# Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?



## a_majoor

This is a bit of a blue sky idea, and I am willing to be shot down, but:

The CF is routinely deploying in fairly austere theaters, and needs some sort of light, simple to maintain and rugged tactical combat aircraft that could be sent overseas quickly and operate from austere forward airstrips in support of the mission. A small, light aircraft like the former CF-5 seems like a good fit, it "should" require fewer support personnel and logistics than a comparable number of the larger and more complex CF-18s.

While the CF-5 is no longer with us, we could take planes like the BaE "Hawk" trainer into service to fill this role, or for some more performance maybe the SAAB Gripon or MiG-29 (both planes designed to operate off sections of highway or other inhospitable places). If we must wait a decade or more for the procurmenrt system to creak along, we could always try an evolved version of the Boeing "Bird of Prey"...


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## geo

IMHO we should be looking at A10s for ground support.... but that ain't going to happen.

Too bad!


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## Guy. E

Canada seems to be good at buying used equiptment. Why cant/ shouldent we look at purchacing "Used" MIgs and Su's?


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## geo

already been discussed
- supply chain problems would be the 1st problem
- compatibility problems with NATO allies (esp US) would be another
- a used Mig & Su is a hunk of junk that is best left in the bone yard


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## Guy. E

Point seen.

The European Typhoon has already been discussed. (I am reading what i found on the SEARCH! now.)

OOOoooooo I would LOVE to work on those in the future  8)


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## GK .Dundas

http://www.stavatti.com/machete/m_homepage.html

It's a fake site  but even if they do'nt exsist ,I want them anyway!!!!!!!!


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## Armymatters

geo said:
			
		

> already been discussed
> - supply chain problems would be the 1st problem
> - compatibility problems with NATO allies (esp US) would be another
> - a used Mig & Su is a hunk of junk that is best left in the bone yard



And Russian jets are maintainence hogs, and repair part supplies are a bit iffy, as recently discovered by the Indians when they got their new Sukhoi jets. I made a example earlier about the MiG-29 engines. I will repeat as follows:



> I do not recommend Russian jets for one good reason: maintenance. I know a mechanic in the Luftwaffe that serviced the MiG-29's. He said that the MiG-29 was hell to service, primarily due to its crudeness. Also, Russian engines aren't too reliable, and they are more finicky with fuel - see the Indian experience with Russian jets. For example, you have to overhaul a RD-33 engine in a MiG-29 every 500 hours, he told me. Remember, there are two of these engines in a MiG-29. The GE F110 engine in a F-16 can go 1000-1500 hours between overhauls, roughly 2-3 times the life of a Russian engine. So, I have to agree, from a technical perspective to stick with Western designs, and a easy to maintain airplane, to save money on maintenance. Sure, Russian fighters are cheap, and they perform great, but think of the overall costs as well.


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## geo

gravyboat... what few CF5s were still in storage are presently being distributed to places for mounting on pedestals.... Matter of fact, there's one that I can see outside my office window.... in pieces, on the ground & up to it's canopy in snow.... they aren't going anywhere.

some time ago, was watching the top 10 countdown of the world's best Tanks. The T72 was somewhere around #6 or 7.... crew have to be custom selected (shorter than 5'6") armour sacrificed for speed leaving crew exposed - result being; crew more scared of that bad boy than we would be.


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## Cdn Blackshirt

I'd prefer to go with MALE UAV's with SDB's.....


M.


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## Scoobie Newbie

A 10's
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmm


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## a_majoor

MiG 29s were mentioned for their ability to use austere airstrips rather than their "sterling" qualities. The fact of the matter is most combat aircraft resemble formula one race cars rather than M-38 Jeeps in terms of their maintenance requirements, and airfields with long prepared runways are sometimes rather hard to find on short notice. The list of aircraft that fit the bill is rather short (AV-8B Harriers are the only other one I can think of off hand, and I wonder a bit if the A-10 is really in the same camp, being a dedicated CAS aircraft).

While the CF-5 wasn't a perfect fit to this ideal, a small, light aircraft (all other things being equal) should outperform a larger and heavier aircraft in terms of shorter take off and landing runs, acceleration and turning. I was always amazed watching our CF-5's screaming in at treetop hight and pulling up(!) to engage American aircraft in exercises back in the 1980s. More modern designs can incorporate clever features to increase flying performance, stealth or whatever is considered important (like the hypothetical "SM 27" posted earlier. Our planes may have to attack targets in very complex terrain, track down enemy UAVs or pull tight turns to evade enemy AA fire, so a simple bomb truck might not cut it, fighter like performance is still needed in some circumstances.

In any case, a reasonably simple and rugged airplane which can go on deployment with us is a much needed addition to our military tool kit.


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## geo

from my perspective, looking for something that can provide ground support (and supression) I'm more inclined / interested in providing protection to ground troops than providing air superiority. 
A relatively simple design, fast without being too fast, robust and packing plenty of heat; something like the Cobra gunships the USMC tend to favour and/or something like the A10 that can provide overwhelming fire support without too many bells and whistles... 
as the saying goes.... could do a lot worse


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## COBRA-6

I think gunships/ armed reconnaissance helicopters would be of greater utility than fixed wing... that being said I would love to see some A10s with a maple leaf on them...


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## a_majoor

In the perfect world, we would have helicopter gunships and CAS aircraft in the kitbag as well.

Since we don't, we need some sort of multi-role aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft have more versatility in terms of speed, range, load carriage etc. than helos, but sacrifice loiter speed and the ability to hover. A light fighter bomber with some "fighter" like performance covers a lot of ground, and we should not assume we will always be operating under conditions of air superioraty.


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## geo

light fighter bomber with a little bit of "fighter" thrown in for good measure?...... that's spelled "H A R R I E R"


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## a_majoor

I was thinking about this topic again, after reading about "Operation Anaconda" in the Sha-i-kot valley in 2002. There were a lot of issues with air support, one being the "fast movers" had a hard time identifying and striking targets in the confines on the valley, and space limitations ment many aircraft had to be "racked and stacked" some distance away so they wouldn't fly into each other while providing air support.

On the other end of the spectrum, the AC-130 could only be used at night, since during the daylight hours, they showed up like the Goodyear blimp (a blimp with a 105mm, mind you), and were vulnerable to atack by enemy SAMs and HMG. The main source for both observations is the book "Not a Good Day to Die : The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda" by Sean Naylor http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0425196097/102-2659521-2840120?v=glance&n=283155

What seems to be needed is something in the middle, between a "slow mover" which is vulnerable to ground fire (no matter how well armed and armoured, the Apache gunships inserted into the battle also suffered grave battle damage from small arms, MG and RPG fire), and "fast movers" which can't stay on station or on target long enough to help. Harriers and A-10s have been mentioned in this thread, and I think some evolved version of these platforms or something designed from the ground up as a CAS with secondary fighter-like qualities would be a good solution.


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## Ex-Dragoon

I wonder if a gunship variant of the V22 Osprey might fit the bill?


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## Astrodog

tough to find anywhere in the osprey to mount any legitimate firepower except out the rear door, not the ideal setup


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## beenthere

Buy anything called a V22 and the bill would be so high that the troops would have to do without boots.
I don't know the reason for scrapping the CF-5s but it may have been that at that point in time no one envisioned that there could be a use for them in future operations. There could have been many good reasons for getting rid of them as they were getting rather old and they do make nice pedestal toppers.
It's my understanding that we get lots of support for ops in Afghanistan from other participating forces so we should continue to do the best at what we are doing now which is the ground role. 
The effects of downsizing have put the air force in a poor position for acquiring new equipment as a great deal of expertise was lost when the most experienced technical personnel were offered incentives to retire.


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## Daidalous

Trenton has  a MIG-21. We could fire that big bad boy.   Correct me if I am wrong but was the CF-5  not called the "widow maker" because it's controls were very unforgiving at low altitudes thus causing you to crash?


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## Inch

Daidalous said:
			
		

> Trenton has  a MIG-21. We could fire that big bad boy.   Correct me if I am wrong but was the CF-5  not called the "widow maker" because it's controls were very unforgiving at low altitudes thus causing you to crash?



No, the Widow Maker was the CF-104 Starfighter.


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## Haggis

The CF-5 had worse fuel economy than an M1A1.  IIRC max range bare assed, one way, without drop tanks was 150-200 miles.


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## turretmonster

Performance 
Maximum speed 650 knots 1,204 km/h 
Combat radius 760 nm 1,405 km 
Ferry range 2,010 nm 3,720 km 
Service ceiling 41,000 ft ft 12,496 m 
Rate of climb 34,400 ft/min 10,500 m/min 

Fill er up and check the hydraulic fluid eh??

The one in Kingston sure is pretty... sad it's impaled on a big stick.... 

TM


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## geo

The one in Montreal is sitting on it's belly..... wings detached  - pretty pathetic looking if you ask me. Wonder if and when someone is going to do something about it?


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## turretmonster

Would it fit on my utility trailer? I'll come get it this weekend. I have a big olde new england haybarn for storage.  
TM


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## Haggis

turretmonster said:
			
		

> Performance
> Maximum speed 650 knots 1,204 km/h
> Combat radius 760 nm 1,405 km
> *Ferry range 2,010 nm 3,720 km *
> Service ceiling 41,000 ft ft 12,496 m
> Rate of climb 34,400 ft/min 10,500 m/min



Oops.  I think I dropped a zero somewhere..... :-[


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## a_majoor

The Canadair CL-84 Dynavert was supposed to come in a gunship version, with the one picture I saw showing what looked like a medium calibre gun mounted in the nose and rocket pods attached to the fuselage clear of the propeller arcs. This was a long time ago and I don't have the reference picture any more, so I could be wrong.

Operating a small, light aircraft in support of troops on the ground would require changing a lot of how we operate. A very rugged airplane might actually deploy forward to a FARP (Forward Arming and Refueling Point) close to the battle, but this has different logistical issues from operating from an established airfield.

In the past, trainers or airplanes derived from trainers were used in this role. The Cessna A-37 "Dragonfly" is one example I can think of. The CF uses BAe Hawks for training, we could perhaps go this route (actually owning and operating them). Another alternative is a medium performance airframe, like the A-7 Corsair, which was a great gun platform and bomb truck.


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## Jantor

Hi,

Has anybody explored the possibility of say leasing some A-10's from the Americans? Considering that the Canadian "Warthogs" may have the opportunity to support American forces as well as other NATO contingents in Afghanistan, It might work. 

The Americans are in the process of upgrading the 350+ A-10's. Going digital cockpit and new engines IIRC.
Maybe they could find another dozen in AMARC for us to use. What do ya think?

BTW almost all the AUP upgraded CF-5A's were sold to Botswana


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## Navy_Blue

Wow I've heard many times the US talking of removing the A-10 from service but the thought doesn't last long I guess.  They will be remembered along the same lines as the B-52 "immortal".  Simply an amazing aircraft.  Knowing the yanks they would sell us them for a buck a piece if we serviced them south of the boarder and threw in a few political favours.  

We're fooling ourselves if we think we'll ever see a maple leaf on the side of one any time soon/ever.


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## geo

an inventory of +/- 367 A10s 
(http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=70)

The original service life of the A-10 was 8,000 hours, approx = FY2005. Revised to 12,000 hours, approx FY2016.  The most recent long range plan has the A-10 in the fleet through FY2028, approx 18,000-24,000 hours. 

Somehow - think the US will want to keep it's fleet for as long as it can.


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## JBP

I think the A-10 is an amazing aircraft but as others mentioned, it wouldn't be right for Canada since we need a "multi-role" aircraft. It's not very multi-role... It's "multi-blow-your-taliban-dirkadirka-ass-up-with-30-kinds-of-munitions-PRICK".... 

It's VERY good at CAS and has a high survivability rating proven with it's successes in Iraq. I don't think I really need a website source to prove that, it's all OVER the net and any defence papers how well it performed.

As stated in other threads also, we need something truly multi-role like the Super Hornet, but more hopefully the F-35 JSF.

If it was up to US... I bet we'd have... F-22's for air superiority, A-10's for CAS, AC-130 Gunships just cause and Apache Longbows for good measure! 
Alas.... It will never come!

Maybe we'll get lucky 20yrs from now and get to actually have an assault ship like we've been talking about in other threads also!!!


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## Cloud Cover

A while back, I believe  Britney Spears mentioned a modernized piston engined fighter bomber- something like Sandy in Vietnam. 

A-10 is a mean machine.


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## Jantor

Other reasons for possibly leasing A-10's could be (total uneducated guesses obviously)

1) In theater in 12 to 18 mos.

2) May be able to bypass most of the bureaucratic processes associated with procurement

3) Can be returned to the Americans later

4) The most capable aircraft for CAS I can think of

5) We've leased from them before and it worked out OK (Voodoo)

 Anyway, just some thoughts


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## Cdn Blackshirt

I'd rather go with MQ-9 Predators directing M777 fire when it's in range and using Hellfire or SDB's when artillery is not.  

More to the point, A-10's make me nervous due to the ever-improving MANPADS available to those who can afford them.


M.


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## a_majoor

Here are some very out of the box ideas that a company called IML came up with out of New Zealand in the 1980s. From what I can gather, the designers were prompted by questioning how then current aircraft used their available dimensional envelopes and how they could perform their missions even suffering battle damage. The ADDAX-S is the most "fighter" like idea, while the AX-1 has similarities to the A-10

The wide engine spacing led to other ideas, like bleeding compressor air over the upper surface of the wing to vastly boost lift during take off and landing (not sure if this would work while you are flying at speed). On the other hand, Low Observability or "Stealth" was never considered, and there does not seem to be a provision for radar (not really a problem with the class of aircraft being considered here anyway). More can be found at this link: http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=13654


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## beenthere

On the lighter side,how about the Defender developed in Carmen Manitoba. All Canadian development and production with economy at the forefront. Electrical conduit tubing actuates the flight controls.Cheap and readily available automotive parts integrated into the aircraft  using Canadian Tire pop rivets to assure structural integrity under the most demanding flight conditions.
When I was stationed in Winnipeg in the 80's a took a little drive out to Carmen and met the developer and the machine that was under advanced stages of development. Neither were impressive. In fact I could not comprehend either the developer or the aircraft. I had to bang my head against a wall to try to awaken myself from what seemed like a bad dream. My head hurt all the way home. Photos 9 & 10 are the Defender. http://www.nfb.ca/trouverunfilm/fichefilm.php?id=17667&v=h&lg=en&exp=#


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## George Wallace

beenthere said:
			
		

> ...... Photos 9 & 10 are the Defender. http://www.nfb.ca/trouverunfilm/fichefilm.php?id=17667&v=h&lg=en&exp=#


So what is with the naked guy in photo 4?


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## GK .Dundas

geo said:
			
		

> an inventory of +/- 367 A10s
> (http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=70)
> 
> The original service life of the A-10 was 8,000 hours, approx = FY2005. Revised to 12,000 hours, approx FY2016.  The most recent long range plan has the A-10 in the fleet through FY2028, approx 18,000-24,000 hours.
> 
> Somehow - think the US will want to keep it's fleet for as long as it can.


 If I'm not mistaken that does'nt count the aircraft in storage that might add another 200 - 300 A/C to that number.


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## ringo

IMO the Swedish Gripen is rather like a modern F-5.


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## Astrodog

Canada might have to look to europe in the future as US aircraft such as the JSF and Raptor seem to be out of a realistic price range, problem with the Gripen is that it is a single engine aircraft..


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## Armymatters

Astrodog said:
			
		

> Canada might have to look to europe in the future as US aircraft such as the JSF and Raptor seem to be out of a realistic price range, problem with the Gripen is that it is a single engine aircraft..



The nice thing about the Gripen is that its engine is a modification of the GE F404 engine, of which we use in our CF-18's.


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## geo

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> If I'm not mistaken that does'nt count the aircraft in storage that might add another 200 - 300 A/C to that number.


The AF "fact sheet" didn't mention anything about a/c is storage...... with the additional hours being added to each airframe, I do not believe there are as many "on the shelf" as there are in the air... but I guess there must be some - somewhere.


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## Good2Golf

George Wallace said:
			
		

> So what is with the naked guy in photo 4?



George, I think it's a peach-coloured flight suit...  ;D  What were we talking about, again?


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## geo

Peach colour?.... 
Must be a SAR guy with washed out suit OR..... maintain the story.... he's naked!


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## Matt_Fisher

Blackwater Security is in the process of purchasing the Brazilian Super Tucano for counter-insurgency operations and the USAF have announced a tender for COIN aircraft for the fledgling Iraqi Air Force, whereby one of the prerequisites is that the powerplant be a Pratt & Whitney Canada PT-6A.

Something like the Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano/ ALX , Hawker-Beechcraft/Raytheon AT-6, or the US Aircraft Corporation's A-67 could be quite well suited as a relatively inexpensive close-air support asset that the CFs (and most NATO nations) are currently lacking.

US Aircraft A-67
http://www.usaircraftcorp.com/

Hawker-Beechcraft AT-6
http://www.hawkerbeechcraft.com/military/at-6_ab/R0816AT-6_LithoUpdate.pdf

Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano
http://www.embraerdefensesystems.com/english/content/combat/tucano_light_attack.asp

A twin engined (non-P&W powered) aircraft that's also interesting to have a look at is the Argentine FMA IA 58 Pucará, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FMA_IA_58_Pucar%C3%A1.  Would there be any advantages to modifying this aircraft with P&W PT-6As, aside from a nice 'Made In Canada' bit that could boost appeal to procurement folks?


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## Matt_Fisher

Here's something I'm going to throw out there, just for fun:

Canadianized 'CA-58 Super Pucara'.  Original 760kW Astazous engines are replaced with PT6A-67s, and an air-to-air refueling prode to make the aircraft more self-deployable.


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## tomahawk6

Blackwater is buying the Super Tucano.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20070827.aspx

Blackwater Buys Brazilian Bombers

August 27, 2007: Security company Blackwater U.S.A. is buying Super Tucano light combat aircraft from the Brazilian manufacturer Embraer. These five ton, single engine, single seat aircraft are built for pilot training, but also perform quite well for counter-insurgency work. Brazil. The Super Tucano is basically a prop driven trainer that is equipped for combat missions. The aircraft can carry up to 1.5 tons of weapons, including 12.7mm machine-guns, bombs and missiles. The aircraft cruises at about 500 kilometers an hour and can stay in the air for about 6.5 hours per sortie. One of the options is a FLIR (infrared radar that produces a photo realistic video image in any weather) and a fire control system for bombing. Colombia is using the Super Tucanos for counter-insurgency work (there are over 20,000 armed rebels and drug gang gunmen in the country). The aircraft is also used for border patrol. The U.S. Air Force is watching that quite closely. The Super Tucano costs $9 million each, and come in one or two seat versions. The bubble canopy provides excellent visibility. This, coupled with its slow speed (versus jets), makes it an excellent ground attack aircraft. 

Blackwater already has a force of armed helicopters in Iraq, and apparently wants something a little faster, and more heavily armed, to fulfill its security contracts overseas. Initially, Blackwater is getting one two-seater, for pilot training in the United States.


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## Zoomie

The Hawker-Beechcraft AT-6 is a "weaponized" version of the CT-156 Harvard 2.  Commonality of training would permit such an aircraft to be easily streamed into CF service - as all newer CF pilots are qualified on type.


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## McG

If we are looking for something to fill a lighter ground support role, as a compliment to the CF-18 fleet, then I think we should be looking at UAVs like the Reaper.
http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/34289/post-614453.html#msg614453

They bring a lighter punch but can be much more persistent over the battlefield.


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## Colin Parkinson

Considering that our current enemies have minimal AD and if we deploy to some of the African cesspools where unguided 23mm are the main threat, smaller CAS aircraft may be very useful. I think the key is their deployment, don't use them for hunter killer mission where they can be drawn into a AD ambush, but only as direct support for the troops and convoys. Using a platform like the Hawk or Harvard 2 make sense from a logistic point of view, although they would have limited armament, fuel and protection. It would certainly be worth building up a Air reserve squadron here in Canada that uses these aircraft, to build knowledge base for both the Air Force and forward observers in CAS, this ability could be transferred to more robust aircraft and would also be a good way to retain some the pilots in the forces,

 I suspect flying around shooting and bombing stuff would be a fun way for a Air Canada pilot to spend their weekends...


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## GK .Dundas

Colin P said:
			
		

> Considering that our current enemies have minimal AD and if we deploy to some of the African cesspools where unguided 23mm are the main threat, smaller CAS aircraft may be very useful. I think the key is their deployment, don't use them for hunter killer mission where they can be drawn into a AD ambush, but only as direct support for the troops and convoys. Using a platform like the Hawk or Harvard 2 make sense from a logistic point of view, although they would have limited armament, fuel and protection. It would certainly be worth building up a Air reserve squadron here in Canada that uses these aircraft, to build knowledge base for both the Air Force and forward observers in CAS, this ability could be transferred to more robust aircraft and would also be a good way to retain some the pilots in the forces,
> 
> I suspect flying around shooting and bombing stuff would be a fun way for a Air Canada pilot to spend their weekends...


 One Hawk 100 with integral 30 mm Aden gun 4 x 250 LB. SDB 2 x19 70 mm laser guided rockets sounds good to me!
 I'm about to use a phrase that will get most the F18 crowd recoiling in disgust . "close air support"


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## Colin Parkinson

I see Singapore is signing a deal to replace it's F5's with Gripens.


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## forcerecon85

For filling a CAS and provide air security, I know the conversation was more than a year back, would we be able to lease some Panavia Tornado IDS? From what I remember as an interested civy it had good survivability, a full array of close air support tools and can provide protective air defense with aim-9's and aim-132's. As a bonus, Germany is downsizing its force, so we might be able to get a deal. My only question is if the Tornado is too old? Would it fill a gap until the JSF is done? Also, as a dreamer, I'd love to see A-10's or F-15E's. If it was still alive I'd throw the F-14D Tomcat's hat in the ring.


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## Spencer100

Colin P said:
			
		

> I see Singapore is signing a deal to replace it's F5's with Gripens.



They did not go Gripen.  They went 12 F-15SG Strike Eagles with all the options!  

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/singapores-rsaf-decides-to-fly-like-an-eagle-01141/#more


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## Colin Parkinson

Not sure but I think these are two different deals

Sounds like the F-15's were meant to replace the Skyhawks and Gripen may replace the F-5's


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## aesop081

forcerecon85 said:
			
		

> Panavia Tornado IDS?



Aircraft being retired by everyone using it except the Saudi Arabia. 



> As a bonus, Germany is downsizing its force, so we might be able to get a deal.



Yes, thats just what we need...more second hand stuff other coutries are retiring because its old and outdated. They are downsizing their Tornado force for a reason you know........its called Typhoon.




> A-10's



No longer manufactured by anyone...anywhere.



> or F-15E's.



As soon as South Korea's order has been delivered, the production line is closing.



> If it was still alive I'd throw the F-14D Tomcat's hat in the ring.



Well, its dead and so are any spare parts for it....case closed


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## Colin Parkinson

The A10's worst enemy has always been the USAF. Their handling of this aircraft careers is the best argument I have seen for a rebirth of the USAAF. I suspect that if you could start building the updated A10 version today, you would have a buyer tomorrow waiting at the end of the line.


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## SupersonicMax

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> One Hawk 100 with integral 30 mm Aden gun 4 x 250 LB. SDB 2 x19 70 mm laser guided rockets sounds good to me!
> *I'm about to use a phrase that will get most the F18 crowd recoiling in disgust . "close air support"*



Please support this argument please.  All I've heart from the Hornet community about CAS is just positive.  They've been training for some time already for that specific mission.


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## forcerecon85

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Aircraft being retired by everyone using it except the Saudi Arabia.
> 
> Yes, thats just what we need...more second hand stuff other coutries are retiring because its old and outdated. They are downsizing their Tornado force for a reason you know........its called Typhoon.
> 
> 
> No longer manufactured by anyone...anywhere.
> 
> As soon as South Korea's order has been delivered, the production line is closing.
> 
> Well, its dead and so are any spare parts for it....case closed



Thanks for the update, I've been out of the loop too long.


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## h3tacco

Notwithstanding its current grounding its my understanding that the F-15E compares favorably to the F-16, F/A-18 and Tornado in respect to CAS. It carries a larger payload and has a greater endurance (ie longer on-station time) than all three. As well it has an extra crewman over the F-16 and F/A-18, which apparently is quite useful for CAS type missions.


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## Command-Sense-Act 105

> there are no A-10s in theatre



WTF?  More combat this year in that theatre than in the last 3 and there are no A-10s?


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## Good2Golf

h3tacco said:
			
		

> Notwithstanding its current grounding its my understanding that the F-15E compares favorably to the F-16, F/A-18 and Tornado in respect to CAS. *It carries a larger payload and has a greater endurance (ie longer on-station time) than all three*. As well it has an extra crewman over the F-16 and F/A-18, which apparently is quite useful for CAS type missions.



...but not as much as a B-52 on station for XX hours, carrying XXX JDAMs...  

G2G


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## Journeyman

h3tacco said:
			
		

> *Notwithstanding its current grounding its my understanding that the F-15E compares favorably to the F-16, F/A-18 and Tornado in respect to CAS. *


You can't say "notwithstanding its current grounding...."    If it's grounded, it does not compare favourably with a less complex aircraft that is flying. 

And I certainly can't comment on the source of your "understanding" -- your view may be popularly-held within the Mess or in the back of a Sea King.....but you won't hear it from anyone with dirty boots who's relied on CAS and is familiar with the danger-close template of the various aircraft.



			
				tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> *Seriously though I dont see a drop off in CAS capabilities.*


 ....quoting an airforce perspective, that's still mired in the Douhet-Mitchell mindset that worships statistics confusing the amount of iron successfully striking the earth....with combat effectiveness.

During an Op coincident with one of ours, I got to watch the Pred porn of a US mission. Yep, the B1 and F15s made all kinds of rubble bounce....repeatedly. 
But at the end of the day, the only...yes ONLY....confirmed kills of bad guys by aircraft came from the A10 *guns*. 

And because the enemy can psychologically link the A10 with the subequent destruction, it is a more feared platform than a contrail at 20,000 feet. As such it can be used in a show of force role as well (you don't have to kill _all_ the local inhabitants).


Nonetheless, the USAF is transferring A10s back in-theatre as we speak, because they're needed and effective....despite what one may read on USAF websites.


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## h3tacco

My understanding is based on the fact that the F-15E, F-16. F/A-18 and Tornado are all of similar complexity and similar vintage. They all carry similar armament and with similar sensors. Except as mentioned the F-15E has a greater payload and endurance and an extra crewman. If your experience shows that the F-16, F/A-18 or Tornado are better at CAS I would have to guess it would have more to do with crew competency/training vice system capabilities.  Nowhere did I mention the A-10. 

As you correctly pointed I have no experience in CAS. If you have experience where the F-15E did not preform CAS as well as  the "less complex" F-16, F/A-18, or Tornado I would to love hear why.


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## Journeyman

h3tacco said:
			
		

> *My understanding is based on the fact that the F-15E, F-16. F/A-18 and Tornado are all of similar complexity and similar vintage. ...... Nowhere did I mention the A-10.*


 Ahh, correct. Mind you, the stated topic is F15's breaking up in mid-air....with the discussion turning quickly to how F-15's current operational role is CAS, given the noticable absence of Taliban air superiority fighters about. 

Damn if A-10s didn't enter the discussion with GTG's earlier comment about the airforce adoration of Fighters having a negative effect on issues such as A-10s and CSAR -- and every posting since yours, except one by GTG, *has been discussing A-10s*.  I apologize if we're moving too fast for you.

I will therefore state unequivocally that F-15E, F-16, F/A-18, and Tornado are just about equally not good at CAS. 

And my experience with F-15E's not performing as well as the less-complex aircraft in a CAS role has been stated:
THE F-15E's ARE GROUNDED....THEREFORE, NO CAS!!  

But thanks for playing along.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Thinking back to my days as a FAC, the best platforms (that I dealt with) for CAS were (in order):

1.  USAF A-10s.  These guys were in a class of their own.  Once you read them on the target, they set up their "wagon wheel of death orbit" and pummelled it out of existence.  I had A-10s in Gagetown doing gun runs on tree lines 300 metres in front of me (they approached from behind me- I cleared them hot as they passed overhead).

2. USAF AC-130 Gunships.  The volume of fire they could deliver accurately would turn the tide of any battle.  Another bunch of real pros.

3. USMC A-4 Syhawks.  Unexpectedly, a bunch of Marine Reservists could really move mud with this airplane.  Lots of fun working with this eager and professional bunch- too bad the airplane is retired.

4. T-33s.  Yeah, it wasn't an armed aircraft, but they really worked hard to support our training and were really good at what they did.  Too bad they didn't have the bomb racks and guns still installed- they would have been awesome at "real" CAS.

5. Dutch F-16s.  Not bad, but they mostly viewed it at as sideline to air-to-air fights.

6. Canadian CF-18s.  Sigh.  Really gave the impression that they were forced at gunpoint to drop bombs and fire rockets.  Some pilots were pretty good; most were lucky to get their ordnance anywhere in the impact area.

7. German Tornados.  Maybe it was a language thing, but they never once reacted to any of my attack guidance.  They would just dump practice bombs where ever the hell they wanted to.  Luckily, we were in Goose Bay, so it didn't really matter much.

The upshot- the guys owning non-Mach 1 airplanes did the best.  The faster the top speed of the airplane (IMHO)  the worse the CAS service (in general) that you are likely to receive.


----------



## Edward Campbell

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Thinking back to my days as a FAC, the best platforms (that I dealt with) for CAS were (in order):
> 
> 1.  USAF A-10s.  These guys were in a class of their own.  Once you read them on the target, they set up their "wagon wheel of death orbit" and pummelled it out of existence.  I had A-10s in Gagetown doing gun runs on tree lines 300 metres in front of me (they approached from behind me- I cleared them hot as they passed overhead).
> 
> 2. USAF AC-130 Gunships.  The volume of fire they could deliver accurately would turn the tide of any battle.  Another bunch of real pros.
> 
> 3. USMC A-4 Syhawks.  Unexpectedly, a bunch of Marine Reservists could really move mud with this airplane.  Lots of fun working with this eager and professional bunch- too bad the airplane is retired.
> 
> 4. T-33s.  Yeah, it wasn't an armed aircraft, but they really worked hard to support our training and were really good at what they did.  Too bad they didn't have the bomb racks and guns still installed- they would have been awesome at "real" CAS.
> 
> 5. Dutch F-16s.  Not bad, but they mostly viewed it at as sideline to air-to-air fights.
> 
> 6. Canadian CF-18s.  Sigh.  Really gave the impression that they were forced at gunpoint to drop bombs and fire rockets.  Some pilots were pretty good; most were lucky to get their ordnance anywhere in the impact area.
> 
> 7. German Tornados.  Maybe it was a language thing, but they never once reacted to any of my attack guidance.  They would just dump practice bombs where ever the hell they wanted to.  Luckily, we were in Goose Bay, so it didn't really matter much.
> 
> The upshot- the guys owning non-Mach 1 airplanes did the best.  The faster the top speed of the airplane (IMHO)  the worse the CAS service (in general) that you are likely to receive.



Then, does that mean we should be buying something like the AT-6? Or is it (something like it) too vulnerable to cheap, readily available and relatively unsophisticated AA weapons?


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## Old Sweat

To stick my oar in in response to Edward's question, I believe that we will be unable to purchase a separate "close air support" fixed wing aircraft for reasons that should be obvious to most of us. We never really had a dedicated platform, except for the few T33s that flew out of Rivers in the really bad old days. Even the Typhoon was a failed interceptor that was rerolled in an effort to salvage something from the project, and frankly it was not all that effective a platform, propaganda notwithstanding.

Where does this lead us? UAV? Armed Helicopters? 

In the meantime, it seems to me there is a gap of some size in theatre and we can't do anything about it. Or can we? Is it militarily and politically possible to deploy a six paxk? Would it make any difference, considering it would be swallowed up in the giant light blue air power maze?


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## SeaKingTacco

Firstly, I think our friendly neighbourhood Mod should split this- this is good stuff.

Ok- CAS.  Edward- I think (because I am not a expert on the Texan/Harvard II platform), that it is too slow, too vulnerable and can't carry nearly the ordnance required to be effective.  It only carries about 1200lbs of fuel, and burns that at around 400lbs an hour- add ordnance and hot and high, you will likely have to subtract gas.

I think  what a good CAS aircraft demands is something that can get where it is going at a reasonable speed (maybe 300-400kts), but can loiter at at around 150-200kts for a couple of hours (at least) before having to RTB.  I think that it should have two engines (probably jet or turbojet), because the environment where the loss of an engine to ground fire is likely and would be very serious.  I think  that it should have good self-protection features (armour and redundant systems where it makes sense, as well as decoys and jammers).  I think  it requires a gun if some sort and the ability to carry a decent load of armament- enough for more than one pass.  It obviously needs the right radios to talk to the Army, as well as other aircraft.  It probably needs to be able to fight at night, too.

So what out there fits that bill?  The A-10 for sure.  The SU-25 as well.  Not much else jumps to mind. I personally do not like UAVS in this role, as the comms problem is a nightmare and SA for the operator is not nearly as good as a manned aircraft.  

The trouble with this is- selling an aircraft like this to our Air Force is difficult, if not impossible.  It is too much of a one trick pony- even if the trick is vital. Maybe something like NLOS (a ground based, precision munition) is a better solution for our military.  Thoughts anyone?


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## observor 69

Doesn't the SU-25 look sweet for CAS !

http://www.enemyforces.com/aircraft/su25.htm


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## Kirkhill

SKT it seems as if you are starting to hit the same seam that Tomahawk 6 was hitting on the MGS thread,



			
				SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> .....
> The trouble with this is- selling an aircraft like this to our Air Force is difficult, if not impossible.  It is too much of a one trick pony- even if the trick is vital. Maybe something like NLOS (a ground based, precision munition) is a better solution for our military.  Thoughts anyone?



From T6



> Trying to find something for the Artillery to do shows how far down the ladder of priorities it has slid. If it werent for the Afghanistan deployment there might not be any tubes left. It was hilarious to me that the CF was going to give mortars, an infantry weapon, to the artillery. If you are going to play with the big boys you must have artillery. I couldnt quite figure out why the CF hasnt bought HIMARS. It fits into a C-130 and one fire unit is equal to a battery of guns.



With NLOS and HIMARS capable of delivering similar warheads to those mounted on CAS aircraft, "orbiting" "on the deck", with all weather readiness what are the incremental advantages that CAS delivers in comparison to missile systems?  Especially with the Air Force heading to 250lb Precision Guided bombs (the Small Diameter Bomb) that puts the delivered payload of the G-MRLS and the SDB on the same footing.  3 or 4 HIMARS would deliver a similar punch to a pair of CF-18s, would be instantly on call and more easily reloaded (and fewer Hotel Bills  ).

Reading your shopping list it looks like you are thinking of something like the Pucara or the old OV-10 Bronco.  Anyplace close?


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## Spencer100

Take this for what it is worth.  A-67 (looks like a Havard II) They say it is a replacement for the old A-1 Skyraider

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20071107.aspx

They say it will be ready next year.


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## SeaKingTacco

> Take this for what it is worth.  A-67 (looks like a Havard II) They say it is a replacement for the old A-1 Skyraider



Not a frickin chance it would replace a Skyraider.  Depending on what website you believe, a Skyraider could carry between 6000-10000 lbs  of external stores, against 3600 lbs for the A-67.  I doubt that the A-67 would be anywhere near as survivable and I question the "hot and high" performance numbers.

Kirkhill-  I've been following the MGS thread.  It is not by accident that I am coming to the conclusions that I'm having.  Air Force Generals should be waking up at night screaming in terror - if they are paying attention.  The best way to do CAS in the future (gulp) might not be with an aircraft (BTW, I don't count Attack Helos as CAS.  Like a few others here, I consider them to be another land manoeuver unit).

I too am thinking that something along the OV-10 or Pucara line might be the answer- if the ultimate CAS aircraft (the A-10) is unavailable!


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## Spencer100

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Not a frickin chance it would replace a Skyraider.  Depending on what website you believe, a Skyraider could carry between 6000-10000 lbs  of external stores, against 3600 lbs for the A-67.  I doubt that the A-67 would be anywhere near as survivable and I question the "hot and high" performance numbers.



I did say to take it for what is worth and I see not very much


----------



## MarkOttawa

Spencer100: If only:

A2D Skyshark
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/a2d.htm

Mark
Ottawa


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## Matt_Fisher

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Not a frickin chance it would replace a Skyraider.  Depending on what website you believe, a Skyraider could carry between 6000-10000 lbs  of external stores, against 3600 lbs for the A-67.  I doubt that the A-67 would be anywhere near as survivable and I question the "hot and high" performance numbers.
> 
> Kirkhill-  I've been following the MGS thread.  It is not by accident that I am coming to the conclusions that I'm having.  Air Force Generals should be waking up at night screaming in terror - if they are paying attention.  The best way to do CAS in the future (gulp) might not be with an aircraft (BTW, I don't count Attack Helos as CAS.  Like a few others here, I consider them to be another land manoeuver unit).
> 
> I too am thinking that something along the OV-10 or Pucara line might be the answer- if the ultimate CAS aircraft (the A-10) is unavailable!



Something like this you mean?  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/40352/post-614895.html#msg614895


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## TangoTwoBravo

*Disclaimer*.  I am neither a pilot nor a FAC/JTAC.

I have been around the effects of CAS, however, and have been invovled in their use on a couple of occasions.

I do see A-10s as the gold standard.  To add to what Journeyman said, my observation was that the enemy was truly afraid of that plane.  Several long TICs were ended by the A-10 cannon.  I would argue that the A-10 should be replaced by another A-10.  

We were also supported by "strategic bombers", and truth be told they had some advantages.  For one series of encounters we were in a very remote area and others means would take a while to get to us and had somewhat limited endurance.  The big bombers, on the other hand, could get to us in minutes and could stick around for a while dropping JDAMs as required (we were the main effort for a little while).  Perhaps not the ideal CAS platform, but you can't always get what you want and sometimes you get what you need.  When you need fire support NOW you appreciate somebody that can get to you quickly.

AHs were great for developing the situation and their firepower was wonderful but their time of flight to your location and endurance _could_ be issues.  I do not see AHs as maneouvre assets.  We had this debate down south quite a bit.  AHs have some of the characteristics of manouvre units, but ultimately their limited endurance means that I see them as fire support (using the US Army BOS as a point of view).  That being said, I refer you to my disclaimer.  Their escort capabilties, however, made them worth their weight in gold and not having them is a non-starter.  Perhaps this runs counter to my thought of them being fire support and not maneouvre.  Perhaps a good debate to be had here.

Tos um up, my own observations were that the different platforms gave you advantages and came with disadvantages.  That may be a blinding statement of the obvious, but perhaps the "so what" that I took away was how important it was to undestand these and then sequence your assets accordingly.

If it were up to me, for Canada I would spend any available money on attack helicopters and then make sure that our CF-18s were optimized for CAS.  I believe that work is being done on the second issue.  Whether I would want an air force consisting only of A-10s is another issue.  That might be a little extreme.  We do have territorial air defence issues and an air force without fighters seems a little out of balance.  A mix of fighters and ground attack planes would seem the optimal solution, but I'm not sure if we are in that position.

Cheers


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## Kirkhill

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> *Disclaimer*.  I am neither a pilot nor a FAC/JTAC.
> 
> ....
> If it were up to me, for Canada I would spend any available money on attack helicopters and then make sure that our CF-18s were optimized for CAS.  I believe that work is being done on the second issue.  Whether I would want an air force consisting only of A-10s is another issue.  That might be a little extreme.  We do have territorial air defence issues and an air force without fighters seems a little out of balance.  A mix of fighters and ground attack planes would seem the optimal solution, but I'm not sure if we are in that position.



I don't think we can reasonably argue against fast movers for the territorial defence of Canada.  With a large land and sea area and a huge air volume, with varied threats (and many non-threatening events requiring recce), with some threats being exceptionally dangerous but all threats being intermittent, AND with a well prepared infrastructure to support fast-movers  they are pretty much THE best answer as first responders.  As flying bomb-trucks they can rapidly move the necessary ordnance from the warehouse to a position where they can be released and engage the enemy (and not expose the pilot and aircraft to much risk).  With the right Optronics they can rapidly move to a position to get "eyes on" and start generating a sense of the situation.   They can get there faster than UAVs and loiter (with tankers) long enough for the UAVs to get on site and establish a permanent orbit.

For Domestic Ops CF-18s, or fighters generally, make perfect sense.  They are a defensive armament.

But they don't make sense for Expeditionary Forces: Too much infrastructure, too low endurance, too little armament, too expensive in hardware, crew and maintenance.  A six-pack of CF-18s would buy many UAVs and HIMARS with a mix of missiles.  What could that six pack do that couldn't be done by the 155s in combination with the HIMARS and the UAVs?

On the other hand, it seems to me, that the "Gunships" whether fixed or rotary, single, twin or 4 engined varieties DO bring something different to the battlefield.  They bring presence.  If not a sense of humanity, at least a different sense of scale.

Soldier to soldier conflict is a test of courage. The winner gains moral ascendancy but the fight is too equal and the outcome too uncertain.  The enemy is inclined, I believe, to "give it a go" in the words of our Aussie brethren.

Soldier to explosive conflict is a different test of courage but there is little moral ascendancy gained by the bomber.  The "victor" is often the person on the receiving end.  Bombs, perhaps, should be included under "environmental" issues like sun, rain, snow and dust.  They impair operations and they can stop operations but there is a sense of, I want to say unreality, but that is wrong. The effects are real enough but like the sun and the snow and the dust there is little that can be done about them other than endure them.

Soldier to machine conflict is something else again.  And I believe that the relative invulnerability of the A-10, just like the tank, applies a different psychological effect to the combatants.  It is an obvious threat, it is an "irresistible" force and it a personal threat.  That vehicle is moving at a speed that allows you to time to think.  It is coming for you.  Nobody else. You have time to decide whether to run away, or stay and try to fight, or just stay and die in place.  And reality is that if you stay option C is the most likely outcome.   I think you may get the same effect out of a sustained bombardment (and for a small force maybe that is only 2 or 3 effectively placed rounds), or an infantry assault by overwhelming numbers but I don't think you can beat the "cost effectiveness" of "gunships" and "tanks" in achieving that ascendancy.

I don't think, ultimately, that destroying each individual fighting soldier is the way to win wars.  That, IMO, just seems to create martyrs whose cause is taken up by their sons and daughters.  What seems to be a better strategy is to demoralize the enemy, to get them to break and go hands up.  Then you get to demonstrate your ethos to them and remove the sense of otherness that was instilled in them to get them to the battlefield in the first place.  Take a look at how many German PWs decided to emigrate to Britain and Canada and the US after being held in PW detention camps.  That was the most lasting victory of the allies.

The Gunships and Tanks may be mechanical, inhuman monsters, but they operate on a human scale.  A fast mover that drops its bomb and exits the scene before the sound of its arrival is heard doesn't have the same impact.  Perhaps a B52 circling at 40,000 ft and leaving contrails in a blue sky does have the same impact - a sense of being watched, being vulnerable and being impotent.  I think those are the effects that ultimately gain you the opportunity to win the hearts and minds of your opponents.  You may have to take out 10-30% of their number to get their attention and get them to put their weapons down. They may not like you and probably won't trust you.  But, you have gained the opportunity to talk to them and convince them of your moral superiority.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> For Domestic Ops CF-18s, or fighters generally, make perfect sense.  They are a defensive armament.
> 
> But they don't make sense for Expeditionary Forces: Too much infrastructure, too low endurance, too little armament, too expensive in hardware, crew and maintenance.  A six-pack of CF-18s would buy many UAVs and HIMARS with a mix of missiles.  What could that six pack do that couldn't be done by the 155s in combination with the HIMARS and the UAVs?



Well, everything has infrastructure and endurance issues.  To add to my disclaimer, I am not a gunner.  That being said, I will offer that guns (155mm in our current instance) give you one form of fire support.  HIMARs, CAS and AHs give you other forms.  Genuine fast movers let you cover a potentially huge area which is a bonus in dispersed operations.  Guns, on the other hand, are relatively restricted and they have a logistical tail that requires sustainment outside the wire.  You want both in my opinion.  

As for the moral plane, we can go down a COIN tangent here as well as a philisophical rabbit hole.  To venture in a little bit, I would argue that ultimately it is political victories that count.  Your military successes only buy time and space for those political things to happen.  There are various psyops angles to military means (personal or impersonal) and I am not qualified in that field.  In a TIC itself I don't really care, just bring fire support on the enemy.  It it means dropping a rather impersonal JDAM then so be it. 

To come back to more tangible arguments, while it pains me to say this I can understand why Canada has CF-18s instead of A-10s.  I'm sure that in the late 70s there were air force guys who wanted both F-15s and A-10s.  I don't know if Canada is in a position to have two such planes and I can understand why they went with a single dual-role fighter.  I don't know if our situation has changed in that regard.  The USAF is in a different situation entirely and I hope that the dedicated CAS platform survives the next decade.

All that being said, I still think that Canada needs to get AH-64s or some other modern attack helicopter.  If we want to have other helicopters in theatre we need the escorts.


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## observor 69

"To come back to more tangible arguments, while it pains me to say this I can understand why Canada has CF-18s instead of A-10s.  I'm sure that in the late 70s there were air force guys who wanted both F-15s and A-10s.  I don't know if Canada is in a position to have two such planes and I can understand why they went with a single dual-role fighter. "

As an avionics tech, during the 70's, I am a bit out of my lane commenting on your remark. But my first thought is in context at the time we had 104's and wanted a multi role contemporary generation aircraft, in other words we skipped a generation. I also think fighter jocks aren't really attracted to air to dirt even if at the time that was our NATO role. My memory of that time was 16's versus 18's , good at multi-role and two engines. I can't recall or even think that A-10s were in the mix. In fact my understanding is the USAF in the past has had no love for A-10s.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I don't think that A-10s were seriously on the table, so to speak, but given the role in CFE I imagine that some looked at them.  I base my comments on simple mess-talk from pilots some time ago as opposed to research...


----------



## Kirkhill

T2B

To preclude another bout of "violent agreement" - I agree  ;D  Horses for courses and the most important issue is knowledge of the course and the horses available.

To my mind Arty supplies a "cheap" enduring presence.  Arty can stockpile many rounds in theater and have them ready at minutes and seconds notice for a very long time without burning gas or wearing out kit (if you discount the wearing effects of polishing their guns).  Air can react more widely but with longer response time unless a lot of money is spent keeping them in the air.  It seems to me that Air works best against identified and fixed targets while the guns (and missiles) not only do that but also add an additional layer of deterrence in that they reduce the amount of time that the enemy has to operate before he can expect a reaction.  Arty also takes a while to replenish once it exhausts its in theater rounds.  Air can shuttle direct from warehouse to target without having to pass through the local distribution centre but at a relatively slow rate when looked at on a campaign level. There just aren't that many aircraft.

As for morality in a TIC....wrong time, wrong place.  A Pyrrhic victory is still not a victory.   But you can't win wars: civil disturbance, Co-In, general or political, without considering the moral.  They are all contests of wills by people convinced of their moral superiority.  The "game" is to convince the other guy that he is wrong and you are right.  And that game continues after the bullets stop.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> T2B
> 
> To my mind Arty supplies a "cheap" enduring presence.  Arty can stockpile many rounds in theater and have them ready at minutes and seconds notice for a very long time without burning gas or wearing out kit (if you discount the wearing effects of polishing their guns).  Air can react more widely but with longer response time unless a lot of money is spent keeping them in the air.  It seems to me that Air works best against identified and fixed targets while the guns (and missiles) not only do that but also add an additional layer of deterrence in that they reduce the amount of time that the enemy has to operate before he can expect a reaction.



Unless those guns are operating from your airhead then they need tactical replenishment by some means.  That is not an easy feat.  CAS, on the other hand, operates by default from some sort of airhead.  You need to bring bombs and fuel into theatre to that airhead (or to your carrier), but that is less risky than a sustainment run to a gun troop out in the rhubarb.

I would argue for the opposite in terms of reaction vs deliberate.  CAS gives you the ability to bring fire support to pretty much anywhere quickly in a given area of operations.  It means tankers and some Air guys doing some wonders but it pays off.  I've been in a situation where the guns were not in range yet.  A strategic bomber was over our heads in five minutes from the first call and he stayed for a couple of hours dropping explody things on the enemy.  Where the guns really came in for that battle was early the next morning to support the assault.  It can be very hard to keep all of your troops within gun range at all times in that AO.  Now, the nice thing about guns is that if you have taken the trouble to bring them in range of a TIC then you have coverage that you own (for the most part).


----------



## MarkOttawa

Tango2Bravo: The "cab rank":
http://www.3squadron.org.au/MacK1/The%20Kittyhawk%20Mk_IIa%20(P-40L)%20in%203%20Sqn%20RAAF%20Service.htm



> At this stage while the Kittyhawk units were in theory fighter squadrons, they only met German aircraft on a couple of occasions for the remainder of the war. This was because their role was close air support near the front line areas. In Italy the 'Cab Rank' system was developed whereby fighters would loiter in a given area until directed to a specific target (using map co-ordinates) by the ground controller who was himself usually an ex Kittyhawk pilot 'resting' between tours. In addition they would attack interdiction targets (bridges, road junctions, road traffic, enemy headquarters) up to 150+ miles behind the front line in pre briefed attacks. Formations in Italy were normally of 6 aircraft, it was rare that a full Sqn effort of 12 would be laid on.



And in Burma:
http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avp47.html



> The Thunderbolt also provided extensive service against the Japanese, by both the USAAF and the British. The RAF began to receive the type during mid-1944, and received 240 razorback P-47Ds, which they designated "Thunderbolt Mark I", and 590 bubbletop P-47Ds, which they designated "Thunderbolt Mark II".
> 
> Except for a few evaluation aircraft, these were all operated by the RAF from India for ground-attack operations, known as "cab rank" sorties, against the Japanese in Burma. They were armed with 225 kilogram (500 pound) bombs, or in some cases the British "60-pounder" rocket projectiles...



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Kirkhill

T2B:

You are talking about an active theater of operations.  I am talking about the Fulda Gap and long term deterrence.  Emplaced guns and missiles and a dug in magazine to deter operations within the umbrella provided by the guns/missiles.  I am also talking about supplying security to fixed installations, like villages, in perpetuity - or the next best thing.  In my view the airhead is just another village.

I fully agree that when you are out dealing with pop-up targets then it is worth while to maintain a cab rank of ready response aircraft.  Is it worthwhile to maintain orbiting aircraft for a multi-month or multi-year commitment?

Alternately how much does it cost to build a forward air base and maintain idle aircraft on alert versus maintaining gun parks on alert but not firing.

The calculus changes when bombs are dropping versus when bombs aren't dropping.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

To me the airhead is a very special village since it has a fully functional runway and is relativley secure.  You can CSS it through the efforts of the movements folks as opposed to ground convoys or CH-47s.

To cover a whole area with guns in not necessarily efficient.  Guns do give you a sense of permanence, and in a conventional war scenario (well, WWIII) we are talking about a different kettle of fish.

In my mind it is worthwhile to keep aircraft orbitting (or at a high state of alert close at hand) as long as it takes.


----------



## a_majoor

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> You are talking about an active theater of operations.  I am talking about the Fulda Gap and long term deterrence.  Emplaced guns and missiles and a dug in magazine to deter operations within the umbrella provided by the guns/missiles.  I am also talking about supplying security to fixed installations, like villages, in perpetuity - or the next best thing.  In my view the airhead is just another village.



The age of permanent emplacements and magazines is past, except for very limited circumstances. The problem with fixed anything is the enemy will find you sooner or later, and it is much easier to track, target and fire on static targets than mobile ones. (This argument is applicable to airfields as well; one of the arguments early on in this thread was a simple and rugged airplane could operate from very austere airfields, dirt airstrips, sections of road etc.)

Even with artillery mobile launchers are far more flexible and effective. Being able to show up unexpectedly has a great deterrent effect as well, so rugged aircraft that can operate from lots of places, mobile artillery pieces and mobile platforms for both (aircraft carriers, navy missiles and artillery, SP guns, etc.) are always desirable. We are fortunate in the West in that we also have the wealth and organizational ability to operate a global logistical network to supply these systems, making them real deterrents.


----------



## Kirkhill

a_majoor said:
			
		

> The age of permanent emplacements and magazines is past, except for very limited circumstances. The problem with fixed anything is the enemy will find you sooner or later, and it is much easier to track, target and fire on static targets than mobile ones. (This argument is applicable to airfields as well; one of the arguments early on in this thread was a simple and rugged airplane could operate from very austere airfields, dirt airstrips, sections of road etc.)
> 
> Even with artillery mobile launchers are far more flexible and effective. Being able to show up unexpectedly has a great deterrent effect as well, so rugged aircraft that can operate from lots of places, mobile artillery pieces and mobile platforms for both (aircraft carriers, navy missiles and artillery, SP guns, etc.) are always desirable. We are fortunate in the West in that we also have the wealth and organizational ability to operate a global logistical network to supply these systems, making them real deterrents.



I disagree vehemently.  The enemy doesn't need to find you. It isn't about you.  The target is the villagers - and they aren't going anywhere.    They are where they are and there they will stay. Talk to the Israelis about what the target is.  The game plan HAS to be to keep the enemy away from the villagers - in perpetuity.  You may as well dig in a proper defensive system that allows you to respond to a threat in a timely fashion from local resources.  I see no difference between a C-RAM system with emplaced 20mm Phalanxes to knock down incoming mortar rounds and emplaced, magazine fed 155mms or siloed missiles to knock down assaults AND to supply a ready reaction umbrella to support patrolling forces.  AND they are not burning gas and wearing out parts and pilots when they aren't needed.   I am back to equating a village with a frigate. Both of them are point targets.  Both of them can "carry" with them their own means of defence, and by interlocking "umbrellas" supply dominance over an extended area.  And are inexpensive when NOT used.  Orbiting aircraft, or even aircraft on the ground, are very expensive.

As to the use of aircraft in expeditionary forces, or aircraft being on call.....as long as we are working in support of the Yanks then you can rely on them sucking up the costs of delivering rounds on time and on target from Missouri or Guam or Japan or Kuwait or a Nimitz Class carrier.  They are paying for all the gas, mechanics, parts, runway maintenance crews, control tower personnel, fire departments and cooks necessary for mounting that support.  What are you going to do when their need is greater than yours and the choice they face is digging you out of the muck or digging one of their own battalions out?  Your options become investing the type of bucks that they have in order to make your "phone call away" air support available or figuring out how to supply similar support with fewer bucks or staying home.  And the last is always an option here in Canada.

Given that the USAF is downsizing their rounds in order to keep their aircraft in the fight without causing too much collateral damage and at the same time Arty is getting the call to supply GMRLS rounds in preference to Air Support I don't see that it is implausible to meet at least some of our own support needs by means of the HIMARS-155 combination.  Mobile for the expeditionary force.  Emplaced for long term deterrence.  We have already had a similar discussion about putting weapons of similar range and effect on frigates to supply support for shore assault forces.  If they are good enough for that role why are they not a viable option for land-based forces.

Aircraft are great for getting rounds on target fast across a large area.  Therefore, IMHO, they are best employed as a reserve force to meet the enemy when the enemy shows up where you DON'T expect him or to deliver short, sharp shocks en masse. If you know where the enemy is and the enemy know's where you are and it is a matter of trying to maintain a standoff/peace then I fail to see that keeping aircraft on permanent orbit is a "Cost Effective" strategy.


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## Colin Parkinson

To boil this thread down, you need a mix of resources, both ground and air, both have advantages and disadvantages. It shows that Canada does need an organic ability to provide it’s own CAS if we want to be truly independent of other NATO forces. It would be nice if each NATO country provided a specialist resources, but with the nations placing caveats on their forces, there is no way you can do this with any confidence that they will be there when the poop hits the fan. I still say start small with an Air reserve squadron based on the Turboprop trainer in the CAS configuration use it to build the expertise within the Air force and then step up to a dedicated larger platform. It would be nice to stand up a squadron of gunships, but we Canadians seem to have problems buying helicopters….


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## Kirkhill

Thanks for the intervention Colin. Although in my case it might be better to say you are unboiling the thread.  Sorry for the excessive heat.  

Cheers.

Just a further thought on the cab rank system of air support.  Those aircraft had no electronics and engines that were extremely rugged and servicing was not greatly different from servicing a truck engine.  Most importantly those aircraft could operate out of fields and were consequently located close to the FEBA.  They didn't have to spend a lot of time transiting from their home base to their area of operations.  That both increased their availability and decreased their response time.  That should have made them more useful to the ground commanders.....but even back then the "Bombers" were arguing that these "Fighters" were a waste of resources and while twin engined mediums like the B25 Mitchell and the Mosquito were assigned to ground support roles it virtually took an act of Parliament to get Harris to divert his heavies to CAS/IDS roles in support of the D-Day landings.

Ultimately though, Colin is right. It is all about getting a mix of resources, and of getting the best mix that the budget can afford.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Kirkhill,

Are we back to your garrison artillery bit?

Big sophisticated bombers with speed, endurance and payload are worth their cost in my opinion.  Sometimes they will be supporting a platoon fight, which would seem an extravagant waste of resources in a WWII or WWIII scenario.  The cost-effectiveness meta-game changes as the scale slides from "limited war" to full-on heavy metal peer fighting with national survival at stake.  Platoon fight outcomes suddenly become real important in the unconventional wars.  Cost-effectiveness at Falaise may not be the same cost-effectiveness in Kandahar.

A word on nationally-owned enablers.  Having a Canadian flag on a piece of kit or capability does help ensure that Canadian troops will be supported by that enabler.  That being said, it can be hard for us to have every required enabler.  When it comes to choices I would focus on the things that do not move quickly around theatre but are critical to success.  Those things (like Route Clearance Packages, CSS vehicles and Attack Helicopters to escort transport helicopters and casevacs) can be essential to success but may be pulled away to national priorities.  They might sit idle in readiness to support their parent nation while Canadians do without.  Bombers, on the other hand, can be assigned in minutes.  If you are in a TIC these days it can suddenly become "the show of the hour" for the whole theatre.  Bombers can be reassigned quickly while the other assets I mentioned take more time (even Attack Helicopters).  All that to say I would accept some risk and rely on coalition CAS if it meant I could guarantee Attack Helicopters,  CH-47s and Route Clearance Packages.

Cheers!


----------



## Kirkhill

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Kirkhill,
> 
> Are we back to your garrison artillery bit?



We are.  ;D.  And I am back on my Meds.  

Maybe it is the incurable romantic in me but I do see a continuing role for The Tower of London, Stirling Castle, Vlad the Impaler's castles, the Citadels at Quebec and Halifax, Arafat's 1930s British built Police Fort at Ramallah and CIMIC and Platoon Houses in Kandahar and Baghdad.   There is something about them that suggests stability, solidity, presence...security.  And they represent a nice warm/air-conditioned location for a good night's sleep for the local "Law/Peace-Enforcers".     Part of guaranteeing those guys, I am guessing that means you guys, a good night's sleep means to knock down incoming threats: 82mm mortars, 122mm rockets and 400 man Taliban assaults.   And if you are standing on the walls repelling those assaults then you are not getting a good night's sleep.

"A" Battery at Fort Henry supplied a 3 mile umbrella that dominated the waters around the Fort permitting constant patrolling and ultimately peaceful use.  As well they represented a local defence force.

All I am suggesting is that:

Local defence forces are required in order to both control and comfort the local population.
The local defence force needs a place to get a good night's sleep.
The place to get a good night's sleep needs to be well defended.
An integrated defence requires active measures as well as passive (more than just thick walls)
Active defences that defend the premises without the need to waken the entire garrison means that the garrison is available for other tasks.  If not sleeping they can be out patrolling.

So fixed populations requires a fixed local presence which requires a defended locality.  

Given that: how much bang for the buck can we supply now that we have to recruit, train, feed, pay and protect those forces?

I am suggesting that IF you accept my premise that Local Fixed Forces are necessary THEN the question becomes how much influence can they exert, and over what area - all the while trying to minimize the number of personnel devoted to the task of local security.

It is possible to protect a facility with a 50% stand-to, rifles and machine guns but nobody gets much sleep.  A well practiced infantry and armoured standard.  The Navy used to do things that way but not so much any more.

Warships use active defences that defend the ship with relatively little man-power.
The array of automated active responses currently available at the click of a button from a mouse starts with Claymores, progresses through ROWS installations, CIWS/C-RAMS, Skyguard, Sweden's now decommissioned ERSTA coastal artillery guns*, any artillery piece that can be fired from the cab of the vehicle, any missile that launches itself on detection of the right conditions, any containerized or siloed missile.

That means that instead of "A" Battery dominating the 1000 islands with its 3 mile guns and telescopes that same group of individuals could now be "dominating" Canada, either from their central location or from netted distributed nodes. - Given adequate situational awareness.


I am working from the premise that dispersed local forces to comfort and control the locals is a necessary evil.  I am suggesting that those bodies come at the expense of manoeuvre forces.  Therefore we should both minimize the numbers necessary and allow them to be useful across the broadest spectrum of operations.   Allow them to use their eyes via ROWS, UAVs, Aerostats, Satellites and monitors and allow them to respond over the broadest possible area using systems ranging from the point-defence like the Claymore to the theater-range systems like the Patriot and the ATACMS.  Needless to say those latter require central co-ordination of those dispersed firing points.

Now, having said all of that, I have nowhere argued against manoeuvre forces, Quick Reaction Forces, mobile reserves and flexible fire support.  All good. 

But I don't believe that you can fight Rupert Smith's  "War Amongst the People" entirely with manoeuvre forces.  You have to give the people of Srebrenica their safehaven.  You have to deploy the DutchBat.  You have to give them the authority and the means to defend themselves and their charges.  Those forces are lost to your manoeuvre elements.  You might as well make them as capable and useful as you can.  And the more they can support the manoeuvre forces the better.

This is all that I suggest.

As to my "heat of the moment" references to Yanks paying for your CAS - I accept the realities of coalition warfare.  And frankly I can't think of any wars that have ever been one from entirely "National" resources.  Even Napoleon and the Romans vacuumed up additional support from their "conquered" territories.  It makes you wonder how much conquering and how much liberating goes on in these things.  'Nuther tangent.

One of these days I am going to have to buy you a Guiness or two.

Cheers, Chris.

* Relative to ERSTA - I would argue that those were decommissioned NOT because they weren't effective, or cost effective, but because the enemy went away (He may be coming back soon.)  But much of that Autoloading/Firing technology is still available on the back of a Volvo truck.  I just don't see the need to keep tires inflated and engines maintained if I can achieve the same effect by dismounting the gun-platform from the back of the vehicle, hooking it up to a generator along with 3 or 5 more guns and running a conveyor from a dug in magazine to the autoloaders.  

As noted previously and elsewhere by others the Maginot line was not a failure because it existed.  It failed because there wasn't enough of it - and that was because it became too expensive to build and operate and that in turn was because of short range weapons and short sight lines and the great need for manpower which had to be fed and protected.  The Maginot Line that was built functioned as intended.  It deterred and repelled and forced the enemy to go around.  Unfortunately the manoeuvre element wasn't prepared to defeat the enemy on the enemy's chosen ground.


----------



## a_majoor

It seems we are in violent agreement on some things, the crux of the argument is not so much if we should be supplying security to our "clients"; rather it is the means to do so.

The counter example to the "artillery fortress" protecting the villagers was the USMC's "Civic Action Program" or CAP from the Viet Nam war. The CAP provided a very small number of Marines (generally speaking, a platoon, although with things like R&R, sickness, "ash and trash" duties it was probably a very short platoon) to a particular village, augmenting the local militia (usually no more than a company). They lived and worked in the village with their local counterparts, and took on the security and patrolling tasks in the neighborhood with the local forces.

In today's terms they were both the OMLT and the PRT, since CAP also hosted "county fairs" where villagers got visits from medical and dental pers and various reconstruction tasks were undertaken. While the American Army looked down on such initiatives, CAP was actually quite successful. They provided protection against the most feared weapon in the insurgents arsenal; "the man with a knife" who lived in or around the village. Their patrols kept up to date on the activities of the enemy, and could occasionally snag a few of them (a realistic scenario even today). Should a large body of "Popular Front" or NVA be located, or attempt to attack the village, the Marines could call on all kinds of firepower, ranging from a few mortar tubes they used themselves to Marine Aviation screaming in over the horizon from off shore carriers.

From what I have read, the CAP platoon lived and worked out of something resembling a "line house" rather than a bunker, which would have made them much more accessible to the locals. While this is not to say the CAP didn't build bunkers or fighting positions, I believe they didn't make a point of living in them unless there was a specific need (i.e. a stand to).

Since the firepower wasn't overtly on display at all times, CAP was not a threatening presence like Edward "the Longshank's" castles in Wales and along the Scottish Marches which also provided the garrison with a secure place to sleep and zones of control over the restive conquered population. Since the firepower was always "on call" from many dispersed sources, the population knew there was little chance the enemy could militarily defeat the CAP platoon and local militia, and the enemy knew it was bad news to be found in that area.

In today's environment, it should be fairly easy to resurrect many programs from the 1980's which promised compact firepower in simple, dispersed packages (although contractors would flip!). The demonstration of firing a HELLFIRE from a CUCV pickup truck is one example, FOG-M fired from trailers towed by utility HMMVW's or a 4 pack of LOSAT fired from a "roof rack" mounted on a HMMVW "hard top" are two different ways to skin the cat (and can easily be hidden in a garage rather than emplaced behind a HESCO bastion in a tank run up). Given time and space factors, as well as range requirements, simple and rugged aircraft able to operate from dispersed forward locations would be an effective part of the mix. Artillery counter battery radar and a land based CIWS might require more elaborate tracked vehicles, but even here you have the option of moving the systems in unpredictable ways to shape the defensive zone and essentially preempt the enemy mortar and rocket teams (either they have to move around looking for undefended areas, or their spotter teams looking for the CIWS become our targets, and lead us to the enemy firing points).

So we have ways and means to have presence, security and firepower all focused on an area, but not necessarily physically in that location.


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## Kirkhill

But does a platoon house defended by Hellfires equate to the capabilities supplied by the CF-5?

I am contending that even an economical aircraft like the CF-5 required a fairly massive footprint (a defended forward hard runway) to deliver 500lb munitions in support of operations.  I believe that once you have dedicated a platoon to defending a village by whatever means that a useful battery of munitions in the 200-500 lb class can be co-located within the same footprint.  

You HAVE to defend the village.  You HAVE to commit the platoon.  The platoon is able to also defend a battery of missiles and autoloading cannons.  Those missiles and cannons CAN supply much of the support that the CF-5 used to.  You can disperse launchers around the area of operations in locales that have to be defended in any case thereby getting much the same coverage that orbiting CF-5s would have supplied - assuming that you measure the capability in terms time from call to delivery and size and number of rounds delivered.  How many platoons, dedicated platoons, would it take to secure a CF-5 airfield?  How many villages are UNdefended in order to defend the airfield?

I am also suggesting that the platoon, allocated to the village, can be made more effective if their defence were thickened by emplaced ROWS that could be directed from a central location.  And if that central location were capable of firing ROWS Hellfires at designated targets then it could as easily access heavier munitions located in range but at distributed nodes - such as additional defended villages.

This is decidedly NOT a recipe for dealing with a high intensity war of manoeuvre.  It might be a recipe for dealing with a low intensity counter-insurgency operation.  That would depend on how many munitions are dropped, how big and how often. I think it would work if you are looking at occasional rounds against fleeting, occasional, targets.


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## a_majoor

Once again, I think we are disagreeing with the means to an end.

Think of the CF-5 analogue aircraft as the "today" version of Cab Rank. The company AOR is supported by a Cab Rank flight located somewhere "out there" at an airfield or FARP. The platoons are spread out over a wide area in villages or patrolling. A few utility trucks with missiles or 120mm mortars are in and around assessed "high threat" villages since the patrols and Int have seen indications of the enemy moving into the area, but it turns out the logistics convoy is the target of the enemy action this day. 

The local platoon commander calls for the duty Cab Rank plane, which vectors into the scene of the action while cam nets are tossed off the other planes in the Cab Rank flight and they roll out onto the road prepared to support the action. The airfield does not have to be elaborate or heavily defended; it may be a FARP selected by the aviation commander by throwing a dart at the map board and abandoned after a day or two of use.

Obviously, the type of plane you have in the inventory controls how far down you can go with Cab Rank. CF-18's will need a KAF to operate, while a small, piston or turboprop trainer with rocket pods hung off the wings could operate from almost anywhere. Each type has advantages and disadvantages, so various factors go into the calculus of what to get (speed, range, payload, ability to loiter, day/night/all weather capability, cost, O&M......). My scenario above *might* be doable by a Pucara, JAS 39 Gripen or AV-8B Harrier.



			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> You HAVE to defend the village.  You HAVE to commit the platoon.  The platoon is able to also defend a battery of missiles and autoloading cannons.



A modern CF Platoon is already well stocked in that regard with its LAV III carriers, which can be parked discreetly in a barn or openly by the ANP station. Longer range artillery weapons or the Zoomies provide the ability to swing the big stick without rubbing the villagers noses into it (especially if a local force like the ANA or ANP is being groomed to take over the security tasks in the village). It is also easier to drive out of town and set up in the next village if you are not packing up your separate artillery park at the same time.

Even in high intensity war it is probably better to be dispersed rather than concentrated, any enemy will be swatting a cloud of bees rather than smoking out the hive and eating the honey.


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## Kirkhill

I yield.


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## Matt_Fisher

*edited*

Please disregard this post as after I re-read the thread, it makes more sense.  Carry on...


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## Bandit1

Why don't we just get some Tornado's?  ;D

[flash=200,200]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIxJpCtkCtM[/flash]

Bandit


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## aesop081

Bandit1 said:
			
		

> Why don't we just get some Tornado's?  ;D
> 
> [flash=200,200]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIxJpCtkCtM[/flash]
> 
> Bandit



Because they are old and every country that uses them currently have begun replacing them ( with the exception of Saudi Arabia).


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## a_majoor

Perhaps since the Air Force seems unwilling to "do" CAS, we might offer a slightly different mission profile:

http://www.jerrypournelle.com/mail/mail491.html



> *What Role is there for the USAF*
> 
> The US Air Force has always been primarily interested in maintaining itself as a Strategic Force. If I were them I would give up the Ground Support entirely to the army and navy and concentrate on your own High Frontier suggestion.
> 
> With that in mind a US Aerospace Force is a viable structure, let the other forces have the bottom 40000 feet, let the USAF control everything above. This would include satellites, THOR weapons, Ben Bova Laser Battlestations, and a fleet of Aerospace Fighters. This is the role I could envisage for a future USAF. The control of these and other Strategic Tools would be best controlled by a arm dedicated to them.
> 
> Dave March
> Military Interests Games Society Hamilton, ON
> 
> _Become the Middle and possibly High Guard... USAF refused to give up the ground support mission even though it was clear they didn't want it and didn't want to do it. The miserable performance in close support is one reason USMC gets to keep its own air force. Marine Air works well with the ground forces. USAF hates the mission._


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## Kirkhill

Just take a look at the Iran programme for a credible use of the USAF as a strategic force. Especially with the PGM standoff capability and the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses as well.  

In the G&M article Pike declares that the USAF isn't likely to be able to eliminate all the targets and that in another 10 years the Iranians will be right back where they are today.  I reckon that a "whackamole" sortie once every decade or so would be just about affordable enough to be able to repeat as necessary.  Long enough for the mullah's to eventually get the message.

The USAF as a Strategic Air Armada would seem to be appropriate.  The only problem that I see with that is that doesn't appear to work very well for the fighter community.  Much of the work would be done by Bomb Trucks, and not all of them need to be stealthy once the Air Defences are suppressed.  The B1s and the B52s are still getting a workout.


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## Colin Parkinson

I suspect by the next decade even the USAF will have a hard time getting most of their B-52's into the air, talk about getting good bang for the buck out of those airframes.


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## a_majoor

Not to mention the "Talon" jet trainer.


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## rampage800

Admittingly I haven't taken the time to read this entire thread but I'm not so sure we need a new a/c, Hornets just need a new pod ie. what we were in the process of getting, the SNIPER pod I believe.
Our pilots are still CAS capable but their hands are a little tied trying to look through that piece of junk called the NIGHTHAWK, been told its like looking at the target area through a straw.
My 2 cents


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## spitty

Ok... I'm sure this is not something the CF would buy. I'm simply curious.

The requirements listed in this thread included something "low and slow", dirt strip friendly, etc, not to mention dirt cheap, easy to mass produce and hopefully useful for something else, like crop dusting, highway patrol, and other assorted low altitude duties. It's cheaper per unit to build a few thousand of them. More fun for the rest of us too, since most of us will never get anywhere near the gazillion dollar kit currently in fashion. A reasonable target price would be $150,000 with no armour or weapons.

The best configuration for cheap, low, slow, and fantastically durable is a bi-plane. Something about 25 ft long, with a wing area of ~300ft2 designed for use under 5,000ft. With no armour and the "experimental" engines I've been looking at the weight is ~1000lbs, with an ideal weight of ~2,500lbs and max 3,500 - 4,000lbs to keep the wing loading reasonable and the handling easy. Light weight also keeps it street legal -- it won't damage roads or sink too far in mud. Plus with the wings detached you could tow it home with a Honda. Keeping the height and disassembled width under 9ft means you could fit a pair in a C130. 

Best to use a fixed undercarriage for durability on rough strips. Wing loading less than 15 lbs per ft2. Modern steel frame with fabric covered wings and fuselage. Probably kevlar, something that resists tearing but allows larger small arms fire to pass right through.

I have seen such things fly. You could blow 3ft holes in the wings and it would stay up. They glide so well that engine failure is rarely fatal (it is legal to install uncertified engines in these), and they are so stable a 12 year old can fly one. Speed range is 50 - 175 knots. With 1,000lbs of armour it could carry a single 30mm ADEN Mk5 with 200 rounds or 3 250lb bombs, but not much more. Like I said, it all comes down to weight.

I don't know how much spotting gear / FLIR weighs. I should go look that up.


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## Kilroy

COBRA-6 said:
			
		

> I think gunships/ armed reconnaissance helicopters would be of greater utility than fixed wing... that being said I would love to see some A10s with a maple leaf on them...



Now wouldn't that look sweet. Dang, anyone good with Photoshop?? I'd love to see what one WOULD look like.


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## geo

Spitty - not in my lane but, why don't you look at the specs for the A10.  It's a titanium bathtub with wings.

Else... look at the specs for the Cobra or Apache gunships for weight distribution.


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## a_majoor

Looking at the requirments to fly low and slow off minimal airfields and FARP's I think the aviation art reached its peak near the end of WWII. Fighters and fighter/bombers could operate in these conditions and carry useful loads of weapons (multiple HMG's in the case of US planes, 20mm cannons for most UK designs and even a PAK-75 in the case of one German ground attack plane. Bombs and rockets were also carried in useful amounts).

The prime disadvantage of WWII era aircraft was either a lack of power, or growing to immense size when engines of sufficient size were fitted (i.e. the P-38 Lightning and the P-47 Thunderbolt). Only the P-51 Mustang seems to have evaded this trap, and even then the A-51 dive bomber which originated the line was a real dog with its low powered Allison engine.

Now the design parameters reached the post WWII apogee with the Skyraider (AKA "SPAD"), but an even better way ahead was developed into prototype form: a turboprop engine was fitted to a P-51 airframe to create the Piper "Enforcer".  This combined the speed and manouevrability of the P-51 with roughly double the payload. Less successful was the "Skyshark", which was a turboprop rendition of the Skyraider. Other turboprop COIN aircraft which did make it into production include the PUCARA and OV-10 Bronco.

You see where this is going; if we are looking for just COIN or CAS, then a turboprop powered "bomb truck" is the way to go. Since I am thinking there are both a limited amount of resources (pilots, ground crews, training bases among other things) and lots of other things we need combat aircraft to do, then a small, multi-role fighter/bomber with most of these attributes will suit our needs. Something like the JAS-37 Gripon seems to be the modern iteration of the CF-5, although more capable. Really high end aircraft like the F-35 are too expensive and resource intensive for our needs.


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## TangoTwoBravo

Spitty,

How would your biplane fair against Dishkas (12.7mm) and RPGs, not to mention 7.62mm rounds from any number of weapons?  Low and slow is one set of requirements that have been offered here, but I don't know if they are the official ones.

What kind of speed and range would this have with a useful payload?  Have you factored in all the aiming bits to your unit cost?

Cheers


----------



## spitty

Hi Thucydides. That's precisely where I'm coming from. I found this thread through a blog called The Torch and immediately thought of a guy in Australia who bought the Supermarine name and started making modern (civilian) kits -- 80% and later 90% scale reproductions of the Spitfire with 6 cylinder Isuzu engines. This was a while ago, and I've been thinking about it on and off ever since.

Air superiority requires very new, sophisticated, and impossibly expensive machines that require extensive training to fly and large crews to maintain. We have a bomb truck / fighter in the CF18. I started thinking about the revival of old brands like the Spitfire (a phenomenon similar to the old mini-cooper / new mini-cooper cars) and possible uses for a light cheap ground attack plane that even Canada could field a few hundred of easily. Large numbers of cheap easy to fly planes would make the Air Force a lot more fun and allow larger numbers of reserve pilots to spend their weekends in the air. 

I started with the WWII aircraft like the Spitfire and P51. I am especially fond of the Spitfire, and chose spitty as a username because that is where I started. I gave up on that idea for a couple of reasons. The biggest was the wingspan and power needed to keep a heavy monoplane in the air at low speeds. Monoplanes like the Spitfire and P51 were designed as interceptors -- they were as fast as possible and notoriously short-legged. Their optimum speed and maneuverability were too fast and too high up.  The P51 was a good tank killer, but there getting in and out quickly was a good thing. We have newer better planes for that now. Monoplanes like the A10 need a proper airfield and freakin' huge wings. There is no way I can see that the slender wings of a Spitfire could be armoured to protect all the various gear inside them -- landing gear, guns, and sometimes extra fuel tanks. This problem is overcome in the A10 with a lot of power and weight and expense. The A10's cannon alone is heavier than an entire Spitfire with a 200lb pilot and full tanks of gas.

The bi-plane hasn't been used as a British military aircraft since the late 30s. Bi-planes were never designed as interceptors. In WWI they patrolled roads or would loiter over the trenches looking for targets of opportunity. They dropped 20-25lb frag grenades, strafed targets on the ground with Vickers .303 machine guns, and acted as spotters for artillery. The more I read up on them, the more I liked them. The design seemed much better suited for putting an infantryman on patrol 200 ft up with a heavy machine gun, some large frag granades, and maybe a single bomb, 30mm anti-tank cannon or anti-tank missile -- all for very low cost. I said earlier that these could make the Air Force more fun  -- I have to add that I don't see this as an Air Force role, not really. An infantry patrol's bullet magnet / spotter / machine gun 200-500 feet up is more what I had in mind. Something that can run on the same fuel as other vehicles, and which comes in at no more than 50% of the LAVIII's 10,000lb tow rating became design goals.  I live in a trailer ('68 Avion T-28) and for civilian purposes on good roads I would avoid pulling more than 75% of a vehicles' rated gross combined weight. Hence a maximum 5,000lbs or 50% of the LAVIII tow rating published on Wikipedia. I don't know if the LAV even has a hitch or not, but I wanted it to be a possibe to drag one home if necessary. A $250,000 price tag is another design goal. 

A biplane design adds about 20% lift and a lot more drag. I've looked at quite a few of the old ones. There may be some older guys around who trained on Tiger Moths. It and the Stearman were too small. Too little payload. There was a torpedo bomber called the Fairey Swordfish, which I thought was too big, but which was very versatile and popular. It's pilots called it the Stringbag (like the old mesh bags women used to shop with) because it took on so many roles. My favourite -- the Bristol Bulldog -- was discontinued because it could not keep up with the newer monoplane bombers it was supposed to be defending against. They saw no combat as British fighters, but were used by the Finns during the Winter War largely in a ground attack role. A biplane has optimal maneuverability at slow speeds and low altitudes and can take off from much shorter, rougher runways. These are barnstorming machines. A bi-plane needs less power (more fuel efficient at low speeds) and can be fitted out with one of the newer diesel / multi-fuel rotaries that are just coming onto the market, or failing that with a converted car or truck engine. The Renesis out of a Mazda RX8 would do in a pinch. The heavy steel framed Bulldog had 440hp, a lot less than the 1200hp Spitfire and a lot more than its lighter wooden frame antecedents. Today's engines get much more power per pound than they did in 1936. The original Bulldog has a maximum take-off weight of 3,400lbs and weighted 2,200lbs empty. With newer materials and engine technology I am hoping it might be possible to add armour and keep the 1,200lb payload.






