is needed. Survival in an ambush, to the extent that survival is possible, is IMHO a product of preparation, as is survival in combat in general. While I agree with you that a well-laid ambush will probably kill or injure a large number of its victims, I can also tell you that the Coalition forces here commonly experience ambushes laid with varying degrees of skill, and because of training and preparation their casualties are usually minimized.

You seem to suggest that there is no way for CSS units to avoid ambushes, nor to minimize their effects. I disagree completely, and I back up my position with the most recent "Lessons Learned" publication from the US Army here in Afgh. They have learned  many ways to achieve both of these things. 
But, lessons learned are just so much useless history if they are not put into effect through realistic and demanding training, and this is the issue in the 507 situation: they were apparently not properly trained for combat. Our CSS folks are vital: if they die, we fail. Therefore we must train and equip them to survive. The approach of the USMC is that "every Marine is a rifleman" (NOT, they hasten to point out, every Marine an infantryman...) and this ensures that even Marine CSS units can give a good account of   themselves in combat.

Quite apart from the physical skills and drills, there is the mental outlook that is a product of proper training. Awarness, alertness, immediate reaction, self-confidence and determination are products of good combat training. IMHO, these are needed by anybody who may be faced with enemy contact, whether it be ambush, raid on a CSS hide, etc. Cheers.


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## pbi (21 Sep 2004)

48 Regulator: was it in Sector South, en rte to the Kenyan OP? Your last name seems familiar. Cheers.


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## chrisf (21 Sep 2004)

Caeser said:
			
		

> PBI: How would you address the issue of training? Would you increase the war fighting training of CSS pers over their trades training? Make each man/woman a qualified Infantry soldier prior to commencing any trades qual courses?



Isn't that the theory behind SQ?


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## ark (21 Sep 2004)

x westie said:
			
		

> i would like to hear from you on what you believe went wrong,,and if the Canadian Army is taking steps in training to prevent this from happening to our troops,



I hope this is what you are looking for http://www.sftt.org/PDF/article07102003a.pdf


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## Gayson (21 Sep 2004)

Everyone has to take SQ, so the problem of CSS pers getting trained initially in the combat arms isn't the problem.  The problem is maintaning these standards.

Are non combat arms required to take a sort of SQ refresher course every so often?  How are their combat skills monitored?  How often do they train in the basics?

I think to prevent future occurances like the 507th happening to Canadian troops can be accomplished by:

a)  Requiring all non-combat arms to do an SQ-refresher style course, or have these skills a part of their units yearly training schedule (if not already done so)

b)  From day one develope the idea that everyone is a soldier first tradesmen sceond in all recruits, and keep this idea throughout their career.


Sure non-combat arms may not see nearly as much combat as their Infantry, Armoured, Engineer bretherin, but what happens if supply lines get attacked, of if for an upcoming battle the commander has a shortage of men and orders non-combat pers to fight as well?

The SQ course covers the C6, C9, defensive ops, recce patrolling, how to dig in amoung other essential skills which are the basics.  Like all skills these basics MUST be practiced!


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## dutchie (21 Sep 2004)

Isn't that the theory behind SQ?

The problem is not the original training, it is the maintaining of the skills and abilities over a 20 year career. How do we realistically expect people to maintain skills learned if they only 'practice' them once a year (if that)? A CSS tradesman/woman straight off their SQ would probably be much more proficient than someone who's been in for a year or two, or twenty. Their proficiency in 'soldier-skills', or 'infantry-type skills' will naturally go down, however, as their proficiency in their chosen trade goes up. There of course will be exceptions to this. But it's only natural that the skills learned on SQ will degrade over time unless pacticed and used regularly. That means less 'convoy-ops' ex's for MSE Ops for example, and more advance to contact, ambush, patrolling, etc type ex's. 

In my opinion, CSS types should be doing at least as many strictly war fighting ex's (involving 100% soldier-skills) as opposed to ex's involving practicing their actual trade. I would much rather their skill at their chosen trade degrade a little in exchange for the ability to survive in a hostile environment......after all, you're ineffective if you can't survive long enough to actually support the troops doing the fighting. 

If you don't have the skills (_or the inclination_) to kill an enemy soldier with the tools available to you, despite your skill in your trade, you are useless. You are a drain on the CF, and the tax payer in general.


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## Michael Dorosh (21 Sep 2004)

I think there is a big difference between being beasted once a year by infantry-types running the CSS through Warrior training and generally either treating the drills as a joke, or else trying to fail as many CSS and officers as possible, and useful training in the field.   Warrior training has been pretty mellow for the last few years in our unit here, but I do recall many of the infantrymen going out of their way, in years past, to fail all the officers and CSS types on minor points rather than actually help them relearn the skills they needed (the whole point of Warrior training).   In my opinion - and this is where I agree with Caeser, apparently - those skills are best developed in a field setting rather than on an armouries floor.   And they should be developing those skills every time the unit exercises.


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## Matt_Fisher (21 Sep 2004)

I agree with Michael Dorosh here.  Warrior training done by infantry for CSS can quickly turn into a non-learning, beasting type environment.  I think it would be better to develop a combat attitude from within by adding a Force Protection billet at the company level for CSS SR. NCOs as part of their career progression.  They would be formally trained and be responsible for instilling good tactical knowledge and practices into their CSS unit.


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## dutchie (21 Sep 2004)

"those skills are best developed in a field setting rather than on an armouries floor"

Exactly. It's one thing to learn the drills on a C7 for instance, but it's quite another to be able to bring effective fire down on an enemy under extremely stressful, terrifying, and dangerous situations (not that I profess to have experience in that either). 

These are merely basics, that give you enough skill to safely start the actual training in a field environment. In short, we are taught these drills so we don't kill someone in training. Their original intent was never to be the training itself. Calling it 'Warrior Training' is really stupid. It should be called 'I-Won't-Accidentally-Shoot-You-on-the-Range Training'.

"develop a combat attitude from within by adding a Force Protection billet at the company level for CSS SR. NCOs as part of their career progression.   They would be formally trained and be responsible for instilling good tactical knowledge and practices into their CSS unit." - excellent suggestion Matt.


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## pbi (21 Sep 2004)

With respect to the issue of SQ, can somebody refresh me as to whether or not Regular Force CSS support MOCs go through that? I know that Reservists do, but I'm not certain about RegF. I rather think most RegF CSS MOCs go from BMQ to MOC trg, which would help to explain part of the problem.

Another issue that weakens the soldier skills of our CSS people is the manner in which our unified system shunts them around different environments. An MSE Op who has just spent three or four years driving bus on an Air Wing is not likely to have anything like the soldier skills or the outlook to perform properly in combat, especially today when the idea of the safe rear area simply does not exist on many operations.

Like others on this thread I have seen and had the pleasure to command some pretty impressive CSS soldiers. In Croatia, I had a cook who regularly went out on night patrols, and a clerk who volunteered to double as a sniper spotter. Thse guys were great and the o31s thought highly of them. But, IMHO they were great in spite of the unified system, not because of it. What we want is all CSS soldiers to be just like that. Cheers.


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## Jarnhamar (21 Sep 2004)

Theres no excuse for a soldier removing their firing pin or magazine on operations. Someone who does that should be sent to club ed. It's treason. What better way to aid an enemy than disabling your weapon? Thats one step below giving the bad guys your C7.

I personally think they should be kicked out of the military. It's not someone making a mistake or screwing up by accident. It's someone deliberatly making themselves non effective.  I wish I had more balls to do something about this when I saw it overseas. 
I'm quite ashamed that I saw it a few times (No mags in weapons) and didn't do anything about it. Now I truely see how important of a thing it is and i won't overlook that again.

All ambushes are different of course. In some cases the ambushee (Is that the proper word?) will die regardless of their training, in other cases they won't. I don't think this is an excuse for soldiers not to be trained in ambush drills or support weapons. To just shrug the shoulders and hope for the best.

