# Artillery Battery Fire Direction



## usdaoven (9 Nov 2017)

During World War II, who, by duty position and in a battery, calculated the firing data for each gun? What was the name of the organization in which this duty position existed? Typically, where on the battlefield was this organization? Ok, that's enough questions to start with.


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## Old Sweat (9 Nov 2017)

Shortish answer: In British pattern artillery, which included us, the initial fire order included a grid reference of the target picked from the map by the forward observer. A field or medium battery had two troops, each of four guns controlled by a troop command post. Each command post was led by a lieutenant gun position officer (GPO) with a small staff of signallers and technical assistants (TARAs.) A TARA would plot the target on an artillery board (think big, blank map sheet) and read the direction and range from the right gun in the troop to the target. Corrections for weather, muzzle velocity, etc could be added and the result was ordered to the guns.

If more than one troop was involved the gun data for each troop was checked by the battery command post under the control of the command post officer (CPO) and his staff. If more than one battery was required, fire was controlled by the regimental command post under the direction of the adjutant. If more than one regiment was required the brigade major, royal artillery (BMRA) did the same at divisional artillery headquarters.

There is much more to it than this, but our artillery outclassed that of all our enemies, and in technical ability, that of the Red Army as well. It is still an open question whether the Brit or the American system was better. The main difference is that in the Brit system the forward observed ordered fire, while an American forward observer requested it. Either system could literally deliver tons of ammunition in a matter of a very few minutes on a target. Our rate and volume of fire was such that there are recorded instances of German prisoners asking to see the automatic field guns.


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## pbi (25 Jan 2018)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> It is still an open question whether the Brit or the American system was better.



Good question. Both systems were very good but I think the US  gets the nod on sheer weight of tubes available at  Div, Corps and Army levels (Ardennes Campaign being, I think, a very good example of the decisive power of massed US Arty fires).

An important factor contributing to the high effectiveness of the US and Commonwealth artillery branches was their complete motorization and partial mechanization. (Canada had already motorized the RCHA batteries before WWII broke out).  Allied firing batteries could move farther, faster and much more frequently than the German artillery which was overwhelmingly horse drawn. The waggon lines (ammo supply vehicles) in motorized artillery could also hold many more rounds than horse drawn German equivalents.


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## Colin Parkinson (25 Jan 2018)

A substantial portion of any horse drawn unit is taken up carrying feed for the horses. I read a report from my unit who experimented with borrowed trucks back in the early 30's and they raved about the increases in efficiency of being mechanized over horse drawn. Both in bulk stores and manpower.


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## pbi (25 Jan 2018)

But, to be fair, if you are starving in Russia in January you can't shoot a gun tractor and eat it.


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## Old Sweat (25 Jan 2018)

Mechanization and the ability of Western industry to produce guns in the thousands and rounds in the millions, maybe billions, was a factor, as was the organizational ability to deliver it when and where required. However. by 1943 the Commonwealth artilleries had managed to devise a fire control system that allowed for the movement of the concentrated fire of literally every gun within range across the front in response to calls for fire from relatively junior gunner officers. This fire could also be concentrated in planned programmes. The first William Target, that is using all the guns in a field army on a target of opportunity, was fired by Brigadier Bill Ziegler, the CRA of the First Canadian Infantry Division, in the Liri Valley in mid-1944. Note, this required a sophisticated communications system as well as highly standardized procedures in gunnery, fire discipline and artillery fire orders - a subset of voice procedure.

The Soviets, and the Germans too for that matter, seemed stuck in 1917 in terms of artillery employment that was rigid and inflexible.