An original Bristol Bulldog, 609 Squadron RAF​
An ADEN Mk5 with 150 rounds weighs 800lbs according to Wikipedia. An M18 minigun with a few thousand rounds would likely weight about the same. I did some quick googling for FLIR and I found several cheap mount-anywhere infra-red or night vision cameras which could be mounted along with a gun and hooked up to an LCD panel in the cockpit. Cheap, simple, and less than 5lbs. As I understand it the Army also has some sort of laser pointing device which is used to guide artillery or smart bombs over the radio. I don't know what it weighs but I expect it might fit. 

Flying one of these on a patrol down an Afghani highway would attract a lot of fire. It's going to be a bullet magnet. It is also slow and steady but maneuverable enough to shoot back at a single person on the ground with. The more I looked at it, the more I thought that a bi-plane could be made survivable at less cost and weight than a monoplane, and much much cheaper than a helicopter. The low speed and extra wing area mean that engine failure (or the prop shot off) is usually non-fatal. It glides well. Skipping the ejection seat in favour of automotive airbags is a possibility.

The most common threats (from my own limited reading) are small arms fire, RPG rounds, MANPADS, and anti-aircraft cannon like the ZSU.

The wings and most of the fuselage would contain nothing but air or styrofoam. Small arms or cannon fire would pass right through, leaving holes in the skin or even in one of the beams. A MANPAD missile or RPG would do far more damage. These are almost all explosive / fragmenting warheads, and these go fast enough to pass through the wing completely. Careful design of the interior structure should allow a couple of fair sized holes to be blown in the wings without it falling out of the sky. The fabric and other materials should resist tearing as much as possible. Careful location of the exhaust plume might mitigate the danger from some of the most common infra-red MANPADS. The Bulldog has most of the features from the last years of the biplane era: the top wing is much larger than the lower wing, and they are staggered slightly. The top wing does most of the lifting. The lower wings should be designed to take explosive hits without (much) damage to the top wing. 

The only part of a bi-plane that would need to be armoured is the roughly 3ft x 5ft engine / cockpit / fuel tank at the front of the plane. I'm not sure at this point how well armoured. If a 30mm cannon can cut through a tank's shell then I don't see a small biplane stopping one. Armour enough to deflect a fragmenting RPG or MANPAD missile and small arms fire might be possible at a reasonable weight. Stopping a 30mm anti-tank cannon or anti-tank RPG round would be harder if not impossible, but to be fatal these would have to hit the pilot or ignite the fuel. Extra plating at the floor and firewall combined with a V shaped bottom and rear might do it. As always, it is a trade off. 

Call me crazy, it looks to me like a very interesting engineering and design problem. I like those. The Bristol brand is now owned by BAe. Dunno if they would want toi build it or sell the name.


----------



## rampage800

Spitty

I'm not shooting down your ideas but theres a few more factors at play in CAS then just shooting up the bad guys. As was noted earlier what is this plane going to have for "play time" ?, how is it going to guide PGMs or drop JDAMs ? (that laser you talked about is an actual IR pointer not a LTD), what about pilot protection and survivability ? what about payload ? (your minigun will be good for about 2 passes before winchester), how are you going to hook a pod up to it to make it ROVER capable ?
Anyhow its a legit idea but I think were just trying to re-invent the wheel here, take the money invested in this, buy some new pods and were good.


----------



## spitty

rampage800 said:
			
		

> Spitty
> 
> I'm not shooting down your ideas but theres a few more factors at play in CAS then just shooting up the bad guys. As was noted earlier what is this plane going to have for "play time" ?, how is it going to guide PGMs or drop JDAMs ? (that laser you talked about is an actual IR pointer not a LTD), what about pilot protection and survivability ? what about payload ? (your minigun will be good for about 2 passes before winchester), how are you going to hook a pod up to it to make it ROVER capable ?
> Anyhow its a legit idea but I think were just trying to re-invent the wheel here, take the money invested in this, buy some new pods and were good.



Hi rampage,

Play time depends on the engine, weight and fuel capacity. The original 1927 Mark II model had a range of 275 miles, or ~3 hours of play time cruising at highway speeds (80-90MPH). ie not enough. It's hard to calculate play time in a new version without knowing some of the other details first. I know that endurance is a big concern. 

I have no idea how guidance systems work (as you can tell). Something this small can't carry JADAMs they are large & need to be dropped from higher altitudes if I'm not mistaken. That's what B52s are for. Thucydides started this thread talking about something small, light, and capable of operating without a proper airfield, even from a FOB, so that limits the options. A ROVER would be most excellent. When I looked up the cameras I wondered how hard it would be to feed the camera to a Panasonic Toughbook on the ground (I know, I know, it's civilian tech, but it's what I have access to). Biplanes were often used as spotters -- I tend to see that as the main role. Its ability to bounce rocks would likely be better than a UAV but still very limited for all that. Wiring up military grade spotting and targeting equipment is not something this civilian would have any clue how to do, and every airforce has their own gear -- they don't come from a factory with that stuff, do they? The approximate weight and bulk would determine if existing systems could be used. _x_ number of feet of usable space in the fuselage behind the armoured pilot & engine pods and a capacity for _y_ weight. I don't know about those things. Where OPSEC is a concern I'd rather not know.

My first question was about the thickness and weight per ft2 of a commonly used armour I saw mentioned elsewhere. I was told it's a secret. Such a craft would be a big bullet magnet, so pilot protection would be a paramount concern. If that won't work then it's time to drop the idea and move on to something else. 

Don't worry about shooting down ideas. Posting in this forum is the fastest way I can think of to determine if it's completely stupid or merely half-baked.


----------



## McG

What of something completely different?
http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2004/07/05/daily3.html


----------



## karl28

Here is my thought on a possible candidate for close air support .  I am most defiantly not an expert on the topic but if we are going for a older new version of an aircraft thinking than why not something that is already in service such as the hawk 

BAE Systems  CT-155  Hawk  (115)  –  NFTC  ‘Advanced’ Trainer
Crew: 2  Dimensions: Span  9.94m x  Length  12.43m x  Height  3.98m
Performance: max. speed  1000km/h, ceiling 1372m, range 2622km [4]
Weights: empty 4442 kg, gross 9100kg, MTOW 9100kg, land n/a kg 
Powerplant:  26.6  kN  Rolls-Royce Turbomeca  Adour  871  turbofan
[4] The CT-155 has seven hard points including wing pylons, two of latter being plumbed for twin external fuel tanks (590L capacity each

The way I would see it is the F-18 would be used as a pure air dominance fighter and the Hawk would handle all the CAS .


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Spitty,

Protecting a pilot in a slow bi-plane is going to be a problem.  From being involved in a couple of TUAV recoveries gone wrong I also would not bet on a soft crash-landing.

Some of the things you are describing can be seen to some extent in the various UAVs out there.  The Spitfire had her moment of glory.  

If CAS means that an expensive plane gets to me in five minutes no matter where I am and drops a JDAM from heights unseen then I'm cool with that.  If CAS means I have to wait for Snoopy's plane to arrive overhead and then get shot down I'd rather not have the help.  Adding a downed pilot rescue to the grouping and task matrix during the firefight is not helping.

Some of these low-tech planes would be very suitable for the airforce of a developing nation.


----------



## rampage800

Spitty

First of all I'm not sure of your background at all or anything but you do have a pretty good imagination and a better grasp on the working of the ROVER than you actually think you do,lol, it does indeed use the Toughbook, theres a little more to it than you describe but you're in the ballpark, I'm not sure whats on the Internet about it but I won't go any further.
WRT JDAMs your a bit off, there are smaller ones now, the GBU-39 SDB comes to mind, and they can be released from "lower" altitudes but once again I'm not sure how much of it is open source and I really don't feel like looking right now so I'll leave it at that too.
A plane though that is too small to carry much of a payload isn't going to be of much use to the SAC/JTAC on the ground and as T2B posted, a downed pilot only hampers the situation, a plane showing up with only guns, except in a X or E-CAS situation would probably just add to the confusion of deconflicting airspace.
I guess one other thing that hasn't been mentioned is the ability of this supposed a/c to be night capable...........a CAS platform that only flies daylight is...well......shortsighted.
My 2 cents.


----------



## Matt_Fisher

MCG said:
			
		

> What of something completely different?
> http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2004/07/05/daily3.html



The concept of a tilt-rotor replacement for both the AH-1 and AV-8 in Marine Corps service has been tossed around for sometime, so that they're actually going to be spending some money on development doesn't surpise me at all.  It could turn out to be a very interesting concept; Range and speed of a conventional fixed wing aircraft, with the ability to hover like a helicopter, combined with the armaments and targeting systems of an attack helicopter.


----------



## spitty

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Spitty,
> 
> How would your biplane fair against Dishkas (12.7mm) and RPGs, not to mention 7.62mm rounds from any number of weapons?  Low and slow is one set of requirements that have been offered here, but I don't know if they are the official ones.
> 
> What kind of speed and range would this have with a useful payload?  Have you factored in all the aiming bits to your unit cost?
> 
> Cheers



I don't know if they are accurate or not, but the specs I found for the A10 "bathtub" is 1/2" - 1 1/2" titanium with a kevlar spall shield. It is said to be capable of taking multiple hits from a 23mm (is that the ZSU?) and weighs 900lbs. The weight is doable. I found a supplier in Germany selling .5 to 45mm sheets and plates. 1 1/2" is 38mm. If it doesn't have to be some secret alloy it might do. The weights are similar.

Tango: The idea is to have a Snoopy to take with, not wait for. And to patrol those carefree highways. The original could do 175MPH, that's not much slower than the A10. You're right about the poor countries. I figured something like this could be left behind for the ANA. Might be useful for highway and border patrol (if the range is good enough). 

rampage: I've been trying to figure out what kind of armour is needed or possible. No point worrying about electronics if the thing won't fly or stay up under fire. If it can't handle getting shot at at least as well as an A10 then there's no point, is there?

Who am I? Why am I here? I'm new and I never did introduce myself. 

I'm a Currie. No relation to Aurthur, but our families come from the same county in N. Ireland and both run long on schoolteachers writers and science geeks. 

I started out in the computer industry as a laptop repair guy at OTA (College & Bathurst, Toronto) in 1994. Before that I was a hobbyist. Entirely self-taught. The guy who hired me became a good friend and mentor. He now works for the DND but we are no longer on speaking terms. Long story short: he thinks I did his wife. Back then the coolest toy ever was the GRiD, a laptop developed for the first gulf war. I loved that thing. The first Toughbook came out a year or so later. I'm more of a software guy now, into wireless (cellular mostly) networking, XML, WCAG. I was an IBM guy for years, mostly OS/2 and later Lotus Domino. I'm a perennial hobbyist.  I'm the kind of guy who will spend two weeks figuring out how to use a well directed Hunt's Spaghetti Sauce can to extend free 802.11b wireless internet to a cute blonde's house two miles down the road. Yep. Inventive *and* stupid. I want to build one of those Spitfires for myself. I'm running OpenBSD on a 12" iBook G3 right now (that's my laptop). Couldn't afford the Toughbook, so I got four dead iBooks off eBay and built two that work. The blonde has three kids and they are expensive. I read the family law act when I was a kid, and decided never to marry until it was repealed. No kids. Only mistresses and none of them marriageable. I've been wanting to start playing with radar for years now but it's highly illegal for a civilian. I'd be better off growing weed in the front yard.

I like toys. I heard you guys needed stuff, like a CAS aircraft. Right now I'm into restoring an old Avion all-aluminum travel trailer (and hopefully soon a truck camper). It's a silver twinkie, sort of like an Airstream only better built. So far it's good to -15C. Water pipes and the water heater are the weak spots temperature wise. When I'm done I'm going to tow it to Tuktuyuktuk in February and camp out for a few days. And not freeze to death. The Dempster is my favourite highway. A childhood friend designed this year-round trailer recently. It's awesome. Since I started following news from Afghanistan I've had recurring dreams about building an armoured trailer similar in size to an Airstream Bambi. Fridge, stove, real dishes and a potty. Roof-top solar & satellite internet, large batteries, 25 gallons of water and a hot shower. Four bunks for hauling journalists/wounded as necessary. I'd call it the "Crusty" after a certain columnist. I'm starting a 7 month RV Technician course in September, if they let me in. My marks are terrible. I'm not fond of Marxists, and I like to argue. Not a good combination in a state-run university. My GPA at King's College / Dalhousie is 2.0. I dropped out (Classics / Economics) in '94 1/2 credit short of a BA. Not my finest moment. I do better when I read up and teach myself, and I don't feel so bad about it any more. When some asshat tries to put a Marxist/lefty spin on _The Pelopennesian War_ and ignore everything else we know of Hellenic culture it's not a bad thing to call him on it. Is it? Thucydides? With hindsight I feel kind of bad for my profs. They always seemed surprised when a student actually read and remembered the assigned books. 

I live on Vancouver Island. Lots of older guys here. My neighbour drove a Cromwell tank, my other neighbour flew a variety of bombers. The Legion is lively. In my spare time I drive a 1990 Nissan taxi -- the only one in this small town. The other day I drove an old guy in a wheelchair around.  His name is Arty. He's been in that chair since the Korean War and at the end of the ride he wants to give *me* a tip. Chokes me up sometimes if I think about it. We have the same argument every time I drive him home from the Legion.

My Dad served on the Lanark. My step-dad flew Banshees off the Bonaventure. He tells great stories. Nobody knows what my Grandfather did, he was always off on "training missions" and when the war ended he joined the Toronto Argonauts. He died young. I never heard his stories. I have his medals and a few pictures. His father was an officer with the Lieutenant Governor's Horse Guards in Toronto. I have his sabre and a few pictures. There is an officer's training college sitting where his house and the stables used to be. I went to elementary school a few blocks away, at Armour Heights. His father died in WWI. Beyond that I won't say. It would take too much time. My mom's side is French. Been here since 1615.

My kid brother wants to be a combat engineer. He's 20, almost 300lbs and is having trouble passing the physical. He played center in high school football, refused scholarships to McGilll and Queens. He has been bulking up since he was 14. He can lift anything but can't run far enough fast enough. I think he'll get in if he keeps up with the endurance training. Me.... I'm too old now (almost 40) and they weren't hiring in the early 90s, not with my low marks and poor eyesight. I'm more of a mad hillbilly inventor than a soldier in any case. I am an associate member of the Legion (in Wilberforce, Ontario). Every man I looked up to and emulated as a kid was at one time a member of the Canadian Forces. If there is now some need then I will do whatever is in my limited power to fill it.

If there is equipment needed I don't expect the CF will be very quick to build it or buy it. I've seen "government" computer systems. They suck and cost double what everyone else would pay. I can find people who can design and build damned near anything. Dad's old company had some pretty good engineers and my step dad worked at Indal after the Bonny was paid off. I'd donate stuff to the CF, if it's needed badly enough. 

Come to think of it... how much does an A10 cost? If private citizens came up with the dough would it be possible to buy one and donate it? Could you keep one flying? 

Bah. This is waaaay off topic. I've had too much whisky just sitting here typing. I'm drunk and it's time to turn in.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Spitty,

Open source Specs are admittedly dodgy, but the A-10 is given a cruise speed roughly twice your plane's speed.  If you wanted one of these over every platoon or convoy's head you would a large number of airframes and aircrew.  Again, some of things you are talking about are good for a UAV and that is an area in which I believe there is much promise.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> If CAS means I have to wait for Snoopy's plane to arrive overhead and then get shot down I'd rather not have the help.



OK now that was f'n funny.


----------



## spitty

Jimmy4Now said:
			
		

> OK now that was f'n funny.



It was.




A six foot long RC would be a cool toy, but hard to fit in a backpack. There's a guy in Vancouver hawking a new engine design. His prototype is 40lbs, 6"x6"x6", runs on diesel, and produces 42hp.

The slowest an A10 can go is 200MPH (published specs). A 1927 bulldog with a contemporary 14 cylinder rotary and fixed pitch wood prop did max 175MPH. I don't know how fast you could make a new one go, but you're right. I had the A10's minimum speed in my head. Newer biplanes are much more aerodynamic (lower drag) have better props, better engines, and better (computer designed) wings. They are likely much faster. A modern design would use a pair of engines with counter-rotating composite props. 

Now.....

The requirements I have gleaned from this thread are:


Rough or no airstrip required
which implies:
low weight
sturdy wide stance landing gear


Same fuel as LAV / Leopard etc (high compression diesel, kerosene etc)
Can be towed / dragged by existing vehicles (< 5,000lbs)
Fits in a C130
STOL
Low stall speed
Good low speed maneuverability
Optimum performance @ < 5,000ft 
pilot protection (armour) equivalent to an A10 (multiple hits with a 23mm)
High survivability
which implies
shred resistant skin
mulitple control surfaces
can lose ~33% of wing area and stay up
lower wings/fuselage/(cage?) pre-detonates contact fuse warheads
small IR signature


crash protection -- any ideas? Will a 'chute be useful at 200ft up?
6-8 hour play time
good speed to target (is ~300MPH cruise / ~350MPH max a useful speed?)
useful munitions / electronics payload (will 1,200lbs do?)
Cheap cheap cheap - (new design with as many off the shelf parts as possible)

I'm not adding any electronics requirements here except as part of the payload.

To keep costs down a base model should

have civilian uses (highway patrol, agriculture)
be useful enough to mass produce
not include technology which cannot be exported

Is there anything else to add to this list?


----------



## observor 69

How about some of these?  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embraer_EMB_314_Super_Tucano

The Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano, also named ALX or A-29 is a turboprop aircraft designed for light attack, counter insurgency (COIN) and pilot training missions, incorporating modern avionics and weapons systems. It is currently in use by the air forces of Brazil, Colombia, and Dominican Republic. Embraer has plans to sell it to other countries in Asia and the Middle East. Besides pilot training, it is heavily employed in monitoring operations in the Amazon region.

Edited:

And another link http://www.embraer.com.br/english/content/aeronaves/super_tucano.asp


----------



## Edward Campbell

I asked that same question, Baden Guy, a few months ago. I think the consensus was: No, too little weapons load and not enough range/loiter time.


----------



## Kilroy

Aw heck, let's just get Steve Branson to drop a few bombs out of his balloon on one of his record breaking attempts!! :rofl:


----------



## TCBF

Buy surplus USAF A-10s.


----------



## aesop081

TCBF said:
			
		

> Buy surplus USAF A-10s.



good luck finding any


----------



## TCBF

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> good luck finding any



Yup. They want to keep them in service to 2028, so we may have to wait a bit.


 ;D


----------



## a_majoor

I guess the problem isn't the idea that a light CAS airplane that could operate from unimproved airstrips, FARPs and so on is outlandish, rather there needs to be a much tighter definition of what is wanted/needed. 

The thread has revealed a shopping list that would fill a Jane's handbook. Small jets, big jets, turboprops, tiltrotors, AC-130's and now biplanes (not actually a totally outrageous idea, some stunt pilots have installed turboprop engines in high performance biplanes, which should have the same relation to the base aircraft as a Piper Enforcer to a P-51D Mustang).

Looking at the picture from the widest possible angle, I am in favor of a small jet, with the SAAB JAS-37 Gripon as the "here and now" example (with maybe the F-16 XL prototype or the IAI LAVI as "might have beens"). As medium to high performance aircraft, they have the ability to operate as fighters and interceptors (since some enemies do have air forces of their own, and UAV technology will eventually filter down, Hezbollah has deployed a few from Lebanon into Israel). If they can carry a useful weight of bombs and rockets, they can also carry more specialized items, such as anti-ship missiles, since you do need to be flexible. They can defend themselves if they get "bounced" on the way in, and they have the speed and range to respond quickly over an AOR. The other advantage is they can or at least should be logistically compatible with their "big brothers" like the CF-18. While parts might not be interchangeable (although some of the electronic modules and pods would be), training and maintainence would be similar enough to allow us to have two fleets with a fair degree of overlap. Some possible choices like the Hawk actually are trainers, so we can kill another bird with that stone.


----------



## Kilroy

While a biplane does seem to have a few advantages "Hey, I watched Iron Eagle too!!   ;D  )  How effective would they be at avoiding missiles like a sidewinder or such? Would the missiles even be able to lock on, or would the biplane even have a chance to avoid them??


----------



## aesop081

Kilroy said:
			
		

> Would the missiles even be able to lock on,



Yes




> or would the biplane even have a chance to avoid them??



No


----------



## Kilroy

Thanks for the reply. Wasn't sure if a missile could lock onto a small plane with very little metal in it (compared to a modern jet. Also, I thought the manouverability of such a small plane could avoid a missile. Learned a new thing today, thanks.


----------



## spitty

Gotta say I've also been confused by the grab bag of requirements.

The A10 is a beautiful plane but there is no way you could land one in a Manitoba hayfield and not be up to the hardpoints in muck. No way to throw on skis or pontoons. I'm seeing two completely different aircraft here.

The big one should do what an A10 does. When reading the specs for the A10 again last night I got a better idea of how they are used. 3 is the magic number: fly 300 miles (in less than an hour) and hang around low speed low altitude for three hours before heading home. To be useful for three hours the 16,000lb load and incredible variety of weapons supported by the A10 are a must. It might work as a bi-plane but 350MPH is pushing the speed with that much drag. An A10 with two wings would have a shorter wingspan and more lift, slowing down top speed but also reducing minimum speed and extending loiter time. The 1927 Bulldog had 310ft2 of wing to the A10's 200ft2. No way you could run it on diesel though. Three Pratt & Whitneys minimum, if not the same pair of turbofans. A big sucker like that could also be used in an armoured transport / gunship role.

A little one.... I'm still thinking more bomb tractor than bomb truck. The Tuscano is nice. It would be nicer with elliptical wings and a Supermarine brand name.  A Spitfire hit 690MPH (Mach 0.94) in a dive from 50,000ft and retained control. Very stable and sweet to fly. If Wikipedia is right that's still a  prop driven speed record. A bi-plane is too slow. Most of my ideas are wrapped around a 1200hp single engine. With a small payload it would be better to have something fast that can get back to FOB and refuel / rearm in very short order. No minimum speed requirement could bump the top speed payload and weight up. A turboprop with available pontoons, skis, and foot-wide mudders would be go anywhere and could carry a WWII type load - 2 bombs, 2 30mm cannon and 4 7.62mm guns with enough ammo for (realistically) a single engagement. Harder to make a flying tank out of one though. 

Sidewinders.... if the enemy jets and radar stations are still working, then either of these planes would be suicide.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

I'm not sure if we gain anything by aquiring a "cheap" manned aircraft to drop bombs instead of or augmenting the CF-18.  We have the CF-18.  I doubt very much that a plane will remain cheap once it is upgraded to employ the kinds of weapons we need with the required precision in both day and night.  That "cheap" airplane is still going to require support personnel.  It is not going to be cheap for very long.

If we insist on slow speeds then I'd much rather have AH-64s than some aircraft that belong at a historical airshow.  While the costs may or may by different, we will be still be putting pilots into them.  I don't think that we are going to risk pilots in that fashion when we don't have to.

Now, a UAV that can take off and land from a short rough strip and could carry a night optics package and a PGM or two would be great.  If the view from the optics package could be fed real-time to ground troops with ease then that is even better.


----------



## Old Sweat

Tango2Bravo beat me to the response. What do we want from close air support? It seems to this old gunner that we want accurate fire of the right type on the target as soon as possible. To my little military mind, that is not possible with centrally controlled high performance aircraft or even a specialized COIN platform. That leaves UAVs and armed helicopters as well as A10 type aircraft. 

We have already determined surplus A10s are not available, so our choices are reduced to two. Both have a place and I suggest we are more likely in the short-medium range to see UAVs, although I would like to see both. If I had my druthers I guess I would opt for the armed helicopter. However the controlling factor is the budget. As the Chief of the General Staff of the Canadian army said in response to an 1927 suggestion to replace horses with mechanical transport in 1927, "We are long on sympathy, but short on cash."

One last thought, the CF5 was not an ideal CAS platform. It was short-ranged and very restricted in the weight of fire it could deliver. This should not be a surprise because the aircraft was designed for a different purpose as were the Western Allies' air support aircraft of the Second World War.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Kilroy said:
			
		

> Thanks for the reply. Wasn't sure if a missile could lock onto a small plane with very little metal in it (compared to a modern jet. Also, I thought the manouverability of such a small plane could avoid a missile. Learned a new thing today, thanks.



Size does not have anything to do with RCS (Radar Cross Section) of an object, which is not the same as its OCS (Optical Cross Section) where size is directly related.  Its all about angles.  A good example of OCS vice RCS is the decoy that was once used on the B-52, the "Quail".  The RCS of the Quail was larger than that of the B-52.  (All of this can be found using Google, I checked for open-source info before posting.)

Bearing in mind OPSEC, the rest of the equation is not something likely to be discussed here.


----------



## aesop081

Jimmy4Now said:
			
		

> Size does not have anything to do with RCS (Radar Cross Section) of an object, which is not the same as its OCS (Optical Cross Section) where size is directly related.  Its all about angles.  A good example of OCS vice RCS is the decoy that was once used on the B-52, the "Quail".  The RCS of the Quail was larger than that of the B-52.  (All of this can be found using Google, I checked for open-source info before posting.)
> 
> Bearing in mind OPSEC, the rest of the equation is not something likely to be discussed here.




Keep in mind that RCS has jacks**t to do with an IR missile like the AIM-9 that Kilroy asked about.



			
				Kilroy said:
			
		

> While a biplane does seem to have a few advantages "Hey, I watched Iron Eagle too!!   ;D  )  How effective would they be at avoiding missiles like a sidewinder or such? Would the missiles even be able to lock on, or would the biplane even have a chance to avoid them??


----------



## Eye In The Sky

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Keep in mind that RCS has jacks**t to do with an IR missile like the AIM-9 that Kilroy asked about.



Roger that.  I was trying to expand on the 'small plane with little metal on it' idea.  (I wasn't going to dive into EO or homing/guidance topics  :-X)


----------



## spitty

I've tried feeding video over wireless. With civilian radio restrictions (low power and open unlicensed frequencies) the range and bandwidth are very limited. Illegally boosting the power would...er... open every garage door, change every TV channel and ring every wireless doorbell in town. Nothing like getting the video from your RC plane with audio from someone's baby monitor mixed in. A buddy tried it with a car once. The range was 350ft, if line of sight. 

Real time video is very bandwidth intensive. Securing a wireless link incurs a huge performance penalty. The guys at slashdot.org had a field day during the war in Yugoslavia when someone figured out that anyone with a TV satellite dish and the knowhow to point it and change the channel could watch real-time feeds from various predator drones at home on their TV sets. The guy who discovered this spent two months trying to find someone stateside who would fix it before he went public. (same protocol most geeks follow with new Windows vulnerabilities). An encrypted low bandwidth fault-tolerant control signal that could carry basic data like position, altitude, attitude etc and send basic commands coupled with a decent autopilot -- a radio system entirely separate from sensor feeds -- would be a good start. A lot of progress has been made with vehicles that can navigate themselves, and sending GPS coordinates takes a lot less bandwidth than keeping a realtime link to your remote Logitech joystick. With enough storage space a drone could keep all data and images it collects on its own hard drive. With enough CPU it could cherry pick images based on known signatures -- human, vehicle, etc -- and send those with co-ordinates as fast as possible to the remote controller. I could maybe do this with an Xbox mainboard. Depends on the internal bandwidth and power needed. Sending 800x600 JPEG images uses a lot less bandwidth and requires a less steady radio link, which would increase the range. Sending real-time video through a satellite (as the Predator does) is unbelievably f'n expensive, and I don't like relying on satellites. Not since the Red Army very publicly tested a satellite killer on one of their own last year. Getting position without GPS needs multiple radio signals from the ground to triangulate from, which may not be easy in the field. 

On a side note, the F-22 apparently uses its own juiced up version of Firewire (IEE1394) to transmit data to and from its various peripherals. Nice. USB is too slow. Whatever they have running it would look fantastic on my desktop. CS3 and FSX like I've never seen them. Wow. One way to get around the bandwidth limitation is to send vector data instead of the pixel data used in video and still images. Same protocols the computer game industry uses. A highly compressed data stream from a ground mapping system combined with good topographical mapping software on the receiver could allow a UAV to be flown much like a commercial flight sim game, including stuff on the ground with a known signature. Telling the receiving computer to draw a LAVII or prone human at x,y,z co-ordinates takes much less bandwidth than sending a picture of one. Thanks to the game industry there are existing 3D models available for most of the world's current military hardware. It might cause problems with staff though. People would spend too much time ... er... "training". EA Games is based in Vancouver. Hire a couple of those guys and your Toughbook would never be the same.

Different wing shapes are good for different things. It has nothing to do with history or sentimentality. For subsonic flight a bi-plane configuration provides the best lift with the least power but has high drag. The resistance of the air would rip them right off at high speed. An A10 biplane would be slower but have longer loiter time, as it would take less fuel / power to keep it in the air. It's a trade off. Faster planes have swept wings, very fast planes have small delta wings, but these don't have the same lift and aren't as good under 500-600MPH. The elliptical wing shape used on the Spitfire is as good as it gets for subsonic flight. They have the best balance of lift, maneuverability, and control at both low (near stall) speeds and high (mach 0.8) speeds. Those elliptical wings took three times as long to build as the simple square wings of the Me109 but they were worth it.  The square wing can stall suddenly in a tight turn. The elliptical stalls partially (no lift at the root near the fuselage) but not at the wingtips, which causes the wings to vibrate but still retain control. They were much safer to fly when pushing them right to the stall point in a tight turn. Put a 1600hp turboprop on those wings and you'd have the best subsonic fighter ever built. The fuselage could be a brick outhouse it wouldn't matter.

You're right about the cost. The airframe and engine seem to be about 1/10 the cost of an airplane. Most of the cost seems to be software, radio / wireless gear and sensors.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

spitty said:
			
		

> Sending real-time video through a satellite (as the Predator does) is unbelievably f'n expensive, and I don't like relying on satellites.



We do rely on satellites for a whole range of things, and things are expensive.  If the Russians knock out all the satellites then perhaps B.A. Barracus and Face can make us a new plane from the scrapyard using old-school technology during the _montage_.  Of course, if we are fighting Russians then I guess we are also fighting against fast jets and modern air defence so they had better cook up an F-35 or something like that.   

In the meantime I'll take my Preds, A-10s, B1s, Harriers and whatever else is effectively bringing hate to the enemy.


----------



## aesop081

spitty said:
			
		

> Sending real-time video through a satellite (as the Predator does) is unbelievably f'n expensive, and I don't like relying on satellites.



Thats why the rest of us are using (or soon will be) TCDL to send real-time video.


----------



## rampage800

Hey

I'm going to weigh in here real quick, I think that maybe theres a misconception that the feeds from the pod go to a satellite and then down to the Receiver............not true.........works off of sometimes a pre-set freq or in a lot of the a/c the pilot can "switch" freqs as well as go Analog or Digital...............Maybe I'm just reading the posts wrong and if I am then kindly disregard.
I believe some of the other stuff you may be talking is Link 16 and SADL

T2B, don't forget about the newest kid on the block bringing it, Mr. Reaper (MQ-9)

Have a great day.


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

All sorts of frames out there doing the business.  

Spitty,

I am not a tech guy, but rather a guy who has relied on some of these things on the ground or as a planner.  _How_ your feed works is not a big deal to me, although I imagine that it is a big deal to those who design things.  As long as a platoon commander in his LAV or on foot could see what the aircraft is seeing real-time (to include positional data etc) then I will leave the details of how up to you.   ;D  I have worked with one system regarding live feed and they were a bit clunky in the field.   For the feed from plane to ground I doubt that you would use satelitte due to the niche that this AC would fill.  

A TUAV that could take off from a rough strip, carry a couple of Hellfire and perhaps a cannon to go with a current generation FLIR combined with real-time video feed to tactical ground commanders would be a neat thing.  I doubt, however, that it would end up being cheap although it might fall into a good price range based on capabilities.  Nothing is cheap except my opinion!


----------



## Good2Golf

Expectations that UAVs are cheaper than manned platforms are about as realistic as thinking that computers have saved us from excessive paperwork.  ;D


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Turns out they don't even get rid of pilots either.   

To be fair, it is me that is trying to turn Spitty towards a UAV for his idea.  I am not doing that on a money basis, but rather on _risk_.


----------



## Kilroy

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Expectations that UAVs are cheaper than manned platforms are about as realistic as thinking that computers have saved us from excessive paperwork.  ;D




Uh yes, the promise of the paperless office. I laugh at that idea on a regular basis.  ;D


----------



## Kilroy

Jimmy4Now said:
			
		

> Size does not have anything to do with RCS (Radar Cross Section) of an object, which is not the same as its OCS (Optical Cross Section) where size is directly related.  Its all about angles.  A good example of OCS vice RCS is the decoy that was once used on the B-52, the "Quail".  The RCS of the Quail was larger than that of the B-52.  (All of this can be found using Google, I checked for open-source info before posting.)
> 
> Bearing in mind OPSEC, the rest of the equation is not something likely to be discussed here.



Never thought of ideas like that. Good point though, cause that's like the whole idea behind "stealth" aircraft, is trying to reduce the RCS. Now, as was mentioned in another post, how would the HEAT signature of a biplane compare to a more modern jet? I know some jets have specific designs to reduce heat signatures, but maybe somethng like an A10 or an Apache, I would think they would have very large heat signatures compared to a biplane. Those turbines do after all put out alot of heat.

Thanks for the info people, keep it coming. Learning alot!!


----------



## Good2Golf

Piston power would have significantly lower thermal signatures than turbines.  An IR-guided missile would have a much harder time tracking the biplane.  More advanced imaging IR missiles would have a higher probability of success, but still, they're made for taking jet-powered aircraft out.

G2G.


----------



## spitty

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> Turns out they don't even get rid of pilots either.
> 
> To be fair, it is me that is trying to turn Spitty towards a UAV for his idea.  I am not doing that on a money basis, but rather on _risk_.



Yeah. That and the possibility that I might run down to Radio Shack and start building one (and have some clue what I'm doing -- I don't fly). I think the guy who runs this trailer park might be a tad upset if I start welding together a 25' airframe with 33' wings. 

Decent cameras might be hard to get. The civilian GIS market might have some useful gear though, and prices are coming down quite a bit.


----------



## a_majoor

Tango2Bravo said:
			
		

> I'm not sure if we gain anything by aquiring a "cheap" manned aircraft to drop bombs instead of or augmenting the CF-18.  We have the CF-18.  I doubt very much that a plane will remain cheap once it is upgraded to employ the kinds of weapons we need with the required precision in both day and night.  That "cheap" airplane is still going to require support personnel.  It is not going to be cheap for very long.



To me the key capability is operating from unimproved airfields, FARPs and sections of road. To physically do this requires a smaller and lighter aircraft than a CF-18 or F-35. This does not imply "cheap", although such aircraft are usually less expensive than the large front line fighters.

Jet trainers like the BAE Hawk, lightweight fighters like the Gripon, Scaled Composite ARES, the Harrier "Jump Jet" or the MiG 29 have most of the attributes that I would consider important for this class of aircraft. 

WRT the historical ground attack aircraft, airplanes like the Skyraider were far better for dedicated CAS than jet aircraft like the F-100 or F-105, and one possible role for a turboprop ground attack aircraft would be to escort helicopters and V-22 tilt rotor transports (the Douglas Sky Shark was designed to do 500 mph with a very impressive weapons load). Large UAV's can also take this role, although there are still issues of latency and situational awareness compared to a manned aircraft.


----------



## aesop081

Thucydides said:
			
		

> To me the key capability is operating from unimproved airfields, FARPs and sections of road. To physically do this requires a smaller and lighter aircraft than a CF-18 or F-35. This does not imply "cheap", although such aircraft are usually less expensive than the large front line fighters.



Although larger than the Harrier, the STOVL version of the F-35 has the capability to fill these requirements.



> Jet trainers like the BAE Hawk, lightweight fighters like the* Gripon*, Scaled Composite ARES, the Harrier "Jump Jet" or the MiG 29 have most of the attributes that I would consider important for this class of aircraft.



Just as a point of note, its "Gripen"



> WRT the historical ground attack aircraft, airplanes like the Skyraider were far better for dedicated CAS than jet aircraft like the F-100 or F-105,



They are well suited until they are faced with a decent AD system.


----------



## a_majoor

Spitty, this one's for you  ;D


----------



## McG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> To me the key capability is operating from unimproved airfields, FARPs and sections of road.


but, is this really the key capability?  If one concludes that the average company FOB requires built-in CAS, then maybe.  However, I think the real desire to to see CAS which is faster to respond (arrive) when the fight starts.  There seems to be a lot of support for the idea that the aircraft should be able to fly very slow (or even hover) for engaging the enemy (including gun runs).

The A-10 seems to be the referenced paragon for this capability.  So it seems we want something that provides the firepower & survivability of the A-10.  However, we want a faster top speed so that it gets to the fight quicker.  We also want a slower minimum speed so there is more time to do damage before the target is overflown.  We probably want a longer loiter time so that more are available in the sky when we need them.  The wings of this aircraft will have to provide significantly more lift than those of the A-10 in order to allow the same capability to fly at slower speeds while including the additional weight of more powerful engines and additional fuel.  Oh, yeah ... we want this to hover too, right?


----------



## TangoTwoBravo

Thucydides said:
			
		

> To me the key capability is operating from unimproved airfields, FARPs and sections of road.



I would argue that the key capabilities are:

    1.  speed of response (timlieness)

    2.  ability to deliver effects despite enemy, weather and time of day

    3.  those effects must be devastating to the enemy

    4.  those effects must be precise

Flying from a rough strip might achieve those things, but it might not.  As a ground guy I care about the effect on the ground.  The effect could come from North Bay for all I care, as long as it arrives where I want it within about 15 minutes of asking.   ;D


----------



## spitty

Quick question: Didn't the CF already order UAVs? When are they coming?

Do we need a new topic for this?

I've done some homework on the video and found a number of camera options, including a dual-head camera which auto-mixes an IR (sees at night, through dust, smoke, fog etc) and CCD (good to 0.1 lux, sees b&w in moonlight, colour in daylight) based on lighting conditions. It has a head that swivels up and down 80 degrees. Dunno how hard that would be to hook up to the remote controller for looking down or ahead as needed. The camera alone is $10,000. Don't f'n lose it.  So far this is my favourite option.

CCD only cameras are much cheaper and some are lighter.

These are not wireless network (802.11) based but rather based on existing wireless CCTV security systems. There are battery powered wireless hand-held receivers available. Standard TV resolution, no video recorder. I don't know if you would have the ability to receive and record video in a vehicle on a bigger screen.

The wireless video range is 100 yards or so, but the controller is good for up to a mile. I don't think an airplane is suitable, so I've been looking for remote controlled helicopters capable of lifting 20lbs. Ones with two contra-rotating main rotors instead of a tail rotor look like they would be easier to fly but would need more custom work. Apparently a regular model with a tail rotor has a steeper learning curve.

The engine options are electric or gas powered. I am tending towards the electric because it is very quiet. You get more power and in-the-air time with gas but it's as stealthy as your average lawn mower.  The downside of electric is short flight time (15 minutes or so, just long enough to pop it up and look around from 100 yards up) and the need to keep spare batteries and the ability to charge them. This would require (at least) access to a 12v cigarette lighter in a running vehicle. A gas engine would still need a battery for the camera.

I've also looked at a couple of different controllers. I don't know much about hiding or masking radio signals, but it seems to me that you don't want the guy holding the controller to be broadcasting his exact location to anyone with the gear to pick it up. Some of these controllers and wireless video transmitters use spread spectrum in the 2.4Ghz range. I'd like to hear from someone more knowledgeable that a) this would not make the operator an easy target or b) you guys have your own transmitters /  receivers / wireless controllers which do not suffer the short distance / lit-up-like-a-radio-christmas-tree limitations that off-the-shelf civilian components do.

I haven't done any research on weapons yet. You guys don't want my bi-plane, but someone asked for a cannon. Would a 9-pounder do? Brass or iron? You'd have to provide powder and shot yourselves it's too hard to obtain by mail-order.

The better controllers have as many as six buttons / channels that can be made to do different things. The easiest option might be to set up unattached 12-volt red and black wires so they become live when you push a button. Should work with the explosives and detonator of your choice to create a flying bomb. Pull the camera and you can put 5lbs of whatever you like in it.

I'd make this all as small and stowable as possible but it would be clunky, and include more parts than I would like -- controller, video receiver, helicopter, plus batteries and chargers for all three.

Clunky means difficult to smuggle. Assuming I could Fed-Ex this thing to Kandahar,  how many hours of latrine cleaning would be involved in getting caught loading unauthorized gear into a LAVIII? If I'm wasting my time then do let me know before I start hitting people up for money for parts.

Thucydides -- Thanks! Looks like one of my favourite planes from Microsoft's _Crimson Skies_ game.


----------



## Kilroy

Yes, the Sperwer has been in Afghanistan since atleast 06, and I heard rumours we are getting / have the predator 1's.


----------



## observor 69

Kilroy said:
			
		

> Yes, the Sperwer has been in Afghanistan since atleast 06, and I heard rumours we are getting / have the predator 1's.




Speaking of lawn mower engines.  ;D


----------



## a_majoor

The reason I place the ability to operate from FARPs and unimproved airfields is to reduce the ability of the enemy to deny us CAS support. Taking our current situation as an example, should KAF be closed for any reason, fixed wing air support will have to come from a very long way, reducing reaction time to intervene and loiter time once on station (people who have been there will know what I'm talking about).

With the smaller/lighter aircraft, it will be possible to disperse to reduce vulnerability as well as provide fast flexible response. We go from a potential single point of failure to a dispersed and flexible "mesh" configuration. There are certain disadvantages to this model as well, but overall, it increases the choices available for the commander and increases the number of possible options to use against the enemy.


----------



## McG

At the same time, you will bloat the tail in order to do this.  More techs spread in more locations, more soldiers guarding little airfields, more CSS moving fuel, parts and ammunition.  Additionally, instead of several far reaching aircraft able to converge and aggregate their strength against a target, sub-units would now be dependent on only a handful of local short range support.  Support already comes from more places than just KAF, so I'm not certain FOB based CAS is a really good trade-off.


----------



## TCBF

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... airplanes like the Skyraider were far better for dedicated CAS than jet aircraft like the F-100 or F-105,...



- Remember, both the F-100 and the F-105 were developed to be nuclear capable.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Frankly I think the A10 is about the best CAS aircraft built so far, plus considering how old it is, the USAF has got their money worth several times over, despite their distaste for this type of aircraft. UAV will take over some of it's roles in the future, but I suspect that the need for manned CAS will be around for quite sometime. It would be a good investment to build new A10's with improvements in avionics, engines and with the improved wing design. 

Meanwhile I still think Canada should use our turboprop trainer as platform for a Air Reserve squadron dedicated to CAS, mainly for training purposes.


----------



## aesop081

Colin P said:
			
		

> Meanwhile I still think Canada should use our turboprop trainer as platform for a Air Reserve squadron dedicated to CAS, mainly for training purposes.



And then what would we use for trainers ? Who will maintain them ? Where will they be based ? We do not own these aircraft, might this be a problem ?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

We would have to buy new ones, since they would be based in Canada they could be maintained as an extension of the contract. I suspect flying CAS training in a turbo prop would be quite a draw and would help retain pilots in the reserves (A bit more fun than flying for Westjet all of the time). It would build up the knowledge base for CAS both in the Air Force and the Army, plus start building better bonds between them. I would love to equip them with new A10's, but I am being realistic and the Turboprops would be cheaper to buy, run and maintain. They MIGHT also add a organic CAS for a future mission in some god forsaken hellhole where the parties involved have little AD and we do not have another partner to give us that CAS.


----------



## dapaterson

Colin P:

There is no "Air Reserve" per se - it's a landing zone for ex-Reg F types, most of whom are employed on 330 day class B periods of service.  Roughly 80% of Air Res intake is by CT; those who enter off the street are almost never sent to get their wings.

Of course, there's a strategic impact to this:  if one goal in having a Reserve is to enable a surge to meet additional requirements and your Reserve is already committed, you're pretty much stuck.

From a strategic perspective, Canada has lost the bubble on the "Reserve Force"; with roughly 2 brigades worth of Reservists working full time (across all environments), and with those numbers skewed towards mid-level leadership ranks, it's not just the Air Reserve that suffers from an inability to surge.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Thanks for the reply, I am trying to think outside of the box, trying to think of not what we presently can, but what we should be doing. The military is a bit like the abused spouse, it takes times to be able to look beyond the immediate issues to what we are going to have to do in the future. I suspect such a proposal would generate a lot of interest and help rebuild what is left of the Air reserve. A defined and interesting role as such will draw people, a concept I found is often lost on our senior leaders in the past. Even if the military, government and treasury board agreed to this today, it would likely be 2 years before the first aircraft arrived and another year before the squadron would be operational for the training role. I suspect that people would start to appear to fill the roles. As I suggested an aircraft already familiar to the system, the growing pains would be somewhat less.

If you think this is bad, just imagine what it was like at the beginning of WWII, going from a small peace time army to a large wartime army, it takes imagination to get things done, just like Worthington and his  "scrap metal tanks"

Edited: It was Worthington not McNaungton that supported the Armoured Corp. "OOPS!"


----------



## phaedrus2

While I perceive a need for a capable and cost effective ground attack platform in the Afghan theatre, I was hoping for a little more input before I direct my research further into the topic.


My theory at this point involves the design and production of a fixed-wing, propellor driven ground attack aircraft to provide air support in conflicts like Afghanistan (theatres where there is no air-to-air threat, and little to no threat from advanced surface-to-air weapons).

The idea seems to make alot of sense to me, and I am confused why so simple of a solution has not been implemented.

Starting with a design based on the airframes of either the A-1 Skyraider, or a P-47 Thunderbolt, make the design more efficient using CAD and simulations, reduce weight / strengthen the airframe using composite materials, add modern armor, find space to cram an electronics suite into it so that while it wouldn't have it's own radar, it could be directed from ground based radar or an AWACS platform.

The result would be an even more durable aircraft than the orignal design, have a long loiter time, and the ability to deliver munitions with a high-degree of accuracy (I'm assuming it would be easier to put unguided muntions on target more accurately moving 300 mph than 700 - 900 mph).

Production costs would be a fraction what they would be for a more "modern" jet age aircraft, as would the upkeep....  making it easier for the government to make a decision about having them in theatre in the first place.

I'm not sure about the effectiveness of early stinger and red-eye era man portable missles against turboprop aircraft...  but I'd imagine that a radial engine does not emit enough heat for 80's era SAM's to track effectively....  someone can correct me on that if wrong.

So thats what I'm thinking.
I'm just fishing for some opinions on whether or not I am completely crazy before I start getting into the research for inflation adjusted costs for production and maintainence, etc... 

Is it at all feasible?  Is there a need for such an aircraft in a place like Afghanistan, or any of the similar locations we might end up spending a little time in?
The "it will never happen" comments aside, I am just wondering if I am the only one who thinks this might work.


I look forward to the input of the experts.


Regards,


Eric


----------



## CrazyCanuck

The A10 works fine for now, no sense in us getting our own. We have more important kit to spend our money on.


----------



## CBH99

I'm no expert either, but if I'm not mistaken - doesn't Brazil, Columbia, Argentina, Chile use a prop-driven ground attack aircraft known as the Dragonfly?

I don't even know if they are still in service, but I read about them in a Jane's article a while back.  They were being used to attack guerilla forces & drug cartels deep in the jungles.  Fitted with machine guns & rocket pods, they were prop-driven and could actually get up to a fairly good speed.  I'll try to hunt down some research for ya when I've got a bit more time.  

I'm not saying it would be practical for us to get them, as mentioned above, we have more pressing needs in terms of material acquisition.  Just an aircraft that fits the description you mentioned.


----------



## Schafer

I'd have to agree with Boater the A-10 does an excellent job in providing air to ground support. And  as you said phaedrus2 "it would be used to deliver munitions with a high degree of accuracy" well then I'm sorry to say but what about the M-777 wasn't it designed for that exact same job your prop airplane would provide? get the soldiers to call it in and the HE Excalibur round will do the rest.


----------



## phaedrus2

CBH99 said:
			
		

> I'm no expert either, but if I'm not mistaken - doesn't Brazil, Columbia, Argentina, Chile use a prop-driven ground attack aircraft known as the Dragonfly?




The A-37 Dragonfly is built by Cessna ...  its jet powered...  but there are also a few other prop aircraft used in the "counter-insurgency" role in South American countries.
The OV-10 Bronco and IA 58 Pucará are prop-driven...  but lightly armored and more suited to observation and control roles.

I am aware of these designs, but stayed away from them because I thought if such an aircraft was ever created, it would need to have a high degree of survivability from small arms fire.

Thanks for the input all!


----------



## benny88

Schafer,

    I don't think it's accurate to compare artillery to air-to-ground aircraft for a number of reasons. I'm not an authority on artillery by a long shot, but I know that it's far less mobile than an aircraft, and also that a shell doesn't have eyes that a pilot does. Your point is valid, as artillery is indispensible, but I have to imagine that aircraft would be more effective against small, mobile groups.
    I would agree that A-10s are probably the most effective platform, but if Canada decides to have it's own dedicated air to ground platform, turboprop aircraft would be a much more affordable and realistic option.


----------



## Loachman

phaedrus2 said:
			
		

> The idea seems to make alot of sense to me, and I am confused why so simple of a solution has not been implemented.



Because, even if it could be done at reasonable cost and it worked in this mission, it may well not in the next.

If it was such a good idea, somebody else, somewhere (other than third world countries for local use only), would have done it.

The more accepted combination of fast CAS aircraft, A10, and armed helicopters doesn't leave much of a niche market.


----------



## Good2Golf

"joint fires"

At the end of the day, whether the effects come from a boat, plane, gun, tank, etc... really doesn't matter.  A munition that has terminal accuracy sufficient for the operational role is fair game for being a part of the joint fires structure.  As Loachman said, such a concept is so particular, that it may well not work in the next theater.  As well, odds are that there may be a few other factors that we're not privy too that would render a light, prop-driven plane impractical in the current deployment.

G2G


----------



## a_majoor

A wide range of historical information here (once you subtract the "editorial content"), as well as a few rather outlandish suggestions including armed crop dusters(!).

http://www.combatreform2.com/killerbees3.htm

Fun stuff....


----------



## RCAFBrat

New here.
Here is an aircraft that might work.
http://www.hawkerbeechcraft.com/military/at%2D6%5Fab/


----------



## -dikweed-

The answer seems simple to me.  All you have to ask is what aircraft was designed nearly from the outset as a F-5 replacement.

Answer: the CAS variant of the Korean T-50 Golden Eagle, the A-50.

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/t-50/

"The aircraft has seven external hardpoints for carrying weapons, one on the centreline under the fuselage, two hardpoints under each wing and an air-to-air missile launch rail at the two wingtips.

The wingtip launch rails can carry AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. The underwing and centreline hardpoints can carry rocket pods, air-to-surface missiles or air-to-air missiles according to the mission requirements, e.g. AGM-65 Maverick missiles or mk 82/83/84 bombs or rocket launchers.

In November 2005, the A-50 successfully test-fired an AIM-9L air-to-air missile.

A 20mm General Dynamics Armaments three-barrel M61 cannon is installed internally on the A-50 LIFT version. The gun is mounted behind the cockpit and carries 205 rounds of ammunition in a linear linkless feed system. The A-50 LIFT can carry electronic warfare pods and a radar warning receiver. "

"The A-50 made its first flight in September 2003. A programme of weapon delivery flight testing is continuing and deliveries of the A-50 are planned to begin in 2009."


----------



## Michael OLeary

"Let's Buy These Aircraft" - Please read these before submitting your choice.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Loachman said:
			
		

> Because, even if it could be done at reasonable cost and it worked in this mission, it may well not in the next.
> 
> If it was such a good idea, somebody else, somewhere (other than third world countries for local use only), would have done it.
> 
> The more accepted combination of fast CAS aircraft, A10, and armed helicopters doesn't leave much of a niche market.



I am sure the Army has happily accepted the A-10, but I am not sure if the USAF brass has, I'm sure they will clamour to have them retired to free up money for their two pet projects F-22 & f-35. The politics of US defense spending does not seem to leave a lot of room for common sense.


----------



## -dikweed-

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> "Let's Buy These Aircraft" - Please read these before submitting your choice.



sorry boss, I had gone through most of those threads at one time or another, must have missed the one discussing the T-50.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Philltaj said:
			
		

> sorry boss, I had gone through most of those threads at one time or another, must have missed the one discussing the T-50.



Did you read the second post in that thread?


----------



## -dikweed-

Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> Did you read the second post in that thread?



I wasn't trying to be a smart ass, just that I had missed that thread


----------



## WPA

Just asking, 

The type of conflicts that Canada is doing right now woulf it not be better to convert 4 130H into ground attact planes like the US uses as the new C130J are delivered.
DID the Four C-17 make it delivered free up C130?   
If anything more is need the CF-18 would be the better option and new reaper UAV's with hellfire missile and 250 pound bombs.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

WPA said:
			
		

> Just asking,
> 
> The type of conflicts that Canada is doing right now woulf it not be better to convert 4 130H into ground attact planes like the US uses as the new C130J are delivered.
> DID the Four C-17 make it delivered free up C130?
> If anything more is need the CF-18 would be the better option and new reaper UAV's with hellfire missile and 250 pound bombs.



You mean the AC-130 Spectre gunship?


----------



## George Wallace

WPA said:
			
		

> Just asking,
> 
> The type of conflicts that Canada is doing right now woulf it not be better to convert 4 130H into ground attact planes like the US uses as the new C130J are delivered.
> DID the Four C-17 make it delivered free up C130?
> If anything more is need the CF-18 would be the better option and new reaper UAV's with hellfire missile and 250 pound bombs.



This question has been asked and discussed in detail.  With a Search you will find that this is far too expensive a proposition for Canada to undertake.


----------



## geo

WPA, would you mind filling in your profile so we can know your background better?
(might save you a flame or two in the long run )


----------



## OldSolduer

Has the Harrier or similar V/STOL type a/c been mentioned?


----------



## Panzer Grenadier

I believe we are holding out for the F-35 in whatever final production variant emerges.


----------



## Michael OLeary

OldSolduer said:
			
		

> Has the Harrier or similar V/STOL type a/c been mentioned?



Yes, see this thread.


----------



## George Wallace

George Wallace said:
			
		

> This question has been asked and discussed in detail.  With a Search you will find that this is far too expensive a proposition for Canada to undertake.





			
				Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> Yes, see this thread.



Anyone starting to wonder how some of these topics start to take up so many pages?


----------



## thunderchild

:cdnsalute: :cdnsalute:Two thoughts 1 south Korea is building the a-50 as a replacement for their f-5's.  It has a F404-400 an m61 cannon limited air to air and is a 2 seat / LIFT. the whole thing is is 80% of the size of an f-16 and costs about 22million per aircraft. I have more stats but I don't know if it is in flight refuelable. I prefer the JAS-39NG it uses the f-414 in the superhornet is truly multi role and has increased range and limited super cruse ability to 1.1MACH but is about 50 million each i think. According to CASR the AT-6B is 10 million per aircraft and has a limited useful load buta mix could a good idea.


----------



## Michael OLeary

thunderchild said:
			
		

> :cdnsalute: :cdnsalute:Two thoughts 1 south Korea is building the a-50 as a replacement for their f-5's.  It has a F404-400 an m61 cannon limited air to air and is a 2 seat / LIFT. the whole thing is is 80% of the size of an f-16 and costs about 22million per aircraft. I have more stats but I don't know if it is in flight refuelable. I prefer the JAS-39NG it uses the f-414 in the superhornet is truly multi role and has increased range and limited super cruse ability to 1.1MACH but is about 50 million each i think. According to CASR the AT-6B is 10 million per aircraft and has a limited useful load buta mix could a good idea.



Start here:



			
				Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> The following is recovered from a number of old threads and posted here for reference:
> 
> If you want to start proposing new aircraft programs, start with these points:
> 
> Tasks and roles to be conducted.
> Aircrew training requirements.
> Aircraft maintenance lifecycle.
> Number of airframes required, based on your assessment of tasks.
> Expected lifespan of "new" airframes, compared to expectation of available manufacturer and principal nation support.
> Requirements and costs to retrain and retool all required maintenance facilities and maintainers.
> Infrastructure costs to support new aircraft in all Wing locations.
> 
> As you can see, simply comparing statistics or unit costs doesn't quite scratch the surface of what you are proposing....


----------



## thunderchild

thanks for the info,  as I said I don't even imagiane that anthing could just be tossed into the mix.  I'm thinking about what could be used in 5-10 years time.  we're stuck with what we have ,we have harvard 2's moving to a armed version may not be such a strech as all CF piolts learn to fly them and parts and crews are available.  Im such a fan of the gripen because it is easily maintained in production since 1996 it is well armed and designed for use behind,in the midst of a hostile situation.  Personally the government should be equipping us to fight on our terms, but to me it seems smaller shorter wars more often is likely.


----------



## Command-Sense-Act 105

Please use proper punctuation and grammar and spell check your submissions before you post.

Thank you.

*The Army.ca Staff*


----------



## SupersonicMax

thunderchild said:
			
		

> thanks for the info,  as I said I don't even imagiane that anthing could just be tossed into the mix.  I'm thinking about what could be used in 5-10 years time.  we're stuck with what we have ,we have harvard 2's moving to a armed version may not be such a strech as all CF piolts learn to fly *them and parts* and crews are available.  Im such a fan of the gripen because it is easily maintained in production since 1996 it is well armed and designed for use behind,in the midst of a hostile situation.  Personally the government should be equipping us to fight on our terms, but to me it seems smaller shorter wars more often is likely.



We doN,t have parts, we don't own them.


----------



## aesop081

thunderchild said:
			
		

> we're stuck with what we have ,we have harvard 2's moving to a armed version may not be such a strech as all CF piolts learn to fly them and parts and crews are available.



Are you German and living in Montreal by any chance ?

We may have pilots to fly them but we dont own the planes and we dont have military technicians to fix them. Oh wait, if we use them to fight, what are we supposed to use to train pilots ?


----------



## HItorMiss

CDN

We'll just get them to run around in a big open field and flap their arms while making machine gun noises with there mouths.  ;D


----------



## thunderchild

ok, I know that we don't own them and I'm not suggesting that we remove training aircraft from the flight line.  Any ground attack varients would have to be new builds.  as for tech support we can contract that out while we train our own.


----------



## Old Sweat

The Harvard was designed and is a trainer, nothing more and nothing else. Are you suggesting that we adopt an upgrade of a 1930's technology for something it was never to do, to support our troops in combat? It was tried before, by the way. In a fit of I don't know what, desperation perhaps, the Australians tried using a version called the Wirraway as a fighter in the early days of the Second World War. The results when the aircraft faced Zeroes were predictable.


----------



## Danjanou

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> CDN
> 
> We'll just get them to run around in a big open field and flap their arms while making machine gun noises with there mouths.  ;D



They're not doing that now? I'm sure Max mentioned the PO check on it in chat a few weeks back. 8)


----------



## Adamant

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The Harvard was designed and is a trainer, nothing more and nothing else. Are you suggesting that we adopt an upgrade of a 1930's technology for something it was never to do, to support our troops in combat? It was tried before, by the way. In a fit of I don't know what, desperation perhaps, the Australians tried using a version called the Wirraway as a fighter in the early days of the Second World War. The results when the aircraft faced Zeroes were predictable.



As much as I agree that using the Harvards as an attack platform is dumb, I don't think that thunderchild was talking about the WWII-era Harvards.  I'm sure he meant the CT-156 Harvard II used by NFTC. 

Just for clarification.


----------



## Old Sweat

It is still bascially a very old design that has been souped up like a street rod built from a Ford Model A. 

Given the range of weapons and delivery systems and the ways available to control close air support these days, the whole premise is more than a little dubious, at least in my opinion.


----------



## aesop081

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It is still bascially a very old design that has been souped up like a street rod built from a Ford Model A.



Far from it.


----------



## Old Sweat

I may have been a bit over the edge in knocking the aircraft, but the concept of adapting an aircraft of that type for tactical purposes is not an ideal or even a not too bad solution. It is something that was done in the Vietnam era to drop iron bombs, naplam or rockets and to strafe concentrations of insurgents with fair accuracy. The world has moved on, and so should we.


----------



## a_majoor

There are many examples of trainers being pressed into service as attack aircraft with mixed results. While a purpose built aircraft like an A-10 is by far the best solution, small air forces cannot afford this. Many current jet trainers can be used as CAS platforms (at least according to the manufacturer), so it isn't beyond the pale to consider this option.

As well, in the current threat environment, these sorts of aircraft might be better for the job; consider the A-37 Dragonfly or the A-1 Skyraider (AKA "Spad") were considered to be much better CAS platforms in the Viet Nam war than the "Century Series" fighter bombers or other jet warplanes the Americans used. Low and slow so you can see and identify the targets, and being able to remain on station for extended periods of time are the two keys to CAS, high performance jets like the F-18 do not have these attributes.


----------



## hauger

Adamant said:
			
		

> As much as I agree that using the Harvards as an attack platform is dumb, I don't think that thunderchild was talking about the WWII-era Harvards.  I'm sure he meant the CT-156 Harvard II used by NFTC.
> 
> Just for clarification.



Umm....check out the T-6A/B based AT-6 (basically the same as the trainer but with some business making munitions no board):

http://www.hawkerbeechcraft.com/military/at-6_ab/
http://www.hawkerbeechcraft.com/military/at-6_ab/R0816AT-6_LithoUpdate.pdf (*warning, PDF file)


----------



## aesop081

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The world has moved on, and so should we.



In fact, many nation use modified training aircrafts for operational purposes. This is not something from the past. Aircraft like the Pilatus PC-9 have successfuly been adapted for the light strike role. The environment these aircraft operate in has be be more permissive that that of an A-10 for example but if you are not facing a significant AD threat then why not.


----------



## GDawg

These "wish list" threads sure tend to get circular, people absolutely refuse to read and post the same links over and over again. We're not going to see Canadian CAS over there by 2011, that is a fact. I would much rather see a helicopter providing overwatch than anything else in the sky today. I've seen what Kiowas and Apaches can do over there and its impressive! With fixed wing, the faster the platform the greater the chance of missing the target...


----------



## Old Sweat

As well, in the current threat environment, these sorts of aircraft might be better for the job; consider the A-37 Dragonfly or the A-1 Skyraider (AKA "Spad") were considered to be much better CAS platforms in the Viet Nam war than the "Century Series" fighter bombers or other jet warplanes the Americans used. Low and slow so you can see and identify the targets, and being able to remain on station for extended periods of time are the two keys to CAS, high performance jets like the F-18 do not have these attributes.

In fact, many nation use modified training aircrafts for operational purposes. This is not something from the past. Aircraft like the Pilatus PC-9 have successfuly been adapted for the light strike role. The environment these aircraft operate in has be be more permissive that that of an A-10 for example but if you are not facing a significant AD threat then why not.

Two good comments. However we are talking about the CF and what we should do. In my opinion we will operate as part of a coalition, which means that there are a variety of delivery systems available. For starters, the attack helicopter and certain UAVs (as well as the A10) fill the role of the low, slow and long-legged Skyraiders et al of the Vietnam era four decades past. Second the high performance aircraft now have the ability to hit a point target accurately for a variety of reaons including various means to identify, designate and guide the weapon, and not only from the launching aricraft. I won't say anymore on this means.

To my tiny, aged mind, the solution is to procure platforms such as an armed UAV and/or to keep our CF18 fleet able to deliver smart stuff. I would also love to see some AHs in our air force. Some of this is doable within our personnel and financial constraints, maybe. 

And, I agree with GDawg that this is hypothetical and we are not apt to see anything of the sort fielded by 2011.


----------



## Adamant

hauger said:
			
		

> Umm....check out the T-6A/B based AT-6 (basically the same as the trainer but with some business making munitions no board):
> 
> http://www.hawkerbeechcraft.com/military/at-6_ab/
> http://www.hawkerbeechcraft.com/military/at-6_ab/R0816AT-6_LithoUpdate.pdf (*warning, PDF file)



I never said it couldn't be done.   I said it wasn't a good idea, and I stand by it.  

The PC-9, CT-156 and T-6 Texan II are all related airframes, so yes it can be done...

One could also arm the Infantry with 22's from Canadian Tire but, like adapting the CT-156, it is a ridiculous idea


----------



## thunderchild

well its more likely that we get an armed Harvard 2 than an A-10,AH-64 if there really is a need I think that this is the fastest cost effective alternative.  No waiting or hoping to jump the production line no depending on somebody else to watch our butts. Limited pilot training as they would all be type certified anyway. UAV's are nice but how many do we have? I've never seen a Spewer with Hellfire missiles, GBU-10's, external cannon and fuel tanks but the AT-6C does.


----------



## Adamant

thunderchild said:
			
		

> well its more likely that we get an armed Harvard 2 than an A-10,AH-64



How do you figure?

Not one of them are likely, but really you think an attack variant of the Harvard is the most likely? really?


----------



## aesop081

I see that this thread has irreversably departed from controlled flight...........as most "lets buy this aircraft" threads do.


----------



## thunderchild

then I'm guessing that we don't need that capability now. Thanks for the conversation


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Using a CAS version of the Harvard or the Hawk as a basis for a squadron dedicated to CAS in the CF, would allow both the air force and the army to practice the techniques and build the capacity into the Air Force at a reasonable cost. The squadron could be a mix of reserve and regular pilots and even tap the civilian market for ground personal or maintenance. I suspect that quite a few pilots that leave the Forces to fly with the airlines would enjoy coming back for some CAS flying. In this configuration it would not be deployable, but if we were to get a handle on the manning issues, a deployable squadron might be possible for missions which may not have significant air support (UN type mission)


----------



## thunderchild

That is what I've been trying to say thanks for the input Colin P.


----------



## Old Sweat

Colin P

With respect, for you are a sensible and thoughtful poster, your above suggestion is not a good use of resources. There already is an established process for training and maintaining the standards of our FACs. It works well as events in Afghanistan have proven. (I can't speak for the air force on this.) To inject a less capable aircraft would just create static in a system that is working well.

Now, re the use of these aircraft in lower intensity operations. The army has avoided thinking like this like the plague during the peacekeeping years. If we train and equip for the worst case, we can adapt to less intense situations. The opposite is not true.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The problem with using the next generation of aircraft for CAS is that they are becoming so expensive and we will have fewer in number, the air force will be reluctant to use them as such. Except as a bombing platform. If I recall the majority of aircraft shot down over Vietnam was by AA guns. Once you are into the weeds, you are placing a 50-100 million dollar machine into the lethal zone of a 50 year old 23mm AA gun. 
While guided munitions reduces the need for close in bombing runs, the A10 is proving that air gunnery still has a place in the non-conventional warfare that abounds on our planet. I want to see the CAS ability maintained and improved in the CF. I realize we don't have the people or the bucks to build a highly effective deployable squadron at present, so that's why my suggestions was to use the type of platforms we already use that are also economical to buy and run for the present. A big part of the squadrons job would be the change the mindset in the senior levels, making close support an important component of any new overseas deployment. I am trying to suggest achievable baby steps for the moment.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Colin,

Putting a turbo-prop training aircraft into that same AAA environment is not any smarter than risking a $50-100 million aircraft.  I would suggest that, for the types of task you are implying, the Attack Helicopter is your platform of choice.


----------



## thunderchild

An attack helicopter would be best I agree and we should have that capability but to give some capability a turboprop can be fielded faster, this is dependent on operational requirements, if we have 10-15 years the helicopter is the way to go. However if we only have 2 years then the turboprop makes more sense.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Thunderchild,

You are not reading what is being posted here- NOTHING, not helicopters, not your turbo-prop idea, not flying sharks with laser beams will make it to Afghanistan in two years.  Let's move on to reality, please.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

In a perfect world, I would get those attack helos, along with trying to weasel in on the re-manufactured A10 program for 20 airframes. The aircraft I suggested would not be the best for deployment as they have no armour to speak of and any attempt to harden them would suck up much of the payload they have. Once we get a dedicated CAS squadron and the people in place we can go shopping for a appropriate airframe. In my view (limited as it is) I don't see attack helicopters occupying the same niche as CAS aircraft, both bring different strength's and weakness to the mix it certainly is nice to have both and some good FAC's on the ground to use them.

Here are excerpts of the ambush of the French patrol as told by the survivors, I have picked out the relevent parts

_H + 25 minutes. Évrard has asked for air support. Ten minutes later, American A-10s fly over the combat zone. The combatants are utterly interlocked and the pilots have to turn back. That’s what the Talibans were expecting. At the same time, Tora dispatches troops as reinforcements._

A pair of attack helicopter would be very good at this moment, it might have turned the battle even if they could not stay long. 

_At the very same time, an A-10 appears suddenly and fires a stream of 30 mm rounds, right above them. “We’ve taken advantage of the dust for withdrawing discreetly.” The paras get away through a series of thrusts and carefully avoid venturing onto the bombarded path_

Any CAS is better than none!!

“_I’ve seen the A-10s coming from the valley and flying above the slope at low altitude. They were firing at the insurgents but also straight at our position. It was dark, I was afraid they hit us. I’ve seized my flashlight and sent out a few SOS: dot dot dot, dash dash dash, dot dot dot. At some point, the plane has flown over me and I’ve seen the pilot’s figure. He’s sent me out signals with a red light. He had understood. It was an enormous relief.”_

Shows the importance of pilots that eat, sleep, drink and poop CAS. It also shows that a aircraft with a decent gun (and ammo load) optimized for CAS is still important. It also shows the importance of FAC's, I am not sure from the report if their was a dedicated FAC or if any coordination was done by ground personal beyond the request for assistance.

Seaking
I agree that we won't have anything to send over there in time. However the world churns on and the possibilty of other deployments or even a renewed mission in Afghanistan exists. In fact predicting the future for the next 20 years is going to be a bit hard.


----------



## thunderchild

Not expecting them to I used a bad example.  DND is buying some very expensive helicoplers and no escort for the helicopters or the troops they carry.


----------



## thunderchild

lets face reality,how long did it take to replace the seaking? the army was going to get the MGS instead of the leo 2's they needed we need to plan now expecting a 15-20 year wait for the kit we should have had 5 years ago. The AT-6C was an idea to get some capability and develop it.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

Well until we actually have Cyclones on our flight decks then they have not been replaced.


----------



## aesop081

thunderchild said:
			
		

> The AT-6C was an idea to get some capability and develop it.



The Sea King replacement disaster delay is a political problem. We could be flying the EH-101 already if the Lieberals had not cancelled it. What on earth makes you think that that a light strike aircraft will not encounter more political problems ? We are still waiting for a decision on FWSAR, the continuation of AIMP for the CP-140 came at the very last moment possible..........see a trend here ?


----------



## CBH99

Someone with more experience with politics or AF procurement than myself...feel free to correct me.

But the lack of helicopter-based CAS is more of a politican issue than a technical or economic issue.  There is a Bell plant right there in Quebec (Same factory that built our Griffons if I'm correct) - that could be used to build other Bell products.  A Bell plant building Bell aircraft - right here in Canada.  And Quebec, to top it off.  

Acquiring a small number of 'armed recce helicopters' shouldn't be all that challenging.  Order the aircraft, order the parts, train the flight crews & ground crews.  Its the political will to do so that is the hard part.  Am I correct, or am I missing something??


----------



## thunderchild

I'm all for 30-40 AH-1Z rather thanAH-64's, we just have to make sure that they will be able to fight where they are needed without having to mission adapt everything.


----------



## aesop081

thunderchild said:
			
		

> I'm all for 30-40 AH-1Z rather thanAH-64's,



There you go again.......What are you basing this on ?




> we just have to make sure that they will be able to fight where they are needed without having to mission adapt everything.



What ?


----------



## Infanteer

I am loathe to join the "let's buy this aircraft" discussion, but I really did like the slant of this article from the March 2008 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette.  I have a PDF copy if anyone wants the whole article, but the gist is Squadrons capable of deploying away from the large "KAF's" that are anathema to Counterinsurgency.  Why would Canada aim towards something like this?  First, it is cheap(er) yet effective.  Second, as someone said earlier, we will be operating in a Coalition environment.  We'll let the USAF fly the high-skies with F-22s while we get the most bang for our Airpower bucks.  Some highlights:



> Counterinsurgency requires us to go 'back to the future'
> 
> We will be leaving Iraq soon. If there is going to be any sort of peace in Al Anbar Province we had better prepare the Iraqi Air Force with the tools and skills to continue this counterinsurgency fight. This article addresses the shortage of true counterinsurgency aircraft in the Marine Corps fight, which ones to use, how to use them and, most importantly, how to transition the fight over to the Iraqi Air Force. The Marine Corps should look at three types of fixed-wing turboprop aircraft to win and transition this fight-light attack/forward air controller (airborne) (FAC(A)), light, and medium cargo.
> 
> Light Attack/FAC(A) Aircraft
> 
> Older, proven turboprop aircraft are first to jump to mind as perfect light attack aircraft. Certainly one of the best examples is the OV-10. It was built expressly for the task. The problem with selecting the Bronco today has everything to do with availability. Unless the OV-10 line is reopened by Boeing (who bought Rockwell, the original Bronco manufacturer), I believe the way forward is to look at current turboprop aircraft in use today that have existing and tested ordnance mounting and delivery systems.1 In his 1986 article, "Air Power in a Low-Intensity Conflict in the Middle East," William Olsen summed up the problem and reason for a fixedwing turboprop solution very quickly:
> 
> The use of high-speed, high-performance aircraft and heavy ordnance, like the indiscriminant use of long-range artillery, is counterproductive. Targets are difficult to identify, distinguishing friend from foe is largely a matter of chance, and time on station is too ephemeral. What are needed are slow planes that can be directed discriminatingjly by ground observers who have an understanding of the situation. The air platform needs to be stable, tough, inexpensive, and easily maintained and operated in an austere environment . . . . Expense, time on station, and difficulty of maintenance are reasons why helicopters are not necessarily the best answer to the situations of low-intensity conflict. [Author's emphasis.]2





> Tactics. The best way to employ a counterinsurgency light attack/FAC (A) squadron would be to have it forward deployed alongside the ground unit it is supporting. The FAC(A) would be intimately familiar with the geography of his assigned area of operations, the rules of engagement, the threat, and friendly units supported. In our current fight the fixed-wing aircraft are employed as close air support/nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in general support of the entire Multinational Force-West (MNF-W) area of operations (AO). Aircrew are sent anywhere within this enormous area on a daily basis. It is impossible to "know" the area as well as we should. The Marine Corps should relook at the way area FACs were used during the Vietnam War. FAC squadrons were assigned specific AOs to work. Aviators assigned to those units could generally expect to fight in that AO for their entire tour.





> Light Cargo Aircraft
> 
> Light cargo aircraft also serve an important place in any air force fighting a counterinsurgency war. The movement of personnel and cargo within the AO is a time- and asset-consuming problem. The main advantages of a fixedwing light cargo aircraft over a rotary-wing aircraft lies in its speed, altitude, and ease of maintenance. Over the distances we are covering in our current fight, speed becomes critical in the timely delivery of needed people and equipment. Our CH-53s and 46s are maxed out flying every night in our current fight. The aircraft are absolutely full, and there are more people and equipment to be moved than actually get moved. The current surface-to-air threat has relegated most of our helicopters to flying their assault support requests at night. Fixed-wing aircraft could avoid flying through most of the threat envelopes and would give the ground combat element (GCE) what they need 24/7. These two factors-speed and altitude (read survivability)-are why the Marine Corps has pushed so hard for the MV-22. The Marine Corps is not leaving any of the MV-22s for the Iraqi Air Force, so we had better be prepared to leave them something they can use.
> 
> Air resupply. The Marine Corps should also revisit using airdrops for resupply. This ability would let the GCE stay out in the field longer-one of the key tenets in winning a counterinsurgency. It would also do away with (for a large part) the ground resupply convoys that have been hit so hard by improvised explosive devices through the years and coordinated attacks recently. The Marine Corps already has air delivery Marines in its table of organization (T/O). By using airdrops they could be employed as their military occupational specialty designates.
> 
> In the 1962 RAND Corporations Symposium on Counterinsurgency Report, COL John White, Royal Australian Army, "quarreled with the theory, taught by the special warfare schools, that air support is a bonus, and advocated air supply as a routine means of support wherever other vehicles are unusable." In the same paragraph, COL Charles Bohannan, AUS(Ret):
> 
> . . . was inclined to make an even stronger case for the logistic uses of aircraft. He felt that the potential of air drops, which are economical in manpower and money, had not been fully enough exploited. . . .11





> Medium Cargo Aircraft
> 
> The Iraqi Army is not going to be fighting the counterinsurgency with large troop movements, mass airborne assaults, or with a requirement for large airdrops. Nor is it going to need an aerial refueling capability. What would be more useful is a larger number of medium-sized cargo aircraft able to move smaller units and reasonably sized cargo requirements around the country. The Iraqi Air Force does not need more large, complex aircraft to maintain on an austere budget and battlespace....
> 
> Tactics. At a minimum the Marine Corps should stand up one 12-plane, medium-lift VMR squadron and base it at Al Asad Airbase. This aircraft would coordinate with the GCE at the Marine expeditionary force level. For the Marine Corps fight, this would allow the Marine aerial refueler transport squadron to concentrate on fixed-wing aerial refueling and intertheater lift requirements. The intratheater lift would be handled by the medium-lift VMR squadron.
> 
> As the cargo is moved within the theater between the larger prepared fields, the light cargo aircraft would take the cargo out to unprepared fields or airdrop the cargo as required. This is not to say the medium-lift cargo aircraft is incapable of operations out of those fields or of airdropping supplies. It is just that it would not be economical to move the amount of cargo that would need to be distributed to remote communities or small units in the field with medium-lift aircraft.





> Maintenance
> 
> One of the biggest factors in deciding which aircraft to use for the light attack and light cargo aircraft would be commonality of parts. The use of the Pratt & Whitney PT6A engine amongst the light attack and light cargo aircraft is a major bonus for the Marine Corps and the Iraqi Air Force. No matter what forward base the aircraft stop through, common consumables-petroleum, oil, and lubricants-and light maintenance requirements could be satisfied.



If we are going to have CAS, I would like to see Green CAS, with pilots who've trained with their Ground Combat Arms brethren (perhaps even doing Phase III infantry, as Marine Corps Aviators do).  Their aircraft are small, sturdy and capable of operating from austere fields that we spread out amongst our FOBs.


----------



## Zoomie

Infanteer said:
			
		

> If we are going to have CAS, I would like to see Green CAS, with pilots who've trained with their Ground Combat Arms brethren



Giddy-up.  There's plenty of space on those courses, right?  Sign me up.  Wait - isn't that why we have FoxholeU?

The best thing about CAS is that at a minimum the aircraft can travel at around 4 miles/minute - that eats up the ground pretty fast and gives a large area of quick reaction.

IMO - AT-6 would make an excellent low intensity CAS aircraft.


----------



## Infanteer

Zoomie said:
			
		

> Giddy-up.  There's plenty of space on those courses, right?  Sign me up.  Wait - isn't that why we have FoxholeU?



I've worked with other military forces who do it and it works.  It was awesome to do mission planning with aviators who actually spoke some "ground-tactics" language.  Same with their logistics officers.

Would it eliminate some fat plods who are in it for the shot at Air Canada?  Probably.  Make it Green aviation and let the Blue stick to what they're doing now and I think we'll all be happy.


----------



## George Wallace

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Would it eliminate some fat plods who are in it for the shot at Air Canada?  Probably.  Make it Green aviation and let the Blue stick to what they're doing now and I think we'll all be happy.



Now you are talking sacrilege.  The Air Force won't even let the Tac Hel guys go "Green".  Now want them to let CAS go "Green".


----------



## thunderchild

maybe going green is what is needed for any cas to work.  Why would the airforce mind giving up somthin that they don't want anyway ........


