# Russia in the 21st Century [Superthread]



## tomahawk6

Interesting American Thinker article about Putin stepping into the power vacuum left by the US.

http://www.americanthinker.com/2013/08/dangerous_times_russia_rising_in_the_middle_east.html



> In the absence of American strength and reliability, all the players are turning to Russia, which is emerging:
> 
> ● as a vocal defender of Christianity against Muslim persecution around the world;
> 
> ● as a plausible peacemaker in the Middle East, with far better relationships with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria than America has today;
> 
> ● as the monopoly natural gas supplier for Germany, with the consent of the Franco-German axis;
> 
> ● as the only country with a credible a nuclear umbrella to protect its friends and deter its enemies;
> 
> ● as a country that understands the value of relatively free markets -- witness the 14% flat tax Putin just introduced in Russia.


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## Edward Campbell

Interesting but, I think, because it is designed to convince Americans to change governments, not because it presents a credible case for a Russian turn around. 

I remain convinced that Russia is a _failing_ state, not a potential leader of even a rival for any of the America, China or India.


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## a_majoor

I'm not so sure about Russia "_turning around_", but they have the legacy of an "Empire", a legacy military force and a large reserve of resource wealth, so stepping into a power vacuum isn't to difficult to imagine.

It also bolster's the legitimacy of the Russian ruling elites, and serves (like most Imperial ventures) to distract the people from issues and problems at home and the "near abroad".

Historically, Europeans have been afraid more of the _potential_ of Russia rather than the reality. Everyone was afraid of the "Russian Steamroller", but it finally came into existence only in the second half of the "Great Patriotic War" after years of being forged in the fires of real combat against the Nazis. As you yourself have pointed out on many occasions, the Red Army *we* feared during the Cold War was generally ill led, ill trained, ill disciplined and poorly equipped, and this only a few decades after their military peak. I'm sure the situation is the same today.


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## Kat Stevens

Not sure I'm really getting that warm fuzzy feeling from having the worlds largest Thugocracy as the go to guy in the second, third, or lost world.


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## Bert

The article puts a comparative microscope on some aspects of US and Russian foreign policy and leadership styles of Obama and Putin.  Pushing aside critiques of Obama's application of foreign policy, any US President would be hard pressed dealing with unpayable levels of national debt and the hampered ability to project influence globally.  Other regional powers are filling the gaps.  Putin, as I recall reading from a Stratfor
article some time ago, implied he's got a short time to gain geo-economic/political influence until his "term" ends (no strong successor) and the population demographics slide.


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## tomahawk6

Bert said:
			
		

> The article puts a comparative microscope on some aspects of US and Russian foreign policy and leadership styles of Obama and Putin.  Pushing aside critiques of Obama's application of foreign policy, any US President would be hard pressed dealing with unpayable levels of national debt and the hampered ability to project influence globally.  Other regional powers are filling the gaps.  Putin, as I recall reading from a Stratfor
> article some time ago, implied he's got a short time to gain geo-economic/political influence until his "term" ends (no strong successor) and the population demographics slide.



The US economy is a powerful engine if allowed to function without interference.The debt could easily be paid down,unfortunately this crowd in dc are anti-business.They also don't care for the military and will use the defense budget to foster their agenda.The latter isn't new at all.Meanwhile,as has happened before other nations will try to take advantage of our weaknesses.


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## AirDet

When it comes down to the dollars and cents; Russia has a GDP less than that of Italy. That mere fact limits what they can do and influence.


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## a_majoor

AirDet said:
			
		

> When it comes down to the dollars and cents; Russia has a GDP less than that of Italy. That mere fact limits what they can do and influence.



True enough, but as the saying goes:

"Capitalism is about the _use_ of capital"

If Russia is willing to use a large fraction of its economic resources to project military and political power into what it sees as its area of interest; and if that fraction works out to be more than rival States are willing to spend to oppose it, then Russia still comes out ahead WRT its interests.


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## a_majoor

Putin _uses_ his diplomatic, strategic and economic capital to achieve the results that he wants at the G-20 summit, as reported by Bloomberg:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-06/putin-overwhelms-obama-at-the-sulky-summit.html



> *Putin Overwhelms Obama at the Sulky Summit*
> By Leonid Bershidsky Sep 6, 2013 10:43 AM ET
> 
> When Russian President Vladimir Putin came out to welcome world leaders to this week's G-20 summit at the Constantine Palace in Strelna, a St. Petersburg suburb, many wondered how it would go between him and U.S. President Barack Obama.
> 
> The latter had, after all, likened Putin to a bored, slouching kid at the back of the class. The Russian ex-KGB officer, eight years Obama's senior, took offense. In an interview the day before the summit, he resorted to the royal "we" when commenting on Obama's remark: "I am surprised sometimes to read about body language, about us being bored or otherwise behaving differently. Who but ourselves can say what's in our heads and our souls?"
> 
> The leaders arrived one after another in Russian-assembled Series 7 BMWs that were provided by the hosts. Putin laughed with U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron and spent more time talking to German Chancellor Angela Merkel than to any of his other guests. Obama was the last to appear -– in his own Cadillac.
> 
> He extended his hand as soon as he climbed out of the limousine, and Putin did the same as he walked over to meet him. The handshake was brief, just long enough for photographers to capture Obama's broad smile and Putin's more tight-lipped one.
> 
> Through most of the first day Putin and Obama avoided each other. The organizers initially wanted to seat the G20 leaders according to the Russian alphabetical order of their countries, putting only King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia between Putin and Obama, but decided at the last moment to switch to the Latin alphabet. The Russian and U.S. presidents ended up separated by five people. They didn't exchange a meaningful word.
> 
> Finally, the two stepped aside for a 20-minute conversation during the first day's dinner and reception. The talk appears to have been inconclusive.
> 
> The St. Petersburg meeting of the G-20 may well go down in history as the Sulky Summit, but also as a qualified Putin victory. "Syria: G-20 trapped by Putin," read a headline in the conservative French newspaper le Figaro.
> 
> Most of the leaders present share the Russian president's views on whether to intervene in Syria, the most divisive issue on the agenda. European Council President Herman van Rompuy, representing the European Union at the summit, said early on that -- unlike Obama and his British, French, Turkish and Canadian allies -- he did not support airstrikes. Putin even received a letter from Pope Francis, which said the search for a military solution in Syria was "futile." Like van Rompuy, Merkel wants the situation to be resolved within the framework of the United Nations, and most of the leaders of the emerging world agree.
> 
> At June's G-8 summit in Northern Ireland, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper insisted that Putin was an outlier in the group, because of his stand on Syria: "I don't think we should fool ourselves. This is G7 plus one ... We in the West have a very different perspective on this situation. Mr. Putin and his government are supporting the thugs of the Assad regime for their own reasons that I do not think are justifiable."
> 
> Yet Putin was able to block the G-8 from issuing a statement condemning Assad and demanding his ouster -- and that was before the Obama called for air strikes to punish Assad's alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians.
> 
> In St. Petersburg, Putin and Harper smiled and shook hands. The Canadian prime minister did not talk of "G-19 plus one." In the expanded format, a tough line on Assad is unpopular. Putin clearly enjoyed rubbing in the fact that a number of big, increasingly economically powerful countries did not feel the need to fall in with the U.S. line.
> 
> Putin also reveled in his role as host. It was he who cajoled Russian and foreign companies into helping to fund the $300 million refurbishment of the Constantine palace, finished in 2003. So the imperial splendor of the summit's backdrop was in part his doing. The meeting was impeccably and expensively organized, the Kremlin having splurged on a fleet of new buses and electric cars, a majestic light show at the baroque palace in Peterhof, and a further $60 million pre-summit facelift of the Constantine palace.
> 
> This being Russia, some of the expense was called into question. Dimtry Peskov, the Kremlin press secretary, said that during the first day of the summit, 1,500 people were served by the press center's restaurant, consuming 26 tons of food. "You're eating a lot," he told reporters. Journalists quickly calculated that Peskov's numbers came to 17 kilograms (37.5 pounds) of food per person.
> 
> "They must have allocated money for 26 tons of food," Elena Panfilova, head of the Russian branch of Transparency International, wrote only half-jokingly on Facebook. "Then they must have skimmed 50 percent right off and another 40 percent when they went about buying the 13 tons for which they had money left. That left them with about 7.5 tons. Then they lost another 30 percent to spillage and shrinkage during transportation and cooking. So about 5 tons was served, and I know from experience that one can put away some three kilos of canapes and sandwiches during a stressful event."
> 
> Syria aside, Obama and Harper have the same problem with Putin and his regime that many Russians do: It is transparently corrupt, Byzantine and self-serving. That, however, does not prevent it from organizing impressive international events and scoring diplomatic victories.
> 
> (Leonid Bershidsky, an editor and novelist, is a Bloomberg View contributor. He can be reached at bershidsky@gmail.com).


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## a_majoor

This has been noted several times in the past, but so far no one has actually seemed to have taken action on this:

http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials-perspective/091313-671006-stop-putin-with-shale-revolution.htm



> *Gain Leverage Over Putin With Some 'Shale Diplomacy'*
> 3 Comments
> By WILLIAM F. SHUGHART II
> Posted 09/13/2013 05:26 PM ET
> 
> Dealing with Russian President Vladimir Putin isn't easy.
> 
> On the one hand he steps up as "peacemaker" in Syria, forestalling possible U.S. military action against the Assad regime for its alleged chemical-weapons atrocities.
> 
> At the same time, he reportedly is increasing sales of advanced anti-aircraft systems to Iran. And he continues to supply Assad with weapons as well.
> 
> What's the United States to do?
> 
> First, we need to sober up and recognize the source of Putin's power: petro-dollars. Half of Russia's state budget comes from foreign oil and gas revenue. So if we want leverage over Putin and his cronies, we need to break his petro piggybank.
> 
> While surging U.S. natural gas production already is applying pressure on the Russians, more can be done. Exporting U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) and spreading the shale revolution abroad offer opportunities for undercutting Putin's power.
> 
> The early shale boom stunned global energy markets and caught Russia flatfooted. Its state-owned gas company, Gazprom, was forced to renegotiate supply contracts with European customers and book billion-dollar losses.
> 
> Russia's gas exports ran up against an unlikely competitor: cheap U.S. coal, which flooded the European electricity market as U.S. electric utilities switched from coal to low-cost and abundant natural gas.
> 
> However, Gazprom has since recovered, and its profits are climbing again. Exports of Russian gas to Europe are at a three-year high. Since more than half of Gazprom's revenue comes from such exports, Putin's coffers are flush again, and he's flexing his muscles.
> 
> Exporting more of our natural gas and technological expertise would be effective ways of hitting Putin where it hurts. With major shale formations scattered across Eastern Europe, the potential is there to pull Gazprom's largest export market out from under Putin's nose.
> 
> ConocoPhillips, Shell and Chevron, among other major oil-and-gas producers, have reached deals to begin shale development in former Soviet-bloc nations. Chevron alone already has leased some 5.6 million acres of shale-rich land in Ukraine, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania. More will follow.
> 
> Meanwhile, U.S. LNG exports are looming large. The Department of Energy has issued export licenses to three companies, with an eye on shipping LNG to key markets in Europe and Asia. With more than a dozen applications from other companies awaiting review, the U.S. could send Putin a strong message by immediately approving a half-dozen more.
> 
> Challenging Gazprom in Europe is just half the story. The Russians also are looking east to a huge market in Japan, which needs substitutes for nuclear power to generate electricity, following the accident at Fukushima.
> 
> Read More At Investor's Business Daily: http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials-perspective/091313-671006-stop-putin-with-shale-revolution.htm#ixzz2esUUeZ1e
> Follow us: @IBDinvestors on Twitter | InvestorsBusinessDaily on Facebook


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## a_majoor

The Russians have only a limited window to acheive whatever goals they hope to reach:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/8/berman-misreading-a-russia-on-the-run/print/



> *BERMAN: Misreading a Russia on the run*
> 
> By Ilan Berman-The Washington Times Tuesday, October 8, 2013
> 
> Far from robust, the federation is facing implosion
> 
> Don't let Russia's recent attempts to play peacemaker on Syria fool you — U.S.-Russian relations are still on the rocks. A range of issues — from Russia's stubborn support for the Iranian regime to the Kremlin's very public snub of the White House in granting asylum to fugitive whistleblower Edward Snowden — have cast a profound pall over bilateral ties. In the process, they have sounded the death knell for the vaunted "reset" of relations with Russia that President Obama made a centerpiece of his foreign-policy agenda during his first term in office.
> 
> In response, experts have taken to calling for a "strategic pause" in relations between Washington and Moscow, so that the White House can reassess exactly what is possible to achieve through outreach toward Russia. That's undoubtedly good thinking. However, Washington's reappraisal also needs to take into account the larger, more long-term threat to international security that is now posed by Russia. This is because the Russian Federation is fast approaching a massive social and political upheaval, one that promises to be as transformative as the Soviet Union's demise some two decades ago. Russia's coming crisis is driven by the convergence of three trends:
> 
> Russia is dying. The once-mighty Russian state is undergoing a catastrophic post-Soviet societal decline. Health standards are abysmal, and life expectancy in Russia is nothing like it is in the West — just age 60 for men (less than in Botswana and Madagascar) and 73 for women, roughly the same as in Saudi Arabia. Alcoholism — the scourge of Soviet society — continues to ravage the country, with a death rate among Russia's youth that is 35 times higher than among their counterparts in Europe. So does drug addiction. According to United Nations statistics, more than a fifth of all heroin consumed globally every year occurs in Russia. Prevalent, too, is a corrosive culture of abortion, with unofficial estimates placing the number of annual abortions at 2 million to 2.5 million — close to 2 percent of the Russian Federation's potential population.
> 
> In all, the country is contracting by close to half-a-million souls every year owing to both death and the emigration of its citizens (to Europe and beyond). At this rate, according to the Kremlin's own estimates, Russia could lose a quarter of its population by the middle of this century. It's a phenomenon that demographers have described as "the emptying of Russia" — a wholesale implosion of Russia's human capital, and a collapse of its prospects as a viable modern state.
> 
> Russia is also transforming. The country is experiencing a radical change in its ethnic and religious composition. Today, Russia's roughly 21 million Muslims are still a distinct minority. Comparatively robust birthrates have put Muslims on track to account for a fifth of the country's population by the end of this decade, and possibly a majority by midcentury.
> 
> Such a demographic revolution will fundamentally change Russia's character. That is not a problem, per se. In recent years, though, the Kremlin has discriminated against its Muslim minority and ignored (even abetted) the rise of corrosive xenophobia among its citizens. This has bred resentment and alienation among Russia's Muslims — sentiments that radical Islamic groups have been all too eager to exploit. The result is an increasingly restive Muslim minority that has little connection to — or love for — the Russian state.
> 
> Finally, the Chinese are coming. Over the past two decades, Russia's population east of the Ural Mountains has declined by a fifth, and now stands at some 25 million, or some six inhabitants per square mile on average. This depopulation has sharpened the strategic competition over the country's resource-rich east, which is now increasingly coveted by an energy-hungry China. In this unfolding contest, China, a rising global economic and strategic power, holds the upper hand over a declining Russia. Because it does, China could soon grow bold enough to challenge Russia for dominion over the latter's economically vital eastern territories.
> 
> This perfect storm of demographic change, religious transformation and external pressure will determine Russia's internal political climate, its place in the world, and its future strategic priorities. The economic and social indicators are unmistakable: The Russia of tomorrow will look radically different than that of today.
> 
> As they set about rethinking their approach to Russia, policymakers in Washington would be wise to understand this reality. They would be even wiser to begin planning for it.
> 
> Ilan Berman is vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council. He is the author of "Implosion: The End of Russia and What It Means for America" (Regnery, 2013).
> 
> © Copyright 2013 The Washington Times, LLC.
> 
> Read more: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/8/berman-misreading-a-russia-on-the-run/#ixzz2hQOlfxje
> Follow us: @washtimes on Twitter


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## a_majoor

And more on the decline of Russia. In the long run, a power vacuum in the Eurasian heartland will cause a long period of instability from Europe to China, and affect everyone else as well:

http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/10/23/moldova-looks-to-europe-as-russian-influence-declines-throughout-region/



> *Moldova Looks to Europe as Russian Influence Declines Throughout Region*
> NocolaeTimofti
> 
> Add Moldova to the list of countries shunning Russian attempts to establish a customs union to rival Europe’s. And Moscow, appearing increasingly weak in its near-abroad, is furious.
> 
> Larger and more prosperous countries like Ukraine and Belarus are well on their way to choosing Europe over Russia, despite relentless Russian strong-arming. Armenia looked set to join them last month before its President abruptly gave in to Russian pressure and joined the Moscow-sponsored Eurasian Customs Union over the EU’s Eastern Partnership program.
> 
> Now it’s Moldova’s turn to choose. After decades of dependence on Russia and the Soviet Union before it, the tiny republic, by far the poorest on the continent, seems to be heading Europe’s way. Its move westward has provoked the usual warnings and threats from Russian leaders. “We hope that you will not freeze,” Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister said, suggesting Moscow would shut down the pipelines that send Russian gas to the energy-starved country. Not long after that, Russian officials, citing vague health concerns, stopped imports of Moldovan wine, which make up a huge percentage of the country’s exports. There have also been warnings that the tens of thousands of Moldovans working in Russia would be expelled.
> 
> “Rather than intimidating leaders of the country’s fragile coalition government, however, Russia’s tactics have only cemented their resolve to complete the political and free trade agreements with the European Union,” the New York Times reported today. “The signing of these agreements,” said the Moldovan president, “is the only chance that Moldova has in order to develop itself as a European country and in the European spirit.”
> 
> Within Moldova, not everyone is pleased about joining the EU. The Communist Party is strong there and is already agitating to bring down the pro-Europe ruling coalition. But many of the country’s businesspeople prefer Europe, a market of 500 million people, to Russia, where politics frequently get in the way of stable business and government. “We want to be treated by our bigger partners, if not equally, at least with respect,” a deputy foreign minister told the Times.
> 
> Though Moldova is a tiny country and only marginally important to Eurasian politics, its decision to pursue deeper integration with Europe is another sign of Russia’s declining influence in its near-abroad.





> Hey, just because Vlad was able to roll Barry on Syria doesn’t mean he’s winning everywhere


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## pbi

I have never been to Russia, but I often wish I had. It might be very interesting to see the place first hand.

Failing that, I fall back on what I've read and seen on the media over the years, and what I've gathered from folks who have served in Russia or visited there with the CF, including fairly recently. I've served alongside Russians but it was only a small group, and only for six months.

My general impression is that Russia is a turd cake covered in bright shiny icing. While it certainly has lots of resources, and it can actually produce some pretty impressive pieces of kit from time to time, I think that politically, societally and physically it is dysfunctional and sick. Putin is popular, IMHO, because he appeals to a deep seated Russian comfort with being ruled with an iron fist, and not to have to think too much about anything. He benefits from the xenophobia and cultural arrogance that, again IMHO, seem to be salient characteristics of Russian society.

I can't imagine democracy (at least of the sort any of us would regard as credible) ever taking root in such a place, any more than it would in China. But I doubt that most Russians care, much.

The terms that come to my mind are backwardness, corruption, brutality and ignorance. Now, combine those with lots of petro dollars and a still fairly impressive military, and you get a very nasty and still possibly quite dangerous player on the world stage.


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## Colin Parkinson

I was reading somewhere that Russia's population curve had bottomed out and stabilized. to be honest haven't had the time to look into that rather important bit of info.


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## pbi

I've read a similar article in the last year. It claimed that Russia had overcome its demographic nosedive and was actually close to achieving a birth rate well in excess of most EU countries. (Whi h may not be saying much considering their sclerotic growth rates, but would still be an improvement). I don't recall seeing anything else on this, so I'm not sure about the credibility.


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## a_majoor

Sorry folks, but the CIA World Fact Book says different:

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html



> Population growth rate:
> 
> -0.02% (2013 est.)
> country comparison to the world: 199
> Birth rate:
> 
> 12.11 births/1,000 population (2013 est.)
> country comparison to the world: 165
> Death rate:
> 
> 13.97 deaths/1,000 population (2013 est.)
> country comparison to the world: 10



While the cause of this has been debated for many years, the effect are quite clear. The one possible saftey valve the Russians may have is to attract ethnic Russians back to Russia from the "Near Abroad" (former Soviet territories), although for many ethnic Russians living outside Russia, it is hard to imagine what sort of incentives would work. Trade a relatively bleak existence for an extremely bleak one?


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## pbi

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Sorry folks, but the CIA World Fact Book says different..



Nothing to be sorry about!! 

Hopefully Russia's decline and eventual implosion will not send tremors through the geopolitical space around it, but that is probably wishful thinking.

A scary thought would be an increasingly desperate "backs against the wall" Russia that embarks on some more bullying adventures to revive the glory days,  make itself feel better and keep the home folks quiet. Kind of a bloody version of "bread and circuses".

Nothing quite as dangerous and unpredictable as a dying monster.


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## vonGarvin

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Sorry folks, but the CIA World Fact Book says different:
> 
> https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html
> 
> While the cause of this has been debated for many years, the effect are quite clear. The one possible saftey valve the Russians may have is to attract ethnic Russians back to Russia from the "Near Abroad" (former Soviet territories), although for many ethnic Russians living outside Russia, it is hard to imagine what sort of incentives would work. Trade a relatively bleak existence for an extremely bleak one?


The *birth rate* in Russia has exceeded that of the USA.  Of course, this only talks of live births, not the population decline.  And the situation in Russia has improved.  The 0.02% decline is of one year.  
Check out the "population pyramid"







Note how there are more Russians who are 0-4 than 5-9, and how they in turn outnumber those 10-14.  


And again note how there are *fewer* of those 10-14 than 15-19, and how much less of them there are between 20-24.  And on.  In short, *something* happened around 10 years or so ago that saw their birth rate increase.


Also, you can see the history of WW2 in the pyramid.  With the war ending almost 70 years ago, those "vets" of ~90 years age and male are outnumbered, vastly, by the females of the similar age.  (Yes, I also acknowledge that women, by and large, live longer than men)


For comparison, here is the USA's population pyramid:


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## Colin Parkinson

It seems the West faces a "Cougar gap" 

It would be interesting to see a breakdown of the Russians birthrate by region/ethnicity/religion.


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## a_majoor

Very interesting, if a bit strange. We still have the CIA World Fact Book figues showing deaths outnumbering births, so someone's figures are not adding up somewhere.

Overall, I'm still seeing Russia as being able to make a presence on the world stage in limited areas and at great expense, while still suffering an overall decline in fortunes. How this demographic "wave" will change things is hard to predict, young Russians growing up in a State in relative decline (and one that is declining from an already low starting point) will have lots to be angry about but few resources to apply to potential solutions.


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## a_majoor

Actually, getting into space is easy (the WWII era V2 brushed the edge of space), _staying_ in space is difficult because of the need for a vast amount of speed (@ Mach 25 to hit orbital velocity). These Soviet era ASATS and their modern descendants are very sophisticated, but shooting a sounding rocket straight up in the path of a satelite and releasing a bucket of ball bearings will also do the job. Interestig to see how far back the roots of space warfare really go.

As a counterpoint, the US X-37 spaceplane may well have been designed with these things in mind, having a very large reserve of fuel and the ability to make large changes in orbital parameters, as well as remain in space for extended periods of time before returnign to Earth:

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/satellites/the-hidden-history-of-the-soviet-satellite-killer-16108970?click=pm_news



> *The Hidden History of the Soviet Satellite-Killer*
> 
> As soon as the Space Age got under way, the Soviet Union was trying to build antisatellite weapons—and kept trying for decades.
> By Anatoly Zak
> 
> RussianSpaceWeb
> November 1, 2013 11:32 AM
> 
> Half a century ago, on Nov. 1, 1963, the Soviet Union launched the first prototype of the "killer" satellite—what we would call today an antisatellite system, or ASAT. Officially announced as Polyot-1 (or Flight-1), this highly maneuverable spacecraft was intended to test whether the Soviets could approach an "enemy" satellite and blow it in smithereens. This mission set off a decades-long race to develop and deploy offensive weapons in space that culminated in the 1980s with Ronald Reagan's famous Star Wars program.
> 
> Although a nuclear standoff between East and West subsided soon thereafter and the Cold War thawed, the danger of weaponization of space flared up again recently with the emergence of new space powers, such as China and Iran.
> 
> With the world dependent more than ever on satellites for communications, navigation, and other daily needs, the very possibility of orbital warfare could trigger a domino effect of costly measures and countermeasures—as the history of the Soviet killer satellite effort vividly illustrates.
> 
> Origin of the Soviet Satellite-Killer
> 
> The Space Age had hardly begun when Soviet engineers were already busy drawing blueprints of satellite killers. Following the famed 1960 Soviet shoot-down of an American U-2 spy plane, Kremlin leader Nikita Khrushchev was determined to do the same with the emerging "threat" from spy satellites, particularly the American Satellite Interceptor, or SAINT project, developed at the end of the 1950s and publicly disclosed in 1960.
> 
> Like their American counterparts, Soviet engineers initially considered piloted space fighters armed with missiles. Prominent leaders of the Soviet aviation industry including Vladimir Myasishev and, later, Vladimir Chelomei proposed orbital space planes, but their ideas were too far-fetched for that era. In the interim, the USSR settled on a remotely controlled robotic spacecraft.
> 
> The father of the Soviet space program, Sergei Korolev, pushed for his flight-proven R-7 ICBM to carry an interceptor that would be sent on an exact collision course with its target. However, Chelomei argued for a self-guided orbital vehicle that would enter the proximity of an enemy satellite, explode, and pierce its target with shrapnel.
> 
> In 1960, the Kremlin chose Chelomei's concept. Dubbed Istrebitel Sputnikov (for the Satellite Destroyer), the barrel-shaped spacecraft would sport 17 thrusters to make any conceivable maneuver in orbit. It would be supported by a complex network of ground stations spread over several time zones across the Soviet Union for tracking enemy satellites and guiding the killer to its target. The top-secret command post for the system was located in the Moscow suburb of Noginsk. A pair of guidance stations were deployed in the Siberian town of Irkutsk and near Lake Balkhash in Kazakhstan.
> 
> By 1962, while Soviet newspaper headlines proclaimed the great successes of cosmonauts and called for peaceful exploration of space, the USSR was focusing much of its space effort on a killer satellite. According to Vladimir Polyachenko, a leading engineer in the IS project, Chelomei led daily meetings on the status of its development. On February 11, 1963, the Kremlin leadership, including Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, appeared in Moscow's suburb of Fili, where Chelmei's engineers labored on the first killer satellite. Polyachenko showed Khrushchev a huge terrestrial globe covered by a web of blinking satellite orbits designed to illustrate how the interceptor would work. Khrushchev liked what he saw.
> 
> After the successful first launch in November 1963, clandestine flight tests of Soviet killer satellites continued for most of the 1960s. Exactly 45 years ago, on Nov. 1, 1968, the USSR succeeded with an actual intercept and the destruction of a specially designed target satellite in orbit. However, it would take another five years before the antisatellite system entered experimental service, and another whole decade before it was fully operational. By 1978, a converted R-36 ICBM topped with the IS interceptor reportedly could be rolled out to the launchpad from its bunker in Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, propped into vertical position, loaded with propellants, and blasted off toward its target in just an hour and a half.
> 
> But on August 18, 1983, the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov suddenly declared an end to the tests, apparently as a gesture of goodwill in the midst of the escalating Cold War. Yet behind the scenes, engineers continued working on further improvements to the operational killer satellites, as well as on much bigger and frightening projects—frightening plans to employ orbital battle stations and even laser weapons.
> 
> The upgraded antisatellite system, code-named IS-MU, was capable of chasing enemy satellites even if they tried avoidance maneuvers. It was declared operational in 1991. Just two years later, though, as the Cold War wound down, the cash-strapped government led by the Russian president Boris Yeltsin pulled the plug on the system. Around the same time, the first photo showing the IS satellite was finally published, taking the official veil of secrecy off the project.
> 
> New Generation of Russian Killer-Satellites
> 
> After more than a decade-long hiatus, the Russian antisatellite program showed signs of life again in the 2000s , as the United States and China vividly, even if unofficially, had demonstrated their capability to attack and destroy satellites in space. No longer toying with the ideas of expensive and vulnerable battle stations in orbit, the Russian military banked on converted ballistic missiles placed in well-protected silos and equipped with maneuverable satellites capable of sending missiles on a collision course with enemy satellites at a minute's notice.
> 
> In March 2009, then deputy minister of defense Vladimir Popovkin told journalists that Russia had "retained basic assets" in Naryad-VN and Naryad-VR (or Sentry) systems. "We can't sit and watch others do it. I can only say similar works are done in Russia too," Popovkin said. Popovkin did not elaborate as to what Naryad-V was all about. However, a number of Russian sources recently shed some light on its design.
> 
> The Naryad-V, which apparently also has the military designation 14F11, consists of an orbital space tug, whose civilian version is known today as Briz-K (Breeze). Its engine can fire up to 75 times during one mission. This highly maneuverable rocket stage serves as a launch platform for multiple missiles developed at a highly classified KB Tochmash design bureau. Each missile initially receives guidance from its orbital launch platform and homes in on its target with the help of powerful thrusters facing in four different directions. The missile's warhead, developed at KB Geofizika in Moscow, eventually locks onto its target, and the missile's own minicomputer takes over the flight control.
> 
> The Naryad-V spacecraft is launched by a lightweight Rockot booster, which is converted from the UR-100NU ballistic missile, once the most numerous ICBM in the Soviet nuclear force. As a space launcher, Rockot can place under 2 tons of cargo into orbit.
> 
> In the waning days of the USSR, Rockot flew two suborbital test missions with prototypes of the Naryad-V spacecraft. In 1994, the third test vehicle actually made it into orbit, before the missile's firing crew in Baikonur was finally disbanded in the wake of the Soviet collapse.
> 
> The Rockot did survive the economic turmoil of the 1990s, in part thanks to a joint European–Russian commercial venture aimed to haul lightweight foreign satellites into orbit from the Russian military launch site in Plesetsk. In 2002, when President Vladimir Putin visited Khrunichev space center in Moscow, which built both Naryad-V and Rockot, the company's leaders reportedly assured him that the antisatellite system had been ready for a revival.
> 
> In January 2010, the commander of the Russian space forces, Oleg Ostapenko, told the official ITAR-TASS news agency that Russia would be able to respond to threats from space. "The USSR was developing inspection and strike spacecraft," Ostapenko said. "Our policy—there should be no war in space, but we are military people and should be ready for everything. Our activities in this direction would be dependent on others, but, trust me, we would be able to respond quickly and adequately."
> 
> After half a century of roller-coaster rides for one of the most controversial developments in space, the world still faces a considerable probability of satellites blowing each other up in space. Not coincidentally, far below the Earth orbit, in the atmosphere, remotely controlled flying robots capable of shooting missiles at targets on the ground had already become a reality.
> 
> Anatoly Zak is the editor of RussianSpaceWeb.com and the author of Russia in Space: The Past Explained, The Future Explored.


----------



## a_majoor

Russia's economy is in far worse shape than perhaps anyone realized. This should put the brakes on further adventurism in the Middle East and other places, while new developments in offshore gas exploration, fracking and oil shale put pressure on Russia's main source of revenues. In the much longer term, Russia will be forced to retreat back to the European Russian "heartland", with its Easternmost boundary at the Urals and most of her attention focused on the "Near Beyond" as a huge non Russian demographic wave threatens from the South and the East becomes too expensive in terms of manpower and resources to maintain a hold on. This is a prediction for the 2100's:

http://pjmedia.com/blog/putinomics-has-the-russian-economy-in-a-tailspin/?print=1



> *‘Putinomics’ Has the Russian Economy in a Tailspin*
> Posted By Kim Zigfeld On November 20, 2013 @ 12:28 am In economy,Europe,Money,Politics,Russia,World News | 13 Comments
> 
> The bad economic news has rolled over Russia this month in a manner as devastating in a financial sense as the tsunami that struck the Philippines was in the physical. No matter where you turned, if you were a Russian there was only a gigantic wave of red ink rushing at you full speed.
> 
> In a move some called unprecedented [1] in Russian history, Economic Development Minister Aleksei Ulyukayev openly admitted that over the next fifteen years the Kremlin expects Russian economic growth to be over 25% less than the world average, with the result that by 2030 Russia’s share of the world economy will have declined by at least a stunning 15%, from 4% today  to just 3.4% fifteen years from now.
> 
> The stunned editors of the leading Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta stated in an editorial: “Neither the tzars, nor the Bolsheviks, nor the statists ever once told the population that their country did not have greater prospects.” It was jarring indeed to realize that things might be so bad that not even the Kremlin would take the chance of lying about them.
> 
> In other words, the days of Vladimir Putin strutting about the world stage boasting of his economic achievements have come to an abrupt and ignominious end.
> 
> Then came the Economist magazine, with a hard-hitting feature item on the collapse of Putinomics provocatively titled “The Crumbling Kremlin [2].”  The piece almost seemed to be mocking Putin, the former KGB spy, taunting [3] him with the dreaded word “stagnation” that wrought so much despair in Soviet times.
> 
> The magazine’s data show that the Russian economy never recovered from the 2009 global economic meltdown. Its post-crisis growth level is consistently a pale shadow of what it knew before.  The magazine shows that Russia experienced nearly $50 billion in capital flight in just the first three quarters of this year alone, and posits that Russia is facing a collapse of a state pension system which it can no longer afford to fund.
> 
> And worst of all it notes: “The oil price at which Russia can finance budgeted spending without borrowing has increased from just $34 a barrel in 2007 to above $100 for the years ahead.”
> 
> Putin’s country stands totally at the mercy, in other words, of a world oil price over which it has no control.  Ironically, Putin’s main foreign policy objective seems to be undermining the economies of the West, a policy which if successful would only lead to reduced demand for oil with brutal consequences for Russia.
> 
> Already beleaguered by illness of every kind imaginable, including a horrific AIDS crisis, Putin’s Russia is not prepared to sustain the type of draconian cuts to pensions and social services that are clearly now in the offing.  A major demographic debacle is inevitable.
> 
> Finally, the boot was put in by the financial consulting firm Z/Yen, which annually prepares a listing of world cities [4] ranked by their financial clout.  In 2011 Z/Yen put Moscow at #61 on its list of about 80 major metropolises. Pretty feeble stuff.  But for wretched Moscow, now it’s the good old days.  The 2013 study places Moscow #69, after falling to #64 in 2012.  Despite Putin’s bold pronouncements that Moscow would soon become a leading financial center, backed up by massive skyscraper construction projects, the capital city is going backwards not forwards.  One Western banker working there told the New York Times [5]: “Moscow was never going to be an international financial center. That was a joke.”
> 
> The tone in all this adverse reporting is crystal clear:  The neo-Soviet arrogance and even petulance which Putin has adopted towards the outside world was not just unjustified, it was fraudulent.  Putin benefited from the accidental spiking of the price of oil and a temporary uptick in childbirth, neither of which had anything at all to do with his policies. Now, the neo-Soviet chickens have come home to roost. The world now sees Putin’s Russia for what it truly is, like the infamous emperor without his “new clothes [6],” and the world is jeering.
> 
> A good case study for understanding the sorry plight of the Putin economy is tourism.  Putin’s English-language propaganda screed Russia Beyond the Headlines recently touted [7] a UN report showing that Russia was in ninth place worldwide for visitation by tourists. But as is so typical for RBTH, one of the worst sources of information about Russia that there is, the real story, extremely negative for Russia, was left out of its pages.
> 
> Russia does not rank anywhere remotely close to the top 10 when it comes to receipt of tourist dollars.  It had a paltry $12 billion [8] in tourist receipts compared a whopping $30 billion by Australia, which rounds out the top 10 list (the USA tops the list with $125 billion in tourist receipts, ten times more than Russia has and five times more per capita).
> 
> The reason for this is simple:  The “tourists” who visit Russia have little or no money, mostly coming from the impoverished nations of the former USSR.  When it comes to competing for the attention of sophisticated tourists who do have money and the PR clout that goes with it, clout that might influence international attitudes towards Russia, Russia doesn’t compete, it simply fails.
> 
> This is confirmed by the World Economic Forum [8], whose most recent data show that Russia ranks an anemic #63 in tourism competitiveness.  Sophisticated tourists are going to tend to shy away from the horrific issues that plague Russian society, from rudeness to corruption to illness and safety risks. And without genius-level marketing, they’re not going to find Russia’s relatively modest attractions very beguiling.
> 
> But Putin’s response to all this will be the RBTH response:  deception and diversion.  He will not seek reform, but he will put a great deal of energy, just as in Soviet times, into creating the illusion of success and liquidating anyone within Russia who tries to tell a different story.
> 
> Article printed from PJ Media: http://pjmedia.com
> 
> URL to article: http://pjmedia.com/blog/putinomics-has-the-russian-economy-in-a-tailspin/
> 
> URLs in this post:
> 
> [1] unprecedented: http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2013/11/window-on-eurasia-will-russians-react.html
> [2] The Crumbling Kremlin: http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/11/russias-economy
> [3] taunting: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21589455-will-stagnating-economy-bring-about-much-needed-structural-reform-s-word
> [4] listing of world cities: http://dyingrussia.wordpress.com/2013/11/14/moscow-in-financial-free-fall-under-putin/
> [5] New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/business/global/moscow-tries-to-remake-itself-as-financial-center.html?_r=1&
> [6] new clothes: http://en.ria.ru/photolents/20131113/184683984_6/Putin-Earns-Honorary-Grandmaster-Title-in-Taekwondo.html
> [7] touted: http://rbth.ru/international/2013/11/07/russia_enters_list_of_top_10_travel_destinations_31503.html
> [8] $12 billion: http://dtxtq4w60xqpw.cloudfront.net/sites/all/files/pdf/unwto_highlights13_en_lr_0.pdf


----------



## a_majoor

The Ukraine sits at the intersection between Russia and Europe. It looks like they are trying to play both sides against the middle, but for now, it is still a small nation caught between a large federation on one side and a jealous, much larger nation on the other. (The Ukraine may be natrually divided between a Catholic "European" Ukraine west of the Dnieper, and an Orthodox, Slavic Ukraine east of the Dnieper, which makes the position of the country even more difficult):

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-echochambers-25128329

*Yanukovych's Ukrainian calculus: Power at all costs* 
Nataliya Jensen

BBC Ukranian Service

Tens of thousands have taken to the streets in Kiev to protest Ukraine's decision to back away from an EU agreement 
On the eve of the European Union (EU) summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on 28-29 November, Europeans said the door is still open for Ukraine to sign a historic agreement with the EU. 

Kiev, meanwhile, is putting the signing on hold and asking for financial compensation from the EU for trade losses due to economic pressure from Russia.

In August, three months before a scheduled deal-signing with the EU, Russia stopped all Ukrainian imports. Seventy-five percent of Ukraine's machine-building production is exported to Russia. Experts say the losses from Moscow's actions could cost up to $2.5bn (£1.53bn) for just the second half of 2013. 

"As soon as we reach a level that is comfortable for us, when it meets our interests, when we agree on normal terms, then we will talk about signing," President Viktor Yanukovych told Ukraine's TV channels on Tuesday. He said that he is still planning to go to the summit to explain Ukraine's position. 

In Mr Yanukovych's mind, at least, he may not have closed the door on joining the EU. Many observers were surprised by the news that he told Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite in a telephone conversation last week that Russian economic pressure and blackmail is the reason that Kiev cannot sign the agreement.

Every Ukrainian president since the fall of the Soviet Union has found himself on a complicated geopolitical chessboard between East and West. Each has had to decide how to balance and where to lead the second-largest country in Europe - toward Brussels, which is likely to be the best guarantor of Ukraine's long-term economic prosperity and political development, or toward Moscow, to which Ukraine has cultural and historical ties.

While Ukraine's Baltic and Central European neighbours fully realised their ambition to be in the EU, Belarus sought close ties with Russia. Ukraine, by contrast, has still not made its choice. It remains a country on hold.

Its refusal to sign the agreement (combined with departure of President Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia) likely means the end of the dream of many Western policymakers of a Europe whole and free. It also probably will encourage the Kremlin more assertively to reintegrate the former Soviet space under Russian authoritarian rule, as many in Kremlin believe Europe is in decline and US power around the world is in retreat.

Yanukovych is less afraid of Brussels than of Moscow, one commentator has said "The US always believed that democratic freedoms are universal values and events that happen in Europe influence us," said Kurt Volker, former US ambassador to Nato and now executive director of the McCain Institute of International Leadership in Washington DC. "Ukraine is a part of Europe, and it's important not to allow those who want to separate Ukraine from it to do this."

Ariel Cohen from the Heritage Foundation writes: "It is in the national interest of the United States to prevent Ukraine from becoming a Russian satellite and a key member of a Moscow-dominated sphere of influence. Ukraine is more democratically oriented than Russia. Historically, it has closer ties with Europe; and geopolitically, it can provide a necessary check on Russia's imperial ambitions."

There are several conclusions we can draw from the current status of the EU-Ukraine negotiations:

-Ukrainian leadership may not yet be ready either to democratise the country or integrate Ukraine into European economic and security institutions. However, the Ukrainian population - even in the Russian-speaking east of the country - is increasingly supportive of Ukraine joining the EU.

-Mr Yanukovych, who is supported by less than half the population, wants to ensure he stays in power. Many Ukrainian experts believe that he tried to play off Russia and the EU in order to maximise his chances of re-election in 2015. To achieve this he needs either a successful agreement with the EU, which would broaden his political base, or Russian President Vladimir Putin's help in consolidating his authoritarian rule. 

-While Ukraine has for now picked the short-term benefits of improving trade ties with Russia over the long-term benefits of association with Brussels, it still refuses to join Mr Putin's Customs Union, which could lead to further integration with Moscow.

Serhiy Rahmanin of the Ukrainian newspaper Mirror Weekly writes: "Yanukovych is less scared of Brussels than [of] Moscow." Mr Putin wants to build a new USSR, he contends, which would cost Mr Yanukovych real power. 

For now Mr Yanukovych will attend the Vilnius gathering this week, where he hopes to discuss possible "three-way consultations" among Ukraine, the EU and Russia, and conduct talks that would be "in the best interests of Ukraine".

Whether EU representatives are prepared to listen after months of frustrating negotiations is another matter.
[/quote]


----------



## CougarKing

How Putin benefits from Ukraine's backing away from the EU...

Reuters



> *Ukraine holds key to Putin's dream of a new union*
> Reuters
> By Timothy Heritage
> 
> 
> MOSCOW (Reuters) - *Ukraine's refusal to sign a trade pact drawing it into Europe's orbit marked a victory for Vladimir Putin*,  winning him time to lure Kiev into a project for a trade and political bloc stretching from the frontiers of China to the edge of the EU.
> 
> *The Russian president sees his "Eurasian Union", in which Ukraine would play a central role, as a future rival to China, the United States and the European Union. Some say he sees it as the president's personal political legacy - a strong force emerging from the ashes of the old Soviet Union.*
> 
> "The Eurasian Union is a very important project for Putin. Without Ukraine, he will lose all enthusiasm for it," said Gleb Pavlovsky, a former Kremlin spin doctor who has also worked in Ukraine. *"Without Ukraine, Putin's project is impossible."*
> 
> Putin also hopes to woo several other former Soviet republics that were being courted by EU leaders at a summit in Lithuania on Friday. But none is more important to Putin than Ukraine, a huge market and the cradle of Russian civilization.
> 
> (...)


----------



## Brad Sallows

In surprising news, a European country with a long history of being a regional power and occasional global power wishes to continue doing so.  Film at 11.


----------



## a_majoor

How this ends will have long term implications for Russia's ability to remain relevant. Attempting to stand between the EU and Russia is not tenable. If the Ukraine moves to Russia, it strenthens Russian power for a generation, while if the protestors are successful and move to the EU, it will weaken Russia far more than most people probably realize (looking upthread at Russian economic statistics and the questions about Russian demographics don't put them in a good place):

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/1203/Is-Ukraine-s-unrest-a-new-Orange-Revolution-in-the-making-video



> *Is Ukraine's unrest a new Orange Revolution in the making? (+video)*
> Despite parallels to 2004's peaceful democratic revolution, the current upheaval in Kiev is unlikely to settle the EU-Russia tug-of-war over Ukraine.
> 
> By Monika Rębała, Contributor, Michał Kacewicz, Contributor / December 3, 2013
> 
> WARSAW; AND KIEV, UKRAINE
> As protesters dig in to Kiev's Independence Square, establishing barricades of cars, bringing in television monitors, and erecting a small tent city in the heart of Ukraine's pro-European Union demonstrations, there is much talk of forcing the government to change – indeed, of revolution.
> 
> With Ukraine's president out of the country and his opponents still boiling with anger, the country's political tensions appeared mired in a standoff as large protest rallies showed no sign of letting up. The opposition lost its attempt to topple the government by parliamentary means when a vote of no-confidence they called failed by a sizeable margin. Protest leaders, however disappointed, vowed to continue their demonstrations. Soon after the vote, about 5,000 protesters gathered outside the presidential administration building, then moved to the capital's central Independence Square, where the crowd grew to more than 10,000, according to police estimates. The opposition called for the parliamentary vote in protest both of President Viktor Yanukovych's shelving of a long-anticipated agreement to deepen political and economic ties with the European Union, and the violent tactics used by police to disperse demonstrators protesting that decision.
> 
> "There is no way back," says Volodymyr Sherstiuk of the Ukrainian folk-rock group Kozak System, one of several bands playing on the scene. “People are united and will stay here as long as they have to."
> 
> But despite the transformation over the weekend – from simple protest against the government's decision not to sign an association agreement with the EU last week, to hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians calling for the government and president to step down – experts say that current events in Ukraine are not a replay of Ukraine's Orange Revolution.
> 
> Though the protests have similarities to the 2004 demonstrations that knocked Ukraine out of Russia's orbit, their outcome is likely to be far less radical, as President Viktor Yanukovych tries to wait out protesters and thread the needle to placate both pro-European forces and Russia.
> 
> Revolutionary mood
> 
> The current protests are made up of young people who are too young to remember the Orange Revolution, and are still learning how to organize protests. But the 2004 revolution remains a touchstone for their efforts against the government.
> 
> “If we don't defeat them, we will have no future here,” says Oleg, one of the young activists at the square.
> 
> “I don't belong to any party, I came here to fight with police” in response to their weekend attack on protesters, he adds. “During the Orange Revolution it was different, then there was no aggression. Now people are very angry.”
> 
> That anger was fed by the Ukrainian opposition’s failed no-confidence vote earlier in the day, which protesters had hoped would oust Prime Minister Mykola Azarov’s cabinet. But the opposition fell 40 votes short of the mark.
> 
> “We've stood here in freezing weather for a few days, and politicians, as usual, let us down,” says Tatiana Marchenk, a student in Kiev.
> 
> A different Ukraine
> 
> But despite the mood on the streets, analysts say, these protests will not follow the same arc as 2004.
> 
> “It's not a second Orange Revolution,” says Pawel Kowal, a chairman of the European Parliament delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. "It's hard to compare protests in 2004 with what is happening today at [Independence Square] in Kiev."
> 
> “The Orange Revolution was a middle-class revolution, was organized by the opposition, and had strong leaders: Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko. Today, those on the streets are mainly young people and students who gathered there spontaneously to protest against Yanukovych and his government,” Mr. Kowal adds.
> 
> At the same time, Mr. Yanukovych's political support among Ukraine's southern and eastern regions, which are more pro-Russia, may be ebbing. Though the country's Russian-speaking regions are unhappy about integration with the EU, those regions are not coming out for Yanukovych the way they did during the Orange Revolution.
> 
> “Yanukovych is losing active support – during the Orange Revolution we saw many people on the streets in the eastern part of the country," particularly in his native, industrial region of Donetsk,” says Ievgen Vorobiov, a Ukrainian analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw." But today, this is a very rare sight."
> 
> “Many people are disappointed with him," says Rostyslav Kramar, a political analyst at the University of Warsaw and a Ukrainian. "He promised a lot but economic and social conditions didn't improve during his presidency, thousands or even millions of Ukrainians have been forced to look for jobs abroad.”
> 
> Even Yanukovych's party is not a monolith now – a few people left the party since the protests began. The governor of Donetsk has backed protesters in Kiev. And students from Donetsk wrote a public letter in the Ukrainian language to students in Lviv – a major city in pro-EU western Ukraine – in which they proclaimed their desire to walk through the EU's doors with their western peers. These kind of gestures would have been hard to imagine during the Orange Revolution, says Dr. Kramar.
> 
> Yanukovych's next move
> 
> The EU has emphasized that its door remains open to Ukraine, and that Yanukovych is welcome to sign the agreement at a planned EU-Ukraine summit in the spring. But “he has to act more quickly, if he wants to be ready on time," warns Kowal. "In the latter half of the next year it will be too late, because we will have elections for the European Parliament" – pulling the EU's focus away from Ukraine – "and in 2015 Ukrainians will choose a new president,” further delaying a deal.
> 
> Kramar says the most likely scenario is that Yanukovych will stay in power, but his prime minister, Mr. Azorov, will be forced to resign. “Yanukovych's main goal is to win elections in 2015. He will do everything to achieve this goal, even sacrifice his ministers and impose Russian standards in Ukraine, if that will help him to win an electoral contest.”
> 
> Yanukovych has already started his campaign, Mr. Vorobiov says, pointing to the president's decision to travel to China today despite the situation in Kiev. "He wants to show that nothing serious is really happening and everything is under control.”
> 
> Kramar thinks that in the coming months the protests in Ukraine will lose momentum. “People can't protest on the street forever, the winter is coming and so are the holidays. I'm afraid that the opposition will lose some power and vigor, and Yanukovych will play for time. He won't impose any radical changes and reforms in the country.”
> 
> And Yanukovych will likely try to keep his options open with both the EU and Russia, Vorobiov adds. “Yanukovych will go to Brussels soon and probably promise to sign some kind of agreement with the EU to neutralize the opposition," and “later he will visit Moscow and try to negotiate better trade arrangements with Putin.”
> 
> Escalation?
> 
> And while some protesters have taken to calling the president "bloody Viktor" after the police's violent attacks over the weekend, experts say that it doesn't seem that Yanukovych will decide to use force against protesters again.
> 
> But still, they note, there is cause for concern.
> 
> “It seems like [Yanukovych] looks through Eastern not Western politician's glasses now,” says Kramar. “If we look at Russia or other countries in the region, military solution is not something unusual.”
> 
> “It is a bad sign that many policemen from the Berkut special unit are very close to the square,” adds Vorobiov. Anti-government groups accuse the Berkut riot police of using intimidation to suppress protests.
> 
> But if Yanukovych uses force, he will be totally isolated in the West and will have no other choice than become a vassal of Moscow.
> 
> “People are determined to fight, it doesn't look like they will give up easily,” says Kramar. “Everything depends on a political solution being worked out in the coming days. If politicians don't satisfy the protesters, I would not rule out a military solution.”


----------



## Lightguns

What if the Russians sent two ships.  

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2533846/Battle-stations-Navy-scrambles-destroyer-challenge-Russian-warship-British-coast-takes-24-hours-make-600-mile-journey-Portsmouth-base-Putin-testing-response-time.html#ixzz2pZG9Gslw


----------



## MilEME09

Lightguns said:
			
		

> What if the Russians sent two ships.
> 
> http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2533846/Battle-stations-Navy-scrambles-destroyer-challenge-Russian-warship-British-coast-takes-24-hours-make-600-mile-journey-Portsmouth-base-Putin-testing-response-time.html#ixzz2pZG9Gslw



24 hours is a long time, and a black eye to the Royal navy in my opinion, a ship loaded with land attack cruise missiles could cause a lot of damage and be gone in 24 hours. Though from the article it sounds like the RAF was on top of things at least. With decreasing Western military budgets Russia seems to be taking full advantage to push their capabilities and test response times of the west. I wonder if this will become business as usual in the North Sea, similarly to how Russian aircraft have to be intercepted in the arctic frequently?


----------



## Robert0288

Definitely a black eye for the navy, but in all honesty the RAF could have sunk the thing extremely quickly compared the the naval response time.

In other news:
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140106/DEFREG01/301060017/Russia-s-Navy-Buy-40-New-Vessels



> Russia's Navy To Buy 40 New Vessels
> WARSAW — With the aim of modernizing and overhauling its fleet, the Russian Navy plans to acquire 40 new vessels in 2014, said Rear Adm. Viktor Bursuk, the Navy’s deputy commander.
> 
> The procured vessels will include a Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, a Varshavyanka diesel-electric submarine and the search-and-rescue ship Igor Belousov, Bursuk told local news agency RIA Novosti.
> 
> The admiral, who is responsible for the Navy’s arms procurements, said that at least two diesel-electric submarines are to be added to the Black Sea fleet. The Navy already operates two Borey-class submarines.
> 
> Bursuk did not disclose the value of the planned acquisitions.
> 
> The procurements will be part of Russia’s plan to spend US $650 billion on new arms and military equipment for its armed forces by 2020.
> 
> In December, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that strengthening the Navy’s presence in the Arctic is one of Russia’s top defense priorities for the future. The announcement was made at a meeting of the Russian Defense Ministry’s board.


----------



## a_majoor

Given the Russian economy is about the size of Italy's, we should be wondering how they can afford this and if this buying spree is sustainable.

We should also wonder why with the size of our economy we cant afford to procure a few basic things like combat boots and trucks in a reasonable amount of time (much less ships and aircraft).


----------



## 57Chevy

Quote from article above;
 "Putin said that strengthening the Navy’s presence in the Arctic is one of Russia’s top defense priorities for the future"

Perhaps it's time to consider adding a section to The Rangers.

 :sarcasm:


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Lightguns said:
			
		

> What if the Russians sent two ships.
> 
> http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2533846/Battle-stations-Navy-scrambles-destroyer-challenge-Russian-warship-British-coast-takes-24-hours-make-600-mile-journey-Portsmouth-base-Putin-testing-response-time.html#ixzz2pZG9Gslw



Depending on its home port (NORFLT or BALFLT) you would have thought that either Norway or Denmark would have passed on info of its transit.


----------



## Journeyman

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> Depending on its home port (NORFLT or BALFLT) you would have thought that either Norway or Denmark would have passed on info of its transit.


The article did note that ".....as the Russian ship retreated. They followed it north to the Baltic Sea, where a Russian task force was on legitimate manoeuvres."  I'd guess its transit was reported as part of the "legitimate" group, then breaking off further out to sea.  

But then, making an assessment based on one newspaper article (UK _Daily Mail_ at that) is a gutsy move.  :dunno:


----------



## a_majoor

The interesting thing about this is while the economic decline is observable, the _reason_ for the decline is hotly debated. I would suspect that a very strong factor would be the extreme centralization of the Russian economy, with a great many resources misallocated due to crony and State capitalism.

http://nextbigfuture.com/2014/01/russia-is-losing-sources-of-economic.html



> *Russia Is Losing Sources of Economic Growth and like Brazil and India has stagflation*
> 
> Anders Aslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has written about the problems that Russia has generating economic growth
> 
> The annual Gaidar Forum, held last week in Moscow, is a good occasion to assess the country's economic state of affairs. Russia's economy and politics are marked by what optimists call stability and what pessimists call stagnation.
> 
> Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev claimed that Russia's economic growth sources have been exhausted, and he introduced the idea of Russia being in a "middle-income trap," drawing on an academic paper by the Berkeley Professor Barry Eichengreen. Medvedev was concerned with the sudden slowdown in economic growth, which is common to countries that have reached middle incomes, such as Russia and Brazil.
> 
> Sensibly, Medvedev emphasized that the causes were primarily domestic in nature. Russia risks losing out when competing with more advanced economies because of insufficient institutions and high costs in less developed economies. It needs to improve the quality of its labor, management, health care, pension system and, most of all, its institutions. Yet as usual, Medvedev ended with only minor proposals for improvement, notably in the business environment.
> 
> First Deputy Chair of the Central Bank of Russia Ksenia Yudayeva claimed that Russia, like India and Brazil, had entered "stagflation," as the West did in the 1970s. Their economic growth was declining, while inflation was rising.
> 
> Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev opened the forum with a daring programmatic speech. Russia now seemed stuck at an annual growth rate of no more than 2.5 percent, while the rest of the world was set to grow at 3.5 percent. He focused on two factors to boost growth. Russia's investment of 21 percent of gross domestic product needed to increase to the savings rate of 30 percent of GDP. The other factor was to promote supply by improving Russia's institutions in several ways.
> 
> Corruption was discussed in multiple panels, but only as a low-level problem of doing business rather than as top-level larceny. The obvious solution is to discipline big state corporations, privatize them, and liberalize their markets. But everyone realizes that this is not possible under the current regime, which favors economically harmful state corporations.


----------



## pbi

Thucydides said:
			
		

> How this ends will have long term implications for Russia's ability to remain relevant. Attempting to stand between the EU and Russia is not tenable. If the Ukraine moves to Russia, it strenthens Russian power for a generation, while if the protestors are successful and move to the EU, it will weaken Russia far more than most people probably realize (looking upthread at Russian economic statistics and the questions about Russian demographics don't put them in a good place):
> 
> http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/1203/Is-Ukraine-s-unrest-a-new-Orange-Revolution-in-the-making-video



I don't see how Russia can let this situation go south (no pun intended...) It would mean that they were then flanked on all three sides (less the East) by pro-Western countries (I don't count Belarus, which as far as I can tell is a Russian "Mini-Me".) It would also (and perhaps more critically) deny them access to the port use agreement by which, AFAIK, they are still able to sustain a Black Sea Fleet.

As much as I bet Putin really, really doesn't want a detraction from the Potemkin village that is Sochi, my money is on a military intervention if the anti-Russian crowd actually seizes power. The pretexts will be variations on one or more of the usual that Russia has trotted out in the past: "fraternal" assistance to the legally elected govt of the Ukraine against Western-controlled rebels; protection of ethnic Russians in east Ukraine, etc, etc.


----------



## Journeyman

pbi said:
			
		

> ..... doesn't want a detraction from the Potemkin village that is Sochi...


:rofl:   Nice.

If nothing else, I think the Russians tend to have a better grasp on time.  I suspect that 'Sochi being wonderful' will trump pretty much anything else; whatever happens in Ukraine will go uncontested (except hand-wringing within Pravda) because Russia can wait to deal with them.  After the Olympics, all bets are off.


ps - I think Belarus is worse than a Russian "Mini-Me" in that they're just as xenophobic, but living in Russia's shadow they have a "small man" neurosis tacked onto it.


Edit: punctuation


----------



## vonGarvin

Most of Ukraine isn't protesting, especially east of Kiev. That side is very amenable to closer ties to Russia than to the EU.  
As for Belarus, aren't they more Russian than the Russians?


----------



## pbi

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Most of Ukraine isn't protesting, especially east of Kiev. That side is very amenable to closer ties to Russia than to the EU.
> As for Belarus, aren't they more Russian than the Russians?



That's always been my impression. They want Stalin to come back: Putin is too much of a Westernized wussy for them.

But, seriously, you raise a good point about East-West Ukraine division. One wonders if there is a Yugo-style civil war on the horizon. Which will, of course, only further guarantee that Moscow will send in the Cossacks.


----------



## a_majoor

Russia as a Potemkin Village. So long as people remain dazzled by the external appearance, or need the backing of a supposedly Great Power for diplomatic purposes, Russia can continue to pull off the Great Power act. The economic foundation is crumbling, and Russia's social foundations have been unmoored for at least a generation:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/blog/2014/02/21/putins-achilles-heel/



> *Putin’s Achilles Heel*
> 
> Give Putin some credit: He has put together an impressive spectacle in Sochi. But while the world’s attention is focused on Kiev and the billion-dollar show in the Caucasus, Russia’s economy as a whole is slowly falling apart. Capital flight is accelerating, and the ruble has fallen by 8.1 percent this year and 1.7 percent in the past week alone. Only the Argentinian peso is doing worse.
> 
> Russia was also forced to cancel three debt auctions in four weeks due to weak demand and high yields. The markets have cast a skeptical eye on Putin’s policies, particularly his decision to pledge $15 billion in aid to Ukraine so soon after dropping nearly three times that amount on Sochi. As one analyst told Bloomberg:
> 
> “The meddling with Ukraine certainly hurts Russia’s image as an investment destination,” David Hauner, a fixed-income and currency strategist at Bank of America Corp., said in a telephone interview from London. “It is not going to bankrupt Russia, but $15 billion can turn out to be $50 billion, and Russia will have to plug the holes for a couple years.”
> 
> Another analyst noted that the trouble in Ukraine was hurting Russia’s image in the markets:
> 
> “From a psychological standpoint, Ukraine’s problems affect foreign investors’ perception of Russia,” Vladimir Bragin, head of research at Alfa Capital in Moscow, said in a telephone interview. “In their eyes, the first reaction is to sell Russia, cut risks. It’s in Russia’s interests that the situation stabilizes” in Ukraine.
> 
> Putin’s foreign policy successes will be hard to replicate in the economic sphere, where he can’t count on Western fecklessness or incompetence to bail him out. Russia’s economic troubles are the consequence of his failure to lead an effective economic transformation over the past two decades.
> 
> Imagine if Putin had been able to develop a track record like the Chinese Communists over the past 20 years. Russia would be in far better shape than it is today and would likely have the money to devote to both Sochi and Ukraine without spooking the markets. But he hasn’t, and he doesn’t appear likely to do so in the future.
> 
> Russia’s failure is not about democracy, transparency, or corruption. China has galloping corruption and little democracy or transparency, but it has still managed to pursue a successful development path. Putin’s Russia hasn’t, and now it’s paying the price.


----------



## a_majoor

Magic Realism as a metaphor for Russia's political class. The striking contrast between the reality (a GDP the size of Italy and a per capita GDP similar to that of the Barbados) and the aspiration to regain Great Power or even Superpower status is going to ba a source of long term problems given Russia's xenophobic culture and the lingering sense of bitterness from their defeat in the Cold War:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/02/14/russias-political-magical-realism/



> *Russia’s Political Magical Realism*
> AUREL BRAUN
> The glitter of the Sochi spectacle hides the reality of an empire in decline. Is Putin’s profligacy hastening Russia’s nosedive?
> 
> Published on February 14, 2014
> Visitors who have braved the threat of terrorism and shelled out big bucks for airfare, hotels, and event tickets at the Sochi Olympics are getting something for their money: lavish ceremonies, world-class athletic competition, architecturally striking sporting venues, and spectacular vistas from the slopes. President Putin undoubtedly views the grandeur of these Olympics, by far the most costly in history, as a testimony to the greatness of Russia and a sign of its return to the commanding center of the international system. The irony is that Sochi reflects not what is great about Russia but much of what is fundamentally wrong with it.
> 
> The Sochi Olympics are emblematic of a perilous political distortion in Russia. Let’s call it “political magical realism,” after the literary technique used so successfully by writers like Gabriel Garcia Marquez. In the political context, this approach entails evading problems by retreating into fantasy rather than finding solutions for them. Some of the hallmarks of this approach are President Putin’s highly publicized, thoroughly ridiculous staged feats of personal strength, underwater archaeology, and wildlife rescues. The policy manifestations of this approach are Russia’s grandiose domestic projects and manic international activities, highlighted by political subversion of the judiciary, anti-gay laws, the prosecution of political opponents, and electoral malfeasance. The country, including now a large and seething opposition, are thus left to face a bizarre mix of the repressive and the risible.
> 
> None of this is to deny that Russia has the potential to climb out of this morass. Blessed with enormous natural resources and a talented, well-educated population, it still has the ability to become a successful modern state. Note that this is not about superpower restoration—a Putinite delusion. (Russia’s well documented demographic problems preclude this.) Rather, it is about Russia’s potential to become another Japan or Germany.(_Interpolation: this is the best case scenario in the post Putin environment_)
> 
> Russia remains weighed down by an uncompetitive uni-dimensional economy whose only viable exports are energy and armaments. *The Kremlin’s unconscionable waste of Russia’s entrepreneurial energy, scientific talent, and national wealth have left the country with a nominal GDP equivalent to Italy (but without its international competitiveness and diversity) and a per capita GDP approximating that of Barbados.*
> 
> Corruption in Russia remains not only endemic, but cannibalistic. Business law offers little protection, particularly to foreign investors, and the outflow of funds usually far exceeds incoming capital and investments. Putin has centralized corruption rather than reducing itPutin has centralized corruption rather than reducing it. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index ranks Russia 127th out of 174 countries.
> 
> Nonetheless Putin’s government continues to be driven by seemingly limitless domestic and international ambitions. With a stagnant economy that will likely come under increasing stress over the next few years, Russia is witnessing the yawning gap between the Kremlin’s unrestrained imperial ambitions and its true capacity transform into a treacherous gulf.
> 
> To be sure, Russia has enjoyed some seeming international successes. For example, Putin appears to have outmaneuvered President Obama and saved Russia’s Syrian client, Bashar al-Assad. Moscow also succeeded in bullying Ukraine into dropping its promise to sign the (Eastern Partnership) association agreement with the European Union and setting out on a path to join the Russian controlled Eurasian (Customs) Union. But as with many things involving Russia, here too appearances are deceiving.
> 
> In Syria, the Russian-brokered chemical weapons agreement with Syria could be called a “one percent solution” (as 99 percent of those who have died have been killed by conventional weapons); the fighting continues unabated and the situation has grown more unstable over time. There is also continuing friction between Moscow and Washington over the Kremlin’s support for Iran, its pressure on Ukraine and over its apparent violation of the 1987 treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces. All of these may be coaxing the Obama Administration to take tougher measures against the Kremlin.
> 
> Further, Russian support for sordid dictatorships presents long-term risks—and not just risks to its reputation. In protecting the Iranian regime and thus facilitating its nuclear weapons ambitions, Moscow may find itself confronting a nuclear Iran whose missiles could just as easily reach the Russian capital as they could Israel. Associations with Belarus and support for Assad also impose heavy economic costs. In the case of Ukraine, the weakness and ineptness of the Yanukovych government could cause Russia’s expensive hegemonic plans there to unravel.
> 
> In light of all of these problems, the Sochi Olympics looks like nothing more than an absurdly lavish party, a fantasy that Russia can ill afford. After the Olympic torch goes dark and the euphoria of the games dissipates, the Kremlin will still have to face the cold reality of its failure to transform Russia into a modern state.
> 
> Aurel Braun is visiting professor in the Department of Government at Harvard University. He is also Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the University of Toronto. His latest book is NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century.


----------



## vonGarvin

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ...a GDP the size of Italy...


Which makes it a top ten GDP in the world.
According to the United Nations Statistics Division, it is 8th largest in the world (after the US, China, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and Brazil).
According to the IMF, it is 8th as well (after the US, China, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and Brazil: the same as the UN Stats Division)
Same listing according to the world bank and the CIA world fact book.

(Interestingly, the EU is ahead of the USA in GDP, as an aside)

Also, let's not forget that Russia works by Russia's rules, not by ours.  And GDP isn't all it takes to succeed.


----------



## a_majoor

Indeed, but having fiscal resources is very important to acheive your goals. To act as a Superpower (the Putinite dream), then you need access to superpower levels of financial capability. Given the relatively limited financial capabilities, plus the declining manpower, Russia will have to make some very hard choices about where to actually deploy the resources.

Russia becoming a new "Japan" or "Germany" is a very achievable goalithin its resource envelope.

Of course to use these resources effectively, there will have to be a huge shift in Russian "culture", including developing independent and relatively "clean" institutions (rather than centralized corruption).


----------



## vonGarvin

They've turned the corner on their declining population.  Of course, its effect won't be felt for a decade or so. 
But...its debt is only 11% of its GDP, whereas the U.S.'s is about 101%. 
You keep talking as though Russia is about to collapse.  It's far from it, its economy is growing, and Putin has international clout, such as it is. 
And he was able to mass a combined arms army on Ukraine's border, with over 800 tanks. He has power and we'd be daft to brush him off as impotent.


----------



## tomahawk6

Look at the economic disaster that is Ukraine.The previous government spent the country into the ground.Which is why they need EU money.The Russian economy cannot carry the Ukraine without damaging its own shaky economy which is why I think Putin will be satisfied with the Crimea.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/canada-has-a-role-to-play-in-ukraines-future/article17131989/


----------



## Kirkhill

I agree with the article but rather than seeing the "informal economy" as a problem to be solved by technocrats (Gawd how I detest that word) I would see that as the foundation of a proto-capitalist society.  I would not be worrying about raising taxes from the broke and starving.  I would be encouraging them to convert and build the informal economy, through support to small and medium businesses, into a productive economy that can be taxed.

Ukraine needs short term financing.  It can't wait for the IMF to get its act together, and frankly the IMF terms seldom give comfort to any but the lenders.

Canada can afford to carry some of the bill as a bilateral loan.  The same is true for Britain, the US and Germany.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

This latest crisis also bumped the price of NG, which helps Russia as it sells to Europe.


----------



## a_majoor

Is this the sort of thinking behind the actions of the Russian "elites"?

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/372353/eurasianist-threat-robert-zubrin#!



> *The Eurasianist Threat*
> Putin’s ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine.
> 
> ByRobert Zubrin
> The National Bolshevik Party flag flies near a statue of Lenin.
> 
> As the Putin regime invades Ukraine, it has become apparent that a new force for evil has emerged in Moscow. It is essential that Americans become aware of the nature of the threat.
> 
> Putin is sometimes described as a revanchist, seeking to recreate the Soviet Union. That is a useful shorthand, but it is not really accurate. Putin and many of his gang may have once been Communists, but they are not that today. Rather, they have embraced a new totalitarian political ideology known as “Eurasianism.”
> 
> The roots of Eurasianism go back to czarist émigrés interacting with fascist thinkers in between-the-wars France and Germany. But in recent years, its primary exponent has been the very prominent and prolific political theorist Aleksandr Dugin.
> 
> Born in 1962, Dugin was admitted to the Moscow Aviation Institute in 1979, but then was expelled because of his involvement with mystic neo-Nazi groups. He then spent the Eighties hanging around monarchist and ultra-right-wing circles, before joining for a while​ Gennady Ziuganov’s Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF, a neo-Stalinist group partially descended from, but not to be confused with, the previously ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CPSU), after which he became a founder and chief ideologue of the Eurasianist National Bolshevik Party (NBP) in 1994.
> 
> Nazism, it will be recalled, was an abbreviation for National Socialism. National Bolshevism, therefore, put itself forth as an ideology that relates to National Socialism in much the same way as Bolshevism relates to Socialism. This open self-identification with Nazism is also shown clearly in the NBP flag, which looks exactly like a Nazi flag, with a red background surrounding a white circle, except that the black swastika at the center is replaced by a black hammer and sickle.
> 
> Dugin ran for the Duma on the NBP ticket in 1995, but got only 1 percent of the vote. So, switching tactics, he abandoned the effort to build his own splinter party and instead adopted the more productive strategy of becoming the idea man for all the bigger parties, including Putin’s United Russia, Ziuganov’s CPRF, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. In this role he has succeeded brilliantly.
> 
> The core idea of Dugin’s Eurasianism is that “liberalism” (by which is meant the entire Western consensus) represents an assault on the traditional hierarchical organization of the world. Repeating the ideas of Nazi theorists Karl Haushofer, Rudolf Hess, Carl Schmitt, and Arthur Moeller van der Bruck, Dugin says that this liberal threat is not new, but is the ideology of the maritime cosmopolitan power “Atlantis,” which has conspired to subvert more conservative land-based societies since ancient times. Accordingly, he has written books in which he has reconstructed the entire history of the world as a continuous battle between these two factions, from Rome v. Carthage to Russia v. the Anglo Saxon “Atlantic Order,” today. If Russia is to win this fight against the subversive oceanic bearers of such “racist” (because foreign-imposed) ideas as human rights, however, it must unite around itself all the continental powers, including Germany, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet republics, Turkey, Iran, and Korea, into a grand Eurasian Union strong enough to defeat the West.
> 
> In order to be so united, this Eurasian Union will need a defining ideology, and for this purpose Dugin has developed a new “Fourth Political Theory” combining all the strongest points of Communism, Nazism, Ecologism, and Traditionalism, thereby allowing it to appeal to the adherents of all of these diverse anti-liberal creeds. He would adopt Communism’s opposition to free enterprise. However, he would drop the Marxist commitment to technological progress, a liberal-derived ideal, in favor of Ecologism’s demagogic appeal to stop the advance of industry and modernity. From Traditionalism, he derives a justification for stopping free thought. All the rest is straight out of Nazism, ranging from legal theories justifying unlimited state power and the elimination of individual rights, to the need for populations “rooted” in the soil, to weird gnostic ideas about the secret origin of the Aryan race in the North Pole.
> 
> The open devotion to Nazism is Dugin’s thought is remarkable. In his writings he celebrates the Waffen SS, murderers of millions of Russians during the war, as an ideal organization. He also approves of the most extreme crimes of Communism, going so far as to endorse the horrific 1937 purges that killed, among numerous other talented and loyal Soviet citizens, nearly the entire leadership of the Red Army — something that Stalin himself later had second thoughts about.
> 
> What Russia needs, says Dugin, is a “genuine, true, radically revolutionary and consistent, fascist fascism.” On the other hand, “Liberalism, is an absolute evil. . . . Only a global crusade against the U.S., the West, globalization, and their political-ideological expression, liberalism, is capable of becoming an adequate response. . . . The American empire should be destroyed.”
> 
> This is the ideology behind the Putin regime’s “Eurasian Union” project. It is to this dark program, which threatens not only the prospects for freedom in Ukraine and Russia, but the peace of the world, that former Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych tried to sell “his” country. It is against this program that the courageous protesters in the Maidan took their stand and — with scandalously little help from the West — somehow miraculously prevailed. But now the chips are really down. The Ukrainians are being faced not with riot police, but with Russian divisions, subversion, and economic warfare. The country needs to be stabilized, and defended. The Ukrainians deserve our full support — and not just for reasons of sympathy for those resisting tyranny or respect for the brave. It is in the vital interest of America that freedom triumphs in Ukraine.
> 
> Without Ukraine, Dugin’s fascist Eurasian Union project is impossible, and sooner or later Russia itself will have to join the West and become free, leaving only a few despised and doomed islands of tyranny around the globe. But with Ukraine underfoot, the Eurasianists’ program can and will proceed, and a new Iron Curtain will fall into place imprisoning a large fraction of humanity in the grip of a monstrous totalitarian power that will become the arsenal of evil around the world for decades to come. That means another Cold War, trillions of dollars wasted on arms, accelerated growth of the national-security state at home, repeated proxy conflicts costing millions of lives abroad, and civilization itself placed at risk should a single misstep in the endless insane great-power game precipitate the locked and loaded confrontation into a thermonuclear exchange.
> 
> The 20th century saw three great-power confrontations. Two of them turned into total war. We lucked out on the third. Do we really want to roll those dice again? We will have to, unless the Eurasianist program is stopped.
> 
> The stakes in Ukraine could not be higher.
> 
> — Robert Zubrin is president of Pioneer Energy and the author of Energy Victory. The paperback edition of his latest book, Merchants of Despair: Radical Environmentalists, Criminal Pseudo-Scientists, and the Fatal Cult of Antihumanism, has just been published by Encounter Books.


----------



## Robert0288

Deserved to be in a Russia thread, but there isn't enough information for its own.

Apparently a 100MW power plant in Novokuznetsk exploded yesterday, looks like it supplied power to a town of about 550,000 people as well as being home to metal industries.   On the bright side, its non-nuclear.

http://englishrussia.com/2014/03/07/an-explosion-at-novokuznetsk-power-plant/#more-141118
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=89f_1394272050&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=33227215
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Novokuznetsk


----------



## a_majoor

Russian nationalism raises some disturbing questions about what sort of future Vladimir Putin is setting for Russia, and what sort of state it is evolving into:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/03/14/putins-nationalist-gamble/



> *Putin’s Nationalist Gamble*
> 
> Raymond Sontag
> 
> In justifying his intervention in Crimea with a duty to defend Russians abroad, Putin is fueling the destructive fire of nationalism. It could be Russia’s undoing.
> 
> Published on March 14, 2014
> 
> On the eve of Moscow’s incursion into Crimea, the Kremlin mouthpiece Izvestia ran a headline declaring “A Majority of Russians Consider Crimea Russian Territory”. Curiously, though, the article that followed was not about Russia needing to grab territory, but rather about its struggle to hold the territory it has. According to a recent poll, the paper wrote, while 56 percent believe Crimea is Russian land, only about 40 percent consider Russia’s predominantly Muslim regions of Chechnya and Dagestan to be such. Existing state borders, it seems, mean little to Russians’ ideas of what constitutes Russia.
> 
> This fact may embolden the country’s leaders to occupy foreign territory, but it also scares them. Izvestia called this failure to accept ethnic minorities as countrymen the “single greatest danger to the Russian state’s integrity”. In this, it echoed Vladimir Putin’s recent campaign to promote a civic national identity as opposed to one based on ethnicity. “Nationalists must remember that by calling into question our multi-ethnic character… we will begin to destroy ourselves” he warned recently. “In order to maintain the nation’s unity, people must develop a civic identity on the basis of shared values.”
> 
> In justifying his intervention in Crimea with a duty to defend Russians or Russian-speakers abroad, though, Putin has fueled the destructive fire of nationalism that his civic-identity campaign is meant to combat. If Russians conceive of their country in ethnic terms, why should minorities and the regions they dominate be part of that country? And why should predominantly ethnic Russian regions in other countries not be part of that state? A Russia that defines itself in ethnic terms will be unable to integrate territories in the North Caucasus peacefully and will be more likely to look at lands beyond its borders as rightfully its own.
> 
> Many have dismissed both Putin’s civic-identity campaign and his commitment to Russians abroad as cynical ploys meant only to serve immediate political needs. Indeed, Putin until now has shown little interest in ethnicity, ideology or identity, largely ignoring Russians abroad and dismissing the search for a national idea that many pundits and politicians engage in as an “ancient Russian game”. But Putin’s motivations and sincerity are beside the point. The dangerous nationalist tendencies he claims to combat at home are real even if he does not recognize or care how his actions abroad exacerbate those tendencies.
> 
> An Old Problem
> 
> Russia’s worsening interethnic relations do seem to have captured Putin’s attention before his latest adventures in Ukraine. According to the Levada polling firm the number of people who support the idea that “Russia is for [ethnic] Russians” – a favorite slogan among right-wing groups – grew from 55 percent to 66 percent between 2002 and 2013, while the proportion who oppose the phrase as “true fascism” declined from 28 percent to 19 percent. Similarly, over that period the number of people who said they “felt hostility toward people of different nationalities” grew from 12 percent to 20 percent. As a 2013 government report noted, “post-Soviet Russia has a crisis of civic identity, ethnic intolerance, separatism and terrorism, as a result of which there is a danger of society disintegrating.” To combat this, the report proposes a $186-million, 6-year program to “strengthen the unity of the Russian Federation’s multinational people”. Putin has devoted considerable attention to this problem, making it the focus of his 2013-state of the-nation address.
> 
> The problem of forming a common identity out of myriad ethnicities and managing ethnic Russian nationalism is, of course, not new for Russia. The Soviet Union faced the same challenge and it was ultimately a resurgence of ethnic nationalisms that broke that country apart. Putin’s civic-identity campaign, in fact, borrows heavily from Soviet nationalities policy: It is based largely on opposition to Western liberalism; it seeks to preserve and promote the country’s various ethnic cultures while uniting them in a larger community; it emphasizes protecting the state and the ethnic group and deemphasizes the rights of the individual; and it seeks simultaneously to temper ethnic Russian nationalism and harness it as a uniting force. “For centuries, Russia developed as a multi-ethnic nation” Putin said in his 2012 state-of-the-nation address, “a civilization-state bonded by the [ethnic] Russian people, Russian language and Russian culture native for all of us, uniting us and preventing us from dissolving in this diverse world.”
> 
> Whereas the Soviet Union could build an identity around Marxism-Leninism, Putin’s Russia lacks any such unifying ideas. He has offered as ideology a brand of conservatism that emphasizes defending “traditional values” against Western political and cultural encroachment, with opposition to same-sex partnerships and efforts to promote democracy around the world featuring prominently. He presents this conservatism as a philosophy of national salvation from forces that would overturn the traditional order, explaining it by quoting the twentieth-century anti-revolutionary philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev: “The point of conservatism is not that it prevents movement forward and upward, but that it prevents movement backward and downward, into chaotic darkness and a return to a primitive state.” But while the Kremlin has assigned reading and organized seminars for government officials in an effort to develop this ideology, it still largely lacks positive values and is primarily reactive. Putin is far longer on what he opposes than what he is for.
> 
> Can’t Have It Both Ways
> 
> The crisis in Ukraine has shown the promise, limits and dangers of Putin’s ideology. On the one hand, the idea of defending the beleaguered people of Crimea from Western encroachment has been a powerful and popular message within Russia. On the other hand, official language on the subject veers quickly into ethnic Russian nationalism, with no real appeal to common values. Putin’s rhetoric on Ukraine is, in fact, another attempt to harness ethnic Russian nationalism without embracing it. He has tried to avoid mention of ethnic Russians when discussing motivations for intervening, instead pointing to a duty to protect “Russian-speaking populations”. Russian language, something common to all Russia’s citizens, seems like safer ground than ethnicity for building support for military action abroad. Further down the Kremlin’s propaganda vertical, though, this distinction becomes muddled.
> 
> The country’s main television channel this week, for example, described a large protest in Stavropol as being in “defense of [ethnic] Russians and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine”. That a protest in Stavropol, a city in the diverse and restive North Caucasus, would focus on protecting ethnic Russians is notable and troubling. Interethnic tensions have been most destructive in this part of the country and checking separatist movements there is a primary objective of the civic-identity campaign. If, encouraged by Moscow, people in the North Caucasus are taking to the streets to defend the rights of ethnic Russians, what chance do efforts to build peace and unity through common civic values have? In his drive for Crimea, Putin is undermining one of the great projects of his presidency: keeping regions such as Chechnya and Dagestan within Russia.
> 
> Moscow’s expansion of power in Ukraine weakens its power in the North Caucasus not only because of the separatist precedent it sets, but because of what it says about how the country sees itself: as “Russia for Russians” and not a multinational people. Putin has kept the North Caucasus under control through force and massive spending, a policy that has spawned one of Russian nationalists’ favorite slogans: “Enough Feeding the Caucasus!” Money and lives spent in the North Caucasus alienates the rest of Russia from that part of the country, necessitating that more lives and resources be spent to hold on to it. Failure to build a real sense of national unity means that Russia’s colonial project within its own borders will have to continue until the will and means to fight are exhausted. The idea of Russia ultimately paying a high price at home for its actions in Ukraine may well please American politicians and pundits eager to see Putin punished. But Russia losing control of the North Caucasus would likely be disastrous for the outside world.
> 
> Raymond Sontag received his doctorate in politics from the University of Oxford in 2011. He previously served as the program officer for the National Democratic Institute's political party program in Moscow.


----------



## pbi

Putin is nothing if not astute. He knows what ancient buttons to push in the Russian psyche, and how to exploit what seem to me to be the narrow-minded, suspicious, xenophobic/paranoid attitudes of the average citizen. (Kind of like a Russian version of the Tea Party...)

All he has to do is say "those Western devils and their lackies the (insert despised ethnic minority here) are threatening Mother Russia! They will force us all to be gay liberals, and to wear clothes that were made after 1978!!"

Then the usual gang of skin-heads, neo-fascists, bemedalled veterans and leather jacketed, slightly overweight men with bad haircuts take to the streets and kick it up a notch.

OK, now I'm indulging in stereotyping.... >

Even Stalin and his gang resorted to this nationalism in WWII: when things when bad, he made an emotional and deeply traditional appeal to Russians as Russians, not as internationalist Communists. After all: look at what they called WWII: "The Great Patriotic War of The Fatherland".


----------



## Infantryman2b

http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/6/putin-has-transformed-russian-army-into-a-lean-mea/?page=all

Good read on Russia's new military mobility. This talk of how weak Russia's economy and what not isn't valid IMO. For one the Wests economy is crumbling, the US is trillions in debt, American society is filled with violence and crime and corruption also(maybe not as much as Russia, but very close), and the EU isn't strong IMO. Not to mention if we continue aggressive measures on Russia, then I guarantee  China will side with Russia damaging everyones economy. Gas would need to come from somewhere else not to mention all the other resources Europe gets from Russia. The Russian mainland has all the resources and minerals needed to sustain its own war machine for a long time. Underestimating Russian resolve and might are mistakes histories greatest military minds gambled on and lost big time. Its Naive to think the present situation is the basis to which to estimate capabilities.


----------



## pbi

Infantryman2b said:
			
		

> http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/6/putin-has-transformed-russian-army-into-a-lean-mea/?page=all
> 
> ... Underestimating Russian resolve and might are mistakes histories greatest military minds gambled on and lost big time...



I agree with what you said here.



			
				Infantryman2b said:
			
		

> Its Nivea to think the present situation is the basis to which to estimate capabilities.



...But I don't think you meant "Nivea". That is a kind of hand cream.


----------



## a_majoor

Russia's project seems more and more like reassembling the USSR, or Imperial Russia:

http://hotair.com/archives/2014/03/21/is-putin-making-moves-in-latin-america-too/



> *Is Putin making moves in Latin America too?*
> posted at 10:41 am on March 21, 2014 by Bruce McQuain
> 
> While everyone is focused on the Ukraine and eastern Europe, Vladimir Putin has also been projecting Russian power into our own backyard:
> 
> Away from the conflict in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin is quietly seeking a foothold in Latin America, military officials warn.
> 
> To the alarm of lawmakers and Pentagon officials, Putin has begun sending navy ships and long-range bombers to the region for the first time in years.
> 
> Russia’s defense minister says the country is planning bases in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, and just last week, Putin’s national security team met to discuss increasing military ties in the region.
> 
> “They’re on the march,” Sen. Joe Donnelly (D-Ind.) said at a Senate hearing earlier this month. “They’re working the scenes where we can’t work. And they’re doing a pretty good job.”
> 
> Gen. James Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command said there has been a “noticeable uptick in Russian power projection and security force personnel” in Latin America.
> 
> “It has been over three decades since we last saw this type of high-profile Russian military presence,” Kelly said at the March 13 hearing.
> 
> Less obviously, but for a longer time, China too has been establishing a presense in the region:
> 
> 
> “In Venezuela, a lot of the money that’s been able to prop up President Chavez and now Maduro has been Chinese money,” Kelly said.
> 
> But the push by Russia has implications which can’t be ignored, especially its attempt to establish bases in its old client states when it was the USSR.
> 
> Meanwhile, Latin America certainly hasn’t been much of a priority for the US:
> 
> 
> According to Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), there are 10 countries in Latin America that currently have no U.S. ambassador because they either haven’t been nominated yet or confirmed, a sign that the region is seen as a low priority.
> 
> Another sign of an inept foreign policy. If we don’t move quickly to correct the situation, the outcome is pretty easy to predict:
> 
> 
> “We will be losing the ability to influence developments in a region that is very important to us because of proximity,” Rabasa said.
> 
> Indeed.  Likely these warning will be waved off as alarmism until it is too late.  And it will then tally as another failure in a long line of foreign policy failures by this administration.


----------



## The Bread Guy

pbi said:
			
		

> ...But I don't think you meant "Nivea". That is a kind of hand cream.


Gotta love auto-complete!


----------



## vonGarvin

Вели́кая Оте́чественная война́
Great Patriotic War.  No need to add "of the fatherland", because "patriotic" implies that.


----------



## Kirkhill

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Вели́кая Оте́чественная война́
> Great Patriotic War.  No need to add "of the fatherland", because "patriotic" implies that.



Спасибо, Господи


----------



## CougarKing

Putin's upcoming May meeting with Chinese Pres. Xi Jinping should also be something to watch for this year.

Reuters



> *Putin looks to Asia as West threatens to isolate Russia*
> 
> By Timothy Heritage and Vladimir Soldatkin
> 
> MOSCOW  Fri Mar 21, 2014 6:09am EDT
> 
> 
> (Reuters) - When President Vladimir Putin signed a treaty this week annexing Crimea to great fanfare in the Kremlin and anger in the West, a trusted lieutenant was making his way to Asia to shore up ties with Russia's eastern allies.
> 
> Forcing home the symbolism of his trip, Igor Sechin gathered media in Tokyo the next day to warn Western governments that more sanctions over Moscow's seizure of the Black Sea peninsula from Ukraine would be counter-productive.
> 
> The underlying message from the head of Russia's biggest oil company, Rosneft, was clear: If Europe and the United States isolate Russia, Moscow will look East for new business, energy deals, military contracts and political alliances.
> 
> *The Holy Grail for Moscow is a natural gas supply deal with China that is apparently now close after years of negotiations. If it can be signed when Putin visits China in May,* he will be able to hold it up to show that global power has shifted eastwards and he does not need the West.
> 
> (...EDITED)


----------



## Edward Campbell

S.M.A. said:
			
		

> Putin's upcoming May meeting with Chinese Pres. Xi Jinping should also be something to watch for this year.
> 
> Reuters




Putin/Russia needs to be a bit cautious. China is not Europe. China will not allow Russia to turn off the gas or oil ... not even once.


----------



## Kirkhill

Bloomberg:  Does Europe Need Russian Gas?

Putkin may already be in the process of shooting himself in the foot.

Edit to get the link to work


----------



## a_majoor

An interesting contrast piece; Russia in pre revolutionary times, photographed in colour. the images are very sharp and colour saturated, being photographed using a 3 plate process, details in the article.

The Final Years of Pre-Soviet Russia, Captured in Glorious Color

http://www.wired.com/rawfile/2014/03/prokudin-gorskii-photos-russia


----------



## Edward Campbell

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Interesting but, I think, because it is designed to convince Americans to change governments, not because it presents a credible case for a Russian turn around.
> 
> I remain convinced that Russia is a _failing_ state, not a potential leader of even a rival for any of the America, China or India.




Here is an interesting take on Russia and Putin and _neo-Eurasianism_ in an article that is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Globe and Mail_:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/has-putin-bought-into-these-dangerous-ideas/article17610287/#dashboard/follows/


> Has Putin bought into these dangerous ideas?
> 
> DOUG SAUNDERS
> The Globe and Mail
> 
> Published Saturday, Mar. 22 2014
> 
> On Tuesday, Vladimir Putin stood before the Duma and delivered a speech that changed the history of his country, and possibly of the world. The speech opened by declaring that the representatives of Crimea seated before him were “citizens of Russia, residents of Crimea and Sevastopol,” and ended by making this a fact, by signing Crimea into the Russian Federation, and making the world’s largest country slightly larger.
> 
> During the intervening hour he uttered 5,000 words that will be studied carefully. They changed the world’s question from “What is Mr. Putin thinking?” to “Does he really believe what he says?” If his language is taken at face value, Mr. Putin has become an ethnic-nationalist menace to his people and region, a Slobodan Milosevic with better weapons. If he is simply drawing on the language of extremism for political gain, then a different response is needed.
> 
> Speakers of Russian immediately noticed something different.
> 
> As Kimberly Marten, a Russia scholar at Columbia University noted, for the first time Mr. Putin did not refer to Russians as “Rossisskii” – citizens of Russia – but as “Russkii,” ethnic Russians. “Crimea is primordial ‘Russkaya’ land, and Sevastapol is a ‘Russkii’ city,” he said. And he described the Orthodox Church as the institution that “predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.”
> 
> His speech’s blend of Orthodox Christian ethnic-Russian nationalism with conspiratorial anti-Americanism is a major tip of the hat to the movement known as neo-Eurasianism, an ultra-nationalist political philosophy whose explosive language has become either Mr. Putin’s new guiding belief or, more likely, an important rhetorical tool in his political arsenal.
> 
> The central figure in this movement is the bearded philosopher Alexander Dugin, who has played an on-and-off advisory role in Mr. Putin’s political party for 14 years and who has frequently spoken to the media on behalf of Kremlin interests during the Ukraine crisis.
> 
> In the years after communism collapsed, Mr. Dugin and other activists revived Eurasianism, a pre-communist movement that saw the Russians as a fully independent third “civilization” between East and West. To this he added more Orthodox mysticism, the ideas of Martin Heidegger and of anti-globalization thinkers such as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, a sprinkling of gender studies and critical theory, and came up with a movement whose declared enemies are liberal democracy, modernism and the Enlightenment, which he sees not as ideas with their own proud and independent history in Russia (which they are) but as tainted Western imports.
> 
> In 1992, months after the Soviet Union collapsed, Mr. Dugin wrote proudly that “the Endkampf, the final struggle will burst upon us very soon … the decisive hour is already at hand, the hour of Eurasia. The great war of the continents is approaching.”
> 
> It is unlikely (we can hope) that these words are what Mr. Putin has had in mind when his speeches have referred to neo-Eurasian ideas. After all, the President showed little sign of being an ethnic nationalist or Eurasianist during his first two terms in office, or even the beginning of his third; this new language has emerged in recent years, after Russia’s liberal middle class revolted against him and he sought a new political base.
> 
> Rather, he seems to be drawing from Mr. Dugin’s 2009 manifesto The Fourth Political Theory, which became a sensation in Moscow circles. The other three political theories to which the title alludes are liberalism, fascism and communism; the first, (economic and political liberalism, including liberal democracy), is to be opposed by all means possible. Fascists and communists, Islamists and “defenders of the spiritual traditions of the pre-modern West” are described as crucial allies in this struggle. He refers to his own ideology, the fourth, not just as neo-Eurasianism but frequently as “National Bolshevism” (a reference to National Socialism – he is an admirer of the Nazi legacy). He describes his ideology as “socialism without materialism, atheism, progressivism and modernism.”
> 
> Does Vladimir Putin really believe all of this? It’s unlikely, given his lack of prior interest in such extremes of ethnic nationalism. But he is clearly using this movement, and language, as a tactic with which to cement his power, as a gaudy ornament to his self-aggrandizement. For now, this is how we should see the move on Crimea: As an easily grabbed jewel in an autocrat’s crown, not as the launch of a continental bid. We are right to isolate and shun Mr. Putin as long as he pays favour to such dangerous beliefs; he must be aware of their darkest implications.



_Neo-Eurasianism_ is a strange doctrine that holds that Russia is _special_ and has a _special_ place between liberal, Western Europe and conservative Sinic Asia. It is, in my opinion: _fascist_ and foolish.

Russia is, simply, backwards.

Despite Borodin and Tchaikovsky,  Sholokhov and Solzhenitsyn, Abrikosov and Ginzburg and Ilyushin and Korolev, Russia remains an essentially _peasant_ society stuck, not positioned, between a dynamic, forward looking Europe and an equally dynamic, albeit often inscrutable, Asia.

I think Aleksandr Dugin is charismatic but, fundamentally wrong. He has said, in _The Basics of Geopolitics_ (1997) that: “In principle, Eurasia and our space, the heartland Russia, remain the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution. ... The new Eurasian empire will be constructed on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us. This common civilizational impulse will be the basis of a political and strategic union.” He promotes an alliance between Eurasia and the Arabs.  I think Dugin sees, clearly and correctly, that Russia is surrounded and will, sooner or later, will be chewed up, piece by piece, by the Germans _Mittel Europeans_ and the Chinese. I understand that he and Putin want to fight against that, but ...  :dunno:


----------



## Infantryman2b

Some good articles. Hopefully no matter what happens, the worlds powers realize nobody can win an all out nuclear war. I think that if war did come between the west and east, the threat of nuclear war would happen if one of the major players was losing and country was facing a direct invasion. But then again nobody can know for sure. Russia definitely has an agenda as does China, this is definitely some very interesting current events.


----------



## Kirkhill

> As Kimberly Marten, a Russia scholar at Columbia University noted, for the first time Mr. Putin did not refer to Russians as “Rossisskii” – citizens of Russia – but as “Russkii,” ethnic Russians. “Crimea is primordial ‘Russkaya’ land, and Sevastapol is a ‘Russkii’ city,” he said. And* he described the Orthodox Church as the institution that “predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*.”
> 
> His speech’s blend of Orthodox Christian ethnic-Russian nationalism with conspiratorial anti-Americanism is a major tip of the hat to the movement known as neo-Eurasianism, an ultra-nationalist political philosophy whose explosive language has become either Mr. Putin’s new guiding belief or, more likely, an important rhetorical tool in his political arsenal.



And in Georgia



> ‘No to Theocracy’ Rally and Counter Demo
> A week after* Orthodox clergy-led crowd violently attacked an attempted anti-homophobia rally*, several hundred people gathered on May 24 in downtown Tbilisi park under the slogan ‘No to Theocracy’ to protest against violence and to speak out against what they believe is the Georgian Orthodox Church’s attempts to claim supremacy over the state. In the same park a parallel rally was held by counter-demonstrators, who said they were gathered to protest against “propaganda” of homosexuality on the one hand and on the other to speak out in defense of the Georgian Church and Orthodoxy; some carried banners calling for “ban of propaganda of sexual wrongness and indecency”; *one Orthodox priest at counter demo said he was protesting against “LGBTization in Georgia.*” There was a heavy police presence in between the two demonstrations.



Way too many coincidences and too much speed.  This is not a spur of the moment response to some demonstrators in Kyiv/Kiev.


----------



## Kirkhill

> In the years after communism collapsed, Mr. Dugin and other activists revived Eurasianism,*a pre-communist movement that saw the Russians as a fully independent third “civilization” between East and West*. *To this he added more Orthodox mysticism*, the ideas of Martin Heidegger and of anti-globalization thinkers such as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, a sprinkling of gender studies and critical theory, and came up with a movement whose declared enemies are liberal democracy, modernism and the Enlightenment, which he sees not as ideas with their own proud and independent history in Russia (which they are) but as tainted Western imports.
> 
> In 1992, months after the Soviet Union collapsed, Mr. Dugin wrote proudly that “the Endkampf, the final struggle will burst upon us very soon … the decisive hour is already at hand, the hour of Eurasia. The great war of the continents is approaching.”



*With respect to the Third Civilization* I offer The Third Rome an ancient doctrine that goes back to the First Bulgar Empire as an alternative to the Western Rome in Italy and the Eastern Rome of Constantinople.

*With respect to Orthodox mysticism* I offer Rasputin.

And to prove that mysticism is not strictly a Russian problem I offer Jack van Impe on Gog and Magog

Some idiocies are self-fulfilling prophecies.

Russia may be foolish, fascist, backward and all the rest ..... but it is not inactive.


----------



## pbi

As usual, the combination of nationalist, xenophobic politics, ignorance  and fundamentalist religion never produces anything good. I see very little difference between the role of the Orthodox Church in fanning the Serbian nationalist flames in FRY in the early 90s or its antics in Russia now, and the rantings of  the religious right in the US as well as is various political mouthpieces.

If you oppose them, you oppose God.

These movements tend to obscure or demonize rational thinking, drum up the mobs of the ignorant and easily-led, and contribute to an atmosphere of self-righteousness, as to who can be the first to bring on the Apocalypse, or Armageddon, or whatever other mass bloodletting it is that will lead to "God's dominion on earth".

The US Founding Fathers had it right when they spoke about the "Separation of Church and State".


----------



## a_majoor

Russia, or at leas Vladimr Putin's true goals may be to dismember Liberal Democracy in the States surrounding Russia. Compliant authoratarian States are easier to manage, but also don provide an attractiove alternative to the autocratic model of Russian rule to its own population:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/03/19/putins-real-target-democracy-in-russia-and-beyond/



> *Putin’s Real Target: Democracy in Russia and Beyond*
> Arch Puddington, David J. Kramer
> 
> Vladimir Putin considers stable, prosperous, rule-of-law democracies along Russia’s border as a threat because of what they represent: the possibility of an alternative to autocratic rule in Russia.
> 
> Published on March 19, 2014
> 
> Vladimir Putin’s brazen invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea are a frontal assault not only on Ukraine’s territorial integrity but also on the very concept of freedom and the ability of people to choose their political destiny.
> 
> The outcome of the crisis—and the response by the West—may determine the prospects for democracy for Russia’s neighbors and beyond Eurasia.
> 
> For some time, Putin has resented attempts to build democratic governments on Russia’s periphery. To be sure, Putin has clashed with neighboring autocrats from time-to-time. But when dictators like Alexander Lukashenka of Belarus have been challenged by reform movements, Putin has invariably sided with the forces of despotism. At the same time, he has imposed trade restrictions on Poland, waged cyber warfare against Estonia, incited Russians in Latvia to undermine that country, and occupied Georgian territory. More recently, the Kremlin initiated a campaign of economic sabotage against Moldova after that country decided to join the EU’s Eastern Partnership agreement.
> 
> Much of the commentary, especially from foreign policy ultra-realists, has spoken blandly of Russia’s desire to exercise “influence” over Ukraine and other states formerly under Soviet control. But to Russia’s leaders, influence means more than proper diplomatic and economic relations with Moscow. Putin’s overarching objective is to control a country’s leadership and political direction. While he is most comfortable if a country has a system similar to Russia’s—a modern authoritarianism with empty trappings of democracy—he has tolerated governments that are somewhat more open but with mediocre, corrupt leaders who are well disposed to Russia, like Ukraine’s recently deposed President Viktor Yanukovych.
> 
> Russia’s most stable neighbors are the three Baltic states and Poland, democracies rooted in rule of law, and they also are members of the EU and NATO. And yet Putin considers them a threat because of what they represent. Democracy, transparency, rule of law, and respect for human rights are concepts that clash with the corrupt, authoritarian model Putin is intent on creating in Russia and along its borders. Greater democracy in neighboring states, he fears, could generate demand for meaningful freedoms inside Russia itself.
> 
> To staunch demand for liberalization, Putin has based his presidency on the suppression of the political opposition, and he has achieved this by marginalizing opposition parties and by relentlessly crushing civil society. He has taken special aim at dissident activists because he is aware of the role that civil society has played in promoting change in Ukraine, Georgia, and the Arab world.
> 
> *Early on, Putin masterfully established control over messaging. From the beginning of his rule, command and control of the media have underpinned Putin’s governing strategy, including his takeover of two nationwide, privately held television networks. Russia today approaches the status of a classic propaganda state. Russia’s media focus single-mindedly on portraying the President as the latest in a line of great Russian strongmen, on promoting his policies, and especially on demonizing his opponents.*
> 
> Propaganda is a permanent project for the Kremlin. The Russian media needed no time to prepare once Putin made the decision to annex Crimea and threaten to expand his intervention to eastern Ukraine. The propaganda offensive began immediately. Crimea was cut off from Ukrainian television and exposed to fabricated accounts of the depredations of Ukrainian fascists and the oppression of Crimean Russians. Ethnic Russians who live in Ukraine understand the grim implications of annexation. Some have told Western journalists that, whatever their reservations about the new Ukrainian authorities, they do not want to become citizens of Putin’s Russia. Those views are even more firmly held by ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (24 and 12 percent of the population, respectively) living in Crimea.
> 
> Putin publicly blames the United States for the political movements that have overthrown despots in recent years. But behind his assertions is a deep apprehension that a stable democracy next door would threaten the legitimacy of his own repressive model. If he succeeds in grabbing Crimea, he is sure to mobilize his formidable weapons to destabilize the rest of Ukraine, in effect warning off the European Union and NATO, and to impose a new doctrine of limited sovereignty on Russia’s neighbors.
> 
> Beyond Eurasia, Russia has taken the leading role in a coalition of authoritarian regimes that provide diplomatic, economic, and occasionally military support for beleaguered dictators like Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Not surprisingly, Russian officials have made clear their hope that democracy in the Arab world will fail.
> 
> When Putin assumed the Russian presidency in 2000, prospects for progress toward freedom in Eurasia seemed promising. In the intervening years, political conditions have deteriorated to the point that people living in the post-Soviet sphere face levels of repression as severe as those experienced in the Middle East. Putin is not solely responsible for this. But he is the principal enabler. He has recently gone a step further by arguing that his system—with its political prisoners, anti-gay and anti-immigrant campaigns, and noisy propaganda—is as desirable and legitimate as Western liberal democracy as a model for other countries.
> 
> Western leaders must recognize that the serious threats posed by Russian expansionism include challenges to freedom of speech, honest elections, the rights of minorities, and a just legal system—the foundational values of liberal society. Accordingly, the response to events in Ukraine must be strong and swift—tough sanctions against Putin and his regime and support for the Ukrainian people. Left unchallenged in a serious way, Putin’s “success” in Ukraine will whet his appetite for further campaigns to expand Russia’s influence at democracy’s expense.
> 
> David J. Kramer is president of Freedom House. Arch Puddington is vice president for research at that organization.


----------



## Kirkhill

Russia's Declining Influence

Warsaw Pact - Died 1989

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrzgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, East Germany

USSR - Died 1991

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrzgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, East Germany

CIS

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrzgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, East Germany

CSTO 1991

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrzgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, East Germany

SCO 2001 (Competing Organization - Attracts the Stans to Beijing - Belarus only given observer status - also attracts other Asian nations)

China, Mongolia

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrzgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, East Germany

Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Iran, Turkey, ASEAN

Eurasian Union 2010

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrzgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, East Germany

Crimea Supporters 2014

Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrzgystan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, East Germany

How much of that contraction has happened on Vlad's watch?  What has he prevented?  What has he hastened?


Add in the following separatist threats within Russia

Chechenya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Chuvashia, Prussia, Sakha, Siberia, Tuva (there are others without "official" party organizations)

And Vlad's increasing references to Ethnic Russians as opposed to Civil Russians and you can discern a desperate man, increasingly isolated, struggling to find a means of hanging on to power even as he feels the noose contract.

Times are becoming more interesting for both us (of the broad West) and the Chinese.


----------



## Kirkhill

Crimean Vote Galvanizes Russian Separatists

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/crimea-vote-galvanizes-separatists-in-russia/496142.html

Russia Movements Towards Sovereignty

http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-11404.html

Particularly interesting is this 



> The enormous Republic of Sakha in north-central Siberia, rich in diamonds and other minerals, exemplifies the threat that secession poses to the Russian Federation. Sakha has declared that its local laws supersede those imposed from Moscow and that it will retain all revenues generated by the sale and use of its resources. The republic also has accepted substantial direct development investment from Japan and China. Many members of Sakha's Russian majority have sided with the indigenous population in supporting self-government or full independence. Experts believe that such regions as Sakha, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan theoretically have sufficient natural wealth to become viable independent entities. According to estimates, these regions' secession from the Russian Federation would deprive Russia of half of its oil, most of its diamonds, and much of its coal, as well as a substantial portion of such industries as automobile manufacturing.



taken together with these











And you clearly see the Ethnic Russians dying and the Non-Russians growing further and further away from Moscow.


----------



## tomahawk6

Considering tht Siberia is overrun with Chinese,Putin better look to the east and restore Russian control over its border.


----------



## Hisoyaki

What most in the West forget is that Putin has an 80% approval rate. If anything, the Crimean crisis have solidified popular support at home. I don't think his approval ratings ever dipped below 60% in his 10+ or so years in power. 

That was in spite of a 10 years insurgency in Chechnya that cost some 7000 casualties amongst Russian troops.

Plenty of dictators hold on to power in spite of bad economic conditions.

E.g. Iranian mullahs, Fidel Castro, Soviet Union, Hugo Chavez,etc.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Some good advice, in my opinion anyway, from Prof Stephen Sestanovich (Columbia University), in this opinion piece which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _New York Times_:

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/opinion/putins-reckless-gamble.html?_r=0


> Putin’s Reckless Gamble
> 
> By STEPHEN SESTANOVICH
> 
> MARCH 29, 2014
> 
> President Obama’s meetings with European leaders last week made clear how much they hoped Russia, having seized Crimea, would call off any further dismemberment of Ukraine. They may get their wish, whether or not President Vladimir V. Putin’s telephone call Friday to Mr. Obama bears diplomatic fruit. But to assure Ukraine’s survival, the United States and Europe need a more ambitious strategy. To avoid a new Cold War, we must learn the right lessons from the old one.
> 
> The best reason to think President Putin is in fact seeking a break in the action is that his policy to date has been one improvisation after another. For weeks, he urged Ukraine’s leaders to crack down on protesters. When doing so brought down the Ukrainian government and created still more disorder in Kiev, Mr. Putin’s original goal — to draw the whole country into his orbit — seemed hopelessly out of reach. His impulsive response — grabbing Crimea, the one piece of Ukraine already under de facto Russian control — has brought him a quick 10 percent jump in popularity at home (and given him a new tool, nationalist hysteria, with which to control dissent). It has also produced the most extreme international isolation Moscow has felt since Leonid I. Brezhnev invaded Afghanistan.
> 
> Mr. Putin needs a breather. If he forswears further territorial aims in Ukraine, he will get no early rollback of the sanctions Europe and America have imposed. But he can probably avoid new ones. So much discussion has focused on the risk of a Russian blitzkrieg into eastern Ukraine that, when it doesn’t happen, many Western policy makers will breathe a sigh of relief. Mr. Putin could then work to cool European and American indignation, and get our leaders bickering with one another about the next step. With that, he — and we — might think the worst was over.
> 
> Would it be? Russian actions have been so shocking that their impact will certainly linger. Mr. Putin has won himself a reputation as a wrecker of international norms. He’ll have to live with that for a while. Yet the real damage to Russian diplomacy goes far beyond the question of personal trust.
> 
> By undermining Ukrainian statehood, Mr. Putin has made it impossible to call off the crisis. Over more than 20 years, Ukraine’s leaders, however corrupt and incompetent, have been extremely responsible about the question of national unity. Despite ethnic resentment and suspicion, they never contemplated breaking up the country. This was the third rail of Ukrainian politics, and very few were willing to touch it. Secession was taboo.
> 
> Now Mr. Putin has put the question of a breakup on the national agenda. And it can’t easily be taken off. Fractious nationalism — not invasion — is Ukraine’s real vulnerability. Even without a grand plan to dismember his neighbor, Mr. Putin has recklessly whipped up patriotic sentiment and groups on both sides of the border. Such forces have a life of their own. Moscow may offer separatists in eastern Ukraine active support or mere rhetoric. Either way, the threat is a permanent one. As in Crimea, Mr. Putin can turn the “protection of Russian speakers” into outright aggression almost overnight.
> 
> To limit this danger, the United States and Europe have to address Ukraine’s many weaknesses. Economic success is important; American loan guarantees, the International Monetary Fund’s new $18 billion stabilization program and the opening of the European Union’s market will help.
> 
> But the problem goes beyond matters of trade, currency or economic growth. It goes beyond even the issues of corruption and the rule of law. Ukraine’s institutions function poorly across the board, from its military to its police and border guards, from local government to political parties. When ethnic resentments were under control, this poor performance didn’t matter. Now it could produce a new crisis.
> 
> American policy has rarely excelled at “nation building.” Even the rigors of European Union accession, or of I.M.F. assistance, which demand reform and modernization, offer no surefire solution. In Europe and America, budgets are tight and attention spans short. But unless our policy makers understand the huge scope of the problem, they will someday wake up to discover Ukraine’s viability at risk again.
> 
> No one wants to revive the Cold War. But it offers lessons for today. In the 1940s, the authors of “containment” saw nation building as the key to success. They wanted to check Russian power without war, and believed that across Western Europe, once viable societies were so deeply divided that they might not survive. Those nations’ political and economic models, like Ukraine’s today, were broken. They would not hold together without what Dean Acheson called “the added power and energy of America.”
> 
> What made “containment” successful was not the infliction of pain on the Soviet Union. The heart of American policy was to revive, stabilize and integrate countries on our side of the line. Yes, we worried that Stalin had been able to bring down the government in Prague. We worried even more that he might do so in Rome and Paris. Successful nation building eventually dispelled those fears. In time, even Eastern Europe got its chance to build successful pluralist societies, but only because years earlier Western Europe had done the same.
> 
> A policy that saw the parallels between the dangers of the ’40s and those of today would never — ever — accept the annexation of Crimea. But it would not make reversing it the most urgent goal. Our real challenge is to keep Mr. Putin from any temptation to break up one of the biggest countries in Europe. It may take years, even decades, of effort, just as it did from the 1940s on, to know whether our policy has succeeded. Unless it does, we will face a far more dangerous crisis than the one over Crimea.
> 
> ----------
> Stephen Sestanovich, a professor of international diplomacy at Columbia University, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the United States ambassador at large for the former Soviet Union from 1997 to 2001, is the author of “_Maximalist: America in the World From Truman to Obama_.”




I think Prof Sestanovich has the big things about right: we don't want, certainly don't need, a new "cold war;" Europe, large parts of it, remains, as it was in the 1940s, weak and disorganized; _containment_ works; and Russia is not anywhere near as powerful nor as capable as we might frighten ourselves into believing.


----------



## Kirkhill

Some other graphics to ponder:

The border shared by Kazakhstan, Russia, China and Mongolia on the Altai






Population Density






And below my own contribution.

To the west of aging Moscow is aging Europe.  To the south is the Turko-Scythian insurgency (to include the Uighurs of China's Xinjiang province - and the equally restive Buddhist province of Tibet in China).  To the east is a younger, more ethnically diverse population where even the Russians are not particularly tied to Moscow (forcible relocations, inmates of the Gulag and Gulag guards put some pressures on their patriotism, I am sure).  

Throughout Russia proper are many locations where the authority of Moscow is challenged.   In the far east Japan and China are bypassing Moscow and talking to the locals to make their own investment deals directly.  And in the 90's the direct route to Vladivostock and the Magadan ran through Seattle and past Sarah Palin's backyard.

Vlad may have an 80% approval rating but this is likely concentrated in the same way that Marois's support is concentrated.

One of his problem's is that his strongest support comes from Rus of Moscow and pensioners.   The farther from Moscow the weaker his support - and he is not likely to get large numbers of pensioners to resettle to the East to increase his hold in that territory.

Russia's East is like Joel Garreau's Empty Quarter - resource rich, people poor, and a puzzle to the pensioners of the Blue State cities that suckle from it.


----------



## a_majoor

Hisoyaki said:
			
		

> What most in the West forget is that Putin has an 80% approval rate. If anything, the Crimean crisis have solidified popular support at home. I don't think his approval ratings ever dipped below 60% in his 10+ or so years in power.
> 
> That was in spite of a 10 years insurgency in Chechnya that cost some 7000 casualties amongst Russian troops.
> 
> Plenty of dictators hold on to power in spite of bad economic conditions.
> 
> E.g. Iranian mullahs, Fidel Castro, Soviet Union, Hugo Chavez,etc.



If you read history carefully, you will see lots of seemingly invincible dictatorships and authoratarian governments which lasted for a long time, but then suddenly crumbled like dust. The former USSR is, in fact one of these regimes.

The problem is that these regimes are brittle and rigid. So long as the stresses (internal or external) are low enough, or within limits, they can resist much like a structural element in a building or a car. However, like a structural element which is repeatedly stressed, it develops faults or accumulates stress unevenly, which can result in a catastrophic failure later when new or different stressors arise.

They can't even releave the stress through innovation or growth, since these are direct threats to the regime in power and whatever support base it has (think of crony capitalists and then multiply by 10), and generally, htese sorts of regimes cannot reatact quicly to many tipes of events because they are centralized regimes and suffer from the "Local Knowledge Problem" (where local actors can react to fleeting opportunities, while the time it takes to communicate the event, process it, issue directives and take action via central command and control means the opportunity is gone before the action takes place).

So Putin might have solid "approval" ratings, and appear strong, but who knows where the hidden fault line is, or what will trigger it? Very few people predicted the total collapse of the USSR how or when it happened (the event was totally dumbfounding for most), and if/when Putin or Russia go down, it will seem similarly surprising.


----------



## vonGarvin

Facta non verba. Russia has a growing birth rate, sits on Europe's supply of gas, has a military that is no paper tiger, and has clout whether we like it or not.  
What they don't have is crippling debt, nor is their GDP less than the little debt they do have.
We can talk about how the rotten structure is about to collapse all we want, but more and more it sounds like what the Germans were saying about the USSR in 1941.
They get and understand force like we do. If we want to contain them, then park a carrier battlegroup in international waters in the Baltic,  in the Arctic near Murmansk, in the Black Sea and one in the Pacific off of Vladivostok.  Then politely ask them to dial down the rhetoric. And by "them", I mean Ukraine.


----------



## Kirkhill

Russia has a growing birth rate..... but it is in the East and highest amongst the "subject peoples".

Russia sits on Europe's supply of gas .... currently and Europe doesn't like it and China wants it

Russia has a military that is no paper tiger .... but it is not what it used to was

Russia has clout.... stipulated without contention

Russia doesn't have crippling debt .... but it needs cash flow to convert gas into pensions and tanks

Our problems will not be solved by waiting for Russia to collapse.  It will get more dangerous before that happens.  

Equally we are not equipped materially or psychologically to go invading Eurasia.  What happens there will happen and we will adapt, adjust and accomodate - or be silly buggers and go broke.

They do indeed understand force - but only if we actually intend to allow people to start squeezing triggers when "red lines" are crossed.  

No indication of that to date.

And no, I don't propose turning my back on any man or woman that chooses to decide their own fate.  So long as they keep their fist away from my nose.

More thoughts from Sakha:



> With the demise of the Soviet Union, Sakha, like the rest of the vast country, underwent a wrenching transition. *The leaders of the Republic tried to take advantage of the confusion to realize their long-standing desire for independence, and therefore declared Yakutia’s sovereignty in 1991*. Such a declaration had little significance, but during the rest of the decade Sakha did achieve an unaccustomed degree of political and economic autonomy. By the late 1990s, John Tichotsky could write that, “In the area of regional sovereignty, Sakha is the leader among all of Russia’s political units” (p. 227).
> 
> Source: http://www.geocurrents.info/place/russia-ukraine-and-caucasus/siberia/sakha-yakutia-since-the-fall-of-the-soviet-union#ixzz2xUbToM5S





> *The post-Soviet transition also brought major economic changes. Industrial production plummeted*; according to Tichotsky, of all Soviet regions only Kamchatka experienced a greater decline. *Personal income dropped as well, and the average life expectancy slipped by three years*. As state farms were broken up and herds privatized, livestock was slaughtered with abandon, temporarily increasing meat consumption. But as Tichotsky also specifies, *Sakha experienced a more rapid economic recovery than the other parts of the former Soviet Union. Driven mainly by diamond mining,* the republic matched and then surpassed its previous level of economic output. In 1995, almost half of its industrial production derived from diamond mining. *Currently, Sakha is considerably richer than Russia as a whole on the basis of per capita GRP (Gross Regional Product), with 2009 figures of $18,955 and $12,339 respectively*. But such apparent wealth by no means benefits all the people of Sakha. As is true elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, the end the communist system generated both winners and losers. Pensioners in particular have suffered, as their allotments have failed to keep pace with inflation.
> 
> Source: http://www.geocurrents.info/place/russia-ukraine-and-caucasus/siberia/sakha-yakutia-since-the-fall-of-the-soviet-union#ixzz2xUbiLKpN





> *The end of the Soviet system also resulted in the demographic transformation of Yakutia*. In 1989, *the Sakha were a minority within their own republic*, accounting for *thirty-three percent of the region’s total population*, as opposed to the *fifty-seven percent constituted by Russians and Ukrainians*. As can be seen in the Wikipedia graph posted here, *the Russian population dropped sharply after the political transition*, as large numbers of Russians abandoned the harsh land of Yakutia in favor of larger cities and milder climes  (interpolation - like Crimea). At the same time, *the Sakha  ethnic population continued to grown, due mainly to a relatively high birth rate*. *This trend continues*: according to the 2002 census, the Sakha then numbered 432,290, constituting 45.5 percent of the republic’s population; in 2010, they totaled 466,492, coming in at 49.9 percent. *Other indigenous ethnic groups also expanded in the same period*; the Evenks, for example, increased from 18,232 to 21,008 and the Yukaghirs from 1,097 to 1,281. *Russians, Ukrainians and Tatars, on the other hand, all registered population declines* in the republic from 2002 to 2010.
> 
> Source: http://www.geocurrents.info/place/russia-ukraine-and-caucasus/siberia/sakha-yakutia-since-the-fall-of-the-soviet-union#ixzz2xUbx26vb



Just as the American Southwest is changing,  and the influence of the Canadian East is diminishing so are Russia's fates changing for exactly the same reasons - Demographics.

As stated earlier - Russia is not yet the Ottoman Empire.  She's not that sick.  And the Ottoman's never had nukes.  Russia is going to be more dangerous than the Ottomans ever were.

But it doesn't strike me as a gesture of strength to be parking IRBMTBMs (Iskanders) in the Orenburg corridor between recently separated and unsupportive Kazakhstan and a bunch of restive oblasts with ethnic connections to the Kazakhs.  That Corridor is the gateway past the Urals to the Far East.

Edit:  My error on the Iskanders - 500 Km with the SS26 - 2000 km when launching P500 cruise missiles.

What are they going to use those missiles on?  Turks on ponies?


----------



## vonGarvin

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> And no, I don't propose turning my back on any man or woman that chooses to decide their own fate.  So long as they keep their fist away from my nose.



So, you support the Crimeans then?  (I know I do)

Edit to add: if they voted to be part of Poland, then so be it.  They aren't my concern, and they voted to join Russia, who said "Okay".  The fact that the Black Sea Fleet is moored there, and that the Not Russian Army (NRA) was there, probably didn't hurt things either.


----------



## vonGarvin

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Russia has a growing birth rate..... but it is in the East and highest amongst the "subject peoples".


Still rising.  Ours is dropping, below replacement rate.  Denmark is trying to get its people to start fucking again. At least to stop using contraceptives.


			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Russia sits on Europe's supply of gas .... currently and Europe doesn't like it and China wants it


possession is 9/10ths and all that


			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Russia has a military that is no paper tiger .... but it is not what it used to was


I would argue that it's leaner and more effective than the old Soviet Army.  Its actions in Georgia and now in Crimea have been very well-run.


			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Russia has clout.... stipulated without contention
> 
> Russia doesn't have crippling debt .... but it needs cash flow to convert gas into pensions and tanks


True.  And it has starving customers in Europe (for now, anyway)


			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Our problems will not be solved by waiting for Russia to collapse.  It will get more dangerous before that happens.


Hopefully it remains *just stable enough* to not collapse...


			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Equally we are not equipped materially or psychologically to go invading Eurasia.  What happens there will happen and we will adapt, adjust and accomodate - or be silly buggers and go broke.


Agreed.  And I would argue that it's going to get much worse (for us) and be silly.  I hope I'm wrong, but I fear I'm not.


			
				Kirkhill said:
			
		

> They do indeed understand force - but only if we actually intend to allow people to start squeezing triggers when "red lines" are crossed.
> 
> No indication of that to date.


Agreed.  Sadly.


----------



## Kirkhill

My big concern is how we manage the next 5 to 10 years during which Europe can transition off Russian Gas -  the prices the Euros are paying for electricity (35 to 40 cents per kWH) and gas (20 USD per GJ) will allow them to import LNG from us and the Yanks, build pipelines across the Med and Black Sea and develop their own Shale and UCG industries.

During that time Russia will feel the pinch in cash flow, and lose influence in Europe.  The might offset the loss of cash with Chinese cash but will they offset the loss of influence?


----------



## tomahawk6

If Libya stabilizes Europe will once again have a reliable source of energy.Throw in the huge gas field that the Israelis are developing and Russia may lose its leverage.


----------



## Kirkhill

Technoviking said:
			
		

> So, you support the Crimeans then?  (I know I do)
> 
> Edit to add: if they voted to be part of Poland, then so be it.  They aren't my concern, and they voted to join Russia, who said "Okay".  The fact that the Black Sea Fleet is moored there, and that the Not Russian Army (NRA) was there, probably didn't hurt things either.



To be honest....occasionally I find it necessary....  I don't have anything against the Crimeans deciding to join Russia.   But... It was done in an unseemly manner, in the wrong sequence and with external intervention.

Had they done it according to international norms (say in the manner of Gibraltar and Falklands) I would not have had any cause for complaint.   But Argies holding Marines hostage and running the polls with the Falkland Islanders boycotting the referendum.... I'm not so sure I would accept that outcome.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _The Economist_ is a useful _infographic_ for those considering Europe's thirst for Russia's gas:


----------



## a_majoor

Russia continues to make bold moves to capitalise on the inaction of the American led *West*. I suspect some of this activity is driven more by a need to make Russia stronger in relation to her continental neighbours, particularly the Islamic crescent and China rather than just poking a stick in Obama's eye. Having the economic ability to pull strings on Tehran makes Iran a useful puppet to keep the ME destabilized and offer a threat to others when it suits Russia's needs:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/blog/2014/04/07/russia-to-bust-the-iran-sanctions-regime/



> *Russia to Bust the Iran Sanctions Regime?*
> 
> Western leaders appear to have found themselves something resembling a strategy for dealing with Vladimir Putin: hit him with sanctions while providing him with face-saving way of de-escalating the situation in Ukraine. Unfortunately for the West, Putin seems to have other plans:
> 
> 
> As nuclear negotiations continue this week in Vienna, Moscow appears poised to openly flaunt the U.S.-led Iran sanctions regime. The move could undermine the Obama administration’s assurances that neither the Crimea crisis nor the recent de-escalation of sanctions would undercut U.S. leverage in its nuclear negotiations with Iran. [...]
> 
> The proposed deal, worth possibly $20 billion, would include Russian purchases of up to 500,000 bpd of Iranian oil—boosting Iranian exports by as much as 50% from levels permitted to Iran under the Geneva interim nuclear agreement—in exchange for Russian equipment and goods. The deal would ease further pressure on Iran’s battered energy sector and at least partially restore Iran’s access to oil customers with Russian help. There is further reason for concern that such a scheme could provide a channel for the transfer of sanctioned nuclear equipment or military hardware to Iran, not to mention other illicit financial transactions.
> 
> Combined with the announcement by Transnistrian separatists that they will not be attending the next round of talks with Moldova and the latest unrest in Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Lugansk (all of which provide more excuses for Putin to send his forces into Ukraine), a negotiated solution with Russia looks increasingly like a pipe dream. On the contrary, Putin is aiming to cause problems for the United States across the board.
> 
> Maybe it’s time to come up with a real Russia policy.


----------



## pbi

Here is an interesting piece by George Friedman of STRATFOR, in Geopolitical Weekly, addressing US defence policy since the Maidan Revolt in Kyiv:

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/us-defense-policy-wake-ukrainian-affair?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20140408&utm_term=Gweekly&utm_content=readmore


----------



## a_majoor

pbi said:
			
		

> Here is an interesting piece by George Friedman of STRATFOR, in Geopolitical Weekly, addressing US defence policy since the Maidan Revolt in Kyiv:
> 
> http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/us-defense-policy-wake-ukrainian-affair?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20140408&utm_term=Gweekly&utm_content=readmore



Halford Mackinder lives!

This article could also be posted in the Grand Strategy for a Divided America thread as well.


----------



## Kirkhill

"Give me a place to stand on  and a lever long enough and I will move the world".  Archimedes.

The closer you get to the fulcrum the shorter the lever gets and the harder it is to exert influence.    Try standing in the middle of a teeter-totter and stop the teeter-tottering.

Russia exists at the fulcrum of the teeter-totter.  It is easier for things to be done to it than it is for it to do things.  

Put it another way - without lots of cash to buy influence it is terminally f*cked.


----------



## pbi

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> "Give me a place to stand on  and a lever long enough and I will move the world".  Archimedes.
> 
> The closer you get to the fulcrum the shorter the lever gets and the harder it is to exert influence.    Try standing in the middle of a teeter-totter and stop the teeter-tottering.
> 
> Russia exists at the fulcrum of the teeter-totter.  It is easier for things to be done to it than it is for it to do things.
> 
> Put it another way - without lots of cash to buy influence it is terminally ******.



I'm not sure. You might ask the Poles, Balts, Rumanians and other small countries in Putin's "'hood": even a cash--strapped Russia might still be frightening for them: maybe even more so if it's impending financial ruin, combined with the usual collection of unpleasant Russian national traits such as rabid nationalism, bully tendencies and xenophobia (underlain by a secret jealousy and frustration that they can never quite "get" modern Western society as well as some others do...), provoke it do do some dangerous thing in desperation or as a show of force.

I've slagged them quite a bit on these pages, but in seriousness it may be a dangerous mistake to underestimate them.


----------



## Kirkhill

I don't underestimate them.  Nor, I am sure do their neighbours.  The Poles in particular are taking this situation seriously.  They have been steadily building their own military and reaching out to the rest of Russia's neighbours - offering an agricultural programme here, an industrial programme there.

They are creating their own net of bilateral agreements in the area - all the way from the Baltic to the Black Sea.  I don't think they will wait for NATO to come and save them this time.  They have seen that movie recently.

With respect to Russia's activity - I believe that that proves the point.  Russia, like the man on the teeter totter, has to be constantly active, constantly expending energy, just to maintain its balance.  It doesn't feel it has the luxury of just sitting back and letting the world go by.  If it isn't acting it is being acted upon.... Hence my previous crude expression of its condition.

The problem with that is that Russia is as likely to over-react as react appropriately ... or at least the people leading her.


----------



## Edward Campbell

I just saw this:





Caption: "Allow me to give you a glimpse inside my mind & personality,"
says Vladimir Putin

I have frequently read reports that many, many Russians yearn for a new Stalin. They think that Stalin represented the zenith of Russian achievement: defeating the hated Germans, building the bombs, setting Russia (the USSR, of course) on the path to the stars and so on. They willfully ignore _how_ those things happened but they remember, or think they do, anyway, that they did happen and Russia was *great*.


----------



## vonGarvin

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I just saw this:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Caption: "Allow me to give you a glimpse inside my mind & personality,"
> says Vladimir Putin
> 
> I have frequently read reports that many, many Russians yearn for a new Stalin. They think that Stalin represented the zenith of Russian achievement: defeating the hated Germans, building the bombs, setting Russia (the USSR, of course) on the path to the stars and so on. They willfully ignore _how_ those things happened but they remember, or think they do, anyway, that they did happen and Russia was *great*.



I think he's one step further back: the Russian Empire of old.  Stalin was (officially) atheist and all that, while Putin (et al) appear to be embracing the Russian Orthodox Church.  No matter what it is, Russians seem to be yearning for a Czar.  And Putin seems to know this quite well.  His image betrays that:


----------



## a_majoor

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> I don't underestimate them.  Nor, I am sure do their neighbours.  The Poles in particular are taking this situation seriously.  They have been steadily building their own military and reaching out to the rest of Russia's neighbours - offering an agricultural programme here, an industrial programme there.
> 
> They are creating their own net of bilateral agreements in the area - all the way from the Baltic to the Black Sea.  I don't think they will wait for NATO to come and save them this time.  They have seen that movie recently.
> 
> With respect to Russia's activity - I believe that that proves the point.  Russia, like the man on the teeter totter, has to be constantly active, constantly expending energy, just to maintain its balance.  It doesn't feel it has the luxury of just sitting back and letting the world go by.  If it isn't acting it is being acted upon.... Hence my previous crude expression of its condition.
> 
> The problem with that is that Russia is as likely to over-react as react appropriately ... or at least the people leading her.



The Poles are a logical choice to lead a "Central European Zone", having the largest and most "organized" state, as well as being wary of both the Russians to the East and the Germans to the West. Culturally, the linkage with Central European nations from the Baltic to the Black Sea also makes more sense than (say) reaching to the Nordic nations, the German Zone, the "Latin Zone", Britain or the Balkans.

I suspect that in the long term, the EUZone will become much more polarized between these various factions, even if the EU itself continues to exist as a sort of shadow of its former self (the various regional blocks will probably work to sharply limit the powers of the EU Parliament and bureaucracy, for example). While Obama may joke about the '80's calling for their foreign policy back, in the real world 19th century "balance of power" is reasserting itself.


----------



## pbi

> I have frequently read reports that many, many Russians yearn for a new Stalin. They think that Stalin represented the zenith of Russian achievement: defeating the hated Germans, building the bombs, setting Russia (the USSR, of course) on the path to the stars and so on. They willfully ignore how those things happened but they remember, or think they do, anyway, that they did happen and Russia was great.





> I think he's one step further back: the Russian Empire of old.  Stalin was (officially) atheist and all that, while Putin (et al) appear to be embracing the Russian Orthodox Church.  No matter what it is, Russians seem to be yearning for a Czar.  And Putin seems to know this quite well.  His image betrays that



I think you are both right. My gut feeling is that "democracy" is meaningless rubbish and confusion to most Russians. They yearn, secretly or openly, for the "Father King" figure. That, I think , is when they are at their happiest. Combine this with what I think is a deep-running streak of brutality and willful ignorance in their society, and you don't get anything nice.



> The Poles are a logical choice to lead a "Central European Zone", having the largest and most "organized" state, as well as being wary of both the Russians to the East and the Germans to the West. Culturally, the linkage with Central European nations from the Baltic to the Black Sea also makes more sense than (say) reaching to the Nordic nations, the German Zone, the "Latin Zone", Britain or the Balkans.



This would be an interesting return to Polish pre-WWII foreign policy that sought to establish a "Third Europe" of  Eastern states led (of course...) by Warsaw. They saw this a necessary balance against Germany in the West and the USSR in the East, without having to rely too much on external guarantors like France or Britain.

In 2008 I attended a Corps exercise in western Poland. The enemy was very clearly Russia. The Poles envisioned losing the eastern part of their country, then falling back on successive river lines until NATO could help them, but clearly carrying the brunt of the fight on their own.


----------



## George Wallace

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I think he's one step further back: the Russian Empire of old.  Stalin was (officially) atheist and all that, while Putin (et al) appear to be embracing the Russian Orthodox Church.  No matter what it is, Russians seem to be yearning for a Czar.  And Putin seems to know this quite well.  His image betrays that:




Putin is definitely a Type A personality.  With his numerous bare-chested photo ops and his affiliation with the Nochniye Volki (the Night Wolves) biker group and the Russian chapters of Hells Angels.  I think you may be heading down the right avenue.  Stalin, not doubt, considered himself as the 'Czar', if not by name.  Putin and Bikers photos would tend to indicate that he wants to show affiliations with all classes of Russians, especially the classes other than the 'upper more mobile', yet still hold the reign of power over all.  He definitely knows how to control how his image is portrayed.


----------



## Kirkhill

In 1917 the Russian war effort collapsed amid bread riots.  In 1918 Germans gave up when they were reduced to eating turnips.


New York Times Article



> Russia Economy Worsens Even Before Sanctions Hit
> By DAVID M. HERSZENHORNAPRIL 16, 2014
> 
> MOSCOW — Margarita R. Zobnina, a professor of marketing here, has been watching the Russian economy’s gathering woes with mounting alarm: friends who have moved abroad with no plans to return; others who put off new business ventures because of rising uncertainty. Meanwhile, Ms. Zobnina and her husband, Alexander, also a professor, have rented a safe deposit box to hold foreign cash as a hedge against the declining ruble.
> 
> Most shocking, she says, is that her local grocery is now selling anchovies packed in sunflower oil rather than olive oil, an obvious response to the soaring cost of imports. “That really freaks me out,” she said.
> 
> While the annexation of Crimea has rocketed President Vladimir V. Putin’s approval rating to more than 80 percent, it has also contributed to a sobering downturn in Russia’s economy that appears to be worsening even before Western sanctions take full effect. With inflation rising, growth stagnating, the ruble and stock market plunging, and billions in capital fleeing the country for safety, the economy is teetering on the edge of recession, as the country’s minister of economic development acknowledged on Wednesday.
> 
> Mr. Putin, who just lavished $50 billion on the Sochi Olympics, also must absorb the costs of integrating Crimea, which economists and other experts say has its own sickly economy and expensive infrastructure needs. The economic costs have been masked by recent patriotic fervor but could soon haunt the Kremlin, as prices rise, wages stall and consumer confidence erodes.
> 
> Even before the Crimean episode, and the resulting imposition of sanctions by the West, Russia’s $2 trillion economy was suffering from stagflation, that toxic mix of stagnant growth and high inflation typically accompanied by a spike in unemployment. In Russia, joblessness remains low, but only because years of population decline have produced a shrunken, inadequate labor force.
> 
> In recent weeks, international and Russian banks have slashed their growth projections for 2014, with the World Bank saying the economy could shrink by 1.8 percent if the West imposes more sanctions over Ukraine. By some accounts, more than $70 billion in capital has fled the country so far this year and the main stock market index fell by 10 percent in March — and a dizzying 3 percent just on Tuesday over fears of greater Russian involvement in Ukraine.
> 
> “This is our fee of sorts for conducting an independent foreign policy,” Aleksei L. Kudrin, a former Russian finance minister, said at a recent investor conference in Moscow. He added that the sanctions and the fallout from Mr. Putin’s foreign policy moves would drain hundreds of billions of dollars from the national economy and strangle growth for the remainder of the year.
> 
> But Mr. Kudrin, who quit his post in a dispute over the Kremlin’s economic policies, said the population had yet to confront the full bill, which he predicted would grow as a result of the steep costs of absorbing Crimea, a geographically isolated peninsula. “Society has not yet seen the final result, and that will be when this puts the brakes on real incomes,” he said. “For now, society accepts this fee.”
> 
> From a textbook perspective, the deep-rooted ills in Russia’s economy have been clear for years: The decade-long skyrocketing in energy prices that buoyed Mr. Putin’s popularity has flatlined, exposing the country’s dangerous over-reliance on revenues from oil and natural gas. Efforts to diversify into manufacturing, high technology and other sectors have failed, and officials have been unable, or unwilling, to stop the rampant, corrosive corruption that scares off foreign investors.
> 
> Consumer demand, which had been a primary driver of the Russian economy in recent years, stalled hard in 2013. Surveys by the Levada Center, Russia’s only independent polling institute, show that consumer sentiment has been on a slow, steady decline since 2010, while fears of inflation — especially rising prices for basic necessities, which have persisted since the 1990s — have grown along with new anxiety about a potential drop in wages or rising unemployment.
> 
> “If you want to open your eyes, you would admit that it is a slow, downward trend of social optimism and consumer optimism,” said Marina Krasilnikova, who leads income and consumer research for the Levada Center.
> 
> “The situation with Ukraine and Crimea has resulted in patriotic and imperialistic optimism,” Ms. Krasilnikova said. But, she added, “this optimism will not last long.”
> 
> Some analysts said that Russia’s annexation of Crimea had proved that Mr. Putin puts politics ahead of reasonable economic decisions, and that there was little reason for economic optimism, particularly given his inward, xenophobic turn, including his vow to create Russia’s own cashless pay systems and even its own credit rating agency so it would not have to rely on the global financial system.
> 
> Miljenko Horvat, a private equity investor who ran Citibank’s office in Russia in the 1990s, said that Russia had simply failed to make itself economically relevant beyond its energy supplies.
> 
> Mr. Horvat, who now lives in Vancouver, British Columbia, said that he often challenged his Russian friends by making the following point: “I wake up in the morning and drink coffee from a machine made by a Swiss company, Nescafé. I wear something that was designed in France or Italy but probably made in Turkey. I get into a German car, look at a Korean phone, use a computer that was designed in California but made in Japan or Korea. Russia just doesn’t touch me in my daily life. It just doesn’t matter. It’s just not relevant. So where is the economic engine going to come from?”
> 
> Mr. Horvat said that he had lived in Russia through defaults in 1991, 1993 and 1998 and that he expected another one. “I am not long in Russia,” he said, invoking the financial term for betting on a rising stock, “neither in my portfolio, nor in life.”
> 
> Given the recent turmoil, a catastrophe has been averted so far largely because the price of oil has remained stubbornly high, at nearly $110 per barrel of Brent crude on Wednesday, even as production steadily rises in the United States. For now, that has kept the federal budget in decent shape with still no deficit projected for the year.
> 
> But even without a shock, it is not clear how Russia will manage to climb out of the current quagmire. Stagflation is among the most confounding economic problems that policy makers can face, and officials here seem flummoxed, with the Central Bank, Finance Ministry and Economics Ministry urging contradictory steps.
> 
> Last month, the bank raised its key interest rate to 7 percent from 5.5 percent to combat inflation and support the ruble, a step that could slow growth. Meanwhile, the Economics Ministry, worried about growth, favors borrowing and government spending as a stimulus and to reduce capital flight, a possibly inflationary strategy that is opposed by the Finance Ministry, which wants to keep debt low and reserve funds available to weather any unexpected drop in oil prices.
> 
> 
> “All of them have their clear priorities, and they stick to their priorities,” said Alexei Deviatov, the chief economist for Uralsib Capital, an investment bank here, “and there is very little coordination between these authorities.”
> 
> While Russian and global investors and businesses have been moving billions of dollars out of Russia to places perceived as less risky, it is not just money that is fleeing. Ms. Zobnina, who teaches at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, said that one of her classmates had left for the United States after college 10 years ago, and that another friend followed three years ago to pursue a Ph.D., with no plans to return. Still another friend, a journalist, moved to London last summer with her husband and three children.
> 
> Ms. Zobnina, 32, said that she and her husband, 30, were thinking about finding posts in Europe or the United States, and for now were keeping their savings in dollars and euros. In an interview, she conceded that putting cash in a safe deposit box hardly amounted to sophisticated financial planning, particularly for two economics professors.
> 
> “It’s absolutely not rational to prefer safe box than deposit because you lose interest,” she said. “But in this unpredictable situation, when the ruble is falling and banks are unstable — and who knows when we’ll be cut off from the global financial system or which bank will be next to be closed — it’s better to have this small bird in hand.”


----------



## Edward Campbell

_The Economist_ gets it about right on this week's cover:


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Now a little humour break.


----------



## pbi

You know what's funny, and a bit weird?

Go on the CBC.ca news site, and look up the latest article about the Ukraine/Russia situation. Look at the blog comments that, based on their similar content and fractured English, are almost certainly originating in Russia, possibly in an organized effort.


----------



## vonGarvin

pbi said:
			
		

> Go on the CBC.ca news site, and look up the latest article about the Ukraine/Russia situation. Look at the blog comments that, based on their similar content and fractured English, are almost certainly originating in Russia, possibly in an organized effort.


Could very well be.

Edit to add:


Here's a quote:



> After CIA director visit Kyiv, few days after Ukraine announce anti-terrorist operations which failed dismally and now the US vice president visited Kyiv and again after he left they announce another anti-terrorist operation. That gives suggestion that US want another war to keep the economy going and they forgot that Ukraine military is in disarray and demoralized unless US/ NATO sends their own man in the front line of this anti-Ukraine operation.



The grammar is off enough on this to suggest it's of Slavic origin: lack of definite articles especially in some spots.


----------



## pbi

That's the very quote I was looking at this AM. 

There seem to be several "repeat offenders" (or one person using several screen names). They generally harp on the same themes, with the same bad English. One I saw yesterday was a bit ominous (although probably a crackpot): he was rambling on about creating a "free Germany". The last time Russia was involved in Germany it wasn't very free, IIRC.

Occasionally they launch their rant-bombs in threads where the connection to the subject heading is either very thin, or non-existent. They might be keying on certain indicator words in the articles and posting accordingly, whether their post is actually relevant or not. 

Or maybe they're just dumb.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Two reports, this morning, that illustrate the complexity of Russia's natural resource wealth and the ties it creates:

     1. The _Financial Times_ reports that "Gazprom said it was taking action to mitigate the impact of possible further western sanctions as it reported a 7 per cent drop in net profit last year ...
         the Russian state gas giant, the world's largest producer of natural gas, highlighted its plans to expand sales in Asia and said it was adopting incentives to encourage local sourcing among its suppliers and contractors, as
         it flagged the "material adverse effect" that any sanctions on the group would have ... Gazprom said that European plans to increase diversity of energy suppliers and move gas markets away from long-term contracts "may
         disrupt the balance of demand and supply in the European gas market and have unpredictable implications, including threaten energy security of importing countries" ... nonetheless, it highlighted its plans to increase supplies to Asia.
         The company hopes to sign a long-term supply contract with China next month when Russian president Vladimir Putin visits the country."

     2. The _Wall Street Journal_ reports that  "Former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder celebrated his 70th birthday with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg Monday evening, as the U.S. and European Union stepped up sanctions against
          Moscow over its handling of the Ukraine crisis ... the meeting took place during a birthday reception organized by Mr. Schroeder’s employer Nord Stream AG, a pipeline operator controlled by Russian gas giant OAO Gazprom ...
          The meeting between Mr. Schroeder and Mr. Putin highlights divisions in Germany over Chancellor Merkel’s tough line against the Kremlin. Mr. Schroeder and former chancellor Helmut Schmidt, both Social Democrats, have repeatedly
          criticized the West’s handling of the crisis and its treatment of Mr. Putin over past weeks ... [and] Mr. Schroeder’s birthday reception was also attended by Erwin Sellering, the governor of the German state of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania,
          which is organizing a “Russia Day” to be held in the state in September."


----------



## CougarKing

If Russia aims to flex its muscles militarily in this century, they have to wean themselves from the dependence on Ukrainian spare parts for some types of their military equipment as mentioned in the Ukraine-Crimea crisis thread below:

Russian military needs Ukrainian spare parts; Kiev's arms embargo may cripple the Kremlin

Or perhaps Chinese arms companies like NORINCO may see an opportunity to sell Russia reverse-engineered versions of those spare parts?  ;D


----------



## Edward Campbell

Russia flexes another muscle, one which the USA has (foolishly) allowed to atrophy, according to this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Financial Times_:

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9338626e-dab7-11e3-8273-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz31dMNOgQw


> Russia moves to oust US from International Space Station
> 
> By Kathrin Hille in Moscow and Robert Wright in New York
> 
> Last updated: May 13, 2014
> 
> Russia is to deny the US use of the International Space Station beyond 2020 and will bar export of critical rocket engines to the US, in a move that has highlighted American dependence on Russian space technology.
> 
> Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy prime minister, announced the measures in response to US sanctions against a series of Russian companies and officials over the Ukraine crisis.
> 
> The twin moves against the space and satellite programmes represent one high-tech niche in which Moscow believes it has leverage over the US.
> 
> Mr Rogozin pointed out that, following the US’s retirement of its space shuttle fleet amid National Aeronautics and Space Administration cuts in 2011, the US was no longer able to send astronauts to the station on its own.
> 
> “The Russian segment of the ISS can exist independently from the US one, but the US segment cannot exist independently from the Russian one,” Mr Rogozin said.
> 
> The effective ban on exports of MK-33 and RD-180 rocket motors could be of greater significance to the US. The RD-180 powers the Atlas rocket used by the United Launch Alliance joint venture between Boeing and Lockheed Martin which puts the US’s most sensitive military satellites into orbit.
> 
> Mr Rogozin said the exports could continue if the US gave guarantees that the motors would not be used to launch military satellites. But, given ULA’s critical role in the US’s military satellite programme, such guarantees look unlikely.
> 
> “At the moment, US national security launches are heavily dependent on access to the Russian engine,” Loren Thompson, an analyst at the Virginia-based Lexington Institute, said.
> 
> As Moscow’s stand-off with Ukraine escalated in recent months into the worst falling-out with the west since the Cold War, both US and Russian diplomats had noted that the two powers continued to “do business” pragmatically in areas of global significance. “Space is obviously no longer part of that,” said one western diplomat.
> 
> Washington last month decided to revoke export licences for technology goods that can be used militarily by Russia and to refuse to extend new ones. Washington is also considering new restrictions on the export of high-tech equipment to develop Russia’s energy resources.
> 
> Moscow’s move against the ISS came in the form of a rejection of a US request to use the station beyond 2020. The ISS, jointly maintained by several countries, has been continuously manned by rotating missions for more than 13 years and is used for research, some of which is considered vital for further space exploration.
> 
> The move over the rocket motors comes after SpaceX, the space venture of Elon Musk, founder of Tesla Motors, asked a federal court to bar the ULA from buying RD-180 motors. SpaceX said the purchases breached US sanctions against Mr Rogozin, who is also head of Russia’s space programme. SpaceX, which already carries out some launches of less sensitive satellites for the US government, does not use Russian engines and would like to break into launching the most sensitive satellites.
> 
> ULA said neither it nor NPO Energomash, its Russian supplier, had been made aware of any restrictions. But, if reports of the move were accurate, they affirmed that SpaceX’s “irresponsible actions” had created “unnecessary distractions, threatened US military satellite operations, and undermined [the US’s] future relationship with the International Space Station”.
> 
> “We are hopeful that our two nations will engage in productive conversations over the coming months that will resolve the matter quickly,” ULA said.
> 
> ULA added that it could switch to a second vehicle – Boeing’s Delta rocket – which used US-built motors and could meet all its customers’ needs. It also had a two-year supply of RD-180 motors “to enable a smooth transition to our other rocket”.
> 
> Mr Thompson said the US military strongly favoured using ULA for its most sensitive launches because of its flawless record of putting satellites safely into orbit. Most other rocket systems continue to suffer regular launch failures that destroy vehicle payloads.
> 
> “The Ukraine crisis has made policy makers reflect on the wisdom of relying on Russia for any type of lift requirements, either manned or unmanned,” Mr Thompson said.
> 
> Three astronauts – one American, one Russian and one Japanese – were due to leave the ISS in the early evening on Tuesday US eastern time to return to earth. They were due to land near Dzhezkazgan in Kazakhstan. A further three astronauts – one American, one Russian and one German – are due to blast off for the space station from Kazakhstan on May 28.
> 
> Assuming Russia does not reconsider, its decision on the ISS could strengthen China, which aims to have its own space station by 2020 and is currently excluded from the ISS – chiefly because of opposition from the US.
> 
> Mr Rogozin said Moscow would not impose sanctions of its own, and would not obstruct the work of US astronauts. However, he called the US an “unreliable” technology partner and said the government was therefore seeking to intensify work with other countries.
> 
> Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, is due to present new plans for space exploration to parliament. Mr Rogozin said it was looking to redirect funds from manned space flight to other, more promising areas and had been advised to seek co-operation with Asian countries.
> 
> Russia also threatened to switch off 11 GPS ground stations on its territory unless the US agrees to its request to establish a similar station for its own satellite position system Glonass in the US. The GPS ground stations would be suspended from June 1 and switched off on September 1 if a bilateral working group failed to reach consensus on the Glonass issue, Mr Rogozin said.
> 
> GPS, on which services such as navigation and mapping apps rely, would still work as its satellites continue to operate. But it would lose accuracy because the ground stations help correct the satellite data.




The USA has starved NASA and, especially, the manned space programme - preferring to leave manned shuttle trips to the ISS to the Russians, and to allow China and India to play catch-up - while it, under both Presidents Bush and Obama, focuses spending on domestic, _social_ targets.


----------



## CougarKing

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Putin/Russia needs to be a bit cautious. China is not Europe. China will not allow Russia to turn off the gas or oil ... not even once.



And speaking of Chinese demand for Russian gas:



> Putin heads to China as Ukraine sinks ties with West
> 
> By: Anna Smolchenko,
> 
> Agence France-Presse
> May 18, 2014 11:14 AM
> 
> MOSCOW - Russian President Vladimir Putin heads to China on Tuesday to shore up eastern ties as relations with the West plunge to new lows over the Ukraine crisis.
> 
> During a two-day visit to Shanghai, *Putin and Chinese host Xi Jinping will seek to clinch a raft of agreements including a landmark gas deal crucial for Moscow as Europe seeks to cut reliance on Russian oil and gas.
> 
> The two leaders will also take part in a regional security forum and oversee the start of joint naval exercises off Shanghai in the East China Sea.*
> 
> Moscow's relations with the United States and European Union have dived to a post-Cold War low in recent months over Russia's seizure of Crimea and Western accusations the Kremlin is fomenting unrest in the east of Ukraine.
> 
> The West has slapped sanctions on some of Putin's closest allies and threatened broader punitive measures if Moscow disrupts presidential polls in Ukraine on May 25.
> 
> (...EDITED)


----------



## Edward Campbell

It is, potentially, a good deal for both countries.

The advantages to China - supplies very close at hand, etc - are obvious. For Russia the main advantage is a reliable customer - high demand - with very, very large reserves of hard currency.

I cannot see a down side for China; for Russia the only down side is that China will, possibly, become its main customer - consider Canada and the USA and oil for an example of what's wrong with that relationship.


----------



## CougarKing

NO Gas deal????  ???



> *Russia Fails to Sign China Gas Deal at Shanghai Meeting*
> 
> quote:
> The presidents of China and Russia failed to sign a $400 billion gas supply deal at a meeting yesterday in Shanghai, prolonging negotiations that started more than 10 years ago.
> 
> Talks are continuing as the two countries seek a compromise, Alexey Miller, chief executive officer of Russian gas-exporter OAO Gazprom (OGZD), said in a statement after Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping signed bilateral agreements that didn’t include the gas deal.
> 
> Russian officials said before the meeting that *the two sides were very close to a deal on gas price, opening the way to building a pipeline linking the world’s largest energy producer with the biggest consumer. That has been the stumbling block throughout the past decade, though with Putin facing sanctions from the U.S. and Europe after he annexed Crimea*, an agreement had been seen as more likely than at previous summits.
> 
> *“It shows that Russia is not willing to cut a low-price deal just to make a political point with the west,”* said Chris Weafer, founder at Macro Advisory in Moscow. “The danger is if a deal is not concluded this year China may switch its efforts to secure pipeline gas elsewhere.”
> 
> (...EDITED)
> 
> 
> Bloomberg


----------



## Edward Campbell

S.M.A. said:
			
		

> NO Gas deal????  ???




The _Financial Times_ is reporting that a lastminute deal was signed. The article says that, "State-owned China National Petroleum Corp, China’s largest oil company, said on Wednesday it had signed a 30-year deal to buy up to 38bn cubic metres of gas per year, beginning in 2018 ... The company did not give details on the pricing of the gas, the sticking point in negotiations that have stretched over a decade ... The breakthrough came just hours after PetroChina, the listed subsidiary of CNPC, told the Financial Times that the deal would not be completed during Mr Putin’s visit because of the pricing dispute."

The price will be interesting. China _should_ be willing to pay a premium for guaranteed delivery through a pipeline and Russia _should_ be willing to accept a price a wee, tiny bit below current market rates for a guaranteed, high volume deal. The _FT_ article concludes, "For China, with a growing diversity of natural gas sources including from newly licensed Russian exporters, securing supply of piped gas from Gazprom no longer holds the importance it did when the two companies began negotiating a decade ago."

But, always, see my comments about China's expectations. Russia has, in the recent past, in Putin's era, used oil and gas as a weapon, closing the taps to punish its neighbours. The Chinese will not accept that and, unlike the rest of the world, China would have no compunction about physically punishing Russia for any such move. Xi Jinping is nothing at all like Barack Obama or Angela Merkel and he, Xi, has _waaaay_ more balls than Putin can even dream about ... it's all in the nature of the _system_ through which he made his way to the top.


----------



## Kirkhill

That seems about right ERC.

I think that if Putin did turn off the taps Xi, or his successors, would have few compunctions about seizing the wellheads - many of which are located east of the Urals.  That territory is only nominally Russian.  Culturally it is, if not anti-Russian, at least antipathetic towards Moscow.

And .... there have been some interesting goings on in Kazakhstan with rockets recently.

Russia moved a new Iskander battery on to Kazakhstan's border at the south end of the Urals.
Shortly there after missile debris landed just outside a Kazakhstani village.
Kazakhstan closed the Baikonur cosmodrome to Russia - apparently the debris came from a failed Russian ICBM test
Russia just launched another test ICBM from their Kasputin Yar test site near the Caspian in Astrakhan.  
That round splashed in a test range leased by Russia in Kazakhstan.

I find Kazakhstan's role in current events curious.  It is working very hard to stay neutral enough that it stays out of Moscow's orbit without offending Putin.  For instance, although it is a member of CIS and the Shanghai group, it has not supported Moscow on the Ukraine.  I believe the only CIS members that have are Belarus and Turkmenistan.


----------



## Edward Campbell

There are more details about the deal, including some gross dollar values, in an article in the _Globe and Mail_.

The report says that "Gazprom expects to sell the gas for about $350 per thousand tons, or $9.91 per thousand cubic feet. While that is far above prices in North America, where gas has lately traded for around $4.50, it’s well below the pricing for Pacific liquefied natural gas." Other reports say the gas should sell for $11.00 per thousand cubic feet in and around Beijing, maybe a bit less in and around Shanghai. The _Financial Times_ reports that "Gazprom had been forced to make concessions. People in the industry in Beijing said China was able to drive a harder bargain in the light of Gazprom’s growing international isolation."

The new pipeline is interesting:





Source: The _Globe and Mail_

But it may be that the development of the Kovykta and Chayanda gas fields, in Eastern Siberia, mayb be the biggest long term news.


----------



## CougarKing

A parallel update at the China superthread, is of similar importance:

China, Russia sign deal to BYPASS US Dollar


----------



## Kirkhill

Our response to both Russia and China

Baluchi Separatists
Laskars






Historically the Baluchis are tied to Oman.  They controlled the access to the Persian/Arabian Gulf.

A separate Baluchistan would give the Stan Confederacy TM a salt water port and put them on the world market.

That means that Afghanistan remains a critical piece for the west to maintain relations -  The Northern Alliance of Turks etc is more "pragmatic" than the Pashtun hill tribes.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

I suspect the Chinese sees this as good business and an insurance policy. They will have yet another source of energy that will help limit their use of coal which will help with the air quality issue. It will lessen any western boycott ability and provide infrastructure in the Northwestern Provinces which seem to need it. I doubt they trust Russia very much and also knew they had them over a barrel. However Gazprom might be hoping this is another step towards linking to the Indian market as well.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Here is an interesting _inforgraphic_ provided by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development showing Sino-Rissuan trade in 2013:






Not the _nature_ of the trade: almost all of Russia exports are natural resources; most, the overwhelming majority of China's exports are _finished_ or _processed_ goods. In other words Russia is, like Canada, a "hewer of wood and drawer of water" while China is adding value and providing added domestic employment.


----------



## Kirkhill

If this deal benefits Russia so greatly why:

Is it decades in the making?
Did it take Europe turning off the taps to make it happen?
Was it not concluded between Gazprom and CNPC directly but required Putin to make concessions directly to Xi?

In the balance of trade, Russia is 10 BUSD per year in the red to China?

China still has access to its own coal and world markets.
Europe has given up Global Warming and reverted to King Coal.

Russia is now officially a client state of Beijing.  

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard - Telegraph



> The China prize has given Russia a dramatic means of fighting back, though it is far from clear what the Memorandum of Understanding between the two sides actually means. Most analysts say it is highly unlikely that China would wish to become too dependent on Russian supplies after witnessing the skirmishes in Europe.
> The reason why Europe's imports of LNG have fallen so low is because Japanese demand since the Fukushima nuclear disaster has pushed up the price. Germany, Spain and the UK have been turning to coal instead to produce electricity.



Russia is having to refinance its banks.  Its army is reduced to guerilla warfare in Ukraine.....

In words in common currency in my youth: It's in a worst state than China.

And with Obama still banging the drum FOR Global Warming I can't make up my mind whether the fair, fond, fool is venial, gullible or daft.

Edit to add one last point.  2018 is when the gas could potentially start to flow.  Four years from now. That is an eternity in this man's calendar:


----------



## Kirkhill

Here's a surprise... as far as I'm concerned anyway.

Lord Mandelsson and I agree.  I am sure he IS pleased.


----------



## Edward Campbell

I was reading something else, quite unrelated to Russia, about why America needed to increase defence spending and it got me to thinking about the enemy that is required to support such an analysis. The article I was reading suggested, without coming right out and saying so, that China was the “peer” enemy against which America would be required to match itself unilaterally.

I have a problem with that analysis. First: I cannot see a _strategic_ rationale for either America or China to wish to provoke such a war. Second: I think an accidental war, drifting into war, is very unlikely because of the “elephant vs whale” or “tiger vs shark' analogies that many analysts present. Third: history suggests, to me, anyway, that neither America nor China is overly _expansionist_. Both did extend their boundaries in the 19th and 20th centuries, but one might argue that China has still not succeeded in 'digesting' its gains; in fact some doubt that Tibet and Xinjiang were, really, gains at all.

But I do see a threat ... one that has solid historical roots: a Russo-German axis or a _Mitteleuropean_ power.

Imagine this, please: It is 35 years from now, around 2050, in the past decades Eurasia has seen some upheavals. The first was that Russian Far Eastern region, basically Region 4 on this map ...






... including Amur, Chukotka, Eastern Siberia (Sahka), Kamchatka, Khabarovsk, Magadan, Primosky and Sakhalin, separate from Russia. They are not absorbed by China but, rather, they become (an) independent state(s), UN members, in fact, rather like Mongolia. This would not have been a pretty process ... China would have been a _provocateur_ but the main problem would have been Russians simply abandoning the Far East and returning to Europe, and Asians, some Chinese, some Mongolians, but, mainly,indigenous people taking over the management and finding that North <-> South links, with China, are much more _natural_ (and profitable) than East <-> West links with Russia.

Being 'reduced' to a more modest (but still) Eurasian power will have caused the Russians to look West.

In Europe two major things will have happened by, say, 2040:

     1. NATO will have disbanded itself, being replaced by a separate series of bilateral and some multilateral _arrangement_ involving America, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland,
         Netherlands, Norway and Sweden – almost a _Nordic Alliance_; and

     2. The EU will have been reorganized into a _tiered_ organization with varying levels of engagement – so 'loose' that even Norway and Switzerland will have joined the 'bottom' tier, along with
         Britain and Denmark and few others.

France will have tried, but failed, to organize first a EU military alliance and,,later, a Central European and then Southern European alliance. None will have lasted more than a few years.

Germany, having finally thrown off its collective, _national_ guilt over World War II, will assert its leadership role and the notion of _MittelEuropa_ will be front and centre, again.






Russia will have no place to go: the East and South are less and less friendly – Muslim _Stans_ and Chinese client predominate. They will make common cause with the Germans, creating a new _League of Europe_ stretching from Atlantic (France and Portugal) to the Yenisey which divides Central from (the now independent) Eastern Siberia.






The _Nordics_ and the Brits want to stay aloof, but it's very, very hard and through the still existent EU they have free trade and strong economic links with it ... this new _leviathan_ is rich and powerful. China is modestly friendly towards the new _League_ because it has no further border issues, it shares some important trade ties and there is a 'common enemy' in the shape of _Militant Islam_ in Central and West Asia and the Middle East.

Japan has slipped, further and further into the Chinese _sphere of influence_ and trade and cultural ties grow stronger and stronger. There is a South-East Asian _union_ of sorts – India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka having joined ASEAN. But the Asians, even including India, want friendly relations with China and do not feel overly threatened by it.

America is isolated – along with Australia and Canada. There is a bit of an _Anglosphere_, America, Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand have a formal military alliance – with which Denmark the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden all cooperate to varying degrees, but it has political divisions, the Brits and _Nordics_ have strong ties to Europe and Australia and New Zealand have equally strong economic ties to China.

Where is there a potential _flashpoint_? *Africa*.

Why? Resources

It is, in fact, a three way _competition_, between the American led _Anglosphere_, the Chinese and other Asians, and the new German led _League of Europe_.

If the Europeans have made a decision to become a global military power then, with access to African oil and minerals, it has the _potential_ to be a real “peer” of the Americans – able to fight as both an elephant and a whale.

 :2c:   Just thinking out loud ...


----------



## tomahawk6

A German Russia axis isn't realistic as the Russians still remember WW2 vividly.What is more likely is a resumption of the Russian-Sino partnership.


----------



## Edward Campbell

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> A German Russia axis isn't realistic as the Russians still remember WW2 vividly.What is more likely is a resumption of the Russian-Sino partnership.




Disagree ... First: there never was a Sino-Russian _partnership_, initially, in the 1930s, the CCP was a _client_ of the _Comintern_ but, by the 1960s, the traditional animosity which both countries have felt towards the other for 800 years had firmly reasserted itself; it, the animosity, remains strong today, in my own experience. Second: I think Putin's Russia fears China because my Far Eastern scenario is all too plausible; it does not fear Europe, Russia may remember Nazi Germany, now, but I am not convinced that can last another generation. Third: Russia is _*failing*_ by almost every social, political, demographic and economic measure. It is, also, hemmed in: by Islam in the South, by China in the East and by Europe in the West - of the three Europe is the least unpleasant.


----------



## tomahawk6

I would hope at some point that Putin realizes that he has more in common with the west than standing alone or joining with China to carve out a new hegamon.Forbes take on a Russia-Sino alliance.

http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2014/05/20/a-russia-china-alliance-is-emerging-and-it-will-be-a-disaster-for-the-west/


----------



## Kirkhill

I'm going to throw in a nickle's worth and highlight two points.

I don't think we can call what Russia and China are arranging an alliance.  Usually an alliance is based on equality.  I agree with ERC on China and don't think that China perceives Russia as an equal - not culturally, politically, militarily or economically.  I think China perceives Russia exactly the same way they perceive any of their other resource suppliers: a vendor and an inferior one at that.

The other point that I would make is about Islam.  I think we are starting to drift back into the mistake we were making in the early days of Iraq and assuming all muslims are Twelvers or Wahhabis.

Beyond the big divisions between Sunnis (the original Arab strain) and the Shia (the Persian strain) there is another grand tradition in Islam and that is Sufism.  Sufism is a variant of Sunni Islam but is differently focused and is particularly popular amongst the Turkic peoples of the Stans.  It is decried by both the Wahhabis and the Twelvers as anathema because it is influenced by Buddhism, Zoroastrianism and the even more ancient Tengrism - the shamanism of the Mongols and the Gokturks.

Those that were there will know better than I but I was under the impression that a good part of the problem in Afghanistan was the antipathy between the Turkic dominated Northern Alliance and the Pashtun hill tribes with their Arab influenced Taliban.  Karzai was supposed to be a Pashtun that could work with the Turks.

Here's an article on Sufism in the Stans:



> Chechen Sufi revival —between Russian occupation and Wahhabis
> Submitted by Bill Weinberg on Wed, 05/24/2006 - 21:57 Caucasus Theater
> 
> How interesting. In an implicit acknowledgement that their hardcore Islamophobe policies are backfiring in Chechya, the Russian authorities are embracing the indigenous peace-loving Sufi tradition as an alternative to the violently intransigent Wahhabism imported from the Arab world. But this could also backfire—as the Sufis themselves also seek independence from Russia, even if they aren't willing to blow up civilians to acheive it. The implications are "unclear" indeed. And while it is good to see the Kunta-Haji Sufis on page 4 of the New York Times, we're not sure they would appreciate the writer's depiction of their chanting as "grunts."
> 
> A Whirling Sufi Revival With Unclear Implications
> 
> GROZNY, Russia — Three circles of barefoot men, one ring inside another, sway to the cadence of chant.
> 
> The men stamp in time as they sway, and grunt from the abdomen and throat, filling the room with a primal sound. One voice rises over the rest, singing variants of the names of God.
> 
> The men stop, face right and walk counterclockwise, slowly at first, then fast. As they gain speed they begin to hop on their outside feet and draw closer. The three circles merge into a spinning ball.
> 
> The ball stops. It opens back up. The stamping resumes, softly at first, then louder. Many of the men are entranced. The air around them hums. The wooden floor shakes. The men turn left and accelerate the other way.
> 
> This is a zikr, the mystical Sufi dance of the Caucasus and a ritual near the center of Chechen Islam.
> 
> Here inside Chechnya, where Russia has spent six years trying to contain the second Chechen war since the Soviet Union collapsed, traditional forms of religious expression are returning to public life. It is a revival laden with meaning, and with implications that are unclear.
> 
> The Kremlin has worried for generations about Islam's influence in the Caucasus, long attacking local Sufi traditions and, in the 1990's, attacking the role of small numbers of foreign Wahhabis, proponents of an austere Arabian interpretation of Islam whom Moscow often accuses of encouraging terrorist attacks.
> 
> But Chechnya's Sufi brotherhoods have never been vanquished — not by repression, bans or exile by the czars or Stalin, and not by the Kremlin of late.
> 
> Now they are reclaiming a place in public life. What makes the resurgence so unusual is that Sufi practices have become an element of policy for pro-Russian Chechens. Zikr ceremonies are embraced by the kadyrovsky, the Kremlin-backed Chechen force that is assuming much of the administration of this shattered land.
> 
> Post-Soviet Russia tried to make zikr celebrations a symbol of Chechen aggression, portraying zikr as the dance and trance of the rebels, the ritual of the untamed. Now zikr is performed by the men the Kremlin is counting on to keep Chechnya in check.
> 
> The occasion for ceremony on this day was the blessing of the foundation of a mosque that will be named for Akhmad Kadyrov, the Russian-backed Chechen president who was assassinated in 2004.
> 
> The mosque, whose foundation rests on the grounds of the former headquarters of the Communist Party's regional committee, is meant to replace older associations. Not only is it an implicit rebuke of Communism, it is situated beside the ruins of another, much smaller mosque that was being constructed by the separatists in the 1990's.
> 
> Its scale and grandeur are intended as public statement. At a cost of $20 million, it will be a sprawling complex, with room for a religious school and a residence for the mufti, said Amradin Adilgeriyev, an adviser to Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechnya's pro-Kremlin premier and son of the slain president.
> 
> The mosque will hold 10,000 worshipers, making it the largest in the republic. Its minarets will rise 179 feet in the air. It will speak not just of faith, but of power.
> 
> And so on this day the men dance. And dance. Tassels on their skullcaps bounce and swing. Sweat darkens their shirts. They are perhaps 90 in men in all, mostly young. They look strong. But zikr is demanding. As some of them tire, they step aside. Others take their place.
> 
> Their stamping can be heard two blocks away.
> 
> The entrance to the construction site is controlled by gunmen who make sure that none of the separatists enters with a bomb. Other young men boil brick-sized chunks of beef in caldrons of garlic broth, stirring the meat with a wooden slab.
> 
> Zikr has several forms. This form traces its origins to Kunta-Haji Kishiyev, a shepherd who traveled the Middle East in the 19th century, then returned to Chechnya and found converts to Sufism. Initially his followers pledged peace, but in time many joined the resistance to Russia, and their leader was exiled. They fought on, becoming a reservoir of Chechen traditionalism and rebellious spirit.
> 
> In 1991, when Chechnya declared independence from Russia, the Kunta-Haji brotherhoods, long underground, fought again. Sebastian Smith, who covered the Chechen wars and wrote "Allah's Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus," noted that they became a source of rebel resolve.
> 
> At one zikr ceremony he observed, the men were dancing, he wrote, until a Russian bomber screamed low overhead, buzzing the village. Mr. Smith watched their reaction. "No one even looks up," he wrote. "The whooping grows louder."
> 
> The Sufis resisted the influx of Wahhabis who came to fight Russia beside them, but whose version of Islam aligned more closely with that of the Afghan Taliban.
> 
> Mr. Kadyrov said in an interview that he hoped to help restore Chechen Sufi traditions as part of an effort to preserve Chechen culture. He has reopened the roads to Ertan, a village in the mountains, where Kunta-Haji Kishiyev's mother is buried. Her grave is a shrine and a place for pilgrimages, which for years were not made. This spring the roads to Ertan are crowded with walkers, who visit the grave to circle it and pray.
> 
> Still, efforts to incorporate Sufi brotherhoods into a government closely identified with the Kremlin contain contradictions. Some see manipulation on Mr. Kadyrov's part, noting that Chechen self-identity has never been suppressed, even by some of the most repressive forces the world has ever known.
> 
> Whether Mr. Kadyrov can control the forces he taps into is unknown. The zikrists dance on this day with state approval. But for whom?
> 
> "Kadyrov wants to show that he is a supporter of Chechen traditional Islam," said Aslan Doukaev, a native of Chechnya who is director of the North Caucasus service of Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty. "But Sufis always wanted Chechen independence, and that signal is being sent here too."
> 
> We hope history is not about to repeat itself. "The Religious Roots of Conflict: Russia and Chechnya" by David Damrel (originally published in Religious Studies News, September 1995, now online at the Belfast Islamic Center) outlines the long historical cycle of tolerance and repression the Sufis have faced in the Caucasus:
> 
> The history of Russian expansion into Caucasia - the remote, rugged, mountainous territory between the Black and Caspian Seas that is home to over 30 different ethnic groups--began in the late eighteenth century with Catherine the Great’s attempts to forcibly annex the region. But the Russian invaders inspired fierce, unexpected resistance from a broad ethnic coalition of Caucasian Muslims who had united in loyalty to one spiritual leader - a Chechen Muslim mystic warrior named Shaykh Mansur Ushurma. Declaring the struggle a jihad, Shaykh Mansur and his Muslim mountaineers inflicted a crushing defeat on Czarist forces at the Sunzha River in 1785 and were briefly able to unite much of what is modern Daghestan and Chechnya under their rule.
> 
> Shaykh Mansur headed a branch of the Naqshbandi Sufi order, an Islamic mystical brotherhood that originated in fourteenth century Central Asia. Islamic mysticism - known as Sufism - spread quickly among both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Caucasus and Central Asia, largely through the missionary activities of itinerant Sufi scholars and mystics. These popular shaykhs (saints, literally "friends of God") often acquired reputations as miracle workers, and their tombs frequently became shrines (mazars) and pilgrimage sites. As recently as the late 1970s, Soviet authorities testified to the abiding attraction of these shrines, listing more than 70 active mazars in Daghestan and over 30 more in Chechnya. More traditional Muslim religious leaders often attacked the Sufi "cult of saints" for un-Islamic practices, but from early on in the Caucasus, Sufism helped attract converts to Islam at a popular level and offered a powerful source of spiritual guidance and social identity.
> 
> These Sufi shaykhs usually directed a tight, clannish organization of disciples (murids) bound to them with oaths of absolute obedience. Senior disciples were allowed to initiate new devotees into the brotherhood, and these deputies were often dispatched to spread the order in villages deep in the mountains. Frequently, charismatic and ambitious murids formed their own branches and subbranches within an order. Certain Sufi orders and suborders became closely associated with specific ethnic groups and with particular notable families.
> 
> Zikr (remembrance [of God]) is the central ritual practice of most Caucasian Sufi orders. This mystical ceremony, designed to lead participants into an ecstatic union with God, involves the group repetition of a special prayer or various divine names of God. The Naqshbandis favor a silent form of zikr that is closed to outsiders, but other orders sometimes permit vocal and public zikr assemblies.
> 
> Reliable membership figures are impossible to establish, but a 1975 Soviet survey in Chechnya claimed that half of the Muslim population there belonged to local Sufi orders--a stunning total of over 300,000 murids. The Naqshbandis, joined later by the Qadiri Sufi brotherhood, have dominated north Caucasian Muslim spiritual life from the late eighteenth century to the present day. Naturally secretive and disciplined, with broad-based social support and foreboding mountainous terrain for cover, these orders have proven formidable adversaries for whoever has tried to rule the Caucasus.
> 
> Shaykh Mansur’s disciples continued their low-key resistance against the Russians even after his death in prison in 1793. Full-scale armed revolt against the Russian occupation of Daghestan and Chechnya resumed in 1824, when a series of Naqshbandi Sufi leaders called Imams began a bitter guerrilla war that would last for over 30 more years. The most famous of these Sufi warriors, the Naqshbandi Shaykh Imam Shamil, actually established a short-lived Islamic state in Chechnya and Daghestan before his capitulation in 1859. With Shamil safely imprisoned, the Russians moved to crush the remaining "Muridists" and pacify the region. Many of Shamil’s
> 
> The Qadiri order, with its origins in twelfth-century Baghdad, first appeared in the Caucasus in 1861 headed by a Daghestani shepherd named Kunta Haji Kishiev. Based in Chechnya, Kunta Haji taught a mystical practice that, unlike the Naqshbandis, allowed vocal zikr, ecstatic music and dancing. And, at first, he counseled peace with the Russians. His popularity surged but soon his following, swelled by many murid fighters from Shamil’s former army, so alarmed the Russians that he was arrested and exiled in 1864. That same year at Shali in Chechnya, Russian troops fired on over 4,000 Qadiri murids, killing scores and igniting a fresh wave of violence. The brotherhood--whose remaining leaders all claimed spiritual descent from Kunta Haji--became implacable Russian foes and struck deep roots in the Chechen countryside. Together with the rejuvenated Naqshbandis, the Qadiris rose up against the Romanovs in 1865, 1877, 1879 and the 1890s and plagued Czarist rule in the Caucasus through the Bolshevik Revolution.
> 
> The revolutionary years were especially bloody in Daghestan and Chechnya. The Qadiris, and a Naqshbandi movement led by Shaykh Uzun Haji battled for eight years against the White and the Red armies to create a "North Caucasian Emirate." The pious, uncompromising Uzun Haji - whose tomb remains a major pilgrimage site for Chechen Muslims - saw little difference between the Czarist Russians and the atheist communists. "I am weaving a rope," he was quoted by his enemies, "to hang engineers, students and in general all those who write from left to right."
> 
> His uprising in Daghestan was suppressed in 1925, but the Soviets, branding the Sufis "bandits," "criminals" and "counter-revolutionaries," continued to arrest, execute and deport the "zikrists" almost up to the outbreak of WWII. The brotherhoods braved the crackdown as they always had: the shaykhs disappeared deep into the mountains, the murids organized their zikr assemblies in private homes, and the orders ensured their secrecy through the double bond of spiritual initiation and tight-knit clan loyalty.
> 
> During WWII, when disturbances occurred in Chechnya in 1940 and again in 1943, Stalin responded with astonishing brutality that bordered on genocide. Accusing them of still unproven collaboration with Nazi Germany, in 1944 he forcibly relocated six entire Caucasian nationalities, including the whole Chechen and Ingush populations, to special camps in Central Asia. All told, more than a million Muslims from the Caucasus were deported, with tremendous loss of life. By some estimates one third to one-half of the population of Chechen-Ingushetia alone - well over 250,000 people - disappeared after the republic was liquidated in February 1944.
> 
> The Chechens and other groups spent more than a decade in isolated work camps in Kazakhstan. But by all accounts, the forced resettlement failed to break either the Sufi brotherhoods or Chechen national spirit. Describing the fearsome "psychology of submission" that prevailed in Soviet relocation camps, Russian author Alexander Solzhenitsyn observed that only one people refused to be broken by the ordeal: "the nation as a whole - the Chechens." And in later sociological surveys Soviet academics euphemistically noted that "the special postwar conditions" had actually strengthened religious beliefs within the exiled Caucasian peoples.
> 
> In 1957, when the Chechens and other exiled Caucasian groups were proclaimed "rehabilitated" and returned to their republics, they found that their land had been "Russified." Hundreds of thousands of Russian farmers brought in to work the land during their absence had become permanent residents and now comprised a quarter of the region’s population.
> 
> The Chechens, Ingush and Daghestanis also discovered a land scoured of Islam. Soviet authorities had experimented with the near total suppression of Islam in the region, closing over 800 mosques and 400 religious colleges. Mazars were demolished, converted into state museums, or made inaccessible. Only after more than 30 years, in 1978, Soviet authorities in the Caucasus allowed under 40 mosques to reopen and staffed them with less than 300 registered ulema.
> 
> We have also noted that Sufis face harsh persecution in Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.



