# The Oka Crisis



## Canuck725 (1 Apr 2005)

Anyone has any info on the 1990 Oka crisis? I read a book by a WO from the Vandoos named Gagnon, but I would appreciate getting more info.


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## pbi (2 Apr 2005)

The 1990 Oka crisis was known in the Army as OP SALON. This op, the largest military operation in Aid to the Civil Power since OP GINGER (the 1970 October FLQ crisis), was conducted in response to a request for assistance from the Quebec Government, after the Surete du Quebec (the QPP) found itself unable to deal with the situation confronting it at the aboriginal reserve located at Oka near Montreal.

While there are still many stories floating around about what happened, I was attending Army Staff College in Kingston around the time it took place, and was fortunate enough to receive a briefing to our class from the then-CLS, LGen Foster. It was very interesting, not the least for the incompetence displayed on the part of the QPP (a force with a number of blots on its record...).

The natives, many of whom were quite well armed and were engaged in tobacco smuggling and other illegal activities, had fortified portions of their reserve in response to an earlier failed assault by the QPP at the site of a proposed development by the municipality of Oka, on what aboriginals claimed was their ground. The assault was a shambles: the QPP fired teargas but a number of the officers did not have respirators. In the confusion that followed, the only fatality occurred: a QPP constable who, IIRC, was shot by another QPP in error. The Indians easily resisted the assault. In due course the QPP realized that they needed help, and the process was initiated to request military assistance from the CDS via the Govt of Quebec.

The military force that was deployed consisted mainly of 5ieme GBMC from Valcartier and Gagetown, but it was a truly joint force as it included fully armed CF-18s, armed naval elements on the nearby St Lawrence, and other assets. Army assets included the full range of battalion weapons, artillery, tanks and AEVs. A perimeter was established around the Reserve and the famous stand off began. An interesting point made by the CLS was that in one case the Army negotiated to allow an aboriginal to be brought out of the Reserve to go to a local hospital. The condition from the Indian side was that he was to be given safe passage and not fall into the hands of the QPP. According to Gen Foster, the result was that the Indian was placed in the hospital, but guarded by soldiers _against_ the QPP!

There was quite a bit of sympathy for the aboriginals around the country, from the usual quarters but from some surprising ones as well: while I was at Staff College, the City Council of Kingston voted to send the aboriginals blankets and medicine (due to pressure from various left-wing types on and off Council). The military were of course made to look like fascist monsters but overall we conducted ourselves well, including at such potentially lethal incidents as the Mercier Bridge confrontation. In general IIRC the Army displayed a much higher level of discipline and competence than that shown by the hapless SduQ. (Who later on wanted to buy their own Leopards...scary!!)

The post-op analysis and intel stuff indicated that the Mohawks were well armed-there were reports of .50 cal, sniper weapons, and LAWs. Fortifications had been constructed, including propane cylinders wired to electrical initiator circuit. There were also persistent rumours that the local Mohawks had been reinforced by natives from the US who had US military experience.

Fortunately, the stand off ended without serious injury or death (less the one poor QPP) and offers a useful model to study ACP ops.

I'll never forget the comment made by a Botswanan Major who was sitting in the mess one afternoon and watching it on TV:

"_In my country we give them five minutes then we kill them all"_​
Lefty Canadians who still winge about the role of the military at Oka might want to consider how this event might have played out in 80% of the world, as opposed to the professional but forceful manner in which we managed it.

Cheers.


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## camochick (2 Apr 2005)

CBC has a bunch of stuff in their archives about the whole thing

http://archives.cbc.ca/300c.asp?IDCat=71&IDDos=99&IDLan=1&IDMenu=71

http://history.cbc.ca/history/webdr...1&episode_id=17&chapter_id=2&page_id=2&lang=E


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## x-grunt (2 Apr 2005)

Canuck725, there's a fair bit of info on the net about Oka. As an Aboriginal person who was involved on the very periphery of events, (I was no longer in the CF at that time) my take is the troops did a reasonable job at the barricades. Many of my Native friends disagree with me, but then as usual the recounting of these types of events gets polarized into "my side good - your side bad." On _both_ sides of the issue. 

