# Preparing for NATO’s Failure



## ruxted (1 Nov 2007)

Link to original article on ruxted.ca


Preparing for NATO’s Failure

Several recent reports1 indicate that efforts by Canada and others, including the NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, himself to convince NATO members to beef up their military contributions to Afghanistan or, at least, to reduce some of the restriction on the use of the troops which are already there, have fallen short.

Some commentators2 suggest that if NATO cannot succeed in its first major ‘out of area’ mission then NATO, itself, might become increasingly irrelevant.

The Ruxted Group made the case, nearly a year ago, that NATO was in danger of moving from a cornerstone of Canada’s foreign and defence policy to being a stumbling block.

Some other recent articles3 have suggested that we need a replacement for NATO – an ‘alliance’ able to act for the United Nations when military operations are beyond the skill set of the UN’s staff – which almost any operations requiring the use of force will be. The Ruxted Group has also suggested such a solution to the perceived problem with NATO. In essence, Ruxted proposes that Canada should push for a new ‘alignment’ of like minded, modern democracies and traditional allies4 which can provide a military C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence) ‘superstructure’ around which multi-national military forces can be assembled to execute complex UN mandated operations.

The time is ripe, we believe, to resurrect this proposal.

NATO heads of government will meet in Romania in April 2008. Defence Minister McKay has already signalled that Canada wants action on Afghanistan. The problem with Minister McKay’s statement is that there is no “or else.” It is time for Prime Minister Harper, in our parliament, to start setting out the “or else.”

He (Harper) has indicated that there will be another debate in parliament between end January 2008 (when John Manley’s group reports) and the April 2008 NATO meeting. During that debate he (and his ministers) should:

1.	Issue a clear warning to NATO that it risks failure – with all the consequences attached – unless it steps up and ‘wins’ the Afghanistan counter-insurgency campaign.

2.	Invite leaders of those ‘like minded, modern democracies’4 to consider if they might be willing to work more closely together, to replace NATO, the next time the UN calls for a mission lead organization.

At the April 2008 meeting, regardless of the outcome, Canada should:

1.	Admit that it is not without sin when it comes to shirking its alliance responsibilities.

2.	State that it will not participate in any future NATO military operations if the notorious ‘national caveats’ are still going to be put in place by e.g. France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

3.	Announce that it favours having ‘competitive’ military command structures available to the United Nations so that the best command system can be put in place for UN mandated mission. NATO will, surely, be one of the options available to the UN but it should not be the only choice.

NATO remains an important and, for Canada, useful ‘window’ into Europe. It provides Canada with an irreplaceable ‘seat at the table’ in Europe, too. But, Europe is no longer a region of primary importance to Canada – we care, just as much, about East and South Asia, the Middle East and West Asia and, above all, the Americas. NATO is just one tool in our kit – as we have said it is no longer the ‘cornerstone’ of our foreign policy.

Canada should not threaten to withdraw from NATO but it should make it clear that it has reservations about NATO’s ability to organize and conduct ‘out of area’ military operations.

ISAF highlights one of NATO’s weaknesses. NATO is a ‘Eurocentric’ organization and some – probably most – 21st century problems will require broader, more global solutions. Traditional allies, like Australia and New Zealand, and newer friends – like minded nations – like Sweden are all participating in ISAF even though they are not NATO members. We need to make it easier and more comfortable for non-NATO nations to participate in UN sanctioned multi-national endeavours.

But, ‘out of area’ (out of NATO’s area) operations are likely to be the wave of the future. As former Defence Minister Graham said, “the dangers of the Cold War have been replaced by new and evolving threats, threats caused by failed and failing states, by global terrorism, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and by instability.” 

Canada wants to lead, it is in our national interest to lead. NATO appears less and less able to provide a platform from which we can lead. NATO needs to be augmented, indeed, it needs some good old fashioned competition. Canada should take the lead in organizing a competitive, global, 21st century ‘alignment’ of nations which can conduct complex multi-national military operations on behalf of the United Nations.

The Government of Canada should, now, follow its own advice. In the recent throne speech, Governor General Michaëlle Jean enunciated her government’s proper goal when she said: “our Government will continue Canada’s international leadership through concrete actions that bring results.”


----------
1.	See, for example: Report: Dutch general advises government to reduce presence in Afghanistan, Secretary Gates this week is expected to press the alliance to supply more trainers for the Afghan police and Army, a key to countering resurgent violence there and NATO allies offer troops, resources for Afghan mission
2.	See, for example:  NATO in Afghanistan: A Test Case for Future Missions and  NATO's future on the line
3.	See A new global force and An Anglosphere Future
4.	Some or all of Australia, Denmark, India, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States might be candidates for this group.


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## geo (1 Nov 2007)

+1 Ruxted

The "anglo" alliance & it's friends will have their day


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## karl28 (1 Nov 2007)

I honestly in my opinion think that NATO should rethink who gets to stay as members based on who contributes to the combat role of the mission in Afghanistan .     What's the point of having an alliance of nations when only a few of the members due the dangerous work ?


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## geo (1 Nov 2007)

Let's face it.  NATO is more of an EUROFORCE than anything else.  Possibly, it should be relabeled accordingly.
NATOs day has come and gone - same as happened for SEATO.

Time to come up with a new formula.

A "Commonwealth multi-national force" that includes the US & some other old & dear friends would probably more effective in the long run...  Time for a new Empire?


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## Greymatters (1 Nov 2007)

Hmmm, the article fails to address Russia's increasing military activism (or should I say, a return to previous levels of military activism), the whole point upon which NATO was formed.  What is Ruxted's opinion on this?


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## karl28 (1 Nov 2007)

geo 

     I am in agreement with you on  a new  alliance .  I would like to see one done up with  Canada , USA , Great Britian ,  Japan ,  Australia as a corps  foundation  .     Maybe  some of the other  new  members could be  included from the  Middle east  so that way we could have a location to keep an eye on Iran  and have accesses to major oil facilities .      
           Regardless of what we think  Oil will be a major source of problems  in the near future  until we can reduce our reliance to it .  
The main thing that would have to be stressed in this new  alliance is that when on a major operation like Afghanistan  as an example they would all have to contribute combat operations to hold on to there member status .   You could even call this new Alliance the G.A  Global Alliance


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## a_majoor (1 Nov 2007)

Greymatters said:
			
		

> Hmmm, the article fails to address Russia's increasing military activism (or should I say, a return to previous levels of military activism), the whole point upon which NATO was formed.



