# Great Canadian Military Leaders



## Canuck725 (21 Mar 2005)

The Yanks have George Patton and Ike, just for world war II,as well as Washington and Grant and the Brits have Montgomery, Nelson and Wellington. Who would be a great Canadian Military leader?Arthur Curie?
What do you think?

 Cheers


----------



## Canuck_25 (21 Mar 2005)

Canuck725 said:
			
		

> The Yanks have George Patton and Ike, just for world war II,as well as Washington and Grant and the Brits have Montgomery, Nelson and Wellington. Who would be a great Canadian Military leader?Arthur Curie?
> What do you think?
> 
> Cheers



 Yep, Arthur Currie is the only one i can think of. No one really that stands out in WW2 and post WW2


----------



## Michael Dorosh (21 Mar 2005)

Try reading a book or two.

Hoffmeister and Simonds come immediately to mind, but unfortunately you won't learn about them on A and E.  There are many others.  Rockingham is another one off the top of my head.


----------



## Edward Campbell (21 Mar 2005)

Currie, certainly.   I concur with Michael Dorosh re: Hoffmeister and Simonds (good, not great) and I would add Moncel, too.   Leonard Murray (Rear Admiral) may have been the most significant Canadian military leader - he was the only Canadian to hold a major _allied_ command - and Harry Lay, also Navy, deserves to be on any list.

We had too few air force officers in major command positions because we never had an air force formation above group and we had only a very, very few (one or two?) of those but we should not discount the organizational ability of the senior air force officers who organized and managed the Commonwealth Air Training Plan which was, after food and supplies, one of Canada's most important contributions to the war effort.

I'm not denigrating our combat efforts but:

"¢	The Royal Canadian Navy had to be withdrawn from combat midway through the war to be retrained - not the fault of the men in the ships, it was the product of inept leadership and too rapid expansion; and

"¢	The Canadian Army's tooth-to-tail ratio was scandalous - one field army and two corps for five combat divisions and a few independent tank brigades?   It was Andy McNaughton's _pique_ filled empire building at its worst.


----------



## Old Sweat (21 Mar 2005)

Currie stands alone at the top of a rather small pile. Simonds was good, but he was not in the same league. Hoffmeister commanded a division superbly, while Moncel and Rockingham were brigade commanders. They were not in the same category as Currie and Simonds, however talented they were.

There was another Canadian who commanded a theatre, although as an officer in the British army. Brigadier General Charles Dobell, a graduate of RMC from Quebec City, had served on the North-West Frontier and had been decorated as a leader of mounted infantry in the South African War. He had also served in Crete, North China and Nigeria. As he was fluently billingual, he was accepted by the French to command the Cameroons Expeditionary Force in the First World War. While he hardly was one of history's great captains, he was successful in his efforts. 

I first became aware of him while researching my book on the Canadians in the South African War, as he had been attached to 2 RCR for a short period.


----------



## pbi (21 Mar 2005)

> The Canadian Army's tooth-to-tail ratio was scandalous â â€œ one field army and two corps for five combat divisions and a few independent tank brigades?   It was Andy McNaughton's pique filled empire building at its worst.



Tooth to tail isn't always bad-usually it ensures that the teeth have a high level of support and can be sustained in ops to their max potential. The tail lets the teeth focus on tactical combat operations.Armies with weak or defective logistic/C3I structures are constantly being hampered by those shortfalls-the German inability to really come to grips with logistics issues in WWII provides a good example, as does the ineffectveness of the C3I system of the otherwise relatively modern and well-equipped French Army in 1940.

And, to be fair, 1 Cdn Army in NW Europe often had Allied formations under its operational control, thus reducing the apparent imbalance.

Cheers.


----------



## Michael Dorosh (21 Mar 2005)

The tooth to tail problem was evident in Italy, though, where the I Corps headquarters was both unwanted and unnecessary.   Tommy Burns wrote an entire book about it after the war; he also mentioned other units like the Tobacco Depot in England that employed many soldiers.

This is with perfect hindsight, of course.   Casualty estimation in Normandy was done based on experiences in the desert, and no one was prepared for the higher losses in Normandy - to the extent that a new description of casualty rates had to be coined - "Double Intense".

I think I am more forgiving than many postwar historians or wartime leaders, for that matter, in regards to the training of infantry reinforcements.   Was a tough call.