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## Edward Campbell (25 Jan 2018)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Mechanization and the ability of Western industry to produce guns in the thousands and rounds in the millions, maybe billions, was a factor, as was the organizational ability to deliver it when and where required. However. by 1943 the Commonwealth artilleries had managed to devise a fire control system that allowed for the movement of the concentrated fire of literally every gun within range across the front in response to calls for fire from relatively junior gunner officers. This fire could also be concentrated in planned programmes. The first William Target, that is using all the guns in a field army on a target of opportunity, was fired by Brigadier Bill Ziegler, the CRA of the First Canadian Infantry Division, in the Liri Valley in mid-1944. Note, this required a sophisticated communications system as well as highly standardized procedures in gunnery, fire discipline and artillery fire orders - a subset of voice procedure.
> 
> The Soviets, and the Germans too for that matter, seemed stuck in 1917 in terms of artillery employment that was rigid and inflexible.




During my later years in the service I had the opportunity to work closely with my ABCA+NZ (plus, now and again Singaporean and Indian) colleagues on parts of the "sophisticated communications systems" and my impressions were that the Americans were still behind us in that procedural realm ... what we used to call "gunner juju." Our American friends leapt out in front with the use of computers as far back as the 1960s and early '70s, but the key, in my mind ~ the FOO in the combat team with the _*authority*_ to call the fire of all guns within range and the technical "black magic" of Commonwealth fire control procedures ~ seemed to have eluded them. We, Australians, Brits and Canadians, often spoke of the "gunner overlay" of radio-comms over the formation C3 system and the Americans always seemed a bit lost ... when we went to the chalkboard to illustrate they just said, "oh, no that's not our way."

Maybe I'm wrong but I felt that we were using fire control procedures (which includes radio-comms) "gunner juju" to multiply our effectiveness while they preferred to use simple mass.


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## Old Sweat (25 Jan 2018)

One other factor than got rounds on the ground more quickly was competition. Believe it or not, the controlling regimental, divisional or corps artillery CP did not automatically detail which troop and battery would be used to adjust its fire onto the target. Instead every troop raced with every other troop to report "ready," that is loaded and pointed at the target  and ready to shoot. It was quite a distinction to win adjustment (ranging in the day) and to do so required the troop to have its act together, but overall a good TARA (see my first post in this thread) counted for a lot. This competition shaved seconds, sometimes as much as a minute, off the time to get the first round in the air, and thus got rounds on the target in support of our forward troops. 

And if I can hoot for a minute, as a 20-year-old TARA, I won adjustment for my troop on the first regimental mission I ever "fired" on the arty board in our CP, and then carried on to do the same for all the rest on the annual regimental fire mission day in 4 RCHA way back in 1960. The troop signaller, my buddy "Spud" Gallant, and I didn't have to buy beer in the battery canteen that evening.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (25 Jan 2018)

You forgot to mention, Old Sweat, that during WWII, another factor that helped Canadian and British artillery was the excellent British 25 pdr Field gun that could be turned around in any direction in a matter of almost seconds by  a well trained crew because of its (I don't know the correct technical name) bottom circular plate on which you could rotate with the wheels.

This made it possible for all the field guns to be turned very quickly onto any target of opportunity or to support an SOS target somewhere nearly instantly if in range, then turn back just as quickly to their originally designated area of responsibility and assigned targets.


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## Old Sweat (25 Jan 2018)

You are absolutely correct. The 25-pdr could be switched by one person lifting the end of the trail by means of the handspike, throwing the centre-of-gravity forward, and walking it around. Seconds count, especially if you are an infanteer in a tight spot, and Commonwealth gunners knew who had the worst job in the army, and it wasn't them. While it sounds corny, they were utterly dedicated to the ideal behind the words on their cap badges.