Europe might be well advised to get their act together for Europe, but Russia will attempt to use the energy card as the trump against Europe, rather than the military card. Europe will be in a massive bind anyway; depending on energy from a hostile Middle East or a hostile Russia is hardly a choice, and they no longer have the military, economic or diplomatic muscle to do anything about that.

Canada can certainly retain membership in NATO as well as an "Alliance of the Willing", and turn her attention to particular problems using the appropriate vehicle.


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## Edward Campbell (2 Nov 2007)

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act, from today’s _Globe and Mail_ is an indication that:* NATO is failing* and NATO is probably doomed to fail – in Afghanistan and in other dangerous, deadly ‘out of area’ mission – which is what Sudan/Darfur will be when, not if, it comes:

 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20071102.wafghanconference02/BNStory/Afghanistan/home


> Infighting among NATO members snarls Afghan mission, ex-commander says
> 
> DOUG SAUNDERS
> 
> ...



NATO’s *problem* is not military – French and German soldiers are just as capable and brave, etc as American and Dutch soldiers; French and British generals are just as able as British and Canadian generals. The problem is political. France and Germany, the French and German peoples, don’t want to be in Afghanistan – especially not doing anything that even remotely resembles supporting George W. Bush’s ill conceived ‘Global War on Terror.’

Because NATO is a full fledged, formal alliance, with all manner or legally binding rules, politics must take pride of place when military operations are conducted.


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## Greymatters (2 Nov 2007)

Karzai's comment makes a good point though - with limited budget and resources you cant meet all the demands of seperate plans and actions being put forward by all contingents at once.  Although it makes him look like the tool so many anti-war groups claim him to be, he cannot meet every one's expectations by only partially funding and partly supporting 20 different projects, which is made more difficult by countries threatening to hold back their contributions and resources if their plans aren't run the way they want them to be.


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## tomahawk6 (3 Nov 2007)

http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/subscriber/editorial/story/4066827p-4669322c.html

Waterloo for NATO

Mon Oct 29 2007

THE Dutch are debating whether to withdraw their troops from the hot zone of southern Afghanistan and move them to the safer and more comfortable coffee shops of Kabul and northern Afghanistan, where their German, French and Italian fellows-in-arms -- if one can call them that -- from NATO sit out the war. 

The configurations of the Dutch debate have come to include Canada and were raised at a meeting of NATO defence ministers in the Netherlands last week. The Dutch fear that if they withdraw from the war zone, where they, along with Canada, the United States and Britain, bear the bulk of the burden of actually fighting the Taliban, that would lead to an abandonment of the war, an effective if unofficial surrender to the terrorists. 

The Dutch are probably right. At the NATO meeting that ended Thursday, Germany made it clear that it has no intention of putting its more than 3,000 soldiers in harm's way in Afghanistan; the French offered a few airplanes to help out other NATO allies who have troops on the ground; and the Italians were not to be heard from. The Danes, however, did offer about $1.5 million to buy video equipment that would enable NATO to document Taliban atrocities and show them on European and North American television screens. Such is the mighty fighting force, the solid alliance that once was NATO. 

A Dutch withdrawal would certainly heat up the debate over Canada's role in Afghanistan, already a controversial issue in this country. If it were to happen and no other NATO ally were to step up to take the place of the Dutch, it would create an almost irresistible pressure on the federal government to follow suit. 

That would, in itself, be a disaster for Afghanistan and an insult to the sacrifice that Canadian soldiers have made there. It may already, however, portend an even worse disaster in the long run than that -- the end of NATO as an effective military alliance. 

For a time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO appeared to have lost its bearings -- there was no enemy to fight anymore. But it found its footing again during the Balkan wars when it did what the United Nations would not; when it expanded its membership into the central and eastern European nations; and extended its mandate to a global scale, from Kosovo to the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan. But the lean-on-me part of an alliance -- which is integral to the very nature of NATO -- must be mutual throughout its membership. In Afghanistan it is not, and in the Netherlands last week some of NATO's original and most powerful members, such as Germany, France and Italy, indicated that they don't much care. Under those terms, NATO itself cannot survive. With a Russia resurgent and increasingly bellicose, they may come to regret their apathy in Afghanistan.


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## pbi (4 Nov 2007)

I think E.R. has it right:



> NATO’s problem is not military – French and German soldiers are just as capable and brave, etc as American and Dutch soldiers; French and British generals are just as able as British and Canadian generals. The problem is political. France and Germany, the French and German peoples, don’t want to be in Afghanistan – especially not doing anything that even remotely resembles supporting George W. Bush’s ill conceived ‘Global War on Terror.’
> 
> Because NATO is a full fledged, formal alliance, with all manner or legally binding rules, politics must take pride of place when military operations are conducted.



The "old NATO" nations signed up to something that was, IMHO, understood by their electorates to be about defending teir homelands against the Soviet Hordes. This was relatively easy to accept at one time in history (although there was always left-wing political resistance to it in most European countries...), but as the Warsaw Pact threat declined, that raison d'etre began to dwindle, conscription was cut back or abolished, and defence expenditures slashed.  I don't believe that most Euro electorates ever imagined that being in NATO meant fighting a war in SW Asia. On top of that, in the "old NATO" nations, anti-US sentiments have been on the gradual rise for years, spiking dramatically during OIF.  I think that, just like the Canadian electorate, there is a blurring of Iraq and Afghanistan in many European minds. Fighting in Afghanistan just doesn't sell in France, or Germany, or Italy, and the militaries of those countries must obey their elected govts, not the wishes of NATO. That's the problem.

Cheers


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## tomahawk6 (4 Nov 2007)

The only good that has come out of a NATO presence in Afghanistan is that it has freed up US ground forces for Iraq. Next year if progress continues the draw down in Iraq will begin. Which will allow for the US to add additional forces as required. As long as the north remains quiet the allies wont pull out. If the Dutch leave the US can replace them so not a big loss from a tactical standpoint but it would be a PR hit for the coalition.

As the ANA fields units capable of independant operations they probably will move into the hot provinces which will enable the UK and Canadian troops to act as a rapid reaction force. In time it is hoped they will handle all security with ISAF providing logisitical support. I am optimistic about Afghanistan. The taliban/AQ are taking a beating. The problems we are having in Musa Qala are directly related to General Richards essentially surrendering a key town to the Taliban that we must now retake by force. His command tenure will not want to be repeated after McNeil leaves so Washington will exercise a veto of who the next commander will be. I would prefer a US General but would be comfortable with a Canadian or Australian General.Link below is to a nice map of Afghanistan and zones of control of ISAF.

http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf


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## ArmyRick (4 Nov 2007)

Maybe the nations of US, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand can form a new alliance? I know we already share lessons learned and some doctrine stuff throough ABCA.