It was the excess of light anti-aircraft artillery men, and shortage of infantry, that created the so-called "crisis" of late 1944.  Interesting also that no one knew what the mix of infantry and armour should be in Italy - to the extent that the created an entire infantry brigade in Italy out of whole cloth, by juggling recce assets, disbanding LAA and reroling a motor battalion.  It's easy to be critical now, but if you look at what was in place in 1939....I am surprised they got as much right as they did.


----------



## old medic (21 Mar 2005)

Edward Campbell said:
			
		

> "¢	The Canadian Army's tooth-to-tail ratio was scandalous - one field army and two corps for five combat divisions and a few independent tank brigades?  It was Andy McNaughton's _pique_ filled empire building at its worst.



As much as people may want to bash McNaughton,  I find his refusal to break up the Canadian army and play colonial augmentee for the British and some in his own government as one of his career highlights.


----------



## Edward Campbell (21 Mar 2005)

No one says he had to break up the army but he did not need a field army HQ.   One small corps in Italy was a good idea to keep the Canadians together.   A second corps for Normandy and beyond was also a good idea.   There was no need, in my view, for 1st Canadian Army.   When 1 Corps arrived it (two divisions plus an independent brigade or two) could have been folded into *The* Canadian Corps.   Many, many corps had five or six or more divisions â â€œ including Canadian corps when they had others under command.

Of course a _supersized_ Canadian Corps would not have, necessarily, gotten McNaughton his fourth star; he would have been 'one down' on his old nemesis Brooke.

Old Sweat: thanks for that remindre about Charles Dobell - almost a forgotten war, now.


----------



## Michael Dorosh (21 Mar 2005)

old medic said:
			
		

> As much as people may want to bash McNaughton,   I find his refusal to break up the Canadian army and play colonial augmentee for the British and some in his own government as one of his career highlights.



I don't know that I'd phrase it exactly like that.  Certainly there would have been  much to gain by employing a division or two in North Africa, though the King government was still trying to fight the war as a limitied liability action.  The casualties that would have resulted would probably have exacerbated the later manpower problems considerably.

I don't think employing an entire division really counts as being an "augmentee".

And I wonder if a Canadian Division serving in North Africa for a year would have suffered any worse than the 2nd Division did at Dieppe in nine hours?


----------



## Old Sweat (21 Mar 2005)

I would not consider Brooke as an old nemesis of McNaughton's. From the former's diary entires, he considered himself a close friend of both McN and Crerar, as he had served with them in the artillery headquarters of the Canadian Corps in the First World War. It was only after he acquiesced in McN's removal from command of First Canadian Army that their relationship collapsed. Much of the comments in McNaughton's biography re Brooke having it in for him are unsubstantiated and quite possibly were formed after his removal from command.

As to whether having a division in North Africa might have contributed to later reinforcement problems is moot. However, there would have been time to refill the stream, and the benefits of being able to develop commanders in battle, as opposed to on exercises in the UK, far outweighed the disadvantages. After Dieppe, there was virtually no chance of having a Canadian division sent into battle in 1942, and it took some lobbying to be included in the invasion of Sicily in 1943.


----------



## old medic (21 Mar 2005)

Michael Dorosh said:
			
		

> I don't think employing an entire division really counts as being an "augmentee".
> 
> And I wonder if a Canadian Division serving in North Africa for a year would have suffered any worse than the 2nd Division did at Dieppe in nine hours?



I agree that a division wouldn't count in that defintion,  but one must remember that between September 1st and 20th 1939 there were no guarantees that the division would even stay together or be under Canadian command.

" ..... The first sign of difficulties arose over his insistence that Canadian forces had to serve under Canadian command. Having watched Arthur Currie resist British attempts to feed the original Cdn. Corps into battle division by division, McNaughton never let his British counterparts forget that he was the commander of a national army, not a colonial force under their control.

Reviewing these political disputes with Gen. Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, it is difficult not to have considerable sympathy for the Canadian general. McNaughton had a constitutional duty and a personal commitment to the autonomy of the Canadian Army while Brooke wanted to control all Commonwealth forces as if they were British units. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa accepted British direction, why were the Canadians so difficult?

