# British / US Blue on Blue Incident - Merged



## The Rifleman (6 Feb 2007)

www.thesun.co.uk/artic...33,00.html


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## Trooper Hale (6 Feb 2007)

Wow, was i right in reading that no action was taken against the pilots? 
Simply put, wow. The whole video is just amazing to see all that taking place, they saw the orange panels too. Thats truely disgraceful.


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## The Rifleman (6 Feb 2007)

orange panels - maybe orange rockets. Who the f### has seen orange rockets on a military vehicle? Toy army truck maybe - did they use toys for AFV recognition before they deployed?


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## Trooper Hale (6 Feb 2007)

I was going to say the same thing but wasnt sure. Square Orange rockets must be a real danger for Aerial reservists. They seemed outragiously unproffessional. Seeing this sort of thing doesnt really inspire confidence no does it. Especially as the pentagon buried it for that last few years and it doesnt seem like the sods who did it got in any trouble. Truely shocking, especially if they'r really a Lt-Col and a Major, where'd they get the promotions? In Christmas Bon-Bons?


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## observor 69 (6 Feb 2007)

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/02/06/nmatty106.xml

The A-10 transcript provides more detail.


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## geo (6 Feb 2007)

Hmmm... friendly fire incidents will always bring acrimony.
The two tastes our troops have had of this particular fruit have been.... somewhat bitter.


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## Navy_Blue (6 Feb 2007)

I'm out of my lane a bit here.  I would appreciate any feed back from anyone in our AF as to what they would do if they had a wing man point out big orange panels on vehicles??  Like a CF-18 pilot past or pressent or any fast movers for that matter.  

I do think they have to stop giving these national guard cowboys big toys.   

Call sign MANILA sounds like some sort of C&C he without question or confirmation said no friendlies in your area.  Instant reply.  Probably looked up at some big screen and if its on TV it must be true.  None of the call sign POPOV A-10's gave any indication they were in any sort of danger to the controllers.  Why not take a second to check with the Brit's.

When your C&C takes away the possibility of it being a friendly they started making crap up.  Orange rockets yeah those Iraqi's are trying to make us think they just have toy weapons. (And who the hell refers to anyone they talk to on military channels as Dude???).  

This is one of many incidents now with blue on blue from National Guard pilots is there no will to change the way they operate.  If that happened in Canada we would probably disband the Sqn after a lengthy inquiry completely in the public view.

It disturbs me that they make us play in the same sandbox as these yahoos.


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## geo (6 Feb 2007)

Navyblue,
We are only as good as the information that is passed on to us at any one time.

The fact that they are National guard OR reserve pilots does not mean anything at all.  Regular airforce pilots do not have permanent billets and they are passed on to regional guard/reserve units to serve their career.  Most of these guys have tons of experience.  Unfortunately, if we do not have IFF capabilities for our vehicles while the US troops in the area do.... guess what. we risk becoming a target... nothing personal.  If tactical positioning is not being tracked by the FAC and data passed on to AWAC aircraft... the CAS aircraft are flying blind... and making good time


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## TangoTwoBravo (6 Feb 2007)

Navy Blue,

Without getting into the specifics of this case, be careful judging and applying blanket statements such as "cowboys" and "yahoos".  

Cheers


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## aesop081 (6 Feb 2007)

Navy_Blue said:
			
		

> I'm out of my lane a bit here.  I would appreciate any feed back from anyone in our AF as to what they would do if they had a wing man point out big orange panels on vehicles??  Like a CF-18 pilot past or pressent or any fast movers for that matter.
> 
> I do think they have to stop giving these national guard cowboys big toys.
> 
> ...



Navy_blue,

I dont fly CF-188s, but let me tell you, as someone who look at things on the ground from the air, that you are over generalizing and have no serious clue as to what you are saying.  Everything we do happens in a split second.  regardless of what actualy happenned, right or wrong, you are NOT in a position to call these guys "cowboys" and "yahoos".  You do NOT know what its like to make decisions at 300 knots, you do NOT know what the ground war looks like from above......i will catch crap for saying it, but you need to remain in your area of expertise.


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## 3rd Horseman (7 Feb 2007)

Navy Blue said,
“I'm out of my lane a bit here. I would appreciate any feed back from anyone in our AF as to what they would do if they had a wing man point out big orange panels on vehicles?? Like a CF-18 pilot past or pressent or any fast movers for that matter. “

Let me try and answer some of your questions. As a past FAC and Air controler and one who has flown in an F-18 on CAS mission I have a small insite.

“I do think they have to stop giving these national guard cowboys big toys.”

National Guard and Reserve AF are very capable and experienced pilots, I have FAC’d many of them in training and in combat, they are very professional if you can get by the easy going radio procedure.   

“Call sign MANILA sounds like some sort of C&C he without question or confirmation said no friendlies in your area. Instant reply. Probably looked up at some big screen and if its on TV it must be true. None of the call sign POPOV A-10's gave any indication they were in any sort of danger to the controllers. Why not take a second to check with the Brit's.”

The A-10s probably don’t have the freqs of the brits, the controller’s and the FACs do.

“When your C&C takes away the possibility of it being a friendly they started making crap up. Orange rockets yeah those Iraqi's are trying to make us think they just have toy weapons. (And who the hell refers to anyone they talk to on military channels as Dude???).”

As for the C&C ie Manila it would appear you have perceived the issue at the centre.

At XXX feet above the ground and flying at speed, running out of fuel, concerned for your ass, I cant comment , you would have to be there. On the Dude issue….well that’s the way they talk on the their means.

“This is one of many incidents now with blue on blue from National Guard pilots is there no will to change the way they operate. If that happened in Canada we would probably disband the Sqn after a lengthy inquiry completely in the public view.”

Here you are out of the lane.

“It disturbs me that they make us play in the same sandbox as these yahoos”

Also here, but I do understand the point your making even if it is being conveyed in a flippant way.


As a past FAC I have some thoughts on the issue.
Blue on Blue conflicts are a sad part of modern war, as they were in the past. It is tragic although not entirely preventable could be minimized more than it has through the adoption of new procedures. These procedures which have been called for in the past through AARs are not expensive nor do they require the purchase of new equipment like IFF. They are quite simple, just a change in sortie and FAC procedures.
They are in summary form as fols:

1. CAS sorties in the combat zone must have a Ground FAC, Air FACs are not enough on their own.
2. Non CAS hunter killer/seek and destroy sorties must never attack within the combat zone unless requested and accepted control by a ground FAC.
3. Other sorties that fly in the overall combat zone CAS mission packet but not directly assigned to CAS must never react to activities in the combat zone without clearance and accepted control by a ground FAC. 
4. BAI and deep strike sorties must never react to activities in the combat zone as they transit without clearance and accepted control by a ground FAC.

Simple rules but they make all the difference. Too bad they have not been adopted.


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## The Rifleman (7 Feb 2007)

the constant reference to orange marker panels - the ones friendlies use - the ones the US insisted we use in GW1 - surely something must have clicked in these cowboy's heads?

I know that the CAS means are secure but "dude"? Is this how we expect a professional officer and pilot to talk - like a surfer bum? It reeks of lack of professionalism and training, and the Yanks know it - probably why the tape was buried until the British media got hold of it


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## 3rd Horseman (7 Feb 2007)

The Rifleman said:
			
		

> the constant reference to orange marker panels - the ones friendlies use - the ones the US insisted we use in GW1 - surely something must have clicked in these cowboy's heads?



Rifleman,

  I hear ya, I was not going to comment on the issue above in my past post but the issue of red panel markers does require a specific reaction from the pilots and Air FACs. It would appear or should I say it is glaringly obvious they did not follow the drill.


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## time expired (7 Feb 2007)

I feel this looks as if it could have been another comms. f$&/§k up, if the controlling agency"Manila Hotel"
tells them there were no friendlies that far north, where did he get this info from, the Brits?from an
AWACS, Its very difficult to know given the info. available.But these pilots had every right to be very
suspicious of vehs. ahead of the FEBA,Orange panels or not. I also feel that interoperbility training
would be better done before opps.and not during,but of course trg. is always the first place to cut
if your politicos wish to save money.Another solution would be for allied counties to do their own
CAS,then yank bashers would have to find another area of dissatisfaction.
                                             Regards


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## 3rd Herd (7 Feb 2007)

Just to add to 3rd's thoughts and from the historical perspective there are several instances of Canadian ground forces specifically requesting that close air/tac not be provided by certain airforce squadrons due to their repeated ability in hitting friendly forces and missing the bad guys. With this incident in addition to the quotes from the tape already mentioned in this thread was "dude, we are going to jail". Sounds like an admission of culpability to me.


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## Navy_Blue (7 Feb 2007)

These pilots were not under any extreme stress.  No missiles where pointed at them no one was shooting at them.  If there was they had every right to turn and bring the wrath of god down on what ever chose to shoot at them.  They for all that the video showed they were close to ending the mission and looking for targets of opportunity.  POPOV35 "what do you think?" POPOV34 "I think I want to get those (orange) rockets."  



