# CF Transformation & the Operational Commands (Merged)



## Cdn Blackshirt (6 Jun 2005)

Have to give credit to Hillier so far....

Very impressive indeed.



Matthew. 
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http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20050605.wmili0605/BNStory/National/


Military Begins Major Overhall

Sunday, June 5, 2005 Updated at 3:24 PM EDT

Canadian Press

 Ottawa â â€ Canada's military command structure is about to be turned upside down so the Armed Forces can deal more quickly with natural disasters and potential terrorist attacks.

In the biggest restructuring in four decades, Gen. Rick Hillier has ordered a transformation that will see control of domestic military assets turned over to integrated regional centres, known as Canada Command.

Since the mid-1960s, the army, navy and air force have worked together to a certain extent. But each section has independent control over ground forces, ships, aircraft and other equipment.

Mr. Hillier, the chief of defence staff, wants the command structure to be more â Å“top down,â ? with regional commanders in control of all military personnel and hardware.

â Å“They'll now come under an integrated commander at a regional level,â ? said a spokeswoman for Mr. Hillier.

â Å“So we don't have army only and air force only and navy only and they each have their separate stove pipes up to Ottawa,â ? Maj. Rita Lepage said.

â Å“You can see how much quicker you can respond . . . when you've got one person owning air and sea and land elements.â ?

The military also wants certain equipment assigned to specific units. As an example, the JTF2 â â€ Canada's elite commando unit â â€ might want full control over aircraft that could see the unit deploy faster, instead of having to wait for approvals from the air force to use a plane.

â Å“It's an evolution that's necessary,â ? says Brig.-Gen. Daniel Gosselin, named chief of staff over the Canadian Forces Transformation Team.

â Å“The command and control structure that we have, because of its nature, might not be responsive enough if something happens,â ? Mr. Gosselin said in an interview.

â Å“(Hillier) doesn't want to take a chance that something happens and we are not prepared at a level that we need to be prepared,â ? Mr. Gosselin added.

â Å“It's consistent with the level of preparedness that we're trying to (achieve) in the post-9/11 era.

â Å“It has to do with the domestic situation from a disaster point of view. But it has to do also with . . . potential crises related to an airliner or some other kind of (terrorist attack) situation.â ?

Britain and Australia adopted similar changes during the last two years. The Americans are restructuring as well, although their plans have faced budget hurdles in Washington.

Canadian top brass began preliminary work on the overhaul last week. Four teams have responsibility for specific areas where reforms are needed.

For example, the first will recommend how to change the military's command structure, both for domestic and international operations. Another is looking at how to better recruit, train and deploy people.

The Paul Martin government has said it wants to increase the size of the military by 8,000 people during the next five years.

They'll be needed if the overhaul is to work. Getting the military to move faster â â€ the goal for some units being deployment within 10 days â â€ means you need more people, Mr. Gosselin said.

â Å“This is very high readiness,â ? he says.

â Å“When you increase readiness, it's taxing. It's fairly demanding in terms of people, in terms of the training you have to do, how you prepare.â ?

Two other teams are reviewing what new equipment the Forces need, and how to better work with other government departments and non-governmental agencies. Their work is expected to take longer, perhaps up to five years.

A main priority of the restructuring should be to streamline the military, cut the size of defence headquarters and not to simply create another chain of command, says one military analyst.

â Å“We are very top heavy in terms of our command structure,â ? says David Rudd, director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

â Å“If they do that, the money that can be saved . . . can be thrown back into the organization and hopefully pay for a lot more privates and corporals,â ? Mr. Rudd said.

â Å“It would be absolutely unconscionable for us to emerge from this process with even more people at headquarters. That must be avoided at all cost.â ?


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## Pikache (6 Jun 2005)

Well, gotta give the generals and colonels that we seem to have a lot something to do


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## Infanteer (6 Jun 2005)

It seems that General Hillier is accomplishing what Hellyer tried and didn't quite succeed at doing 40 years ago.


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## SHELLDRAKE!! (6 Jun 2005)

It makes you wonder why this wasn't put in place years ago. IMHO theres too many political fingers keeping us from effectively and efficiently doing what we are paid to do.


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## Infanteer (6 Jun 2005)

SHELLDRAKE!! said:
			
		

> It makes you wonder why this wasn't put in place years ago. IMHO theres too many political fingers keeping us from effectively and efficiently doing what we are paid to do.



From what I understand, there is an institutional "tug-of-war" in the CF between a _strong-service_ idea and that of _unification_ or its new incarnation, _jointness_ (which I feel is a slightly different approach to the same concept).   This is not a uniquely Canadian thing; you see it in our Allies' forces as well - one only has to look at the arguments surrounding the evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee to see it.

Anyways, the way I read things, in the 1990's, with the Liberal government chopping big bucks all over the place, a program came out of the 1994 White Paper that was called the Management, Command, and Control Re-engineering (MCCR) initiative, which basically sliced and diced the unified headquarters and deconstructed much of what Unification had engineered in the CF.   The benefactors of this were the Environmental Commands - which were essentially the old Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force in all but name.

My take is that the 80's and early 90's were a distinct period of "anti-unification" in the CF (thus why, as Shelldrake asked, this wasn't in place years ago).   I feel this has had some negative effects on the CF, such as the elimination of Army and Naval Aviation in the interest of pre-Unification empire building by the Services.   However, with the growth of the importance of the DCDS and the primacy of "Jointness" in the CF right now, we are seeing the idea of a Unified defence force regaining momentum (possibly for good?).   The unification of regional headquarters which are based along functional/territorial lines rather than service based ones is a good indicator of this.

There are many good papers on this topic at the Canadian Forces College website.   Among others, Colonel Gosselin's NSSC paper is an excellent intro to the topic (you'll find much of what I've said in here):

http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/papers/nssc/nssc6/gosselin.htm

Cheers,
Infanteer


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## Teddy Ruxpin (6 Jun 2005)

Some good points, Infanteer, but I think the linkage between unification and jointness isn't all that you make it out to be.

Unification required a single service, with a common operating and training structure, common traditions _and_ a joint operational focus.

Jointness leaves force generation in the hands of each service (including much of the training program), but provides a tri-service operational capability.

I love jointness, but hated unification...

A couple of points:  first, IMHO the CDS is reflecting a distinctly American point of view with the Command structure.  In the US Army, FORSCOM force generates for the combatant commands (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, etc.), who are the force employers.



> A Unified Combatant Command is composed of forces from two or more services, has a broad and continuing mission, and is normally organized on a geographical basis into regions known as "Areas Of Responsibility" (AORs).


 (Sound familiar?  From the CENTCOM website.)

In our context, CANADACOM (even the terminology is the same) will be the force employer, through a series of regional HQs.  The Army will still force generate for that component command.  We'll also have an overseas component command (MAPLE LEAF COM?) that will do the same thing.

Secondly, this isn't as radical as it sounds.  At present, each of the Army's LF Areas have the responsibility for domestic operations within boundaries. Each one of them could be required to generate a joint TF HQ in support of domestic operations.  We did this for OP PEREGRINE, for example, and employed forces from the Army, Navy and AF under one HQ.  What the CDS' plan does is institutionalize this process and make it permanent, thus reducing response times (at least on the command and control level).  Permanently assigning capabilities to units like JTF-2 will further increase readiness.  This, in part, explains why this was not done before - it wasn't deemed necessary pre-9/11 when the readiness requirements were somewhat less than they are now.  The US component command structure has evolved over a fairly long period of time



			
				RoyalHighlandFusilier said:
			
		

> Well, gotta give the generals and colonels that we seem to have a lot something to do.



Never worked in a HQ, have you?  

Cheers,

Teddy


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## Infanteer (6 Jun 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Some good points, Infanteer, but I think the linkage between unification and jointness isn't all that you make it out to be.



Hence why I said _"which I feel is a slightly different approach to the same concept"_.   To me, it appears that Unification is a bottom up procedure while Jointness is a top down one.   Unification has a single basic training school and a common uniform, while Jointness doesn't require this.   I think the dominance of Jointness (which is, as I said, a bit different then Unification) in the current defence environment is reviving and reinforcing many of the key themes of Unification which Hellyer originally intended; this is one of them.

There are many things I didn't like about Unification (attacking service culture and identity is one of them) but, in general, I think Hellyer's motives were good and his general concept was sound (unified source for military advice and command).



			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Secondly, this isn't as radical as it sounds.   At present, each of the Army's LF Areas have the responsibility for domestic operations within boundaries. Each one of them could be required to generate a joint TF HQ in support of domestic operations.



Just curious, who did the previous Land Force Area Commanders report to?  I am assuming to the Land Staff?  Is this how the other forces operated as well - Pacific and Atlantic Fleet answering to the Maritime Staff and 1 Canadian Air Div reporting to the Air Staff?

If these changes are truely functional, are these Unified regional commands answering to the DCDS now?


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## KevinB (6 Jun 2005)

Gee I wonder how the AF and Navy are taking this.

 Perhaps its my ARMY bias and history - but to me it sound like we are finally "Either your Infantry or you support the Infantry"

I can dull that down to Support the Army for the tracktoads and Herbie's  :-*

I just hope Hillier does not make to many more enemies that try to plot to make this fail.


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## old medic (6 Jun 2005)

> "Either your Infantry or you support the Infantry"



It's interesting to see everyone reading different things into this.  
I am extremely cynical. The more I look at the original article
the more I cringe. 

For example I look at 


> so the Armed Forces can deal more quickly with natural disasters


and;


> how to better work with other government departments and non-governmental agencies.



and I read less infantry, less everything.  More pretending to be the peace corps and
fire fighters.

Perhaps after years of cut after cut I'm jaded. Or perhaps it's specific words in the article:



> the restructuring should be to streamline the military



I always associate that word streamline with "budget cut" or worse yet: " lost capability ".

Of course, given the makeup of the committee I suspect the recommendations are already
a foregone conclusion.

Time will tell.

Sorry all, just an aside:

<RANT>
When did the Canadian Press change the honourifics for General ranks to Mr.? 
</RANT>


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## Teddy Ruxpin (6 Jun 2005)

Well, I was intimately involved in slapping together a joint HQ for OP PEREGRINE and can say that having something in place will make things much, much easier.  As was explored on another thread a long time ago, the CF has no hesitation in saying it is the absolute force of last resort when it comes to assistance to civil authorities.

Reading between the lines, a lot of the "domestic" part of the restructure is a direct result of Bi-National Planning Group activity and our relationship with USNORTHCOM.  NORTHCOM was very anxious to have the CF as a direct reporting agency, as it is very concerned with control of airspace and sea approaches to the continent. At my level, I was beat on several times by Americans wanting information on force structure, joint planning, and "direct liaison" with Canadian units.  Having a CANADACOM will allow us to deal with NORTHCOM on a bi-lateral level without giving NORTHCOM control over Canadian assets - a cunning plan, IMHO, given the current political climate.  It isn't all about shovelling snow in TO...

Cheers,

Teddy


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## McG (6 Jun 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> We'll also have an overseas component command (MAPLE LEAF COM?) that will do the same thing.


Does that not (more or less) already exist within the DCDS office?


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## Enzo (6 Jun 2005)

_*"Another is looking at how to better recruit, train and deploy people.

The Paul Martin government has said it wants to increase the size of the military by 8,000 people during the next five years."*_ 

So, can we expect efficiency within the recruiting and training process? Or should we continue to enjoy anywhere from approx. >6mo (if your ducks are in a row, you haven't done anything to raise an eyebrow and you're lucky) to 2-3 years before one swears their oath.


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## Infanteer (6 Jun 2005)

I am still unsure of the lines of Command - do these new Regional Commands report to the DCDS, along with the functional commands?  Can anyone fill this in for me?

PS.  I suggest "Expeditionary Forces Command" for the name of Joint HQ controlling, for the CDS through the DCDS, Canadian Forces deployed overseas - it sounds cool.... :warstory:


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## Teddy Ruxpin (6 Jun 2005)

MCG said:
			
		

> Does that not (more or less) already exist within the DCDS office?



Yes and no.   I believe that the idea of the deployable "expeditionary command" (I like that name too) is to act as the NCE for any Roto 0s.   The idea may well be to divorce the operational HQ from NDHQ - not a bad thing in my view - but we'll have to wait out and see what the actual plan is.   You could well see J3 Intl staff embedded within the expeditionary HQ and the JOG go by the wayside.



> I am still unsure of the lines of Command - do these new Regional Commands report to the DCDS, along with the functional commands?   Can anyone fill this in for me?



As for command and control, it should be fairly simple and reflect what we actually do when deploying a TF domestically.   That is:

Regional HQ ------->CANADACOM-------->DCDS-------->CDS

It appears that there's another layer of HQ here, but there really isn't.   I gather (educated guess) that CANADACOM would assume the operational functions of the four LF Areas, MARCOM, CANR, and 1 CAD, splitting the responsibilities between itself and the regional HQs.   It might even include the J3 Continental staff from the DCDS' shop, reducing staffing further.   This would take us from eight HQ's to five - not bad.


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## ArmyRick (6 Jun 2005)

Interesting thread, does anybody know how the commands and regions are breaking down? Combat teams are out and task forces are in......