I love the idea of having all canadian soldiers trained like the marines. Riflemen first. I just don't see that as a possibility in Canada. We don't have enough people with that mentality or mindset, nor willing to do it.  We just won't attract enough soldiers willing to go through that then take trade training.  I DO think it's possible to give CS and CCS soldiers (much) more exposure to 'field' type training and keep then current. I don't see why we can't use Iraq as an example and have our friends in support trades thrown into convoys and attacked. Put into 'base defense' situations. Give them lots more range time, run them through jungle lanes. Navagation by foot and especially vehicle. Survival training.
I can see a lot of people saying "Fuck that, thats not what i signed up for. I'm here for the $10'000 signing bonus and the free schooling so i can quit in a few years and get a great civilian job"
Well tough. I think people who "Just want to be a mechanic" should keep the hell away from the military. Just because YOU don't want to use guns, sleep in the field or get dirty doesn't mean you won't be put in that situation.

Would it be so hard to set aside even 2 weeks a year and have non combat arms trades (that would find themselves deployed overseas) involved in an ex where they would learn and use the kind of life saving tactics were talking about? BEcome confident and comfrtable with their weapons? It's a big joke when someone picks up a rifle and says damn i haven't touched the C7 in 7 years. I think thats just scarry.  Have the combat arms as enemy force. What better way to learn about the enemy and see how things look from their point of view?
It's just like a 2 man enemy force team with miles equipment picking off a section of troops doing a section attack across a field. As the bad guy you get to see just how effective your tactics are.

I remember going to the MIR for poison ivy juice right before a battle group run. I couldn't believe how many people were there with some kinda problem trying to get chits.   I can only imagine the excuses from soldiers trying to get out of 2 weeks in the field or any other sort of training as were mentioning. 
I think many canadian soldiers feel like only the infantry or combat arms will ever really be in harms way and it's going to take a situation like the lynch ambush for people to wake up.


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## x westie (21 Sep 2004)

All recruiting ads never mention anything about CS trades as a soldier first, tradesmen second, i think alot of people join with this mindset, CF RC should quit been so politically correct and instill this when people go down to join the CF


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## D-n-A (21 Sep 2004)

Yea, CFRC doesn't always tell people that their gonna be a soldier first(an train as one) and a tradesmen second, because of that 3 people quit my basic course, two were joining as supply techs, the other was a Clerk.


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## Gayson (21 Sep 2004)

I met a recruit in the reg force during the summer at wasaga beach during leave.  He was to be a Vtech and was on his SQ.  

I was impressed to hear from them that their field ex was suppose to be 3 weeks long, unlike my small 1 week field ex for my reservist sq.


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## ghazise (21 Sep 2004)

The 507th Ordnance Maintenance Company is the Army equivalent of my old unit Ordnance Maintenance Company (Re designated CSSB-18, Maint Co for OIF)   I'm not one to criticise another unit but remember there were absolutely terrible sand storms in late March 2003.

Some very easy things to improve CSS units would be:
- Disseminate Movement Orders / 5 Paragraph Orders / Frag Orders throughout the convoy,
- Land Nav,   ensuring NCO's/Officers really know how to navigate and work GPS
- Keeping the convoys as small as possible, distribute gun trucks evenly, 
- Have a quasi recce units within the convoy,
- ensure drivers have NVG's and interconvoy communication
- sandbag your vehicles and cargo

Also, my unit had to give up two M88A2 for one M88A1 and we lost both our AAVR7, plus plenty of machine guns to Division units, while in country we did manage to pick up AT-4 for recovery missions.   

The most important part is to keep a convoy moving, a quasi recce unit could help avoid ambushes.
Active Marine CSS Units get billets for all sorts of infantry courses,   we had Infantry Instructors, MOUT Instructors, Mountain Warfare Instructors, HRST Instructors, and I even have 0352 as a secondary MOS (Anti-tank Missileman), but not allot of this does allot of good in a CSS unit.   My point, smart proactive CPL and SGTs can do allot more with their CSS platoons to prepare for CSS missions (Convoy, Recovery and CSS Compound Defence), not infantry missions, you do not need a Force Protection Billet (Sorry Matt, Every NCO is responsible for leading their unit in combat)


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## Jarnhamar (21 Sep 2004)

You know what REALLY doesn't help?
is the attitude of our recruiters (among others)
We've even seen it mentioned on the boards here plenty of times.

Someone goes into the recruiting office and says 'I wanna be in the infantry' and the recruiter says "ahh geee damn why do tyou wanna do that, you don't want infantry, you qualify for so many other things, take my advice don't go infantry"

What a bad message to send.


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## jfladeroute (21 Sep 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> With respect to the issue of SQ, can somebody refresh me as to whether or not Regular Force CSS support MOCs go through that? I know that Reservists do, but I'm not certain about RegF. I rather think most RegF CSS MOCs go from BMQ to MOC trg, which would help to explain part of the problem.



I think you may be misremembering the fact that CSS soldiers can do their SQ and MOC courses in any order, while the combat arms must take the SQ first.



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> Like others on this thread I have seen and had the pleasure to command some pretty impressive CSS soldiers. In Croatia, I had a cook who regularly went out on night patrols, and a clerk who volunteered to double as a sniper spotter. Thse guys were great and the o31s thought highly of them. But, IMHO they were great in spite of the unified system, not because of it. What we want is all CSS soldiers to be just like that. Cheers.



I'd be hard pressed to disagree, however that attitude has to be encouraged from the top (particularly from the senior CSS types). I've been accused of being "too army", which can make it quite difficult to effect any change.


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## jfladeroute (21 Sep 2004)

Ghost778 said:
			
		

> You know what REALLY doesn't help?
> is the attitude of our recruiters (among others)
> We've even seen it mentioned on the boards here plenty of times.
> 
> ...



We have quite the opposite problem with Reserve recruiting locally. Candidates coming through the door have either watched every episode of "Band of Brothers" (twice) and want to be infanteers, or have seen every rerun of M*A*S*H* a thousand times and want to be medics. Encouraging any other trade option is like pulling teeth.


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## the 48th regulator (21 Sep 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> 48 Regulator: was it in Sector South, en rte to the Kenyan OP? Your last name seems familiar. Cheers.



yes that was me.

we we left the Kenyan o.p and was head back to Charles coy camp.

cheers


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## the 48th regulator (21 Sep 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> Just out of interest, where were you ambushed and how did you survive?
> 
> I believe that the facts of  the 507th ambush are much worse than what you are suggesting. I have heard from US types here that the members of the coy did not have magazines in their weapons and in some cases were not able to operate weapons such as the SAWS (=our C9). These sad facts, as well as high level of concern about the low combat skill levels of their CSS types (esecially ARES CSS) has led the US Army to go into the crash combat training program I referred to above. Perhaps you may not feel that such training will make much difference, but evidently the US Army, who have all the facts of the 507 incident, do feel that it is needed. Survival in an ambush, to the extent that survival is possible, is IMHO a product of preparation, as is survival in combat in general. While I agree with you that a well-laid ambush will probably kill or injure a large number of its victims, I can also tell you that the Coalition forces here commonly experience ambushes laid with varying degrees of skill, and because of training and preparation their casualties are usually minimized.
> 
> ...



To answer the first question it was the former Yugoslavia, Southwest sector of Croatia, UNPROFOR ROTO 5, 31/12/1994.  We were returning from escorting a convoy of engineers who were setting up the power and lights to an O.P that we had to reconstruct.  The Local belligerents had threatened to attack the o.p due to the fact that we Confiscated U.N equipment sold to them by the former peacekeepers who dwelled there.  We attempted to detain some of their personnel, confiscated weapons and equipment, and ended up in a "Mexican standoff" with them for a period of time.  When cooler heads prevailed our platoon escorted them off the grounds of the o.p, all the time hearing these belligerents threaten to kill in both English and Serbo Croation. (My response was exactly as follows "ON YER BIKE).  

We left behind the Pioneer section of our company (which was a section of our platoon) and returned to our company camp with some of the weapons and equipment to be bagged and tagged.  A decision was made that since it was New Years eve the Locals would be restless and it was determined that we needed to get power and light up the area of the o.p pronto.  My Buddy (Phil Badanai) was assigned as the driver of the lead vehicle and was told to find a volunteer to ride shotgun.  He went to his I.S.O trailer which was close to ours, poked his head in mine told me what he was up to and I said I would go with him, as I still had most of my gear on.