So, I encourage you to read through some of what is available from both Military, mainstream and the Native perspective too. There is a heck of a lot more to this than "tobacco smuggling", which indeed was happening around that time but was NOT the cause of the crisis. Probably fueled it some though, esp. on the side of a very frustrated QPP, but that's pure speculation on my part. Kanehsatake has been a troubled place at times, both internally and with it's non-native neighbours. 

My favourite memory of the time was a quote from a Texan (on CBC perhaps?), who when he heard of the Army being sent in said "By gawd, you take yer golf real serious up there, don't you?" ( the trigger issue revolving around the building of a 9 hole golf course )


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## Haggis (2 Apr 2005)

x-grunt said:
			
		

> There is a heck of a lot more to this than "tobacco smuggling", which indeed was happening around that time but was NOT the cause of the crisis.



The expansion of the Oka municipal golf course onto land claimed by the Mohawk of Kahnesatake was the main irritant which sparked the crisis.  The Mohawk of Kahnanwake (just south of Montréal) blockaded the Mercier Bridge in sympathy with their Kahnesatake bretheren.  The Mercier Bridge is the principal commuter route for those travelling from the south shore into Montréal West and other West-Island communties.

Also at the same time, the police and Army were involved in troubles at the Mohawk Nation of Akwesasne near Cornwall, Ontario.  There, a battle had raged between pro and anti gambling factions over casinos on the Reserve.  Several hundred residents fled the reserve to Cornwall as gunbattles between the factions became all-night affairs.  Two natives were killed in gunbattles in early May 1990.  This resulted in over 500 RCMP, OPP, SQ and Canadian soldiers moving onto and around Akwesasne. The bulk withdrew in early June but some remained unitl December 1990.


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## Sputnik (4 Oct 2005)

I suggest that if you are interested you read People of the Pines by York and Pindera.  Although bias and sympathetic toward the Native "cause", it is a good overview of the events surrounding the conflict, the historical framework and the major events (told form a mostly Native view). Also, Johansen's Life and Death in Mohawk Country, and Hornug's One Nation Under the Gun.  I urge all of you who are interested NOT to take any past work at face value, there was/is a lot of disinformation out there including this "fact" that Cpl. Lemay was shot by his own SQ force. NOT TRUE.  The coronor's report was finally released in 1994 and it clearly states that it was NOT an SQ bullet and narrowed the shooter down to 3 people("Warriors") in the area of the lacrosse "rink" in the pines at Kanesatake.  Anyway, it is important to get the facts straight, if one want to know the truth as it were about Op SALON and Op FEATHER/AKWESASNE.  I beleive there is an independant Canadian film coming out soon and also a book from the army perspective using the info. now available.  The books mentioned above were all written in 1990-1991, so they did not have access to gov't and mil. docs.  Cheers.


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## Old Sweat (4 Oct 2005)

I was in J3 Plans at NDHQ at the time, so was involved at the national level. This was the same time as the Allied build-up in response to the invasion of Iraq and it was quite remarkable how the NDHQ J Staff, despite the best efforts of the bureaucracy, was able to come to grips with the situation. I do not mean that facetiously.

As for Oka, one of the areas where the CF lost and never regained the initiative was in public affairs. While the natives had an articulate and attractive voice in the person of Ellen Gabriel, DND centralized in a very few senior officers, who were not readily available to the media. Thus, Ms Gabriel would appear, make a statement and make the news almost immediately, while the forces lagged and never sounded all that convincing. All reports of that time should be read with that in mind.


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## mdh (4 Oct 2005)

> As for Oka, one of the areas where the CF lost and never regained the initiative was in public affairs. While the natives had an articulate and attractive voice in the person of Ellen Gabriel, DND centralized in a very few senior officers, who were not readily available to the media. Thus, Ms Gabriel would appear, make a statement and make the news almost immediately, while the forces lagged and never sounded all that convincing. All reports of that time should be read with that in mind.