----------



## SupersonicMax

thunderchild said:
			
		

> maybe going green is what is needed for any cas to work.  *Why would the airforce mind giving up somthin that they don't want anyway * ........



What do you mean?


----------



## aesop081

thunderchild said:
			
		

> maybe going green is what is needed for any cas to work.



How so ? Are you saying that all AF provided CAS is ineffective ?


----------



## GAP

Why are you guys feeding this troll?


----------



## FSTO

Just wondering here. When was the last time the army and AF had a training exercise where the CF-18 provided CAS to army units? Who is designated as the ground-air controller for calling in the strikes? How are the communications between the two? Is is direct or does it go thru several other steps before the airplane is on task?

 know its been a few years since I've been in battlestar but if I remember right the Navy has AF air controllers posted to the command ship. They were responsible for the CAP, had direct communications with them and control their employment.


----------



## dimsum

FSTO said:
			
		

> know its been a few years since I've been in battlestar but if I remember right the Navy has AF air controllers posted to the command ship. They were responsible for the CAP, had direct communications with them and control their employment.



I thought it was the SAC specialty of NCIOPs or MARS who did that onboard?


----------



## SupersonicMax

FSTO, it happens all the time.  CAS is BIG right now in the fighter community.  There are FACs deployed in afghanistan (which are pilots by trade, 1 hornet driver deployed as FAC at all times).


----------



## aesop081

FSTO said:
			
		

> When was the last time the army and AF had a training exercise where the CF-18 provided CAS to army units?



Almost every MAPLE GUARDIAN i have participated in had Hornets providing CAS and CP-140s providing ISR. Controlled by the guys on the ground.


----------



## FSTO

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Almost every MAPLE GUARDIAN i have participated in had Hornets providing CAS and CP-140s providing ISR. Controlled by the guys on the ground.



Thats good to know. Now how are the comms? That is usually the single point of failure in most operations.


----------



## aesop081

FSTO said:
			
		

> Thats good to know. Now how are the comms? That is usually the single point of failure in most operations.



I wont comment on these means.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

> Isn't a 3D radar contained within FELEX? Coupled with the ripping out of the 70's era computer systems and the additional space opened we should be able to make the Frigates more C4IC capable.



upgrades to the SPS49 and the SG150, no plan in FELEX to make them 3D.


----------



## Old Sweat

Let's leave the subject of FACs for a while and get back to the question whether a relatively 'unsophisticated' aircraft is a suitable ground support aircraft.

Before I do, in my opinion to cite the example of the USMC is to ignore a fundamental difference between their doctrine and ours. The marines dedicate their aircraft to support of their own on the ground, and we do not. A marine division is supported by a complete marine air wing, which is a pretty formidable force in its own right. As the size of the force decreases, so does the air element. But it still supports ground marines.

We are unlikely to depart from the doctrine that drives most western air forces - the centralized control of air power at as high a level as possible. Thus any aircraft we deploy will go into the big pot. Thus our aircraft will be employed based on theatre priorities. Bascially I agree with this system, frustrating as it is. 

What governs how many sorties we are apt to see in any given day, besides the tactical situation? Obviously major factors are the number of airframes serviceable which is usually far less than the actual number on paper, and the monthly flying rates, as well as the availability of things that go boom on the ground. The capability of the airframes is also really important and this is where I am at odds with many of you. Rusty as I am, I still feel that something as short legged and with as small a payload as the CF5 or any other the other birds proposed is a misuse of space on the tarmac. We might be able to provide a six pack of aircraft to the theatre, which (I am guesstimating) could allow four sorties a day, each of no more than two hours duration. For that eight hours of aircraft hours, which might translate into two two aircraft missions on station for perhaps ninety minutes each, we should want to get as large a return as possible. 

Last, let me harp at one of my pet points. A fast, modern aircaft can fight and survive in more theatres than a less capable bird. Let's not limit our ability to participate because of the type of airframe we have in service.

Rant off, and I am headed to the fridge for a beer followed by some prime rib with the trimmings and some good red wine.


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

FSTO said:
			
		

> Isn't a 3D radar contained within FELEX? Coupled with the ripping out of the 70's era computer systems and the additional space opened we should be able to make the Frigates more C4IC capable. Not an ideal situation but at least a stop gap until we get (we hope) the 280/CPF replacements. Major lack of foresight when expansion was not designed into the Frigates. (Sorry about turning an AF thread into a Navy thread, but you know us Navy types always implying that a Navy opinion is always a valued one ;D).



The radar upgrade is a separate program. Probably not much upgrading to be done with the provided budget though.

What's wrong with tracking with the STIR? As long as nobody illuminates, people shouldn't get too antsy.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Last, let me harp at one of my pet points. A fast, modern aircaft can fight and survive in more theatres than a less capable bird. Let's not limit our ability to participate because of the type of airframe we have in service.



I think a Hawk, equipped with the ADEN 30mm, 2XAIM-9s on the wingtips plus A-G ordinances on the 4 wing pylons would be a decent CAS platform...  That's 8000 lbs for A/G Ordinances!


----------



## McG

Zoomie said:
			
		

> ... would make an excellent low intensity CAS aircraft.


Except as band-aid measures to meet urgent operational requirements for limited periods of time, I don't think we should be buying things with suitability limited to low intensity conflicts.  If the CF requires a specific CAS platform, then it must stand up to the AD beasting it may very well find itself exposed to in future theatres of operations.  

Consider that there has been a lot of political spin on the idea of intervention in Sudan (and under other governments we might have found ourselves leading a coalition there).  Despite being "low intensity" there is a real air threat in that theatre and there is a cooresponding real AD threat.  There have been articles posted on this site about MIGs being employed in CAS & being shot out of the sky in that theatre.  While we are not in Sudan in any large numbers today, we must be ready to go there or theatres like it in the future.

In the long run we are only likely to kill service personnel with half-measures such as buying "peace support" or "low-intensity" operational kit to save money.  In the case of budget CAS, we risk the lives of the pilots in the air & the soldiers on the ground depending on supporting fires.


----------



## SupersonicMax

MCG, there are many models of MiGs...  Which ones are being shot down?  There is a significant difference between the MiG 17 and MiG 29...


----------



## McG

It was a 29
http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/77110.0.html


----------



## Infanteer

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> We are unlikely to depart from the doctrine that drives most western air forces - the centralized control of air power at as high a level as possible. Thus any aircraft we deploy will go into the big pot. Thus our aircraft will be employed based on theatre priorities. Bascially I agree with this system, frustrating as it is.



I guess I'm saying we should get away from this "Blue Sky" doctrine, or at least create a corresponding "Green Grass" one for it.



> Last, let me harp at one of my pet points. A fast, modern aircaft can fight and survive in more theatres than a less capable bird. Let's not limit our ability to participate because of the type of airframe we have in service.





			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Except as band-aid measures to meet urgent operational requirements for limited periods of time, I don't think we should be buying things with suitability limited to low intensity conflicts.  If the CF requires a specific CAS platform, then it must stand up to the AD beasting it may very well find itself exposed to in future theatres of operations.
> 
> Consider that there has been a lot of political spin on the idea of intervention in Sudan (and under other governments we might have found ourselves leading a coalition there).  Despite being "low intensity" there is a real air threat in that theatre and there is a cooresponding real AD threat.  There have been articles posted on this site about MIGs being employed in CAS & being shot out of the sky in that theatre.  While we are not in Sudan in any large numbers today, we must be ready to go there or theatres like it in the future.
> 
> In the long run we are only likely to kill service personnel with half-measures such as buying "peace support" or "low-intensity" operational kit to save money.  In the case of budget CAS, we risk the lives of the pilots in the air & the soldiers on the ground depending on supporting fires.



As I mentioned in my caveat above, I am basing my "preference" on the principle of USAF Air Superiority.  It is a reality, and I can't really see us being committed to a situation requiring CAS without it.  The second principle stems from the first.  For the foreseeable future, the US Military will simply crush any near-peer foe, full stop.  This is the environment the CF, and especially CF Airpower, will operate in - Coalition operations against a "low-intensity foe" because, for the next "generation" at least, anyone who steps away from this paradigm of fighting is going to end up like Saddam's Republican Guard.

By sticking to High + Fast CAS we are sticking to a game we can't really compete in and is so resource intensive that we can't really deploy it anyways (an Airbase in Italy doesn't count).  I want to see deployable CAS that is actually deployable as well as flexible enough to get away from the "Fortress Bases" to support good expeditionary warfighting.  The excerpts from the article I posted above are an example of how we could achieve this.

I'm happy to let the Blue CF stick to high altitude fighters with huge logistical tails for a peer-on-peer fight - it has its place and if we develop the capability enough perhaps it can be employed in a reasonable fashion (ie: F-35B from a LHD); but we have the "Green Grass" force for the myriad of situations that force our "Blue Sky" fleet to sit out of the fight.  As well, something needs to be said for the theory of what happens once 1-billion dollar planes start going down in AD buzzsaws.  How fast could we replace CF-18's once they start going down?  At least the "austere" planes are replaceable.  As for the cost in pers, well, maybe we should shift to an all-UAV force if we are afraid of losing pilots?


----------



## Kirkhill

But I think we end up coming around again to how much marginal advantage does a fixed wing CAS aircraft deliver over a force equipped with Rotary Wing assets, Hunter-Killer UAVs, Recce UAVs and Arty equipped with 155/Excalibur, MRLS/G-MRLS and NLOS systems?

Isn't it still just an issue of how quickly you can defeat your target of interest?   24 hour CAP is certainly one way of getting the job done but it is pretty pricey and I am going to guess that even the Marines occasionally have to wait their turn for available assets to bail them out.  6 AV-6Bs in DS of a MEU are not going to be available at Seconds to Move.

Having said that, and essentially agreeing with Old Sweat, there is another side to the premise that Infanteer posted.    And that is the general concept of integrating the Air and Ground forces better.

How about taking a leaf out of Herr Goering's book and offering the Air Generals their own Ground Troops to "play" with.  As I suggested to Infanteer in a PM, seeing as how the Navy doesn't want to play nice by supplying Big Honking Ships, and the Air Force has at least demonstrated a willingness to buy the kit necessary to move Ground Pounders around the countryside (C17/C130/C27(maybe)/CH-147/CH-146) maybe the way to get them into the Air Mobile game is to give them a direct, personal (need I say promotion enhancing) stake in supplying an Air Mobile Force.    

As the Iraqi article suggested - mass drops are not necessary but a Regimental/Brigade sized formation of independent Commandos (not all Para Qualified - some airlanded infantry, maybe even some LAV infantry) but all capable of operating with air logistics.   Useful at home here, or at least the training exercises would both bolster sovereignty and provide real world experience that would be of benefit overseas to allies of whichever Club of the Day.


----------



## HItorMiss

The Problem with the Commando moniker is what constitutes a Commando...currently Canada has two SOF Units in JTF2 and CSOR. If you want a Highly trained Airmobile Unit the Perhaps going back to the old Model of the Airborne minus the need to be Jumper. Have a Unit in-doc like the AIC only call it CIC or perhaps a small 2 month course/selection process. From there you integrate said unit into a Mobile force with integrated Airmobile assets and Logistics and perhaps this BG(ish) group could have a rotating Commander between the AF and the Army. With one element holding Command and the other 2IC and rotating that every 2-3 yrs.


I would like to add that said force would need some form of CAS for myself I am more a fan of Rotary CAS then Fast Air. Though prop driven might be a nice in between the two. I like AH's though  for escort of the UH's and for staying on station for intimate support with Fast Air and Arty on call.


----------



## a_majoor

http://www.jerrypournelle.com/mail/mail491.html



> *What Role is there for the USAF*
> 
> The US Air Force has always been primarily interested in maintaining itself as a Strategic Force. If I were them I would give up the Ground Support entirely to the army and navy and concentrate on your own High Frontier suggestion.
> 
> With that in mind a US Aerospace Force is a viable structure, let the other forces have the bottom 40000 feet, let the USAF control everything above. This would include satellites, THOR weapons, Ben Bova Laser Battlestations, and a fleet of Aerospace Fighters. This is the role I could envisage for a future USAF. The control of these and other Strategic Tools would be best controlled by a arm dedicated to them.
> 
> Dave March
> Military Interests Games Society Hamilton, ON
> 
> Become the Middle and possibly High Guard... USAF refused to give up the ground support mission even though it was clear they didn't want it and didn't want to do it. The miserable performance in close support is one reason USMC gets to keep its own air force. Marine Air works well with the ground forces. USAF hates the mission.



I'm bringing this back because I think it does illustrate the divide; USAF and their admirers want to be able to fly the biggest, baddest, most sophisticated aircraft, while most "grunts" (of whatever persuasion) are more concerned that something is overhead and available when they need it, and could care less if it is a Raptor or a cropduster with a guy hanging out the back with a C-6.

I suspect that many in the Airforce community are true believers in sophisticated, high tech solutions and see a B-2 filled with smart bombs as a great support platform. This may even be true under some circumstances, and I wouldn't say no if that was what was available. A bit farther in the future, airborne laser platforms will have moved from the pages of SF to working hardware (several different prototypes are flying around right now), so the Zoomies will have the biggest and best toys to bring to the game.

These tools are so sophisticated and so expensive (a single B-2 costs almost as much as an attack submarine, especially when you add in the special ground support it needs) that the centralized "pool" model of allocating resources does make sense. Using the arbitrary 40,000 ft line as the dividing point, then we can reasonably allocate decentralized resources for a "green" airforce, which the manoeuvre commander has in his own pocket. These aircraft can be as cheap and unsophisticated as desired (which seems to have been one of the reasons the USAF really hates the A-10, very low LCF for wannabe fighter jocks), and since they are flying under the USAF's air superiority umbrella, objections about flying into danger can be somewhat muted.

Perhaps this has been the real problem with this thread all along, not so much the type of airplane, but rather who controls the asset. IF it is an Airforce General or Theater Joint Forces commander, then high performance aircraft that can cover the entire AOR are the best possible asset. If it is a Brigade or Battalion commander, then something that can fly from unimproved airstrips and sections of road are in order.


----------



## thunderchild

maybe we can have things both ways, I took some advice from a previous posts, did some digging and got information from the Public Relations and Information office of the Swedish Airforce RE: the JAS-39c fully loaded it can take off from rough airstrips, airfields of parts there of and highways with a solid serface with in 600M.  It takes 1 C-130 load per day to support 3 aircraft (no mention of #of sorties per day) an can be maintained by 1 2.5 tone truck with a crew of 3.Is this someting close to what everybody is thinking?


----------



## Old Sweat

If it is a Brigade or Battalion commander, then something that can fly from unimproved airstrips and sections of road are in order.

I have lifted your last line because it all boils down to that. If we go that route, how many hours per day of air suport will we have? Not bloody many, I venture, and a lot less than under the present system.


----------



## Kirkhill

BulletMagnet said:
			
		

> The Problem with the Commando moniker is what constitutes a Commando...currently Canada has to SOF Units in JTF2 and CSOR. If you want a Highly trained Airmobile Unit the Perhaps going back to the old Model of the Airborne minus the need to be Jumper. Have an Unit in-doc like the AIC only call it CIC or perhaps a small 2 month course/selection process. From there you integrate said unit into a Mobile force with integrated Airmobile assets and Logistics and perhaps this BG(ish) group could have a rotating Commander between the AF and the Army. With one element holding Command and the other 2IC and rotating that every 2-3 yrs.
> 
> 
> I would like to add that said force would need some form of CAS for myself I am more a fan of Rotary CAS then Fast Air. Though prop driven might be a nice in between the two. I like AH's though  for escort of the UH's and for staying on station for intimate support with Fast Air and Arty on call.



Sorry for the lack of clarity.  I was referring to option 2 - the CAR Commando model - the reinforced company or the permanently formed combat team.


----------



## aesop081

thunderchild said:
			
		

> maybe we can have things both ways, I took some advice from a previous posts, did some digging and got information from the Public Relations and Information office of the Swedish Airforce RE: the JAS-39c fully loaded it can take off from rough airstrips, airfields of parts there of and highways with a solid serface with in 600M.  It takes 1 C-130 load per day to support 3 aircraft (no mention of #of sorties per day) an can be maintained by 1 2.5 tone truck with a crew of 3.Is this someting close to what everybody is thinking?



Just so you know, the Sweedish highways and road network was designed to support this. Our system is not.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

It really seems there are 3 types of fixed wing air support, 4 if you want to count air resupply, 

!. Recce/overhead cover being mainly passive relaying information to the ground troops. This can be done by many differnet platforms, loiter times, surveillance packages are the most important issues.

2. Air support from medium altitude via dumb munitions or guided munitions, as the cost (and a lesser amount of air frames) of first line fighters go up, I see the Air forces preferring this type of engagement where the aircraft are protected from low level AA (and large rocks) From the air force command view, it does not make sense to risk a 70 million dollar aircraft to strafe a few guys on a hilltop. (The squad being pinned down by said guys might be in disagreement with this viewpoint)

3. In the weeds and eating dirt flying, using rockets, guns and bombs to take out enemy positions close in and dirty. Presently there are only 2 frontline aircraft specifically designed for this task and to take the damage normally expected, these are the A10 and the SU-25  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sukhoi_Su-25 Both give up airspeed for other desirable characteristics, mainly survivability and slower maneuvering speeds and weapon loadouts. 

I guess the question to be asked of our Air force bosses is: Are you willing to send our new F-35 (assuming they buy such) into the weeds to support troops in close contact and risk serous damage or loss of theses aircraft?   I suspect I already know the answer, being an extremely long winded and roundabout way of saying NO while really saying we will support you as best we can as long as the risk of ground fire is nil. Therefore I believe we safely say the future of CAS in the Canadian Air force will be #2

So if we want and need #3 in the future we need another air frame. Based on our budget i don't think we can afford presently both fixed and rotary attack aircraft (never minding the political discussions about such) The USAF is upgrading the existing A-10 airframes, going by the internal politics of that organization, I wouldn't be surprised if a request to purchase some of those airframes might actually be entertained, the number that pops into my head is 20, for a squadron of 12 aircraft with spares. (out of 356 airframes to be upgraded)  I suspect most opposition to such would come from the Canadian Air Force command, who would see the budget and manning requirements of such a purchase as a threat to the plans to buy new fighters, followed by handwringing from Taliban jack and co. This is why I proposed the build up of a ground attack squadron based on similar platforms as our training aircraft. This squadron would be an virtual orphan, a threat to the established order of things and will have to survive on tight funding for some time before acceptance seeps in. The risk is that the squadron will be pressed into oversea service with 2nd line aircraft if we deploy into an operation with minimal airsupport. Mind you the army has had to deploy with 2nd rate equipment for years, it will be a matter of risks vs benefits and only those in the future will be able to decide that equation. What the main role of the squadron would be is to train dedicated CAS pilots with close ties to the ground forces and to change mindsets on the blue side of things. These pilots could also fly with our allies gaining experiance on other airframes and learning tactics.

Well I beaten this horse enough, now what else can I find in the back of the stable, hmmm MGS, no, Russian aircraft, no, SPG's, no, aircraft carrier, hmmm... nah to much typing, well off for a beer!  ;D  

The other option is rotary wing which we can leave for anther day.


----------



## Infanteer

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> If we go that route, how many hours per day of air suport will we have? Not bloody many, I venture, and a lot less than under the present system.



So, we are talking about the current system - how many hours of CAS has Air Command given TFA elements to date?


----------



## Old Sweat

As you well know, Air Command has not given any hours of air support to TFA because it has no aircraft deployed in theatre. However the combined air assets have provided a heck of a lot of air support. I have skimmed a couple of logs (unclassified) kept by FOO/FAC parties in theatre and they have often controlled several missions per day, even when not in TIC situations. 

Whatever aircraft Air Command uses makes no difference to the argument. If they are not deployed, they can't fly missions. However given the NATO procedures for air support, our troops have not suffered all that much from a lack of support.


----------



## Zoomie

A few things that have peaked my interest in the past pages - everything else is chaff and useless diatribe.

The Airforce doesn't decide what aircraft it buys or where it deploys.  The Government of Canada makes these decisions.  Purchase of the CC-177, CH-47, J-model, etc wasn't done to appease the green folks - it is just a part of fleet renewal and rationalization.

People with Master's Degrees in Education are the ones who design and develop training for each OSS.  If they believed that we needed to take Phase 3 Infantry, we would all be loaded on it while waiting for Phase 3 AFT <period>

CAS is not something new or lacking in the CF - our CF-188s are designed as attack aircraft (F/A).  Fiscal responsibility prohibits this multi-role aircraft being used to 100% of its capability - if we stopped fuel payments to the Navy and Army for a couple years, we could achieve this.  Sound fair?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

It's ironic that a air force type would deride Chaff, I think it would be your best friend when a radar wants to lock on you!!  ;D

The government does make the final decision, but not in a vacuum, they relay on the Senior Commands for advice, the pressure from Allies and Representatives from the companies and the workers in factories in their riding's, plus I suspect interest groups and cool TV shows about the latest miltary gizmo the minister saw on Saturday.


----------



## Good2Golf

[slightly OT]

CF-18's have been pitched, several times.  They performed exemplary duty during OP ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, but they are deployed on the direction of the Government, not on the wishes of the Air Force.  As others have noted, there has not been a shortage of offensive air support or battlefied air interdiction identified by NATO to request nations to provide more assets.  That's where it stops.  To imply that there is risk aversion on the part of the Air Force that causes the the case to be made not to deploy forces is uninformed at best.  Government is not sending them -- that appears to be 'point finale' -- that's life, we move on.    

Air support?  

What FOO here will say that with a 10-digit grid and tgt altitude, that they would not be able to effectively call in fires?  Question -- is a 10-digit grid and alt from a TUAV any less valuable than one from a FOO in the conduct of a fire mission?  Yup....thought so.  UAV capability only getting better.

Do the guys resupplied by CC130 airdrop when all other methods failed complain about not beinbg supported by air?  Yup....thought so again.

The list goes on, and will get longer in the near future....a little bit of introspective honesty in the *CF's* contributions in support of, and within the theatre would go a long way.

G2G


----------



## McG

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> [slightly OT]


I don't think it is off topic at all.  If one cannot demonstrate a requirement for "FOB CAS" because a network of existing CAS and UAV are meeting all of our needs, then it becomes very difficult to argue for such aircraft.  If "FOB CAS" will not result in aircraft on station any sooner (or more consistently), then there is no basis for calling on fixed wing attack aircraft to be staged any more forward; the existing procedure of flying from theatre bases (KAF, BAF, etc) or from out of country can meet our needs.

If effects on the ground are the point of concern, then capabilities of those aircraft flying from theatre bases should be examined.  If availability/responce time of aircraft is a concern, then perhaps more are required or perhaps more strike UAV should supplement the manned aircraft.

Going back to my earlier point, whatever the capability deficiency (real or perceived), it is not in our best interests to buy a low-intensity only CAS platform because this will only risk soldiers and airmen wherever out next theatre turns out to be.


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## Old Sweat

I second MCG's remarks. (I was going to say more, but my points do not require repitition.)

All I will add is what about air defence, including small arms in air defence?


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## a_majoor

I do believe that "FOB CAS" or a "Green Airforce" is desirable from several points of view: the availability of assets to the manouevre commander and the shortened response time for assets to get on station. As well, considering the huge logistical demands of high performance aircraft, a "Green Airforce" might actually be easier to deploy (and could also make self deploying the field force possible as well).

Obviously the Green Airforce would not look anything like the Blue Airforce, perhaps being heavily weighted towards armed UAVs and light cargo aircraft, but is the Blue Airforce is focused on their job at the higher end of the scale, then I don't believe that the Green Airforce will need to be too worried about enemy air power, and between the two will also have the means to deal with many levels of enemy air defenses.

WRT air defenses, it seems that even very sophisticated and high tech aircraft are vulnerable to small arms fire when they try to get "down and dirty". US aircraft losses in Viet Nam, Argentinian aircraft running out of fuel and crashing on the way home due to holed fuel tanks and Apache helicopters being shot down by SA fire during OIF come to mind. Even worse is the way low tech can be adapted against aircraft, certain types of mines and IED's can be rigged to be triggered by the downwash of a helicopter rotor, for example. The only solutions there are either "flying tanks" or changing TTPs on a constant basis to throw the air defenders off.


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## Kirkhill

Thucydides - what particular effects do you want the CAS to bring to the field?

Do you want more "eyes on"?

Do you want a flying machine gun platform?

Do you want to drop HE on targets, and if so what sizes (2 kg, 20 kg, 200 kg or 2000 kg)?

I would suggest to you that beyond the machine gun platform that there are other means of delivering those capabilities.  And if it is the machine gun platform you want then you move into the A-10/AC-130 realm for fixed wing solutions. Meanwhile rotary wing platforms are available for that task.

What would a Light Attack Aircraft contribute that could not be covered by a mix of UAVs, HIMARS/GMRLS/MRLS and helos?


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## a_majoor

If I had to prioritize (it is not easy making priorities you know!), I would say "eyes on" is first, and rapid DF second, with bomb hauling third.

While I started with the CF-5 as an example, the idea has evolved from catalogue shopping, so a "Green" UAV or new ideas like the LAMV are worth considering. More to follow.


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## Kirkhill

Would this fit into the mix?



> The lurker bomb that can hover for ten hours... and then strike its target  in the space of a minuteBy Peter Almond
> Last updated at 2:38 AM on 12th October 2008
> 
> A revolutionary missile that can stalk a target until the perfect moment to strike is being developed by the Ministry of Defence for use against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
> The so-called lurker bomb will also be able to shadow British troops for up to ten hours or 100 miles, ready to take out enemy targets with surgical precision at a minute’s notice.
> The 12ft weapon – officially named Fire Shadow and made in Britain by leading missile manufacturer MBDA – will be operated by the Royal Artillery.



Source: The Daily Mail

Graphics on the link.  50lb/20kg warhead.


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## YZT580

Admittedly, I am not, repeat, not an expert in the delivery of munitions but I am an expert in aviation concepts and one issue that is not forthcoming in this discussion is the advantage of having real eyes lurking overhead and watching the activities going on below.  Returning veterans from Viet Nam all spoke of the comfort of having an FAC overhead during a firefight with one of those big old sky raiders (not a jet) that was able to lumber in when needed.  They weren't fast, they weren't pretty but they certainly did the job.  

I also suspect that much of the efforts of 'the other guy' is to identify means of interfering with the electronics on the UAVs and this will happen eventually.  All in all, there would seem to be much to be said for having an A-10 style aircraft in the inventory, even more so than helicopters which are slower and more vulnerable (me thinks)


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## Steve Daly

CAS should remain a manned venue for the time being.

UAVs have serious shortcomings in situational awareness, they are overloading the existing network infrastructure and the loss rate in routine ops is 5-10 times that of a manned platform. UAVs also have shortcomings in the type of weapons that may be employed, they are fine for long range engagements with missile/LGBs or newer GPS guided weapons... but they suffer horribly when the job requires strafing or engaging a close-in popup target.

A couple of generations down the road and UCAVs may be suitable for the CAS role, until then we need a man to be not just in the loop, but in the cockpit.


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## Steve Daly

Hello all!

I found this site while seeing where my CF-156B concept had wandered off to on the web.  

I noticed that the previous subject discussing the concept had been somewhat 'spoiled' by the apparent presence of someone who really didn't understand the concept. Or perhaps  didn't understand any concept... I wasn't quite sure.

For clarity, the original article can be found at: http://www.casr.ca/mp-army-aviation-coin-daly.htm with an accompanying 'Modest Proposal' at: http://www.casr.ca/mp-army-aviation-coin-daly.htm  The included attachment shows a rather different view of the Snowbirds than many may be familiar with. The image is based on the original CASR article artwork.  

Any feedback welcome.


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## Schafer

Interesting concept..... It would be just like in Vietnam when rescue choppers would be flying into save a downed pilot they were escorted by prop driven aircraft that provided protection. Personally I like the idea, but in reality due to date the CF has been given to withdraw forces from the sandbox. It is unlikely that we would have this, if it were to ever be approved. Sorry to be the bearer of bad news.....

But good idea.


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## Steve Daly

Despite the merged thread which brings my other post here...

The CF-156B concept is not just for COIN or CAS roles. In fact, COIN as a role should be hastened to a quick and ignoble death. I'm working on a new concept which would replace COIN with a new acronym, and a new mission profile. At present the working acronym is LASSO (Light Airborne Security, Strike and Observation). Cheap multirole aircraft doing a variety a valuable roles with minimum modification, that is something Canada can afford and the rest of NATO actually can use.

On the CAS side, we have to acknowledge that Canada is never going to be able to afford a dedicated CAS/BAI platform. CAS/BAI is going to be limited to whatever capability the CF-18 replacement brings to the table. 

Even if Canada were to be interested in purchasing later Mks of the BA Hawk, the latest version has a flyaway price in excess of $30M C/airframe. To acquire any useful number we start talking about an order in excess of $1B C!

Not within the next 25 years... by then UCAVs should be suitable and Canada might look at that capability.

btw... How do I get this forum software to stop displaying my email? None of the profile options seem to make any difference and I'll be damned if I'm going to advertise a valid email addy for any spambot that is lurking!


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## Ex-Dragoon

Your email when in italics can only be seen by you, the DS and the Forum owner.


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## Steve Daly

Thanks Ex-Dragoon!

I'm used to other boards where it displays as 'Hidden' when not being displayed. Different forum, different software... got to get used to the differences.

And now... back to our regularly scheduled topic, already in progress.


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## a_majoor

CAS as supplied by the "Green Airforce" would rely on a mixture of airframes and systems. I can certainly see manned FACs as an important part of the mix, but what goes in after the target might be an armed UAV, a rotary wing platform or an intelligent munition like Kirkhill highlighted (or similar weapons like "Tacit Rainbow" or ALARM; an anti radar cruise missile from the late 1980s and a British anti radiation missile respectively).

The FAC would also have access to other "Green" systems as well, so if a target can be services by artillery, mortars or a nearby LAV then the FAC should have access to the appropriate nets to call it in.

The other thing a "Green Airforce" should be able to supply is rapid logistical support, both for the aircraft and the supported ground forces as well (although this is probably the subject of a different thread. Mods, is starting a "Green Airforce" thread from this point appropriate?)


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## WrenchBender

Some of the things that are being bandied about here are included in the INGRESS program for the CH146. 

WrenchBender


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## Steve Daly

INGRESS should have been nose mounted to free up a weapons pylon. It's just another example of the head shed trying to get things implemented quickly in case the politicos change their mind and tighten the purse strings.

A 'Green Airforce' might have certain appeal, but it's just going to get in the way of fleet rationalization and commonality. It's also going to start a war between various political factions within the military. A much better way to go would be to better integrate capabilities that support the ground forces with capabilities that the Air Force want.

An example would be upgrading the CT-142 Gonzo Nav trainers to full CP-142 patrol aircraft. They can still be used in the training role, but an expanded fleet with updated sensors also provides the Air Force, and supported forces, with an enhanced surveillance capability.

A Green Airforce means we get back to the situation that saw the CF get rid of the CH-147s, the boys in blue saw no utility in them as perceived 'Army' assets. None of the elements are going to support any capability that doesn't seem to bring them an advantage.  If we want an airborne capability for the Army, we have to design for the Air Force. It's all a matter of stroking egos, stroke the wrong one and you're wasting your time. Stroke the right ego and whole worlds of possibilities open up. 

To design a CAS capability for the Army, first figure out what the exact Army needs are. Then figure out what those capabilities, or extensions of those capabilities, bring to the Air Force. Offer up a desirable option, not an imposition on an already tight budget.


----------



## aesop081

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> An example would be upgrading the CT-142 Gonzo Nav trainers to full CP-142 patrol aircraft.



No.

The CT-142 , all 4 of them, are not enough as it is to provide for the required production of ANAVs and the soon-to-be increase in production of AES Ops. We cannot afford to send them to do anything else. Even if we were to buy more Dash-8s, several of them would be needed at CFANS.

Short and medium range coast patrols is already well in the hands of the NASP and long-range by the CP-140.


----------



## Steve Daly

There are insufficient numbers of NASP airframes and the shortening of CP-140 numbers mean that there is a shortfall there as well.

Bring the CT-142 up to CP-142 standard, it makes a better trainer anyway. Add airframes to fully equip the Sqdn as a Patrol/OCU Sqdn.

If the Sqdn is going to stay as a training asset only, cut it loose to the civvie sector. It shouldn't be any different than any other flight training done by the Air Force. As it stands the Sqdn is under-equipped to serve any role other than training and the assets can be used elsewhere.

Ultimately, we should be looking to get as much utility as possible from each asset. Training assets can have a valuable wartime role if the imagination is there. I was in 414 (EW) Sqdn when Ottawa and AirCom told us the Sqdn had no wartime role. There could have been one, but the head shed wouldn't listen. Instead a valuable asset was on the budget chopping block as just another training-only asset to be axed.

A capable military demands that we do better.


----------



## aesop081

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> There are insufficient numbers of NASP airframes



Thats a contractual issue. If the Government wants more planes from NASP contractor, all it has to do is ask.



> and the shortening of CP-140 numbers mean that there is a shortfall there as well.



Of course it creates a shortfall. It creates a shortfall in an area that a CP-142 cannot support.



> Bring the CT-142 up to CP-142 standard, it makes a better trainer anyway.



Sure.



> Add airframes to fully equip the Sqdn as a Patrol/OCU Sqdn.



And what is it going to patrol ? The Manitoba lakes ?



> If the Sqdn is going to stay as a training asset only, cut it loose to the civvie sector. It shouldn't be any different than any other flight training done by the Air Force.



I'm sure that when the CT-142 life-expires, that is what will happen.



> As it stands the Sqdn is under-equipped to serve any role other than training and the assets can be used elsewhere.



It is under-equiped for its training role. Lets not scatter its assets to other missions wich are already filled by other assets.



> A capable military demands that we do better.



Certainly not by modernizing an old airframe for a mission that is already being done by brand new KA and .......Dash-8s.


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## x-zipperhead

CP-142???  ???  oi,oi,oi.  What next.  Thinking outside the box is well and good, but come on.  Besides the fact that, like CDN Aviator pointed out, there's too few of them as it is and they would be inadequate in a patrol capacity, you seem to dismiss the importance of force generation in favour of finding an operational use for every airframe.  All these different airframes with a multitude of operational tasks aren't much good if you can't train pilots and crews to fly them.  Once you have training establishments competing with operations for the training use of airplanes then you are going to experience a reduction in the production of the aircrew you need.  It ain't sexy but you have to accept that you need schools and airplanes dedicated to training.  

Maybe a little biased since I am in one of those training organizations


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## a_majoor

Back to the main argument, more thinking about the "Green Airforce" seems to be going back to airmobile and "Air Cavalry" concepts of the late 1950's and early 1960's, where the concept grew beyond supporting the manouevre commander to being the manouevre force. I believe the most fully fleshed out example was the 11th Air Assault Division (Test), which was the imediate predecessor of the 1rst Air Cavalry. The primary difference was the formation had integral fixed wing aircraft as well, including "Buffalo" or "Carribou" light transport airplanes for logistical support of dispersed formations.

A Canadian version of the idea was floated here, and can be considered an attempt to merge the ideals of airmobility with a view to cost constraints. How realistic the idea actually is is for the reader to decide.


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## McG

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> CAS should remain a manned venue for the time being.
> 
> UAVs have serious shortcomings in situational awareness ...


Sure, but I wonder ...


			
				Steve Daly said:
			
		

> .... the working acronym is LASSO (Light Airborne Security, Strike and Observation).


It seems to me that striking and observing are things that a UAV can do pretty well.  What does "Light Airborne Security" entail that makes a "Cheap multirole aircraft" better suited than a UAV?

Keep in mind that we also have the CF-18 (with its on-board pilots) doing CAS.  If this were augmented with a strike UAV, the two types of aircraft should be employed such that thier strenghts compliment eachoter.  Is there a critical capability gap in a CF-18 and UAV organization that would not exist in a CF-18 and "Cheap multirole aircraft" organization?


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## Steve Daly

Too many issues for me to answer in my available time right now... but I will address them in due course.

LASSO is an answer to a question that should have been asked, but never was. Primarily, it removes the need to divert front-line combat forces to provide security in rear areas. That's why the focus is on cheap multirole platforms. Situational Awareness is the biggest factor. Current generation UAVs have severe limitations in the SA realm.

Having an _*expanded * _  CP-142 fleet patrol the Manitoba lakes might be something for the future, but I would think that deploying for NorPats, patrolling the Great Lakes or patrolling the US-Canada border were all higher priority. Feel free to make a case for any area you think needs patrolling though.  

btw, having a Sqdn train and have an operational role has worked quite well in Fighter Group for about half a century... no reason that the model can't be equally well applied by a patrol unit. Mostly it entails training sorties supporting an operational tasking on an 'as required' basis. Think about it... does the CP-142 need to be in Winterpeg to train, or can it be deployed to conduct OJT?


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## McG

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> .... Situational Awareness is the biggest factor. Current generation UAVs have severe limitations in the SA realm. ...


Arguably, the same vague statement could be made of a manned aircraft too.  It looks to me that you are presenting opinion as fact, and expecting other readers to simply accept that your underlying arguments are sound.



			
				Steve Daly said:
			
		

> LASSO is an answer to a question that should have been asked, but never was. Primarily, it removes the need to divert front-line combat forces to provide security in rear areas.


Maybe an answer in search of a question.  Is there really a requirement for a dedicated RAS CAS platform (or would that be CAS RAS??!)?


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## Michael OLeary

By all means, sell a plan for a dedicated Rear Area Security fighter.  And once the estimate has been completed for the Commander, the plan will ensure that they will be diverted to RAS if and when they are needed, but only as long as the Commander's plan will not be detrimentally affected by their retasking.


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## Kirkhill

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> LASSO is an answer to a question that should have been asked, but never was. Primarily, it removes the need to divert front-line combat forces to provide security in rear areas. That's why the focus is on cheap multirole platforms. Situational Awareness is the biggest factor. Current generation UAVs have severe limitations in the SA realm.




I'm afraid that I am not following.   We can't afford line of communications troops to secure our rear but we are to find the funds and personnel to recreate something akin to the 2ATAF  of 9th Air Force of WW2 and have them supply 24 hour cab-rank service?   Even with the full resources of WW2 that service couldn't be supplied - and that was just to supply strike forces, let alone supply your 24 hour observation and security tasks.


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## aesop081

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> Having an _*expanded * _  CP-142 fleet patrol the Manitoba lakes might be something for the future,



Why ? Is there some threat in the lakes area i missed while i was flying there ?



> but I would think that deploying for NorPats,



Ever done one of those ?



> patrolling the Great Lakes or patrolling the US-Canada border were all higher priority.



More of a law enforcement mission that a military one is that case.



> btw, having a Sqdn train and have an operational role has worked quite well in Fighter Group for about half a century... no reason that the model can't be equally well applied by a patrol unit.



Its already being done by the LRP comunity. Its called 404 LRP&T Sqn.



> Mostly it entails training sorties supporting an operational tasking on an 'as required' basis.



I wouldnt know anything about what an OTU does, i'm only a gradute from 404.



> Think about it... does the CP-142 need to be in Winterpeg to train, or can it be deployed to conduct OJT?



I wouldnt know about that as i only learned my job on the CT-142 in Winnipeg. Theres a good reason that most flying training in this country happens away from Major centers and around flat open terrain.


----------



## x-zipperhead

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> btw, having a Sqdn train and have an operational role has worked quite well in Fighter Group for about half a century... no reason that the model can't be equally well applied by a patrol unit. Mostly it entails training sorties supporting an operational tasking on an 'as required' basis. Think about it... does the CP-142 need to be in Winterpeg to train, or can it be deployed to conduct OJT?



True, just as 404 Sqn does in the LRP community.  The difference is those are operational training squadrons, meaning they are training wings qualified pilots and crews to be effective on those platforms in an operational environment.  As a result, they can fulfill limited operational missions.  The CT-142 is used to train ab-intio aircrew (brand new), who cannot be employed operationally.    If you want to find a medium range patrol platform, if that is even required, there may be better choices than the Dash-8.  The CT-142 has a mission to train ab-intio Navigators & AES Ops.  It is well suited and it is situated in a good place to fulfill that mission.  Just as the CT-156 is dedicated to training ab-initio pilots.

I don't want to derail the topic here, but you seem to be dismissing the need for dedicated resources to train ab-intio aircrew.  

Anyway back to the CT-156 being used in a CAS role.  It's an interesting idea. Relatively inexpensive and would provide increased CAS.  One thing that comes to mind though is that when we acquire such a airplane is it just for Afganistan?  Granted, it would be superb there as we have total air superiority. We probably will be out of there in the next few years.  Would a hundred havards be much good to us in any potential conflict with an enemy who actually has it's own airforce.  Are we acquiring for an immediate need or a medium to long term rationalized procurement of assets that will meet our defence needs in decades to come?


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## a_majoor

Assuming that we or our allies (more likely) will provide and maintain air superiority over the AOR, then there are few arguments against "FOB CAS", the "Green Airforce" or related concepts. I should note that in the beginning of the thread the need for aircraft with some high performance attributes was suggested, since they could be pressed into service against enemy air threats (even if the threat is enemy UAV's or their own "Green Airforce"), as well as to maintain quick response time. Note the kickoff aircraft for the thought experiment was the CF-5; a relatively "hot" machine, although with limited "legs" or payload. 

This LASSO concept really seems like creating an airmobile manoeuvre force (unless I am reading this wrong), and these ideas have been floated and tested many times since the late 1950's. Fixed wing aircraft *integrated* into the airmobile manoeuvre force would seem to have lots of advantages, turboprop aircraft can certainly keep up with and escort the helicopters, and fixed wing transport aircraft can provide much greater logistical leverage to fast moving and widely dispersed forces. Given the desire for more capable CAS platforms, turbofan powered A-10 analogues might be the ideal choice (given nothing like the A-10 is being built today, we can call the hypothetical machine the A-_x_)

Given the limitations in overall resources to create pilots, airframes and infrastructure, I am very tempted to suggest the one "high impact" airframe we should be looking at for the manoeuvre commander is a FAC platform, which can provide real time observation of the AOR and vector in and control various assets in support of the manoeuvre commander. Given the high threat nature of the job from ground fire, a two seat OV-_x_ would be the ideal, and given the will and resources to create that, then the next step of introducing an A-_x_ is both logical and justified. (A airborn FAC also has some ability to act as a DF platform in his own right, many FAC aircraft in the past carried rocket pods to mark targets, and a WP warhead is _always_ guaranteed to get attention). OF course a modern FAC also has the option to lase a target and guide a JDAM from an orbiting B-2 as well....


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## Steve Daly

OK, ignoring the concepts that aren't really part of this thread...

LASSO, as a concept, has nothing to do with airmobile forces, but it could support such forces.

Basic taskings would include:

1. Airborne Security. The platform should be able to patrol an area and deter/deny Special Forces or irregular troops access to the area.  This is basically a COIN role. Protection of logistics/communication nodes and such assets as harbours/airfields is also part of the tasking.

2. Light Strike.  To accomplish (1) the platform should be able to engage detected targets with guns/missile fire as required.

3. Anti-Helicopter. Killing choppers that intrude into the rear area is also required.

4.  Point Air-Defence.  The ability to engage UAVs, cruise missiles or conventional strike aircraft is desirable.  The basic goal here is to extend the air-defence envelope of a high-value target to begin the process of attrition further out or to deny a hostile force the use of UAVs over a potential target.

5. Observation. To accomplish the tasking the platform is going to require sensors such as EO/IR turrets and radar. SAR radar is probably a requirement. A complex A-A radar is likely not needed, even if missiles such as AMRAAM are carried they can be used co-operatively with another platform responsible for datalink target info and mid-course guidance.

The 'inspiration' is the WWII CVE escort carrier. The CVE freed up more capable units to carry out the real front-line battle. CVEs protected rear areas and carried the brunt of the ASW battle late in the Atlantic War. In the Pacific the role was a little more wide open, protection of amphib forces ashore and fire support to those forces was quite common. The closest aircraft to my envisioned concept would be the 1980's British Aerospace SABA (Small Agile Battlefield Aircraft). SABA was A-A optimized, but a mud-moving capability is a natural extension.

The thing needs to be cheap enough that it doesn't break the bank. The basic idea is to free more regular forces for the main battle, not defeat those forces by sucking up huge amounts of defence dollars.

Note: The CF-156B concept is not really fully compliant with the LASSO concept. The CF-156B is somewhat lacking in performance and lacks a radar (though one could easily be fitted). Something like the Piper Enforcer would be a better match, but a tailwheel aircraft is not going to gain much traction these days.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Do you know a radar weights about 1000 lbs at the minimum and the max weight of the Harvard is 6500 lbs?  You would bring his payload to virtually 0.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> OK, ignoring the concepts that aren't really part of this thread...



It's not much of a debate if you're only on "send" with your one theory.  And it's the fastest way to get people to ignore you.  If you have a proposal that you actually want to try and develop some support for, then you should be prepared to debate and defend it in detail, including the tangential concerns of other willing posters.  If your approach is simply to ignore any information which doesn't fit your plan, you've already failed.


----------



## Steve Daly

> Do you know a radar weights about 1000 lbs at the minimum and the max weight of the Harvard is 6500 lbs?  You would bring his payload to virtually 0.



SupersonicMax, the AN/APG-67 radar weighs all of 160 Lbs. The LYNX SAR/GMTI radar weighs even less at approx. 115 Lbs. Either radar would be suitable now that later variants of the APG-67 have SAR capability. The APG-67 would also confer full AMRAAM capability if that were desired.  Fit would probably need to be in a wingtip nacelle such as was carried by the Hellcat and Corsair night fighters of WWII. Field of view would admittedly suffer somewhat. AN/APG-67: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/7729.pdf Lynx: http://www.ga-asi.com/products/lynxSAR.php 

Micheal O'Leary, I'm ignoring the concepts not part of this thread... because they shouldn't be part of this thread. If you, or anyone else, wants to discuss them in another thread that's cool. It's basic forum manners to not drag a thread off-topic and this was getting way out of hand. Tangential concerns are one thing, direction changes are another. Discussion of patrol aircraft, patrol areas and utilization of training assets in operational, albeit secondary, roles doesn't quite fit with _'Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?'_ now is it? Debate and discussion are all very well and good. It stretches the mind and, if nothing else, forces the person defending a position to more fully understand it themselves.

There are some tangential concerns that are probably quite valid here, such as the use of CAS/COIN aircraft to support a deployed airmobile force. LASSO platforms would be even more capable in that role, but I hadn't originally weighed rough-field capability amongst the desired attributes... but hey, why not? LASSO v LASSO combat is something I hadn't thought of as well, and probably should have.  If weapons exist they will probably face each other.


----------



## aesop081

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> Micheal O'Leary, I'm ignoring the concepts not part of this thread...



Excuse me but you are the one who brought it up so now you are stuck with it. Adress the points brought forward by people who fly/have flown maritime patrol and have flown the 142.



> because they shouldn't be part of this thread. If you, or anyone else, wants to discuss them in another thread that's cool. It's basic forum manners to not drag a thread off-topic and this was getting way out of hand. Tangential concerns are one thing, direction changes are another. Discussion of patrol aircraft, patrol areas and utilization of training assets in operational, albeit secondary, roles doesn't quite fit with _'Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?'_ now is it? Debate and discussion are all very well and good. It stretches the mind and, if nothing else, forces the person defending a position to more fully understand it themselves.



You are the new guy here so dont think for a second that you can lecture the rest of us on what is proper form or not within this forum.

Have a great day.


----------



## Steve Daly

CDN Aviator, I'm not going to wander afield just because your sensibilities demand answers. If the issue is important to you, start a thread. If the issue is unimportant, don't start a thread. I really couldn't care much one way or another, I used the idea as an example only... if the example was rejected I would normally just look for another, better, example. 



> You are the new guy here so dont think for a second that you can lecture the rest of us on what is proper form or not within this forum.



I wouldn't think of lecturing folks on what is proper form _within this forum_. I will, however, remain bound by the acceptable behavior required at the majority of forums where I've been a member. This forum is nowhere near as active as others where I've been a member or a mod, perhaps things can be somewhat looser here and still work out OK. 

And now back to our regularly scheduled discussion, already in progress...


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## OldSolduer

How about an upgraded two seat biplane with the observer tossing hand grenades out the back? 
Just a bit of humour. ;D


----------



## SupersonicMax

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> SupersonicMax, the AN/APG-67 radar weighs all of 160 Lbs. The LYNX SAR/GMTI radar weighs even less at approx. 115 Lbs. Either radar would be suitable now that later variants of the APG-67 have SAR capability. The APG-67 would also confer full AMRAAM capability if that were desired.  Fit would probably need to be in a wingtip nacelle such as was carried by the Hellcat and Corsair night fighters of WWII. Field of view would admittedly suffer somewhat. AN/APG-67: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/7729.pdf Lynx: http://www.ga-asi.com/products/lynxSAR.php
> 
> Micheal O'Leary, I'm ignoring the concepts not part of this thread... because they shouldn't be part of this thread. If you, or anyone else, wants to discuss them in another thread that's cool. It's basic forum manners to not drag a thread off-topic and this was getting way out of hand. Tangential concerns are one thing, direction changes are another. Discussion of patrol aircraft, patrol areas and utilization of training assets in operational, albeit secondary, roles doesn't quite fit with _'Close Air Support in the CF: Bring back something like the CF-5 or introduce something with props?'_ now is it? Debate and discussion are all very well and good. It stretches the mind and, if nothing else, forces the person defending a position to more fully understand it themselves.
> 
> There are some tangential concerns that are probably quite valid here, such as the use of CAS/COIN aircraft to support a deployed airmobile force. LASSO platforms would be even more capable in that role, but I hadn't originally weighed rough-field capability amongst the desired attributes... but hey, why not? LASSO v LASSO combat is something I hadn't thought of as well, and probably should have.  If weapons exist they will probably face each other.



You know that with the radar comes the wiring, the new hardares, etc, etc.  That's what's heavy in the end.  It all adds up.  Where would you put the radar?  I can't seem to find any space for it.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Steve Daly,

From my perspective what is appears that you have done is yank a capability concept out of your ass, given it a pretty acronym, and now are busily waving away any suggestion that your argument isn't fully developed from a task assessment or capability requirement perspective.  Additionally, you seem to be ignoring, or just haven't offered, details concerning a reasoned argument to justify the expense and efforts to develop a modified capability. What, exactly, makes you so well positioned to be the inventor/champion of this concept which you seem to imply has been ignored by the existing establishment?

So, before we put the cart before the horse by situating the estimate and leaping right to a fancy acronym and selection of airframe, lets start with your arguments to prove a deficiency exists that cannot be met by existing resources.  And source data would be welcome to help shape your argument.

Next, since the defence budget is not unlimited, what capability(ies) get cut to fund this new one?  And how do you demonstrate that your proposal is of greater value?

And, while we're n the subject of poorly presented proposals:



			
				Michael O`Leary said:
			
		

> The following is recovered from a number of old threads and posted here for reference:
> 
> If you want to start proposing new aircraft programs, start with these points:
> 
> Tasks and roles to be conducted.
> Aircrew training requirements.
> Aircraft maintenance lifecycle.
> Number of airframes required, based on your assessment of tasks.
> Expected lifespan of "new" airframes, compared to expectation of available manufacturer and principal nation support.
> Requirements and costs to retrain and retool all required maintenance facilities and maintainers.
> Infrastructure costs to support new aircraft in all Wing locations.
> 
> As you can see, simply comparing statistics or unit costs doesn't quite scratch the surface of what you are proposing....



As anyone that's been to one of our staff colleges can tell you, you win no points by assuming problems away, or by jumping to a preferred solution without examining and dealing with the details.

If this is such a great idea, then lay down the basics of the estimate showing why we need it, and how we can afford it. If it's not worth that effort, then it's just another wild-assed wish list idea.


----------



## Kirkhill

Michael, you've stolen my thunder.

Mr. Daly, I believe that Michael is dead right in suggesting that you are situating the estimate in order to justify your choice of a P-51 knock-off for the mission.  Personally I have always been a fan of the DH Mosquito - a larger two seater aircraft in the medium weight range (11 tonnes) that could move fast, carry useful payloads, had long legs, could fight and was cheap to build.

I am sure that we could cobble together something similar today and maybe have it take over some other roles as well.  Perhaps a Buffalo replacement......

But that is an opinion.

First of all I need to be convinced that there is a sufficiently wide capability gap to justify diverting resources to make a specialized plug.  Perhaps if you went back to square one and focused less on the platform and more on the battlefield we might get a clearer picture of why you think we need such a piece of kit.    

And no, consideration of the battlefield environment is not tangential to discussions  about the kit to be employed thereupon.

Cheers.


----------



## aesop081

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> CDN Aviator, I'm not going to wander afield just because your sensibilities demand answers. If the issue is important to you, start a thread. If the issue is unimportant, don't start a thread. I really couldn't care much one way or another, I used the idea as an example only... if the example was rejected I would normally just look for another, better, example.
> 
> I wouldn't think of lecturing folks on what is proper form _within this forum_. I will, however, remain bound by the acceptable behavior required at the majority of forums where I've been a member. This forum is nowhere near as active as others where I've been a member or a mod, perhaps things can be somewhat looser here and still work out OK.
> 
> And now back to our regularly scheduled discussion, already in progress...



And with that i will assign zero credibility to anything you have to say and put you on ignore.

Have a great evening.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

> This forum is nowhere near as active as others where I've been a member or a mod, perhaps things can be somewhat looser here and still work out OK.



Not as active, hmmm? Well 21,000+ members is nothing to sneeze at in my opinion. We have nowheres near the numbers like militaryphotos.net(for which I am glad) but frankly I think our well regarded reputation Forces wide speaks for itself.


----------



## x-zipperhead

Steve Daly said:
			
		

> It's basic forum manners to not drag a thread off-topic and this was getting way out of hand.


I believe I may be one you direct this comment to.  You took the thread in that direction while you pontificated from your soapbox.  You ventured into a lane where some of us, who know a thing or two within that lane, had to question your assertions.  If you want to be a know-it-all and wander afield yourself, don't whine that the thread is going somewhere else.  I don't appreciate being called rude.


----------



## Steve Daly

OK, in order... if I miss anyone, just remind me.

*OldSolduer*: An upgraded bipe works for me as long as it's open cockpit, painted in garish colours and the aircrew wear white scarves. Please note, the scarves must be silk, none of this new-fangled synthetic stuff. ;D

*SupersonicMax* : The AT-6B already has a MIL Standard 1553 databus built in and computer/display capabilities for the new sensor. Added weight would be a factor, but primarily in increased structure for the mount, power/datalines for the radar and possibly a larger alternator. Based on similar mods I've taken part in, the increase would be 300 Lbs for the APG-76, maybe 350 if the alternator required upgrade. That's inclusive of the radar itself. Both radars are designed for small airframes and small electrical loads. Fitting, as previously stated would probably need to be similar to the Corsair or Hellcat night fighters. Check out http://modelingmadness.com/reviews/korean/cleaverf4u5n.htm It's a model of a Corsair night fighter, but does give a good idea of how the radar was fitted. Not ideal, as I said previously there would probably be limitation on the radar field of view.

*Michael O`Leary*: 


> and now are busily waving away any suggestion that your argument isn't fully developed from a task assessment or capability requirement perspective.


 Exactly where have I done that? The only thing I have waved away is the sidetrack discussion of the CP-142. That isn't, and never was part of the discussion. It was an example only, on a separate point. Perhaps a bad example, but as something not on topic in the first place it's something that should be ignored or left for a different discussion. As for selection of airframe, I haven't selected one... I've suggested that the BA SABA comes close, or that the Piper Enforcer is close (with one huge obvious drawback), but haven't selected any airframe as being truly suitable. For you edification, I did read the passage you quoted. I ran into a basic problem though in compliance... as I haven't identified a platform that might fit the perceived need, it isn't yet possible to start trying to generate numbers.


> If this is such a great idea, then lay down the basics of the estimate showing why we need it, and how we can afford it. If it's not worth that effort, then it's just another wild-assed wish list idea.



Fair enough. Please excuse me if I keep this short at this juncture. The basic question underlying my concept is this: "What does the Air Force bring to the rear-area security table?" There are loads of front-line assets (but never enough), but can the Air Force only contribute by diverting those assets just as they are needed at the front? I considered the possibility that a role-specific rear-area asset might actually free more front-line assets to the main fight rather than divert resources. Force balance would require careful assessment, at what point does it become a diminishing return?

I selected a new acronym early in order to avoid the rather extensive baggage associated with COIN. As you are, no doubt, aware there has been a rather large amount of resistance in First World air forces to acquiring COIN-type aircraft. Most of that has centered, IMHO, on the lack of insurgents to counter. The platform has an inherent capability of doing other things, but COIN aircraft get swept under the COIN rug and those 'other things' get done by higher value units. This has lead to accelerated use of things like USAF F-16's in roles where a lower value unit would be suitable, if available. Citation available upon request. 

*Kirkhill*: The potential of a 'modern' Mosquito is very high, perhaps ideal for the role envisioned. My only concern would be maneuverability on the air-air side. A twin engine configuration solves the radar fit question ideally, but cost might make the diminishing return point very low. As for selecting a Mustang knock off... haven't done it, haven't any idea how you might have got that idea. I said the Enforcer would be a better match (than the CF-156B), but immediately qualified that by discounting a tailwheel configured aircraft.

*CDN Aviator*: Says he has me on ignore, so this space intentionally left blank.

*Ex-Dragoon*:


> Not as active, hmmm? Well 21,000+ members is nothing to sneeze at in my opinion.



Not a derogatory statements, just a simple statement of fact. I'm currently active in communities that have far more frequent posts. In one case the forum has generated approx 950K posts in the last 4-4 1/2 years (I was a mod there, but stepped down to get more free time.). In another case the forum has generated only 15K posts, but that counter was reset when the software crashed and was unrecoverable... on the 27/Sept/2008. My most active forum was while working as a flight-simulation administrator for one of the premier online gaming leagues... that place was a madhouse, generating 3000 posts/day! Almost made a killing there on the buyout, damn tech crash.  My Air Force background, coupled with a life-long involvement with Flight Sim had lead to an ownership stake in a company that was being targeted for potential takeover by Microsoft. The opening moves had been made when the bubble burst and our company, like a great number of others folded. Don't take me to mean those places are better, but it does require a somewhat more stringent enforcement of staying on topic. I've been involved with places like that since I got my first Internet connection and doubt that I'll be changing using that form of conduct anytime soon.

*x-zipperhead*: Nope, wasn't you I was referring to. I always appreciate a free exchange of ideas, but do try to limit myself to one conversational topic per thread. I notice that your user-image is a CP-140. If anything I said here, by way of example, makes you want to discuss a patrol-related topic with me... sure ( Why do I have a feeling the CP-142 leaps to mind?). But how about we do it elsewhere than a thread about CAS? I'm not as conversant on patrol issues as I might be, but my time in 414 (EW) did teach me more than a few things concerning how to conduct combined training and operational taskings. 414 had to train all it's Navs to the task, there really wasn't any assets available to do that training other than what we had flying, and the only spares that might have been used as training aids were there as well. We also had to convert pilots to the CT-133, train transport guys to fly the CC-117 in a fighter-type environment and train ground crew to the rather unofficial "tech crewman" ideal. That unit also deployed... a lot. I lost count of exercise deployments when I crossed 50. I went to Cool Pool so often during the initial Hornet workups that Base Flight Cold Lake thought I worked there. A unique Sqdn leads to unique problems and unique solutions... and we all know just how well received any suggestion from the new guy in the unit is when he starts with "At my last unit...". Some of that stuff may never have been spread throughout the rest of the military, EW was always the red-headed bastard stepchild of Fighter Group. 

I think that covers it, apologies to anyone I might have missed.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Steve Daly,

If you are only going to select single sentences to address in the responses put forward to you, then why should we bother to engage you?

Take your proposal to NDHQ and stop wasting our time in presumptions of "debate.".

Michael O'Leary


Edited to add:

In case you missed the points in my post, instead of just choosing to ignore them, here is a concise listing:

1. A reasoned argument to justify the expense and efforts to develop a modified capability. 

2. What, exactly, makes you so well positioned to be the inventor/champion of this concept which you seem to imply has been ignored by the existing establishment?

3. Lets start with your arguments to prove a deficiency exists that cannot be met by existing resources.  

4. Source data would be welcome to help shape your argument.

5. What capability(ies) get cut to fund this new one?  

6. And how do you demonstrate that your proposal is of greater value?

7. Tasks and roles to be conducted.

8. Aircrew training requirements.

9. Aircraft maintenance lifecycle.

10. Number of airframes required, based on your assessment of tasks.

11. Expected lifespan of "new" airframes, compared to expectation of available manufacturer and principal nation support.

12. Requirements and costs to retrain and retool all required maintenance facilities and maintainers.

13. Infrastructure costs to support new aircraft in all Wing locations.


----------



## SupersonicMax

You know the wings are used for fuel.  If you put the radar on the wing, you reduce the fuel you can carry (kinda critical for a CAS airplane).  I really don't see why you need a radar on that airplane.  CAS is all about aquiring visually a target and hitting it usually via FAC (even for radar equipped aircraft).  Plus, you wouldn't use any weapons that require a radar.  If you put on a radar, you totally change the aircraft and its structure.  (By the way, there is no alternator on the aircraft.).

I have flown the CT-156 and while it is an extremely nice training aircraft, I think it would lack excess power with the added weight could cause some problems.  Put a bigger engine?  I believe we already have the most powerful of the PT-6 serie engines.  Something bigger isn't really an economical solution (plus, the AT-6B is going to use the PT6A-68, the engine we currently have on the Harvard). Adding aftermarket items to an aircraft just doesn't make any sense to me on a NEW aircraft, when you can buy something off the shelve that will do the job just fine.  IMHO, the Hawk would be a much better CAS platform than the AT-6B.  While it may lack in endurance, you can have a probe on it (the Hawk 127 already has that) for AAR.  The Hawk is already used by some countries as a light attack aircraft.

Also, reading from posts on other sites, you seem to suggest that the backseat is raised, giving a good visibility to the backseater.  You obviously have never flown in the backseat.  There is no step up whatsover (or very little) giving a fairly bad forward visibility from the backseat.  Plus, you are sitting where the wing roots are, so your visibility below is almost nil.  Furthermore, you suggest the AT-6B and the Harvard II will be similar aircraft.  I would think they would be very different, from structure to avionics and electronics.  I assume that flying it would be different as well.

You know, I wouldn't count your "flight simulation" equivalent to real world experience.  Even though simulators these days are more "realistic", they are still games.

You suggestion may be a good one, however it is certainly not a practical one.  The AT-6B has yet to fly and nowhere it mentions its payload (which I would suggest is very low)  Plus, to make it to our standards, you suggest to add aftermarker items to it, which doesn't make any sense, especially when you can buy an airplane off the shelve with all the stuff you want.

Anyways, my 2 cents.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Well, I guess Steve Daly (now "He who talks to walls ... ") was unable or unwilling to actually try and convince us that he has a worthy idea.  There's few things worse than throwing around ideas that would affect CF organizations, equipment, doctrine, training, etc., without actually having done the homework for a complete solution.  Too bad, it might have been an interested debate if there was any real information to be contributed.


----------



## a_majoor

Sneaking back into the discussion (heh)

I have found a reference at the ever interesting "Chaos Manor" which demonstrates the enhanced FAC leg of any "Green Airforce" is right here right now. While "Magic Eyes" is not platform centric, anyone going down to get eyes on the target is going to attract a lot of attention, so had best be in a powerful, well armoured airframe. The two seat "OV-10" derivative of the A-10 would be ideal in this context, and suggests that the second leg of the "Green Airforce" (CAB RANK type support) would go hand in hand using a similar airframe (the A-10 itself). Given there are no A-10's to be had and the production line is long closed, this limits the choices somewhat, unless there is the will to create an up to date "A-x/OV-x", possibly in collaberation with allies like Australia and the UK.

Further growth of the "Green Airforce" idea is possible if fixed wing logistical support to deployed troops and CAB RANK FARPs is considered desirable, using a twin engined STOL tactical transport, which then leads to the question "why not carry troops in these planes as well?" Of course resource availibility is the real show stopper here. Even getting a dedicated OV-x will probably be a non starter, unless modifying the CT-115 Hawk can be considered suitable. Assuming the answer is "yes", the Canadian A-x may well be armed UAV's under direction or control of the FAC. 

Magic Eyes:

http://www.jerrypournelle.com/mail/2008/Q4/mail540.html#Swiss



> JTAS magic eyes
> 
> Dr. Pournelle,
> 
> I don’t know how long the Army has been pursuing that magic eyes project but the USAF has for a long time been working on equivalent “wish them dead” systems. Similar concept, except that the necessary weapons are carried by the guy who has eyes on the target and the system weight is a huge issue because a smart reticle must be mounted in a helmet carried by a person who may have to pull 9 Gs (or eject) with all that extra weight in the helmet. Look at a target, push a few buttons, and wish it dead. Precision attack planning reduced from a matter of hours to a matter of seconds, and that’s really important to the guys on the ground that we’re supporting. We’ve had the tech AND the system integration issues worked out for a while, but they’re not terribly high on the budget priority list. *Done properly, that magic eyes system could be integrated into the tactical datalink network and the coordinates could be passed to ANY system able to achieve the desired effects. That would be a perfect implementation of a joint system that is platform-agnostic… Why does it HAVE to be artillery (or a fighter or a bomber or a UAV) if it could be something else that happens to be available and has the required capability? *
> 
> This could be one more major step away from the old school platform-specific-mission mindset if the Army doesn’t use it just for artillery spotting. Junior USAF officers nowadays have no delusions about any particular platform being tied to a specific mission, so this ought to be one more step down the road towards effects based ops. Aim magic eyes at target, push a couple of buttons, and a short while later the target blows up, and who cares where the weapon came from. *An extension of the concept – a software tool hanging on the network at the AOC could compare the target coordinates against the do not strike or high value target list, so an abort command could come down in time if there is a reason to not destroy that target. *
> 
> Sean


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

I wonder if thats the same Jerry Pournelle who used to write some sci fi?


----------



## drunknsubmrnr

Same guy. He still writes fiction.


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

I am thinking outside the box but what of an updated and armed version of the Buffalo?


----------



## aesop081

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I am thinking outside the box but what of an updated and armed version of the Buffalo?



Americans are already developing a gunship version of the C-27J......why not jump in on that rather that pay more to start our own program ?


----------



## Ex-Dragoon

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Americans are already developing a gunship version of the C-27J......why not jump in on that rather that pay more to start our own program ?



That would make more sense.


----------



## a_majoor

Since the vastly more powerful AC-130 has been regulated to fly only at night due to the threat of anti aircraft fire, I am a bit leery of advocating a smaller and less capable gunship as a CAS platform. There are economy of scale arguments that can be made (if this is part of a larger fleet of light logistics/patrol/observation planes), but unless the gunship can _really_ outgun the enemy (a plane mounting a powerful laser comes to mind) I suspect that the flexibility offered by a high performance airframe or a dedicated CAS airframe will outweigh any advantages of weight of fire.

The positive side of the argument is that a fleet of logistics/patrol and observation planes is a major part of the "Green Airforce", so if the gunship is part of the package, then we can adjust our TTPs to reflect the strengths and weakness of the platform. Maybe a FAC seated on a C-27 observation plane will use a powerful sensor turret to mark targets, and also have the FSCC on board with him.

There are many different possibilities opened up by this idea; lots to think on.


----------



## McG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Assuming that we or our allies (more likely) will provide and maintain air superiority over the AOR ...


Perhaps a dangerous assumption.  Once again, I'm not aware of another western nation with as much political support for the idea of going into Sudan.  There is an air threat and, if we ever find ourselves there, we may be alone in fighting for air superiority.  This will not be instantaneous and therefore our own CAS capability must not be established in the assumption that air superiority will exist.



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... there are few arguments against "FOB CAS" ...


As the only argument for "FOB CAS" is that it will be more responsive (and I doubt this), I think your statement may be backward.

There is already CAS in the air, orbiting, waiting for a fight and ready to fly off in the direction needed on order.  FOB CAS, while potentially closer to the fight, will have its own delays as pilots on the ground zip zippers & fasten buckles before scrambling to planes, then getting into the sky, climbing and finally making their way to the fight in (potentially much) slower aircraft.  Further aggravate this by recognizing that, if the FOB itself is the location requiring CAS, it may be impossible to get FOB CAS in the air with fires onto the airstrip.  In many cases, existing CAS is faster, farther reaching and carrying a much larger payload than budget platforms being proposed here.  If there is nothing more than wild assumption that FOB CAS can be more responsive than conventional CAS, then I am not convinced there is value in reducing the number of superior platforms in order to put those pilots into FOB CAS.  Especially when the related problems are many.

"FOB CAS" would impose a large administrative footprint into the FOBs, and place increased demands onto the sustainment lines supporting the FOB (someone has to bring forward the parts, additional fuel, ammunition, additional rations, etc).  Resources currently used to support the fight would become consumed in supporting mini airbases.  These airbases will not come without a foot print.

You will need space for maintenance, fuel, ammunition, aircraft, parts, air crews, ground crews, etc.  If you are not prepared to dump a lot of the parts forward, then be prepaired for greater periods of unavailability while waiting for parts to be pushed forward (in which case you've just lost the responsiveness intended in FOB CAS).  Through this, FOBs start getting bigger. 

Bigger FOBs require more manpower for security (and so you are tying more personnel to the FOB and away from the work outside that is the FOB's reason to exist) and more engineering resources to build (and again these are taken from those supporting the manoeuvre fight and from those supporting reconstruction activities).  All of a sudden, we find CSS, Engineer and Infantry resources taken away from the current fight in order to support the mini-airbases.  

Should our land element ever decide that it wants to free itself from FOBs, it will be unable as the new method of air support will require we remain fixed to the FOBs they operate from (without the land element in the FOB, it cannot be kept secure for air operations).



			
				He who talks to walls.... said:
			
		

> "What does the Air Force bring to the rear-area security table?" There are loads of front-line assets (but never enough), but can the Air Force only contribute by diverting those assets just as they are needed at the front? I considered the possibility that a role-specific rear-area asset might actually free more front-line assets to the main fight rather than divert resources.


While "cheap multi-role aircraft" may require less in financial resources to buy, there are still other resources you are over looking.  Pilots and ground crew are also in finite supply.  Putting these human resources into a cheap dedicated RAS CAS will deny their use other roles (thus denying the commander flexibility).

If there are already not enough "front-line" assets but those front line assets are capable of supporting RAS, then why would you propose permanently redicing the number of "front-line" assets to staff a role-specific platform unsuited to supporting the "front-line" fight?



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> .... and also have the FSCC on board with him.


I'm not clear on the value of putting the FSCC in an observer aircraft.  It seems to me they are better in a location where they can think on the larger fight, and probably where they can talk across the room to do coordination with the ASCC and TACP.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Well surprise, surprise, the Iraq airforce is due to get Grand Caravans armed with Hellfire missiles for it's first ground attack aircraft, I have never considered them, will be interesting to see how they work out.

http://groups.google.com/group/rec.aviation.military/msg/422f4c3520b4390f


http://www.cessna.com/caravan/special-missions.html


----------



## Loachman

I really, really, really hate this thread, and consequently have avoided posting in it for a long time. Jut too many bad ideas.



			
				MCG said:
			
		

> Perhaps a dangerous assumption.  Once again, I'm not aware of another western nation with as much political support for the idea of going into Sudan.  There is an air threat and, if we ever find ourselves there, we may be alone in fighting for air superiority.  This will not be instantaneous and therefore our own CAS capability must not be established in the assumption that air superiority will exist.
> As the only argument for "FOB CAS" is that it will be more responsive (and I doubt this), I think your statement may be backward.
> 
> There is already CAS in the air, orbiting, waiting for a fight and ready to fly off in the direction needed on order.  FOB CAS, while potentially closer to the fight, will have its own delays as pilots on the ground zip zippers & fasten buckles before scrambling to planes, then getting into the sky, climbing and finally making their way to the fight in (potentially much) slower aircraft.  Further aggravate this by recognizing that, if the FOB itself is the location requiring CAS, it may be impossible to get FOB CAS in the air with fires onto the airstrip.  In many cases, existing CAS is faster, farther reaching and carrying a much larger payload than budget platforms being proposed here.  If there is nothing more than wild assumption that FOB CAS can be more responsive than conventional CAS, then I am not convinced there is value in reducing the number of superior platforms in order to put those pilots into FOB CAS.  Especially when the related problems are many.
> 
> "FOB CAS" would impose a large administrative footprint into the FOBs, and place increased demands onto the sustainment lines supporting the FOB (someone has to bring forward the parts, additional fuel, ammunition, additional rations, etc).  Resources currently used to support the fight would become consumed in supporting mini airbases.  These airbases will not come without a foot print.
> 
> You will need space for maintenance, fuel, ammunition, aircraft, parts, air crews, ground crews, etc.  If you are not prepared to dump a lot of the parts forward, then be prepaired for greater periods of unavailability while waiting for parts to be pushed forward (in which case you've just lost the responsiveness intended in FOB CAS).  Through this, FOBs start getting bigger.
> 
> Bigger FOBs require more manpower for security (and so you are tying more personnel to the FOB and away from the work outside that is the FOB's reason to exist) and more engineering resources to build (and again these are taken from those supporting the manoeuvre fight and from those supporting reconstruction activities).  All of a sudden, we find CSS, Engineer and Infantry resources taken away from the current fight in order to support the mini-airbases.
> 
> Should our land element ever decide that it wants to free itself from FOBs, it will be unable as the new method of air support will require we remain fixed to the FOBs they operate from (without the land element in the FOB, it cannot be kept secure for air operations).
> While "cheap multi-role aircraft" may require less in financial resources to buy, there are still other resources you are over looking.  Pilots and ground crew are also in finite supply.  Putting these human resources into a cheap dedicated RAS CAS will deny their use other roles (thus denying the commander flexibility).
> 
> If there are already not enough "front-line" assets but those front line assets are capable of supporting RAS, then why would you propose permanently redicing the number of "front-line" assets to staff a role-specific platform unsuited to supporting the "front-line" fight?
> I'm not clear on the value of putting the FSCC in an observer aircraft.  It seems to me they are better in a location where they can think on the larger fight, and probably where they can talk across the room to do coordination with the ASCC and TACP.



*BINGO!*

Pretty much exactly my feelings, but less ranty.

On the last point, Kiowa crews functioned as Air OPs and FACs, which was adequate. The only downside to that was shortage of guns with which to engage at times, which illustrates the absolute necessity for decent armament on reconaissance helicopters. Putting a segment of a staff into an aircraft would be courting disaster for a bunch of reasons.


----------



## a_majoor

MCG said:
			
		

> I'm not clear on the value of putting the FSCC in an observer aircraft.  It seems to me they are better in a location where they can think on the larger fight, and probably where they can talk across the room to do coordination with the ASCC and TACP.



Actually, I should have added a smiley to that comment: using a large or medium transport for the FAC is a bit of overkill.



> Well surprise, surprise, the Iraq airforce is due to get Grand Caravans armed with Hellfire missiles for it's first ground attack aircraft, I have never considered them, will be interesting to see how they work out.
> 
> http://groups.google.com/group/rec.aviation.military/msg/422f4c3520b4390f
> 
> http://www.cessna.com/caravan/special-missions.html



The Grand Caravan isn't the first plane that would have come to mind for me either, but it seems to have a lot of the features a "Green Airforce" would be looking for. This aircraft served as a ground attack plane during the Nigerian Civil War, so size, speed and power are not always the key factors (although I would go for the more powerful aircraft if I could).


----------



## Don2wing

Here is a news release from the Finnish government regarding their BAE Hawks 50s:

      Poland Keen on Finnish Hawks -YLE 
  
  
(Source: STT Finnish government news; issued Dec. 10, 2008)
  
   
  
 Poland has expressed interest in buying some of the Finnish Air Force's inventory of British Aerospace Hawk advanced jet trainers, the Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE) reported on Wednesday. 

The public broadcaster added that the issue had been raised last week when Bogdan Klich, the Polish defence minister, visited Finland. 

Poland is in the process of procuring 16 trainer jet aeroplanes and aims to close the deal by the end of the year. 

Some of the FAF's fleet of 65 Hawks are becoming redundant as Finland's plans to found an international air combat school in Kauhava have come to nothing. 

-ends-


----------



## thunderchild

I'd buy enough to re equip the snow birds if the condition of the aircraft and price was right.


----------



## Loachman

thunderchild said:
			
		

> I'd buy enough to re equip the snow birds if the condition of the aircraft and price was right.



I'd just let people with real knowledge decide when the Tutor needs replacement and with what to replace it.

And it's "Snowbirds". One word, starting with a capital "S".

The first requirement for membership on the replacement-picking team is proper spelling of the unit of those whose lives you're playing with.


----------



## observor 69

Loachman said:
			
		

> I'd just let people with real knowledge decide when the Tutor needs replacement and with what to replace it.
> 
> And it's "Snowbirds". One word, starting with a capital "S".
> 
> The first requirement for membership on the replacement-picking team is proper spelling of the unit of those whose lives you're playing with.



I thought "people with real knowledge " had already said that the Snowbird are overdue for a new aircraft and as new aircrew are trained on the Hawk and the aircraft meets the teams flight profile requirements it would make an ideal replacement ?


----------



## aesop081

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> the aircraft meets the teams flight profile requirements it would make an ideal replacement ?



When i flew with the team, the ones i talked to didnt agree with what you just posted.


----------



## observor 69

This report was the line of thought I was referring to.

http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/06/24/snowbirds-jets.html

Agreed pilots differ in their choice of a replacement aircraft.


----------



## Cleared Hot

So I just found this thread and I have always had a question maybe someone here can answer.  I should point out that I am of the opinion that Canada will always opt for multi-role vice single purpose equipment i.e. we would never buy an A-10 (for example) we are just too small for that kind of specialization.  That being said, we have in our inventory one airframe which would make one of the best CAS platforms ever - the CP-140.  Throw some hardpoints with LGBs, JDAMs and Hellfires underneath, add a Sniper Pod and you are rockin'.  Theoretically you would have almost unmatched on station time, the ability to have dedicated image analysts on board giving real time analysis of target data, unbelievable comms and RRB capabilities, a large amount of firepower, standoff / stealth, its endurance would mean the home base would not have to be right in the immediate area, so the austere air field requirements would not be an issue etc. etc.

I understand that they already have an important role to play, but they have just added an ISR capability to their repertoire so why not take that to the next logical level?  They are already very good at working jointly (albeit mostly with the Navy although they are working more with the guys in green as of late).  The crews are already used to fighting an air-to-surface battle so why not make it over land in addition to over sea?  So I guess my question is with all the P-3 variants out there internationally, why have they never tried to make one for CAS.  My initial thought is with all the CAS capable a/c in the US inventory there was just no need to spend money developing another.  How hard would it be for Canada to do on their own?

Anyway, just a thought.

-CH


----------



## aesop081

Cleared Hot said:
			
		

> one of the best CAS platforms ever - the CP-140.



Ever been in one ?




> Throw some hardpoints



The CP-140 already has hardpoints. Some we can mount on the wings, the others are mounted in the bomb bay. Where do you think we hang all those Mk46 Mod V torpedoes from ?



> add a Sniper Pod and you are rockin'.



Sniper...sure. But why not take advantage of that spiffey, new MX-20 EOIR instead ?



> Theoretically you would have almost unmatched on station time,



Outmatched by anything that can be refueld in flight.



> the ability to have dedicated *image analysts * on board giving real time analysis of target data,



AES Op will do nicely thanks...... ;D





> I understand that they already have an important role to play,



Yup



> but they have just added an ISR capability to their repertoire



Thats what we have always done....we just recently adopted this buzzword and took it over land. Thankfully we are now getting a moving map display so i dont have to contort myself in my seat trying to read a paper map.....oh and TCDL will be nice too !



> why have they never tried to make one for CAS.



10,000  P-3 operators cant be wrong.........


----------



## Cleared Hot

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Ever been in one?


Yep. And I even crashed the Sim in the H.C into the A.V's north mountain.



> The CP-140 already has hardpoints. Some we can mount on the wings, the others are mounted in the bomb bay. Where do you think we hang all those Mk46 Mod V torpedoes from ?


Fair enough, I was talking more about the weapons and any mods (if any) you would have to make to accomodate A-G weapons.



> Sniper...sure. But why not take advantage of that spiffey, new MX-20 EOIR instead ?