Here are links to a few Zikrs


http://vimeo.com/65859098
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ih395-JcvQo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G5goISKPSH8
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CtPu-EAJf6s

Tengrism is also being promoted by the governments of the Stans - as in Tengri News of Kazakhstan


----------



## Infanteer

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> It is, in fact, a three way _competition_, between the American led _Anglosphere_, the Chinese and other Asians, and the new German led _League of Europe_.
> 
> If the Europeans have made a decision to become a global military power then, with access to African oil and minerals, it has the _potential_ to be a real “peer” of the Americans – able to fight as both an elephant and a whale.
> 
> :2c:   Just thinking out loud ...



Where does South America sit in your (interesting) estimate of long-term geopolitical trends?


----------



## Edward Campbell

Infanteer said:
			
		

> Where does South America sit in your (interesting) estimate of long-term geopolitical trends?




I honestly don't know ... it is resource rich and China is already moving in down there. The politics are always _weak_, ripe, it seems to me, for corruption and, therefore, for external influence. It has been, for generations, America's preserve; the Europeans have or, at least, have had had important interests; but the Chinese are making inroads, too. 

I suppose it could be another point of contention.

I also wonder about Indonesia and Philippines ...


----------



## Edward Campbell

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The _Financial Times_ is reporting that a lastminute deal was signed. The article says that, "State-owned China National Petroleum Corp, China’s largest oil company, said on Wednesday it had signed a 30-year deal to buy up to 38bn cubic metres of gas per year, beginning in 2018 ... The company did not give details on the pricing of the gas, the sticking point in negotiations that have stretched over a decade ... The breakthrough came just hours after PetroChina, the listed subsidiary of CNPC, told the Financial Times that the deal would not be completed during Mr Putin’s visit because of the pricing dispute."
> 
> The price will be interesting. China _should_ be willing to pay a premium for guaranteed delivery through a pipeline and Russia _should_ be willing to accept a price a wee, tiny bit below current market rates for a guaranteed, high volume deal. The _FT_ article concludes, "For China, with a growing diversity of natural gas sources including from newly licensed Russian exporters, securing supply of piped gas from Gazprom no longer holds the importance it did when the two companies began negotiating a decade ago."
> 
> But, always, see my comments about China's expectations. Russia has, in the recent past, in Putin's era, used oil and gas as a weapon, closing the taps to punish its neighbours. The Chinese will not accept that and, unlike the rest of the world, China would have no compunction about physically punishing Russia for any such move. Xi Jinping is nothing at all like Barack Obama or Angela Merkel and he, Xi, has _waaaay_ more balls than Putin can even dream about ... it's all in the nature of the _system_ through which he made his way to the top.




Another _inforgraphic_ showing that China would need the equivalent of 16, that's *16!* of those Russian gas deals to meet its energy demands.


----------



## CougarKing

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Germany, having finally thrown off its collective, _national_ guilt over World War II, will assert its leadership role and the notion of _MittelEuropa_ will be front and centre, again.



Sorry to be a little off-topic,

But I certainly hope that the notion of _MittelEuropa_ does not evolve into a "Fourth Reich" that seeks to displace other nations and ethnic groups while seeking "_Lebensraum_" ("Living Space")... 

Agence-France-Presse



> *GAME CHANGER? European Parliament set to usher in first neo-Nazis*
> 
> BRUSSELS - Though no stranger to controversy or diatribe, *the European Parliament is set to usher in its first fully-fledged neo-Nazis members, from Germany and Greece.*
> 
> With around 300,000 votes at Sunday's European elections the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) is expected to claim one of the country's 96 seats in the new Parliament, in a historical ground-breaker.
> 
> A recent change in German electoral laws, scrapping all minimum thresholds, paved the way for the march into parliament of the NPD, which has 6,000 members.
> 
> It describes itself as "national socialist," just like Germany's Nazis in the 1930s, and is openly xenophobic and anti-semitic so a group of German regional governments have tried to have it banned for propagating racism.
> 
> Meanwhile, with almost all ballots counted in Greece,* the neo-Nazi "Golden Dawn" party is claiming over nine percent of the vote, which would net it three seats in the 751-member Parliament.
> 
> Golden Dawn was founded in the 1980s by Nikos Michaloliakos, an open admirer of Adolf Hitler. In 2012, Michaloliakos publicly denied the responsibility of Nazis in the mass-murder of six million Jews.*
> 
> (...EDITED)


----------



## Kirkhill

The anti-EU forces (both left and right wing), I believe, are not expansionist.  They are very much focused on local control.

The expansionists are the traditional socialists/internationalists running the bureaucracy in Brussels.  Which, in fact, brings them head to head with the Russians.

Nationalism could actually reduce the pressure on Russia's border.  If only the Russian's weren't so keen on maintaining borders that no longer exist.


----------



## a_majoor

From the American Interest: Russia revitalizes their longstanding propaganda machine for the 21rst century. And they were very, VERY good at it back in the day. Simply look at Boshevik and early Russian posters, or watch the movies of Sergi Esinstein (who not only was a contemporary of Leni Riefenstahl, but an equally skilled director), or study the way the Russians spread the gosple of Communism around the world through various means. We will need to be at the top of our game since they are leverageing their strong suit against us:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/blog/2014/06/02/the-great-success-of-the-russian-propaganda-machine/



> *The Great Success of the Russian Propaganda Machine*
> 
> Propaganda has always been an important tool of war—and its importance grew during the 20th century as Stalin and Goebbels took the dark art to new heights of sophistication and power. As Putin seeks to rebuild Russian power on the rubble of the Soviet Union, he is reaching out for the USSR’s most effective propaganda and espionage weapons.
> 
> Here’s the opening from a Spiegel article well worth your time:
> 
> 
> Ivan Rodionov sits in his office at Berlin’s Postdamer Platz and seems to relish his role as the bad guy. He rails in almost accent-free German, with a quiet, but sharp voice, on the German media, which, he claims, have been walking in “lockstep” when it comes to their coverage of the Ukraine crisis. During recent appearances on two major German talk shows, Rodionov disputed allegations that Russian soldiers had infiltrated Crimea prior to the controversial referendum and its annexation by Russia. He says it’s the “radical right-wing views” of the Kiev government, and not Russia, that poses the threat. “Western politicians,” he says, “are either helping directly or are at least looking on.”
> 
> Rodionov defends President Vladimir Putin so vehemently that one could be forgiven for confusing him with a Kremlin spokesperson. But Rodionov views himself as a journalist. The 49-year-old is the head of the video news agency Ruptly, founded one year ago and financed by the Russian government. The eighth floor of the office building has a grand view of Germany’s house of parliament, the Reichstag. It’s a posh location and the Kremlin doesn’t seem to mind spending quite a bit of money to disseminate its view of the world from here. Around 110 people from Spain, Britain, Russia and Poland work day and night in the three-floor office space on videos that are then syndicated to the international media.
> 
> At first glance, it’s not obvious that Ruptly is actually Kremlin TV. In addition to Putin speeches, there are also numerous other video clips available in its archive, ranging from Pussy Riot to arrests of members of the Russian opposition. When it comes to eastern Ukraine, however, the agency offers almost exclusively videos that are favorable towards pro-Russian supporters of the “People’s Republic of Donetsk,” which was founded by separatists. You’ll also find right-wing radicals like Britain’s Nick Griffin or German far-right extremist Olaf Rose, an ideologist with the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD), stirring up hatred towards the European Union and its Ukraine policies.
> 
> (Note the opportunistic use of far-right European political figures to further Russian talking points. This is a trend worth watching.)
> 
> The West needs to up its game. Cracking down on Russian espionage, both commercial and strategic, tracing and publicizing the flow of money and influence in the Kremlin’s propaganda enterprise, and countering Russian disinformation and attempts to shape world opinion must now become part of Western policy.


----------



## vonGarvin

Don't kid yourself.  The propaganda machine works for us as well:

"I am the Ukrainian" was a pretty slick little number.  And people bought it.


----------



## Kirkhill

Foreign Policy.

Some interesting maps - circa 2035
















Europe dismembered. Russia united.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Part 1 of 2

Alexander Lukin, a Russian _insider_ offers an interesting analysis and prescription, with which i fundamentally disagree, for the current _contretemps_ in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_:

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141538/alexander-lukin/what-the-kremlin-is-thinking


> What the Kremlin Is Thinking
> *Putin’s Vision for Eurasia*
> 
> By Alexander Lukin
> 
> FROM OUR JULY/AUGUST 2014 ISSUE
> 
> Soon after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Western leaders began to think of Russia as a partner. Although Washington and its friends in Europe never considered Moscow a true ally, they assumed that Russia shared their basic domestic and foreign policy goals and would gradually come to embrace Western-style democracy at home and liberal norms abroad. That road would be bumpy, of course. But Washington and Brussels attributed Moscow’s distinctive politics to Russia’s national peculiarities and lack of experience with democracy. And they blamed the disagreements that arose over the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Iran on the short time Russia had spent under Western influence. This line of reasoning characterized what could be termed the West’s post-Soviet consensus view of Russia.
> 
> The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has finally put an end to this fantasy. In annexing Crimea, Moscow decisively rejected the West’s rules and in the process shattered many flawed Western assumptions about its motivations. Now U.S. and European officials need a new paradigm for how to think about Russian foreign policy -- and if they want to resolve the Ukraine crisis and prevent similar ones from occurring in the future, they need to get better at putting themselves in Moscow’s shoes.
> 
> *BACK TO THE BEGINNING*
> 
> From Russia’s perspective, the seeds of the Ukraine crisis were planted in the Cold War’s immediate aftermath. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the West essentially had two options: either make a serious attempt to assimilate Russia into the Western system or wrest away piece after piece of its former sphere of influence. Advocates of the first approach, including the U.S. diplomat George Kennan and Russian liberals, warned that an anti-Russian course would only provoke hostility from Moscow while accomplishing little, winning over a few small states that would end up siding with the West anyway.
> 
> But such admonitions went unheeded, and U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush chose the second path. Forgetting the promises made by Western leaders to Mikhail Gorbachev after the unification of Germany -- most notably that they would not expand NATO eastward -- the United States and its allies set out to achieve what Soviet resistance had prevented during the Cold War. They trumpeted NATO’s expansion, adding 12 new members, including former parts of the Soviet Union, while trying to convince Russia that the foreign forces newly stationed near its borders, in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, would not threaten its security. The EU, meanwhile, expanded as well, adding 16 new members of its own during the same period.
> 
> Russian leaders were caught off-guard; they had expected that both sides would increase cooperation, remain responsive to each other’s interests, and make mutually acceptable compromises. The Russians felt that they had done their part: although never entirely abandoning the idea of national interests, Russia had shown that it was willing to make sacrifices in order to join the prevailing Western-led order. Yet despite an abundance of encouraging words, the West never reciprocated. Instead, Western leaders maintained the zero-sum mindset left over from the Cold War, which they thought they’d won.
> 
> It remains hard to say whether a different approach to the post-Soviet states would have produced a better result for the West. What is obvious is that the course Clinton and Bush took empowered those Russians who wanted Moscow to reject the Western system and instead become an independent, competing center of power in the new multipolar world.
> 
> Today, the West’s continued advance is tearing apart the countries on Russia’s borders. It has already led to territorial splits in Moldova and Georgia, and Ukraine is now splintering before our very eyes. Divisive cultural boundaries cut through the hearts of these countries, such that their leaders can maintain unity only by accommodating the interests of both those citizens attracted to Europe and those wanting to maintain their traditional ties to Russia. The West’s lopsided support for pro-Western nationalists in the former Soviet republics has encouraged these states to oppress their Russian-speaking populations -- a problem to which Russia could not remain indifferent. Even now, more than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than six percent of the population in Estonia and more than 12 percent of the population in Latvia, most of them ethnic Russians, do not have the full rights and privileges of citizenship. They cannot vote in national elections, enroll in Russian schools, or, for the most part, access Russian media. The EU, despite its emphasis on human rights outside its borders, has turned a blind eye to this clear violation of basic rights within them. So when it came to Ukraine and the threat of NATO forces appearing in Crimea -- a region for which Russia has special feelings and where most residents consider themselves Russian -- Moscow decided that there was nowhere left for such minorities to retreat. Russia annexed Crimea in response to the aspirations of a majority of its residents and to NATO’s obvious attempt to push Russia’s navy out of the Black Sea.
> 
> Western leaders were taken aback by Moscow’s swift reaction. In late March, General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, said with surprise that Russia was acting “much more like an adversary than a partner.” But given that NATO has acted that way since its founding -- and never changed its approach after the Cold War -- Moscow’s actions should have been expected. It was only a matter of time before Russia finally reacted to Western encirclement.
> 
> In this context, the government of Vladimir Putin has interpreted Western protests about the situation in Ukraine as nothing more than a case of extreme hypocrisy. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the Kremlin could think otherwise. Consider the EU’s recent criticism of right-wing groups in Ukraine. In March, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, condemned Right Sector, a militant nationalist group, for attempting to seize the parliament building in Kiev. But the EU had effectively supported Right Sector when it took to the streets to depose the government of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych only months earlier. None of this is surprising, of course; Western leaders have never had any difficulty justifying the actions of such extremist groups when convenient, as when it assisted Croatians fighting in the self-proclaimed republic of Serbian Krajina in 1995 or nationalists in Kosovo in 1997–98.
> 
> Western hypocrisy doesn’t end there. Washington has regularly chastised Russia for violating the sanctity of Ukraine’s borders. Yet the United States and its allies have no leg to stand on when it comes to the principle of territorial integrity. After all, it was not Russia but the West that, in 2010, supported the ruling by the International Court of Justice that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 did not violate international law. And Moscow repeatedly warned that the precedents set by Western military interventions in such places as Kosovo, Serbia, Iraq, and Libya would undermine the existing system of international law -- including the principle of sovereignty as enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Accords, in which the West formally acknowledged the national boundaries of the Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and the Warsaw Pact states.
> 
> In spite of such Western double standards, Moscow has offered up a number of proposals for resolving the Ukraine crisis: the creation of a coalition government that takes into account the interests of the eastern and southern regions, the federalization of the country, the granting of official status to the Russian language, and so on. But Western ideologues seem unlikely to ever accept such proposals. Working with Russia, instead of against it, would mean admitting that someone outside the West is capable of determining what is good and what is bad for other societies.



End of Part 1


----------



## Edward Campbell

Part 2 of 2



> *COLLISION COURSE*
> 
> Given the growing distance between Russia and the United States and Europe, it was only a matter of time before their two approaches collided in Ukraine, a border state that has long vacillated between the pull of the East and that of the West. The struggle initially played out between opposing Ukrainian political factions: one that advocated signing an association agreement with the EU and another that favored joining the customs union formed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia.
> 
> Western leaders have consistently viewed such Russian-led efforts at regional integration as hostile moves aimed at resurrecting the Soviet Union and creating an alternative to the Western system. Most officials in the United States and Europe thought that bringing Ukraine into alignment with the EU would deliver a heavy blow to those plans, which explains why they interpreted Yanukovych’s decision to temporarily postpone the signing of the EU agreement as a Russian victory that called for a counterattack.
> 
> Yet Western leaders are woefully misinformed about the idea of Eurasian integration. Neither Russia nor any of the states seeking to join a Eurasian system wants to restore the Soviet Union or openly confront the West. They do, however, believe that in a multipolar world, free nations have a right to create independent associations among themselves. In fact, the ruling elites of many former Soviet republics have long favored the idea of maintaining or re-creating some form of association among their states. In 1991, for example, they created the Commonwealth of Independent States. And of the 15 former Soviet republics, only a few of them, primarily the Baltic states, have used the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to permanently abandon all ties to the former union and join Western economic and political unions instead. The remaining countries struggled to arrive at a consensus on precisely what role the CIS should play.
> 
> In some former Soviet republics, leaders have actively sought to create new forms of integration, such as the Eurasian Economic Community, whose members include Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan (Uzbekistan suspended its membership in 2008). In others, such as Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, the ruling elites considered the commonwealth the primary means for obtaining a civilized divorce from Russia and dividing up the ownership rights and authorities that were previously held by a single, unified state. In most of these countries, at least part of the official establishment and a significant segment of the general population wanted to maintain close relations with Russia and the other former Soviet states. In Georgia and Moldova, for instance, various ethnic minorities feared increasingly assertive nationalist majorities and hoped that Russia would help protect their rights. In other states, including Belarus and Ukraine, significant parts of the populations had such close economic, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia that they could not imagine a sharp break.
> 
> Yet economic problems have long stood in the way of real integration. Although Putin came to power convinced that the collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century, he waited a decade -- until Russia had gained sufficient economic and political strength -- to do anything about it. It wasn’t until 2010 that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia launched a customs union, the first real step toward meaningful economic cooperation among post-Soviet states. The union created a territory free from duties and other economic restrictions, and its members now apply common tariffs and other common regulatory measures in their trade with outside countries. Negotiations are currently under way to add Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to the union.
> 
> In addition to providing economic benefits, Eurasian integration has fostered security cooperation. Like NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization -- which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan -- requires signatories to help assist any member that comes under attack. Many Eurasian countries put a special value on the CSTO; their leaders know that despite assurances from many other countries and organizations, in the event of a real threat from religious extremists or terrorists, only Russia and its allies will come to the rescue.
> 
> UNDER GOD, INDIVISIBLE
> 
> With economic cooperation a success, political elites in the countries of the customs union are now discussing the formation of a Eurasian political union. As Putin wrote in the Russian newspaper Izvestiya in 2011, Moscow wants the new union to partner with, not rival, the EU and other regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the North American Free Trade Agreement. That would help the member states “establish [themselves] within the global economy,” Putin wrote, and “play a real role in decision-making, setting the rules and shaping the future.” For such a union to be effective, however, it will need to evolve naturally and voluntarily. Moreover, taking post-Soviet integration to a new level raises the question of what deeper values would lie at its foundation. If the countries of Europe united to champion the values of democracy, human rights, and economic cooperation, then a Eurasian union must stand for its own ideals, too.
> 
> Some political thinkers have found the ideological foundation for such a union by looking to history. The concept of a Eurasian space or identity first arose among Russian philosophers and historians who immigrated from communist Russia to western Europe in the 1920s. Like Russian Slavophiles before them, advocates of Eurasianism spoke of the special nature of Russian civilization and its differences from European society. But they gazed in a different direction: whereas earlier Slavophiles emphasized Slavic unity and contrasted European individualism with the collectivism of Russian peasant communities, the Eurasianists linked the Russian people to the Turkic-speaking peoples -- or “Turanians” -- of the Central Asian steppe. According to the Eurasianists, the Turanian civilization, which supposedly originated in ancient Persia, followed its own unique political and economic model -- essentially, authoritarianism. Although they valued private initiative in general, many of the Eurasianists condemned the excessive dominance of market principles over the state in the West and emphasized the positive role of their region’s traditional religions: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. However dubious the Eurasianists’ historical claims about the Turanians may be, this theory now enjoys wide popularity not only among a significant part of the Russian political elite but also in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and other Central Asian states where the Turanians’ descendants live.
> 
> Although the old ideas advanced by today’s Eurasianists may seem somewhat artificial, the plan to establish a Eurasian union should not be considered so far-fetched. The culture and values of many former Soviet republics really do differ from what prevails in the West. Liberal secularism, with its rejection of the absolute values that traditional religions hold as divinely ordained, may be on the rise in western Europe and the United States, but in these former Soviet republics, all the major religions -- Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism -- are experiencing a revival. Despite the significant differences between them, all these religions reject Western permissiveness and moral relativism, and not for some pragmatic reason but because they find such notions sinful -- either unsanctioned or expressly prohibited by divine authority.
> 
> Most inhabitants of these post-Soviet states also resent that people in the West consider their outlook backward and reactionary. Their religious leaders, who are enjoying increasing popularity and influence, concur. After all, one can view progress in different ways. If one believes that the meaning of human existence is to gain more political freedoms and acquire material wealth, then Western society is moving forward. But if one thinks, as a traditional Christian does, that Christ’s coming was humanity’s most important development, then material wealth looks far less important, for this life is fleeting, and suffering prepares people for eternal life, a process that physical riches hinder. Religious traditionalists see euthanasia, homosexuality, and other practices that the New Testament repeatedly condemns as representing not progress but a regression to pagan times. Viewed through this lens, Western society is more than imperfect; it is the very center of sin.
> 
> A great majority of Orthodox Christian believers in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova agree with all of this, as do many people in Central Asia. And these beliefs have propelled to power leaders who support the integration of the former Soviet republics. They have also helped Putin succeed in establishing an independent power center in Eurasia. Western meddling, meanwhile, has only served to further consolidate that power.
> 
> *MOVING FORWARD*
> 
> The situation in Ukraine remains tense. It might very well follow the example of Moldova, effectively splitting in two. The United States has perceived Russian calls for dialogue as an attempt to dictate unacceptable conditions. In Russia, the continuing strife has fueled the activity of nationalists and authoritarians. The latter group has become especially active of late and is presenting itself as the only force capable of protecting Russia’s interests. An uncontrolled escalation of the confrontation could even lead to outright war. The only solution is for the United States and its allies to change their position from one of confrontation to one of constructive engagement.
> 
> After all, a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis is still possible. Even during the Cold War, Moscow and the West managed to reach agreements on the neutral status of Austria and Finland. Those understandings did not in the least undermine the democratic systems or the general European orientation of those countries, and they even proved beneficial to their economies and international reputations. It is no coincidence that it was Finland, a neutral state with strong ties to both the West and the Soviet Union, that hosted the talks leading to the signing of the Helsinki Accords, which played a major role in easing Cold War tensions. The solution to the current crisis similarly lies in providing international guarantees for both Ukraine’s neutral status and the protection of its Russian-speaking population. The alternative would be far, far worse: Ukraine could well break apart, drawing Russia and the West into another prolonged confrontation.




I agree, broadly, with Mr Lukin's analysis in "Back to the Beginning" and I also agree that we, both, set ourselves (unintentionally) on a "Collision Course." Where I part company with him is that I do not accept that "Neither Russia nor any of the states seeking to join a Eurasian system wants to restore the Soviet Union or openly confront the West." I think Vladimir Putin wants both, albeit with a new, different outcome.

Obviously I cannot accept Lukin's prescription that "The only solution is for the United States and its allies to change their position from one of confrontation to one of constructive engagement." In fact I think we should _disengage_ and, economically and politically, isolate Russia.


----------



## Kirkhill

I agree with the prescription - isolation.

I disagree with Lukin on the origins. 

My belief is that both the Kremlin and Beltway Washington both have it wrong.  And got it wrong long ago.

They labour under the delusion that they control their populaces and that deals made on their behalf will stick.  As Canadians dealing with the US we should no better.  (And we can't gloat - witness Meech Lake).

Governments govern with the consent of the governed.  Full stop.

A deal between Kennan and Gorbachev means nothing after 1,000,000,000 Europeans, Americans and Russians have their say.

It isn't too difficult to understand why Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Romanians, Moldovans and Georgians might not be as wedded to the notion of Russian rights after those same Russians arrived uninvited, stayed too long, denied them access to their own institutions and schools and declared themselves overlords.

The Russians living in Estonia or elsewhere, do not consider the Estonians legitimate suzerains in their own country.  They never have.  It is not difficult to understand the antipathy of the "non-Russians" to the Russians.  It is also easy to understand why the non-Russians might be eager to associate with non-Russians over Russians.

The Russians left in Eastern Europe are the same poor bastards that have been left stranded in the tidal pools by the retreat of every empire.  Bright folks figured out how to adapt to local realities quickly.  The not so bright often retreated with the tide or ended up dead.

The Russians of Donetsk, Crimea, Estonia and Transnistria are no different than the Brits of India, Singapore and Hong Kong.

Adapt or die.


----------



## The Bread Guy

*Interceptions Rise as Russia Boosts Air Power*


> The Russian Air Force is upgrading its long-range aircraft, making the decades-old planes more lethal amid increasing encounters near US airspace, a top US general responsible for defending the American and Canadian airspace said.
> 
> “They are much, much better than they ever were during the Cold War,” Gen. Charles Jacoby, commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command, said in an interview.
> 
> “One of the things we have seen is that it’s increasingly sophisticated [and] increasingly capable,” he said.
> 
> US and NATO aircraft have been intercepting Tu-95 Bear, Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-22 Backfire strategic bombers and numerous fighter aircraft since 2007 when the Russian Air Force resumed long-range aviation missions, which had stopped at the end of the Cold War.
> 
> “We’ve seen it go up and down a little bit, but steadily increase over the intervening seven years,” Jacoby said of the pace of the flights. “A lot of it depends on their exercise cycle. Sometimes it depends on what’s going on in the world.”
> 
> The intercepts typically take place near Alaska and down the western coast of Canada and the continental US. In Europe, they typically occur over the Baltic and North seas.
> 
> Since the middle of the past decade, the Russia Air Force has been modernizing its bomber aircraft and long-range missiles, according to Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London ....


----------



## a_majoor

An interesting article quoting a former US ambassador on why Vladimir Putin behaves the way he does:

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/07/michael-mcfaul-what-turned-putin-against-the-us/373866/



> *Why Putin Turned Against the U.S.*
> 
> Former ambassador Michael McFaul on what really motivated Russia to invade Ukraine
> 
> David A. GrahamJul 2 2014, 5:56 PM ET
> 
> ASPEN, Colo.—One major divide in international relations, as well as in other social sciences, is between those who believe in structure and those who believe in agency. Members of the first group say leaders are just representations of cultures and nations, subject to long-running political dynamics; their counterparts insist, no, individual leaders make decisions that can change the course of history.
> 
> Discussing whether Vladimir Putin's actions in Ukraine herald a new or resurrected Cold War between Washington and Moscow, former ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul placed himself firmly in the agency camp: He thinks the current crisis is a direct result of Putin's actions and personality. But while he didn't put it exactly this way, he suggested that Putin's worldview is shaped by the fact that the Russian president is a structuralist. McFaul made the comments at the Aspen Ideas Festival, which is hosted by The Atlantic and the Aspen Institute.
> 
> "Is this a new Cold War? There are certain similarities. This is the greatest moment of confrontation since [the time of Soviet leader Mikhail] Gorbachev," McFaul said. For example, he noted that not even in the depths of the Cold War was the Kremlin chief of staff subject to economic sanctions, which is the case today. "It’s a deeply tragic moment. It makes me wonder, and I know the president wonders, were we naive to try to think about a different relationship with Russia?"
> 
> There several ways of thinking about the recent crisis. One favorite frame, especially among Russian experts, is that this is simply the way Great Powers behave and the way they've behaved for centuries. Russia is a rising power, and it's only natural that it would seek to control more territory. That can't be written off entirely, McFaul said, but he doesn't see it as the main factor. First, he explained, if Russia had made a faster transition to democracy and markets—like, say, Poland did—the situation might be different. And second, he noted that Russian policy up until late February of 2014 was far more accommodating.
> 
> "I don’t think [Putin] was sitting as a kid dreaming about putting back the Russian empire," McFaul said. The lavish Sochi Olympics and the decision to release of imprisoned Russian businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky were the actions of a nation trying to assimilate into the world; the crisis in Ukraine imperiled Putin's dream of creating an eastern version of the EU.
> 
> Another approach suggests that U.S. policy is to blame—either the Americans were far too aggressive, chastising Russia for its failings, driving NATO eastward, and supporting "color revolutions" in Eastern Europe, which drove Putin to paranoia; or else the Americans were too soft, letting Putin get away with his incursion into Georgia and telegraphing that they wouldn't strike back. McFaul rejected that, too, noting the long list of collaborations between the two governments up to February: a nuclear-arms-reduction treaty, distribution networks to Afghanistan, Iran sanctions, the Syrian chemical-weapons deal. Violent protests in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan didn't cause a crisis; Russian opinion polls showed two-thirds approval of the United States as recently as three years ago.
> 
> “Something that happened 20 years ago cannot explain what’s happening now if we were cooperating two years ago,” McFaul argued. That is perhaps not a completely convincing argument—as we learned during the Balkan Wars, among other conflicts, historical animosities can appear to have disappeared, only to reappear suddenly and violently—but it does undermine those who blame U.S. policy.
> 
> Instead, McFaul sees two crucial events as leading Putin to decide the U.S. was implacably opposed to him and determined to push him out of power, which together produced the current situation. The first was widespread protests against Putin in early 2012, which the Kremlin accused McFaul himself of organizing. “But that was not the end of the story, because Putin is a great compartmentalist," McFaul said. "He'd say, ‘I understand you’re trying to overthrow regimes in Syria and Iran and here,'" but still see ways to work on business deals or the chemical-weapons deal with America.
> 
> The second event came during negotiations for a peaceful exit for Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych this winter. The American government was deeply involved in trying to broker a handover; Vice President Biden was on the phone with Yanukovych. Then the Ukrainian leader suddenly fled the country. "Putin thought that yet again the Americans had duped him. That’s when he said, 'I’m done worrying about what they think about me.'" In short, Putin had adopted a structuralist view. Believing that American grand strategy was geared toward undermining him at every turn, he rejected any attempt to reckon with Obama as an agent of policy. But that was an emotional decision—hence McFaul's allegiance to agency.
> 
> “We tend to assign a lot of rationale and logic to individuals and states, and my experience in government suggests ... they’re people with emotions, with worldviews, and that different people in that job will behave differently,” McFaul said. "The good news is that this is not part of a grand strategy where first they take Crimea, then eastern Ukraine, then Moldova, and then a piece of Estonia. This was a response to the collapse of the government in Kiev."
> 
> Yet even if the spark wasn't a grand strategy, the ground has now shifted. "The bad news is I think Putin is now locked into his worldview," McFaul said. "It’s going to be a long, long confrontational struggle with Russia that will last at least until Putin is no longer the leader."


----------



## Edward Campbell

We can file this report, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Financial Times_, under "It's Not Easy being Green Russia:"

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/668ee370-090e-11e4-8d27-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz37Thz6iI4


> Wooing China runs into local difficulty in Russia far east
> 
> By Kathrin Hille in Khabarovsk
> 
> July 14, 2014
> 
> When Russia and China inked a $400bn gas supply deal in May it marked an unexpected breakthrough after a decade of delays and bogged-down negotiations.
> 
> For Vladimir Putin, the deal was something more: the dawn of a new golden era in Russo-Chinese economic co-operation.
> 
> As relations with the west fray over Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Mr Putin has reacted by seeking to throw open the door to Chinese trade and investment.
> 
> In addition to the gas deal, Moscow has lauded China as Russia’s most important economic partner, set up a host of joint projects in energy, infrastructure and technology, and estimated that bilateral trade will more than double by 2020 to $200bn.
> 
> Yet a visit to Pashkovo, a village on the banks of the Amur river that divides the two countries, suggests Mr Putin’s vision – for all its potential – is still beset by longstanding rivalry and mistrust.
> 
> In 2008, two Chinese forestry companies invested here with the aim of serving their nearby factory. Two years later, they found the door slammed in their faces after Russia closed the local border crossing.
> 
> “[To begin with], we would ship the wood across the river to our plant in China for further processing, just a few kilometres away,” says Zhao Fuquan, director of the sawmill Heilongjiang Xin Chun Timber Group runs here. “Now every truckload has to make a 700km detour. That cut our profits in half.”
> 
> His frustration is but one example of the enormous hurdles Chinese companies face in conquering Russia.
> 
> Most are active in the Russian far east, a vast, resource-rich but sparsely populated region between Lake Baikal and the Pacific coast.
> 
> Kangbo, a Chinese seller of agricultural machinery in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (JAO), is struggling to keep afloat as Russian customs imposes strict quotas on large gear.
> 
> “We have to undergo an onerous application process for every single combine harvester we want to import. In 2013 the government approved only one machine for the JAO for the entire year,” says Chen Dajun, the local manager.
> 
> Oubangde, another Chinese forestry firm, had its logging concession shut down last year after federal authorities conducted a series of raids and found fault with fire security measures, work permits and tax records.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Zu Guofu, head of the company’s operations in Russia, accuses the regional government of systematically targeting Chinese investors.
> 
> The Chinese are making inroads and steadily weaving themselves into the fabric of the economy. In Khabarovsky Krai, they accounted for 4 per cent of foreign direct investment last year, up from 2 per cent in 2009. If round-tripping by Russian groups registered offshore was excluded, the ratio would be much higher.
> 
> In Birobidzhan, capital of the JAO, most new buildings are built by Chinese contractors and the Chinese play a growing role in the local retail, logistics, hotel and recycling sector. “Without the Chinese, this whole place would stop running,” says Wang Mingwei, an official who represents the city of Yichun in Birobidzhan.
> 
> Larger firms are now following the small companies that spearheaded the move. Fuyao, one of the world’s largest manufacturers of car glass, has set up shop south of Moscow where it supplies a Volkswagen plant.
> 
> Russian officials say they are wooing Chinese investors but acknowledge that it is a process fraught with challenges for both sides.
> 
> “Bilateral trade and investment are growing fast, and all the more so now since the Ukraine crisis,” says Maxim Tarasov, head of the foreign economic co-operation and investment department at the ministry of economic development in the Khabarovsky Krai.
> 
> But echoing views widespread in Russia, he complains that Chinese investors are mainly interested in getting their hands on Russia’s natural resources and it is hard to persuade them to set up manufacturing operations or employ Russian staff – something Moscow considers key to making the partnership benefit the Russian economy. “The Chinese want whatever is most profitable,” says Mr Tarasov.
> 
> The Chinese have not endeared themselves to the locals by using mainly Chinese workers in the Russian far east – similar to their approach in Africa and Latin America.
> 
> Haihua, the other wood processing plant in Pashkovo, employs 105 Chinese and only 20 Russians. Chinese managers claim that local villagers are too lazy and too often drunk. Chinese staff, who stay at dormitories at the plant, work seven days a week from dawn to dusk.
> 
> The disregard for local knowledge and customs has proved costly at times. Consider China National Electric Engineering, a state-owned enterprise that is building an iron ore extraction plant in the JAO for an affiliate of the London-listed Petropavlovsk Group.
> 
> CNEEC was fined repeatedly for failing safety inspections. According to Gu Xiaomei, the deputy general manager, no member of the project team had any Russia experience and the company only hired a Russian chief engineer after the unsuccessful inspections.
> 
> Such sensitivities could become even more acute as the Chinese make a grab for Russian land. In recent years, Chinese state farms have followed a wave of individual Chinese farmers to the Russian far east. According to Russian data, the agricultural area contracted by farms from China’s northeastern province of Heilongjiang is expected to expand from less than 50,000 hectares in 2008 to 666,666 hectares in 2016.
> 
> As China’s vice-president argued during a Moscow visit in May: “You have the land and the resources, and we have the people and the money.”
> ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
> 
> *Japan and South Korea push their companies*
> 
> Japan and South Korea are prodding their companies to team up in Russia to stem China’s economic power there, writes Kathrin Hille in Khabarovsk.
> 
> The embassies of Japan and Korea have in recent weeks hosted companies from both countries with investments in Russia and are planning more meetings this year, according to diplomats and company executives.
> 
> “Japanese and Korean companies in Russia should consider each other as partners now that China is getting stronger and stronger,” said a Japanese diplomat. “Russia’s decision to seek a much closer partnership with China can only create pressure on our economic interests. Our companies can counter this.”
> 
> The initiative follows Moscow’s move to crank up trade, financial and investment relations with China as economic ties with Europe, its main source of foreign investment, suffer as a result of the standoff over Ukraine.
> 
> Since the US and the EU slapped sanctions on Russian government officials and businesspeople, President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly singled out China as an important economic partner.
> 
> His signing of a $400bn gas export deal in May, which Russian state firm Gazprom  had failed to close with its Chinese partner for more than a decade, is seen as a signal of a new willingness in Moscow to make concessions to receive access to the Chinese market and attract Chinese funds.
> 
> Last week, Russian and Chinese companies and regions signed contracts worth $3.15bn at a bilateral trade fair, with most funds earmarked for trade with Russia’s far east.
> 
> This has caused alarm in Tokyo and Seoul. This year, Park Byung-hwan, an official at the economic section of the Korean embassy in Moscow, warned that China was gaining a “huge impact on the region” and called Chinese companies’ growing presence there a threat.
> 
> Seoul and Tokyo see the Russian far east, with its energy and raw material resources and reserve of agricultural land, as vital for future energy and food security. South Korea’s keen interest in the energy resources of Russia’s far east was one factor behind Seoul’s decision to support the development of the Rason port in North Korea, which is linked to the Russian rail system.
> 
> _Additional reporting by Simon Mundy in Seoul and Ben McLannahan in Tokyo_




I have mentioned before that the Russia Far East is _Asian_ and, in the minds of many Chinese, _Asian Siberia_ ought to be a Chinese vassal.


----------



## Kirkhill

Just as the Tungusic Manchus of the Qing and the Mongols of the Yuan were vassals of the Han?

The Han have not demonstrated a propensity for prolonged ventures outside the Middle Kingdom.

I still feel that both the Rus and the Han take the people of the steppes too much for granted.  The Rus are losing influence in the East and the Han are gaining influence.  That doesn't mean that either of them are particularly welcome, or at home, out there.  

The Han's best bet is to stay home and trade.


----------



## Edward Campbell

The Chinese do *not*, in my opinion, want to own Siberia. (Some Chinese feel the Qing went too far in annexing Xinjiang.) They do, however, reject the notion that Russia, a European power, should have sovereignty in East Asia. My _sense_ is that the preferred (by the Chinese) solution is an independent _East Siberia_ ~ maybe several states ~ within China's _sphere of influence_.

Staying home and trading is the best idea ... but the Russian Far East is a problem.


----------



## Kirkhill

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> ... but the Russian Far East is a problem.



Agreed in full.

With respect to Qing  annexing Xingjiang to China: perhaps, given the geographic origins of the Qing, they saw it as Xingjiang annexing China?


----------



## Edward Campbell

There's some discussion, including in e.g. _Bloomberg_ that Putin is doing what he's doing in Ukraine to shore up his support at home, even though he must know that he's on the wrong side of history in the eyes of most, much anyway, of the world. It _might_ be that Putin has troubles, more than are visible to us, at home and he must take risks with his international reputation in order to score domestic political points.

The contrary opinion is that he's trying to strengthen Russia's global 'hand' by acting the bully, and the increased domestic support is just a nice byproduct.

*------------------*

Edited to add:

More on this idea in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Financial Times_:

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cc3ca75c-10c5-11e4-812b-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz380Qzv9iv


> The Kremlin’s Machiavelli has led Russia to disaster
> *Putin is revealed as a reckless gambler leading his country into economic and political isolation*
> 
> By Gideon Rachman
> 
> July 21, 2014
> 
> Just a couple of months ago it was fashionable to laud Vladimir Putin for his strategic genius. American rightwingers contrasted his sure-footedness with their own president’s alleged weakness. In a column entitled “Obama vs Putin, The Mismatch ”, Charles Krauthammer argued: “Under this president, Russia has run rings around America.” Rudy Giuliani, former mayor of New York, praised Mr Putin’s decisiveness and cooed: “That’s what you call a leader.” Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence party, said Mr Putin was the world leader he most admired.
> 
> How misplaced all this adulation looks after the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. Russia’s apparent policy of supplying anti-aircraft missiles to the Ukrainian rebels was not simply immoral. It also gives the lie to the idea that Mr Putin is some kind of strategic genius. Instead he is revealed as a reckless gambler, whose paranoid and cynical policies are leading Russia into economic and political isolation.
> 
> The Kremlin’s mini Machiavelli believed he could destabilise eastern Ukraine while maintaining plausible deniability about Russia’s links to the separatist rebels.
> 
> However, the puppet master failed to keep hold of the strings. After the deaths of nearly 300 innocent civilians, a harsh light is shining on Russia’s involvement in the tragedy. Outside Russia, only a hard core of Putin apologists is likely to accept denials of involvement.
> 
> The Russian authorities now face a very difficult choice. If they co-operate with an international investigation into the MH17 atrocity, the results are likely to be extremely embarrassing. But if they block the investigation, shelter behind conspiracy theories or even send troops into eastern Ukraine, they will encourage an even fiercer international backlash. Last week, even before the airliner tragedy, the US had announced intensified sanctions. The EU is also now likely to toughen its stance. Some big Russian companies are losing access to western capital markets.
> 
> Political isolation also looms. Russia has already been chucked out of the Group of Eight leading industrial nations. The Australians, who lost several citizens on the flight, are balking at welcoming Mr Putin to a G20 summit in Brisbane in November. Russia’s hosting of the 2018 World Cup will come into question before long.
> 
> Mr Putin’s mistakes extend beyond the irresponsibility of enabling the separatists to shoot at passing aircraft. That blunder has its roots in at least four other failed policies. First, there was the wildly excessive reaction to the idea that Ukraine might sign a trade deal with the EU. The idea that Brussels was desperately trying to grab Ukraine was paranoid. In reality, the EU has, for decades, been embarrassingly reluctant to admit Ukraine. Nato membership – which Moscow evoked as the great threat to Russia – was a similarly remote prospect. At its 2008 summit Nato declined to put Ukraine on the path to membership, and that has been the basic position ever since.
> 
> Russia’s second blunder was to stir up unrest in Ukraine while denying responsibility. This must have seemed smart in a cynical sort of way – and it certainly caught the world off guard when it came to the annexation of Crimea. But in eastern Ukraine, Moscow’s manipulation has been less effective and harder to disguise. This has culminated in the MH17 tragedy. The result is that Russia has the worst of both worlds. It is not completely in control of events but is still blamed for them. And rightly so because, even if the order to shoot did not come from Moscow, the Russians enabled the disaster to happen.
> 
> The third trap that Mr Putin has created for himself involves the manipulation of Russian public opinion through increasingly crude, nationalistic propaganda. This has had the desired effect of boosting the president’s approval ratings. But it also makes it much harder for him to back down. Anything less than total support for the separatists will open Mr Putin to the charge that he has failed to protect Russian speakers from the “fascists” his media claim control Ukraine.
> 
> His fourth blunder has been consistently to underestimate the reaction in the west. Perhaps he was convinced by the sycophants around him – and their echo chamber overseas – that he is a master strategist and that the west is feeble. The west’s response has sometimes been slow but real sanctions have been passed, and more are on their way. Russia’s business leaders are aghast at the situation. But, for now, they are powerless.
> 
> By allowing himself to be sucked into an unnecessary and destructive confrontation with the west, Mr Putin is also engaging with the wrong problem. For all Moscow’s paranoia about Nato, the real strategic challenge to Russia is the rise of China. But, locked into a confrontation with the west, Mr Putin has become a supplicant of Beijing, as is evident in the lopsided energy deal recently signed with China.
> 
> It is the tame Russian media’s job to gloss over this record of failure and misjudgment and instead to present Mr Putin as a hero standing up to a hostile world. Opinion polls suggest this campaign is working well for the moment.
> 
> The danger is that the only way for Mr Putin to disguise his repeated failures is to further ratchet up the atmosphere of crisis, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which Russia is indeed faced by an increasingly hostile west. That policy is dangerous for the world – and, most of all, for Russia itself.




I _think_ Mr Rachman has identified Russia's real enemy: it's China, not the West/NATO. 


*-------------------*

Further edit to add:

This is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Globe and Mail_:



> Harper saw through Putin from the start
> 
> J.L. GRANATSTEIN
> Contributed to The Globe and Mail
> 
> Published Tuesday, Jul. 22 2014
> 
> _J.L. Granatstein is a fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. William Kaplan is a Toronto lawyer and historian._
> 
> Stephen Harper was right. It’s not fashionable today to say that about anything the Prime Minister says or does. It’s especially against the current to praise his foreign policy which, most critics agree, is distinguished only by its unbalanced megaphone style and simplistic good versus evil rhetoric. But how can anyone deny that on Vladimir Putin, Mr. Harper, from the get go, got it right on the money?
> 
> Consider the recent record. After Russia orchestrated the absorption of Crimea into the Soviet Union – oops – into Russia, the Prime Minister told a German audience that Mr. Putin was a “throwback” to the USSR. “Unfortunate as it sounds,” Mr. Harper observed, “it’s increasingly apparent to me that the Cold War has never left Vladimir Putin’s mind.” Then the Prime Minister added, “we simply … cannot afford the risk of Europe going back to being a continent where people seize territory … where the bigger military powers are prepared to invade their neighbours or carve off pieces.” The economy was important, he went on, but global security remained Canada’s highest priority.
> 
> In April, Mr. Harper spoke out again: “When a major power acts in a way that is so clearly aggressive, militaristic and imperialistic, this represents a significant threat to the peace and stability of the world, and it’s time we all recognized the depth and the seriousness of that threat.” All nations had to be rallied “to understand that peace and stability is being threatened here in a way that has not been threatened since the end of the Cold War.”
> 
> From the outset Mr. Harper declared the presence of Russian troops in Crimea to be an “illegal military occupation” and said Canada would refuse to recognize the forthcoming referendum that Mr. Putin used to “legitimize” its seizure. Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird chimed in to call the upcoming referendum “a Soviet-style tactic that’s unacceptable for a G8 country…” So it was.
> 
> Russian-sponsored and Russian-assisted separatist groups were already operating in eastern Ukraine, arming Russian nationalist thugs to fight against the legitimate Kiev government. The Canadian government believed that Russian special forces were on the ground, training the separatists and providing them with weapons. In May, Prime Minister Harper was sharp-tongued: “We are obviously concerned by the continuing escalation of violence in Ukraine, which to me very much appears to be clearly what I would call a slow-motion invasion on the part of the Putin regime.”
> 
> Thus, when Mr. Harper flew off to Europe on a week-long trip at the beginning of June, a trip that was to culminate with a gathering of world leaders on the Normandy beaches to mark the 70th anniversary of D-Day, Mr. Harper declared forthrightly that he had no interest in talks with Mr. Putin. The Russian leader should be present at Normandy, he said, recognizing the critical role the Soviet Union played in defeating Nazi Germany, but even if European leaders wanted to talk to him, he did not. All the Europeans should do was deliver a clear denunciation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Mr. Harper said in Brussels that the message should be about “ending illegal occupations, about ending provocative actions, ending the supporting of violent actions in eastern Ukraine.” He called upon the G7 to take immediate action.
> 
> There were a succession of sanctions by Western nations against Russia, and there will be more. And NATO, including Canada, began military efforts to bolster the states that might be in Mr. Putin’s crosshairs next. These measures were pinpricks, though they will now be increased further.
> 
> The reason, of course, is that a Malaysian airliner was destroyed by a Russian surface-to-air missile almost certainly fired by Russian-aided separatists in the Donetsk “People’s Republic.” The evidence is not yet all in, but Mr. Harper’s response, again, was exactly right in tone and content. “It is clear,” he announced Monday, “that the Putin regime’s continuing provocative military action against Ukraine, its illegal occupation of the Crimean peninsula, and its failure to end its support to armed separatist groups in eastern Ukraine constitute a threat to international peace and security.” Canada, the Prime Minister said, in concert with its allies would step up its sanctions.
> 
> From the very beginning of this current crisis, Canada’s Prime Minister has been dead right in his assessment of Vladimir Putin. To Moscow, the supporters and officials of the Ukrainian government are regularly painted as fascists and Nazis. But to Mr. Harper, and now incontrovertibly to rest of the world, Mr. Putin is a Stalinist using Nazi big-lie techniques and Soviet-era disinformation tactics to try to camouflage his government’s actions and shift blame. It won’t work, and to Stephen Harper’s credit, he not only saw these appalling tactics for what they were months ago, but was among the first Western leaders to call on the world to take action.


----------



## pbi

> The third trap that Mr Putin has created for himself involves the manipulation of Russian public opinion through increasingly crude, nationalistic propaganda. This has had the desired effect of boosting the president’s approval ratings. But it also makes it much harder for him to back down. Anything less than total support for the separatists will open Mr Putin to the charge that he has failed to protect Russian speakers from the “fascists” his media claim control Ukraine.



I think this bit is very important. Putin woke up the tiger of Russia's traditional paranoid xenophobic nationalism, then climbed up on its back. (Look at the current coat of arms of the Russian state: a direct throwback to Imperial Russia: Great Russia is back!)  Now, if he tries to climb off the tiger, it might eat him.

And, God knows, we have no idea what even greater nasty might take his place, if Putin wasn't enough for the Russian self-image.


----------



## Kirkhill

Stratfor's take on Putin's situation and prospects....


----------



## Edward Campbell

pbi said:
			
		

> I think this bit is very important. Putin woke up the tiger of Russia's traditional paranoid xenophobic nationalism, then climbed up on its back. (Look at the current coat of arms of the Russian state: a direct throwback to Imperial Russia: Great Russia is back!)  Now, if he tries to climb off the tiger, it might eat him.
> 
> And, God knows, we have no idea what even greater nasty might take his place, if Putin wasn't enough for the Russian self-image.




More on this theme in this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Globe and Mail_:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/putin-cant-back-down-now/article19718068/#dashboard/follows/


> Putin can’t back down now
> 
> MARK MACKINNON
> The Globe and Mail
> 
> Published Wednesday, Jul. 23 2014
> 
> The pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin grows each day. He must end his support for the rebels accused of shooting down a passenger plane over eastern Ukraine, Western leaders say, or face tougher economic sanctions and greater political isolation.
> 
> And each day, Mr. Putin makes it clearer that he’s not about to bend.
> 
> Mr. Putin is in a trap of his own making following the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. He’s unable – even if he were willing – to meet the West’s demands, in large part due to the anti-Western opinion in Russia he and his Kremlin have moulded over 15 years in power.
> 
> Having cast the West as Russia’s enemy for so long, and having personally vowed to protect ethnic Russians everywhere, analysts say Mr. Putin would be fiercely criticized at home if he pulled an about-face and abandoned the separatists of the Donetsk People’s Republic under pressure from Washington and London.
> 
> Much of the world sees the pro-Russian rebels as the villains of the MH17 saga. But they have been portrayed as heroes – standing up for their right to speak Russian and choose their own course – on Kremlin-run television for the past five months, making it almost impossible for Mr. Putin to desert them now.
> 
> “People are still supportive of the government, and they buy into this picture created by Russian TV of a fascist government in Kiev trying to destroy the population of the southeast [of Ukraine], of Novorossiya,” said Sergey Utkin, head of strategic assessment at the Moscow-based Russian Academy of Sciences. “It’s a myth that’s dear to Russian conservatives,” he added, “and we have quite a lot of Russian conservatives these days – call them revanchists if you like.”
> 
> “I’m afraid we can’t hope that this conflict will end soon. Most probably, it will escalate.”
> 
> In such an atmosphere, Mr. Putin is under domestic pressure to do more, not less, to support the rebels in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine, an area collectively known as Donbass. “Putin risks coming into contradiction with public opinion [if he cuts support to the rebels]. Public opinion is very clear – do not allow the killing of ethnic Russians in Donbass,” said Sergei Markov, a Moscow-based political scientist and unofficial Kremlin spokesman.
> 
> Amid Ukrainian allegations of a renewed buildup of tanks and troops on the Russian side of the border, Mr. Markov said the option of direct Russian military intervention in eastern Ukraine remained very much on the table. “The fact that Putin didn’t send the troops in yet is because it requires more preparation.”
> 
> Kiev and the West accuse Russia of having fomented the civil war in eastern Ukraine, supplying the rebels with fighters and weapons including tanks and anti-aircraft systems. More than 1,000 combatants and civilians have been killed since fighting began in April.
> 
> While other observers feel Mr. Putin is extremely unlikely to send Russian troops into eastern Ukraine following the MH17 disaster, there is still a sense in Moscow that the country is locked into a confrontation with the West with no obvious way out.
> 
> Former finance minister Alexei Kudrin, once a close associate of Mr. Putin’s, warned Tuesday that there were some in Russia “who have long wanted to distance us, who have wanted isolation.” He said Russians risked seeing their standards of living fall by as much as one-fifth if the conflict in Ukraine continues and the country’s confrontation with the West grows.
> 
> “All this has fallen onto fertile ground and I’m just surprised at the scale of the anti-Western rhetoric which has emerged here,” Mr. Kudrin told the Itar-Tass news service.
> 
> Since last week’s downing of MH17, which killed all 298 people on board, Russian media have created another alternate reality, one in which the rebels aren’t presumed guilty of firing the surface-to-air missile. Theories suggesting the Ukrainian military may have downed the plane to frame Russia and its allies are given plenty of airtime.
> 
> Tuesday saw a fresh tranche of actions aimed at upping the pressure on Mr. Putin. The European Union said it was preparing new sanctions to punish Russia for its actions in Ukraine, while the United Kingdom announced a public inquiry into the 2006 death of Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB operative who was poisoned with polonium while sipping tea in a London hotel, to determine whether the Russian state was involved.
> 
> Some Russian observers argue that each new round of blame and sanctions from the West makes Mr. Putin even less likely to do what’s being demanded of him.
> 
> “Any pressure like [new sanctions] would only strengthen the hardliners in Russia, and only lead to a more robust and tough position,” said Pavel Andreev, executive director of the Valdai Club Foundation, a state-backed foreign-policy think tank in Moscow.
> 
> Indeed, rather than acknowledging his weakening position and stepping away from his unsavoury allies in eastern Ukraine, Mr. Putin emerged from a much-anticipated meeting of his Security Council sounding as if he was preparing instead for an arms race against the NATO military alliance.
> 
> “NATO is demonstratively reinforcing its grouping on the territory of East European states, including in the areas of the Black and Baltic Seas,” Mr. Putin said, referring to recent alliance deployments in Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. “Because of this, we need to implement all planned measures to boost the country’s defence capabilities fully and in time, naturally including Crimea and Sevastopol.”
> 
> Crimea and the Black Sea port of Sevastopol are considered part of Ukraine by those in the West who consider Russia’s March annexation of the peninsula illegal. The seizure of Crimea marked the start of a fresh spiral in relations between Moscow and the West, with the United States, the EU and Canada implementing several rounds of sanctions since then.
> 
> The Crimea annexation was part of Russia’s response to a February revolution in Kiev, which saw the Moscow-friendly government of Viktor Yanukovych ousted in what Russia says was a Western-supported “coup.” The new government of President Petro Poroshenko is portrayed by the Kremlin as having “fascist” leanings, even though far-right candidates were distant finishers in May’s election.




I suspect no one (not me, certainly) is absolutely certain about whether "Mr. Putin is in a trap of his own making" or whether he is preparing Russia for another all out _struggle_ with the US led West. Remember that Stalin could have been a major - almost certainly the biggest - beneficiary of American generosity in the 1940s and 50s: the Marshal Plan and so on. But he chose to _challenge_ the US led West for global supremacy.  

"Russia," Churchill famously said, "is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."


----------



## pbi

> “All this has fallen onto fertile ground and I’m just surprised at the scale of the anti-Western rhetoric which has emerged here,” Mr. Kudrin told the Itar-Tass news service.



Surprised? Really? I'd say it was only to be expected.


----------



## Edward Campbell

_The Economist_ makes Russia/Putin its 'cover story' this week:







Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from that newspaper, is that 'lead' story:

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21608645-vladimir-putins-epic-deceits-have-grave-consequences-his-people-and-outside-world-web
My emphasis added


> A web of lies
> *Vladimir Putin’s epic deceits have grave consequences for his people and the outside world*
> 
> Jul 26th 2014 | From the print edition
> 
> IN 1991, when Soviet Communism collapsed, it seemed as if the Russian people might at last have the chance to become citizens of a normal Western democracy. Vladimir Putin’s disastrous contribution to Russia’s history has been to set his country on a different path. And yet many around the world, through self-interest or self-deception, have been unwilling to see Mr Putin as he really is.
> 
> The shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, the killing of 298 innocent people and the desecration of their bodies in the sunflower fields of eastern Ukraine, is above all a tragedy of lives cut short and of those left behind to mourn. But it is also a measure of the harm Mr Putin has done. Under him Russia has again become a place in which truth and falsehood are no longer distinct and facts are put into the service of the government. Mr Putin sets himself up as a patriot, but he is a threat—to international norms, to his neighbours and to the Russians themselves, who are intoxicated by his hysterical brand of anti-Western propaganda.
> 
> The world needs to face the danger Mr Putin poses. If it does not stand up to him today, worse will follow.
> 
> *Crucifiction and other stories*
> 
> Mr Putin has blamed the tragedy of MH17 on Ukraine, yet he is the author of its destruction. A high-court’s worth of circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that pro-Russian separatists fired a surface-to-air missile out of their territory at what they probably thought was a Ukrainian military aircraft. Separatist leaders boasted about it on social media and lamented their error in messages intercepted by Ukrainian intelligence and authenticated by America (see article).
> 
> Russia’s president is implicated in their crime twice over. First, it looks as if the missile was supplied by Russia, its crew was trained by Russia, and after the strike the launcher was spirited back to Russia. Second, Mr Putin is implicated in a broader sense because this is his war. The linchpins of the self-styled Donetsk People’s Republic are not Ukrainian separatists but Russian citizens who are, or were, members of the intelligence services. Their former colleague, Mr Putin, has paid for the war and armed them with tanks, personnel carriers, artillery—and batteries of surface-to-air missiles. The separatists pulled the trigger, but Mr Putin pulled the strings.
> 
> The enormity of the destruction of flight MH17 should have led Mr Putin to draw back from his policy of fomenting war in eastern Ukraine. Yet he has persevered, for two reasons. First, in the society he has done so much to mould, lying is a first response. The disaster immediately drew forth a torrent of contradictory and implausible theories from his officials and their mouthpieces in the Russian media: Mr Putin’s own plane was the target; Ukrainian missile-launchers were in the vicinity. And the lies got more complex. The Russian fiction that a Ukrainian fighter jet had fired the missile ran into the problem that the jet could not fly at the altitude of MH17, so Russian hackers then changed a Wikipedia entry to say that the jets could briefly do so. That such clumsily Soviet efforts are easily laughed off does not defeat their purpose, for their aim is not to persuade but to cast enough doubt to make the truth a matter of opinion. In a world of liars, might not the West be lying, too?
> 
> Second, Mr Putin has become entangled in a web of his own lies, which any homespun moralist could have told him was bound to happen. When his hirelings concocted propaganda about fascists running Kiev and their crucifixion of a three-year-old boy, his approval ratings among Russian voters soared by almost 30 percentage points, to over 80%. Having roused his people with falsehoods, the tsar cannot suddenly wriggle free by telling them that, on consideration, Ukraine’s government is not too bad. Nor can he retreat from the idea that the West is a rival bent on Russia’s destruction, ready to resort to lies, bribery and violence just as readily as he does. In that way, his lies at home feed his abuses abroad.
> 
> *Stop spinning*
> 
> In Russia such doublespeak recalls the days of the Soviet Union when Pravda claimed to tell the truth. This mendocracy will end in the same way as that one did: the lies will eventually unravel, especially as it becomes obvious how much money Mr Putin and his friends have stolen from the Russian people, and he will fall. The sad novelty is that the West takes a different attitude this time round. In the old days it was usually prepared to stand up to the Soviet Union, and call out its falsehoods. With Mr Putin it looks the other way.
> 
> Take Ukraine. The West imposed fairly minor sanctions on Russia after it annexed Crimea, and threatened tougher ones if Mr Putin invaded eastern Ukraine. To all intents and purposes, he did just that: troops paid for by Russia, albeit not in Russian uniforms, control bits of the country. But the West found it convenient to go along with Mr Putin’s lie, and the sanctions eventually imposed were too light and too late. Similarly, when he continued to supply the rebels, under cover of a ceasefire that he claimed to have organised, Western leaders vacillated.
> 
> Since the murders of the passengers of MH17 the responses have been almost as limp. The European Union is threatening far-reaching sanctions—but only if Mr Putin fails to co-operate with the investigation or he fails to stop the flow of arms to the separatists. France has said that it will withhold the delivery of a warship to Mr Putin if necessary, but is proceeding with the first of the two vessels on order. The Germans and Italians claim to want to keep diplomatic avenues open, partly because sanctions would undermine their commercial interests. Britain calls for sanctions, but it is reluctant to harm the City of London’s profitable Russian business. America is talking tough but has done nothing new.
> 
> Enough. The West should face the uncomfortable truth that Mr Putin’s Russia is fundamentally antagonistic. Bridge-building and resets will not persuade him to behave as a normal leader. The West should impose tough sanctions now, pursue his corrupt friends and throw him out of every international talking shop that relies on telling the truth. Anything else is appeasement—and an insult to the innocents on MH17.
> 
> _From the print edition: Leaders_




Indeed!


----------



## pbi

My very unscientific  impression is that in fact, public opinion in the West is rapidly turning against Russia. Of course this is not a universal trend, nor should we expect it to be in such diverse and pluralistic societies, but I think it is significant. If Russia continues to tough it out (which they almost have to...), I think that they will continue to lose the public opinion war.

To me this shows the importance of free, diverse and fractious media. That doesn't really exist in Russia (with a few brave exceptions), but it does in the West. I know that we spill a lot of digital ink on the pages of this site in slagging the media, but in my opinion in their diversity, sarcasm, cynicism and freedom the media are one of the very few real guardians of democracy. The fact that they are frequently at loggerheads with governments is a good sign of this.

If Russia were truly to have traditions of democracy, individual freedom, tolerance and free media, it's interesting to imagine what the country would be like, and what its role in the world would be. But, of course, this is counterfactual pipe-dreaming: I don't think there is any fertile soil in Russian society for any of that.


----------



## Kirkhill

pbi said:
			
		

> ....
> To me this shows the importance of free, diverse and fractious media. That doesn't really exist in Russia (with a few brave exceptions), but it does in the West. I know that we spill a lot of digital ink on the pages of this site in slagging the media, but in my opinion in their diversity, sarcasm, cynicism and freedom the media are one of the very few real guardians of democracy. The fact that they are frequently at loggerheads with governments is a good sign of this.
> ....



Agreed entirely.  My only beef with the media is when they get above their station and start to believe that they are arbiters of "The Truth".  I enjoy reading one fantastical opinion as much as another.  I become vexed when the opinionated are also intolerant and full of themselves.  

(Sorry for the tangent).


----------



## pbi

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Agreed entirely.  My only beef with the media is when they get above their station and start to believe that they are arbiters of "The Truth".  I enjoy reading one fantastical opinion as much as another.  I become vexed when the opinionated are also intolerant and full of themselves.
> 
> (Sorry for the tangent).



Yes, but twas ever so. Go back to the very beginnings of the old 17th century newsheets, and I think you'll find that objectivity was not only unheard of, but probably would not have been understood. All media takes one stand or another, and if they are serious about journalism they probably believe strongly that what they are writing is "true".

OK...maybe not the National Enquirer....


----------



## a_majoor

Sanctions where they really hurt: expose Putin's own web of offshore accounts, real estate holdings and other financial shenanigans:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/24/how_to_kneecap_the_thug_in_the_kremlin_putin_ukraine_mh17



> Last week, Putin’s wholly owned guerrilla subsidiary in Ukraine blew 298 civilians out of the sky, looted the belongings of the victims, let their cadavers rot for days in the hot summer sun, then violently obstructed OSCE monitors from inspecting the carnage. Talk of a forensic “investigation” at this point is just that — talk. Furthermore, according to U.S. intelligence, the Kremlin was evidently so pleased with this performance that it has dispatched more materiel to the culprits in eastern Ukraine. This new hardware includes rocket launchers, light arms, and tanks — only adding to the sophisticated weapons already sent in to aid the rebel cause. There are “indications,” U.S. officials say, that advanced Russian anti-aircraft systems — such as vehicle-mounted Buk (or SA-11) missile launchers, which defense and aviation analysts agree were responsible for downing MH17 — had been moved into eastern Ukraine from Russia and then back to the Motherland following the immolation of the airliner. The West has lately discovered something about Putin that Marina Litvinenko did eight years ago: his penchant for covering up his worst crimes. . . .
> 
> Let’s give Putin a clear choice: Either he can continue subventing and enabling the bloodletting in eastern Ukraine, or we can expose the enormous global network of offshore bank accounts, dummy companies, and real estate holdings that belong to him and his criminal elite. A mafia state should be treated as such. And information should once again be weaponized as it was during the Cold War. Moscow has already gotten a head start, by leaking compromised telephone calls between members of our State Department and between Eurocrats and NATO-allied state officials.
> 
> Investigative journalism has already yielded reams of copy on where some of the Putinist wealth is hidden, and how it got there. Much of it is in EU jurisdictions, which are subject to sanctions and/or concerted American diplomatic overtures. The U.S. Treasury Department, the CIA, and the FBI all know more about Putin’s and his cronies’ billions than they say publicly.



excerpt from the longer article


----------



## The Bread Guy

The Russian air force's "poke, poke, poke" efforts continue ....


> Polish aviators, who are heading the NATO air-policing mission in the Baltic states for the fifth time, say that they are faced with growing activity of the Russian Air Forces.
> 
> Lieutenant Colonel Piotr Wyrembski, deputy head of the mission, told BNS that NATO fighter jets usually have to take off from the base in Šiauliai, north Lithuania, in order to escort Russian warplanes flying from northern Russia to its Kaliningrad region.
> 
> In his words, this can be explained by growing frequency in Russia's war games and reinforced Russian Air Force.
> 
> "The activity in the air-space is growing gradually and it can be seen every year. A few years ago, it was rather trivial, and now it [the number of take-offs] is growing with every rotation and every mission," said Wyrembski.
> 
> A Polish air contingent currently serves in the Lithuanian Air Force Aviation Base in Šiauliai with British airmen. *In September, the mission will be taken over by Canada and Portugal*, before going back to Poland and Great Britain again in January ....


_Lithuania Tribune_, 28 Jul 14


----------



## Kirkhill

Coming soon to Latin American cities near you.  Brought to you by Rosoboronexport.

Russia is exporting SafeCitiesTM.  

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/155847/russia-plans-to-build-%E2%80%9Csafe-cities%E2%80%9D-in-latin-america.html


----------



## Edward Campbell

Who said the World Bank was apolitical?

Canada and the USA turn the screws on Russia's credit according to this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Bloomberg News_:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-24/u-s-canada-to-oppose-world-bank-development-projects-in-russia.html


> U.S., Canada to Oppose World Bank Aid Projects in Russia
> 
> By Sandrine Rastello and Theophilos Argitis
> 
> Jul 25, 2014
> 
> The U.S. and Canada will oppose World Bank projects in Russia, adding economic pressure on the country over its actions in Ukraine.
> 
> The U.S. will vote against Russia-related loans and investments that come before the board, Treasury Department spokeswoman Holly Shulman said. Melissa Lantsman, a spokeswoman for Canadian Finance Minister Joe Oliver, said her country also opposes such projects. European governments are discussing doing the same, a European official said, asking not to be named because the discussions are confidential. Japanese Finance Minister Taro Aso said his nation may reconsider support.
> 
> The World Bank unit that lends directly to governments has 10 investment projects currently in Russia totaling $668 million, though less than half of the total has been disbursed, according to the bank. It also has nine Russian projects in preparation worth a total of $1.34 billion, including one on pre-school education and another focused on energy efficiency, according to its website.
> 
> While Canada and the U.S. account for about one-fifth of votes at the 188-member institution, their opposition would be enough to delay loans, said Scott Morris, a former deputy assistant secretary for development finance and debt at the Treasury in Washington. If European Union countries follow the U.S., the bank’s largest shareholder, projects could end up not being presented to the board, he said.
> 
> *Halting Projects*
> 
> “If they informally took a poll of their shareholders and understood that the balance weighed toward opposition, it’s very unlikely the bank management would proceed to bring something to the board and watch it be rejected,” Morris said. “This is a very difficult thing for the president of the World Bank to navigate.”
> 
> World Bank spokesman David Theis declined to comment.
> 
> Two days ago, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development bowed to its shareholders and said it’s halting new Russia projects after a majority indicated it would not support them. European Union leaders last week had made it part of their latest round of sanctions over Russia’s involvement in unrest in eastern Ukraine.
> 
> The U.S. and Canada have also decided to oppose EBRD projects in Russia, the spokeswomen said.
> 
> “We will consider what to do based on what the European and other nations decide to do,” Japan’s Aso said.
> 
> The U.S. is pushing Europe to toughen its stance toward President Vladimir Putin a week after a Malaysian commercial jet was destroyed by a missile American officials say was probably fired from a Russian-supplied launcher. Russia denies involvement in the disaster, which led to the death of 298 people.
> 
> *Nearing Contraction*
> 
> Yesterday, the International Monetary Fund said Russia’s economic growth will slow to 0.2 percent this year from 1.3 percent last year. Sanctions may weaken growth even further, IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard told reporters in Mexico City.
> 
> While the economic impact of scrapped development projects on Russia would be minor, the opposition to World Bank support could prove painful if Russia needed a rapid disbursement from the bank, said Morris, a senior associate at the Center for Global Development, an aid research group in Washington.
> 
> The World Bank already was thrust into discussions over how to use economic sanctions to punish Russia, when the lender eight weeks ago approved its first investment there since Putin annexed Crimea. Canada then voted against it, while the U.S. and some EU countries abstained.
> 
> *Kim’s View*
> 
> The International Finance Corp., the World Bank’s private-sector arm, voted May 29 for parts of a 250 million euros ($337 million) package enabling French grocery retailer Groupe Auchan SA to expand in Russia, Vietnam and other emerging markets.
> 
> World Bank President Jim Yong Kim tried to keep his institution outside of the debate earlier this week, saying the bank has a good relationship with both Ukraine and Russia.
> 
> “We are going to continue to focus on trying to provide the kind of support and advice that will help both of those countries in responding to issues of poverty,” he said in a July 22 interview in the southern Indian city of Chennai. “It is extremely important for the world community to have an organization that remains apart from the politics and focuses on economics.”




This is a good move. I hope the EU, Japan and others get on board.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Part 1 of 2

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_ is a *Russian insider's* look at "What Moscow _Really_ Wants:"

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141538/alexander-lukin/what-the-kremlin-is-thinking


> What the Kremlin Is Thinking
> *Putin’s Vision for Eurasia*
> 
> By Alexander Lukin
> 
> FROM OUR JULY/AUGUST 2014 ISSUE
> 
> Soon after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Western leaders began to think of Russia as a partner. Although Washington and its friends in Europe never considered Moscow a true ally, they assumed that Russia shared their basic domestic and foreign policy goals and would gradually come to embrace Western-style democracy at home and liberal norms abroad. That road would be bumpy, of course. But Washington and Brussels attributed Moscow’s distinctive politics to Russia’s national peculiarities and lack of experience with democracy. And they blamed the disagreements that arose over the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Iran on the short time Russia had spent under Western influence. This line of reasoning characterized what could be termed the West’s post-Soviet consensus view of Russia.
> 
> The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has finally put an end to this fantasy. In annexing Crimea, Moscow decisively rejected the West’s rules and in the process shattered many flawed Western assumptions about its motivations. Now U.S. and European officials need a new paradigm for how to think about Russian foreign policy -- and if they want to resolve the Ukraine crisis and prevent similar ones from occurring in the future, they need to get better at putting themselves in Moscow’s shoes.
> 
> *BACK TO THE BEGINNING*
> 
> From Russia’s perspective, the seeds of the Ukraine crisis were planted in the Cold War’s immediate aftermath. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the West essentially had two options: either make a serious attempt to assimilate Russia into the Western system or wrest away piece after piece of its former sphere of influence. Advocates of the first approach, including the U.S. diplomat George Kennan and Russian liberals, warned that an anti-Russian course would only provoke hostility from Moscow while accomplishing little, winning over a few small states that would end up siding with the West anyway.
> 
> But such admonitions went unheeded, and U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush chose the second path. Forgetting the promises made by Western leaders to Mikhail Gorbachev after the unification of Germany -- most notably that they would not expand NATO eastward -- the United States and its allies set out to achieve what Soviet resistance had prevented during the Cold War. They trumpeted NATO’s expansion, adding 12 new members, including former parts of the Soviet Union, while trying to convince Russia that the foreign forces newly stationed near its borders, in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, would not threaten its security. The EU, meanwhile, expanded as well, adding 16 new members of its own during the same period.
> 
> Russian leaders were caught off-guard; they had expected that both sides would increase cooperation, remain responsive to each other’s interests, and make mutually acceptable compromises. The Russians felt that they had done their part: although never entirely abandoning the idea of national interests, Russia had shown that it was willing to make sacrifices in order to join the prevailing Western-led order. Yet despite an abundance of encouraging words, the West never reciprocated. Instead, Western leaders maintained the zero-sum mindset left over from the Cold War, which they thought they’d won.
> 
> It remains hard to say whether a different approach to the post-Soviet states would have produced a better result for the West. What is obvious is that the course Clinton and Bush took empowered those Russians who wanted Moscow to reject the Western system and instead become an independent, competing center of power in the new multipolar world.
> 
> Today, the West’s continued advance is tearing apart the countries on Russia’s borders. It has already led to territorial splits in Moldova and Georgia, and Ukraine is now splintering before our very eyes. Divisive cultural boundaries cut through the hearts of these countries, such that their leaders can maintain unity only by accommodating the interests of both those citizens attracted to Europe and those wanting to maintain their traditional ties to Russia. The West’s lopsided support for pro-Western nationalists in the former Soviet republics has encouraged these states to oppress their Russian-speaking populations -- a problem to which Russia could not remain indifferent. Even now, more than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than six percent of the population in Estonia and more than 12 percent of the population in Latvia, most of them ethnic Russians, do not have the full rights and privileges of citizenship. They cannot vote in national elections, enroll in Russian schools, or, for the most part, access Russian media. The EU, despite its emphasis on human rights outside its borders, has turned a blind eye to this clear violation of basic rights within them. So when it came to Ukraine and the threat of NATO forces appearing in Crimea -- a region for which Russia has special feelings and where most residents consider themselves Russian -- Moscow decided that there was nowhere left for such minorities to retreat. Russia annexed Crimea in response to the aspirations of a majority of its residents and to NATO’s obvious attempt to push Russia’s navy out of the Black Sea.
> 
> Western leaders were taken aback by Moscow’s swift reaction. In late March, General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s supreme allied commander for Europe, said with surprise that Russia was acting “much more like an adversary than a partner.” But given that NATO has acted that way since its founding -- and never changed its approach after the Cold War -- Moscow’s actions should have been expected. It was only a matter of time before Russia finally reacted to Western encirclement.
> 
> In this context, the government of Vladimir Putin has interpreted Western protests about the situation in Ukraine as nothing more than a case of extreme hypocrisy. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the Kremlin could think otherwise. Consider the EU’s recent criticism of right-wing groups in Ukraine. In March, the EU’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, condemned Right Sector, a militant nationalist group, for attempting to seize the parliament building in Kiev. But the EU had effectively supported Right Sector when it took to the streets to depose the government of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych only months earlier. None of this is surprising, of course; Western leaders have never had any difficulty justifying the actions of such extremist groups when convenient, as when it assisted Croatians fighting in the self-proclaimed republic of Serbian Krajina in 1995 or nationalists in Kosovo in 1997–98.
> 
> Western hypocrisy doesn’t end there. Washington has regularly chastised Russia for violating the sanctity of Ukraine’s borders. Yet the United States and its allies have no leg to stand on when it comes to the principle of territorial integrity. After all, it was not Russia but the West that, in 2010, supported the ruling by the International Court of Justice that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 did not violate international law. And Moscow repeatedly warned that the precedents set by Western military interventions in such places as Kosovo, Serbia, Iraq, and Libya would undermine the existing system of international law -- including the principle of sovereignty as enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Accords, in which the West formally acknowledged the national boundaries of the Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and the Warsaw Pact states.
> 
> In spite of such Western double standards, Moscow has offered up a number of proposals for resolving the Ukraine crisis: the creation of a coalition government that takes into account the interests of the eastern and southern regions, the federalization of the country, the granting of official status to the Russian language, and so on. But Western ideologues seem unlikely to ever accept such proposals. Working with Russia, instead of against it, would mean admitting that someone outside the West is capable of determining what is good and what is bad for other societies.
> 
> *COLLISION COURSE*
> 
> Given the growing distance between Russia and the United States and Europe, it was only a matter of time before their two approaches collided in Ukraine, a border state that has long vacillated between the pull of the East and that of the West. The struggle initially played out between opposing Ukrainian political factions: one that advocated signing an association agreement with the EU and another that favored joining the customs union formed by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia.
> 
> Western leaders have consistently viewed such Russian-led efforts at regional integration as hostile moves aimed at resurrecting the Soviet Union and creating an alternative to the Western system. Most officials in the United States and Europe thought that bringing Ukraine into alignment with the EU would deliver a heavy blow to those plans, which explains why they interpreted Yanukovych’s decision to temporarily postpone the signing of the EU agreement as a Russian victory that called for a counterattack.
> 
> Yet Western leaders are woefully misinformed about the idea of Eurasian integration. Neither Russia nor any of the states seeking to join a Eurasian system wants to restore the Soviet Union or openly confront the West. They do, however, believe that in a multipolar world, free nations have a right to create independent associations among themselves. In fact, the ruling elites of many former Soviet republics have long favored the idea of maintaining or re-creating some form of association among their states. In 1991, for example, they created the Commonwealth of Independent States. And of the 15 former Soviet republics, only a few of them, primarily the Baltic states, have used the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to permanently abandon all ties to the former union and join Western economic and political unions instead. The remaining countries struggled to arrive at a consensus on precisely what role the CIS should play.
> 
> In some former Soviet republics, leaders have actively sought to create new forms of integration, such as the Eurasian Economic Community, whose members include Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan (Uzbekistan suspended its membership in 2008). In others, such as Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, the ruling elites considered the commonwealth the primary means for obtaining a civilized divorce from Russia and dividing up the ownership rights and authorities that were previously held by a single, unified state. In most of these countries, at least part of the official establishment and a significant segment of the general population wanted to maintain close relations with Russia and the other former Soviet states. In Georgia and Moldova, for instance, various ethnic minorities feared increasingly assertive nationalist majorities and hoped that Russia would help protect their rights. In other states, including Belarus and Ukraine, significant parts of the populations had such close economic, cultural, and even familial bonds with Russia that they could not imagine a sharp break.
> 
> Yet economic problems have long stood in the way of real integration. Although Putin came to power convinced that the collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century, he waited a decade -- until Russia had gained sufficient economic and political strength -- to do anything about it. It wasn’t until 2010 that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia launched a customs union, the first real step toward meaningful economic cooperation among post-Soviet states. The union created a territory free from duties and other economic restrictions, and its members now apply common tariffs and other common regulatory measures in their trade with outside countries. Negotiations are currently under way to add Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to the union.
> 
> In addition to providing economic benefits, Eurasian integration has fostered security cooperation. Like NATO, the Collective Security Treaty Organization -- which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan -- requires signatories to help assist any member that comes under attack. Many Eurasian countries put a special value on the CSTO; their leaders know that despite assurances from many other countries and organizations, in the event of a real threat from religious extremists or terrorists, only Russia and its allies will come to the rescue.
> 
> *UNDER GOD, INDIVISIBLE*
> 
> With economic cooperation a success, political elites in the countries of the customs union are now discussing the formation of a Eurasian political union. As Putin wrote in the Russian newspaper Izvestiya in 2011, Moscow wants the new union to partner with, not rival, the EU and other regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the North American Free Trade Agreement. That would help the member states “establish [themselves] within the global economy,” Putin wrote, and “play a real role in decision-making, setting the rules and shaping the future.” For such a union to be effective, however, it will need to evolve naturally and voluntarily. Moreover, taking post-Soviet integration to a new level raises the question of what deeper values would lie at its foundation. If the countries of Europe united to champion the values of democracy, human rights, and economic cooperation, then a Eurasian union must stand for its own ideals, too.
> 
> Some political thinkers have found the ideological foundation for such a union by looking to history. The concept of a Eurasian space or identity first arose among Russian philosophers and historians who immigrated from communist Russia to western Europe in the 1920s. Like Russian Slavophiles before them, advocates of Eurasianism spoke of the special nature of Russian civilization and its differences from European society. But they gazed in a different direction: whereas earlier Slavophiles emphasized Slavic unity and contrasted European individualism with the collectivism of Russian peasant communities, the Eurasianists linked the Russian people to the Turkic-speaking peoples -- or “Turanians” -- of the Central Asian steppe. According to the Eurasianists, the Turanian civilization, which supposedly originated in ancient Persia, followed its own unique political and economic model -- essentially, authoritarianism. Although they valued private initiative in general, many of the Eurasianists condemned the excessive dominance of market principles over the state in the West and emphasized the positive role of their region’s traditional religions: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. However dubious the Eurasianists’ historical claims about the Turanians may be, this theory now enjoys wide popularity not only among a significant part of the Russian political elite but also in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and other Central Asian states where the Turanians’ descendants live.
> 
> Although the old ideas advanced by today’s Eurasianists may seem somewhat artificial, the plan to establish a Eurasian union should not be considered so far-fetched. The culture and values of many former Soviet republics really do differ from what prevails in the West. Liberal secularism, with its rejection of the absolute values that traditional religions hold as divinely ordained, may be on the rise in western Europe and the United States, but in these former Soviet republics, all the major religions -- Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism -- are experiencing a revival. Despite the significant differences between them, all these religions reject Western permissiveness and moral relativism, and not for some pragmatic reason but because they find such notions sinful -- either unsanctioned or expressly prohibited by divine authority.
> 
> Most inhabitants of these post-Soviet states also resent that people in the West consider their outlook backward and reactionary. Their religious leaders, who are enjoying increasing popularity and influence, concur. After all, one can view progress in different ways. If one believes that the meaning of human existence is to gain more political freedoms and acquire material wealth, then Western society is moving forward. But if one thinks, as a traditional Christian does, that Christ’s coming was humanity’s most important development, then material wealth looks far less important, for this life is fleeting, and suffering prepares people for eternal life, a process that physical riches hinder. Religious traditionalists see euthanasia, homosexuality, and other practices that the New Testament repeatedly condemns as representing not progress but a regression to pagan times. Viewed through this lens, Western society is more than imperfect; it is the very center of sin.
> 
> A great majority of Orthodox Christian believers in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova agree with all of this, as do many people in Central Asia. And these beliefs have propelled to power leaders who support the integration of the former Soviet republics. They have also helped Putin succeed in establishing an independent power center in Eurasia. Western meddling, meanwhile, has only served to further consolidate that power.



End of Part 1 of 2


----------



## Edward Campbell

Part 2 of 2



> *MOVING FORWARD*
> 
> The situation in Ukraine remains tense. It might very well follow the example of Moldova, effectively splitting in two. The United States has perceived Russian calls for dialogue as an attempt to dictate unacceptable conditions. In Russia, the continuing strife has fueled the activity of nationalists and authoritarians. The latter group has become especially active of late and is presenting itself as the only force capable of protecting Russia’s interests. An uncontrolled escalation of the confrontation could even lead to outright war. The only solution is for the United States and its allies to change their position from one of confrontation to one of constructive engagement.
> 
> After all, a diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis is still possible. Even during the Cold War, Moscow and the West managed to reach agreements on the neutral status of Austria and Finland. Those understandings did not in the least undermine the democratic systems or the general European orientation of those countries, and they even proved beneficial to their economies and international reputations. It is no coincidence that it was Finland, a neutral state with strong ties to both the West and the Soviet Union, that hosted the talks leading to the signing of the Helsinki Accords, which played a major role in easing Cold War tensions. The solution to the current crisis similarly lies in providing international guarantees for both Ukraine’s neutral status and the protection of its Russian-speaking population. The alternative would be far, far worse: Ukraine could well break apart, drawing Russia and the West into another prolonged confrontation.




I think that Dr Lukin's view that we, in the US led West are, and have been since the 1990s, *hypocrites* is well taken. I will not comment further onthe terminally f___ing stupid decision to enlarge NATO into Russia's backyard ... except to that that it represents a low point in American strategy.


_____
     Dr Alexander Lukin is Director, Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at Moscow State Institue of International Relations of the MFA of Russia.

     Alexander Lukin received his first degree from Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 1984, a doctorate in politics from Oxford University in 1997 and a doctorate in history from the Russian Diplomatic Academy in 2007.
     He worked at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Soviet Embassy to the PRC, and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

     He holds the position of Advisor to the Governor of the Moscow Region on Foreign Economic Relations and serves on the editorial board of the International Problems journal in Belgrade, Yugoslavia).

     In 2009 he was awarded by President Hu Jintao a medal for the "Outstanding Contribution to the Development of Sino-Russian Relations." The medal was awarded to sixty Russians to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment
     of the diplomatic relations between the PRC and the USSR.

     He is also a member of the Russian National Committee of The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)


----------



## Lightguns

I think it is hypocritical to think that Russia somehow owns the free nations that border it.  Western expansion has been lead by the elected governments of those nations, not by the NATO or EU.  Those nations have had to fullfill criteria in order for admission.  In Russia, free trade means surrendering your internal secuity and political structures to Russian control in order to receive a penance from Russia.   In the West, Free Trade means developing the institutions of democracy and anti-corruption in your own national way and seeking acceptance from the EU and NATO.  The fact is that nations WANT to become apart of Europe, while those who sign on with Russia feel like they have no other choice.

I have no doubt the gentlemen is receiving medals from Putin!


----------



## Edward Campbell

The only _criteria_ Bill Clinton and George W Bush sought was a "please" ...

I'm not suggesting that those "free nations" could not or should not choose their own fates. But I am suggesting asserting that there was not, in the 1990s or early 2000s, and is not now any reason to allow them, much less invite invite them into NATO. Both NATO and Russia would have benefited from a _buffer zone_ between the two.

I think adding some, even most of .g. the Czech Republic, Estomnia, Hungary, Latvia, Lituania and Poland to the EU was a good idea and I think it would have been less _provocative_ had they not been NATO members, too.


----------



## Kirkhill

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I think adding some, even most of .g. the Czech Republic, Estomnia, Hungary, Latvia, Lituania and Poland to the EU was a good idea and I think it would have been less _provocative_ had they not been NATO members, too.



But how would that have played out?

The easterners are very cognizant of their geopolitical position as the new cockpit of Europe.  The Metternich solution to the last one was the independent state of Belgium - neutrality guaranteed.

For the easterners security they need/want both economic and military security.  The EU provides one, NATO the other.  The idea being that the nation can advance more quickly if it doesn't have to sink a fortune into unproductive military activity.  In the absence of NATO then you would see the Neutral states aligning and allying with each other and creating a third military unit on the continent.  

Would a third, independent, military alliance, one with a deep antipathy towards Russia and a resentful attitude towards the west (due to the manner in which the West has treated them since 1918, if not earlier, and still treats them) be in the West's or Russia's best interest?

I don't think Russia would be any happier to find themselves barricaded by an alliance of Swedes, Finns, Balts, Poles, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks and Romanians, with or without the Ukraine.

In the meantime the West would have lost some leverage with that central alliance and more likely to find themselves responding to events  in Central Europe and less able to influence events without significant ammunition expenditure.


----------



## Edward Campbell

I understand that the "easterners ... need/want both economic and military security," but that doesn't mean that we, the West, are obliged to provide either or even that it is our interests to provide either. I think _integrating_ the "easterners" into 'Economic Europe' was, broadly, a good idea ... I think it would have been even better had we *not* integrated them into our military security system.


----------



## Kirkhill

Your point is taken and well understood.

My counter would be along the lines that even now, inside NATO, Poland in particular is actively taking measures to strengthen its own position militarily and economically.  As well they are reaching out to fellow NATO easterners to find like-minded associates.  And they are open in their desire to support Ukraine against Russia.

What odds that they might already be in Ukraine except for the "steadying hand - dead weight" of NATO?

Would it have served the EU - Old NATO any better if the fighting had spread - potentially allowing the front to move further west?


----------



## vonGarvin

The other alternative could have been the loose association of "Partnership for Peace", such as one finds in Austria, Sweden and other nations.  They get some sort of military support (in terms of training, cooperation on international missions, etc), but remain steadfastly neutral, neither for nor against (officially) one side or the other.


----------



## YZT580

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> The only _criteria_ Bill Clinton and George W Bush sought was a "please" ...
> 
> I'm not suggesting that those "free nations" could not or should not choose their own fates. But I am suggesting asserting that there was not, in the 1990s or early 2000s, and is not now any reason to allow them, much less invite invite them into NATO. Both NATO and Russia would have benefited from a _buffer zone_ between the two.


Gee.  Wasn't that the general idea behind the nuclear non-aggression treaty signed by Russia, GB, and others that caused Ukraine to release its nuclear weapons back to Moscow.  They signed up to be the buffer and we can all see how that worked out right?  Going to war for Ukraine may not be a smart idea but doing nothing is even dumber.  Every step Putin takes west is one step closer to a return to the 1960,s and 70's.  Buffers don't work unless that buffer is so well armed that going over or through becomes too costly an exercise.  So a friendly Ukraine that is armed to the teeth is the perfect east/west buffer.  An emasculated Ukraine (as now) becomes and now is a potential flash point to European war.


----------



## Edward Campbell

YZT580 said:
			
		

> Gee.  Wasn't that the general idea behind the nuclear non-aggression treaty signed by Russia, GB, and others that caused Ukraine to release its nuclear weapons back to Moscow.  They signed up to be the buffer and we can all see how that worked out right?  Going to war for Ukraine may not be a smart idea but doing nothing is even dumber.  Every step Putin takes west is one step closer to a return to the 1960,s and 70's.  Buffers don't work unless that buffer is so well armed that going over or through becomes too costly an exercise.  So a friendly Ukraine that is armed to the teeth is the perfect east/west buffer.  An emasculated Ukraine (as now) becomes and now is a potential flash point to European war.




Ukraine is too poor, too backward, to arm itself "to the teeth" and there is no political will in the West (Germany and the USA, really) to arm it as a surrogate. 

Putin is, in my opinion, welcome to return to the 1960s - it was an especially low point for Russia. I have no objection to Russia being mismanaged back to that level - and I do not believe Russia can, for at least a couple of generations, manage anything reasonably well. There is a HUGE _cultural_ (sophistication) defecit in Russia. I'm guessing it can be overcome - primarily by Russia being less and less _Russian_.

I really do not see anyone, anywhere, being willing to go to war over Ukraine: Hand wringing? Yes; Fighting? No.


----------



## Kirkhill

Worth quoting in its entirety...

Lilia Shevtsova in The American Prospect
http://www.the-american-interest.com/shevtsova/2014/08/28/putin-ends-the-interregnum/

I don't find anything to disagree with.



> NEW WORLD DISORDER
> Putin Ends the Interregnum
> Vladimir Putin’s increasingly reckless interventions in Ukraine should force the West to reevaluate everything it thought it knew about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the past two decades of Western policy on Russia.
> 
> When the Gaza War and the threat from ISIS pulled global attention away from Ukraine, you could almost hear the sighs of relief emanating from the Western capitals: Finally, something to distract us from this Eurasian conundrum! This isn’t to say that Western leaders don’t understand that the war in Ukraine has implications for both the international order and the West’s own internal workings. By now they appreciate the stakes (or at least they ought to); they just haven’t been able to come up with an answer.
> 
> Meanwhile, Russia itself faces a conundrum of its own. By attempting to shift Russia backward to an older civilizational model, Putin has already inflicted a deep strategic defeat on his country. His efforts to turn Russia back to the “Besieged Fortress” model will only rob Russia of its chance to become a modern society. Moreover, Putin has also unleashed forces he can’t hope to contain, thus accelerating the agonizing decay of his own regime. Nevertheless, though he has lost the battle with history, Putin has been moving from one tactical victory to the next by forcing the West to constantly react and try to accommodate his reckless behavior.
> 
> Russia’s recent “humanitarian invasion” of nearly 200 trucks—which crossed the border and then returned, the Ukrainian government alleges, with stolen factory equipment—is only one of the more recent Kremlin experiments aimed at testing both the global rules of the game and Western leaders’ readiness to confront Russia. This alleged mass theft, in particular, took place just before Ukraine’s Independence day, on the eve of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Kiev and before the meeting between Putin and Poroshenko. It was an intentional slap in the face, meant to bring across a simple message: “Screw you! We don’t care what you say!”
> 
> The Kremlin has been intentionally escalating tensions in order to ready us for Putin’s attempt to assume the role of Peacemaker—albeit on his terms. Peacemaking, for the Russian leader, is merely a means to another goal: forcing the West to accept the Kremlin’s right to change the rules of the game whenever it suits its interests. Indeed this is precisely what he demonstrated at the recent meeting in Minsk between the EU, Russia, and Ukraine, where Putin stubbornly refused to admit to the Russian military’s involvement in the war in Ukraine.
> 
> What this means is that there are no concessions on the part of the West and Ukraine that can satisfy the other side. This is true not because of bellicosity or incompetence of the Russian leader; he is quite rational and competent. Rather, he understands all too well the logic of personalized power in Russia—that, at this late stage of regime decay, it requires him to keep Russia in a state of war with the outside world. The war with Ukraine has thus become an existential problem for the current Russian political regime. It can’t afford a defeat. Yesterday Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko claimed—and NATO satellite imagery appears to confirm—that Russian troops have openly invaded the Ukrainian territory, proving that the Kremlin is no longer interested in forestalling an escalation. Hell is unfolding…
> 
> 
> Several years ago the famous Polish political philosopher and sociologist Zygmunt Bauman reintroduced into our political lexicon the term “interregnum” (a word once used by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci to describe the early 1930s). The term means “a time without a trajectory,” or “a time outside of time,” when the old is dying and the new has not yet been born or is too faint to notice. It is a treacherous time to interpret: Is it just before dawn, or just after dusk? “Interregnum” is also an apt description for the times in which the world found itself during the first decades of the 21st century: a time of ideological fuzziness, political ambivalence, and normative relativism.
> 
> Having flipped the global chessboard with his annexation of the Crimea and an undeclared war against Ukraine, Putin effectively ended the most recent period of interregnum and inaugurated a new era in global politics. However, no one yet knows what this era will bring. The global community is still reeling in shock, when it isn’t trying to pretend that nothing extraordinary has in fact occurred. This denial of the fact that the Kremlin has dealt a blow to conventional ideas, stable geopolitical constructs, and (supposedly) successful policies proceeds from the natural instinct for self-preservation. It is also quite natural that the political forces that have grown accustomed to the status quo will try to look to the past for answers to new challenges—this is precisely what those who were unprepared for a challenge always do. It was easy enough to predict that many politicians and political analysts would explain what Putin has done to the global order by using Cold War analogies. Drawing these historical parallels is potentially useful in only one respect: if they help us to see what is truly new about the current situation, and the scale of the risks involved.
> 
> The Cold War of the past century was not merely a competition of two global systems; it was also a clash of two ideologies that sought world domination. Russia, having entered a stage of decline, no longer possesses a global ideology and cannot play a role in counterbalancing the West. Nevertheless, the new containment policy initiated by the Kremlin should concern the West, since in one important respect these times differ from those of the Cold War. Back then, the opposing sides attempted to follow the rules of the game (the Cuban Missile Crisis was the sole exception that highlighted the need to play by the rules). The current confrontation with the West instigated by Putin’s Russia, however, is characterized by a new set of circumstances:
> 
> Russia and the West (primarily Europe) are economically interconnected.
> There is now a massive pro-Kremlin lobbying operation within Western society. This operation engages right- and left-wing forces, as well as business elites and former politicians, in serving the Kremlin’s interests.
> Unlike the Soviet Kremlin, Putin’s Kremlin is not only prepared to violate the international rules of the game; it also demands that the world recognize its right to interpret them.
> Influential forces within Western society aren’t ready to acknowledge the failures of Western policy on Russia. These “accommodators,” attempting to act within the past framework of engaging Russia, view its current belligerence as a temporary phenomenon caused by local factors.
> Thus, the Western proponents of the two opposing courses on Russia are quite confused now. After all, the Kremlin seeks to contain the West even as it maintains an active presence there, which prevents the West from either successfully containing or engaging Russia. Аs for the dual-track approach—that is, the combination of both containment and engagement—the West has never had success with this. The crisis of these past foreign policy models has become obvious in the case of Ukraine, where the West still struggles to find a solution that would end the Kremlin’s undeclared war. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has managed to force the West to accept the aggressor in this conflict as a peacemaker and mediator. Not only that, but it is also now trying to force the West to agree to a new status quo, without offering its own pledge to respect it.
> 
> In other words, we face a new reality in which neither Cold War schemes nor post-Cold War settlement approaches appear to work. This means that we will have to revisit a number of traditional views, including our views on the collapse of the Soviet Union—which, as we now should understand, merely served to sustain the Russian Matrix of personalized power at the cost of dismantling the old state. The same understanding applies to Yeltsin’s role: He was in fact an architect of anti-Communist authoritarianism, creating the constitutional grounds for Putin’s regime. We will have to take a fresh look at the policies the West has been advancing over the past twenty years, ranging from the European Union’s roadmaps for Russia’s inclusion in Europe to the U.S. “reset” and the EU’s “Partnership for Modernization.” We will need to ask ourselves to what extent Western policies were actually means of including Russia in Western normative space, and to what extent they merely facilitated the revival of the Russian personalized power system. Having cast aside imitations of partnership and democratization in Russia, Putin seriously damaged the reputation of Western intellectual and political communities. Just think how many analytical publications, speeches, and dissertations have now been rendered superfluous, if not just plain wrong! How many political decisions and constructs have been exposed as futile, or even deleterious to the liberal democracies! Even a short list of misguided political actions, op-eds, and academic research would offer a stunning example of a collective failure to analyze, predict, and react to the obvious.
> 
> Meanwhile, Russia’s war against Ukraine could have consequences reaching even further than those of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.Russia’s war against Ukraine could have consequences reaching even further than those of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet collapse was unexpectedly peaceful (again despite numerous predictions to the contrary). The Soviet Union just cracked and crumbled like a clay pot. This painless demise to a large extent resulted from the fact that the old and frail Soviet elite was unable to struggle for survival, and a significant number of Russians wanted change and looked up to the West. The situation is drastically different today: the Russian elite will fight tooth and nail to survive, using every means at its disposal—including, we now see, external aggression, blackmail, and the threat of undeclared war. Besides, the Russians of today, zombified by television war propaganda, fear change and view the West suspiciously. The 1991 Soviet collapse spawned a democratic euphoria and hopes for the ultimate victory of liberal democracy. Today the world finds itself in the midst of the authoritarian surge. In its final days, the Soviet Union could barely attract worldwide, let alone Western, support; Putin’s Kremlin, meanwhile, has managed to find supporters in the West all across the political spectrum—many of whom aren’t always aware of whose tune they’re dancing to. Today’s Russia is an advance combat unit of the new global authoritarianism, with China acting as its informal leader and waiting in the wings to seize its own opportunities. Indeed, by destabilizing the Western world and exposing its weaknesses, Putin is effectively doing Beijing’s dirty work.
> 
> Putin’s Kremlin challenged the West at the same time that the liberal community was losing its mission and normative dimension. This is essentially a civilizational rather than a geopolitical challenge: Apart from testing the liberal democracies’ ability to defend the global order, it is testing their ability to reintroduce the normative dimension to their foreign policies. That is exactly what Ukrainian crisis is about: Here Putin is trying to explore how strong the West’s positions are. The Kremlin isn’t fighting for the rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, or for greater autonomy for the east. These issues are ultimately of little significance to the Kremlin. Instead, what we have in Ukraine is a battle waged by a declining but ever more desperately aggressive authoritarianism against a hostile civilization. And today’s Russian elite will not leave the battlefield voluntarily, as the impotent Soviet leaders once did. After the Kremlin turned Ukraine into an internal political factor, and turned containment of the West in Ukraine into a tool for mobilizing Russians around their leader, it cut off its avenues for retreat. Retreat would lead to a loss of power and control over the country, which under current Kremlin conditions, would be tantamount to suicide (and not just the political variety). Putin’s retreat would spell defeat for global authoritarianism. Therefore, we can expect that Beijing will lend Moscow a helping hand where possible. (Beijing will also force Moscow to pay for this help—the recent Russia-China gas contract, which exclusively caters to Chinese interests, is a clear illustration of what’s to come).
> 
> To be sure, it’s possible to reach the same diagnosis I have here and nevertheless draw precisely the opposite conclusions: “We should accommodate Russia. Ukraine is a failed state no matter what we do. Let the Russians have this twilight zone.” So say those who believe that it is still possible to fall back to the familiar “Let’s Pretend!” game of the past. Even those who understand that the world now faces a much more formidable challenge calling for new and far reaching solutions still haven’t fully grasped the meaning of the new reality unfolding before our eyes.
> 
> Ironically, the 1991 Soviet collapse did not guarantee the gradual rise of liberal civilization. We are witnessing its crisis twenty years later. Perhaps, the West needs rivals like the former Soviet Union to sustain itself and remain true to form. The West needs to return to its mission and core values in order to respond to Putin’s Russia, but doing so calls for taking stock of the mistakes and dashed hopes of the past. It requires an overhaul of long-standing and ostensibly immutable institutions and principles, including: the European security system (particularly as it pertains to energy security); issues involving democratic transitions, war and peace, and global government and responsibility; and the role of the normative dimension in foreign policy.
> 
> What a mess Putin has gotten us all into! But let’s also give him his due: He has paved the way for the emergence of new trends—or at least he’s called the existing ones into serious question. He has also facilitated the formation of Ukrainian national identity, ensuring that the country will never again become a mere extension of Russia. He has thus undermined his own dream—that of creating the Eurasian Union. He has precipitated a crisis in his own country, making its future path completely unpredictable. And finally, he has reminded NATO of its mission and prompted the liberal democracies to reflect on their own principles.
> 
> Now, it is entirely up to the West. The liberal democracies may choose to return to their foundations. If not, the accommodators—those who hope for a return to the old “Let’s pretend!” game—will win. If they do, this will give a green light to the Authoritarian Internationale, signaling that the West is weak and can be trampled underfoot.


----------



## Kirkhill

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ....
> 
> But, Putin is leaving himself a number of options.
> 
> The Kazakhs may well be in his sights next.
> http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kazakhs-worried-after-putin-questions-history-of-country-s-independence/506178.html
> 
> Kazakhstan would be a softer target than Ukraine.  Less Western interference likely.  The Chinese position would be interesting to see.
> And there have been some interesting issues with Russia moving missiles into the border area with Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan shutting down Baikonur, failed missile launches dropping debris on Kazakh villages.



Further to Kazakhstan and Vlad's comments.

President of Kazakhstan opens the possibility of withdrawing from Vlad's Eurasian Union if its independence is threatened.



> Kazakhstan may leave EEU if its interests are infringed: Nazarbayev
> 
> Wednesday, 27.08.2014, 22:44
> 
> Kazakhstan has a right to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union if its interests are infringed, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev reminded in an interview to Khabar TV Channel.
> 
> "If the rules set forth in the agreement are not followed, Kazakhstan has a right to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union. I have said this before and I am saying this again. Kazakhstan will not be part of organizations that pose a threat to our independence. Our independence is our dearest treasure, which our grandfathers fought for. First of all, we will never surrender it to someone, and secondly, we will do our best to protect it," the President said



http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-may-leave-EEU-if-its-interests-are-infringed-Nazarbayev-255722/


----------



## Kirkhill

Vlad has placed his Iskanders in three locations of interest.

Kaliningrad, Krasnodar (in the Kuban adjacent to Ukraine and "Caucasus Emirate") and outside Orenburg facing Kazakhstan and at the pass around the south end of the Urals that connects Siberia to European Russia




> Kaliningrad’s Drift toward Europe Shows What Happens to Russians Cut Off from Russia, Nationalist Commentator Says
> 
> Paul Goble May 15, 2014
> Print Friendly
> Staunton, May 15 – Separatist and pro-German sentiment among ethnic Russians in Kaliningrad reflects not only German revanchist efforts but the threat of “the alienation of young from the Russian world” if they are “cut off” for a lengthy period from Russia and if Moscow acts as if “’there are no problems’” with such people, according to a Russian nationalist writer.
> 
> In an essay on Stoletie.ru entitled “Crimea has Returned but Will Kaliningrad Leave?” Vladimir Shulgin argues that “the events in Ukraine obviously showed what will happen with a people who for a long time are intentionally separated from their true Russian name, spirituality and customs.”
> 
> The Russian nationalist’s words underscore something that Moscow is loath to admit and that helps to explain some of the hysteria behind the Kremlin’s words and actions: Russian identity is far less strong than Russians would like the world to believe, and Russians in the non-Russian countries are different from and even antagonistic to Russians in the Russian Federation.
> 
> Shulgin begins his article by asking directly “Why has our Baltic Shore suddenly been seized by an obsession with all things Koenigsberg?” Why are people in what he describes as “a typical Russian region, where [the members of that ethnic community form an enormous majority of the population saying and doing such pro-German things?
> 
> “What,” in short he asks, “does all this mean?”
> 
> In part, Shulgin says, it reflects the actions of German writers and bloggers who promote the idea of the restoration of a German Koenigsberg and who are able to win over marginal elements who carry German flags and march around. But this “separatist” movementreally “exist only in their imagination.”
> 
> German commentators call any manifestation in Kaliningrad an indication of the appearance of “die Deutsch-Russen” (German-Russians) and encourage Germans in Germany to support them. Indeed, the message to the latter may be more important than the former: Germans need to be Germans and not Europeans or Atlanticists.
> 
> But if the Koenigsberg movement is not as strong as some German writers suggest, it does exist and has a basis for doing so, Shulgin writes. And there is the chance that the movement’s activists may succeed in organizing a referendum in support of some if not all of their goals.
> 
> That is because the Russian community of Kaliningrad is largely cut off from Moscow and has begun to articulate narrow regionalist goals: autonomy from the central government, the right of return of Germans who were forced out, and the renaming of cities, towns and streets to reflect their original German titles.
> 
> Another reason they may succeed, the Russian commentator says, is that in the face of German propaganda and the lack of well-articulated national sensibilities among the Russians in Kaliningrad, “local politicians in essence do not interfere with the separatist mobilization of public opinion.”
> 
> Shulgin’s article does not mean that he believes Kaliningrad is going to become independent as “the fourth Baltic state” as some have predicted or transfer from Russian to German sovereignty, but it clearly does mean that he and others in Moscow fear that Russian identity there is weaker than they would like it to be and that measures must be taken.



http://www.interpretermag.com/kaliningrads-drift-toward-europe-shows-what-happens-to-russians-cut-off-from-russia-nationalist-commentator-says/



> ‘Siberian Federalization’ Idea Spreads to Kaliningrad and Kuban
> 
> Paul Goble August 13, 2014
> Print Friendly
> Staunton, August 13 – Despite Moscow’s apparently successful efforts to block a march in Novosibirsk this Sunday, the Russian authorities have failed to prevent the ideas behind it from spreading not only to other Siberian cities like Yekaterinburg but also and more seriously to Kaliningrad and Kuban.
> 
> Feliks Rivkin, an activist in Yekaterinburg, says that he will be leading a demonstration in his city for the same thing the Novosibirsk activists want: to force Moscow to live up to the Russian constitution and give Russian regions their federal rights. Even if the authorities refuse, he adds, his group plans to go ahead anyway.
> 
> Meanwhile, in Kaliningrad, local activists are picking up on the same ideas. One Moscow commentator, Vladimir Titov, argues that Kaliningraders don’t have all the bases for launching an independence movement, but he suggests that “the single place in Russia where at present regionalism as a political direction has real prospects” is precisely there.
> 
> Kaliningrad’s non-contiguous location, its closeness to European Union countries, and the fact that 25 percent of its residents have Shengen visas and 60 percent have foreign passports all have the effect of making ever more Kaliningraders look toward Europe rather than toward Russia proper.
> 
> Well-off Kaliningraders are buying property in the EU, they are sending their children to study in Lithuania, Poland and Germany, and “young Kaliningraders already find it difficult to name the main Russian cities, including in such lists Klaipeda, Riga, Poznan, Rostok and Lubeck.
> 
> “This isn’t surprising,” Titov says. “Warsaw and Yurmala for these young people are closer and more familiar than Kaluga or Khabarovsk.” And their elders also reflect this sense of place: They speak about conditions “among them, in Russia” in much the same way they would talk about any other foreign country.
> 
> Increasingly too, he continues, Kaliningraders refer to their land not as Kaliningrad oblast but as the Amber kray and to their capital as Koenigsberg or more familiarly Koenig. That doesn’t please the authorities or “professional patriots” but it is the way things are. None of this means they want independence, but they seek real federalization and see this as their time.
> 
> Making concessions to Kaliningrad’s special situation seems entirely reasonable, Titov says, but “then a question arises: “If Kaliningrad can, why can’t Siberia? And just who is to say that it can’t?”
> 
> But interest in federalization is not limited to Siberia and Kaliningrad. There are regionalist movements in Karelia, Ingermanland, Novgorod and elsewhere, and they have now been joined by a new one: in Kuban. Activists there have announced plans to hold a march for the federalization of Kuban on August 17 to demand a separate republic be established for them.
> 
> Regional officials in Krasnodar have already refused to give them permission, but organizers say that they will go ahead anyway, citing their Constitutional right to freedom of assembly in order to demand their Constitutional rights for federalism.
> 
> From Moscow’s perspective, this is all very disturbing. Not only does it suggest that the center is losing control over the situation in at least some regions, but it raises the spectre of regional separatism of the kind that spread through the Russian Federation in the early 1990s and that Vladimir Putin has worked hard to suppress.
> 
> Moreover, it raises questions about the dangers Moscow has brought on itself by its promotion of “federalism for export” in the case of Ukraine, especially since what Moscow has been seeking there is not devolution of powers from Kyiv but in fact separatism and a change of state borders.
> 
> In a commentary on Politcom.ru, Konstantin Yemelyanov notes that the organizers of these actions “undoubtedly are trying to use the Kremlin’s weapon against it: not long ago, for example, the theme of the federalization of Ukraine was the public basis of Russian policy toward a neighboring country, and the Russian foreign ministry highlighted all the benefits” of such arrangements.
> 
> “A political provocation which formally does not contradict Russian law but hits the weak places of Russian public policy is becoming one of the types of political participation and self-expression for the opposition.” Given the memories of those now in power about 1991, that is a truly frightening “spectre.”



http://www.interpretermag.com/siberian-federalization-idea-spreads-to-kaliningrad-and-kuban/


So Vlad has got an independent Ukraine actively leaving his orbit, an independent Kazakhstan threatening to leave his orbit, active separatists in Siberia, Kaliningrad-Koenigsberg, on the north slopes of the Caucasus (Caucasus Emirate) and most importantly in the Kuban - from where he is mounting battlegroup incursions into Ukraine.  He also has a number of other places with restive populations - including Tatarstan - and now he has just bought himself more problems by annexing Crimea with its indigenous Tatars.

Which brings us to this:



> Crimea Vote Galvanizes Separatists in Russia
> By Yekaterina KravtsovaMar. 14 2014 00:00 Last edited 21:10
> 
> David Mdzinarishvili / Reuters
> Ukrainian soldiers talking to armed men in Perevalnoye on Thursday.
> For separatist groups in Dagestan, Tatarstan and other regions of Russia, the Kremlin's support of a referendum on independence in Ukraine's Crimea peninsula would seem to provide an opportunity for their own movements, which have long been repressed by Russian authorities.
> 
> The Kremlin, evidently, does not agree. President Vladimir Putin has long been a vocal opponent of regional separatist movements in Russia, having risen to power by waging a bloody war against rebels in Chechnya, and last year he signed into law a bill that stipulates prison time for those who make separatist appeals.
> 
> Ruling party lawmakers hold a similar position, arguing that the situation in Crimea is fundamentally different from that in the North Caucasus and in multiethnic republics of Russia that have active separatist movements.
> 
> But some observers believe that in the long term, the Kremlin will not be able to restrain the activity of separatist movements across Russia if it supports measures like the Crimea referendum.
> 
> "Russia must never support any referendums [on independence]," opposition leader and anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny wrote Wednesday on his popular LiveJournal blog. "The economy will become weak and we will not be able to give wagons of money to [Chechen leader Ramzan] Kadyrov anymore. This will happen sooner or later."
> 
> "No one doubts that he will immediately organize a referendum on independence. There are no Russians there anymore, the result is clear," Navalny warned.
> 
> Chechnya and Dagestan are seen as the main centers of separatism in Russia, but there are also separatist movements in regions including Tatarstan, Tuva, Bashkortostan, Sakha, and even regions where the majority of the population is Russian, such as exclave Kaliningrad and the Primorsky region in the Far East.
> 
> In recent years, the Kremlin has initiated a policy of settling Russians from former Soviet republics in these regions, giving them Russian citizenship immediately and a place to live. Less than a decade ago, an ethnic Russian moving from a former Soviet country was required to live for five years in Russia to qualify for citizenship.
> 
> At the same time, Russia adheres to a tough policy of suppressing separatist movements. In Chechnya, Putin installed Kadyrov, the son of a former rebel who is now fiercely loyal to the Kremlin, and annually allocates millions of dollars to the republic partly in exchange for Kadyrov's efforts to quash separatist violence there.
> 
> Russia conducted two wars against Chechen separatists following the Soviet collapse. In 1991, Chechnya was declared an independent state by a leader of one of its nationalist movements, Dzhokhar Dudayev, who later became its president. It remained de facto independent until Russian troops invaded in 1994.
> 
> Troops were withdrawn in 1996 after thousands of casualties on each side, and a decision about Chechnya's status was postponed until 2001. The second war, which officially was a counter-terrorist operation, was held from 1999 until 2009, with combat operations lasting until 2001. According to official statistics, up to 160,000 people died during the two wars.
> 
> Putin typically reacts aggressively to any calls for self-determination in regions of Russia, even when such appeals appear to represent no real threat.
> 
> In October, when university professor Sergei Medvedev said he believed the Arctic should be under international control in order to prevent damage to the environment, Putin called him a "fool" and said his position was "anti-national and unpatriotic."
> 
> And late last year, Putin signed into law a measure that stipulates prison time for those who call for independence from the Kremlin. The authorities said the law would prevent the rise of possible separatist tendencies and actions that may lead to Russian regions becoming parts of other countries.
> 
> Given Putin's position on the issue, groups in Russia seeking independence for their regions see the Kremlin's support of Crimea splitting from Ukraine as highly hypocritical.
> 
> "[We] condemn Russia's ongoing double-standard policy in international and home affairs," separatist group the All-Tatar Civic Center said in a statement posted online earlier this month. "It supports any pro-Moscow national movements in former Soviet republics with all [possible] means … while on its own territory conducts a policy of brutal Christianization and Russification of enslaved peoples, with those who oppose such policy being unjustly prosecuted."
> 
> In 1992, Tatarstan held a referendum on independence and 61 percent voted for Tatarstan to be an independent country, but Russia refused to acknowledge the results of the vote.
> 
> Kremlin-loyal lawmakers and observers argued that Russia's support of the Crimea referendum was not hypocritical due to crucial differences between the Ukrainian region and Russian republics.
> 
> Robert Shlegel, a State Duma deputy from the ruling United Russia party, said the referendum in Crimea would be different from separatist initiatives in Russia because Ukraine was "in a state of anarchy."
> 
> "Moreover, Crimea is not a Russian region right now, so separatism movements in Russian regions will not take it as a sign that they can also have a referendum on independence," he said by phone. "That is why in this particular political situation holding a referendum in Crimea is a logical decision."
> 
> Another United Russia deputy, Dagestan native Gadzhimet Sarafaliyev, said he believed the Crimea referendum was legal because the peninsula was historically Russian and it was a mistake to have given it to Ukraine in the first place.
> 
> "We are talking about helping Crimea here," he said by phone. "We do not have any geopolitical interests — Crimea has always been Russian and it must be Russian again."
> 
> He said he was not concerned that the referendum might trigger an escalation of separatist movements in the turbulent Dagestan republic. "How can we talk about an escalation of something that does not exist? Dagestan is the most adapted to Russian society of all regions — there has never been any talk about it becoming a separate country."
> 
> The majority of Dagestan's population is ethnically non-Russian, with some 26 different nationalities living there, and an Islamic separatist movement is active in the republic, although the movement's adherents typically call for the creation of an independent state that would include territories from other North Caucasus republics.
> 
> Meanwhile, Russia's state-controlled media compares the Crimean referendum with upcoming referendums in Britain's Scotland and Spain's Catalonia and refers to Western support of Kosovo's separation from Serbia in 2008.
> 
> Alexei Makarkin, a deputy head of the Center for Political Technologies, a Moscow-based think tank, said that Russia has a clear division into "us and them," allowing everything for "us" and nothing for "them."
> 
> Makarkin's point was demonstrated by Safaraliyev, who insisted that Turkey must have only cultural and humanitarian cooperation with Tatars in Crimea and must not interfere in Ukraine's affairs, since it was a NATO member.
> 
> According to pro-Kremlin pundit Alexei Mukhin, who heads the Center for Political Information think tank, the Kremlin decided to support the Crimea referendum because it realized it would not inspire separatist sentiments in Russia, since all separatist movements in Russia are under the tight control of regional authorities.
> 
> But he argued that the Kremlin's support of the referendum was no more than a bluff in order to "bring to life Ukraine's political system that is stuck in mess and mayhem."
> 
> "When the Federation Council approved the president's decision to send troops to Ukraine, everyone thought war had already begun, which was not true. The same thing holds here — support of the referendum does not mean that the Crimea is already a part of Russia," Mukhin said, adding that Russia would act within the confines of international law in any case.
> 
> But Makarkin said he believed there is no logic in the Kremlin's move and that in the long term it could motivate independence movements in certain Russian regions.
> 
> "Now separatist movements fear the central authorities, who can easily destroy them, but many of them will definitely think, 'Why can't we have such a referendum?'" he said. "The Kremlin has no other answer besides, 'You cannot because it is prohibited.'"
> 
> Makarkin said that the process of fanning separatist sentiments was closely tied with the country's economic situation. "When the economy is weak, separatist movements get an additional argument for their activity," he said.
> 
> All those interviewed by The Moscow Times agreed that Russia would need to allocate significant funds to Crimea if it became part of Russia, making Russia's policy similar to that in Chechnya.
> 
> "The difference is that even though Chechnya was in an extremely disastrous state after two wars, Russia allocated money there at a time when there was economic growth in the county," Makarkin said.
> 
> "But now it would be difficult for the Kremlin both to give money to Crimea and to keep all its social promises, especially if sanctions against Russia come into effect."



http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/crimea-vote-galvanizes-separatists-in-russia/496142.html


----------



## CougarKing

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> for Russia the only down side is that China will, possibly, become its main customer - consider Canada and the USA and oil for an example of what's wrong with that relationship.



ERC,

Didn't you say at another thread that while the EU may tolerate Russia shutting off the gas, China will not?

Source: Yahoo Finance

And the oil pipeline goes ahead:



> *Russia breaks ground on new gas pipeline to China*
> 
> Russia launched construction Monday of a 770 billion ruble ($20.8 bn) gas pipeline that will help bring gas from the far east of the country to China.
> 
> "We are today starting the biggest construction project in the world," President Vladimir Putin said at the ceremonial joining of the first sections of the 3,968-kilometre (2,466-mile) Siberian Strength pipeline outside the eastern Siberian city of Yakutsk.
> 
> China's Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli, who was also in attendance at the ceremony, said he hoped the pipeline would be completed within four years.
> 
> "China already plans in the first half of next year to start building the Chinese section of the pipeline and we should make an effort to complete construction and begin exploitation of the pipeline in 2018," he said.
> 
> In May the two countries signed a 30-year deal which will eventually see Russia supplying China with 38 billion cubic metres of gas per year, an agreement worth some $400 billion.
> 
> The pipeline, which will have a total capacity of 61 billion cubic metres per year, will also link the gas fields in Yakustsk and Irkustsk to cities across the Russian far east.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Edward Campbell

In this article, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from that newspaper, _The Economist_ warns Western leaders that a "longer and broader confrontation with Russia ... lies ahead:"

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21615582-sad-reality-vladimir-putin-winning-ukraine-west-must-steel-itself


> *Ukraine, Russia and the West*
> The long game
> *The sad reality is that Vladimir Putin is winning in Ukraine. The West must steel itself for a lengthy struggle*
> 
> Sep 6th 2014 | From the print edition
> 
> IN HIS undeclared, unprovoked, grisly war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin enjoys several telling advantages. Unlike the bickering Western leaders who have failed to deter him, he is answerable only to himself. He has no real allies, and, because he silences his critics as ruthlessly as he violates his neighbours’ sovereignty, few domestic constraints. Nor, plainly, is he constrained by shame: witness his staggering lies over Russia’s role in the fighting, and his decision, even after flight MH17 was shot down by his proxies, to send in more tanks and troops.
> 
> Above all, Mr Putin cares more about the outcome than the West does. His geopolitical paranoia, his obsession with the territory lost at the end of the cold war, and the personal prestige he has staked on victory make it essential. And he has a modern army he is willing to use. Because of these imbalances Mr Putin is winning, at least by his own warped calculus. Yet in doing so he has forfeited another edge that he held until too recently, namely the willingness of some Western dupes to see him as a reasonable interlocutor, even a partner. Even the most purblind now know him for what he is: less a statesman than a brigand, not a partner but a foe.
> 
> That overdue clarity should guide the West in the ongoing struggle for Ukraine. And it should prepare its leaders for the longer and broader confrontation with Russia that lies ahead, which may stretch all round its borders.
> 
> The fog of hybrid war
> Hopes of a ceasefire in Ukraine this week were undermined by Mr Putin’s ludicrous insistence that Russia is not a belligerent. But as things stand, any truce will be on his terms. Since regular Russian forces helped the ragtag separatists to turn back Ukraine’s army in devastating style (see article), Ukrainian generals are less concerned with defeating the rebels than resisting a full-scale Russian invasion; Mr Putin’s thuggish boast that he could “take Kiev in two weeks” is dreadfully plausible. Most likely his plan remains a federal Ukraine, with an eastern region controlled by Moscow, or, failing that, a simmering, low-intensity conflict. Either arrangement would wreck Ukraine’s dream of integrating with the European Union and NATO.
> 
> Even the whiff of peace will encourage some Europeans to argue that Mr Putin need not be punished further—just as there were some who used his denials of involvement as a pretext to equivocate. That would be an inexcusable mistake. As Angela Merkel says, Russia cannot simply be allowed to invade its neighbours and shift Europe’s borders with impunity. The measures under discussion in Washington and Brussels should be much tougher than previous sanctions, including the limp reaction to the annexation of Crimea. Every member of Russian’s craven parliament, security services and government should face visa bans and asset freezes. The offshore assets of top Russian kleptocrats should be identified and seized. Russia’s energy and defence sectors must be squeezed and its sovereign bonds should be shunned: Western lenders should not finance Mr Putin’s warmongering.
> 
> One aim of all this should be to bolster Ukraine’s hand in the negotiations that, sooner or later, it will probably have to enter. (More generous financial aid, to save its free-falling economy and help pay its energy bills, is needed too.) The other aim is to put pressure on Mr Putin. The propaganda pumped out by Kremlin-run television has maintained Russians’ support both for the war and for him; but as the rouble falls, capital flees Moscow and the body bags of Russian soldiers covertly return, his political problems will mount. And even if Western punishment fails to modify his behaviour in the short term, the underlying goal should be to tame him (and perhaps his successors) in the future, for Ukraine is plainly not the end.
> 
> Kiev and beyond
> Mr Putin’s first choice was to suborn Ukraine without invading it, but by demonstrating his willingness to use force, he has sown fear—and, for Mr Putin, fear is the basic currency of politics. A puny, divided response has emasculated the West, which he thinks is bent on weakening and encircling Russia. For him, Russia’s post-Soviet history has been a catalogue of American-inflicted humiliation, which it is his mission to reverse. He wants his neighbours to be weak more than he wants Russians to be prosperous; he prefers vassals to allies.
> 
> This world view—a noxious compound of KGB cynicism and increasingly messianic Russian nationalism—propelled him into Ukraine. The idea that his adventurism will end in the Donbas is as naive as the theory that he would be satisfied when his troops wrenched Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia in 2008. This week Mr Putin rattled his sabre at Kazakhstan, still ruled by the elderly Nursultan Nazarbayev: any succession squabble would be an opportunity. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, small, ex-Soviet countries, have Russian-speaking minorities of the kind Mr Putin has undertaken to “protect”. These Baltic states joined NATO in 2004. But what if a Russian-financed separatist movement sprang up, a Baltic government claimed this amounted to an invasion and its NATO allies refused to help? The alliance’s bedrock—its commitment to mutual self-defence—would be shattered.
> 
> Mr Putin’s revanchism must therefore be stopped in Ukraine. This week, en route to a NATO summit in Wales, Mr Obama visited Estonia to assure his Baltic allies of America’s backing. A brigade of American soldiers would be more reassuring still. NATO is set to approve a nimbler reaction force, with kit pre-positioned in Poland. But it is past time for the alliance to junk the undertaking it gave Russia not to base troops in the Baltics: that was made in an era of goodwill, which Mr Putin has trampled. The Europeans must do more to wean themselves from Russian gas, by diversifying supplies and introducing new rules and infrastructure to trade energy across the continent. Mr Putin is not a good commercial partner.
> 
> Eventually these measures may together force Mr Putin to rethink his recklessness, or encourage the Russian people and elite to think differently about him. There will be a price for the West too, of course. But as poor, benighted Ukraine shows, the price of inaction has always been higher.




It _appears_, to me anyway, that _The Economist_ is right:

     1. Putin/Russia has 'won' in Ukraine; and

     2. Putin/Russia is far, far more like Stalin/USSR than like Gorbachev/USSR, we cannot, as Mrs Thatcher so famously put it, "do business together" with Putin/Russia. 

My prescription, which will cause some (even considerable) economic pain to many Western, including Canadian, companies, is: _isolation_ and _containment_, and _containment_ must be accompanied by a real, credible threat of _rollback_, as it was in the 1950s and '60s. (Stalin knew that Truman and Eisenhower were ready and able to fight to stop and "roll back" Russian aggression, Malenkov, Bulganin and Kruschev all worried that Kennedy and even Lyndon Johnson would do the same ... Russian _certainty_ about American _certainty_ began to wane in the mid to late 1960s when it became increasingly apparent that the US was not ready to prosecute a "long, long war."*) _Isolation_[ involves kicking Putin/Russia out of e.g. the G20 and the OECD: "no truck or trade with the Ruskies," if I may update a 1911 (Canadian) campaign slogan.


_____
*


----------



## The Bread Guy

Meanwhile, on the Baltic borders ....


> An Estonian intelligence officer has been kidnapped at gunpoint and taken into Russia, according to local Estonian reports.
> 
> Estonian intelligence confirmed that the incident occurred at the Luhamaa border checkpoint while the officer was investigating an incident of cross border crime, according to The Baltic Times.
> 
> "Unidentified persons coming from Russia took the freedom of an officer of Estonian Scurity police officer on the territory of Estonia," Estonia's state prosecutor's office announced. "The officer was taken to Russia using physical force and at gunpoint."
> 
> In retaliation, Estonia's Foreign Ministry summoned the Russian Ambassador to Estonia, Juri Merzljakov, in relation to the incident ....



The Russian version:


> An officer of the Estonian security police was detained on Friday on the territory of Russia’s north-western Pskov region while he was conducting an undercover operation, the public relations center of the Federal Security Service told ITAR-TASS.
> 
> “A citizen of Estonia, Eston Kohver, who is an officer of the Estonian security police bureau, was detained on the territory of the Russian Federation,” the press center said. “He had a Taurus handgun, an amount of €5,000 in cash, equipment for covert audio recording, and materials indicative of an intelligence mission."


----------



## McG

Russia is now accused of launching a small operation into Estonia.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nato-faces-1st-test-as-estonia-accuses-russia-of-abduction-1.2757254


----------



## The Bread Guy

Meanwhile, if you're a Lithuanian who opted out of serving in the Soviet Army after The Wall came down, watch out ....


> Russia has reopened 25-year-old cases that may lead to criminal charges against young people who refused to serve in the Soviet army in 1990-1991, shows a request for legal assistance received by the Lithuanian Prosecutor General's Office.
> 
> "We have received such request for legal assistance. As the activities, which Russia lists among criminal deeds, is not criminalized in Lithuania, the request for legal assistance will not be processed," Vilma Mažonė of the Prosecutor General's Office told BNS.
> 
> The Prosecutor General's Office refused to reveal further details of the case.
> 
> Russia may bring criminal charges against the citizens of Lithuania who left the Soviet army or refused to serve there after Lithuania declared independence on 11 March 1990.
> 
> Some of the young men were abducted and transported to Soviet army units by force, some were sent to jail, a few died during persecution by Soviet army officers, while others returned to the Soviet military units in fears for their own or their family's safety, some escaped the Soviet army by hiding.
> 
> According to data provided by the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, 1,562 young people refused forced service in the Soviet army after 11 March 1990. Of them, 67 were taken to Soviet military units by force, 20 were sentenced to jail terms, three faced criminal charges and three died.
> 
> Another 1,465 were forced to go into hiding, change their place of residence and leave families to avoid forced service or repressions by the Soviet army or the Soviet authorities ....


Stay classy, Soviet Union Russia ....


----------



## vonGarvin

Just in case you were wondering, it's back on...


----------



## The Bread Guy

General Disorder said:
			
		

> Just in case you were wondering, it's back on...


Back, by (un)popular demand, War, Cold, C1-A1, for the use of ....


----------



## Good2Golf

...wouldn't it be: War, Cold, C1-A*2*?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> ...wouldn't it be: War, Cold, C1-A*2*?


Good point.


----------



## CougarKing

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine actually brings a sense of deja vu to Estonians about their own history:

Military.com



> *Estonian Commander Says Russia Wants a Europe Without America*
> 
> Sep 15, 2014 | by Matthew Cox
> Estonia may be one of NATO's smallest members, but its air force commander had the strongest words for Russian aggression in Ukraine at a gathering of allied military leaders.
> 
> Russian President Vladimir Putin's "war against Ukraine did not really come as a surprised to us," Col. Jaak Tarien, commander of the Estonian Air Force, told an audience at the U.S. Air Force Association's 2014 Air and Space Conference.
> 
> *Speaking with a group of NATO military leaders, Tarien reminded how Soviet Russia launched a similar operation in Estonia in 1924.
> 
> "Soviet Russia sent infiltrators to our young republic. They tried to rally local people to demonstrate against our government," he said.
> The Estonian people did not want to go along.*
> 
> (...EDITED)


----------



## cupper

cupper said:
			
		

> Oh the games people play.
> 
> Looking more and more like we're going back to the Cold War.
> 
> Laissez les bonne temps rouler! ;D



Yep, seems the Russians are into the spirit of throwback Thursday.

*Canadian fighter jets intercept Russian bombers in Arctic*

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/canadian-fighter-jets-intercept-russian-bombers-in-arctic-1.2772440



> Fighter jets intercepted two Russian bombers flying on the perimeter of Canada’s Arctic airspace in the early morning hours Thursday, NORAD revealed to CBC News.
> 
> Two CF-18s met the Tupolev Tu-95 long-range bombers, commonly referred to as "Russian Bears," at around 1:30 a.m. PT as they flew a course in “the western reaches” of Canada’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Beaufort Sea, said Maj. Beth Smith, spokeswoman for North American Aerospace Defence Command.
> 
> The ADIZ extends approximately 320 kilometres from Canada’s coastlines, a distance far beyond the 22 kilometres, or 12 nautical miles, from the coast that define a nation’s sovereign airspace. Smith made it clear that the Russian bombers never entered Canada’s sovereign airspace.
> 
> The encounter comes one day after Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko delivered a speech in Parliament thanking Canada for its ongoing support as his country’s forces battle with pro-Russian separatist rebels.
> 
> “This is disturbing. We’ve heard stories like in the past, of Russian bombers challenging Canadian airspace,” said James Bezan, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of National Defence and a Conservative MP from Manitoba.
> 
> “This plays into the narrative of a Putin regime that’s more aggressive not just in Crimea, not just in Ukraine, but indeed testing their neighbour in their entire region," he said.
> 
> About six hours before the CF-18s intercepted the Russian bombers, American F-22 fighter jets were scrambled from a base in Alaska to meet a group of Russian aircraft, including two refuelling tankers, two MiG-31 fighters and two long-range bombers.
> 
> After the U.S. jets made contact, the group headed west back towards Russian airspace.
> 
> “We’re seeing increased aggressive actions being taken by the Russian Federation,” Bezan said during an interview on CBC’s Power & Politics.
> 
> Despite the ongoing tensions between Western allies and Russia, it is not the first time Canadian and U.S. aircraft have intercepted Russian bombers seemingly flying towards toward sovereign airspace.
> 
> According to Smith, NORAD has dispatched fighter jets to make contact with Russian long-range bombers “in excess of 50 times” in the last five years.
> 
> Canadian jets intercepted the same type of long-range bombers off the coast of Newfoundland in 2010. After that incident, Peter MacKay, then minister of defence, told CBC News that Canadian military aircraft intercept between 12 and 18 Russian bombers annually.


----------



## cupper

Putin is really trying to restart the Cold War apparently. Or he's just bat poop crazy.

*Russia Plans Break From Global Web as U.S. Rift Deepens*

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-19/russia-seeks-to-safeguard-itself-from-u-s-internet-regulation.html



> Russia plans next week to discuss contingency measures to cut the country off from the global Internet in what the Kremlin called a necessary step to shield the nation from the U.S.-controlled worldwide Web.
> 
> Russia’s state security council will examine ways to ensure domestic users can be redirected to servers inside the country rather than relying on the U.S.-managed Internet domain-names system, the Moscow-based Coordination Center for .RU domain said by e-mail today.
> 
> “We need to defend ourselves from the U.S. and Europe,” President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said by phone today. “This is not about isolating ourselves, it’s about getting ready for possible cut-offs as countries that regulate the Web may act unpredictably.”
> 
> Russia, on the brink of recession after U.S. and European Union sanctions provoked by the worst geopolitical rift since the Cold War over Ukraine, has been tightening control of the Internet this year. Putin, a former KGB colonel who’s centralized power since he became president in 2000, has called the Internet a creation of U.S. spy agencies.
> 
> “The Kremlin has already crushed all real opposition and taken over control of nearly all media that tried to remain independent,” Gennady Gudkov, a former opposition lawmaker, said on his blog. “Criticism of the authorities is now an almost exclusive preserve of the Internet.”
> 
> *Autonomous Access*
> 
> Russia may urge its telecommunication operators to adjust their equipment to enable access to the Russian Internet autonomously in case of war or mass protests, the daily newspaper Vedomosti reported today.
> 
> The press offices of Yandex NV, Mail.ru Group Ltd, OAO Mobile TeleSystems, OAO MegaFon and VimpelCom Ltd (VIP) declined to comment. Yandex declined 1.3 percent and MegaFon 0.6 percent in Moscow as of 5:10 p.m. in Moscow. VimpelCom lost 0.8 percent in New York.
> 
> The entire global system of Internet domain names and IP addresses is managed by the Los Angeles-based Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, or ICANN.
> 
> Putting a block on the worldwide Internet doesn’t present technical challenges and is only a matter of political will, said Anton Nosik, a well-known blogger in Russia.
> 
> “It’s clear that moving Russia onto a North Korean model of Internet management will have far-reaching consequences for the economy,” he said on his blog. “But the overall trend of the government seeking to restrict the exchange of information and access to the Web is clear.”
> 
> *Internet Crackdown*
> 
> Russia last month banned anonymous access to the Internet in public spaces and expanded the regulation of media to the blogosphere, requiring those with at least 3,000 daily readers to register their real names and contact information. In February the authorities had passed a law allowing them to close webpages without a court decision if material is deemed “extremist.”
> 
> Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny, who used to criticize Putin and reveal corruption among his inner circle, was the first victim of that law when his blog on LiveJournal.com was shut in March. Recent legislation requires Internet companies to store Russian users’ information on servers in the country, similar to Chinese regulations.
> 
> Google Inc. Chairman Eric Schmidt said last year, as the changes were being proposed, that Russia was “on the path” toward China’s model of Internet censorship.
> 
> “Russia is isolating itself and securing itself from the West,” said Masha Lipman, an independent Moscow-based political analyst. “Putin throughout almost all of his 15 years of rule has made control over societal forces a priority. It’s only natural that his concern is even higher now with the Western sanctions and a deteriorating economy.”


----------



## Kirkhill

Or perhaps he is just trying to convince folks he is bat poop crazy because only a crazy person would actually press the button and launch a nuclear missile.  And the only high card he has in his hand is the nuclear one.

Well maybe not the only one - but I think he is running out of other good ones.

Locking Russia off from the world and turning it into North Korea may be his preferred tactic now.


----------



## George Wallace

Perhaps it is only his belief that Russia must keep its military industrial complex active in order to build up a healthy economy......or maybe he is just batshyte crazy..... :dunno:


----------



## Journeyman

> *Pabst Brewing to be sold to Russian company*
> Bruce Horovitz, USA TODAY September 19, 2014



     Why bother?   :dunno:


----------



## CougarKing

"Crazy? nawww. you don't say"  ;D Ras-PUTIN is being his normal, foreign asset-nationalizing self.

Yahoo Finance/Business Insider



> *Russia Is Considering A Crazy New Law That Would Allow The State To Seize Foreign Assets*
> Business Insider
> By Tomas Hirst – 4 hours ago
> 
> on Aug. 27.* In another dark twist to the West's standoff with Russia over the crisis in Ukraine, a pro-Kremlin deputy has submitted a draft law that would allow the government to seize foreign assets in the country in response to Western economic sanctions.*
> 
> The law, submitted after Italian authorities seized €30m worth of shares and bank accounts belonging to the Russian businessman Arkady Rotenberg, would also allow for oligarchs to get compensation from the state in the case of an "unjust judicial act of a foreign court." The full (Russian language) text of the draft law can be found here.
> 
> *Given Russia's parlous economic position — GDP grew only 0.8% this year — the concept of using state funds to bail out multimillionaire businessmen may be received poorly in the country.* Already opposition leaders are rounding on the government with Boris Nemtsov, co-chair of the RPR-PARNAS political party and outspoken critic of Vladimir Putin, writing on Facebook:
> 
> What is [the benefit of] a strongman's friendship?* It's when you have 4 villas, apartments and a hotel seized in Italy and your accomplice in the Kremlin immediately introduces a bill for damages from the Russian budget.
> *
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Why bother?   :dunno:



Thankfully they only brew pisswater and not real beer


----------



## Edward Campbell

Part 1 of 3

Here, according to a report which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _The New York Times_, is how Putin and his inner circle _survive_ sanctions: 

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/world/europe/it-pays-to-be-putins-friend-.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=LedeSumLargeMedia&module=a-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0


> Private Bank Fuels Fortunes of Putin’s Inner Circle
> 
> By STEVEN LEE MYERS, JO BECKER and JIM YARDLEY
> 
> SEPT. 27, 2014
> 
> Weeks after President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea in March, an obscure regulatory board in Moscow known as the Market Council convened inside an office tower not far from the Kremlin to discuss the country’s wholesale electricity market. It is a colossal business, worth 2 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product, and a rich source of fees for the bank that had long held the exclusive right to service it.
> 
> With no advance notice or public debate, though, the board voted that day in April to shift that business to Bank Rossiya, a smaller institution that lacked the ability to immediately absorb the work. For Bank Rossiya, it was a tidy coup set to yield an estimated $100 million or more in annual commissions, yet it was hardly the only new business coming in. State corporations, local governments and even the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea were suddenly shifting their accounts to the bank, too.
> 
> In a matter of days, Bank Rossiya had received an enormous windfall, nearly all from different branches of the Russian state, which was delivering a pointed message. In late March, the United States had made Bank Rossiya a primary target of sanctions, effectively ostracizing it from the global financial system. Now the Kremlin was pushing back, steering lucrative accounts its way to reduce the pain.
> 
> The reason the Kremlin rushed to prop up Bank Rossiya is the same reason that the United States, and later its European allies, placed it on the sanctions list: its privileged status as what the Obama administration calls the “personal bank” of the Putin inner circle. Built and run by some of the president’s closest friends and colleagues from his early days in St. Petersburg, Bank Rossiya is emblematic of the way Putin’s brand of crony capitalism has turned loyalists into billionaires whose influence over strategic sectors of the economy has in turn helped him maintain his iron-fisted grip on power.
> 
> Now the sanctions are testing the resilience of his economic and political system. Even as President Barack Obama argues that the measures aimed at Putin’s inner circle are pinching Russia’s economy and squeezing the tycoons who dominate it, many of them have mocked the sanctions as a mere nuisance, the economic equivalent of a shaving cut, while the Kremlin has moved rapidly to insulate them.
> 
> Woven deeply into the Putin system is Bank Rossiya. Founded as the tiniest of banks in the twilight of the Soviet era, Bank Rossiya, through staggering, stealthy expansion backed by the largesse of the state, now has nearly $11 billion in assets. It controls a vast financial empire with tentacles across the economy, including a large stake in the country’s most powerful private media conglomerate, a key instrument of the Kremlin’s power to shape public opinion. How well the bank survives in a time of sanctions may ultimately be a barometer of whether economic pressure is enough to make Putin stand down at a time when neighboring countries, especially in the Baltics, are increasingly anxious about a newly aggressive Russia.
> 
> Putin came to power vowing to eliminate “as a class” the oligarchs who had amassed fortunes - and, to the new president’s mind, a dangerous quotient of political sway - under his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, in the post-Communist chaos of the 1990s. Instead, a new class of tycoons have emerged, men of humble Soviet origins who owe their vast wealth to Putin, and offer unquestioning political fealty to him in return.
> 
> “These guys emerged from scratch and became billionaires under Putin,” Sergei Aleksashenko, a former deputy finance minister and central banker, said in a recent interview.
> 
> If the modern Russian state is Kremlin Inc., Putin is its CEO, rewarding his friends with control of state-owned companies and doling out lucrative government contracts in deals that provoke accusations of corruption but have the veneer of legality under the Putin system.
> 
> “He has given and he has taken away,” said Mikhail M. Kasyanov, who served as prime minister during Putin’s first term. “They depend on him, and he depends on them.”
> 
> This inner circle coalesced around Putin as he began his unobtrusive rise, from a middling career as a KGB intelligence officer to a midlevel functionary in the office of St. Petersburg’s mayor.
> 
> One of these loyalists is Bank Rossiya’s chairman and largest shareholder, Yuri V. Kovalchuk, a physicist by training, sometimes called the Rupert Murdoch of Russia for his role as architect of the bank’s media interests. Other Bank Rossiya shareholders include several of the country’s wealthiest men, the son of Putin’s cousin and even an old St. Petersburg friend of his, a cellist who was formerly first chair at the fabled Mariinsky Theatre.
> 
> The Kremlin has long denied giving Putin’s friends preferential treatment. But in acquiring many of its holdings, the privately held Bank Rossiya benefited from Kremlin directives that allowed it to purchase prized state-owned assets at what critics have called cut-rate prices. Meanwhile the true extent of its holdings is obscured by shadowy corporate shell structures that nest like matryoshka dolls, one inside the next.
> 
> Records show that the ownership of one powerful TV advertising company linked to Bank Rossiya, for example, is buried in offshore companies in Panama, in the British Virgin Islands and even at a simple concrete house on Karpathou Street in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, whose owner had no idea of the company registered there.
> 
> In the early days of the conflict over Ukraine, several European leaders expressed deep ambivalence about alienating a Russia that under Putin’s rule has become immeasurably wealthier than it ever was under the Soviet system. Russia has been a sought-after partner in the globalized economy, a source of cheap natural gas for Europe, where wealthy Russians have also purchased billions of dollars in real estate in places like the Cote d’Azur and the Belgravia district of London.
> 
> But that resistance has to some extent eroded, especially since the downing of a commercial airliner over eastern Ukraine in July that killed 298 people. This month, despite an edgy truce between pro-Russian separatists and government forces in Ukraine, the West announced a new round of sanctions aimed not just at Putin’s powerful cronies but at the Russian economy more broadly.
> 
> Some argue, however, that this punitive strategy fundamentally misunderstands the way the Putin system works.
> 
> Gennady N. Timchenko, an oil trader and Bank Rossiya investor whose own holding company is also under sanctions, admitted in a recent interview with the Russian government’s news agency, Tass, to a measure of annoyance. He was unhappy that his Learjet had been grounded because of sanctions, and that he could not vacation in France with his family and dog, Romi, which happens to be the offspring of Putin’s beloved black Labrador, Koni.
> 
> And yet, he said, he would never presume to question the Russian president’s policies in Ukraine, whatever the cost to companies like his.
> 
> “That would be impossible,” he said, going on to refer to Putin formally by his first name and patronymic. “Vladimir Vladimirovich acts in the interest of Russia in any situation, period. No compromises. It would not even enter our minds to discuss that.”



End of Part 1 of 3


----------



## Edward Campbell

Part 2 of 3


> *‘A Bouquet of Friends’*
> 
> In the Kolomna district of St. Petersburg, near the shipyards, is a 19th-century palace that belonged to Grand Duke Aleksei Aleksandrovich, a son of Czar Aleksandr II. Lately its elegant halls - this one in Baroque style, this one English, this one Chinese - have been repurposed as the House of Music, a training academy for classical musicians.
> 
> The academy’s artistic director, Sergei P. Roldugin, has his own singular back story. He is an accomplished cellist and musical director. He is certainly not a businessman, he explained at the palace the other day.
> 
> “I don’t have millions,” he said.
> 
> And yet, on paper at least, he has a fortune that could be worth $350 million. That is because, years ago, he said, he acquired shares in a small bank run by men close to his old friend Putin.
> 
> He had met Putin in the 1970s, and is godfather to his eldest daughter, Maria. He opened the House of Music with Putin’s patronage. Last year, he recalled, the president asked him for a favor: Would he organize a private concert?
> 
> So Roldugin traveled to the president’s official residence west of Moscow, Novo-Ogaryovo, with three young musicians: a violinist, a pianist and a clarinetist. They played Mozart, Weber and Tchaikovsky - so well, he said, that Putin invited them to play again the next night for the same small group of friends who had gathered there.
> 
> They were “of course, very famous people,” Roldugin said, without revealing any names.
> 
> “Quite all,” he said, “are under sanctions.”
> 
> The concerts are a glimpse into the small, remarkably cohesive group of men who came together around Putin as the old order was crumbling and a new, post-Soviet Russia was taking form.
> 
> When the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, began to allow the first experiments in private enterprise in the 1980s, St. Petersburg was still Leningrad, an impoverished shadow of the czarist capital it had been.
> 
> An early adapter was Kovalchuk, a physicist at the Ioffe Physical Technical Institute, who founded an enterprise to turn its scientific work into commercially viable products. Another was Timchenko, a former Soviet trade official, who formed a cooperative to export products from an oil refinery on the Baltic Sea.
> 
> What brought Putin into their orbit was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. After five years as a KGB officer in East Germany, Putin was part of a wave of embittered military and intelligence officers who withdrew from the Soviet satellites and returned with few prospects to a changing homeland.
> 
> Still with the KGB, Putin came into contact with one of his former law professors: Anatoly A. Sobchak, a reformer who had just become chairman of the Leningrad legislature (and would later become mayor of the renamed St. Petersburg). He asked Putin to become an adviser, to smooth relations with the still-powerful security services. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, Putin joined Sobchak full time, overseeing a new committee on foreign economic relations.
> 
> The committee worked closely with Russia’s emerging entrepreneurs, regulating imports and exports and distributing city contracts. Some of the deals became controversial, notably one during the hungry winter of 1991-92, of a deal to barter oil, metal and other products for food. Virtually none of the food ever materialized, and a City Council committee unsuccessfully sought to have Putin fired for incompetence.
> 
> For all that, Putin was considered an efficient, unprepossessing administrator, helping businessmen cut through the bureaucracy. His fluency in German was useful with the many Germans seeking a foothold in the city. Among them was Matthias Warnig, formerly of the East German secret police, the Stasi, who opened one of the city’s first foreign banks, Dresdner.
> 
> Putin was, in short, both collecting new friends and laying the foundation for what would evolve into the system of personalized, state-sponsored capitalism now at the heart of his power.
> 
> “It was a favorable environment for such a bouquet of friends to appear,” explained Mikhail I. Amosov, who served on the City Council at the time.
> 
> In many cases, contracts and property were distributed through insider deals, often without open or transparent bidding.
> 
> “Everything was decided through personal connections,” Amosov said. “We didn’t like it.”
> 
> One enterprise that received an infusion of municipal aid was Bank Rossiya.
> 
> The bank had been founded in 1990 at the initiative of the city’s branch of the Communist Party, with party funds as capital. It was also believed to handle the banking needs of the KGB. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was all but bust.
> 
> Kovalchuk stepped in. In December 1991, he and a group of friends secured a small loan from a local shoe manufacturer and bought the foundering bank. The investors included three other alumni of the Ioffe Technical Institute - the physicists Victor Y. Myachin and Andrei A. Fursenko, and Vladimir I. Yakunin, the institute’s former head of international relations.
> 
> The reconstituted Bank Rossiya quickly became a favored city institution. At the mayor’s instruction, according to news reports, the city opened several large accounts there, fattening the bank’s coffers and setting it on its way.
> 
> Business connections became deeply personal connections.
> 
> In 1996, Putin joined seven businessmen, most of them Bank Rossiya shareholders, in forming a cooperative of summer homes, or dachas, called Ozero, or “lake,” in the northeast of St. Petersburg. The group has come to have an outsize influence on Russia’s political and economic life. The cooperative included the homes of Putin, Yakunin, Kovalchuk, Fursenko and his brother Sergei, Myachin, and Nikolai T. Shamalov, who headed the St. Petersburg office of the German manufacturer Siemens and would also acquire a major stake in Bank Rossiya. Vladimir A. Smirnov, a St. Petersburg businessman with an exclusive contract to supply the city’s gasoline retailers, served as Ozero’s director.
> 
> Timchenko, the oil trader, entered the Bank Rossiya circle as an investor; according to the bank, his stake is owned by a company he controls. Warnig, the German banker, would later join Bank Rossiya’s board. (When Putin’s wife was badly injured in a car accident, Warnig’s bank arranged to pay for her medical care in Germany.)
> 
> And there was Roldugin, the cellist.
> 
> “The issue was that I needed to have some money,” he said, adding, “There was no money for art anywhere.”
> 
> His investment, he said, involved “a lot of manipulations” and required him to take out a loan. Today the bank lists him as owner of 3.2 percent of its shares.
> 
> Putin’s stint in St. Petersburg ended in 1996, when his boss lost his bid for re-election. Soon Putin had a new boss, Yeltsin. And after Yeltsin unexpectedly elevated him to prime minister and then acting president on New Year’s Eve in 1999, the fortunes of many of his friends - and their little bank - began to be transformed.
> 
> *‘Bank Rossiya, That’s It’*
> 
> He had arrived in Moscow as a midlevel apparatchik in ill-fitting suits, had ascended to power as a thoroughly unexpected president and won his first presidential election in 2000 on the crest of war to suppress separatists in Chechnya. By 2004, Putin had become the paramount figure in Russia, winning a second term with 72 percent of the vote, in a race tainted by allegations of strong-arm tactics and vote rigging. Yet Putin probably would have won a fair election easily, too. The Russian economy, buoyed by high oil prices, was booming, creating huge fortunes and also lifting the middle class. The long era of post-Soviet gloom seemed done.
> 
> Not many people yet understood that in the middle of Russia’s prosperity, the men in the tight circle close to Putin were becoming fabulously wealthy, and increasingly powerful, in what critics now consider a case study in legalized kleptocracy.
> 
> Bank Rossiya, which reported less than $1 million in profits the year before Putin became president, had grown steadily, but figures like Kovalchuk and Timchenko remained in the shadows.
> 
> “I didn’t even know such names - Timchenko, Kovalchuk,” said Kasyanov, whom Putin dismissed as prime minister shortly before the elections.
> 
> During the 2004 campaign, one of Putin’s quixotic challengers, Ivan P. Rybkin, did raise the issue of corruption, accusing Kovalchuk and Timchenko of acting as the president’s “cashiers.” But few people were listening. (Rybkin disappeared soon after making his accusation, re-emerging several days later, saying he had been kidnapped and drugged in Ukraine’s capital, Kiev.)
> 
> In sanctioning Bank Rossiya, the Obama administration would resurface the “cashier” allegation, though it offered no evidence that Putin has personally profited from the bank. Kovalchuk, who through a spokeswoman did not respond to requests for comment, in the past has attributed his bank’s success not to any special treatment but to sound investment and business decisions.
> 
> Either way, Bank Rossiya’s holdings would increase tenfold during Putin’s second term. Critical to this remarkable growth was the bank’s ability to snap up assets, at knockdown prices, that had previously belonged to the state-owned energy company Gazprom.
> 
> Those deals were documented in a series of reports published at the end of Putin’s second term by Boris Y. Nemtsov, a former deputy prime minister, Vladimir V. Milov, a former deputy energy minister, and others.
> 
> “The total value of the assets exfiltrated from Gazprom,” they estimated, was $60 billion.
> 
> An early deal involved one of the country’s biggest insurers, Sogaz. Bank Rossiya bought a controlling stake in Sogaz by acquiring shares that had been held by Gazprom. The bank paid around $100 million, according to Nemtsov and Milov, who later valued Sogaz at $2 billion.
> 
> “Putin said, ‘Bank Rossiya, that’s it,’” Milov later told the Russian edition of Forbes.
> 
> Sogaz became the insurer of choice for major state companies like Russian Railways, headed by Yakunin, and the growing oil giant, Rosneft, by then led by Igor I. Sechin, who had been Putin’s deputy in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office. Sogaz also bought 75 percent of a company called Leader that managed Gazprom’s $6 billion pension fund, Gazfond. The purchase price was $30 million, less than Leader’s profits that year alone, according to Nemtsov and Milov.
> 
> It seemed to be a quintessential insider deal: The year before, Yuri Shamalov, son of the Bank Rossiya shareholder and Ozero member, had been appointed chairman of Gazfond.
> 
> “Shamalov Jr., as head of Gazfond, sold shares in the company managing Russia’s largest private pension fund at a fantastically low price to the bank owned by his father,” Nemtsov asserted.
> 
> At the same time, Kovalchuk, the bank’s chairman, began assembling a media empire that now controls some of Russia’s largest television and radio stations and newspapers.
> 
> Bank Rossiya had already assumed management of the assets of Gazprombank, one of Russia’s largest. Now, Gazprombank purchased Gazprom Media Group, which owns five TV and several radio stations. The price: $166 million.
> 
> Two years later, Dmitri A. Medvedev, a Putin protégé and first deputy prime minister, put Gazprom Media’s value at $7.5 billion, or 45 times the purchase price.
> 
> Not content merely to manage media assets, Bank Rossiya began buying up media companies of its own.
> 
> In 2005, a subsidiary of Bank Rossiya bought a stake in Channel 5, a local television network owned by the St. Petersburg government. The price was $25 million. There was no competition. Channel 5’s value swelled in 2006, when regulators let it acquire frequencies in 30 regions across Russia.
> 
> Soon after, Putin designated it a national broadcaster, able to reach 91 cities and 53 million people. Today, it is the country’s fifth-largest broadcaster.
> 
> A year later, a Bank Rossiya subsidiary bought a controlling stake in Ren TV, today the country’s eighth-largest broadcaster.
> 
> Once known for investigating government corruption and airing opposition views that were never allowed on state television, Ren TV over time became noticeably less critical.
> 
> In August, amid the fervor over Ukraine, it canceled what was widely viewed as one of the last reasonably independent national political talk shows, “Nedelya,” or “The Week.”
> 
> “The first goal was political control of the media,” said Roman Pivovarov, a leading analyst of the Russian media landscape. “But that was achieved relatively early on. So this was as much about money. The picture today is clear, in that the big media belongs to the small circle of people who control not only the politics but the economics of Russia.”
> 
> By 2008, Putin’s second term was ending and the Bank Rossiya media empire provided a supportive voice when, rather than recede from politics, he decided to serve as prime minister. Medvedev was elected president, while Putin largely retained control over the levers of government.
> 
> Two years later, Kovalchuk scored his biggest prize - a 25 percent stake in Channel 1, a state-controlled network with the largest audience in Russia. The stake cost only $150 million, “an amazingly low price,” according to the newspaper Novaya Gazeta. The next year, Channel 1 reported profits of nearly $100 million.
> 
> Then, in 2012, Putin announced he would seek a third term as president. Democracy activists were deeply alarmed but powerless. No one doubted he would win, though the economy had slowed and Putin’s men were targets of rising criticism, no longer hidden.



End of Part 2


----------



## Edward Campbell

Part 3 of 3


> *‘My Friends Get Everything’*
> 
> To grasp how Bank Rossiya’s holdings extend around the globe - and how island tax havens and other tools of global finance may serve to obscure their true breadth - one place to visit is 13A Karpathou Street in Nicosia. This is the registered address of Med Media Network Limited, a company listed in a corporate flow chart connecting Bank Rossiya to a company called Video International.
> 
> In a peculiarity of the Russian marketplace, broadcasters do not sell advertising time directly. They act through middlemen like Video International, which buy airtime wholesale, then sell to those who wish to advertise.
> 
> Med Media is a major shareholder, holding a 20 percent stake. Except that Med Media’s address in Cyprus is hardly a corporate headquarters at all. It is a simple concrete home with a large ficus shading a small garden. The owner, Agathi Zinonos, has never heard of Med Media or any of the other companies registered there.
> 
> She regularly receives legal documents in the mail from Russia, Bulgaria, Romania and other countries.
> 
> “Every day, there is a whole packet coming,” she said, noting that the documents are addressed to her son, who recently moved out. “Whatever comes, I take to him, because it is a lot of companies.”
> 
> Attempting to unwind Video International’s convoluted corporate structure requires going back to 2011. That is when Bank Rossiya and a couple of partners purchased the company, according to an interview given by Video International’s chief executive in 2013.
> 
> Video International had controlled 70 percent of the advertising-placement market. But in the months before the sale, the government hastily enacted a new antimonopoly law, prohibiting national TV networks from using advertising shops that controlled more than 35 percent of the market. Video International would have to abandon many of its contracts.
> 
> But what looked like a debacle for Video International turned out to be a boon for Bank Rossiya. The new law depressed the company’s value - and thus its purchase price. And while Video International gave up many contracts, its new owners managed to profit from the “lost” business: Many of the networks simply brought the placement business in house - while continuing to pay Video International consulting and software-licensing fees.
> 
> Reflecting on the way the government’s antimonopoly office has looked the other way, Aleksashenko, the former deputy finance minister, invoked the saying “my friends get everything, while my enemies get the law.”
> 
> Among those taking part in the new arrangement was CTC Media, a company with several TV channels that was partially owned by a subsidiary of Bank Rossiya. CTC continues to pay Video International around $80 million a year - but as a consultant.
> 
> Yet while the arrangement allowed Video International to maneuver around Russian law, it may actually have placed CTC at risk of violating U.S. sanctions. For though CTC is a Russian broadcaster, its headquarters are in Delaware and it is traded on the Nasdaq. The sanctions prohibit American-headquartered companies like CTC from doing business with entities that are majority-owned by sanctioned companies like Bank Rossiya.
> 
> But whether Bank Rossiya retains a majority stake in Video International is impossible to ascertain. Records show that, on paper at least, its shares, held by a subsidiary, are down to 15 percent. Nearly all the rest of the shareholders are buried behind fronts like Med Media of Karpathou Street.
> 
> Cyprus is one of the world’s busiest offshore financial-service centers, with one of Europe’s lowest corporate tax rates and laws that enable foreigners to incorporate companies within days. Nearly 270,000 companies are registered there, and many are shells created to shelter income while obscuring the real owners.
> 
> Zinonos’ son, Zinon, who is listed as a Med Media director, is an administrator at Scordis, Papapetrou & Co., a Nicosia law firm that not only represents Med Media but helped create it. A partner there, Makis Chrysomilas, said his firm typically uses its own address or those of employees when establishing residence for shell companies.
> 
> “We are lawyers for 4,000 or 5,000 corporations,” he said.
> 
> Coming up with names for them can be a challenge, he explained. So he has taken names from a book listing the thoroughbred horses auctioned in the United States. He also has named companies after streets in London and other European cities.
> 
> Cypriot laws enable the true owners of shell companies to remain secret. Of the eight corporations with shares in Video International, at least five, with a combined stake of 69 percent, are incorporated in Cyprus: Med Media, Namiral Trading Limited, Devar Investments Limited, Reibruk Limited and Attalion Investments Limited. Delving into their ownership produces yet more corporate shells, headquartered in Panama and the British Virgin Islands, equally opaque jurisdictions.
> 
> Cari N. Stinebower, who advises clients on sanctions compliance at the law firm of Crowell & Moring, called the web of shell companies a “red flag.”
> 
> “The way the law works,” she said, “it’s incumbent on CTC to understand the beneficial ownership of the company they are doing business with” to ensure that there is not “some sanctioned entity at the end of the chain.”
> 
> A Video International spokesman would not reveal who was behind the shell companies, and said only that they had not been sanctioned.
> 
> “Why is the shareholder structure specifically like that?” he said. “Because the shareholders decided so.”
> 
> A CTC official declined to say what if any due diligence the company had done to determine if it was violating the sanctions. But he said CTC was working with the Treasury Department to ensure that it complied with the law.
> 
> *‘A Medium-Sized Bank’*
> 
> The day after Obama blacklisted Bank Rossiya, Putin met with his national security council. Told that a total of 20 people had also been sanctioned - including three security council members, Putin compatriots from St. Petersburg - the president turned sarcastic.
> 
> “We should distance ourselves from them,” he said, deadpan. “They compromise us.”
> 
> As for Bank Rossiya, he went on: “As far as I recall, this is a medium-sized bank. Personally, I did not have an account there, but I will definitely open one on Monday.”
> 
> He later directed the presidential administration to begin depositing his official salary - roughly $7,500 a month - into a Bank Rossiya account.
> 
> Kovalchuk later gave a rare TV interview with Dmitri K. Kiselyov, a prominent news anchor and ardent defender of Putin’s Russia. The president’s public gesture, Kovalchuk said, had prompted a flood of new customers, including an old, impoverished woman who wanted to deposit her life savings. For a bank with billions in assets, “this old woman means nothing financially, but the fact is that is worth more than any financial investments,” he said. “There is a Putin factor, and it is unconditional. The fact is that people intuitively feel which side of the barricades business stands on.”
> 
> Putin’s efforts to protect the bank were not just symbolic. He ordered the Central Bank to provide assistance if needed. State-owned energy companies transferred accounts to Bank Rossiya, and the governors of St. Petersburg and the surrounding Leningrad region told state institutions in their jurisdictions to do the same, according to Russian news reports. Additionally, in the lower house of parliament, the main party loyal to Putin provided the margin needed to rescind the law effectively limiting Video International to just 35 percent of the advertising-placement market.
> 
> And on April 10, the Market Council stepped in. The council, which regulates Russia’s $35 billion wholesale electricity market, is a nonprofit organization with 22 members representing government ministries as well as major producers and suppliers of electricity. One of the council’s members is an executive at Inter RAO UES, a private enterprise spun off from the former state electricity monopoly. Its chief executive is Kovalchuk’s son, Boris; its board chairman is Sechin, the president of the state-owned oil giant Rosneft and one of Putin’s closest advisers.
> 
> The council met at its office in Moscow’s World Trade Center. A spokeswoman declined to discuss the vote, except to say that a quorum attended, explaining that she did not want to contribute to an “anti-Russian” article. The decision to shift the business to Bank Rossiya, she said, was one of several routine actions taken during a regular meeting that day. In remarks published on the council’s website in May, its director, Maksim S. Bystrov, said Bank Rossiya had “brought us” a proposal with lower commissions than those charged by the previous bank, Alfa. But he declined to provide details, and Alfa Bank declined to comment.
> 
> As the United States and Europe continue to ratchet up the economic pressure, it is an open question how long the government can continue to prop up the growing number of institutions faced with sanctions. Russia’s economy had been struggling even before the annexation of Crimea. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development recently predicted that, with the added impact of Western sanctions and Putin’s retaliatory embargo on Western goods, the economy could contract next year.
> 
> Other companies are lining up behind Bank Rossiya, hoping for bailouts. The government recently announced that it would pump $6.6 billion into two state-controlled banks whose access to foreign capital has been cut. And Sechin’s Rosneft has requested a $42 billion loan.
> 
> For his part, Putin has denounced the sanctions as unfairly targeting people with no influence over Russia’s policies on Crimea or Ukraine.
> 
> “Yes, these people are my friends and I’m proud to have such friends,” he said at an economic forum in St. Petersburg in May. “They are true patriots and their business is oriented towards Russia. Have these sanctions done damage to them? Yes, they have. If I’m being honest, they have. But they are seasoned entrepreneurs and brought all their money back to Russia, so don’t worry about them too much.”



End of Part 3 of 3


----------



## Kirkhill

Vlad needs money he doesn't have.

A reality check from his Finance Minister.



> Finance Minister Says Russia's Grand Rearmament Plans are Unaffordable
> 
> (Source: Moscow Times; published Oct 07, 2014)
> 
> Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov says that Russia will not be able to afford its current level of military spending in the long term, as an economic slowdown amid declining oil prices and Western sanctions forces Moscow to drastically alter the expected funding environment.
> 
> Russia is currently pursuing a 20 trillion ruble ($500 billion) rearmament program through 2020, and announced last month that another defense program with comparable spending is in the works for 2016-25.
> 
> The 2016-25 rearmament plans, however, may not enjoy the same lavish level of funding as the ongoing program. "We want to reconsider the amount of resources devoted in the course of this new program, so that they are more realistic," Siluanov was quoted by RIA Novosti as saying Tuesday.
> 
> Siluanov explained that the current proposals for the program were formulated when Russia's economic outlook was brighter.
> 
> Russia's economy has suffered from various punitive measures enacted by Western governments over Moscow's annexation of Crimea in March and its alleged role in Ukraine's crisis. U.S. and EU sanctions, besides targeting specific Russian companies and individuals, have also made many foreign bankers skittish over investing in any companies based in Russia.
> 
> Meanwhile, the declining value of the ruble, rising inflation, and falling oil prices have forced the Economic Development Ministry to halve their growth forecast for next year to 1 percent.
> 
> "Right now we simply cannot afford to carry out [the 2016-25 armament plan] and will work out a means to determine what can be funded by the budget with the defense minister," Siluanov said at a Federation Council hearing.
> 
> Various statements from defense officials in recent months have painted an increasingly ambitious picture for the Russian government's military modernization goals. Most recently, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said that Russia's nuclear forces — the backbone of Russian military power — would be completely outfitted with new missile systems by 2020.
> 
> Despite the strain on the federal budget, some analysts have said that high spending on defense helps boost the economy. A report released by Moscow's Higher School of Economics in late September showed that military and related defense expenditures, such as "the production of ships, airplanes, spacecraft and other means of transportation," was one of the primary driving forces of a surge in industrial production.
> 
> However, the report cautioned that these developments mask stagnation across most other areas of manufacturing.



link

Does this have any impact on Vlad? Does he expect to be in power in 2025? Possibly-probably.

Does this slow his plans or speed them up?  I think it is likely to encourage him to be more radical.

Does he revert to a command economy? A real possiblity.  He can argue that Russia is under siege and they need to revert to the old ways.
That could possibly fly with the pensioners but will it fly with the oligarchs?

The other solution found in history has been to go invading other countries to capture their gold.  But as Vlad is discovering in Donbas, even/especially a slow motion war wrecks the targeted economy.  And since the value of a country is its GDP and the ability of the GDP to support borrowing an invaded country is a degraded asset that is more likely to be a liability.  

If he can't find enough money to buy an army can he find enough money to buy an empire?  The Brits couldn't and they were the most recent and most successful attempt.


----------



## McG

As we launch into a new round of whack-a-mole in the desert,  some wonder if we are committing ourselves to the lesser dangerous threat.