Old Sweat,

Interesting points - I seem to recall though that the CF had a pretty good spokesperson at Oka at the time - IIRC his name was Major J.P. Macdonald.

cheers, mdh


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## Old Sweat (4 Oct 2005)

MDH,

That is intersesting, as I have no recollection of him. There was a tendency to centralize the flow at NDHQ, which is unfortunate, as the troops on the scene of all ranks were extremely frank and believable. In fact, ome of the best advertisments for the CF was the clip of two heavily-armed Vandoos being berated and swatted by an angry native woman, and keeping their cool through the whole thing.


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## geo (4 Oct 2005)

one of the spokesmen for the CF at that time would have been Capt St Louis - a CFRd RSM

Probably one of the most memorable pics was of the R22R Cpl (Cloutier?) that "lasagna" tried to intimidate will screams, yells and wild agitation. The fella had worked on the R22R ceremonial guard and had mastered the trick of "zoning out".... which resulted in Lasagna getting even more irritated 

The Cpl was fastracked and given his MCpls. Some say that the public attention got to him - he was busted out of the army on Drug charges - did a couple of Porno flicks and pretty much faded away into the woodwork.


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## Sig_Des (4 Oct 2005)

geo said:
			
		

> one of the spokesmen for the CF at that time would have been Capt St Louis - a CFRd RSM
> 
> Probably one of the most memorable pics was of the R22R Cpl (Cloutier?) that "lasagna" tried to intimidate will screams, yells and wild agitation. The fella had worked on the R22R ceremonial guard and had mastered the trick of "zoning out".... which resulted in Lasagna getting even more irritated
> 
> The Cpl was fastracked and given his MCpls. Some say that the public attention got to him - he was busted out of the army on Drug charges - did a couple of Porno flicks and pretty much faded away into the woodwork.



LOL....wasn't that picture on the cover of TIMES?


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## geo (4 Oct 2005)

Ummm.... yeah... but he was wearing all his clothes at the time


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## mdh (4 Oct 2005)

The infamous Lasagna - aka Ronald Cross - passsed away in 1999



> Mohawk warrior in Oka crisis dies
> Last Updated Sun Nov 7 20:44:19 1999
> MONTREAL - Ronald Cross, known during the Oka crisis by his Mohawk nickname "Lasagna", died Monday night.
> 
> ...


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## squealiox (5 Oct 2005)

i do recall a rather silly documentary about the incident that the cbc ran a couple years later.
it included an interview with a person who said the army tried to "gas" her. she even showed a photo she took as evidence of the "poison gas bomb" -- which looked suspiciously like a used paraflare projectile.  :


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## Sputnik (5 Oct 2005)

Again, I urge you to look deeper into the "Crisis" as it were.  That famous picture is NOT Lasagna.  The Warrior pictured with Pte. Cloutier is one Brad Larocque, aka "Freddy Krueger."  He is an Ojibway from Weyburn Sask.  and at the time was an economics student at U of Sask.   This goes back to my point about many "myths" that are taken and assumed to be fact.  The CF did have media personnel and the two names mentioned are correct on the CF side.  Yes, the Mohawks did have a PR team that was based in the basement of the Treatment Centre, but was also being controlled from Akwesasne, until Loran Thompson came to Kanesatake in the flesh.  Ellen Gabriel, interestingly enough was chosen before the crisis started as a Clan Mother, as she was one of the few who had the ability to speak Englsih, French and Mohawk.  Having talked to her personally since, her "control" was not as cemented as it appeared on T.V.  In accordance, she had virtually no control over the events at Kahnawake.  There were numerous "groups" within the Mohawk community fighting for power and various agendas.  If all agreed then a unified front was portrayed; however, there was always the "well that person does not speak for me" when there were disagreements.  This was one of the hardest things for the CF to figure out.  The would negotiate with certain people only to find out that these people did not represent the "community" if you will, and then these "deals" would fall through, more so at Kahnawake.  The original group that occupied the Mercier Bridge were not part of the Warrior Society.  They actually had negotiations about power between themselves and the Kahnawake Warrior Society.  If anyone has specific questions please ask.  I am quite versed on the subject.  Regards.


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## Franko (5 Oct 2005)

All I can say is that I'm glad it ended before winter hit.

We had no winter clothes....and let me tell you it was freakin' cold in my Cougar.