> Everything we do happens in a split second.  regardless of what actually happenned, right or wrong, you are NOT in a position to call these guys "cowboys" and "yahoos".  You do NOT know what its like to make decisions at 300 knots, you do NOT know what the ground war looks like from above......i will catch crap for saying it, but you need to remain in your area of expertise.


  

Thinking at 300knts or the speed of sound is what being fighter pilot is all about.  If you can't make the right choices you have no business being in a fighter.  That is why everyone isn't a fighter pilot or a doctor or an astronaut.  We have a right to expect accountability from people we pay to drop explosives from the sky.  In most military occupations we are required to make split second decision.  The difference between someone dieing, a compartment burning, flooding or the ship being dead in the water.  A fighter pilot has supposedly gone through allot of training and proved he could make the right choices with everything coming at him all the time.  That is why they get to sit in the cockpit.   I don't think these guys are villains or malicious but they made a mistake and didn't connect the dots.   

I have on occasion caught traffic between the ship and the Sea King.  Never once have I heard them refer to the ship or anyone as Dude.  I was an infantry signalman in the reserves, at times at the company level it was always pushed that people were listening.  These guys knew everything they said and did was being recorded if you went to the end POPOV35 asked if his wingers tape was still on.

The incident in AFG with the PPCLI the pilots failed to listen or read the posted information that we were training in the area.  In this case the pilots failed to listen, read or take note of the fact that they were fighting a war with Allied forces.  Not only that but remember that they conveniently paint big orange "don't hit me" signs on there equipment.  If there was any question, the information about the location of the suspect armour is almost more important than killing them.

This isn't about bashing yanks.  I have had the chance to work, talk and socialize with several armed forces now.  All NATO Allies or considered modern militarys'.  Consistently my impression of US service men has been below the others.  My unit was down south while I was in the reserves some fine US service men, in a mess asked a member of our unit why he was sitting with us.  He was black by the way.  I did a cross pole on NATO to the USS Mckinerny  (OHP).  They're Helo had a window heater catch fire and spider web the windscreen.  I was working with there Hull types so we did FOD rounds at a leasurly pace while watching the helo circle the ship anxious to land and finally some one said "I think they really want to land guys."  If that happened on our ship we would most likely go to emergency flying stations.  In an other experience an officer came up to me in the Gulf and asked about a duty driver for Commander Soandso.  I replied that I wasn't keeping track of US vehicles.  Looking at me in my NCD's (HMCS MONTREAL Crest) and standing beside a Canadian warship she said "Oh your not an American??"    There are many more stories that are third person so I will not go into it.   

Most people I talk to who look up to the US military justify it by saying its so big or they have some excellent equipment.  That is no different than playing with the slightly stupid rich kid on the street but only because he has cool toys.  There are always exceptions and I have met some very switched on US soldiers and sailors but they are few and far between.  I also believe US service people truly have good intentions and for the most part good people.  It doesn't forgive ignorance and lack of any situational awareness.


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## TangoTwoBravo (7 Feb 2007)

Navy_Blue said:
			
		

> This isn't about bashing yanks.  I have had the chance to work, talk and socialize with several armed forces now.  All NATO Allies or considered modern militarys'.  Consistently my impression of US service men has been below the others.  My unit was down south while I was in the reserves some fine US service men, in a mess asked a member of our unit why he was sitting with us.  He was black by the way.  I did a cross pole on NATO to the USS Mckinerny  (OHP).  They're Helo had a window heater catch fire and spider web the windscreen.  I was working with there Hull types so we did FOD rounds at a leasurly pace while watching the helo circle the ship anxious to land and finally some one said "I think they really want to land guys."  If that happened on our ship we would most likely go to emergency flying stations.  In an other experience an officer came up to me in the Gulf and asked about a duty driver for Commander Soandso.  I replied that I wasn't keeping track of US vehicles.  Looking at me in my NCD's (HMCS MONTREAL Crest) and standing beside a Canadian warship she said "Oh your not an American??"    There are many more stories that are third person so I will not go into it.



The rest of your paragraph doesn't accord with your lead-in.  You do appear to be "yank-bashing."  I have served with soldiers from the US Army in combat and been supported by their aircraft (a variety of types) and I do not share your views.  I've had an pair of A-10s deliver fires on a positon quite close to me, and they were very concerned about fratricide.  This incident is tragic and obviously mistakes were made, but you are generalizing about a huge group of people.  The US are not the only ones who have blue-on-blue.

Cheers


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## aesop081 (7 Feb 2007)

Navy_Blue said:
			
		

> Thinking at 300knts or the speed of sound is what being fighter pilot is all about.  If you can't make the right choices you have no business being in a fighter.  That is why everyone isn't a fighter pilot or a doctor or an astronaut.  We have a right to expect accountability from people we pay to drop explosives from the sky.  In most military occupations we are required to make split second decision.  The difference between someone dieing, a compartment burning, flooding or the ship being dead in the water.  A fighter pilot has supposedly gone through allot of training and proved he could make the right choices with everything coming at him all the time.  That is why they get to sit in the cockpit.   I* don't think these guys are villains or malicious but they made a mistake and didn't connect the dots.    *



Feeew....thanks for starightening me out there...i dont know what i was thinking  :

Now, about the part highlighted in red.  Because you think they didnt connect the dots, it gives you the right to call them "yahoos" and "cowboys" ? don't tell me you have never once in your career failed to connect dots ? And what dots would those be ?

Orange panels ? Is that some sort of fool-proof identification ?

"No freindlies this far north" ?


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## Navy_Blue (7 Feb 2007)

Its not meant to be bashing its my opinion based on my experience which seems is different from yours. Bashing would be implying they are inherently evil and bent on world domination. Something I don't believe.  I know the US is not the only one that has friendly fire incidents.  I understand that by shear numbers in a theater would dictate a higher % of blue on blue. IT is still not right and should never be accepted as crap happens. We're in the 21st century folks.  

From my experiences all in none combat mostly training situations there people do not compare to our armed forces, not even close.  A human life in the CF is worth infinitely more then one in the US. I'll say it again these guys were not bad people prison is not the answer discharge is not the answer take there wings and put them in training billets. They have to live with it forever and the rest of there organization could learn from them.

Orange panels are fool poof enough for the US to request them.  

These men knew what they did from the second they got word the Brits where in the area.  They knew what an orange placard meant before they did it.  MANILA told them no friendlies but they still knew and they were there looking at them.   

I will take my comments of Cowboys and Yahoos back it was uncalled for and I apologize if I offended anyone.  I just believe incidents like these could be lessend if the will was there.


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## The Rifleman (8 Feb 2007)

Navy Blue - no need to apolagise, the Pilots in this instance were cowboys. We know they are not all like that. And this from yesterdays press makes it even worse:


THE pilot in the “friendly fire” horror is now in charge of training other US fliers to kill, The Sun can reveal.

The airman, nicknamed Skeeter, was promoted to Colonel with the Air National Guard’s A10 tankbuster training wing at a top US base.

He teaches novices how to dive and strafe targets, as he did in the attack that killed Lance Cpl of Horse Matty Hull.

We showed Matty’s widow Susan the video of the attack, and she said: “Finally I am seeing my husband die at the hands of two imbeciles.” She added: “I am really grateful to The Sun for exposing this.

“I always knew there was something seriously wrong with the circumstances surrounding Matty’s death.”

Yesterday, we shocked the world by publishing the tape at the heart of the incident — filmed from inside the pilot’s A10. It shows the airman — whose Skeeter nickname is US slang for mosquito — break all the rules to shoot up the four vehicle-strong Household Cavalry convoy. He was in radio contact with a colleague flying alongside.

The attack took place on March 28, 2003, seven days into the invasion of Iraq. Skeeter, a member of the 190th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron of the Idaho Air National Guard, *was flying his very first combat mission.*

That was despite being a military pilot for more than 20 years.

A US Air Force Brigadier General did conduct an inquiry behind closed doors into what went wrong. Its findings were never released. But The Sun has learned that Skeeter and his wingman were cleared of any wrongdoing, with neither pilot being court martialled.

www.thesun.co.uk/artic...89,00.html


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## Navy_Blue (8 Feb 2007)

Wow...thats all I have to say.


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## geo (8 Feb 2007)

Hmmm.... Considering that the vehicles were from "the Blues" and considering that same said unit now have some "Royals" in their ranks, I shudder at the thought that Skeeter could have "stung" the Royal family - if the incident was repeated round about now.

Somehow,  think that things would haven't gone as smoothly for the ANG pilots career.

However,  I still go back to the main point that the AWACS, AND Command & Control just weren't happening that day (same as our blue on blue blowout in '02).  Even if the pilots were on their 1st sortie, the Air controllers should have zeroed in on the "orange panel" thing the minute it was blabbed on the air.