We headed to the town of Benkovac, hooked up with our convoy (about 2-3 vehicles) of engineers, and headed back to the o.p with minor incidences of children throwing firecrackers at us, or some drunken fool stumbling on the side of the road with firearm slung (you name it they had it, both new and old). We arrived at the o.p dropped off our engineer brothers, and declined an invitation to stay. We wanted to head back to the mess for a hot meal and some pints.

Off we went in our ILTIS (God bless it . . . he he) and headed back.  It was dark now and the party was now full under way.  The most surreal scene that I have ever witnessed.  Constant sound of small arm bursts and the gentle arcs of green tracer were lighting the air.  The radio crackled and we were all told to keep the shot reps to a minimum, and to report only visual threats that would need investigation from the Recce PLT or the QRF.  

We then rounded a corner and there was a group of about 25-30 guys on the right side of the road.  I un-racked my weapon, but decided to lay the weapon across my lap as not to agitate them  (can you tell I had just finished reading Bravo Two Zero?), as we expected they would let us pass and fire in the air just to let us know who was in charge.  Ya we could have turned around, but at this close proximity (about less than 30 M) I would rather have drove pass them than receive the token cowards' bullet in the back, plus aren't we taught to charge into the direction of enemy fire when in an ambush, might as well start to move in that direction when you know they are there. (yes yes I know not enemy, B E L I G E R E N T I sometimes forget my pre training)

They poured onto the road to stop us, I told Phil not to stop, and he slowed down slightly so we would not hit anyone.  They made a break in the crowd; we gunned the gas and went for that break.  This startled and pissed them off.  They caulked their weapons and opened fire; I could have reached out and grabbed their rifels if I wanted to.  As per my training instincts, I caulked my weapon (yep we were not allowed to have a round up the spout) and before I could return fire I was knocked out.... You can read more about the extent of my injuries on the 48th website and all about my time afterwards.

Whew hoped that answered the first one PBI

As for whether I seem to suggest that there is no way for CSS units to avoid ambushes or survive, nope, I suggest that we should not kid our selves into believing that just because troops that constantly practice ambush drills In meaford or Pet against the Fantasian horde will fair better than those that don't, as I think that's hooey

Until we learn how the enemy acts and feel will we be able to beat them at their game, mind you we will still need to practice and borrow from previous engagements, we can only do proper training in theatre, you should know this as that what was being done even in Khandahar.  But, face it an ambush is meant to surprise you, keep you off your momentum and win by beating while your still trying to figure out what's happening.

That's what I meant.  Sorry for the long ramble mates (man I love this web site, glad I found it)

Tess.


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## Jarnhamar (21 Sep 2004)

Glad you made it through and are able to contribute to the site. 

Long posts make for good reads


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## dutchie (21 Sep 2004)

That's what I meant.  Sorry for the long ramble mates (man I love this web site, glad I found it)

You weren't rambling, and thanks for the good read.

Welcome.


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## Infanteer (22 Sep 2004)

I feel the Regulator and others are correct in many points.

Instilling combat drills in CS and CSS troops on a routine basis will not make necessarily make them more effective fighters.   As some have pointed out, there may be unintended consequences of this.   As well, as Regulator pointed out, these troops fell into an ambush.   The bad guys are smart and know what their doing.   I think what we are lamenting is the fact that many of our support guys may face a situation mentally unprepared for the situation; a perfect example is not having their firing pin in or treating their weapon gently for fear of an ND.

Changing gears abit, perhaps the goal should be to install the correct mindset into all soldiers.   In another spot, I discussed my philosophy on people; there are two types of people in life; people of action or people who are victims.

People of action will react and seize any opportunity to take their fate into their own hand, even if, in the end, they go down fighting.

People who are victims are passive to threats for many reasons (panic, unsure of what to do, fear); they become victims to people of action.   A good example is these poor guys getting their heads lopped off by militant terrorists.   They are just kneeling on the ground passively while a terrorist cuts their head off.

I am not saying all CSS are victims and all Infanteers are action takers, but I feel the difference in mentality weights each to each side.   This comes in part from my personal experience.   I remember the NSE in Velika Kladusa as seeming to be "out of sync" with the companies in the battlegroup.   To many of them, the focus was on bingo night, Sunday routine, and the next mess party.   In my company, we seemed keyed to physical fitness (the gym was never empty on our small camp), playing around with all things military (kit, etc) and preparing for the next op (Ok, it was a PSO, but we were keen to get our boots muddy).   Things like physical fitness (confidence), musketry (capability), and a very active ops or training tempo (morale and sense of mission) were all important to the fostering of a soldiering mentality.   I just didn't see it to the same degree in the NSE.

The goal of basic training (and of Army training in general) should be to turn every soldier in a person of action.   Whether it means fixing a vehicle under fire, fighting a fire in a ship while engaged by a hostile force, or fighting off an ambush and maybe dieing in the effort to do so, at least these people are mentally prepared to meet their fate "with their boots on", as my Grandfather like to say.   I believe the fundamental nature of a fighting soldier is that he is a man of action; good soldiers understand that the chaos of war may fling a bad situation their way, but they refuse to be victims.

How to do this will take alot more then just teaching Support trades "Ambush Left" drills.   It is something that needs to be expounded on from day 1 in recruit school and continually reinforced throughout the Army at all levels.   We should do our best to weed out victims, people who are apt to stand by and let circumstance completely overwhelm them, whether they are a clerk on a convoy who won't put the firing pin in or a company commander who is indecisive in stressful combat situations; having victims in the army can be a danger to those that serve around them.   As well, Matt's proposition of the "Force Protection NCO" in all units is a step in the right direction; it helps to develop the idea that we are all responsible in the field of battle for our lives and for the mission, regardless of what our trade is.

Any thoughts on this approach to looking at things?   I hope this doesn't appear to be "bravado", because that is not the intent.   I realize that not everybody in the Army can be a hardcore Airborne trooper, but I firmly believe we should do our best to mentally prepare every soldier for the rigors of battle.

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## Gayson (22 Sep 2004)

Great post Infanteer!


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## LowRider (22 Sep 2004)

Having enough money in the yearly budget,to allow us to get on the range and actually handle a weapon more than once a year would help. ???


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## Soleman (22 Sep 2004)

Training...this topic is one that the brass in Ottawa should be making a post on.  A saying that means alot now-a-days is Train to fight, Fight like you train.  Being and becoming a proficient soldier is not just the army's job to train you it is also the individuals job to want to improve themselves.  To often I have seen people going on the range once a year striving just to make the bare minimum for a pass.  What is worse is the cuts in budget and ammo that prevent ranges from taking place in CSS units.  Most of them get to do MLOC on the SAT range.  I find this piece of equipment useless for developing and maintaining any marksman skills. They should have taken the money spent on that, it's yearly upkeep cost and put it towards ammo.  

If you are not comfortable with your weapon in training you will be useless in a firefight.  The army needs to break away from conventional ranges, 100,200,300m prone, kneeling etc.  They need to concentrate on CQB and train for unconventional warfare. 

 :warstory: I was on the 25m range in Julien practising CQB drills with the Slovs.  During our fire and movement/transition drill between C8 and pistol, a Strat officer who was waiting to use the range after us came up to talk to our RNCO and proceeded to tell him that you can't do that it is unsafe range practise.  I didn't realise a firefight was safe? 

Another situation...Going on a live fire range and being told by the Log O that we can remove our TV and helmet because they will be constricting during this scenario.  I refused to remove my kit, and was then told that everyone will dress the same or I won't take part in this range.  
Until people get used to the idea of not being scared of their weapon, knowing what state it is in and how to use it properly it doesn't matter what MOC you are an ambush will get you killed.  Granted Infanteers this is your bread and butter so don't think this is directed towards you.  Being a loggie I know exactly what the previous posts are talking about.  

That said, how is the guy with the foot doing?

For what it's worth...


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## Infanteer (22 Sep 2004)

Well, I must say Soleman, you are a breath of fresh air.  Good post.


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## pbi (23 Sep 2004)

> Any thoughts on this approach to looking at things?  I hope this doesn't appear to be "bravado", because that is not the intent.  I realize that not everybody in the Army can be a hardcore Airborne trooper, but I firmly believe we should do our best to mentally prepare every soldier for the rigors of battle.



In the end, I'll settle for this being the lesson of this thread. Cheers.