Broken heater...no parts   :

Regards


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## geo (5 Oct 2005)

Franko,
Cold.... Pshaw.... twas a nice warm walk in the park (JK)... could abeen worse

Sputnik
I agree with you that there were (and still are) many divided groups in the 3 Mohawk communities. Each one had his or her own agenda and no one really spent much time trying to reach consensus before steping forward with that ''unified'' face.

Fortunately, calmer heads were able to gain control of the situation and, excl the SQ Cpl, no one lost his / her life in the event.

Chimo!


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## Haggis (5 Oct 2005)

geo said:
			
		

> excl the SQ Cpl, no one lost his / her life in the event.



Don't forget the two dead at Akwesasne: one "pro" and one "anti" Warrior, killed in late April and early May 1990.  Not "exactly" part of the Oka crisis but a catalyst of Mohawk resistance to outside interference in their affairs which carried over to Kahnesatake some weeks later. 

By and large the Mohawk are good people but are quite divided by politics, geography, blood and tradition.



			
				Franko said:
			
		

> ...and let me tell you it was freakin' cold in my Cougar.



It was freakin' cold doing fast boat patrols and resupply runs at Akwesasne in late October, too!


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## Bob F. (22 Nov 2005)

Cold in the Cougar, cold in the boat on the river...and also cold under the river, inside of a sinking Grizzly.

During Op Feather, 1RCR conducted float tests, and combat dives with our AVGP's. The float test was done first with a cable attached and only the drv and crw cmdr on board. Once a successful float test had been conducted, the Grizzly was then loaded up with troops for a combat dive. Our driver decided to enter the water at a rate of speed far in excess of the recommended one, allowing water to flow over the pointed front of the carrier and into the engine compartment before the trim vein could be lifted. This put an enormous amount of weight in the front of the carrier, which kept rolling into(and under) the St. Lawrence river. 
In the back, we didn't know this had happened until water started to pour in from the top of the turret...Oh boy, thats not supposed to happen!...went through my mind. At that point people started to try to get out, but the weight of the water prevented that option until the pressure was equalized on the inside. In other words, we had to wait for the thing to fill up before we could escape!
Getting out was difficult, we had on LPU's (life preserver units) which made the individual wider and therefor harder to get through the hatches. I literally kicked the first guy (a pl cmdr) through the hole to get him out. He had already struggled with the lever of the hatch trying to pull it with his hands, so I got my back on the seat and kicked the lever to open it. I didn't want to wait anymore, so putting the boots to him(to get him out) seemed like the thing to do. That part amuses me (a little bit) to this day. I didn't pull the tab to inflate my lpu because I thought we were much closer to the surface. That was an unfortunate miscalculation, and made for a unnecessarily long trip up. 
The rescue boat(s) picked us up and brought us to shore. I was walked over to a waiting passenger van, and given a blanket to warm up with but what I really wanted was a smoke! I had quit, over a year prior, but I must have smoked about five packs in the next hour alone.
I don't remember ever seeing that driver again. Wonder what happened with him.
If there are others who visit this site, who were also in that carrier gone submarine, feel free to PM me anytime.


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## geo (22 Nov 2005)

The resurection of the CF in the Country's good books started with events like Oka, Winnipeg.
I still find it irritating that the bureaucrats let old wounds fester to the point where an armed standoff did occur. Does not speak well for the competence of the people into whom we (the people) put our trust.


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## JackD (26 Nov 2005)

Mr. Bob F. I can understand your return to smoking afterwards. Three times I've broken through ice and but for getting one hand on the edge, would have been a goner for sure. Not a nice way to go. But why the combat swim practice for this exercise? It doesn't make much sense - i used to live in that area and while it's been some thirty odd years, that reserve isn't exactly on the water, and the St. Lawrence can have a powerful current, and the banks aren't exactly gentle... On the other hand I still can't understand why cf18's were used either. By the way, The upper hatches that allowed you out - do the Coyotes and LAV3s have these? Maybe that is why swimming a vehicle is no longer a design feature. What about deep wading - is there possibilities for this on these err.... newer vehicles?