> Putin is more dangerous than ISIL, harder to understand and a much bigger threat to world order
> Ottawa Citizen
> Opinion - Eric Morse
> 16 Sep 2014
> 
> Judging by reactions at the NATO summit in Wales last week and an emergency gathering of 40 countries in Paris this Monday, European nations view the Islamic Caliphate (ISIS/ISIL/IS) as a greater threat than Vladimir Putin's revanchist ambitions in Eastern Europe. That may be understandable, but it's extremely disturbing.
> 
> The Caliphate is certainly a threat. It has occupied/created a black hole in the Middle East. Despite Obama's overheated promise to "destroy" it, that's going to take a lot more doing than airstrikes and some special forces (including Canadian advisers) on the ground can muster.
> 
> The upgraded light cavalry tactics that the Caliphate has been using until recently can be beaten back fairly easily with enough intelligence and air power.
> 
> Actually retaking territory held by it will be far harder, because that will involve cities with civilian populations.
> 
> Retaking a city like Mosul will be a horror. Judging by their performance up to now, Caliphate forces will fight to the death in their strongholds and may try to leave nothing living behind them. Western publics will not like to see their air (or ground) forces used to inflict the kind of devastation that will be involved.
> 
> Local disaffection in the face of what terror the Caliphate is accustomed to inflict will not be very helpful. Reducing the Caliphate's power - if it can be done - will be a job for regional states. But it's one thing to show up at a conference (to which Iran was not even invited), another to co-operate effectively in a ground war.
> 
> Still, the Caliphate is not an existential threat to world order on the scale that Russia is. We know what the Caliphate wants. We are a great deal less sure about Putin's objectives, only that he is willing to overthrow just about anything to achieve them. Europe's leaders pay more attention to the Caliphate partly because they have no real idea what to do about him. Meanwhile, as of Monday ominous "reports" are coming out of Moscow about "oppression" of the Russian minority in Estonia.
> 
> The Caliphate disrupts existing borders and states, some of which may never be revived.
> 
> The continued existence of a "Syrian state" supported by Iran and Russia is one of the larger problems in getting a working coalition going against it.
> 
> Obama talks of arming the "moderate rebels," but he isn't going to find any. Yet it is perfectly clear (as it was in fighting the Taliban) that as long as there is even a fictitious border to hide behind, an insurgency cannot be fought.
> 
> Putin may be happily dismantling sovereignties in Europe, but he is quite firm in supporting that of Bashar Assad in the Middle East, if only because it gives him yet another chance to play spoiler and humiliate Obama and NATO.
> 
> He has already declared that any U.S. airstrikes in Syria will be taken as an act of aggression against Syria unless the U.S. allies with Assad - who, Russia reminds us, is allied with Russia and Iran.
> 
> At this point, Iran is probably less interested in supporting Assad than it is in fighting the Caliphate, and it also doesn't love Russia. It should have been at the Paris conference, but will likely turn a blind eye to whatever the U.S. feels it has to do in Syria.
> 
> Given Russia's Muslim, restive southern flank, Putin should have far greater reason to fear the Caliphate as an imminent threat than the West does. But apparently, he is viewing it as a strategic distraction for the West which he can leverage to achieve his objectives closer to home.
> 
> _Eric Morse is a former Canadian diplomat who is cochair of the Security Studies Committee of the Royal Canadian Military Institute in Toronto._


----------



## Edward Campbell

In this report, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Reuters_, that news agency says that China will "bail out" Russia ... that may not be unallayed good news for the Russians:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/13/us-russia-china-banks-idUSKCN0I20WG20141013


> Russia signs deals with China to help weather sanctions
> 
> BY VLADIMIR SOLDATKIN
> MOSCOW
> 
> Mon Oct 13, 2014
> 
> (_Reuters_) - Russia and China signed energy, trade and finance agreements on Monday proclaimed by Moscow as proof that a policy turn to Asia is bearing fruit and will help it to weather Western sanctions over the Ukraine crisis.
> 
> The 38 deals, signed on a visit to Moscow by Premier Li Keqiang, allow for deeper cooperation on energy and a currency swap worth 150 billion yuan ($25 billion) intended partly to reduce the sway of the U.S. dollar.
> 
> They are among the first clear successes of the eastward shift, ordered by President Vladimir Putin to avoid isolation over the sanctions, since the vast nations reached a $400 billion, 30-year natural gas supply agreement in May.
> 
> "I consider it important that, in spite of the difficult situation, we are opening up new possibilities," Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said after the signing ceremony.
> 
> In a sign that mistrust has still not been completely buried, Li was less effusive, even when holding out the prospect of a deal in 2015 to build a second pipeline along what is called the Western route to ferry Russian gas to China.
> 
> "Cooperation over natural gas between Russia and China goes back quite a long way," Li said. But he added: "Further discussion is needed between companies."
> 
> For Russia, the agreements offer some relief, with the European Union and the United States showing no signs of lifting sanctions imposed over Russia's annexation of the Crimea peninsula and its backing of separatists in east Ukraine.
> 
> The sanctions target the finance, energy and defense sectors, restricting some state firms' and banks' ability to raise financing in Western markets.
> 
> The currency swap strengthens China's plans to promote international usage of the yuan CNY= following pledges by Moscow and Beijing to settle more bilateral trade in roubles and yuan. Spurred by their often fraught relations with the United States, Russia and China have long advocated reducing the role of the dollar in international commerce.
> 
> China, which has 32 percent of its $4 trillion foreign exchange reserves invested in U.S. government debt, would like to cap its vulnerabilities to any fluctuations in the dollar in the near term. Over the longer term, it wants to increase the yuan's clout and turn it into a global reserve currency.
> 
> *EASTWARD SHIFT IN OIL SUPPLIES*
> 
> Medvedev said trade turnover between Russia and China had grown by more than 100 percent over the past six years from $40 billion to $90 billion.
> 
> "We are very close partners," he said, although trade with the combined 28 nations of the EU is greater than with China.
> 
> Under the new agreements, cooperation will deepen between state oil producer Rosneft (ROSN.MM) and China National Petroleum Corporation, including in liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects and possibly LNG supplies to China.
> 
> Banks VTB (VTBR.MM), VEB and Russian Agriculture Bank - like Rosneft hit by sanctions - signed framework agreements with China Exim bank to open credit lines.
> 
> Mobile phone operator MegaFon and China Development Bank agreed to arrange financing of $500 million.
> 
> Li, who arrived from Germany and will go on to Italy for a summit of European and Asian leaders later this week, is expected to hold talks with Putin on Tuesday.
> 
> Another sign that Russian ties with Beijing are improving was the release of energy ministry data showing crude oil supplies to China rose in January-September by almost 45 percent year-on-year. Shipments from the Baltic Sea port of Primorsk toward Europe fell almost 20 percent.
> 
> "Much greater changes can be seen in the geographical distribution of these shrinking exports, with flows to the West clearly losing out against prioritized links to the Far East, a trend that could easily be accelerated further in the current political climate," JBC Energy consultancy said in a note.
> 
> Beijing has made clear it wants to increase business with Russia and cash in on the crisis in relations between Moscow and the West, now at their worst level since the Cold War.
> 
> But time will be needed to end mistrust in relations between countries that almost went to war in a border dispute in the 1960s, when Russia was part of the Communist Soviet Union.
> 
> Beijing is interested in investing in infrastructure, energy and commodities in Russia, but Moscow long had reservations about allowing Chinese investment in strategic industries.
> 
> China may also have worries about investing in an economy that is stuttering, with the rouble hit by sanctions and a drop in the price of oil, Russia's most important export commodity.
> 
> (Additional reporting by Katya Golubkova, Denis Pinchuk, Lidia Kelly and Alexander Winning in Moscow and by Gui Qing Koh in Beijing; Writing by Timothy Heritage; editing by David Stamp)




Russia is used to being in the driver's seat on energy deals and it has, in the past, cut supplies to Europe when it suited it ... it will do that once, and only once with Beijing. The Russian Bear is big, but shambling and weak in the Far East; the Chinese Dragon is bigger, strong, nimble and single minded.


----------



## Kirkhill

As in: if Canada reneges on an oil deal with China then China needs a boat to come and get the oil while if Russia reneges on the same deal it becomes "a mere matter of marching"?


----------



## observor 69

Reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the New York Times;

Is it just my imagination or is there a global oil war underway pitting the United States and Saudi Arabia on one side against Russia and Iran on the other? One can’t say for sure whether the American-Saudi oil alliance is deliberate or a coincidence of interests, but, if it is explicit, then clearly we’re trying to do to President Vladimir Putin of Russia and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, exactly what the Americans and Saudis did to the last leaders of the Soviet Union: pump them to death — bankrupt them by bringing down the price of oil to levels below what both Moscow and Tehran need to finance their budgets.


http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/opinion/thomas-friedman-a-pump-war.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=c-column-top-span-region&region=c-column-top-span-region&WT.nav=c-column-top-span-region&_r=0

Great article. Is that why my gas at the pumps is so low.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Baden Guy said:
			
		

> Reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the New York Times;
> 
> Is it just my imagination or is there a global oil war underway pitting the United States and Saudi Arabia on one side against Russia and Iran on the other? One can’t say for sure whether the American-Saudi oil alliance is deliberate or a coincidence of interests, but, if it is explicit, then clearly we’re trying to do to President Vladimir Putin of Russia and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, exactly what the Americans and Saudis did to the last leaders of the Soviet Union: pump them to death — bankrupt them by bringing down the price of oil to levels below what both Moscow and Tehran need to finance their budgets.
> 
> 
> http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/opinion/thomas-friedman-a-pump-war.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=c-column-top-span-region&region=c-column-top-span-region&WT.nav=c-column-top-span-region&_r=0
> 
> Great article. Is that why my gas at the pumps is so low.




Thomas Friedman often talks plain, simple sense ... he sees the _connections_ in disparate things. In this case I'm not sure that the perceived _strategy_ is the result of planning or just good fortune. But, in a fully serviced market, the normal reaction of suppliers is to cut production until equilibrium is achieved, but the Saudis are maintaining and even increasing production, despite falling crashing oil prices so maybe there is a plan, after all.

Canada is, of course, being hurt by this process, but ...

*Anything that hurts Russia is a good thing.*


----------



## CougarKing

Some experts predict Putin's next aggressive move could be in the Baltic states...

Yahoo Finance/Business Insider



> *Putin's Next Move Could Make Eastern Europe Explode*
> Business Insider
> By Brett LoGiurato – 13 hours ago
> 
> (...SNIPPED)
> 
> Three of the four panelists —  New Yorker editor David Remnick, journalist and author Masha Gessen, Russian political activist and former grand chessmaster Garry Kasparov, and former Treasury Department official Roger Altman — *agreed Putin could soon try to stretch his influence into the Baltic states of  Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.*
> 
> "They already are under pressure," Gessen, the author of a  2012 unauthorized biography  of Putin, said of the Baltics.* "That's very much where he's doing his nuclear saber-rattling, and that's where he's planning to call NATO's bluff."
> 
> Unlike Ukraine, all three Baltic states are NATO members.  NATO's Article 5 requires all members of the alliance come to the defense of any member that is attacked or targeted. *
> 
> Putin last month made casual mention of his country's nuclear arsenal, around the same time NATO accused Russian forces of an "incursion" in Ukraine. Many analysts have speculated Putin's next move could come in the Baltic states, something that would be a clear challenge to NATO.
> 
> Amid the bluster from Putin — who also reportedly said in a private conversation he could invade Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states if he really wanted to — NATO states made a point of countering with strong rhetoric of their own.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Edward Campbell

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Financial Times_, is some informed opinion about the impact of low oil prices on Russia:

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/988c386a-552a-11e4-89e8-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Gd5GxIZi


> Russia can withstand lower oil prices but not for very long
> *The government will have either to cut spending or raise taxes, writes Sergei Guriev*
> 
> Sergei Guriev
> 
> October 19, 2014
> 
> Russia does not face an immediate threat from the sharp fall in oil prices over recent months. While the economy is heavily dependent on oil, the country’s accumulated reserves and the floating rouble will mitigate the shock, and Russia should be able to withstand levels of $80 to $90 a barrel for about two years. But in the longer term, persistently low prices – reinforced by the pressure imposed by western sanctions – could pose an existential challenge to Vladimir Putin’s regime.
> 
> The 25 per cent drop in the oil price over the past three months did come as a shock to the Russian government. The latest draft of the 2015-17 budget assumes a price of $100 a barrel (and average annual gross domestic product growth of 2.6 per cent). Even before the oil price shift, the government planned to deplete its Reserve Fund from 5 per cent of GDP to 3 per cent by the end of 2017, in order to pay for the deficit foreseen in each of the next three years. Much of Russia’s other sovereign fund, the National Welfare Fund, has already been committed to infrastructure and providing support to the banks and companies sanctioned by the west.
> 
> Oil and gas account for about half of government revenues in Russia; a price drop from $100 to $80 a barrel would cause a shortfall of about 2 per cent of GDP. Normally this would not be a great problem, as Russia would borrow in international markets, and Russian state-owned banks and companies would refinance their external debt.
> 
> In the light of the west’s sanctions, the situation is a lot more uncomfortable. But this does not mean Russia will run out of cash before the end of 2017. The central bank has committed to the floating exchange rate, so the lower oil price will result in a weaker rouble, helping both the economy and the government’s own budget to weather the shock. Russian government spending is denominated in roubles; if depreciation is strong enough, the budget may be balanced even if the oil price is at $80.
> 
> This will not solve Mr Putin’s real problem: stagnating, and most likely declining, real incomes. Capital outflows will continue to result in lower investment, and therefore lower growth, in coming years. The government’s 2 per cent growth forecast for 2015 already looks optimistic. Even before the oil price dropped, the consensus was for 1 per cent; the forecast by market analysts and international organisations is now about 0.5 per cent. And while the central bank will attempt to keep a lid on inflation, a weaker rouble will undermine the purchasing power of Russian consumers in real terms. Russia is a net importer of food and consumer goods; while there will be substantial import substitution, overall prices can be expected to increase.
> 
> Mr Putin’s government has never faced budget constraints as tough. Even during the 2008-09 financial crisis, the challenge was more manageable. The budget then was based on an oil price of $40 to $50 a barrel, while Russia had much larger Reserve and National Welfare Funds, worth 20 per cent of GDP. Not surprisingly, the state spent its way out of the crisis.
> 
> This time, the government will have to choose whether to cut spending, and thus publicly recognise its inability to deliver on Mr Putin’s 2012 electoral promises, or raise taxes – which would further hit investment and GDP growth. Either way, if oil prices remain in the $80 to $90 range, the government will have to placate an electorate suffering lower living standards. The experience of recent months gives us a good idea of how Mr Putin will respond: by convincing the public that they are in a besieged fortress and must rally around the flag whatever the cost. This will require raising propaganda and political repression to yet another level – and may involve even more unpredictable foreign policy choices.
> 
> _The writer, a former rector of the New Economic School in Moscow, is professor of economics at Sciences Po in Paris_




See, also: this in the _Grand Strategy for a Divided America_ thread.


----------



## Altair

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Thomas Friedman often talks plain, simple sense ... he sees the _connections_ in disparate things. In this case I'm not sure that the perceived _strategy_ is the result of planning or just good fortune. But, in a fully serviced market, the normal reaction of suppliers is to cut production until equilibrium is achieved, but the Saudis are maintaining and even increasing production, despite falling crashing oil prices so maybe there is a plan, after all.
> 
> Canada is, of course, being hurt by this process, but ...
> 
> *Anything that hurts Russia is a good thing.*


 As a major oil exporter, I'm not sure Canadians should be chearing this.


----------



## a_majoor

Altair said:
			
		

> As a major oil exporter, I'm not sure Canadians should be chearing this.



Saudi Arabia is aiming its oil weapon at _all_ potential competitors, Russia and Iran since they are the most dangerous in the short term, but American Shale Oil and Canadian Oil Sands since we are a long term threat to them. OTOH, while Russia and Iran are heavily dependant on oil revenues to survive, Canada and the US have larger and more diversified economies which can weather this more easily. It may not be "good" and it will certainly hurt some sectors of the economy, but not as drastically and probably not as long.

Don't forget that the Saudi Kingdom is also dependent on it's oil revenues to maintain domestic stability by essentially "paying off" its masses of unemployed young people, radicals and various "princes". Low oil prices will make it harder to do this and maintain their external adventures as well.


----------



## Kirkhill

Also, it has been pointed out (by whom I can't remember  :-[ ) that because our dollar is considered a petro-dollar by the market when the price of oil drops the value of our dollar drops.  When we sell into the US we get paid in US dollars.

So with the dollars at par and oil at $100 per barrel then we get $100 CAD for our barrel.  But when the barrel drops to $80 per barrel then the Canadian dollar drops to $0.80 USD / CAD.  Consequently we get $80 USD per barrel which in turn buys $100 CAD.

Our internal economy keeps humming along as before.  Our exports are more competitively priced in all market sectors.  Our imports are more expensive which opens up new domestic market opportunities.

It ain't all doom and gloom.

We are all going to die..... just not today  >


----------



## Altair

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Also, it has been pointed out (by whom I can't remember  :-[ ) that because our dollar is considered a petro-dollar by the market when the price of oil drops the value of our dollar drops.  When we sell into the US we get paid in US dollars.
> 
> So with the dollars at par and oil at $100 per barrel then we get $100 CAD for our barrel.  But when the barrel drops to $80 per barrel then the Canadian dollar drops to $0.80 USD / CAD.  Consequently we get $80 USD per barrel which in turn buys $100 CAD.


 So as long as both drop in tandem the economy wont take so much of a hit?

Well, that works. I remember reading somewhere that for every dollar the price of oil drops the Alberta goverment loses out on 250 million dollars in royalties.


----------



## CougarKing

Speaking of the oil/energy barons:

Reuters



> *Sanctions bind Russia's energy elite to Putin*
> BY ELIZABETH PIPER AND TIMOTHY HERITAGE
> MOSCOW Wed Oct 29, 2014 2:10am EDT
> 
> (...SNIPPED)
> 
> The relationship between the two state run firms has long been strained. Most recently Gazprom, successor to the Soviet gas ministry, has been worried by Rosneft's ambition to increase its gas output having become Russia's biggest oil producer, borne out in an intensifying price war for domestic gas consumers.
> 
> *The mere suggestion that such rivals could cooperate to reduce the impact of sanctions is one of the strongest signals yet of how, after seven months, Western measures are having the opposite effect to the one intended.
> 
> Far from dividing those closest to President Vladimir Putin, they have forced the main players in the energy sector to rally behind him. This circle has by necessity become more focused, *Western and Russian businessmen, diplomats and politicians said.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## a_majoor

Well, surprise!:

http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/10/research-links-massive-cyber-spying-ring-to-russia/



> *Research links massive cyber spying ring to Russia*
> Foregoing crime, the group targets European, US governments in 7-year spree.
> 
> by Robert Lemos - Oct 28 2014, 8:00pm EDT
> 
> A professional espionage group has targeted a variety of Eastern European governments and security organizations with attacks aimed at stealing political and state secrets, security firm FireEye stated in a report released on Tuesday.
> 
> The group, dubbed APT28 by the company, has targeted high-level officials in Eastern European countries such as Georgia, and security organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While Russian and Ukrainian cybercriminal groups are known to conduct massive campaigns aimed at stealing money and financial information, APT28 focuses solely on political information and state secrets, according to FireEye.
> 
> The report argues that the group is closely tied to Russia and likely part of Moscow’s intelligence apparatus.
> 
> “This group, unlike the China-based threat actors we track, does not appear to conduct widespread intellectual property theft for economic gain,” FireEye stated in the report. “Nor have we observed the group steal and profit from financial account information.”
> 
> While linking specific actions on the Internet to people in the real world is difficult, FireEye used the report to make the case that a variety of espionage operations can be laid on the collective keyboards of APT28 and that the group is tightly linked to Russia.
> 
> This is not the first time the company has taken aim at nation-state cyber espionage. In 2013, Mandiant, now a subsidiary of FireEye, released a report on a Chinese group, APT1, which the company argued was part of the People's Liberation Army and which Mandiant researchers tied to attacks on more than 100 companies. The report has shaped much of the debate over online espionage between countries.
> 
> Attributing APT28’s efforts to Russia seems straightforward. More than half of the language setting in the compiled executable are Russian. Also, 96 percent of the malware samples analyzed by FireEye were compiled between Monday and Friday, from 8 am to 6 pm in the GMT+4 time zone, which matches Moscow. Such regularity suggests that the programmers were working during the regular work week in Moscow, the report argues.
> 
> The group behind the tools used by APT28 has frequently updated the software and focused on making the resulting binaries difficult for defenders to reverse engineer, according to the report. The technical components include a downloader, dubbed “SOURFACE” by FireEye, a program to give hackers remote access (“EVILTOSS”), and a group of modules to enhance functionality of the espionage software (“CHOPSTICK”). The modular nature of the program, similar to other espionage threats such as Flame and Duqu, allowing attackers to pick and choose the final functionality of any particular attack, as well as tailor the eventual malware to the target's environment.
> 
> The code’s sophistication and complexity suggests a professional development group, the company said.
> 
> “The coding practices evident in the group’s malware suggest both a high level of skill and an interest in complicating reverse engineering efforts,” the report stated.
> 
> For the most part, the analysis focuses on the group’s interests and how those interests are closely tied with the Russian government.


----------



## a_majoor

Russia's agressive attitude creates more blowback. While the military dimension will largely be notional (for now), the political dimension is quite large, both in optics and in harnessing more partners to a common task:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/blog/2014/10/29/nervous-swedes-eye-nato-membership/



> *Nervous Swedes Eye NATO Membership*
> 
> Russia’s repeated little “visits” with subs and planes might finally be enough for famously neutral Sweden. For the first time, an opinion poll has found that the majority of respondents want to join the NATO alliance. According to the Financial Times:
> 
> More Swedes are in favour of joining Nato than are against for the first time in the Nordic country’s history, according to a poll just a week after a hunt for a suspected submarine in the waters outside Stockholm.
> 
> In a new poll by Novus for TV4 conducted over the weekend, 37 per cent of Swedes said they supported joining Nato while 36 per cent were against. Five months ago a poll showed 28 per cent in favour and 56 per cent against.
> 
> Sweden’s new center-left government came into office having made anti-NATO pledges, but the conversation seems to have shifted significantly since then. Not only have the Russians been (supposedly) poking around in Swedish waters; they’ve also entered Swedish airspace. As a similar incident over Estonia makes clear, the Russians are testing how much leeway they have in the Baltic after an easy win in Ukraine—but it appears they are finally getting some pushback.
> 
> If Sweden did start to explore NATO membership, the move would have regional repercussions:
> 
> The three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are particularly keen for Sweden and Finland to sign up to Nato, believing that their own security is weakened without them in the club. This is especially so for Sweden, whose island of Gotland lies in the middle of the Baltic sea and is seen as a tempting and vulnerable target should Russia wish to attack the Baltics.
> 
> Sweden and Finland have an informal understanding that they would only join Nato together. The issue of Nato membership is likely to feature heavily in Finland’s parliamentary elections due in the spring with Alex Stubb, the new prime minister, a big proponent of joining the military alliance.
> 
> Potentially, then, Russian aggression might be uniting the whole Baltic against Russia, which was not the case during the Cold War. Sweden was officially neutral during that conflict (though it often cooperated with NATO), while at times Finland was practically a ward of the Soviets.
> 
> But even if Sweden did join NATO, its military weakness would leave it vulnerable. Meanwhile, NATO’s European members are historically weak, even on paper, and even more so in the field. And above all, American posturing and retreat over the Ukraine crisis has called into question the alliance’s ability to deter Putin from further aggression in the Baltics.
> 
> It’s good to see some of the Europeans start taking this threat seriously. But Putin is bringing hard-power realities back to the fore, and should not be underestimated.



and some more on why Sweden is changing its attitudes:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/nato-says-russian-jets-bombers-circle-europe-in-unusual-incidents/2014/10/29/6098d964-5f97-11e4-827b-2d813561bdfd_story.html



> *NATO says Russian jets, bombers circle Europe in unusual incidents*
> By Michael Birnbaum October 29 at 4:24 PM 
> 
> MOSCOW — NATO said Wednesday that it had intercepted a large number of Russian aircraft flying close to European airspace in the past two days, in an “unusual” series of incidents that brought Russian bombers as far afield as Portugal.
> 
> The aircraft — at least 19 in all — offered reminders of Russian air power at a time of the worst relations between the West and Russia since the Cold War. Russian military aircraft have significantly increased their activity in Europe since the conflict in Ukraine began earlier this year, with NATO scrambling to intercept aircraft more than 100 times in 2014. But a NATO official said the scale of the latest incidents was the most provocative this year.
> 
> Over the Atlantic Ocean and the North, Black and Baltic seas, Russian bombers, fighter jets and tanker aircraft were detected flying in international airspace, NATO said. There were no incursions into national airspace, a violation of sovereignty that would have significantly amplified the seriousness of the four incidents, three of which took place on Wednesday.
> 
> “We’re raising it as an unusual level of activity,” said Lt. Col. Jay Janzen, a spokesman for NATO’s military command in Mons, Belgium. “The flights we’ve seen in the last 24 hours, the size of those flights and some of the flight plans are definitely unusual.”
> 
> U.S. officials regard the flights as a show of force by the Putin government. “It’s concerning because it’s moving in the wrong direction,” said one U.S. defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the air activity publicly. “It’s not helping to de-escalate the situation in Ukraine. It’s not helping to improve relations between NATO and Russia. It’s not helping anybody.”
> 
> At least nineteen Russian aircraft, including fighter jets and bombers, have been intercepted in four waves over Europe yesterday and today. Smaller-scale incidents have also increased this year, approximately tripling from the same period in 2013, Janzen said.
> 
> In at least one of the four incidents, the aircraft had switched off their transponders and had not filed flight plans with civilian air traffic controllers. That means that civilian air traffic control cannot track them, potentially creating a risk for civilian planes.
> 
> That incident took place around 3:00 a.m. in Western Europe on Wednesday, when four Tu-95 long-range strategic nuclear bombers and four Il-78 tanker aircraft flew over the Norwegian Sea. Norwegian F-16 fighter jets scrambled to intercept them. Six of the planes returned to Russia, but two of the bombers skirted the Norwegian coast, flew past Britain — sending Typhoon fighter jets to scramble in response — and then finally looped west of Spain and Portugal, attracting Portuguese F-16s. Then the two bombers appeared to return to Russia, Janzen said.
> 
> The Tu-95 bombers are not commonly seen close to Europe, Janzen said. Nor are the MiG-31 fighter jets that were intercepted along with other aircraft above the Baltic Sea in two separate incidents Tuesday and Wednesday. It was not immediately clear whether the two incidents above the Baltic represented the same group of seven planes entering and departing a Russian military base at Kaliningrad.
> 
> There was no immediate reaction from the Russian government.
> 
> Fighter jets from Norway, Britain, Portugal, Turkey, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Sweden were involved in responding to the Russian aircraft, Janzen said. Finland and Sweden are not members of NATO, and they have long refrained from joining the defensive alliance, which was formed after World War II as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.
> 
> But military incidents with Russia this year have caused both countries to start to reevaluate their positions. Most recently, the Swedish military last week spent several days searching a vast territory for an unidentified underwater craft suspected to be Russian. Last month, Sweden said two Russian military planes had violated its airspace.
> 
> A Novus opinion poll released Tuesday found for the first time that more Swedes favored joining NATO than opposed it.
> 
> The most recent violation of NATO airspace was last week, when a Russian spy plane flew almost 2,000 feet into Estonian airspace. This year, NATO increased its air patrols based in the Baltics from four to 16 jets, a measure of the newly hot confrontation between the two military juggernauts.
> 
> The incidents appear to have set European militaries on edge this week. British fighter jets were scrambled Wednesday to bring a civilian Antonov cargo jet into a London airport; it stopped responding to radio calls from air traffic controllers while flying over the British capital. That caused a supersonic boom that was audible across a large stretch of southeastern England.
> 
> Missy Ryan contributed to this report.
> 
> Michael Birnbaum is The Post’s Moscow bureau chief. He previously served as the Berlin correspondent and an education reporter.


----------



## CougarKing

How long till Russia takes advantage of this worsening situation below to bite off another piece of Georgia much like the way South Ossetia became a Russian satellite?

Defense News



> *Power Struggle Plunges Georgia In Turmoil*
> Nov. 5, 2014 - 03:29PM   |   By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE
> 
> TBILISI, GEORGIA — Georgia on Wednesday plunged into political crisis after its youthful prime minister sacked his hugely popular defence minister and the foreign minister resigned in protest.
> 
> In the ensuing political turmoil in the pro-Western Caucasus nation, Irakli Alasania — who was fired in a surprise move on Tuesday — said his Free Democrats party was leaving the ruling coalition, robbing Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, 32, of a parliamentary majority.
> 
> “Free Democrats will no longer be in the coalition,” the photogenic ex-defence minister, 40, told reporters.
> 
> The ruling Georgian Dream coalition was left with only 73 seats in the 150-member legislature after Free Democrats’ 10-member-strong parliamentary faction quit.
> 
> Observers said the row had all the trappings of a bitter power struggle in which Garibashvili got rid of his charismatic, influential opponent.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)
> 
> Shortly after he was sacked, Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze said that she and her four deputies were resigning “to show what threats the country is facing.”
> 
> Alexi Petriashvili, the minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and a close ally of Alasania, also resigned in protest on Tuesday.
> 
> “Dictatorship is coming to Georgia, our democracy is in danger,” Petriashvili said late on Tuesday.
> 
> Georgia’s pro-Western President Giorgi Margvelashvili denounced the “political confrontation that endangers the functioning of state institutions and the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration.”
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Edward Campbell

Here, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Financial Times_ is an article that suggests that the sanctions are working:

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6c059328-666d-11e4-9c0c-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3IQQ7jgpE


> Plunging rouble raises spectre of fresh financial crisis for Russia
> 
> Kathrin Hille in Moscow, Roman Olearchyk in Kiev
> 
> November 7, 2014
> 
> Russia faces the risk of financial instability, the country’s central bank warned, after dramatic gyrations in the currency amid renewed tension in Ukraine revived fears of a currency crisis.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The warning came after a day of huge swings in the rouble and capped a weekwhen the currency fell 8 per cent, its biggest weekly drop in 11 years.
> 
> The rouble is a casualty of falling oil prices, which have plunged more than 25 per cent since mid-June, geopolitical tensions over Ukraine and sanctions that have shut some of the country’s biggest companies out of western capital markets.
> 
> For many ordinary Russians, the currency’s slide has evoked painful memories of the financial crises that rocked Russia in 2008-9 and 1998. Analysts said if the rouble’s fall continued it could undermine President Vladimir Putin’s popularity, which currently stands at record highs.
> 
> The Bank of Russia said the past few days had seen”extreme demand” for dollars, which could lead to “the creation of risks for financial stability”.
> 
> The central bank said it stood ready to increase its foreign exchange interventions “at any moment”, and use other tools in its arsenal, to support the rouble.
> 
> It also defended a decision to let the currency float freely, a move which was rigorously stress-tested on Friday when the rouble initially fell as much as 4 per cent to a record low against the dollar and breached the threshold of 60 to the euro for the first time.
> 
> The currency later pared its losses and swung up more than 2 per cent against the dollar on the day, after speculation that the central bank would take action to halt the crisis, before falling back again.
> 
> The Bank of Russia said Friday’s volatility was part of an adjustment process following Wednesday’ policy changes. “The sharp weakening of the rouble that started late Thursday was caused by a new round of the conflict in Ukraine, fears of new sanctions and the falling oil price,” said brokerage BCS Prime in a research note.
> 
> “However, households’ expectations of rouble devaluation are contributing more than ever to the . . . fall these days.”
> 
> Kiev said on Friday that dozens of Russian tanks and fighters had recently entered the breakaway regions of eastern Ukraine. Fighting in the seven-month conflict which has claimed more than 4,000 lives had subsided after fierce August battles gave way to a September ceasefire agreement.
> 
> But the so-called Minsk accords started to unravel swiftly after separatists held an election on Sunday that was considered illegitimate by Kiev and the west.
> 
> The central bank said on Wednesday it would sell no more than $350m a day to support the rouble, arguing that from now on market forces would be key in determining the exchange rate.
> 
> The bank did, however, stick to its commitment to make unlimited one-off interventions if financial stability was at risk.
> 
> At Credit Europe Bank, a midsize lender in Moscow, customers were queueing at lunchtime to withdraw foreign currency or buy dollars, while the branch manager tried to persuade them to open rouble deposits instead. The lender, and many other smaller Russian banks, have started requiring customers who want to buy dollars to order them at least one day in advance.
> 
> The rouble’s slide has raised concerns over whether Russian companies and banks can service their external debt. Some $30bn is due for redemption before the end of the year by Russian corporates and about $10bn by Russian banks.
> 
> In total, Russia’s corporate sector has $422bn in foreign currency debt and the country’s banks have $192bn, the central bank said.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The corporate borrowers due to make big repayments by the end of the year are mostly state companies with a steady stream of foreign currency revenues from exports of oil and gas.
> 
> For that reason, analysts say the rouble volatility should not affect their ability to service their debt in the near term.
> 
> But an executive at a foreign investment bank in Moscow said: “The picture is more worrying for the banks.”
> 
> For Russia’s fiscal situation, the cheaper rouble against the dollar is less worrying as it helps mitigate the steady slide in the oil price, which has led to a fall in oil and gas-based revenues.
> 
> Moscow equities markets were also under heavy pressure. The dollar-denominated RTS stock index hit its lowest level since 2009, falling below 1,000 points.
> 
> Russia’s 10-year sovereign debt yields rose 15 basis points to 10.3 per cent, making its borrowing the most expensive since November 2009. The cost of insuring Russian debt against default returned to its highest level of the year. Credit default swaps for Russia were up 9 basis points to 286 basis points.
> 
> _With additional reporting by Elaine Moore in London_




The real hero in all this may be an accountant.


----------



## Kirkhill

It's enough to give somebody a heart attack....


----------



## a_majoor

Here is a good preview of what we are _really_ up against. Our thinking about defense and security needs to be updated:

www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx


----------



## The Bread Guy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Here is a good preview of what we are _really_ up against. Our thinking about defense and security needs to be updated:
> 
> www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx


Good piece - milpoints inbound for sharing.


----------



## McG

More confirmation that all is not well ... Rather, some of the posturing is reminiscent of that which contributed to the launch of the First World War.


> Study reveals Russia's near misses in Europe
> BBC NEWS
> 10 Nov 2014
> By Jonathan Marcus
> BBC diplomatic correspondent
> 
> The growing strains between Russia and the West prompted by the Ukraine crisis are now sending ripples of military tension across Europe.
> 
> Nato has responded to Russia's incursions into Ukraine by stepping up its ties with Kiev and bolstering air patrols and exercises with its eastern and central European members.
> 
> Russia in turn has decided to pursue a more active, many might say a more aggressive, military policy of its own, returning to the sorts of flights and activities from the Cold War years that were used to regularly test out Nato defences.
> 
> The European Leadership Network, a London-based think tank, has produced a detailed study of this more assertive Russian activity.
> 
> Entitled Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia and the West in 2014, it chronicles almost 40 specific incidents that have occurred during the past eight months.
> 
> It says these "add up to a highly disturbing picture of violations of national airspace, emergency scrambles, narrowly avoided mid-air collisions, close encounters at sea and other dangerous actions happening on a regular basis over a very wide geographical area".
> 
> Apart from routine or near routine encounters, the report identifies "11 serious incidents of a more aggressive or unusually provocative nature, bringing a higher level risk of escalation".
> 
> These include harassment of reconnaissance planes, close over-flights over warships and Russian "mock bombing raid" missions.
> 
> It also singles out "three high-risk incidents which," in its view, "carried a high probability of causing casualties or a direct military confrontation".
> 
> The fact that one of these was a narrowly avoided collision between an SAS civil airliner taking off from Copenhagen and a Russian reconnaissance plane shows that these are not just military games.
> 
> There is a very real risk of calamity.
> 
> The Russian military aircraft was not using a transponder to identify its position.
> 
> The second high-risk incident involved the abduction of an Estonian security service operative from a border post on Estonian (and hence Nato) territory.
> 
> He was later taken to Moscow and accused of espionage.
> 
> Then of course there was the major submarine hunt by the Swedish authorities last month, with the Swedes warning that they were ready to use force to bring any submerged vessel to the surface.
> 
> The danger, the report indicates, comes from both sides.
> 
> "The mix of more aggressive Russian posturing and the readiness of Western forces to show resolve, increases the risk of unintended escalation and the danger of losing control over events."
> 
> The European Leadership Network makes three broad recommendations.
> 
> It says that "the Russian leadership should urgently re-evaluate the costs and risks of continuing its more assertive military posture, and western diplomacy should be aimed at persuading Russia to move in this direction".
> 
> It says that "all sides should exercise military and political restraint".
> 
> And it says that "all sides must improve military-to-military communication and transparency".
> 
> There is probably much that is sensible here.
> 
> But given the unresolved tensions over Ukraine, the overall trajectory of current Russian foreign policy and the pressures coming from those in Nato who feel most threatened, like the Poles, this pattern of behaviour risks becoming the new norm.
> 
> Indeed the growing frequency and scale of Nato military exercises in eastern and central Europe is only likely to encourage the Russians to bolster their own military manoeuvres.
> 
> Procedures and operational patterns from the Cold War may need to be re-learnt.
> 
> We are not back in the 1950s.
> 
> But in some ways the dangers of bravado leading to miscalculation or of genuine error make matters today every bit as dangerous.


http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29956277


----------



## tomahawk6

The crisis in the Ukraine is Russia's fault.They could have stayed out of that mess,but instead chose to take advantage of the crisis takeover the Ukraine.It hasnt gone well for Putin.Short of an all out invasion the crisis will continue until one side gives in.Putin would be well advised to turn his attention to Siberia as China is poised to grab more valuable land there.


----------



## Edward Campbell

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> 1. The crisis in the Ukraine is Russia's fault.They could have stayed out of that mess,but instead chose to take advantage of the crisis takeover the Ukraine.
> 
> 2. It hasnt gone well for Putin.Short of an all out invasion the crisis will continue until one side gives in.
> 
> 3. Putin would be well advised to turn his attention to Siberia as China is poised to grab more valuable land there.




I agree wholly with your first two points. The Ukrainians are not, themselves, blameless, but Putin made an internal problem into a crisis. 

The Chinese are unlikely to "grab" anything, but they will - already are _I believe_ - assiduously undermine Russian sovereignty in the region_*s*_, and I emphasize the plural because I think the Chinese see Siberia as something other than a monolithic single entity. My _guess_ is that the Chinese aim to have sundry "independent" Siberian republics emerge from out of Russia and into China's orbit.

How far does China want to go in "liberating" Asia from European domination?







There are three parts to Russia, Western (grey) Central (white on this map) and Eastern (also grey). My sense is that China sees the _natural_ division to be in the middle of Central Russia, on the Yenisey River line. It helps that there are massive oil and gas fields in the parts of Russia (everything East of the Yenisey) that China would like to see as "independent" republics.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Altair said:
			
		

> As a major oil exporter, I'm not sure Canadians should be cheering this.




Falling oil prices are, indeed, slowing the Canadian economy, but, see this and, also this: "Falling oil prices, sanctions push Russia to brink of recession".


----------



## dimsum

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-12/defence-monitors-russian-naval-vessels-north-of-australia/5887134

Interesting, but not entirely surprising, as the G20 is going on this weekend in Brisbane.


----------



## YZT580

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Short of an all out invasion the crisis will continue until one side gives in



NATO sources report large movements of tanks, mobile artillery and significant numbers of troops identified as Russian, into eastern Ukraine.  Russia of course denies any involvement but that is only for the two people left here in NA that actually what they say.


----------



## a_majoor

While the article is about the Stasi, it is important to remember the Stasi was one of the tools of the KGB to maintain their control over the Soviet Empire, and as we read in the article, the KGB and now FSB is utilizing many of the tactics developed by the Stasi:

http://pjmedia.com/lifestyle/2014/11/12/what-happened-to-east-germanys-brutally-effective-secret-police-after-the-wall-fell/?print=1



> *What Happened to East Germany’s Brutally Effective Secret Police After the Wall Fell?*
> Posted By Robert Wargas On November 12, 2014 @ 3:09 pm In Communism,Europe,Evil,History,Ideology,International,Marxism,Psychology,Radicalism,Religion,Sex,Spying | 19 Comments
> 
> On November 9, 2006, as the free world celebrated the seventeenth anniversary of the Berlin Wall’s demise, an 83-year-old man died in a peaceful slumber at his home in the German capital city. The man was Markus Wolf, who during the Cold War led the foreign-intelligence section of East Germany’s secret-police apparatus: the Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit), known colloquially as “the Stasi.” The Stasi’s most renowned spymaster, he controlled thousands of agents, whose purpose was to infiltrate important Western institutions and government positions. Often mistaken as the inspiration for John le Carre’s shadowy Karla character, Wolf for years remained a mystery to Western intelligence services, who didn’t even have a picture of him until the late 1970s—several decades into his career. Historians have marveled at his success in leading the Stasi’s foreign wing, known as the HVA, or Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung. Perhaps his most well known accomplishment is having one of his agents, Gunter Guillaume, become a trusted aide to Willy Brandt, the West German chancellor.
> 
> Seven years after Wolf’s death and twenty-five years after the Wall’s, the West still doesn’t appreciate the breadth and depth of the Stasi’s brutality. (The KGB still reigns in the popular imagination as the ultimate secret-police force.) Formed after the Second World War in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, the Stasi grew to become the most potently effective Eastern bloc intelligence organization. They possessed a more impressive informant network than even the KGB. When East Germany crumbled, the Stasi employed upwards of 190,000 unofficial informants. By 1989, approximately one out of every 90 East German citizens was a Stasi informant. Referred to as inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (“unofficial collaborators”), most were simply ordinary German citizens, tasked with reporting everything they could about possible (real or imagined) anti-regime activity, as well as details about family and friends. Even children were involved in spying on their parents.
> 
> The Stasi’s methods of controlling the East German population were often wickedly creative. Even among those fairly knowledgeable of the German language, the word “Zersetzung,” used in a political context, is likely unfamiliar. Translated variously as “degradation,” “decomposition,” “disruptiveness,” or “disintegration,” the word is most often used in a biological sense. When it comes to espionage, Zersetzung refers to the Stasi’s practice of destroying a target’s personal life. The methods, however, were much more subtle than the word implies. The Stasi perfected their ability to torture people indirectly—a kind of psychological death by a thousand cuts. Zersetzung, for instance, often involved breaking into the homes of those considered enemies of the East German government. Stasi agents would then begin a series of bizarre and unorthodox moves, designed to delicately frighten and manipulate the target into anxiety and paranoia. This might include taking pictures off the wall or moving items in the house: small, often nearly imperceptible offenses that former officers said would demoralize the opposition by invading their private spaces without overtly threatening or harming anyone. One tactic, for instance, involved sending dildos or vibrators to the target’s spouse. Consider how finely tuned must be someone’s manipulative ability in order to think of such schemes.
> 
> As an important side note, the Russian FSB, successor to the KGB, has continued Zersetzung as a useful tactic against certain Westerners. Luke Harding, a correspondent for The Guardian, has documented the Russians’ harassment of British and American diplomats. Employing a strategy eerily redolent of Stasi activity, the FSB has broken into targets’ homes, moved certain items, and even purposely triggered alarms. The U.S State Department has acknowledged that “home intrusions” have become common, and one State Department cable was clear that “we have no doubt that this activity originates in the FSB.” It ought not to be forgotten that Vladimir Putin, in his salad days as a KGB officer, was stationed in the East German city of Dresden.
> 
> Since there was no Cold War analogue of the Nuremberg trials, nor any anti-Communist version of Simon Wiesenthal, it’s understandable to ask what happened to members of the Stasi after the East German regime disintegrated. Wolf fled to Russia, which denied him asylum, and he was eventually caught while traveling through Bavaria. He was charged with treason, though his sentence was suspended. In logic that one suspects would never be applied to Nazis, it was argued that Wolf’s activities were legal at the time he performed them.
> 
> Most other ex-Stasi agents simply re-entered German society, though not always smoothly, along with all the ex-politicos, border guards, and other Communist functionaries. Reporting not long after the Wall fell, Steven Emerson discovered that
> 
> With the disbanding of the Stasi, 85,000 full-time officers lost their jobs virtually overnight. No more than 10,000 have since found gainful employment, most of them in various Government ministries, including 2,000 in the Ministry of the Interior, which formerly oversaw the Stasi. The rest have joined the growing ranks of East Germany’s unemployed; some get by on standard unemployment benefits, while others receive no Government compensation at all. Many are embittered at finding themselves excluded, even ostracized, by their fellow citizens.
> 
> A quarter century on, many of them are not the slightest bit embarrassed by their past work for the secret police; on the contrary, they are boldly proud. There even exists an organization, the amusingly named Society for Legal and Humanitarian Support, dedicated to assisting ex-Stasi officers and other former East German bureaucrats. For them, the fall of the Berlin Wall was a tragedy rather than a triumph for liberty. “What happened that day has been a burden to people like us,” Hans Bauer, chairman of the group, told Reuters in 2009.
> 
> Though the post-Communist German government shied away from hiring too many ex-Stasi officers for state positions, pilfered documents from Wikileaks show that the German government does employ them in (of all places) the federally administered archive of Stasi records—a revelation that caused some dismay in German society. Many other ex-Stasi personnel eventually went on to careers in the private sector. After the Wall fell, it was, oddly enough, the newly reunified German government that urged corporations to absorb former Communist encryption experts, fearing they would otherwise be driven to aid Western enemies with their skills. One German company, Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH, a supplier of encryption and communications technology to NATO, employs plenty of former Stasi codebreakers.
> 
> Of course, most ex-Stasi employees are not figures like Wolf and Guillaume. They did not have careers full of secret intrigue and romantic exploits. Most did not kill, torture, or even tap phones. They were probably paper-pushers of one sort or another—doing their routine jobs to support families or, sadly, to avoid the suspicions of those for whom they worked. Still, it was Hannah Arendt who so ably explained what paper-pushers are capable of, and how evil is more likely to be living next door than lurking in the closet.
> 
> Editor’s note: this is part 5 in an ongoing series exploring the history of dictators, tyrants, criminals and their evil ideologies. See the previous installments: Part 1: “Why It’s OK to Be Intrigued by Evil Dictators“ and Part 2: “Does Everybody Want Freedom?” Part 3: “Like a Serial Killer, Mao Zedong Manipulated Everyone,” Part 4: ”Mike Tyson: He Has a New TV Show, But Does Anyone Care?.” Have ideas for who you’d like to see Robert explore next? Get in touch on Twitter: @RobertWargas and@DaveSwindle
> 
> Article printed from PJ Lifestyle: http://pjmedia.com/lifestyle
> 
> URL to article: http://pjmedia.com/lifestyle/2014/11/12/what-happened-to-east-germanys-brutally-effective-secret-police-after-the-wall-fell/


----------



## Edward Campbell

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> From the _Globe & Mail_:
> 
> 
> 
> Stephen Harper told Russian President Vladimir Putin flatly that he needs "to get out of Ukraine," when the two met at a Group of 20 summit of major economies in Brisbane.
> 
> A spokesman for the Canadian Prime Minister relayed the details of the encounter and, according to director of communications Jason MacDonald, "Mr. Putin did not respond positively."
> 
> (....)
> 
> Mr. Harper's encounter with Mr. Putin came Saturday morning when the Canadian Prime Minister was speaking to a group of leaders.
> 
> The Russian Leader stuck out his hand.
> 
> Mr. Harper accepted the gesture but said to the Russian Leader: "I guess I'll shake your hand but I have only one thing to say to you, you need to get out of Ukraine."‎ ....
Click to expand...



I think Mr Putin is rather like the man in the fable who only has a hammer ... eventually every problem looks like a nail. Mr Putin's "hammer" is force, aggression ... and he sees, _I think_, every problem as being best addressed by force.

This creates two problems, in my opinion:

     1. While no one really _*wants *_to fight Russia, no one, not even Australia, Belgium, Canada and Denmark and so on, is afraid to fight Russia. Russia is a giant but it is a stupid, shambling giant ... big feet and fists but
         not a real threat; and

     2. China is "eating Russia's lunch." Chinese diplomacy is _delicate_ and nuanced ... clever and it accomplishes China's aims. Russian 'diplomacy' (AKA bullying) just drives it farther and farther away from countries that might be good
         trading partners and into the arms of China ... and China is NOT Russia's friend.


----------



## a_majoor

Buying and hoarding gold is the usual response to real or preceived economic calamity. I think one question to be asked here is does Russia see a calamity coming, or do they intend to start one? China's gold holdings are interesting as well:

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-putin-buying-much-gold-210532064.html



> *Why Putin is buying so much gold*
> By Everett Rosenfeld November 18, 2014 4:05 PM
> Russian President Vladimir Putin is developing a taste for gold (CEC:Commodities Exchange Centre: @GC.1).
> 
> Wih all of its income from selling oil (Intercontinental Exchange Europe: @LCO.1), Russia is diversifying its reserves by buying massive amounts of gold, said William Rhind, CEO of the World Gold Trust Services.
> 
> Of all the central banks that make their reserve actions public, Russia has been the "largest, most active" gold accumulator, he explained. Still, Rhind said, the "elephant in the room" is how much gold China is buying, as Beijing does not publish these figures.
> 
> A recent report from the World Gold Council showed that many central banks, including Russia's , have beefed up their gold reserves. This investment, the report suggested, was "driven by a number of factors including a continued diversification away from the U.S. dollar and the backdrop of ongoing geopolitical tensions."
> 
> Read More Central banks: The new gold bugs?
> 
> Still, Rhind explained that the move towards gold buying does not represent a new trend for global currencies.
> 
> "I don't think it's moving to a de facto gold standard, it's just simply about diversification," he said. "In many ways they view it as being not too dissimilar from why anybody would own gold."
> 
> More than half of all the gold added to central bank reserve assets in the third quarter was purchased by Russia (55 of about 96 metric tons), the World Gold Council report said.
> 
> Read More Technical move in gold ETF could be short-term bullish
> 
> 
> In total, Russia's central bank has bought about 150 metric tons of gold so far this year, Bank of Russia Chairwoman Elvira Nabiullina said on Tuesday


----------



## Edward Campbell

Of course we do ... all sane people are "seeking regime change" in Russia ...

... see the story, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from the _Globe and Mail_:

http://www.theglobeandmail.com//news/world/russian-foreign-minister-accuses-west-of-seeking-regime-change/article21717126/?cmpid=rss1&click=sf_globe#dashboard/follows/


> Russian foreign minister accuses West of seeking ‘regime change’
> 
> Polina Devitt MOSCOW — Reuters
> 
> Published Saturday, Nov. 22 2014
> 
> Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused the West on Saturday of trying to use sanctions imposed on Moscow in the Ukraine crisis to seek “regime change” in Russia.
> 
> His comments stepped up Moscow’s war of words with the United States and the European Union in their worst diplomatic standoff since the Cold War ended.
> 
> “As for the concept behind to the use of coercive measures, the West is making clear it does not want to force Russia to change policy but wants to secure regime change,” Tass news agency quoted Mr. Lavrov as telling a meeting of the advisory Foreign and Defence Policy Council in Moscow.
> 
> He said that when international sanctions had been used against other countries such as Iran and North Korea, they had been designed not to harm the national economy.
> 
> “Now public figures in Western countries say there is a need to impose sanctions that will destroy the economy and cause public protests,” Mr. Lavrov said.
> 
> His comments followed remarks on Thursday in which President Vladimir Putin said Moscow must guard against a “colour revolution” in Russia, referring to protests that toppled leaders in other former Soviet republics.
> 
> Western sanctions have limited access to foreign capital for some of Russia’s largest companies and banks, hit the defence and energy industries, and imposed asset freezes and travel bans on some of Putin’s allies.
> 
> The measures have aggravated an economic downturn, which has also been worsened by a fall in global oil prices and has helped cause a nearly 30-per-cent slide in the rouble against the dollar since the start of the year.
> 
> Mr. Putin’s popularity has soared in Russia since the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in March.
> 
> He says Western powers were behind the overthrow of a Moscow-backed president in Ukraine in February after months of street protests, but the West blames Moscow for the crisis.
> 
> U.S. Vice President Joe Biden in Kiev on Friday termed Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine as “unacceptable”. He said Moscow must abide by a Sept. 5 ceasefire deal, which has failed to end a conflict that has killed more than 4,300 people since mid-April.
> 
> Mr. Biden urged Moscow to pull soldiers out of Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian separatists are fighting government forces, though Moscow denies supporting the rebels with troops and weapons.




Smart Russians, and there must be a few, should be looking for regime change, too - a change to a regime that is friendly to the West. The alternative, it seems to me, is that they will get a regime change imposed by China.


----------



## George Wallace

Reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Bloomberg.com_:

LINK


> Russian War Games Spill Secrets, Spur Neighbors; 'Scared the Hell Out of NATO'
> 
> By Leon Mangasarian and Ott Ummelas  Nov 21, 2014 7:19 AM ET
> Bloomberg News
> 
> Russian jets probing NATO airspace and supersized war drills are spilling Kremlin military secrets and scaring European nations into stiffening their armed forces.
> 
> Allied jets “have been scrambled over 400 times” this year to intercept Russian planes -- a 50 percent rise over 2013, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said yesterday. A report by the European Leadership Network, a London-based security research group, termed the incidents “a highly disturbing picture of violations of national airspace” and “narrowly avoided mid-air collisions.”
> 
> Yet there are benefits for NATO.
> 
> “Clearly, every time we come into contact with Russian forces and every time we see their tactics and how they deploy, we do learn about them,” U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove, the 28-member NATO’s top military commander, said in Tallinn on Nov. 19. “They are just happening more often and occasionally, the size of the activities is larger.”
> 
> A worsening standoff is pitting Europe and the U.S. against Russia over Ukraine in the biggest crisis since the Cold War’s end 25 years ago. Even German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier -- a persistent proponent of dialog -- said on Nov. 18 after shuttle diplomacy in Kiev and Moscow, that he sees little reason for optimism.
> 
> *‘Scared’ NATO*
> 
> “The rapid mobilization of 20,000 to 40,000 Russian troops at the Ukrainian border scared the hell out of NATO,” Karl-Heinz Kamp, academic director at the German government’s Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin, said by phone.
> 
> Russian President Vladimir Putin said the U.S. wants “not to humiliate, but to subjugate” Russia, in remarks at a Nov. 18 meeting of his People’s Front party supporters in Moscow.
> 
> “We had such brilliant politicians like Nikita Khrushchev, who hammered the desk with his shoe at the United Nations,” Putin said in an Oct. 24 speech. “And the whole world, primarily the United States, and NATO thought: this Nikita is best left alone, he might just go and fire a missile.”
> 
> Monitoring drills and Russian aircraft flying along NATO or Finnish and Swedish airspace is yielding intelligence on command and control, communications and tactics, said Lukasz Kulesa, research director of the ELN in London and former deputy head of Poland’s National Security Bureau that advises the Polish president. Non-NATO members Finland and Sweden upgraded their alliance ties in September.
> 
> *‘Complex Deployments’*
> 
> “A Russian mission that sent planes on the same day to the Baltic, the North Sea and the Black Sea tells us what Russian capabilities have become,” Kulesa said by phone. “It gives us a much better understanding of Russian readiness and their ability to perform more complex deployments.”
> 
> Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies and a member of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Public Council, said equipment being used in drills and missions is well-known to NATO.
> 
> “Russia is not at risk of revealing any secret information to NATO by conducting so many intensive drills and flights,” Pukhov said in an interview. “Russia can keep real secrets quite well, as proven by the surprise of the Crimea operation.”
> 
> *Raised Spending*
> 
> After suffering initial setbacks in the 2008 Georgia War, Russia has increased spending on its armed forces. The Kremlin increased military spending by 50 percent since 2005 while NATO has cut spending by 20 percent, according to NATO chief Stoltenberg.
> 
> “In 2008, Russian generals commanded their soldiers from Moscow in the war by running outside the Defense Ministry and calling them by cellphone. The lessons were learnt,” said Pukhov, who co-authored a book about military aspects of the Ukraine crisis titled Brothers Armed.
> 
> NATO, at its Sept. 4-5 Wales summit, shored up its eastern defenses against Russia as the U.S., which makes up two-thirds of alliance military spending, urged European allies to pay more. The alliance agreed to rotate more troops through eastern Europe and to set up a 5,000-soldier rapid-reaction force.
> 
> The Baltic states are bolstering their armed forces with Estonia vowing more troops on its border with Russia after a security officer was snatched and taken to Moscow.
> 
> *NATO Target*
> 
> Estonia, which already meets NATO’s military spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product, plans to raise spending to 2.05 percent next year. Latvia and Lithuania -- both now spending less than 1 percent -- aim to reach the goal by 2020.
> 
> Alliance states including Denmark, Poland and Germany also plan to increase defense spending, though in the case of Germany only from 2016. Germany spends about 1.3 percent of gross domestic product on the military.
> 
> Denmark is poised to spend more than $4 billion in its biggest air defense upgrade on either Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F-35, ’s F-18 Super Hornet or Typhoon fighters, built by the Eurofighter consortium of [url=http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/AIR:FP]BAE Systems Plc, Airbus Group NV and Italy’s Finmeccanica SpA.
> 
> Poland, which shares borders with both Russia and Ukraine, will choose suppliers for helicopters and an air-defense system within a year as it begins a $27 billion program to overhaul the military and replace Soviet-era military equipment, Defense Minister Tomasz Siemoniak said in an Oct. 24 interview. It’s also bringing forward purchases of attack helicopters, drones and missiles for Lockheed F-16 jets.
> 
> *‘Wake-Up Call’*
> 
> Charly Salonius-Pasternak, a security expert at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki, termed Russia’s moves “quite a wake-up call” that makes it impossible for Finnish or Swedish politicians “who want to be taken seriously” to dismiss Russia’s buildup as low-level rearming.
> 
> “Russia’s armed forces can do things that they couldn’t do 10 years ago,” he said in an interview. “Russia has a much better ability to transport large units, long distances and have them arrive combat ready.”
> 
> That’s triggered a debate in both Finland and Sweden on whether to join NATO.
> 
> Putin, whose military has taken control of or holds territory that under international law belongs to Moldova and Georgia as well as annexing Ukraine’s Crimea in March, noted in his Oct. 24 Valdai speech that when Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck first appeared in the European arena in the 19th century “they found him dangerous because he spoke his mind.”
> 
> “I also always try to say what I think,” Putin said.
> 
> 
> 
> To contact the reporters on this story: Leon Mangasarian in Berlin at lmangasarian@bloomberg.net; Ott Ummelas in Tallinn at oummelas@bloomberg.net
> 
> To contact the editors responsible for this story: Alan Crawford at acrawford6@bloomberg.net James G. Neuger



More on LINK


----------



## chanman

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> I think Mr Putin is rather like the man in the fable who only has a hammer ... eventually every problem looks like a nail. Mr Putin's "hammer" is force, aggression ... and he sees, _I think_, every problem as being best addressed by force.
> 
> This creates two problems, in my opinion:
> 
> 1. While no one really _*wants *_to fight Russia, no one, not even Australia, Belgium, Canada and Denmark and so on, is afraid to fight Russia. Russia is a giant but it is a stupid, shambling giant ... big feet and fists but
> not a real threat; and
> 
> 2. China is "eating Russia's lunch." Chinese diplomacy is _delicate_ and nuanced ... clever and it accomplishes China's aims. Russian 'diplomacy' (AKA bullying) just drives it farther and farther away from countries that might be good
> trading partners and into the arms of China ... and China is NOT Russia's friend.



I disagree that Putin's hammer is force - as a career KGB man, I think his preferred tool is intimidation - much like it is for organized crime. The periodic aggression serves as a reminder to other neighbours to pay their protection fees and to weaken neighbours that start to get uppity and a little too cozy with other powers.

I'd love to see an analysis of the Kremlin not by diplomats, but by experts in organized crime. I'm sure it would be illuminating.


----------



## a_majoor

We might be in for a wild ride. I have seen a few predictions that oil might drop radically (the lowest prediction is it could drop to $30/barrel), but the consensus seems to be around the $70/barrel mark. This would wreak havoc with our oil industry (particularly the oil sands), as well as high tech tracking and shale oil extraction in the US, but Russia could suffer even more:

http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/10/03/how-russias-debt-and-currency-markets-could-spiral-into-crisis/



> *How Russia’s Debt and Currency Markets Could Spiral into Crisis*
> By  MICHAEL J. CASEY
> 
> This week’s rumor that Russia would impose capital controls to protect a plummeting ruble has dissipated – with no less an authority than Vladimir Putin dismissing it as unfounded earlier Thursday.
> 
> But that doesn’t mean the Russian President won’t eventually have a major financial crisis on his hands, or that he won’t have to resort to even more draconian measures to contain it than limiting cross-border fund flows. It will just take longer for that crisis to gestate than was implied by the market’s selloff.
> 
> Fact 1: Russia had $465 billion in foreign reserves as of the end of August, the fifth largest stash in the world. That can buy the central bank an awful lot of rubles to prop up the currency.
> 
> Fact 2:Russia had $524 billion in reserves just 10 months earlier. That $69 billion depletion demands that you weigh Fact 1’s significance with skepticism.
> 
> In just five months during the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, Russia suffered $210 billion in reserve outflows. Indeed, the country has an almost unbroken history of capital flight – its wealthier citizens have always spirited their money offshore – and there’s plenty about the current environment that could cause that trend to pick up.
> 
> Oil prices are at two-year lows and would be lower if not for the conflict in the Middle East, which undermines Russian public revenue and private profits. What’s more, Mr. Putin faces some potentially expensive contingencies. A clandestine war in Ukraine could drain the public purse, as could bailouts of Russian banks and other politically important companies if European and U.S. sanctions restrict their actions too severely. Add the prospect of the central bank intervening as the ruble hits the lower end of its target basket price, and it’s not hard to imagine a vicious-cycle that accelerates the reserve depletion.
> 
> “Russia is a big a country, it has a lot of needs,” says Michael Cirami, co-director of global fixed income Eaton Vance , which has $288 billion in assets under management. “It’s not like it’s Ghana that has $500 billion in reserves.”
> 
> A few risk-hungry hedge funds, those from the “don’t bet against Putin” crowd, as London-based Standard Bank analyst Timothy Ash puts it, opportunistically snapped up beaten-down, high-yielding Russian bonds in September following a Ukraine ceasefire and a moderation in Mr. Putin’s rhetoric that stirred speculation over a softening in the U.S. and E.U. sanctions. But for a wider, more conservative group of institutional investors, the whole Ukraine episode, revealing Mr. Putin’s willingness to jeopardize the economy for the sake of a geopolitical power grab, has cemented a view that “Russia is just uninvestable,” Mr. Ash says.
> 
> The current backdrop of slowing growth, mounting inflation and a falling ruble stems from flaws that precede the Ukraine-spurred sanctions, says Frances Hudson, global thematic strategist at Standard Life Investments , which has $313 billion assets under management. She points to an over-reliance on commodity exports and failure to take advantage of past booms to diversify the economy.
> 
> Foreign investors would be wise to review that history.
> 
> Not only are foreign lenders proven over the time to be “pretty low on the food chain,” says Standard Bank’s Mr. Ash, but past records also show a generalized opposition to creditor interests, backed up by debtor-friendly courts inherited from the Soviet era. He notes that during the recent global crisis, banks’ non-performing loans surged disproportionately in Russia even though the overall economy’s balance sheet was in a relatively healthy state before. It is evidence, Mr. Ash says, of an ingrained “unwillingness to pay.”
> 
> Given that cultural predilection, the grinding economic pain of sanctions, along with waning oil and gas revenues and a falling ruble – which makes foreign debt payments more expensive – could easily foster a dangerous, self-reinforcing cycle.
> 
> Mistrust in the ruble has left Russian companies reliant on foreign-currency bonds. At some point, a whole host of them could slip into default. Sure, Mr. Putin might bail out those considered strategically or politically important, but that would in turn mean that his big pool of reserves could disappear very quickly and that the capital controls option is put back on the table.
> 
> – Follow Michael J. Casey on Twitter: @mikejcasey.



and more about massive drops in oil prices: 

http://nextbigfuture.com/2014/12/cheap-oil-shock-could-see-30-per-barrel.html

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-30/oil-at-40-possible-as-market-transforms-caracas-to-iran.html



> Oil Shock Streaks Across Globe From Moscow to Tehran to Caracas. Ready for $40?
> By Gregory Viscusi, Tara Patel and Simon Kennedy  Dec 1, 2014 4:53 AM ET  918 Comments  Email  Print
> Facebook
> Twitter
> Google+
> LinkedIn
> Save
> 
> Dec. 1 (Bloomberg) –- In today’s “Bart Chart,” Bloomberg’s Mark Barton takes a look at Brent Crude prices since the beginning of 2014 on “Countdown.” (Source: Bloomberg)
> Related
> How Oil's Price Plunge Impacts Wall Street
> Cheaper Oil Prices: Are They Good for Global Economy?
> Which Nations Are Most Vulnerable to Cheaper Oil Prices?
> Oil’s decline is proving to be the worst since the collapse of the financial system in 2008 and threatening to have the same global impact of falling prices three decades ago that led to the Mexican debt crisis and the end of the Soviet Union.
> 
> Russia, the world’s largest producer, can no longer rely on the same oil revenues to rescue an economy suffering from European and U.S. sanctions. Iran, also reeling from similar sanctions, will need to reduce subsidies that have partly insulated its growing population. Nigeria, fighting an Islamic insurgency, and Venezuela, crippled by failing political and economic policies, also rank among the biggest losers from the decision by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries last week to let the force of the market determine what some experts say will be the first free-fall in decades.
> 
> “This is a big shock in Caracas, it’s a shock in Tehran, it’s a shock in Abuja,” Daniel Yergin, vice chairman of Englewood, Colorado-based consultant IHS Inc. and author of a Pulitzer Prize-winning history of oil, told Bloomberg Radio. “There’s a change in psychology. There’s going to be a higher degree of uncertainty.”
> 
> Related:
> 
> OPEC Inaction Spurs Survival of Fittest as Oil Below $65
> ECB Confronts Cheaper Oil Spilling Onto Stimulus Debate
> A world already unsettled by Russian-inspired insurrection in Ukraine to the onslaught of Islamic State in the Middle East is about be roiled further as crude prices plunge. Global energy markets have been upended by an unprecedented North American oil boom brought on by hydraulic fracturing, the process of blasting shale rocks to release oil and gas.
> 
> 
> Photographer: Susana Gonzalez/Bloomberg
> Gas is flared from a tower on an oil drilling rig operated by Petroleos Mexicans in the... Read More
> Cheap Gasoline
> 
> Few expected the extent or speed of the U.S. oil resurgence. As wildcatters unlocked new energy supplies, some oil exporters abroad failed to invest in diversifying their economies. Coddled by years of $100 crude, governments instead spent that windfall subsidizing everything from 5 cents-per-gallon gasoline to cheap housing that kept a growing population of underemployed citizens content.
> 
> Oil Prices
> 
> Those handouts are now at risk.
> 
> “If the governments aren’t able to spend to keep the kids off the streets they will go back to the streets, and we could start to see political disruption and upheaval,” said Paul Stevens, distinguished fellow for energy, environment and resources at Chatham House in London, a U.K. policy group. “The majority of members of OPEC need well over $100 a barrel to balance their budgets. If they start cutting expenditure, this is likely to cause problems.”
> 
> 
> Photographer: John Moore/AP Photo
> An official of the Saudi oil company at a rig near Howta, Saudi Arabia.
> Costs as Benchmark
> 
> Oil has dropped 38 percent this year and, in theory, production can continue to flow until prices fall below the day-to-day costs at existing wells. Stevens said some U.S. shale producers may break even at $40 a barrel or less. The International Energy Agency estimates most drilling in the Bakken formation -- the shale producers that OPEC seeks to drive out of business -- return cash at $42 a barrel.
> 
> Canadian Natural Resources Ltd. Chairman Murray Edwards said crude may sink as low as $30 a barrel before rebounding to stabilize at $70 to $75 a barrel, the Financial Post reported.
> 
> “Right now we’re seeing a price shock coming out of the meeting and it will be a couple of weeks until we see where the price really falls,” said Yergin. Officials “have to figure out where the new price range is, and that’s the drama that’s going to play out in the weeks ahead.”
> 
> Brent crude was down $1.40 at $68.75 as of 9:14 a.m. in London, while New York oil lost $1.47 to $64.68. Brent is now at its lowest since the financial crisis -- when it bottomed around $36.
> 
> Not All Suffer
> 
> To be sure, not all oil producers are suffering. The International Monetary Fund in October assessed the oil price different governments needed to balance their budgets. At one end were Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which can break even with oil at about $70 a barrel. At the other extreme: Iran needs $136, and Venezuela and Nigeria $120. Russia can manage at $101 a barrel, the IMF said.
> 
> “Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. and Qatar can live with relatively lower oil prices for a while, but this isn’t the case for Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Venezuela, Algeria and Angola,” said Marie-Claire Aoun, director of the energy center at the French Institute for International Relations in Paris. “Strong demographic pressure is feeding their energy and budgetary requirements. The price of crude is paramount for their economies because they have failed to diversify.”
> 
> Brent crude is poised for the biggest annual decline since 2008 after OPEC last week rejected calls for production cuts that would address a global glut.
> 
> Like this year’s decline, oil’s crash in the 1980s was brought on by a Saudi-led decision to defend its market share, sending crude to about $12 a barrel.
> 
> Russia Vulnerable
> 
> “Russia in particular seems vulnerable,” said Allan von Mehren, chief analyst at Danske Banke A/S in Copenhagen. “A big decline in the oil price in 1997-98 was one factor causing pressure that eventually led to Russian default in August 1998.”
> 
> VTB Group, Russia’s second-largest bank, OAO Gazprombank, its third-largest lender, and Russian Agricultural Bank are already seeking government aid to replenish capital after sanctions cut them off from international financial markets. Now with sputtering economic growth, they also face a rise in bad loans.
> 
> Oil and gas provide 68 percent of Russia’s exports and 50 percent of its federal budget. Russia has already lost almost $90 billion of its currency reserves this year, equal to 4.5 percent of its economy, as it tried to prevent the ruble from tumbling after Western countries imposed sanctions to punish Russian meddling in Ukraine. The ruble is down 35 percent against the dollar since June.
> 
> This Will Pass
> 
> While the country’s economy minister and some oil executives have warned of tough times ahead, President Vladimir Putin is sanguine, suggesting falling oil won’t force him to meet Western demands that he curb his country’s interference in Ukraine.
> 
> “Winter is coming and I am sure the market will come into balance again in the first quarter or toward the middle of next year,” he said Nov. 28 in Sochi.
> 
> Even before the price tumble, Iran’s oil exports were already crumbling because of sanctions imposed over its nuclear program. Production is at a 20-year low, exports have fallen by half since early 2012 to 1 million barrels a day, and the rial has plummeted 80 percent on the black market, says the IMF.
> 
> Lower oil may increase the pain on Iran’s population, though it may be insufficient to push its leaders to accept an end to the nuclear program, which they insist is peaceful.
> 
> ‘Already Losing’
> 
> “The oil price decline is not a game changer for Iran,” said Suzanne Maloney, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based research organization, who specializes on Iran. “The Iranians were already losing so many billions of dollars because of the sanctions that the oil price decline is just icing on the cake.”
> 
> While oil’s decline wrenches oil-rich nations that squandered the profits from recent high prices, the world economy overall may benefit. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates a $20 drop in price adds 0.4 percentage point to growth of its members after two years. By knocking down inflation by 0.5 point over the same period, cheaper oil could also persuade central banks to either keep interest rates low or even add stimulus.
> 
> Energy accounts for 10 percent to 12 percent of consumer spending in European countries such as France and Germany, HSBC Holdings Plc said.
> 
> Nigerian Woes
> 
> As developed oil-importing nations benefit, some of the world’s poorest suffer. Nigeria’s authorities, which rely on oil for 75 percent of government revenue, have tightened monetary policy, devalued the naira and plan to cut public spending by 6 percent next year. Oil and gas account for 35 percent of Nigeria’s economic output and 90 percent of its exports, according to OPEC.
> 
> “The current drop in oil prices poses stark challenges for Nigeria’s external and fiscal accounts and puts heavy pressure on the exchange rate,” Oliver Masetti, an economist at Deutsche Bank AG, said in a report this month. “If oil prices remain at their current lows, Nigeria will face tough choices.”
> 
> Even before oil’s rout, Venezuela was teetering.
> 
> The nation is running a budget deficit of 16 percent of gross domestic product, partly because much of its declining oil production is sold domestically at subsidized prices. Oil is 95 percent of exports and 25 percent of GDP, OPEC says.
> 
> “Venezuela already qualifies for fiscal chaos,” Yergin said.
> 
> Venezuelan Rioting
> 
> The country was paralyzed by deadly riots earlier this year after police repressed protests about spiraling inflation, shortages of consumer goods and worsening crime.
> 
> “The dire state of the economy is likely to trigger renewed social unrest, while it seems that the government is running out of hard currency,” Capital Economics, a London research firm, wrote in a Nov. 28 report.
> 
> Declining oil may force the government to take steps to avoid a default including devaluing the currency, cutting imports, raising domestic energy prices and cutting subsidies shipments to poorer countries in the region, according to Francisco Rodriguez, an economist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch.
> 
> “Though all these entail difficult choices, default is not an appealing alternative,” he said. “Were Venezuela to default, bondholders would almost surely move to attach the country’s refineries and oil shipments abroad.”
> 
> China Bailout?
> 
> In an address on state television Nov. 28, President Nicolas Maduro said Venezuela would maintain social spending while pledging to form a commission to identify unnecessary spending to cut. He also said he was sending the economy minister to China to discuss development projects.
> 
> Mexico shows how an oil nation can build new industries and avoid relying on one commodity. Falling crude demand and prices in the early 1980s helped send the nation into a debt crisis.
> 
> Oil’s share of Mexico’s exports fell to 13 percent in 2013 from 38 percent in 1990, even as total exports more than quadrupled. Electronics and cars now account for a greater share of the country’s shipments. Though oil still accounts for 32 percent of government revenue, the Mexican government has based its 2015 budget on an average price of $79 a barrel.


----------



## Flanker

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Of course we do ... all sane people are "seeking regime change" in Russia ...



Just a question Mr Campbell.
Who authorized you to talk on the name of "all sane people"?


----------



## CougarKing

Turkey's not only playing the multi-sided ISIS conflict (ISIS vs West/Gulf States vs Iran/Assad vs Kurds), but also playing the game between Russia and the EU/NATO/the US.



> Source: CNBC
> 
> *One NATO state wins big from clashes with Putin*
> By Everett Rosenfeld | CNBC – 13 hours ago
> 
> (...SNIPPED)
> 
> Russia scrapped plans for a pipeline into Southern and Central Europe, and instead announced this week a new pipeline to carry discounted natural gas into Turkey . Moscow has already spent $4.5 billion on the so-called South Stream project, which would have seen Gazprom (Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange: SBNF-MZ) transport its product under the Black Sea and potentially all the way to Italy by way of several countries.
> 
> Turkey will be getting gas at what some have suggested may be a double-digit discount, while furthering its aspirations to be a regional energy hub.
> 
> *"Turkey is looking out for itself," said Lauren Goodrich, senior Eurasia analyst at global intelligence and advisory firm Stratfor. "It's good for Russia to have a country that has a stake in Ukraine and a stake in the Black Sea and a NATO member that isn't putting sanctions on Russia...Turkey is standing on its own and they're going to reap the benefits from it."*
> 
> Following Russia's announcement it was abandoning the project, some European politicians have already suggested that *the South Stream project could be revived.
> 
> Gazprom has reported that discounts could be about 6 percent for Turkish customers*, Goodrich said, but Russian energy minister Aleksandr Novak reportedly said an arrangement could settle on a 15 percent discount.
> 
> "Turkey is in a very interesting position," Goodrich said. "They see an opportunity that the rest of the world is kind of against Russia right now, so if they work with Russia they can get a better deal."
> 
> Russia previously announced a gas deal with China that many have said favored Beijing because of the geopolitical pressure on Moscow from Europe and the United States.
> 
> Still, experts stressed that those deals do not mean Russia is desperate, but simply playing its cards as well as it possibly can.
> 
> Putin's Monday announcement of the $30 billion South Stream pipeline's cancellation marked the culmination of increasing difficulties for the project, which began in 2007. Bulgaria ceased construction on its part of the line in June following pressure from the European Commission that the deal would violate the Third Energy Package legislation, and other E.U. states were being similarly influence, Goodrich explained.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## a_majoor

A possible response to Russian aggression: "Ghost Airports". Instapundit suggests these airports are infrastructure for a possible air bridge in the event we need to support Poland or Eastern Europe (much like some people think the "String of Pearls" naval facilities in the Indian Ocean are to support Chinese naval activities should the need arise at some future time). Military airfield don't need such elaborate facilities (C-17's and C-130's can land on dirt airstrips, after all), but this adds more "noise" to the signal, and certainly leaves questions in people's minds. A more likely explanation is these airports are part of the "stimulus package" to help bail out the EUZone from recession, but now that they are there, NATO planners have more options:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/14/us-poland-airports-specialreport-idUSKBN0JS06K20141214



> *Special Report: EU funds help Poland build 'ghost' airports*
> BY CHRISTIAN LOWE AND WIKTOR SZARY
> LODZ, Poland Sun Dec 14, 2014 3:29am EST
> 
> (Reuters) - The European Union has given Poland more than 100 million euros ($125 million) to build at least three "ghost" airports in places where there are not enough passengers to keep them in business.
> 
> The result is gleaming new airport terminals which, even at the peak of the holiday season, echo to the sound of empty concourses and spend millions trying to attract airlines.
> 
> Poland is not the only country in Europe to have built airports that struggle to attract flights. Around 80 airports in Europe attract fewer than 1 million passengers a year, and about three-quarters of those are in the red, according to industry body Airports Council International. Some cost much more to build than the Polish projects. One airport in eastern Spain, open for three years, has so far received not a single flight.
> 
> But Poland is striking because the country received so much money for its projects from EU funds.
> 
> Poland received 615.7 million euros in EU support for airports between 2007 and 2013, according to figures supplied to Reuters by the European Commission. That was almost twice as much as the next biggest recipient, Spain, and more than a third of all member states’ money for airports. The government declined to provide all the information on which it based its decisions to invest in the airports, but Reuters has reviewed data on three sites where traffic fell dramatically short of forecasts.
> 
> Poland is often touted by Brussels as one of the most efficient users of EU aid, and there is no suggestion the country used EU airport money corruptly. European help has been vital in improving Poland's aviation infrastructure, only a small share of the country’s airport spending has been on white elephants, and passenger shortfalls may have been exacerbated by the 2008 global financial crisis. Spokespeople at some airports said the projects could be considered a success because they were creating jobs, bringing in tourists, and driving investment in the regional economy.
> 
> But it is clear mistakes were made in Poland, planning officials and aviation executives say. The whole experience raises questions about how the government will handle the next big injection of EU money, which it expects to be 82 billion euros over the next seven years.
> 
> The problem is most striking at the recently rebuilt Lodz passenger terminal, where passenger numbers in 2013 fell almost one million short of forecasts, according to European Commission documents examined by Reuters.
> 
> On a relatively busy day this summer, just four flights arrived and four departed. In between, the place was almost deserted. In the early afternoon a single passenger, a woman in a blue-and-white striped T-shirt, sat in a 72-seat waiting area. Outside on the tarmac, five sets of movable steps stood waiting for a jet to land.
> 
> Where there aren’t enough passengers to make an airport viable, local governments keep them on life support through subsidies, according to a report by CEE Bankwatch Network, a non-governmental watchdog. The beneficiaries have often been the airlines that use them.
> 
> Jacek Krawczyk, the former chairman of the board of Polish national airline LOT who sometimes advises the European Commission on aviation policy, said Poland was no worse than other EU countries at building airports, but the sheer volume of EU money it was trying to absorb in a short space of time explained some problems. The European Union has now tightened up the rules on state aid that airports can receive.
> 
> Krawczyk, who was not directly involved in planning any of the airport investments, said that in those Polish cases where things did go wrong, “there was no corruption, just wrong priorities.”
> 
> FAULTY FORECASTS
> 
> Between 2007 and 2013, the European Union promised funding to help build and upgrade 12 Polish airports. Some of the projections underlying the plans were highly ambitious.
> 
> The government declined to detail its predictions for passenger numbers. But figures for three of the airports – Lodz, Rzeszow and Lublin – are contained in letters on a related topic sent by the European Commission to the Polish foreign minister. The letters show Polish authorities projected combined passenger numbers for the airports to be more than 3 million passengers a year. In 2013, the actual number was just over 1.1 million.
> 
> Together, the investments in the three airports totaled about 245 million euros. Around 105 million of that came from the European Union. The rest came from central government in Warsaw, local governments and the airports themselves.
> 
> The airport with the biggest projected traffic was in Lodz.
> 
> In its heyday, the city was a thriving textile manufacturing center. Now, many of the elegant 19th-century merchant’s houses lining the main drag, Piotrkowska Street, are crumbling.
> 
> Jerzy Kropiwnicki, mayor of Lodz between 2002 and 2010, wanted to attract foreign investment and tourists. The city had a small airport that handled domestic flights; but Kropiwnicki felt a big international terminal would revive the local economy.
> 
> "I used to endlessly answer questions like: 'How do we get to you?' and 'How do we fly there?'" Kropiwnicki told Reuters.
> 
> Poland, which had joined the European Union in 2004, was gearing up for a massive injection of EU cash to be spent on development projects between 2007 and 2014. To get the funds, the country had to prepare a strategic plan for civil aviation. At the Transport Ministry, this task fell mainly to Andrzej Korzeniowski.
> 
> He was given three months to draft the plan and meet the EU funding deadline. “I slept on a camping mattress under my desk," Korzeniowski, now retired, told Reuters. "I had no time to eat."
> 
> Looking back on the 160-page document he drafted, Korzeniowski says it was, under the circumstances, a good program. But it had a big shortcoming: It let local governments decide where new airports should be built, and how big they would be. “That was the biggest mistake, for which we’re now paying the price,” he said. “The local governments decided, 'I’m a prince in my domain, the government doesn’t tell me what I’m supposed to do, we do what we want.’”
> 
> By 2005, passenger numbers in Lodz were shooting up. Wojciech Laszkiewicz, an adviser to the mayor who went on to be deputy chief executive of the airport, said the team decided to rebuild the terminal entirely.
> 
> The airport commissioned a feasibility study from advisory firm Ernst & Young (EY), published in November, 2009. EY predicted a minimum of 1.042 million passengers in 2013 for Lodz. That was less than the government forecast but many more than the 353,633 who actually passed through the airport last year. EY declined to comment.
> 
> Lodz’s mayor, Kropiwnicki, left office in 2010, two years before the new terminal opened. The aim of the airport was to help stimulate the local economy, he said, and it is achieving that. "From my point of view, the airport wasn't supposed to make a profit."
> 
> “CANNIBALIZATION”
> 
> The problem, say aviation industry officials and consultants, is that passenger numbers for any individual airport are impossible to predict with confidence. Even if national forecasts hold true, local factors can pull passengers away from one airport and attract them to another.
> 
> Lodz quickly became a victim of this "cannibalization,” as the airline industry calls it, because Warsaw airport was also upgraded, and a new highway built which brought the capital within 50 minutes’ drive of Lodz.
> 
> “To have an airport in Lodz from that point of view makes no sense at all," said Krawczyk, the former airline chairman. He is now president of the Employers’ Group of the  European Economic and Social Committee, a Brussels-based consultative body that advises on EU decision-making.
> 
> In a statement, a spokesman for the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development said it could issue guidelines, but could not directly influence local authorities: "A decision on expanding or building an airport for a particular region is the prerogative of the local authorities."
> 
> Under EU rules, though, the initial cash for airports comes from national governments. They are reimbursed by the EU when it approves a scheme.
> 
> Only investments worth over 50 million euros have to seek the Commission’s prior approval, and many of the Polish airport investments were below that threshold. The Commission has since said its approach to funding the airports will undergo a radical change. In February, it introduced stricter criteria, and said loss-making airports will be forced to wean themselves off state aid. It did not name any countries.
> 
> PAYMENTS TO AIRLINES
> 
> For now, the Polish airports still need help, and that can be expensive. Senior managers in the Polish aviation industry said the cost of running a small regional airport would be at least 3 million euros a year. At the moment in Europe, they are often propped up through financial injections from local authorities, which are often their biggest shareholders.
> 
> The state also has indirect methods of helping the airports, in particular by giving money to the airlines – mainly low-cost carriers like Ryanair.
> 
> "In practice, these payments serve as an incentive for airlines," CEE Bankwatch Network, the non-governmental watchdog, said in its report.
> 
> Lodz and Rzeszow airports did not respond to questions about how much they pay airlines. A spokesman for Lublin airport said only that it was successfully boosting communications to help the local economy.
> 
> But public records for Podkarpackie, the mountainous, forested region where Rzeszow airport sits, show that between 2011 and 2014 its government paid 5.7 million euros to Ryanair in exchange for advertisements promoting the region, which appeared on Ryanair’s web site and in its in-flight magazines. Podkarpackie spent another 3 million euros to advertise with Polish carrier Eurolot over a three-year period.
> 
> In all, 70 percent of the region’s 2013 promotional budget went to airlines that fly into Rzeszow airport.
> 
> These payments are problematic, say several people involved in Polish aviation, because the airports are at the mercy of the airlines. With so many airports to choose from, airlines can easily shift routes.
> 
> “The relationship between the local airports and low-cost carriers is suicidal,” said Krawczyk, the former airline chairman. For low-cost carriers, he said, “nothing will ever be enough. ... At some point they will say, ‘If you don’t give us more, we’ll go.’ And they go.”
> 
> A spokesman for the region where Rzeszow is located said the deals were good value because they allowed it to target the kind of travelers it wants. He said tourist numbers in 2013 were double the level in 2010.  A Eurolot spokeswoman said such marketing deals were widely used in the aviation business in Europe. She said the airline provided marketing exposure for the region, for example by painting its jets in the region’s colors.
> 
> Ryanair chief executive Michael O'Leary told Reuters such advertising was a good deal for local governments because the Ryanair website reached a huge audience. He said Ryanair brought economic benefits to places that are off the beaten track, in part by flying in tourists. But “if the airport doesn’t want me, that’s fine. I’ve 80 other airports in Europe who want the growth. We don’t force any airports" to pay.
> 
> "If Rzeszow has enough low fares, Rzeszow can grow to 1 million visitors, 5 million visitors, 10 million visitors,” said O’Leary. “They provide – well, I don’t know what Rzeszow is famous for, but it's famous for something."
> 
> (Additional reporting by Robert Hetz in Madrid and Rene Wagner in Berlin; Edited by Sara Ledwith)


----------



## Kirkhill

>

The Poles are amateurs in comparison to Spain.

The Spaniards build airports then don't have to waste money on maintaining them because no one uses them.

However the Spaniards are still not in the league of the true professionals.  The Greeks.  They get money to build airports and then don't build them, thereby saving themselves both capital and operating costs.

 >

The problem with an airfield as a military asset is that it benefits he who gets there fustest with the mostest.  The Poles should be in good shape as long as they maintain a solid air defence capability.  Otherwise a chap named Vlad could be tempted to leap over Donetsk and Lviv to Lodz.


----------



## CougarKing

The KGB agent in power seems stumped:

Reuters



> *Putin says Russia economy will be cured, offers no remedy*
> By Timothy Heritage and Alexei Anishchuk
> 
> MOSCOW (Reuters) - President Vladimir Putin assured Russians on Thursday that the economy would rebound after the ruble's dramatic slide this year but offered no remedy for a deepening financial crisis.
> 
> Defiant and confident at a three-hour news conference, Putin blamed the economic problems on external factors and said the crisis over Ukraine was caused by the West, which he accused of building a "virtual" Berlin Wall to contain Russia.
> 
> At times sneering, at others cracking jokes, he ignored pressure to say how he will fix an economy facing what his economy minister calls a "perfect storm" of low oil prices, Western sanctions over Ukraine and global financial problems.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Edward Campbell

_The Economist_ weighs in with this article which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from that newspaper:

http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21636747-collapse-rouble-caused-vladimir-putins-belligerence-greed-and-paranoia-ye


> Russia and the rouble
> As ye sow, so shall ye reap
> *The collapse in the rouble is caused by Vladimir Putin’s belligerence, greed and paranoia*
> 
> Dec 20th 2014 | From the print edition
> 
> VLADIMIR PUTIN has successfully suppressed dissent, squeezed out opposition and clamped down on the media, but he has not been able to control global financial markets. In recent days the rouble has collapsed; it has lost almost 40% of its value over three weeks. This is the biggest crisis of Mr Putin’s reign—and it is entirely his fault.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Mr Putin will no doubt blame all the usual suspects—Western speculators who bet against his currency, Western imperialists who imposed sanctions on his economy, Western economists who failed to forecast that the oil price (down by half over six months) would fall as far as it has and, of course, Western newspapers that told him that his policies would lead to disaster. But the crisis is the inevitable consequence of Putinism—of aggression abroad and a corrupt-and-control economy at home.
> 
> *Kleptocracy and its consequences*
> 
> The sanctions were imposed by the West because of his conduct in the Ukraine, where he has, among many things, seized territory, engineered a war and refused to investigate the shooting down of a civilian airliner. Meanwhile, he has failed to reform Russia’s economy, leaving it dependent on the energy industry that he has carved up among his friends. Had he chosen to build an economy based on the rule of law and competition rather than patronage and corruption, things would have looked very different.
> 
> In the short term, there is not a great deal that Mr Putin can do to get his country out of the mess that he has made. A huge interest-rate rise this week, following previous large increases, has not worked. Capital controls are not the answer. They can sometimes be effectively employed against short-term speculation, but in this case investors are rightly worried about an economy that is so reliant on one sector. Anyway, in such a lawless place, capital controls would be porous and could trigger runs on the banks (see article) which the country could ill afford. Russia still has reserves of $370 billion, but it also has foreign-currency debts of more than $600 billion.
> 
> To improve the long-term prospects of an economy that is heading into a deep recession, two bigger changes are needed. The first is that Russia should pull back from eastern Ukraine and seek some accommodation with the government in Kiev and the West that could lead to the lifting of sanctions. The second is a change to the country’s economic model. Mr Putin needs to take advantage of the fall in the value of the currency to diversify away from excess dependence on oil and gas, which make up two-thirds of exports; to improve the competitiveness of manufacturing and high-tech industry; to strengthen the rule of law; and to clean up corruption. To implement all this he should replace his pliant prime minister (and previous president), Dmitry Medvedev, with a credible economist such as Alexei Kudrin, who was a respected finance minister for 11 years. His oligarch chums might not like this, but Russians would be better off.
> 
> Sadly, none of this is likely to happen. Mr Putin will probably double down, railing against Western iniquity, stifling all dissent at home, destabilising Ukraine still more and interfering further in other neighbouring countries. And he will pursue a course of growing autarky, severing as many of Russia’s economic and financial links to the West as he can.
> 
> A brazenly nationalist course will impoverish Russia further, making it impossible for Mr Putin to keep delivering rising living standards. He will gamble that the Russian people are foolish enough to trade prosperity for nationalistic fervour. This newspaper hopes he is wrong.




_In my opinion_, and many will differ, Mr Putin is a prototypical Russian: a bully and a bit thick, to boot; but the Russian people support him, and his aggression, and that just proves my point.


----------



## McG

A similar bit from the Globe and Mail suggests that it is that Russian nationalism that may be the biggest hazard for what comes next.



> Putin, not oil prices, the author of Russia's miseries
> The Globe and Mail
> 18 Dec 2014
> 
> Russia has been a country on the brink for a long time, held together by the force of Vladimir Putin’s personality. But even an 80-per-cent domestic approval rating cannot help Mr. Putin when so many economic forces are lining up against him. A deep dive in oil prices in recent weeks is simply the final nudge pushing Russia to the edge of the cliff.
> 
> The ruble’s value against the U.S. dollar has been cut in half this year; after the country’s central bank this week attempted to stem the tide by hiking interest rates to 17 per cent from 10.5 per cent, the markets responded by shaving 20 per cent off the value of the currency in a matter of hours. The ruble’s fall is linked to a 50-per-cent decline in oil prices since last summer. But oil prices alone have not caused Russia’s decline.
> 
> If Mr. Putin were the introspective type, he would have to accept blame for much of this situation. Russia has been shovelling money into its incursions in Ukraine and in retaliation is beset by an array of global trading sanctions. Foreign companies have become increasingly leery of the corrupt regime he oversees and have withdrawn in droves. Domestic investors are even wiser.
> 
> But *Mr. Putin is defiant and defensive, and the worry now is what he may do next to try to distract from his problems. The worst case scenario is that he plays the nationalist card to provoke more military conflicts in neighbouring countries*, a strategy he has employed in Ukraine with great domestic success.
> 
> There are those who think that sanctions should be eased, to help protect Russia from a full-out economic collapse. But unless Mr. Putin agrees to withdraw from Ukraine, any reversal on sanctions will be read as acceptance of his actions. That would reward aggression, and further empower him against what little domestic opposition still exists. It would give him a huge win.
> 
> No one wants Russia to sink further into economic turmoil. But Mr. Putin is the main author of his country’s misfortunes. His policies have damaged Russia’s global relationships and left few tools in place for western countries or corporations to help clean up its growing mess.


----------



## a_majoor

And WRM suggests that Putin may well become more dangerous as his options become more limited:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/12/16/ruble-crisis-puts-putins-back-against-the-wall/



> *Ruble Crisis Puts Putin’s Back Against the Wall*
> WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
> Putin’s path of least resistance is the path of greatest danger for Russia.
> 
> It’s panic time in Moscow, as the deadly double whammy of collapsing oil prices and Western sanctions is knocking the Russian economy into recession. Nothing the government can do has been able to stem the accelerating selloff in Russian assets, and the meltdown has gone so far that average people increasingly understand that their economic futures are at risk. And for good reason, as Reuters explains:
> 
> The rouble plunged more than 11 percent against the dollar on Tuesday in its steepest intraday fall since the Russian financial crisis in 1998 as confidence in the central bank evaporated after an ineffectual rate hike…
> 
> It has now fallen close to 20 percent this week, taking its losses this year against the dollar to over 50 percent and raising memories of the crisis in 1998 when the currency collapsed within a matter of days, forcing Russia to default on its debt… [A]nalysts say the country is on the brink of a full-blown currency crisis.
> 
> The Putin government has come to a fork in the road—and both of its choices look unpleasant. It can accept that the oil price collapse is forcing it to change paths in foreign policy and give up (at least for now) on its dreams of geopolitical revenge for the defeat in the Cold War—or it can double down on the fight against the West and the world system.
> 
> The first course is obviously the smartest from the standpoint of Russian national interest, but the second may make more sense in terms of the personal fortunes of one Vladimir Putin—and unless something changes in Russia, Putin is firmly in charge.
> 
> Putin has to be thinking in terms of using the crisis to enforce even tighter government control over Russia’s economy: cracking down on currency trading, increasing control over banks, possibly repudiating private as well as public debts to Western creditors. To make this work, he’d have to resort to claims that the West is in an all-out war to destroy Russia, and that national mobilization (under, of course, his inspired leadership) is the only way to save the country.
> 
> The long term prospects for such a course of doubling down on an aggressive foreign policy are not good; the Soviet Union was a lot stronger than Russia is today, and the USSR went down in poverty and defeat. And many of the Russian oligarchs and elites who have made huge fortunes under Putin would face massive financial losses if this plan goes forward. (They’ve already sustained heavy blows as Russia’s stock market implodes.) So to continue down this road, Putin will need to tighten his control over his supporters; the logic of Putin’s policy abroad is a more radical dictatorship at home. To justify the crackdown, Putin will need to convince Russians that the country faces a truly diabolical threat from beyond its borders, so we could well see him simultaneously embracing more confrontational policies abroad and a more totalitarian style of leadership at home.
> 
> Putin, who embodies a mix of geopolitical recklessness and shrewd calculation, will do his best to avoid being trapped into the harshest and most radical course. He will be looking for a strategy that avoids the worst economic consequences without giving up on his ambitions in Ukraine. One choice would be to do something dangerous and expensive from the standpoint of Russia’s longterm national interests, and double down on his relationship with China.
> 
> Putin has tried this route before, announcing large, long term gas deals with China as a way of underlining his independence from European energy customers. But those deals are long term and may never reach fruition. If he needs ready cash—and the increasing pressure on his shrinking foreign exchange reserves suggests that he soon may—he’ll have to find some compelling deals that the Chinese are willing to pay for up front. Fire sales of Russian assets to Chinese buyers could generate enough cash to ride out the storm in the financial markets, and China’s hunger for raw materials remains huge. Long term contracts to exploit mineral resources, sweetened perhaps with agreements not to contest Chinese influence in central Asia and so forth, could provide—at an extremely high cost to Russia’s own long term national interests—a way for Putin to ease the pressure he’s under now.
> 
> At the moment, China wants no part of Russia’s quarrel with the West. But, it also doesn’t want the U.S. to crush Russia once again. If there were a way for China to make extremely advantageous energy and mineral deals while also propping up a power that, like China, wants to see a reduced U.S. role in the world, Beijing just might lend Putin a helping hand.
> 
> It won’t come cheap, though: Beijing can see what a weak hand Putin has, and it will expect to be compensated—at Russia’s expense—for any help it offers the struggling strong man.
> 
> Another route Putin may opt for is to take measures to bring Russian oligarchical capital, which has been in full-on flight mode, back to Russia. One of the least-discussed parts of Putin’s recent annual state-of-the-country speech was his announcement of an amnesty that will allow the oligarchs to bring their money home without punishment.
> 
> There is one other alternative that the Dark Genius of the Kremlin may be turning over in his mind: Is there some way Russian foreign policy could create a Middle East crisis that would drive oil prices back up into the stratosphere? The most obvious way would be to bring about some kind of situation involving the Iranian nuclear talks—perhaps by offering quiet support to Iranian hardliners, increasing the chances that the talks fail. Any kind of serious war scare in the Persian Gulf would be good for Russia’s financial situation; Russian foreign policy experts are presumably thinking through their options.
> 
> One hopes for the sake of the long-suffering people of Russia that Putin somehow finds it in himself to turn away from the very dark path that now lies before him. But it won’t be an easy thing to do. He’s gone out on such a limb in Ukraine, introduced such a poisonously chauvinistic public mood in Russia, and alienated so many potential partners and interlocutors in the West that it will be extremely difficult for him to defuse the crisis while remaining in power.
> 
> The path of least resistance for Putin is the path of greatest danger for Russia; we shall see what choices he now makes—and we shall see if he has so thoroughly mastered Russia’s oligarchs and institutions that no effective opposition to him is possible even if he pushes the country further down the road to isolation and ruin.


----------



## CougarKing

A trade/customs union?

Associated Press



> *Leaders of Russia and 4 other ex-Soviet nations finalize creation of new ambitious alliance*
> 
> MOSCOW - The leaders of Russia and four other ex-Soviet nations have completed the creation of a new ambitious alliance intended to bolster their economic integration.
> 
> The Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, comes to existence on Jan. 1. *In addition to free trade, it's to co-ordinate the members' financial systems and regulate their industrial and agricultural policies along with labour markets and transportation networks*.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## a_majoor

Because Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan provide so much value added to Russia. 

The ideal outcome for Russia is the Russians get to plunder the natural resources and exploit the labour resources of these nations for Russia's profit. the ideal outcome for us is they become even greater drags on the Russian economy, since as impoverished and underdeveloped nations they would demand Russian financial resources to participate in any projects and modernize their economies.


----------



## vonGarvin

Well, it's only fair.  The EU has such stalwart economic powers as Greece, and has taken on the burden of Ukraine, so I guess it balances things out


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

General Disorder said:
			
		

> Well, it's only fair.  The EU has such stalwart economic powers as Greece, and has taken on the burden of Ukraine, so I guess it balances things out


----------



## McG

Not sure if it is doctrine (as the article suggests) or policy, but regardless it would seem the Russia is expressly, publicly declaring a first-strike nuclear defence policy and is naming NATO as the key enemy.  Is the return to Cold War now complete?



> Putin signs new military doctrine naming NATO as Russia’s top military threat
> by Associated Press
> National Post
> 26 Dec 2014
> 
> MOSCOW — President Vladimir Putin has signed a new military doctrine that describes NATO’s military buildup near the Russian borders as the top military threat amid Russia-West tensions over Ukraine.
> 
> The document released by the Kremlin on Friday maintains the provisions of the previous, 2010 edition of the military doctrine regarding the use of nuclear weapons. It says Russia could use nuclear weapons in retaliation to the use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies, and also in case of aggression involving conventional weapons that “threatens the very existence” of the Russian state.
> 
> For the first time, the new doctrine says that Russia could use precision weapons “as part of strategic deterrent measures.” The document doesn’t spell out conditions for their use.
> 
> ...


----------



## vonGarvin

Can't say that I blame them for this, and it's our (the West's) fault: we started it first when we started converting former WP nations and Soviet Republics to NATO.  Then the coup d'état in Kyiv (with or without our help is irrelevant: the fact is that "we" benefited from it and are now providing material support to Kyiv).

Best to keep a hands-off approach to anything the other side of the Bug river.


----------



## dimsum

MCG said:
			
		

> Not sure if it is doctrine (as the article suggests) or policy, but regardless it would seem the Russia is expressly, publicly declaring a first-strike nuclear defence policy and is naming NATO as the key enemy.  Is the return to Cold War now complete?



CF bases in France and Germany back on the table?    :blotto:


----------



## Edward Campbell

Forcing the Russians to (stupidly) waste (spend) more and More and MORE on their national defence while, simultaneously, undercutting their economy, by all means, fair and foul, is the best tactic. We don't need to spend a lot more on defence ... just keep pressuring them.

The Chinese will, eventually, step in and "rescue" them, _I think_, but I doubt the Russians will like the r_escue_ package very much, at all. (As someone pointed out earlier, the Chinese don't want the Russians to fall. Weaken and wither? Yes. Fall? No. The Chinese want to pick up the pieces of an only partially collapsed Russia - mainly the natural resources, especially water, oil and gas, in Central and Eastern Siberia.)


----------



## a_majoor

General Disorder said:
			
		

> Can't say that I blame them for this, and it's our (the West's) fault: we started it first when we started converting former WP nations and Soviet Republics to NATO.  Then the coup d'état in Kyiv (with or without our help is irrelevant: the fact is that "we" benefited from it and are now providing material support to Kyiv).
> 
> Best to keep a hands-off approach to anything the other side of the Bug river.



Although *we* certainly benefit, it is also quite clear that the vast majority of Eastern European nations actively wanted to join the EU and become part of NATO in order to achieve a permanent severing of their "ties" to Russia. Other than allowing the formation of an Eastern European Union centred on Poland (which in the end is actually happening now), I'm curious as to what other COA there was? They clearly had no desire or intention of remaining under the Russian influence or inside any sort of Russian zone of influence, regardless of what Russia or the EU wanted...


----------



## vonGarvin

Simple COA: Partnership for Peace.


----------



## a_majoor

I remember that many of the nations involved looked at the Partnership for Peace as the essential first stepping stone for entry into the EU Zone and becoming integrated with the West (joining the EU, NATO etc.). If you are suggesting that the PfP should have been used as a sort of corral for Eastern European nations, my question would be was that a realistic proposition, given that it was the express desire for all these nations and peoples to exit the Russian "zone" as rapidly as possible?

Even if it it was somehow possible to corral the Eastern European nations into a PfP zone sandwiched between the EU and Russia, would that have been a better solution? I could certainly picture a grouping of nations centred on Poland which looked with suspicion and dread to the East, while being resentful of being excluded from the prosperous and peaceful West, hardly an improvement in my view.

I'm not disputing that the process that was followed in the real world could have been done differently, I'm saying that there were very strong forces at work to bring the Eastern European nations into the West, and not all these forces were coming from Bonn or Brussels.


----------



## CougarKing

Putin's grip on power weakening?

Reuters



> *After 15 years in power, Putin risks running out of luck*
> 
> By Timothy Heritage
> 
> MOSCOW (Reuters) - When Vladimir Putin was handed power unexpectedly by an ailing Boris Yeltsin on the last day of the last century, his first move was to go on television to guarantee Russia the freedoms needed for a "civilized society".
> 
> *Fifteen years later, his critics accuse the former KGB spy of sacrificing emerging political and economic freedoms to the idea of Soviet-style glory, bringing the country close to economic collapse and international isolation over Ukraine.*
> 
> Opinion pollsters say his ratings are at near record highs and a groundswell of protest is unlikely in the near future.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)



Reuters



> *Putin foe found guilty of fraud; anti-government protest erupts in Moscow*
> The Canadian Press
> 
> By Nataliya Vasilyeva, The Associated Press
> 
> MOSCOW - President Vladimir Putin's chief political foe was convicted along with his brother on Tuesday in a fraud case widely seen as a vendetta by the Kremlin, triggering one of Russia's boldest anti-government demonstrations in years.
> 
> *Police allowed a few thousand protesters to gather just outside Red Square for about two hours — a show of relative restraint for Russian authorities, who have little tolerance for dissent* — before moving in to break up the unsanctioned rally by pushing the demonstrators toward subway entrances
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Kirkhill

The Counter-Offensive Begins....

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11321207/Russias-Red-Army-Choir-cover-Pharrell-Williams-Happy.html


----------



## The Bread Guy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> The Counter-Offensive Begins....
> 
> http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11321207/Russias-Red-Army-Choir-cover-Pharrell-Williams-Happy.html


"Because I'm happy to be here, instead of doing traffic control in Novorossia right now ...."  >


----------



## a_majoor

Russia's military seems determined to go all out in developing combat robots. While the US has developed various sorts of combat robots, concerns about their effectiveness and ethical issues about control over autonomous killing machines have prevented them from being used to date. Russia already fields some of these devices, and things like the next generation Russian T-14 tank are claimed to have robotic turrets. The reasoning seems a bit fuzzy from these articles; are the Russians thinking ahead to the demographic crash when they will need to man the borders _and_ the factory floors with half their current population, or are they looking at the here and now and massively upgrading the firepower available to their troops?

There is perhaps something to be learned for us in the CF: we have the need for lots of systems and enablers, but simply do not have the manpower (to field mortar platoons or fire support platoons in the Infantry, for example). A robot carrying an HMG/grenade launcher/automatic cannon or an automatic mortar similar in conception to the "Dragonfire" or the 2B9 Vasilek could move with the infantry (both mounted and dismounted) to provide heavy firepower for a fraction of the manpower needed to field a platoon that can provide the same amount of firepower and support. Robotic trucks to flesh out the logistics systems, and robotic engineering machines to carry out the most dangerous tasks are also real, near term possibilities that a rich, Western military could field.

http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/robots/russia-wants-autonomous-fighting-robots-and-lots-of-them-16787165



> *Russia Wants Autonomous Fighting Robots, and Lots of Them*
> Putin's military is busy building autonomous tanks with mounted machine guns and unmanned, amphibious Jeep-size vehicles.
> By David Hambling
> May 12, 2014 5:00 PM
> 
> A new video shows a Russian military robot doing something no American machine in service can match: firing a machine gun. It's hardly a technological triumph—the U.S. has been testing armed robots for decades. But while political and ethical caution has prevented the West from advancing with the concept, Russia seems determined to field a wide variety of combat robots.
> 
> The Russians call such robots MRKs, from the Russian for Mobile Robotic Complex. The latest is the MRK-002-BG-57, nicknamed Wolf-2. It's basically a tank the size of a small car with a 12.7-mm heavy machine gun. In the tank's automated mode, the operator can remotely select up to 10 targets, which the robot then bombards. Wolf-2 can act on its own to some degree (the makers are vague about what degree), but the decision to use lethal force is ultimately under human control.
> 
> Ramp-Up
> 
> Although the U.S. military fielded thousands of robots in Iraq and Afghanistan, these were used for bomb disposal and reconnaissance only. In 2007 the widely publicized deployment of three Talon/SWORDS robots fitted with machine guns ended in fiasco. The robots were confined to their base and never sent out on patrol because of fears of what might happen if anything went wrong. Work continues with MAARS, the successor to Talon/SWORDS, but there is no sign yet of anything being fielded. And when the budget gets tight, unmanned systems tend to feel the squeeze first.
> 
> While research stalls in the United States, Russia's leaders are determined to make their country a robot superpower. In January 2013, defense minister Sergei Shoigu announced plans to expand the army's use of robots. A few months later, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin announced a new production facility for military robots and a research center for military robotics. Rogozin says that someday soon, one Russian soldier will do the work that takes five or 10 soldiers today, which would be impossible without advanced robots.
> 
> Not surprisingly, then, Wolf-2 is far from Russia's only entry in armed robotics. In December, Shoigu visited Rzhevsky Proving Ground to watch a Jeep-size amphibious vehicle called Argo swim across a lake and fire at targets. In June Rogozin was treated to a display by the tank-like Nerehta with twin machine guns; the developers claim the stabilization is better than on Western models. (Rogozin advised adding some anti-tank missiles. This would give it effective firepower against other vehicles as well as against foot soldiers.
> 
> There are smaller machines for urban operations, like the Strelok or "Sharpshooter," a 5-foot by 2-foot robot armed with a Kalashnikov, that can slam through doors and climb stairs. Then there is the Metalliste, a short-range, grenade-lobbing device, a 110-pound six-wheeler that can mount a silenced submachine gun as well. It is supposed to reduce casualties to Interior Ministry police by keeping them out of harm's way.
> 
> Catch-Up
> 
> These unmanned systems represent a monumental undertaking, especially for a Russian military known not for high-tech systems but for rugged, reliable weapons that can be churned out in great numbers (think the T-34 tank, AK-47 Kalashnikov, and RPG-7 grenade launcher). Frank Tobe, editor of The Robot Report, says that the Russians have a lot of catching up to do when it comes to sophisticated fighting robots.
> 
> "My sources in Israel and the U.S. say that Russia is generations behind and not a serious participant in the growing science of unmanned vehicles," Tobe told Popular Mechanics.
> 
> But Mark Gubrud, an expert on emerging technology and a member of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, believes the situation has the makings of an arms race.
> 
> "Russia will need years to catch up in robotics but is fully capable of doing so," Gubrud says. "This highlights the folly of pursuing a robot arms race. As the U.S. and U.K. are clear leaders in the race, they should equally well take the lead in calling it off." Would Russia really agree to call off the arms race? "I do believe they may support the initiative if others do, especially the U.S, U.K. and allies," Gubrud says.
> 
> We're still waiting to see whether Russia has the funding to back up its armed robot rhetoric. It is clear, however, that the push to develop Russia's own Terminators has support from the very top.
> 
> "These are serious combat systems, both attack and reconnaissance versions," President Vladimir Putin said last year, describing new Russian development in unmanned vehicles. "It is absolutely clear that they have good prospects."


----------



## The Bread Guy

Meanwhile, another retired Russian general has killed himself apparently because he couldn't get adequate cancer treatment:


> Lieutenant general Anatoly Kudryavtsev, a 77-year-old former serviceman in the Russian air force committed suicide in Moscow on Tuesday according to Russian police, becoming the fourth case of a former high-ranking Russian military officer taking his own life in less than a year.
> 
> Police in the Russian capital said that they had found Kudryavtsev’s body in his flat in southwestern Moscow. It’s reported that he had hung himself and left a suicide note explaining that he had suffered "excruciating pain" as a result of his stomach cancer and that he did not “blame anyone” for his death.
> 
> According to official records Kudryavtsev served in the air force until 1993.
> 
> (....)
> 
> In June, 68-year-old retired Russian secret service agent general Viktor Gudkov was found dead by police in his flat in southern Moscow. He appeared to have shot himself in the throat with a gun awarded to him for his military service in Chechnya.
> 
> Gudkov was reported to have suffered a “serious illness”, which was said to have caused him to fall into a depression, though his health problems had not been specifically diagnosed before his death.
> 
> Several months prior, also in Moscow, the highly decorated major general Boris Saplin, who retired in 1989, committed suicide by shooting himself in the head with a prize gun which had been given to him after his service in the Soviet-Afghan war.
> 
> According to police, he too was suffering from cancer, leaving a short suicide note in which he complainined of an “immense headache”.
> 
> Earlier in the year in February, retired rear admiral of the Russian navy Vyacheslav Apanasenko also shot himself in the head in his Moscow apartment after also suffering from stomach cancer.
> 
> Apanasenko was found by police and rushed to hospital, where he remained in critical condition for 10 days until he passed away. His suicide note alleged his wife had tried to procure the necessary drugs to treat his condition but had been unsuccessful. He wrote: “I do not blame anyone for this except the government and our health care.” ....


----------



## a_majoor

The ramifications of Russias actions in the Caucus have not been subject to much analysis to date. This article from The American Interest is a good starting point:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/01/06/the-caucasus-after-ukraine/



> *The Caucasus After Ukraine*
> Sergey Markedonov & Maxim A. Suchkov
> 
> A look around the Caucasus shows that the various constituent countries have drawn vastly different lessons from the crisis in Ukraine.
> 
> The crisis in Ukraine seized the world’s attention for the better part of 2014, and it may be just the beginning of a broader trend in confrontation and competition between Russia and the West across Russia’s periphery.
> Within the territory of Ukraine itself, the conflict has some risk of spreading. Ukraine has a 405 km-long border in its southeast with an internationally unrecognized pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria, which is locked in a “frozen conflict” with the government of Moldova. Before the current crisis in Ukraine blew up, Kyiv had acted as one of the guarantors of the peacekeeping process there (along with Russia, and with the OSCE as mediator). The new Ukrainian authorities have, however, changed tack on the region, constructing defensive fieldworks across the border and disallowing Transnistrians who hold Russian passports from crossing it. While the current economic malaise consuming Moscow’s elites makes it unlikely that the Kremlin will push events on behalf of the Transnistrians, Western policymakers focusing solely on events in the eastern half of Ukraine are ignoring a potentially dangerous situation.
> 
> But the real effects of the Ukraine crisis will be felt most profoundly in the South Caucasus, the least predictable hotbed of discontent in Eurasia, where the events in Ukraine are being watched attentively. Six of the nine armed conflicts in the space of the former Soviet republics are festering in the South Caucasus, and it is here that several destabilizing precedents—like the recognition of former autonomous areas (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia) as independent states—were first attempted by Moscow. It is also the only part of the former USSR where neighboring states have no diplomatic relations with each other (Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia). Finally, it is a region of particular focus for Russian security services, which are preoccupied with the looming threat of cross-border Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, always apparently on the verge of spinning out of control.
> The precedents and examples created by Ukraine’s Maidan protests, its civil war in the Donbass, and the case of Crimea are reverberating across the region. And although Ukraine itself has not historically been the biggest player on the South Caucasian chessboard, its role in regional affairs should not be underestimated.
> 
> Kyiv’s Strategic Ally
> 
> Georgia was among the first of the former Soviet republics to sign the treaty “On Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Help” with Ukraine, in April 1993. Ever since, Tbilisi has been Ukraine’s most loyal ally in the region. The dynamics and the content of the relationship have certainly changed over time, but what has been preserved and re-emphasized is a focus on strategic cooperation. Georgian elites viewed Ukraine as a new potential “elder brother”, and an alternative power center for Moscow’s policies in the post-Soviet space. The idea reached its zenith in the GUAM project in 2001, a trade and security pact uniting Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in a bid to counter Moscow’s predominant influence in the region. At one point, there was even a serious debate about the possible deployment of Ukrainian peacekeepers in the zone of Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.1
> 
> Today, Georgian elites regard the situation in Ukraine as a microcosm of the bigger geopolitical standoff between Russia and the West, rather than as a sui generis crisis that arose out of various domestic political developments. As a result, Georgia’s leaders are on tenterhooks, worrying if Tbilisi is next on Moscow’s list of states that need to be brought to heel. Make no mistake: the Ukraine crisis is currently a prime driver of Georgia’s ambitions for integrating into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
> 
> And these fears seem justified by the recent developments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the Ukrainian conflict was cited by the breakaway factions as justification for further moves for outright secession. During the parliamentary elections in South Ossetia, the victorious “United Ossetia” party trumpeted reunification with North Ossetia in Russia. Similarly, the newly elected President of Abkhazia, Raul Khadzhimba, favors deeper politico-military relations with Russia and a freezing of all contact along the breakaway region’s frontier with Georgia. Moscow subsequently began preparing a new bilateral treaty, with emphasis on deeper trade integration and further liberalization of the border. It was finally signed last November.
> 
> Nevertheless, it’s important to note that the treaty was not some sort of unilateral triumph for the Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions, as it was often portrayed in Western media. Though the Abkhaz elite was interested in having deeper relations with Moscow, it nevertheless managed to reject some key points in the treaty, such as a clause allowing Russians the right to acquire Abkhaz citizenship and to claim land and property there.
> 
> Though the worry that Moscow will incorporate the breakaway regions into its territory is certainly not farfetched, it is based on the assumption that it is now the Kremlin’s strategy to multiply “Crimean precedents” all across the post-Soviet space. The reality, however, is that Moscow has shown little appetite to extend the precedent to the Caucasus. Right after the five-day war with Georgia in 2008, for example, the Kremlin extended its Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership with Ukraine, originally signed on May, 31, 1997, for another ten years. This was at a time when Saakashvili’s close ally, Victor Yuschenko, ran the country. And more importantly, while it has expressed interest in a closer relationship with Georgia’s two breakaway entities, Moscow has repeatedly declined to discuss the regions’ change in status and any “incorporation” of new territories into the Russian Federation.
> The truth of the matter is that Russia has little additional leverage to gain from outright annexation, and in fact would be only multiplying its liabilities, both economic and in the security realm, should these wayward territories be joined to it. And therein lies a potentially serious trap for Moscow. If the Russian-backed regions present the Kremlin with a direct plea for annexation, it will face an unpleasant choice: either disappoint its clients or further antagonize the West, cementing its reputation as a pariah state for more than a generation to come.
> 
> Nevertheless, none of this means that Russia will foreswear annexation eventually. Many Georgian leaders, in both the United National Movement party and the Georgian Dream, hope that Russia’s support for the separatist forces in Ukraine is ineluctably forcing the West to confront Russia both directly, through sanctions, and indirectly, by putting in place some kind of security framework in other post-Soviet states. Though there is precious little evidence that the West is tilting in this direction—both the Obama administration and the EU seem focused on keeping their disagreement with Moscow focused on what is going on in Ukraine alone—Georgian leaders’ most fervent wishes could well turn out to be the stuff of nightmares for them. For as history has repeatedly shown since the fall of the Soviet Union, pushing Russia out of areas where it perceives it has real national interests only increases its resolve. And this has little to do with Russia’s political or military swagger, or with dreams of recreating some kind of expansive empire on the ashes of the Soviet Union. It is, rather, the product of a genuine and broad resentment across Russian society for any and all foreign encroachments on its sovereignty. President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry can speak all they want of outmoded 19th-century ideas about spheres of influence, but if anyone in Washington or Brussels is at all perplexed by the resiliency of Vladimir Putin’s popularity, he need not look further than this very real psychological fact.
> 
> Ukraine Crisis as Accelerator of Eurasian Integration
> 
> The Ukrainian Maidan pushed Georgia’s neighbor Armenia in the opposite direction. While Yerevan had never been particularly close to Kyiv2, it was far from an open-and-shut case that the country would choose to join Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (as it did by signing a treaty on October of 2014 that gives it full membership in January 2015). There is no common border between Armenia and Russia, and tariffs and custom duties are already lower in Armenia than in the current members of the Eurasian Economic Union. Furthermore, the common border between Armenia and a Western-inclined Georgia, which is still angling for further Euro-Atlantic integration, could potentially also create problems.
> 
> Ideally, the Armenian leadership would have liked to stick to a balancing, “complimentary approach”, having both Russia and the West woo it, playing one off against the other just as Ukraine had managed to do to varying degrees after the Orange Revolution. After Maidan, however, it saw the Eurasian Union as the better deal: an opportunity to re-configure bilateral relations with Russia and to get some additional sweeteners from Moscow. The Association Treaty with the EU, the leadership judged, would just as surely scupper Yerevan’s “complimentary approach” without giving it any of the tangible benefits that Moscow was offering.
> The government decision to do so, however, triggered a great deal of skepticism among some sectors of Armenia’s elites, and strengthened support for opposition parties. While the treaty may well be a done deal, the political ramifications may not yet be fully felt.
> 
> The other precedent Ukraine set for Armenia parallels what we have seen in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and has to do with the resurgence of nationalism in the region. There is growing sentiment across the political spectrum that the “re-incorporation of Crimea into Russia” justifies Yerevan’s striving to win back “Armenia’s historical lands” in Nagorno-Karabakh. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the summer of 2014 saw the largest number of reported cases of ceasefire violations in the region since overt hostilities ended in 1994. Over the last week of July and first week of August, there were more than 1,500 breaches of the ceasefire on both sides, resulting in at least 24 dead. In one of the most serious incidents, an Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army plane was shot down by the Azeri military this November. This is all truly regrettable, as Nagorno-Karabakh has probably been the only conflict in the post-Soviet space where, despite differences in interests and positions, Russia and the West (the United States and France) cooperated within the OSCE Minsk group with relative success over two decades.
> 
> And the international community is being far from helpful. As the crisis in Ukraine grew more heated with each passing week, each member of the OSCE Minsk group tasked at policing the conflict—the United States, Russia and France—insisted more vehemently on pursuing its own policy without coordinating with the others. This led to a particularly silly series of repetitive meetings between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, first mediated by President Putin in August, then by Secretary John Kerry in October, and then by French President François Hollande in November.
> 
> Azerbaijan: Between the Energy and Revolution
> 
> Azerbaijani interpretations of the developments in Ukraine, however, are based on different premises than those of its neighbors. For one, Azerbaijan has been Ukraine’s principal partner since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1992. Unlike Georgia, the strategic focus between the countries has been the creation of an alternative energy supply route to minimize Russian influence. Just before the protests sparked on the Maidan, then-President Victor Yanukovich declared Ukraine to be a reliable transit-state for Azerbaijan’s energy exports, and called on Baku to consolidate this key segment of their nexus and to pool their efforts in supplying hydrocarbons to Europe. Yanukovich, of course, is there no more, but despite the outspoken criticism of his policies on the part of the current Ukrainian leadership, there’s every reason to presume that this specific area of Azeri-Ukrainian relationship will remain in place.
> 
> The strongly authoritarian government in Baku remains extremely wary of any signs of agitation for regime change on its territory and in its periphery. A little-known fact is that the Maidan first appeared as a symbol of civic and political activity in Azerbaijan during an 18-day rally in late November and early December of 1988. From that time, numerous small-scale Maidans have recurred across Azerbaijan, usually during election campaigns—for example in 2003 and 2005. This explains the circumspect way the Azerbaijani authorities have approached the Ukrainian revolution. Since the country’s territorial integrity with the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is brought in question by the precedents in Ukraine, the ruling elite in Baku have sensibly adopted a wait-and-see approach, until a real power center in Ukraine emerges that they can do business with.
> 
> One thing is for certain: the longer the conflict in Ukraine continues, the more ripple effects it is likely have across the Caucasus and the rest of Eurasia—ripples which can easily grow into sizable waves, given how divisive the conflict is proving across the post-Soviet space. The Ukrainian experience certainly will not be exactly repeated in any of the countries, but it has stirred passions across the political spectrum in all the important countries in the Caucasus, a region that neither Russia nor the West is likely to let go easily.
> 
> How one sees the Ukrainian revolution all depends on one’s “sitting point” (a favorite phrase of Ukraine’s second President, Leonid Kuchma). But by stubbornly clinging to the inviolability of its “sitting points” and by failing to work out a modus operandi, Ukraine could easily become a sticking point that leads to yet another era of deep mistrust, confrontation, and uncertainty between the West and Russia, with neither side a winner.
> 
> Dr Sergey Markedonov is Associate Professor at Russian State University for the Humanities. In 2010-2013 he was a Visiting Fellow at the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program (Washington, DC). He is the author of numerous works on the Caucasus and Black Sea security and ethno-political issues. Dr. Maxim A. Suchkov, formerly Fulbright Visiting Fellow at Georgetown University, is currently a Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies (Pyatigorsk, Russia), a contributor to Al-Monitor and to the Carnegie Moscow Center's Eurasia Outlook.


----------



## a_majoor

More on Russian modernization plans for the future. It is interesting that they are focusing on area weapons (flame and thermobaric) rather than increasing the scale and scope of PGMs like Western nations (Think of things like the XM-25 or mini Spike Anti Personnel Guided Missile as examples of man portable Infantry PGM's.). The big question is can the Russian economy support this level of effort?

http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/01/russia-will-deploy-innovative-special.html



> *Russia will deploy innovative special ammunition for better penetration of fortification and armor*
> 
> Russia’s intendsto modernise much of its military in the coming years. Russia will spend about $600 billion from now to 2020 upgrading tanks, planes, missiles and ships.
> 
> The commander of Russia’s Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense (RBhBD) troops, Maj. Gen. Eduard Cherkasov, announced a focus on so-called ‘flame weapons’ – incendiary, thermobaric and fuel-air explosive (FAE) weapons – describing a program of modernisation and development.
> 
> Russia is creating special ammunition that will hit highly secure defense constructions. Shortly, infantry flame units will receive new weaponry with higher fire precision and the penetration before exploding effect, ability to destroy fortified emplacements, armoured equipment, and personnel in trenches.”
> 
> “Flame weapons are very efficient in close combat and have not only physically destructive but also psychological effect on an enemy.”
> 
> Some examples of existing flame based weapons and special ammunition
> 
> The RPO-A is a shoulder-fired recoilless weapon in a 93 mm calibre, with an effective range of approximately 200 meters. It enteredservice in Soviet times and remains in production today, however it has been supplemented in Russian service by the MRO-A. The MRO-A is a 72.5 mm rocket launcher with a total weight of 4.7 kg, and an effective range of around 90 meters.
> 
> The 9M22S incendiary rocket ws used in eastern Ukraine. The 122 mm 9M22S rocket carries the 9N510 warhead, containing 180 incendiary elements which are composed of ML-5 magnesium alloy and filled with a pyrotechnic composition similar to thermite. Each element has a burning time of at least 2 minutes. The 122 mm rocket is launched from the 9K51 Grad MLRS and similar systems, with the 9K51 being capable of firing up to 40 rockets in around 20 seconds.
> 
> The 9M51 fuel-air explosive rocket has also been employed in eastern Ukraine. This 220 mm rocket is launched from the 9K57 Uragan MLRS and delivers the 30.2 kilogram 9N515 FAE warhead. This rocket is designed to engage infantry and light vehicles, and is particularly effective against targets in confined spaces


----------



## ueo

Direct response to your posed question- probably as these types are much less expensive to develop, produce and employ than the west's PGMs. IMO the reason behind area weapon development is the almost total control of the Russian press by Putin et al. No collateral damages reported to the quivering masses. Just a thought.


----------



## CougarKing

"The Bear" resurgent?

Reuters



> *Russia could soon run multiple Ukraine-sized operations: U.S. general*
> Reuters
> 
> By Adrian Croft | Reuters – 8 hours ago
> 
> WIESBADEN, Germany (Reuters) - Russia is working to develop within a few years the capability to threaten several neighbors at once on the scale of its present operation in Ukraine, a senior American general said.
> 
> *Lieutenant-General Ben Hodges, commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe, told Reuters an attack on another neighbor does not seem like an immediate threat because Moscow appears to have its hands full in Ukraine for now.
> 
> But that could change within a few years, when upgrades sought by President Vladimir Putin would give Russia the ability to carry out up to three such operations at the same time, without a mobilization that would give the West time to respond.*
> 
> "Right now, without mobilizing, I don't think they have the capacity to do three major things at one time. They can do one thing, I think, in a big way without mobilizing. But in four to five years, I think that will change," Hodges said.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## George Wallace

Throughout history, others have tried that.  Napoleon.  Hitler.  Almost all have met with dismal results and annihilation of their cause.


----------



## a_majoor

I wonder if a little quiet pressure applied to Sibera over a long time by China won't change Russia's tune?


----------



## Kirkhill

Putin's Deputy Prime Minister to Davos - on the fate of that great liberal reformer, Catherine the Great:



> Mr Shuvalov said a utopian quest for freedom is the curse that brought down the Soviet Union. In a bizarre digression, he then launched into tirade against former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, accusing him of leading the country to destitution and collapse by opening up to western ideas.
> 
> "This freedom they are trying to impose on us, it is freedom from common sense, it is freedom of the media to insult anybody, to throw dirt in his face. That's not freedom," he said.
> 
> Mr Shuvalov said his country needs the smack of firm government, and reminded the audience of what happened to the German-born empress Catherine the Great when she tried to foist freedoms on Russia in the 18th Century: "She was told clearly that if she meddled in these matters, she would be murdered."
> 
> This silenced the room.



And the Ukrainians, as Rus, likely also need a firm smacking......

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11365497/Kremlin-hard-liner-Russians-would-rather-starve-than-surrender-Putin-to-Western-aggressors.html


----------



## a_majoor

Reports that the Russian Navy is literally rusting away. I'm sure this is a best/worst case scenario (depending on where you sit), with heroic efforts the Russians should be able to operate more tun 45 ships. (Of course we have few reasons to gloat, _our_ navy has pretty much disintegrated as well, and we don't have enough sailors to man the ships we do have):

http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/01/russian-navy-can-only-deploy-45-of-its.html



> *Russian Navy can only deploy 45 of its 270 ships*
> 
> The Russian navy is on the edge of a precipitous decline in ship numbers and combat power, owing to huge industrial shortfalls that have been decades in the making. Today the Russian navy possesses around 270 warships including surface combatants, amphibious ships, submarines and auxiliaries. Of the 270 ships, just 125 or so are in a working state. And of those 125, only around 45 are oceangoing surface warships or submarines that are in good shape and deployable.
> 
> Most of the Soviet-vintage ships will decommission in the next few years as they became too old to sail safely and economically.
> 
> Gorenburg, Harvard Analyst, says the Russian shipbuilding industry could build somewhere between half and 70 percent of the vessels Moscow wants by 2020. “The earliest that Russia could build a new aircraft carrier is 2027, while new destroyers are still on drawing board, with the first unlikely to be commissioned for 10 years.
> 
> The U.S. Navy possesses some 290 warships. Pretty much all of them are well-maintained, deployable, oceangoing vessels.
> 
> China has plans to grow its navy to 351 ships by 2020 as the Chinese continue to develop their military’s ability to strike global targets.
> 
> When Moscow moved to annex Crimea in March, the U.S. Navy promptly sailed its new flattop USS George H.W. Bush into the eastern Mediterranean to reassure NATO governments. Bush‘s battle group included no fewer than 60 high-tech warplanes and several of Washington’s modern Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, armed with missiles and guns for fighting planes, submarines and other ships.
> 
> In response, the Kremlin sent in Kuznetsov. The aging carrier — much smaller than Bush — carried a dozen or so Sukhoi fighters. Her six escorts included just a single heavily-armed vessel, the Soviet-vintage nuclear cruiser Pyotr Velikiy. The other five ships included one small amphibious landing ship plus three support tankers and a tugboat.
> 
> The tugboat was along for a good reason. On the few occasions when Kuznetsov leaves port, she often promptly breaks down. In 2009, a short circuit sparked a fire that killed one seaman aboard the rusting vessel.
> 
> Kuznetsov shadowed Bush in the Mediterranean for a few weeks, then returned home to northern Russia through the English Channel in early May.
> 
> Kuznetsov doesn’t have many years left in her. Her boilers are “defective,” according to the trade publication Defense Industry Daily. Yet when she goes to the breakers to be dismantled, Moscow could find it impossible to replace her. For one, the shipyard that built all the Soviet carriers now belongs to Ukraine. It lies just outside of Crimea, and Russian forces did not manage to seize it.
> 
> SOURCES - War is Boring, Reuters, Defense Tech


----------



## Retired AF Guy

> Mr Shuvalov said his country needs the smack of firm government, and reminded the audience of what happened to the German-born empress Catherine the Great when she tried to foist freedoms on Russia in the 18th Century: "She was told clearly that if she meddled in these matters, she would be murdered."
> 
> This silenced the room.



While not an expert by any means on Russian history, my understanding is that Catherine was known for her reforms to Russian society.


----------



## McG

S&P cut Russia's credit rating to junk status.  France suggests that, maybe, Russia should see this as a sign to reflect on its continued behaviour in the Ukraine.

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-s-sovereign-credit-rating-downgraded-to-below-investment-grade-1.2932136


----------



## The Bread Guy

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> While not an expert by any means on Russian history, my understanding is that Catherine was known for her reforms to Russian society.


Among other things ....





 >

Back to reality, this caught my eye in ITAR-TASS:


> The chairman of Russia’s State Duma education committee, Vyacheslav Nikonov, dismissed as nonsense a proposal by a Russian lawmaker that Moscow should ask Germany to pay reparations for the World War II damage.
> 
> "That’s nonsense," Nikonov, a prominent Russian political scientist and historian, told TASS in comments to a proposal voiced by Mikhail Degtyaryov, a lawmaker from the Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR).
> 
> "The reparations were paid by Germany and mainly East Germany, and this matter has been settled," Nikonov said, adding that Germany stopped paying reparations in 1953.
> 
> Russia’s Izvestia daily reported on Tuesday that the lawmakers of the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, are setting up a working group that will calculate the damage inflicted by Germany, which invaded the Soviet Union in 1941.
> 
> Degtyaryov, a member of the LDPR’s supreme council, claimed that Germany had paid practically no reparations for the devastation and carnage during World War II, which is known as the Great Patriotic War in Russia.
> 
> The lawmaker said although an agreement on cessation of reparations was signed with the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), no such agreements were ever signed with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and after the German reunification.
> 
> Under the Yalta agreements, the Soviet Union received some German assets, mostly furniture, clothes and manufacturing equipment, from the Soviet sector of control. But this no way compensated for the damage to the USSR’s economy during the war.
> 
> ( .... )
> 
> The lawmaker said the total amount of reparations that Germany has to pay to Russia, which is the legal successor to the USSR, could stand at around €3-4 trillion.
> 
> Russian experts say, however, that although claims against Germany are well-grounded, repayment of reparations is possible only upon an interstate agreement and it is practically unrealistic to recover any reparations seventy years after the end of the war.


----------



## cupper

Interesting. Didn't know that the Pentagon had a "Body Leads" team. Wonder if they are hiring?

*The Pentagon’s Secret Putin Diagnosis
What the world’s most powerful military learned from watching TV.*

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/putin-autism-pentagon-114937.html?hp=m1#.VNQZtkuRtM8



> Do you like watching Internet videos and then drawing broad, sweeping, pseudoscientific conclusions about the people involved? If so, congratulations, you might be qualified to join the Pentagon’s secret team investigating the nonverbal cues of powerful world leaders.
> 
> Yesterday, following Freedom of Information Act requests by a group of news organizations including Politico, the Pentagon released two studies, both published here in full for the first time, analyzing Vladimir Putin's inner demons—or at least those inner demons that you can observe from watching a ton of publicly available videos. The release has brought a harsh light to the Office of Net Assessment’s “Body Leads” team and its conclusion diagnosing Putin, the Russian president who likes to take shirtless horseback rides, bunga bunga with his bestie Silvio Berlusconi and invade his neighbors, with autism. Or, actually, according to the report, he probably has autism—they’d need a brain scan to confirm. And that’s harder to do when you’re just watching someone on TV.
> 
> “Body Leads” is apparently a Department of Defense-funded project dedicated to writing studies that no one ever reads (at least not until this week) about the “nonverbal communication” (aka movement) of world leaders. Its first study about Putin, “A Technical Report on the Nature of Movement Patterning, the Brain and Decision Making (with gratitude to Vladimir Putin, The President of Russia For helping us understand ……),” was published in 2008 and prepared by “Body Leads” leader Brenda Connors, an expert in “movement patterns analysis” at the Naval War College.
> 
> Analysis of Internet videos, Connors writes, “clearly reveals that the Russian President carries a neurological abnormality … identified by leading neuroscientists as Asperger’s Syndrome, an autistic disorder which affects all of his decisions.” (As of 2013, Asperger’s syndrome is no longer considered a legitimate diagnosis but rather part of the autism spectrum.)
> 
> The autocrat’s “primary form of compensation,” Connors concludes, “is extreme control.” Those who work with him are encouraged to present “an exhaustive fact sheet” when they outline geopolitical recommendations. Because “unsubstantiated recommendations may be lost in his perceptual system that simply has trouble taking in information differently.”
> 
> We also learn that Putin did not crawl as a child (have you noticed how he has trouble getting off that judo mat?); that, unlike what Time says, he was probably born with his cold stare; and that his “own sense of self is a work in progress.”
> 
> The second study, published two years after the “reset” with Russia when Putin was prime minister and his protégé Dmitry Medvedev was president, is called “The Russian Leadership Tandem in Interaction: Insights From Movement Analysis.” In its 40-or-so pages, we learn essentially that Medvedev does not have autism (but “since adolescence, he has exhibited a physical armoring or disunity which inhibits harmonious movement”) and that Putin is kind of a procrastinator. No study has been conducted since Putin returned to the top office, annexed Crimea and sent his tanks rumbling into Ukraine.
> 
> It’s unclear what it costs the Office of Net Assessment to fund “Body Leads,” but we know that since 2009, outside experts working with Connors have received at least $365,000.
> 
> Just yesterday, one of the “leading neuroscientists” cited in the 2008 study backed off his initial diagnosis. It turns out that Putin’s tendency to get defensive in large social settings—while it has been observed in individuals who have autism—could also be characteristic of, well, people who get defensive in large social settings.
> 
> Even the authors have admitted in the past that this is all a work in progress. But thankfully for them, Putin’s “continuing presence on the world stage provides a rich ongoing basis to confirm previous project hypotheses about his behavior.” Do you think they have all they need now?
> 
> “Body Leads” repeatedly calls whatever it does “as potent an instrument as an evolving weapon system.” But if these two particular inquiries into the bane of the West and how he gets off the judo mat were so useful, why has no one important ever seen them? According to his spokesperson, Hagel didn’t. Panetta didn’t. And surely Obama didn’t, or he probably would have handed Putin an exhaustive fact sheet and Ukraine would be a lot better off today.



Both reports are available at the link.


----------



## cupper

I found this Frontline documentary to be a much more meaningful analysis of Putin's agenda. The Cleptocracy that is modern Russia is a construction in which Putin has a deep involvement.

And a very telling line towards the end of the video. Essentially it says Putin needs to hold onto power no matter what the cost. There are too many bodies buried, people with axes to grind, and unpunished crimes for him to ever let go of the reins. The only alternatives are jail or death.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/putins-way/

Oh, and you might get a laugh or two out of the comments section. Particularly Brian Lee. Can you say plant?


----------



## cupper

A good commentary addressing the validity of the report I referenced upthread on the Pentagon's analysis that determined Putin suffers from Asperger's Syndrome.

*Putin Has Asperger’s? Don’t Flatter Him.*
As the father of a child with the syndrome and a Russia expert, I can tell you the Pentagon report couldn’t be more wrong.

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/putin-has-aspergers-dont-flatter-him-114978.html?hp=m1#.VNZLyEuRtM8



> A recently-released 2008 Pentagon-backed study has set the Internet aflame with the hypothesis that Russian President Vladimir V. Putin might have Asperger’s syndrome—an autism spectrum disorder characterized by social, behavioral and communicative difficulties. While there’s been a lot of talk in the Twittersphere discussing how ridiculous this “diagnosis” is, there’s also been quite a lot of fairly serious coverage of the report, all of which completely ignores its speculative and unscientific nature. As a Russia watcher with a son diagnosed with Asperger’s—and likely on the spectrum myself—I’m struck by how thoroughly the report and those who give it credence both demean people with Asperger’s and show a complete ignorance of Russian history and current affairs.
> 
> In his seminal 1944 study of children who exhibited obsessive interests, a domineering conversational style, clumsiness of movement and difficulty feeling empathy and forming friendships, Viennese child psychologist Dr. Hans Asperger referred to these children as “little professors,” as they could investigate and speak endlessly on those topics that engrossed them. That is true of my son, and of me—both as a child and now as an actual professor of political science. Perhaps it is that obsessiveness that motivated me to look further into this study of Putin.
> 
> It is best that Brenda Connors’ paper, “A Technical Report on the Nature of Movement Patterning, the Brain and Decision-Making,” was left to languish in a dusty, Defense Department archive, since it would never had made it through the rigorous peer-review process—either in the social sciences, psychology or the professional medical community.
> 
> First: the paper, beyond being sloppily written, full of typos and logical inconsistencies, with entire sections repeated verbatim, has no hypothesis, no claim that can be either substantiated or disproven with evidence. Indeed, that Vladimir Putin has Asperger’s is the foundational assumption at the start of the paper, rather than the conclusion reached at the end. “Vladimir Putin,” she writes, “is our focus because his movement patterns and his microexpressions, analyzed on open source video so clearly reveals that the Russian President carries a neurological abnormality, a profound behavioral challenge identified by leading neuroscientists as Asperger’s Syndrome, an autistic disorder which affects all of his decisions. His primary form of compensation is extreme control and this is isomorphically reflected in his decision style and how he governs.”
> 
> Beyond beginning with a conclusion, the paper tells us nothing about what these patterns and microexpressions are, how and by whom they’re interpreted and what basis exists for such a diagnosis from such evidence. Well, actually, we are given some evidence: Time’s “Person of the Year” article, which that mentions Putin’s cold, icy stare, his lack of charm, impatience and that he didn’t crack a joke.
> 
> And never mind that the main tool the author uses to diagnose the Russian leader, “Movement Pattern Analysis,” was pioneered by a 1930s Hungarian choreographer. Or that a study she uses to interpret invisible thoughts through movement was only published by something called “Dance & Movement Press.”
> 
> While not wanting to disparage unconventional research, I would not want to rely on these types of sources for making a serious autism diagnosis.
> 
> Still, the report asks us to believe that all of Putin’s political decisions and inclinations are singularly influenced by Asperger’s: his impatience, his wonkish attention to detail, his comfort with routine, his obsession with controlling the day-to-day operation of running a giant country, his “basic personal struggle” to find an inner circle he can trust, seeking glory for himself and the country he leads—all of it because of something that may or may not have happened when young Volodya was a child. This explanation overlooks the tomes of research in sociology, history, political science and Russian studies suggesting that such traits are all manifestations of the sistema of high-level autocratic politics in Russia—before Putin, under Putin and will continue after Putin—regardless of whether he has Asperger’s or not.
> 
> But here’s what I worry about most: In recent months, Vladimir Putin has become arguably America’s greatest foreign villain: invading and annexing Crimea, stoking anti-Western xenophobia at home, withstanding international sanctions for fueling the bloody war in Eastern Ukraine that resulted in the tragic downing of MH-17, thousands of Ukrainian deaths and a refugee crisis in the heart of Europe. American public opinion toward Putin has tanked, while experts struggle to explain this new belligerence coming from the closed-off autocrat behind the Kremlin walls. While I’m sure many have (rightly) dismissed the Pentagon study as the unscientific rubbish it is, there are others who are too primed to believe that America’s most vilified, opaque and misunderstood political rival should be singularly motivated by autism—America’s widely feared, opaque and misunderstood neurological condition. Putin is scary. Autism is scary. Put the two together, and you’ve got a story with legs, if not evidence.
> 
> It is not just Putin who gets further denigrated in all of this—it is those of us in the special-needs community, too. Sticking through the jargon of this Pentagon report is hurtful, unscientific and downright condescending terminology describing not just the Russian president, but individuals with Asperger’s and autism worldwide: “suffering” the “neurological insult” and “profound handicap” of Asperger’s, Putin is at a “primitive,” “pre-mammalian” and “reptilian stage of development.” Honestly, it’s so thoroughly insulting, the Pentagon should be ashamed to have paid for it.
> 
> And ultimately: So what? If, in the end, it turns out that Vladimir Putin is an Aspie—what does it matter? Can someone with Asperger’s not run a country? Certainly it’d be preferable if the Russian Federation were an actual, functioning, democratic federation, with decision-making power spread throughout the system—but it’s not. Russia is—and largely has been—a closed autocracy with most of the levers of power housed in the Kremlin. In that situation, it might actually be preferable to have someone who’s wired to be obsessively dedicated to the work of governance. In a 2008 hot-mic gaffe, Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell claimed Janet Napolitano was perfectly suited for the onerous job of Secretary of Homeland Security, “because for that job, you have to have no life. ... She can devote, literally 19-20 hours a day to it.” Rendell’s words were impolite and embarrassing, but they also contained a grain of truth: For tough government jobs, you need people with tremendous dedication. In that way, Asperger’s may be an asset for politicians, entrepreneurs, managers and even professors, for whom dedication, hard work and an almost obsessive attention to detail are job requirements. Though it goes without saying that such a diagnosis neither explains nor excuses invading neighboring countries, annexing their territory or stoking a protracted land war.
> 
> At the end of the day, the Pentagon’s Asperger’s report was likely a waste of money that had very little impact on American foreign policy toward Russia. But the media firestorm that it has unleashed tells us that we still have far to go in how we understand autism here at home, and how we treat those of us who have it.
> 
> _Mark Lawrence Schrad is assistant professor of political science at Villanova University and author of the new book Vodka Politics: Alcohol, Autocracy, and the Secret History of the Russian State.
> _


----------



## Kirkhill

Putin may or may not have a mental deficit.

But he is bright enough to have worked his way out of a communal apartment to achieve the point where the whole world has been backfooted and speculates idly about who he is while worrying about what he will do next.

He is a bastard surrounded by like-minded bastards.


----------



## dimsum

Russia Reportedly Getting Bases in an EU State



> Presumably, the Russian Air Force will use the airbase “Andreas Papandreou,” along with the international airport of Paphos in the southwest of the island, approximately 50 kilometers from the air base of the British Royal Air Force “Akrotiri.” Additionally, the Russian navy will be able to permanently use the base of Limassol, according to Lenta.Ru.
> 
> “The Limassol port borders on the British air base of Akrotiri which serves NATO operations and is also an important hub in the electronic military surveillance system of the alliance,” according to the Global Post.



A Russian naval base 50km from RAF Akrotiri.  Well then.

http://www.businessinsider.com.au/russia-military-agreement-in-cyprus-2015-2?utm_content=bufferb0b32&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer


----------



## cupper

Hmmm. This should be interesting.


----------



## CougarKing

The worst of economic woes still yet to come?

CNBC



> *'Storm is coming': Russians still fear crisis*
> CNBC – 4 hours ago
> 
> As Russia's economy continues to struggle amid swingeing sanctions, oil price declines, a weak ruble and rampant inflation, ordinary Russians are feeling the pinch - with some believing the crisis hasn't even started yet.
> 
> Russia's economy has been hit hard by the severe decline in global oil prices and sanctions imposed on the country for its part in the Ukraine conflict. This, in turn, has caused the currency to weaken 90 percent against the dollar over the last 12 months, further pushing up the rate of inflation which stands around 11.4 percent.
> 
> To top it all off, Russia's economy is expected to enter recession this year, but one Moscow-based economist told CNBC that the crisis hadn't even started yet. "We are on the edge of crisis, we're close but we're not yet there," Vladimir Tikhomirov, chief economist at Russian financial services firm BCS Financial Group, told CNBC. "I can say that we have not yet seen the full effect of the economic crisis - redundancies, closing businesses, rising non-performing loans - we haven't seen those things yet but that's not to say it's not coming," he warned.
> 
> Putin says leaders have agreed on Ukraine cease-fire* "This is the calm before the storm, we know the storm is coming it just depends on how severe it is." Russia's economy has undergone a radical tranformation from the days when it was a jewel among emerging markets. In 2015, the economy could shrink by as much as 5.5 percent, however, according to ratings agency Moody's, a far cry from the 5.6 percent growth seen back in 2008*.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## cupper

Interesting read on perhaps the inner thinking of the man in charge.

*What Putin’s Favorite Guru Tells Us About His Next Target*

Russia’s Soviet-style leader is following the advice of the USSR’s most famous dissident.

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/vladimir-putin-guru-solzhenitsyn-115088.html#.VOKBnUuRtM8



> In a ceremony at the Kremlin in June 2007,  Vladmir Putin awarded the State Prize of the Russian Federation—the highest award in Russia—to Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel Prize-winning author whose brave exposure of Soviet oppression during the Cold War had made him a revered figure in the West. Both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin had tried to do give Solzhenitsyn the same prize for the Gulag Archipelago and other famed works but the writer didn’t have much use for them—two leaders who tried to break with the communist and imperialist identity of Russia. Putin was different. Putin, Solzhenitsyn said in an interview shortly before his death in 2007 at age 88, had brought “a slow and gradual restoration” to Russia.
> 
> The admiration was mutual. After praising Solzhenitzyn at the Kremlin ceremony for devoting “practically all his life to the Fatherland,” Putin visited the writer at home, telling him how much of his program for Russia was “largely in tune with what Solzhenitsyn has written.” And recent political developments show that Putin indeed has followed many of Solzhenitsyn’s ideas, particularly in the area known as “the near abroad,” or the former USSR.
> 
> Indeed, it is one of history’s ironies that the No. 1 internal enemy of the Soviet Union has now become a spiritual guru to a former KGB officer who repeatedly voices nostalgia for Soviet times. For years before his death, the fiercely nationalistic Solzhenitsyn suggested that post-Soviet Russia must include Ukraine. Solzhenitsyn did not see the Ukrainians as a separate nation: “All the talk of a separate Ukrainian people existing since something like the ninth century and possessing its own non-Russian language is recently invented falsehood,” he wrote in a 1990 essay, “Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals.”
> 
> Putin likewise sees Ukraine as an artificial state: At the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, he told then-President George W. Bush that “Ukraine is not even a state. Part of its territory is in Eastern Europe and the greater part is a gift from us."
> 
> Today, with the world’s attention focused on Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, we might look to Solzhenitsyn’s writings for a clue as to where Putin’s next aggressive move might be: Kazakhstan.  Solzhenitsyn saw Kazakhstan in the same light as Ukraine, suggesting that it was not really a separate state and that much of its territory is historically Russian. “Its present huge territory was stitched together by the communists in a completely haphazard fashion: wherever migrating herds made a yearly passage would be called Kazakhstan,” he wrote in his essay. “Today the Kazakhs constitute noticeably less than half the population of the entire inflated territory of Kazakhstan.”
> 
> Putin has taken a similar tack toward Kazakhstan publicly. He managed to insult the Kazakhs in the midst of the Ukrainian crisis by saying that their president, Nursultan Nazarbaev, had “created a state on a territory where no state had ever existed.”
> 
> Kazakhstan, like Ukraine, has a large Russian population, and as in Ukraine, Russian nationalists view parts of Kazakhstan as Russian land. Kazakhstan, Solzhenitsyn wrote: “had been assembled from southern Siberia and the southern Ural region, plus the sparsely populated central areas which had since that time been transformed and built up by Russians, by inmates of forced-labor camps, and by exiled peoples.”
> 
> A passionate patriot as well as a champion of free speech, Solzhenitsyn left a rich, diverse, and controversial legacy. Putin chooses to follow only those ideas that fit his neo-imperialist and reactionary agenda, and naturally they don’t usually include the free-speech part. But Solzhenityzn the nationalist he loves. In December 2014, speaking in the Kremlin about Western sanctions, Putin quoted Solzhenitsyn as saying: "It is time to defend Russia, otherwise they will cow us completely."
> 
> In his 1990 essay, written on the eve of the fall of the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn suggested that Russia abandon its global agenda and focus, instead, on its internal problems. He called for the immediate separation of Russia from the Soviet Union—a call that was heard by the first president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who in December of 1991 signed the Belavezh Accords with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and the head of Belarusian parliament, Stanislau Shushkevich, thus hammering the last nail in the coffin of the USSR and leaving Mikhail Gorbachev without a job.
> 
> Yet in the same essay, Solzhenitsyn wrote that “the word “Russian” had for centuries embraced Little Russian [Ukrainians], Great Russians, and Belorussians.”He accepted the potential future independence of Ukraine but added: “The area is very heterogenous indeed, and only the local population can determine the fate of a particular locality”–advice that Putin appeared to take to heart in his annexation of Crimea and is currently pursuing in Eastern Ukraine.
> 
> Located in the center of Eurasia, Kazakhstan covers a territory larger than Western Europe. It is rich in natural and human resources and, unlike some other post-Soviet states, has maintained relative peace and stability. This is largely due to the political efforts of Nazarbaev, the country’s autocratic ruler, who has demonstrated Machiavellian skills in suppressing the opposition and appeasing external foes. Nazarbaev has been very careful with Putin but the seeds for a future dispute—either political or military—have been planted. Concerned with Russia’s neo-imperialist policies conducted under the pretext of defending the Russkii Mir (the Russian World), the Kazakhs may eventually turn away from Russia, particularly when the era of Nazarbaev ends.
> 
> No doubt this will have  political consequences, possibly envolving a military conflict similar to what is happening in Ukraine, where after his annexation of Crimea Putin supplied and funded pro-Russian separatists in the east.
> 
> Putin also seems to echo  Solzhenitsyn in his distaste for the West and its mores. In 1978 in a famous speech at Harvard, Solzhenitsyn criticized Western civilization for a lack of courage, its unrestained freedom of media, and its fixation on law and individual rights. The withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Vietnam, according to the Nobel Prize Laureate, was a sign of weakness: “To defend oneself, one must also be ready to die; there is little such readiness in a society raised in the cult of material well-being.” Solzhenitsyn even passed harsh judgment on the Western concept of the rule of law, no doubt pleasing Russia’s future leader: “Legal frames, especially in the United States, are broad enough to encourage not only individual freedom but also certain individual crimes… The letter of the law is too cold and formal to have a beneficial influence on society.”
> 
> In spite of his abhorrence of Soviet system, Solzhenitsyn also recommended that Russia not follow the Western path: “Should someone ask me whether I would indicate the West such as it is today as a model to my country, frankly I would have to answer negatively…  The next war (which does not have to be an atomic one and I do not believe it will) may well bury Western civilization forever.”
> 
> This reactionary agenda has been meticulously followed by Vladimir Putin.


----------



## a_majoor

Russia and "Orthodox Civilization" (to use Samuel Huntington's idea) have a far different outlook than "Western" civilization on things like individual rights, property and the Rule of Law. To some extent, this explains why a man like Alexander Solzhenitsyn could be both a severe critic of the USSR and of the West at the same time.

While I have no definitive answers, it is instructive to read some of Putin's other influences, including Alexander Dugan and Vladimir Solovyov. Russian philosophical thought also seems to be dominated by Eurasianism; the study of Russia's place and influence in Eurasia and the world, which may go some way to explaining Russia's actions in the "Near Beyond" and Russia's former "sphere of influence" (regardless of the fact that most of the nations formerly in that sphere made every effort to exit as soon as possible and practical).

While it would take a long time to study and absorb this, I'm fairly certain the reason we find Putin's motives so opaque is we really don't understand the lenses that he is looking at the world through. If we had a better understanding it would be easier to predict where they Russians think as the way forward, and also to find points of leverage we could use against them when needed.


----------



## MilEME09

> Putin says 'no one' can have military superiority over Russia
> 
> The Associated Press
> Published Friday, February 20, 2015 12:49PM EST
> Last Updated Friday, February 20, 2015 2:35PM EST
> 
> MOSCOW -- President Vladimir Putin says he will not allow anyone to get a military advantage over Russia and pledges that the country will never yield to foreign pressure.
> 
> In a tough statement that comes amid tensions with the West over Ukraine, Putin warned Friday that "no one should have any illusions that it's possible to achieve military superiority over Russia or apply any kind of pressure on it." He added that the nation's military would always have an "adequate response."
> 
> The Russian leader vowed that an ambitious military modernization program envisaging the deployment of hundreds of new combat jets, missiles and other weapons would be carried out
> 
> Despite an economic downturn caused by low oil prices and Western sanctions over Ukraine, Russia's military budget has risen by one-third this year.



http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/putin-says-no-one-can-have-military-superiority-over-russia-1.2245701


----------



## a_majoor

While YMMV with Wikipedia, it is a good basic starting point to begin research. Here is the article on Eurasianism. It is instructive to see how Russians who follow this idea reject the idea and ideals of Western civilization or Russia (even European Russia) being a part of it. Alexander Dugin is a prolific writer on the subject, and also is associated with Putin's inner circle. It is quite probable that Putin and his circle have drunk the kool aide and are motivated at least in part by some of the ideas of Eurasianism.



> *Neo-Eurasianism*[edit]
> 
> See also: Foundations of Geopolitics
> 
> Former Warsaw Pact countries
> Neo-Eurasianism (Russian: неоевразийство) is a Russian school of thought, popularized in Russia during the years leading up to and following the collapse of the Soviet Union, that considers Russia to be culturally closer to Asia than to Western Europe.
> 
> The school takes its inspiration from the Eurasianists of the 1920s, notably Prince Nikolai Trubetzkoy and P.N. Savitsky. Lev Gumilev is often cited as the founder of the Neo-Eurasianist movement, and he was quoted as saying that "I am the last of the Eurasianists."[1]
> 
> At the same time, major differences have been noted between Gumilev's work and those of the original Eurasianists.[1] Gumilev's work is controversial for its scientific methodology (the use of his own conception of ethnogenesis and the notion of "passionarity"). At any rate, Gumilev's work has been a source of inspiration for the Neo-Eurasianist authors, the most prolific of whom is Aleksandr Dugin.
> 
> Gumilev's contribution to Neo-Eurasianism lies in the conclusions he reaches from applying his theory of ethnogenesis: that the Mongol occupation of 1240–1480 AD (known as the "Mongol yoke") had shielded the emergent Russian ethnos from the aggressive neighbor to the West, allowing it to gain time to achieve maturity. The idea of Eurasianism contrasts with Konstantin Leontyev's Byzantism, which is similar in its rejection of the West, but identifies with the Byzantine Empire rather than with Central Asian tribal culture.
> 
> Greater Russia[edit]
> 
> Not to be confused with Great Russia.
> 
> Russia growth 1613–1914
> Main article: Greater Russia
> 
> The movement is sometimes called the Greater Russia and is described as a political aspiration of pan-Russian nationalists and irredentists to retake some or all of the territories of the other republics of the former Soviet Union and territory of the former Russian Empire and amalgamate them into a single Russian state. Alexander Rutskoy, the Vice President of Russia from 1991–1993, asserted irredentist claims to Narva in Estonia, Crimea in Ukraine, and Ust-Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan, among other territories.[2] The idea of a Greater Russia still has important relevance in Russian politics, as expanding the Russian state to include Belarus is an important topic in Russian political affairs, as well as the political aspirations of Russian nationalists especially in Moldova and Ukraine to have their people reintegrated with Russia.[3] Before war broke out between Russia and Georgia in 2008, Aleksandr Dugin visited South Ossetia and predicted, "Our troops will occupy the Georgian capital Tbilisi, the entire country, and perhaps even Ukraine and the Crimean Peninsula, which is historically part of Russia, anyway."[4] Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity is a Eurasianist and argues that South Ossetia never left the Russian Empire and should be part of Russia.[5]


----------



## a_majoor

And more on the challenges that Russia faces today:

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-35-billion-problem-worrying-vladimir-putin-more-more-than-ukrainian-sanctions-10045102.html



> *The $35 billion problem worrying Vladimir Putin much more than Ukrainian sanctions*
> A recent ceasefire already looks set to crumble as fighting continues and Russia and Ukraine quibble over details of the agreement
> 
> Friday 13 February 2015
> 
> The Ukrainian ceasefire, tortuously reached over the past few days, already looks in danger of collapsing as reports emerge of continued fighting in the east of the country.
> 
> Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was present at the talks, has warned EU leaders to prepare further sanctions against Russia should the ceasefire breakdown yet again.
> 
> But the Ukrainian situation may be the least of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s problems.
> 
> The Russian leader today announced a $35 billion anti-crisis spending plan, but admitted to reporters he did not know how best to implement the cash injection into the economy, a local Russian news station reported.
> 
> The economy aside, Russia faces its own threat from Islamic extremism, weak national institutions, increasing societal pressures, and looming unemployment.
> 
> 1. Economic failings
> 
> Russian oil giant Rosneft have their headquarters in Moscow
> 
> Western economic sanctions are – undoubtedly – having an adverse effect on the Russian economy. But they are not the whole story, and many businesses are still finding loopholes to circumvent them – as this Economist article demonstrates.
> 
> Joseph Dayan, Head of Markets at BCS Financial Group, Russia’s largest broker, told The Independent it was “misleading” to point to sanctions as being the chief economic problem in Russia but added: “The country is going into a crippling recession this year”.
> 
> “50 per cent of the Russian government’s income is derived from what you can take from the ground - oil and gas - and today oil is doing better but it is this huge dependency that is the main factor impacting the Russian economy.”
> 
> Mr Dayan continued: “In good times this is a plus, but in bad times it is a burden.”
> 
> “But they can survive under a year or two, even under sanctions, as long as oil prices do not dip below $50,” he said. If that happens, “it could all end very badly,” Mr Dayan claimed.
> 
> 2. Weak institutions
> 
> Supporters of Russian opposition leader and anti-corruption blogger Alexei Navalny hold a rally in protest against court verdict at Manezhnaya Square in Moscow
> 
> Russia is ranked as among the most corrupt nations on the planet, scoring just 27 out of 100 (0: highly corrupt, 100: clean) in Transparency Internationals 2014 ranking. It came below countries such as Pakistan, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.
> 
> What this corruption translates to (returning to the economy) is that since the Russian government slid back reforms – for example, re-taking many of the businesses that were privatised during the boom years – productivity and investment have slumped.
> 
> Put simply: there is no growth as a direct result of corruption. Previous sources of growth have been exhausted and investment requires protection of property right and enforcement of contracts – exactly what corruption dissuades.
> 
> 3. Unemployment
> 
> Last month the first deputy prime minister warned Russians to expect a rise in unemployment.
> 
> Figures showed an eight-month high in December, just months after reaching a record low in August last year.
> 
> One of Mr Putin’s signature achievements has been to keep unemployment falling since 2000, should this slip he may begin to feel the pressure internally.
> 
> 4. Societal pressures
> 
> The Russian birthrate is falling
> 
> Two factors are important to remember here: firstly the turbulence of the economy; and secondly President Putin’s crackdown on social freedoms.
> 
> This crackdown, often targeting certain groups such as the LGBT community or press freedoms, has fuelled a wave of middle-class migration.
> 
> In 2013 more than 186,000 people left Russia. To put that in perspective, that’s five times as many as two years earlier according to state statistics agency figures quoted by business magazine Sekret Firmy.
> 
> Around 40,000 Russians applied for asylum in 2013, according to a UN report, 76 per cent more than in the previous year.
> 
> Added to these departures is Russia’s falling population. According to a recently published article by Yale Global the country’s shrinking population “is the result of deaths outnumbering births for nearly two decades without sufficient immigration to compensate for the deficit.”
> 
> 5. Threat from Islamic extremism
> 
> A video of a Chechen Isis fighter threatening Russia.
> 
> Last month a senior Russian diplomat claimed that more than 800 Russian nationals were fighting alongside Isis, also known as the Islamic State. New York security firm Soufan Group claims the number is nearer 2,000.
> 
> Russia is grappling with similar problems to that of Europe – namely rising nationalism and xenophobia, which pushes selected groups towards extremism.
> 
> Many of those allegedly fighting were from the Northern Caucasus Chechen province and an Isis video in August threatened to bring the war home. "We will liberate Chechnya and the Caucasus, Allah willing,” said one fighter in the video.
> 
> This area has already seen two separatist wars but had stabilised in recent years under Moscow, after a brief-lived Islamic uprising in 1999. Mr Putin, prime minster at the time, quickly crushed the rebellion.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Russia, the geographic expression, doesn't make much social, economic or political sense to me. There is a "natural" Russia which extends from somewhere around the Pirpet (Pinsk) Marshes (sorry Ukraine and Belarus) to the Urals ~ it is settled, Slavic (European) and Orthodox. Everything East of the Urals is something else ... Asian, at least in the sense that e.g. Afghanistan and Uzbekistan are Asian in Western Sibera, and _Sinic_/Mongol in Eastern Siberia.

It seems to me that the time is ripe for an all out political/diplomatic and, above all, economic attack on Russia with the aim of promoting rebellions and revolutions.

Perhaps, as I think the Chinese, wish, the end result will be to dismember Russia into at least three "new" states: _traditional_ European Russia, a West Asian Siberian State and an East Asian Siberian State. Perhaps some other forms will present themselves.

I believe that what we have - Putin's kleptocracy - is bound to fail. I fear it may fail in some sort of violent, messy _Götterdämmerung_ style climax; I hope it can be made to fail in a less violent, even faintly democratic manner - although I don't think Slavic and democratic go all that well together.

I believe that Russia can be 'beaten' and forced into some new configuration without Western military action ... I think economics (legitimate trade actions and sabotage) can do the trick.


----------



## Kirkhill

Despite the fact that I don't think Russia is militarily as strong as Vlad wants us to believe I also think he can be brought down by other means.

I also think that the Russian Empire can naturally split into three parts.  One of them certainly stretches from the Pripet Marshes to the Urals and centers on Moscow.

But...  

I don't think it extends any farther south than the tree line.  (What is the Russian equivalent of Red Deer>?).  

The second part is Siberia proper, east of the Urals and north of the tree line.

The third part is the problematic part. It extends from the Altai to the Carpathians and as far north as the treeline.  It has a common language family, Turkic and a common culture based on the horse.  It extends into Mongolia and Xinjiang, through the Stans and the Caucasus and into Turkey.

The Hordes of the Steppes have been a constant fear to Muscovy.  How would China react to a resurgence of the horsemen?


----------



## Edward Campbell

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> ...
> 
> The Hordes of the Steppes have been a constant fear to Muscovy.  How would China react to a resurgence of the horsemen?




Same as they've done, again and again, for over a thousand years, since e.g. the Jin (金 - Gold), Yuan and Qing dynasties ... absorb and _sinify_ them.


----------



## Lightguns

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Despite the fact that I don't think Russia is militarily as strong as Vlad wants us to believe I also think he can be brought down by other means.
> 
> I also think that the Russian Empire can naturally split into three parts.  One of them certainly stretches from the Pripet Marshes to the Urals and centers on Moscow.
> 
> But...
> 
> I don't think it extends any farther south than the tree line.  (What is the Russian equivalent of Red Deer>?).
> 
> The second part is Siberia proper, east of the Urals and north of the tree line.
> 
> The third part is the problematic part. It extends from the Altai to the Carpathians and as far north as the treeline.  It has a common language family, Turkic and a common culture based on the horse.  It extends into Mongolia and Xinjiang, through the Stans and the Caucasus and into Turkey.
> 
> The Hordes of the Steppes have been a constant fear to Muscovy.  How would China react to a resurgence of the horsemen?
> 
> I find it interesting that alot of open source intelligence reports that the majority of the fighters going in are not Russian but Crimean-Russians.


----------



## McG

Lightguns said:
			
		

> I find it interesting that alot of open source intelligence reports that the majority of the fighters going in are not Russian but Crimean-Russians.


I have not seen this claim.  Where did you find it?


----------



## a_majoor

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Despite the fact that I don't think Russia is militarily as strong as Vlad wants us to believe I also think he can be brought down by other means.
> 
> I also think that the Russian Empire can naturally split into three parts.  One of them certainly stretches from the Pripet Marshes to the Urals and centers on Moscow.
> 
> But...
> 
> I don't think it extends any farther south than the tree line.  (What is the Russian equivalent of Red Deer>?).
> 
> The second part is Siberia proper, east of the Urals and north of the tree line.
> 
> The third part is the problematic part. It extends from the Altai to the Carpathians and as far north as the treeline.  It has a common language family, Turkic and a common culture based on the horse.  It extends into Mongolia and Xinjiang, through the Stans and the Caucasus and into Turkey.
> 
> The Hordes of the Steppes have been a constant fear to Muscovy.  How would China react to a resurgence of the horsemen?



Sounds a bit like the "Intermediate Region" theory of geopolitics: 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermediate_Region



> The Intermediate Region is an established geopolitical model set forth in the 1970s by the Greek historian Dimitri Kitsikis, professor at the University of Ottawa in Canada.[1] According to this model, the Eurasian continent is composed of three regions; in addition to Western Europe and the Far East, a third region called the "Intermediate Region" found between the two constitutes a distinct civilization. It roughly covers Eastern Europe and the Middle East and North Africa.


----------



## Kirkhill

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> Same as they've done, again and again, for over a thousand years, since e.g. the Jin (金 - Gold), Yuan and Qing dynasties ... absorb and _sinify_ them.



Hmm.... I understand there are ways to make the process quite painless.

Funny how that absorption thing works:

Chlodio's outlaw Germans invade Paris, learn to speak bastard Latin and become the Franks
Rollo's outlaw Danes invade France, learn to speak French and become the Normans
William the Bastard's Normans invade Sussex, learn to speak like the Angles and become English

Mongols invade China, set themselves up as overlords in Beijing and become Chinese - while the Han forget about why they have been fighting over the Yalu Bend for the last few millenia.

I can actuallly see an effective sinification programme working between the Iron Gates (the European ones where the Danube pierces the Carpathians and the Asian ones in the Altai which guard the Silk Road into China).  The memories of the Hordes are not so old there and the wealth and freedom that trade brought likely remains fresh.

 The issue remains what to do about Muscovy.  They fear the Tatar Yoke.  They want to be Westerners not Easterners.  And yet they can't stand us and fear us as well.  Just look at their troop dispositions.  What troops, air defenses and equipment they have are concentrated west of the Urals and in particular around Moscow.


----------



## Kirkhill

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Sounds a bit like the "Intermediate Region" theory of geopolitics:
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intermediate_Region



Interesting bit about the Intermediate Region but I would be splitting it somewhere around Syria, where the Turks of the Steppes and the Arabs of the Middle East and North Africa are still duking it out for supremacy.

The Turks are to the Arabs what Horst and Hengest's Angles were to the Brits.  Too lazy to do their own fighting they invited strangers to do the work for them and are resentful to this day that the strangers became their masters.


----------



## Lightguns

MCG said:
			
		

> I have not seen this claim.  Where did you find it?



Gee, I am not sure now, I read it via a twitter link on two occasions, one was European and the Other Indian.


----------



## vonGarvin

I don't understand why we wish to attack Russia, Putin or anyone else for that matter.  

Despite years of indoctrination to the contrary as a youth, Russia (or as it was then, the USSR) does not want anything more than to be the big kid in his own back yard.  Period.  And this back yard does not include Europe.  Of course, there's the whole matter of the Warsaw Pact, but let's not forget that Stalin, and later Kruschev, etc, had fresh memories of Europeans coming to Russia on the rampage, not the other way around.


----------



## CougarKing

Technoviking said:
			
		

> fresh memories of Europeans coming to Russia on the rampage, not the other way around.



Napoleon and Hitler's invasions of Russia aside, aren't you forgetting at least 5 instances where the Russians went the other way?

1.)The 1956 Hungarian uprising( And all the Soviet armoured divisions that annihilated it)
2.) August 1968- Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.
3.) Soviet invasion of half of Poland when Hitler and Stalin partitioned Poland in Sept. 1939
4.) Soviet invasion of Finland in the 1940 "Winter War"
5.) Soviet occupation of the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Lativa and Estonia in 1940

Those memories are bound to be as fresh in the collective consciousness of the other countries involved as well.


----------



## vonGarvin

S.M.A. said:
			
		

> Napoleon and Hitler's invasions of Russia aside, aren't you forgetting at least 5 instances where the Russians went the other way?
> 
> 1.)The 1956 Hungarian uprising( And all the Soviet armoured divisions that annihilated it)
> 2.) August 1968- Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.
> 3.) Soviet invasion of half of Poland when Hitler and Stalin partitioned Poland in Sept. 1939
> 4.) Soviet invasion of Finland in the 1940 "Winter War"
> 5.) Soviet occupation of the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Lativa and Estonia in 1940
> 
> Those memories are bound to be as fresh in the collective consciousness of the other countries involved as well.


I don't forget those, but in terms of points 1, 2, 3 and 4, they all have the same thing in common: buffer zone.  

1956 and 1968 were about maintaining that zone (Both independent Slovakia and Hungary were belligerents in the "Great Patriotic War".  The Soviets didn't forget that)
1939 was about gaining more to that zone: Stalin knew that it would have to eventually come to blows with Germany, and the further west it started, the better.  As an aside, the territory gained in 1939 by the USSR is now part of Belarus and Ukraine.
1940 with Finland was a bit of an anomoly, but in the end, it was about buffer: Finland posed no threat to the USSR, but there were territorial "disputes"
Gaining the Baltic was similar to 1939 in Poland: again, gaining that zone.

In the end, right or wrong, the USSR saved itself by gaining that buffer zone in 1939 and 1940.  That makes little comfort for those in Poland and in the Baltic states today, however.  But in the end, had Germany started Barbarossa a few hundred km to the East, that war would surely have been ended in Germany's favour in late 1941.

Russia (Moscow) never forgot that, and they still remember, and when they see US armour literally metres from their border in Narva, they tend to get a bit a antsy.  


And now, after having seen Kyiv swing suddenly from "Russia Friendly" to "EU friendly" through a (perceived) coup d'état, they are full blown panic mode.  And this won't end well, I fear.


----------



## Kirkhill

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I don't understand why we wish to attack Russia, Putin or anyone else for that matter.
> 
> Despite years of indoctrination to the contrary as a youth, Russia (or as it was then, the USSR) does not want anything more than to be the big kid in his own back yard.  Period.  And this back yard does not include Europe.  Of course, there's the whole matter of the Warsaw Pact, but let's not forget that Stalin, and later Kruschev, etc, had fresh memories of Europeans coming to Russia on the rampage, not the other way around.



I don't wish to "attack" Putin.  I wish that Putin would stop "attacking" Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Estonia and would make nice with Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland - not to mention the whole of the EU.  

If he won't stop then I would prefer that some of his countrymen stop him.   Failing that - I FEAR - that leaving him alone is not an option.  

It becomes wearisome holding the shield over one's head and constantly backing up.  Sooner or later one is inclined to try to strike back.

And this has nothing to do with indoctrination.  It has everything to do with "what have they done for us lately?"

 :cheers:


----------



## a_majoor

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I don't understand why we wish to attack Russia, Putin or anyone else for that matter.
> 
> Despite years of indoctrination to the contrary as a youth, Russia (or as it was then, the USSR) does not want anything more than to be the big kid in his own back yard.  Period.  And this back yard does not include Europe.  Of course, there's the whole matter of the Warsaw Pact, but let's not forget that Stalin, and later Kruschev, etc, had fresh memories of Europeans coming to Russia on the rampage, not the other way around.