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## FJAG (25 Jan 2018)

The circular plate is called a "firing platform"

 :cheers:


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## medicineman (25 Jan 2018)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> One other factor than got rounds on the ground more quickly was competition. Believe it or not, the controlling regimental, divisional or corps artillery CP did not automatically detail which troop and battery would be used to adjust its fire onto the target. Instead every troop raced with every other troop to report "ready," that is loaded and pointed at the target  and ready to shoot. It was quite a distinction to win adjustment (ranging in the day) and to do so required the troop to have its act together, but overall a good TARA (see my first post in this thread) counted for a lot. This competition shaved seconds, sometimes as much as a minute, off the time to get the first round in the air, and thus got rounds on the target in support of our forward troops.
> 
> And if I can hoot for a minute, as a 20-year-old TARA, I won adjustment for my troop on the first regimental mission I ever "fired" on the arty board in our CP, and then carried on to do the same for all the rest on the annual regimental fire mission day in 4 RCHA way back in 1960. The troop signaller, my buddy "Spud" Gallant, and I didn't have to buy beer in the battery canteen that evening.



Me dad was a troop signaller - he told me part of his job was interjecting onto the net on Mike Targets the literal second all guns called in ready, even if he cut some higher up off, to ensure they got to fire the first rounds out.

I'm reminded of a documentary about the Battle of Long Tan in 1966 with the Aussies - the rifle coy engaged had a Kiwi FOO and a combined 105mm Regt of RNZA/RAA on call with support from a battery of US Army M109's.  He had some issues intially trying to get all the assets to fire in what was essentially a regimental target - roughly a provicnical VC battalion that decided to hug the buckle on them, so it was danger close for most fire missions - the Americans didn't want to drop the 155's in as close as the OC/FOO wanted, so they fired at depth targets.  

MM


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## Rifleman62 (26 Jan 2018)

Brigading everything together, guns/ammo, what could the CF, RegF and PRes do today and how long could they sustain fire.


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## FJAG (26 Jan 2018)

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Brigading everything together, guns/ammo, what could the CF, RegF and PRes do today and how long could they sustain fire.



 :rofl:

No seriously - 

 :'(

 [cheers]


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## Rifleman62 (26 Jan 2018)

Seriously, what could we do now with everything we have. Leaving out the smart munitions which would be for specific tgts.

I don't expect an actual brigading.


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## Colin Parkinson (26 Jan 2018)

We have about 37x155 and about 95 x 105, making about a 132 guns, guessing at least 10% aren't working at anyone time, so lets say between 100-112 guns available if you gathered all of them together, which would be 18 batteries, not a bad turn out.


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## pbi (26 Jan 2018)

Rifleman: right now I believe each of our three RCHA Regts is crewing six M777 155s on a regular basis. So that's 18 tubes there. In the Reserve, given the  fluctuating crewing levels on the old 105mm guns, I'd throw out a rough guess of about 50 tubes across all the CBGs. That is just Reserve tubes and doesn't account for tractors, ammo waggons, command posts or other support vehicles, or the trained support people required to keep everything moving, shooting and communicating.
That's my guess and I welcome corrections.


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## Rifleman62 (26 Jan 2018)

Ammo? You got guns, how long could they sustain fire? That's the question.


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## FJAG (26 Jan 2018)

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Ammo? You got guns, how long could they sustain fire? That's the question.



Back in the seventies there was a period of time where we had an abundance of ammo due to rotating time sensitive war stocks. I remember one fire mission in 3 RCHA where my troop of three guns had to fire 500 rds of WP as part of a regimental smoke screen. When the call came for that we had to empty the command post (except for one sig) and the echelon in order to get everyone to dump on the ground and unpack all the ammo. We had 105mm L5s and were able to sustain 8-9 rounds per minute although half way through the mission one of my guns packed it in (it recoiled out of battery after a round and stayed there) about twenty minutes later we took another gun out of action when the brass bushing on one of the trunnions started to flatten out and the barrel started skewing sideways and slamming into the shield.

The point of this small story is to say that the answer to your question is based on the following factors: the number and quality of the guns, the number and quality of the gun crews, the amount of ammunition available within reach of the gun platforms, the availability of transport and personnel who can get it onto the gun platform and unpack it. Much of the talent of artillery staff work is to predict ammunition expenditure needs and to initiate the appropriate dumping programs to get it into place.