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## Bob F. (26 Nov 2005)

Hello Jack. 
Each section was to be accompanied by a RCMP officer in the event that we would need to make arrests (properly in the public eye?) on the reserve. An effort was made to familiarize them with our vehicles, swimming and all. An other reason may have been to confuse our opponents,wrt our most likely avenue of approach (element of surprise). As I was just a Pte. I can only speculate about the strategy involved.
As far as the Coyotes and LAVIII are concerned, someone else will have to help out here. They were not yet in service by the time I left. 

PS.... ice fishing and playing hockey are not worth risking your life over...well not ice fishing anyway.  ;D


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## JackD (26 Nov 2005)

actually the first time I had a good dunking was as a kid on a toboggan and that got me petrified of deep water-which made life hell for me in Cornwallis - although I did and passed the swim test (forward roll-entry and drown - the instructor left the 'proof' after that statement...) and became of all things, a sapper - tootling about in those 1950 era assault boats and such throughout B.C. - always a three man job - one to try to get the bloody motor started again, one to try to re-inflate the air bladders, and one to bail and row.  Later it was as a Geologist's assistant in Northern  Manitoba and Saskatchewan...wearing and using army surplus equipment... I had one Sargeant-major with a sardonic sense of humour - who had me on the troop swim team and also put me in for a diver's course...My problem as I explained to him, was not the submerging part, it was the coming up for air thing. But back onto topic.. it seemed - note - I said seemed -  that that whole operation was a bit of a panic at the higher levels and it was more the common sense of the lower ranks that made the thing a success. Compared to the October Crisis,  it, at the time and in hindsight,  seemed to be a bit overblown - certainly so compared to what was to come in Bosnia - Mind you I'm making these statements as an observer far away from the scene.


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## Cloud Cover (26 Nov 2005)

JackD said:
			
		

> . On the other hand I still can't understand why cf18's were used either.




Just a quick point- there were also CF-5's performing high photo-recon.


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## Black Watch (26 Nov 2005)

As my uncle was working as an ops-O at MFCHQ, all I know is that security was tight on CFB Montreal and CFCHQ St-Hubert


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## geo (26 Nov 2005)

St Hubert was FMCHQ not MFCHQ (Force Mobile Command)

CFCHQ? I guess it coulda been refered to as being LFCHQ (Land Forces HQ)


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## Black Watch (26 Nov 2005)

geo said:
			
		

> St Hubert was FMCHQ not MFCHQ (Force Mobile Command)
> 
> CFCHQ? I guess it coulda been refered to as being LFCHQ (Land Forces HQ)


Canadian Forces Command Head Qaurters


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## JackD (27 Nov 2005)

Hi! Still, the interesting thing about this Oka "crisis" was that it got greater media attention - national and international - and generation of more "urban myths" about heavier weapons displayed (machine guns visible at observation posts, armoured vehicles) then during the FLQ crisis of the 60's and the October Crisis of the 70's - which you must admit were of far greater importance. I would love to know the politics behind the scene in deploying the armed forces and what other options were being considered before it blew over - perhaps HMCS Iroquois sailing up the Ste Lawrence to the St Catherine Locks?


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## geo (27 Nov 2005)

Black Watch said:
			
		

> Canadian Forces Command Head Qaurters


St Hubert was Mobile Command aka Land Forces Command

CFHQ, Canadian Forces ( army/Air/Navy) HQ was & is in Ottawa.


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## Black Watch (27 Nov 2005)

geo said:
			
		

> St Hubert was Mobile Command aka Land Forces Command
> 
> CFHQ, Canadian Forces ( army/Air/Navy) HQ was & is in Ottawa.


sorry, my bad...I just read the little plaque that was besides the main door (I took it with the permision of it's new owner, Ville de Longueil) and I misspeled. PLease forgive me...