While it is true that various peoples have invaded Russia over the centuries, it is equally true that the various nations that Russia sees as being in its sphere of influence are dead set against being part of the Russian _anything_, and are determined to become part and parcel of Europe and reap the benefits of being European. Russia may want to be the "Big Kid" on the block, but to the Balts, Finns, Ukrainians, Georgians and the nations of the "Near Beyond" Russia looks more like a bully who wants to steal their lunch money.

During the Cold War *we* could close our eyes and avoid the fact that most of the nations in the Warsaw Pact were held there in bondage and not by choice, mostly because any miscalculation would have ended up going nuclear. During the period between the fall of the wall and Putin's Munich 2007 speech, when nuclear conflict seemed to have been taken off the table, we were willing to accomodate the aspirations of the Eastern European nations to join the West, and I certainly recall that every possible means were also used to "invite" the Russians to take part in the banquet as well, from entering into the "G-X" groups to pumping hundreds of billions of dollars into the Russian space program.

Russia's new ruling cliques seem to be determined to go back to older ways of thinking and acting, but they should also understand that by asserting themselves in that fashion, they are also inviting a huge amount of pushback.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I don't understand why we wish to attack Russia, Putin or anyone else for that matter.
> 
> Despite years of indoctrination to the contrary as a youth, Russia (or as it was then, the USSR) does not want anything more than to be the big kid in his own back yard.  Period.  And *this back yard does not include Europe*.  Of course, there's the whole matter of the Warsaw Pact, but let's not forget that Stalin, and later Kruschev, etc, had fresh memories of Europeans coming to Russia on the rampage, not the other way around.


While what you're saying may be true, it's that bit in yellow becomes the contentious point:  who decides who's "Europe"?  Some places are pretty black and white, it's those pesky grey areas - including Ukraine, with bits of the country having historical links westward, and bits having historical links in the other direction - that cause grief.


----------



## vonGarvin

That area is indeed grey and murky. Ukraine is riddled with ethnic Russians (among other groups), but I would offer that Germany is definitely not their backyard, nor Poland, (in spite of parts of East Prussia being part of Russia), but Ukraine is that grey belt, I suppose.

But for the other posters: we have much larger problems than a bunch of Slavs fighting each other. Neither group wants to horn in on us, nor has either threatened us.

Let's focus on things that matter to us, namely the very dangerous ISIS.


----------



## Kirkhill

Technoviking said:
			
		

> That area is indeed grey and murky. Ukraine is riddled with ethnic Russians (among other groups), but I would offer that Germany is definitely not their backyard, nor Poland, (in spite of parts of East Prussia being part of Russia), but Ukraine is that grey belt, I suppose.
> 
> But for the other posters: we have much larger problems than a bunch of Slavs fighting each other. Neither group wants to horn in on us, nor has either threatened us.
> 
> Let's focus on things that matter to us, namely the very dangerous ISIS.



Shirley! You Jest?
  
The Wogs have the intent but not the means.  The Slavs have the means (diminished) but not the intent (debatable).  Neither one represent a Clear and Present Danger (Thank You Tom Clancy) although neither one can be entirely ruled out as a threat.

Part of the reason for the rise of ISIS is the lack of the bipolar hegemony of the Cold War.  Actually I wouldn't mind a strong Russia.  The strong, silent type. Talking softly and carrying a big stick.  Offering the occasional carrot and generally being a good neighbour.

The reason Vlad spends so much time spouting off is because he has to appear strong and he knows he isn't.  The problem for him is that most folks in his neighbourhood also know that he isn't.  He is strong enough to make their lives miserable.  He is strong enough to utterly destroy them (if he doesn't mind a little bit of glow in the night skies around his borders).  What he isn't, is strong enough to compel them.


----------



## Kirkhill

Hey guys, 

The "war" is over and "we" have won.  

I mentioned this article http://www.cast.ru/files/book/NewArmy_sm.pdf here 
http://army.ca/forums/threads/111881/post-1353771.html#msg1353771.

It absolutely has to be read. It demonstrates the Russian military complex has been infiltrated by Canadian bureaucrats who have imposed all the same policies on Russia as they have on you.

Helicopters bought against military advice to prop up a regional business (Ka52)

Anything that flies centralized under the Air Force, only to discover the Air Force is unresponsive to VDVs need to train paras and the Army's need to have helicopters available when they need them, which results in the Air Force helos being put under Army command and the Air Force being only tasked to train pilots.

Everything subordinated to four Joint Task Forces

Available equipment concentrated into a reduced number of units with reduced manpower.  Battlegroups are the standing operational force.  Units are understrength.  Recruiting is difficult.  Wives and Girlfriends hate the service.

Generals told to downsize but never seem to go away.  Command heavy.  Lacking in modern radars, PGMs and night fighting capabilities.  

Government telling Abn forces to use Armd vehicles that can't be lifted by the helos available.  Paras buying Polaris ATVs for trials with available helos......

And it goes on and on and on.....

Obviously these guys have all got their MBAs from Carleton and Phoenix.


----------



## Edward Campbell

Technoviking said:
			
		

> That area is indeed grey and murky. Ukraine is riddled with ethnic Russians (among other groups), but I would offer that Germany is definitely not their backyard, nor Poland, (in spite of parts of East Prussia being part of Russia), but Ukraine is that grey belt, I suppose.
> 
> But for the other posters: we have much larger problems than a bunch of Slavs fighting each other. Neither group wants to horn in on us, nor has either threatened us.
> 
> Let's focus on things that matter to us, namely the very dangerous ISIS.




I don't think IS** is or is likely to become an existential threat to Canada or America or Europe, Australia, Japan, etc, etc ...

I think Russia is a threat, a real, measurable threat, to the peace and stability of Eurasia, and, therefore, a problem for the 
US led West.

I think the best way to "handle" Russia is through an all out, sustained, crippling economic attack; the aim being to promote internal dissent, rebellion and revolution. I don't think the final "shape" of the outcome matters beyond Russia being reduced in power. 

I think the best way to "handle" IS** is also through economics: First, "follow the money;" Second, find the money and block it; Third punish the sources of the money ~ and yes I am conscious of the fact that I advocate "punishing" (let's say assassinating) Saudi princes and Gulf State emirs and the like.

   (Broadly, I remain wedded to the notion of *isolating*, completely _isolating_, the Arab and West Asian worlds, from
    Palestine through to Pakistan, (excepting Jordan) ... nothing enters but arms, nothing comes here except payments - no immigrants, no parents,
    no students, no poor, innocent, sick children needing medical care ... nothing. I think _isolation_ will also work against Russia.

    In the end i think most of the _Islamic Crescent_, which stretched from the Atlantic coast of North Africa through to
    the Indonesian archipelago, needs some, in most cases of lot, of something akin to 18th century European style _enlightenment_.
    My _guess_ is that will not come until there is something akin to a _reformation_ and that may need a long series
    of bloody internecine wars throughout the region, lasting generations.)

We don't need to spend huge amounts of troops or bombs - we can do some bombing or other combat - money should be the main weapon.

My _guess_ is that Russia needs something different: just, really, a few "teeth" pulled so that it cannot disrupt its neighbourhood and will be forced to be a good better 'citizen.'


----------



## a_majoor

So if Putin is replaced either in the near term (through economic and diplomatic actions) or long term (as his term in office ends), the question remains: What next? The American interest looks at this question, but there are few good answers right now:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/02/26/after-putin/



> *After Putin*
> Andrew Wood
> 
> Putin’s poll numbers may be sky high now, but not even he and his inner circle believe they will stay that way for long.
> 
> Eighty percent poll ratings, almost four years to go before the next elections, and the chance to stay until 2024—what’s not to like for Putin? The outside world, and the majority of Russians, suppose that he will stay that long, if not longer. However, if we were to judge by the actions of Putin and his immediate circle, we would conclude that they have little confidence in the durability of the people’s love for the Russian President.
> 
> Russia today is a state in thrall to a distorted narrative. Putin has to stay in control of that narrative. The institutional structures of the state have been deprived of their independent meaning, leaving the Kremlin, and therefore Putin, both exalted and isolated. There is a considerable range of questions about Putin personally and the system he has promoted that will not simply disappear. If only one of them were allowed to become a focus of public dissatisfaction, especially as a particular illustration of a wider problem, the regime would be threatened. Lies and repression remain necessities. So too now is the securely implanted perception of Fortress Russia, surrounded by enemies and doing its duty in Ukraine.
> 
> Putin’s sacralization as national leader is reinforced by the absence of any other visible contender for power and the interdiction of significant argument over policies determined through him. There is a constitutional process for his replacement as President in 2018 or 2024, as the case may be. If he left the Kremlin before presidential elections could be held on the regular timetable, then the Prime Minister, for now the poorly rated Medvedev, would act as interim President for three months.
> 
> But Putin will not go voluntarily. He would be taking a huge personal risk if he left office in 2018, or even, on present form, in 2024. Appointing his long term and obedient associate Medvedev in 2008 led in the end to the airing of unwelcome ideas and to street protests. Any successor to Putin now would be bound to show himself (or notionally herself) as seeking to become his own President; in case of need Putin would be the ideal scapegoat. But Putin is also the prisoner of the course he has followed since his return to the Kremlin in May 2012. The risks of that course are mounting, be they for Russia’s economy, for its confrontational relationship with the outside world (and not just the West), or for its internal stability.
> 
> There may well be those in Putin’s immediate circle who recognize the dangers they face over the next couple of years. It is possible that, if his health came into question, or if it seemed to them that he was ready to take some gamble too far, at least some of them might seek to combine against him. They have after all their fortunes and safety to look to. But they are also complicit in what has been done over the past fifteen years, and their overall objective would be to preserve the essential characteristics of this period. Few if any of Putin’s inner circle have political credibility. Choosing a safe successor would mean choosing the political orientation of the next President—supposing that plotting Putin’s overthrow were even a practicable option. A whiff of liberalization would bring its own risks. More intense Russian nationalism, others. A caretaker in case of ill health or Putin’s death would prolong the period of contention as to Russia’s future course, not resolve it.
> 
> Putin’s immediate colleagues are not the only Russians who have a stake in the present system and stand to lose from its decay. But the majority are beneficiaries rather than principal actors. Moscow remains the political center of Russia’s political life and fortunes. The present regime would not be so insistent on the dangers of color revolutions, or so willing to turn to semi-legal groups like anti-Maidan, exploit criminal groups and interests, or organize mass demonstrations, if Russia’s leaders were confident of their grip, even after reducing the 2011-12 protest movement to virtual impotence. Russia has become a country suspended in potential anarchy, not a state ready to evolve in harmony with itself.
> 
> Western policymakers need therefore to contemplate the risks of eventual breakdown in Russia. That is not to say that Russia is, for us, too big to fail. Nor is it to urge us to bring about regime change. Neither option is practicable or desirable for the West to prevent or to undertake. We should, however, act in the case of Ukraine in the knowledge that what Russia is doing there is not as the Kremlin claims because of the threat to Russia from the West, but because of the developing crisis within Russia itself. Putin is not to be appeased by Western concessions, or necessarily by the West abandoning Ukraine. The respect we owe to Russia is to its people, not to its regime. Change can now come only with a new regime, whose birth may well be rough.
> 
> Andrew Wood is an associate fellow of Chatham House and a former British Ambassador to Belgrade, and subsequently to Moscow (mid 1995–early 2000).


----------



## Old Sweat

Well, there is one less potential replacement as a Russian opposition leader was murdered the day before he was to lead an anti-Putin rally. The story demo the CBC site is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act.

Boris Nemtsov, Russian opposition leader, shot dead in Moscow
Nemtsov was to lead major anti-Putin rally in Moscow on Sunday
The Associated Press Posted: Feb 27, 2015 5:14 PM ET Last Updated: Feb 27, 2015 7:19 PM ET 


Boris Nemtsov, a charismatic former deputy prime minister turned Russian opposition leader and outspoken critic of President Vladimir Putin was shot and killed in Moscow Saturday, officials said.

Nemtsov's death comes just a day before a planned protest against Putin's rule. The Kremlin said that Putin will personally oversee the investigation.

Nemtsov, who was 55, was a sharp critic of Putin, assailing the government's inefficiency, rampant corruption and the Kremlin's policy on Ukraine, which has strained Russia-West ties to a degree unseen since Cold War times.

The Russian Interior Ministry, which oversees Russia's police force, said that Nemtsov was shot four times from a passing car as he was walking a bridge just outside the Kremlin shortly after midnight.

Interior Ministry spokeswoman Yelena Alexeyeva told reporters on the scene that Nemtsov was walking with a female acquaintance, a Ukrainian citizen, when a vehicle drove up and unidentified assailants shot him dead. The woman wasn't hurt.

Opposition activist Ilya Yashin said on Ekho Moskvy radio that he last spoke with Nemtsov two days before the killing. Nemtsov was working on a report presenting evidence that he believed proved Russia's direct involvement in the separatist rebellion that erupted in eastern Ukraine last year.

Ukraine and the West have accused Russia of backing the rebels there with troops and weapons. Moscow has denied the accusations, but large numbers of sophisticated heavy weapons in the rebels' possession has strained the credibility of its denials.

'Atmosphere of hatred'

Yashin said he had no doubt that Nemtsov's murder was politically motivated.

"Boris Nemtsov was a stark opposition leader who criticized the most important state officials in our country, including President Vladimir Putin. As we have seen, such criticism in Russia is dangerous for one's life," he said.

Political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky told Ekho Mosvky radio station that he did not believe that Nemtsov's death would in any way serve Putin's interests.

"But the atmosphere of hatred toward alternative thinkers that has formed over the past year, since the annexation of Crimea, may have played its role," Belkovsky said, referring to the surge of intense and officially endorsed nationalist discourse increasingly prevalent in Russia since it annexed Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula.

Nemtsov served a deputy prime minister in the 1990s and once was seen as a possible successor to Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first elected president. After Putin was first elected in 2000, Nemtsov became one of the most vocal critics of his rule. He helped organize street protests and has relentlessly exposed official corruption.

He was one of the organizers of the Spring March opposition protest set for Sunday, which comes amid a severe economic downturn in Russia caused by low oil prices and Western sanctions.

Earlier this month, Nemtsov told a Russian television news station in an interview that he feared he might be killed.

Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Rob Nicholson called the murder an "outrage" and said Canada is monitoring the situation in a tweet.  

The White House released a statement Friday evening condemning Nemtsov's murder.

"We call on the Russian government conduct a prompt, impartial and transparent investigation and ensure those responsible are brought to justice," the statement said. 

Russian chess grandmaster and political activist Garry Kasparov, who himself is a vocal critic of Putin's government, tweeted that he was "devastated to hear about the brutal murder of my long-time opposition colleague Boris Nemtsov."


----------



## Good2Golf

> The Kremlin said that Putin will personally oversee the investigation.



As though that would be a good thing...I'm sure he will.


----------



## Rifleman62

> The Kremlin said that Putin will personally oversee the investigation.



Sympathy for the poor innocent sod who is going to take the fall for this.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> The Kremlin said that Putin will personally oversee the investigation.


----------



## cupper

> It was Keyser Soze, Agent Kujan. I mean the Devil himself. How do you shoot the Devil in the back? What if you miss?


----------



## OldSolduer

A typically Soviet solution to an annoying problem - kill it. Not surprising and not new.

Stalin ordered Trotsky's death. Stalin also purged the military prior to World War Two. 

There was a chap killed in London by ricin poisoning in the 80s and another not long ago by radiation poisoning.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> A typically Soviet solution to an annoying problem - kill it. Not surprising and not new.



Putin's version of  Thomas Becket.


----------



## Robert0288

Anyone want to start a poll if it's going to be Chechens, Georgians, or terrorist Ukrainians blamed for it?  Or maybe some political ally who was fighting for power within the same party.  Good way to get rid of multiple problems at once.


----------



## OldSolduer

"Death is the solution to all problems. No man - no problems"

Joseph Stalin

It appears Uncle Vlad agrees with this.


----------



## cupper

Robert0288 said:
			
		

> Anyone want to start a poll if it's going to be Chechens, Georgians, or terrorist Ukrainians blamed for it?  Or maybe some political ally who was fighting for power within the same party.  Good way to get rid of multiple problems at once.



One of the many story lines coming out of the government is that the Opposition had him killed to make him a martyr for the cause, and more powerful in death than in life.

My money is on Putin telling the truth. About as likely as anything else. :


----------



## OldSolduer

cupper said:
			
		

> One of the many story lines coming out of the government is that the Opposition had him killed to make him a martyr for the cause, and more powerful in death than in life.
> 
> My money is on Putin telling the truth. About as likely as anything else. :



Is this a Slavic thing? I recall similar things happening during the 90s in the Balkans.


----------



## cupper

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> Is this a Slavic thing? I recall similar things happening during the 90s in the Balkans.



More likely regimes that grew out of the former Soviet / Communist era "Truths"


----------



## Kirkhill

> NORMALLY a boisterous sort, Peter Pomerantsev says he kept quiet when he found himself, at the age of 24, in a Moscow meeting room listening to *20 of the country’s top media executives discussing the news agenda for the week.
> 
> Not what the news was, but what they would make it,* said Mr. Pomerantsev, the author of a recent book chronicling the moral and financial corruption of modern-day Moscow and the manipulation of a Russian television industry that he later joined.
> 
> He listened in amazement, he says, as a prominent news anchor reviewed the coming events as if they were part of a film script, musing on how best to entertain the audience and questioning who that week’s enemy should be.
> 
> “It was shocking,” said Mr. Pomerantsev, speaking over coffee in London last month. “They really saw television and news as a movie, and talked about it as a movie.”
> 
> That was in 2002.



http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14/world/europe/russian-tv-insider-says-putin-is-running-the-show-in-ukraine.html?_r=0



> Mr. Pomerantsev’s area of study is propaganda, and he believes he saw many classic techniques at work in Moscow. He says one favorite trick was to put a credible expert next to a neo-Nazi, juxtaposing fact with fiction so as to encourage so much cynicism that viewers believed very little. Another was to give credence to conspiracy theories — by definition difficult to rebut because their proponents are immune to reasoned debate.
> 
> *“What they are basically trying to undermine is the idea of a reality-based conversation,” Mr. Pomerantsev said, “and to use the idea of a plurality of truths to feed disinformation, which in the end looks to trash the information space.”*





> During Mr. Putin’s first stint in the presidency, slick techniques imported from the West helped engineer a spectacular rise in his approval ratings. They are now being deployed, not just against Western policies, but against basic Western values, Mr. Pomerantsev argues.
> 
> *“It’s not so much an information war, but a war on information,”* he said.



Believe exactly what you want to believe.


----------



## Sean Murray

Here is a link from Vice News covering a pro-Putin march in Russia following the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. It is amazing how much support Putin has. 

https://news.vice.com/video/thousands-attend-pro-putin-rally-moscows-anti-maidan-march


----------



## cupper

Sean Murray said:
			
		

> Here is a link from Vice News covering a pro-Putin march in Russia following the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. It is amazing how much support Putin has.
> 
> https://news.vice.com/video/thousands-attend-pro-putin-rally-moscows-anti-maidan-march



Just need to know the correct incentives to use to motivate the masses. Loss of jobs, loss of housing, imprisonment all make good incentives. So does cash, alcohol, and certain perks.

Damn. There I go getting all cynical again. :nod:


----------



## Kirkhill

I mentioned this article http://www.cast.ru/files/book/NewArmy_sm.pdf here 
http://army.ca/forums/threads/111881/post-1353771.html#msg1353771.

That was the Russian perspective on Russia circa 2011.

Here is a Swedish perspective on Russia circa July 2013 - or as the Swedes put it, "in the wake of the major anti-regime demonstrations in 2011–2012"

http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3734.pdf  

Like the Russian review it is a series of essays and runs to 160 pages.  Lots of good information about strengths of units, quality of units, deployability availability, ability to defend, ability to launch strikes.....


"Both the political and the military leadership in Russia apparently sense a great deal of insecurity." 

The Swedish take on the Russian situation is much the same as the earlier Russian take.  Russia is weak and getting weaker but strong enough to make life difficult and dangerous.

This was published about 5 months before the Maidan was occupied, 8 months before Yanukovych was deposed and Crimean Russians voted for Anschluss.


----------



## OldSolduer

cupper said:
			
		

> Just need to know the correct incentives to use to motivate the masses. Loss of jobs, loss of housing, imprisonment all make good incentives. So does cash, alcohol, and certain perks.
> 
> Damn.



Certain perks meaning you get to stay alive til Comrade Vlad needs some more support....

Correct incentives means your family gets to eat today......


----------



## a_majoor

While this might be the "best" outcome for us, I suspect that Vlad has a few tricks up his sleeve, and am also reminded that historically, failing governments or States often use foreign adventures and wars to distract the population from the problems at home:

http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/03/russia-could-have-depression-currency.html



> *Russia could have depression, currency crisis and distressed sale of assets in 2015*
> 
> Anders Aslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics predicts a 10% decline in Russia's 2015 GDP.
> 
> Since November 2014, it has been obvious that the Russian economy would shrink sharply this year, and the January statistics indicate a serious decline has started. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development has forecast a decline of GDP of 3 percent this year, while the Central Bank of Russia predicts a decline of 4.5 to 5 percent at an oil price of $50 per barrel. These forecasts appear overly optimistic. An abrupt fall of 10 percent seems more likely, because key Russian indicators look worse than in 2009, when Russia's GDP contracted by 8 percent.
> 
> Another proposed definition of depression includes two general rules:
> 
> a decline in real GDP exceeding 10%, or
> a recession lasting 2 or more years.
> 
> Worldwide GDP fell by 15% from 1929 to 1932. Between 1929 and 1933, the gross national product of the United States decreased by 33% while the rate of unemployment increased to 25%.
> 
> In July 2014, the United States and the European Union imposed serious financial sanctions on Russia. In parallel, the global oil price started falling and with it the ruble. As if these factors were not bad enough, the Kremlin is pursuing an economic policy that aggravates the decline.
> 
> Tightened Western financial regulations have made the Western financial sanctions more severe than expected. The official Russian currency reserves are still large at $368 billion on February 13, but they have fallen by $110 billion since July 2014. However, the situation is considerably worse. The Ministry of Finance controls two sovereign wealth funds, the Reserve Fund with $88 billion and the National Welfare Fund with $78 billion on February 1. These funds will be used for bailouts of companies and infrastructure investments and are not real international reserves. The government plans to spend half of its Reserve Fund this year. In addition, the Central Bank of Russia holds gold worth $49 billion.
> 
> The liquid international reserves held by the Central Bank of Russia have declined from $257 billion on July 1 to $153 billion on February 13. Considering that Russia's foreign indebtedness is almost $600 billion and the expected currency outflow is about $100 billion this year, Russia's reserve situation is approaching a critical limit. At present, Russia loses more than $10 billion a month, which means that a real reserve crisis will erupt in the third quarter.
> 
> Even the official Russian reserve reports from the Russian Central bank have Russia on pace to have closer to $200 billion by the end of the year.
> 
> Will there be an emergency sale of oil and gas fields to China ?
> 
> Russian officials are saying there would now be "no political obstacles" to allowing Chinese stockholders to hold more than 50 percent of large oil and gas fields.


----------



## OldSolduer

http://www.redflagnews.com/headlines-2015/developing-unconfirmed-russian-internet-rumors-that-vladimir-putin-is-dead

Anyone got any info on Uncle Vlad?


----------



## McG

The only thing I have seen were denials of health problems as reported by BBC

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31849925


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Well there have been several announcements on various websites (e.g. debka news) saying that the Kremlin has told journalists not to leave Moscow in anticipation of a major announcement, but nothing from any mainstream agency.


----------



## cupper

Hmmm. Maybe during his investigation of the Nemtsov killing he discovered that it was he who ordered the hit, so he's had himself arrested, and is currently holding himself deep in the bowels of the Lubyanka Prison undergoing a vigorous interrogation being performed by the only man who is fully capable persuading the truth from himself, Himself.  ;D


----------



## Retired AF Guy

The New York Post is reporting that Putin is in Switzerland for the birth of his "love child."



> Missing Putin found after ‘birth of love child’
> 
> By Geoff Earle
> 
> March 13, 2015 | 5:30pm
> 
> WASHINGTON — From Russia, with love child. Vladimir Putin hasn’t been seen in public for more than a week — and rampant speculation over the Russian president’s whereabouts took a wild turn on Friday with reports he was in Switzerland for the birth of his secret daughter.
> 
> “Es ist ein Madchen!” or “It’s a Girl!” screamed a headline from the Swiss newspaper Blick, which had him in Lugano to witness the arrival of his child with Alina Kabaeva, 31, a retired Olympic gymnast who served in the Russian parliament and now works for a media company.
> 
> The paper reported that Putin’s daughter was born at the posh Santa Anna di Sorgeno clinic on the Italian border.
> 
> Putin reserved two rooms at the clinic — one for Kabaeva, and one for body guards, Swiss radio channel RSI said, according to the Daily Beast.
> 
> Putin himself was staying with friends in the area, the Swiss website Ticino news reported.
> 
> Desperate to squash the rumors, the Kremlin released a photo and video Friday of the 62-year old Russian strongman meeting with the head of the Russian Supreme Court.
> 
> But there was no way to verify when they were taken, and plenty of reason for suspicion.
> 
> On Wednesday, the government issued a picture of a meeting between Putin and the regional governor of Karelia, but the Russian newspaper RBC said the meeting actually took place March 4.
> 
> There has been no verified Putin sightings since March 5, when he appeared at a press conference in Moscow with Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi.
> 
> Two canceled meetings since then have Kremlin watchers furiously trying to figure out where Putin is and what he’s doing.
> 
> Putin has two adult children with his ex-wife, Lyudmila Shkrebneva, and has insisted he has no relationship with the gymnast.
> 
> Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov denied the love child stories.
> 
> “The information on a baby born to Vladimir Putin is false,” Peskov said. “I am going to ask people who have money to organize a contest on the best media rumor.”
> 
> Other speculation about what’s behind Putin’s vanishing act range from health problems to a power struggle in the Kremlin. Peskov’s poetic denials – and the Kremlin’s reputation for obfuscation — did little to tamp down the persistent questions.
> 
> At one point, he claimed there was “no need to worry” about Putin’s health because. “His handshake is so strong he breaks hands with it.”



Article link.
More speculation to follow I'm sure.


----------



## Good2Golf

Hmmm....google-fu only show up this person when searching for "ALINA KABAEVA."  I though Vlad prefers riding horses, shirtless?


----------



## larry Strong

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Hmmm....google-fu only show up this person when searching for "ALINA KABAEVA."  I though Vlad prefers riding horses, shirtless?




https://www.google.ca/?gws_rd=ssl#q=+Alina+Kabaeva%2C+31


Cheers
Larry


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Hmmm....google-fu only show up this person when searching for "ALINA KABAEVA."  I though Vlad prefers riding horses, shirtless?



I'm sure you meant to say "bareback".  Right?


----------



## a_majoor

Interesting comparison of Vladimir Putin to the _Tyrants_ of ancient Greece. While like most analogies it fails if pushed too far, it is still an interesting read:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/03/13/the-tyrants-hopelessness/



> *The Tyrant’s Hopelessness*
> JAKUB GRYGIEL
> The ancients knew: to understand a tyranny, you have to understand the tyrant’s soul.
> 
> Tyrants, degenerate kings who ruled according to their own will and not the law, occurred relatively frequently in the history of ancient Greece (with the exception of Sparta) and Rome. They are also the protagonists of tragedies, dialogues, and histories written by classic authors, from Herodotus to Tacitus, from Plato to Cicero. The ancients found the term “tyrant” appropriate as a descriptor for a corrupted form of political regime based on personal rule, as well as a useful analytical tool. They were correct then. More importantly, they are still correct now.
> 
> Regrettably, modern language and thought have effectively expunged the word “tyrant” from our lexicon, diminishing our ability to assess many of our enemies. In modern times the simple definition, as mentioned above, is deemed to be unsophisticated. It puts a lot of emphasis on the individual leader, whereas we prefer to seek explanations in large impersonal forces, ranging from contests of ideas and economic systems or the élan of the masses. We are also wary of embracing a “great man” view of history because this assigns responsibility to an individual for political outcomes, and there seems to be a widespread allergy to accountability. (Hence, “mistakes have been made”, rather than “I made a mistake”, is a common talking point for today’s leaders.)
> 
> Furthermore, to call a political leader a “tyrant” is to impart a nefarious connotation and to render judgment that a leader is personally responsible for the brutality of his state in its domestic as well as foreign acts. The modern presumption, since perhaps Weber, is that political analysis ought to be pursued not so much sine ira et studio (as Tacitus put it in the first lines of his Annales) but without expressing moral judgments. Calling somebody a tyrant expresses a “value judgment,” and carries a tinge of anger and partiality too. For the well-heeled modern mind, “tyrant” is a slur, not an analytical concept. Hence, we prefer to study the institutional arrangements that may be less than optimal for freedom, to measure the material conditions that impede the exercise of freedom, or to ignore in toto the reality of a tyrant by adopting euphemisms such as “rogue state” or “strongman.”
> 
> Another source of the modern skepticism toward the term “tyrant” is the belief that the 20th-century version of dictatorship has been marked by the lethal and unique combination of ideology and science. The modern dictators—Hitler and Stalin come to mind—are essentially deadly managers of ideological dogmas and scientific tools (giving rise to a “dark age, made more sinister, and perhaps more prolonged, by the lights of a perverted science” as Winston Churchill famously said)—racial purity and paganism combined with armored divisions and gas chambers, atheistic materialism prodded by the atom and industrial power. The resulting totalitarian systems were thus more than anything an individual tyrant could erect. They were all-pervasive political systems, and could not sustain themselves by the sheer will of one tyrant.
> 
> But there is still an analytical place for tyrants. In fact, many of today’s strongmen—say, Vladimir Putin—resemble more ancient tyrants than modern ones. Ideology and science play less of a role in their hold on power. Today’s tyrants are ideological opportunists—postmodern leaders who shape their “narrative” according to public relations needs. They also face science, or technology, which can strengthen their rule but also has ways of undermining it. Instead, today’s tyrants exercise personal rule through brute force and murder, but also through skillful cooptation of society. They are good pupils of Niccolò Machiavelli, and expend energies to avoid being hated by the majority of their subjects. They are feared, to be sure, but they buy the servility or docility of their populations through economic welfare and propaganda.
> 
> Putin’s tyranny, for instance, is built on targeted violence (the recent assassination of Boris Nemtsov is one in a long list), propaganda (the television channel “Russia Today”, the most visible tool abroad, is just one part of a much larger apparatus of disinformation), nationalism (the invention of “Novorossiya” as a distinct Russian land encompassing, of course, the Donbas region is one example) and bribery of Russians (a project that may be more difficult to continue given the fiscal troubles of the regime). It is personal rule, maintained for the personal benefit of the leader. A tyrant is a violent narcissist. And his will trumps all law, positive and natural.
> 
> What do ancient writers say about tyranny, then?
> 
> A useful ancient text to understand tyrants—and for our purposes, how tyrants may behave in their foreign relations—is a minor work by Xenophon of Athens (430–354 BC). A student of Socrates, he wrote, among many other dialogues, treatises, and histories (notably, the Anabasis), Hiero or Tyrannicus, a brief dialogue between the eponymous tyrant of Syracuse and the poet Simonides. Somewhat forgotten, this short text was brought back to our attention by Leo Strauss, who in 1948 wrote On Tyranny, a commentary that spurred a vibrant debate on Xenophon as well as on the wider subject. While the dialogue revolves around the question of whether tyrants can be happy (the answer is no, not really—in large measure because they must remain dissatisfied hedonists), it also offers a window into the minds of these solitary rulers whose will is the law of the land.
> 
> In Xenophon’s description, tyrants have a few particular traits that, by implication, make them behave in unique, distinguishable ways.
> 
> The first, and perhaps most striking, characteristic of a tyrant is that he has little hope. As Xenophon writes, “in this pleasure of hope [tyrants] are worse off than private men” (1:18). The subject of the discussion at this point of the dialogue between Hiero and Simonides is the pleasure of food and how the ability to be served with every conceivable delectable deprives the tyrant of the pleasant expectation of something he cannot obtain. But the point is larger: tyrants can get anything they want in great abundance—horses, gold, food, and women—and as a consequence they lack the anticipation of greater delights. Fantastic wealth and absolute power are not the sources of joy but of constant disappointment. What we see of tyrants is their wealth and castles—in Putin’s case, his expensive watches, gold-laden mansions, and bank accounts—but this does not tell us much about them. As Hiero says, this “keeps what is harsh hidden in the tyrants’ soul, where human happiness and unhappiness are stored up…. [T]his escapes the notice of the multitude.” (2: 4-5).
> 
> Why does this matter? Who cares if a tyrant is unhappy or, perhaps more crassly, if he is a hedonist unable to enjoy pleasure? The darkness of a tyrant’s soul is no private predicament because it alters his outlook, and hence his behavior. The inability to hope leads to a lack of appreciation of the future. The expectation of a better tomorrow—in terms of more scrumptious food or a more just and peaceful political environment—can create incentives to moderate one’s behavior in the present as a means of achieving goals. Or to be more precise, it makes personal sacrifices possible: one works hard to build something for tomorrow, or saves money to acquire a possession later on. A tyrant lacks this sense, according to Hiero’s argument; his is a barren soul, incapable of understanding the benefits of personal sacrifice.
> 
> The result is not inaction or peace. On the contrary, a hopeless tyrant is “insolent” and lives off constant and destructive plunder. The poet Simonides understands the tyrant when he explains that “it is inbred in some human beings, just as in horses, to be insolent in proportion as the needs they have are more fully satisfied” (10:1). Aristotle went even further, writing that “the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold” (Aristotle, Politics, Book II, Part 7). Xenophon, through Hiero, admits that “tyrants are compelled most of the time to plunder unjustly both temples and human beings, because they always need additional money to meet their necessary expenses. For, as if there were a perpetual war on, [tyrants] are compelled to support an army or perish.” (4:11) Incapable of hope, living in fear of losing what he has, the tyrant is constantly preying on his own subjects but also on subjects of neighboring states.
> 
> Another source of a tyrant’s myopia is implied in the above description. Tyrants are perennially insecure. Their lives are ruled by the desire—and the need—to hold on to power, a preoccupation that is always immediate.
> 
> Xenophon describes the fear with which tyrants must travel. They all “proceed everywhere as through hostile territory” (2:8). All men tend to experience risks in foreign territory, but only tyrants “know that when they reach their own city they are then in the midst of the largest number of their enemies.”(2:9). A tyrant is therefore a “soul distracted by fears” (6:5), who believes he sees “enemies not only in front of [him], but on every side” (6:8). Euripides also observes in a fragment of a lost tragedy that the “tyrant must ruin his friends and put them to death; he lives in very great fear that they will do him harm.” The tyrant’s life is constantly at risk: there may be no tomorrow if today the tyrant stops increasing his domination of others, acquiring greater wealth, accumulating more power, and consequently plundering ever more. Xenophon again: “Their largest and most necessary expenses go to guard their lives” (4:9).
> 
> For the tyrant, the future is irrelevant because the present is perennially at risk. Or, another way of putting this is that the tyrant is a narcissist whose only preoccupation is his own wellbeing and survival. The future is circumscribed to his own personal survival, no matter what the costs may be.
> 
> A tyrant is a shark who perishes when he stops swimming, as George Weigel comments on Putin; the tyrant dies (or rather, is killed because few retire peacefully) when he stops dominating others.
> 
> Two immediate consequences, relevant for how we assess the strategic interactions with today’s tyrants such as Putin, stem from this ancient wisdom.
> 
> First, threatening a tyrant with future costs is ineffective. In War and Human Nature, Harvard professor Stephen Rosen observes, “Tyrannies have shorter time horizons within which strategic costs and benefits are calculated. Specifically, tyrannies [are] prone to be strongly affected by incentives and disincentives that appear near in time to the moment of choice.” What speaks to a tyrant is costs or pain that can be imposed here and now; tomorrow is less relevant. In practical terms, this may mean that imposing economic sanctions on a tyrant is less effective because the costs of such punishment will become a reality slowly, at some future point. As such, sanctions are less likely to alter a tyrant’s behavior today or in the immediate future.
> 
> Second, tyrants do not understand the concept of peace. The tyrant of Syracuse, Hiero, explains to the poet Simonides that “for private men, relief from war is brought about both by treaties and by peace. Whereas for tyrants peace is never made with those subject to their tyranny; nor could the tyrant be confident trusting for a moment to a treaty.” (2:11) The constant, perennial war that the tyrant himself is causing means that even when he has killed the enemy he feared, he cannot rest and be glad (2:18). In brief, one would be foolish to trust a treaty or ceasefire or even a “peace” with a tyrant. He is inherently incapable of respecting it.


----------



## a_majoor

Unbelievably, we are still not ready for prime time against Russian "Hybrid Warfare", despite seeing it in action in Georgia in 2008, Crimea and Ukraine starting in 2014 and watching "shaping" operations even now:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/03/16/hard-power-gestures-from-russia-and-the-west/



> *Hard Power Gestures from Russia and the West*
> 
> After reappearing triumphantly following a mysterious absence, Vladimir Putin ordered a massive military drill during which personnel will be on high alert. Bloomberg News reports:
> 
> 
> Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered troops placed on full combat readiness in snap drills in western Russia, as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu warned the country was facing new threats to its security.
> 
> Some 38,000 troops, 41 warships, 15 submarines and 110 aircraft are involved in the exercises, Shoigu said on Monday, according to a Russian Defense Ministry statement. “New challenges and threats to military security demand a further increase in the military capabilities of the armed forces,” Shoigu said, the Interfax news service reported.
> 
> According to Russian state media, the drills are a response to Western and specifically NATO exercises encroaching on Russia’s breathing room. CNN reports on the strongest of these hard power gestures:
> 
> 
> The U.S. Army says it will soon be sending armored Stryker vehicles on a 1,100-mile convoy through six European countries to show solidarity to allies in the wake of recent Russian actions in the Ukraine and Crimea that have Eastern Europe on edge.
> 
> The move was first reported Thursday in the military newspaper Stars and Stripes. U.S. Army Europe posted the Stripes story on its website on Friday.
> 
> The convoy is “a highly visible demonstration of U.S, commitment to its NATO allies and demonstrating NATO’s ability to move military forces freely across allied borders in close cooperation,” U.S. Army Europe spokesman Lt. Col. Craig Childs, said in a statement, according to the Stripes report.
> 
> The troops and vehicles involved will be moving from training exercises conducted as part of Operation Atlantic Resolve in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, the report said. They’ll move through Latvia and the Czech Republic as they make their way to Vilseck, Germany, about a 40 miles drive from the Czech border.
> 
> NATO’s very visible renewed efforts in eastern Europe are a nice gesture to soothe the nerves of rattled allies, but physical presence alone is unlikely to prove terribly effective against Russia’s hybrid war doctrine. The odds that Russia would roll a tank battalion into sovereign territory are much lower than a seemingly ‘organic’ uprising of ethnically Russian citizens taking place somwhere like Estonia or Latvia (where Russians represent as much as a quarter of the population). Above all, Russia’s hybrid war gambit demands that it maintain plausible deniability about its involvement, all while creating a situation beyond the West’s will or ability to repair.
> 
> The ugly truth is that hard power alone may not deter Putin (nor, unfortunately, any of his likely successors) from trying to rattle the cage. NATO currently lacks its own doctrine for dealing with what on the surface may look like a popular uprising in a member country—short of invasion, what is the threshold for invoking Article V? Hybrid warfare is ultimately a shadow struggle led by intelligence agencies, a struggle in which a conventional military alliance can be easily wrong-footed by a nimbler foe. We may well not see it discussed with the press, but we hope that Western planners are well aware of the imbalance facing NATO and are doing their utmost to compensate however they best can.


----------



## Good2Golf

Is not the West engaging in a type of hybrid warfare with Russia on the economic front?  The country sliding towards a full-on recession may significantly impact Russia's ability to continue imposing its will on the region.  Did I misread my von Clausewitz? 

Regards
G2G


----------



## a_majoor

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Is not the West engaging in a type of hybrid warfare with Russia on the economic front?  The country sliding towards a full-on recession may significantly impact Russia's ability to continue imposing its will on the region.  Did I misread my von Clausewitz?
> 
> Regards
> G2G



Given that the main driver of the economic warfare project seems to be Saudi Arabia (which has its own reasons to cripple Russia, particularly the support Russia gives Iran and its proxy, Syria), and *we* have been generally slow and irresolute (and not even consistent) in our use of the economic sanction weapon, as well as being pretty much outclassed on the information warfare front,  I'd say that generally we have been more lucky and opportunistic in our ability to react to the crisis in Ukraine, and certainly haven't demonstrated the ability to counter or supress the "shaping" activities in the Baltic Republics and elsewhere. If (for example) the ethnic Russian population of Latvia "spontaniously" demands Russian protection, we will be totally flat footed.


----------



## tomahawk6

How Russia went from Democracy to one man rule - again !!


----------



## MilEME09

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> How Russia went from Democracy to one man rule - again !!


The key was he was so popular most didn't care, and his information control is top notch so Russians believe anything state media tell them, or atleast most do


----------



## Good2Golf

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Given that the main driver of the economic warfare project seems to be Saudi Arabia (which has its own reasons to cripple Russia, particularly the support Russia gives Iran and its proxy, Syria), and *we* have been generally slow and irresolute (and not even consistent) in our use of the economic sanction weapon, as well as being pretty much outclassed on the information warfare front,  I'd say that generally we have been more lucky and opportunistic in our ability to react to the crisis in Ukraine, and certainly haven't demonstrated the ability to counter or supress the "shaping" activities in the Baltic Republics and elsewhere. If (for example) the ethnic Russian population of Latvia "spontaniously" demands Russian protection, we will be totally flat footed.



I was refering less on petro-related efforts, on which I agree with your assessment on the maint target being KSA, vice RUS, and more on the sanctions impost on Putin's 22 cronies comprising the senior level of the RUS kleptocracy.  

I do agree with you, however, on the poor performance rating I would give the West regarding more directly shaping a response to the RUS use of force in the region.

Regards,
G2G


----------



## Robert0288

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> The key was he was so popular most didn't care, and his information control is top notch so Russians believe anything state media tell them, or atleast most do



Unfortunately, western news has gotten so bad many people here see Russian news as news rather than an extension of the Russian government and a key piece of their propaganda machine.


----------



## a_majoor

The Baltic Republics are pretty open and vocal about preparing to resist the "Hybrid Warfare" strategy of the Russians. While being forewarned and forearmed, the Balts only have a tiny pool of manpower and are not economically strong enough to stay mobilized for prolonged periods, so the next few years are going to be difficult for them.

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/international/europe/2015/03/18/nato-allies-brace-for-russias-hybrid-warfare/24979545/



> *NATO Allies Brace for Russia's 'Hybrid Warfare'*
> Agence France-Presse 5:40 p.m. EDT March 18, 2015
> 
> RIGA, Latvia — NATO allies are scrambling to protect vulnerable Baltic partners from the threat of hybrid warfare, a Russian tactic that officials and experts say is based on deception rather than formal declaration of war.
> 
> Russian President Vladimir Putin's use of anonymous "little green men" to slice Crimea away from Ukraine last year sent alarm bells ringing throughout the three small Baltic NATO and EU members.
> 
> They endured decades of Soviet occupation after the Red Army rolled in during World War II. While a full-scale invasion is improbable now, hybrid meddling and destabilization tactics designed to test NATO's commitment to collective defense are not.
> 
> Putin's brand of hybrid warfare also relies on "misinformation, bribery, economic pressure," which are designed to "undermine the nation," according to Latvian Defence Minister Raimonds Vejonis.
> 
> *Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite did not mince her words when she said: "The first stage of confrontation is taking place — I mean informational war, propaganda and cyber attacks. So we are already under attack."*
> 
> Trojan Horse
> 
> According to James Sherr of Britain's Chatham House think-tank, hybrid warfare is "designed to cripple a state before that state even realizes the conflict has begun.
> 
> "It's a model of warfare designed to slip under NATO's threshold of perception and reaction."
> 
> NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow has called it a modern example of the ancient Trojan Horse tactic.
> 
> NATO is "looking at how we prepare for, deter, and — if required — defend against hybrid threats," the former US ambassador to Moscow said recently at a security conference in the Latvian capital Riga.
> 
> Not to be caught off guard amid an increased Russian military presence in the Baltic, alliance members have mounted a series of troop rotations into the region.
> 
> The United States also deployed a cargo ship full of heavy armor there this month, including helicopters and tanks for exercises dubbed Atlantic Resolve.
> 
> NATO will boost defenses on Europe's eastern flank with a spearhead force of 5,000 troops and command centers in six formerly communist members of the alliance: the Baltic states and Bulgaria, Poland and Romania.
> 
> Lithuania revived its pre-WWII Riflemen's Union to help deter the threat of both conventional and hybrid warfare.
> 
> *The citizens' militia boasts over 8,000 members in the nation of three million people, a number almost on par with its 8,000 military personnel and 4,500 reservists*.
> 
> 'Media Weaponization'
> 
> With roughly a quarter of the populations of Estonia and Latvia being ethnic Russian, some argue that Moscow's huge TV, radio and Internet presence is part of a hybrid battle for Baltic hearts and minds.
> 
> Putin justified his Crimea takeover by insisting that Moscow was coming to the defense of ethnic Russians in the territory, sparking concern here that Russia could deploy a similar policy.
> 
> According to Riga journalist Olga Dragileva, a hybrid media war aimed at sowing "dissatisfaction and illusions" among ethnic-Russian Latvians is in full swing in the eurozone member, which is still recovering from a crippling 2008-9 recession sparked by the global financial crisis.
> 
> It amounts to "the weaponization of social media," according to Janis Karklins, director of NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.
> 
> Based in Riga, the center works to analyze the official Russian political narrative and suggest responses.
> 
> Karklins warns the solution does not lie in creating counter-propaganda: "The old recipes are not effective any longer."
> 
> He proposes instead "to develop skills of media information literacy and critical thinking in our education system to make it harder for adversaries to disorient the population."
> 
> EU leaders are expected to agree at a summit this week to set up a special media unit to counter what the bloc sees as a skilful Russian propaganda campaign during the Ukraine crisis.
> 
> Hybrid Response
> 
> Many here believe neighboring Estonia had a foretaste of hybrid war in 2007 when the nation of 1.3 million suffered a blistering cyber attack against official state and bank websites.
> 
> The assault was widely blamed on Russian hackers, although the Kremlin denied involvement.
> 
> As in hybrid warfare, aggressors in cyberwarfare are often hard to identify and hence may not fear immediate and targeted retaliation — a key plank of conventional warfare.
> 
> Tallinn, home to NATO's cyber defence center, is also demanding Moscow release Eston Kohver, an Estonian police officer it claims was snatched at gunpoint by Russian operatives last September from inside Estonia.
> 
> Moscow insists Kohver was engaged in a clandestine operation in Russia and has charged him with espionage.
> 
> To counter similar murky scenarios, Vershbow says the alliance must develop hybrid responses able to "deploy the right forces to the right place at the right time."


----------



## a_majoor

And on a different topic, the US has inadvertently shot itself in the foot twice: becomong dependent on foreign technology coming from a non allied state, and not having any "plan B" if the supply was cut off. Of course ULA could buy rocket motors directly from SpaceX which is vertically integrated and has no subcontractors in the usual sense. SpaceX plans to ramp up rocket engine production for their own expanding slate of launches (each Falcon uses 9 rockets on the first stage and a slightly modified version of the same motor for the second stage, the Falcon 9 Heavy uses 3 first stages ganged together for 27 motors), so making extra motors for ULA will not tax them too much (besides the obvious irony of supplying their own competitor):

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/space/2015/03/18/hasc-looking-to-alter-rd180-restriction/24977293/



> *HASC Looking to Alter RD-180 Restriction*
> by Aaron Mehta 10:27 p.m. EDT March 18, 2015
> 
> WASHINGTON — There is a growing sense on the Hill that language designed to limit the procurement of Russian engines for military space launches needs to be altered to avoid unexpected fallout.
> 
> Both Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee, and the panel's ranking member Rep. Jim Cooper, D-Tenn., indicated a belief that section 1608 of last year's National Defense Authorization Act needs to be re-opened and cleaned up to ensure the United Launch Alliance (ULA) can use its full lot of purchased RD-180 engines.
> 
> In a marathon double-hearing, Roger's committee questioned, first, SpaceX president Gwynne Shotwell and ULA head Tory Bruno, and then Pentagon representatives, about whether the language, which restricted the use of RD-180 engines on the Atlas V launch vehicle to those that were purchased before the February invasion of Ukraine, was being properly interpreted.
> 
> The situation Congress is dealing with is complicated, to put it lightly. The Hill passed 1608 with the intention of allowing ULA to use 14 engines it was already on contract for before the Russian invasion. However, Pentagon lawyers have apparently concluded that the language, as written, allows ULA to use only five of those 14.
> 
> At the same time, ULA has decided it will close down its Delta IV medium launch vehicle line by 2018, leaving it just with the Atlas V and the Delta Heavy, used only every few years for specialized missions. Without the extra RD-180 engines, ULA says, it will run out of the ability to compete for competitive launches after 2019.
> 
> That would leave SpaceX's Falcon 9 – which members of Congress, SpaceX executives and US Air Force officials alike continue to say will be certified by June – as the only military space launch option for the Air Force. Meanwhile, costs for the Delta IV Heavy would increase, potentially to as high as $1 billion per launch, Bruno said.
> 
> The reverse-monopoly is an idea ULA, which SpaceX been hammering on for being a monopoly during the last decade, has taken great pains to point out. So did Rogers, who tried hard to get Shotwell to use the "monopoly" word when describing that situation before eventually giving up and using it himself.
> 
> "You would have a monopoly, is where I'm going with this, and I just want you to acknowledge it," Rogers said after a back and forth with Shotwell. "You would have a monopoly on that work."
> 
> Rogers and Cooper alike made it clear they were sympathetic to the need for ULA to have access to those extra engines.
> 
> "We're going to try and statutorily clarify that it was our congressional intent that those 14 engines be used," Rogers said. "That will require both the House and Senate to concur on that but that's what we're going to try and clear up."
> 
> Speaking to Defense News, Cooper said "the Congress made a mistake" with its language.
> 
> "It was a drafting error and we need a technical correction to fix that," Cooper said. "I thought that should be made more explicit."
> 
> While the subcommittee's leadership might be in agreement, not everyone on the Hill is. Rogers noted that Sen. John McCain, the Arizona Republican who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, seems to disagree with that interpretation.
> 
> "We're helping him understand the national security implications of that," Rogers added. "Hopefully it results in what is not a problematic remedy, but I've been in congress 13 years. Nothing is easy."
> 
> Asked about the RD-180 issue on March 16, Rep. Mac Thornberry, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, said he wants to "understand much more clearly why they don't think that we can have an American engine." (_interpolation: besides SpaceX, no current American company seems to have a suitable rocket motor in production or advanced development)_
> 
> I would say the anxieties about being dependent on a Russian engine have only grown as we've seen what the aggression of Russia in a variety of spheres," he added. "So is this a question of dollars? Is it technology? Is it bureaucracy? What's the issue here? That's what we would need to understand better in order to answer that question."
> 
> In the meantime, the Air Force is trying to sort through its options. Bill LaPlante, the service's acquisition head, said the Pentagon lawyers' reading of the law is "quite restrictive."
> 
> If that's the intent of the Congress, we can do that," LaPlante said after the hearing. "The top legal experts in the department are reading it that way. If that wasn't their intent, [Congress] can change the language and we certainly will adhere to it."


----------



## a_majoor

Putin signals Russia will stay the course. I suspect he is counting on the irresolution of Western leaders (where is the ghost of Winston Churchill?) and the internal friction of multi player alliances to reduce the pressure on Russia so long as Russia stays resolute. The Russian game plan is to wait out the sanctions and oil war (although Saudi Arabia probably has a few thoughts on that matter). The western inability to seemingly sustain attention or effort over the long term will cost us pretty badly, I suspect:

http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/russia-won-t-bend-down-in-standoff-with-west-putin-says-1.2298317



> *Russia won't 'bend down' in standoff with West, Putin says*
> 
> Vladimir Isachenkov, The Associated Press
> Published Thursday, March 26, 2015 10:05AM EDT
> Last Updated Thursday, March 26, 2015 12:38PM EDT
> 
> 
> MOSCOW -- President Vladimir Putin voiced confidence that Russia will come out as a winner in its standoff with the West if it firmly stays its ground.
> 
> Speaking Thursday before senior officials of the Federal Security Service, the main successor to the KGB agency, Putin said "the situation around our country will change for the better, but not because we will make concessions, bend down or trifle with someone."
> 
> "It will change for the better only if we become stronger," he said.
> 
> The Russian leader accused the West of using "attempts at political isolation, economic pressure, large-scale information war and instruments of special services" to weaken Russia.
> 
> He named the deployment of NATO's forces near Russian borders, the development of the alliance's U.S.-led missile defence program, and a U.S. program of developing high-precision long-range conventional weapons among the top threats.
> 
> "No one has succeeded in scaring our country or pressuring it and no one will," he added.
> 
> Russia's relations with the West have plunged to the lowest point since the Cold War over the Ukrainian crisis. The United States and the European Union have slapped painful economic sanctions against Russia over its annexation of Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula and support for insurgents in eastern Ukraine.
> 
> Putin, a KGB veteran, praised the agency, known under its Russian acronym FSB, for its efforts to catch foreign spies, saying it exposed 52 foreign intelligence officers and 290 of their agents last year alone.
> 
> He added that a top priority for the FSB now should be tracking Russian citizens who have left to fight alongside the Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria.
> 
> "Later they could be used against us, against Russia and its neighbours," Putin said. "So it's important to take additional measures to cut international links and resource base of the terrorists, block avenues for their entry and exit from Russia."


----------



## a_majoor

Rusian oligarchs bailing as the economy tanks. The economic stats in this article are looking pretty grim as well:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11482991/Russias-oligarchs-head-for-London-as-rouble-collapses.html



> *Russia’s oligarchs head for London as rouble collapses*
> 
> Some of Russia's wealthiest individuals are looking to leave the country for London and Switzerland as the economy faces a sharp recession
> By Peter Spence, Economics Correspondent
> 
> 6:00AM BST 29 Mar 2015
> 
> Russia’s richest and most powerful are set to leave in droves, seeking to avoid a tax squeeze and the fallout from the country's economic crisis.
> 
> The majority of oligarchs interviewed for a new report on Russian have said that they are likely to leave the country in the next few years. Of the 30 Russian nationals included in a study by Campden Wealth, in partnership with UBS, more than half said that there were likely to move abroad, although not imminently.
> 
> 
> Of those living in Russia, more than one in four said they had plans to leave within five years. Participants in the Campden study jointly control $2.5bn (£1.7bn) of personal wealth, and businesses with turnover of $6.5bn last year.
> 
> 
> One Russian national interviewed by Campden said: “Russians, if they haven’t done so already, are considering relocation out of Russia. Clearly London is a key jurisdiction of choice.”
> 
> 
> New rules introduced at the start of the year have meant that foreign business owned by Russians are now subject to Russian taxes, putting the squeeze on the wealthiest in a country where just 111 individuals control nearly a fifth of all household wealth.
> 
> Only businesses domiciled in countries with taxes 75pc lower than the Russian rate are affected. As a result, business interests in Cyprus are affected, while those in the UK are not.
> 
> Data showed a 69pc increase in Russian applications for UK investor visas in the first nine months of 2014, compared to 2013. Last November, the minimum investments for such visas was doubled to £2m.
> 
> Along with the tax changes, collapsing forecasts for economic growth and rocketing inflation rates have made Russia a less attractive place to do business. Andrew Porter, director of research at Campden Wealth, said: “Many of the wealth holders we spoke with expect that the economic conditions will, if not worsen, stay as bad.”
> 
> The Central Bank of Russia has estimated that GDP will fall by as much as 4pc this year, a product of falling oil prices and ongoing conflict in Ukraine. At the same time, inflation soared to 16.7pc in the year to March 10.
> 
> As fears of an even deeper slump have mounted, oligarchs have become more conservative in an attempt to preserve their wealth. The number who said they were pursuing preservation strategies has more than quadrupled from two years ago to 23pc, according to Campden.
> 
> A businessman from Nizhny Novgorod said: “Business owners are now more likely to adopt a more conservative approach to investing … because of the economic situation.”
> 
> Yet despite the gloomier landscape, some oligarchs surveyed by Campden Wealth believed that the downturn offered money making opportunities.
> 
> Peter O’Flynn, a co-author of the report, said: “Wealth holders seeking security invest in Europe, Russians deeply committed to gains invest in Russia.”
> 
> 
> 
> The rouble’s swift depreciation, losing more than 45pc of its value against the dollar since the start of 2014, may result in an M&A spree. On average, the oligarchs profiled in the report have segregated 48pc of their wealth from their business assets, and said they intended to segregate more of their personal wealth over the next 12 months.
> 
> Much of this personal wealth is held in foreign currencies, meaning that snapping up Russian firms is now easier. Russians are now looking to pick up bargains as the economic climate has reduced the valuations of potential targets. As such, most respondents said that they planned to invest more in Russia than abroad.
> 
> Russian entrepreneurs maintain a higher risk appetite than their western European peers. About half of participants’ private portfolios are made up of cash and real estate.
> 
> For some, sanctions over Ukraine have created business opportunities. As imports have been blocked, food prices have soared and presented investment opportunities in the agricultural sector.


----------



## CougarKing

How can long can they sustain this with the current economic sanctions and the effects of the sinking price of oil?

International Business Times



> *Russia Working To Make Military Invincible, Says Rearmament Of Nuclear Forces Top Priority*
> By  Kukil Bora @KukilBora on January 31 2015 1:42 AM EST
> 
> Russia’s Defense Ministry announced Friday that the government will work for the reinforcement of the country’s military, with more focus on the rearmament of nuclear deterrence forces, so that the Western powers cannot outclass Russia in military capabilities.
> 
> Citing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s comment in December about furthering the development of the country’s armed forces, *Defense Ministry Sergey Shoigu said that Russia is not interested in an arms race, but it is ready to ensure defense capacity in the current military and political situation*. Tensions between Russia and the West have significantly increased over the past few months due to the conflict in the eastern Ukraine. Some observers even foresee the possibility of a military confrontation between Moscow and the West.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Edward Campbell

S.M.A. said:
			
		

> How can long can they sustain this with the current economic sanctions and the effects of the sinking price of oil?
> 
> International Business Times




In my view they cannot even start it, much less sustain it ...

It's all bluff, to fool the rabidly anti-American lunatic fringe in Europe and to fool the Russian people, too.

The Russians are nostalgic for the "dream time" when they were a global superpower ~ a Potemkin village sort of superpower but one to be reckoned with, all the same.

Russia is a socio-cultural, political and economic shambles.


----------



## a_majoor

Evidence is already apparent; look at the Russian Military thread: http://army.ca/forums/threads/20333/post-1359599.html#msg1359599

The PAK-FA "5th Gen" fighter order has been reduced to 12; one squadrons(?) worth...


----------



## Retired AF Guy

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> In my view they cannot even start it, much less sustain it ...
> 
> It's all bluff, to fool the rabidly anti-American lunatic fringe in Europe and to fool the Russian people, too.
> 
> The Russians are nostalgic for the "dream time" when they were a global superpower ~ a Potemkin village sort of superpower but one to be reckoned with, all the same.
> 
> Russia is a socio-cultural, political and economic shambles.



Its just not the economy that Putin has to worry about, but also the population. A low birth rate(1) combined with both a high death rate(2) and low life expectancy(3) equals trouble! 

(1) 11.87 per 1,000 people. Slightly ahead of Canada, but behind the U.S.
(2) 13.83 deaths per 1,000 people. Tenth highest in the world.
(3) 70.16 years (avg); female 76/male 64. Canada's avg is 81. 

Source: CIA  World Factbook.


----------



## vonGarvin

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> Its just not the economy that Putin has to worry about, but also the population. A low birth rate(1) combined with both a high death rate(2) and low life expectancy(3) equals trouble!
> 
> (1) 11.87 per 1,000 people. Slightly ahead of Canada, but behind the U.S.
> (2) 13.83 deaths per 1,000 people. Tenth highest in the world.
> (3) 70.16 years (avg); female 76/male 64. Canada's avg is 81.
> 
> Source: CIA  World Factbook.


The low birth rate is recovering from the low in the post USSR era. Compare it to the US (2000 to 2012):







The sad part about a population that doesn't age, that means you don't have to pay to take care of the elderly for as long.  Economically, retired people contribute nothing to society and only take.

And according to the Moscow Times, 2014 saw the natural population of Russia increase for the first time since the collapse of the USSR.  The difference?  24,013.  They aren't out of the woods yet, but they are doing something we are not: increasing by natural means.  And their life expectancy is actually on the rise.  

So, yes, the raw data shows them worse off than us: but they are getting better, and we are getting worse.

Edit to add link to Moscow Times article:

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-reverses-birth-decline-but-for-how-long/502325.html


----------



## Good2Golf

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Economically, retired people contribute nothing to society and only take.



Ah, I see you subscribe to the "old people's money spent on goods and services don't contibute to the economy, only young people's do" school of economics.  While retirees no longer pay into social support directly with CPP and OAS deductions, their spending their disposable income does contribute to the economy as does the amount of income tax they may pay, income depending, on their retirement income.

Nice "cherry picking" charts.  Are you saying that "natural" growth is a more important factor than considering the overall national population increase considering all factors, including immigration.  Why don't immigrants increasing the overall population of the U.S. count?

Regards
G2G


----------



## Kirkhill

Another question that might be asked is: how many of those Russians are Russians and how many are Tatars, Chechens, Kazakhs and other indigenous peoples?


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Technoviking said:
			
		

> The low birth rate is recovering from the low in the post USSR era. Compare it to the US (2000 to 2012):
> 
> And according to the Moscow Times, 2014 saw the natural population of Russia increase for the first time since the collapse of the USSR.  The difference?  24,013.  They aren't out of the woods yet, but they are doing something we are not: increasing by natural means.  And their life expectancy is actually on the rise.



Not according to the CIA Factbook; the Russian population is actually declining at a rate of -0.03%. Canada's rate is +0.76.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> Another question that might be asked is: how many of those Russians are Russians and how many are Tatars, Chechens, Kazakhs and other indigenous peoples?





> Ethnic groups:
> 
> Russian 77.7%, Tatar 3.7%, Ukrainian 1.4%, Bashkir 1.1%, Chuvash 1%, Chechen 1%, other 10.2%, unspecified 3.9%. note: more than 190 ethnic groups are represents in Russia's 2010 census (2010 est.)



CIA Factbook.


----------



## a_majoor

Russian bases proliferating outside of Russia proper. Interesting to look at where all these things are on the map:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20150326.aspx



> *Information Warfare: The Russian Exception*
> 
> March 26, 2015:  Russian media, using government data, recently understated the number of military bases that Russia operates outside its borders; apparently forgetting about the several bases Russia has in the Caucasus and elsewhere. This came about when the Russian president, at the high-profile annual press conference was asked about the possibility of a "new Cold War" and Russia's aggressive moves around its Western borders. The reply insisted that it was in fact the West who was being aggressive. This was emphasized by pointing out that there are a lot more American military bases abroad than Russian ones, and certainly a lot more American military personnel deployed close to Russia's borders than the other way around. But this response neglected to mention several other bases Russia has abroad:
> 
> -- *In Armenia, Russia's 102nd Military Base in Gyumri hosts about 5,000 Russian soldiers, both land and air forces. In 2010 Armenia and Russia signed an agreement extending the base's lease until 2044. In recent years Russia has made moves to upgrade its presence at the base and it may host the Caucasus portion of the nascent Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) air forces*.
> 
> -- *In Abkhazia, Russia's 7th Military Base hosts at the Bombora Air Field in Gudauta about 3,500 soldiers and a small number of aircraft. Russia has reportedly spent $465 million since recognizing Abkhazia as an independent country in 2008 to upgrade its military facilities there. In 2011, Russia and Abkhazia signed an agreement permitting the base to stay until 2060*.
> 
> -- *In South Ossetia, the 4th Military Base hosts about 3,800 soldiers in Tskhinvali, Java, and Kanchaveti. There is also a military airport in Kurta. That base also has the right to stay until 2060*.
> 
> -- *In Transnistria, Russia keeps about 1,500 troops in the Moldovan breakaway republic, based in the de facto capitol Tiraspol as well as in the Bender Fortress*.
> 
> And that doesn't include the naval base at Tartus, Syria (although that one is temporarily evacuated due to the Syrian Civil War) or the air base planned in Babruysk, Belarus for 2016. And in February 2016, Russia was planning to establish several new military bases abroad, including "Vietnam, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, the Seychelles, Singapore and several other countries," though no details of those plans have emerged.
> 
> It might be beneficial for American and European leaders to think about an actual reengagement approach with Russia and look at the rationale for the actions of their adversary. As every nation state operates in within their own self-interests, Russia is no exception to this. The security concerns stated by Russia due to possible NATO expansion into the former Soviet Union are legitimate to Russia. But the U.S. and Europe don’t accept this as this is done at the invitation of Russian neighbors that fear a return of the traditional Russian aggression against its neighbors. If this is ultimately responsible for the creation of a new Cold War it is merely a recycling of what caused the first Cold War. Russia does not accept the fact that their aggression is never acceptable to anyone. – Ryan Schinault


----------



## vonGarvin

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Russian bases proliferating outside of Russia proper. Interesting to look at where all these things are on the map:
> 
> http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20150326.aspx


That's bunk.  Yes, those are "outside of Russia proper", but pale in comparison to US military bases and presence around the globe:

Link to PDF


(As for Belarus, that's simply "White Russia" as it used to be called.  It's practically part of Russia proper)


----------



## a_majoor

Hardly "bunk"; despite their very strained economic circumstances, these are new facilities, or ones being reactivated since the dissolution of the USSR. The point is not the number of bases, but the fact the Russians are expanding their military footprint abroad.

And of course they are also revitalizing their military footprint in Russia, including bases in the far north, across from us...


----------



## tomahawk6

Russian ships have a foothold in the former Norwegian Naval Base of Olavsvern.The government sold the base to a private company for $5m.

http://news.yahoo.com/russian-ships-old-arctic-nato-set-alarms-bells-050008186.html


----------



## The Bread Guy

Santa's got some Russian company (original in Russian - Google English) ....


> Blue berets 76th Air Assault Division from Pskov finish preparation for priledneniyu on drifting ice of the North Pole, where, according to the scenario, they will have to save the polar scientific station. Together with the Russian paratroopers will perform their task Belarusian colleagues. During kilometer forced march Russian military train them to use snowmobiles and dog sleds to transport victims. Parachute blue berets will be of military transport IL-76. Have been trained and air troop complex.
> 
> As observers at the exercises will be representatives of the armies of other countries of the CSTO.
> 
> Exercises will be held as part of a rapid response unit.
> 
> During the exercises paratroopers dressed in a special form, designed to meet the requirements of Russian polar explorers - layered and wicking, comfortable and warm - especially for action under abnormal temperatures.







_At the North Pole unfurled flags of 85 subjects of the Russian Federation. Flags were neatly stacked on the polar snow over an area of ​​1.5 thousand sq. Meters.  This event was held in honor of the 70th anniversary of the victory in World War II. The ceremony was TV presenter Nikolai Drozdov. _


----------



## Boxtop22

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Is not the West engaging in a type of hybrid warfare with Russia on the economic front?  The country sliding towards a full-on recession may significantly impact Russia's ability to continue imposing its will on the region.  Did I misread my von Clausewitz?
> 
> Regards
> G2G



I think the answer isn't that black and white. I am not too sure I would resort to Clausewitz, as I believe looking at the conflict / confrontation from such a lens would be anachronistic. The United States (read US HUMNIT agencies) understood (or thought they had) that if they play the economic warfare game on Putin's entourage, then they may be able to destabilize him. That wasn't really a bad idea, but I think it just wasn't properly thought through. 

It is a very well known fact that Russia's political sphere is a number of different power-clusters. The one common denominator to most of the people who constitute these clusters is that they're either rich, very rich, and/or former KGB / GRU / FSB people. They mostly have a very comprehensive security/intelligence background, they are rather informed, paranoid, and influential (You can see the problem here: a lot of powerful influential people will often head in opposite directions, preventing the formation of any real movement). 

In this context, I think the Sanctions and/or Economic warfare strategy failed. In war and/or security studies there is a notion of Market Deterrence which affirms that if a State acts very aggressively and is very belligerent, the global market will naturally act negatively toward that country's economy. On the other hand, Artificial Market Deterrence is a man-made version of this, which comprises economic and industrial sanctions, as well as the full spectrum of economic warfare. The issue with Artificial Market Deterrence is that it is not a natural process and therefore. Because of this, it is hard to sustain over a long period of time, and it often or leads to unexpected consequences. In the case of Russia, Artificial Market Deterrence generated three major counter effects: 
1) The oligarchs we wanted to target to destabilize Putin, have now lost most of what they had to lose abroad (frozen assets, seized yachts, real estates, aircraft, bank accounts, funds, etc). This has rendered them either bitter against Western Sanctions, or powerless against Russia's powerful elite. (I would add that a lot of people were indirectly impacted by the overall sanctions)
2) With many of the oligarchs politically neutralized, Putin, Patrushev (who I think is Russia's most-powerful at the moment) and their entourage have more leverage in Russia. 
3) The sanctions have forced Russia to open her economy and it is giving her the opportunity to finally complete the economic reform which no-one could complete since Andropov died (many believe that Andropov's death is what prevented Gorbatchov from successful reforms because he understood the Soviet economy like very no one else.)

I unfortunately believe that our mistake is that we're effectively giving Russia an opportunity to reform her economy. This may be good for global stability and for democracy in the long-run, but in a time of conflict it is offering Putin's government the opportunity to achieve something the previous oligarchs had failed to do under Yeltsin. It's a golden opportunity for Russia to increase the role of services, R&D, Weaponry and Techs industries in her domestic economy. It is important to note that China is also a military technology / energy partner (a partner more than an ally though). Along with China are many upcoming regional powers such as Algeria (who is now leading Africa in defence spending) , Indonesia, India, Vietnam, Brazil, and many other significant economic and geopolitical powers. A lesser mistake is that we've underestimated the good old Russian recipe for popular support: create an enemy, create a war, solidify the leader, and blame America (and, or, the West) for the economic situation and add a bit of "the westerners are decadent gay people who fudge children" to reach out to the most hardcore faithfuls in Russia. I have personally seen very smart, young Russians, who left Russia, who hate Putin, but who are now supporting him because in their mind (and hearts? how cute) Russia is their country, and the bad Putin is not bad enough for them to "betray" their motherland. 

It does seem like our economic warfare model is failing, the only thing with have left is a military or diplomacy based approach. We must acknowledge that Putin already adopted a neorealist approach. He mobilized his forces, he increased their state of readiness, he increased domestic troop movements (I added a link), he increased logistical flows toward the front and started cutting off energy supplies from time to time. The Russians are also sending aircraft and vessels everywhere, not to test our defences, but to force leaders to react publicly (P.R. Warfare). For now he has succesfully forced the Europeans to rethink their Common Security and Defence Policy (which went dormant for years), he forced the Swedish to reconsider joining NATO, he forced the Norwegians to go back to a Cold-War approach and he is forcing us to rethink our defence capabilities in the Arctic. 

My recommendation would be: either we take comprehensive defensive and military actions to show Russia that if they're willing to cross the line, we will cross it with them and without hesitation (which I do not think is their intention) or we engage in open and clear diplomacy to find out what the hell do they want, because the longer we keep the "conflict" alive, the more we increase the odds of other countries attempting to challenge the global order for territorial or influence gain. 

This is a purely personal analysis, not based on any non open-source information. 

A very interesting game-theory text on Russia and the West in Ukraine: http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/03/game-theory-ukraine
On troop movements (not sure how reliable): http://cdn.theeventchronicle.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/troop-movements.jpg

[I edited the text for grammar / spelling / clarity]


----------



## Good2Golf

I'm intrigued as to your assessment element 1), above.  Who then are the "elite" you speak of if they are, or were not Putin's oligarchic comrades?  So you assess that the oligarchs no longer retain ultimate influential/powerf/control of their assets inside of Russia as well -- that international sanctions have rendered them helpless to control any of their domestic assets?  How have these other elite Russians of whom you speak taken control of the country's assets?


----------



## Boxtop22

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> I'm intrigued as to your assessment element 1), above.  Who then are the "elite" you speak of if they are, or were not Putin's oligarchic comrades?  So you assess that the oligarchs no longer retain ultimate influential/powerf/control of their assets inside of Russia as well -- that international sanctions have rendered them helpless to control any of their domestic assets?  How have these other elite Russians of whom you speak taken control of the country's assets?



I think there has been a three phase evolution of Russia's elite since 1992. The first phase first appeared under the rule of Yeltsin's Elite, nicknammed "the family" (It included Tatyana Yumasheva - Eltsin's daughter - Boris Berezovsky, Anatoly Chubais Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, and many more, including the late Nemtsov.) This first-phase elite benefited from the "privatization of the economy" which Chubais was overseeing at the time. They became an hybrid of media tycoon, business owners and political actors. What Putin probably noticed very early on is that all these individuals surrounding Yeltsin had a lot of influence over him, if anything they were virtually ruling Russia. Berezovsky had managed to have FSB/GRU agents to represent about 20% of Aeroflot's workforce. Aeroflot at the time was basically funding a big chunk of Russia's foreign operations. This very powerful group fought hard to get Putin elected thinking he would be grateful and offer them laissez-passer or, at least, allow them to remain in that sphere of influence. They basically wanted to make Putin a new kind-of Yeltsin, a leader in appearance, who would not really have any impact domestically. It seems like Putin did not fall for that, he either ordered the expulsion or the neutralization of those he deemed to be too powerful. The only one to whom he was loyal was Yeltsin, he honoured his promise to shield him and his real-family from legal troubles. 

That constituted the beginning of the second phase. Putin attempted to create the Phase II elite. An elite based on your closeness to Putin. If you were his ally, and he trusted you, you would remain around. A new system of power emerged with people attempting to show Putin how loyal they were. One example could be the theory that Anna Politkovskaya was probably killed by people attempting to make him a gift (it was his birthday) in order to gain his trust. This phase of power saw anybody who constituted a real threat to Putin (unlike Politkovskaya, which is why I don't think he actually ordered her killed) being eliminated. Alexander Litvinenko was a good example. On the other hand, anyone who truly wanted to gain his support, would make consequential acts to prove their loyalty. Abramovich did so by sinking Berezovsky and his allies in a corruption / fraud affair that forced Berezovsky out of the country. 

I think right now, we are in a third-phase. A lot of people who were relegated out of the sphere of influence during the second-phase, are slowly trying to come back. But with the War in Ukraine and the military tensions, no one wants to truly challenge Putin publicly, it would be too easy to label them as under "foreign influence" and "antipatriotic". Unlike what we hear, I think public image is kind of essential in the "russian-style" democracy. I also believe that the fact that most of them have seen their assets seized or frozen has greatly limited their ability to operate domestically, effectively solidifying Putin's power. This is for the elites. 

As for how they took control of the country's assets? False trials (Khudorkosvky), Corruption Affairs, Elimination, Seizures and Nationalization seem to be a recurring feature of Putin's modus operandi. I would not say that the oligarchs no longer retain ultimate influence / power / control over Russia. I think they still have a big margin of manoeuver but that they are too fragmented to act, as long as the war persists, it will be difficult to act against Putin. Eventually, in a year or two, there may be an opportunity (over 200,000 Muscovites and Peterburzhec will protest during the next campaign if Putin seeks reelection, I would bet a lot on that). That may give those wealthy isolated oligarchs the opportunity to shake the existing establishment. A lot of oligarchs still have money, individually, and could be a very strong power collectively, but Putin's strategy seem to have successfully prevented them from unifying in any way, that would be my guess.

It's just an opinion, obviously. I do base myself on facts, published stories, books, articles, and my studies and research on Russia. Most facts can probably be tracked back to a source, but the logic is a personal one, I am open to criticism.


----------



## a_majoor

Long article on the situation in Russia. Lots of interesting details on how Russia is building relations with other nations to evade sanctions (and often the other nation is one like Iran which is also seeking to evade international sanctions, or questionalble deals with lots of strings attached).

How this plays out in the long run is hard to predict, but Russia's options are becoming more limited, and much of the damage is self inflicted:

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/russia/articles/20150402.aspx



> *Russia: Counting The Losses*
> 
> April 2, 2015: *Russian economists see GDP shrinking another four percent this year and less than one percent in 2016 followed by growth. What the Russian economists will not openly discuss is that this forecast implies that something will be done about the corruption and lawlessness that makes it difficult for businesses to be created and grow*. The government has some very good economic advisors but so far there has been little action on dealing with the corruption, which the economists (and most Russians) agree is the major obstacle to growth and prosperity.
> 
> The growing Russian use of armed (and diplomatic) aggression against its neighbors is hurting the Russian economy in unexpected ways. For example long time customers for Russian military equipment (weapons, spare parts and services) are becoming more reluctant to buy Russian. The reason is simple, Russia is now seen as unpredictable and unreliable when it comes to supplying support and spare parts for their weapons and equipment. This became obvious when Russia was hit with economic sanctions in 2014 for its aggression against Ukraine. Russia then threatened to halt shipments and support for weapons to any country that supported the sanctions. Soon Russia got the message and tried to back down, but it was too late. The message was sent and the damage was done.
> 
> Meanwhile the government continues to succeed at shifting the blame for the poor economy to the West and especially NATO. Most Russians believe that this is all part of a NATO plot against Russia and that their own government is merely responding to this aggression. President Putin still has approval ratings of over 80 percent. The sanctions are directed at the key people supporting Putin and the aggression in Ukraine but most of these targets are very rich and the only discomfort they endure is a fall in the value of their assets. For most Russians the deprivations are more tangible with rising prices, shortages and unemployment. For thousands of parents there is the son getting killed or wounded in the Ukraine where, officially, there are no Russian soldiers.
> 
> Ukraine has asked NATO for electronic warfare support and there has been no publicity about the response. That could mean that some NATO nations came through, quietly, mainly for the opportunity to get a better understanding of the latest Russian electronic warfare gear when used under combat conditions. That is important because Russia exports a lot of this equipment. The Russians don’t mind making their electronic warfare tech more vulnerable to theft because Russian manufacturers need the money to stay in business. NATO would simply like to know more about the latest Russian gear, just in case.
> 
> A Russian motorized infantry brigade in Western Siberia recently received fifteen modernized T-72B3 tanks. This is a modernized version of T-72 with an improved fire control system and next-generation communications equipment. The delivery was of the Russian effort to modernize its armed forces. Russia has over 5,000 T-72 tanks in use (2,000 in active service and 3,000 in reserve) and most of them are Cold War (pre-1991) vintage and seriously out-of-date compared to American, European and Chinese tanks. Modernizing these Cold War era tanks has been underway for a decade but is proceeding very slowly because of money shortages.
> 
> As much as Russia tries to hide the presence of Russian troops in the eastern Ukraine (Donbas) those troops have become more and more visible to the general public. The rebel controlled areas of Donbas are not heavily policed and many of the civilians there don’t want to be ruled by Russia but keep their mouths shut and their cell phone cameras active. With the addition of commercial satellite photos and military grade satellite photos released by the United States it has been possible to identify the extent of the Russian effort. Increasingly Russian soldiers are going public on the Internet and even in some Russian media about the presence and importance (for rebel success in Donbas) of Russian troops in Ukraine. From all this it appears that Russia has brought in over 40,000 combat and support troops from over a hundred different units. These troops are usually brought in for a few months, or as many as six months, then sent back to their home base and replaced by another unit. This is causing problems in Russia because many of the troops involved are conscripts and when these are killed the official story is that they died from something other than combat. The bodies are shipped home in sealed caskets which are often, in violation of government instructions, unsealed. When that happens the parents discover that their son died in combat and that gets around via the Internet and some of the more daring mass media. Most Russian mass media is government controlled, but the Internet dilutes the news monopoly that control of mass media used to confer. The situation has gotten worse as Russia has begun using special units of Interior Ministry Police to work behind units in combat and arrest any troops, usually conscripts, who try to run away. This harkens back to the World War II practice of having groups of KGB men behind the front line with orders to shoot on sight any troops they saw moving away from the fighting.
> 
> Since Russia began invading and trying to annex parts of Ukraine in 2014 there has been a substantial shift in population. *Since early 2014 nearly two million people have left Russia. More than half these were Westerners (including many from East European countries) working in Russia, providing skills that Russia did not have. The rest were Russians, most of them highly educated and with similar skills to the departing Westerners. What all these migrants had in common was a desire to get away from an increasingly authoritarian, intolerant and economically disastrous Russian government.* About half the departing Westerners and skilled Russians were replaced by more (less educated and skilled) migrants from the east (Central Asia, North Korea, China and the Caucasus). There would be more migrants from the east but the lower oil prices has caused an economic crises and fewer jobs, especially fewer jobs for the less educated. Since the current Russian government seems determined to continue its aggressive and anti-Western policies, the exodus of skilled Russians will continue. During the Soviet period such migration was forbidden and a growing number of Russians fear those Soviet era travel restrictions will return, because without such restrictions Russia will lose a critical number of skilled personnel needed to operate a modern economy. The current government seems unconcerned about this and has an attitude of “good riddance”. Some members of the government do realize the implications of these migration patterns but know better than to go public with their misgivings. If this trend is not reversed, Russia will continue to have a smaller, and less Russian and less educated population. If the current Russian leadership have their way the size of Russia and population will grow via conquest. As in the past, many of the neighbors are willing to resist.
> 
> One of the less publicized casualties of the current Russian aggression is the nuclear disarmament efforts that have been underway since the 1980s. Russia is no longer interested in nuclear disarmament but rather in further developing nuclear weapons. Russia sees its nukes as its most reliable and intimidating weapon.
> 
> Ukraine is also coping with economic problems caused by Russia. The major one is natural gas supplies. In the last year Ukraine has increased natural gas imports from the west by 138 percent and cut Russian imports by 44 percent. Even with that and reduced use of natural gas, Russia still accounts for over 70 percent of natural gas used in Ukraine.
> 
> April 1, 2015: In Yemen the Russian consulate was looted by Shia rebels who have entered some parts of the port city of Aden. Arab bombing attacks on the Shia rebels in Aden blew out most of the windows in the Russian consulate. Meanwhile a Russian transport sent to the capital (Sanaa) to evacuate embassy staff was turned away because of the Arab air attacks. The Russian transport landed in Egypt and plans to try again in a day or so.
> 
> March 31, 2015:  *Russia and Turkey are negotiating terms of Turkey joining a barter arrangement with Russia. To get around the banking sanctions Russia has, in effect established a barter system with China, North Korea and Iran. China has become a major trading partner of Russia. As a result Chinese businesses with Russian dealings have been advised by their government to use the rubles they are paid for goods to buy Russian assets, which are finding far fewer other foreign buyers because of the Russian economic crises. This Chinese aid comes with strings, mainly in terms of Russia agreeing to sell more military tech (design and manufacturing methods) to China. Turkey is also looking for some payback although it is unclear so far what that is. *
> March 30, 2015: A Russian newspaper published an interview with Syrian president Assad thanking Russia for continuing to deliver weapons. Assad said these were orders from before the 2011 revolution and after (when a UN arms embargo went into effect). Russia did not respond to international media queries but inside the country it’s a different story. Since 2011 the Russian government openly boasted (at least inside Russia) of how it was backing the Syrian government against a popular uprising and how this had been successful. Russian arms shipments (via air and sea) increased after 2011 and has included armored vehicles and UAVs. Syria accounted for seven percent of Russian arms exports in 2011, and Russia wants to show that they always deliver. Russia was also building a naval base at the Syrian port of Tartus in 2011 but the several hundred Russians who there working on the project were soon withdrawn from Syria and the Tartus project suspended until the war is over.
> 
> March 29, 2015: *Russia agreed to let Chinese banks with questionable finances (even by Chinese standards) to operate in Russia. This is because Russia needs access to investment capital as the sanctions have deprived Russia of this.* Russian economists caution against this sort of involvement with China but are ignored because the struggle with the West is considered a higher priority than the future health of the Russian economy.
> 
> March 25, 2015: The U.S. delivered the first ten of 230 armored hummers. The Americans are also providing UAVs, radars and other electronics.
> 
> March 23, 2015: *The Russian Finance Ministry has gone public with its warning about how much the government is depending on the $85 billion Reserve Fund to cover budget deficits. In 2015 the government is spending $50 billion of the reserve fund to cover deficit spending. When the Reserve Fund is gone the government risks ruinous hyper-inflation by simply printing more money. At this point the government is betting it will win its war of wills with the West by 2016. Meanwhile a fifth of the 800 Russian banks are in financial trouble because of the sanctions and the plunging price of oil. Most economists believe Russia needs oil selling at $100 a barrel to avoid an extended economic recession. Currently oil it at less than $50 a barrel and the Arab Gulf oil states are not inclined to help Russia out by cutting production and forcing oil prices back up. This is because Russia is increasingly very open in its alliance with Iran, which the oil price war is mainly aimed at. Meanwhile the Finance Ministry worries that the sanctions are doing permanent (or at least long term) damage to the Russian economy. Europeans no longer want to buy Russian natural gas, or much else Russian because now West Europe sees Russia more of a threat than a reliable and profitable trading partner.*
> 
> March 21, 2015: in the south (Dagestan) police clashed with Islamic terrorists and killed seven of them.
> 
> Russia threatened Denmark with nuclear attack if Denmark decides to participate in the construction of an American anti-missile system to protect Europe from such attacks out of Iran and, apparently, now Russia as well.
> 
> March 20, 2015: Ukrainian troops near Mariupol clashed with pro-Russian rebels and killed three and wounded six. The rebels appear to be bringing in more troops and weapons forward in preparation for another effort to take Mariupol. This is in violation of the truce and is nothing new as far as the Russians and rebels are concerned.
> 
> March 19, 2015: EU (European Union) leaders agreed that their sanctions on Russia would remain in force until Russia made peace with Ukraine.
> 
> The U.S. has agreed to send 290 American paratroopers from a brigade based in Italy, to Ukraine and being training 750 Ukrainian troops in April.
> 
> March 16, 2015: Russia began nationwide military training exercises involving 38,000 troops, 3,360 vehicles, 41 surface warships, 15 submarines and 110 warplanes.  This is expensive but the government is willing to pay what it costs to increase the combat capabilities of its troops.
> 
> The U.S. made clear that the economic sanctions against Russia will go on as long as Russia continues meddling in Ukrainian affairs. The EU nations have already said the same thing.
> 
> March 15, 2015: Ukrainian leaders are going public with their misgivings about the current ceasefire with Russian and Ukrainian rebel forces in the east (Donbas). The rebels continue to fire on Ukrainian troops and sometimes even try to advance, often retreating only after taking casualties. The rebels also block European ceasefire monitors. Russia denies any problems exist except those caused by Ukrainians and NATO agents.
> 
> March 14, 2015: *Iraqi media has been playing up the aid Iran is providing to defeat ISIL. This makes Iraqis more eager to do business with Iran. That is important for Iran because of a new agreement between Iran and Russia signed today. The two countries worked out details and agreed to form a joint supervisory board for a joint bank which would enable Iran to evade sanctions, at least with Russia, by gaining access to the Russian banking system.* While this subterfuge could expose Russia to more international banking sanctions, Russia apparently sees that coming anyway and is seeking to build a separate international banking system for outcast nations. Iraq has become an unofficial member of this new banking system with a growing number of Iranian firms establishing themselves in Iraq. Afghanistan is also a growing trade partner but because Afghanistan relies so much on Western aid to stay solvent, Iran cannot get as involved in manipulating the Afghan economy to help Iran beat the sanctions. If China can be persuaded to join this arrangement it will be a formidable competitor for the existing international banking system.
> 
> March 10, 2015: The U.S. accuses Russia of continuing to send weapons to Donbas rebels in violation of the recent ceasefire.


----------



## CougarKing

A former chess grand champion and Russian political opposition activist weighs in; Kasparov should not be dismissed simply because he spent most of his life playing chess.  Take note that Kasparov was close to recently assassinated opposition politician Boris Nemtsov:

CBC



> *Kasparov: Vladimir Putin's Russia a virus that must be contained*
> CBC – 15 hours ago
> 
> Chess champion Garry Kasparov outplayed nearly everyone in the world for 22 years. Today the Russian grandmaster is taking on his most formidable opponent, President Vladimir Putin.
> 
> *"Putin's Russia is a virus. You don't engage the virus, you have to contain it," he told me.*
> 
> Kasparov is one of four debaters Friday night in Toronto questioning the West's response to Russia: 'engage or isolate?'
> 
> *He's been  fiercely critical of the west's "failure" to effectively take on Putin. He likens the Russian leader's political tactics and power to Adolf Hitler's in the years leading up to the Second World War.
> *
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Boxtop22

Very valid point for Kasparov, but I think he and Navalny are not ready yet. They lack grit, experience, popular support and funds.
I think by jailed Navalny's brother, Putin may actually be reinforcing him, but Kasparov, whom I respect, has been very vocal, that's for sure. He's made very interesting points, but I don't recall him being able to successfully rally people behind him, he's often be a "supporting actor" to other "big shots" such as Nemtsov or Navalny.


----------



## a_majoor

A long article in the National Interest. This could equally go in Grand Strategy for a Divided America, and it gives a very good overview of how things are interlinked in ways that are not immediately apparent. It also points out the very different perceptions that various players like Russia, China and the United States have on the same issues:

http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/russia-america-stumbling-war-12662

Part 1


> *Russia and America: Stumbling to War*
> Graham Allison Dimitri K. Simes
> May-June 2015 [5]
> 
> AFTER THE Soviet Union collapsed, Richard Nixon observed that the United States had won the Cold War, but had not yet won the peace. Since then, three American presidents—representing both political parties—have not yet accomplished that task. On the contrary, peace seems increasingly out of reach as threats to U.S. security and prosperity multiply both at the systemic level, where dissatisfied major powers are increasingly challenging the international order, and at the state and substate level, where dissatisfied ethnic, tribal, religious and other groups are destabilizing key countries and even entire regions.
> 
> Most dangerous are disagreements over the international system and the prerogatives of major powers in their immediate neighborhoods—disputes of the sort that have historically produced the greatest conflicts. And these are at the core of U.S. and Western tensions with Russia and, even more ominously, with China. At present, the most urgent challenge is the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. There, one can hear eerie echoes of the events a century ago that produced the catastrophe known as World War I. For the moment, the ambiguous, narrow and inconsistently interpreted Minsk II agreement is holding, and we can hope that it will lead to further agreements that prevent the return of a hot war. But the war that has already occurred and may continue reflected deep contradictions that America cannot resolve if it does not address them honestly and directly.
> 
> In the United States and Europe, many believe that the best way to prevent Russia’s resumption of its historic imperial mission is to assure the independence of Ukraine. They insist that the West must do whatever is required to stop the Kremlin from establishing direct or indirect control over that country. Otherwise, they foresee Russia reassembling the former Soviet empire and threatening all of Europe. Conversely, in Russia, many claim that while Russia is willing to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (with the exception of Crimea), Moscow will demand no less than any other great power would on its border. Security on its western frontier requires a special relationship with Ukraine and a degree of deference expected in major powers’ spheres of influence. More specifically, Russia’s establishment sentiment holds that the country can never be secure if Ukraine joins NATO or becomes a part of a hostile Euro-Atlantic community. From their perspective, this makes Ukraine’s nonadversarial status a nonnegotiable demand for any Russia powerful enough to defend its national-security interests.
> 
> When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia was on its knees, dependent on Western assistance and consumed by its own internal affairs. In that context, it was not surprising that Western leaders became accustomed to ignoring Russian perspectives. But since Vladimir Putin took over in 1999, he has led a recovery of Russia’s sense of itself as a great power. Fueled by rising oil production and prices that brought a doubling of Russia’s GDP during his fifteen-year reign, Russians increasingly bridled at such treatment.
> 
> Americans would do well to recall the sequence of events that led to Japan’s attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor and America’s entry into the Second World War. In 1941, the United States imposed a near-total embargo on oil shipments to Japan to punish its aggression on the Asian mainland. Unfortunately, Washington drastically underestimated how Japan would respond. As one of the post–World War II “wise men,” Secretary of State Dean Acheson, observed afterward, the American government’s
> 
> 
> misreading was not of what the Japanese government proposed to do in Asia, not of the hostility our embargo would excite, but of the incredibly high risks General Tojo would assume to accomplish his ends. No one in Washington realized that he and his regime regarded the conquest of Asia not as the accomplishment of an ambition but as the survival of a regime. It was a life-and-death matter to them.
> 
> Just days before Pearl Harbor, Japanese special envoy Saburo Kurusu told Washington that “the Japanese people believe that economic measures are a much more effective weapon of war than military measures; that . . . they are being placed under severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American position; and that it is preferable to fight rather than to yield to pressure.” Despite this warning, the Japanese response to U.S. economic warfare caught the United States off guard, killing nearly 2,500 people and sinking much of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
> 
> Reviewing the recent record of American administrations’ forecasts about the consequences of major foreign-policy choices should serve as a bright warning light. The Clinton administration misread an extended and bloody civil war in Yugoslavia before imposing its own shaky partition and angering Russia and China in the process. When George W. Bush decided to invade Iraq and replace Saddam Hussein’s regime with a democratically elected one, he believed that this would, as he said, “serve as a powerful example of liberty and freedom in a part of the world that is desperate for liberty and freedom.” He and his team held firmly to this conviction, despite numerous warnings that war would fragment the country along tribal and religious lines, that any elected government in Baghdad would be Shia-dominated and that Iran would be the principal beneficiary from a weakened Iraq. Next, the Obama administration joined Britain and France in a major air campaign in Libya to remove Muammar el-Qaddafi. The consequent chaos contributed to the killings of a U.S. ambassador and other American diplomats and to the creation of a haven for Islamic extremists more threatening than Qaddafi’s Libya to its neighbors and to America. In Syria, at the outset of the civil war, the Obama administration demanded the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad, even though he never posed a direct threat to America. Neither the Obama administration nor members of Congress took seriously predictions that Islamic extremists would dominate the Syrian opposition rather than more moderate forces—and that Assad would not be easy to displace.
> 
> COULD A U.S. response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine provoke a confrontation that leads to a U.S.-Russian war? Such a possibility seems almost inconceivable. But when judging something to be “inconceivable,” we should always remind ourselves that this is a statement not about what is possible in the world, but about what we can imagine. As Iraq, Libya and Syria demonstrate, political leaders often have difficulties envisioning events they find uncomfortable, disturbing or inconvenient.
> 
> Prevailing views of the current confrontation with Russia over Ukraine fit this pattern. Since removing Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein and Muammar el-Qaddafi from power had limited direct impact on most Americans, it is perhaps not surprising that most Washington policy makers and analysts assume that challenging Russia over Ukraine and seeking to isolate Moscow internationally and cripple it economically will not come at a significant cost, much less pose real dangers to America. After all, the most common refrain in Washington when the topic of Russia comes up is that “Russia doesn’t matter anymore.” No one in the capital enjoys attempting to humiliate Putin more than President Barack Obama, who repeatedly includes Russia in his list of current scourges alongside the Islamic State and Ebola. And there can be no question that as a petrostate, Russia is vulnerable economically and has very few, if any, genuine allies. Moreover, many among its business and intellectual elites are as enthusiastic as the Washington Post editorial page to see Putin leave office. Ukrainians with the same view of former Ukrainian president Viktor F. Yanukovych successfully ousted him with limited Western help, so, it is argued, perhaps Putin is vulnerable, too.
> 
> Nevertheless, Russia is very different from the other countries where the United States has supported regime change. First and most important, it has a nuclear arsenal capable of literally erasing the United States from the map. While many Americans have persuaded themselves that nuclear weapons are no longer relevant in international politics, officials and generals in Moscow feel differently. Second, regardless of how Americans view their country, Russians see it as a great power. Great powers are rarely content to serve simply as objects of other states’ policies. Where they have the power to do so, they take their destiny into their own hands, for good or ill.
> 
> 
> 
> WHILE MOST policy makers and commentators dismiss the possibility of a U.S.-Russian war, we are more concerned about the drift of events than at any point since the end of the Cold War. We say this having followed Soviet and Russian affairs throughout the Cold War and in the years since the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991. And we say it after one of us recently spent a week in Moscow talking candidly with individuals in and around the Putin government, including with many influential Russian officials, and the other in China listening to views from Beijing. We base our assessment on these conversations as well as other public and private sources.
> 
> There are three key factors in considering how today’s conflict might escalate to war: Russia’s decision making, Russia’s politics and U.S.-Russian dynamics.
> 
> With respect to Russia’s decision making, Putin is recognized both inside and outside the country as the unilateral decider. All available evidence suggests that he relies on a very narrow circle of advisers, none of whom is prepared to challenge his assumptions. This process is unlikely to help Putin make informed decisions that fully take account of the real costs and benefits.
> 
> Moreover, Russia’s political environment, at both the elite and public levels, encourages Putin to escalate demands rather than make concessions. At the elite level, Russia’s establishment falls into two camps: a pragmatic camp, which is currently dominant thanks principally to Putin’s support, and a hard-line camp. The Russian public largely supports the hard-line camp, whom one Putin adviser called the “hotheads.” Given Russian politics today, Putin is personally responsible for the fact that Russia’s revanchist policies are not more aggressive. Put bluntly, Putin is not the hardest of the hard-liners in Russia.
> 
> While none of the “hotheads” criticize Putin, even in private conversations, a growing number of military and national-security officials favor a considerably tougher approach to the United States and Europe in the Ukraine crisis. This is apparent in their attacks on such relatively moderate cabinet officers as Vice Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. From their perspective, the moderates fail to comprehend the gravity of the U.S.-European challenge to Russia and hold futile hopes that things can change for the better without Russia surrendering to an unacceptable and degrading foreign diktat. They recommend shifting the game to areas of Russian strength—by using military force to advance Russian interests as Putin did in Crimea and to pressure the West into accepting Moscow on its own terms.
> 
> An increasingly nationalistic Russian public also supports this “challenge the main enemy” approach, which draws its language and inspiration from former Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. Putin has clearly contributed to growing nationalist sentiments through his patriotic rhetoric and his harsh indictment of Western behavior. But he was pushing on an open door due to widespread disillusionment with Western treatment of Russia as a Cold War loser rather than an ally in building a new world order. What’s more, ordinary Russians may have gone further in their truculent views than Putin himself. Not long ago, Russia’s media widely reported a warning from the recently dismissed rebel commander Igor Strelkov, who said that by being too indecisive, Putin would satisfy no one and would suffer the same fate as Slobodan Milosevic—rejection by liberals and nationalists alike. More recently, Strelkov has reportedly placed Putin’s portrait prominently in his office, explaining that in his view the Russian president “understood that all compromise with the West is fruitless” and that he is “reestablishing Russian sovereignty.” Strelkov often exaggerates, but his views reflect the frustrations of Russia’s influential nationalist coalition.
> 
> Added support for a more muscular assertiveness comes from an expanding group of military officers and civilians who believe that Russia can brandish its nuclear weapons to good effect. According to this group, Russia’s nuclear arsenal is not just its ultimate security blanket but also a sword it can wield to coerce others who have no nuclear weapons, as well as those who are unwilling to think the unthinkable of actually exploding a nuclear bomb. Putin appeared to endorse this view in his controversial Sochi speech last September when he said:
> 
> 
> Nikita Khrushchev hammered the desk with his shoe at the UN. And the whole world, primarily the United States and NATO, thought, “This Nikita is best left alone, he might just go and fire a missile. We better show some respect for them.” Now the Soviet Union is gone and there is no need to take into account Russia’s views. It has gone through transformation during the collapse of the Soviet Union, and we can do whatever we like, disregarding all rules and regulations.
> 
> The director of the television network Rossiya Segodnya, Dmitry Kiselyov, has been more explicit, repeatedly warning, “Russia is the only country in the world that is realistically capable of turning the United States into radioactive ash.” Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine emphasizes that Russia will use nuclear weapons not only in response to nuclear attacks but also “in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons.” And, as a recent report of the European Leadership Network notes, there have been almost forty incidents in the past year in which Russian forces engaged in a pattern of provocations that, if continued, “could prove catastrophic.”


----------



## a_majoor

Part 2



> Counterintuitive though it may seem, Russia’s weakening economy is also unlikely to create public pressure for concessions. On the contrary, the damage to an already-stagnant Russian economy suffering from low energy prices is actually reducing Putin’s foreign-policy flexibility. Russia’s president needs to show that his country’s suffering has been worth it. Retreat could severely damage Putin’s carefully cultivated image as a strong man—a style Russians have historically appreciated—and alienate his hypernationalist political base. They resent sanctions, which they see as hurting ordinary people much more than Putin’s entourage, and they want their leaders to resist, not capitulate. For many, Russia’s dignity is at stake.
> 
> This came through clearly in a recent conversation with a top Russian official. When asked why his government would not try to negotiate a deal based on principles it has already articulated, such as exchanging Russian guarantees of Ukraine’s territorial integrity minus Crimea and Ukraine’s right to move toward the European Union for Western guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO and that the United States and the European Union would relax sanctions, the official responded by saying, “We have our pride and cannot appear to be pressuring the insurgents to have sanctions reduced.”
> 
> 
> 
> THE KEY question is this: Will Putin continue to support the relatively moderate pragmatists, or will he turn toward the “hotheads”? So far, he has split the difference: Russia has provided effective but limited support to the separatists, while at the same time hoping against hope to restore many of its ties with the West (or at least with Europe). Putin has also tried to conceal the scale of Russia’s intervention in order to temporize and to exploit U.S.-European and intra-European differences.
> 
> Currently, the pragmatists retain the upper hand, in no small part because Putin has kept his government team almost intact both in the cabinet and in the presidential administration. While loyal to Putin and prepared to execute his agenda, that team consists primarily of officials whose formative experiences have been in establishing economic interdependence with the West and in attempting to make Russia a major voice in a world order predominantly shaped by the United States and its allies.
> 
> Foreign Minister Lavrov and others supporting his more pragmatic approach argue that Moscow can still do business with the United States and especially with the Europeans if Russia doesn’t close the door. The “hotheads” take the opposite view, insisting that the West would view any moderation in Russian policy as a sign of weakness. Portraying themselves as realists, they argue that NATO is determined to overthrow Putin, force Russia to its knees and perhaps even dismember the country.
> 
> Putin’s reluctance to change course dramatically so far explains his hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, which helps the separatists without Russia formally entering the conflict. It also underlies Russia’s unpersuasive denials that it is giving military support to the separatists, which simultaneously make Moscow subject to justified criticism and create unfounded hope in Washington and in Europe that Russia will be unable to absorb higher casualties in a war in which it claims not to participate.
> 
> Yet Putin’s attempt to pursue the pragmatists’ broad objectives while accommodating the “hotheads” on the ground in Ukraine may not be indefinitely sustainable. An increasingly prevalent view among Putin’s advisers sees hopes of a restoration of Western-Russian cooperation as a lost cause because U.S. and Western leaders will not accept any resolution that meets Russia’s minimal requirements. If the United States and the European Union would largely remove sanctions and restore business as usual, they would urge that Russia swallow its pride and reconcile. But if Russia is going to continue to be sanctioned, excluded from financial markets and denied Western technology, they say, then Russia should pursue its own independent path. Putin has yet to face a decisive moment that would require him to make a fateful choice between accommodating Western demands and more directly entering the conflict and perhaps even using force against Western interests outside Ukraine. And if that moment arrives, we may well not welcome his choice.
> 
> 
> 
> SANCTIONS ASIDE, two other developments could force Putin’s hand. One would be the prospect of military defeat of the separatists; the second would be NATO membership for Ukraine.
> 
> Putin drew a bright red line precluding the first in an interview with Germany’s ARD television channel on November 17, 2014. Speaking rhetorically, he asked whether NATO wanted “the Ukrainian central authorities to annihilate everyone among their political foes and opponents” in eastern Ukraine. If so, Putin declared categorically: “We won’t let it happen.” In every instance when the Ukrainian military seemed close to gaining the upper hand in the fighting, and despite U.S. and European warnings and sanctions, Putin has raised the ante to assure the separatists’ success on the battlefield.
> 
> Though Russia’s president has said less about the second red line, there can be no doubt that Ukraine’s potential NATO membership is a preeminent Russian concern. One important reason for Moscow’s willingness to let Donetsk and Luhansk go back under central Ukrainian control with a considerable degree of autonomy is the Kremlin’s desire for their pro-Russian populations to vote in Ukrainian elections and for their autonomous local governments to serve as a brake on Ukraine’s road to NATO. Russia’s political mainstream overwhelmingly supports preventing the emergence of a hostile Ukraine under NATO security umbrella less than four hundred miles from Moscow.
> 
> This feeling is grounded both in Russian security concerns and in nearly uncontrollable sentiments about Ukraine and its Russian-speaking population. The growing popularity of the slogan Rossiya ne brosayet svoikh—Russia does not abandon its own—reflects these feelings and resembles Russia’s pan-Slavic attitudes toward Serbia before World War I. One of us saw a powerful example of these emotions while watching a Russian talk-show discussion about Ukraine before a live audience. A Russian panelist declared that “our cause is just and we will prevail” to thunderous applause. Importantly, the speaker, Vyacheslav Nikonov, is not only a member of the pro-Putin United Russia party and the chairman of the parliament’s education committee. He is also the grandson of former Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, who made the same statement after Hitler attacked the USSR in 1941. Nikonov is known for reflecting establishment perspectives. The early nineteenth-century Savoyard diplomat and conservative philosopher Joseph de Maistre saw something similar in his own time: “There is no man who desires as passionately as a Russian. If we could imprison a Russian desire beneath a fortress, that fortress would explode.” Russian nationalism today is such an explosive force.
> 
> Little imagination is required to find possible triggers for a decisive change in Putin’s posture. The most immediate would be a U.S. decision to arm Ukraine’s military. Could some in Putin’s government actually be seeking to entice the United States into arming Ukraine? While this seems far-fetched at first blush, another Russian interlocutor made a thoughtful case that this is indeed the plan of some around Putin, perhaps even with Putin’s consent. According to this theory, this ploy has both a tactical and a strategic rationale.
> 
> Tactically, an announcement by Obama that the United States was sending arms to Ukraine would give Putin an easy escape from what has become an increasingly untenable denial of the obvious. To fellow Russian citizens, Putin and his government have unambiguously and repeatedly insisted that Russia is not a party to the conflict, despite the fact that pro-Russian government politicians and separatist leaders brag about Moscow’s help on television. Even after the downing of the Malaysian airliner killed nearly three hundred last July, and despite continuous Western reporting of the facts, Putin has stuck to his story.
> 
> An announcement that Washington was arming Ukraine would, it is argued, give Putin the pretext he needs to affirm his narrative. He has claimed that the United States sponsored the Maidan coup that ousted Yanukovych, a democratically elected president, and has been supporting the current government’s war against fellow Russians in eastern Ukraine. Overtly arming Ukraine will thus unmask previously covert American activity and justify Russia responding with arms or even troops, initiating a game of escalation that plays to his strength.
> 
> Strategically, this would be what chess masters call a trap. By shifting the competition from the economic chessboard (where the United States and Europe have all the powerful pieces) to a military one, he will have moved from weakness to strength. In the military arena, Putin owns the commanding heights: there is hardly a weapon the United States can provide Kiev that Russia can’t match or trump; logistically, he can send arms by road, rail, sea and air across a porous border, while the United States is a continent away; within the ranks of Ukraine’s military, he has hundreds or even thousands of agents and collaborators. And, most importantly, as he has already demonstrated, the Russian military forces are prepared not only to advise separatists but also to fight alongside them—and to kill and to die. He assumes that the United States will never put boots on the ground in Ukraine. The more vividly he can drive this home to Europeans, so hard-line thinking goes, the more respect he can command.
> 
> Hard-liners see this as Putin’s best chance to snatch what they call “strategic victory” from the jaws of defeat. As they see it, Russia’s comparative advantage in relations with Europe and the United States is not economics. Instead, it is deploying military power. Europeans have essentially disarmed themselves and show little will to fight. Americans undoubtedly have the most powerful military on earth and are often prepared to fight. But even though they win all the battles, they seem incapable of winning a war, as in Vietnam or Iraq. In Ukraine, the “hotheads” hope, Russia can teach the Europeans and Americans some hard truths. The professionally executed operation that annexed Crimea virtually without a shot was the first step. But the deeper the United States can be sucked into Ukraine and the more visibly it is committed to achieving unachievable goals like the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the better from this hawkish Russian perspective. On the battlefield of war in Ukraine, Russia has what Cold War strategists named “escalation dominance”: the upper hand at every step up the escalation ladder. This is a proxy war the United States cannot win and Russia cannot lose—unless America is willing to go to war itself.
> 
> 
> 
> THE PRIMARY audience for this drama is, of course, Europe. The fact that neither European members of NATO nor the United States can save Ukraine is hoped to sink into the consciousness of postmodern Europeans. When it does, according to this logic, a skillful combination of intimidation and intimation of hope should give Russia an opening to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe, providing relief from the most onerous sanctions and access to European financial markets.
> 
> Initially, Putin will attempt to exploit the expiration of EU sanctions, which are scheduled to expire in July. If that fails, however, and the European Union joins the United States in imposing additional economic sanctions, such as excluding Moscow from the SWIFT financial clearing system, Putin would be tempted to respond not by retreating, but by ending all cooperation with the West and mobilizing his people against a new and “apocalyptic” threat to Mother Russia. As a leading Russian politician told us, “We stood all alone against Napoleon and against Hitler. It was our victories against aggressors, not our diplomacy, that split enemy coalitions and provided us with new allies.”
> 
> At that point, Putin would likely change both his team and the thrust of his foreign policy. As a senior official said, “The president values loyalty and consistency, so letting people go and announcing fundamental policy changes comes hard to him. But he is a decisive man and when he reaches a decision, he does whatever it takes to get results.” This would mean a significantly more belligerent Russian policy across all issues driven by a narrative about a Western campaign to undermine the regime or indeed to cause the collapse of the country. Among other things, it would likely mean an end to cooperation on projects like the International Space Station, supplies of strategic metals like titanium, dealing with Iran’s nuclear program and stabilizing Afghanistan. In the latter case, this could include not only pressuring Central Asian states to curtail security cooperation with the United States, but also exploiting political differences in the Afghan ruling coalition to support the remnants of the Northern Alliance.
> 
> 
> 
> ONCE THE U.S.-Russian relationship enters the zone of heated confrontation, senior military officers on both sides will inevitably play a greater role. As the world saw in the lead-up to World War I, when the security dilemma takes hold, what look like reasonable precautions to one side may well appear as evidence of likely aggression to the other. Clausewitz describes the relentless logic that pushes each side toward “a new mutual enhancement, which, in pure conception, must create a fresh effort towards an extreme.” Commanders have to think in terms of capabilities rather than intentions. This pushes them toward steps that are tactically prudent but that invite strategic misinterpretation.
> 
> Predictably, leaders and their military advisers will also miscalculate. Before World War I, Kaiser Wilhelm II did not believe that Russia would dare to go to war because its defeat by Japan less than a decade earlier had demonstrated the Russian military’s incompetence. At the same time, Russian defense minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov was assuring the czar that Russia was ready for battle and that Germany had already decided to attack. As Sukhomlinov said in 1912, “Under any circumstances the war is unavoidable and it is advantageous for us to start it sooner rather than later . . . His Majesty and I believe in the army and know that the war will only bring good things to us.” In Berlin, the German General Staff also argued for quick action, fearing the impending completion of a new network of rail lines that would allow the czar to move Russian divisions rapidly to Germany’s border. After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, as the crisis intensified, military commanders in both Russia and Germany rushed not to be the second to mobilize. As the Russian General Staff told Nicholas II, only an immediate and full-scale mobilization would prevent a quick defeat, if not of Russia itself, then at least of France, whose long-term support Russia needed to withstand the German assault.
> 
> 
> 
> LATVIA, ESTONIA, and Lithuania form the Achilles’ heel of the NATO alliance. They are protected by its Article 5 guarantee that an attack upon one will be regarded as an attack upon all. Thus, the United States has an unambiguous and undeniable responsibility to deter and defend attacks on the Baltic states. Given their size, proximity to Russia and substantial Russian-speaking minorities, this is a daunting requirement. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which either U.S. or Russian action could set in motion a chain of events at the end of which American and Russian troops would be killing each other.
> 
> There is currently a lively discussion among Russian hard-liners about how Russian dominance in both conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Central and Eastern Europe could be used to Russia’s advantage. Putin has talked publicly about his willingness to use nuclear weapons to repel any effort to retake Crimea—noting that he relied on Russia’s nuclear arsenal during the Crimean operation. In these debates, many ask whether President Obama would risk losing Chicago, New York and Washington to protect Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. It is a troubling question. If you want to either dumbfound or silence a table next to you in a restaurant in Washington or Boston, ask your fellow diners what they think. If stealthy Russian military forces were to take control of Estonia or Latvia, what should the United States do? Would they support sending Americans to fight for the survival of Estonia or Latvia?
> 
> Imagine, for example, an uprising of ethnic Russians in Estonia or Latvia, either spontaneously or at the instigation of Russian security services; a heavy-handed response by that nation’s weak police and military forces; an appeal by ethnic Russians to Putin to honor his “Putin Doctrine” declaration during the liberation of Crimea that he would come to the defense of ethnic Russians wherever they were attacked; an attempted replay of the hybrid war against Ukraine; and a confrontation with the battalion of six hundred American or NATO forces now on regular rotations through the Baltic states. Some Russians have gone so far as to suggest that this would provide sufficient provocation for Moscow to use a tactical nuclear weapon; Russia’s ambassador to Denmark, for example, recently threatened that Danish participation in NATO’s missile-defense system would make it “a target for Russian nuclear weapons.” What’s more, Russia is exploring stationing Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad—the Russian enclave between Lithuania and Poland—while Sweden’s intelligence has publicly stated that it views Russian intelligence operations as preparation for “military operations against Sweden.”


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## a_majoor

Part 3



> IN A climate of mutual suspicion further fueled by domestic politics on both sides, assurances of benign intentions rarely suffice. Christopher Clark’s 2013 book, The Sleepwalkers, provides a persuasive account of how, in the days preceding World War I, both alliances contemptuously dismissed the explanations and assurances they heard from the other side.
> 
> Of course, alliances are now Putin’s weakest point. Russia does not have a single ally committed to supporting Moscow in war. Nevertheless, one should be cautious about counting on Moscow’s isolation in a longer-term confrontation with the West. One reason Kaiser Wilhelm II presented his ultimatum to Russia was that he did not believe England would join Russia in a war over the crisis in the Balkans, where London had traditionally opposed Russian influence. Furthermore, without England, few expected France to offer much resistance. What those who count on Russian isolation today do not properly take into account is that a powerful and assertive alliance prepared to pursue its interests and promote its values inevitably stimulates antibodies. It was that sense of Germany’s determination to change the geopolitical balance in Europe and in the world that prompted Britain to depart from a century of splendid isolation and become so entangled with allies that when war came, it had little choice but to enter. It is the same sense that is leading China today to expand its ties with Russia during its conflict with the United States.
> 
> To be clear, there is virtually no chance that China would join Russia against the United States and Europe in a confrontation over Ukraine. Likewise, China is not prepared to bail Russia out financially or to risk its lucrative economic integration with the West to support Moscow’s revanchist ambitions. But neither is Beijing indifferent to the possibility of Russia’s political, economic or (particularly) military defeat by the Western alliance. Many in Beijing fear that if the United States and its allies were successful in defeating Russia, and particularly in changing the regime in Russia, China could well be the next target. The fact that the Chinese leadership views this as a serious threat could, over time, push Beijing closer to Moscow, a development that would fundamentally alter the global balance of power.
> 
> Moreover, if there were a Russian-American war, one needs to think carefully about what actions the Chinese might choose to take against Taiwan, for example, or even to punish neighbors like Japan or Vietnam whom Beijing believes are cooperating with Washington to contain its ambitions.
> 
> Neither China nor Russia is the first state to confront a powerful and growing alliance. Nor is the United States the first to receive enthusiastic appeals from prospective allies that can add marginally to overall capabilities, but simultaneously bring obligations and make others feel insecure. In a timeless passage in his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recounts the Athenian response to a troubled Sparta: “We did not gain this empire by force. . . . Our allies came to us of their own accord and begged us to lead them.” Needless to say, Sparta did not find that explanation reassuring—and that excuse did not prevent thirty years of war that ended with defeat for Athens, but at a price far beyond any benefits that accrued to the victor.
> 
> To recognize the potentially catastrophic consequences of war with Russia does not require paralysis in addressing the challenge of a resurgent but wounded Russia. The United States has a vital interest in maintaining its credibility as a superpower and in assuring the survival and security of its NATO alliance—and thus of every one of its NATO allies. Moreover, in international politics, appetites can grow quickly if fed by easy victories.
> 
> The Russian president’s currently limited objectives in Ukraine could become more expansive if Russia does not face serious resistance. After all, the smooth annexation of Crimea led to an outburst of triumphalist rhetoric in Moscow about creating a new entity, Novorossiya, which would include eastern and southern Ukraine all the way to the Romanian border. The combination of resistance by local populations, the Ukrainian government’s willingness to fight for its territory, and U.S. and EU sanctions quickly persuaded the Russian leadership to curtail this line of thinking. When a nation is prepared to fight for important interests, clarity about that determination is a virtue in discouraging potential aggression.
> 
> Yet the United States should be careful to avoid giving allies or friends—like Kiev—the sense that they have a blank check in confronting Moscow. During World War I, even such a strong supporter of the war as Pavel N. Milyukov—leader of Russia’s Constitutional Democrats and later foreign minister in the Provisional Government—was shocked at the lengths to which British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey would go in refusing to assign any blame for the conflict to the Serbs. “Listen,” he reports saying to Grey, “the war started because of Serb grandstanding. Austria could think that it was in serious danger. Serbia was aspiring to do no less than to split Austria.” To Grey, however, an ally could do no wrong.
> 
> The Balkan crises in the several years prior to World War I deserve careful study. Few at the time could conceive that they would become the flashpoint of a fire that would eventually become a continental inferno.
> 
> But they did. Meeting the challenge of an angry but weakened Russia today requires a subtle combination of firmness and restraint. Where vital American interests are engaged, we have to be able and willing to fight: to kill and to die. Effective deterrence requires three C’s: clarity about red lines that cannot be crossed (for example, attacking a NATO ally); capability to respond in ways that will make the cost of aggression greatly exceed any benefits an aggressor could hope to achieve; and credibility about our determination to fulfill our commitment. At the same time, we should recognize that if American and Russian forces find themselves firing upon each other, this would violate one of the principal constraints both sides respected assiduously during four decades of the Cold War—risking escalation to a war both would lose.
> 
> Military force and economic warfare such as sanctions are indispensable instruments of foreign policy. When employed without a sound strategic vision and artful diplomacy, however, instruments of coercion can develop their own momentum and become ends in themselves. Having managed a confrontation over the Soviet Union’s attempt to install nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba that he believed had a one-in-three chance of ending in nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy spent many hours reflecting on the lessons from that experience. The most important of these he offered to his successors in these words: “Above all, while defending our vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.” It is a lesson statesmen should apply to meet the challenge Russia poses in Ukraine today.
> 
> Graham Allison is director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans. Dimitri K. Simes, The National Interest’s publisher, is president of the Center for the National Interest.


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## Good2Golf

A very thought provoking read.

Given this thought: 



> Strategically, this would be what chess masters call a trap. By shifting the competition from the economic chessboard (where the United States and Europe have all the powerful pieces) to a military one, he will have moved from weakness to strength. In the military arena, Putin owns the commanding heights: there is hardly a weapon the United States can provide Kiev that Russia can’t match or trump; logistically, he can send arms by road, rail, sea and air across a porous border, while the United States is a continent away; within the ranks of Ukraine’s military, he has hundreds or even thousands of agents and collaborators. And, most importantly, as he has already demonstrated, the Russian military forces are prepared not only to advise separatists but also to fight alongside them—and to kill and to die. He assumes that the United States will never put boots on the ground in Ukraine. The more vividly he can drive this home to Europeans, so hard-line thinking goes, the more respect he can command.



What are Putin, his pragmtists and the "hotheads" to make of Canada sending 200 troops onto Ukraine soil?

Regards
G2G


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## Kirkhill

- St Petersburg





 - Stavropol





 - Moscow





 - Novosibirsk

Putin has his own "traps" to worry about.


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## Edward Campbell

I agree, broadly and generally, with Graham Allison and Dimitri Simes: we are, Russia and the West and, especially Ukraine, playing a dangerous game.

We have massive, absolutely overwhelming social and economic advantages.

We have the _strategic_ advantage, too.

Russia has the local, _tactical_ (operational level) advantage based on geography and concentration of force.

We face one threat on one front (East); Russia faces at least two threats on at least two front (West, South and East). But, as Drs Alison and Simes point out, we did ourselves no _military-strategic_ favours by adding Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania to NATO. (Nor do Poland and Hungary do as much good as members as they would have done as _buffers_). The Baltic states, especially, are badly exposed and isolated.

All that being said, we should, _in my opinion_, reinvigorate the Cold War. We won it last time on, essentially, our social, political and economic strengths. We can defeat Russia, just as we defeated the Warsaw Pact, using the same tools. That may require Canada and Britain and Germany and many of the others to (unwillingly) spend more on defence and even assign troops to Eastern NATO regions (say in the Czech Republic) because we will want to force the Russians to waste money on the military when they really, desperately, need that (limited) money for _productive_ national development. But, we can win, in my estimation, without firing a shot ... and it will be a victory worth having if it results in a new Russian civil war.


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## Boxtop22

I very much agree with 90% of Thucydide's three-part posts. 

On the risk of nuclear warfare over the Baltic: I believe that neither the United States nor NATO (NATO isn't even allowed to offer negative-security assurances, anyway. And the B61-Mod-11 are pretty old weapons that would require NATO sending pilots in very-hot areas) are willing to use Area-denial nuclear devices to protect Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius. The US congress had already opposed the concept of an automatic declaration of war if Japan was to be attacked by China. If they won't stand up for Japan against China, they won't stand up for the Baltic against Russia. What would even be the point of losing thousands of man and risking a nuclear warfare to retake the Baltic, and why would Russia even take the Baltic at this point? The very same congress also questioned the validity of Article V, saying that no foreign treaty should have the power to send the United States to war as it could be a breach of her sovereignty. It would require an incredible escalation for Russia to consider this move. If anything (in a parallel universe) it's a safer (even though more challenging) bet for Putin to take Visby - since Sweden isn't a NATO member - and then force panicked leaders to negotiate a peace treaty trading Visby back for the independence of Eastern-Ukraine, than it would be to take Tallinn, Riga and/or Vilnius. 

Putin does not want the Baltic, he is trying to make a point. The Soviet Union collapsed, and all we did (I'm not judging the morality of the actions) was look at it agonize, offer her some help, on the condition that Russia basically sell herself to us (cf. the HIID / USAID / Chubais group). Putin's first objective following his election was to give autonomy and might to the Russia he admired as a former senior officer.

I think his second objective is to reaffirm the power of Russia. One way would be to force a redefinition of the Global Order - which is a very dangerous path, because China doesn't not want such a redefinition. The alternative is to use Russia's military might, to force the West to recognize her as a very serious threat, and to force the West to sit down and renegotiate the role of Russia in the world. There is a diplomatic way out of this nightmare, unlike Campbell, I disagree with reinvigorating the Cold-War. It made the world unstable, it forces conflicts, removed democratically-elected leaders, and almost resulted in Nuclear Warfare on more than one occasion. We must prepare for war, we must be ready for war, but I think we must do what we can to prevent it. Another Cold-War is not an acceptable option at this point, not because a self-centered Russian President decided to fudge shit up in Ukraine. A Cold-War in our century, with our technology could swing in either way, we live in a much different world, with many more variables, and if we have learned from the Cold War, so have they. You learn more from a defeat than you do from a victory. Oh and given the number of GRU / FSB people all over Ottawa, I'm not sure we want to get into a cold-war before we clean our own-backyard...

Finally, I'd like to quote Kissinger's World Order. He analyzes Russia's historical behaviour in a Western context, and I think most of the following is still very accurate today. It's part of Russia's strategic culture.

"In the Westphalian concept of order, European statesmen came to identify security with a balance of power and with restraints on its exercise. In Russia's experience of history, restraints on power spelled catastrophe: Russia's failure to dominate its surroundings, in this view, had exposed it to the Mongol invasions and plunged it into its nightmarish "Time of Troubles" (a fifteen-year dynastic interregnum before the founding of the Romanov Dynasty in 1613, in which invasions, civil wars, and famine claimed a third of Russia's population). The Peace of Westphalia saw international order as an intricate balancing mechanism; the Russian view cast it as a perpetual contest of wills, with Russia extending its domain at each phase to the absolute limit of its material resources. Thus, when asked to define Russia's foreign policy, the mid-seventeenth-century Czar Alexei's minister Nashchokin offered a straightforward description: "expanding the state in every direction, and this is the business of the Department of Foreign Affairs ... When it was strong, Russia conducted itself with the domineering certainty of a superior power and insisted on formal shows of deference to its status. When it was weak, it masked its vulnerability though brooding invocations of vast inner reserves of strength. In either case, it was a special challenge for Western capitals used to dealing with a somewhat more genteel style." 

[I'm still new here, so do tell me if you think I lack clarity, if I'm breaking some sort of Milnet culture, or if I'm doing anything wrong. I may get a little over-enthusiastic when it comes to discussing Russia...]


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## Good2Golf

Far earlier in this thread it was mentioned briefly that the one thing that Putin would actually NOT at all want is for Ukraine to "give" (with Western support to relocate ethnic Ukrainians) the East and South (but not South-West Odessa) to the Ethnic-Russian majority and the resultant direct-dependnace this Novorossia' would have on Russia and the impact it would have on Russia's economic growth (or contraction, most likely).  Western pride would have a hard time letting that happen, but with a decent enough relocation package and National support of the displaced Ukrainians, it would give the Russians the very thing they may not have ever counted on truly getting.  "Careful what you (surreptitiously) ask for, Russia...you may just get it."

:2c:

Regards
G2G


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## vonGarvin

We do not have the stomach for expanding our armies for another Cold war. We have fronts with which we can barely contend. (Syria, Iraq, the expanding  ISIS threats...)
We ought to make some noise, then quietly fade away. Period. Our Twitter generation is too involved with self gratification than to worry about some poor slob Slavs fighting each other over some place they've never heard about. Especially when it's not they who have threatened us on YouTube videos  as they behead their prisoners.


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## Kirkhill

Technoviking said:
			
		

> We do not have the stomach for expanding our armies for another Cold war. We have fronts with which we can barely contend. (Syria, Iraq, the expanding  ISIS threats...)
> We ought to make some noise, then quietly fade away. Period. Our Twitter generation is too involved with self gratification than to worry about some poor slob Slavs fighting each other over some place they've never heard about. Especially when it's not they who have threatened us on YouTube videos  as they behead their prisoners.



For a change we agree....

With respect to the separation of the Donbas from Ukraine, I guess that is what is behind *Ukraine Starts Building Wall to Keep Russia Out*.

Obviously Ukraine can't control entry to the Donbas but they can control egress into the rest of Ukraine.  That barrier will clearly delineate those Ukrainians Kyiv can help and those that are beyond help.  Ukraine can deliver aid to the barrier.  It can allow Ukrainians across the barrier. It will have no need for military vehicles beyond the barrier.  It could even leave the Russians in "peace" beyond the barrier and let the Separatists stew.

With respect to military aid, we could supply Ukraine with any weapons or systems that allow them to defeat any conventional military hardware that crosses the barrier.

Ukraine doesn't have to cede sovereignty over the Donbas. It can even try to enter its own sovereignty territory with civilians.  This would shift the onus on to those east of the barrier.

At that point it becomes a mini-variant of the Cold War and in some ways results in a "frozen war" like Transdniestria or South Ossetia.  The difference is the zone is quarantined.


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## CougarKing

Another political dissident weighs in on Putin:

Vox.com



> *Exiled Russian lawmaker explains why Putin isn't afraid of Obama*
> Updated by Max Fisher and Amanda Taub on April 21, 2015, 8:00 a.m. ET
> 
> On March 20, 2014, when Russia's State Duma voted on whether to annex the Ukrainian region of Crimea into Russia, 445 of the Duma's legislators voted yes and one voted no. The "no" was Ilya Ponomarev, a longtime leftist politician and critic of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
> 
> Within a few months, Ponomarev was exiled from Russia and stripped of his legislative immunity from prosecution. Though he is still officially a Duma member, he now lives in the US and is attempting to organize a more formal opposition to Putin from outside of the country.
> 
> We spoke to him in Washington, DC, about the stability of Putin's rule, the Russian elites who help keep him in power, how things might change, and Putin's increasingly tense relationship with Europe and the United States. *While Ponomarev believes change will come to Russia, he warned that it will take years — and believes it will likely come from a combination of Russian elites turning against Putin and popular unrest, not from the ballot box.*
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


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## McG

Does Russia need the Ukraine crisis to maintain domestic moral and order?



> *How Vladimir Putin tries to stay strong
> Russia’s president is trapped by his own strident anti-Western rhetoric*
> The Economist
> 18 Apr 2015
> 
> A RELATIVE hiatus in the fighting in eastern Ukraine (at least until this week) and a relative stabilisation in the Russian economy are prompting two questions. Is the worst of the war over and might better economic news calm the Kremlin—or is this a lull before a new storm?
> 
> The economic situation is not as bad as many predicted four months ago. Having lost half its value, the rouble has stabilised and even started to strengthen, thanks in part to a recent rise in oil prices. Inflation is running at 17% but is rising more slowly than many feared. Instead of a 5% contraction, the economy may shrink by only 3% this year. “The situation is not as catastrophic as many people thought,” is how a senior Russia banker sums up the mood.
> 
> 
> Yet the fragile economic balance is not being used by Vladimir Putin as an argument for returning to peace and prosperity, but rather as evidence that he is standing strong against Russia’s adversaries. The state media have trumpeted the strengthening of the rouble against the dollar and the euro as a victory in the face of American and European enemies determined to ruin Russia.
> 
> The Kremlin’s narrative of war has long moved beyond Ukraine to the West in general. The claim that their country is at war may be news to Americans, but it has been drilled into the minds of many ordinary Russians. The prospect of a war with the West is now a big concern for public opinion. Some 81% of the population sees America as a threat, the highest proportion since the Soviet Union fell apart.
> 
> According to this narrative, Russia is under attack on all fronts—economic, ideological, Middle Eastern, European—and must respond accordingly. This week’s decision to sell the S-300 missile system to Iran is part of this response (see article). As for the supposed threat from the European Union, Channel One news recently instructed its viewers: “Put crudely, the EU started and flourished as a mechanism for redistributing the gains from the collapse of the USSR and former communist bloc. At some stage, however, the flow of resources from conquered markets started to run out and expansion to the east was the only option.” This expansion, it adds, has now been stopped by Russia; so the EU, deprived of new sources of prosperity, may soon crumble.
> 
> In this world of mirror images, America serves as Russia’s reflection and alter ego. It ascribes to America its own actions: incitement of violence in Kiev, support of extreme nationalists in eastern Ukraine, military involvement in the conflict. In a recent article, Sergei Naryshkin, Speaker of the Russian parliament, blamed America for “unleashing a military-political adventure” in Ukraine and stalling its peaceful resolution. “America needs the continuing bloodshed in the Donbas as a means of achieving something important for itself,” he wrote. The sanctions against Russia and the information hysteria in the Western media are a cover for America’s economic “gangsterism”, he added.
> 
> What are Russia’s motives and goals in this confrontation, and is it now trapped in a spiral of aggression? Russian officials talk obsessively of geopolitics, but the answers depend not on what the West does but on how the Kremlin calculates its risks at home, since staying in power is its main goal. A study commissioned by Alexei Kudrin, a former finance minister, and conducted by a group of Russian sociologists led by Mikhail Dmitriev of the New Economic Growth, a think-tank, suggests that the roots of Mr Putin’s actions in Ukraine lie in the Kremlin’s need to solidify its legitimacy after the growing discontent that erupted into street protests during the winter of 2011-12.
> 
> Those protests were driven mainly by Russia’s middle class, frustrated by its lack of prospects. After a decade of rapid income growth that boosted living standards, priorities shifted to such aspirations as better justice, education and health care that Mr Putin’s regime of crony state capitalism could not provide. In the eyes of the middle class, Mr Putin was becoming a symbol of stagnation rather than stability—so his ratings began to fall. Trust in the state media also wobbled. Observers started to compare the situation to the mid-1980s, when a frustrated intelligentsia became a driving force behind Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. The protests in Russia’s larger cities started to resonate with economic and social discontent in poorer provinces, and risked erupting into an open social conflict.
> 
> Russia’s annexation of Crimea arrested this trend. Alexei Navalny, a leader of the protests of 2011-12 who memorably named Mr Putin’s United Russia a party of crooks and thieves, says that the president has hijacked the political agenda by substituting imperial nationalism for building a modern state. The annexation of Crimea won over provincial Russia and legitimised his rule even in the eyes of many who had protested against him two years earlier. As Mr Dmitriev sees it, unmet hopes of personal fulfilment were assuaged by symbolic victories for the state.
> 
> The war in eastern Ukraine and the economic crisis have turned the euphoria associated with Crimea into a paranoid and defensive patriotism aimed against the West, pushing Mr Putin’s approval ratings up to nearly 90%. The Kremlin can ill afford a real military clash with the West, but it will claim any signs of Western weakness as victories. To demonstrate its strength, it is brandishing its nuclear arms and flexing its muscles all around NATO’s borders. Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, a think-tank, says Mr Putin wants his nuclear threats taken seriously, and adds that the risk of nuclear war is greater than at any time since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. But the immediate goal of such intimidation is to persuade the West to drop sanctions, which would be presented at home as a huge victory.
> 
> Against this background a resolution of the Ukrainian crisis and de-escalation of tensions with the West would push the focus back onto economic and social problems, lowering Mr Putin’s ratings, just as happened after Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008. A continuation of the war in Ukraine and the stand-off with the West will keep his ratings up for longer. But while this may benefit Mr Putin, it risks leaving Russia isolated and economically stagnant.
> 
> Russia’s budget cuts are a good guide to Mr Putin’s priorities. The upkeep of the Kremlin and spending on the army and security services take 40% of the entire budget. But spending on health care and infrastructure has been reduced twice as much as spending on defence. Among other winners in the budget are the state media which spew out hatred and aggression.
> 
> The object of this aggression can vary: two years ago it was migrants and corrupt officials. Now it is the West, “national traitors” and a “fifth column” that included Boris Nemtsov, a liberal politician assassinated in Moscow in February. In this way the Kremlin’s aggression has become a narcotic that may lead to an overdose, causing it to lose control. Indeed, the mood could one day switch from an external enemy back to Mr Putin himself, not least because the image of America constructed by the Kremlin’s propaganda bears such a close resemblance to the reality of Russia.


http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21648678-russias-president-trapped-his-own-strident-anti-western-rhetoric-how-vladimir-putin-tries


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## Boxtop22

At least a bit. There's a great article which covers the link between Ukraine, foreign enemies and domestic power.

I'll copy-paste it since it requires a membership. 

Source: http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/21/putins-empire-of-the-mind/


Putin’s Empire of the Mind

How Russia's president morphed from realist to ideologue -- and what he'll do next. BY MARK GALEOTTI, ANDREW S. BOWEN APRIL 21, 2014

A specter is haunting Europe, the specter of Russian imperialism. When Vladimir Putin first came to power in 1999, he talked ideologically but acted rationally. He listened to a range of opinions, from liberal economist Alexei Kudrin to political fixer Vladislav Surkov — people willing to tell him hard truths and question groupthink. He may have regarded the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century, but he knew he couldn’t re-create it. Perhaps the best metaphor is that while he brought back the Soviet national anthem, it had new words. There was no thought of returning Russia to the failed Soviet model of the planned economy. And as a self-professed believer who always wears his baptismal cross, Putin encouraged the once-suppressed Russian Orthodox Church. He was a Russian patriot, but he also was willing to cooperate with the West when it suited his interests. One of the first leaders to offer his condolences after the 9/11 attacks, Putin shared Russian intelligence on al Qaeda with the United States. He did not hesitate to protect Russia’s interests against the West — in 2008 Putin undercut any thought of NATO expansion into Georgia by launching a war against its vehemently pro-Western president, Mikheil Saakashvili — but Putin’s challenges were carefully calibrated to minimize repercussions while maximizing gains. He shut off gas to Ukraine, unleashed hackers on Estonia, and, yes, sent troops into Georgia, but he made sure that the costs of asserting regional hegemony were limited, bearable, and short term. But that was the old Putin. Today, the West faces a rather different Russian leader. After all, the annexation of Crimea, by any rational calculation, did not make sense. Russia already had immense influence on the peninsula, but without the need to subsidize it, as Ukraine had. (Russia has already pledged $1.5 billion to support Crimea.) The Russian Black Sea Fleet’s position in the Crimean seaport of Sevastopol was secure until 2042. Any invasion would anger the West and force it to support whatever government took the place of Viktor Yanukovych’s administration in Kiev, regardless of its composition or constitutionality. In Putin’s actions at home as well, the Russian president is eschewing the pragmatism that marked his first administration. Instead of being the arbiter, brokering a consensus among various clans and interests, today’s Putin is increasingly autocratic. His circle of allies and advisors has shrunk to those who only share his exact ideas. Sober technocrats such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu played seemingly no role in the decision-making over Crimea and were expected simply to execute the orders from the top. This has become one of the new themes of Russian politics: the conflation of loyalty to the Kremlin with patriotism. It says much that dissidents at home, from journalists failing to toe the official line to protesters on the streets, are castigated either as outright "foreign agents" (every movement, charity, or organization accepting foreign money must register itself as such) or else as unknowing victims and vectors of external contamination — contamination, that is, from the West, whose cosmopolitanism and immorality Putin has come to see as an increasing threat to Russia’s identity. As a result, Putin’s relationship with Russia’s elite — now often foreign-educated, usually well-traveled, and always interested in economic prospects abroad — has become tortuous. Having provided members of the elite with opportunities during his first presidency, Putin not only mistrusts the elite now, but sees it as unpatriotic. Some $420 billion has flowed out of Russia since 2008, and in 2013, Putin decried those who were "determined to steal and remove capital and who did not link their future to that of the country, the place where they earned their money." In response, he launched a program of "de-offshorization" that has prompted major Russian telecom, metals, and truck-manufacturing companies to announce their return to Russia. And Alexander Bastrykin, the powerful head of the Investigative Committee and one of Putin’s closest acolytes, promised a crackdown on schemes designed to transfer money out of the country. These efforts are representative of a broader reconsolidation that requires the West to stay out of Russia’s politics and that prevents its ideas and values from perverting Putin’s country. In this context, Yanukovych’s ouster from the Ukrainian presidency was the inevitable catalyst for a decisive expression of a new imperialism. From the Kremlin’s perspective, a Western-influenced and -supported opposition movement in Kiev rose up and toppled a legitimate leader who preferred Russia over the European Union, in the process threatening the liberties and prospects of the ethnic Russian population in Ukraine’s east. Perhaps the world should have paid more attention when Putin made 2014 Russia’s "Year of Culture." This was to be when the country celebrated its unique identity — a year of "emphasis on our cultural roots, patriotism, values, and ethics." It was nothing less than a recipe for a new Russian exceptionalism, one that Putin himself would craft and impose. Seen in those terms, the turmoil in Ukraine did not merely allow him to step in — it demanded it. The imperialism that has sprung from Putin’s revived emphasis on Russian identity cannot neatly be compared with either its tsarist or its Soviet forebears. The tsarist empire was driven by an expansionist logic that would gladly push Russia’s boundaries as far as they could stretch. Although multiethnic, there was no question that ethnic Russians were the imperial race and that others — with a few exceptions, such as the Baltic German aristocrats on whom Tsar Nicholas I relied — were second-class subjects. This was Russkii, ethnic Russian, not Rossiiskii, Russian by citizenship. By contrast, Soviet imperialism embodied, at least in theory, a political ideology greater than any one people or culture and a rhetoric of internationalism and evangelism. Putin has spent considerable effort in forging a new Rossiiskii state nationalism. Absent is the visceral anti-Semitism of the Russian Empire, and the widespread racism and hostility visible within much of Russian society is not reflected in government policy. Nor does the president seem interested in expanding direct Russian rule (as opposed to political authority) or in exporting any particular political philosophy to non-Russians. At the same time, Putin thinks that "the [ethnic] Russian people are, without a doubt, the backbone, the fundament, the cement of the multinational Russian people." In other words, though ethnic Russians do not rule the state, they do provide the foundations for the "Russian civilization" on which it is based. Putin’s reference to Russia as a "civilization" signals itself a return to the time-honored belief that there is something unique about Russia rooted not only in ethnic identity but in culture and history — a belief that began when the country became the chief stronghold of Eastern Orthodoxy after the fall of Constantinople. As he put it in his 2012 state-of-the-federation address: "In order to revive national consciousness, we need to link historical eras and get back to understanding the simple truth that Russia did not begin in 1917, or even in 1991, but, rather, that we have a common, continuous history spanning over 1,000 years and we must rely on it to find inner strength and purpose in our national development." <
span class="pull-quote">Putin’s conception of what it means to be Russian combines the stern-jawed heroics of the Soviet defenders of Stalingrad with the exuberant loyalty of the tsar’s own Cossacks, while excluding the humanism of Andrei Sakharov and the ascetic moralism of Leo Tolstoy. It is a version of Russian history and philosophy cherry-picked to support Putin’s notion of national exceptionalism. In fact, he recently assigned regional governors homework, writings by three prominent 19th- and 20th-century intellectuals: Nikolai Berdyaev, Vladimir Solovyov, and Ivan Ilyin. These three, whom Putin often cites, exemplify and justify his belief in Russia’s singular place in history. They romanticize the necessity of obedience to the strong ruler — whether managing the boyars or defending the people from cultural corruption — and the role of the Orthodox Church in defending the Russian soul and ideal. In this, Putin is directly drawing on a classic Russian dichotomy between autocracy and anarchy, as well as on the country’s experiences during the 1990s, when there was no strong, consistent central rule and the country was beset by rebellion, gangsterism, poverty, and geopolitical irrelevance. In his 2013 state-of-the-federation speech, Putin made the connection between authoritarianism and social order, admitting, "Of course, this is a conservative position. But speaking in the words of Nikolai Berdyaev, the point of conservatism is not that it prevents movement forward and upward, but that it prevents movement backward and downward, into chaotic darkness and a return to a primitive state." THIS IS THE CENTER OF PUTIN’S IMPERIAL VISION: The pragmatic political fixer of the 2000s now genuinely believes that Russian culture is both exceptional and threatened and that he is the man to save it. He does not see himself as aggressively expanding an empire so much as defending a civilization against the "chaotic darkness" that will ensue if he allows Russia to be politically encircled abroad and culturally colonized by Western values at home. This notion of an empire built on the basis of a civilization is crucial to understanding Putin. There are neighboring countries, such as those in the South Caucasus, that he believes ought to recognize that they are part of Russia’s sphere of influence, its defensive perimeter, and its economic hinterland. But, he stops short of wanting forcefully to bring them under direct dominion because they are not ethnically Russian. Even when Moscow separated the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia in 2008, for example, it set them up as independent puppet states; it did not annex them into the Russian Federation. Putin does insist, however, that Moscow is the protector of Russians worldwide. Where there are Russians and Russian-speakers and where Russian culture and the Russian Orthodox faith hold or held sway, these are nash — "ours." Despite his mission to "gather the Russian lands" like the 15th-century’s Prince Ivan the Great, this does not necessarily mean occupying Crimea today, Donetsk in eastern Ukraine tomorrow, and Russian-settled northern Kazakhstan the day after, but it helps define what he thinks is Russia’s birthright. In his defense of the annexation of Crimea, he said that the Soviet Union’s collapse left "the Russian nation … one of the biggest, if not the biggest, ethnic group in the world to be divided by borders." Crimea, after all, is historically, ethnically, and culturally Russian, which is why, after its residents voted in favor of annexation, Putin approvingly noted that "after a long, difficult, exhausting voyage, Crimea and Sevastopol are returning to their native harbor, to their native shores, to their port of permanent registration — to Russia." By contrast, the case to reach out to Transnistria in Moldova, for example, or even eastern Ukraine, is less clear. The Transnistrian Russians are relatively new colonists, arriving after World War II, and eastern Ukraine has Russian cities, but also a Catholic, Ukrainian countryside. Putin is putting as much effort into defending his vision of "Russian civilization" at home as abroad, and he has drawn a direct connection between the two. In the past, he was a patriot, a Russian Orthodox believer, and a social conservative, but he saw the difference between his own views and state policy and was little interested in enforcing a social agenda. Indeed, he warned in 1999 that "a state ideology blessed and supported by the state … [means] practically no room for intellectual and spiritual freedom, ideological pluralism, and freedom of the press — that is, for political freedom." But what he once merely frowned upon, Putin now wants to ban. The conservative backlash, with laws against gay "propaganda," the heavy-handed prosecution of members of punk band Pussy Riot after their "blasphemous" performance in a church, and renewed state control of the media, all speak to a new moral agenda — a nationalist and culturally isolationist one. Just as Putin has been trying to "de-offshorize" the Russian elite, he is now launching what could be called a "moral de-offshorization." His more recent pronouncements have been full of warnings about the "destruction of traditional values," threatening the moral degradation of Russian society. The Russian Orthodox Church thus comes increasingly to the fore as a symbol and bastion of these traditional values and all that they mean for the new imperialism. Russian Orthodoxy was never an especially evangelical faith, concentrating on survival and purity over expansion, and much the same could be said of Putin’s worldview. In Putin’s previous presidency, the church was supportive, but just one of many of his allies. Now, though, from the pulpit to television news programs, the church is one of the most consistent and visible supporters of Putin’s state-building project. When interviewed on the subject of Crimea, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, one of Putin’s cassocked cheerleaders, asserted that the church has long believed that "the Russian people are a divided nation on its historical territory, which has the right to be reunited in a single public body." IN 1999, SOON BEFORE HE BECAME ACTING PRESIDENT, Putin released a personal manifesto in which he admitted that Soviet communism was "a road to a blind alley, which is far away from the mainstream of civilization." Now, he is looking for exit ramps from that mainstream. Speaking in 2013 at the Valdai International Discussion Club, he warned against "mechanically copying other countries’ experiences" because "the question of finding and strengthening national identity really is fundamental for Russia." It is a quest that he has taken upon himself in the name of personal and national greatness: A people with a destiny cannot be allowed to let him, themselves, their country, and their mission d
own. All this helps explain the difficulty that Western governments have in understanding and dealing with him, especially this most aggressively cerebral U.S. administration. It seems that much is lost in translation between the Kremlin and the White House. Putin is not a lunatic or even a fanatic. Instead, just as there are believers who become pragmatists in office, he has made the unusual reverse journey. Putin has come to see his role and Russia’s destiny as great, unique, and inextricably connected. Even if this is merely an empire of, and in, his mind — with hazy boundaries and dubious intellectual underpinnings — this is the construct with which the rest of the world will have to deal, so long as Putin remains in the Kremlin.


----------



## jollyjacktar

A pretty slick video, I have to admit.  

Russian Armed Forces Response to NATO 2015


----------



## Kirkhill

An interesting blog on Russian Defence Policy

Some interesting takeaways from current articles:

Recruitment and Professionals suggests that move to a professional force is real but glacially slow - many are entering but few are staying around.  The vast bulk of the 700,000 PY force is made up of 1 year conscripts (half with less than 6 months training) and "professionals" with less than 3 years service.

The Plan calls for a 915,000 PY force by 2017 (all services and branches).



> According to TASS, Goremykin told the assembled media that the MOD will very soon have 300,000 contractees, because it now has exactly 299,508.  He added that the military gained 80,000-90,000 men on contract service in 2013 and 2014, and has added 19,000 in 2015 thus far.
> 
> We can peel back the contract service onion as a result:
> 
> If, from this 299,508, we subtract 90,000 + 90,000 + 19,000, the Russian MOD had only 100,508 contractees as recently as 31 December 2012. Pankov claimed 186,000 contractees at the start of 2013.  The 85,492-man discrepancy represents contract attrition over the last 27 months, or an average loss of 3,166 contractees — an entire brigade of recruits — every 30 days.
> 
> As Mokrushin notes, General Staff Chief Valeriy Gerasimov said there were only 295,000 contractees in late December.  If 19,000 were added in 2015 but the total is only 299,508, then a net of only 4,508 was added due to the loss of 14,492 contractees during those months.  Call that five percent attrition, but annualized it’s 20 percent.
> 
> We were told in early November 2014 that the Russian military, for the first time, had more contractees than conscripts.  Since there were 305,000 conscripts at the time, ipso facto, contractees must have numbered at least 305,001.  You can add the November-December losses — 10,001 — to 14,492 and you get 24,493 lost in five months.  That’s 4,899 per month on average — call that two brigades of recruits lost — every 30 days.
> 
> Russian recruiting centers have to keep a torrid pace just to stay even with these losses.
> 
> But back to Goremykin.  He said the MOD’s goal for 2015 is to reach 352,000 contractees, and plans for the outyears haven’t changed — 425,000 by 2017, and 499,000 by 2020.
> 
> With possible attrition of 27,000 over the next nine months, the MOD will have to recruit 79,000 contractees to be at 352,000 by the end of 2015.
> 
> Goremykin indicated the MOD will continue allowing conscripts with higher education to serve two years as contractees instead of one as draftees.  The percentage choosing this option isn’t large, but it’s growing, according to him. The six-year service requirement to qualify for a military-backed mortgage may be dropped to five years just to encourage this category of contractees to re-up.
> 
> The GUK chief said there are plans to make the Russian Navy almost 100 percent contractee, starting with its submarine forces first, then most of its surface forces.
> 
> According to RIA Novosti, General-Colonel Goremykin also announced this year the MOD will make its entire contingent of “junior commanders” (NCOs) contractees.  It intends to do away with the longstanding practice of selecting and making some draftees into sergeants.  Goremykin added, “This is a task for this year.”
> 
> Two take aways:
> 
> As always, it’s difficult to trust the MOD’s numbers; they tell us about additions, but not subtractions.
> As shorthand, we tend to call newly recruited and enlisted Russian contractees professionals when, in fact, they have just signed up to become professional.  Whether they do is a function of whether they stay, get trained, and become experienced.  One senior Russian commander has said he considers soldiers professionals when they’ve served two or more contracts (6+ years).



And this report from the recent "surprise inspection" exercises.



> Not Enough Men or Transports
> 
> Another large-scale Russian military “surprise inspection” has concluded, and military commentator Ilya Kramnik has placed it, and other exercises, into perspective for Lenta.ru.
> 
> Interpreted as a prologue to war in Europe by some, the Kremlin-directed “surprise inspections” are the logical continuation of a process in recent years.  It is the process of developing strategic mobility through deployment exercises, according to Kramnik.
> 
> The latest six-day “surprise inspection” focused on deploying and redeploying forces in Russia’s Arctic regions, but President Vladimir Putin expanded it into a nation-wide exercise.
> 
> Kramnik focuses his analysis first on the Kaliningrad exclave.  Russia has practiced its defense of this region since the mid-2000s on an expanding scale. But the first large-scale drill in Kaliningrad, Kramnik says, was Zapad-2009.
> 
> Kaliningrad is where the pattern of special attention to troop mobility developed. In “surprise inspections,” military units from almost every armed service and branch were delivered by ground, rail, sea, or air transport to unfamiliar ranges in that region to conduct training missions.
> 
> The pattern has repeated in each of Russia’s “strategic directions.” Although Kramnik doesn’t describe it as such, it is, in effect, the establishment of expeditionary forces within the Russian military intended for internal transfer and use on any of Russia’s borders (or beyond them).
> 
> If mobility questions play a key role in Kaliningrad, Kramnik continues, they are dominant when it comes to the Arctic.  All Arctic deployments depend on Navy and Air Forces transport capabilities.  Then he writes:
> 
> “It relies first and foremost on reestablishment of infrastructure which supports, if necessary, the redeployment [переброска] of troops by sea and by air and not requiring large numbers of personnel for daily service and security.  13 airfields, radar stations, repaired ports and other facilities allow forces to return quickly ‘in a threatening period.’  And to control the surrounding sea and air space a rather sufficiently compact grouping based here on a permanent basis.”
> 
> Kramnik concludes that Russia is confronting its weakness — armed forces not large enough to garrison its immense territory.  This increased attention to strategic maneuver is a means to compensate for an insufficient number of troops.  He takes a comment from Viktor Murakhovskiy:
> 
> “Today we don’t have a single self-sufficient grouping on any of our [strategic] directions.  This is the main reason for the great attention the Armed Forces leadership allocates to the potential for redeploying forces.”
> 
> Mobility, guaranteed by a developed railroad network, and in distant and isolated TVDs by the world’s second largest inventory of military-transport aviation, should support the potential for Russia, if necessary, to “swing the pendulum” — effectively maneuvering forces between different TVDs, Kramnik writes.  The capacity provided by the civilian airlines and fleet can also add to this.
> 
> But besides men, Russia also lacks enough transport aircraft.
> 
> Kramnik writes that while attention has gone to constructing and reconstructing airfields and finding personnel to service them, the VTA’s order-of-battle is in critical condition, especially in terms of light and medium transports.  The average age of the An-26 inventory is nearly 35 years; the An-12 more than 45 years.
> 
> Events of the last year in Ukraine ended what were already difficult talks with Kyiv about building the An-70 and restarting production of the An-124.  Meanwhile, much of the Antonov Design Bureau’s competence has degraded, according to CAST Deputy Director Konstantin Makiyenko.
> 
> So today, Kramnik says, Russia has at its disposal only one serial VTA aircraft — the modernized Il-76, developed 40 years ago with serious limits on the weight and dimensions of military equipment it can deliver.  It will be supplemented by the Il-112 (light) and Il-214 (medium) transports, and by a “future aviation system transport aviation” or PAK TA.
> 
> The very same reported PAK TA that generated hysterical press here, then here, and here by promising to land an entire armored division of new Russian T-14 / Armata tanks overnight, anywhere in the world.  From an aircraft industry at pains to duplicate large but old designs like Antonov’s?  Obviously, a sudden outbreak of irrational Soviet-style giantism.
> 
> In the end, Kramnik concludes that VTA needs a high priority or Russia will have trouble moving combat capable groupings to the Arctic and Far East.  New aerial tankers are needed as well.


----------



## pbi

My take on this is that Putin, in order to maintain power and prevent Russians from asking serious questions about the future of their country, has mixed up a very nasty and dangerous stew of extreme nationalism, religious fervor and unthinking social regression. Combine these with the xenophobia and racism which are, in my opinion, both deeply rooted in Russian culture, and you get something quite scary.

Personally, I find nothing very "left wing" or "communist" about Putin's Russia at all. It bears more resemblance to a fascist or right-wing nationalist regime, since it relies on all the same tricks, and appeals to the same vile instincts.

As we sometimes see in the West, it's all too easy to wage a campaign to silence or demonize critics of the government by condemning them as "unpatriotic", or "in the pay of foreign interests", or, worse, "elites". (Funny how a word which once had such a good connotation has somehow become an epithet). The difference in the West is that the activities of a formal political opposition and of a media critical of the government of the day are both fairy well established, there is generally reliable rule of law, and we have at least a reasonable chance of a change of government after a few years.

In my view none of these things currently exist in Russia, (nor have any history) which makes the situation all the more alarming.


----------



## a_majoor

pbi said:
			
		

> My take on this is that Putin, in order to maintain power and prevent Russians from asking serious questions about the future of their country, has mixed up a very nasty and dangerous stew of extreme nationalism, religious fervor and unthinking social regression. Combine these with the xenophobia and racism which are, in my opinion, both deeply rooted in Russian culture, and you get something quite scary.
> 
> Personally, I find nothing very "left wing" or "communist" about Putin's Russia at all. It bears more resemblance to a fascist or right-wing   left wing nationalist regime, since it relies on all the same tricks, and appeals to the same vile instincts.
> 
> As we sometimes see in the West, it's all too easy to wage a campaign to silence or demonize critics of the government by condemning them as "unpatriotic", or "in the pay of foreign interests", or, worse, "elites". (Funny how a word which once had such a good connotation has somehow become an epithet). The difference in the West is that the activities of a formal political opposition and of a media critical of the government of the day are both fairy well established, there is generally reliable rule of law, and we have at least a reasonable chance of a change of government after a few years.
> 
> In my view none of these things currently exist in Russia, (nor have any history) which makes the situation all the more alarming.



Communism, Fascism, National Socialism, the various "cult of personality" regimes like the DPRK or Venezuela are all subsets of Socialism.


----------



## Boxtop22

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Communism, Fascism, National Socialism, the various "cult of personality" regimes like the DPRK or Venezuela are all subsets of Socialism.




That is pretty off topic, and unverified. You would first have to define what you consider to be socialism, and draw a line between actually socialist regimes and those who claimed to be.




			
				pbi said:
			
		

> My take on this is that Putin, in order to maintain power and prevent Russians from asking serious questions about the future of their country, has mixed up a very nasty and dangerous stew of extreme nationalism, religious fervor and unthinking social regression. Combine these with the xenophobia and racism which are, in my opinion, both deeply rooted in Russian culture, and you get something quite scary.
> 
> Personally, I find nothing very "left wing" or "communist" about Putin's Russia at all. It bears more resemblance to a fascist or right-wing nationalist regime, since it relies on all the same tricks, and appeals to the same vile instincts.
> 
> As we sometimes see in the West, it's all too easy to wage a campaign to silence or demonize critics of the government by condemning them as "unpatriotic", or "in the pay of foreign interests", or, worse, "elites". (Funny how a word which once had such a good connotation has somehow become an epithet). The difference in the West is that the activities of a formal political opposition and of a media critical of the government of the day are both fairy well established, there is generally reliable rule of law, and we have at least a reasonable chance of a change of government after a few years.
> 
> In my view none of these things currently exist in Russia, (nor have any history) which makes the situation all the more alarming.



I have to say that I find this to be a little bit oversimplified. Also, the whole part about xenophobia being deeply rooted in Russian culture, is kind of a huge cliche. I personally did not find Russia to be more racist than many European countries. I mean, one could argue that racism is deep rooted in the American culture as well (Obama is black? So what...). I am not trying to compare, I am just saying these are pretty vague statements that do not really mean anything and are very hard to substantiate. Not that I want to defend the Russians, but I think generalizing and oversimplifying prevents us from fully understanding them and their culture, and as long as we keep doing that, we won't provide adequate answers to the Russian equation. I see where you're going though, and I agree with the general idea but their society is far more stratified than most people try to describe it as. 

I've seen a lot of highly educated, cultured, anti establishment people in Russia. They are not as vocal, true, but we tend to diminish the power of the people in Russia. They have a voice, they have power, they just haven't resorted to using it yet because they need more incentives for that. It's a cultural difference, a fundamental one, they won't change their society for progress, they'll change it out of need, there is a certain cultural stoicism accross their land. If you want a good indicator of the people's potential power, look at Putin's efforts to convince them. He resorted to big-media campaigns, he took risks and put himself in situations he hates, just to get Russians on his side. Unrelated to the current crisis, he fired Moscow's mayor during the big fires, a very-very close friend of his. He wouldn't have done that if he didn't fear popular pressure. Russia is corrupt, and it's far from being a democracy like we imagine it, but it is also very far from being that sort of fascist / nazi State where people are deprived of all rights, can't express themselves, can't assemble, etc. I've seen gay people protesting, I've seen anti-Putin protesting, I've seen all sorts of people protesting in big numbers there. At the end of the day, we must make sure not to fall in his trap, an mix the Russians, Russia and Putin all together. His objective is that we believe that he has the support of his country, and on the other side, he wants to convince his people that they must support him, because we're against them...trickeyyy.

As for Putin, of course he resorts to scare-tactics and fear mongering, but that's as old as politics. Find me a country which doesn't? Half of the global war on drugs, war on terror, was pretty much excessive scaremongering to support ideological objectives (i.e. the neocon's era). I recognize that he is a massively corrupt son-of-a-borsch but that's part of the game, that's politics in about 80% of the world. It's a messy game, often dirty, sometimes bloody.


----------



## jollyjacktar

Some of the new military gear on parade practice for the Victory parade.  Photos and video at story link.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3067609/Putin-unveils-new-Russian-tank-1993-powerful-gun-huge-arsenal-sophisticated-military-hardware.html


----------



## MilEME09

The T-14 and its family seem to be a good concept, many parts will probably be interchangeable between all the vehicles.


----------



## CougarKing

Vox.com

*Why one of Russia's top foreign policy experts is worried about a major war with Europe*
Updated by Max Fisher 



> Western countries have sought to sanction and isolate Russia over its actions in Ukraine. They have increased their military activity, particularly in the NATO-allied Baltic states along Russia's borders, to deter any more aggression. Russia, in turn, has sought to cultivate European allies who could split the anti-Russian coalition. It has also increased its own military activity along the borders of NATO, and it has warned repeatedly that it could use nuclear weapons to deter a Western attack. Both sides are competing for influence in Germany, which is widely seen as Europe's deciding vote on any Western response to Russia — economic, political, or military.
> 
> In Western capitals, policymakers tend to be more focused on Middle Eastern problems such as ISIS or Iran. *Those paying close attention, though, warn that Russia could try to permanently split NATO, or even that the saber-rattling could escalate out of control into a full-blown war that nobody wants.*
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## CougarKing

While Russia will always loom large in Poland's foreign policy because of proximity and historical reasons, it will also place centre stage in that country's next election because of the current Eastern Ukraine conflict.

Foreign Policy



> *Don’t Bring a Dove to a Polish Hawk Fight
> As Poland readies for its presidential election, one thing is certain: Russia is a threat*
> 
> WARSAW — On Feb. 14, Magdalena Ogórek, a left-wing candidate in Poland’s presidential race, said if she were elected, she “would pick up the phone to call the Russian president” to normalize relations between Moscow and Warsaw. As it happens, it’s an unlikely scenario: The 36-year-old historian and TV personality is polling just 3 percent. But her comment sparked the question every candidate has now had to think about in the run up to the May 10 presidential election: Would you call Vladimir Putin?
> 
> The incumbent, President Bronislaw Komorowski, dismissed it outright. “If someone thinks that peace in Europe depends on a phone call, then they’re a bit out of touch with reality,” he said in a television interview.“If someone thinks that peace in Europe depends on a phone call, then they’re a bit out of touch with reality,” he said in a television interview. But that didn’t stop his main rival, Andrzej Duda, from releasing a campaign video showing a snoring Komorowski being woken in the night to take a phone call from Moscow. The clip ends with the words: “Do you want to continue worrying who will answer the phone?”
> 
> *Foreign policy concerns — far beyond phone calls to the Kremlin — have been more prominent in this Polish election than previous ones,* says Marcin Zaborowski, director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). According to a recent poll, Poles consider security the most important topic in the presidential campaign. The spotlight has been on the conflict in Ukraine and its implications for Poland and the region.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Edward Campbell

See here for a useful overview of the Sino-Russian _balance_.


----------



## CougarKing

I am guessing some of you aren't surprised that Obama sent his Secstate to handle Putin instead of going there in person and staring the Russian leader in the eye...

Agence-France Presse




> *Putin to host John Kerry for high-stakes Sochi talks*
> AFP By Anna Smolchenko
> 1 hour ago
> Moscow (AFP) - President Vladimir Putin is expected to host US Secretary of State John Kerry for talks in Sochi on Tuesday, in the first visit to Russia by the US top diplomat since the start of the crisis in Ukraine.
> 
> Ties between Moscow and Washington collapsed after Russia seized Crimea and buttressed separatists in eastern Ukraine, but after a year of raging tensions signs are emerging that both Russia and the West may be ready for a detente.
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## OldSolduer

Almost twenty years ago I had the privlege of dining with some members of the German Army in Shilo. The German company 2 IC said one thing that stood out:

`Russia is still too close`


----------



## Kirkhill

Moscow Times



> *Sanctions Force Russia to Abandon Next-Gen Warship Construction Plans*
> 
> The Moscow Times
> 
> May. 20 2015 21:24 Last edited 21:24
> 
> Yekaterina Kuzmina / Vedomosti
> 
> *Severnaya Verf shipyard has had trouble finding replacements to Western components used in the design.*
> Construction of *a new class of highly advanced warships for the Russian navy has been abandoned after shipbuilders were unable to find parts to replace foreign hardware cut off by Western sanctions over the Ukraine crisis*, news agency RIA Novosti reported Wednesday.
> 
> "Currently two of the ships are being built at our shipyards, [but] apparently they will be the only two ships from this project," the marketing director of the Severnaya Verf shipyard, Leonid Kuzmin, told RIA Wednesday. The yard has had trouble finding replacements to Western components used in the design.
> 
> The Gremyashchy-class corvettes — a class of small warship — are derived from the older Steregushchy-class corvettes but built to allow longer missions and launch cruise missiles.
> 
> But these plans have been torpedoed by the realities of Russia's import substitution drive, which was intended to mitigate the effects of a Western arms embargo by spurring the development of comparable domestic equivalents.
> 
> *Russian-made alternative components have been made for the two Gremyashchy-class ships already under construction, but Kuzmin said they are not as good as the Western hardware they replace*, and the final eight vessels on order will be built as the normal Steregushchy-class corvettes the ships were based on.



The question Vlad has to ask himself, if he resorts to the Brezhnev era 30 year old nucular (  ;D ) option - is how many of those rusty firing pistols would actually detonate - and how many of them would even lift off.


----------



## The Bread Guy

And Russia's Deputy PM keeps the rhetoric dial cranked to 11+ ....
_*"Russian Official: 'Tanks Don't Need Visas' "*_

Then again, maybe he's also Russia's Minister for Playing to the Base - this, from his Twitter feed:


> It's not Russia that threatens the West. Its foundations will crash down under the pressure of ISIS and gays


----------



## Old Sweat

Hamish Seggie said:
			
		

> Almost twenty years ago I had the privlege of dining with some members of the German Army in Shilo. The German company 2 IC said one thing that stood out:
> 
> `Russia is still too close`



In the mid-sixties the Germans tested a number of wheeled and tracked vehicles (I got this second hand from some friends who were there at the time.) in Shilo. The Canadians who saw the vehicles were impressed with the high ground clearance. When asked the Germans replied that that they were not going to get immobilized by Russian snow and mud again.

It could have been a bit of a joke, and remember how the Germans are noted for having a sense of humour, not. There was a lingering doubt about German militarism then 20 years after the end of the war. I remember reading a bit in Time magazine that light heartedly proclaimed that on the 20th anniversary of VE Day, all the Volkswagen bugs in the world would turn into Tiger tanks and take over the world.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> And Russia's Deputy PM keeps the rhetoric dial cranked to 11+ ....
> _*"Russian Official: 'Tanks Don't Need Visas' "*_
> 
> Then again, maybe he's also Russia's Minister for Playing to the Base - this, from his Twitter feed:










..........








 > > > > >


----------



## a_majoor

Applying pressure in unexpected places:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/05/28/putin-fumes-over-fifa-arrests/



> *Putin Fumes over FIFA Arrests*
> 
> Vladimir Putin is loudly railing against the dramatic U.S. arrest of FIFA’s top officials in Zurich for massive corruption, using his favorite rhetorical tricks of reversing the narrative and demonizing America. Reuters reports:
> 
> Putin said the arrests in Switzerland on Wednesday were an “obvious attempt” to prevent FIFA head Sepp Blatter’s re-election this week but that the 79-year-old had Russia’s backing.
> 
> “If anything happened, it did not happen on U.S. territory and the United states [sic] has nothing to do with it,” he said. “This is yet another blatant attempt (by the United States) to extend its jurisdiction to other states.” […]
> Swiss authorities also announced a criminal investigation into the awarding of the next two World Cups, including the 2018 tournament which was granted to Russia in 2010 by a committee containing two of the indicted FIFA officials.
> 
> One of the reasons Putin may be so exercised is that the whole affair could call the location of the 2018 tournament into question. Putin is a man who loves sports, and and it was a huge point of pride for him when he secured the rights to host last year’s Winter Olympics in, of all places, Sochi, the seaside southern resort town where he likes to summer. The games cost a record-smashing $51 billion dollars (with some critics estimating that embezzlement accounts for more than half of that figure). That victory was multiplied when Russia’s bid to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup in 13 cities, including Sochi, won out. The Russian Sports Minister told state media that Russia’s right to host the Cup was not in danger, but given the investigation into how the decisions to award the tournament to South Africa, Russia, and Qatar were made, there are good reasons to doubt that. For one, consider this passage in the New York Times report on the issue:
> 
> Despite the broad nature of the charges, the case itself arrived at the Justice Department as something of a surprise. The four-year F.B.I. investigation grew out of an unrelated inquiry into aspects of Russian organized crime by the Eurasian Joint Organized Crime Task Force in the F.B.I.’s New York office, according to people with knowledge of the case’s origins.
> 
> There’s a second reason Putin might care about the FIFA arrests. His claim that the U.S. doesn’t have rightful jurisdiction because none of the alleged criminal activity is related to America is complete bunk and almost certainly an intentional misreading of how international criminal jurisdiction works (and that’s not to mention that the Russian president hasn’t exactly been leading by example on the issue of maintaining great respect for other countries’ inviolable territorial sovereignty). Recently, he trotted out the same invalid objection about the U.S. securing an extradition order for a Russian citizen accused of industrial espionage in Sweden. A world with more prosecution of corruption is a world that’s harder for Putin to operate in.


----------



## The Bread Guy

And on the lighter side, from the satire site Duffle Blog ....

_*"Russia Threatens Export Ban On Cheap Vodka, Organized Crime"*_

 ;D


----------



## opcougar

*[size=12pt]Russia Will Have 55 Stealth Sukhoi T-50 Fighters By 2020, But Are They As Good As The US Stealth Jets?[/size]*






http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-will-have-55-stealth-sukhoi-t-50-fighters-2020-are-they-good-us-stealth-jets-1763583


----------



## a_majoor

Russian aviation technology really isn't up to snuff, and things like this only put them farther behind the eight ball. Whatever the faults of the F-35, at least the program is running and will produce hundreds, if not thousands of fighters, while the PAK-FA stalled out at 12:

http://pjmedia.com/vodkapundit/2015/06/05/those-stealth-fighter-blues/?singlepage=true



> *Those Stealth Fighter Blues*
> 
> Building fifth-generation fighters is hard, and the Russians so far just aren't up to the challenge.
> by Stephen Green
> June 5, 2015 - 6:39 am
> 
> The Russians just cut back — way back — on their PAK FA T-50* stealth fighter procurement. And it’s not because Moscow is short on cash, but because the fifth-gen fighter isn’t living up to expectations:
> 
> The first sign something was very wrong appeared in March. On March 24. Yuri Borisov, Russia’s deputy defense minister for armaments, told the Kommersant newspaper that the military is drastically cutting its number of T-50s. Instead of 52 stealth fighters, Russia will build merely 12 of them.
> 
> That’s hardly anything.
> 
> The Kremlin has produced five T-50 prototypes so far  —  and one was heavily damaged in a fire. Meanwhile, India is co-developing the plane with Russia, and New Delhi’s funding helps keep the project alive. But now Indian Air Force officials have also stopped talking to their counterparts in Moscow.
> 
> Which all puts a spotlight on Russia’s problems building so-called fifth-generation fighter jets  —  which the country needs to compete with the best the United States and China have to offer.
> 
> That bit about China is unfair. The Chinese can’t build a fourth-gen fighter without ripping off somebody else, and their engines aren’t even up to Russia’s Second World standards.
> 
> But back to the T-50′s teething problems, which we’re hearing about from Russia’s development partners in New Delhi:
> 
> 
> For more than a year, the Indian Business Standard newspaper has reported on New Delhi’s misgivings. The Indian version of the T-50 is known as the FGFA.
> 
> “The FGFA’s current AL-41F1 engines were underpowered, the Russians were reluctant to share critical design information, and the fighter would eventually cost too much,” the paper reported, based on briefings from Indian Air Force officials in December 2013.
> 
> A month later, more bad news leaked to the press. India wanted a bigger share of the project. But the engine was still bad, it still cost too much, the plane’s radar was “inadequate” and its “stealth features badly engineered.”
> 
> Then in June, a T-50 landed at the Zhukovsky testing grounds near Moscow … and its engine caught fire. Russian officials said the damage was minor.
> 
> Moscow claims money problem are to blame for the scaled-back procurement, but that lie is revealed by this report:
> 
> 
> Putin is allocating unprecedented amounts of secret funds to accelerate Russia’s largest military build-up since the Cold War, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The part of the federal budget that is so-called black—authorized but not itemized—has doubled since 2010 to 21% and now totals 3.2 trillion rubles ($60 billion), the Gaidar Institute, an independent think tank in Moscow, estimates.
> 
> Stung by sanctions over Ukraine and oil’s plunge, Putin is turning to defence spending to revive a shrinking economy.
> 
> If the PAK FA program were any damn good, Putin would find the money for it in his black budget. The Russian Air Force has been living off the scraps of the Sukhoi Su-27 — an airframe which first flew five days before Star Wars premiered in 1977. It has since been upgraded into fourth-generation “plus” planes like the Su-30 and Su-33, but the fact remains that Moscow hasn’t been able to develop a world-beating fighter in nearly 40 years.
> 
> And even back then, their engines sucked — less powerful and much less reliable than Western jets, and with maybe 2/3rds the service life.
> 
> The safest guess as to what happened to that burned-up T-50 is that something went very, very wrong with the engines. And if Moscow really wants to build a fighter as big as the T-50 — all weapons are stored internally and it has a massive wingspan nearly six feet wider than our F-22 — then they’re going to need big, powerful, and reliable engines to power that pig.
> 
> But they don’t, and throwing billions of dollars at it isn’t going to solve a problem which Russian aircraft have suffered from for 50 years or more. The Soviets could paper over that problem by building thousands of expendable jets, hoping to overwhelm NATO with sheer numbers. But the advent in the ’70s of airborne radar platforms and long-range air-to-air missiles obviated much of the Soviet’s numerical advantage. Stealth complicates things for the Russians even further. The Soviets responded to the challenge by trying to build fewer models of better aircraft — the Su-27 and the MiG-29. The MiG-29 never lived up to its promise, and the Russians must still depend on variants of the Su-27 well into the 21st century. It may be true that Western air forces are far too small, but the Russian Air Force is far too old.
> 
> Building fifth-generation fighters is hard, and the Russians so far just aren’t up to the challenge.