To put some numbers to it, the sustained rates of fire for the M777 is 5 rounds per minute maximum and 2 rounds per minute normal; the 105 mm C3 is 3 rounds per minute normal and I've seen 9 rounds per minute for short bursts; the 105 mm LG1 is 8 rounds per minute but I would think that, like the C3, 3 - 4 rounds per minute sustained would be more realistic. Guns, properly manned and with the appropriate ammunition delivery and unpacking support should be able to keep up the normal rate of fire indefinitely. (Barring mechanical failures and enemy interference - let's never forget about the enemy's counter-battery capabilities)

 :cheers:


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## Rifleman62 (26 Jan 2018)

I read in The Guns of Normandy how the RCASC carried the boxes from the trucks on the road to each gun.

To be more specific, as I should have been from the start, how much ammo does Canada have in stock and how long would it last?


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## Old Sweat (26 Jan 2018)

I am not sure the army understands the requirements of artillery ammunition supply. A few minutes firing by only a battery on even a quick fire plan can put a truckload of ammunition downrange. We went into Kandahar with what I feel was a flawed ammunition supply concept and suffered from shortages of 155mm at the wrong times, including during Op Medusa.

To make one point, we need to be able to provide ammunition in terms of hundreds of rounds per gun above the basic load for specific missions.


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## Rifleman62 (26 Jan 2018)

Exactly. So how much Ammo does anyone think we have in stocks and how long would it last?

Minimal I bet.


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## FJAG (26 Jan 2018)

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Exactly. So how much Ammo does anyone think we have in stocks and how long would it last?
> 
> Minimal I bet.



I'll be the first to admit that I have no idea what we hold in stocks anymore. We do have manufacturing capability. See here e.g.: https://www.gd-otscanada.com/product/155mm-artillery-ammunition/

 :cheers:


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## AmmoTech90 (26 Jan 2018)

If we faced an enemy we had to mass all our guns against (Russia/China), we would run out of guns before ammo.  Between our lack of air defence and being out ranged, more than one pallet of ammo per gun is optimistic.

If the response to this is that we won't go to war alone and someone else will provide counter battery and air superiority, then we will also have access to lots of ammo.

Our people are excellent, a lot of our kit is excellent, but we have no depth to deal with casualties.

A few years ago we had tons of white bag and M107, and some stocks of more modern propelling charges/projectiles/fuzes.

As FJAG pointed out, we do have domestic ammo production.  We also have the Munition Supply Programme which means Canada can demand priority on production.


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## pbi (27 Jan 2018)

My guess is that the actual holding of arty ammo is classified, or at least the Ops stocks portion would be.

Like so much else in war, it seems to come down to dull, boring and complicated things like trucks, load capacity, ammo supply, fuel, maintenance and stuff. I think it was Patton who said: "Amateurs talk about tactics: professionals talk about logistics"


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## SeaKingTacco (27 Jan 2018)

pbi said:
			
		

> My guess is that the actual holding of arty ammo is classified, or at least the Ops stocks portion would be.
> 
> Like so much else in war, it seems to come down to dull, boring and complicated things like trucks, load capacity, ammo supply, fuel, maintenance and stuff. I think it was Patton who said: "Amateurs talk about tactics: professionals talk about logistics"



You guess correctly: the op stock quantity of any nature of munition held by the CF is classified information. Posters in this thread would do well to remember that as this discussion evolves.


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## Rifleman62 (27 Jan 2018)

Realize it would be classified. Discussion relates to: Would we have enough stocks for a war now? Or would we be caught flat footed? Even that would probably classified. With our defence dollar squeezed are we prepared? Or is the funding going to uniforms/badges?

In the Navy forums someone stated that they have never been to sea with some type of missile on the ship. Why would that be?


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## pbi (27 Jan 2018)

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Realize it would be classified. Discussion relates to: Would we have enough stocks for a war now? Or would we be caught flat footed? Even that would probably classified. With our defence dollar squeezed are we prepared? Or is the funding going to uniforms/badges?
> 
> In the Navy forums someone stated that they have never been to sea with some type of missile on the ship. Why would that be?