IMHO, don't shoot the pilot.... time to have a real serious talk with the controllers who are riding in the virtual back seat of each aircraft.


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## 3rd Horseman (8 Feb 2007)

geo said:
			
		

> IMHO, don't shoot the pilot.... time to have a real serious talk with the controllers who are riding in the virtual back seat of each aircraft.



  Geo has a very good point, although we all appear to agree that the A-10s are wrong and screwed the pouch, they are only part of the chain. As I said in an earlier post the problem is procedure. If one looks very close at all the FF incidents the errors would have been caught had the procedures been changed to the Ground FAC points I raised several posts ago. We (the FAC community) had this resolved we thought in 91-95 but in the intervening years 96 to 01 the whole program went for a sleeper as war again disappeared from our tours. With Iraq and A stan it would appear we are slowly relearning our weakness, problem is that I have not seen any changes moving towards fixing it.

  Rifleman, On the SUN media thing, I am surprised the widow did not know how her husband died or am I getting the wrong slant from the reporter.

edit spell check


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## The Rifleman (8 Feb 2007)

She knew it was a Blue on Blue alright - just not the details


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## FormerHorseGuard (8 Feb 2007)

i hope lessons are learned from these accidents or  what ever you want to call them, i think a lot more training as to be done on afv rec and some sort of marking system has to be in place....a huge white star was used in WW 2 on equipment, and stripes on the aircraft to help the people relaize what was there. 
something has to be made to work and prevent this sort of thing


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## The Rifleman (9 Feb 2007)

click on this link to see the extent of the damage to the AFV's

http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2007060452,00.html


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## geo (9 Feb 2007)

Hmmm.... Can only imagine the extent of pressure Canada applied on the US for them to have dealt with our 1st blue on blue (PPCLI) incident.  The US military pert well clipped the wings of those two "good old boys" ..... while "nada" was done about this one?

Why was this dealt with differently?


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## The Rifleman (9 Feb 2007)

The Yanks don't seem to be improving - 


*Police Killed In Blunder*
Updated: 14:00, Friday February 09, 2007

American helicopters have mistakenly launched a deadly attack on Kurdish positions in Northern Iraq, reports have said.

At least five police officers were killed.

American officials said the helicopter crews believed they had been targeting Al Qaeda guerrillas.

The US military said the attack was launched after soldiers identified armed men in a bunker near a building which they thought was being used for bomb-making.

The troops called for the men to put down their weapons in Arabic and Kurdish and fired warning shots, a spokesman said.

Helicopters fired at the bunker, killing the five men and detaining nine others who were later identified as Kurdish officers.

Officials with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the party headed by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said the helicopters had hit a guard post.

news.sky.com/skynews/a...74,00.html


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## geo (9 Feb 2007)

After having lost several helicopters since Jan 1st, I venture to think that the jockeys are somewhat "jumpy".  However,  if a police station is occupying a bunker, I would have thought that people who need to know... would know... but I have been known to be wrong... though they should have (known I mean)


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## 3rd Herd (9 Feb 2007)

Begining of TAC Air: Some thoughts​
With the power of the press one only has to mention tank busting and readers immediately imagine one of two things. The first is of Oberst Rudel in his Ju. 87 flying low over the Russian steppes above columns of burning Russian tanks. One the opposite side of the continent paintings glamorize Royal Air Force Typhoons hurtling rockets into stranded German armored columns. The second image is of the vaunted Fairchild A-10 flames blazing from it’s nose as Iraqi soldiers cower in foxholes. 

The true ancestor of the A-10 is actually thought to be the German He 129. Both are described as being a “purpose built flying gun platform designed to destroy tanks”. The He. 129 was armed with four 30 cm. forward firing cannons and was the evolutionary upgrade of Rudel’s Ju. 87. The employment of these aircraft due to the vastness of the Russian steppe and the doctrinal changes of the German high command resulted in the few aircraft available becoming a ‘fire brigade’. Rushing from one break through to another. German doctrine was based on the perception that “tank where to small a target to hit effectively”(Muller 135) Further, that without the purpose built ‘gun platform’ the “Luftwaffe air armaments where unsuitable to the task” of stopping tanks(Muller 123). This doctrine therefore lead to the belief that the Luftwaffe was “more suited to an indirect interdiction role”.

The allied thought after the success of the “Huribuster” in the initial stages of the desert campaign was to develop a dedicated ground attack aircraft, enter the Typhoon. Purpose built with four 20 mm wing mounted cannons  and the ability to carry either bomb loads or rockets. Desmond Scott, a former Typhoon pilot and author offers these insights. An accurate placed bomb will flip a tank over, there is no need for a direct hit. A mixed flight of both rocket carrying and bomb carrying aircraft guaranteed the best chance of success. He also thought that the rockets carried were extremely effective and accurate.

From the ground perspective in Field of Fire  by Terry Copp it is noted that an examination of German fortifications in the D-day area showed little evidence of being hit by allied tactical air. Weather additionally contributed as low lying fog prevented target identification and or the aircraft themselves being able to take off from home bases. One only has to watch Clint Eastwood in the movie “Kelly’s Hero’s” to gain an accurate picture of the problems of TAC air hitting there own troops.

Sources:

Copp, Terry. Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003

Muller, Richard. The German Air War in Russia. Baltimore, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993

Scott Desmond. Typhoon Pilot. London, Random House, 1982


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## tomahawk6 (9 Feb 2007)

The Rifleman said:
			
		

> The Yanks don't seem to be improving -
> 
> 
> *Police Killed In Blunder*
> ...



I stand corrected. 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,251064,00.html



> The U.S. military said the attack was launched after ground forces identified armed men in a bunker near a building they thought was being used to make bombs. The troops called for the men to put down their weapons in Arabic and Kurdish and fired warning shots before helicopters fired at the bunker, the military said.


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## time expired (10 Feb 2007)

3rd Herd
           A couple of minor corrections to your informative post,the Typhoon was developed as a
fighter to specifically combat the FW 190 however the instillation of 4 20mm cannon in the wing
in an upright position led to overly thick wing, this led to dissapointing performance over 20000ft.
 plus the tail kept falling off.The RAF then used it as a ground attack aircraft and with the use of
air force FACs in direct contact with the pilots turned the "Tiffy" into the best allied ground attack
aircraft of the war.Incidentley they did fix the, tail falling off, problem.
Getting back to the subject of this thread,one does not hear many of these blue on blue problems
with the US naval air and none from USMC ,I suspect CAS is still not a job the USAF  wants to
 do,they did not want the A10 in the beginning and only accepted it to avoid it going to the US
Army and of course losing budget funds, and even after getting the aircraft were very slow in up
grading the electronic fit to make it a more capable CAS platform.This goes back to the Korean
war when the USAF where not trained to do CAS instead did intediction that is to attack the
enemy suppy lines at least 20 miles behind the FEBA,CAS however was the bread and butter of
Marine air and the US navy.This lack of CAS trg. led to plenty of blue on blue involving USAF
aircraft in Korea.
             Maybe this problem could be traced to earlier training errors as the the US army and
air force seem to have a very poor institutional memory.
                          Regards


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## 3rd Herd (10 Feb 2007)

time expired said:
			
		

> 3rd Herd
> A couple of minor corrections to your informative post,the Typhoon was developed as a
> fighter to specifically combat the FW 190 however the instillation of 4 20mm cannon in the wing
> in an upright position led to overly thick wing, this led to disappointing performance over 20000ft.
> ...



Time expired,
Thank you for your comments. First I am not trying a thread hijack but laying the ground work in a perspective for which members can understand the evolution of TAC air and close support in order to have a reasonable amount of information to make an 'informed' judgement about what is occurring today. While agreeing about the FW 190, the Tiffy was on the drawing board before the appearance of or mention of the FW 190 as a replacement for the Hurricane (Scott). Somewhat  of a evolutionary advancement. 

Back to the subject at hand.

As noted by Time expired on of the faults of the Tiffy was the tail section separating from the sircraft in a dive. I suspect this was due to  the airflow and compression resulting from the high rate of speed attained in a acute angle dive. I believe the P-47 employed by the United States suffered the same problems. What has this to do with the matter at hand ? Simply that  pilots where trying to accurately as possible place their ordnance without endangering friendly troops. Secondly, the projectiles leaving the aircraft travel in the same direction as the aircraft was flying at the moment of release. The Germans for example over came this problem in the JU. 87 with it's dive brakes and later the same application was fitted to the JU.88 in a dive bomber role. The latter American series of aircraft followed suit in this time era. As mentioned the next step was to control attacking and supportting aircraft by using another aircraft. Prior to this occurring though there was a restructuring in both British and German airforces. This was a result of exactly what we are discusing at present. Scott found through personal observation that the standard formation of twelve aircraft has too large a group to effectively control and according reduced the number of aircraft to eight. A practice that was soon adopted as standard protocol. Likewise Muller points to the same reorganization in some Luftwaffe squadrons.

