# Court Finds Netherlands At Fault for Srebrencia Massacre



## MAJONES (16 Jul 2014)

Shared IAW the Fair Dealings provisions of the copyright act.




> Netherlands liable for 300 Srebrenica massacre deaths, court rules
> THE HAGUE, Netherlands — The Associated Press
> Published Wednesday, Jul. 16 2014, 5:50 AM EDT
> Last updated Wednesday, Jul. 16 2014, 5:53 AM EDT
> ...




http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/netherlands-liable-for-300-srebrenica-massacre-deaths-court-rules/article19629551/comments/


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## Colin Parkinson (17 Jul 2014)

So basically once they are under your protection they are your responsibility. It sounds like a fair judgement. it will play a role on future UN missions and limit ROE's and protection offered. Once you offer that protection how do you discharge the responsibility?


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## The Bread Guy (17 Jul 2014)

Colin P said:
			
		

> it will play a role on future UN missions and limit ROE's and protection offered.


Not to mention refining the calculus of countries considering sending troops on any given mission, given the national "on the hookedness" (given NLD's paying even if not "liable").


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## Colin Parkinson (17 Jul 2014)

Good luck getting Bangladesh to cough up.


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## Retired AF Guy (17 Jul 2014)

I've often wondered if what happened at Srebrencia might have played out differently if the Canadians hadn't pulled out??


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## Cloud Cover (17 Jul 2014)

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> I've often wondered if what happened at Srebrencia might have played out differently if the Canadians hadn't pulled out??



Might be that a few dozen Canadians would have been massacred too? I really don't see how the folks in charge would have obtained a change in the ROE quickly enough to have done much different than the Dutch.


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## Colin Parkinson (18 Jul 2014)

At the time were we not one of the better equipped units?


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## Retired AF Guy (19 Jul 2014)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> Might be that a few dozen Canadians would have been massacred too? I really don't see how the folks in charge would have obtained a change in the ROE quickly enough to have done much different than the Dutch.



My understanding is that the Dutch Bn was made up of conscripts who may not have had the training or discipline of say Canadian troops. Maybe someone here has more information on this??



			
				Colin P said:
			
		

> At the time were we not one of the better equipped units?



That was my understanding as well.


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## daftandbarmy (19 Jul 2014)

Retired AF Guy said:
			
		

> My understanding is that the Dutch Bn was made up of conscripts who may not have had the training or discipline of say Canadian troops. Maybe someone here has more information on this??
> 
> That was my understanding as well.



I've worked with Dutch (and Danish and Norwegian) conscripts before and they can do well, if well led.


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## medicineman (19 Jul 2014)

I think that the issue lies with the lack of testicular fortitude on the part of UN to give (and back up) robust ROE to actually enforce the mandates of UNPROFOR such as they were.  The constraints put on units to ensure they didn't have a lot of teeth so as not to look like an invading/occupying force hamstrung any unit that might be forced to lock horns with any of the factions of bad guys out there for longer than about 30 seconds.  I know that when I was in Croatia, we were told we'd have to be prepared to defend the Zone of Separation we were supposed to patrol - a section house had an APC with .50 cal,  a C6 with SF kit , a Carl G, a 60mm mortar and a section complement of C7's and 9's.  Each dude had (IIRC) about 300 rounds for a C7 or 2 boxes for a C-9, the .50 had 2-300 rounds, the C6 500 rounds, 6 WP rounds for the mortar and 4 RAP rounds for the Carl G and a couple of M72's - most guys figured the bad guys would make contact, duke it out until rounds stopped and then carry on through about a minute or two after it all started, since they'd be done.  If our TUA's got in on it, might last a few more minutes.  The Dutchies in Srebrenica were light infantry IIRC with little or no anti-armour capabilities - the Serbs had tanks and APC's and a lot more men than the Dutch had ammo in all likelihood.

The UN is all about optics - the asshats in NYC don't give a flying rat's arse about the people at the pointy end of things on UN ops.  My ROE for UNPROFOR fan folded out to about 8 x 4" and was double sided - imagine trying to run through your what if's with BS like that.  By the time you get past "Stop or I'll say Stop Again" and "Stop or I'll have to consider cocking my weapon in a menacing manner", you could only hope the bad guy/s have died of laughter, because you'd be a dead man if they didn't.  Give poorly equipped troops, that are not well led or disciplined, a mission with muddy mandates and piss poor ROE that are utterly confusing to an educated person, I'd say they're most likely to hunker down and look out for number one and let the baddies drive on by and do what baddies do.

I glumly note that the UN weren't held responsible - when in fact, it was their mandates and over the top ROE, along with underwhelming rules regarding weapons, that failed those soldiers and ultimately, the citizens of Srebrenica.  

My somewhat myopic/bitter :2c: for what it's worth.

MM


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## Ostrozac (19 Jul 2014)

medicineman said:
			
		

> The UN is all about optics



I note that the UN has had no issues using lethal force in the DR Congo, including Mi-35 Hinds painted white with UN on the side.

The cynic in me suspects that this is because the international media rarely cares about or visits DR Congo, and therefore there are no issues with the "optics" of the UN using helicopter gunships, there. It might be a different dynamic if the UN started being more robust in a place like Lebanon or the Golan Heights, where it would be reported on daily.