Can the MX-20 EOIR laser designate?  You don't have to answer that.



> Outmatched by anything that can be refueld in flight.


It sucks when you are getting shot at and the birds have to leave to top up.  Ever been in that situation?



> AES Op will do nicely thanks...... ;D


I'll take your word for it.



> Yup
> 
> Thats what we have always done....we just recently adopted this buzzword and took it over land. Thankfully we are now getting a moving map display so i dont have to contort myself in my seat trying to read a paper map.....oh and TCDL will be nice too !


I guess that's my point.  No offence but the realist in me says the move to over land was because someone felt there might not be enough work over water - don't worry I don't agree.



> 10,000  P-3 operators cant be wrong.........


No but we don't have A-10, B1, B-52, B-2 F-15E, F-16, AH, AC-130, Reaper, Pred Av-8B...

Edited for formatting.


----------



## Cleared Hot

Sorry that didn't come out the way I wanted... still getting the hang of this quote thing.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

> No but we don't have A-10, B1, B-52, B-2 F-15E, F-16, AH, AC-130, Reaper, Pred Av-8B...



And you think we can support so many different airframes ???

Please give your head a shake.


----------



## Cleared Hot

What post are you reading?  My point was because we aren't big enough for that we have to double hat what we do have and the Aurora properly configured would also make a good CAS aircraft.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Cleared Hot said:
			
		

> What post are you reading?  My point was because we aren't big enough for that we have to double hat what we do have and the Aurora properly configured would also make a good CAS aircraft.



Yours..... http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/40352/post-787962.html#msg787962


----------



## Cleared Hot

Right and maybe you should have read the first one I posted that said we will never buy an A-10.


----------



## thunderchild

Here are two aircraft being marked as F-5 fighter replacements that may do the job, first South Korea's A-50 attack aircraft it uses the same engine and radar as the F-18C, and is basically an 80% size version of the F-16C, it has a decent weapons load it can carry AIM-9L's, Mavericks, MK-80's and a 20mm cannon and other weapons.  It's cost is some were between 22-25 million per aircraft.  The other fighter is the Indigenous Defence Fighter made in Taiwan, it has 2 engines but it is regarded as being under powered.  It does have better weapons than the A-50 but much shorter "legs".


----------



## Good2Golf

Capital procurement budgets are so strained that there really is not even a faint hope of consideration being given to such a niche role as CAS/OAS.


----------



## aesop081

thunderchild said:
			
		

> Here are two aircraft being marked as F-5 fighter replacements that may do the job, first South Korea's A-50 attack aircraft it uses the same engine and radar as the F-18C, and is basically an 80% size version of the F-16C, it has a decent weapons load it can carry AIM-9L's, Mavericks, MK-80's and a 20mm cannon and other weapons.  It's cost is some were between 22-25 million per aircraft.  The other fighter is the Indigenous Defence Fighter made in Taiwan, it has 2 engines but it is regarded as being under powered.  It does have better weapons than the A-50 but much shorter "legs".



Are you going to be posting here very time you get an idea from reading Jane's ( or whatever it is you are reading ) ?


----------



## rampage800

Ummm

Maybe we should outfit the aircraft we do have to properly support CAS before we purchase something else, maybe even some new munitions. Just a thought.


----------



## SupersonicMax

rampage800 said:
			
		

> Ummm
> 
> Maybe we should outfit the aircraft we do have to properly support CAS before we purchase something else, maybe even some new munitions. Just a thought.



What do you suggest?


----------



## ironduke57

Jericho Trompeten! (Jericho Trumpet´s) ;D

SCNR,
ironduke57


----------



## a_majoor

rampage800 said:
			
		

> Maybe we should outfit the aircraft we do have to properly support CAS before we purchase something else, maybe even some new munitions. Just a thought.



Interesting question. We know that the IAF is making pin point attacks using their F-16's and F-15's over the Gaza strip, maybe we should look into what they are using and how it is being used.

Various issues come to mind: 

Do the aircraft carry their own dedicated sensors or are the pilots being cued?
What munitions are being used?
How are the pilots trained to discriminate targets in heavily cluttered environments?
Are they actually being used for CAS or are they prepping the battlespace well clear of the IDF ground forces?

People better versed in the art might also think of a few questions.


----------



## thunderchild

This is a long thread so I thought I'd try to sum things up, let me know what I missed.
1. Needs good loiter time.
2. Ease of maintenance.
3. Reliability.
4. High number of sorties per day.
5. Can be forward deployed easily with minimum of support equipment.
6. Not fixed to an airfield.
7. Needs advanced detection capabilities.
8. Must have good hot/high performance for deployability.
9. Must be inexpensive.
10. Minimum training and requirement for pilots and ground crew.
11. Easily deployable from Canada.


----------



## rampage800

SMax

I'll caveat this by saying that most of our Hornet pilots (IMO) are still pretty damn good at CAS even with the Nighthawk but its time to move past that(Pod I mean). As mentioned previously I understand some of these things are coming and are being held up with Red Tape so I'm not really laying fault here. The first thing we need is the Pod project rectified, a SNIPER Pod will/can work and make sure we get one that hasn't been chopped down, ie no ROVER/MOVER capability, good PODS aren't the end all to be all with CAS but it sure makes it alot easier and quicker. WRT munitions, well once again I'm lead to believe this is held up but something GPS guided would sure come in handy, I know its just a kit but these things have been around for a long time now, time to get on board. I'm thinking GBU-39s SDBs and 49s could easily cover about 90% or more of the CAS drops.And last but not least(well theres more but I'll sum up at 3) we need to start doing LL runs again, some day CF pilots will operate in a High Threat environment and hanging out at 20K won't cut it. To go along with that and to re state Pt 2, on a cloudy or dusty day laser guided doesn't work too well.

These points are strictly my opinion and nothing but, there are probably valid arguments for and against what I said but just expressing what I think. I don't think we need a new a/c just some "accessories".

My 2 cents.


----------



## Loachman

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Do the aircraft carry their own dedicated sensors or are the pilots being cued?



Laser designation or GPS, with target information/location and/or designation by themselves, another manned aircraft, a UAV, or ground observer.



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> What munitions are being used?



I would suspect that everything is precision-guided due to the nature of the targets and environment. A websearch would probably turn up the Israeli inventory.



			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> How are the pilots trained to discriminate targets in heavily cluttered environments?



You'd have to ask them.

If they're dropping from high altitude in a permissive environment, they are probably loitering and observing with IR. If low-level, designation is by somebody else. They'd never have time to see the target.


----------



## a_majoor

For whatever reason, the message itself won't post but here is a link to an interesting story about TF ODIN; which has many of the attributes discussed for a "Green Air Force":

http://toyoufromfailinghands.blogspot.com/2009/01/fighting-ieds-in-afstan-task-force-odin.html

Enjoy


----------



## a_majoor

Further on TF ODIN:

http://www.casr.ca/ft-coin-army-aviation-1.htm



> *Counterinsurgency  Legacy  –  US  Army  Aviation Supports its Own*
> US  Air  Force  turns  out  to  be  too  Tardy  to  be  Tactically  Useful
> 
> Edited  excerpts  from  an  article  published  in  The  Sunday  New  York  Times    [1]
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> US Ground Forces dissatisfied  with their dependence on far off  USAF Commander Centres
> 
> Ever since the US Army  lost its warplanes  to a newly independent US Air Force after World War II,  soldiers have depended on their sister service for help from the sky  –  from bombing and strafing, to transport  and surveillance. But  the [counterinsurgency]  warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan have frayed the relationship, with  US  Army officers making increasingly vocal complaints that the Air Force is not pulling its weight.
> 
> In Afghanistan, Army officers have complained about bombing missions gone awry that have killed innocent civilians.  In Iraq,  US Army officers say that the US Air Force has often been out of touch,  fulfilling only half of  their requests  for the sophisticated  surveillance aircraft that ground commanders say are needed to find  roadside bombs and track down insurgents.
> 
> The US Air Force responds that  it  has only a limited number of  those remotely  piloted  Predator  UAVs  (left),  and other advanced  surveillance  aircraft [ manned or remotely piloted ], so that  priorities  for  assigning them must  be  set  by  senior commanders at  the  local  headquarters  in  Baghdad.  [ Those Baghdad commanders must  then, in  turn, consult ]  with their counterparts  at  the  USAF  Regional  Command  in  Qatar.
> 
> In Iraq,  the US Army quietly decided to 'go it alone',  especially in the surveillance missions
> 
> [In response, the US Army has] organized an 'all-Army' surveillance unit. [This US Army unit] represents a  new move by  the ground forces towards self-sufficiency,  and  away from 'joint' operations.  Senior aides to US  Defense Secretary  Robert  M. Gates  say  that  he has shown  keen interest in this US Army initiative as a quick way to improve battlefield surveillance.
> 
> The work of  the new aviation battalion  was initially kept secret,  but Army officials involved in its planning say it has been exceptionally active.  [They used] remotely piloted surveillance aircraft to call in  Apache  helicopter  strikes  [using  Hellfire  missiles and  30mm  cannon fire].
> 
> The US Army aviation task force became  fully operational  last July, setting up  its  headquarters at  Camp Speicher,  in  the north-central Iraq city of Tikrit. [The aviation task force] has focused its efforts on insurgents [who have been found ]  planting roadside bombs [IEDs]. However,  it has also located and attacked insurgents in battles with US and  Iraqi troops. [ In additon ],  it has supported  Special  Opera- tions  missions intended  to capture or kill  high-value targets in Iraq.
> 
> The battalion is called Task Force ODIN. The name is that of  the  Norse god,  but it is also an acronym  for  ' observe,  detect,  identify,  and  neutralize '.  The task force of about 300 people and 25 aircraft is a  'Rube Goldberg' [2] collection of surveillance, communications,  and attack systems.  [ It  is a  lash - up ]  of  manned  and  remotely  piloted  vehicles,  commercial  aircraft with  infrared  sensors  strapped  to the fuselage,  along  with attack  helicopters and  infantry.
> 
> The  US  Army  cobbled   together  small  civilian aircraft, including the Beech C-12 [3],  fitting them with advanced  reconnaissance sensors [infrared and radar]. Small, medium, and large remotely pilo- ted surveillance vehicles,  including  Warrior and Shadow  UAVs  [4]  –  carrying  infrared  cameras for night operations and  full-motion video cameras  –  have also  been assigned to TF  ODIN.
> 
> All are linked  by radio to  Apache  attack helicopters, with Hellfire missiles and  30-millimeter cannons  –  and  to  infantry  units  in  armoured  vehicles.
> 
> The Army  claims  that  civilian  casualties  are  lower  when  they  perform  local  airstrikes
> 
> Civilian casualties are always  a risk  in air raids,  particularly  those  attacking  bomb-placing teams that operate in cities and villages. Army officials declined to say whether they believed the casualties  from  the new  US Army raids  included innocent civilians,  but they sought to pre-empt some criticism  by screening an aerial surveillance video  that they said  showed the precise nature of the raids.  The video showed an insurgent who had escaped attack and hid in a courtyard a few feet from a grazing mule.  It then showed  Apache  helicopter fire,  killing the insurgent,  while the  mule was  left grazing  beside  the corpse.
> 
> In contrast to  Predators,  which are assigned by  the  top  USAF  headquarters  for  missions all  across  Iraq,  TF ODIN  is  'on  call '  for  commanders  at  the level  of  brigade  and  below. [This is]  an effort  by  the  US  Army  to be  responsive  to the needs of  smaller combat units in direct contact with adversaries  –  [a clear divergence from the USAF concept of readiness].
> 
> The Pentagon's  press secretary,  Geoff  Morrell,  said  that  Secretary  Gates  "wants  to  make sure that we are looking at,  not  just  top - down  solutions,  but  also  ground - up  solutions. We  need  to  pay  attention  to  anything  that  works."
> 
> Counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have strained relations between the services
> 
> Army and Marine Corps officers in Afghanistan have complained that Air Force pilots flying attack missions  in  support of  ground operations  do not come in as  low  as their Navy and Marine counterparts.  Instances of civilian casualties from bombing and missile attacks have increased tensions among  the local people. These tensions must then  be eased  by ground commanders, adding to their burden of winning  hearts and minds in the counterinsurgency.
> 
> "We are supporting the Army as best we can," Michael W. Wynne,  the departing Air Force Secretary, said Friday.  He said that, as the Army and Marine Corps increased ground forces in Iraq as part of the so-called 'troop surge' over the past year,  the Air Force  quadrupled its number of  sorties  and  increased  its bombing  tenfold.  The number of  surveillance flights by Predators  and  Reapers over  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  has doubled  since  January  2007.
> 
> US Army officers who are promoting the new concept have shown senior Pentagon officials classified [ targetting sights ] video clips intended to advertise the service�s increasing  'go-it-alone ' ability. One clip from a remotely piloted vehicle shows an insurgent using palm fronds to smooth dirt over a bomb he had buried late at night along a major convoy route. Moments later, he disappeared in  30- millimeter  fire  from an  Apache, alerted  by  the Army - controlled  UAV overhead.  The Army is asking  for money  to create  a similar unit  in  Afghanistan  within  the  next  six  (6)  months.
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> [1]   Article published under the title,  'Edging away from Air Force,  Army adds Air Unit',
> in  The  Sunday  New  York  Times,  22  June  2008.
> 
> [2]   ' Rube  Goldberg '  is  an  American  anachronism  for  the  ' Red  Green '  approach  to
> problem-solving.  It  involves  a lot of  duct  tape  and  a  cheerful,  unrelenting  faith
> in  one's  own  technical  abilities.
> 
> [3]  US Army Raytheon Beech C-12R Huron transport aircraft have been modified into ARMS
> (Aerial Reconnaissance Multi-Sensor) carriers known as 'Horned Owls'.  A C-12 is a more
> powerful version of the C90B King Air, used to train Canadian Forces pilots in Manitoba.
> 
> [4]   "Warrior" is the General Atomics MQ-12 Sky Warrior (which the US Army prefers to call
> the Warrior-Alpha). "Shadow" is the much smaller AAI RQ-7 Shadow 200 Tactical UAV.



A battalion sized unit of @ 300 personell fielding a mix of aircraft and UAV's sounds like the sort of "Green Air Force" that would be viable, affordable and tactically useful for a deployed Battlegroup. Tweak the mix of aircraft a bit (rugged Caravan STOLs vs Beechcraft "King Airs") and make allowances for the lack of dedicated attack helicopters (either armed UAV's or some sort of weapons package for the Caravans might substitute) and we might be getting somewhere.


----------



## Loachman

This is not a "green a** f**ce". It is an Army Aviation Corps/Branch.

Terminology is important. Use "a** f**ce" in the name, and those in blue will think that it is theirs and will try to steal it. It will then shortly cease to serve those whom it was intended to serve.

There is good reason why many countries, this one included, re-formed Army and Naval Aviation components again several years after forming a** f**ces. Task Force ODIN illustrates this quite nicely: "In Iraq, US Army officers say that the US Air Force has often been out of touch, fulfilling only half of their requests for the sophisticated  surveillance aircraft that ground commanders say are needed to find  roadside bombs and track down insurgents".

Light seized-wing aircraft are not, not, not a substitute for attack helicopters. Neither are armed UAVs.

They may be able to perform some of the function of AHs, but still only fill a narrow niche role at best and lack any capability for employment in a higher threat environment.

There are plenty of other platforms around already which can put bombs and bullets on the ground with sufficient accuracy and in a timely manner, regardless of the threat environment.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

Loachman said:
			
		

> This is not a "green a** f**ce". It is an Army Aviation Corps/Branch.
> 
> Terminology is important. Use "a** f**ce" in the name, and those in blue will think that it is theirs and will try to steal it. It will then shortly cease to serve those whom it was intended to serve.
> 
> There is good reason why many countries, this one included, re-formed Army and Naval Aviation components again several years after forming a** f**ces. Task Force ODIN illustrates this quite nicely: "In Iraq, US Army officers say that the US Air Force has often been out of touch, fulfilling only half of their requests for the sophisticated  surveillance aircraft that ground commanders say are needed to find  roadside bombs and track down insurgents".
> 
> Light seized-wing aircraft are not, not, not a substitute for attack helicopters. Neither are armed UAVs.
> 
> They may be able to perform some of the function of AHs, but still only fill a narrow niche role at best and lack any capability for employment in a higher threat environment.
> 
> There are plenty of other platforms around already which can put bombs and bullets on the ground with sufficient accuracy and in a timely manner, regardless of the threat environment.



Touched a nerve Loach?


----------



## Loachman

Merely stating the facts.

Again.


----------



## rampage800

All things being equal TF ODIN is great but not sure it qualifies as Close Air Support, if it alerted "armed" UAVs you could say that but seeing how its the AH-64 doing the strike piece its probably closer to CCA than CAS. To go along those lines I could see them changing in Afghanistan to using all branches again, theres alot more UAVs and planes flying around over there than there is 64s. I could just be interpreting the article wrong though too :-\

My 2 cents, the bottom line is getting the upper hand on the INS, who does the sense and who does the strike is irrelevant, as long as it gets done.


----------



## rampage800

To go along with the CAS, CCA issue that I raised you could easily make the argument that its neither if no troops are actually around. That would then make it AI I would think.

Bottom line is still the same though.


----------



## Zoomie

Loachman said:
			
		

> Merely stating the facts.
> 
> Again.



 :     Saying it over and over won't make it a reality or any more valid.  If that was the case, I would be a multi-billionaire.


----------



## Loachman

Please point out those things that I said that were not reality or not valid.


----------



## Loachman

rampage800 said:
			
		

> To go along with the CAS, CCA issue that I raised you could easily make the argument that its neither if no troops are actually around. That would then make it AI I would think.



Nope. AI is not an Army mission.

The US Army rightfully considers AHs to be a manouevre element, just like Infantry and Armour. This is simply application of firepower to a target, no different than any other application of firepower to a target.

As far as I can see, "CCA" falls into that category as well. A tank can engage a target a thousand metres from friendly troops, or one in close proximity to them, without need of a fancy name applied to the latter. AHs are no different.

I suspect that the US Army came up with the term as a self-protection measure, ie to avoid confused people referring to certain things that they do as CAS and blurring the lines between the Army AH role and fighters/bombers. There is much more overlap in the two current conflicts than in "normal" wars, and the US Army is protective of its turf.


----------



## a_majoor

Loachman said:
			
		

> Light seized-wing aircraft are not, not, not a substitute for attack helicopters. Neither are armed UAVs.
> 
> They may be able to perform some of the function of AHs, but still only fill a narrow niche role at best and lack any capability for employment in a higher threat environment.
> 
> There are plenty of other platforms around already which can put bombs and bullets on the ground with sufficient accuracy and in a timely manner, regardless of the threat environment.



Since we do not have AH-64s, Supercobras, Tigers, A129 Mangusta etc. to fill the actual "shooter" role, armed UAV's or Cessna Caravans packing "Hellfire" missiles or rocket pods (or machine guns firing out the side door) will have to substitute in this thought experiment.


----------



## rampage800

Yea, I agree that AI is not a Army mission........yet, remembering of course that this new program is in its infancy,
_
Air interdiction (AI) is the use of aircraft to attack tactical ground targets that are not in close proximity to friendly ground forces. It differs from close air support because it does not directly support ground operations and is not closely coordinated with ground units.

The purpose of air interdiction is to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces or supplies en route to the battle area before they do any harm against friendly forces._

But if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck...................there are obviously some things like coordinating with ground units as to troop loc but I'd have to say that what they're doing is probably more AI than any other mission verb I can think of.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Seems that we actually had an aircraft other than the first line fighters to fill the ground attack role.


http://www.malaysian-museums.org/rmaf/

 The introduction of this jet strike aircraft marked the end of the "Non-Fighting Force" concept of the RMAF since its formation in 1958. With these CL41G Tebuans No. 6 and 9 Squadrons were formed in August 1967 and September 1969, respectively. The Tebuans were unique since the RMAF 'G' version was not even used by the RCAF. The RMAF was the only operator in the world -- with 20 aircraft and 30 specially modified J85 engines. However, the RMAF managed to keep the aircraft flying for 20 years.

The CL41G Tebuan is an "all through" trainer - from initial through advanced stages of pilot training, including tactical and armament training phases. In a permissive environment, *the Tebuan also provides a significant strike capability*.

Dam, now where did I put that pot stirring icon........ ;D


----------



## Cleared Hot

Loachman said:
			
		

> Nope. AI is not an Army mission.
> 
> The US Army rightfully considers AHs to be a manouevre element, just like Infantry and Armour. This is simply application of firepower to a target, no different than any other application of firepower to a target.
> 
> As far as I can see, "CCA" falls into that category as well. A tank can engage a target a thousand metres from friendly troops, or one in close proximity to them, without need of a fancy name applied to the latter. AHs are no different.
> 
> I suspect that the US Army came up with the term as a self-protection measure, ie to avoid confused people referring to certain things that they do as CAS and blurring the lines between the Army AH role and fighters/bombers. There is much more overlap in the two current conflicts than in "normal" wars, and the US Army is protective of its turf.



You are correct, however, it is even more subtle than that.  The Marines use their AH as CAS because they understand their role to be the firepower for the guys on or going ashore esp until the artillery can make it to the beach and deploy.  If controlling Marine AH, you use the standard CAS 9-line brief.  Army Avn see their role (as you point out) as a manoeuvre element and they want a mission - i.e. you give them a good read in of the sit and make sure they know where you are, give them a target using a 5-line brief and you basically hand over the fight to them. While there often appears that there is potential for them to be less responsive to the guys on the ground, in reality it is pretty much the same thing as CAS.

As for AI, while the execution of the targets is indeed (by definition) an air mission the selection of those targets is not.  What gets hit is truly based on the level of HQ the AF is supporting because they do not just go randomly bombing targets.  Yes, the AF can also nominate targets but at some level, someone on the ground owns every bit of realestate.  They draw lines on a map detailing who has to deconflict with who, where and when.  And BTW just because the AF nominates a tgt does not mean they hit it.  Joint Fires work both ways and an ATACMS strike on that AD Bty may be just what the doctor ordered before the fast movers come in.  In the end though (regardless of specific distances) if it is determined that there is a need for "detailed coordination" then it becomes CAS.  In today's nonlinear battlefield these lines are less easy to define so the terms often get blurred.  In any case, there are courses on this that last for weeks, so this being a very short post I understand it is extremely basic/general.


----------



## Journeyman

The Air Force's less-than-timely responsiveness:

1)    I had a 4-day in-theatre swan up to Club Med er, Kabul for a Weapons and Tactics conference on the subject of "Improving Air-Land Cooperation." The participants consisted of about 45 Air Force LCols/Cols (mostly-US), and a whopping 4 Army people -- with the highest rank being Capt. Needless to say, the Air Force perspective prevailed.

One of the USAF taskers insisted, "If you want air support, you MUST request it 72 hours in advance; I don't care if it's VIP travel, ISR, TICs, or a one-off requirement." Yes, it was pointed out that Troops in Contact was tough to schedule; it clashed with his powerpoint, so it didn't seem to register. 

2)    Not all Canadians fall under ISAF; some are deployed under OEF. Some of our NATO "allies" refuse to support OEF taskings _*cough* France, Holland *cough*_  (Before, I despised the Dutch merely because my ex-wife is one)	

The bottom line in most endeavours (business as well as war-fighting) -- if you require support, there are fewer snags if you own the requisite capability. If the Canadian Army requires CAS, we really ought to own/deploy CAS assets.

...my bitter, twisted $0.02 anyway


--------------			
Mind you, those zoomies can be a pretty funny bunch: "The U2 isn't really a good platform for a Show of Force task – sure we could bring it down to 60,000 feet, but…"


----------



## Edward Campbell

I know we've been around and around and around this over and over and over again, and I also know that there are arguments against, but:

*The kind of Close Air Support the Canadian Army needs for most of the eventualities it is likely to face* is Army Aviation - attack (at least armed) helicopters in green suit, Army combat arms units.*.

My opinion, anyway, and it's free and it's worth everything you paid.
-------------------------

* In my opinion these 'eventualities' will occur in Central and West Asia (where we are now), in Africa (where I am around 99% certain we will be, in combat, within about five years) and even in the Caribbean (where we have been and will, almost certainly go again, as the situations deteriorate). These 'eventualities' will involve large, mixed (land/aviation) battle groups of 1,500-2,000 soldiers (maybe even small brigades? - one _cavalry_ regiment (tank squadron + recce squadron + AH squadron) one infantry battalion, one artillery battery, one engineer squadron, maybe one combat logistics unit) serving within larger joint (Canadian land/air) and combined (multinational) forces.


----------



## aesop081

I'm sadend by that BS Journeyman, the air types should be there to support the guys on the ground regardless of notice or situation.

Speaking only from this air force guy's perspective, we have always done everything we can to give the guys on the ground what they want, when they want it. We retask airborne at moments, notice, we shut down engines to extend our on-station time, rearange schedules with airports/ATC and stick around until the guys on the ground say they're done. The USMC is always more than happy with our support and requests us over their own Navy assests.

Some of us are in the AF but we're still focused on whats important.


----------



## mover1

Why does the Army need to OWN the flying assets. We are not three distinct forces we are the Canadian Forces.
I agree with CDN Aviator (saddened by the BS) and I have been in situations that he has talked about. Last minute taskings. Being on the last day of a deployment only to have it extended by two weeks. Leaving the Canada for what you expect is only for a week only to come back more than a month later. And for whom .. The Army. 
Yes I support the guys on the ground. 
Always have always will. But we need your support too.
 By making a broad statement of the army owning the asset would mean you could get it when you wanted it is very naive. And you need to come to the understanding that sometimes there are larger pictures out there to deal with. We can't knit airplanes and we can't knit crews.  72 hours for Air assets isn't unreasonable in fact its great!  I would like to know in what context was this statement was made? Is it in response to having certain assets in an area of operations? Ie a 72 hour window to have Fast Air cover in a certain area for a CAP mission for a certain OP?  

Maybe you should be asking yourself why the army only sent 4 low ranking officers to the meeting. 

By making a broad statement of the army owning the asset would mean you could get it when you wanted it is very naive.


----------



## Cleared Hot

To our brothers in blue, make no mistake we don't fault you personally, we know you want to get into the fight and do your part.  We understand you have other tasks as well, like NORAD, maritime patrol, SAR, AAR, TAC/Strat Mvmt, EW, etc.  But lets be honest our a/c are usually purchased to be multi-role because we do not have the budget/resources to always buy task built equipment.  For example the CF-18 - yes it is a great multi role a/c but only recently is it NVG capable, the Nighthawk had no LST capability, it could not program JDAMs in flight, was not ROVER capable, we don't do Low level CAS (in part) due to wear on old airframes etc.  All of these were cost saving measures because "we were never seriously going to fight a ground war again" (my quotes) so why spend the money.  In fact, the AF stopped running the FAC crse in early 2000s because, due to cutbacks, they decided they needed to (not incorrectly) concentrate on air-to-air.  The army picked up the ball and ran with it.  Now that we as a military are back in the CAS game, everyone wants back in.  In the end, if the Army bought its own a/c it would get exactly what it wanted/needed.  AH will never fly CAP, refuel a CF18 or do maritime patrol etc.  Now I understand the way things work and the Army will never be allowed to buy it's own a/c, but you can understand why it would want to.

As for the responsiveness issue, 72 hours is admittedly a pretty good ATO cycle (yes that changes based on the theatre). To my brothers in green, how many times have you really been in a TIC and not gotten air support?  That ATO that comes out 72 hours in advance has time built in for XCAS and GCAS which get pushed to whoever needs it instantly.  Your 72 hours is only if you want dedicated air and those missions are limited so they are prioritised (and not nec by the AF - apportionment, allocation blah blah),  Yes we all feel safer crossing the LD with air support, but let's be honest, how often was it not there when it was actually needed?  A/C are a pretty limited resource to have burning holes in the sky, just to have to leave when you really need it because they ran out of gas only because some ground comd didn't really understand the employment of a/c but damn it he wouldn't launch without it.  Canada desperately needs to become more "joint" so that there is a better understanding - but that is another thread.


----------



## Journeyman

mover1 said:
			
		

> Leaving the Canada for what you expect is only for a week only to come back more than a month later. And for whom .. The Army.


 I'm sorry, but as a Traffic Tech whose major complaint is that you had to go on exercise for a month, when you packed for a week....you've got no dog in this fight. [/ignore]




			
				Cleared Hot said:
			
		

> *As for the responsiveness issue, 72 hours is admittedly a pretty good ATO cycle*


I agree. Really. As an airframe/"troops to task" system, it's probably as best we can get....._ IF _...... flexibility and a lack of 'national caveats' will allow for maximum utilization.

Tip-toeing around that "opsec" canard however, there may_ hypothetically _ be situations where there is not enough XCAS responsiveness for the various kids playing in the regional sandbox.


----------



## Zoomie

/sigh

This BS is getting tiresome.  Like previously mentioned - we are all one happy family under the auspices of the CF.  

Army Aviation exists as much as it is ever going to - CH-146s/Hooks - they are posted on army bases, tasked to support army units and pretend that they are in the army.  What more do you want?  Do you want the fuel bill, training bill, maintenance costs and replacement costs too?  If you think the worn out LAV-3's were you biggest problem - think again.

The crunchies hold the ground, the zipperheads blast big holes in stuff, the zoomies fly over-head making everyone feel safe, the trash-haulers keep the bullets and food flowing into the country and the support structure extending all the way back to Canada keeps the boys in the FOBs alive. 

Everyone has a "dog in this fight" as everyone is affected and everyone contributes.  

The army can't survive in the Arctic without AF support - it has been documented and proven.

IMO - we will never have AH's in the CF arsenal - regardless of if the Army really really wants them.


----------



## Loachman

mover1 said:
			
		

> By making a broad statement of the army owning the asset would mean you could get it when you wanted it is very naive.



Quite the contrary. That concept is born of lengthy experience.

There are real reasons why those nations, in particular the US, that fight wars rather more frequently than we do have Army Aviation forces, and why they have developed them to the point that they have.

Unless it belongs to you, you have very little control over either its make-up or its employment.

Both Tac Hel and its prime customer have suffered as a result of Tac Hel's usurpation by the a** f**ce.


----------



## Loachman

Zoomie said:
			
		

> Do you want the fuel bill, training bill, maintenance costs and replacement costs too?



You are presuming that ownership of the assets would be separated from their operating budget.



			
				Zoomie said:
			
		

> IMO - we will never have AH's in the CF arsenal - regardless of if the Army really really wants them.



Unlikely, yes, but then just a short time ago people were saying the same thing about Chinooks and C17s as well.


----------



## Journeyman

Journeyman said:
			
		

> * If the Canadian Army requires CAS, we really ought to own/deploy CAS assets.*





			
				Zoomie said:
			
		

> *The army can't survive in the Arctic  without AF support - it has been documented and proven. *



_*WTF??*_




			
				Zoomie said:
			
		

> *This BS is getting tiresome....... Army Aviation exists as much as it is ever going to....*


"Thus is it written - thus shall it always be..."  
So if it's not 'doctrinaire' it shall not be discussed? Heaven forbid operational experience inform any force development thinking. 



oh -- and my "dog in this fight" comment goes back to this ongoing peeve of mine; everyone has opinions, but informed opinions actually provide value to a discussion. I know, I_ know _ -- "stay in your lane" is a bizarre concept.......


----------



## mover1

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'm sorry, but as a Traffic Tech whose major complaint is that you had to go on exercise for a month, when you packed for a week....you've got no dog in this fight. [/ignore]



Sorry dude I was talking of my experiences as a loadmaster flying around in airplanes.  And it was it that context where to where I have left home station for a planned week.  And had to phone home to the family "that I don't know when I am coming home and no I can't tell you where I am at all I can say is that I have been re tasked" And return a month later.
I guess I should update my profile.


----------



## McG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Since we do not have AH-64s, Supercobras, Tigers, A129 Mangusta etc. to fill the actual "shooter" role, armed UAV's or Cessna Caravans packing "Hellfire" missiles or rocket pods (or machine guns firing out the side door) will have to substitute in this thought experiment.


Since we do not have these other systems either, perhaps the thought experiment should not constrain itself as such and instead endeavor instead to determine which platforms can provide us the most well-rounded & relevant system (regardless if those platforms turn out to be fixed or rotary wing, or if they are manned or unmanned).  It is conceivable that some of the desired capability described in this thread could be delivered not by aircraft but by long range precision guided munitions fired from the ground (for an illustrative concept, consider the Precision Attack Missile or Loitering Attack Missile both from Raytheon). 



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> One of the USAF taskers insisted, "If you want air support, you MUST request it 72 hours in advance; I don't care if it's VIP travel, ISR, TICs, or a one-off requirement."


I am certain that the Air Force understands the enemy gets a vote and we may require to pull air assets into a fight at some less than predictable time.  However, while TICs cannot be predicted, it is possible to predict when they will be more likely based on planned  things like named operations, patrols to areas we always get hit, or other increases in planned activities outside the wire.  By providing this information the air taskers, they are able to assign assets to areas such that they can be more responsive at the times we are more likely to have a TIC.  If the ground forces fail to provide this information for situations with predictable increase in TIC chances, then the Air Force is forced to pull resources from other tasks or areas to cover a planning failure. They will do it, but it means that someone somewhere else on the ground is going without the coverage they should have.  

Since it is not CLS that deploys, I've amended your following:





			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> The bottom line in most endeavours (business as well as war-fighting) -- if you require support, there are fewer snags if you own the requisite capability. If the Canadian Army CEFCOM requires CAS, we really ought to own/deploy CAS assets that we own.


The decision to deploy Canadian aircraft is higher than the CF, and this does not change if those aircraft are controlled by one ECS or another.


----------



## Infanteer

The notion of Army/CEFCOM ownership is interesting.  Aside from different coloured hats, I think the real difference is that we'd have helicopter pilots taking ATOC/AOC and possibly commanding CMBGs.  Would bringing aviation into the "Combat Support Arms" field mean big changes for career structures?

As for the comment of the CF never getting AH - these forums are full of similar pronouncments about modern MBTs, M-777 and C-17s so.....


----------



## aesop081

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I think the real difference is that we'd have helicopter pilots taking ATOC/AOC


Whats stoping us from doing that now ?

The Navy has no issues loading air force personel on their tactics courses so whats the army's problem ?


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> ... I think the real difference is that we'd have helicopter pilots taking ATOC/AOC ...


I don't know about ATOC, but pilots do get on AOC regularly.


----------



## Good2Golf

MCG said:
			
		

> I don't know about ATOC, but pilots do get on AOC regularly.



Yup, occasional Herc and 18 guy, but at least two or three tac hel pilots on every AOC...that is the de facto TH DP2 course.

Just so folks don't get thinking that the Army would look after TH any better than the AF, even though Air Command stood up in 1975, the Army provided capital and O&M funding for tac avn assets up until 1993 -- it was an inter-CC transfer of funds deal, from CC2 (the 'Army') to CC3 (the 'Air Force') to procure or support helicopters.  Seems innocent enough statement.  Now look at some interesting timelines -- when did Chinook (the 'C' model) retire from service?  1991.  Hmmm...there are those who have seen the 1990 letter in which LGen Foster stated that he had no option but not to support upgrade of Canadian Chinooks to the D-model.  Hint:  LGen Foster was not an Air Force officer...

G2G


----------



## Journeyman

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Hmmm...there are those who have seen the 1990 letter in which LGen Foster stated that he had no option  but not to support upgrade of Canadian Chinooks to the D-model.  Hint:  LGen Foster was not an Air Force officer...



Oh, come on G2G.....apples and oranges. We_ both _ know that the 1990's CF budget, driven by the Berlin Wall collapse, was a whole different world. As you noted, Kent Foster had "no option." His budgeteers were trying desperately to maintain a Division HQ, in addition to four Brigades, and could only hope that the fighter pilot-dominated Air Force would keep the airframe in the ORBAT.

Trust me, history doesn't repeat itself (it seldom even rhymes    )

Clausewitz clearly mentioned "friction" and "fog of war." He obviously died before he could write the chapter on "rice bowls." I can only hope that today's actual operational scenario (dare I say "war-fighting") may cause some serious reflection amongst the tribal elders in both the army and the airforce.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Journeyman-

I call BS on your call of BS  (and no returnsees?).

LGen Foster did have a choice- he could have have crap-canned the Div HQ, or part of a Bde to save the Hooks.  He chose not to.  I too remember those days- they were, in many ways, small minded and Regimentally focused days.  No one gave a rat's butt about anything out side their own corps or Regiment.  No one wearing OG107 in those days gave much thought to Tac Avn- it was either there or it wasn't- preferably there if you wanted to do con para or helo rappelling.  This does not, BTW, let the Air Force off of the hook for either Chinook or Bell 412 fiascos (yeah- I know, Marcel Masse) in the early 1990s- they were too busy trying to save unsalvageable CF-18 squadrons to care about an air frame the Army did not want to pay for.

Trust me- if the Army was to ever get stuck with the full cost of aviation assets again- its current equipment issues with Navstar trucks, LSVWs and LAV-3 resets would look like child's play.

BTW- good to see you back on these means- I missed your posts.


----------



## Journeyman

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> *I too remember those days- they were, in many ways, small minded and Regimentally focused days. *


You're not looking for an argument, are you?     I agree.

 My point was, _those_ days sucked...for various reasons. But 'G2G' citing those days (immediate post-cold war environment) to justify negative opinions on Army CAS options _now_, is a bogus strawman. [Remember, CAS_ IS _ the topic here] And I have enough faith in him to believe that he knows that already.

Although you left the flock for the lighter blue side (  ), and 'G2G' has a credible muddy blue heritage, the bottom line is there's an increasing number of troops with multiple operational deployments (dare I say "warfighting") who are less than enthused with air support. 

Should we not talk about it? 



(For what it's worth, I've also had variations of this discusion with one of you zoomie guys.....some 'Angus' guy, something or other     )


----------



## Good2Golf

JM, I'm not saying the fighter-centric AF shed any tears when the Chinook was retired, but the fact of the matter is that FMC was funding tac aviation and chose to cut the capability.  Sure, wall down, 'peace dividend' for all to profit from...no doubt KF felt he had no real choice in the matter and the rather flaccid protestations from AIRCOM didn't help the situation.  Perhaps it is semantics, but FMC rolled on aviation without much of a pause, notwithstanding AIRCOM's long-established disdain for tac hel.  

My point is that it took two to tango back then, the Army shed no more tears for the Hook than did the Air Force.  I just think Loachman gets all misty-eyed and thinks that things would be so much better if the green choppers were stewarded by those wearing green...not so sure that would be the case.

Zwei mere centen.
G2G

p.s.  Next time you flop up to Bytown, the beer's on me -- I have a message to pass to you from LTG Thurman... :cheers:


----------



## Journeyman

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> I have a message to pass to you from LTG Thurman... :cheers:


Damn, wasn't I just being pedantic about keeping discussions on topic?!!!   




Edit: Remainder of message, plus add'l details, cut to PMs -- sorry for being off-topic


----------



## aesop081

Journeyman said:
			
		

> (For what it's worth, I've also had variations of this discusion with one of you zoomie guys.....some 'Angus' guy, something or other     )



.........


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Journeyman,

I guess my point is that, I don't share the optimism that both you and Loachman seem have that things would be better CAS-wise if CLS owned all his aviation resources.  Come budget crunch time (and there is always a budget crunch, because in Canada, there is never and will never be enough money for the CF), I can pretty much guarantee that when choosing to fund helo Squadrons or infantry battalions...well, no contest. I've seen too much tribalism in the CF in my 24 years too believe anymore that an Infantry (or Armoured or Artillery) General Officer would sell his corps down the river to preserve something as "weird" as helos.  War experience from Afghanistan or not...


----------



## George Wallace

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Journeyman,
> 
> ............ I've seen too much tribalism in the CF in my 24 years too believe anymore that an Infantry (or Armoured or Artillery) General Officer would sell his corps down the river to preserve something as "weird" as helos.




I was aghast a few years back to see the CDS, a former CO of mine, sell TANKS down the drain, with a full page blurb in the Ottawa Citizen in praise of the MGS.  Don't let your memories fade.  Things like this do happen.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Yeah, George, but it was still the wrong decision (without picking the scab off of the 40-odd page MGS vs tank debate).


----------



## Journeyman

When I weighed in on this topic.....my concluding point was:  


			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> *If the Canadian Army requires CAS, we really ought to own/deploy CAS assets.*


...based upon two examples in that post, wherein I cited my grievances with USAF, Dutch, and French fixed-wing CAS in-theatre. In a subsequent post I "suggested," from experience, that there may not always be adequate XCAS/GCAS available.

By "we," in that quote, I meant Canada. I was arguing that _Canada_ deploy CAS dedicated primarily to Canadian ops. And yes, I understand how the 'pool' works; this was the discussion I had with LGen Watt -- while we're all "allies," if there's two TICs in progress, planes with US flags respond more quickly to US TICs -- our troops on the ground should have a Canadian option to do the same.


Now, the care and feeding of aviation by the _Canadian Army_.....that's a separate topic, and not where I was going with my input.


----------



## Infanteer

MCG said:
			
		

> I don't know about ATOC, but pilots do get on AOC regularly.



Ahh, right.  Now we just need one to command a CMBG....


----------



## Good2Golf

JM, your point about XCAS is very valid.  There is no denying that there is some influence that the providers of the assets can effect through either the CAOC directly or through the RC's tasking staff.  Can't saying as I can blame the folks though, that's perhaps human nature.  One could ask the same question in parallel regarding RW tpt...Canadian assets are declared to NATO, thus could be used for any mission in the Region...odds are the assets will likely have a flavour in support more of CA troops than others (beyond proportionality of troops ratios in the Region, I mean).  It would be nice to have Hornets in location, but they have an even bigger tail that rotary assets and the required offset against other elements of the Can TF might not be deemed acceptable to the overall force composition.

Cheers
G2G


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Journeyman said:
			
		

> When I weighed in on this topic.....my concluding point was:  ...based upon two examples in that post, wherein I cited my grievances with USAF, Dutch, and French fixed-wing CAS in-theatre. In a subsequent post I "suggested," from experience, that there may not always be adequate XCAS/GCAS available.
> 
> By "we," in that quote, I meant Canada. I was arguing that _Canada_ deploy CAS dedicated primarily to Canadian ops. And yes, I understand how the 'pool' works; this was the discussion I had with LGen Watt -- while we're all "allies," if there's two TICs in progress, planes with US flags respond more quickly to US TICs -- our troops on the ground should have a Canadian option to do the same.
> 
> 
> Now, the care and feeding of aviation by the _Canadian Army_.....that's a separate topic, and not where I was going with my input.



There are also possible scenario's in the future where Canadians may be deployed with even less capable forces than ourselves, then we will have no CAS at all. I have to admit I like the Warsaw Pact idea of mutli-tasked helo's capable of either troops or weapons or a mizx of both. I would like to see a replacement for the Griffion that gives us some abilty for organic air support. The current configuration is better than nada.


----------



## McG

Colin P said:
			
		

> There are also possible scenario's in the future where Canadians may be deployed with even less capable forces than ourselves, then we will could have no CAS at all.


Canada does possess the capability to provide CAS: the CF-18, and when it deploys it does so under CEFCOM.  The government decides to deploy it or not.  Buying a duplicate capability to be force generated by CLS will not change this.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Not to rehash an old argument, by the time another deployment roles around, the CF-18's will likely be gate guards. Judging by choices offered their replacements will be few and costly, wave goodbye to any in the weeds CAS from those platforms.


----------



## Journeyman

Some background info from _USA Today _ to inform the discussion, stating basically that the Taliban are a pretty adaptive group, have learned to estimate CAS response times, and are reacting accordingly.


Shared in accordance with the "fair dealing" provisions, Section 29, of the Copyright Act.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2009-01-19-airstrikes_N.htm

*Afghan insurgent tactics shift to dodge airstrikes  * 
 By Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY

BAGRAM AIR BASE, Afghanistan — Afghan insurgents have learned to attack U.S. troops and scatter before they can be hit by airstrikes, a change in tactics that creates new pressure on coalition ground forces, say defense officials and military experts.
Insurgents "have a pretty good idea of how long it takes for close-air support to arrive," Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said. "We've seen some indications that they will fight for as long as they believe they have until close-air support will likely arrive on the scene."

Military records show U.S. aircraft conducted a record number of aerial raids over Afghanistan in 2008 but dropped fewer bombs and missiles than they did in 2007.

The changing insurgent tactics have the potential to limit the effectiveness of air power and put more pressure on U.S. and coalition ground troops, said Loren Thompson, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute.

"The war in Afghanistan is not the kind of conflict where air power can be used to maximum advantage," he said. Finding insurgents "has proven devilishly difficult, and in Afghanistan that often requires sending ground troops to flush them out."

There are now about 32,000 U.S. and 28,000 coalition forces in Afghanistan. Military leaders, including Gen. David McKiernan, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, say the U.S. presence will grow to about 60,000 troops and could stay that size for four years.

Intercepted insurgent communications confirm they fear the airstrikes, which hit a record number in 2008, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Michael Holmes, commander of the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing here.

In one instance, he said, militants retreated from an ambush, saying, " 'No, stop. The birds are back.' "

McKiernan said insurgents realize the propaganda value of civilian deaths, so they often attack coalition troops from areas crowded with civilians.

"When the insurgency creates those casualties, they do it on purpose to create fear and intimidation to support their ambition," McKiernan said.

Coalition jets flew 19,603 close-air support missions in Afghanistan in 2008 and dropped bombs or fired missiles 3,369 times, about 17% of the time. In 2007, coalition aircraft flew 13,965 missions and dropped munitions 3,572 times, or about 26% of the time.

Airstrikes likely will increase in 2009 as U.S. forces push into areas held by the Taliban and other militants, says Tom Ehrhard, a military analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and retired Air Force colonel. That raises the potential for more accidents.

Ehrhard also predicts an increasing need for surveillance, supply and medical evacuation flights. Demand for aircraft that collect intelligence rose 44% in 2008 in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to Air Force data.

The watchdog organization Human Rights Watch reported in September that airstrikes in Afghanistan inadvertently had killed more than 650 civilians since 2006. That pales in comparison to the more than 3,000 Afghan civilians killed in deliberate attacks by insurgents.

The group also reported last year that insurgents hid among civilians and used them as "shields" from airstrikes.

The rugged, expansive terrain of Afghanistan makes it impossible to fight without airstrikes, says Marc Garlasco, a military analyst at Human Rights Watch and former intelligence analyst at the Pentagon. Although he expects more bombing in 2009, Garlasco says civilian casualties can be minimized with an effective counterinsurgency strategy.


----------



## aesop081

Colin P said:
			
		

> Judging by choices offered their replacements will be few and costly, wave goodbye to any in the weeds CAS from those platforms.



Not to rehash it further but you are assuming that by that time, we will do CAS the same way we do it now.


----------



## Kirkhill

Off topic but an interesting tone coming from USA Today:



> ...The watchdog organization Human Rights Watch reported in September that airstrikes in Afghanistan inadvertently had killed more than 650 civilians since 2006. That pales in comparison to the more than 3,000 Afghan civilians killed in deliberate attacks by insurgents.
> 
> The group also reported last year that insurgents hid among civilians and used them as "shields" from airstrikes.
> 
> The rugged, expansive terrain of Afghanistan makes it impossible to fight without airstrikes, says Marc Garlasco, a military analyst at Human Rights Watch and former intelligence analyst at the Pentagon. Although he expects more bombing in 2009, Garlasco says civilian casualties can be minimized with an effective counterinsurgency strategy.



Taliban are explicitly bad guys and our guys are doing what has to be done AND minimizing civilian casualties.

Not a take that has been apparent in the Canadian media nor, for that matter the US press these last seven years.

Stand by for: "We must finish what we started" rhetoric.  - Not that I disagree with that.


----------



## McG

Journeyman said:
			
		

> *Afghan insurgent tactics shift to dodge airstrikes  *
> By Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY
> 
> BAGRAM AIR BASE, Afghanistan — Afghan insurgents have learned to attack U.S. troops and scatter before they can be hit by airstrikes, a change in tactics that creates new pressure on coalition ground forces, say defense officials and military experts.
> Insurgents "have a pretty good idea of how long it takes for close-air support to arrive," Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said. "We've seen some indications that they will fight for as long as they believe they have until close-air support will likely arrive on the scene."


 As I read this, it appears to me that we are better off with more XCAS consisting of faster & farther reaching aircraft.  Diluting our efforts on budget aircraft dispersed in FOB as GCAS, well that just sees to be more favourable to the current enemy.

That being said, I have been told that one US General (I suspect Gen James Conway, USMC) has also identified a requirement for V-22 to counter this insurgent tactic.  While I have not been able to find the comment linking the V-22 to countering these new insurgent tactics, I have found that he is calling on Marines to  think of Afghan-Bound Osprey as more than just helicopters in order to get the most from their potential and I have found a few other thoughts of his:



> Conway said the expected Marine deployment to Afghanistan would include at least one squadron of tilt-rotor MV22 Osprey aircraft, the half-airplane half-helicopter made by Textron Inc. and Boeing Co..
> 
> "It's made for a place like Afghanistan," he said, adding that the Marines and U.S. special forces were installing a belly gun to the Osprey to make it more effective against insurgents in Afghanistan.


http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=10808&pop=1&page=0
and:


> The first squadron [of MV-22] has just recently come home from Iraq, a seven-month deployment with VMM-263. We were very pleased with the first combat deployment of that aircraft in that squadron. I will be honest. We purposefully downplayed the success they were having throughout the seven months because we wanted to finish the deployment. We wanted to make sure that our initial assessments were correct and that the airplane was going to be everything we wanted it to be in replacing the venerable CH-46 and our CH-53 Deltas. It has done that. The availability rates, the mission performance, the way that all Marines, both aviation and ground, are attracted to the new capabilities of the airplane is just incredible. And we are delighted with the success that we have seen. We now are opening to the media and to the congressmen on the Hill, the success of that deployment.
> 
> Let me give you one example of the capability of the airplane. When we crossed the line in ’03, I said to my boss, General McKiernan, let me make sure you remember that if you need 1,000 Marines anywhere on the battlefield within 100 miles of where we are located, we will come out of our tracks, into our helicopters, and be there for you in 12 hours. Today if the Marine commander were to make that same promise, it would be anywhere 300 miles on the battlefield. That is the tremendous additional capability that this aircraft gives to us.


http://www.marines.mil/units/hqmc/cmc/Documents/2008%20May%2022%20-%20%27%27This%20Week%20in%20Defense%20News%27%20Interview.pdf

On [the Osprey's] initial seven-month deployment, VMM-263 recorded a mission availability rate of around 70% and a monthly flying rate per aircraft of around 65h

I know, others have argued the V-22 is a USMC vehicle that was designed for USMC requirements supporting over the horizon littoral warfare, and therefore we don’t need it.  I’ve never bought this argument.  Our BG AO are growing with every new theatre to the point that the expanses between APOD, FOBs, SPs, Pl houses, etc is just as expansive as the over-the-horizon littoral operations for which the V-22 was designed.  The ability to fly faster and farther to the extent of the V-22 is a fairly significant capability.  Getting a QRF into a fight sooner (or emplaced as cut-off sooner) can be decisive in a COE engagement.  It is also particularly important to reach out farther to recover casualties and return them faster to a role 3 facility.  The real reasons not to go with tilt rotor would be the capabilities we have to trade-off.  V-22 are expensive and I do not know that we could afford to buy them without forgoing other (potentially more important) requirements.  I also suspect there are things a true helicopter can do which a tilt-rotor cannot do.

So, why have I brought-up mention of the aircraft in a CAS thread? Well, one reason is that others have steered this discussion to including a whole Army Aviation analysis.  The V-22 potentially fills a role complimenting various helicopters, as an effective intra-theatre resupply, medevac, or CSAR platform.  Without an escort able to match its speed, the Osprey may not be the best for landing under fire. Despite that, its role in supply runs could be carried out rather easily (and still exploiting its speed and reach).  If our Hercs in theatre can go in alone and still manage to drop beans and bullets (sometimes even landing to pick-up / drop-off) then the Osprey can too.   

The other reason I mention tilt-rotors is that in this thread we keep returning to the idea of FOB CAS.  I still do not think FOB CAS is the right way to go.  However, if it were introduced, the aircraft would need to offer something that we cannot get from the faster & farther reaching ‘jet’ CAS nor from AHs.  We will not get this something from vulnerable, short-legged, slow, fixed-wing, budget platforms.  Attack tilt-rotor aircraft might provide something that fills a capability niche between AH and CAS.  Here again, there is a bigger dollar value attached and we probably will not like to pay the cost (in other capabilities lost/forgone).


----------



## Colin Parkinson

It may also be an excellent aircraft for missions such as Dafur, where you have long distances and limited infastructure. As for it's use in CAS, Afghanistan represents it's first real deployment (Iraq use was more of a test of aircraft and figuring out how to use it best) If it continues to perform well and is capable of operating after recieving a fair bit of damage, then it may start filling a CAS role in a limited role. If I recall the belly gun was more designed with suppressing fire in mind than with it's use as a primary attack weapon.


----------



## a_majoor

The V-22 is a transporter, so I see it as complimentary to the ground force and CAS. As noted you can move men and equipment quickly around the battlefield, establish cut offs or insert troops unexpectedly.

As for the CAS or support role, Bell actually floated a souped up version of the V-15 (an early proof of concept vehicle that led to the V-22) as an attack aircraft early in the LHX program. A small one or two seat tilt rotor built around the V-22 wings and engines is possible, and would be related to the V-22 like the Cobra was to the UH-1 "Huey".

WRT getting inside the OODA loop; if the Taliban and their supporters have determined how long they have before the arrival of CAS, then two solutions suggest themselves:

1. Have long duration armed UAV's on station for every manouevre element, or
2. Go with Kirkhill and organize long range rocket artillery that can strike targets throughout the AOR with minimum delay

A combination of the two would provide instant response from the UAV, and the UAV can be used to guide the follow on strikes from the other means (this may be rockets dispensing "brilliant pebble" submunitions, conventional CAS using bombs and rockets or airmobile troops inserted to contain and shape the battlefield)

The long duration UAV is obviously "flavor of the month", most of these jobs could also be done with an O-2 "Skymaster" or other FAC, although larger planes would have endurance and stealth issues.


----------



## Loachman

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Have long duration armed UAV's on station for every manouevre element,



There is, currrently, no such thing. Add the weight of bombs and/or missiles, and one is forced to remove the equivalent weight of fuel. I was quite surprised to learn how short Reaper's armed missions were, and what it's actually carrying on them. The specs in the shiny brochure may give a maximum weapon load and maximum endurance but they don't necessarily mean anything under real operating conditions. You get long endurance or armed but not both. And there'd better not be any cloud or icing conditions, either.

There will not be one "on station for every manouevre element". You can't crowd these into limited airspace, and there aren't enough anyway. 

With conventional manned aircraft, augmented with tankers if necessary or rotated, however...

Rather like we do now...

Don't count on "instant response from the UAV". It takes time to acquire and confirm a target, and there is no guarantee that the target will be acquired and/or confirmed. This counts for manned aircraft as well. Some of the delay in CAS response is due to that. The bomber can be right overhead, but spec bombing is not a tactic.

O2s won't give long endurance or carry a useful weapon load, and you have to train a pilot whose skills would be put to better use flying something with more practical value. They are also a niche aircraft that could well be completely irrelevant in future conflicts. This is not Vietnam, geographically, threat-wise, or technologically any more than it is WWII, WWI, or Agincourt, and I see no value in resurrecting ancient machinery of any sort. F15s and B1s can do what they can do, and carry real weapons too, and perform in a full-blown modern war. As for "stealth issues", I've yet to see a Talib react before it was too late. Have you ever heard a jet pass overhead at 20,000 feet? They might hear the bomb at the last second, but they're not going to outrun it at that point.

The Marines want V22 because they need to cover longe distances from ship to shore as quickly as possible. At the shorter distances at which we are operating, either in the current conflict or a more traditional one, those distances are not an issue. As I have said elsewhere, most likely in this thread, you are looking at just a few minutes difference at 80 km and we are not operating at those distances too much anyway. It is not worth adding another niche aircraft for the once or twice per century that three minutes might be critical, and losing some flexibility in the process. Would we buy this, _*or*_ Chinook? Can the V22 sling a load? I don't know, and I'm not interested enough in this aircraft to bother finding out. It's certainly not going to be doing that at anywhere near its max cruise speed however - but if zipping home empty once the load's been dropped is crucial, then there's some benefit, I suppose.

"FOB CAS" or "FOB AH"...

You don't want to have to deal with defending the size of the area that this would take up, or dealing with the movement of fuel and parts in huge quantities, the increased losses of machines and likely crew, or, initially, in the construction of the infrastructure required for no benefit whatsoever. Either the machines are in the air before they are needed, or time is going to be lost starting (including post-start checks), manoeuvring prior to take-off, and working into the situation in progress if it's not over by then. And if they are going to be in the air before being needed, they can operate from a major base like KAF and leave one minute earlier for every three to four k that they need to go (in the case of helicopters, and much less for jets), like ten minutes for forty k, which would be pretty close to the time required to start and take off.

There are sometimes good and valid reasons for not doing things.


----------



## rampage800

Loach

Even though I agree with most of your post, to say the MQ-9 isn't carrying a significant load over there might be a little misleading, as compared to the DE guys yea not much, but pretty comparable to everything else flying(fighters) and more than enough to deal with a TIC or two I would think.


----------



## Loachman

There's some video that you should see.


----------



## rampage800

Yea I can imagine, seen some of that stuff too, some of those guys were all very good friends of mine not too long ago,lol.


----------



## Loachman

But seriously, I didn't say that Reaper didn't carry a significant load, I said that I was surprised to learn what it's actually carrying, and how short its missions were when carrying it.

If those Taliban didn't all run in different directions...

My main point, though, is that we can pack a whole lot more onto regular bombers (and I'm including the ones that start with "F") if we want to, and cram a whole bunch more of those bombers into smaller airspace than an equivalent number of UAVs.

Each has its place, and that's why each is gainfully employed.


----------



## YZT580

In the what goes around comes around category, the US is investigating the potential for either a re-vitalised or new-build Bronco style aircraft.  Seems that their mission capability is not replicated by anything in the current inventory and both Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated the need for such an aircraft.  Hence interest in aircraft such as the Toscano.


----------



## Journeyman

source/link?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The Malaysians bought these for CAS, although this example didn't seem to have any hardpoints (other than the fueltanks) or guns. Looks vaguely familiar doesn't it.... ;D


----------



## GDawg

Journeyman said:
			
		

> source/link?



http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2009/01/will-the-ov-10-ride-again.html

I found that link on the wiki page for the Bronco.


----------



## Journeyman

Seen. Thanks.


----------



## Loachman

GDawg said:
			
		

> http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2009/01/will-the-ov-10-ride-again.html
> 
> I found that link on the wiki page for the Bronco.



The most significant words that I saw on that link are "Boeing is apparently pitching..."

Like Viking is pitching a resurrected Buffalo.


----------



## GDawg

Loachman said:
			
		

> The most significant words that I saw on that link are "Boeing is apparently pitching..."
> 
> Like Viking is pitching a resurrected Buffalo.



We sure got a lot of conversational mileage out of that one. I bet there is a forum in the States going mental about a theoretical purchase of a Brazilian plane vs. a currently non-existent American plane that no one has formally asked for?


----------



## observor 69

North American Rockwell OV-10 Bronco is a turboprop-driven light attack and cargo aircraft. Although it is a fixed-wing aircraft, its mission capabilities resemble a fast, long-range, inexpensive and reliable ultra-heavy attack helicopter. It flies at 244 knots (452 kilometers/hour), carries 3 tons of external munitions, and easily loiters for 3 or more hours. It is prized for its versatility, redundancy, load, wide field of view, short-field ability, low operational costs and ease of maintenance."

"The OV-10 has been used by the United States' Air Force, Marines and Navy, the military forces of several other nations, and the U.S. Customs Service, Bureau of Land Management, NASA and California Department of Forestry. There is at least one airplane in private hands as well.
http://wiki.flightgear.org/index.php/North_American_OV-10A_Bronco

Been following this thread. What's wrong with this one, sounds pretty good ?

Just askin'


Edit: Oh ya they don't make them anymore ! But if a "similar" aircraft, Tucano  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embraer_EMB_314_Super_Tucano,  is in production or this one was put back into production ?


----------



## McG

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> Been following this thread. What's wrong with this one, sounds pretty good ?


The answer, while not specific to your plane, has been given:



			
				Loachman said:
			
		

> O2s won't give long endurance or carry a useful weapon load, and you have to train a pilot whose skills would be put to better use flying something with more practical value. They are also a niche aircraft that could well be completely irrelevant in future conflicts. This is not Vietnam, geographically, threat-wise, or technologically any more than it is WWII, WWI, or Agincourt, and I see no value in resurrecting ancient machinery of any sort. F15s and B1s can do what they can do, and carry real weapons too, and perform in a full-blown modern war.


----------



## Loachman

While three tons is nothing to sneer at, what does this give us that we do not already have, what are we willing to give up in order to get it, and why is no other major Western military force interested?

I am not a Griffon fan, but I'd happily trade a bunch for an equal number of OH58D or even AH64 or AH1Z. I'd not trade a single one for a half-dozen of these things, however. Besides, although some of the extreme nutters amongst you might get off on the Bronco troop delivery technique I'd suspect that most would prefer the helicopter.

Modern warfare is not supposed to be an exercise in nostalgia.

I've always been partial to Spitfires and Mosquitos though...


----------



## observor 69

Thanks for the reply Loachman. Turbo prop a/c are appealing for their speed and carry weight and the plus factor of eyeballs vice UAV/UCAV. Apparently those qualities are appealing to other countries also but as you say in our situation there are other factors to feed into the equation.


----------



## Loachman

Bombers are faster and carry plenty. Eyeballs aren't worth much at 20,000 feet. That's what the sensors are for, and they can go on anything currently in our inventory. The platform is less important than the sensors and weapons.


----------



## Michael OLeary

Baden  Guy said:
			
		

> Turbo prop a/c are appealing for their speed and carry weight ....



But you don't necessarily get the advertised speed while carrying the advertised maximum load.


----------



## McG

> British - U.S. study affirms V-22 Osprey effectiveness
> 
> An independent British -- U.S. study jointly assessed the potential for the V-22 to meet current and future U.K. vertical airlift requirements. The requirements for this study were based on the Royal Navy's Future Amphibious Support Helicopter program, as well as the U.K.'s recent Strategic Defence Review.
> 
> The Defence Evaluation Research Agency, or DERA, the privatized research arm of the Ministry of Defence, located in Farnborough, United Kingdom, along with TRW, Inc. of Fairfax, Va., evaluated the V-22s operational capability versus that of conventional helicopters using three scenarios. The high-resolution combat results models demonstrated the potential benefits to the UK of three key tiltrotor attributes: speed, range and survivability.
> 
> "The superior speed of the tiltrotor dramatically improved the rate at which troops, weapons systems and supplies were delivered to the landing zones," said John Buyers, Bell Boeing program manager at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md. Speed also reduced exposure to air defense threats and increased aircraft and payload survivability in the simulations, he explained.
> 
> Increased mission radius capability allowed the assault ships to operate well away from land-based anti-ship missile batteries and naval mines according to the report. On land V-22s permitted deeper operations and enhanced survivability as mission planners routed the aircraft around known air defense threats.
> 
> The study also indicated that the V-22 had utility in performing eight ancillary missions, in particular ship-based Airborne Early Warning, Aerial Tanker platform and Strategic Self-Deployment.
> 
> The first scenario evaluated was an amphibious assault performed by the Royal Marines as part of a U.S.-led coalition force in the Persian Gulf. In this scenario, the performance of the V-22 was evaluated solely against that of the medium-lift helicopter. DERA and TRW determined that this would be the most likely competitor for the V-22 in the assault role. The study concluded that in the critical first six hours of the simulated assault mission, the V-22 delivered 41 percent more combat power to the landing zones than the medium-lift helicopter in this short-range scenario. At longer ranges the models showed the V-22 able to deliver the complete landing force in 15.7 hours less time, a 50 percent advantage, over the medium-lift helicopter.
> 
> The second scenario was a regional conflict inside NATO. In this scenario, the use of support rotorcraft in a number of possible fleet mixes was examined. The scenario showed that an all V-22 force of 27 aircraft could perform all the missions 45 percent faster than the base case of 40 helicopters (i.e., 16 heavy-lift, 8 medium-lift and 16 light-lift helicopters). For a raid on the enemy tank division headquarters, the speed of the tiltrotor allowed mission completion with 39 percent to 47 percent less time exposure to air defense threats. The increased exposure of the helicopters to surface-to-air threats, along with the inherent hardness of the V-22, meant that the helicopter alternatives suffered twice as many combat losses/casualties and had fewer aircraft remaining for subsequent operations.
> 
> The third scenario looked at a U.K.-led multi-national force tasked with conducting a non-combatant evacuation operation in Western Africa. With an equal number of three tiltrotors or helicopters, the speed of the tiltrotor allowed all civilians to be evacuated in the shortest period of time; overcoming even the larger passenger capacity of the heavy lift helicopter. The medium or light-lift helicopter would require almost two days to complete the same mission that the V-22 tiltrotor could do in less than 20 hours.
> 
> In every scenario the speed, range and survivability of the tiltrotor allowed it deliver more combat power faster, more effectively and with fewer combat losses than would helicopters.
> 
> If only V-22s were used to meet the military needs of these three scenarios, DERA modeling showed that based on Strategic Defence Review operational requirements, between 42 and 62 V-22s would be required for the UK.
> 
> The first production MV-22 made its public debut by landing on the Pentagon parade grounds in September, providing orientation flights to several congressman and defense officials during an all day static display of the Bell XV-15 tiltrotor.
> 
> The Osprey will provide a multi-mission, multi-service versatility and capability to U.S. forces by beginning with USMC initial operational capability in 2001. It is capable of carrying 24 combat-equipped personnel or a 15,000-pound external load. It also has a strategic self-deployment capability with 2,100 nautical mile range with a single aerial refueling. Its vertical/short takeoff and landing capability allows it to operate as a helicopter for takeoff, hover and landing. Once airborne, the engine nacelles rotate forward 90 degrees, converting the V-22 within 20 seconds into a high-speed, high-altitude (25,000 feet), fuel-efficient turbo-prop aircraft.


http://www.helis.com/Since80s/h_v22ukus99.php


----------



## Colin Parkinson

U.S. Eyes Super Tucano for SpecOps Work


http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3989450&c=AME&s=AIR

Also posted by Ex-Dragoon    http://forums.milnet.ca/forums/threads/84732.0

Will be interesting to see how it works out.


----------



## Rinker

Wow, I was just going to mention the osprey. Though I do think it is very limited in a ground attack role. But if they found newer ways to mount weapons on it etc. And it good be an attack heli/plane it would be perfect for transportation and then just have it hang around for the guys on the ground to call in strikes or have it do its own thing. But thats just me I really don't know much about these things.


----------



## daftandbarmy

After talking to some people who've recently returned from Afghanistan, it sounds like the Reaper RPV is the way to go for CAS. They were very complimentary about it's performance in a gunfight.


----------



## Loachman

Limited weapon carriage.

No low-level capability.

More sensitive to weather than many other things.


----------



## McG

Rinker said:
			
		

> Wow, I was just going to mention the osprey.  ... it would be perfect for transportation and then just have it hang around for the guys on the ground to call in strikes or have it do its own thing.


The more missions you attempt to fit a single platform for, the less effective it is going to be in any given one of those missions.  Trying to make the Osprey an Attack & Transport platform is probably not a good idea.  Transport capacity would be reduced to accommodate external weapons load, and the firepower would be limited so as to not consume all the payload mass the aircraft can lift.  Because you want this vehicle to loiter on-call to support, increased fuel requirements will also be competing with weapons & transported troops/goods for a portion of that max payload limit.

Your omni-role Osprey will (far more often than not) be flying missions heavier and with more external sources of drag than the Osprey currently has to contend with.  This will have a negative impact on speed, range, manoeuvrability, and all flight characteristics.  As a result, many of the platform's weaknesses would be exaggerated.

There is a reason that fixed and rotary wing aircraft have traditionally (for the most part) had distinctly seperate aircraft for transport and fighting roles.  The Osprey does not need to become a omni-role aircraft.  What it might need is an attack tilt-rotor counterpart ... maybe.


----------



## Cleared Hot

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> After talking to some people who've recently returned from Afghanistan, it sounds like the Reaper RPV is the way to go for CAS. They were very complimentary about it's performance in a gunfight.


One of my pet peeves from theatre is that with the rest of the military (outside the FAC/fighter communities) finally being seriously exposed of air-ground operations, every time someone drops a bomb it is referred to as CAS.  And don’t even get me started about CCA vs. Rotary wing CAS.  Just because an aircraft releases ordnance does not mean it is doing CAS.  Make no mistake, the MQ9 has killed a lot of guys who needed killing but most of the time it is doing so in a role other than CAS.  It really is a much better armed ISR platform than it is a CAS one.  In addition to the limfacs Loachman points out, its slow speed makes it much less responsive (time wise) and it also causes other limitations I won’t go into here.  That being said, if I was going out on patrol for the day and I didn’t know if/when we were going to get bumped, I would want a Reaper above me for the whole mission as opposed to trying to guess at the right 1.5 hour window to ask for a fast mover to check-in.  Conversely, if I get to set H-hr for a pre-planned op, I’d rather choose when to have the 15E with sniper pod check in.

In the end, MQ9s, B1s, A-10s, F15s, etc. are all great airframes with the ability to do CAS (in addition to many other tasks) and each has their individual strengths and weaknesses (in relation to those tasks) but no one airframe is “the way to go”.  While admittedly (and largely because) you don’t always have the choice as to what will check in, knowing the capabilities and limitations of each and using the right tool/TTP for the situation is what FACs get paid to do and we always get the job done.


----------



## MarkOttawa

New Sturmovik?

Air Truck AT-802u
http://www.makli.com/air-truck-at-802u/



> Paris Air Show will be privileged this year when Air Truck AT-802u makes its debut. Air Tractor AT-802u is a new single-engine turboprop utility aircraft prototype and is fully armed. “Air Tractor, Inc” division of agricultural planes has designed this aircraft AT-802 and is widely used for agricultural duties. U.S State Department has been using this aircraft in Latin America by the for drug elimination duties. Air Tractor Inc. has now changed its agricultural plane into a warfare plane; this AT-802u has the ability to counter attack, observe and investigate. The AT-802U is the replica of popular Air Tractor AT-802 but it has been customized significantly for a light attack potential against permanent, fixed and moving targets.
> 
> The two-seat, tail-dragger might emerge as prehistoric, but features a powerful design with plentiful power, which is supplied by a 1,600shp (1,190kW) engine. AT-802u weighs 7,260 KG and can carry a payload of 3,720 Kg, this means AT-802u can carry up to nine 225kg precision-guided bombs such as “Hellfire II and DAGR laser-guided rockets” and 50-calibre gun pods. According to the manufacturers this aircraft fully qualifies as an aerial firefighter, it means that it is designed for high agility at low speeds and low-altitude.
> 
> Air Truck AT-802U can carry a number of weapons that include “M260 rocket launchers”, “Mk 82 500-pound bombs” and GAU-19/A three-barreled 12.7-mm Gatling guns.
> 
> AT-802U aircraft is perfect for rocky operational surroundings for example “Afghanistan”, but it could also be significant from the Air National Guard.



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## FltEngr

I've seen 3 of those Air Tractor landing in Fredericton 2 weeks ago....


----------



## Nfld Sapper

FltEngr said:
			
		

> I've seen 3 of those Air Tractor landing in Fredericton 2 weeks ago....



IIRC there is a flight school located adjacent to the Fredrericton Airport that use these airframes.


----------



## FltEngr

NFLD Sapper said:
			
		

> IIRC there is a flight school located adjacent to the Fredrericton Airport that use these airframes.



It's Forest Protection Limited that flies them for mainly crop dusting. The flight schools you are referring to are Capital Airways and Moncton Flight Center remote facility.


----------



## rampage800

Well maybe this whole idea isn't too far off the mark, looks like the USAF is going exactly in this direction for a COIN a/c, okay maybe not exactly but running roughly parallel with 


http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2009/07/usaf-officially-launches-light.html

Who would have thought ?


----------



## time expired

It seems to me that the USAF already has the ideal airframe for the 
CAS tasking ,great load carrier,good loiter time,good armoured protection,
the A10.There was also a two seater night attack version built but was
never ordered by the USAF.

Why is it not possible to reopen the production line?, surely that in the
long run this would be cheaper than acquiring a completely new aircraft.
                                         Regards


----------



## SupersonicMax

I think something important to consider is:

Right now, sure, we're all into COIN, however, 10-20 years from now, are we really still going to do this, or are we going back to a more conventional type or combat?  Buying aircraft now that we will not use in 20 years is a waste in my opinion.


----------



## George Wallace

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I think something important to consider is:
> 
> Right now, sure, we're all into COIN, however, 10-20 years from now, are we really still going to do this, or are we going back to a more conventional type or combat?  Buying aircraft now that we will not use in 20 years is a waste in my opinion.



And what do you see in your crystal ball?


----------



## Zoomie

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Buying aircraft now that we will not use in 20 years is a waste in my opinion.



Concur.


----------



## YZT580

Ground attack aircraft are the ugly ducklings of the air force.  They are slow, not very pretty and only used to attack the ground which is not what high speed jet jocks want to do.  But ask the boots on the ground in WW2 or Korea or Viet Nam what the greatest sound in the world was when they had their faces buried in the mud and they will universally say it was the sound of a piston driven douglas or Mitchel lumbering overhead.  After each of the aforementioned wars the first aircraft the air force got rid of was those same propeller fleets.  

Interestingly enough every war brings out the same requirements.  The guys on the ground need support and mach 1.4 doesn't help them much but 50 cal. strafing and precision munitions drops from close in does it every time so around 2 or 3 years into each of those wars some air force genius reinvented the ground support aircraft: they just called it different names.  This time it is COIN.  Next time it will be something else but I guarantee there will be a requirement for a troop supporting aerial platform in 20 years.


----------



## SupersonicMax

YZT, the F-18, or any multi-role jet fighter can do the job just as well.  Right now, CAS is a big priority for obvious reasons:  it's used in great quantity in Afghanistan.  In a more "conventionnal" war, would we really be relying on CAS as much as we do now?  Can we justify the acquisition of XX dedicated CAS platform when our fighters can do a good job?


----------



## aesop081

YZT580 said:
			
		

> The guys on the ground need support and mach 1.4 doesn't help them much



Not one single fighter out there does CAS at Mach 1.4.

I'm sure the guys on the ground don't mind an aicraft that can get to them at Mach 1.4 though, when shit is going south.

I will let you in on a little secret we have in aviation : We have more than one speed.


----------



## rampage800

> Posted by: YZT580
> 
> Ground attack aircraft are the ugly ducklings of the air force.  They are slow, not very pretty and only used to attack the ground which is not what high speed jet jocks want to do.  But ask the boots on the ground in WW2 or Korea or Viet Nam what the greatest sound in the world was when they had their faces buried in the mud and they will universally say it was the sound of a piston driven douglas or Mitchel lumbering overhead.  After each of the aforementioned wars the first aircraft the air force got rid of was those same propeller fleets.



Agree 100%, you don't even have to go back as far as the conflicts you mention to make your point for CAS, I'm sure there was probably an incident within the last week in Afg where the good guys were hunkered down awaiting the CAS strike (although it wasn't necessarily a prop driven a/c) The truth of the matter is CAS/BAI always has and always will be in style, its been going on since WW I (in a very elementary way) and will probably be around for the rest of my lifetime at least. To say that we might not need that capability in 20 years might be shortsighted, I'd point to the A-10 for an a/c that is basically a one trick pony and look how long that platform has been around or the AC-130 for that matter(TE, they, A-10s, are also being outfitted with SNIPER pods now, and FMV capable, imagine that ????) I totally understand that the limitations placed on Canada mean we need an a/c that basically can cover a full spectrum of operations, not every country is under those same constraints !!!


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The problem with the "do all fighter-bomber" is that the growing cost of each airframe will mean less aircraft being bought and a increasing reluctance of the senior staff to risk those airframe in strafing attacks. Once the A10's go and the current generation of fighters are replaced by F-22/F-35 or similar, I think you can wave goodbye to low level attacks. i have no doubt they will do fine at higher elevation attacks. The question will be can the increase in technology combined with stand off attacks replace the effectiveness of low level strafing?


----------



## SupersonicMax

Colin P said:
			
		

> The problem with the "do all fighter-bomber" is that the growing cost of each airframe will mean less aircraft being bought and a increasing reluctance of the senior staff to risk those airframe in strafing attacks. Once the A10's go and the current generation of fighters are replaced by F-22/F-35 or similar, I think you can wave goodbye to low level attacks. i have no doubt they will do fine at higher elevation attacks. The question will be can the increase in technology combined with stand off attacks replace the effectiveness of low level strafing?



I wouldn't be surprised to see low level CAS (more like medium level attacks), as you call it, carry on with the new generation fighter.  However, with the advances in Technology, it is possible to hit precisely a target without having a visual ID from the aircraft (if you have Lat/Long, with a JDAM, or with a LGB).  It would obviously depend on ROEs.  It's been done already, in theater.

There are a few obvious advantages to that, one being that the first pass won't scare them away if lead cannot drop his bombs, for any reasons.  

On the con side of things, well, hearing jet engines screaming above you tend to make you keep your head down.  

Low/Slow aircraft, like the Air Tractor or the Texan II are specifically designed for COIN ops and I am sceptic as to how efficient they would be in a more conventional warfare.  The battlefield is/will be much different from Korea/Vietnam/WW2/WW1.  The assets are much more limited, which makes the reaction time much slower with slower aircraft.


----------



## aesop081

Colin P said:
			
		

> The question will be can the increase in technology combined with stand off attacks replace the effectiveness of low level strafing?



But why does it have to replace it ?

Do we need an F-35 to come down low if the troops on the ground are already supported by AHs of various forms ?


----------



## rampage800

> Do we need an F-35 to come down low if the troops on the ground are already supported by AHs of various forms ?



SA-6, 15, 20....to name a few.


----------



## aesop081

rampage800 said:
			
		

> SA-6, 15, 20....to name a few.



i'm not sure of what you are saying here.......


----------



## Zoomie

COIN, AC-130 etc is all fine in the current theatre where the low to mid level threat is relatively low.  Put a slow tractor or Tex2 in a situation with modern Air Defense and a lack of air superiority and the game is changed dramatically.


----------



## Nfld Sapper

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> But why does it have to replace it ?
> 
> Do we need an F-35 to come down low if the troops on the ground are already supported by AHs of various forms ?



And AH here means Attack Helicopters.



			
				rampage800 said:
			
		

> SA-6, 15, 20....to name a few.



Those are Surface to Air missles....



			
				CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> i'm not sure of what you are saying here.......



What he said.


----------



## rampage800

CA

What I'm trying to say is that with those threats on the ground that the F-35 is probably going to have to come low, he can't just hang out up top, not with the SA threats in a modern conventional war, thats why we have things like SEAD. 

I don't think collectively as a group we can say that the planes discussed will be useless in a conventional war and then on the other hand say we'll just buy a (insert a/c of your choice ie.JSF), stay high above the threat and not have to come down because thats not going to work either, we can't drop JSOWs for an entire war (or have dedicated arty support).

This subject is starting to bounce around quite a bit here, I'm not saying one platform is better than another what I am saying though is CAS and a/c that have those abilities are here to stay.

 NFLD Sapper, I don't follow your post at all, are you narrating ?


----------



## aesop081

rampage800 said:
			
		

> CA
> 
> What I'm trying to say is that with those threats on the ground that the F-35 is probably going to have to come low,



I'm from a different mind then. I dont see the F-35 coming down significantly. I see the F-35 staying high and out of AAA range. With its advanced DEWS and LO technology, it is , IMHO, better for the JSF to stay above the expected threat and drop JDAM/SDB. Leave the down low CAS to AHs that can operate closer to the fight than even the A-10 can.



> he can't just hang out up top, not with the SA threats in a modern conventional war, thats why we have things like SEAD.



Yes and it is this very SEAD that can allow the F-35 to hangout high and drop JDAM/SDB. SEAD eleiminates the SAM threat with HARM ( or similar system) and JSOW/SLAM-ER ( or the likes) allowing you bomb truck to stay high and respond. Combination of hard-kill and soft-kill will enable the JSF to stay where it wants. I would rather be high and deal with a SAM in this kind of environment then to be down low within range AAA.