The second adaptation on the Anglo side of this development was the formation of the "cab rank". Intially, the "cab rank" was controlled by a member of the attacking unit. Here again Scott illuminates the problem of command and control while also trying to fight the 'battle'. One solution was the assignment of a pilot to the ground forces with suitable means of communication and protection to control air support. Digressing for a moment there is an excellent photo of a command and control tank in one of the other threads with the comment "what good is a wooden gun on a tank" The other adaptation as mention by Time expired was the flying FAC. In this I do not mind being corrected on but I believe here again this was developed by the Anglo effort using Austers(?). While the Americans having a similar aircraft in the Piper cub. This aircraft to my knowledge was attached to artillery units to direct and control their fire and remained so for most of the war. But the British apparently had already saw the light and where using it to direct aircraft. At this junction in time from the German perspective this was not necessary as just about every armoured vehicle and transport was enemy and therefore a target. In conjunction at this time the Allies had near total air superiority. Ground attack could take place without having to worry about being attack by opposing fighters. These changes in doctrine resulting in more accurate, timely and effective support to the troops on the ground. 

With the Korean War the learned lesson's of WW2 were dusted off and the next step in control took place. From the commonwealth point of view the Harvard became the ideal. Intially used as a trainer for pilots having dual seats it was discovered improved control could be obtained by having the pilot concentrate on flying and the second seat carried the controller of the air support. Air ordnance was directed on target by marker rockets containing white phosphorous fired by the FAC aircraft. Hence the expression "hit my smoke". The use of the Harvard in this role comes from Blood On The Hills by David Burcuson. Also at this point in time another doctrinal question resurfaced. That of causality rates in the infantry formations and the availability of replacements. 

First appearing in WW2 the Anglo forces fresh with the memories of horrific slaughter in the trenches and the resulting public opinion sought to minimize rates. This leading to criticism of Montgomery in the Northwest Europe campaign of his tactics and his master plan. On the otherhand the Americans having forgotten James Brady's photographs of the Battle of Anteim where perfectly willing to accept a statical percentage of causalities due to 'friendly fire' in order to achieve the combat aim. This doctrine of acceptable causaltiles due to friendly fire or blue on blue became public knowledge with the publishing of the book Friendly Fire  by C.D.B. Bryan and a movie under the same title in 1979. Congressional hearings, public outcry and doctrinal development yet again.

Enough for now. And if any objects to this PM me and I will shut up.

Sources:

Burcuson, David. Blood On The Hills: The Canadian Army in Korea, Toronto: University Press, 2003

Bryan, C.D.B. Friendly Fire.Bantam; Reissue edition (June 1, 1982) 

Scott, Desmond. Typhoon Pilot London:Secker & Warburg, 1982

Stahl, P.W. KG 200:The True Story: London: Janes, 1981.


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## tomahawk6 (10 Feb 2007)

Fratricide is a fact of life in a combat zone. It can be minimized through intense training stressing ROC-V's.
But vehicles and troops in combat need to have markers. US vehicles have multiple markers from phoenix junior markers at a cost of $25 positioned on the vehicle antenna, they can be programmed to send out various codes so a commander is able to tell where each company is located on the battlefield.Phoenix junior lights are also carried by individual soldiers.Glow tape attached to the back of the helmet and on each shoulder.Soldiers also have IR strobes.

CIP's,combat identification panels,a 5 panel set for an Abrams costs $1200. A three panel set for a IFV around $500.Thermal identification panels are for air-to ground recognition and cost $125 per panel.

Dust degrades the CIP/TIP. Normal range from the air is around 12 k under good thermal conditions. Dust cuts that distance in half.Wiping the panels off just doesnt help.

In short some of these fratricide incidents occur because our allies lack these markers.There is an aspect of pilot error involved as well. The USAF has been extremely deadly in Afghanistan causing numerous casualties to US forces. The causes range from human error to lack of properly marked local vehicles the operators were using.For an army it is expensive to mark each vehicle so it can be identified by air and ground thermal devices.Not to mention providing multiple markers for each soldier so they can be seen by air assets and fellow soldiers on the ground.There is a measure of blame that has to be shouldered by the UK and Canadian governments when they send their troops onto the battlefield without these marking systems. The fratricide incident involving Canadian troops last year did have one positive,DND purchased IRR markers for their ground troops which should avoid future accidents.I doubt if UK infantry even have strobes due to the bean counters in Whitehall, but correct me if I am wrong.


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## 3rd Horseman (10 Feb 2007)

As usual 3rd Herd is giving us all a very good education, thanks for that it does help put the current state into perspective.

Tomahawk6
   Very valid and excellent points but they are technical solutions. I have been arguing a simple change in procedure, it is IMHO the simplest and quickest solution. If life were perfect the technical solutions combined with the procedural changes would be instituted together.


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## geo (10 Feb 2007)

T6... all valid points.  The fog of war says it all BUT,  as indicated at the start of this thread,  UK troops weree told that their vehicles had to have orange panel markers .... which they did.  Are the pilots at fault?  Are the AWAC controllers at fault?  Let's face it, in a fluid combat environment when the ground is "rich" in targets it is essential that everyone is in agreement on what is AND is not a recognized sign that we are the good guys.


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## Roy Harding (10 Feb 2007)

3rd Herd said:
			
		

> ...
> Enough for now. And if any objects to this PM me and I will shut up.
> 
> ...



3rd Herd:

Fascinating reading.  Don't stop.


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## geo (11 Feb 2007)

Why do you need em and let's give you a few you can share around?
- with the active deployment of some purple type trades, I think people are starting to see it "our" way.


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## 3rd Herd (11 Feb 2007)

Part Three​
Some back tracking to begin with to answer a few of the comments which have been posted here. The examples of the big white star on allied vehicles and the special white and black stripes on aircraft were a valid attempt to prevent blue on blue or ‘fratricide’ (thanks T-6 I had forgotten that word). Interestingly enough though the big white star became an excellent aiming point for a multitude of German anti-armour weapons. Easy to see through the haze of battle and prominently placed for ranging a first shot kill. Many tank crews obliterated the white star once this was realized or the star was unintentionally covered up in an upgrading of vehicle protection by accident. 

The white and black stripes on aircraft apparently did not help much either. I am surmising this development came out after the Scilly, Italy invasions. In that case naval vessels opened fire on the preinvasion forces airborne troop carriers. This had two results, casualties in the air and a wide dispersal of the airborne troops themselves which leads to various connotations. Jumping forward the same happened with the Normandy landings and naval gunners firing at their own transport with the same afore mentioned results. Now in reading after action reports one of the conclusions that could be reached is that there was considerable “buck fever” amongst the young gunners. We will come back to this term and I think it plays a great role in todays or this topics thread. In a strictly air to air context the stripes did not help much as with a little bit of inquisitive research anecdotal information abounds with blue on blue kills, most of which was over looked by historians at the time.

Also in the attempt to minimize casualties by air was the two minute release delay in the heavy or strategic bombing of German beachhead fortifications by radar. In an attempt to prevent an accidental slaughter from the air in turn led to a slaughter on the beach. Omaha beach as exemplified in the movies Longest Day (1962) and Saving Private Ryan have provided the public at large with very good visual examples. For those who prefer a textual based reference point, recent studies and their resulting books have come to this exact conclusion. In this case Terry Copp’s Fields of Fire serves as an excellent example.

Now we return to our regular feature in progress. T-6 has brought up the excellent example of technology primarily American developed and used to help alleviate this reoccurring problem. I feel that it is just more than a technological fix but requires a shift in doctrine which has been identified in prior conflict but not yet solved. The campaigns in Normandy during the Second World War illustrated the host of logistical and command and control problems of multi national forces engaged in combat. A prime illustration is the advance on Caen and the lack of movement of British forces when compared to gains achieved by the Canadian forces. In the command and control realm senior staff did not know what was actually happening or were units where. In the logistical sense British prudence could be seen as husbanding vital resources, troops. More recent example of this can be found in the Korea effort in which such Canadian commanders such as Rockingham and Stone refused to move into combat zones until certain conditions were met. These conditions ranged from securing proper equipment from American sources to the readiness of their own troops. At times their decisions where even at odds with members of the Canadian government. A thought which carries over to this day is “well since you have invited us to this conflict, how about some help in the equipment department”. And I use the term invited loosely as with both the Korean conflict and today’s adventure in Afghanistan considerable political pressure has been applied in securing ground troops from a multitude of nations. 