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## Edward Campbell (4 Nov 2007)

I think part of NATO’s problem is precisely that it is an *alliance*. An alliance is a formal, political organization – the members are bound together by a treaty. Treaties impose obligations and provide options and ‘opt outs’ – _caveats_, for example.

The great strength of ABCA, AUSCANZUKUS and CCEB – as examples – is that they are *NOT* alliances. They were created and are maintained by national chiefs of staff – there are few rules and fewer restrictions. They do what they agree, amongst themselves, to do. There are no ministerial meetings much less ‘heads of government’ or ‘plenipotentiary’ meetings.

As the ABCA site says: “...the focus of the Program is on *interoperability*, defined as: _the ability of Alliance Forces, and when appropriate, forces of Partner and other Nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks._" When you stop and think about it that’s *most* of what we need to conduct operations. What’s missing is a tiny slice of NATO: the part that plans and mounts operations. I will defer to serving officers, but my SWAG (Scientific Wild Assed Guess) is that a combined (multi-national) and joint (multi-service) staff of less than 50 can do whatever is necessary – because most of the really hard work (J1, J4 and J6) will be, of necessity, _sub-contracted_ out to nations and _coordinated_ by the ‘affiliated’ combined & joint staff.


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## George Wallace (4 Nov 2007)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I think part of NATO’s problem is precisely that it is an *alliance*. An alliance is a formal, political organization – the members are bound together by a treaty. Treaties impose obligations and provide options and ‘opt outs’ – _caveats_, for example.
> 
> The great strength of ABCA, AUSCANZUKUS and CCEB – as examples – is that they are *NOT* alliances.



Sounds good, until you added this contradictary statement:



			
				E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> As the ABCA site says: “...the focus of the Program is on *interoperability*, defined as: _the ability of Alliance Forces, and when appropriate, forces of Partner and other Nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks._"



Still, it does show the different problems faced in the various Alliances, Associated Partnerships, Agreements of Understanding, etc. that bind many of the Western Nations in relative peace.


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## Edward Campbell (4 Nov 2007)

Notwithstanding what the twits who write the booklets say: *There is no ABCA treaty*; ABCA is not an 'alliance' in the proper (NATO) sense of that term. ABCA (and all the related groups) are creatures of the respective military chiefs of staff; they have no 'treaty' status - they are absolutely *informal* _arrangements_ which do not bind the nations at all. That's why they work as well as they do.


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## tomahawk6 (4 Nov 2007)

I think thats the way forward. Ad hoc coalitions to accomplish one specific aim. For other operations the US may have to build a diplomatic coalition to support a military operation.


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## Edward Campbell (4 Nov 2007)

But not *too* _ad hoc_, please. We do need ways and means to develop, maintain and use _interoperable_ C[su]2[/sup] (in the broadest sense of that term). That means we need some sort of a small, tight _core staff_ around which we can, quickly, build a HQ and a multinational force.

I wasn't there, but I heard, on the *rumour* net that the _ad hoc_ multinational HQ for Desert Storm was a bit of a nightmare - _waaaaay_ too _ad hoc_.

One key, I think is to keep national force commanders *out* of the combined (multinational) HQ. National commanders, with all their rights and duties, are an essential part of a combined operation but the HQ must serve the commander and the formations and units - regardless of nationality. What that means, _inter alia_ is that 'big' force contributors do not, as a matter of right, get a big 'slice' of the HQ.  It may be that a major troop contributor to an operation will not have very many officers with the language skills, staff experience and, above all, familiarity with the combined force staff procedures - they must not be allowed to clutter up the HQ with largely useless senior staff officers.


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## geo (4 Nov 2007)

+1 Mr Campbell...
Ad hoc only results in having a bunch of people "come as you are" with very little preparation.
Not a good formula for success.


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## tomahawk6 (4 Nov 2007)

The definition of ad hoc is "for this purpose". Any military operation that I can think of will have a US headquarters already in place. Most if not all of our dotcoms also have allied officers on staff so we are hardly talking about something put together on the fly - except maybe the coaltion members.


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## CougarKing (5 Nov 2007)

geo said:
			
		

> Let's face it.  NATO is more of an EUROFORCE than anything else.  Possibly, it should be relabeled accordingly.
> NATOs day has come and gone - same as happened for SEATO.
> 
> Time to come up with a new formula.
> ...



+1 Geo.  I think Campbell mentioned that in another thread- about involving the UK and the Commonwealth of Nations into more of a real military alliance, though T6 and everyone else's comments about ad hoc coalitions seem to have merit too.

What exactly was the death knell for SEATO?  Was it only because it wasn't able to stop the conquest of South Vietnam in 1975 by Hanoi's forces? And because France- one of its members- didn't want to intervene, which quashed any hopes for SEATO action since every decision required unanimity?

Wasn't there also a third organization called CENTO, that involved a number of Middle East nations as well as the UK and Pakistan, during part of the Cold War?

Perhaps NATO should be kept beyond the current Iraq/Afghanistan conflict and its mandate be made global and its membership expanded to include other key US Pacific Rim allies such as Australia, Japan, Thailand and South Korea. In the future, NATO itself might act as an effective counterweight to the Shanghai Cooperative Organization/SCO (_Shanghai He Zuo Zu Zhi_) or "Shanghai Six" alliance of China, Russia and all these Central Asian nations that used to be Soviet satellites. It would be premature to call the SCO a new Warsaw Pact, though the PLA, Russian armed forces and other member nations' militaries have been engaging in a number of joint military exercises annually since the SCO's formation.

The latest series of exercises were just last August, btw. Here's a little article and link about it:

http://www.rusi.org/research/studies/asia/commentary/rss/ref:C46B334C544C8A/



> [The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a multilateral regional cooperation framework established in 2001 by six countries: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, with four countries (Mongolia, India, Pakistan, and Iran) sitting as observers.
> 
> The "Peace Mission 2007" joint military exercise, held by all six members of the SCO in the Volga-Urals military district of Russia from 9 until 17 August, will involve around 6500 military personnel and 80 aircraft. Russia will deploy about 4,700 personnel and 36 aircraft. China will be represented by around 1700 personnel and 46 aircraft. Tajikistan and Kazakhstan will send air assault companies, Kyrgyzstan, an air assault platoon and officers from Uzbekistan will take control of the whole exercise.
> 
> The maneuvers will be conducted in three stages. The first stage will consist of military-political consultations at the level of chiefs of general staffs in the Chinese city of Urumqi, the second stage will consist of preparatory panning and the third will be the exercise proper.