Keeping in mind SeaKing Taco's warning, I 'd guess that very few countries hold a full wartime load of ammunition of any kind. It would require huge storage facilities, and you would have to be constantly testing it and checking it for quality control. Anything with built in electronics has to be very carefully looked after. You would also need a program to fire a percentage of it away each fiscal year so you could keep rotating the stock. We do have most of these procedures already but not on such a massive scale.

Modern ammo is expensive especially arty, mor, rockets and anything precision. How  much of your budget do you spend on it.?
?

It can happen to anybody: when the Germans launched their campaign against Poland in 1939, they very quickly began to run low on artillery op stocks because they hadn't ordered enough in the years before, and cranked it off at a much greater rate than originally expected.


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## SeaKingTacco (27 Jan 2018)

I recall a conversation I had with a treasury board analyst, maybe 25 years ago, who was visiting an artillery exercise in the field, to get a sense of how the Amy did business. He was very excited because he had discovered a way to save the government of the day massive amounts of money on ammunition costs.

According to his calculations, we had something like 5 billion dollars worth of ammunition "just sitting there" in the depots, doing nothing.

In his mind, if we sold it all and went to "just in time delivery", like Walmart or GM, we wouldn't have all this sunk cost sitting around, deprececiating, and would not have to pay for all these ammo depots.

After we all got over the urge to strangle him on the spot, we patiently explained that ammunition was not like underwear or cans of beans: you don't just call up Artillery R Us and have a million rounds of 155mm delivered, tomorrow.

To his credit, the lightbulb did eventually go on. God preserve us from MBAs....


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## Old Sweat (27 Jan 2018)

During the Korean War, when concurrently we were deploying a brigade group to Germany, the Canadian Army was purchasing stocks of 25-pdr that had been dumped in the ocean near Hong Kong after VJ Day. Much of the markings had been obliterated and there was some corrosive build up on the rounds. We had a number of gun numbers killed because of premature detonations of unsafe ammunition as a result. This never made the press, at least in reference to the number of incidents, and hence no scandal and no outcry. VT rounds also used to detonate at odd places along the trajectory, but that's another story.

My course officer in OCP was serving in Korea at the time, and 60 plus years after the event would still get very, very angry about this penny pinching instead of purchasing new production.


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## Old Sweat (27 Jan 2018)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I recall a conversation I had with a treasury board analyst, maybe 25 years ago, who was visiting an artillery exercise in the field, to get a sense of how the Amy did business. He was very excited because he had discovered a way to save the government of the day massive amounts of money on ammunition costs.
> 
> According to his calculations, we had something like 5 billion dollars worth of ammunition "just sitting there" in the depots, doing nothing.
> 
> ...



That is exactly the concept we started with in Kandahar, and it bit us on the butt. Just in time works if you are Walmart, but to practice it in wartime requires the enemy to provide forecasts of activity so we can stock up for periods of heavy usage.


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## Oldgateboatdriver (27 Jan 2018)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I recall a conversation I had with a treasury board analyst, maybe 25 years ago, who was visiting an artillery exercise in the field, to get a sense of how the Amy did business. He was very excited because he had discovered a way to save the government of the day massive amounts of money on ammunition costs.
> 
> According to his calculations, we had something like 5 billion dollars worth of ammunition "just sitting there" in the depots, doing nothing.
> 
> ...



Another wonderfull moment brought to you by people with pocket calculators who will never be on the receiving end of an AK-47, RPG, Armata, Mig-31 or Victor-III.

 :facepalm:


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## Petard (13 Feb 2018)

Rifleman62 said:
			
		

> Realize it would be classified. Discussion relates to: Would we have enough stocks for a war now? Or would we be caught flat footed? Even that would probably classified. With our defence dollar squeezed are we prepared? Or is the funding going to uniforms/badges?