With the American doctrine of acceptable losses through ‘fratricide’ well known publicly through movies including Jack Nicholson’s famous line in A Few Good Men, “the truth, you can’t handle the truth” and supported by textual statements on internet sites such as "the Navy and Air Force air combat training force structure has been starved into decline. The implications are far reaching and long term: without the best possible, fully supported training, our pilots will, quite simply, not be the best. They will be, in fact they are now being, sent to combat theatres without meeting standards that were commonly met in the past and that current instructor personnel regard as minimal. In fact, in some respects current "standards" are inadequate. The implications for the lives of pilots and the ability of the US to achieve its own goals in a conflict are obvious. (Trip)

Leaving doubt about the abilities of those in the air is it little wonder there is public outcry in Canada and abroad when some of our highly valued limited resources are lost through an accident or mistake. In my mind losses due to accidents fall into a palatable if some what distasteful acceptance. Examples of such ‘accidents’ I define as very last minute obstruction of view, faulty munitions, mother nature’s divine interruption in a host of forms. Mistakes on the other hand are unforgivable. In that not all options were considered or employed to the extent of the professionalism of the person committing them. This was exemplified by the video footage quoted in this thread, “Dude, I think we are going to jail.” In closing, I particularly used the Trip report as it nicely fits into the ‘mistake’ in which four members of my former regiment lost their lives.

The end.

Sources:

Trip Report: Navy and Air Force Air Combat Training: http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/trip_rpt_act.htm

A Few Good Men. Reiner, Robert. 1992.

The Longest Day. Annakin, Ken . Marton, Andrew.1962

Saving Private Ryan. Speilberg Steven.1998.


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## geo (11 Feb 2007)

3rd  +1


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## time expired (11 Feb 2007)

3rd Herd
           Interesting posts,agree with most of your conclusions,however I still think the USAF has
serious problems with the CAS mission that are institutionaly and historically driven.During WW2
9th Air force was the USAFs tactical air arm in Europe and it concerned itself mainly with interdiction,
that is the destruction of enemy supplies and reenforcements well behind the FEBA,it never attained
the level of CAS support that 2TAFsupplied to Brit.and Can.armies.Look at the German attempt to
split the US armies at Mortain,2 TAFs Typhoons had to be called in and stopped the German armour
cold.
          After the war the USAF turned wholeheartedly to strategic bombing and Stategic Air Comd.
was formed its commander Gen.Lemay saw little need for tactical fighter aircraft and only grudgingly
allowed that maybe fighter aircraft would be needed to intercept incoming Russian bombers.This
regime almost convinced Secretary of Defence Johnson to strip the Navy of its carriers but a revolt
of the admirals caused the government to reconsider and a few carriers were saved.
         During the Korean war the USAF was illequiped and poorly trained to do CAS and had to
pull F51 Mustangs out or retirment to try to fill the gaps,a poor choice as the Mustang was very vulnerable due to its
 belly mounted radiator,.After the Chinese entered the conflict the allies initiated Operation
Strangle the aim was to use interdiction and strategic bombing to stop supplies from reaching the
enemy troops at the front this operation was a complete failure and the USAF returned to doing what it did best ,shooting down Migs in Mig alley,the interdiction campaign continued at a reduced level and the
USAF tried to improve its CAS performance and making more use of Moskito FACs,T6(Harvards), armed
with rockets for target marking. There were still problems however and in one incident Air force fighter
bombers hit the Argyll Sutherland Highlanders killing or wounding over a 150 Brits.
        By the time the Vietnam war rolled around Gen. Lemays diciples had all reached general officer rank
and many of these SAC attitudes prevailed, the Rolling Thunder ops. over North Vietnam must stand as
an example of how not to run an air interdiction campaign.Poor leadership both military and political
led this poor performance.In the South the USAF did much better using airborne FAC, but when reading
naratives by ground forces in this conflict one cannot help but get the feeling that the troops were more
comfortable with CAS from Marine or Navy air. The US Navy and Marines have special equipped ANGLICO
Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies which direct both gunfire and naval and marine air in support of 
ground forces,this seems to indicate a much more professional attitude to the CAS mission that seems 
to be still missing in the USAF.

  Ref: Going Downtown        Jack Broughton
         The Naval Air War In Korea       Richard P.Hallion
         The USAF In Korea          Robert F. Futrell


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## tomahawk6 (12 Feb 2007)

Fratricide is as real on the battlefield today as it was in the past. We use technology and ROC-V training to lessen the occurances but it will never ever prevent future instances. Human beings make mistakes plain and simple just as governments err. Blame the pilot who fires on friendly forces,but also blame the bean counters who decided it was too expensive to provide their troops with the technology that might avoid friendly fire.To the infantryman who is pinned down by heavy enemy fire with bullets and shrapnel flying through the air there is nothing so welcome as friendly aircraft rolling in to surpress the enemy fire. Without CAS far more of our friends would be dead today than the few that have died in these incidents. I view fraticide in the same category as road accidents in combat, helicopter crashes and other causes.Getting killed in a vehicle rollover is far more common than friendly fire incidents.All these deaths are preventable. The more you preach safety the less likelihood your unit will have an accidental death. This applies to training at home as it does in the sandbox.So if you get a chance to buy a zoomie a drink do it because he may be the guy that saves your platoon tomorrow.


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## 1feral1 (12 Feb 2007)

The Rifleman said:
			
		

> Navy Blue - no need to apolagise, the Pilots in this instance were cowboys. We know they are not all like that. And this from yesterdays press makes it even worse:



The press makes it worse?

Yes, they sensationalise everything that is negative, and report little on the positive. For them, its about ratings and yes $$$$.

In many ways the press are a bigger enemy that the bad guys. I have NO USE for the media period!

As for The Sun, its a tabloid, like the National Enquirer.

You want the near truth, divide by 3 or maybe 4 in this instance and you'll get it. I am not denying this unfortuante incident happened, but saying it is being used for media sensationalism.

Sadly blue on blue is a sad fact of life in any war, and it will continue to happen. People error, or ROEs dictate fate, and in operational circumstances with stress and ROEs etc, decisions to shoot/don't shoot have to be made instantly in many occasions.

We had a blue on blue with fatal results last month, and we were not cowboys! No OPSEC here - openly reported in the media in Australia and the USA, so no one is immune.

My 2 cents


Wes


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## Trip_Wire (12 Feb 2007)

time expired said:
			
		

> 3rd Herd
> Interesting posts,agree with most of your conclusions,however I still think the USAF has
> serious problems with the CAS mission that are institutionaly and historically driven.During WW2
> 9th Air force was the USAFs tactical air arm in Europe and it concerned itself mainly with interdiction,
> ...



As a combat Veteran of the Korean war, I must agree the USAF wan't the best at CAS, especially with the jet fighter/bombers of that era. The F-51s of the USAF and the South African AF did a fine job at CAS. As you indicte the USMC has always been the best at CAS, no matter what they fly. Their gull winged Corsairs did a VERY good job at CAS, which I experienced, as well as the SA Air force. The US Navy's Battleships were also a great source of fire support, especially when a USMC trained to use the support was attached to your unit.

The old Spad (A-1 Sky radier) in Vietnam was also a GREAT CAS aircraft.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3897/is_200408/ai_n9458172

The problem with the USAF is that nobody really likes to do CAS, everybody wants to be an ACE and shoot down enemy figters, etc. We need a dedicated aircraft and squardrons of pilots designed and trained to perform CAS. The insurgents were fighting in the GWOT have no fighter aircraft to shoot down; however, lots of people on the ground to destroy!


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## 3rd Herd (12 Feb 2007)

Time expired,
"I still think the USAF has serious problems with the CAS mission that are institutionally and historically driven" I do not disagree with this either but I would add that culture particularly American military culture and acceptable losses are still current doctrine. In conjunction Stedman states "despite the appearance of a harmonic doctrine in Vietnam, periodic evaluations of the state of the art suggest the doctrine remains a contested issue between the US Army and US Air Force." Interestingly though while researching for this thread I came across a US Navy website and have tried to go back and find it but the 'conclusion' 'was while every effort to avoid hitting friendly troops and civilians the mission comes first.' Mission historically defined as defined as the number of strikes carried out, ordnance dropped, BDA and the quantifiable body count. All needed for the successful climb up the promotion ladder. That is fine if you have a large standing army and a well developed reserve system but in a multi national task force all countries involved do not have this capability. As for the technological argument of better technology is needed this seems to be another block in tactical doctrine that the Americans in particular have not been able to wean themselves away from. The lesson of the French defeat in Indo China, the American's own defeat in Vietnam and the Soviets defeat in their excursion twice into Afghanistan bear witness.Mundane verses scientific technology. The only reasons the Soviets even 'won' in Chechnya was that they did what Nixon was unable to "bomb them back into the stone age" and to hell with world opinion. Photographs of Grozny after the Soviets had finished resembled German cities at the end of the Second world war.

 In this case and you will like this Wesley (Over There), foregin 'journalists' were encouraged to cover conflicts elsewhere in the world. This was achieved by accurate directed sniper fire and other not so subtle means such as "oops your vehicle just blew up". Quoting my kid brother who has extensive experience in covering small conflicts off the beaten path amongst other things, "they manipulated things so well that we could just not get insurance coverage for any amount" (an aside is the the higher your insurance rider they higher up your are in the journalistic pecking order). It is kind of nice to have a war inside a sealled country, no oversight to worry about.