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## Shrek1985 (19 Jul 2014)

I'm not getting how they dutch are responsible for some deaths, but not others.


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## medicineman (19 Jul 2014)

Ostrozac said:
			
		

> I note that the UN has had no issues using lethal force in the DR Congo, including Mi-35 Hinds painted white with UN on the side.
> 
> The cynic in me suspects that this is because the international media rarely cares about or visits DR Congo, and therefore there are no issues with the "optics" of the UN using helicopter gunships, there. It might be a different dynamic if the UN started being more robust in a place like Lebanon or the Golan Heights, where it would be reported on daily.



Or they've finally learned from their mistakes - if they say they're there to protect someone, maybe they're finally willing to back that up?

But you're right - they are out of sight and mind there in Congo right now.

MM


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## George Wallace (19 Jul 2014)

medicineman said:
			
		

> Or they've finally learned from their mistakes - if they say they're there to protect someone, maybe they're finally willing to back that up?
> 
> But you're right - they are out of sight and mind there in Congo right now.
> 
> MM



And let the African Union handle their own affairs.


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## medicineman (19 Jul 2014)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> And let the African Union handle their own affairs.



Amen to that.


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## pbi (20 Jul 2014)

medicineman said:
			
		

> I think that the issue lies with the lack of testicular fortitude on the part of UN to give (and back up) robust ROE to actually enforce the mandates of UNPROFOR such as they were.  The constraints put on units to ensure they didn't have a lot of teeth so as not to look like an invading/occupying force hamstrung any unit that might be forced to lock horns with any of the factions of bad guys out there for longer than about 30 seconds.  I know that when I was in Croatia, we were told we'd have to be prepared to defend the Zone of Separation we were supposed to patrol - a section house had an APC with .50 cal,  a C6 with SF kit , a Carl G, a 60mm mortar and a section complement of C7's and 9's.  Each dude had (IIRC) about 300 rounds for a C7 or 2 boxes for a C-9, the .50 had 2-300 rounds, the C6 500 rounds, 6 WP rounds for the mortar and 4 RAP rounds for the Carl G and a couple of M72's - most guys figured the bad guys would make contact, duke it out until rounds stopped and then carry on through about a minute or two after it all started, since they'd be done.  If our TUA's got in on it, might last a few more minutes.  The Dutchies in Srebrenica were light infantry IIRC with little or no anti-armour capabilities - the Serbs had tanks and APC's and a lot more men than the Dutch had ammo in all likelihood.
> 
> The UN is all about optics - the asshats in NYC don't give a flying rat's arse about the people at the pointy end of things on UN ops.  My ROE for UNPROFOR fan folded out to about 8 x 4" and was double sided - imagine trying to run through your what if's with BS like that.  By the time you get past "Stop or I'll say Stop Again" and "Stop or I'll have to consider cocking my weapon in a menacing manner", you could only hope the bad guy/s have died of laughter, because you'd be a dead man if they didn't.  Give poorly equipped troops, that are not well led or disciplined, a mission with muddy mandates and piss poor ROE that are utterly confusing to an educated person, I'd say they're most likely to hunker down and look out for number one and let the baddies drive on by and do what baddies do.
> 
> ...



Medman: I was in Croatia in 94: your description of the situation is very familiar. I was OC C Coy/1PP, responsible for the ZOS from  Zemunik Crossing in the NW to Pristeg in the SE. Our direction from the UN was clear: we were to defend the ZOS (and UNPA)  from a military incursion. Although the UN didn't name a side as being the one we were "protecting" against, the military reality on the ground was quite clear that the threat was the Croatian HV, not the raggedy-ass SVK. And, as events proved with OP STORM the following year, this was true.

Although we had pretty liberal ROE for the time and place (we didn't have to wait to be shot at, nor did we have to fire warning shots if lives were in danger), we realized two things pretty early on. First,  Canada violently disagreed with the UN mission statement (no doubt fearing another Medak...) and made this very clear to the CO after we did OP SAMSON, a  show of force op directed at the Croats. In other words,  if we followed UN direction we might not be backed up by our own Govt and legal system.

Second, we realized that even though we were by far the best -armed, -equipped and -trained UN contingent in Croatia, there was a severe limit to how long we could hold out against a concerted Croat offensive. Although we had 81mm mors, TUA and .50 cals, we had no artillery, no tanks and no air. We had no dedicated medical support beyond the UMS and no Cdn CASEVAC lift. We were dispersed along nearly 70km of line in section-size OPs that in some cases couldn't see each other. The Bn reserve was a partial rifle coy in old M113s: it would have taken ages for it to get anywhere.

After quite a bit of to-ing and fro-ing both within the Bn leadership and with NDHQ, we adopted the limited self defence stance that, AFAIK, prevailed right up until OP STORM in 1995 which effectively ended the UN mission by force. But, even with that limitation, we protected Serb farmers working in the ZOS by putting our patrols in between them and the HV/HVO positions, and explaining to the Croats that if they fired on the farmers, we would take that as an attack on us and react in self defence with all available weapon systems (which was within our ROE to do: we were not restricted to personal weapons).