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## geo (5 Nov 2007)

NATO by it's defenition involves the "North Atlantic" and the defence of a group of countries that have something in common.... the North Atlantic... same as SEATO covered South East Asia.

Time to rethink what we are attempting to accomplish and draw up a new treaty, establish some rules and sign on the dotted line.
The countries that belong to the Commonwealth are, in my eyes, the 1st ones who should be invited to this little event.  Commonwealth and the US have a common history and similar global views - without it, IMHO it does not have much of a chance to succeed.


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## CougarKing (5 Nov 2007)

geo said:
			
		

> NATO by it's defenition involves the "North Atlantic" and the defence of a group of countries that have something in common.... the North Atlantic... same as SEATO covered South East Asia.



Geo,

A name that implies shared history because many of these nations were original Western Allied powers in that not only fought WW2, but acted as a deterrent to the Soviets in the Cold War is important, but a name is just a name and thus can be changed to fit the purpose/mandate of the organization, while all the organization's assets and structure remain nearly the same. In a way, this is similar to the way the United Nations inherited the League of Nations' offices in Switzerland and elsewhere, though they are technically two different organizations with the latter simply inheriting the latter's assets.

BTW, are you even going to comment on the later half of my reply dealing with the SCO?


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## geo (5 Nov 2007)

NATO - the old treaty ain't what it used to be.  It might have to be rethought & rewritten.

SCO - Didn't Japan try that with their Friendship league back in the 30s? 

The Warsaw pact is dead, long live SCO!
There is no doubt that this is a force that will flex it's muscle and cause us problems in the long run.
The Chinese are a rising force & the Russians are trying to reanimate some vestigtes of their Soviet empire (?)

I think that both Russia and China, with their economic clout will be a cause of trouble in the future.  Already, Chinese meddling in Africa is creating waves - what'll come next?


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## CougarKing (17 Nov 2007)

Is this yet another sign that the Russian Bear is being resurrected by President Putin?  A newly resurgent Russia may just be the thing to rejuvenate the NATO alliance and give it more llegitimacy in today's international arena.

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,1331...00.html?wh=news



> Russia Suspends Cold War Arms Treaty
> Associated Press  |  November 16, 2007
> MOSCOW - Russia's upper house of parliament voted to suspend compliance with a key Cold War treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, Russian news agencies reported.
> 
> ...


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## geo (18 Nov 2007)

Daddy,
At the time of the big bad soviet bear, Western Europe was not so dependent on Russian oil & gas.....
Imagine how things would have turned out in the west if, after umpteen years of receiving & becoming dependent on soviet oil, the "reds" had turned off the oil tap..... much different story ending IMHO.


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## daftandbarmy (18 Nov 2007)

Over the past hundred years, the current members of NATO spent much of their time and money killing each other, to the tune of millions of casualties and untold misery. It's easy to forget that only approximately 90 years ago this month the Battle of Passchedaele was grinding to a grisly close. It could be argued that the Taliban are the least of our worries as NATO partners. 

If nothing else, NATO should stay together to prevent the outbreak of a 3rd European Civil War (could this happen? IMHO it could), and continue to deter the threat from the east which, as we have seen recently, is increasing (again). If that means some heavy lifting in the short term for a few NATO members, it's probably a price worth paying to keep the alliance intact. 

This will also give us some bargaining leverage to meet Canada's future foreign policy goals. For example, I was in Norway the winter that Canada decided to pull it's CAST brigade out of the role of NATO northern flank protection. Believe me, this was seen as a big blunder politically by other NATO members there at the time who whined loud and long about it. If we did the same now, most of NATO wouldn't have the credibility to criticize our decision.


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## Edward Campbell (1 Mar 2008)

Here (and linked to elsewhere on Milnet.ca), reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from today’s _Globe and Mail_, is a fairly long, detailed analysis of why NATO *is* failing, right now:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080301.wcanukafghan0301/BNStory/Afghanistan/home/?pageRequested=all


> The ugly truth in Afghanistan
> 
> GRAEME SMITH AND PAUL KORING
> 
> ...



More to come


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## sgf (1 Mar 2008)

Great Article.


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## Edward Campbell (1 Mar 2008)

Continued from the previous post

The _Globe and Mail_ reporters offer three potential solutions:

1, More Canadian “boots on the ground” which, until the government actually keeps its promise of thousands and thousands more people in the CF and as has been discussed here on Milnet.ca, really means extending tour lengths to 9, 12 or 15 months with or without more ‘breaks;’

2. More American boots, specifically the ‘new,’ 3,000 strong USMC contingent and, concomitantly a shift in tactics; or

3. A new, approach, “community peace-building” which, in my opinion, can only succeed if it is supported by a robust security operation: many more _boots on the ground_.

If the authors are right then NATO’s failure is imminent and, absent thousands of new, first rate, _caveat_-free combat troops in Kandahar, in the very near future, it is unavoidable. Without that new _surge_, the Pashtun _revolt_, which as the authors correctly note is carried out by the Taliban plus a number of only loosely affiliated groups, will likely overwhelm the Canadian in Kandahar and then spread throughout the South and deeper into the West and East, overwhelming the Dutch, British and even the American areas in rapids succession, because nothing succeeds like success.

There are ways to prevent a NATO failure but they all seem to depend upon a very few countries (America, Australia, Britain, Canada and a very, very few others) doing a whole lot more. It is difficult to see the political ‘payback’ when only a few do the _heavy lifting_ while a few others get to _call the shots_. The *alliance* is fractured and increasingly at odds with itself, but, being a formal alliance, its members are solidly fixed in their positions and there is little that the ‘lifters’ can do about the ‘callers.’

There are, for Canada, _strategic_ (political/diplomatic, military and economic) consequences to a NATO failure. For nearly 50 years NATO was, as Ruxted has said, a ‘cornerstone’ of our foreign policy and, now, we have invested a great deal (lives, money and prestige) in this NATO mission in Afghanistan. A failure – a *defeat* – will have domestic and global consequences. The “Little Canada” crowd will be emboldened; Maude Barlow and Stephen Staples and all the others who oppose a “True North, Strong and Free” will have won the debate; Jack Layton’s version of Pierre Trudeau’s _vision_ of a poor, weak, isolated and introspective nation-state, huddling behind America’s skirts, will come to pass.