----------



## a_majoor

Various moves and countermoves in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. The various nations have been agitating for soem sort of response to Russian agression, and now the US is offering to preposition some equipment. Russia, of course makse more threats in response:

http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCAKBN0OV17A20150615?sp=true&utm_content=buffere3dd1&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer



> *Russia says will retaliate if U.S. weapons stationed on its borders*
> Mon Jun 15, 2015 2:39pm EDT
> 
> By Gabriela Baczynska and Wiktor Szary
> 
> MOSCOW/WARSAW (Reuters) - A plan by Washington to station tanks and heavy weapons in NATO states on Russia's border would be the most aggressive U.S. act since the Cold War, and Moscow would retaliate by beefing up its own forces, a Russian defense official said on Monday.
> 
> The United States is offering to store military equipment on allies' territory in eastern Europe, a proposal aimed at reassuring governments worried that after the conflict in Ukraine, they could be the Kremlin's next target.
> 
> Poland and the Baltic states, where officials say privately they have been frustrated the NATO alliance has not taken more decisive steps to deter Russia, welcomed the decision by Washington to take the lead.
> 
> But others in the region were more cautious, fearing their countries could be caught in the middle of a new arms race between Russia and the United States.
> 
> "If heavy U.S. military equipment, including tanks, artillery batteries and other equipment really does turn up in countries in eastern Europe and the Baltics, that will be the most aggressive step by the Pentagon and NATO since the Cold War," Russian defense ministry official General Yuri Yakubov said.
> 
> "Russia will have no option but to build up its forces and resources on the Western strategic front," Interfax news agency quoted him as saying.
> 
> He said the Russian response was likely to include speeding up the deployment of Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave bordered by Poland and Lithuania, and beefing up Russian forces in ex-Soviet Belarus.
> 
> "Our hands are completely free to organize retaliatory steps to strengthen our Western frontiers," Yakubov said.
> 
> The Russian Foreign Ministry said: "We hope that reason will prevail and the situation in Europe will be prevented from sliding into a new military confrontation which may have dangerous consequences."
> 
> ALLIED ARMY
> 
> The Pentagon said on Monday the U.S. military was in the process of deciding where to store a battalion's worth of military equipment in Europe. The decision is part of a long-term effort to maintain equipment for a heavy brigade in the region to facilitate U.S. rotational training with NATO allies.
> 
> "This is purely positioning of equipment to better facilitate our ability to conduct training," said Army Colonel Steve Warren, a Pentagon spokesman, noting that two battalions of equipment already was stored there.
> 
> Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, told Reuters in December the equipment set for the full brigade would be about 160 M-1 tanks plus M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles and self-propelled howitzers. A Pentagon official said on Monday the total number of vehicles would be about 220.
> 
> U.S. officials said a proposal under review envisages storing a company's worth of equipment, enough for 150 soldiers, in each of the three Baltic nations: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
> 
> Enough equipment for a company or possibly a battalion, or about 750 soldiers, would also be located in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and possibly Hungary.
> 
> The idea was that, in the event of an attack on NATO's eastern border, the United States could quickly fly in troops who would use the equipment, cutting out the weeks or months it would take to transport convoys of gear overland across Europe.
> 
> However, the U.S. proposal could cause tensions within NATO, an alliance that often struggles to accommodate more hawkish members such as Poland or Lithuania alongside other states that want to avoid a military stand-off with Russia at any cost.
> 
> Speaking after talks in Warsaw with the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, Polish Defence Minister Tomasz Siemoniak said he expected a final U.S. decision on the equipment within a few weeks.
> 
> "They know how important this is to us, because we want to build a permanent U.S. presence, the allied army here on the Polish territory," Siemoniak told reporters.
> 
> "It seems to me that such enterprises, that is equipment warehouses, are a very crucial step when it comes to building such a presence."
> 
> A spokesman for Lithuania's foreign ministry, Kestutis Vaskelevicius, said any increased NATO presence was intended to improve the security of the Baltic states. "(It) is not directed against anyone, and it does not threaten anyone," he said.
> 
> TWO-SPEED NATO
> 
> Since Russia's annexation of Ukraine's Crimea Peninsula and a rebellion by Moscow-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states - countries with a history of Russian occupation - have pushed NATO for a muscular response.
> 
> But proposals for a permanent NATO combat presence in eastern Europe were blocked by Germany and some other alliance members. Instead, NATO intensified exercises, rotating troops through the region and set up a command headquarters for a rapid reaction force in north-west Poland.
> 
> Sources close to the government in Poland, and other states in the region, said that response persuaded them they could not fully rely on NATO, and that their best bet in the event of an attack was that the U.S. military would come to their aid.
> 
> At a NATO summit in Wales last year, agreement was reached on "pre-positioning" military equipment in eastern Europe, but the Pentagon's plan appeared to go further and faster than measures envisaged by the alliance.
> 
> The initiative could force some former Warsaw Pact countries now in NATO to make uncomfortable choices.
> 
> Bulgaria and Hungary both say they are committed members of the alliance, but they have maintained close cultural and commercial ties to Moscow, and may not want to jeopardize those links by storing U.S. military equipment on their soil.
> 
> Rosen Plevneliev, the Bulgarian President, said it was too early to say if his country would join the Pentagon's initiative.
> 
> "At the current moment there is no proposal whatsoever to the Bulgarian government upon which we can start discussions," he said.
> 
> (Additional reporting by Andrius Sytas in Vilniu, Tsvetelia Tsolova in Sofia, Katya Golubkova in Moscow and Adrian Croft in Brussels; editing by Giles Elgood)


----------



## a_majoor

When the Chinese close their doors to Russian bankers, you know things are getting bad. Propping up Russia as a stick to beat the West (and keep people's minds off the South China Sea) would seem to be an ideal strategic use of their financial power:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/18/chinese-banks-closed-for-russian-business/



> *Chinese Banks Closed For Russian Business*
> 
> Here’s still more evidence that at least the financial part of the sanctions on Russia is having an effect: Yuri Soloviev, the deputy chairman of VTB, Russia’s second largest lender, wrote an op-ed to complain about how Chinese financial firms are declining to work with their Russian counterparts these days. In his piece in Finance Asia titled “Unlocking the Potential of Russia-Asia Cooperation”, after the usual platitudes about all the things going well, he gets to a section called “sticking points”:
> 
> China’s ambiguous position regarding Russian banks in the wake of US and EU sanctions is a key issue holding back progress toward greater bilateral cooperation. Most Chinese banks will currently not execute interbank transactions with their Russian peers. In addition, Chinese banks have significantly curtailed their involvement in interbank foreign trade deals, such as providing trade finance.
> China’s domestic capital markets are another area of untapped potential. Currently, foreign companies are barred from raising equity or debt capital on China’s local yuan markets.
> 
> Avid TAI readers might recall Anders Aslund earlier this year pretty much predicting that the financial sanctions would start to leave a mark:
> 
> The Dodd-Frank Act and similar EU regulations have reinforced the powers of U.S. and EU financial regulators, compelling international banks to exercise extreme caution. The banks’ internal due diligence departments are far more strict than the actual law, and they prevented loans to Russian companies from going through even when the transactions were formally legal, because they feared that the rules might suddenly change. Even Chinese state banks are now reluctant to lend to Russia. As a consequence, Russia has become exposed to a liquidity freeze.
> 
> A liquidity freeze or “sudden stop” of international financing is a frightful condition. It hit much of the world after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. The smaller and the more financially exposed an economy was, the greater the damage. Three of the worst-hit economies were the Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—which faced GDP slumps of 14-18 percent in 2009. Interestingly, these three countries had state finances that were as stellar as Russia’s, with more or less balanced state budgets and minimal public debt, before the crash, but it did not save them. Thus these Russian virtues are beneficial, but are no guarantee of financial stability. The key commonality of these four countries is that they all lacked access to international finance. For the Baltic countries, the liquidity freeze lasted only three quarters. It is likely to last much longer for Russia.
> 
> Why does this matter? While the Russian state under Vladimir Putin paid off all its debt and tucked away a sizable rainy day fund in the 2000s, Russian firms are deeply indebted. We once again direct you to the excellent piece by Vladislav Inozemtsev from a few months back for context:
> 
> Russia throughout the 2000s remained an economy with high inflation, and therefore with high interest rates. At the same time, the ruble/dollar exchange fluctuations were relatively small during the whole period (30.6 rubles per dollar in early 2002, 24.4 rubles per dollar in early 2008, and 33.1 rubles per dollar in early 2014). In such circumstances large Russian companies listed on foreign stock exchanges and showing healthy financial results easily obtained three- to ten-year loans from foreign banks at 3.5–5.5 percent per annum, instead of paying 12–14 percent for one- to two-year loans from Russian banks. As a result, by the beginning of 2014 Russian corporations owed foreign creditors more than $678 billion (22.4 trillion rubles), while borrowing from Russian banks totaled only 19.3 trillion rubles. Most of these foreign loans were constantly replaced by new ones; in other words, the corporations borrowed money not just to acquire additional capital but also to pay off older obligations—but their overall amount of debt grew steadily by $60–70 billion per year from 2009 to 2013.
> 
> Bills coming due, income drying up, and no way to borrow money: it’s a sticky situation for anyone to be in. The Kremlin might try to put on a brave face by talking about meeting EU sanctions with counter-sanctions of their own. But the truth is, they’ve got an incomparably weaker hand to play. They’re vulnerable, and they know it.


----------



## Kirkhill

If true then Capitalism wins again.

Money trumps both policy and politics.  The Chinese have met the enemy and they are us.....


----------



## a_majoor

And more unrest in the Near Abroad. Funny how ham handed crony capitalism and centralized control tends to annoy people even without Wstern intervention....

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/06/24/protests-in-yerevan-have-the-kremlin-spooked/



> *Protests in Yerevan Have the Kremlin Spooked*
> 
> Street protests in Armenia have continued for a fifth straight day in response to an electricity price hike of 16.7 percent announced on June 17 by the government in this poor landlocked nation of 3 million. The protests show no sign of easing off. The Guardian:
> 
> The protests in Yerevan, which began on Friday, escalated significantly after police fired water cannons to disperse seated demonstrators on Tuesday morning. By Wednesday evening thousands of people had gathered on Marshal Baghramyan Avenue near the presidential palace, chanting slogans and blocking traffic.
> 
> In the early hours of Wednesday, ruling party politicians and others formed a human shield between police and protesters, although negotiations over a potential meeting with the president, Serzh Sargsyan, fell through for the second night.
> 
> Why is this significant? The parent company of Electric Networks of Armenia, the firm that has a monopolistic grip on electricity distribution on the country and that his been insisting on the price hike, is Inter RAO, a large Russian energy company whose chairman is none other Igor Sechin, one of Vladimir Putin’s closest pals.
> 
> As the indispensable Leonid Bershidsky has pointed out, even if the protests hadn’t been warmly greeted by Ukraine’s Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen Avakov (who happens to be an ethnic Armenian), Moscow was more than ready to see the West’s fingerprints all over them:
> 
> 
> “I’m sure there are plenty of militants from Ukraine and there is an outside coordination center run by the same political operators who ran the Maidan in Kiev,” Russian political scientist Sergei Markov wrote on Facebook. “There can be no doubt that this is no spontaneous outpouring of popular protest in Yerevan. It’s all a matter of technology and the organizers’ main goal is to incite bloodshed.”
> According to Markov, the Yerevan disturbances are the response of a sinister Western cabal to Armenia’s 2013 decision to opt out of a trade and association agreement with the European Union and instead join Putin’s Eurasian Union.
> 
> In addition, the Guardian notes that Igor Morozov, a member of the foreign affairs committee in the Duma, accused the American embassy of actively participating in fomenting the unrest in Yerevan.
> Bershidsky thinks that the Armenian protests don’t yet stand much of a chance of turning into a Ukraine-style revolution (read his whole piece here for more context) and he may well be right. But then again, the world has not been short of surprises this year, and with it never being clear just how much Kremlin bluster is propaganda and how much is serious, it’s safest not to write anything completely off.
> 
> In any case, we here at TAI will certainly be following events on Twitter using the #ElectricYerevan tag.


----------



## threestorms

Well now that oil prices are up that will affect Russian for sure.

ie they will benefit from it.

On the flip side I would love to see people go to the streets when water and electricity is allowed to be upped by 30%ish (Ontario)


----------



## The Bread Guy

I see Russia's Info-machine can sometimes be guilty of "premature ejaculation" ....

June 11, 2015:  _"Kremlin Blames Technical Glitch for 'Fake Firing' of Kaliningrad Governor -- The Kremlin has apologized for a "technical glitch" that caused an announcement to appear briefly on its website in the early hours of Thursday morning claiming that President Vladimir Putin has dismissed the governor of Russia's Baltic exclave, Kaliningrad.  The governor, Nikolai Tsukanov, remains in his job and "there is no question of an early resignation," Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in comments carried by state-run news agencies.  Peskov sought to stress the Kremlin's support for the governor, saying Tsukanov will run for a second term this fall, and enjoys the president's endorsement for his re-election bid.  "A technical glitch happened during the night, and a decree about Tsukanov's early resignation was issued," Peskov was quoted as saying by state-run news agency RIA Novosti. "That decree was recalled, it was removed from the presidential website. You are all witnesses to that. Tsukanov remains governor." ...._
June 28, 2015:  _"Executive Order on early termination of Kaliningrad Region Governor’s mandate -- Following a request from Kaliningrad Region Governor Nikolai Tsukanov to step down ahead of term, the President accepted his resignation and appointed Mr Tsukanov Acting Governor of the region until an elected Kaliningrad Region Governor takes office."_
Oooopsie ....


----------



## The Bread Guy

Really?  Really?


> Russia's Prosecutor General's Office has opened an investigation into the legitimacy of the independence of the Baltic states. The office is to look into whether a decision, made by the State Council of the USSR in 1991, to recognize the three breakaway states as independent nations was legal, newsru.com reports.
> 
> Russian news agency Interfax quotes a source saying that Russia's Prosecutor General's Office has accepted an enquiry previously made by several parliament members. "The decision to recognize the Baltic states' independence is juridically harmful, because it was adopted by an unconstitutional body," the source said.
> 
> He added that the enquiry would be analogous to the one that the office made regarding the status of Crimea, ruling recently that the 1954 decision to hand it over to the Ukrainian SSR was illegal. The source noted, however, that this conclusion of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office did not carry any legal consequences.
> 
> "The Office of the Prosecutor General of Russia merely stated that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine under Nikita Khrushchev was unconstitutional, because the decision was made by state bodies that were not authorized to do so," the source explained ....


----------



## McG

If you are inclined to (maybe one day) launch an invasion, then you may as well get around to laying the groundwork with your legal pretext sooner as opposed to later.


----------



## The Bread Guy

MCG said:
			
		

> If you are inclined to (maybe one day) launch an invasion, then you may as well get around to laying the groundwork with your legal pretext sooner as opposed to later.


But, but, but .... _"Putin Wants Peaceful Coexistence With the West"_


----------



## McG

A common foe may be knocking on Russia's southern door.


> *Islamic State may threaten Russia's Caucasus*
> By Sarah Rainsford
> BBC News
> 29 Jun 2015
> 
> The head of Russia's Security Council has identified Islamic State (IS) as the greatest threat to world peace and security, and it seems the danger could be getting closer to home.
> 
> The militant Islamist group has proclaimed the establishment of a wilayaat, or province, in Russia's mainly-Muslim North Caucasus, suggesting it may be gaining the upper hand in a battle for control over radical forces there.
> 
> The statement follows an anonymous audio message posted online pledging allegiance to IS on behalf of militants in four regions.
> 
> But it remains unclear how far - and high - that support may reach among militants previously loyal to the banned, al-Qaeda-affiliated group Caucasus Emirate, which has long sought to carve out an Islamist state in the region.
> 
> Caucasus Emirate's presumed head has made no comment. Meanwhile, analysts say most militants who have publicly switched support to IS are largely unknown figures.
> 
> Rooted in the Chechen separatist movement of the 1990s, Caucasus Emirate has committed numerous terror attacks against civilians, including the Moscow metro bombing of 2010 that killed dozens. But its insurgency has recently focused on Russia's security forces.
> 
> Some fear an upsurge in deadly attacks if the network does indeed affiliate itself with IS.
> 
> "I don't think they are planning just to separate off a piece of the North Caucasus for themselves, to create a territory controlled by their jihadists," Grigory Shvedov of the internet news agency Caucasus Knot believes.
> 
> "I think the plan would be to use the region for terror attacks in Russia, which would show their reach and put them 'on the map'," he adds.
> 
> It is perhaps that heightened danger, coupled with renewed IS gains in Syria, which prompted a rare phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Barack Obama on Thursday.
> 
> The White House says Islamic State was the top issue for discussion: the leaders' last call in February focused exclusively on the Ukraine crisis.
> 
> "Of course it is in our mutual interest to co-operate on this with the West, though we disagree on other issues," former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told the BBC.
> 
> "Modern security threats are international, we can't fight them alone," he added - a theme that Russian officials have begun to stress.
> 
> *'Frustrated rebels'*
> 
> The head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has dismissed claims of an IS province in the region as "bluff", but also said the threat of the IS "virus" was not being ignored.
> 
> "We will destroy the devils and bandits without mercy," he pledged.
> 
> Whilst highly controversial, his tough methods have been relatively successful in suppressing the threat from the Caucasus Emirate in Chechnya - but the usual tactics could backfire badly with IS.
> 
> "I think a lot of rebels, especially the young, are very frustrated and would support a more radical response," believes Grigory Shvedov, and says that IS would back that.
> 
> Official estimates of how many Russian citizens have travelled to Syria and Iraq to join IS differ, though the most conservative count is more than 1,000.
> 
> Just this month, 13 potential recruits were returned to Moscow from the Syrian border, including a teenage female student.
> 
> On Thursday, Russia's Anti-Terrorism Committee said two people killed in Ingushetia were suspected of trying to recruit fighters for IS.


http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33311959


----------



## Edward Campbell

There's an article, reprinted from _Foreign Affairs_, about China's _threat_ to Russia in Central and Eastern Siberia here.


----------



## a_majoor

Russia's hand in the Greek financial crisis. Instapundit makes an interesting comment about this:


> Reagan won the Cold War, in part, by playing a long game designed to bankrupt the Soviet Union. It seems Putin now has similar aims, using the profligacy of European socialist countries such as Greece as a long-term weapon. Such profligacy holds the potential to bankrupt the EU if it continues to cave to political pressure to bailout Greece and similar entitlement-driven economies.  And if EU resists the pressure and refuses further bailouts, Russia will undoubtedly swoop in with offers of “assistance” to leaders more interested in keeping entitlements flowing than defending and preserving their countries’ freedom and democracy.



Russia's own economy is in difficulty, so offering to bail out Greece (especially given the almost certainlty of being stiffed for any loans or assistence) is perhaps a very long shot at best. Manipulating the situation and letting the EU consume itself makes much more sense, and leaves Russia's reseouces available to deal with other matters:


http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/08/is-putin-playing-puppetmaster-in-greece.html#



> *Is Putin Playing Puppetmaster in Greece?*
> 
> As the Greeks move further away from the European Union and NATO, the Kremlin is poised to reap the benefits—with rumors swirling that Putin is already calling the shots.
> 
> The weekend’s stunning repudiation  of further European bailouts by a strong majority of Greeks shocked Brussels and beyond. That 61 percent of Greek voters want nothing to do with European Union “fixes” to their country’s grave fiscal crisis, which has preoccupied the EU for five years, represents a shocking development to Eurocrats.
> 
> What happens next is on everyone’s mind. Unless Athens comes up with a revised—and more plausible—finance plan very soon, expulsion from the Eurozone appears imminent. While that could cause financial instability for Europe, and may bring bad tidings far beyond, there’s one country that seems to be savoring this crisis.
> 
> That’s Russia. To the surprise of no one who pays attention to Vladimir Putin’s persistent efforts to undermine the EU and NATO, Moscow is poised to reap political benefits from Greece’s financial collapse.
> 
> The morning after the referendum, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras spoke with Putin to discuss the fallout—a full day before Tsipras spoke with President Obama.
> 
> Neither are close ties between Athens and Moscow anything new, or exactly hidden. Tsipras’s first foreign outreach upon becoming prime minister was to Moscow’s ambassador—not to EU or NATO partners.
> 
> The affection of Greece’s ruling Syriza party for much of the Putin worldview, including a reflexive anti-American and anti-NATO posture with strong doses of “anti-imperialist” rhetoric, isn’t something Athens has been shy about. Although Syriza’s far-left political orientation would seem to make it an unlikely partner for Putin’s  conservative, even traditionalist, Kremlin, shared anti-Western values seem to be enough.
> 
> Syriza’s robust Moscow links exist at several levels and are nothing new. Ideological harmony has been matched by money deals behind the scenes. Long before taking power at the beginning of this year, party leaders had regular discussions with top Russian officials as well as with far-right activists like Alexander Dugin, a neo-fascist ideologue who intermittently has the Kremlin’s ear.
> 
> Unsurprisingly, given the extent of Greece’s financial-cum-political crisis, anti-EU and anti-American sentiments run deep, to a degree not found in any other NATO country. Mounting concerns that Athens is falling into Moscow’s orbit, its ostensible Western political and military ties notwithstanding, are no longer a fantasy.
> 
> “For Athens, NATO seems to be mostly a paper exercise at this point,” a senior Alliance official told me, expressing a common frustration at Alliance headquarters, where Greek representatives are viewed with mounting suspicion. Many in NATO fear that information shared with Greece, including intelligence, is winding up in Moscow. Recently the Alliance executed a long-overdue cull of Russian liaison officers in Brussels, many of whom were barely concealed spies, and now there’s fear that the Kremlin can make up that setback with Greek help.
> 
> It’s premature to suggest that Greece might actually leave NATO, much less the EU, since Athens gets considerable benefits from both partnerships, but it’s certainly time to ask where that country’s sympathies truly lie. More than a shared Orthodox faith, buttressed by hazy paeans to long-dead Byzantium, is at work now in the relationship between Athens and Moscow.
> 
> The involvement of Russian intelligence in present-day Greek turmoil plays an important role, albeit one seldom discussed openly. Greece has long been a playground for Kremlin spies. During the Cold War, KGB operatives worked in Greece with a degree of impunity they found in no other NATO country, while Soviet spies penetrated Greek politics and society very deeply.
> 
> Under Putin, such covert linkages have been reestablished, and secret Russian activities in Greece today enjoy a degree of openness they never had in Soviet times. Since Syriza came to power, the already significant contingent of Russian intelligence officers serving in Athens under official covers (usually as diplomats) has been bolstered, according to Western security officials. Friendly meetings between Greek officials and representatives of the SVR and GRU, Russian military intelligence, detected by NATO intelligence, have been a cause of discussion and concern in Brussels, Washington, and beyond.
> 
> It’s not like Syriza has been hiding all of this. Defense Minister Panos Kammenos, shortly after a visit to Moscow last fall, signed a memorandum of understanding between his Athens think tank, the Institute for Geopolitical Studies, and a Moscow counterpart, the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, known as RISI.
> 
> However, RISI is no ordinary think tank.Headed by Leonid Reshetnikov—a career KGB officer who retired as a lieutenant-general and the head of analysis for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, or SVR—RISI is a Kremlin outfit, a sort of governmental NGO that functions as the public face of Putin’s vast intelligence apparatus. Officially RISI is no longer part of the SVR, falling under the presidential administration, but no Western intelligence services accept that claim at face value.
> 
> “It’s like the bad old days when we didn’t trust the Greeks and they didn’t trust us. Only now Putin’s in the middle of the game.”
> 
> Reshetnikov, a one-time communist but now a devout, indeed militant, Orthodox Christian, is close to Putin and is one of the top movers and shakers in the Kremlin when it comes to spy matters. Speaking Greek and Serbian, he plays a large role in Russian activities in the Balkans, which have increased noticeably in recent months. Reshetnikov’s regular trips to southeastern Europe, where he denounces Western “imperialism” and does photo ops with senior Orthodox clergy, feature in local media, usually with praise.
> 
> Prime Minister Tsipras, too, has visited RISI headquarters, leading to the odd situation that one of the top security partnerships possessed by a NATO and EU country is with Putin’s foreign intelligence service. Current government assessments coming out of Athens “read like they’re written by the SVR—which they probably are,” bemoaned a European intelligence official. “We’ve always had our doubts about the Greeks,” he added, “but today’s situation is even worse than it was during the Cold War. The Russians are quietly running the show.”
> 
> Rumors of Russian money and influence calling the shots in Athens—or at least playing an outsized role—are no secret in NATO security circles. That Putin wants to harm Greece’s already precarious links with the EU and NATO is plain to see, and it seems to be getting close to fruition as the Greek crisis worsens.
> 
> “They’re only technically on our side,” explained a retired CIA officer with long experience in Greek matters. U.S. intelligence has never fully trusted the Greeks, with the CIA especially having misgivings stemming from the 1975 murder of Richard Welch, the agency’s station chief in Athens. While Langley blamed Phil Agee, a former CIA officer who went over to the Cubans and Soviets—think of Agee as the Ed Snowden of the mid-1970s—for Welch’s death, it was long obvious that Athens was never very eager to catch Welch’s killers. Neither did the 1988 terrorist assassination of the U.S. naval attaché to Greece, Capt. Bill Nordeen, promote trust.
> 
> Ties between U.S. intelligence and the Greek security services suffered for years, and things are getting unpleasant again. “We’re back to square one,” rued the former CIA case officer. “It’s like the bad old days when we didn’t trust the Greeks and they didn’t trust us. Only now Putin’s in the middle of the game.”
> 
> Time will tell if Moscow can pull a strategic win out of Greece’s mounting chaos. But there’s little doubt anymore that the Syriza government’s barely concealed ties with the Kremlin, particularly with its intelligence services, are causing serious heartburn inside NATO and the EU alike. It’s now Putin’s game to lose.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> But, but, but .... _"Putin Wants Peaceful Coexistence With the West"_



He certainly does, but on his terms and ever changing demands.


----------



## vonGarvin

Colin P said:
			
		

> He certainly does, but on his terms and ever changing demands.


Just as we want peaceful coexistence with him.  On our terms and ever changing demands...


----------



## Kirkhill

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Just as we want peaceful coexistence with him.  On our terms and ever changing demands...



Is it coincidence that "The Red Flag" and this little ditty

"The Pitter Patter of Little Feet,
(Somebody or other) in full retreat.
Oh, Raise the Flag, but not too high.
(Somebody or other) goes running by.

Are both sung to the same tune?  >


----------



## a_majoor

The NextBigFuture blog is full of Russian press releases lately; new aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines etc. 
This one is interesting, basically it seems to take jamming and EMP up to 11:

http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/07/russia-has-new-anti-electronics-and.html



> *Russia has new anti electronics and anti-satellite weapon *
> 
> Russia’s Radio-Electronic Technologies Group (KRET) is developing a fundamentally new electronic warfare system capable of suppressing cruise missile and other high-precision weaponry guidance systems and satellite radio-electronic equipment, KRET Deputy CEO Yuri Mayevsky told TASS on Thursday.
> 
> "The system will target the enemy’s deck-based, tactical, long-range and strategic aircraft, electronic means and suppress foreign military satellites’ radio-electronic equipment," Mayevsky said.
> 
> The system will be mounted on ground-based, air-and seaborne carriers, he added.
> 
> "It will not be based on satellites as this is prohibited by international rules and we comply with this rule," he said.
> 
> Mobile electronic warfare systems 'Krasuha-4' suppress spy satellites, ground-based radars and airborne systems AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System).
> 
> 'Complex 'Krasuha-4' fully covers an object from radar detection at 150-300 kilometers, and may also cause damage to enemy radar electronic warfare and communications systems.
> 
> 'The complex functioning is based on creating powerful jamming at the fundamental radar frequencies and other radio-emitting sources.'



Of course one needs to understand the physics behind this; how much power is being input, conversion efficiencies and the coupling mechanism of the beam to the target, in order to understand how effective this *might* be and what sorts of countermeasures (besides bombing the crap out of every place that might be hiding one) you could use.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Meanwhile, _initial_ reports suggest the Russian military machine is not immune from problems with infrastructure repair work:


> Violations during repair work probably caused the Airborne Troops training center barracks in the Omsk Region to collapse, a regional law enforcement source said Monday.
> 
> "The barracks in the village of Svetly recently underwent repairs. According to one of the versions, errors possibly occurred during the repair, including a change in design of the building," the source said. "This version will be checked."
> 
> He said the external wall and roof partially collapsed.
> 
> A section of the four-story barracks of the Airborne Troops training center in the Omsk Region in Siberia collapsed on Sunday at 19:52 Moscow Time (16:52 UTC). There were 337 servicemen inside, and 38 found themselves under the debris.
> 
> A total of 22 servicemen have been rescued from under the debris of the Airborne Troops training center barracks in the Omsk Region in Siberia and taken to medical institutions, the Russian Defense Ministry said Monday.


More here and here.


----------



## The Bread Guy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Meanwhile, _initial_ reports suggest the Russian military machine is not immune from problems with infrastructure repair work:More here and here.


#roundinguptheusualsuspects


> _*Chief of Omsk-based airborne training center arrested over barrack collapse incident*_
> 
> Oleg Ponomarev partly admitted his guilt when he was earlier questioned as a suspect ....


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Re-produced under the usual caveats of the Copyright Act, an article from Frontline Defence Magazine, about modernization plans for the Russia military.



> Russian Military awaits massive modernization
> 
> by Eugene Gerden
> © 2015 FrontLine Defence (Vol 12, No 3)
> 
> The Russian government plans to suspend the approval of a new State Armaments Program, designed for the period of 2016-2025, due to a current economic crisis in the country and devaluation of its national currency – the ruble – caused by Western sanctions, according to an official representative of the Russian Presidential Administration.
> 
> The program, which is valued at RUB 30 trillion (US$20 billion), has been considered an untouchable item of the Russian federal budget, however, due to complex economical situation in the country, its implementation may now be postponed.
> 
> Instead, Russia plans to focus on implementing the existing State Armaments Program for the period of 2011-2020, which was approved in 2011. However, both the existing and the suspended armaments programs involve massive purchases of combat equipment.
> 
> The total cost of the existing program is estimated at 23 trillion rubles, of which about 19 trillion will be allocated for the purchase of new modern weapons and combat equipment for the Russian army. The remaining 4 trillion is for the introduction of these new weapons in the Russian arm – its tests, military exercises, and so on.
> 
> According to Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff, the program involves annual purchases of up to 100 fixed wing aircraft, 120 helicopters and 600 armored vehicles. However, last year the Russian army received 38 intercontinental ballistic missiles, more than 250 military aircraft, 280 armored vehicles, and more than 5000 units of motor vehicles.
> 
> According to Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s Minister of Defence, implementation of both programs is an acute need that will allow the Russian army to become more mobile and better prepared for quick responses and local conflicts, which will be contrary to heavy-handed Soviet army.
> 
> Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are currently used in Russian army will be replaced by the RS-24 Yars MIRV-equipped, thermonuclear intercont­inental ballistic missile. Designed by scientists of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, the RS-24 is heavier than the Topol-M (which can carry up to 10 independently targetable warheads). It is planned that during the 2015-2016 period, up to 150 Yars will be supplied for the needs of Russian army.
> 
> Among the other weapons and equipment that will be supplied for the needs of Russian army by 2020 are eight Borei Class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines; the new MS-26 rail-mobile Barguzin missile systems; the Sarmatian heavy liquid rocket; a new strategic bomber; two new missile defense systems, and other combat equipment.
> 
> The MS-26, an upgraded version of the Molodec missile system, has improved accuracy and range of flight, is a response to American strike power.
> 
> One of the new missile defence systems is the S-400 Triumf, a new generation anti-aircraft weapon system developed by Russia’s Almaz Central Design Bureau as an upgrade of the S-300 family. Details of the second system (currently being tested in Almaz) have not been disclosed.
> 
> The RS-26 Rubezh, nicknamed Avangard, is based on the RS-24 Yars. As of early 2015, this ballistic missile with hypersonic warheads is reportedly in advanced stages of development. A check launch carried out in March was leaked to media in advance.
> 
> As part of these capitalization plans, particular attention will be paid to further developing the country’s strategic nuclear forces. It is planned that by 2020 the share of new generation guided missile systems in Russia’s nuclear arsenal will reach 80%.
> 
> In the case of land forces, probably the biggest hopes of the Russian Ministry of Defence are pinned to its new generation of infantry fighting vehicle, the BMPT-72 Terminator 2. Built on a base of T-72 hull – including drivetrain and running gear – it has been designed to operate alongside MBTs or independently. It is anticipated that up to 150 units will be supplied to the Russian army between 2015 and 2017.
> 
> Overall, according to Minister Shoigu, 70% of the weapons, military platforms, and equipment in the Russian armed forces should be new or modernized by 2021.
> 
> Training
> 
> In addition to production and design of new equipment, the new program involves more active training of military specialists and experts. As part of these plans, Russian military high schools have increased the number of state-funded places this year to a record 13,000.
> 
> Air Force
> 
> Looking at Russia’s air forces, Minister Shoigu says that despite planned suspensions, both the national air force and naval aviation are currently undergoing modernization, which should be 33% completed by the end of 2015, while the share of operative equipment is expected to reach 67%.
> 
> As part of these plans, the Russian Air Force and naval aviation will receive 126 new aircraft and 88 helicopters, including the newest Su-35 fighter, which is currently undergoing testing.
> 
> By 2020, according to Air Force Commander Lt.-Gen. Viktor Bondarev, up to 56 S-400 Triumf anti-aircraft weapon systems will be supplied to the Russian Air Force.
> 
> In addition, about 454 storage units for missiles, ammunition and explosives (which will be combined into 13 arsenals), will be established in Russia this year.
> 
> Finally, more than new 140 cantonments will be built throughout Russia, the largest of which will be located in the city of Gadzhiyevo (Murmansk region) and will be a base for the Borei Class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.
> 
> As for fighter capability, Russia’s T-50 fifth-generation fighter, designed by Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi, is a stealthy, single-seat, twin-engine jet fighter. It will be the first operational aircraft in Russian service to use stealth technology. This multirole combat aircraft is designed for air superiority and ground attack functions. Up to 55 T-50s will be supplied to the Russian Air Force.
> 
> Navy
> 
> According to state plans, its submarine fleet will remain the basis of Russian naval power for the next several years at least.
> 
> Attention is expected to focus on the purchases of Borei Class submarines, which are built in Severodvinsk by local JSC PO Sevmash, the largest shipbuilding enterprise in Russia and the country’s only nuclear submarine producer.
> 
> This nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine is intended to replace the Delta III, Delta IV and Typhoon classes now in Russian Navy service.
> 
> Army
> 
> In addition to supplies, the existing State Armaments Program involves more active design and production of new weapons and combat equipment that is expected to propel Russian defence enterprises to capacity production levels.
> 
> The majority of future Russian combat vehicles will be built on the basis of the recently designed Armata Universal Combat Platform – a prototype for an advanced next-generation heavy military tracked vehicle. The new platform will provide the basis for a main battle tank, a heavy infantry fighting vehicle, a combat engineering vehicle, an armoured recovery vehicle, a heavy armoured personnel carrier, a tank support combat vehicle, and several types of self-propelled artillery.
> 
> For example, the new platform will accommodate the Buratino, a Soviet 220mm 30-barrel multiple rocket launcher and thermobaric weapon and its Solntzepek analogue, which can shoot thermobaric missiles that are comparable with nuclear, in terms of power.
> 
> Some leading Russian defence analysts have already welcomed the supply of the new Armata platform for the needs of the national army. Igor Korotchenko, Director of the Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade and one of Russia’s leading analysts in the field of defence, says: “Russia is the world’s first country that will get a tank of the 5th generation. This is very important because tanks still remain the main striking force of the ground forces of each country. The conflict in the Donbass revealed that armored vehicles and tanks are widely used even in low-intensity conflicts.”
> 
> Korotchenko has also added that the new Russian tank will have a special crew cell, equipped with comfortable conditions (in contrast to conventional tanks, where core temperature is very high). Its ammunition will be located in a separate compartment, and it will include automation of many functions, including surveillance, reconnaissance and communications.
> 
> A new Russian tracked vehicle platform based on the Kurganets platform will become the basis of at least three medium-weight (25 tonne) combat vehicles, such as new Russian infantry combat vehicles, airborne combat vehicles, lightweight self-propelled artillery systems and possibly air defense systems.
> 
> Implementation
> 
> Implementation of the state program may be significantly complicated by sanctions imposed on Russia, particularly for its military and defence companies.
> 
> Among the Russian defense enterprises that were included in the EU and U.S. sanctions list are such leading Russian producers of weapons and combat equipment as Izhmash, Uralvagonzavod, and Almaz-Antey. Their presence in the list means these companies no longer have access to some Western technologies that are used in their production processes. In addition, they have lost access to cheap Western loans, which were needed for further expansion of production.
> 
> According to Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s first Deputy Prime Minister, successful implementation of the State Armaments Programs will make Russia’s armed forces one of the world’s most modern and well-equipped by 2020-2025, which is one of the most important goals of the Russian government for the next several years.
> 
> This is the second program of modernization of Armed Forces in the history of modern Russia. The first program, for the period of 1996-2005, was financially unrealistic and its implementation ultimately failed. It involved not only the 80% modernization of the national armed forces, but also massive purchases of new weapons and equipment which were not produced by Russian defence enterprises at that period of time. However, the annual funding of the program covered only 23% to 25% of the overall needs, and the government of the day, headed by Boris Yeltsin, was forced to suspend its implementation for an indefinite period.
> 
> Prime Minister Putin, on the other hand, seems intent on making the financial commitment work and see this large modernization completed.
> 
> ====
> Eugene Gerden, a former deputy director in the Russian Ministry of Defence, was responsible for fighting cyber crimes (2008-09).
> © 2015 FrontLine Defence



 Article Link


----------



## a_majoor

A fairly long article from Wired on the Soviet Union's mapping project. Unlike most maps we are familiar with, Russian maps were insanely detailed right down to things like the width of roads and load bearing capabilities of bridges. It is interesting to note that all this detail would need lots of "eyes on the ground", and I can only imagine since the fall of the USSR much of this information was digitized for ease of access. I would also not be surprised at all to discover that Russian agents are still operating around the world to keep this map database up to date:

http://www.wired.com/2015/07/secret-cold-war-maps

(First few paragraphs)


> A MILITARY HELICOPTER was on the ground when Russell Guy arrived at the helipad near Tallinn, Estonia, with a briefcase filled with $250,000 in cash. The place made him uncomfortable. It didn’t look like a military base, not exactly, but there were men who looked like soldiers standing around. With guns.
> 
> The year was 1989. The Soviet Union was falling apart, and some of its military officers were busy selling off the pieces. By the time Guy arrived at the helipad, most of the goods had already been off-loaded from the chopper and spirited away. The crates he’d come for were all that was left. As he pried the lid off one to inspect the goods, he got a powerful whiff of pine. It was a box inside a box, and the space in between was packed with juniper needles. Guy figured the guys who packed it were used to handling cargo that had to get past drug-sniffing dogs, but it wasn’t drugs he was there for.
> 
> The Soviet Military secretly mapped the entire world, but few outsiders have seen the maps—until now.
> Inside the crates were maps, thousands of them. In the top right corner of each one, printed in red, was the Russian word секрет. Secret.
> 
> The maps were part of one of the most ambitious cartographic enterprises ever undertaken. During the Cold War, the Soviet military mapped the entire world, parts of it down to the level of individual buildings. The Soviet maps of US and European cities have details that aren’t on domestic maps made around the same time, things like the precise width of roads, the load-bearing capacity of bridges, and the types of factories. They’re the kinds of things that would come in handy if you’re planning a tank invasion. Or an occupation. Things that would be virtually impossible to find out without eyes on the ground.
> 
> Given the technology of the time, the Soviet maps are incredibly accurate. Even today, the US State Department uses them (among other sources) to place international boundary lines on official government maps.
> 
> 
> John Davies, a retired British software developer, has been studying the Soviet maps for a decade.	 PHOTO BY: NICK BALLON FOR WIRED
> Guy’s company, Omnimap, was one of the first to import Soviet military maps to the West. But he wasn’t alone. Like the military officials charged with guarding the maps, map dealers around the world saw an opportunity. Maps that were once so secret that an officer who lost one could be sent to prison (or worse) were bought by the ton and resold for a profit to governments, telecommunications companies, and others.
> 
> “I’m guessing we bought a million sheets,” Guy says. “Maybe more.”
> 
> University libraries at places like Stanford, Oxford, and the University of Texas in Austin have drawers stuffed with Cold War Soviet maps, acquired from Guy and other dealers, but the maps have languished in obscurity. Very few academics have seen them, let alone studied them. Whatever stories they have to tell are hidden in plain sight.
> 
> But one unlikely scholar, a retired British software developer named John Davies, has been working to change that. For the past 10 years he’s been investigating the Soviet maps, especially the ones of British and American cities. He’s had some help, from a military map librarian, a retired surgeon, and a young geographer, all of whom discovered the maps independently. They’ve been trying to piece together how they were made and how, exactly, they were intended to be used. The maps are still a taboo topic in Russia today, so it’s impossible to know for sure, but what they’re finding suggests that the Soviet military maps were far more than an invasion plan. Rather, they were a framework for organizing much of what the Soviets knew about the world, almost like a mashup of Google Maps and Wikipedia, built from paper.


----------



## Kirkhill

And speaking of Russian mapping projects - take a look at map of nuclear explosions at the bottom of this National Post graphic.

https://nationalpostcom.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/bomb-1200.jpg

Talk about doing it to themselves......







What I find fascinating is the Brits did it to the Aussies, the French did it to the Algerians, the Yankees did it to the Nevadans, the Russians did it to everybody outside of Moscow - leaving no autonomous region unfouled.  

Can't help but wonder what effect that lack of discrimination has had on the local populations and how they perceive Moscow.

(And the Chinese appear to be doing it Xinjiang - a region notably friendly to Beijing).


----------



## McG

Meanwhile, the breakdown of military trade between Russia and Ukraine is starting to make a negative impact on Russian maritime and air capabilities.



> Ukraine crisis: Why a lack of parts has hamstrung Russia's military
> By Pavel Aksenov BBC Russian
> BBC News
> 07 Aug 15
> 
> Russia's defence firms have been hit not only by Western sanctions but also by a breakdown in business ties with Ukraine.
> 
> For decades under Soviet rule, Russia's strategic industries had close links with partners in Ukraine, all centrally controlled from Moscow.
> 
> But relations soured last year, with Ukraine's pivot to the West, Russia's annexation of Crimea and the pro-Russian insurgency in eastern Ukraine.
> 
> The EU and US banned military exports to Russia, saying Moscow was supplying the insurgents with sophisticated heavy weapons and regular troops. Moscow denied the allegations.
> 
> Last month, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin told parliament that Ukrainian components were used in the production of 186 types of Russian military equipment.
> 
> That is a serious problem, he admitted, and Moscow could resolve it only by 2018.
> 
> Back in June 2014, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko ordered a halt to military co-operation with Russia - and that has shut down several projects.
> 
> Ukraine hosts the design bureau of Antonov military transport planes. The economic freeze has blocked plans to deliver a new heavy transport plane, the An-70. And this month, Russia stopped producing another transport plane - the An-140.
> 
> In February, Russia closed another programme - Rokot space rockets, which had been putting military satellites into orbit.
> 
> The Russian navy has suffered too. It was awaiting three Project 22350 frigates (Admiral Gorshkov-class), but they did not arrive because Ukraine did not deliver the turbines for them.
> 
> Communist-era production cycles involved defence plants in several Soviet republics, but they became independent states when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
> 
> Since then, Russia has become dependent on Western electronic components - especially computers, vital for all modern armies.
> 
> In a high-profile setback for the Russian navy, France cancelled delivery of two Mistral helicopter carriers. France finally agreed on a compensation deal for Russia this week, after long negotiations.
> 
> Since 1991, Russia's armed forces have continued to rely on Antonov transport planes - the An-26 (for lighter loads), An-12 (medium loads) and An-124 (very heavy loads). For the heaviest cargoes, Russia also has the Ilyushin-76.
> 
> All Antonov planes have Ukrainian components. Experts say suspension of the An-70 programme will not affect the Russian army much, but the lack of components for An-140 production will be a problem.
> 
> The Russian air force and navy had already received up to 10 new Antonovs before deliveries stopped.
> 
> There is an urgent need to replace ageing An-26 planes - production was discontinued in the mid-1980s.
> 
> Russia could revive plans to build a light cargo plane, the Ilyushin-112, but that means finding reliable Russian replacements for Ukrainian components.
> 
> "Whatever option it decides to go with, Russia's efforts to revamp its fixed-wing transport capabilities are being affected by the crisis with Ukraine in ways that go beyond the An-140," wrote analyst Gareth Jennings in Jane's Defence Weekly.
> 
> Ukraine has also been a key supplier of engine components.
> 
> In May, the Ukrainian company Motor-Sich stopped deliveries of helicopter engines for combat helicopters, but continued taking orders for civilian helicopters.
> 
> Mr Rogozin said Russia would strive to integrate engine production for the navy and air force, to reduce costs and move away from reliance on Ukrainian and Western equipment.
> 
> But a previous Russian attempt to reduce the military's reliance on Ukrainian equipment was only partly successful, Russian military expert Alexander Golts told the BBC.
> 
> "We can't take Mr Rogozin's statements at face value. We can believe them only when we see the first Russian gas turbines [for the military]," he said.


http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33822821


----------



## McG

... and on the civil front, Russia has stepped up its import ban of fresh produce from nations imposing sanctions; the prohibition now extends to selling as well as importing.  With particularly steep food inflation, there is some unhappy reaction to the Russian government destroying the contraband food that it discovers.



> Russia destroys tonnes of foreign food imports
> BBC News
> 06 Aug 2015
> 
> Russia has bulldozed a pile of Western-produced cheese and tonnes of other foodstuffs imported in violation of sanctions.
> 
> The country has also steamrollered fruit and burnt a huge pile of bacon.
> 
> The actions come a year after Russia banned some Western food products in retaliation to EU and US sanctions applied after Moscow annexed Crimea.
> 
> The destruction has caused an outcry from anti-poverty campaigners who say it should have been given to the poor.
> 
> One steamroller took an hour to crush nine tonnes of cheese. Another consignment was due to be burnt. Boxes of bacon have been incinerated. Peaches and tomatoes were also due to be crushed by tractors.
> 
> Religious leaders expressed outrage. One called the actions "insane, stupid and vile".
> 
> Russia has suffered notorious famines in its recent history which saw millions starve.
> 
> More than 285,000 people have backed an online petition calling on President Putin to give the food away.
> 
> The petition says that food sanctions have led to higher prices and shortages that are causing real hardship.
> 
> Food price inflation is running at around 20%.
> 
> Former prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, said that 20 million Russian citizens were below the poverty line, commenting that destroying food products was "some real triumph of humanism".
> 
> ...


http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33814362



> Russians shocked as banned Western food destroyed
> By Sarah Rainsford BBC News, Moscow
> 07 Aug 2015
> 
> The sight of vast amounts of banned foreign food being bulldozed, buried or burned is causing controversy in Russia.
> 
> Tens of thousands of people have joined a protest petition to President Vladimir Putin.
> 
> For the past year, Russia has banned most fresh produce from countries imposing economic sanctions against Russia over the illegal annexation of Crimea. Now anyone caught breaking the ban will have their produce seized and destroyed.
> 
> As the presidential decree came into effect on Thursday, state TV ran reports accompanied by vivid images of huge, round cheeses being dumped and crushed.
> 
> Reporters hailed a crackdown on contraband, but many Russians are deeply disturbed by the development.
> 
> "If they start destroying food, what next? It's like our authorities don't care about the people," argues Muscovite Olga Saveleva, who has launched an online petition against the decree. It has attracted more than 285,000 signatures.
> 
> She says Western sanctions against Russia have already fuelled inflation and helped push more people into poverty.
> 
> "One pensioner wrote and said 'I can't eat, I can't buy this or that, so if you want to destroy produce, bring it to my home. I can eat it!'," Ms Saveleva recounts.
> 
> The memory of Soviet-era famines makes Russians particularly sensitive to wasting food. But President Putin's decree has its cheerleaders nonetheless.
> 
> This week a group of girls in T-shirts emblazoned with the slogan "Eat Russian" descended on a Moscow supermarket and began scouring the shelves for sanctioned foreign goods. Their raid eventually unearthed some illicit French cheese and bags of German nuts.
> 
> "This is prohibited!" the food patriots declared to a somewhat stunned-looking store manager, before slapping "sanctioned" stickers on the items, complete with a roaring Russian bear.
> 
> The girls believe the new law will stop such items reaching Russian shelves. Many banned items have entered through Belarus, after repacking and relabelling.
> 
> "Now everyone will know that there are sanctions," Anna explains. "If they try to get produce through now, it will be burned."
> 
> The move will complicate life for Russian restaurants, already facing rising prices and reduced customer spending power.
> 
> "The sanctions were a shock at first, but we adapted," says Easy Brix head chef Andrei Antonov, who explains that the restrictions have forced him to be creative.
> 
> "Our clients thought everything would run out and they'd just get potatoes - that was the joke," he laughs.
> 
> Instead, suppliers have sourced good-quality local produce or non-sanctioned alternatives - with one notable exception.
> 
> "Clearly you can't replace Gorgonzola with a Russian cheese, and a cheese plate is boring without it," the chef admits.
> 
> "I don't know where it comes from, and of course the price is different, but somehow Gorgonzola, Camembert and Brie are always available."
> 
> Until this week, only importing produce from sanctioned countries was prohibited, not selling it. But the agriculture ministry now says even warehouses could be raided and produce seized.
> 
> "I think we have to distribute food, not destroy it," says activist Andrei Volkov, who helps feed around 300 homeless people in Moscow each weekend, with the volunteer group Friends on the Street.
> 
> He has noticed demand for the handouts increase over the past year, as Russia's economic crisis has deepened.
> 
> "I know there are a lot of people who need this food. Destroying it is not humane," Mr Volkov argues.
> 
> The Kremlin has urged people not to "over-dramatise" the situation.
> 
> "Visually, it probably doesn't look very nice," spokesman Dmitry Peskov conceded. But he said that the produce being liquidated was smuggled food, without paperwork, and no-one could vouch for its safety.
> 
> As for the protest petition, Mr Peskov promises that the signatures will undergo "expert" checks.
> 
> Meanwhile, President Putin's decree stands and the next batch of banned food - including piles of fresh peaches and nectarines - has already been lined up for destruction.
> 
> 
> *Russian press outcry*
> 
> Mikhail Rostovskiy in the popular daily Moskovskiy Komsomolets says the authorities are behaving "like an actress in a second-rate variety show", against a "nightmarish scenario" of a failing currency, high oil prices and conflict with the West. "Domestic political stability is not everything," he writes, accusing Moscow of showing "clear contempt" for the views of ordinary people.
> In the government daily Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Irina Krasnopolskaya notes that the destruction of food has provoked "quite a lively reaction". But she is sceptical of the suggestion - made by anti-poverty campaigners - that the food should have been given to the poor, saying it would be impossible to monitor the safety of food imported with fake documents.
> Igor Tsukanov in business daily Vedomosti says the decision is no more than an empty gesture. "Could the source of the joy with which our authorities are destroying imported cheese and apples be the fact that they actually have no response to sanctions? What could we deprive Western countries of? … We'll show them our attitude, deprive ourselves of their food and then go and bury it."


http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33818186


----------



## a_majoor

Some speculation on the post Putin future. Edward has suggested that the Russian state east of the Urals may become economically and politically detached from Russia and bound to China, and that does seem to be one of the more likely outcomes as the centralization of the Russian State under Putin becomes undone through corruption, increasing opposition and the ability of China to offer a better deal (especially when it comes to paying off corrupt local elites). Other outcomes are possible, of course:

http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/08/could-russia-breakup-after-putin.html



> *Could Russia Breakup after Putin ?*
> 
> The Soviet Union came apart because it overstretched itself and ran out of money and ideas. Local elites saw no benefit in remaining part of a bankrupt country. It fragmented along the administrative borders of the 15 republics that made up the giant country.
> 
> Yet there was no reason why the process had to stop there. Indeed, many of Russia’s regions—including Siberia, Ural, Karelia and Tatarstan—declared their “sovereignty” at the time. To prevent further disintegration Russia’s then president, Boris Yeltsin, came up with the idea of a federation, promising each region as much “sovereignty as it could swallow”. Yeltsin made this promise in Kazan, the ancient capital of Tatarstan, which acquired many attributes of a separate state: a president, a constitution, a flag and, most important, its own budget. In exchange, Tatarstan promised to stay part of Russia.
> 
> This is an analysis by the Economist magazine with some more specific historical information from the NY Times and Aljazeera.
> 
> Putin is keeping Russia together through force and payoffs to regions and regional leaders. Putin will turn 63 this year (born Oct 1952). An average life expectancy for a wealthy Russian man who takes care of his health would be about 75-80 years. So a post Putin situation would likely become a reality by 2027-2032 based on his death from aging or earlier if he lost power for other reasons.
> 
> President Boris Yeltsin made statements to Russia's regions in August 1990 to "take as much sovereignty as you can swallow". It was taken earnestly by Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev, who engineered a Tatarstan declaration of sovereignty later that same month.
> 
> There was a vote in March, 1992 by Tartarstan on sovereignty
> 
> A majority of Tatarstan's citizens then voted for state sovereignty in the referendum.
> 
> Mr Putin has reversed federalism, and turned Russia into a centralised state. He cancelled regional elections, imposed a “presidential” representative over the heads of governors and redistributed tax revenues in Moscow’s favour. But he did not build common institutions. The Russian state is seen not as an upholder of law but as a source of injustice and corruption.
> 
> In the words of Mikhail Iampolski, a historian, Russia at present resembles a khanate in which local princes receive a licence to rule from the chief khan in the Kremlin. For the past decade the main job of the Moscow-appointed governors has been to provide votes for Mr Putin. In exchange they received a share of oil revenues and the right to rule as they see fit. Chechnya under Ramzan Kadyrov, a former warlord installed by Mr Putin, is a grotesque illustration of this. In the most recent presidential election, Chechnya provided 99.7% of its votes for Mr Putin with a turnout of 99.6%. In return, Mr Kadyrov receives subsidies and freedom to subject his people to his own “informal” taxes and Islamic rules. Moscow pays a dictatorial and corrupt Chechnya a vast due in return for Mr Kadyrov pretending to be part of Russia and pledging loyalty to Mr Putin.
> 
> If Mr Putin goes and the money runs out, Chechnya could be the first to break off.
> 
> Tatarstan, home to 2m Muslim ethnic Tatars and 1.5m ethnic Russians, could declare itself the separate khanate it was in the 15th century. It has a strong identity, a diverse economy, which includes its own oil firm, and a well-educated ruling class. It would form a special relationship with Crimea, which Crimean Tartars (at last able to claim their historic land) would declare an independent state.
> 
> The Ural region could form a republic—as it tried to do in 1993—around Yekaterinburg, Russia’s fourth-largest city, or else it could form a union with Siberia.
> 
> Siberia itself could revive its own identity, from a base in the cities of Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk, and lay claim to its oil-and-gas riches, which it would sell to China. Unlike Russia, China might not have much interest in territorial expansion into the sparsely populated Far East and Siberia, but it could (and already does) colonise these regions economically. Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, two of the largest cities in the Far East, are more economically integrated with China and South Korea than they are with the European part of Russia.
> 
> SOURCES- Economist, NY Times, Aljazeera, Wikipedia


----------



## Edward Campbell

_In my opinion_ China does not want to "own" Siberia ~ many Chinese scholars believe the Qing dynasty went too far, in the 18th and 19th centuries, by annexing, rather than just _subjugating_ Tibet and Xinjiang ... they are not "Chinese" enough to be part of China, proper. China want quasi-independent, client republics on its borders: dependant on China for trade and security, but, nominally at least, independent.

China's goal, _I believe_, is to dominate ALL of East Asia, and that means no "foreign" presence in East Asia ~ which, _I think most Chinese think_, is everything East of Kazakhstan and South to include the China Seas.


----------



## CougarKing

How ironic for a country touted to be the world's 2nd largest oil producer:

CNN Money



> *Russia is facing a fuel shortage*
> 
> By Ivana Kottasova and Virginia Harrison
> 
> Russia has lots of oil, but in a weird twist of fate, the nation could soon run dangerously low on gasoline.
> The head of Russia's biggest oil company is warning that the world's second largest oil producing nation could soon face a fuel shortfall.
> 
> Rosneft's Igor Sechin predicts that Russia's gasoline shortage could reach 5 million tonnes a year by 2017. It produced around 38 million tonnes of gasoline in 2014, according to the energy ministry.
> The expected shortfall is a result of many factors, including new tax rules, a weakening economy and Western sanctions that are hurting Russia's oil refining businesses. This is pushing fuel prices up, even as oil prices have plunged.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## a_majoor

The effects of Hubris and the laws of unintended consequences are always amazing to behold.


----------



## McG

Western medical products and condoms may be next to face Russian sanctions.  But there are also signs that the population may be loosing its humour with the regiem's actions.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-33851990


----------



## a_majoor

More "good" news about the Russian economy. Ironically, the NextBigFuture blog had an article about the development of the PAK-FA fighter as the next post; makes you wonder how the Russians plan to pay for all this new and upgraded military equipment they keep announcing?

http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/08/russias-economy-shrinks-by-46-on-low.html



> *Russia's economy shrinks by 4.6% on low oil prices, sanctions *
> 
> Russia's economy shrank by 4.6% in the second quarter of this year, posting the worst performance since the crippling recession of 2009, the state statistics agency reported Monday.
> 
> Russian consumers have also been hit by the eroding value of the ruble. The currency has dropped to 64 to the U.S. dollar, boosting inflation to 15.6% in July and propelling a decline in buying power with its depreciation of 43% over the last year.
> 
> The most damaging influence on the Russian economy is attributed to the slump in oil prices, which are roughly half what they were a year ago and down 20% in just the last six weeks. Russia counts on oil and gas sales to generate more than half of its national budget revenue.
> 
> U.S. and European sanctions imposed more than a year ago in punishment for Russia's seizure and annexation of Ukraine's Crimea region also have taken their toll. And Russia's retaliatory ban on imports of European Union food products has spread the pain to many of the 28 member countries that enjoyed brisk trade with Moscow before the measures were invoked.
> 
> Russia's second-quarter year-over-year gross domestic product contraction was more than twice the rate of the first quarter, when the economy shrank by 2.2% compared with the first quarter of 2014. It also exceeded the Russian Economy Ministry's forecast of 4.4% economic decline this year.
> 
> Car sales in Russia are projected to drop by 36% this year
> 
> In June 2015, the Worldbank projected Russia's GDP would contract by 2.7 percent in 2015, before reaching 0.7 percent in 2016, and 2.5 percent in 2017. This was assuming an average oil price of US$58.0 per barrel for 2015 and of US$63.6 per barrel for 2016.
> 
> Currently West Texas oil is at $44 per barrel and Brent is at $50 per barrel.
> 
> Nextbigfuture has previously looked at the currency problems in Russia, the possibility of a depression (where the economy contracts by 10%) and where Russia could run out of liquid financial reserves.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Meanwhile, let the recce begin!


> Russia's iconic Red Army Choir, orchestra and dance ensemble start a European city tour next month to honour the 70th anniversary of Second World War victory against Nazi Germany.
> 
> The route takes the world-famous Aleksandrov Ensemble to venues in 40 cities. It starts in Hungary's capital, Budapest, on September 5 and finishes in Tallinn, Estonia's capital, on December 10.
> 
> "We have a large-scale tour this year," said Valentina Maksimova, the ensemble's press secretary." Our main aim is to remind people of the role of the Soviet Union’s Red Army in the liberation from Nazi occupation."
> 
> Concert venues hosting capacity audiences of 4,000 or more will ring to a range of music including folk tunes, hymns, operatic arias and popular music ....


That would be THIS Red Army Chorus (site in Russian).


----------



## McG

Russia adds four more countries to food import ban, and also bans Dutch flowers.  Threatens that Ukraine food imports may be banned in 2016 if they continue getting closer to EU.

Russia adds countries to food import ban over sanctions
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-33905340


----------



## MilEME09

MCG said:
			
		

> Russia adds four more countries to food import ban, and also bans Dutch flowers.  Threatens that Ukraine food imports may be banned in 2016 if they continue getting closer to EU.
> 
> Russia adds countries to food import ban over sanctions
> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-33905340



more food from the rest of us, hurts russians more then the rest of us


----------



## CougarKing

A fatal misstep for this gas giant?

Business Insider



> *Gazprom's colossal deal with China is already looking like a terrible move for Russia*
> 
> MIKE BIRD
> 
> Aug. 17, 2015, 3:50 AM57,096  36
> 
> There was a lot of excitement in the industry when the Russian energy giant Gazprom announced a mammoth $400 billion (£256 billion), 30-year export deal to China in May 2014, but the agreement is now coming under extreme pressure on numerous fronts.
> 
> Morgan Stanley analysts on Monday morning suggested that construction of the necessary pipeline would be delayed by at least six months, taking the initial exports to mid-2019 at the earliest.
> 
> The initial deal had talked about beginning supplies as early as 2018.
> 
> Here's part of the note from Morgan Stanley on Monday morning:
> 
> According to a recent Interfax report,* this contract was only activated on May 13 (2015) – seven months after the initial deadline. This means that exports from Russia can begin no earlier than in May 2019. The final deadline for the project coming on line is now May 2021. At the same time, in late July, China reportedly suspended a second pipeline, this one planned to pump 30 bcm per year from Western Siberian gas fields to China’s northern-western Xinjiang region.*
> 
> It's not the first problem that's been noted for the Gazprom deal. *Last week, a Financial Times report noted that the deal offered Gazprom, which is majority-owned by the Russian government, no protection against a prolonged period of lower oil prices. According to analysts the FT spoke with, at current oil prices the project is unprofitable or even loss-making for Gazprom.*
> 
> russia china pipelineGazprom
> 
> In May 2014, Brent Crude was sitting at well over $100 a barrel, but it began to decline almost immediately after the agreement was reached.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)



Business Insider



> *Russia's gas giant 'is confronted with the greatest challenge in its history'*
> AFP
> GERMAIN MOYON, AFP
> Aug. 17, 2015, 9:12 AM
> 
> Moscow (AFP) - Facing a cold shoulder from Europe and increased competition at home, Russia's Gazprom has struggled to assert dominance on the global energy market, prompting speculation the energy giant could have no choice but to splinter.
> 
> With the Russian economy slipping into recession on the back of lower oil prices and Western sanctions over Ukraine, the economy ministry predicted Gazprom would produce 414 billion cubic metres of gas this year, an all-time low for the public company sitting atop some of the world's largest natural gas reserves.
> 
> Gazprom's market capitalisation has plummeted in recent years. Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, the company was worth more than $300 billion. Its value now hovers around $50 billion, trailing far behind the world's other major energy companies.
> 
> "Gazprom is confronted with the greatest challenge in its history," Chris Weafer, a partner at the Macro Advisory consultancy firm, told AFP.
> 
> "What remains to be seen is whether Gazprom becomes an appendage of the foreign ministry or evolves into a global energy company."
> 
> The decline in Gazprom's value and gas production coincides with mounting tensions with the European Union, which has accused it of catering to Moscow's geopolitical interests instead of operating according to business principles.
> 
> *Gazprom is now grappling with a series of issues, including its recent loss of the Ukrainian market, Europe's energy diversification efforts and increased competition on the domestic market, which jeopardise its status as a gas giant.*
> 
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Edward Campbell

This article, which is reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _The Economist_ newspaper, belongs in both the Chinese Military, Political and Social Superthread and here:

http://www.economist.com/news/china/21661033-hard-times-border-these-days-packing-up-suitcase-trade


> China and Russia
> Packing up the suitcase trade
> *Hard times at the border these days*
> 
> Aug 15th 2015 | HEIHE | From the print edition
> 
> A FERRIS wheel visible from the Russian bank turns alluringly on the low island of Daheihe on the Chinese side of the Amur river. But the main attraction is the Daheihe Island International Trading City, with its bright ferry terminal and multi-level trading hall. Russian traders used to flock across the border to stuff their suitcases with cheap Chinese goods. Yet that trade, which long sustained the nearby Chinese city of Heihe, has hit a rough patch. Inside the vast trading hall stall-keepers spend more time knitting, napping and playing cards than they do making deals.
> 
> Shi Ying, a purveyor of medicines, tea, cosmetics and knick-knacks, blames the drop in value of Russia’s currency. Just over a year ago 100 roubles bought more than 18 yuan (about $3), but today they buy fewer than ten. The Russian economy has been hit by slumping prices for oil and gas, and by Western sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 and meddling in Ukraine. Russians, Ms Shi says, “have no money, it’s that simple.”
> 
> The stalls cover a huge space and offer wigs, watches, wheel rims, studded leather belts, fake Jim Beam bourbon, high-powered outboard motors and low-powered sex toys. Yet despite the astonishing range of goods, the traders all tell the same tale: declining sales. The few surly buyers from the Russian Far East are struggling too. “It is barely worth the trip,” says Irina, from Khabarovsk. “If the rouble falls any further, I’ll stop coming.”
> 
> Political leaders on both sides of the border have said they want to boost bilateral trade. They have focused on oil and gas from Russia, and machinery going the other way. Last year bilateral trade topped $95 billion, a 6.8% increase over the previous year. Work has just begun on China’s portion of a 4,000-kilometre (2,500-mile) pipeline that will carry natural gas from Siberia—through Heihe—to Shanghai. But although the project will create a small number of local jobs during construction, residents expect to see few benefits once the gas starts flowing past their town.
> 
> The provincial government of Heilongjiang has been looking to boost trade in other ways. It shares a border of nearly 3,000 kilometres with Russia. It accounts for a quarter of China’s bilateral trade, and 30% of China’s total investment in Russia. Yet the sums are hardly spectacular—$1 billion of investment last year. The province intends to improve infrastructure. Plans for the first-ever bridge between the two countries across the Amur are being touted. Yet such plans have been on the drawing board for years.
> 
> Even if a bridge gets built, bilateral promise has a habit of falling short. Much is made of the warm political and personal ties between the Chinese and Russian presidents, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. In May, when many national leaders stayed away from Russia’s parade marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war in Europe, Mr Xi cheerfully attended. Mr Putin is expected to return that favour in September, when China holds a parade of its own to commemorate the anniversary of the war’s end in Asia.
> 
> By far the biggest commercial deal to come out of the relationship was a 30-year contract for gas supplies that China signed last year with Gazprom, Russia’s state giant. Over $400 billion of gas, the deal’s boosters said, would be delivered over 30 years. The agreement was portrayed as having huge benefits for both countries. Yet even at the time, China was reckoned by analysts to have got Russia, suffering from Western sanctions, over a barrel. Since then energy prices have more than halved, leading many to suspect that under the terms of the deal Gazprom is losing lots of money already.
> 
> If so, it will do nothing to dispel Russian suspicions of China that lurk not far below the surface. In the late 1960s the two countries traded fire across the Amur river. Relations are now a world away from that period, yet while Russia sells arms to China, it is not trusting enough to provide its most advanced equipment. And in the Russian Far East, people are often quick to claim, with little evidence, that their empty land is being infiltrated by nefarious Chinese.
> 
> Back on Daheihe island, Oleg, a Chinese-speaking Russian, is doing his bit to improve relations—and profit from Russian woes. His Russian Products Direct Sales Centre opened early this month and offers 5-litre jugs of Russian sunflower oil and thick slabs of Russian chocolate to Chinese buyers. On the shop’s first day the top-selling item was milk powder for babies—Chinese trust foreign brands much more than domestic ones following years of contamination scandals. The weak rouble, Oleg says, can only be good for business.
> 
> _From the print edition: China_




It's a long, sometimes porous border that stretches from Hunchun, in Jilin province where the borders of Russia, North Korea and China meet and then North and West to a point, West of Manzhouli, where the borders of Russia, Mongolia and China meet. For centuries, millennia, actually, the Chinese feared the _barbarian_ horsemen from the North ~ Mongols, Jurchens and Machus and so on ~ with good reasons and, over about 4,000 years, they adopted a variety of strategies, from _Great Walls_ through bribery to cultural assimilation to cope. But the Russians are, to (some, perhaps many) Chinese a different category of _barbarian_. While the _Asian_/Sinic Mongols _et al_ were to be feared, respected and even befriended, the Russians are seen as _beneath_ the Chinese, less than suitable for civilization (a somewhat loaded idea in Chinese). The Chinese believe that Eastern Siberia is rich in resources, which the Chinese covet. But, _I believe_, that the Chinese, generally, do not want to annex or absorb Eastern Siberia. Some (many?) Chinese believe that the Qing Dynasty went too far in the 18th and 19th centuries and absorbed (annexed) too much; they believe that Tibet and Xinjiang are not _Chinese_ enough to be part of China, despite their (debatable) strategic importance. Those people believe that Eastern Siberia should be a (or a few) independent state(s), rather like Mongolia, with close political ties to China.


----------



## Good2Golf

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> ...Those people believe that Eastern Siberia should be a (or a few) independent state(s), rather like Mongolia, with close political ties to China.



...as Crimea is to Russia?


----------



## Kirkhill

More evidence Vlad is losing his grip?

http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-eu-praises-release-of-political-prisoners-in-belarus-2015-8



> The authoritarian president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, unexpectedly pardoned all six political prisoners on Saturday evening, including former opposition presidential candidate Nikolai Statkevich.
> 
> Statkevich was greeted at the Minsk train station late Saturday by hundreds of opposition activists who chanted "Hero."
> 
> He connected his release with the Belarusian government's need for credits to help it survive the economic downturn.
> 
> The EU and United States had set the freeing of political prisoners as a condition for easing economic sanctions and travel bans imposed on Belarusian officials



Lukashenko has been a mini-Vlad for a while now.  Perhaps a suitable bell-wether for the winds of change?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Interesting idea coming from the Estonian justice minister (Google English, from original in Russian):


> The crimes of the Communist regime should be investigated as well as investigated the crimes of Nazism, but for this it is first necessary to establish the court, which would have the status of interstate body, said Justice Minister Urmas Reinsalu .... This proposal will be included in the agenda of the opening on Sunday in Tallinn International conference dedicated to the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which will be attended by politicians and experts from many countries.  Reinsalu stressed that it is important to fulfill the promise to establish the 100th anniversary of the Estonian state in 2018 in Tallinn memorial to the victims of people who have been the victims of communism in Estonia. "We do not forget about the past. On the plaque to be recorded the names of all the repressed "- said the Minister ....


Notwithstanding how tough this would be, it would be interesting to see who was tried.  And if the Russians said, "hey, it wasn't our state," then they'd have to suck back a bit on stuff like this then, no?


----------



## CougarKing

Not really a problem if you got mouthpieces like Pravda at your side.  :blotto:

Reuters



> *Higher prices dent Putin's sky-high popularity: paper*
> Fri Aug 28, 2015 4:20am EDT
> 
> MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russians' concern about rising prices has eroded President Vladimir Putin's approval ratings but these remain extremely high, the daily Vedomosti reported on Friday.
> 
> It cited a poll by the Public Opinion Foundation as showing that 72 percent of Russians would have voted for Putin in August, down from 76 percent in May.
> 
> *Another poll, by the Levada Center, showed that in August 83 percent of Russians approved of the President's actions, down from an all-time high of 89 percent in May.*
> 
> The paper quoted experts as saying the fall reflected public dissatisfaction about prices during the summer, when many regulated prices such as utility and transport charges are raised.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## vonGarvin

> Another poll, by the Levada Center, showed that in August 83 percent of Russians approved of the President's actions, down from an all-time high of 89 percent in May.


During his inauguration, President Obama was at 67%.  He is currently at 46%, according to Gallup.  

Just to put things into perspective is all.


----------



## a_majoor

Casualty figures from Ukraine were accidentally released (then hastily retracted) by the Russians. The amount of casualties is pretty steep considering the time frame and that this is supposed to be a "Hybrid war", where presumably the enemy will is crushed and most of the fighting and casualties are done by your sock puppet army rather than by you....

http://dailycaller.com/2015/08/26/russia-accidentally-reveals-its-massive-ukraine-body-count/



> *Russia Accidentally Reveals Its Massive Ukraine Body Count*
> Ivan Plis
> Reporter, Daily Caller News Foundation
> 5:17 PM 08/26/2015
> 
> Though Russia denies official involvement in Ukraine’s civil war, a Russian news site briefly reported Russia’s huge military casualties in Ukraine Tuesday.
> 
> Buried in a mundane report on army salaries, Delovaya Zhizn (Business Life) noted that family compensation went to the families of 2,000 soldiers killed “taking part in military action in Ukraine.” The information was briefly online before Russian censors detected the fact and took it offline — but not before a Ukraine-based news site detected the admission and cached it online.
> 
> That some 2,000 Russian service members have died, all fighting a war that the Kremlin does not acknowledge exists, is a staggering admission of President Vladimir Putin’s commitment to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian war has lasted for exactly 18 months — by comparison, the U.S.’ nearly 14-year involvement in Afghanistan has claimed the lives of 2,154 American soldiers.
> 
> Besides the toll on Ukrainian and Russian fighters’ lives, the Russian intervention has also inflamed sanctions against Russia from European and North American governments. In response, Russia has embargoed food imports from a long list of Western countries, prompting a grocery crisis for Russian shoppers. (RELATED: Russian Muslims Traveling To Fight Against Russia’s Ukraine Invasion)
> 
> Forbes, which broke the story in English, pointed out that Putin recently declared all Russian military casualties, in wartime and peacetime alike, to be government-protected “state secrets.”
> 
> Boris Nemtsov, a former Russian lawmaker, was assassinated early this year while working on a report documenting Russian involvement in Ukraine. Besides suppressing the results of Nemtsov’s work, the Russian government has made efforts to downplay the investigation of the assassination. (RELATED: Russia Tries Every Tactic To Downplay Opposition Leader’s Murder)
> 
> In another sign of Putin’s stranglehold on information in Russia, Russian authorities moved on Monday to ban all of Wikipedia in the country — a move that was later walked back.
> 
> Follow Ivan Plis on Twitter
> 
> Read more: http://dailycaller.com/2015/08/26/russia-accidentally-reveals-its-massive-ukraine-body-count/#ixzz3kDuhDxoC


----------



## cupper

Apparently Ukraine is not the safe and friendly vacation spot Russian Military travel agents have been making it out to be.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Meanwhile, in southwest Asia ....


> Abdul Rashid Dostum, Afghanistan's vice president since 2014, asked Moscow to provide military assistance to Kabul in its fight against the Islamic State since the radical group is allegedly planning to carry out terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Russia, Pajhwok Afghan News reported.
> 
> The official, often described as one of the most powerful warlords in the country, wants Russia to supply armaments, military aircraft and helicopters ....


----------



## Kirkhill

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Meanwhile, in southwest Asia ....



I wonder what the "quid" is for the "pro quo".


----------



## Flanker

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Casualty figures from Ukraine were accidentally released (then hastily retracted) by the Russians. The amount of casualties is pretty steep considering the time frame and that this is supposed to be a "Hybrid war", where presumably the enemy will is crushed and most of the fighting and casualties are done by your sock puppet army rather than by you....
> 
> http://dailycaller.com/2015/08/26/russia-accidentally-reveals-its-massive-ukraine-body-count/



Looks like army.ca becomes a collector of fake news.
Please provide links to reliable sources.


----------



## Kirkhill

Flanker said:
			
		

> Looks like army.ca becomes a collector of fake news.
> Please provide links to reliable sources.








Welcome back Flanker.  How's the weather in St Petersburg today?


----------



## Good2Golf

Flanker said:
			
		

> Looks like army.ca becomes a collector of fake news.
> Please provide links to reliable sources.



Вот! Этот интернет-ссылка должна быть по своему вкусу, да?

http://www.gazeta-pravda.ru


----------



## Flanker

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Вот! Этот интернет-ссылка должна быть по своему вкусу, да?
> 
> http://www.gazeta-pravda.ru



Oh boy!  Guys, these cold-war stereotypes are funny.
Pravda is a marginal newspaper. Seriously.
Even at the time of Soviet Union wasn't considered a good source of info by most of people.


----------



## George Wallace

Flanker said:
			
		

> Pravda is a marginal newspaper. Seriously.



So?  Where to you find your reputable and reliable sources?


----------



## Flanker

George Wallace said:
			
		

> So?  Where to you find your reputable and reliable sources?



There is absolutely reliable sources.
There are all less or more reliable.
However, when you see such a "news" in an anonymous newspaper (no established headquarter, no contact info), without documental references provided and non correlating with other sources, there are no doubts.

Do you think it is so easy now to hide 2000 "killed" troops in such a short period of time?
What about their relatives? How to hide them?
The media space in Russia is much more liberal than you may think.


----------



## George Wallace

Flanker said:
			
		

> There is absolutely reliable sources.
> There are all less or more reliable.
> However, when you see such a "news" in an anonymous newspaper (no established headquarter, no contact info), without documental references provided and non correlating with other sources, there are no doubts.
> 
> Do you think it is so easy now to hide 2000 "killed" troops in such a short period of time?
> What about their relatives? How to hide them?
> The media space in Russia is much more liberal than you may think.



Fine.

And your sources?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Flanker said:
			
		

> The media space in Russia is much more liberal than you may think.


 :rofl:
Liberal?  Just like it's safe to be a journalist there, especially if one criticizes the government, right?  It can ONLY be more liberal than *I* think ....


			
				George Wallace said:
			
		

> Fine.
> 
> And your sources?


What he said.


----------



## CougarKing

Russian trolls aside, this article provides some insight into Putin's inner circle; it's titled "The Rise of the Kremlin Hardliners" on the print version of the latest Time issue:

Time.com



> *Inside Vladimir Putin’s Circle*
> Simon Shuster / Moscow @shustry  Aug. 27, 2015
> putin-supporters
> Maxim Shipenkov—The New York Times/Redux
> 
> Gleb Pavlovsky arrived for work as usual that day in the spring of 2011, walking up to the clock tower of the Spassky Gate, which serves as the entrance to the Kremlin fortress. This had been his routine during the first two terms of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, when Pavlovsky had served as a top adviser on matters of domestic politics and propaganda. But on that April day, Pavlovsky discovered that his security pass would not open the gate.
> 
> “They just locked me out,” he recalled this spring at his personal office, a shamble of books and papers on the top floor of a crumbling apartment block in central Moscow. Pavlovsky was hardly alone–in the years since his dismissal, many others have been discarded from Putin’s staff in the same way, especially the more politically liberal members of the ruling class, the ones who wanted to stop Russia from tumbling backward into another Cold War with the West. For them the past few years have been a period of setbacks and humiliations–“a shriveling up,” is how one Kremlin consultant put it–while the hard-liners in Putin’s circle have seen their influence steadily expand.
> 
> *Known in Russia as the siloviki, or “men of force,” this coterie of generals and KGB veterans has come to fully dominate political life in Russia in the year and a half since the war in Ukraine ruptured Moscow’s relations with the West. Their rise has contributed to what several current and former advisers to the Kremlin describe as an atmosphere of paranoia and aggression. Officials seen as sympathetic toward the West have been mostly sidelined and discredited,* limiting the voices Putin hears on matters of national and global security. The result is a regime in Moscow that looks increasingly antagonistic to the West and appears prone to ill-considered and dangerous decisions. “Sometimes the old instincts kick in,” says one of Putin’s senior counselors, referring to the Cold War backgrounds of the officials who now dominate the Kremlin. “I’d say there is the danger of going backward.”
> 
> That’s bad for an increasingly isolated Russia, but it’s dangerous for the entire world. Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, where Russian-backed militants have taken control of large patches of territory, both Russian and Western forces have dramatically ramped up their military exercises in Eastern Europe. The outcome “has been a game of Russian-instigated dangerous brinkmanship which has resulted in many serious close military encounters between the forces of Russia and NATO,” said a report published on Aug. 12 by the European Leadership Network, a think tank that monitors security threats in the region.
> 
> Should a mistake happen, it is far from clear that cooler heads would prevail in the Kremlin–for the simple reason that there aren’t many of them left in Putin’s entourage.* Sergei Naryshkin,* a close Putin ally and speaker of Russia’s lower house of parliament, suggested in a newspaper article on Aug. 9 that the U.S. is trying to goad Russia into war. In a warning to President Barack Obama, he wrote that it “wouldn’t hurt the current and latest ‘war-time’ President of the USA to remember: if you sow the wind, you will reap the storm.” *Nikolai Patrushev*, the head of Russia’s Security Council and a 17-year veteran of the KGB, was even more direct in an interview published in late June. “They really want Russia to cease to exist as a nation,” he said of the U.S. “Because we have enormous wealth, and the Americans think we have no right to it and don’t deserve it.”
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Kirkhill

Here's a neat little item that I stumbled across a couple of days ago.

But I guess I shouldn't worry.  We never have to deal with the Indians.  The Russians would never interfere in our domestic affairs.  We only need an expeditionary army.



> Voices from Russia
> 
> Thursday, 22 May 2014
> 
> Mohawk Nation Stands with Russia
> 
> Filed under: history,Russian — 01varvara @ 00.00
> 
> Tags: American Indian, Canada, Edward Snowden, First Nation, First Nations, Great Law of Peace, Indians, indigenous peoples of the Americas, Iroquois, McCarthyism, Mohawk people, Native American, Native Americans in the United States, Peter the Great, political commentary, politics, Pyotr Veliki, Russia, Russian, Russian history, Ukraine, United States, USA
> 00 mohawk warrior. 21.05.14
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The above is an Indian warrior of the period of the great wars of France and Britain in the New World in the 18th century. Both British and French militaries learned much of value in light infantry tactics and skirmishing from their Indian allies… American propaganda that British soldiers were ignorant of American conditions is arrant bullshit devoid of any truth… after all, they DID listen to the Kanienkehaka leader Thayendanegea during the War of the American Rebellion. Do notice how silent American history books are on the ruthless Rebel sack of Thayendanegea’s home of Onaquaga.
> 
> _____________________________
> 
> Corporation of Canada CEO Harper is sending 6 CF18s and other weapons of mass destruction for NATO provocations against our ancient allies in Russia. Russia is legally a long-time ally of the Rotino’shonninwe/Iroquois Confederacy and its friends and allies on Great Turtle Island. Our alliance comes from the Kaia’nereh:kowa, our constitution. Treaty belts accepted by Peter the Great in 1710 record this sovereign international agreement of peace. They presented these belts to us for interpretation. According to our constitution, which is always recorded in wampum, and our treaty, we’ll seek all international legal remedies to stop Canada’s violation of the Peace established between Russia and the Onkwehonwe, the true sovereigns on Great Turtle Island.
> 
> Canada is conspicuously not attending the present negotiations between Russia, the USA, the EU, and other affected nations. Each party agreed not to supply weapons to the Ukraine. However, Canada is provoking war against our ancient allies by providing fighter jets and other weapons of mass destruction. This treaty alliance predates the corporations of Canada and the USA by more than a century. CEO Harper can’t speak on our behalf. Only we speak for ourselves and our friends and allies. The Corporation of Canada speaks for its shareholders. Like all corporations, Canada exists for one reason, to give ever-growing dividends and to protect their shareholders’ anonymity.
> 
> We stand by our Russian allies. There’ll be no war. Consequences will follow for these violations of our ancient alliances and sovereignty. According to international law, it’s our duty to demand that Canada refrain from posturing war against Russia. We Rotinoshonnionwe reaffirm our alliance to spread world peace. We assume our Russian allies who met our grandfathers in 1710 continue to have this on their minds too. These belts were left so that one day we could sit together and discuss them. These treaty belts predate the corporations of Canada and USA and the religion spread by Handsome Lake. We reaffirm this alliance between Russia and the people of the Kaianerekowa, the Great Law of Peace, those who follow the natural laws of this land. A corporation that is masquerading as a sovereign on our land is threatening Russia.
> 
> Editor:
> 
> The Anglos stole what is today the USA and Canada… they expect praise for it! I’d say to attend to history… the Anglos never kept a single treaty with native people, so, why does their duplicity vis-à-vis Russia surprise you? They love the Right Sector and Svoboda, as these groups are as violent, greedy, and untruthful as they are. It’s time to push back… in Russia… AND closer to home. However, take a care in how you express yourself, McCarthyism proved that the Americans, in particular, are jumpy and aren’t careful in their repressions. NEVER EVER use language that even implies the overthrow of the US government. You can describe the evil… you can castigate the evil… you can “finger” the criminals… but, please, NEVER call for the overthrow of the US government… they can and will throw you in prison for that… do recall what they did to Eugene V Debs and what they wanted to do to Edward Snowden. Take a care…
> 
> Remember Vine Deloria Jr’s words… “I was oppressed as an Indian, I’ll win justice as an Indian, and after I win justice, I’ll call myself whatever I damned well please”. Keep the faith and keep the fires burning…
> 
> BMD
> 
> 18 April 2014
> 
> Mohawk Nation News
> 
> http://mohawknationnews.com/blog/2014/04/18/canada-threatens-ancient-mohawk-allies/


----------



## Kirkhill

Nope.  Never happen.


----------



## a_majoor

More "Smart Diplomacy" fallout. Frankly, I hope the Gulf States and Saudi go all in in supporting and funding ISIS so the Russians can fight on multiple fronts, while we can pack up and go home.

http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/charles-krauthammer-putin-outflanks-obama-article-1.2365143



> *How Putin outflanks Obama: Russia's objectives in Syria are blindingly obvious*
> NEW YORK DAILY NEWS /
> Thursday, September 17, 2015, 8:00 PM
> 
> Once again, President Obama and his foreign policy team are stumped. Why is Vladimir Putin pouring troops and weaponry into Syria? After all, as Secretary of State John Kerry has thrice told his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, it is only making things worse.
> 
> But worse for whom? For the additional thousands of civilians who will die or flee as a result of the inevitably intensified fighting. True, and I’m sure Lavrov is as moved by their plight as by the 8,000 killed in Russia’s splendid little Ukrainian adventure.
> 
> SYRIAN REFUGEES TELL THEIR HARROWING STORIES
> 
> Kerry and Obama are serially surprised because they cannot fathom the hard men in the Kremlin. Yet Putin’s objectives in Syria are blindingly obvious:
> 
> 1. To assert Russia’s influence in the Middle East and make it the dominant outside power. Putin’s highest ambition is to avenge and reverse Russia’s humiliating loss of superpower status a quarter-century ago. Understanding this does not come easily to an American president who for seven years has been assiduously curating America's decline abroad.
> 
> 2. To sustain Russia’s major and long-standing Arab ally. Ever since Anwar Sadat kicked the Soviets out of Egypt in 1972, Syria’s Assads have been Russia’s principal asset in the Middle East.
> 
> 3. To expand the reach of Russia’s own military. It has a naval base at Tartus, its only such outside of Russia. It has an airfield near Latakia, now being expanded with an infusion of battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, howitzers and housing for 1,500 — strongly suggesting ground forces to follow.
> 
> 4. To push out the Americans. For Putin, geopolitics is a zero-sum game: Russia up, America down. He is demonstrating whom you can rely on in this very tough neighborhood. Obama has given short shrift to the Kurds, shafted America’s allies with the Iran deal and abandoned the Anbar Sunnis who helped us win the surge. Meanwhile, Putin risks putting Russian boots on the ground to rescue his Syrian allies.
> 
> Obama says Bashar Assad has to go, draws a red line on chemical weapons — and does nothing. Russia acts on behalf of a desperate ally. Whom do you want in your corner?
> 
> 5. To re-legitimize post-Crimea Russia by making it indispensable in Syria. It’s a neat two-cushion shot. At the UN next week, Putin will offer Russia as a core member of a new anti-Islamic State coalition. Obama’s Potemkin war — with its phantom local troops (our $500 million training program has yielded five fighters so far) and flaccid air campaign — is flailing badly. What Putin is proposing is that Russia, Iran and Hezbollah spearhead the anti-jihadist fight.
> 
> View Gallery Shocking images show Europe's migrant crisis
> 
> Putin’s offer is clear: Stop fighting Assad, accept Russia as a major player, and acquiesce to a Russia-Iran-Hezbollah regional hegemony — and we will lead the drive against the Islamic State from in front.
> 
> And there is a bonus. The cleverest part of the Putin gambit is its unstated cure for Europe’s refugee crisis.
> 
> Wracked by guilt and fear, the Europeans have no idea what to do. Putin offers a way out: No war, no refugees. Stop the Syrian civil war and not only do they stop flooding into Europe, those already there go back home to Syria.
> 
> EUROPE SHOULD TAKE SYRIA'S ASSAD TO WAR
> 
> Putin says, settle the war with my client in place — the Assad regime joined by a few “healthy” opposition forces — and I solve your refugee nightmare.
> 
> You almost have to admire the cynicism. After all, what's driving the refugees is the war and what's driving the war is Iran and Russia. They provide the materiel, the funds and now, increasingly, the troops that fuel the fighting. The arsonist plays fireman.
> 
> After all, most of the refugees are not fleeing the Islamic State. Its depravity is more ostentatious, but it is mostly visited upon minorities, Christian and Yazidi — and they have already been largely ethnically cleansed from Islamic State territory. The European detention camps are overflowing with Syrians fleeing Assad’s barbarism, especially his attacks on civilians, using artillery, chlorine gas and nail-filled barrel bombs.
> 
> Putin to the rescue. As with the chemical weapons debacle, he steps in to save the day. If we acquiesce, Russia becomes an indispensable partner. It begins military and diplomatic coordination with us. (We’ve just agreed to negotiations over Russia’s Syrian buildup.) Its post-Ukraine isolation is lifted and, with Iran, it becomes the regional arbiter.
> 
> In the end, the Putin strategy may not work, but it’s deadly serious and not at all obscure. The White House can stop scratching its collective head whenever another Condor transport unloads its tanks and marines at Latakia.
> - See more at: http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/charles-krauthammer-putin-outflanks-obama-article-1.2365143#sthash.uThugwBV.dpuf


----------



## Good2Golf

Thucydides said:
			
		

> More "Smart Diplomacy" fallout. Frankly, I hope the Gulf States and Saudi go all in in supporting and funding ISIS so the Russians can fight on multiple fronts, while we can pack up and go home.
> 
> http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/charles-krauthammer-putin-outflanks-obama-article-1.2365143




Or...it's reverse psychology and letting Putin's ego allow him to over-extend himself into Syria (and leave his Caucus flank vulnerable)...kind of like drawing the Soviets into another trap, just like in Afghanistan in the late 70's, which arguably, had a great influence in the Soviet regime (and its wall) fall a decade later...

Hypothetically...


----------



## Altair

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Or...it's reverse psychology and letting Putin's ego allow him to over-extend himself into Syria (and leave his Caucus flank vulnerable)...kind of like drawing the Soviets into another trap, just like in Afghanistan in the late 70's, which arguably, had a great influence in the Soviet regime (and its wall) fall a decade later...
> 
> Hypothetically...


If drawing a direct parallel, wouldn't that mean giving weapons to ISIL?


----------



## Good2Golf

Altair said:
			
		

> If drawing a direct parallel, wouldn't that mean giving weapons to ISIL?



I wouldn't say the direct parallel need be drawn (where ISIL today is yesterday's Mujahideen), the effect (Russia over-extending) is perhaps what the US and KSA (and other secondary/tertiary players) are looking for?  

:2c:

G2G


----------



## YZT580

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> I wouldn't say the direct parallel need be drawn (where ISIL today is yesterday's Mujahideen), the effect (Russia over-extending) is perhaps what the US and KSA (and other secondary/tertiary players) are looking for?
> 
> :2c:
> 
> G2G


I fear you are giving those running the show too much credit?  I don't believe that they have the mental dexterity to even consider a scenario as complicated as that one.


----------



## Altair

I would imagine a quick campaign(example; France in mali) to wipe out ISIL in conventional battle and reclaim territory to then be occupied /controlled by assad forces coming up after the Russians wouldn't be too hard for the Russians.

Assuming that's their play.


----------



## Good2Golf

Perhaps Putin's plan in to 'help' Assad by bringing his troops down for some good old high-readiness training, and if in the 'Fog of War' a coalition plane or three get shot down, well...oops. You know, these things...they happen, Comrade!" :nod:


----------



## The Bread Guy

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Perhaps Putin's plan in to 'help' Assad by bringing his troops down for some good old high-readiness training, and if in the 'Fog of War' a coalition plane or three get shot down, well...oops. You know, these things...they happen, Comrade!" :nod:


Or maybe to set up another Georgia/Transdnistria/Novorossia?  More on this theory here:


> .... Accounting for about 15% of territory, “Useful Syria” is now home to more than half of the population, partly thanks to influx of displaced people from other parts of the country. The strip between the coast and the mountains has the added advantage of being the principal base of the Alawite community to which Assad and his clan belong.
> 
> Get ready for Russia to cast itself as the protector, not only of the Alawites but also of other minorities such as Turcoman, Armenians and, more interestingly for Moscow, Orthodox Christians who have fled Islamist terror groups such as ISIS.
> 
> Russia has always seen itself as the “Third Rome” and the last standard-bearer of Christianity against both Catholic “deviation” and Islamist menace.
> 
> By controlling a new mini-state, as a “safe haven for minorities,” Russia could insist that if Syria returns to some normality it be reconstituted as a highly decentralized state. This is what Putin is also demanding in Georgia and Ukraine ....


----------



## Altair

Considering the state of syria and the advances of ISIL,  that wouldn't be the worst possible outcome.


----------



## Kirkhill

Tell me again.

WHY are we leaving the field to Putin?

 :not-again:

JFHC.


----------



## Altair

Why not?

Who else is going to put boots on the ground?

God bless the air forces of all the members of the coalition but when it comes to actually defeating ISIL it's probably going to take a trained military with boots on the ground. 

The USA under the Democrats have no interest in doing that, Europe doesn't either, middle eastern countries much prefer westerners to die for them.

For all of their faults, russia>ISIL


----------



## Kirkhill

It is not just about ISIL.  And it is not just about boots on the ground - or even birds in the air.

It about all the various fora in which Putin is putzing around.  He does not have the cards the Stalin, or Krushchev, or Brezhnev or even Gorbachev had to play.  And yet we treat him as if he does.

He needs to be backed up and backed up fast.  The world was a damned sight scarier in 1948 and 1962 and even in the era of "The Evil Empire".


----------



## Altair

There's a saying, it's better to be present with ten men than be absent with ten thousand.

No point in having a royal flush when you fold off the blind. 

Sure, putin has a lot less to play with than his predecessors but he's actually willing to use what he has.  And if in the end he helps to defeat ISIL in Syria,  the enemy of my enemy is my friend.


----------



## Good2Golf

Given that the Bear got thumped when it went over The Mountain, do some not see the benefit to seeing Putin's little green men "not fight" on two fronts?  Syria and Egypt are smaller power brokers than KSA and Kuwait...let Putin stretch himself to ingratiate himself with old friends.  I look forward to when the House of Saud finally decides enough is enough and becomes more proactive in the region.


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Given that the Bear got thumped when it went over The Mountain, do some not see the benefit to seeing Putin's little green men "not fight" on two fronts?  Syria and Egypt are smaller power brokers than KSA and Kuwait...let Putin stretch himself to ingratiate himself with old friends.  I look forward to when the House of Saud finally decides enough is enough and becomes more proactive in the region.



Aye, I do see benefit to Putin's non-armies being stretched.... If there is a plan to keep the mess in check.  My concern is that entropy is the natural tendency of things and that it is very easy to promote.  Dysfunction and chaos will happen naturally if nothing is done.  Speeding up the process is simple.   

What happens if Putin's plan is the equivalent of putting a torch to the place?

What happens if he decides that if he can't win then nobody else will win either? 

Criminals flourish during chaotic times.

To my eye, chaos certainly seems to be expanding.  It is expanding in the areas that Putin is active.  It is expanding in areas that order has been maintained for decades - Western Europe for example - and the Middle East and North Africa.  

I suggest that it is not implausible to suppose that Putin, angry about the chaotic state of the old USSR and its near abroad, seeks to reduce his enemies in the West to the same level of impotence.

What if the Putin strategy is to Reset the game by tipping over the chess board and forcing everyone to start over - on equal terms?

I don't believe we have the luxury of pulling a Chamberlain and ignoring events in distant lands involving people about whom we know nothing.  Even if we ignore Putinesque plays like stirring the pot among our own disaffected.

I am perturbed because, while I see this playing out, I don't see any need for it to play out.  We have all the tools necessary to oppose entropy.  Those tools are the same tools that have always allowed governments to oppose entropy and chaos and impose order.  I am perturbed because I don't see any will to get off our collective duffs and act.

And as to the choice of the tools: Boots on the ground, Birds in the air - those are the equivalent of fighting fire with fire.  And they are only one strategy possible.

A forest fire is entropy writ large.  A sudden conflagration that releases energy and destroys order leaving chaos in its wake.

Fire is one tool used to fight fire.  Water is another.  Chemicals are another.  Removing fuel.  Removing oxygen. Cooling the surrounds. Creating barriers. And many more....

I don't see any evidence of a coherent strategy, hell I don't see any evidence of an incoherent strategy, that addresses the key issue: Putin.

Putin:  Robert Mugabe on steroids (and we didn't do anything about him either and Zimbabwe continues to suffer, along with the rest of his neighbours)

One outfit does benefit:  China.

In the power vacuum China advances its own Honourable East India Company strategy, imposing its own order on its own sites all over the world - from Afghanistan, to Zimbabwe, to Iran, to Oregon, to Edmonton.

I see those effects daily.  Chinese investment regularly means Chinese equipment, Chinese managers, Chinese installers and Chinese operators.  It is not illegal.  It is not even novel.  It is worrying when, instead of a gaggle of investors, a single controlling body with a plan manipulates those levers.

Edit - By the way Mugabe was a Chinese client as well.

But, by all means - leave us retire to the dock, put a line in the water and suck back another beer.  I am sure it will all work out in the end.

How's that Canadian election doing? Eh?


----------



## Good2Golf

Note all above.  Don't forget, there is actually, Nature-wise, a fair bit of good that comes of forest fires, as well. 

G2G


----------



## Kirkhill

Or did the light just go on?

There is a strategy.  And it is a coherent strategy.

Lanchester - a Brit that developed a minor machine gun and a major marketing strategy.

I was introduced to it during a marketing seminar.  It is ultimately a flanking strategy.

The example that I was given was Canon copiers.  Once upon a time the copier market was owned by a company called Xerox.  A Japanese upstart called Canon wanted to get into the game.  Their game plan started in Glasgow.  Not the US at all because that was going right at a well defended target.  So Britain.  Not London, because that was owned by Xerox.  So Glasgow.  Connected but distant so kinks in Canon`s game could be worked out, success touted and failures buried.  The plan worked.  Glasgow, London, UK, US....

Mugabe`s Zimbabwe, Putin`s Russia.  Create disorder.  Create opportunity.  Establish colonies.

It is easy, and cheap, to encourage entropy. To have your ancient enemies beating each other up is never a bad thing.  And while they are entertaining themselves.  You can establish little patches of order, to your own liking and playing by your own rules, cheaply and profitably.

It worked for the Brits.  Maybe it works for China.  Except that initially there was no Brit plan.   And when the Brits discovered why they had so many red dots on the map and tried to turn their success into a plan they lost their red dots.

To be clear - there is a strategy but it is being implemented by China.

OK - so now you can tie me up in my jacket and check the fit on my tinfoil hat.

Cheers.

And G2G, a good burnover is necessary from time to time.  But it is better to recognize that one is happening and to manage it rather than hope that if and when the time comes the conflagration will pass over you as you huddle under your survival blanket, wondering how long you can hold out.


----------



## Good2Golf

Kirkhill said:
			
		

> And G2G, a good burnover is necessary from time to time.  But it is better to recognize that one is happening and to manage it rather than hope that if and when the time comes the conflagration will pass over you as you huddle under your survival blanket, wondering how long you can hold out.



:nod:  Absolutely, especially if Nature is manipulated by man such that the natural process becomes modified to an extent where there is not only benefit, but previously unseen destruction.

cheers
G2G


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> :nod:  Absolutely, especially if Nature is manipulated by man such that the natural process becomes modified to an extent where there is not only benefit, but previously unseen destruction.
> 
> cheers
> G2G



Banff national park and our environmentally sensitive natives come to mind.... But we are wandering well off our path here. 

Creative Destruction....It's a good thing.


----------



## CougarKing

I wonder if this guy is related to the pilot after whom the Pugachev Cobra aerial maneuver is named after?

Reuters



> *Exclusive: 'Putin's banker' Pugachev files $10 billion claim against Russia*
> Mon Sep 21, 2015 2:50pm EDT
> 
> By Guy Faulconbridge
> 
> LONDON (Reuters) - Sergei Pugachev, a tycoon once dubbed "Putin's banker" because of his influence in the Kremlin, has filed a claim against Russia for more than $10 billion after his business empire was carved up when he fell out of favor with President Vladimir Putin.
> 
> The claim was filed in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on Monday, a source close to Pugachev told Reuters on condition of anonymity. Lawyers for Pugachev will outline his claim against Russia on Tuesday in Paris, the source said.
> 
> It was not immediately possible to get a response from the Russian government. Russia is already fighting a separate ruling by the same court in 2014, which ordered Russia to pay $50 billion for expropriating the assets of Yukos, once Russia's biggest oil producer and run by Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## vonGarvin

I'd rather Russians die fighting ISIL than us. 
As for Afghanistan and the USSR,  it was the nuclear arms and conventional arms race that brought it down, not the handful of Muhajadeen we kept supplied.
And we've done not much better there. :/


----------



## The Bread Guy

An interesting messaging track laid out by this commentator, pulling in the Pope:


> .... Just as the chemical weapons crisis was “solved” by throwing the whole matter under the Russian bear, might the refugee crisis be “solved” the same way? Might the Holy Father lend his moral authority to Russia’s presence if Putin presents it as a more effective means to ending ISIL’s brutal persecution of the region’s indigenous Christian population? Francis insistently speaks out on the atrocities against Christians at the hands of ISIL and Putin portrays himself at home as the defender of Holy Mother Russia. He would be inclined to do the same on the world stage. Putin is eager to fill the vacuum created by the absence of international intervention in Syria. Will Francis urge that the vacuum be filled in another way? ....


----------



## Edward Campbell

Technoviking said:
			
		

> _I'd rather Russians die fighting ISIL than us._
> As for Afghanistan and the USSR,  it was the nuclear arms and conventional arms race that brought it down, not the handful of Muhajadeen we kept supplied.
> _And we've done not much better there._ :/




I agree with both your first and last points.

As to the second point, I think the biggest "defeat" Russia suffered was in the "soft power" campaign ... Russia proved, for all the world to see, that it was no different, in any respect, from any Western power, from ancient Greece to 20th century America. That put paid to the old communist (USSR) lie about being "different" or "special" and a "friend" to the developing world. Afghanistan, for Russia, in the 1970s and '80s, was the same as Viet Nam for America, in the 1960s and '70s.


----------



## Kirkhill

Technoviking said:
			
		

> I'd rather Russians die fighting ISIL than us.
> As for Afghanistan and the USSR,  it was the nuclear arms and conventional arms race that brought it down, not the handful of Muhajadeen we kept supplied.
> And we've done not much better there. :/









This also contributed to the demise of the USSR - Russians that died fighting mujahadeen in Afghanistan - Cargo 200.

The failure resulted in loss of faith in the Kremlin, the Army and the Party.  None of which have been restored.

And that is the reason why I don't think that Putin can succeed in establishing any type of order and I don't believe that he intends to.

If you want order, if you want to paint rocks white, you are going to have to do it yourselves.

Putin's non-armies of non-soldiers and packets of half-a-dozen super-annuated tanks scattered abroad are not going to get the job done for you.


----------



## CougarKing

The former KGB agent will be meeting the former "community organizer" soon:

Reuters



> *Obama and Putin to meet; Syria and Ukraine vie for attention*
> Thu Sep 24, 2015 10:40pm EDT
> 
> By Roberta Rampton and Denis Dyomkin
> 
> WASHINGTON/MOSCOW (Reuters) - U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin will meet in New York next week at a time of high tension in Europe and the Middle East, but the Kremlin and the White House disagreed on Thursday over the top priority for the talks.
> 
> The White House insisted the meeting would focus on eastern Ukraine, where Russian-backed forces are fighting the Kiev government, prompting tough sanctions that have damaged Russia's economy.
> 
> Moscow, however, said the main focus would be on Syria, where Russia has built up its military forces in recent weeks with combat aircraft, tanks and other equipment in support of President Bashar al-Assad.
> 
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## a_majoor

The real question now is how long Russia can sustain its ambitions in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Syria and so on based on their resources:

http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/09/russian-economy-facing-depression-high.html



> *Russian Economy Facing Depression, High Interest Rates and Low Oil and Gas Prices*
> 
> Russia has fallen into full-blown depression and faces a mounting fiscal crisis as oil and gas revenues plummet. Output from country’s state-owned gas giant Gazprom has collapsed by 19pc over the past year as demand shrivels in Europe.
> 
> The Russian authorities have the crisis under control for now. They have allowed the ruble to fall rather than burning up reserves, providing a cushion for the budget and for oil and gas producers. But this policy is inflationary, and politically toxic.
> 
> It is 66 rubles to 1 US dollar
> 
> In March 2015, the government was forced to amend the budget in order to adapt to the $50 oil price level, and it is likely that the 2016 budget will also be tailored accordingly.
> 
> Russia has been able to weather the challenges facing its economy a bit better than Nextbigfuture thought they would back in March 2015. However, if oil prices stay low it seems to be a matter of time (1 to 4 years) before Russia has a bigger crisis. With China's economy in what appears to be long term slower growth, it seems oil prices could stay at $60 per barrel or less through 2020.
> 
> Gazprom’s revenues are likely to drop by almost a third to $106bn this year from $146bn in 2014, seriously eroding Russia’s economic base. Gazprom alone generates a tenth of Russian GDP and a fifth of all budget revenues.
> 
> The economy has contracted by 4.9pc over the past year and the downturn is certain to drag on as oil prices crumble after a tentative rally. Half of Russia’s tax income comes from oil and gas.
> 
> “Russia is going to be in a very difficult fiscal situation by 2017,” said Lubomir Mitov from Unicredit. “By the end of next year there won’t be any money left in the oil reserve fund and there is a humongous deficit in the pension fund. They are running a budget deficit of 3.7pc of GDP but without developed capital markets Russia can't really afford to run a deficit at all.”
> 
> The official reserves have dropped from $524bn to $361bn since the Ukraine crisis first erupted in late 2014. Unicredit said the true figure is nearer $340bn once other commitments are stripped out.
> 
> New Investment and Foreign Technology needed to maintain Oil Production by 2018
> 
> They are still relying on old Soviet wells,” said Mr Mitov. The depletion rates in the traditional fields of Western Siberia are running at 8pc-11pc a year.
> 
> “They can’t keep up production without access to foreign imports and technology, so we think there could be a fall in output of 5pc to 10pc by 2018,” he said.
> 
> Lukoil’s vice-president, Leonid Fedun, said in March that Russia’s oil output could fall 8pc by the end of next year, taking 800,000 barrels a day (b/d) out of global markets, with major implications for the balance of supply and demand.
> 
> Any such loss would be corrosive for Russia. It has not happened yet. Russian producers have taken advantage of a new tax regime to raise output this year to 10.7m b/d, close to the post-Soviet peak. But they are relying on legacy investments and imported machinery that must be replaced sooner or later.
> 
> Putin’s long-term strategy depends on opening up the Arctic and the vast shale reserves of the Bazhenov basin and the Volga-Urals. Drilling in these regions is covered by sanctions, forcing Western firms to freeze joint ventures.
> 
> Russia lacks the technology to make these projects viable. Average fracking costs in Russia are three times higher than those of cutting-edge drillers in the US.
> 
> SOURCES - Telegraph UK, Bloomberg, Global Risk Insights



As noted in another thread, if the US Federal Reserve were to raise interest rates IOT unf**k the economy, it would have a devastating effect on fragile economies like Russia, so the danger is that the foundation of Russia's economy is so small that unexpected shocks (i.e. a small drop of China's economic growth) could have huge effects.


----------



## CougarKing

A prisoner exchange reminiscent of the Cold War?

Sky News



> *Russia And Estonia Swap Spies On Bridge*
> Sky NewsSky News – 21 hours ago
> 
> Russia and Estonia have swapped convicted spies on a bridge that links the two countries.
> It follows a period of heightened tensions between the two countries as Estonia accused the Russians of kidnapping one of the men and taking him across the border.
> Russian officials said they handed over Eston Kohver, an Estonian security officer detained by Russia last year, in exchange for Alexei Dressen, a former Estonian official serving a 16-year jail term for being a Russian spy.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)



Plus, no love lost between Kiev and Moscow over flight restrictions against each other: 

Reuters



> *Russia to consider restrictions against Ukrainian airlines*
> Mon Sep 28, 2015 6:46am EDT
> MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has given an order to the transportation ministry to consider retaliatory restrictive measures against Ukraine for banning Russian flights, the government spokeswoman Natalia Timakova said on Monday.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## CougarKing

Aside from being in top shape, he also is a judo black belt if I can recall correctly.

Reuters



> *'Czar Putin': as secure as he seems?*
> Thu Oct 8, 2015 7:35am EDT
> 
> By Guy Faulconbridge and Stephen Grey
> 
> PARIS (Reuters) - Vladimir Putin turned 63 this week with his now traditional display of sporting prowess, and an announcement that Russian naval vessels had launched a wave of missiles against Islamic State in Syria.
> 
> The Russian leader has never appeared more confident and his grip on power never more secure. In the past two years he has outmaneuvered the West in Crimea, eastern Ukraine and Syria. Western sanctions have apparently failed to blunt his ambition.
> 
> But some of Putin's former allies, those who have fallen from grace during his 15 years in power, paint a different picture: Putin's position as Russian leader may be far less assured, they say.
> 
> 
> (...SNIPPED)



Plus, more on Putin celebrating his 63rd birthday with a hockey game:

CNN



> *Putin celebrates 63rd birthday with ice hockey game and seven goals*
> 
> By Jethro Mullen, CNN
> Updated 5:30 AM ET, Thu October 8, 2015
> 
> (CNN)Not the kind of guy to miss a flattering photo op, Russian President Vladimir Putin put his skates on for his 63rd birthday and took to the ice.
> 
> The leader, famous for posing shirtless on horseback and in other unashamedly macho situations, played in a hockey game Wednesday night alongside former NHL stars.
> 
> As you'd expect, Putin's team won. And the man himself scored seven goals.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## a_majoor

While Russia still has the resources to spend, they are rapidly developing a true expeditionary capability (something they did not have under the former Soviet Union). Once again, the real question isn't "can they do this?" but rather "for how long?"

http://nextbigfuture.com/2015/10/russia-has-restored-much-of-its-soviet.html



> *Russia has restored much of its Soviet era military capability*
> 
> Putin’s expansionist policy in Russia’s neighborhood is backed up by a poised and professional military thanks to Russia’s most significant military reforms since the 1930s.
> 
> ECFR Visiting Fellow Gustav Gressel, asserts that reforms initiated in response to the blundering invasion of Georgia in 2008, have left Russia with a military that would make short work of any of its neighbors, were they left isolated by their Western allies, though he calls into question Russia’s capacity in Syria.
> 
> Gressel argues that many Western policy makers, have been lulled into a false sense of security by focusing primarily on the military hardware component of Russian military modernization.
> 
> Russia’s fighter jets are, for now at least, conducting nearly as many strikes in a typical day against rebel troops opposing the government of President Bashar al-Assad as the American-led coalition targeting the Islamic State has been carrying out each month this year.
> 
> The operation in Syria — still relatively limited — has become, in effect, a testing ground for an increasingly confrontational and defiant Russia under Mr. Putin. In fact, as Mr. Putin himself suggested on Sunday, the operation could be intended to send a message to the United States and the West about the restoration of the country’s military prowess and global reach after decades of post-Soviet decay.
> 
> The Russian campaign in Syria is giving officials and analysts far greater insight into the new Russian military.
> 
> “We’re learning more than we have in the last 10 years,” said Micah Zenko, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, noting the use of the new strike fighters and the new cruise missile, known as the Kalibr. “As it was described to me, we are going to school on what the Russian military is capable of today.”
> 
> The Russian advancements go beyond new weaponry, reflecting an increase in professionalism and readiness. Russia set up its main operations at an air base near Latakia in northwestern Syria in a matter of three weeks, dispatching more than four dozen combat planes and helicopters, scores of tanks and armored vehicles, rocket and artillery systems, air defenses and portable housing for as many as 2,000 troops. It was Moscow’s largest deployment to the Middle East since the Soviet Union deployed in Egypt in the 1970s.
> 
> “What continues to impress me is their ability to move a lot of stuff real far, real fast,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the commander of United States Army forces in Europe, said in an interview
> 
> Since its air campaign started on Sept. 30, Russia has quickly ramped up its airstrikes from a handful each day to nearly 90 on some days, using more than a half-dozen types of guided and unguided munitions, including fragmentary bombs and bunker busters for hardened targets


----------



## Edward Campbell

If the Mongol Empire reunited ...

     
	

	
	
		
		

		
		
	


	




          ... and there would be NO _Islamist_ terrorism within its boundaries, not after the first incident, anyway.


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

E.R. Campbell said:
			
		

> If the Mongol Empire reunited ...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ... and there would be NO _Islamist_ terrorism within its boundaries, not after the first incident, anyway.



But it would then have a somewhat reduced population, wouldn't it Mr. Gengis Khan?


----------



## Edward Campbell

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> But it would then have a somewhat reduced population, wouldn't it Mr. Gengis Khan?




The Mongols were not mindless slaughterers ... they did, now and again, kill on a large scale, but almost always, for exemplary purposes. Populations that first, treated the Khan's envoys with respect and, second, _"kowtowed"_ when required were, generally left alone to pay their taxes and prosper, or not, as their own initiative dictated. Those that e.g. murdered the Khan's envoys were, of course, slaughtered, man woman and child ... but maybe that's how it should be ...   ...


----------



## Kirkhill

It is not that THEY are that good.  It is that WE are that bad.



> US Army forced to borrow British helicopters amid budget cuts
> 
> Reduced America military presence in Europe forces US to borrow equipment from Nato allies
> 
> By David Lawler and Ruth Sherlock, Washington1:08PM BST 19 Oct 2015
> 
> The US military has been forced to borrow British helicopters and conduct training exercises with equipment loaned by other Nato members due to budget cutbacks.
> 
> America no longer has any tanks in Europe, and the number of US troops stationed there has decreased by more than a third since 2012. Many of the weapons used for Nato exercises rotate between bases in the US and in Europe.
> Lt General Ben Hodges, the US Army's commander in Europe, said allies had increasingly been called upon to loan out vehicles and supplies.
> 
> _*“I don’t have bridges, I don’t have the trucks that can carry tanks, we don’t have enough helicopters to do what we need to do,” *_he told the New York Times. “Practising with British helicopters here is an essential part of it. Using British and German bridges, using Hungarian air defence is part of it."
> 
> In an interview with the Telegraph, Gen Hodges said Britain was still playing a key role in European defence: "One of the most important things that happened in the past year was the UK saying it would maintain it's two per cent GDP [on military spending]," he said. "If the UK had dropped off that would have taken all the pressure off the other European countries."
> 
> That the world's most expensive military must now rely on borrowed hardware for its operations in Europe is indicative of the diminishing presence of the US armed forces on the continent.
> 
> The Pentagon has been hampered by sharp cuts over the past several years, and what resources are available are increasingly targeted elsewhere.
> 
> The Obama administration announced in 2012 that it would be shifting military assets away from Europe to Asia and the Middle East.
> Gen Hodges said last week that America no longer has the "intelligence capacity to do what we need to do" and that, as a result he had been "suprised" by Russia's actions in Ukraine and in Syria.
> 
> "We don't have that many Russian speakers anymore," he said. "I personally have been surprised by every single snap exercise and when they went into Syria: we just do not have the capability to see and track what they're doing the way they used to."
> The demands on the US Army in Europe have not decreased. Growing Russian aggression, in particular, has posed challenges that the US has been forced to prepare for with fewer troops and less equipment.
> 
> _*At the end of the Cold War, the US had more than 200,000 troops stationed in Europe. The current troop count is now less than one-fifth of that figure.
> *_
> 
> “The mission’s still the same,” General Hodges said. “So we have to figure out how you make 30,000 (troops) feel like 300,000.”



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11940511/US-Army-forced-to-borrow-British-helicopters-amid-budget-cuts.html

The answer to Vlad playing schoolyard bully?

Contrary to reports about how strong Vlad is his Fronts have become Armies and his Armies have become Brigades. His Brigades are equipped with assorted vehicles and can only move by rail from garrison to garrison.  His Air Transport fleet is shrinking and is made in Ukraine. And to top it off the only troops he can rely on are his "elite" forces - airborne, naval infantry and what used to be known as GRU.  He has no conscript base and he can't hire volunteers for service abroad.

And yet he struts the stage influencing events with a 6 pack here and an agitator there.....

And he is allowed to.

Here is a map of his Main Supply Route






http://www.transsiberiantrain.com/transiberiantraintranssiberianrailway/train_moscow_russian_railways.php


----------



## Edward Campbell

This article, reproduced under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act from _Foreign Affairs_ supports what Chris says about the essential weakness that lies behind Putin's opportunism:

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2015-10-18/putins-potemkin-intervention


> Putin's Potemkin Intervention
> *The Weakness of Moscow's Syrian Adventure*
> 
> By Alexander Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon
> 
> October 18, 2015
> 
> When it comes to foreign policy, U.S. President Obama’s critics have long accused him of being weak, indecisive, and naive. “Restoring resolve” to the Oval Office was a Republican theme in 2012, and it remains one among the 2016 GOP contenders. This narrative has now spread beyond Obama’s partisan opponents: many accuse Washington of responding with insufficient strength to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its support of the insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military intervention in Syria, which seeks to support Russia’s longtime ally Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, leaves the United States looking flatfooted. To some, it also highlights Washington’s waning power.
> 
> In short, Obama’s apparent restraint appears irresolute, whereas Putin comes across as a strong, decisive master strategist who exploits Obama’s weakness and keeps Washington off balance. _The Economist_ declares that “Putin dares, Obama dithers,” and wishes that “Mr. Obama had a bit more of Mr. Putin’s taste for daring.” The former U.S. State Department official Jeffrey A. Stacey writes in _Foreign Affairs_ that “when Putin stared down the West and the West blinked, the West lost its credibility and, with it, its ability to deter further Russian bad behavior.” The Telegraph columnist Matt K. Lewis notes, “Today, it looks like [Obama’s] allowing Russia to push America around, and dictate the terms of our being pushed around.”
> 
> These interpretations dangerously misread contemporary geopolitics, however. Putin’s appearance of strength is, in reality, a function of Russia’s relatively weak international position. Russia lacks a global network of allies and partners and denounces the United States’ leadership. But Moscow cannot decisively influence the rules, institutions, and norms of the international order. By contrast, what many diagnose as U.S. weakness is a symptom of its exorbitant geostrategic privilege. Prudent foreign policy requires Washington to manage its extensive and heterogeneous security commitments and global relationships carefully. This makes Putin’s style of boldness not only less difficult to pursue but also often reckless—sacrificing longer-term position for short-term gain.
> 
> THE PSEUDO-STRENGTH OF WEAK TIES
> 
> Putin faces a difficult international environment. Moscow lacks a broad international network of reliable partners and allies. And despite a decade of military reforms, Russia’s ability to project force abroad remains hampered by a lack of overseas bases. Its agreements with major base hosts—Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the beleaguered Assad regime in Syria—are insufficient to help Russia demonstrate military might. Without substantial military power and few international allies, Russia barely qualifies as a global power.
> 
> Indeed, Putin’s actions in Syria mark the first major use Russian forces outside of its near abroad—unless one counts the mad rush to Pristina, Kosovo, in 1999 during the end of the Kosovo war—since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008 sought to check Western influence in its regional sphere of privileged interest and punish the staunchly pro-Western regime of then Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. However, despite an intensive diplomatic push, Moscow largely failed to secure international recognitions for the independence of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It garnered the lasting support of only Nauru, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.  The August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, of course, demonstrated Moscow’s ability to overwhelm a tiny country on its border. But, in general, Russia’s efforts to influence and leverage even its neighbors routinely fall short. As Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness write in _Foreign Affairs_, Moscow’s “bark is worse than its bite.”
> 
> Russia’s alliance portfolio both underscores and contributes to its problems. Moscow relies on cultivating and supporting strongman clients. It pursues this policy within its own territory, such as in Chechnya and the North Caucasus; across the “frozen” separatist entities it backs in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; and in post-Soviet states such as Belarus and several Central Asian countries. Russia uses incentives—including subsidized energy, military assistance, and pledges of financial support—in exchange for continuing fealty to Moscow and support of Russian-backed foreign policy initiatives such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union. Yet, as the world saw with the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia’s political clients are often deeply kleptocratic and enjoy fragile domestic legitimacy. It should surprise no one, then, that in a post–Arab Spring, post-Maidan environment, Central Asian autocrats have followed Moscow’s lead and cracked down on the political activities of nongovernmental organizations and other forms of “foreign influence.”
> Even worse, many of Russia’s clients are flight risks; they enjoy access to multiple international patrons and could leave Moscow’s sphere of influence relatively easily. For example, China offers an emerging alternative to Russian dominance in Central Asia. The European Union pulls at Russian clients in western Eurasia. This provides ways for many of Russia’s clients to enhance their autonomy from Moscow.
> 
> At the same time, Moscow continues to back counterweight organizations, such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but these remain largely aspirational entities rather than effective problem-solving international bodies. Despite public calls for a Russian pivot to China, numerous cooperative arrangements between Beijing and Moscow, such as the Power of Siberia gas agreement, appear to be developing on Beijing’s terms. And China has proven unable to provide a source of financing for Russian firms that have been hit hard by Western financial sanctions and need to roll over and restructure debt. At the most basic level, Russia and China remain frenemies with often divergent—if not conflictual—strategic and economic interests.
> 
> In contrast, the United States sits at the center of a vast network of alliances, strategic partnerships, bases, and access agreements. Washington’s close allies include many of the world’s wealthiest nations—France, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. It is a driving force in NATO, maintains close security cooperation with the Gulf states, enjoys deeply institutionalized alliances with every major Pacific power other than China, and has recently seen many other Asian countries tilt in its direction. Most of its linchpin regional allies, especially in Europe and Asia, are democratic regimes. In France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, the question of security cooperation with the United States concerns not whether, but how much.
> 
> Of course, critics often accuse Washington of hypocrisy. In addition to working with stable, democratic governments, the United States cooperates with a number of autocratic regimes that do not embody liberal principles. When conducting counterterrorism operations in Africa and Asia, or when establishing basing rights in Central Asia for the war in Afghanistan, Washington has cut its own fair share of deals with dictators in graft-ridden countries. But it has also paid the price in countries such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where it has been entangled in domestic power struggles and corruption schemes. Accusations of Washington’s double standards resonate precisely because the United States maintains such a broad range of security relationships, many of which are undergirded by liberal norms and values that are widely shared by its partners.
> 
> Beyond accusations of hypocrisy, Washington’s relations with its heterogeneous collection of allies and partners often force caution, deliberation, and legal nuance when undertaking important security decisions. When Washington refuses to provide weapons to Ukraine out of fear of regional escalation, it must still take steps to reaffirm its Article V commitments to NATO members—such as the Baltic States and Poland—by increasing its rotational presence instead. Even within NATO, the United States must lead an alliance composed of relative hawks and doves—and, in the case of Hungary, perhaps even admirers—when it comes to Russia. For those obsessed with flashy displays of boldness and resolve, it is no wonder that such prudent management of American power appears weak and indecisive.
> The complications of being an alliance-rich global power extend well beyond Europe. When Washington makes a nuclear deal with Iran, it faces pressure to reassure Israel, the Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia that its alliances are every bit as strong as they were before. It must tread delicately when it comes to the various fault lines in the Middle East: Turkey and the Kurds; the tensions among Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shiites in Iraq and throughout the Middle East; and the Israel-Palestine conflict and how that plays among other U.S. allies in the region. The United States inevitably faces cross-pressures, blowback, and diplomatic gymnastics because its own policies directly impact a much larger number of relationships and global commitments than Russia’s.
> 
> Russia can ignore these same sites of conflict, even if doing so would be unwise. In the Middle East, Russia must decide between losing the Syrian regime and its basing regional foothold, or enter into a conflict where it will aim to shore up its political client and reinvigorate its relationship with Iran in the wake of the nuclear deal. In Ukraine and eastern Europe, Moscow is willing to alienate Sweden and Finland to the point where NATO membership becomes a live political option. And why not? Russia’s economic and military power is already dwarfed by that of the Western alliance. In Asia, where Russia barely has a presence, Moscow’s access to Cam Ranh Bay is complicated by the fact that it mostly serves Vietnam as a hedge in the context of growing Vietnamese-U.S. cooperation and escalating Vietnam-China tensions over the South China Sea. Russia’s attempt to support the regime in Cuba—for which it granted debt relief—now appears overtaken by the normalization of relations between Washington and Havana. And attempts to draw closer to countries such as Egypt—by offering cooperative ties with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union—are more about symbolism and status than actual legal economic integration.
> 
> DESPERATE TIMES, DESPERATE MEASURES
> 
> Moscow’s weak hand makes Russian officials scramble for the least bad option. But this weakness should also caution the West against the risk of Putin envy. Obama’s recent comments about how Putin’s adventures abroad signal weakness at home hit upon an essential truth: Moscow’s recent moves are desperate attempts to stave off the loss of clients and influence, rather than a changing of the geopolitical guard.
> 
> Russia’s Ukraine policy is more failure than success: Putin’s pressure on Yanukovych brought a pro-Western regime to power and forced Moscow to turn to military instruments to salvage its position at tremendous cost to its international standing and economy. Outside of Crimea—which in itself is likely to be an expensive albatross—Russian forces and their allies hold very little Ukrainian territory. As of now, it looks as though Russia will have to settle for a few frozen conflicts instead of a land corridor to Crimea and the collapse of a hostile Ukrainian regime. Even if Moscow’s fortunes shift, the whole stream of events showcases Russia’s weakness: the fragility of its clients, the limited efficacy of Moscow’s power-political instruments, and the large costs incurred from having to resort to force in order to maintain its small pool of allies and partners.
> 
> The same basic dynamics likely hold in Syria. Of course, Russian intervention complicates an already dicey U.S. policy in the country, where Washington’s arming of rebels now places U.S. weapons at the firing end of Russian and pro-Assad forces. Indeed, Moscow’s intervention in Syria demonstrates that the Russia of 2015 is much more capable than the Russia of 2000. But Moscow’s actions amount to a risky attempt to prop up its only reliable Middle Eastern ally, secure practically its only overseas military base, and break from relative isolation.
> 
> Russia’s geostrategic position is overwhelmingly inferior. Combined with profound status insecurity and a regime that remains nervous about domestic stability, this constitutes a potent mix. Ironically, it leaves Moscow comparatively unfettered to engage in opportunistic and risky actions. With no extensive global alliance system to conserve, it need not worry about cross-pressures, hypocrisy costs, and other luxuries of geopolitical success. This may enable it to chip away at weak links in the American order and even to take “bold” actions to enhance its strategic outlook. But in international affairs, fortune—as Washington learned in Iraq and Libya—does not always favor the bold.




Russia looks big and bold, but it's mostly bluster and bluff, and Russia must always look over its shoulder at it "frenemy" China which is juts waiting to pounce on Siberia.


----------



## Kirkhill

The big problem is we are playing Russian Roulette with a Russian armed with a rusty revolver and corroded nuclear tipped bullets.... and the Russian is fully aware that he has a limited amount of time.


----------



## a_majoor

Knowing the past is usually a good way of predicting the future. (I was quite surprised when studying translations of Vladimir Putin's speeches and pronouncements his references to Russian philosophers from the 19th century, but once I started looking at what these philosophers were saying, some of Putins actions fit that world view). Robert Conquest was a  historian of the Soviet Union, and (much like Edward suggests that modern China has recreated the forms of the old dynastic system) the autocratic system of Tzarist Russia was recreated in Communist Russia and again under Putin:

https://reason.com/archives/2015/10/18/stalins-prosecutor



> *Stalin's Prosecutor*
> RIP Robert Conquest, the historian who held the Soviets accountable
> Glenn Garvin from the November 2015 issue - view article in the Digital Edition
> 
> To understand the moral and literary power with which Robert Conquest wrote, consider the second sentence in his book Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine, a study of the 14.5 million deaths that resulted from Joseph Stalin's murderous takeover of his nation's agricultural sector: "We may perhaps put this in perspective in the present case by saying that in the actions here recorded about twenty human lives were lost for, not every word, but every letter, in this book."
> 
> As Conquest's friend, the British novelist Martin Amis, would later observe with a palpable shudder, "The sentence represents 3,040 lives. The book is 411 pages long." The math is too terrible to contemplate.
> 
> Conquest, who died of pneumonia on August 3 at the age of 98, was many things: a highly regarded anti-modernist poet, a military intelligence officer, a diplomat, a scholar, a ribald prankster, a serial non-monogamist (four wives punctuated with countless entanglements), even a dystopian science fiction novelist.
> 
> But most of all he was Stalin's personal prosecutor, over and over placing him in the dock of history to answer for his monstrous crimes. Conquest wrote more than a score of books on Soviet history and politics, two of them—Harvest of Sorrow and 1968's groundbreaking The Great Terror: Stalin's Purges of the Thirties—considered the definitive texts on the pure wickedness of the events they describe. "I know that after my death a pile of rubbish will be heaped on my grave, but the wind of History will sooner or later sweep it away without mercy," Stalin once said. Fortunately, Conquest was there to stack it right back up.
> 
> The British-born son of an American father and an English mother, Conquest was educated at Oxford, where he joined the Communist Party and visited the Soviet Union in 1937. That started a process of disillusionment that gained speed when Conquest served as a British military intelligence liaison to Russian-commanded Bulgarian resistance forces and hit critical mass when he stayed on in Bulgaria as a diplomat after the war and witnessed Stalin's brutal Sovietization of the country. By 1948 he was back in London, writing an increasingly hostile series of Foreign Office research papers on Soviet activities in Eastern Europe that would eventually morph into his books.
> 
> The first of those, Common Sense About Russia, appeared in 1961. But it wasn't until 1968, with the publication of The Great Terror, that Conquest truly hit his stride. Drawn from emigre memoirs, dissident samizdat documents, and sworn statements by hundreds of Soviet exiles and defectors who testified in a 1948 libel trial against a French Communist newspaper, The Great Terror was the first systematic compilation of the atrocities committed during Stalin's massive purges of 1936 through 1938.
> 
> The purges themselves were hardly news, but the world had mostly fixated on the manifest injustice of the Moscow show trials of a relatively small group of disgraced top officials charged with spying and sabotage. Conquest forced attention to the massive body count—a million or more—among ordinary citizens, who were shot in prison basements or sent to starve to death in Arctic work camps.
> 
> But The Great Terror was much more than a morgue census. Conquest's compelling eye for detail, coupled with a stark, understated prose style, combined to produce the greatest horror story of the 20th century.
> 
> He wrote of a town in Byelorussia where a group of peasants stumbled into what may have been the perpetually depressed Soviet economy's single growth industry: professional informing. They routinely partied after trials with the 15 rubles a head they were paid to denounce neighbors as spies, hoarders, and "wreckers," as saboteurs were known. They even wrote an epic ballad about some of their most successful denunciations.
> 
> He wrote of the urkas, the labor-camp gangs of common criminals so violent and depraved that even the guards feared them and refused to make them work. The hideously tattooed members, sporting names like Hitler or The Louse, instead spent their days plotting mass rapes of female inmates and gambling for the clothing of newly arrived political prisoners; the losers had to strip it from the victims and deliver it to the winners.
> 
> He wrote of Stalin's workdays, which usually began by leafing through hundreds of secret-police-recommended death sentences left in his morning inbox, perhaps with the help of his sycophantic adviser Vyacheslav Molotov. December 12, 1937, was a typical day, Conquest reported: "Stalin and Molotov sanctioned 3,167 death sentences, and then went to the cinema."
> 
> Not that being a bloodthirsty dictator was all work and no play. Conquest described Stalin laughing until he cried as an executioner acted out the final, sobbing moments of his former crony Grigory Zinoviev. "Stalin was overcome with merriment and had to sign to [the performer] to stop," Conquest wrote.
> 
> "The Great Terror is an extraordinary book, and even more extraordinary is that he extracted it from a totally closed society," says the Emery historian Harvey Klehr, who has written extensively on Soviet espionage in the United States. "The information was out there, but nobody had thought of collecting it using those sources."
> 
> As skeptics of the Cold War gained the upper hand in American academia, Conquest's work was dismissed as reactionary fantasy and criminal libel. But in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Moscow's archives began dribbling out to the public, his reporting was confirmed and judged by some even a bit too mild.
> 
> Conquest was, of course, gratified. Martin Amis reported that, when a publisher asked for a new title for a revised edition of The Great Terror, Conquest suggested: "How about I Told You So, You Fucking Fools?" The historian later said, not altogether convincingly, that the quote was the jocose fabrication of a friend. But there is little doubt that he considered most of his critics fools, and fools who needn't be taken seriously.
> 
> In 1988, The Village Voice published a shrill attack on Harvest of Sorrow that accused Conquest of, among many other things, "red-baiting" Walter Duranty, the New York Times correspondent in Moscow whose Panglossian reporting on Stalin won him a now-discredited Pulitzer Prize. Among other things, Duranty's stories repeatedly denied any famine in the Soviet Union during 1932–33, though we now know somewhere between 6 million and 8 million peasants starved to death at the time. Pshaw, sniffed Conquest. "Duranty wasn't a red at all, just a self-serving liar," he wrote the Voice. "I think liars should be baited. Dupes, too, perhaps less harshly."
> 
> Contributing Editor Glenn Garvin is the author of Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA and the Contras and (with Ana Rodriguez) Diary of a Survivor: Nineteen Years in a Cuban Women's Prison. He writes about television for the Miami Herald.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

Calm down everyone. PM Trudeau is going to give him a stern talking to and make him play nice.


----------



## RocketRichard

Or he could challenge Putin to a fist fight and beat the scheit out of him.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

RocketRichard said:
			
		

> Or he could challenge Putin to a fist fight and beat the scheit out of him.



^^^ :rofl:

He'd be squashed like a grape.


----------



## RocketRichard

Absolutely not. Whatever 'rofl' means...


----------



## RocketRichard

Just asked a teenager and they told me.


----------



## Fishbone Jones

RocketRichard said:
			
		

> Absolutely not. Whatever 'rofl' means...



You can't seriously think that JT would beat Putin in a fist fight :


----------



## CougarKing

Wasn't there some kind of boxing match between Justin Trudeau and former Senator Parick Brazeau a few years ago?  ???

That Trudeau won, incredibly? (Perhaps he paid Brazeau to take a fall)  ;D


----------



## a_majoor

The Young Dauphin can't even face Sun Media reporters. If Vladimir Putin walks into the same room as the Young Dauphin, Putin's manliness will simply eclipse the Dauphin until Putin exits the building.


----------



## Kirkhill

file:///C:/Users/Kirkhill/Downloads/NewArmy_sm.pdf

Just a refresher in light of ERC's post on Vlad's Potemkin village. I strongly recommend its reading.  It is five years old but change isn't happening that fast.

Vlad has reorganized the pieces he has available on the board and is conducting a good offence.  But his situation is poor.

In chess terms I might suggest that he has castled up and is letting his knights rove.


----------



## dapaterson

Vlad's situation is examined more in depth in the Telegraph here: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11937348/Russia-retreats-to-autarky-as-poverty-looms.html



> Russia is running out of money. President Vladimir Putin is taking a strategic gamble, depleting the Kremlin's last reserve funds to cover the budget and to pay for an escalating war in Syria at the same time.
> ...
> The Kremlin is launching a radical plan to slash imports across twenty key sectors within five years, ranging from heavy machinery to electrical engineering, photonics, cars, tractors, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and food.
> 
> The targets are drastic. Reliance on foreign farm and forestry machinery is to be cut by 56pc, food processing by 53pc, and engineering equipment by 34pc. State procurement contracts will be steered to companies that produce in the country, whether or not they compete on quality.
> 
> But the switch-over costs money that the government does not have. Viktor Semenov from the Belaya Dacha Group said his agro-conglomerate is raking in big subsidies to grow lettuces in the Siberian heartland of Novosibirsk, relying on heated greenhouses to fight temperatures of minus 20 degrees.
> 
> "We're building 250 hectares of hothouses a year on my farms," he said. Whether it makes sense is anybody's guess. The same vegetables could be imported more cheaply from Turkey.
> 
> Trade experts are already shaking their heads. Such a reflex usually means a country is going badly off the rails, though Germany pulled it off with macabre success in the 1930s. “In most of the cases I have known import substitution policies have failed. They degrade the economy," said Pascal Lamy, former head of the World Trade Organisation.


----------



## Edward Campbell

dapaterson said:
			
		

> Vlad's situation is examined more in depth in the Telegraph here: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11937348/Russia-retreats-to-autarky-as-poverty-looms.html




Oh, good ... of all the _stupid_ policy examples available in the world, and the supply seems endless, Vlad looks to the _Buy America Act_ which guarantees spending too much for too little.


----------



## a_majoor

Autarky is a very old and well oiled response to deteriorating economic situations, although there are almost no examples of success that I can point to. Fans of Autarky should rest easy knowing that it was, until recently, one of the key planks of the NDP platofrm (and may be again if Mr Mulcair is turfted as leader).


----------



## a_majoor

An interesting propaganda piece about the development and deployment of hypersonic weapons from a Russian POV. (Of course the Russians are working very hard to perfect these sorts of weapons themselves):

http://www.globalresearch.ca/hypersonic-deterrence-how-to-maintain-strategic-balance-the-geopolitics-of-long-range-hypersonic-high-precision-weapons/5484962



> *Hypersonic Deterrence: How to Maintain Strategic Balance. The Geopolitics of Long-Range Hypersonic High-Precision Weapons*
> 
> By Vladimir Kozin
> Global Research, October 28, 2015
> Oriental Reivew 27 October 2015
> Region: Russia and FSU, USA
> Theme: Militarization and WMD
> 
> It is unlikely that nuclear weapons, which the US created in the mid-twentieth century and used only once – to bomb Japanese cities – will ever be activated in a global conflict. We can assume that the leaders of the official Western nuclear powers (the UK, US, and France) as well as the other states that actually possess such weapons (India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan) will continue to base the conceptual foundation of their military strategy on this incontestable truism: “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
> 
> Russia’s current military and political leaders agree with this self-evident observation. In his Oct. 22 speech in Sochi before the Valdai Club, an international discussion group, President Vladimir Putin echoed these sentiments: “The development of nuclear weapons has made it clear that there can be no winners in a global conflict.”
> 
> Unlike nuclear weapons, which are “tools of extreme impact,” Long-Range Hypersonic High-Precision Weapons (or Advanced Hypersonic Weapons – AHW in US terminology) are ready for use in any scenario, including as part of counter-terror operations. AHW do not cause unnecessary civilian casualties and do not inflict significant material damage to civil transportation systems, power plants, or other infrastructure beyond the small affected area.
> 
> Russia has been developing its own promising prototypes of AHW in the numbers deemed necessary to bolster its own security, in response to both America’s functional rollout of Prompt Global Strike, an ambitious program to deploy a global, layered missile-defense system, as well as the Pentagon’s modernization of its strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.
> 
> There have already been calls for an international moratorium on R&D and testing of AHW. Despite the fact that this idea appears somewhat utopian, it is quite feasible that at some future date quantitative limits could be introduced on types of AHW and the regions where they could be positioned, but only if the following six key preconditions are met:
> 
> 1) Any future AHW agreement must be grounded in the principle of equality and equivalent security for all signatory states and must ensure the creation of a system of multilateral, strategic-deterrence treaties.
> 
> 2) Signatories to such an agreement must agree to respect the mutual commitment not to use AHW against each other under any circumstances.
> 
> 3) Before such a treaty goes into effect, all nuclear powers must agree to respect the reciprocalobligation to either refrain from inflicting a nuclear first strike against each other or not to use such weapons at all, and also to renounce the use of weapons of any kind against manned or unmanned spacecraft, and these promises would be formalized through legally binding, international covenants.
> 
> 4) All states possessing nuclear weapons, whether officially or factually, must commit themselves to move toward the use of defensive strategies and unconditional nuclear deterrence that threatens no one.
> 
> 5) States deploying missile-defense systems and tactical nuclear weapons within the borders of other states, must dismantle the installations of this type currently being designed or constructed, before reaching an agreement on limiting AHW, and America must also pull all of its tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe and the Asia Pacific region, deploying them only within the borders of the continental US.
> 
> 6) This agreement must be formalized through a legally binding international treaty that is both versatile and inclusive – in the sense that it includes provisions allowing any other state to join it – and its validity should be of indefinite duration.
> 
> Unfortunately, any type of Agreement on Quantitative and Territorial Constraints on the Deployment of AHW would hardly be reached shortly, given the context of America’s updated National Security Strategy (February 2015), which six times refers to Russia an “aggressor,” as well as the identification of Russia and China (here, here, and here) as her first and second, respectively, biggest potential adversaries in the American playbook for the use of strategic nuclear weapons. The Pentagon still adheres to a doctrine that calls for inflicting initial “preemptive and preventative” nuclear strikes against an enemy, and it keeps a longer list of potential targets for an initial nuclear strike than any other state. Another important point to consider is the multifold increase in NATO’s military activitynear Russia’s borders during last two years.
> 
> In other words, without a radical change by Washington and its NATO allies in their negative and even hostile stance toward Russia and China, the idea that any sort of mutually acceptable agreement could be reached to limit or control AHWs is simply unrealistic and should be put off until a “better time.”
> 
> Vladimir Kozin is Head of Advisers’ Group at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences and Professor of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation.
> 
> The original source of this article is Oriental Reivew
> Copyright © Vladimir Kozin, Oriental Reivew, 2015


----------



## Cloud Cover

Russia lays down first of two new Arctic support ships: 

http://www.janes.com/article/55630/russia-lays-down-first-of-two-new-arctic-support-ships?utm_campaign=PC6110_E15%20DF%20NL%20Naval%2011_03_15&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua


Russia's Vostochnaya Verf shipyard in Vladivostok laid down the first of two new arctic multi-purpose support vessels for the Russian Navy on 27 October.

The Project 03182 vessels are designed to act as small tankers, replenishment and support vessels for Russian warships working in the arctic region. They're also intended to be able to take on patrol functions, tow other vessels, conduct search and rescue (SAR) operations, fisheries monitoring and to support civilian shipping and oil and gas operations.

With arctic operations in mind, the vessels have been built to the Russian Arc 4 ice class standard, the second highest level and equivalent to the Finnish-Swedish IA class. The vessels are understood to be a derivative of the Project 23310 design from the Zelenodolsk Design Bureau (ZPKDB).

The first vessel will be called Mikhail Barskov , the Russian Ministry of Defence announced, and will have a displacement of 3,500 tonnes, a crew of 24, a length of 80 m and a range of 1,500 n miles. It will be powered by three diesel-electric engines, and equipped with two auxiliary power units and a bow thruster. A helicopter pad at the rear of the vessel can accommodate a helicopter such as the Kamov Ka-27 'Helix', and the vessel is fitted with a 20 tonne crane amidships. They are not believed to be armed.

Both of the two vessels will enter service with the Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet, with Russian media reporting that Mikhail Barskov will be delivered in November 2017, with the second following at the end of 2019.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

We could maybe learn a lesson here: it seems to me that an Arctic replenishment ship for the AOPS Fleet is a good idea.


----------



## Cloud Cover

recceguy said:
			
		

> You can't seriously think that JT would beat Putin in a fist fight :



Putin is some sort of martial arts student/expert. So the old guy is ready for a scrap with Mr. Silverspoon. ..


----------



## a_majoor

So the question is really how long can Russia continue to draw on its reserves, especially if Russia is ramping up expenditures without a similar increase in income?

http://www.ibtimes.com/russian-economic-crisis-2015-international-reserves-slump-54b-amid-sanctions-ongoing-2171565



> *Russian Economic Crisis 2015: International Reserves Slump $5.4B Amid Sanctions, Ongoing Recession*
> By Jess McHugh @McHughJess j.mchugh@ibtimes.com on November 05 2015 2:15 PM EST
> 
> Russia's international reserve reportedly saw a major dip in October as the country continued to struggle through a recession. Pictured: Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke during an economic summit in October. AFP/Getty Images
> Russia's international reserves, liquid foreign assets managed by the Central Bank of Russia, fell by $5.4 billion to $369.2 billion in the week of Oct. 23-30, Tass, a state-owned news agency, reported Thursday. News of the dip came as Russia struggled to recover from a continuing economic downturn while bracing for more losses in 2016.
> 
> Russia's economy has been in a downslide since 2014, in part because of crippling sanctions from both the United States and the European Union. Both the U.S. and EU imposed sanctions following Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula and alleged backing of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine in March 2014. The nation was formerly a large importer and exporter to the EU in particular.
> 
> Worldwide drops in oil prices have also contributed to the national economic slump. Russia is one of the largest producers of oil in the world, and in September, its output was around 10.74 million barrels a day, according to state data as reported by the Wall Street Journal. Demand for oil has continued to decrease throughout the year, however, as emerging markets did not buy as much oil as had been predicted. The imbalance in supply and demand has continued to push the price per barrel down.
> 
> Is the #Russian economy about to be hit by a new drop in #oil prices? https://t.co/uTYNgaH0gf pic.twitter.com/u9GeclNEMf
> 
> — RBTH UK (@rbthUK) October 30, 2015
> 
> Alongside the drop in international reserves, other indicators of Russia's slump included a 10 percent reduction in retail sales while inflation hovered around 16 percent, the Wall Street Journal reported in October. Experts said the slump might soon bottom out, however. “Overall, we interpret these indicators to imply that the economy is near the bottom of its cycle and that the recession will not deepen much further,” Barclays Capital said in a research note, as reported by the Wall Street Journal.
> 
> Authorities in Russia said they were fearful of shortages when it came to basic food supplies, such as meat and cheese. The country could see a shortage of meat and dairy in 2016, according to a report released by Russian news agency Ria Novosti Wednesday, as a result of ongoing sanctions.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Poking into Donbas to distract from taking Belarus?!?


> For Vladimir Putin, Viktor Kaspruk argues, “Ukraine is the key to a future Russia or more precisely a future Russian Empire,” and consequently, even if he has lowered the temperature in the Donbass in recent weeks, the Kremlin leader is likely to renew his attacks on Ukraine next year having first moved to annex Belarus.
> 
> In a commentary for Radio Liberty’s Belarusian Service***, Kaspruk argues that “if Putin begins thinking about opening a second front for an attack on Ukraine, then it would not be possible for him to find a better place d’armes for that than a Belarus occupied by Russia.”
> 
> Such a move, the Ukrainian political analyst says, would be extremely popular in Russia. “On a wave of hurrah patriotism, euphoria from ‘getting up from its knees,’ and the PR bombing in Syria, the consciousness of Russians has completely atrophied. Therefore it would support with joy the next political adventure of Putin – the return of Belarus ‘home’ to Russia.”
> 
> There are already signs that the Kremlin leader is preparing for just such a move. Kaspruk points to the attacks on Lukashenka that have appeared in Kremlin-controlled media and the dispatch already of “’little green men’ to Belarus under the guise of protecting Russian military objects on its territory.”
> 
> Such units could quickly link up with pro-Moscow officials and people in Belarus and then “take under their control state institutions and strategic objects in Mensk and key industrial cities.” After which time, a new government would declare that it wants to realize the ideas of the “union state” between Russia and Belarus by being absorbed by the Russian Federation.
> 
> Lending support to this argument is that over the last month, Russian embassies in Lithuania, Poland, and Latvia have organized conferences on the “union state” between the Russian Federation and Belarus ....


*** - links to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty UKR Service article in Ukrainian.


----------



## a_majoor

Seems a bit silly, since Belarus is the most compliant and pro Russian of the former states of the USSR and already a reliable Russian ally. Indeed, the ZAPAD war-games were joint operations with Russia to flex military muscle and paralyze NATO decision making by assembling up to 70,000 troops in Belarus where they could theoretically jump off into the Baltic States, Poland, Eastern Europe or Ukraine.

What do you gain by invading your friends and allies?


----------



## CougarKing

Despite the recent loss of that Russian airliner over Egypt, at least one aerospace giant sees opportunity in the Middle East:

Reuters via Yahoo News



> *Russia Sukhoi plans to triple jets output by 2020 on Mideast demand*
> 
> By Stanley Carvalho | Reuters –
> 
> DUBAI (Reuters) - Russia’s Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Company, a maker of regional jets, plans to lift production more than three-fold by 2020, banking on demand from at least five Middle East customers, a senior executive said on Sunday.
> 
> Sukhoi is in talks with Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman for sales of its Sukhoi Superjet 100 (SSJ 100), Evgeny Andrachnikov, senior vice president, told Reuters at the Dubai Airshow.
> 
> “By 2020, we will have critical mass of 200 aircraft (produced annually). We are in serious talks with many clients including in the Middle East with Egypt a big ticket game,” he said. Currently, Sukhoi’s production capacity is 60 jets annually.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## a_majoor

Interesting; apparently a UUV with a nuclear warhead is either part of Russia's arsenal or under consideration:

http://voxday.blogspot.ca/2015/11/star-wars-worked.html



> *Star Wars worked*
> 
> The good news is that the Strategic Defense Initiative appears to have worked well enough to deter potential enemies from planning to launch orbital missiles. The bad news is, there is a developing alternative to space-based attacks that even the U.S. Navy's superiority at sea can't do much about.
> 
> 
> 
> The Kremlin has confirmed “some secret data” was accidentally leaked when Russian TV stations broadcast material apparently showing blueprints from a nuclear torpedo, designed to be used against enemy coastal installations.
> 
> During President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with military officials in Sochi, where the development of Russia’s military capabilities were being discussed, a number of TV crews were able to capture footage of a paper that was certainly not meant for public viewing.
> 
> The presentation slide titled “Ocean Multipurpose System: Status-6” showed some drawings of a new nuclear submarine weapons system. It is apparently designed to bypass NATO radars and any existing missile defense systems, while also causing heavy damage to “important economic facilities” along the enemy’s coastal regions.
> 
> The footnote to the slide stated that Status-6 is intended to cause “assured unacceptable damage” to an adversary force. Its detonation “in the area of the enemy coast” would result in “extensive zones of radioactive contamination” that would ensure that the region would not be used for “military, economic, business or other activity” for a “long time.”
> 
> 
> 
> 
> According to the blurred information provided in the slide, the system represents a massive torpedo, designated as “self-propelled underwater vehicle,” with a range of up to 10 thousand kilometers and capable of operating at a depth of up to 1,000 meters.
> "Accidentally leaked." Right. Anyhow, this is particularly interesting because we had a submission for Riding the Red Horse vol. 2 that had to be withdrawn due to the fact that it was still under some sort of embargo by the naval service concerned. The torpedoes it described were not so massive, but they were fast and land-launched, and my impression was that they were designed to be used to deny control of the sea in places like the Persian Gulf, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz.
> 
> 4GW isn't the only challenge facing the U.S. Armed Forces. The naval dominance enjoyed by the U.S. Navy since the dawn of the aircraft carrier is on the verge of ending, as the combination of aircraft-killing lasers and long-distance, land-launched torpedoes looks likely to render them as vulnerable, and therefore outdated, as battleships in WWII.
> 
> And since the United States is a maritime power, the loss of naval superiority necessarily means the loss of its superpower status.
Click to expand...


----------



## The Bread Guy

I know hearty drinking is part of Slavic stereotyping, but it looks like certain alcohol issues haven't gone away completely yet ....


> The Russian Investigative Committee suggests equating sales of fake alcohol with murder amid reports about dozens of people dying or being poisoned.
> 
> "We believe responsibility should be comparable with an intentional killing," its spokesman Vladimir Markin said on Tuesday, noting that at the moment responsibility was comparable rather to that for death inflicted through negligence.
> 
> "Thus the death of one person envisages the punishment of up to six years in prison, and up to ten years if two or more people die," he continued. "In our opinion, the person producing lethal alcoholic drinks is well aware of the social danger of his activity and possible consequences," Markin said.
> 
> "We must bear it in mind that alcohol consumption in Russia has mass proportions," he continued.
> 
> "By the present moment, methanol poisoning as a result of consumption of fake alcohol has been fixed already in six regions of the Russian Federation," Markin said, mentioning the Krasnoyarsk region, the republic of Chuvashia, as well as the Orenburg, Kursk, Moscow and Kaluga regions.
> 
> Dozens of people have died or have been poisoned, he said. "One cannot be certain that the list of regions registering new victims of deadly ‘booze’ will not grow," he added. Twelve people have recently died after drinking fake alcohol alone in the Far Eastern Krasnoyarsk region.
> 
> Fifteen people died in poisoning from fake alcohol in Russian regions between November 9 and 23, the state Investigative Committee’s spokesman said on November 23.
> 
> Vladimir Markin said 10 others had been taken to hospital with poisoning. Most victims bought the drink online, he added ....


Ouch!

If you're interested, here's some info about the drinking habits of some of the Soviet troops in Afghainstan - mmmmm, shoe polish on bread .....


----------



## CougarKing

The rift in Russia-Turkey relations caused by the Su24 shootdown is also having ripple effects on Central Asian states that have Turkic roots and were former Soviet satellites.

Diplomat



> *A Tangled Web: Russia, Turkey and Central Asia
> 
> Moscow’s displeasure with Ankara is trickling into Central Asia, but to varying degrees in each capital.*
> Putz_Catherine
> By Catherine Putz
> December 04, 2015
> 
> 
> Turkey has long been a second-tier power in Central Asia. The recent tensions between Russia and Turkey do put the region in an awkward spot, but Turkish-Central Asian dealings have never had the high profile of Russian or Chinese regional engagement. The Russia-Turkey tension will trickle into Central Asia — and already has — but will be exhibited in different ways in each state.
> 
> Last year (almost exactly), Ryskeldi Satke, Casey Michel, and Sertaç Korkmaz wrote a piece for The Diplomat exploring the region’s ‘Turkic Togetherness.’ They highlighted several areas of engagement — Turkish-funded schools, the creation of the Turkic Council, defense-related cooperation (mostly training exchanges and military aid) — but ultimately concluded that Ankara had been noticeably reticent in developing ties with Central Asian states. “Still,” they wrote, “even though progress can be seen in certain avenues, Turkish-Central Asian relations fall far short of their original promise.”
> 
> In the last year Turkish-Central Asian relations have progressed in the same tentative manner, with Turkey playing the proverbial second fiddle to Russia’s overpowering social and cultural influence and Beijing’s big spending.* The Turkic Council (members: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey) and its constituent bodies continue to meet and make progress in trade and investment arenas anyway, as well as with cultural initiatives. The Turkic Parliamentary Assembly (TurkPA) convened in Astana this week. *In August, information and media officials from the member countries mutually endorsed the idea of a international Turkic news network.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## CougarKing

The posturing between Turkey and Russia continues:

Defense News



> *Sources: Ankara Summons Russian Envoy Over Soldier Brandishing Weapon On Warship*
> Agence France-Presse 6:58 p.m. EST December 7, 2015
> 
> ISTANBUL — *Turkey on Monday summoned Russia's ambassador to Ankara over images of a Russian serviceman brandishing a rocket launcher as his warship navigated through Turkish waters, foreign ministry sources said.*
> 
> Russian ambassador Andrey Karlov was summoned to the foreign ministry headquarters over the images published by the Turkish media on Sunday, the sources said, the latest escalation of tensions following Turkey's downing of a Russian warplane last month.
> 
> "Our expectation that such acts, which are against the spirit of international laws and not directly related to the passage (of the ship) itself, will not be repeated, has been emphasized."
> 
> (...SNIPPED)
> 
> NTV reported that the vessel from the Russian navy's Black Sea fleet passed through the Bosphorus on Sunday morning. However, the foreign ministry sources said the incident occurred on Friday.
> 
> Moscow and Ankara are locked in their worst crisis since the Cold War over the Nov. 24 jet downing on Turkey's border with Syria, sparking fury and economic sanctions from the Kremlin.


----------



## The Bread Guy

S.M.A. said:
			
		

> The posturing between Turkey and Russia continues ...


Meanwhile, from the RUS Info-machine/RUS state media ....


> *Before Su-24 downing Putin personally apologized to Erdogan over previous airspace violation *
> 
> Prior to the downing of the Su-24, Russian President Vladimir Putin had personally apologized to Turkey’s Erdogan for the previous violation of Turkish airspace by a Russian aircraft, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has stated.
> 
> In an interview with Italian journalists, Lavrov said that Russia sees no other reason behind the incident with its Su-24 other than an attempt by Turkey to undermine anti-terrorism efforts or even derail the political process in Syria, which has begun to take shape on the basis of the Vienna agreement.
> 
> “Our assessment of what happened on November 24 remains completely the same. We see no other explanation other than a desire to disrupt counterterrorism efforts and make them less effective, or to prevent the Russian Federation from working in Syrian airspace, or perhaps even to derail the political process beginning to take shape on the basis of the Vienna agreement.” ...


Elsewhere, the "Pokey, pokey, pokey" game continues ...

_"Finland Accuses Russia of Violating Airspace"_
_"Russian military aircraft made 266 'blind' flights near Estonia this year "_
_"Georgia accuses Russia of violating its airspace"_


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

If that is not done on purpose, they seriously have to consider firing the head of their Air Nav school, and completely reviewing its curriculum. [:-[


----------



## The Bread Guy

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> If that is not done on purpose, they seriously have to consider firing the head of their Air Nav school, and completely reviewing its curriculum. [:-[


If this is what happens to political opponents in Russia, methinks navigation errors would have been dealt with pretty briskly -- either that, or Vlad hasn't apologized to all those other places yet  ;D


----------



## Kirkhill

How about the Quartermaster General or Master of the Ordnance that allows his troops to go on foreign vacations with their cannons and tanks?


----------



## McG

That guy even covers the cost of ammo consumed on vacation.  Troops must love him.


----------



## The Bread Guy

This, from the RUS MoD Info-machine ...


> On December 13, 2015, the Russian guard ship Smetlivy staying 22 km far from the Lemnos Island in the northern part of the Aegean Sea prevented the collision with a Turkish seine vessel.
> 
> At 9:03 (MSK), watchmen detected the Turkish vessel at the distance of 1 000 metres approaching the anchored guard ship Smetlivy from the starboard.
> 
> Despite multiple efforts of the Smetlivy to establish a contact with the Turkish seine vessel, its crew did not respond to radio and semaphore signals as well as signal rockets.
> 
> After the distance between the Turkish seine vessel the Russian guard ship reached 600 metres, the naval small arms were used at the distance of guaranteed survivability of the target in order to prevent the collision of the ships.
> 
> Immediately after that, the Turkish vessel changed the heading and continued movement at the distance of 540 metres without contacting the Russian crew ...


MSM versions:

_"Russian destroyer fires warning shots at Turkish fishing boat on collision course in Aegean "_ (RT Russian state media)
_"Russia fires Turkey boat warning shot"_ (BBC)
_"Russian Destroyer Wards Off Turkish Fishing Ship in Aegean"_ (Associated Press)
_"Russia says fired warning shots at Turkish ship in Aegean to avoid collision"_(Reuters)
More on _Smetlivy_ (usual Wikipedia caveats apply) here.


----------



## tomahawk6

Very professional way to deal with the seiner.The safety of the warship is paramount.BZ to the Russian captain


----------



## Good2Golf

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Very professional way to deal with the seiner.The safety of the warship is paramount.BZ to the Russian captain



Concur.

In an unknown situation, the Captain of the Smetlivy kept his ship from becoming a Russian 'USS Cole.'  :nod:


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Or, alternatively, he avoided a collision with yet another fisherman who put his ship on "cruise control" and went below to sleep, eat, or at the stern to deal with the fishing gear, oblivious to anybody else out there " 'cause i'm a fisherman and it's for everybody else to leave me in peace".


----------



## The Bread Guy

Or, as satirical Putin on Twitter puts it ...


> The Russian Navy is as accurate as the Russian Air Force. We were shooting *at* the fishing vessel and missed by 600m.


Dealing with an earlier question ...


> Although if the Russian Air Force bombed within 600m of the intended target the pilot would either get fired or promoted.


----------



## a_majoor

More people finally recognizing the real target of the Saudi Arabia oil war: Iran and its enablers (Russia) and allies (Syria). It is estimated Saudi Arabia can afford to continue its social welfare spending for the next five years before their bank account runs dry (possibly longer, as they are still making *some* money by pumping oil), while Russia claims to be able to sustain itself for at least seven years. I think both sides have cooked the books, so time will tell:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/12046185/russia-opec-saudi-arabia-bluff-40-oil-price.html



> *Russia plans $40 a barrel oil for next seven years as Saudi showdown intensifies*
> 'We will live in a different reality,' said a top Kremlin official. The message is aimed squarely at Saudi Arabia in a war for market share
> 
> Ambrose Evans-Pritchard By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard3:43PM GMT 11 Dec 2015 Comments1777 Comments
> 
> Russia is battening down the hatches for a Biblical collapse in oil revenues, warning that crude prices could stay as low as $40 a barrel for another seven years.
> 
> Maxim Oreshkin, the deputy finance minister, said the country is drawing up plans based on a price band fluctuating between $40 to $60 as far out as 2022, a scenario that would have devastating implications for Opec.
> 
> It would also spell disaster for the North Sea producers, Brazil’s off-shore projects, and heavily indebted Western producers. “We will live in a different reality,” he told a breakfast forum hosted by Russian newspaper Vedomosti.
> 
> The cold blast from Moscow came as US crude plunged to $35.56, pummelled by continuing fall-out from the acrimonious Organisaton of Petrol Exporting Countries meeting last week. Record short positions by hedge funds have amplified the effect.
> 
> Bank of America said there was now the risk of “full-blown price war” within Opec itself as Saudi Arabia and Iran fight out a bitter strategic rivalry through the oil market.
> 
> Brent crude fell to $37.41, even though demand is growing briskly. It is the lowest since the depths of the Lehman crisis in early 2009. But this time it is a 'positive supply shock', and therefore beneficial for the world economy as a whole.
> 
> The International Energy Agency said in its monthly market report that Opec has stopped operating as a cartel and is “pumping at will”, aiming to drive out rivals at whatever cost to its own members. Opec revenues will fall to $400bn (£263bn) this year if current prices persist, down from $1.2 trillion in 2012. This is a massive shift in global wealth.
> 
> The IEA said global oil stocks were already at nose-bleed levels of 2,971m barrels, and were likely to increase by another 300m over the next six months as “free-wheeling Opec policy” floods the market.
> 
> The watchdog played down fears that the world was running out of sites to store the glut, citing 230m barrels of new storage coming on stream. Inventories in the US are still only at 70pc capacity. But this could change once Iranian crude comes on stream later next year.
> 
> Russia’s $40 warning is the latest escalation in a game of strategic brinkmanship between the Kremlin and Saudi Arabia, already at daggers drawn over Syria.
> 
> The Russian contingency plans convey a clear message to Riyadh and to Opec’s high command that the country can withstand very low oil prices indefinitely, thanks to a floating rouble that protects the internal budget.
> 
> Saudi Arabia is trapped by a fixed exchange peg, forcing it to bleed foreign reserves to cover a budget deficit running at 20pc of GDP.
> 
> Russia claims to have the strategic depth to sit out a long siege. It is pursuing an import-substitution policy to revive its industrial and engineering core. It can ultimately feed itself. The Gulf Opec states are one-trick ponies by comparison.
> 
> The deputy premier, Arkady Dvorkovich, told The Telegraph in September that Opec will be forced to change tack. “At some point it is likely that they are going to have to change policy. They can last a few months, to a couple of years," he said.
> Kremlin officials suspect that the aim of Saudi policy is to force Russia to the negotiating table, compelling it join Opec in a super-cartel controlling half the world’s production.
> 
> Abdallah Salem el-Badri, Opec’s chief, came close to admitting this last week, saying the cartel is no longer big enough to act alone and will not cut output unless non-Opec producers chip in.
> 
> “We are looking for negotiations with non-Opec, and trying to reach a collective effort. Everybody is trying to digest how they can do it,” he said
> 
> Russia is in effect calling Opec’s bluff, gambling that it has the greater staying power. It cannot easily cut output since its main producers are listed companies, answerable to shareholders. Any arrangement would have to be subtle.
> 
> Mr Dvorkovich gave an oblique answer when asked whether Russia would ever do a deal. "We are not going to cut supply artificially. Oil companies will act on their own. They will look at market forces and decide whether to invest more or less. If prices stay low, it is in the nature of oil companies to stabilize production, or even to cut production," he said.
> 
> Whether Russia really can withstand the strain for years is an open question. The economy is in deep recession. Output has contracted by 4pc over the last year. Real incomes have fallen by 9pc. The latest gambit may in reality be a negotiating ploy.
> 
> Mr Oreshkin said oil prices of $40 would force the government to bleed its reserve fund by 1.5 trillion roubles next year, or 2pc of GDP.
> Standard & Poor's says the budget deficit has reached 4.4pc of GDP, including local government shortfalls. A further $40bn is needed to bail out the banking system.
> 
> “They just don’t have the money. The deficit is heading for 5pc of GDP,” said Lubomir Mitov from Unicredit.
> “The biggest danger is that the reserve fund will be exhausted by the end of 2016. They will then have to monetise the deficit or cut real spending by another 10pc. They can’t cut defence so that leaves social welfare,” he said.
> 
> Bond markets in Russia are shallow. The country cannot hope to borrow abroad on any scale as long as it is under Western sanctions.
> Saudi Arabia’s leaders are fully aware of the Kremlin’s painful predicament. They appear certain that they can outlast Russia in a long duel. By the time we find out which of these two petro-giants is stronger, both may be on their knees.


----------



## CougarKing

Putin praising a future presidential rival?

CNN



> *Putin praises 'bright and talented' Trump*
> 
> 
> By Jeremy Diamond and Greg Botelho, CNN
> 
> Updated 11:35 AM ET, Thu December 17, 2015
> 
> (...FULL VIDEO REPORT AT LINK ABOVE)


----------



## Kirkhill

S.M.A. said:
			
		

> Putin praising a future presidential rival?
> 
> CNN



Putin doing his duty as a KGB officer.  Sowing dissent in order to disrupt.   He knows what he knows and is good at it.


----------



## a_majoor

Interesting (if really huge) info graphic comparing the navy of the Soviet Union to that of today's Russian navy. Click on link to see graphic:

http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a18668/soviet-navy-vs-modern-day-russia-infographic/



> *The Soviet Navy Vs. Modern Day Russia's in One Graphic*
> It was a whole lot bigger.
> 
> 
> Contemporary Issues & Geography
> By Eric Limer
> Dec 21, 2015
> 
> In 1990, just before the fall of the Soviet Union, the Red Fleet was big, made up of over 600 ships spread out over dozens of different classes. But here in 2015, 25 years later, the Russian Navy is a fraction of its forebear's size with under 200 ships. This lovely little graphic really illustrates how big of a difference that is.
> 
> Made by Louis Martin-Vézian of Contemporary Issues and Geography—the same minds behind those graphics about Air Force Planes—this all-encompassing graphic shows the total inventory of the Red Fleet and the modern Russian Navy side by side, dispensing with that pesky quarter century in between:
> 
> 
> Contemporary Issues and Geography
> (You can look at the giant, full-res version here)
> 
> You might think that one of the reasons for the big shrink was that many of the Soviet ships floated off to other nations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but in fact Russia took virtually the whole fleet. The problem was a steep drop-off in funding that made maintenance of the former Red Fleet a total nightmare. So expansion was brought to a complete halt while many existing ships were scrapped or retired to bases to live out their lives as floating barracks.
> 
> Unfotunately the folks at Contemporary Issues and Geography aren't selling prints of this poster, so the ghost of Soviet naval might will have to live in your web browser, though you can pick of up a print of the US Navy's Air Arm if that floats your boat. Or floats some 600 of them, if you happen to be the Red Fleet.


----------



## tomahawk6

ONI report on Russian naval capabilities.Essentially the report states that the Russian Navy can deny access to the Black Sea and Baltic Sea.Flip side is that the Turks or the US could put a cork in the bottle called the Black Sea.The link also has a similar report on the PLAN.Some good reading for a slow weekend. :camo:

http://news.usni.org/2015/12/18/document-office-of-naval-intelligence-report-on-russian-navy


----------



## The Bread Guy

Bad genes or  :Tin-Foil-Hat: ?


> Today, news broke about the death yesterday (3 January) of 58-year-old Colonel General Igor Sergun, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, better known as the GRU.
> 
> No cause of death has yet been announced, but there has been no suggestion of anything shady or strange about his demise, even at this relatively young age (especially by the standards of Russian military gerontocracy!). No doubt more details will follow tomorrow; today it’s just the hurried eulogies. Putin issued a statement that said “Colleagues and subordinates knew him as a real military officer, an experienced and competent commander, a man of great courage, a true patriot. He was respected for his professionalism, strength of character, honesty and integrity.” Defence Minister Shoigu and the Collegium of the ministry extolled “the bright memory of a wonderful man, a true son of Russian patriots of the Motherland […who…] forever remain in our hearts.”
> 
> Sergun was an extremely important figure in the revival of the fortunes of the GRU, an agency that was pretty much at rock bottom when he took it over at the end of 2011. Since then, it has regained control over the Spetsnaz special forces, been crucial in the seizure of Crimea and operations in the Donbas, emerged as the lead agency for dealing with violent non-state actors and generally consolidated its position as a crucial instrument of today’s “non-linear war.” Indeed, it was a perverse accolade to this effect that he was included in the EU’s post-Crimea Western sanctions list ...


More here.


----------



## Kirkhill

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Bad genes or  :Tin-Foil-Hat: ?More here.



I'm going with bad vodka.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I'm going with bad vodka.


OK, one may be bad luck, but two?  In a month?


> ... A week ago the general who led the invasion of Crimea, General Alexander Shushukin, also died unexpectedly, officially of a heart attack. Shushukin commanded the military operation of the Russian Federation during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, but before that he had been in charge of operations in South Ossetia ...


I know the holidays can be a stressful time and all, but RUS's VAC better start looking at participation in that Crimea thing as an early morbidity factor ...


----------



## Journeyman

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> OK, one may be bad luck, but two?  In a month?


Interesting connection, Shushukin and Sergun. I'm not going for my tinfoil hat_ just  _yet, but both have links to Crimea and South Ossetia, possibly Grozny (although if I'm remembering correctly, at different points in the siege).  Shushukin was also in Kosovo when we were there, although he wasn't the ass-pain Battalion commander on our flank.


----------



## The Bread Guy

On the sudden (?) death of GRU's boss, one think tank's "we've heard":


> ... The Russian government said he had a heart attack in Moscow on Jan. 4, but a Stratfor source heard a report that he died on New Year's Day in Lebanon. If the report that he died in Lebanon is true, it raises questions about what Sergun was doing in a country that is a hotbed for the world's intelligence services and why the Kremlin would cover up his death abroad ...


This (also attached), from Lebanon's Info-machine:


> The head of Russia's secretive GRU military intelligence service, Gen Igor Sergun, has died suddenly aged 58, the BBC reported.
> 
> Expressing condolences, President Vladimir Putin called him "an experienced and competent commander, a man of great courage, a true patriot".
> 
> The circumstances of his death are not clear. He became GRU chief in 2011.
> 
> In 2014 he was placed on EU and US sanctions lists targeting top Russian officials after Russia's annexation of Crimea, in southern Ukraine.
> 
> The EU list said Gen Sergun was "responsible for the activity of GRU officers in eastern Ukraine".
> 
> Gen Sergun is not thought to have had direct combat experience when he took charge of the GRU.
> 
> After graduating from military academies, he joined the service in 1984, and had various posts before working as military attache in Albania in 1998.


 op:


----------



## chanman

I wonder if the death was anything as suspicious as that of the GCHQ mathematician found dead in a padlocked bag in his bathtub.


----------



## Kirkhill

The really neat thing about having Russia run by an ex-KGB agent is it leaves open all sorts of new James Bond plot lines.

Howabout the one where Vlad decides to level the playing field and bring Europe down to Russia's level by encouraging a bunch of lecherous Arabs to go foraging for sex in Europe's public squares.  The Arabs are happy.  Europe is distressed and hamstrung because its women suddenly are kicked back four decades.  Europe no longer looks so attractive to Russians.  Win-Win-Win.

But that is too ludicrous, even for a Bond flick.