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## GO!!! (6 Jun 2005)

Perhaps this means we will be able to do Herc jumps on less than 6months notice....

The AF and Navy must be shuddering, a military with the Infantry in command YES  ;D


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## Infanteer (7 Jun 2005)

Why the Air Force and the Navy should be shuddering, I am unsure of - in the joint environment, all three Services have an equal role to play.   What Unification means is that the independent interests of the Services are subordinated to a cohesive plan for National Defence.   In my view, we need to take a view similar to the Australians and look to a unified and joint maritime strategy.

Canada is essentially, like Australia, an island.   We are bounded on 3 sides by oceans and on the fourth by a neighbour with which we share a symbiotic relationship that is unique within the world - if Canada is going to use its Forces to pursue its National Interest and Foreign Policy it will be doing so, as we have for the last century, away from our shores and through the sea.

As well, conflict is and will be dominated by the large populations that flock to urban environments and the littoral - if we prepare ourselves with a proper maritime strategy, we can use the mobility of Naval power to allow us to "punch above our weight".   The Aussies are exploring and developing this concept with "Maneuver Operations in a Littoral Environment" (MOLE) - I feel we should do the same.   Conflict is a human affair, and humans live not under water or in the air but on the land.   If we are to have efficient and effective military, we must have the Navy and the Air Force to project and sustain the Army while it does the job on land.

As LtCmdr Bob Moyse writes in his excellent article on a Maritime Strategy:

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/AbstractsOnline/AAJournal/2004_W/AAJ_Winter_2004_AmphibWarfare.pdf



> "any operational concept developed must be tri-service both in tone and character.   An intellectual and philosophical recognition of interdependence is vital because neither the Navy nor the Air Force can control the maritime environment without the Army."



Likewise, the Army cannot do without the Air Force and the Navy; same for the Air Force.   Without the Navy, the Army is just a bunch of guys running around that are a LONG way from Canada.   Without the Air Force, we are a two-dimensional Army, lacking the flexibility and reach that the force multiplier of Air Power brings to the table.   Jointness is a top down approach that must factor what each Service can best bring to the table.   Deriding the Navy and the Air Force is quite unproductive in Defence structure where we can't do anything without them....


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## Teddy Ruxpin (7 Jun 2005)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Interesting thread, does anybody know how the commands and regions are breaking down? Combat teams are out and task forces are in......



Actually, the waters are pretty muddy terminology-wise and this was just clarified.  We're using the term "task force" slightly incorrectly.  A TF is the deployed element - TF Kabul, etc..  It might include combat teams, battle groups (both terms now back in vogue), helicopters, ships, etc..  Thus a theoretical TF Kandahar might consist of a PRT, Bde HQ, Battle Group and other supporting units.



> The AF and Navy must be shuddering, a military with the Infantry in command YES



Infanteer has already engaged on this, but you do know that the CDS is a black hat, right?  And that the current head of his action teams is Air Force?

Teddy


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## Ex-Dragoon (7 Jun 2005)

GO!!! said:
			
		

> Perhaps this means we will be able to do Herc jumps on less than 6months notice....
> 
> The AF and Navy must be shuddering, a military with the Infantry in command YES   ;D



I never understood why some people constantly gloat over the fact that capabilities of the air force and navy might be weakened to prop up the army....  :


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## Gunner98 (7 Jun 2005)

I believe the last Infantry Forum stated that the term Task Force may be on its way out and Combat Teams are coming back.  Watch and shoot.


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## GO!!! (7 Jun 2005)

Ex-Dragoon said:
			
		

> I never understood why some people constantly gloat over the fact that capabilities of the air force and navy might be weakened to prop up the army....   :



Not so much gloating as revelling in the possibility that we may turn the air force into more of an Army Air Corps, and the Navy into an entity suitable for movement of troops and equipment, and not just naval supplies. In other words, if it is not supporting the Army, perhaps the item/capability needs to be re-evaluated.


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## Bert (8 Jun 2005)

I don't think its accurate to take an elemental perspective and over-simply the
distribution of resources.  From what has been seen, the CF constantly
evolves and changes.  Recently initiatives are to expand on expeditionary and rapid
reaction forces in military.  To achieve that level of quick response competence,
better interoperability, readiness standards and simplification is needed between the 
elements and its been in motion for some time.  Equipment acquisition plans and t
raining provided to deployable units seem to suggest this is what we're going to get.

Perhaps members from all army, air force, or navy units see this as an elemental
centric issue.  Those that have experience in joint environments and taskings or
units that support all elements see the benefits of jointness as something
we should had for many years.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (8 Jun 2005)

Gunner98 said:
			
		

> I believe the last Infantry Forum stated that the term Task Force may be on its way out and Combat Teams are coming back.   Watch and shoot.



As I said, TF is for deployed ops only.  Combat team and battle group are "official" again...

Cheers,

TR


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## Infanteer (8 Jun 2005)

GO!!! said:
			
		

> Not so much gloating as revelling in the possibility that we may turn the air force into more of an Army Air Corps,



Army Air Corps do not protect Air Space or Strategically Project Airpower to well (unless they are monstrosities like the USAAC of WWII, which was so big it gained its independence) - they should be proficient at doing what they are supposed to do; CAS and general ground support.   This is why I believe that the Army should blaze its own trail with regards to CAS, bringing equipment, doctrine, and career structures into the Army fold while letting the Air Force cover the strategic projection of Airpower/Spacepower gig.



> and the Navy into an entity suitable for movement of troops and equipment, and not just naval supplies. In other words, if it is not supporting the Army, perhaps the item/capability needs to be re-evaluated.



Kinda hard to move around when you have no control of the Sea Lanes and no ability to project your Naval/Maritime Power into the littoral.   The Navy is not a glorified taxi service - infact, I'd argue that Jackie Fisher's remark that the Army is something for the Royal Navy to shoot out is much more apt, especially when you consider Canada's geostrategic situation (as I said above, for all intensive purposes we are an island).

Each Service has a responsibility to Joint Force as well as its own independent functions (application of Land/Air-Space/Naval power) - I believe that these independent functions are "force multiplied" if they are blended into a Joint setting.

I jotted down a little circle diagram that kinda expressed my thoughts.   All three Services should focus on building their "colour" based upon Cohesive Joint Force Doctrine "flowing out" from the Purple Center; they use the purple center to define their unique and independent function, which then flows back into to Purple center as military force.   Each contribution is based upon unique and distinct Service culture, but a full-range of capability is required from each Service to make "purple" work.   

Dumping on the Navy or the Air Force for the sake of "Team Green" (which was the reason we had Unification in the first place) does nothing to "draw the arrow" into the central Joint Forces function.   It is just as foolish as saying "We don't need to fund a standing Army as we can build a strong Air Force/Navy to keep the hordes away from Canada."


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## KevinB (8 Jun 2005)

I think GO!'s point (not to put words in his mouth) is that we will be back to basics - in that the combat power of the Army (speciafically boots on the ground) will be the primary issue.

 For Herc jumps - heck we could not get one stinking Herc for the 60th Anniversary of the Abn last year - we had to do a shit load of chalks in CH146's.  With a regional setup - the Western Region coudl simply allocate AC.

 Both the Navy and the AF have their roles - however it would be nice to play together more often.  Doing Amphib assaults with the Navy - and combined Airborne/Airmobile -It might not be glorious for the Navy and AF - but it gets our boots ont he ground se we can act.  Projecting Power with the Navy and AF - and supporting/transporting the Army is not within the current budget - hopefully the intergration of commands can get us all working on the same page, and a little give in either direction.


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## FSTO (8 Jun 2005)

Quoted from a CMS memo from last month "The CDS Vision and DPS make it clear that the pre-positioning of sea-based military capability for operations ashore will constitute a primary focus of Horizon 1 joint force development, generation and employment efforts across the CF. A uniquely Canadian light and fast amphibious capability, enabled by JSS and a new â Å“amphibious type shipâ ? is envisaged as part of the emerging SCTF construct."

Therefore the Navy has stood up a working group to get the ball rolling. 
May 10 there was a brief from two Royal Marines on RN Amphib ops.

The CMS memo ended with this: "My aim is to assist us all in easing the culture shift of joint/army/air staff officers to sea billets, and to smooth the integration of combat arms and tactical helicopter/UAV elements to sea-based SCTF operations."

The entire memo can be acessed through the DIN (DND Intranet) here.

http://maritime.mil.ca/english/cmssuite/May/May2005/02-06/RDIMS%2044974.doc

The Navy is very serious here, and if the CF is smart, we'll strip mine the needed info and lessons learned from the RN, Royal Marines, USN and USMC to get ourselves into amphibious operations quickly and with the minimum amount of pain.


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## Ex-Dragoon (8 Jun 2005)

Its no good if we become a glorified taxi service without the ability to protect the troops as Go is advocating.


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## ArmyRick (8 Jun 2005)

Combat Teams are back in and Task Force Out? No I am fairly confident that its the other way around Gunner98. I say this because of what our OC passed along in one of his O Gp. 
I know the term combat team in US Army refers to Brigade Combat Teams which is their own transformation (to produce more F echelon units).

I have looked at the PPT on the CDS web site and I beleive it uses the term Task Force alot.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (8 Jun 2005)

I find myself in the interesting position of quoting myself...from this thread!



			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Actually, the waters are pretty muddy terminology-wise and this was just clarified.   We're using the term "task force" slightly incorrectly.   A TF is the deployed element - TF Kabul, etc..   It might include combat teams, battle groups (both terms now back in vogue), helicopters, ships, etc..   Thus a theoretical TF Kandahar might consist of a PRT, Bde HQ, Battle Group and other supporting units.



Adding to the confusion is the fact that the managed readiness plan has been using the term "task force" (as in TF 01-06 for what really is the 1 PPCLI Battle Group) to describe a potentially deployable entity - in other words, using overseas terminology here in Canada.  This is because (for instance) 01-06 includes more than just 1 PPCLI.  I have the e-mail sorting all this out at work and can post tomorrow.


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## McG (9 Jun 2005)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> Combat Teams are back in and Task Force Out? No I am fairly confident that its the other way around.


I'm fairly confident it is neither way.  Both terms are acceptable and describe different things.  A Combat Team is a grouping of an infantry company and an armoured squadron (traditionally a tank squadron).  A Battle Group is a grouping based on a manoeuvre battalion that includes other arms.  A Task Force is any size organization that has been put together for an operation.  A BG or Cbt Tm could each be a TF, or they could be a component of a TF.  I believe that Op PEREGRINE peaked at six separate TF in various parts of BC fighting the fires (so a TF need not be deployed internationally).


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## Teddy Ruxpin (9 Jun 2005)

Exactly.     ;D

PEREGRINE is a bad example, though.   We misused the term "TF" for the units fighting the fires, while in Ottawa, the entire mission was TF PEREGRINE.   It caused massive confusion and was a major POR point.   How do I know?   I was G3 Operations LFWA at the time and - concurrently - G3 Ops PEREGRINE.

Edit:   Now that I'm in the office, I can post this by way of a clear explanation.   The source is unimpeachable and this reflects the official POV:



> (1)	What do we call combined arms units? The Army has gone back to the terms Battle Group (BG) and Combat Team (Cbt Tm), We have stopped using the terms Tactically Self Sufficient Unit (TSSU) and Combined Arms Team (CAT).
> 
> (2)	What is a Task Force?
> 
> ...



I have cut out one or two sensitive parts from this e-mail, but you get the idea.   Hope this helps.

Teddy


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## McG (9 Jun 2005)

Have we dropped the process of putting the word "Joint" at the front of any TF that includes elements of more than one enviroment?  I notice your email quote uses "TF" to describe what would have been a "JTF."


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## Teddy Ruxpin (9 Jun 2005)

Hmmm...good point.

Doctrine would dictate that a "Joint Task Force" would require a land, sea and air component commander operating as part of a single entity.  On a very large operation involving two or more elements (each with their respective commanders) the term "joint" would come into the title.  As a good example, OP APOLLO was controlled by JTFSWA out of Tampa - it had land, air and naval component commanders.  We also used it during the G8 summit.

By definition, all TFs are supposed to be "joint" in one way or another.  For instance, TF Kabul has control over all CA air assets in theatre.  Even TF PEREGRINE was "joint" and commanded helicopters and naval fire fighting parties...all very "interesting"!  None of them, though, had separate component commanders.


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## John Nayduk (28 Jun 2005)

Canada overhauls domestic defence
Last Updated Tue, 28 Jun 2005 12:36:37 EDT 
CBC News
Canada's military simplified its domestic command structure on Tuesday, saying the goal was to respond more quickly to domestic disasters and terrorist threats. 


INDEPTH: Canadian Military

  
Vice-Admiral Jean Forcier, Tuesday.  
The new command is to be headed by Vice-Admiral Jean Forcier, a Trois Rivières native who has been in the service more than 33 years. Forcier will oversee six new regional commanders from his position in Department of National Defence headquarters in Ottawa, officials announced Tuesday. 

The aim is to cut red tape and deploy soldiers and supplies quickly across the country when they are needed. 