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## Sputnik (10 Dec 2005)

Hello all.  I realize that some of you took part in Op SALON and or Op Feather renamed Op AKWESASNE in the middle for obvious reasons.  As mentioned earlier there are some serious myths surrounding these events.  There were problems long before 1989 and Military participation had been an option for quite awhile.  Also in 1993, there was an organized raid that was planned with joint RCMP, Military and JTF2 elements that was scheduled to go into Akwesasne and clean uip the smuggling of drugs, weapons, immigrants, cigarettes and booze.  For obvious reasons this was called off.  It was called Op CAMPUS/SCORPION SAXON.  I have been investigating all of these operations for the better part of 1.5 years.  There will be a book coming out soon, look for it!! I think more of the "truth" as it were will be told.  I will not say much more, other than that.  Oh, for those of you are still doubt the firepower possessed by the Mohawk Warriors? Don't...they had it all, and much more that was never actually released by the CF during or was found out after the fact.  My regards.


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## Haggis (10 Dec 2005)

Bob F. said:
			
		

> During Op Feather, 1RCR conducted float tests, and combat dives with our AVGP's. ...This put an enormous amount of weight in the front of the carrier, which kept rolling into(and under) the St. Lawrence river. ...If there are others who visit this site, who were also in that carrier gone submarine, feel free to PM me anytime.



I was on shore watching and the bunch of us altogether said "holy sh*t!" as she went down.  Then the shoreline was just pandemonium.  Three of my troops kept sentry on it  until it could be recovered the next day. Kinda boring watching the top 6 inches of the radio whips all night...


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## geo (11 Dec 2005)

Sputnik,
Nice to see someone talk without saying anything.
If you have something to say... say it... otherwise - why are you bothering?


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## UberCree (2 Jan 2006)

Very interesting thread.  I have a good friend that was inside the perimeter at Oka and have heard some very good stories.  
A movie was being made this summer about the crisis, as well there is someone at Kingston writing a thesis on the crisis that is doing some valuable research (Sputnik?).  Should make for a good book now that more information is available.  Bad part is that most of the warriors involved have died or committed suicide since 1990.


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## 3rd Herd (2 Jan 2006)

I have been investigating all of these operations for the better part of 1.5 years.  There will be a book coming out soon, look for it!! I think more of the "truth" as it were will be told.  

Only a year and a half of research, give me a break, unless of course you have a large research staff. I also assume you have someone current in the native languages as native history is primarily oral needed for the background of your "book" or are you just secondary sourcing and gossip mongering. The only problem with the truth is there are so many perspectives of it. I will look for your book right next to the National Enquire and other factual based readings next to the check out stand.


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## Lou-Dog (5 Jan 2006)

Here's a news flash for ya about oka;

                                                             Does anyone remember that pretty boy private who stood off with "Lasagna", the tough native??

 I recall that he later got out and made films, namely "Quebec Sexy Girls" in which he had a very different type of stand off with a pretty native actress....

 ......any truth to this??


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## PPCLI MCpl (5 Jan 2006)

geo said:
			
		

> one of the spokesmen for the CF at that time would have been Capt St Louis - a CFRd RSM
> 
> Probably one of the most memorable pics was of the R22R Cpl (Cloutier?) that "lasagna" tried to intimidate will screams, yells and wild agitation. The fella had worked on the R22R ceremonial guard and had mastered the trick of "zoning out".... which resulted in Lasagna getting even more irritated
> 
> The Cpl was fastracked and given his MCpls. Some say that the public attention got to him - he was busted out of the army on Drug charges - did a couple of Porno flicks and pretty much faded away into the woodwork.



Already answered...in this thread.


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## George Wallace (11 Jul 2010)

Reproduced under the Fair Dealings provisions of the Copyright Act.

*
Oka Crisis legacy questioned*
08/07/2010 11:49:19 PM
CTV.ca News Staff 


LINK 

*Twenty years after the Oka Crisis there are differing views over whether the relationship between the government and First Nations has improved.
*

Sunday marks two decades since the start of the 78-day-long standoff between Mohawks in the community of Kanesatake and police and the military.

The conflict in the community west of Montreal was sparked by plans to expand a golf course in the neighbouring community of Oka on land the Mohawk claimed was a traditional burial ground. A provincial police officer, Cpl. Marcel Lemay, was killed in gunfire during the early days of the crisis.

An agreement signed in Quebec City on Tuesday is an example of how relations have improved since 1990, said Federal Indian Affairs Minister Chuck Strahl. The agreement between the federal and provincial governments and the Assembly of First Nations in Quebec allows First Nations communities more power over the distribution of social assistance money, he said.