> I don't think collectively as a group we can say that the planes discussed will be useless in a conventional war



Not useless but certainly nothing more than a limited "niche" role ISO things like SF operations and most likely limited to night ops.


----------



## rampage800

Yea

Fair enough, I can't comment much further on the F-35 without straying waaaaay out of my lane, it was never my intent to talk about a particular a/c's capes anyhow.

We obviously have a couple differences of opinion, nothing wrong with that, thats what makes this Forum what it is in the first place.

Have a good night.


----------



## aesop081

rampage800 said:
			
		

> We obviously have a couple differences of opinion, nothing wrong with that, thats what makes this Forum what it is in the first place.



Agreed. I could talk all day and night about this stuff so thanks for joining in. Wish this kind of talk was more prevalent within the AF.



> Have a good night.



You too.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Yes and it is this very SEAD that can allow the F-35 to hangout high and drop JDAM/SDB. SEAD eleiminates the SAM threat with HARM ( or similar system) and JSOW/SLAM-ER ( or the likes) allowing you bomb truck to stay high and respond. Combination of hard-kill and soft-kill will enable the JSF to stay where it wants. I would rather be high and deal with a SAM in this kind of environment then to be down low within range AAA.



This is a very optimistic evalutation of an enemy's Air Defence capabilities.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Bird Gunner:  Every battlefield is different and strategies and tactics will depend on what the enemy has and what we have.  I'm sure the Command has a good idea of what's within enemy lines before they launch the fleet.


----------



## McG

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> This is a very optimistic evalutation of an enemy's Air Defence capabilities.


Regardless, we have doctrine, procedures & tools to bring the fast movers in low and close when required or desired.  Alternately, when it is more appropriate they can operate from high & far. We can be adaptable to the intensity of the conflict and the capabilities/limitations of our enemy.

This adaptability would not likely be true of a limited one trick pony (like a fixed wing prop-driven CAS aircraft).


----------



## aesop081

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> This is a very optimistic evalutation of an enemy's Air Defence capabilities.



That may be but it is no less valid than anyone else's assesment when not discussing a specific threat.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

As an Air Defence guy, I think I'd rather stay low and fast and take my chances with a tired gunners luck of hitting me with a finger guided/laser riding MANPAD/35mm configured gun than up high dealing with radar/thumb driven missiles.  Air Defence always deploys in depth, mutual coverage, and in a layered approach. The best option, IMHO, is an armed UAV, and the F35 doing the HARM missiles for it. Much cheaper, and with the person handling the weapon out of harms way, likely more accurate... can't say for sure since I'm not AF.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> Air Defence always deploys in depth, mutual coverage, and in a layered approach.



In an ideal world, with all the ressources readily available to you.

EDIT:  For example, Canada.  We have a very extensive Air Defence weapons inventory, don't we


----------



## aesop081

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> As an Air Defence guy, I think I'd rather stay low and fast and take my chances with a tired gunners luck of hitting me with a finger guided/laser riding MANPAD/35mm configured gun than up high dealing with radar/thumb driven missiles.



Speaking as the target of SAMs and AAA i prefer to have altitude in order to engage my defensive systems/countermeasures to deal with a missile i can see coming. If for some reason, the unfortunate happens and we get hit, higher altitude gives us more options for saving the aircraft and crew and deal witht he damage done to the aircraft.. We may be able to glide/limp it towards freindly airfields or at the very least towards friendly lines so that we can crash land it and avoid being placed in a SERE situation. I'm sure a fighter guy would rather eject over freindly territory rather than be on the run or get captured.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> If for some reason, the unfortunate happens and we get hit, higher altitude gives us more options for saving the aircraft and crew and deal witht he damage done to the aircraft.. We may be able to glide/limp it towards freindly airfields or at the very least towards friendly lines so that we can crash land it and avoid being placed in a SERE situation. I'm sure a fighter guy would rather eject over freindly territory rather than be on the run or get captured.



Yeah, if you're not blown up in the initial explosion.... High altitude air defence missiles tend to have a large warhead as opposed to small MANPAD warheads, and even smaller AHEAD rounds.


----------



## aesop081

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> High altitude air defence missiles tend to have a large warhead as opposed to small MANPAD warheads,



Yup but they also tend to operate by proximity rather than direct impact. They are also more likely to be guided by radar and those radars are the target of SEAD and our own DEWS/SDS. More time to detect the threat, more time to employ countermeasures and more time to deal with any damage.

Just my 2 cents.......as a target.


----------



## SupersonicMax

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Yup but they also teand to operate by proximity rather than direct impact.



Same with most IR Guided missiles.  Both a proximity and an impact fuse.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Well if Afghanistan has taught anything, it is that when predicting what the next mission for the Canadian military is, all bets are off! Both the Liberals and the Conservatives have learned that Canadians will accept causalities and a warlike mission depending on the reason. This opens us to a much broader global role in the future. It could be our next mission will be without the US and possibly against an opponent with a more sophisticated AD. We may be called on to provide either CAS or Air superiority, even both for the mission.


----------



## McG

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> In an ideal world, with all the ressources readily available to you.


When doing an estimate, you want to ensure that you at least look at the enemy's most likely and the enemy's most dangerous potential courses of action.  If we're trying to crystal ball the future threat that our aircraft may have to fly through to support ground forces, then shouldn't we give some consideration to the large competent enemy with a layered air defence network and some ability to deny air superiority to our side?


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

CDN Aviator said:
			
		

> Yup but they also tend to operate by proximity rather than direct impact. They are also more likely to be guided by radar and those radars are the target of SEAD and our own DEWS/SDS. More time to detect the threat, more time to employ countermeasures and more time to deal with any damage.
> 
> Just my 2 cents.......as a target.



I understand your thinking, and ironically, I think our opinion of the F-35 (I think that's the right numbering for the JSF) is the same... I am a believer in low and fast, but the best aircraft we can get for CAS, aside from something unmanned, is a system that can go high or low. does the JSF do HARM?


----------



## SupersonicMax

MCG said:
			
		

> When doing an estimate, you want to ensure that you at least look at the enemy's most likely and the enemy's most dangerous potential courses of action.  If we're trying to crystal ball the future threat that our aircraft may have to fly through to support ground forces, then shouldn't we give some consideration to the large competent enemy with a layered air defence network and some ability to deny air superiority to our side?



Sure, if we had an unlimited budget, we could get everything we needed against a perfectly equipped enemy (Air Superiority Aircraft, Strike Aircraft, SEAD Aircraft, EW Aircraft, CAS Aircraft, ect).  However, as we all know, our budget is quite limited, therefore we need to compromise on some things.  

To win a war, you need to obtain Air Superiority.  Without it, you cannot do anything without a constant Air Threat (both to air and ground troops).  You can eighter destroy every fighter aircraft they have or deny their use.  Unless the enemy is pretty close to you in terms of technology and quantity, it will be possible to get it (Gulf War 1 & Kosovo are good examples)

In the Balkans War, the Serbs had a very sophisticated Air Defence system.  Nonetheless, the first thing the Allied did was to disable it as much as possible.  It was the very first thing to do, in order to obtain Air Superiority.  Even with that sophisticated, mobile Air Defence system, there was no loss of life in the whole Air Campaign (sure some people got shot down, but they eventually made it.  Getting shot down doesn't always equal a dead crew).  After that, the allied aircraft had the sky almost to themselve and could strike tactical and strategical targets pretty much at their will.

I doubt Canada will ever engage in an Air Campain by itself, and will always eighter be a support element of a bigger coalition or have support from allies.  We will never, in the medium term, have a big enough quantity to do it, so to speak, by ourselve.


----------



## McG

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Sure, if we had an unlimited budget, we could get everything we needed against a perfectly equipped enemy (Air Superiority Aircraft, Strike Aircraft, SEAD Aircraft, EW Aircraft, CAS Aircraft, ect).  However, as we all know, our budget is quite limited, therefore we need to compromise on some things.


Assuming away the threat is a stupid & dangerous way to do an assessment and determine one's requirements (unless maybe you like to be caught with your pants around your ankles when it is time to sprint for your life).  We might not be able to afford everything, but we need to be ready for whatever is conceivably probable in the next foe.

Our limited resources don't mean that a capable enemy does not exist.  Our limited resources mean that we don't squander dollars and effort into a one trick pony (like a "COIN fighter") when a capable modern aircraft can fill that role & the high intensity fight against a competent foe.  



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I doubt Canada will ever engage in an Air Campain by itself, and will always eighter be a support element of a bigger coalition or have support from allies.  We will never, in the medium term, have a big enough quantity to do it, so to speak, by ourselve.


There have been Canadian politicians of more than one party floating the idea of Canada as the heavy lifter in Sudan.  There is both an air and an AD threat in that theatre.  Sure, it is not the most dangerous senario, but don't fool yourself into thinking it can never happen.


----------



## aesop081

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> does the JSF do HARM?



Thats a good question. i'm not sure if the internal weapons bays of the F-35 can accomodate the AGM-88 or succesors. If they are large enough, with the required electonic systems, i cant see why it wouldnt be able to employ it.

Further to the AD discussion, another ace in the F-35 may be the MALD-J ( Miniature Air-Launched decoy-Jammer) being developed. It is basicaly a cruise missile-like system that acts as a decoy with a jammer package and stays close to enemy AD. Combine this with a Stand-off jamer- equiped B-52......


----------



## Infanteer

This page is like the "Infantry Support Gun" page where everyone except the infantry is making recommendations on what the Infantry needs.  

Oh well, the thread is interesting, despite routine static, for the amount of thought going into tactical and strategic requirements for Canadian air power.

A few questions/points from the peanut gallery:

1.  Interesting debate on threat assessments, and one that must go with any argument to by any piece of hardware.  What's the threat?  People have a good bogeyman in China, but guys like Thomas Barnett make good cases against that scenario.  White Paper material.

2.  What can be assumed?  Some hard assumptions have to be made - we simply don't have the resources to cover all eventualities (or tailor forces for every niche conflict).  Will we always have air superiority?  My initial thought is that we can count on air dominance, or at least air superiority, for the next decade or so - we don't really go anywhere without the US.  Can we afford to plan against a relatively thin enemy air defence in the near and mid-term future?  Some have made relatively convincing arguments that we can.  Again, White Paper material.

3.  MCG mentioned Sudan, but should we really be basing our force structure planning off of preparing for abjectly poor strategic decisions?  Canada deciding to unilaterally sort out the Sudan, or pretty much in any real contested idea, is – at this point in time - poor, any way you cut it.  Look at the effort made, with superb overwhelming American support, to pacify a single province in Afghanistan.  Yet again, White Paper material.

4.  That being said, I think the F-35 is (for all the right reasons) a given.  It can cover off enough vital roles to hit those baseline Air Force requirements (patrol Canadian skies, contribute to allied ops, drop a bomb on something, intercept something) that we can’t avoid getting it.  This thread shouldn’t be an either/or argument, but rather on how to effectively augment the capabilities of this airframe that we will undoubtedly acquire in limited numbers.

5.  This mention of a COIN fighter is silly - I'm unsure of how it has come to dominate this thread.  Dropping bombs and strafing does not constitute "COIN" anymore than a rifleman using a rifle means he is a "COIN Policeman" vice soldier - why should we define a fighter by an operational construct?  This thread is on the verge of creating a false dichotomy of HIC/LIC airpower – that if something is good at dropping bombs on bad guys it is a “COIN fighter”.  How about just a “warfighter” airplane – something that drops bombs on bad guys regardless of what sort of uniform they put on.

6.  I think the crux of what some on this thread were aiming at was an airframe that dealt with two major issues with deploying airpower; the footprint it requires to operate it (airstrips, control towers, etc, etc) and the maintain it (mechanics, vehicles, etc, etc).  This makes employment of the vehicle more likely as it is easier to deploy and sustain on operations.  The “low-tech” solution was put forward, and was intriguing, as a solution to meet these demands; however others may be more feasible/palatable – such as armed mini-UAVs launched from LAVs or something.  Either way, I think the discussion of “Green Airpower” should focus on footprint vice capability to put lead on a target (as most airframes can do so, especially with a good JTAC).

7.  The other is cost - I once read an interesting article somewhere that measured the cost and time to produce a modern fighter and how if two guys went at it with similar machines that attrition would soon render all super high-tech models obsolete as there is no way they could replaced in good order.  Do an experiment and picture what would happen if we got in a fight with country "X" and 23 CF-18s were shot down in the first week or two of conflict?  How the hell would we replace those?  How long does it take a factory to spit out an F-22 or an F-35 to replace it?  Interesting thought experiment anyways, and something the "low tech" crowd may be right in bringing up?

Anyways, just my 2-non-wedge-wearing-cents.

PS.

We aren’t the only one’s discussing these general concepts – many good threads (with real good articles) over on the Small Wars Council:

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7603&highlight=Airpower

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2357&highlight=Airpower


----------



## McG

Infanteer said:
			
		

> 3.  MCG mentioned Sudan, but should we really be basing our force structure planning off of preparing for abjectly poor strategic decisions?  Canada deciding to unilaterally sort out the Sudan, or pretty much in any real contested idea, is – at this point in time - poor, any way you cut it.


While potentially a poor strategic decision, it is a probable type of task the Canadian government & public will call on us to perform.  As an instrument of the national will, we should be basing our force structure planning on achieving those tasks for which the nation is likely to call on us.  If the Sudan is a bad fit for our current force structure but also the type of mission that Canada is likely to ask of its military, then we absolutely have to address this ... but maybe we are getting broader than the scope of this thread.  For now, I will simply state that I think the Sudan is a suitable model environment against which to assess CAS and AD force design (and any force structure should be assessed against several models of potential operating environments).



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 1.  Interesting debate on threat assessments, and one that must go with any argument to by any piece of hardware.  What's the threat?  People have a good bogeyman in China, but guys like Thomas Barnett make good cases against that scenario.  White Paper material.
> 
> 2.  What can be assumed?  Some hard assumptions have to be made - we simply don't have the resources to cover all eventualities (or tailor forces for every niche conflict).  Will we always have air superiority?  My initial thought is that we can count on air dominance, or at least air superiority, for the next decade or so - we don't really go anywhere without the US.  Can we afford to plan against a relatively thin enemy air defence in the near and mid-term future?  Some have made relatively convincing arguments that we can.  Again, White Paper material.


China, North Korea, Iran, etc ... I think these countries constitute the "most dangerous" scenarios, and it is safe to say we probably will not pick a fight with any such nation our own.  When using the most dangerous model to assess our force structure it should be done with our forces in a coalition context.  While our allies might to the heavy hitting to establish air supremacy, we still need to be capable of participating (on the ground & in the air) during these opening stages.  At the same time, we might want to consider the possibility that the US is not present & the heavy lifters are European nations.
  ... and again this might be straying from the topic.

For this thread, the conclusion from my responses above is that we still must plan to be in a fight where there is an organized, sophisticated, and competent enemy Air & AD threat.  We cannot assume the threat away.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 5.  This mention of a COIN fighter is silly - I'm unsure of how it has come to dominate this thread.  Dropping bombs and strafing does not constitute "COIN" anymore than a rifleman using a rifle means he is a "COIN Policeman" vice soldier - why should we define a fighter by an operational construct?  This thread is on the verge of creating a false dichotomy of HIC/LIC airpower – that if something is good at dropping bombs on bad guys it is a “COIN fighter”.  How about just a “warfighter” airplane – something that drops bombs on bad guys regardless of what sort of uniform they put on.


+1

We (the Canadian military) cannot afford an aircraft which is only suited to a particular "level of intensity" or specific slice in the spectrum of conflict.  There are plenty of generic terms that can be used without pigeon holing an aircraft into a particular intensity of conflict.  Consider: attack fighter, ground-attack fighter, fighter-bomber, tactical fighter, tactical bomber, close support bomber, strike fighter, light strike aircraft, gunship, etc.  I'm not sure which of these terms is the best fit, and it really should not matter until we've figured out what the capability requirement is.  We should always define the capability requirement and then identify the equipment to best fit.   Otherwise, we end-up with a solution (COIN fighter, FOB CAS, LASSO, Typhoon Gunship, etc) that is looking for its problem.



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 7.  The other is cost - I once read an interesting article somewhere that measured the cost and time to produce a modern fighter and how if two guys went at it with similar machines that attrition would soon render all super high-tech models obsolete as there is no way they could replaced in good order.  Do an experiment and picture what would happen if we got in a fight with country "X" and 23 CF-18s were shot down in the first week or two of conflict?  How the hell would we replace those?  How long does it take a factory to spit out an F-22 or an F-35 to replace it?  Interesting thought experiment anyways, and something the "low tech" crowd may be right in bringing up?


The same argument could be made of LAVs. It is possible to plan for this and procure reserve war fleets & battle replacement stock.  This may be an unpleasant cost upfront, but it avoids the industrial back-log when the equipment is urgently needed in conflict.

Another big price tag is the pilot.  Freshly trained each is already a seven digit financial investment, and has taken longer to train than is required to manufacture a fighter in production run. 



			
				Infanteer said:
			
		

> 4.  That being said, I think the F-35 is (for all the right reasons) a given.  It can cover off enough vital roles to hit those baseline Air Force requirements (patrol Canadian skies, contribute to allied ops, drop a bomb on something, intercept something) that we can’t avoid getting it.  This thread shouldn’t be an either/or argument, but rather on how to effectively augment the capabilities of this airframe that we will undoubtedly acquire in limited numbers.
> 
> 
> 6.  I think the crux of what some on this thread were aiming at was an airframe that dealt with two major issues with deploying airpower; the footprint it requires to operate it (airstrips, control towers, etc, etc) and the maintain it (mechanics, vehicles, etc, etc).  This makes employment of the vehicle more likely as it is easier to deploy and sustain on operations.  The “low-tech” solution was put forward, and was intriguing, as a solution to meet these demands; however others may be more feasible/palatable – such as armed mini-UAVs launched from LAVs or something.  Either way, I think the discussion of “Green Airpower” should focus on footprint vice capability to put lead on a target (as most airframes can do so, especially with a good JTAC).


I think we've already seen that any manned fixed-wing aircraft (even if we use 1945 vintage Warthogs) will increase foot print, tie-up more ground combat power, steal resources from more capable multi-role aircraft and not provide any increase in capability.  http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/40352/post-774643.html#msg774643

If there is an exception to this statement, then it would be an expensive modern A-10 type platform.  Otherwise, we are looking at expensive helicopter or tilt-rotor platforms (and even here there are large resource trade-offs & footprint issues to be addressed).

I still believe that if the F-18 (and its eventual replacement) requires another platform to compliment it in CAS, then that platform is likely a UAV or a family of UAV.


----------



## Good2Golf

One of the biggest problems with this thread is that much of it devolves to debating/discussing the platform-specific issues, vice the capability/effects you want.  At the moment, nothing says persistent CAS like a B-52 out of Diego Garcia loitering for half a day overhead spitting out JDAMs to the JTAC on the ground, when/where required.  If you are a small-medium power and you tie yourself to specific weapon systems for some rather specialized employment, you are setting yourself up for disappointment.  CAS is a doctrinal employment of air power in support of ground force --  a UAV targeting precision fires can be jsut as much CAS as the A-10 rolling in burping with its GAU-8. 

Do a proper mission analysis, figure out what you need to do to respond to what the enemy might likely, or in the worst case, do (this solid point noted by our ground-borne brethren - good stuff  :nod: ) in a number of different force employment scenarios and stop when the price tag for the overall capability set gets to high.  It is probably fair to say that Canada is not going to resource capabilities to anything beyond a smaller number of multi-mission capable aircraft -- in fact this is reinforced as there is a drive to reduce numbers of fleets and conduct several mission types with fewer fleets and airframes.


Safe to say that for CAS-like capabilities (in varying degrees of persistence or max effect), you could use a CF-18, a UAV, an Aurora, a Griffon, etc... 

What hasn't been discussed in enough detail in this thread is ensuring that the AF develops a clear-enough understanding of what the ground forces need (phrases such as "Air-Land Integration" come to mind), and how best to integrate into that framework to conduct the required missions.  Personally, I still like the USMC's idea of CAS which, while departing slightly from the nice NATO AAP-6 definition, gets no argument from the Leatherneck on the ground, who knows that his/her fellow soldier above them, raining down a variety of munitions (bombs, rockets, 20mm, etc...) is providing ["lower-case"] close air-support.  Ask a Marine if the "grey angel of death" raining down hot 20mm shells from directly overhead him is, or isn't "CAS"...  

Cheers
G2G


----------



## time expired

GOOD2GOLF
                Hit the nail right on the head,Marine air exists purely to
supply the Marine grunt with CAS.read anything about Korea,Vietnam,the
Marines,and anyone else who happened to be blessed with Marine Air
CAS swore by it and wrote that it was head and shoulders above what
ever else was in the air.
              One thing that is always apparent when threads on equipment
acquisition are on this site, is the very low level of expectation that one
senses as though we were still a country of 14 million people.Canada is
one of the riches countries in the World with a population of 32 million,
that is incidentally about half the population of the UK,surely a country
of this wealth and size can afford 24 airframes dedicated to providing
CAS for our deployed troops.
                                      Regards


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

some outstanding points brought up.  I certainly agree that Canada needs to sit down and make a real analysis of what we require. Do we want an Air Defence/interceptor, CAS, and deep strike combination (CF-18, A-10 type, and JSF), or do we just need the AD Capability.  Is there a role for AH? Take it a step further, why not just stand army aviation back up and let the army take care of it's own integral suppport? For my two cents, as an Air Defence guy, I would say the AH is the better bet... cheaper, and can stay on station, and much stealthier... defending against fast air is pretty routine for GBAD, helo is much trickier... plus AH gives you more airmobile options. Just food for thought.


----------



## a_majoor

Infanteer has it right (for me anyway), one of the questions I was trying to address was "footprint".

I have a few blue sky thoughts WRT how this might play out in the mid term (after the F-35 is deployed):

1. UACV's become capable enough to be "trusted" to do the ground support mission. A control aircraft similar to an AWACS will probably be in the area to provide guidance, SA and ensure the ROE's are followed. As this evolves, the control function may be transferred to the back seaters of two place fighters, since the control aircraft will need to be able to survive in an unfriendly sky.

2. Technological advances will bring weapons like lasers and railguns out of SF into real world service. The carrier aircraft will need to be large enough to carry the weapon, power system and sensors, so we are talking about a 747 or "Dreamliner" sized aircraft, but one which can rapidly engage targets from the ground to the edge of space. In this case the "footprint" will change, with several large aircraft orbiting the edge of the battlespace to provide continuous coverage rather than fleets of smaller aircraft based nearby.

3. Technological advances may also bring about a real "green airforce". Small aircraft based on ultralights with limited costs and footprints could literally be carried around by the manouvre force folded up on the back of a LAV or MLVW to provide "instant on" air response to situations. Even smaller aircraft are also possible or even in current service, I believe there is a micro UAV that an individual soldier can carry in a backpack and hand launch to see what is over the next hill. FOG-M missiles also combine the attributes of being portable, allow you to see what is over the next hill and take armed action against a target (and are also usable in all intensities of conflict). This isn't an aircraft per se, but an evolution of the concept (using a small turbine engine or even a propeller for long endurance and being able to recover the FOG-M if nothing shows up) may be possible.


----------



## McG

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... I believe there is a micro UAV that an individual soldier can carry in a backpack and hand launch to see what is over the next hill.


Are you thinking of the Skylark, or something smaller?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Predicting technological trends is always fun. I have a book written in 1935 where a master mariner predicted that Merchant ships would have aircraft catapulted off of them for the junior officers to do ice recce! He also predicated coal dust replacing that upstart diesel oil…..  

The UAV world is full of promise. However the wavelength realm has limitations. Of course with super small UAV's, perhaps new AD troops might be issued a long barrelled over and under shotgun!


----------



## MarkOttawa

A post at _Defence of the Realm_ (lots of links in original):

Gaining momentum
http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/08/gaining-momentum.html



> From a minority obsession, the deployment of light turboprop strike reconnaissance aircraft to aid the conflict in Afghanistan has achieved the status of an idea whose time has come.
> 
> The latest writing on the wall came with a Pentagon briefing reported on 23 July, when Michael Vickers, the acknowledged guru on special operations and low intensity conflict told a small group of defence reporters that upcoming Quadrennial Defence Review (QRD) would be looking at creating "irregular warfare air units" to beef up the US counterinsurgency capability.
> 
> The US Navy is SEALs are, of course, already ahead of the game. They are testing leased an EMB-314 Super Tucano aircraft in the desert ranges in California, under a year-long project codenamed "Imminent Fury", picked up recently by _Strategy Page_.
> 
> But now we learn from _Flight Global_ that the US Air Force has issued a "request for information" (RFI) to identify sources that can supply 100 new aircraft to perform light attack and armed reconnaissance.
> 
> This is from Air Combat Command, issued on 27 July, calling for aircraft deliveries to start in 2012 and the first operational squadron to activate a year later.
> 
> The requirements call for a two-seat turboprop capable of flying up to 30,000ft and equipped with zero-altitude/zero-airspeed ejection seats, full motion video camera, data link, infrared suppressor, radar warning receiver and armoured cockpit. Weapons must include a gun, two 500-lb bombs, 2.75-inch rockets and rail-launched munitions.
> 
> The known for competitors for the requirement include the *Air Tractor AT-802U, Embraer Super Tucano, Hawker Beechcraft AT-6B Texan II and Pilatus PC-9* [emphasis added].
> 
> The thinking is based on a summary study that concludes that, "As far as can be determined without actual operational testing, the use of light aircraft is suitable, feasible and acceptable", reinforced by a study last year that concluded that a light attack aircraft could save the USAF billions.
> 
> This study, conducted by Col Gary Crowder, commander of the Middle East-based Combined Air and Space Operations Centre, complains that there has not been a "substantial ... intellectual investment" into air-ground integration in the 21st Century.
> 
> Crowder argues that a platform like the AT-6 could dramatically reduce the number of fighter jets deployed, provide a light observation utility, save thousands of flying hours on the fighter fleet and extend the life of fighter and attack platforms while saving money.
> 
> "At the end of five years, you not only have a suitable force that is ... capable of doing counterinsurgency, stability support and peacekeeping operations, you've also saved thousands of flying hours on your F-16s," he says.
> 
> But strike/reconnaissance aircraft are not the only options being considered. A week earlier the *USAF issued an RFI for as many as 60 light mobility aircraft (LiMA) to airlift up to six passengers or small loads of cargo from austere or unimproved surfaces* [emphasis added--new-build Twotters, anyone?
> http://www.vikingair.com/content.aspx?id=276 ].
> 
> This goes back to our thinking on the utility of such aircraft as the Pilatus Porter. But the concept of using light STOL transport aircraft goes much further back, to the use by British forces in the 1950s and 60s of the Scottish Aviation Twin Pioneer (pictured above) the Single Pioneer and even the Beaver.
> 
> In fact the idea of fixed-wing re-supply aircraft for mobile formations was exploited during the Second World War, using single-engined Waco biplanes to support the LRDG.
> 
> Nor indeed is the idea foreign to the US. During Vietnam, extensive use was made of the DHC-4 Caribou (and other air forces – pictured RMAF, right). The type was operated by the US Army until 1966 when the aircraft were traded to the USAF, under the Johnson-McConnell agreement, in exchange for an end to restrictions on Army helicopter operations.
> 
> Therein, actually lie much of the current doctrinal difficulties where, in the UK also, there is an unofficial agreement with the RAF restricting the use of fixed wing aircraft in the Army.
> 
> While the issues are being thrashed out in the United States, if there is a debate in the UK about restoring light, fixed wing aviation to the battlefield, it is being carried out in private, with little indication that the Service Chiefs are taking it seriously.
> 
> One of the problems, it seems, is that fixed wing aircraft are not seen as a 100 percent answer, providing only supplemental capacity to helicopters on the one hand and fast jets on the other.
> 
> As the argument has matured in the US, however, the economic benefits have come to the fore and, as Crowder observes, even if light aircraft take some of the load off existing assets, the overall savings could run into billions.
> 
> Certainly, in UK terms, where the media (and political) focus has been on increasing helicopter _capacity_, much of the _capability_ could be achieved by light, fixed wing assets, at considerably less cost. Where Apaches are currently used to escort Chinooks, for instance (in which role they struggle to keep up with the faster transport helicopters) aircraft such as the Tucano could do the job better.
> 
> Equally, *STOL transport aircraft could deliver to FOBs* [emphasis added] – even parachuting supplies in – and support mobile formations, delivering supplies, transferring personnel and even evacuating casualties - as well as radio relay and reconnaissance. They have a possible additional role as a light gunship.
> 
> It is a measure of the paucity of the UK scene, therefore, that such ideas are not being openly discussed, or that the Armed Forces themselves are not initiating a debate as a cost-effective way of relieving some of the pressure on air assets in Afghanistan. The debate needs to move on from capacity to capability.
> 
> Nevertheless, the rediscovery of light aviation is gaining momentum and, one supposes, three or four years hence, the British media will suddenly wake up to the idea, unless there happens to be a journalist out there who can actually kick-start our military into action. We live in hope.



Comment thread:
http://umbrellog.com/forum3/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=1007733

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Loachman

Nice-sounding chaps, but they are flopping in the dark, and living in the past - completely oblivious to modern technology and its capability (thermal imagery, synthetic aperture radar, GPS guidance).

This is not WWII, Korea, or Vietnam anymore.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The problem with the article is they deal with 2 distinct issues. Resupply/transport and light CAS

I suspect the Super Turnaco (spelling?) will have a fairly decent sensor suite.

As for remote base resupply, it has a certain appeal, however a short strip means more area to guard and a much more predictable approach than a helo requires. That being said I have seen Beavers, Porters plunk down and take off in some remarkable bad landing areas here in Canada and in South America (the term strip likely would not even apply). Also as far as the US is concerned, you are now chomping on the territory that the Osprey is supposed to fill, that will not go over well I bet.
The authors forget that the causality rates of these aircraft just from accidents was fairly high, both in military and civilian use. Squeezing a heavily loaded aircraft onto a small strip, often with the worst possible alignment of rocks, winds and slope is a guaranteed to cost you a few aircraft. 

All being said the approach make sense for smaller militaries who can afford enough helo’s to support operations.


----------



## YZT580

DHC5, DHC4, DHC2.  I guess Viking is going to be trying to market their aircraft in lots more places besides OW and for lots more reasons than S&R.  If I remember my history correctly remote resupply was the reason for the Caribou and Buffalo and it was only when the airforce took over fixed wing from the army that helicopters became the vehicle of choice because the air force refused to use the short strips.  What ever is old is new again!


----------



## Loachman

YZT580 said:
			
		

> What ever is old is new again!



Some things should just be allowed to stay old.


----------



## GAP

Regarding Mark's Post....

There's a valuable place for an aerial observer with good SA...I'm not all that in love with the 2-500lb bombs, but the rest sounds about right.

We loved when the fast movers came in, but mostly they came in after the birddog vectored them in.....we knew they would hit what we wanted because birddog was doing overwatch.

The article points out some of the stuff they want to do, and like all hierarchies they are taking a tin cup and making it into the holy grail sans rockets/bombs/super sensors/etc. etc......  simply use it the way it was meant to be used.


----------



## aesop081

YZT580 said:
			
		

> because the air force refused to use the short strips.



Source ?


----------



## GAP

And then you have this.....

Air Force may buzz before bombing in Afghanistan
(AP) – 1 hour ago
Article Link

SHAW AIR FORCE BASE, S.C. — The Air Force general in charge of the air war in Afghanistan says a new strategy means warplanes in some cases may be buzzing rather than bombing some insurgents.

Lt. Gen. Gilmary Hostage said Thursday that his job is to support the strategy of winning Afghan support as formulated by the new U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal. As part of that, McChrystal imposed restrictions on air power to limit civilian casualties.

Hostage told reporters at Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina his forces can easily drop bombs with pinpoint accuracy.

But the three-star general said that at times, it may be better to fly low over enemy forces and disperse them with noisy warplanes that threaten with firepower but don't immediately unleash it.
More on link


----------



## YZT580

To Cdn Aviator: Here are the figures the army used for the caribou.  

Two piston engines are mounted in the wings’ leading edges, and the engine nacelles extend beyond leading edges. Powered by two Pratt & Whitney engines of 1,450 hp each, it cruised at 149 knots with a service ceiling of 27,500 ft. It is designed to take off and clear a 50-foot obstacle in a distance of 1040 feet with zero wind. With a 20-mile headwind, the takeoff distance over a 50-foot obstacle is just 460 feet. Its landing distance is just over 590 feet while clearing a 50-foot obstacle. These characteristics enabled the Caribou to operate out of tiny jungle landing strips, from beachheads, or from improvised military landing strips as short as 850 feet. The wings are high-mounted with straight leading edge and forward-tapered trailing edge from engines to the blunt tips. The fuselage is slab-sided with a solid, rounded nose and stepped cockpit. The tail flats are mid- to low-mounted on the tail fin and tapered with blunt tips. The large fin is tapered with blunt tip.


When the air force took it over they added about a third to the requirements: ending the close in resupply missions.  Article is from Global Security.org.  The air force refused to use the figures that the army pilots were using and instead went to the DH published figures which are about 1000 feet, as shown above


----------



## a_majoor

The Iraqi Air force gets more punch:

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A65bfc2c9-0f02-462d-8af9-ad7f060c30c8



> *Armed Bread Box for Iraqi Air Force*
> Posted by David A. Fulghum at 10/15/2008 9:29 AM CDT
> 
> Right now, the new strike capability for the Iraqi Air Force is flying out of a civilian airport in Fort Worth and will be delivered to Iraq starting in December.
> 
> Two Cessna Grand Caravan 208Bs, armed with a pair of AGM-114 Hellfire missiles each, were photographed flying out of Meacham Airport earlier this month. The field has no official military presence, but it is the home of a major ATK Integrated Systems major modification facility and the armed Caravan is one of its projects.
> 
> Also operating out of ATK’s shops are C-130s, a deHavilland Dash-8 and a Swearingen Metro IV all heavily modified for clandestine ISR operations, say those with knowledge of the field’s operations.
> 
> In Dec. the IqAF will receive the first three armed Cessna Caravans -- with laser designators for the missiles -- followed by two more in early 2009, says Brig. Gen. Brooks Bash, current chief of the coalition air force transition team.
> 
> The IqAF is already flying a number of unarmed Caravans for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), VIP transport and pilot training and it is expecting its armed Caravans by year’s end.
> 
> In July, the Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq signed over eight Cessna 172s as primary trainers and three Cessna Caravan 208s as advanced trainers to the Iraqi Defense Ministry for the Iraqi Air Force’s training program at Kirkuk AB. The plan is to train 130 new pilots annually. The service’s projected size is 6,000 airmen and 133 aircraft by late 2009.
> 
> The olive-drab Caravans have with no national markings, but they do carry an off-colored rectangle near the top of the vertical stabilizer where Iraq puts national flag markings on its military aircraft. The aircraft are fitted with an EO/IR surveillance sensor ball offset to the left side of the aircraft. The engine exhaust is offset to the right to avoid interference with the IR sensor. The sensor ball, targeting pods and missiles will be the same as those on the Predator UAV. A pod on the leading edge of the right wing of the Caravan holds a weather radar. The aircraft also has missile warning sensors on the tail and nose and what appears to be chaff and flare dispensers for self protection.


----------



## a_majoor

Looking at more out of the box solutions:

http://nextbigfuture.com/2009/11/missile-delivered-uavs.html



> *Missile Delivered UAVs*
> 
> The US Army is funding Missile Delivered UAVs amongst dozens of other projects
> 
> A10-006   Missile Delivered UAV
> A10-010   Real-time Visualization Tool for Distributed Intrusion Detection System Data
> A10-011   Intelligent Agents for Improved Sensor Deployment and Surveillance
> A10-012   Coordinated Responses through Knowledge Sharing in Mobile Agent-Based Intrusion Detection Systems
> A10-013   Intrusion Detection System (IDS) With Automatic Signature Generation for Self Healing Networks
> A10-014   Spoofing Network Architectures in Response to Hostile Reconnaissance
> A10-015   Linearity Improvement of MMIC Power Amplifiers at Reduced Output Power Backoff
> A10-016   Wideband Multi-Carrier Digital Up-Converter
> A10-017   Indium Surface Preparation for Improved Flip-Chip Hybridization
> A10-018   In-Vacuo Passivation of High Aspect Ratio HgCdTe Surfaces
> A10-019   Electronically Switchable infrared Beam Splitter Technology
> A10-020   Advanced Molded Glass Lenses
> A10-021   Lightweight, Wide Field-Of-View Wave-guided Head-mounted Display
> A10-022   Innovative Annealing Apparatus for Mercury-Based, Compound Semiconductors
> A10-023   Untethered Real Time Low Cost Head Tracking
> A10-024   Real-Time Vis-SWIR Multispectral Sensor for Day/Night Operations
> A10-025   Large Format Dual Band FPA ROIC for Low Flux Environments
> A10-026   A Viable Method for Metal Nano-Coating of Graphite Microfibers
> A10-027   Improved Methods of Explosively Disseminating Bi-Spectral Obscurant Materials
> 
> A10-028  Innovative and Novel Concepts for Eye-Safe Wavelength High Power Fiber Lasers for Increased Performance
> A10-029  Flux Compression Generators
> A10-030  Electromagnetic Attack Detector
> A10-031  Lightweight Nanosatellite Propulsion System to Enhance Battlespace Awareness and Battle Command Capabilities
> A10-032  Information Security and Trust in a Space Communications Network
> 
> OBJECTIVE
> 
> To develop innovative concepts to provide near real-time situational awareness on the battlefield with the possibility of providing a quick response attack.
> 
> DESCRIPTION
> 
> ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) platforms delivered from missiles can potentially provide battlefield information that is only seconds old when transmitted from long ranges. This information is particularly valuable since it is so current. It provides the potential for striking a very mobile enemy before he has time to alter his position. In addition, it also offers the possibility of a deep strike by the platform itself.
> 
> Among the potential ISR platforms that have recently been proposed/developed/built are a large number of UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) and LAM (loiter-attack missile) concepts. Some of these concepts have the potential of being packaged in a missile and carried for long distances from their launch point. Obviously, the quicker the missile arrives in the vicinity of the targets, the more valuable the information being transmitted to the war fighter for use in targeting the enemy and/or providing situational awareness and/or providing battle damage information. The use of any existing components for this system obviously is important since the cost of the system is directly affected.
> 
> PHASE I: *This solicitation seeks innovative concepts to deliver an ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) platform that reports back in near real-time and provides the possibility of a long-range strike mission at the end of the ISR mission.* Technical approaches formulated in Phase-I shall place emphasis on minimization of the delay in providing battle field information and attacking the enemy target complex. Phase-I concept development shall include simulated fly-outs of the system to determine flight parameters of interest (area-time coverage, maximum and minimum range, dispense altitude, operational altitude, etc.) and, thus, establish the potential for Phase-II success.
> 
> PHASE II: The technical approach formulated in Phase-I will be developed and refined for full-scale flight simulation. The contractor shall pay particular attention to the dispense of the ISR platform from the missile accounting for any aero-propulsion interference between the platform and missile. The contractor will also pay particular attention to the missile proposed for delivery of the ISR system to insure there are no incompatibilities between the delivery mission and the original operational requirements of the missile (center-of-gravity, angle-of-attack, flight velocity, etc.). The critical flight phase of the concept shall be refined and the dispense of the ISR platform planned for a test in a full scale, Government owned ground test facility using instrumented tunnel models at a fidelity level deemed appropriate at that time. Tunnel time will be provided as GFE; tunnel models will be developed under Phase-II.
> 
> PHASE III: If successful, the end result of this Phase-I/Phase-II research effort will be a validated concept and set of validated research tools for the dispense, by AMRDEC, of a ISR platform from a tactical missile. The transition of this product will require additional upgrades of the software tool set for a user-friendly environment along with the concurrent development of application specific data bases to include the required input parameters such as vehicle geometries, aerodynamic and aero-propulsion properties, and performance parameters.
> 
> For military applications, this technology is directly applicable to the battle field awareness provided from UAVs and other ISR platforms. Currently, this information is near real-time and is not provided for any long range battle field situations. There are no known commercial applications for this technology at this time; however, it is conceivable that search/rescue and wild fire control operations that have a very short time line could benefit directly from this technology product.
> 
> The most likely customer and source of Government funding for Phase-III will be those service project offices responsible for the development of battle field situational awareness specifically using UAV ISR platforms. Indeed, the expansion of UAV capabilities and missions throughout the armed services continues as one of the most promising areas of research as evident in Reference 1 which forecasts a combined service and industry near term investment of over $20 billion.


----------



## a_majoor

Here is the ultimate in reducing footprint:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/01/killer-micro-drone/



> *Air Force Completes Killer Micro-Drone Project*
> 
> * By David Hambling Email Author
> * January 5, 2010  |
> 
> The Air Force Research Laboratory set out in 2008 to build the ultimate assassination robot: a tiny, armed drone for U.S. special forces to employ in terminating “high-value targets.” The military won’t say exactly what happened to this Project Anubis, named after a jackal-headed god of the dead in Egyptian mythology. But military budget documents note that Air Force engineers were successful in “develop[ing] a Micro-Air Vehicle (MAV) with innovative seeker/tracking sensor algorithms that can engage maneuvering high-value targets.”
> 
> We have seen in recent years increased strikes by larger Predator and Reaper drones using Hellfire missiles against terrorist-leadership targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But these have three significant drawbacks.
> 
> First, you can never be quite sure of what you hit. In 2002’s notorious “Tall Man incident,” CIA operatives unleashed a Hellfire at an individual near Zhawar Kili in Afghanistan’s Paktia province. His unusual height convinced the drone controllers that the man was Bin Laden (who stands 6 feet, 5 inches). In fact, he was merely an innocent (if overgrown) Afghan peasant.
> 
> A second problem is that the Hellfire isn’t exactly the right weapon for the mission. Originally designed as an anti-tank missile, it’s not especially agile, nor is it designed to cope with a target that might swerve or dodge at the last second (like cars and motorbikes).
> 
> And thirdly, such strikes tend to affect a number of others, as well as the intended target. It raises the risk of killing or injuring innocent bystanders.
> 
> This was the rationale for Project Anubis. Special Forces already make extensive use of the Wasp drone made by AeroVironment. This is the smallest drone in service, weighing less than a pound. It has an endurance of around 45 minutes, and line-of-sight control extends to 3 miles.
> 
> It might seem limited compared to larger craft, but the Wasp excels at close-in reconnaissance. Its quiet electric motor means it can get near to targets without their ever being aware of its presence.
> 
> The Air Force’s 2008 budget plans described the planned Project Anubis as “a small UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] that carries sensors, data links, and a munitions payload to engage time-sensitive fleeting targets in complex environments.” It noted that after it was developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory, Anubis would be used by Air Force Special Operations Command. The total cost was to be just over half a million dollars.
> 
> No official announcements have been made since then, and the Air Force did not return a request to comment on this story (hardly surprising for a weapon so likely to be used covertly). But the current Air Force R&D budget does mention the effort, briefly. This newer document refers to Project Anubis as a development that has already been carried out. According to the budget, $1.75 million was spent to reach the goal.
> 
> The current state of Project Anubis is unknown. It could be one of tens of thousands of military research efforts that started, made some progress and ended without a conclusion. Or Anubis could now be in the hands of Air Force Special Operations Command.
> 
> If so, Anubis would solve both of the problems associated with the Predator-Hellfire combination. It would follow and catch the most elusive target, and its ability to take a video sensor close to the target should mean it can be positively identified before the operator has to make a go or no-go decision.
> 
> (There may be a classical reference here: The god Anubis was responsible for weighing the hearts of the dead to judge whether they would have eternal life. The Project Anubis MAV will have to make similarly fine judgments.)
> 
> A tiny warhead, weighing a fraction of a pound, could mean extremely little collateral damage, compared to the 20-pound warhead on a Hellfire.
> 
> I reported in 2007 on a rumor that the miniature Wasp drone (photo at top) might get a lethal “sting.” It now appears that word of this new weaponry was more than idle talk.


----------



## a_majoor

This is about the ultimate in micro UAV's and even is controlled by an iPhone or iPod touch. Most of the troops would have their own control interfaces without any DND purchase!:

http://nextbigfuture.com/2010/01/ces-2010-parrot-ar-drone-and-duck-hunt.html



> *CES 2010 - Parrot AR Drone and Duck Hunt Extreme*
> 
> The Parrot ARDrone is the first quadricopter that can be controlled by an iPhone or iPod Touch
> 
> * made of carbon fiber and PA66 plastic
> * MEMS and video for intuitive piloting
> * two cameras, wifi and video streaming
> * image processing software for augmented reality
> * 5 meters/sec or 18 km/hour
> * 15 minute running time
> * lithium polymer batteries
> * 360-400 grams (a little less than one pound)



OK you probably won't use this to drop bombs or kill bad guys directly,  but you could get close enough to guide in fire from almost any platform available (imagine this linked to a sniper, for example).


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Any news on the possible deployment to Afghanistan of small turboprops CAS aircraft by the USAF or SF types?


----------



## a_majoor

Some historical perspective:

http://up-ship.com/blog/?p=4468



> *Martin “Mighty Midget”*
> 
> In 1952, the Martin Company produced a design for a single-seat ground attack plane. Check that… a single *couch* ground attack plane. It didn;t have a seat, as the pilot lay prone. The result was a plane of remarkably small frontal section… and remarkably small overall dimensions. The Mighty Midget was designed to be a small, tough, cheap proto-A-10, able to dish out a truckload of industrial strength whoopass; small, fast and nimble enough to evade enemy fire; and tough enough to take whatever did hit it.
> 
> A modernized version could very well do great service in today’s wars.  The Marines and the Army would almost certainly love to have such a plane (although the Army would tick off the Air Force if they actually went ahead and bought something like this).
> 
> To get more info on the Mighty Midget, check this out.



Or if you like gunships:

http://up-ship.com/blog/?p=3908



> *Gun, guns, *holy crap* helicopter artillery*
> 
> A Boeing-Vertol design study from October 1972 for the US Army Weapons Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois (just about my home town). The idea was to strap an XM204 105 mm “soft recoil” howitzer to either side of a CH-47C Chinook helicopter. This was not for the purpose of transporting the weapons from place to place, but to actually use them in an air-to-ground “lay down some whoopass” role. A nine man gun crew and 96 rounds of ammo would be carried. Mission radius was 100 n.mi.
> 
> The helicopter could be used in two ways:
> 
> 1) Land, and fire the right-hand gun. A special platform was built for the weapon for crew servicing while on the ground. The left-hand weapon was a complete field piece, and was meant to be easily removed and located for firing.
> 2) Fire while in flight. As reported:
> 
> both XM204 soft-recoil howitzers are
> mounted for forward direct air-to-ground firing with automatic
> ammunition-loading mechanisms provided for rapid firing (30
> rounds per minute each). The copilot is provided with a
> simple, fixed, depressible-reticle sight and laser rangefinder
> for aiming the helicopter/gun system for firing in this mode.
> Preflight adjustments of the howitzer elevation settings will
> allow for aiming the weapons with the helicopter at various
> airspeeds, rates of climb, and heights above the target.
> 
> Yow.
> 
> Sadly, the illustrations are of suck quality, but they get the idea across.


----------



## a_majoor

More retro future; the CL-84 as a gunship. The illustration seems to indicate a minigun in the nose, a gun turret in the belly (20mm?) and pylons for bombs or rocket pods.


----------



## a_majoor

A rather bizzare proposal; as I read it, the idea is the sniper rifle is carried in the blimp and used to take out individual targets via remote control. At least collateral damage will be almost eliminated. The second half of the piece is a case where common sense just would not do (dropping a *nuke* from a blimp?):

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/12/army-eyes-man-h/



> *Army Eyes Man-Hunting Mini-Blimps?*
> By Noah Shachtman   December 10, 2008  |  7:57 am  |  Categories: Air Force
> 
> We’ll get to the real substance in a second. But first, let’s focus on the man-hunting mini-blimps.
> 
> Stephen Trimble flags this odd, odd paragraph in an otherwise straight L.A. Times story about the spending choices facing Defense Secretary Bob Gates in a new administration.
> 
> Some Army officials are pushing development of a small blimp equipped with an automated high-powered sniper rifle that could provide a form of inexpensive but effective air support for platoons in Afghanistan.
> 
> "Surely, the army is really asking for a small aerostat linked to an actual soldier on the ground with a sniper rifle, no?" Trimble asks.
> 
> Maybe a sniper detection system, mounted on an airship? A "Sniper" targeting pod, put on a blimp? The mythical "AirSniper" mini-drone, come to life? Or perhaps some folks in the Army really do want to have a small blimp, floating in the sky, taking out enemies, one by one.
> 
> 
> Of course, all of those ideas are pretty wimpy, when you compare ‘em to 1957’s "Operation Plumbob." As part of a series of above-ground nuclear weapons tests, the government hung a-bombs "as large as 74 kilotons beneath blimps," Popular Mechanics says.
> And then the unmanned airships dropped the weapons, to see what would happen. Needless to say, the blimps didn’t fare particularly well, after the blasts.
> 
> Three years later, notes Airminded, the Navy ran a pair of trials, to see if airships could drop nuclear depth charges on Soviet submarines. The results:
> 
> The first airship exposed to overpressure experienced a structural failure of the nose cone when it was rammed into the mooring mast, together with a tear of the forward ballonet which necessitated deflation of the envelope. The second airship broke in half and crashed following a circumferential failure of the envelope originating at the bottom of the envelope, forward of the car.


----------



## GAP

> At leat colateral damage will be almost eliminated. The second half of the piece is a case where common sense just would not do (dropping a nuke from a blimp?):



Well, if it's a remote controlled blimp, you wouldn't have to hurry away to get out of the blast radius...... :nod:


----------



## daftandbarmy

The most amazing thing about this piece is the apparent immediate assistance provided by the Air Force. Well done them....

Precision Close Air Support Takes Over

August 16, 2010: The U.S. Department of Defense is developing a device that enables the ground controller, who usually talks pilots down to the location of a ground target, to take control of sensors (cameras and ground radars) and weapons on UAVs, or even manned aircraft, and pull the trigger himself. Developing this gear (PCAS, or Precision Close Air Support) is actually not a major undertaking, because some of it already exists. 

That all began eight years ago, when a Special Forces soldier, just back from Afghanistan, walked into the Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, and asked the technical people why his guys could not have a device that would allow them to watch the video being generated by a Predator, AC-130 or other aircraft overhead. In particular, the soldiers wanted the capability of the AC-130 getting video from a Predator that had spotted something the AC-130 was being sent to destroy. Since it was the Special Forces troops on the ground who were running, and fighting, the ground battle, it would help them a lot if they could see the real time video from Predators and combat aircraft. At that time, the video was being viewed by people in the aircraft, or the UAV operators (who were back in the United States, running things via a satellite link), but not the guys closest to the fighting, on the ground.Thus ground troops had to radio and ask the air force what could be seen on the video, and there was usually a delay in getting that information. It would be much better for all concerned if the ground troops could see that video in real time.

The air force went to work, and in two weeks had a prototype that Special Forces personnel could take back to Afghanistan. Called ROVER I, the device  was not terribly portable, but the Special Forces could haul it around in a hummer, and see what any Predators overhead were seeing. This proved very useful. A few months later, ROVER II appeared, which allowed troops to view UAV vids on a laptop computer. By late 2004, Rover III, a 12 pound unit built to be carried in a backpack, was put into service. New models kept appearing, and the current one can grab video feeds from army, marine and air force UAVs and bomber targeting pods (which have great resolution, even when the aircraft are 20,000 feet up.) The latest Rover allows users to point and click on targets to be hit. With ROVER IV, the bomber pilot, or UAV operator, is looking at the same video as the ground troops, and can confirm that the indicated target is what is to be hit. This is particularly important in urban warfare, where the building next door might be full of innocent civilians.

The ROVER gear was initially operated, mostly, by air force ground controllers. The larger number of Rover units out there now allows platoon leaders and company commanders access, as well as Special Forces teams and some army or marine ground patrols. PCAS will replace Rover, and enable ground controllers to take control of any aircraft within range, and use its sensors to more quickly find the target (which the controller can usually see from the ground) and release the smart bomb. PCAS will also be able to control the A-10's 30mm autocannon, as well as unguided rockets and guided missiles like Maverick. PCAS will also reduce errors, and generally improve the quality of air support. The first live demonstration of PCAS is supposed to take place within four years. 

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairw/20100816.aspx


----------



## thunderchild

Could this be used by our CF-18's now that they have been updated? Or is there more upgrades needed.


----------



## SupersonicMax

The Sniper Pod is Rover Capable.

But, a big But...

I would never be willing to let a guy on the ground with no Aviation weapons knowledge or flight experience with them take a weapon on my jet and drop it.  I'll let him talk my pod on a target, but not take weapons on my plane.


----------



## Old Sweat

Rover has been used by the CF in Afghanistan since midway through TF 3-06. Before then, in cases where ground troops were not able to observe a target located by a UAV for example, the FSCC had to guide the pilot onto the target by means such as a Mark mission using 155mm illuminating. I don't want to get too specific for a couple of reasons, but Rover provides an extra bit of confidence to both the air and ground forces.


----------



## Journeyman

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> But, a big But...
> 
> I would never be willing to let a guy on the ground with no Aviation weapons knowledge or flight experience with them take a weapon on my jet and drop it.  I'll let him talk my pod on a target, but not take weapons on my plane.


Well that's should make the planners' and taskers' job even more difficult -- assuming we get the equipment and develop suitable techniques, they'll have to factor in whether each individual pilot thinks the ground controller is sufficiently worthy.  :


----------



## Loachman

In the interests of fairness, perhaps a reciprocal arrangement could be reached: give jet jockeys remote control of a few tanks and guns each.

Think of the frivolity and mirth that woiuld ensue.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Well that's should make the planners' and taskers' job even more difficult -- assuming we get the equipment and develop suitable techniques, they'll have to factor in whether each individual pilot thinks the ground controller is sufficiently worthy.  :



The day you sign for the bomb and the Jet, I'll give you full control over it.  Until then, I signed for the aircraft and the weapons.  I decide who uses them.  According to 1 Cdn Air Division orders, the Aircraft Captain (that would be me) is responsible for the safe conduct of a flight.  It includes weapons.


----------



## Brutus

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> The day you sign for the bomb and the Jet, I'll give you full control over it.  Until then, I signed for the aircraft and the weapons.  I decide who uses them.  According to 1 Cdn Air Division orders, the Aircraft Captain (that would be me) is responsible for the safe conduct of a flight.  It includes weapons.



I think one could logically assume that if control of an aircraft's weapons shifts to a ground controller, so would the responsibility for them. Obviously, that would take some changing of orders, such as the one you quoted.

I THINK the poster was saying that if control of the weapons is given to a ground controller, it is no longer the Air Force Captain's purview to question the ground controllers 'jurisdiction' on the matter.

editted to correct spelling.


----------



## Old Sweat

The people that operate the Rover ground stations are, as far as I can determine, all FACs and/or JTACs. As such they are qualified and authorized to clear or to deny you authority to deliver your ordnance. By "as far as I can determine" I mean that I have not come across any examples of other people employing Rover tactically.

Max, you do not decide who uses your weapons. The competent ground controller ie a FAC or JTAC decides if your weapon load is appropriate and if so, clears it for use. Rover is a tool that allows that controller to ensure that you are being directed on the correct target and are not endangering friendly forces. I would suggest that actually firing/dropping your weapon remains your responsibility, but I cannot speak for every situation.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Max, you do not decide who uses your weapons. The competent ground controller ie a FAC or JTAC decides if your weapon load is appropriate and if so, clears it for use. Rover is a tool that allows that controller to ensure that you are being directed on the correct target and are not endangering friendly forces. I would suggest that actually firing/dropping your weapon remains your responsibility, but I cannot speak for every situation.



But I have a pretty good influence on his decision. I know what I can do with the weapons and which weapon is most suited for the target he is giving me.  He doesn't have weaponeering experience on our weapons, I do.  And I can at any time decide not to drop for any reason I deem sufficient.  The FAC will get my eyes on the target and the friendlies.  By eyes, I mean eyes, not only Sniper.  If I do not see both, I am not dropping.


----------



## McG

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> He doesn't have weaponeering experience on our weapons, I do.


Do you know that, if the tool were introduced to the inventory, we would not modify our FAC/JTAC training so that operators might have the full range of knowledge necessary to properly (effectively & safely) operate said new tool?


----------



## SupersonicMax

MCG said:
			
		

> Do you know that, if the tool were introduced to the inventory, we would not modify our FAC/JTAC training so that operators might have the full range of knowledge necessary to properly (effectively & safely) operate said new tool?



Well, today, FACs are supposed to decide the weapons we are going to use and they do not get that training.  I don't see how it will change because of a different version of a piece of equipement.  Also, weaponeering a bomb is actually fairly complex and has many, many variables (arm time, fuse time, altitude dropped, angle at impact, angle at release, airspeed at impact, safe separation, safe escape, etc etc) that are all related one an other in some way.   Sometimes, only experience in weaponeering will give you a proper solution, especially on the spot.  That experience a FAC cannot get, unless he is involved in quite a bit of mission planning cycles.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Old Sweat and others;

Max is correct on this one.  The way our Air Div Orders are curently written, the Aircraft Captain is responsible, fully, completely, 100% for how all of his/her weapons land.  Doesn't matter what the FAC or anyone else says- it is still the Aircraft Captain's responsibility.

Now, with developing technology, it might be possible to rewrite the orders- but a lot of thought about possible unforeseen implications should go into it before we go down that road.


----------



## rampage800

I can't really think of a reason why a Controller would want to be the actual trigger puller as well, it makes sense to me that if there's a pilot onboard then why wouldn't you use them, that being said;

SM,

 How do you know what JTACs receive for weapons trg at their units ? Why exactly do you need a Friendly talk on before you drop, what pam does that come out of ? What about a BOC, why exactly do I need to give a Fr talk on for that ? 

As much as you say if you don't get the info required then your not dropping you have to remember that the reverse is also true, you're certainly not the only show in town !


----------



## Old Sweat

With apologies to Max, who is quoting from his book, I once was on the receiving end (1973) of a near miss from a 250-pound iron bomb from a CF5 whose pilot decided he knew more than the (ex-fighter pilot) FAC who tried to direct him onto the target. This was during a demonstration in Petawawa and only a stand of trees prevented splinters from spraying a couple of bleachers full of dependents.

I have read logs kept by FOOs and FACS who have directed literally hundreds of missions in the sandbox and to say that they do not undertand employment of aerial delivered weapons is condescending claptrap. Having said that, which is verging on the argumentative, I am going to check out for the night and cool down.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

OS,

With respect to your near death experience in 1973- I was not trying to be condescending.  I, too, am FAC and FOO qualified, in addition to having dropped/fired aerial weapons as a TACCO.  I have half a clue about the complexity of dropping aerial weapons... Max has a point about it being somewhat more complex than pushing a button on a laptop.  If that happens when the aircraft is out of configuration (either moving to fast or slow, pulling G or turning the wrong way, etc) lots of bad things could happen... unless the technology is configured in such a way to prevent an out of envelop launch/drop...which I don't think is possible with our current equipment.

And your CF-5 pilot from 1973 would have been responsible for his mis-placed bomb, because he was an idiot not to listen to a good target read-in.


----------



## WingsofFury

Just to change the mood here...

Wouldn't this be a similar reason as to why a FAC wouldn't take control of something like a Predator once it is in a "kill" zone?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

If I recall correctly a CF-5 strafed a OP by accident in Suffield around 1984 with it's 20mm, no one was hurt.


----------



## Journeyman

WingsofFury said:
			
		

> Wouldn't _this_ be a similar reason as to why a FAC wouldn't take control of something like a Predator


I'm not intentionally being obtuse here, but isn't _what_ a similar reason?   ???


----------



## Old Sweat

WingsofFury said:
			
		

> Wouldn't this be a similar reason as to why a FAC wouldn't take control of something like a Predator once it is in a "kill" zone?



The reason why a FAC would take control of a Predator or a manned aircraft is so that its weapons are best utilized to support the ongoing land battle. The aim is not to usurp the pilot's authority; the aim is to employ the weapons in the most effecitve manner. In my opinion, it would be a very foolish pilot who would decide that he knew better than the FAC and dropped his weapon despite being ordered not to. Remember the A Coy 1 PPCLI incident in 2002. An AWACS was trying to clarify the situation when the F16 pilot declared self defence under dubious circumstances and used his weapon. 

There also is the question of airspace control to keep, say, 155mm rounds and flying machines from occupying the same bit of sky at the same time.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The reason why a FAC would take control of a Predator or a manned aircraft is so that its weapons are best utilized to support the ongoing land battle. The aim is not to usurp the pilot's authority; the aim is to employ the weapons in the most effecitve manner.



You won't make it a more effective employment, simply because FACs don't have experience in dropping the weapons and weaponeering and to be honest, I believe it's outside their scope of employment and rightly so.  They don't have the experience of utilizing weapons with the aircraft.  It takes more than groundschool.  It takes experience IN an aircraft. The one that is the best suited to make the call in the end, is the pilot (be it UAV or Manned).  He has SA of more than the 100mX100m area around your TIC.



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> In my opinion, it would be a very foolish pilot who would decide that he knew better than the FAC and dropped his weapon despite being ordered not to. Remember the A Coy 1 PPCLI incident in 2002. An AWACS was trying to clarify the situation when the F16 pilot declared self defence under dubious circumstances and used his weapon.



In CAS, the pilot does not have a blanket authority to drop anywhere, except in a Type 3 scenario to some extent(kill box essentially) .  CAS procedures are set and respected.  Type 1 and 2 requires a specific clearance to drop (Cleared Hot).  Even if I am cleared hot, I have the last call to decide wheter or not it's safe to drop, for the troops and for me.  My fear as a pilot would be a FAC that has no clue or little experience with safe separation or safe escape (and that he doesn't care, it's not his pink ass in the cockpit) and he drops the bomb and I fly in the frag.  It is far more complicated than setting a floor, especially for shallow dives.

Every time we brought FAC with us airborne for famil flights, they were amazed by the amount of things to consider and the 3rd dimension that is now incorporated.  What you see on the ground is definately not what I see from my cockpit.

In the case you mentionned, IIRC they were going back home and the pilot felt he was under attack.   I don't believe he was under JTAC control at that point, but I could be wrong.  It wasn't only his mistake (even though he was partly responsible) a whole bunch of things happened and the holes in the swiss cheese aligned.



			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> There also is the question of airspace control to keep, say, 155mm rounds and flying machines from occupying the same bit of sky at the same time.



It is not an issue now.  JTAC is responsible to keep us safe.  Not only from 155mm rounds but also from other aircraft, enemy MEZ, restricted areas, etc.  And I believe having a FAC control the airplane would make it LESS safe.  Again because we have a greater big picture SA that the guys on the ground do, just by the nature of where we sit and what we have access to in the cockpit (that FACs don't have access to, and will not with only a rover)


----------



## McG

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The reason why a FAC would take control of a Predator or a manned aircraft is so that its weapons are best utilized to support the ongoing land battle.


Is that aim not achieved by communication and cooperation?


----------



## rampage800

OS,

I understand what you're saying but essentially the JTAC is controlling the jet, he's just not the guy who actually pickles the weapon. Every single time a pilot drops in a CAS situation he needs a Clearance (Type 3s as well, its a Cleared to Engage coupled with a Call Engagement complete) from that Controller. To be honest JTACs become task saturated pretty quick, especially when multiple users are in the airspace like you elude to, its not out of the norm for a UAV, OH-58s or other helos, arty rds and a couple a/c to all be in the same airspace at the same time and be in a TIC and all trying to help. For reasons mentioned earlier about release parameters etc I honestly believe its too much for 1 dude to handle, let pilots do what pilots do and let the Controllers do what they do. Is there pilots out there like that CF-5 and Maj Schmidt (wasn't under control of a JTAC, called in on self defense) who are complete morons, absolutely and they get weeded out very quick but to be honest theres Controllers out there who would run a/c together in the same alt block during a stack if it weren't for pimping from the pilot. We don't expect the FOO to compute data, issue it, lay the gun, pull the lanyard and then observe the tgt, why would we expect the JTAC to do essentially the same thing.

Yesterday Brutus brought up this point but essentially it already has for Danger Close situations, it should also be noted that the JTAC doesn't make the ultimate decision to drop, the GFC (Ground Force Commander) does, the JTAC works for him as just as much as a pilot would be in crap for dropping without Clearance, so to would the JTAC without authority from the GFC, Anyhow I'm off subject, heres the quote



> I think one could logically assume that if control of an aircraft's weapons shifts to a ground controller, so would the responsibility for them. Obviously, that would take some changing of orders, such as the one you quoted.



From the JFire



> The GFC must accept responsibility for the risk to friendly forces when tgts are inside the 0.1% PI (percentage of incapacitation) distance. The GFC will pass his/her initials to terminal controllers to pass to the attacking a/c indicating acceptance of the risk inherent in in ordnance delivery inside the 0.1 PI



To briefly explain, the 0.1 PI for a Mk-82 (500lb bomb) is 230m, the GFC is accepting responsibility to the fragging of any of his own guys within that distance.......thats in a very very brief nutshell

The JFire is a JFCOM Pub which is basically the bible (as is JP 3 09 3), maybe 1 CAD Flying Regs say one thing but JTACs don't know that, the JFire is what they know. I know Max yesterday said he needs to see Friendlies, maybe in Canada as a flying reg but then what happens on operations when you have a cloud deck and have to do a BOC with a GBU-12, your not going to drop ? At some point there has to be a trust factor, both with allowing the JTACs allowing the pilots to do their jobs and vice versa.

Anyhow, my 2 cents............


----------



## Brutus

rampage800 said:
			
		

> Yesterday Brutus brought up this point but essentially it already has for Danger Close situations, it should also be noted that the JTAC doesn't make the ultimate decision to drop, the GFC (Ground Force Commander) does, the JTAC works for him as just as much as a pilot would be in crap for dropping without Clearance, so to would the JTAC without authority from the GFC, Anyhow I'm off subject, heres the quote
> 
> From the JFire
> 
> To briefly explain, the 0.1 PI for a Mk-82 (500lb bomb) is 230m, the GFC is accepting responsibility to the fragging of any of his own guys within that distance.......thats in a very very brief nutshell
> 
> The JFire is a JFCOM Pub which is basically the bible (as is JP 3 09 3), maybe 1 CAD Flying Regs say one thing but JTACs don't know that, the JFire is what they know. I know Max yesterday said he needs to see Friendlies, maybe in Canada as a flying reg but then what happens on operations when you have a cloud deck and have to do a BOC with a GBU-12, your not going to drop ? At some point there has to be a trust factor, both with allowing the JTACs allowing the pilots to do their jobs and vice versa.
> 
> Anyhow, my 2 cents............



Thanks for that. That makes total logical sense.

I'm finding this discussion to be very fascinating, and of course way beyond my arcs now.


----------



## SupersonicMax

rampage800 said:
			
		

> To briefly explain, the 0.1 PI for a Mk-82 (500lb bomb) is 230m, the GFC is accepting responsibility to the fragging of any of his own guys within that distance.......thats in a very very brief nutshell



I'm actually fully aware of the JFIRE and know it pretty much like the back of my hand.  I understand what danger close is and will drop in such case, again with friendlies and the target visual/tally.



			
				rampage800 said:
			
		

> Every single time a pilot drops in a CAS situation he needs a Clearance (Type 3s as well, its a Cleared to Engage coupled with a Call Engagement complete) from that Controller.



That's why I said to some extent.  I can get a cleared to engage, kill whatever I need to and 30 minutes later call Engagement Complete.

On type 1 and 2 I need a cleareance on every pass.



			
				rampage800 said:
			
		

> The JFire is a JFCOM Pub which is basically the bible (as is JP 3 09 3), maybe 1 CAD Flying Regs say one thing but JTACs don't know that, the JFire is what they know. I know Max yesterday said he needs to see Friendlies, maybe in Canada as a flying reg but then what happens on operations when you have a cloud deck and have to do a BOC with a GBU-12, your not going to drop ? At some point there has to be a trust factor, both with allowing the JTACs allowing the pilots to do their jobs and vice versa.



JFIRE is not regulatory.  You will not get court martialed for not following the JFIRE.  1 Cdn Air Div are.  I don't believe we have a rule saying we need to see friendlies and target (although I doubt the controller will allow you to drop if you don't call tally), however I personally want to see the friendlies.  Most talk ons I have had always included a talk on to the friendlies.   It gives me a confirmation that my attack axis is optimal to avoid friendlies.

No, I will not drop a GBU-12 through clouds in a CAS scenario and I don't know many pilots that would to this idiotic idea!  How the hell do you know that the bomb will have sufficient time to guide?  How do you know if the laser energy will be in the seeker FOV when it breaks out of cloud??  What about the effect of humidity on the seeker as it emerges below the clouds?  GBU-49? Yes.  GBU-12? Not a chance in hell.

A GBU-12, before it guides, is essentially a dumb bomb.  And I would not drop a Mk82 through clouds.


----------



## Loachman

Colin P said:
			
		

> If I recall correctly a CF-5 strafed a OP by accident in Suffield around 1984 with it's 20mm, no one was hurt.



It was during RV 83 or 85 but, yes, in Wainwright. I met the pilot in the Officers' Mess in Edmonton a few days later. He eventually got a flight safety award for not hitting his intended target.

I also almost got bombed by a CF5 in Gagetown on my FAC course in October 1984. The pilot said "Oops" when told.


----------



## rampage800

> No, I will not drop a GBU-12 through clouds in a CAS scenario and I don't know many pilots that would to this idiotic idea!



Nice.......its not too condescending I guess Max, you're right, it could never happen, nobody else knows anything about CAS except you.


----------



## SupersonicMax

I don't think a FAC will know more about GBU-12 employment than a fighter pilot.


----------



## PuckChaser

Isn't that their job, though? Employing CAS and knowing certain munitions and how to effectively utilize them? They're not going to know every single detail like you need to, since you've got upwards of 500lbs of HE strapped a couple feet from your cockpit, but they're still going to be very knowledgeable if they take their job with any seriousness.


----------



## fireman1867

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I don't think a FAC will know more about GBU-12 employment than a fighter pilot.



How many Canadian FAC's have been deployed and utilized operationaly in the past 6 years vs Hornet pilots?


----------



## SupersonicMax

In my experience, they have a very, very broad and generic understanding of the weapons and their employment.  There are too many variables that are not controllable by the FAC to have a precise understanding of how to use the weapons. The effects of a Mk-82 one day may be very different the next day because of things like fuse settings, arm times, nose type, weather (how high is the ceiling, which will have effects on the max dive angle for dive deliveries and altitude for LGBs), which in turn will have effect on the impact angle and impact velocity.  The pilot is the one controlling some of those parameters and assessing all of the parameters, not the FAC.

Fireman1867:  I personally know at least a dozen Hornet drivers that deployed as JTACs and all of us drop live weapons a few times a year.  We weaponeer almost on a daily basis as part as our training.  Because we didn't deploy doesn't mean we don't know our weapons.  I can guarantee I know more about any weapon in our inventory than any army FAC.


----------



## rampage800

Max,

You should know more about weapons in our inventory than JTACs but why don't you go ahead and tell us a bit about the AGM 114K or the GBU-38v4 ? What about the SCL of B-1B ?  Why don't you tell us what a GBU-12 will do to a Grape Hut Max, thats in our inventory ? 

I'm not sure where your distrust of JTACs come from, personally I don't give a s**t, I think your posts are condescending and from personal experience most Hornet dudes I know are great guys, you're the definitely the exception instead of the norm !!!

Go read your JFire again Max, really really memorize it this time  :


----------



## SupersonicMax

rampage800 said:
			
		

> Max,
> 
> You should know more about weapons in our inventory than JTACs but why don't you go ahead and tell us a bit about the AGM 114K or the GBU-38v4 ? What about the SCL of B-1B ?  Why don't you tell us what a GBU-12 will do to a Grape Hut Max, thats in our inventory ?



Have I ever said I had to know about every weapons in every aircraft inventory?  I am sure the B1B pilots know more about their weapons than the JTAC or me for that matter.  I can't tell you what a GBU-12 does to a grape hut because I need more information.  What altitude was it dropped?  What dive angle?  What was the fusing on the bomb?  See where I am going?  



			
				rampage800 said:
			
		

> I'm not sure where your distrust of JTACs come from, personally I don't give a s**t, I think your posts are condescending and from personal experience most Hornet dudes I know are great guys, you're the definitely the exception instead of the norm !!!



I don't distrust JTACs. I don't trust they have the knowledge and experience to physically control the delivery of any weapon on any platform. I think they have a job, I have mine.  Mine is the safe and effective use of my aircraft and weapons.  The JTACs is the safe and effective conduct of CAS procedures. If they tell me they need my only GBU-12 on something that doesn't make sense because of whatever factor, it's my job to suggest something more appropriate to the situation.  It is not their job to "fly" my aircraft.  Nor is it my job to decide where firepower should be delivered.  How the firepower is delivered is where the teamwork begins.  It's not just the FAC, not just me.  I know the weapons, the FAC knows the situation on the ground. 

 I just don't think that they should be allowed to pickle the weapons off.  As the Aircraft Captain, I should have the hammer on the decision to drop or not, after being cleared hot for the reasons explained before.  

I don't give a shit what someone on an internet forum thinks about me.  This is what I think and I am not ashamed of it.



			
				rampage800 said:
			
		

> Go read your JFire again Max, really really memorize it this time  :



I know the JFIRE you don't have to worry.  Don't forget, it's mostly procedures and a bit of rough gouge on weapons and effects.  It's definitely not the bible for weaponeering.  If you are ever out East, I'll gladly bring you to the squadron and show you how real weaponeering is done and explain you live why I think it's not a good idea to have JTACs "in our cockpits".


----------



## Journeyman

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Remember the A Coy 1 PPCLI incident in 2002. An AWACS was trying to clarify the situation when the F16 pilot declared self defence under dubious circumstances  and used his weapon.
> 
> 
> 
> In the case you mentionned, IIRC they were going back home and the pilot felt he was under attack.   I don't believe he was under JTAC control at that point, but I could be wrong.  It wasn't only his mistake (even though he was partly responsible) a whole bunch of things happened and the holes in the swiss cheese aligned.
Click to expand...

I guess that's the difference between those of us who have actually served in Afghanistan (Kosovo, Bosnia, etc) and those who have merely defended the Primrose Air Weapons Range. To you, Canadian soldiers' deaths are nothing more than 'holes in the swiss cheese' aligning.


Personally, I find it reprehensible that you would defend Maj "Psycho" Schmidt, ignoring the transcript of his court martial, and the testimony of the Canadian soldiers who managed to survive his attack.

Yes, his 'claim' of self defence came once there was a lawyer at his side....even after his element lead had ordered him to break off his attack.





> *Maj Harry M. Schmidt*
> 
> Charge I: Violation of the UCMJ, Article 92
> Specification: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
> Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, who
> knew or should have known of his duties as the wingman and an aircraft commander in a
> two-ship flight of F-16 aircraft, in the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17
> April 2002, was derelict in the performance of those duties in that he willfully failed to
> exercise appropriate flight discipline over his aircraft and failed to comply with the
> applicable rules of engagement   and special instructions to airmen in effect on that date in
> that area of operations, as it was his duty to do.
> 
> Charge II: Violation of the UCMJ, Article 119
> Specification 1: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
> Group, United States Air Force, then-deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
> vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, by culpable negligence,
> unlawfully kill Sergeant Marc Daniel Leger, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess
> Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian
> Forces, by causing mortal injuries upon his person with a 500 pound laser guided bomb.
> 
> Specification 2: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
> Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in
> the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, by culpable
> negligence, unlawfully kill Corporal Ainsworth Dyer, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion,
> Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group,
> Canadian Forces, by causing mortal injuries upon his person with a 500 pound laser
> guided bomb.
> 
> Specification 3: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
> Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in
> the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, by culpable
> negligence, unlawfully kill Private Richard Anthony Green, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion,
> Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group,
> Canadian Forces, by causing mortal injuries upon his person with a 500 pound laser
> guide bomb.
> 
> Specification 4: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then--
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
> Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in
> the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, by culpable
> negligence, unlawfully kill  Private Nathan Lloyd Smith, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion,
> Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group,
> Canadian Forces, by causing mortal injuries upon his person with a 500 lb laser guided
> bomb.
> 
> Charge III: Violation of the UCMJ, Article 128
> Specification 1: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332nd Air Expeditionary
> Group, United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in
> the vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault
> upon Sergeant Lorne Ford, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
> Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at
> or near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
> laser guided bomb.
> 
> Specification 2: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
> United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
> vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
> Corporal Rene Paquette, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
> Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at or
> near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
> laser guided bomb.
> 
> Specification 3: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
> United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
> vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
> Corporal Brett Perry, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
> Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at or
> near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
> laser guided bomb.
> 
> Specification 4: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
> United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
> vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
> Private Norman Link, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
> Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at or
> near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
> laser guided bomb.
> 
> Specification 5: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
> United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
> vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
> Corporal Brian Decaire, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
> Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at or
> near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
> laser guided bomb.
> 
> Specification 6: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
> United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
> vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
> Master Corporal Curtis Hollister, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s
> Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by
> directing at or near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a
> 500 pound laser guided bomb.
> 
> Specification 7: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
> United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
> vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
> Master Corporal Stanley P. Clarke, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s
> Canadian Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by
> directing at or near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a
> 500 pound laser guided bomb.
> 
> Specification 8: In that Major Harry M. Schmidt, 170th Fighter Squadron (ANG), then—
> constituted as the 170th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, 332 Air Expeditionary Group,
> United States Air Force, then—deployed at a forward operating location, did, in the
> vicinity of Kandahar, Afghanistan, on or about 17 April 2002, commit an assault upon
> Corporal Shane Brennan, “A” Company, 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
> Light Infantry, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Canadian Forces, by directing at
> or near him a means likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm, to wit: a 500 pound
> laser guided bomb.





As for this:


			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I don't give a shit what someone on an internet forum thinks about me.  This is what I think and I am not ashamed of it.


Thank you for reaffirming that absolutely nothing has changed since you started posting here as a self-centred, but equally uninformed, RMC cadet   :




Edit: I had to come back to underline reprehensible, even if you never understand.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I guess that's the difference between those of us who have actually served in Afghanistan (Kosovo, Bosnia, etc) and those who have merely defended the Primrose Air Weapons Range. To you, Canadian soldiers' deaths are nothing more than 'holes in the swiss cheese' aligning.



The death of every canadian soldier in Afghanistan is saddening.  Yes.  

Having said that, to understand and prevent the same mistakes from happening, you need to look at it from an objective point of view.  The 'swiss cheese' model thing is something our flight safety team uses.  I was just trying to highlight that there is more than a pilot disobeying ROEs that lead to the tragedy.  Yes, the pilot disobeyed and was dealt appropriately.  Other things up the chain happened and shouldn't have (or didn't and should have) .

I was definitely not trying to downplay their sacrifice.



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> As for this:Thank you for reaffirming that absolutely nothing has changed since you started posting here as a self-centred, but equally uninformed, RMC cadet   :



Again, it's a forum.  You may think I'm a self-centered person.  That's okay. 

The point I am trying to get across through all that chaff is that I won't tell an artilleryman how to fire his gun, I won't tell how a tank commander should deal with his firepower.  I don't expect someone with no experience in flying the F-18 to tell me how to use my airplane and weapons or worse, take control or them.


----------



## WingsofFury

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I'm not intentionally being obtuse here, but isn't _what_ a similar reason?   ???



A FAC can't control something like a Predator (UAV) when it's being called in for a strike, so if they aren't granted permission to operate the firing systems on an unmanned UAV then why would they be allowed to operate firing systems on a manned aircraft?


----------



## alexgold

I don't know where this Max guy gets off saying he owns the world, but the relationship between OPERATIONAL pilots in Afghanistan (A-10s,F-16s, F-18s) and the JTACs is great.  We work together in a discussion to get the bombs on target and neutralise the enemy.  Its not a pissing contest between the two as to who gets to pick the ordnance. If I as the JTAC pick an ordnance that he doesn'T agree with he'll let me know.  And most likely I will probably agree with him, but if say I am worried about collateral damage so I choose a strafe for a particular target, the pilot might disagree and suggest another ordnance for better weapons effects, but he doesn't have the full picture up there.  Again though its the JTACs job to make sure he/she has all the info.