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## pbi (23 Sep 2004)

48Regulator: Thanks for your story.

What happened to you that night can be laid, to a great extent, at the feet of the Kenyan Battalion (KENBAT) who held that OP before your bn took it over. I was OC C Coy (Gornje Miranje-Kamp Krusty) on the Roto you guys took over from. I handed over to Maj Robinson. I was (prior to the AO shift) the left flank of  CANBAT, so I was responsible to try and keep liaison with KENBAT.

The first time I met the Kenyan commander was at a conference being held at the HQ of the SVK Bde just between Kamp Krusty and Sopot on the Benkovac road. I told him that I wanted to start running contact patrols to his right flank. He seemed very concerned, then said: "Well-I'll have to ask the Serb Brigade Commander". I asked him what the Serb Bde Comd had to do with it, and he replied: "Oh, well-he told me that if the Canadians are going to come into my area I have to ask his permission first." This was my first clear indication of how utterly useless they were.

When we started the patrols, they reported that the Kenyans were doing absolutely nothing. They had not even fortified their OP (we had to send NCOs to teach them how.,..) and were often asleep. As well, we heard that the Kenyans were not really in control of their own OP. Finally, they were completely corrupt: we had standing orders in the bn to stop any of their vehicles we met on the road in our AO and find out where they were going, because they were selling POL, etc to the Serbs. We were often asked by locals why we wouldn't sell POL to them.

When you guys took over that area, you disturbed a relationship that the Kenyans had fostered because they did not want to do their jobs (if they even had the faintest idea what that was...). The Serbs were not keen to see the CANBAT approach spreading into the KENBAT area, because it might have made life more difficult for them. When you guys turfed them out of the OP, that was probably the last straw. Cheers.


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## KevinB (23 Sep 2004)

http://lightfighter.net/eve/ubb.x?q=Y&a=tpc&s=7336015661&f=7206084761&m=2356046934&p=12

Food for thought...




> You aren't going to turn your weapon in if it's dirty. I'm not your mom, so you're going to clean it.
> 
> If you break it, or let it rust shut, and the enemy is on your ass, I'm not going to lend you another one to f_ it up.
> 
> ...



and



> Let me ask you a question, when you were a pogue, wandering around, ignorantly banging your weapon on everything, lazily throwing it on the ground, and too busy playing cards or grab-ass to clean it, did you really realize you were a pogue?"


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## Lance Wiebe (23 Sep 2004)

Soleman wrote:



> Most of them get to do MLOC on the SAT range.  I find this piece of equipment useless for developing and maintaining any marksman skills.



I would have to suggest that either you were not briefed/debriefed properly, and/or your SAT operator did not know what he was doing.

The SAT, while it cannot, and should not, replace live firing, is an excellent tool to teach basic markmanship (developing), and in displaying many of the bad habits shooters sometimes develop.  Once a month on the SAT range is a great aid for maintaining skills, with the proper coaches.  If I had my way, everyone would shoot MLOC on the SAT monthly, and open range practices of shoot to live quarterly.


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## pbi (23 Sep 2004)

Kevin B: Right on. Pogue, REMF, whatever, it's the mentality we have to defeat.

Lance Wiebe: With you 100% on SAT. It's a great system that we are just not making use of to full potential. As you point out, it does not replace the act of live firing, but it can make that live firing alot more productive. It is also a excellent section/team tac trainer. I think the issue may be lack of fully trained operators. Cheers.


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## Soleman (23 Sep 2004)

pbi, lance

I will take your word that maybe I am to harsh on this system, but from a CSS stand point the only thing I have seen it used for is PWT level 1.  Soldiers go in spend 15mins shooting and leave.  If we are lucky the Bn will get 2 days a year on the SAT.  Just like ammo the SAT is affected by our CSS status.  Combat arms have priority.  

So the main point...changes have to start at the top if CSS units are going to change the way they train and adopt doctrine.

I spent two yrs in Coy Ops and Trg, This little, old, MCpl at the bottom has a sore melon from knocking heads with the upper ech trying to allocate more trg time on weapons and drills than sweeping floors and washing trucks.

Cheers.


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## ackland (23 Sep 2004)

I know this will not work in the regs but in the reserves it swhould be real simple. If the CSS at the unit are thrown into the Cmbt Arms postions on weekend training and made to do the job then they will learn. The Office staff at my unit does nothing on weekend that we deploy. Well get them in and start them doing basic soldier skills. They may not like it but TS. We have a Sigs Mcpl in the unit who is all gungho and trains as part of the Recce sqn as often as posible. he isn't Qualified to crew command, but he comes out adn does the rad op thing for a troop leader which then allows himself to take part in recce patrols from time to time. That should be the attitude of all CSS pers. trying to get in the game.

 Why not make an orderly room act as a section in the infantry? Why not have your Ech work as a quick reaction force for a weekend.  :mg:

Get them out doing the basics not just sitting in there offices or machine shops pickin there noses.


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## Quinn (27 Sep 2004)

Private Lynch was part of a unit whose mission was to maintain the vehicles of the US Army's 3rd Infantry Division, which at the moment was pushing on to Baghdad at breakneak speed, bypassing serious points of resistance. One of these places was the town of Fallujah. As the advance elements of the 3rd Infantry Division approached the city, they found no resistance: the Iraqi army unit assigned to protect the town, like much of the Iraqi army, wisesly decided to desert their posts. 

In their place came the Arab irregulars. There are many other words that can be used to describe them: holy warriors, jihadists, insurgents...terrorists. As the massive American division rollled by, a special US Marine force was assigned to clear the city. It was into this cauldron that Private Lynch and her unit drove into, instead of around. 

It doesn't take a Caesar to ambush a convoy of "soft-skinned" vehicles, and the attacker in a situation like this has an obvious advantage. Private Lynch and her buddies were given the classic "Basic Training", emphasis on basic. While they knew how to fire their rifles, in their suceptibility to the element of surprise they were especially vulnerable for they did not receive, being mechanics, the intense training a combat soldier undergoes in the ability to recover from a shock and deal with the situation. 

A short firefight ensued. Several of them were killed, many wounded. While the early reports of the plucky blonde American girl going down like Crocket at the Alamo were innacurate (she does not remember much if anything of the encounter, which may say something about her training, or lack thereof), they're still Americans with guns and so likely did not go quitely. Lynch was probably seriously wounded early on and lost consciousness. 

Her attackers did not kill her out of hand likely because they realized she was more useful to their cause alive than dead. She was in critical condition, and so her captors took her to a clinic. The Iraqi doctor who saved her life, realizing her likely fate in the hands of her captors, bravely crossed the lines, so to speak, and got a message through to American forces. 

Special forces were callled in, distracted the Arab fighters, nipped in and grabbed Lynch, as everyone got to see on TV. 

So in short, the Army left an enemy to its rear for the Marines to deal with, Lynch and her buddies ran smack into those enemies, and they came second place in a firefight with those crazed zealots, their training and/or equipment not being sufficient to fend them off. 

The training issue is a bit of a red herring though. It's not really practical to train your support troops up to the level of combat troops - unless you're a relatively small, specialized group like the US Marines - every person a rifleperson   Jessica Lynch was supposed to be protected by the almost indescribable speed and firepower of a American infantry division. If her unit was considered to be under threat, it would have protection, enough protection to make any attacker pause. The point has been made that they are still soldiers, and indeed they are. I seem to remember an episode during at Ypres in 1915 where the Prussian Guard, no less, was beaten off by the cooks and servants of a headquarters company.

Would a couple days of convoy ambush drills have helped Lynch and her friends? Perhaps. We'll never know, but more training is usually better than less.


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## KevinB (27 Sep 2004)

Quinn,

You have missed the point - the vast majority of these solider's weapons did not fire - either due to poor maintainance - or lack of will (read Col Grossman on this issue).

 Now if your M2 .50 won't fire - you have not been workign on it for a long time - the bullshit about the sandstorms etc aside (yeah weapon get dirty but it is YOUR job to ensure they function.


The Brits recently did a bayoney charge at an IRAQI ambush - killed over 22  

They had the will to kill - sadly the Maintaineers did not.


That is what we need to change.