There are some solutions between now and 2011:

•	Despite this weeks’ budget, give the military a lot of new money to expand, quickly so that we can carry a much bigger load in Kandahar – absent that our voice in NATO remains shallow, hesitant, weak and whiney;

•	Lick the attrition and recruiting problems – more money is the first and biggest key;

•	Extend tour lengths in Afghanistan to 9 months, then 12 months, then 15 months – and add even more combat pay and some additional benefits to help compensate – to effectively increase our own combat strength while we train and equip new soldiers with the new money;

•	Accept US leadership in Kandahar until we are able to put enough troops on the ground to play a real leadership role; and

•	Explore new ways to provide security to promising new approaches to ‘winning’ Kandahar for the Government of Afghanistan.


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## Edward Campbell (2 Mar 2008)

The obvious answer to the overarching, potentially alliance destroying *requirement* for another battle-group (1,000± soldiers) is: *CANADA*.

Just two years ago the brand spanking new minister of national defence promised new money and new men for the CF. _"Increasing the strength of the Canadian Forces to at least 75,000 regular force personnel is a clear priority. We will also intend to increase the reserve force by 10,000."_ Gordon O’Connor told the CBC.

How many of those 25,000± people have been recruited and trained in two years? Are they really ‘new’ people or are they just replacing good, useful soldiers the CF could not convince to stay in the service?

Many will argue that two years is a long, long time – but: Is it, when we’re fight a war? We managed to do rather a lot in the way of recruiting and training between say, Feb ’40 and Feb ’42 and Feb ’50 and Feb ’52. But, I keep forgetting: the Canadian Army may be fighting a tough, bloody war but DND, the Government of Canada and Canada, itself, are resolutely at peace.

Anyways, Prime Minister Harper and Defence Minister MacKay: *Where* is the beef *are the troops?*


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## sgf (2 Mar 2008)

Well there isnt any new money out of this latest budget and I have to wonder why not



> Budget offers low-key defence spending increase
> By Mike Blanchfield, Canwest News Service
> Published: Tuesday, February 26, 2008
> OTTAWA - With Canada's military all but committed to Afghanistan to 2011, Tuesday's federal budget delivered a politically low-key defence spending increase, while topping up aid money to the war-torn country by $100 million.
> ...



http://www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=55026b85-f81b-44cc-b0d9-b1db9caa1a11


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## Celticgirl (2 Mar 2008)

Canada has made a commitment and followed through. It seems to me that some of the countries in the NATO alliance want to enjoy the benefits of being a part of this organization without having to take on any of the responsibilities. The term "fairweather friends" comes to mind. _They _ should step up. _WE _ already have and continue to do so. 

I can't believe I'm getting into this type of discussion right before church.


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## sgf (2 Mar 2008)

They should indeed, but they arent. So what next?


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## Celticgirl (2 Mar 2008)

sgf said:
			
		

> They should indeed, but they arent. So what next?



Reconsider their NATO memberships.


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## sgf (2 Mar 2008)

That would be great, but it wont happen.


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## Edward Campbell (2 Mar 2008)

Celticgirl said:
			
		

> Canada has made a commitment and followed through. It seems to me that some of the countries in the NATO alliance want to enjoy the benefits of being a part of this organization without having to take on any of the responsibilities. The term "fairweather friends" comes to mind. _They _ should step up. _WE _ already have and continue to do so.
> 
> I can't believe I'm getting into this type of discussion right before church.



"Fairweather friend" is an apt description of Canada from 1969 through to about 1995. We did, in spades, exactly what some European 'friends' are doing now; we shirked our duty to our allies. Maybe "turnabout is fair play' is is another term that ought to come to mind.

We selected Kandahar; we made a commitment; we're not doing as well as we might wish; we're asking for demanding help and threatening to impose a defeat upon NATO if we don't get what want.

Canada is a rich country, a member of the G7. If we cannot afford another battle-group then maybe we need to consider withdrawing from the world and hiding behind Uncle Sam's coattails.


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## Loachman (2 Mar 2008)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Are they really ‘new’ people or are they just replacing good, useful soldiers the CF could not convince to stay in the service?



I think that the implications of that statement do a disservice to a lot of people, as well as ignoring the real problem: FRP and freeze on recruiting for over a decade that has left a huge hole in the organization that's working its way through.


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## Old Sweat (2 Mar 2008)

It seems to me that Canada has reinforced its contingent in terms of both numbers and equipment. Have we the numbers trained and equipped to provide another battle group or even a combat team or two for the present one? That question should be left to those with detailed knowledge, but it seems to me that that is getting close to committing the reserve too early. 

We are not in any position to point fingers for just the reasons Edward made. That, of course, need not bother any one who wants to bash the Europeans for not doing their bit. After all, sanctimonious posturing is a time-honoured Canadian political tradition. I am sure many of the European nations can justify their actions using the argument that they are securing their particular areas in the best hearts and minds tradition.


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## Edward Campbell (2 Mar 2008)

Loachman said:
			
		

> I think that the implications of that statement do a disservice to a lot of people, as well as ignoring the real problem: FRP and freeze on recruiting for over a decade that has left a huge hole in the organization that's working its way through.



Obviously, I'm not sure what the 'real' problems are anymore, but I suspect that words like 'inertia,' 'disorganized' and 'empire building' might apply. They were in common use when I was still serving and the 'problems' of how to do more with less were 'always and everywhere.'


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## Meist (2 Mar 2008)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The obvious answer to the overarching, potentially alliance destroying *requirement* for another battle-group (1,000± soldiers) is: *CANADA*.
> 
> Just two years ago the brand spanking new minister of national defence promised new money and new men for the CF. _"Increasing the strength of the Canadian Forces to at least 75,000 regular force personnel is a clear priority. We will also intend to increase the reserve force by 10,000."_ Gordon O’Connor told the CBC.
> 
> ...



Well, I for one think it was just a bad idea for the then Defence Minister to make such a promise. You can't just promise more people, because the government can't force people to join. Of course, more money is usually a good thing, and a slick recruiting campaign always helps, but maybe there just aren't ~25 000 Canadians that want to join the CF? I could however be completely wrong, and the CF could be off to a good start on meeting those targets. Anyone have any statistics in regards to that? 

As far as NATO goes I'm in agreement with what a lot of people have said in that it needs some.. work put into it.


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## Old Sweat (2 Mar 2008)

I tried to download the CDS's address to the annual CDA meeting, but my laptop decided it didn't want to play. As I recall the CDS said that in the last two (I think) years the trained CF strength went from 60,000 to 66,000. Given the attrition rate and the lack of capacity in the training system, that is significant progress.

Can someone confirm these figures?