"[It will] allow us to react more quickly and more effectively to events across Canada, including the North," federal Defence Minister Bill Graham told reporters. 

Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier said regional commanders will have the authority to deploy land, sea and air resources where they are needed, without going through what he called the current structure's "complex matrix" of commanders. 

"We are going to simplify that, move very much to a command-centric structure," he said. 

"Although we have always treated defence and security ... seriously, we have not done it in a manner that satisfies me, or the rest of the men and women in uniform or the civilians who support us," the general said. 

Graham said the new command will also improve co-ordination between the military and Canada's security and border control agencies, while reinforcing the country's commitments under the North American Aerospace Defence Command. 

He said the announcement was the first step in a larger plan to revamp Canada's military, a force that has been criticized by the U.S. and other NATO allies as underfunded. 

Graham said subsequent revisions, which were not described in detail on Tuesday, would include new equipment and technologies. 

"However, this transformation will not happen overnight. It's a long-term and continuous process," the minister said. 

Hillier promised a "complete transformation of the Canadian Forces ... in a profound, not a cosmetic alteration." 


Copyright ©2005 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation - All Rights Reserved


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## Cloud Cover (28 Jun 2005)

I feel safer already. :


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## Grunt_031 (28 Jun 2005)

> Forcier will oversee six new regional commanders from his position in Department of National Defence headquarters in Ottawa



Another layer of Command? How is this cutting red tape. 

Will these "units"  report directly to him? or through the C ocf C anready in place. 

If the current C of C is ineffective or cumbersome, fix it, streamline, but not add to it.

CDS-Area-Unit, what is the problem?


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## Scoobie Newbie (28 Jun 2005)

At least they're trying something.


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## McG (28 Jun 2005)

Domestic ops will be run through this new chain.   Participating units/formations will be cut OPCOM to the Canada Command.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (28 Jun 2005)

It is NOT another layer of command. The Areas will go. This has been extensively discussed here:

http://forums.army.ca/forums/threads/31276.0.html

Some background reading would be in order before rounds are fired at the concept... Personally, I think getting operations away from Disneyland on the Rideau is a great thing and that the CDS is well on the right track.


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## pbi (28 Jun 2005)

Each HQ will be like a JFHQ: there will be a designated commander (for example, probably a naval commander in Pacific Command), but the other elements will be represented by the right kind of joint staff, so that the right "colour" is giving advice to the JFC on par5ticular issues or ops. The Land Force Area HQs will be folded into these regional commands, possibly as a sort of "Land Component Command". LFWA will probably be split up between the Pacific Command and the Prairie Command. Essentially, as Teddy explained, a complete level of stand-alone Army C2 will vanish, so that the chain of command will be CDS-CanadaComd-JFHQ-formation (ie: 1 CMBG or 38 CBG)-unit. For folks down at unit level, it should be pretty transparent. It is at Bde and above where we will feel the big changes.

Cheers.


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## McG (28 Jun 2005)

pbi said:
			
		

> The Land Force Area HQs will be folded into these regional commands, possibly as a sort of "Land Component Command".


Sounds a lot like some proposals passed about between mbrs of this site.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (28 Jun 2005)

Pretty close, actually:

JTF Pacific
JTF Prairie
JTF Central 
JTF North
JTF Eastern (Quebec)
JTF Atlantic (first to stand up - based on MARLANT and LFAA)

That gives the six mentioned in the article.   The terminology is that being used in Ottawa.

Cheers,

TR

_edit to update info_


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## Fishbone Jones (28 Jun 2005)

Oh man. I can see all the ninjasniperwannabes hanging around their local watering hole now! ;D

"Hey there sweetcheeks, do you know I'm part of the JTF?"


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## Teddy Ruxpin (28 Jun 2005)

Bloody hell... ;D  The walts will always find a way regardless...


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## Acorn (29 Jun 2005)

Words I heard included "region" not JTF. 

Joint Region Pacific (BC)
JR Prairie (AB, SK, MB)
JR North (currently Northern Region)
JR Central (ON)
JR East (QC)
JR Atlantic (NB, NS, PEI, NF)

I think we need to wait a bit before we find out what the real nomenclature will be.

Acorn


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Jun 2005)

Got my terms while in Ottawa last week - right from the source, so to speak (no, not the CDS himself..!)

Watch and shoot, though... You could well be right.  We have too many damned TFs running around now!


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## McG (29 Jun 2005)

My initial impression was that Canada Comd would be parallel to the current force generation commands (the Navy's two coasts & the army's areas).   As it seems I miss-interpreted, will the LF area training centres fall directly under LFDTS (as opposed to the new Joint Area)?   What comd will be resp for infrastructure & bases?


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## McG (29 Jun 2005)

> Command Canada to stand on guard
> By SCOTT DEVEAU
> Tuesday, June 28, 2005 Updated at 11:08 AM EDT
> Globe and Mail Update
> ...


http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20050628.w2defence0628/BNStory/National/


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## Infanteer (29 Jun 2005)

http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/index.html

More of the same, so I won't put it up.

However, one line caught my attention:



> The officer in charge of Canada Command will be the second most powerful uniformed officer in the Canadian Forces â â€œ reporting directly to the chief of defence staff.



Is this Commander going to be above the VCDS and the DCDS in authority?

As well:



> The Department of National Defence said the commander of Canada Command "will be responsible for the conduct of all domestic operations â â€œ routine and contingency â â€œ and will be the national operational authority for the defence of Canada and North America."
> 
> That means the new Canada Command will be this country's equivalent of the U.S. military's Northern Command, created after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
> 
> ...



So, the way I'm understanding it is that "Canada Command" is a unit under the CDS.  This unit has six sub-units (the regional headquarters).  Canada Command will issue all orders for Domestic Operations and the Regional Commands will be the active Force Employers.

Questions:

Will this be the regular Chain-of Command for all of our forces now?  (eg: 3 PPCLI ---> 1 CMBG ---> Prairie Command ---> Canada Command)?

Will the Regional Commands be Joint "Force Generators" for Overseas Operations?

Will the DCDS group still run the show for Overseas Operations?


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Jun 2005)

A couple of points AFAIK:

-  Support isn't sorted out yet.  There is some talk of a "Support Command", but that is years off.  My guess is that the current Wing/Base/ASU structure will remain in place, reporting to their respective Regional Commands.

-  CANADACOM is the exact equivalent of US NORTHCOM in that it is a force employer only.  The same holds true for the Regional "Commands".  Thus the Land Component of each regional command force generates for its new joint HQ and for overseas missions.

A scenario for illustration:  say there's massive flooding in Manitoba along the Red River, affecting both the Province and North Dakota.  The Province asks for military assistance and the request for which is passed to the MND.  MND directs the CDS to assist. 

This now becomes a CANADACOM mission.  Because the incident is in Prairie Region's AOR, it is responsible to CANADACOM for mission execution.  Prairie Region's MGen is instantly the "on-scene" commander.  He can direct his Land Component commander (a BGen) to deploy troops, his Air Component commander to deploy helicopters, can get airlift for evacuations instantly via CANADACOM and has - with one phone call - access to neighbouring regional formations.  CANADACOM is plugged right into US NORTHCOM, the American (Federal) force employer for any cross-border activity or issues.
  
For overseas service, deployments will fall under CEFCOM (Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command - love the name).  The environmental components force generate (via the regional commands) for CEFCOM on both a routine and "as required" basis.  Thus the Land Component commander for Prairie Region could be told to force generate an infantry BG for deployment OPCOM CEFCOM, which commands overseas.  Not much different than what we do now.  What I don't have sight of at the moment is where (if at all) CANADACOM fits into the force generation structure.  It is entirely possible that this will remain an "army" thing for now (ie:  CDS to CLS to Comd Land Component JTF Prairie)...  Watch and shoot.

Finally, Comd CANADACOM is a force employer (in the US: "Commander of a Combatant Command") and (as such) reports directly to the CDS for operations.  Look at it as the equivalent of CLS, etc..  It is entirely possible that the DCDS shop will fold into the Commands (J3 Intl to CEFCOM and J3 Cntl to CANADACOM, for instance) but I haven't seen anything on this.

I don't know if this is clear or not - let me know if I've been inarticulate.

Cheers,

TR


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Jun 2005)

This just in:



> CANFORGEN 116/05 CDS 053/05 281555Z JUN 05
> CANADA COMMAND AND JOINT TASK FORCE ATLANTIC COMMANDERS AND STAND UP DATE
> CANADA COMMAND
> 
> ...



Note the terminology - "Joint Task Force Atlantic".


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## McG (29 Jun 2005)

. . . so, LFAA will still exist.  It will be responsible to LFC for force generation, but it will be responsible to JTFA for Dom Ops?


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## CH1 (29 Jun 2005)

Calling all OT's.

Doesn't this sound familiar?  Good step forward!  This sounds like we are stepping back some 30+ years with some modernised ideas.  Wonder if we will see the return of the sheep's head for Prairie Com?

Cheers


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## Infanteer (29 Jun 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> For overseas service, deployments will fall under CEFCOM (Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command - love the name).   The environmental components force generate (via the regional commands) for CEFCOM on both a routine and "as required" basis.   Thus the Land Component commander for Prairie Region could be told to force generate an infantry BG for deployment OPCOM CEFCOM, which commands overseas.   Not much different than what we do now.   What I don't have sight of at the moment is where (if at all) CANADACOM fits into the force generation structure.   It is entirely possible that this will remain an "army" thing for now (ie:   CDS to CLS to Comd Land Component JTF Prairie)...   Watch and shoot.



You're right, I do love the name (because I also proposed it 6 months ago.... ).

1)  Will CEFCOM be another Command on the same level as CANCOM?  EG: Canada will deploy forces to Durkastan - CEFCOM will designate what is required and the tagged regional commands will generate the required Forces.  The NCE of the mission will report to CEFCOM who reports (like CANCOM) to the CDS.

2)  Will CANCOM (and CEFCOM) report directly to the CDS?  If so, does this represent an evolution (and a loss of power) for the DCDS and his staff (I thought that all operations reported to the CDS *through* the DCDS group - the way I understood it, this was a post-Somalia reform).

3)  What are the Environmental Chiefs doing now that we have Joint Regional Commands - does anyone report to them anymore?  Do they now only deal with training, doctrine, etc, etc?  If so, this seems to be a loss of position for the Service Chiefs that they clawed back in the 1980's-1990's and a victory for Unification (as CH1 pointed out).


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## Gunner98 (29 Jun 2005)

I was briefed thru HSS CoC that ECS and other staff in NDHQ will have strategic planning responsibilities only.   They are still working on the concept of a Support Command.   It seems to be a combination of Cdn historical, US Army and Marine terminology.


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## Acorn (29 Jun 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> So, the way I'm understanding it is that "Canada Command" is a unit under the CDS.   This unit has six sub-units (the regional headquarters).   Canada Command will issue all orders for Domestic Operations and the Regional Commands will be the active Force Employers.



A semantic correction: CANCOM would be a higher _formation_. The Regional JTFs (I bow to Teddy and the CANFORGEN) would also be _formations_, and would have _subordinate formations_ (CMBGs and CBGs for the army).

Acorn


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## Old Sweat (29 Jun 2005)

Surely Canadacom is a command and the commander would have the powers of an officer commanding a command.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Jun 2005)

Acorn's right - CANADACOM is a formation, roughly equivalent to LFC, etc..



> 1)   Will CEFCOM be another Command on the same level as CANCOM?   EG: Canada will deploy forces to Durkastan - CEFCOM will designate what is required and the tagged regional commands will generate the required Forces.   The NCE of the mission will report to CEFCOM who reports (like CANCOM) to the CDS.


   More or less, yes.   Although the force generation part is still unclear to me.   The Army may well do it, working through the Land Component Commander in each Regional JTF.   I'm not sure they have the CEFCOM part fully worked out yet.

As an aside, the LF Area would likely become the Land Component portions of the new HQs.   Comd LFWA, then, could become the Land Component Commander for JTF Prairie.



> 2)   Will CANCOM (and CEFCOM) report directly to the CDS?   If so, does this represent an evolution (and a loss of power) for the DCDS and his staff (I thought that all operations reported to the CDS *through* the DCDS group - the way I understood it, this was a post-Somalia reform).


   Guessing, yes, I should think that the DCDS would "evolve" into CEFCOM and CANADACOM - replaced (eventually) by both.   DCDS is really the CF J3 (hence COS J3, etc), so the position could eventually "transform" in that direction.   We're talking massive restructure here.



> 3)   What are the Environmental Chiefs doing now that we have Joint Regional Commands - does anyone report to them anymore?   Do they now only deal with training, doctrine, etc, etc?   If so, this seems to be a loss of position for the Service Chiefs that they clawed back in the 1980's-1990's and a victory for Unification (as CH1 pointed out).


   The ECs don't command on operations anyway - any operation.   Even for domestic operations, the Area Commanders (currently responsible for Dom Ops) report directly to the DCDS for operational matters.   Until the entire structure shakes out, the ECs may not have to change much.



> Doesn't this sound familiar?   Good step forward!   This sounds like we are stepping back some 30+ years with some modernised ideas.   Wonder if we will see the return of the sheep's head for Prairie Com?