----------



## vonGarvin

Europe did that to itself, assuming that those savages had a common sense of morals.


----------



## Kirkhill

Random events 

https://www.google.ca/search?q=helsinki+new+year&oq=helsinki+new+year&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60.5900j0j1&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=93&ie=UTF-8

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/08/cologne-violence-suspects-include-asylum-seekers?CMP=share_btn_tw

http://www.returnofkings.com/77331/the-attacks-on-german-women-over-new-years-eve-appear-organized-and-planned

http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/01/08/sex-attack-in-austria-too-police-deliberately-tried-to-cover-them-up/

http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/01/08/multiple-new-years-eve-sex-attacks-in-sweden-police-compare-it-to-cologne/

Pure coincidence.

There are no state organs in existence dedicated to the premise of disruption of other states.

Vladimir Putin never held such a job.

Can I prove the connection?  No.

I don't think it is wise to discount the possibility - at least hypothetically.


----------



## vonGarvin

The little flaw in that theory is that the savages would have to listen to an infidel.


----------



## Kirkhill

No, in my purely fictional world of course, the three guys on the Cathedral steps are not infidels.  Vlad is not on the steps.  

An ISIS assault on Europe helps to distract from Ukraine and Syria and drilling in the Black Sea and building bases in Poland.

Cui bono?

The actions of leaders, the associations of leaders, have never correlated well with the beliefs of their followers.  Cardinal Richelieu is a good guide to the modern world.

Protestants allied with Turks against French Catholics.  French Catholics and Protestants against Roman Catholics.    Roman Catholics and Protestants against French Catholics.   French Catholics allied with Turks againt Northerners. And then good old common or garden freebooters (Sea Dogs, Sea Beggars, Corsairs, Sallee Rovers, Brethren of the Coast, Dunkirkers).  Private Enterprise.  Religion.  State Authorization.  State Encouragement.  Grog.  Booty.  Loot.   1525 to 1763.


----------



## The Bread Guy

More satirical grist for the mill - a Putin parody Twitter feed suggests such a conspiracy _can't_ be possible ...


> My plan:
> 1 Fund Assad's slaughter to make refugees
> 2 Fund anti refugee parties in EU
> 3 Get Pro-Putin fascists popular
> 4 Get them elected


... not to mention this one:


> We're at stage 3 but most of the West hadn't figured stage 1 even exists.


From a previous Tweet:


> Reminder on how i'll break EU
> 1 Fund Assad's slaughter to create refugees.
> 2 Fund anti refugee parties in EU.
> 3 Criticize EU refugee policy.


Neeeeeeeeeeeeever happen ...  >


----------



## Kirkhill

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> More satirical grist for the mill - a Putin parody Twitter feed suggests such a conspiracy _can't_ be possible ...... not to mention this one:From a previous Tweet:Neeeeeeeeeeeeever happen ...  >



And that is the reason I am still unrich - Somebody always steals my ideas before I have them.


----------



## a_majoor

One can only hope

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-13/russia-s-59-billion-budget-cushion-may-not-last-the-year-chart



> *Russia's $59 Billion Budget Cushion May Not Last the Year: Chart *
> by
> Alexander Nicholson and Olga Tanas
> January 13, 2016 — 6:29 AM EST
> 
> Russia Finance Minister: We Must Cut Budget by 10%
> 
> Russia’s Reserve Fund, which it uses to plug gaps in the budget, has slumped 30 percent since the start of last year. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov warned Wednesday that the buffer may be depleted entirely in 2016 if the government doesn’t enact bold spending cuts.
> 
> The fund, which was built from windfall oil revenue, stood at $59.35 billion at the end of November. That compares with a five-year high of $91.72 billion in August 2014. Russia’s budget is based on an average oil price of $50 per barrel, while Brent is trading near the lowest level in 12 years, slightly above $31. December fund figures are due to be released on Wednesday.


----------



## McG

Does that not still look like they have more savings than we do?


----------



## a_majoor

MCG said:
			
		

> Does that not still look like they have more savings than we do?



True, but given the agressive posture that Russia has taken, the expeditionary forces in Ukraine and Syria, the announced production of new generations of fighter planes, tanks, submarines, missiles etc., not to mention the existing liabilities like pensions and the normal government sopending on day to day affairs like roads and garbage disposal, the sudden diminishing of their reserve fund deprives them of any cushion for unexpected events, and probably forces them to scale back on something.

What exactly they scale back on will be interesting; do they abandoin allies like Syria and Iran, allow Eastern Ukraine to fall back to the Ukrainians or risk rising discontent and potential unrest at home? A lot of Putin's power is based on paying off constituents to keep his powerbase intact.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Interesting connection, Shushukin and Sergun. I'm not going for my tinfoil hat_ just  _yet, but both have links to Crimea and South Ossetia, possibly Grozny (although if I'm remembering correctly, at different points in the siege).


It appears that being a General officer in the Russian system carries a fair bit of ... actuarial risk ...





Source


----------



## George Wallace

Are we witnessing another Stalin Purge Putin Purge?

Lot of "shot", "suicide", "poisoned", "car accident" ( although those may be legit after watching all those YouTube videos) and "heart attack" stats there.


----------



## The Bread Guy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Are we witnessing another Stalin Purge Putin Purge?
> 
> Lot of "shot", "suicide", "poisoned", "car accident" ( although those may be legit after watching all those YouTube videos) and "heart attack" stats there.


Not to mention a couple of "fell outta windows" ...


----------



## a_majoor

Russia blinks. 

In my mind, the Saudis have no upside agreeing to this, since their strategic interests are best served by starving the Iranians of cash, and by extention Iran's allies and enablers, which includes Syria and Russia. I believe it is extrememy "Amerocentric" to see this as a coordinated attack on US unconventional oil plays (and by extension, Canadian oil sands) becasue the effects on fellow OPEC members is even more dramatic, and the effects are much farther downrange than the immediate effects of hamstringing Iran. I do accept that Saudi Arabia looks at the effects on Canada and the US as acceptable collateral damage.

http://nextbigfuture.com/2016/01/russia-blinks-and-wants-to-talk-to.html



> *Russia blinks and wants to talk to Saudi Arabia and OPEC about coordinated oil production cuts*
> 
> Russian officials have decided they should talk to Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries about output cuts to bolster oil prices, the head of Russia's pipeline monopoly said on Wednesday, remarks that helped spur a sharp rise in world prices.
> 
> Oil futures surged more than 5 percent after the comments by Nikolai Tokarev, head of oil pipeline monopoly Transneft, which gave the strongest hint yet of possible cooperation between the top non-OPEC oil producer and the cartel to try to reverse a record glut.
> 
> On its own, a production cut by OPEC would provide only marginal support to the oil price under the present market conditions, as would a cut by Russia alone. However, if the two sides cut together, such a move would cause substantial ripples in the oil market.
> 
> The only problem for both is that it would be the ultimate fool’s gambit. The move would support the price; but what it will also do is give a whole lot of non-OPEC producers, including and especially ultra efficient US shale players who have kept going even at $30 per barrel, some much needed breathing room.
> 
> If Russia and OPEC actually go down such an improbable route, then it would a victory for independent US upstarts on an epic scale.
> 
> U.S. shale player Continental Resources said weakness in the energy sector will manifest itself in a slow decline in overall production through 2016.
> 
> Continental said in a statement laying out its plans for the year that first quarter production will average around 215,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day and drop around 13 percent to 185,000 boe in the fourth quarter.


----------



## Kirkhill

And I think that too little is being made of the Paris COP connection.

Paris, if the politicians did what they promised - a stretch, presents an existential threat to OPEC in general and the Saudis in particular.

One way for them to fight back is to drive the price of oil waaaay down and make uncompetitive technologies that required ridiculous levels of government support beforehand even less competitive.

With oil at 30 to 40 dollars a barrel carbon capture becomes an affordable marginal cost when compared to building nuclear plants or silly bugger notions like windmills and tidal ponds.

And the Saudis get to continue making money.  As will Canadian oil sands, which actually have a very low cost of production once the plant is up and running.


----------



## a_majoor

Russia contemplating selling energy at a discount to keep their market? Given the current bite low oil process are taking from the Russina budget, I can see this being something they would undertake very reluctantly.

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/19/should-gazprom-imitate-saudi-arabia/



> *Should Gazprom Imitate Saudi Arabia?*
> 
> A top Russian economist thinks Gazprom would be able to adopt Saudi strategies, in a move that would help the company stay relevant in Europe. Bloomberg reports:
> 
> The Saudis compete with other crude suppliers by boosting oil production and cutting prices, [Russian state bank Vnesheconombank’s chief economist Andrey Klepach] said Friday. “We could play the same role in gas as we have the capacity for boosting gas exports and production,” he said in the Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk. […]
> 
> Facing limited demand in Russia and other post-Soviet states, Gazprom says it has capacity to produce as much as 617 billion cubic meters of gas a year, which is 47 percent higher than its output last year. The company forecasts its average price in Europe may drop more than 30 percent this year to $169 per 1,000 cubic meters (about $4.7 per million British thermal units) if oil remains at about $35 a barrel.
> Gazprom has a history of tying its natural gas contracts to the price of oil, and this decision—once decried by its customers when crude was selling for more than $100 per barrel—is now coming back around to hurt it given today’s sub-$35 prices.
> 
> But discounted prices may be the only way Russia can hold on to its share of its most important market, as the Continent increasingly turns to LNG as an alternative. The global LNG market is fairly flooded with supplies these days (sound familiar?), and with the United States just now emerging onto the scene as an exporter of the superchilled hydrocarbon, prices are coming down.
> 
> So now Moscow is facing down the prospect of having to woo a customer base that for decades was more of a foregone conclusion. Russia is already dealing with the considerable pain of being a petrostate in a bearish oil market, which makes this natural gas pressure all the more harrowing.


----------



## The Bread Guy

From the "everything old is new again/deja vu all over again" file ...


> Russia will continue to render assistance to Afghanistan in equipping national security forces for the fight against terrorism and drug threat, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Monday.
> 
> "A large batch of Russian small arms and ammunition for the needs of the Afghan Interior Ministry has been delivered to Afghanistan gratis through the Russian Interior Ministry," the Russian Foreign Ministry said. "In view of this, the Afghan authorities have expressed gratitude to the Russian leadership."
> 
> "We reaffirm our readiness to continue cooperation with Afghanistan in fighting against terrorism and the drug threat both on the bilateral basis and in cooperation with foreign partners and international organizations," the Russian Foreign Ministry said ...


----------



## PanaEng

Here is an interesting article. 
The activities in Syria and elsewhere are just peripheral to their main effort: Ukraine
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2016/02/26/10-maps-that-explain-russias-strategy/#45b1e70d6c82


----------



## Journeyman

From Stratfor







 (Not Stratfor's photo of Putin and Lesin; theirs was too big)


> Controversy is brewing between the United States and Russia over the mysterious death of a one-time Kremlin heavyweight in Washington. Mikhail Lesin, Russia's former press minister, died in the U.S. capital in November 2015. At the time, Lesin's family reported that he had suffered a fatal heart attack. But on March 10, Washington's medical examiner and police department announced that Lesin was killed by blunt force injuries to his head, neck and upper and lower torso.
> 
> At this point, it is too soon to definitively label Lesin's death an assassination ordered by the Kremlin. However, with tension once again rising between the United States and Russia, it is possible that Moscow is seeking to remind Washington of its long reach while also silencing a defector.



Heart attack -- blunt force trauma....I always mix up the signs & symptoms!


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Heart attack -- blunt force trauma....I always mix up the signs & symptoms!



That's why you're not a med tech or a P.A.  ;D.


----------



## CougarKing

A joint European-Russian mission to Mars to search for life:

Yahoo News video



> *What Is The ExoMars Mission? Everything You Need To Know*
> Yahoo News
> March 14, 2016
> 
> A Russian rocket blasted off from Baikonur Cosmodrome Kazakhstan on Monday to launch Europe’s ExoMars mission searching for life on Mars.
> 
> A joint effort between the European Space Agency (ESA) and Russia’s Roscosmos, the mission comprises the Trace Gas Orbiter (TGO) and Schiaparelli landing module, both of which are designed to sniff out signs of life on the red planet.
> 
> The space modules will travel for seven months before reaching Mars in October.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## tomahawk6

Putin has cut out from the Interior Ministry its elite troops to be under his personal command.Curious move.

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-04-10/putin-gets-his-own-army?cmpid=yhoo.headline

President Vladimir Putin has overhauled Russia's law-enforcement operations to create a domestic army that ultimately would answer to him personally, not to one of the government ministers. It was the clearest demonstration in years of the Russian leader's concern about preserving his power.


----------



## Kirkhill

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Putin has cut out from the Interior Ministry its elite troops to be under his personal command.Curious move.
> 
> http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-04-10/putin-gets-his-own-army?cmpid=yhoo.headline
> 
> President Vladimir Putin has overhauled Russia's law-enforcement operations to create a domestic army that ultimately would answer to him personally, not to one of the government ministers. It was the clearest demonstration in years of the Russian leader's concern about preserving his power.





> *The Praetorians’* may have been tasked with protecting the Roman Emperor, but they *were also the single greatest threat to his life*. The unit was a major player in the webs of deceit that characterized imperial Rome, and *they were willing to slaughter and install new emperors when tempted by promises of money or power*. Disgruntled Praetorians famously engineered the assassination of Caligula and the selection of Claudius as his successor in A.D. 41. Among others, the Guard or their prefect also played a part in the murder of Commodus in 192, Caracalla in 217, Elagabalus in 222 and Pupienus and Balbinus in 238. In some cases, the Praetorians were partially responsible for both installing andmurdering a would-be emperor. Galba ascended the throne in A.D. 68 after winning the support of the Guard, only to be killed at their hands the following year after he neglected to properly reward them. Likewise, Emperor Pertinax was confirmed by the Praetorians in 193 and then slain just three months later when he tried to force them to accept new disciplinary measures.



http://www.history.com/news/history-lists/8-things-you-may-not-know-about-the-praetorian-guard

Risky move?


----------



## tomahawk6

Putin evidently felt the need for a unit more robust than the Kremlin Guard.The Nazi's did the same with their SS/Waffen SS.This force will compete for funding with the Interior Ministry and Army which may cause hard feelings.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Heart attack -- blunt force trauma....I always mix up the signs & symptoms!



Maybe he had a heart attack poisoned shot himself suicide shot died of old age hanged himself and then was pushed tripped thrown fell down the stairs...


----------



## The Bread Guy

Looks like Гусь & инакомыслящий*** have been busy over the Baltic ...


> The Russians must have thought they were on a 1950s-1960s set of a Cold War movie being filmed about the building political tensions between two superpowers.
> 
> Instead of a film, what happened Monday and Tuesday in the Baltic Sea was only too real. Russian Su-24 attack planes buzzed the USS Donald Cook multiple times getting as close as 30 feet to the Navy destroyer. The Russian jets appeared unarmed on Tuesday, but the commander of the USS Donald Cook said the planes flew a simulated attack profile, The Associated Press reports ...



*** - Russian for Goose & Maverick





(Photo source)


----------



## a_majoor

Estonia's report on Russia's Hybrid Warfare threat to Europe. I'm personally not convinced that a breakup of the EU might not be as devastating as suggested; there are already indications that Poland is cementing a leadership position among the Eastern European nations, and it is possible that the "German Zone" might do a lot better if they shed the "Latin Zone". The Nordic nations can do well on their own, and the UK has options like maintaining the balance of power from the outside, or join a NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Zone), among other things:

http://freebeacon.com/national-security/estonian-report-russia-hybrid-threat/



> *Estonian Report Details Russia’s ‘Hybrid Threat’ to Europe*
> Combating Russian propaganda increasingly important front in information war
> BY: Molly McKew
> April 18, 2016 4:00 pm
> 
> A new report by the Estonian Internal Security Service emphasizes the danger a resurgent Russia and a weakening European Union poses to stability and democracy in the region, highlighting Russian propaganda efforts in recent years.
> 
> The service, known in Estonia as Kaitsepolitseiamet or “Kapo,” produces an Annual Review summarizing trends and internal threats to Estonia. The 2015 Annual Review, released last week, includes sections on cyber security, preventing international terrorism, and fighting corruption, among other issues.
> 
> However, the first page of the report makes it clear what the service considers the top threat to Estonian and European security: “In the context of Russian aggression, the security threat arising from a weakening of the European Union is many times greater than that arising from the refugees settling in Estonia.”
> 
> “This is the most important point,” Martin Arpo, Kapo’s deputy director general, told the Washington Free Beacon. “For Estonia, the report is a reminder: let’s think about real security threats, and not imaginary ones. The migration crisis is bringing focus away from real threats not only in Estonia but in Europe, as well. The only hope for Putin to fulfill his ambitions is that Europe and NATO are split or have controversies inside. The refugee crisis is really the only serious topic that can bring these controversies.”
> 
> The first page of the report references the Gerasimov Doctrine, a vision of war through non-military means published by Russian Chief of General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov in early 2013.
> 
> The doctrine stipulates that the purpose of modern war is to erode the “readiness, will, and values” of the enemy. This concept drives how Estonia evaluates the internal threat from Russia.
> 
> Propaganda and other Russian activities in Estonia are tools, Arpo says, “for possibilities to create instability. The Russians won’t do anything militarily without creating an internal threat—the impression of an internal threat, if not a real one.”
> 
> One front in the information battle has been the debate over Syrian refugees.
> 
> Estonia, like the rest of Europe, has hosted fierce public debate about immigration due to the influx of refugees from Syria and other conflicts zones. Arpo said fear of the refugees is misplaced.
> 
> “Thousands of immigrants come to Estonia and integrate, create no problems,” said Arpo. “The number of refugees coming to Estonia is marginal compared to this number. These are ungrounded fears.”
> 
> Arpo said Russia is exploiting the immigration debate to sow dissent and bolster opposition movements within European countries.
> 
> “Populists have gained a lot of ground by bringing the refugee topic to the public,” he said. “Russian propaganda picks up the populist comments. The prevailing message is that governments in Europe are unable to address the migration crisis, so populists now represent ‘the people’ more than their governments.”
> 
> Asked how Estonia tries to fight the Russian propaganda campaigns against it, Arpo laughed. “The best you can achieve with Russian outlets is that they don’t use what you give them.”
> 
> If the facts are good enough, he says, the Russians can’t spin them, so they end up on the cutting-room floor. Often this process is seen as wasted effort.
> 
> “You have to tell your own story. Don’t get trapped into their story. If there are lies, we have to say it is a lie, and what is the truth. But we can’t lose ourselves on this Russian battlefield, reproducing their narrative for them.
> 
> “Propaganda is for the Western audience as much as the Russian one, and the West should not forget this. It is the electorates of NATO countries who will ultimately decide if NATO protects us or not, if sanctions continue or not.”
> 
> Arpo compared the information campaigns of Russia with those of ISIS.
> 
> “Russia wants to show itself as the last fortress of the Christian world and conservative values. ISIS propaganda also tries to offer an alternative to the liberal world and Western values,” he said. “Both use anti-liberal, anti-Western rhetoric. This is the common ground. But more important is the synergy between them. The big, distorted picture of the West as weak, and decadent.
> 
> “Maybe Russian propaganda is not a direct threat for western European countries,” Arpo said. “But it is a threat to the integrity of Europe.”
> 
> When Estonia regained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, it embraced a national policy of rapid integration into the EU and NATO to provide political and security guarantees for its sovereignty. Estonia is now one of the few NATO countries spending the target 2 percent of GDP on national defense.
> 
> Estonia’s recent history of Soviet occupation, as well as attempted Russian disruption of its internal affairs since, means it keeps a wary eye on its neighbor to the east.
> 
> The review provides detailed examples of what Arpo describes as the “hybrid threat” that Russia presents to Estonia. Arpo emphasizes that the threat is about far more than espionage.
> 
> “Information is not a goal, but a tool. The goal is not information, but to influence,” Arpo said.
> 
> Previously seen as an outlier in its fear about Russian aggression in its near abroad, Estonia is now at the center of conversations about countering the Russian threat.
> 
> “It’s not Russia that has changed,” Arpo said. “It’s the perception of Russia that has changed.”
> 
> Arpo said Baltic economies have been impacted far more by sanctions against Russia than the rest of Europe, but that it is a small price to pay. “Europe needs this approach to Russia. So we are accepting the losses. It is cheaper to deal with Russia this way than deal with consequences later from their aggressive policy.”
> 
> High-profile examples of Russian aggression, such as the dangerous flyover of the USS Donald Cook and intercept of an American reconnaissance plane, dominate media coverage, but the review said more attention should be paid to the internal subversion being pushed and funded by Russia across Europe.


----------



## Kirkhill

Putin vs the Saudis - not so chipper looking.



> Hardly any country in the OPEC cartel is capable of producing more oil. Several are failed states, or sliding into political crises.
> 
> Russia is milking a final burst of production before the depleting pre-Soviet wells of Western Siberia go into slow run-off. Sanctions have stymied its efforts to develop new fields or kick-start shale fracking in the Bazhenov basin.



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/04/18/saudis-are-going-for-the-kill-but-the-oil-market-is-turning-anyw/


----------



## CougarKing

Meanwhile, even as Putin "spars" with OPEC, in another former Soviet satellite, Kazakhstan, next door:  

Yahoo Finance/Oilprice.com



> *Why Chevron Is Investing $37B In The World’s ‘’Most Difficult Oil’’*
> By Dave Forest | Oilprice.com – Fri, 27 May, 2016 11:28 AM EDT
> 
> I wrote Wednesday about Australia’s Oil Search making a major $2.2 billion investment in Papua New Guinea natural gas. Noting this as a sign the right projects are still getting financed in the global oil and gas space.
> 
> And later that day, we got news of a new mega-deal in the petroleum investment space. One that comes at a ten-fold larger scale.
> 
> That came from U.S. major Chevron. Which the Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday will lead a consortium investing a stunning $37 billion in one single project — located in a completely unexpected part of the world.
> 
> Offshore Kazakhstan.
> 
> The Journal cited Kazakhstan’s energy minister, Kanat Bozumbayev, as saying the massive investment will come from Chevron and partners ExxonMobil, Lukoil and Kazakhstan state firm KazMunaiGas. With the target being an expansion of the Tengiz oil field, located in the Kazakh Caspian Sea.
> 
> Energy minister Bozumbayev said that recent meetings with Chevron had confirmed the investment at Tengiz. Which is already producing 500,000 barrels per day of oil under the Chevron-led consortium.
> *
> The fresh $37 billion program will be aimed at expanding that output. With production now expected to rise to 760,000 barrels per day by 2021.
> 
> The move is surprising for a number of reasons. First for its shear size — at a time when most E&Ps are cutting back capital expenses.
> 
> The deal is also surprising given the extreme challenges involved with Tengiz. As the figure below shows, the field (circled in white) lies at the remote northern reaches of the Caspian Sea — where conditions like cold weather and ice flows make development extremely challenging.
> *
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## jollyjacktar

This had me laughing.  Is Edward wanting to get kicked out of the country and turned over to the Americans... 

"Edward Snowden decries Russian surveillance bill as dangerous, urges Putin not to sign

By Andrew Blake - The Washington Times - Saturday, June 25, 2016 

Sweeping new surveillance measures approved by lawmakers in Russia this week were denounced Saturday by one of the country’s most well-known residents: former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.

Responding to an expansive package of legislative proposals passed Friday in the State Duma, Mr. Snowden took to Twitter early Saturday to urge President Vladimir Putin to not sign the measures into law.

“Russia’s new Big Brother law is an unworkable, unjustifiable violation of rights that should never be signed,” Mr. Snowdentweeted...
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/25/edward-snowden-decries-russian-surveillance-bill-d/"


----------



## PuckChaser

Is this guy's 15 minutes of fame up yet? He's lucky Putin doesn't just lock him up, like he does with other opponents. If you thought the NSA surveillance was bad domestically, Russia must seem like hell on earth.


----------



## Kirkhill

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Is this guy's 15 minutes of fame up yet? He's lucky Putin doesn't just lock him up, like he does with other opponents. If you thought the NSA surveillance was bad domestically, Russia must seem like hell on earth.



PC - you forget.  Russia is trying hard but it just isn't up to its old standards.  Much of their territory is a lawless wild west where it is pretty hard to find a jack to plug a wifi into.

I'm guessing the poor little bugger is just getting tired of the long download times.


----------



## CougarKing

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Is this guy's 15 minutes of fame up yet?



Hollywood's apparently going to give Snowden a helluva a lot more than 15 minutes:  :blotto:

(first 10 seconds of trailer is the part where he tries to go through US Army Basic despite injured limbs.)

*Snowden: 2016 movie trailer*


----------



## cupper

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Responding to an expansive package of legislative proposals passed Friday in the State Duma, Mr. Snowden took to Twitter early Saturday to urge President Vladimir Putin to not sign the measures into law.



He knows that nothing gets through the Russian Parliament without Putin's say so right?

Dude, how did you manage to get recruited by US intelligence without knowing that basic concept.

Russian Democracy. See below.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Remember this?  _*"Turkey has just shot down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 near the border with Syria"*_ (Nov 2016)?  This out today, from the Kremlin info-machine:


> *Vladimir Putin received a letter from President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan*
> 
> Vladimir Putin received a letter from President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in which the Turkish President expressed his desire to settle the situation concerning the downing of a Russian military aircraft.
> 
> June 27, 2016
> 15:55
> 
> Mr Erdogan said in his letter that Russia is Turkey’s friend and strategic partner, and the Turkish authorities do not want to ruin relations between the two countries. “We never had the desire or deliberate intention of shooting down the Russian Federation’s plane,” Mr Erdogan said.
> 
> The letter went on to say that the Turkish side “undertook much effort at great risk to retrieve the Russian pilot’s body from the Syrian opposition and bring it back to Turkey, where pre-burial procedures were carried out in accordance with religious and military procedures.
> 
> We performed this work at a level worthy of our two countries’ relations. I once again express my sympathy and profound condolences to the family of the Russian pilot who was killed and I apologise to them. I share their grief with all my heart. We look on this Russian pilot’s family as we would a Turkish family and we are ready to undertake any initiative that could lessen the pain and severity of the damage caused.”
> 
> The letter also said that a judicial investigation is underway against the Turkish citizen said to be involved in the Russian pilot’s death.
> 
> Mr Erdogan expressed his deep regret for what happened and said that he is ready to do all possible to restore the traditionally friendly ties between Turkey and Russia and also to work together to respond to crisis situations in the region and fight terrorism.


----------



## CougarKing

A friend of Putin and Steven Segal?  :facepalm:

New York Times



> *Surfer Republican' Russia's Unlikely Advocate in Congress*
> 
> By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
> 
> JULY 4, 2016, 3:30 A.M. E.D.T.
> 
> 
> WASHINGTON — When several members of Congress accused Vladimir Putin's Russia of human rights abuses and aggression toward its neighbors, a veteran California congressman stood virtually alone in urging a more cautionary stance.
> 
> For 69-year-old Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, a self-described "surfer Republican," this wasn't a totally unexpected position: he's long been virtually the lone pro-Russian voice on Capitol Hill.
> 
> "Right from the beginning we've had this incredible hostility," Rohrabacher, who has defended President Vladimir Putin and urged a dialogue with the Kremlin, lamented at a recent congressional hearing. He urged both Russia and the United States at the time to "take a deep breath and a step back."
> 
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## The Bread Guy

"Nice military you have there, Finland - SHAME if anything were to happen to it" ...


> Speaking to the press Friday during his short visit, Putin said that Russia will respect Finland's possible decision on NATO membership.
> 
> According to Putin, Russia's basic approach is that Finland is a neutral country and Russia keeps its own troops well away from the common border.
> 
> "Imagine that Finland were to join NATO. That would mean that Finland's defense forces would no longer be independent, rather part of a NATO infrastructure extending up to Russia's border," he said.
> 
> Putin added that in such a situation things would change. *He let it be understood that in this case Russian troops would no longer stay 1500 kilometres back from the Finnish border, as they do now.*
> 
> The Russian president went on to say that even so, Russia would respect a decision by the Finns, since it is Finland's own decision to make.
> 
> *"NATO would gladly fight Russia to the last Finnish soldier. Russia would not want that. But, it is not our decision, it's yours,"* stated Putin ...


On that bit in yellow, very Sopranos.

On that bit in orange, I guess these guys are all gone now?


> A detachment of about 800 servicemen from Russia’s Northern Fleet has been stationed in the Russian town of Alakurtti, Murmansk region, just 50km from the Finnish border, part of a large-scale expansion of Russian military facilities in the country’s northwest according to a press statement issued by the unit’s commanding admiral Vladimir Korolev on Tuesday.
> 
> The rest of the fleet are expected to be stationed there “soon” according to Korolev. The base will be one of the key strongholds in Russia’s northernmost territories, designed to strengthen the country’s defence capabilities from the west, and improve their territorial claims over areas in the Arctic.
> 
> At full force, Russia’s Northern Fleet consists of about 3,000 ground troops trained for combat in Arctic conditions, along with 39 ships and 45 submarines. Its arrival in Murmansk follows Russia’s decision last year to create a united command for all of its units designated with protecting Russia’s interests in the country’s northern regions ...


More on these guys from Russia's MoD (in Russian) here - also attached in case link doesn't work.


----------



## a_majoor

At least the Russians know the Finns are not ones to go down quietly...

http://www.winterwar.com/


----------



## The Bread Guy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> At least the Russians know the Finns are not ones to go down quietly...
> 
> http://www.winterwar.com/


As biggish as the Russian military is, I agree that there maaaaaaaaaaay still be a touch of institutional memory there, indeed.


----------



## CougarKing

Aside from more about the Finns and Putin mentioned below, the looming Russian shadow over Scandinavian countries reminds me of this series, currently showing on Netflix, called "Occupied" about a future Russian invasion and occupation of Norway.

Defense News



> *Putin Lures, Warns Finland Over Defense Ties*
> Gerard O’Dwyer, Defense News 10:34 a.m. EDT July 8, 2016
> 
> 
> HELSINKI — Finland’s long-term interests would be better served by deepening its defense relationship with Russia rather than aligning itself militarily to NATO, Russian President Vladimir Putin said during a heads-of-state summit meeting in Finland earlier this month.
> 
> Moscow remains opposed to the possibility of Finland joining NATO. Instead, Russia wants non-aligned Finland to develop closer links in the area of military cooperation and defense-industrial collaboration.
> 
> The July 1 summit meeting with Finnish president Sauli Niinistö, the commander-in-chief of Finland’s Armed Forces (FAF), was held at Niinistö’s summer residence at Kultaranta in south west Finland.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## The Bread Guy

> ... Finland’s long-term interests would be better served by deepening its defense relationship with Russia rather than aligning itself militarily to NATO ...


----------



## MilEME09

Well Russia tried to invade Finland once before, we all know how that went


----------



## larry Strong

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> Well Russia tried to invade Finland once before, we all know how that went



Well......it worked well enough in 1944..........



Cheers
Larry


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Yes we do.

After brilliantly working the Soviets to a stand still the first winter, the Finns were roundly defeated by mass artillery the next year and their lines completely breached. At that point, with no one coming to their help, they surrendered and reached a peace agreement with the Soviets that gave the later that which they had originally asked of the Finns, but now with  providing anything in return.

The Finns remembered this defeat, as result of which, when the Cold War came into being, the Soviets were able to exact from them an agreement to remain (officially) neutral, but in reality a vassal of the Soviet Union, even with its own name: Finlandization. And the Soviets then used Helsinki as the location in the "free" world for all their front organizations pushing "world peace and global disarmament initiatives" on all the western nations at apparent arms length (save for those of us in the Know), in one of the worlds largest and most organized psychological warfare initiative (leading to the "Better Red than Dead" campaign in Germany - for instance).

If you are going to quote history as if we all know what you mean - you better know what you mean yourself.


----------



## CougarKing

Marshal Mannerheim and the Finns' experience with the Russians aside...

Meanwhile in the present day, a key figure within Putin's inner circle resigns and is transferred...

American Interest



> *From Defense Minister to Eco Envoy
> The Rise and Fall of Sergey Ivanov Karina Orlova*
> 
> The most puzzling and unexpected high-profile resignation happened today in the Kremlin. Vladimir Putin dismissed the Chief of his Presidential Administration, his long-time friend and closest of allies, Sergey Ivanov. Formally, Ivanov filed for resignation himself, but in fact not only did he lose his position, he was moved to another post: he was made Special Presidential Representative for Environmental Preservation, Ecology and Transport.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Kirkhill

http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/700971/Russia-ploughing-millions-into-EU-think-tanks-create-social-unrest-Europe

The Russian version of the Colour Revolutions - George Soros with a strong element of Putin's KGB influence activities.

And no, I don't need any more tin foil.

With respect to the targeting - I suggest that the effort is not just to build up Russia's image but to destabilize all others by any means possible - even if that meant backing anti-Moscow elements like radical Islamists - or moderate oppositions.


----------



## Lightguns

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/700971/Russia-ploughing-millions-into-EU-think-tanks-create-social-unrest-Europe
> 
> The Russian version of the Colour Revolutions - George Soros with a strong element of Putin's KGB influence activities.
> 
> And no, I don't need any more tin foil.
> 
> With respect to the targeting - I suggest that the effort is not just to build up Russia's image but to destabilize all others by any means possible - even if that meant backing anti-Moscow elements like radical Islamists - or moderate oppositions.



Tin foil is just the excuse for people who refuse to believe they could be manipulated.  The reality is that we have been such since organized society began.  Today it is much more global, much better funded but also much harder to hide the machinations in a legal framework with the information age.  Since democracy is pretty much on the ropes, its no surprise that the EU is becoming a Russian colony.  For a Canadian prospective, see Vivian Krause's blog and her research into the tax refunds of the eco-warriors foundations in the US.  http://fairquestions.typepad.com/rethink_campaigns/


----------



## CougarKing

Aside from the former Soviet Republics like Georgia in the Caucasus, there's also Chechnya and Dagestan within Russian borders to think about...

Newsweek



> *Putin’s Savage War Against Russia’s ‘New Muslims’ *
> Newsweek
> Denis Sokolov
> 10 hrs ago
> 
> This article was first published on the Wilson Center site.
> 
> Today there are more than 2,000 fighters from Russia on the battlefields of Syria and Iraq fighting on behalf of the Islamic State. _
> 
> A large number of these fighters are Muslims originating from the Northern Caucasus, a fact that feeds a narrative back in Russia that has been growing since the 1990s.
> 
> *Many Russians now link the Muslim populations of the North Caucasus with extremism and terrorism.* That perception is not entirely without basis: the North Caucasus region has been rent by war, terror and brutal state crackdowns for over two decades.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)
> 
> _


----------



## CougarKing

Living in Kiev doesn't mean you're out of Putin's reach:

Independent



> * Russian journalist critical of Vladimir Putin found dead on his birthday*
> The Independent
> 
> Rachael Pells
> 2 hrs ago
> 
> A well-known Russian journalist and critic of President Vladimir Putin has been found dead in his Kiev apartment with a gunshot wound to the head.
> 
> The body of Alexander Shchetinin, founder the Novy Region (New Region) press agency, was found at his flat after friends tried to visit him on his birthday.
> 
> Mr Shchetinin gave up his Russian citizenship before becoming a Ukrainian national and settling in Kiev
> 
> A police spokesperson said Kiev forces were alerted of Ms Schetinin’s death at around midnight on Saturday. He is believed to have died a few hours earlier, between 8 and 9.30pm.
> Putin attacks Russian Paralympic ban as 'outside bounds of morality
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

So ... Death from natural causes according to the Pravda ... I mean TASS.  :nod:


----------



## CougarKing

Apparently Japan has its own share of tin foil hatters:

Washington Post



> *Japanese reporter thinks something strange is afoot with Putin’s schedule *
> The Washington Post
> 
> Adam Taylor
> 11 hrs ago
> 
> To all appearances, Vladimir Putin keeps a tight schedule. But perhaps that schedule isn't quite as tight as it appears.
> 
> Akiyoshi Komaki, the Moscow bureau chief for the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun, recently investigated a number of photographs the Kremlin had put out of the Russian president's meetings in August.* The meetings all took place in the same dark, wood-paneled room in the Russian governmental complex, though they were said to take place on different days.*
> 
> The first meeting, with acting Magadan region governor Vladimir Pechyony, was said to have taken place Aug. 18. Another meeting, with Igor Anatolyevich Orlov of the Arkhangelsk region, took place Aug. 22. The next, with Sverdlovsk region governor Yevgeny Kuyvashev, was said to have taken place Aug. 23. A final meeting was said to have taken place Aug. 24 with the governor of Moscow region, Andrei Vorobyev.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Kirkhill

> How to deal with Vladimir Putin - my advice to Theresa May as a former ambassador to Russia
> ANTHONY BRENTON
> FORMER UK AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA
> 3 SEPTEMBER 2016 • 2:27PM
> 
> Vladimir Putin will want to establish a positive relationship with Theresa May
> 
> The Prime Minister will meet Vladimir Putin for the first time at the G20 summit in China. Faced with the prospect of a Hillary Clinton presidency in the US, Putin will be keener than might be expected to establish a positive relationship.
> 
> He will, as ever, be formidably well briefed and direct. He will appreciate, and reciprocate, Mrs May's forensic, no nonsense style. But he will react sharply to any challenge on Russia's key concerns.
> 
> His brittleness comes from his conviction that the vastly stronger West is out to do Russia down. Even so, he probably feels that, currently, things are moving his way.
> 
> Mrs May will have no illusions about Russian ruthlessness
> 
> China, where they meet, is warming relations with Russia even while they deteriorate with the West. Russia is increasingly setting the agenda on Syria. Putin can live with what he has got in Ukraine, while awaiting the erosion of Western sanctions. Russia's economy seems to be recovering from the oil shock. He faces awkward parliamentary elections, but knows there is no real threat to his survival as president.
> 
> Putin will not expect dramatic results from this meeting. He knows that the UK has been amongst the toughest in the EU on relations with Russia, and views us as something of a US clone on international security issues (which is why he lost interest in his relationship with Tony Blair).
> 
> World leaders family photo at the G20 summit in BrisbanePlay! 01:20
> He will be interested to hear about Brexit, on which his feelings are mixed (the EU is Russia's largest trading partner). A characteristic joke would be an offer of advice on becoming a proud, free-standing, nation state.
> 
> But his main aim will be to warm up the strikingly cold UK-Russia relationship left by Mrs May's predecessor.
> 
> This would include more high-level political contact and some strengthening of trade and investment links (he would no doubt like to sell us more gas if we pull out of Hinkley Point), as well as the security links cut off after the Litvinenko murder.
> 
> Mrs May too will not have exaggerated expectations. As Home Secretary during the Litvinenko inquiry she will have no illusions about Russian ruthlessness. And she will have been fully briefed on Russia's current military posturing.
> 
> She might want to break the ice with a reference to last week's anniversary of the Arctic convoys, which the Russians still deeply appreciate. But she will need to be clear on our support for NATO's increased preparedness in Europe.
> 
> On Ukraine, her message that Russia must observe the Minsk agreement would have more effect if she could undertake to say the same to the Ukrainians.
> 
> And on Syria, she should acknowledge that Russian concerns about militant Islamism closely match our own, and we should strengthen our co-operation accordingly.
> 
> But the key point for her to make is that the current escalation of Russia/NATO tensions is in nobody's long-term interests. We should be looking together for ways to reverse it.



http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/03/how-to-deal-with-vladimir-putin---my-advice-to-theresa-may-as-a/

Related, and in my mind curious, 



> Putin Decries 'Shock Tactics' of Clinton, Trump Campaigns



http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/videos/2016-09-02/putin-decries-shock-tactics-of-clinton-trump-campaigns

Is it possible that Putin may be starting to confront the consequences of a destabilized and unpredictable US?  I believe that Putin has always put Russia, his Russia, first and focused - perhaps to the point of tunnel vision - on that goal.  As part of that effort he has, again in my belief, used the tools at hand and sought to level the game.  If he couldn't bring Russia's conventional game up to the level of the US then he could employ the tools of craft he learnt at KGB academy.

To wit: Bleed the US of resources, bleed it of internal cohesion.

The US, whether as a result of his machinations or not,  has diminished financial capacity, diminished conventional military capacity, diminished credibility that permits free use of unconventional forces, diminished moral suasion and diminished internal cohesion.

Concurrently, Russia has moved very little.  It is still the highly centralized, secret police riven state that it has always been.  It's conventional forces are diminished from the Brezhev era but adequate for domestic consumption and foreign propaganda purposes.  The one area that has improved is the special forces, not so much in the forces themselves but in the strategy that underpins their employment.

Again, independent of any consideration of KGB/GRU machinations or not - he is also facing a disjointed, disheartened and distressed EU and, as a consequence, NATO.  And he has a working, if mutually antagonistic, relation with China.

The chess board, in my opinion, relative to 1989, has been well and truly upended.  

I wonder if that is as far as Vlad's vision extended?   What next?


----------



## a_majoor

_Dezinformatsiya_ is an old Russian tactic, but the rise of Social Meida gives it far more reach and power. Russian Hybrid Warfare doctrine emphasizes the use of _Dezinformatsiya_ to see confusion and reduce morale and willpower to resist Russian actions. This article is also very interesting, as well as this one.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/europe/russia-sweden-disinformation.html?_r=1



> *A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories*
> By NEIL MacFARQUHARAUG. 28, 2016
> 
> STOCKHOLM — With a vigorous national debate underway on whether Sweden should enter a military partnership with NATO, officials in Stockholm suddenly encountered an unsettling problem: a flood of distorted and outright false information on social media, confusing public perceptions of the issue.
> 
> The claims were alarming: If Sweden, a non-NATO member, signed the deal, the alliance would stockpile secret nuclear weapons on Swedish soil; NATO could attack Russia from Sweden without government approval; NATO soldiers, immune from prosecution, could rape Swedish women without fear of criminal charges.
> 
> They were all false, but the disinformation had begun spilling into the traditional news media, and as the defense minister, Peter Hultqvist, traveled the country to promote the pact in speeches and town hall meetings, he was repeatedly grilled about the bogus stories.
> 
> “People were not used to it, and they got scared, asking what can be believed, what should be believed?” said Marinette Nyh Radebo, Mr. Hultqvist’s spokeswoman.
> 
> As often happens in such cases, Swedish officials were never able to pin down the source of the false reports. But they, numerous analysts and experts in American and European intelligence point to Russia as the prime suspect, noting that preventing NATO expansion is a centerpiece of the foreign policy of President Vladimir V. Putin, who invaded Georgia in 2008 largely to forestall that possibility.
> 
> In Crimea, eastern Ukraine and now Syria, Mr. Putin has flaunted a modernized and more muscular military. But he lacks the economic strength and overall might to openly confront NATO, the European Union or the United States. Instead, he has invested heavily in a program of “weaponized” information, using a variety of means to sow doubt and division. The goal is to weaken cohesion among member states, stir discord in their domestic politics and blunt opposition to Russia.
> 
> “Moscow views world affairs as a system of special operations, and very sincerely believes that it itself is an object of Western special operations,” said Gleb Pavlovsky, who helped establish the Kremlin’s information machine before 2008. “I am sure that there are a lot of centers, some linked to the state, that are involved in inventing these kinds of fake stories.”
> 
> The planting of false stories is nothing new; the Soviet Union devoted considerable resources to that during the ideological battles of the Cold War. Now, though, disinformation is regarded as an important aspect of Russian military doctrine, and it is being directed at political debates in target countries with far greater sophistication and volume than in the past.
> 
> The flow of misleading and inaccurate stories is so strong that both NATO and the European Union have established special offices to identify and refute disinformation, particularly claims emanating from Russia.
> 
> The Kremlin’s clandestine methods have surfaced in the United States, too, American officials say, identifying Russian intelligence as the likely source of leaked Democratic National Committee emails that embarrassed Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign.
> 
> The Kremlin uses both conventional media — Sputnik, a news agency, and RT, a television outlet — and covert channels, as in Sweden, that are almost always untraceable.
> 
> Russia exploits both approaches in a comprehensive assault, Wilhelm Unge, a spokesman for the Swedish Security Service, said this year when presenting the agency’s annual report. “We mean everything from internet trolls to propaganda and misinformation spread by media companies like RT and Sputnik,” he said.
> 
> The fundamental purpose of dezinformatsiya, or Russian disinformation, experts said, is to undermine the official version of events — even the very idea that there is a true version of events — and foster a kind of policy paralysis.
> 
> Disinformation most famously succeeded in early 2014 with the initial obfuscation about deploying Russian forces to seize Crimea. That summer, Russia pumped out a dizzying array of theories about the destruction of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, blaming the C.I.A. and, most outlandishly, Ukrainian fighter pilots who had mistaken the airliner for the Russian presidential aircraft.
> 
> The cloud of stories helped veil the simple truth that poorly trained insurgents had accidentally downed the plane with a missile supplied by Russia.
> 
> Moscow adamantly denies using disinformation to influence Western public opinion and tends to label accusations of either overt or covert threats as “Russophobia.”
> 
> “There is an impression that, like in a good orchestra, many Western countries every day accuse Russia of threatening someone,” Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, said at a recent ministry briefing.
> 
> Tracing individual strands of disinformation is difficult, but in Sweden and elsewhere, experts have detected a characteristic pattern that they tie to Kremlin-generated disinformation campaigns.
> 
> “The dynamic is always the same: It originates somewhere in Russia, on Russia state media sites, or different websites or somewhere in that kind of context,” said Anders Lindberg, a Swedish journalist and lawyer.
> 
> “Then the fake document becomes the source of a news story distributed on far-left or far-right-wing websites,” he said. “Those who rely on those sites for news link to the story, and it spreads. Nobody can say where they come from, but they end up as key issues in a security policy decision.”
> 
> Although the topics may vary, the goal is the same, Mr. Lindberg and others suggested. “What the Russians are doing is building narratives; they are not building facts,” he said. “The underlying narrative is, ‘Don’t trust anyone.’”
> 
> The weaponization of information is not some project devised by a Kremlin policy expert but is an integral part of Russian military doctrine — what some senior military figures call a “decisive” battlefront.
> 
> “The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness,” Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, wrote in 2013.
> 
> A prime Kremlin target is Europe, where the rise of the populist right and declining support for the European Union create an ever more receptive audience for Russia’s conservative, nationalistic and authoritarian approach under Mr. Putin. Last year, the European Parliament accused Russia of “financing radical and extremist parties” in its member states, and in 2014 the Kremlin extended an $11.7 million loan to the National Front, the extreme-right party in France.
> 
> “The Russians are very good at courting everyone who has a grudge with liberal democracy, and that goes from extreme right to extreme left,” said Patrik Oksanen, an editorial writer for the Swedish newspaper group MittMedia. The central idea, he said, is that “liberal democracy is corrupt, inefficient, chaotic and, ultimately, not democratic.”
> 
> Another message, largely unstated, is that European governments lack the competence to deal with the crises they face, particularly immigration and terrorism, and that their officials are all American puppets.
> 
> In Germany, concerns over immigrant violence grew after a 13-year-old Russian-German girl said she had been raped by migrants. A report on Russian state television furthered the story. Even after the police debunked the claim, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, continued to chastise Germany.
> 
> In Britain, analysts said, the Kremlin’s English-language news outlets heavily favored the campaign for the country to leave the European Union, despite their claims of objectivity.
> 
> In the Czech Republic, alarming, sensational stories portraying the United States, the European Union and immigrants as villains appear daily across a cluster of about 40 pro-Russia websites.
> 
> During NATO military exercises in early June, articles on the websites suggested that Washington controlled Europe through the alliance, with Germany as its local sheriff. Echoing the disinformation that appeared in Sweden, the reports said NATO planned to store nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe and would attack Russia from there without seeking approval from local capitals.
> 
> A poll this summer by European Values, a think tank in Prague, found that 51 percent of Czechs viewed the United States’ role in Europe negatively, that only 32 percent viewed the European Union positively and that at least a quarter believed some elements of the disinformation.
> 
> “The data show how public opinion is changing thanks to the disinformation on those outlets,” said Jakub Janda, the think tank’s deputy director for public and political affairs. “They try to look like a regular media outlet even if they have a hidden agenda.”
> 
> Not all Russian disinformation efforts succeed. Sputnik news websites in various Scandinavian languages failed to attract enough readers and were closed after less than a year.
> 
> Both RT and Sputnik portray themselves as independent, alternative voices. Sputnik claims that it “tells the untold,” even if its daily report relies heavily on articles abridged from other sources. RT trumpets the slogan “Question More.”
> 
> Both depict the West as grim, divided, brutal, decadent, overrun with violent immigrants and unstable. “They want to give a picture of Europe as some sort of continent that is collapsing,” Mr. Hultqvist, the Swedish defense minister, said in an interview.
> 
> RT often seems obsessed with the United States, portraying life there as hellish. On the day President Obama spoke at the Democratic National Convention, for example, it emphasized scattered demonstrations rather than the speeches. It defends the Republican presidential nominee, Donald J. Trump, as an underdog maligned by the established news media.
> 
> Margarita Simonyan, RT’s editor in chief, said the channel was being singled out as a threat because it offered a different narrative from “the Anglo-American media-political establishment.” RT, she said, wants to provide “a perspective otherwise missing from the mainstream media echo chamber.”
> 
> Moscow’s targeting of the West with disinformation dates to a Cold War program the Soviets called “active measures.” The effort involved leaking or even writing stories for sympathetic newspapers in India and hoping that they would be picked up in the West, said Professor Mark N. Kramer, a Cold War expert at Harvard.
> 
> The story that AIDS was a C.I.A. project run amok spread that way, and it poisons the discussion of the disease decades later. At the time, before the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse, the Kremlin was selling communism as an ideological alternative. Now, experts said, the ideological component has evaporated, but the goal of weakening adversaries remains.
> 
> In Sweden recently, that has meant a series of bizarre forged letters and news articles about NATO and linked to Russia.
> 
> One forgery, on Defense Ministry letterhead over Mr. Hultqvist’s signature, encouraged a major Swedish firm to sell artillery to Ukraine, a move that would be illegal in Sweden. Ms. Nyh Radebo, his spokeswoman, put an end to that story in Sweden, but at international conferences, Mr. Hultqvist still faced questions about the nonexistent sales.
> 
> Russia also made at least one overt attempt to influence the debate. During a seminar in the spring, Vladimir Kozin, a senior adviser to the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank linked to the Kremlin and Russian foreign intelligence, argued against any change in Sweden’s neutral status.
> 
> “Do they really need to lose their neutral status?” he said of the Swedes. “To permit fielding new U.S. military bases on their territory and to send their national troops to take part in dubious regional conflicts?”
> 
> Whatever the method or message, Russia clearly wants to win any information war, as Dmitry Kiselyev, Russia’s most famous television anchor and the director of the organization that runs Sputnik, made clear recently.
> 
> Speaking this summer on the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Information Bureau, Mr. Kiselyev said the age of neutral journalism was over. “If we do propaganda, then you do propaganda, too,” he said, directing his message to Western journalists.
> 
> “Today, it is much more costly to kill one enemy soldier than during World War II, World War I or in the Middle Ages,” he said in an interview on the state-run Rossiya 24 network. While the business of “persuasion” is more expensive now, too, he said, “if you can persuade a person, you don’t need to kill him.”
> 
> Correction: August 28, 2016
> An earlier version of this article misstated the surname of a spokesman for the Swedish Security Service. He is Wilhelm Unge, not Urme.
> 
> Correction: August 31, 2016
> Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article referred incorrectly to RT’s coverage of the Democratic National Convention. It devoted little to the speeches on the day President Obama spoke — not throughout the entire convention.
> 
> Follow Neil MacFarquhar on Twitter @NeilMacFarquhar.
> 
> Eva Sohlman contributed reporting from Stockholm, and Lincoln Pigman from Moscow.


----------



## Kirkhill

Further to my comment above:



> Putin is ‘DELIBERATELY destabilising’ the world: US defence chief issues Russia warning
> 
> RUSSIA'S Vladimir Putin is making deliberate attempts to destabilise the rest of the world, the US Defence Secretary has warned during a visit to the UK.
> 
> By TOM BATCHELOR
> PUBLISHED: 11:41, Wed, Sep 7, 2016 | UPDATED: 14:51, Wed, Sep 7, 2016
> 
> Ash Carter said Russia was eroding international order
> 
> America’s defence chief warned in a highly-charged assessment of the Kremlin that Russia had clear ambitions to erode international order.
> 
> Ash Carter, speaking in Oxford, sounded a note of caution about Russia’s willingness to reach a ceasefire deal in Syria.
> 
> But he added that the US was not seeking either a hot or cold war but was merely acting to defend its allies.
> 
> His comments risk souring an already tense diplomatic standoff between the two military superpowers, who are involved in ongoing talks over the future of Syria.
> 
> Moscow and Washington back opposing sides in the five-year-long Syrian conflict, with the Russians fighting on President Bashar al-Assad's side while the Americans back opposition groups and insist Assad must go.
> 
> The two powers have been negotiating in recent days, with Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin meeting for 90 minutes on Monday on the sidelines of a G20 meeting in China, but failed to reach an agreement.
> 
> However, efforts are still going on behind the scenes and Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir said in London on Tuesday that an agreement was possible within 24 hours.



http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/708074/US-defence-chief-Ash-Carter-Putin-deliberately-destabilising-world


----------



## The Bread Guy

A Congressional Research Service short report (3 pages) on Russian info-ops attached (source):


> Pointing to several recent high-profile events, media reports suggest that Russia is engaging in activities that some may describe as Information Warfare (IW): the range of military and government operations to protect and exploit the information environment. These alleged events include "hacks" of servers of U.S. political parties and other groups; releases and possible manipulation of sensitive documents in an attempt to influence the upcoming U.S. presidential election; and the manipulation of publicly available information on Russian activities in Ukraine. The scale and frequency of attacks on U.S. information architecture raise issues for the United States, including whether the Department of Defense adequately conceptualizes and is organized to counter IW ...


----------



## Kirkhill

But, I believe, the question still stands: "where to from here?"

I don't believe that Putin honestly thinks that he can put Moscow at the centre of the world.  

And he seems to be having trouble keeping his cronies on side - what with them all having nasty accidents and all.

Perhaps his plan was summed up by Milton?

"Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven."


----------



## a_majoor

Putin's plan, insofar as he has an overarching plan, is probably based on Russian national "mythology". Most nations and people's have a defining mythology, like American Exceptionalism or the Britania Rules the Waves.

The general thrust of Russian Mythology as articulated buy Putin is Russia is the "Third Rome" and is in a unique position to unite the civilizations of the Orient and the West. Because of this unique position and mission, Russia needs to be a powerful nation capable of leading and uniting these different civilizations and leading them. (This may be the underlying source of Putin's lament that the dissolution of the USSR was the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century). Some support of this hypothesis is  people like Aleksandr Dugin are in the outer circle, and Putin references Russian philosophers like Vladimir Solovyov in his speeches.

Now it is highly unlikely Putin has a three ring binder outlining his plan to unite East and West on his desk. Rather, the sort of world view of Russia having a historically important and dominant role in the world means that events which diminish Russia's position need to be countered and events which can expand Russia's role need to be exploited as much as possible.  Long term internal issues like the collapse of oil revenues and the drag of internal corruption and kleptocracy obviously hinder these efforts, but then again, these are his problems.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I don't believe that Putin honestly thinks that he can put Moscow at the centre of the world.


Even if he's not one of the key guests at the party, will it be enough for him to be that, "well, you know, what'll he do if we DON'T invite him?" kinda guy?


----------



## CougarKing

The global oil glut isn't helping Putin's "pan-ethnic Russian" Fuhrer-saviour designs on Europe:  ;D

CNN Money



> *Russia is seriously running out of cash*
> by Ivana Kottasova   @ivanakottasova
> September 16, 2016: 12:03 PM
> 
> Russia is bleeding cash at an alarming rate.
> After almost two years in recession, the country's rainy day fund has shrunk to just $32.2 billion this month, according to the Russian Finance Ministry. It *was $91.7 billion in September 2014, just before oil prices started to collapse.
> And it's getting worse. Analysts expect the fund will shrink to just $15 billion by the end of this year* and dry up completely soon after that.
> 
> "At the current rate, the fund would be depleted in mid-2017, perhaps a few months later," Ondrej Schneider, chief economist at the Institute of International Finance, wrote in a note this week.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## CougarKing

Putin/Palpatine: I am the Senate!".  ;D

Reuters



> *Pro-Putin party seen winning even greater sway in Russia's parliament *
> Reuters
> By Andrew Osborn
> 10 hrs ago
> 
> 
> MOSCOW, Sept 18 (Reuters) - The ruling United Russia party is expected to win even greater dominance over Russia's lower house in a parliamentary election on Sunday, showing that support for President Vladimir Putin is holding up despite sanctions and a deep economic slowdown.
> 
> The election for the Duma, or lower house, is being seen as a dry run for Putin's expected presidential campaign in 2018.
> 
> (...SNIPPED)


----------



## Good2Golf

...right up until the masses stop getting food when the Federal reserve runs dry, and those masses storm Tzar Putin's palace while he's eating cake...


----------



## CougarKing

Putin to revive the KGB as the MGB.

Veuer



> *Vladimir Putin allegedly planning to 'revive the KGB'*
> Duration: 00:59 19 hrs ago
> 
> President Vladimir Putin is planning to restructure the country's security services according to reports.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Russia:  Don't think we can't see you, Montenegro & Bosnia ...


> The anticipated joining by Montenegro, and also Bosnia and Herzegovina, of NATO will not be good for relations with Russia, Russian Foreign Ministry European Cooperation Department Director Andrei Kelin said.
> 
> “NATO is currently pursuing extremely unfriendly policies on Russia, foreign troops are being deployed in the territory of the Baltic states. The joining of NATO in this situation will not increase stability, but will increase confrontation in the relations between countries,” he said at a young diplomats’ forum.
> 
> “I would ask for that to be borne in mind: Montenegro is now going to enter there, I know that they are encouraging Bosnia and Herzegovina [to do that] as well,” Kelin said. “This will not improve our relations,” he said.


----------



## tomahawk6

Putin views Obama with disdain and according to the article,might be moving forward to make life difficult for the Harvard professor turned President.Iskander to Kaliningrad and Russian power in Syria have the potential to cause a crisis between the US and Russia,that would force someone to blink.

http://observer.com/2016/10/putins-activation-of-iskander-m-ballistic-missile-is-a-message-to-obama/

It’s long been obvious that Vladimir Putin and his inner circle view Barack Obama with utter contempt. To the hard men in Moscow, who got their schooling in the KGB, our diffident, wordy Ivy League lawyer president is a weakling—almost a caricature of everything they despise about the postmodern West.

Here the Kremlin mirrors most Russians, who find Obama a puzzling and contemptible man. This is nothing new. I’ve heard remarkable put-downs of our commander-in-chief for years, going back to 2008, even from the mouths of highly educated Russians. Their comments are invariably earthy, insulting, and nowhere near politically correct.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Comintern 2.0?


> The International Youth and Students for Social Equality (IYSSE) is establishing a club at the University of Melbourne and will be holding our Inaugural General Meeting (IGM) on Thursday, October 13. The IGM will be followed by a report and discussion on *the urgent need to develop conscious political opposition to the growing dangers of a US-led imperialist war against China in Asia, and against Russia in Europe*. We appeal to every student who opposes militarism, nationalism and the related assault on the living standards and democratic rights of the working class to attend the IGM and join and fight to build the IYSSE at University of Melbourne ...


I eagerly await similar protests being conducted against the OTHER nuclear super powers ...  :crickets:

Deja vu all over again?  This, from the U.K., 1980 ...


----------



## cavalryman

We never seem to run out of useful idiots, do we?


----------



## Kirkhill

Just wondering if Jeremy Corbyn turned up for that parade.  Don't know how useful he is though.   ???


----------



## Journeyman

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> http://observer.com/2016/10/putins-activation-of-iskander-m-ballistic-missile-is-a-message-to-obama/


I don't see it as a message to Obama; he's already a non-player.  It's more a message to the US and NATO in general.  After all, Putin had agreed previously to not deploy SS-26s to Kaliningrad in exchange for the US not deploying BMD systems further east.  That agreement hasn't changed, but he said 'screw it' anyway.

It's also useful for the Russian domestic audience, with the combination of on-going tough economic times and the return of cold winter, to keep the people focused on the evil Western boogeyman.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> I don't see it as a message to Obama; he's already a non-player.  It's more a message to the US and NATO in general.  After all, Putin had agreed previously to not deploy SS-26s to Kaliningrad in exchange for the US not deploying BMD systems further east.  That agreement hasn't changed, but he said 'screw it' anyway.


Ah, the "Ukrainian border integrity deal" loophole - although I don't think the Poles or Lithuanians have been naive enough to lease out basing facilities to the Russians.  



			
				Journeyman said:
			
		

> It's also useful for the Russian domestic audience, with the combination of on-going tough economic times and the return of cold winter, to keep the people focused on the evil Western boogeyman.


 :nod:


----------



## vonGarvin

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Comintern 2.0?I eagerly await similar protests being conducted against the OTHER nuclear super powers ...  :crickets:
> 
> Deja vu all over again?  This, from the U.K., 1980 ...


Reminds me of the 1980s in Germany.  Many West German university students were out protesting the deployment of the Pershing II missiles by the US.  So were many East German students....


----------



## The Bread Guy

Technoviking said:
			
		

> Reminds me of the 1980s in Germany.  Many West German university students were out protesting the deployment of the Pershing II missiles by the US.  So were many East German students....


With nobody complaining about the then-Soviet nukes - just like in N.America at the same time.

Speaking of nukes, lookit what Russsia's been up to:

_*"(Northern Fleet) submarine "Novomoskovsk" fulfilled "Sineva" missile launch in the Barents Sea"*_ (RUS MoD, in Russian)
_*"From the cosmodrome "Plesetsk" promoted launch of intercontinental ballistic missile RS-12M "Topol" "*_ (RUS MoD, in Russian)
_*"SSBN "Georgiy Pobedonosets" Pacific Fleet has made a successful launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile"*_ (RUS MoD, in Russian)

Meanwhile, the U.K. _Daily Mail_ says _"Russia orders all officials to fly home any relatives living abroad, as tensions mount over the prospect of a global war,"_ but the original source article in Russian seems to talk more about the optics of Russian mucky-mucks having their kids educated overseas - more from myth-busting site Snopes here.


----------



## MilEME09

just keep an eye on the russian Embassy, if they are burning documents, better pack your kit


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Or better: keep your kit packed at all times. We reservists of the cold war certainly did ... just in case.


----------



## fake penguin

I read that  Russia could beat Nato in 60 hours.  But also in one year Nato could build up enough forces to hopefully defend against Russia. Is this because Russia has now a more powerful  military than the USA or is it all because of logistics  and where the fight would take place the reason Russia would destroy Nato?


----------



## MilEME09

fake penguin said:
			
		

> I read that  Russia could beat Nato in 60 hours.  But also in one year Nato could build up enough forces to hopefully defend against Russia. Is this because Russia has now a more powerful  military than the USA or is it all because of logistics  and where the fight would take place the reason Russia would destroy Nato?



Two things that play majorly into this. First NATO war plans usually involved delaying until American divisions could be brought in from across the Atlantic because that would be the bulk of NATO's combat power. Where as Russia and the warsaw pact had all there forces ready to go. That is the numbers game.

Second, without a doubt whoever strikes first will have some element of surprise, capitalizing on that is basic strategy in warfare so if Russia strikes first you could expect the baltics and eastern Europe to fall before NATO mounts a sustained, coordinated defense across europe. Once NATO can dig in, and reinforcements start pouring in NATO has an equel footing.


----------



## GR66

You can't compare 1976 with 2016.  The Fulda Gap is now 1,200km from the closest Russian-allied point (Brest, Belarus).  That's a hell of a long way to go against Polish and German (and NATO allied) ground and air defences before you're able to break through and into the heart of the alliance and "win".  There's always those pesky NATO nukes that might get in the way if there's a total collapse anyway.  

The threat against NATO is no longer an overwhelming Russian attack into the heart of the alliance.  It's Russia chipping away at the edges where there's enough Russian interests (eastern Ukraine, the Baltic States and possibly the eastern edges of Poland) where Russia might be willing to take the chance that NATO's interests are not strong enough to risk a full-scaled war in order to defend those regions.


----------



## MilEME09

Your right it's not the Fulda Gap any more, its the forests of eastern poland, the hills of the baltics, and the plains of Ukraine. The front is large, the stakes are the same, Russia is growing at an alarming rate, and seem to be preparing as if war is around the corner. I hate to say it but at the rate things are going WWIII isn't an if question, its a when.


----------



## GR66

I certainly won't argue that conflict is very possible and we should definitely be prepared to defend our interests against a resurgent and aggressive Russia.  However I'd argue that the stakes aren't the same.  If the Cold War had become "hot", the goal of the Russians would have been to utterly defeat NATO.  That meant bursting through our defensive lines and breaking through into the heartland of not only West Germany, but France as well and forcing our unconditional surrender.

The stakes now aren't as high (although of course the risk of unintended escalation and "mistakes" are clearly possible).  Russia is looking to re-establish LOCAL dominance.  To regain control of areas historically and strategically important to Russia.  This is limited to the periphery of the Russian state with the goals of regaining control/influence and creating a buffer from the forces of NATO.  The Baltic States, the Caucasus, Eastern Ukraine, and Eastern Poland are most certainly at risk.  I don't believe however that Russia has either the will, the power or the resources to take the fight to NATO's homeland (Germany and France) in a WWII-style war of conquest.  

The world has become too economically interdependent since 1945 (and nuclear weapons too much of a deterrent) for the established major states to have their actual existence threatened by other states.  Borders may shift and internal stresses may certainly cause fractures, but in my opinion there are very few direct, external, threats to our actual existence as a nation.


----------



## Altair

GR66 said:
			
		

> I certainly won't argue that conflict is very possible and we should definitely be prepared to defend our interests against a resurgent and aggressive Russia.  However I'd argue that the stakes aren't the same.  If the Cold War had become "hot", the goal of the Russians would have been to utterly defeat NATO.  That meant bursting through our defensive lines and breaking through into the heartland of not only West Germany, but France as well and forcing our unconditional surrender.
> 
> The stakes now aren't as high (although of course the risk of unintended escalation and "mistakes" are clearly possible).  Russia is looking to re-establish LOCAL dominance.  To regain control of areas historically and strategically important to Russia.  This is limited to the periphery of the Russian state with the goals of regaining control/influence and creating a buffer from the forces of NATO.  The Baltic States, the Caucasus, Eastern Ukraine, and Eastern Poland are most certainly at risk.  I don't believe however that Russia has either the will, the power or the resources to take the fight to NATO's homeland (Germany and France) in a WWII-style war of conquest.
> 
> The world has become too economically interdependent since 1945 (and nuclear weapons too much of a deterrent) for the established major states to have their actual existence threatened by other states.  Borders may shift and internal stresses may certainly cause fractures, but in my opinion there are very few direct, external, threats to our actual existence as a nation.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Illusion



> Angell argued that war between industrial countries was futile because conquest did not pay. J.D.B. Miller writes: "The 'Great Illusion' was that nations gained by armed confrontation, militarism, war, or conquest."[3] The economic interdependence between industrial countries meant that war would be economically harmful to all the countries involved. Moreover, if a conquering power confiscated property in the territory it seized, "the incentive to produce [of the local population] would be sapped and the conquered area be rendered worthless. Thus, the conquering power had to leave property in the hands of the local population while incurring the costs of conquest and occupation



I know its not a direct parallel but I always think of that whenever someone mentions economic interdependence preventing war.

That said, I agree 100% that nukes and their high cost prevents a lot of conflicts these days. The cold war would have just been WW3 if not for nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan would have probably gone at it another time of two if they were not nuclear powers, Israel and its neighbours would probably have had another round or ten if Israel didn't have some nukes, and I'm of the opinion that North Korea would be a smoldering hole in the ground if not for the few nuclear weapons they have cobbled together.


----------



## George Wallace

GR66 said:
			
		

> You can't compare 1976 with 2016.  The Fulda Gap is now 1,200km from the closest Russian-allied point (Brest, Belarus).  That's a hell of a long way to go against Polish and German (and NATO allied) ground and air defences before you're able to break through and into the heart of the alliance and "win".  There's always those pesky NATO nukes that might get in the way if there's a total collapse anyway.



On this point, it a much larger distance for the Soviets to fly in their Spetznaz to attack NATO's rear and take control of French Nuclear weapons, but it does not totally remove the possibilities that they may still have many of the Cold War tactics on their books.



			
				GR66 said:
			
		

> The threat against NATO is no longer an overwhelming Russian attack into the heart of the alliance.  It's Russia chipping away at the edges where there's enough Russian interests (eastern Ukraine, the Baltic States and possibly the eastern edges of Poland) where Russia might be willing to take the chance that NATO's interests are not strong enough to risk a full-scaled war in order to defend those regions.



If we delve into the Cold War world of Robert Ludlum and other writers, the use of Intelligence Agents to turn segments of Western populations to their cause and create havoc tying up LEO and military resources is still a reality.  It is not like the Fall of the Wall and the "end" of the Cold War magically did away with clandestine activities by any of the world powers.  That is very naive.


----------



## GR66

Altair said:
			
		

> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Illusion
> 
> I know its not a direct parallel but I always think of that whenever someone mentions economic interdependence preventing war.
> 
> That said, I agree 100% that nukes and their high cost prevents a lot of conflicts these days. The cold war would have just been WW3 if not for nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan would have probably gone at it another time of two if they were not nuclear powers, Israel and its neighbours would probably have had another round or ten if Israel didn't have some nukes, and I'm of the opinion that North Korea would be a smoldering hole in the ground if not for the few nuclear weapons they have cobbled together.



I'm definitely not suggesting that globalization will PREVENT a war between the major powers.  I'm just suggesting that globalization (among a number of other factors) is likely changing the nature of war that we can expect between major powers.  In my opinion a truly "total war" where one major power seeks to militarily defeat and occupy another major power in the sense that we might have expected in the Cold War is highly unlikely.  

I think that it is highly unlikely that China would actually invade Japan if they come into conflict over the South China Sea for example.  That doesn't mean that each side wouldn't strike important targets in eachother's homelands and they would be at war...but not our grandfather's type of war.  I think the same is probably true with Russia.  NATO and Russia could very well go to war over the Baltic States for example but I honestly don't see the Russians pouring West and trying to occupy Berlin or a NATO drive into the heart of Russia to seize Moscow.  War, but likley war with more limited objectives that what we may have expected in the past.

My opinion anyway.


----------



## Kirkhill

GR66 said:
			
		

> You can't compare 1976 with 2016.  The Fulda Gap is now 1,200km from the closest Russian-allied point (Brest, Belarus).  That's a hell of a long way to go against Polish and German (and NATO allied) ground and air defences before you're able to break through and into the heart of the alliance and "win".  There's always those pesky NATO nukes that might get in the way if there's a total collapse anyway.
> 
> The threat against NATO is no longer an overwhelming Russian attack into the heart of the alliance.  It's Russia chipping away at the edges where there's enough Russian interests (eastern Ukraine, the Baltic States and possibly the eastern edges of Poland) where Russia might be willing to take the chance that NATO's interests are not strong enough to risk a full-scaled war in order to defend those regions.



Depends where you consider "the heart of the alliance" to be located.  Jean Claude Juncker probably has a different definition than Donald Tusk.

And that brings up the real problem.

When Russia crosses into Latvia, will Luxembourg rush to Latvia's defence?

60 hours to the Carpathians?

Why not?


----------



## The Bread Guy

George Wallace said:
			
		

> ... the use of Intelligence Agents & fellow travellers/dupes to turn segments of Western populations to their cause and create havoc tying up LEO and military resources is still a reality ...


FTFY


----------



## fake penguin

Thanks for answering my questions guys. So basically Russia doesn't have enough resources to go into places like Germany and US doesn't have enough resources to take the Baltic states back but enough with help from rest of nato to stop Russia from going to far into Europe. So the question is will Russia take over the Baltic states and push it and go further and will Nato just hold of Russia from going further or push it and try to take on Russia in the Baltic States. Trying to read everyone response and just trying to make sure I got it.


----------



## Kirkhill

fake penguin said:
			
		

> Thanks for answering my questions guys. So basically Russia doesn't have enough resources to go into places like Germany and US doesn't have enough resources to take the Baltic states back but enough with help from rest of nato to stop Russia from going to far into Europe. So the question is will Russia take over the Baltic states and push it and go further and will Nato just hold of Russia from going further or push it and try to take on Russia in the Baltic States. Trying to read everyone response and just trying to make sure I got it.



I would argue the question is:  Is either side prepared to pull the trigger?  Or are they just willing to bump chests?


----------



## Kirkhill

> .... Russia tells citizens to find out where the closest bunkers are
> 
> .... Russia told its citizens to urgently prepare for a devastating radioactive conflict as relations with the West stoop to their lowest since the Cold War.
> 
> By PATRICK CHRISTYS
> 
> PUBLISHED: 02:09, Fri, Oct 14, 2016 | UPDATED: 07:41, Fri, Oct 14, 2016
> 
> Russia told its citizens to find their nearest nuclear bunker ...
> 
> A ... Russian television broadcast ... told civilians to find out where their nearest bomb shelter is and repeatedly asked viewers if they were ready for nuclear war.
> 
> One ... broadcast told viewers on Moscow's state-owned TV channel NTV: "If it should one day happen, every one of you should know where the nearest bomb shelter is. It’s best to find out now."



Edited to remove histrionic adjectives.

http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/721008/Russia-America-nuclear-war-Putin-Obama-bunker-fallout-shelter-Syria-Bashar-al-Assad

Anybody have any sense of the truth of this article?  Or the nature of the programme on which it was reputedly broadcast?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Edited to remove histrionic adjectives.
> 
> http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/721008/Russia-America-nuclear-war-Putin-Obama-bunker-fallout-shelter-Syria-Bashar-al-Assad
> 
> Anybody have any sense of the truth of this article?  Or the nature of the programme on which it was reputedly broadcast?


First I've seen of the TV show in question, and I'd have to dig a bit, but in the past, senior RUS government info-machine folks have used "current affairs" programming to give the party line in ... melodramatic terms.  

What I HAVE seen recently is an all-Russia civil defence exercise last week - these news release links, in English, from Russia's federal emergency management ministry ...

*"Large-scale All-Russian civil defense drill to take place from 4 to 7 October "*
*"Vladimir Puchkov: All-Russian civil defense drill to help make public management of response to large disasters more efficient "*
*"All-Russian civil defense drill goes on in all Russian regions"*
*"Far East sums up second day of All-Russian civil defense drill "*
*"Third stage of All-Russian civil defense drill practices response to massive disasters and fires (video)"*
*"Vladimir Stepanov: Third stage of All-Russian civil defense drill to feature many practical events"*
*"Final stage of All-Russian civil defense drill held"*
*"Emergency Ministry sums up All-Russian civil defense drill"*


----------



## The Bread Guy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Speaking of nukes, lookit what Russsia's been up to:
> 
> _*"(Northern Fleet) submarine "Novomoskovsk" fulfilled "Sineva" missile launch in the Barents Sea"*_ (RUS MoD, in Russian)
> _*"From the cosmodrome "Plesetsk" promoted launch of intercontinental ballistic missile RS-12M "Topol" "*_ (RUS MoD, in Russian)
> _*"SSBN "Georgiy Pobedonosets" Pacific Fleet has made a successful launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile"*_ (RUS MoD, in Russian)
> ...


Again ...

_*"Russian Northern Fleet sub launches cruise missile at target in Novaya Zemlya"*_ (TASS)
_*"Nuclear submarine SF "Smolensk" in the final inspection carried out rocket fire on coastal targets"*_ (RUS MoD, in Russian)


----------



## a_majoor

More Russian paramilitary groups. The end of the article puts it into perspective: no group like this could possibly exist or operate without the permission of the government:

http://nypost.com/2016/10/18/inside-the-radical-war-camps-where-russian-fighters-are-born/



> *Inside the radical ‘war camps’ where Russian fighters are born*
> By Associated Press October 18, 2016 | 9:16am | Updated
> 
> MOSCOW — Deep in the woods on the outskirts of Moscow, a sudden burst of gunfire sends a flock of birds screeching into the sky. A dozen people dressed in military fatigues scale a crumbling, abandoned high-rise with Kalashnikovs strapped to their backs.
> 
> This is a “war camp” organized by the ultra-nationalist Eurasian Youth Union, known as ESM, the youth wing of the broader Eurasian movement. Such camps, which are on the rise in Russia, imitate a broader Kremlin policy of “patriotic education” that has seen a marked increase in government funding in recent years.
> 
> The ESM camps serve as breeding grounds for the volunteers who fought alongside Russia-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine and are now producing a new generation of trained fighters.
> 
> “We are in a state when NATO moves closer to our borders and today’s youth needs to be trained in order to prevent those attacks,” says ESM leader Anton Bryusov.
> 
> The nationalists see the West as their key enemy, but some are dissatisfied with President Vladimir Putin’s handling of the war in Ukraine and believe he has not gone nearly far enough.
> 
> “War with Ukraine is inevitable, but so far we have done only half of the task,” says Alexander Dugin, the leader of the Eurasian movement. “We have united with Crimea, we have provided help to Novorossiya, but we didn’t liberate Novorossiya.”
> 
> A member of Right Anarchist prepares to shoot his Kalashnikov in a makeshift camp. Photo: AP
> Nationalists had believed in what was known as the Novorossiya project, which aimed to carve out a swathe of traditionally Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine and reunite it with Russia. Instead, the conflict has created two breakaway pro-Russian regions in Donetsk and Lugansk, but they formally remain part of Ukraine.
> 
> Still, despite their dissatisfaction over Ukraine, the bulk of nationalists remain supportive of the current regime, said Andrei Kolesnikov, an expert on Russian domestic politics at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
> 
> “Mostly, the nationalists who are more or less rational are pro-Putin. Those who are really radical are against Putin because he hasn’t finished the story in Donbass,” he said. Plus, he added, “if they ended up going too far and presented a real threat to the regime, their activity would be stopped.”
> 
> Dugin, a far-right political ideologue with close ties to the Kremlin, chalks up Putin’s handling of the situation in Ukraine to the political realities of Western pressure and economic sanctions.
> 
> “I am irritated by the slowness of Putin’s reform,” Dugin said, speaking in his TV studio a stone’s throw from Red Square. “When we are hesitating, we are losing; when we are making decisive steps, we are winning.”
> 
> Dugin denies he is in the Kremlin’s pocket, insisting they regard ESM as “a dangerous force that they cannot be lead or rule because we follow a strict line of our ideology.” But research carried out by the Russia-based Center of Economic and Political Reforms shows that between 2013 and 2015, the ESM received presidential grants totaling more than 18.5 million rubles (nearly $300,000).
> 
> Carrying out his own training in the woods, not far from the location of the ESM “war camp,” Sergei Andreev, the 25-year-old founder of a small, far-right youth group called Right Anarchist, is polishing his Kalashnikov. Unlike most of his peers, he does not support Putin’s presidency.
> 
> “Putin is like all other leaders in the modern world: He just wants to hoard money and resources so that his family lives well,” Andreev said. Behind him, the Right Anarchist flag — a skull and crossbones — flutters above a crackling camp fire. “There is no great idea behind him. He uses it to cover up his political manipulations.”
> 
> The numbers of far-right supporters like him who openly position themselves against Putin is small, and it’s unlikely this discontent poses much of a threat to the Kremlin.
> 
> “Part of the Putin regime is far-right and ultra-nationalist. However, Putin would crush any ultranationalist force that’s not loyal to the Kremlin,” says Anton Shekhovtsov, an expert on the far right who has extensively chronicled Dugin and his followers over the past decade. “If it’s not instrumental to them, they would ban them or crush them or put their leaders in jail.”


----------



## a_majoor

Sanctions continue to bite:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/10/17/putins-boasting-hides-his-fear-of-sanctions/



> *Putin’s Boasting Hides His Fear of Sanctions*
> KARINA ORLOVA
> 
> Russian President Vladimir Putin was in Goa, India this weekend at the annual BRICS summit, where the big announcement was that Igor Sechin’s Rosneft had bought a controlling stake (49 percent) in the Indian Essar Oil company. At a press conference for the announcement yesterday, Putin was asked if Russia would consider softening its counter-sanctions against the United States and the European Union. “Screw them,” he said. More:
> 
> We deliberately enacted restrictions on importing agricultural products, a kind of an asymmetric response. They hit our manufacturing, dual-purpose manufacturing, financial restrictions… but we can’t do the same in response. I mean, we could, but it would have been senseless. So we acted in the sphere where it creates problems for them—their losses are in the billions, you see yourself. We are not keeping count, it’s being tallied by Western European experts, representatives from relevant industries. That’s why we did it, we profited from it. We won’t be doing anything to just punish somebody, and punish ourselves.
> 
> The bravado was surely music to the ears of his Russian audience. But Putin was sounding a distinctly different note two weeks ago, when he submitted a law to the Russian Duma withdrawing Russia from a long-standing plutonium disposal agreement with the United States. Among the preconditions for the resumption of the treaty named in the document one in particular stands out: “The United States must pay for the damages incurred by the Russian Federation as a result of the aforementioned sanctions, including any costs born from counter-sanctions the Russian Federation was forced to undertake.” (This language was of course not mentioned in Russian coverage of Putin’s bill. What the Russian people instead heard on TV was that Putin Almighty was sticking it to the United States.)
> 
> The economic reality is harsher. The Russian Government, looking ahead to a future where oil prices stay at around $40/barrel, recently announced that it will slash its budgets for next year, including a cutting its health care budget by one third, down to $6 billion for 126 million people, which includes spending on research. And yet all these budget cuts still have the Russian Government running a deficit well into the future. Russia’s reserve fund is expected to drop to $15 billion by the end of the year by some analysts, and could run out as early as mid-next year. Though the IMF is predicting that the Russian economy will return to growth next year, it maintains a gloomy outlook for the next few years out, arguing that growth “remains subdued given long-standing structural bottlenecks and the impact of sanctions on productivity and investment.”
> 
> EU Foreign Ministers are meeting this week, and Russia is on the agenda. New European sanctions seem unlikely—Austria today joined Hungary, Cyprus, and Greece in signaling opposition—but recent developments in Syria appear to have forestalled any talk of easing the sanctions currently in place. For his part, Secretary of State John Kerry yesterday announced that the United States was mulling imposing additional sanctions on Russia in connection with Syria. We will see if anything comes of it.
> 
> President Putin is indeed screwing someone over, but it’s not the West; he is screwing over his own people, over and over again, millions of whom are paying the price for their leader’s personal ambitions and interests. Critically, however, Putin’s decisions are also hurting those in his inner circle, and his regime is suffering and weakening. Sanctions won’t make the Russian President behave in a more democratic way. He has crossed so many red lines by now that he cannot go back—at this point, Russia either becomes more authoritarian and dangerous, or Putin steps down. But what sanctions might do is lead to a change of direction for the whole of Russia down the road…


----------



## The Bread Guy

Highlights mine - shared under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act...


> *Russia's only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov , and a supporting naval task group has set sail for the Mediterranean, state-owned news agency TASS has reported.*
> 
> "The group consists of the aircraft-carrying heavy cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov , the battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy , large anti-submarine ships Severomorsk and Vice Admiral Kulakov and support vessels," according to a statement from the Russian Northern Fleet on 15 October, reported by TASS later that day.
> 
> The mission of the deployment is "to ensure naval presence in the important areas of the World Ocean", said the Northern Fleet statement. "Special focus will be made on safeguarding security of maritime traffic and other types of maritime economic activity of Russia and also on responding to the new kinds of modern threats such as piracy and international terrorism."
> 
> NATO has been developing plans to monitor the progress of Admiral Kuznetsov and its battlegroup as they transit through the North Atlantic and into the Mediterranean. *Many of the alliance's naval and air assets participating in Exercise 'Joint Warrior' off the west coast of Scotland are expected to be drawn upon for the surveillance operation, including Royal Canadian Air Force CP-140 Aurora and US Navy Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft temporarily deployed to RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland.*
> 
> UK assets on call for the surveillance operation include a Type 23 frigate and a Type 45 destroyer to shadow the Russian ships, a senior UK military official has told IHS Jane's . Royal Air Force aircraft are also being prepared for the operation. These include a Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic eavesdropping aircraft, a Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules transport being used in the surface surveillance role and Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft to shadow any Sukhoi Su-33 or Mikoyan MiG-29K naval strike fighters launched from the Russian carriers.
> 
> A UK Royal Navy spokesperson told IHS Jane's on 15 October, "UK and NATO assets routinely monitor warships from other nations when they enter our area of interest and this will be no different."


----------



## The Bread Guy

On a lighter note on the Russian carrier task force dropping by the English Channel ...


----------



## Lightguns

One thing is for certain, the Med is going to be very crowded for the next bit.  Whatever happened to those politicians who would avoid this by diplomacy and proxy.


----------



## Kirkhill

> World war FEARS: 'Weak' Russia will drag world to brink of nuclear war, says expert
> 
> VLADIMIR PUTIN'S Russia is weak and insecure and may push the world to the brink of nuclear war to avoid a conventional conflict with the West, a leading expert on the region has warned.
> 
> By TOM BATCHELOR
> PUBLISHED: 11:00, Fri, Oct 21, 2016 | UPDATED: 18:10, Fri, Oct 21, 2016
> 
> Successive wars in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria have demonstrated Russia's willingness and ability to use its military power to achieve political goals, award-winning author Arkady Ostrovsky argued.
> 
> But Mr Putin's belligerent approach is not a sign of Russia's unbridled strength, he added.
> 
> Instead, it reveals deep insecurity and weakness in the Kremlin, Mr Ostrovsky said.
> 
> Mr Putin knows he cannot afford a conventional war with NATO alliance members, but is trying to raise the stakes he could inadvertently bring the world to the brink of nuclear war.
> 
> His report, published in the Economist this week, states: "[Russia] is once again using the threat of nuclear arms to blackmail the West."
> 
> He wrote: "Mr Putin sees Russia's wars as a form of self-defence, driven by the need to deter the West.
> 
> "Russia's military-industrial complex is unable to produce anything close to Soviet volumes of hardware.
> 
> "But the country's relative economic and military weakness compared with NATO does not make the country any safer; on the contrary, it poses a big risk.
> 
> "The only way Russia can compensate for the gaps in its conventional forces is to invoke the threat of a nuclear strike."
> 
> His essay continued: "Mr Putin would not unleash a war for ideological reasons. He will continue to present his actions as defensive.
> 
> "What he is ultimately after is a new pact along the lines of the Yalta agreement after the Second World War which would create a buffer zone between Russia and the West.
> 
> "In the absence of such a deal, Mr Putin will continue to confront his perceived enemies by both non-military and military means."
> 
> Mr Ostrovsky is the winner of the 2016 Orwell Prize for books and author of 'The Invention of Russia: A Journey from Gorbachev's Freedom to Putin's War'.
> 
> His analysis comes as relations between the West and Russia reaches its lowest ebb in years.



http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/723873/Vladimir-Putin-Russia-drag-world-brink-nuclear-war


----------



## Kirkhill

More, in a similar vein, from The Spectator.



> Putin's dangerous games in the Baltic
> 
> Is the Russian president really crazy enough to launch a new wave of invasions, or is it all a clever bluff?
> Paul Wood
> 
> 22 October 2016
> 9:00 AM
> 
> The old KGB headquarters in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, is a sinister place, full of ghosts. It is a solid 19th-century neoclassical building with walls thick enough to have muffled the screams of those under interrogation. The cells in the basement are as cold and damp as they were in Soviet times and there are stone steps down to an airless, claustrophobic chamber where prisoners were executed, a thousand of them, the wall still pock-marked with bullet holes. You can imagine people hurrying by on the other side of the road in the old days, not daring to look up at the pale grey façade, knowing what took place behind it.
> 
> The building now houses Lithuania’s Museum of Genocide Victims, a monument to the one third of the country’s population killed or deported to Siberia during the-Soviet occupation. Lithuanian army recruits are taken there just as Israeli conscripts make a ritual visit to the Holocaust-museum near Jerusalem. ‘We feel the same,’ said my friend, a senior officer in the Lithuanian army, who was showing me round. ‘Never again… We will not repeat the mistakes we made when we allowed Lithuania to be occupied by the Soviet Union without one shot fired. It took an enormous effort for the freedom fighters after the second world war to resist and take that shame away.’
> 
> Russian tanks rolling into the Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — once again? It seems a mad idea, but Lithuania thinks it real enough to have reinstated conscription. This is more than just Baltic alarm: Sweden signed a defence pact with the United States in June, and Finland is-trying to do the same. A recent Norwegian television drama imagined the country under Russian occupation. Meanwhile, in real life, Russia has formed three new motorised rifle divisions, with more than 30,000 troops, many of them to be sent close to the Baltics. And short-range missiles that can carry nuclear bombs have been delivered to Kaliningrad, the neighbouring Russian enclave.
> 
> Lithuania’s President, Dalia Grybaus-kaite, called the missiles’ deployment an ‘open demonstration of power and aggression against not [just] the Baltic states but against European capitals.’ The Russian military said it was only an exercise. My friend, the Lithuanian army officer, said: ‘We constantly see Russian forces on exercises close to the border. Most of these activities are offensive in nature: paratroopers conducting airborne assaults, marines in landing operations. When it’s combined with aggressive political rhetoric, we take this threat very seriously.’
> 
> A retired British general, Richard Shir-reff, believes that the Russians might well be coming. A former Nato deputy commander, he has written a future history novel called 2017: War with Russia. In it, Russia invades the Baltics then paralyses Nato by threatening to use nuclear weapons. The general’s view, shared by many serving-officers, is that complacent politicians have cut too much from defence and Nato countries need to rearm in order to deter Russia. ‘At all costs, we must avoid a miscalculation that could lead to the sort of scenario I outline in the book,’ he said. ‘Unless the risk of doing so is sufficiently high, the Russians might do it. They could bite off the Baltic states in pretty short order.’
> 
> A Russian invasion of Estonia and-Latvia would be complete in as little as 36 hours, according to a study by the Rand Corporation for the Pentagon. Russian tanks would be rumbling through Tallinn and Riga before Nato could so much as convene an emergency meeting to invoke Article 5 of its charter for mutual defence. The Rand study showed that it would take more than a week for Nato to get its tanks to the Baltics from Germany in response. By then it would all be over.So Nato has decided to send four battalions of troops to the Baltics, including one from Britain — exactly the kind of reinforcement that General Shirreff wants. The Baltic states have welcomed this.
> 
> One of the saddest exhibits in the KGB museum in Vilnius shows the long and ultimately doomed war ‘in the forest’ against the Soviet occupation. The partisans managed to smuggle a messenger through the Iron Curtain to the West, a difficult and dangerous journey, only for him to return two years later with the devastating news that no help would be coming. General Shirreff thinks that history might repeat itself.
> 
> ‘If Putin did move into the Baltic states, that is probably the end of Nato,’ he said. ‘How certain are we that the alliance-really would invoke Article 5? The defence of Europe has depended on the certainty that America would come to the aid of a Nato member if attacked. But Germany? France? Italy? The UK? To recapture the Baltics would take massive military force, the like of which we haven’t seen since Overlord or Desert Storm. It’s difficult to see how Nato could summon the will or the capability.’
> 
> James Carden, a former adviser to a US presidential commission on Russia, agrees. ‘We have a habit of leading on these people who are along the periphery of Russia. Do the Baltics really think that we’ll get into a nuclear exchange if Russia runs over their borders? We won’t. We’re not going to go to war for them. De Gaulle knew this as far back as the 1960s, that the US would not trade New York for Paris in a-nuclear war.’ But he doubted that Russia really-wanted the Baltics back: it was just sending a-message to the West.
> 
> Certainly, the Russian military described the new motorised rifle divisions and the missiles in Kaliningrad as a response to Nato exercises on the border. To the West, Russia illegally annexed Crimea and tried to do the same to eastern Ukraine. But to-Russia, the West has recklessly ignored understandings about Ukraine’s neutrality by trying to bring it into Nato and the EU. Nato is already — symbolically — as close to the Russian-motherland as the Wehrmacht got in the second world war. Things look very different from Moscow. ‘We look the aggressors to Russia. Maybe their paranoia is understandable.’
> 
> If an invasion of the Baltics came, it would probably not start with tanks but with well-trained thugs stirring up trouble in Estonia’s Russian-speaking northeast.
> 
> This is all-shadow boxing, so far, a phoney war. So much depends on the personality of Vladimir Putin. ‘He’s a great tactician,’ said Professor Karen Dawisha, author of a book on Putin. ‘He’s a terrible strategist, as we can see from where Russia has fallen… He has been a huge failure in promoting Russia’s long-term interests but he has the capability to take us from one crisis to another.’
> 
> Putin knows perfectly well that going to war with the West — in Syria or the-Baltics — would be a disaster. ‘So he’ll want to-prevent that and o*ne of the ways he prevents it is by convincing us all — and we are all convinced — that he’s slightly crazy*.’
> 
> Putin, then, may have adopted Richard Nixon’s ‘madman theory’ — the attempt to scare a potential enemy into thinking you might just go to war, might even drop the big one, if pushed. Others in the Russian federation are playing their part — it sometimes seems as if the whole country has been gripped by world war three hysteria. The state-controlled TV channel NTV took its cameras into a nuclear bunker, telling-viewers: ‘Everyone should know where the nearest bomb shelter is.’ The chairman of the Duma’s defence committee even appeared on television in his old uniform as commander of the country’s airborne troops and promised to fly to the US on a military-transport plane if ordered to by President Putin. ‘We need to stop apologising to the Westerners,’ he said.
> 
> The very fact that people are talking seriously about an invasion of the Baltics may be evidence that Putin’s tactics are working. But it is a terrifying gamble. ‘Russia can win big but it can also lose big,’ said the Russian newspaper Moskovskij Komsomolets, speaking of the looming confrontation between the West and Russia in Syria.
> 
> Actual madman or just a convincing impression? We may not be able to tell the difference until it’s too late.
> 
> Paul Wood is a BBC foreign correspondent and fellow of the New America foundation in Washington.



http://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/10/putins-dangerous-games-in-the-baltic/


----------



## Kirkhill

But, here is the reality of Russia's power.







The reason she went through the Channel.  It is easier for her tug to get her to shore.


----------



## a_majoor

The playing out of Russian "Hybrid Warfare" doctrine in Georgia. This is going on in several nations that border on Russia:

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/world/europe/in-russias-frozen-zone-a-creeping-border-with-georgia.html?_r=0



> *In Russia’s ‘Frozen Zone,’ a Creeping Border With Georgia*
> By ANDREW HIGGINSOCT. 23, 2016
> 
> JARIASHENI, Georgia — Marked in places with barbed wire laid at night, in others by the sudden appearance of green signs declaring the start of a “state border” and elsewhere by the arrival of bulldozers, the reach of Russia keeps inching forward into Georgia with ever more ingenious markings of a frontier that only Russia and three other states recognize as real.
> 
> But while dismissed by most of the world as a make-believe border, the dirt track now running through this tiny Georgian village nonetheless means that Vephivia Tatiashvili can no longer go to his three-story house because it sits on land now patrolled by Russian border guards.
> 
> That track marks the world’s newest and perhaps oddest international frontier — the elastic boundary between Georgian-controlled land and the Republic of South Ossetia, a self-proclaimed breakaway state financed, defended and controlled by Moscow.
> 
> Mr. Tatiashvili’s troubles started early in the summer when earth-moving equipment turned up without warning and started digging a wide track through an apple orchard and a field of wildflowers on the edge of the village. He was out at the time, so he avoided being trapped.
> 
> There is no fence or barbed wire, but Mr. Tatiashvili does not dare to cross the track to visit his house for fear of being arrested, as his elderly neighbor was, by Russian border guards.
> 
> “It is too dangerous for me to go home,” he said, complaining that the boundary has become so mobile that nobody really knows its final destination. Mr. Tatiashvili now lives in his brother’s house, away from the border in the village center.
> 
> The destitute mountainous area of South Ossetia first declared itself independent from Georgia in 1990, but nobody outside the region paid much attention until Russia invaded in August 2008 and recognized South Ossetia’s claims to statehood. With that, the territory joined Abkhazia in western Georgia, the Moldovan enclave of Transnistria and eastern Ukraine as a “frozen zone,” an area of Russian control within neighboring states, useful for things like preventing a NATO foothold or destabilizing the host country at opportune moments.
> 
> The leader of South Ossetia, Leonid Tibilov, has said he plans to hold a referendum like the one in Crimea in 2014 on whether to request annexation by Russia.
> 
> But even without a referendum, the nominally independent country is already Russian territory in all but name. It has its own small security force, but its self-declared frontiers are mainly guarded by Russia’s border service, an arm of the Federal Security Service, the post-Soviet version of the K.G.B. It houses three Russian military bases with several thousand troops and, with no economy beyond a few farms, depends almost entirely on Russian aid for its survival.
> 
> The green border signs that first appeared last year and now keep popping up along the zigzagging boundary warn that “passage is forbidden” across what is declared to be a “state border.” Which state, however, is not specified, though locals are in no doubt about its identity.
> 
> “Russia starts right here,” Mr. Tatiashvili said, pointing to the freshly dug track that separates his house from Georgian-held land.
> 
> “But who knows where Russia will start tomorrow or the next day,” he said. “If they keep moving the line, we will one day all be living in a Russian-Georgian Federation.”
> 
> One of the new signs — written in English and Georgian — is just a few hundred yards from Georgia’s main east-west highway, and it puts a short part of an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to a Georgian port on the Black Sea within territory controlled by Russia.
> 
> So tangled is the dispute over what land belongs to whom that each side has its own definition of the line. Russia and South Ossetia insist it is a border like any other — Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru also recognize it — while Georgia calls it “the occupation line.” The European Union, which has around 200 unarmed police officers in Georgia to monitor the agreement that ended the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, also says there is no actual border, only an “administrative boundary line.”
> 
> Kestutis Jankauskas, the head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, said it was hard to know where this boundary line exactly runs. It was never recognized or agreed upon, and its location depends on which maps are used. Russia, he said, is using a map drawn by the Soviet military’s general staff in the 1980s.
> 
> It demarcates what in the Soviet era was an inconsequential administrative boundary within the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia but what is now hardening into a hazardous frontier.
> 
> The fitful movement of the boundary seems to be driven mostly by Russia’s desire to align what it sees as a state border with this old Soviet map. So far, the movement has always been forward, often by just a few yards but at other times by bigger leaps.
> 
> Because the line is so uncertain and, in many places, still completely unmarked, Georgian villagers sometimes find themselves on the wrong side and under arrest by Russian border guards or local security officers.
> 
> To help get people out of detention, recover cattle that have strayed into Russian-controlled land and settle quotidian disputes like who owns which apple trees or vineyard, Europe’s monitoring mission organizes a monthly meeting of Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian officials.
> 
> As happened when the two pro-Russian regions of eastern Ukraine declared themselves independent states in 2014 and said they would like to be absorbed by Russia, President Vladimir V. Putin has mostly feigned ignorance of what his country’s surrogates are up to in Georgia.
> 
> Asked in April about South Ossetia’s plans to hold a referendum on joining Russia, Mr. Putin suggested that Moscow was mostly a bystander. But if South Ossetia wants to hold a referendum, Mr. Putin said, “we cannot resist it.”
> 
> While Russian military, border and diplomatic personnel have poured into South Ossetia, the local population of Ossetians — an ethnic group whose language is distantly related to Persian — has steadily drifted away, shrinking by around half from a prewar level of roughly 70,000. An ethnic Georgian population of around 25,000 that used to live there has long since fled.
> 
> Like Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory, the border markings deep into what Georgia insists is its territory are slowly creating “facts on the ground” that, no matter what the international community might think, are a reality that everyone has to deal with, particularly residents.
> 
> Elizbar Mestumrishvili, 75, a farmer who lives next to Mr. Tatiashvili’s now-marooned house, can still get to his home, as it lies on the Georgian side of the new dirt track.
> 
> But he is wary of going to the bottom of his garden, which lies within a 60-yard frontier zone that Russian and South Ossetian security officers claim the right to patrol. Pointing to a row of vines drooping with plump grapes, he said it was unwise to walk any farther because “they might come and set up a border post.”
> 
> The so-called borderization of a previously vague administrative boundary created political headaches for Georgia’s government ahead of parliamentary elections on Oct. 8. It still won the election but had to fend off attacks from rivals who said it had responded too meekly to Russia’s “creeping annexation.”
> 
> When it defeated supporters of former President Mikheil Saakashvili in elections four years ago, a coalition led by Georgian Dream, a party set up by an enigmatic billionaire, pledged to reduce tensions with Russia, which loathed Mr. Saakashvili. Instead, Russian border guards have moved deeper into Georgian territory.
> 
> “There is no improvement. I would say the opposite,” Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili said in an interview. “Unfortunately, Russia never appreciates when you concede or make a step forward or compromise. They always take it for granted.”
> 
> All the same, he insisted that even though his government had no intention of repeating Mr. Saakashvili’s disastrous 2008 attempt to confront Russia militarily, the border will not last.
> 
> “It has no prospect,” he said. “They are trying to build this border, these fences inside our country. We think it is temporary.”


----------



## fake penguin

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> But, here is the reality of Russia's power.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The reason she went through the Channel.  It is easier for her tug to get her to shore.



Crazy thing is I google  Russia  military capabilities  and it's scary how powerful they are.  With their s400's they have by far the best air defence in the world. Sounds like they can defeat us air power. Some say they are developing better 5th generation fighter jets. Also a better electronic warfare capabilities.   Now I  know I just started to read up on Russia military  I just had no clue.


----------



## Good2Golf

fake penguin said:
			
		

> Crazy thing is I google  Russia  military capabilities  and it's scary how powerful they are.  With their s400's they have by far the best air defence in the world. Sounds like they can defeat us air power. Some say they are developing better 5th generation fighter jets. Also a better electronic warfare capabilities.   Now I  know I just started to read up on Russia military  I just had no clue.



Some say though, that their captured UFO technology is not as advanced as the USA's captured UFO technology.  Some also say that the USA's TR-3B can outfly the S400 missile, so the air defence overmatch is not as great as some say. :nod:


----------



## blacktriangle

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> TR-3B



You know too much. What a shame, you could have made a great black helicopter pilot...

 >


----------



## Lightguns

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> But, here is the reality of Russia's power.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The reason she went through the Channel.  It is easier for her tug to get her to shore.




The last American aircraft that smoked like that was the USS Langley, but they are catching up.  I bet cancer is high on the list of aliments of flight deck crew.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Article from Foreign Policy argues that Putin may not be the great strategist people take him for.



> Putin’s Chaos Strategy Is Coming Back to Bite Him in the Ass
> 
> The Russian president has sown confusion and conflict around the world the past two years. But his short-sighted meddling isn’t the work of a mastermind.
> 
> Back in March, when the U.S. elections still seemed far away — back before anyone had heard the name Fancy Bear and before everyone knew John Podesta’s risotto secrets — I was in Moscow talking to a Russian who had previously worked in the Kremlin. Over the course of a wide-ranging conversation, it became clear that we agreed on one key characteristic of Vladimir Putin. He called it the “Putin Paradox” and defined it thus: The Russian president’s tactical instincts for how to seize an opportunity are so brilliant, and yet the strategic outcomes are almost invariably disastrous. Seven months later, the saga of Russian meddling in America’s presidential election has managed to illustrate the “Putin Paradox” perfectly.
> 
> There can be little serious debate at this point that Moscow is indeed meddling. Despite Donald Trump’s skepticism, the U.S. intelligence community has collectively blamed Russia for the hack of Hillary Clinton’s campaign emails, which were released by the website WikiLeaks, and the hack of the Democratic National Committee. In addition to this more hands-on interference, Russia’s foreign-language state media, notably the RT television network and Sputnik press agency, consistently push a partisan, anti-Clinton line and spread claims of election rigging and other shenanigans. (This is tame, by the way, in comparison with the over-the-top rhetoric of Russian TV host and propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov, who claimed the U.S. establishment might kill Trump rather than let him become president — but such bombast is intended for domestic consumption and not to influence the U.S. vote.) There are also concerns, still unproven, that Russians could hack electronic voting systems on Election Day.
> 
> And yet, for all this effort, what has been achieved? There have been some successes — but they seem likely to come at a very high cost.
> 
> The success of Russia’s intervention must be measured relative to its goals. Although a Trump victory seems increasingly unlikely, there’s little reason to think that’s what the Kremlin ever really wanted. The Republican nominee may seem like something of a fellow traveler now — it was noticeable that even during the third debate he batted away opportunities to distance himself from Putin — but he would be an unpredictable president. Putin has gotten used to operating as the wildest man on the geopolitical stage; a Trump presidency might severely cramp his style and his strategic calculations.
> 
> Rather, the aim of all of Russia’s election interference was to do two things. First, to weaken Clinton, such that on her inauguration she would be too busy coping with a disgruntled Democratic left, an embittered Republican right, and a divided country in between to devote energy to confronting and toppling Putin. It is too early to be sure, but if anything, the hacks actually seem to be doing the unthinkable and bringing Democrats and mainstream Republicans together in their shared anger at Moscow.
> 
> Second, by undermining the very legitimacy of U.S. democracy, Russia’s hacking sought to weaken U.S. legitimacy abroad, dismay its friends, and provide fuel for a global propaganda campaign that, at its heart, tries to convince people not that the Russian system is better than the rest, so much that it isn’t any worse. That propaganda has resonated somewhat, but it is hard to demonstrate that anything the Russians are doing is more damaging than the Trump campaign itself.
> 
> But just like the Crimean annexation (which led to sanctions and massive costs to the state treasury), the Donbass adventure (which led to more sanctions and has mired Russia in an expensive, undeclared war), and the Syrian intervention (where Putin backed away from an early withdrawal, leaving him stuck in yet another open-ended war), today’s Russian achievement is poised to become tomorrow’s debilitating disaster. Russians who chortled at the original WikiLeaks revelations and felt sly satisfaction at the havoc created by “their” hackers are now expressing concerns about possible U.S. retaliation and, more importantly, what this will mean for future Russo-American relations. As one bitterly grumbled, “Let’s get used to sanctions until we’re in the grave.”
> 
> Clinton is no friend of Putin’s. But she is a pragmatic operator less interested in starting new crusades than clearing up old conflicts; had Putin waited until her inauguration and offered some kind of deal on Syria, maybe even Ukraine, it seems likely that she would at least have considered it. With his smear-and-leak antics, though, Putin appears to have managed to convince Clinton and those around her that the Kremlin represents a clear and present danger to American democracy and Western unity. As a Washington insider put it to me, “Expect now to see Putin’s nightmares” — maybe even that long-rumored quiet support for regime change in Russia — “come true once Hillary’s in the Oval Office.”
> 
> In Moscow, the realization is growing that a few months of schadenfreude during the U.S. presidential campaign are not going to be worth the likely fallout. The foreign-policy elite fear that Washington is preparing to call Moscow’s bluffs in the Middle East and Europe and also push harder on a wavering European Union to maintain and even step up pressure on Russia. The political and business elite are concerned that even if the United States does not actively push for regime change, it will clamp down all the more tightly on their opportunities to travel abroad and invest. One senior parliamentary aide recently expressed to me the worry that “Russia is becoming the new South Africa,” referring to the 30-year era of boycotts and sanctions that isolated that country when it was still white-ruled and characterized by apartheid.
> 
> Even the spooks who orchestrated all this have their qualms. Putin’s patronage and his enthusiasm for their ability to stir up trouble abroad have served them very well until now. However, their methods and capabilities are now coming under a scrutiny unseen since the Cold War, and a new U.S. retaliatory strategy seems to be taking shape. An analyst close to the Russian intelligence community expressed a real worry, for example, that cyber-espionage capabilities, “which could have been real assets, were wasted on emails full of gossip.”
> 
> To understand why Putin’s American adventure has gone so badly wrong — and to understand why it illustrates so well this idea of a “Putin Paradox” — it helps to look at it in the context of how the Russian president likes to operate. Putin is a sort of improv player on the world stage, riffing off current events and others’ concerns. In particular, he has for some time engaged in what I’ve called “troll geopolitics,” which involves dramatic stunts that cross all sorts of lines and generate plenty of breathless press coverage along the away.
> 
> Examples of this sort of trolling include rhetorical and gestural displays like sending long-range bombers to skirt NATO airspace and, recently, deploying nuclear-capable missiles to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. These are relatively meaningless — but do attract alarmed attention from the West. At other times, his trolling can take a much more serious, and risky, form. The intervention in Syria was meant to prop up one of Russia’s last allies and serve as a brazen response to Washington’s efforts diplomatically to isolate Moscow. But it has also increased the odds of two nuclear powers coming into direct military conflict.
> 
> As for the meddling in America’s elections, it may have started as the more inconsequential sort of trolling, but when Putin succumbed to his usual tendency to double down in the heat of the moment, it became a more consequential intervention — an overt challenge to the very integrity of U.S. democracy.
> 
> For Putin, the temptation to meddle in America’s domestic politics must have been irresistible. Massive and diffuse political machines, especially those relying heavily on volunteers, are by their nature insecure, easy targets for Russia’s extensive, aggressive, and active intelligence services. And America’s increasingly bitter and divided political landscape produced an exceedingly hostile presidential campaign that maximized the impact of strategic leaks and other “active measures” — as the Russian spooks call political operations. The opportunist in Putin spotted the weaknesses within the U.S. political system this election and seized the moment with glee, and American democracy has indeed suffered. But Putin has also managed to make Russia’s role so evident that it demands some kind of U.S. response.
> 
> The Kremlin’s problem, among others, is that Putin the Opportunist is consumed by the moment. He is focused on what he can accomplish tomorrow, without necessarily thinking through to what the consequences may be the day after. He also too easily assumes that he will remain in control of what he started; this, too, is something we’ve seen before.
> 
> When the Kremlin decided to intervene in Ukraine’s Donbass region, arming local malcontents and sending men and guns to back them, it must have looked like a shrewd tactic. Kiev, the thinking went, would be forced to capitulate, and Moscow could claim not to be involved. More than two years later, Russia is still mired in a vicious and bitter conflict, bankrolling the thuggish pseudo-states of Donetsk and Luhansk out of a shrinking state budget.
> 
> In some ways, the story of Putin’s foray into American politics follows the same trajectory. A cute plan to use deniable assets to stir up trouble abroad and force an opponent into a weak position has once again proved too cute for its own good. Putin’s claims that his hands are clean look increasingly flimsy; the chaos takes on a life of its own and even begins to threaten its maker.



 Article Link


----------



## a_majoor

Lithuania prepares a manual for its citizens in the event of an invasion:

http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/28/europe/lithuania-war-manual/index.html



> *Lithuania issues manual on what to do if Russia invades*
> By Nic Robertson, Antonia Mortensen, Elizabeth Roberts and Woj Treszczynski CNN
> Updated 12:44 PM ET, Fri October 28, 2016
> 
> (CNN)If you invade, don't expect our people to make it easy for you.
> 
> That was the message Lithuania sent to Russia Friday as it published a manual for its three million citizens on how to defend their homeland in the event of invasion.
> 
> Since Russia annexed Crimea two years ago, Lithuanians have been on edge.
> 
> Conscription has been restarted and defense spending ramped up, not to mention their now-answered calls for NATO to deploy more troops to the Baltics.
> 
> But even this is not enough to assuage anxiety -- the Lithuanian government has Friday issued a 75-page guide on what to do if the country is invaded, entitled "Prepare to survive emergencies and war."
> 
> "Attention needs to be paid to the actions of the neighboring country -- Russia," says the manual.
> 
> "This country does not hesitate to use a military force against its neighbors, and at this moment it basically continues the military aggression against Ukraine."
> 
> It notes the Russian method of using "denial and ambiguity" at the beginning of an invasion and warns: "It is most important that the civilians are aware and have a will to resist -- when these elements are strong, an aggressor has difficulties in creating an environment for military invasion."
> 
> Hard-hitting new instructions
> 
> It is the third time the Lithuanian government has distributed a handbook of this type to its citizens since the Russian annexation of Crimea.
> The last one, published in December 2015, was entitled "Prepare to survive emergencies and war: a cheerful take on serious recommendations."
> 
> It included cartoons of a family with a cat and noted that "while no country is immune to adversities of any nature" it is important not to panic if there is an emergency.
> 
> There is nothing cheerful about the latest edition, which details how Lithuanians should spy and inform on the enemy if Russia succeeds in occupying part of the country.
> 
> There are also detailed images of Russian-made tanks, grenades, mines and guns and instructions on how to recognize different types. Further instructions cover first aid and surviving in the wild.
> 
> There will be 30,000 copies available in schools and libraries and it will also be published online.
> 
> Lithuania borders Russia's strategically important enclave of Kaliningrad where it has been enhancing its already muscular military options, including the arrival of a nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missile system earlier this month.
> 
> The document reminds Lithuania's people -- of whom around six percent are Russian, according to the last census in 2011 -- that the defense of the country is "the right and duty of every citizen".
> 
> Citizens are the best early warning system
> 
> Karolis Aleksa from the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, the editor of the manual, said that in times of invasion, "people become your early warning system," and by reporting crucial details they can help intelligence officers and soldiers.
> 
> "This doesn't scare people when you give them this, so we will see actually society is waiting for this," he told CNN.
> Additionally, he suggested, simply creating and distributing the manual publicly and with "fanfare" could deter potential aggression from Russia.
> 
> "It is precisely to send a message to Russia -- don't do it -- we are ready and will not be hoodwinked like Ukrainians," he said.
> 
> Lithuania's defense minister, Juozas Olekas, told CNN "We demonstrate that whoever crosses our border will have strong resistance from our society, from our military forces"
> 
> Lithuania lived under Soviet rule from 1940-1991. Thirty thousand Lithuanian resistance fighters were killed in the first 10 years as they tried to fight the Red Army from flimsy hideouts in Lithuania's sprawling forests.
> 
> With ramped up defense spending, the reinstatement of conscription and NATO's troops, Lithuania is at the front line of a new Cold War.
> Its defense minister sees no thaw any time soon, telling CNN: "President Putin only understands power against power."
> The new handbook aims to place some of that power in the hands of Lithuania's people.


----------



## Kirkhill

From the Daily Express.  http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/727105/Russia-defence-spending-drop-27-per-cent-draft-budget



> Russia braced for huge cuts to defence as financial crisis looms
> 
> VLADIMIR Putin's ability to wage wars around the world could be severely curtailed after a draft budget submitted to parliament set out swingeing cuts of 27 per cent to Russia's defence programme.
> 
> By TOM BATCHELOR
> PUBLISHED: 13:00, Mon, Oct 31, 2016 | UPDATED: 17:54, Mon, Oct 31, 2016
> 
> Cost-cutting measures amounting to tens of billions of pounds could scupper research and investment in new technologies including next-generation fighter jets and intercontinental cruise ballistic missiles as well as the country's ability to wage wars in Europe and the Middle East.
> 
> Projects such as the PAK-DA hypersonic stealth bomber - due to enter testing in 2020 - may also be put on hold as the massive savings start to impact Russia's ability to project its influence around the world.
> 
> According to a draft budget seen by the Financial Times, President Putin's spending programme on defence is likely to be cut from £50bn to £37bn in 2017.
> 
> That would bring Russia's defence allowance in line with the spending in the UK.
> 
> Britain plans to invest around £35bn this year on defence, rising to almost £40bn by 2021.
> 
> But as UK military spending rises, Russia's could drop by around 15 per cent between 2015 and 2019.
> 
> Russia's economy has been in a deep recession since 2015, shrinking by 3.7 per cent in real terms last year as a result of a sharp drop in oil prices.
> 
> Cuts to other areas including health and education are also mooted in the policy document, submitted on Friday to the Duma.
> 
> Despite turbulent economic conditions in Russia, spending on defence grew by 60 per cent by 2015 as compared to 2010.
> 
> However, Julian Cooper, a UK-based expert on Russia's defence programme, told the FT that was likely to change.
> 
> He said: "If the draft budget is adopted it may well result in a period during which military expenditure in real terms will decline."
> 
> NATO secretary general warned on Friday that Russia was using nuclear threats to try to intimidate Europe.
> 
> Jens Stoltenberg said he did not see an "imminent threat" but warned about a "stronger Russia... a Russia which is more assertive, and a Russia which has been willing to use force against non-Nato European countries".
> 
> Nuclear weapons are hugely costly to develop and maintain and deep cuts to Russia's budget could impact on Moscow's equivalent to the Trident weapons system in the UK, which MPs backed in a vote last month.
> 
> Dr Natasha Kuhrt, of King's College London's War Studies department, said: "It's not definite yet but clearly with the economic situation being as it is, something has to give.
> 
> "To some extent Russia has achieved what it wanted in terms of military spending and has brought armed forces up to the required level from quite a low base.
> 
> "If this is approved by the Duma, it is a sign that their priorities need to be recalibrated."
> 
> She also warned that a reduced military budget did not mean an end to the fighting in Ukraine.
> 
> Dr Kuhrt said: "Ukraine doesn't take a lot out of the military budget. Russia now feels confident that it can defend itself.
> 
> "It is all about threat perceptions, if you are in the Baltic states even though you may feel insecure, it doesn't mean that Russia poses a direct military threat.
> 
> "I don't think Russia would actually launch an attack on the Baltic states, all it needs is for the West to overreact and that creates a certain momentum, then they can say to their people 'We told you so, they are the aggressive ones'."
> 
> A significant cut in the country's defence bill chimes with a leading Russian analyst's assessment that President Putin is weak and insecure despite his aggressive posturing.
> 
> Award-winning author Arkady Ostrovsky argued that the Russian leader knows he cannot afford a conventional war with NATO but is trying to intimidate the West with a threat of nuclear conflict.
> 
> Mr Putin may be forced to rely on increasingly bellicose rhetoric if the funding for Russia's military programme begins to dry up.
> 
> Moscow-based newspaper Vedomosti has warned the cuts "brings Russia close to third-world countries".
> 
> Details of the Russian government's future budget comes just two weeks after Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia announced plans to triple annual spending on arms and military equipment.
> 
> By 2020 the combined overall defence budgets of the three Baltic republics will reach an estimated $2.1bn (£1.7bn), more than double that when the countries entered NATO in 2004 and the fastest such growth in any region worldwide, Reuters reported.



Implications for Vladimir's ability to bluff, to hold on to his cadre in the Kremlin, near term stability.

The difference between the US and Russia is not that they have equal capabilities - they don't - but Vladimir's willingness to use the capabilities that he has.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvrupRQD44I


----------



## MilEME09

The Russian military isnt dumb either, it knows where it's weak points are, and uses its strengths like the VDV, Naval Infantry, special forces, etc to full use. In open conflict I feel the west has the better trained regular forces, however russia I feel has us beat in the SF category namely in the Tier 2/3 capabilities. The VDV for example is to be expanded to 72,000 by 2019, that is an airborne force with air mobile armour, and other combined arms support that is larger then the entire CF.


----------



## a_majoor

Russia may be expanding their efforts into other regions as well:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/10/30/did-moscow-botch-a-coup-in-montenegro/



> *Did Moscow Botch a Coup in Montenegro?*
> DAMIR MARUSIC
> 
> A murky tale of spycraft, diplomacy and intrigue in the Balkans suggests that Russia’s secret services are ratcheting up their efforts to an unprecedented degree.
> 
> On the day of Montenegro’s Parliamentary elections on October 16, a remarkable story emerged: Montenegrin security services had arrested some 20 Serbian nationals who were alleged to be preparing an attack on various state institutions that very evening, as the results were rolling in. Among those arrested was a retired Serbian general who was also the leader of a right-wing nationalist movement based in Novi Sad, almost 500 kilometers away in Serbia’s Vojvodina region.
> 
> The immediate reaction from Serbia was disbelief leavened with thinly-veiled contempt. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic demanded he be shown proof of the plot, and many in Montenegro’s opposition, who are in large part made up of Montenegro’s Serbian minority, claimed that Prime Minister Milorad Djukanovic’s security services had ginned up a false flag operation in order to help cement his victory.
> Two days later, Montenegro’s special prosecutor Milivoje Katnic, insisted that he would be happy to share the evidence that his investigators had gathered, and that an “unprecedented massacre” had been prevented by the arrests. More details of the plot were revealed: The plan was for several individuals to enter the parliamentary building in the capital, Podgorica, wearing uniforms of Montenegro’s elite security services, and subdue the guards inside. They would then open fire on unarmed opposition supporters gathering outside the parliament awaiting election results. Finally, they would kidnap the Prime Minister, and either declare the election invalid, or somehow hope to throw it to the opposition.
> 
> By that point, Djukanovic’s ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) had won a convincing plurality of the votes and was settling in for the negotiations necessary to cobble together a governing coalition. Western journalists by and large stopped paying attention. Crazy conspiracies are a fact of political life in the Balkans. And though there were reports of voting irregularities, DPS’s margin of victory more or less corresponded to pre-election polls. Nothing more to see here.
> 
> But the story was far from over.
> 
> This past Monday, the Serbian PM held another presser. Looking shaken, Vucic confirmed that there had in fact been a plot to assassinate Djukanovic. Another set of special forces uniforms and €120,000 in cash had been found in Serbia, Vucic said, and several other Serbian nationals had been arrested. He added that no politicians, in either Serbia or Montenegro, were involved in the planning, but rather he vaguely gestured at “foreign services, both from the West and from the East”, and said that those that have been arrested would be dealt with.
> 
> On Thursday, another bombshell landed: the daily newspaper Danas, citing highly-placed sources in the government, reported that Serbia had secretly expelled several Russian citizens in connection with the Montenegro plot. Furthermore, the paper reported that the Serbs arrested earlier had in their possession several devices allowing for encrypted communication, as well as some unspecified sophisticated technology used to continuously track the location of Djukanovic. Some of the arrested Serbs had reportedly fought on the Russian side in Donbas, in Ukraine.
> 
> It just so happened that Nikolai Patrushev, the former head of the FSB and the current head of Russia’s Security Council, had just arrived in Belgrade. Could his visit be linked to the expulsions of what appeared to be Russian agents? An almost-forgotten story about electoral intrigue in a small Balkan country of 600,000 all of a sudden involved its larger neighbor, and even implicated Russia in a plot with potentially global ramifications.
> 
> The Montenegrin elections were framed by the long-serving Djukanovic as a referendum on his decision to pursue further euroatlantic integration for his country. And the vote was more than just an attempt at getting a symbolic mandate: Montenegro completed its accession negotiations with NATO in May of this year, and now needs its own parliament to ratify the treaty. If the opposition had won, Montenegro’s NATO bid would have been dead in the water. (NATO member states are, in turn, expected to ratify Montenegro’s accession by Spring of next year.)
> 
> NATO’s calculus for admitting Montenegro, a state that is anything but a paragon of transparency and press freedom, is obvious: Albania and Croatia are already members, and admitting Montenegro de facto closes off the Adriatic to Russia’s military. Djukanovic, himself a problematic character who has clung to the levers of power for the better part of two decades, is alleged to have direct links to various smuggling rings and mafias that operate out of his country. Of course, as a defensive alliance, NATO is primarily concerned with reforms tied to aspirant countries’ armed forces, and here Montenegro appears to have made the required progress. Presumably, the thinking goes, the larger-frame corruption will be dealt with as the country strives to work its way into the EU. NATO accession for Montenegro, apart from serving immediate strategic interests, will also put the country on the path to eventual virtue.
> 
> For its part, Russia has been particularly irked by the country’s westward lurch, and especially its NATO aspirations. Its irritation has two facets—one broadly strategic and one broadly economic.
> 
> As far as strategy goes, Russia sees its competition with NATO in more zero-sum terms. Though Moscow has made no measurable progress in getting Montenegro to cooperate on security matters, NATO accession forecloses even the possibility of Russia having a friendly outlet on the Adriatic at some point in the future. This feels like a slap in the face to the Kremlin. And it blames the West for delivering it.
> Montenegro’s westward drift also sets a kind of uncomfortable precedent for Russia’s best ally in the region, Serbia. Prime Minister Vucic has been playing a careful double game on this count, quietly telling Western audiences that he intends to steer his country their way, while publicly maintaining good relations with Moscow. Serbian public opinion remains icy on NATO and warm on Russia. But with time, the Kremlin is surely calculating, that could change.
> 
> Financial interests, too, play a role in Russian frustrations. The above-mentioned lack of transparency makes Montenegro an attractive destination for Russian money, much of which is of murky provenance to say the least. Many Russian expats have made summer homes for themselves in Montenegro—25 percent of all tourists to Montenegro are Russians, and by some estimates, Russian citizens own 40 percent of the real estate in the tiny Balkan country.
> 
> Oleg Deripaska, one of the richest men in Russia before the 2008 financial crisis and still a well-connected Kremlin insider, is an outsize player in Montenegro. The saga of Deripaska’s involvement with Montenegro’s aluminum smelter KAP is lengthy and full of intrigue. Djukanovic had personally negotiated with Deripaska over the initial privatization of KAP in 2005, and Deripaska’s En+ holding company is currently suing the government for around €700 million, a hefty chunk of the country’s $4.25 billion GDP. Beyond commodities, Russian capital totaling more than a hundred million dollars continues to flow in to the country every year, much of it into real estate or the development of massive hotel and casino complexes. Deripaska himself is a key investor in the Porto Montenegro marina project, which is being designed specifically to cater to the superyachts of the world’s mega-rich. Russian money accounts for about a third of the foreign direct investment flowing into Montenegro.
> 
> Djukanovic’s government appears to have concluded that being so tightly dependent on a single source of foreign capital is not a smart long-term development strategy. And while wealthy Russians have no problems continuing to park their money in both NATO and EU countries, a pivot westward for Montenegro does (eventually) mean increased scrutiny. It’s not an insurmountable problem by any means for Russia’s quasi-gangster elites, but the status quo is certainly preferable. And Russian foreign policy is always attentive to the needs of its kleptocrats.
> Whatever its roots, the Kremlin has made no secret of its displeasure at Montenegro’s NATO pretensions. Russia’s Foreign Ministry called Montenegro’s accession an “openly confrontational step, fraught with further destabilizing consequences for the Euro-Atlantic security system.” Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov was more direct and menacing: “Moscow has always said that the continued expansion of NATO, of NATO military infrastructure in the east, cannot but lead to a response from the east, that is from Russia,” he said.
> 
> According to polls trumpeted by Djukanovic’s government, support in Montenegro for NATO accession appears to have grown this year. Nevertheless, splits on ethnic lines persist: Ethnic Bosniaks and Albanians—small minorities—support entrance overwhelmingly, the majority ethnic Montenegrins grudgingly support accession, and ethnic Serbs are mostly opposed. Djukanovic has accused the Serbian opposition parties of taking Russian money, a charge which opposition leaders deny. At the same time, the opposition parties have unabashedly supported the Russian line on NATO, and have echoed the anti-Western and pro-Russian sentiments of the more nationalist politicians across the border in Serbia.
> 
> That Serbian irredentist forces in Montenegro would be cooperating with paramilitaries in Serbia proper barely raises an eyebrow for anyone even passingly acquainted with the Balkans. Similarly, that the Russians would be tempted to exploit ethnic divisions for their own ends should surprise no one at this point.
> 
> That Russia may have been plotting a coup against a country weighing its options on NATO accession, however, is a new and troubling development—if true.
> 
> But how likely is it that Russia was actually behind the failed coup? The available evidence, though circumstantial, is suggestive.
> 
> It’s well known that Russian intelligence services have operated with a fairly long leash in Serbia for some time now. Less well known is that the leash had started to fray recently. A colleague with intimate knowledge of the Balkans tells me Russian spies are aggressively tailing foreigners in and around Belgrade, using techniques until recently only visited upon diplomats in Moscow. While Prime Minister Vucic is not said to have authorized the new behavior, up until now he has done nothing to try to curb it either.
> 
> The true nature of Patrushev’s visit to Belgrade is at the heart of the matter. Serbian Interior Minister Nebojsa Stefanovic claimed that the trip was not a surprise—that it had been planned well in advance, and was a routine state visit for a high-ranking Russian official. The official reason for his trip, according to Stefanovic, was to discuss the signing of a proposed memorandum for security cooperation.
> 
> The most authoritative publication to dispute that claim, perhaps surprisingly, was the Russian business daily Kommersant, which reported that the true purpose of Patrushev’s “unexpected” visit was to “discuss the ‘Montenegro case'” and to “prevent the scandal from roiling Serbo-Russian relations”. Kommersant noted it was suspicious that Patrushev held separate closed-door meetings with Stefanovic, the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, and even the President, Tomislav Nikolic, over a proposed agreement that had already been discussed, and was in itself completely non-binding. Citing unnamed sources in Belgrade, Kommersant concluded that Patrushev’s intervention appears to have been successful.
> 
> How successful the intervention was—if it was an intervention in the first place!—remains to be seen. For example, while Stefanovic has been denying that any Russians were expelled, Vucic was more circumspect when pressed by media about the reports of expulsion, and their linkage to Montenegro. “Not everything in your question is correct, one part is false,” the PM answered gnomically, before adding he could not legally say more. The Russian Foreign Ministry, for its part, called the reports of Russian spies being declared persona non grata an “absolute fiction”.
> 
> Taken together, all the evidence is still inconclusive, and given the sensitivities involved, may stay that way. And like all stories having to do with spies, speculation can lead down endless rabbit-holes. However, one very recent development, which occurred as this piece was being written, is worth mentioning: yesterday evening, a large cache of weapons, including an RPG, several hand grenades, and ammunition for automatic weapons and a sniper rifle, were found in the woods near Prime Minister Vucic’s residence. The stash was located near a bend in the road, where the Prime Minister’s armored car would have had to slow down as it made its way to Belgrade’s center. Vucic was reportedly spirited away to a safe-house by his bodyguards, and is awaiting the results of the investigation into the incident.
> 
> So while the facts remain murky, something definitely appears to have happened. Vucic looked rattled at his press conference last Monday when he first revealed that the plot against Djukanovic was real, so perhaps he didn’t know exactly how much freelancing was going on within his country’s borders up until that point. He had certainly been tolerating Russian activities until then, and if Russian agents were in fact expelled this past week, it would indicate that he had concluded that things have gone too far. He may have realized in a blinding flash that his delicate dance, of edging Serbia ever closer to the West while publicly flirting with Russia, could have ended in catastrophe had there been bloodshed in Montenegro. Perhaps whatever power struggles Vucic’s moves have triggered have yet to play out fully in Serbia—violently, as is tradition.
> 
> But more broadly, if the story, as I’ve tried to reconstitute it, is true and the Russians were in fact involved in a failed coup against a sovereign country trying to align itself with the West, it should give pause to those pundits who still think that a workable equilibrium with the Kremlin is somehow attainable. At the Valdai conference this past week, Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that he increasingly saw talking to Washington as pointless. With old spies running the Russian state, the conversation appears to be going back into the shadows, where these men are most comfortable.


----------



## Journeyman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> Cost-cutting measures amounting to tens of billions of pounds could scupper research and investment in new technologies including next-generation fighter jets and  intercontinental cruise ballistic missiles as well as the country's  ability to wage wars in Europe and the Middle East.



a)  What's a cruise ballistic missile?

b)  I doubt "waging war in Europe and the Middle East" is a line serial in anyone's annual budget.

                   :dunno:


----------



## Old Sweat

Journeyman said:
			
		

> a)  What's a cruise ballistic missile?



A contradiction in terms, or a sign of a sub-standard education, or both.


----------



## Kirkhill

It was a Financial Times article redone for the Daily Express..........  Proceed with caution.

Having said that:  I don't see a problem with the overall report or conclusions.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> Russia may be expanding their efforts into other regions as well:
> 
> http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/10/30/did-moscow-botch-a-coup-in-montenegro/


Yup ...



			
				milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Russia:  Don't think we can't see you, Montenegro & Bosnia ...


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Journeyman said:
			
		

> a)  What's a cruise ballistic missile?
> 
> b)  I doubt "waging war in Europe and the Middle East" is a line serial in anyone's annual budget.
> 
> :dunno:





			
				Chris Pook said:
			
		

> It was a Financial Times article redone for the Daily Express..........  Proceed with caution.
> 
> Having said that:  I don't see a problem with the overall report or conclusions.



Unfortunately, the original FT article is behind a paid firewall, but I was able to find a copy, and while it talks about possible cuts to the Russian defence budget, it makes no mention of specific weapon systems. 



> What's a cruise ballistic missile?


 Long range cruise missile (AS-15 A/B Kent, Kh-101/102)??  :dunno:


----------



## The Bread Guy

Well, THAT'S got to be reassuring to Russians ...


> *Russia outstrips USA in anti-meteorite defence*
> 
> The US government has held exercises to simulate a collision of planet Earth with an asteroid up to 250 meters in diameter. The asteroid may supposedly ram into Earth on September 20, 2020.
> 
> Pravda.Ru asked coordinator of Kosmopoisk public association, cryptophysicist,  researcher and writer Vadim Chernobrov what means of protection against space bodies Russia had.
> 
> "The Americans often carry out large-scale and regional exercises, the legend of which is about meteorites. Russia should not be envious about such measures at all, because Russia holds similar exercises on a regular basis without advertising them.
> 
> "One of the most recent exercises was held in the Tyumen region. I have to say that the world's largest of such exercises was conducted in Russia in the first half of 2013, although the event had not received any coverage at all. The event was held soon after the fall of the Chelyabinsk meteorite. As we know, pieces of that space body started falling on Earth on February 10. The last pieces fell on 20 February - the process took ten days.
> 
> "The Russian Defence Minister ordered to hold large-scale exercises in the area of the crash site soon after the phenomenal event. The legend of the exercises did not contain a word about the meteorite danger, but everyone knew that the event was connected with the fall of the Chelyabinsk meteorite. In fact, their goal was to show both the defence minister and the president, that our troops, if necessary, would be ready to go to any location in Russia and take all necessary measures in this regard." ...


Source (Pravda)


----------



## Good2Golf

Yay!  "We'll investigate why your family was flattened by a meteorite..."


----------



## The Bread Guy

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Yay!  "We'll investigate why your family was flattened by a meteorite..."


"Even 99.9% reliable fails _ONCE_ in a while ..."


----------



## The Bread Guy

Trump, Putin chat on the phone - this, via Google Translate, from the Kremlin's statement (attached, in Russian):


> *Telephone conversation with President-elect of the United States Donald Trump*
> 
> By mutual agreement, a telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin, President-elect of the United States by Donald Trump.
> November 14, 2016
> 22:30
> 
> The Russian leader once again congratulated the interlocutor on his victory in the presidential election and wished him success in the implementation of the pre-election program and noted the willingness to build affiliate dialogue with the new administration on the principles of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.
> 
> During the conversation, Putin and D.Tramp not only agreed to assess the current very poor state of Russian-American relations, but also spoke in favor of active joint work to their normalization and removal in the direction of constructive cooperation on a wide range of issues. Underlined, in particular, the importance of creating a solid foundation of bilateral ties through the development of their trade and economic component.
> 
> It is noted that next year marks 210 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States, which in itself should stimulate a return to pragmatic, mutually beneficial cooperation, which would meet the interests of both countries, stability and security throughout the world.
> 
> Putin and D.Tramp divided opinion on the need for joint efforts in the fight against the common enemy number one - international terrorism and extremism. In this vein, and discussed issues of the settlement of the crisis in Syria.
> 
> It was agreed to continue contacts on the phone and in the future to provide for a personal meeting, the preparation of which will take the representatives of both parties.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Couldn't resist sharing this one  ;D (source)


----------



## Kirkhill

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Couldn't resist sharing this one  ;D (source)



That looks astonishingly like Sarah Palin's back yard.  Doesn't it?


----------



## Journeyman

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> During the conversation, Putin and D.Tramp....


Interesting translation.


----------



## Journeyman

The US-based Center for European Policy issued a report yesterday on "Black Sea Imperatives: Ensuring NATO Security and American Interests for the Incoming U.S. Administration."  While it's written with their usual degree of jingoism (ie - language = 'US awesome/Russia demonic,' with no hint that Russia's behaviour may be even remotely linked to fears of NATO expansion), I think it's well-researched nonetheless.

*LINK*

The gist:
The balance of power in the Black Sea is changing in Russia’s favour. Moscow is enhancing its Black Sea fleet, seeking supremacy in the Black Sea in order to restore its Eurasian domination by projecting power toward the littoral states, as well as toward the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.  

Russia’s offensives in and around the Black Sea are part of a larger anti-NATO strategy, in which naval forces play a significant and growing role. It exploits the Black Sea as a more advantageous method of revisionism than extensive land conquests, (although occupation of Crimea and the port of Sevastopol certainly ties in). Control of ports and sea lanes hinders NATO from ensuring security for its Black Sea members or intervening on behalf of vulnerable neighbours. It threatens to choke trade and energy supply routes of states not in compliance with Russia’s national ambitions, and gives Moscow an enhanced ability to exploit gas/oil in this region. 

While the report claims to provide "concrete policy recommendations for Washington and the other NATO capitals to counter Moscow’s destructive policy toward the West," what it provides are pretty much common-sense suggestions. 

Although the report supposedly took a year to produce, the timeliness seems pretty fortuitous if the message is "Mr Trump, don't bail on NATO now."


----------



## Journeyman

Yet another knock-on from Trump's election.  
While I'm not a fan of Mitrovica's writing style, he provides an interesting perspective; ie - it's got to suck being Edward Snowden right now.   :nod:

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/11/161127140817720.html



> *Will Putin expend Snowden for Trump?
> With Trump's presidency, Edward Snowden may be compelled to leave Russia the way he entered it.*
> 
> Andrew Mitrovica
> 
> So, this is where matters stand between a serial liar and a serial truth teller: the former is the US President-elect Donald Trump, while the latter, Edward Snowden, remains holed up in self-imposed and now precarious exile in Russia.
> 
> ....Beyond his many other manifest sins, Trump is busy stocking his regime with mostly old, white, male, right-wing fanatics who share many of his manifest sins, including his overt racism and zealotry.  Meanwhile, the young man who risked his freedom and his life to tell the truth by providing the world with proof that the vast, unchecked machinery of the surveillance state - which scoffs at territorial boundaries, as well as domestic and international law - is trained almost exclusively on the very citizens it's allegedly supposed to protect.
> 
> .....These must be turbulent times for Snowden.
> 
> ....Snowden's value to Putin as a real or symbolic slap to America's haughty face will have run its profitable course.  Putin doesn't strike me as a sentimental politician prone to keeping qualified promises to offer safe haven to an ex-American spy who has not only lost his propaganda currency, but who may be a thorny impediment to a new and recalibrated relationship Moscow is seeking to establish with Trump.
> 
> ....Reportedly, Snowden has already made asylum requests to 21 countries . Most of them said no.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Note "Comments":



> The Russian Way of–Hybrid–Warfare
> 
> A very interesting analysis of how the Bear works–both at home and abroad–at _War on the Rocks_...
> https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2016/12/06/mark-collins-the-russian-way-of-hybrid-warfare/
> A very interesting analysis of how the Bear works–both at home and abroad–at War on the Rock



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## The Bread Guy

What's a few liquidated priests in the old days between friends, right? - highlights mine ...


> Jesus Christ was the world's first Communist, Tamara Lavrischeva announced cheerfully.
> 
> "Jesus said, 'Don't collect earthly wealth, you won't take it with you after death,'" the 78-year-old pensioner and Orthodox Christian told Al Jazeera as she trudged through the snow-covered streets of central Moscow with thousands of other Communists during the November 7 rally that commemorated the almost-centennial anniversary of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution.
> 
> "And Communists thought the same," she added, her voice drowned by the crowd chanting Soviet-era songs under red banners with hammers and sickles and portraits of Soviet leaders Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin.
> 
> With a dismissive shrug and a condescending smile, Lavrischeva rejected the killings, imprisonment and persecution of millions of Orthodox Christian clerics and believers at the hand of Communists.
> 
> What she said was not just an opinion of an elderly woman who wants to reconcile her faith with the ideals of her youth in the officially atheist USSR. *Her selective amnesia about the persecution of believers - well-documented and brandished by Soviet authorities - reflects a seemingly paradoxical trend in the recent policies of Russia's Communist Party.
> 
> More than 25 years after the Soviet collapse, the party vocally appeals to Orthodox Christianity, Russia's dominant creed. The party's sole post-Soviet chairman Gennady Zyuganov called Jesus "the first Communist" more than once.*
> 
> "It is a holy duty of Communists and the Orthodox Church to unite," Zuyganov wrote in 2012 in his party's first lengthy document on religion, because both institutions shared "common goals and enemies". The goals included censorship of "debauchery and violence" in mass media, eradication of Western liberalism and "its conception of human rights", e-government and sexual education in schools ...


Quite the shift - although not entirely surprising given how significant an institution the church seems to be in Russia these days.


----------



## tomahawk6

NATO is hunting one or two Oscar's off the coast of Syria thought to be in striking range of USN carriers.Although the P-700 is a threat to land forces as well. Launching a nuke at US forces or Israel with a nuke would be WW3,probably not going to happen,but best thing to do is be aware of the Russian deployment of key assets.

http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a51503/nato-hunting-russian-carrier-killer-submarines/

The Oscar-class submarines were specifically designed in the 1980s to stalk and kill high-value enemy ships. Each vessel measures 506 feet long with a beam of 60 feet, making them some of the largest submarines ever constructed.

The Oscar's firepower lies in its 24 P-700 Granit long-range missiles. This is a huge weapon—33 feet long and weighing 15,400 pounds each—that flies at speeds of Mach 1.6 and can reach targets over 300 miles away. The missiles can be equipped with either a 1,653-pound warhead or a 500-kiloton nuclear warhead. In addition to the Granits, the Oscar has six torpedo tubes for launching anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine rockets, and homing torpedoes.


----------



## The Bread Guy

He says, ...


> Cyber attacks and attempts to subvert democracy by states like Russia pose a fundamental threat to British sovereignty the head of MI6 has warned.
> 
> Alex Younger used his first major public speech as head of the Secret Intelligence Service to attack the Kremlin for creating a human tragedy in Syria and to warn of the threat to the UK from high tech subversion by Moscow.
> 
> The security chief known as C also paid tribute to MI6 agents risking their lives to infiltrate the heart of a “murderously efficient” Islamic State which he said is still planning murderous attacks in Britain.
> 
> And he said that despite the upheaval of Brexit and the surprise election of Donald Trump, he expected Britain’s security ties with Europe and the US to only get stronger ...


... she says ...


> _*Comment by the Information and Press Department on anti-Russian remarks by Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Alex Younger*_
> 
> We took note of an anti-Russian remark Chief of the British MI6 service Alex Younger made at a news conference on December 8. He made the unsubstantiated claim that Britain is under threat from high-tech sabotage carried out by regimes like Moscow and that the Russians will try to undermine the upcoming elections in Germany and France.
> 
> It looks like fundamental democratic institutions are now interfering with the way Western elites have become accustomed to governing their countries for decades now. British intelligence, which has clearly lost touch with reality, is trying to hide its shortcomings and setbacks behind their favourite theory about the alleged machinations of external forces. We hear this more and more from the leaders of Western, in particular British, intelligence services.
> 
> Regrettably, the Anglo-Saxon world has in recent years developed a firmly entrenched habit of bringing charges without providing specific evidence. This is a dangerous path. Everybody remembers how, under the pretext of “undeniable” evidence, which turned out to be an undeniable lie, the war in Iraq was unleashed, which was willingly supported by London. And, by the way, there still has been no accountability.
> 
> Several years later, we see MI6 and its overseas handlers return to their old habit of conducting witch hunts instead of dealing with real challenges and threats. Perhaps they do not fully realise who the real enemy is today, because, in Syria, the United States and its allies have, for several years now, been unable to figure out who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter. Or, maybe they just lost their touch and this is their way of justifying their existence and earning their keep?
> 
> In any case, Mr Younger finds it easier to scare his own people by invoking the “Russian threat” and “hybrid warfare” than to confront the terrorists and extremists. It’s unfortunate that certain Western intelligence agencies and politicians have chosen this path. Returning to reality and restoring international credibility is something they will have to deal with sooner or later. The sooner, the better.


----------



## a_majoor

As usual, the tone and content have change remarkably for two very similar charges. I wonder what has changed....?

http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2016/12/obama-to-putin-cut-it-out.php



> *OBAMA TO PUTIN: CUT IT OUT!*
> 
> Barack Obama has spent the last eight years resisting the idea that Russia is an adversary of the United States. First we had the “reset”; next the cancellation of the Eastern European missile shield; then we had Obama assuring President Medvedev that he would be able to give away the store, but the Russians would need to wait for his second term; and then the presidential debate where Obama mocked Mitt Romney’s statement that Russia is our number one geopolitical rival by saying that the 1980s called, and they want their foreign policy back. In between, we had a foreign policy that was supine in the face of Russian aggression in Crimea and Ukraine.
> 
> Now, in a typically head-snapping 180-degree turnabout, Obama and his fellow Democrats portray Republicans as soft on Communism Russia. It’s a throwback to the 1970s, but with the parties’ roles reversed.
> 
> In his press conference today, Obama described the stern measures he supposedly took after learning that the Russian government was involved in breaking into Debbie Wasserman Schultz’s email account:
> 
> And so in early September when I saw President Putin in China, I felt that the most effective way to ensure that that did not happen was to talk to him directly and tell him to cut it out, there were going to be some serious consequences if he did not.
> 
> And in fact, we did not see further tampering of the election process. But the leaks through Wikileaks had already occurred.
> 
> So all it took, apparently, was for President Obama to tell Vladimir Putin to cut it out.
> 
> This is what I don’t understand: in October 2014, the Russian government hacked into both the White House’s and the State Department’s computer systems. For an unknown period of time, weeks if not months, the Russians were reading White House and State Department emails–a far more significant security breach than the accounts of Debbie Wasserman Schultz and John Podesta. The Obama administration never did discover that its communications had been compromised, but an ally (I suspect it was Israel) alerted the administration to the Russian intrusion. The White House’s computer system was down for weeks while experts tried to deal with the Russian hack and improve security.
> 
> What was President Obama’s reaction to this hack, which could reasonably be seen as an act of war? There was none, apparently. The administration downplayed the significance of the intrusion. The Russian government had been reading White House and State Department emails? No big deal! The liberal press followed suit. The newspapers that are now hysterical about the alleged Russian hacking of Wasserman Schultz’s email account dutifully kept quiet about what happened in the White House and the State Department. It doesn’t take a genius to figure out that Democratic Party newspapers like the Washington Post and the New York Times remained silent because the midterm election was just a few weeks away, and the story reflected badly on the Obama administration.
> 
> So this is what I don’t get: why didn’t President Obama tell Vladimir Putin to cut it out back in 2014? If all it took was a stern warning by our president to bring Russian cyberwarfare to a halt, why didn’t Obama tell Putin to stop it two years ago? If he had done so, following his own logic, the Russians would have behaved and there would have been no Wasserman-Schultz hack two years later. Who knows, Hillary Clinton might be our president-elect!
> 
> This question is so blindingly obvious that one can only wonder why not a single reporter at today’s press conference thought to ask it.
> 
> I am just kidding, of course. The news outlets that covered up the Russian hack of White House and State Department computers in 2014 are not about to challenge their fellow Democrat today.
> 
> For background on the 2014 intrusion, which the Obama administration attributed to Russia after the fact, go here, here, here, here, here and here.


----------



## PuckChaser

Obama should draw a line in the sand. Then Putin will know he's serious.


----------



## Edward Campbell

PuckChaser said:
			
		

> Obama should draw a line in the sand. Then Putin will know he's serious.



 :rofl: ... he could do this, too:  :tsktsk:  that'll show 'em.


----------



## Kirkhill




----------



## The Bread Guy

Confirming stereotypes since before 1917 ...


> Up to 100 might get poisoned with a bath lotion containing methanol in Siberian Irkutsk, Investigative Committee spokesperson Svetlana Petrenko told Tass on Tuesday.
> 
> "According to investigation, 95 reports have come to law enforcement agencies of Irkutsk between December 16 and 20, about citizens poisoned with methanol and about dead bodies found," she said. "All poisoning incidents came as a result of consumption of alcohol-containing cosmetic product for taking baths called Boyaryshnik, in which methanol was found," she said.
> 
> As of the present moment, 55 people have died of poisoning and 40 are in hospitals.
> 
> Nine people selling bath lotion Boyaryshnik have been detained.


----------



## Lightguns

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Confirming stereotypes since before 1917 ...



I would imagine their North hinterlands have the same problems ours do, only without the dry communities.  It's the location not necessarily the people that fuel drug and alcohol problems.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Putin pines for (a version of) the old days ...


> The USSR can’t be restored, although its disintegration was a disaster, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in an interview with the Mir TV Channel on Wednesday.
> 
> However, the logic of today’s events suggests that a need exists for new integration in the post-Soviet space, Peskov said.
> 
> "[Russian President Vladimir] Putin still believes that this [the disintegration of the Soviet Union] was a disaster for those peoples who lived under the roof of one union state," the Kremlin spokesman said.
> 
> "This was a disaster that pushed us far back in our development. All the countries that are now independent were actually pushed decades back after the ruin of the Soviet Union," the Kremlin spokesman said.
> 
> "But you see for yourselves that it is impossible, of course, to talk about any reverse processes. This is impossible," the spokesman said.
> 
> "But the logic dictates the need of new integration in the space of the former Soviet Union," he added ...


----------



## The Bread Guy

AND he's all about pluralism and a range of political views and opinions, including those opposing his own, too!


> Vladimir Putin is a liberal by nature who is no stranger to the concepts ‘development’ and ‘freedom’, and he is not a promulgator of a strong state, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry Peskov said in an interview with Mir TV channel.
> 
> "You know that (Putin’s) foes - and the ones located abroad, in the first place, but some foes inside this country, too - believe that Putin much rather is a conservative and an advocate of a strong state, and the word ‘freedom’ is alien to him," Peskov said. "But Putin is an attested liberal by nature. He is much more liberal than the self-styled ‘liberals’ who claim they are opposition."
> 
> Peskov finds Putin to be an absolutely liberally-minded person in what concerns his stance on the economy, social policies and other spheres. That is why the notion of ‘liberty’ is so close to the President ...


----------



## MarkOttawa

Very interesting geopolitical read by Niall Ferguson:



> The Russian Question
> http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/23/the-russian-question-putin-trump-bush-obama-kissinger/



Prof. Ferguson:
http://www.niallferguson.com/

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Kirkhill

I found the latest little nuclear exchange interesting.

Putin: (Reiterating Russian Policy to go nuclear early) We are stronger than any potential aggressor.  We will continue to upgrade nuclear weapons.
Trump: You say you want an arms race.
Putin: Oh.  I wasn't meaning you.  Your the most powerful nation on the planet.

Quite as set of policy clarifications in a very short time.  Transparent diplomacy?


----------



## MarkOttawa

See Russian (not Putin as such) "nuclear de-escalation" thinking:
https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/?s=nuclear+de-escalation

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Kirkhill

> Russia’s Interest in and Plans for Decisive Limited Nuclear Use
> 
> Less well understood but possibly of greater relevance, however, is Russia’s interest in and development of capabilities for more limited nuclear use. *Moscow is aware of its only partial success in fielding a modern conventional military* and of that force’s imperfect ability to challenge the forces of the United States and NATO in a broader conflict as well as of the relatively narrow relevance of its strategic nuclear forces in situations short of the apocalyptic. This leaves a significant gap in Russia’s defense posture: *left alone, Russia’s conventional forces could be decisively overcome by NATO forces in a plausible conflict over, for instance, the Baltics or other countries in Eastern Europe.* Such a scenario would likely fall considerably short of a situation in which Moscow would see the utility in initiating a general nuclear strike against NATO, a strike that would essentially inevitably result in a comparable massive Western response. Russia could therefore find itself exposed to Western coercion if this vulnerability were left unaddressed .
> 
> To deal with this problem, Russia has for a number of years seen the value of seeking to extend credible nuclear deterrence down the ladder of escalation to scenarios below the extreme in order to deter the West from seeking to exploit this potential conventional vulnerability as leverage. As Russian expert Yuri Federov has outlined, “_n the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War, instead of massive use of nuclear weapons planned by the Soviets during the Cold War, *[the] Russian military command [has] sought to develop a method of limited use of nuclear weapons that will enable them to deter or stop [an] attack of superior conventional forces without escalation into total nuclear exchange or large-scale regional war.” .Moscow has occasionally described the objective of such nuclear employment as “de-escalation of aggression,” *an approach sometimes termed an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy.” . An influential 2003 official document, for instance, described “[d]e-escalation of aggression” as the effort to “forc[e] the enemy to halt military action by a threat to deliver or by actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity with reliance on conventional and (or) nuclear weapons.” .Russia appears to see both nuclear weapons of tailored effect and non-nuclear but “strategic” conventional weapons as being of potential use in such scenarios . This strategy is consistent with those of other countries facing a potential adversary possessing stronger conventional forces – NATO in the Cold War and Pakistan vis-à-vis India, for instance  . In accord with this doctrine, Moscow has since the early 1990s made clear that it would resort to using nuclear weapons first .
> 
> The precise conditions under which Moscow would employ its nuclear weapons in this fashion are ambiguous – by design. Official Russian statements as to when it would use its nuclear weapons have varied. In its 2000 defense statement, for instance, Moscow adopted a broader set of parameters for such use, apparently prompted by the Western Alliance’s awing display of force unsanctioned by the UN Security Council in Kosovo. This doctrinal statement explicitly extended the intended relevance of Russia’s nuclear arsenal from “global war,” or a “a war against a coalition of powerful states in which sovereignty and [the] very survival of Russia are at stake,” to “regional war,” with the latter defined as “a war with a powerful state or a coalition [namely the United States and NATO], which Russian forces cannot win or terminate on favorable conditions.” . In more colloquial terms, Russia explicitly announced that it was prepared to use nuclear weapons in a major but not total conflict with NATO in which Russia believed it could not prevail.
> 
> The most recent (2010 and 2014) official statements of Russia’s military doctrine, however, appeared to narrow Russia’s declaratory policy on nuclear use . With the exception of retaliating against nuclear attack, the 2010 and 2014 white papers suggested that *Moscow would confine any first nuclear use to situations of, as in the 2003 paper, “a military conflict involving the utilization of conventional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional war)” but also “imperiling the very existence of the state.”* . The last section of the statement seemed to indicate that Russia’s bar for using nuclear weapons in the face of conventional conflict with NATO would be quite high; such a conflict would, the statement appeared to imply, have to threaten the collapse of the state – an undefined but presumably extreme circumstance – before Moscow would reach for its nuclear arsenal ._


_

https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/russia-s-evolving-nuclear-doctrine-and-its-implications-2016-01_


----------



## a_majoor

Russia expands their reach into space again:

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/12/23/did-russia-just-test-a-weapon-in-space.html



> *Did Russia Just Test a Weapon in Space?*
> Vladimir Putin’s regime is asserting itself around the world—and above it, too.
> David Axe
> DAVID AXE
> 12.23.16 1:02 AM ET
> 
> Russia isn't done screwing with the United States in 2016.
> On Dec. 16, the Russian military reportedly tested what appears to be an anti-satellite weapon—a rocket that can boost into low orbit and smash into enemy spacecraft.
> 
> The test could be the latest sign of Russia’s intention, and improving ability, to threaten America’s hundreds of government and private spacecraft—and chip away at the United States’ military and commercial advantage in space.
> 
> It might also be the latest provocation from a Russian regime that increasingly denies any responsibility for its most destabilizing moves. That’s how Moscow can get away with hacking elections in the United States and other Western countries and invading Ukraine, among other attacks on global order.
> 
> The apparent anti-satellite (ASAT) test largely escaped public notice. The Washington Free Beacon was the first to report on the weapon’s trial, on Dec. 21—attributing the information to unnamed U.S. government sources. CNN also pointed out the test, again citing anonymous U.S. officials.
> 
> Capt. Nicholas Mercurio, a spokesman for the 14th U.S. Air Force, which oversees space systems, declined to specifically comment on the reported Russian test. “We monitor missile launches around the globe,” Mercurio told The Daily Beast, “but as a matter of policy we don’t normally discuss intelligence specific to those launches.”
> 
> For the anti-satellite test, the Russians have a tidy cover story—that the rocket isn’t actually an anti-satellite weapon, or ASAT. Instead, it’s a meant for shooting down incoming ballistic missiles.
> 
> That is to say, the rocket that Russia tested on Dec. 16 could be a defensive rocket-killer, rather than an offensive satellite-killer. “My take is that it could be either,” Pavel Podvig, an independent expert on Russian strategic forces, told The Daily Beast via email. “It is difficult to say at this point.”
> 
> But in fact, there’s no meaningful difference between an anti-satellite weapon and a defensive missile-interceptor. The same basic hardware can do both jobs.
> 
> “The only difference between a hit-to-kill interceptor for missile defense and one for low-Earth-orbit ASAT is going to be in the software,” Jeffrey Lewis, who helps lead nonproliferation programs at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, told The Daily Beast via email.
> In 2008, for example, the U.S. Navy tweaked the code on one of its ship-based SM-3 missile-interceptors and successfully targeted an old U.S. satellite in low orbit.
> 
> The nature of the Russian test underscores the likelihood that the rocket in question is a satellite-killer. The rocket reportedly blasted off from a base in central Russia and arced into low orbit. There was no debris, according to CNN—meaning the missile likely targeted a point in space instead of aiming for, say, a decommissioned Russian satellite.
> 
> But the fact that the rocket targeted fixed coordinates in space indicates that it’s meant for destroying spacecraft. “Shooting at a point in space is useless from a missile-defense point of view,” Lewis explained.
> 
> That’s because incoming ballistic missiles move quickly. A missile-interceptor must be able to maneuver rapidly to match the target’s constantly-changing position. A satellite, by contrast, moves comparatively slowly and predictably. “You don’t know where a missile is going to be,” Lewis said, “but you do know where a satellite is going to be.”
> 
> Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has become the world leader in “asymmetric” warfare: targeting its enemies surreptitiously and in ways that avoid direct confrontation. After sending “Little Green Men”—troops without official uniforms—to invade Ukraine’s Crimea region, Russian forces pummeled Ukrainian troops with artillery that fired from the Russian side of the border with Ukraine… and denied doing it.
> 
> Likewise, Russia has targeted Ukraine and the tiny states along NATO’s eastern border with relentless cyberattacks. In late 2015, Russian hackers disrupted Ukraine’s power grid. (And another substation near Kiev was recently hit, although its unclear by whom.) The Kremlin hides its cyberattacks behind murky, non-state groups or individual hackers such as the notorious Guccifer 2.0. He’s the self-proclaimed “Romanian” hacker who claimed to hit the Democratic National Committee—only to be exposed as a Russian.
> 
> If the ASAT tests are successful and Russia deploys the weapon, its potential targets could include the surveillance, positioning, and communications satellites that the United States relies on to wage war—and that the American economy counts on for navigation, television broadcasts, and even mobile gaming.
> 
> The United States possesses nearly half of the world’s roughly 1,000 operational satellites, many more than any other individual country. Both Russia and China have been working hard in recent years to counter this numerical advantage.
> In a 2007 ASAT test, China lobbed a rocket at a defunct weather satellite, smashing it into thousands of pieces—many of which remain in orbit and regularly endanger manned and unmanned spacecraft.
> 
> Both Russia and China have deployed small “inspection” satellites that, officially, exist to maneuver close to and monitor other spacecraft but which, with a simple command, could collide with U.S. satellites and hijack, damage, or destroy them.
> 
> For the record, the Pentagon also deploys inspection satellites that could threaten other spacecraft.
> In parallel with its development of possible killer satellites, Russia has been hard at work on its Nudol rocket system, which is—officially—a missile-interceptor designed to protect Russian cities from nuclear bombardment. Moscow wants Nudol to replace decades-old Gazelle and Gorgon defensive missiles.
> 
> Nudol’s capabilities remain something of a mystery outside of the Russian government. If the Kremlin intends Nudol to replace Gazelle, then Nudol might not have applications in space. But if Nudol is supposed to replace the much more powerful Gorgon, then Nudol could pull double-duty as a missile-interceptor and a satellite-killer.
> 
> “Gazelle was not an ASAT threat, as its range was only a few miles,” Brian Weeden, a space exert at the Secure World Foundation in Colorado, told The Daily Beast via email. “Gorgon was likely an ASAT threat because it could reach into low Earth orbit.”
> If Nudol matches Gorgon’s capabilities, then it’s possible the new missile-interceptor formed the basis of the rocket in the apparent ASAT test on Dec. 16.
> 
> Adapting Nudol to kill spacecraft makes sense. Instead of designing a new ASAT weapon from scratch—a potentially laborious process—Russia could simply modify a rocket it’s been working on for years.
> 
> The accelerating pace of Russian and Chinese ASAT developments—of which the Dec. 16 test is only the most recent—has kept some U.S. officials up at night. Air Force general John Hyten, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told Congress in September that Russia and China are developing offensive space weapons faster than the United States is developing countermeasures.
> 
> “We are moving much slower in certain areas than our adversaries,” Hyten said. “We need our industries and our acquisition process to move faster.”


----------



## tomahawk6

A Russian aircraft headed for Syria crashed into th Black Sea with 91 souls.There was a crew of 8 and the rest were members of a Russian Army choir.

https://www.rt.com/news/371623-russian-tu-154-disappears-radars/



> Nine journalists along with musicians from the army choir of the Russian Armed Forces, the Alexandrov Ensemble, were aboard the plane, the ministry confirmed. The musicians were due to take part in a New Year’s concert at the Russian airbase in Latakia, Syria.
> 
> “Alexandrov Ensemble singers made up the majority of the missing passengers of the Tu-154,” a defense source told RIA, adding that 90 members of the choir were supposed to be flown to Syria on two Russian military planes.


----------



## dimsum

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> A Russian aircraft headed for Syria crashed into th Black Sea with 91 souls.There was a crew of 8 and the rest were members of a Russian Army choir.



Setting aside politics, the choir was going there to entertain the troops and not take part in the fighting.  RIP.


----------



## tomahawk6

Dimsum said:
			
		

> Setting aside politics, the choir was going there to entertain the troops and not take part in the fighting.  RIP.



I didnt say they were going to fight.In fact there was a second aircraft with the other half of the choir.They were on a morale tour. The choir is quite good.


----------



## dimsum

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I didnt say they were going to fight.



I didn't say you were suggesting that at all - we are both agreeing on their reason for travel.


----------



## Journeyman

You too stop agreeing so aggressively; it's Christmas (or PMJT's birthday.....William the Conqueror's coronation....whatever).

 :subbies:


----------



## brihard

Man, the Red Army Choir? That's brutal. 

Given the location, proximity to shore, and the alleged spread of wreckage and bodies, this may have been a shoot down.


----------



## jollyjacktar

Another thing to blame the Kurds for.


----------



## Old Sweat

I don't know if we can rule out other issues yet. The aircraft had just taken off from Sochi which is in Russian territory and headed out across the Black Sea.


----------



## daftandbarmy

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> I didnt say they were going to fight.In fact there was a second aircraft with the other half of the choir.They were on a morale tour. The choir is quite good.



I saw them in concert at the Queen E theatre in Vancouver in the 70s. I was so pumped I ran back stage and had them all sign the jacket of the 33 LP record I was clutching like a new baby...

Kalinka... my favourite: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-jsXGLysCU


----------



## brihard

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I don't know if we can rule out other issues yet. The aircraft had just taken off from Sochi which is in Russian territory and headed out across the Black Sea.



Definitely not ruling anything out, just saying there's cause for concern. Low altitude on a predictable flight path, routine aircraft operations, holiday of religious significance to the West (ISIS may not necessary realize there's a distinction with Russian religious holidays), and so on.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I don't know if we can rule out other issues yet. The aircraft had just taken off from Sochi which is in Russian territory and headed out across the Black Sea.



While anything is possible, the aircraft has a long history of crashes and I believe it has actually been withdrawn from commercial service.

Here is a link from the Aviation Safety Network that lists all 109 accidents involving the Tu-154. 

Another  link with accident related statistics (including causes of crashes, number of fatalities, aircraft flight operation at time of accident, etc). Note that you a have less than a 32 % chance of surviving an accident involving the TU-154.


----------



## tomahawk6

I think the Russian angle is mechanical failure but we dont know yet if the pilot had a chance to call an inflight emergency. The pilot was in contact with the tower at the time of the crash. That may change as the inquiry progresses.

An example of the quality of the music. A tragedy.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m4ria6UZbSg

http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2016/12/25/russian-plane-crash/amp/


----------



## tomahawk6

My favorite song and video is the VDV airborne song !!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlQ6KqTlyfk


----------



## The Bread Guy

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Another thing to blame the Kurds for.


Heck, maybe even the Ukrainians (to stretch paranoia to an extreme - although there's gotta be some shaudenfreude in Kiev over the death of a bunch of Russian troops as well as a doctor who worked on the sepraratist side of the conflict).

A few links from the RUS mil Info-machine (all in Russian)...

_*"Briefing of the Russian Defense Ministry on the situation with the crash of Tu-154 (at 13:00)"*_ (YouTube)
_*"Briefing of the Russian Defense Ministry on the situation with the crash of Tu-154 in Sochi, as of 13:00"*_ (written statement)
_*"List of passengers aboard the Tu-154 Russian Defense Ministry"*_
Also, a few maps from what looks like a German-based aviation safety/tracking page post ....












_(no attribution for the proposed route, so caveat lector)_


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Now for a little trip down Memory Lane to look at what Putin calls the greatest disaster of the 20th century, aka, the Fall of the Soviet Union 25 years ago today.



> 25 Years Ago – The last day of the Soviet Union (December 25, 1991)
> 
> Posted by William A. Jacobson	   Sunday, December 25, 2016 at 8:45pm
> 
> President George H.W. Bush in address to the nation: “Every American can take pride in this victory”
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5gHfPMlaY4
> 
> On December 25, 1991, Mikhail Gorbachov resigned as President of the Soviet Union. The red flag was lowered at the Kremlin, and the next day, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.
> 
> The BBC reported:
> 
> _Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union for almost seven years and executive president for nearly two, has stepped down from office. He announced his resignation in a 10 minute speech, broadcast live on television, as the Soviet Union passed into history.
> 
> It has been replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
> 
> The 60-year-old appeared solemn but composed.
> 
> “Due to the situation which has evolved as a result of the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent states I hereby discontinue my activities at the post of president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” he said.
> 
> He said he was resigning on a matter of principle, adding the decision to dismantle the state should have been made “on the basis of popular will”._
> 
> The NY Times reported:
> 
> _Mr. Gorbachev’s moment of farewell was stark. Kremlin guards were preparing to lower the red union flag for the last time. In minutes, Mr. Gorbachev would sign over the nuclear missile launching codes for safeguarding to Mr. Yeltsin, his rival and successor as the dominant politician of this agonized land….
> 
> The flag was lowered from its floodlit perch at 7:32 tonight. A muted moment of awe was shared by the few pedestrians crossing Red Square.
> 
> ‘Why are you laughing at Lenin?’ a man, obviously inebriated against the winter cold, suddenly shouted in the square. He reeled near Lenin’s tomb.
> 
> The mausoleum was dusky pink against the evergreen trees outside the Kremlin walls. Within, for all the sense of history wheeling in the night sky, the embalmed remains of the Communst patriarch still rested.
> 
> The drunk was instantly shushed by a passer-by who cautioned that ‘foreigners’ were watching and he should not embarrass the reborn Russia.
> 
> ‘Foreigners?’ laughed another Muscovite. ‘Who cares? They’re the ones who are feeding us these days.’_
> 
> President George H.W. Bush gave a televised speech that evening:
> 
> _Good evening, and Merry Christmas to all Americans across our great country.
> 
> During these last few months, you and I have witnessed one of the greatest dramas of the twentieth century — the historic and revolutionary transformation of a totalitarian dictatorship, the Soviet Union, and the liberation of its peoples. As we celebrate Christmas — this day of peace and hope — I thought we should take just a few minutes to reflect on what these events mean for us, as Americans.
> 
> For over 40 years, the United States led the West in the struggle against Communism and the threat it posed to our most precious values. This struggle shaped the lives of all Americans. It forced all nations to live under the specter of nuclear destruction. From Union, a Commonwealth
> 
> That confrontation is now over. The nuclear threat — while far from gone — is receding. Eastern Europe is free. The Soviet Union itself is no more. This is a victory for democracy and freedom. It’s a victory for the moral force of our values. Every American can take pride in this victory, from the millions of men and women who have served our country in uniform, to millions of Americans who supported their country and a strong defense under nine presidents…._
> 
> (I’ve been unable to find a video of President Bush’s televised address, if anyone finds it, please post a link in the comments and I’ll add it.)
> 
> http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1225.html
> 
> That victory, of course, was several decades in the making, at the cost of tens of thousands of American lives fighting global communist expansionism. It also was a victory born of strength, not submission.
> 
> It was a victory opposed by Western leftists who sought to undermine the will to fight at every turn and in every place they could.
> 
> Leaders like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were denigrated and mocked as warmongers and fools. Thankfully, they and other stood strong when weakness was the politically easier position.
> 
> There’s a lesson there, as we move forward to confront and defend against new and old foes.



 Article Link


----------



## dimsum

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> My favorite song and video is the VDV airborne song !!
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlQ6KqTlyfk



...and I thought you were talking about this VDV song... >

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YSj5RbWtR7c


----------



## tomahawk6

One black box has been found.Images at the link as recovery operations continue.

http://www.charlotteobserver.com/entertainment/music-news-reviews/article123067489.html


----------



## tomahawk6

Evidently the flaps were not moving together according to investigators.Very tragic.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38449058

The main flight recorder from the Russian jet that crashed into the Black Sea on Sunday has revealed that faulty flaps were to blame, Russian media say.
The flaps, panels on the wings that help lift an aircraft, were not moving together, a source close to the probe told the private Interfax news agency.
The pro-Kremlin Life news website says this led the pilots to lose control as the plane was at a "critical angle".
It also quoted the crew's last words, including: "The flaps, hell... !"

Pilots' last words:
"Speed 300 (inaudible)."
"(Inaudible)."
"I've pulled in the landing gear, commander."
"(Inaudible)."
"Oh bloody hell!"
Piercing alarm sounds
"The flaps, hell, what a…!"
"The altimeter [altitude meter]!"
"We're in… (inaudible)."
Alarm sounds about dangerous proximity to the ground
"(Inaudible)."
"Commander we're falling!"


----------



## MarkOttawa

Caustic appraisal of Obama by ret'd British ambassador Charles Crawford:



> Cold War 2.0: Obama, Putin, Trump
> 
> Here is a link (££) to my latest Telegraph piece on the Obama expulsion of Russian diplomats.
> 
> In case (like me!) you can’t access it, some highlights of what I sent them:
> http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/31/cold-war-20-power-plays-us-russia-relations-putin-rewriting/
> 
> "It’s safe to say that President Obama and his team knew little about Russia before the President visited Moscow a few months after his election in 2009. Why should they? Russia is an enigma wrapped in a conundrum surrounded by a mysterious riddle. Above all it’s BIG. Big attitudes. Big grudges. Big ‘intensity’. Russia likes being Russia. Nowhere else does Russia like Russia does."
> 
> Thus the hapless early moves by President Obama to make a New Start in US/Russian relations. First in 2009 came Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, presenting the bemused Russian Foreign Minister with a bright red Reset Button, a slick PR gesture wrecked only by the Americans using the wrong Russian word for Reset.
> 
> Then came President Obama’s keynote speech in Moscow. Look how oddly it reads now:
> 
> 'There is the 20th century view that a strong Russia or a strong America can only assert themselves in opposition to one another. And there is a 19th century view that we are destined to vie for spheres of influence… These assumptions are wrong…
> 
> The future does not belong to those who gather armies on a field of battle or bury missiles in the ground; the future belongs to young people with an education and the imagination to create. That is the source of power in this century.'
> 
> Putin Moscow not unreasonably took such syrupy Obama liberal platitudes as a sign of feeble-mindedness, and came up with a view of its own: that plenty of power today comes from cunningly combining of 19th century attitudes with 21st century e-methods..."
> http://charlescrawford.biz/2017/01/01/cold-war-2-0-obama-putin-trump/



Read on.

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MarkOttawa

Cf. by former NSA analyst John Schindler in 2014:



> Putinism and the Anti-WEIRD Coalition
> 
> ...many in the West...seem not to understand Putin’s agenda. Among the doubters is President Obama, who dismissed the idea of a new Cold War with Russia, on the grounds that Putin has no ideology, so what’s there to fight about? As Obama put it recently, “This is not another Cold War that we’re entering into. After all, unlike the Soviet Union, Russia leads no bloc of nations. No global ideology. The United States and NATO do not seek any conflict with Russia.”..
> 
> I’ll elaborate what Putinism actually is, but before I do, it’s important to understand why President Obama and countless other Westerners cannot see what is right before them. Putin and the Kremlin actively parrot their propaganda, they are doing anything but hide it, yet we still cannot make it out.
> 
> This is simply because we are WEIRD. That’s social science shorthand for Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic – and nobody is WEIRDer than Americans. In the last several decades many Americans, and essentially all our elites, have internalized a worldview based on affluence, individualism, and secularism that makes us unique, globally speaking. So much so that we seem unable to comprehend that there actually are opposing viewpoints out there.
> 
> Barack Obama, by virtue of his diverse ethnic and religious background and elite education, is almost an ideal stand-in for the WEIRD demographic, as he embodies so many things WEIRDos admire: education, affluence, diversity, progressive social views, etc. He comes close to being almost the perfect post-modern American, which perhaps is why so many Americans of that bent adore him deeply. Thus when President Obama says he detects no ideological rivalry with Putin’s Russia, he undoubtedly speaks the truth as he sees it.
> 
> Americans of all stripes have a well-honed ability to ignore inconvenient facts...
> https://20committee.com/2014/04/07/putinism-and-the-anti-weird-coalition/



Do read it all.  Plus more from Charles Crawford on the Obama response to Russian hacking:



> Expelling Spies: Negotiation Psychology
> http://charlescrawford.biz/2017/01/01/expelling-spies-negotiation-psychology/



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## The Bread Guy

For the record, more (unclas) details from the U.S. on the hacking grist for the mill in case you want to read it instead of read about it ...
_*"Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections"*_ (Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) - 25 pg PDF)

ODNI statement:


> *ODNI Statement on Declassified Intelligence Community Assessment of Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections*
> 
> On December 9, 2016, President Barack Obama directed the Intelligence Community to conduct a full review and produce a comprehensive intelligence report assessing Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections.  We have completed this report and briefed President Obama as well as President-elect Trump and Congressional leadership.  We declassified a version of this report for the public, consistent with our commitment to transparency while still protecting classified sources and methods.
> 
> The Intelligence Community did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016 election, and DHS assesses that the types of systems the Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying.
> 
> This declassified version of the report is being released to the public and can be accessed via IC on the Record.