The OP question had a more historical context, but these latest ones are more futuristic; IMO maybe move this to the arty forum?

At anyrate, from 2008 to 2011 I was the DLR rep for all arty ammo (and the 60 mortar ammo, since the infantry didn't have anyone available to cover it off), and can give something of a response to Rifleman's ammo questions

War stock vs Op stock: most thought War stock was an obsolete concept about a decade ago, that's probably changing

The War stock concept lasted up to the cold war era, and on the face of it looked much like the ammo supply concepts from the World War 2 and Korean war era. It was maintained after the Cold War era, to some degree, as it was believed high ammo expenditure rates might happen well above Op stock capacity, and if they did War stock was supposed to buy time for industry to get caught up to the higher demand.  How much that was supposed to be, and how long it was really supposed to last seem to generate a lot of debate and no conclusions

Op stock is of course the limited amount needed for Operations over a given time. Typically, it was planned out roughly 5 yrs in advance, with a Battle Group possibly deployed, another in high readiness training, and everything else in some kind of transition training. There was also an outside chance of a Brigade deployment, supposedly non sustained, for about a year.
The upshot of the discussions, back then, was there was no need for War Stock in the legacy qty scales. But you never know, so some surge capacity, even beyond a brigade deployment was factored into this "Reserve", that is, a qty of ammo to be sustained above Op stocks. 

Regardless what the army thought the Op stock and pseudo-war stock should be, an intractable constraint was imposed by a reduction in NP funds (operating budget) over the past decade +. Exacerbating the problem was that new ammo natures coming into use were not offset by the elimination of old natures, 120 mm tank for 105, 60mm mortar for 40 mm auto grenade for example; the de-mil/disposal of the obsolete types added to costs. 

There was a need to improve the capabilities of indirect fire munitions as well, which = more costs.  This meant what ever stock that had been built up over the years, for the what if, was becoming less useful, as time went by and concept of Ops changed (dispersed ops etc etc). Then there was pressure to reduce even Op stock qty's, due to costs and changing requirements

By the time I left DLR in late 2011, it looked like the decision was to gradually eliminate the War stocks, and the concept of war stocks itself to be abandoned 
Maybe that's changed drastically in the last 7 years, but I doubt it. I'm out now, but before I left I helped with a study to justify the bare minimum artillery amounts needed for training, which was a clear sign of pressures to reduce the Op stock even more, never mind war stock

But I'd say Rifleman has a good question, maybe everything old is new again; it all depends on the war you think Canada might end up in
For example, given the recent Russo-Ukrainian conflict there's a good reason to revisit this war stock concept, or at least the qty's kept above Op stock needs
It's easy to dismiss our involvement in that type of conflict, but the thing is you should be prepared for the worst case, no?


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## Colin Parkinson (13 Feb 2018)

War/Op stock can be gradually increased. Artillery/naval shells and aerial bombs are generally stable and can come with regular fuzes. Keep the stockpile of add on expensive fuzes small, slightly over current need. ensure the stockpile covers countermeasures for ships/aircraft and also adequate Sonabuoys 
Small arms stocks I would suggest be built up, as the manufacturers are still struggling to keep up with demand, a long term contract would likely save money, because in the event of a large conflict, ammunition costs are going to skyrocket. Missiles are a different beast. Perhaps a review of what are the choke points in manufacture and what systems are long term stable and which components are not. From there you can determine what are the current needs, the likely needs and can the stable/choke point components be manufactured beforehand and stored?

War stocks would also capture spare parts, particularity for AFV's. Keeping a larger than needed tank track and suspension inventory and rotating it. Basically look at the stocklists and start increasing the supply of almost combat related items by 1-2% a year for 10 years.


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## Rifleman62 (13 Feb 2018)

Thanks Petard. Your answer confirms my suspicions.