----------



## alexgold

And the JTAC does control predators and reapers when they strike, he doesn't the plane physically but the ordnance and Mandatory Attack Headings are all determined by the FAC.


----------



## SupersonicMax

alexgold said:
			
		

> I don't know where this Max guy gets off saying he owns the world, but the relationship between OPERATIONAL pilots in Afghanistan (A-10s,F-16s, F-18s) and the JTACs is great.  We work together in a discussion to get the bombs on target and neutralise the enemy.  Its not a pissing contest between the two as to who gets to pick the ordnance. If I as the JTAC pick an ordnance that he doesn'T agree with he'll let me know.  And most likely I will probably agree with him, but if say I am worried about collateral damage so I choose a strafe for a particular target, the pilot might disagree and suggest another ordnance for better weapons effects, but he doesn't have the full picture up there.  Again though its the JTACs job to make sure he/she has all the info.



Yes, the way it is now, its great. I just cant see JTACs, FACs taking physical control over the plane and weapons.


			
				alexgold said:
			
		

> And the JTAC does control predators and reapers when they strike, he doesn't the plane physically but the ordnance and Mandatory Attack Headings are all determined by the FAC.



Yes, and thats fine.  The final decision to drop or not once down the wire and cleared hot should be left to the pilot(the way it is now). And unless thereisa drastic change in regulations, Ibelieve it will remain that way.


----------



## OldSolduer

I've been watching this thread and while I know very little about what weapon drops off what aircraft, I can tell you this:

If I have a C7 rifle and all I do is carry it, while some guy in a building actually can fire it.....I as the weapons platform guy ain't gonna like that. Niether will a tank commander who has no control over when they can fire the main gun.

I agree wiht Max....the final call has to be up to the person actually operating the weapons platform.


----------



## Loachman

Some people need to go back and actually read what some other people are actually saying, without letting emotion cloud their interpretation.

Two links describing the Swiss Cheese Model fore those unfamiliar with it: http://www.coloradofirecamp.com/swiss-cheese/introduction.htm and http://wikiofscience.wikidot.com/science:accident-causation-model.

The Tarnak Farm "Friendly Fire" tragedy is another sad illustration of this model.

There was far more at play there than simply two "cowboy" F16 pilots, and it is my belief that they were let off so lightly despite the severity of their charges in order to protect all of the other cheese slices from public examination and embarassment.

Good analogy, Jim.


----------



## Journeyman

Loachman said:
			
		

> Good analogy, Jim.


Bad analogy, Jim -- for two reasons:

1) If you're carrying the tripod for a .50, are you actually firing the weapon or merely part of the team supporting the system? In this example, the USAF is developing a system in which a pilot carries the munitions to the objective and someone else in the system pulls the trigger. 

2) You're saying that the guy carrying the weapon "ain't gonna like it." Neither you nor I have to refer to our watches when discussing time in; the military has on many occasions had us do things we didn't really like. Did it change anything? No. We did it. 

While everyone has a role to play, perhaps this new generation expects the chain of command to consider their feelings when acquiring weapons or developing SOPs.


Tarnak Farm is a tangent. What we're discussing here is an ordnance delivery system. Assuming such a system were introduced into the CF, we'd use similar procedures as the Americans are developing. Yet we have a CF pilot without enough time-in for a CD but apparently knowing more about weapons than the entire USAF, suggesting he would disobey a lawful order to use that equipment.

And that, Zoomie,  is not dog-piling, it's multiple people calling BS simultaneously.


----------



## Old Sweat

I think, JM, is what he is claiming, that based on current Air Command orders, he can refuse to use the developmental technology. Well, gee, in my career I learned about all sorts of technical advances, many of which came to nought. I was not expected to go any use them in the field based on stories in the print media, but that appears to be what he is assuming here. That he managed more of less concurrently to p... off all sorts of people with intemperate statements is unfortunate. 

What is more unfortunate that none of us, on any side of the argument keyed on the point that before something like this enters general service, there are beaucoup issues to be resolved. Fortunately the opinions of very wet behind the ears pilots do not rank very high on the list.


----------



## DexOlesa

> 1) If you're carrying the tripod for a .50, are you actually firing the weapon or merely part of the team supporting the system? In this example, the USAF is developing a system in which a pilot carries the munitions to the objective and someone else in the system pulls the trigger.



No, you are right. The guy carrying the tripod isn't firing the weapon. The guy carrying the weapon (which would be the pilot) is firing the weapon. This analogy is much worse than the C7 one.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

meanwhile

Top Aces Interim Contracted Airborne Training Services Standing Offer Extended. Offer Covers Training for Canadian Army FACs

http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2011/01/27/top-aces-interim-contracted-airborne-training-services-standing-offer-extended-offer-covers-training-for-canadian-army-facs.aspx


----------



## SupersonicMax

Journeyman said:
			
		

> but apparently knowing more about weapons than the entire USAF



I assume you have never seen a new development or idea and think "Jebus, that doesn't make any sense".  



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> suggesting he would disobey a lawful order to use that equipment.



I re-read what I wrote and I cannot find where I suggested that.  Please don't put words in my mouth.  I said the idea doesn't make sense and provided reason why I tought that. 



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> Yet we have a CF pilot without enough time-in for a CD



Of course I will never have enough experience to have a legitimate opinion on anything in the military.  If I had a CD, it would be "Yet we have a CF pilot without enough time-in for a CD2".

UAVs are made for this exact scenario.  No need to take control over a manned aircraft or its weapons.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

This little bun fight needs a time out.

Milnet.ca Staff


----------



## Kirkhill

Now that time has passed, and hopefully emotions cooled, I would like to post this article

It is about the validity of the piloted turbo-prop in Close Air Support as compared to fast movers, high altitude bombers and UAVs.

Some highlights:



> “The A-10 is the best ‘close attack’ plane ever made, period,” Sprey tells me. “But the Air Force hates that mission. They’ll do anything they can to kill that plane.” He says retiring the iconic A-10, a twin-engine attack jet with 30-mm cannons that hit with 14 times the kinetic energy of the 20-mm guns mounted on America’s current fleet of supersonic fighters, became an article of faith among high ranking Air Force officers, generations of whom had been raised to believe in the redemptive power of technological innovation.





> So if the A-10 was never going to be around in enough numbers, what could be done? Only one group had enough distance from the Air Force and enough independent money to consider a viable alternative: buying a cheap, lightweight attack plane on their own. That was the Navy SEALs. A group of them met with the Secretary of the Navy in 2006 to tell him about the problems they faced with getting good enough air support.
> 
> Like other American combat troops in Afghanistan, the SEALs sometimes found that high-tech gear couldn’t reliably get the job done, *or that cheaper, lower-tech solutions worked better*. This is how the US military almost adopted the A-29 Super Tucano, a $4 million turboprop airplane reminiscent of WWII-era designs that troops wanted, commanders said was “urgently needed,” but Congress refused to buy.











> Super Tucano’s tight turning radius and low stall speed meant pilots could maintain constant visual contact with ground forces and instantly shift from surveillance and reconnaissance to attack. And after dark, an A-29 could use night vision and thermal sensors as sophisticated as those on any fighter jet.
> 
> “It’s a great plane,” says recently retired Air Force Lt. Col. Shamsher Mann, an F-16 pilot who has flown A-29s. “Pilots love it. It handles beautifully, sips gas, and can go anywhere. If you want to get into the fight and mix it up with the guys on the ground, the Super T is a great platform.”
> 
> Another former fighter pilot tells me that the Super Tucano provided the “low-end” air-to-ground attack capability the United States simply never had in Afghanistan—a capability the Pentagon’s F-35 could never hope to replicate.
> 
> Soon after 9/11, the pilot said, Army Special Forces famously rode horses into the Hindu Kush, but carried laptop computers and sophisticated targeting and communications gear with them as well. “Super Tucano is almost a mirror image of that in the air,” he said. “The low-tech combined with the high-tech.”





> In Afghanistan, US troops didn't need airplanes that could evade detection from enemy radar; they needed planes that flew low enough for pilots to see the enemy eye-to-eye. They needed bombs dropped close enough to hurt them, bullets shot from the sky landing just out of arm's reach and into the enemy. They needed the Taliban dead.





> In response to the SEALs’ request, the Navy committed Pentagon heresy by going backwards in airplane technology. Instead of jet engines, they found a propellor-driven plane worked better.





> Navy and Air Force pilots jumped at the chance to volunteer. Upon selection, pilots simply disappeared from their regular units. They started working with SEALs trained to call in airstrikes. This was a special operations mission, and this was a specops plane. On paper, they now worked for the Navy’s Irregular Warfare Office on Imminent Fury.
> 
> In Nevada, they shot 50-caliber machine guns mounted in the A-29’s wings. They dropped small laser-guided and GPS-guided bombs. They fired thousands of 2.75-inch rockets, some of which had laser-guidance upgrades. These were the types of weapons best suited to the war in Afghanistan. And for self-defense, the A-29 could even fire the same Sidewinder air-to-air missile used in their previous lives as jet pilots.



Obligatory Sky Raider reference....



> Hukee often had to fire rockets or shoot his four 20-mm cannons on a target, and because of his A-1’s slow speed he could adjust his point of aim and fire again before zooming overhead and turning around for another pass.
> 
> That’s impossible to do in a jet aircraft. Hukee says the F-4 jet pilots’ motto in Vietnam was “One Pass, Haul Ass,” meaning they’d typically drop 500-pound or larger bombs only once and then zoom off. But for Skyraiders, they’d come in low, slow, and pound the target—sometimes making a dozen or more passes before having to refuel.





> More than four decades later, the tests at Naval Air Station Fallon, in western Nevada, showed that the Super T was the closest thing yet to the Skyraider’s capabilities. The A-29 was capable of flying and fighting from less than 1,000 feet above the ground. An armed Tucano has a loiter time of up to four hours, far better than fuel-hungry fighter jets which would usually stay overhead for as little as 20 minutes at a time before needing to refuel.
> 
> Typical fighter jets could only fly loose, three- or four-mile radius circles around a fight, but the Super T could remain as close as 500 meters to the target area. Perfect for responsive air strikes.





> A few years after 9/11, those F/A-18s were going into Afghanistan loaded with just one laser-guided 500-pound bomb, one GPS-guided 500-pound bomb, and one AIM-9 air-to-air missile for self-defense. All of which a Super T can likewise carry on long-duration missions. The only difference is the Hornet’s internal 20-mm cannon, which is significantly larger than a Super T’s wing-mounted .50-cal machine guns. But an add-on 20-mm gun pod can be mounted underneath the A-29 fuselage, essentially matching the F/A-18’s typical weapons load and lethal capabilities.
> 
> Most of the time, those Hornets landed back on the carrier with all bombs still attached and guns unfired. The Hornet’s cost per flight hour? $25,000 to $30,000, according to official Navy figures. It’s estimated the F-35 costs anywhere between $31,900 to $38,400 per hour to fly. As for the Super T? $600 per hour, according to the Sierra Nevada Corporation, manufacturer of the A-29.





> But the “8-minute rule” standard breaks down when you talk to veteran pilots and air controllers.
> 
> “Getting there in 8 minutes sounds accurate, but what you do then is a completely fucking different thing,” says an active-duty Army Special Forces air controller who also wished to not be named. “It might take 10 minutes to dial-in the fast mover,” the controller, who’s completed multiple combat tours, says, noting the time required to orient a jet pilot to the situation on the ground upon arrival.
> 
> He says dealing with unmanned aerial systems like the vaunted Predator and Reaper drones is even worse, taking twice as long to get dialed-in as the jets do. The reason is that drone pilots are only looking through their sensors and targeting pods.
> 
> “They can’t look out the canopy and see me, and then see the enemy,” the soldier explains. The pod, he says, “just doesn’t show you much of the ground, and so it can take a long time to make sure the pilot knows where I am, where the enemy is, and to make sure we’re both talking about the same thing. I won’t let him fire until I’m sure of both.”



The merits of a Pratt and Whitney based solution.

Perhaps a Reserve heavy capability based on Tucanos and Twotters - low cost training and low intensity warfare.    The Twotters supply a cheap transport solution for small formed bodies of troops to remote locations.


----------



## Loachman

What makes you think that training would be cheap, and within the realm of part-timers?

How would we benefit from a niche aircraft with very limited capability?


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Now that time has passed, and hopefully emotions cooled, I would like to post this article
> 
> It is about the validity of the piloted turbo-prop in Close Air Support as compared to fast movers, high altitude bombers and UAVs.
> 
> Some highlights:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Obligatory Sky Raider reference....
> 
> The merits of a Pratt and Whitney based solution.
> 
> Perhaps a Reserve heavy capability based on Tucanos and Twotters - low cost training and low intensity warfare.    The Twotters supply a cheap transport solution for small formed bodies of troops to remote locations.



The Pucara didn't fare too well in a modern air combat environment in the Falklands... and that was wayyyyyy back in 1982:


----------



## dimsum

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Perhaps a Reserve heavy capability based on Tucanos and Twotters - low cost training and low intensity warfare.    The Twotters supply a cheap transport solution for small formed bodies of troops to remote locations.



Training/currency for airplanes is definitely more than is feasible for a Class A reservist doing one night a week and one weekend a month.  Unless the proposal is for more Class C folks - in which case, might as well give these to the Reg F.


----------



## MAJONES

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Training/currency for airplanes is definitely more than is feasible for a Class A reservist doing one night a week and one weekend a month.


Not really, we keep class A reservists current on the Gonzo; should be quite doable on a Twin Otter.  As for the Tucano, it should be doable to; the USAF ANG does it with their fast air.


----------



## blacktriangle

How about we focus on acquiring a capable RPA? And sustaining our critical capabilities?


----------



## Loachman

400 Squadron expects its Res F aircrew to attend a minimum of six full days per month. That permits them to maintain currency, but not profiency. Adding tactical currency, beyond basic nav and handling skills, and weapons currency to that is not feasible.

There is nothing that a cheap aircraft can do that an F35 cannot. The F35, however, can do much more and carry much more, and it can do it in real war conditions.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

It would allow you to keep your pilots that are leaving connected and fairly current, as well as doing CAS training with the army. I have argued for a lighter airframe for this role before, prefer something like the armed Hawk. Also means that your pilots can still get flying in when your main fleet gets grounded for some safety reason, which I can bet will happen with the F-35 as it seemed to have happened with pretty well all jet fighters introduced in the last 30+ years. Not to mention that even though availability will go up, the real number of air frames is going to go down. It's entirely possible that air frames will get significant flight hour restrictions to make them last. A cheaper to run air frame will allow your pilots to practice many of the skillsets without incurring those hours on the main air frame.


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> It would allow you to keep your pilots that are leaving connected and fairly current, as well as doing CAS training with the army. I have argued for a lighter airframe for this role before, prefer something like the armed Hawk. Also means that your pilots can still get flying in when your main fleet gets grounded for some safety reason, which I can bet will happen with the F-35 as it seemed to have happened with pretty well all jet fighters introduced in the last 30+ years. Not to mention that even though availability will go up, the real number of air frames is going to go down. It's entirely possible that air frames will get significant flight hour restrictions to make them last. A cheaper to run air frame will allow your pilots to practice many of the skillsets without incurring those hours on the main air frame.



something cheap like the Textron Scorpion? a forecasted unit cost of less then $20 million each would make it a cheap buy to fill that roll, could even use it as a jet trainer at that price.


----------



## Loachman

Colin P said:
			
		

> It would allow you to keep your pilots that are leaving connected and fairly current,



Current on what? An aircraft that they will ride into battle? Some cheapy little putt-putt with limited range, limited weapons, limited speed, and limited survivability in a real conflict? What may work in an Afghan situation will not work as well when somebody like China gets uppity.

Or do you think that they could simply get dropped into the cockpit of a serious machine at short notice and be able to operate it effectively?

What you are suggesting, and what keeps being suggested, is akin to the Cougar being bought as a "tank trainer" in the seventies.

If there were no tanks without crews for the tank-trainer crews to occupy, then they would have been trained for nothing.

Why have one tank regiment and three tank-trainer regiments? What would those crews do in wartime? It is unlikely that a lot of tank crews would die in undamaged vehicles that could simply be taken over.

The tank-trainer crews would never be sent into battle in crappy little moving targets.

One fights with what one has. If what one has is not up to the real job, then one is rather screwed, nein?

Why keep these Pilots current, and what is expected of them?

How many such people would there be? How many would be interested in flying something with a non-existent operational role? Precious few ex-Reg Kiowa Pilots seemed interested in flying them as Reservists - as Res F Pilots could not fly enough to maintain tactical quals and there was no establishment for Observers (or any possibility of training Res F candidates to the required standard). Max has said that he would not be interested in flying anything less than what he has now.

Where would these machines be flown? There is not a lot of free airspace around the cities to which ex-Reg Pilots tend to gravitate, and few ranges into which they could shoot. Most guys who wish to continue flying go to airlines. To find a pool large enough that might generate enough Pilots, one would therefore have to look at Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver etcetera. Where are the ranges? Where are the hangars? Who will maintain these machines?



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> as well as doing CAS training with the army.



You really, really, really do not want that.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> I have argued for a lighter airframe for this role before



And I have pointed out the weaknesses of such arguments before.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> something like the armed Hawk



Again, do you really think that this is a good machine in which to send somebody off to engage a credible enemy? They'd achieve nothing more than glorious deaths. Wire my feet to the rudder pedals and my hands to the stick and throttle, Goose! Banzai! Banzai! Banzai! VCs for All.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> Also means that your pilots can still get flying in when your main fleet gets grounded for some safety reason



How often does that happen? For how long do these groundings happen? Long enough to refresh guys on another machine with completely different performance and handling, systems, procedures, cockpit layout? I've never seen that since I started flying 3.5 decades ago.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> It's entirely possible that air frames will get significant flight hour restrictions to make them last.



Yup.

But,



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> A cheaper to run air frame will allow your pilots to practice many of the skillsets without incurring those hours on the main air frame.



No.

We have simulators, which perform much more like the real thing than a completely different machine that has no real reason to exist, and no retraining on a different type is required.

If you want to have a military flying organization, then purchase the appropriate machines in the various categories - effective, capable aircraft, that will survive in the most demanding operational conditions imaginable. For anything with a ground attack role, that means a decent weapon load and the targeting systems to match, adequate speed and range, and the means to avoid detection and defend itself.

If you want a decent Infantry capability, buy enough proper rifles for all of them, and not a bunch of lever-action .22s.

Anything less is a waste of money at best, and a waste of lives and ultimate defeat at worst.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

IF the GOC and CAF really want another bomb truck, we could do what others are doing.

Possible CAS/bomb truck solution #1     It can Be Done  P-3 Bomb Camp

There seems to be no political will to have anything like this in Canada; we have an airframe that has a bombbay AND wing pylons for external ordinance as well.  If you want to have something manned that can remain on station for decent times and deliver CAS, write your MP and have him press to kit out the CP-140.  

Everytime you think we need/should have one of these really small low level rinky-dink CAS platforms, the next thing you should think is MANPAD engagements/SAFIRES.  IMO.  Why?  Because the plane you buy for 'one type of war' is the one you are going to be stuck with for _any_ type of war.

Honestly, I am not even sure why we talking about this "new CAS airframe".  Think of this CAS airframe we are talking about as the girl in this movie scene.  The RCAF is the guy with the hat on, the Cdn Army is the guy with no hat on, all dreamy eyed.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

How about the Army folks stop interjecting with what they think the Air Force needs to do the job.

You don't see Loachman try and tell someone what a proper section attack should look like so why do we continue to interject in to Air Force business.

Canada needs a credible multirole fighter force for a variety of reasons, more than just acting as the Army's bomb truck.

Instead of trying to discredit Air Force programs so we can fund our own pet projects, maybe we should be supporting their endeavours.   :2c:


----------



## Baz

Royal Drew,

I agree largely.  An exam came directly from a briefing by Gen Hillier I attended; I was in CSprings at the time.  He was just at the Boeing plant and asked some dude on the line how long to build a Chinook... a few months.  Wrong question... the right question is if you get in line right now when will you get one... he didn't understand how airplanes are built.

However, although I largely agree with your premise (aviation  is a specialty so let aviators do it), we have a problem in Canada... unlike almost every other country, we don't have proper Maritime and Tactical Aviation where it belongs... in the Navy and Army.  And that is causing us lots of problems.  The Air Force doesn't understand the Army's needs... Tactical Aviators like Loachman and trained JTACS do.  They don't run the Air Force...

As a complete outsider (I was infantry a very long time ago, but I was a private in the reserves... don't count for turds),  I would rather the discussion be about a proper rotary Wing force (and by the way, a ship to put them on if we needed), of LOH,  Attack, Utility, and heavy.  By the way, question: how useful is heavy going to be to us in contested airspace?

From experience, I don't trust the RCAF; fully admit my bias.


----------



## Loachman

Baz said:
			
		

> Tactical Aviators like Loachman and trained JTACS do.  They don't run the Air Force...



Nor would I want to.

I don't want anything to do with it.

It does not understand us, nor does it care to.

It drags upon us in far too many ways.

I do not care one whit what it does with its bombers and transport communities. I just want it to leave us alone and release us from its clutches. Everyone would benefit.

"Render unto Caesar" 'n' all.


----------



## dimsum

Baz said:
			
		

> Royal Drew,
> 
> I agree largely.  An exam came directly from a briefing by Gen Hillier I attended; I was in CSprings at the time.  He was just at the Boeing plant and asked some dude on the line how long to build a Chinook... a few months.  Wrong question... the right question is if you get in line right now when will you get one... he didn't understand how airplanes are built.
> 
> However, although I largely agree with your premise (aviation  is a specialty so let aviators do it), we have a problem in Canada... unlike almost every other country, we don't have proper Maritime and Tactical Aviation where it belongs... in the Navy and Army.  And that is causing us lots of problems.  The Air Force doesn't understand the Army's needs... Tactical Aviators like Loachman and trained JTACS do.  They don't run the Air Force...
> 
> As a complete outsider (I was infantry a very long time ago, but I was a private in the reserves... don't count for turds),  I would rather the discussion be about a proper rotary Wing force (and by the way, a ship to put them on if we needed), of LOH,  Attack, Utility, and heavy.  By the way, question: how useful is heavy going to be to us in contested airspace?
> 
> From experience, I don't trust the RCAF; fully admit my bias.



Crazy how something like this isn't followed along with the same vigor as the "buttons and bows" projects.


----------



## GR66

It seems to me that a "low tech" CAS aircraft only makes sense for a country that is prepared to actually use them.  If Canada had the political will to get heavily involved militarily in regional conflicts where AA risks are reduced and was willing to both potentially suffer losses and to be potentially be seen as an imperialistic aggressor, then we could probably get a lot of real use out of them.  

That's not the case however.  We're not France or Russia.  If our warplanes are realistically only going to be deployed regionally as part of a coalition where risk to our forces is limited as much as possible for political reasons...or are meant to fight a potential near-peer enemy in a major conflict, then they are not the right tool for the job.  

The Canadian public won't stand for seeing news clips of (hypothetical) RCAF AT-6's strafing and firing rockets & bombs at IS** positions and possibly being shot down with pilots captured in the same way as they will accept seeing "video game" footage of targets being "neutralized" from fighter-bombers at 10,000 feet.  The enemies are dead in both cases, but one method just "seems" so much more brutal and doesn't allow us to maintain the fantasy of being the clean, good-guys.

Similarly, if we are forced to face China, Russia, Iran or North Korea, etc. we risk having our "brush war" aircraft swatted from the sky by an enemy with "real" weapons.

So to my mind, while maybe you can make a strickly military case for having a low-tech CAS capability I don't think you can make a political case for it.


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> It seems to me that a "low tech" CAS aircraft only makes sense for a country that is prepared to actually use them.  If Canada had the political will to get heavily involved militarily in regional conflicts where AA risks are reduced and was willing to both potentially suffer losses and to be potentially be seen as an imperialistic aggressor, then we could probably get a lot of real use out of them.
> 
> That's not the case however.  We're not France or Russia.  If our warplanes are realistically only going to be deployed regionally as part of a coalition where risk to our forces is limited as much as possible for political reasons...or are meant to fight a potential near-peer enemy in a major conflict, then they are not the right tool for the job.
> 
> The Canadian public won't stand for seeing news clips of (hypothetical) RCAF AT-6's strafing and firing rockets & bombs at IS** positions and possibly being shot down with pilots captured in the same way as they will accept seeing "video game" footage of targets being "neutralized" from fighter-bombers at 10,000 feet.  The enemies are dead in both cases, but one method just "seems" so much more brutal and doesn't allow us to maintain the fantasy of being the clean, good-guys.
> 
> Similarly, if we are forced to face China, Russia, Iran or North Korea, etc. we risk having our "brush war" aircraft swatted from the sky by an enemy with "real" weapons.
> 
> So to my mind, while maybe you can make a strickly military case for having a low-tech CAS capability I don't think you can make a political case for it.



Why have low tech fixed wing? We need high tech helicopter gunships, you know, like others have had since the early 60s  :


----------



## GR66

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Why have low tech fixed wing? We need high tech helicopter gunships, you know, like others have had since the early 60s  :




Simple answer:  $

I don't have any expertise to recommend one CAS platform over another.  The original suggestion to bring back something "CF-5 like" or "something with a prop" I'm assuming was based on the idea that it would be a cheaper alternative to the F-35 or other fast air CAS platforms.  If a cheap, low tech, fixed wing solution doesn't make political/economic sense for Canada then a more expensive, high tech, rotary wing solution is even less likely to happen in my opinion.  

Attack helicopters are one of the MANY things I'd love to see the CF have available, but in the current political and economic climate it's about as likely as getting Star Destroyers.


----------



## Loachman

We could have bought fewer Chinooks - a nice but niche machine - and a few AH instead.

Griffon will not make such a great escort machine in cooler/wetter climates than Afghanistan. It can get a little breezy in the back without the doors.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Loachman said:
			
		

> We could have bought fewer Chinooks - a nice but niche machine - and a few AH instead.
> 
> Griffon will not make such a great escort machine in cooler/wetter climates than Afghanistan. It can get a little breezy in the back without the doors.



And it's a big, fat, underpowered thing too, thus probably a lot easier to see and shoot down  ;D


----------



## Eye In The Sky

GR66 said:
			
		

> If our warplanes are realistically only going to be deployed regionally as part of a coalition where risk to our forces is limited as much as possible for political reasons...



Or, hey how about just so they don't get blotted from the sky for no real good military reason so they can fly and fight again the next day...aircraft and crews are not easily replaced.


----------



## a_majoor

GR66 said:
			
		

> Simple answer:  $
> 
> I don't have any expertise to recommend one CAS platform over another.  The original suggestion to bring back something "CF-5 like" or "something with a prop" I'm assuming was based on the idea that it would be a cheaper alternative to the F-35 or other fast air CAS platforms.  If a cheap, low tech, fixed wing solution doesn't make political/economic sense for Canada then a more expensive, high tech, rotary wing solution is even less likely to happen in my opinion.
> 
> Attack helicopters are one of the MANY things I'd love to see the CF have available, but in the current political and economic climate it's about as likely as getting Star Destroyers.



As the originator of the thread, the initial idea was to have something lower cost, requiring less infrastructure and the ability to operate off forward, austere air bases. Some of the suggestions I made in that long ago time included (as thought experiments) the CF-5, MiG 29 and SAAB JAS-39 Gripen. Real world experience shows Russia's SU-25 is also an excellent candidate, being both purpose built for the role and both smaller and faster than the A-10, giving it a few logistical and survival advantages as well.

While actually buying SU-25's would be problematic (unless we were to gather them up from third world air forces and do complete rebuilds including Western engines and avionics), the initial idea still stands. While the CF-35 would be an outstanding bomb truck, among other things, it also needs a lot of care and feeding, which would defeat the idea of low infrastructure and operating off austere airfields.


----------



## MilEME09

Thucydides said:
			
		

> As the originator of the thread, the initial idea was to have something lower cost, requiring less infrastructure and the ability to operate off forward, austere air bases. Some of the suggestions I made in that long ago time included (as thought experiments) the CF-5, MiG 29 and SAAB JAS-39 Gripen. Real world experience shows Russia's SU-25 is also an excellent candidate, being both purpose built for the role and both smaller and faster than the A-10, giving it a few logistical and survival advantages as well.
> 
> While actually buying SU-25's would be problematic (unless we were to gather them up from third world air forces and do complete rebuilds including Western engines and avionics), the initial idea still stands. While the CF-35 would be an outstanding bomb truck, among other things, it also needs a lot of care and feeding, which would defeat the idea of low infrastructure and operating off austere airfields.



Another thing would be the increased cost of a mixed fleet


----------



## YZT580

The navy is buying ships tailored to operating in the north.  They already own subs, frigates, a destroyer etc.  Each serves a particular combat function.  Why does the air force figure they can perform all the myriad tasks that they are assigned with a single combat type?  First define the mission, then define the equipment required.  If you can't supply the equipment, don't do the mission.  But compromise in war, kills.  From all the information available, it is evident that the F35 is a poor compromise for CAS.


----------



## McG

YZT580 said:
			
		

> From all the information available, it is evident that the F35 is a poor compromise for CAS.


What information proves this?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

YZT580 said:
			
		

> The navy is buying ships tailored to operating in the north.  They already own subs, frigates, a destroyer etc.  Each serves a particular combat function.  Why does the air force figure they can perform all the myriad tasks that they are assigned with a single combat type?  First define the mission, then define the equipment required.  If you can't supply the equipment, don't do the mission.  But compromise in war, kills.  From all the information available, it is evident that the F35 is a poor compromise for CAS.



It's called a multi-role fighter for a reason.  The F35 is the best aircraft available to do the missions we use our combat aircraft for.  If the Army wants a dedicated CAS platform, they should
help the Air Force build a business case to procure a dedicated Attack Helicopter platform.  

The Air Force has quietly gone about building a pretty good capability with the deployable ATF based around a Six Pack of Fighter/Bombers, Air to Air Refuelers and dedicated ISR platform with the CP-140.  The next bound should be to procure an armed UAV that can do ISR but also work in tandem with the F35 to find, fix, strike.  

If we buy some shat second rate aircraft you can kiss this all goodbye.  Combined with our world class SOF forces, our Air Force is delivering some excellent service and is exactly the type of expeditionary force we need. Glad some folks here aren't involved in the decision-making process, some of the ideas floated here would set the military back years.


----------



## Edward Campbell

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> It's called a multi-role fighter for a reason.  The F35 is the best aircraft available to do the missions we use our combat aircraft for.  If the Army wants a dedicated CAS platform, they should help the Air Force build a business case to procure a dedicated Attack Helicopter platform.
> 
> The Air Force has quietly gone about building a pretty good capability with the deployable ATF based around a Six Pack of Fighter/Bombers, Air to Air Refuelers and dedicated ISR platform with the CP-140.  The next bound should be to procure an armed UAV that can do ISR but also work in tandem with the F35 to find, fix, strike.
> 
> If we buy some shat second rate aircraft you can kiss this all goodbye.  Combined with our world class SOF forces, our Air Force is delivering some excellent service and is exactly the type of expeditionary force we need. Glad some folks here aren't involved in the decision-making process, some of the ideas floated here would set the military back years.




_I agree _... but it would require a commitment, on the Army's part, to _aviation_, maybe even to having a green suited Army Aviation Corps, consisting of aircrew and ground crew flying a range of Army helicopters. That's how things were planned in the 1960s but it appears, from what I've heard and read, that the Army was far less than 100% committed to aviation and, willingly, sacrificed "it's own air arm" for the sake of artillery, armour, etc.

If the Army needs and wants dedicated CAS aviation then it will need to pay for it ~ in every way, including in recognizing the aviators as combat soldiers, just like the infantry and tankers.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Loachman said:
			
		

> Current on what? An aircraft that they will ride into battle? Some cheapy little putt-putt with limited range, limited weapons, limited speed, and limited survivability in a real conflict? What may work in an Afghan situation will not work as well when somebody like China gets uppity.
> 
> Or do you think that they could simply get dropped into the cockpit of a serious machine at short notice and be able to operate it effectively?
> 
> What you are suggesting, and what keeps being suggested, is akin to the Cougar being bought as a "tank trainer" in the seventies.
> 
> If there were no tanks without crews for the tank-trainer crews to occupy, then they would have been trained for nothing.
> 
> Why have one tank regiment and three tank-trainer regiments? What would those crews do in wartime? It is unlikely that a lot of tank crews would die in undamaged vehicles that could simply be taken over.
> 
> The tank-trainer crews would never be sent into battle in crappy little moving targets.
> 
> One fights with what one has. If what one has is not up to the real job, then one is rather screwed, nein?
> 
> Why keep these Pilots current, and what is expected of them?
> 
> How many such people would there be? How many would be interested in flying something with a non-existent operational role? Precious few ex-Reg Kiowa Pilots seemed interested in flying them as Reservists - as Res F Pilots could not fly enough to maintain tactical quals and there was no establishment for Observers (or any possibility of training Res F candidates to the required standard). Max has said that he would not be interested in flying anything less than what he has now.
> 
> Where would these machines be flown? There is not a lot of free airspace around the cities to which ex-Reg Pilots tend to gravitate, and few ranges into which they could shoot. Most guys who wish to continue flying go to airlines. To find a pool large enough that might generate enough Pilots, one would therefore have to look at Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver etcetera. Where are the ranges? Where are the hangars? Who will maintain these machines?
> 
> You really, really, really do not want that.
> 
> And I have pointed out the weaknesses of such arguments before.
> 
> Again, do you really think that this is a good machine in which to send somebody off to engage a credible enemy? They'd achieve nothing more than glorious deaths. Wire my feet to the rudder pedals and my hands to the stick and throttle, Goose! Banzai! Banzai! Banzai! VCs for All.
> 
> How often does that happen? For how long do these groundings happen? Long enough to refresh guys on another machine with completely different performance and handling, systems, procedures, cockpit layout? I've never seen that since I started flying 3.5 decades ago.
> 
> Yup.
> 
> But,
> 
> No.
> 
> We have simulators, which perform much more like the real thing than a completely different machine that has no real reason to exist, and no retraining on a different type is required.
> 
> If you want to have a military flying organization, then purchase the appropriate machines in the various categories - effective, capable aircraft, that will survive in the most demanding operational conditions imaginable. For anything with a ground attack role, that means a decent weapon load and the targeting systems to match, adequate speed and range, and the means to avoid detection and defend itself.
> 
> If you want a decent Infantry capability, buy enough proper rifles for all of them, and not a bunch of lever-action .22s.
> 
> Anything less is a waste of money at best, and a waste of lives and ultimate defeat at worst.



the F-22 is an example that quickly comes to mind for being grounded, not to mention the F-35 fleet has already been grounded once for engine issues, plus the F-15, F-16 (i know it's age related) .

 A pilot flying the "cheaper aircraft" is practicing the other skillsets other than flying the top line machine. As I recall, lot's pilots flew in the older birds to keep their flight status up as there was not enough flying hours and CF-18's for them otherwise. When a fighter pilot leaves, we lose those skills, giving them a option to maintain those skills at a certain level, gives us some surge ability that we otherwise might have. Yes i would prefer to buy another 40 Super Hornets instead, but am aware there is only so much money, hence the lesser option. I think the RCAF is terrified of putting anything else on the table that might allow the politicians an excuse not to buy the F-35 or reduce the numbers even further. 

and why would you not want the RCAF to train with the army in the use of CAS?


----------



## SeaKingTacco

Colin,

Increasing, we use simulators to keep pilots current. They are relatively immune to fleet groundings. And simulators do not incur the o&m trail airplanes do (not to say the Simulators are free- they are anything but).

The prop CAS thing is a non-starter in Canada. CAS (in the rocket firing, strafing sense that you mean it) is dead in all but the most permissive of environments. IMHO...


----------



## dimsum

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> _I agree _... but it would require a commitment, on the Army's part, to _aviation_, maybe even to having a green suited Army Aviation Corps, consisting of aircrew and ground crew flying a range of Army helicopters. That's how things were planned in the 1960s but it appears, from what I've heard and read, that the Army was far less than 100% committed to aviation and, willingly, sacrificed "it's own air arm" for the sake of artillery, armour, etc.
> 
> If the Army needs and wants dedicated CAS aviation then it will need to pay for it ~ in every way, *including in recognizing the aviators as combat soldiers, just like the infantry and tankers.
> *



And therein lies the rub.  Would Army Aviation be recognized by folks in the (other) Combat Arms corps as another Cbt Arm, or a glorified "battle taxi and escort" service?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Dimsum said:
			
		

> And therein lies the rub.  Would Army Aviation be recognized by folks in the (other) Combat Arms corps as another Cbt Arm, or a glorified "battle taxi and escort" service?



They should be and if I am ever in a position to bring Tac Aviation into the fold I will do my utmost to make it happen.  

There really should be three definitions of what a combat team is:

Infantry-led
Armour-led
Aviation-led

The Army needs to arrive in the 21st century and start envisioning a three-dimensional battle space.


----------



## Good2Golf

Aviation in the US Army is a combat arm.  The CA isn't, and will never be, IMO, a proponent of AH.  The rest is a moot point.  Canada will never have an Aviation Branch within its Army.   It would impact its own wishes and desires far too greatly.  For the same reason, the CA will never make a bona fide case for CAS integral to the RCAF/CAF.  

Call me from Missouri, but if the Army can't even work out its inter-Branch promises for indirect fires and engineering support, who actually believes it would care any more for aviation support?

Banana republic prop-driven or cheap jet counter-insurgency CAS is a solution looking for a problem where Canada is concerned.

'Tis what it is...


----------



## Loachman

Colin P said:
			
		

> the F-22 is an example that quickly comes to mind for being grounded, not to mention the F-35 fleet has already been grounded once for engine issues, plus the F-15, F-16 (i know it's age related) .



F35 is still in development. There are very few flying, and no operational need to fly with even minimum shortcomings.

Whole-fleet grounding is rare, and brief. It is even more rare when there is an operational imperative to fly. That imperative is reduced when a comparable fleet is available. It is still not a significant concern.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> A pilot flying the "cheaper aircraft" is practicing the other skillsets other than flying the top line machine. As I recall, lot's pilots flew in the older birds to keep their flight status up as there was not enough flying hours and CF-18's for them otherwise.



Up until around the late 1980s, and possibly early 1990s, flying bases kept a handful of CT133s around, mainly for the use of Pilots who were not on the strength of an active Squadron. There is an expense associated with that, and it was ultimately determined to not be worthwhile - especially as the purpose behind maintaining these machines was more likely more morale- and aircrew allowance-related than operationally-driven. Regaining currency, when required following a staff posting, is not a big deal. The actual flying skill is not what fades so much, but the procedural knowledge, which would have to be refreshed on the operational type anyway. I do not see any operational benefit from acquiring and maintaining a machine that has no operational reason for existing simply to provide what is essentially recreational flying.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> When a fighter pilot leaves, we lose those skills



When anybody leaves, we lose their skills. So what?

Why cater to one of the smallest groups, that also has, most likely, the highest maintenance cost - with an associated high cost of returning to full operational status, presuming that members of this group would even be available for operational re-activation? I would rather spend money keeping the skills of the active aircrew sharp and their mounts up-to-date and sound. And, unless there are spare cockpits around, ie insufficient active crews for all of the aircraft available, this additional expense is useless. Into what would we "surge" these people?



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> I think the RCAF is terrified of putting anything else on the table that might allow the politicians an excuse not to buy the F-35 or reduce the numbers even further.



I think that there is no justifiable need for an expensive plaything.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> and why would you not want the RCAF to train with the army in the use of CAS?



I did not say that. You were talking about Reserve Pilots. It is a challenge to maintain simple basic currency for part-timers. Expecting them to be sufficiently proficient in CAS is extremely unrealistic. The only thing that save a bunch of people - and me - from being shot up by a new CF5 guy in 1983 was the fact that it was a dual rather than a single and therefore had no guns so the target was engaged with a 33 lb BDU (Bomb Dummy Unit) instead, which went low over our heads.


----------



## Baz

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> _I agree _... but it would require a commitment, on the Army's part, to _aviation_, maybe even to having a green suited Army Aviation Corps, consisting of aircrew and ground crew flying a range of Army helicopters. That's how things were planned in the 1960s but it appears, from what I've heard and read, that the Army was far less than 100% committed to aviation and, willingly, sacrificed "it's own air arm" for the sake of artillery, armour, etc.
> 
> If the Army needs and wants dedicated CAS aviation then it will need to pay for it ~ in every way, including in recognizing the aviators as combat soldiers, just like the infantry and tankers.



ERC, exactly, same for Naval Air.

We have created a unique situation in Canada where institutional the Army and Navy neither understand nor care about Aviation, and the Air Force (who own all the aircraft) neither care about nor understand the Army or Navy.

In that environment, CAS and AH, or a littoral maneuver ship, are all just dreams.

So much for th Unified CAF being Joint... we are less Joint than most.

I think the only way it will change is for us to actually experience a failure.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> Colin,
> 
> Increasing, we use simulators to keep pilots current. They are relatively immune to fleet groundings. And simulators do not incur the o&m trail airplanes do (not to say the Simulators are free- they are anything but).
> 
> The prop CAS thing is a non-starter in Canada. CAS (in the rocket firing, strafing sense that you mean it) is dead in all but the most permissive of environments. IMHO...



do the simulators count as flight time hour for hour? Is there a requirement for x amount of real flight time vs simulator hours?


----------



## Edward Campbell

Baz said:
			
		

> ERC, exactly, same for Naval Air.
> 
> We have created a unique situation in Canada where institutional the Army and Navy neither understand nor care about Aviation, and the Air Force (who own all the aircraft) neither care about nor understand the Army or Navy.
> 
> In that environment, CAS and AH, or a littoral maneuver ship, are all just dreams.
> 
> So much for th Unified CAF being Joint... _we are less Joint than most_.
> 
> I think the only way it will change is for us to actually experience a failure.




That's my perception, too. When I first joined this forum, over a decade ago, I used the name _Rusty Old Joint_ Rusty and Old were to describe my skills and knowledge and me, personally, but I added Joint because my last job was head of a small, specialized _joint_ staff directorate in NDHQ, and a lot of my earlier experience had involved _joint_ environments, including some work with the old 10TAG (10th Tactical Air Group) and with the UK Navy. 

Like many I was excited by the _integration/unification_ exercise ~ especially at the notion that we, in Mobile Command had _organic_ air, including "fast air" and smaller fixed wing tactical transports. We were all in the same suits and our pilots wore a mix of RCAF, Canadian Army (mostly RCAC and RCASC, but some gunners and a few RCCS folks, too) and even a couple of RCN badges, but we were all transitioning to a single uniform and we would be a fully _unified_ command ... we thought/hoped.

It all went pear shaped ... we tried to revive the idea when I was in Staff College, but Air Command was having none of it: our air force colleagues were actually warned off even discussing it in syndicate ... but many, including many "fast air" and transport guys wanted the Navy and Army to "own," properly own and be responsible for, their own _aviation_. So, over 25_ish_ years I watched us go from a really _joint_ structure to three, single service stove pipes that barely even talk to one another.


----------



## Kirkhill

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> _I agree _... but it would require a commitment, on the Army's part, to _aviation_, maybe even to having a green suited Army Aviation Corps, consisting of aircrew and ground crew flying a range of Army helicopters. That's how things were planned in the 1960s but it appears, from what I've heard and read, that the Army was far less than 100% committed to aviation and, willingly, sacrificed "it's own air arm" for the sake of artillery, armour, etc.
> 
> If the Army needs and wants dedicated CAS aviation then it will need to pay for it ~ in every way, including in recognizing the aviators as combat soldiers, just like the infantry and tankers.



Why do you have Attack Helicopters to choose from?  I would argue it is in large part because the Air Force wouldn't fly Sky Raiders and wouldn't let the US Army fly them either.  The only service that had a niche need for Attack Helicopters was the USMC and much of their support work was being done from fixed wing carriers.  The Harrier was acquired by the Marines as an alternative to Pappy Boyington's Corsairs flying from grass fields.  For the USMC CAS includes F-18s, AV-8Bs, AH-1Zs and UH-1Ys. 

I leave it to the experts to decide which is the most effective platform and the easiest target.







Skyraider on a grass field. 400 m to take off and 800 m to land.  Was it important to develop attack helicopters when that capability already existed


----------



## George Wallace

RoyalDrew said:
			
		

> They should be and if I am ever in a position to bring Tac Aviation into the fold I will do my utmost to make it happen.
> 
> There really should be three definitions of what a combat team is:
> 
> Infantry-led
> Armour-led
> Aviation-led
> 
> The Army needs to arrive in the 21st century and start envisioning a three-dimensional battle space.



Perhaps this is leading us back to threads on returning TACHEL (and perhaps more AIR elements) to the ARMY.


----------



## Loachman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> The only service that had a niche need for Attack Helicopters



There is nothing "niche" about AHs.

The US Army considers Aviation to be a Combat Arm for good reason. They get much better support from their Aviators than they ever did from the USAF or its US Army Air Corps predecessor because those Aviators are members of the same organization just as any Infantry, Armor (US spelling intentional), or Artillery person is. They live, train, fight, and die with each other.

AHs do not provide CAS. AHs are heavily-armed vehicles with rotary wings for mobility instead of wheels or tracks. AH units are manoeuvre units, like Armor and Infantry. They conduct blocks, counter-attacks, raids, and ambushes etcetera with or without accompanying ground troops mounted in utility helicopters.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Skyraider on a grass field. 400 m to take off and 800 m to land.  Was it important to develop attack helicopters when that capability already existed



Yes, or it would not have been done. Early gunships escorted UHs conducting air assaults, provided indirect fire support (there were Aerial Rocket Artillery units in Vietnam, with large, boxy 2.75-inch rocket super-pods on each side of UH1s), and conducted very close armed reconnaissance missions (generally as part of Cavalry "Pink" Teams).

AH support is much more intimate, and Much Closer than Close Air Support.

Just imagine how wonderful everything would be with the RCN providing all watercraft support to RCE units because everything that floats has to be Navy.


----------



## Shrek1985

How about this; cheap and effective.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Tractor_AT-802#Specifications_.28AT-802U.29


----------



## dimsum

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Perhaps this is leading us back to threads on returning TACHEL (and perhaps more AIR elements) to the ARMY.



And MH (and one can argue LRP) to the Navy.  Prob less with LRP now that there is a big overland surveillance mission.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Colin P said:
			
		

> do the simulators count as flight time hour for hour? Is there a requirement for x amount of real flight time vs simulator hours?



As it stands, to satisfy NATO expeditionary requirements, we need to fly 180 hours a year of which, 40 can be flown in simulators.  I would not be surprised to see this number increase as simulators get better. A lots of the currency items can be done in the simulator (mostly non-tactical stuff right now, but I would not be surprised to see this change)

For the F-35, there is probably a bunch of things that we will only be allowed to do in simulators so we don't give away critical capabilities.


----------



## Loachman

And emergency responses can be practised in simulators that cannot be practised in a real aircraft, as they are either too dangerous or the emergency cannot be simulated in the real aircraft. There are other benefits, too, from relatively simple but networked systems - multi-aircraft tactical missions can be planned to the same degree whether the mission is conducted in the real aircraft or in simulators. There is little transferable flying skill involved, but more missions can be run in a shorter period at much lower cost,  and none are subject to the vagaries of serviceability or weather. The main intent is to confirm planning and orders and inter-crew communications and co-operation.


----------



## Kirkhill

Loachman said:
			
		

> .....
> Just imagine how wonderful everything would be with the RCN providing all watercraft support to RCE units because everything that floats has to be Navy.


  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

So we should be investing in more of this stuff and distributing it to armouries and stone frigates across Canada?






































> LIGHT ARMOURED VEHICLE MISSION TRAINING
> 
> lav mission training system
> Individual and collective trainer
> 
> The Thales LAV Mission Training System (MTS) has been designed using the latest in technology and experience gained from delivering land-based simulators around the globe. MTS is optimised for technical and tactical gunnery use by light armoured vehicle crews in an era of net-centric capabilities.
> 
> Through the use of highly realistic and spatially accurate replica turret equipment, LAV crews are able to train in gunnery techniques in the simulated environment to neverbefore attainable standards. The simulated LAV Turret components are fully interactive and provide realtime feedback to LAV crews; they are identical to those which can be found on LAV 25 mm turrets. The MTS container is fully deployable by air, land and sea and can be prepared for use in less than 20 minutes from the stowed state.
> 
> Characteristics
> 
> The LAV MTS contains all the required equipment for LAV crews to carry out gunnery skills at both the tactical and the technical level. Because the MTS can be linked in a net-centric environment, both individual and collective training is supported.
> 
> Products such as ThalesView and SETHI give Thales the ability to provide highly realistic geo-specific terrain databases. LAV MTS is delivered with a range of exercises designed to meet the expectation of all customer requirements.
> 
> Growth capacity
> 
> The flexibility of the Thales design enables the MTS to be used for LAV gunnery training as well as analysis and evaluation. This simulator product is currently in operation with the Australian Army.
> 
> With a modular design for hardware and software components, the LAV MTS can evolve to meet the everchanging requirements and demands of users.
> 
> The MTS Includes
> 
> • Individual 25/40 mm gunnery entry level training for armoured schools
> • Collective 25/40 mm gunnery training for armoured schools
> • Individual advanced 25/40 mm gunnery training at LAV user units
> • Collective 25 mm gunnery training at patrol and troop level at school and LAV user unit environments
> • Evaluation of the individual and collective skill levels during initial employment training and advanced unit training.
> 
> Key Features
> 
> • A low cost, containerised system capable of being adapted from 25 mm to 40 mm cannon variants
> • Fully deployable, requiring only generator set power for field use
> • 13 Image Generators providing 18 different views (including all weapon sights, 360o binocular, Turret and Hull)
> • Configurable interactive entities and exercises tailored to suit individual customer requirements
> • A comprehensive instructor station which permits full interaction and influence during the conduct of the exercise
> • Full after-action review in the electronic and printed format
> • All hardware uses COTS displays and PC’s, ensuring low cost and easily managed obsolescence
> • Tactical environment model provides simulation of large, complex peacetime and wartime environments
> • Technologically advanced software that provides detailed ballistic characteristics and accurately mirrors LAV Improved Fire Control Systems
> • Custom Visual Data Base enabling both rural and urban terrain training
> • Full driver interaction through the use of intercom, radio and steering wheel, and pedals
> • Highly developed training aids and courseware expertly delivered by qualified 25 mm master gunners and simulator instructors.









































































You would be beating them off with sticks on Wednesday nights (and every other night of the week).


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Well I bought the early Steel Beasts, the Pro series and had a friend who saved a fortune getting his twin engine certificate using a flight sim that counted to his hours. I think simulators are fabulous and a great economy. However they can't bomb the enemy and for that you need real air frames. The question is how many and what types.


----------



## McG

Colin P said:
			
		

> However they can't bomb the enemy and for that you need real air frames.  The question is how many and what types.


I think the "what type" has been answered above as a modern multi-role fighter.


----------



## Loachman

And, more specifically, F35.


----------



## SupersonicMax

MCG said:
			
		

> I think the "what type" has been answered above as a modern multi-role fighter.



I used to be a Super Hornet proponent.  2 engines, multi-role, AESA radar, you know....  Until I was read in to the JSF program.  Then I quickly changed my mind after seeing what the F-35 could really do, well beyond what MSM says...


----------



## MilEME09

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I used to be a Super Hornet proponent.  2 engines, multi-role, AESA radar, you know....  Until I was read in to the JSF program.  Then I quickly changed my mind after seeing what the F-35 could really do, well beyond what MSM says...



agreed, the problem is people are bashing the F-35 because of what it CURRENTLY can do, not what it will be able to do once everything is said and done


----------



## Good2Golf

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> I used to be a Super Hornet proponent.  2 engines, multi-role, AESA radar, you know....  Until I was read in to the JSF program.  Then I quickly changed my mind after seeing what the F-35 could really do, well beyond what MSM says...



Agreeably, the government has not necessarily messaged the capabilities and the requirement well, and this includes the Liberal government right back to 2002, when then ADM(Mat) Mr. Williams, signed the original JSF Memorandum of Understanding with the USA in Washington.

A number of forum members have noted the key to the capability, which is the fact that the F-35 is part of the system of system of 5th Generation warfare systems - many sensor, command and control, targeting and kinetic engagement capabilities integrated into a very capable, but also very expensive, battlespace framework.  F-35 is the modest entry into that 5th Gen framework....F-22, B-2 and other capabilities that most people don't and will never know exist, is the higher-level stuff that Canada will likely never possess.  The physical flying capabilities of the jet itself are but a portion of the overall capability.

I neither try to make the case for, note refute the F-35.  It is, however, a system that will have a good portion of a century of life in service.

:2c:

G2G


----------



## FormerHorseGuard

I have been a follower of most posts here about the F35, and I did like the Super Hornet also as it is very close to what  we fly now.
Canadians and the those we elect to power do not seem to realize we buy a piece of equipment of for the Military for what we need today and hope it still works tomorrow when we need it.

Examples of this
Seaking helicopter, designed in the 1950s introduced into service in 1963, still flying today
CF18  designed in the 1970s flown first time in 1978, into service 1983 still flying today
CH 47 designed 1960, many upgrades and redesigns and entered Canadian service for the second time in 2013
CH 146 designed the 80s, first flew 1992, entered service 1995, service life planned to 2021, maybe 2025
F35, designed and planned in 2000s, first flight 2006, life span unknown
C 130  designed in the 1960s again and various upgrades been in the manufacturing for over 50 years. Canada did buy  upgrades and kept some of the older airframes for search and rescue.
Canadians seem to forget that equipment purchased for one generation is going to be still in service for the next 2 generations of soldiers at least. 

We do this with aircraft, tanks, trucks, jeeps, howizters, and even small arms.
Now the F 35 if that is the air frame that is going to replace the CF 18, and was put into service today at midnight. How long will it be flying for till we look at a replacement plan for it?  CF 18 has been flying for 32 years now, F 35 if we got into service today, it would be 2047 if they get 32 years of service from it. We do not know what  the needs will be that far into the future. How many generations of pilots and service crews will be working on this air frame.  20 years is a long career I am guessing, so we will at least 2 generations of pilots flying this air frame. Most likely a 3rd will start the road to flying it and might make the switch to the new aircraft. 

If we get the F 35, it will be the all job tasking air craft, fighter, recon, and bomber and close air support air craft. We need an aircraft that will last till when the government decides we need something new and shiny again.


----------



## daftandbarmy

FormerHorseGuard said:
			
		

> Examples of this
> Seaking helicopter, designed in the 1950s introduced into service in 1963, still flying today
> CF18  designed in the 1970s flown first time in 1978, into service 1983 still flying today
> CH 47 designed 1960, many upgrades and redesigns and entered Canadian service for the second time in 2013
> CH 146 designed the 80s, first flew 1992, entered service 1995, service life planned to 2021, maybe 2025
> F35, designed and planned in 2000s, first flight 2006, life span unknown
> C 130  designed in the 1960s again and various upgrades been in the manufacturing for over 50 years.
> _*Daftandbarmy*_



There, FTFY  ;D


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Loachman said:
			
		

> And emergency responses can be practised in simulators that cannot be practised in a real aircraft, as they are either too dangerous or the emergency cannot be simulated in the real aircraft. There are other benefits, too, from relatively simple but networked systems - multi-aircraft tactical missions can be planned to the same degree whether the mission is conducted in the real aircraft or in simulators. There is little transferable flying skill involved, but more missions can be run in a shorter period at much lower cost,  and none are subject to the vagaries of serviceability or weather. The main intent is to confirm planning and orders and inter-crew communications and co-operation.



We have a few options for 'simulation' in the CP140 world like other sim's, which can exercise the entire aircrew at once, partial task trainers, flight-deck specific, stuff that can be done while airborne.  As sim's improve, so do the resulting training.  It allows very flexible CRM trg, SA, mission-specific etc options in any weather and 'YFR' environment.


----------



## Baz

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> We have a few options for 'simulation' in the CP140 world like other sim's, which can exercise the entire aircrew at once, partial task trainers, flight-deck specific, stuff that can be done while airborne.  As sim's improve, so do the resulting training.  It allows very flexible CRM trg, SA, mission-specific etc options in any weather and 'YFR' environment.



Battle Management aircraft (MPAs, AWACS, JSTARS, advanced MH) have significantly different simulator requirements then other aircraft; the mission Sims can stand somewhat alone from the flight Sims, although the more tactical missions (eg ASW) tend to require a good representation of what the flight deck does.  Less experienced pilots from other communities don't seem to understand these aircraft are quite focused on the back end  ( the last Comd RCAF didn't understand it at all, except maybe in the context of AWACS).

I think this is where the F-35 is a game changer.  The networking, sensors, and displays allows all the aircraft to become a battle management team, much like Link has between ships.   That means it should be much more effective at putting the right thing at the right place and time, especially when other Battle management assets aren't present.  Thought: will it replace the need for AWACS by putting the battle managers in the cockpit?

Right now, it's the only real game in town for that as far as I'm concerned; the advantages of building it from the ground up are very real.  The RCAF has done a horrible job of explaining it though; statements like we really need it because of what it can do, but I'm not going to tell you what that is because it's classified are not acceptable, not.only are they condescending but it's their money.

My opinion is that it's going to force a basic question in airpower with the emergence of bandwidth as one of the most important resources in battle (allowing sensor information to be passed in fused): centralized or decentralized.  In the simplest explanation, centralized is the AWACS model of everything to a central control hub, decentralized is the F-35 model at its logical full implementation of every node a control hub.  Tactically, UAVS are just sensor (and possibly weapon) extensions of this network; the control hubs are still required (we're a long way from allowing machines to decide when we kill someone, and I think morally we need to stay there).  Notice these are control hubs that are decentralized; centralized command is still required.

Training wise, the end case models represent two different requirements: the decentralized version requires less people (no dedicated control hubs) but more training for each, centralized requires more people,  but each has less tasks so less training.

The overall answer to these questions will determine if the next fighter (or closer to my roots next MH) will be manned...


----------



## Colin Parkinson

But how long will the F-35 hold this technological edge? Sensors, computers, RAM, memory are all getting cheaper, smaller, less power hungry and more reliable. You can be sure the Chinese are working hard to get (by any means) and replicate this edge. So once the F35 meets a similar equipped opponent, what else does it bring to the fight? (I neither a hater or a fanboy of the F35 for the record)


----------



## SupersonicMax

It will still be better off than a 4th Gen .


----------



## Edward Campbell

Re: all the fancy simulators. I agree with Chris they ought to be appearing, in quantity, on every base, station, garrison, school, reserve naval division and militia armoury ... and each must be accompanies by the right supply, support and maintenance contracts and/or the detachments of CF technicians needed to keep them running.


----------



## Baz

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> It will still be better off than a 4th Gen .



I actually agree, as I said so much effort has been put into it that it's the only game in town... but somebody needs to explain it to the people that have to pay for it why that's important...


----------



## Kirkhill

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Re: all the fancy simulators. I agree with Chris they ought to be appearing, in quantity, on every base, station, garrison, school, reserve naval division and militia armoury ... and each must be accompanies by the right supply, support and maintenance contracts and/or the detachments of CF technicians needed to keep them running.



The neat thing is that the first two "simulators" I posted are actually the real-time workstations for the NASAMS GBAD system and the Reaper UAV.

The fact that the "missiles" and "UAVs" are not at the other end of the "phone" is apparently immaterial.  Nor is the length of the "wire".


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Not much sense if putting a UAV GCS 'simulator' in place if you don't actually have any AUVs though is there.  Echo that statement for any of the above pictures sim's that we don't have now and aren't expecting to have in the next 2+ years.  Put the money into improving the ones we have now and getting ones for the systems coming online in the very near future... :2c:.

FWIW, I have heard zero chatter about needing payload op's in units in Canada; and even less about Canada having its own UAV in the next 2-4 years.


----------



## Kirkhill

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Not much sense if putting a UAV GCS 'simulator' in place if you don't actually have any AUVs though is there.  Echo that statement for any of the above pictures sim's that we don't have now and aren't expecting to have in the next 2+ years.  Put the money into improving the ones we have now and getting ones for the systems coming online in the very near future... :2c:.
> 
> FWIW, I have heard zero chatter about needing payload op's in units in Canada; and even less about Canada having its own UAV in the next 2-4 years.



EITS......

All it wants is a plan, a concept, a vision... a flaming target.  >


----------



## Eye In The Sky

And all it doesn't have is a little thing called "funding".   ^-^


----------



## Kirkhill

With respect to the funding/vision thing:

The generalized use of simulators down to every garrison and armoury impacts on the size of the training bill, the size of the training staff, command and control in the CAF, comms, netting, and the way the CAF fights.

In a world of google glasses and every weapon with a scope/screen attached, and 20,000 people playing Halo while another 50,000 play COD and god knows how many others playing WOT etc.  the technology is already there.  Security issues need to be addressed - but that was/is true for radios, heliographs and semaphore.  Ruggedness issues need to be addressed but I have faith that you will figure out ways to break anything that is fielded in any event.

In the mean time even if the early effort is focused on "training only" solutions at the armoury floor the Command, Control, Communications and Networking dollars spent will likely be indistinguishable from the CCC and Networking dollars spent from the operational budget.  The Upper Management HMIs will all look and work the same.  The Data management will be the same in both cases. The only question will be the nature of the sensors and the operators - are they spoofed, are they directly connected, are they man-in-the-loop or are they autonomous operators reporting in by voice?

I could easily see the day where Command pods like the GBAD one, or even the Reaper one, shown were cropping up everywhere.  If one Command HMI pod were in common use then training, ops, maintenance and the budget would all benefit.  

If you can get three or four pods to every armoury then adding in a few for a new overseas deployment would be a dawdle.

And if you used a common architecture for a naval CIC as for the land forces, and you accepted that command is command then you would impact on the deployable footprint of HQs.

If each 2-person Command Pod is optimized to report one up, and controlling 2 to 5 subordinates then your Command training becomes standardized and simplified - and secured due to the redundancies associated with nodal networking.

Once the upper management level is fixed (both cured and standardized) then the lower levels become easier.  And plugging in operators (flyers, tankers, recce troopers, sailors, gunners, mortars, mgs, snipers and assaulters) all become easy.  Most of the systems necessary exist.

The impact, I believe (opinion I stress), the impact would be across the board. Mechanical systems that wear out during training would be conserved.  Training would become closer to real world training.  Actual vehicles and weapons would be concentrated at training nodes and points of departure to be issued as required. (And complaints about weapons not properly cleaned on return should be dealt with by the summary firing of Sergeants Major until cleaning improves - maintenance will just have to suck up the rest - but their numbers should be concentrated in fewer locations managing fewer systems and with clear distinctions between deployable vehicles and weapons and training vehicles and weapons).

And people would start asking: "why do I need so many pods to relay instructions between me in Ottawa and Bloggins in Kinshasa when I can see what he sees and hear his call for fire support and I know I have 4x F35s, and a dozen missiles in VLS cells off shore that I can vector to his assistance?"

Give the job to Sony and have them build it around the Xbox system.  Two operators in a seacan with an Xbox, two wide screen tvs, a pair of La-Z-Boys and a coffee maker.

They can then start plugging in F-35s, M777s, Leopards, Mortars and C6/7/8/9s.

And as a side benefit - If the module is standardized across ABCA then Canadians could stand a shift while Aussie and Brit Reaper operators get their heads down. 

That's what I meant by a plan, a concept, a vision - a flaming target.  Something to aim for.  

Edit: By the way, modelling on the basis of 1 and 4 yields this:

CDS - 1
Chiefs - 4
Groups - 16
Units      - 64
Sub-Units - 256
Sub-Sub-Units - 1024
Sections           - 4096
Dets/Tms           - 16384
Troops                 - 65536

Adjust according to practical and budgetary demands.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I for one (and maybe it is just me), don't support investing a whole lot of money on the PRES for simulators; sorry it is just that money can be better used on people and units who are part of the Reg Force.  I don't see the cost benefit of these systems for armouries where they might get used a handful of times each year.  In those cases, centralize the system like they do in Knox or something and have people go there to use them.

There was talk years and years ago about putting Coyote turret sim's at PRES Armd Recce units; it never happened and likely for the same reasons/concerns I mentioned above.  I train in sim's now and they are not cheap or simple.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

there are different levels for sims, one like Steel beast Pro can work with the full meal deal cockpit or a regular destop PC. It is about what you wish to train for. at my armoury we had a room turned into a "puff table" for training OP's. We also had the 14.5mm arty sim as well, mind you only got used once in my time. much of the training was "dry heaves" which really is a reality based extension of the Sim. the SB Pro sim allows for tactical training for the officers to get them used to handling multiple and varied units, plus resources.


----------



## Kirkhill

Signs of change in procurement?  Asking for answers to the question: "What can you do with what is available?"



> Goldfein said it is important to note, “This isn’t a competition, it’s an experiment.”
> 
> “*We’re going to do this experiment and see what’s out there,* and I’m expecting many of the companies to come forward,” he said.
> 
> Brig. Gen. Edward Thomas, director of Air Force public affairs, said Goldfein — who hasn’t officially signed off on the experiment, dubbed OA-X — “believes it does make sense to look at opportunities to provide a … cheaper, attack-type aircraft that can do the close-air support mission, that other countries, allies, can fly also. And do this in a way that doesn’t require an F-22 or an F-35 over a permissive environment,” he said, mentioning Iraq and Afghanistan.
> 
> With the current budget, “I don’t believe there is anything specifically programmed for it right now,” Thomas said, noting the experiment is in its early stages and doesn’t have any funding attached.
> 
> The additional light attack aircraft — which would not replace the service’s beloved A-10 Warthog — “would relieve the pressure on other aircraft, maintenance crews, [and] it would give us some turning space with our other combat platforms,” Thomas said.
> 
> In September, Holmes told Defense News that a less expensive aircraft could help the service alleviate the strain of maintaining its infrastructure, growing and training new pilot ranks, and adding more resources while simultaneously contributing to ongoing conflicts.
> 
> “We don’t think it would cost a lot of money, and *it’s designed just to help us get our arms around [questions like], ‘What can you actually do? Does it actually contribute? Can it survive in different threat environments?’ ”* Holmes said at the time.



http://www.defensetech.org/2017/01/19/air-force-eyes-low-cost-fighter-experiment/


----------



## MarkOttawa

More at AvWeek:



> U.S. Air Force Chief Backs Idea Of Low-Cost Fighter Fleet
> 
> The U.S. Air Force chief of staff endorses the idea of buying 300 low-cost, light-attack fighters for counterterrorism missions as a “great idea.”
> 
> Gen. David Goldfein is already preparing to talk with industry about engaging companies such as Textron, which makes the Scorpion light attack fighter. The dates are still to be determined, but after a talk at the American Enterprise Institute Jan. 18, Goldfein said he may begin to “experiment” with commercial off-the-shelf designs for light fighters as soon as this spring.
> 
> In a white paper out this week [ http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/25bff0ec-481e-466a-843f-68ba5619e6d8/restoring-american-power-7.pdf ], Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggested that in addition to using the A-10 for close air support, the Air Force should buy 300 light-attack fighters. They could help perform close air support and other missions where air defenses are not a problem and help bring pilots up to speed. “The Air Force could procure the first 200 of these aircraft by fiscal year 2022,” the paper says.
> 
> It is not the first time that top Air Force officials have mentioned the idea. In July, officials discussed the possibility of an “OA-X” program to supplement the service’s light attack force. Sierra Nevada’s A-29 Super Tucano and the Beechcraft AT-6 Wolverine were mentioned as possible platforms...
> http://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-chief-backs-idea-low-cost-fighter-fleet



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Loachman

Others can dabble with limited-capability niche aircraft as much as they wish. We cannot afford the luxury.


----------



## Good2Golf

I can hear the carbon-fibre wing spar splintering from here when it takes a round or two in the seized-rotor...  :blotto:


----------



## Kirkhill

Loachman said:
			
		

> Others can dabble with limited-capability niche aircraft as much as they wish. We cannot afford the luxury.



I don't disagree on that Loachman.  I find it curious that, for a change, they seem to be trying something other than writing an encyclopedia of specifications then waiting 20 years for somebody to build it for them.

As to the utility of the craft - if nothing else they can use it as a trainer and see how close to the frontline their pilots want to fly it.   Especially attractive if it keeps the price of gas down and reduces the hours on the "front line" 3rd, 4th and 5th generation fleets.

Meanwhile G2G - is there a difference in sound between seized carbon-fibre and flung carbon-fibre?  ;D


----------



## Loachman

"They" can do whatever they want. _*We*_ cannot afford a small fleet of less-than-fully capable niche aircraft.

We would still need to house them and train and maintain people to fly, fix, and support them, and those people and that money would have to come out of some other capability's budget. It's not worth the cost.


----------



## Journeyman

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> I can hear the carbon-fibre wing spar splintering from here when it takes a round or two...


At the risk of giving anyone ideas, wasn't that a benefit of the Hawker Hurricane?  The doped canvas could be repaired at the airdrome while the Spitfires, with their alloy monocoque fuselages, had to be trucked away for repairs.


----------



## Kirkhill

Loachman said:
			
		

> "They" can do whatever they want. _*We*_ cannot afford a small fleet of less-than-fully capable niche aircraft.
> 
> We would still need to house them and train and maintain people to fly, fix, and support them, and those people and that money would have to come out of some other capability's budget. It's not worth the cost.



Again, not disagreeing.  The RCAF is in a different situation than the USAF, or even the RAF.


----------



## YZT580

Perhaps if we were budgeting closer to the 2% we would be discussing this from the viewpoint of "Do we need this capability?" rather than rejecting it because of budgetary constraints.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

YZT580 said:
			
		

> Perhaps if we were budgeting closer to the 2% we would be discussing this from the viewpoint of "Do we need this capability?" rather than rejecting it because of budgetary constraints.



If that was the case, we should be looking at expanding and replacing the LRP fleet before getting play fighters.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> At the risk of giving anyone ideas, wasn't that a benefit of the Hawker Hurricane?  The doped canvas could be repaired at the airdrome while the Spitfires, with their alloy monocoque fuselages, had to be trucked away for repairs.


Hence the term "100 mph tape"?


----------



## NavyShooter

*OK, outside my lanes here as a sailor, and open for correction...my coffee index is not high enough yet today*

Bringing in the Scorpion wouldn't so much be a 'niche' fleet, it'd be able to replace some of what we already have.

Think in terms of replacing the Hawk and Tutor fleets.

Interweb info tells me that the Hawks have been in service since 2000, with a fleet of between 16 and 22 airframes.

Tutors have been in service since 1962, only flying with the Snowbirds now, with 24 airframes.

Suppose we took those 40-46 airframes, combined into one airframe (Scorpion.)  

There's enough life in the Hawks that they could be sold off for some cost recovery/offset, you have a standardized training and flight display team airframe, and while it's not a fighter, the Scorpion can carry out some air-to-mud training, along with ISR.  

Your personnel training/qualification load goes down because you are reducing the types of airframes.  Your parts inventory can go down because we're no longer trying to keep 54 year old aircraft in the air.  

If we were looking at a 'show the flag' capability with basic air-to-mud ability, the Scorpion could do that too, so maybe an extra 16-20 for a single squadron to 'bridge the gap'?  

[\cynicism]

Or, if we look at the "Interim buy" of the Super Hornets as being all we get for fighters for a long time....then a cynical person could suggest that having the single squadron of SH meets our 'basic' Air Defence requirements (and we can still use a 6-pack of them for expeditionary uses if necessary), so let's just replace all the other 188's with Scorpions, even though they are not air-to-air capable and pretend that our missions are covered off because we have enough airframes to do it.

If we bought 150 Scorpions for the Training/Air Demo/Show Flag roles, and maintained 20 Super Hornets for real Air Defence and Expeditionary Missions, that'd be a HUGE cost savings, an 'out' for the government of the day.  All they'd have to do would be to clearly define the Expeditionary role requirement and North American Air Defence roles in a new white paper.  

They could point at the numbers and say "Look, new planes" and the average member of the general public will nod and accept that the fancy new jets meet Canada's needs.  Even though they don't.

[/cynicism]


----------



## Bearpaw

Perhaps the Korean KAI T-50 Golden Eagle with engine upgraded to  General Electric F414-EPE
could better serve as a combined fighter-trainer and light ground attack aircraft.  They would likely cost
about $30M.airframe.

Bearpaw


----------



## YZT580

Bearpaw said:
			
		

> Perhaps the Korean KAI T-50 Golden Eagle with engine upgraded to  General Electric F414-EPE
> could better serve as a combined fighter-trainer and light ground attack aircraft.  They would likely cost
> about $30M.airframe.
> 
> Bearpaw


There are lurkers on this website, wouldn't it be wise not to give them too many bad ideas!!! [


----------



## SeaKingTacco

The flaw in all this musing about the Scorpion is that we (the CF) does not own the Hawk. Our contractor in Moose Jaw does. The contractor provides jets, parts and technicians to the CF for a price.

So, if you want Sqns of Scorpions for the RCAF, what are you prepared to give up? Because PYs are a zero sum game in the CF and no HQ ever shut itself down to provide PYs for a new capability....


----------



## QV

From someone who knows nothing about air combat power let me say this; the thought of our country only having 18 "real" fighters (and SH at that) as well as a bunch of those cheaper far less capable aircrafts is scary.  Potemkin village indeed.


----------



## SupersonicMax

NavyShooter:  how do you plan to maintain our NORAD commitment and have a deployable force in case of major conflict?


----------



## Good2Golf

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Meanwhile G2G - is there a difference in sound between seized carbon-fibre and flung carbon-fibre?  ;D



Primary sound likely the same.  The secondary 'thump' at the AGI* may sound a bit different, though.



			
				SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> The flaw in all this musing about the Scorpion is that we (the CF) does not own the Hawk. Our contractor in Moose Jaw does. The contractor provides jets, parts and technicians to the CF for a price.
> 
> So, if you want Sqns of Scorpions for the RCAF, what are you prepared to give up? Because PYs are a zero sum game in the CF and no HQ ever shut itself down to provide PYs for a new capability....



Perhaps they could redirect the as-yet-not-approved PYs for the 5th fighter squadron for the SHs? ;D

Cheers,
G2G


*AGI: 'air-ground interface'


----------



## NavyShooter

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> NavyShooter:  how do you plan to maintain our NORAD commitment and have a deployable force in case of major conflict?



Hi Max,

I'm not suggesting that it's what the CAF wants, or that it would meet our current requirements (or at least I'm not meaning to if it read that way) what I am suggesting is that since the public is not bought in on the need for F-35's, if the government presents another 'solution' that sounds good, the general public would probably accept it.  (Mostly I think because they don't understand the benefits of the Sensor Fusion capabilities and the networked battlespace that the F-35 provides.) 

Really, Joe Q public isn't going to really know the difference between a light fighter/trainer and a real fighter, they see a grey, sleek airframe with a Maple Leaf in a roundel.  

If the Government says:

_"We're buying a few more of a less capable aircraft for a LOT less money, it lets us consolidate 3 different types of aircraft, and because they're less expensive it means we can keep our campaign promise to put money into the NSP, but the Super Hornets will cover 'enough' of our mission capability requirements for NATO/Expeditionary that we'll be OK in the long run." _ 

Is the average Canadian Citizen in the 'heartlands' of Toronto, or Vancouver going to argue?  

Nope.  And that's the problem.  The 'obvious' technical advantages of the F-35 as a 5th generation aircraft make a lot of sense, but the public doesn't understand the capability well enough to embrace it.  

If the 'sale' to the public was done right, we'd end up with our wings clipped, our capabilities gutted, and all the public would know was that we *saved money*, got *MORE* airplanes, (they're grey, and look fast, right?) and the government kept their promise to fund the ships with the savings....

Plausible?  Yup.

Desirable?  Nope.

NS


----------



## suffolkowner

Is there any benefit to the light fighter/trainer approach though? (minus the leasing part of the equation)
Would it be that difficult to maintain armed versions of our Hawks/Harvards?

assuming new brighter government, bigger budget

F-35
T-X
harvard/tucano

would it be cheaper to run predators for that CAS/COIN role in permissive environments?


----------



## Kirkhill

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> The flaw in all this musing about the Scorpion is that we (the CF) does not own the Hawk. Our contractor in Moose Jaw does. The contractor provides jets, parts and technicians to the CF for a price.
> 
> So, if you want Sqns of Scorpions for the RCAF, what are you prepared to give up? Because PYs are a zero sum game in the CF and no HQ ever shut itself down to provide PYs for a new capability....



At risk of adding oxygen.... (never stopped me in the past)

If we are paying a company, any company to supply a service for a couple of decades, we are paying them to buy the equipment they use.  It just doesn't get managed through our procurement process.  And that is a major plus.

But... having said that... if we could figure out how to purchase/lease/rent/procure kit effectively (stop laughing).... if we could figure that out, Navy Shooter's suggestion on the Hawk-Tutor thing is defensible.  I wouldn't go so far as to bring it into the SH/F35 discussion though.  And I don't disagree with EITS on the value (unexploited) of the LRPA.  

With respect to the PYs - somebody is already supplying the PYs - either service or private contractor.  Is their any reason why, instead of the student riding in the contractor's plane the contractor couldn't ride in a government plane?  Or support the government plane on the ground?


----------



## Loachman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> if we could figure that out, Navy Shooter's suggestion on the Hawk-Tutor thing is defensible.



No, it is not, on any grounds.

There are cheaper ways to convert fuel into noise - and that is all that would be accomplished by buying aircraft that have little to no combat viability and effect.


----------



## Kirkhill

Loachman - Harvards, Tutors and Hawks are not considered combat viable in Canada (well, to be fair the Tutor isn't combat capable anywhere),  but Harvards and Hawks are armed in other Air Forces.  And I doubt if the Hawk is much different in price than this Scorpion thingy.

I do not challenge the need to focus on the CF18 replacement - and I support purchasing the F35.   But the RCAF, even the fixed wing branch, has other aircraft that need replacing.  Don't they?  

If there is a price saving to be had in purchasing non-combat capable trainer and the training value is equal then I am all for minimizing that expenditure to maximize the front line effort.  

But....

If there is minimal difference in price between a platform on which you can attach weapons and one which you can't, couldn't it be considered?


----------



## SupersonicMax

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Loachman - Harvards, Tutors and Hawks are not considered combat viable in Canada (well, to be fair the Tutor isn't combat capable anywhere)



Il all fairness, the Malaysians bought Tutors to use as Air-to-Surface Attack aircraft


----------



## Loachman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Loachman - Harvards, Tutors and Hawks are not considered combat viable in Canada (well, to be fair the Tutor isn't combat capable anywhere),  but Harvards and Hawks are armed in other Air Forces.  And I doubt if the Hawk is much different in price than this Scorpion thingy.



We do not own the Harvards and Hawks. The Tutors will eventually be replaced, yes, but most likely with the cheapest jet trainer that can be found/bought from Bombardier.

What military organization of significance uses Hawk as a combat aircraft? We had a CAS aircraft at one time that was described as "an excellent aircraft if you wanted to bomb the end of your own runway". That was the CF5. Payload or fuel, but not much of both.

"Cheap" aircraft are not so cheap when one has to factor in cost of more aircraft to drop the same number of bombs as one "pricey" one, the cost of more personnel to fly and maintain the additional aircraft, the hangar costs to house the additional aircraft, and the cost in lives and mission failure if we ever have to use them for real.

Stop thinking about airframes and think, instead, of the desired operational effect and then look for the best method of achieving it.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I do not challenge the need to focus on the CF18 replacement - and I support purchasing the F35.   But the RCAF, even the fixed wing branch, has other aircraft that need replacing.  Don't they?



Neither Scorpion nor Hawk can carry enough cargo or people or ASW kit or SAR Techs or fly far enough or hover.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> If there is minimal difference in price between a platform on which you can attach weapons and one which you can't, couldn't it be considered?



There is more involved than simply "attaching weapons". Are the weapons that can be attached actually useful? Can enough be carried? Can they be carried far enough? Can they be delivered accurately? Can the machine survive in combat? What will our allies think and say? Do we want to be perceived by allies and potential enemies as a serious force or not? Why waste the money?



			
				SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Il all fairness, the Malaysians bought Tutors to use as Air-to-Surface Attack aircraft



They bought four, which could each carry two small bombs and were used for counter-insurgency for twenty years. Not really what I would consider to be a "combat" aircraft".