Although there are still more than 3,000 aboriginal land claims outstanding - including the one launched by the Mohawk of Kanesatake - Strahl said they are being dealt with in a better way.

In 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced a revamp of the federal land-claims process. The changes included $250 million a year for 10 years to help manage the backlog of claims, and the creation of an independent tribunal to make final decisions on disputes.

Twenty years ago, Strahl said, there was confrontation, not negotiation. "The federal government has been much quicker to recognize that claims exist," said Strahl. "[It] used to be [that] we were just in complete denial. We would just say 'No, we're not going to negotiate, we're not talking, there's nothing to talk about.'"

But the Quebec chief of the Assembly of First Nations, Ghislain Picard, said he has his doubts. Picard points to the number of outstanding land claims and to the Royal Commission Report on Aboriginal Peoples, which was set up after the Oka Crisis.

In 1996, the commission made more than 400 recommendations, including a 20-year agenda to "revitalize" First Nations communities and end the "staggering" human and financial cost of supporting them.

*'What has changed?'*

"What has changed since Oka?" asked Picard. "How many of those recommendations have been implemented?"

Tensions have recently flared again in Kanesatake over a developer's plan to build three homes on a site across the street from the pine forest where the standoff began. Taxes on the land are paid to the municipality of Oka. But members of the Mohawk community argue that the land belongs to them, as part of an ongoing claim.

Residents of Kanesatake have also sought a moratorium on a plan to extract and mill niobium in the region until the claim is resolved. Niobium is used in superconductors and in alloys such as high-strength steel for pipelines and bone implants.

The current grand chief of the Kanesatake Mohawk, Sohenrise Paul Nicholas, said there has been progress on the land claim, but at a snail's pace. "We are the point now where we are going to be starting discussion," said Nicholas.

That little has changed in two decades comes as no surprise to two key players in the Oka Crisis.

*'We never learn from history'*

"We never learn from history, do we?" John Ciaccia said with a sigh. The former Quebec native affairs minister was at the centre of the storm two decades ago. He was at odds with his own government and police, while scrambling to broker a deal and prevent further bloodshed.

In the months leading up to the crisis, Ciaccia pushed Ottawa to OK an agreement that would have let the disputed territory be acquired by the federal government and given over to the Kanesatake Mohawks.

Ciaccia's voice still chokes with anger and frustration as he recalls the events of that long summer.

Under police protection for much of the crisis, he was also branded a traitor by some of his then-colleagues. Ten years ago, he went public with his view that the blame for the crisis should be placed squarely on the governments of the time - the Quebec Liberal administration of Robert Bourassa and the federal Conservative government under Brian Mulroney.

"It was wrong to put the natives in that position," the retired politician maintains. "The whole crisis could have been avoided with common sense and respect for the native community."

*Ottawa blamed*

Even at the height of the crisis, he said, Ottawa refused to budge while he struggled to find common ground between the Mohawk leaders and the government. Ottawa dragged its heels, and continues to do so today, Ciaccia said.

It's an opinion echoed by Ellen Gabriel. In 1990, the then 31-year-old firebrand acted as chief Mohawk negotiator, working alongside Ciaccia to bring an end to the stalemate.

Now president of a native women's association, she says Oka's only legacy is a greater awareness of native issues across Canada. "If anything it was a waking up," she said, adding that people realized "in a simplified, clichéd way, there are still ongoing Indian wars."

The initial transfer of the Oka land took place in 1717, when France gave it over to a missionary group. "It's a 290-year-old fight," said Gabriel. "So history's not changing. It's business as usual as far as the government is concerned."

Kanesatake residents planned an evening of songs and poetry on Saturday and a march Sunday from Oka to the site of the protest camp where the crisis began. The marchers were to be joined by some Oka villagers and local farmers who share the opposition to the niobium mine.

All Quebecers have also been invited to the annual Powwow in the Mohawk community of Kahnawake, south of Montreal. Kahnawake's grand chief, Mike Delisle, and local Bloc Québécois MP Carole Freeman billed the event, running through the weekend, as an opportunity to heal scars that still remain following the crisis.