   It isn't the the Hellyer fiasco discussed on other thread.   It is joint, not unified - there is a significant difference (see my point above).   The Ram's head is currently used by 1 CMBG, 1 ASG and LFWA - it never really left.

Cheers,

Teddy


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## Infanteer (29 Jun 2005)

Acorn said:
			
		

> A semantic correction: CANCOM would be a higher _formation_. The Regional JTFs (I bow to Teddy and the CANFORGEN) would also be _formations_, and would have _subordinate formations_ (CMBGs and CBGs for the army).





			
				Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Acorn's right - CANADACOM is a formation, roughly equivalent to LFC, etc..



Yeah, I was aware of that - I was only using unit and sub-unit to simplfy it in an attempt to make out the new "lines and boxes" for Chain-of-Command and responsibilities.   My fault for not using the right lingo.... 



> More or less, yes.   Although the force generation part is still unclear to me.   The Army may well do it, working through the Land Component Commander in each Regional JTF.   I'm not sure they have the CEFCOM part fully worked out yet.



Is it necessary to have a "Land Component Command", along with, I'm assuming, an "Air Component Commander" and a "Maritime Component Commander" in Regional Commands?   Doesn't this just obfuscate the need for a Regional Commander if all he is going to do is to deal with independent commands under him?

It seems to me that we may have just created another layer of Command.



> As an aside, the LF Area would likely become the Land Component portions of the new HQs.   Comd LFWA, then, could become the Land Component Commander for JTF Prairie.



What do we still need LFWA for?   I am assuming the 39 CBG will now fall under Pacific Command while 1 CMBG, 41 and 38 CBG fall under Prairie Command.



> Guessing, yes, I should think that the DCDS would "evolve" into CEFCOM and CANADACOM - replaced (eventually) by both.   DCDS is really the CF J3 (hence COS J3, etc), so the position could eventually "transform" in that direction.   We're talking massive restructure here.



Hmmm, if we now have Formation Commanders responsible directly to the CDS, than I could see the DCDS losing some stature as he returns to being a Staff Member (my understanding was that the DCDS group had Command Authority when it came to operations).



> The ECs don't command on operations anyway - any operation.   Even for domestic operations, the Area Commanders (currently responsible for Dom Ops) report directly to the DCDS for operational matters.   Until the entire structure shakes out, the ECs may not have to change much.



But doesn't, under the current mixup, the major Service formations report to their respective Service Staffs?   LFWA, LFCA, LFNA, SQFT, and LFWA report to CLS, while Pacific and Atlantic Fleets report to CMS and 1st Air Div reports to CAS?   Is that not correct?

If the above is how it works, than I'd imagine substanital change if now all these areas are broken up and instead report to Regional Commanders and Canada Command.



> It is joint, not unified - there is a significant difference (see my point above).



I guess, if there is a Component Commander for each Service in each Region, then yes - this is more Joint than Unified.   I still think that Unified Commands should be the eventual target as they are better integrated and can skim off an entire layer of the C-of-C.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Jun 2005)

> Is it necessary to have a "Land Component Command", along with, I'm assuming, an "Air Component Commander" and a "Maritime Component Commander" in Regional Commands?  Doesn't this just obfuscate the need for a Regional Commander if all he is going to do is to deal with independent commands under him?
> 
> It seems to me that we may have just created another layer of Command.
> 
> What do we still need LFWA for?  I am assuming the 39 CBG will now fall under Pacific Command while 1 CMBG, 41 and 38 CBG fall under Prairie Command.


  Right, LFWA would get the chop - as would MARPAC, 1 CAD, etc.  It isn't another level of command.  By my count we go from around eight HQs to six.  A Joint HQ has to have each component commander as the technical expert for force employment and to simplify the command and control.  The component commanders would each be part of the Regional HQ.  For example (from deployed ops), JTFSWA in Tampa had a BGen Comd.  Under him were a naval component commander (embarked in the Gulf), a Land Component Commander (in Afghanistan) and an air component commander (at Mirage).  All reported to the same boss - one HQ.



> Hmmm, if we now have Formation Commanders responsible directly to the CDS, than I could see the DCDS losing some stature as he returns to being a Staff Member (my understanding was that the DCDS group had Command Authority when it came to operations).


  The DCDS runs operations on behalf of the CDS.  It is staff authority, rather than command (not that there's much difference at that level!).



> But doesn't, under the current mixup, the major Service formations report to their respective Service Staffs?  LFWA, LFCA, LFNA, SQFT, and LFWA report to CLS, while Pacific and Atlantic Fleets report to CMS and 1st Air Div reports to CAS?  Is that not correct?


  Yes, but not for operations.  ALL operations report to the DCDS shop, although the Navy and AF have slightly different ways of doing business.  The Navy runs operations centres on each coast that report to the DCDS, while the AF has CANR which does the same.  Each LFA has an operations centre that reports directly to J Staff for operations.  Note, though, that none of these entities report - _on operational matters_ - to the Service Chiefs.  They are merely kept informed as a matter of courtesy and because the Services do all the force generation for operations.  DLFR is double-hatted as J3 Land.



> If the above is how it works, than I'd imagine substanital change if now all these areas are broken up and instead report to Regional Commanders and Canada Command.


  That's for sure!!



> I guess, if there is a Component Commander for each Service in each Region, then yes - this is more Joint than Unified.  I still think that Unified Commands should be the eventual target as they are better integrated and can skim off an entire layer of the C-of-C.


  The structure should evolve over time.  The "environments" may well disappear, but I personally would prefer training and procurement to be an Army matter as opposed to "purple".

Cheers,

TR


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## Infanteer (29 Jun 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Right, LFWA would get the chop - as would MARPAC, 1 CAD, etc.   It isn't another level of command.   By my count we go from around eight HQs to six.   A Joint HQ has to have each component commander as the technical expert for force employment and to simplify the command and control.   The component commanders would each be part of the Regional HQ.   For example (from deployed ops), JTFSWA in Tampa had a BGen Comd.   Under him were a naval component commander (embarked in the Gulf), a Land Component Commander (in Afghanistan) and an air component commander (at Mirage).   All reported to the same boss - one HQ.



Ok - that makes much more sense.



> The DCDS runs operations on behalf of the CDS.   It is staff authority, rather than command (not that there's much difference at that level!).



No kidding - "I'm sorry Admiral, but I'm not going to listen to you, I'm going to the General...."   



> Yes, but not for operations.   ALL operations report to the DCDS shop, although the Navy and AF have slightly different ways of doing business.   The Navy runs operations centres on each coast that report to the DCDS, while the AF has CANR which does the same.   Each LFA has an operations centre that reports directly to J Staff for operations.   Note, though, that none of these entities report - _on operational matters_ - to the Service Chiefs.   They are merely kept informed as a matter of courtesy and because the Services do all the force generation for operations.   DLFR is double-hatted as J3 Land.



Okay, I understand that - I'm talking about things regarding training and what not.   For example, will Prairie Commander be able to order his Herc fleet to train with 3 PPCLI, giving the Light Battalion all the time it needs to get the jumps it needs (just an example - as well, operational concerns will of course be paramount).



> The structure should evolve over time.   The "environments" may well disappear, but I personally would prefer training and procurement to be an Army matter as opposed to "purple".



I agree here - let's not make the same mistakes that Hellyer did.


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## Teddy Ruxpin (29 Jun 2005)

> Okay, I understand that - I'm talking about things regarding training and what not.  For example, will Prairie Commander be able to order his Herc fleet to train with 3 PPCLI, giving the Light Battalion all the time it needs to get the jumps it needs (just an example - as well, operational concerns will of course be paramount).



I'm afraid I don't know the answer to that one.  I am under the impression that the JTF structure is for operations, but could well be wrong and would be speculating big time to pontificate much more on the non-operational side.  It could well be that these are aspects that VAdm Forcier is tasked to work out as his team stands up...

Like everyone else, I'll be waiting with baited breath to see what happens!

Cheers,

TR


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## Gunner98 (29 Jun 2005)

The JTF Regional HQs will control all assets in their regions.  How they close or modify 1 CAD and the Area HQs will come out of the Transition teams' reports.


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## Gunner (29 Jun 2005)

> I'm afraid I don't know the answer to that one.   I am under the impression that the JTF structure is for operations, but could well be wrong and would be speculating big time to pontificate much more on the non-operational side.   It could well be that these are aspects that VAdm Forcier is tasked to work out as his team stands up...



We had a pretty good brief by the former Comd LFWA on CF Transformation but besides the why this is happening and to a certain extent how it will happen, there remains alot of questions to answer.   As it stands now, the JTF will be for operations (force employment) vice training (force generation).   So, from what I have heard, the Comd JTF will not be able to direct this type of event.

Having said that, the CDS has made a clear statement that the army, navy and air force need to work together jointly (mutual support) within the operational "bubble".   Why does the army have to beg the Air Force to conduct ground attack operations during major exercises? Same goes with the Navy begging the army, etc, etc.   This shouldn't happen but it does.   By forcing a "joint" approach to dom ops, it should support some mutual cross understanding amongst army, navy and air force folks.   VAdm Forcier is an excellent choice for CANADACOM as he has had extensive experience working with the army on various dom ops (Winnipeg Floods, APEC).

The key nut to crack will be sorting out force generation....


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## CH1 (30 Jun 2005)

Oh Oh, stuck foot in  my mouth.  Before Unification, there was if I remember correctly 4  (possibly 5) commands. Pacific, Prairie, Eastern, & maritime.  The structure they operated under was similar to what is now being proposed.  Also I think I mentioned Sheep head as the crest for Prairie command.  It was actually a rams head & was diplayed on everything in Prairie Com.  Even vehicles had a decal.  Can't remember the other com crests.  Those of us that pre date unification will remember some of the structure from that period.

It appears on the surface, that this is what's being proposed, with a major facelift & modernisation.  Each command could operate with some autonomy from the others, depending on tasking requirements.
This way the command could tailor trg specific to their home area.  For example veh movements in prairie forest is different from from moving veh in the mountains.  Basic operation of veh is the common  denominator.  Another example might be Coy deployment on flat land whereas mountain deployment has extra skill sets.  Sorry these may be poor examples, they are the best I can come up with at the moment.

At any rate if they approach this with caution & thought, it could turn out to be decent.  How ever they still have to deal with the manpower & equipment crunch to make it work properly.  Under the old system there was eqt & manpower distributed across the country in strategic (?) places.  This gave the military a quicker reation time as an aid to civil authority.  It could also give a quicker local response, in theory, if we were attacked on our own turf.  There was separate pools of eqt for out of country taskings.

In the end we will have to wait to see the structure & execution.  Hopefully it will alleviate some of the problems.  For the first time in a long time I have some faith in the CDS.

Cheers


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## Edward Campbell (30 Jun 2005)

CH1 said:
			
		

> ...   Before Unification, there was if I remember correctly 4   (possibly 5) commands. Pacific, Prairie, Eastern, & maritime.   The structure they operated under was similar to what is now being proposed.
> 
> ...
> 
> ...



In the early '60s there were four geographic Army commands:

"¢	Western - everything from the Pacific to the Arctic to the Man/Ont border;

"¢	Central - Ontario;

"¢	Eastern - Québec; and

"¢	Atlantic - everything else.

In addition there was CAE: Canadian Army Europe and AHQ controlled units and formations like the forces deployed in the Middle East and Africa.

There were two Navy fleets:

"¢	Atlantic; and

"¢	Pacific.

Each fleet included RCN fleet air arm squadrons.

The Navy also had several _systems_ which formed the base for the Canadian Forces Communications System (later Command later whatever) and the Supplementary Radio (SIGINT) System.

There were several _functional_ Air Force Commands, including:

"¢	Air Defence Command, which included CC NORAD;

"¢	Maritime Air Command;

"¢	Air Transport Command;

"¢	Air Materiel Command; and

"¢	Air Training Command.

This is the model we adopted for the Canadian Forces in the mid '60s.   We added a brand new Mobile Command with most of the army and some of the air force in it.   We merged all of MAC and most of the Navy into Maritime Command.   All service schools, but not RMC, CMR, RRMC and the staff colleges were melded into Training Command.   Army units like AEEE were merged into Materiel Command.

The previously autonomous Defence Research Board became, eventually a branch of Material Command as did the equally autonomous Defence Construction (1951) Ltd.   (Pre-unification DND consisted of: Dept HQ, and unofficial Chiefs of Staff *Committee*, the RCN, the Canadian Army, the RCAF, the DRB and Defence Construction Ltd.  The _unification_ exercise dealt with more than just the military.)

The post _unification_ organization may not have made much sense but it was a bit less of a bugger's muddle than the tri-service _structures_ which preceded it.   Each worked well enough for its time and place but joint planning, training and operations required a complex superstructure and careful but always, essentially, _ad hoc_ coordination.

There were, prior to 1965 a tiny handful of _joint_ elements like Canadian Joint Air Training Centre at RCAF Station Rivers (near Shilo).

</history lesson>


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## pbi (30 Jun 2005)

> No kidding - "I'm sorry Admiral, but I'm not going to listen to you, I'm going to the General...."