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## Edward Campbell (2 Mar 2008)

Let’s, as bridge players like to say, ‘review the bidding:’

•	In 1969/70 the Canadian government of the day, (Pierre Trudeau) made a sharp _volte face_ and stood _traditional_ (since 1949) Canadian foreign and defence policy on its head. Canada unilaterally abrogated its commitments to NATO and tried to steer a sharply left anti-capitalist/anti-American course. The effective withdrawal* from NATO worked, albeit not as ‘well’ as Trudeau wished; the ‘left turn’ did not because Canadians and Canadian industry and, _de facto_ the government, _per se_, would not cooperate. Thus began three _decades of darkness_;

•	In the 1980s (Brian Mulroney) the government talked a good fight but did little if real strategic significance – we remained ‘free riders,’ parasites on the military bodies of our friends and neighbours. A few very modest defence spending increases could not even prevent the ‘rust out’ of the CF;

•	In the early 1990s the cuts to Canada’s defence forces got deeper. The real ‘fat’ had already been trimmed away in the ‘70s, followed by the ‘meat’ in the ‘80s. In 1993 Jean Chrétien attacked the muscle and bone;

•	In the mid to late 1990s the government did another about turn. Chrétien suddenly rejoined NATO in an (eventually) effective manner in the Balkans operations;

•	In 2001 Prime Minister Chrétien committed Canada to Afghanistan, to combat in Kandahar, as part of the US coalition. (The actual forces didn’t deploy until early 2002.) For reasons that were militarily/logistically sound and politically prudent Prime Minister Chrétien limited Canada to one battle group for one six-month tour of duty;

•	In 2003  the government of the day faced a new dilemma. The very real threat pose by _al Qaeda_ and the _Taliban_ and sundry fellow travellers had made rebuilding the CF both urgent and popular. But, the US Bush administration remained unpopular with Canadians, 9/11 notwithstanding, and the decision to invade Iraq was wildly unpopular – amongst the public and the _policy elites_, equally. M. Chrétien was advised (probably incorrectly if recent evidence is to be believed) that the US *required* a Canadian commitment. All manner of unspecified bad consequences would result, the PM was advised, if Canada sat on the fence in the misnamed and ill-conceived _global war on terror_ that now embraced Iraq. Chrétien hit upon a good excuse to avoid participating in Iraq: Canada would make a substantial commitment to ISAF in Afghanistan. A Canadian battle group plus a substantial admin _tail_ went to Kabul;

•	In 2005 the government decided, at NATO and US prompting, to stay in Afghanistan – this time by committing to a PRT in Kandahar. The PRT is small (200± people) but the concomitant and essential security and support bills drove the overall commitment to 2,500± troops;

•	By 2008 we appreciated that 2,500 troops, of whom only 650± are in active combat roles, are not sufficient to do the job. We need more and better equipment and more combat troops – another battle-group of about 1,000 soldiers – to just ‘stay put’ much less to get the job done.

Now, like Old Sweat I do not know how many of the promised 25,000 new people have been recruited and trained. If, Big *IF* we have 6,000 new, ‘regulars’ then the government has done well. I would agree that a 10% growth rate over two years is highly acceptable. If the number is, say, 3,000 new troops then I’m still satisfied. But, if we are at, say, 61,000 effectives then I think we (long suffering taxpayers) deserve answers. I fully understand that the ‘system’ can only absorb so much money and do so much in two years. I understand that the first phase of _transformation_ – which appears to me to be _*mostly*_ about reshuffling staff officers’ desks in HQs (_pace_ special ops people, I know you’ve got new units doing important stuff)  – and the rush of new aircraft orders is using up a lot of the staff _capacity_, but the *government promised* new troops two years ago. It is not unrealistic, in my view, to expect progress.

The reason this _itches_ is that I think the most effective way to get another battle-group is to add another Canadian battle-group to the mission. The Canadian admin _tail_ is, largely, in place. It is possible that 750-850 more Canadians will be sufficient to provide to combat capable battle group ‘outside the wire.’ I think another Canadian battle-group *will* attract other reinforcements – _“the Lord helps him who helps himself”_ sort of effect. I think another Canadian battle-group would be sufficient to allow the US to make the 3,000 additional Marines ‘permanent.’** 

I’m guessing that we have enough LCols and Majs and Capts and MWOs to staff another battle-group. I’m *guessing* we are short, mainly, Sgts, MCpls and Cpls and some of the kit needed for another battle-group. I thought that’s the sort of thing the MND promised to remedy back in Feb 06.   

Finally, it sounds to me like the government and the _commentariat_ are whining – we’ve done enough of that since 1969. It’s unbecoming.

----------
* The impact was to remove a small but potent fighting force from the front lines on NATO’s most dangerous front (the North German Plain) and put a smaller, impotent force into reserve on one of NATO’s less likely battlefields – the South German mountains.
** It’s hard, in an election year, to blame the US for resisting pressure to beef up its forces in Afghanistan when it is already carrying a large burden and the country hollering for help may not be fully extended.


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## daftandbarmy (2 Mar 2008)

Why not just mobilize the militia? It would take a couple of years, but would give us long term staying power...


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## benny88 (2 Mar 2008)

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Let’s, as bridge players like to say, ‘review the bidding:’



   Thanks for the recap E.R.. I consider myself pretty aware and fairly well read, but because of my age, I've only been so for about 5 years. Your summary was a big help, thanks again.


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## Edward Campbell (3 Mar 2008)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Why not just mobilize the militia? It would take a couple of years, but would give us long term staying power...



That’s essentially what we did 60 years ago when we built 27 brigade for the newly formed NATO.

The three _traditional_ regular regiments (The RCR, PPCLI and R22eR) were augmented by 2nd and later 3rd battalions (for service in the _Defence of Canada Force_ and with 25 brigade in Korea). The 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry Battalions, 1st and 2nd Canadian Highland Battalions and 1st and 2nd Canadian Rifle Battalions were created to serve in Europe. The new, composite regiments, were formed by bringing militia companies up to strength and then grouping them into composite battalions. (They later (Oct 53) became, respectively: 1st and 2nd Canadian Guards, 1st and 2nd RHC (Black Watch) and 1st and 2nd QORofC.)

Of course life was a bit simpler. First off: equipment was far less of an issue. These were, essentially, 1945 style ‘lorried’ infantry battalions and sufficient kit was readily (and equally importantly *cheaply*) available. Second: training was not a big issue. Almost all NCO positions were filled by combat veterans. Third: while Canada was not ‘at war’ – not in the 1944/45 sense of that word, anyway – the threats were very real and most Canadians perceived them to be real. None of those conditions exist in 2008, I suggest.