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## Infanteer (27 Sep 2004)

> either due to poor maintainance - or lack of will



Bang on Kevin.  All soldiers have to be given the mentality that ensures they will not lay down and die - victims.  Simply handing off techniques to soldiers is no good if you do not give them the mental fortitude to execute their duties under the stress of combat.

The easiest and best way to do this.  Tough and realistic training from day 1.

Here is a good video example of how it is done:

http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/data/strength_ad.mp4


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## pbi (27 Sep 2004)

Quinn-you said:


> unless you're a relatively small, specialized group like the US Marines



The USMC is at least three times the size of our entire Armed Forces, and contains all the MOCs (and a few more) that we have in our Army and most that we have in our Air Force. This argument does not wash. By contrast, we are a "relatively small, specialized group".



> Jessica Lynch was supposed to be protected by the almost indescribable speed and firepower of a American infantry division. If her unit was considered to be under threat, it would have protection, enough protection to make any attacker pause.



I don't think this concept has much relevance on the modern battlefield-it might have on the stereotyped, neatly laid out AirLand battlespace we imagined for fighting Group of Soviet Forces Germany, but in places like Iraq (or here in Afgh..) there is no such protection. The Combat Arms are busy fighting, not shepherding CSS types around. CSS are an easy target for asymmetrical enemies and the more we do to give them a fighting chance, the better. Cheers.


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## Quinn (27 Sep 2004)

The USMC is and always has been a small and specialized force - in comparison to the rest of America's armed forces. The Corps can justify, being an elite formation, the need to have every one of its personnel trained to a minimum level of combat competency. 

I maintain it is impractical, even impossible, in a regular army, to train support troops up to the level of combat infantry, much less to the level of a Marine rifleman. 

That does not mean of course they should drive into a combat zone with crusty rifles and panic upon being ambushed. I agree that additional "warrior" type trainining should be made available to support units, especially if they are to be deployed in a 'hot zone'. 
But not everyone is cut out to be a combat infantryman. If an army were to insist that they were, you would find, like I'm sure the Marines do every year, many recruits washing out of basic training, which here in Canada would only increase our recruitment worries. 

I'd like to also reiterate the circumstances that lead them into that ambush the first place - in their mad dash to Baghdad, a decision was made for the 3rdInfDiv to bypass points of resistance. If the 3rd had taken a longer detour around Fallujah, or had paused to deal with the nest of fighters in the city, the ambush would have never taken place.

Even assuming that the jeeps and trucks of that unit were filled with Marine Sharpshooters, there is no guarantee of a different result. I'd liklely bet that they would have held their own, but with only their personal weapons and perhaps and a couple .50 cal's  mounted on soft skinned vehicles, they would still be at a disadvantage in the opening moments of an ambush. 

Ultimately, what happend to Jessica Lynch can be explained by applying the concept of Occam's Razor: the simplest explanation is usually the correct one:

They took a wrong turn. 

Perhaps what is needed for CSS types is not a refresher in marksmanship, but in navigation! 

P.S. That was a nice commercial Infanteer, and it underlines my point: we cannot expect support troops of a maintenence company to have the toughness of the Royal Marines.


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## dutchie (27 Sep 2004)

The Corps can justify, being an elite formation. - As good as the Marines are, to characterize them as 'Elite' is wrong. The MEU is elite, but not the Marine Corps in general.

I maintain it is impractical, even impossible, in a regular army, to train support troops up to the level of combat infantry, much less to the level of a Marine rifleman. - the Marines have shown that it is possible to train all trades to be competant rifleman. As well, I am not sure what you mean by 'Combat Infantry'....is there any other kind? One of the strengths of the Canadian Army is the quality of our training, particularly at the basic soldier skills/infantry level. We have the capacity within our training system to turn out very good soldiers/infantrymen. It is not a stretch, and certainly not 'impossible' as you claim, to expect that we could train evry new recruit to a certain level, and MAINTAIN that level with regular, consistant, relavant, and above all _intense_ field training, in addition to any regular trades-type training (both field and garrison).

That does not mean of course they should drive into a combat zone with crusty rifles and panic upon being ambushed.  - that is what will happen if you do not train them to do otherwise.

I agree that additional "warrior" type trainining should be made available to support units, especially if they are to be deployed in a 'hot zone'. - by the time the warning order comes down re: deployment to 'hot zone', it is too late to train troops to fight like warriors. Keep in mind that any 'hot' deployment will almost certainly be on very little notice. You can't expect to break habits that have been developed over years of insufficient training by sending CSS   tradesmen to the field for a couple of weeks. If you have to bring up the quality of training in order to deploy, why let it slip in the first place?

But not everyone is cut out to be a combat infantryman. If an army were to insist that they were, you would find, like I'm sure the Marines do every year, many recruits washing out of basic training, which here in Canada would only increase our recruitment worries.  - again, not sure what a 'non-combat infantryman' is, but whatever...
An infantry soldier should have more skill than a non-infantry rifleman. No-one is suggesting otherwise. But, the average (and I stress average) CSS soldier in the CF could not adequately defend themselves against even mediocre infantry soldiers. That is the crux of the issue. If that means more drop-outs of basic, and less incompetant riflemen, that's a good thing.


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## Quinn (27 Sep 2004)

In terms of "impractical" and "impossible" I am referring to the contraints placed on the Forces by the beancounters at NDHQ, and beancounters everywhere for that matter. 

In use of the apparently oxymoronic "combat infantry" I am referring to the combat arms of the army, as distinct from the support forces, I apologize if I didnt make this clear. 

Elite is a subjective term of course, but you are correct, as good as the Marines are, some are more highly trained than others.

It is sobering to hear however that our support units, even though, like the rest of the Forces, trained to a higher standard, may still find themselves in alot of trouble should a convoy ambush occur. Certainly more training needs to be done, but let's be realistic. There are limits as to what we can expect support troops to accomplish: they are not warriors. 

"If victory is the flower, supply is the stem that gives it life"

Winston Churchill, "The River War".


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## dutchie (27 Sep 2004)

In terms of "impractical" and "impossible" I am referring to the contraints placed on the Forces by the beancounters at NDHQ, and beancounters everywhere for that matter.  - Your original post didn't mention anything about the costs, NDHQ, beancounters, or anything else. To refresh your memory, you said, _"I maintain it is impractical, even impossible, in a regular army, to train support troops up to the level of combat infantry, much less to the level of a Marine rifleman."_ - however, if you claim that it is fiscally impossible to train css types to the level of infantry, I will also disagree with you on that. I read an article today in the Vancouver Sun indicating that Infantry Bns are the cheapest type of unit. I'm sorry I don't have a link, but it is on the Global web page, but you need to be a suscriber to see it. The gist is that Infantry Bn's are cheap, cheap, cheap. Infantry training requires experienced NCOs/Officers, keen and fit troops, weapons, a training area, and time. None of these are in short supply in todays CF. You can write posts critical of NDHQ/Beancounters if you like (a popular opinion), but it does not cover for the fact that you claimed it 'impractical, even impossible' to train CSS troops to the level of Infantry. You are wrong, full stop.

There are limits as to what we can expect support troops to accomplish: they are not warriors.  - then we should either accept that they will fail as warriors (and die), train them to be warriors (and live), or not place them in an area where enemy warriors are present(not a real option). All CF personnel who hold positions designed to be deployed should be capable of surviving deployment. It is unfair and immoral to all to do otherwise.


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## PPCLI Guy (27 Sep 2004)

LowRider said:
			
		

> Having enough money in the yearly budget,to allow us to get on the range and actually handle a weapon more than once a year would help. ???



I see from your profile that you are a Reservist in LFAA. I can't comment on LFAA policies for ammo allocation, but I can (and will) on Army and LFCA policies.  Ammo is allocated for the conduct of MLOC (which includes PWT) for all units (not including schools, ASUs and HQs) - based on 85% of their strength.  In LFCA we had to shave that icecube slightly to allocate ammo for the ASFs and for ATC and CPC.  All of that to say that ammo was allocated to your Area, for your Unit.  You should have received enough to do MLOC.


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## jfladeroute (27 Sep 2004)

Quinn said:
			
		

> It is sobering to hear however that our support units, even though, like the rest of the Forces, trained to a higher standard, may still find themselves in alot of trouble should a convoy ambush occur. Certainly more training needs to be done, but let's be realistic. There are limits as to what we can expect support troops to accomplish: they are not warriors.