Well: if that Admiral isn't a commander in his own right, then he can't stand in the way of a subordinate commander going around him to the next superior comd. Staff is just staff, no matter the rank.  (I know-I am one...)This principle holds pretty well at all levels of formation command-if one of our unit COs disagrees with a staff answer and wants to go to the Bde Comd, he does so. And so on, up the chain.


On the Force Generation issues, my guess (and hope) is that we will follow a US model. The US Service Chiefs are each responsible to raise, train, equip and maintain forces in being and reserve components, as well as setting single-service doctrine, pers policies, etc. They hand their troops, ships and planes over to the CINCs (Combatant Commanders) who actually employ them for ops. When I was at Quantico, for example, an apocryphal comment was that the Commandant of the Corps commanded only the training depots and the USMC Band-all the rest belonged to CINCs. As far as joint training-I hope that we will achieve that through stronge leadership from the CDS, such that when there is a need for joint trg, it happens because all the commanders involved believe in it and see the need, and those who don't get their asses kicked. This as opposed to the current "begging": situation described earlier. I hope we do  not get any more "purple" in our Force Generation below Service Chief level: we need IMHO to reverse the damage of Unification on our Force Generation system, not aggravate it. IMHO we need "rainbow" not "purple" (And that has nothing to do with a certain bill recently passed in Parliament...)

Cheers


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## McG (30 Jun 2005)

So, does the solid line connect the LF Areas to LFC and a dotted line conect them to the JTF Area, or does the solid line go to the JTF Area and the dotted line to LFC?

 . . . or, to put the question another way, who would write Gen Grants PER and who will give LFWA its budget under this new system?


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## Guardian (30 Jun 2005)

We've been comparing this idea with NORTHCOM and the other US combatant commands...

One major difference I noticed (assuming I have my facts straight   :-X ) is that under the Canadian system, the combatant commanders report directly to the CDS (our equivalent of the Chairman of the JCS). Under the US System, the combatant commanders report directly to the Secretary of Defense (our Minister equivalent). 

So CANADACOM's Cdr gets his marching orders from a soldier; the NORTHCOM Cdr from a civilian.

Anyone know why we went this route? 

At risk of answering my own question, could it be because we're legally unified, whereas they've got five services...


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## Teddy Ruxpin (30 Jun 2005)

Well, there are major differences between the chains of command in the two countries.  In Canada, legally, the Commander in Chief is the Governor General.  Next in line is the CDS.  Thus, a political leader cannot be in the formal chain of command and the component commanders must report to the CDS as a result.  Of course, in practice, the CDS is appointed by the PM and gets his marching orders from Cabinet.

As an aside, here's a link from the USNORTHCOM website:

http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_team

Note the similarity in terminology and structure with the new CANADACOM...


----------



## Old Sweat (30 Jun 2005)

To add to TR's latest post, the NDA also states that all orders and instructions to the Canadian Forces will be issued to the CDS from the MND. Therefore (a) the minister cannot issue orders directly to any element or component of the forces and (b) neither can any one else in Canada including the Governor General, the Prime Minister or any member of the public service or the political staffs.


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## TCBF (30 Jun 2005)

At the risk of cluttering up a perfectly educational thread, I'd like to know if anyone has considered the way we do business - our internal and imposed policies - as well as our structure.  True re-organization is not complete unless the administrative culture changes as well.

Take 'cost accounting' ;  we appear to have adopted a civilian accounting tool (bearing in mind that accounting is 50% math, and 50% witchcraft) that penalizes us for doing our jobs.  I have been saying this for a dozen years - which probably means I'm wrong - but we should not be debiting a CO's budget for rolling track.  We should debiting his unit's account for NOT rolling track and  NOT training soldiers.

Why are we rewarded for doing nothing? 

Tom


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## Guardian (30 Jun 2005)

Teddy Ruxpin said:
			
		

> Well, there are major differences between the chains of command in the two countries.   In Canada, legally, the Commander in Chief is the Governor General.   Next in line is the CDS.   Thus, a political leader cannot be in the formal chain of command and the component commanders must report to the CDS as a result.   Of course, in practice, the CDS is appointed by the PM and gets his marching orders from Cabinet.





			
				Old Sweat said:
			
		

> To add to TR's latest post, the NDA also states that all orders and instructions to the Canadian Forces will be issued to the CDS from the MND. Therefore (a) the minister cannot issue orders directly to any element or component of the forces and (b) neither can any one else in Canada including the Governor General, the Prime Minister or any member of the public service or the political staffs.



Thanks, that was exactly what I was looking for - makes things a lot clearer....  ;D


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## CH1 (1 Jul 2005)

Mr Cambell

Thx for the correction & indepth explanation of the old Command structure.

Cheers


----------



## ArmyRick (1 Jul 2005)

I like the CANADACOM idea.

Does anybody know what all CF forces deployed abroad will be come under?

I heard speculation on another thread of a name like MAPLE LEAF COMMAND? Anybody able to confirm this? Or is it just speculation?


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## Gunner (1 Jul 2005)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> I like the CANADACOM idea.
> 
> Does anybody know what all CF forces deployed abroad will be come under?
> 
> I heard speculation on another thread of a name like MAPLE LEAF COMMAND? Anybody able to confirm this? Or is it just speculation?



Canada Command (CANCOM) will have the domestic/North America mandate.

Canada Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCOM) will have the international mandate.

The Team Maple Leaf you have heard about reflects a changing international policy to include diplomacy, development and defence.  This includes all federal departments (CSIS, RCMP, DFAIT, CIDA, CF, and others) all focussed on a common goal vice many different federal departments all working towards different end states.


----------



## Scoobie Newbie (2 Jul 2005)

Team Maple Leaf kinda sounds like the US Homeland Security.


----------



## McG (3 Jul 2005)

> *Military command gets biggest overhaul in decades*
> Army, navy, air force to fall under regional control
> TERRY PEDWELL
> The Canadian Press
> ...





> *Military gets disaster-response make over*
> Centralized command to take pressure off lower ranks, general says
> JAMES GORDON
> CanWest News Service
> ...


----------



## Infanteer (3 Jul 2005)

I like how all this reorganization is being fitted around "disaster response" - what are we, the Parks Service?


----------



## 48Highlander (3 Jul 2005)

> Hillier couldn't provide estimates of how much Canada Command and further transformation of the Forces would cost, but said the $12.8-billion committed to defence in February's federal bud get was enough to kick-start the changes. He added the department's overall re-organization strategy will be worked out over the next 12 months.



Silly me, I thought that money might go into something like more soldiers, more deployments, better training, better kit...


----------



## Teddy Ruxpin (3 Jul 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> I like how all this reorganization is being fitted around "disaster response" - what are we, the Parks Service?



It's the flavour of the month and is what the civvies like to hear right now.  If you look at the US NORTHCOM site, you'll see much of the same (albeit with a "warfighter" angle - it IS American, after all).



> potential terrorist attacks



It doesn't say much about this, but think about it.  What's CANADACOM's relationship with NORAD going to be?  What about the new SOFCOM (when established)?  Yup, the public likes us to be seen filling sandbags (and there is a disturbingly large constituency in the CF that does too), but there is a lot more to this than meets the eye.



			
				48Highlander said:
			
		

> Silly me, I thought that money might go into something like more soldiers, more deployments, better training, better kit...



You have read the other threads (and this one) connected with this plan, right?


----------



## Scoobie Newbie (3 Jul 2005)

Infanteer they can call it Ring around the Possy.   If it gets us more streamlined and better able to do what's asked of us who cares how they sell it.


----------



## muffin (14 Dec 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> But GO!!! has a point - if I sign a Class C contract for 3 years, am I not just becoming a regular?



OK - I saw some stuff in here about Reservists wanting to apply for some of the new Transformations positions - so I thought I would post this message I got here at work to help them out.

Canforgen 181-05

UNCLASSIFIED
CANFORGEN 181-05 ADM (HR-MIL) 181 301421Z DEC-05

CANFORGEN 181/05 ADM(HR-MIL) 094 301421Z NOV 05
CL B RES EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES - CF TRANSFORMATION
PROTECTED A 
REFS: A. NDHQ INSTR ADM (HR-MIL) 20/04 01 DEC 04, ADMIN POLICY OF CL A, B AND C RES SVC  
B. CFIRP 05/06, ADDENDUM 9  
C. VCDS LETTER 1901-1 (DFPPC 9-3) 14 MARCH 2002, TEMPORARY RESERVE POSITIONS IN REGULAR FORCE UNITS - 
CHANGE IN FUNDING AND ESTABLISHMENT GUIDELINES 
1.	IN KEEPING WITH CDS PRINCIPLE SIX, WHICH CALLS FOR CLOSER INTEGRATION OF REGULAR, RESERVE AND 
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN THE EXECUTION OF ASSIGNED MISSIONS, RESERVISTS WILL BE INTEGRATED INTO 
NEW ESTABLISHMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN OR WILL BE CREATED AS PART OF CF TRANSFORMATION, IE: 
A.	STRATEGIC JOINT STAFF (SJS), NDHQ OTTAWA 
B.	CANADA COMMAND (CANADA COM) HQ OTTAWA 
C.	CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES COMMAND (CEFCOM) HQ OTTAWA 
D.	CANADIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES COMMAND (CANSOFCOM) HQ OTTAWA 
E.	GENERAL SUPPORT (GS) FORMATION HQ OTTAWA 
F.	JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) PACIFIC HQ VICTORIA 
G.	JTF PRAIRIE HQ EDMONTON 
H.	JTF CENTRAL HQ TORONTO 
I.	JTF EASTERN HQ MONTREAL 
J.	JTF ATLANTIC HQ HALIFAX 
K.	JTF NORTHERN HQ YELLOWKNIFE 
2.	IT IS CLEAR THAT EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF RESERVISTS WILL BE 
REQUIRED IN THE ABOVE ESTABLISHMENTS HOWEVER, DETAILS REGARDING POSITIONS ARE NOT YET 
AVAILABLE. RESERVISTS INTERESTED IN BEING CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT AT THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED UNITS/LOCATIONS ARE TO FORWARD A NOMINATION (SEE PARA 7 BELOW) THROUGH THEIR 
RESPECTIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO DMHRR. A SELECTION BOARD WILL BE CONVENED TO MATCH 
APPLICANTS TO POSITIONS BASED ON QUALIFICATIONS (APPROPRIATE BLEND OF 
PROFESSIONAL/MILITARY/ACADEMIC AND OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE) AND REQUIREMENTS. FOLLOWING 
THE SELECTION BOARD, OFFERS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR SPECIFIC POSITIONS WILL BE ISSUED FOR 
CONSIDERATION BY APPLICANTS 
3.	DETAILS OF EMPLOYMENT AS FOLLOWS: 
A.	POSNS TO BE FILLED WILL BE PRIMARILY IN THE J3 (OPERATIONS), J4 (LOGISTICS) AND J5 (PLANS 
AND POLICY) SECTIONS OF EACH HQ ALTHOUGH PERSONNEL QUALIFIED FOR J1 (PERSONNEL), J2 
(INTELLIGENCE), J6 (COMMUNICATIONS), J7 (DOCTRINE AND TRAINING) J8 (FINANCE), AND HQ 
ADMIN/SP WILL ALSO BE CONSIDERED 
B.	POSNS ARE PRIMARILY AT THE OFFICER LEVEL, BUT SOME NCM OPPORTUNITIES EXIST AT ALL RANK 
LEVELS 
C.	EMPLOYMENT TO COMMENCE AS SOON AS FEB 06, DEPENDING ON STAFFING AND MEMBER S 
AVAILABILITY 
D.	PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT: THREE YEARS, WITH POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSION, UNLESS SHORTER 
TERM REQUESTED BY MEMBER 
4.	ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS ARE AS FOLS: 
A.	RANK: CPL/LS TO COL/CAPT(N) 
B.	MOS ID: ANY 
C.	LANGUAGE: ENGLISH ESSENTIAL, FRENCH DESIREABLE EXCEPT FOR JTF EASTERN WHERE FRENCH 
IS ESSENTIAL, ENGLISH DESIRABLE. BILINGUILISM AN ASSET 
D.	SECUR CLEARANCE LEVEL: AT OR ABILITY TO ATTAIN LEVEL II 
E.	HEALTH: MEET MIN OCCUPATION MED CAT 
F.	PHYSICAL FITNESS: MUST HAVE VALID EXPRESS TEST PASS OR ACHIEVE PASS PRIOR TO 
COMMENCEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
G.	EXPERIENCE AND QUALS: DEPENDENT OF THE TYPE OF POSN. FOR STAFF/PLANNING POSN THE 
PREFERRED APPLICANT WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING:  

(1) CF OR ALLIED PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR STAFF EMPLOYMENT TO INCLUDE AN 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS  

(2) OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE DESIRABLE  

(3) STUDY OR WORK EXPERIENCE IN SECURITY, DEFENCE, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE, OR SIMILAR AREA AN ASSET  