But,  and someone please correct me if I’m wrong, I recall reading that at least one Canadian militia unit (Calgary Highlanders?) was/is trying to recruit and train a company for service in Afghanistan. I don’t know if that’s a good idea or even a practicable one but it might be worth exploring – maybe we can create ‘short service’ battle-groups from militia brigades for, say, a 30 month period of service including training, service in Afghanistan for, say, 12-15 months, and a couple of months for _demobilization_. I’m way too old and too _out of touch_ to assess the practicability of such an idea – but we did it before, albeit in a vastly different time.


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## Edward Campbell (3 Mar 2008)

Back to my _itch_: 1,000 new _caveat_-free soldiers for Kandahar is not going to do the job, neither are 3,000 US Marines for the South and East of Afghanistan. Many military experts have suggested than 10,000 or 20,000 or even 30,000 more troops are required if we want to *secure* Afghanistan so that the lawfully elected government of that poor, war-torn country can do the very basic things governments of a sovereign state ought to do – like allowing aid and development agencies to operate in reasonable safety.

If we – that big, amorphous, NATO-led ‘we’ – want to ‘win’ in Afghanistan, as I suggest we do, then everyone, including Canada, has to pay the piper. Our ‘fair share’ may well be a small combat brigade (two or three battle groups plus support and the admin _tail_) for five to ten years.

It’s time to stop whining and start expanding. The sooner we settle the Afghanistan problem the sooner we can turn our attention to the other pressing crises, to the people for whom, we keep telling ourselves, we have accepted a *”Responsibility to Protect”*.


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## daftandbarmy (3 Mar 2008)

30 million Canadians, 50,000 (ish) CF members. That's about 0.002% of the population holding up about 90% of our international reputation. It's time to do something drastic about that IMHO.



"The Last of the Light Brigade

There were thirty million English who talked of England's might,
There were twenty broken troopers who lacked a bed for the night.
They had neither food nor money, they had neither service nor trade;
They were only shiftless soldiers, the last of the Light Brigade." - Kipling -


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## Gimpy (3 Mar 2008)

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> 30 million Canadians, 50,000 (ish) CF members. That's about 0.002% of the population holding up about 90% of our international reputation. It's time to do something drastic about that IMHO.



The number of troops should have little to do with how we uphold our international reputation. The UK and the US are quite similar to those statistics, in the UK its only 0.006% and in the US its 0.01%. Even in China its 0.005% and in India its 0.003%. We have a proportionately sized military compared to our peers. CF members are holding up this country's reputation amazingly, there is nothing wrong with what they are doing, and if Canada's international reputation is being let down it's not due to the soldiers, but due to the politicians who are making it harder for them to do as such. The politicians are hurting our international reputation far more than the troops who have done nothing to hurt it. The troops are doing their best to hold up a reputation that is being marginalized by politics, so nothing drastic needs to be done regarding them, but maybe something drastic should be done about the politicians. What that could be? Far beyond me. A lot of things have been tried, but in the end political power will outweigh personal morals for most politicians.


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## Greymatters (3 Mar 2008)

Thats a bit negative and counter-productive considering the potential positive solutions others are offering...


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## Gimpy (3 Mar 2008)

Greymatters said:
			
		

> Thats a bit negative and counter-productive considering the potential positive solutions others are offering...



Would you care to elaborate on this? How is it counterproductive and even negative to argue that our troops are not the problem and the politicians are? I'd say daftandbarmy's proposal was much more negative than mine. Even if only 0.002% of our population is holding up our reputation what does the number have to do with it? That seems negative to place an emphasis on quantity over quality. More does not necessarily equal better.


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## Edward Campbell (22 Aug 2009)

Here, in four parts, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions (§29) of the Copyright Act from the most recent issue of _Foreign Affairs_, is an essay by former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65251/zbigniew-brzezinski/an-agenda-for-nato
Part 1 of 4


> An Agenda for NATO
> *Toward a Global Security Web*
> 
> Zbigniew Brzezinski
> ...




While Dr. Brzezinski is undoubtedly correct, “whether World War III was actually likely will never be known,” it is an undeniable fact that we – including US presidents, Canadian prime ministers, allied admirals and generals and  _ordinary_ people, too – believed it was likely, indeed even probable, because people like Brzezinski told us it was so.


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## Edward Campbell (22 Aug 2009)

Part 2 of 4



> *ENLARGING THE WEST*
> 
> By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet Union's officially proclaimed expectations of surpassing the United States in both economic and military power had begun to look hollow, and strains within the Soviet Union itself -- intensified by Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika -- began to mitigate Western fears that growing Soviet strategic power might make Europe vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. In that setting, both sides became more willing to actively explore such issues as arms control, human rights, and even troop reductions. By the end of the decade, the rapidly growing disarray in the Soviet bloc -- spearheaded by the success of the Solidarity movement in Poland and prudently exploited in its final phase by NATO (and particularly by closely cooperating U.S., German, British, and French leaders) -- had gotten out of hand. Before long, both the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc became history.
> 
> ...




I disagreed in the 1990s and disagree now that “NATO enlargement was historically timely and also the right thing to do.” The _potentially_ dire consequences that Brzezinski offers were not “likely” – possible, but not probable.  The enlargement may have been the result of “history’s spontaneity” but that doesn’t make it any of right, necessary or wise.

But he is quite correct to say that, _“ the global center of political and economic gravity is shifting away from the North Atlantic toward Asia and the Pacific."_ This is a challenge to which the US led West – part of which is within NATO - must respond, in part by making the “West” a whole lot more “Eastern.”

The _”Muslim resentments on the United States and the West”_ predate “US leadership in recent years.” Brzezinski’s highly partisan Democratic instincts, never far below the surface, are on display. That “Muslim resentment” might well go all the way back to the First Barbary War (1801-05): from whence we get “The shores of Tripoli".


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## Edward Campbell (22 Aug 2009)

Part 3 of 4



> *SUSTAINING ALLIANCE CREDIBILITY*
> 
> The dispersal of global power and the expanding mass political unrest make for a combustible mixture. In this dangerous setting, the first order of business for NATO members is to define together, and then to pursue together, a politically acceptable outcome to its out-of-region military engagement in Afghanistan. The United States' NATO allies invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in deciding to join the campaign to deprive al Qaeda of its safe haven in Afghanistan. The alliance made that commitment on its own and not under U.S. pressure. It must accordingly be pursued on a genuinely shared military and economic basis, without caveats regarding military participation or evasions regarding badly needed financial assistance for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The commitment of troops and money cannot be overwhelmingly a U.S. responsibility.
> 
> ...