Three of these were eventually registered in the US by civilians, but I've never seen any indication of them flying (nor have I looked for such).


----------



## Kirkhill

I'm gonna stop.  Honest I am.

I didn't want this to become about the aircraft.  I was just curious about the procurement thought process that allows for purchasing kit that "might come in handy" to see what can be done with it operationally.   That was it.  Full stop.

I am not promoting the cause of a light attack craft.  That doesn't mean that I think it is wrong for some to suggest there are benefits.

But.....

Before I go

From Wiki



> Hawk 200[edit]
> Main article: British Aerospace Hawk 200
> 
> Hawk 208 of the Royal Malaysian Air Force
> The Hawk 200 is a single-seat, lightweight multi-role combat aircraft for air defence, air-denial, anti-shipping, interdiction, close air support, and ground attack.[27]
> 
> Hawk 203 – Export version for the Royal Air Force of Oman. (12)
> Hawk 205 – Proposed export version for the Royal Saudi Air Force.
> Hawk 208 – Export version for the Royal Malaysian Air Force. (18)
> Hawk 209 – Export version for the Indonesian Air Force. (32)



Apparently something over 1000 have been built - including 221 for the USN as trainers - and at least some of the clients have attached weapons and used them to "supplement" front line capability.  Indonesia, Malaysia and Zimbabwe (smile if you want) have considered and/or employed them as "combat" aircraft.  Finland bought them as trainers to employ them as fighters (ducking under the terms of a 1947 treaty with the USSR) and the RAF employed some between 83 and 88 as short range interceptors.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAE_Systems_Hawk#United_Kingdom

Again, I am not promoting.  Neither the Hawk, nor the Scorpion, nor the role.

I am intrigued by the concept of buy and then try.

And just a final point.  We may not own the Harvards and the Hawks - but we certainly paid for them.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> The flaw in all this musing about the Scorpion is that we (the CF) does not own the Hawk. Our contractor in Moose Jaw does. The contractor provides jets, parts and technicians to the CF for a price.
> 
> So, if you want Sqns of Scorpions for the RCAF, what are you prepared to give up? Because PYs are a zero sum game in the CF and no HQ ever shut itself down to provide PYs for a new capability....



Perhaps a replacement that the RCAF owns and the contractor operates and maintains, that has hard points and also replaces the Tutor. Which would reduce both the types of airframes, training and parts. Having ownership means that if you decide to do something offensive with them, you can, particularly if support for them including outside of the country as required is written into the contract.


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> Perhaps a replacement that the RCAF owns and the contractor operates and maintains, that has hard points and also replaces the Tutor. Which would reduce both the types of airframes, training and parts. Having ownership means that if you decide to do something offensive with them, you can, particularly if support for them including outside of the country as required is written into the contract.



I think for a military as small as our own, getting as many multi-platform aircraft to cut down on the total types of fleets has marit. Having a low cost jet trainer that could be brought into a CAS role for operations where there is little to no GBAD present could be beneficial. However I'm a ground walker, not a pilot or a airforce expert, my knowledge goes as far as reading Canadian defense review and other media sources.


----------



## Loachman

Changing rank insignia again would be cheaper and more worthwhile than wasting millions/billions on a cheap aircraft that has no battlefield utility.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Loachman said:
			
		

> Changing rank insignia again would be cheaper and more worthwhile than wasting millions/billions on a cheap aircraft that has no battlefield utility.



A Skyraider with a modern sensor pod and GPS would be fine in Mali or Afghanistan. All depends on who you are going to be fighting.


----------



## Old Sweat

I wonder. Is there more benefit in a "low and slow" platform or in a faster aircraft that can carry and launch smart ordnance that can be guided by the aircraft itself, another aircraft, manned or nor, or a ground observer depending upon the circumstances. Now add in that the faster aircraft can also perform a variety of "traditional" fast air functions.

Again, I am old, brown - except for the grey parts, and way behind the curve, but it seems to me that the day of the utility aircraft is in the past.


----------



## MarkOttawa

The Spad in Vietnam--now just give it a turboprop engine too:



> http://www.schifferbooks.com/the-a-1-skyraider-in-vietnam-the-spads-last-war-1593.html



More:



> Able Dog: Was the AD Skyraider the Best Attack Bomber Ever Built?
> http://www.historynet.com/able-dog-was-the-ad-skyraider-the-best-attack-bomber-ever-built.htm
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _A perfect example of this air-to-ground workhorse the Military Aviation Museum's impressive AD-4 Skyraider has gone from gate guard to airshow star._



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Loachman

What do we give up in order to buy a niche aircraft with limited capabilities?

What can it do that F35 cannot?

Modern munitions render the "need" to go low and slow, which is quite risky, obsolete.


----------



## MilEME09

Loachman said:
			
		

> What do we give up in order to buy a niche aircraft with limited capabilities?
> 
> What can it do that F35 cannot?
> 
> Modern munitions render the "need" to go low and slow, which is quite risky, obsolete.



My counter argument about modern munitions is cost, why drop a $25,000 JDAM from a $104 million aircraft (F-35) when you could do the job when a cheap CRV-7 rocket from a $20 million dollar plane (Textron scorpion) Again it is situation dependent but the costs do add up.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Why buy a specialized aircraft that can only operate in a very specific scenario (unopposed CAS)?  They would not have been used in Iraq (1990), Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011).  So, they would only have been used for a single operational deployment.  Bang for buck?


----------



## Kirkhill

Wiki, so suspect, but curious.



> NATO Flight Training in Canada (NFTC) is a military flight training program for NATO and allied air forces provided by the Canadian Forces.
> 
> Located at 2 Canadian Forces Flying Training School, 15 Wing, CFB Moose Jaw in Saskatchewan and 4 Wing, CFB Cold Lake in Alberta, the program is delivered as a cooperative operation between a civilian contractor, CAE Inc. (CAE Training Centres),[1] and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).
> 
> Two types of aircraft are flown at NFTC: the CT-156 Harvard II and the CT-155 Hawk. NFTC training consists of Phases II, III, and IV. Phase II is subdivided into IIA and IIB.
> 
> All pilots in the NFTC program undertake Phase IIA[2] (Basic Pilot Training), which consists of 95.1 flying hours on the CT-156 Harvard II. After Phase IIA, students are split into 3 streams: fast-jet trainees (future instructors and/or fighter pilots); multi-engine trainees; and helicopter trainees.
> 
> Those moving on to Phase III training on the Helicopter and Multi-Engine tracks go to 3 Canadian Forces Flying Training School in Manitoba. Those selected for the Fast Jet track complete Phase IIB (another 45 flying hours on the Harvard II). Fast-jet candidates then move on to Phase III in Moose Jaw (69.8 flying hours). At the completion of Phase III, pilots are awarded their Pilot's Wings (Canadian Forces Flying Badge).
> 
> Future fighter pilots move on to Phase IV, still on the Hawk, but now at 419 Tactical Fighter Training Squadron in Cold Lake. Phase IV consists of 48.9 flying hours. Successful graduates of Phase IV are then trained on the CF-18 Hornet (CF-188) at 410 Tactical Fighter Operational Training Squadron.
> 
> Division of responsibilities between DND (RCAF), CAE, and participating Air Forces is as follows:
> 
> RCAF: All in-aircraft flying instruction is given by military pilots from the Canadian Forces. DND oversees training standards, provides Canadian military trainees, provides airspace, and dictates the syllabus.
> 
> CAE: *The NFTC aircraft are owned by the Government of Canada, then leased to and maintained and serviced by CAE*. Academic and simulator instruction is given by CAE employees (who must have had previous military flying instruction experience). CAE also operates infrastructure (buildings) and provides food services.
> 
> Other participating Air Forces: International program management, foreign military flight instructors, foreign military students, quality control.




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Flying_Training_in_Canada
http://www.cae.com/defence-and-security/training-and-services/training-centres/NATO-flying-training-in-canada-NFTC/

Is that verifiable?


----------



## daftandbarmy

In comparison with peer/ near peer militaries our biggest capability gap in terms of close support must be the lack of an Apache, or Apache-like, attack helicopter. This should probably be our first step in closing any CAS type gaps.

Or am I wrong?


----------



## Loachman

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> My counter argument about modern munitions is cost, why drop a $25,000 JDAM from a $104 million aircraft (F-35) when you could do the job when a cheap CRV-7 rocket from a $20 million dollar plane (Textron scorpion) Again it is situation dependent but the costs do add up.



Because in a real war you can drop one JDAM from one well-protected aircraft and stand a better chance of hitting the target AND seeing both Pilot and aircraft returning home. And that aircraft can perform other tasks as well, including air-to-air.

The costs of buying more aircraft to deliver the same amount of weaponry onto a target also add up.

Replacing lost aircraft is more expensive than buying munitions. It also takes too much time to build replacements, and far too long to train replacement Pilots.

Funerals cost a lot more, and not just in monetary terms.

I - and many others here - went to more than enough ramp ceremonies and funerals over several years, hunted for the trigger men at the other end of the command wire, tried to keep people alive one way or another, grieved for friends and colleagues and strangers, and comforted families and, to me, at least, cheaping on equipment is false economy.

Another Site member here, during the planning phase for the first Stalwart Guardian exercise, articulated something that I had already long understood. He was discussing mundane things such as printers and photocopiers for Excon HQ, and stated, several times, "Don't make do". Don't buy the cheapest one available to save a few dollars, because it will fail. Buy the best available, because it will save money in the long run. I was a quality-over-quantity guy long before that, but PPCLI Guy had a better way of expressing it.

Modern aircraft can now, individually, do much more than hundreds of their predecessors could just a few decades ago, with a one-person crew vice a crew of ten (B17G).

The "cheap" aircraft will require larger fleets and more Pilots to do the same job at greater individual risk than a single F35. It is not worth the cost.

Cheap aircraft are fine for countries who only have to worry about insurgencies. They are not so fine for those flying close to Russia.

We still have to buy enough F35s for the hard jobs. A small, orphan fleet of semi-useless cheapies adds nothing, but takes away from something else.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Loachman said:
			
		

> Because in a real war you can drop one JDAM from one well-protected aircraft and stand a better chance of hitting the target AND seeing both Pilot and aircraft returning home. And that aircraft can perform other tasks as well, including air-to-air.
> 
> The costs of buying more aircraft to deliver the same amount of weaponry onto a target also add up.
> 
> Replacing lost aircraft is more expensive than buying munitions. It also takes too much time to build replacements, and far too long to train replacement Pilots.
> 
> Funerals cost a lot more, and not just in monetary terms.
> 
> I - and many others here - went to more than enough ramp ceremonies and funerals over several years, hunted for the trigger men at the other end of the command wire, tried to keep people alive one way or another, grieved for friends and colleagues and strangers, and comforted families and, to me, at least, cheaping on equipment is false economy.
> 
> Another Site member here, during the planning phase for the first Stalwart Guardian exercise, articulated something that I had already long understood. He was discussing mundane things such as printers and photocopiers for Excon HQ, and stated, several times, "Don't make do". Don't buy the cheapest one available to save a few dollars, because it will fail. Buy the best available, because it will save money in the long run. I was a quality-over-quantity guy long before that, but PPCLI Guy had a better way of expressing it.
> 
> Modern aircraft can now, individually, do much more than hundreds of their predecessors could just a few decades ago, with a one-person crew vice a crew of ten (B17G).
> 
> The "cheap" aircraft will require larger fleets and more Pilots to do the same job at greater individual risk than a single F35. It is not worth the cost.
> 
> Cheap aircraft are fine for countries who only have to worry about insurgencies. They are not so fine for those flying close to Russia.
> 
> We still have to buy enough F35s for the hard jobs. A small, orphan fleet of semi-useless cheapies adds nothing, but takes away from something else.



And there's fewer and fewer of us, people are not joining the military in sufficient numbers, and the ones that are left are (except for me of course  ) getting older and fatter.

Therefore: technology.

Future Soldiers: “The Few ...” Military Personnel Trends in the Developed World

High-Tech Militaries. Advanced militaries aggressively pursue cutting-edge technology—largely information-processing, but also precision-guided munitions. One significant impetus for this is the requirement to keep casualties low. Equally important, as recruiting pools grow shallower and qualified personnel more expensive, investment in technology enables militaries to substitute capital for labour.45 High-tech weapons (i.e., pilotless drones and cruise missiles) are more efficient than other means at projecting force to remote locations, while also limiting non-combatant casualties. They negate the need for large numbers of troops on the ground, and greatly reduce the hazards of combat for those who are deployed. Indeed, the transformation of the American military following the Vietnam War was predicated on just such strategic needs: “the need for power projection, quick wins, low casualties, and the flexibility to move from one theatre to another.”46

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no4/page12-eng.asp


----------



## Loachman

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> In comparison with peer/ near peer militaries our biggest capability gap in terms of close support must be the lack of an Apache, or Apache-like, attack helicopter. This should probably be our first step in closing any CAS type gaps.
> 
> Or am I wrong?



We should have Attack Helicopters, but they do not perform CAS. (The USMC did, many years ago, employ their Sea Cobras in a CAS-like role, but I do not know if they still do; the US Army acquired TOW long before the USMC did and that changed a lot.)

The term "Close Combat Attack" was coined for the theatre-specific tactics used by AHs and armed UHs in Afghanistan, and most likely Iraq. In a conventional war, AH units are treated as manoeuvre units.


----------



## Loachman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Wiki, so suspect, but curious.
> 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Flying_Training_in_Canada
> http://www.cae.com/defence-and-security/training-and-services/training-centres/NATO-flying-training-in-canada-NFTC/
> 
> Is that verifiable?



Is it relevant?

Only if you advocate stealing trainers to send to war.

If so, how do you continue to train Pilots if their training aircraft have left? Do you expect Instructors to maintain proficiency in the CAS role as well as instruct? That may be possible, but it is far from practical.

Buy trainers to train.

Buy combat aircraft to fight.

Far simpler.

Far more effective.

Stryker MGS costs less per unit than Leopards as well. Does anybody here think that acquiring a bunch of them instead of tanks makes sense?


----------



## dimsum

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I wonder. Is there more benefit in a "low and slow" platform or in a faster aircraft that can carry and launch smart ordnance that can be guided by the aircraft itself, another aircraft, manned or nor, or a ground observer depending upon the circumstances. Now add in that the faster aircraft can also perform a variety of "traditional" fast air functions.
> 
> Again, I am old, brown - except for the grey parts, and way behind the curve, but it seems to me that the day of the utility aircraft is in the past.



Or, an aircraft built to take a bunch of stand-off weapons (not fitted, but still possible), loitering behind the FLOT and lobbing them in either self-designated or from other aircraft closer to the fight.  Wonder if we have any of those kicking around?


----------



## Loachman

Put a 40mm gun in the nose and you could take out tanks, too - one per aircraft.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Why buy a specialized aircraft that can only operate in a very specific scenario (unopposed CAS)?  They would not have been used in Iraq (1990), Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011).  So, they would only have been used for a single operational deployment.  Bang for buck?



Is quite possible that we will be involved in several wars with opponents who have little or no Manpads or aircraft. I would like 80 or so top line aircraft, but if we are not getting enough and we can supplement them with lesser aircraft at a significant savings and then have enough airframes to meet all obligation and preserve the flying hours of the top line aircraft for their primary role using aircraft that can function both as operational trainer (for maintaining flight proficiency and conducting exercises) and conduct operational missions in these permissive environments then I am for it. The reality is that there may not be enough money to buy the aircraft you want to fly or to few of them, in which case the resource needs to be husbanded carefully.


----------



## Good2Golf

There is also a case for not over-doing commonality.  An RCN comprised of 24 frigates an NO other ships wouldn't be practical.  A Canadian Army with 500 Leopard 2s and no other vehicles wouldn't be practical.  Extremes, yes, but one should not discount the potential of an appropriately layered "air effects" portfolio.

:2c:

Regards
G2G


----------



## daftandbarmy

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> There is also a case for not over-doing commonality.  An RCN comprised of 24 frigates an NO other ships wouldn't be practical.  A Canadian Army with 500 Leopard 2s and no other vehicles wouldn't be practical.  Extremes, yes, but one should not discount the potential of an appropriately layered "air effects" portfolio.
> 
> :2c:
> 
> Regards
> G2G



Hmmm.... sounds amazingly like one of those 'Principles of War' things... like 'Flexibility' or something


----------



## Eye In The Sky

"Flexibility is the key to air power, and indecision is the key to flexibility".   ;D


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Or, an aircraft built to take a bunch of stand-off weapons (not fitted, but still possible), loitering behind the FLOT and lobbing them in either self-designated or from other aircraft closer to the fight.  Wonder if we have any of those kicking around?



Others have done it with success and with smaller, older platforms...

First Air Strike with GBU-12 Against ISIL in Iraq for French Navy ATL2 Maritime Patrol Aircraft


----------



## MarkOttawa

Air Tractor AT-802 anyone ?



> http://militaryedge.org/armaments/at-802u/



Official site (note 8,000 lb load): 



> http://802u.com/



Latest:



> Sale of Air Tractors to Kenya Approved
> http://www.monch.com/mpg/news/11-air/674-sale-of-air-tractors-to-kenya-approved.html



The new Sturmovik?



> http://military-historian.squarespace.com/archive-1/2016/6/22/tools-of-war-the-il-2-shturmovik



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Colin Parkinson

As I recall the Sturmovik was exceptional well armoured for it's day. For an amateur like myself, I divide aircraft engaging the enemy ground forces into 2 groups. Air Support which is bombing/missiles from altitude from any number of different airframes. The other is Close Air Support which would be gun runs, low altitude bombing and rockets/missiles from jet/turboprop or rotary. The type of airframes for the latter definitely more niche, like the A-10, AT-102, Super Turanco, Kiowa and the Griffon (a real case of working with what you got). The threats to these aircraft are different as well. Frankly dropping bombs from altitude in a permissive environment does not require a F35, just a bomb truck with good payload, networked and good loiter time. 
With the small numbers of F35's we may be getting is it really a good idea to use them for dropping bombs on a goat herder with a AKM/RPG? I don't see the RCAF doing gun runs with their F35 or any fighter we get in small numbers and risk getting a 23mm lucky BB in the wrong place. The real question is the client (army) happy with that solution?


----------



## Loachman

It is the _*effect*_ that is important, _*not*_ the means to deliver it. Why is everybody getting hung up on the means?

We have moved on from horse-mounted cavalry and massed archery as well.

_*Technology has advanced*_, and low-and-slow is _*no longer required*_ to put bombs and missiles on target with incredible accuracy. Gun runs are _*no longer required*_.

Close Air Support is _*not*_ a helicopter function.

All sorts of aircraft - including B1s - were used to drop bombs on insurgents in Afghanistan - lots of good experience for everyone (except for the insurgent who made poor life choices). Bombs (and Hellfire, especially with thermobaric warheads, launched from helicopters or Predator/Reaper) may be expensive, but, again, they are effective, cheaper than replacing a LAV, and infinitely preferable to paying for funerals and lifetimes of medical care.

Troops are happy to see targets blow up. That is all that counts. Sure, the A10 airshow is fun, but an A10 has no greater ability than any other suitably-equipped and suitably-armed machine, and would be very vulnerable in a major war these days. Even in the Good Old Days of the Cold War, I was sceptical of their ability to survive given the tactics that I saw over three years in Germany.

Pilots for F35s and jazzed-up crop dusters will still be paid the same, except one of those Pilots will be able to deliver a greater quantity of munitions at longer ranges in both permissive and _*non-permissive *_environments, cover the air-to-air role, and stand a much better chance of ultimately collecting a pension.

We would still need the minimum number (either the Conservative sixty-five or the sudden and unexpected Liberal ninety-five) fully-capable fighters to cover NORAD and NATO high-threat scenarios, so these limited-value machines would represent an increased cost in aircraft and infrastructure and an increased manning requirement. PYs are fixed, so those would have to come out of somebody else's hide, and that hide is not going to be an HQ or badge/hat designer, as those are too-high priorities.

I would not even trade real fighters for AHs, which would be of far, far greater value than replica Sturmoviks, Skyraiders. cropdusters, and other assorted putt-putts.


----------



## GR66

Loachman said:
			
		

> It is the _*effect*_ that is important, _*not*_ the means to deliver it. Why is everybody getting hung up on the means?
> 
> We have moved on from horse-mounted cavalry and massed archery as well.
> 
> _*Technology has advanced*_, and low-and-slow is _*no longer required*_ to put bombs and missiles on target with incredible accuracy. Gun runs are _*no longer required*_.
> 
> Close Air Support is _*not*_ a helicopter function.
> 
> All sorts of aircraft - including B1s - were used to drop bombs on insurgents in Afghanistan - lots of good experience for everyone (except for the insurgent who made poor life choices). Bombs (and Hellfire, especially with thermobaric warheads, launched from helicopters or Predator/Reaper) may be expensive, but, again, they are effective, cheaper than replacing a LAV, and infinitely preferable to paying for funerals and lifetimes of medical care.
> 
> Troops are happy to see targets blow up. That is all that counts. Sure, the A10 airshow is fun, but an A10 has no greater ability than any other suitably-equipped and suitably-armed machine, and would be very vulnerable in a major war these days. Even in the Good Old Days of the Cold War, I was sceptical of their ability to survive given the tactics that I saw over three years in Germany.
> 
> Pilots for F35s and jazzed-up crop dusters will still be paid the same, except one of those Pilots will be able to deliver a greater quantity of munitions at longer ranges in both permissive and _*non-permissive *_environments, cover the air-to-air role, and stand a much better chance of ultimately collecting a pension.
> 
> We would still need the minimum number (either the Conservative sixty-five or the sudden and unexpected Liberal ninety-five) fully-capable fighters to cover NORAD and NATO high-threat scenarios, so these limited-value machines would represent an increased cost in aircraft and infrastructure and an increased manning requirement. PYs are fixed, so those would have to come out of somebody else's hide, and that hide is not going to be an HQ or badge/hat designer, as those are too-high priorities.
> 
> I would not even trade real fighters for AHs, which would be of far, far greater value than replica Sturmoviks, Skyraiders. cropdusters, and other assorted putt-putts.



 :goodpost:

At one time I would have considered myself being in the "quantity has a quality of its own" camp, but the more I read and learn the more I'm in favour of fewer, high-end platforms.  That doesn't mean that in some cases there might not be overreach in new designs where the massive cost required to achieve that extra 5% performance isn't worth the cost, but in general I think we should strive to get the best equipment available.

Ultimately, the further away from the battlefield you can get your platform to provide the desired effect the better.  Less advanced platforms operating closer to the risks seems to me to be the wrong way to go.


----------



## Loachman

GR66 said:
			
		

> :goodpost:



Thanks.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> overreach in new designs where the massive cost required to achieve that extra 5% performance isn't worth the cost



Nope, but F35 offers much more than 5% better.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> in general I think we should strive to get the best equipment available.



Yup

Imagine if we'd bought the jazzed-up cropduster-equivalent APC instead of the LAV.

And how many here thought/think that we should have bought a tiny (well, we did, but it could have been tinier) fleet of Leopard 2s and a batch of cheaper Stryker MGS, or - worse - just MGS as was being pushed just a few short years ago?

C'mon...

'Fess up.

And then there's TAPV, for the Army guys who are envious of Scorpion.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Colin P said:
			
		

> and risk getting a 23mm lucky BB



Why go so small?  Others aren't!   ;D


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Why go so small?  Others aren't!   ;D



Pffftttt... just another ambitious gunner trying to get a good 'leading change' score on his PER


----------



## Old Sweat

Indeed, but to this old, out-of-date gunner, that looks to be a field or anti-tank gun being porteed on a truck. Note the barrel is clamped in the travelling position and the arrangement of the wheels and shield are not what one would expect from an anti-aircraft gun. Having nit picked the valid observation, EITS is right.


----------



## Good2Golf

Loachman said:
			
		

> It is the _*effect*_ that is important, _*not*_ the means to deliver it. Why is everybody getting hung up on the means?
> 
> We have moved on from horse-mounted cavalry and massed archery as well.
> 
> _*Technology has advanced*_, and low-and-slow is _*no longer required*_ to put bombs and missiles on target with incredible accuracy. Gun runs are _*no longer required*_.
> 
> Close Air Support is _*not*_ a helicopter function.



Sorry Loachman, but Uncle Sam thinks you're wrong.

JP 3.09-3 - Close Air Support



> Close air support (CAS) is air action by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.



I think you're getting just as hung up on definitions and platforms as the others.

:2c:

Effects, dear boy, it's about effects.

Scorpion (and helicopters) can provide CAS in the appropriate conditions...

Regards
G2G


----------



## MilEME09

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Effects, dear boy, it's about effects.
> 
> Scorpion (and helicopters) can provide CAS in the appropriate conditions...



Well let me throw another version of the two aircraft fleet scenario, lets say we do buy F-35's but use them primarily in the SEAD, and strikes against command and control role, clearing the way for a larger bomb truck, or a greater number of cheaper bomb trucks to flood the battle space.


----------



## Loachman

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Sorry Loachman, but Uncle Sam thinks you're wrong.



Not entirely.

From page I-5:

c.  RW Considerations.  RW attack assets provide the ability to maneuver and reposition firepower in response to changing situations.  They carry a wide variety of forward firing and off-axis firing munitions, are equipped with advanced sensors, have excellent response and loiter times, can conduct low altitude or nap of the earth ingress, attacks, and egress, and have an excellent capability to conduct CAS in diverse terrain and when accompanying other transport, medical evacuation, or personnel recovery assets.

(1)  Army RW assets are organic to combat aviation brigades organized and trained to be employed in unit operations, maneuvering independently or in support of ground forces as part of the Army combined arms team.  Army RW attack assets use close combat attack (CCA) procedures.  *CCA is not synonymous with CAS, and the Army does not consider its attack helicopters a CAS system*.  Although some Army aircrews may be proficient in CAS TTP, JTACs should not expect Army attack aviation assets to perform CAS TTP without further coordination and training, since they are normally employed using CCA as the standard attack method.

(2)  Marine Corps attack helicopters are organized in squadrons and typically operate in sections and divisions.  These units are assigned to and are integral to the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).  Marine Corps RW attack assets are trained and equipped for CAS missions to support the ground commander’s objectives and may be tasked accordingly.  Sections normally fly in mixed configuration with attack helicopter (AH)/UH [utility helicopter] assets. Mixed sections provide the RW CAS element with the most flexible mix of sensors, communications capabilities, maneuverability, firepower, and mutual support.

I did discuss USMC use of its earlier Sea Cobras in a CAS role in an earlier post, but had not worked with them in many years and was not certain if they still did. The USMC has a different role and approaches things in ways that work best for them. The vast bulk of my experience has been with US Army Aviation, and they were always keen to differentiate themselves from any USAF connection or encroachment into their turf, hence the CCA term which appears to have been coined for Afghanistan-like operations where there was more integration. My previous statement was made in that light.

I'll continue reading through the entire document later. It is interesting.



			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> I think you're getting just as hung up on definitions and platforms as the others.



More ownership and employment of platforms. AHs are organic to US Army Divisions, and integral to the land battle.



			
				Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Scorpion (and helicopters) can provide CAS in the appropriate conditions...



Which still does not mean that we should rush out and buy Scorpion, as "appropriate conditions" are not "all conditions" or even necessarily "enough conditions", ie it would be, for us, a niche aircraft.

Griffon can provide CCA in "appropriate conditions" as well, ie suitable climate (not too cold and not too wet) and relatively permissive environment. The difference is that we adapted an existing machine to the role rather than buying it for that purpose.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Indeed, but to this old, out-of-date gunner, that looks to be a field or anti-tank gun being porteed on a truck. Note the barrel is clamped in the travelling position and the arrangement of the wheels and shield are not what one would expect from an anti-aircraft gun. Having nit picked the valid observation, EITS is right.



Unless my RECCE is way out to lunch, it is actually a S-60 57mm AAA gun.  ISIS does, however, use them on the back of flatbeds, dumptrucks, etc in the 'ground' role.


----------



## Old Sweat

Quite possible and I did have second thoughts when I considered the small diameter of the barrel.


----------



## Good2Golf

LM, I didn't say go out and buy Scorpions, but rather consideration be given to the appropriateness of having a fit into air effects.  I was also challenging your black and white "helicopters don't do CAS."  As you noted yourself, in some cases they (still) do.

Who knows, maybe we'll see Scorpion and other candidates (like Boeing's T-X) become the training platform for future aircrew training and potentially providing CAS-related FG to the CF as CATS now achieves with Alpha Jets?

One should never say never.

:2c:

Regards
G2G


----------



## Spencer100

Here is an article that is interesting on this very topic

http://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/03_fm2017-attack-of-the-cropdusters-180961662/#Xdx6CMiCgZWBmCyr.01


----------



## dimsum

Spencer100 said:
			
		

> Here is an article that is interesting on this very topic
> 
> http://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/03_fm2017-attack-of-the-cropdusters-180961662/#Xdx6CMiCgZWBmCyr.01



The link itself (not the article name, strangely) is "Attack of the Cropdusters".  For a second I thought it'd be about the Pilots and Flt Engineers who walk through the Tactical Tube and unleash noxious gases.   :-X


----------



## Kirkhill

*FOR THOSE SO INCLINED I AM STATING AT THE OUTSET THAT I AM [size=18pt]NOT** PROPOSING THIS AS AN RCAF SOLUTION*[/size]

*INFORMATION ONLY.*

Sorry for shouting.  Just wanted to make sure I was heard by those whose ears may have been damaged by too much exposure to propwash or some such.   [



> MAY 3, 2017 @ 01:45 PM
> 
> Back To The Future: Why The U.S. Needs A Light Turboprop Attack Aircraft
> 
> GUEST POST WRITTEN BY
> Col. Michael Pietrucha
> The author is a member of the U.S. Air Force Strategic Studies Group.
> 
> Throwback. Backwards. Illogical. Three words used recently to describe an emerging U.S. Air Force initiative to field light attack aircraft of a type not operated by U.S. forces since Vietnam. Aircraft that are compact, lethal, relatively inexpensive and easy to support in the field. Powered by a turboprop engine, looking remarkably like their forebears from the Second World War, they often inspire an emotional reaction that equates the design features negatively with older concepts, now long past.
> 
> To some of the combat aviators who have been deeply embroiled in continuous conflict since 9/11, they’re a no-brainer.
> 
> This discussion of options for new airplanes is no longer academic. This summer, the Air Force will engage in a light attack experiment at Holloman AFB, which may be followed by a combat demonstration the likes of which has not been carried out by the Air Force since Vietnam.
> 
> If you’re prepared to take advice from individuals with no aviation background at all, this should worry you deeply. But if you’re prepared to concede, maybe, that professional aviators with extensive combat experience haven’t suddenly lost their minds, then it should become immediately obvious that there might be some utility in light attack. Certainly it has historical roots – The Navy, Marines and Air Force all used light attack aircraft in Vietnam. But just using the term doesn’t adequately describe the aircraft, or the reasons to consider them. Why a light attack aircraft?
> 
> Light attack aircraft were just that – smaller attack aircraft like the A-37 Dragonfly or Navy OV-10, with significant weapons loads but not designed to stand up in the front of the apocalyptic Soviet/NATO battlefield. For the Air Force, the long path to considering a new attack aircraft started in 2008. Faced with increasing airpower demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, the existing fighters were being wrung out. For the kind of air support we were providing for U.S. ground forces, the existing F-16, F-15E and Navy / Marine F-18 were a ridiculous overmatch. Recall that by 2008, the Air Force and Naval aviation had been in continuous combat since January 16, 1991, and a decade and a half later the strain was showing. Meeting airpower demand with expensive, high end aircraft was the only option we had, and we were flying their wings off. We still are.
> 
> First, we had to define the aircraft. At Air Combat Command, a handful of aviators wrote the concept for OA-X, OA meaning observation/attack, and X meaning something we didn’t have a number for yet (not meaning experimental, as some have written). We started with historical examples – the aircraft we used to fight an insurgency in the jungles of Vietnam. The first example was the A-1 Skyraider, a hulking behemoth of an airplane with a massive, 18-cylinder radial engine designed as a carrier aircraft and transferred to the Air Force in 1964 after the Navy retired them. Alongside, the OV-10. The OV-10 Bronco, a new-build, twin-turboprop observation aircraft used as a forward air controller by the Air Force and as an attack aircraft by the Navy and Marines. What the authors envisioned with OA-X was a modern turboprop aircraft with advanced sensors and precision weapons just like a modern fast jet. But we also wanted aircraft that could be forward deployed to austere airfields, fueled from 55-gallon drums, and supplied from the back of a pickup truck – none of which a jet can easily do. And we needed it to be relatively cheap to buy and to operate. In short, we envisioned an aircraft that looked like earlier designs, with the weapons and sensors of a modern jet.
> 
> These aircraft existed. I had seen the A-29 Super Tucano in Colombia in 2007. Raytheon had a conversion of their T-6 trainer (the AT-6) that included a weapons capability. What we were looking for was off the shelf stuff, not needing a long development period. For combat operations in the Middle East, this seemed like a good match. The aircraft that existed were two-seaters with light armor, good day/night electro-optical sensors, guns, and precision munitions. Unrefeueled, they had twice the loiter time of the fast jets. They sipped fuel – the fuel they burned in an hour of flight approximated the fuel an F-15E used taxiing from parking to the runway. We were looking at traditional attack aircraft – combat aircraft that could be used for a wide array of missions from Close Air Support to interdiction to combat search & rescue. In 2009 these aircraft could have flown from a dozen US-operated airfields in Afghanistan that could not have supported fast jets.
> 
> But making the case to an Air Force that had always been able to afford very high-end aircraft took time. The Air National Guard tested the AT-6 from 2010 to 2014 and judged it “operationally suitable and operationally effective.” Ironically, it wasn’t the combat capabilities of the aircraft that made the strongest case – it was the health of the rest of the fighter / attack enterprise. A quarter century of continuous operations was wrecking the force – readiness was the worst ever measured, aircraft sustainment costs were climbing, and the Air Force had long since run out of the cockpits we needed to turn freshly-graduated aviators into seasoned fighter pilots. The F-35, as capable as it is, could only provide a limited number of cockpits, and those not enough to “absorb” the new pilots to keep the force healthy. By 2016 we were short almost a thousand experienced fighter pilots, and the shortage was getting worse. The Air Force was buying fighter aircraft at a rate so slow that it was going to take us 200 years to recapitalize even the shrunken, post-drawdown force. We needed to return to a healthy balance – and that meant buying more aircraft. As the concept moved forward into a planned flying experiment in the summer of 2017, resistance mounted.
> 
> Some objections were emotional. Turboprops were old, and suitable only for people too poor to afford jets. The objections to a turboprop were perhaps the most irrational, and the easiest to dispel with data. A modern turboprop is a computer-controlled marvel of engineering, and is the most efficient aircraft powerplant for the performance regime that we needed to operate in. It is easy to maintain and very resistant to ingested debris to be expected at forward airfields. Other objections were financial. Cost is always an issue, and under sequestration, the Air Force already has too much mission and not enough Air Force. But with the possibility of ending this self-destructive budget cap came the opportunity to buy new aircraft without taking the money from some other portion of an under-resourced service. The most pernicious objections came from industry, focused on what companies wanted to sell, rather than what the Air Force was looking for. In a flashback to the bad old days of acquisition, we heard over and over that a light jet was the solution – fuel demand, debris resistance, cost and maintenance requirements be damned. Jets were new, turboprops were old. But no jet had the characteristics we actually needed in a powerplant.
> 
> Other resistance relied on a panicked notion of the air defense threat. Suddenly, the widespread proliferation of “wish-you-were-dead” air defense weapons would end the usefulness of light attack aircraft. Except that such a proliferation isn’t happening, and if it did it would spell the end of a worldwide aviation enterprise. Really good air defenses are expensive and have to be sustained, and very few people can afford to buy the radar-guided threats, much less operate them. There really are places and scenarios where airpower is going to have a hard time operating, but those places are not ubiquitous. It’s not reasonable to expect that there will be a sudden surge of radar threats in the places where violent extremists are the most firmly entrenched – unless there are Russian or Chinese units nearby. So you can be assured that light attack aircraft are not intended for a radar threat environment. Not are they intended for an environment dominated by hostile fighters. Because that would be stupid.
> 
> That last issue deserves attention. Turboprop light attack aircraft are intended for lightly contested airspace, where the primary threats are guns and shoulder-launched, heat-seeking missiles, commonly known as MANPADS. This is the environment that has dominated the threat airspace over Iraq, Afghanistan, much of Syria, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, and almost the entire African continent. In fact, in the last 25 years, US combat operations have involved 176 days spent in contested airspace – and over 9400 calendar days outside it. Counting simultaneous operations like the no-fly zones as separate events, the total count of permissive days exceeds 17,000. That’s the environment in which we have been using up our highly capable legacy fighter / attack fleet, and it’s not going away.
> 
> In the most likely environment, OA-X would have three key survivability advantages over legacy jets.
> 
> They are quiet. It may not be obvious, but most gunners in an irregular warfare environment have to hear or see an aircraft to find it. They have no early warning system to feed them information. Our experience with AT-6 and A-29 on our training ranges are that they are very hard to hear. By the time you hear them, you’re in range of their weapons.
> 
> They are cool. Heat-seeking missiles rely on signatures from exhaust or hot metal, caused by friction with the air they fly through. The exhaust of the A-29s turboprop (the same as the AT-6C) is mixed with a strong propwash, and isn’t even hot enough to boil water by the time it reaches the trailing edge of the wing. The fastest moving part of the aircraft is the prop, which has to have special equipment built in to prevent ice from forming – the exact opposite of a heating problem. Add in the ability to detect missile launches and dispense flares, and the aircraft may well be less susceptible to the heat-seeking threat than any other fighter or attack aircraft in the inventory.
> 
> They’re small. Worst case, the AT-6 has less than half the exposed area of the A-10 when looking straight up at it. Best case, looking at it nose on, it presents an even smaller target. The A-29 is only a little bit larger that the AT-6 and I can attest that it’s hard to keep sight of your own wingman at distances where the larger jets maintain a visual formation. Small size makes an aircraft much harder to hit with gunfire, particularly with the obsolescent, aimed-by-eye, ex-Soviet antiaircraft guns fielded by insurgent groups worldwide. Joint experience with more than 15 years of warfare against violent extremists shows that fixed-wing aircraft moving faster than a helicopter only rarely get hit by small-arms fire, and they are not downed.
> 
> The alarmist among us can postulate about the proliferation of MANPADS but the reality is that comparable aircraft that stand out more in infrared would then be far more vulnerable that OA-X. That kind of air defense proliferation that would render OA-X unusable is extremely unlikely for the same reason that not everybody owns a new Lexus (cost, shortage of dealerships, supply limits, poor credit, etc). Yes, there are plenty of missiles and guns, but gunners able to hit moving targets, maneuvering in three dimensions, with countermeasures – those are hard to find.
> 
> The Air Force could make excellent use of light attack aircraft. We are experimenting with them for a reason – because we already wish to confirm that their attributes (precision, firepower, low footprint, low cost of ownership, low logistical burden) are exactly what we need to provide responsive, deployable and effective airpower against violent extremists worldwide – an expectation that the Joint Force continues to have. We need more cockpits to alleviate our shortage of fighter pilots and to improve readiness. There are objections to light attack, the most telling being that the Air Force cannot afford any new aircraft without additional funding from Congress to buy them. Other objections fall by the wayside when we look at the available data, and we intend to capture more, and soon.
> 
> Col. Mike “Starbaby” Pietrucha is a serving officer who was an instructor electronic warfare officer in the F-4G Wild Weasel and the F-15E Strike Eagle, amassing 156 combat missions and taking part in 2.5 SAM kills over 10 combat deployments. As an irregular warfare operations officer, Colonel Pietrucha has two additional combat deployments in the company of US Army infantry, combat engineer, and military police units in Iraq and Afghanistan.
> 
> The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force or the U.S. Government.



I'm now leaving the target area.  

Edit to add link forgotten in haste to get out of Dodge
https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2017/05/03/back-to-the-future-why-the-u-s-needs-a-light-turboprop-attack-aircraft/#27a7a899267d


----------



## Lumber

Whatever you do, don't show this document to the Liberals...


----------



## Rifleman62

Would it be able to operate from a carrier deck or a type of amphibious warfare ship? Are they relatively STOL and will not need an arrester hook and all the aircraft hardening that means?

If the US goes ahead, then we could get some to get over the 65 cockpits the Minister said we need, plus give them to the Reserves in line with his statement yesterday. [


----------



## YZT580

can't see why not, the Enterprise (CV6) was just over 800 feet long and she was one of the larger of the WW2 carriers.  Heck, they were converting liberty ships to wooden flat tops at one point.  I can recall seeing two of them in Hamilton harbour awaiting scrap in the 60's.


----------



## Kirkhill

Tucano and MD500 in CAS training.

What CAS looks like when Hollywood isn't directing.

https://youtu.be/CKNWEEq0PQI


----------



## GR66

I don't doubt that a turboprop light-attack aircraft would be a very useful and cost-effective system in the vast majority of the world's conflict zones.  Hell if you could have one that was built domestically you'd have the added bonuses of Canadian jobs producing our aircraft as well as the potential to export an affordable aircraft (and provide non-combat training assistance) to less wealthy allied states that are involved in conflicts.

I think however that the nature of the aircraft however is the very reason that it's not a good fit for Canada.  It's designed for down in the weeds, in your face death and destruction.  That's not really a role that the Canadian government (of any party) has in recent decades been very willing to endorse.  While probably quite survivable in most modern conflict zones we're likely to face, there IS more risk of combat losses when you fly low and slow and expose yourself to enemy ground fire.  

Probably just as bad in a Canadian context is that we'd be seen quite visibly as an aggressor.  A dot high up in the air dropping a laser-guided munition doesn't have the same visual and emotional impact as a CAS aircraft dropping down low (in clear camera range) and destroying things...possibly even some things that were not intentional.  Even when we're fighting we like to be seen as the ones trying to stop wars rather than participating in them.  Even supplying these aircraft to allies and training their pilots would run the risk that we'd take the blame for any use of the aircraft (intentional or accidental) that doesn't match the expectations of the Canadian public.

The net result for Canada would be that you'd have an aircraft (and all it's infrastructure) sitting undeployed in Canada with no real useful domestic role to fill.  If something so bad happens internationally that our government is prodded into a significant military response where public support exceeds our reluctance to be seen killing, then it's likely to be one of those rare military situations where we're fighting a more advanced foe and a light attack aircraft probably won't be the right tool.

These might be an excellent tool for the USA or other countries that are willing to use their military forcefully, but in my opinion they would be a waste of resources for Canada.

 :2c:


----------



## tomahawk6

https://video.search.yahoo.com/search/video?fr=yfp-t&p=A-10+video+usaf#id=42&vid=56c84af1bb3e64b568d679becfac18fb&action=click


----------



## MilEME09

The only role I could see working for a small turbo prop for us is if we expanded our fleet of trainers, and then had a AirRes with pilots who could keep flying at a lower cost. You could then be trying PRes FAC's.


----------



## YZT580

Something for the reserves was the raison d'etre for the single otter fleet.  It's a good concept but it doesn't keep your reserve ready to fly any form of real mission.  Might be better to maintain the old hercs although the difference between them and our current model I suspect is quite significant but at least you'd be maintaining currency in the same category.


----------



## a_majoor

Future CAS might be in the form of drones like "Tacit Rainbow" which simply loitered over the battle space hunting target signatures or "ALARM" which zoom climbed to a great altitude and then hung under a parachute, prepared to fire a rocket engine and slam into any target which revealed itself below....

Not as "cool" as a CAS aircraft rolling in hot with rockets and cannon blazing, but certainly much less dangerous and likely to arouse opposition due to potential pilot casualties.


----------



## tomahawk6

A-10 is all you need. 8)


----------



## ueo

Some Honourable Members: "Here, here."


----------



## daftandbarmy

GR66 said:
			
		

> I don't doubt that a turboprop light-attack aircraft would be a very useful and cost-effective system in the vast majority of the world's conflict zones.  Hell if you could have one that was built domestically you'd have the added bonuses of Canadian jobs producing our aircraft as well as the potential to export an affordable aircraft (and provide non-combat training assistance) to less wealthy allied states that are involved in conflicts.
> 
> I think however that the nature of the aircraft however is the very reason that it's not a good fit for Canada.  It's designed for down in the weeds, in your face death and destruction.  That's not really a role that the Canadian government (of any party) has in recent decades been very willing to endorse.  While probably quite survivable in most modern conflict zones we're likely to face, there IS more risk of combat losses when you fly low and slow and expose yourself to enemy ground fire.
> 
> Probably just as bad in a Canadian context is that we'd be seen quite visibly as an aggressor.  A dot high up in the air dropping a laser-guided munition doesn't have the same visual and emotional impact as a CAS aircraft dropping down low (in clear camera range) and destroying things...possibly even some things that were not intentional.  Even when we're fighting we like to be seen as the ones trying to stop wars rather than participating in them.  Even supplying these aircraft to allies and training their pilots would run the risk that we'd take the blame for any use of the aircraft (intentional or accidental) that doesn't match the expectations of the Canadian public.
> 
> The net result for Canada would be that you'd have an aircraft (and all it's infrastructure) sitting undeployed in Canada with no real useful domestic role to fill.  If something so bad happens internationally that our government is prodded into a significant military response where public support exceeds our reluctance to be seen killing, then it's likely to be one of those rare military situations where we're fighting a more advanced foe and a light attack aircraft probably won't be the right tool.
> 
> These might be an excellent tool for the USA or other countries that are willing to use their military forcefully, but in my opinion they would be a waste of resources for Canada.
> 
> :2c:



Which is still probably not a good enough reason to NOT have CAS integral to the CAF, especially as we continually work under the US CAS umbrella when it comes down to a real fight. Or just an average day on patrol somewhere.


----------



## McG

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Which is still probably not a good enough reason to NOT have CAS integral to the CAF, especially as we continually work under the US CAS umbrella when it comes down to a real fight. Or just an average day on patrol somewhere.


.. except, I do not believe GR66 was arguing for Canada to not have CAS.  I believe he was arguing against buying something cheap, for _permissive combat environments_ only, that would take resources away from a capability that can be employed in high & low threat environments.


----------



## GR66

MCG said:
			
		

> .. except, I do not believe GR66 was arguing for Canada to not have CAS.  I believe he was arguing against buying something cheap, for _permissive combat environments_ only, that would take resources away from a capability that can be employed in high & low threat environments.



Yes.  In a round about way that is what I was trying to say.  There are a lot of capabilities that the CF is currently lacking that a modern and effective military SHOULD have.  CAS is one of them.  Funding is limited and what money is available isn't enough to fulfill ALL of those requirements and frankly I think it would be unrealistic for anyone to think that is likely to change.

With that being the case, a CAS platform is something that (in my opinion anyway) a Canadian government (of any political stripe) is highly unlikely to be politically willing to deploy an any but the most extreme of circumstances.  Those particular circumstances (Korea, Iran, the Baltic States?) are situations where a LIGHT CAS platform wouldn't be suitable.  Why then waste limited resources on a capability that isn't likely to be deployed except in a circumstance where it is likely to be inadequate for the task?  Better in my mind to spend the money on capabilities that are likely to be used and effective.

If the political appetite were to change and Canadian governments were to be willing to take more military and political risks and make use of these kinds of assets then certainly I'd be in favour of this kind of capability for the CF.


----------



## SupersonicMax

We have a CAS capability that was successfully employed in Iraq.


----------



## GR66

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> We have a CAS capability that was successfully employed in Iraq.



The specific suggestion was for the CF to have a dedicated light CAS capability for the Reserves.  In my opinion, such a capability is highly unlikely to be deployed by a Canadian government (whether the capability is in the Reserves or the Reg Force) due to the relatively higher risk that would be faced by such an aircraft compared to a multi-role fighter, as well as because of the optics of such an aircraft.  

A multi-role fighter aircraft can much more easily be portrayed by the government as a primarily "defensive" aircraft designed to protect our airspace that also happens to have other capabilities, while a light "attack" aircraft is harder to fit into the modern Canadian military peacekeeper narrative.  

If it's not likely to be deployed then to my mind with out limited budget the money would be best spent on other capabilities that are more likely to be deployed.


----------



## Loachman

And there are other problems with a low-capability, low-survivability, niche concept like this.

One needs:

An airfield close to a population base large enough to provide sufficient aircrew, groundcrew, and support personnel that is not too busy and has somewhere close by in which to train, even if only dry, that will not interfere with commercial traffic and scare people, cows, and horses on the ground, and has suitable infrastructure.

This is not a cheap venture, even if the aircraft is relatively cheap, and it gives us what, a pricey flying club? It does not provide any, ANY, benefit for the cost.

Our last dedicated CAS aircraft was the CF5. It did the job fairly well despite being a fast-mover armed with dumb weapons in the days prior to laser designators and GPS and fancy computers. It was limited, however, by payload, range, and endurance. Modern REAL fighters are capable of so much more.

Our biggest problem, besides a government unwilling to acquire necessary equipment in a timely fashion, is _*PEOPLE*_.

Until we can attract, train, and _*RETAIN*_ enough aircrew and groundcrew, we will not be able to fly more aircraft, no matter how cheap they are. We need, therefore, to provide what people we do have with the most capability per Pilot and Tech.

A flying Iltis is not acceptable for many reasons, practical and political.

I wish that this thread would die.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Loachman said:
			
		

> I wish that this thread would die.



Why don't you call in an airstrike? Broken Arrow!!!!!


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Loachman said:
			
		

> And there are other problems with a low-capability, low-survivability, niche concept like this.
> 
> One needs:
> 
> An airfield close to a population base large enough to provide sufficient aircrew, groundcrew, and support personnel that is not too busy and has somewhere close by in which to train, even if only dry, that will not interfere with commercial traffic and scare people, cows, and horses on the ground, and has suitable infrastructure.
> 
> This is not a cheap venture, even if the aircraft is relatively cheap, and it gives us what, a pricey flying club? It does not provide any, ANY, benefit for the cost.
> 
> Our last dedicated CAS aircraft was the CF5. It did the job fairly well despite being a fast-mover armed with dumb weapons in the days prior to laser designators and GPS and fancy computers. It was limited, however, by payload, range, and endurance. Modern REAL fighters are capable of so much more.
> 
> Our biggest problem, besides a government unwilling to acquire necessary equipment in a timely fashion, is _*PEOPLE*_.
> 
> Until we can attract, train, and _*RETAIN*_ enough aircrew and groundcrew, we will not be able to fly more aircraft, no matter how cheap they are. We need, therefore, to provide what people we do have with the most capability per Pilot and Tech.
> 
> A flying Iltis is not acceptable for many reasons, practical and political.
> 
> I wish that this thread would die.


Wiki claims these figures for the A-29
Range: 720 nmi (827 mi, 1,330 km)
Combat radius: 550 km (300 nmi, 342 mi) (hi-lo-hi profile, 1,500 kg (3,300 lb) of external stores)[184]
Ferry range: 1,541 nmi (1,774 mi, 2,855 km)

I wonder if having a Reserve squadron flying such might actually help retain pilots, flying one of these is likely to be quite enjoyable for a fighter pilot, particularly when it's not a full time commitment. The smaller footprint could mean the Squadron is based at or close to a big city and with say a 50/50 split of reg and reserve maintainers might mean you could also retain more ground crew.
Let's just say for argument sake you get a squadron based out of Edmonton. The "Combat Radius" allows it to fly to Wainwright, Coldlake and Suffield and return. Now that would be without weapons. Dry runs could be done at 2 bases and live fire at Cold lake likely with a fly Friday night to Cold lake, aircraft prepped Saturday, mission briefs, sortie out, expend ammunition, return to Cold lake, de-arm, service aircraft and return to Edmonton on Sunday. Maintainers get roughly a 2 weeks to a month to carry out maintenance between missions. Squadron could support exercises across Western Canada with FOO's getting experience calling in air support (Squadron could provide a small ground team to coach units in proper procedures). Start with 2 Reserve Squadrons, on in the West and one in the East, both at or near big cities.


----------



## Loch Sloy!

> I wonder if having a Reserve squadron flying such might actually help retain pilots, flying one of these is likely to be quite enjoyable for a fighter pilot, particularly when it's not a full time commitment. The smaller footprint could mean the Squadron is based at or close to a big city and with say a 50/50 split of reg and reserve maintainers might mean you could also retain more ground crew.
> Let's just say for argument sake you get a squadron based out of Edmonton. The "Combat Radius" allows it to fly to Wainwright, Coldlake and Suffield and return. Now that would be without weapons. Dry runs could be done at 2 bases and live fire at Cold lake likely with a fly Friday night to Cold lake, aircraft prepped Saturday, mission briefs, sortie out, expend ammunition, return to Cold lake, de-arm, service aircraft and return to Edmonton on Sunday. Maintainers get roughly a 2 weeks to a month to carry out maintenance between missions. Squadron could support exercises across Western Canada with FOO's getting experience calling in air support (Squadron could provide a small ground team to coach units in proper procedures). Start with 2 Reserve Squadrons, on in the West and one in the East, both at or near big cities.



Great idea!


----------



## Infanteer

Loachman said:
			
		

> I wish that this thread would die.



So, is there any alternative to breaking the bank with the only airframe on the market?  Are we doomed to obsolescence by F35?


----------



## Kirkhill

My takeaway from the article that I posted was that the USAF decided it was ripping the guts out of too many high end vehicles doing stuff that something simpler could handle.  

They were burning more gas than they might, more parts than they might (and parts that were more expensive and harder to get) and reducing the inventory of aircraft necessary for fighting a major war.  And reducing the number of seats available to keep pilots flying between wars.


----------



## Loachman

Colin P said:
			
		

> I wonder if having a Reserve squadron flying such might actually help retain pilots, flying one of these is likely to be quite enjoyable for a fighter pilot, particularly when it's not a full time commitment.



Max is in a better position to answer the joy aspect. Perhaps he could conduct an informal survey.

How many ex-fighter pilots are in Edmonton to draw upon? Techs? Enough? How does one determine this?

We had a healthy number of mainly ex-fighter-cum-airline pilots in Downsview flying Kiowas. We lost the majority of them post-Griffon conversion and move to Borden, even most of the ones who had an easier and quicker commute to Borden than Downsview. Commuting was not a problem in the Kiowa days - we had guys driving in from the far side of Kitchener, Trenton, and north of Barrie. A lot of them didn't like the machine, and they were not afforded the same flexibility as they were with the Kiowa - they had to find two more crewmembers with the same personal and work schedules (airline guys do not work Monday to Friday as a rule).

If moving and re-equipping a Squadron is as challenging as this was (years of disruption and instability), how much of a challenge would creating one from scratch be? And what happens if the novelty wears off for a good chunk of the Reservists and they drop out over the following two or three years?



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> say a 50/50 split of reg and reserve maintainers might mean you could also retain more ground crew.



A healthy complement of full-timers, Reserve and Regular, is essential to any Reserve-heavy flying organization. 400 Squadron's policy was a min monthly attendance of six days for Class A people, in order to maintain basic currency. Currency does not equal proficiency. Our long-established Class B establishment was slashed post-Afghanistan and it hurt bigly. It's not coming back. Reg PYs have to come from somewhere, so who loses? There is a shortage of experienced aircrew and groundcrew already. What do you want to shutdown in order to start a glorified non-deployable flying club?



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> Let's just say for argument sake you get a squadron based out of Edmonton.



Hangars? Office space? Simulator (almost every flying community has one now)? Money?

Again, what is the military benefit for this?


----------



## suffolkowner

Infanteer said:
			
		

> So, is there any alternative to breaking the bank with the only airframe on the market?  Are we doomed to obsolescence by F35?



I think this is the reality that people are going to have to deal with just as the F-35 is going to play havoc with the high end NATO/allied market. If not the F-35 than what? Gripen? Fa-50? 

For low end permissive environments are we going to be able to afford to fly F-35's as opposed to Predator's, Fa-50's, Super Tucano's (Harvard's)

We already pay for Hawk's and Harvard's one way or another so it's not like we actually need to add an airframe. 

The reality is there is no commitment to defence in Canada meanwhile Australia currently has 4 high end platforms in use Classic Hornets, Super Hornets, Growlers, and the F-35


----------



## dimsum

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> The reality is there is no commitment to defence in Canada meanwhile Australia currently has 4 high end platforms in use Classic Hornets, Super Hornets, Growlers, and the F-35



Agree with the sentiment, but the RAAF doesn't have the F-35 yet.  It has 2 airframes, which it will use to train up its pilots.  After that, the Classic Hornets will be replaced.


----------



## suffolkowner

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Agree with the sentiment, but the RAAF doesn't have the F-35 yet.  It has 2 airframes, which it will use to train up its pilots.  After that, the Classic Hornets will be replaced.



Still thats going to be an extended switchover is it not? How quickly can one realistically switch airframes?


----------



## Loachman

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> I think this is the reality that people are going to have to deal with just as the F-35 is going to play havoc with the high end NATO/allied market.



The cost per machine continues its downward trend.



			
				suffolkowner said:
			
		

> For low end permissive environments are we going to be able to afford to fly F-35's as opposed to Predator's, Fa-50's, Super Tucano's (Harvard's)



For non-permissive environments are we going to be able to afford to be stuck with a bunch of underperforming aircraft left out of battle?

One machine will work in both environments, the others will not.

UAVs are not cheap. They require complex ground control stations with line-of-sight and powerful directional antennae to transmit control information and video. Range for that is limited. Satellite control imposes delay in each direction - video and telemetry lag for the operator, and control signals lag for the UAV. Engagement of moving targets is challenging at best. Current UAVs are optimized for endurance. They are not manoeuvrable, making re-attacks quite time-consuming and the machine vulnerable to attack, and payloads are light. They cannot yet operate in formation.

The little, thirteen-foot-wingspan, unarmed, CU161 Sperwer UAV was the most expensive machine, per flying hour, that the CF has operated. Yes, that was a unique case, but still serves to illustrate the point.



			
				suffolkowner said:
			
		

> We already pay for Hawk's and Harvard's one way or another so it's not like we actually need to add an airframe.



We would still have to buy the machines and man and maintain them, whether a particular airframe is in use in a training capacity or not.



			
				suffolkowner said:
			
		

> The reality is there is no commitment to defence in Canada meanwhile Australia currently has 4 high end platforms in use Classic Hornets, Super Hornets, Growlers, and the F-35



The reality of the airframes has already been addressed. Australia's situation is different. They do not have a big brother next door to help them out, and have closer less-friendly neighbours, and had a different domestic experience during the Second World War compared to us.


----------



## MilEME09

Loachman said:
			
		

> The reality of the airframes has already been addressed. Australia's situation is different. They do not have a big brother next door to help them out, and have closer less-friendly neighbours, and had a different domestic experience during the Second World War compared to us.



To use the WWII context for Australia, they are "The England of the Pacific", and they know it. In the event of any conflict in the western pacific region, Australia knows, and understands that with the exception of New Zealand, they are alone with help a long way away. There fore they need to have the military capability to fight and hold the line and maybe go on the occasional offensive while they wait for help to arrive. Our Strategic situation is different, we are right next to the most well funded military in the world, if we are attacked, help is hours away at worst. This paints a vastly different picture as to our defense priorities.


----------



## Edward Campbell

I've tried to stay away from this thread because I show my age when I remind everyone that I served when we, the Canadian Army (AKA Mobile Command) had our own, organic CF-5s, and transports and helicopters, too. The notion of true _*joint*_ forces (designed by Paul Hellyer) only lasted for about a decade: it was just too much for a handful of air force generals to bear. ( I remember (_circa_ 1973 or 74) briefing LGen Carr on the enormous complexities of C2 of air forces by army tactical HQs ~ *there were none!* We had the right radios, we had good, sound, tested procedures and more and more pilots were graduating from the army staff college and staffing the TACPs, there was no operational C3 case FOR Air Command.) 

While I understand Chris' explanation of why a very, very large air force like the USAF might (re)consider having some dedicated, single role, CAS aircraft, is there a sound case for a country like Canada or even the UK or Germany to have such a capability? I guess I understand the tactical appeal, but can someone make a sensible "business" case for it?

It seems to me that we, the defence community, should be trying to exploit the tiny opening the Senate has given us in its most recent report and ask our government to provide attack helicopters ~ for which, I believe, sound operational and business cases can be made.


----------



## suffolkowner

Loachman said:
			
		

> The cost per machine continues its downward trend.
> 
> Yes, but I don't foresee it ever costing $10 million to purchase and $2000 per hour do you? My point wasn't really about the cost of the F-35 but it's cost versus the alternatives
> 
> For non-permissive environments are we going to be able to afford to be stuck with a bunch of underperforming aircraft left out of battle?
> 
> Yes, and we already have 24 Tutors, 25 Harvards, and 16 Hawks that have never fired a shot in anger
> 
> One machine will work in both environments, the others will not.
> 
> Agreed, but I wonder if it is truly the best use of resources that's all
> 
> UAVs are not cheap. They require complex ground control stations with line-of-sight and powerful directional antennae to transmit control information and video. Range for that is limited. Satellite control imposes delay in each direction - video and telemetry lag for the operator, and control signals lag for the UAV. Engagement of moving targets is challenging at best. Current UAVs are optimized for endurance. They are not manoeuvrable, making re-attacks quite time-consuming and the machine vulnerable to attack, and payloads are light. They cannot yet operate in formation.
> 
> The little, thirteen-foot-wingspan, unarmed, CU161 Sperwer UAV was the most expensive machine, per flying hour, that the CF has operated. Yes, that was a unique case, but still serves to illustrate the point.
> 
> Agreed, but there remains a push to acquire them nevertheless. It was more to illustrate 3 different aircraft directions to go in, a manned aircraft may be preferable
> 
> We would still have to buy the machines and man and maintain them, whether a particular airframe is in use in a training capacity or not.
> 
> The reality of the airframes has already been addressed. Australia's situation is different. They do not have a big brother next door to help them out, and have closer less-friendly neighbours, and had a different domestic experience during the Second World War compared to us.
> 
> Agreed, again however they will still be operating those airframes at the same time, where there's a will there's a way. I'm not so sure about their threat environment, we're pretty close to Russia ourselves. They sometimes seem to get along pretty well with Indonesia and China too for that matter.


----------



## SupersonicMax

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> Still thats going to be an extended switchover is it not? How quickly can one realistically switch airframes?



Probably 10 sims and 4-5 flights...


----------



## suffolkowner

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Probably 10 sims and 4-5 flights...



wow, that's impressive and a good thing. Is that specifically for transitioning to the F-35 or in general? I had read that the F-35 was an easy plane to fly


----------



## Colin Parkinson

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I've tried to stay away from this thread because I show my age when I remind everyone that I served when we, the Canadian Army (AKA Mobile Command) had our own, organic CF-5s, and transports and helicopters, too. The notion of true _*joint*_ forces (designed by Paul Hellyer) only lasted for about a decade: it was just too much for a handful of air force generals to bear. ( I remember (_circa_ 1973 or 74) briefing LGen Carr on the enormous complexities of C2 of air forces by army tactical HQs ~ *there were none!* We had the right radios, we had good, sound, tested procedures and more and more pilots were graduating from the army staff college and staffing the TACPs, there was no operational C3 case FOR Air Command.)
> 
> While I understand Chris' explanation of why a very, very large air force like the USAF might (re)consider having some dedicated, single role, CAS aircraft, is there a sound case for a country like Canada or even the UK or Germany to have such a capability? I guess I understand the tactical appeal, but can someone make a sensible "business" case for it?
> 
> It seems to me that we, the defence community, should be trying to exploit the tiny opening the Senate has given us in its most recent report and ask our government to provide attack helicopters ~ for which, I believe, sound operational and business cases can be made.



I think the terms "helicopter" and "ground attack" gives our governments indigestion. As for Loachmans comments about "undeployable" I will have say the aircraft is being deployed in several arenas and if the need is there, then they will be deployed one way or another, just like the Cougars and Bisons. Fair comments on personal issues, what I was thinking is that to have a posting near/at a major city is likely to give people a reason to stay in. As for the F35, I don't believe they will every be used in close and dirty and getting them deployed will be very political as always. Prop or rotor driven air support for a deployment in a remote area *cough* Mali *cough* might be more politically digestible.


----------



## Kirkhill

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> Probably 10 sims and 4-5 flights...



Curious.  So how many aircraft can a pilot stay current on simultaneously?

And ERC - re CAS - as much as I like tweaking Loachman from time to time, he and you are, in my opinion, on the right track with respect to focusing the Canadian effort on the Attack Helicopter.  The US is a different case.  

In fact, with respect to helicopters in general, I would be inclined to turn our current 2/3 medium, 1/3 light structure on its head and make it 2/3 light (helo) and 1/3 medium-heavy.  The helo force has a lot more utility in Canada's frozen, forested and maritime areas, in peace, war and civil insurgency, than TAPVs and LAVs.  It also offers expeditionary opportunities that complement TAPVs and LAVs.


----------



## Kirkhill

From the Defence Budget thread.

[quoteJust for reference - the senate called for 36 Chinooks and one AH for each Chinook - apparently in the senate that equates to 24 AH.

Loachman, how would you feel about 36 AH-1Zs and upping the CH-146s to the UH-1Y configuration?  Don't adjust the number of flying squadrons or pilots.  Just adjust the inventory.[/quote]

Working on the assumption that a helicopter is an engine furiously spinning inefficient wings to keep a weight dangling underneath it from hitting the ground I am going to assume that bigger is better.

The CH-146 uses a TwinPak PT6T-3D(??) that puts out something like 932 kW total according to Wiki and that engine can keep a total mass of 5355 kg in the air until the gas runs out.

The Old UH-1N using the same TwinPak was only expected to keep a total of 4763 kg flying  

So the CH-146 powerplant was expected to lift 5355 Canadian kg instead of 4763 American kg - I assume that is some sort of cross-border discount of some sort.

When the USMC "Converted" their UH-1Ns they replaced the 932 kW engine with a pair of 1150 kw engines for a total output of 2300 kw.   Or 150% more than the CH-146.

That means that aircraft with the same registration numbers increased their all up weights from 4763 American kg to 8390 American kg.  Or almost double the load lifting capacity as the UH-1Ns.

Any of that sound about right to you and G2G?


----------



## GK .Dundas

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> From the Defence Budget thread.
> 
> [quoteJust for reference - the senate called for 36 Chinooks and one AH for each Chinook - apparently in the senate that equates to 24 AH.
> 
> Loachman, how would you feel about 36 AH-1Zs and upping the CH-146s to the UH-1Y configuration?  Don't adjust the number of flying squadrons or pilots.  Just adjust the inventory.
> 
> Working on the assumption that a helicopter is an engine furiously spinning inefficient wings to keep a weight dangling underneath it from hitting the ground I am going to assume that bigger is better.
> 
> The CH-146 uses a TwinPak PT6T-3D(??) that puts out something like 932 kW total according to Wiki and that engine can keep a total mass of 5355 kg in the air until the gas runs out.
> 
> The Old UH-1N using the same TwinPak was only expected to keep a total of 4763 kg flying
> 
> So the CH-146 powerplant was expected to lift 5355 Canadian kg instead of 4763 American kg - I assume that is some sort of cross-border discount of some sort.
> 
> When the USMC "Converted" their UH-1Ns they replaced the 932 kW engine with a pair of 1150 kw engines for a total output of 2300 kw.   Or 150% more than the CH-146.
> 
> That means that aircraft with the same registration numbers increased their all up weights from 4763 American kg to 8390 American kg.  Or almost double the load lifting capacity as the UH-1Ns.
> 
> Any of that sound about right to you and G2G?


 Actually the one thing that doesn't get mentioned much is that the UH 1 Y are almost all new builds .
 It seems that Marines are play fast and loose with this programme.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Curious.  So how many aircraft can a pilot stay current on simultaneously?
> 
> And ERC - re CAS - as much as I like tweaking Loachman from time to time, he and you are, in my opinion, on the right track with respect to focusing the Canadian effort on the Attack Helicopter.  The US is a different case.
> 
> In fact, with respect to helicopters in general, I would be inclined to turn our current 2/3 medium, 1/3 light structure on its head and make it 2/3 light (helo) and 1/3 medium-heavy.  The helo force has a lot more utility in Canada's frozen, forested and maritime areas, in peace, war and civil insurgency, than TAPVs and LAVs.  It also offers expeditionary opportunities that complement TAPVs and LAVs.



I am current on two and will be on three. You can maintain basic currency on all but can probably effectively maintain tactical proficiency on one, unless tactics are somewhat transferable in which case you can probably do two.


----------



## SupersonicMax

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> wow, that's impressive and a good thing. Is that specifically for transitioning to the F-35 or in general? I had read that the F-35 was an easy plane to fly



All modern fighters are relatively easy to fly.  Fighting (ie: managing the systems and the formation) is what makes it difficult.  A lot of the skills required to fly and fight the Hornet are transferable to the JSF.  Most of the tactical things can be effectively learned in the sim.


----------



## Kirkhill

GK .Dundas said:
			
		

> Actually the one thing that doesn't get mentioned much is that the UH 1 Y are almost all new builds .
> It seems that Marines are play fast and loose with this programme.



You say that like it is a bad thing.

Edit: And thanks Max.


----------



## Kirkhill

Just a quick google around the multiverse got me this graph of Power vs Weight for some of the helicopters under discussion.

See attachment below.

Ready for corrections.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

SupersonicMax said:
			
		

> All modern fighters are relatively easy to fly.  Fighting (ie: managing the systems and the formation) is what makes it difficult.  A lot of the skills required to fly and fight the Hornet are transferable to the JSF.  Most of the tactical things can be effectively learned in the sim.



Do you think that having an opportunity to fly an aircraft like the A-29 on a part time basis after doing a full time stint as a pilot would appeal to many in the fighter pilot community?


----------



## Good2Golf

Chris, I'm not sure where the 36 CH-147F and AH came from...I don't think that's feasible, and the mix isn't right.  Like Loachman alluded too, if we had the luxury, we'd have a blend.  If I were king for a day, I'd have 16 Chinooks, 24-32 AH and 48 UH (UH-60 class).  One Chinook unit, two AH and three(four?) Utility Squadrons.  Utility will do the greatest number of rounds, so you want them to have the greatest rotational depth.  The Chinooks may go out at sub-unit level and likely even section-level for sustained ops, so 4-6 aircraft non-surge is about as much as the unit could support on an ongoing basis.  AH should not be tied to specific numbers of escorted/protected CH/UH, but rather from how much AH capacity is required for the Area of Operations and the threat level to provide a secure means of the CH and UH o operate.  Loachman could probably provide more about that bit, but something in between the CH and UH fleet sizes is about right for what Canada _could_ put out the door as a sustained combat-capable middle-power force if it were firing on all cylinders (which it isn't at the moment.)

:2c:

Cheers
G2G


----------



## Kirkhill

Thanks G2G

The 36 CH147s came from the senate report.  As did the two conflicting statements:  "24 AH"  and "One AH per escorted CH-147"

"The government should consider a plan to keep 40 Griffons in place, and add to our helicopter
fleet 24 new attack helicopters, one to protect each Chinook, while on deployment. " p.16

"AIRFORCE INVESTMENTS (Page 13)
The air defence of the continent and the provision of an effective Air Force capability are
core requirements for the defence of Canada. A number of specific investments should be
made to support the Royal Canadian Air Force as defence spending is increased to the
required 2% of GDP by 2028. The committee recommends that these steps include:
• the renewal of the current North Warning System which is now some 30 years old;
• *an increase of the fighter jet fleet to 120 jets in order to meet the government’s
declared objective to defend Canada while simultaneously meeting our NORAD and
NATO commitments;*
• replacement of the current fleet of air-refuelling tankers in order to support fighter jets;
• replacing the Griffon helicopter fleet with non-civilian, medium-to-heavy-lift military
helicopters with sufficient speed and lift capacity to support military needs;
• *increasing the number of heavy-lift helicopters to 36*; and
• *adding new capabilities, such as a fleet of 24 attack helicopters to protect the current
Chinook helicopter fleet and our military personnel*. "  Executive Summary p vii

I also highlighted the fighter call.  If the rules have changed to NORAD AND NATO as opposed to NORAD OR NATO then the "requirement" is not 65, or even 83 but, apparently, 120.

But all of these questions are "how long is a piece of string" questions.  As long as you need it.  As long as you want it.  Are we deploying a Baltic Air Patrol, a Kosovo Squadron, a Gulf War 1 Wing or 1 CAD?


----------



## Loachman

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> My point wasn't really about the cost of the F-35 but it's cost versus the alternatives



What difference does cost make if the machine purchased cannot do the job required in a high-threat environment? We still require air defence aircraft, so that would add the costs and penalties of two fleets vice one.



			
				suffolkowner said:
			
		

> Yes, and we already have 24 Tutors, 25 Harvards, and 16 Hawks that have never fired a shot in anger



The Tutors entered service at the same time as the Sea Kings. They have no hard points for weapons, and are underpowered for an armed role. The Malaysian light attack version had a more powerful engine. Parts are scarce, so aircraft are cannibalized to keep the Snowbirds flying. The Snowbirds have a higher priority than some operational fleets.

We do not own the Harvards and Hawks. If we did, and re-roled those, what, then, would be used as trainers?



			
				suffolkowner said:
			
		

> a manned aircraft may be preferable



If one wants to carry effective loads and do combatty things, then manned aircraft will be essential for quite some time to come.


----------



## Loachman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> The CH-146 uses a TwinPak PT6T-3D(??) that puts out something like 932 kW total according to Wiki and that engine can keep a total mass of 5355 kg in the air until the gas runs out.



Can you use real units of measure like pounds and horsepower?

And keep this thread on topic?


----------



## Kirkhill

Sir. Yes Sir.  [


----------



## McG

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> Yes, and we already have 24 Tutors, 25 Harvards, and 16 Hawks that have never fired a shot in anger


But that is not the cost of what you are proposing.  Those are training platforms.  Even if you replace them all with a common platform capable of dropping bombs, you still have not created the capability that you want.  Your common platform replacement would have to be taken away from its primary job to go fight an enemy that could be handled by more capable aircraft with the sole job of killing things.  If you really want a cheap aircraft to throw bombs at things, then you need to buy more and create a squadron with the mission to operate those aircraft in the combat role.  You need to allocate people, infrastructure, spare &a replacement parts, and other support equipment.  At this point, your "cheap" aircraft is stealing resources from somewhere else in the defence organization.  So what do you cut to get this?


----------



## suffolkowner

What difference does cost make if the machine purchased cannot do the job required in a high-threat environment? We still require air defence aircraft, so that would add the costs and penalties of two fleets vice one. 

Obviously the aircraft would only be useful in limited engagements but so are attack helicopters and ucav's

Quote from: suffolkowner on Yesterday at 08:40:42
Yes, and we already have 24 Tutors, 25 Harvards, and 16 Hawks that have never fired a shot in anger

The Tutors entered service at the same time as the Sea Kings. They have no hard points for weapons, and are underpowered for an armed role. The Malaysian light attack version had a more powerful engine. Parts are scarce, so aircraft are cannibalized to keep the Snowbirds flying. The Snowbirds have a higher priority than some operational fleets.

We do not own the Harvards and Hawks. If we did, and re-roled those, what, then, would be used as trainers?

The tutors and Hawks I am assuming are going to be replaced with a common platform T-X(?) so that would/could allow funds to be reinvested elsewhere assuming the Snowbirds continue and if we get rid of the Snowbirds even better. Alternatively Harvards/AT-6 would/could be used and benefit from the above as well.

Whether we own or lease is just an accounting decision. 

Loachman, MCG don't get me wrong I'm just brain-farting I mean brain-storming [lol: at some point the cost differential in operating has to be worthwhile,especially since these platforms already in service, depending I guess on the ability of pilots to maintain qualifications on different platforms. Maybe we are just too small an airforce in which case I can't see the point in attack helicopters or ucavs either


----------



## Colin Parkinson

One can argue that if we only get 65 fighters, then the need for a secondary attack aircraft either jet/prop/rotor is going manifest itself in the near future. The RCAF will not risk it's primary airframes in altitudes where it's at risk from ADA and Manpads. We will be dependent on our Allies even more for that function. The question would be how to build that groundattack/close support within the political, existing resources and budgetary means that we have. Buying more "trainers" that happen to have numerous hard points may be the way around the political problems and could be sold by having them built mostly in Canada through a licensed deal.


----------



## SupersonicMax

Colin P said:
			
		

> One can argue that if we only get 65 fighters, then the need for a secondary attack aircraft either jet/prop/rotor is going manifest itself in the near future. The RCAF will not risk it's primary airframes in altitudes where it's at risk from ADA and Manpads. We will be dependent on our Allies even more for that function. The question would be how to build that groundattack/close support within the political, existing resources and budgetary means that we have. Buying more "trainers" that happen to have numerous hard points may be the way around the political problems and could be sold by having them built mostly in Canada through a licensed deal.



Do you qualify the instructors in the tactical roles?  If so, how do you manage to keep pilot production going?  They are already operating at near max capacity to generate the minimum of pilots every year.  Maintaining tactical proficiency is no small feat.

I disagree that we wouldn't operate our JSF in face of ADA/Manpads.  It is meant to operate in a contested airspace.  I don't see where the need for more CAS is.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

"Trainers" would be a term used to get them approved, real usage would be different, you have to make the politicians feel comfortable if you want more airframes. I don't share your confidence in our senior commanders risking their precious aircraft in what they think is a secondary and likely unnecessary role with higher risk. I suspect any support given to ground troops will be from altitude.


----------



## Kirkhill

I'm feeling devilish this morning, and thus....

Aircraft are tools.  Pilots can fly more than one type of aircraft. Fast mover pilots are trained on slow moving planes.  

So, if the planes that the fast movers trained on, planes that were selected because they were both economical to operate and that shared characteristics with the fast movers that made the transition between planes easier, if those planes were also capable of conducting operations in a permissive environment then what would be the cost of adding more Training aircraft to the inventory?

The pilots could be the same fast mover pilots reassigned to a different platform.  ie When a six-pack or squadron gets tasked overseas then that body of pilots is lost to the RCAF/NORAD mission in North America.  Regardless of what aircraft they are flying.  They can either be flying $100,000,000 F18Es and burning them up at a capital depreciation rate of $10,000 per hour, plus operating costs in $20,000 per hour range or they can be flying the same $10,000,000 aircraft they did their primary training on at a flying cost of closer to $2,000 per hour.  That equates to 10 times more air support time over the burning sands of Araby.

Or the pilots could be Reserve pilots.

The low cost aircraft turning circles in the sky also means that the high cost aircraft will last longer, taking more years to burn up their available flying hours.


----------



## suffolkowner

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I'm feeling devilish this morning, and thus....
> 
> Aircraft are tools.  Pilots can fly more than one type of aircraft. Fast mover pilots are trained on slow moving planes.
> 
> So, if the planes that the fast movers trained on, planes that were selected because they were both economical to operate and that shared characteristics with the fast movers that made the transition between planes easier, if those planes were also capable of conducting operations in a permissive environment then what would be the cost of adding more Training aircraft to the inventory?
> 
> The pilots could be the same fast mover pilots reassigned to a different platform.  ie When a six-pack or squadron gets tasked overseas then that body of pilots is lost to the RCAF/NORAD mission in North America.  Regardless of what aircraft they are flying.  They can either be flying $100,000,000 F18Es and burning them up at a capital depreciation rate of $10,000 per hour, plus operating costs in $20,000 per hour range or they can be flying the same $10,000,000 aircraft they did their primary training on at a flying cost of closer to $2,000 per hour.  That equates to 10 times more air support time over the burning sands of Araby.
> 
> Or the pilots could be Reserve pilots.
> 
> The low cost aircraft turning circles in the sky also means that the high cost aircraft will last longer, taking more years to burn up their available flying hours.



This is what I think as well, but...