(4) HOWEVER, ANY OTHER SKILL SETS WILL BE CONSIDERED ACCORDINGLY 
5.	RATIONS, QUARTERS, ACCOMMODATION AND/OR MOVE OF DHG AND E: 
A.	WILL DEPEND OF LOCATION 
B.	THE INTENT IS TO AUTH COST MOVE, IR OR SCA FOR MEMBERS SELECTED TO FILL CLASS B 
POSITIONS OF ONE YEAR OR MORE AND WHO MEET THE CRITERIA AT REF B 
6.	CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT: 
A.	IAW REF A, PREFERENCE TO MEMBERS OF THE RES, THEN REG F WHO WISH TO CT TO P RES 
B.	MEMBERS OF THE P RES SELECTED FOR RESERVE POSITIONS THROUGH THIS PROCESS TO BE 
RETAINED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT (UNIT OR PRL) OF, AND ADMINISTERED BY, THEIR PARENT P 
RES ELEMENT 
C.	OTHER MEMBERS OF THE RES AND REG F SELECTED FOR RESERVE POSITIONS THROUGH THIS 
PROCESS TO BE TRANSFERRED/ATTACHED-POSTED TO THE NDHQ PRL FOR ADMINISTRATION 
PURPOSES 
D.	ATTEMPTS WILL BE MADE TO MEET APPLICANTS EMPLOYMENT PREFERENCES BUT THE OVERRIDING 
CRITERION WILL BE THE NEEDS OF THE CF 
E.	RESERVE PERSONNEL SELECTED FOR EMPLOYMENT IN SJS OR OP HQS SHOULD EXPECT, DURING 
THE COURSE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT, TO BE ROUTINELY SHIFTED BETWEEN THE VARIOUS STAFF 
SECTIONS AS THEY GROW IN EXPERIENCE AND COMPETENCY 
7.	NOMINATIONS: MUST BE SENT VIA CHAIN OF COMD TO DMHRR 2-2 BEFORE 30 DEC 05 AND MUST INCLUDE: 
A.	SN, NAME AND RANK 
B.	CURRENT UNIT 
C.	SECOND LANGUAGE PROFILE AND, IF AVAIL, TESTING DATES 
D.	SECUR CLEARANCE LEVEL AND DATE 
E.	DATE AND CATEGORY OF LAST MEDICAL AND ANY MEDICAL EMPLOYMENT LIMITATIONS IF 
APPLICABLE 
F.	CF EXPRESS COMPLETION DATE OR DATE SCHEDULED TO BE TESTED 
G.	RESUME DESCRIBING MEMBERS QUALS AND EXPERIENCE (INCLUDING HIGHEST LEVEL OF 
EDUCATION COMPLETED) 
H.	MEMBERS PREFERENCES WRT LOCATION AND TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT 
I.	DATE MEMBER WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO COMMENCE EMPLOYMENT 
J.	PERSONAL REFERENCE (MILITARY REFERENCES PREFERED) 
K.	CONFIRMATION OF WHETHER OR NOT MEMBER IS IN RECEIPT OF A PENSION UNDER THE CFSA, OR 
WHETHER OR NOT MEMBER IS A FORMER CONTRIBUTOR TO THE CFSA 
L.	ANY OTHER PERTINENT INFO THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE SELECTION BOARD (PERSONAL 
LIMITATIONS AFFECTING SERVICE PERFORMANCE, ETC.) 
8.	SELECTION WILL BE BASED ON FILE REVIEW (INCL PERS FILE, RESUME, ETC). WHERE FURTHER INFORMATION 
IS REQUIRED INTERVIEW MAY BE CONDUCTED/COORDINATED 
9.	OPI: MAJ MICHEL PROTEAU, DMHRR 2-2, TEL NUMBER 613-992-5852, FAX 613-992-2238


----------



## darmil (14 Dec 2005)

Why does everything have to be in Ontario.Too bad  :'(


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## geo (14 Dec 2005)

I.  JTF EASTERN HQ MONTREAL 
some 30+ individuals volunteers were interviewed so far. 20+ were selected and will be starting in Jan 06. Other individuals within Puzzle Palace are being shuffled around to meet requirements.


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## Jarnhamar (21 Dec 2005)

I'd follow Hillier anywhere.


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## career_radio-checker (21 Dec 2005)

Ghost778 said:
			
		

> I'd follow Hillier anywhere.



Even to the bathroom?


----------



## Bobbyoreo (21 Dec 2005)

I'd follow him pretty much anywhere as well. I had the chance to meet and talk with the man a few times overseas and he is down to earth tells it like he sees it. I've never met an officer that made any sence...be he did. Glad we finaly have a person in the CDS spot that is not afraid to tell it like it is.


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## Jarnhamar (21 Dec 2005)

> Even to the bathroom?



Even to the bathroom 

Spend time with someone like that and you see someone with a vision who cares about Canada and her soldiers very much. 

If people are saying "what war" how can you educate them on what's going on in the world today? You can't.


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## Haggis (22 Dec 2005)

pbi said:
			
		

> He is making some enemies, both internally and externally, but that is what happens when you try to change a military institution and a national way of thinking.



The one thing I fear about our current CDS is that his visions will not be allowed to reach fruition due to internal and external poliitcking.

The Regular Force is in need of a makeover.  The Reserves are, quite simply put, broken.  The Department is a bureaucrats nirvana of policy, order, counter-order disorder, delay and obfuscation.  It's this last poiint that makes me fear for the CDS's plan, since many of those bureaucrats wear uniforms.


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## COBRA-6 (22 Dec 2005)

Haggis said:
			
		

> The one thing I fear about our current CDS is that his visions will not be allowed to reach fruition due to internal and external poliitcking.
> 
> The Regular Force is in need of a makeover.   The Reserves are, quite simply put, broken.   The Department is a bureaucrats nirvana of policy, order, counter-order disorder, delay and obfuscation.   It's this last poiint that makes me fear for the CDS's plan, since many of those bureaucrats wear uniforms.



I also worry about this. Too many people intent on remaining king of their molehill, regardless of said molehill's necessity or utility.


----------



## Good2Golf (22 Dec 2005)

Naw, I figure he'll get a lot of momentum going in 3-4yrs time.  There are rumblings that we will be seeing a slew of "early retirements" this spring/summer....


----------



## buzgo (22 Dec 2005)

I keep overhearing Majors, LCols and Cols bitching on the elevators around NDHQ, and I heard some muttered comments during the last 'town hall' the CDS gave - there seems to be a fair amount dissent. I hope that there is a house cleaning. IMHO there is alot of deadwood laying about in the CF. The CDS is on the right track and needs our support to make transformation a success.

Oh, and what kind of senior officers would be so BLATANTLY disloyal in front of a MCpl. They get developing for 'Leading Change' this year!


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## COBRA-6 (22 Dec 2005)

signalsguy said:
			
		

> I keep overhearing Majors, LCols and Cols bitching on the elevators around NDHQ, and I heard some muttered comments during the last 'town hall' the CDS gave - there seems to be a fair amount dissent. I hope that there is a house cleaning. IMHO there is alot of deadwood laying about in the CF. The CDS is on the right track and needs our support to make transformation a success.
> 
> Oh, and what kind of senior officers would be so BLATANTLY disloyal in front of a MCpl. They get developing for 'Leading Change' this year!



Deadwood indeed. Bring on the chainsaws!


----------



## Haggis (22 Dec 2005)

signalsguy said:
			
		

> I keep overhearing Majors, LCols and Cols bitching on the elevators around NDHQ, and I heard some muttered comments during the last 'town hall' the CDS gave - there seems to be a fair amount dissent. I hope that there is a house cleaning. IMHO there is alot of deadwood laying about in the CF. The CDS is on the right track and needs our support to make transformation a success.



It all depends on if they are perceived as being disloyal to "the leader" or "the institution".  They may, for whatever reason, think that this change is "bad".  Leaders come and go but the instituton is perpetual (and perpetuated by those it serves).  Some may think that all they have to do is outlast Gen Hillier and then the status quo will return.



			
				signalsguy said:
			
		

> Oh, and what kind of senior officers would be so BLATANTLY disloyal in front of a MCpl. They get developing for 'Leading Change' this year!



BTW you're not alone. I hear it too, as a MWO.   Thankfully it is diminishing.


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## Gunner (22 Dec 2005)

signalsguy said:
			
		

> I keep overhearing Majors, LCols and Cols bitching on the elevators around NDHQ, and I heard some muttered comments during the last 'town hall' the CDS gave - there seems to be a fair amount dissent. I hope that there is a house cleaning. IMHO there is alot of deadwood laying about in the CF. The CDS is on the right track and needs our support to make transformation a success.



My personal favorite is "rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic".

Don't confuse concern with the CDS's plans with disloyalty, they are not one and the same.  We work based on the commander's intent using mission command in order to accomplish the mission or the task given to us, rather than CF automatons blindly carrying out the exact orders given by the CDS.  While I fully support General Hillier approach and believe he is moving in the right direction, however, we must also make sure that the end result does not break the CF for years to come nor interfere with our ability to train soldiers, sailors and airmen and woman.  These two approaches are not mutually exclusive as long as the CDS's intent is maintained.


----------



## Michael Dorosh (22 Dec 2005)

Gunner said:
			
		

> My personal favorite is "rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic".
> 
> Don't confuse concern with the CDS's plans with disloyalty, they are not one and the same.   We work based on the commander's intent using mission command in order to accomplish the mission or the task given to us, rather than CF automatons blindly carrying out the exact orders given by the CDS.   While I fully support General Hillier approach and believe he is moving in the right direction, however, we must also make sure that the end result does not break the CF for years to come nor interfere with our ability to train soldiers, sailors and airmen and woman.   These two approaches are not mutually exclusive as long as the CDS's intent is maintained.



You forgot to use the word "synergy" in there somewhere... 

That all seems rather vague; can you give some specifics of what you think he might break, or how the ability to train might be impacted?  I guess the one that seems obvious to me is overdeploying soldiers at the expense of training others - is that the kind of thing you're referring to?


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## sheikyerbouti (22 Dec 2005)

Since the "Titanic' is sinking, would it not make sense to have someone rally the troops around a suitable plan for moving forward? 

 A return to fiscal stability and the need for the Federal government to demonstrate its' relevance means the CF has some room to manouevre with respect to its future sustainability. The question that arises for me, is whether or not we are creating one operational, and essentially, a second static force for some limited capability domestic involvement.


----------



## Gunner (22 Dec 2005)

> That all seems rather vague; can you give some specifics of what you think he might break, or how the ability to train might be impacted?  I guess the one that seems obvious to me is overdeploying soldiers at the expense of training others - is that the kind of thing you're referring to?



I'll give you an example that was sorted out in late Nov/early Dec.  Each area maintains a battalion sized Immediate Response Unit (IRU) for domestic emergencies and capable of responding in a 8/12/24 hour manner (recce, vanguard company, main body).  The ownership of this unit (and ready duty ships and aircraft) pitted the new Force Employment HQs (specifically Canada Command in this case) versus the Force Generation HQs (army, navy and airforce).  Canada COM wanted ownership in order to provide guidelines on training requirements for domestic operations, the ability to exercise the unit(s), etc.  The army argued that they had to maintain ownership of the unit as we typically double hat the IRU with many other roles.  For example, a unit may be the IRU but at the same time are running courses to preapare to deploy overseas, participate in a CPX, even conducting collective training outside of their normal garrison location.  It was finally decided that Canada COM would not take on any force generation responsibilties and would remain focussed on force employment.  In other words, the army would generate trained forces for employment with Canada COM and CEFCOM.  

An interesting scenario that was discussed several months ago could also have been a unit that is detailed as an IRU (under Canada COM) and is also preparing for deployment overseas (under CEFCOM) and is supporting the running of certain individual training courses (under the army).  Whose 3 star mission/direction takes priority for the unit?

Hope that helps.


----------



## Gunner (22 Dec 2005)

> Since the "Titanic' is sinking, would it not make sense to have someone rally the troops around a suitable plan for moving forward?
> 
> A return to fiscal stability and the need for the Federal government to demonstrate its' relevance means the CF has some room to manouevre with respect to its future sustainability. The question that arises for me, is whether or not we are creating one operational, and essentially, a second static force for some limited capability domestic involvement.



I wouldn't say the Titanic is sinking but one of the concerns was where the PYs were coming from to man these new formations and units.  Particularly since they are not looking for privates/corporals or Lieutenants/Captains.  

We are moving in the right direction and what has been articulated repeatedly is the soldier on the ground should not witness much if any difference.  Units will be fed by the army into force employment structures and fed back into to the army to reconstitute, reequip and train for the next operation.


----------



## sheikyerbouti (22 Dec 2005)

Gunner:

 Is there planning in the works to address those critical manpower areas? Off the top of my head, some CFC papers I have read state that over 50% of the budget is currently spent on personnel costs. With such a high proportion of labour costs, does this indicate a Federal intent to promote drawdown of numbers on strength in order to open up the budget for future priorities?

 If the problem is with retention why is there no incentivizing provided to the required personnel? Instead we have private contracting of support services and now instruction on an ongoing basis. It seems illogical to promote the idea of having your people leave, only to draw on them once again but only in a civilian role. Some examples which come to mind are private contracting of pilots for towing targets and private contracting of planes by DFO to overfly fishing areas.