The problem was compounded by the British belief that they knew and understood modern war. Brooke believed Canadian formations ought to be commanded by British generals particularly if British units might serve with them. This was not an argument that held much appeal for Canadians, or for the Americans when their turn came. The British Army had after all failed at virtually every task it undertook from 1940 to the Battle of El Alamein and it was not obvious why anyone should believe that British generals held the key to success on the battlefield.'' McNaughton also insisted on expressing his own views about the best strategy for winning the war. He made no secret of his support for the direct approach to liberating Europe that was favored by generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, but strongly opposed by the British military. When McNaughton agreed, at Churchill's invitation, to re-examine the Jupiter schemeâ â€œa projected invasion of Norway which the British generals had already rejectedâ â€œhe created further resentment, even though his report concluded that the plan was too hazardous.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff was not the only powerful individual to clash with McNaughton. He found himself at odds with Ralston, a distinguished WW I veteran who had commanded an infantry battalion at Vimy Ridge. From McNaughton's perspective, Ralston was prone to interfere in matters that ought to be left to the responsible officers. Ralston, McNaughton insisted, should stick to policy and leave the details to the professional head of Canada's overseas army. Again, it is hard to disagree with McNaughton. Ralston, a man of great ability, was respected for his commitment to the army but was notorious for his inability to delegate authority. Canadians concerned with the current debate over civilian versus military control of the Armed Forces would find much that is familiar in the Ralston/McNaughton conflict.  .... "

http://www.legionmagazine.com/features/canadianmilitaryhistory/97-05.asp


----------



## Riobeard (21 Mar 2005)

I know this might cause a storm or discussion but I'd like to pose the more recent Great Canadian Military Leaders as follows:

Gen. John De Chastelain
- For putting out to pasture a lot of the old establishment within DND and closing the book on the unified forces fiasco of the 60's and 70's (no easy task) 

Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire
- For his personal courage in the face of and despite bureaucracy

Maj. Gen. Lewis Mackenzie
- for his outspoken views of what is really happening in the military and for having the fortitude and tenacity to be a soldier first and not a politician.

Let the salvos begin.....


----------



## Old Sweat (21 Mar 2005)

Re old medic's post, while I have not read the article in question, it is my understanding from having studied the matter, that Alan Brooke was sympathetic to Canadian sensibilities and understood the constitutional link between Canadian generals and Ottawa. He also bore crushing responsibilities and had to deal with some formidable egos in the like of Churchill, Montgomery and Mountbatten.

It is my opinion that McNaughton was unable to handle the dual hats as a field commander and senior Canadian officer overseas - which were not the same. Brooke had recognized this and had urged him to form a higher headquarters to some of the load off his (corps) headqaurters.


----------



## jmacleod (21 Mar 2005)

General McNaughton took his orders from Prime Minister MacKenzie-KIng, and a formidable
Cabinet, like MacDonald, Ralston, Howe, many of whom had served in World War I - they
were a tough crowd, especially King, constantly underrated as a politician of "skill and cunning"
who had a number of Canadian internal problems to deal with, including conscription of course.
General Guy Simmonds is fairly highly rated in Max Hasting's "Armageddon". I was surprised at
a previous comment about the RCN being withdrawn during World War II - we come from a
family of master mariners, many of whom were in the Merchant Service and the RCNVR in the
war - one who enlisted as a Certified Mate, was commissioned, commanded Corvettes and
was awarded the MBE essentially for five years service on the North Atlantic, and I have never
heard that comment before - it was a fact however, that sea going skills were in short supply
but despite that, the Wavy Navy did a highly commendable job. MacLeod


----------



## SALH (22 Mar 2005)

From our past, they fought the battles against the USA that we will likely have to fight again:

Charles-Michel D'Irumberry De Salaberry gets my vote.

http://www.galafilm.com/1812/e/people/salaberry.html

Next would be Tecumseh (sp) Another Fine example of leadership.


----------



## Gill557 (4 Apr 2005)

Riobeard said:
			
		

> I know this might cause a storm or discussion but I'd like to pose the more recent Great Canadian Military Leaders as follows:
> 
> Gen. John De Chastelain
> - For putting out to pasture a lot of the old establishment within DND and closing the book on the unified forces fiasco of the 60's and 70's (no easy task)
> ...




I'll buy some of that.  Well Dallaire and Mackenzie for certain.  Gen. Hilliar is another good one.  He did good work in Afghanistan and working with the Americans.

And now the salvos begin.... ;D


----------



## Royal76 (5 Apr 2005)

I would agree with Dallaire and MacKenzie but I would not place Dechastelaine up there with great wartime leaders like Simmonds, Currie and McNaughton.

BGen Rockingham from the Korean War would also be on my list.


----------