I remain convinced that Afghanistan will be NATO’s graveyard.

NATO will not fail *IN* Afghanistan; the US will not permit that to happen. It will fail in Brussels when NATO will demonstrate that Afghanistan has rendered it unwilling to conduct such a (necessary) operation again. It will fail in Ottawa and Canberra, too, where countries will lack faith in NATO’s capabilities to conduct dangerous military operations.


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## Edward Campbell (22 Aug 2009)

Part 4 of 4



> *ENGAGING RUSSIA*
> 
> The alliance also needs to define for itself a historically and geopolitically relevant long-term strategic goal for its relationship with the Russian Federation. Russia is not an enemy, but it still views NATO with hostility. That hostility is not likely to fade soon, especially if Prime Minister Vladimir Putin becomes president again in 2012. Moreover, for a while yet, Russia's policy toward NATO -- driven by historical resentment of the Soviet defeat in the Cold War and by nationalist hostility to NATO's expansion -- is likely to try to promote division between the United States and Europe and, within Europe, between NATO's old members and NATO's new members.
> 
> ...




China’s _interests_ in Pakistan and in West Asia, more broadly, cannot be overemphasized. One huge _potential_ disaster, just waiting to happen, is a failure by the US to recognize and accommodate China on these matters. Ignoring China is dangerous. The Chinese do not have the same vital interests as does America and the US led West. The Chinese do not even, always, define _vital interests_ in the same way we do. Miscalculation is always possible; miscalculations of China’s interests in Pakistan could be tragic. Sadly the level of stupidity re: China and West Asia seems to be a bipartisan issue – equally abysmally deep amongst Liberal and Conservatives, Democrats and Republicans and so on.

Russia is not, in my view, going to be strategically relevant for another two generations. When it becomes relevant again it will be a smaller, more advanced, *European* leader of the Slavic nations. What is now the Russian “East” (Siberia) will be Asian.

NATO is not the only body with _”the experience, the institutions, and the means to eventually become the hub of a globe-spanning web of various regional cooperative-security undertakings among states with the growing power to act.”_ Military groups like ABCA, AUSCANZUKUS and Field Z have the capacity to expand. They are, already, leaders of NATO’s standardization and C4I processes.


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## Edward Campbell (11 Aug 2012)

I'm reviving a very old thread because Conrad Black, in a column in the _National Post_ has revived the idea of the _Anglosphere_ or, maybe even _Anglosphere plus_; here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisons of the Copyright Act from the _National Post_, is an excerpt:

http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/08/10/conrad-black-the-u-k-s-olympic-crossroads-reflections-on-the-commonwealth/


> Britain’s Olympic crossroads
> 
> Conrad Black
> 
> ...




First: I do not think that an _Anglosphere_ (even a "plus" one) that does not have _active_, even _enthusiastic_ US support can or would do anything useful.

Second: let's not call it the _Anglosphere_ because that disguises its cultural strength which is based on its respect for the rule of law and for transparent institutions, not on language.

But: let us, by all means, try and strengthen the strategic and military _cooperation_ between:

1. Selected NATO members - America, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands and Norway;

2. _Traditional_ allies - Australia and New Zealand; and

3. Newer friends who have demonstrated a commitment to the rule of law and good government - India, Finland, Japan and Singapore.

That, 12 countries, is, in my opinion big enough (and, broadly, sufficiently representative) to be credible and, still, small enough to actually accomplish something.

Remember that NATO, in its *golden* age, when it mattered and when, in my opinion, it actually worked, had only 12 members.


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## Edward Campbell (17 Jan 2014)

A _necrothread_ is revived yet again because Prof Stephen Saideman, who I find a credible "authority" on the subject, suggests that we still need NATO, or something like it, for the next, inevitable crisis that will demand Canada's action in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Globe and Mail_:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/after-afghanistan-how-will-we-fight-the-next-multination-war/article16384521/#dashboard/follows/


> After Afghanistan, how will we fight the next multination war?
> 
> STEPHEN SAIDEMAN
> Contributed to The Globe and Mail
> ...




I continue to believe that NATO is well past its "best before" date and that it will be even less suited than now for the next "beyond the European periphery" mission.

I also continue to believe that my smaller, less rigid, less _formal_ 12 nation _group_ (I suggested America, Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Singapore 16 months ago) (and, yes, I would be willing to swap e.g. Finland for e.g. South Africa id someone really insisted on a _broader_ group) would be a better forum to provide military leadership for UN sanctioned combat missions in the Afro-Asian sphere.


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## GAP (17 Jan 2014)

Hmmm......the present biggies from Europe don't seem to be on that list.....


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## Edward Campbell (17 Jan 2014)

GAP said:
			
		

> Hmmm......the present biggies from Europe don't seem to be on that list.....




Nope, they are not. The French are wiling to fight, but only when their vital interests are at stake and only under their own rules ... America can get away with that but France cannot; it is, as a very senior French diplomate said of Israel, just a "shitty little country" and no one needs it. The Germans remain unwilling to, due to deep domestic socio-political divisions, to _engage_ in the world. Neither should be allowed a _leadership_ role in most future coalitions.

My  :2c:


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## GAP (17 Jan 2014)

sound reasoning.....


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## qqperson (27 Jan 2014)

Probs one of the more interesting threads ive seen.


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## Journeyman (27 Jan 2014)

We're not the only ones pondering NATO's future.  _Small Wars Journal_ has an interview with Dr. Andrew A. Michta, the M.W. Distinguished Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College, entitled "NATO’s Post ISAF Challenges and the Danger of a Hollow Alliance."  Beyond having doubts about higher-level military skills developing within the Afghan Army, his main premise for NATO itself is numbers and budgets are decreasing, and what's missing "is a political piece of the conversation we need to have across the Atlantic, especially with Central Europe."

Complete interview here


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## Loachman (27 Jan 2014)

tysonbishop said:
			
		

> Probs one of the more interesting threads ive seen.



Prob*ably* one of the more interesting threads *I'*ve seen.

Proper spelling, grammar, punctuation, capitalization etcetera - use it.

At least this thread is not over a decade old.


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## Humphrey Bogart (27 Jan 2014)

Found this little gem today, thought it relevant to post it here:

Courtesy of the Telegraph

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10598250/Comrades-in-arms-Britain-and-Russia-to-sign-defence-deal.html



> Comrades in arms: Britain and Russia to sign defence deal
> Once they were Cold War foes. Now Britain and Russia are preparing to work together on defence projects
> 
> By Matthew Holehouse, Political Correspondent
> ...


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