----------



## Gunner (22 Dec 2005)

sheikyerbouti said:
			
		

> Gunner:
> 
> Is there planning in the works to address those critical manpower areas? Off the top of my head, some CFC papers I have read state that over 50% of the budget is currently spent on personnel costs. With such a high proportion of labour costs, does this indicate a Federal intent to promote drawdown of numbers on strength in order to open up the budget for future priorities?
> 
> If the problem is with retention why is there no incentivizing provided to the required personnel? Instead we have private contracting of support services and now instruction on an ongoing basis. It seems illogical to promote the idea of having your people leave, only to draw on them once again but only in a civilian role. Some examples which come to mind are private contracting of pilots for towing targets and private contracting of planes by DFO to overfly fishing areas.



There are two parts ot your question.  First is the demographic bubble or "greying" of the military that is currently occuring.  It is well known and is a result of the considerable downsizing in the early 90s.  How to solve it is a problem considering we are going to undergo an expansion by 5000 regulars and 3000 reservists in the next 5 years.  Many will recall in the 80s when we underwent our last expansion and promotions were fairly quick.  While fast promotions led to inexperience at various rank levels, I think the army had enough depth at the time to draw up some of the better talent (some of our current leadership certainly is indicative of this).  Not sure if we have the same depth of experience and talent now (in our smaller army) that we had in the 80s.  This makes you wonder how the expansion will effect us?

The second part would be the manning of the new HQs.  I believe the manning of the new HQs will come from current structures within NDHQ (ie the DCDS shop) and additional manning will come from lower priority areas.  I have heard that LFDTS will take a  PY hit to fill Majs and LCols army positions in the new HQs.  Capable Majs and LCols are not created in a couple of years and with the current shortage of junior officers right now, it makes for an interesting question as to where the senior officers will come from and what they will be like in the future? 

50% in personnel costs doesn't surprise me.  If you google "Making Sense Out of Dollars", this ADM Fin document will show you where the DND budget is spent.  Maybe I'm jaded about incentives, but I really feel the force reduction plan (FRP) in the 90s kept the wrong people in the military.  Those with other options, the ones you wanted to keep in, where the ones that took the package and fled to the private sector not wanting to serve in a CF that was crippled by inadequate budgets.  Ask yourself the question why retirement is being boosted to 25 years of service vice the previous 20 years...get more return on the CF investment!


----------



## pbi (28 Dec 2005)

Gunner: I support your assessment 100%, in particular your observations on our potentially tenuous ability to expand rapidly, and the disastrous effects of the FRP fiasco. From what I have been able to make out from briefings, Powerpoints, etc, your comments on HQ sourcing are correct: we are breaking up and stripping existing organizations in order to source the new operational commands. Despite all the inevitable frictions I think that we are moving in the right direction. While I agree that the CDS needs to rule with a strong hand(and kick some comfy butts...), I am also concerned that legitimate professional dissent and concern are given fair hearing and considered where it makes sense to do so, and not summarily smacked aside by a slavering pack of "Get on the Train Gestapo" hounds. A very difficult balancing act, but if anybody can do it I think it is our CDS.

Cheers


----------



## GO!!! (28 Dec 2005)

Has anyone stopped to consider the *need* for these new commands (Canada Command, SOF Command, Expeditionary Force...)?

We are still unable to increase our numbers in the field at the Cpl to WO level, but we are creating and staffing more jobs for Major + at an astounding rate! These commands seem to me to be creating more jobs in an already bloated bureacracy - with no capability increase at the end that matters.

Since we have no ongoing operations in Canada, who will "Canada Command" command?

We only have one SF unit, that has it's own command structure, but now a new one will be placed on top of it.

We have no expeditionary forces! Anywhere! (Or a method of sending them if they existed!)

Perhaps I am just a little too jaded and cynical, but can these outlays of personnel and money be justified with the current lack of capabilities and soldiers? Are'nt we putting the cart before the horse here? 

The capability to expand our command structure seems to be well documented and proven - when will this ability translate into getting more than 3-5 men in a section?


----------



## buzgo (28 Dec 2005)

AFAIK they are shutting down the JOG in Kingston and moving many of those positions to CEFCOM/CANADACOM. The positions at NDCC are rolling over into CANADACOM as well I think. There are also a bunch of people at LFDTS that are coming up to Ottawa. As for CANSOFCOM, I believe that there has always been a cell in the J3 shop that is expanding to take over.


----------



## Gunner (28 Dec 2005)

> Has anyone stopped to consider the need for these new commands (Canada Command, SOF Command, Expeditionary Force...)?



It is very much required and, in essence, is separating command functions out of NDHQ.   



> We are still unable to increase our numbers in the field at the Cpl to WO level, but we are creating and staffing more jobs for Major + at an astounding rate! These commands seem to me to be creating more jobs in an already bloated bureacracy - with no capability increase at the end that matters.



The Cpl to WO will come in time and the staffing of these positions are simply moving around currently existing PYs.  



> Since we have no ongoing operations in Canada, who will "Canada Command" command?



Actually there is alot going on every day with the air force and navy primarily but also with the army in terms of liaison and planning with the provincial governemnts.   Moreover, don't forget Canada Command covers Canada, the US and Mexico.



> We only have one SF unit, that has it's own command structure, but now a new one will be placed on top of it.



COMSOFCOM consists of JTF2, CSOR, CFNBCD, etc.  



> We have no expeditionary forces! Anywhere! (Or a method of sending them if they existed!)



If you have been overseas, you were considered an expeditionary force.  The navy is the lead for a SCTF that would include an amphibous battalion (maybe the one slated for Comox ...).



> Perhaps I am just a little too jaded and cynical, but can these outlays of personnel and money be justified with the current lack of capabilities and soldiers? Are'nt we putting the cart before the horse here?



For someone so young, you are jaded and cynical.     As mentioned above, the new commands are not new PYs, etc and are very much required to streamline the CDS C2 structure and get the NDHQ mentality out of the CF.  To quote Martha Stewart, it's a good thing.



> The capability to expand our command structure seems to be well documented and proven - when will this ability translate into getting more than 3-5 men in a section?



That is a recruiting and retention issue and it is being also being dealt with.


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## ArmyRick (28 Dec 2005)

personally i am for the direction that Hillier is heading


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## McG (29 Dec 2005)

Gunner said:
			
		

> It was finally decided that Canada COM would not take on any force generation responsibilties and would remain focussed on force employment.  In other words, the army would generate trained forces for employment with Canada COM and CEFCOM.


Does this mean that the LF Areas will continue to exist beside the CF regional JTFs?


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## ArmyRick (29 Dec 2005)

From what I took away from the O Groups (This past fall) is that the JTF Regions will replace LFCA, LFWA, SQFT, etc. Keep in mind the JTFs will not be stood up for a short while yet.


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## Good2Golf (29 Dec 2005)

Actually, JTF (Atlantic) was stood up this summer, with RAdm McNeil double hatted as Comd JTF(A) as well as Comd MARLANT in the transition.  One would likely see the LFA's exist as Regional JTF LCCs (land component commands)...that's already the way 1 CAD is heading...as the CFACC (CF Air Component Command).

Cheers,
Duey


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## GO!!! (29 Dec 2005)

Duey said:
			
		

> ...that's already the way 1 CAD is heading...as the CFACC (CF Air Component Command).
> 
> Cheers,
> Duey



Oh boy, I can hear it already - "their an hour late for extraction, where are they, I'm freezing - this is all FACCed up"


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## Infanteer (29 Dec 2005)

GO, these changes are for the good along organizational terms.  Try and find Douglas Bland's Chiefs of Defence, it gives a very good account of why these changes needed to be made (the changes of Transformation are very similar to those he proposed in his book 10 years ago).


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## Roy Harding (29 Dec 2005)

Infanteer said:
			
		

> GO, these changes are for the good along organizational terms.  Try and find Douglas Bland's Chiefs of Defence, it gives a very good account of why these changes needed to be made (the changes of Transformation are very similar to those he proposed in his book 10 years ago).



You can find the book here:  http://www.ciss.ca/books_Bland.htm


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## Good2Golf (29 Dec 2005)

GO!!! said:
			
		

> Oh boy, I can hear it already - "their an hour late for extraction, where are they, I'm freezing - this is all FACCed up"



 ;D

GO!!!  You won't get any argument from me!


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## Gunner (29 Dec 2005)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> From what I took away from the O Groups (This past fall) is that the JTF Regions will replace LFCA, LFWA, SQFT, etc. Keep in mind the JTFs will not be stood up for a short while yet.



No, the LFA's will continue to exist as will their army "force generation" requirements - this is 95% of what a LFA currently does.  They will be double hatted (similar to what they have done since 1990) but will be beefed up staff capable of domestic operations planning and execution.  The JTF's are all well on their way to stand up with IOC occuring on 1 Feb 06.



> Quote from: GO!!! on Today at 12:15:54
> Oh boy, I can hear it already - "their an hour late for extraction, where are they, I'm freezing - this is all FACCed up"
> GO!!!  You won't get any argument from me!



Canada Command was originally referred to as "CANCOM" however V/Adm Forcier quickly stated that it would be referred to as Canada COM.  If there was a screw up he didn't want it referred to as "CAN'T COM" (you will recall the UNPROFOR CANBATS became CAN'T BAT)


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## George Wallace (29 Dec 2005)

Gunner said:
			
		

> Canada Command was originally referred to as "CANCOM"



This initially had me confused as to why everyone who had moved into Startop now had to move out to make room for CANCOM.  I couldn't figure out for the life of me why they would give the brand new building up to the Singers, Dancers, Musicians, Comedians, and other Entertainers and Staff.....


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## Haggis (30 Dec 2005)

George Wallace said:
			
		

> This initially had me confused as to why everyone who had moved into Startop now had to move out to make room for CANCOM.



Now that you mentioned it, the first floor of Star Top is occupied by CFPSA, the folks who put on the CANCON shows.

Star Top was a super facility.  Too bad it wasn't my long term home. (It had a great and rarely used gym.)  Now I'm in a draughty mausoleum downtown until our next move in Aug 06.  My section has moved so often, it makes me feel that the "N" in NDHQ stands for "nomadic".


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## ArmyRick (30 Dec 2005)

So they will keep both the Regional JTF and the Land Forces Areas? That is screwed up IMO. Now we really are adding in too many HQs.


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## Infanteer (30 Dec 2005)

ArmyRick said:
			
		

> So they will keep both the Regional JTF and the Land Forces Areas? That is screwed up IMO. Now we really are adding in too many HQs.



I agree.  What is the point with going with unified regional/functional HQs if we are to also keep the Service based HQ's they were meant to replace?   ???


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## Good2Golf (30 Dec 2005)

I'm not so sure the LFA's will continue to exist in their present form.  That's not what CAT 1 came up with in its C2 recommendations to the Chief.  The biggest delta being LFWA then being part of both JTF(Prairie) and JTF(Pacific)?  Not sure that's even possible, let alone plausible. ???  Any refs: Gunner?

Cheers,
Duey


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## Jungle (30 Dec 2005)

In the briefing I received, the LFA HQs will be the basis for the new regional HQs being set-up. It doesn't appear like the LFA HQs will survive... we won't need them anyway. Some people just want to keep their empires.


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## Gunner (30 Dec 2005)

Gents,

You have to get your minds around the CDS's intent (a command centric institution) and difference in responsibilities for Canada COM, CEFCOM, SOFCOM and the future Support Command with the traditional roles of the army, navy and air force.  

Canada COM and CEFCOM are "force employers".  They will receive units, ships, task forces, etc under command once they are trained and declared OPRED by their respective ECS's.  Once these forces are placed under OPCOM they will be employed in domestic and international environments.  This has a distinct advantage as the CDS has commander's that he can turn to who is solely focused on North America or operations around the world.  These organizations will have units, etc allocated to them depending on their tasks.  

Examples 

International.  The army prepares (force generation) 1 CMBG HQ and 1 PPCLI BG for deployment to Afghanistan.  The CLS declares these forces as OPRED to the CDS for deployment.  In Jan/Feb the deployment commences.  1 CMBG HQ (MNB (S) and 1 PPCLI BG are commanded (force employment) by CEFCOM while deployed in Afghanistan.  Upon their return in August or December, they revert back to CLS control for reconstitution.

Domestic.  Canada COM and JTF's maintain planning and liaison with Federal, Provincial (and potentially municipal) governments.  A severely dry Spring results in considerable wild fires occurring throughout western Canada.  Provincial resources are quickly expended fighting the blazes and a call is made through an LO who has been deployed to the provincial emergency management organization.  The JTFW may or may not have prepositioned forces (CDS intent to be proactive) and rapidly begins moving units into the affected areas.  Comd JTFW directs air force wings within his AOR to begin developing composite company's for deployment to afflicted areas.  Canada COM recognizing that JTFW land resources are rapidly diminishing, directs JTFP and JTFC to bring their IRU's to a higher state and begins contingency planning for moving these forces into the afflicted areas.  Note - this is not that different from how things happen now with the exception that the JTF's have more staff capability, have direct control of assets within their AOR and there is Canada COM above them maintain overwatch and coordinating national resources. 