----------



## tomahawk6

The report was compiled from Russian TV from 2012. :

http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2017/01/report-support-for-russia/


----------



## The Bread Guy

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> The report was compiled from Russian TV from 2012. :
> 
> http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2017/01/report-support-for-russia/


Good catch, that -- let's go to the original source for the information mentioned in the GP piece, RIA Novosti (Russian state media):
_*"Shocker: 'Proof' of Russia's Trump Support Was Compiled During Obama's Election"*_
Gateway Pundit may or may not have an agenda on this one, but does Russia?  Discuss  ;D


----------



## nick21infinite

Interesting but, I think, because it is designed to convince Americans to change governments, not because it presents a credible case for a Russian turn around. 

I remain convinced that Russia is a failing state, not a potential leader of even a rival for any of the America, China or India.


----------



## Lightguns

nick21infinite said:
			
		

> Interesting but, I think, because it is designed to convince Americans to change governments, not because it presents a credible case for a Russian turn around.
> 
> I remain convinced that Russia is a failing state, not a potential leader of even a rival for any of the America, China or India.



Russia is always one bad wheat harvest from being a failed state.  But the Russian condition is more complicated than the usual conditions of a failed state. Russia can be successfully ruled only by a strong man who stokes the eternal Russian fixation on a single external enemy.  If Russia fails it is never catastrophe as Russia is almost a cultural mono block and there is always an new enemy.


----------



## a_majoor

An interesting look at the cultural basis of Russia's relationship with the West. Samuel Huntington is smiling somewhere right about now....

http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/01/the-secret-source-of-putins-evil



> *THE SECRET SOURCE OF PUTIN’S EVIL*
> It’s not the K.G.B., or the Cold War. It’s decidedly more Pushkin-esque, or Peter the Great, than that.
> BY PETER SAVODNIK
> JANUARY 10, 2017 5:00 AM
> 
> Henry Kissinger recently compared Vladimir Putin to “a character out of Dostoevsky,” which apparently delighted the Russian president. That’s not entirely surprising. No Russian writer encapsulates the many incongruous feelings and forces—cultural, spiritual, metaphysical—still coursing through the post-Soviet moment better than Fyodor Dostoevsky.
> 
> Technically, our current chapter of Russian history began on Christmas Day, 1991, when Mikhail Gorbachev declared the Soviet Union dead. But, in reality, it didn’t come into focus until 1999, with the outbreak of the second Chechen war and Putin’s rise to power, and, really, it didn’t acquire any momentum or self-awareness until October 2003, when Yukos oil chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested at gunpoint on a tarmac at an airport in Novosibirsk. That was when Putin signaled that the old Boris Yeltsin configuration—the weakened head of state enveloped by a swarm of self-seeking boyars, or oligarchs—was over and that the once dormant, fractured, fractious state was reasserting its authority and imposing a new order: a new telos. Since then, the question that’s animated all discussion of Russia outside Russia has been: Where is Putin leading his country? What does he want?
> 
> When Americans try to explain anything that they think is bad about modern Russia, they inevitably blame the Soviet Union. Russians like flashy clothes because they didn’t have them for so long, they say. Or Russians don’t smile because, well, if you’d grown up in the Soviet Union, you wouldn’t smile either. And so on. This makes us feel good about ourselves—we were on the right side of history—but it’s also incorrect. The great disruption, the sea change, far presaged the rise or fall of the Soviet Union. It was Peter the Great, in the late-17th and early-18th centuries, “cutting a window,” as Pushkin put it, to Europe. That genuflection to the West—reorganizing the army, imposing new styles and codes of conduct on the aristocracy, liberalizing universities—may have been right, but it was also brutal and bloody, and it spawned a crisis of confidence, and a questioning or ambivalence about what Russia ought to be that has existed ever since.
> 
> For the next three centuries, this questioning, very roughly, pitted Slavophiles (those who believed in the inherent goodness of the old Russia) against Westernizers, who wanted to transform the empire into Europe: liberal, less insular, more secular. Russia lacked a clearly defined identity, always veering between its oriental and occidental selves—bifurcated, fragmented, unsure of what it was meant to be. In the late 19th century, in the wake of the 1848 revolutions in France and Austria and the German and Italian principalities, and the publication of Marx’s Communist Manifesto, the wandering—the battle—sharpened. A radical consciousness opened up. It had been imported from Europe, but, in Russia, as always, it acquired a new ferocity. What had been a desire for polite and incremental reform morphed into a violent nihilism. Change, whatever had been meant by that, would no longer suffice. Now, the only option was to blow it all up and start over.
> 
> “A DOSTOYEVSKEAN VOZHD KNOWS RUSSIA IS GOOD AND THE WEST IS NOT, AND HAS LEARNED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO KEEP THE WEST OUT IS TO OVERCOME IT.”
> 
> Dostoevsky, who traveled widely in Europe but was suspicious of it, despised passionately the revolutionaries and their desired revolution. He spent the 1860s and 1870s obsessing over Russia’s looming confrontation with itself. His four most important works (Crime and Punishment, The Idiot, Devils, and The Brothers Karamazov) are not simply novels, but rather dystopian warnings about what would happen if Russia did not return to its pre-Petrine origins.
> 
> Dostoevsky foresaw Russia destroying itself with the clandestine, or not so clandestine, support of the West. The clearest illustration of this self-destruction comes in The Brothers Karamazov. The novel, the longest whodunit ever written, revolves around the murder of Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov. One of Karamazov’s three legitimate sons, Mitya, is accused and found guilty of the murder. But the real murderer is Karamazov’s mentally challenged, bastard son, Smerdyakov—and the real murderer behind Smerdyakov (the zakashik, or orderer) is Ivan, the most successful and Westernized of the Karamazov brothers. It is Ivan, full of his newfangled Western ideas, who tears apart his family (and, metaphorically, Russia), and it is the last remaining legitimate Karamazov son, Lyosha, who is left to rebuild it. Not incidentally, Lyosha is the youngest, most religious, and most self-effacing of the Karamazov clan. The way forward is actually the way backward—all the way to the ancient, Russian sobornost, the spiritual community that, in the Slavophile mind, used to bind Russia together. This, all these years later, is Putin’s Russia.
> 
> The Soviet perplex, viewed through a Karamazov prism, is not the cause of post-Soviet Russia’s woes but the effect of the same calamity that still bedevils Russia: the identity crisis bequeathed to it by its original Westernizer, Peter. Russia spent the 1990s devouring itself—selling off its biggest oil assets, handing over its elections to the C.I.A., allowing NATO to encroach upon its borders—and, only under Putin, has it retaken possession of itself.
> 
> The yawning chasm in this logic, of course, is Vladimir Putin, who bears zero resemblance to the fictional Lyosha. Putin, indeed, betrays few signs of being especially deep. It’s unlikely his agenda stems from a close reading of Russian novels. He’s a mobster, and he views his fellow countrymen the way a mobster views the little people in his neighborhood, with a mix of sympathy and disdain. But Putin is also Russian, and the same angers and longings that permeate the wider Russian psyche are presumably his, too.
> 
> Assuming Kissinger is right, it’s unclear which of Dostoevsky’s characters, if any, Putin identifies with. That’s not really the point. The point is that Dostoevsky very clearly delineates right from wrong in a distinctly Manichaean way. Russia, the old Russia, is good, pure—childlike or diminutive, in a way. The West is bad. It’s not simply that it’s a rival civilization, an economic or geopolitical competitor; it’s that the West is impure and, when introduced into the Russian bloodstream, toxic.
> 
> A Dostoyevskean vozhd, or leader, knows Russia is good and the West is not, and presumably he has learned by this late date that the only way to keep the West out is to overcome it, to expedite its undoing. The more Western leaders, and especially American presidents, talk about resetting relations with Moscow, the more the Dostoevskian president distrusts them. He hates them, and any so-called Russian president who doesn’t is a traitor or a buffoon. (Exhibit A: Gorbachev. Exhibit B: Yeltsin.)
> 
> Putin’s goal is not just a little more turf. Russia has a lot of that. His telos—his endgame—is the destabilization, the overcoming, of the whole Western order. This sounds fantastical to Americans because we’re an ahistorical people. That doesn’t mean we’re ignorant of history, although there’s a great deal of that, too. It means the categories with which we apprehend the world are not defined by the past, and we can’t really understand how it could be otherwise.
> 
> Russia, like most countries, however, is a decidedly historical country, and it appears to be seeking to rectify a 400-year-old wound. It has discovered, much to its chagrin, that you can’t simply look inward. That was the tsars’ mistake. They thought they could keep the West out. The cost of that mistake was the Bolshevik revolution, Stalin, famine, the Gulag, world war, and, ultimately, a failed state, the decimation of a way of life, the economy, their pensions and pride and sense of place in the world.
> 
> “TRUMP, WHO APPEARS UNBOUND BY ANY CODE OF ETHICS OR OVERARCHING THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, OFFERS PUTIN AN AMAZING OPPORTUNITY.”
> 
> Putin will not make that mistake. When he bombed Aleppo, it likely wasn’t because of ISIS or Bashar al-Assad. It was because he wanted to assert Russia’s hegemony—and undermine America’s. We can presume this because no obvious Russian interests have been served by the country’s meddling in Syria, but many American interests have been thwarted. Also, it fits a pattern: Putin’s Russia creates chaos wherever possible and then seeks to take advantage of that chaos. (Consider, for example, the so-called frozen conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.)
> 
> When he allegedly hacked into the Democratic National Committee, it wasn’t a personal vendetta, as Hillary Clinton suggested, and when he allegedly helped disseminate fake news about the candidates, it wasn’t because he cared, first and foremost, about the election result. It was because he wanted tens of millions of Americans to doubt the legitimacy of their own election. After all, Putin can’t really be sure Donald Trump will serve Russia’s interests better than Clinton would have. That Trump is so erratic must worry the Kremlin. That his instrument of choice is Twitter must compound those worries. What is beyond debate, however, is that Americans losing faith in their democracy—and the institutions that prop up that democracy, like the media—does serve Russia’s long-term interests.
> 
> Trump, who appears unbound by any code of ethics or overarching theory of international affairs, offers Putin an amazing opportunity. He will be the first American president who has said he wants better relations with Moscow and means it unqualifiedly. True, most American presidents say things like that, but there’s always an implied (and obvious) caveat: so long as our improved relations further U.S. interests.
> 
> With Trump, however, there are no obvious caveats. Why should there be? The interests we’ve long defended are not his interests. He exists outside any tradition of American government. If better U.S.-Russian relations—which, for Trump, mean better relations between Trump and Putin, however superficial they may be—endanger our Eastern European allies, or prolong the conflict in the Middle East, or, more broadly, counteract the democratic strivings of any number of peoples around the globe, that won’t matter, because those are no longer our interests. Republicans who defend Trump or warn against being duped by our own intelligence agencies may be unaware of how narcissistic and pliable the incoming president is—or they’ve yet to read much Russian literature.
> 
> Or they’ve allowed their partisan furies to cloud what should be nakedly transparent to all, which is that Russia is doing what it has been trying to do for a very long time. In previous centuries, they thought their moment had arrived—Peter, Catherine, the Communists, the post-Communists—and they were always wrong. They had imagined they were on the cusp of escaping themselves, and they never did. Now, maybe, they have arrived at a cosmically aligned juncture, choreographed by Putin and his lieutenants, destined by forces outside any human jurisdiction.


----------



## Kirkhill

U.S. tanks, trucks and other military equipment, which arrived by ship, are unloaded in the harbour of Bremerhaven, Germany January 8, 2017. REUTERS/Fabian Bimmer

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-baby-commentary-idUSKBN14W2X1



This is f****d!


January 8th.  11 days before change of command.  The guy who took the tanks out of Europe, and signalled his lack of interest in getting involved with Europe's discussions with Vlad, decides to return the tanks.

Keeping them in place might have kept young Vlad mindful of consequences.   Putting them back, while he has the blood up, but with no time on the clock to be able to do anything with them,  is merely the red rag to the bull.

Talk about playing silly bugger.


----------



## George Wallace

Was this not all laid out months ago when the various NATO Deployments to the Baltics were made?


----------



## Kirkhill

George Wallace said:
			
		

> Was this not all laid out months ago when the various NATO Deployments to the Baltics were made?



That is true George.  

Still, to my mind, the whole issue of sending back a single brigade to be penny-packeted across a new eastern border, a militarily useless provocation, could have been avoided by leaving the existing 2008 stocks in place as pre-positioned war stock.  Sucking everything back just left a gap that was exploited.

And to put them back now, as a gesture by an outgoing administration, with no sense of continuity with the incoming administration's policy, (a mutual problem I will grant) is just weak.


----------



## MarkOttawa

A tweet:
https://twitter.com/mrdavidboberesq/status/820612767690424322



> David Bober
> ‏@mrdavidboberesq
> 
> Future war stories.



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Kirkhill

A pretty rational take on the situation - and thus unwelcome, probably.

Maxflex used to be a common expression.  Some folks may need to learn/relearn the concept.  Others can't.


http://theweek.com/articles/673371/how-nato-grew-fat-russia-took-advantage

Michael Brendan Dougherty is senior correspondent at
TheWeek.com



> Why are we so panicked about Russia? Not long after Mitt Romney was dismissed as a Cold War nostalgist for calling Russia the top geostrategic foe of the United States, elite paranoia about the Kremlin is back.
> 
> Some of it is just the Vladimir Putin scare-stories that Americans are telling themselves. Much of the respectable American news media has fallen for embarrassing rumors of Russian interference and hacking in recent weeks. A story spread that Russia had hacked C-Span, replacing it with Kremlin-funded Russia Today. It was false. A week earlier thousands of outlets repeated the claim that Russian hackers had penetrated the American electrical grid. The hacked computer wasn't even tied to the electrical grid. Last year an email marketing system was confused with some imagined digital leash that Putin had around the neck of Donald Trump's campaign.
> 
> Some of the unease is inspired by the real dread of watching the Russian military thwart American ambitions. A protest movement in Kiev that was cheered and funded by the West inspired a Russian reaction. The Russian Army crossed the border into Crimea, as Ukrainian nationalists watched a portion of their country lopped off in horror.
> 
> We saw how easily Russia escalated its involvement in Syria, effectively saving the Assad regime from years of U.S.-backed rebellion. Russia even parodied the American playbook, claiming to intervene to stop ISIS, while in fact taking firm sides in the main theater of the Syrian civil war.
> 
> And some of the Russia panic is the fear that the post-Cold War unipolar moment is ending, that we've somehow passed "Peak America." But that may just be a more prosaic way of saying that the actual ideological and psychological costs of NATO expansion over the last 17 years are finally coming home, likely to be followed by real financial costs.
> 
> NATO expansion in 1999, 2004, and beyond meant issuing nearly a dozen new permanent war guarantees throughout the part of Europe that was the charnel house of the 20th century.
> 
> Western policymakers buck themselves up by saying Russia's military mostly went into scrapyards at the end of the Cold War. The Russian economy is primitive. It's a "gas station" that generates as much wealth for its 140 million citizens as the Italian economy generates for 60 million. That's all true. But what might be a remote threat becomes more urgent if you are overexposed to it.
> 
> The problem is, America's NATO war guarantee is wrapped up in a larger ideological status quo across the West. Trade liberalization, political liberalization, increased migration, sexual and cultural liberation from Christian traditionalism, the further political integration of the E.U., and the expansion of the Western alliance to the borders of Russia are all wrapped together in the minds of policymakers. And so, every reversal for any part of that project is seen by the guardians of the policy consensus as a demoralizing reversal for the Western alliance and, consequently, a gain for revisionist Putinism.
> 
> Knowing this, all political discontent in the West becomes of interest to Putin. And so he extends loans to parties like France's Front Nationale that question the post-Cold War consensus. The Kremlin-funded news network highlights all dissident political movements in the United States.
> 
> And consequently, the West frets about every party that comes to power that is wobbly on any one of the planks of the status quo. Hence the small panic about Poland's Law and Justice. As if questions about the size of a majority needed on Poland's constitutional court were of grave importance to the whole project of liberal governance.
> 
> Beyond that, the position of U.S. military assets and potential war materiel is still largely the way it was at the end of the Cold War, much of it in Germany and Italy. And the promise of mutual protection amounts to little more than the extension of a promise to fire nuclear missiles at Russia in the event of a challenge to NATO. That makes it trivially easy for Russia to put America's premise to the test. Would Americans really want to respond to a conventional military threat in the Baltic countries that separate Russia from its exclave in Kaliningrad with an ICBM?
> 
> The NATO alliance is the basis of America's post-war global strategy. But it's undergone significant revision since the end of the Cold War. These expansions were carried on with little debate because there was no cost.
> 
> But the price is starting to come in. Americans have to worry about what, say, a collapse of the government in Belarus could mean if Russia and Poland both respond to it militarily. Preserving this larger, baggier NATO may require huge new financial and military investments. And it may require decoupling some of the total package of ideological values from each other so that the project doesn't flounder on Poland's Catholicism or France's desire to protect its remaining industry.
> 
> Is that really so crazy?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Something from Small Wars Journal:


> *Nine Lessons of Russian Propaganda*
> Roman Skaskiw
> 
> (...)
> 
> 1. Rely on dissenting political groups in Western countries for dissemination.
> 
> (...)
> 
> 2. Domestic propaganda is most important.
> 
> (...)
> 
> 3. Destroy and ridicule the idea of truth.
> 
> (...)
> 
> 
> 4. "Putin is strong.  Russia is strong."  This message permeates all Russian information efforts.
> 
> (...)
> 
> 5. Headlines are more important than reality, especially while first impressions are forming.
> 
> (...)
> 
> 6. Demoralize.
> 
> (...)
> 
> 7. Move the conversation.  No matter how ridiculous their propaganda, no matter how many times it is proven to be false, it succeeds in shifting the conversation.
> 
> (...)
> 
> 8. Pollute the information space.
> 
> (...)
> 
> 9. "Gas lighting" -- accuse the enemy of doing what you are doing to confuse the conversation ...


----------



## Journeyman

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Nine Lessons of Russian Propaganda
> 
> Domestic propaganda is most important.
> 
> Destroy and ridicule the idea of truth.
> 
> Headlines are more important than reality.
> 
> Demoralize.
> 
> Move the conversation.  No matter how ridiculous their propaganda, no matter how many times it is proven to be false, it succeeds in shifting the conversation.
> 
> Pollute the information space.
> 
> "Gas lighting" -- accuse the enemy of doing what you are doing to confuse the conversation ...


Wow, I was in the completely wrong thread, reading those.


----------



## The Bread Guy

This from Putin's Info-machine re:  his chat with POTUS45 on the phone ...


> Vladimir Putin congratulated Donald Trump on taking office and wished him every success in his work.
> 
> During the conversation, both sides expressed their readiness to make active joint efforts to stabilise and develop Russia-US cooperation on a constructive, equitable and mutually beneficial basis.
> 
> Mr Putin and Mr Trump had a detailed discussion of pressing international issues, including the fight against terrorism, the situation in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict, strategic stability and non-proliferation, the situation with Iran’s nuclear programme, and the Korean Peninsula issue. The discussion also touched upon the main aspects of the Ukrainian crisis. The sides agreed to build up partner cooperation in these and other areas.
> 
> The two leaders emphasised that joining efforts in fighting the main threat – international terrorism – is a top priority. The presidents spoke out for establishing real coordination of actions between Russia and the USA aimed at defeating ISIS and other terrorists groups in Syria.
> 
> The sides stressed the importance of rebuilding mutually beneficial trade and economic ties between the two counties’ business communities, which could give an additional impetus to progressive and sustainable development of bilateral relations.
> 
> Mr Putin and Mr Trump agreed to issue instructions to work out the possible date and venue for their meeting.
> 
> Donald Trump asked to convey his wishes of happiness and prosperity to the Russian people, saying that the American people have warm feelings towards Russia and its citizens.
> 
> Vladimir Putin, in turn, emphasised that the feeling is mutual, adding that for over two centuries Russia has supported the United States, was its ally during the two world wars, and now sees the United States as a major partner in fighting international terrorism.
> 
> The two leaders agreed to maintain regular personal contacts.
> 
> The conversation took place in a positive and constructive atmosphere.


Nothing on whitehouse.gov yet.


----------



## tomahawk6

Russian security organs have arrested 4 FSB officers and it was revealed that a former KGB General linked to fake news was found dead in his car.


https://www.yahoo.com/news/m/5162d518-cc94-3bcb-b4ff-049fd3dd1cdb/russia-charges-four-top.html

KGB General Found dead

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/27/mystery-death-ex-kgb-chief-linked-mi6-spys-dossier-donald-trump/


----------



## The Bread Guy

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> This from Putin's Info-machine re:  his chat with POTUS45 on the phone ...


And here's POTUS45's version:


> President Donald J. Trump received a congratulatory call today from Russian President Vladimir Putin. The call lasted approximately one hour and ranged in topics from mutual cooperation in defeating ISIS to efforts in working together to achieve more peace throughout the world including Syria. The positive call was a significant start to improving the relationship between the United States and Russia that is in need of repair. Both President Trump and President Putin are hopeful that after today's call the two sides can move quickly to tackle terrorism and other important issues of mutual concern.


Meanwhile, EST military int's best publicly-shared guesstimate:  slim (but not zero) chance of a Russian invasion this year ...


> The threat of a direct Russian military attack on NATO member state is low in 2017, but it cannot be ruled out, Mikk Marran, the director general of Estonian Information Board (EIF), Estonia's foreign intelligence service, said LETA/BNS.
> 
> The Information Board on Wednesday published a report titled "International Security and Estonia 2017" which describer the threats against Estonia and also assesses the military danger arising from Russia, the Ministry of Defense said.
> 
> "We clearly state in the report that in 2017 the probability of a Russian military attack against NATO is low," Marran said at the report's presentation to journalists. "This likelihood is not non-existent, but it is low," he stressed.
> 
> According to Marran the military threat is about the same as it was a year ago. He said that while NATO can be efficient and Russia has unfinished military conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, the situation will remain the same.
> 
> "Considering the fact that the Russian government is an authoritarian regime, the risk that the Russian leadership will make a strategic miscalculation and decide to test the functioning of NATO's collective defense cannot be completely ruled out. Moreover, the Russian regime has to keep an "external enemy" prominent to divert attention from domestic problems and stifle society's aspirations for democracy," it is written in the second annual overview of the Information Board.
> 
> According to EIB, Russia will continue with active influencing activities in the direction of the West, including Estonia. "Such activities are not just propaganda, but a set of different methods and tactics, the aim of which is to increase tensions in the society and to harm the reputation of the West, including Estonia," Marran said ...


Russian media's headline:  _*"Estonian intelligence service says armed conflict between NATO, Russia unlikely"*_
The full EST mil int report, in English, here (64 pg PDF)


----------



## The Bread Guy

Baaaaaaaaaaaaad NATO ...


> Chairman of the Defense Committee in the lower house of Russia’s parliament and former Airborne Force Commander Vladimir Shamanov said on Monday a possibility existed that NATO forces might launch an offensive against Russia on the alliance’s eastern flank.
> 
> "The balanced development of the [Russian] troops’ military branches and services continued in 2016… the formation of four motor rifle divisions and one tank division was completed. This is a direct response to the challenges and threats linked with NATO’s course towards building up its presence in the alliance’s eastern flank," the MP said at a meeting with military attaches accredited in Moscow. The discussion focused on the lower house’s work on the legislative provision for the country’s defense in 2016.
> 
> "In the West, they call it the containment of Russia. We believe that these forces and means may be used in offensive operations against our country," the politician said.
> 
> "*In our history, we signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler but he treacherously attacked our country on June 22," the parliamentarian said* ...


On that bit in yellow, it's good to remember lots of agreements get broken_ all _the time ...


----------



## MarkOttawa

Bear sharpens claws:



> Planes, tanks and ships, oh my!: Russian military gets a sweeping, massive upgrade
> 
> The Russian military received a sweeping array of new weapons last year, including 41 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the wide-ranging military modernization will continue this year, the defence minister said Wednesday [Feb. 22].
> 
> Minister Sergei Shoigu told lawmakers the air force will receive 170 new aircraft, the army will receive 905 tanks and other armoured vehicles while the navy will receive 17 new ships this year.
> 
> Amid tensions with the West, the Kremlin has continued to spend big on new weapons despite Russia’s economic downturn.
> 
> Also this year, three regiments of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces will receive new intercontinental ballistic missiles, Shoigu said. Each regiment has up to 10 launchers.
> 
> The rising number of new weapons has raised demands for new personnel. Shoigu said the military currently needs 1,300 more pilots and will recruit them by 2018...
> 
> The weapons modernization effort has seen the 1-million Russian military narrow the technological gap in some areas where Russia had fallen behind the West, such as long-range conventional weapons, communications and drone technologies.
> 
> Shoigu said the military now has 2,000 drones compared to just 180 in 2011. He also noted that Russia has now deployed new long-range early warning radars to survey the airspace along the entire length of its borders.
> 
> The minister said the military will complete the formation of three new divisions in the nation’s west and southwest, and also deploy a new division on the Pacific Islands, which have been claimed by Japan...
> http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/planes-tanks-and-ships-oh-my-russian-military-gets-a-sweeping-massive-upgrade



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MilEME09

3 Divisions in southern and western command? and another for the far east? almost 1000 AFV's, anyone else feel like this sounds like a build up to something?


----------



## The Bread Guy

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> 3 Divisions in southern and western command? and another for the far east? almost 1000 AFV's, anyone else feel like this sounds like a build up to something?


Like the old Soviet days, it's _aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaall_ defensive against the NATO juggernaut that just won't stop imperializing ...





(image source)


----------



## a_majoor

While alarming in of itself, there are a few factors which still need to be taken into account:

1. Russia's GDP is about the same size as Italy's. Pouring all these resources into arms means a far smaller slice of pie is left for other things.
2. This overspending on the military is reflected in the generally dismal state of other Russian economic endeavours. For example, Italy has a small military force, but _also_ produces coffee makers, cars and other things Russia does not (well, to be fair, Canada does not produce locally designed cars or coffee makers either).
3. The small and very specialized industrial base means it is difficult for Russia to truly innovate. Note that the PAK-FA was designed and built decades after the F-22, is deficient in its electronics (according to the Indians, who want in on the program) and still does not have engines of sufficient power to perform at F-22 levels.
4. Russia has a very limited force projection ability
5. China is on Russia's other border.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ... 4. Russia has a very limited force projection ability ...


If you believe some commentators, they don't seem to need huge doses of just-military power projection over long periods to coerce convince other states to do what it wants.


----------



## Old Sweat

Remember what happened the last time they got in a military spending contest.


----------



## a_majoor

From "The American Interest", how President Trump may turn out to be Russia's nightmare:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/24/trump-isnt-sounding-like-a-russian-mole/



> *Trump Isn’t Sounding Like a Russian Mole*
> Walter Russell Mead
> 
> Trump’s core global strategy is intended to destroy any illusions in Moscow that Russia is a peer competitor of Washington’s.
> 
> With his latest effusive remarks to Reuters on the importance of expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal, President Donald Trump has sent the press into a panic once again.
> 
> What the press has largely ignored about Trump’s latest pronouncement is an obvious truth that undermines its own narrative: someone who was safely in Vladimir Putin’s pocket wouldn’t run around saying things like this. While liberal America may have forgotten recent history, Russia certainly hasn’t: provoking a nuclear arms race with an outclassed, economically weak Soviet Union was Ronald Reagan’s winning strategy in the 1980s. Tech and wealth are two key American advantages over Russia now as they were over the Soviet Union then; Trump’s message here is that he intends to follow in Reagan’s footsteps to use these strengths to advance American power, with the inevitable result of marginalizing one of Russia’s primary sources of power and prestige. Putin’s ramshackle Russia is no more capable of matching an American nuclear buildup than Brezhnev’s sclerotic Soviet Union could keep up with the United States—and Putin knows it.
> 
> Whether it will work is an entirely different question, but there can be little doubt that Trump’s core global strategy will destroy any illusions in Moscow, or anywhere else, that Russia is a peer competitor of the United States. A Trump administration is going to be four years of hell for Russia: a massive American doubling down on shale production along with a major military buildup. Trump is, in other words, a nightmare for Putin and a much, much bigger threat to Putin’s goals than President Obama ever was or wanted to be.
> 
> If Trump were the Manchurian candidate that people keep wanting to believe that he is, here are some of the things he’d be doing:
> •Limiting fracking as much as he possibly could
> •Blocking oil and gas pipelines
> •Opening negotiations for major nuclear arms reductions
> •Cutting U.S. military spending
> •Trying to tamp down tensions with Russia’s ally Iran
> 
> That Trump is planning to do precisely the opposite of these things may or may not be good policy for the United States, but anybody who thinks this is a Russia appeasement policy has been drinking way too much joy juice.
> 
> Obama actually did all of these things, and none of the liberal media now up in arms about Trump ever called Obama a Russian puppet; instead, they preferred to see a brave, farsighted and courageous statesman. Trump does none of these things and has embarked on a course that will inexorably weaken Russia’s position in the world, and the media, suddenly flushing eight years of Russia dovishness down the memory hole, now sounds the warning that Trump’s Russia policy is treasonously soft.
> 
> This foolishness is best understood as an unreasoning panic attack. The liberal media hate Trump more than they have hated any American politician in a generation, and they do not understand his supporters or the sources of his appeal. They are frantically picking up every available stick to beat him, in the hopes that something, somehow, will Miloize him.
> 
> So blind does hatred make them that they cannot understand how their own behavior is driving American public opinion in directions that bode ill for liberals in the future. In the first place, suppose Donald Trump does not in fact turn out to be the second coming of Benedict Arnold. Suppose instead, as is much more likely, that he turns out to be a very hawkish president, one who quite possibly will make George W. Bush look like Jimmy Carter. The media and Democratic Party leaders will have staked huge amounts of credibility on a position that turns out to be laughably untrue. Six months or a year from now, they will have to flip from calling Trump an anti-American traitor and Russian plant to calling him a dangerous, fascistic ultranationalist whose relentless hawkishness is bringing us closer to World War Three. Already there are some days when they mount both attacks at the same time: the hawkish traitor whose Nazi style America First ideology leads him to lick Putin’s boots. The media wants to cast Trump as both Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler; but you can’t give the Sudetenland to yourself.
> 
> The talking heads and the top pundits won’t admit it, and may not even see it—as our media is extremely good at hiding from facts that make it feel uncomfortable—but not many people will be convinced by this line of attack. Hawk or traitor: you can only pick one.
> 
> Meanwhile, the current media and Democratic drumbeat of fierce, hyper-patriotic anti-Russian fervor is legitimating exactly the kind of nationalist assertiveness and chauvinism that, in normal times, liberals try to tamp down. The liberal media, in the desperate hope of landing some blows on President Trump, is helping to create a national climate of alarmed and defensive patriotism that leads to exactly the kind of public opinion climate that is catnip to Republicans and poison to liberal Democrats.
> 
> Of course it’s possible that all the rumors and gossip about Trump and Putin are true, and that Putin holds powerful blackmail material on Trump, or alternatively that they share a dark and anti-democratic dream that they will jointly try to impose on the world. But if those things are true, we won’t find out because some nameless source has whispered something incriminating to one of Ben Rhodes’ 27 year-old journalistic naifs; it will be because Trump begins to shift American foreign policy in ways that benefit Russia.
> 
> What would those telltale signs of treason look like?
> 
> Trump might for example acquiesce in a greater Russian presence and say in the Middle East. He might limit U.S. fracking, helping to prop up Putin’s oil price. He might seek to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles in ways that give Russia badly needed economic relief from an arms burden that daily pressures the country more, and that accepts a permanent parity between the US and Russian nuclear arsenals, leaving America perpetually hostage to a nuclear balance of terror with a much weaker Russia. He might slash military spending and procurement; rather than steadily building the gap between Russian and American military capabilities, he might slow down and allow the Russians and others to dream of catching up.
> 
> In other words, if President Trump really is a Putin pawn, his foreign policy will start looking much more like Barack Obama’s. Will the New York Times and the Washington Post really have the brass to call Trump a traitor for pursuing a mix of policies which came right out of Obama’s playbook?
> 
> This would be a foolish enough positioning to cause even the press, or at least some of it, to blush. The Gray Lady has her limits. What is happening instead is the identification of the largely ineffective and symbolic sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea as the gold standard of anti-Russia policy. If Trump so much as hints at bargaining away these largely decorative sanctions, we are likely to see a media firestorm of historic scale. It will not be grounded in reality; Obama’s chosen anti-Russia policy mix was as weak and hesitating as such policy can be. The sanctions were a way of pretending to ourselves that we had a Ukraine policy more than offering an actual path to forcing Russia to disgorge its gains. Trump’s policies of fracking and big military build up are more anti-Russian without sanctions than Obama ever thought was practical or wise.
> 
> This doesn’t mean that there aren’t some honest and important questions about Trump and Russia. Looking into President Trump’s business ties and possible conflicts of interest is legitimate journalism. And there is little doubt that some of the Russian and other ex-Soviet figures which whom President Trump did business in the past are not the kind of people one would want a future president associating with.
> 
> But Trump’s actual foreign policy hardly suggests a president in thrall to the Kremlin, and excessive dovishness is unlikely to be the besetting sin of the Trump administration. The more the media locks itself into the narrative of Trump the appeaser, the harder its job will become when the real difficulties of the Trump presidency begin to take shape.
> 
> America needs an intellectually solvent and emotionally stable press to give this president the skeptical and searching scrutiny that he needs. What we are getting instead is something much worse for the health of the republic: a blind instinctive rage that lashes out without wounding, that injures its own credibility more than its target, that discredits the press at just the moment where its contributions are most needed.


----------



## a_majoor

Setting the conditions for a new "Cold War"? The only real issue in this article is the definitive blaming of Russia for the election hacks, I would suggest the DNC hacks were far more plausibly done by disgruntled "Bernie Bros" angry at how the nomination process was manipulated against Senator Sanders and his very motivated supporters:

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/brace-yourself-new-cold-war



> Dispatches
> Michael J. Totten
> *Brace Yourself for a New Cold War*
> 8 March 2017
> 
> American-Russian relations are about to take a sharp turn for the worse.
> 
> President Donald Trump, like Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton before him, hoped to “reset” Washington’s dismal relationship with Moscow, but that was always the longest of long shots. Vladimir Putin’s ideology and perceived national interests require the West as an enemy, and no matter how many times Trump tweets that he respects Putin’s “strength” and says it would be “a good thing” if we could get along with Russia and unite against ISIS, neither the Kremlin nor permanent Washington will allow it.
> 
> To be sure, Russians initially swooned when Trump beat Clinton in the election last November.
> 
> “It turns out that the United Russia [Vladimir Putin’s party] has won the elections in the United States!” Omsk governor Viktor Nazaro said. “Tonight we can use the slogan with Mr. Trump; Yes We Did,” said Boris Chernyshev, a member of the Russian parliament’s ultranationalist faction. “I want to ride around Moscow with an American flag in the window, if I can find a flag,” said Margarita Simonyan, editor in chief of Putin propaganda channel RT (Russia Today). Alexander Dugin, former professor and fascistic Putinism philosopher, gushed that Trump’s inauguration was “incredibly beautiful—one of the best moments of my life.”
> 
> According to international public opinion surveys, Russia is the only country in the entire world where more people rooted for Trump than for Clinton. (He “beat” her in Russia by 21 points.)
> 
> He’s one of us, the Russians thought, sort of. A rising leader of the ragtag nationalist anti-globalist movements. Trump’s antipathy toward the European Union, NATO, and the bipartisan political class in the United States imperfectly mirrors their own attitudes and prejudices.
> 
> Russian dolls adorned with Trump’s face are available in stores all over Moscow and beyond. Putin even told the state-run media to provide non-stop friendly coverage to the new administration in Washington for a while. According to the Russian news agency Interfax, Russian media mentioned Trump more often in January than it mentioned Putin.
> 
> That’s over now. The media swooning has cooled. The Russian ruler has again eclipsed Trump. It’s not hard to understand why.
> 
> Having even a potentially innocuous meeting with Russian officials has rapidly turned into a new third rail in American politics. National Security Advisor Mike Flynn lost his job for lying about discussing sanctions with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. Attorney General Jeff Sessions had to recuse himself for saying under oath at a Senate hearing that he had no contacts with Russian officials even though he too had met with Kislyak in his office. Congress is investigating Russia’s hacking of the Democratic National Committee last year, and even Republican members of Congress are wondering aloud if the Trump campaign had anything to do with it.
> 
> There is virtually no chance after all this that the Trump administration will be able to get away with lifting sanctions against Russia or anything else that looks chummy or even blandly cooperative without triggering a spectacular backlash that includes members of his own party and possibly even his cabinet.
> 
> Don’t think for a moment that Russians haven’t noticed this either. Of course they’ve noticed, and they have every reason to be anxious about it. Before long, anti-Russian sentiment in the United States could eclipse anti-Americanism is Russia. The only reason that hasn’t happened already is because so many Americans hoped for so long against hope that Russia shorn of totalitarian communism would eventually return “home” to the West like the prodigal son.
> 
> Russia, though, hasn’t been fully European since the Mongol invasion of Rus in the year 1240. Its forcible incorporation into the Golden Horde Empire endured for more than 200 years. Sure, Russia’s capital is on the European continent, but Russians see themselves as Eurasian. (North Korea and China, don’t forget, border Russia.)
> 
> Putin crafted the Eurasian Economic Union—which includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia—as an authoritarian crony state-capitalist competitor to the liberal democratic West that he detests. There isn’t a damn thing anybody in Washington can say or do to convince him to dump that project and align himself as a junior partner with the European Union and NATO, not when he’s the undisputed one-man boss of an entire continent-spanning alternative.
> 
> Understand something here. Both the European Union and Putin’s Eurasian Economic Union sent out feelers to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia for possible future membership. Rather than joining Putin’s Union like Belarus and the others, all three signed association agreements with the European Union. And all three have been dismembered and occupied in part by the Russians, indefinitely preventing them from joining the Western alliance. Neither the European Union nor NATO will even consider accepting a member state that has a disputed territorial conflict with Moscow.
> 
> If Russian and American national interests are so at odds then, why on earth did the Kremlin bother interfering in our election in order to get Donald Trump elected? I don’t believe that it did, at least not if you put it that way.
> 
> Think about it. Almost everybody thought Trump would lose, including the president himself. His win last November surprised everybody. Vladimir Putin is a smart man, but he can’t see the future better than anyone else. Like the rest of us, he assumed Hillary Clinton would win.
> 
> So when his cyberagents hacked the Democratic National Committee and released what it found to WikiLeaks, Putin was attacking the presumed incoming president of the United States. He didn’t go after Clinton per se. Rather, he pre-emptively struck against the next White House. He would have done the same thing if Joe Biden or Tim Kaine or any other Democrat were at the top of the ticket. And he would have done the same thing to the Republican Party if, say, Marco Rubio were the GOP nominee and the presumed winner of the general election.
> 
> The fact that Trump actually won was a surprise and a bonus.
> 
> Trump said last September that he loves WikiLeaks, forgetting everything he ever knew about the rogue outfit. (Someone should ask him what he thinks of WikiLeaks dumping a trove of classified material onto the Internet supposedly revealing how the CIA spies on people all over the world through their smart phones.) Its founder Julian Assange is emphatically not a Republican operative. WikiLeaks has spent its entire existence waging geopolitical warfare against the United States, mostly on behalf of itself, but partly on behalf of the Russians and everyone else in the world who wants to pull down the American “empire.” Like the Russians, Assange trained his fire on Clinton not because he likes the Republicans but because the Democratic Party includes roughly half the elected officials in the United States and presumably would have included the next president of the United States.
> 
> Assange and Putin hoped to kneecap the incoming president before she could even get started.
> 
> Their hostility toward the United States in general isn’t obvious to everyone in this country. Putin’s approval rating actually increased during the last year among Trump’s most die-hard supporters. The rest of us, though—and the rest of us still includes most Republicans—are reacting against Russian malfeasance more strongly than we have at any time since the Berlin Wall fell.
> 
> That reaction is blowing up in the Trump administration’s face, but the president can turn it around by taking an unambiguously hawkish stance against Russia. Putin, meanwhile, can’t do anything to recover his reputation in the United States.
> 
> Trump has already started to reverse himself and isn’t as rhetorically kind to Putin as he was even recently. “Even in the way he talks you can now hear notes of Obama,” said Russian Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov. “And you can hear in his address [to Congress]: the military budget will be increased by over $50 billion.”
> 
> During last year’s campaign, Trump openly considered recognizing Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula, joining just a handful of rogue states like North Korea and Venezuela. A couple of weeks ago, though, he backtracked and tweeted, “Crimea was TAKEN by Russia during the Obama Administration. Was Obama too soft on Russia?”
> 
> Many of the president’s pro-Putin aides and staff—Paul Manafort, Carter Page and Mike Flynn to a lesser extent—are out now while many of his current cabinet members—in particular United Nations Ambassador Nikki Haley and Defense Secretary James Mattis—are as staunchly hawkish on Russia as John McCain and Mitt Romney. Trump hasn’t stuck a sock in their mouths and probably never will. “There's a decreasing number of areas where we can engage cooperatively,” Mattis said recently, “and an increasing number of areas where we're going to have to confront Russia.”
> 
> There are other reasons Putin and his claque are unhappy. “With Trump in the White House,” Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes write in Foreign Policy magazine, “Putin has lost his monopoly over geopolitical unpredictability. The Kremlin’s ability to shock the world by taking the initiative and trashing ordinary international rules and customs has allowed Russia to play an oversized international role and to punch above its weight. Putin now has to share the capacity to keep the world off balance with a new American president vastly more powerful than himself. More world leaders are watching anxiously to discover what Trump will do next than are worrying about what Putin will do next.”
> 
> So after all this, the Kremlin has ordered Russia’s state-run media to stop writing about Trump as if he’s some kind of hero.
> 
> There’s a lot more going on, though, than a cooling of the Trump euphoria in Moscow. The Russians have plenty of reasons to fear the emergence, if not sooner then at least later, of a sustained bipartisan American hostility to Russia and Putin, with Donald Trump himself as its champion, that dwarfs anything the world has seen since Ronald Reagan engaged with détente with the Soviet Union’s last premier Mikhail Gorbachev.
> 
> The Kremlin reportedly fears that Trump will be removed from office—either by Congress or a military coup and possibly even assassinated—and that a venomous anti-Russian consensus will unite Americans, finally bringing about at least a partial end to our debilitating political polarization that Russia has been crowing about for a year now. They are most likely wrong about the first part of that equation. An American president hasn’t been assassinated for more than a half-century, no American president has ever been forcibly removed from power against his will internally, and the very idea of a military coup is absurd. The Russians are probably right, though, about the second part. A venomous anti-Russian consensus in America is already rising.
> 
> Whatever else happens, at some point Vladimir Putin will inevitably infuriate Trump. The American president is notoriously thin-skinned and couldn’t even get through a phone call with Australia’s friendly Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull without losing his cool. Even leaving all that aside, Trump may soon realize that the most effective way to retire the ongoing controversy surrounding his staff’s real and alleged dodgy ties to Russia is to fulminate against Putin the way he does against Barack Obama and Rosie O'Donnell.
> 
> Donald Trump hasn’t even been president for two months yet. His bizarre pro-Russian bumbling could easily turn out to be a mere blip at the start of his presidency. And if a galvanizing anti-Russian consensus does end up emerging, it’s likely to be much more intense than it would have been had Vladimir Putin left us alone.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> ...  I would suggest the DNC hacks were far more plausibly done by disgruntled "Bernie Bros" angry at how the nomination process was manipulated against Senator Sanders and his very motivated supporters ...


Based on what evidence?  Heck, if we're going all :Tin-Foil-Hat:, why not blame the CIA for the hack?


> ... apparently the CIA has the ability to mimic Russian hackers. In other words, the CIA has the ability to hack anybody they want and make it look like the Russians are doing it or make it look like the ChiComs are doing it or make it look like the Israelis are doing it ...


More from those fake-newsers @ the _Washington Post_ here.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Those ungrateful Latvians, asking to see a Russian military facility, then saying, "uh, no thanks" when the Russians say, "sure, drop on by ..." ...


> Russian ministry of Defense (Mindef) denounced today that Latvia denied the visit to military facilities that this country had previously requested to be closely monitored, describing them as a threat for its security.
> 
> Latvia asked in 2016 for a visit to the Russian air force brigade in the city of Ostrov and the landing troops of Pskov, but now this country refuses to do it, said a statement issued by Mindef.
> 
> Russia considers that the refusal of Latvia responds to an action of solidarity with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
> 
> Mindef also referred to the statements made by NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg, who said that at least ten times Russia was invited by this organization to join the exercises in the region.
> 
> The Mindef statement said that according to a document signed in Vienna 2011 on the principle of openness by the two parties, Russia was only invited once to witness the exercise Anaconda-2016.
> 
> Mindef said that following the documents of Vienna, Russia sent its monitors to the exercises, but they only received negative answers to their requests from the Government of Poland, where the exercise took place ...


Could the Latvians be trying to avoid one of these situations?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Not likely to cause RUS to fall, but interesting nonetheless ...

_*"Hundreds arrested in protests against Russian government's corruption"*_
_*"Are Russian protests about corruption, Vladimir Putin the start of something?"*_
_*"Russian Opposition Leader Arrested as Police Clear Anti-Corruption Protest"*_
_*"Russian protest leader Alexei Navalny gets 15 days in jail"*_
_*"Russia's mass protests were a win for Navalny. How will the Kremlin respond?"*_


----------



## The Bread Guy

Ya don't say?


> Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday compared a recent wave of street demonstrations in the country to the first stirrings of the Arab Spring, warning that his government would deal harshly with unsanctioned protests.
> 
> “This tool was used at the beginning of the so-called ‘Arab Spring,’” Mr. Putin said, referring to anticorruption protests held Sunday in Moscow and many other cities, Russian news agencies reported. “We know very well what this led to, what bloody events this led to.”
> 
> Thousands of Russians took to the streets Sunday in protests that were spurred by lawyer and anticorruption activist Alexei Navalny. In Moscow, riot police faced down marchers at an unsanctioned rally along one of the central boulevards of the capital, arresting hundreds ...


----------



## Oldgateboatdriver

Yep! Leave it to a dictator to figure out how other dictators have fallen ... and thinking (deluding oneself?) that he knows how to deal with it.  ;D


----------



## a_majoor

More on the pressures that Putin is facing:

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/beginning-end-putinism-1091



> *The Beginning of the End of Putinism?*
> APRIL 4, 2017 | ROB DANNENBERG
> 
> On Sunday, March 26, widespread protests broke out in more than 80 cities in the Russian Federation, apparently in response to the government's inability or unwillingness to deal with the problem of endemic corruption.
> 
> Estimates of the numbers of protesters vary, with the opposition claiming that more than 30,000 participated in Moscow alone. The government estimated fewer than 8,000 protesters. With the announced number of protesters arrested at over 1,500, it is likely the number of participants was larger than government figures suggest, though definitely smaller than the massive protests in 2011 and 2012.
> 
> Striking nonetheless was the breadth of the protests -- in cities from St. Petersburg in the west to Vladivostok in the east -- and the relative youth of the participants.  These weren't disgruntled pensioners complaining about transfer payments.  Many of the protesters appeared to be young enough to have known only post-Soviet leadership in Russia.  They seemed worried about the direction their country is taking under Putin's leadership. Perhaps significantly, the protests took place on the 17th anniversary of Putin's first election to the presidency. Putin warned of hooliganism and point to the chaos that stemmed from "colored revolutions" and the Arab Spring.
> 
> Putin may have cause for concern.  The recent protests, complaining about corruption, are materially different in substance than the 2011 and 2012 protests that focused on election fraud, although the issues are related.  The latest round of protests has taken place in a worse economic and political environment.
> 
> Moreover, the luster of the nationalism aroused by Putin's geopolitical adventures in Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere may have begun to fade as the conflicts in those regions continue and as their economic cost rises. Russia's increased negative image in the world, and in the West in particular, may be taking its toll on the Russian polity as the effects of the corruption exposed in the Panama Papers and by the impressive investigative activity of opposition leader Alexei Navalny starts to have an impact. This is in addition to the impact of the massive Russian sports cheating scandal exposed by the WADA investigations.
> 
> Western sanctions have been meaningful but not for the purpose for which they were implemented, i.e., to reverse the annexation of Crimea. The sanctions may have helped foster the economic conditions which might over time bring about political change in Russia. Real incomes in Russia have been steadily falling for several years despite relatively stable energy prices.  The number of Russians living below the poverty line has increased by 15 percent in the past two years.  The number of billionaires and millionaires has increased, and evidence of their extravagant lifestyles has become increasingly available on the internet.
> 
> The geopolitical environment may be turning against Putin as well. Despite the annexation of Crimea and the Russian-sponsored insurrections in the Don Basin and the establishment of two more "frozen conflict" states in the model of Transdniestria and Abkhazia, the bulk of the Ukraine has survived and has embarked on a path toward a closer economic, political, and ultimately military relationship with the West.  This is precisely what Moscow was trying to avoid. Russia can’t preserve Putinism by creating a ring of "Lugansk People's Republics," meaning, small, weak, pro-Russian, self-proclaimed city-states on its borders.
> 
> Moscow has complained repeatedly and loudly about having been betrayed by the West over the eastward expansion of NATO, but Russia’s annexation of Crimea has resulted in meaningful NATO military deployments in the Baltic States, Poland, and elsewhere.  The 2014 annexation has likely served as the impetus for increased military spending by NATO members and the expansion of the alliance to include Montenegro (where a failed coup attempt was likely engineered by Russian military intelligence).  The U.S. has deployed ballistic missile defense systems to Poland and Romania. Although the rationale for those deployments is defense against Iran, the Russians understand those same systems could be used in defense against Russian missiles.
> 
> Even Russia's pervasive use of cyber tools to influence the recent U.S. presidential election has backfired. If you accept the premise that the Russians conspired to bring about a Trump victory, the victory is a pyrrhic one, because the U.S. political environment brought about by Russia's cyber meddling has likely made it very difficult if not impossible for President Trump to effect any meaningful improvement in U.S.-Russian relations and to give Putin the sanctions relief he so clearly desires. Compounding Putin's problems in the long run, Trump has proposed a significant increase in U.S. defense spending and is embarking on a program of modernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. At the same time, Trump is encouraging/insisting that U.S. allies increase their defense spending and participation in mutual security. We may be witnessing the beginning of a new arms race that Russia has no more chance of winning than did the Soviet Union.
> 
> The Russian argument against the eastward expansion of NATO is based on the belief that NATO is a strategic military threat to Russia. But what Putin and Russia's leadership really fear is the expansion of Western values and economic prosperity to Russia's borders.  The pluralistic and democratic values of the West and the efficiency and prosperity of Western economic systems represent direct and existential threats to Putinism.
> 
> Putin is desperately engaged in an all-out effort to stem the tide of history.  This is a contest he cannot hope to win. Recent protests may be the beginning of a rejectionist movement by Russia's youth against the corruption and dishonesty of the system Putin and his Siloviki cronies have established and from which they have massively profited.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Oldgateboatdriver said:
			
		

> Yep! Leave it to a dictator to figure out how other dictators have fallen ... and thinking (deluding oneself?) that he knows how to deal with it.  ;D





			
				Thucydides said:
			
		

> More on the pressures that Putin is facing:
> 
> https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/asia/beginning-end-putinism-1091


He may be under pressure, but I wouldn't be at all surprised if he parlayed this into a way to get a firmer grip.  I could be wrong, but it wouldn't be out of character.  In fact, some ideas here ...


> ...  *1) Blame the West*
> Why? Because that’s what the Russian government-controlled, conspiratorial media always does. In fact, Pravda almost immediately published this interview with the heading, “CIA Involved in St. Petersburg Terror Act?” The source was an individual with the background of “government and business consultant.”
> 
> *    2)  Double-Down on Alliances with Shiite Wing of Radical Islam*
> Russia is a long-standing ally of the Shiite wing of radical Islam represented by the Iranian and Syrian regimes and their Hezbollah terrorist proxy. The civil war in Syria has tightened this alliance, making Russia a direct ally on the battlefield.If ISIS or any other jihadist group based in Syria is behind the bombing, Russia’s resolve to keep Assad in power and expand the regime’s territorial holdings will only stiffen. The bombing makes it less likely Russia will pressure Assad and his inner circle out of power (even if a pro-Russian regime remains), as that’ll give the appearance that Russia caved in to the jihadists.Expect Putin to tempt the West into a laxer policy towards Iran and Hezbollah, claiming that their anti-American hostility is a byproduct of U.S. aggression that will disappear when the U.S. changes its tune and abides by Russia’s strategy for the region.
> 
> *    3)  Use It as a Pretext for Action Against a Neighbor****
> Putin has a dual strategy conquering neighboring territory under the guise of protecting and unifying Russian minorities while depicting Russia as the best hope of the civilized world as America declines.Putin has been setting the stage to once again seize Georgian territory ever since he had Russian forces rip away Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008. Russia has been slowly taking more land, eliciting a condemnation from the European Union and a complaint from Georgia about “creeping annexation.”In March 2015, Vasil Rukhadze of the Jamestown Foundation warned that Russia “might be preparing for a final assault on Georgia.”Russia consistently accuses the pro-U.S. government of Georgia of responsibility for Islamist terrorist attacks on its soil. The Russian foreign minister said in January 2016 that ISIS has a training base in the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia.
> 
> The region is indeed a hotspot for ISIS recruitment, but the accusation that ISIS has a training base implies Georgian acquiescence.
> 
> There are other neighbors that could be in Russia’s sights, but Georgia is most likely to be blamed for the bombing of the subway.
> 
> *    4)  Retaliate with Syrian Kurds*
> Russia has been arming Syrian Kurdish forces that have a Marxist orientation and are accused of being part of the PKK terrorist group. Increased assistance and coordinated action with them is a likely form of retaliation.The Turkish government, which views PKK as a terrorist threat of the highest order, is furious about this but eager to grow its military ties with Russia.
> 
> *    5)  Increased Support to the Taliban in Afghanistan*
> Senior U.S. military leaders say that Russia is backing the Taliban in Afghanistan. Iran is likewise helping the Taliban fight ISIS in Afghanistan.Increased support to the Taliban is an option for retaliating against ISIS (if ISIS is deemed responsible for orchestrating or inspiring the bombing) and also serves other interests.  The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan believes Russia wants to undermine the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan.  Russia has also sided politically with the Taliban in opposing long-term agreements for U.S. and NATO involvement and demanding the departure of foreign forces from the country.
> 
> *    6)  Suppress Massive Protests*
> Putin has been facing the biggest protests in five years with demonstrators fueled over frustration over corruption. The U.S. State Department condemned the arrests of hundreds of protestors, including a major opposition leader.Putin warned the protestors that they risked making Russia follow in the footsteps of the Arab Spring, referring to mass violence and chaos. He obviously wants to use national security as a justification for shutting down the opposition ...



*** - Maybe a titch less likely, give the alleged Kyrgyz perp, but the perp could always have gotten help from _some_one, right?


----------



## The Bread Guy

:rofl:


> The State Duma’s committee on information policies, information technologies and communication will hold a special meeting in cooperation with experts to look into whether the offices of the Voice of America and Radio Liberty radio stations operating in Russia, as well as the US television network CNN are in compliance with Russian legislation and if their broadcasts were tantamount to meddling in Russian elections, the committee’s chairman Leonid Levin, of the A Just Russia party, said on Thursday.
> 
> The first deputy chairman of the committee on CIS affairs, Eurasian integration and relations with compatriots, Konstantin Zatulin, of the United Russia party, came out with an idea of such a probe last March. He explained it would be a proportionate response to US Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen’s demand for investigating Russian television broadcaster RT. Shaheen suspects this multi-lingual television channel addressing a world audience is in breach of US legislation on the registration of foreign agents.
> 
> "After consultations with legislators and with the brain-father of the proposal, Konstantin Zatulin, the committee made a decision to hold an enlarged meeting to be attended by analysts and experts to decide if the Voice of America, Radio Liberty and the CNN observed Russia’s election legislation or were responsible for influencing election processes in the country," the committee’s press-service quotes Levin as saying.
> 
> He said that such questions begin to be put to the US public when Russian mass media, such as the RT television channel and agency Sputnik, are accused of influencing US presidential elections and truying to undermine trust towards the voting procedure.


In the words of someone way more clever than me, _"Ah, yes. Remember back when the hackers from Voice of America leaked a bunch of Putin's emails and sent spambots to support the opposition?"_


----------



## Kirkhill

Great fan of Putin that I am - I'm not laughing.

Putin continues doing what he knows - the same job he was trained for as a kid in the KGB: winning friends and influencing people.  That task is as old as the COMINTERN and SMERSH and for those that don't remember the 80's google Helen Caldicott and "If you love this planet".

Meanwhile

http://www.ned.org/



> How many Americans could identify the National Endowment for Democracy? An organization which often does exactly the opposite of what its name implies. The NED was set up in the early 1980s under President Reagan in the wake of all the negative revelations about the CIA in the second half of the 1970s. The latter was a remarkable period. Spurred by Watergate-the Church Committee of the Senate, the Pike Committee of the House and the Rockefeller Commission, created by the president, were all busy investigating the CIA. Seemingly every other day there was a new headline about the discovery of some awful thing, even criminal conduct, the CIA had been mixed up in for years. The Agency was getting an exceedingly bad name, and it was causing the powers-that-be much embarrassment.
> 
> Something had to be done. What was done was not to stop doing these awful things. Of course not. What was done was to shift many of these awful things to a new organization, with a nice sounding name-the National Endowment for Democracy. The idea was that the NED would do somewhat overtly what the CIA had been doing covertly for decades, and thus, hopefully, eliminate the stigma associated with CIA covert activities.
> 
> It was a masterpiece. Of politics, of public relations and of cynicism. Thus it was that in 1983, the National Endowment for Democracy was set up to "support democratic institutions throughout the world through private, nongovernmental efforts". Notice the "nongovernmental"-part of the image, part of the myth. In actuality, virtually every penny of its funding comes from the federal government, as is clearly indicated in the financial statement in each issue of its annual report. NED likes to refer to itself as an NGO (non-governmental organization) because this helps to maintain a certain credibility abroad that an official US government agency might not have. But NGO is the wrong category. NED is a GO.
> 
> Allen Weinstein, who helped draft the legislation establishing NED, was quite candid when he said in 1991: "A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA." In effect, the CIA has been laundering money through NED.
> 
> The Endowment has four principal initial recipients of funds: the International Republican Institute; the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs; an affiliate of the AFL-CIO (such as the American Center for International Labor Solidarity); and an affiliate of the Chamber of Commerce (such as the Center for International Private Enterprise). These institutions then disburse funds to other institutions in the US and all over the world, which then often disburse funds to yet other organizations.
> 
> In a multitude of ways, NED meddles in the internal affairs of foreign countries by supplying funds, technical know-how, training, educational materials, computers, fax machines, copiers, automobiles and so on, to selected political groups, civic organizations, labor unions, dissident movements, student groups, book publishers, newspapers, other media, etc. NED programs generally impart the basic philosophy that working people and other citizens are best served under a system of free enterprise, class cooperation, collective bargaining, minimal government intervention in the economy and opposition to socialism in any shape or form. A freemarket economy is equated with democracy, reform and growth, and the merits of foreign investment are emphasized.



http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/TrojanHorse_RS.html

confirmed by this

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Endowment_for_Democracy#Criticisms

And then there is this

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/03/15/gop-senators-ask-tillerson-to-probe-us-funding-soros-groups-abroad.html

and this

https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/

and this

http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/george-soros-democratic-convention-226267

Where does government end and private society begin?

Meanwhile this

http://www.cnbc.com/2017/01/19/george-soros-calls-donald-trump-a-would-be-dictator-who-is-going-to-fail.html

Now, if I were Putin, I might be having difficulty distinguishing amongst the US, the Democrats, the Clintons, the Rockefellers and Soros - all of whom are offering advice to his citizens on how to vote him out of office by applying Alinsky's rules.

But I'm guessing that I should have stocked up on tinfoil as obviously my brain has been fried...

Even paranoids have enemies.

As I am re-reading this I am reminded of an aphorism of empire: military follows missionaries following merchants.  The military isn't necessary until the do-gooders show up.  The State Department is full of "Shining City on a Hill" acolytes.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> ... Now, if I were Putin, I might be having difficulty distinguishing amongst the US, the Democrats, the Clintons, the Rockefellers and Soros - all of whom are offering advice to his citizens on how to vote him out of office by applying Alinsky's rules ...


Methinks the Republicans may also have been behind any ... "democratic nudging" that may have happened, too ...


----------



## Kirkhill

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> Methinks the Republicans may also have been behind any ... "democratic nudging" that may have happened, too ...



I think that point was not lost on those that decided on "none of the above" on November 8th.  The US version of Preston Manning's "same old story".


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> History proves that European wars have killed more people than every other war put together.
> 
> That should be our main peacekeeping focus.... through providing a credible deterrent to Russian aggression.



History hasn't proven that at all actually.... as per the list above.

There's no actual proof of a Russian threat, so there's no apparent value in "deterring" them. Russia, like Britain and France, is a former power that is being passed over. Us "deterring" in Latvia is akin to the Simpson's episode where they stand up the Bear Patrol


----------



## Eye In The Sky

I can't say I agree with the Russian threat part.  They appear to be building force/strength, practicing projecting it and while it may be insidious to some, I think it is something to be aware of, at least, if not concerned.


----------



## Kirkhill

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I can't say I agree with the Russian threat part.  They appear to be building force/strength, practicing projecting it and while it may be insidious to some, I think it is something to be aware of, at least, if not concerned.



I agree.  I'm not sure though that they have the capabilities to be the threat that many folks imagine.  Basically they seem, in my opinion, to be living off of Brezhnev era war stocks.  I don't believe they, or the Chinese have the capabilities to match the Americans.  Vladimir has a hammer.  Donald has a sledge.  The difference in the past was that Vladimir was prepared to use what he had.  Obama, when he held Donald's sledge, was not.  

One swallow does not make a spring but Donald now has given a reasonable Vladimir cause to second guess himself.  And the uncertainty that surrounds Donald plays into Donald's hands.



> “Probe with a bayonet: if you meet steel, stop. If you meet mush, then push.”


  Variously attributed and widely adopted. A bunch of people have been probing and pushing these past few years.

Putin, Xi, Kim, Abbas and Khameini now have to contend with the possibility of steel.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> I can't say I agree with the Russian threat part.  They appear to be building force/strength, practicing projecting it and while it may be insidious to some, I think it is something to be aware of, at least, if not concerned.



The question would be what is the purpose of their building force? As per the link attached, Russia cannot hope to come anywhere near to matching the US alone militarily, let alone the US and the rest of NATO. In my opinion, there is no value and nothing to gain for Russia from attempting to fight a conventional war against NATO, which would mute any real rationale for doing so. The presence of thousands of nuclear warheads in both Russia and the US also provides both sides with a reasonable guarantee that they don't need to anticipate an existential threat to the sovereignty of the other (after all, sovereignty is the purview of the powerful, as seen through constant interventions of smaller states). 

IMHO, Russian military "expansion" is more about maintaining relevance in the international community and ensuring that Russian economic and political interests can be at least somewhat represented. Attacking NATO in a conventional sense would not further any economic or political interest nor would it assist in influencing any potential change in the current US led liberal international world order. Russia is more likely to continue to cyber attack the west to discredit our moral leadership amongst non NATO nations. Conventional military action will only lead to a further polarization of the world against them and a military defeat.   

As such, I stand by my assertion that our "deterrence" of Russia is the same as the Bear Patrol on the Simpsons. It's deterring something that wasn't going to happen, so by default it will be a rousing success.

http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp?form=form&country1=United-States-of-America&country2=Russia&Submit=Compare+Countries


----------



## Kirkhill

But there are bears.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> But there are bears.



Yes, there are but none of them (china, Russia, Islamic state, etc) provide an existential threat to the west. 

From a geopolitical standpoint, would we be better "peacekeeping" in Korea or other areas that have the actual potential for large force on force conflicts to occur or is the bear patrol more likely to anger a bear than to deter it? Remember, it's not that long ago that Russia was a friend of the US (Clinton and Yeltsin). The expansion of NATO, the 1998 world economic crisis and its impact on Russia, and the wests unwillingness to compromise or engage Russia in areas that it felt that it had geopolitical concerns (Serbia, Kosovo, Ukraine, etc) have largely brought the west and Russia to where they are now.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> ... I'm not sure though that they have the capabilities to be the threat that many folks imagine ...





			
				Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> ... there is no value and nothing to gain for Russia from attempting to fight a conventional war against NATO ... Russian military "expansion" is more about maintaining relevance in the international community and ensuring that Russian economic and political interests can be at least somewhat represented. Attacking NATO in a conventional sense would not further any economic or political interest nor would it assist in influencing any potential change in the current US led liberal international world order ...


And yet, they're able to keep Ukraine off balance enough to keep them out of NATO for the moment, were able to seize Crimea with minimal force and maximal political and "face" effect, continue to nudge ever so subtly around the Baltics to the point of getting NATO to throw some troops that way, and continue to be "in & out" of Syria enough to be considered a key player.

Russia is a threat, but I think only because it manages to figure out _exactly_ how much pressure to apply with the right (but no more than required) amount of troops/power to get _JUST_ enough of the job done to carry on.  I like how this article summarizes the main elements of Russia's approach:


> ... Reasonable Sufficiency: Inverting the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine
> 
> (...)
> 
> Force Multipliers: The Dead Cost Nothing
> 
> (...)
> 
> Firing in Burst Mode: Battlefield Dominance and Coercive Warfare
> 
> (...)
> 
> Always Be Withdrawing
> 
> (...)
> 
> Rethinking Use of Force: No Tool is Too Small for the Job
> 
> (...)


----------



## GR66

This is taking us off track for this thread but I've said in various threats that I don't think that Russia (or China) have any desire or intention of undertaking a war of aggression against the core nations of the West.  I don't believe they have the capability (or desire) to occupy Berlin, Paris, Oslo, Washington, Ottawa, Tokyo, or Canberra.  I don't think that it makes any sense to have Canadian defence policy focused on repelling Russian invasion forces.  

That doesn't mean however that Russia (or China) aren't military threats in those areas where our interests butt up against theirs.  Ukraine, the Baltic States, Georgia, Moldova, Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea, Taiwan, the South China Sea, etc. are all potential areas where we could see conflict with these nations.  Mistakes, miscalculations or just simple military failures however COULD make one of these countries feel so threatened that escalation could take place.  

We should definitely have forces that are capable of both deterring aggression and dealing with aggression against our collective interests, but at the same time I think we need politically to decide which hills we are willing to die on and which we are not.


----------



## The Bread Guy

GR66 said:
			
		

> This is taking us off track for this thread ...


Good point - brought the Russia-related material into the Russia thread.

Carry on ...


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> And yet, they're able to keep Ukraine off balance enough to keep them out of NATO for the moment, were able to seize Crimea with minimal force and maximal political and "face" effect, continue to nudge ever so subtly around the Baltics to the point of getting NATO to throw some troops that way, and continue to be "in & out" of Syria enough to be considered a key player.
> 
> Russia is a threat, but I think only because it manages to figure out _exactly_ how much pressure to apply with the right (but no more than required) amount of troops/power to get _JUST_ enough of the job done to carry on.  I like how this article summarizes the main elements of Russia's approach:



Yes, and these examples are in reality small potatoes with minimal geo-strategic impacts on the west. The Russian ability to influence any NATO country is effectively blocked by the mere presence of NATO, more realistically the US. The fact that Russia could only take the Crimea and was forced into a proxy war with the Ukraine over the eastern provinces should be a text book indication of why they're not to be feared. Their force projection abilities are only what the only remaining superpower, the US, will allow.

Syria is an interesting topic for Russia, and somewhere I see them using military force for strategic reasons. They are required to prop up Assad to keep a mediteranean naval base as well as because Assad has blocked natural gas pipelines from elsewhere in the mid east that were intended to provide Europe, who Russia ships 70% of its gas to, with cheaper gas and another option.

Aside from Russia and small portions of territory with no importance to the west Russia isn't a threat to NATO.


----------



## Kirkhill

I agree they are not to be feared.  They are not likely to be driving into Berlin any time soon.  Unless the Germans invite them in.

Mushroom clouds at dawn are not the issue.  The bigger issues are financial, political, economic stability from keeping the system off balance.  And Vlad is doing a fine job of that.  His overall strategy seems to be to exploit, if not align, with every disruptive influence he can find.  A government says "black", he will lend support to anybody that says "white". If they make it to power he will switch to supporting those that say "black".

That makes him more dangerous, because he "operates" everywhere, everyday, and is hard to oppose, especially by conventional military means.  Rock, Paper, Scissors.... Tanks, Comms,... What cuts comms?


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I agree they are not to be feared.  They are not likely to be driving into Berlin any time soon.  Unless the Germans invite them in.
> 
> Mushroom clouds at dawn are not the issue.  The bigger issues are financial, political, economic stability from keeping the system off balance.  And Vlad is doing a fine job of that.  His overall strategy seems to be to exploit, if not align, with every disruptive influence he can find.  A government says "black", he will lend support to anybody that says "white". If they make it to power he will switch to supporting those that say "black".
> 
> That makes him more dangerous, because he "operates" everywhere, everyday, and is hard to oppose, especially by conventional military means.  Rock, Paper, Scissors.... Tanks, Comms,... What cuts comms?



I agree that it is in the Russian interest to break the US led liberal international order, same as it is in the interest of China, Brazil, India, and other nations that would like to move up into a higher power position. However, I dont believe that NATO keeping a Bde Group in eastern Europe is going to have any impact on any of it. The solution to keeping Russia "down" is diplomatic and financial. 

So, to the original point, I dont believe that Russia is any sort of military threat. Small campaigns into South Ossetia, Crimea, and the dombrass,have no impact on the west aside from giving people who want to see the Cold War come back ammunition to get back to the "good old days"


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> The question would be what is the purpose of their building force? As per the link attached, Russia cannot hope to come anywhere near to matching the US alone militarily, let alone the US and the rest of NATO. In my opinion, there is no value and nothing to gain for Russia from attempting to fight a conventional war against NATO, which would mute any real rationale for doing so. The presence of thousands of nuclear warheads in both Russia and the US also provides both sides with a reasonable guarantee that they don't need to anticipate an existential threat to the sovereignty of the other (after all, sovereignty is the purview of the powerful, as seen through constant interventions of smaller states).
> 
> IMHO, Russian military "expansion" is more about maintaining relevance in the international community and ensuring that Russian economic and political interests can be at least somewhat represented. Attacking NATO in a conventional sense would not further any economic or political interest nor would it assist in influencing any potential change in the current US led liberal international world order. Russia is more likely to continue to cyber attack the west to discredit our moral leadership amongst non NATO nations. Conventional military action will only lead to a further polarization of the world against them and a military defeat.
> 
> As such, I stand by my assertion that our "deterrence" of Russia is the same as the Bear Patrol on the Simpsons. It's deterring something that wasn't going to happen, so by default it will be a rousing success.
> 
> http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.asp?form=form&country1=United-States-of-America&country2=Russia&Submit=Compare+Countries



So Crimea, Donnas, South Ossetia and Abkhazia were all figments  of our imagination?

I disagree with you about as much as is possible.  Russia has proven to be completely untrustworthy and expansionist anywhere they identified a vulnerable target.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

There is no question, the United States is the undisputed military power of the world; however, Russia is powerful in its own right.  The power they are able to exert is different though.  Russia is a land power and has a sphere of influence that extends from its borders in to former Soviet states:







I would also argue that Russia has a second sphere, what I would call its sphere of interest.  This extends further in to the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.  The Middle East being of special importance due to Russia's reliance on energy exports which fuel its economy.  











Russia has no global ambition like the United States, its military is there to protect its sphere of influence and keep access to its spheres of interest open.  The Regular Army is 270,000 in strength with another 750,000 in Reserve.  That's not including VDV which is separate and sitting at around 50,000.  It's got a reasonably large Navy and large Air Force, more than enough to deny access of the Black Sea, Norwegian Sea, etc.  

I also wouldn't put much stock in Defence budgets, yes Russia only spends $60 billion dollars on Defence; however, given the State control of the Russian military industrial complex, secrecy, etc.  I would argue that this number is irrelevant.  How much would Canada have to spend to have an equivalent force in capability and size, $200-300 billion?  There dollars go a lot further than any NATO country's dollars go.

I've got a couple of friends that grew up in Russia and only moved to Canada in their teens.  School children in Russia all receive military training, my friend told me when he was in middle school all the children were taught how to strip and assemble AK47 rifles, conduct orienteering, etc.  This is all done under the veil of "adventure training/outdoor activities" but there is a higher intent here.


----------



## GR66

I'm with the camp that doesn't see Russian Army Groups dashing for the Fulda Gap any time soon, but there are three VERY big flies in the ointment - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

These three NATO countries do pose a serious issue for Russia.  Their entrance has pushed the NATO/Russian border 1300km closer to Moscow and right up against the border of Russia.  Not only has this move completely eliminated the presence of "buffer states" between Russian and the West, but has actually physically separated part of Russia (Kaliningrad) from the rest of the country.

Whatever our actual intentions, they can very easily be seen by Russians as a potential NATO dagger aimed at their homeland and a threat to their strategic (political, military and economic) position in the Baltic.

To complicate matters even more, these three states have a very muddled history with periods of independence separated by periods of domination by both Russia and other foreign powers.  All three countries have significant ethnic Russian minorities (25% in Estonia and Latvia, 6% in Lithuania but some major cities have Russian populations approaching 50% of the population).  What stand do we as NATO take if these minorities start agitating for greater rights?  Citizenship rights for some older Russian-speaking residents who were denied it at time of independence because they only spoke Russian?  Official Language rights?  Education in their native tongue?  Are these demands legitimate in an open, "Western" democracy?  Do they become illegitimate if they begin to receive moral or economic support from the Russian state?  Where does NATO stand if protests by Russian minorities becomes "heated" and the governments crack down?  Suppress the protests?  Maybe even use force?  

There are a lot of potentially difficult issues in those areas.  Personally, while I totally support the independence of the Baltic States and their freedom from Soviet domination, I think that bringing them into NATO was a very poor decision.  But that is the past and now we have to deal with that reality.  The risk now is that Russia might be sufficiently motivated to try to lessen the perceived threat that the Baltic States pose to Russia by destabilizing them from within rather than threatening them directly from without.  The problem for NATO is that they can't afford to "lose" any of the Baltic States without shaking the confidence of the rest of the members in NATOs commitment and capability.


----------



## tomahawk6

Russia is increasing its role in Central America including a new facility in Nicaragua to enhance Russia's version of GPS,but is more likely an intelligence gathering facility. Time for the US to counter this Russian activity possibly with more foreign aid.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/the-soviet-union-fought-the-cold-war-in-nicaragua-now-putins-russia-is-back/2017/04/08/b43039b0-0d8b-11e7-aa57-2ca1b05c41b8_story.html?utm_term=.64953f5b75e8

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA — On the rim of a volcano with a clear view of the U.S. Embassy, landscapers are applying the final touches to a mysterious new Russian compound.
Behind the concrete walls and barbed wire, a visitor can see red-and-blue buildings, manicured lawns, antennas and globe-shaped devices. The Nicaraguan government says it’s simply a tracking site of the Russian version of a GPS satellite system. But is it also an intelligence base intended to surveil the Americans?


----------



## Cdn Blackshirt

"Russia has no global ambition like the United States, its military is there to protect its sphere of influence and keep access to its spheres of interest open."

I hear this comment regularly from those who attempt to defend the Russian for their indefensible actions.

Regardless of their perception of "their sphere of influence" it does not entitle them to invade and annex independent nations.  Much less to actively support tyrants like Bashir Assad as they strategically murder their own citizens.

It's a B.S. argument and if you lived in one of those "sphere of influence" border nations like Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Georgia, etc., where you were constantly threatened for doing anything contrary to the Kremlin's wishes, you'd see this ridiculousness completely differently.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> "Russia has no global ambition like the United States, its military is there to protect its sphere of influence and keep access to its spheres of interest open."
> 
> I hear this comment regularly from those who attempt to defend the Russian for their indefensible actions.
> 
> Regardless of their perception of "their sphere of influence" it does not entitle them to invade and annex independent nations.  Much less to actively support tyrants like Bashir Assad as they strategically murder their own citizens.
> 
> It's a B.S. argument and if you lived in one of those "sphere of influence" border nations like Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Georgia, etc., where you were constantly threatened for doing anything contrary to the Kremlin's wishes, you'd see this ridiculousness completely differently.



It's not BS it's reality.  The United States, France, UK, China have all invaded and meddled in the affairs of other countries in there spheres of influence, why should Russia receive harsher treatment in your eyes and not the others?

I'm sure you feel the same level of compassion for Panama, Grenada, Cuba, Mexico, Colombia, etc.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Cdn Blackshirt said:
			
		

> "Russia has no global ambition like the United States, its military is there to protect its sphere of influence and keep access to its spheres of interest open."
> 
> I hear this comment regularly from those who attempt to defend the Russian for their indefensible actions.
> 
> Regardless of their perception of "their sphere of influence" it does not entitle them to invade and annex independent nations.  Much less to actively support tyrants like Bashir Assad as they strategically murder their own citizens.
> 
> It's a B.S. argument and if you lived in one of those "sphere of influence" border nations like Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, Georgia, etc., where you were constantly threatened for doing anything contrary to the Kremlin's wishes, you'd see this ridiculousness completely differently.



I dont defend Russia, I just dont believe that they're any threat. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are all parts of NATO, so there is no chance, in my opinion, that Russia would invade them directly since they would be defeated in due fashion. So, spending money to "deter" the Russians from something they aren't going to do is more of a slight of hand in my opinion.

The only strategic option that Russia has is to break the US led liberal international order which cannot be done militarily.


----------



## a_majoor

The problem is much more difficult.

Nations like the Baltic Republics are seen by Russia as in Russia's "sphere of influence", as well as buffer states to absorb invading armies. From Russia's perspective, it is unforgivable for nations in the "near abroad" to decisively reject Russian influence and literally turn their backs on Russia to face West and seek the opportunities available in the EU and North America.

Since Russia has few natural barriers against invasion from either the East or West, losing the former buffer states is scary. In addition they are now a nation with a GDP about the size of Spain sandwiched between the EU (with a population and GDP similar to the United States) and China (the second largest economy in the world and a population of over a billion), which is very much at odds with Vladimir Putin's 2008 speech where he declared Russia is indeed a Great Power and should be treated as such, as well as deep seated Russian Mythology of Moscow being the "Third Rome" and Russia being destined to unite and rule over the civilizations of the West and East.

Putin and the Russians are very opportunistic and using every opportunity to sow confusion and attempt to turn Western nations against each other in order to keep their cards in play as long as possible, but the mismatch of resources will eventually tell so long as the West or China have resolute leadership. Even the Gulf States could collapse the oil market and upend the Russian position, which is not a good place to be in.

Expect Putin to continue to try to exploit the seams for as long as possible, and jump at every opportunity to sow confusion and discord in his wake.


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The problem is much more difficult.
> 
> Nations like the Baltic Republics are seen by Russia as in Russia's "sphere of influence", as well as buffer states to absorb invading armies. From Russia's perspective, it is unforgivable for nations in the "near abroad" to decisively reject Russian influence and literally turn their backs on Russia to face West and seek the opportunities available in the EU and North America.
> 
> Since Russia has few natural barriers against invasion from either the East or West, losing the former buffer states is scary. In addition they are now a nation with a GDP about the size of Spain sandwiched between the EU (with a population and GDP similar to the United States) and China (the second largest economy in the world and a population of over a billion), which is very much at odds with Vladimir Putin's 2008 speech where he declared Russia is indeed a Great Power and should be treated as such, as well as deep seated Russian Mythology of Moscow being the "Third Rome" and Russia being destined to unite and rule over the civilizations of the West and East.
> 
> Putin and the Russians are very opportunistic and using every opportunity to sow confusion and attempt to turn Western nations against each other in order to keep their cards in play as long as possible, but the mismatch of resources will eventually tell so long as the West or China have resolute leadership. Even the Gulf States could collapse the oil market and upend the Russian position, which is not a good place to be in.
> 
> Expect Putin to continue to try to exploit the seams for as long as possible, and jump at every opportunity to sow confusion and discord in his wake.



Not to mention these States along with Moldova, Ukraine, etc... All contain substantial Russian populations.  I see no difference with what Russia is doing to what the French do in Africa, the Americans do in Latin America or the Chinese do in Southeast Asia.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Thucydides said:
			
		

> The problem is much more difficult.
> 
> Nations like the Baltic Republics are seen by Russia as in Russia's "sphere of influence", as well as buffer states to absorb invading armies. From Russia's perspective, it is unforgivable for nations in the "near abroad" to decisively reject Russian influence and literally turn their backs on Russia to face West and seek the opportunities available in the EU and North America.
> 
> Since Russia has few natural barriers against invasion from either the East or West, losing the former buffer states is scary. In addition they are now a nation with a GDP about the size of Spain sandwiched between the EU (with a population and GDP similar to the United States) and China (the second largest economy in the world and a population of over a billion), which is very much at odds with Vladimir Putin's 2008 speech where he declared Russia is indeed a Great Power and should be treated as such, as well as deep seated Russian Mythology of Moscow being the "Third Rome" and Russia being destined to unite and rule over the civilizations of the West and East.
> 
> Putin and the Russians are very opportunistic and using every opportunity to sow confusion and attempt to turn Western nations against each other in order to keep their cards in play as long as possible, but the mismatch of resources will eventually tell so long as the West or China have resolute leadership. Even the Gulf States could collapse the oil market and upend the Russian position, which is not a good place to be in.
> 
> Expect Putin to continue to try to exploit the seams for as long as possible, and jump at every opportunity to sow confusion and discord in his wake.



While I agree that Russia will pursue its self interest, it doesn't possess the military or economic strength to challenge NATO so there is no threat for the baltic nations of direct invasion. What Russia is left with are 3 options- either participate as a member in the US liberal world order, move outside the world order, or lead a new world order. The reality is that Russia doesn't have the ability, militarily or diplomatically, to create a classic realist "balance of power" against in the US in the way that the Warsaw Pact operated. They are better to operate within the current system in a contradictory role to the US than to attempt to directly challenge it, a challenge it will lose. Further, if Russia was attempting to create a new world order or alliance to counter-balance the Americans and the west it would have to do so diplomatically through either soft power alliance or by showing other nations who may oppose the US led order (China, most of Africa, Brazil, etc) that their leadership can provide a real alternative that is beneficial for all parties. Things like influencing the US election can be seen as much more effective means of undermining US credibility than any attack... the US has already lost face due to Trump and is likely to lose more as time passes on.

In neither scenario do I see Russia directly attacking any NATO country despite where its "sphere of influence" lies. If they want to power balance than having the appearance of at least some ability to militarily stand up to the west is vital but they cannot maintain any military influence through direct conflict.

So I still submit that our military efforts are better situated elsewhere than eastern Europe.


----------



## Kirkhill

No, Russia won't send a Division into Estonia guns blazing.

Yes, Russia will/may undercut the Estonian government by supporting legitimate opposition parties with policy differences, Estonian businesses opposed to government tax or employment plans, Ethnic Russians, criminal elements, supportive foreigners, activities in international fora like OSCE and the UN, media and television, social media, economic actions and anything else that will destabilize the situation.  Ultimately they will seek an opportunity to exploit any opening that comes their way.  

That exploitation could mean "little green men" and/or "division" invited by the opposition or an elected government or just to "stabilize" a "failed state" on its border, or with a mandate from the UN Human Rights Committee.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> No, Russia won't send a Division into Estonia guns blazing.
> 
> Yes, Russia will/may undercut the Estonian government by supporting legitimate opposition parties with policy differences, Estonian businesses opposed to government tax or employment plans, Ethnic Russians, criminal elements, supportive foreigners, activities in international fora like OSCE and the UN, media and television, social media, economic actions and anything else that will destabilize the situation.  Ultimately they will seek an opportunity to exploit any opening that comes their way.
> 
> That exploitation could mean "little green men" and/or "division" invited by the opposition or an elected government or just to "stabilize" a "failed state" on its border, or with a mandate from the UN Human Rights Committee.



I agree, which is why us spending money and our limited resources in Latvia is futile in my opinion (aside from it being a better training activity than Maple Resolve). Russia has interests in its neighbouring countries, no doubt. But our presence will do absolutely nothing in curbing any of it


----------



## Kirkhill

I disagree.

Even a company of troops standing alongside the locals will tend to discourage incursions by little green men.  And the type of actions the LGM are likely to be able to undertake can be countered by Light Infantry on Para-Military/Constabulary duties.  Think Carabinieri and the Gendarmerie Nationale level of operations.  A couple of mixed battle groups currently seen in the Baltics would, I believe, have changed the calculus in the Crimea.  

The "locals" would then have had to wonder about the consequences of killing Italians and Frenchmen, amongst others.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> I disagree.
> 
> Even a company of troops standing alongside the locals will tend to discourage incursions by little green men.  And the type of actions the LGM are likely to be able to undertake can be countered by Light Infantry on Para-Military/Constabulary duties.  Think Carabinieri and the Gendarmerie Nationale level of operations.  A couple of mixed battle groups currently seen in the Baltics would, I believe, have changed the calculus in the Crimea.
> 
> The "locals" would then have had to wonder about the consequences of killing Italians and Frenchmen, amongst others.



I disagree with your disagreement. Your "little green men" will infiltrate into the baltics if it is what Russian strategy desires whether they are there are not. The Russians are well aware that those nations are in NATO and are well aware of what any sort of hostile action towards a baltic nation would mean.


----------



## Kirkhill

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> I disagree with your disagreement. Your "little green men" will infiltrate into the baltics if it is what Russian strategy desires whether they are there are not. The Russians are well aware that those nations are in NATO and are well aware of what any sort of hostile action towards a baltic nation would mean.



Good.  We are in agreement then.  We disagree.  [


----------



## a_majoor

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> No, Russia won't send a Division into Estonia guns blazing.
> 
> Yes, Russia will/may undercut the Estonian government by supporting legitimate opposition parties with policy differences, Estonian businesses opposed to government tax or employment plans, Ethnic Russians, criminal elements, supportive foreigners, activities in international fora like OSCE and the UN, media and television, social media, economic actions and anything else that will destabilize the situation.  Ultimately they will seek an opportunity to exploit any opening that comes their way.
> 
> That exploitation could mean "little green men" and/or "division" invited by the opposition or an elected government or just to "stabilize" a "failed state" on its border, or with a mandate from the UN Human Rights Committee.



This is absolutely the MO of Hybrid Warfare, and it can escalate into Direct Action, such as kidnapping people (like the Estonian customs officer taken at the border and then charged with Espionage when inside Russia), as well as threats like cyber war impeding communications and utilities operations. Hybrid warfare, like Chinese "Unrestricted Warfare" is deliberately designed to be ambiguous, non attributable and limit the possibilities of retribution, so there is a possible argument against using our resources to send a battlegroup to Latvia. The question then becomes what, exactly, are we going to do?

Sitting on our hands is not an option, but Canada's "soft power" is laughably small (the only people who say the world wants more Canada are Canadians), we have very limited alternative enablers like Cyber, IA, economic warfare or other non traditional means, so even a small application of Hard Power in the right place to send a massage of resolve both to the Russians and the Baltic Republics may be the best we can do for the moment. Resolve in the face of ambiguity may well be one of the better counters to Hybrid Warfare.


----------



## Bird_Gunner45

Thucydides said:
			
		

> This is absolutely the MO of Hybrid Warfare, and it can escalate into Direct Action, such as kidnapping people (like the Estonian customs officer taken at the border and then charged with Espionage when inside Russia), as well as threats like cyber war impeding communications and utilities operations. Hybrid warfare, like Chinese "Unrestricted Warfare" is deliberately designed to be ambiguous, non attributable and limit the possibilities of retribution, so there is a possible argument against using our resources to send a battlegroup to Latvia. The question then becomes what, exactly, are we going to do?
> 
> Sitting on our hands is not an option, but Canada's "soft power" is laughably small (the only people who say the world wants more Canada are Canadians), we have very limited alternative enablers like Cyber, IA, economic warfare or other non traditional means, so even a small application of Hard Power in the right place to send a massage of resolve both to the Russians and the Baltic Republics may be the best we can do for the moment. Resolve in the face of ambiguity may well be one of the better counters to Hybrid Warfare.



Understood (though this sounds like 4GW, which absolutely is not a thing). It belies the point that deploying a BG to stretch our already stretched resources, is futile in the face of the threat. Assets such as EW, cyber warfare, etc woudl be more appropriate. I dont believe that the Russians care that Canada has sent troops to the baltic nor do I believe that it has any affect other than providing a good training opportunity.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Bird_Gunner45 said:
			
		

> ... It belies the point that deploying a BG to stretch our already stretched resources, is futile in the face of the threat ...


And convince enough NATO & allied governments of this, and Russia has checkmated without _needing_ to deploy divisions ...


----------



## Rifleman62

Thucydides: 





> Sitting on our hands is not an option, but Canada's "soft power" is laughably small (the only people who say the world wants more Canada are Canadians (Liberals)..........


----------



## GR66

Deploying traditional military forces has more of a political objective than a military objective.  It reassures our host allies (and other nearby allies) that we are willing to meet our treaty obligations to defend their territory by putting some of our forces in the potential direct line of fire of the enemy.

At the same time is serves to fairly clearly set the upper limit of what Russia can do in the area.  Annexation or direct military action is effectively off the table, unless things get to the point where they are willing to face all out war with NATO.

The trick then is not being pressured into wasting our militarly resources on political deployments which serve to limit our actual military capability.  The deterrent force only really needs to be symbolic.  Just large enough to provide the political deterrent to a Crimea-style fait accomplit annexation and halt but not so large that the forces themselves could be used to Russian political means (targets for pro-Russian protests, being seen as "occupation" forces, etc.).

That should (hopefully) leave us (the "collective" us) enough resources to provide the kind of resources which could counter Russian non-conventional actions.

Does that maybe raise the question of how we should organize our military forces in general?  If small conventional forces are enough to shape the types of conflicts we can expect in known hot spots, then should the bulk of our remaining forces be organized in such a way to be most effective in unexpected situations/locations rather than as additional conventional forces designed to augment our already deployed forces against a conventional attack that is unlikely?


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Russia won't use force if facing NATO;  I guess that depends on how strong and effective you see NATO as.


----------



## MilEME09

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Russia won't use force if facing NATO;  I guess that depends on how strong and effective you see NATO as.



Considering Europes energy dependence on Russia, I would much more expect to see Russia play that card.


----------



## Good2Golf

Anyone here follow the Elbe Group?

http://www.belfercenter.org/elbe-group/overview-elbe-group

Interesting reading.

Regards
G2G


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> Anyone here follow the Elbe Group?
> 
> http://www.belfercenter.org/elbe-group/overview-elbe-group
> 
> Interesting reading.
> 
> Regards
> G2G



Never heard of them before, but thanks for sharing.


----------



## Kirkhill

Eye In The Sky said:
			
		

> Never heard of them before, but thanks for sharing.



Likewise.  Thanks G2G.


----------



## a_majoor

On the resurgence of Russian Naval power. Notably this is consistent with Russian History dating back to Peter the Great, so once again, the lessons of history are available to whoever is willing to look for them:

https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/russia-a-land-power-hungry-for-the-sea/



> *Russia: A Land Power Hungry for the Sea*
> Tom Fedyszyn
> ‎18‎/‎04‎/‎2017
> 
> Trying to understand the military behavior of nations has been a hobby of Western academics, beginning with the great geopoliticians of former centuries, such as Nicholas Spykman, Sir Halford Mackinder, and Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. Simply, the argument is that geography demanded that insular and coastal nations such as England, Japan, and the Netherlands develop strong navies to support their national economic and political interests. Conversely, Germany, the Turkish Republic, and the Roman Empire were required to use their formidable land armies to defend and expand their territories. Russia stands out as a one-off. Situated squarely on the borders of Eastern Europe and central Asia, she endured numerous land assaults, and, accordingly built large defensive and offensive land armies. However, in fits and starts, she has also assembled naval forces equal to or greater than most of her presumptive adversaries. Why does Russia, a traditional land power, engage in such counterintuitive and unique behavior? Do recent international events shed light on Russia’s future naval activities?
> 
> When Tsar Peter the Great embarked on building a navy 330 years ago, he did so to defend the homeland from Swedish and Turkish enemies, north and south, while at the same time buying Russia a seat at the “great power” diplomatic table. Serendipitously, his navy did enable him to expand Russian boundaries and give him access to the world’s oceans. A second noteworthy Russian foray into the sea was at the height of the Cold War when Soviet Adm. Gorshkov planned and built a naval force that rivalled American supremacy at sea. His submarines alone (385) outnumbered those of the NATO Alliance and they regularly patrolled off the American Atlantic and Pacific coasts until the fall of the Soviet Union. On the surface of the oceans, it was commonplace for U.S. warships visiting exotic ports around the world to be joined by their Soviet counterparts throughout the Cold War.
> 
> All this ended abruptly with the implosion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet 5th Eskhadra ingloriously slipped out of the Mediterranean in the dark of night once it was determined that there wasn’t enough money left in the Kremlin’s coffers to sustain its operations in late 1989. Russian ballistic-missile submarines gradually reduced their Atlantic Ocean patrols until they reached zero in 2001.
> 
> Almost as quickly as the Russian Federation Navy vanished, it reappeared. A convenient benchmark for this turnaround is 2008, since a number of factors began to congeal. First, the Russian military (including its navy) performed deplorably while defeating hapless Georgia in a short war of annexation. This incited the Putin-Medvedev team to spur Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov to reform the defense establishment. He mimicked U.S. initiatives to become more professional and “joint.” Additionally, he also addressed the training, morale, and recruit quality in the Russian navy, since it was equally unsatisfactory. Second, the price of oil (Russia’s only meaningful export commodity) began to skyrocket, filling Russian pockets with vast reserves of discretionary resources.  Third, and finally, Putin and Medvedev decided to invest much of this money building a bigger and better military, and the Russian navy got more than its fair share of the 10-year building plan.
> 
> Today, we once again are being treated to witness a land power whose sea power switch has been reactivated. For instructive purposes, let’s take a close-up look at Russia’s Syria interlude: The Russian navy had awakened from its Rip Van Winkle-like 20-year sleep and in 2013 re-established a “permanent flotilla” in the eastern Mediterranean, serviced by all four of its major fleets (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific). After the Obama administration’s “red line” pronouncement on Bashar al-Assad’s chemical weapons, only this Russian naval force was in position to escort the vessels carrying Syrian chemical weapons to their ultimate destruction. The world acknowledged Putin’s diplomatic lead on this navy-enabled initiative. Then, Russia’s air force required additional air defense and communications support in its operations in support of the Syrian regime. The Russian permanent naval flotilla obliged. The Russian air campaign was then augmented by the arrival of Russia’s only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, last fall. Finally, in an act that surprised and impressed most of the world, the Russian navy launched multiple long-range Kalibr cruise missiles on so-called terrorist positions in Syria from both small Buyan-M patrol boats in the Caspian Sea as well as similarly small Kilo-class diesel submarines in the Mediterranean. Perhaps of greatest importance, Russia provides virtually all of its logistical support for its Syrian operation with logistic ships operating from the Black Sea and escorted and defended by the naval flotilla, enroute to its base in Tartus, Syria.
> 
> Worldwide, the Russian navy has made equally impressive gains, particularly in view of its low starting point in the 1990’s. Operating jointly with the Russian Air Force, there is no point on the Russian periphery where a foreign military can now operate with impunity. This is most obvious in Russia’s northern reaches where she has militarized the Arctic with a vengeance. This initiative is led by the Russian Northern Fleet, which has once again begun deploying submarines into the North Atlantic in great numbers. Given the political focus caused by Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and expansion of its base in Sevastopol, the Russian navy has also been rushing new frigates and submarines to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Former head of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, Admiral Mark Ferguson, has described this as Russia’s “Arc of Steel” from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, vaguely reminiscent of the Churchillian Iron Curtain.
> 
> What lessons might we learn about the future behavior of this land power with a hefty appetite for maritime power? Does the United States have reason for concern as it, too, launches naval cruise missile strikes into Syria, with the well-armed Russian navy observing on the sidelines?
> 
> From the perspective of the United States and its allies, the current status of the Russian navy offers both comfort and consternation. On the plus side for the West, irrespective of how much money Russia throws at its navy, no serious analyst thinks that the Russian navy can contend for control of the world’s oceans. This is eminently logical because the Russian fascination with the sea does not rest on economic necessity. Moscow never had, and still today does not have, an economy that is dependent on global trade, much less one that demands control of the seas. In addition, Russia’s stark inability to build large ships (think, aircraft carriers) ties its hands in any attempt at blue water sea control and power projection. Plus, it goes unsaid that the Russian economy is always at risk. Continued stagnation in Russian GDP growth probably is the death knell of expanding its navy.
> 
> Nonetheless, Putin’s navy continues to perform the missions outlined by Peter the Great, which should begin to offer a stew of comfort mixed with consternation. First, defense of the homeland. The Russian navy’s principal focus is on real estate close to the Russian border. Most of its operations and exercises are in waters adjacent to Russia. Think of it as high firepower potential but limited range. This, however, is comforting only if you are not a NATO member in Eastern Europe near the Russian border. Russia’s resumed deployment of ballistic missile submarines in the Atlantic could be unnerving, but is more readily construed as defense of the homeland, since these submarines, more than ever, will constitute Russia’s second strike – that is, deterrent — capability. Tsar Peter’s secondary consideration – gaining international diplomatic respect and recognition – continues to be supported by Russian Navy port visits and exercises around the world. In recent months, Russian ships have visited Namibia, the Philippines, South Africa, and the Seychelles and also conducted fleet exercises with the Indonesian and Chinese navies. While Putin has lost no ground to Peter the Great, this activity need not keep us awake at night.
> 
> Now, for the anxiety. The Russian naval mission appears to have quietly expanded to become a vehicle to sell sophisticated weaponry. Witness the salability of the Kalibr cruise missile and the Improved Kilo-Class diesel submarine, highlighted by its recent combat performance in Syria. Weapons exports follow behind the sales of petroleum products as the leading source of Russian foreign exchange. This may be of minimal concern, but even strategically important and friendly nations can unwittingly become client states as they realize weapons systems purchases addict the purchaser to follow-on supply, repair, and support contracts. Think India.
> 
> Of even greater concern is that Russia’s navy is now conducting military operations (Syria) some distance from its borders and it can apparently shoot straight. The U.S. Navy has learned over history that there is no alternative in learning to “fight the away game” than by sending naval forces beyond their security umbrella and forcing them to learn how to operate without an umbilical cord to fleet headquarters. This has never been a strong point of the Russian navy in the past. Also, should Russian national strategies be taken seriously, we might anticipate seeing the development of maritime hybrid warfare in the eastern Mediterranean, so well-perfected by Russian ground forces in Ukraine and Eastern Europe.
> 
> Perhaps the greatest and most serious concern is Russian national security decision making, concentrated in Vladimir Putin. He sure seems to love his navy. For unscientific proof, Google him and note the frequency with which he dons nautical fashion (hint: somewhat less often than bare-chested bear riding). At a recent press conference, he boasted that Admiral Kuznetsov’s deployment to the Mediterranean was his “personal initiative.” Based on the frequency with which he attends naval events and dresses in its uniforms, it is not unreasonable that he has a special affinity for his fleet. Further, he is a risk taker, known to overplay weak hands – and get away with it. And, finally, he is a judo master, fashioning himself along the lines of a navy destroyer: sleek, lean, lethal, vicious, stealthy and a very impressive sight to witness.
> 
> 
> Tom Fedyszyn is Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. A retired Navy captain, his military assignments included command of a cruiser and naval attaché to Russia. The views expressed here are his own and do not represent those of the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or any part of the U.S. government.


----------



## Good2Golf

And keep in mind that Russia is investing heavily in its leased (just renewed in JAN 2017, until 2066) base in Tartus, Syria.  Additoinally, it seems they are looking to increase the ship-handling capability significantly.

People would do well to try and appreciate why the Russian's will be very protective of the Regime in Syria.  They essentially took Crimea because the extant Ukrainian Government significantly changes its position regarding Sevastopol; no reason to think Syria would be the other exception for Russian Naval bases outside of Russia.

:2c:

Regards
G2G


----------



## The Bread Guy

Russia supporting the Taliban:  don't believe it until both the Russians and the Taliban*** deny it.

More here (via Google News)

*** - If you don't want to click on a Taliban page, full statement also attached.


----------



## Kirkhill

Russia having difficulty keeping troop numbers up.

More foreigners.  More PMCs. More forced conscripts.



> APRIL 24, 2017
> Russia’s Desperation for More Soldiers Is Taking It to Dark Places
> BY VALENTYN BADRAK, LADA ROSLYCKY, MYKHAILO SAMUS, AND VOLODYMYR KOPCHAK
> 
> Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine and intensive military operations in Syria have caused a very big problem: a shortage of qualified people to man its occupation forces. This personnel gap, caused by permanent, heavy losses suffered by Russia’s forces, has drastically changed the scale and character of its military missions.
> 
> At the early stages of the conflicts, this shortage of qualified military personnel was corrected by recruitment from the Army Special Operations Forces, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service, and other special services. But now, to fill this gap further, Russia has moved to employ private military companies (PMC), expand its recruitment base, and punish contract soldiers for refusing to partake in its illegitimate operations.
> 
> To date, information about Russian PMCs remains limited. At least ten PMCs exist in Russia; some operate outside its jurisdiction. Following the Kremlin’s September 2015 intervention in Syria, about 1,500 Russian mercenaries arrived from the Russian PMC “Wagner,” which is linked to operations in Ukraine, where the group is known as “The Cleaners” in areas controlled by Russian and Russian-backed forces. Soviet fighters of the PMC “Malhama Tactical,” with mainly Uzbek and North Caucasus roots, have been noted as forming the first jihadist PMC with a “distinct niche between the worlds of professional PMCs and jihadi groups operating in Syria.”
> 
> To further expand its contracted recruitment base, the Kremlin has also amended the recruitment process for Russian conscripts, military reservists, stateless persons, and foreign nationals. Recruitment of Russian citizens for contracted military service is facilitated by the legislative package “On the Introduction of the Draft of Federal Law on Amendments to the Federal Law on Conscription and Military Service,” which passed on October 14, 2016. It enabled short-term missions for contracted recruitment of Russian conscripts and reservists.
> 
> Previously, the first military contract with the rank of soldier, seaman, sergeant, or sergeant-major was to be signed for two or three years. Positions with the rank of warrant officer, sub-officer, or officer stipulated five years. Now, these categories are allowed to sign for a term of "between six months and one year" in the cases of “disaster relief or efforts related to a state of emergency, restoration of the constitutional order, and other extraordinary situations, or to take part in collective measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
> 
> Importantly, the amendments are further justified by “changes in the military and political situation, and intensified activity of international terrorist organizations,” resulting in “the necessity for increasing of mobility of troops (forces), the creation of combined and irregular detachments, and their expedited staffing by contract servicemen, to quickly accomplish short-term yet crucial missions related to participation in peace support operations and operations to fight against terrorist and extremist organizations.” The amendments were signed into law by President Vladimir Putin on December 28, 2016.
> 
> These amendments enable Russia to rapidly deploy and use a large invasion and occupation army, under the pretext that the detachments are carrying out “peace support operations” and “fighting against terrorist and extremist organizations.” In effect, they legalize the unlawful recruitment of conscripts for “short-term tours of duty” to Ukraine as contract soldiers.
> 
> Significant changes have also been made to the procedure for contracted recruitment and service in the Russian Armed Forces for stateless persons and foreign nationals. On January 2, 2015, a presidential decree amended the “Provision on the Procedure of Military Service” to facilitate the contracted participation of stateless persons and foreign nationals in the Russian Armed Forces; the adoption of Russian citizenship is not required. This includes active service and operations abroad.
> 
> The low quality of life, high unemployment rates, and Russian military bases in Central Asia and the Caucasus region make the CIS a fertile recruiting ground. Importantly, the territories of other separatist regions fomented by the Russian Federation (i.e., Crimea, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria) also contain Russian military bases and equipment, and may also deliver fresh recruits. Russian-speakers in Western Europe, the Middle East, or North America may be willing to join; but with payment and social benefits well below international standards, they are likely to come from fringe groups. Russian experts estimate that twenty-five million Russian speakers could be recruited from abroad.
> 
> Such foreign recruits may be used as part of Russia’s neo-imperial policy and hybrid war waged through illegal armed formations, which could, at any point, turn into an open, armed aggression of the Russian army. A real and serious threat lies in the recruitment and training of foreign individuals by Russian special services for use in extremist or terrorist groups and activities. The increase of this risk can be seen in the growing number of Russian and CIS militants actively participating in extremist and terrorist acts by ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and by the Taliban in Afghanistan.
> 
> High casualty rates in the Russian military have also resulted in widespread avoidance of tours to the Ukrainian border. Between 2014 to mid-2015, the most avoided appointment was service in the 12th Reserve Command of the Russian Armed Forces, in Novocherkassk, Russia, which was created to “officially deploy” Russian military servicemen (under concealment) to Ukraine. Servicemen who try to avoid serving there have found themselves on the receiving end of the Russian government’s repressions. Russian courts fast-track resolutions to discharge and convict them, at times under threat of sentencing to penal colonies.
> 
> Employing PMCs, recruiting foreigners, and forcing servicemen to fight in illegitimate wars and follow unlawful orders may be categorized as war crimes. In addition to creating military advantages and cutting costs, Russia’s leadership may also be facing criminal liability for its decision to initiate armed aggression with the use of unlawful forces in Ukraine and Syria. The best evidence of such a course of events is the experience of leaders from former Yugoslavia, whose aggressive Balkan wars and ultra-nationalistic policies landed them as war criminals at the International Tribunal in The Hague.
> 
> Valentyn Badrak is the Director the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies; Lada Roslycky is a soft power security expert and strategic communications adviser to government and nongovernmental institutions, including DCAF; Mykhailo Samus is the Deputy Director for International Affairs at the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies; and Volodymyr Kopchak is the Deputy Director of the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies.



http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-s-desperation-for-more-soldiers-is-taking-it-to-dark-places


----------



## Kirkhill

And as a result - Pre-emption



> APRIL 27, 2017
> 
> The Unsettling View From Moscow
> Russia's Strategic Debate on a Doctrine of Pre-emption
> 
> By Alexander Velez-Green
> 
> A rising number of Russia’s senior military strategists are advocating for the adoption of a doctrine of pre-emption for the defense of their nation. This doctrine would be intended to protect the territorial integrity and vital national interests of the Russian Federation. To achieve these fundamentally defensive aims, Russian military strategists argue that if an attack on Russian vital interests appears imminent, Moscow must be prepared to use strategic non-nuclear or limited nuclear force first in order to deter or defeat the United States or NATO. Pre-emption could occur in crisis or in the early stages of an escalating conflict. Russian advocates of pre-emption argue that the pre-emptive attacks on U.S. or NATO targets could serve one or more of three purposes.
> 
> 1. Deterrence by cost imposition. Pre-emptive attacks on countervalue targets could provide a “punch in the nose” that deters U.S. or NATO aggression by communicating to Western policymakers and publics alike that the costs of attacking or escalating a military confrontation with Russia will outweigh any plausible benefits.
> 
> 2. Deterrence by denial. Pre-emptive attacks on counterforce targets could degrade U.S. or NATO power projection capabilities, and change the “correlation of forces,” such that Washington and other NATO capitals no longer believe that they can prevail in a major war, at acceptable levels of escalation, against Russia.
> 
> 3. Pre-emption as a defeat mechanism. Some advocates argue that pre-emptive attacks on key Western aerospace – and other – capabilities may allow the Russian armed forces to degrade or eliminate U.S. and NATO forces’ comparative advantages, such as long-range strike, thereby improving Russia’s relative military-operational position.
> 
> 
> Russia’s potential adoption of a military doctrine based on pre-emption appears to remain in debate. The Kremlin does not yet appear to have shifted to a pre-emptive posture, based on open-source reporting. However, arguments for Russia’s shift to pre-emption seem to have gained traction in Moscow since the mid-2000s. And there is a significant likelihood that Moscow may ultimately endorse pre-emption for the defense of the Russian state in the coming decades.
> 
> Consideration of a pre-emptive military doctrine is motivated first by Russian policymakers’ dismal geopolitical outlook. Moscow sees the United States as the world’s sole remaining superpower, intent on maintaining its position by constraining aspirant powers and imposing its own will on other nations – chief among them Russia. The Kremlin has indicated as well its belief that the United States would be willing to use force to impose its will on Russia in the future, if Russia is not prepared to defend itself.
> 
> Simultaneously, a growing number of Russian military strategists forecast that defensive or retaliatory operations alone will soon be insufficient to protect Russia’s vital interests. They assess that a host of new military technologies are collapsing the battlespace and giving growing advantage to the side that escalates first. These systems will allow both Russia and the United States to act more rapidly across broader geographic expanses than before. Moreover, many of these emerging technologies – including cyber, counterspace, conventional prompt global strike (CPGS), and certain autonomous weapons – may hold Russia’s strategic nuclear forces at unprecedented risk in the coming decades.
> 
> From a Russian perspective, seizing the initiative will be the key to deterrence or if necessary military defeat of Western aggression in this collapsing battlespace. Pre-emption advocates contend that if Moscow does not escalate first in a future crisis or conflict, then the United States and its allies will. If that happens, they fear that Russian defenses will be unable to repel or absorb the U.S. or NATO attacks on Russian vital interests. They expect further that the Russian Federation will be unable to seize back the initiative once it is lost. Indeed, if the initial period of this future war is as devastating as many expect, the Russian armed forces may have limited retaliatory options left.
> 
> Russia’s adoption of a defensive doctrine of pre-emption would severely complicate efforts by U.S. and NATO policymakers to deter Russia or manage a future crisis or conflict on NATO’s eastern flank – such as a Baltic contingency – without triggering runaway escalation. It would deny Russian, U.S., and NATO officials the time required to determine whether an attack is actually imminent and enact a proportionate response. The result would be to increase the risk of rapid early military strikes and rampant escalation. This will be especially dangerous in the coming years. In view of the growing perceived fragility of Russian and U.S. nuclear forces, once war begins, it may prove difficult to contain at non-nuclear levels.
> 
> The United States should therefore take steps to dissuade Moscow from shifting to a doctrine of pre-emption. It is beyond the scope of this study to offer exhaustive recommendations to this effect. As a starting point, U.S. policymakers should seek to reduce both the expected value of and the perceived need for a doctrine of pre-emption, as seen by Moscow.
> 
> To reduce the expected value of pre-emption, as seen by Moscow, the United States should:
> 
> 1. Seek recognition of “rules of the road” for cyber and counterspace operations.
> 2. Prioritize the development of more resilient U.S. and NATO operational concepts.
> 3. Demonstrate NATO’s emphasis on resilience in future military exercises.
> 4. Boost investment in cyber resilience.
> 5. Expand investment in space resilience.
> 6. Bolster conventional deterrence in Europe.
> 7. Sustain Third Offset technological, doctrinal, and organizational innovations.
> 8. Reaffirm the United States’ intent to respond forcefully to Russian aggression.
> 9. Engage the American public on the costs of inaction in the face of foreign aggression.
> 10. To reduce Moscow’s perceived need for pre-emption, the United States should take a complementary but distinct set of steps:
> 11. Restore U.S.-Russian military-to-military contacts.
> 12. Sustain engagement with Russia on NATO ballistic missile defenses.
> 13. Consider limitations on U.S., Russian, and Chinese CPGS forces.
> 14. Promote the responsible use of military autonomy.
> 15. Clarify the United States’ preference against pre-emption.
> 16. Engage Russia on geopolitical concerns.
> 
> 
> This policy approach is not without risks. Yet, the evolving security environment demands a more active U.S. strategy. If the Russian Federation officially adopts a defensive doctrine of pre-emption, it will signify the opening of a deeply concerning chapter in U.S.-Russian relations. That chapter would be defined by more acute fear, hastening timelines, and perilous risk-taking in a security environment defined by uncertainty. It would constitute a return to Cold War–level tensions, only this time with more ways for the United States and Russia to stumble into potentially catastrophic escalation than before.
> 
> The Unsettling View from Moscow
> 
> Russian policymakers believe their nation is under siege. The eastward march of liberalism in post–Cold War Europe is seen by the Kremlin to pose an existential threat to the Russian state. Meanwhile, rapid shifts in the military-technological environment are simultaneously exposing Russia to U.S. or NATO military coercion. These trends inform arguments by Russia’s top military strategists in favor of what they perceive to be a defensive doctrine of pre-emption.
> 
> A Dismal Geopolitical Outlook
> 
> Moscow has identified the United States and its NATO allies as the Russian Federation’s greatest threats today and for the foreseeable future.1 This pronouncement is rooted in Russian policymakers’ understanding of U.S. hegemonic intent. Russian officials believe that the United States is actively working to weaken the Russian state in order to fortify its own position as the world’s sole remaining superpower.2
> 
> They cite a host of U.S. policies as evidence of this intent. For instance, Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin, often characterize NATO expansion in the 1990s and 2000s as an effort to isolate and subordinate Russia.3 They argue similarly that U.S. activities in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria are motivated by a desire to cultivate U.S. proxies in Russia’s near abroad. Russian analysts say the United States ultimately hopes to use these proxies to stir dissent within Russia itself.4
> 
> These attempts to co-opt or reorient regional actors to disadvantage Russia are not isolated events, according to Russian analysts. Instead, they sit within a long history of U.S.-backed “color revolutions” in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia.5 U.S. analysts often characterize Russian military-operational art as “hybrid warfare.” Yet, Russian political-military thinkers are clear in their assessments that it is the United States that is using a combination of political, economic, information, and other non-military instruments to destabilize foreign nations.6
> 
> Vladimir Putin speaks in July 2015. He has forcefully criticized what he characterizes as the United States’ ongoing efforts to impose its will on weaker nations.
> 
> Lastly, Russian policymakers find little reason to expect that future U.S. interference in other nations’ domestic affairs will remain non-military. The Russian Federation has repeatedly highlighted and condemned what it has seen as the United States’ unlawful use of force to impose its will on weaker nations in the post–Cold War era. Frequent citations to this effect include U.S. actions in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya.7 The regularity and severity with which Russian officials criticize the United States’ alleged overreliance on military force strongly imply their belief that the United States would be willing to use force to impose its will on Russia, if Russia is not prepared to defend itself.
> 
> In this context, some Russian officials believe that President Donald J. Trump’s election may offer new opportunities for bilateral political engagement.8 Yet Moscow also knows that U.S. skepticism of Russia has strong and lasting bipartisan support. This means that any gains achieved through U.S.-Russian engagement over the next four or eight years may prove limited or subject to reversal after Trump leaves office. As a result, Russian policymakers assess that the United States and its allies will remain a serious and lasting threat to Russian national security for the foreseeable future. Senior Russian officials thus say quietly that “Cold War 2.0” has begun between the United States and Russia.9
> 
> A Collapsing Battlespace
> 
> Rising U.S.-Russian geopolitical tensions are paralleled by rapid shifts in the military-technological environment. Russian strategists forecast that a host of novel or improved military technologies will allow both parties to act more rapidly across broader geographic expanses than before. At the same time, new weapon systems integrating greater autonomy and harnessing new physical principles promise to inject even further uncertainty into the U.S.-Russian correlation of forces. These shifts threaten to erode Russia’s ability to deter or defeat future U.S. aggression by defensive or retaliatory operations alone. In this regard, they constitute a primary reason why a rising number of Russia’s senior military strategists endorse a doctrine of pre-emption.
> 
> Russian analysts in Military Thought and other outlets consistently forecast that major wars in the future will be fought across all domains – not just in the land, sea, and air.10 They write that fighting will occur in outer space as adversaries attack one another’s space-based military architectures in order to cripple space-dependent air, sea, and land forces.11 And fighting will take place in the information domain – a domain unto itself – the “high ground” of modern warfare upon which all else rests.12
> 
> Russian forecasts stress equally that fighting in these domains will occur at once-unfathomable speeds.13 As Major General I.N. Vorobyov (Ret.) writes, “Its Majesty Time has sped up its flight.”14 Novel informational capabilities will allow belligerents to coordinate action by widely dispersed strike units with unprecedented synchrony and precision.15 At the same time, high-precision weapons – particularly conventional prompt global strike assets – will allow belligerents to strike one another’s vital targets faster than ever.16 And, as many analysts predict, novel attack methods – leveraging dramatic advances in military autonomy, directed energy, electromagnetics, nanotechnology, genetic engineering, and even the ability to control geological and climatic phenomena – may put the defense at a significant disadvantage relative to an increasingly diverse and deadly array of offensive tools.17
> 
> Russian authors posit that enemy targets will no longer be engaged successively in major wars.18 Traditional notions of the front and the rear, strong points, flanks and junctions, and combat-contact lines will be largely outmoded.19 Where is a nation’s flank when the enemy can hold its entire territory at risk through a combination of an expansive array of advanced sensors; exquisite information networks capable of synthesizing large amounts of targeting data in real time; and a balance of long-range precision strike assets that outmatch enemy air defense capabilities? Where is the front line when the objective in future wars will be to ensure that no enemy soldiers ever make it close to a defending nation’s borders?20



https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-unsettling-view-from-moscow

Comment:  A 16 point priority list of things the Yanks need to do to manage Moscow?  That's not a strategy.  I don't know what to call it - perhaps just a statement of how bad things are.

Interesting thoughts about front and rear and cyberspace.  Where does an anti-Russian server located in Toronto sit on the Priority Target list?


----------



## The Bread Guy

Interesting developments ...

_*"Russian diplomat reproaches US media for heavy bias during Lavrov’s visit to US"*_ (TASS)
_*"Trump Bars U.S. Press, but Not Russia’s, at Meeting With Russian Officials"*__ -- When President Trump met with top Russian officials in the Oval Office on Wednesday, White House officials barred reporters from witnessing the moment. They apparently preferred to block coverage of the awkwardly timed visit as questions swirled about whether the president had dismissed his F.B.I. director in part to squelch the investigation into possible ties between his campaign and Moscow.  But the Russians, who have a largely state-run media, brought their own press contingent in the form of an official photographer. They quickly filled the vacuum with their own pictures of the meeting with Mr. Trump, Sergey V. Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, and Sergey I. Kislyak, Moscow’s ambassador to the United States.  Within minutes of the meeting, the Foreign Ministry had posted photographs on Twitter of Mr. Trump and Mr. Lavrov smiling and shaking hands. The Russian embassy posted images of the president grinning and gripping hands with the ambassador. Tass***, Russia’s official news agency, released more photographs of the three men laughing together in the Oval Office. The White House released nothing..."  (NY Times)_
_
And while #POTUS45 was meeting with Lavrov ...



			@VP  Today I met with Foreign Minister @PavloKlimkin & emphasized unwavering U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
		
Click to expand...







He did get a photo with #POTUS45, though ...




Mentions of this meeting @ whitehouse.gov?  Not so much yet ...

*** - I'm sure the TASS photographer in the White House couldn't possibly be linked to any RUS intelligence agency ..._


----------



## The Bread Guy

Over in the Baltic Sea area ...

_*"Lavrov: There are no threats in Baltic region that would justify its militarization"*_ (TASS)
_*"Lavrov: Claims of Russian Threat to the Baltics 'Absurd, Absolutely Unfounded' "*_ (RIA Novosti)
_*"Russia’s Baltic Sea Commander: A significant strengthening of the Baltic Sea Fleet is underway"*_ (uawire.org)
And if your Russian is up to snuff, here's the interview w/RUS's Baltic Fleet boss:  _*"Baltflot will not fail!"*_ (Red Star, RUS military media)


----------



## Kirkhill

At the risk of being accused of spamming - but convinced of the value of a good map in any discussion






Just a reminder of the States with whom Russia shares a direct land or maritime boundary.

US, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, North Korea, Japan.

That is 23 sovereign nation-states with which Moscow has to concern itself.  Any one could be a direct threat, a failed state or an unreliable ally.  It probably doesn't make for restful nights.  With or without Gen Mattis.   And we haven't mentioned internal ethnic, religious and political dissent.

I am not apologizing for Russia.  

I am just working on the same principle that I was taught when setting up any defensive position: once the COPPED analysis was complete from my side, get out and walk the ground and do the same analysis from the other side.

I think Russia has grounds for paranoia.

I understand why Russia may feel the need to try and keep the neighbours off balance - it can't afford to build a wall along all its borders.  
I believe that it is likely that it sees itself as a fencer - unarmoured and lightly armed - facing 23 opponents on the piste.  It can never let its guard down.  It must always keep moving.  It must always keep backing its opponents up.  
It is a tiring, and wasting, strategy but I doubt if it can see any other.

At the same time I don't think Russia can launch a major invasion of anywhere - especially not an invasion that would impact Western Europe.


----------



## Journeyman

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> US, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, China, North Korea, Japan.


Facing Canadian troops on TWO flanks;  how can they not feel threatened?  

/self-congratulatory jingoism


----------



## Kirkhill

Journeyman said:
			
		

> Facing Canadian troops on TWO flanks;  how can they not feel threatened?
> 
> /self-congratulatory jingoism



Seen.   ;D


----------



## The Bread Guy

When _WILL_ Russia's oppression end?


> Russian Foreign Ministry’s official spokesperson Maria Zakharova said at a summit of world news agencies (at an international economic forum in St. Petersburg, Russia) on Friday the bullying of Russia in Western mass media was akin to informational holocaust.
> 
> "We’ve read in textbooks about the events of the end of the 1930’s in Europe and in Poland and it seemed unfathomable to us that a single people could be accused of all the woes***," she said. "How could it be that people got deaf instantaneously and began to trust everything that was peddled to them as truth at that moment?"
> 
> "The result was World War II and Holocaust," Zakharova said.
> 
> "Doesn’t it seem to you that what we’re going through today, and particularly when it comes down to Russia, resembles an informational holocaust when Russia is used as a scarecrow without proper facts, rabidly, totally mindlessly on every other occasion that comes their way?" she said.
> 
> "The mainstream media are setting the tune to it and then this wave, as the nuclear wave, spreads further and rules out an opportunity to ask the question, what facts do you have and why are you doing it?" Zakharova said ...


*** - Pretty ballsy Russia comparing itself to Jews in pre-WW2 Germany, given it's own record on such things ...


----------



## jollyjacktar

Uncle Joe was just misunderstood  :nod:


----------



## The Bread Guy

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> Uncle Joe was just misunderstood  :nod:


Indeed ...


----------



## a_majoor

Countering propaganda without "counter propaganda". an interesting concept, but requires a much longer time horizon than we normally employ:

http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/06/16/ways-of-combatting-propaganda-without-counter-propaganda/



> *25 ways of combatting propaganda without doing counter-propaganda*
> counter-propaganda not the only way to combat propaganda
> 2017/06/16 - 20:42
> 
> The Director of the French Institut de recherche strategique de l’Ecole militaire (IRSEM), which is part of the French Defence Ministry, took to a subject little researched: how to combat pro-Kremlin propaganda without falling into the trap of doing counter-propaganda? Counter-propaganda would be an ill-suited means for Western democracies to fend off the effects of disinformation activities, argues Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer. It would also require more means than “any European government is ready to bring up”.
> 
> Director Jeangène Vilmer makes 25 proposals for countering pro-Kremlin disinformation without doing counter-propaganda:
> 
> Clearly distinguish between disinformation, propaganda and public diplomacy to avoid the argument that “everything is propaganda”. While every country can defend their points of view, the author argues, the “intentional falsification of information” must be condemned.
> 
> Do not demonize Russia, but focus on fighting disinformation.
> 
> Raise awareness of the importance of the issue.
> 
> Recognise there can be information activities that straddle the preconceived divisions between information warfare and military action, including cyber-attacks, political communication, election interference and disinformation.
> 
> Strengthen the research on this issue from all sides, including ministries, universities, think-tanks and the press.
> 
> Recognise the limits of a purely state-driven response to disinformation. It will always be suspected of being biased. Civil society must also be involved.
> 
> Acknowledge the limits of debunking. Establishing the facts is necessary, but it itself not sufficient. This is particularly true given that the aim of pro-Kremlin disinformation has been described as “undermining the notion of objective truth and the very possibility of doing journalism”.
> 
> Develop programmes to educate citizens in media literacy.
> 
> Promote a widely shared convention of journalism ethics.
> 
> Adapt the response to the audience. Respond with infotainment-style content for those who can only “consume entertaining information”.
> Encourage independent Russian media.
> 
> Translate the articles written by independent Russian voices. This could contribute to showing that RT and Sputnik are not the only Russian points of view.
> 
> Build up networks with independent Russian journalists.
> 
> Use the testimony of whistleblowers who have left the propaganda machine. They can reveal the methods used.
> 
> Make use of the latest technology to research how fact-checking and identification of online trolls can be automatized.
> 
> Reinforce the EU’s East StratCom Task Force with funds and staff and distribute its products more widely.
> 
> Encourage EU Member States to develop national mechanisms to combat disinformation. While some have already starts this endeavour, having a national centre against disinformation facilitates the quick response to disinformation stories.
> 
> Reinforce the cooperation between states, the European Union and NATO in this field. Avoid overlap and duplication of efforts.
> 
> When debunking disinformation, also expose the propaganda methods used. Familiarise users with those methods so they can detect them elsewhere.
> 
> Track the financing of “anti-European propaganda”.
> 
> Create an international NGO dedicated to the fight against disinformation, like Reporters without Borders or Transparency International. It could rank media according to the trustworthiness of their reporting.
> 
> Consider, if needed, more restrictive counter measures, including fines, sanctions and blocking in certain cases.
> 
> Combat also the effects of disinformation by strengthening EU and NATO solidarity, social cohesion, democracy and respect of human rights.
> 
> Communicate more in Russian, especially on social media.
> 
> Defend European values and develop a positive narrative about the European Union.


----------



## jollyjacktar

Russia unveils a supposed next generation combat uniform, complete with exoskeleton and full face helmet etc.  Very GI Joe or Halo looking. 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4653886/Russia-unveils-generation-Star-Wars-combat-uniform.html


----------



## a_majoor

More on breaking Russia's energy stranglehold over Europe:

https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2017/07/08/trump_has_putin_over_a_barrel_134415.html



> *Trump Has Putin Over a Barrel*
> By Lawrence Kudlow
> July 08, 2017
> 
> A few years back, in one of his finest moments, Sen. John McCain said on a Sunday talk show, "Russia is a gas station masquerading as a country." It was right when he said it, and it's even more right today.
> 
> Russian President Vladimir Putin's circle of corrupt oligarchs gouge whatever money they can from the impoverished Russian economy and move it to bank accounts overseas. And they do this after giving Putin his cut, which he apparently also sends overseas.
> 
> Many say Putin is the richest man in Russia, worth billions and billions. So the old Soviet model of nomenklatura communist bureaucrats getting rich while the rest of the country declines is still in place.
> 
> But with energy prices falling, Putin's Russia has essentially been in a recession over the past four years. With oil at $50 a barrel or less, Russian budgets plunge deeper into debt. It's even doubtful the Russians have enough money to upgrade their military-energy industrial complex.
> 
> Through crafty media relations and his own bravado, a deluded Putin struggles to maintain the illusion that Russia is a strong economic power. But it ain't so. Not even close.
> 
> Now, Russia still has a lot of oil and gas reserves. And it uses this to bully Eastern and Western Europe. It threatens to cut off these resources if Europe dares to complain about Putin power grabs in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, the Baltics and elsewhere.
> 
> But enter President Donald Trump. In his brilliant speech in Warsaw, Poland, earlier this week, he called Putin's energy bluff.
> 
> It may well have been the best speech of his young presidency. Trump delivered a stirring leadership message, emphasizing the importance of God, freedom, strong families and democratic values.
> 
> And while unambiguously pledging to uphold NATO's Article 5 -- which commits the members to protect one another -- Trump went even deeper. "The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive," he said. "Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost? ... if we do not have strong families and strong values, then we will be weak and we will not survive." He also spoke several times of the religious leadership and bravery of Pope John Paul II.
> 
> It was a bold strike for the West.
> 
> But in an absolutely key part of the speech, he took direct aim at Putin's energy bullying.
> 
> Trump said, "we are committed to securing your access to alternate sources of energy, so Poland and its neighbors are never again held hostage to a single supplier of energy."
> 
> President Trump has quickly made it clear that former President Barack Obama's war on business is over. He's also made it clear, through regulatory rollbacks of breathtaking scope, that the Obama war on fossil fuels is over.
> 
> Trump wants America to achieve energy dominance. He withdrew from the costly Paris climate accord, which would have severely damaged the American economy. He directed the EPA to rescind the Obama Clean Power Plan, which would have led to skyrocketing electricity rates. He fast-tracked the Keystone XL pipeline. He reopened the door for a modernized American coal industry. He's overturning all the Obama obstacles to hydraulic fracturing, which his presidential opponent Hillary Clinton would have dramatically increased. And he has opened the floodgates wide to energy exports.
> 
> Right now, U.S. oil reserves are almost in parity with those of Saudi Arabia. We have the second most coal reserves in the world. There are enough U.S. gas reserves to last us about a century. We have already passed Russia as the world's top natural gas producer. We are the world's top producer of oil and petroleum hydrocarbons. And exports of liquefied national gas are surging, with the Department of Energy rapidly approving new LNG projects and other export terminals.
> 
> All these America-first energy policies are huge economic-growth and high-wage job producers at home. But in the Warsaw speech, Trump made it clear that America's energy dominance will be used to help our friends across Europe. No longer will our allies have to rely on Russia's Gazprom supplies with inflated, prosperity-killing prices.
> 
> In short, with the free market policies he's putting in place in America's energy sector and throughout the U.S. economy, the business man president fully intends to destroy Russia's energy-market share. And as that takes hold, Russia's gas station economy will sink further.
> 
> And as that takes hold, Bully-boy Putin will have to think twice about Ukraine, Poland and the Baltics. He'll have to think twice about his anti-American policies in the Middle East and North Korea. And he'll have to think twice about his increasingly precarious position as the modern-day Russian tsar.
> 
> And the world may yet become a safer place.
> 
> Trump has Putin over a barrel.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Thucydides said:
			
		

> More on breaking Russia's energy stranglehold over Europe ...


Coal to Ukraine would be an interesting start ...


----------



## The Bread Guy

NATO makes an 8-ish minute video (links to YouTube) highlighting the history of some anti-Soviet resistance in the Baltics post-WW2, and lookit the response ...

_*"‘Perversion of history’: Russian officials blast NATO film glorifying Nazi collaborators"*_ (RT)
_*"Russian Foreign Ministry Official Slams NATO Film on Baltic Resistance"*_ (_Moscow Times_)
_*"NATO Film Glorifying 'Remnants' of Nazi Troops in Baltics 'Brazen' - Deputy PM"*_ (Sputnik News/RIA Novosti)
_*"'NATO Charging New Propaganda Cannons': What's Behind 'Forest Brothers' Video?"*_ (Sputnik News/RIA Novosti)
_*"Russian diplomat calls to quash NATO’s attempts to falsify history"*_ (TASS)


----------



## a_majoor

The pressures described in the article apply to the ruling class in Canada, the US, China and pretty much everywhere else, so this article could be I'm multiple threads. such as Brexit, Grand Strategy for a Divided America, or even Deconstructing Progressive Thought. The creation of parallel structures is part of the replacement of existing structures which are no longer functioning. Lots to ponder:

https://pjmedia.com/richardfernandez/2017/07/14/unconventional-wisdom/



> *Unconventional Wisdom*
> BY RICHARD FERNANDEZ JULY 14, 2017 CHAT 132 COMMENTS
> 
> Conventional Wisdom
> 
> During the Cold War the Soviets were contained by physically surrounding them with allies (NATO) while pelting its firewall with messages from the Voice of America, Newsweek and CNN.  Precious little got through.  Just how total this exclusion in the pre-Internet and BC (Before Cellphone) days was is illustrated by the story of defector Viktor Belenko and the American supermarket.  Traveling through suburban Virginia he noted the vast array of goods and absence of rotten smells in these establishments and suspected Fake News.
> 
> "I congratulate you," Belenko said en route back to the mansion. "That was a spectacular show you put on for me."
> "What do you mean?'
> 
> "I mean that place; it's like one of our show kolkhozes where [our government] takes foreigners."
> 
> Nick laughed, but not Peter. ["Belenko], I give you my word that what you've just seen is a common, typical shopping center. There are tens of thousands of them all over [the U.S.A.]. Anywhere you go in the United States, north, south, east, west, you will see pretty much the same. Many of the shopping centers in the suburbs of our cities are bigger and fancier and nicer."
> 
> But it wasn't fake; just that Belenko's mind couldn't take in the new paradigm.  Forty years later the Internet, cellphone and a shift "from a centrally planned economy to a globally integrated market economy" made the sight of consumer goods familiar in Russia.  But finding the money to buy these goodies depended on oil.  Oil is the lifeblood of Putin's ambitions and his Achille's heel.  Obama's reset with Russia may have failed to slow Putin but the lack of money caused by sanctions and the collapse of oil prices worked just as advertised.
> 
> The Russian economy experienced two major shocks in 2014 ... the first shock was the sharp decline in oil prices during the third and fourth quarter of 2014, exposing Russia’s extreme dependence on global commodity cycles. ... The second shock was the economic sanctions resulting from geopolitical tensions, which negatively affected investor appetite for Russian investments.
> 
> Lack of money was a powerful restraint.  The oil crash collapsed the ruble and forced a 27% reduction in the Kremlin's military budget in 2016.  With oil prices set to stay flat the Russians have to keep drilling and investing simply to stay level as the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies notes.  The Kremlin doesn't make any real spending money until world oil price gets above levels before the great oil crash of 2014, which may not happen any time soon. As the Oxford study explains:
> 
> The correlation between upstream spending in ruble terms and oil production is ... an R-square of 0.96. However, companies would not spend their money on increasing output without some commercial incentive, no matter how much the Kremlin might urge it [without] ... the Russian tax system ...
> 
> these taxes ... are also calculated relative to the oil price and have a sliding scale. The rate of export tax, for example, changes when the oil price goes above $15, $20 and $25/barrel. As a result, as the oil price rises the government take increases significantly, but when it falls it is government revenues that take the largest hit.
> 
> You would think this a Eureka moment: to contain oil prices is to contain Russia (and Islamism). But cheap fossil fuels are not everyone's cup of tea.  "Drill, baby, drill" is not popular on the left.  Even though liberals understand the power of cheap energy -- one of Hillary's supposedly hacked emails even alleged anti-fracking and environmental causes were a Russian plot to depress oil production -- to advocate it is bad progressive politics. This probably led the Saudis to Hillary's camp in 2016. "According to Bob McNally, president of consulting firm Rapidan Group, countries in the oil-producing Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, are hoping for Hillary Clinton to become president."
> 
> "It is no secret that the Saudis and other Gulf Sunni powers are rooting for Mrs. Clinton," McNally told CNBC from Vienna ahead of Thursday's widely eyed OPEC meeting.
> 
> "(There is) a lot of concern and anxiety about what Donald Trump would mean," he said.
> 
> If second marriages are the "triumph of hope over experience"  perhaps environmental policy is the victory of lobbying over common sense.  The Russians stymied on the physical front had to resort to the virtual world to equalize.  Despite the depiction of Russians as uber-hackers, they actually saw themselves as coming from behind the West in cyberwarfare. The Russian General staff was inspired by the role social media played in the Arab Spring to create a cyberwarfare capability. Nor had the Kremlin forgotten the traumatic role soft power played in the downfall of the Soviet Union. "In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, many western nations continued to utilise soft power initiatives to consolidate the spread of western liberal ideas and culture. ... For Russia, this extensive dispersal of western liberal influence was viewed as a potential threat. Citing events like Color Revolutions, the Maiden Protest in the Ukraine and uprisings of the Arab Spring, Russia believed America was using soft power as a weapon in a new form of hybrid warfare."
> 
> So they tried a little soft power themselves.  Little did they imagine how successful they would be against the former information warfare gurus. The Russian hacks of the 2016 election are regarded as such epic victories that Keith Olbermann broadcast an online plea for help to the world's intelligence agencies to help prevent a Russian coup in Washington. Significantly more measured is former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright description of the shocking reversal of fortune.
> 
> In the 1970s, I wrote my dissertation on the role of the Czechoslovak press in the events of Prague Spring. In the early 1980s, I traveled to Poland to study the underground press of the Solidarity movement. I met with dozens of journalists, who told me that while they started out by delivering typed news sheets to workers in factories, they found they could increase their speed of communication and the reach of their messages by using what was then considered a cutting-edge technology — audiocassettes.
> 
> I remember thinking about those tapes in 2011, as I watched activists in Tunisia and Egypt use social media to organize, communicate, and ultimately topple two entrenched regimes. It was easy, in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, to believe that these new tools of communication had only transformed politics for the better, and that the spread of @Twitter and @Facebook would inevitably lead to more open and democratic societies.
> 
> But as our agenda today attests, those views did turn out to be too optimistic — because like so many other things, technology is a double-edged sword. In recent years, democracy’s enemies have become adept at polluting social media platforms with rumors, disinformation, and anti-democratic propaganda. And has let some of the same people who once heralded the birth of the social media age to wonder whether democracy can survive it. ...
> 
> The Oxford researchers also showed how authoritarian governments are using these tools on their own populations as a form of social control, with some 45 percent of twitter activity in Russia coming from automated accounts.
> 
> We are now Viktor Belenkos to be protected from the contagion of subversive thought.  This amazing turnabout partly explains the media's bitterness for Donald Trump.  Their downfall seems so sudden it can only be due to some evil Trumpian witchcraft or infernal magic, for nothing else can explain it.  But Albright to her credit understands that what changed since the day Viktor Belenko walked into a suburban Virginia supermarket wasn't Trump:  what changed was the implosion of the information hierarchy.
> 
> What is interesting to me is comparing this to how information got transmitted during communism.
> In the days of the Soviet Union, people largely knew that official sources of information could not be trusted, so they built unofficial channels that were more reliable, for example talking to friends and family.
> 
> In the internet age, it is these unofficial channels that are becoming less reliable, as computational propaganda is able to more easily infiltrate these networks. At the same time, people do not seem to have yet developed a healthy skepticism about what others are sharing online.
> 
> Our trust hierarchies have collapsed. As with Soviet Russia, the "official" media sources are now distrusted as purveyors "fake news".  To fill the gap a peer-to-peer grapevine, similar to the "friends and family", a samizdat is emerging to pick up the slack. Sonya Mann at Inc uses a startup to illustrate the growing division of society into trust groups. "Pax Dickinson wants to fund the revolution. Not a blood-in-the-streets revolution, but one where hardcore right-wingers can economically secede from the parts of society they vehemently dislike. "We need parallel everything. I do not want to ever have to spend a single dollar at a non-movement business."
> 
> In conversations with Inc., Dickinson explained that he sees CounterFund as the linchpin of a parallel far-right economy. The alt-right movement shouldn't fund or depend on platforms that are hostile to their goals, he believes. CounterFund's website sports endorsements from Richard Spencer, the suit-wearing white supremacist who went viral after being punched in the face, and comedian Sam Hyde, whose divisive show Million Dollar Extreme was kicked off the air by Adult Swim.
> 
> Dickinson is pitching CounterFund itself as a new kind of political party, one that cares for its community rather than pouring money into candidates' campaigns. It's hard to overstate the degree to which he's willing to take this project beyond mainstream acceptability. Dickinson compared CounterFund to Hezbollah: "Hezbollah is a government within a government. They collect garbage, they operate hospitals, they're an economy within an economy, and a government within a government."
> 
> The Resistance is probably embarked on the same process of internal secession themselves.  How long can this mutual escalation of mistrust continue without effect?   The challenge to hierarchy probably arose independently of Putin.  He just happened to come along at the right time to ride the wave and take credit for it.
> 
> The Chinese government, less apoplectic than the humiliated Washington elite, is collected enough to realize they too are at risk from the forces of entropy engulfing the West and they are damping down on it.  "China will completely block access to much of the global internet as part of a sweeping crackdown aimed at suppressing dissent and maintaining the Communist party’s grip on power. The government has ordered China’s three telecommunications companies to completely block access to virtual private networks, or VPNs."
> 
> The Chinese aren't afraid of Putin, but they are terrified of what they perceive as chaotic process. In the West it's just the opposite.  No one fears a chaotic process.  They're all afraid of a man.
> 
> Conventional wisdom posits the chief challenges facing the post-Cold War World are Global Warming and the decline of international institutions. But maybe that assurance is a species of Fake News.  Suppose the most pressing problems in the next decade is finding new energy supplies to 1) keep the price of oil low enough to contain Russia (and Islamism); and 2) adapting to a disruptive information revolution no one can seem to control.  Who will hand you that unconventional wisdom unless you come to it yourself?


----------



## The Bread Guy

A few reasons why the U.S.-Russia relationship may not get better anytime soon, shared under the Fair Dealing provisions of the _Copyright Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42)_ ...
https://nobsrussia.com/2017/07/29/trump-cant-deal-the-problem-of-improving-usrussian-relations/


> *Trump Can’t Deal: The Problem of Improving US/Russian Relations*
> Russia Without BS blog
> 29 July 2017
> 
> Long before he got elected, Trump talked about having better relations with Russia. Of course he also talked about shooting down Russian planes for buzzing US Navy ships, but generally his attitude was “Wouldn’t it be nice if we could get along with Russia?” Many people on both sides of the political spectrum and with little knowledge of Russia or its ruling class have asked the same question. Is it really so bad to want better relations with Russia? Honestly the answer is no, it’s not bad at all, but the devil is in the details.
> 
> First of all, people who tend to advance this argument tend to put all the blame and responsibility on the United States for the breakdown in relations. NATO expansion was “provocative” to Russia, they often say. More brazen defenders of Putin *COUGH*MARK AMES*COUGH* claim that the US was responsible for the Maidan “revolution” in Ukraine which “sparked a civil war.” All of this betrays the mentality that the Kremlin is promoting. All of this is hypocritical and wrong, as well.
> 
> For one thing, whatever you think about NATO (and I have my complaints as well), Russia long since recognized the rights of sovereign nations (including those which were in the former Eastern Bloc) to join whatever international alliances or organizations they wanted. It is indeed interesting how these non-interventionists are quick to jump on any example of the US violating the sovereignty of foreign nations, yet they never consider that joining NATO or the EU is also exercising a nations sovereignty. Maybe, just maybe, a better question to ask is why nations like the Baltic states (the only NATO members which actually share a border with the bulk of Russia) wanted to join NATO in the first place. In any case, if you look at NATO spending and US military deployments in Europe up till about 2015, you’ll see how ludicrous it is to claim that NATO was somehow threatening Russia, so much so that it justified invading Ukraine and annexing a part of it just because a corrupt would-be dictator pissed off his own people and then ran instead of abiding by the agreement he signed.
> 
> There’s also the argument that the West screwed over Russia during the Yeltsin years. There are certainly real grievances here, particularly economic advice that emphasized free market dogma at the expense of human lives, and looking the other way while Boris Yeltsin illegally and violently constructed an authoritarian system which he would later hand over to Vladimir Putin. But this also ignores the other side of the coin. For one thing, Western governments also provided humanitarian aid during this period. Could they have done more? Definitely. But it’s simply a lie to assert that all the West did was send free market missionaries and sex tourists. Second, this argument about the 90’s totally removes all agency from Russians. The United States didn’t force dishonest people to form organized crime gangs (some of which dated back to late Soviet times), nor did it force people to rob and cheat their fellow citizens so they could become unbelievable rich. The West was, at worst, an enabler in this business. It was not the initiator.
> 
> The West did not “humiliate” Russia. In fact it was quite the opposite. It looked the other way as Russia helped create pseudo-states in Moldova and Georgia. It helped negotiate a deal with Ukraine, whereby that country gave up its nuclear weapons and entrusted them to Russia. It acknowledged Russia as the successor to the Soviet Union, thus allowing Russia to take over the USSR’s permanent position on the UN Security Council. Over my long time in Russia, I learned that what many Russians considered humiliating about the 90’s wasn’t what I considered humiliating. If you asked me what was humiliating about that period I would have said the poverty, the crime, and most of all the sexual exploitation, which became so widespread it led to the name “Natasha” becoming a slang term for prostitute in many countries. But the humiliation that many Russians think about today largely ignores that, and instead focuses on the loss of their empire. It was humiliating to have to acknowledge the independence of countries like Kazakhstan or Ukraine. It was humiliating that Russians would have to start learning the language of the titular nationality instead of the latter having to use Russian all the time. If that’s humiliation, then the West is under no obligation to alleviate it.
> 
> Lastly there’s the idea that Putin made overtures toward the West, only to be snubbed. I’d say there’s some truth to this argument. I believe that at least in the beginning, Putin did have a sincere desire to bring stability and prosperity to Russia, as well as closely integrate it into the West. You could argue about the Chechen war or the crackdown on media (whose owners were not necessarily objective nor innocent) that took place in the early Putin presidency, but I would say that literally anyone taking over from Yeltsin in that period would have been forced to make tough decisions. The system was already corrupt and authoritarian. I still believe that Putin could have taken a different route in the early 2000s, then if he left power he could have retired as true modernizer and savior of Russia, albeit with controversy. We would look at him the way we look at figures like Pilsudski or Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
> 
> Yet not only did Western leaders, after a brief flirtation, give Putin the cold shoulder, but this was also the time when Western media seemed to criticize everything Putin did. Things that were ignored under Yeltsin, who was portrayed as the father of Russian democracy, were suddenly controversial and ominous under Putin. And of course, the press almost never failed to identify Putin as the “former KGB officer.”
> 
> At the same time, Putin came of age if you will, during the beginning of the War on Terror and more specifically, the war on Iraq. The latter, and especially the Bush doctrine behind it, had huge implications for Putin. For one thing, it ignited massive anti-American sentiment throughout the world, which would remain fresh for exploitation long after the initial invasion. Second, he learned that if you have the ability to project military power, you can do it so long as you make up some supposedly humanitarian pre-text. Bush had WMDs, whereas Putin would later use the excuse of protecting Russian speakers in the Crimea. Lastly, it confirmed a view held by Putin and many of his generation, that the United States doesn’t really believe in human rights or national sovereignty, but that it simply invokes these things as it pleases in order to serve its own interests. While Putin and others who believe this are wrong to think that the United States hasn’t grown and evolved from the monster that it was in the Gilded Age or during the Cold War, there are still plenty of examples of American hypocrisy when it comes to human rights- most notably the war in Yemen.
> 
> But the argument that Putin was snubbed by the West can’t totally explain away his own actions and decisions since that time. So Western leaders didn’t accept him as he wanted- did that mean he needed to construct an authoritarian, centralized system of kleptocracy? Wouldn’t it have been better for Putin to simply brush off the cold responses and busy himself with modernizing Russia, creating stable democratic institutions, and establishing rule of law? What better way to get back at leaders like Blair and Bush than by turning Russia into an economic powerhouse, one which actually stood by the principle of respecting national sovereignty? That, sadly, is not what Putin chose to do, of course. He and his cronies decided to use Russia’s natural wealth to enrich themselves at the expense of the country’s future, and rather than build a stable democratic system he created a cult of personality that revolves around him personally. And while Putin would love to point fingers at the West, the whole time he and his pals were robbing Russia, the West was more than happy to accept the dirty money and even invest massive amounts of capital into Russia. So in the end, the argument that Putin became Putin because he was rejected by the West ultimately fails.
> 
> Having gotten those arguments out of the way, there’s the ultimate obstacle to better US/Russia relations, which is Putin and his system. They want bad relations with the West and they need bad relations with the West, because the oil boom is over, their gas leverage is waning, and they squandered much of the wealth Russia produced over roughly a decade- the West is the scapegoat. The West, its dastardly fifth column and ultra-secret sixth column is necessary to explain why, in spite of being one of the richest nations in the world in terms of natural resources, Russia has only managed to achieve the economic power of Italy or Spain, but with much lower living standards, salaries, pensions, etc. People have been angry since 2011, and they need to be suppressed, ergo the must be labeled as Western-backed agents of revolution. Putin is literally fighting for survival, and the cult of personality built up around him doesn’t allow him to blink or make concessions. There’s nothing he can really offer in any negotiations.
> 
> This is why in the past I have criticized the so-called “realists” who say that the West needs to negotiate with Russia, yet never articulate what exactly Russia is going to give the West in exchange. Vague promises of cooperation are useless. Likewise Russia has shown that its word on treaties is essentially worthless (ask Ukraine). If the Kremlin is really so eager to engage with its “Western partners,” it needs to explain what it can offer in concrete terms.
> 
> Since the reality is that Putin will not and cannot actually offer anything of value to the West, and US president wishing to improve relations would have to talk over his head, to the Russian people. This would require a US president with actual knowledge of Russia, its history, and its culture. Ideally it would be a presidential candidate who can actually speak some Russian. But most of all it would have to be a president who is ready to acknowledge the many bad foreign policy choices of the United States so as to avoid the appearance of hypocrisy and head off the Kremlin’s attempts to use its favorite weapon whataboutism.
> 
> This US president needs to be sincere, and explain how the United States, over the years, has had to acknowledge the reality of sovereign states, and how it has often failed to be consistent in its application of human rights. They would have to stress that if Russia is serious about being a partner with other leading nations, it must abandon dreams of empire and spheres of influence and join those other nations in securing a world that respects international law and sovereignty. Of course these words must also be backed with action, for example in regards to Saudi Arabia and its war in Yemen. This president could invoke that example to show how the United States is ready to change and isn’t just trying to trick Russia into unilateral concession, as many Russians no doubt suspect. This hypothetical president would have to do all this and more, while also remaining firm about what the West demands of Russia- that it take responsibility for its own condition and stop undermining its neighbors like Ukraine.
> 
> Do I even need to point out at this point that Donald Trump is not the president who can do any of that, ever? Hell, I can’t imagine anyone in DC that I know of who could possibly do that. Hillary wouldn’t have been able to do it. Bernie couldn’t have done it. Anyone that has those skills and that knowledge probably has no shot of ever being elected president (I’m not announcing my candidacy at this time).
> 
> Therefore someone like Trump has no choice but to accept the same “deal” that the Kremlin has been offering for years now- let us do what we want, and we give you nothing but vague cooperation on “terrorism” and maybe something involving plutonium or missile quantities. Knowing Trump, the master deal-maker, it’s easy to see why his handlers in the White House, State Department, and intelligence communities are careful to limit and monitor his contacts with Putin and other Russians. Not only would he easily be manipulated by a far more intelligent individual like Putin or Lavrov, but he’d probably throw in Alaska if they gave him a gold fidget spinner or something. Then he’d go tweet about how the fake news media and the Dems are criticizing his master deal just because they’re still upset about his big electoral college win.
> 
> So to reiterate. Better relations with Russia are just fine, but actually achieving that goal is easier said than done. It would take a very special kind of negotiator, a rare type of politician. It would also require the Russian side to accept responsibility for the deterioration of relations. The West didn’t invade Ukraine and start a war- Russia did that, period. Repairing relations between countries is a two-way street.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Canadian Association of Security and Intelligence Studies annual symposium, Ottawa at Canadian War Museum--Dick Fadden, former CSIS Director, DM at DND, and PM's National Security Advisor, will be keynote speaker:
http://www.casis-acers.ca/annual-symposium/



> CASIS Annual Symposium
> Preliminary Program
> Friday, September 29, 2017
> RUSSIA AND THE WEST: TEMPORARY STALEMATE OR
> IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES
> 
> REGISTRATION:
> 
> https://www.eventbrite.com/e/casis-annual-symposium-russia-and-the-west-temporary-stalemate-or-irreconcilable-differences-tickets-35345045984?
> 
> 8:15               Registration, Coffee, Networking
> 
> 9:00              Opening Remarks (Welcome and Program Overview)
> 
> President CASIS
> 
> 9:15                Keynote Speaker: Richard Fadden, Former National Security Advisor, Privy Council Office
> 
> 10:15              Break
> 
> 10:30             Drivers of Russian Foreign Policy
> 
> Aurel Brown, University of Toronto: Domestic Drivers of Russian Foreign Policy
> 
> Tim Frye, Columbia, Russian Foreign Policy from an Economic/Market Perspective
> 
> Paul Robinson, University of Ottawa, Russia and Ukraine.
> 
> Presentation and Questions
> 
> 12:00             Lunch
> 
> 1:00                Russian Influence Operations
> 
> Clint Watts, Foreign Policy Research Institute. Russian Influence Operations.
> 
> Presentation and Questions
> 
> 2:00               Russian Military and Security Services
> 
> Greg Smolynec, Canada DND: The Russian Military
> 
> Margarete Klein, SWP: Russia’s military and security services
> 
> Presentations and Questions
> 
> 3:00                Break
> 
> 3:15                Russia and the US/Canada
> 
> Kimberly Marten, Columbia: Russia and the US
> 
> TBD: Canada and Russia: is there a Canadian role?
> 
> Presentations and Questions
> 
> 4:15                Closing Speech/Overview
> 
> Irvin Studin, Global Brief
> 
> 4:45               CASIS Annual Meeting and Election of Board
> 
> All speakers listed are confirmed. Titles for Presentations will be added.
> Breaks and lunch are included in the Registration fee.
> 
> Final Summary Highlights from the CASIS 2016 Annual Symposium ["The Cyber Challenge"]
> http://www.casis-acers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Final-Summary-Highlights-from-the-CASIS-2016-Annual-Symposium.pdf



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## jollyjacktar

I know it's a great deal of smoke, mirrors and showmanship but Naval Day in St Petersburg is a good show nevertheless. 

https://youtu.be/1bKTJ44GS5o


----------



## The Bread Guy

jollyjacktar said:
			
		

> I know it's a great deal of smoke, mirrors ...


Not as much smoke as some recent developments ...  (source for attachment) ;D


----------



## jollyjacktar

Apparently the Cardinals of the Kremlin are trying to elect a new Putin.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Don't hear of _this_ sort of thing very often ...

_*"Protesters in Minsk denounce military exercises with Russia"*_ (ABC News)
_*"Belarusian opposition protests Zapad 2017 exercise in Minsk"*_ (UKR media)
_*"Protests in Minsk as Belarus prepares to host Russian drill"*_ (TUR media)
_*"Belarus: Hundreds protest joint Russo-Belarussian military exercises in Minsk"*_ (DEU media, with video)


----------



## a_majoor

Low oil prices and economic sanctions have certainly taken their toll on reequipping the Russian Army:

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2017/09/russia-getting-100-new-armata-tanks-and-usa-upgrades-abrams-again.html



> Russia getting 100 new Armata tanks and USA upgrades Abrams againbrian wang | September 7, 2017 |
> 
> The Russian Ground Forces are expected to receive up to 100 third-generation T-14 Armata main battle tanks (MBT), by 2020 and not the old plan for 2500 new tanks by 2020.
> 
> The T-14, an armored vehicle based on the “Armata” universal chassis system, is one of the world’s first battle tanks to feature an unmanned turret. The MBT’s main weapon system is a 2A82 125-millimeter smoothbore cannon, capable of firing high-powered munitions (10 shots a minute at an effective range of up to 7 kilometers). The 125-millimeter variant will be replaced with a more powerful 152 mm cannon in later versions.
> 
> General Dynamics Land Systems, a business unit of General Dynamics (NYSE: GD), recently received two contract awards from the U.S. Army for Abrams main battle tank upgrades, which will boost the platform’s capabilities and help the Army lead the way into the future.
> 
> The company will design, develop and integrate multiple engineering changes into the Abrams M1A2 System Enhancement Package Version 3 (SEPv3), creating a SEPv4 and further modernizing the tanks. Abrams main battle tanks are produced at the Joint Systems Manufacturing Center in Lima, Ohio.
> 
> The first contract is for SEPv4 upgrades, which include the Commander’s Primary Sight (formerly known as the Commander’s Independent Thermal Viewer), an improved Gunner’s Primary Sight and enhancements to sensors, lethality and survivability. General Dynamics Land Systems will deliver seven prototype M1A2 SEPv4 tanks to the Army. The contract has an initial value of $311 million. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, Mich.; Lima; Scranton, Pa.; and Tallahassee, Fla.
> 
> The second award was a $270 million contract from the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command to produce 45 Abrams M1A2 SEPv3 tanks. The first pilot vehicles, which feature technological advancements in communications, reliability, sustainment and fuel efficiency and upgraded armor, are expected to roll off the production line in fall 2017.



To put it in perspective this is slightly more than 2 tank battalions worth of tanks (indeed if many are taken for training, testing and evaluation etc then they may end up fielding one and a fraction of a battalion).


----------



## a_majoor

Russian wargames designed to head off colour revolutions?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-war-games-aim-to-head-off-another-color-revolution/2017/09/14/53aa93d8-9896-11e7-af6a-6555caaeb8dc_story.html?utm_term=.332378100999



> *Russia kicks off war games with Belarus as U.S., NATO watch anxiously*
> Russia and Belarus hold joint military exercise
> 
> Russia began a week-long military exercise with its ally Belarus on Sept. 14. (RU-RTR/AP)
> By David Filipov September 14 at 4:02 AM
> 
> MINSK, Belarus — Russia on Thursday kicked off a week-long military exercise with its ally Belarus that has its NATO neighbors and the United States watching anxiously, but actually addresses one of Moscow’s primary fears.
> 
> Shortly after Russia’s Defense Ministry said the war games dubbed “Zapad,” or “West,” had begun, it announced that elements of its First Tank Army had been “put on alert” and moved into Belarus for the exercise. Airborne units stationed in Russia have also been put on alert and are getting ready to join the drills, the ministry said.
> 
> At a time of renewed Cold War-style tension between Russia and NATO, the symbolism couldn’t have been more striking. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact once used the Zapad exercises to prepare for war with the West; that tank army’s job was to smash through NATO lines, including 300,000 U.S. troops.
> 
> The Russian announcement Thursday was accompanied by a reassurance repeated by Moscow for weeks, that the current exercise is “of an entirely defensive nature and is not aimed at any other states.” The Russian scenario for the games is a separatist incursion into Belarus spurred on by three imaginary countries, Veishnoriya, Lubeniya and Vesbasriya — in which NATO observers and others recognize Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.
> 
> Concerns in the Western alliance were raised by the apparent difference between official Russian figures about the size of the exercise — 12,700 troops and 680 pieces of military equipment, including 138 tanks — and Western estimates, based on troop and equipment movements,  that the number could range from 70,000 to as many as 100,000 participants.
> 
> Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Belarusan counterpart, Alexander Lukashenko, will appear on the sidelines of the drills this weekend, a sign of how important the drills are to the Russian leader, who has vowed to prevent “color revolutions” in the former Soviet region similar to the 2014 rebellions that established a pro-Western government in Ukraine.
> 
> The exercises — an update of Zapad war games held in 2009 and 2013 — show off a military that Putin has transformed into an effective force that has deployed to Syria and Ukraine in recent years.
> 
> The story line of the exercise sees militant groups linked to Veishnoriya and backed by the West cross the Belarus border, similar to the way “little green men,” widely assumed to be Russian soldiers, appeared in Ukraine in 2014 prior to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. The Russian forces cut off the insurgents’ access to the sea and air to prevent the Western coalition from providing backing to the separatists.
> 
> Western military officials have expressed concern that Zapad 2017 will serves as a “Trojan horse,” allowing Moscow to leave behind some of the military personnel and equipment it deployed for the drills. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told The Washington Post  last week that Russia could build trust and head off possible accidents by being more transparent.
> 
> On Thursday Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told reporters, “We reject complaints of these exercises not being transparent.” He accused the West of “whipping up hysteria” as a “provocation.”
> 
> In Latvia, Foreign Minister ­Edgars Rinkevics told The Post that the country’s leaders are “not panicking” but are being “cautious” because “what we are seeing is that the exercises are of an offensive nature, they are exercising access and area denial, they are exercising against at least four NATO member states under the pretext that they are fighting [separatists].”
> 
> NATO, which has been conducting its own exercises in Europe this summer, has stationed four battalions — including U.S. troops — in the Baltic states and Poland.
> 
> Western officials in the Baltics last week said they saw the games as a rehearsal of the capability to seal off Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and deny access to the Baltic Sea to NATO forces attempting to come to their rescue. They also see a larger strategic goal: to demonstrate to U.S. and NATO leaders the high cost of defending the Baltics, and thus bringing into question the viability of the alliance.
> 
> In Belarus, the country’s small opposition, which fears Moscow could leave its troops in order to head off any attempt to remove Lukashenko from power, last week held a protest over the presence the Russian military.
> 
> Ishaan Tharoor in Washington and Michael Birnbaum in Brussels contributed to this report.


----------



## a_majoor

Interesting, if true. Long term, it would seem to be more in Russia's interests to retain the resource base of Siberia than to focus on Kazakhstan, but logistics and lines of communication makes the idea of rebuilding a Greater Russia or Russian Empire Redux somewhat of a dubious prospect:

https://strategypage.com/on_point/20170919222549.aspx



> Russia's War in Ukraine and War Games in Belarus
> by Austin Bay
> September 19, 2017
> 
> Russian President Vladimir Putin's personally expressed dismay at the collapse of the Soviet Union connects directly to two current events: Russia's war of conquest in Ukraine and the Russian Army's large-scale war games in western Russia and Belarus. By the way, the Russian military calls its war game enemy "The Western Coalition." The name deliberately incriminates NATO, the USSR's Cold War nemesis and an outfit on which Putin ritually blames 21st century Russian woes.
> 
> A minor dispute rages over the precise translation of Putin's April 25, 2005, USSR lamentation. Did he say that the USSR's demise was "a major geopolitical disaster of the (20th) century" or that it was the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century"?
> 
> The BBC and NBC News chose the "catastrophe" translation. Both renditions confirm the USSR's collapse appalled the former KGB colonel, who is now Russia's president.
> 
> Putin's dismay says a lot about him. The USSR was a Russian empire with Communist trappings. The czars portrayed themselves as defenders of Orthodox Christianity. The Communist dictators claimed they were the vanguard of global Marxism defending Workers' Paradise. Both regimes relied on gulags, secret police and state terror to maintain power.
> 
> Both appealed to Russian ethnic solidarity and nationalist aspirations. In WW2, when invading Nazi armies threatened his regime, Communist dictator Josef Stalin called on the people to defend Mother Russia, not communism.
> 
> Putin bewails the lot of Russians living in non-Russian, former Soviet territories. Putin repeatedly claims he must act to protect "cut off" Russians or secure "Russian rights" in these regions. The Kremlin invoked these justifications in 2008 during the Russo-Georgia War. They also provided propaganda cover for the 2014 invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Protecting ethnic Russians justifies Kremlin support for the rogue Transnistria statelet, a Russified sliver of Moldova. In different disguises (including peacekeeping contingents), the Kremlin has kept a Russian military force in Transnistria since 1992.
> 
> In early 2014, Russian agitators orchestrated incidents to "prove" the fiction that violent "Ukrainian fascists" threatened Russians living in Crimea. Such a dire situation! The Kremlin had to take all means necessary to protect ethnic Russians. The Kremlin made the same claim when its proxy forces invaded eastern Ukraine. It continues to use the propaganda trope.
> 
> But on March 18, 2014, the Kremlin didn't protect people -- it seized territory and annexed Crimea to Russia. For the first time since WW2, military aggression in Europe by a major European power led to political annexation and territorial expansion. Moreover, Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, a multi-lateral diplomatic agreement guaranteeing Ukraine's territorial integrity. That agreement helped stabilize post-Cold War Eastern Europe.
> 
> The Crimean annexation and the war with Ukraine are evidence Putin intends to rebuild the USSR, or at least control key parts that would make Greater Russia a global power.
> 
> RUBK -- pronounced "rubik" as in in the puzzle Rubik's Cube -- is an acronym for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Under Kremlin control, the RUBK would have the demographics and natural resources to once again make Greater Russia a global power.
> 
> Super-power status takes money and a large number of people (how large is arguable, but 200 million is a plausible figure).
> 
> Russia needs Ukraine's immense agricultural productivity.
> 
> Russia already wields immense political and economic influence in Kazakhstan; the country is essentially a Kremlin satrap. At the moment Belarus escapes complete Kremlin control. However, several analysts claim the huge on-going war game in Belarus could easily mask an invasion of the country. What does Belarus do if the Russian Army just decides to stay?
> 
> Perhaps the Kremlin intends to forward deploy Russian tank divisions in Belarus. Belarus is a route to Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave on the Baltic. The Kremlin wants to "re-connect" Kaliningrad. However, Lithuania and a sliver of Polish territory known as the Suwalki Gap separate Belarus from Kaliningrad. Russians in Kaliningrad are definitely "cut off."
> 
> Polish Army units defend the gap. Remember, Poland is a NATO nation, an armed member of that great Western coalition.


----------



## a_majoor

Interesting look at Russia's use of "Hybrid Warfare" against America. What is illuminating is the "trigger" for Russia's use of Hybrid Warfare against the United States, and what needs to be determined is the end point and what responses the United States either can or should take against Russia:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/oct/18/vladimir-putins-rage-triggered-by-president-obamas/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTldVM1pXSTVZV1JsTkdFNCIsInQiOiJDMWRrMnhzeHEyY2xCaVVkR0tmcmlIUkNRaHJVcXNxXC85eUtPdlpCT2ptVVUrNk55SCtFbmcybnk0XC83T044SEpqTVVFREJBK0U3OEp5SEV5aFRHem9MbnJwNDlSSUpSbXV5YUt1QUdHbTRCZmRMK095SkFiOXk1Z0w5WmxpQlV0In0%3D



> *Putin’s rage triggered by Obama’s moves*
> Fearing meddling by U.S., Moscow now turns to ‘hybrid warfare’
> By Dan Boylan and Guy Taylor - The Washington Times - Wednesday, October 18, 2017
> Part of an occasional series
> 
> In interview after interview with top U.S. intelligence officials and foreign diplomats about the downward spiral in U.S.-Russian relations, one date keeps resurfacing: January 2012.
> 
> That month Michael McFaul, President Obama’s newly appointed ambassador to Russia, arrived in snow-covered Moscow and almost immediately began meeting with opposition leaders and human rights activists critical of the Kremlin.
> 
> It was a provocative move at a sensitive moment when Vladimir Putin was already seething over perceived American backing of mass protests designed to smear him. The Russian president was also facing a wobbly economy as global oil prices plunged as he struggled to reclaim Russia’s influence on the world stage.
> 
> Mr. McFaul, an academic by training and a political appointee, had never served as an ambassador before. The sandy-haired Montana native was 49 at the time, and in the midst of his whirlwind first month in Moscow, he blogged that he’d started things off “with a bang.”
> An investigation into what’s happened since, down to and including explosive charges of Russian meddling in the U.S. political process, suggests the fallout was greater than anyone could have predicted.
> 
> In interviews The Washington Times has conducted with several foreign diplomats and more than a dozen current and former high-level U.S. intelligence and national security officials, Mr. McFaul’s arrival in Moscow has been cited as being like a bee sting that enraged the Russian bear.
> 
> It actually “pissed off Putin so much” that the Russian president personally vowed revenge, said one former official involved in the intelligence debate raging over the causes of the Kremlin’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
> 
> “The Washington establishment drastically underestimates who started this,” a foreign diplomat with access to Mr. Putin told The Times. “It was actually Obama and Hillary, not Putin. They sent McFaul over to Russia to try and overthrow Putin, and it made him livid.”
> 
> Mr. McFaul in an email exchange insisted it was never the Obama administration’s policy or goal to overthrow the Russian president. But he acknowledged outright that Mr. Putin “perceived us — of course, wrongly, in my view — as trying to undermine his legitimacy.”
> 
> “Could that perception have been one of the motivating factors for his attack on our sovereignty in 2016?” the former ambassador wrote. “Yes.”
> 
> Mr. Putin’s inner circle, including a mysterious Army general who would later rise in prominence to craft the Kremlin’s policy of “hybrid warfare” against Washington, already knew Mr. McFaul well before 2012.
> 
> A political scientist at Stanford who helped set up the Moscow Carnegie Center in the mid-1990s, Mr. McFaul had served as the top Russia policy adviser on Mr. Obama’s National Security Council during the administration’s fumbling attempt to “reset” relations with Moscow in 2009. By the time he showed up as U.S. ambassador, he was viewed by Mr. Putin’s allies as a henchman for then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
> 
> Just before Mr. McFaul’s arrival, Mr. Putin and Mrs. Clinton had engaged in a nasty public exchange over the 2011 Russian legislative elections, which triggered the largest Moscow street protests since the 1990s. Mrs. Clinton criticized the vote as “neither free nor fair” and called for a “full investigation.”
> 
> Mr. Putin countered by accusing Washington of supporting the opposition protesters. “We need to safeguard ourselves from this interference in our internal affairs,” he declared.
> 
> ‘To punish Hillary’
> 
> The politics had become deeply personal, according to former U.S. officials who worked on Russia policy with Mrs. Clinton.
> How Mr. Putin would strike back at her wouldn’t be known for another four years, and it would come about in ways that may take Washington many more years to fully comprehend.
> 
> Former CIA and NSA Director Michael Hayden said Russia’s efforts to influence the 2016 presidential election were the “most successful covert influence campaign in the history of covert influence campaigns.”
> 
> “The Russians,” he added, “wanted to punish Hillary and erode confidence in the American electoral process itself.”
> 
> Back in 2012, Mr. McFaul felt the Kremlin’s wrath immediately. Within a month of his posting to Moscow, Russian state TV launched a major propaganda campaign blasting him with tabloid exploits of his meetings. Picket lines also sprung up at the U.S. Embassy, with a pro-Kremlin youth group even playing dead at the front gate and referencing U.S. involvement in the Arab Spring protests breaking out across the Middle East.
> 
> Mr. McFaul increased his security.
> 
> Speaking to reporters at the time, the new envoy said he’d never anticipated “the relentless anti-Americanism” that had taken hold in the Russian capital.
> 
> With the hindsight of five years, he told The Times this week that his “reaching out to opposition figures was deliberately and grossly exaggerated by the Kremlin and state-controlled media.”
> 
> Mr. Putin felt threatened by the Moscow street demonstrations, said Mr. McFaul, who returned to Stanford and is also a contributing columnist at The Washington Post.
> 
> “The Kremlin needed a way to discredit the opposition, so they accused them of being puppets of the West, Obama and me,” he said. “In my view, their propaganda efforts succeeded.”
> 
> ‘Hair standing on end’
> 
> A former covert intelligence agent previously based in the region said Mr. McFaul underestimated the threat Mr. Putin felt.
> “We were not at war with [Russia], but they were at war with us,” the former agent said.
> 
> “McFaul made the Kremlin’s hair stand on end,” added a prominent Western journalist based in Moscow during Mr. McFaul’s ambassadorship.
> In November 2012, 10 months into the McFaul ambassadorship, Mr. Putin raised the stakes significantly by appointing General Valery Gerasimov, a mysterious operator within the Russian military’s brain trust, as chief of staff of the Russian armed forces.
> 
> Now 62, Mr. Gerasimov hailed from a region of Russia home to the ethnic Tatars. His early career included one of Russia’s bloodiest recent conflicts, the second Chechen War, which pitted separatist rebels against the Kremlin and was one of Mr. Putin’s signature initiatives.
> ‘Hybrid warfare’
> 
> In 2013 the new military chief published an article in a Russian journal that widely has come to be considered the strategic foundation undergirding the Kremlin’s subversion policies in the years since.
> 
> Known in military commands as the “Gerasimov Doctrine of Hybrid Warfare,” the theory encourages blending conventional and unconventional warfare, essentially expanding military battlefield options infinitely — including into cyberspace.
> 
> “In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace,” the general wrote. “Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template. The very ‘rules of war’ have changed.”
> 
> The general also addressed the Arab Spring. Mr. Putin, who obsessed over the mass protests that led to the Soviet Union’s collapse, believed a hidden U.S. hand factored heavily in the “color revolutions” in former Soviet states such as Georgia and Ukraine and the 2011 popular uprisings that rocked the Muslim world.
> 
> The Kremlin particularly feared the power of Twitter and other social media platforms during the Arab Spring and their ability to mobilize opinion and organize protests even in authoritarian countries. In his writing, Gen. Gerasimov warned the Arab Spring-type events were “typical of warfare in the 21st century.”
> 
> It was here, intelligence officials told The Times, that Mr. McFaul — who had studied and taught at Stanford and prominently used American social media as a diplomatic tool to connect with the Russian people — and Mr. Gerasimov intersect. “McFaul was the essence of the Twitter culture, sunny California high-tech solutions and Democratic optimism,” a former intelligence officer said. “Gerasimov and Putin were two guys who studied the best way to smash you over the head with a rock.”
> 
> Fast-forward four years to the U.S. presidential election of 2016, and the Kremlin stands accused of using those same social media tools to sway the political debate during the campaign.
> 
> It’s not clear whether the U.S. intelligence community or multiple congressional investigations into Russia’s activities — not to mention former FBI Director Robert Mueller’s special counsel probe — can stop the Russians if they try again.