If not warriors, then what? In terms of the modern non-contiguous battle space, there is no expectation of a secure rear area - which, conversely, means that there_ is_ an expectation that any soldier may find themselves in contact during any operation.

Given that, what are the ethics of requiring a soldier to operate in such an environment without the training required to protect themselves? And why would anyone choose to be in a support trade if they realized it meant being both an attractive target and a weak one? I may be dedicated and loyal, but I'm not suicidal - and I can't say that I would be able, in good conscience, to expect that from my troops.


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## Quinn (27 Sep 2004)

Warriors with wrenches?

Seems to me you can be excellent at one or the other: not both. You can be a Class B rifleman and a Class A mechanic, like perhaps in the USMC, or you can be a Class A rifleman and a Class B mechanic. It's the classic case of falling between two stools. Furthermore, as that Royal Marine spot so excellently demonstrates, being a "warrior" is not for everybody. 

Neverthless please don't misunderstand: CSS troops, while not being "warriors" in a classic sense - trained to aggressively close with and destroy the enemy - can and should be trained in the art of convoy defense, and certainly there is no excuse for having a rifle that won't fire. Perhaps the more, if you're forgive the phrase, gung-ho of CSS troopers, while still being experts in their trade, would be the ones to receive extra training and take point and/or man the support weapons on a "gun truck". But if we insist on a level of combat competency for all CSS troopers up to -  or even close to - the level of "line" troops, there will be a price to pay. Even if additional training would cost nothing, to intesnively train every CSS trooper in the art of defensive warfare would affect the recruiting pool: it may shrink further if an emphasis is placed on intensive combat training: more may wash out, and more may stay away entirely.  

We should prepare CSS troopers to face the kind of "eastern" style ambushes by irregulars with small arms, but we cannot expect them to resist serious attack and/or clear even lightly held positions without backup. And while its true that you can't always guarantee safety "behind the lines", you should certainly try your best not to create situations, like the 3rdInvDiv did, where your support troops may be exposed to perhaps unnecessary risk if unescorted. An exposed supply line hurt Lynch's unit as much as anything.


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## dutchie (27 Sep 2004)

You can be a Class B rifleman and a Class A mechanic, like perhaps in the USMC - that would be nice. Unfortunately, calling the average CSS soldier a rifleman is a _serious_ stretch of the definition. We aren't even close to training our support troops to the level of the USMC, and quite frankly, were not even close to maintaining the skills that are taught on QL2/BMQ-SQ/GMT/Et to CSS troops. Lets start by demanding CSS troops maintain the skills they have been taught, then we can worry about raising the bar to the levl of the USMC support tradesmen.

Furthermore, as that Royal Marine spot so excellently demonstrates, being a "warrior" is not for everybody.  - then I say, don't apply for a job that may require you to kill people. If you want to join the military but don't want to be in a position where you will have to defend your life (and your buddy's) by ending another's life in a violent and aggressive manner, then apply for a trade that isn't deployed to the field (Air Weapons Tech for one...I think). 

if we insist on a level of combat competency for all CSS troopers up to -   or even close to - the level of the "line" troops, there will be a price to pay. - and that price is less incompetant riflemen, fewer dead canadian soldiers, and more dead enemy soldiers.

but the recruiting pool, already seemingly so slim, may shrink further if an emphasis is placed on intensive combat training - then so be it. Either train for it now, or die for it later, or as the saying goes, 'The more you seat in training, the less you bleed in battle.'. 

We should prepare CSS troops to face the kind of "eastern" style ambushes by irregular troops with small arms,  - the average CSS soldier (for the thrid time) cannot repel an attack by average Infantry soldiers.

you should certainly try your best not to create situations, like the 3rdInvDiv did, where your support troops may be exposed to perhaps unnecessary risk if unescorted.  - the nature of the rear area is that front line troops aren't there. That is why it is called the rear area. Sadly, the combat arms troops are too busy destroying the enemy to escort every convoy in the rear area. In war, it is necessary for all soldiers in theatre to be able to defend themselves and others. Our CSS troops cannot do this.


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## D-n-A (27 Sep 2004)

To addon/echo to what others have said, regardless if your a Combat Arms or a CSS troop, your a soldier, an must know how to do that job. If you can't, you shoulden't be in the Army. CSS troops should know how to use their weapons, and how to fight/defend themselves, if they don't know how, then their going to get shot up and captured(like what happened to the 507th Maint Co).   Yes CSS should do more defensive training, but why not some offensive, why shoulden't they know how to take the fight to the enemy, Marine cooks did it in Afghanistan, why can't Canadian CSS troops be able to do the same, its part of their job as soldiers.


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## Spc_Cameron (27 Sep 2004)

Caeser said:
			
		

> I will summarize what happened to the esteemed PFC Lynch and ther buddies:
> 
> Rear ech troops driving in a war zone, took wrong turn , ran into enemy troops who were not rear ech.
> 
> ...




I agree ....such is not the case anymore though.... this is why the US army is instituting a new set of battle drills for support personell... to little too late if you ask me.


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## pbi (28 Sep 2004)

> Seems to me you can be excellent at one or the other: not both. You can be a Class B rifleman and a Class A mechanic, like perhaps in the USMC, or you can be a Class A rifleman and a Class B mechanic. It's the classic case of falling between two stools. Furthermore, as that Royal Marine spot so excellently demonstrates, being a "warrior" is not for everybody.
> 
> Neverthless please don't misunderstand: CSS troops, while not being "warriors" in a classic sense - trained to aggressively close with and destroy the enemy - can and should be trained in the art of convoy defense, and certainly there is no excuse for having a rifle that won't fire. Perhaps the more, if you're forgive the phrase, gung-ho of CSS troopers, while still being experts in their trade, would be the ones to receive extra training and take point and/or man the support weapons on a "gun truck".



There are several misconceptions here, IMHO. First of all, let us not confuse "warrior" with "qualified DP1 Infantryman". All soldiers need to be warriors, regardless of MOC. Practically, not all can be trained as MOC-qualified Infantry, but this is not really required. IMHO we have created a military in which we have severed our support people from their operational environment, under some misguided 1960's idea of efficiency. 

Second, "the art of convoy defense" represents a fairly comprehensive set of skills. Here are a few:

-Vehicle hardening using local materials;
-Tactical driving by day and night;
-Recognition and avoidance of likely ambush sites;
-improvised veh recovery methods incl under fire;
-enemy ambush practices to date (aval through AAR and ALLC reports);
-Immediate Action Drills on Ambush;
-navigation by day/night with/without GPS;
-voice procedure;
-employing "gun trucks" or other fire sp vehs so as not to blow away the cargo vehs;
-combat first aid/combat lifesaving;
-weapons handling incl CSW and grenades;
-handling PW's

I suggest to you that unless the support soldier is already starting from a solid base of combat skills, it will be difficult to develop a useful level of proficiency without extensive training. This, IMHO, goes directly to our wretched, non-operationally oriented and utterly outdated "Unified Tradesman" concept that teaches a person they are a technician first and a soldier second, _whether this is imparted in a formal sense or by socialization and implication_.

Third, you cannot confine the training of skills such as crewing a fire sp veh to "the more gung-ho" members of a support unit: what happens if they are absent/on leave/sick/dead? It has to be all hands.



> But if we insist on a level of combat competency for all CSS troopers up to -  or even close to - the level of "line" troops, there will be a price to pay. Even if additional training would cost nothing, to intesnively train every CSS trooper in the art of defensive warfare would affect the recruiting pool: it may shrink further if an emphasis is placed on intensive combat training: more may wash out, and more may stay away entirely.



And I suggest to you that we may very well pay a much more tragic price if we do not raise them as warriors. Let us not be so foolish as to assume that because we have been lucky so far, we will always be so. If such training has a bad impact on recruiting (although I really doubt that it would: in fact I think it could be used to attract more of the right sort of person and less of the job seeker), then we need to ask ourselves just what sort of a military we have, if it is institutionally suited to today's operations and threats, and if we are projecting the right image of ourselves. Being killed because you don't know what to do in an emergency may have a rather negative effect on recruiting, too; not to mention retention.
  