Former CASR proposal 
https://defencemuse.wordpress.com/2017/01/24/rcaf-cf-156b-for-the-coin-role/


----------



## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I'm feeling devilish this morning, and thus....
> 
> Aircraft are tools.  Pilots can fly more than one type of aircraft. Fast mover pilots are trained on slow moving planes.
> 
> So, if the planes that the fast movers trained on, planes that were selected because they were both economical to operate and that shared characteristics with the fast movers that made the transition between planes easier, if those planes were also capable of conducting operations in a permissive environment then what would be the cost of adding more Training aircraft to the inventory?
> 
> The pilots could be the same fast mover pilots reassigned to a different platform.  ie When a six-pack or squadron gets tasked overseas then that body of pilots is lost to the RCAF/NORAD mission in North America.  Regardless of what aircraft they are flying.  They can either be flying $100,000,000 F18Es and burning them up at a capital depreciation rate of $10,000 per hour, plus operating costs in $20,000 per hour range or they can be flying the same $10,000,000 aircraft they did their primary training on at a flying cost of closer to $2,000 per hour.  That equates to 10 times more air support time over the burning sands of Araby.
> 
> Or the pilots could be Reserve pilots.
> 
> The low cost aircraft turning circles in the sky also means that the high cost aircraft will last longer, taking more years to burn up their available flying hours.



One problem that might pop up in Canada: the government points to the cheaper planes and says 'if they do what you need them to do, then fly those instead of the expensive ones' and we lose the fast jet fleet.'


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I suspect that is what is driving most of the internal workings of the senior RCAF command and their backers. I would say that any jet/prop ground support airframe can only come after the fighter selection has happened and the memories have faded a bit, baring a really nasty conflict where we need something but there is no political appetite to deploy top line fighters.


----------



## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> One problem that might pop up in Canada: the government points to the cheaper planes and says 'if they do what you need them to do, then fly those instead of the expensive ones' and we lose the fast jet fleet.'



Agreed.  That is a definite risk.


----------



## McG

Colin P said:
			
		

> One can argue that if we only get 65 fighters, then the need for a secondary attack aircraft either jet/prop/rotor is going manifest itself in the near future. The RCAF will not risk it's primary airframes in altitudes where it's at risk from ADA and Manpads. We will be dependent on our Allies even more for that function. The question would be how to build that groundattack/close support within the political, existing resources and budgetary means that we have. Buying more "trainers" that happen to have numerous hard points may be the way around the political problems and could be sold by having them built mostly in Canada through a licensed deal.


So, when it is too dangerous for the Super Hornet or F-35, you would send in the cheap aircraft?  Or are you arguing an alternate CoA of buying an expensive dedicated CAS aircraft that is capable of fighting against a near-peer threat?



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> "Trainers" would be a term used to get them approved, real usage would be different, you have to make the politicians feel comfortable …


Lying to TB and cabinet is a good way to undermine our credibility.  The CAF would forever be doubted and every new requirement fought and resisted.  We don’t want that.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> So, if the planes that the fast movers trained on, planes that were selected because they were both economical to operate and that shared characteristics with the fast movers that made the transition between planes easier, if those planes were also capable of conducting operations in a permissive environment then what would be the cost of adding more Training aircraft to the inventory?


Aside from the initial procurement cost?  The infrastructure to house more aircraft.  The technicians (and all their costs including pay & training or opportunity cost of not using the PY somewhere else).  More YFR (which means fuel, parts, etc) for pilots to maintain currency on two different aircraft types, and the cost of the ammunition that these planes will use in training.  Potentially there is trade-off on pilot proficiency when their focus is on a specific fighter platform or when they are splitting their time across two.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Or the pilots could be Reserve pilots.


Why? What problem does this address?  Is a platform flown entirely by reservists actually deployable, or does this become a capability that exists for the glory of itself?  You still have the infrastructure, YFR, support PYs, and now Class A pay that has to go into this.  What are capability do you take away from to do this?

I get that the plane may be substantially cheaper itself as an initial capital cost, but …
When your wife comes home with a new fashion accessory that was neither needed nor wanted when she left the house, did she really save you $100 “because it was half off” or did she spend the $100 that was going to be a new saw for the basement reno?


----------



## dapaterson

MCG said:
			
		

> I get that the plane may be substantially cheaper itself as an initial capital cost, but …
> When your wife comes home with a new fashion accessory that was neither needed nor wanted when she left the house, did she really save you $100 “because it was half off” or did she spend the $100 that was going to be a new saw for the basement reno?



Or are you now going to spend hundreds more on a dress and shoes to go along with that accessory?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

MCG said:
			
		

> So, when it is too dangerous for the Super Hornet or F-35, you would send in the cheap aircraft?  Or are you arguing an alternate CoA of buying an expensive dedicated CAS aircraft that is capable of fighting against a near-peer threat?
> Lying to TB and cabinet is a good way to undermine our credibility.  The CAF would forever be doubted and every new requirement fought and resisted.  We don’t want that.
> Aside from the initial procurement cost?  The infrastructure to house more aircraft.  The technicians (and all their costs including pay & training or opportunity cost of not using the PY somewhere else).  More YFR (which means fuel, parts, etc) for pilots to maintain currency on two different aircraft types, and the cost of the ammunition that these planes will use in training.  Potentially there is trade-off on pilot proficiency when their focus is on a specific fighter platform or when they are splitting their time across two.
> Why? What problem does this address?  Is a platform flown entirely by reservists actually deployable, or does this become a capability that exists for the glory of itself?  You still have the infrastructure, YFR, support PYs, and now Class A pay that has to go into this.  What are capability do you take away from to do this?
> 
> I get that the plane may be substantially cheaper itself as an initial capital cost, but …
> When your wife comes home with a new fashion accessory that was neither needed nor wanted when she left the house, did she really save you $100 “because it was half off” or did she spend the $100 that was going to be a new saw for the basement reno?



You assume DND has any credibility with a Liberal Cabinet? As for the environment, sending a F35 into the weeds places at risk from threats aided by the visual acquisition which would negate one of it's biggest features which is stealth, so yes I don't see it being allowed to conduct that type of strikes and the ammo load for the inboard cannon is rather limited anyways. I do see it sitting up high using it's sensors and guided munitions to good effect. The other aspect is that if we go to places like Mali and you suddenly discover we need close ground support, there might not be enough room to run large fighter or the political will to send them. Depending how they are named "Light support Aircraft" or "Ground Support/Trainer aircraft" that may be more palatable to the public and therefore the politicians. I rather see our guys supported by a A29/Hawk or AH than nothing and that is what I fear will happen if we get the F-35's.


----------



## GR66

suffolkowner said:
			
		

> This is what I think as well, but...
> 
> Former CASR proposal
> https://defencemuse.wordpress.com/2017/01/24/rcaf-cf-156b-for-the-coin-role/



On the surface, this proposal appears to my inexperienced brain to at least have some possible merit.  I'd be very interested in hearing what the experienced people here feel about it.    

Replace the Griffons with AT-6Bs (or something similar) when they eventually require replacement.  You're replacing one airframe with another, not adding a new fleet to the existing mix.  Added bonus that it's an aircraft our pilots are already trained on.  Pilot and maintainer numbers wouldn't have to change, so once the transition to the new airframe is completed no real change in infrastructure and staffing (assuming similar numbers of aircraft).  

I'm sure that there are things that the AT-6B can't do that a Griffon can, but I also imagine that the AT-6B would add some capabilities that do not currently exist for the CF.  I think the key to making this work would be to combine this with the Senate recommendation for a new fleet of utility helicopters.  That would (hopefully) maintain some of the capabilities that would otherwise by losing the Griffon.

So the Senate Plan seems to call for:  Keep 40 of 95 Griffons.  Replace 55 of 95 Griffons with non-civilian medium/heavy lift helicopters.  Add 24 AH (giving us 40 x Griffons, 55 x UH and 24 x AH).  What if instead we eliminated the Griffons completely and replaced them with 40 x AT-6Bs and 55 x UH.  No net increase in airframes.  AT-6Bs give some added CAS capability in addition to being able to escort the Chinooks instead of the planned new AH's.  The UH's have better lift capability than the Griffon's they are replacing.  Some streamlining in training in that pilots are already qualified on the AT-6 (although not the tactical elements).

What are the major issues with this idea?  What do we gain and what do we lose?


----------



## Kirkhill

OK.  GR66, you go too far.  DAP you go too far the other direction.



> On the surface, this proposal appears to my inexperienced brain to at least have some possible merit.  I'd be very interested in hearing what the experienced people here feel about it.
> 
> Replace the Griffons with AT-6Bs (or something similar) when they eventually require replacement.  You're replacing one airframe with another, not adding a new fleet to the existing mix.  Added bonus that it's an aircraft our pilots are already trained on.  Pilot and maintainer numbers wouldn't have to change, so once the transition to the new airframe is completed no real change in infrastructure and staffing (assuming similar numbers of aircraft).
> 
> I'm sure that there are things that the AT-6B can't do that a Griffon can, but I also imagine that the AT-6B would add some capabilities that do not currently exist for the CF.  I think the key to making this work would be to combine this with the Senate recommendation for a new fleet of utility helicopters.  That would (hopefully) maintain some of the capabilities that would otherwise by losing the Griffon.
> 
> So the Senate Plan seems to call for:  Keep 40 of 95 Griffons.  Replace 55 of 95 Griffons with non-civilian medium/heavy lift helicopters.  Add 24 AH (giving us 40 x Griffons, 55 x UH and 24 x AH).  What if instead we eliminated the Griffons completely and replaced them with 40 x AT-6Bs and 55 x UH.  No net increase in airframes.  AT-6Bs give some added CAS capability in addition to being able to escort the Chinooks instead of the planned new AH's.  The UH's have better lift capability than the Griffon's they are replacing.  Some streamlining in training in that pilots are already qualified on the AT-6 (although not the tactical elements).
> 
> What are the major issues with this idea?  What do we gain and what do we lose?



This is not a matter of replacing Griffons with a cheap fixed wing solution.  I would set the Griffon replacement issue to the side.  Yes helicopters can supply Close Air Support but they are also pricey to run and too valuable when needed to burn them up unless you have to.  If you are going to get more helicopters make them more capable and replace the 1 tonne pickups that we call Griffons with something in the Deuce and Half range like the UH1Y/AH1Z - UH60/AH-64 which can haul sections rather than teams.  The CH-147 hauls platoons.



> Quote from: Chris Pook on Today at 10:35:13
> So, if the planes that the fast movers trained on, planes that were selected because they were both economical to operate and that shared characteristics with the fast movers that made the transition between planes easier, if those planes were also capable of conducting operations in a permissive environment then what would be the cost of adding more Training aircraft to the inventory?
> 
> Response from DAP
> 
> Aside from the initial procurement cost?  The infrastructure to house more aircraft.  The technicians (and all their costs including pay & training or opportunity cost of not using the PY somewhere else).  More YFR (which means fuel, parts, etc) for pilots to maintain currency on two different aircraft types, and the cost of the ammunition that these planes will use in training.  Potentially there is trade-off on pilot proficiency when their focus is on a specific fighter platform or when they are splitting their time across two.



All offset against the cost of operating, and burning out, a small fleet of high-end, high-cost aircraft that are being under utilized and having to replace them sooner.



> Quote from: Chris Pook on Today at 10:35:13
> 
> Or the pilots could be Reserve pilots.
> 
> Response from DAP
> 
> Why? What problem does this address?  Is a platform flown entirely by reservists actually deployable, or does this become a capability that exists for the glory of itself?  You still have the infrastructure, YFR, support PYs, and now Class A pay that has to go into this.  What are capability do you take away from to do this?



I'm not talking about making the AT-6 or similar a "Reserve" aircraft.  I am talking about supplying the RCAF with more aircraft to fly which in turn will require more pilots.  Some of which, both high end and low end, could be Reserve pilots.

I would also suggest that seeing as how the T-6/CT-156 is employed to train all manner of pilots then all manner of pilots could conceivably fly them in the field in permissive environments



> Canada’s student pilots prove their mettle in the CT-156 Harvard II. This agile turboprop trainer is the aircraft of choice for the early stages of the NATO Flying Training in Canada (NFTC) program.
> 
> Boasting an impressive thrust-to-weight ratio, the CT-156 has an initial climb rate of about 1km per minute. It can handle sustained 2G turns at an altitude of 7,500 metres. The Harvard II’s fully pressurized cockpit features an Electronic Flight Instrumentation System (EFIS) and a Global Positioning System (GPS).
> 
> The aircraft is ideally suited to help new pilots move seamlessly from basic flight training to high-performance jet training. Its performance, combined with its advanced cockpit layout and agile handling, make it an ideal stepping stone toward advanced training phases.
> 
> NFTC students log about 95 hours on the Harvard II. After successful basic training, the pilots are streamed into the fighter, multi-engine or helicopter programs.


http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/aircraft-current/ct-156.page

Yes. I know we don't own them. But we could.  Yes. I know we don't maintain them.  And that is a plus.  Field maintenance would need to be handled separately.  As for accommodation.  Any hangar.  Any field.


The provision of the AT-6 would mean that in low risk environments the aircraft could deploy independently with UAVs.  In higher risk environments a deployment of 6 pack of f35s and a 6 pack of AT-6s would allow the F35s to stay on the ground while the AT-6 did the stooging around, the target assessment and marking and the initial engagement and spot the F35s if necessary. Meanwhile the F35s are saving valuable flight hours for the high threat environments where they will be really needed, and for our own local NORAD commitments.

Horses in the stable.  Tools in the toolbox.  Just for once, get out of the logistics mindset and stop trying to convert everything into a problem that a single hammer can solve.   [

Craftsmen need tools.  And a variety of tools. Tools cost money.  [cheers]


----------



## Edward Campbell

GR66 said:
			
		

> On the surface, this proposal appears to my inexperienced brain to at least have some possible merit.  I'd be very interested in hearing what the experienced people here feel about it.
> 
> Replace the Griffons with AT-6Bs (or something similar) when they eventually require replacement.  You're replacing one airframe with another, not adding a new fleet to the existing mix.  Added bonus that it's an aircraft our pilots are already trained on.  Pilot and maintainer numbers wouldn't have to change, so once the transition to the new airframe is completed no real change in infrastructure and staffing (assuming similar numbers of aircraft).
> 
> I'm sure that there are things that the AT-6B can't do that a Griffon can, but I also imagine that the AT-6B would add some capabilities that do not currently exist for the CF.  I think the key to making this work would be to combine this with the Senate recommendation for a new fleet of utility helicopters.  That would (hopefully) maintain some of the capabilities that would otherwise by losing the Griffon.
> 
> So the Senate Plan seems to call for:  Keep 40 of 95 Griffons.  Replace 55 of 95 Griffons with non-civilian medium/heavy lift helicopters.  Add 24 AH (giving us 40 x Griffons, 55 x UH and 24 x AH).  What if instead we eliminated the Griffons completely and replaced them with 40 x AT-6Bs and 55 x UH.  No net increase in airframes.  AT-6Bs give some added CAS capability in addition to being able to escort the Chinooks instead of the planned new AH's.  The UH's have better lift capability than the Griffon's they are replacing.  Some streamlining in training in that pilots are already qualified on the AT-6 (although not the tactical elements).
> 
> What are the major issues with this idea?  What do we gain and what do we lose?




But, surely, the Army requires a replacement for the _Griffon_ that does, substantially, the same sort of thing the _Griffon_ does, in roughly similar ways, except faster, better, cheaper, etc, etc, etc ... i.e. a new, better helicopter, or a fleet of helicopters to meet multiple roles ...


----------



## suffolkowner

GR66 said:
			
		

> On the surface, this proposal appears to my inexperienced brain to at least have some possible merit.  I'd be very interested in hearing what the experienced people here feel about it.
> 
> Replace the Griffons with AT-6Bs (or something similar) when they eventually require replacement.  You're replacing one airframe with another, not adding a new fleet to the existing mix.  Added bonus that it's an aircraft our pilots are already trained on.  Pilot and maintainer numbers wouldn't have to change, so once the transition to the new airframe is completed no real change in infrastructure and staffing (assuming similar numbers of aircraft).
> 
> I'm sure that there are things that the AT-6B can't do that a Griffon can, but I also imagine that the AT-6B would add some capabilities that do not currently exist for the CF.  I think the key to making this work would be to combine this with the Senate recommendation for a new fleet of utility helicopters.  That would (hopefully) maintain some of the capabilities that would otherwise by losing the Griffon.
> 
> So the Senate Plan seems to call for:  Keep 40 of 95 Griffons.  Replace 55 of 95 Griffons with non-civilian medium/heavy lift helicopters.  Add 24 AH (giving us 40 x Griffons, 55 x UH and 24 x AH).  What if instead we eliminated the Griffons completely and replaced them with 40 x AT-6Bs and 55 x UH.  No net increase in airframes.  AT-6Bs give some added CAS capability in addition to being able to escort the Chinooks instead of the planned new AH's.  The UH's have better lift capability than the Griffon's they are replacing.  Some streamlining in training in that pilots are already qualified on the AT-6 (although not the tactical elements).
> 
> What are the major issues with this idea?  What do we gain and what do we lose?



I was more agreeing with chris and just added the link for info purposes. How feasible is it for an AT-6 to do helicopter escort? Right off the bat I'm thinking you would need bigger footprint to accompany the runway. I can't see us adding multiple helicopter types either

Doing Chinook escort with an AT-6 is definitely going to be controversial and was just one role envisioned. The AT-6 would at least have the speed to keep up with the Chinooks.

The article proposed 16 AT-6 each at Cold Lake and Bagotville another 12 for 431 and 6 spares effectively keeping the aircraft frames the same but getting rid of one aircraft type. There might be some personnel savings involved by using a common modern aircraft (431=80 pers?)


----------



## Loachman

GR66 said:
			
		

> On the surface, this proposal appears to my _*inexperienced*_ brain to at least have some possible merit.





			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> I'd be very interested in hearing what the experienced people here feel about it.



We've already been saying it.

Nobody's listening.

The notion of trying to use something fast-moving and high with limited downward visibility and fixed-forward weaponry to escort helicopters is ludicrous, and completely impossible in a high-threat environment. I picked up a lot of suspicious activity with my naked eye, ahead of and downwards on my side of the machine, while flying two six-month Police helicopter trials (Peel Region and Toronto), as I could see a large area. The Police observer was generally looking at too small an area with the thermal imager.

I would not pay much attention to CASR. They will never have to do this for real.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> Replace the Griffons with AT-6Bs (or something similar) when they eventually require replacement.  You're replacing one airframe with another, not adding a new fleet to the existing mix.  Added bonus that it's an aircraft our pilots are already trained on.  Pilot and maintainer numbers wouldn't have to change, so once the transition to the new airframe is completed no real change in infrastructure and staffing (assuming similar numbers of aircraft).



Fixed to runways - don't believe anything about austere/rough/unprepared airfields. Unable to provide close escort to other hels. Unable to provide close convoy escort. Unable to provide really close fire support to ground troops (I have seen video of Griffon and Kiowa crews engage Taliban at approximately 100 metres). Unable to carry passengers, including casualties. Unable to move cargo. Unable to use terrain and vegetation for concealment. Waste of money. Utility helicopters exist for good reason. "CF156s" do not. We do not have enough UHs to meet demand now. Fewer would be stupid. We do not have any "CF156s" now. More would be stupid.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> I also imagine that the AT-6B would add some capabilities that do not currently exist for the CF.



Such as?



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> I think the key to making this work



There is _*no*_ key to making the unworkable work.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> combine this with the Senate recommendation for a new fleet of utility helicopters.  That would (hopefully) maintain some of the capabilities that would otherwise by losing the Griffon.



If we are to buy a new fleet of utility helicopters, then we are replacing our old/current utility helicopters (Griffon) with those.

You wish to add another fleet on top of that, and another fleet that does not give us any capability that we do not already have.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> So the Senate Plan seems to call for:  Keep 40 of 95 Griffons.



Some of those Griffons are used as trainers in Portage La Prairie. Some are used as local SAR aircraft at fighter bases and Trenton. Some are used by 427 Squadron in the SOF role. Two are used as tech-training aircraft and do not fly. This would completely remove all UHs from 1 Wing. As a side effect, it would eliminate 1 Wing as a feeder community for 427 Squadron, both for crews and spare machines.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> Replace 55 of 95 Griffons with non-civilian medium/heavy lift helicopters.



Too big for the general-purpose tactical role and many humanitarian operations. Two expensive for many roles. More rotorwash. Can't stuff as many into a C17 (one Chinook or three Griffon, and the Chinook requires a lot more time and people to make it fit in and re-assemble it when it comes out again at the other end; it's not fun to do that in rain and snow absent hangars, as some places are).



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> Add 24 AH



No sound reason has been stated for that number. It is too small to be sustainable. Thirty-two to thirty-six would be my minimum number.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> (giving us 40 x Griffons, 55 x UH and 24 x AH).



None of those 40 Griffons would be Tac Hel, as I explained. And Griffons _*are*_ UHs. The senate is talking about very expensive, big, fat, juicy target helicopters and should not be considered to be knowledgeable on this matter.

Eggs and baskets. We almost lost around thirty to thirty-five lucky eggs in this basket: http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/flight-safety/article-template-flight-safety.page?doc=ch147202-chinook-epilogue-flight-safety-investigation-report/hl6j9ilb . A few US Chinooks, crews, and passengers were not so lucky.

A lost fully-loaded Griffon or other UH would see eleven deaths max, and three others would deliver their troops. The effect on a particular mission, the units involved, and public and political will should not be underestimated.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> What if instead we eliminated the Griffons completely and replaced them with 40 x AT-6Bs and 55 x UH.



Griffons _*are*_ UHs. AT-6Bs cannot carry troops into battle, deliver cargo to forward areas in close proximity to an enemy, pick up casualties, perform SOF tasks, or pick up downed fighter pilots in Cold Lake, Bagotville, or Goose Bay, or lost/injured civilians across the Country, or assist in disaster relief, or operate away from runways.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> AT-6Bs give some added CAS capability



F35 can do it better, and defend against enemy aircraft on top of that. UHs give some CCA (Close Combat Attack) capability. Our Griffons were quite potent in that regard in Kandahar.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> able to escort the Chinooks



Nope.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> The UH's have better lift capability than the Griffon's they are replacing.



Griffons _*are*_ UHs. Just not the best UHs. UH-60 or UH-1Y would be better choices.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> Some streamlining in training in that pilots are already qualified on the AT-6 (although not the tactical elements).



Not a significant factor.

We could eliminate the Harvard phase from the Helicopter Pilot training programme and achieve far greater efficiencies. We had that programme when we trained Jamaica Defence Force Pilots in Portage. An extended seized-wing training programme like our current one is wasteful (time and money) and adds no benefit. It's just useless a** f**ce tradition.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> What do we gain



Nothing.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> and what do we lose?



A lot of money at best and the next war at worst.


----------



## a_majoor

This thread[color] talks about a precision strike capability for the Aurora and C-130. I suspect it would be quite possible to mount the USMC strike "kit" on our C-130's and bring some extra fire support in lower threat environments without a great deal of fuss ad bother.

The other option which occurs to me is the low observable "pod" designed for the Advanced Super Hornet concept. Placing one of these under the wing would provide room to carry munitions, and the low observable aspect of the pod would provide a nasty surprise for anyone thinking they are on to a lumbering transport (if the pod is armed with AAMs), or even ground observers thinking its only a transport....


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Loachman, what do you think of the 2 helo's that the CCG just bought the 412 and 429?


----------



## Kirkhill

I get that we could hang 2000 lb missiles from a 150,000 lb lifter with four engines and five or more people on board but why would we?

Like the article on the Navy I posted "The missile is the thing".  What does it take to get the missile from the warehouse to the target in the most timely way possible?

And here I am using "missile" in its generic form:  dumb or guided or smart, unpowered or externally powere or internally powered.

If I am going to hire five people and maintain them, along with maintaining four engines why wouldn't I consider the option of hanging them at four different spots in the sky, at the same time or four different times?   Especially if the types of targets being plinked only require a 20 kg ViperStrike or even a 15 kg APKWS 70mm delivered once in a while?

Burning up engine time and air frame hours to supply a couple of firing platforms doesn't make sense to me, especially if that platform could be divided into smaller ones, perhaps even accompanied by unmanned ones in loose formation under supervision covering more area.

I have nothing against big planes with big crews - I presume that having a bunch of people sitting in one place brings benefits - in fact I know it does, in specific situations. It becomes worth the risk of putting that many people in one target.    Equally I have no problems with that bunch of people in that singular target having the ability to interact directly with the ground by having their own battery of missiles available to them.   But that doesn't mean that I think the primary purpose of a big lifter should be hauling 15 kg missiles that will only be in the sky at one point in space, occasionally.

For constabulary work, (low intensity, third block, Counter-Insurgency work if those are less offensive) it seems to me, you want a lot of platforms with small loads continually available.  For high intensity warfare you want large loads concentrated in time and space that put the fewest number of dollars and lives at risk.


----------



## a_majoor

What the USMC "kit" does is add more platforms carrying weapons than you would have had previously. This is an analogy of your own argument of putting containers carrying missiles on cargo ships, simply changing "container ship" to "C-130". If a Reaper, F-35 or attack helicopter spots a target which it can't attack on its own (for whatever reason) and a kitted C-130 is in range, then they put out the call and the Herc takes the shot.

This is really a lower tech/lower cost version of the USAF "Arsenal Plane" concept or the related USN 'Kill Web", where sensors and shooters are not necessarily on the same platform.


----------



## a_majoor

Bit of a "for fun" post. The Airtractor company, which makes crop-duster aircraft, had developed a ground attack version as part of the counter narcotics wars in Columbia (evidently the initial plan was to fly the actual crop dusters over the drug crops, but the narcos tended to shoot first and ask questions later). The company has now developed a third generation of this platform, which is eerily reminiscent of the Stuka dive bomber (similar problems result in similar solutions)

The three generations of the AT-802U:

and:

http://defense-studies.blogspot.ca/2014/06/iomax-offers-archangel-light-attack.html



> *IOMAX Offers Archangel Light Attack Turboprop to the Philippines*
> 07 Juni 2014
> 
> IOMAX has offered its Archangel Block 3 Border Patrol Aircraft (BPA) to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) as a replacement for its ageing Rockwell OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency fleet, IHS Jane's was told on 2 June.
> 
> The US defence company has submitted a bid to the Philippine government, in which it is pitching the Archangel as a replacement for the PAF's nine remaining OV-10s, which were acquired second-hand in the 1990s, IOMAX CEO Ron Howard disclosed during a visit to the company's North Carolina headquarters.
> 
> "IOMAX has previously done signals intelligence in Southeast Asia, and so we know the region. The Philippine mission is very well suited to the Archangel," he said.
> 
> The Philippine requirement was formally launched in mid-May, when the Department of National Defense (DND) issued tender documents to acquire six close air support aircraft and an accompanying logistics support package for PHP4.968 billion (USD114 million).
> 
> In its documents, the DND noted that the selected bidder must have had prior experience of such programmes over the previous decade, and that the selected platform should already be in service with the armed forces of the country of origin or by the military of at least two other countries.
> 
> Although the Archangel BPA is regarded by some (the US Department of Defense included) as being an essentially new platform, it is in fact the third iteration (hence the Block 3 designation) of the Block 1 and Block 2 AT-802 that IOMAX developed and supplied to the United Arab Emirates (and which it still supports). Also, with the Block 1 also now in service with Jordan, the Archangel does fit the criteria for selection as laid down by the DND.
> 
> While the DND did not publically disclose aircraft specifications, IHS Jane's understands that they have been written up with the Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano in mind, with requirements that it be equipped with retractable undercarriage and ejector seats, among other things.
> 
> The Archangel currently features neither of these, but Howard told IHS Jane's that IOMAX has done studies with Martin-Baker on the feasibility of replacing the current crash-resistant seating and roll-cage with twin ejection-seats and bubble canopy, and that this is perfectly doable (the United Arab Emirates is also said to be interested in the canopy for a potential follow-on order of aircraft, but not the ejection-seats). As for retractable undercarriage, Howard said the mission did not require it, and the weight penalties and rough field limitations would outweigh any benefits over the current fixed undercarriage, and so this would not be offered.
> 
> As retractable undercarriage is not being offered as an option, Howard said the company's designers were looking at a number of aerodynamic improvements to the Archangel that would help it close the speed gap from its current 180 kt cruise speed to bring it closer to the 220 kt of platforms such as the Super Tucano.
> 
> From spinner to tail, these enhancements include the option of an enhanced propeller with a scimitar-style composite blade; a sleeker nose profile; angling the exhaust rearwards to provide about 200 lb of additional thrust; speed fairings on the main undercarriage and wheel struts; remodelled wing roots and tips; blending the rear of the cockpit to the tail section to reduce buffeting and drag; remodelled tail and stabiliser roots and tips; and a more generally cleaned-up fuselage, with as few protruding parts as possible. According to IOMAX's chief scientist, Ray Nielson, who is leading this improvement effort, these modifications should increase the aircraft's cruise speed to about 210 kt.
> 
> Even so, Howard was keen to note that speed is not everything, and that rival platforms had sacrificed much in terms of payload and range/endurance in order to go faster. With a typical mission profile of 175 kt outbound to a range of 1,350 n miles, six hours on station, and 175 kt inbound to base, and all with a maximum gross take-off weight of 6,715 kg, the Archangel can cover more of the Philippine's area of operations with a greater weapon load than any of its competitors. At just USD8 million per aircraft (without options), the Archangel is also cheaper than many of its rivals ( IHS Jane's All the World's Aircraft gives the Super Tucano a unit price of USD12-13 million).
> 
> With the DND's tender documents now released, all bids must be submitted by 11 June, with the selected platform expected to be with the PAF 18 months after contract signature. Besides the Archangel and Super Tucano, other platforms expected to compete include the Beechcraft AT-6 Texan II, and perhaps even the Pilatus PC-21.


----------



## daftandbarmy

In the next war, fast jet pilots won't even have to leave friendly air space to provide close air support. I assume there will be fittings in the cockpit for a couch and popcorn maker  

F35 to control armed attack drones:

http://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/F-35-to-Control-Armed-Attack-Drones-101456567


----------



## MarkOttawa

Own fixed-wing manned CAS for US SOCOM (further links at original)?



> U.S. Special Operations Forces Want Their Own Light Attack Aircraft
> _The U.S. Air Force is about to start its OA-X tests, but that program may soon have competition from SOCOM._
> 
> The U.S. Air Force is about to begin testing a number of light attack aircraft as part of an experimental assessment commonly known as OA-X.  At the same time, it appears that U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has been actively pushing the service for a project of its own, called Light Attack Support for Special Operations, or LASSO.
> 
> On July 28, 2017, the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio announced the LASSO plan on the federal government’s main contracting website, FedBizOpps. The notice said the center’s Fighter Bomber Directorate had teamed up with SOCOM to explore both light attack aircraft and associated technology specifically for special operations forces.
> 
> The brief posting made clear that the first step would be simply to gather information on “emerging light attack platforms” and “platform-agnostic” systems, which is to say equipment that wouldn’t require any specific plane to accommodate it. SOCOM and its service components have long been interested in expanding their organic light attack capabilities, which presently including armed drones, fixed wing gunships, and specialized helicopters.
> 
> ...“this effort is separate and distinct from the on-going Light Attack Experiment or any other Light Attack projects,” the notice explained. “This effort should not conflict with or be confused with any other Light Attack aircraft program or effort.”
> 
> But while any special operations light attack fleet would undoubtedly be smaller than one within the U.S. Air Force proper, it seems hard to imagine that LASSO won’t be a competitor to the nebulous OA-X experiment at least to some degree. As of yet, the Air Force has yet to articulate any real goals or objectives for the test project, which has become formally known as the Capability Assessment of Non-Developmental Light Attack Platforms.
> 
> In addition, the service insists that there is no existing plan to turn results from the OA-X into a fully fledged “program of record” that would lead to purchases of actual aircraft. This is despite the service’s own repeated acknowledgements of the obvious benefits of a fleet of low-cost attackers for operations in permissive environments with very limited anti-aircraft threats, namely freeing up high performance tactical aircraft for more high-risk missions, well as a push in Congress to include money in the next defense budget that could cover the cost of dozens of planes.
> 
> It seems almost guaranteed that OA-X and LASSO would end up evaluating many of the same technologies and exactly the same types of aircraft. At present, we know that the Air Force’s light attack experiment will evaluate three types, Sierra Nevada Corporation and Embraer’s A-29 Super Tucano, Air Tractor's OA-802, along with Textron’s AT-6 Wolverine and Scorpion.
> 
> Other similar planes on the market include IOMAX’s Archangel and L-3’s AT-802L, both of which are heavily modified agricultural designs like the OA-802, as well as the AC-208 Combat Caravan, an armed conversion of Cessna’s light utility aircraft. The U.S. military has already facilitated the delivery of the IOMAX and Cessna types, as well as Super Tucanos, to American allies abroad, including Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates...
> 
> [Next: video of IDEX 2017: IOMAX Archangel 3 Armed ISR]
> http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/13047/u-s-special-operations-forces-want-their-own-light-attack-aircraft



More:



> "Archangel Manned Strike"
> http://www.iomax.net/archangel/archangel-strike-platform/



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## dimsum

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> In the next war, fast jet pilots won't even have to leave friendly air space to provide close air support. I assume there will be fittings in the cockpit for a couch and popcorn maker
> 
> F35 to control armed attack drones:
> 
> http://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/F-35-to-Control-Armed-Attack-Drones-101456567



Considering the jokes about RPA crews by folks who risk their butts by flying into enemy airspace, this is pretty ironic (assuming the F-35 and its driver can stay well inside protected airspace).


----------



## MarkOttawa

Further to my post just above, back at USAF OA-X:



> Another Light Attack Offering Joins Air Force’s OA-X Fly-Off
> 
> Another aircraft will fly at the Air Force’s OA-X light attack competition next week.
> 
> Air Tractor and L3 announced Monday [July 31] they will offer the AT-802L Longsword to participate in the fly-off at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, on Aug. 8 and 9, according to a release.
> 
> Together, the companies developed the L variant off its predecessor, the AT-802U, the release said. The Longsword is a light attack and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.
> 
> Related content:
> 
> Super Tucano Enters Air Force Light Attack Demonstration
> Air Force to Invite Firms to Show Off OA-X Light-Attack Aircraft
> Air Force Mulls Low-Cost Fighter Experiment
> 
> “We are proud of the Longsword and the opportunity to participate in OA-X. We are looking forward to flying at Holloman AFB and showcasing our capabilities to the Air Force and to our partner nations,” said Jim Hirsch, president of Air Tractor.
> 
> “The AT-802L Longsword provides a highly effective capability based on a rugged, proven platform that adds class-leading technologies integrated by L3 for a simple, yet powerful solution,” added Jim Gibson, president of L3 Platform Integration and the L3 Aircraft Systems sector.
> 
> L3 developed a “certified, state-of-the-art glass cockpit and the L3 Wescam MX-15 EO/IR Sensor,” ideal for medium-altitude ISR and search-and-rescue missions, according to the New York-based company.
> 
> Air Tractor, based in Texas, and L3 in March showed the aircraft during the Avalon Airshow in Australia, rebranding it the OA-8 with hopes of securing Asia-Pacific partners. Variants are operated by countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt and Kenya.
> 
> The Air Force distributed formal invitations to the fly-off in March.
> 
> Sierra Nevada in May announced the Super Tucano will participate in the event, pitching it as “A-29 for America.”
> 
> Textron and AirLand LLC will showcase the Scorpion jet, as well as the AT-6B Wolverine, an armed version of the T-6 Texan II made by Textron’s Beechcraft Corp. unit and Raytheon Co., according to an April release from Textron...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.dodbuzz.com/2017/07/31/another-light-attack-jet-offering-joins-air-forces-oa-x-fly-off/



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## daftandbarmy

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Considering the jokes about RPA crews by folks who risk their butts by flying into enemy airspace, this is pretty ironic (assuming the F-35 and its driver can stay well inside protected airspace).



Don't worry, we'll make sure the 'Argus Eye' gets their own fleet of drones to maintain air parity with the brylcreem boys.


----------



## Kirkhill

Should the RCAF be worried?



> The Air Force’s next step after its light attack demo: A combat trial
> By: Valerie Insinna
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein and Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson chat in front of the Beechcraft AT-6 Wolverine produced by Textron. Goldfein and Wilson visited Holloman Air Force Base, N.M., on Aug. 8 for the light attack demonstration. (Valerie Insinna/Staff)
> 
> 
> HOLLOMAN AIR FORCE BASE, N.M. — This month, three industry teams will hand over four different light attack aircraft to Air Force pilots for a series of flight demonstrations to test just how well the aircraft can prosecute targets on the ground while operating in austere desert environments. Those that prove their mettle will move on until the next phase of the experiment: a combat demonstration in the Middle East.
> 
> Specifically, planes could participate in the fight against the Islamic State and other terrorist groups, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson told reporters Wednesday.
> 
> The Air Force won’t know for sure whether it will pursue a combat demonstration until the experiment at Holloman Air Force Base is finished. Then, the service will take the data it has collected and assess the aircraft cost, capability and the manufacturer’s production capacity.
> 
> “That data is intended to inform strategic decisions. It will also tell us whether we take this to the next step, to what we call a combat experiment, and whether any of these aircraft are ready for that,” Wilson said. “That combat experiment could take place early next year.”
> 
> Reporters headed to Holloman AFB on Wednesday to get a glimpse of the four aircraft participating in the demo: the A-29 from Sierra Nevada Corp. and Embraer, the AT-802L Longsword by L3 and Air Tractor, and the AT-6 Wolverine and Scorpion jet, both by Textron.
> 
> They weren’t the only interested parties. Several top Air Force officials also visited the base to observe the experiment, including Wilson; Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein, who flew both the A-29 and AT-6 today; Gen. Mike Holmes, who heads Air Combat Command; and Lt. Gen. Arnold Bunch, the service’s top uniformed acquisition official.
> 
> *Representatives from about a dozen international partner militaries also attended, including members from [size=14pt]Canada**, *[/size]Australia, the United Arab Emirates and Paraguay.
> 
> Although there is no real winner of the light attack demo, the A-29 Super Tucano and AT-6 Wolverine already seem to be a step ahead of the other options in terms of moving on to the next phase. Both aircraft have been categorized as “tier one” by the service for the purpose of the experiment, meaning that they meet all of the Air Force’s objectives, which include the ability to take off from unimproved fields and having an ejection seat.
> 
> Should the Air Force decide to press on with a combat demonstration, it would likely continue to evaluate those two planes, Bunch said.
> 
> “If the two ‘tier ones’ are successful in executing the first phase of the experiment and they want to continue to participate in the experiment, we plan to work with the combatant commanders to utilize both of those resources if they want to go forward,” he said.
> 
> But the “tier two” offerings — the Scorpion jet and AT-802L — won’t necessarily be left behind.
> 
> “I believe the tier twos are going to learn from this. I believe they are going to understand what we were looking for,” Bunch said. “They now have our criteria that were in the invitation to participate, so I think they’ll analyze that, they’ll go back and look at their systems, and then they can advance those.”
> 
> Or those companies may choose to go a different direction with their platforms. The experiment’s criteria were heavily centered around the needs of Air Combat Command, Bunch acknowledged. However, the requirements of other potential customers, such as the special operations community or international partners, may be different.
> 
> If Wilson and Goldfein approve a combat demonstration, Air Combat Command (ACC) will take the reins from Air Force Materiel Command, which is executing the experiment at Holloman, Holmes said.
> 
> Col. Michael “Starbaby” Pietrucha, ACC’s staff lead for light attack, said the command is already starting to consider how it could execute a combat demonstration. Though much is still to be determined, the demo will likely involve bringing light attack aircraft to the Middle East and having it fill in for other aircraft, like the F-16 or A-10, when low-end missions need to be executed.
> 
> A future combat exercise might also emphasize the aircraft’s ability to network with coalition ground forces.
> 
> “If we decide to move forward with a combat demo, we will take what we’ve learned … and then take that forward with some kind of a low cost network,” Holmes said. “It might be a cellphone. It might be an iPad, taking advantage of networks that are already there in some of these places.”
> 
> About Valerie Insinna
> Valerie Insinna is Defense News' air warfare reporter. She previously worked the Navy/congressional beats for Defense Daily, which followed almost three years as a staff writer for National Defense Magazine. Prior to that, she worked as an editorial assistant for the Tokyo Shimbun’s Washington bureau.


----------



## dimsum

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Should the RCAF be worried?



Keeping abreast of developments is IMO a pretty good thing to do.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Our new Interim fighter  [


----------



## Rifleman62

Slideshow of 13:

http://www.foxnews.com/tech/slideshow/2017/08/11/amazing-experimental-attack-planes-on-show.html#/slide/the-textron-scorpion-experimental-aircraft-conducts-handling-and-flying-quality-maneuvers-above-white-sands-missile-range-


http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/13393/usafs-oa-x-light-attack-experiment-is-looking-more-like-an-international-arms-fair
*
USAF's OA-X Light Attack Experiment is Looking More Like an International Arms Fair* - BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK AUGUST 10, 2017

4.28 video at link


----------



## dimsum

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/13393/usafs-oa-x-light-attack-experiment-is-looking-more-like-an-international-arms-fair
> *
> USAF's OA-X Light Attack Experiment is Looking More Like an International Arms Fair* - BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK AUGUST 10, 2017



This quote peaked my interest:



> As with the U.S. Air Force, Australia and Canada could be interested in a light attack aircraft as a low-cost alternative to sending their multi-role F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets on operations abroad. Both countries routinely engage in counterterrorism and peacekeeping missions overseas that could call for surveillance and light attack missions in permissive environments.


----------



## MilEME09

Well now that could change things for our fighter procurement, did someone with insider information just leak something?


----------



## Kirkhill

Is there an RCAF pilot that wouldn't be qualified on the AT-6 Wolverine given the use of the T-6 (CT-156 Harvard II) as the primary trainer and the similarities?







http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/aircraft-current/ct-156.page








> The Beechcraft T-6 Texan II is a single-engine turboprop aircraft built by the Raytheon Aircraft Company (which became Hawker Beechcraft and later Beechcraft Defense Company, and was bought by Textron Aviation in 2014). A trainer aircraft based on the Pilatus PC-9, the T-6 has replaced the Air Force's Cessna T-37B Tweet and the Navy's T-34C Turbo Mentor. The T-6A is used by the United States Air Force for basic pilot training and Combat Systems Officer (CSO) training and by the United States Navy and United States Marine Corps for primary Naval Aviator training as well as primary and intermediate Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training. The T-6A is also used as a basic trainer by the Royal Canadian Air Force (CT-156 Harvard II), the Greek Air Force, the Israeli Air Force (Efroni), and the Iraqi Air Force. The T-6B is the primary trainer for U.S. student naval aviators. The T-6C is used for training by the Mexican Air Force, Royal Air Force, Royal Moroccan Air Force, and the Royal New Zealand Air Force.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beechcraft_T-6_Texan_II

I guess the same question would apply to all the other air forces listed above.


----------



## dimsum

I'm really more surprised that the Americans aren't in full "Buy American" mode and single-sourcing the AT-6 over the Super Tucano.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Apparently the OV-10 Bronco kicked ISIS dish dash...

https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/ov-10-broncos-were-sent-to-fight-isis-and-they-kicked-a-1764407068


----------



## YZT580

So, if the OV10 has already demonstrated it prowess why not simply put it back into production. It is a proven design, offers significant loiter time and is combat proven.  And all the reports have already been written and signed off.  It was/is a great aircraft for its specifically designed duties.


----------



## dimsum

Tangent:



			
				YZT580 said:
			
		

> So, if the OV10 Buffalo has already demonstrated it prowess why not simply put it back into production. It is a proven design, offers significant loiter time and is combat proven.  And all the reports have already been written and signed off.  It was/is a great aircraft for its specifically designed duties.



/tangent

For the Bronco, mostly because like the Buffalo, it'd be more of a hassle to re-tool the line, etc to start making them again?  The T-6 and Super Tucano lines are still in production.


----------



## tomahawk6

The CF probably cant afford a separate aircraft for CAS. The CF-18 will have to make do until the CF-35 is available.Although I do favor the Apache for supporting the ground forces.


----------



## YZT580

It would be a whole lot cheaper to stand up a couple of squadrons of T6's  than it would be to purchase 18 interim CF18s or the like.  Don't need any new infrastructure, we already train on type, maintenance and operating costs are far lower and it would get the libs out of the corner they have painted themselves into regarding Boeing and their ongoing trade dispute and of course the never buy F35 crowd.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Would actually standing up a actual RCAF training squadron with the Hawks, Harvard’s and some light attack aircraft to replace the current contractor system perhaps help with the pilot and maintainer retention? It would mean a posting with a regular schedules.


----------



## MilEME09

Colin P said:
			
		

> Would actually standing up a actual RCAF training squadron with the Hawks, Harvard’s and some light attack aircraft to replace the current contractor system perhaps help with the pilot and maintainer retention? It would mean a posting with a regular schedules.


While I don't know the issues facing the airforce retention problem, I imagine being posted to places like cold lake doesn't help. Doing our training in house as well (with contractor help at first) will probably save cost as well. Problem is the investment to make it happen.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Colin P said:
			
		

> Would actually standing up a actual RCAF training squadron with the Hawks, Harvard’s and some light attack aircraft to replace the current contractor system perhaps help with the pilot and maintainer retention? It would mean a posting with a regular schedules.



I would say a large part of that might be where they would be posted to.  Places like Portage and Moosejaw aren't exactly on the top of people's *where do I dream of living* lists.

Ref buying a few Sqns of light attack prop airframes...they're more niche aircraft IMO, and we need multi-mission type ones because of our size and funding (or lack of it).  If we did get them, where would the $ come from...we are on a fixed income afterall.

:2c:


----------



## YZT580

The availability of cash is not the issue: it never really has been.  The government of the day deals in perception.  If purchasing ground attack aircraft is perceived to resolve an equipment/political issue and can be demonstrated as being consistent with the direction in which the government wants to move then it will happen.  As witness, recall the purchase of the C17s and the Leopard tanks.  Our current government has stated their desire to get back into 'peace keeping' and they have pledged resources to fulfil this goal.  Pursuing the purchase of said aircraft for support punts the issue into the next decade as they can promise as soon as we have the resources we will be there.  Both Mali and the Congo have demonstrated the requirement for light duty airborne support.  Purchasing new interim aircraft is resolved and it doesn't take money away from their favourite charities.  IMHO it is a win-win for the libs.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

So all of a sudden there's an abundance of extra YFR to go around???

I couldn't get flight suits or even t-shirst this spring and summer so far...people are not able to get PRTs issued...I won't even get into serviceability because of no spares, etc...and we have no money contraints.


----------



## MilEME09

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> So all of a sudden there's an abundance of extra YFR to go around???
> 
> I couldn't get flight suits or even t-shirst this spring and summer so far...people are not able to get PRTs issued...I won't even get into serviceability because of no spares, etc...and we have no money contraints.



CANSOFCOM needed new DEU's sorry  >  the airforce and the CAF is living on a fixed income less then what we need.


----------



## Good2Golf

YZT580 said:
			
		

> It would be a whole lot cheaper to stand up a couple of squadrons of T6's  than it would be to purchase 18 interim CF18s or the like.  Don't need any new infrastructure, we already train on type, maintenance and operating costs are far lower and it would get the libs out of the corner they have painted themselves into regarding Boeing and their ongoing trade dispute and of course the never buy F35 crowd.



By cheaper, I'm assuming you are not referring to Departmental personnel costs, which on the whole would make even a very healthy capital acquisition budget look tiny in comparison.

Take a look at the Cost Factors manual and your "couple of squadrons of T6's" will set DND back a cool 1/20th of a Billion dollars in personnel costs, give or take.  You should not be surprised then, that the DM's blood pressure rises significantly when the good idea fairies are at work, especially when they "just" ask for people.

:2c:

Regards
G2G


----------



## Kirkhill

Idle thought.

If all pilots are type qualified on the CT-156/T-6/AT-6 does that mean that the pool of pilots available to provide support in permissive environments is all pilots (including rotary wing), rather than just the pilots qualified to fly the F-18/F-35?

Thus reducing the workload on the F-18 pilots.

Second idle thought.

If the CT-156/T-6/AT-6 is a primary trainer does that mean that the time necessary to convert a pilot into a "useful" asset can be reduced?

Third idle thought.

What is the impact on Reserve Pilot employment and retention?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> So all of a sudden there's an abundance of extra YFR to go around???
> 
> I couldn't get flight suits or even t-shirst this spring and summer so far...people are not able to get PRTs issued...I won't even get into serviceability because of no spares, etc...and we have no money contraints.



There is always money to be had, if you are the chosen ones, Who is the chosen ones depends on the government of the day, crisis dejour and political capital to be spent or gained.


----------



## YZT580

Thanks Colin you said it much better than I.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Colin P said:
			
		

> There is always money to be had, if you are the chosen ones, Who is the chosen ones depends on the government of the day, crisis dejour and political capital to be spent or gained.



I am not saying it is the fleet I am a part of.  I am saying it is across the not only the RCAF, but the CAF (the do less with more funding program).  IF you are adding multiple Sqns of aircraft, that is going to cost a few dollars.  Where are their hangers going to be, the hangers have to be heated...its more than just aircrew and maintainers and a bit of gas.  

These are niche capabilities...outside of the one-sie/twosie mission sets, what is their capability?  If you were going to do something like this, I'd expand it into the MAISR project instead of relating it to anything fighters...because fighters can do CAS.  I see this type of CAS (the little single prop bug smasher type airframe) and I think lower, slower and that makes it a target for...lots of stuff.

If the GoC isn't willing to use existing strike aircraft to drop iron on targets such as ISIS..why bother buying a lower/slower platform to do something we aren't even doing now?   ???

Fit a couple of '140 with the kit needed to do CAS, let the fighters do it, get attack helicopters and add them to the TacHel world (1 or a combo of any of those...doesn't matter)...I don't see a need or reason to have a one-of mission aircraft in an air force that isn't funded well.


----------



## Loachman

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Ref buying a few Sqns of light attack prop airframes...they're more niche aircraft IMO, and we need multi-mission type ones because of our size and funding (or lack of it).



As I've said here multiple times over quite a long time...

Niche-push has zombie-like qualities.



			
				YZT580 said:
			
		

> Our current government has stated their desire to get back into 'peace keeping' and they have pledged resources to fulfil this goal.  Pursuing the purchase of said aircraft for support punts the issue into the next decade as they can promise as soon as we have the resources we will be there.  Both Mali and the Congo have demonstrated the requirement for light duty airborne support.  Purchasing new interim aircraft is resolved and it doesn't take money away from their favourite charities.  IMHO it is a win-win for the libs.



Campaign promises casually tossed out with no expectation of a need to fulfil, and which have since tapered off into silence after much wafflement, aside, we are currently operating much closer to Russia than Mali and Congo, at this government's whim.

How much deterrent value would a slow-moving putt-putt have in that area?

How would a slow-moving putt-putt fare in that area if the situation boils over?

And, if we're buzzing around, even in slow-moving putt-putts, and dropping/firing anything, it _*ain't*_ peacekeeping.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> If all pilots are type qualified on the CT-156/T-6/AT-6 does that mean that the pool of pilots available to provide support in permissive environments is all pilots (including rotary wing), rather than just the pilots qualified to fly the F-18/F-35?
> 
> Thus reducing the workload on the F-18 pilots.



Thus increasing the workload on every other community.

Absent an increase in the number of Pilot positions (and techs, etcetera), who's going to get yanked out of their "pool" to flounder around in this one? I am not aware of a single CF flying community that has a large excess of potential candidates. Everybody is busy, and short of people, as it is.

In the Tac Hel case - and likely similar in other communities - a sustained op drives down general competencies in favour of op-specific competencies as it is, requiring a lengthy (one to two years) period to regain those competencies. At least we are operating the same machines, and not some completely different niche putt-putt, which would only make it worse.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> If the CT-156/T-6/AT-6 is a primary trainer does that mean that the time necessary to convert a pilot into a "useful" asset can be reduced?



Training somebody - and in this case, refreshing - to fly a given machine is not difficult. Developing tactical proficiencies, including multiple-aircraft operations, takes somewhat longer.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> What is the impact on Reserve Pilot employment and retention?



Unless there is a permanent unit established (with the necessary infrastructure and not-insignificant budget) at a suitable airport with a large-enough pool of ex-Regular Pilots _*and techs, etcetera,*_ this is an irrelevant non-issue.

Simpler solution:

Buy the best multi-role aircraft available.

Don't waste scarce people and funds on a niche putt-putt.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

My concern is that we use up airframe hours on a expensive resource we have to few of already. Frankly I would love to go buy 10 more ASW aircraft, it seems it's not happening either. If we get around 80 fighters, then we will be doing ok there, if we don't and the project gets locked in a death grip of political infighting a lesser "peacekeeping" CAS aircraft might be the only digestible game in town for awhile. Stranger things have happened.


----------



## Loachman

To do that, one either has to build and maintain additional infrastructure somewhere and increase the establishment of Pilots, Techs, and other support pers, or _*cut something else out*_.

So - what are you willing to cut.

For absolutely no benefit.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Loachman said:
			
		

> So - what are you willing to cut.



Any/every project that has to do with new ranks, DEUs, buttons, ties and socks for the next decade or two??

 :blotto:


----------



## daftandbarmy

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Any/every project that has to do with new ranks, DEUs, buttons, ties and socks for the next decade or two??
> 
> :blotto:



Plus 5 or 6 gigantic and semi-useful HQs, ex Maple Resolve and similarly frustrating exercises, all 'morale patch' programs and mandatory briefing programs, semi-professional military sports (and PSP while you're at it) and the Snowbirds.... 

oh.... oh.... and the Military Colleges, just for spite


----------



## Loachman

I'd leave the Snowbirds alone, but the rest - oh, yes.

How many of those other people are aircrew-fit Pilots, though?

We cannot train enough now, let alone even a small increase merely to support something that is not particularly useful.


----------



## tomahawk6

Evidently the USAF is studying CAS on the cheap and here is the video of the options.Who would have thought a crop duster would be in the running ?  :camo:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-air-force-reveals-powerful-041956009.html


----------



## Karel Doorman

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Evidently the USAF is studying CAS on the cheap and here is the video of the options.Who would have thought a crop duster would be in the running ?  :camo:
> 
> https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-air-force-reveals-powerful-041956009.html



Well we know the reason behind "the on the cheap" part,don't we?

Everything is ok just to be able to "kill" the Warthogs.My belief is such that when they've decided(wich one for the USAF)they'll cancel the project,and the USAF has what it wants,"kill" the A-10's and do the CAS part with the F-35(as they wanted to do in the 1st place,btw the USAF is scrapping them fast,damaged ones, so that it isn't possible to bring them back,against the order from Congress i've heared)

Poor soldiers on the ground,they love the A-10's,the enemies "crap" in their collective pants when they hear 1 comming.And the USAF just don't care about CAS.

So here's an idea just transfer the A-10's to the Marines,they want to do CAS,and the most feared CAS plane stays.


----------



## a_majoor

Slightly sideways look, but the rise of UAV's and UCAV's, and especially the potential for "swarming" attacks brings back the need for "low and slow" airframes. This article looks at the issue. Imagine a turboprop version of the Spitfire or Hawker Typhoon patrolling down in the weeds ready to unleash hails of machine gun or cannon fire against UAV class targets:

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-be-the-us-militarys-secret-weapon-stop-swarm-strike-24093



> Could This Be the U.S. Military's Secret Weapon to Stop a 'Swarm' Strike?
> Dave Majumdar
> January 16, 2018
> 
> Last week’s massed attempted drone strike against Russian forces in Syria is a harbinger of things to come. Indeed, it is almost inevitable that American forces could come under similar attack. However, countering drones with surface-to-air missiles or interceptor aircraft is expensive, thus an airplane such as Embraer and Sierra Nevada’s A-29 Super Tucano might be a more cost effective option.
> 
> “The A-29 does have an air-to-air kill against drug runners so it can certainly be used very effectively against that class of target,” Taco Gilbert, Sierra Nevada’s senior vice president for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) told reporters on Jan. 16. “It has the ability to go slow like a slow-mover aircraft.”
> 
> Gilbert noted that during the last stages of the Second World War, piston-engine Spitfire fighters were very effective at intercepting the German V-1, the world’s first cruise missile. Indeed, once the Spitfire pilots learned more about the threat, they often would not even bother to shoot the target, but would fly alongside and tip the missile over with the wings of their fighters. Today’s pilots could apply the same principle to intercepting incoming drones. “When you look at a similar class weapon today, a slow-moving cruise missile or a slow-moving drone, this is a very effective aircraft in that type of environment,” Gilbert said.
> 
> Moreover, even if weapons had to be employed, the A-29 is armed with highly accurate .50 caliber machine guns that could quickly dispatch those threats. “It’s one of those things where you want to be efficient and effective and the A-29 is both,” Gilbert said.
> 
> The threat from swarming drone attack is here to stay.
> 
> “Looking at non-state actor drone operations in the last 2-3 years, I would expect to see more efforts to launch swarm drone attacks by non-state groups in the future,” David Knoll, an analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses told The National Interest.
> 
> “As with the improvised explosive device (IED) fight during the Iraq war, we’re seeing a cat and mouse game between the non-state groups employing drones and the states attempting to counter them. The key difference is that with drones, the commercial sector is driving the rapid development of drone technology. The non-state actors only have to modify the platforms—in many cases not at all—and figure out how to employ them effectively in a military setting.”
> 
> Samuel Bendett, another specialist researching drone technology at the Center for Naval Analyses, agreed that swarming drone attack and coordinated drone launches—such as the one that hit Russian forces—will become increasingly common. The best defense against such attacks is likely electronic warfare (EW).
> 
> “Robust EW defenses—in fact, the Russians are already talking about bolstering their EW even more following this Syria attack,” Bendett told The National Interest.
> 
> However, rather than using a platform such as a A-29 in a kinetic role against UAV swarm, a better use might be to use such an aircraft as a carrier-vehicle for an electronic warfare package.
> 
> “Any platform can be outfitted with enough sensors to either track or engage and destroy an incoming UAV of a certain type- after all, the Russians have already mounted an EW system on a small Orlan-10 UAV,” Bendett said. “So using a Leer-3 system as an example—it’s a cellular signal jammer that operates on an Orlan-10 UAV—other technologies can be developed that can be mounted on other airborne platforms.”
> 
> Thus, if the United States Air Force acquires a platform like the A-29 or AT-6, it might be able to use such an aircraft as a defense against swarms of drones in lieu of a $1.8 million AIM-120D AMRAAM launched from a F-22 Raptor or F-15C Eagle. Certainly, from a cost perspective, it would make sense.
> 
> Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.



Other seemingly retro plans call for rapid fire artillery (one article on NextBigFuture spoke of 50mm chain guns) as a counter to this threat. We might see layers of "retro" tech and very new tech working together against different target sets.


----------



## a_majoor

Going back over some of this thread, it occurs to me that new developments can be leveraged for this and some other goals. I had opened the thread by asking if it were possible to supply CAS from austere and dispersed airfields using relatively inexpensive aircraft.

Since that time, the US Army has been asking for a new replacement utility machine to replace the UH-60 family, One of the early contenders which has already done demonstration flights is the Bell V-280 tilt-rotor. Since it is a replacement for a battlefield utility helicopter it is a bit larger than a dedicated gunship, but it has the sort of speed and range as some of the turboprop aircraft that have been mentioned upthread.

As a bonus, if we were to get in on a bulk purchase with the US Army to replace our rotary wing fleet, we could likely get the economies of scale to purchase them in larger numbers (I might even say bulk up the fleet by replacing some of the small SAR aircraft, and seeing if they are adaptable for the Navy and Coast Guard as well). While not a bomb truck, the Valor should be able to mount guided missiles, an automatic cannon or be capable of doing more out of the box things like launching and controlling UAV or UCAV's. Low and slow and loitering should not be an issue, and of course any reasonably flat field or surface can be used as a FARP.


----------



## SupersonicMax

The issue with VSTOL props is the downwash generated by the props when coming to slow speed/hover which makes unsuitable for any domestic SAR roles.  Its larger size makes it a fairly limited utility helicopter when it comes time to get into tight spots.  Time will tell what the US Army will get.


----------



## GR66

It would seem to me that any "inexpensive" CAS aircraft would only be survivable in a fairly low intensity environment where we (i.e. the Americans) dominate the airspace.  

With all the desperately competing needs for the limited funding the CF has, I can't see us purchasing a dedicated CAS aircraft.  The best we could hope for would be either an armed version of a transport/utility helicopter (https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2018-02-06/armed-black-hawk-completes-qualification)  or possibly an armed version of a training aircraft (https://defense.txtav.com/en/at-6).

This would at least give us an aircraft to fill a needed non-combat role that could in a pinch also fill the CAS role when required.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Having our training aircraft equipped for CAS would allow them to be used for regular training (including CAS) and if absolutely required to fill a operational gap, which would impact training if for any length of time.


----------



## Loachman

GR66 said:
			
		

> The best we could hope for would be either an armed version of a transport/utility helicopter (https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2018-02-06/armed-black-hawk-completes-qualification)  or possibly an armed version of a training aircraft (https://defense.txtav.com/en/at-6).



Griffon can be armed - typically a GAU-21 (M3 Browning .50 cal) on one side and Dillon Aero M134D (six-barrel 7.62mm) on the other.

It is used for CCA (Close Combat Attack) vice CAS, which is a seized-wing role.

It's restricted to warm/dry environments, as lack of cabin doors in cooler/wetter ones is, as they say, "sub-optimal" - especially for the FEs.

If the Inuit suddenly rise up and seize the north, we're completely buggered.



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> Having our training aircraft equipped for CAS would allow them to be used for regular training (including CAS) and if absolutely required to fill a operational gap, which would impact training if for any length of time.



Except "our training aircraft" are not ours. We _*do not own*_ them.

But, if we did commandeer them and send them off to war (presuming that they have hardpoints etcetera; I really do not know), then who would train our new Pilots, and on what? We cannot keep up to demand in several areas of the aircrew (and Tech) training chain as it is. The wait between courses (for some guys - and one is too many - at least) is horrendous, ie up to two years for a certain relatively-new helicopter.

No recent government has elected to add PYs. Whatever we gain in one area has to be offset in another. What - again (I've asked a few times before) - are you willing to give up in order to gain a limited-use niche-role pseudo-capability, and why?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

You are correct and I acknowledge the ownership up thread. If we have to bring these to a fight, you won't have time to train new pilots or supply new aircraft. Until the fight is over. Having the planes part of the fleet and having the air training near a decent place to live, might be a preferred posting. If done right, might help retention \. You can still hire civy (ex-RCAF) to assist in training.


----------



## Kirkhill

Loachman said:
			
		

> No recent government has elected to add PYs. Whatever we gain in one area has to be offset in another. What - again (I've asked a few times before) - are you willing to give up in order to gain a limited-use niche-role pseudo-capability, and why?



Legitimate ask (histrionics aside).  I am one that has come around over time to your position Loachman.  There is no push to hire pilots, mechanics or sailors.  Therefore there is no requirement for aircraft or ships of any type.

Soldiers are a marginally acceptable buy, so long as they are never used and don't require any weapons.

We might be able to find more Air Force PYs if the RCN were willing to reduce the number of sailors it needed to man ships, but that will never happen.  Just like the Institutional Army will never reorg itself.

Edit - On the other hand, arming trainers is still an idea I support.  The question of what we will do to train pilots once the balloon goes up is moot.  We will burn through both aircraft and pilots faster than either can be replaced.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Ma Deuce 






Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Colin Parkinson

The AOP's are hulls with significantly less manpower for the same tonnage, so technically yeas the RCN has dropped PY's. An incremental increase in PY in the pointy bits of each service and reduction in HQ staff would make significant difference. 

Frankly I too would prefer Attack Helicopters, but suspect arming training aircraft would be far more likely.


----------



## Loachman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> There is no push to hire pilots, mechanics or sailors.  Therefore there is no requirement for aircraft or ships of any type.



There is, and there is.

Recruiting for most, if not all, occupations continues, but retention sucks. Aircraft and ships are relatively cheap - politically, at least - things to quickly push overseas for a little flag-waving and, occasionally, achieving something useful. Demand exceeds capability for all of our fleets.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Edit - On the other hand, arming trainers is still an idea I support.



And I never will. That's just a waste of valuable aircrew and ground crew. They're the bigger investment, by far. Equipment can be bought, but people need time for training and experience-gathering. If we are going to invest in such people, give them something useful to fly and maintain - a real aircraft, with real capabilities including a chance of survival and not just some short-range un(der)-armed putt-putt that does not even belong to the CF.



			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> The question of what we will do to train pilots once the balloon goes up is moot.  We will burn through both aircraft and pilots faster than either can be replaced.



Keep training anyway. Suicide tactics are not our style.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

It won't be suicide, but the attrition rate of aircraft and pilots in a war with a peer enemy might be quite sobering. Particularly after each side runs short of missiles to arm their remaining aircraft with. I wonder how quickly we would deplete current stocks in 3 weeks of intensive combat?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

In the conflicts we've been involved in over the past decade/decade and a half, it's more the stuff in the picture attached and links below that concerns me...

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-a-10-warthog-planes-in-iraq-reportedly-shot-at-by-isis-militants-with-manpads-2015-1

http://www.aircraftresourcecenter.com/Stories1/001-100/0016_A-10-battle-damage/story0016.htm


----------



## Loachman

Colin P said:
			
		

> It won't be suicide, but the attrition rate of aircraft and pilots in a war with a peer enemy might be quite sobering.



If you are going to send a guy or girl into combat, give him/her a fighting chance to both kill an enemy or several, either in the air, on the ground, or both, and get back home to re-arm with whatever stocks remain.

A trainer will have to carry out far more sorties to launch the same number/weight of weapons as a single F35 (or whatever) will in a single sortie, and has little in the way of survivability aids - no sensors, no datalinks, no stealth, no ability to designate targets and carry even a light load. Pack the noses with C4 if we ever get desparate enough to send kids to battle in trainers. They'd have the same chances of survival, and greater effectiveness.

This country _*can*_ afford _*real*_ aircraft. There is no excuse to cheap out and potentially - and criminally - risk Canadian lives for no gain.

If we do eventually buy 88 fighters as "promised", we'll not be able to fill all of the seats anyway, in the shape that we're in now and for the foreseeable future.


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## GR66

The point I was making was that without a fundamental change to the way the government funds the military (and and equally fundamental change in the way the CF structures the military) we will never have a dedicated, properly capable in a true high-intensity combat environment, CAS aircraft. 

As you've noted, even manning (an inadequately sized) fighter fleet of 88 aircraft will be a serious challenge for the CF.  How on earth could we manage an additional fleet of proper CAS aircraft?  

So, if we want to have any type of air support capability at all, then to my mind it will be something like was done with the Griffons, taking an existing asset and making it useful in a way that wasn't originally intended for it.  And then only in situations where we're up against an enemy that isn't in a position to really exploit its weaknesses.

An armed transport/utility helicopter, or trainer against China/Russia/Iran/North Korea of course would be a stupid idea.  Against a low-tech insurgent group like IS?  Maybe it might have some merit.  

Is spending money on that (niche) capability worthwhile compared to spending the same money on other core capabilities like more ATGMs for the infantry, more guns for the artillery, etc?  I have my doubts.


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## Colin Parkinson

The only advantages would be that you could conduct CAS training with them and have a secondary fleet if the crap really hits the fan and you need far more aircraft than you ever have. 
If we get the F35 the only CAS it will do is drop bombs from a fairly high altitude, which is not a bad thing, just might not be what the grunts would want. If there is conflicting priorities for the few fighter aircraft we will have is the RCAF going to place any importance on CAS?


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## McG

If the “grunts” get the effect they need, does it matter if it was delivered by the plane they think they want?


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## Kirkhill

MCG said:
			
		

> If the “grunts” get the effect they need, does it matter if it was delivered by the plane they think they want?



Personally I wouldn't care if the "package" were delivered by ICBM, if it arrived in a timely fashion and removed the problem while leaving me happily drinking my beer.


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## daftandbarmy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Personally I wouldn't care if the "package" were delivered by ICBM, if it arrived in a timely fashion and removed the problem while leaving me happily drinking my beer.



I can see a business opportunity here for FedEx


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## Kirkhill

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> I can see a business opportunity here for FedEx


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## MilEME09

https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/icarus-aerospace-unveils-multi-role-capable-tav-aircraft/?fbclid=IwAR0u98LU0ktBhWwIpcVvFnGtxChn4IdaMFpNn2nOikRHSwE-Aosw_WTiBMQ

Meet the TAV, made in Quebec, not by Bombardier, 8,000 pounds of ordinance. Interesting low cost design, wonder if it could be useful to us?


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## Good2Golf

Looks exactly like an OV-10 Bronco.  I don’t see the scale-up to support 8,000lbs of munitions and 6hr endurance, from the Bronco’s 3000 lbs and 3-4 hours.


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## dapaterson

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Looks exactly like an OV-10 Bronco.  I don’t see the scale-up to support 8,000lbs of munitions and 6hr endurance, from the Bronco’s 3000 lbs and 3-4 hours.



Almost like you should see an aircraft in actual operation, and not just buy based on manufacturer's claims.


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## dimsum

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Almost like you should see an aircraft in actual operation, and not just buy based on manufacturer's claims.



Now why would anyone do that?  Those reps have nothing but the best intentions   :nod:


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## dapaterson

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Now why would anyone do that?  Those reps have nothing but the best intentions   :nod:


Cough LockMart a decade ago on the F35 cough


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## Retired AF Guy

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Looks exactly like an OV-10 Bronco.  I don’t see the scale-up to support 8,000lbs of munitions and 6hr endurance, from the Bronco’s 3000 lbs and 3-4 hours.



More info here.  Really?: 

_+ One belly mounted optionally installed (up to 30mm) 360-degree turret cannon_

I wish them all the best, but when I actually see an aircraft flying I  won't be hold my breath.


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## Weinie

Does anyone notice the syntax/grammar errors in their on-line brochures? Could just be a problem with the English language, as it quotes Marko Ivankovic, senior product development manager and flight test engineer for Icarus Aerospace.


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## Halifax Tar

I am no expert anything tha flys or CAS.  But wouldn't these prop driven planes be easy pickins for AAA or even SA fire ?


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## Dana381

GR66 said:
			
		

> The point I was making was that without a fundamental change to the way the government funds the military (and and equally fundamental change in the way the CF structures the military) we will never have a dedicated, properly capable in a true high-intensity combat environment, CAS aircraft.
> 
> As you've noted, even manning (an inadequately sized) fighter fleet of 88 aircraft will be a serious challenge for the CF.  How on earth could we manage an additional fleet of proper CAS aircraft?
> 
> So, if we want to have any type of air support capability at all, then to my mind it will be something like was done with the Griffons, taking an existing asset and making it useful in a way that wasn't originally intended for it.  And then only in situations where we're up against an enemy that isn't in a position to really exploit its weaknesses.
> 
> An armed transport/utility helicopter, or trainer against China/Russia/Iran/North Korea of course would be a stupid idea.  Against a low-tech insurgent group like IS?  Maybe it might have some merit.
> 
> Is spending money on that (niche) capability worthwhile compared to spending the same money on other core capabilities like more ATGMs for the infantry, more guns for the artillery, etc?  I have my doubts.



I agree 100% and in order to change the governments military spending habits the media has to change its constant negative spin on anything military related. Ottawa Citizen's Defense Watch didn't even run a story about the acceptance of AOPS Harry DeWolf and neither did CBC. During the Afgan war these media outlets were criticizing the government for NOT buying new kit. Our soldiers need support and our media actively prevents it in peace time.

Someone should design a modular mission module to slide into a Hercules to make it a gunship. If side doors were added in the right places a pallet could be made the size of the cargo bay with heavy guns and ammo stores mounted. Any Hercules with the doors added could load the module and become a gunship relatively quickly and when not needed it could be used for humanitarian and cargo missions. It would not likely be able to mount guns a large as a dedicated AC-130 carries but should be able to mount guns large enough to make a potent gunship for close air support. You could even add some AGM's and rockets to wing hardpoints if weight allows.


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## YZT580

Just get Viking to re-purpose the Buf. We already own the air frames and it would provide jobs for BC and AB. (sarcasm) 
After all the Yanks did it with the DC3 in the 60's and the payload figures are about the same. Loiter time would be good and any opposition would be laughing so hard that they wouldn't be able to focus their aim until it was too late.


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## a_majoor

Dana381 said:
			
		

> Someone should design a modular mission module to slide into a Hercules to make it a gunship. If side doors were added in the right places a pallet could be made the size of the cargo bay with heavy guns and ammo stores mounted. Any Hercules with the doors added could load the module and become a gunship relatively quickly and when not needed it could be used for humanitarian and cargo missions. It would not likely be able to mount guns a large as a dedicated AC-130 carries but should be able to mount guns large enough to make a potent gunship for close air support. You could even add some AGM's and rockets to wing hardpoints if weight allows.



There are multiple iterations of this idea already, including the AC-130 Specter Gunship, kits that allow the USMC to attach Hellfire ATGM's to underwing stations of a C-130 and even a pallet allowing you to fire small "Griffon" missiles from the ramp while in flight.

Of course, the shootdown of an AC-130 over Kuwait in the 1991 Persian Gulf War during a daylight mission demonstrated that the gunship isn't viable in contested or defended airspace, and to my knowledge, no daylight missions have been undertaken since then. Even at night, there are insurgent forces which have MANPADS and the ability to use NVG's or other devices which would make operations difficult for a cargo plane, much less one flying low and slow for an attack run, and against a modern near peer enemy, you would be toast. Russian _Spetsnaz_ operators with MANPADs essentially cleared the skies of Ukrainian SU-25's in the Donbass, and the SU-25's are analogues of the A-10. If a dedicated ground attack aircraft isn't going to cut it, then adapting a cargo plane won't work very well either.

The one thing a C-130 could do in the modern environment is serve as a "mothership" for UAV or UCAV's, an idea the Americans are exploring now. This is far different from a gunship mission, however.


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## Dana381

I'm not arguing you point, just asking for clarity. If the enemy can shoot down an SU-25 and by extension an A-10 then how would an Apache help. I did not know about the palletized systems already in use, I wonder if a mini version of a Phalanx using a 7.62 mini gun would be able to stop a manpad? If that was part of the gunship pallet and mounted to the ramp? I'm just dreaming now I know, but it does sound really cool!


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## Eye In The Sky

Halifax Tar said:
			
		

> I am no expert anything tha flys or CAS.  But wouldn't these prop driven planes be easy pickins for AAA or even SA fire ?



It depends on the altitude the CAS platform is flying.  Close air support doesn't have to = _low_ air support.  

Based on recent operational experience, I'd personally be more worried about MANPADs (even older gen ones).  An older article, but gets the point across about how hard these are to track and where some of them are known/suspected to have ended up.  I'm confident that systems like SA-24s are in the hands of 'undesirables' as well (call it a _gut feeling_ ).  MANPADs at a glance


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## a_majoor

Dana381 said:
			
		

> I'm not arguing you point, just asking for clarity. If the enemy can shoot down an SU-25 and by extension an A-10 then how would an Apache help. I did not know about the palletized systems already in use, I wonder if a mini version of a Phalanx using a 7.62 mini gun would be able to stop a manpad? If that was part of the gunship pallet and mounted to the ramp? I'm just dreaming now I know, but it does sound really cool!



Close air support via ground attack aircraft is a paradigm from 1918 "contact patrol" fighters, and until the 1970's, was really the only way to carry out the task. The development or laser and television guided "smart bombs" turned the equation around, now the pilot did not have to physically come up close and personal to see the target (technically this technology was developed near the end of WWII, but there was a long pause past 1945 as everyone tried to work out how to fight in a nuclear battlefield). By the 1991 Pesrian Gulf War, even the A-10 was mostly using "Mavrick" air to surface guided missiles to take out enemy tanks - coming in for a gun run invited eating a lot of GBAD, and many A-10s suffered massive damage because of that.

Today, an aircraft like an F-15E can be directed to engage a target over 100km away using a Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) which glides towards the target - several versions have seekers which allow the bomb to track and destroy a moving target. various other long range munitions exist, and the future may include delivering a container which splits open in flight and releases a swarm of mini UAV's. Arsenal aircraft like the USAF B-52 could carry large numbers of these sorts of weapons and loiter for hours while F-35's or UAV's slip ahead to identify and mark targets. Farther ahead, the "arsenal aircraft" might be an F-15E or X, making it harder to engage the weapons carriers since they are full fledged fighters themselves. "Loyal Wingman" UCAV's will also be in the mix. Just to make it more confusing, there is a distinct possibility that ultra long range artillery rockets and shells could be directed by loitering air platforms.

The reality isn't a souped up A-10, but a distributed network of sensors and weapons platforms. This wasn't even really apparent when I started this thread. Perhals the real future is a swarm of small, relatively cheap "Skyborg" platforms operating from "lily pads" (minimalistic forward bases), which really answers the question of "should we have or need huge air bases forward to support high performance platforms to support troops"?


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## daftandbarmy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> which really answers the question of "should we have or need huge air bases forward to support high performance platforms to support troops"?



The answer, of course, is 'yes', because RCAF Officers will continue to need to be able to earn campaign medals to progress in rank


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## Halifax Tar

Hit quote when it should have been modify opps


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## Zoomie

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> The answer, of course, is 'yes', because RCAF Officers will continue to need to be able to earn campaign medals to progress in rank


Can’t just have the RCN as the only deployable force in the CAF.


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## MilEME09

Reading more about the TAV, the company has a second version called the Wasp. Designed as a CAS/MPA that can fly autonomously. Which got me thinking could having a fleet of MPA drones benefit us? Not to mention an armedwould e in general would be useful, its easier to build a drone then train a pilot after all.


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## Zoomie

Who flies the drone?   What does the drone do?   Who analyzes what the drone looks at?  Where does the bandwidth come from to operate these drones - DWAN?


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## dimsum

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Reading more about the TAV, the company has a second version called the Wasp. Designed as a CAS/MPA that can fly autonomously. Which got me thinking could having a fleet of MPA drones benefit us? Not to mention an armedwould e in general would be useful, its easier to build a drone then train a pilot after all.



MPA drones, with current technology, would help with the searching (ie. extra aircraft to monitor sonobuoys, whether dropped from them or a manned MPA).  I'm not sure they're at the point of attacking yet.

Also, we're not at the point (technologically maybe, but not culturally/doctrinally) to allow fully autonomous RPA operations, so as Ditch was alluding to, we'll still need Pilots, sensor operators, Int folks, etc.  It's not a "fire and forget" solution yet.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Reading more about the TAV, the company has a second version called the Wasp. Designed as a CAS/MPA that can fly autonomously.



From the article:

_TAV is the first in a family of specialized aircraft, including WASP, a mission-oriented version, focused on close-air support (CAS), maritime and coastal patrol and anti-submarine warfare, and surveillance, and BRANTA, a long endurance, high-altitude optionally-piloted/unmanned combat air vehicle (OPV/UCAV)._

Company *claims* don't equal an actual capability.  Keep in mind, this entire aircraft is a concept at this point.  It doesn't exist beyond '_the imagination and a few drawings_'.  

- This is a 2-pers crew.  I'm not aware of any platform (modern one) that has only 2 pers to fly and do an ASW mission.  Most MH's are 4 pers crews.  2 pilots, a TACCO and a SENSO is the Canadian crewing (and it would be much better if there was a 5th seat for a 2nd SENSO).  One pers can only do so much, despite computers and automation.

- That little plane won't carry enough search or kill stores, far enough and with enough ONSTA ability, to be useful (IMO).  AAR capable?  So...you break off to tank...and...

- MHs have something to bring to the fight that MPAs don't, dipping SONAR.  They can return to MOTHER, bomb up again and go back out.  This Wasp?  Nope.  

- If you're going to be in the ASW game and be taken seriously, you need a true MPA.  This little platform isn't it.  You'd be surprised how quickly you can burn thru 100ish sono's, this baby plane can't even think about carrying that many.

In short?  *Next*

My  :2c: only;  if you want to see how a potential MPA *measures up*, you should compare it to the 2 big heavy-hitters in the world we know today.  Here's one article discussing them...

Boeing P-8A vs Kawasaki P-1: The comparison of modern MPAs.

Single comment on the P-8/P-1; MAD is a valid sensor and is worth its (low) overall weight on a MPA.  I've been ONSTA before and the Acoustics system went U/S;  while 'recovery of the Acoustic system' was in progress, we dropped down low and flew a MAD barrier between the surface force and LKP of the submerged contact.


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## Rifleman62

Good video of ordnance loading on various US aircraft (closely related to CAS!) 

https://www.facebook.com/116140569088136/videos/385580359022452/

Incredible Video of F-35|F-22|F-16|F-15|A-10 | Shows Its Insane Ability Loading |dropping bombs


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## armrdsoul77

Can we get in on a buy of these?


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