Force Generation.  95% of what the Army (and lesser extent navy and airforce) does is termed force generation.  We reequip ourselves, train (collectively and individually), administer, garrison, etc are all done within the framework of the army.  These responsibilities will NOT be given over to Canada COM, CEFCOM, SOFCOM, etc.  If the CDS's intent is to be realized, we really don't want to burden each of these organizations with the byzantine force generation problems inherent in the army.  More on this in a second.
There was much discussion in the CAT reports about the role of the army, navy and airforce (from status quo to disbanding them completely).  Remember that the CAT reports were only reports and they were not the CDS's direction (at least for now).  It is currently been decided that force generation tasks cannot be taken away from the army, navy and air force.  Having said this, one of the CDS's tenets is to get the army, navy and airforce working together (and capable of working together) within a 3 block war scenario.  Although the intent in the late 60s and early 70s was for the army navy and air force to begin working together, this really wasn't accomplished and we saw each service developing their own pet projects without the requirements of the other services in mind.  

JTFs.  The stand up of the 6 JTF's (JTFA has already stood up) will occur on 1 Feb 06.  The army LFA's have had responsibility for domestic operations on land (Vancouver Island to Newfoundland) since 1990/92 when they were stood up.  We (LFA's) have conducted dom ops on a as required basis using the mantra of a force of last resort.  Emergency Management is a provincial responsibility and we provide forces based on what they think they may need. This may be part of a gradual build up (Op ASSISTANCE) or it may be very quick (OP RECUPERATION or OP PEREGRINE).  Having said this, the LFA's spent limited time on preparing and training for dom ops as it was almost a secondary duty.  The J Staff had relatively little resources focused on domestic matters.  The main problem with the LFA dom ops set up was that we did not own anything in our AOR.  Hence, if Comd LFWA required 17 Wg to provide cots to the local Red Cross, he would have to ask/beg Comd 17 Wg to assist or go up through the DCDS shop and task 1 CAD to provide the support. Not very efficient if you are given the responsibility for dom ops but no authority for them.

On 1 Feb 06, when Canada COM, CEFCOM, and the remaining JTF's stand up, they are standing up as "force employer's", not "force generators".   In the JTF's this is a double hatting as 95% of the staff will remain focused on traditional force generation issues and some of the new PY's being added to the HQs will be focused on JTF activities. LFWA, LFCA, LFAA, SQFT will all still exist.  In the West, 39 CBG will remain under command of Comd LFWA for force generation activities but Comd 39 CBG will be double hatted as the Land Component Comd for JTFP and will respond to Comd JTFP (a double hatted Comd MARPAC) for force employment tasks.

Hope this make sense.


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## Infanteer (30 Dec 2005)

Gunner said:
			
		

> On 1 Feb 06, when Canada COM, CEFCOM, and the remaining JTF's stand up, they are standing up as "force employer's", not "force generators".



So, the Regional JTF's are merely subordinate units to CANADACOM?

It seems as if this is only a half-baked measure.  The regional commands should be THE unified joint-force generators of the CF.  CANADACOM should be THE force joint-force employer for Fortress North America (including Dom Ops).  This should allow CANADACOM to take available forces from any Regional Command that it requires to accomplish the mission.  If we are moving to a functional/territorial based organization, there is no need to retain outdated service based structures at that high of a level.

I'll have to hash this out with General Hillier next time we get together for the hockey game.... :blotto:

Ideally, there is 6 Regional Commands - Pacific, Praire, Northern, Central, Eastern and Atlantic.  It seems logical that MARFORPAC and MARFORATL take the two coastal commands and Prarie, Central, Northern and Eastern taken up by LFWA, LFCA, CFNA, and SQFT respectively.  This means that 1 CDN Air Division and LFAA can be folded up?  The next step would be to integrate these commands - there needs to be tri-service representation at each level.  It should be entirely possible to see an Officer from any service background holding key positions (including command) of these joint organizations.  As well, there is CANSOFCOM, which has national control of (and is responsible for generating) all strategic SOC-units (regardless of region).  CANADACOM and the Expeditionary command are the two "Force Employers" (for North America and overseas, respectively) and should have "Component Commands" for the four services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Forces) contained within them.

Can't get easier then that.


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## Good2Golf (30 Dec 2005)

Gunner, are you hearing that MARCOM, LFC and AIRCOM will still exist after 1 Feb 06?  Although I was a CAT 2 guy, I saw not only the development of CAT 1 material but other issues not contained in their Report that were still part of the CDS' "solution space".  Command relationships are important to the Chief and unless the three environmental "Commands" remain, vice three environmental staffs to help administer sailors, soldiers airmen and women, and supporters generate forces "Comanded" by Canada COM, I don't see as the Chief's intent will be met.  I don't think I'm out to lunch on this one, but my understanding was that the Chief was heading to four and four only Commands in the future: Canada COM, CEFCOM, CANSOFCOM and (as yet to be formalized) [support command]...

p.s.  rumblings are that Comd 1 CAD becomes the CF Air Component Commander (CFACC).

Cheers,
Duey


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## Gunner (30 Dec 2005)

> So, the Regional JTF's are merely subordinate units to CANADACOM?



Yes.  The double hatted JTF/LFA will be responsive to Canada COM for domestic operations (force employment matters) and to CLS for force generation matters.



> It seems as if this is only a half-baked measure.  The regional commands should be THE unified joint-force generators of the CF.  CANADACOM should be THE force joint-force employer for Fortress North America (including Dom Ops).  This should allow CANADACOM to take available forces from any Regional Command that it requires to accomplish the mission.  If we are moving to a functional/territorial based organization, there is no need to retain outdated service based structures at that high of a level.



Infanteer, we are too small (and too fragmented) to have joint - force generation structures within the CF.  Canada COM is the joint force employer for North America and will take resources from the army, navy and airforce to accomplish its mission.  Remember that ops have primacy over training.  The force generation problem is not easy to solve within our current environment.  Do you want to saddle JTFP with all of the Army Reserve individual training problems?  No, of course not.



> Ideally, there is 6 Regional Commands - Pacific, Praire, Northern, Central, Eastern and Atlantic.  It seems logical that MARFORPAC and MARFORATL take the two coastal commands and Prarie, Central, Northern and Eastern taken up by LFWA, LFCA, CFNA, and SQFT respectively.  This means that 1 CDN Air Division and LFAA can be folded up?  The next step would be to integrate these commands - there needs to be tri-service representation at each level.  It should be entirely possible to see an Officer from any service background holding key positions (including command) of these joint organizations.  As well, there is CANSOFCOM, which has national control of (and is responsible for generating) all strategic SOC-units (regardless of region).  CANADACOM and the Expeditionary command are the two "Force Employers" (for North America and overseas, respectively) and should have "Component Commands" for the four services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Forces) contained within them.



It's not Prairie, it West.  1 CAD will form the CFACC under 1 CAD.  LFAA still must exist unless you want to saddle MARLANT with militia force generation responsibility.  I don't think you fully understand the force generation puzzle that exists within the army, navy and airforce.  Why have component Command under Canada Com and CEFCOM?  Isn't that an additional level of HQ that is not required?  



> Gunner, are you hearing that MARCOM, LFC and AIRCOM will still exist after 1 Feb 06?



Yes, for all of the force generation reasons stated in the above posts and I agree with it (for now...wait for MGen Leslie's report).



> Command relationships are important to the Chief and unless the three environmental "Commands" remain, vice three environmental staffs to help administer sailors, soldiers airmen and women, and supporters generate forces "Comanded" by Canada COM, I don't see as the Chief's intent will be met.



I think the CDS has focussed on getting the new Commands sorted out is the first priority.  Changes to the Army, Navy and Airforce will come at a later date (is that 6 months from now or 2 years from now I don't know).  Canada COM, CEFCOM, SOFCOM are all very good things for the CF and the CDS is moving us in the right direction.  The key is not to break us in the process!  



> p.s.  rumblings are that Comd 1 CAD becomes the CF Air Component Commander (CFACC).



This is a done deal.  The original plan was for air assets to be partioned out to the regional commands but this did not make sense as you are penny packeting a limited resource.  So I agree with this approach.   This does't mean AIRCOm will disappear as it will retain all of its force generation responsibilities.


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## Infanteer (30 Dec 2005)

> Infanteer, we are too small (and too fragmented) to have joint - force generation structures within the CF.



Are you saying we need MORE officers?    GO!!! will be knocking on the door pretty quickly.... 



			
				Gunner said:
			
		

> It's not Prairie, it West.



My bad.  Western Command makes more sense.



> LFAA still must exist unless you want to saddle MARLANT with militia force generation responsibility.



Well, neither should have responsiblity; it should be the unified regional command responsible for generating joint forces in its area.  FWIW, Reserve issues seem to be a mess no matter who has control of it.



> I don't think you fully understand the force generation puzzle that exists within the army, navy and airforce.



Well, it definately is a puzzle - that's for sure.... :blotto:



> Why have component Command under Canada Com and CEFCOM?  Isn't that an additional level of HQ that is not required?



That would be an additional level of HQ that would be required.  I would assume that these service based components would provide unique advice and background to a unified command that employs CF forces.  No point having CEFCOM commanded by a bunch of Air Force guys and undertaking a Naval Task Force mission with which they have no experience.  My thinking is that Component Command for both CEFCOM and CANADACOM wouldn't neccesarily be large and they could form the basis for deployed TF headquarters (we are still calling the NCE, right?).  CEFCOM/CANADACOM would have small standing NCE's that could be plugged into with force generated assets when situations arise.

I still maintain that having competing territorial/functional and service based organizations is inefficent at best.


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## Gunner (30 Dec 2005)

> Are you saying we need MORE officers?    GO!!! will be knocking on the door pretty quickly....



I'll give GO!!! a heart attack yet.  



> Well, neither should have responsiblity; it should be the unified regional command responsible for generating joint forces in its area.  FWIW, Reserve issues seem to be a mess no matter who has control of it.



I think you are narrowly defining force generation as the provision of force packages for employment.  This is not the broad definition of force generation.



> That would be an additional level of HQ that would be required.  I would assume that these service based components would provide unique advice and background to a unified command that employs CF forces.  No point having CEFCOM commanded by a bunch of Air Force guys and undertaking a Naval Task Force mission with which they have no experience.  My thinking is that Component Command for both CEFCOM and CANADACOM wouldn't neccesarily be large and they could form the basis for deployed TF headquarters (we are still calling the NCE, right?).  CEFCOM/CANADACOM would have small standing NCE's that could be plugged into with force generated assets when situations arise.I still maintain that having competing territorial/functional and service based organizations is inefficent at best.



The three ECS are responsible for commanding the force generation aspects of the army, navy and airforce for employment by CEFCOM, CANADA COM, SOFCOM, etc and providing advice to the CDS.  Comd CEFCOM (engr army guy) will have command of a Naval Task Force while it operates in the Persian Gulf.  Remember that the Naval Task Force or Army Task Force, or Air Task Force, or Task Force Maple Leaf (Joint) will be under OPCON of some strategic or operational force in theatre.  When you deployed with 1 PPCLI to Bosnia, you were under OPCOM to Comd TFBH and OPCON to Comd MND SW.  CEFCOM would still have a requirement for an NCE deployed with the deployed assets. In the immortal words of the intelligentsia, you can't suck and blow at the same time.  NDHQ has learnt this error with the DCDS organization and the CDS is trying to rectify it with  the new Commands.


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## McG (31 Dec 2005)

Gunner said:
			
		

> we are too small (and too fragmented) to have joint - force generation structures within the CF.


Could we atleast plug the helicopters into the enviroments for which they provide tactical support (land & sea)?

I also wonder: if we cannot have structures, can we have one FORGENCOM (which would include component staffs but no component commands)?


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## Gunner (31 Dec 2005)

MCG, 

I believe this is the way the CDS is pushing us toward this (or something of similar nature).  Even though we are the "CF", I believe that the army, navy and air force have maintained too much independence and need to be brought into the CF fold.   Unification was done to reduce costs and overlapping resources however it did not go far enough in terms of forcing the army, navy and airforce working together in a joint atmosphere.  Decisions were not always made with the good of the CF in mind by each of the ECS's.  We are such a small military and our ability to interoperate is minimal.  The army purchases radio's that can't talk to the air force, the air force spends huge amounts of money on CF18s without being capable of supporting land forces, and the navy has traditionally been forcused on ASW and has limited ability to support the army when it needs to go somewhere.  Too many rice bowls that need to be over turned and refocussed on interoperability.  This is a good thing for the army who has shouldered the majority of international deployments and it is good for the CF.

My 2 cents.


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## Good2Golf (31 Dec 2005)

MCG said:
			
		

> Could we atleast plug the helicopters into the enviroments for which they provide tactical support (land & sea)?
> 
> I also wonder: if we cannot have structures, can we have one FORGENCOM (which would include component staffs but no component commands)?



MCG, as of 1 Feb 06, 427 SOAS will be OPCOM to CANSOFCOM...that's a huge change to the SOA status quo!  That's as plugged in as it will ever get.

Cheers,
Duey


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