This says it all IMHO: 





> Regardless what the army thought the Op stock and pseudo-war stock should be, an intractable constraint was imposed by a reduction in NP funds ......



Colin P you are living in a dream world wrt your post.

I say again: The first priority of a government is to defend it's citizens. The priority of this government is to be in power forever to the benefit of the LPC and it's friends.

The CF will take needless casulties because of these policies. As an aside, if the Liberals run down the CF they could also eliminate those pesty Vets and VAC. ;D


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## Petard (13 Feb 2018)

That sharp reduction in NP funds happened under a Conservative government, I have no idea if the current one is aware of the risks being taken without a viable reserve, but I think its a moot point; so far it looks like the general public doesn't really have an interest in its military right now, although it does feel bad about the way veterans are treated


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## Rifleman62 (13 Feb 2018)

Thanks again. I sit corrected. I am sure the Liberals are continuing the funding minus.


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## Petard (19 Feb 2018)

Then there's this; looks like the US is going back to a war stock concept 
https://taskandpurpose.com/army-budget-artillery-shells/


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## FJAG (19 Feb 2018)

Petard said:
			
		

> Then there's this; looks like the US is going back to a war stock concept
> https://taskandpurpose.com/army-budget-artillery-shells/



Something about those numbers seems wonky.

My memory is getting weak, and Old Sweat could give me a reality check here, but it strikes me that in the early seventies we were burning up old war stocks and we were firing around ten thousand rounds plus of 105 mm per year in each of 2 RCHA and 3 RCHA alone. I know after I left there that Militia Area Prairie's annual  allotment was somewhere in the area of 5,000 rds per year.

150,000 rds 155mm for the whole US Army is a pitiful amount.

 :cheers:


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## Kat Stevens (19 Feb 2018)

SeaKingTacco said:
			
		

> I recall a conversation I had with a treasury board analyst, maybe 25 years ago, who was visiting an artillery exercise in the field, to get a sense of how the Amy did business. He was very excited because he had discovered a way to save the government of the day massive amounts of money on ammunition costs.
> 
> According to his calculations, we had something like 5 billion dollars worth of ammunition "just sitting there" in the depots, doing nothing.
> 
> ...



No, you'd probably want to go to Ammozon.com for that.


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## Old Sweat (19 Feb 2018)

FJAG said:
			
		

> Something about those numbers seems wonky.
> 
> My memory is getting weak, and Old Sweat could give me a reality check here, but it strikes me that in the early seventies we were burning up old war stocks and we were firing around ten thousand rounds plus of 105 mm per year in each of 2 RCHA and 3 RCHA alone. I know after I left there that Militia Area Prairie's annual  allotment was somewhere in the area of 5,000 rds per year.
> 
> ...



In my opinion 150,000 rounds is pitiful for an army of that size. I once saw the number of 155mm of various genres (remember the Americans use both various marks of the M109 and the M777) in the US Army, but it has to be in the multiple zeros after the comma range. The figure cannot maintain any sort of operational capability, no matter how many simulators and fancy gimmicks pop up on readiness power points.

That's my opinion, and my data are incomplete, but I hope the figure is out to lunch.


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## FJAG (20 Feb 2018)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> In my opinion 150,000 rounds is pitiful for an army of that size. I once saw the number of 155mm of various genres (remember the Americans use both various marks of the M109 and the M777) in the US Army, but it has to be in the multiple zeros after the comma range. The figure cannot maintain any sort of operational capability, no matter how many simulators and fancy gimmicks pop up on readiness power points.
> 
> That's my opinion, and my data are incomplete, but I hope the figure is out to lunch.



OK. I've just done a quick count of US Active and NG artillery units and it comes out like this (give or take in rough counts)

Active army - 25 Bns 155mm; 7 Bns 105mm organized within 10 Divisions; 5 MLRS Bns and 5 HIMRS Bns in 4 Separate Arty Bdes);

NG - - 25 Bns 155mm organized within 8 Divisions and 15 Bns 155mm and 8 HIMRS Bns in 8 separate Arty Bdes.