My feeling from the soldiers in C Coy was that while they were always willing to take reasonable risks (and they did, often...), they were not prepared to take near-suicidal risks in a poorly conceived and unsupported UN operation. The change to a more restrained Use of Force policy was, I thought, well received.

So, I guess all this is a round about way to say a couple of things:

-you are ultimately bound by your national ROE, not by the UN ROE. You are under Canadian FULCOM, but at best only under UN OPCON (IIRC). Just blaming the UN may not be the answer in the Srebenica case: what were the NL ROE?; and

-you may take risk on UN missions, but you still have to think about your troops. Who is coming to pull you out if you get into the sh*t with a small, lightly armed force? Yes, if it had been 1 PPCLI at Srebenica, with all our kit and our stronger ROE, the result might have been different.

I know that these two points seem to conflict with each other, but I guess I'm trying to point out that these UN missions can present commanders with hellish dilemmas between what the UN says, what your government says, and what you believe is right. My own gut feeling is that it can never be wrong to stop the slaughter of unarmed and non-combatant people when it is happening right in front of your position, if you have a chance to do it. That is what Jim Calvin did at Medak.


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## Cloud Cover (20 Jul 2014)

pbi said:
			
		

> So, I guess all this is a round about way to say a couple of things:
> 
> -you are ultimately bound by your national ROE, not by the UN ROE. You are under Canadian FULCOM, but at best only under UN OPCON (IIRC). Just blaming the UN may not be the answer in the Srebenica case: what were the NL ROE?; and
> 
> -you may take risk on UN missions, but you still have to think about your troops. Who is coming to pull you out if you get into the **** with a small, lightly armed force? Yes, if it had been 1 PPCLI at Srebenica, with all our kit and our stronger ROE, the result* might *have been different.



"might" is the correct word indeed, and maybe it was lucky that the PP didn't have it's Jim Calvin moment in that particular spot. We will never know, because the Canadians were elsewhere at the time.  Adding to the above about limited quantities of ammunition, the Serbs and the Croats had access to UN radio frequencies, positions, maps, everything was pretty much compromised.  And, the Serbs had tanks, artillery, infiltrators in the town, and were not burdened with concern for civilians or the rules on engagement.


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## pbi (21 Jul 2014)

whiskey601 said:
			
		

> "might" is the correct word indeed, and maybe it was lucky that the PP didn't have it's Jim Calvin moment in that particular spot. We will never know, because the Canadians were elsewhere at the time.  Adding to the above about limited quantities of ammunition, the Serbs and the Croats had access to UN radio frequencies, positions, maps, everything was pretty much compromised.  And, the Serbs had tanks, artillery, infiltrators in the town, and were not burdened with concern for civilians or the rules on engagement.



I used "might" advisedly.

I'm also aware that Canada's track record in FRY had some blemishes on it, so we can't claim perfection.  My real point, I think, is that without knowing all the facts, it's hard to judge. It's fairly easy to say "_what I would have done_". A few questions that might be worth knowing the answers to would include:

-what was the morale situation in the NL unit?

-what was the leadership climate? Discipline level?; and

-how well trained were the troops, and what was their experience level?

Based on probabilities and common sense, I would expect a well-trained unit of long service professionals, armed and equipped to fight if needed, with a strong leadership framework of officers and veteran professional WOs/NCOs,  with more liberal ROE, to be more likely to have intervened. But, that is only an educated guess.


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## Old Sweat (21 Jul 2014)

Speaking with the double-based wisdom of hindsight and not having served in the FRY, perhaps the UN's most powerful weapon was the international media. Live world wide coverage from the area may well have deterred the Serbs from carrying out the massacre, but then maybe not.


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## pbi (22 Jul 2014)

Old Sweat said:
			
		

> Speaking with the double-based wisdom of hindsight and not having served in the FRY, perhaps the UN's most powerful weapon was the international media. Live world wide coverage from the area may well have deterred the Serbs from carrying out the massacre, but then maybe not.



One of the important things that Jim Calvin did at Medak was to quickly enlist the power of the media. He knew that the Croats, being very image-aware and far more media-savvy than the Serbs, would immediately feel pressure.

Canadian BGen Alain Forand, when he was the last commander of UN Sector South during the Croatian OP STORM offensive in 1995, asked in his after action report just where the world media was when the Croats were committing war crimes in the Krijena. He understood that if CNN had been there, some things might not have happened the way they did.

I'm not 100% sure that the "threat" of world media attention would have had the same effect on the Serbs. My dealings with Serb leadership in the Krijena in 1994 suggested to me that they were extremely suspicious of Western media, and didn't really understand how to use it. This was probably a reflection of two things: a very old-fashioned Communist view of Western media, and a paranoia caused by media coverage of the various atrocities that Serbs had in fact committed earlier in the war.

That said, probably better to have media there than not.


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## daftandbarmy (23 Jul 2014)

Shrek1985 said:
			
		

> I'm not getting how they dutch are responsible for some deaths, but not others.



I assume the families of the 'some' have better personal injury lawyers than the families of the 'others'.


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