> And while its true that you can't always guarantee safety "behind the lines", you should certainly try your best not to create situations, like the 3rdInvDiv did, where your support troops may be exposed to perhaps unnecessary risk if unescorted. An exposed supply line hurt Lynch's unit as much as anything



But herein lies the entire problem. Warfare, especially in the many forms it assumes today, prevents us from making such tidy assumptions as the idea that we "_should try not to create situations (etc)..". _ As well, it is somewhat unrealistic to suggest that a manoeuvre commander should make the safety of CSS a driving factor in the conduct of operations. CSS is vital, and already imposes an iron leash on some aspects of operations, but it must not become more of a burden than is absolutely necessary. Cheers.


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## the 48th regulator (28 Sep 2004)

what went wrong, dunno, no security, lack of in theatre prep (training),

ahh the heck with it, I willl just start the whole thread over again.

all I will say pbi very good post (geez too hard to specify) but on the last one, you were bang on.  Hey by the way can I asay what a small world, Mirajne of all places!!  You guys set up an amazing camp, sorry for knocking down the Krusty sign, remember painting rocks white was the priority!

tess


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## gun plumber (28 Sep 2004)

Please do not jump down my throat for this as it is not my intention to get into a game of pokey chest.
For starters I agree with all that has been posted here ref training standards for CSS troops.As has been said to me many a time "solider first ,tech second" but to play devils adcovate I must point out one thing:
 the more combat arms related training that CSS troops take,the less time we have to do our primary task of serving those who serve.We all would like to see a set standard of training,but none of us would like to see a drop in the skills or service provided.
 I would just like to say again that I do agree with improved training standards and I know that a little training goes a long way,but if it was you who had to carry a broomstick into battle because the weapons shop was gone on a 1 month SQ refresher course,would'nd you be a bit miffed?
        Just playing devils advocate


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## Infanteer (28 Sep 2004)

Ack...I hate the term "warriors"!!!

We are professional soldiers, not some individuals seeking glory in combat!!!

The goal should be to ensure that all soldiers possess a fighting mentality and adhere to a professional ethos.


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## pbi (28 Sep 2004)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Ack...I hate the term "warriors"!!!
> 
> We are professional soldiers, not some individuals seeking glory in combat!!!
> 
> The goal should be to ensure that all soldiers possess a fighting mentality and adhere to a professional ethos.



Which, to me, is exactly what warrior means. It means(to me, anyway) the embodiment or personification of the values that make up the profession of arms, as opposed to a job-seeker or terrorist. A true warrior does not seek personal glory, and does not fight for bloodlust alone. However, I will admit that it is a rather subjective term and one we Canadians are perhaps not fully comfortable with.


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## pbi (28 Sep 2004)

> Please do not jump down my throat for this as it is not my intention to get into a game of pokey chest.
> For starters I agree with all that has been posted here ref training standards for CSS troops.As has been said to me many a time "solider first ,tech second" but to play devils adcovate I must point out one thing:
> the more combat arms related training that CSS troops take,the less time we have to do our primary task of serving those who serve.We all would like to see a set standard of training,but none of us would like to see a drop in the skills or service provided.
> I would just like to say again that I do agree with improved training standards and I know that a little training goes a long way,but if it was you who had to carry a broomstick into battle because the weapons shop was gone on a 1 month SQ refresher course,would'nd you be a bit miffed?
> Just playing devils advocate



Gun plumber: Having had the privelige of commanding Admin Coy/1PPCLI, I understand your concern 100%. I was often faced with resolving this very question:"rifles or wrenches". I had a secondary task of generating a QRF from Maint Pl: even though EME has most faithfully held to the idea of Soldier First (at least alot better than other MOCs) there were still some skill gaps that had to be overcome. The only way I see out of this is to scrap the "Lowest Common Denominator" CF purple recruit course, designate CSS pers as Army from the get-go, and give them a solid basic combat training based on what the USMC gives for all MOCs before specialization. In other words start training a soldier the second he walks in the door of the depot. Then, run all CSS courses with a heavy Army field flavour. Unfortunately, to truly achieve this would require us to more or less de-unify the CSS: a goal I am all for, but which might be traumatic for the CF. Cheers.


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## PPCLI Guy (28 Sep 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> With respect to the issue of SQ, can somebody refresh me as to whether or not Regular Force CSS support MOCs go through that? I know that Reservists do, but I'm not certain about RegF. I rather think most RegF CSS MOCs go from BMQ to MOC trg, which would help to explain part of the problem.



It is certainly the intent that all CSS soldiers will do the SQ - it was supposed to start last year in Meaford and Farnham, but got delayed.  I think we are on track for this fall.  In the meantime, there is the Land Enironment Tactical Skills (I thinks that's what it stands for) or LETS that is run at the unit level.



			
				pbi said:
			
		

> Like others on this thread I have seen and had the pleasure to command some pretty impressive CSS soldiers.



I had the distinct honour of being OC Admin in 3 VP, during which time we re-roled from Light to Grizzly and did a PALLADIUM tour.  The Maintainers worked unbelievable hours - and still maintained a high level of fitness.  The QM worked equally long hours, stretched many rules on behalf of the Bn, all while maintaining a strong esprit de corps.  The transport guys ran course after course in the work ups, and then did stalwart duty in theatre keeping us moving.  The Med As (this is back when we owned them) worked just as hard as the Rifle Coys.  

Now all of that is to be expected - it is after all their job.  But on top of all of this, 3 VP had a strong "warrior" mentality.  Prior to deployment, all personnel, regardless of trade, were required to go through live fire pairs fire and movement.  The CSS soldiers relished the opportunity to practice and demonstrate their soldierly skills -- indeed the Maint boys progressed to section, and Transport to Platoon live fire.  Having said that, the CSM and I did a lot of pairs fire and movement, cus some were just too iffy to pair up with anyone else (think doctors and padres).

On STALWART GUARDIAN this year, we committed early in the process to each CSS soldier being given an opportunity to practice their tactical skills.  Early accounts asuggest that they enjoyed this challenge.

All of that to say that soldiers respond to the training environement and the ethos of a particular unit.  You can cultivate a warrior mentality in your unit, and if you do, soldiers being soldiers, they will respond.


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## pbi (28 Sep 2004)

> All of that to say that soldiers respond to the training environement and the ethos of a particular unit.  You can cultivate a warrior mentality in your unit, and if you do, soldiers being soldiers, they will respond.



This is the crux of the whole thing right here. Its about attitude and belief, bolstered by confidence in good skills well taught. If we encourage the job seeker "i'm just a tech f**k this Army crap" mentality, well, we may reap what we have sown. If on the other hand we take ppcli guy's approach and apply it to the Army as a whole, regardless of MOC, then I believe we can make progress. Will we turn away some prospective recruits? I don't know, and I certainly don't know on what basis some of the doom-sayers so fervently maintain that this will be the case. I prefer to think that we will draw in the right sort of people from the start. Those that leave because it is "too Army" are liabilities anyway. As I have said before (I have never found repetition an obstacle to repetition.....) we are hamperd by the legacy mindset of Unification, a concept that was dreamed up in a long ago time, for primarily administrative reasons, in an era when the entire value of the combat soldier, indeed even of ground forces at all, was in serious question under the shadow of the mushroom cloud. It is time, IMHO, to relook this at least as far as the Army goes. Cheers.


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## KevinB (28 Sep 2004)

PBI - excellent post.


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## PPCLI Guy (28 Sep 2004)

pbi said:
			
		

> If on the other hand we take ppcli guy's approach and apply it to the Army as a whole, regardless of MOC, then I believe we can make progress. Will we turn away some prospective recruits? I don't know,



This ties in to a post that you made in another thread about PT and the Reserves.  I believe that the vast majority of people that join the Army do so because they are looking for something different.  The problem arises when those expectations are not met right away.  When the recruit starts his trade training and is told that it is about the trade - we soldier when we get the chance, or when the recruit gets to the Armoury and doesn't do PT - that is when the trouble starts.  It basically comes down to our failure to properly inculcate (or socialise) recruits into the "Army way" of doing things.  I would suggest that this failure stems from our inability to articulate what the "Army way" is, both internally and externally.