So in total there are approximately (very roughly) 25 Active and 40 NG 155mm Bns (at 18 tubes per Bn that's 450 Active Army and 720 NG 155mm tubes.) 

So 150,000 rounds would work out to 2,307 rds per Bn or 127 rds per tube per year. (Not counting whatever their artillery schools etc need) I expect that, like here, the Active Army would get a considerably higher percentage of rounds per Bn/tube than the NG.

All in all its not that far out to lunch. Fun with numbers.

 :cheers:


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## Old Sweat (20 Feb 2018)

I would also expect various commanders will take a slice for a reserve and/or demonstrations, training for aerial observers, etc. The final breakdown might be around 100 rpg for the battalion commander to use to train his unit.

 :cheers:


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## pbi (21 Feb 2018)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> I would also expect various commanders will take a slice for a reserve and/or demonstrations, training for aerial observers, etc. The final breakdown might be around 100 rpg for the battalion commander to use to train his unit.
> 
> :cheers:



And keep in mind that the USARNG batteries are not firing every monthly drill weekend: maybe just at annual camp and a few other times.


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## Petard (24 Feb 2018)

FJAG said:
			
		

> OK. I've just done a quick count of US Active and NG artillery units and it comes out like this (give or take in rough counts)
> 
> So 150,000 rounds would work out to 2,307 rds per Bn or 127 rds per tube per year. (Not counting whatever their artillery schools etc need) I expect that, like here, the Active Army would get a considerably higher percentage of rounds per Bn/tube than the NG.
> 
> ...



Actually, I'd have to disagree with your main assumption that the 150k-ish rds represent the total number allotted for operational use for the next FY (anymore than the original 16,000ish did)

What I think it does represent is a reduced rate of consuming stock already built up, and introducing more modern types into that stock. For example buying up more M795 but using up more of the older stock M107 rds for training etc., and there's still a lot of that old stuff around 

The total qty's available for operational use, plus a substantial reserve (war stock), are most likely well in excess of the 150k amount


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## Old Sweat (24 Feb 2018)

Petard said:
			
		

> Actually, I'd have to disagree with your main assumption that the 150k-ish rds represent the total number allotted for operational use for the next FY (anymore than the original 16,000ish did)
> 
> What I think it does represent is a reduced rate of consuming stock already built up, and introducing more modern types into that stock. For example buying up more M795 but using up more of the older stock M107 rds for training etc., and there's still a lot of that old stuff around
> 
> The total qty's available for operational use, plus a substantial reserve (war stock), are most likely well in excess of the 150k amount



I had read the 150,000 rounds figure as "bullets" to be fired in training. I have no idea how much is fired by the school in Fort Sill, one could assume it is a significant percentage of the total. It certainly is not a wartime figure.   Consider that five 18-gun battalions (a reinforced div arty) supporting a brigade attack with 100 rpg - which is not a lot - would send 9000 rounds down range. How many truck loads is that?


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## FJAG (24 Feb 2018)

Petard said:
			
		

> Actually, I'd have to disagree with your main assumption that the 150k-ish rds represent the total number allotted for operational use for the next FY (anymore than the original 16,000ish did)
> 
> What I think it does represent is a reduced rate of consuming stock already built up, and introducing more modern types into that stock. For example buying up more M795 but using up more of the older stock M107 rds for training etc., and there's still a lot of that old stuff around
> 
> The total qty's available for operational use, plus a substantial reserve (war stock), are most likely well in excess of the 150k amount



I didn't consider that the 150k (or the previous 16k) were for "operational use". 

My thought--from the link that you posted above--was that the 150k was being purchased for training use for the next FY and that there were operational stocks over and above that.

My numbers were simply to try to calculate a number of rounds per tube/battalion based on the 150k number to see if that represented a realist "annual training" figure.

 :cheers:


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