With files from The Canadian Press


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## Oldgateboatdriver (12 Jul 2010)

PBI, thank you for noting the naval element. Yes we were there too.

In the Navy, our nickname for Op SALON was the "other golf war", as the Navy was the lead element in the "Gulf War" that led to the liberation of Koweit, of course.

I must say it was an interesting set up, having to report both to Halifax and Montreal (location of Army command at the time). Unfortunately, we probably could not provide this type of assistance today, at least on the east side of Canada: The type of patrol vessels we used is no longer in service and there have been no replacement. MCDV's would be too large for the job and the Orca class are only available on the West coast.

As for the operation itself, no one so far has really done the honour to the masterful use of "threatened force" to achieve a peaceful objective that was used at the time. On the very first day that the  Army was to take over the SQ barricades, the commanding general walked over to the other side openly (for which move he was highly criticized in the Quebec papers), shook hand with the native leader that met him and informed him that basically, (1) he had a job to do, (2) He would do it no matter what, (3) under no circumstances would his people shoot first, (4) however, they would shoot last, and (he would inform them every time he was about to make a move so they would know exactly what was about to occur in front of them. After that, it would be up to the Mohawks to decide were they wanted to take this fight to.

He then did exactly what he said he would and, after every "confrontation" set up by the Mohawks for PR purposes, they backed up without making any trouble. Discipline held and won the day.


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## vonGarvin (12 Jul 2010)

After reading through this entire thread, I just thought I'd throw in my  :2c:, having been a MCpl Section 2IC for Op SALON.  

There is one event that summed it all up for me.  H Coy, 2 RCR had just been given the task to move to the Mercier Bridge.  I'm not sure of the background behind it, but there we were, all our M113's revving up, and then moving into the bridge area.  The platoon commander went to the confirmatory orders, and I was busy sorting out the section.  This lady came by, looking at us curiously and I waved hello.  She motioned for me to come over, so I did.  In talking, she asked if we were there to help, hinder or occupy.  I asked her what the problem was, and she mentioned that there had been a car stopping by the end of her driveway, a few young folks in it.  I didn't ask the history, or why they could be there, but since the police were non-existant on the reserve, she felt threatened.  I told her that I would keep an eye out for her.  I know that she didn't believe me.

Anyway, not half an hour later, a car drove to the end of her driveway, and stopped.  I had one of the privates check out the licence plate and record it (using binos, of course), and I went over.  I got within about five metres when they noted that I was coming over.  They sped out like Starsky and Hutch chasing down Huggy Bear's latest tip!  The lady came out within minutes, and we talked, and I assured her that we got his plate number.  Now I know that she believed me, and I could see relief in her face.

Another event that same day: a young local fellow came over when we were just setting up.  He asked us if we were from "...the RCR Regiment" (sic).  We said yes, and then he proceeded to shake our hands.  "You saved my life the other night," he said.  Turns out he was one of the local fellows we passed through the barricades into the reserve after they were being chased down by a mob of angry locals from outside the reserve.  They ended up torching his car (a beater, so he was out by 50 bucks or so! ;D) but he was quite happy to see us again.

So, yeah, it wasn't all about "us" vs "them" or "white" vs "red".


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## pbi (29 Jul 2010)

It's hard to realize this was 20 years ago. Our Army (and our world) have gone through an awful lot of changes since then, but I think that two things are still true. First, this country needs to do everything it can to help the First Nations get themselves sorted out, functional, and capable of setting and maintaining their own course into the future. If that means settling land claims quickly, in favour of First Nations, then get on with it. (We seem to have no worries that Americans, Brazilians, Chinese or other foreigners own all sorts of land in Canada-why shouldn't the aboriginals?)

Second, I believe that very few armies in the world could have handled a crisis like Oka, with its massive potential to go sideways into a bloodbath, as well as we did in 1990.  The combination of training, discipline, professionalism and (yes...it's true...) our experience on peace support operations all contributed to the existence of a force that had the inherent ability to carry a steel fist inside a velvet glove. We can still do that.

Cheers


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