----------



## a_majoor

The Russians have always been extremely interested in PSYOPS and propaganda, if this excerpt is any indication they are at least researching ways to more subtly influence people in their target audiences (full article behind paywall):

https://pjmedia.com/instapundit/280550



> DO TELL: Nudging can also be used for dark purposes: The path of least resistance can easily direct people to do the wrong thing.
> 
> Policy wonks have nudged people to sign up for organ donation, to increase their pension contributions — and even insulate their homes by coupling home insulation with an attic-decluttering service. All we have to do is make it easy for people to do the right thing.
> 
> But what if you want people to do the wrong thing? The answer: make that easy; or make the right thing difficult. Messrs Thaler and Sunstein are well aware of the risk of malign nudges, and have been searching for the right word to describe them. Mr Thaler likes “sludge” — obfuscatory language or procedures that accidentally or deliberately encourage inertia. Voter ID laws, he says, are a good example of sludge, calculated to softly disenfranchise. Meanwhile Mr Sunstein has written an entire book about the “ethics of influence”.
> 
> And as we are starting to realise, Vladimir Putin is well aware of the opportunity that behavioural science presents, too. Rumours circulate that the Russian authorities are keen recruiters of young psychologists and behavioural economists; I have no proof of that, but it seems like a reasonable thing for the Russian government to do. I am willing to bet that not all of them are working on attic-decluttering.
> 
> You know who’s an expert at nudging? Satan. Just sayin’ . . . .


----------



## tomahawk6

A look at one of Russia's Arctic bases.Throw in robot subs and you have an interesting force projection or area denial capability.

http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20171121-why-russia-is-sending-robotic-submarines-to-the-arctic

The Arctic: the smallest of Earth’s five oceans, with icy waters and dagger-like winds, is home to some of the most unforgiving conditions on the planet.
But far below the skin of sea ice that waxes and wanes with the seasons, this inhospitable ocean is hiding a treasure trove of natural resources – one that’s largely untapped by mankind.
The Arctic Ocean is estimated to hold billions of barrels of oil, and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas – accounting for 16-26% of the Earth’s undiscovered reserves. And there’s a superpower scrambling to beat all others in the race to exploit this chilly mother lode of polar resources: Russia.


----------



## a_majoor

The fate of the Su-57:

https://warisboring.com/russias-su-57-stealth-fighter-is-doomed-to-fail/



> Russia’s Su-57 Stealth Fighter Is Doomed to Fail
> WIB AIR December 11, 2017 Tom Cooper
> 
> Westerns analysts have concluded that Russia’s fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighter is unlikely to enter operational service before 2027. Postponements, cost-overruns and research and development-related problems mar the project.
> 
> This should come as no surprise. The Su-57 program was never really viable.
> 
> Back in early 2006, Russian president Vladimir Putin integrated all of Russia’s aviation companies into a single, state-owned holding — the United Aircraft-building Corporation.
> 
> Over the time, UAC absorbed more than 20 aviation companies, and re-organized these into four aircraft-manufacturing divisions. One for combat aircraft, one for military transport aircraft, one for civilian aircraft and one for aircraft components.
> 
> In the course of the streamlining, most of the state-owned enterprises became joint-stock companies. However, the government owns at least 90 percent of shares.
> 
> Despite the resulting centralized and vertical structure, most of enterprises integrated within UAC have retained some level of autonomy. MiG and Sukhoi both have their own board of directors.
> 
> However, with few exceptions, these directors have no say. On the contrary, the entire UAC conglomerate is subject to a board of 14 directors, most of them well-known associates of Putin. Few are skilled industrial managers.
> 
> At top and above — Su-57s. Photos via Wikipedia
> 
> Despite bombastic reports in the Russian media, UAC turned out to be a lame duck. The conglomerate proved capable of re-launching production of types designed back in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Otherwise, UAC is incapable of innovation and adaptation.
> 
> The main reason is that most of UAC’s directors are hand-picked yes-sayers — people more than happy to discuss planning, strategies and new projects, but lacking the ability to make hard decisions. Unsurprisingly, over the last 10 years UAC has made promises it cannot fulfill,
> 
> In the case of the Su-57, UAC’s crucial failure was the early decision to close its Combat Aircraft Division to foreign investors. The first director of the consortium, former deputy minister of defense and later prime minister Sergey Ivanov, insisted back in 2006 that Russia “plans to develop this sector on its own.”
> 
> Combined with the dramatic collapse of the Russian economy in the wake of Western economic sanctions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the inflexibility of UAC made the Su-57 impossible to realize. No matter how large or populated, a country with GDP comparable to that of Australia cannot afford to play at being a superpower, fight a protracted war in Syria and develop its own stealth fighter.
> 
> The last hope for the project was the serious Indian interest in financing the conversion of the Su-57 into a stealth strike fighter in the class of the Su-30MKI. But the management structures Putin imposed undermined that collaboration.
> 
> Of course, the Kremlin’s core interest in the Su-57 is scoring big propaganda points by creating a supposed match for Lockheed’s F-22 Raptor. This is something the business-minded Indian air force is not keen to finance.
> 
> And that means the Su-57 is going nowhere fast.


----------



## MarkOttawa

And now Russian strategic deterrence with conventionally-armed cruise missiles (ALCM and SLCM)--very relevant for NORAD and new RCAF (whenever, whatever) fighter and for surface-to-air missile suite for RCN CSCs:



> The Russification of U.S. Deterrence Policy
> 
> The new U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which was unveiled on December 18, is a thoroughly realist document that places premium on effective deterrence—which, the document says, has degraded in the recent years. The key paragraph describing these challenges paints a troubling picture:
> 
> “The spread of accurate and inexpensive weapons and the use of cyber tools have allowed state and non-state competitors to harm the United States across various domains. Such capabilities contest what was until recently U.S. dominance across the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. They also _enable adversaries to attempt strategic attacks against the United States—without resorting to nuclear weapons_ [emphasis added]—in ways that could cripple our economy and our ability to deploy our military forces.”
> 
> ...These capabilities, indeed, change the strategic landscape in a fundamental way—after a quarter-century monopoly on such capabilities, the United States finds itself essentially in the same predicament that the Russians or Chinese have faced since the end of the Cold War: the threat of a strategic non-nuclear use.
> 
> When Russia’s President Vladimir Putin announced in the end of 2013 that Russia was working on long-range conventional weapons, few U.S. analysts paid attention at all. When, in _December 2014, Moscow unveiled a new military doctrine that introduced the notion of non-nuclear deterrence_ [emphasis added], it generated some interest. But the belief in Russian inability to catch up with the United States remained so strong that few considered it a realistic prospect with serious consequences. Only when long-range conventional sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs and ALCMs) were deployed in Syria did American analysts begin to pay attention.
> 
> We still do not know what the consequences of Russia catching up with the United States in the only usable strategic capability might be; it is still unclear how the United States and its allies might react, and what the Russian counterreaction might be. But at least we are paying attention—and this is a welcome first step.
> 
> ...the United States’ strategic conventional capability has been a nightmare for Russian military planners since at least 1999, when it was employed in the Balkans. The initial Russian response was to increase reliance on nuclear weapons, which were assigned a mission of limited nuclear strike in response to a large-scale conventional attack. Moscow stated, however, that this was a temporary fix and that reliance on nuclear weapons would again decrease when it acquired a conventional strategic capability. _Last month, Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, confirmed that Moscow planned to reassign some deterrence missions from nuclear to conventional assets at an undefined future time_ [emphasis added]...
> 
> _Dr. Nikolai Sokov is a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies._
> http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-russification-us-deterrence-policy-23785



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MarkOttawa

More, by Dave Majumdar (further links at original):



> Russia's Military in 2035: Killing the Enemy from Distance (With Cruise Missiles)
> 
> Ultimately, Russia is not the threat that the Soviet Union once was. But nor is Moscow quite as weak as it was in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union where the Kremlin had to rely solely on its nuclear arsenal for deterrence. Modern Russia has the means to strike back conventionally against potential threats. “Russia now has a really decent conventional standing force,” Kofman said. “They no longer depend on nuclear weapons as their only deterrent.”
> 
> The shape of Russia’s military in 2035 will largely be determined by how successfully Moscow can transition from projects originally conceived by the Soviet Union into efforts that originated in today’s Russian Federation. Many of Russia’s most modern weapons such as the Kalibr-NK cruise missile or Iskander-M ballistic missile are actually projects that were on the drawing board in the late 1980s when the Soviet Union began to falter.
> 
> True next-generation Russian weapons—that don’t have their origins in the Soviet-era—include the developmental S-500 air and missile defense system, Zircon hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile and the Tupolev PAK-DA stealth bomber. Other next-generation systems include the operational izdeliye 129 engines for the Sukhoi PAK-FA fifth-generation stealth fighter. It’s not clear how much of a learning curve Russia will face in developing those new motors since the country has not developed a new fighter engine since the Soviet-era. “Engines are really hard,” Kofman noted. “If they weren’t, China wouldn’t still be buying Russian engines.”
> 
> In the future, Russia is likely focus “non-contact” warfare—that might include long-range strike capabilities, long-range air and missiles defense systems and precision-guided weapons. The _idea is to be able to punish a potential aggressor at long-ranges—striking back directly against a potential aggressor. “They’re working on deterrence by punishment, which is what all this long range strike potential is about,” Kofman said. “The ability to retaliate and to strike with conventional weapons, not nuclear weapons_ [emphasis added].”
> 
> The Russians are also developing unmanned systems in a completely different way than Western militaries. Russia is currently behind the West in terms of unmanned technology, but the Kremlin and the Russian defense industry is dumping money into such systems. As such, the Russia is rapidly moving forward in the area of robotics. “There is a rapid proliferation of drones across the Russian military,” Kofman said.
> 
> Compared to Western forces, there is much less focus on large medium altitude unmanned aircraft and much more focus on tactical systems for the Russian Ground Forces. Thus, the Russians are focused on cheap, plentiful and disposable drones that can be used as reconnaissance assets to provide targeting capability for heavy artillery.  The Russian “are trying to enable our surface-to-surface long-range fires,” Kofman said. “There, they very quickly started adapting drones to the way the Russian Army would like to fight. And the Russian Army would like to fight with face-melting firepower.”..
> 
> _Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar._
> http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-military-2035-killing-the-enemy-distance-cruise-23808?page=show



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## a_majoor

Longish article on Strategypage on Russia's situation:

https://strategypage.com/qnd/russia/articles/20171219.aspx

Full article here: https://army.ca/forums/threads/127127.0.html



> *Russia: Avoiding The Judgement Of China*
> 
> December 19, 2017: Russia ends 2017 still trying to hide the damage done by over three years of low oil prices and sanctions. There are certain indicators that cannot be completely concealed. One is the number of rubles it takes to buy a dollar (the benchmark for buying foreign goods or services.) After the Soviet Union dissolved most of the 1990s were spent with the new Russian economy getting used to the real world. By the late 1990s the Russian currency had reached a realistic value versus the dollar (about 30 rubles per). It is currently 60 rubles per dollar. In 2016 it hit 80 rubles to buy a dollar. All because of low oil prices and sanctions. More sanctions are coming in 2018 as the U.S. unilaterally sanctions about a hundred Russian business and government officials for their role in various illegal activities. While the travel and banking sanctions applied to these people is a minor inconvenience, being named and having your misdeeds explained is embarrassing and could cause long-term problems.
> 
> Meanwhile the government spent a lot of money to get a more favorable exchange rate but that uses up a lot of foreign reserves. As the ruble loses value versus the dollar and other foreign currencies imported goods become noticeably more expensive and there is a lot of essential stuff Russian can still import, if they can afford it. Meanwhile Russian citizens are less able to afford overseas vacations and those that do go find that Russians are not as welcome as they used to be. Russian airlines have seen foreign traffic decline as foreign passengers switching to non-Russian airlines when travelling into and out of Russia.
> 
> Since 2013 GDP dropped from $2.1 trillion to about half that as and the ruble lost about half its value compared to the dollar (the currency of international trade). Russia dropped from being the sixth largest economy in the world to the 14th. Russian banks are a good example of what is happening because they are increasingly insolvent. The government tries to hide that but foreign financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF, with experience measuring situations like this know better. Thus Russian claims to current and future GDP growth are exposed as deceptions based on accounting tricks and don’t really conceal unresolved and worsening problems. Reality is the shrinking defense budget and spending on needed infrastructure maintenance and construction.
> 
> The two main sources of capital (cash to work with) was oil income and access to investment or loans from foreign (usually Western) sources ( like banks). Those two sources are gone and now Russia has to seek loans from nations it really does not want to become indebted to, like China. In part that is because China is very strict when it comes to business and loans. This is the case even when there is a diplomatic or political angle involved. China will charge you market rates (of interest, much higher for worse risks like Russia or Venezuela) and cut you off if your financial situation is considered desperate. Russia does not want to risk the judgement of Chinese lenders. But Russia is running out of money, credit and options. Grabbing more of Ukraine won’t help because Crimea turned out to be a lot more expensive than expected and the subsidies to the half of Donbas they have already taken (or, rather, their mercenaries and hired rebels have taken) is a drain on the shrinking economy. The costs of Crimea are even worse.


----------



## a_majoor

Swarming drone attack reported against Russian bases in Syria. A forecast of what we can probably expect going into the future:

http://www.sciencealert.com/swarm-home-made-drones-strike-military-base-first-attack-kind-russia-uavs



> *First-Ever Drone Swarm Attack Has Struck Russian Military Bases, Sources Claim*
> We knew this day was coming.
> PETER DOCKRILL 11 JAN 2018
> 
> Ever since technological advancements made drones possible, people have warned of the potential dangers of weaponised UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), which could effectively become murderous slaughterbots we need to defend ourselves against.
> 
> Now, it looks like those fears have become a reality. The Russian Ministry of Defence claims its forces in Syria were attacked a week ago by a swarm of home-made drones – the first time such a coordinated assault has been reported in a military action.
> 
> According to the Ministry of Defence, Russian forces at the Khmeimim air base and Tartus naval facility "successfully warded off a terrorist attack with massive application of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)" last Friday night.
> 
> "As evening fell, the Russia air defence forces detected 13 unidentified small-size air targets at a significant distance approaching the Russian military bases," the Ministry said in a statement.
> 
> "Ten assault drones were approaching the Khmeimim air base, and another three – the CSS point in Tartus."
> 
> Six of the assault force drones were intercepted by Russian electronic warfare units, with three of the UAVs being brought to land outside the base, while the remaining three exploded on contact with the ground.
> 
> Another seven drones were "eliminated" by Pantsir-S anti-aircraft missiles fired by the Russians, with the bases reporting no casualties or damage, the statement explains.
> 
> If the report is accurate, the Russian forces are lucky the attack wasn't worse, because whoever unleashed these drones wasn't fooling around.
> 
> While photographs of the improvised UAVs used in the assault make the drones look clunky and strung together, the Russians' analysis reveals they were armed with explosives and launched from a site more than 50 kilometres (31 miles) distant from their targets, navigating the trek via GPS and altitude-control sensors.
> 
> The Ministry says a technical examination indicates these drones would have an effective attacking range of about 100 kilometres (62 miles) – which is pretty terrifying – and means that in the new era of UAV warfare, locations that once may have seemed immune to attack, are in fact exposed.
> 
> "They thought the base was secure, but now it seems it is vulnerable," Maxim Suchkov of the Russian International Affairs Council told The Washington Post.
> 
> It's unknown who launched the swarm, with the attack being unclaimed at present. But the Russians have hinted that the technology used was too advanced for local militants, seen as a suggestion it could have been supplied by US forces in the vicinity – something the Pentagon says is "absolutely false".
> 
> There's an awful lot about this incident that's unconfirmed right now, but one thing we can be sure of is this technological first could usher warfare into a terrifying new chapter – and towards a grim future scientists have been desperately warning we need to prevent.
> 
> "Who knows how accurate some of these details really are, but if the number of drones launched at the facility is anywhere near correct, it would seem to be the first self-contained, large scale, coordinated, standoff drone assault on a fixed installation like this," Tyler Rogoway reports at The Drive.
> 
> "It seems that the age of drone swarms has arrived, and that's a terrifying reality to comprehend."


----------



## Kat Stevens

The Skynet Funding Bill is passed. The system goes on-line August 4th, 1997. Human decisions are removed from strategic defense. Skynet begins to learn at a geometric rate. It becomes self-aware at 2:14 a.m. Eastern time, August 29th. In a panic, they try to pull the plug.

Skynet fights back.


----------



## Good2Golf

> It's unknown who launched the swarm, with the attack being unclaimed at present. But the Russians have hinted that the technology used was too advanced for local militants, seen as a suggestion it could have been supplied by US forces in the vicinity – something the Pentagon says is "absolutely false".



In the grammatically-correct sense, would CIA assets be considered "US forces?"  If no, then the Pentagon would indeed be accurate in its reply. :nod:


----------



## Kirkhill

Good2Golf said:
			
		

> In the grammatically-correct sense, would CIA assets be considered "US forces?"  If no, then the Pentagon would indeed be accurate in its reply. :nod:



And now you better keep an eye open for black helicopters in your vicinity.......  ;D


----------



## Good2Golf

Chris Pook said:
			
		

> And now you better keep an eye open for black helicopters in your vicinity.......  ;D



Saw Tom Cruise in "American Made" recently.


----------



## a_majoor

While blaming Americans is an international pastime, the Chinese have been very heavily involved in research about drones and swarming as well.


----------



## Good2Golf

Thucydides said:
			
		

> While blaming Americans is an international pastime, the Chinese have been very heavily involved in research about drones and swarming as well.



While true, what's the PLA's angle in Syria such that attacking Team Vlad makes sense?


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Well the AD network around the base worked as intended  8)


----------



## Good2Golf

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> Well the AD network around the base worked as intended  8)



Not surprised.  Pantsir S1 is a nasty (i.e. capable AD) one!


G2G


----------



## MarkOttawa

Start of lengthy piece (note US worked on these in 1950s-60s):



> U.S. Has Been Secretly Watching Russia's Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missiles Crash and Burn
> _Successful or not, if Russia is test flying these weapons, this means it has been repeatedly crashing nuclear reactors into the ground or the ocean._
> 
> Following Russian claims that it is developing a new nuclear-powered cruise missile, there are reports that the U.S. government has been actively spying on this work and that some or all of the test flights have failed. This, in turn, raises questions about the safety and viability of such a weapon, as well as why American officials would keep this knowledge a secret.
> 
> Russia’s President Vladimir Putin publicly announced the as yet unnamed missile in an annual speech on March 1, 2018. The Kremlin says it successfully tested one of the weapons near the end of 2017 and released video footage claiming to show the launch and it in flight. So far, Russian authorities have not released any other significant details about the weapon’s configuration or capabilities, though Putin implied that the final design would be broadly similar in size and shape to the existing, conventionally-powered Kh-101 cruise missile.
> 
> At the most basic conceptual level, the weapon could conceivably reach supersonic speeds, fly at very low altitudes, and have effectively unlimited range thanks to its nuclear powerplant, allowing it to hit targets anywhere in the world with little warning and dodge anti-missile defenses.
> 
> But shortly after Putin’s address, CNN, in a story citing an anonymous U.S. government official, cast doubt on the possibility that this weapon was anywhere near operational. That individual added that the “United States had observed a small number of Russian tests of its nuclear-powered cruise missile and seen them all crash.” Fox News said its own sources indicated the same thing, that the weapon was in the research and development phase and that at least one had crashed during testing in the arctic...
> http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/18948/u-s-has-been-secretly-watching-russias-nuclear-powered-cruise-missiles-crash-and-burn



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MarkOttawa

Russian and US nuke developments and plans, esp. low-yield--start of lengthy AvWeek piece:



> Cold War Frost Grips Nuclear Arms Debate
> 
> The end of the Cold War led to an extraordinary reduction in city-destroying nuclear weaponry, with both Russia and the U.S. reducing their respective stockpiles by more than 80% compared to the highs of the mid-1960s and ’80s. As of Feb. 5, the two sides are at their lowest levels since the outbreak of the Soviet-U.S. nuclear arms race over six decades ago, each now possessing 1,550 accountable “strategic” warheads.
> 
> But despite hopes for continued arms reductions, the world now finds itself on the brink of another nuclear arms race, although Moscow and Washington won’t admit it. Even though neither side intends to break faith with the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start) by increasing their respective number of deployed high-yield nukes, Russia and the U.S. are now engaged in a tactical nuclear weapons buildup.
> 
> As a renewed Cold War chill sets in, Trump administration defense officials publicly acknowledge that Russia is decades ahead on nuclear weapons modernization, but also commands a leading position when it comes to tactical nukes. According to the administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Russia has a modern, active stockpile of “up to 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons,” whereas the U.S. commands at most several hundred B61 free-fall bombs carried by “dual-capable” fighters and bombers. The U.S. outguns Russia in terms of conventional, nonnuclear forces, but this position is offset by a “tactical nuclear weapons gap,” U.S. officials say.
> 
> The Defense Department and NNSA are getting to work on a low-yield warhead option for Trident
> 
> Pentagon to begin analysis of alternatives for nuclear sea-launched cruise missile
> 
> Russia’s low-yield nuclear force, capable of raining down upon U.S. and NATO targets across Europe at a moment’s notice, includes close-, medium- and long-range ballistic, cruise and anti-aircraft missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges and torpedoes. In response, the Pentagon has proposed rapidly developing and fielding a low-yield warhead for the Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missile, as well as a longer-term project for a sea-launched cruise missile, plugging a hole in deterrence left by the retirement of the nuclear Tomahawk in 2012-13. These new initiatives add to an expansive list of strategic nuclear weapon programs that will replace Washington’s critically outdated nuclear triad of bombers, missiles and submarines.
> 
> But despite this heavy investment by the U.S., Russia has a few new tricks up its sleeve. In an address to the Russian Federal Assembly on March 1, President Vladimir Putin unveiled several newly developed tactical and strategic nuclear weapons designed to outsmart even the most capable U.S. missile defenses. This list includes Russia’s latest 440,000-lb. (220-ton) RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, dubbed “Satan II” by NATO. It has “practically no range restrictions,” with the ability to strike the North and South poles, Putin says, and it will eventually be armed with hypersonic maneuvering reentry vehicles capable of propelling nuclear warheads at speeds “in excess of Mach 20.”
> 
> From his lectern, Putin unveiled a new type of missile, torpedo and unmanned submersible, each powered by small-scale nuclear reactors and able to deliver devastating payloads at intercontinental ranges while navigating around U.S. air and sea defenses. He says Russia has also become the first nation to field an air-launched hypersonic strike weapon, which entered service in December 2017 on aircraft assigned to the nation’s southern military district. That district borders Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine and incorporates Crimea.
> 
> Putin says these weapons are “invincible,” designed to overcome current and future Western missile defense systems, including the Aegis Ashore sites now installed in Romania and Poland. They will be used as leverage for arms control negotiations, with the Russian president calling on the U.S. to halt and even roll back its missile defense shields and return to compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the George W. Bush administration unilaterally withdrew from in 2002.
> 
> “No one has managed to restrain Russia,” Putin says. “Everything I have said today is not a bluff, believe me.”
> 
> One man who knows for sure Putin is not bluffing is Air Force Gen. John Hyten, head of U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom). He has been warning about Russia’s rapidly advancing nuclear arsenal since assuming the position of Stratcom commander in November 2016. While Putin’s claim of owning “invincible” nuclear weapons is an exaggeration, the threat these weapons pose to the U.S. and its NATO allies is real.
> 
> “The return of great power competition is not necessarily a return to the Cold War, but the emergence of a new, complex and threatening security environment,” Hyten said during a presentation at the National Defense University on Feb. 16. “Rather than reducing the salience of nuclear weapons, Russian leadership has made explicit nuclear threats and brandished their nuclear weapons in ways we have not seen in a generation.”..
> http://aviationweek.com/aviation-week-space-technology/cold-war-frost-grips-nuclear-arms-debate



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MarkOttawa

Cyber Bear getting awfully bold:



> Russian Hackers Attacking U.S. Power Grid and Aviation, FBI Warns
> 
> 
> U.S. officials warn of attacks, including on nuclear plants
> Cyber-attacks underway since at least March 2016, U.S. says
> 
> Russian hackers are conducting a broad assault on the U.S. electric grid, water processing plants, air transportation facilities and other targets in rolling attacks on some of the country’s most sensitive infrastructure, U.S. government officials said Thursday.
> 
> The announcement was the first official confirmation that Russian hackers have taken aim at facilities on which hundreds of millions of Americans depend for basic services. Bloomberg News reported in July that Russian hackers had breached more than a dozen power plants in seven states, an aggressive campaign that has since expanded to dozens of states, according to a person familiar with the investigation.
> 
> "Since at least March 2016, Russian government cyber actors" have targeted "government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors," including those of energy, nuclear, water and aviation, according to an alert issued Thursday by the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation.
> 
> Critical manufacturing sectors and commercial facilities also have been targeted by the ongoing "multi-stage intrusion campaign by Russian government cyber actors."
> 
> Cyber-attacks are "literally happening hundreds of thousands of times a day," Energy Secretary Rick Perry told lawmakers during a hearing Thursday. "The warfare that goes on in the cyberspace is real, it’s serious, and we must lead the world."
> 
> Separately Thursday, the U.S. sanctioned a St. Petersburg-based “troll farm,” two Russian intelligence services, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian citizens and businesses indicted by Special Counsel Robert Mueller on charges of meddling with the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
> 
> A joint analysis by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security described hackers as extremely sophisticated, in some cases first breaching suppliers and third-party vendors before hopping from those networks to their ultimate target. The government’s report did not say how successful the attacks were...
> https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-15/russian-hackers-attacking-u-s-power-grid-aviation-fbi-warns



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## pbi

As Boney M once sang: _Ahhh, those Russians_. 

Always bad, always there. Is anybody really surprised that they behave they way they do? More or less the way they always have?  

As the great George Kennan, father of Containment, said: "_Russia can have at its borders only enemies or vassals_".


----------



## jollyjacktar

Bruce MacKinnon cartoon on Russia and. PM Teresa May.


http://thechronicleherald.ca/editorial-cartoon/2018-03-14-editorial-cartoon


----------



## a_majoor

Long article from Radio Free Europe about Russian mercenaries in Syria. It seems they had a much better relation with Syria or at least their Russian masters, but now have had heavy equipment withdrawn. It is also interesting that they see their deployments in Syria, Ukraine and other places as part of an ongoing war between the Russian Federation and the United States:

https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-mercenaries-vagner-commanders-syria/29100402.html



> Russian Mercenaries: Vagner Commanders Describe Life Inside The 'Meat Grinder'
> March 14, 2018 21:06 GMT
> Sergei Khazov-Cassia Robert Coalson
> Smoke rises following an air strike on a rebel-held area in Syria. According to one commander, a Russian officer "coordinates the air cover" with mercenary troops on the ground. "Sometimes it is a thing of beauty to see how perfectly the aviation and artillery support works out," he says. (illustrative photo)
> Smoke rises following an air strike on a rebel-held area in Syria. According to one commander, a Russian officer "coordinates the air cover" with mercenary troops on the ground. "Sometimes it is a thing of beauty to see how perfectly the aviation and artillery support works out," he says. (illustrative photo)
> Share
> 449
> Print
> The Russian mercenaries fighting in Syria say they are not in the country for the money or to help Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
> 
> "[Syrians] can't stand Assad," one Russian mercenary commander told RFE/RL. "Really. Only a tiny percentage of the population there supports him and the rest oppose him. Only [Russian President Vladimir] Putin supports him. Russia supports him -- no one else."
> 
> There is a bigger motivation, the mercenary claimed. "If you are fighting under a Russian flag, with a Russian weapon, even if you are eating moldy food and are 10,000 kilometers from home, you are nonetheless fighting for Russia," he said.
> 
> "There is no Syrian war," he added. "There is no Ukrainian war. There is only a war between the Russian Federation and the United States."



Article will be posted in the Long article thread


----------



## Journeyman

Bosnia-Herzegovina 2.0, anyone?

The Foreign Policy Research Institute has just published a report, *Bosnia on the Chopping Block: The Potential for Violence and Steps to Prevent It*, stating that Russia is actively supporting political and paramilitary actors within the Republika Srpska (RS), seeking to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

With Russian support, RS police and security forces are receiving army-style training and equipment; this is in direct violation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Russian organizations (such as the Night Wolves biker group, which played an active role in Crimea’s annexation), are helping to form Serb nationalist paramilitary forces.

In 2016, a Kremlin-backed coup attempt in Montenegro failed (bordering B-H); this was followed by Montenegro becoming part of NATO in April 2017.  Observers claim that Russia is now working to guarantee that the Montenegro scenario isn't repeated in Bosnia by apparently seeking to destabilize this NATO flank, providing support for secessionist  RS President Dodik, and hoping to splinter B-H. In addition to the military support, Russia is providing financial and political backing.


Complete FPRI report here


----------



## jollyjacktar

It would seem that Vald saw his shadow today and now Russians will have to go through 6 more years of Putin.

http://www.cbc.ca/beta/news/world/russia-presidential-election-1.4581534


----------



## OldSolduer

In Russia people do not elect President - he elects himself.


----------



## tomahawk6

Here is an image of the so called hypersonic rocket carried by a MIG 31 of which only 6 have been modified to carry the weapon.

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2018/03/russias-kinzhal-mach-10-hypersonic-weapon-is-a-single-stage-pegasus-rocket.html


----------



## MarkOttawa

The rather different Russian perspective on nukes and, especially, missile defence--excerpts (further links at original):



> Red Glare: The Origin and Implications of Russia’s ‘New’ Nuclear Weapons
> 
> “Crazy.” “Dr. Strangelove weapons.” These were just two of the more colorful reactions to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revelation of new exotic nuclear delivery systems in a March 1 speech. The system receiving the most attention is a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile with intercontinental range, though the Status-6, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed long-range underwater vehicle, has also drawn comment. Why would Russia, which has over 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads that can already be delivered from existing ballistic and cruise missiles, invest in these new, exotic — and, according to some, crazy — systems?
> 
> The answer is deeply rooted in two of the defining events of modern Russian and Soviet history: the Great Patriotic War (or World War II) and the Cold War. Far from being crazy, these “new” Russian nuclear weapons have their origin in an abiding fear and respect for U.S. nuclear and missile defense capabilities...
> 
> The Soviets took missile defense so seriously that they did not want to lose a competition in the field. Better that neither side have missile defenses than the United States be superior in offense and defense. Thus, despite intense interest in missile defense for both strategic and bureaucratic reasons, Soviet leaders were eager for an arms control agreement to end the competition. A Special National Intelligence Estimate in 1970 assessed that the Soviets would be interested in arms control limits on missile defense based in large part “on a fear that U.S. technology could put it ahead in this field.” Such limits were codified in 1972 as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
> 
> Freezing missile defense also allowed the Soviets to agree to limits on the number of strategic nuclear weapons...
> 
> In summary, nearly 35 years ago the Soviet leadership, fearful of renewed missile defense competition and U.S. nuclear modernization, began to mull exactly the sort of systems Putin revealed this month. They did so not because they were crazy, but because they were deeply fearful that the United States would resume missile defense competition in parallel with a competition over the quality of strategic nuclear forces. The Soviets doubted they could keep up in either competition — much less both — so asymmetric responses were their only hope...
> 
> ...it is important that U.S. policymakers understand the Russian perspective. Russian proclamations about missile defense are not mere propaganda, though they may overstate some of their views publicly to influence various audiences. So what does this mean for the nuclear relationship? First, U.S. leaders should recognize that no amount of explaining of the technical limitations of present or even potential U.S. missile defense capability is likely to change long and deeply held Russian views about missile defense competition.
> 
> Second, and more importantly, there is probably no future for formal, treaty-based U.S.-Russian arms control if the negotiations do not cover missile defense. The Russians sought unsuccessfully to include missile defense in the last round of strategic arms control negotiations (2009-2010). Today, with their “new” systems, they have a stronger bargaining position. This presents a dilemma for American policymakers, who clearly want to continue the ongoing U.S. deployment of limited missile defense capabilities against North Korea and Iran, even if they do not seek to neutralize Russia’s strategic deterrent, as the Kremlin fears. The instinct may be to simply proceed with missile defense despite the consequences for arms control...
> 
> _Austin Long is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and the author of multiple studies on nuclear strategy._
> https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/red-glare-the-origin-and-implications-of-russias-new-nuclear-weapons/



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## tomahawk6

The Russians targeted a British sub prior to the missile strikes on Syria.It wasnt part of the Syria operation.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5617799/Royal-Navy-submarine-hunted-Russia-cat-mouse-pursuit.html


----------



## Eye In The Sky

Honestly, that has been going on for...decades...between both sides.



> "The Russian Kilo-Class submarines tracked the British crew..."



Author doesn't seem to know what he is suggesting there...



> Nick Childs of the International Institute for Strategic Studies said submarine commanders were trained not to fire too many missiles at once as they would give away their position



 :  or  :facepalm:, or both.

They could at least use a picture of a Kilo-class.  But they are small and don't look as 'scary' I guess?


----------



## TQMS

A couple of Russian points out of the PAO today at work.

Russian forces lined up along NATO's border for 'assault' operations
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/russian-forces-lined-up-along-12379551
(Mirror (UK), 17 April 18) Kremlin troops are poised for an attack, ambassadors from three Baltic states told MPs

US and Russian nuclear arsenals set to be unchecked for first time since 1972
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/17/us-russian-nuclear-arsenals-treaty-expire-unconstrained
(The Guardian, 17 April 18) Arms control experts have signed a statement warning international constraints will expire in 2021 unless a new nuclear deal is reached


----------



## a_majoor

I have thought of this as well, but Russian bellicosity towards the West is much more rewarding (in that the West has  not displayed much resolution in the past several decades). The other sticking point to this theory is the Russians haven't attempted to follow up in any of the ways "Hybrid Warfare" doctrine would suggest, not to mention the correlation of forces is distinctly unfavourable to Russia in Siberia (political, economic, demographic as well as military). Regardless, Russia does feel pressed from the Islamic South and the Chinese East, how they deal with this should be interesting in the coming years:

https://pjmedia.com/trending/direction-russias-new-nukes-pointed-anyway/



> Which Direction Are Russia's New Nukes Pointed, Anyway?
> BY STEPHEN GREEN APRIL 25, 2018
> 
> You might remember Vladimir Putin's speech last month, in which he revealed five "new" nuclear weapons systems. They weren't really new, because as Norman Friedman notes in a new article, "the Sarmat ballistic missile, the Avangard hypersonic maneuvering reentry vehicle, the Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic cruise missile, the Status-6 nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle, and a nuclear-powered cruise missile," are all derived from previous Cold War-era systems. But it was a helluva speech, filled with sound and fury... but aimed at whom, exactly?
> 
> That's where Friedman's new piece for the U.S. Naval Institute gets really interesting, because he posits that Putin's bluster was not, despite all appearances, aimed at the West. Friedman believes that Putin's real audience sits at the headquarters of the Communist Party of China in Beijing. Friedman reminds us that "Chinese maps still show one of the results of the 'unequal treaties' between the Qing Dynasty and foreign powers — Russia’s possession of large swaths of Chinese Siberia, where many ethnic Chinese live today." And then there's the "intense nationalism" which the CPC has nurtured, especially in the last two decades as the country has grown rich.
> 
> The view from the Kremlin not only includes Chinese revanchism, but also that "the Russian Army is thinly manned while the Chinese have a seemingly bottomless pool of manpower coupled with increasingly sophisticated weaponry."
> 
> From there, things look even more desperate from the Russian point of view. Anyone who paid attention to late Cold War history must remember how deeply rattled the Kremlin was by Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. Desperately poor in so many ways, the Soviets simply could not afford to keep up with America's financial and technological might. They had no greater fear than the U.S. developing a missile shield strong enough for us to hide behind while launching a first strike against them.



The rest of the article is at the link.


----------



## Good2Golf

Once_a_TQ said:
			
		

> A couple of Russian points out of the PAO today at work.
> 
> Russian forces lined up along NATO's border for 'assault' operations
> https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/russian-forces-lined-up-along-12379551
> (Mirror (UK), 17 April 18) Kremlin troops are poised for an attack, ambassadors from three Baltic states told MPs



If folks want to take the time to read up on the background and record of discussions in the day (1989-1991) regarding German re-unification and the West's assurances to Gorbachev and Yeltsin, here "NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard " (ref: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early ), they'd be rewarded with what objective people might call a basis for appreciating "Why the Russians might very well be acting the way they are..."

NATO did exactly the counter of what key leaders messaged to Soviet leadership they would not do -- they expanded right up to the Russian border. 

Add to that ISIS and the Dragon on the other two non-frozen "fronts" and can intellectually honest people actually be surprised at how the Soviet company-man is behaving?

:2c:

Regards
G2G


----------



## Kirkhill

> *The role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy* is traditionally defined
> in the Military Doctrine, in nuclear deterrence policy documents, and in key
> speeches and declarations by the political leadership. *At the doctrinal level there
> has been no public change in the Russian nuclear position*. The revised Military
> Doctrine 2014 has the same wording as was previously used to explain Russia’s
> policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 27 states: “*The
> Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons* in response to
> the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against
> it and (or) its allies, and also *in the event of aggression against the Russian
> Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence
> of the state is under threat*. The decision to utilize nuclear weapons is made by
> the president of the Russian Federation.” However, the state in today’s Russia
> is closely associated with the political system built around President Vladimir
> Putin. This raises the question of whether the current political leadership makes
> a distinction between regime survival and the state.
> 
> According to the new National Security Strategy “strategic deterrence and the
> prevention of military conflicts are achieved by upholding nuclear deterrence
> at a sufficiently high level” (Strategiia natsionalnoi 2015: §36). This is slightly
> sharper than in the previous Security Strategy where the “importance of keeping
> the potential of the strategic nuclear forces” was underlined.
> 
> In addition to the latest public declarations and the increase in nuclear exercises
> over the last three years (both in size and duration), a debate is going on in military
> newspapers and journals* regarding the use of nuclear weapons to de-escalate a
> conflict. Nuclear de-escalation means the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons
> when a local war is escalating into a regional war. The use of nuclear weapons
> should, according to this line of thought, frighten the adversary and lead to a
> de-escalation of the conflict*.



Reiterating a passage previously posted from a Swedish report (section 4.4.3)  https://www.foi.se/en/pressroom/news/news-archive/2016-12-08-russian-military-capability-is-strengthened-and-increasing.html

I think it is fair to say that Europe is sufficiently frightened.  Russia's Eastern Flank (and Alaskan Flank) may be different matters.

Lots of sound and fury in the Vladivostok area.  How many reserves does that leave to reinforce Kaliningrad?  Or even Rostov?


----------



## MarkOttawa

Bit off topic but a bit of a cartographic Cold War blast from the GRU's past--put your Cyrillic and cartographic hats on (plus any personal experience); did fairly well myself:



> Quiz: can you guess the world city from its cold war Soviet spy map?
> _From 1950 to 1990, the Soviet army created incredibly detailed maps of much of the world_
> https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/apr/27/quiz-map-world-city-soviet-cold-war-spy



This one took a truly educated guess :






Hint: "Tunes of Glory".

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## jollyjacktar

9/11 correct.  Lucky.


----------



## MarkOttawa

11/11--some luck esp. Edinburgh, Liverpool--had to do one outside check on San Fran vs San Diego.  Maritime/river/port aspects very useful.

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## jollyjacktar

I've only been to 2 or 3 of those places.  Just educated guessing on my part.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Russian academic on their nukes (including "escalation for de-escalation"), doctrine important for NORAD--excerpts:



> Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Reality Check
> 
> In 1991-1992, the US and the USSR/Russia put forward unilateral but reciprocal ‘presidential nuclear initiatives’ to reduce their respective stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). The thousands of such weapons the two countries had accumulated had become a burden for their owners. But TNWs to this day remain important for Russia’s military power, and the Kremlin’s aspiration for special status in the world. They are also intended to make up for problems with the precision and reliability of Russia’s conventional weapons.
> 
> The real Russian arsenal of TNWs is below most estimates: approximately 520 warheads, as opposed to figures ranging from 1,000-2,000. Against the backdrop of the confrontation with the West, Moscow is trying to take advantage of this discrepancy in numbers for foreign policy purposes. The key role is played by the doctrine of nuclear de-escalation, coupled with the intention to politically damage the system of America’s nuclear guarantees to its European allies. At the same time, the withdrawal of TNWs lowers the threshold for their use...
> 
> *Modernisation of delivery systems*
> 
> The number of Russian TNW delivery systems is also changing. In general, it is declining, due to the phasing out of old equipment. The introduction of new equipment is not keeping up with the pace of retirement of old systems.
> *
> Long-range aviation*
> 
> Russia’s long-range aircraft include heavy (strategic) Tupolev Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers, which fall under the START-3 (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaty, and Tu-22M3 strike bombers. There are 30-50 operational aircraft in Russia, while no more than 30 aircraft are scheduled for upgrading. Each is armed with three dual-capable Kh-22 cruise missiles (up to 600 km) and the Kh-32 upgraded version (up to 1,000 km) equipped with conventional warheads. It can also be deduced that the Tu-22M3 bombers will be _upgraded with Kh-101/ Kh-102 strategic cruise missiles (range of up to 4,500 km) or their latest versions_ [emphasis added]. At the same time, it seems Moscow is considering the use of Kh-32 missiles on MiG-31 fighters. In other words, the Tu-22M3 can turn into a strategic bomber, and therefore fall under the START-3 Treaty and lose the status of a TNW carrier _[if Tu-95MS and Tu-160 carry nuclear-armed Kh-102 cruise missiles those weapons are hardly "tactical"_]...
> 
> *Ships and submarines*
> 
> By all accounts, the lion’s share of TNWs is intended for the Russian fleet. On paper, nearly 120 ships and submarines can carry hundreds of nuclear-armed cruise missiles, torpedoes and mines. Modernisation of these weapons systems is significant. At least four out of eight Antey (Oscar II) cruise missile submarines are being rearmed with Onyx and Kalibr missile systems, which have superseded the nuclear-capable Granit cruise missiles; this has increased the operational stock. Moreover, four out of 11 Shchuka-B (Pike-B) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) are being upgraded with the Kalibr. The remaining SSNs will either be rearmed or retired [_subs with nuked cruise missiles also not necessarily "tactical" and must concern NORAD_].
> 
> Potentially, the Kalibr is a dual-capable cruise missile. Annually, Russia produces approximately 180 Kalibr-type missiles in various versions, including fewer than two dozen Kalibr-NK long-range cruise missiles. The Granit missiles will be replaced with conventional hypersonic Zirkon cruise missiles carried by ships and submarines. Most probably, the dual-capable torpedoes are being gradually replaced by new conventional torpedoes.
> 
> In all likelihood, only P-1000 Vulkan cruise missiles (Varyag, Marshal Ustinov and Moskva missile cruisers, 16 missiles each) capable of carrying warheads will be operational in the 2020s. Also, Nanuchka-class corvettes (12 missile ships) armed with dual-capable medium-range (of up to 150 km) Malakhit anti-ship cruise missiles will remain in service. However, it is doubtful that these missiles will carry nuclear warheads, given that they were initially designed for the Soviet Chaika (Charlie II) submarines...
> 
> *De-escalation doctrine*
> 
> Some experts question the very existence of this concept. However, as _stipulated in Article 37 of The Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period until 2030, ‘During an escalation of military conflict, demonstration of readiness and determination to employ non-strategic nuclear weapons capabilities is an effective deterrent_ [emphasis added].’ Readiness to employ TNWs can be demonstrated by methods such as the simulation of a nuclear attack. In 2013, Russia simulated attacks on Sweden; in the case of real warfare, _Russian forces could initially launch a demonstration nuclear strike in an uninhabited area, or a part of the ocean away from shipping routes. Russian long-range and anti-submarine aircraft would probably play the key role in such an operation_ [emphasis added].
> 
> On the one hand, the _shrinking of the Russian TNW stockpile paradoxically lowers the threshold for its use, since the political leadership has the illusion of having control over the consequences_ [emphasis added]. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that American TNWs have largely been converted into political capital, which requires immense investments. Against the backdrop of the confrontation with the West, Moscow is tempted to devalue this capital. This can be done either by increasing pressure so that the Europeans demand the withdrawal of TNWs from their bases, or by putting forward a peace initiative for TNW withdrawals. The growing gap between the existing arsenal and non-operational stock could generate a spectacular effect if this initiative is accepted.
> http://www.ridl.io/en/russias-tactical-nuclear-weapons-a-reality-check/



Not exactly re-assuring.  How will NORAD/USAF/RCAF cope?

Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MarkOttawa

From "Summary" of major report by Royal Institute of International Affairs:



> Russia’s New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027
> 
> While Western observers should be prepared to see Russia's armed forces become more capable over the next decade, they should avoid exaggerating the threat posed by these developments
> 
> *Summary*
> 
> The newly approved state armament programme (GPV 2027) will form the basis of Russia’s defence procurement and military priorities until 2027. It is expected to build on the progress made under the previous programme, GPV 2020, and further strengthen and modernize the Russian armed forces.
> 
> GPV 2020 helped revitalize sections of the Russian defence-industrial complex (OPK). New capital stock was installed, higher wages attracted younger and better-qualified workers, and production lines underwent a shift towards serial production of equipment for the first time in the post-Soviet era. This bodes well for GPV 2027. Some of the problems Russia encountered when developing and introducing weapons systems for GPV 2020 are likely to have been overcome by 2020. As a result, the defence industry looks set to start GPV 2027 from a much better position compared with where it started GPV 2020...
> 
> GPV 2027 will guide defence procurement and the modernization of the armed forces. The modernization of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad is expected to remain a priority. While the navy is likely to receive less funding and prioritize the acquisition of smaller vessels, the ground forces can expect a larger share of funding than before. Meanwhile, the country’s Aerospace Forces (VKS) will probably concentrate on filling existing gaps in procurement (especially with regard to transport aircraft), as well as on boosting power-projection capabilities and force mobility. Air defence systems, and the honing of deterrence and anti-access capabilities, will probably keep playing an important part in military planning.
> 
> Implementation of GPV 2027 will necessarily be affected by external and internal factors. Issues such as production capabilities, adaptation and technological development will continue to present challenges for the military industry throughout the 2020s.
> 
> Key external factors will include ‘lessons learned’ from operational combat experience in Ukraine and Syria since 2014, as well as negative impacts of targeted international sanctions on Russia’s defence sector and from the breakdown of military cooperation with Ukraine since 2014. Technological and tactical adaptations that have been developed to mitigate these challenges are expected to drive the implementation of GPV 2027.
> Internal factors will include the struggle to modernize military equipment, the need to increase the effort around military R&D, and the existence of long-term, unresolved issues relating to the internal workings of the defence industry. These critical shortcomings are likely to remain in place throughout the implementation of GPV 2027.
> 
> By 2027, the Russian armed forces are likely to be considerably better equipped than they are today. Nevertheless, one should not overstate the pace of probable modernization. While some progress may be made in the development of new-generation equipment, the armed forces will probably still rely on a mix of legacy hardware and modernized Soviet systems alongside new designs. Providing Russia with 21st-century military capabilities and adapting its armed forces to today’s challenges will require sustained investment in modernization efforts and military R&D.
> https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russia-s-new-state-armament-programme-implications-russian-armed-forces-and-military



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## TQMS

Little PAO info from today.

How Good Is Russia's Missile Defense? Israel Hit Moscow's Systems in Syria And Beat Them 
http://www.newsweek.com/how-good-russias-missile-defense-israel-hit-moscows-systems-syria-and-beat-927563
(Newsweek, 15 May 18) Israeli strikes on targets in Syria last week took out several Russian missile defense systems and raised questions about the viability of Moscow’s military equipment.

US Intelligence Reports: Russia's New Hypersonic Weapon will Likely Be Ready for War by 2020 
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-intelligence-reports-russias-new-hypersonic-weapon-will-likely-be-ready-for-war-by-2020/ar-AAxkKaZ
(CNBC, 15 May 18) A Russian weapon the U.S. is currently unable to defend against will be ready for war by 2020, according to sources with direct knowledge of American intelligence reports.


----------



## CBH99

MarkOttawa said:
			
		

> From "Summary" of major report by Royal Institute of International Affairs:
> 
> Mark
> Ottawa




Nothing wrong with upgraded Soviet era equipment being used alongside the newer technology.  In many cases, I'd say this gives them a lot of benefits - older technology as a base doesn't necessarily mean it's poorer technology.  (One only has to look at the B-52 to see how older technology, when maintained and upgraded, can still be extremely relevant in modern times)

The use of their equipment is far more important than the improvements to the equipment itself, in my opinion.  A well deployed and skillfully operated T-72 or T-90 is a far bigger threat than a poorly positioned & operated Leopard 2A4 or Abrams (example, Turkey & Saudi Arabia)

Upgraded & more fuel efficient engines, upgraded fire control computers, upgraded ammunition types - Soviet era equipment isn't something to snub our noses at.   :2c:


----------



## MarkOttawa

Nice cruise missiles "tee hee":


> Putin's 'unlimited range' nuclear missile crashed after 22 miles, US intelligence sources claim
> 
> The Kremlin has denied US claims that Russia's nuclear-powered cruise missile with “unlimited” range crashed after only 22 miles.
> 
> The weapon was one of a range of “invincible” nuclear arms announced by Vladimir Putin during a speech in March.
> 
> “Since its range is unlimited, it can manoeuvre as long as you want,” Mr Putin said. “For now, no one in the world has anything like this.”
> 
> But sources with direct knowledge of a US intelligence report told CNBC that four tests of the missile between November and February all resulted in crashes.
> 
> The longest flight lasted two minutes and covered 22 miles, while shortest ended only four seconds and five miles after launch, they said.
> 
> CNN previously quoted a US official as saying the cruise missile had crashed during tests...
> 
> After taking off with conventional fuel, the cruise missile is designed to be powered by a small nuclear reactor during flight.
> 
> Although Mr Putin had said the nuclear unit had successfully powered up and “provided the necessary level of thrust,” US intelligence claimed this component had failed to start.
> 
> Kremlin officials allegedly ordered the tests over objections from engineers that the weapon system was not ready.
> 
> The US intelligence report did not mention the health or environmental impacts potentially caused by damages to the missile's reactor.
> 
> Vladimir Putin first touted the cruise missile during a sabre-rattling March speech in which he said Russia had developed “invincible” nuclear arms including a glider warhead, hypersonic missile and underwater drone. One of the accompanying computer animations showed warheads raining down on Florida.
> 
> The “Dagger” hypersonic missiles Mr Putin mentioned were later displayed on the belly of MiG-31 jets roaring over Red Square during the annual Victory Day parade this month.
> https://www.yahoo.com/news/putin-apos-apos-unlimited-range-123018369.html



More on hypersonics:



> Russia Shows New Hypersonic Missile on Two MiG-31 Aircraft in Victory Day Rehearsals.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://theaviationist.com/2018/05/05/russia-shows-new-hypersonic-cruise-missile-on-two-mig-31-aircraft-in-victory-day-rehearsals/



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Retired AF Guy

Apparently last week one of Russia's Borei-class SSBN's launched four SLBM's in under 15 seconds. Offhand I can't think of any nation launching multiple SLBM's like this. 



> Watch: Russia’s newest missile sub just launched four nuclear missiles in just 15 seconds SOFREP Original Content
> 
> BY ALEX HOLLINGS 05.29.2018
> 
> Conducting test launches of long range, nuclear capable ballistic missiles may be seen as wantonly aggressive act when done by states like North Korea, but among the world’s established super powers, it’s seen primarily as a maintenance endeavor. The United States and Russia are both no strangers to launching ICBMs and similar platforms to test and train the personnel assigned to these powerful weapons systems, as well as a part of continued testing tied to modernizing each nations’ respective nuclear forces.
> 
> For the most part, these tests offer little more than a dramatic visual and accompanying public relations pieces about nuclear deterrence and countering global threats but occasionally, such tests offer an important glimpse into the mindset and approach of nuclear competitors. Last week, just such a launch took place in the White Sea, a sovereign Russian inlet near the border of Finland.
> 
> For the first time ever, one of Russia’s newest and most advanced class of submarines successfully fired a salvo of four submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) within a dauntingly short period of just 15 seconds. The submarine, named the Yuri Dolgoruky, is one of three operational Borei-class nuclear subs — a class of submarines designed to replace the nation’s aging Delta-class subs as Russia’s primarily submersible ballistic missile platform. The missiles, however, are the real feature of the show.
> 
> The Bulava missile platform has been touted as the cornerstone of the Russia’s future SLBM arsenal, and is the most expensive weapon system the nation has ever developed. The platform is truly intercontinental-target capable, with a claimed range of nearly 5,000 miles and six individual warheads housed within the nose, along with decoy warheads designed to confuse incoming interceptors. Each of those six active reentry vehicles is said to hold a 100-150 kiloton nuclear weapon — making each of the six separate reentry vehicles more than 6 times, and possibly as much as 10 times, as powerful as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
> 
> In this video, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense, four of these massive ballistic missiles can be seen firing from the sub in right around 15 seconds, but the submarine itself is capable of housing as many as 16 of these missiles. If the timing holds true through a full launch, that means these submarines are able to surface and unload all 16 missiles in about a minute. In that short window of time, those 16 missiles would rapidly become 96 separate nuclear reentry vehicles, along with more than a hundred dummy warheads closing on targets spread out over thousands of miles.
> 
> According to the Russian Ministry of Defense’ statement, all four missiles covered approximately 3,500 miles before striking designated targets at the Kura range on the Kamchatka Peninsula.
> 
> While it’s important to note that the United States also has new, modernized ballistic missile submarines heading into service, the comparison between American and Russian missile submarines isn’t necessarily the point. These platforms aren’t designed to tangle with one another (like attack submarines) but instead serve as a nation’s hidden, last line of defense against nuclear war. Thanks to nuclear propulsion systems, these submarines can remain submerged and hidden for extended periods of time and do not require fuel stops that can offer the world a glimpse into the region your submarines are working in. Instead, they’re tasked with staying hidden and unleashing as much damage as possible on land based targets in the event of nuclear war.
> 
> Ultimately, that means it doesn’t matter whose ballistic missile subs are better, it’s more a question of who’s more adept at keeping them hidden in the event of war. Russia’s massive investment into this new class of submarines and their accompanying nuclear missiles serves, once again, as a reminder of the increasing emphasis Russia is placing on undersea warfare. With doomsday nukes like the Status 6 confirmed recently and successes in testing their Borei-class submarines, it appears that Russia has its sights squarely set on claiming dominance beneath the waves — and they may working toward having the equipment they need to do it.





https://sofrep.com/103775/watch-russias-newest-missile-sub-just-launched-4-nuclear-missiles-in-just-15-seconds/


----------



## MarkOttawa

Start of a lengthy, worrying piece:



> Russian Air-Delivered Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
> 
> Before starting a discussion of Russian non-strategic or tactical air-delivered nuclear weapons, it is important for the reader to understand that these weapons do not exist in isolation. They are part of what amounts to a Russian non-strategic nuclear Triad composed of: 1) ground-based nuclear capable short- to intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles; 2) a sea-based force of nuclear-capable cruise missiles carried on both surface ships and submarines; and 3) an air-delivered non-strategic nuclear force of Backfire bombers and a variety of long-range fighter aircraft which carry both nuclear bombs and nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. Russia’s non-strategic nuclear Triad has the same resilience, flexibility, survivability, and defense penetration ability of Russia’s better known strategic Triad. _Only Russia, and apparently China, have a non-strategic nuclear Triad_ [emphasis added]. Russia is secretive about its non-strategic nuclear capabilities, particularly its low-yield weapons; hence, it is unlikely that the picture derived from open sources is complete.
> 
> Russia routinely practices the first use of nuclear weapons in major theater exercises. Indeed, in 2014, Russian expatriate Nikolai Sokov wrote, “…nuclear exercises have been conducted with targets in Europe, the Pacific, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and even the continental United States,” and, “…all large-scale military exercises that Russia conducted beginning in 2000 featured simulations of limited nuclear strikes.”[1] The implication of this is that Russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons in a variety of conflicts, including minor ones, which was suggested by its Secretary of the National Security Council Nikolai Patrushev in October 2009. He said that existing policy allowed the first use of nuclear weapons even in “local” wars.[2] Indeed, in 2010, the official newspaper of the Far East Military District said, “To suppress a large center of the separatists’ resistance and to achieve minimal losses of the attacking troops a low-yield ‘nuclear’ attack was mounted against the enemy.”[3]
> 
> _Russia’s strategy of limited nuclear strikes is characterized in the U.S. as an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear strategy.[4] Russia calls its strategy “de-escalation of aggression,” but it does not characterize nuclear first use as “escalation.” The Russian belief is that its introduction of nuclear weapons will terminate the conflict in the Russian favor_ [emphasis added]. When Russia first announced its simulated first use of nuclear weapons in the Zapad 1999 theater war exercise, then-Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev asserted, “Our Army was forced to launch nuclear strikes first [in Zapad-1999] which enabled it to achieve a breakthrough in the theater situation.”[5] This is perhaps the classic high-level statement of Russia’s view regarding the impact of its introduction of nuclear weapons into a war against NATO.
> 
> Russia will not be invaded by NATO. The current focus of Russia’s strategy appears to be to deter a NATO counterattack after a Russian invasion of a weak NATO state (e.g., the Baltic republics) as former STRATCOM commander General (ret.) Kevin Chilton pointed out in April 2018 and what NATO Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Bradshaw said in February 2015.[6] In 2017, then-Director of the DIA Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart said Russia has built nuclear de-escalation “…into their operational concept, we’ve seen them exercise that idea…”[7]
> 
> *Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Capable Aircraft*...
> 
> _*Dr. Mark B. Schneider* is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served in a number of senior positions within the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy including Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions.  He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff._
> https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/06/15/russian_air-delivered_non-strategic_nuclear_weapons_113537.html



Relevant post from 2015, note link at end:



> NORAD Note: Russian Bomber (with cruise missiles) Strikes in Syria
> https://cgai3ds.wordpress.com/2015/11/20/mark-collins-norad-note-russian-bomber-with-cruise-missiles-strikes-in-syria/



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MarkOttawa

More on Russian air force's Kinzhal hypersonic missile:



> Russia's Tu-22M3 Backfire Bomber Could Soon Be Armed with Hypersonic Weapons
> _Well, maybe. _
> 
> Russia may test its Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aero-ballistic missile onboard the Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber , which would greatly extend the number of targets Moscow could hold at risk with the new weapon.
> 
> The missile is currently launched from onboard the Mikoyan MiG-31K variant of the Mach 2.83 capable Foxhound interceptor, but the Kinzhal might be better operationally suited for a bomber.
> 
> “I believe it is speed that matters,” retired Lt. Gen. Mikhail Oparin, former commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces Long Range Aviation branch, told the state-owned TASS news agency .
> 
> “The MiG-31 has higher supersonic speed than the Tu-22M3 but now that a possibility has emerged to test the missiles aboard a long-range plane, this has to be done. This will raise the combat potential of the Aerospace Force and add might to it.”
> 
> While adding the Kinzhal to the Backfire’s arsenal might be operationally useful for the Russian air force, it remains to be seen if the Tu-22M3 is capable of accelerating the weapon into the correct launch parameters.
> 
> Though the Tu-22M3 is capable of reaching speeds of about Mach 1.88, it does not quite have the sheer acceleration, speed or altitude of the MiG-31K...
> 
> The Russians claim that the Kinzhal—which is based on the 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile—is effectively invulnerable to existing ballistic missile defenses because of its maneuverability in flight...
> 
> “This is a class of precision weapons fitted with multifunctional combat capabilities making it possible to strike both stationary and mobile targets,” Russian deputy defense minister Yuri Borisov told TASS .
> 
> “Specifically, aircraft carriers and cruiser-class warships, destroyers and frigates are potential targets for this weapon.”
> 
> According to TASS, the Russian Ministry of Defense is expected to test the Kinzhal missile onboard the Tu-22M3, citing a source in the Russian defense industry.
> 
> With a claimed range of over 1,200 nautical miles and a speed of Mach 10, the addition of the Kinzhal missile would significantly boost the Backfire’s capabilities to strike land and maritime targets across Europe, the Middle East, the Asia Pacific and the North Atlantic regions.
> 
> While Western experts harbor some doubts about just how operational the Kinzhal missile is, the Russians insist that the weapon is operational onboard the MiG-31K. Moscow claims that its MiG-31K crews have already flown more than 250 training flights with the new weapon...
> 
> Thus, it is likely that the Kinzhal is probably operational in a limited capacity, but eventually the weapon will likely be deployed more widely as it becomes more mature. It is also likely that the Kinzhal will probably be integrated on other Russian strike platforms such as the Tu-22M3, Tu-160 Blackjack or even large fighter aircraft such as the Su-30SM that can reach high supersonic speeds.
> 
> _Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter:  @davemajumdar. _
> http://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-tu-22m3-backfire-bomber-could-soon-be-armed-hypersonic-weapons-24902



Mark
Ottawa


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## tomahawk6

Russia showed off its new nuclear torpedo.I wonder if its sub launched or surface launched ?I guess we would half to track these as it leaves port.Just follow the glow. ;D

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-just-showed-off-a-potentially-world-ending-nuclear-doomsday-torpedo-that-the-us-cant-stop/ar-BBL0a2h?ocid=spartanntp


----------



## tomahawk6

The Russians have moved 2 Tu-160's opposite Alaska. Should keep ALCOM on their toes. Although the F22 shouldnt have a problem.

https://www.theintelligencer.com/news/world/article/Russian-strategic-bombers-deploy-near-Alaska-13161106.php


----------



## MarkOttawa

Very interesting by Julian Lindley-French (Senior Fellow of the Institute of Statecraft, Director of Europa Analytica & Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University, Washington DC) on German foreign policy and Russia--excerpts:



> Norsdstream 2 and Germany's Two-Legged Foreign Policy
> 
> Apparently, it did not go terribly well. Officially Saturday’s meeting between Kanzlerin Angela Merkel and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the late-Baroque splendour of the Schloss Meseberg discussed Ukraine, Syria, Iran and the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline project.  The meeting, like so many Russo-German meetings of late, involved ‘hard talking’ but made little official progress. And yet, in spite of the tensions, Nordstream 2 just ploughs ahead tying Russia and Germany ever closer together in mutual energy dependency and threatening to by-pass much of Eastern Europe with profound security implications. Nordstream 2 also reveals the two legs of contemporary German foreign policy which is both legalistic and mercantilist at one and the same time.
> 
> German foreign policy is increasingly neither European nor transatlantic, just German...
> 
> Nordstream 2 should thus be seen less as a pipeline pumping Russian gas directly to Germany and beyond, but rather as a gigantic money-transfer conduit designed to keep Russia afloat. Berlin has reason to be concerned about Russia’s stability and all points European in between. In 2017 the Carnegie Moscow Centre stated: “A substantial part of Russia’s production capacity – more than 40% by some estimates – is both technologically and functionally obsolete and cannot produce competitive and marketable products. For instance, Russia’s machine stock has shrunk by almost a half in the last ten years…Over the next few years, we can expect a decline in investment…This downward spiral will eventually lead the country to economic collapse”. In other words, President Putin is committed to exactly the same course of action as the Tsars (both White and Red) before him: a level of strategic ambition that simply cannot be sustained over the medium to long-term and which unless mitigated or changed will lead to a crunch.  If Russia catches a bad cold the rest of Europe…
> 
> ...Viewed from Berlin Germany is surrounded by supplicant states all either seeking German money, German blessing or both on a continent in which only Germany can guarantee order. That includes Britain and France. And yet Germany still seems ill-at-ease with the very idea of German power and leadership. It is strategic recalcitrance that could well flunk lead Berlin to flunk the hard test that is inevitably coming Germany’s way.
> 
> Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, suggests the problem with German foreign policy is that it does not want to get ‘wet’, i.e. face hard realities when things go wrong and have the will and the means to do something about them. It is also why the Nordstream 2 strategy could fail. Given the nature of the Putin regime, Moscow might simply use the new gas money that will flow up Nordstream 2 to further reinforce the very tools of international coercion which threaten other Europeans and upon which Russia has been investing for a decade since the August 2008 invasion of Georgia. What price gas then?
> 
> ...Unfortunately, German foreign policy is also a two-legged stool critically lacking a third leg – hard power. Back to Germany and Russia.  Today, Russia commences Vostok 2018, the largest Russian military exercise for forty years, Germany’s weakness is that its foreign policy is an ‘anything but war’ policy, whilst Russia’s foreign policy is ‘war or the threat of war as a means to an end’ policy.. At Meseberg these two very different ideas of power tried to speak to each other and failed, which is why Europeans will continue to need American engagement in its affairs.  Sadly, Russia will not be a ‘normal’ power (nor have a future) until it reduces the level of state investment in intimidating others and starts investing in its own people. Germany will not really be a normal power until Berlin recognises that ‘shit happens’ when dealing with the likes of Putin’s Russia – big shit! It is not Russian power that is a threat to Europe but Russian economic weakness in conjunction with an over-bearing and unaffordable Russian security state. No amount of money Germany pours into Russia via Nordstream 2 will avert eventual Russian collapse unless Berlin can convince Moscow to change course...
> http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.com/2018/08/norsdstream-2-and-germanys-two-legged.html



Mark
Ottawa


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## Kirkhill

> ... German foreign policy which is both legalistic and mercantilist at one and the same time....



The anti-thesis of liberalism, and unfortunately Germany is not alone in its preference for Colbertism and an authoritarian Natural Order.


----------



## Retired AF Guy

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> The Russians have moved 2 Tu-160's opposite Alaska. Should keep ALCOM on their toes. Although the F22 shouldnt have a problem.
> 
> https://www.theintelligencer.com/news/world/article/Russian-strategic-bombers-deploy-near-Alaska-13161106.php



Actually, they were only there temporarily before redeploying them back to their home base.


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## tomahawk6

Let's see the Russians have flooded the Atlantic with subs and they test ALCOM defenses with bombers and have done so for years. Coincidence ? No.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Not clear if this baby of Putin's such a bright idea (further links at original):



> Nuclear-powered missile crashed in Barents Sea, intelligence report allegedly claims
> _While Vladimir Putin bragged about the invincible new missile in his annual speech to the nation, a U.S. intelligence report claims each of the four tests crashed. _
> 
> It is CNBC that reports about one of the missiles being lost at sea after a test late last year. The news channel refers to sources with direct knowledge of a U.S. intelligence report about Russia’s nuclear-powered missile program.
> 
> A search and recover mission will try to lift the crashed missile from the seabed, but the CNBC report is unclear about if the location of the missile is known or not.
> 
> The recover mission will include three vessels, the report says. One of the ships carry equipment to handle radioactive material from the missile’s reactor core.
> 
> If the miliary know the exact location of the crash site, a recovery operation would not be too difficult. The Barents Sea is relatively shallow, with an average depth of 230 meters. Some areas near the shores of Novaya Zemlya are deeper with a depth of about 300 meters.
> 
> In March, the Barents Observer reported about the first speculations that Russia’s new nuclear-powered missiles could be the source of the mysterious radioactivity measured in the air over northern Europe, including Norway’s border area to Russia in the north. Tiny small amounts of radioactivity were measured several times last year and early this year.
> 
> In July, the Russian online Popular Mechanics published a longer article detailing the nuclear-powered missile and earlier Soviet plans to take advantage of using nuclear reactors to power both planes and missiles for military purposes.
> 
> The reactor, which is very small in size, is likely using highly enriched uranium-235 as fuel. The core diameter is less than half a meter.
> 
> A question still unanswered though, is whether the reactor started or not after the initial launch of the missiles. When Putin bragged about the unbeatable cruise missile in his speech to the nation in March, a video animation of the missile launch was displayed on big screens. The video shows the launch at Novaya Zemlya and the first few seconds of the flight.
> 
> The video of the launch site has later been analyzed by comparing satellite images via Google Earth and located to be the old observation station Pankovo at Novaya Zemlya. This location is in the outskirts of the nuclear test range and was used until 1961 to observe atmospheric nuclear bomb explosions taking place some few tens of kilometers further north. Satellite images comparing Putin’s video with the actual landscape is published at the blog-forum Military Russia.
> 
> The flight path starts at Pankovo, continues over shore for the first few seconds, then turn north over the waters at the inlet of the Matotchkin Shar dividing the northern and southern islands of Novaya Zemlya, before continuing towards the Sukhoy Nos, which is believed to be the impact area for the test. Sukhoy Nos north of the Matochkin Shar was a testing range for atmospheric nuclear bombs, including the 52 Megatons so-called Tsar-bomb, the largest nuclear devise ever tested in history...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2018/08/nuclear-powered-missile-crashed-barents-sea-intelligence-report-allegedly-claims



Mark
Ottawa


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## a_majoor

Russia apparently tried to recreate the SLAM (Supersonic Low Altitude Missile) AKA Project Pluto, which was one of those crazy ideas that kept posting up in the Cold War. Although the Americans did some research and even wind tunnel tests, the idea of an unshielded nuclear ramjet spewing radioactive death from the exhaust was a little too extreme even for that time period (the only way to stop the thing if it was launched was to crash it into the middle of the ocean, so the reactor could be entombed under the sea for thousands of years....)

https://www.fourmilab.ch/documents/pluto/
https://jalopnik.com/the-flying-crowbar-the-insane-doomsday-weapon-america-1435286216
http://up-ship.com/blog/?p=11940

The fact the Russians apparently were unable to make it work despite decades of much more advance knowledge of nuclear energy and material science does make the claims back in the 60's a little bit suspect......


----------



## Kirkhill

With all the discussion of Russian involvement in life, the Universe and everything these days we seem to be forgetting the works of these people:

Oleg Gordievsky  "colonel of the KGB and KGB resident-designate (rezident) and bureau chief in London"
Vasili Mitrokhin    "major and senior archivist for the Soviet Union's foreign intelligence service, the First Chief Directorate of the KGB," 
Viktor Suvorov    "joined the Soviet mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva, working undercover for the Soviet military intelligence service (GRU)"
Stanislav Lunev   "a GRU intelligence officer in Singapore in 1978, in China from 1980, and in the United States from 1988"




> *The Soviet Union wisely spent more money on funding of U.S. anti-war movements during the Vietnam War than on funding and arming the VietCong forces*.
> - Stanislav Lunev, highest ranking GRU officer to defect from the USSR



https://medium.com/@JSlate__/how-the-soviet-union-helped-shape-the-modern-peace-movement-d797071d4b2c  (an interesting read for those that weren't there).

Mitrokhin's First Chief Directorate 



> The First Main Directorate (or First Chief Directorate, Russian: Первое главное управление, Pervoye glavnoye upravleniye) of the Committee for State Security under the USSR council of ministers (PGU KGB) was the organization responsible for foreign operations and intelligence activities by providing for the training and management of covert agents, intelligence collection administration, and the acquisition of foreign and domestic political, scientific and technical intelligence in the Soviet Union. The First Chief Directorate was formed within the KGB directorate in 1954, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union was renamed as the Central Intelligence Service and finally the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR RF). Although the agency SVR restyle in 1991 implies a generic foreign surveillance activity, the primary foreign intelligence service in Russia and the Soviet Union has been the GRU, a military intelligence organization and special operations force



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Chief_Directorate

And on Putin and the KGB



> In 1975, Putin joined the KGB and trained at the 401st KGB school in Okhta, Leningrad.[31][45] After training, he worked in the Second Chief Directorate (counter-intelligence), before he was transferred to the First Chief Directorate, where he monitored foreigners and consular officials in Leningrad.[31][46][47] From 1985 to 1990, he served in Dresden, East Germany,[48] using a cover identity as a translator.[49] Masha Gessen, a Russian-American who has authored a biography about Putin claims, "Putin and his colleagues were reduced mainly to collecting press clippings, thus contributing to the mountains of useless information produced by the KGB."[49] According to Putin's official biography, during the fall of the Berlin Wall that began on 9 November 1989, he burned KGB files to prevent demonstrators from obtaining them.[50]
> 
> After the collapse of the Communist East German government, Putin returned to Leningrad in early 1990, where he worked for about three months with the International Affairs section of Leningrad State University, reporting to Vice-Rector Yuriy Molchanov.[47] There, he looked for new KGB recruits, watched the student body, and renewed his friendship with his former professor, Anatoly Sobchak, soon to be the Mayor of Leningrad.[51] Putin claims that he resigned with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on 20 August 1991,[51] on the second day of the 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt against the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.[52] Putin said: "As soon as the coup began, I immediately decided which side I was on", although he also noted that the choice was hard because he had spent the best part of his life with "the organs".[53]



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin#KGB_career

The collected works of the four gentlemen at the top should make for interesting reading for some of the younger members.


----------



## daftandbarmy

Paper Tigerski:



Don’t Be Fooled By Russia’s Latest War Games


The week-long exercises, which kicked off yesterday, are intended as a show of might. But the country is in no position to wage a real conflict.

The headline figures for Russia’s Vostok (or “East”) military exercises, which began yesterday, are dramatic: 300,000 soldiers, 36,000 tanks and other vehicles, 80 ships and 1,000 aircraft, operating across more than half the country. That’s double the size of the British armed forces. It’s also twice the size of the last Vostok wargames, held back in 2014. As if that weren’t enough, some 3,200 Chinese troops and 30 aircraft are also involved, along with a small Mongolian force.

The bottom line is that Russia lacks the cash and the transport capability to move this many troops without causing disruption. But Russia is happy to see the world swallow that 300,000 figure because, like an animal puffing out its fur and baring its teeth when faced with a predator, it wants to look as formidable as possible. As an authoritarian nation, it spends more than it should on its military—more than a third of the total federal budget goes on security, broadly defined. Putin has certainly managed to turn the demoralized and depleted armed forces he inherited into a capable, competent army.

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/russia-vostok-putin-army-china-nato/570034/


----------



## MarkOttawa

Meanwhile, back at hypersonics:



> Russia hits a snag in developing a hypersonic weapon – after Putin said it was already in production
> 
> Russia is currently unable to find a source for the critical carbon fiber components needed for one of its hypersonic weapons, according to people with direct knowledge of a U.S. intelligence report.
> Yet, these people added, the weapon is still on track to achieve its initial operational capability by 2020 because Moscow has prioritized this program.
> The Kremlin is slated to conduct another flight test of the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle by the end of the year.
> 
> Russia is currently unable to find a source for the critical carbon fiber components needed to make one of its hypersonic weapons, despite President Vladimir Putin's claims that the device has already entered serial production, according to people with direct knowledge of a U.S. intelligence report.
> 
> A hypersonic weapon can travel at least five times the speed of sound, or about one mile per second. What's more, the U.S. is currently unable to defend against this breed of threat.
> 
> The Kremlin considers their current carbon fiber material unreliable and is therefore looking for another source. Yet, the people added, Moscow has prioritized the program, and so the _weapon is still on track to achieve initial operational capability by 2020_ [emphasis added].
> 
> The next flight test is slated for December, said one of the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
> 
> "The body of the hypersonic glide vehicle cannot withstand the heat on re-entry, and therefore the internal systems fail," this person explained to CNBC. "The Russians therefore need a better material because they have an upcoming test and they don't think the material used to construct the body provides enough thermal protection."..
> 
> The latest revelations come less than eight months after Putin touted his nation's growing hypersonic arsenal as "invincible."
> 
> The hypersonic glide vehicle, dubbed Avangard, was one of the six weapons Putin presented in March. Avangard is designed to sit atop an intercontinental ballistic missile and uses aerodynamic forces to sail on top of the atmosphere.
> 
> Putin claimed Avangard was capable of reaching targets at a speed of 20 times the speed of sound and strikes "like a fireball." He also said that the hypersonic warhead had already entered serial production.
> 
> "Certainly, heat management is a huge challenge; you know, you have this thing that is going through the atmosphere at very high speeds and potentially for a long period of time," said James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace...
> https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/12/russia-having-trouble-building-hypersonic-weapon-putin-hyped.html



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## a_majoor

In the battle for hearts and minds, Russia is now engaged with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Religion is such a powerful motivator, and this has the potential to get really ugly:

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/10/ukraine-orthodox-church-independence-russia/571333/



> *Ukraine’s Spiritual Split From Russia Could Trigger a Global Schism*
> For Moscow, the crisis is geopolitical as well as religious.
> GABBY DEUTCH OCT 11, 2018
> 
> “This is a victory of good over evil, light over darkness.” That’s how Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko described the announcement Thursday that the Orthodox Church’s Istanbul-based leader, Patriarch Bartholomew, will grant Ukraine’s Church independence from Russia.
> 
> In televised remarks, Ukraine’s president dubbed this a “historic event,” which it undoubtedly is: For more than three centuries, Ukraine and Russia have been religiously united within the Russian Orthodox Church. It was a union Poroshenko characterized this summer as a “direct threat to the national security of Ukraine,” given his view that the Russian Orthodox Church fully supports Kremlin policy; he said then that it was “absolutely necessary to cut off all the tentacles with which the aggressor country operates inside the body of our state.”
> 
> Now, four years after Russia annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, Ukraine is asserting its territorial independence by demanding its own national Church. For Russia, the crisis is geopolitical as well as spiritual. The stakes are so high that in order to protest Ukraine’s religious autonomy, Russia may respond harshly enough to trigger a deep schism in the Christian world.
> MORE STORIES
> 
> How Russian Schools Are Teaching the Annexation of Crimea
> LYUBOV CHIZHOVA FARANGIS NAJBULLAH
> 
> Why Is Russia So Homophobic?
> OLGA KHAZAN
> Russian President Vladimir Putin
> Trump, Putin, and the Art of Appeasement
> DOMINIC TIERNEY
> Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko meets with servicemen during his visit to Donetsk region, Ukraine on June 14, 2017.
> Will U.S. Arms Resolve the Conflict in Ukraine?
> YASMEEN SERHAN
> At the core of this issue is a fundamental question of both religious and territorial identity, as Russian actions in eastern Ukraine aimed to undermine the country’s very independence. The Ukrainian Church had sought independence from the Russian one for decades, but it only became “inevitable after the Russian military excursion in eastern Ukraine, no question about it,” said Aristotle Papanikolaou, a co-chair of Orthodox Christian studies at Fordham University. Ukraine will join several other countries that have their own independent national Churches, among them Serbia, Greece, and Romania.
> 
> Read: Ukraine is ground zero for the crisis between Russia and the West.
> 
> The Russian Church claims that Ukraine and its backers are the ones pushing the Church to the brink of catastrophe. A top Russian Church official said that by supporting Ukraine’s bid for an independent Church, Istanbul “threatens the global Orthodox world with a schism.” That schism would have an outsized effect on Russia: Severing ties between the Russian Church and its parishes in Ukraine would strip Moscow of a crucial component of its sphere of influence to its west. George Demacopoulos, the other chair of Orthodox Christian studies at Fordham, told me an independent Ukrainian Church would strip the Russian Church of a third of its jurisdiction, and Russia would “symbolically suffer a very big blow because they have been presenting themselves as the leaders of the Orthodox world in the 21st century.”
> 
> The Moscow Church “is frequently accused of being a tool of the Kremlin,” Katherine Younger, who directs the Ukraine in European Dialogue program at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, told me. She said she believes that’s why Poroshenko portrayed the issue of Church independence “as a matter of state security”— it’s “a way to weaken a major ideological interference and source of Russian propaganda.” Poroshenko’s apparent concerns have some basis in fact: The Russian hackers indicted by the U.S. special prosecutor in July have tried for years to access private correspondence from top Orthodox Church officials, according to an investigation by the Associated Press. And beginning with the 2014 invasion of Crimea, the Russian Orthodox Church—which is not technically affiliated with Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin—has been accused of spreading “misinformation” about Ukraine.
> 
> Read: Ukraine’s long-smoldering war for independence
> 
> There are a few different ways Russia could react to Patriarch Bartholomew’s announcement. It could withhold recognition of Ukraine’s Church, which would be a purely symbolic statement of disapproval. Or, according to Demacopoulos, Russia might take “the nuclear option of breaking sacramental unity,” which means people who belong to Orthodox Churches aside from the Russian one could not receive communion while in Russia. That might not sound like much to outsiders, Papanikolaou said, but “it’s a pretty severe step.”
> The fight over the Church goes back to a single event that took place more than 1,000 years ago. In 988, Vladimir the Great, the prince of an empire known as Kievan Rus (and Putin’s namesake), converted to Christianity in what is now Ukraine. Russia claims that empire as the birthplace of its historical heritage as a nation. But Ukraine does, too, and Ukraine is the country that actually has Kiev in its territory.



Read remainder at link.


----------



## CBH99

So if Russia goes with the "nuclear option" and refuses to provide communion to people who belong to an Orthodox Church that isn't the Russian Orthodox Church...God all of a sudden stops forgiving these same people, due to a political matter outside of their control?   :

I'm not trying to be disrespectful of anybody's religion.  Not in the slightest.  

But religion & spirituality is about your relationship with a higher power, and how that relationship with a higher power helps you to improve yourself as a person.  Does that relationship all of a sudden change because "We're calling it something different now, on this side of the imaginary line our governments recognize as a border!"



I'm truly hoping people won't let political leaders interfere with their relationship with whatever name they call God, especially to the point where they are manipulated into being violent towards others.  (I know, I know...)   :


----------



## Kirkhill

CBH99 said:
			
		

> So if Russia goes with the "nuclear option" and refuses to provide communion to people who belong to an Orthodox Church that isn't the Russian Orthodox Church...God all of a sudden stops forgiving these same people, due to a political matter outside of their control?   :
> 
> I'm not trying to be disrespectful of anybody's religion.  Not in the slightest.
> 
> But religion & spirituality is about your relationship with a higher power, and how that relationship with a higher power helps you to improve yourself as a person.  Does that relationship all of a sudden change because "We're calling it something different now, on this side of the imaginary line our governments recognize as a border!"
> 
> 
> 
> I'm truly hoping people won't let political leaders interfere with their relationship with whatever name they call God, especially to the point where they are manipulated into being violent towards others.  (I know, I know...)   :



And that is precisely why the First Amendment to the US Constitution states :  





> *Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;* or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.[1]



For those that are doubtful of the role of religion in establishing modern liberal governance.

Religion was top of mind for the authors of the rules and regulations that would govern the United States and was considered ahead of, but in conjunction with freedoms of speech, publication and assembly.  The whole point of the exercise was due to groups of Frenchmen, Germans, Swiss, Dutch, Scots, Irish, Welsh and various Englishmen all agreeing that they couldn't tolerate the imposed conformity of Europe but couldn't agree on an absolute alternative.  So they agreed to disagree and tolerate each other's practices.  Quite liberal, as Adam Smith would have said.


----------



## a_majoor

Big "oops"

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/10/30/russias-only-aircraft-carrier-is-damaged-when-dock-sinks-crane-punches-huge-hole-in-ship/



> *Russia’s only aircraft carrier is damaged when dock sinks, crane punches huge hole in ship*
> By: The Associated Press     1 day ago
> 
> MOSCOW — Russia’s only aircraft carrier was damaged in a dock accident Tuesday that left one person missing and four injured, officials said.
> 
> A floating dock sank early morning in Murmansk, dropping a crane on the deck of the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier, the United Shipbuilding Corporation said.
> 
> The corporation’s chief, Alexei Rakhmanov, said the 70-ton crane left a hole of 215 square feet, but added that it didn’t damage any of the ship’s vital systems.
> 
> The accident happened as the ship was leaving the dock following repairs. Rakhmanov said it may have been caused by a sharp power surge that led to pumps' failure.
> 
> The Russian naval grouping is led by the Northern Fleet’s guided missile cruiser Marshal Ustinov.
> 
> Rakhmanov said that accident wouldn't lead to a significant extension of the carrier's refurbishment. Following the repairs, the carrier is to be fitted with modern control systems and new weapons.
> 
> Rakhmanov acknowledged, however, that the loss of the huge, 80,000-ton dock would disrupt the planned modernization of other Russian navy ships. The dock is the only structure of that capacity that Russia has, and it wasn't immediately clear whether it could be lifted.
> 
> The Admiral Kuznetsov carrier was launched in 1985 and has repeatedly been plagued by technical problems.
> 
> While the ship with its turbines belching black smoke looks outdated compared with the U.S. nuclear-powered carriers, it allows the Kremlin to project power far away from Russia's shores.
> 
> Two years ago, the Admiral Kuznetsov was deployed to the eastern Mediterranean as part of Russia’s campaign in Syria, launching the first carrier-mounted attacks in Russia’s navy history.


----------



## a_majoor

More on Russia's naval woes:

https://warisboring.com/56769-2/

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/11/russian-officials-nope-we-cant-finish-fixing-the-carrier-kuznetsov/

The big takaway is much of Russia's Blue Water capability and ability to do force projection is dependent on a dwindling number of large, soviet era ships, many of which are both old and maintainence intensive. Russia's ability to carry out maintaining these ships is limited by the remaining drydocks in service, as well as the state of the Russian economy and how much they actually can afford to spend. The Russian submarine fleet is really the only big stick they have left, but once again, a large portion of the submarine fleet is Cold War submarines buiilt before the fall of the wall.

How this is going to play out, and how we should respond to this is an interesting question.


----------



## CBH99

Russia doesn't need a large, powerful blue water navy.  It doesn't have the economic or political clout to justify a large, powerful blue water navy.  That navy would have no Russian-state interests to rush to the aid of, unlike the US needing to rush to Europe or SE Asian allies.

What Russia would really benefit from is a large & capable green water navy.  Their newer frigates are lethal, as are their newer submarines.  A healthy fleet of those, along with air assets - would, in my opinion, serve Russia far better.  It would be a better use of resources & give Russia  a robust capability to control situations along it's borders...which is where a lot of our current trouble spots are.


Let's not forget.  It's not Russian ships sailing in the islands off of BC, or parking themselves just outside of Canada's EEZ.  It's western ships sailing around the Baltic sea, etc.


Personally, I think Russia would be far better off building a robust & capable fleet for near it's own shores.  It doesn't need tons of subs prowling the Atlantic, ready to strike back against a nuclear onslaught by the US.  It does need the ability to assert it's own interests close to it's own borders, which I believe would actually really help normalize relations.


----------



## Underway

Depends on how you define blue water.  Russian needs to challenge NATO force projection.  This means going after aircraft carriers/subs, and pushing them out further and further from threatening Russia.  Which is why a "blue water" submarine fleet is a good idea.  As for a surface fleet Russia can do well with a smattering of heavy surface ships and a bunch of smaller vessels.  This is one of the reasons for the Syrian intervention.  They get access to a Med military port, pushing NATO even further away from Crimea and Ukraine on one axis and threatening the southern route into Russia.


----------



## Eye In The Sky

And they have there...interests...and...maybe not partners, but certainly people with similar interests, on the western side of the Pacific.


----------



## MilEME09

Ukraine: Intercepted communications suggest Kremlin directed Azov Sea crisis
Http://amn.one/Sr4nCEd

Looks like this might be part of a bigger Russian game plan


----------



## MarkOttawa

Further to this post on hypersonic Avangard glide vehicle for ICMBs,
https://milnet.ca/forums/threads/111880/post-1551238.html#msg1551238

the latest (serious missile defence and arms control implications with coming hypersonic, Russian, Chinese and American):



> Russia announces successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle
> 
> Russian President Vladimir Putin on 26 December 2018 announced a successful initial all-up flight test of the Avangard (Vanguard) hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).
> 
> According to Putin, the Avangard HGV (previously designated Objekt 4202, Yu-71, and Yu-74) was launched from the Dombarovskoye missile base in the southern Ural Mountains, flew about 6,000 km, "manoeuvering horizontally and vertically at hypersonic speeds" and successfully engaged a simulated target at the Kura Range in Russia's Kamchatka peninsula.
> 
> "The Avangard has fully passed through its test program and will become operational on schedule. The weapon has fully confirmed its specifications," said Putin.
> 
> Developed by the NPO Mashinostroyenia Corporation and furnished with a solid propellant scramjet engine, Avangard has a claimed engagement speed of Mach 27 (32,202.36 kph). The _HGV can reportedly be integrated as a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) with the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces' (Raketnye voyska strategicheskogo naznacheniya - RVSN) RS-18B/UR-100UTTKh SS-19 Mod 3 'Stiletto', R-36M2, and RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)_ [emphasis added].
> 
> The Avangard system has already been integrated onto the UR-100UTTKh ICBM, according to Russian Security Council member, Sergei Ivanov. "We have several dozen brand new UR-100N UTTH ICBMs, with which the Avangard fits very well," he said. According to Ivanov, _the new HGV also complies with the existing strategic arms reduction treaties, including the New START_ [emphasis added] (SNV-3).
> 
> RVSN Commander Colonel General Sergey Karakayev confirmed on 17 December 2018 that RVSN's Dombarovo Missile Division would receive the first Avangard HGVs integrated with the UR-100N UTTKh ICBMs in 2019. The _UR-100N UTTH (SS-19 mod. 3 Stiletto) ICBM weighs 105.6 tonnes and carries a 4,350 kg payload. The baseline variant of the missile is fitted with six HGVs. Col Karakayev said the RVSN will stand up two missile regiments, each equipped with six Avangard systems by 2027_ [emphasis added].
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> https://www.janes.com/article/85511/russia-announces-successful-flight-test-of-avangard-hypersonic-glide-vehicle



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Cloud Cover

Pair of SU- 34 collide mid air, some air crew rescued in Pacific: https://www.rt.com/russia/449092-su-34-collide-russia/

I thought these were crewed by 2 but it appears only one flyer per bird.


----------



## tomahawk6

The new nuclear capable missile violates 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty  INF. So whats a super power to do ? Cancel the treaty or build our own version ? 


https://tinyurl.com/y92t4j9p


----------



## a_majoor

New toy for Russian Special Forces and irregular troops everywhere: a captive piston "silent" mortar:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-russian-army-is-getting-e2-80-9csilent-e2-80-9d-mortars/ar-AABefJT



> *The Russian army is getting “silent” mortars*
> Justin Rohrlich  2 days ago
> 
> Russian Army troops have begun taking delivery of advanced “silent” mortars, stealthy light artillery used by special commando units, Russia’s TASS news agency recently reported.
> 
> The 82mm 2B25 “Gull” mortar is manufactured by CRI Burevestnik, part of state-owned tank manufacturer UralVagonZavod. They are piston-launched, producing very little smoke or muzzle flash, and have a range of more than 1 km, or about six-tenths of a mile. Gull mortars are silent in the same way “bulletproof” vests are bulletproof: They aren’t, at least not 100% so. Picture a suppressed Kalashnikov rifle, only a lot bigger.
> 
> There are no other silent mortars on the market aside from the Gull, which Burevestnik says can fire 15 rounds per minute. Unnamed defense industry sources cited by TASS said a smaller 60mm version with a range of up to 4 km (2.5 miles) is in the works.
> 
> A Pentagon spokesperson declined to provide a statement, telling Quartz: “We don’t comment on matters of intelligence.”
> 
> The Gull “provides the advantage of concealed operation,” Burevestnik says in its marketing, explaining that it can be easily carried by one soldier. “All these advantages make the mortar attractive for Special Forces, especially in counter-terrorism operations.”
> 
> Sharon Burke, a former US assistant secretary of defense under the Obama administration, says the Gull could be useful for Russia given its “penchant for sneak attacks on neighbors with irregular forces, which the Russian government then denies responsibility for.”
> 
> “A long-range, large-caliber, stealthy and portable weapon would serve that end nicely,” says Burke, now a senior advisor to the New America Foundation.
> 
> The element of surprise
> 
> A regular mortar is not overwhelmingly loud to begin with; it produces a low thump that retired US Army colonel Jeff McCausland describes as something akin to a “cough.”
> 
> McCausland, a former Army War College dean who also commanded an artillery battalion during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, sees the Gull as a “not-insignificant improvement” over existing mortars. He says the Gull’s most important feature is the element of surprise.
> 
> “If they don’t hear you coming, you can just sit there and keep dropping shells down the tube till the barrel melts,” he tells Quartz. “You can pump out 15 rounds a minute from one of these things; you can do a good amount of damage.”
> 
> The Gull could also be a reliable moneymaker for Russia vis-a-vis overseas arms sales, McCausland believes. Countries like Sudan and DRC Congo “are all light infantry places, by and large, so selling it on the world market to folks like that is a distinct possibility,” he says.
> 
> Small systems like the Gull can be shipped easily, and should be simple for the Russians to get into the hands of various militaries and separatist groups without attracting much notice, explains former CIA military analyst Cindy Otis.
> 
> “Mortars are not what most people think of in terms of modern military technology,” she tells Quartz. “But they’re cost-effective, light, easily transportable, and adding a silencer is an extra plus.”


----------



## TIMMYO

Russia should be somewhat wary. China isn't Europe. China won't enable Russia to kill the gas or oil not by any means once. Putin may as of now be shooting himself in the foot.


----------



## The Bread Guy

RUS has more ways to #$%^Y&*( up GPS - an overview here …


> A new investigative report*** by the Russian independent media group “The Project” into luxury dachas owned by high-ranking government officials revealed that most all include GNSS jammers among their amenities. Attempts by the journalists to photograph the dachas from the air using drones were routinely foiled by jamming.
> 
> (…)


More @ link

*** - Report in Russian


----------



## Journeyman

milnews.ca said:
			
		

> RUS has more ways to #$%^Y&*( up GPS


Absolutely.  The US Centre for Defense Studies put out an excellent report in March 2019, "Above Us Only Stars: Exposing GPS Spoofing in Russia and Syria." LINK 
They are routinely active in messing with GNSS for VIP/strategic facility protection, as well as active combat zones like Syria for airspace denial.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Nuclear weapons arms control treaties--two detailed analyses by very serious Americans with extensive personal involvement in the subject: 



> Intermediate-Range Missiles Are the Wrong Weapon for Today’s Security Challenges
> https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/intermediate-range-missiles-are-the-wrong-weapon-for-todays-security-challenges/
> 
> Bringing Russia’s New Nuclear Weapons Into New START [hypersonics: Avangard glide vehicle for ICBMs; Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile for, say, Tu-22M3 bomber]
> https://www.lawfareblog.com/bringing-russias-new-nuclear-weapons-new-start



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## The Bread Guy

:tsktsk:


> Several news outlets have reported that Russian special forces were seen entering the Svalbard archipelago and mainland Norway.
> 
> According to Aldrimer news outlet, sources in NATO and in Norwegian intelligence have reported that the Russian troops were studying the terrain and important infrastructure. The US has obtained satellite images depicting the Russian special forces troops in Norwegian territory.
> 
> Oslo said that the incident was related to Russia’s military exercise in the Barents Sea, during which Russia’s North Fleet approached Svalbard.


From Norwegian media source(original in Norwegian - Google Translate into English) …


> Tactical groups of Russian special forces have been operating on Norwegian soil in recent days, both in Svalbard and mainland Norway. Special Forces Operators have performed reconnaissance against key objects and critical infrastructure. The operators have also deployed technical monitoring systems and sensor platforms …


Google English of entire Norwegian article here.


----------



## Cloud Cover

Nyet. They are just playing their made for TV role: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied


----------



## The Bread Guy

Cloud Cover said:
			
		

> Nyet. They are just playing their made for TV role: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied


They're all on leave or just retired, right?  #UkraineNorth

Meanwhile, as someone smarter than me often says, don't believe it until the Kremlin denies it …


> Russia’s Embassy in Oslo has dismissed as a gross provocation a report published by a Norwegian media outlet that a Russian special ops unit was allegedly carrying out a mission in the kingdom, the Russian diplomatic mission said on its Facebook page on Monday.
> 
> "Information published in an article by Aldrimer.no on September 27, 2019 on alleged actions by a Russian special forces unit in Spitsbergen is fake news. We cannot call it otherwise than a gross provocation. We consider this publication as part and parcel of the ongoing systemic work carried out by certain circles in Norway on imposing an image of an enemy on Russia," the embassy said ...


----------



## The Bread Guy

Aaaaand another Norwegian media outlet says "nope" (link in Norwegian) …


> E-Service and PST: Nothing supporting allegations of Russian forces on Norwegian soil ...


Google English version here.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Interesting ...


> Russia has not harassed U.S. ships and aircraft in Europe and the Mediterranean for the past three months in what appears to be an effort to avoid incidents that could escalate into conflict, NATO Supreme Commander Gen. Tod Wolters said Tuesday.
> 
> Russian aircraft still shadow U.S. and allied ships and planes, but "we have had zero unprofessional incidents at sea and zero unprofessional incidents in the sky" in the last 90 days, he said.
> 
> At a breakfast with defense reporters, Wolters attributed the decrease in unsafe operations by the Russians to the "deconfliction dialogue" he had in his first face-to-face meeting with Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff.
> 
> A NATO news release said the Wolters-Gerasimov talks took place in July in Baku, Azerbaijan.
> 
> Incidents in which Russian aircraft flew low over U.S. warships or made dangerous passes at American aircraft were "a key military topic in my consultations with Gen. Gerasimov," said Wolters, an Air Force general who doubles as head of U.S. European Command.
> 
> "He was concerned about it; I was concerned about it," he said, adding that the result of their talks was "zero unprofessional behavior that occurs in the maritime or in the air."
> 
> "The safety deconfliction has improved," Wolters said. "That's because we're deterring better, that's because we're deconflicting better" with upgrades to intelligence and surveillance assets ...


More @ link


----------



## MarkOttawa

Russia hardly as down and out as some sometimes think--with rise and rise of China US not in such a great position--start of major piece:



> Why Russian Military Expenditure Is Much Higher Than Commonly Understood (As Is China’s)
> 
> Gresham’s Law states that bad money drives out good money, but anyone who has spent time around Washington, D.C., knows that this law can safely be applied to information too — bad information tends to drive out good information. Such is the case with America’s assessments of other countries’ military and economic power. Defense spending is one of the most commonly used measures for gauging a country’s potential military power, setting expectations of what the military balance might look like in the future. It helps give us a sense of how much of a state’s economic power is being converted into military power. Well, in theory it should, if we knew how to measure it right, but comparing defense spending across countries is a complicated task. As a consequence, the United States doesn’t really know where its military expenditure stands in relation to that of its principal adversaries, what kind of military capability they’re getting for their money, and whether the balance of power is likely to improve or worsen over time.
> 
> Policymakers are barraged by a daily stream of think tank reports, academic writing, and media stories competing for their perceptions. For example, by cherry-picking a few gross measures, including military expenditure, a recent RAND report caricatured Russia as a weakling rogue state. Major newspapers generate erroneous headlines: many ran stories asserting that in 2017 Russian defense spending declined by a fifth . In our experience, both in Washington and London, decision-makers have little time to investigate or read and tend to believe many of the headlines they come across. Indeed, rarely does a discussion take place on Russia or China without a series of assumptions being voiced based on questionable assessments of relative power when it comes to GDP, defense spending, or demographics.
> 
> 
> Become a Member
> 
> 
> 
> Of course, a necessary precursor to finding measures that matter is knowing how to measure in the first place. This is a challenge we hope to briefly take up here. It is hardly an academic question. Strategic implications abound for America’s pursuit of a favorable regional military balance in Europe and decisive military advantages over its adversaries. In our view, despite its tremendous size, U.S. defense spending does not actually dwarf that of the rest of the world. This also raises some uncomfortable questions about the ability of the United States to attain deterrence by denial against competing revisionist powers. The disparity is especially evident when looking at the case of Russian military expenditure, which is much larger than it appears, though a fair assessment of Chinese defense spending would also yield pessimistic expectations about the future balance of military power.
> 
> Why Russia Gets More Bang for the Ruble
> 
> Based on the annual average dollar-to-ruble exchange rates, Russia is typically depicted as spending in the region of $60 billion per year on its military. This is roughly in line with the defense spending of medium-sized powers like the United Kingdom and France. However, anybody familiar with Russia’s military modernization program over the past decade will see the illogic: how can a military budget the size of the United Kingdom’s be used to maintain over a million personnel while simultaneously procuring vast quantities of capable military equipment?
> 
> Russian procurement dwarfs that of most European powers combined. Beyond delivering large quantities of weaponry for today’s forces, Russia’s scientists and research institutes are far along in development of hypersonic weapons, such as Tsirkon and Avangard, along with next-generation air defense systems like S-500. This volume of procurement and research and development should not be possible with a military budget ostensibly the same size as the United Kingdom’s. When theory checks in with practice, the problem with the approaches that return such answers is plain for anyone to see.
> 
> The reason for this apparent contradiction is that the use of market exchange rates grossly understates the real volume of Russian military expenditure (and that of other countries with smaller per-capita incomes, like China). Instead, any analysis of comparative military expenditure should be based on the use of purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates rather than market exchange rates. This alternative method takes differences in costs between countries into account. As we demonstrate, despite some shortcomings, PPP is a much more methodologically robust and defensible method of comparing defense spending across countries than the method of comparing spending using the market exchange rates that are commonly used by think tanks and academics. Using PPP, one finds that Russia’s effective military expenditure actually ranged between $150 billion and $180 billion annually over the last five years. That figure is conservative; taking into account hidden or obfuscated military expenditure, Russia may well come in at around $200 billion.
> 
> To put it simply, _calculating Russian military expenditure based on purchasing power means that the United States spends only about four times more than Russia on defense, rather than ten times more when using market exchange rates. But this remains a crude comparison. The gap is even narrower when one digs into the differences in how this money is spent. At nearly 50 percent of federal budget spending on national defense, a large proportion of the Russian defense budget goes to procurement and research and development. By comparison, in other countries with large defense budgets, procurement spending tends to be much lower_ [emphasis added]: in India, the United States, and the United Kingdom, spending is at about 20–25 percent...
> 
> _Michael Kofman is director and senior research scientist at CNA Corporation and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. Previously he served as program manager at the National Defense University. The views expressed here are his own.
> 
> Richard Connolly is director of the Centre for Russian, European, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birmingham and senior lecturer in political economy. His research and teaching are principally concerned with the political economy of Russia and Eurasia._
> https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/why-russian-military-expenditure-is-much-higher-than-commonly-understood-as-is-chinas/



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MarkOttawa

Boost-glide hypersonics operational on ICBMs says defence ministry, with nuclear weapons:



> Russia deploys Avangard hypersonic missile system
> 
> Russia's first regiment of Avangard hypersonic missiles has been put into service, the defence ministry says.
> 
> The location was not given, although officials had earlier indicated they would be deployed in the Urals.
> 
> President Vladimir Putin has said the nuclear-capable missiles can travel more than 20 times the speed of sound and put Russia ahead of other nations.
> 
> They have a "glide system" that affords great manoeuvrability and could make them impossible to defend against.
> 
> Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu confirmed the "Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle entered service at 10:00 Moscow time on 27 December", calling it a "landmark event".
> 
> Mr Putin said on Tuesday the Avangard system could penetrate current and future missile defence systems, adding: "Not a single country possesses hypersonic weapons, let alone continental-range hypersonic weapons."
> 
> The West and other nations were "playing catch-up with us", he said.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It is hard to determine if Russia's new Avangard hypersonic missile system really has entered service, as Moscow claims, or if this is just an advanced phase of field testing. But President Putin's eagerness to claim bragging rights is to some extent justified. Russia looks to be ahead in the hypersonic stakes. China is also developing such systems; while the US appears to be somewhat behind.
> 
> Hypersonic missiles, as their name implies, fly very fast, at above Mach 5 - ie at least five times the speed of sound. Hypersonic weapons can take various forms. They can be cruise-type missiles, powered throughout their flight. Or, they can be carried aloft on board a ballistic missile from which the hypersonic "glide vehicle" separates and then flies to its target.
> 
> Such "boost-glide" systems, as they are known (Avangard appears to be one of these), are launched like a traditional ballistic missile, but instead of following an arc high above the atmosphere, the re-entry vehicle is put on a trajectory that allows it to enter Earth's atmosphere quite quickly, before gliding, un-powered, for hundreds or thousands of kilometres.
> 
> It is not so much the speed of the hypersonic weapon alone that counts. It is its extraordinary manoeuvrability as it glides towards its target. This poses a huge problem for existing anti-missile defence systems. Indeed the glide vehicle's trajectory, "surfing along the edge of the atmosphere" as one expert put it to me recently, presents any defensive system with additional problems. Thus, if Russia's claims are true, it has developed a long-range intercontinental missile system that may well be impossible to defend against.
> 
> The announcement that Avangard is operational heralds a new and dangerous era in the nuclear arms race. It confirms once again President Putin's focus on bolstering and modernising Russia's nuclear arsenal. It's indicative of the return of great power competition. Some analysts might well see Russia's development programme as a long-term strategy to cope with Washington's abiding interest in anti-missile defences. The US argument that these are purely designed to counter missiles from "rogue-states" like Iran or North Korea has carried little weight in Moscow.
> 
> This all comes at a time when the whole network of arms control agreements inherited from the Cold War is collapsing. _One crucial treaty - the New START agreement - is due to expire in February 2021. Russia seems willing to extend the agreement but the Trump administration has so far appeared sceptical. With a whole new generation of nuclear weapons at the threshold of entering service, many believe not just that existing agreements should be bolstered, but that new treaties are needed to manage what could turn into a new nuclear arms race_ [emphasis added].
> https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50927648



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Black Sea Rover

Interesting article: "Why we'll see more and more carriers on the high seas" (https://nationalpost.com/opinion/david-j-bercuson-why-well-see-more-and-more-carriers-on-the-high-seas).

My only concern, why didn't author mentioned Italian carrier. And why the word "second" was used in relation to Russian navy? As far as Russian navy is concerned it's rather 0.5 carrier. Admiral Kuznetsov belching and smoking like hell. If it was a horse, somebody would have shot it. While it takes russkies ten years to build a frigate, building a carrier would take them at best 12 years. By that time Kuznetsov carrier would be retired, and they risk to have several gap years without an operational carrier around 2030.


----------



## mariomike

In the news,



> February 6, 2020
> 
> Pew Research Center
> 
> About a third of U.S. Republicans have confidence in Putin, up significantly since 2015
> https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/07/russia-and-putin-receive-low-ratings-globally/ft_2020-02-07_russia_07/
> 
> Americans consistently have expressed little confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin. But Republicans are now 21 points more likely than Democrats to express confidence in him (31% vs. 10%), the widest partisan gap in our polling.


----------



## OceanBonfire

> *Russian frigate fires hypersonic missile for first time*
> 
> A Russian Navy warship has fired an NPO Mashinostroyeniya 3M22 Zircon (Tsirkon) hypersonic missile for the first time during trials in the Barents Sea.
> 
> Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu confirmed the start of the test programme by the Northern Fleet during a meeting of his ministry's board on 28 February.
> 
> "The trials of new armament, including hypersonic weapons, continue. All this will make it possible to qualitatively boost the combat potential of the Russian Navy's Northern and other fleets," Shoigu was reported as telling the board meeting by Russian state news agency TASS on 28 February.
> 
> The test launch was part of the Northern Fleet's plan of activity for 2019-25, said Shoigu.
> 
> 
> https://www.janes.com/article/94629/russian-frigate-fires-hypersonic-missile-for-first-time


----------



## The Bread Guy

From a while back, but just popped into my RSS feed -- another tool in Russia's tool belt ...


> *ABSTRACT*
> 
> While the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club's (NWMC) roots are similar to Western counterparts such as the Hells Angels MC and Bandidos MC, they have evolved into a proxy of the Russian state who unite combat-ready diasporas. The NWMC nongovernmental organization provides soft propaganda while they operate alongside the Russian military and imbed military tactics into foreign Russian populations through their corporate entity Wolf Holding of Security Structures. This case study explores the evolution from outlaw motorcycle club to political force and their integration into Russia's information operations and conflict. The NWMC activities in Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, highlight how this motorcycle club has been able to cultivate a fifth column to agitate domestic politics and increase ties to the Kremlin.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Trum admin. looking to pull US out of Open Skies Treaty:


> What the United States loses by quitting the Open Skies treaty, in one chart
> 
> Reports emerged this week that the White House may be moving “soon” on withdrawing from the Open Skies treaty, a nearly two-decade-old agreement that allows 34 countries to fly and share reconnaissance missions over each other to promote military cooperation and transparency.
> 
> Last month, defense secretary Mark Esper said he was freezing a long-overdue replacement of the aging OC-135B aircraft used for flights under the treaty. “Until we make a final decision on the path forward, I am not prepared to recapitalize aircraft,” Esper told the Senate Armed Services Committee. Although more than 1,500 observation flights have been flown since the treaty took effect in 2002, vocal Republican opponents like Sens. Tom Cotton, Richard Burr, and Ted Cruz claim its benefit is “marginal” because US satellites make aerial imagery unnecessary, and the United States gives up more to its adversaries under the treaty than it gains. Their criticism extends from complaints about the costs of the OC-135B upgrade to protests over Russian compliance with the treaty—specifically, restrictions on missions flown over Kaliningrad and along Russia’s border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Cotton and Cruz introduced a resolution calling for withdrawal in October.
> 
> Meanwhile, foreign policy veterans from multiple administrations have called on the White House to reconsider. This week, Democratic leaders from the House and Senate committees on armed services and foreign relations said that the action would be “not only shortsighted, but also unconscionable,” and urged the Trump administration “to reverse course on this reckless policy decision rather than ramming it through while our country and the entire world grapples with an unprecedented crisis.” Proponents note that the images gathered during flights are important to US allies in Europe who have limited access to satellite surveillance and that the treaty allows the United States to receive imagery even from flights it does not conduct itself. On Russian compliance, they argue that any issues can best be addressed via the treaty itself, not by abandoning it—an argument that failed to halt the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the INF treaty last year.
> 
> Originally proposed in 1955 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as a means of reducing Cold War tensions and assisting arms control inspections, the Open Skies treaty found its footing only as the Soviet Union was falling apart, when (quoting the treaty’s preamble) events in Europe “transformed the security situation from Vancouver to Vladivostok.” The idea was to encourage that new spirit of cooperation by placing representatives of potential adversaries on the same airplanes, jointly collecting intelligence that all treaty signatories have access to.
> 
> 
> “What is important is that these people, the military officers, they sit together in one plane, together with their counterparts, all the time,” Alexander Graef, a researcher in the arms control and emerging technologies project at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy in Hamburg, told the Bulletin. “They engage with them on a daily basis, and you cannot replicate that with satellites. So that is something, a human factor, that’s in the treaty.”
> 
> While information about the joint flights under the treaty is not classified, researchers and journalists have generally had to glean details from a mix of sources. One frequently cited source is the US State Department itself, which previously maintained a comprehensive list of flights on its website. But that information has not appeared since Trump took office.
> 
> So earlier this month, Graef and his colleague (and Bulletin Rieser award winner) Moritz Kütt decided to publish figures based on exhaustive flight data they received from a NATO source on all Open Skies missions from 2002 through 2019. They set up a website, OpenSkies.flights, that quantifies the overall flight records and features an interactive graphic to help visualize the extent to which states have continuously cooperated on overflights since the treaty took effect—and, they hope, undermine arguments for US withdrawal.
> 
> The United States receives (as shown on the right side of the diagram) far fewer flights over its territory than it flies over others’ (as shown on the left side). Graef and Kütt calculate that more approximately 94 percent of reconnaissance flights under the Open Skies treaty were flown over European states, including Russia.
> 
> Moreover, the visualization makes plain that there are really two main blocs gathering observations of each other under the treaty: European states and Russia (including Belarus, which is grouped with Russia under the terms of the treaty). “Thus, even if the United States left the treaty, Europe could still derive benefits from overflying Russia-Belarus,” Graef and Kütt wrote. “In turn, although Russia-Belarus would lose the ability to fly over the United States, it would retain the right to conduct overflights over European states and Canada, which together currently account for more than 87 percent of its active flights.”
> 
> “_One of the things we show is that the Americans fly way more often over Russia than the Russians fly over them,” Kütt said. And because any imagery can be shared among all states, the United States doesn’t even need to actively participate in missions over European states to receive copies of the intelligence that Russia obtains_ [emphasis added]...
> https://thebulletin.org/2020/04/what-the-united-states-loses-by-quitting-the-open-skies-treaty-in-one-chart/



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## MilEME09

https://americanmilitarynews.com/2020/06/us-general-russian-aircraft-flown-to-libya-linked-to-moscows-pursuit-of-foothold-in-region/?utm_source=militarymemes&utm_medium=facebook&utm_campaign=alt

Russian adventures in Libya causing concern in the west over Russias long term goals.


----------



## MarkOttawa

Start of a post:



> Public Russian Nuclear Weapons Use Doctrine–Willing to go First if Necessary
> 
> Further to the discussion of use of nuclear-armed cruise missiles (SLCMs) carried by Russian submarines at this March 2020 post,
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Subs and Russian Nuclear Weapons Doctrine, Note Cruise Missiles
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Russia has just published its first, public document on policies for the use of strategic nuclear weapons. The document does not rule our first use of those weapons in certain circumstances, nor does it seem to preclude first use of tactical nuclear weapons (which may well be how those carried by the navy’s SLCMs are classified even if some targets are in North America) as part of what may be a non-public “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine (more at the first quote below)...
> https://mark3ds.wordpress.com/2020/06/08/public-russian-nuclear-weapons-use-doctrine-willing-to-go-first-if-necessary/
Click to expand...


Mark
Ottawa


----------



## CBH99

Russia isn't about to nuke northern Europe, even with smaller yield tactical nuclear weapons.  And neither Syria or Libya are important enough to whip out the nukes for...

Their involvement in Syria and Libya is to maintain some control over events that are happening relatively close to them, and they believe are in their own national interest.  Despite the western media constantly making the Russians the bad guys, they aren't about to start lobbing nukes anytime soon - especially when their primary military focus right now is on maintaining some sort of controlled order in nearby failed states.    :2c:


----------



## MilEME09

https://americanmilitarynews.com/2020/06/report-russia-paid-taliban-bounties-for-killing-us-troops/?utm_source=militarymemes&utm_campaign=alt&utm_medium=facebook

Well now, this is interesting


----------



## CBH99

MilEME09 said:
			
		

> https://americanmilitarynews.com/2020/06/report-russia-paid-taliban-bounties-for-killing-us-troops/?utm_source=militarymemes&utm_campaign=alt&utm_medium=facebook
> 
> Well now, this is interesting




Interesting is true, indeed.

Personally, I doubt it's true.  Interesting nonetheless.  



***Not insulting you or your source, to clarify.  I just have my doubts***


----------



## daftandbarmy

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Interesting is true, indeed.
> 
> Personally, I doubt it's true.  Interesting nonetheless.
> 
> 
> 
> ***Not insulting you or your source, to clarify.  I just have my doubts***



Spies and Commandos Warned Months Ago of Russian Bounties on U.S. Troops - NY Times

The recovery of large amounts of American cash at a Taliban outpost in Afghanistan helped tip off U.S. officials. It is believed that at least one U.S. troop death was the result of the bounties.

United States intelligence officers and Special Operations forces in Afghanistan alerted their superiors as early as January to a suspected Russian plot to pay bounties to the Taliban to kill American troops in Afghanistan, according to officials briefed on the matter. They believed at least one U.S. troop death was the result of the bounties, two of the officials said.

The crucial information that led the spies and commandos to focus on the bounties included the recovery of a large amount of American cash from a raid on a Taliban outpost that prompted suspicions. Interrogations of captured militants and criminals played a central role in making the intelligence community confident in its assessment that the Russians had offered and paid bounties in 2019, another official has said.

Armed with this information, military and intelligence officials have been reviewing American and other coalition combat casualties over the past 18 months to determine whether any were victims of the plot. Four Americans were killed in combat in early 2020, but the Taliban have not attacked American positions since a February agreement to end the long-running war in Afghanistan.

The details added to the picture of the classified intelligence assessment, which The New York Times reported Friday has been under discussion inside the Trump administration since at least March, and emerged as the White House confronted a growing chorus of criticism on Sunday over its apparent failure to authorize a response to Russia.


https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/28/us/politics/russian-bounties-warnings-trump.html


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

Russian tentacles are stretching across the Mediterranean:



> *U.S. Threatens Libya's General Haftar With Sanctions Over Russian Ties*
> 
> By Charles Kennedy - Jul 27, 2020, 9:30 AM CDT
> 
> The United States has threatened General Khalifa Haftar with sanctions over his ties with Russia, the Wall Street Journal reports, after Russian military contractors with ties to the Kremlin seized control of Libya's largest field and the oil export terminal of Es Sider.
> 
> General Haftar and his Libyan National Army are affiliated with the eastern Libyan government, and last year Haftar launched an offensive against the UN-recognized Government of National Accord. The U.S. has been supporting Haftar, but now the tide seems to be turning as the LNA and Russian mercenaries forge closer ties.



https://www.google.com/amp/s/oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/US-Threatens-Libyas-General-Haftar-With-Sanctions-Over-Russian-Ties.amp.html


----------



## Lumber

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> Russian tentacles are stretching across the Mediterranean:



Good strategy.

As Robin Williams said regarding western tactics in Afghanistan:

"If we tell them we're going to bomb them back to the stone age, they'll just go 'Oooh! Upgrade!'."


----------



## Flanker

Humphrey Bogart said:
			
		

> Russian tentacles are stretching across the Mediterranean





> In an April 19 phone conversation with Haftar, who is also a US citizen, Trump recognised "Field Marshall Haftar's significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya's oil resources".
> 
> Washington in July blocked a UNSC statement condemning an air raid on a migrant detention centre that killed more than 40 people, which the GNA blamed on the US ally UAE



https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/libya-war-supporting-200104110325735.html

Can we say that US tentacles are stretching too?


----------



## Flanker

Lumber said:
			
		

> Good strategy.
> 
> As Robin Williams said regarding western tactics in Afghanistan:
> 
> "If we tell them we're going to bomb them back to the stone age, they'll just go 'Oooh! Upgrade!'."



Putting aside a somewhat supremasict character of this comment, bombing into stone age never worked to fix poverty and radicalism.
It will just create more of them. Only the opposite strategy will work: help to rebuild economy first.
Thus the question is ... does the West want actually to fix the problem?


----------



## Donald H

daftandbarmy said:
			
		

> Spies and Commandos Warned Months Ago of Russian Bounties on U.S. Troops - NY Times
> 
> The recovery of large amounts of American cash at a Taliban outpost in Afghanistan helped tip off U.S. officials. It is believed that at least one U.S. troop death was the result of the bounties.
> 
> United States intelligence officers and Special Operations forces in Afghanistan alerted their superiors as early as January to a suspected Russian plot to pay bounties to the Taliban to kill American troops in Afghanistan, according to officials briefed on the matter. They believed at least one U.S. troop death was the result of the bounties, two of the officials said.
> 
> The crucial information that led the spies and commandos to focus on the bounties included the recovery of a large amount of American cash from a raid on a Taliban outpost that prompted suspicions. Interrogations of captured militants and criminals played a central role in making the intelligence community confident in its assessment that the Russians had offered and paid bounties in 2019, another official has said.
> 
> Armed with this information, military and intelligence officials have been reviewing American and other coalition combat casualties over the past 18 months to determine whether any were victims of the plot. Four Americans were killed in combat in early 2020, but the Taliban have not attacked American positions since a February agreement to end the long-running war in Afghanistan.
> 
> The details added to the picture of the classified intelligence assessment, which The New York Times reported Friday has been under discussion inside the Trump administration since at least March, and emerged as the White House confronted a growing chorus of criticism on Sunday over its apparent failure to authorize a response to Russia.
> 
> 
> https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/28/us/politics/russian-bounties-warnings-trump.html



Yes, likely true. But true at any point in time for both Russia and the U.S. 

And as for this particular story? It smells too much like the Dem party's politics in my opinion.


----------



## FJAG

I've recently come across a Strategic Multilayer Assessment White Paper published in 2019 responding to several questions raised by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command titled "Russian Strategic Intentions". That analysis, contributed to by 23 experts in the field, is to provide a:



> wide-ranging assessments of Russia’s global interests and objectives, as well as the activities—gray or otherwise—that it conducts to achieve them



It's lengthy, some 171 pages, but very informative. I'll throw out one quote from one article that is fundamental to understanding Russia in the 21st Century:



> One cannot understand how the Russian leadership thinks strategic issues without appreciating the fact that the Kremlin sees itself as being at war with the West. To use a common US military term, it is always phase zero. As viewed from Moscow, the war is not total but it is fundamental. Since Russia is at war, for the Kremlin there is no separate gray zone, nor are there unacceptable forms of deterrence, compellence, or coercion.



https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SMA-TRADOC-Russian-Strategic-Intentions-White-Paper-PDF-1.pdf

 :cheers:


----------



## Cloud Cover

"Since Russia is at war, for the Kremlin there is no separate gray zone, nor are there unacceptable forms of deterrence, compellence, or coercion."

Very Schelling-esque.  So much so, I would think he wrote that himself.


----------



## FJAG

CloudCover said:
			
		

> "Since Russia is at war, for the Kremlin there is no separate gray zone, nor are there unacceptable forms of deterrence, compellence, or coercion."
> 
> Very Schelling-esque.  So much so, I would think he wrote that himself.



Dr. Daniel Goure. p. 32


----------



## MarkOttawa

This was in the 20th century but the video is quite something, as is the physical size of the hydrogen bomb (thermonuclear) dropped in the Arctic from a Tu-95; the explosion takes place 22 minutes in:



> Rosatom releases previously classified documentary video of Tsar Bomba nuke test
> _Photos and short video clips have previously been available, but this unseen 40 minutes declassified footage of the Soviet Union’s monster nuclear bomb give a whole new insight into what happened on Novaya Zemlya on October 30, 1961. _
> 
> The documentary film was released and posted on August 20 on the YouTube channel of Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation in connection with the celebration of 75 years of nuclear industry.
> 
> The film, edited in classic Soviet-style propaganda, shows all preparation procedures. First the transportation of the giant bomb by rail to the Olenya airbase near Olenogorsk on the Kola Peninsula. The Tu-95 aircraft take-off and flight across the Barents Sea to the detonation site near the Matochkin Strait at Novaya Zemlya. Then the release of the bomb attached to a parachute to slow the fall so the plane could get in safer distance from the blast. Videos from several directions and distances show the apocalypse looking detonation and following mushroom cloud.
> 
> The bomb, officially named RDS-220 and later nick-named Tsar Bomba, was the largest nuclear weapon ever constructed.
> 
> With a yield of 50 megatons (50 million tons), equal to around 3,800 Hiroshima bombs, the weapon was set off over Novaya Zemlya on October 30, 1961.
> 
> It was Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev who in July 1961 ordered the development of the doomsday-size bomb at a time amid rising political tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States.
> 
> Khrushchev wanted a 100 megaton weapon and to achieve such size, the engineers added a third stage on the thermonuclear warhead. Normal hydrogen bombs comprise two stages. Understanding the extreme radiation releases, the engineers, and among them Andrei Sakharov, decided to reduce the actual yield of 100 megatons to around half.
> 
> The film shows how the modified Tu-95 bomber plane was coated with a special white reflective paint to protect it from the heat caused by thermal radiation from the explosion. Measurement equipment was attached all over and a second plane flew beside, filming and monitoring radiation samples.
> 
> To slow the drift down after release, the bomb was deployed to a giant parachute, itself weighing nearly a ton.
> 
> The bomb was detonated 4,000 meters above the ground. As seen in the film, the fireball flash lasted far longer than seen on any other nuclear weapon test videos. The flash dome itself reached 20 km, while the ring of absolute destruction had a radius of 35 kilometers
> 
> After 40 seconds, the dome of the fire reached 30 km and thereafter developed into a mushroom cloud which soared to a height of 60-65 kilometers with a diameter of 90 km. In the military town Severny, center for the nuclear weapons test around the Matochkin Strait, most buildings were destroyed. The town was 55 kilometers from ground zero.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _A few seconds after the explosion, the diameter of the dust column was about 10 km. Screenshot from the film_
> 
> Although being detonated four kilometers above the ground, the seismic shock wave equivalent to an earthquake of over 5.0 on the Richter scale was measured around the world.
> 
> The Tu-95 plane carrying the bomb was far away at the time of detonation. However, the explosion’s shock wave caused the aircraft to instantly lose 1,000 meters of altitude, but it later landed safely.
> 
> In Norway, military border guards on the Jarfjord Mountain near Kirkenes could see the flash. In the film, it is said the light from the flash could be seen at a distance of 1,000 kilometers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Radiation fallout was measured all over Scandinavia, and international condemnation followed.
> 
> Domestic protests were also voiced inside the USSR, among them from Andrei Sakharov who began speaking out against nuclear weapons. In his book, Memoirs, Sakharov wrote in detail against the Soviet leadership’s policies. In 1975, Sakharov was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but Moscow denied him permission to go to Oslo for the ceremony.
> 
> After the Tsar Bomba and other thermonuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya and by the United States in the Pacific, the two superpowers realized the craziness of conducting atmospheric tests with huge radioactive fallouts. In 1963, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.
> 
> Consequently, nuclear weapons tests were conducted underground. The last two such tests took place at Novaya Zemlya on October 24, 1990.
> 
> In 1996, the UN adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosions.
> https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/08/rosatom-releases-previously-classified-documentary-video-50-mt-novaya-zemlya-test



Mark
Ottawa


----------



## Cloud Cover

Informative article about the nasty Russians trying to pick fights with private American citizens and US forces abroad. Stemmed in part by the US attack on their mercenaries last year.  Some interesting videos as well: https://www.polygraph.info/a/fact-check-russian-military-alaska-syria/30827884.html


----------



## MilEME09

https://www.ctvnews.ca/mobile/world/russian-opposition-leader-navalny-able-to-leave-hospital-bed-1.5103454?utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_campaign=trueAnthem%3A+New+Content+%28Feed%29&utm_source=facebook&cid=sm%3Atrueanthem%3Actvnews%3Apost

At this point I would put the question to Russia plain and simple Either is someone in the Russian government is responsible for this or have they lost control of their chemical weapons stockpiles? Cause this is either one or the other. I would be very entertained to watch Russia spin to answer without loosing face.


----------



## Donald H

CBH99 said:
			
		

> Interesting is true, indeed.
> 
> Personally, I doubt it's true.  Interesting nonetheless.
> 
> 
> 
> ***Not insulting you or your source, to clarify.  I just have my doubts***



IMHO, almost certainly true in a nuanced way for both sides. But unfortunately turned into political spin by the Democrats for their obvious intent of demonizing Trump.

The question on the Dems' accusations being valid and rightfully so? That's just politics.


----------



## Donald H

Sorry about disrupting the conversation with my previous post. Just ignore it if that's applicable.

It's very difficult to say with Navalny. US freedom of information act has revealed many, many false flag maneuvers that have been released after 50 years. 

Could it be that this is a part of the fight between the Dems and the Repubs. (Trump's buddying up to Putin?) I would suggest that this runs deeper in America than just D/R politics. The FBI/CIA/DHS/etc. must be very troubled with the relationsihip between Trump and Putin.


----------



## JMCanada

Not sure this is the correct thread, but it might be...
I just want to share an interesting article on Russian Arctic and Sino-Russian relationship. Hope you enjoy it.

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities/


----------



## Donald H

This article found in the Strategist link too

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/in-search-of-a-clear-eyed-us-strategy-on-russia/



> What does this imply for US strategy? Clearly, it won’t be achievable if Donald Trump is re-elected, but that would make a ‘deterrence and détente’ approach equally implausible. To work effectively, a deny–disrupt–dilute strategy will require Washington to engage more closely with its allies, recommit firmly to NATO and recognise that not all its partners will always feel similarly threatened. It will also have to reach beyond its alliance networks to others with interests in checking Russian ambitions.



Another clue to how America's allies feel about Trump's dealings with Russia/Putin.

The question to ask is not whether it is so about Trump, it's to ask 'why' it is so. 

One reason I will suggest is that the hookers in the hotel room with Trump story is being held by Putin for a rainy day. Known as the Christopher Steele dossier if anybody doesn't know that yet. It never did really get put down completely as a Democratic party ploy to damage Trump. 

And of course many other theories on why Trump buddies up to Putin. This story from the Strategist just makes it obvious again that he does.


----------



## Brad Sallows

Most people do know about the Steele dossier, and most people also know it's bullsh!t.


----------



## Donald H

Brad Sallows said:
			
		

> Most people do know about the Steele dossier, and most people also know it's bullsh!t.



Most people do know about the Steele dossier and most people believe it's bullsh-t.

But Comey knows about it and Steele much more completely than do 'most' people and he knows it's the factual truth. Even though Comey is the 'good' cop and the 'good' patriot and can't bring himself to say that Trump has been compromised by Russia on the pissing hookers episode.

Just a little bit of the inside story for you there Brad. Promise to keep it to yourself?


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Russian and Turkish forces conduct joint patrols, interesting mods on the Turkish trucks, shades of the British on the NWF interwar period, patrol starts at 2:20


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Some video of subs breaking through the ice, I note they didn't surface enough to clear their missile hatches. Also Russian snowmobiles and Manpads








						Three nuclear ballistic missile subs surfaced simultaneously through the ice in complex Russian Arctic exercise
					

Exercise Umka-21 is Russia’s most complex military drill in the high Arctic, involving fighter jets, torpedo shootings and Arctic brigade soldiers training warfare on Franz Josef Land.




					thebarentsobserver.com


----------



## CBH99

Colin Parkinson said:


> Some video of subs breaking through the ice, I note they didn't surface enough to clear their missile hatches. Also Russian snowmobiles and Manpads
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Three nuclear ballistic missile subs surfaced simultaneously through the ice in complex Russian Arctic exercise
> 
> 
> Exercise Umka-21 is Russia’s most complex military drill in the high Arctic, involving fighter jets, torpedo shootings and Arctic brigade soldiers training warfare on Franz Josef Land.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> thebarentsobserver.com


That's a pretty impressive show of strength in the Arctic - being able to surface 3 nuclear subs at the same time, along with a variety of supporting assets.  As far as operations in the Arctic go, the Russians are just as capable as anyone else with just the assets described in this article alone.

We really should stop sanctioning Russia, and doing everything we can to pigeon hole them into being more of an adversary than they need to be.  With China on the horizon as an extremely real and capable threat (not just militarily, but in literally _everything_) - and somehow claiming to be a near arction nation - having Russia 'not be our enemy' might be a lot more valuable than we realize right now.  

Although I fear that ship sailed a long time ago...


0.02


----------



## MilEME09

Satellite images show huge Russian military buildup in the Arctic
					

Russia is amassing unprecedented military might in the Arctic and testing its newest weapons in a region freshly ice-free due to the climate emergency, in a bid to secure its northern coast and open up a key shipping route from Asia to Europe.



					www.ctvnews.ca
				




Possiden is real according to western intelligence and its concept scares the crap out of me for sure.


----------



## Kirkhill

It being the Christmas season and all I guess Vladimir is going all out with the Nutcracker Suite as a theme


----------



## Good2Golf

Are those RCR Nutcrackers?


----------



## MilEME09

Good to see he keeps his eternal throne shiny behind him


----------



## OldSolduer

Kirkhill said:


> It being the Christmas season and all I guess Vladimir is going all out with the Nutcracker Suite as a theme


You know I'd rather he stay as Dictator for Life  I mean President as he's somewhat predictable. As for China's dictator for life - well my solution for him can't be published.

At least Vlad has a sense of humour.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Looks like it's from a commentator, but still ...


> The Kremlin warned it could blow up 32 GPS satellites with its new anti-satellite technology, ASAT, which it tested Nov. 15 on a retired Soviet Tselina-D satellite, according to numerous news reports.
> 
> Russia then claimed on state television that its new ASAT missiles could obliterate NATO satellites and “blind all their missiles, planes and ships, not to mention the ground forces,” said Russian Channel One TV host Dmitry Kiselyov, rendering the West’s GPS-guided missiles useless. “It means that if NATO crosses our red line, it risks losing all 32 of its GPS satellites at once.” ...


Outlet's almost 40% government owned, so take that or not as "official".


----------



## Good2Golf

Most NATO kit is ironically dual-channeled and includes GLONASS in additions to GPS.

Nice try, Vlad.


----------



## YZT580

The cost of maintaining that many troops in the field is huge.  No country can afford those expenses for very long so whatever game Putin is playing must be into the second half by now.


----------



## Altair

YZT580 said:


> The cost of maintaining that many troops in the field is huge.  No country can afford those expenses for very long so whatever game Putin is playing must be into the second half by now.


Gas prices are pretty healthy right now.


----------



## KevinB

Vlad knows we have had Anti Sat missiles since the late 50's.
    Heck, the 80's vintage ASM-135 is on public display at the Air and Space Museum - those where launched from F-15's in the upper stratosphere.
No idea why he is posturing now.


----------



## Altair

KevinB said:


> Vlad knows we have had Anti Sat missiles since the late 50's.
> Heck, the 80's vintage ASM-135 is on public display at the Air and Space Museum - those where launched from F-15's in the upper stratosphere.
> No idea why he is posturing now.


With gas prices being what they are he can actually afford to right now?


----------



## Good2Golf

Domestic consumption, pure and simple, to bolster any move further into UKR, beyond Crimea and some of the Donbas.


----------



## KevinB

Altair said:


> With gas prices being what they are he can actually afford to right now?


Vlad I think it going to have a rude awakening.

   Either being dragged with a blindfold out of bed from his bubble villa by internal forces
        or
   Seeing Russia crumble from outside weight in Response to the Ukraine - it is a line in the sand NATO cannot allow him to cross, or he won't stop till German (and maybe not then), and we will be in a massive war as opposed to a limited area dispute.

His one ally is an equally narcissistic ass in Belarus - and ally is a misnomer as for the most part Vlad has his hand up Lukashenko's ass to make his mouth move when Vlad talks.


----------



## Altair

KevinB said:


> Vlad I think it going to have a rude awakening.


The next time that happens will be the first.


KevinB said:


> Either being dragged with a blindfold out of bed from his bubble villa by internal forces


I see this as unlikely, unless he were to get massively unpopular.


KevinB said:


> or
> Seeing Russia crumble from outside weight in Response to the Ukraine - it is a line in the sand NATO cannot allow him to cross, or he won't stop till German (and maybe not then), and we will be in a massive war as opposed to a limited area dispute.


We let him take Crimea, we let Russian soldiers join "separatists" in Donbass, and the go to response to him have been ineffective sanctions.


KevinB said:


> His one ally is an equally narcissistic ass in Belarus - and ally is a misnomer as for the most part Vlad has his hand up Lukashenko's ass to make his mouth move when Vlad talks.


The west isn't going to fight Russia over Ukraine. They are both without allies but one is much bigger than the other.


----------



## KevinB

Altair said:


> The next time that happens will be the first.


He's had some stumbles over the years


Altair said:


> I see this as unlikely, unless he were to get massively unpopular.


 Russians only buy into Nationalism when it is in their best interests these days -- fuel, food etc price increases get them cranky faster than the old days.


Altair said:


> We let him take Crimea, we let Russian soldiers join "separatists" in Donbass, and the go to response to him have been ineffective sanctions.


At that time the US was distracted.  There is no mistaking his ambitions now, and the US is busy trying to get the EU to see that.


Altair said:


> The west isn't going to fight Russia over Ukraine. They are both without allies but one is much bigger than the other.


I think most in the West realize that if he isn't stopped in the Ukraine - that he won't stop his desire to return to the olden days of the USSR borders - the US Army, USAF etc have forces in the Ukraine, Sleepy Joe is getting a lot of political pressure here to increase our commitments.

Vlad ain't dumb - arrogant yes, but I suspect he knows at this point if push comes to shove - he's going to lose.
   I suspect he is going to wait until the eyes of the West are elsewhere - like dealing with China in Taiwan - and then he would act.


----------



## suffolkowner

I hope there can be a clear signal from NATO on Ukraine towards Russia but I haven't seen it yet.  While Putin continues to mouth off absurdities. The risk to Putin personally has to come from the inner circles and oligarchs when they begin to suffer. All dictators come to an end, very few get to retire to their palace in Sochi in peace


----------



## Altair

KevinB said:


> He's had some stumbles over the years


A few small ones, nothing big to write about though.


KevinB said:


> Russians only buy into Nationalism when it is in their best interests these days -- fuel, food etc price increases get them cranky faster than the old days.


The Russians dealt with the oil slump plus sanctions and Putins hold didn't waver. 

There would need to be the complete decoupling of the Russian economy from the west for that to happen but considering a large percentage of Europes oil and gas come from Russia that isn't going to happen.


KevinB said:


> At that time the US was distracted.  There is no mistaking his ambitions now, and the US is busy trying to get the EU to see that.


The Americans are pivoting to the Pacific and trying to deal with China. Don't think this isn't lost on Russia.


KevinB said:


> I think most in the West realize that if he isn't stopped in the Ukraine - that he won't stop his desire to return to the olden days of the USSR borders - the US Army, USAF etc have forces in the Ukraine, Sleepy Joe is getting a lot of political pressure here to increase our commitments.


The west has token forces in Ukraine. Token forces are not going to stop Russia if Russia is determined to take chunks of Ukraine. 


KevinB said:


> Vlad ain't dumb - arrogant yes, but I suspect he knows at this point if push comes to shove - he's going to lose.
> I suspect he is going to wait until the eyes of the West are elsewhere - like dealing with China in Taiwan - and then he would act.


I think the Russians and Chinese are banking on America being unable to deal with those two situations at once.

Probably just a matter of who blinks first between those two.


----------



## Altair

suffolkowner said:


> I hope there can be a clear signal from NATO on Ukraine towards Russia but I haven't seen it yet.  While Putin continues to mouth off absurdities. The risk to Putin personally has to come from the inner circles and oligarchs when they begin to suffer. All dictators come to an end, very few get to retire to their palace in Sochi in peace


Unpopular dictatorships come to an end.

So long as Putin can deliver he is safe. This is the country ruled by the Romanovs for 301 years.


----------



## The Bread Guy

KevinB said:


> ... I think most in the West realize that if he isn't stopped in the Ukraine - that he won't stop his desire to return to the olden days of the USSR borders ...


That assumes "most" in the West can name all the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries as part of understanding restoring the old USSR/Warsaw Pact.

The ones that are _members_ of NATO, I think Putin's not dumb enough to take direct military action against.  All sorts of ways to get them doing what Russia wants (or at least not doing what Russia doesn't want) short of sending in "polite green men" and tanks right behind.

NATO "allies" like Ukraine, though, if I had to bet a loonie, I'd bet it the same way Altair would re:  Western military forces not likely coming in to help stop Russia.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Putin is a bit like water, he will flow along the path of least resistance. but unlike water, he will help dig the ditch from one place to the next. Reinforcing their hold on Kalingrad will always be a primary political goal. There is always Georgia as well. He will have to keep an eye on the Taliban, they may play nice for a few years, but Islamic nutbars can't help themselves from doing something stupid eventually.


----------



## Kirkhill

Russia Has Deployed Its First Terminator Tanks

Russia has deployed its first regular unit of Terminator combat support tanks.

The first Terminator company – equipped with nine BMPT-72s – was assigned to the 90th Guards Tank Division, which is stationed in the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk areas of the Urals region in Central Russia, according to Russian news agency TASS.

While the BMPT-72 has been tested in Syria, equipping a regular army division with the vehicles also known as the Terminator 2 – indicates that the Russian Army believes the vehicle is ready for combat.

“The first regular company of nine tank support fighting vehicles in the Russian armed forces was introduced into the table of organization and equipment of a tank regiment of the military district’s armored division,” said Colonel-General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District.

The BMPT-72 is considered a “tank support combat vehicle,” which in this case means a tank is designed to support other tanks, as compared to traditional main battle tanks (MBT). The Terminator is built on the chassis of the ubiquitous T-72 main battle tank, of which 25,000 were built since the 1970s.  But instead of mounting a 125-millimeter cannon in a big turret, the BMPT-72 has a small turret armed with an array of weapons:  two 30-millimeter cannon, four Ataka antitank missiles, two rapid-fire 30-millimeter grenade launchers, and a heavy machine gun.

This diverse suite of weapons allows the Terminator to engage multiple types of targets, including tanks, infantry, fortifications, helicopters and low-flying aircraft. At the same time, using a tank chassis offers the heavy armored protection found on tank hulls, as well as the off-road mobility of a fully tracked vehicle.









						Russia Has Deployed Its First Terminator Tanks
					

Russia has deployed its first regular unit of Terminator combat support tanks. The first Terminator company – equipped with nine BMPT-72s – was assigned to the 90th Guards Tank Division.




					www.19fortyfive.com


----------



## Kirkhill

Russia has made no secret of its intent to de-escalate threats to the homeland by using tactical nuclear weapons against neighbouring states

"Putin developed Russia’s nuclear strategy, which allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in conventional war, when he was secretary of the Russian National Security Council Staff. Russian nuclear doctrine allows for the first use of nuclear weapons in “regional or even a local” war. Starting in 1999, Russia began to simulate the first use of nuclear weapons in large, theater-war exercises. Since 2000, all large-scale Russian military exercises have reportedly featured simulations of limited Russian nuclear strikes. Russia characterizes the first use of nuclear weapons as “de-escalation” of aggression."



			https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495933.2018.1526558
		


China appears to be following suit.

"Recently, China’s own nuclear breakout – termed "breathtaking" by USSTRATCOM Commander ADM Richard – has come to light as several previously unknown missile fields have revealed unexpected near-term strategic parity, together with a surge of unknown size in its theater nuclear forces. China has accelerated development, production and deployment of advanced, precision, theater-range, dual-capable missile systems while massively expanding its secretive nuclear warhead production site, Pingtung.  None of China’s 800+ nuclear weapons (our private, detailed estimate) are treaty accountable, and some of them may well soon be arming their newest hypersonic missiles."

The counter-move appears to be well under way.

In addition to the US Army re-deploying Theatre range missiles (albeit conventionally armed) similar in concept to the Pershings and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles of the Reagan era, the US is actively upgrading their "battlefield nukes" that fall outside the scope of SALT and START treaties.  Treaties that have been abrogated, ignored or never signed in any event.









						To Deter China, Invest in Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
					

Escalation. It’s Indiana Jones pulling out a revolver in response to the whirling blades of the Arabian fighter. It’s also Russia or China employing ultra-low-yield theater nuclear weapons




					www.realcleardefense.com
				












						Updated B61 nuclear warhead enters production - Breaking Defense
					

The new B61-12, with replaced or refurbished components, will be used by the F-15, F-16 and B-2, among others.




					breakingdefense.com
				




Just when you thought it was safe to go back to war.

(Ironic call heard in the 1980s - "Ban the bomb! Make the battlefield safe again.")


----------



## Jarnhamar

Combat Team Commanders course FTX Wainwright October 2021.

If the Russians attack our tanks at close range with rifles and rations our new commanders will be prepared.


----------



## Kirkhill

"B61 Mod 12
As of 2013 the Pentagon saw the B83 nuclear bomb as a "relic of the Cold War," believing that deploying a megaton-yield gravity bomb, the highest level nuclear weapon left in the U.S. inventory, to Europe is "inconceivable" at this point. It also can only be carried by the B-2 bomber, and integrating it onto additional aircraft would be costly. The Mod 12 upgrade is being pursued as a forward-deployed tactical/strategic nuclear weapon to protect NATO and Asian allies since it can be used from dual-capable fighter aircraft, as well as planned to arm the F-35 and B-21 Raider, and its lower yield options make it more flexible with less collateral effects. Recapitalizing the B61 is hoped to lead to the retirement of the B83, resulting in the elimination of the last megaton-yield U.S. bomb and leave the B61-series as the only U.S. gravity nuclear bomb.[45]

In 2013, the Pentagon and NNSA stated that if B61 refurbishment did not begin by 2019, components in the existing weapons could begin to fail.[46] In 2013 Tom Collina of the Arms Control Association said that the new development could complicate arms control efforts with Russia.[47]

In 2014, Congress slashed funding for the project and called for alternates to be studied.[48] In January 2014, former Air Force Chief of Staff Norton A. Schwartz stated that the Mod 12 nuclear bomb upgrade would have enhanced accuracy and a lower yield with less fallout compared to previous versions of the weapon. Accuracy has not been a guarantee for air-dropped nuclear weapons, so consequently large warheads were needed to effectively impact a target; the Mod 11 nuclear earth-penetrator is accurate to 110–170 meters from the desired detonation location, so it requires a 400-kiloton warhead. The Mod 12 is accurate to 30 meters from a target and only requires a 50-kiloton warhead. Schwartz believes that greater accuracy would both improve the weapon and create a different target set it can be useful against. An example is the higher-yield Mod 11's role of attacking underground bunkers that need a ground burst to create a crater and destroy it through the shockwave. A 50-kiloton yield detonating on the ground produces a crater with a radius of 30–68 meters, depending on the density of the surface, effectively putting the bunker within the circular error probability.[49]

In 2014 critics said that a more accurate and less destructive nuclear weapon would make leaders less cautious about deploying it, while Schwartz said it would deter adversaries more because the U.S. would be more willing to use it in situations where necessary. The improved accuracy would make it more effective than the previous Mod 3/4 currently deployed to the continent. F-16 and Panavia Tornado aircraft cannot interface with the new bomb due to electronic differences, but NATO countries buying the F-35 would be able to utilize it.[49] The first flight test for an inert Mod 12 was conducted in 2015, with a second successful test in August 2017.[50][51]

In November 2015, a test of the Mod 12 was conducted where the bomb penetrated underground, showing its potential as a nuclear earth-penetrator. Although ground penetration was not an objective of the Mod 12 upgrade, this could allow it to take up the penetrating mission of the Mod 11, which has no life-extension planned and will expire in the 2030s. Being able to penetrate underground increases its effectiveness against buried targets, as it more efficiently transmits explosive energy through enhanced ground-shock coupling, allowing its max yield of 50 kilotons underground to have the equivalent surface-burst capability of a 750 kt to 1.25 megaton weapon. The Mod 12's increased accuracy and earth-penetration capability allows a lower strike yield to be selected, reducing radioactive fallout risk, potentially making it more attractive to military planners.[52] However the Mod 12 does not have the reinforced structure of the Mod 11 which will be retained in service for the ground penetrating mission.[53]

The Mod 12 Life Extension Program continued in 2018 and on 29 June 2018 two successful non-nuclear system qualification flight tests at Tonopah Test Range were reported.[54] In October 2018, the Mod 12 guided tail-kit assembly received Milestone C approval to enter the production phase; the TKA went through the traditional test program in under 11 months, achieving a 100% success rate for all 31 bomb drops.[55] The B61-12 nuclear bomb completed its successful flight tests with the US Air Force’s F-15E in June 2020. It was dropped from above 25,000ft and was in the air for approximately 55 seconds before hitting the target.[56]"









						B61 nuclear bomb - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org
				




I presume that the 715 lb B61 is also compatible with various JDAM, JDAM-ER and various Glide Bomb kits giving precision strike capability from stand off ranges of greater than 100 km


----------



## suffolkowner

Kirkhill said:


> Russia Has Deployed Its First Terminator Tanks
> 
> Russia has deployed its first regular unit of Terminator combat support tanks.
> 
> The first Terminator company – equipped with nine BMPT-72s – was assigned to the 90th Guards Tank Division, which is stationed in the Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk areas of the Urals region in Central Russia, according to Russian news agency TASS.
> 
> While the BMPT-72 has been tested in Syria, equipping a regular army division with the vehicles also known as the Terminator 2 – indicates that the Russian Army believes the vehicle is ready for combat.
> 
> “The first regular company of nine tank support fighting vehicles in the Russian armed forces was introduced into the table of organization and equipment of a tank regiment of the military district’s armored division,” said Colonel-General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District.
> 
> The BMPT-72 is considered a “tank support combat vehicle,” which in this case means a tank is designed to support other tanks, as compared to traditional main battle tanks (MBT). The Terminator is built on the chassis of the ubiquitous T-72 main battle tank, of which 25,000 were built since the 1970s.  But instead of mounting a 125-millimeter cannon in a big turret, the BMPT-72 has a small turret armed with an array of weapons:  two 30-millimeter cannon, four Ataka antitank missiles, two rapid-fire 30-millimeter grenade launchers, and a heavy machine gun.
> 
> This diverse suite of weapons allows the Terminator to engage multiple types of targets, including tanks, infantry, fortifications, helicopters and low-flying aircraft. At the same time, using a tank chassis offers the heavy armored protection found on tank hulls, as well as the off-road mobility of a fully tracked vehicle.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Russia Has Deployed Its First Terminator Tanks
> 
> 
> Russia has deployed its first regular unit of Terminator combat support tanks. The first Terminator company – equipped with nine BMPT-72s – was assigned to the 90th Guards Tank Division.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.19fortyfive.com



and we can't even get any sort of Anti Tank or Air Defence turret for our LAV's. The BMPT-72 sounds like a real beast


----------



## Kirkhill

Jarnhamar said:


> Combat Team Commanders course FTX Wainwright October 2021.
> 
> If the Russians attack our tanks at close range with rifles and rations our new commanders will be prepared.
> 
> View attachment 67503



The infamous PB&J sticky bomb?


----------



## Kirkhill

The BMPT's ATAKA missile (4 per vehicle in ready to launch positions)

7.4 kg warhead
6 km range being extended to 10 km
SACLOS
15 seconds flight time to 6 km (25 seconds to 10 km?) estimates based on published 400 m/s average speed.

"The Ataka missile is stored in a glass reinforced plastic tube, which also acts as its launcher. The missile is reported to be considerably faster than the 9K114 Shturm, with longer range than the original version. It still uses radio command guidance, but the system has been improved when compared to the earlier 9K114 Shturm.

The system is carried by the multiple kinds of helicopters including the Mi-28 and Mi-35. It is also offered for ground vehicles like the BMPT and the 9P149.

There are three main missiles that are compatible with the launch system. The first is a two-stage anti-armour weapon that features a tandem warhead for dealing with add-on armor. The second variant of the missile – designated as 9M120F – has a thermobaric warhead for use against infantry positions and bunkers. The third variant of the 9M120 Ataka is the 9M220, which features a proximity fused expanding rod warhead, providing the missile with air-to-air capability against low- and slow-flying aircraft."









						9M120 Ataka - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## The Bread Guy

Bumping this one with an intriguing chart I found alleging all kindsa (at least alleged) Russian links/shenanigans re:  various media outlets ...

source


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Say what you want about Russian influenced media, but ANNA produced some of the best Urban Combat footage yet made, particularly in regards to Armour in urban ops.


----------



## Czech_pivo

Colin Parkinson said:


> Say what you want about Russian influenced media, but ANNA produced some of the best Urban Combat footage yet made, particularly in regards to Armour in urban ops.


I found it too painful to watch the first Russian/Chechen war footage. Those poor conscripts didn't deserve what happened to them.


----------



## Good2Golf

Czech_pivo said:


> I found it too painful to watch the first Russian/Chechen war footage. Those poor conscripts didn't deserve what happened to them.


You mean the Colombian Chechen neck-ties?  Yeah, it wasn’t pretty.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Czech_pivo said:


> I found it too painful to watch the first Russian/Chechen war footage. Those poor conscripts didn't deserve what happened to them.


agreed, but i was referring to the Syrian footage.


----------



## KevinB

Czech_pivo said:


> I found it too painful to watch the first Russian/Chechen war footage. Those poor conscripts didn't deserve what happened to them.


Having watched a lot of Afghanistan/Russian footage - there seems to be a theme.

My sympathies for Russian soldiers however are very thin.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Nice to see the old Soviet traditions (if the Suvorov books are to be believed, anyway) seem to carry on in the Russian army 








						'They Drink A Lot, Sell Their Fuel': Belarusians Give Low Marks To Russian Troops Deployed For Drills
					

Russian soldiers in southeastern Belarus "settled in the surrounding forests," one local resident said. "They drink a lot and sell a lot of their diesel fuel."




					www.rferl.org


----------



## Humphrey Bogart

If it's not apparent to anyone yet that Russia has made up their mind that the West is no friend of Russia and is actively engaged in operations against us, perhaps this will remind them:









						Why are French troops leaving Mali, and what will it mean for the region?
					

Will France's decision to remove 5,000 troops weaken the fight against Islamists in Africa's Sahel?



					www.bbc.com
				












						Diplomacy and Dividends: Who Really Controls the Wagner Group? - Foreign Policy Research Institute
					

Many expected the diplomatic relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States to fray when U.S. forces killed hundreds of Russians assaulting a U.S.-held Syrian outpost in early 2018. Yet, the Kremlin quickly distanced itself from the Russian bodies on the far-off Syrian...




					www.fpri.org
				










I think it's pretty clear that the Russian State has made the decision that the relationship with the rest of Europe and the United States will be adversarial going forward.


----------



## The Bread Guy

The Bread Guy said:


> Nice to see the old Soviet traditions (if the Suvorov books are to be believed, anyway) seem to carry on in the Russian army
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 'They Drink A Lot, Sell Their Fuel': Belarusians Give Low Marks To Russian Troops Deployed For Drills
> 
> 
> Russian soldiers in southeastern Belarus "settled in the surrounding forests," one local resident said. "They drink a lot and sell a lot of their diesel fuel."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.rferl.org


A more granular view, from this Tweeter

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1494655948912267264


----------



## The Bread Guy

An example from Baltic media of the tug of war caused by different interpretations of history in Latvia, especially regarding the USSR's "liberation" during WW2 ...


> Public gatherings on 9 May, when Russia celebrates Victory Day, will be considered support of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, said Chief of Latvian State Police Armands Ruks in an interview to LTV programme Rīta panorāma on Thursday, 24 March.
> 
> He said it is in the hands of Riga City Council – permitting or banning public events at Victory Park. Ruks also allowed there may be people who will go to the park even if events are cancelled, since people have the freedom of movement and freedom of speech. The chief of State Police reminded that freedom of speech is not universal and cannot go against general interests.
> 
> «All kinds of scenarios are considered. We are preparing and planning accordingly. But I would like to invite people who come every year to commemorate the people who died in WWII, which is nothing bad in of itself, to understand that such gatherings and processions will be considered as support for Russia and Russian aggression,» said Ruks, adding that this may further fracture society ...


Another example:  in Poland, a local council decided to "de-communize" by taking down a monument to Soviet war dead (Google English from Polish), but Russia is launching a criminal investigation into the issue (see attached).


----------



## The Bread Guy

Remember this?


The Bread Guy said:


> Strange times -- RUS CBRN/NBC troops now appear to be disinfecting/sanitizing hot spots in Italy.
> 
> Attached photo caption:  "A *Russian Army specialist* walks outside the Honegger nursing home where 35 people have died so far from coronavirus in Albino, Italy, on March 28, 2020, amid the spread of the COVID-19 (new coronavirus) pandemic. (Piero CRUCIATTI / AFP)" (source)


Well, Italy is now having second thoughts about Russia's help during COVID








						Italian lawmakers probe Russian pandemic mission's motives
					

ROME (AP) — An Italian Parliament committee that deals with intelligence matters summoned former Premier Giuseppe Conte on Thursday over growing concerns that a Russian military and medical team sent to help Italy early in the COVID-19 pandemic was really on a spying mission.




					apnews.com


----------



## Altair

The Bread Guy said:


> A more granular view, from this Tweeter
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1494655948912267264


Shades of 1916, or rhyming with 1988?


----------



## Altair

Humphrey Bogart said:


> If it's not apparent to anyone yet that Russia has made up their mind that the West is no friend of Russia and is actively engaged in operations against us, perhaps this will remind them:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Why are French troops leaving Mali, and what will it mean for the region?
> 
> 
> Will France's decision to remove 5,000 troops weaken the fight against Islamists in Africa's Sahel?
> 
> 
> 
> www.bbc.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Diplomacy and Dividends: Who Really Controls the Wagner Group? - Foreign Policy Research Institute
> 
> 
> Many expected the diplomatic relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States to fray when U.S. forces killed hundreds of Russians assaulting a U.S.-held Syrian outpost in early 2018. Yet, the Kremlin quickly distanced itself from the Russian bodies on the far-off Syrian...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.fpri.org
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I think it's pretty clear that the Russian State has made the decision that the relationship with the rest of Europe and the United States will be adversarial going forward.


Is Cuba out of Russias orbit or stable enough to not need Wagner?


----------



## The Bread Guy

The Bread Guy said:


> An example from Baltic media of the tug of war caused by different interpretations of history in Latvia, especially regarding the USSR's "liberation" during WW2 ...
> 
> Another example:  in Poland, a local council decided to "de-communize" by taking down a monument to Soviet war dead (Google English from Polish), but Russia is launching a criminal investigation into the issue (see attached).


The other side of the same coin, this time for Latvia (where authorities are working towards dismantling a huge monument to, in their eyes, a former bad guy), who's miffed a Belgian community wants to take down a monument to the Latvian Legion.  This bit was the most interestingly worded version of this sort of ... organization ...


> ... The monument has caused controversy in Belgium as *the Latvian Legion was structurally part of the Waffen SS*. Belgium suffered greatly during the period of Nazi occupation, though no units of the Latvian Legion were involved in Belgium. Following protests about the monument last summer, an international panel of historians deemed the monument inappropriate ...


That bit in red is critical, given the same can't be said of some other German foreign legions of the time.


----------



## The Bread Guy

Shame ...








						Russian agent Kovtun, accused in spy poisoning, dead at 57
					

MOSCOW (AP) — Russian agent Dmitry Kovtun, who was accused by the U.K. authorities in the poisoning death of former spy Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006, has died at 57. Russian lawmaker Andrei Lugovoi, who also was accused by the U.K.




					apnews.com


----------



## McG

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1535652700209262593


----------



## KevinB

Replace 1471 with 2023...


----------



## Spencer100

KevinB said:


> Replace 1471 with 2023...


Funny.

Honest question.  Why the hate for Russia?  I get the Putin and team.  And I get the historical hate of the USSR and Communism.  But I think the West (for lack of a better term)  needs a strong Russia something.  There is a kingdom out there that does very much covet lands in Russia.  Also Russia could be an ally dealing in the Muslim world and Middle East.  I think that has been a great mistake of the last 20 years.  

How do we get the current Russia to feel safe and secure in their current borders?  The world would totally happy to see Russia just stay the size it is.   The other options of a China pushing North and West, Turkey going Ottoman v2, and other Muslim area carved off is not a great situation for the world.


----------



## KevinB

Spencer100 said:


> Funny.
> 
> Honest question.  Why the hate for Russia?  I get the Putin and team.  And I get the historical hate of the USSR and Communism.  But I think the West (for lack of a better term)  needs a strong Russia something.  There is a kingdom out there that does very much covet lands in Russia.  Also Russia could be an ally dealing in the Muslim world and Middle East.  I think that has been a great mistake of the last 20 years.
> 
> How do we get the current Russia to feel safe and secure in their current borders?  The world would totally happy to see Russia just stay the size it is.   The other options of a China pushing North and West, Turkey going Ottoman v2, and other Muslim area carved off is not a great situation for the world.


The Russians are doing that to themselves.  
   I’d love for a western learning Democratic Russia to exist, but the Russians need to fight Putin etc for that.


----------



## Good2Golf

Spencer100 said:


> Funny.
> 
> Honest question.  Why the hate for Russia?  I get the Putin and team.  And I get the historical hate of the USSR and Communism.  But I think the West (for lack of a better term)  needs a strong Russia something.  There is a kingdom out there that does very much covet lands in Russia.  Also Russia could be an ally dealing in the Muslim world and Middle East.  I think that has been a great mistake of the last 20 years.
> 
> How do we get the current Russia to feel safe and secure in their current borders?  The world would totally happy to see Russia just stay the size it is.   The other options of a China pushing North and West, Turkey going Ottoman v2, and other Muslim area carved off is not a great situation for the world.


Thought experiment:  Why the hate for Muslims?  Why the position that a nation that so blatantly disregards global order should be deferred to, even in cases where wide scale misery and suffering is inflicted by it towards others?


----------



## KevinB

At the end of the day, if the people of a country act a certain way, and blindly follow their leaders, they reap what the leader sows.  

Hate is a strong word, I don’t know many Russians personally enough to use the term hate.  That said I didn’t hate Iraqi or Afghans, even those who sometimes tried to kill me, one doesn’t need to hate someone personally to hate what their country is doing.  

Russia is behaving like a bully, that bully is going to take two to the back of the head pretty soon.  What happens then is the big question.  The West needs to step up faster and harder in Ukraine to hasten the Russian fall, BUT also needs to be ready and wiling to help Russia change after that.


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## Spencer100

Good2Golf said:


> Thought experiment:  Why the hate for Muslims?  Why the position that a nation that so blatantly disregards global order should be deferred to, even in cases where wide scale misery and suffering is inflicted by it towards others?


Badly worded on my part.  Erdogan seems to want the Ottoman Empire 2.0 but your mileage may vary.  The Muslim world in the former republics and in Russia have been suppressed for along time. The weakening of Moscow control would create much instability in Central Asia to the Caucasus.   The war with Armenia war with Azerbaijan is an example. Also of Turkeys involvement.  The "peacekeeping" mission in Kazakhstan just before the Ukrainian invasion was an example of Moscow keeping one of the Stans inline.  

My point was if Russia falls apart things start to look very dicey. But maybe it should.  I don't know.


----------



## Good2Golf

Interesting follow-on thought would be what would the influence of a more democratic Turkey be, throughout the Caucuses?  Perhaps not such a bad thing?


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## McG

Spencer100 said:


> The "peacekeeping" mission in Kazakhstan just before the Ukrainian invasion was an example of Moscow keeping one of the Stans inline.


Is it an example of Russia "keeping one of the Stans inline" or is it an example of Russia supporting friendly authoritarian regimes?


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## McG

Lebensraum is not so easy to take from Ukraine. Maybe some Anschluss in Belarus would be easier?


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1543040508640911361


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## MilEME09

McG said:


> Lebensraum is not so easy to take from Ukraine. Maybe some Anschluss in Belarus would be easier?
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1543040508640911361


Good luck with that, I doubt the average Belarusian actually wants Moscow in full control


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## Colin Parkinson

Hmm I wonder if we see a Cuban Blockade 2.0 in the future as Russia tries to set the US off balance?









						Russian Fuel Oil Cargo Arrives in Cuba as the Island Ramps Up Imports
					

A tanker carrying Russian fuel oil arrived in Cuba on Thursday, bringing supplies for the Caribbean nation's sputtering power plants…




					www.marinelink.com


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## OldSolduer

MilEME09 said:


> Good luck with that, I doubt the average Belarusian actually wants Moscow in full control


Yes IF they remember the last time Moscow ruled. Which was less than 35 years ago.


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## Kirkhill

This shouldn't be news.  The Russians have been at this since the Comintern in 1919.  Igor Gouzenko brought a taste of it to Canada in 1945.



> Russia has secretly funneled at least $300 million to foreign political parties and candidates in more than two dozen countries since 2014 in an attempt to shape political events beyond its borders, according to a new U.S. intelligence review.





			https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/13/united-states-russia-political-campaign/?utm_source=reddit.com
		










						Igor Gouzenko - Wikipedia
					






					en.wikipedia.org


----------



## Spencer100

It's not good to be above ground level in Russia anymore.  



			Top Russian aviation expert dies after reportedly ‘falling down’ stairs


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## YZT580

has anyone considered changing the title to Russia's path to the 18th century or such like


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## RangerRay

YZT580 said:


> has anyone considered changing the title to Russia's path to the 18th century or such like


Definitely has a Tsarist Russia 2.0 vibe to it.


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## suffolkowner

Well if the videos on the internet are anything to go by I can see why they were hesitant to mobilize. Grabbing people off the street, chaos,


----------



## McG

US blames Russia for attack on pipelines.








						US points finger at Russia over gas pipeline sabotage
					

US Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm tells the BBC its unlikely Nord Stream leaks are coincidence.



					www.bbc.com


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## McG

Ukraine is not the problem. The problem is in Russia.








						Opinion: There can be no end to this war that leaves Putin in power
					

The period we are now entering the most dangerous, with the most potential for catastrophe, in at least 60 years




					www.theglobeandmail.com


----------



## McG

How the Anti-war Camp Went Intellectually Bankrupt
					

Critics of U.S. foreign policy from both ends of the ideological spectrum have found common cause in supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.




					www.theatlantic.com


----------



## OldSolduer

McG said:


> Ukraine is not the problem. The problem is in Russia.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Opinion: There can be no end to this war that leaves Putin in power
> 
> 
> The period we are now entering the most dangerous, with the most potential for catastrophe, in at least 60 years
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.theglobeandmail.com


And the first problem - his first name is Vladimir - and he is only ONE problem.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Russians I know, call Putin and his cronies the "Pro-West appeasement party". They want a more nationalistic government, ready to defend Russia's interests and not to have massive amount of money and investments in the west.


----------



## McG

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1576238707656380417


----------



## McG

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1576307188091744256


----------



## Kirkhill

Results of the UN Vote on Russia in Ukraine


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1580290964165341185



Russian Allies voted with Russia (Belarus, N. Korea, Syria, Nicaragua)
Russian Friends took the Chinese position and abstained (The BRICS position)
Russian Associates took the Iranian position and did not vote.
Anti-Russians voted against Russia's invasion.

The cohesion of BRICS is noteworthy,  as is the loyalty of Nicaragua.


----------



## Kat Stevens

Kirkhill said:


> Results of the UN Vote on Russia in Ukraine
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1580290964165341185
> View attachment 74205
> 
> 
> Russian Allies voted with Russia (Belarus, N. Korea, Syria, Nicaragua)
> Russian Friends took the Chinese position and abstained (The BRICS position)
> Russian Associates took the Iranian position and did not vote.
> Anti-Russians voted against Russia's invasion.
> 
> The cohesion of BRICS is noteworthy,  as is the loyalty of Nicaragua.


"HALT! Or we will yell "HALT!" again!


----------



## Kirkhill

Kat Stevens said:


> "HALT! Or we will yell "HALT!" again!


There will be a strongly worded letter in your mailbox at the end of the month!


I don't expect the UN to do anything but I do find the voting patterns intriguing.  For example India-China-South Africa (BRICS) seems to be a stronger draw than India-Japan-Australia-US (The Quad).


----------



## GR66

Kirkhill said:


> Results of the UN Vote on Russia in Ukraine
> 
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1580290964165341185
> View attachment 74205
> 
> 
> Russian Allies voted with Russia (Belarus, N. Korea, Syria, Nicaragua)
> Russian Friends took the Chinese position and abstained (The BRICS position)
> Russian Associates took the Iranian position and did not vote.
> Anti-Russians voted against Russia's invasion.
> 
> The cohesion of BRICS is noteworthy,  as is the loyalty of Nicaragua.


Except of course the "B" in BRICS (Brazil) voted against Russia


----------



## KevinB

He’s making a list checking it twice, and going to JDAM the crap out of those No Voters later…

Nicaragua 
Syria 
Belarus 
North Korea are all getting Regime change in their stockings after Putin goes.


----------



## Good2Golf

Heck, even Iran chose to stop and tie its shoelace, instead of voting…


----------



## CBH99

KevinB said:


> He’s making a list checking it twice, and going to JDAM the crap out of those No Voters later…
> 
> Nicaragua
> Syria
> Belarus
> North Korea are all getting Regime change in their stockings after Putin goes.


Nicaragua - forgot it was even a country until just now 

Syria - that’s _sooooooooo 2018_ 

(But since it’s still fighting the same civil war it was in 2018, and nothing has really changed, sure!  JDAM that dickhead.)

Belarus - not sure we can JDAM a European country, even if they are ‘the last dictatorship’ in Europe…

(Kosovo was already mucked up when NATO got involved.  Scuff on the carpet was already there before we got there)

But if Ukraine’s recent concerns turn out to be true, Ukraine may take care of it sooner vs later…

North Korea - is that fat little dipshit still alive even?  If so, agreed.  JDAM em’.


I can be Santa’s little helper if he needs a hand getting ready for Christmas this year 🎅🏻


----------



## OldSolduer

KevinB said:


> He’s making a list checking it twice, and going to JDAM the crap out of those No Voters later…
> 
> Nicaragua
> Syria
> Belarus
> North Korea are all getting Regime change in their stockings after Putin goes.


North Korea might not. Mr Kim has a lock on the press there


----------



## KevinB

OldSolduer said:


> North Korea might not. Mr Kim has a lock on the press there


I wasn’t necessarily suggesting it was going to be spontaneous or internally driven.


----------



## OldSolduer

KevinB said:


> I wasn’t necessarily suggesting it was going to be spontaneous or internally driven.


Roger that


----------



## Journeyman

A good portion of those abstaining countries are having their own border-claim issues, and probably don't want a precedent of a stern UN finger-wagging if their territorial dealings are deemed inappropriate (eg - India/Pakistan). Interesting that Thailand abstained, yet the other side of their 'border issues,' Myanmar, voted in favour.   🤷‍♂️


----------



## Colin Parkinson

Cuba was also abstaining which I found interesting


----------



## KevinB

Colin Parkinson said:


> Cuba was also abstaining which I found interesting


Cuba I suspect has little interest generating rate from us, when their godfather is doing a shit job in Ukraine...
@Journeyman I suspect several countries abstained when it was clear the motion was a majority and they didn't want to unduly ruffle the Russians.

Belarus, well Luka is clinging to power by his short and curlies, and knows if VVP removes his troops, he's going to folks -- he pushed his chips to stake Vlad, and is nothing more than a sock puppet now -- I expect there will come a time, when Vlad tries to order Belarus troops over the border, but I'm not sure that would end positively for either Vlad or Luka (and I expect Luka has made that clear to Vlad).

Iran and Venezuela where the odd ones, I think they knew that voting either way was going to be bad for them, and the "I forgot to set my alarm clock for the meeting" routine gives them an out to both sides.


----------



## McG

This article takes a long meander before getting to its point, but suggests that maybe it is time we just label the current Russian regime as fascists.

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1585431616129753088


----------



## Kat Stevens

McG said:


> This article takes a long meander before getting to its point, but suggests that maybe it is time we just label the current Russian regime as fascists.
> 
> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1585431616129753088


He's a Putinist, plain and simple.


----------



## McG

Looks like Putin doesn’t think he has imposed war on enough countries. The heat is being turned up in Moldova.




__





						Loading...
					





					www.washingtonpost.com
				



This is not a regime that can be trusted to negotiate in good faith.


----------



## daftandbarmy

McG said:


> Looks like Putin doesn’t think he has imposed war on enough countries. The heat is being turned up in Moldova.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> __
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Loading...
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.washingtonpost.com
> 
> 
> 
> 
> This is not a regime that can be trusted to negotiate in good faith.



Speaking of heat... 

It would be good to visit some of these horrors on Moscow on the 'tit for tat' principle:


__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1586035168543838208


----------



## GR66

This being reported in the Canadian Press:



> Indonesian officials: Russian FM Lavrov taken to hospital





> NUSA DUA, Indonesia (AP) — Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has been taken to the hospital after suffering a health problem following his arrival for the Group of 20 summit in Bali, Indonesian authorities said Monday.



Apparently being treated for heart issues according to unconfirmed reports.


----------



## tomydoom

GR66 said:


> This being reported in the Canadian Press:
> 
> ​
> Apparently being treated for heart issues according to unconfirmed reports.


It’s been denied by the Kremlin, so it must be true.


----------



## SeaKingTacco

GR66 said:


> This being reported in the Canadian Press:
> 
> ​
> Apparently being treated for heart issues according to unconfirmed reports.


Defecting?


----------



## Good2Golf

SeaKingTacco said:


> Defecting?


Defenestrating?


----------



## McG

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1592973179806699520


----------



## McG

Russia falls into recession as Western sanctions lead to a 4% fall in GDP
					

Russia has plunged into a recession after its economy shrank by 4% in the most recent financial quarter, with the effects of Western sanctions on trade now taking hold




					www.mirror.co.uk


----------



## KevinB

McG said:


> Russia falls into recession as Western sanctions lead to a 4% fall in GDP
> 
> 
> Russia has plunged into a recession after its economy shrank by 4% in the most recent financial quarter, with the effects of Western sanctions on trade now taking hold
> 
> 
> 
> 
> www.mirror.co.uk


Based on a few other articles it’s about to go into free fall.


----------



## McG

More observations of an unwell economy.

__ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1593852613103177730


----------



## Good2Golf

What’s RUS inflation rate?  This won’t help.


----------



## McG

It’s not pretty.








						Russia inflation monthly 2022 | Statista
					

In September 2022, consumer prices in Russia were nearly 14 percent higher than one year prior. The inflation rate decreased over the past month.




					www.statista.com


----------



## Kat Stevens

Just do what we do and print more money, it'll all work itself out in the end.


----------



## Colin Parkinson

McG said:


> __ https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1592973179806699520


One of the Russians I know feels these "Westernized" elites are the problem and once Russia has eradicated them, everything will get better. They do live in their own circular reality.


----------



## FJAG

Colin Parkinson said:


> One of the Russians I know feels these "Westernized" elites are the problem and once Russia has eradicated them, everything will get better. They do live in their own circular reality.


I don't see it any different from the rhetoric going around in the US and parts of Canada about the "corporate elites" and the "swamps that need draining" and the "globalists" and the "deep state" and a dozen other buzz words used by populists and nationalists.

I blame the internet and communications with no filters.

🍻


----------



## Furniture

FJAG said:


> I don't see it any different from the rhetoric going around in the US and parts of Canada about the "corporate elites" and the "swamps that need draining" and the "globalists" and the "deep state" and a dozen other buzz words used by populists and nationalists.
> 
> *I blame the internet and communications with no filters.*
> 
> 🍻


That's awfully "elitist" sounding... 😉🤣


----------



## Colin Parkinson

FJAG said:


> I blame the internet and communications with no filters.
> 
> 🍻


and a example of news with filters applied (He who controls the filters, controls the opinion)


----------