 A quick peruse of journalled sources on the matter of modern Soviet doctrine of close air support particularly in Afghanistan revels some of the same problems we have been discusing so far. In that "the MiG-21s often fire from a range of about 2000 meters, which makes their strikes somewhat inaccurate and ineffective. This tactic, combined with the failure of many bombs to explode on impact and the failure of some cluster bombs to deploy and scatter, has at times rendered the Soviet fighter-bombers ineffective."(Nelson citing Hansen) Here again as with the Americans a technological fix was sought with the development  and introduction of "their new Su-25 Frogfoot fighter-bomber into the war.The Frogfoot, designed as a close-support aircraft, is similar in performance to the USAF A-10."(Nelson) though even with this technological leap Nelson states, "the use of forward air controllers (FACs), especially in the mode in which the United States used them in Vietnam, has been conspicuously absent (although, as noted previously, some helicopter FACs apparently have been used)." In his conclusion he notes that "exercises are good training, but real combat is the only true test of commanders, unit personnel, and equipment." And, I would add only if your training doctrine is correct. A further point Nelson brings forth in his conclusions is "gradually, the Soviets are learning the same hard lessons we learned in Vietnam. Fighting guerrilla forces with conventional forces is a long, arduous affair."

Further information on the Soviet perspective is illustrated by Steadman in that "even when modern sophisticated equipment is used, the Soviets believe that for air support of ground troops it is important to train pilots to navigate by landmarks, to search for targets visually, and to determine the distances to targets without technical aids." Of intrest is the discovery that during the Second world war "the Soviets limited such support to the first phase of offensive operations (air preparation), to the repulse of counterattacks, and to covering intervals between ground formations. Pilots seldom attacked targets within 10-15 kms of friendly forces."(Steadman citing Timokhovich) 

With the war in the Pacific, Japanese doctrine states "If the conditions of the battle permitted, the Army Air Force would provide strategic and tactical reconnaissance for the ground forces. The keynote was "Air Superiority: A Must Over the Battlefield." and that their usual air ground communications consisted of "a wireless platoon (two air-ground radios, one truck) was attached to division head quarters." (Steadman)

Sources:

Nelson, Denny R. Lieutenant Colonel USAF."Soviet Air Power:Tactics and Weapons Used in Afghanistan" January-February 1985 http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/jan-feb/nelson.html

Steadman, Kenneth A. LTC."A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT AIR-GROUND SUPPORT DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE IN WORLD WAR II:with an appendix on Current Soviet Close Air Support Doctrine"   
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/steadman/steadman.asp


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## 3rd Herd (12 Feb 2007)

Trip_Wire said:
			
		

> As a combat Veteran of the Korean war, I must agree the USAF wan't the best at CAS, especially with the jet fighter/bombers of that era. The F-51s of the USAF and the South African AF did a fine job at CAS. As you indicte the USMC has always been the best at CAS, no matter what they fly. Their gull winged Corsairs did a VERY good job at CAS, which I experienced, as well as the SA Air force. The US Navy's Battleships were also a great source of fire support, especially when a USMC trained to use the support was attached to your unit.
> 
> The old Spad (A-1 Sky radier) in Vietnam was also a GREAT CAS aircraft.
> 
> ...



I did not intentionally overlook the Vietnam conflict or the fantastic ability of the Spad. Very few aircraft are/where able to land beside a down comrade pick him up and fly back off into the wild blue. I simply stayed away from it due to the geographical nature of the country in that the heavy jungle coverage limited CAS. Your point of "nobody wants to move mud" is I think part of the problem. To my knowledge only the USMC has managed to solve this problem to a successful degree with the doctrine or philosophy of "rifleman first". The siege of Khe Sanh is another excellent example of CAS directed by on the ground USMC pilots and a well trained FAC. Unfortunately, the majority of those lessons seem to have fallen by the wayside or there just are not enough Marines around. Again the argument of not enough resources and the shame to lose carelessly the little we have.


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## time expired (13 Feb 2007)

3rd. Herd
             I must disagree with your implication that Nixons air assault on North Vietnam was in anyway
a failure,the Linebacker 2 operation was the most effective use of air power during the Vietman war.It
was everthing that Rolling Thunder wasnt, 11 days of intense unlimited air attack at the end of which
Haiphong port was closed,the railway lines to China destroyed,the previously formidable air defenses
had ceased to exist,as did oil reserves and electrical energy.This was attained at the cost of 5000 civilian
casualties and the loss of 15 B52s caused mainly by poor tactic,SAC Generals again. I would maintain
that if this air op. had taken place in 1968 right after Tet the doves in the North Vietnam gov.,and there
were a good number,would have fired Giap and sued for peace,ah hindsight.
             I am sorry if this has gone a little off thread but Ihope it was interesting to some,a bunch of
"pongos" discusing Air Strategy.
                                         Regards


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## 3rd Herd (15 Feb 2007)

Time Expired,
at the risk of digressing even further Linebacker was not CAS but used as an example of the failure of the lack competent  coherent developed CAS doctrine. If you are not trained well enough to hit the barn door then you might as well just take out the whole barn. As for us 'pongo's' discussing air strategy. Who flies home to a nice warm bed and who is residing in a nice warm bomb crater, due to the "oops" from above. Next, I remember being trained to call in support both arty and air and there are a few other "ground combat types"(not all of us are blessed enough to be infantry unfortunately) with the same experience. Some who have voiced an opinion in this thread have more than I. Perhaps, because at times I am so eloquent I chose to take the bull by the horn. But back to the matter at hand, I learned the procedure and the calls, nets, resources(aircraft, weapons loads etc.) never got a chance to use them for real though. But it was interesting though in all the sand table manovers more than 80% those above declined to come and play due to the "high threat environment". Such as hand helds, ZSU-23-4, SA 6 etc. The face saving acceptable excuse was they 'were conserving their resources for the 'big' push'. Point blank I was trained to "not count on air support" which was readily accepted. MY southern neighbours though in almost a hundred years of airwarfare have not improved much from throwing a brick or iron dart at the poor guys on the ground from a biplane tottering along at 80 miles an hour and throwing a 500lb bomb at 400 miles an hour at the same poor guys on the ground great grand kids and hitting the right great grand kids. Some of us pongos also take offense to those who do not check their posts for spacing of words, punctuation marks, run on sentences at least we know the right buttons to push prior to "bombs" away. And yes I am being a little cheeky.


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## aesop081 (15 Feb 2007)

I see we're pretty far off now, is this going somehwere anytime soon ?

army.ca staff


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## Petard (15 Feb 2007)

Maybe if there is a common thread here it is that historically the air force's focus on depth targets made it diffcult to adapt to the close fight. 
Since this incident occurred in March 2003, I am assuming the A10 pilots were operating when something more of a conventional war was taking place, but within the tragic events that occurred I would say the problem can be seen of  how top-down "netcentric" warfare is unable to cope with the exigencies of a battle transitioning from attacking strategic or operational targets to the tactical close fight. I would say this example is linked to the airforce role which has historically evolved to focus on the former two and is still having difficulty in dealing with the later.
If I'm reading it right the pilots were attacking targets of opportunity in support of an advancing ground force, eliminating as much of the threat and it's C2 as possible, well in advance so the ground force doesn't have to, and keep the momentum going. But references to adjusting artillery fire can be heard in their radio transmissions; the friendly forces couldn't have been too far away.
To me these pilots were trying to do what their training and doctrine had focused them to be doing, plus they had an additional worry of time running out; how many targets can they eliminate before breaking for home? Hence the urgency to engage one more.
Adding to the dilemma is the limitations of top-down control. The pilots were aware there might be friendlies near by and suspected as much, but to add to their confusion is the advice from their manila controller that there are no friendlies this far north (and I suspect he might have got confused himself by some of the cross-traffic talking about the friendly artillery fire at the same time as the pilots were trying to get information on the "trucks".) But they had a mission, driven home from historical years of evolution, to eliminate as much as possible the ground threat for their brothers in arms on the ground.
So they convinced themselves to attack. 
We can say easily now it was a terrible mistake, or for the want of few seconds it wouldn't have happened, or whatever, but I think underlying all of this is the limitations of the current system in dealing with the current operating environment. I see these tragic incidents as a clear example of the false belief that top down control, so essential and evolved during the cold war for focusing on coordinating attacks on depth targets, is flexible enough to respond to the nature of warfare now. We need to take a look back and relearn from the hard lessons that came from dealing with very similar problems, as happened in the hedgerows of Normandy, the Korean hills, and the asymmetric war of Vietnam. 
So, in a roundabout way, which happens so often around here, is that where this thread has been heading?