In last years SORD, LGen Hillier made it clear that he wanted to adopt a mentality of "soldiers first".  The problem was that this slogan was not well explained.  It fell to subordinate formations to interpret his intent.  The statement could easily be interpreted to mean that the welfare of the men is paramount: Man Mission Self.  It could also be interpreted to mean that we are all soldiers first: Mission Man Self.  We chose the latter.  In our first cut at articulating Comd LFCA's vision of "soldiers first", we explained that it was fundamentally a problem of balancing "quality of life" with "quality of work".  I liked that one (and not just because I wrote it!), but it failed to capture the essence of the statement.  In the second iteration, the emphasis was on the fact that we are all soldiers first - fit, competent and disciplined.

If the Army as an institution truly understood this, it would view all problems through the lens of being soldiers first.  That would certainly provide some focus to our thinking, and go a long way towards establishing a warfighter mentality.


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## Infanteer (28 Sep 2004)

> Which, to me, is exactly what warrior means. It means(to me, anyway) the embodiment or personification of the values that make up the profession of arms, as opposed to a job-seeker or terrorist. A true warrior does not seek personal glory, and does not fight for bloodlust alone. However, I will admit that it is a rather subjective term and one we Canadians are perhaps not fully comfortable with.



We had a thread that went into considerable detail on the notion of the warrior vs. the professional.   If you have the time in the interest, check it out here.   I reopened it and removed some superfluous posts if you're interested.

http://army.ca/forums/threads/18342.0.html

Basically, you're right.   The warrior term is for the most part used subjectively by people to fit their purpose.   My arguments attempt to aim for a more objective notion of the term "warrior" based upon historical fact; historical fact that show the professional consistently beating out the warrior.

Some aspects in history that are common to the idea of the warrior is:

1) No prisoners
2) Pillage of surrounding territory for "reward" to warrior class
3) Ossification of progress due to focus on ceremonial and cultural aspects of "warrior" (internally-focused) as opposed to focus on how to win at war as a means to further ones interests (externally-focused).
4) Fighting to the death or refusing to live when faced with failure (Japanese Generals regularly committed suicide following battlefield defeat - not conducive to maintaining a strong Officer Corps)
5) Disdain of those who are not members of the warrior class (this thinking is something that surfaces in modern soldiers who relish in calling themselves warriors)

It can be a bad road to go down if we follow the traditional notion of creating "warrior spirit".

I argue that we must aim to focus our soldiers on the profession of arms with the goal of every soldier being a fighting professional with the warfighting mentality.   PBI's recommendation of a common training for the purple trades in order to promote this mentality is something I agree with; I've advocated it in my own fashion around these pages before.   The fighting soldier seeks victory, not combat, and he achieves victory through executing his duties (whatever they may be; mechanic, doctor, or footsoldier), not engaging enemy "warriors".

Again, this is my interpretation of the term "warrior"; I base it on the historical context.   I just find that alot of the times the statement "we will inculcate the warrior spirit" is meant to refer to an effort to increase the capabilities (both mental and physical) of the professional soldier - which has no relation to the notion of a warrior.

Here is an excerpt from the linked thread that gives an overview of my position.   Enjoy.

_I understand your admiration of a particular mindset dedicated to excellence, but you must understand that this mindset is one of dedication to excellence in the profession of arms

Your definition of the term warrior is a bit misplaced.   The "warrior" is traditionally defined as a subculture that dedicates itself solely to battle.   However, the warrior is an individual who places emphasis on personal ability and prowess in battle.   There are many aspects that typified the warrior in battle such as highly valued personal weapons, individual combate, and reliance on ferocity and fighting prowess over tactics.

Your impression of the warrior as the pinnacle of armed conflict is unfortunately misplaced.   The "warrior" lost his standing over two thousand years ago when the professional soldier picked up arms under their commanders and worked as a unit to overcome the individual warriors.   Two of the earliest examples in Western civilization is when the Greeks, particularly the Spartans, picked up arms as *professionals* and worked as an amorphous unit known as the phalanx, to defeat 10,000 of the Persian King's elite "Immortals".   To the Greek professionals, maintaining one's position within the phalanx in order to protect the man to his right with his large shield was the epitome of excellence in battle as opposed to breaking ranks to find personal glory in singular combat (something that was severely frowned upon).   That trend carried on in Western civilization when Celtic warriors were subdued by the professional soldier of Rome, the Legionnaire, who followed his NCO commander, the Centurion (Yes, setbacks against warrior cultures such as the German tribes were present, but this was no fault of their military system).

History is full of examples of the elite "warrior" finding his social position toppled by the professional soldier who was simply a better fighter due to the fact that they dedicated themselves to the profession of arms rather then to the glory of combat.   The Japanese Samurai warrior were shot to pieces in the 1800's when they tried to bring their quasi-religious form of ritual battle to the fore against industrialized forces; this is why the Samurai class outlawed the firearms in the 1600's following Oda Nobunaga's destruction of samurai armies with conscript levies wielding cheap firearms; it was a threat to their inefficient and less effective warrior culture.   As well, the constant battles between various Native American tribes and the United States Army in the 1800's also saw the Native warrior destroyed by the disciplined regular.   Napoleon's professional Army, in its conquest of Egypt, decimated the Mameluke's; a Islamic subculture that dedicated its members from birth to being warriors.   That belief fell to the discipline and shock of the Regiment of the Line.     You could find many more examples if you took the time to truly study the history of conflict.

Those characteristics that you mentioned in you inaccurate depiction of the warrior are actually the signs of the highest form of dedication as a soldier to the profession of arms.   Look at the characteristics of our soldiers in our Special Operations Capable unit (JTF-2), whom I would regard as the elite of the professional soldier in a modern army; these men are not warriors, they do not relish personal combat and glory for their subculture.   Rather, they are the epitomization of what we should strive for as professionals; they are experts on all technical fields related to the trade, their level of cohesion and teamwork is unmatched (they accomplish their missions as a team, if you didn't know that), and their dedication to their profession, up to the point of sacrificing their own life, is unrivaled (hence the reason they spend nearly all their time to preparation and training)._


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## Acorn (28 Sep 2004)

I posted to the "Warrior?" thread before reading this. Infanteer has said it better (though I might quibble an historical point or two.

That being said, I also agree with pbi's point about the "purple trade" concept being our primary problem with instilling "soldier first" in the CSS trades. There are many individuals in the CSS that are dedicated soldiers, but the institution overall is flawed.

Acorn


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## KevinB (29 Sep 2004)

I am a big fan of the warrior idea - not so much with Infanteers historical concept of the idea - but in the fact that some have gotten the idea that soliders march around on a parade square and don't fight wars anymore.  The War fighter (warrior) ethos need to be reinstilled not only into the CSS trades but into the CF as a whole.

 We have a discouragingly check the box mentality in the CF these days - this needs to change.  As my OC likes to say at the end of the day your job is to get up there - stick your bayonet into the enemies chest and let him bleed out (words to that effect).  I think lectures from Col Grossman should be mandatory for all soldiers - everyone should have come to grips with the fact that whatever trade they are they are in the Army and Armies are in the job of killing people.  that means everyone - from the lowest private all the way up top.  IMHO the new CQC course should be mandatory for all trades.

 In Calgary in 1VP we used to conduct tri-weekly unarmed combat refreshers and cuminate in a Thursday Platoon bear pit matches for troops to get a day off (Friday) - It keep the lifeblood flowing and kept our agressiveness high.

Similarily our weapon training has got to come off the check the box attitude of the annual (or Bi-annual) PWT's  - it has to be fluid and the basis of killing the enemy.


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## the 48th regulator (30 Sep 2004)

here here Kevin,

I agree on that, very good post

tess


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## pbi (2 Oct 2004)

Michael: I did look at the Warrior thread. Having reviewed the comments on it, I see that it is a very emotive term (as well it should be...) but has some negative historical connotations which you have ably enumerated. However, I for one believe that usage and meaning of words can change significantly over time ('gay" comes to mind...) and that we can adapt the idea of a warrior spirit to the constraints imposed on the professional soldier. Cheers.


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## Infanteer (3 Oct 2004)

Hey, I'm not Michael!


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## pbi (3 Oct 2004)

You are now.  > Cheers.


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