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## tomahawk6 (15 Feb 2007)

Petard there is nothing wrong with the way the US air forces[navy,marines.usaf]conduct the CAS mission.You can twist yourself into a pretzel over this issue if you want. The bottom line is that there have been accidental attacks on friendly forces.If you consider the sheer numbers of CAS hours flown, around 1.5 million,statistically the likelihood of getting hurt by friendly air is far lower. In fact I think you have a better chance of being killed/injured in a road accident or IED attack than by an errant CAS mission. As long as humans are in the loop there will be fratricide both on the ground and in the air. Going to war isnt like an FTX in the US or Canada. In the incidents I have studied the contributing causes of CAS fratricide are marking issues - ground forces lack the proper markers for night/low light operations, although I think this has been corrected.This doesnt mean the pilot gets a pass because he too is part of the problem.Its a chicken and the egg situation.If ground forces are not equiped to be seen from the air then that is a real problem. If your unit is about to be overrun by the enemy do you call for CAS danger close or take your chances ? 

If you want to blame the pilots in a case of fratricide fine.But dont make blanket statements condemning CAS. No other country has the experience that the US has in this field and believe it or not it saves alot of lives.


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## Petard (15 Feb 2007)

I'm not twisting anything, if anything I'm trying to make sense of the turns this thread has taken, perhaps it's my explanation that's too twisted.

As far as this specific incident I would say the aircraft were operating on the fringe of an area where better ground control was needed, and not just the top down approach that was happening.
I don't believe the pilots are deserving of some of the slamming that has been directed at them, here and on the Sun's web site.
When to switch or involve the ground forces directly in the use of CAS is what I was referring to in the hard lessons learned. IMO, considering their proximity to friendly forces, their mission should've been directed by a FAC.


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## 3rd Horseman (15 Feb 2007)

Petard may I be so bold as to correct your last sentence and say Ground FAC. I do believe that is what you intended since it would appear an Air FAC was involved in this incident.

T6 - I agree with most of what you say but I don't think the issue is resolvable by the ID tech stuff you suggest. It is all about the human factor as you have said and in this the solution appears. Ground FAC.....a human but the final say on the targets and the final word on control of CAS, without it you get what we are arguing about. Review each incident Canada has been in and all have been due to a lack of ground FACs. It would appear this Brit incident is the same. No Ground FAC increases Blue on Blue to a point of unacceptability no matter how many lives CAS saves.


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## 3rd Horseman (15 Feb 2007)

I repeat my solution, easy, cheap, effective. 



			
				3rd Horseman said:
			
		

> As a past FAC I have some thoughts on the issue.
> Blue on Blue conflicts are a sad part of modern war, as they were in the past. It is tragic although not entirely preventable could be minimized more than it has through the adoption of new procedures. These procedures which have been called for in the past through AARs are not expensive nor do they require the purchase of new equipment like IFF. They are quite simple, just a change in sortie and FAC procedures.
> They are in summary form as fols:
> 
> ...


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## aesop081 (16 Feb 2007)

I just love this one: http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/57584/post-528726/topicseen.html#new

I know tat at his point its all speculation but, 

nice how some are pretty quick to justify shooting on allies when it happens on the ground.......


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## time expired (16 Feb 2007)

PETARD
          Great post and for me that rounds this thread out very nicely.
                                              Regards


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## Trip_Wire (19 Feb 2007)

tomahawk6 said:
			
		

> Petard there is nothing wrong with the way the US air forces[navy,marines.usaf]conduct the CAS mission.You can twist yourself into a pretzel over this issue if you want. The bottom line is that there have been accidental attacks on friendly forces.If you consider the sheer numbers of CAS hours flown, around 1.5 million,statistically the likelihood of getting hurt by friendly air is far lower. In fact I think you have a better chance of being killed/injured in a road accident or IED attack than by an errant CAS mission. As long as humans are in the loop there will be fratricide both on the ground and in the air. Going to war isn't like an FTX in the US or Canada. In the incidents I have studied the contributing causes of CAS fratricide are marking issues - ground forces lack the proper markers for night/low light operations, although I think this has been corrected.This doesn't mean the pilot gets a pass because he too is part of the problem.Its a chicken and the egg situation.If ground forces are not equipped to be seen from the air then that is a real problem. If your unit is about to be overrun by the enemy do you call for CAS danger close or take your chances ?
> 
> 
> If you want to blame the pilots in a case of fratricide fine.But don't make blanket statements condemning CAS. No other country has the experience that the US has in this field and believe it or not it saves alot of lives.



Good post, I agree with you! I just wish that the USAF would take their roles as providers of CAS a wee bit, more seriously! I'd like to see more thinking at the top levels of the USAF adopting the USMC's views on CAS.

I see a real need at the top levels of the USAF to face the facts, we need to get a lot better at supplying CAS to ground units involved in small unit tactics fighting a 'low intensity' war. The time for dog fighting 'Aces,' is over and I don't see a big need for it to be the the primary need at the moment.

The USAF, has always fought tooth & nail to prevent the US Army from developing a fixed wing CAS ability, I wonder if that isn't wrong and the Army should devote pilots and aircraft suited to do CAS to the troops. We'll take the A-10s and pilots and look at other designs and improvements to really support ground units! Just humble opinion!


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## 3rd Herd (20 Feb 2007)

Trip_Wire said:
			
		

> Good post, I agree with you! I just wish that the USAF would take their roles as providers of CAS a wee bit, more seriously! I'd like to see more thinking at the top levels of the USAF adopting the USMC's views on CAS.
> 
> I see a real need at the top levels of the USAF to face the facts, we need to get a lot better at supplying CAS to ground units involved in small unit tactics fighting a 'low intensity' war. The time for dog fighting 'Aces,' is over  and I don't see a big need for it to be the the primary need at the moment.
> 
> The USAF, has always fought tooth & nail to prevent the US Army from developing a fixed wing CAS ability, I wonder if that isn't wrong and the Army should devote pilots and aircraft suited to do CAS to the troops. We'll take the A-10s  and pilots and look at other designs and improvements to really support ground units! Just humble opinion!



Trip_Wire,
+1 on your post. 
As I tried to illuminate through a historical capture of Close Air Support you have sucintly(?) captured two key points. One the days of dog fighting Aces are over and in fact have been over for twenty odd years. In spite of this no concreate doctrine has been advanced by the higher ups in the USAF. Maybe "LeMay" syndrome has just manifested itself in another form. 

As for the vaunted A 10, I am still of the opinion that it is a stop gap fix and has been so for the aforementioned twenty years. Designed to combat Soviet armoured formations rolling across the plains of Europe it's usefulness in that designated role has passed. A fact realized with the withdrawl of the plane from regular USAF formations and reassignment to Reserve formations. 

One has to question the disparity of flying time and expertise between regular and Reserve units and their ability to function in today's low intensity conflict. The Canadian military on the other hand has shown a spark of brilliance in the combining of pre deployment training between part time and full time units. I would suggest that the performance of Canadian units in the "Battle of the Medack Pocket" and other areas of the Yugoslavian conflict may have had something to do with this.

Lastly, given your profile information I think you under estimated the value of your opinion.


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## geo (20 Feb 2007)

3rd...
during GW1, A10s were an army resource that the USAF looked down upon.  They felt that their F whatevers could look after anything that needed to be done on the battlefield.  It stuck in their craw the devastation that the A10s inflicted upon the Republican guards.  

In order to get rid of it, they jockeyed around to get the A10s assigned to the USAF.  Once in the Airforce inventory, the A10s were relegated to the Res & NG formations.  Attrition has reduced the inventory - though nothing else has ben put on the table as a replacement - which they are not looking very hard to replace....

Only thing working as an alternative to the A10?.... the Harrier


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## 3rd Herd (20 Feb 2007)

Geo
as always feel free to correct where necessary. As to the Harrier I think several of us who have posted in this thread have alluded to it vis via the comments about the USMC. It would interesting to hear the opinion of some of those who have had experience with the Harrier. In this regard I am thinking of some of our members from the South Atlantic excursions. Also citing a more or less complete lack of  knowledge of up to date Harrier qualifications it would be interesting to find out the thoughts on several points. Ranging from the high altitudes, narrow canyons, limited visibility which the Soviets faced when attempting to perform CAS in Afghanistan. Further given the recent rumblings or down right sabre rattling coming out of Iran and their Republican Guard the A 10 yet again may fulfil it's role as a tank killer extraordinaire. But the fact of the matter is in low intensity conflict there has not been allot of thinking in the terms of CAS doctrine. The other esteemed 3rd posts reflect several excellent proposals based on experience.


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## TangoTwoBravo (20 Feb 2007)

I think that the A-10 has always belonged to the USAF, but I could be wrong.  The US Army owns very little in the way of "fixed wing."   

With regards to Harriers, we had UK Harriers (GR7s?) providing CAS overseas, along with USAF B1s, A-10s and some other systems.  By CAS I mean providing effects in support of troops in contact on the ground.  Those effects are usually in the form of bombs (JDAMs, Laser guided or otherwise), rockets, missiles or cannons but can also be non-kinetic (show of force).  The JDAM has changed the rules of the game somewhat.  I don't know if we called AH-64s "CAS", but they were a part of the picture as well.  All were effective, although each had its strengths and drawbacks.

My own thoughts are that friendly fire can happen with any technology, system or level of training.  This is especially true with aircraft, but it can also happen with ground forces.  Ground controllers for air strikes can certainly help, but that doesn't take away the chance.  

Vigourous efforts should still be made to reduce the likelihood of fratricide, but we should be realistic.  When you mix nationalities it can get even trickier.  Mixed nationalities and services can also make the reaction to the incident more strong. 

One thing to consider is that placing too many restrictions on enablers such as CAS can in turn lead to more casualties due to enemy action. 

Cheers

Red Five


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## geo (20 Feb 2007)

Just did my homework.... after the fact 
A10 is a USAF product.  
The first production A-10 flew in October 1975, and deliveries to the Air Force commenced in March 1976. The first squadron to use the A-10 went operational in October 1977. In total, 715 aircraft were produced, the last in 1984... and Gulf war 1 happened in 1991.


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## 3rd Herd (21 Feb 2007)

Geo:

"Because few of the high-speed fighters are forward deployed, they must orbit in preplanned locations, awaiting missions from ground commanders. The A-10 is forward deployed to Iraq at several locations but has relatively short loiter capability over a convoy or fixed location; furthermore, we must use many of these aircraft to provide necessary coverage during refueling. The A-10 is designed to provide CAS and convoy escort, but its slow speed, vulnerability to ground fire, and few numbers limit the aircraft to night time only missions of high priority."(Davis)

"The United States faces an enemy who avoids US strengths by utilizing lesser technology and asymmetric tactics. Only by turning to a propeller-driven CAS platform that can support the Army in its current mission will our country gain the upper hand." The author goes onto suggest an off the shelf aircraft such as the "T-6 Texan II, or something similar, might be a good start."(Davis) However, "The Air Force plans to replace the A-10 with the multi purpose F-35A and F-35B in the next 10 to 15 years When this happens there will be no dedicated aircraft designed to conduct." Contining Deyo argues" With the F-35A/B aircraft designated to replace the A-10, the Air Force risks repeating its history of trying to fill the CAS void with a multi-purpose aircraft. The danger of this is that the pilots of these new aircraft will not train sufficiently for CAS and the Air Force will once again be unprepared to provide CAS to the joint forces."(Deyo)

As for case studies in supporting his thesis Davis uses two; Vietnam and the Spad and one overlooked by us all the French and Algeria. Some interesting tactical innovations in the French campaign included the "use of forward-operating locations, often along the route of march,to rearm and refuel their aircraft so that a convoy would always have access to some form of on-hand air support." And that "tactical air command maintained centralized control to some extent, but execution remained extremely decentralized, allowing the ground commander to adjust to mission needs and keep aviation support on hand." In the realm of doctrine Dayo points out in regard to the branches of service in the United States, "unlike the other service’s tactical aviation, Marine aviation existed primarily for providing CAS to their ground forces." In the debate of accurate support or wide spread suppression based in the affair in Somalia, "The ground commanders were left to perform a mission without the required support because the political leadership was afraid of how the images of the resulting military action would appear on the news."(Deyo) 

A very interesting critique involving Operation Acconda is summarized, "CAS can provide a distinct advantage to a commander if used effectively. The effective use of CAS requires many elements to function correctly. One element is that doctrine must be followed when establishing command and control of CAS assets. Another element is the understanding commanders and planners must have of CAS effects and limitations. The last element is training. Many of the problems encountered in Anaconda could have been overcome with regular joint training of both ground and air components. Air Force and Army units get minimal joint training opportunities."(Deyo) Recommendations in the report compiled by Deyo are as follows; "the first recommendation for change is the Air Force must make CAS a higher priority, second recommendation is for the Army and the Air Force to make greater efforts to include CAS into its large force exercises, is to include a detachment of Air Force fighter aircraft in an Army UA when it deploys, lastly, failing to implement the previous recommendations, that the CAS mission should belong to one service."

In a three person study conducted by GruetzmacherJeffrey K. CDR, USN.,Holtery,Michelle Joerin.LTC , USA and Putney, Jonathan R. Maj., USAF it was found, "Should the U.S. military continue to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism with existing CAS doctrine and JTTP, additional fratricide will have a negative impact on the American will to fight. To reduce that potential, USJFCOM must take action by expanding joint doctrine and JTTP." Justifying that "Even one more friendly fire casualty due to faulty targeting is too high a price to pay when the solution to the problem appears to be readily at hand." (one of my major points) "While the use of precision-guided munitions is increasing, problems in close air support persist. Experienced pilots and ground controllers say this is largely due to insufficient training, inadequate communications and night vision gear, and outdated tactics and doctrine…. In an interim report in October 2000, the Joint Close Air Support Study reported that in 22 exercise battles involving 218 close air support missions, there were major problems in planning, coordination, training, and equipment…. Fewer than half of all ground-control teams conducted realistic training with ground troops present"

Source:



Source:
DAVIS, ARTHUR D."Back to the Basics An Aviation Solution to Counterinsurgent Warfare", Air University Press: Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, December 2005.

Deyo, Matthew S. BREAKING THE PARADIGM: THE CHALLENGE OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT".JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL. May 2005

CDR Jeffrey K. Gruetzmacher, USN, LTC Michelle Joerin Holtery, USA, Maj Jonathan R. Putney, USAF
FRATRICIDE: THE ULTIMATE COST OF JOINT INTEROPERABILITY FAILURE, Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Staff Officer School. 11 June 2002

Edit to add: I found a information pathway into the Defense Techinical Information Center: http://stinet.dtic.mil/


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## Blackadder1916 (16 Mar 2007)

http://ca.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-03-16T151815Z_01_L16613309_RTRIDST_0_NEWS-IRAQ-BRITAIN-INQUEST-COL.XML

Iraq Friendly Fire Death Unlawful: UK Coroner

By Peter Graff   Fri Mar 16, 2007 11:18 AM EDT

LONDON (Reuters) - A British coroner ruled on Friday that a U.S. friendly fire air strike that killed a British soldier was "criminal," a scathing verdict in a case that has exposed rifts between the Iraq allies.

A U.S. A-10 tankbuster attack plane killed Lance Corporal Matty Hull by firing on his convoy near Basra in the first week of the 2003 invasion, after the American pilots mistook the British convoy for Iraqis.

Washington has said its own investigation into the incident exonerated the pilots, while an earlier British military probe concluded "procedures were not followed" because the planes opened fire without seeking clearance from ground controllers.

Coroner Andrew Walker called the incident a crime.

"The attack on the convoy amounted to an assault. It was unlawful because there was no lawful reason for it and in that respect it was criminal," he said.

He said the planes were not in danger and the incident could not therefore be justified as self-defense.

The case has been covered extensively in British media, where the issue of friendly fire deaths has been a vivid one since the first Gulf War in 1991 when another U.S. A-10 killed nine British soldiers in a mistaken attack.

British commentators said Hull's death -- and the Pentagon's insistence that no one was to blame -- demonstrated that rules for U.S. pilots allow them to be more gung-ho than their British comrades, and a potential menace to allies and civilians.

Washington does not publish the "rules of engagement" that explain when its forces can fire, but strongly denies they behave irresponsibly. 

REMORSE
In a cockpit video, the U.S. pilots are repeatedly told there are no friendly vehicles in the area and can be heard convincing themselves that orange panels -- meant to mark the British vehicles as friendly -- were in fact orange Iraqi rocket launchers. They then open fire without seeking permission.

The coroner and Hull's family also repeatedly accused Washington of trying to hide details from the inquest. At one point Walker suspended the inquest when Washington refused to allow him to see the cockpit video.

The inquest resumed after a British newspaper leaked the video, and Washington later said the coroner could see it. But parts of the transcript of the U.S. probe remained blacked out.

*Hull's widow said she did not want criminal or disciplinary action to be taken against the American pilots.*

"I hope that they are at peace with themselves and they can move on in their lives," Susan Hull told reporters. "I'm sure that they are feeling remorse for what they did."

The Ministry of Defense said in a statement it was carefully considering the coroner's comments and apologized for the "confusion and upset" caused over the handling of the video.

Susan Hull said the lack of cooperation from the United States throughout the trial had been "very disappointing."

No American witnesses gave evidence.

But the video footage -- which was played out on television -- gave a graphic account of the incident. One of the pilots could be heard weeping after they realized what they had done.

"We're in jail, dude," one of them says.

(Additional reporting by Michael Holden, Paul Hughes and Katherine Baldwin)


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